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The Repression Dilemma: The Politics of Policing in Multi-ethnic Societies

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An abstract of  
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the  
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University  
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## Abstract

### The Repression Dilemma: The Politics of Policing in Multi-ethnic Societies By Travis B. Curtice

Policing in non-democracies is puzzling. On one hand, police are the institution responsible for providing law and order as a public good, ensuring the safety and security of the state. In this capacity, police must be able to solicit information and cooperation from the communities they are protecting to provide safety and security. On the other hand, police in non-democracies are the security agents tasked with everyday acts of repression to deter dissent, ensuring control for political authorities. Individual officer's willingness to repress depends on whether their preferences are aligned with the community or the political authorities. Examining the politics of repression and its direct and in-direct effects on civilian-police interactions, I provide a theoretical and empirical examination of i) the effects of repression on public perceptions of the police; ii) the role of in-group bias in shaping patterns of cooperation; and iii) the implications of repression for crime and social order. I argue that repression affects support for the police and has a conditional effect on co-ethnic bias, which undermines the provision of law and order. I demonstrate that repression by the police and actions political authorities take to ensure police are willing to comply with orders to repress affect how people view the police, decreasing support for police and citizens' cooperation in the provision of law and order and weakening the ability of states to deter crime and provide security.

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When I was a child, my brother got lost in the Alaska wilderness while we were hiking. He became separated from our group when he tried walking back to camp on his own. He didn't find our camp but stumbled across a path which led him to a local resident's home and eventually back to us. Writing a book often felt like wandering in the wilderness with my feet searching for a path. Along the way, this book would not have been possible without the support, direction, and encouragement of many people in my life.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### Questions at the Mass Grave

Stella Nyanzi (2020)

Do you rest in peace in that mass grave?  
Do you wish we kept up the search for your corpse?  
Does each passing season dampen your hopes?  
Thoughts of your final resting place haunt me daily.  
There is no honour in any mass grave!

How many others were heaped into your mass grave?  
How many bullets are lodged in your bodies?  
How many black bags still cover heads in your mass grave?  
How many bayonet wounds decorate your bodies?  
Thoughts of your execution disturb my nights.  
There's no peace in any execution.

Did you see the faces of your murderers?  
Did they wear uniforms of the police or army?  
Did you hear the order from above to kill you?  
Did they murder you with guns issued by the state?  
Thoughts of your murder disturb my freedom.  
There's no life amidst extra-judicial killings.

Who poured the earth onto your mass grave?  
Who prayed for your souls to rest in peace?  
Who digs the weeds in your mass grave?  
Who pours libations to quench your thirst in death?  
Thoughts of your disappearance mock our history.  
There's no death certificate for disappeared persons.

In the yellow bus, the public media is either tainted or mute.  
 The police metes out torture with force of a brute.  
 Truth, freedom, justice, and liberty at all  
 Trampled under foot.  
 Stella Nyanzi, In the Yellow Bus

## 1.1 Introduction

What are the effects of repression on public attitudes toward the police? How might individuals' political and ethnic characteristics condition their interactions with police? And what are the implications of these effects on crime and social order? In answering these questions, this book highlights the puzzle of policing, especially in non-democracies. By focusing on the perceptions of civilians toward the police, I argue the reliance of political authorities on the police to repress political opposition results in the *repression dilemma* – actions political authorities take to repress dissent decrease the state's ability to provide law and order.

What does this look like in real life? In 2017 and 2018, a spree of kidnappings and killings targeting women shook Uganda, a country of 41 million people. Within a brief window of less than a few months, more than 20 bodies were found throughout Wakiso district alone. The bodies showed evidence that the victims were mutilated, strangled or sexually assaulted. The violence continued in 2018, as more than 70 women were kidnapped across the country from January to June.

On June 30, 2018, The Uganda's Women's Protest Working Group, led by Stella Nyanzi, held the One Million Women's March at Centenary Park. Under the slogan, #WomenLivesMatterUG the march transformed from a small group of feminists to a crowd of around 300 people to demonstrate for women's rights and demand the police take action to provide better protection for women, especially in the capital city, Kampala. As they marched, the crowds chanted, "Tulibakazi temutukwaata," (We are women, stop raping us), "Tukooye" (We are tired), "We want security, now"

and “Women’s lives matter.”<sup>1</sup>

The message of the march was clear: the political authorities and the police must take action to protect women and curb the violent trend of murders, rapes, and mutilations that had left more than 42 killed since May 2017. The crowd gathered to raise awareness of the violence and protest what the group considered the police’s ineffectiveness at taking meaningful action to protect women.

As the main domestic security force in Uganda, the Uganda Police Force is responsible for providing law and order, keeping communities safe and deterring crime. Their mission statement claims that they exist “to secure life and prosperity in a committed and professional manner in partnership with the public, in order to promote development.”

Even beyond the protests, Ugandans expressed concerns about the role of police in society. For example, in April 2018, the shadow interior minister of the opposition Forum for Democratic Change led by Kizza Besigye, Ingrid Turinawe said, “The police’s priority is to see the junta stay in power. Their priority is not protecting people.” The police deputy spokesperson, Patrick Onyango, challenged the veracity of such claims when asked about the accusation that the police were politicized, saying, “that’s not true.”<sup>2</sup> Yet due to increased politicization of the force, many people saw the police as repressive agents serving the needs of the political authorities rather than keeping communities safe. As the violence against women continued, many began to question whether the role of the police to repress dissent had weakened the ability of the police to do their job.

Leaders in Uganda frequently use the police to repress dissent, relying on the police to impede opposition movements, arresting political opponents and intimidating voters. In November 2016, security forces led by the police killed more than 100 peo-

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<sup>1</sup>“Ugandan women march for their lives,” *Daily Monitor*, July 7, 2018 (<https://bit.ly/3bTEpTf>).

<sup>2</sup>“Rise in kidnappings shakes faith in Uganda’s police,” *Reuters*, April 16, 2018 (<https://tmsnrt.rs/39QiJ9n>).

ple in a known pro-opposition region.<sup>3</sup> The police played such a key role in securing control and extending the regime under President Museveni and his ruling incumbent party, the National Resistance Movement, that the Inspector General of Police, Edward Kalekezi Kayihura Muhwezi, commonly known as Kale Kayihura, became one of Museveni's key allies. A member of the military turned police officer, Kayihura had risen through the ranks of Uganda's security forces until he became the Inspector General of Police in 2005.

In his tenure as Uganda's longest appointed IGP, Kayihura was recognized as the architect of Uganda's repressive security apparatus, targeting political dissidents, arresting opposition candidates during elections, and gathering information on threats posed to the political authorities. As the leader of Ugandan Police Force (UPF), Kayihura became the right hand of the regime, overseeing numerous arrests of political dissidents, implementing the controversial Public Order Management Act 2013 (POMA), and leading the Flying Squad Unit, which engaged in torture of detainees at the Nalufenya Special Investigations Center (NSIC). On March 5, 2018, Kale Kayihura was fired by President Museveni, even though under his leadership the police became a crucial instrumental to repressing dissent. But why was the leading architect of Uganda's repressive apparatus fired?

As illustrated by the One Million Women March gathering, a different threat had emerged for the political authorities in Uganda, one fundamental to state development – namely the inability of the police to stop a spree of high profile killings and kidnappings. The high profile and public nature of the crimes revealed a deeper issue within the UPF: the role of the police as agents of repression – protecting the interests of the regime – was undermining the ability of the police to deter day-to-day crime.

The dynamics surrounding the firing of Kayihura and subsequent protests, repressive events, and arrests of leaders like Stella Nyanzi and Bobi Wine illustrate what

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<sup>3</sup>See “Uganda: No Justice for 2016 Kasese Massacre by Security Forces,” *Human Rights Watch*, October 10, 2018, (<https://bit.ly/2UYbYNa>)

this book calls the *repression dilemma* faced by political authorities. On one hand, the police can be and often are used by political authorities to repress dissent and maintain political control. On the other, the police require cooperation from the community where they are policing to effectively deter crime and provide law and order. The repression dilemma is especially acute in multi-ethnic societies like Uganda when *mistrust in political authorities*, *fear of repression*, and *in-group bias* affect how people view and interact with the police.

In unconsolidated democracies, civilians face various threats of violence. Violence includes exposure to crimes ranging from homicides, femocides, and kidnappings to less violent criminal activity like petty theft and burglaries<sup>4</sup>. However, violence also involves contentious politics as political authorities employ repressive tactics like arrests, torture, disappearances, and assassinations against political opponents. In interviews, surveys, and editorials, people share concerns about the risks of encountering criminal activity but also encountering the state's repressive apparatus.

This book sets out to examine how civilians navigate threats of crime and repression. It does so by examining civilian-police interactions and the politics of policing in Uganda, a multi-ethnic, electoral autocracy. Specifically, I examine the effects of repression on public attitudes toward the police. As these effects are unlikely to be uniform, I also explore how individuals' political and ethnic characteristics condition their interactions with police. Finally, I also examine the implications of these effects on crime.

This book develops and tests a theory of the politics of policing that focuses on policing and repression from the perspective of the citizen. I theorize that the co-production of law and order involves three sets of actors: 1) political authorities, 2) police (or another security institution), and 3) civilians. By bringing the preferences and attitudes of civilians into the story, I show that when political authorities rely

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<sup>4</sup>For an example of recent work explaining variation in homicides in Latin America, see Yashar (2018).

on the police to repress dissent it undermines their ability to provide law and order.

While repression alone directly affects how the public view the police, I argue that there is also an indirect effect of repression on civilian-police interactions in multi-ethnic societies in which mistrust of political authorities increases co-ethnic bias between civilians and the police. This mistrust of the government and increased fear of repression further undermine people's cooperation with police officers who are from other ethnic groups. Along these lines, this book makes four main claims: first, repression by the police negatively affects public perception of police; second, these perceptions are conditioned by partisanship; third, repression by the police negatively affects the provision of law and order – crime is higher in opposition areas than in areas that align with the political authorities; and fourth, mistrust shapes co-ethnic bias in civilian interactions with the police. Examining how repression affects how people view and interact with the police has important implications for political and economic development, cycles of conflict, and patterns of political violence more broadly.

The objective of this book is to explain how the police's unique dual role in un-consolidated democracies (on one hand to provide law and order while on the other repress dissent) affects public perceptions of police. Theoretically, it charts a new research agenda relating political violence, crime, and order, focusing on how politicization of police impacts civilians attitudes and behaviors toward the police and state. Political authorities relying on the police to repress dissent 1) negatively affects public perceptions of police, 2) decreases civilian cooperation with the police; and 3) undermines the state's ability to provide law and order. Importantly, however, these effects are conditioned by in-group characteristics like partisanship and ethnicity.

Moving beyond the theoretical and empirical goals, normative and policy considerations also drive the book. Significant allocations of development aid are spent each year on security sector assistance to combat violent extremism. However, how peo-

ple view police should inform these policies and where necessary provide a corrective to strengthening security force responsible for human rights abuses. Methodologically, the book seeks to illustrate an ethical approach to research that takes serious the sensitive nature of the topic while also accounting for the challenges of causal inference.

The main theoretical contribution of the book is a seemingly small insight that has significant implications for how we think about and understand contentious politics. Within international relations and authoritarian politics, many scholars focus on the role of the military, pro-government militias, or even the secret police as the dictator's agents of repression. Svoboda (2013) notes, the military are the repressive agents of last resorts. Other scholars emphasize the importance of pro-government militias or the highly politicized secret police to repress dissent (Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014, Cohen and Nordås 2015, Svoboda 2013).

While these security forces are important, we have often neglected the security agents who are responsible for most of the day-to-day acts of repression in unconsolidated democracies. Rather than the military, in fact, it is the national police who are often used to gather information on political opponents, monitor threats to the regime, suppress political opponents, and intimidate voters at the ballot box. Yet, relying on the police to repress dissent generates costs for the state because unlike other security forces the police must rely heavily on the communities where they are policing to be effective at their main job – providing security and deterring crime.

The second contribution of the book is its theoretical and empirical focus on civilians. Much of the existing work on repression focuses on the relationship between the autocrat and her security agents.<sup>5</sup> With a specific focus on the police, this study focuses on the other side of the equation: the relationship between civilians and the police by examining how repression by the police affects citizens' willingness to

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<sup>5</sup>See for example, Greitens (2016), Hassan (2017).



co-produce law and order alongside the police.

## 1.2 Theory: Police and the Repression Dilemma

One of the fundamental roles of government is to provide public goods, such as health-care and education. Of these goods, the provision of law and order may be one of the most important since without security, citizens live in a state of anarchy (Hobbes 1946). Broadly, the provision of law and order fosters economic growth and state development. To the extent that individuals have the freedom and protection to go about their everyday activities – going to work, grocery shopping, dropping their children off at school – depends not only on the laws and policies that exist but the ability of the state to uphold and enforce those laws.

In the modern state, the police are the central actor responsible for providing law and order, and they rely on cooperation with the community to effectively accomplish their objectives (Tyler 2006, Skogan and Frydl 2004).<sup>6</sup> Cooperation involves citizens organizing neighborhood watches, taking note of suspicious activity, and reporting crimes. To prevent and solve crimes, the police critically rely on information supplied by community members, and they can receive this information only if citizens are willing to interact with them and provide it. For example, in neighborhoods around the world, signs are posted showing that the neighborhood is under community watch and that suspicious behavior will be reported to law enforcement. Although the form of community input varies across contexts, law enforcement officers recognize that they critically rely on information from the communities where they are working if they are to be effective.

Yet, the police work under the directives of political authorities who run the government. Take for example, the New York City Police Department (NYPD).

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<sup>6</sup>Police are defined as the formal state institution tasked with maintaining law and order. Policing is a related term referring to “a set of processes with specific social functions” (Reiner 2010, 4).

The NYPD made headlines for implementing their infamous stop-and-frisk policy. Although the NYPD was responsible for implementing stop-and-frisk, the policy and the accompanying directives on how to execute it stemmed from the New York City Mayor's office. In short, police take actions to monitor and enforce the laws, but they work under the directives of the government authorities. In many countries, the executive controlling the police force is not the mayor but rather the head of the national government (for example, the president or prime minister). In these countries, which range from Brazil, Bolivia, Burundi, Colombia, Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Iraq, Syria, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, the national police operate under the directives of the central government.

The theoretical framework developed in this books posits that the co-production of law and order – the provision of security that keeps communities safe from crime and violence – depends on three sets of actors: political authorities, security forces (usually the police), and civilians. The first set of actors are political authorities who are in charge of the government. These actors are tasked with legislating and executing laws to run the government and ensure development. As a function of their authority, they delegate the use of force to agents who are tasked with upholding and enforcing the laws (Hassan 2017, Greitens 2016, Blaydes 2018, Svulik 2012). The second set of actors are the security apparatus who are tasked with the capacity and directives to enforce the law. The police are the primary institution responsible for providing law and order (Tyler 2006, Blair, Karim and Morse 2018, Soss and Weaver 2017). The third set of actors are the civilians who live within the given territory of the state. They must decide whether to comply and cooperate with the security agents they interact with on a day-to-day basis.

The *repression dilemma* emerges when political authorities rely on the police to repress dissent in addition to providing law and order because preferences and interests between leaders, police officers, and the public diverge. When political authorities

rely on the police to repress dissent it undermines the provision of law and order. Rather than focusing on the relationship between the political authorities and the security apparatus (Hassan 2017, Greitens 2016, Blaydes 2018), this theory considers the flip-side examining how people view and interact with the police and its implications for crime and law and order. In so doing this book highlights a cost to leaders who engage in repression: using the police as agents of repression to maintain political control decreases the state's ability to provide law and order and security more broadly.

### **1.2.1 Why People Cooperate with Police**

The criminology literature often based on the study of police in consolidated democracies suggests that people cooperate more with the police when they trust them and view them as legitimate authorities. Whether citizens believe police are legitimate depends on how police treat people and exercise their authority (Tyler 2006). Negative interactions, for example, undermine citizens' confidence in the police (Skogan and Frydl 2004, Tyler 2003, 2004). Other studies suggest that police are viewed as less legitimate if they are perceived to be normatively misaligned with the communities they are policing (Huq, Jackson and Trinkner 2016, Jackson et al. 2012).

Scholars have examined the challenges of policing even in democracies, especially as the police are used to control minoritized communities (Schneider 2014, Soss and Weaver 2017, Prowse, Weaver and Meares 2019). In the United States context, for example, there is a wide gap between how much Black, Native American, and Latinx minorities trust and support the police compared to Whites, as minorities are less likely to express trust in the police (Tyler 2005, Garofalo 1977, Schuman 1997). One explanation for this distrust is the increased risk of violence these communities face when interacting with police (Knox, Lowe and Mummolo 2020, Edwards, Lee and Esposito 2019). In the Liberian context, positive interactions between civilians and

police officers improve public perceptions of police and the state more broadly (Karim 2020). However, trust in political authorities, not to mention the police, can be difficult to sustain or foster, especially in post-conflict societies or un-consolidated democracies (Blair, Karim and Morse 2018). So, what shapes people's perceptions of the police and political authorities more broadly?

In general, we should expect that people will be more likely to cooperate with the police when they view both *political authorities* and *police* as legitimate authorities. Figure 1.2.1 provides a diagram showing the relationship between leaders, police, and civilians and the co-production of law and order. Political authorities determine the type of police, dictating the extent to which the police are politicized. There are two ways through which people observe the extent to which the police are politicized. First, people directly observe or experience the police acting as repressive agents. This might include leaders ordering the police to engage in repression, for example, gathering information on or monitoring suspected political opponents, arresting political leaders, even torturing, disappearing, or killing those who threaten the regime. When the elites rely on the police to enforce political control – like the Public Order Management Act in Uganda – the public are less likely to see the police as street-level bureaucrats.

Second, people observe the political authorities manipulating the social composition of the force in the way that police officers are recruited, trained, and deployed. Two ways that leaders manipulate the social composition of their police are stacking and shuffling. Stacking involves the political authorities filling key positions within the police force with officers from the same in-group. Group identification might be along partisan and ethnic divisions or another salient characteristics like class. Shuffling involves rotating officers so they do not establish connections with the community where they are policing. Even if people do not directly observe repression by the police, observing the political authorities manipulate the partisan and social com-




Figure 1.1: Theoretical Frame

position of the police to reflect the preferences and interests of the regime is likely to increase the public's mistrust of *both* the political authorities and the police. Conflict along the lines of identity can erode trust between people and the state.<sup>7</sup>

The more salient the divisions between in-group and out-group the more likely it is to affect interactions between civilians and the police. Especially in multi-ethnic states, cooperation between citizens and police in the provision of law enforcement is difficult to sustain. Ethnic conflict, even in divided democracies, can undermine police-community relations, shaping people's interactions with the state and their assessment of the police (Weitzer 1995, Weitzer and Hasisi 2008). In divided societies, a more inclusive police force can foster cooperation in the provision of law and order, decreasing crime (Nanes 2018). However, historically marginalized communities like Black and Indigenous communities have more to fear when interacting with the state security apparatus that employs "coercion, containment, repression, surveillance, regulation, predation, discipline, and violence" as mechanisms of control (Soss and Weaver 2017, 565), especially as these tools are disproportionately used against Black and Indigenous communities (Edwards, Lee and Esposito 2019, Knox, Lowe and Mummolo 2020). When people see leaders in non-democratic states strategically employing partisan or ethnic characteristics, they are more likely to see officers from other groups than their own as working for the state.

Certainly, other factors such as people's exposure to crime, their economic status, living environment, and whether people live in urban or rural areas, affect how people view the police. However, this study focuses on how repression directly and indirectly shapes people's attitudes about and perceptions of the police, which then affects their cooperation with them and crime outcomes.

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<sup>7</sup>See Hutchison and Johnson (2011), Linke (2013), Linke, Schutte and Buhaug (2015) on the effects of conflict and repression on people's trust in the state.

## 1.2.2 The Dual Role of Police

Why does repression undermine people's trust in the police? In many countries around the world, the police have two important roles in society. On one hand, police are agents providing law and order (Weber 1946, Hobbes 1946). On the other hand, police function as agents of repression ensuring the survival of political elites and maintaining the political status quo.

In fact, repression by the police is a near global phenomenon. Law enforcement officers around the world from Bolivia, Colombia, Iraq, Hong Kong, Greece, Malawi, Spain, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe have engaged in excessive force violating the physical integrity rights of protesters, journalists, and others. In Colombia and Bolivia, protests escalated after the police used repressive tactics to crackdown on anti-government protests. In Iraq, more than 200 people were killed in 2019 by police and other security forces during anti-government protests. Rather than quelling dissent, the police violence encouraged greater turnout in street-level protests against the government actions. Similarly, in Spain, hundreds of protesters clashed with police in the heart of Barcelona, assembling fiery barricades and throwing rocks at security forces. In Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, political authorities rely on the police both for preventative and responsive repression to deter collective action. Although police officers may act alone using their coercive capacity in illegitimate ways, these examples highlight that across an array of regime types, political authorities justify using excessive police force "as legitimate action" to deter protesters and reestablish rule of law.

Existing studies have considered the role of security forces as instruments of repression. However, few examine the interactive relationship between civilians and the police. Despite a robust literature on state repression and dissent, we do not know how repression affects the provision of law and order. More importantly, few studies examine how repression and co-ethnic bias shape civilian-police interactions.

Citizens' beliefs about the ability of police to secure public spaces and expectations about experiencing repression likely condition whether people dissent from or cooperate with police. Protesting, for example, involves several possible threats to would-be protesters – repression from the state, violence from counter-protesters, destruction of property, and violation of personal integrity rights by fellow protesters.

Considering the conditions that make political dissent more or less likely requires us to examine how the behavior of police at protests shapes individuals' attitudes and behavior toward the state. When police use repressive force, citizens will be more frustrated with the status quo. Given police are one of the most visible extensions of the state apparatus, citizens are likely to blame the state for violations by police and mistrust toward the state shapes how people interact with police.

### **1.2.3 Implications**

In the theory of policing presented in this book, I argue there are two reasons why repression undermines the provision of law and order. First, repression by the police directly affects how people view the police. People who observe or experience repression decrease their confidence in the police and they are more likely to see the police as illegitimate authorities. Second, in multi-ethnic societies, repression also indirectly affects how people view the political authorities and the police, which further impacts citizens willingness to cooperate with the police. Both increase people's fear of repression and mistrust. Witnessing repression by the police has a general effect, negatively affecting how people view the police. In multi-ethnic societies, mistrust in the government and fear of repression interacts with co-ethnic bias decreasing cooperation across ethnic groups.

The theory of policing that is presented and tested in this book argues the following. First, when political authorities use the police to maintain control and repress dissent, it undermines public support for the police. Second, in divided societies,



in-group/out-group divisions affects how political authorities, police officers, and citizens co-produce security. People are more likely to cooperate with police officers who are from their in-group and more likely to fear repression when encountering officers from the out-group. Third, this in-group bias increases the more people mistrust the regime. Fourth, people's lack of support for the regime aggregates from the individual to the district, undermining the ability of the police to deter crime. Consequently, areas with less support for the regime have higher levels of crime. The tension between the dual roles of police in society leads to the *repression dilemma*: political authorities can rely on the police to repress dissent; however, doing so undermines their ability to provide law and order.

### 1.3 Case Selection: Why Uganda?

In selecting a case for this study, I focused on an electoral autocracy where threats to the regime are likely to be repressed but there is still political space to challenge the incumbent government. To that end, I conduct this study in Uganda for three main reasons. First, Uganda is a non-democracy where Yoweri Museveni has maintained control since 1986. Human rights are severely restricted and in many cases violated. Political freedoms including electoral democracy, access to information and justice, and human rights protections remain curtailed or openly violated by the regime.

Second, high restrictions on free and open political spaces remain as the government limits political competition and represses dissent. Restrictions on opposition parties have plagued each of Uganda's subsequent elections, including arrests and beatings of opposition leaders like Kizza Besigye and Robert Kyagulany Ssentamu. Museveni has maintained power with his ruling coalition by using cooptation and coercion, including gerrymandering districts to provide political goods to party loyalists and using the internal security apparatus to repress threats to his political survival.

In September 2009, for example, security forces used live fire to deter protests in Kayunga. Hospitals in the area reported treating more than 88 victims following the violence, the vast majority for gunshot wounds. The official government statement was that 27 people died resulting from security forces' "stray bullets" (Barnett 2018), although some estimate more than 40 died. Rather than investigating the excessive use of force, police targeted protesters, arresting almost 850 suspected of participating in the unrest (Barnett 2018). Moreover, Museveni's dictatorship has had to rely on his internal security apparatus to repress dissent and civil conflict in the north. Most notably the rebellion led by Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army, which affected northern Uganda for over twenty years displacing over an estimated 1.2 million people into internally displacement camps.

Third, as discussed in Chapter 3, the Uganda Police Force (UPF) led by the Inspector General of Police (IGP) falls under the direct control of the president. While the Internal Security Organization (ISO), led by the Security Minister, also contributes to domestic security, the UPF is the primary police institution in Uganda. The Ugandan security sector also includes the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) and the External Security Organization (ESO). This study focuses on the role of UPF, rather than other repressive agents, because they are the security sector most likely to engage in the daily activity we associate with repressing dissent. For example, political authorities have increasingly relied on police to repress political dissent associated with the social media tax protests in July 2018 and the by-election rallies in August 2018. After violence broke-out during the by-elections in Arua Municipality, 5 people were killed by security forces, 33 people were charged with treason and an additional 150 people were held on remand (Monitor 2018).

The UPF's involvement in state repression is long standing. From January 1997 to July 2018, data show that the UPDF and UPF were collectively involved in 2,377 events of political violence and social unrest, with the UPF involved in 30% of them

(Raleigh et al. 2010). The data show important variation regarding which state agency engages in repression (see Table 1.1). While the UPDF conducted more political violence events than the UPF, nearly all (94.2%) were not common policing operations but rather battle-related or remote violence events, primarily involving clashes with insurgent groups. When we consider those involving the UPF, a vast majority (87%) are categorized as state repression, including political violence relating to riots, protests, strategic developments, and violence against civilians. The political violence and social unrest events data in addition to reports by civil society groups and interviews conducted in Uganda demonstrate that the UPF is the primary security force used for both preventative and reactive repression. This coercive activity includes crackdowns on collective action, detaining opposition supporters, and arresting opposition leaders like Kizza Besigye, Norbert Mao, and Bobi Wine.

Table 1.1: Political Violence and Social Unrest Events, January 1997 to July 2018

Conflict Event	Military Forces (UPDF)		Police Forces (UPF)	
	#	%	#	%
Battle	1,536	92.4	90	13.0
Remote violence	30	1.8	0	0
Riots/Protests	4	0.24	422	59.1
Strategic development	21	1.3	73	10.2
Violence against civilians	72	4.3	129	18.1
Total Events	1,663	100	714	100

In this context, the police are the main institution used to repress dissent. Other authoritarian regimes might employ other security forces, like the military or secret police, to repress dissent. Repression by these forces might undermine confidence in these institutions, yet these institutions do not directly serve those they are repressing. The UPF are both prime repressors and public servants, accountable to the executive and the polity. In Uganda, we can examine the implications of repression by the police on people’s attitudes toward them where both order and repression are common.

Finally, Uganda is an ethnically diverse society with at least 65 ethnic groups rep-

resented in Uganda. President Museveni is from the Banyankole ethnic group, which composes only 9.6%. Museveni is from the Banyankole (father) and Banyarwanda (mother) ethnic groups. Both ethnic groups are subgroups of the Bantu peoples. The Baganda ethnic group is Uganda's largest ethnic group, composing approximately 16.5% of Uganda's population. Table 7.4 shows the distribution of ethnic groups from the 2002 and 2014 census.

Table 1.2: Ethnic Groups in Uganda

Ethnic Groups	2002		2014	
	# (Millions)	%	# (Millions)	%
Baganda	4.13	17.7	5.56	16.5
Banyankole	2.33	10.0	3.22	9.6
Basoga	2.07	8.9	2.96	8.8
Bakiga	1.68	7.2	2.39	7.1
Iteso	1.57	6.7	2.36	7.0
Langi	1.49	6.4	2.13	6.3
Bagisu	1.12	4.8	1.65	4.9
Acholi	1.14	4.9	1.47	4.4
Lugbara	1.02	4.4	1.10	3.3
Other Ethnic Groups	6.76	31.4	10.8	32.1
Total	23.29	100	33.6	100

Ethnic-related conflicts have shaped Uganda since independence in 1962, including a series of military coups and violent regime changes. Historically, ethnic divisions have existed since independence between the Bantu people of the South and the Nilotic people of the North. Previous regimes in Uganda including those led by Milton Obote and Idi Amin ethnically stacked their security forces with loyalists to maintain power (Kasozi 1994, Avirgan and Honey 1982). Until the current administration, the security forces were composed predominantly of Langi and Acholi officers from northern Uganda. How has ethnicity shaped politics under Museveni? Museveni and the NRM came to power in 1986 after ousting president Tito Okello who is from the Acholi ethnic group. Broadly, the Acholi people had been loyal to the previous Obote administration until two Acholi Commanders, Bazilio Olara-Okello and Tito Lutwa Okello, launched the 1985 coup that ousted president Milton Obote. Tito Okello took

control of the country and ruled as president for six months until he was overthrown by the National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni.

In 1986 when the NRM took power, the political authorities purged the police force of those loyal to the previous administration, reducing the number of police officers from about approximately 10,000 to 3,000. Specifically, Langi and Acholi officers with ties to Okello or Obote were disbanded and replaced. Between 1986 to 2005, the police force grew from 3,000 to 14,000 (UPF 2019). Especially in the early years of the NRM, the security forces were primarily recruited from the Bantu peoples, including ethnic groups such as the Baganda, Banyankole, Banyoro, Bakonjo, Basoga, and Bakiga among others. In 2001 the NRM leadership split when Kizza Besigye (who is from the Bahororo ethnic group) ran against Museveni in the election. The political authorities faced two threats: first, the security threat led by insurgents in the north; and on second, the political threat associated with the opposition political party led by Besigye. As the regime restaffed the police force, they had to include individuals from numerous ethnic groups. The police force increased to approximately 44,898 officers by April 2016.

Theories of stacking would expect that Museveni would stack his personal security apparatus with co-partisans and co-ethnics in order to police Uganda; however, due to the size of his ethnic group, composing under 10% of the population, he has to enlist people from other ethnic groups. Beyond his presidential guard, Museveni could conceivably stack elite squads within the police force like the rapid response or flying squad units – the latter only had 161 officers in 2016. However, he is unable to staff the entire police force with Banyankole officers.

Unfortunately, data on the ethnic composition and rotation of police deployments are not available. Yet evidence gathered from newspaper reports and interviews conducted in 2018 with UPF officers shows the government regularly shuffles both junior and senior UPF officers. For example, the former IGP Kale Kayihura shuffled

70 highly ranked police officers in April 2017 (Daily Monitor 2018). A year later, the new Inspector General of Police Okoth Ochola shuffled officers including 96 senior police officers (The Observer 2018). Similarly, 142 senior officers were reshuffled in the latest police transfers in January 2019 (Kazibwe 2019). In preparation for the 2021 presidential election, the UPF are recruiting an additional 4,500 officers. However, the police spokesperson said that only 195 recruits will be selected from the Acholi Sub-region, reflecting the under-representation of northern Ugandans within the police force (Ocungi 2019).<sup>8</sup>

## 1.4 Methods and Data

Studying the politics of policing, especially in politically repressive states, raises ethical, logistical, and methodological challenges similar to conducting research in conflict environments.<sup>9</sup>

First, the availability and access to observational data on police activity is limited. Moreover, the sensitive nature of police interactions renders observational measures of behavior suspect. Second, individuals are unlikely to discuss their “true preferences” relating to police if they fear potential retaliation, making it difficult to solicit “truthful” responses by asking directly. Two threats to inference, for example, are social desirability bias and preference falsification; respondents say what they think they are supposed to say either to avoid social sanction or gain a reward. Third, given the political context, any study of such a sensitive topic must be careful not to endanger study participants.

To overcome these challenges and answer these questions, I use a diverse set of methods and field research in Uganda to test the observable implications of my theory.

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<sup>8</sup>The Acholi Sub-region is one of 15 Sub-regions in Uganda and composes approximately 4.8% of the population and eight districts: Agago, Amuru, Gulu, Lamwo, Pader, Kitgum, Nwoya, and Omoro.

<sup>9</sup>Recent work addresses challenges of researching in conflict zones (Bullock, Imai and Shapiro 2011, Blair and Imai 2012, Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013, Blair, Imai and Lyall 2014, DeMaio 1984).

This mixed-method approach includes a natural experiment, two survey experiments, qualitative interviews, and observational statistical analyses. Pre-analysis plans for each of the survey experiments were pre-registered with Evidence with Governance and Politics (EGAP).

I draw on two original survey data collection projects that I fielded in Uganda: first, a nationally representative survey  $N \approx 2,000$ ; and second; a survey in Gulu district ( $N \approx 1,000$ ). In addition to the survey data, I employ data on crime patterns, police deployments, election results, and political unrest events. In all of the work in the book, I strive to use a variety of methods that takes into account the sensitivity of the topic as well as the demands of causal inference.

First, I use an unexpected event during a survey approach to test whether repression by the police undermines public perceptions of police, I use a national experiment (unexpected design during a survey approach) to show that repression adversely affects public perceptions of policing. I use the arrest of a prominent opposition leader to show that use of force by the police at the Social Media Protest affects public perceptions of the police. Partisanship (supporting the incumbent) has a conditional effect on repression; the effects are strongest among those who do not support the ruling party.

Second, I employ a nationally representative list experiment to show that people are less likely to report crime to police officers who are not from their community. The list experiment examines whether ethnicity shapes people's expressed willingness to report crimes to police officers. An estimated 42% of Ugandans believe that one reason why people do not report crimes to the police is because the officers are not from their community. There is suggestive evidence that this perception is higher in areas in the north; however, this study is limited because it cannot show why ethnicity matters.

Third, to examine why people prefer police officers who share their ethnicity, I

use a conjoint experiment in Gulu district Uganda to demonstrate i) co-ethnic bias in civilian-police interactions and ii) that mistrust in political authorities, courts, and the police has conditional effects, increasing co-ethnic bias. Even controlling for several possible confounders including officer’s rank and age, whether they provide material incentives for information, and the ethnicity of the criminal, people prefer officers who share their ethnicity. Mistrust in the police, political authorities, and the courts has a conditional effect increasing co-ethnic bias.

Fourth, I use administrative data and other crime statistics to assess whether support for the regime affects district-level crimes. I examine the effects of incumbent vote share and deployment of police officers on district-level crime patterns.

### 1.4.1 Survey 1: Nationally Representative Sample

The first two empirical chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) use novel data that come from a nationally representative survey of approximately 2,000 Ugandans. Data collection for this survey was conducted between 29 June and 20 July 2018, in 194 parishes located in 180 sub-counties within 127 counties, 100 districts and all 4 regions in Uganda.

Table 1.3 shows the geographical distribution of the sample. The survey was embedded in a round of Twaweza’s Sauti za Wananchi project with assistance from Ipsos.<sup>10</sup> Twaweza is a highly respected research firm working throughout east Africa. Sauti za Wananchi is Africa’s first nationally representative mobile phone survey.

Twaweza’s research team employed a multi-stage stratified sampling approach to achieve a representative sample of the total population of Ugandans who are 18 years and older. The sample frame is based on the 2014 Uganda Population and Housing Census. The baseline sample was selected to be a representative cross-section of

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<sup>10</sup>Data were collected by experienced call center agents using Computer Aided Telephonic Interviews (CATI). Interviews were conducted in the respondents’ preferred language, which was identified during baseline interviews.



Table 1.3: Overview of Multistage Sampling

Sample by Region	Districts		Counties		Sub-Counties		Parishes		Individuals	
	total	sample	total	sample	total	sample	total	sample	total	sample
	112	100	181	127	1,368	180	6,547	194	34,844,095	1,920
Central	24	16	36	23	258	36	1,324	43	9,579,119	434
Eastern	32	29	50	35	412	51	2,056	51	9,094,960	492
Northern	30	29	45	34	311	46	1,545	47	7,230,661	460
Western	26	26	50	35	387	47	1,622	53	8,939,355	534

Notes: Data on administrative units from the 2016 Uganda Electoral Commission Zoning.

all adult citizens in Uganda. Twaweza’s objective was to give “every adult citizen an equal and known chance of selection for interview.” This goal was achieved by “(a) strictly applying random selection at every stage of sampling and (b) applying sampling with probability proportionate to population size at the Enumeration Area (EA) sampling stage.”<sup>11</sup> The baseline data were collected in person; however, the round on security and policing was done by phone. There was a high participation rate in the study (1,920 of 2,000 respondents participated).

## 1.4.2 Survey 2: Gulu District Sample

This study in Chapter 7 employs a second survey administered in 45 parishes across 22 sub-counties of Gulu District, Uganda.<sup>12</sup> The sample includes just shy of 1,000 household surveys. Data were collected in October 2018 and February 2019, using structured questionnaires with face-to-face interviews conducted by a well-respected Ugandan non-governmental organization. Enumerators rotated male and female respondents to ensure that the sample was balanced with an equal number of male and female participants. The study collected pre-test data on how respondents perceive the relationship between the community and police, their level of institutional trust in police and other government institutions, their level of political engagement, and

<sup>11</sup>Twaweza explains the multi-stage sampling design of Sauti za Wananchi in Twaweza’s technical paper.

<sup>12</sup>In Chapter 7, I further elaborate on my sample selection and rationale for conducting the study in Gulu District.

various other relevant demographics.

Within Uganda, I administered the study in Gulu District for three main reasons. First, it is an area dominated by one ethnic group: Acholi. Second, the Acholi are historically in opposition to Museveni. Third, there is within-group variation in how people view the regime because of the civil war.

In Gulu District, there is important in-group variation in which actors people blame for the conflict. On one hand, some people blame the rebels for the civilian victimization that occurred during the conflict. On the other, people express frustration in the government for directly committing abuse and for failing to protect them. Gulu District, in particular, is interesting.

Broadly, the area remains an opposition stronghold and people there express ongoing concern about the human rights abuses committed by security forces in the country.<sup>13</sup> But, there is a sizeable level of support for the incumbent government among those who credit the government for bringing stability and ending the conflict. Moreover, the political authorities have recruited additional police officers from the north as political opposition has increased in other areas of Uganda.<sup>14</sup>

By studying policing in Gulu District, I am able to examine within-group variation of co-ethnic bias depending on individuals' level of mistrust in the government. By design, the study focuses on Acholi respondents, which reduces the sample to 937 participants. Among the sample, there is important variation in how people view broader patterns of cooperation between the police and the community. Descriptively, these data suggest that people hold different attitudes about how police relate to the community and ethnicity shapes these interactions.

The survey data from the two samples discussed above are used to test three main hypotheses: first, repression by the police affects public perceptions of the police

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<sup>13</sup>Only 32.7% of Gulu District voted for Museveni in the 2016 election. Most Acholi in Gulu traditionally support opposition parties; however, there is within ethnic group variation in people's level of trust in the regime and perceptions of the police as illustrated above.

<sup>14</sup>This tension is discussed further in Chapter 7.

(Chapter 4); second, people are less likely to report crimes to non-co-ethnic officers (Chapters 6 and 7); and third, mistrust in political authorities and the criminal justice system increases co-ethnic bias (Chapter 7).

### **1.4.3 Other Data: Police Deployments, Election Results and Crime**

To test my hypothesis that crimes are higher in areas that oppose the regime, I construct a unique dataset with several district-level variables including: 1) the number of UPF officers deployed; 2) the incumbent president's vote share in 2016; and 3) all crimes reported in 2017. The police deployment and incumbent vote share data are my main independent variables for Chapter 5. The number of officers deployed are used to measure the capacity of the police to either repress dissent or provide law and order. The incumbent vote share data are used as a measure of support for the president with the assumption that areas with less support are more likely to oppose the political authorities. Finally, my outcome variables are the annual number of crimes committed in each district across ten categories – specifically, the number of assaults, breakings, child related crimes, economic related crimes, homicides, narcotic related crimes, robberies, sexually related crimes, thefts, and other crimes. In addition to these variables, I also draw on the 2014 census for other control variables, which are discussed in Chapter 5.

## **1.5 Ethical Considerations**

Research on policing in a non-democratic and post-conflict environment raises unique ethical challenges similar to challenges in conflict areas. The survey experiments used in this study use informational interventions and indirect techniques that are lower risk than behavior interventions but still have the ability to produce robust

findings. For potentially sensitive survey questions, I employ indirect experimental techniques that reduce the risk to respondents. I also partnered with local research ethics committees and local partners, in addition to my University IRB. This section provides details about the steps taken to reduce potential risks to survey participants and the actions to minimize risks.

### **1.5.1 Steps to Minimize Threats to Participants**

Several steps were taken to ensure that the studies in this book pose no more than minimal risk to participants. First, the study questionnaires and proposals were designed with Ugandan partners to ensure that the wording and questions were culturally sensitive to reduce social pressures on participants. This included multiple trips to Uganda to meet with the survey firms and extended fieldwork overseeing the pilot study in Gulu district.

Second, in the nationally representative sample the survey was included in a panel approved by the Mildmay Uganda Research Ethics Committee, an ethics review committee accredited by the Uganda National Council of Science and Technology (#REC REF 0204-2017). Similarly, the study in Gulu district was approved by the Gulu Research Ethics Committee. This involved the study being presented before a community of scholars, professionals, and community stakeholders at the Research Ethics Committee (REC) at Gulu University.

Third, several steps were taken to ensure that vulnerability associated with political pressures in Uganda are minimized. The survey experiments do not directly use ethnicity – directly in the survey experiments. Indirect survey experiments are used to minimize political pressures that the study participants, especially those from marginalized ethnic and political groups, might feel if asked directly. The list experiment, for example, uses an indirect questioning strategy that provides anonymity to respondents. The conjoint experiment allows me to test multiple hypotheses (dis-

entangling why ethnicity matters), while providing a test environment that is more generalizable to the real world. The conjoint experiment also masks the main variable of interest, which reduces both experimental demand effects and social desirability bias. Fourth, the research firms used in both surveys have a strong rapport with the local communities gaining permission for the study in all the enumerator areas and taking care to explain the purpose of the study both with the participants but also the principals in the area. Fifth, all participants provided consent, agreeing to voluntarily participate in the study.

Overseeing the data collection for the study in Gulu district, it was especially important to make sure that risks to respondents were carefully minimized. The sample for Chapter 6 (civilians living in Gulu district) may be vulnerable for a couple reasons. First, a civil conflict affected Gulu district from 1986-2008. So respondents may be experiencing emotional distress or trauma as a result of the conflict that occurred. Second, they may be vulnerable to interrogation from the Ugandan authorities. Third, they may be vulnerable to domestic pressure to answer questions in a particular way. Several steps were taken to minimize these risks. Enumerators were trained to monitor study participants for any signs of emotional distress. If a respondent was upset during the survey, enumerators were supposed to remind them that participation was voluntary and they were free to take a break or terminate the survey.

Second, several steps were taken to ensure that vulnerability associated with political pressures in Uganda were minimized. The survey experiment did not directly cue ethnicity and also did not include the ethnic group of the ruling political leaders in Uganda. This design helped to minimize political pressures of the study. Additionally, I met with local police officials and government authorities, which in addition to seeking approval from the REC at Gulu University was done to further minimize vulnerability that might emerge from political pressures. The surveys were conducted

at the respondents home to help protect their privacy. Furthermore, all the enumerators are Ugandans from the same district, which minimizes the potential bias that could occur if respondents felt they were being surveyed by individuals from outside of their community.

Third, the survey experiment was designed for the respondents to answer questions – as they were comfortable – directly to the tablet by selecting their corresponding answer without having to audibly answer the questions. This was to again help minimize any domestic pressures that respondents might feel about answering more sensitive questions. This approach might also help reduce social desirability bias and vulnerability associated with answering questions audibly. This data collection process also reduced the possibility that any survey data are inadvertently disclosed. Enumerators uploaded completed surveys at the end of each day to a secure server. After each survey was uploaded they were no longer accessible from the Android tablets used during the survey.

### **1.5.2 Steps to Protect Data**

In addition to steps taken to minimize risks to participants, I was careful to ensure the data of the project were protected. I travelled to Uganda and trained the team of enumerators who collected data for the study. The enumerators, working under the supervision of the program officer (Monitoring and Evaluation Lead) administered the survey in Gulu district with ZTE Tablets (Model V72A). I programmed each of the ZTE tablets for the survey using a data collection and reporting system developed by The Carter Center and the Institute for Developing Nations, which interfaces with Open Data Kit (ODK). Each enumerator team was equipped with a tablet programmed for the study. Methodologically, this approach was cost effective, secure, and less intrusive. It also ensured the safety and protection of the data gathered in the study and reduced social desirability bias. The data were uploaded to a secure

server and no longer accessible from the tablets once enumerators submit the surveys.

In addition to the quantitative data, this book also draws on several qualitative interviews with local political leaders, police officers, civil society and human rights activists, and civilians. To protect their identity, names and positions or other details that could identify those interviewed are redacted when possible.

## 1.6 Plan of the book

### *Chapter 2: The Repression Dilemma and Policing in Multi-ethnic Societies*

This chapter presents a theory of the politics of policing in divided societies. I argue that leaders who rely on the police to repress dissent face a dilemma. The more they use the police to repress dissent, the more they undermine the co-production of law and order. The argument shows why repression directly undermines how people view the police and shows why ethnicity shapes both how people view the police and their willingness to cooperate with them. Importantly, this chapter provides a theory from the perspective of individuals exposed to repression but also navigating threats of violence from criminal activity.

### *Chapter 3: Are the Police in Uganda Politicized?*

This chapter presents the case of Uganda with a focus on how the UPF developed. I discuss both the institutional structure of the UPF and the history of conflict, coups, election violence, and ethnic tension have shaped the force. Using events data, I compare patterns of repression committed by the police to political unrest events that involve the military, showing how the police are responsible for acts we typically associate with repression. Finally, I conclude by providing descriptive statistics of how people view the police.

### *Chapter 4: How Repression Affects Public Perceptions of Police?*

What are the effects of state repression on public perceptions of police? And to

what extent are these effects uniform or conditional on individuals' loyalty to political authorities? In this chapter, I argue that repression by the police negatively affects how people evaluate the police, especially among those who do not support the ruling party. People who oppose the regime are more likely to fear the police following a repressive event relative to regime supporters. To test this argument, I leverage a unique research design opportunity that emerges from the social media tax protest led by Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu (also known as Bobi Wine) and subsequent selective repression by the Uganda Police Force while a nationally representative survey on police and security was being administered in Uganda. I demonstrate selective repression of protesters decreased support for the police. Additionally, I demonstrate that these effects are largely driven by political loyalty; repression has a stronger effect on how members of the opposition evaluate the police relative to incumbent supporters.

*Chapter 5: Are Crimes Higher Among Districts with Less Support for the Regime?*

This chapter examines the relationship between support for Museveni and patterns of crimes at the district-level. If people who oppose the regime are less likely to cooperate with police than we should expect that crimes should be higher in areas that show higher levels of opposition. I argue opposition to the regime undermines people's confidence in the police, decreasing cooperation and increasing crime. To test this hypothesis, I examine the correlation between Museveni's 2016 vote-share and police deployments on patterns of crime in 2017 and 2018. I show that districts with higher levels of Museveni vote-share have significantly lower levels of some types of crimes.

*Chapter 6: Does Ethnicity Shape whether People Report Crimes?*

This chapter examines whether interacting with non-co-ethnic officers, officers from another community or area, decreased people's willingness to report crimes to the police. In divided societies where the police use repression, how does ethnic-



ity shape the co-production of law and order? For scholars of comparative politics and international relations, examining the effects of ethnicity on patterns of conflict, cooperation, and state repression remains a foundational endeavor. Studies show individuals who share ethnicity are more likely to cooperate to provide public goods. Yet we do not know whether co-ethnic cooperation extends to the provision of law and order and, if so, why people might cooperate more with co-ethnic police officers. In the context of policing, this is especially difficult where leaders often strategically manipulate the social composition of their security apparatus to ensure repression. Encountering non-co-ethnic officers should reduce people's willingness to provide information, report crimes, and cooperate with police. Using a nationally representative list experiment, I demonstrate that an estimated 42% of Ugandans do not report crimes to the police because they are from outside of the community. In short, identity characteristics of the officers shape people's willingness to report crimes to them.

*Chapter 7: Does Co-ethnic Bias and Mistrust in the Regime Determine Affect Cooperation with Police?*

This chapter examines *both* co-ethnic bias and *mistrust* in political authorities on people's willingness to cooperate with police. I theorize co-ethnic bias affects interactions between people and the police because individuals prefer officers who share their ethnicity and fear repression more when encountering non-co-ethnic officers. Using a conjoint experiment in Gulu district, I demonstrate that individuals prefer reporting crimes to co-ethnic officers, even after controlling for potential confounders. Broadly, this result is strongest among individuals with no trust in the police or the political authorities. These findings have important implications for the politics of policing, conflict, and social order.

*Chapter 8: Conclusion*

The final chapter concludes by discussing the theoretical claims made in the book.

I walk through the implications of these claims for how we think about political violence, conflict, and security more broadly. One key question raised by the study is the extent to which policing is actually a public good. The theoretical and empirical contributions of these studies questions this traditional assumption. In the conclusion, I discuss the implications of this study for politics in Uganda and the implications for the politics of policing beyond this case. Much of this theory generalizes to other divided, non-democratic states. I conclude by discussing possible next steps for future work on policing, co-ethnic bias, and political violence in fragile and conflict-affected states.

## Chapter 2

# Theory: The Politics of Repression and Policing

Every policeman knows that though governments may change, the police remains. –  
Leon Trotsky, *What Next?*, 1932

To secure life and property in a committed and professional manner in partnership  
with the Public, in order to promote development.  
Mission Statement, Uganda Police Force

### 2.1 Introduction

In societies around the world, the police are one of the most foundational institutions of government (Soss and Weaver 2017, Knox, Lowe and Mummolo 2020). Police officers are the most visible representatives of the state. Accordingly, one of the most ubiquitous interactions that civilians are likely to have with an agent of the state is encountering a police officer (aside from perhaps teachers). Given the integral role that police have in the modern society, it is difficult to picture a society without them. And yet, the police, as we know them in the modern state with their supposed focus on reducing crime, are a relatively new government institution.

Considering the origins of policing as an institution, the police emerged as a

solution to what Svobik (2012) refers to as the twin challenges of authoritarian power-sharing and authoritarian control. That is, political authorities face political conflicts on two fronts: first, between the autocrat and those she relies on to maintain the status quo – the selectorate or ruling coalition. The second is the conflict between the regime and those barred from political power. Rather than originating as an institution to provide law and order, the police emerged as a coercive and monitoring tool to repress threats from the masses in Great Britain and a mechanism to control the military and elite threats in other parts of Europe.

In this chapter, I present a theory of the politics of policing, challenging the assumption that the police are either repressive agents of the state (Hassan 2017) or street-level bureaucrats providing law and order (Lipsky 1971). Rather, I argue that the relationship between civilians and the police is a more complex dynamic – shaped by political and ethnic characteristics. Police, especially in non-democracies, serve two functions: repressing dissent and providing law and order. How civilians navigate their interactions with the police are shaped by the perceptions of the police based on how police behave and individual-level characteristics. In this book, I argue we need to consider the two key roles that police have in society and how individuals navigate between them. On one hand, police are agents providing law and order as one of the most important and basic public goods states provide (Weber 1946, Hobbes 1946). On the other hand, police function as agents of repression ensuring the survival of political elites and maintaining the political status quo.

In this theoretical framework, I argue that the co-production of security depends on three sets of actors: i) political authorities; ii) police; and iii) civilians. I develop two sets of hypotheses. First, I derive hypotheses about the relationship between repression and public perceptions of police, including the conditional effects of partisanship. Second, considering the importance of ethnic characteristics, I hypothesize that co-ethnic bias and mistrust in the regime, stemming from fear of repression, *both*

decrease people’s willingness to reach across ethnic divisions to cooperate with police.

This theory of policing addresses an important gap in the literature for two reasons. First, civilians’ attitudes and perceptions toward police likely condition their willingness to cooperate with police (Tyler et al. 2018, Blair, Karim and Morse 2019). Second, police officers are responsible for both maintaining order and repressing threats to the political status quo. This tension is reflected in public opinion data collected in Uganda: some individuals look to the police for protection demanding they keep them safe while others resent repression, viewing police officers as politicized and unable to keep them safe. To the extent that repression undermines citizens’ confidence in the police, relying on coercive institutions to suppress dissent not only poses a direct threat to autocrats through coup-like activity and generating political dissent when they use excessive force – it even decreases people’s willingness to cooperate with the police, making the police less effective at deterring crime.

The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present the origins of policing. Second, I present the first part of my theory linking repression and the co-production of law and order, demonstrating why and how repression negatively affects public perceptions of the police as legitimate authorities, undermining support for the police. Third, I present the second part of my theory exploring why ethnicity matters. Finally, I conclude.

## 2.2 Origins of Policing

Political scientists have until late shown only a passing interest in the study of the politics of policing.<sup>1</sup> Addressing this gap, Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) launched a community policing Metaketa. This Metaketa ran from Spring 2016 until Spring 2020 in six countries: Brazil, Colombia, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and

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<sup>1</sup>Examples of early studies on policing include Schneider (2014), Prowse, Weaver and Meares (2019), Mummolo (2018), Knox, Lowe and Mummolo (2020).

Uganda. The projects used common interventions to implement a community policing program consisting of two components: “(1) a community engagement program to solicit information on community problems from citizens and transmit information about police programs to citizens; and (2) a problem-oriented policing program, in which police address problems identified through community engagement programs directly with small, dedicated budgets and/or indirectly with the assistance of other public and private agencies.”

A main focus of the Metaketa was the testing of community policing interventions. Yet, whether community policing is likely to be effective depends on how political authorities have used the police to maintain power and patterns of civilian-police interactions. In short, the police potential to be used as coercive agents is central to how people view them.

Historians have long considered the origins of modern police as an inherently political problem. As Palmer (1988, 11) writes, “if the origins of the modern police may be explained as a response more to pressing political and social challenges than to long-standing problems of daily criminality, it becomes necessary to study the police in a political context.” The political question becomes clear when looking briefly at the emergence of police as a state institution.

In France, for example, the *maréchaussée*, the rural police, was originally established around 1544 to police the king’s soldiers. Following reforms in 1720, by the mid-eighteenth century, the *maréchaussée*, or as they were more commonly known *gens d’armes*, was a force of approximately 3,000 uniformed and heavily armed soldiers. With an intricate chain of command, the *gens d’armes* answered directly to the king in Paris.<sup>2</sup> Following the French Revolution, the new government not only kept the force intact but also expanded its size to approximately 11,000 strong, changing their name to the *Gendarmerie nationale* in 1791. The *Gendarmerie* increased in

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<sup>2</sup>For a discussion of the history of policing in France, see Williams (1979), Mildmay (1763), Cameron (1981).

scope and scale under Napoleon (Payne 1966). By the mid-nineteenth century, the French model of policing had been exported to much of Europe and doubled in size to over 25,000 men. In addition to France's national police force, the police of Paris were established by an edict of Louis XVI in 1667. In Russia, for example, the origins of policing was similarly linked to issues of social control and surveillance on behalf of the Tzars (Zuckerman and Zuckerman 1996).

In England, and the United Kingdom more broadly, the first police force was created around the politics of repressing protests more than in deterring crime. Palmer (1988, 9) writes "over the period of 1815-48, for government ministers and magistrates, the recurrent concerns, preserved in the archival sources, are riots and demonstrations, workingmen's crowds, and radical politics." As such he argues that although ordinary criminality was a concern, the frightening development was the threat posed by the laboring classes to the elites in power. The new police were charged with "protecting the social structure" and from its origins "always had as a function control of unruly mobs, and in particular, the suppression of working class demonstrations" (Friedman 1978).

In many ways, as illustrated above, the origins of the police as an institution are tied to Svoblik's twin problems of authoritarianism. On one hand the police were used as a centralized information and monitoring tool to control other elites (France and Russia) or established to suppress dissent and maintain social control in England and Ireland. This is important because we should not separate the challenges of policing today from the legacy of repression within policing, which is tied to repression and social order. A wave of historians argued that the emergence of policing in England was rooted in a "reassertion of state power in the face of a new and threatening conjuncture," which reflected the need for the elite to suppress the working-class "radicalism" of the 1830s and 1840s. Rather than focusing on deterring crime, the police in England emerged, at least in part, from the need to control and

suppress popular protests.

The first official police force in England was the government-controlled London police. However, other historians note that the oldest police force in Great Britain was actually the Dublin police experiment of 1786, a centralized state force that led to the establishment of the 1787 Irish County Police. In his book, *The Colonial Police*, Jeffries (1952, 30) notes: “that modern policing history begins not in Britain itself but in Ireland.” Reflecting on the origins of policing, Minto (1965, 28) described the ethnic bias – de-humanizing those controlled by the police – that was exhibited by the founder of policing in England as he learned from his experience in Ireland: “in a manner of speaking, [Peel] tried it on the dog. The dog was Ireland.” To the extent that Ireland was a theatre for the origins of modern policing, there is no surprise that the model of policing Great Britain exported to its colonies and protectorates was a coercive institution used to maintain control in often divided societies. In fact, the highly centralized Royal Irish Constabulary was the model that Britain would replicate when they established the first police force in Uganda. Seventy years after the London police were established, the Uganda Police Force was first established as Uganda Armed Constabulary (UAC) in 1899 with the main mandate of maintaining public order. In institutional design, recruitment, and operations, the UAC followed the Royal Irish Constabulary structure of armed policing – with a primary mandate of maintaining social control. Chapter 3 further discusses the development of policing within Uganda.

### **2.2.1 Why Studying the Police and Repression Matters**

Within the subfields of comparative politics and international relations, relatively few studies focus on the police and their relationship to human rights violations. Certainly, there is a robust literature that focuses on repression and the dictator’s agents



of repression.<sup>3</sup> In particular, an extensive literature studying repression examines its effects on political development, for example, the relationship between repression and protest (Gurr 1986, Lichbach 1995, 1987, Moore 1998, Tilly 1978, Rasler 1996, Opp 1994, Carey 2006, Zimmerman 1980).

Repression is defined as a mechanism of control to raise the cost of collective action or punish those already challenging the political status quo (Tilly 1978). The strategic goal of repression is to reduce the capacity and/or will to challenge the status quo by punishing those who oppose the regime or deterring future dissent (Galtung 1969, Nordås and Davenport 2013). Repression by the state takes several forms such as psychological intimidation (stigmatization or increased fear entering public spaces), infliction of material losses (loss of economic revenue and destruction of property), or physical rights violations (arrest, torture, disappearance, or death). Scholars have highlighted the challenges of studying repression and dissent, in part, because the relationship is endogenous, as “governments and dissidents act in expectation of each other’s behavior” (Ritter and Conrad 2016, 85).

Accordingly, the empirical findings are mixed. Some have found that dissent positively increases both the likelihood and severity of government repression. The theoretical claim is so consistently expressed and real-life examples of governments using repression as a mechanism to deter civilian dissent so ubiquitous, human rights scholars have referred to this relationship as the “Law of Coercive Responsiveness” (Davenport 2007). Others have argued and provided evidence that repression can both spark and deter dissident behavior, depending on government’s repressive tactics (Moore 1998). Targeting clandestine activities, for example, might decrease dissent but using it against overt, collective challenges might escalate dissent (Sullivan 2016). Scholars suggest that the “effectiveness of repression” might depend on its timing and type. Reactive, public crackdowns by police of individuals engaged in collective action

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<sup>3</sup>See, for example, Blaydes (2018), Greitens (2016).

might increase backlash effects (Curtice and Behlendorf 2020). Whereas, preventive repression might be more effective at deterring political opponents (Ritter and Conrad 2016, Truex 2019, Greitens 2016).

One common assumption in the study of repression is that the state is a unitary actor repressing to protect the status quo (Fariss 2014, Poe and Tate 1994, Murdie and Davis 2012, Henderson 1991, Carey 2006, Ritter and Conrad 2016, DeMeritt 2012).<sup>4</sup> Theoretically, the logic of repression develops from the interests and preferences of the executive. Political authorities, including democratically elected politicians and autocrats, prefer to maintain power. In the same way that democratically elected politicians must simultaneously deter intraparty threats and successfully campaign for voter support to maintain political office, non-elected leaders in authoritarian regimes must deter the twin threats to their rule: those that emerge from within their ruling coalition and others that come from those they have excluded from power. Empirically, most quantitative studies offer cross-national analysis with the primary unit of analysis at the country level, for example, country-year or country-month. Even studies examining within country variation in repression have typically focused on the interests of the political authorities.<sup>5</sup>

Within non-democratic regimes, leaders are motivated by political survival and must navigate the hazards of coups and revolution (De Bruin 2018, Svulik 2013). In democracies, elected politicians similarly must compete for primary seats against party members conspiring to shift the status quo and winning number of votes in the general elections to defeat members from opposition parties. Similar to constituent services in democracies, leaders in non-democracies can offer political and economic concessions to coopt political challengers. Yet unlike democracies where politics os-

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<sup>4</sup>Others focus on the political effects of repression and exposure to violence (Rozenas and Zhukov 2019, Zhukov and Talibova 2018, Gonzalez and Miguel 2015, Blattman 2009, Bratton and Masungure 2006).

<sup>5</sup>For example, Truex (2019) examines focal points and preemptive repression in China and Arriola (2014) studies 15,000 protest-related arrests in Ethiopia; both studies employ variation in the pattern of arrests as a proxy for repression motivated by the central government.

tensibly unfolds under the umbrella of the rule of law, the survival of autocrats and the politics of authoritarian regimes play out under the ever-present threat of violence. Consequently, how political authorities maneuver the politics of authoritarian rule is inevitably shaped by the politics of repression as the threats leaders face and their primary response to political opposition are characterized by violence. The most common hazard to the political survival of autocrats come from within the autocrat's military and their circle of inner elites. However, when political allies turn opponents and conspire to seize power in autocracies, the result is not a defeat in a primary but an attempted coup d'état. Similarly, rather than a political campaign against other parties, the external threat to their survival takes the form of unrest, protests, insurrection, and armed rebellion.

Although violence and brute force are never off the table in authoritarian politics, the hands of even the most repressive political authorities are usually clean. In short, political authorities delegate violence to others (Greitens 2016, Hassan 2017, Svobik 2012, DeMeritt 2012). Political authorities in non-democracies do not directly engage in repression; they task their agents to intern members of society, mass confiscate property, displace, imprison, torture, or engage in extra-judicial killings or genocide. Even more subtle forms of repression such as barriers to enfranchisement, limiting access to work, and censoring the flow of ideas are not directly conducted by the autocrat (Hassan 2017).

The politics of repression engenders a principal-agent problem because repressive policies are implemented every day by members of the security and police forces who are charged with *both* protecting the national security of the state and ensuring the survival of the regime. By focusing on the preferences and interests of the political authorities, interactions between police and citizens have remained under-explored. Two perspectives have relaxed the unitary actor assumption to address the principal-agent problem leaders have in organizing their policing apparatus. First, from a human

rights perspective within authoritarian politics, studies examine how governments structure their security apparatus to make sure that their security force obey orders to repress (Hassan 2017), deter threats from coups (Svolik 2012), and evade responsibility for human rights abuses (DeMeritt 2012, Cohen and Nordås 2015, Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014). Despite this robust literature on repression, we know less about how decisions by political authorities to employ various security institutions to repress dissent affects people’s support for those security institutions.

Recognizing this limitation, scholars have examined the relationship between political authorities and their security apparatus, considering the role of security forces as instruments of repression. Studies have examined the principal-agent problems associated with repression, including: the relationship between executives and individuals responsible for supervising and interrogating (torturing) state prisoners (Conrad and Moore 2010); why executives delegate human rights abuses to militias (Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014, Cohen and Nordås 2015); and the moral hazard of authoritarian repression and military intervention (Svolik 2013).

Most of these studies, however, focus on the security forces (Svolik 2013); pro-government militias (Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014); or the secret police (Greitens 2016). In non-democracies, coercive institutions are “a dictator’s final defense in pursuit of political survival, but also (the government’s) chief obstacle to achieving that goal” (Greitens 2016). Yet many of these studies implicitly – often even explicitly – focus on the dynamics between the government and the military, overlooking the role of the police. Svolik (2012), for example, refers to the soldiers as the “dictator’s repressive agent of last resort.”

Second, from a criminology and policing perspective, law and order and security more broadly are considered public goods provided by street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1971). Within American Politics, theorists have examined the adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with policing because policing requires high levels

of discretion (Wilson 1968); results in informational asymmetries between officers (agents) and policing principals (Wilson 1968, Goldstein 1960); and monitoring and oversight are costly and not always effective (Wilson 1968, Goldstein 1960). Much of this literature explores problems principals face when they are concerned about selecting the wrong officers or ensuring selected officers remain honest. However, the ideal officer is one who upholds the rule of law while protecting the community's rights.

This highlights another challenge within the literature: police officers are either street-level bureaucrats or cogs in the state's repressive apparatus. This is problematic, as it either assumes away the politics of policing or overlooks the front-line role that police have as repressive agents in many countries. From the first perspective, the prominent assumption is that if principals solve the moral hazard and adverse selection problems associated with policing, governments will effectively provide law and order. In the second perspective, leaders are often motivated by political survival, often at the cost of violating (or at least failing to protect) physical integrity and property rights. However, as discussed above, in many non-democracies the police, rather than the military, are the political authorities' primary instruments of repression.

Political authorities must determine the most effective way to engage in repression, and crucially this depends on who they task with repression, who they target, and how they target. That is, leaders must contract violence to agents they trust. These decisions are driven by three features of authoritarian control – compliance, information, and political threats/competition to the regime. After weighing these three elements the autocrat tasks the security and intelligence community with monitoring threats, following up on leads, and when information is credible, repressing political dissidents. However, the unitary actor assumption potentially biases our understanding of important sub-state variation in the behavior of and response to

the political actors responsible for most repression: the police.

Given the important role police in government, there is surprisingly little empirical research on public perception of police. A growing body of literature on policing is emerging to address this gap; however, few empirical studies examine police in non-democracies. In particular, we still lack empirical studies of the effects of repression on the public perception of police, especially in authoritarian regimes where the government is most likely to rely on repression to maintain power.

Consequently, despite almost daily human rights violations at the hands of the police, political scientists have not studied how state repression by the police affects public perceptions of the police and whether these abuses undermine the state's ability to provide law and order and security more broadly. In short, the interaction between civilians and the police remains under explored both theoretically and empirically. Despite a robust literature on state repression and dissent, we do not know whether individuals respond differently to police officers who use their coercive capacity in a measured way to provide law and order and safety for civilians compared to those who use excessive violence.

## **2.3 Co-production of Security**

In many contexts, political authorities use members of the security apparatus to repress dissent. Several governments employ their police force to suppress and control opposition movements. The Chinese government relies on their police and non-state security institutions to repress Uighur culture and traditions (Ong 2015). Authoritarian governments in Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe have used their police to restrict public spaces associated with political dissent, intimidating opposition supporters during elections, arresting and even torturing political opposition leaders. Since 2013, police in Egypt have imprisoned thousands of Islamist

opponents, as well as numerous liberal activists and journalists. In non-democracies where political authorities are not committed to the democratic transfer of power, people view actions taken by police through a broader political lens of the state. Acts of repression by members of the security apparatus should affect *both* people's perceptions of those who ordered the repression *and* the institution responsible for implementing it.

Studies show that people cooperate with police when they trust them and view them as legitimate authorities (Tyler 2006, Tyler and Fagan 2008, Blair, Karim and Morse 2019). However, police officers around the world have engaged in excessive force violating the physical integrity rights of protesters, journalists, and others. In Colombia and Bolivia, riots escalated after the police used repressive tactics to crack-down on anti-government protests. In Iraq, more than 200 people were killed in 2019 by police and other security forces during anti-government rallies. Rather than quelling dissent, the police violence encouraged greater turnout in street-level protests against the government actions. Similarly, in Spain, hundreds of protesters clashed with police in the heart of Barcelona, assembling fiery barricades and throwing rocks at security forces. In Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, political authorities rely on the police both for preventative and responsive repression to deter collective action.

Even in seemingly democratic societies, unequal policing and abuse results in diverging political outcome (Soss and Weaver 2017, Mummolo 2018). In the United States, thousands of protestors took to the street to protest the murders of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin and Breonna Taylor, a 26-year-old woman who was fatally shot by Louisville Metro Police Department officers in her home. The extrajudicial murders of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor were the latest result of the United States' unjust criminal justice system. Although the police in the United States are highly fragmented due to federalism, the protests were national. In

response to the protests and rallies, several political authorities called for a unified and repressive response to quell the protests. Although police officers may act alone using their coercive capacity in illegitimate ways, these examples highlight that across an array of regime types, political authorities justify using excessive police force “as legitimate action” to deter protesters and reestablish rule of law. But how do people view actions taken by the police?

Most theoretical and empirical studies of repression focus on its political effects (for example, how people view political authorities) rather than its effect on perception of those who implemented it. Existing studies have examined the relationship between repression and dissent (Davenport et al. 2019). We generally know that repression affects political development; however, the relationship between repression and civilian-police interactions remains under explored.<sup>6</sup> The theory developed here explores the second dynamic: how repression by the police affects public perception of the police.

To understand why repression undermines people’s confidence in the police and their willingness to cooperate with them, I develop a theoretical frame in which I argue that the co-production of law and order depends on three sets of actors: 1) political authorities; 2) the police; and 3) civilians. How people view the police and their role in society – and the effects of those perceptions on patterns of cooperation – depend on *both* their opinion of the police *and* their attitudes toward the government.

Broadly, the main purpose of government is to provide public goods. Of the many goods the state provides, such as healthcare and education, the provision of security may be one of the most important because without law and order society remains in relative anarchy (Wilson 1978, Weber 1946, Hobbes 1946). A Weberian definition considers the state the institution that “(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1946, 78).

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<sup>6</sup>See for example, Carey (2006), Davenport (2007), Moore (2000), Lichbach (1987), Henderson (1991), Gurr (2015), and Nordås and Davenport (2013).



Even in non-democracies, regimes see their ability to provide law and order as a cornerstone of legitimacy and economic development. Yet, the ability of states to provide security depends on actions of civilians. And importantly, these actions depend on how individuals view the actions the police take.

Police are generally responsible for providing law and order (Wilson 1978, Weber 1946, Hobbes 1946). However, police officers ability to effectively do their job depends on cooperation from civilians (Wilson 1978). This cooperation supposedly stems from people's trust in police, depending on whether or not they see the police as legitimate. (Lerman and Weaver 2014, Soss and Weaver 2017, Tyler and Fagan 2008). Police require the public's consent to maintain law and order. Police officers build or undermine that consent by behaving in a trustworthy way in their interactions with civilians. However, police are often co-opted for political objectives and deployed as repressive agents by political authorities to suppress collective action, intimidate political opponents, and ensure the political status quo (Arriola 2013, Hassan 2017, Truex 2019).

To maintain law and order, police require the public's consent; they build that consent by behaving in a trustworthy way during routine interactions with citizens. Citizen compliance with police and cooperation more broadly is foundational to maintaining social order and deterring criminal activity. Yet, police also engage in repressive acts such as targeting minority groups at disproportional rates, intimidating political opponents through electoral violence, and violently shutting down collective action by citizens (Arriola 2013, Hassan 2017, Truex 2019).

Public perception of police legitimacy are profoundly influenced by people's interactions with police (Lerman and Weaver 2014). Individuals' compliance with police is often determined by whether police are seen as procedurally fair and/or normative aligned with the communities they are policing (Tyler and Fagan 2008, Nagin and Telep 2017). Procedural justice relates to judgments about the manner in which

authority is exercised, including quality of decision-making such as neutrality and applying rules consistently in addition to judgments about the quality of interpersonal treatment: respect, politeness, and consideration of one's views. Normative alignment is the idea that the police share, reflect, and model the same set of values as the members of the community they are policing. Negative interactions with police can undermine citizens' confidence in the police and their willingness to interact with government (Skogan and Frydl 2004, Tyler 2003, 2004). Lerman and Weaver (2014) find that a high degree of stops involving the use of force, especially when they do not result in an arrest, have a chilling effect on neighborhood-level outreach to local government.

So, repression by the police should negatively affect how people view the police – people are more likely to see the police as illegitimate authorities and less aligned with the community. When political authorities use the police to repress dissent people are more likely to mistrust the regime and fear repression. Exploring the relationship between the political authorities, the security apparatus, and the civilians to answer the question of “how individuals relate to the security apparatus” is foundational to theories of government and state development. The first main theoretical claim is that repression by the police negatively affects how people view the police. Even when people support the political authorities, they are likely to negatively assess action the police take to repress dissent, decreasing support for the police as legitimate authorities. To understand why repression affects the provision of law and order it is important to consider the dual roles of police in many societies.

### **2.3.1 Two Roles of Police: Security and Repression**

Police officers often have two roles in society. First, they are responsible for providing security and law and order. Second, they are used by political authorities to repress dissent and maintain the political status quo. Critically, this means that

in many countries the internal security institution used most frequently by political authorities to repress dissent and enforce the political status quo is also responsible for deterring crime, enforcing law and order and providing security more broadly. Certainly, other security institutions, which include both formal institutions like the police and military forces and informal institutions such as elite police squads and pro-government militias, are also used as agents of repression (DeMeritt 2015, Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014, Blaydes 2018, Greitens 2016).

Yet, the primary security institution responsible for providing law and order is the police. One key characteristic of the police, relative to the military, is that they rely more heavily on people's willingness to cooperate with them to be effective. People's willingness to cooperate with police depends on public perceptions of the police as legitimate authorities. When political authorities rely on the police to repress dissent, it has implications beyond deterring dissent. As a tool used by political authorities to inflict fear and reduce dissent (Young 2019), repression likely increases people's fear of the police. The more people fear the police as repressive agents of the state, the less likely they are to support them.

Daily encounters between citizens and members of the police force are key to state development (Wilson 1978, Mazerolle et al. 2013). For many citizens, encounters with the police are the most likely interactions that people have with agents of the state (Lerman and Weaver 2014). As a consequence, the police and political authorities *both* rely on cooperation with the community to effectively accomplish their objectives (Tyler 2006, Skogan and Frydl 2004, Tyler and Fagan 2008). This cooperation can be characterized as citizens organizing neighborhood watches, taking note of suspicious activity, and reporting crimes. Critically, the police rely on information supplied by community members to prevent and solve crimes. They can receive this information only if citizens are willing to interact with them to provide it.

In general from studies of civilian-police interactions in democracies, we know that

people cooperate more with police when they trust them and view them as legitimate authorities (Tyler and Fagan 2008, Nagin and Telep 2017). Legitimacy is a function of whether or not individuals trust the police. I define legitimacy as “a feeling of obligation to obey the law and to defer to the decisions made by legal authorities” (Tyler and Fagan 2008, 235) Certainly, legitimacy must be seen as a multi-dimensional concept. Beetham (1991), for example, identifies three constituents of legitimacy: 1) conformity to established rules, 2) which can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by dominant and subordinate groups; with 3) evidence of consent by the subordinate group. Alternatively, Tyler (2006) defines it as the “acceptance by people of the need to bring their behaviour into line with the dictates of an external authority.” Accepting the legitimacy of authority is the belief that authorities should be obeyed and individuals should defer to that authority.

The legitimacy argument suggests that the “police can gain leverage for the co-production of security by inculcating the popular perception that their actions and decisions are legitimate” (Tyler and Fagan 2008, 235). The legitimacy-based framework linking legitimacy, compliance and cooperation generalizes across several policing contexts. See for example, studies on the United Kingdom (Tankebe 2013, Jackson et al. 2012), Ghana (Tankebe 2009), Hong Kong (Cheng 2015), and Israel (Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz 2014). People who view the police as legitimate should be more likely to do what they say, obeying police directives and showing deference even if individuals do not agree.

Governments require consent from citizens; however, this support depends on the perceived fairness of the government’s conduct. As Levi (1997, 16) argues “when citizens believe government actors promote immoral policies, have ignored their interests, or have actually betrayed them, citizens are unlikely to feel obligated to comply.” Coercive violence by the state often generates fear, which shapes people’s willingness to engage in dissent (Young 2019). One important dimension not explored

in the criminology literature or the literature on repression is the way that political authorities rely on the police to repress dissent and the effect this might have on people's perception of the police. Coercion against protestors can make people doubt their own loyalty to the ruling regime and question whether the security forces serve the interests of the citizens or the regimes, including their ability and willingness to protect them (Lupu and Wallace 2019).

Consequently, political authorities using violence to repress dissent may be perceived as inherently illegitimate to citizens, even those who support the regime (Weart 1998, Lupu and Wallace 2019). This is especially the case with escalating violence that becomes more indiscriminate. During indiscriminate repression citizens "can no longer assure themselves of immunity from repression by simply remaining politically inert" (Mason and Krane 1989, 176). However, even selective state repression involves observable violations of individuals' physical integrity rights. If people see human rights violations by the police, we should observe police abuse negatively shaping whether people believe the police treat individuals with dignity and respect and their expectations about whether the police make fair and impartial decisions.

When police act in ways that people believe are procedurally unfair, people will be more likely to fear encountering them. Fear of experiencing abuse likely determines whether people view the police as legitimate authorities. Fear and mistrust of the police should decrease people's willingness to interact with police, undermining the police's ability to gather information, investigate and deter crimes. People who mistrust the police are unlikely to cooperate with police, especially if they fear the outcome of their interactions. Similarly, when police act in ways that undermine their relationship to the communities they are policing, community members are more likely to believe that the police will engage in excessive force. In general, populations who mistrust and fear the police are likely to minimize their interactions with police. To the extent that political authorities relying on police to repress dissent might in-

fluence people's perception of the legitimacy of police – determining who cooperates with police in the provision of law and order – the effects of state repression on public perception of police is of significant importance to our theories of governance and development.

## 2.4 First Set of Theoretical Expectations

I expect state repression by the police to negatively affect public perception of the police and decrease support for the police. While negative interactions associated with directly experiencing police abuse should decrease whether people view the police as legitimate authorities, we might even observe selective repression of dissent adversely affecting how people view the police. If people believe the role of police is to provide law and order and protect the community, then observing coercion used on political opponents of the regime rather than suspected criminals should make the police more illegitimate in the eyes of the citizens. Individuals might see such abuse as a violation of procedural fairness and due diligence under the law to protect people.

More generally, people who believe that the police are agents of the political authorities using coercion to repress dissent are less likely to trust the police as street-level bureaucrats, keeping the community safe by providing law and order. When people observe the police engaging in repression, they are more likely to identify the police as repressive agents of the political authorities rather than local agents protecting the community. Viewing the police as agents of repression is likely to decrease cooperation, as the population in general is more likely to fear the police. Additionally, suppressing dissent explicitly uses excessive force to inflict fear *both* to punish protesters and deter future dissent (Young 2019). As a strategy, repression is a tool meant to increase fear (Ritter and Conrad 2016, Young 2019). People are more likely to view the police as repressive agents after observing them engage in

repression. Even if people remain unwilling to join the opposition in collective action against the state, they likely fear repression and view it as illegitimate behavior.

Consequently, repression decreases support for the police through a fear mechanism. People are more likely to see the police as legitimate and support them when the police behave in ways that are considered procedurally fair or when the police are normatively aligned with the community (Mazerolle et al. 2013). Violations to procedural fairness or normative alignment undermine police legitimacy, precisely because they increase fear and mistrust in the police (Skogan and Frydl 2004, Tyler 2003, 2004). The more people fear the police, the less likely they are to see them as legitimate authorities. The use of fear to control dissent is a go-to strategy for political authorities in non-democracies. However, when political authorities delegate repression to the police and the police use coercive force, people see them as agents of repression rather than law enforcement officers. The more people fear and mistrust the police, the more likely they are to see the police as illegitimate authorities.

**Hypothesis 1.** (*Police Repression*): *State repression by the police decreases support for the police.*

### 2.4.1 Conditional Effects of Incumbent Support

While repression is likely to negatively affect public perceptions of the police, how people view actions taken by the police is likely to be shaped by people's political affiliations. Political authorities are likely to frame orders they give the police to quell dissent as necessary for the security of the public. Accordingly, repression is likely to have heterogeneous effects on individuals' perceptions of the police depending on whether they support or oppose the political authorities.

A perspective based on motivated reasoning would predict that people interpret repressive action based on their support for or opposition to the political authorities who ordered the repression. Evidence from survey experiments in Argentina, India,

Israel, and Uganda shows that people are less likely to support the government if the government uses excessive force (Curtice and Behlendorf 2020, Lupu and Wallace 2019). Lupu and Wallace (2019), for example, find a negative effect of government violence on support for the government; however, this is significant only in Argentina and not Israel or India. They suggest one possible explanation for this is that the “most notorious human rights abuses in Argentine history have targeted broad sectors of society” whereas abuses in Israel are mostly targeted.” Curtice and Behlendorf (2020) find that excessive violence by police results in political backlash.

Even in democracies people are considerably more supportive of government abuse – specifically the use of torture – if it is directed at individuals who they perceive as threatening (Conrad et al. 2018). Two contextual factors might drive people’s willingness to support torture: first, a clear perception of the other as a “threat;” and second, an effective rule of law constraining government abuse against the majority of civilians. People’s tolerance of “government crackdowns may depend on whether the resistance campaign is nonviolent or violent, as repressing nonviolent campaigns may backfire” (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 68). Following the logic of motivated reasoning, we might expect that people would interpret actions taken by the police as legitimate or not depending on whether they support or challenge their political preferences.

Beliefs about whether or not repressive action taken by the police is legitimate are likely to depend on a partisan lens and other characteristics like ethnicity. Individuals supporting the incumbent (for example, ruling political authorities) might view political opponents engaging in collective action as social deviants disturbing social order. Additionally, we might expect groups who experience disproportionate amounts of police abuse based on their ethnic or racial group are less likely to see the police as legitimate (Knox, Lowe and Mummolo 2020, Edwards, Lee and Esposito 2019, Soss and Weaver 2017).



We might expect people who align with the political authorities – either politically, ethnically, or both to support state repression by the police, as those actions might be perceived as necessary, to maintain the political status quo. From this perspective, police using force to deter dissent should increase support for the police among those who express political support for the incumbent government or share ethnicity. I develop implications of in-group bias associated with ethnicity below.

Conversely, people who do not politically identify with the political authorities should be less likely to justify repression, seeing any act of repression by the police as a clear violation of the role of police in society. Individuals who do not identify as loyal to the incumbent regime are relatively more likely to support challenges to the status quo, seeing repression as unjustifiable. They are more likely to see political violence by the police, even selective repression, as a signal that the police are aligned with the political authorities rather than the community they are meant to be protecting. Even if they do not directly fear repression, opposition supporters are likely to see repression by the police as illegitimate action that deviates from their mandate to provide security.

However, the more ubiquitous political violence by the police becomes in society the more repression negatively affects how people are likely to view the police through a potential fear mechanism, even across the whole range of regime supporters. The fear mechanism works in such a way that the more exposed people are to police abuse the more likely they are to be afraid of encountering officers and mistrust their role as state agents. Certainly, individuals' loyalty to political authorities might affect how they respond to repression by police; however, if even incumbent supporters are less likely to fear potential repression they are likely to lose confidence in the police when they use violence against political dissidents.

Rather than expecting incumbent supporters to approve of repression by the police, I expect that political loyalty to the regime moderates the effect of repression

on perceptions of the police based on whether or not people believe they are likely to experience repression. People who support the political authorities by attending pro-regime rallies, campaigning for candidates, and joining the ruling party should be less likely to fear repression. Alternatively, people who are engaged in collective action opposing the political status quo are more likely to fear experiencing future repression.

Consequently, we would expect that people who identify as regime supporters should be less likely to fear repression relative to non-supporters. The fear mechanism is reflected by the confessional poem by Martin Niemöller regarding citizens' silence in the face of Nazi repression: "First they came for the Communists And I did not speak out Because I was not a Communist Then they came for the Socialists And I did not speak out Because I was not a Socialist Then they came for the trade unionists And I did not speak out Because I was not a trade unionist Then they came for the Jews And I did not speak out Because I was not a Jew Then they came for me And there was no one left To speak out for me." Implicit is the idea that repression often starts with the other, followed by silence and denial, but the result is that it eventually affects all. The more the repression targets members of an in-group the more likely members of that group are to see the action as illegitimate; however, that does not mean that others will not eventually be touched by state violence, including former supporters.

**Hypothesis 2.** (*Police Repression Conditional on Partisanship*): *The extent to which repression by police decreases public support for the police is larger when the respondent supports the opposition.*

## 2.4.2 Implications for Patterns of Crime

The first set of theoretical expectations is that repression negatively affects public perceptions of police and that these effects are stronger among those who oppose

the incumbent government. However, what are the broader implications of these findings for patterns of law and order? In my theory above, I argue that the co-production of law and order depends on political authorities, police, and civilians. The more people support the incumbent the less likely they are to mistrust the police. People who support the incumbent should be more willing to interact with the police. Consequently, people who support the incumbent should express higher levels of trust in the police. If higher levels of trust increase cooperation then these areas should have more effective police and lower levels of crime. Accordingly, one direct implication is that areas with higher levels of electoral support for the regime should experience lower levels of crime.

**Hypothesis 3.** *Districts with higher levels of electoral support for the incumbent are likely to have less crimes.*

A second mechanism through which mistrust might affect people's cooperation in the provision of law and order is the number of police officers deployed to a district. If people believe that police officers are illegitimate coercive agents working for the political authorities to maintain control and repress dissent, then higher levels of police deployments are likely to decrease cooperation. This expectation diverges from a theory of policing that only views police officers as street-level bureaucrats, which would expect that districts with more police forces should experience less crime. This alternative theory would expect that increased police deployments should foster confidence in the police, increase cooperation, and decrease crime as these areas have higher levels of state capacity to deter crimes. Accordingly, areas with higher police presence are likely to have higher levels of crime.

**Hypothesis 4.** *Districts with higher levels of police presence are likely to have more crimes.*

## 2.5 Ethnicity, Repression, and Police

The theory above argues that repression negatively affects how people view the police and these perceptions in turn impact how effective the police are at providing security. However, political identity is only one important division in society. While partisanship might shape how political authorities, police, and civilians view one another, partisanship is prone to preference falsification – people and police officers for example might say they support the political authorities when, in fact, they do not. In the contexts where political authorities rely on the police to repress dissent, political authorities and the security apparatus often rely on additional heuristic cues to ensure loyalty to the regime.

One important characteristic that people use as a heuristic is ethnicity. Ethnicity is important because it is highly observable and known by the actors. In this context, like co-partisanship – ethnicity operates as another potential source of bias. This results in co-ethnic bias; members of the same ethnic group systematically privilege interacting with individuals from their own ethnic group. Certainly, salient societal cleavages can be drawn along a range of societal and political characteristics: linguistic, regional, religious, sectarian, urban/rural, rich/poor, and, as is the main focus of this study, political and ethnic affiliations. However, political lines of inclusion and exclusion are often drawn along salient ethnic cleavages – ascriptive characteristics – delineating “us” versus “them.”

Conceptually, the primary criterion of ethnicity is ascription or connection through birth to an identity. This conceptualization of ethnicity follows Horowitz’s 1985 canonical work on ethnicity and conflict. Individuals can convert to a different religion or learn a new language; however, the idea of ethnicity is that while they can be fluid they are often quite fixed. Ethnicity is a broader term than identity linked to race and language. Within the umbrella term of ethnicity, as Kanbur, Rajaram and Varshney (2011) argue, “religion, caste, tribe, race and language are simply different

forms of ethnicity.”

In this section, I explore why ascriptive characteristics like ethnicity become another factor that affects people’s attitudes and behavior towards the police. Scholars contend that “at the national level, politics in many, if not all, parts of the world, is often structured along ethnic lines, with major political parties representing different ethnic groupings” Kanbur, Rajaram and Varshney (2011, 11). Ethnic divisions influence the realm of politics across several dimensions. For example, political divisions often drawn along ethnic cleavages have been linked to the distribution of public goods and economic growth (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999, Miguel and Gugerty 2005), communal violence and riots (Wilkinson 2006, Varshney 2002, 2008), and the probability of civil war (Collier 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

The ethnic politics literature frequently focuses on patterns of cooperation or conflict. Scholars demonstrate that members of the same ethnic group accomplish things because their coethnic networks provide better information (Fearon and Laitin 1996, Varshney 2001, Habyarimana et al. 2007, Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2010, Miguel 2004). Habyarimana et al. (2009) argue that ethnic homogeneity is associated with more cooperative outcomes. Members of the same ethnic groups are assumed to cooperate more because they are more successful at achieving collective action (Habyarimana et al. 2009, 7).<sup>7</sup>

Others consider the flip-side of ethnicity, linking it to conflict rather than cooperation. For example, ethnic politics has been used to explain conflict dynamics such as civilian victimization and recruitment (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006, Weinstein

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<sup>7</sup>Habyarimana et al. (2009) identify and summarize eight possible mechanisms across three categories – preferences, technology, and strategy selection – for why coethnics are more cooperative with each other. There are preferences mechanisms: coethnics are more likely to take each other’s welfare into account (other-regarding preferences); care about the same outcomes (preferences in common); and prefer the process of working together (preferences over process). There are technology mechanisms, – coethnics may be able to function together more efficiently (efficacy); gauge each other’s characteristics (readability); interact more frequently (periodicity); and track each other down (reachability). Finally, there are strategy selection mechanisms, coethnics may be more equipped to punish each other for failing to cooperate (reciprocity).

2007); and the geography and intensity of fighting (Slack and Doyon 2001, Petersen 2001, Toft 2005, Kaufmann 1996, Weidmann 2009). Yet, these arguments are contested as others argue that ethnic identities are more fluid, pointing to the historical record of individuals “defecting” against their in-group or changing their identities under conflict pressures (Kalyvas 2006, Wood 2008).

While scholars have attempted to draw causal links between ethnic diversity and politically violent outcomes, others challenge these claims (Varshney 2007). Most notably, Fearon and Laitin (1996) argue that ethnic heterogeneity does not lead to violent consequences. Scholars maintain that what identity is at any given point, how its salience fluctuates, or how malleable it is with another identity are “constructed” by various institutions, historical periods, economic endowments, demography and politics (Laitin 1998, Fearon and Laitin 2000, Brubaker and Laitin 1998, Posner 2005). Varshney (2007), for example, offers a helpful review and critique of the constructivist perspective on ethnic identity and ethnic conflict. Although members of ethnic groups can defect against their in-group (Kalyvas 2006, Wood 2008), these identities are often fixed as members are enmeshed in a network of self-reinforcing cultural norms and institutions. Anthropologists, for example, have argued, as Kanbur, Rajaram and Varshney (2011, 6) note, that this rigidity in identity stems from the “repetition of custom and ritual, often backed by the state, that creates an ideology of their inflexibility and salience.”<sup>8</sup>

Within non-democracies, the political lines of inclusion and exclusion are frequently drawn along salient ethnic cleavages. Ethnic cleavages have shaped the politics in authoritarian states ranging from Afghanistan, Sudan, Syria, Bahrain, Ethiopia, Uganda, Turkey, Rwanda, Burundi, and others. In authoritarian contexts, autocrats can rule through systems of nepotism and patronage with a single coethnic or by forming a coalition among several ethnic groups by and large because they are

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<sup>8</sup>For example, see Mamdani (1996), Mafeje (1971), Derks and Roymans (2009).

able to foster more cooperative outcomes by working with their own ethnic group. So although ethnic heterogeneity might not lead to conflict, it often hinders political and economic cooperation across salient ethnic cleavages (Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan 2005).

Additionally, in many non-democracies, political authorities often stack key positions in the government with co-ethnics and political opponents are frequently members of ethnic out-groups. Economic and political cooperation and patterns of conflict, in authoritarian contexts, often results in ethnically drawn political in-and-out groups. Yet, there is a gap in our understanding of how dissent and repression unfold in ethnically diverse states governed by authoritarian regimes. This is troubling because, as Arriola (2013) shows, “autocracies and partial democracies have levels of ethnic diversity that are 40–50 percent higher, on average, than countries considered full democracies.” Ethnic division is likely to shape the politics of authoritarian rule – especially how leaders navigate reliance on their security forces.

Consequently, policing, which is challenging in the best of political conditions, is especially tricky in non-democratic, fragile, and post-conflict environments. These environments are often shaped by low state capacity, high levels of corruption, and strong ethnic cleavages forged by exposure to violence. However, how these ethnic identities condition citizen-police interactions, including the willingness of individuals to cross ethnic lines to cooperate with the police, remains a neglected area of study. I argue that ethnicity matters in non-democratic states as it shapes the behavior of political authorities, police, and citizens.

For police in non-democratic states, gathering information on emerging population threats and deterring dissent exist next to their more mundane tasks of everyday policing. One challenge political authorities face is how can they make sure that their directives to police to repress are followed. If security forces refuse to use violence against those they are policing, collective action against the regime might

spread. Political authorities, accordingly, have incentives to take actions to ensure that the preferences of the police officers are relatively more aligned with them than the community members the police officers are encountering.

In my theory presented above, the co-production of law and order depends on how people view both political authorities and police. Yet even when political authorities task both repression and security to the police, police officers still rely on cooperation from citizens to effectively accomplish their objectives (Tyler 2006, Skogan and Frydl 2004). For citizens living in non-democracies, their decision to cooperate with police involves a costly calculation as these same agents might use repression against those they suspect are opposed to the regime (Truex 2019, Arriola 2014, Blaydes 2018, Greitens 2016). How might mistrust of the role of police in society interact with ethnic characteristics? This section derives a set of hypotheses regarding how citizens cooperate with police focusing on the role of identity to signal political actors' interests and preferences.

Cooperation includes police relying on citizens to voluntarily comply with their directives, provide information, and tacitly obey the law (Mazerolle et al. 2013). One of the most important forms of cooperation is reporting crimes to the police. A growing research agenda explores the challenges of policing; however, most focus on consolidated democracies (Mummolo 2018, Eckhouse 2019, Braga et al. 2014) or security sector reform in post conflict environments (Blair, Karim and Morse 2018). The consensus view is people in democracies follow the law and cooperate when they view police as legitimate (Tyler 2006, Mazerolle et al. 2013). One implication of this argument is that police officers will be inefficient at gathering information on emerging threats if they are unable to solicit information from individuals who experienced a crime. So although police are the agents tasked with providing law and order, their capacity to do so depends on their ability to foster cooperation from communities where they are policing (Mazerolle et al. 2013).



Negative interactions or repression by the police are likely to undermine citizens' confidence in the police. However, even in environments where the police use repression, people still rely on the police to provide law and order – deterring crime and keeping communities safe. Whether citizens believe police are legitimate depends on how police treat people and exercise their authority. Policing in non-democracies varies from democracies as police are responsible for providing security and repressing political dissent. For police in non-democracies, maintaining control, gathering information on emerging population threats, and suppressing dissent exist next to their more mundane tasks of everyday policing. On one hand, police are the institution responsible for providing law and order to secure the state (Lipsky 1971, Wilson 1978, Mazerolle et al. 2013). On the other, police in non-democracies are security agents tasked with everyday acts of repression to deter dissent and control citizens, ensuring the autocrat's survival (Greitens 2016, Hassan 2017, Arriola 2013, Truex 2019, Curtice and Behlendorf 2020).

Considering the politics of policing is important because the political authorities' need for their security forces to obey orders to repress to deter potential threats does not negate the police's reliance on citizens' cooperation. So even in non-democracies, where submission is required more than loyalty (Havel 1978), police still rely on citizens to accomplish their objectives. But, how do citizens navigate security concerns regarding crime against risks associated with interacting with police?

In multi-ethnic societies, I argue that citizens use police officers' ethnicity to form beliefs about the role of police in society. In-group bias becomes an important heuristic for people when interacting with police. In-group bias is defined as the systematic tendency of individuals to privilege one's own group "in-group" to members of another group "out-group" (Hewstone, Rubin and Willis 2002). I theorize that citizens use police officers' ethnicity to form beliefs about the role of police in society. In particular, coethnic bias affects cooperation with police because citizens: i) cooperate

more with officers who share their ethnicity; and ii) fear repression more when encountering non-coethnic police officers. This second mechanism depends on citizens' level of trust in the regime.

To understand why ethnicity affects who cooperates with police, it is helpful to return to the principal-agent problems discussed above. Broadly, there are two types of principal-agent problems: adverse selection and moral hazard. In adverse selection, the principal selects an agent who likely does not share the principal's preference because she does not know *ex ante* why the agent makes their decisions (i.e., information, beliefs, and values). Moral hazard occurs because agents might shirk if they are not monitored completely by their principal (Moe 1984). Two threats emerge for leaders who select "bad" agents from the perspective of the government. First, the police might shirk – not do what they are supposed to do – by siding with the community they are policing rather than obey the regime. Second, the police might use their means of violence to challenge the state through a coup.

Political authorities have strategic reasons to ensure police align with their interests and not the population (Blaydes 2018, Greitens 2016). Security agents who are isolated from communities and aligned with autocrats are more likely to comply with autocrats' orders to repress (Hassan 2017, Greitens 2016) and coup less frequently (Greitens 2016). Leaders in multiethnic societies attempt to overcome adverse selection and moral hazard associated with repression by manipulating the social composition of the security force and appointing key security portfolios to trusted allies (Hassan 2017, Greitens 2016, Blaydes 2018).

Political authorities *stack* or *shuffle* their security apparatus – systematically positioning members of their social or ethnic in-group to key security sector portfolios and manipulating the composition of the security forces – to ensure repressive compliance and limit threats from coups (Harkness 2016, Quinlivan 1999, Roessler 2011, Belkin and Schofer 2003, Hassan 2017, Greitens 2016). These studies consider the link

between autocrats and their security apparatus (typically referring to the military, secret police, or militias) exploring how autocrats attempt to solve principal-agent problems associated with suppressing dissent to ensure repressive compliance and coup-proof.

When their in-group is a minority ethnic group lacking the requisite number to staff positions, as in the case of Uganda, leaders solve their policing staffing problem by rotating officer posts or not posting agents in their home communities. By hiring officers *outsiders* who do not share common ethnicity with the community they are patrolling, leaders decrease the probability that the security apparatus fails to comply with orders to repress.

Previous studies theorize that autocrats manipulate the social composition of their security apparatus to reduce the threat posed by coups and increase their officers willingness to use repression (Hassan 2017, Greitens 2016). The logic is that people will be less likely to use violence against the regime if they are aligned and more willing to use violence against the communities if they are not-aligned. The main assumption is that out-group officers – those who do not share ethnicity with the communities they are policing – will be more likely to comply with order to repress communities than officers who share ethnicity with the community.

The logic that political authorities hire/deploy non-co-ethnic police officers to police communities is that ethnicity will likely influence police officers' willingness to use repression. When governments rely on police to repress dissent, this leads to the repression dilemma. Namely, police officers will be more willing to repress individuals who do not share their ethnicity but citizens will be less likely to comply with non-co-ethnics or officers from outside of their community.

Accordingly, actions the government take to ensure that police officers are loyal to the regime should condition people's beliefs about the role of police in society likely decreasing policing effectiveness when citizens encounter officers who do not

share their ethnicity. Rather than focusing on the relationship between political authorities and their security apparatus, this theory explicitly considers the flip-side of the coin: the relationship between citizens and police. By doing so, I argue that political authorities hiring outsiders to police communities should decrease citizens cooperation with the police and in turn the state's ability to provide security.

Civilian-police interactions pose risks to civilians in multi-ethnic states in which political leaders have not displayed a commitment to democratic turnover in office (for example, unconsolidated democracies, dictatorships) and use the police and judiciary for political ends to repress political dissent. In these settings, ethnic identity influences the behavior of actors at all levels. For political leaders who are trying to remain in power (often against popular will), the police are an important institution by which they can monitor, control, and repress political opposition.<sup>9</sup> To ensure that the police – and other parts of the security apparatus – serve as a reliable pillar of their rule, leaders in multi-ethnic states frequently over-staff these institutions with loyalists from their (or allied) ethnic groups (Greitens 2016, Quinlivan 1999, Roessler 2011). When demographic limitations make stacking difficult, leaders can resort to shuffling around officers so that dissident areas are policed by loyalists, particularly during politically sensitive moments (Hassan 2017).

In Libya, for example, Gaddafi frequently promoted junior officers from within his own tribe, the Qadadfa, to sensitive posts such as the Cyrenaica region, the Benghazi sector, command of armaments and munitions, military and domestic security, and even the air force. All were almost exclusively stacked with members of the Qadadfa (Gaub 2013). Similarly, the security apparatus in Bahrain is based on the exclusion of the Shias largely because the ruling dynasty comes from the Sunni minority and

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<sup>9</sup>The Chinese government, for example, relies on their police to repress dissent, cracking down on religious practices in Xinjiang associated with the Uighur culture and traditions. Governments in Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe have used their police to restrict public spaces associated with political dissent, intimidating opposition supporters during elections, arresting and even torturing political opposition leaders.

the opposition is dominated by Shia Islamic movements (Louër 2013). Often key security roles are even filled by members of the autocrat's family. For example, Yoweri Museveni's son, General Kainerugaba, was in charge of the Special Forces tasked with the president's security from 2008 to 2017. Kainerugaba was promoted to be a special presidential adviser, after several military officers in Uganda, including some senior ones were arrested in an attempt to overthrow Museveni.<sup>10</sup>

Ethnicity also conditions the attitudes and behaviors of members of the security forces. For police officers, their behavior towards citizens may be conditional on whether they share ethnic ties with members of the community. The broader literature on ethnic politics suggests that co-ethnics may be more willing to cooperate with each other due to affinity or strategic considerations (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999, Fearon and Laitin 1996, Habyarimana et al. 2007). In this context, police officers may be *more* willing to solve crimes on behalf of their co-ethnics and *less* willing to repress them. Ethnicity also shapes wartime attitudes about informing and beliefs about retaliation (Lyall, Shiraito and Imai 2015). Even in high-risk settings, such as conflict, identity consideration still affect people's attitudes and behaviors (Arriola 2013, Lyall, Shiraito and Imai 2015). It is precisely for the latter reason that leaders engage in stacking and shuffling.

This dynamic is illustrated by the recent events in Bahrain. The minority Sunni dictatorship stacked their security forces with fellow Sunnis as a bulwark against the Shias majority opposition rather than a mechanism to neutralize threats from within. Coethnic ties drawn along sectarian cleavages in Bahrain are more important to the dictatorship than even ties to national identity. Following the 2011 uprising in Bahrain, Louër (2013, 246) writes that "sectarian profiling and recruitment of foreign mercenaries have enabled the regime virtually to avoid recruiting Shias in

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<sup>10</sup>See "Uganda Arrests Dozens of Military Leaders Accused of Plotting Coup," *New York Times*, June 6, 2016 (<https://nyti.ms/3eGMCfB>) and "Uganda's Museveni promotes son to special adviser role," *BBC News* (<https://bbc.in/2Vqb6Cn>).

the four main security agencies that are in charge of protecting the ruling elites.”<sup>11</sup> As was illustrated by the harsh suppression of the Shia 2011 uprising in Bahrain, “there is little doubt that the recruitment pattern of the Bahraini security forces was instrumental in ensuring that no segment of the security apparatus sided with the protestors” (Louër 2013, 259).

For citizens, ethnicity affects their beliefs about the role of police in the community. The ethnicity of the police officer likely shapes people’s expectations about the interaction and the eventual outcome. Coethnic bias – the systematic tendency of individuals to privilege a member of their “in-group” to members of another “out-group” – likely affects people’s interactions with police for several reasons. People might expect co-ethnic police will exert more effort for a co-ethnic. Others might expect that co-ethnic officers will be more effective.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, people might have the expectation that a co-ethnic officer will be less likely to extort bribes from a co-ethnic. Finally, people might have affection or affinity for co-ethnic officers rooted in shared ethnic ties. In general, co-ethnic bias should increase individuals willingness to cooperate in the provision of law and order with police officers who share their identity. This logic dovetails with more general arguments about the role of ethnicity, cooperation and the provision of public goods (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999, Fearon and Laitin 1996, Habyarimana et al. 2007).

## 2.6 Second Set of Theoretical Expectations

The added challenge to cooperation for citizens in the context of citizen-police interaction is that they are aware of the dual role of police: the police are there to provide law enforcement to the benefit of the community but also to monitor and control

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<sup>11</sup>In Bahrain these security agencies are the Bahrain Defense Force, the National Guard, the police forces depending on the Ministry of Interior and the National Security Agency.

<sup>12</sup>Co-ethnic officers might be able to engender cooperation from potential witnesses because they speak the same language and are embedded in the same social networks.

dissent to the benefit of the political authorities. So interacting with police – by providing information, organizing neighborhood watches – may help the community, but also makes individuals more known and visible to agents of repression. So civilians must weigh whether they believe police officers they encounter serve as “street level bureaucrats” providing security as a public good (Lipsky 1971) or repressive agents ensuring the incumbent’s survival (Greitens 2016, Hassan 2017, Blaydes 2018).

In this context, ethnic identity functions as a cue for citizens. Shared ethnicity engenders beliefs that the officers are likely to be more effective in helping them and to treat them well. In other words, when encountering officers who share their ethnicity, people should be more confident of the officers’ role to provide safety and security. However, encountering non-co-ethnic officers might remind people that police also function as agents of repression. For citizens, this reasoning for favoring co-ethnics exists not only for reasons of affinity or effectiveness, but also due to fear and trust in the police and political authorities. Importantly, this does not assume that co-ethnics do not behave badly. But rather, it assumes that people are more likely to reward good-performing officers if they are coethnics, and mistrust bad performers if they are non-co-ethnics.<sup>13</sup>

As a strategy by political authorities, repression is meant to punish political disloyalty, deter acts of dissent and induce obedience (Lichbach 1987, Young 2019, Ritter and Conrad 2016, Lyall 2009, Zhukov and Talibova 2018, García-Ponce and Pasquale 2015). However, such tactics can also incite political opposition, mobilizing future collective action (Gurr 2015, Finkel 2015, Balcells 2012). Exposure to violence and repression has both short-term and long-term effects on individuals’ relationship to the state (Rozenas and Zhukov 2019, Blattman 2009, Bratton and Masunungure 2007, Zhukov and Talibova 2018). Indeed, exposure to conflict and repression likely decreases people’s trust in state institutions, particularly trust in those institutions

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<sup>13</sup>For evidence of this behavior in other contexts, see Adida et al. (2017).

associated with repression (Hutchison and Johnson 2011, Linke 2013, Linke, Schutte and Buhaug 2015). Whether individuals attribute blame to the police, believing they are responsible for the violence and insecurity likely affects perceptions of police effectiveness, confidence in the police, and patterns of cooperation (Zahnow et al. 2017, Buckley et al. 2016).

In unconsolidated democracies and autocracies, citizens' trust in political authorities such as the executive and the courts in addition to their trust in the police is important because citizens suspect that leaders use the criminal justice system to serve their own ends. When citizens mistrust their leaders, their distrust of non-co-ethnic police is magnified since the police serve as agents of these leaders. An individual becomes unwilling to make "herself vulnerable to another individual, group, or institution that has the capacity to do her harm or betray her" (Levi and Stoker 2000, 476).

People who mistrust the regime – fear the potential for repression – should be less willing to make themselves vulnerable to the police unless they are co-ethnic police officers who they expect will be more helpful and present a lower risk of repression. So while there is a baseline tendency to favor interaction with co-ethnics (due to affinity and concerns about effectiveness), this co-ethnic bias is exacerbated among those who are especially fearful of the regime and its security apparatus.

**Hypothesis 5.** *(Co-ethnic Bias): People will prefer to report crimes to co-ethnic police officers relative to non-co-ethnic officers.*

**Hypothesis 6.** *(Co-ethnic Bias and Mistrust): The effects of ethnicity will increase in magnitude with greater degrees of mistrust in the police and mistrust in political authorities.*



## 2.7 Summary

This chapter introduces the origins of policing, highlighting how the earliest police forces were designed as an institution to address the dual threat of authoritarian power-sharing and control. In the United Kingdom, the police were used to maintain social control. Whereas, in other parts of Europe, the police were used as a tool to monitor threats to the dictator that might emerge from within the inner circles of power. Over time the police evolved into an institution responsible for deterring crime and providing safety and security by enforcing the rule of law. However, as my theory posits, in many societies, the police are not merely agents of repression or street-level bureaucrats rather they are often responsible for providing both functions.

Arguing that the co-production of law and order depends on political authorities, police, and civilians, I derive two sets of hypotheses. The first set posits that repression by the police negatively affects how people view the police. Although political characteristics are likely to condition the effects of repression, I theorize that fear of the police decreases support for the police, even among those who support the incumbent regime. However, I expect that the effects of repression will be strongest among those who oppose the incumbent leaders. This has implications for levels of crime in society. Namely, we are likely to observe higher levels of crime in areas with higher levels of opposition to the regime.

The second set of hypotheses stem from how ethnicity shapes the preferences and behaviors of political authorities, police officers, and civilians. Rather than focusing on the principal agent problem between the political authorities (as the principal) and the police (as the agents), I examine how civilians form beliefs about the role of the police using ethnicity as a social cue. I argue that ethnicity shapes how civilians view the police in part because they prefer interacting with police officers who share their ethnicity but also because they fear repression more when encountering non-co-ethnic officers. Fear of repression increases mistrust in the regime, which also increases co-

ethnic bias – systematic tendency of individuals to privilege their own ethnic group to another one.

## Chapter 3

# Brief History of Policing in Uganda

If I stood for elections against a cow in a police barracks, I would get 10 votes against the cow's 100.  
President Museveni, 2002<sup>1</sup>

### 3.1 Introduction

In October 2018, I was preparing to pilot the conjoint experiment in Gulu district. I was talking with a man in northern Uganda when our conversation turned to the upcoming elections in 2021. After telling me that he expected the political violence to just get worse as the elections approached, he turned to me and said: “In many ways, Museveni is like an old dog that has lost his ability to smell – he now bites at everything that moves.” He expressed it more as a proverb than an opinion. As is often the case with Acholi proverbs, there was much truth to his statement.

As a leader, Museveni has refused to abide by constitutional presidential term limits and his administration frequently turned to the security forces, especially the police, to repress political opponents. As this chapter shows, his government's reliance on the police to repress political opponents is a well-worn pattern, which likely

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<sup>1</sup>“Uganda: Police Would Vote a Cow Not Me, Says Museveni” *The Monitor*, September 2, 2002, <https://bit.ly/3aNsBSm>

increases Ugandans' mistrust in political authorities and the police.

When Museveni took control of Uganda with the National Resistance Army in 1986, scholars and policymakers thought that it might be a turning point from Uganda's post-independence history, which had been marked by a series of coups, conflicts, and dictatorships. In 2003, the United States president George Bush praised Museveni's leadership in promoting public health, holding Uganda up as model for combating the AIDs epidemic and promising United States' support.<sup>2</sup> Additionally, Uganda was seen as a key ally in the United States' fight against terrorism. The United States even provided military assistance and troops to partner with Uganda in their fight against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).<sup>3</sup>

Uganda became a model example of what William Easterly refers to as *authoritarian development*, a path of development that favored economic and technical development to political accountability (Easterly 2014). Economists and development observers would praise Uganda's growth under the leadership of the seemingly "benevolent autocrat" Museveni and his ruling political party the National Resistance Movement (NRM). "This is an African success story," said Christine Lagarde, International Monetary Fund Managing Director. "Uganda has experienced a threefold increase in per capita GDP over the past generation. And you have reduced extreme poverty to one-third of the population."<sup>4</sup>

However, the closing of political space and patterns of political violence tell another story. First, under Museveni Uganda has experienced several years of civil conflict. The main conflict in northern Uganda led to the displacement of almost 90% of the population in northern Uganda with estimates ranging from 1.3 to 2 million people displaced into internally displacement (IDP) camps. The rebels and

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<sup>2</sup>"Bush Has Praise for Uganda In Its Fight Against AIDs," *New York Times*, July 12,2003, <https://nyti.ms/2Rmx3js>.

<sup>3</sup>"Obama Takes on the LRA," *Foreign Affairs*, November 15, 2011, <https://fam.ag/2xSss1A>.

<sup>4</sup>"Becoming the Champion: Uganda's Development Challenge," *Christine Lagarde, IMF Managing Director* January 27, 2017, <https://bit.ly/3bZZ4oC>.

government forces committed severe human rights abuse during the conflict. Civilian targets such as schools, homes, IDP camps, and families experienced attacks on a daily basis and tens of thousands of people were massacred, mutilated and abducted mostly in northern Uganda.


Second, opposition leaders have been routinely repressed by political authorities. In 2001, the NRM leadership split when Kizza Besigye (Museveni's former physician and collaborator during the Bush war) ran against Museveni in the election. In July 2005, 92% of voters approved the introduction of a multiparty system by referendum. Only 42% of the electorate voted in the 2005 referendum. However, the vote was a marked departure from the 2000 referendum where 90.7% voters said they wanted a "Movement" rather than a "Multiparty" political system. Even with limited political freedom, Besigye would challenge Museveni in each of the subsequent presidential elections in 2006, 2011, and 2016.

The first multi-party elections were held in 2006; however, regardless of this seeming political openness, Uganda remains an electoral autocracy. Museveni won the last three elections with an average vote-share of 60.27%. Yet these elections were generally panned by international and domestic observers as lacking electoral credibility. Security forces used repressive tactics against political various opposition groups. These violations of physical integrity rights includes numerous counts of police abuse against voters and opposition leaders.

Figure 3.1 shows the trends of authoritarianism within Uganda, plotting the Variety of Democracy's electoral democracy index for Uganda between independence in 1962 and 2017. Since Museveni came to power, Uganda's electoral democracy index has ranged from 0.128 to 0.358 (Coppedge et al. 2018). Electoral index ranges from 0 to 1, *electoral democracy is not achieved to fully achieved*.

Political violence by security forces has influenced each of Uganda's general elections. State repression included the intimidation, arrests, and torture of political

Figure 3.1: Uganda's Electoral Democracy Score (1962-2017)



opponents by the police and revealed a more bleak picture of how political authorities in Uganda maintained power. Similar to the previous regimes led by Milton Obote and Idi Amin, the current regime is led by political authorities who rely on repression to maintain power. While political authorities in Uganda have relied on various security forces to repress dissent, the police have become the go-to coercive tool used by Museveni's administration.

## 3.2 Politicizing the Police

Since 1899, there have been 15 IGPs in Uganda. The longest serving IGP was Kale Kayihura. As I mentioned earlier, Kayihura's new task was to restructure the police force. By 2016, the police force became the largest security force in Uganda – surpassing even Uganda's military, the UPDF. After his appointment to IGP, Kayihura was

tasked with reforming the police to be more effective at deterring crime and maintaining political control, suppressing those who threatened the political authorities. The police became responsible for day-to-day acts of repression, cracking down on political gatherings, riots, and protests. Under his leadership, the UPF transitioned from a defunct force to the main repressive apparatus of the state.

To understand how the police became the main repressive agent of the regime, it is helpful to consider how the threats to the current government shaped the political authorities relationship to the security apparatus. When the NRM took power, the new government mostly disbanded the military and purged the police force of those loyal to the previous administration, reducing the number of police officers from approximately 10,000 to 3,000. Specifically, Langi and Acholi officers with ties to Okello or Obote were removed and replaced. The new security forces were primarily recruited from within Bantu communities, including ethnic groups such as the Baganda, Banyankole, Banyoro, Bakonjo, Basoga, and Bakiga among others.

The government led by Museveni faced two threats: first, the security threat led by insurgents in the north, primarily composed of former security forces; and second, the political threat associated with the opposition political party led by Besigye. Many of the polling places near police barracks overwhelmingly voted for Besigye rather than Museveni. Museveni did not respond well to the lack of support. Rather, he claimed that the police force was a corrupt institution composed of criminals. Infamously, Museveni claimed that if he stood for elections against a cow in a police barrack, he would get 10 votes against the cow's 100.

In the early days of the regime, Museveni and the rest of the political authorities relied on the National Resistance Army (renamed the UPDF in 1995). The NRA was used to police political opposition and fight insurgencies against the nascent regime. Between 1986 and 2001, the political authorities strongly relied on the military for security concerns. The NRA/UPDF, the new national army, had a legacy of guerilla

fighting and played a key role in Museveni's post-1986 order. Political authorities portrayed them as the "vanguard of the struggle for democracy and development" (Reuss and Titeca 2017), even as they were tasked with fighting insurgents in the north.

Even though the police had been largely purged, many of those who remained did not support Museveni. Museveni's lack of support among the police became apparent in 2001 when Kizza Besigye, a former ally to the president, ran against Museveni in the election. Following the 2001 election, Museveni replaced IGP John Kisembo with Lt Gen Katumba Wamala. Wamala was the first military officer appointed to lead the UPF. Wamala served as IGP until 2005 when he became the commander of the land forces for the UPDF, eventually being appointed as the chief of defense forces of Uganda, the highest military rank in the UPDF. Wamala's appointment to the UPF was a turning point as the police under Museveni became increasingly politicized and militarized.

By 2005, when Wamala transitioned back the UPDF the police had grown to a force of approximately 14,000 (UPF 2019). Especially in the early years of the NRM, the security forces were primarily recruited from the Bantu peoples, including ethnic groups such as the Baganda, Banyankole, Banyoro, Bakonjo, Basoga, and Bakiga among others. The opening political space in Uganda and winding down of the conflict in the north with the Lord's Resistance Army led to reforms within Uganda and Museveni's relationship to the security forces within Uganda.

After the 2005 referendum, Museveni and the political authorities within the NRM faced a decreasing security threat led by insurgents in the north and an increasing political threat associated with the opposition political party led by Besigye and others. Under the leadership of Kale Kayihura, serving as IGP from 2005 to 2018, the police became the main repressive apparatus of the state.

In this period of transition, Museveni increasingly turned to the police to maintain



control and repress dissent. The police continued to expand both in capacity and political influence as the agents responsible for providing law and order but also as the repressive apparatus of the regime. Kayihura, like Wamala, previously worked for the UPDF. His roles for the military included positions such as the Chief Political Commissar and military assistant to the president. Prior to his appointment to lead the UPF, Kayihura was one of the go-to aides serving the president, often assigned to execute sensitive missions.

As discussed above, Kayihura was eventually removed and replaced by his deputy Okoth Ochola in March 2018. Ochola joined the UPF as a Cadet in 1988 and worked his way up through the police ranks. In 2001, he was promoted from senior superintendent of police to the deputy director of criminal investigations, where he served for seven years. Two more promotions to Assistant Inspector of General Police in 2009 and then Deputy IGP in 2011 placed him second-in-command to IGP Kayihura. As a life-long professional police officer, many thought his appointment to IGP would lead to reform, increasing confidence in the police. Many Ugandans thought this reform would increase people's confidence in the police and be a significant step towards depoliticizing the police.

However, others expressed concerns about the internal shuffling of key positions within the police force. When Ochola was appointed as IGP, Museveni also appointed his relative Major General Sabiiti Muzeeyi as the Deputy IGP. Prior to his appointment of Deputy IGP, Sabiiti was the Commander of the Military Police for the UPDF. With Sabiiti as second-in-command, there were concerns that the police would continue their dual role – repressing political opponents and providing security.

### 3.3 Patterns of State Repression

In many ways, especially under the leadership of Kayihura, the police became security institution most likely to engage in the daily activities associated with repressing dissent. From January 1997 to July 2018 (See Figure 3.2), data show that the UPDF and UPF were collectively involved in 2,377 events of political violence and social unrest, with the UPF involved in 30% of them (Raleigh et al. 2010).


There are concerns with under-reporting within events data; however, the ACLED data show important variation regarding which state agency engages in repression. Although the UPDF conducted more political violence events than the UPF, nearly all (94.2%) were battle-related or remote violence events rather than events we associate with state repression. Considering those involving the UPF, a vast majority (87%) are categorized as events associated with state repression.

Moreover, civil society organizations have highlighted the UPF's role in violating human rights to repress political dissent and restrict political freedoms. The Human Rights Network for Journalists-Uganda (HRNJ-Uganda) recorded 135 violations against journalist and media outlets in 2016 (HRNJ-Uganda 2017*a*). They included violations by state and non-state actors; 61% of the violations against press freedom were perpetrated by the UPF.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Other state agents were responsible for violating press freedoms, including the UPDF (1.5%), Resident District Commissioner (2.2%), Judiciary (2.2%), Local Council (0.7%), and Uganda's Prison Services (0.7%).

Figure 3.2: Political Violence and Social Unrest Events, January 1997 to July 2018



Note: Each geopoint represents a political violence or social unrest event involving either Uganda Police Force (left) or Uganda People's Defense Force (right). The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project provides five categories of political violence and protest events: 1) Battles include "a violent interaction between two politically organized armed groups at a particular time and location." 2) Remote violence is defined as an event in which the tool for engaging in conflict did not require the physical presence of perpetrators. 3) Riots/protests include political events involving either protesters or rioters, depending on whether it is violent. 4) Strategic development captures events that are "important within a state's political history, and may be triggers of future events, but are not directly violent." 5) Violence against civilians are events involving deliberate violent acts perpetrated by an organized political group such as a rebel, militia or government force against unarmed non-combatants.

Widespread allegations of police abuse include torture and political arrests. HRNJ-Uganda reported that “most of the violations, especially those that involved assault to journalists, happened in politically charged regions especially during the electoral period” (HRNJ-Uganda 2016, 38). In 2017, HRNJ-Uganda reported the UPF were again the leading violators of media freedoms accounting for 83 cases out 113 (73%), the Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) and the Judiciary followed in distant second and third positions with six (5.3%) and four (3.5%) cases respectively. Police abuses included among others, 45 arrests and detentions; 21 incidents of assault; and seven cases of malicious damage to journalists’ equipment (HRNJ-Uganda 2017*b*, 8). The Uganda Human Right Commission collected more than 1,000 allegations of torture tied to the UPF between 2012 and 2016 (Spencer 2018). The Africa Centre for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture Victims processed nearly double this count of allegations against the UPF with the majority of allegation received in their office in Gulu District (Spencer 2018).

One prominent example of police abuse occurred in Kayunga in 2009. Security forces consisting primarily of police officers used live fire to deter protests in Kayunga. Hospitals in the area reported treating more than 88 victims following the violence, the vast majority for gunshot wounds. The official government statement was that 27 people died resulting from security forces’ “stray bullets” (Barnett 2018), although some estimate more than 40 died. Rather than investigating the excessive use of force, police targeted protesters, arresting almost 850 citizens suspected of participating in the unrest (Barnett 2018).

### **3.4 Public Perceptions of Police**

Understanding how people see the police is important as these perceptions are likely to shape people’s cooperation with them. Repression by the police likely shapes

people's attitudes and beliefs about the police and their behavior toward them. If people have higher trust in the police, they may interact with the police by providing useful information, lowering ordinary crime. Alternatively, people might suspect that such interactions make them more visible to the very agents of repression employed by political authorities. Certainly, this is difficult to measure as it is hard to ask directly. However, to what extent is there variation in how people see the police?


Drawing from the nationally representative sample of respondents, the data show there is variation in how people view the police in Uganda. In the baseline survey, when asked how well they thought the national government was doing to reduce crime, ensuring safety and security, 37% of respondents said the government was performing somewhat well, which was the modal response. However, others certainly disagreed and were willing to express it. 46% of respondents said the government was performing somewhat or very badly.

Similarly, when asked explicitly about the police, people's attitudes vary. Figure 3.3 shows people's responses regarding their obligations to cooperate with police. When asked directly, 76.2% of people agree or strongly agree that they would report a crime to the police if they witnessed one. Only 17.1% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they should do what the police tell them even if they do not understand or agree with the reasons. 36.9% agree or strongly agree with the statement that the police are not doing a good in preventing crime in their community. Additionally, 59.47% believe that the police are legitimate authorities and that they should do what the police tell them.

One potential reason why people might not believe that the police are legitimate is because people might see the police as not acting in procedural fair ways. A second reason why people might view the police as illegitimate is that people might see the police as more aligned with the regime and less aligned with the community.


Figure 3.4 plots the distribution of participants' responses to a series of questions

Figure 3.3: Attitudes about Obligation and Cooperation



about their attitudes and beliefs about the procedural fairness and normative alignment of the police relative to the respondent and the community. Only 35.2% agree or strongly agree that the police make fair and impartial decisions in the cases they deal with. However, 51.1% agree or strongly agree that the police treat people with dignity and respect. Only 36.2% agree or strongly agree that the police usually act in ways consistent with their ideas about what is right and wrong. Additionally, 40.6% agree or strongly agree that the police stand up for values that are important to them.

Figure 3.4: Attitudes about Procedural Fairness and Normative Alignment



Opinion data of the police show that there is variation in people's attitudes toward the police. On one hand, people understand that they are responsible for providing law and order, deterring crime. On the other hand, people likely understand that police serve to protect the interests of the political authorities in Uganda.

The main argument presented in this book is that repression by police undermines the provision of law and order. I theorized that this happens through two causal pathways. First, when people view the police as engaging in repression on behalf of political authorities, they are more likely to see the police as illegitimate authorities and less aligned with the communities. Second, mistrust in the police and political authorities increases co-ethnic bias, increasing fear of interacting with police officers and decreasing people's willingness to cooperate with non-co-ethnic police officers. In the next chapter, I examine how repression by the police affects how people view the police.

### **3.5 Summary**

This chapter introduces the case of Uganda, referencing Uganda's history of ethnically stacking and shuffling within the security forces. I discuss how this pattern continued first within the NRA/UPDF and then within the UPF after the 2005 referendum. I briefly discuss the history of UPF and how the two main threats to the regime have shaped the security apparatus. I provide evidence that the police are the main security forces used for repressing dissent in Uganda. This was not always the case under the NRM leadership. Between 1986 and 2005, the military was the main security force used by the regime. Under the leadership of IGP Kayihura, there was a pivot to strengthen the police after the 2005 referendum. The police became the main security apparatus in the country responsible for both deterring crime and repressing threats to the regime. I use event data to show variation in patterns of repression between the police and military, highlighting how the police are responsible for political unrest events we typically associated with repression. Next, I discuss broader patterns of repression committed by the UPF, presenting evidence from various civil society organizations that the police are politicized and used as agents of repression. Finally,



this chapter concludes by discussing variation in people's attitudes toward the police.

## Chapter 4

# How Repression Affects Public Perceptions of Police

### 4.1 Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 2, repression can be thought of as “physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions” (Davenport 2007, 2). In this chapter, I examine the effects of state repression on public perceptions of the institution that perpetrates it. Specifically, this chapter asks: Does state repression by the police at the national-level affect individual-level support for the police? And what extent are these effects uniform or conditioned by individual support for the political authorities?

If state repression decreases support for police, it has implications for the ability of police to provide law and order, directly affecting their ability to deter crime and keep communities safe. People who fear repression or negatively assess the police more broadly, for example, are likely to avoid interacting with security forces who

employ it. The extent to which people are willing to cooperate with police depends on how the public perceives the police. People who view the police as illegitimate authorities are less likely to cooperate with them. Individuals refusing to voluntarily provide information, report crimes, or cooperate in general makes routine acts of policing more difficult. Examining how repression affects people's support for the police is crucial to understanding the provision of law and order, especially when security institutions rely on cooperation from individuals.

Political authorities rely on the police both for preventative and responsive repression to deter collective action. Although police officers may act alone using their coercive capacity in illegitimate ways, police abuse and violence highlight that across an array of regime types governments justify using excessive police force "as legitimate action" to deter protesters and reestablish rule of law. Few studies have examined the relationship between repression and public perception of the institution tasked with perpetrating it.

This chapter empirically examines my main hypothesis that when political authorities rely on the police to repress dissent it undermines people's confidence in the police. Observing an incident of repression by the police is likely to make people view the police as illegitimate authorities, increasing fear of interacting with them. Additionally, I hypothesized that the extent to which people fear being repressed varies by whether they support or oppose the regime. After observing repression, people are more likely to fear the police in general; however, support for the ruling party should condition its effect. Incumbent supporters are less concerned about experiencing repression and consequently less likely to fear repression. However, opposition supporters are more likely to fear experiencing repression. Accordingly, the effects of repression on public perception should be strongest among those who are more likely to fear experiencing political violence from the state (for example, those opposed to the ruling party).

There is some empirical support for the idea that excessive police force results in political backlash. In a related study with Brandon Berhlendorff, I examine this question employing a survey experiment. We randomly assigned respondents to one of four hypothetical conditions: 1) they *observe* a rally where police use force to maintain law and order; 2) they *participate* in a rally where police use force to maintain law and order; 3) they *observe* a rally where police use *excessive force*; and 4) they *participate* in a rally where police use *excessive force*. We then measure whether respondents would support, publicly criticize, and/or protest actions taken by police.

Table 4.1 provides the summary of our control and treatment groups and theoretical expectations. As theorized, we find robust evidence of general backlash effects. Respondents assigned to treatments involving excessive police force expressed less support for police and an increased willingness to publicly criticize and even protest actions taken by police. Moreover, viewing repression while engaged in the rally led to an increased willingness to publicly criticize police and engage in future protests.

Table 4.1: Experimental Conditions and Theoretical Expectations  
Dependent Variables

Treatment	Dependent Variables		
	Support the police	Publicly criticize the police	Protest the police
Control: Observer, no excessive police force	—	—	—
T1: Participation in a rally	Negative	Positive	Positive
T2: Excessive police force at a rally	Negative	Positive	Positive
T3: Participation, excessive police force	Negative	Positive	Positive

We also examine the moderating effects of various demographic factors, including individuals' support for the ruling party. We find that support for the incumbent weakened the backlash effects; however, the effects remained in the theorized directions. Overall, reactive police repression, even in a non-democracy like Uganda, violates people's expectations about the role of police in society. In our study we found strong evidence of backlash effects of repression. People assigned to the excessive police violence treatment were less likely to support the police and more likely to

publicly criticize and even protest the police's actions. One limitation of the study was that the excessive police force treatment did not specify whether the action taken by the police was ordered by the political authorities or based on the decisions/discretion of the police on the ground.

To test these claims, I examine the effect of repression by the police on public perceptions of police in Uganda. I estimate the effect of selective repression by leveraging a unique research design opportunity that emerges from the social media tax protest led by Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu (also known as Bobi Wine) and his subsequent arrest by the Uganda Police Force while a nationally representative survey on police and security was being administered in Uganda. I find selective repression of these protesters by police decreased support for the police, even among those who did not directly experience the repression. Following the repression of Bobi Wine and the Social Media Tax protests, people viewed the police as less legitimate authorities. Additionally, these effects are largely driven by political loyalty and perceptions of normative alignment with the police. The effects are weakest among those who support the incumbent.

## 4.2 Empirical Context

Politics as usual shifted in Uganda in 2017 when Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, also known as Bobi Wine and the Ghetto President, announced his plans to compete in the upcoming by-election for Kyaddondo East Constituency. Well-known throughout Uganda as a famous musician, performer, and actor, Bobi Wine's decision to campaign for parliament was not a surprise. His music became increasingly political following the controversial 2016 presidential election. In the 2016 election, the incumbent ruling party led by Museveni defeated the main main opposition party, Forum for Democratic Change, led by Kizza Besigye. However, the election was far from free or

fair. Besigye and his supporters endured routine abuse and acts of repression by the UPF. In response, Wine leveraged his music and social media platform as a venue to call for political reform.

Wine's political engagement and voice for the youth is reflected in the lyrics of his song, Freedom.

We're living in a world similar to the one of slave trade

This oppression is worse than apartheid

The gun is the master

Citizen slave

The pearl of Africa is bleeding

Question

What was the purpose of the liberation?

When we can't have a peaceful transition?

What is the purpose of the constitution?

When the government disrespects the constitution?

Where is my freedom of expression?

When you charge me because of my expression?

Look what you doing to this nation

What are you teaching the future generation?

See our leaders become misleaders

And see our mentors become tormentors

Freedom fighters become dictators

They look on the youth and say we're destructors

We're fighting for freedom

As a political neophyte, Wine's campaign was met with broad dismissal by much of the political establishment in Kampala and few took his candidacy seriously. The

Kyaddondo East Constituency had two well-established candidates competing for it (Sitenda Sebalu of the incumbent ruling National Resistance Movement party and Apollo Kantinti of the dominant opposition Forum for Democratic Change party) in addition to two additional independent candidates. Wine's electoral campaign strategy included combining a rigorous door-to-door walking campaign and substantial social media presence relative to many of the established candidates.

Wine leveraged his social media presence and door-to-door walking campaign to a landslide victory. Shocking the political status quo, Bobi Wine won the election, receiving 25,659 votes with Ssebalu and Kantinti receiving only 4,566 votes 1,832 votes, respectively. The two other independent candidates together received only 952 votes. Wine's rise to political office threatened the 33-year-old government led by President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement. His social media presence, ability to energize crowds, and commitment to political reform contrasted starkly with the incumbent administration.

In March 2018, in part in response to Wine's electoral success, the government gave a directive that all social media platforms would be taxed. Broadly seen as a mechanism used by political authorities to repress political freedom, the new Over-The-Top Tax was designed to raise resources "to cope with the consequences" of social media users' "opinions, prejudices, [and] insults."<sup>1</sup>

For many in Uganda, WhatsApp, Twitter, and Facebook among other social media platforms were a major source of news and political information. The heightened exposure to information had reportedly led Ugandans to become more critical about political conditions in the country.<sup>2</sup> This was not the first time political authorities attempted to control the flow of information via social media platforms. In 2016, the president ordered all social media sites to be shut down during the elections to

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<sup>1</sup><https://cipesa.org/2018/07/uganda-blocks-access-to-social-media-vpns-and-dating-sites-as-new-tax-takes-effect/>

<sup>2</sup><https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/feb/27/millions-of-ugandans-quit-internet-after-introduction-of-social-media-tax-free-speech>.

control the flow of information.

As a mechanism of social control, the Social Media Tax was implemented on July 1, 2018. Figure 4.1 shows the public notice regarding the new tax. The Over-The-Top tax on WhatsApp, Twitter, and Facebook, among other sites, required users to pay a daily fee of 200 Ugandan Shillings (USD 0.05). At USD 0.05 per day, each user must pay approximately USD 1.50 per month in fees to access the social media services, a rate that is prohibitive since the average revenue per user of telecom services at the time in Uganda was an estimated USD 2.50 per month.

On July 11, 2018 a group of political activists organized by Bobi Wine, wearing “This tax must go” shirts, gathered in Kampala to protest the Social Media Tax. Figure 4.2 shows Bobi Wine leading the protest. In response to the protest, political authorities directed the Uganda Police Force to use force to break up the gathering. The police used tear gas and live bullets to break up the protest. At least three protestors were arrested and remanded to Luzira Prison.

Following the clash with the police, the Directorate of Public Prosecutions issued charges of assault and theft against several protestors including Bobi Wine, his bodyguard (Eddy Ssebunifu), and two journalists (Raymond Mujuni and Joel Ssenyonyi). At least three other protestors were taken in to custody over the same charges, including David Lule, Julius Katongole and Nyanzi Ssentamu. Wine was detained and interrogated for more than 8 hours at the Central Police Station in Kampala.

The coercive force used against the protestors was meant to deter collective action against the new social media tax and the regime more broadly. The security apparatus responsible for implementing it was the national police force. The police justified their actions by saying that Wine and the protestors had not gained permission to publicly assemble and charging protestors with assaulting members of the police and theft of police property including handcuffs. The selective state repression by the police of the Social Media Tax Protest is the type of violence that is likely to undermine public



## PUBLIC NOTICE: OTT TAX

Following the directive from the Government of Uganda, a new tax is to be implemented on Over The Top (OTT) services effective 1<sup>st</sup> July, 2018.

We hereby inform the general public of the introduction of the new taxes on the OTT services.

OTT services are applications that offer voice and messaging over the Internet; for example, but not limited to: Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, SnapChat, Instagram, Skype, LinkedIn etc.

Effective 1<sup>st</sup> July, 2018; OTT services can be accessed upon payment of the OTT Tax by the customer of Ushs 200 per user, per day.

Payment of the OTT Tax can be made by the customer using their Mobile Wallet, EVC or any electronic wallets upon which access to the OTT services will be granted.

- MTN Mobile Money (**\*165\*2\*8#**)
- Airtel Money (**\*185\*2\*5#**)
- Africell Money (**\*144\*2\*5#**) or Africell EVC (**\*133\*6#**)

Africell customers can also pay this tax using MTN Mobile Money or Airtel Money at no extra charge.

Access will be granted for a calendar day i.e. from the moment of payment until 11:59 PM of that same day. For the convenience of customers we have the following options:

- Daily (Ushs. 200),
- Weekly (Ushs. 1,400)
- Monthly (Ushs. 6,000)

Should you have any questions or queries regarding the above, please contact us on the Customer Toll Free line 100 or visit our websites.



Figure 4.1: Public Notice of Over the Top Services Tax



Figure 4.2: Robert Kyagulanyi (center) protesting a tax on the use of social media. Photo Credit: Isaac Kasamani/AFP/Getty Images

perceptions of police legitimacy depending on individuals' political loyalty.

In the weeks after the Social Media Tax Protest, the police abuse against Wine and his supporters only escalated. Police and other security forces, including members of the Presidential Protection Unit, attempted to assassinate Wine following clashes with Wine supporters and Museveni supporters during the by-elections at Arua. Wine's driver was killed instead. Rather than investigating the death of Wine's driver, the police arrested Wine and several others on charges of treason. The repression by the police increased, after Wine declared his plan to campaign for president in the upcoming 2021 election. Wine and several of his supporters were routinely harassed and intimidated by the police; intimidation tactics included arrests and torture. Other supporters were attacked and killed in broad daylight.

The initial use of the police to arrest Wine at the Social Media Protest presents

a unique research opportunity. As discussed in Chapter 3, the former IGP Kayihura had been recently fired and many thought that the appointment of the Deputy IGP Ochola to replace him was a move to improve the professionalism of the force. The Social Media Protest created an opportunity for Ugandans to see how the police would respond to this emerging political threat.

### **4.3 The Social Media Tax Protests and Repression**

The theoretical and empirical relationship between repression and its effects on public perception of police remains an open question. Repression by police, for example, might have a uniform negative effect on the public's perceptions of the police as legitimate authorities. Alternatively, people might view acts of repression through motivated reasoning, depending on whether they support the regime. People who support the regime, for example, might view repression as legitimate while people who oppose the regime see it as illegitimate. So, repression might have a positive effect on assessments of incumbent supporters and a negative effect on evaluations by supporters.

### **4.4 Research Design**

This chapter uses a method called an unexpected event during survey design approach to causal inference to estimate the effect of selective repression of the social media tax protests on individuals' perceptions of police legitimacy (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández 2019). This approach allows me to directly test the causal relationship between repression by police on the public perceptions of police.

I test my theory examining the effects of repression on perceptions of police legitimacy with evidence from the Social Media Tax Protests in Uganda on July 11, 2018. The effects of repression are likely conditioned by how people view the politi-

cal authorities. To account for this, I also examine whether the effects of repression are larger when the respondent supports the opposition. I argue that repression is likely to negatively affect how both incumbent supporters and opposition supporters view the police. This idea differs from a motivated reasoning expectation, which, as discussed in Chapter 2, would lead us to expect that incumbent supporters might express more support for the police after repression.

Specifically, I test the following hypotheses from chapter 2: i) state repression by the police decreases support for the police; and ii) the extent to which repression by the police decreases public support for the police is larger when the respondent supports the opposition. These hypotheses vary from expectations of motivated reasoning which would expect: i) repression by the police increases support for the police among incumbent supporters; and ii) repression by the police decreases support for the police among opposition supporters. To understand the selective repression of the Social Media Tax Protests in Uganda, the next section presents my research design and explains the broader political context.

In the following section, I summarize the identification strategy, data, measures, and model specifications I use to test these hypotheses.

#### **4.4.1 Identification strategy and data**

I employ a unique research design opportunity that comes from the unexpected police clashes with the social media tax protesters while a nationally representative survey on security and policing was being administered across Uganda. In this chapter, I define participants surveyed before the repression of the protesters on July 11 as assigned to the control group and respondents interviewed on or after July 11 as assigned to the treatment group. The timing of when respondents would be interviewed was determined at random without any knowledge of the social media tax protests occurring. Importantly, the timing of the selective repressive event did not influence

the administration of the survey.

Data collection was conducted between 29 June and 20 July 2018, in 194 parishes located in 180 sub-counties within 127 counties, 100 districts and all 4 regions in Uganda. Twaweza’s research team employed a multi-stage stratified sampling approach to achieve a representative sample of the total population of Ugandans who are 18 years and older. The sample frame is based on the 2014 Uganda Population and Housing Census.

The baseline sample was selected to be a representative cross-section of all adult citizens in Uganda. Twaweza’s objective was to give “every adult citizen an equal and known chance of selection for interview.” This goal was achieved by “(a) strictly applying random selection at every stage of sampling and (b) applying sampling with probability proportionate to population size at the Enumeration Area sampling stage.” Twaweza explains the multi-stage sampling design of Sauti za Wananchi in Twaweza’s technical paper. The baseline data were collected in person; however, the round on security and policing was done by phone. The survey was embedded in a round of Twaweza’s Sauti za Wananchi project with assistance from Ipsos. Data were collected by experienced call center agents using Computer Aided Telephonic Interviews (CATI). Interviews were conducted in the respondents’ preferred language, which was identified during baseline interviews. There was a high participation rate in the study (1,920 of 2,000 respondents participated).

#### **4.4.2 Measurement**

First, I employ two measures of police support, presented in Chapter 3, as my main dependent variables. Respondents were asked whether they agree that: 1) “The police in their community are legitimate authorities and you should do what they tell you to do.” 2) “You should do what the police tell you even if you do not understand or agree with the reasons.” These measures of police legitimacy were developed

in the criminology literature by Knight and Schwartzberg (2019), Trinkner, Jackson and Tyler (2017). These two measures refer to the legitimacy of police and whether people feel obligated to cooperate with them. The first captures whether respondents perceive the police as legitimate and their obligation to cooperate with them. The second measure focuses on whether individuals feel obligated to comply with police, regardless of whether they agree with the directive. Responses to these direct questions were measured with a five-point ordinal scale from “strongly agree,” “agree,” “neither,” “disagree,” to “strongly disagree.”<sup>3</sup>

Incumbent support is a binary indicator coded as 1 if the respondent stated that the National Resistance Movement is the political party they feel closest to and 0 otherwise. Additionally, I consider an alternative measure: “If the election were held today, which political party will you support or vote for.” Similarly, if respondents said they would vote for the NRM, I coded this second measure as Incumbent vote and 0 otherwise. This second set of analyses using Incumbent vote are reported in the online appendix.

One threat to inference would be if repression affected people’s willingness to identify with the opposition. However, as mentioned earlier, the baseline data were collected before the repressive event and respondents identified which political party they supported during this initial baseline data collection process prior to the survey round on policing and security. Importantly, this means that information on party support was collected prior to the social media tax protests; response on political support is exogenous to the repressive event.

Several other factors are likely to correlate with previous exposure to repression and attitudes about the police. Although in expectation, the as-if random assignment of the repressive event should attenuate concerns. To consider the plausibility of this assumption, I examine balance across pre-treatment observables.

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<sup>3</sup>Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3 presents bar plots of these responses.

Covariate balance across observables by and large justifies the as good as random assumption. Table 4.2 provides two models showing the effect of pre-treatment covariates on the likelihood of assignment to treatment. Control and treatment groups did not systematically vary by people’s pre-test assessment of whether the national government is doing well: reducing crime; maintaining roads and bridges; or ensuring free and fair elections. Similarly, there is balance on those who said they would vote for the NRM party and consider themselves loyal to the NRM. Depending on whether the model includes parish level fixed effects there are some in-balances in the level of education and wealth. However, these covariates are used as control variables among others in the main analyses.

Covariate balance analyses suggest that there are few systematic differences between respondents interviewed before the repression of protesters and those interviewed after. Consequently, I can estimate the effect of repression on public perceptions of police by exploring the variation between those in the control and treatment groups: those interviewed before the event compared to those interviewed following it.

I still control for several of these variables, including participants’ self-reported age, gender, education level, and income status. Additionally, I control for whether the respondent lives in an urban or rural setting. Since exposure to crime, number of police officers deployed, and other potential confounders like prior state repression could affect people’s perception of police, I also control for parish level fixed effects. The results are generally robust to employing district level fixed effects rather than the more micro-level regions. See Table 4.8 in the online appendix.

### 4.4.3 Model

I use the following OLS specifications to test hypothesis 1:

Table 4.2: Effect of pre-treatment covariates on likelihood of assignment to treatment group

	Model 1	Model 2
Believe the national gov. is doing well reducing crime	-0.0082 (0.0122)	-0.0180 (0.0127)
Believe the national gov. is doing well maintaining road & bridges	-0.0002 (0.0119)	0.0026 (0.0130)
Believe the national gov. is doing well ensuring free and fair elections	0.0200 (0.0124)	0.0202 (0.0136)
Would vote for the NRM incumbent party	-0.0079 (0.0258)	-0.0095 (0.0325)
Incumbent Supporter (Loyal to the NRM)	-0.0051 (0.0261)	-0.0069 (0.0323)
Gender (Female == 1)	0.0057 (0.0120)	0.0113 (0.0135)
Age (25-34 yrs == 1)	-0.0012 (0.0176)	-0.0085 (0.0184)
Age (35-44 yrs == 1)	-0.0038 (0.0187)	-0.0060 (0.0199)
Age (45-54 yrs == 1)	-0.0142 (0.0209)	-0.0076 (0.0216)
Age (55-64 yrs == 1)	-0.0133 (0.0243)	-0.0274 (0.0253)
Age (65+ yrs == 1)	-0.0233 (0.0271)	-0.0177 (0.0268)
Education (no schooling == 1)	0.0659 (0.0785)	0.0994* (0.0513)
Education (pre nursery school == 1)	0.1839 (0.1368)	0.2344 (0.2147)
Education (primary in complete (not certified) == 1)	0.0595 (0.0769)	0.0949* (0.0485)
Education (primary complete (certified) == 1)	0.0607 (0.0777)	0.0958* (0.0496)
Education (secondary/high school incomplete (not certified) == 1)	0.0848 (0.0776)	0.1197** (0.0504)
Education (secondary/high school complete (certified) == 1)	0.0657 (0.0796)	0.0800 (0.0533)
Education (college (non degree related certification) == 1)	0.0542 (0.0809)	0.0934 (0.0542)
Education (university incomplete (not certified) == 1)	0.0625 (0.0959)	0.0815 (0.0761)
Education (university complete (certified) == 1)	0.1172 (0.0905)	0.1463* (0.0720)
Education (masters degree incomplete (not certified) == 1)	0.0044 (0.1652)	0.1052 (0.0518)
Education (masters degree complete (certified) == 1)	0.0105 (0.1651)	0.0485 (0.0736)
Urban	-0.0055 (0.0163)	0.0267 (0.0348)
Wealth (Quintile 2 == 1)	-0.0246 (0.0180)	-0.0200 (0.0198)
Wealth (Quintile 3 == 1)	-0.0077 (0.0185)	0.0028 (0.0222)
Wealth (Quintile 4 == 1)	-0.0551*** (0.0186)	-0.0274 (0.0201)
Wealth (Quintile 5 == 1)	-0.0407** (0.0207)	-0.0174 (0.0214)
Parish FEs	No	Yes
Clusted SEs	No	Yes
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0019	0.0390
Observations	1920	1920

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$



$$DV_{i,p} = \alpha_p + \beta_1 T_{i,p} + \beta_2 X_{i,p} + \phi Z_{i,p} + \epsilon \quad (4.1)$$

In this equation, the respondent is referenced with the subscript  $i$  within the parish  $p$ . The  $DV_{i,p}$  captures the individual response to the respective police legitimacy survey question. The treatment variable,  $T_{i,p}$ , is a binary indicator for whether the respondent was interviewed before the arrest ( $T_{i,p} = 0$ ) or on or after the date of the arrest ( $T_{i,p} = 1$ ). The treatment coefficient  $\beta_1$  is the total effect of the repressive incident. The binary variable  $X_{i,p}$  indicates whether the respondent supports the National Resistance Movement (the ruling incumbent party). If the respondent supports the incumbent political party, then  $X_{i,p} = 1$  and 0 otherwise.  $Z_{i,p}$  is a vector of individual-level control variables, including respondent's self-reported age, gender, education level, economic status, and whether they live in an urban or rural environment. Finally,  $\alpha_p$  captures parish-level fixed effects. In the main specification, robust standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment, which is the respondent.<sup>4</sup>

Similarly, I employ the following OLS specifications to examine the conditional effects of partisanship on repression by the police. To investigate heterogeneity in the treatment effect across political support for the regime in the other hypotheses, I interact  $T_{i,p}$  with  $X_{i,p}$ .

$$DV_{i,p} = \alpha_p + \beta_1 T_{i,p} + \beta_2 X_{i,p} + \beta_3 T_{i,p} * X_{i,p} + \phi Z_{i,p} + \epsilon \quad (4.2)$$

The difference between the equations is the addition of the interaction between  $T_{i,p}$  and  $X_{i,p}$ . Here, the treatment coefficient  $\beta_1$  is the total effect of the repressive incident for non-incumbent supporters. The interaction term coefficient  $\beta_3$  estimates the heterogeneous effects by political loyalty, specifically the change in effect from

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<sup>4</sup>I employ OLS models for parsimonious interpretation but results from ordered logit models are reported in the online appendix (see Table 4.7).

non-incumbent supporter to incumbent supporter.

To identify valid causal estimates by comparing respondents surveyed before and after the event requires two key assumptions. First, I assume excludability: any difference between respondents surveyed before or after the event is the only because of the event. Specifically, the timing of the survey  $t$  affects the outcome variable  $DV$  only through  $T$ . Second, I assume temporal ignorability. This second assumption means that for any  $i$ , the potential outcome must be independent from the timing of the survey interview. In short, assignment to either the control or treatment should be independent from the potential outcome of  $DV_i$  (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández 2019). This requires the selection of the timing of the interview to be as-if or as good as random.

After presenting the results, I test the excludability and temporal ignorability assumptions, showing that pre-existing time trends do not explain the main findings and falsification tests show that there are limits in expanding the analyses to non-police related measures. In expectation, we should not observe systematic differences in how people view the police based on how the data generating process unfolded.

## 4.5 Results

Table 4.3 shows the effects of the social media protest and arrests on whether people view the police as legitimate authorities (Model 1 and Model 3) and whether people think they should obey the police (Model 2 and Model 4). I hypothesize that repression by the police should decrease support for the police, negatively affecting public perceptions of police. A second observable implication of my argument is that the effect should be stronger among those who oppose the regime – those who have more to fear from police engaging in repression on behalf of political authorities.

As theorized, police employing state repression, even selective repression against

protestors, negatively affects public support for the police. Model 1 and Model 3 show the unconditional effects of repression of the Social Media Tax Protests on support for the police. Results from Model 1 show that people interviewed on or after the July 11 had lower perceptions of the police as legitimate authorities ( $\beta_1 = -0.2498$ ). We observe a similar pattern with the second measure of support (do people feel obligated to comply with police). Results again provide evidence that repression decreases support for the police. Assignment to treatment lowered perceptions of respondents' obligation to comply and defer to the police ( $\beta_1 = -0.4720$ ).

From a motivated reasoning perspective based on supporting or opposing the regime, it is surprising that these results hold across all levels of regime support. A theory of politically motivated reasoning would expect that people who support the incumbent would support repression while people who oppose the regime would view such acts as illegitimate, hypotheses 3 and 4, respectively. Alternatively, I argued that political support for the regime should have a conditional effect on repression. People who support the regime fear experiencing repression less relative to those who oppose the regime; however, they are still concerned about the incumbent using the police to repress others. If this is the case, we should observe a weaker effect of repression on incumbent supporters.

Results from Equation 2 demonstrate the effects of repression on perceptions of police legitimacy are conditioned by political loyalty. Including the interaction term,  $\beta_1$  shows the effect when the incumbent term equals 0. Model 2 shows that assignment to treatment has a negative effect on whether people view the police as legitimate authorities ( $\beta_1 = -0.5163$ ). To examine the effect of repression when incumbent supporters is equal to 1, I sum the coefficients for the treatment measure and its interaction with incumbent supporter ( $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_3$ ). Considering the conditional effect of incumbent support in Model 2, the heterogeneous effect of repression on perceptions of the police being legitimate authorities decreases (-0.1091).

Table 4.3: Effect of social media tax protest/arrests on public perception of police legitimacy and obligation to comply: results from parish fixed-effects OLS models

Dependent Variable	Police are legitimate authorities & you should do what they say		You should obey the police even if you don't agree	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Protest/Arrests	-0.2498*	-0.5163*	-0.4720***	-0.7523***
	(0.1084)	(0.2108)	(0.0972)	(0.1421)
Incumbent Supporter	-0.0336	-0.0602	0.0050	-0.0229
	(0.0519)	(0.0523)	(0.0491)	(0.0500)
Incumbent Supporter*Protest/Arrests		0.4072*		0.4284**
		(0.2402)		(0.1844)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.2539	0.2555	0.1496	0.1518
Observations	1920	1920	1920	1920

*Note:* Parish fixed effects and control variables indicating education, age, gender, economic status, and urban/rural are included in all models. Robust standard errors are clustered by respondent in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Turning to the second measure of support, Model 4 shows that assignment to treatment again has a negative effect on people obligation to obey the police ( $\beta_1 = -0.7523$ ). The heterogeneous effect of repression on people's obligation to obey the police also decreases (-0.3239). Even controlling for parish-level fixed effects, the results show that repression of the Social Media Tax Protesters decreased individuals' support for the police. The effects of repression are conditioned by political loyalty to the regime. However, even those who identified as supporting the ruling political party viewed the police in lower regard following the incident. This demonstrates that an explanation based on politically motivated reasoning does not fully explain how civilians interpret repression by the police. This provides evidence that even incumbent supporters are likely to fear repression by the police, but as theorized, these effects are stronger among those who do not support the political authorities.

#### 4.5.1 Procedural Fairness and Normative Alignment

There are several mechanisms posited in the criminology literature for why people might view the police as illegitimate. One reason is that people might view their actions as violations of procedural fairness. A second mechanism is that the police

are not normatively aligned with the community. Does repression affect these other perceptions of the police? Public perceptions of procedural fairness and normative alignment are key inputs of whether people support and trust the police (Knight and Schwartzberg 2019, Trinkner, Jackson and Tyler 2017). I use two additional measures that capture respondents' perception of the procedural fairness of police to consider the effects of repression on these crucial perceptions of police. The first statement measures procedural fairness in interpersonal treatment: "The police treat people with dignity and respect." The second statement captures procedural fairness in the decision making of the police officers: "The police make fair and impartial decisions in the cases they deal with." In turn, I examine two statements that focus on whether respondents see the police as normatively aligned with the communities they are policing: "the police stand up for values that are important to you;" and, "the police usually act in ways consistent with your own ideas about what is right and wrong."

Table 4.4 shows the effect of repression on public perception of procedural fairness of police in interpersonal treatment. The odd columns show the results of Equation 1 and the even columns report the results of Equation 2 (including the interaction term between  $T_{i,p}$  and  $X_{i,p}$ ). Considering these dimensions of police legitimacy shows that repression affects people's beliefs about whether the police treat people with dignity and respect (Models 5 and 6) and attitudes about whether the police are fair and impartial in their decisions (Model 7 and 8). In each of these models, the interaction between the repression and incumbent support remains in the hypothesized direction; however, the interaction is only statistically significant in Model 8.

Next, I examine how repression affects public perception of the normative alignment of police operationalized through statements that measure shared values between respondents and the police. Table 4.5 considers the effect of social media tax protest/arrests on public perception that the police stand up for values that are im-

Table 4.4: Effect of social media tax protest/arrests on public perception of procedural fairness of police: results from parish fixed-effects OLS models

Dependent Variable	Police treat people with dignity & respect		Police make fair & impartial decisions	
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Protest/Arrests	-0.2715** (0.1100)	-0.3768* (0.2043)	-0.2905*** (0.0967)	-0.5032*** (0.1495)
Incumbent Supporter	0.0494 (0.0530)	0.0389 (0.0535)	0.0883* (0.0501)	0.0671 (0.0510)
Incumbent Supporter*Protest/Arrests		0.1609 (0.2396)		0.3251* (0.1917)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.1419	0.1417	0.1421	0.1432
Observations	1920	1920	1920	1920

*Note:* Parish fixed effects and control variables indicating education, age, gender, economic status, and urban/rural are included in all models. Robust standard errors are clustered by respondent in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

portant to the respondent (Models 9 and 10) and the police act in ways that the respondent considers to be right (Models 11 and 12). Again, odd columns show the results of Equation 1 and even columns show results from Equation 2 with the interaction term.

In Model 10, we observe a decrease in the perception that the police stand up for values that are important to those individuals who do not support the ruling political party (-0.6384). However, incumbent support attenuates these effects again to almost 0 (-0.0063). Similarly, in Model 12, the treatment effects reduce perceptions that the police act in ways the respondents considered to be right among those who do not support the ruling political party (-0.6582). Once again these effects are attenuated by political loyalty to the ruling party; however, these effects remain negative (-0.0961). This suggests support for the fear mechanism that people fear and mistrust the police when they use coercive force against political opponents. People who see themselves as normatively aligned with the political authorities provide more support for the police relative to those who oppose the regime. These results provide additional support for my hypotheses that repression i) decreases support for the police; and ii) the effects of state repression on perceptions of police legitimacy

Table 4.5: Effect of social media tax protest/arrests on public perception of normative alignment of police: results from parish fixed-effects OLS models

Dependent Variable	Police stand up for values that are important to you		Police act in ways you consider to be right	
	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Protest/Arrests	-0.2248** (0.0899)	-0.6384*** (0.1587)	-0.2904*** (0.0944)	-0.6582*** (0.1605)
Incumbent Supporter	0.0985** (0.0483)	0.0572 (0.0491)	0.1175** (0.0471)	0.0808* (0.0479)
Incumbent Supporter*Protest/Arrests		0.6321*** (0.1872)		0.5621*** (0.1948)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.1764	0.1823	0.1603	0.1651
Observations	1920	1920	1920	1920

*Note:* Parish fixed effects and control variables indicating education, age, gender, economic status, and urban/rural are included in all models. Robust standard errors are clustered by respondent in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

decrease in magnitude among those who support the regime.

## 4.5.2 Pre-Existing Time Trends


Although the results above provide robust evidence for my theoretical expectations regarding why repression undermines public support for the police, there are potential threats to inference in this design. For example, one possibility is that pre-existing time trends that are unrelated to the event of interest might bias the finding. This section considers this possibility by employing a series of placebo treatments to test for plausible existing time trends that might bias the above results. If there are pre-existing time trends, we should expect an arbitrary cutoff point to affect the outcome of interest. However, assuming no pre-existing time trends, then in expectation, an arbitrary point to the left of the cutoff point should not affect the outcome of interest. I construct five placebo treatments to test for time trends.

In these tests, I use the control group subsample, setting aside all respondents assigned to the treatment group (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández 2019, Imbens and Lemieux 2008). Data collection for the control group ran from June 29 to July 10. Rather than using the empirical median of the control group subsample to split

the sample, as suggested by Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández (2019), Imbens and Lemieux (2008), I create 5 placebo treatments in two-day windows (8/1, 8/3, 8/5, 8/7, and 8/9).

Figure 4.3 shows the results of 20 regression models to examine whether the placebos have any effect on the two main measures of support for the police. The results show no evidence of consistent time trends occurring prior to the repressive event.<sup>5</sup>

Figure 4.3: Results from 20 regression models of the date on which peoples attitudes changed



<sup>5</sup>Only one coefficient was statistically significant ( $\beta_1$  in the top right figure when the placebo is 8/1). The placebo effects captured in the remaining 39 coefficients were statistically indistinguishable from 0.



### 4.5.3 Falsification Test: Effects of the event on other outcome variables

Another potential threat to inference is a violation of the excludability assumption by the occurrence of simultaneous events. One approach to consider this is to run a falsification test that examines the effect of the event on outcome variables that should not be affected by the repressive treatment event (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández 2019). To ensure that another event  $T'$  is not driving the effect, one plausible falsification test is using a relevant outcome  $DV'$  that is theoretically unrelated to the repressive event,  $T$ , but might be affected by  $T'$  that might also have an effect on  $DV$ . I use a series of outcome variables relating to how people perceive others in their community that are as close to possible to the survey instruments on policing but should not be affected by the repression. An effect of  $t$  on  $DV'$  would indicate a potential violation of the exclusion restriction, suggesting a broader time trend  $T'$  might be driving people's perception of others  $DV'$ . Alternatively, if we observe null effects of  $t$  on  $DV'$ , we can have more confidence that the estimated effects for  $DV$  are not biased by other events.

Theoretically, a related series of events like an increase in crime, other security threat, or even frustration about the protester (as opposed to the state response) might affect both people's trust in the police *and* their trust in others. Alternatively, the selective repressive event by police should not have an affect on the way people view other individual members of the society, even though it does affect public perception of the police and the broader political system. I construct a falsification test to rule out this possibility.

To do so, I employ a Relational Justice Schema Index used by Pickett, Nix and Roche (2018). The relational justice schema maps to individuals' "beliefs about the degree of procedural justice (as distinct from injustice) exhibited by others in society during interpersonal interactions" (Pickett, Nix and Roche 2018, 99). These

measures focus on interactions between various members of the public rather than on interactions between the public and the police. Broadly, this schema measures the extent to which people in society “generally exhibit procedural justice in their dealings with others... whether they tend to be respectful, fair, and unbiased” (Pickett, Nix and Roche 2018, 99). Participants were asked to think about how people in society generally treat one another, and then responded whether they agreed or disagreed with three statements. 1) Most people are polite when dealing with others. 2) Most people treat other people fairly. 3) Most people treat other people with dignity and respect.

Table 4.6 shows the results of the falsification tests. I estimate the baseline OLS models from Equation 5.1 (odd columns) and Equation 2 (even columns); however, the dependent variables are participants’ responses to the justice schema instruments. Most people are polite when dealing with others (Models 13 and 14). Most people treat other people fairly (Models 15 and 16). Most people treat other people with dignity and respect (Model 17 and 18). Across each of the baseline models from Equation 1, the treatment coefficients ( $\beta_1$ ) are indistinguishable from zero. Similarly, the results are null in each of the models estimated from Equation 2, except for Model 16.

Interestingly, Model 16 shows non-incumbent supporters express a lower assessment about whether people treat others fairly following the repressive event ( $-0.3196$ ); however, incumbent supporters expressed a higher assessment ( $0.051$ .) This was the only falsification statement that includes fairness, relating to a more general system of equality. This was the only result, including the policing measures, that provided any evidence of the motivated reasoning hypotheses.

The falsification tests are neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that the estimated effects of the selective repressive event on public perception of police is not caused by another event. However, they do increase our confidence that the exclusion

Table 4.6: Effect of social media tax protest/arrests on public perception of other members of society: results from parish fixed-effects OLS models

	Most people are polite when dealing with others		Most people treat other people fairly		Most people treat other people with dignity and respect	
	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
Protest/Arrests	0.0700 (0.0816)	0.0438 (0.1246)	-0.0771 (0.0807)	-0.3196** (0.1286)	-0.0366 (0.0808)	-0.1735 (0.1244)
Incumbent Supporter	0.0305 (0.0457)	0.0279 (0.0473)	0.0013 (0.0445)	-0.0229 (0.0458)	-0.0168 (0.0456)	-0.0305 (0.0470)
Incumbent Supporter*Protest/Arrests		0.0400 (0.1649)		0.3706** (0.1641)		0.2091 (0.1617)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.1349	0.1344	0.1534	0.1555	0.1357	0.1360
Observations	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920

*Note:* Parish fixed effects and control variables indicating education, age, gender, economic status, and urban/rural are included in all models. Robust standard errors are clustered by respondent in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

restriction assumption is credible. In short, the link appears to be the state repression by the police against the protesters that affects public perception of the police and not mistrust of others in general or another event.

## 4.6 Discussion and Conclusion

What are the effects of state repression by police on public perceptions of the legitimacy of the police? Using an unexpected event during surveys design approach to causal inference, I show that even selective repression by the police negatively affects how individuals view the police. I theorize that fear of the police as agents of repression is the main theoretical mechanism by which repression decreases support for police. When political authorities rely on the police to repress dissent, it increases people's fear that the police function as agents of repression and undermines people's trust in the police as legitimate authorities who provide law and order. Surprisingly, repression decreases support for the police across the levels of support for the incumbent regime.

A theory of politically motivated reasoning does not completely capture changes in people's attitudes toward the police following repression. Political loyalty to the

political authorities, operationalized by support for the ruling party, does condition the effect of state repression by police on individuals' perceptions of police abuse. I demonstrate the effects of selective state repression are strongest among those who do not identify as supporting the political party. Yet, even respondents who identify with the ruling party view the police as more illegitimate authorities and say they are less likely to comply with police directives after the police engage in repression.

## 4.7 Conclusion

The findings in this chapter make the following contributions. First, the results in this chapter demonstrate that the negative consequences of repression move beyond political behavior (Bautista 2015, Balcells 2012); rather repression by police undermines support for the state institutions responsible for providing security. Second, I show that repression targeted at opposition political elites and protestors has individual-level effects even among those who were not engaged in political dissent. Although violence might be an effective tool to induce political loyalty (Blaydes 2018, Kalyvas 2006), repression still adversely affects the way people view the police. Third, the results in this chapter demonstrate that political authorities face a tradeoff: they can rely on the police to repress dissent, but doing so undermines people's trust in the police – even those who support the regime – and subsequently decreases the co-production of law and order and security.

## 4.8 Summary

This chapter provides a unique empirical picture of the effects of state repression by police within a non-democracy. The survey was conducted from June 29 to July 20, 2018. Less than a month after data collection was completed the violence by the police against Bobi Wine escalated. During the Arua Municipal by-elections in

August, the police and other security forces arrested and tortured Wine and other opposition politicians. Suppressive actions taken by the UPF and other security sector forces underscore tensions between safety and repression that civilians face toward police in non-democracies, as well as other forms of governance. The coercive tactics used by the UPF increased political dissent throughout Uganda, providing additional evidence that our results generalize to the observed repression-dissent dynamics in Uganda.

The results of my analysis demonstrate the limits of repression to deter political dissent – repression decreases civilian confidence in the police. Beyond these findings, the results were also borne out during political events that unfolded in Uganda in the months following the survey.

This chapter in addition to a related co-authored survey experiment suggest that repression by the police negatively affects public perceptions of the police. These backlash effects are also reflected in the dynamics in Uganda. Rather than deterring collective action, repression led to additional support for Bobi Wine and his People's Power Movement. Even the attempted assassination of Bobi Wine failed to dampen support for him, the media and others rallied behind him.

The robust causal evidence shows that repression by the police negatively affects public perceptions of the police. This chapter suggests that people who fear the police are less likely to think that the police are normatively aligned with them. If this is the case, we should expect that opposition areas should less likely to cooperate with police. To the extent that the police need cooperation to be effective, the police should be less effective in opposition areas. One clear implication of this for law and order is that crimes should be higher in opposition areas. The next chapter tests this hypothesis.

## 4.9 Appendix

The main analyses provided in the paper uses OLS models with parish level fixed effects with robust standard errors clustered at the respondent. However, the results are robust to alternative models and specifications.

1. Table 4.7 shows the results are robust to using Ordered Logit Models rather than OLS.
2. Table 4.8 show the results with an alternative specification that uses district level fixed effects with robust standard errors clustered at the district level rather than employing parish level fixed effects with robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level.
3. Table 4.9 replaces the main measure of Incumbent Supporter with an alternative measure of loyalty to the regime: Incumbent Vote. Incumbent Vote is coded as 1 if respondent said that they would vote for the NRM and 0 otherwise. Similar, to the main measure of Incumbent Support, people's responses were recording during the baseline survey collection prior to the survey round on policing and security. Importantly, this means that the Social Media Tax Protests and Arrests did not affect people's response as their answers were recorded prior to the event.
4. Table 4.10 reports the results of the main models using July 12 (the day following the event) as the assignment to treatment cutoff rather than July 11.

Table 4.7: Results from Ordered Logit Models

	Police are legitimate authorities & you should do what they say			You should obey the police even if you don't agree			Police treat people with dignity & respect			Police make fair & impartial decisions			Police stand up for values that are important to you			Police act in ways you consider to be right			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	
Protest/Arrests	0.1784 (0.0994)	0.3270 (0.0954)	0.3270 (0.0954)	0.2974 (0.0928)	0.1771 (0.1588)	0.1370 (0.0980)	0.2921 (0.0921)	0.2407 (0.1730)	0.2914 (0.1743)	0.2407 (0.1743)	0.2914 (0.1743)	0.2407 (0.1743)	0.2914 (0.1743)	0.2407 (0.1743)	0.2914 (0.1743)	0.2407 (0.1743)	0.2914 (0.1743)	0.2407 (0.1743)	0.2914 (0.1743)
Incumbent Supporter	0.0994 (0.0925)	0.0954 (0.0915)	0.0954 (0.0915)	-0.0928 (0.0943)	0.1588 (0.0930)	0.0980 (0.0960)	0.0921 (0.0921)	0.1730 (0.0980)	0.1743 (0.0921)	0.1743 (0.0921)	0.1743 (0.0921)	0.1743 (0.0921)	0.1743 (0.0921)	0.1743 (0.0921)	0.1743 (0.0921)	0.1743 (0.0921)	0.1743 (0.0921)	0.1743 (0.0921)	0.1743 (0.0921)
Protest/Arrests*Incumbent Supporter		0.9949** (0.3765)	0.9949** (0.3765)	1.0327** (0.3667)		0.3106 (0.3710)	0.6557 (0.3681)		1.3165** (0.3751)	1.3165** (0.3751)	1.3165** (0.3751)	1.3165** (0.3751)	1.3165** (0.3751)	1.3165** (0.3751)	1.3165** (0.3751)	1.3165** (0.3751)	1.3165** (0.3751)	1.3165** (0.3751)	1.3165** (0.3751)
AIC	5330.5877	5334.6468	5334.6468	5190.0278	5228.2015	5220.4994	5124.2876	5127.0682	4975.5424	4965.1365	4923.7600	4916.7587	4923.7600	4916.7587	4923.7600	4916.7587	4923.7600	4916.7587	4923.7600
BIC	5405.2700	5495.8891	5495.8891	5345.7100	5383.8887	5380.7417	5270.9698	5284.2406	5131.2246	5126.3788	5079.4513	5078.0010	5126.3788	5078.0010	5126.3788	5078.0010	5126.3788	5078.0010	5126.3788
Log Likelihood	-2641.7989	-2683.8234	-2683.8234	-2567.0139	-2586.1007	-2585.7497	-2534.1438	-2532.4991	-2459.7712	-2453.5883	-2433.8845	-2429.3783	-2453.5883	-2429.3783	-2453.5883	-2429.3783	-2453.5883	-2429.3783	-2453.5883
Deviance	5283.5877	5276.6468	5276.6468	5134.0278	5172.2015	5171.4994	5068.2876	5064.9982	4919.5424	4907.1365	4867.7600	4858.7587	4907.1365	4858.7587	4907.1365	4858.7587	4907.1365	4858.7587	4907.1365
Observations	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920

Note: Each model includes control variables indicating education, age, gender, economic status, and urban/rural. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$

Table 4.8: Effect of social media tax protest/arrests on public perceptions of police: results from district fixed-effects OLS models and standard errors clustered at the district level

	Police are legitimate authorities & you should do what they say			You should obey the police even if you don't agree			Police treat people with dignity & respect			Police make fair & impartial decisions			Police stand up for values that are important to you			Police act in ways you consider to be right			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	
Protest/Arrests	-0.2039 (0.1423)	-0.5394** (0.2463)	-0.4117*** (0.1094)	-0.6929*** (0.1470)	-0.2770** (0.1051)	-0.3618* (0.1882)	-0.2917*** (0.1006)	-0.4875*** (0.1540)	-0.2203** (0.1053)	-0.6280*** (0.1919)	-0.3009*** (0.1031)	-0.6160*** (0.1702)	-0.2203** (0.1053)	-0.6280*** (0.1919)	-0.3009*** (0.1031)	-0.6160*** (0.1702)	-0.2203** (0.1053)	-0.6280*** (0.1919)	-0.3009*** (0.1031)
Incumbent Supporter	-0.0117 (0.0493)	-0.0463 (0.0485)	-0.0021 (0.0454)	-0.0311 (0.0448)	0.0439 (0.0438)	0.0352 (0.0445)	0.0938* (0.0537)	0.0736 (0.0517)	0.1068** (0.0447)	0.0648 (0.0456)	0.1065** (0.0420)	0.0741* (0.0429)	0.1068** (0.0447)	0.0648 (0.0456)	0.1065** (0.0420)	0.0741* (0.0429)	0.1068** (0.0447)	0.0648 (0.0456)	0.1065** (0.0420)
Protest/Arrests*Incumbent Supporter		0.5109** (0.2492)		0.4282** (0.1850)		0.1291 (0.2187)		0.2982 (0.1917)		0.6207** (0.2276)		0.4798** (0.1938)		0.6207** (0.2276)		0.4798** (0.1938)		0.6207** (0.2276)	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.1759	0.1786	0.1100	0.1123	0.1205	0.1202	0.1275	0.1283	0.1512	0.1569	0.1407	0.1441	0.1512	0.1569	0.1407	0.1441	0.1512	0.1569	0.1407
Observations	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920

Note: District fixed effects and control variables indicating education, age, gender, economic status, and urban/rural are included in all models. Robust standard errors are clustered at the district in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Table 4.9: Effect of social media tax protest/arrests on public perceptions of police (with alternative NRM vote measure): results from parish fixed-effects OLS models

	Police are legitimate authorities & you should do what they say		You should obey the police even if you don't agree		Police treat people with dignity & respect		Police make fair & impartial decisions		Police stand up for values that are important to you		Police act in ways you consider to be right	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Protest/Arrests	-0.2490** (0.1082)	-0.3719* (0.2051)	-0.4716*** (0.0972)	-0.7017*** (0.1414)	-0.2704** (0.1103)	-0.2146 (0.1930)	-0.2905*** (0.0969)	-0.4392*** (0.1508)	-0.2249** (0.0906)	-0.4316*** (0.1559)	-0.2905*** (0.0951)	-0.4541*** (0.1554)
Incumbent Vote	-0.0135 (0.0520)	-0.0262 (0.0525)	0.0146 (0.0481)	-0.0093 (0.0492)	0.0719 (0.0529)	0.0777 (0.0536)	0.0823* (0.0495)	0.0668 (0.0506)	0.0906* (0.0473)	0.0691 (0.0484)	0.1082** (0.0466)	0.0912* (0.0475)
Protest/Arrests*Incumbent Supporter		0.1938 (0.2366)		-0.3631* (0.1887)	-0.0881 (0.2319)		0.2347 (0.1948)		0.3262* (0.1887)		0.2581 (0.1950)	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.2538	0.2538	0.1496	0.1512	0.1424	0.1420	0.1420	0.1423	0.1761	0.1774	0.1599	0.1605
Observations	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920

*Note:* Parish fixed effects and control variables indicating education, age, gender, economic status, and urban/rural are included in all models. Robust standard errors are clustered by respondent in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Table 4.10: Effect of July 12 on public perceptions of police: results from parish fixed-effects OLS models

	Police are legitimate authorities & you should do what they say		You should obey the police even if you don't agree		Police treat people with dignity & respect		Police make fair & impartial decisions		Police stand up for values that are important to you		Police act in ways you consider to be right	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Protest/Arrests 2	-0.3081** (0.1199)	-0.6945*** (0.2281)	-0.5503*** (0.1033)	-0.7239*** (0.1540)	-0.3183*** (0.1206)	-0.3922* (0.2233)	-0.3767*** (0.1087)	-0.6065*** (0.1731)	-0.2766*** (0.1013)	-0.7756*** (0.1779)	-0.3549** (0.1087)	-0.7516*** (0.1905)
Incumbent Supporter	-0.0327 (0.0519)	-0.0624 (0.0522)	0.0071 (0.0492)	-0.0063 (0.0501)	0.0505 (0.0532)	0.0448 (0.0537)	0.0893* (0.0500)	0.0716 (0.0509)	0.0993** (0.0483)	0.0609 (0.0489)	0.1186** (0.0472)	0.0881* (0.0476)
Protest/Arrests*Incumbent Supporter		0.5749** (0.2618)		0.2584 (0.1994)	0.1100 (0.2612)		0.3420 (0.2182)		0.7425*** (0.2098)		0.5903** (0.2278)	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.2548	0.2576	0.1513	0.1516	0.1424	0.1420	0.1442	0.1451	0.1773	0.1839	0.1617	0.1660
Observations	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920	1920

*Note:* Parish fixed effects and control variables indicating education, age, gender, economic status, and urban/rural are included in all models. Robust standard errors are clustered by respondent in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .



## Chapter 5

# Incumbent Support, Cooperation, and Crime

“There was information circulating that our soldier shot and killed a wananchi. We sent a team of our battalion commander of Wakiso and his intelligence officer to Nansana. The initial information they gave us is that the person was killed with a pistol. Our LDUs do not carry pistols.”  
Maj Yusuf Katamba

“A very sad day! Yet again, police has murdered one of our solid leaders of the People Power Movement. Police saw Rita Nabukenya wearing People Power colours on a boda boda, run after her with a police patrol truck and knocked her dead.”  
Bobi Wine

“My son did not have any problem ever since he joined People Power group. He has become responsible and more helpful to the family.”  
Faith Nakazzi

“Their crimes will only add to the credit of the NRM because we are going to defeat them. Yet, the People have already seen the bankruptcy and the criminality of these groups and those who back them.”  
President Museveni

## 5.1 Introduction

There is an old adage: “a picture is worth a thousand words.” If this is true of a picture than it is even more the case of a political cartoon. On February 28, 2020, Spire Cartoons released the cartoon in Figure 5.1. Bobi Wine is depicted in the cartoon, physically constrained with a UPF padlock across his mouth next to the bodies of two of Wine’s supporters killed by Uganda’s security forces. IGP Ochola with a yellow nose – the color of the incumbent party – stands next to him, saying “No, No, you people are violent... you see.”

The cartoon’s artist captures two competing ideas. First, police in Uganda, and political authorities more broadly, attempt to portray opposition movements as violent, dangerous, and criminal networks. Second, the image highlights the sentiment that when people see the police in Uganda using coercion to limit political gatherings like protests or political campaign consultations, they see them working as agents of Museveni and not public servants. To understand why opposition supporters are unlikely to trust the police and why crime is likely in opposition areas, it is helpful to consider the escalating violence against political opponents in Uganda.

On February 24, 2020, a supporter of the People Power Movement, Rita Nabukenya, was killed by the Ugandan police. Earlier that day, the police had blocked a People Power Movement “consultative” meeting at the Pope Paul Memorial hotel. The consultative meeting was a strategy session to plan Wine’s upcoming presidential campaign. Blocking the consultative meeting was another repressive attack against Bobi Wine’s presidential campaign.

In fact, since he launched his campaign to compete in the 2021 presidential election, the police had blocked several political gatherings, consultative meetings, and planning sessions citing that the opposition party gatherings were illegal either because they lacked the required paper work or had too many people in attendance. A few hours later, Nabukenya was taking a boda boda (motorcycle taxi) in Nakawa,



Figure 5.1: Bobi Wine

Kampala when she was killed. Members of the People Power movement said that police officers identified her because she was wearing the People Power Movement colors and then drove a patrol truck into her boda boda, fatally knocking her off the motorcycle.

The Kampala Metropolitan Police deputy spokesman said that Nabukenya sustained her fatal injuries when her boda boda collided with another boda boda while she was trying to “overtake a police patrol vehicle.”<sup>1</sup> The controversy around her death escalated at her funeral in Nansana town when UPF officers and members of the Local Defence Units (LDUs) clashed with People Power Movement supporters. LDUs are a group of citizens recruited by the central government to partner with police and other security forces.

During these clashes, another opposition supporter, Dan Kyenune, was killed by

<sup>1</sup>“Police accused of killing People Power Movement supporter,” *Daily Monitor*, February 24, 2020 (<https://bit.ly/2z6X4gk>)

security forces. One eyewitness reported the following: “I wanted to see Bobi Wine, so I left where I was to see him. I followed the convoy and I saw policemen and LDUs clearing the road. One of the two LDUs who was at the back, turned and shot directly at Kyeyune before turning back.”

Several witnesses confirmed that a member of the LDU fatally shot Kyenune before fleeing the scene. However, similar to the death of Nabukenya, a spokesperson for the security forces operating in Kampala, Maj Bilal Katamba, denied the allegations that a member of the LDUs was responsible. Katamba said, “there was information circulating that our soldier shot and killed a wananchi. We sent a team of our battalion commander of Wakiso and his intelligence officer to Nansana. The initial information they gave us is that the person was killed with a pistol. Our LDUs do not carry pistols.”<sup>2</sup>

After her son was killed, Faith Nakazzi told a reporter that Kyenune “did not have any problem ever since he joined People Power group.”<sup>3</sup> In fact, she said, “he has become responsible and more helpful to the family.” Although it was clear that Kyenune was a strong supporter of the People Power Movement, the police draped the flag of the incumbent political party, the NRM, over his casket. The clashes between the police and People Power Movement supporters are representative of similar patterns of repression that surrounded the 2016 election violence by government security forces.

The police, as discussed in Chapter 3, violently repressed opposition supporters and candidates including Besigye and others. Blocking consultative political meetings, gathering information on political activities, and targeting opposition supporters and candidates are the repressive tactics that are likely to undermine the co-production of law and order. When people, as the Spire Cartoon depicted, connect

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<sup>2</sup>“Witness account of how policeman’s son was killed,” *Daily Monitor*, February 27, 2020 (<https://bit.ly/2XJ0wb8>).

<sup>3</sup>“Kyeyune, the victim in Nansana shooting,” *Daily Monitor*, February 27, 2020 (<https://bit.ly/34NDp0D>).

political violence with the police, it should have implications beyond just affecting people’s attitudes. Those attitudes about cooperation should aggregate, shaping variation in how people relate to the police. In this chapter, I examine to what extent support for the incumbent affects district-level crime patterns.

## 5.2 Empirical Design

To examine whether crime is higher in opposition areas, I use four sources of data: first, crime statistics from 2017 reported by the Uganda Police Force in the *Annual Crime Report*; second, electoral returns from the 2016 general election reported by the Electoral Commission; third, 2016 police officer deployment data, discussed in Chapter 3; and fourth, various measures from the GoU BOS 2014 Census. With these data, I construct a novel district-level dataset that includes all reported crimes that occurred in 2017, the level of incumbent vote-share in 2016, total number of police officers deployed in 2016 in addition to the population of each district and other important characteristics vary at the district level but likely also affect levels of crime, support for the incumbent, and number of UPF officers deployed.

### 5.2.1 Variation in Crime

The Annual Crime Report covers the period from January 1st, 2017 to December 31st, 2017 reporting data on 14 crime categories. Categories of crimes reported include: Homicides, Economic crimes, Sexual Related crimes, Child Related crimes, Breakings, Thefts, Robbery, Assaults, Terrorism, Political/Media crimes, Corruption, Narcotics, Other crime in general, and Local laws. Each of these categories represent several sub-categories.<sup>4</sup> However, only the totals for each category are provided at the district

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<sup>4</sup>Homicides are sub-categorized into deaths by: shooting, mob action, poisoning, aggravated domestic violence, fire out breaks, and not specified. Economic crimes include: embezzlement, causing financial losses, abuse of office, counterfeiting, forgeries and uttering of documents, issuing false checks, bank and other corporate frauds, obtaining by false pretences, cyber (Computer) crimes,

level.

During 2017, a total of approximately 252,067 crimes were reported to the police. During this time, 66,626 cases were brought before the court. However, only 18,961 cases secured convictions, 1,419 cases were acquitted and 9,613 cases were dismissed. 105,017 cases were still under inquiry while 36,633 cases were still pending in court. The UPF report that a total of 77,675 suspects were charged to court; 71,680 were males and 5,995 were females. In 2017, a total of 253,316 persons were victims of crime; 164,177 were males and 89,139 were females.

Table 5.1 shows the most frequent crimes reported in 2016, 2017, and 2018. Common assaults were reported most frequently. Domestic violence and defilement were the second and third most frequent crimes reported in 2017. Obtained by false pretense was the only economic crime in the top crimes reported. Child neglect ranked as the sixth most likely crime to be reported. Burglary was the most common form of breakings. Threatening violence was the second most common crime reported and aggravated assaults ranked thirteenth. The most frequent forms of theft reported were cash, mobile forms, and cattle stealing.

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land frauds, and other economic crime. Sexual related offences include: rape, defilement, indecent assaults, incest, and unnatural offences. Child related crimes involve: child desertion, child stealing, child trafficking, child abduction, kidnap, child disappearance/missing, child abuse/torture, infanticide, and abortion. Breakings include: burglaries, house breaking, shop breaking, office breaking, and other breakings. Thefts are sub-categorized into theft of motor vehicles, theft of motorcycles, theft from M/Vs (spares), theft from M/Vs (property), theft of bicycles, theft of computers/laptops, thefts of mobile phones, theft of bank cash in transit, thefts of cash, cattle stealing, theft of telecom, electrical and comm items, theft of railway slippers/material, receiving and retaining (stolen prop), theft (property snatching-bags, necklaces, etc), and thefts of all kinds (general). Robberies are sub-categorized into: aggravated robbery (Motor Cycles), aggravated robbery (Motor Vehicles), aggravated robbery (Cash), aggravated robbery (general), cattle rustling, and simple robbery (general). Assaults include: aggravated assault (acid cases), aggravated assaults (general), and common assaults. Political/Media crimes include: incitement to violence, promoting sectarianism, election offences, treason, and sedition. Corruption involves violations of the corruption act. Narcotics include drug related offenses like: heroin, cocaine, herbal cannabis, cannabis (plants destroyed) cases, and other narcotic related crimes. Other crimes include: threatening violence, missing/disappearance of persons, human trafficking, abduction, kidnap, arson (general), malicious damage to property, malicious damage to school/government property, escapes from lawful custody, rescues from Lawful Custody, examination leakage and stealing, piracy (Copy Right Law), criminal trespass, domestic violence, attempted suicide, attempted killing (by shooting), attempted Killing (other than shooting), other penal code offences (Not Recognised). Local laws include: violations of the Immigration Act, Fish and Crocodiles Act, Firearms Act, and other various local government acts.

Table 5.1: Most Frequent Crimes

Rank	Crimes	2016	2017	2018
1	Common Assaults	36,795	30,794	29,735
2	Defilement	17,395	14,985	15,366
3	Domestic Violence	13,132	15,325	13,916
4	Threatening Violence	14,941	13,474	13,357
5	Obtaining by False Pretences	14,065	12,771	12,313
6	Criminal Trespass	11,356	10,020	9,500
7	Malicious Damage to Property	8,560	8,078	8,339
8	Cattle Stealing	8,712	7,824	7,161
9	Thefts of Cash	9,095	7,878	7,079
10	Burglaries	7,697	6,656	6,867
11	Child Neglect	9,114	10,021	6,757
12	Aggravated Assaults (general)	7,019	5,732	6,584
13	Thefts of Mobile Phones	7,429	6,177	6,205

In addition to differences in types of crimes reported, there is significant regional variation in cases reported. Table 5.2 shows the variation in cases reported to the police in 2016, 2017 and 2018. Districts in North Kyoga, Aswa, and Rwiza were most affected by crime. Whereas, districts in North West Nile and Kidepo reported fewer incidences of crime. Crime statistics of each of Uganda's 112 districts are provided for 2017. The distributions of district-level data for the 14 crime categories are reported in the online appendix.

### 5.2.2 Incumbent Support and Police Deployments

To examine whether variation in support for the political authorities and the police explains differences in levels of crime, I need at least two measures of support for the regime. First, I need a measure to capture the level of expressed support for the incumbent that varies by district. Scholars argue that one reason non-democracies hold elections is because they are an institutional mechanism that provides the leaders critical information on their level of support, including identifying opposition and incumbent strongholds (Hassan 2017, Gandhi 2008, Magaloni 2006). Certainly

Table 5.2: Regional Comparison on Number of Cases Reported

Rank	Crimes	2016	2017	2018
1	North Kyoga	17,972	19,198	16,488
2	Aswa	14,223	15,977	15,839
3	Rwizi	16,593	16,685	15,690
4	Greater Masaka	13,998	13,611	13,056
5	Bukedi	14,100	13,690	12,567
6	KMP South	9,753	10,839	11,582
7	KMP North	10,215	10,121	11,475
8	Kigezi	10,915	11,429	11,317
9	West Nile	9,346	10,079	11,041
10	East Kyoga	12,004	12,292	10,768
11	Albertine	10,886	10,502	10,541
12	Elgon	10,594	10,072	10,096
13	KMP East	8,757	8,934	9,185
14	Rwenzori West	8,847	11,464	8,318
15	Greater Bushenyi	6,121	9,051	7,774
16	Katonga	7,948	9,231	7,444
17	Busoga North	9,833	6,980	7,003
18	Busoga East	6,907	6,668	6,582
19	Wamala	10,496	6,577	6,238
20	Savannah	7,220	6,451	6,185
21	Sipi	4,234	6,360	5,187
22	Sezibwa	4,664	4,937	5,039
23	Kiira	4,017	4,499	4,708
24	Mt Moroto	5,244	6,099	4,374
25	Rwenzori East	3,285	3,674	3,537
26	North West Nile	2,216	2,048	2,733
27	Kidepo	3,329	2,669	2,601
28	C.I.D Headquarters	272	1,930	1,378



election results are an imprecise measure of support for the incumbent; however, it is one form of information that the regime relies on.


In 2016, Uganda held general elections on February 18 to elect the president and parliament. The incumbent candidate was president Yoweri Museveni. The opposition candidates included Kizza Besigye, who had challenged Museveni in the 2001, 2006, and 2011 elections; Abed Bwanika, who has also campaigned against Museveni in 2001, 2006, and 2011; former prime minister Amama Mbabazi; former vice chancellor of Makerere University, Venansius Baryamureeba; Army General Benan Biraaro; Faith Kyala; and Joseph Mabirizi.

Museveni received 60.62% of the votes with the main opposition candidate, Besigye receiving only 35.51% of the votes. Although the turnout was relatively higher (approximately 67% of registered voters), there were widespread allegations of voter fraud, voting irregularities, and intimidation. Between February 15 and February 21, Besigye was detained/arrested three times by the police before they placed him under house arrest, including the UPF raiding the Forum for Democratic Change headquarters to arrest him and several other members of his political party leadership. Other candidates were also arrested or placed under surveillance. The police arrested other politicians after the election for providing documentation that showed election fraud had taken place. The police and other security forces constructed checkpoints throughout Uganda, the government ordered a social media blackout, and at least two people were killed and 20 others injured during unrest that surrounded the election.

Even though threats of intimidation and voter irregularities make election results an imprecise measure, especially at the voter precinct level, aggregating the results to the district level provide a useful measure of support for the incumbent regime. During the 2016 elections, there were 112 districts in Uganda. Figure 5.2 shows the variation of the incumbent's vote share by district. Museveni received more than

50% of the votes in 93 of the 112 districts. However, 19 districts supported the other opposition candidates against the incumbent. From the 2016 election results, I construct two measures: first, the proportion of valid votes Museveni received in each district; and second, a binary measure for opposition districts, coded as 1 if a district received less than 50% of valid votes.

Figure 5.2: Museveni's District-Level Vote Share




As discussed above, the police were involved in intimidating voters and opposition

candidates during the election cycle and repressing dissent more broadly. Figure 5.3, for example, shows a poster of IGP Kayihura calling for information on “those who are distorting the voting process.” On one hand, the police were deployed to deter crime and keep the community safe. On the other, they were also deployed to monitor districts, intimidate voters, and protect the interests of the political authorities. To examine whether higher levels of police undermines cooperation with the police, I use the district-level police deployment data discussed in Chapter 3. The more police are deployed to a district the more community members might fear interacting with police officers. I construct a measure of police presence by calculating the total number of police officers deployed to a specific district. As these data are highly right-skewed, I use their log transformation in the following analyses.

I operationalize incumbent support by using President Museveni’s district-level vote share in the 2016 election. Second, I use 2016 deployment data of police officers, discussed in Chapter 3, to examine whether higher levels of police deployments correlate with crime.

Importantly, crime is likely to be associated with several district-level characteristics that are also likely to correlate with incumbent support and police deployments. One clear example of this is the population of the district. Crimes like thefts and homicides, for example, are more likely in areas with higher populations. However, more densely populated districts might also be more likely to have higher numbers of police officers deployed. Additionally, security might be higher in areas with higher provisions of other public goods like more access to public health and education. If the provisions of these goods are correlated with support for the incumbent (more access to public health and education in incumbent strongholds), then controlling for their effects on crime is necessary. Similarly, mobility might also affect crime prevalence and support for the incumbent. One key measure for movement is the number of motorcycles – Boda Bodas – in the district. Finally, gender parity and levels of

Figure 5.3: Call for Information



literacy likely correlate with the outcome variable of interest and the key explanatory variables.

## 5.3 Results

To test my hypotheses that i) districts with higher levels of support for the incumbent have lower levels of crime; and ii) districts with higher levels of police presence have more crime, I focus on the district as my unit of analysis. In 2016, Uganda had 112 districts. The outcome variables of interest are the count of respective crimes reported to the police in each district in 2017.<sup>5</sup> As a measure of support for the regime, the main explanatory variables are Museveni vote share in 2016 and police deployments in 2016. I employ an observational statistical analysis design to examine whether crime patterns in 2017 are associated with support for Museveni and police deployments.

### 5.3.1 Bivariate Analysis

Figure 5.4 shows the bivariate relationship between crime patterns on the y-axis and incumbent vote share on the x-axis. Several of the crimes, especially sexually related, assaults, breakings, and robberies, appear to be negatively associated with Museveni's vote share. Others show less of a relationship, for example, local "other" laws, corruption, and economic related crimes.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, Figure 5.5 shows the bivariate relationship between crime patterns on the y-axis and total number of police officers deployed on the x-axis. As theorized, most crimes appear to be positively associated with higher levels of police deployments. However, the capital city, Kampala, is an outlier, which might be driving the relationship.

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<sup>5</sup>The results are robust, even when considering the correlation between 2016 vote share and crime in 2018.

<sup>6</sup>Political/media crimes and terrorism are excluded because so few crimes were reported in these categories.

Figure 5.4: Crime Patterns by Vote Share





Figure 5.5: Crime Patterns by Police Deployment



### 5.3.2 Multivariate Analysis

The bivariate relationships above are suggestive; however, several district-level features are likely related to crime in addition to incumbent support and police deployments. For example, there are likely more crimes reported and high numbers of police deployments to districts with higher populations relative to lower populations.

I employ multivariate analyses to examine the associations between reported crimes and incumbent support and police deployments while also controlling for additional observable district-level characteristics. I use the following OLS specifications with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (CR2) to examine the relationship between crime and incumbent support and police deployment.

$$\log(y_d) = \alpha + \beta_1 \log(\text{Incumbent Vote Share}_d) + \beta_2 \log(\text{Police Deployment}_d) + \phi Z_d + \epsilon \quad (5.1)$$

In the above equation,  $y_d$  is the number of crimes reported in district  $d$  for each of the crime categories,  $\text{Incumbent Vote Share}_d$  is the proportion of valid votes received by Museveni in the 2016 election,  $\text{Police Deployment}_d$  is the total number of police officers deployed to  $d$ , and  $Z_d$  is a vector of covariates for each  $d$ . The covariates controls include district-level measures of the average number of motorcycles, average access to public primary schools, proportion of the population that is female, literacy level, and population. I focus the analyses on 10 categories of reported crimes: homicides, sexually related, child related, assaults, breakings, thefts, narcotic related, and other crimes.<sup>7</sup> The log-log model provides an intuitive interpretation where the coefficient is the estimated percent change of crimes reported for a percent change in the respective independent variable.

The top plot in Figure 5.6 shows the results of the above specification without

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<sup>7</sup>Local laws, corruption, political/media crimes, and terrorism are excluded because such a low number were recorded by the police department.



the vector of control variables. In each of the models, except for child related crimes, homicides, and economic related crimes, *Incumbent Vote Share* is negatively associated with the reported crimes. Additionally, for the other models the relationship is statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ). Similarly, as theorized, *Police Deployment* is positively associated with each category of crime. This relationship is statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ) in each model except for child related crimes. The log-log OLS models provide an intuitive interpretation. For example, a one percent increase in incumbent vote share corresponds to a 0.88 percent decrease in the number of sexually related crimes.


Next, the bottom plot in Figure 5.6 shows the results with the vector of controls included. Although not with all crimes reported, *Incumbent Vote Share* is negatively associated with several types of crimes, including: assaults, narcotic related crimes, robberies, and sexually related crimes. The relationship between *Incumbent Vote Share* and these respective crimes is statistically significant at conventional levels ( $p < 0.05$ ). For breakings, child related crimes, economic related crimes, other crimes, and thefts the relationship is negative but the relationships are not significant at standard statistical thresholds.<sup>8</sup>

In general, the results provide support for my hypotheses that at least some types of crime are higher in opposition areas either because they do not support the incumbent or because the police are more heavily deployed to those districts. This district level finding provides suggestive evidence for my theory that mistrust of the police and the political authorities undermines the provision of law and order. Districts with higher levels of support for the incumbent have lower levels of crimes, especially those crimes involving non-lethal forms of violence (i.e., sexually related crimes, assaults, breakings and robberies) and narcotic related crimes. Districts with higher police deployments are more likely to have higher levels of homicides, breakings, thefts,

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<sup>8</sup>The results are robust to other model specifications, including employing negative binomial models or using a binary indicator for opposition strongholds rather than Incumbent Vote Share.

Figure 5.6: The relationship between crime and support for the incumbent and police



robberies, and other forms of crime.

### **5.3.3 Limitations**

There are two limitations to these analyses. First, they rely on administrative data produced by the UPF. One concern is that these data have missingness because the police do not keep accurate records. This becomes a concern if the police implement different data falsification strategies by district. Another potential is that the data are more reliable in some districts because in those districts the police are most effective at collecting data and processing information. If we assume that it is important for the police to maintain more accurate records in areas that support the incumbent government then these results should be lower bound estimates of the actual level of crime.

A second limitation is that these analyses rely on crimes reported to the police. This is both a theoretical and empirical concern. Empirically, reported crimes are only a fraction of the total number of crimes committed. To the extent, that as theorized, people are less likely to report crimes in opposition areas, bias in reporting should make it more difficult to find support for my theory.

## **5.4 Summary**

This chapter begins by showing how Ugandans, especially those who support the opposition, view the police as agents of the state. This perception of the police likely shapes not only individuals behavior with police officers but also shapes broader patterns of crime. Using administrative data, crime statistics, and election results, I explore two main hypotheses: first, districts with higher levels of electoral support for the incumbent have lower levels of crime; and second, districts with higher levels of police presence are likely to have more crimes. Results show that several crimes

negatively correlate with incumbent vote share but are positively associated with police deployments. This suggests that areas with higher opposition support correlate with higher levels of some crime. Distrust in police is one possible explanation for this relationship. The police deployments are from 2016 whereas the levels of crime are from 2017. To the extent that crime levels are static temporally, one alternative explanation is that police are deployed to areas with more crime. This is certainly a possible explanation that this analysis does not exclude. However, there is no evidence that higher police deployments decrease crime. The next questions is whether co-ethnic bias, similar to partisanship, might also influence people's decisions to report crimes.

## Chapter 6

# Fear of Reporting to Outsiders: Evidence from a List Experiment

“Museveni brings in these outsiders because he knows that no one wants to beat up their own nephew or cousin. No one likes to crack the head of their cousin. Can you imagine sitting at the table with your family and they know that you did that?”

Interview with a man in Gulu

### 6.1 Introduction

In an interview in Gulu, an individual told me that “Museveni brings in these outsiders because he knows that no one wants to beat up their own nephew or cousin.” Similarly, in an interview with a junior UPF officer, he told me that he missed his home and being with people who were like him. He said he missed his food, his friends, and the his favorite foods.

In her book, Greitens (2016) shares a story about when South Korea decided to put young conscripts in their riot police units. She writes, “My lieutenant came to me and said, ‘You need to talk to this guy, his father is one of the protesters. I went to the front of the line, and there was a young man, just out of military training, and it

was true, he could see the face of his father and his father's friends in the crowd.” In the United States, Black officers in the National Guard expressed similar difficulties when they policed the Black Lives Matter protests in June 2020. Lieutenant Jenkins-Bey, who is Black, told the *New York Times*, “It’s a very tough conversation to have when a soldier turns to me and they’re saying, ‘Hey, sir, you know my cousin was up there yelling at me, that was my neighbor, my best friend from high school.’”<sup>1</sup> These examples illustrate the strategic logic of why many autocrats shuffle security forces in the first place.

Without shuffling, as was reflected in the examples from the South Korea and the United States, security forces look into the crowds and see their neighbors, family members and friends looking back at them. By shuffling police from other areas and communities, this is less likely to occur. However, as I argue in Chapter 3, there is another societal cost to shuffling: people will be less likely to trust outsiders – either because they fear their role as repressive agents or because they are from communities other than their own. When political authorities employ outsiders, it likely decreases policing effectiveness as citizens will be less likely to report crimes and cooperate in general.

In Chapter 2, I theorize that in-group bias – the systematic preference to prefer members of one’s own group to members of another – operates through two mechanisms: 1) people believe that in-group police officers will be more helpful and effective than police officers from another group; and 2) people believe in-group police officers will be less likely to use repression relative to police officers from another group. While partisanship might shape how political authorities, police, and civilians view one another, partisanship is prone to preference falsification – people and police officers for example might say they support the political authorities when in fact they do not.

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<sup>1</sup>“Aggressive Tactics by National Guard, Ordered to Appease Trump, Wounded the Military, Too,” *New York Times*, June 10, 2020 (<https://nyti.ms/2UliZm1>).

In the contexts where political authorities rely on the police to repress dissent, political authorities and the security apparatus often rely on heuristic cues to ensure loyalty to the regime. One important characteristic that people use as a heuristic is ethnicity. Ethnicity is important because it is highly observable and known by the actors. As discussed in Chapter 2, theories of stacking and shuffling focus on the preferences of the political authorities and the security apparatus, considering how political authorities employ ethnicity to resolve principal-agent problems that emerge through delegating violence to the security apparatus. This strategic behavior has important implications for how civilians likely view the police they encounter. Namely, people are less likely to report crimes.

Data on the ethnic composition and rotation of deployments are not available in Uganda. However, evidence gathered from newspaper reports and interviews conducted in 2018 with UPF officers shows the government regularly shuffles both junior and senior UPF officers. The former IGP Kale Kayihura, for example, shuffled 70 highly ranked police officers in April 2017 (Daily Monitor 2018). A year later, the new IGP Okoth Ochola shuffled officers including 96 senior police officers (The Observer 2018). Similarly, 142 senior officers were reshuffled in the latest police transfers in January 2019 (Kazibwe 2019). Corresponding with a leading journalist in Uganda, he said that one of the reasons why deployment data are not available is because officers are so frequently rotated.

How might observing political authorities moving police officers from one area to another affect civilians' perceptions of the police. Encountering police officers from another ethnic group is likely to increase fear or repression and decrease cooperation with the police. The first mechanism relates to existing arguments explaining why co-ethnics are more likely to cooperate with one another. The second mechanism operates through fear and mistrust toward the dual role of police in authoritarian governments – namely fear of repression.

Citizens who trust the regime will still prefer co-ethnic officers; however, they will be less concerned about the threat of repression when encountering a non-co-ethnic officer. Alternatively, citizens who mistrust the regime – fear the potential for repression – prefer cooperating with co-ethnic police officers because they will be more helpful *and* because they are concerned about the increased risk of repression by a non-co-ethnic officer. Consequently, mistrust in the regime should have a positive conditional effect on co-ethnic bias.

Rather than answering why co-ethnic bias matters, the objective of this chapter is to examine the extent to which co-ethnic bias might shape how people view the police. For now, I set aside the *why* question until the following chapter. The empirics in this chapter focus on testing a hypothesis derived from the first implication: people prefer cooperating with police officers who share their ethnicity. To do so, I employ a nationally representative list experiment to see if encountering police officers from outside of their community is a reason why people do not report crimes.

## 6.2 Research Design

In this chapter, I use a list experiment, also known as an item count response survey, to measure whether citizens report crimes less to police who are from other areas or communities. I employ methodological innovations developed for surveying conflict zones, which allows respondents anonymity in how they respond to questions. This indirect survey methodology allows me to solicit more truthful answers than they might provide if asked directly. This technique is used throughout social sciences to study sensitive topics (Gilens, Sniderman and Kuklinski 1998, Streb et al. 2007, Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013). An alternative approach to the list experiment could be to directly ask respondents whether they would report to police if they witnessed a crime happening. One could regress their responses on self-identified ethnic affiliation



to determine whether certain groups are more or less likely to report to the police. I argue that this approach is problematic for two reasons. First, due to social and political sensitivity of ethnicity in Uganda, our research partners strongly encouraged me to not ask respondents directly about their ethnic identification. Second, social desirability bias likely conditions respondents' answers to questions about reporting crimes to police. This bias is likely present without including any other conditions about ethnicity in the survey prompt.

In theory, list experiments are rather straightforward to implement. Randomly selected study participants are randomly assigned to a control and a treatment group. Respondents assigned to the control group are provided a list of  $J$  items and asked to report how many they think matter. In the treatment group, participants accomplish the same task but are assigned a list of  $J + 1$  items. The treatment list includes the control items and the sensitive item of theoretical interest. Surveys that have a large enough sample size can estimate the proportion that believes the sensitive item matters by comparing the average response of the control group to the average response of the treatment group. Anonymity in responses and broader design of this approach mostly eliminate respondents' pressure to falsify their "true preferences."

However, in practice, list experiments are more difficult to implement. As enumerated by Glynn (2013) and others, several challenges can arise when trying to implement a list experiment. First, list experiments are frequently under-powered. Corstange (2009) suggests studies use a sample ranging from 1,000 to 2,000. The nationally representative sample used in this study includes 1,920 randomly selected respondents. Second, methodologists suggest the other questions on the survey should be similar in nature to the topic to not draw attention to the treatment. The survey round was on safety and security and the list experiment fit the context of the rest of the survey. Third, the list experiment is designed to avoid ceiling and floor effects (low probability that participants answer "yes" or "no" to all of the items).

I designed a set of nonsensitive items where the target mean number of items given would be two (out of a possible four). I included one item that I thought everyone might give – the police are far away. Additionally, I included items that would be negatively correlated: the police are ineffective and the police are violent. Finally, I included an item that people might reject: the police are corrupt.

Employing the standard design, I randomly split the sample into treatment and control groups where  $T_i = 1$  implies that respondent  $i$  belongs to the treatment group and  $T_i = 0$  belongs to the control group. The treatment and control groups were read the following prompt:

I am going to read you a list of reasons for why people might not report crimes to the police. I would like you to tell me how many of these are reasons why people do not go to the police. Please don't tell me which ones you generally agree with; only tell me how many you think matter.

As mentioned above, study participants in the control group were presented with a list of  $J$  control items and asked how many of the items they believe matter. The four following control items are used, and thus we have  $J = 4$ :

- (1) People believe the police are violent
- (2) People believe the police are ineffective
- (3) People believe the police are corrupt
- (4) People believe the police are far away

Study participants in the treatment group were presented the full list of one sensitive item and  $J$  control items.<sup>2</sup>

- (1) People believe the police are violent
- (2) People believe the police are ineffective

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<sup>2</sup>Unfortunately, limitations within the research firm kept me from randomizing the order of items on the partial and full lists to minimize order effects. In the treatment, the sensitive item was the third item.

- (3) People believe the police are corrupt
- (4) People believe the police are far away
- (5) People believe the police are from other areas and communities than their own.

Mistrust toward outsiders and co-ethnic bias are not mutually exclusive. However, I did not cue ethnicity directly for two reasons: first, asking about officers from outside their area or community captures a broader prejudice about outsiders being hired to police communities – mistrust toward officers who are not from the community. Second, security challenges and heightened political tensions precluded me from asking directly about ethnic affiliations even in the list experiment. Moreover, ethnic groups in Uganda are geographically clustered and researchers have previously signalled ethnicity by discussing geographical cues (Carlson 2015). Ugandan research partners also suggested that using *communities* in the sensitive item would signal *common ethnic ties*. Accordingly, police officers from other areas and communities signal both non-ethnic officers and *shuffling* by the regime.

### 6.2.1 Multistage Sampling and Descriptive Statistics

The overview of the sampling for this study was provided in Chapter 1. In the sample, the modal age range of the sample was 25-34 years. The most common level of education was some primary education. The gender distribution included 55% of the sample identifying as female and 45% as male. Unsurprisingly, 68% of respondents in the sample said that the party they felt closest to was the incumbent party, National Resistance Movement (NRM), followed by Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) at 13%. Most respondents said that they “somewhat approve” or “strongly approve” of the president’s overall performance. But some respondents were willing to say that they did not approve of his job performance; 243 respondents said that they somewhat disapproved of his performance and 163 said they strongly disapproved.

## 6.2.2 Evaluating the Design

Table 6.1 reports responses by study participants to the list experiment. There appear to be few floor effects in the design. All respondents in the control said at least one option was a reason why people do not go to the police. There is some potential for ceiling effects. Out of the 961 respondents in the control group 20% said that they believed that all the four nonsensitive choices were reasons people did not report crimes to the police. The modal response from the control group was 3. Approximately 60% of respondents provided 2 or 3 as the answer to the set of nonsensitive items. The mean of the control items was 2.53.

Table 6.1: Observed Data

Response Value	Control Group		Treatment Group	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
1	194	20.2	157	16.4
2	262	27.3	225	23.5
3	309	32.2	181	18.9
4	196	20.4	307	32.0
5			89	9.3
Total	961		959	

Notes: This table reports the frequency and percentage of respondents for each value of  $Y_i$ , the number of items that the respondent supports in the list experiment, for both the control and treatment groups. Percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

## 6.2.3 Results

I make two assumptions in the list experiment. First, I assume that there are *no design effects*. That is, including the sensitive item has no effect on respondents' answers to control items. Following steps provided by Blair and Imai (2012), I do not find any statistical evidence of design effects. I use the `list` package in R to determine if there is any evidence of design effects. I fail to reject that there are no

design effects. This approach does not require respondents to tell the truth regarding the control items, but I do assume that the inclusion of the treatment item does not change the sum of those in the control. Second, I assume that study participants give truthful answers for the treatment item, which is called the *no liars* assumption (Blair and Imai 2012).

Relying on these two assumptions, a standard difference-in-means estimator is an unbiased estimate of the proportion of the population who affirmatively answer the sensitive question.

$$\hat{\tau} = \frac{1}{N_1} \sum_{i=1}^N T_i Y_i - \frac{1}{N_0} \sum_{i=1}^N (1 - T_i) Y_i, \quad (6.1)$$

and  $N_1 = \sum_{i=1}^N$  notates the size of the group assigned to the treatment and  $N_0 = N - N_1$  reflects the size of the control group. Following Graeme and Blair, I denote the population proportion of each type as  $\pi_{yz} = Pr(Y_i(0) = y, Z_{i,J+1}^* = Z)$  for  $y = 0, \dots, J$  and  $z = 0, 1, \dots, J$ , accordingly,  $\pi_{yz}$  is identified  $\forall y = 0, \dots, J$ :

$$\pi_{y1} = Pr(Y_i \leq y | T_i = 0) - Pr(Y_i \leq y | T_i = 1), \quad (6.2)$$

$$\pi_{y0} = Pr(Y_i \leq y | T_i = 1) - Pr(Y_i \leq y | T_i = 0), \quad (6.3)$$

Using the standard list experiment design, I examine the proportion of the population that believes officers from other communities or areas decreases the willingness of individuals to report crimes to police. Assuming there are no design effects and no liars, I estimate the difference-in-means between the control and treatment groups.<sup>3</sup> Results are shown in Table 6.2.

The difference-in-means estimate shows 41.61% (SE = 5.25) of Ugandans believe

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<sup>3</sup>I use the `ict.reg` function within the `list` package to estimate the effect of the sensitive item on the response.

police who are not from their area or community is a reason why individuals do not report crimes to police. The difference-in-means estimate lies between zero and one and represents the proportion of treatment group respondents that (indirectly) answered affirmatively to the sensitive question. This difference is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ . This is significantly higher than the 9.5% of respondents who said they would not report a crime to police when asked directly. Police officers who are not community members or from the area appear to decrease people’s willingness to cooperate with the police. In particular, encountering officers from other areas or communities is a reason why people do not report crimes.

Table 6.2: Difference-in-Means Estimate

	List Experiment	
Control Group	2.53	[961]
Treatment Group	2.94	[959]
Estimated inter-group bias (%)	41.61	(5.25)

Notes: Control and treatment values indicate the mean number of  $Y_i$ , respectively. The number of respondents in each group is provided in brackets. Linear model estimated standard errors are in parentheses.

### 6.2.4 Subgroup Variation

Do results of the list experiment vary across the population? As theorized above, we might expect more co-ethnic bias and mistrust toward police officers from other communities in areas where opposition support is relatively stronger. Although there is limited statistical power, I examine the list experiment by important subgroups to construct a suggestive map of which types of individuals are more likely to report shuffling decreases cooperation with police. Specifically, I explore variation by region. Past political grievances – high levels of political violence by the state – in Northern Uganda should also affect citizens’ attitudes and responses toward the police.

Beyond regional patterns, there might be important variation based on individ-

ual preferences within a group (McClendon 2018). I consider differences based on individual-level characteristics, including party affiliation, approval rating of the president, age, gender, and economic status. Table 6.3 shows variation across respondents to assess whether outsider bias becomes stronger the more politically contested or volatile the region might be or depended on respondents attitudes toward the regime.


Table 6.3: List Experiment Results across Subgroups

	Sub-Group	Sample		List Experiment	
		Frequency	(%)	Estimate	(Standard Errors)
Region	Central	434	23.0	41.14	(10.51)
	Eastern	492	25.6	31.42	(10.15)
	Northern	460	24.0	52.59	(11.22)
	Western	534	27.8	44.42	(9.38)
Party	NRM	1303	67.9	37.65	(6.48)
	FDC	254	13.2	45.60	(13.13)
	Other	363	18.9	52.44	(12.08)
President Approval	Strongly Approve	652	34.0	46.27	(9.11)
	Somewhat Approve	825	43.0	31.16	(7.92)
	Somewhat Disapprove	243	12.7	57.87	(14.92)
	Strongly Disapprove	163	8.5	51.39	(17.15)
Age	18 - 34 yrs	905	47.1	40.77	(7.64)
	35 - 54 yrs	718	37.4	46.20	(8.50)
	55 + yrs	297	15.5	31.11	(13.79)
Gender	Female	1050	54.7	37.57	(7.09)
	Male	870	45.3	47.00	(7.81)
Wealth	Quintile 1	415	21.6	37.22	(11.77)
	Quintile 2	388	20.2	32.88	(12.32)
	Quintile 3	367	19.1	68.65	(11.60)
	Quintile 4	374	19.5	35.07	(11.70)
	Quintile 5	376	19.6	34.22	(10.97)

Notes: Table reports the difference-in-means estimates for various subgroups within the sample. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. NRM = National Resistance Movement. FDC = Forum for Democratic Change.

Table 6.3 shows results of the sub-group analyses. The frequency and percentage of each sub-group in the sample are presented in Columns 3 and 4, respectively. Corresponding difference-in-means estimates for each sub-group and standard errors are reported in Columns 5 and 6. Figure 6.1 shows the difference-in-means estimate across the various subgroups.

Figure 6.1: List Experiment Results across Subgroups



Notes: Each point reports the difference-in-means estimates for the various subgroups. Thin and thick bars represent respective 95% and 90% confidence intervals. NRM = National Resistance Movement. FDC = Forum for Democratic Change.



Considering differences by regions, the estimate of 52.6% is highest among those who are from the North. Considering partisanship, those who support the ruling party have the lowest estimate 37.7% compared to those who support the main opposition party or another party, 45.6% and 52.4%. As similar pattern holds based on people's approval of the president. Although these patterns follow my theoretical expectations, these results are not statistically distinguishable from one other.

The striking takeaway is that across all subgroups, as shown in Figure 6.1, a statistically significant proportion of the population believe citizens do not cooperate with police because police are from other areas or communities. However, one important question remains: why does ethnicity matter? To answer this question, the next chapter answers this question drawing on evidence from Gulu district in Northern Uganda.

### 6.3 Summary

Previous studies argue that leaders are likely to manipulate the social composition of their security forces, assuming that out-group officers will be more likely to comply with orders to repress communities than officers who share ethnicity with the community (Hassan 2017, Greitens 2016). The logic of political authorities to hire non-co-ethnic police officers to police communities is that ethnicity likely influences police officers' willingness to use repression.

In this chapter, I highlight a tradeoff leaders must overcome. Namely, citizens will be less likely to comply with non-co-ethnics or officers from outside of their community. So hiring outsiders to police communities will decrease the provision of law and order. This study assesses this claim. The results support the hypothesis that people cooperate less with police officers who are not from their community. In particular, there is strong support that Ugandans believe "policing" outsiders is one

reason why people do not report crimes. The strategic choice of political authorities like Museveni to employ outsider officers in their security apparatus systematically affects the ability of police to solicit information from citizens. However, to what extent is this lack of cooperation driven by co-ethnic bias, mistrust in the regime, or both?

## Chapter 7

# Police and Co-ethnic Bias: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment

### 7.1 Introduction

Officers frequently work in areas mostly populated by those who do not share their ethnicity. To prevent and solve crimes, the police critically rely on people to report crimes, and they can receive this information only if citizens are willing to interact with them and provide it. Given these requirements for the effective provision of law and order, policing is particularly challenging in multi-ethnic communities. Evidence from the list experiment suggests that people are less willing to report crimes to officers who are from outside of their community.

Recent work on ethnicity and public goods would lead us to expect that cooperation would be difficult in such areas (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999, Miguel and Gugerty 2005, Habyarimana et al. 2007). Indeed, there is some observational evidence of this in democracies (Nanes 2018, Weitzer and Hasisi 2008). The question

in this chapter is: Why?

Co-ethnic bias may be the result of affinity or more strategic considerations of citizens who care about their ability to socially sanction free-riding or defection (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999, Fearon and Laitin 1996, Habyarimana et al. 2007). While these are important factors, I argue that there is something else that explains co-ethnic bias in civilian-police interactions in some states.

When political authorities and police use characteristics like ethnicity as social cues, it has implications for civilian-police interactions. When political leaders use the police for political purposes in multi-ethnic states, they are likely either to stack the police force with their co-ethnic loyalists or to shuffle officers so that the most loyal are responsible for areas with the most political opposition (Quinlivan 1999, Roessler 2011, Greitens 2016, Hassan 2017, Blaydes 2018). In either case, the result is that some areas are characterized by police operating in non-co-ethnic communities playing a dual role: providing law and order and repressing political dissent.

For citizens, interacting with the police presents a dilemma: they may cooperate with the police by providing useful information, lowering ordinary crime. But such interactions – like reporting a crime – make them more visible to the very agents of repression employed by political authorities. For most citizens who just want to get on with their daily lives, they would rather stay relatively invisible to such actors, decreasing interactions. Consequently, in multi-ethnic states with politically-employed police, citizens' co-ethnic bias may be motivated not only by affinity or sanctioning concerns (i.e., the reasons identified in the extant literature), but also by their fear and lack of trust in both the police and their political authorities. A similar fear of police mechanism might be at play in democratic states if non-co-ethnic officers are more likely to use force. However, in a consolidated democracy, mistrust in political authorities alone should have a weaker conditional effect on co-ethnic bias in civilian-police interactions.

Figure 7.1: Main Police Station in Gulu.



To test this argument, I examine whether individuals who experience a crime prefer reporting to police officers who share their ethnicity and if so to what extent mistrust in the police or political authorities has a conditional effect on that co-ethnic bias. Certainly, studying the politics of policing, especially in politically repressive states, raises similar ethical, logistical, and methodological challenges as conducting research in conflict environments. Recent work addresses challenges of researching in conflict zones (Bullock, Imai and Shapiro 2011, Blair and Imai 2012, Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013, Blair, Imai and Lyall 2014, DeMaio 1984). First, the availability and access to observational data on police activity is limited. Second, the sensitive nature of police interactions renders observational measures of behavior suspect: individuals are unlikely to discuss their “true preferences” relating to police if they fear potential retaliation, making it difficult to solicit “truthful” responses. Two threats to inference are social desirability bias and preference falsification; respondents say what they think they are supposed to say either to avoid social sanction or gain a reward. Third, given the political context, any study of such a sensitive topic must be careful not to endanger respondents.

To overcome these challenges, I employ a conjoint survey experiment in Gulu District, Uganda to assess whether ethnicity affects people’s preference for interacting with police officers.<sup>1</sup> The conjoint experiment examines whether people are more likely to report crimes to officers who share their ethnicity relative to non-co-ethnic officers. And if so, to what extent mistrust in the political authorities and the police affects that co-ethnic bias. A limitation of this design is that it focuses on a specific form of cooperation: individuals’ preference between officers rather than their decision to report. In answering these questions, the study provides robust evidence not only of people’s co-ethnic bias in dealing with the police, but also that the strength of this bias is conditioned by people’s level of trust toward the state. In Uganda, respondents

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<sup>1</sup>The survey experiment was pre-registered with Evidence with Governance and Politics (EGAP).

who mistrust the Uganda Police Force, President Yoweri Museveni, or the courts have a stronger preference for officers who share their ethnicity.

The findings make an empirical contribution both to studies of ethnic politics and comparative policing. In showing that ethnicity is a much stronger predictor of respondents' choice over other demographic characteristics of officers and their willingness to pay, I join recent work that carefully identifies just how strong co-ethnic bias is in this context (Lyall, Shiraito and Imai 2015, Habyarimana et al. 2007, Condra and Linardi 2019). I also demonstrate that mistrust in the government broadly increases people's co-ethnic bias. This suggests that fear does more than deter dissent (Young 2019), it also adversely affects people's perception of the police.

This account also has ramifications for our theoretical approaches to understanding interactions within and across ethnic groups. More specifically, the source of co-ethnic bias may depend on the political context of the interaction. Studies show that cooperating with police in democracies depends on trust in police (Mazerolle et al. 2013, Tyler 2006). This study shows that when police are part of the political apparatus, people's preferences for officers who share their ethnicity is conditioned by both trust in the police and trust in political authorities. Affinity and concerns about sanctioning uncooperative behavior may be generally important. But specific political context can provide additional reasons for why cooperation among ethnic groups may be difficult to sustain.

## 7.2 A Conjoint Experiment

Co-ethnic bias in civilian-police interactions might exist for several reasons. I theorize that people's security dilemma when interacting with police in unconsolidated democracies and autocracies likely amplifies it. In general, people are likely to prefer reporting crimes to officers who share their ethnicity. However, concerns about

repression should increase co-ethnic bias, especially among those who mistrust the police, political authorities, or the judiciary. This study tests these two observable implications.

### 7.2.1 Sample and Data

The study in this chapter was administered in 45 parishes across 22 sub-counties of Gulu District. The sample includes 983 household surveys. Data were collected in October 2018 and February 2019, using structured questionnaires with face-to-face interviews conducted by a well-respected Ugandan non-governmental organization. Enumerators rotated male and female respondents to ensure that the sample was balanced with an equal number of male and female participants. The study collected pre-test data on how respondents perceive the relationship between the community and police, their level of institutional trust in police and other government institutions, their level of political engagement, and various other relevant demographics.

For the pilot (October 2018), enumerator areas were selected by meeting with Gulu District's local chairperson 5 (LC5) identifying the five initial sub-counties for the study: Palaro, Laliya, Paibong, Paicho, and Unyama. We selected a balance of old and new sub-counties for the study, including rural and urban areas. Next, we randomly selected parishes within the sub-counties. Then, we randomly selected villages within each parish. Within the selected villages, enumerators went to the center of the village and selected participants through a random walk/snowball sampling design, rotating male and female participants.

After the pilot (February 2019), the remaining 17 sub-counties were selected randomly. Participants within these randomly selected sub-counties were selected using the same approach as the one used during the pilot. Within Gulu District, the only sub-counties not selected randomly were those used in the pilot. As such, Gulu District was selected strategically for the design. Within Gulu District, 17 of the 22



Figure 7.2: Enumerator Training Session, Gulu, Uganda.



Figure 7.3: Enumerators Practice using Tablets, Gulu, Uganda.



sub-counties were selected randomly. Each of the parishes and villages were also subsequently randomly selected. Finally, enumerators worked from the center of the randomly selected village interviewing participants rotating the gender of participants recruited.

I administered the study in Gulu District for three main reasons. First, it is an area dominated by one ethnic group: Acholi. Second, the Acholi are historically in opposition to Museveni. Third, there is within-group variation in how people view the regime because of the civil war. When Museveni came to power, tensions grew between the political authorities and ethnic groups in the north, including Acholi and Langi officers, among others. The NRM's rise to power sparked a spate of insurgencies throughout the north. Most notably the rebellion led by Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army, which was largely composed of Acholi fighters and affected northern Uganda for over twenty years. As a result of the conflict, more than 1.2 million people were forced into internally displacement camps. The conflict between the government and the LRA further escalated in 2002, when the army launched "Operation Iron Fist," a large-scale offensive, against the LRA bases in southern Sudan. During this escalation, the Acholi communities experienced sustained abuse and human rights violations from both the insurgents and the government forces (Finnström 2008). Although Joseph Kony refused to sign the final peace agreement, the Juba Peace Talks, unfolding from July 2006 to April 2008, largely brought an end to the conflict.

Broadly, the area remains an opposition stronghold and people there express ongoing concern about the human rights abuses committed by security forces in the country. Only 32.7% of Gulu District voted for Museveni in the 2016 election. However, there is important in-group variation in which actors people blame for the conflict. On one hand, some people blame the rebels for the civilian victimization that occurred during the conflict. On the other, people express frustration in the government for directly committing abuse and for failing to protect them. Gulu District, in

particular, is interesting.

Most Acholi in Gulu traditionally support opposition parties with relatively high levels of political engagement. There is a sizeable level of support for the incumbent government among those who credit the government for bringing stability and ending the conflict. Table 7.1 provides respondents' demographics by party affiliation and whether they voted in the last election, showing that 43% of the respondents say they support the ruling incumbent party. About 81% said they voted in the last election.<sup>2</sup>

Table 7.1: Political Demographics and Voting Patterns

	# of Observations	Percentage
<b>Party Affiliation</b>		
National Resistance Movement	426	43.34
Democratic Party	12	1.22
Forum for Democratic Change	189	19.22
Independent	194	19.73
People's Development Party	2	0.20
People's Progressive Party	2	0.20
Uganda People's Congress	18	1.83
Non-response (don't read)	133	13.53
<b>Voted in the Last Election</b>		
Yes	793	80.67
No	179	18.21
Non-response (don't read)	11	1.12

Moreover, the political authorities have recruited additional police officers from the north as political opposition has increased in other areas of Uganda. So importantly in Gulu District, there is within ethnic group variation in people's level of trust in

<sup>2</sup>In addition to party affiliation and voting patterns, I also collected data on other political activities including whether respondents had signed a petition against a political party/candidate; taken part in a political party demonstration, protest, or march; attended a political rally; helped organize a political party demonstration or protest; expressed views on an issue by contacting a politician; expressed views on an issue by contacting a newspaper, online blog, or online discussion board; and expressed political views on an issue by contacting a politician; and expressed political views on an issue on social media such as Twitter, WhatsApp, or Facebook.

the regime. By studying policing in Gulu District, I am able to examine within-group variation of co-ethnic bias depending on individuals' level of mistrust in the government.

Comparing co-ethnic bias between Acholi (the main ethnic group in Gulu) and Banyankole (Museveni's ethnic group) would be theoretically ideal. However, political unrest precluded me from using Museveni's ethnic group. A more socially sensitive approach was to focus on a different ethnic group rather than Museveni's. To do so, I consider the relationship between the Acholi and Baganda ethnic groups. The Baganda ethnic group is the most populous and a likely source for police recruits. To the extent that co-ethnic bias operates through the mistrust mechanism associated with outsiders potentially using repression, this design biases against finding support, compared to if I used Museveni's ethnic group. By design, the study focuses on Acholi respondents, which reduces the sample to 937 participants. Among the sample, there is important variation in how people view broader patterns of cooperation between the police and the community. When asked if they agree that the police work together with community members to solve local problems, 33.4% and 4.7% of the sample disagreed or strongly disagreed. 38.1% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the police care about the concerns of the community members. Additionally, 43% of the sample do not think the police make it easy for community members to provide input (e.g., sharing comments, suggestions, and concerns). Importantly, when asked whether they agreed or disagreed that the police treat everyone the same regardless of their ethnicity, 46.3% and 14.0% of the sample either disagreed or strongly disagreed. Descriptively, these data suggest that people hold different attitudes about how police relate to the community and ethnicity shapes these interactions.

Additionally, there is important variation in people's level of security and their perception of police. Table 7.2 provides the distribution of respondents by experiences

with various types of insecurity ranging from feeling unsafe in their neighborhood, hearing about violence in their community, personally experiencing violence, and fearing crime to fearing political intimidation and experiencing negative interactions with the police.

Table 7.2: Insecurity, Exposure to Crime, and Negative Interactions with Police

	# of Observations	Percentage
<b>Personally Experienced Violence or Insecurity</b>		
Never	556	56.56
Just once or twice	297	30.21
Several times	109	11.09
Many times	21	2.14
<b>Heard about Violence or Insecurity in your Community</b>		
Never	196	19.94
Just once or twice	376	38.25
Several times	295	30.01
Many times	116	11.80
<b>Feared becoming a Victim of Political Intimidation or Violence</b>		
Never	725	73.75
Just once or twice	176	17.90
Several times	64	6.51
Many times	12	1.22
Don't know	2	0.20
Non-response (don't read)	4	0.41
<b>Had a Negative Interaction with the Police</b>		
Never	777	79.04
Just once or twice	174	17.70
Several times	29	2.95
Many times	3	0.31
<b>Fear Crime in your Current Neighborhood</b>		
Never	340	34.59
Just once or twice	395	40.18
Several times	199	20.24
Many times	49	4.98
<b>Stayed Home because of the Threat of Violence Outside</b>		
Never	536	54.53
Just once or twice	291	29.60
Several times	132	13.43
Many times	23	2.34
Don't know	1	0.10
<b>Felt Unsafe in Your Neighborhood</b>		
Never	419	42.62
Just once or twice	366	37.23
Several times	166	16.89
Many times	30	3.05
Don't know	1	0.10
Non-response (don't read)	1	0.10

### 7.3 Examining Public Perception of the Police

Even though the police in Uganda are used by political authorities to repress dissent, there is variation in how people view them. Figure 7.4 shows within-ethnic group differences in Acholi perceptions of the police and their relationship to the community.

Among a randomly selected sample of Acholi participants, 64.7% agree or strongly agree that the police develop relationships with community members; 55.7% believe that the police make it easy for community members to provide input; and 74.2% think that the police always have the right to make people obey the law. Additionally, 58.5% think the police care about the concerns of the community and 58.9% think that the police show respect for community members.<sup>3</sup>

What explains this variation in how people view the police? One thing these data suggest is we cannot view the police as simply agents of repression or public servants. Rather there is considerable variation in how people view and relate to police. Understanding how people navigate their complex relationship with the police is an important but understudied aspect of governance.


Why do people cooperate with police in the provision of law and order? One explanation is that people cooperate more when they trust the police. However, trust in the police depends on how people think they will be treated by the police. People who have experienced negative interactions with the police, such as police abuse, corruption, or just ineffective, unprofessional police behavior, are less likely to trust the police.

These effects might be experienced individually; however, they might also be shaped by group-level characteristics and expectations. For example, people might believe that police treat people differently based on their ethnicity. I theorize that in multi-ethnic societies, people's willingness to cooperate with police depends on i)

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<sup>3</sup>Evidence from a nationally representative survey with a similar battery of questions shows similar variation in how people view the police.

Figure 7.4: Acholi Perceptions of Police






co-ethnic bias and ii) levels of mistrust in the state. When political authorities use the police to repress dissent in multi-ethnic societies it undermines the provision of law and order by decreasing confidence in the police and increasing co-ethnic bias.

As shown in Figure 7.5, 60.7% of respondents in Gulu district think that the police treat people differently because of ethnicity. One reason why ethnicity matters is because people prefer cooperating with police officers who share their ethnicity. However, a second reason is that people fear repression more when encountering police officers from another ethnic group. In multi-ethnic societies, mistrust of the state interacts with co-ethnic bias. Consequently, people's willingness to cooperate with police depends on *both* political and ethnic characteristics.

Figure 7.5: Acholi Attitudes about Police and Ethnicity



Certainly, many factors affect public perceptions of the police and people's interactions with them. In this book, I develop a theory about how the co-production of law and order depends on political authorities, police, and citizens. I argue that

when political authorities use the police to repress dissent it negatively affects public perceptions of the police – increasing mistrust of the political authorities and the police and fear of experiencing repression. However, people still need a way to navigate interactions with police to provide security. Under these conditions, ethnicity becomes a key heuristic that these actors employ while navigating the provision of repression and security.

### 7.3.1 Experimental Design

To isolate the effects of co-ethnic bias in civilian-police interactions, this study focuses on individuals' decisions between police officers when reporting a crime rather than their decision to report a crime in the first place. Certainly, the initial decision to go to the police is important but this study examines individuals' stated preferences between officers. This in a way limits the scope of the findings but this design was necessary to ensure greater participation in the study and reduce non-responses. The concern was that participants would select not to go to police; whereas, the objective of the study is to examine co-ethnic bias given an interaction with police officers. Accordingly, the study employs a choice-based conjoint design to explore whether ethnicity affects individuals' attitudes and behavior towards the police.

The experiment has respondents imagine that they have experienced a robbery and then asks them to decide between officers at the police station to whom they would report the crime. Officer profiles were randomly assigned along five relevant attributes: ethnicity, gender, age, rank, and willingness to pay for information. Additionally, I vary the ethnicity of the robber by using geographic cues. Rather than explicitly cuing ethnicity, I employ surnames and geographical cues as contextual indicators for ethnicity.<sup>4</sup> Surnames signal ethnicity and gender. Odong and Adong, for example, signal a male and female officer from the respondents' Acholi ethnic

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<sup>4</sup>Ethnic affiliation are strongly associated with both names and regions (Carlson 2015).

group. Kato and Nakato cue a male and female officer who is from the Baganda ethnic group.<sup>5</sup>

Participants were read the following prompt:

**Prompt:** This study considers how communities report crime to the police. For the next few minutes, we are going to ask you to imagine that you were recently robbed. You know where the robber might be from but do not know the robber. You plan to go to the police station to report the details of the robbery. When you go to the police station to report the crime, there will be two police officers. You will find out some basic information about these officers and you will need to decide to which officer you would prefer to report the robbery. The activity is purely hypothetical. Even if you aren't entirely sure, please indicate which of the two officers you prefer.

Respondents were presented the profiles of two police officers and geographical origin of two robbers.

After reading the scenario profiles, they were asked the following question:

**Question:** If you had to choose between them at the station, which of these two officers would you personally prefer reporting the crime to?

Respondents answered by selecting Officer 1 or Officer 2. For each comparison, I randomly assign the geographical origin of the robber and the attributes of each police officer to ensure variation within and across comparisons. Table 7.3 provides the list of attributes for the study. There are 480 unique police officer profiles. English prompt and directions provided.<sup>6</sup> Officer attributes randomly vary for each profile and respondents indicate which officer to whom they would prefer reporting, given the varying attributes.

Similar to other survey experiment designs for sensitive questions like list and endorsement experiments, conjoint experiments can reduce social desirability bias. One of these benefits is that it allows the respondent to focus on several characteristics rather than only one (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014). In this approach participants are less likely to feel pressure to make the “right” selection based on the ethnicity of the officer.

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<sup>5</sup>Plural members of the Baganda ethnic group are Baganda; however, a single member is Muganda.

<sup>6</sup>Face-to-face interviews conducted in Acholi, English or both, depending on the preference of the respondent.

Table 7.3: Attributes for Conjoint Experiment

<b>Officer's ethnicity (name)</b>	Non-co-ethnic officer (Nakato/Kato) Co-ethnic officer (Adong/Odong)
<b>Rank</b>	Junior Officer Senior Officer
<b>Pays reward for information</b>	Always Very often Sometimes Rarely Never
<b>Age</b>	23 35 47
<b>Gender</b>	Male Female
<b>Robber's geographical origin</b>	Mukono (non-co-ethnic) Pader (Coethnic)

Note: This table shows the attribute values used to generate the police officer profiles for the conjoint experiment and the robber's geographic origin.

### 7.3.2 Analysis and Results

Each respondent, denoted as  $i$ , is presented with  $K$  choice tasks, and in each of their tasks the respondent chooses the most preferred of  $J$  alternatives. Each choice alternative is a profile. The unit of analysis is the rated police officer profile. Each respondent completed five choice tasks generating 10 alternative profiles. For the conjoint analysis, data are subset to include only respondents who are Acholi, leaving 937 respondents (95.3% of participants) and 9,370 observations for the study. The objective to survey Acholi respondents was mostly successful; only 4.7% of respondents were not Acholi.

Using Equation 7.1, I estimate average marginal component effects (AMCEs), clustering robust standard errors at the respondent-level for accurate variance estimates. AMCEs show the average difference in the probability that a police officer is selected when comparing the variants of an attribute (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014).

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Police Officer}_{ijk} = & \theta_0 + \theta_1[\text{Co-ethnic officer}_{ijt}] + \theta_2[\text{Senior}_{ijk}] + \theta_3[\text{Age}_{ijk} = 35] \\
& + \theta_4[\text{Age}_{ijk} = 47] + \theta_5[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Rarely}] + \theta_6[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Sometimes}] \\
& + \theta_7[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Very Often}] + \theta_8[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Always}] \\
& + \theta_9[\text{Robber}_{ijk} = \text{Pader}] + \epsilon_{ijk}
\end{aligned} \tag{7.1}$$

In Equation 7.1, the dependent variable is an indicator variable, coded as 1 if *Police Officer*<sub>ijk</sub> is selected and 0 otherwise and each of the independent variables are binary indicators. The main theoretical variable of interest is *Co-ethnic officer*<sub>ijt</sub>, coded as 1 if the officer is Acholi and 0 otherwise. The randomization did not involve any restrictions on the possible attribute combinations, meaning the attributes are mutually independent. Accordingly, the main estimator of interest is  $\theta_1$ . The reference category is a non-co-ethnic junior officer who is 23 years old and never pays for information and the criminal is non-co-ethnic.

Figure 7.6 shows the AMCEs from the baseline model with 95% confidence intervals.<sup>7</sup> As hypothesized, people prefer reporting crimes to officers who share their ethnicity relative to non-co-ethnic officers. A co-ethnic officer is 10.92 percentage points (SE=1.27) more likely to be selected than a non-co-ethnic officer.

Considering the other officer characteristics provides additional information about respondents' preferences. First, senior officers were 3.44 percentage points (SE=1.35) more likely to be selected compared to junior officers. Second, respondents preferred older officers. Relative to the 23 year old baseline officer, respondents preferred 35 and 47 year old officers 4.67 percentage points (SE = 1.28) and 4.22 percentage points (SE = 1.34) more, respectively. Fourth, whether officers paid for information had less of an effect on selection; however, respondents were more likely to prefer officers who always paid rewards for information 3.15 percentage points (SE = 1.90), compared


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<sup>7</sup>Table 7.6 in the online appendix provides tabular results.

to officers who never pay for information.

The main results are robust to estimating each officer name separately. If the officer's names are modeled separately, a co-ethnic male officer is 11.8 percentage points (SE = 1.65) more likely to be selected than a non-co-ethnic male officer. Similarly, a co-ethnic female officer is 10.43 percentage points (SE=1.68) more likely to be selected than a non-co-ethnic male officer. There is no discernible difference between male and female non-co-ethnic Baganda officers (See Table 7.8 in the online appendix.)

Figure 7.6: Effects of Police Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Respondent



*Note:* This plot shows estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned officer attribute values on the probability of being selected by respondent. Estimates are based on the benchmark OLS model with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent with 95% confidence intervals. Excluded categories: non-co-ethnic junior officer who is 23 years old and never pays for information and the criminal is non-co-ethnic.

Broadly, these findings suggest that people prefer reporting to officers who have more experience and are motivated, in part, by material incentives. However, the conjoint analysis demonstrates that co-ethnic bias strongly predicts officer selection. Even after controlling for several confounders, Acholi respondents stated a significant preference for co-ethnic police officers relative to non-co-ethnic officers. Interestingly, the robber's ethnicity is insignificant suggesting that co-ethnic bias matters for in-

teractions with police officer more than concerns about the ethnic identity of those committing the crime.

It is worth noting that the magnitude of the co-ethnic bias is quite large given that I was indirectly signalling ethnicity by only using traditional surnames. Across each model, the ethnicity of the officer consistently has a larger effect on the probability that the officer is selected relative to the other possible explanations, including officer's age, rank, and whether they pay for information.

### 7.3.3 Conditional Effects of Mistrust

Ethnic affinity or within group sanctioning hypotheses would predict that co-ethnic bias would be generally constant across respondents' level of trust in the regime. Alternatively, I hypothesize that people's concerns about the political objectives of the police should increase co-ethnic bias, especially among those who mistrust the political authorities or the police.

Using pre-test measures of respondents' trust in political institutions, I test this hypothesis in two ways. First, I construct three binary variables that capture respondents' mistrust of the president, the police, and the courts. *Mistrust President* is coded as 1 if the respondent said they have no trust in the president and 0 if they expressed any level of trust in the president. *Mistrust Police* is coded as 1 if the respondent said they have no trust in the police and 0 if they expressed any level of trust in the police. Finally, *Mistrust Courts* is coded as 1 if the respondent said they have no trust in the courts and 0 if they expressed any level of trust in the courts. Additionally, I compare across the individual levels of trust, coding whether respondents expressed a little, quite a bit, or a lot of trust as Low, Medium, or High levels of trust.

As expected, there is variation in people's level of trust in political authorities. 20.4% of the sample said they do not trust the president at all with 20.7%, 25.9%

and 31.9% of the sample saying they had a little, quite a bit, or a lot of trust in him, respectively. The distributions of responses in the level of trust in the police and the courts are similar. 20.4% of the sample do not trust the police at all with 22.7%, 38.2%, and 18.0% of the sample expressing a little, quite a bit, or a lot of trust in the police. Whereas, 20.8% of the sample said they have no trust in the courts with 20.5%, 35.4%, and 17.4% of the sample expressing a little, quite a bit, or a lot of trust in the courts. Some respondents refused to answer the questions. Ten people did not answer whether they trusted the president, six people did not answer whether they trust the police, and 55 did not answer regarding the courts. Non-responses are excluded from the analysis.

As shown in the top plot of Figure 7.7, there is evidence that prior levels of trust in political authorities or the police has conditional effects on co-ethnic bias.<sup>8</sup> The results are as expected, people who said they have no trust in the police, the president, and the courts have a stronger preference for officers who share their ethnicity. People who express no trust in the police (solid circles) prefer a co-ethnic officer 16.95 percentage points (SE=2.87) more than a non-co-ethnic officer.

A similar trend holds among those with no trust in the president (solid triangle) and the courts (solid squares). Respondents with no trust in the president preferred officers who shared their ethnicity 16.54 percentage points (SE=2.77) more than a non-co-ethnic officer. Additionally, participants with no trust in the courts preferred officers who shared their ethnicity 16.55 percentage points (3.05) more than a non-co-ethnic officer. Comparatively, people who expressed any level of trust in the president, the police, or the courts still preferred co-ethnic officers 9.45 percentage points (SE=1.45), 9.38 percentage points (SE=1.42), and 8.17 percentage points (SE=1.42) more than non-co-ethnic officers, respectively.

These results support more general arguments about the role of ethnicity, coop-

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<sup>8</sup>Table 7.6 in the online appendix provides the tabular results for the top figure.



eration and the provision of public goods. However, this only captures part of the story. Mistrust in each of these institutions has a conditional effect on co-ethnic bias, increasing people's preference for selecting an officer who shares their ethnicity. Differences between the conditional effects are statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ). In each of these models, the interaction terms are both substantively and statistically significant. Comparing those with no trust to those with any level of trust demonstrates that mistrust in police, political authorities, and the courts does increase co-ethnic bias.

However, the results are mixed when comparing co-ethnic bias among those with no trust and the disaggregated levels of trust (shown in the bottom plot of Figure 7.7).<sup>9</sup> Broadly, as hypothesized, co-ethnic bias is highest among those with no trust in the police, the president, and the courts. Interacting co-ethnic officers and respondents' level of trust, co-ethnic bias decreases by the other levels of trust: low ( $\theta = -5.90$ ,  $SE=3.83$ ), medium ( $\theta = -8.71$ ,  $SE=3.58$ ), and high ( $\theta = -6.88$ ,  $SE=4.10$ ).

The trend is similar comparing those with no trust in the president. Relative to no trust, co-ethnic bias decreases when people express trust in the president: low ( $\theta = -6.19$ ,  $SE=4.25$ ), medium ( $\theta = -4.64$ ,  $SE=3.51$ ), and high ( $\theta = -9.61$ ,  $SE=3.58$ ). Again, mistrust in courts has similar conditional effects on co-ethnic bias. Relative to those with no trust in the courts, co-ethnic bias also decreases: low ( $\theta = -4.51$ ,  $SE=4.06$ ), medium ( $\theta = -10.93$ ,  $SE=3.68$ ), and high ( $\theta = -7.90$ ,  $SE=4.17$ ).


Across all specifications, people prefer co-ethnic officers relative to non-co-ethnic officers, regardless of their level of trust in the police, the president, and the courts. Generally, lacking trust in these institutions increases co-ethnic bias. The differences between no trust and medium trust in the police; no trust and high trust in the president; and no trust and medium trust in the courts are statistically significant ( $p <$

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<sup>9</sup>Table 7.7 in the online appendix provides the tabular results for the bottom figure.

0.05). However, differences across each level of trust are not statistically significant.

Figure 7.7: Conditional Effects of Trust in Police and Political Authorities on Co-ethnic Bias



*Note:* This plot shows the conditional effects of trust on co-ethnic bias. AMCEs are based on the benchmark OLS model with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent with 95% confidence intervals. Excluded categories: non-co-ethnic junior officer who is 23 years old and never pays for information and the criminal is non-co-ethnic. Only AMCEs for co-ethnic officer coefficients are shown by respondents' level of trust in police (circle), president (triangle), and courts (square).

### 7.3.4 Discussion

These results speak to several possible mechanisms of co-ethnic bias in people's selection between police officers. First, people likely have some affection or affinity for co-ethnic officers rooted in shared ethnicity. This broadly comports with existing theories of ethnicity and cooperation in the provision of public goods. My theory builds on this underlying expectation of ethnic affinity. In fact, this is one of the reasons why political authorities in many unconsolidated democracies and autocracies stack and shuffle their security forces (Greitens 2016, Roessler 2011, Hassan 2017, Blaydes 2018). Moving police officers from one area to police another decreases social ties and makes it more likely that they will follow orders to repress. This analysis shows

that, given the opportunity, people strongly prefer reporting to officers who share their ethnicity and co-ethnic bias is robust across models.

Figure 7.8: High Court Northern Circuit and Chief Magistrate's Court, Gulu.



Second, affinity and social sanctioning mechanisms might explain some of the observed co-ethnic bias (Habyarimana et al. 2009, Fearon and Laitin 1996). However, there is less evidence that ethnicity operates through beliefs about officers' effectiveness per se. If co-ethnic bias operates through this mechanism, there should be variation in people's selection based on the identity of the criminal. If people think

Figure 7.9: Uganda Police Regional Headquarters, Gulu.



officers will be more effective at investigating a criminal who shares the officer's ethnicity, then respondents should prefer officers who have the same ethnicity as the criminal. Counter to these expectations, respondents strictly preferred officers who shared their own ethnicity (See Table 7.11 in the online appendix). So, it is unlikely that people believe an officer would be more effective at finding and apprehending a suspect who shares the officer's ethnicity.

Third, people with no trust in the police might prefer co-ethnic police officers for two related reasons. First, as argued above, people might expect that non-co-ethnic officers are more willing to repress them. Second, people might expect that co-ethnic officers will be less likely to extort them. The conditional effects of mistrust in the police provide evidence that people fear repression when interacting with non-co-ethnic officers and the alternative mechanism that people are more concerned about extortion and abuse when encountering non-co-ethnic officers. As such, the conditional effects of mistrust in the police do not adjudicate between these mechanisms. However, an explanation of co-ethnic bias focusing on extortion or ethnic animus from police officers does not explain why co-ethnic bias increases among those who mistrust the president or the courts. However, fear of repression expressed as mistrust of these institutions does.

Fourth, mistrust more broadly might shape co-ethnic bias, especially if fear of repression is one of the mechanisms driving it. In non-democracies, political authorities often rely on information from individuals to monitor behavior. In such environments, mistrust in general might affect co-ethnic bias in civilian-police interaction. Especially in an ethnically homogeneous area, mistrust of neighbors (who are mostly co-ethnics) should decrease co-ethnic bias; whereas, mistrust of strangers (who might be co-ethnics or non-co-ethnics) should increase it. I examine whether the effects of ethnicity increase or decrease depending on people's level of trust in either their neighbors or strangers. Figure 7.10 of the online appendix shows that

mistrust of neighbors appears to decrease co-ethnic bias while mistrust of strangers increases it. This raises important questions regarding within-group variation in how people view one another and their relationship to the state, especially in communities exposed to violence and repression.

Fifth, some factors might shape people's levels of trust in the government for reasons that are not associated with repression. As highlighted by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), education and income levels might condition individuals' trust in political institutions. I examine whether co-ethnic bias varies by respondents' education and income. Models 17-20 in Table 7.10 (see online appendix) show co-ethnic bias decreases with increases in education. However, the conditioning effects of income on co-ethnic bias are less clear. Co-ethnic bias appears to be strongest among households making somewhere between 100,000 and 500,000 Ugandan shillings, (Table 7.12 [see online appendix]) but relatively lower for both of these populations..

One limitation of this study is the focus on a narrow form of citizen cooperation with police (i.e., reporting crime). Certainly, cooperation with police involves a broader set of actions, including: neighborhood watches, community policing initiatives, and other more reactive and proactive ways communities partner with law enforcement. A similar pattern of co-ethnic bias likely exists in these broader forms of cooperation; however, this study does not provide empirical evidence on these forms of cooperation. Future studies could examine how co-ethnic bias affects other forms of cooperation in the provision of law and order. A second limitation is that this study focuses on a relatively low threat crime – robbery. Future studies, for example, could examine the extent to which co-ethnic bias, repression, and the severity of crime affect broader patterns of cooperation with the police. Studying how people navigate security threats related to repression and crime would provide important insights to understand broader patterns of conflict, policing, and political development. Finally, due to the experimental design, this study focuses on an ethnically homoge-

neous region. Future work could examine whether increased inter-group interactions in more heterogeneous areas increase or decrease co-ethnic bias between civilians and the police.

## 7.4 Summary

The study in this chapter demonstrates that people prefer reporting crimes to co-ethnic officers relative to non-co-ethnic officers. Additionally, co-ethnic bias is a stronger predictor of why respondents selected to report a crime to an officer than other attributes including: rank, age, gender, and willingness to pay rewards for information. Moreover, participants preferred co-ethnic officers, regardless of the ethnicity of the criminal.

Critically, the findings show that co-ethnic bias also depends on the political context of the interactions. In un-consolidated democracies and autocracies, the police are part of the political apparatus. As a consequence, people who mistrust the government exhibit more co-ethnic bias in their interactions with officers. Certainly, affinity and the ability to sanction uncooperative behavior is important, but political considerations provide additional reasons why inter-group interactions are difficult.

Broadly, these findings have implications for the politics of policing and the provision of public goods more broadly. The results suggest that the struggle of political authorities for political survival is at tension with their ability to provide law and order as a public good. This underscores a costly tradeoff for political authorities between repressing dissent and providing law and order. One implication from these results is that the more leaders coopt the police to repress dissent the more it negatively affects their ability to provide law and order. In particular, if leaders employ ethnicity to resolve adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with repression, it will likely decrease their ability of police to engender cooperation from

the community they are policing.

The logic that mistrust in government increases co-ethnic bias in policing likely extends to some democracies, especially states with salient ethnic or racial divisions and a history of state violence against minoritized groups to suppress voter turnout or restrict freedom of movement and other forms of political expression. This sentiment is reflected in James Baldwin’s essay, *A Report from Occupied Territory*. Reporting on police abuse of Black communities in the United States, Baldwin (1966) wrote: “The police are simply the hired enemies of this population.” The police are present to keep the community members in their place and “protect white business interests.” As the literature on comparative policing grows, we need to keep in mind that the legitimacy of the monopoly of violence in addition to the state’s ability to provide law and order are inherently political processes that depend on how individuals view the police and their actions, especially in un-consolidated democracies and autocracies.

## 7.5 Appendix

In Section A below, I provide additional data on Uganda including the distribution of ethnic groups and political violence or social unrest events.

In Section B, I report tabular results for the models in the main paper.

In Section C, I demonstrate that the results are robust to other specifications, including disaggregating by the officer’s surname.

Finally, in Section D, I explore several alternative mechanisms that might condition co-ethnic bias, including respondents’ characteristics like gender, age, education level, and income and the ethnicity of the criminal.



## 7.6 Additional Uganda Data

In this section, I present the distribution of ethnic groups from the 2002 and 2014 census. Uganda is an ethnically diverse society (See Table 7.4 in the online appendix). There are at least 65 ethnic groups in Uganda. The Baganda ethnic group is Uganda's largest ethnic group, composing approximately 16.5 % of Uganda's population.

Table 7.4: Ethnic Groups in Uganda

Ethnic Groups	2002		2014	
	# (Millions)	%	# (Millions)	%
Baganda	4.13	17.7	5.56	16.5
Banyankole	2.33	10.0	3.22	9.6
Basoga	2.07	8.9	2.96	8.8
Bakiga	1.68	7.2	2.39	7.1
Iteso	1.57	6.7	2.36	7.0
Langi	1.49	6.4	2.13	6.3
Bagisu	1.12	4.8	1.65	4.9
Acholi	1.14	4.9	1.47	4.4
Lugbara	1.02	4.4	1.10	3.3
Other Ethnic Groups	6.76	31.4	10.8	32.1
Total	23.29	100	33.6	100

## 7.7 Conjoint Experiment

### 7.7.1 Demographics and Descriptive Statistics

In this section of the appendix, I provide demographics and descriptive statistics. The Conjoint experiment was implemented in Gulu District Uganda. Table 7.5 provides the number of observations and percentage of respondents by ethnicity, gender, age, education, and household earnings.

Table 7.5: Conjoint Sample: Personal Demographics

	# of Observations	Percentage
<b>Ethnicity</b>		
Acholi	937	95.32
Alur	16	1.63
Other	30	3.05
<b>Gender</b>		
Female	535	54.43
Male	448	45.57
<b>Age</b>		
18-24 years old	178	18.11
25-34 years old	300	30.52
35-44 years old	211	21.46
45-54 years old	156	15.87
55-64 years old	86	8.75
65-74 years old	30	3.05
75 years or older	22	2.24
<b>Education</b>		
No formal schooling	130	13.22
Some schooling did not complete P.1	36	3.66
Some primary schooling did not complete primary	325	33.06
Completed primary did not attend secondary	182	18.51
Some secondary schooling did not complete secondary	195	19.84
Completed secondary schooling	52	5.29
Completed Post primary specialized training or Certificate	25	2.54
Completed Post secondary specialized training or Diploma	25	2.54
Completed Degree and above	13	1.32
<b>Household Earnings</b>		
Less than 25,000	76	7.73
25,001-100,000	209	21.26
100,001-200,000	197	20.04
200,001-300,000	171	17.40
300,001-400,000	99	10.07
400,001-500,000	47	4.78
500,001-600,000	21	2.14
600,001-700,000	13	1.32
700,001-800,000	17	1.73
800,001-900,000	14	1.42
900,001-1,000,000	13	1.32
More than 1,000,001	27	2.75
Non-response (don't read)	79	8.04

## 7.7.2 Main Results

Table 7.6 shows the tabular results of the main analyses in the paper. Model 1 is used for the visualization Figure 1.

Next, Models 2 - 4 provide the tabular results for the top coefficient plot results visualized Figure 2. In this model, the baseline category is some level of trust in the relevant political authority. Here, the theoretical expectation is that the interactions between mistrust in the respective institutions and co-ethnic officers should be positive and statistically significant.

Finally, Table 7.7 presents that tabular results used for bottom models visualized in Figure 2, showing the respondent's disaggregated levels of trust in the president (Model 5), the police (Model 6) and the courts (Model 7). In this table, the baseline category is no trust in the respective institution. Here, the interaction terms should be negative, as increased trust should decrease co-ethnic bias in expectation.<sup>10</sup>

Figure 7.10 shows the conditional effect of trust in neighbors or strangers on co-ethnic bias. Regarding levels of trust in their neighbors, the differences across levels of trust are not statistically distinguishable. However, individuals who expressed no trust showed the lowest levels of co-ethnic bias. Alternatively, the difference between those who have trust and no trust in strangers is statistically significant, demonstrating that people who do not trust strangers are significantly more likely to prefer officers who share their ethnicity.

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<sup>10</sup>Tabular results with interactions are provided to show whether interaction terms are statistically significant. Following work by Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014), the coefficient plots are based on estimating the baseline equation after subsetting the data based on respondents' level of trust in the police, the president, and the courts.

Table 7.6: Main Results and Conditioning Effects of Mistrust on Co-ethnic Bias (Full Results)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Co-ethnic Officers	0.1093*** (0.0128)	0.0945*** (0.0145)	0.0938*** (0.0142)	0.0817*** (0.0142)
Senior	0.0344* (0.0135)	0.0377* (0.0154)	0.0388* (0.0151)	0.0396* (0.0162)
35 years old	0.0467*** (0.0128)	0.0430** (0.0147)	0.0374* (0.0145)	0.0348* (0.0152)
47 years old	0.0422** (0.0134)	0.0366* (0.0154)	0.0444** (0.0152)	0.0364* (0.0159)
Rarely pays for information	-0.0081 (0.0181)	-0.0094 (0.0207)	-0.0025 (0.0207)	0.0298 (0.0214)
Sometimes pays for information	0.0198 (0.0185)	0.0135 (0.0213)	0.0313 (0.0210)	0.0511* (0.0216)
Very often pays for information	-0.0197 (0.0194)	-0.0191 (0.0222)	-0.0161 (0.0221)	-0.0038 (0.0230)
Always pays for information	0.0315 (0.0190)	0.0389 (0.0221)	0.0461* (0.0215)	0.0628** (0.0226)
Co-ethnic criminal	-0.0005 (0.0120)	0.0066 (0.0139)	-0.0044 (0.0136)	-0.0104 (0.0142)
Mistrust President		-0.0082 (0.0395)		
Co-ethnic Officers×Mistrust President		0.0709* (0.0312)		
Mistrust President×Senior		-0.0315 (0.0321)		
Mistrust President×35 years old		0.0066 (0.0295)		
Mistrust President×47 years old		0.0132 (0.0306)		
Mistrust President×Rarely pays for information		0.0049 (0.0421)		
Mistrust President×Sometimes pays for information		0.0299 (0.0442)		
Mistrust President×Very often pays for information		-0.0073 (0.0471)		
Mistrust President×Always pays for information		-0.0392 (0.0440)		
Mistrust President×Co-ethnic criminal		-0.0313 (0.0276)		
Mistrust Police			-0.0347 (0.0439)	
Co-ethnic Officers×Mistrust Police			0.0756* (0.0320)	
Mistrust Police×Senior			-0.0172 (0.0340)	
Mistrust Police×35 years old			0.0468 (0.0316)	
Mistrust Police×47 years old			-0.0109 (0.0325)	
Mistrust Police×Rarely pays for information			-0.0347 (0.0423)	
Mistrust Police×Sometimes pays for information			-0.0580 (0.0455)	
Mistrust Police×Very often pays for information			-0.0206 (0.0469)	
Mistrust Police×Always pays for information			-0.0713 (0.0473)	
Mistrust Police×Co-ethnic criminal			0.0293 (0.0291)	
Mistrust Courts				-0.0094 (0.0424)
Co-ethnic Officers×Mistrust Courts				0.0838* (0.0336)
Mistrust Courts×Senior				-0.0213 (0.0314)
Mistrust Courts×35 years old				0.0549 (0.0311)
Mistrust Courts×47 years old				0.0358 (0.0322)
Mistrust Courts×Rarely pays for information				-0.1423** (0.0440)
Mistrust Courts×Sometimes pays for information				-0.1284** (0.0460)
Mistrust Courts×Very often pays for information				-0.0625 (0.0472)
Mistrust Courts×Always pays for information				-0.0926* (0.0456)
Mistrust Courts×Co-ethnic criminal				0.0340 (0.0289)
(Intercept)	0.3535*** (0.0176)	0.3592*** (0.0205)	0.3603*** (0.0197)	0.3598*** (0.0208)
Num. obs.	9370	9270	9310	8820


OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent. \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Table 7.7: Effects of Police Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Disaggregated Levels of Trust

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Co-ethnic Officers	0.1654*** (0.0277)	0.1695*** (0.0287)	0.1655*** (0.0305)
A little trust in president	0.0575 (0.0482)		
A bit of trust in president	0.0140 (0.0509)		
A lot of trust in president	-0.0251 (0.0469)		
Co-ethnic Officers×A little trust in president	-0.0619 (0.0425)		
Co-ethnic Officers×A bit of trust in president	-0.0464 (0.0351)		
Co-ethnic Officers×A lot of trust in president	-0.0961** (0.0358)		
A little trust in police		-0.0101 (0.0535)	
A bit of trust in police		0.0708 (0.0485)	
A lot of trust in police		0.0154 (0.0563)	
Co-ethnic Officers×A little trust in police		-0.0590 (0.0383)	
Co-ethnic Officers×A bit of trust in police		-0.0871* (0.0358)	
Co-ethnic Officers×A lot of trust in police		-0.0688 (0.0410)	
A little trust in courts			-0.0222 (0.0534)
A bit of trust in courts			0.0422 (0.0476)
A lot of trust in courts			-0.0196 (0.0576)
Co-ethnic Officers×A little trust in courts			-0.0451 (0.0406)
Co-ethnic Officers×A bit of trust in courts			-0.1093** (0.0368)
Co-ethnic Officers×A lot of trust in courts			-0.0790 (0.0417)
Num. obs.	9270	9310	8820

OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent. Only constituent terms and their interaction with trust are shown. The other officer attributes, ethnicity of criminal, and component terms suppressed. \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Figure 7.10: Conditional Effects of Trust in Neighbors and Strangers on Co-ethnic Bias



*Note:* This plot shows the conditional effects of trust on co-ethnic bias. AMCEs are based on the benchmark OLS model with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent with 95% confidence intervals. Excluded categories: non-co-ethnic junior officer who is 23 years old and never pays for information and the criminal is non-co-ethnic. Only AMCEs for co-ethnic officer coefficients are shown by respondents' level of trust in neighbors (hollow circle) and strangers (hollow triangle).

### 7.7.3 Robustness Checks and Additional Models

In the empirical analyses in the paper, the main independent variable of interest is co-ethnic officers, coded as 1 if the officer shared ethnicity with participants and 0 otherwise. An alternative approach is to use Equation 7.2 which estimates the surnames independently.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Police Officer}_{ijk} = & \theta_0 + \theta_1[\text{Odong}_{ijt}] + \theta_2[\text{Adong}_{ijk}] + \theta_3[\text{Nakato}_{ijk}] + \theta_4[\text{Senior}_{ijk}] \\
 & + \theta_5[\text{Age}_{ijk} = 35] + \theta_6[\text{Age}_{ijk} = 47] + \theta_7[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Rarely}] \\
 & + \theta_8[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Sometimes}] + \theta_9[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Very Often}] \\
 & + \theta_{10}[\text{Payment}_{ijk} = \text{Always}] + \theta_{11}[\text{Robber}_{ijk} = \text{Pader}] + \epsilon_{ijk}
 \end{aligned} \tag{7.2}$$

I replicate the main results in the paper employing Equation 7.2, presented in Table 7.8. These results demonstrate that co-ethnic bias, even allowing for gender

preferences, still largely determines people's preference for reporting crime to specific officers.

Next, Table 7.9 shows the conditional effects of mistrust in the president (Model 9), the police (model 10), and the courts (model 11) by each officer's surnames rather than by the binary variable for co-ethnic officers.

Table 7.10 provides that tabular results by gender, age, and education level of respondents. Models 12 and 13 provide the results of the baseline model based on the gender of the respondent. Models 14 - 16 provide results by the respondent's age. Finally, Models 17-20 in Table 7.10 assess comparisons across education levels.

Co-ethnic bias has a consistent effect on officer selection across gender and age. As discussed in the paper, ethnicity appears to have a stronger effect among individuals with lower education levels. This provides some additional support for previous findings in the literature (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002) that people with less access to education have lower levels of trust in the government.

Table 7.8: Effects of Police Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Respondent

	Model 8
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)	0.1180*** (0.0165)
Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)	0.1043*** (0.0168)
Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)	0.0037 (0.0156)
Senior Officer	0.0345* (0.0135)
35 years old	0.0483*** (0.0131)
47 years old	0.0419** (0.0135)
Rarely pays for information	-0.0079 (0.0180)
Sometimes pays for information	0.0206 (0.0185)
Very often pays for information	-0.0193 (0.0194)
Always pays for information	0.0315 (0.0193)
Co-ethnic criminal	-0.0004 (0.0120)
(Intercept)	0.3510*** (0.0195)
Num. obs.	9370

OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent.

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$



Table 7.9: Conditional Effects of Mistrust by Officer's Surnames

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)	0.1109*** (0.0188)	0.0987*** (0.0181)	0.0918*** (0.0187)
Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)	0.0806*** (0.0190)	0.0928*** (0.0193)	0.0728*** (0.0193)
Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)	0.0019 (0.0183)	0.0039 (0.0180)	0.0006 (0.0184)
Co-ethnic criminal	0.0070 (0.0138)	-0.0045 (0.0136)	-0.0101 (0.0142)
Mistrust President	-0.0085 (0.0428)		
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)×Mistrust President	0.0318 (0.0405)		
Mistrust President×Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)	0.1157** (0.0400)		
Mistrust President×Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)	0.0058 (0.0338)		
Mistrust Police		-0.0360 (0.0478)	
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)×Mistrust Police		0.0944* (0.0434)	
Mistrust Police×Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)		0.0550 (0.0395)	
Mistrust Police×Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)		-0.0012 (0.0355)	
Mistrust Courts			-0.0083 (0.0467)
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)×Mistrust Courts			0.0663 (0.0421)
Mistrust Courts×Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)			0.1017* (0.0411)
Mistrust Courts×Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)			0.0011 (0.0391)
Num. obs.	9270	9310	8820

OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent.

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Table 7.10: Effects of Police Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Respondents' Gender, Age, and Education

	Gender					Age Group					Education Level							
	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)	0.1157*** (0.0249)	0.1213*** (0.0218)	0.1316*** (0.0243)	0.0965*** (0.0270)	0.1324** (0.0413)	0.1373** (0.0466)	0.1337*** (0.0215)	0.0757* (0.0339)	0.1041 (0.0767)	0.1157*** (0.0243)	0.1213*** (0.0218)	0.1316*** (0.0243)	0.0965*** (0.0270)	0.1324** (0.0413)	0.1373** (0.0466)	0.1337*** (0.0215)	0.0757* (0.0339)	0.1041 (0.0767)
Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)	0.0727** (0.0241)	0.1319*** (0.0230)	0.1042*** (0.0249)	0.0883*** (0.0258)	0.1505** (0.0450)	0.1510*** (0.0441)	0.1152*** (0.0230)	0.0618 (0.0341)	0.0753 (0.0617)	0.0727** (0.0241)	0.1319*** (0.0230)	0.1042*** (0.0249)	0.0883*** (0.0258)	0.1505** (0.0450)	0.1510*** (0.0441)	0.1152*** (0.0230)	0.0618 (0.0341)	0.0753 (0.0617)
Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)	-0.0151 (0.0219)	0.0205 (0.0219)	0.0138 (0.0219)	-0.0298 (0.0250)	0.0594 (0.0451)	0.0600 (0.0488)	0.0179 (0.0209)	-0.0279 (0.0282)	-0.1216 (0.0659)	-0.0151 (0.0219)	0.0205 (0.0219)	0.0138 (0.0219)	-0.0298 (0.0250)	0.0594 (0.0451)	0.0600 (0.0488)	0.0179 (0.0209)	-0.0279 (0.0282)	-0.1216 (0.0659)
Senior	0.0088 (0.0197)	0.0568** (0.0183)	0.0528** (0.0186)	0.282 (0.0224)	-0.0121 (0.0389)	-0.0174 (0.0398)	0.0583** (0.0180)	0.0246 (0.0269)	-0.0172 (0.0495)	0.0088 (0.0197)	0.0568** (0.0183)	0.0528** (0.0186)	0.282 (0.0224)	-0.0121 (0.0389)	-0.0174 (0.0398)	0.0583** (0.0180)	0.0246 (0.0269)	-0.0172 (0.0495)
35 years old	0.0615** (0.0191)	0.0377* (0.0180)	0.0537** (0.0199)	0.0441* (0.0208)	0.0439 (0.0318)	0.0414 (0.0338)	0.0543** (0.0180)	0.0313 (0.0268)	0.0618 (0.0473)	0.0615** (0.0191)	0.0377* (0.0180)	0.0537** (0.0199)	0.0441* (0.0208)	0.0439 (0.0318)	0.0414 (0.0338)	0.0543** (0.0180)	0.0313 (0.0268)	0.0618 (0.0473)
47 years old	0.0307 (0.0206)	0.0525** (0.0177)	0.0343 (0.0194)	0.0473* (0.0220)	0.0499 (0.0364)	0.0626 (0.0360)	0.0626*** (0.0185)	-0.0038 (0.0257)	0.0014 (0.0523)	0.0307 (0.0206)	0.0525** (0.0177)	0.0343 (0.0194)	0.0473* (0.0220)	0.0499 (0.0364)	0.0626 (0.0360)	0.0626*** (0.0185)	-0.0038 (0.0257)	0.0014 (0.0523)
Rarely pays for information	-0.0371 (0.0264)	0.0163 (0.0247)	-0.0172 (0.0257)	-0.0079 (0.0305)	0.0274 (0.0454)	-0.0317 (0.0476)	-0.0074 (0.0254)	-0.0010 (0.0349)	-0.0070 (0.0655)	-0.0371 (0.0264)	0.0163 (0.0247)	-0.0172 (0.0257)	-0.0079 (0.0305)	0.0274 (0.0454)	-0.0317 (0.0476)	-0.0074 (0.0254)	-0.0010 (0.0349)	-0.0070 (0.0655)
Sometimes pays for information	-0.0041 (0.0279)	0.0425 (0.0248)	0.0157 (0.0272)	0.0307 (0.0307)	0.0193 (0.0454)	-0.0065 (0.0449)	0.0291 (0.0255)	0.0316 (0.0378)	-0.0363 (0.0746)	-0.0041 (0.0279)	0.0425 (0.0248)	0.0157 (0.0272)	0.0307 (0.0307)	0.0193 (0.0454)	-0.0065 (0.0449)	0.0291 (0.0255)	0.0316 (0.0378)	-0.0363 (0.0746)
Very often pays for information	-0.0395 (0.0287)	0.0000 (0.0263)	-0.0402 (0.0281)	0.0132 (0.0322)	-0.0319 (0.0483)	-0.0474 (0.0513)	-0.0086 (0.0265)	-0.0196 (0.0402)	-0.0240 (0.0636)	-0.0395 (0.0287)	0.0000 (0.0263)	-0.0402 (0.0281)	0.0132 (0.0322)	-0.0319 (0.0483)	-0.0474 (0.0513)	-0.0086 (0.0265)	-0.0196 (0.0402)	-0.0240 (0.0636)
Always pays for information	-0.0080 (0.0289)	0.0676** (0.0257)	0.0172 (0.0266)	0.0583 (0.0341)	0.0171 (0.0482)	0.0038 (0.0490)	0.0361 (0.0263)	0.0544 (0.0397)	-0.0341 (0.0742)	-0.0080 (0.0289)	0.0676** (0.0257)	0.0172 (0.0266)	0.0583 (0.0341)	0.0171 (0.0482)	0.0038 (0.0490)	0.0361 (0.0263)	0.0544 (0.0397)	-0.0341 (0.0742)
Co-ethnic criminal	0.0186 (0.0177)	-0.0179 (0.0161)	-0.0044 (0.0170)	-0.0047 (0.0206)	0.0232 (0.0295)	0.0156 (0.0327)	0.0048 (0.0169)	-0.0109 (0.0230)	-0.0449 (0.0388)	0.0186 (0.0177)	-0.0179 (0.0161)	-0.0044 (0.0170)	-0.0047 (0.0206)	0.0232 (0.0295)	0.0156 (0.0327)	0.0048 (0.0169)	-0.0109 (0.0230)	-0.0449 (0.0388)
(Intercept)	0.3901*** (0.0272)	0.3160*** (0.0271)	0.3403*** (0.0278)	0.3719*** (0.0321)	0.3291*** (0.0533)	0.3274*** (0.0581)	0.3210*** (0.0264)	0.3984*** (0.0358)	0.4924*** (0.0651)	0.3901*** (0.0272)	0.3160*** (0.0271)	0.3403*** (0.0278)	0.3719*** (0.0321)	0.3291*** (0.0533)	0.3274*** (0.0581)	0.3210*** (0.0264)	0.3984*** (0.0358)	0.4924*** (0.0651)
Subset	Male Respondents	Female Respondents	Age 18-34	Age 35-54	Age ≥ 55	No schooling	Some - completed primary	Some - completed secondary	Diploma or Degree	Male Respondents	Female Respondents	Age 18-34	Age 35-54	Age ≥ 55	No schooling	Some - completed primary	Some - completed secondary	Diploma or Degree
Criteria Num. obs.	4350	5020	4540	3460	1370	1250	5090	2400	630	4350	5020	4540	3460	1370	1250	5090	2400	630

OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent. \*\*\*, \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Next, I consider an alternative mechanism that might be driving co-ethnic cooperation. In the provision of other collective goods people prefer individuals with common ethnicity either because they have a shared affinity (preference-in-common) or because they believe co-ethnics are just more effective. The main logic of the technology mechanism is that people should prefer co-ethnics because they believe they will be most effective.

The conjoint experiment design in the paper is designed to test divergent expectations under these mechanisms, depending on the ethnicity of the perpetrator. If attitudes toward officers are shaped by both the ethnicity of the officer and the perpetrator (i.e., technology or affinity mechanisms), these theories would predict diverging expectations depending on whether ethnicity operates through the affinity or technology mechanism.

From the perspective of the respondent, when the robber is a co-ethnic (from Pader), a co-ethnic officer should be more helpful and more effective. Here, both potential mechanisms would predict co-ethnic bias, making people more likely to prefer an officer who shares their ethnicity. However, when the robber is a non-co-ethnic (from Mukono where the majority of citizens are Baganda), the technology mechanism would predict that people would prefer an officer who shares the identity of the criminal because they would be more effective at investigating. Alternatively, the affinity mechanism would still predict that people should prefer officers who share their ethnicity, regardless of the identity of the criminal. Considering this possibility, Table 7.11 replicates the baseline OLS model but subsetting the sample on whether the robber is from Pader (Acholi) (Model 21) or from Mokuno (Mugandan) (Model 22).

The effect of co-ethnic bias appears to be driven by affinity/shared preferences, relative to the technology mechanism. Even if respondents believe a Baganda officer would be more effective at investigating a robber who is Mugandan, these results

Table 7.11: Effects of Police Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Ethnicity of the Criminal

	Model 21	Model 22
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)	0.1014*** (0.0235)	0.1321*** (0.0225)
Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)	0.1042*** (0.0219)	0.1116*** (0.0254)
Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)	0.0080 (0.0201)	0.0086 (0.0232)
Senior	-0.0074 (0.0174)	0.0799*** (0.0179)
35 years old	0.0723*** (0.0192)	0.0264 (0.0210)
47 years old	0.0551** (0.0189)	0.0327 (0.0218)
Rarely pays for information	0.0172 (0.0275)	-0.0338 (0.0240)
Sometimes pays for information	0.0257 (0.0257)	0.0141 (0.0251)
Very often pays for information	-0.0100 (0.0252)	-0.0277 (0.0262)
Always pays for information	0.0591* (0.0258)	0.0101 (0.0273)
(Intercept)	0.3495*** (0.0260)	0.3447*** (0.0275)
Subset	Co-ethnic	Non-co-ethnic
Criteria	Criminal	Criminal
Num. obs.	4897	4473

OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent. \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

show respondents still prefer co-ethnic officers. When the robber is Acholi, Acholi respondents selected male and female co-ethnic officers 10.14 percentage points (SE = 2.35) and 10.42 percentage points (SE = 2.19) relative to the out-group officer sharing identity with the robber. However, when the robber is Mugandan (from the Baganda ethnic group), Acholi respondents still preferred Acholi officers to Baganda officers: 13.21 percentage points (SE = 2.25) more for male Acholi officers and 11.16 percentage points (SE = 2.54) for female Acholi officers. Assessing respondents' preferences for selecting officers shows respondents in Gulu prefer reporting crimes to co-ethnic officers, especially male officers relative to non-co-ethnic males. Results suggest co-ethnic cooperation in the provision of law and order – reporting crimes – operates through a co-ethnic bias – a systematic tendency to prefer their own group to members of another.

Finally, in addition to the main analyses shown, I also provide results by respondents' following characteristics: income levels (Table 7.12); expressed level of insecurity/exposure to crime (Table 7.13); and prior negative interactions with police and perceptions of fairness (Table 7.14). The models conditioning on income suggest that co-ethnic bias is likely strongest among those with an income between 100,000 and 400,000s (Models 25-27). The results regarding levels of insecurity and negative interactions with police are likely under-powered to show statistical patterns. Interestingly, regardless of whether people said that they agree or disagree that police treat everyone the same based on their ethnicity, co-ethnic bias remains both substantively and statistically significant (Models 46-49).

Table 7.12: Effects of Police Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Income of Respondent

	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26	Model 27	Model 28	Model 29
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)	0.0676 (0.0584)	0.0232 (0.0377)	0.1655*** (0.0333)	0.1595*** (0.0390)	0.1788** (0.0521)	0.1263 (0.0747)	0.0576 (0.0523)
Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)	0.0149 (0.0599)	-0.0207 (0.0352)	0.0992** (0.0337)	0.1792*** (0.0401)	0.2044*** (0.0583)	0.1211 (0.0679)	0.1282* (0.0522)
Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)	-0.0198 (0.0570)	-0.0041 (0.0354)	-0.0034 (0.0335)	0.0169 (0.0344)	0.0842 (0.0468)	-0.0147 (0.0666)	-0.0575 (0.0418)
Senior	-0.0067 (0.0577)	0.0689* (0.0311)	0.0297 (0.0293)	0.0769* (0.0300)	0.0417 (0.0373)	-0.0755 (0.0692)	0.0598 (0.0422)
35 years old	0.0452 (0.0469)	0.0743* (0.0289)	0.0743* (0.0299)	0.0534 (0.0347)	0.0198 (0.0393)	-0.0971 (0.0535)	0.0539 (0.0370)
47 years old	0.0113 (0.0495)	0.0628* (0.0291)	0.0584 (0.0314)	0.0472 (0.0336)	-0.0041 (0.0423)	-0.0440 (0.0646)	0.1006** (0.0365)
Rarely pays for information	-0.0202 (0.0670)	-0.0316 (0.0397)	0.0321 (0.0410)	0.0344 (0.0466)	-0.0681 (0.0475)	-0.0084 (0.0778)	-0.0153 (0.0535)
Sometimes pays for information	-0.0343 (0.0662)	-0.0121 (0.0417)	0.0844* (0.0380)	0.0227 (0.0462)	0.0274 (0.0600)	0.0356 (0.0881)	-0.0192 (0.0559)
Very often pays for information	0.0714 (0.0675)	-0.0002 (0.0469)	0.0118 (0.0434)	-0.0319 (0.0424)	-0.0841 (0.0552)	0.1186 (0.0760)	-0.0899 (0.0569)
Always pays for information	0.0206 (0.0654)	0.0452 (0.0435)	0.0911* (0.0375)	0.0186 (0.0459)	-0.0171 (0.0703)	0.1189 (0.0842)	0.0160 (0.0636)
Co-ethnic criminal	-0.0717 (0.0468)	0.0485 (0.0275)	-0.0138 (0.0248)	0.0254 (0.0295)	-0.0366 (0.0374)	-0.0806 (0.0447)	0.0557 (0.0336)
(Intercept)	0.4656*** (0.0781)	0.3796*** (0.0470)	0.3145*** (0.0416)	0.2835*** (0.0429)	0.3229*** (0.0641)	0.3903*** (0.0790)	0.3231*** (0.0582)
Subset Criteria	Less than 25,000	25,001-100,000	100,001-200,000	200,001-300,000	300,001-400,000	400,001-500,000	More than 500,000
Num. obs.	740	2020	1850	1670	950	470	930

OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent. \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Table 7.13: Effects of Police Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Respondent's Expressed Level of Insecurity/Exposure to Crime

	Felt unsafe in your neighborhood					Feared political intimidation or violence					Stayed home do to threat of violence outside																	
	Model 30	Model 31	Model 32	Model 33	Model 34	Model 35	Model 36	Model 37	Model 38	Model 39	Model 40	Model 41	Model 30	Model 31	Model 32	Model 33	Model 34	Model 35	Model 36	Model 37	Model 38	Model 39	Model 40	Model 41				
Otdong (Male co-ethnic officer)	0.1121*** (0.0256)	0.1069*** (0.0267)	0.1529*** (0.0419)	0.1456 (0.0901)	0.1111*** (0.0191)	0.1610*** (0.0391)	0.0629 (0.0682)	0.0791 (0.1269)	0.0979*** (0.0229)	0.1304*** (0.0296)	0.1622*** (0.0451)	0.1010 (0.1114)																
Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)	0.0834** (0.0266)	0.1108*** (0.0270)	0.1162*** (0.0419)	0.2879** (0.0776)	0.0933*** (0.0193)	0.1860*** (0.0416)	-0.0154 (0.0601)	0.1568 (0.1484)	0.1035*** (0.0237)	0.0933** (0.0291)	0.1044* (0.0410)	0.2395 (0.1320)																
Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)	0.0211 (0.0228)	-0.0430 (0.0264)	0.0713 (0.0398)	-0.0297 (0.0767)	-0.0013 (0.0178)	0.0148 (0.0405)	0.0553 (0.0351)	-0.1377 (0.1213)	-0.0078 (0.0203)	0.0127 (0.0309)	0.0448 (0.0416)	-0.0868 (0.1011)																
Senior	0.0479* (0.0209)	0.0183 (0.0215)	0.0402 (0.0337)	0.0379 (0.0638)	0.0320* (0.0160)	0.0355 (0.0308)	0.0344 (0.0482)	0.2173* (0.0782)	0.0257 (0.0188)	0.0299 (0.0236)	0.1024** (0.0372)	-0.0890 (0.0797)																
35 years old	0.0378 (0.0202)	0.0645** (0.0217)	0.0464 (0.0316)	-0.0084 (0.0680)	0.0263 (0.0148)	0.1080*** (0.0316)	0.1412* (0.0545)	-0.1182 (0.1643)	0.0351* (0.0178)	0.0591* (0.0242)	0.0853* (0.0352)	-0.0116 (0.0841)																
47 years old	0.0398 (0.0203)	0.0260 (0.0232)	0.0855** (0.0314)	0.0392 (0.0581)	0.0278 (0.0159)	0.0862** (0.0313)	0.0994* (0.0470)	0.0111 (0.1608)	0.0221 (0.0185)	0.0319 (0.0253)	0.1357*** (0.0338)	0.0771 (0.0552)																
Rarely pays for information	-0.0078 (0.0283)	0.0074 (0.0301)	-0.0199 (0.0420)	-0.1085 (0.0793)	-0.0176 (0.0212)	0.0277 (0.0423)	-0.0735 (0.0693)	-0.2299 (0.1742)	-0.0468 (0.0246)	0.0449 (0.0339)	0.0296 (0.0501)	-0.0369 (0.0691)																
Sometimes pays for information	0.0347 (0.0286)	0.0403 (0.0312)	-0.0280 (0.0430)	-0.0520 (0.0964)	0.0509* (0.0215)	-0.0129 (0.0422)	-0.2782*** (0.0610)	0.1171 (0.2112)	0.0185 (0.0256)	0.0264 (0.0341)	0.0232 (0.0480)	-0.0853 (0.0900)																
Very often pays for information	-0.0053 (0.0288)	0.0122 (0.0321)	-0.1029* (0.0479)	-0.0784 (0.1075)	0.0096 (0.0220)	-0.0773 (0.0464)	-0.2147* (0.0880)	-0.1033 (0.2142)	-0.0057 (0.0262)	-0.0273 (0.0363)	-0.0117 (0.0517)	-0.2570* (0.0953)																
Always pays for information	0.0340 (0.0293)	0.0902** (0.0307)	-0.0733 (0.0494)	-0.0974 (0.0724)	0.0489* (0.0223)	-0.0010 (0.0438)	-0.1464 (0.0879)	0.0928 (0.1494)	0.0414 (0.0261)	0.0356 (0.0363)	-0.0025 (0.0514)	-0.0608 (0.1030)																
Co-ethnic criminal	-0.0049 (0.0177)	-0.0325 (0.0195)	0.0780* (0.0300)	0.0139 (0.0691)	-0.0034 (0.0137)	-0.0098 (0.0276)	0.0330 (0.0505)	0.0262 (0.1010)	-0.0014 (0.0156)	-0.0171 (0.0219)	0.0372 (0.0378)	0.0594 (0.0868)																
(Intercept)	0.3366*** (0.0309)	0.3770*** (0.0330)	0.3149*** (0.0412)	0.3856*** (0.0914)	0.3254*** (0.0225)	0.354*** (0.0465)	0.4702*** (0.0715)	0.3749 (0.2141)	0.3813*** (0.0272)	0.3537*** (0.0351)	0.2100*** (0.0470)	0.4355*** (0.0933)																
Subset Criteria	Never	Once or Twice	Several times	Many times	Never	Once or Twice	Several times	Many times	Never	Once or Twice	Several times	Many times																
Num. obs.	3950	3450	1640	310	6820	1780	610	110	5090	2790	1240	240																

OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent. \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Table 7.14: Effects of Police Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Respondent's Negative Interactions with Police and Perception of Fairness

	Had a negative interaction with police				Police treat everyone the same regardless of ethnicity			
	Model 42	Model 43	Model 44	Model 45	Model 46	Model 47	Model 48	Model 49
Odong (Male co-ethnic officer)	0.1113*** (0.0188)	0.1525*** (0.0369)	0.2223 (0.1088)	-0.0630 (0.2729)	0.1290* (0.0603)	0.1095*** (0.0265)	0.1279*** (0.0211)	0.1225** (0.0447)
Adong (Female co-ethnic officer)	0.1046*** (0.0192)	0.1003** (0.0368)	0.2240* (0.0882)	-0.0365 (0.3352)	0.1461* (0.0654)	0.1025*** (0.0280)	0.1063*** (0.0210)	0.0798 (0.0440)
Nakato (Female non-co-ethnic officer)	0.0040 (0.0179)	0.0113 (0.0349)	0.0562 (0.0801)	-0.0981 (0.5922)	0.0191 (0.0517)	0.0019 (0.0274)	0.0054 (0.0188)	-0.0393 (0.0383)
Senior	0.0406** (0.0153)	0.0231 (0.0313)	-0.0103 (0.0729)	-0.1608 (0.1191)	0.0676 (0.0498)	0.0274 (0.0232)	0.0379* (0.0166)	-0.0372 (0.0374)
35 years old	0.0461** (0.0146)	0.0377 (0.0317)	0.0802 (0.0661)	0.7193* (0.1210)	-0.0126 (0.0522)	0.0337 (0.0209)	0.0588*** (0.0169)	0.0342 (0.0327)
47 years old	0.0557*** (0.0152)	-0.0219 (0.0302)	-0.0073 (0.0733)	0.6379 (0.3652)	0.0222 (0.0530)	0.0553* (0.0244)	0.0314* (0.0158)	0.0171 (0.0372)
Rarely pays for information	-0.0220 (0.0205)	0.0640 (0.0410)	-0.0719 (0.0864)	-0.2929 (0.6363)	0.0431 (0.0759)	0.0255 (0.0305)	-0.0317 (0.0224)	-0.0201 (0.0497)
Sometimes pays for information	0.0208 (0.0210)	0.0389 (0.0444)	-0.0364 (0.0957)	-0.0487 (0.5271)	0.1352 (0.0876)	0.0466 (0.0306)	0.0003 (0.0234)	0.0503 (0.0505)
Very often pays for information	-0.0127 (0.0215)	-0.0251 (0.0490)	-0.1525 (0.0993)	-0.0366 (0.4085)	-0.0068 (0.0842)	-0.0159 (0.0316)	-0.0216 (0.0247)	0.0031 (0.0524)
Always pays for information	0.0335 (0.0218)	0.0311 (0.0466)	-0.0575 (0.0879)	0.0122 (0.7035)	0.0878 (0.0745)	0.0706* (0.0309)	0.0041 (0.0247)	0.0534 (0.0480)
Co-ethnic criminal	-0.0056 (0.0138)	0.0022 (0.0265)	0.0833 (0.0550)	0.2083 (0.1890)	-0.0685 (0.0494)	-0.0215 (0.0197)	0.0129 (0.0150)	-0.0047 (0.0304)
(Intercept)	0.3446*** (0.0225)	0.3718*** (0.0414)	0.3494*** (0.0908)	0.1407 (0.5611)	0.2899** (0.0870)	0.3402*** (0.0328)	0.3589*** (0.0242)	0.4061*** (0.0578)
Subset Criteria	Never	Once or Twice	Several times	Many times	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Num. obs.	7300	1720	300	50	580	3660	5650	1310

OLS estimates with robust standard errors (CR2) clustered by respondent. \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$



# Chapter 8

## Conclusion

This project is motivated by the idea that violence is central to our understanding of politics, governance, and order. Weber famously defined the state as monopoly of the legitimate use of force over a given territory. However, depending on whether people view the state's use of force as legitimate depends on the type of action the state takes, who employs it, and who is targeted by that violence. In the modern state, the institution responsible for providing law and order is the police. However, not all actions they take are perceived as legitimate by the public.

Yet, few studies have examined how the effects of repression – the use of force to impose costs on political challengers – affects the attitudes of citizens toward the police. Most studies of repression either assume that states engage in repression as a unitary actor or consider the principal agent problem between the executive and her security agents. Theories that do relax the unitary actor assumptions often focus on the role of the military or other informal security institutions like pro-government militias. Leaders face a risk by delegating coercion to the military as military leaders might launch a coup against the government. Others suggest that leaders delegate human rights abuses to non-state actors like pro-government militias to keep their hands clean and have plausible deniability.

What is often overlooked is the role of the police as street-level agents who are responsible to day-to-day acts of repression. To that end I explore three questions that motivate this project. First, what are the effects of repression on public attitudes toward the police? Second, how might individuals' political and ethnic characteristics condition their interactions with police? Third, what are the implications of these effects on crime and social order?

In answering these questions, this book highlights the puzzle of policing, especially in non-democracies. On one hand, police are the institution responsible for providing law and order as a public good ensuring the safety and security of the state. In this capacity, police must be able to solicit information and cooperation from the communities they are protecting. On the other hand, police in non-democracies are the security agents often tasked with everyday acts of repression to deter dissent, ensuring control for political authorities. Importantly, this book focuses on policing and repression from the perspective of individuals.

In the theory developed above, I argue that the co-production of security depends on three sets of actors: political authorities, police, and civilians. The effects of repression on civilian-police interactions matter because police rely on individuals to be effective; higher support leads to more cooperation (for example, better information being provided to the police), which leads to more effective security operations. I argue that the reliance of political authorities on the police to repress political opposition results in a repression dilemma – actions political authorities take to repress dissent decrease the state's ability to provide law and order. Extending beyond partisanship, I maintain that these perceptions are also salient along ethnicity. In multi-ethnic societies, lines of power are often delineated along ethnic categories. In these contexts, I argue that repression increases fear and distrust of the police, magnifying co-ethnic bias and decreasing cooperation with the police, which further undermines the ability of police to provide law and order.

By examining the politics of repression, I provide a theoretical and empirical examination of i) the effects of repression on public perceptions of the police; ii) the implications of repression for crime and social order; and iii) the role of in-group bias in shaping patterns of cooperation. I connect the historical origins of policing with political science theories of repression to show why relying on the police to repress dissent increases costs for political authorities and societies.

## 8.1 Contributions and Policy Implications

This book makes several theoretical contributions to a growing literature on the politics of policing. Existing studies of state repression have focused on its effects on political participation either voter turnout or protests. Answering how repression affects political participation matters because even non-democracies employ protests and elections as important sources of information, if not as a strategy to foster legitimacy (Magaloni 2006, Brownlee 2007, Gandhi 2008). Yet, in this book, I highlight one limitation with the existing work is that it primarily focuses on the costs of repression based on the negative effects it has politically (for example, future protests or more support for the opposition at the ballot box). By examining the effects of state repression on how the public views the legitimacy of the actors responsible for implementing it, I identify another cost for political authorities and society more generally. When political authorities rely on state security institutions, such as the police or military, as agents of repression, it undermines people's willingness to cooperate with them.

Even if fear associated with repression might induce political loyalty and deter dissent (Young 2019), relying on official members of the state security apparatus for coercive force against political challengers adversely affects people's perceptions of the legitimacy of these institutions. This project makes a significant contribution

to our understanding of political development, politics, and conflict by arguing that repression by the police undermines public perceptions of the police and people's confidence that the police exist to protect and serve the interests of the community. This raises several implications for the relationship between repression and the politics of policing and crime.

Next, I join previous work that relaxes the unitary actor assumption within the state repression literature (Hassan 2017, Svobik 2012, Greitens 2016, Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell 2016, DeMeritt 2015). Rather than focusing only on the principal-agent problems associated with repression, I examine the effects of repression on the co-production of security. I argue the co-production of security depends on the relationship between political authorities, members of the security apparatus, and citizens. This has implications for the state's ability to provide law and order (for example, fostering cooperation between law enforcement officers and civilians). By examining the relationship between political authorities, the police, and citizens, I explore important variation in how people might view repression depending on their political preferences.

In addition to its theoretical contribution, this project also makes a significant empirical contribution. Drawing on two novel survey data collection projects in Uganda, I demonstrate that repression by the police and actions political authorities take to ensure police are willing to comply with orders to repress affect how people view the police. Public perceptions of police matter as negative assessments of the police in addition to mistrust of political authorities decrease support for police and citizens' cooperation in the provision of law and order, weakening the ability of states to deter crime and provide security.

In Chapter 4, I use a unique research design opportunity that emerges from the social media tax protest led by Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu (also known as Bobi Wine) and subsequent selective repression by the Uganda Police Force while I was

administering a nationally representative survey. I use the event to identify the effects of repression on people's attitudes toward the police. I demonstrate selective repression of protesters decreased support for the police. I demonstrate that these effects are largely driven by partisanship; repression has a stronger effect on how members of the opposition evaluate the police relative to incumbent supporters. So, even though I find that repression negatively affects people's assessments of the police, it has heterogeneous effects depending on people's political affiliations. This raises implications about the ability of police to deter crimes without people's support.

In Chapter 5, I examine the relationship between patterns of crime and electoral support for the incumbent government and police deployments. If people who oppose the regime are less likely to cooperate with police than we should expect that crimes should be higher in areas that show higher levels of opposition. I argue opposition to the regime undermines people's confidence in the police, decreasing cooperation and increasing crime. I hypothesize that crime will be higher in areas with 1) lower levels of support for the incumbent; and 2) higher levels of police deployments. To test these hypotheses, I examine the correlation between Museveni's 2016 vote-share and police deployments on patterns of crime in 2017. I show Museveni vote-share is negatively associated with reported assaults, narcotic related crimes, robberies, and sexually related crimes. I also find that the level police deployments is positively associated with assaults, breakings, economic related crimes, homicides, robberies, and thefts.

These findings raise several questions about the challenges of rebuilding trust in security institutions in post-conflict environments or after democratic transition (Blair, Karim and Morse 2018). If the recent work on the lingering political effects of state repression are any indicator (Zhukov and Talibova 2018, Rozenas and Zhukov 2019), the negative effects of state repression on people's perception of the legitimacy of their security providers are likely to persist. Future studies could examine the

lingering effects of repression on public perceptions of the police. One future avenue of research could examine challenges of police to solicit information to deter crime among politically marginalized communities, especially among those who have experienced past exposure to state abuse at the hands of law enforcement officers. In this book, I explore some of these questions, examining how mistrust in political authorities, fear or repression, and ethnicity shape how people view the police.

The politics of policing and repression is especially tricky in multi-ethnic societies. Relative to democracies, authoritarian governments are more likely to rely on the police to repress political dissent. In multiethnic autocracies, governments are likely to stack or shuffle members of their police to ensure they follow orders to repress (Greitens 2016, Hassan 2017). Building on the literature on authoritarian politics, I develop a second set of expectations about the role of ethnicity in shaping the government's deployment of police officers, which in turn affects why people cooperate with police. I test this second proposition using two survey experiments in Uganda, examining the effects of ethnicity individuals' perceptions and attitudes toward the police.

In Chapter 6, I use a nationally representative list experiment to demonstrate that an estimated 42% of Ugandans do not report crimes to the police because the officers they encounter are from outside of the community. This finding shows that identity characteristics of the officers shape people's willingness to report crimes to them. In chapter 7, I use a conjoint experiment in Gulu district to demonstrate that individuals prefer reporting crimes to co-ethnic officers, even after controlling for potential confounders. Broadly, this result is strongest among individuals with no trust in the police or the political authorities, including the president and the courts.

Broadly, the findings in this book have implications for the politics of policing and the provision of public goods more broadly. The results suggest that the struggle of political authorities for political survival is at tension with their ability to provide law

and order as a public good. This underscores a costly tradeoff for political authorities between repressing dissent and providing law and order. One implication from these results is that the more leaders use the police to repress dissent the more it negatively affects their ability to provide law and order. In particular, if leaders employ ethnicity to resolve adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with repression, it will likely decrease their ability of police to engender cooperation from the community they are policing.

Additionally, in the context of this study, incumbent supporters did not support the use of repression by the police (at least selective repression did not have a positive effect on their assessment of the police). Future work might consider the strategic role that citizens play not only in the co-production of security but also the co-production of repression. Individuals' decisions to support or oppose repression remains an important question, especially as governments likely frame certain protests as threatening to law and order in an attempt to increase popular support (Edwards and Arnon 2019).

This book also has implications for policymakers. Practitioners, academics, and policymakers have highlighted security sector engagement and state development as a key peace-building practice and mechanism to reduce and deter political violence, including human rights abuses, terrorism and election violence, especially in conflict-affected and fragile states (Lake 2016, Von Borzyskowski 2015, Birch and Muchlinski 2018, Orji 2017).

However, this project underscores the importance of political dimensions of security sector engagement. Security forces – especially the police – do not exist in an apolitical vacuum. Rather they are shaped by political and ethnic dynamics linked to the struggle of power. How police are used to suppress dissent directly affects public perceptions of the police and their willingness to cooperate with them.

The international community's efforts to increase policing effectiveness, promoting

security sector reform, must take into account the preferences of individuals. Importantly, they must consider whether trying to strengthen the police (making a more capable police force) might actually increase risks to the public by increasing their ability to suppress dissent. Additionally, one important policy implication from this study is that making a more diverse police force – where the police are drawn from the community – is an important step to improve cooperation but it also requires steps to restore confidence in the police when there is a past history of repression.

## 8.2 Future Work

There are several important avenues of research that this project promotes. Below I outline three important trajectories charting an ambitious future research agenda of the study of police, political violence, democratization, and security. First, the logic that mistrust in government increases co-ethnic bias in policing likely extends to some democracies, especially states with salient ethnic or racial divisions and a history of state violence against minoritized groups to suppress voter turnout or restrict freedom of movement and other forms of political expression. This is reflected in the article written by Soss and Weaver (2017) after Michael Brown, an unarmed Black teenager, was shot and killed on August 9, 2014, by Darren Wilson, a white police officer, in Ferguson, Missouri. Soss and Weaver (2017) remind us that police violence against minoritized groups are one aspect of an unjust criminal justice system that employs “coercion, containment, repression, surveillance, regulation, predation, discipline, and violence” as mechanisms of control – disproportionately meted out against Black and Indigenous communities (Edwards, Lee and Esposito 2019, Knox, Lowe and Mummolo 2020).

Scholars of policing in the United States are increasingly studying race and policing (Rim, Rivera and Ba 2019, Ba et al. 2020, Edwards, Lee and Esposito 2019). As



the literature on comparative policing grows, we need to keep in mind that the legitimacy of the monopoly of violence in addition to the state's ability to provide law and order are inherently political processes that depend on how individuals view the police and their actions. This is especially the case in un-consolidated democracies and autocracies. But another important avenue of comparative policing research should explore the implications of my theory for the politics of policing in democratic cases with a history of violence against marginalized communities. Moving beyond elections, people's relationship with the police should be a critical marker of democratic strength.

In the United States, thousands of protestors took to the streets to protest the murder of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer. Floyd's murder occurred about two months after Breonna Taylor was killed in her home by Louisville Metro Police Department officers. The protest spread with thousands of protestors joining from around the world. This has led to important conversations about the need to reform, if not abolish, the police as an institution. Certainly, this is an opportunity to reimagine the relationship between individuals and the police. But doing so requires listening to those who have experienced the police as repressive agents of the state. From police abolition to reform, scholars and advocates are already imagining what this might take. This project argues that we need to move beyond focusing on autocrats and their security apparatus to also study how individuals navigate these security threats associated with repression and crime.

Second, future work could expand the empirical scope beyond Uganda. I believe politicizing of the police should be seen as a warning sign of democratic erosion. Co-ethnic bias when combined with mistrust of political authorities and police abuse have serious implications for patterns of enforcement, crime, election violence, and other forms of political violence. A challenge under the best of circumstances, policing is especially problematic in fragile and conflict-affected societies. These settings are often

marked by low state capacity, high levels of corruption, and strong ethnic cleavages forged by exposure to violence. How these ethnic identities condition citizen-police interactions, including the willingness of individuals to cross ethnic lines to cooperate with the police, remains a neglected area of study, however. Indeed, much of the existing literature on civil war (for example, Kalyvas (2006)) suggests that wartime and other high-stakes settings leads individuals to adopt rational modes of decision-making that strip away preexisting ethnic loyalties. Survival, in other words, trumps co-ethnic affinity. By extension, attitudes and behavior toward police should not be influenced by ethnic considerations. This project demonstrates that is not the case, ethnic bias, in fact, does shape citizen-police interactions.

A next step is seeing how this travels to other conflict-affected and fragile states. Working with the Comparative Policing Lab, which includes Jason Lyall, Mara Revkin, and Hilary Matfess, we plan on examining how in-group bias affects civilian-police interactions in several conflict-affected and fragile states. The main objective of this future work is challenging the assumption that law and order is in fact a public good, which is provided equally, if not necessarily efficiently, to all citizens. We argue that in many fragile and conflict-affected states, policing is viewed and experienced as a private good where citizens are treated unequally based on certain characteristics. We plan to test this argument in Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, and the United States.

Third, this study has implications for how perceptions of police affect how people navigate insecurity. One important future avenue of work is how mistrust in government affects public health outcomes. Governments play a role keeping communities safe beyond just deterring crime. Political authorities are also responsible for combating pandemics: coordinating the work of health workers, investing in medical capacity and promoting preventive behavior among the public. But the success of these efforts crucially depends on the actions taken by individuals. For example, individuals' compliance with quarantine directives during the Ebola crisis affected both the spread

and lethality of the virus (Blair, Morse and Tsai 2017). Considering how support for leaders and trust in state institutions, including exposure to negative and positive interactions with the police, shape individuals' responses to public health crises is an important future area of research.

Guy Grossman, David Dow, Robert Blair and I are examining how support for the incumbent government and security institutions shapes individuals' public health responses to the novel Coronavirus in Uganda. In our study, we argue that support for the incumbent government and trust in political institutions are important not only in shaping individuals' attitudes (for example., their assessment of government's mitigating actions), but also their (health preventive) behavior during times of crisis. We received a research grant from the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab's Crime and Violence Initiative to conduct this study. Our planned phone survey builds on a panel survey of an existing community policing randomized controlled trial, while ensuring that ethical best practices are followed and risks to participants and enumerators are minimized. Enumerators will administer this "down-stream" survey from their home using tablets we circulated before Uganda's lockdown. The sample in this survey includes 3,688 Ugandans (3,400 civilians and 288 village leaders). Results from this study will provide important insights into the relationship between community policing and public health; elite messaging during an international health crisis; and the impact of the public health crisis on migration, money transfers, and economic and food insecurity.

### **8.3 Final Thoughts**

This study provides a rare window into the effects of repressive action of a regime that is increasingly relying on the security apparatus to maintain power. Overall, this study demonstrates a cost of repression to political authorities and society. When

political authorities rely on the police as agents of repression, people view the police as more illegitimate authorities. Relying on the police to repress dissent has resulted in political costs for the regime, including increased protests and strengthening of opposition movements to the incumbent government.

State repression by the police has undermined the public's confidence in the government's response to the novel Coronavirus.<sup>1</sup> The police in Uganda used harsh, often repressive, tactics to enforce public health directives – including social distancing and curfews.<sup>2</sup> Opposition leaders argued that the Coronavirus enforcement, which included arrests and violent attacks by the police, was politically motivated and a mechanism employed to suppress dissent.<sup>3</sup> This underscores how the erosion of trust in the security apparatus threatens state's security, even when the stakes are as high as battling a pandemic. Between the increased patterns of repression and protests coupled with Covid19 and the upcoming national elections scheduled for 2021, there are significant risks of democratic erosion and closing of political space in addition to further instability and conflict in Uganda.

In this midst of this historic moment of political crisis, in the United States, it is important to move beyond Uganda, concluding with a few words about the politics of policing in the United States. Thousands of protestors continue to take to the streets to protest the murder of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer. Floyd's murder occurred about two months after Breonna Taylor was killed in her home by Louisville Metro Police Department officers. These extrajudicial murders are but the latest tragic reflection of an unjust criminal justice system (Francis 2014, Soss and Weaver 2017, Phoenix 2019). Even in the midst of these protests, Rayshard Brooks, a Black man, was killed by a White Atlanta Police Department officer.

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<sup>1</sup>“CDT Spotlight: State Force in Uganda,” *Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project*, May 7, 2020, (<https://bit.ly/2zzmC6h>).

<sup>2</sup>“Uganda: Opposition Leader Reported Tortured by Police, Pandemic Restrictions No Excuse for Abuse,” *Human Rights Watch*, April 28, 2020, (<https://bit.ly/2Y2MXDj>).

<sup>3</sup>“Uganda arrests Stella Nyanzi at protest over coronavirus response,” *Al Jazeera*, May 19, 2020, (<https://bit.ly/2UP38Ce>).

Police in the United States are highly fragmented, both across and within states. However, the protests have been national in response, with demonstrations in all 50 states. Others from around the world have joined to stand in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement and against police brutality.

Although some police officers, commissioners, and policymakers have marched in solidarity with protesters, the overwhelming response by the police in the United States has been to use repressive tactics to quell the protests. Police abuse has included targeting journalists with over 300 (and counting) violations of press freedom; arbitrary enforcement of curfews; and a countless number of physical integrity violations, culminating in over 9,000 protestors being arrested.

What effect will this have on protesters? Ostensibly, the goal of repression is to halt protest and discourage it from happening in the future. However, the evidence in this book suggests that repression is not as effective a tool in discouraging protest as is generally assumed and likely leads to other costs. Importantly, however, police violence especially against ethnic or racial groups likely increases fear and distrust, weakening the provision of law and order.

The recent wave of excessive policing of protests in the United States highlights an inherent tension at the core of this project. In many contexts, the police are designed to provide security, deterring crime. On the other hand, they are also coercive agents of the state used by political authorities to repress dissent and maintain control.

Police differ from other security forces, like the military, because they rely on civilians' cooperation in order to be effective at their daily tasks. In order to provide security and deter crimes, police require the support of the public; they gain that support by building trust in the way they interact with those they are policing. When people think the police are fair and effective, they are more likely to cooperate with them to promote public safety. In democracies—where power explicitly lies with the people, and where politicians face the possibility of electoral sanction—police abuse

ought to create a political backlash. Protests might continue, shaping how voters mobilize against political authorities responsible for the abuse.

But even in democracies, this is being tested. Governments of all kinds may be tempted to use force to quell opposition and maintain the political status quo, but they should know that doing so increases public criticism, provides the kindling for future protests, and undermines the state's ability to provide security. Repressive action by the police, whether that involves violently shutting down peaceful protests, suppressing journalists, or implementing racially motivated stop-and-frisks, divides many citizens from their government. These acts undermine the relationship between the police and those who have been targeted, encouraging greater dissent.

The current events in the United States highlight that even in a democratic state – police abuse of marginalized peoples, especially when tied to a legacy of oppression, interacts with co-ethnic bias to shape civilian-police interactions. The effects of repression on public perceptions of the police, increasing fear and mistrust, are likely to persist. The relationship between violence and identity and how they interact to form security institutions, especially the police, should be a litmus test for how we understand governance. The police are a bridge between those in power and the people. When political authorities use them to maintain control, repressing dissent, it undermines their legitimacy and their ability to provide the most basic of government goods – security.

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