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Transforming the Sensible
Dilthey and Heidegger on Art

By

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Transforming the Sensible
Dilthey and Heidegger on Art

By

Rebecca Longtin Hansen
B.A., University of Dallas, 2006
M.A., Emory University, 2011

Advisor: Rudolf A. Makkreel, PhD

An abstract of
a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Philosophy
2014

Abstract

Transforming the Sensible: Dilthey and Heidegger on Art
By
Rebecca Longtin Hansen

This project explains the role art plays in shaping our perception and understanding of the world by tracing the relation between factical life and art in Dilthey's and Heidegger's philosophical works. The facticity of life describes its givenness that is at once not immediately or wholly given, but always open to greater meanings. Life is what is closest to us, and yet most difficult to understand; we are entangled in that which we want to understand. For Dilthey and Heidegger, philosophy must be grounded in the "standpoint of life," i.e. the felt, living perspective of the self that is shaped by the plurality of contexts that form the world. In other words, philosophy must interpret life from life itself. I argue that interpreting life from life itself requires aesthetics because art preserves the complex relations that form the world and makes the significance of these relations more vivid. Rather than abstracting from the sensible and felt qualities of experience by privileging ideas, art delves into their depth. With art, the sensible is meaningful as such, not as a representation of an exterior meaning. Through art we become aware of ourselves as *in* a world, not simply detached spectators of things. By comparing Dilthey's and Heidegger's approaches to art through their shared concern with facticity, I will argue for the need to develop a factical aesthetics that maintains the irreducible significance of the sensible.

In order to develop a factical aesthetics, the first chapter addresses the importance of facticity for Heidegger's 'appropriation' (*Aneignung*) of Dilthey in his lectures prior to *Being and Time* (1919 – 1926) and explain how Dilthey's emphasis on the facticity of art prefigures Heidegger's turn to art in the 1930's. The second chapter provides an overview of Dilthey's aesthetics, which describes art as a *metamorphosis* of life because it renders the implicit meaning of everyday experience more explicit through artistic expression. Dilthey's notion of metamorphosis develops a new framework for understanding experience as an interweaving of feeling, thought, and sensation. The third chapter reads Heidegger's approach to the work of art as an origin that allows access to the things of the world. This concept of art transforms the sensible-intelligible distinction by divining art in terms of truth, rather than in opposition to it. The fourth chapter brings Dilthey's aesthetics and Heidegger's philosophy of art into conversation by examining their mutual critiques of mimesis and Hegelian aesthetics and shared admiration for Hölderlin's poetry. By reading Hölderlin's poetry as an engagement with the paradox of factical life, I argue that Dilthey's and Heidegger's confrontation with the poet introduces a new understanding of art and aesthetics, which the following chapter develops as a "factical aesthetics." The last chapter develops a factical approach to aesthetics by examining the redefinition of space and time in Dilthey's and Heidegger's writings on Hölderlin's poetry. This redefinition illustrates how art transforms ordinary perception. Instead of relating to space and time as calculative measures, poetry exposes space and time as our particular "thereness" in the world, i.e., as the interweaving of subjectivity and objectivity that forms the concrete world that is there for us.

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Acknowledgements

This project would not have been possible without the support of many people. I would like to thank my director Professor Rudolf Makkreel for his guidance during this project, as well as throughout my graduate studies. I am grateful for the advice of my committee members and readers, Professors David Carr, Andrew Mitchell, John Lysaker, and Elizabeth Goodstein, who have provided thoughtful feedback and enlarged my sense of these philosophical questions. I am also grateful to my teachers and mentors from Trinity School at River Ridge and the University of Dallas, who encouraged my love of philosophy, art, literature, and poetry—especially Mr. Jon Balsbaugh, Mrs. Sarah Brown, Dr. Joshua Parens, Dr. Scott Crider, and Dr. Lee Fratantuono.

I owe a debt of gratitude to those who reviewed, provided comments, and edited earlier drafts of this project, especially Catherine Homan and Mark Hansen, and also to Professors William McNeill and Julia Ireland, who allowed me to use an unpublished draft of their translation of Heidegger's *Hölderlin's Hymns* "*Germania" and "The Rhine."*

Additionally, this project grew in clarity and scope through conversations with my fellow graduate students at Emory University. Participating in such a vibrant and inspiring intellectual community has been a pleasure and honor. I am especially grateful for the support of Catherine Homan, Julia Haas, Sam Timme, and Claudine Davidshofer. Another word of thanks must go to my colleagues at the Emory Writing Center for their contagious enthusiasm for writing and learning.

Lastly, thank you to family for their love and support, especially my partner Mark Hansen, who has sustained me through every step of my graduate education.

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Abbreviations

Dilthey's Writings

SW I	*Introduction to the Human Sciences*
SW II	*Understanding the Human World*
SW III	*The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*
SW IV	*Hermeneutics and the Study of History*
SW V	*Poetry and Experience*

Heidegger's Writings

BPP	*Basic Problems of Phenomenology*
BT	*Being and Time*
C	*Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning*
G	"Memorial Address" *in Discourse on Thinking: A Translation of Gelassenheit*
GA 39	*Hölderlin's Hymns* "*Germania" and "The Rhine"*
I	*Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister"*
IPTP	*Introduction to Philosophy—Thinking and Poetizing*
MFL	*Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*
N I	*The Will to Power as Art, Nietzsche,* vol. I
OHF	*Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*
PIA	*Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*
PIE	*Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*
PDT	"Plato's Doctrine of Truth"
PLT	*Poetry, Language, Thought*
PRL	*The Phenomenology of Religious Life*
TB	"Time and Being"
TDP	*Towards a Definition of Philosophy*
WDR	"Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview"

Other Cited Works

C3	Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*
H	Friedrich Hölderlin, *Hyperion*
JB	Friedrich Hölderlin, "Judgment and Being"
LFA	G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*
M	Jean Luc Nancy, *The Muses*
WTP	Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*

Introduction

> Poetry is a passion, not a habit. This passion nourishes itself on reality. Imagination has no source except in reality, and ceases to have any value when it departs from reality. Here is a fundamental principle about the imagination: It does not create except as it transforms… Imagination gives, but gives in relation.
>
> - Wallace Stevens , Notes on "The Man with the Blue Guitar"[1]

The purpose of this project is to develop a theory of art based on the paradox of facticity. The term 'facticity' [*Faktizität*] denotes the *thisness* of experience, the here and now, which is not immediately given, self-evident, or completely analyzable. For Dilthey, facticity describes the unfathomable depths and complexity of what is given in lived experience, as well as its resistance to conceptualization since it is grounded in life. Dilthey presents life as both the ground for and limit of thought. Life is what is closest to us yet most difficult to understand. As we are always within life, we can never get beyond it to analyze it from the outside. We are always caught up within it. This paradoxical relation means that we can never unearth or analyze it. We are entangled in the world. The facticity of life thus describes the situation of our existence as a constant interweaving between self and world and an infinite task of interpretation. The young Heidegger adopts this notion of factical life from Dilthey and develops it into a fundamental ontology.

For both thinkers, facticity describes a dynamic set of relations and contexts that are prior to the distinctions we make between subjects and objects and between sense, feeling, and thought. These distinctions are the product of reflection and conceptual

[1] Wallace Stevens to Hi Simons, Hartford, Connecticut, August 10, 1940, in *Letters of Wallace Stevens*, ed. Holly Stevens, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 363 – 364. This part of the letter is Stevens's notes about his poem, "The Man with the Blue Guitar."

analysis and fail to recognize the interweaving of self and world and of the sensible and intelligible. For Dilthey and Heidegger, philosophy must be grounded in the "standpoint of life," i.e. the felt, living perspective of the self that is shaped by the plurality of contexts that form the world. I argue that philosophizing from the standpoint of life leads both thinkers to take up art because art preserves the complex relations that form life and makes the significance of these relations more vivid.

The distinction between fact and facticity opens up a space for art. Facticity takes up the idea of a fact, i.e. something given in experience, but expands the sense of what is given. If the given is merely factual, i.e. empirical data, it can be collected, analyzed, and determined in its entirety. Experience would be transparent, not interpretative. Facticity, however, recognizes that experience is not transparent because of the incommensurability and un-derivability of the given. The factical is given as the here and now, the haecceity of experience, and yet there is a deeper source to what is given that cannot be revealed. Facticity problematizes what is given in experience. Unlike a fact that is analyzable and can be correct or incorrect, the factical denies this dichotomy because it conveys the unfathomable depths of experience. Facticity is the thinking of surplus. By taking up the paradox of facticity, Dilthey and Heidegger present the paradox of the given: what is tangibly there for us cannot be fully grasped but requires interpretation. This task of interpretation is connected to art.

This project will demonstrate that art provides a way for philosophy to engage with the paradox of facticity in the fullness of its complexity. That is, art takes up our entanglement with the world without abstracting from the concrete particularity of things and the facticity of experience, without covering over the paradox of the given, and

without reducing the given to clear and distinct concepts. By tracing the relation between facticity and art in Dilthey and Heidegger I will argue that art serves as a model for how to understand and be in the world. Both Dilthey and Heidegger present art as a response to our relation to the world in its concrete particularity. In this way, art provides a way for philosophy to think through the facticity of life.

Facticity challenges how philosophy thinks about art. By dismantling conceptual frameworks that assume an essential division between the sensible and intelligible and between us as subjects and the world as an object, facticity breaks from representational theories of art. Representational theories of art often rely on the distinction between form and matter, which treats the sensible qualities of art as a vehicle for ideas or meaning. That is, the work of art represents an idea through its sensuous medium. Representational accounts of art are problematic because they separate the meaning of a work from its medium, which makes the sensuous material of art a mere means to an end. Once the idea is understood, the medium of the message is no longer relevant. As a result, the form-matter distinction cannot account for art's significance because it reduces the work of art to an idea that can be understood independently of its sensuous material. Approaching art as a representation (re-presentation) can also suggest that the work of art copies the external world. The artist stands apart from the world and understands it by recreating it in another medium. Instead of recognizing that we are factically caught up in the world, representation treats the world as an object (*Gegenstand*). This separation of self and world fails to recognize what is at work in art. The work of art is an image of the sensible world engaging us on the perceptual level while expressing more than sensible data. This tension is meaningful and signifies something about reality and thought in addition to art.

Art reveals a prior relation between self and world that is overlooked if we think of it as mere representation. The task for a factical aesthetics is to recover the sensible, which is continually lost in philosophy, and through the sensible to regain a sense of relation to the world.

By *sensible*, I do not mean sense data, sensory perception, or the sensuous apprehension of a subject. Instead, I intend the sensible to describe what is there for sense, what is given to sense in more originary manner and precedes the division between the sensing subject and sensed object—that is, the factical. Recasting sensibility in terms of facticity requires a subject that is sensitive and open and something that offers itself to sense. Considering the sensible in terms of facticity reveals that perception is not complete and does not grasp the thing, but gestures toward its complex relations and depth of meaning.

Since the factical challenges the dichotomies and concepts we apply to experience, an aesthetics shaped by the paradox of facticity does not (1) treat the self as standing apart from the world, (2) abstract from the concrete *thisness* of the work of art, or (3) separate the sensible, intelligible, and felt aspects of experience for the sake of conceptual clarity.

Factical aesthetics is significant for philosophy since art does not deflate the full depth and complexity of the sensible. Art always conveys the facticity of the sensible, since a work of art is always open to new interpretations and understandings. A work of art expresses the inexhaustibility of the given. To understand the sensible as factical, we must approach experience through the work of art. Instead of confining the surplus of the given to categories and distinctions, art creates a constellation of dynamic relations that

mutually shape each other. We are not separate from the world that shapes us. Works of art resist these simple oppositional distinctions. Art acts as a transformation of the sensible in three aspects: (1) from the perspective of the spectator, it transforms how we perceive the sensible, (2) from the perspective of the artist and the act of creation, it transforms sensible objects by reworking relations or elements within the work of art, and (3) even more fundamentally, art transforms our comportment towards things by altering our relation to the world. By examining these transformations I hope to clarify meaningful relations between works of art and theories of art.

The first part of this dissertation provides an initial sketch of the paradox of facticity in Dilthey's and Heidegger's philosophy and their relation to each other. Chapter One reinterprets Heidegger's 'appropriation' (*Aneignung*) of Dilthey in his lectures prior to *Being and Time* (1919 – 1926) by demonstrating how Dilthey's emphasis on art's significance for philosophy prefigures Heidegger's turn to art in the 1930's. In doing so, I argue for the need to re-appropriate Dilthey to understand how Heidegger's "turn" (*Kehre*) to art follows from his early phenomenological projects. Since Heidegger's Dilthey-period precedes his turn to art, scholars rarely compare these thinkers' aesthetics. Bringing Dilthey's aesthetics into dialogue with Heidegger's philosophy of art thus offers a new perspective of Heidegger's turn to art and highlights Dilthey's philosophical insights that were overlooked or not available to Heidegger.

The second part of the dissertation focuses on Dilthey's and Heidegger's separate contributions to thinking about art in relation to life and the world. Chapter Two provides an overview of Dilthey's aesthetics. Dilthey describes art as a *metamorphosis* of life because it renders the implicit meaning of everyday experience more explicit through

artistic expression. Dilthey's notion of metamorphosis revises aesthetic theory by developing a new framework for understanding experience as a dynamic interweaving of feeling, thought, and sensation. Dilthey's aesthetics connects art to life by developing a broader notion of feeling and its role in the formation and transformation of experience. His *Imagination of the Poet*, moreover, responds directly to the art movements that characterize the rise of modernism, which overturns traditional art theory and expresses a new perspective of our relation to the world. The third chapter takes up Heidegger's concept of art as an origin, a happening of truth that reveals the extraordinary in the ordinary, and connects these ideas back to his early concerns with the incommensurability of facticity. By relating Heidegger's lecture "The Origin of the Work of Art" to his critique of the division between truth and art in Plato and Nietzsche, I argue that Heidegger's approach to the work of art attempts to overturn the sensible-intelligible distinction that characterizes representational approaches. The work of art allows a broader, more relational notion of the sensible.

The final part of the dissertation brings Dilthey and Heidegger together more explicitly to develop a factical approach to aesthetics. Chapter Four outlines Dilthey's and Heidegger's shared critiques of mimesis and Hegel's philosophy of art, both of which reduce art to ideas and fail to capture what is meaningful about art's sensuousness. By comparing their critiques of art theory to their philosophical reflections on Hölderlin's poetry, I argue that Dilthey and Heidegger both saw the need for a rehabilitation of the sensible that would allow them to overcome the specious divisions of representational models of art. Chapter Four clears a space for a factical aesthetics, which Chapter Five initiates. Chapter Five explains how art allows Dilthey and Heidegger to rethink the

given, especially in terms of space and time. Instead of relating to space and time as calculative measures, poetry exposes space and time as our particular "thereness" in the world, i.e., as the interweaving of subjectivity and objectivity that forms the concrete world that is there for us. This last chapter addresses the significance of facticity for both aesthetic theory and contemporary continental thought. Namely, since art responds to the world in its concrete particularity, art acts as a way of returning to the things themselves. Art emerges as a phenomenological practice that can convey the patency of things and the entanglement of self and world.

A Few Notes on Terminology and Distinctions

To address some concerns in advance, it should be noted that since I intend to challenge some foundational assumptions philosophy makes about art, this project avoids several common distinctions and divisions used in art theory. Some of these apparent transgressions are due to the historical nature of the material and the particular terminology of German aesthetics, and others are due to my attempt to bridge Dilthey's and Heidegger's distinct philosophical approaches to art. I have provided some brief explanations below.

Life and Being

Life and being are distinct for both Dilthey and Heidegger, but at times I will bring them together in relation to facticity. In his very early lecture courses Heidegger takes up the paradox of factical life as Dilthey formulated it, and this concept of facticity becomes the basis for Dasein and being-in-the-world. While Heidegger reframes life as being, his approach to being still retains some of the qualities of his explication of life. Namely, both life and being are factically given. Thus while the shift from life to being

has implications for Heidegger's development, his discussion of being reflects his earlier concern with facticity. Dilthey, however, only talks about life and avoids discussing being because he rejects metaphysics due to its speculative absolutes and tendency to abstract from the concrete reality of lived experience. Dilthey's notion of life, however, is not simply biological and provides a groundless ground for thought. In this way, Dilthey's notion of life intersects with Heidegger's notion of being, even if they diverge in other respects. At times I will bring life and being into closer proximity to discuss the facticity of the given in light of both Dilthey and Heidegger.

Philosophy of Art vs. Aesthetics

This project avoids the division between philosophy of art and aesthetics. Historically, this distinction begins with Hegel. Hegel drew the distinction between 'aesthetics' and 'philosophy of the fine arts' to separate his approach, which focuses on art as a product of *Geist*, from Kant's aesthetics and its focus on subjective experience.[2] Heidegger too rejects aesthetics throughout his writings on art. In the epilogue to "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger contrasts his approach to aesthetics: "Aesthetics takes the work of art as an object, the object of *aesthesis*, of sensuous apprehension in the broad sense… Lived experience is the source that is standard not only for art appreciation and enjoyment, but also for artistic creation. Everything is a lived experience. Yet perhaps lived experience is the element in which art dies."[3] For Heidegger, aesthetics is the science of sensuous apprehension, which treats the work of

[2] G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, vol. 1, trans. T.M. Knox, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010).

[3] Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, (New York: Perennial Classics, 2001), 15 – 86. 77. Translation modified to reflect Heidegger's use of *Erlebnis*, which he contrasts to *Erfahrung*. See further explanation in Chapter Three, pp. 151 – 159. See Heidegger, *Holzwege*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 5, ed. F.W. von Hermann, (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 67.

art as valuable only insofar as it produces a particular experience in the spectator. Aesthetics approaches the work of art as a product that can be consumed. Art dies when it becomes something that can be exhausted in terms of a subjective experience—it has no depth or force of its own. Robert Bernasconi emphasizes this division between aesthetics and art for Heidegger and proposes the idea that "[a]rt and aesthetics are not compatible. Aesthetics prospers as art declines. Aesthetics is great when it tells what great art used to be."[4] Many Heidegger scholars consider Heidegger's approach to art to be antithetical to any sense of aesthetics for this reason. Heidegger's critique of aesthetics, however, assumes a very specific concept of experience that is not factical. By reinterpreting sensuous experience through facticity, this project will propose a factical aesthetics that does not treat the work of art as a mere consumable good for a detached spectator.

My attempt to bridge this perceived gap between aesthetics and philosophy of art has implications for contemporary philosophy as well. Scholars continue to uphold this distinction by using 'aesthetics' for accounts of the experience of beauty in a subject and 'philosophy of art' for attempts to categorize and explain the fine arts or specific works of art. In other words, 'aesthetics' refers to subjects and their experience, whereas 'philosophy of art' refers to objects or ways of categorizing of objects. Yet this distinction creates artificial restrictions. An aesthetic theory without an account of art would be an empty abstraction, while a philosophy of art without an account of aesthetic experience seems one-dimensional. By using 'aesthetics' and 'philosophy of art' interchangeably, I am not conflating ideas but rather attempting to challenge the distinction itself since Dilthey's and Heidegger's writings attempt to get at what is prior

[4] Robert Bernasconi, "The Greatness of the Work of Art" in *Heidegger toward the Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s*, ed. James Risser (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 95-117.

to the division of subjects and objects. If art preserves the complex interweaving relations of the factical that precede the subject-object distinction, we should approach art in a way that reflects this dynamic interplay.

Likewise, contemporary continental thought no longer treats the term 'aesthetics' as a remnant of early modern subjectivism. In *Aesthetics and Its Discontents*, Rancière notes that the rhetoric of overcoming aesthetics has been germane to aesthetics since its birth. Rancière argues that "our contemporaries strive in vain to denounce the term aesthetics, since those who honoured it were the first to do so… The discontent with aesthetics is as old as aesthetics itself."[5] Other contemporary philosophers like Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy have resuscitated aesthetics by expanding its connotations. The ideas currently associated with aesthetics have little to do with the narrow concept of aesthetics that is rejected by Heidegger.

In particular, I wish to maintain the use of 'aesthetics' to emphasize the role of the sensible in art. The sensible need not be reduced to simply the first-person's subjective experience of an object. The sensible can encompass a broader notion of perception and reflect a deeper relation between the self and world. By transforming our concept of the sensible, this project will also propose a transformed notion of aesthetics.

Works of Fine Art vs. Objects in Nature or in Ordinary Life

The reader will also note that I do not emphasize the difference between works of art and other aesthetically significant things in the world—for example, a beautiful landscape or an object created for a function that might also be beautiful, such as a tea pot. While this project is mainly concerned with works of art created by artists, it also cites other types of examples to illustrate the transformational possibilities of art. I do not

[5] Jacques Rancière, *Aesthetics and Its Discontents* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012). 11

privilege the fine arts for three reasons. First of all, neither Dilthey nor Heidegger was concerned with distinguishing works of fine art from other objects. Dilthey's *The Imagination of the Poet* addresses the crisis in his contemporary art world that resulted from artists going beyond the particular expectations of fine art at that time, which resulted in critics rejecting their works. Heidegger's consideration of art in "The Origin of the Work of Art" first takes up a *thing* to try to address what is *thingly* about the work of art. He begins with peasant shoes and demonstrates the ability of Van Gogh to depict the thingly dimensions of shoes. Dilthey and Heidegger both approach art as connected to ordinary objects within our everyday lives. For these thinkers, art is connected to life and constitutive of our understanding of the world. The difference between works of the fine arts and ordinary things is not essential to understanding Dilthey's or Heidegger's approaches to art.

Secondly, this distinction applies mainly to issues concerning the *fine* arts, rather than broader notions of art, whereas the art movements of the past fifty years have resisted the demarcations of the fine arts. The twentieth century witnessed the complete undermining of previous definitions of art with movements that gave ordinary objects the same status as art (e.g. Duchamp's *Fountain*), embraced popular culture and mass media (e.g. Warhol's pop art), or emphasized the banal rather than the beautiful or refined (e.g. Hirst's 1996 photograph of cigar butts). Other contemporary art movements like street art and outside art also undermine the philosopher's and critic's efforts to define and demarcate art from non-art.

Lastly, many contemporary art theorists no longer privilege the fine arts. In response to art movements that resist definitions of art, contemporary art theory has

expanded to be more inclusive and less hierarchical. One such trend, everyday aesthetics, describes the significance of art in terms of the meaningful activities of our everyday life, rather than in categories that define art from non-art.[6] For these theorists, art is not a collection of great works, but rather a way of engaging the world in all of its fullness, depth, and complexity. Crispin Sartwell describes art not in terms of categories of the fine arts, but as "a process of becoming present in one's life."[7] For Sartwell, art "calls us both into and out of ourselves as and into what is real. Art is the characteristically human way of being in and loving the world."[8] My project takes up art in a similar way. Namely, I do not attempt to categorize art from non-art, but instead approach art as a particular comportment and way of engaging in the world.

Art vs. the Individual Arts

This project not only pursues art in its broadest terms, but also addresses art in general rather than one division of the arts. For example, Chapters Four and Five adopt Dilthey's and Heidegger's use of 'poetics' to refer to a general theory of art, rather than just poetry. I am not denying that there are philosophically significant distinctions between music, the visual arts, and written arts such as poetry and literature. Especially with arts that use the written word, there are distinctions that have philosophical implications. Yet despite these distinctions, my project concerns what is shared in all the arts.

This project's interest in the *sensible* demands a unified approach. The division of the arts is often treated in terms of the sensation that they utilize—music for sound,

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[6] See Thomas Leddy, *The Extraordinary in the Ordinary: the Aesthetics of Everyday Life* (Buffalo: Broadview Press, 2012).
[7] Crispin Sartwell, *The Art of Living: Aesthetics of the Ordinary in World Spiritual Traditions* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995). xii.
[8] Ibid., xi.

painting and sculpture for sight, literature and poetry for higher cognitive functions, etc.—which assumes specific differences between the senses and, more importantly, differences between sensation and higher cognitive functions. My project describes the significance of art in terms of its ability to reveal the interconnections between the sensible and intelligible, not their division.

Other philosophers have also noted the need to address art in terms of sensation as a whole. Phenomenological approaches to art in particular tend to treat sensation as a dynamic whole. In his discussions of Cézanne's paintings, Merleau-Ponty describes how art reveals a more original unity of the senses—"Cézanne declared that a picture contains within itself even the smell of the landscape."[9] Cézanne's method of painting strikes us because he does not treat sight as a separate sense divorced from our experience as a whole. Instead, his paintings allow us to "*see* the depth, the smoothness, the softness, the hardness of objects."[10] Vision, touch, smell, and sound intermingle in art. Art allows us to recognize a more primordial unity between the senses. Jean-Luc Nancy also suggests that the distinctions we make between the senses and the division of the arts according to sensation is derivative rather than essential. Nancy's essay "Why are There Several Arts and Not Just One?" begins by recognizing that the division of the arts according to the different senses they engage is specious. For Nancy, the arbitrary criteria by which we divide sensory experience gestures towards a deeper unity, a more originary synesthesia, that grounds sensation.[11] Art draws out this synesthesia because "[a]rt forces a sense to

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[9] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith, (London and New York: Routledge, 2002). 371.

[10]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Cézanne's Doubt" in *Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader*: *Philosophy and Painting*, trans. Michael B. Smith, ed. Galen A. Johnson (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1993), 59-75. 65.

[11] Jean-Luc Nancy, "Why are There Several Arts?" in *The Muses*, trans. Peggy Kamuf, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). 13.

touch itself, to be this sense that it is."[12] The unity of sensation is essential to art. With art, we can see the complex intersections and dynamic relations that define the peculiar patency of things.

For these reasons, while considering one art form in particular might have its own strengths for investigating a particular dimension of art, this project attempts to approach art in its broadest sense. Namely, I will examine art as a transformation of the sensible that illuminates and reworks our relation to the world.

[12] Ibid., 21.

PART I: THE PARADOX OF FACTICITY

Chapter One

Reappropriating Dilthey: On the Relation between Factical Life and Art

There is little doubt that Dilthey's philosophy was influential in the development of Heidegger's thought. In 1924, Heidegger drafted an article entitled "The Concept of Time: Comments on the Dilthey-Yorck Correspondence" for the *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*.[1] The article was a review of the published collection of letters between Dilthey and Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg. While the article was not published in the journal, the manuscript became the basis for Heidegger's *Being and Time*. Hans-Georg Gadamer described "The Concept of Time" as the *Ur-form* of *Being and Time,* and scholars now refer to this manuscript as "The Dilthey Draft." Heidegger acknowledges the origins of *Being and Time* by including entire passages from this unpublished article and by proposing that his analysis of Dasein "is resolved to cultivate the spirit of Count Yorck in the service of Dilthey's work."[2]

While Dilthey's influence on Heidegger's *Being and Time* is well-known, the magnitude of Dilthey's role in Heidegger's philosophical development has come to light only in the past twenty years[3] and scholars continue to re-examine Heidegger's appropriation of Dilthey. Among these scholars, Robert Scharff argues that Dilthey is

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[1] The subtitle was a part of the rough draft, not the final manuscript that Heidegger sent to the journal. For details about the manuscript, its revisions, and its various transformations that led to the publication of *Being and Time* see Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Being and Time*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), especially chapter 7, "The Dilthey Draft: 'The Concept of Time' (1924)."

[2] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, (New York: SUNY Press, 1996). 369 [404]. Henceforth cited as BT followed by page number with pagination of original text in brackets.

[3] This growth in scholarship is due to: (1) publication of volumes of Gesamtausgabe, which show early Heidegger's intense engagement with Dilthey, and (2) translations of Dilthey's works (Selected Works), which make Dilthey's philosophy accessible to a larger audience and challenge narrow interpretations of his thought that confine him to simply a precursor to Husserl and Heidegger.

essential for understanding Heidegger. In his article, "Heidegger's 'Appropriation' of Dilthey before *Being and Time*," Scharff claims that we have failed to appropriate Heidegger's thought fully because we have not developed an adequate account of his relation to Dilthey. Drawing from Heidegger's early Freiburg lectures, Scharff presents a provocative argument that Dilthey was even more important to the young Heidegger than Husserl and that "the Dilthey appropriation taught the young Heidegger *how to philosophize.*"[4] That is, the young Heidegger does not treat Dilthey as simply one philosopher among others, but rather models his own way of philosophizing after Dilthey's approach to the paradox of factical life.

Yet scholars often downplay Dilthey's influence on Heidegger, particularly since Heidegger's attitude towards Dilthey after *Being and Time* appears to shift. Heidegger's positive references to Dilthey taper off in the late 1920's and 30's and only criticism regarding his philosophical limits remains. This period of Heidegger's philosophical development, known as his 'turn' (*Kehre*), seems to coincide with a rejection of Dilthey. In *Introduction to Philosophy* (1928), Heidegger presents his strongest critique of Dilthey. In this Freiburg lecture, Heidegger accuses Dilthey of privileging presence and objectivity, an indication that his philosophy operates within a Cartesian framework.[5] In his later essay "The Age of the World Picture" (1938) Heidegger develops this critique further when he explains that the Cartesian *subiectum* precludes the possibility of philosophy by rejecting metaphysics, which reshapes philosophy into a mere

[4] Robert C. Scharff, "Heidegger's 'Appropriation' of Dilthey before *Being and Time*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 35, no. 1 (1997): 105 – 128. 127.
[5] Heidegger, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, *Gesamtausgabe* 27 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2001). For an overview of Heidegger's critique of Dilthey's philosophy of worldviews see Eric S. Nelson, "The World Picture and its Conflict in Dilthey and Heidegger" *Humana Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies* 18 (2011): 19 – 38. Nelson demonstrates that Heidegger conflates the plurality of worldviews that Dilthey discusses into one type of worldview—naturalism—which is objectivistic. Heidegger thus misinterprets Dilthey's worldviews.

anthropology. Heidegger argues that Dilthey's critique of metaphysics illustrates "a leading example of anthropology's doing away with—as opposed to overcoming—philosophy."[6] Yet Heidegger's earlier works that celebrate Dilthey's philosophical insight make similar comments about Dilthey's "Cartesian" epistemological framework and the anthropological aspects of his philosophical method. While Heidegger's praise of Dilthey clearly diminishes in the late 1920's and early 1930's, his criticism of Dilthey remains the same throughout his corpus. The similarities in Heidegger's early and late critiques of Dilthey suggest that he did not suddenly reject Dilthey at a certain point in his philosophical career. This continuity in his criticism complicates the task of interpreting Heidegger's appropriation of Dilthey. Namely, Heidegger's critiques of Dilthey focus on his failure to do justice to his most promising insights because his methods remain too ingrained in traditional philosophical language. It is important to note that Heidegger critiques Dilthey's language and methods, not his central insights and guiding questions. The radicalness of Dilthey's insights demands a new approach to philosophy to which he only gestures. In this sense, early Heidegger sees his philosophical project as carrying forward Dilthey's insights by radicalizing philosophical methods and reinventing traditional terminology. Heidegger's "appropriation" (*Aneingung*) takes up and carries forward Dilthey's insights beyond the possibilities that he saw for his own thought. The appropriation as such requires a reformulation of Dilthey's ideas that extends beyond his terminology and methods. Due to the nature of Heidegger's appropriation, I will argue that rather than rejecting Dilthey, Heidegger remains in dialogue with him throughout his career, even if this dialogue is not explicit.

[6] Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture" in *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 57 - 85. 75

This project will demonstrate that although Heidegger no longer refers to Dilthey as an ally during his turn to art, Heidegger's philosophy of art reflects his earlier engagement with Dilthey's philosophy. This chapter examines how Heidegger adopts the paradox of facticity that Dilthey develops and outlines how this paradox impels both thinkers to take up art. I will first discuss why Heidegger takes up Dilthey's notion of facticity as the central issue for philosophy. I will then explain how the paradox of factical life requires a new approach to philosophy and requires Dilthey to find a new model for understanding human experience in art. Lastly, I will explain the relevance of Dilthey's trajectory from facticity to art for Heidegger's *Kehre*. In doing so, this chapter will initiate a new dialogue between Dilthey and Heidegger that extends beyond Heidegger's early appropriation. This dialogue will illuminate the need to reappropriate Dilthey's philosophical insights in service of Heidegger's philosophy of art and, beyond Heidegger, in service of contemporary aesthetic theory.

1. Early Heidegger's Appropriation of Dilthey (1919 – 1926)

Heidegger's early lectures and seminars show that Dilthey's influence on Heidegger was much more extensive than *Being and Time* suggests. Heidegger's references to Dilthey are not limited to the *Being and Time* passages that reference "The Concept of Time" but date back to his 1919 lecture course *Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value*. His lectures and seminars prior to "The Concept of Time" demonstrate the depth of Heidegger's engagement with Dilthey's philosophy and his desire to further it through "destruction," i.e. radical critique. These lectures address Dilthey frequently and confront some of his most important contributions to philosophy, including his approach to life-philosophy, his relation to Neo-Kantianism and

phenomenology, his theory of worldviews, and his method of philosophical hermeneutics.[7] Heidegger's early philosophical endeavors are very much in tune with Dilthey's and reveal the extent to which *Being and Time* (1927) attempts to further Dilthey's work. Heidegger's appropriation of Dilthey thus is not a brief affair, but rather a process of development that spans nearly a decade (1919 – 1927).[8]

In addition to "The Concept of Time," the most revealing works for gathering Heidegger's reflections on Dilthey include his 1920 spring semester course *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression* (GA 59/60), his 1923 spring semester course *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity* (GA 63), and a ten-part lecture series he gave from 1924 to 1925 entitled "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview" (GA 80). These lectures provide a more complete picture of how Heidegger understands Dilthey's contributions to philosophy and the reasons why Heidegger singles out him out as a thinker who provides the possibility for authentic philosophical questioning. In the following section, I will provide a brief overview of Heidegger's engagement with Dilthey prior to *Being and Time* to clarify how Heidegger takes up Dilthey's philosophy to frame his own philosophical project.

1.1 Early Heidegger's Adoption of Dilthey's Life Philosophy (1919 – 1923)

Already in his 1919 summer course *Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value*, Heidegger describes Dilthey as a figure of great philosophical significance, who is misunderstood and underestimated by successive thinkers. Heidegger claims that Dilthey's "awakening of historical consciousness, its emancipation

[7] These particular early Freiburg lecture courses demonstrate Heidegger's consideration of Dilthey: *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews* (1919) [GA 56/57], *Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value* (1919) [GA 56/57], *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression* (1920) [GA 59], and *Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity* (1923) [GA 63].

[8] For a timeline of all the cited primary works by Dilthey and Heidegger, see Appendix.

from the supervision of the natural sciences and metaphysics, is nothing else but the first genuine sighting of the fundamental characteristic growth of *all* human facts."[9] Heidegger describes this awakening of historical consciousness as a break from dogmatism and an opportunity for "authentic" philosophy.[10] Heidegger notes that other philosophers' attempts at worldview philosophy take up Dilthey's distinctions without understanding his crucial insights. His subsequent lectures clarify how philosophers have failed to adopt Dilthey's philosophy in an authentic way, which places Dilthey in a singular position and creates the impetus to appropriate Dilthey—that is to take up his philosophical project critically in the present and carry it forward towards its unfulfilled possibilities.

Similarly, in *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression* (1920) Heidegger addresses how Dilthey's philosophy is misunderstood by both critics and those who attempt to take up his insights.[11] While others are critical of the fact that Dilthey never provided a complete, systematic method of philosophizing, Heidegger states that this aspect of his thought was intentional.[12] Dilthey was aware of the limitations of philosophy, a quality that suggests the sophistication of his thought and not his failings. Whereas the nineteenth-century philosophers preceding him sought absolutes, Dilthey realized that it is questionable whether we can truly trace philosophical questions back to something that is universal and unconditioned (PIE 118-119). For Dilthey, the nature of history and lived experience is change, and life provides a limit that we cannot transcend.

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[9] *Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value* in *Towards a Definition of Philosophy*, trans. Ted Sadler, (London: Continuum, 2008), 93 – 152. 124. [GA 56/57].
[10] Ibid., 124.
[11] Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*, trans. by Tracy Colony, (London: Continuum, 2010. Henceforth cited as PIE.
[12] Here Heidegger defends Dilthey from Husserl, who criticized Dilthey because he lacked a rigorous systematic approach to philosophy.

For these reasons, philosophy cannot attain the unconditioned conditions for experience and knowledge. Instead of seeking absolutes, Dilthey's thought pursued the "ultimate philosophical motive: to interpret life from out of itself, primordially" (PIE 119). Thus,"[l]ife philosophy is for us a necessary station on the way of philosophy, in contrast to empty formal transcendental philosophy" (PIE 119). Dilthey's life-philosophy is not an attempt at an absolute explanation—it is not transcendent or transcendental, so to speak—but an attempt to philosophize concretely in a way that is true to lived experience. In this way, Dilthey's effort to "interpret life from life itself" anticipates Husserl's demand to "return to the things themselves!"

Heidegger praises Dilthey for that which others' criticize but at the same time notes Dilthey's insights were never fully explored because he did not exhaust the possibilities opened by Husserl's phenomenology. According to Heidegger, Dilthey only adopted Husserl's phenomenology "externally" because he did not recognize the significance of intentionality and its radical implications for philosophy. Heidegger considers Dilthey's short-coming to be his formalism: he treats the task of interpreting life from life itself through intellectual history, which in turn creates a merely aesthetic, form-like apprehension of life (PIE 128). This complaint echoes Yorck's criticism of Dilthey's comparative method in their correspondence that Heidegger reviewed for "The Concept of Time." According to Yorck, Dilthey's method is "aesthetic" in nature because he does not penetrate the historicity of our existence by giving an ontological account. Similarly, for Heidegger, Dilthey does not fully delve into historicity in its full depth because he ignores its ontological implications (PIE 130). His philosophy is motivated towards epistemology, not metaphysics, which Heidegger identifies as the primary

motivation of philosophy. Thus for Heidegger, Dilthey's philosophy does not achieve its full potential because "Dasein does not come to its primordial due" (PIE 130).

Heidegger is correct that Dilthey does not want to proceed ontologically or address the nature of being in his philosophical projects, but instead pursues his concerns through epistemology. Dilthey posed *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Science* as an attempt at a new foundation for epistemology.[13] Heidegger's criticism, however, is responsible for many contemporary misconceptions of Dilthey's philosophy. Dilthey was not interested in classical epistemology, which he considered to be based on the models of knowledge used by the natural sciences—i.e. models based on laws of physical causation and spatial relationships—rather than what is proper to human understanding. Dilthey's philosophy was motivated by a desire, not unlike Heidegger's, to overcome modern epistemology. His epistemology was not an abstract system of thought, but an attempt to begin from reality as it "is lived and saturated with life" (SW III 142). Likewise, in "Life and Cognition" Dilthey states that "[e]pistemology must not be grounded on a one-sided, exclusive study of intellectual functions" since "[t]hought arises in the process of life."[14] Past attempts to understand the historical nature of the human sciences, or their continual change and transformations, used explanations rooted in transcendent, metaphysical causes, e.g. Hegel's World Spirit or Fichte's 'I.' For Dilthey, "historical thinking itself needs to be grounded epistemologically and clarified by concepts, without being transformed into something transcendental or metaphysical by

[13] Dilthey, *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*, trans. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, *Wilhelm Dilthey Selected Works*, vol. III, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 143. Henceforth cited as SW III.

[14] Wilhelm Dilthey, "Life and Cognition: A Draft for an Epistemic Logic and a Theory of Categories," trans. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Jacob Owensby, in *Understanding the Human World*, *Wilhelm Dilthey Selected Works*, vol. II, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 58 – 114. 68 -69. Henceforth cited as SW II.

a relation to the unconditioned or absolute" (SW III 128). Dilthey associates this impulse for unconditioned absolutes with the demands of the natural sciences, which use mathematics to achieve clarity and certainty.[15] Dilthey proposes the need to provide a new model for the human sciences and epistemology that is not based on this model, but instead on the facticity of lived experience, which "cannot be metaphysicized" (SW III 131). For Dilthey, metaphysics is a *rational science* that aims at "the *most universal point of view*."[16] As an attempt at universality, metaphysics abstracts from lived experience since "the feeling of life of a genuine and vigorous individual and the richness of the world given him cannot be exhausted in the logical system of a universally valid science. The particular contents of experience, which are distinct from one another in their origin, cannot be converted into each other by means of thought" (SW I 228). Dilthey does not consider the possibility of an ontological approach that is distinct from traditional metaphysics and its absolutes.

Even with this significant difference in emphasis, Heidegger considers Dilthey to provide the possibility for philosophical exploration of Dasein because of his insight into the *facticity of life*. The facticity of life describes its givenness that is not transparent or self-evident, but requires interpretation. For Dilthey, life is what is closest to us, and yet most difficult to understand; thus the facticity of life describes the situation of our existence in terms of a constant interpretation and opening up of meanings. Heidegger's definition of philosophy reflects this need for constant interpretation in his description of 'worrying.' Heidegger characterizes the task of philosophy as "preserving the facticity of

[15] This critique of the natural sciences is not unlike late Heidegger's critiques of calculative thought and his concern with overcoming metaphysics. See Chapter Five.
[16] *Introduction to the Human Sciences, Dilthey Selected Works*, vol. I, ed. Rudolf Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 228. Henceforth cited as SW I.

life and strengthening the facticity of Dasein" which requires "being worried in constant renewal" (PIE 133). According to Heidegger, this tendency to worry about factical lived experience is both essential to philosophy and "hushed up" by his contemporaries. It seems that Dilthey alone provokes the worry about factical life that allows for the possibility of fulfilling philosophy's motive, as Heidegger asserts that "it is only possible on the basis of Diltheyian intuitions" (PIE 133). Dilthey, however, opens up this possibility but does not achieve it. According to Heidegger, "Dilthey only gives, as perhaps every great philosopher, intimations: he sees a new reality but the expansion on what is seen is mostly never enacted" (PIE 125-126). For Heidegger, Dilthey's insights, though essential to the purpose of philosophy, are not fully realized and require a more radical approach.

For this reason, Heidegger intends to further Dilthey's thought by delving into the primordial depths that it opens, i.e. by approaching it more radically through the adoption of phenomenological method: "Dilthey is himself unclear about the new towards which he strives. He does not see that only a radicalism that makes all concepts questionable can lead further. The entire conceptual material must be newly determined in primordial apprehension. That is the particular tendency of phenomenology" (PIE 129). Dilthey mentions Husserl's *Logical Investigations* in *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences* and his revisions to his *Poetics*,[17] yet never adopted Husserl's phenomenological method. Heidegger notes, however, that Husserl was heavily influenced by Dilthey (PIE 125). Yet even Husserl does not seem to exhaust the possibilities of Dilthey's insights, since Heidegger takes up Dilthey in his efforts at a

[17] See SW I 60-63 and "Fragments for a Poetics," trans. Rudolf A. Makkreel in *Poetry and Experience*, *Wilhelm Dilthey Selected Works*, vol. V, 223 - 231. 229. Henceforth cited as SW V.

phenomenological-critical destruction. Heidegger describes phenomenological destruction as necessary to prevent the return to things themselves and analysis of lived experience from becoming "merely a retreat into one's own common sense" (PIE 21). Common sense is not primordial, but rather generalized concepts formed from societal norms that have been adopted uncritically. Heidegger describes destruction as an attempt to go back to the primordial as historical, or the falling-away of life from what we can grasp through concepts (PIE 25-27). For Heidegger, this form of destruction is essential to phenomenological method as "philosophy does not consist in deduced general definitions, but is always an element of *factical life experience*" (PIE 26). Like Dilthey, Heidegger sees philosophy as necessarily enacted in relation to factical life experience. Unlike Dilthey, Heidegger considers the task of *interpreting life from out of itself* to require an ontological approach that "question[s] towards the primordiality of the existence relation" (PIE 27).

While this 1920 lecture course sets up Heidegger's phenomenological destruction of Dilthey's life-philosophy, his 1923 course *Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity* enacts this method. In this lecture course we can see Heidegger's appropriation of Dilthey in his treatment of factical life through ontology, especially insofar as he frames his approach. Like Dilthey, Heidegger situates his consideration of factical life in terms of the distinction between the human sciences and natural sciences. While Heidegger seems to criticize Dilthey's life-philosophy due to his remarks about psychology, these critiques are not aimed at Dilthey but at the same psychological methods that Dilthey opposes. Namely, Dilthey rejects explanatory approaches to psychology that creates abstract

divisions and compartmentalizes the mind, rather than illuminating our existence.[18] Like Dilthey, Heidegger proposes a new basis for human science, "not as a system of propositions and grounds for justifying them, but rather as something in which factical Dasein critically confronts itself and explicates itself."[19] These words resonate with Diltheyan overtones and suggest Heidegger's intention to adopt Dilthey's philosophical project in his own terms.

Here Heidegger's criticism that Dilthey did not adopt phenomenology is tempered by his critique of phenomenology. Heidegger notes several problems with the development of phenomenology: (1) it uncritically takes up traditional epistemological questions, (2) its distinctions are defined by the limits of logic, (3) it has a misguided drive for system – a tendency that Dilthey avoids by realizing that knowledge is always incomplete – and (4) it adopts traditional terminology that waters down its meaning (OHF 56). Heidegger's ontology is an attempt to overcome these limitations of phenomenology for the task of establishing the human sciences without traditional epistemology, logic, philosophical systems, or traditional terminology. He shares Dilthey's task in reestablishing philosophy by breaking from traditional epistemology, yet does not fully acknowledge Dilthey's role in his adoption of this task. Yet Dilthey already took up the very same task in his own work. Before Heidegger, Dilthey attempted to dismantle traditional epistemology through his approach to history and the facticity of lived experience. Heidegger's attempt to radicalize phenomenology's split from traditional epistemology through "fundamental historical critique" shares much in common with Dilthey. Thus the path that "hermeneutics of facticity attempts to travel" is

[18] See Chapter Two for Dilthey's criticism of psychology, especially p. 77.
[19] Heidegger, *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, trans. John van Buren, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 56. Henceforth cited as OHF. [GA 63]

more connected to Dilthey than Heidegger conveys. The following section will consider how Heidegger both appropriates and fails to appropriate Dilthey to argue for the necessity of a re-appropriation.

1.2 Heidegger's Destruction of Dilthey (1924 – 1926)

When he drafted "The Concept of Time" in July 1924, Heidegger demonstrated that he was moving away from Dilthey's influence and taking his ideas in new directions. Despite his growing criticism of Dilthey during this period, Heidegger still engages in an intense dialogue with Dilthey and borrows from his original insights. Even his criticism expresses the seriousness of his attempt to radicalize Dilthey through a *phenomenological-critical destruction*. In "The Concept of Time," Heidegger radicalizes Dilthey's approach to history and the historicity of lived experience by emphasizing how this account of temporality constitutes facticity in terms of possibility, not actuality. For Heidegger, "Dasein is constituted as possibility in its facticity. The genuine being of Dasein is temporalness."[20] Dilthey uses both *Faktizität* and *Aktualität* to describe the facticity of lived experience, but Heidegger uses only *Faktizität* to distinguish this term from positivism and realism, i.e. the assumption that experience gives us immediate intuitions of reality.[21] By emphasizing possibility, Heidegger asserts the lack of immediacy or completeness of factical life. Dasein is never whole and is always open to possibility—in particular, the possibility of death. As *being towards death*, Dasein exists as possibility, as "the futuralness of running ahead towards its ultimate possibility" (OHF 70). For Heidegger "existing in possibility" is equiprimordial with temporalness (OHF

[20] Heidegger, *The Concept of Time*, trans. Ingo Farin and Alex Skinner (London: Continuum, 2011), 51.
[21] Heidegger also distinguishes between factuality (*Tatsächlichkeit*) and facticity (*Faktizität*), while Dilthey does not. See Eric Sean Nelson "Empiricism, Facticity, and the Immanence of Life in Dilthey" *PLI: Warwick Journal of Philosophy* 18 (2007): 108 – 128. 109.

70). These analyses of Dasein's temporality in "The Concept of Time" became the basis of *Being and Time* – which demonstrates why Heidegger proposed his book as "in the service of Dilthey" (BT 369). Despite the clear distinctions between these thinkers, Heidegger's analyses of Dasein were born from his attempt to radicalize Dilthey's facticity of life.

Between drafting *The Concept of Time* and *Being and Time*, Heidegger gave a lecture series that illuminates the significance of Dilthey's influence most clearly: "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview" (1925). Heidegger opens his lecture in a manner that anticipates his introduction to *Being and Time*:

> The theme of these lectures will appear somewhat remote and unfamiliar perhaps, but it involves a fundamental problem pervading the whole of Western philosophy: the problem of the sense of human life. What kind of reality is life? In terms of the question of what reality is, immediate reality is taken to be the world or nature. Yet always already included in such a question is the question of the being of human being itself.[22]

Here Heidegger opens the question of being in connection to life and reality. While Dilthey did not ask the question of being, Heidegger's introduction suggests that Dilthey anticipated it or set it up in a significant way. When Heidegger approaches Dilthey ontologically, his effort to interpret life from life itself – from the facticity of lived experience – becomes a question of Dasein. For Heidegger, Dilthey provides an authentic way of engaging the question of Dasein: "The discovery of the authentic sense of the being and reality of human life has a muddled history. Only in recent times has it arrived at a basis so that it can be investigated in a scientific, philosophical manner. In the history

[22] Heidegger, "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview," trans. Charles Bambach, in *Supplements*, ed. John van Buren, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 148. Henceforth cited as WDR.

of this question, the work of Dilthey has a central place" (WDR 148). Thus Heidegger presents Dilthey as a central figure in the problem that *Being and Time* outlines and in the history of philosophy in general.

Heidegger poses Dilthey's particular philosophical significance within the context of the crisis of the sciences, or the "crisis of foundations" caused by scientific and historical relativity (WDR 148). Scientific and historical relativism overthrew the traditional foundations of knowledge, which made the question of life especially urgent. For Heidegger, the concept of life is one and the same as the problem of history: "When the history of the historical sciences is investigated, life itself is investigated with respect to its knowledge. As knowing, life investigates itself in its history" (WDR 155). Life, as human life, is historical – or for Heidegger, "authentic historical being is human Dasein" (WDR 162). The problem of history is one and same with the concept of life, because of their lack of foundations. Relativity denies that history and life can be supported by universals or any form of absolute, unchanging principles. An authentic conception of life, as a transient, finite, and historical, denies such principles. The sciences must be reestablished not on an unconditional, absolute foundation, but a conditional and changing foundation that responds to the transience and contingency of life. Heidegger describes this challenge as *the struggle for a historical worldview*: "A *historical* worldview is one in which knowledge of history determines one's understanding of the world and of human Dasein. It is grounded in the historical character of the development of the world and of human Dasein" (WDR 149). Heidegger, like Dilthey, makes history the source for understanding human reality.

Heidegger draws out Dilthey's significance further by describing the issue of historicism in terms of its historical development. According to Heidegger, the awakening of historical consciousness began with Kant, Herder, Humboldt and Hegel, who opened up the possibility for historical research (WDR 149). Yet this historical impulse of the nineteenth century died with the decline of Hegelian philosophy, which was replaced with positivistic, systematic approaches to history that were modeled after the natural sciences. This shift signaled the death of genuine historical research and "the question of the sense of historical being" (WDR 150). When historical questions arose again in the 1860's due to a renewed interest in Kant's philosophy, the neo-Kantians treated the issue of history as a subset of epistemology, which was understood as belonging to the domain of science. Since the historical sciences had developed independently of philosophy during this period, the task for the Marburg school of Neo-Kantians was to extend Kant's critical philosophy in light of these developments. Yet Heidegger saw these epistemological and scientific approaches as insufficient attempts to understand history in its full significance. Thus "the need to raise the question of the sense of historical being became even more pressing" (WDR 150). According to Heidegger, Dilthey provides the proper path for historical questioning – he alone understands how to approach these questions. Heidegger poses Dilthey's philosophy as the solution to the crisis of the human sciences and as the guiding light for historical questioning. More importantly, Heidegger describes Dilthey as both a key figure in the development of philosophy and as someone whose significance has not been recognized since "modern theory has not really understood the authentic tendencies of Dilthey's thought; in fact, it has seen to it that these tendencies have remained buried to this day"

(WDR 150). The failure of philosophy to appropriate Dilthey is due to his "truly radical awareness of this problem [of history]" (WDR 150). Given the significance of Dilthey's radical adoption of the problem of history, Heidegger takes up Dilthey by "questioning beyond him" (WDR 150). Heidegger presents Dilthey as a thinker who can formulate the fundamental problem of human life and history, which indicates the significance he holds in Heidegger's formation of his own philosophical concerns.

Even Heidegger's general descriptions of Dilthey are very suggestive for how much he owes his own philosophical approach to Dilthey. In his account of the intellectual influences that shaped Dilthey as a thinker, Heidegger remarks that "Dilthey remained open for everything of substance and closed his mind to all empty and groundless thinking that turns on its own axis and never engages the things themselves" (WDR 152). Heidegger also notes Dilthey's tendency to leave his inquiries open-ended, as evidenced in his titles "'Contributions To…,' 'Ideas Concerning…' 'Attempts At…' Everything preliminary, incomplete, and on the way" (WDR 153). This quality of Dilthey's work is necessary given his hermeneutic approach: understanding is never complete. We can note the same tendency in Heidegger's titles, which often play off of the word *Wegen* (way): e.g. *Holwege* (Off the Beaten Track, 1935-46), *Der Feldweg* (The Pathway, 1949), *Wegmarken* (Pathmarks, 1919-1958), *Der Weg zur Sprache* (The Way to Language, 1959), and *Mein Weg in die Phanomenologie* (My Way to Phenomenology, 1963). Like Dilthey, Heidegger saw his work as preliminary and on the way, rather than a complete, systematic unity.

Throughout even this early period, however, Heidegger distinguishes his thought from Dilthey's by describing Dilthey's philosophy as Cartesian. According to Heidegger,

Dilthey does "not inquire into the character of being that belongs to this center" but instead accepts the Cartesian ego as *res cogitans* (WDR 162). Heidegger describes Descartes' concept of human consciousness as "a box, where the ego is inside and reality is outside" (WDR 163). A 'Cartesian' account of human consciousness is uncritical because it fails to recognize phenomenology's greatest insight: intentionality, i.e. that consciousness is always consciousness of something. There is no way to separate the ego from the world: "the primal givenness of Dasein is that it is in a world. Life is that kind of reality which is in a world and indeed in such a way that it has a world" (WDR 163). Heidegger's depiction, however, exaggerates Dilthey's concept of consciousness and misconstrues his philosophical position, which was clearly not Cartesian. Dilthey's philosophy adopts expressions like *inner* and *outer*, but he did not see human life as consisting of a *res cogitans* set against a world.

Although Dilthey's philosophy does not emphasize being-in-the-world in the ways developed by Heidegger, his descriptive psychology and approach to lived experience is far from Cartesian.[23] Dilthey's individual is not a disembodied ego. Instead, the self emerges only in relation to the world. Dilthey's "reflexive awareness" (*Innewerden*)[24] precedes the subject-object distinction because it precedes reflective judgment, which differentiates the self from the world. Dilthey develops an account of reflexive awareness in his "Breslau Draft" (1880) of the second volume to his *Introduction to the Human Sciences*. Dilthey calls reflexive awareness "being-for-

[23] For a further account of Heidegger's criticism of Dilthey and a defense of Dilthey, see Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies*, 2nd edition, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 371-373.

[24] This translation of *Innewerden* is established by Rudolf Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi to describe the reflexivity of awareness before reflection separates subject and object. The German translates to "becoming aware" (Innewerden), but does not convey the reflexivity or self-givenness that Dilthey describes in this pre-reflective state. See editors' introduction to *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, SW I.

oneself, life" and describes it as "a state of immediate consciousness" in which "the subject is not at all separated from what is perceived" (SW I 339). Here the language of "consciousness" could be viewed as an indication that Dilthey still upholds a Cartesian ego in his epistemological distinctions, yet Dilthey poses reflexive awareness to "avoid restricting its [consciousness's] meaning to representational and intellectual processes" (SW I 246). Instead of pertaining to a *res cogitans*, the "single term 'consciousness' stands as a shorthand expression for the entire content which is there for me" (SW I 246). Reflexive awareness is the dynamic mode of relation that necessarily precedes the recognition of subjects and objects. This pre-reflective state "contains no distinction between subject and object, but rather forms their foundation" (SW I 339). The self and world develop from reflexive awareness when I become aware of the world as it resists me, which is before reflection. Reflexive awareness directly contradicts a Cartesian epistemological framework. As Scharff states, Dilthey "shows us *how* life 'is' for us when understood as experienced, instead of merely what it looks like as an object when theoretically constituted from the 'Cartesian' standpoint shared by natural science and traditional epistemology."[25]

Dilthey's self is far from a disembodied ego. For Dilthey, the world only becomes external to me when it resists my desires. In *The Origin of Our Belief in the Reality of the External World and Its Justification* (1890), Dilthey describes our relation to the external world in terms of resistance, a tactile, bodily relation. Here Dilthey argues against Descartes' problem of the external world and the idea that external objects are

[25] Scharff, "Heidegger's 'Appropriation' of Dilthey before *Being and Time*," 118. See also Makkreel's explanation of reflexive awareness. Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies*, 428 – 431.

"projections of sensations into an outer visual or auditory space."[26] Dilthey calls this concept of projection "superfluous" because the separation of self and world is secondary to our relation to the world and must be established through the experience of external objects resisting us. Dilthey describes this resistance through the body—"a self begins to set itself apart from the objects within this spatial reality, as a *body*, as delineated and oriented in space" (SW II 25). Dilthey then moves to sensory perception, which also allows us to distinguish the external world apart from us. The self is thus dynamically formed through one's concrete relation to the world. This relation to the world is not established through the reflection of an isolated ego, but through a pre-reflective relation to the world as shaped by desire, interest, and bodily sensation. Dilthey's self arises from a complex of immanent relations to the world. Moreover, life grounds the self, not rationality or thought: "Life is primary; impressions, representations, and thoughts are woven into it" (SW II 70). By privileging life, Dilthey does not make the self a mere *res cogitans*. The complexity, depth, and contingency of life develop a very different sense of human existence than Cartesian rationality. That is, "thought, which sets out to ultimately comprehend the universe, is bound to the transient existence of organic life. Thought is extremely fragile; it appears only at isolated points in organic life and as such only at intervals as a temporary function" (SW II 70). Heidegger's accusations against Dilthey's supposed Cartesianism thus misconstrue his notion of self. Since Dilthey concept of the self and its relation to the world is closer to Heidegger's concept of Dasein in *Being and*

[26] Dilthey, *The Origin of Our Belief in the Reality of the External World and Its Justification*, trans. Maximilian Aue, *Understanding the Human World*, *Wilhelm Dilthey Selected Works*, vol. II, ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjob Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 8 – 57. Henceforth cited as SW II.

Time than to Descartes' *res cogitans*, Heidegger overlooks the possibility of a more meaningful dialogue and fails to appropriate this important aspect of Dilthey.

Heidegger's appropriation of Dilthey is limited and incomplete, moreover, because he overlooks the significance of Dilthey's aesthetics.[27] Heidegger's lecture series on Dilthey reveals that Heidegger glosses over Dilthey's later aesthetic writings in *Poetry and Lived experience*. Although Heidegger notes that the essays in *Poetry and Experience* have a special place in Dilthey's corpus, he does not elaborate on its centrality and states that this work is significant only insofar as it is an effort "to understand concrete historical individuals from their intellectual core" (WDR 155). Heidegger's description suggests that Dilthey's writings on poets and artists were a matter of penetrating into the core of their individual, interior lives, i.e. a way of learning from the concrete manifestations of their intellectual life and not an insightful examination of art. This is not the case. Dilthey's work examines art's ability to give expression to life, but not in an interior or solipsistic way. Dilthey's considerations of these poets and artists describe the enduring existential pressures that shaped them, but in relation to the whole of life hermeneutically. The relation between art and factical life is not simply intellectual, introverted, or solipsistic, but rather felt, relational, and dynamic—which should become apparent in the following chapter. Heidegger's limited conception of Dilthey's aesthetics means that he fails to appropriate some of his most interesting and rich ideas. To bridge this gap in Heidegger's understanding of Dilthey, the following sections open a new space for understanding the intersection of Dilthey's and

[27] Heidegger's misinterpretations and subsequent incomplete appropriation of Dilthey is partly due to the fact that many of the texts that shed light on Dilthey's philosophy as a whole were not available during Heidegger's lifetime.

Heidegger's philosophy by exploring how the paradox of factical life impels philosophy to take up art as a model for understanding human experience and the world.

2. Philosophizing from the Standpoint of Life: The Paradox of Factical Life

Factical life plays an important role in understanding how Heidegger's philosophy developed from his early engagement with Dilthey. For both Dilthey and Heidegger, factical life presents the need for thought to be grounded in the concrete world rather than abstract formulas. Philosophy cannot simply proceed from universals to particulars or apply concepts and categories to experience.[28] Philosophy must find a way to negotiate between the concrete particular and the broader categories of thought; a challenge that both Dilthey and Heidegger take up in terms of factical life. As Scharff notes, Heidegger's engagement with Dilthey centers on the idea of factical life: "in Dilthey the young Heidegger sees a pioneering effort to take seriously the idea that all thinking originates in and speaks out from its directly lived, factical situation."[29] Early Heidegger adopts Dilthey's notion that the "standpoint of life" is the proper orientation of philosophizing as opposed to pure theoretical speculation. What does it mean to philosophize from *the standpoint of life*? What is our *lived, factical situation* for Dilthey? How is the same standpoint taken up in Heidegger, whose philosophy becomes increasingly critical of life-philosophy and lived experience (*Erlebnis*)?

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[28] See Robert C. Scharff, "Becoming a Philosopher: What Heidegger Learned from Dilthey, 1919-25" in *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 21(2013): 122 – 142. Scharff connects Heidegger's "formal indication"—which attempts to "steer us away from all the traditional misconceptions, distortions, and selective representations of phenomena, and precisely in the process of doing this, also guide us toward a transformative perception of how phenomena are there-for and given-to us in their own being" (135)—to Dilthey's philosophy. See also, Theodore Kisiel, "On the Genesis of Heidegger's Formally Indicative Hermeneutics of Facticity" in *Rethinking Facticity*, ed. François Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), 41 – 67.

[29] Robert C. Scharff, "Heidegger's 'Appropriation' of Dilthey before *Being and Time*," 112.

In this section, I will compare Dilthey's and Heidegger's accounts of facticity to argue that their shared concern with factical life creates a need for a new approach to philosophy—an approach that must take up art in a radical and ground-breaking way. Factical life also transforms aesthetics by opening up a unique space for thinking about art, which will be discussed briefly in this chapter and more extensively in Chapters Four and Five. To describe this movement from life to art, I will first explain how Dilthey poses the paradox of facticity and how Heidegger takes it up in his description of factical life.

2.1 Dilthey and Factical Life

For Dilthey, *facticity* denotes the qualitative characteristics of experience as well as its givenness in terms of the *here* and *now*, the very concrete particularity of experience, its *thisness*. This qualitative particularity eludes abstraction and thus cannot be subsumed into concepts. In other words, facticity is a term that stands for the aspects of experience that deny commensurable concepts. Dilthey uses the term facticity to describe the incomprehensibility of lived experience, or its resistance to conceptualization, which is nonetheless given in a concrete and tangible way. Facticity is the tangibility of experience, what is *given* in experience, which we can never fully articulate or explain.[30]

In his *Imagination of the Poet: Elements for a Poetics* (1887), Dilthey describes facticity as a "surplus" and ascribes it to poetry as well as to life. "Facticity has always

[30] Nelson notes that this term is used very broadly in Dilthey's philosophy and can mean: "(1) the singularity and multiplicity of historical facticity, which defy theoretical comprehension into a systematic totality and require the infinite work of description and interpretation; (2) the givenness of positive factuality which is the basic, object, and potential limiting condition and other of rational and scientific inquiry." Nelson, "Empiricism, Facticity, and the Immanence of Life in Dilthey," 113. These two senses are connected to the historicity of experience, which shapes the given. See Chapter Five, section 1.

proved to be the ultimate fresh and firm nucleus of every poetic work. Therefore, a poetic work always contains more than can be expressed in a general proposition, and its gripping force comes precisely from this surplus."[31] As a surplus, facticity cannot be reduced to concepts or fit within a systematic framework. Reason lacks commensurable categories. The surplus of facticity describes not only the felt aspect of lived experience,[32] but also its multi-faceted and contextualized nature.[33] Factical life is excessive in the sense that it contains more than can be articulated or defined. Something unsaid always remains. The same is true of poetry. There cannot be a complete or final interpretation of a great poem. Poetic ambiguity allows for a plurality of meanings because what is central to the poem can take on new relations; its meaning is not fixed or determinate. Poetic meaning is fluid. Moreover, the poem says more than a simple proposition or contained idea because *how* it speaks is as important as *what* it says. Through rhythm, style, sound, and image, the words of a poem take on greater significance than what they simply signify. For Dilthey the surplus of meaning in the poetic work evokes the surplus of factical life such that "a great poem is as irrational and incommensurable at its nucleus as the life that it portrays" (SW V 149). A great poem, like life, overflows with possible interpretations and meaning.

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[31] Wilhelm Dilthey, *The Imagination of the Poet*, translated by Louis Agosta and Rudolf A. Makkreel in *Poetry and Experience*, *Wilhelm Dilthey Selected Works*, vol. V, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, 2nd printing, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 137. This work is referred to as Dilthey's *Poetics* (*Poetik*) and is henceforth SW V.

[32] Facticity is not simply another expression for "what it's like" to experience something, i.e. the first person perspective. Facticity is not the same thing as the irreducibility of first-person perspective in philosophy of mind. Although philosophy of mind has similar arguments for the irreducibility of experience to concepts, facticity focuses on more than qualia and consciousness.

[33] Dilthey's theory of the *acquired psychic nexus* describes experience as a dynamic complex of interweaving relations that change over time. See Chapter Two, section 2.3, pp. 80 - 86.

Dilthey draws out the incommensurability and paradoxical nature of factical life in his unpublished notes entitled "Life and Cognition" (1892-1893).[34] Life is most fundamental and intimate, and yet we do not grasp it and cannot understand it fully.[35] It remains, as Dilthey stated in his *Poetics*, "incommensurable at its nucleus" (SW V 149). "The expression 'life' expresses here first of all that which is most familiar, most intimate to everyone. What life is, is thus given in experience. We live through it, yet it remains a puzzle to us. But we know how it appears and presents itself" (SW II 69). Dilthey's description of this paradox—the hiddenness of what is most familiar—is not purely conceptual but relies upon artistic metaphors to convey its complexity:

> The expression 'life' formulates what is most familiar and most intimate to everyone, yet at the same time something most obscure, indeed totally inscrutable. What life is remains an insoluble riddle. All reflection, inquiry, and thought arise from this inscrutable [source]. All cognition is rooted in this never fully cognizable [ground]. Yet it can be described. Its particular characteristic traits can be set in relief. One can trace, as it were, the accents and rhythms of the melody it arouses, but life cannot be analyzed into its factors. It is unanalyzable. What life is cannot be expressed in a formula or be explained. For thought cannot go behind the very life from which it arises and in whose context it appears. (SW II 72)

Life provides both the ground for and limit of thought.[36] As we are always within life, we can never get beyond it to analyze it from the outside. We are always caught up within it. This paradoxical relation means that we can never unearth or analyze it. Philosophizing

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[34] Dilthey later incorporated these notes that outline the idea of factical life in Book V of *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, which was a general plan for a later work, *The Formation of the Historical World* [SW III].

[35] Here Dilthey's concept of life differs from Bergson and James, for whom life has an intuitive quality that makes it transparent to us. See Rudolf A. Makkreel, "Dilthey as Philosopher of Life," in *The Science, Politics, and Ontology of Life-Philosophy*, ed. Scott M. Campbell and Paul W. Bruno (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 3 - 14.

[36] Dilthey's notion of life as both ground and limit bears a similar relation to Heidegger's thinking of the *Abgrund* in Kant. See Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 5th ed, Enlarged, trans. Richard Taft, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

from the standpoint of life thus requires an approach to thinking that remains rooted in the complexity of relations.

For Dilthey, life is an interweaving nexus of dynamic relations. Their interconnections, their coherence, is what provides the ground for philosophy—not logical relations or rational concepts: "connectedness in life cannot be reduced to logical connections" (SW II 73). For Dilthey, philosophy—and metaphysics in particular—attempts to reduce living relations to logical ones and imposes its rational order on the world. Dilthey explains, "Because metaphysics sought to conceptually comprehend the world, it was thinkable only under the presupposition that reason is primary and creative in the world and that concepts of reason are the forms of actuality" (SW II 73). Yet this system of rationality limits philosophy because it fails to recognize the constraints it has imposed. The intellect is not the most foundational ground, life is: "The intellect, this transient function that appears in life only at intervals, made itself into the principle of the entire universe. It saw the forms of the actual in its categories. In contrast to this we have recognized that cognition can never reach behind the life in which it appears" (SW II 73). Life is the ground and limit of philosophy. Thought cannot go beyond it, nor can thought fully penetrate it. Instead, "life manifests an individual factuality, a *haecceitas* that the intellect cannot demonstrate to be necessary… the intellect cannot elucidate the singular traits of this small fragment of reality that lies before it" (SW II 73). For this reason, philosophy must not attempt to dissect and conceptualize the facticity of life, but instead describe it and examine how life articulates itself.

2.2 Heidegger and Factical Life

Heidegger adopts the issue of factical life in his early Freiburg lectures at the same time that he confronts Dilthey's thought most rigorously (1919-1923). As explained earlier, Heidegger sees Dilthey as a significant thinker insofar as he makes thinking about factical life possible. At this time, Heidegger's philosophical questions revolve around the paradox of factical life. In addition to *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression* (1920) and *Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity* (1923), which were discussed earlier, Heidegger takes up factical life in his 1919-1920 winter semester course *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, his 1920-1921 winter semester course *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, his 1921-1922 winter semester course on Aristotle entitled *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, and his drafted introduction to a book on Aristotle that was never completed, "Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation" (1922). A brief overview of these lecture courses and proposed book indicate the depth of Heidegger's engagement with Dilthey and the paradox of factical life.

How Heidegger poses facticity reflects Dilthey's influence. Like Dilthey, Heidegger sees life as the basis for philosophical inquiry and a challenge to philosophical methods that apply conceptual frameworks to life experience. In *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger calls phenomenology a primal science that addresses "life in and for itself."[37] In his lecture course on Aristotle, Heidegger calls life "a basic phenomenological category" and elevates life-philosophy above other approaches: "life-

[37] Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Scott M. Campbell (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 2 [GA 58] Henceforth cited as BPP. Not to be confused with his 1927 lecture course [GA 24] that bears the exact same title.

philosophy is an actual attempt to come to philosophy rather than babble idly over academic frivolities."[38] The goal of life-philosophy is thus to bring philosophy "to 'life'… in an original and radical way" (BPP 2). Like Dilthey, Heidegger's approach to facticity is not through concepts and universals, but through an attempt to understand the concrete contexts and relations of life. As Scott Campbell explains, facticity concerns "those dimensions of human experience by which human beings are able to understand themselves… not looking on at life but participating in it, and so living."[39] For Heidegger, "facticity is something life is, and whereby it is, in its highest authenticity" (PIA 66). Yet bringing philosophy to life and illuminating life through philosophy is not a simple matter. The facticity of life—its paradoxical nature as given and hidden, as tangible and present yet resistant to thought—complicates philosophical conceptualization. Philosophy must examine categories as they arise from experience, i.e. as life articulates itself.[40] Life has its own modes of access, "life comes to itself", and philosophy cannot "pounce" on it from the outside (PIA 66). Like Dilthey, Heidegger considers categories to be grounded in life and in need of articulation, rather than concepts that can be impressed on the raw data of sensory perception: "Categories are not inventions or a group of logical schemata… they are *alive in life itself* in an original way" (PIA 66). For this reason, "[c]ategories can be understood only insofar as factical life itself is compelled to interpretation" (PIA 66). Interpretation, moreover, implies meaning.

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[38] Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001). 61. Henceforth cited as PIA.
[39] Scott M. Campbell, *The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language*, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 2. See Campbell's book for a longer treatment of factical life in early Heidegger, especially the connection between facticity, language, and religious life.
[40] In *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, Heidegger also connects factical life to language: "In 'factical life,' these concepts and propositions encounter each other in the sphere of linguistic presentation and communication as 'meanings' which are being 'understood'" (4). Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). Henceforth cited as PRL.

Just as Dilthey emphasizes meaning, so Heidegger focuses on meaningfulness and significance as the categories that we find in factical life: "In factical life, we always live in contexts of meaningfulness… which speak to themselves in their own language. If we transfer ourselves into such experiences, vitally going along, then we notice that in the context of meaningfulness in which we live, we somehow have ourselves" (BPP 188 – 189). Heidegger's approach to life-categories also has a historical and hermeneutic character. Categories not only are articulated only in terms of life, they must relate to life as a whole: "A category is interpretive in relation to life in its entirety" (PIA 67).[41] For Dilthey and Heidegger, this relation to the whole means that categories must be historical. That is, the temporal structure of factical life requires thinking life in terms of its historicity. In *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, Heidegger states that factical life is only intelligible "from the concept of the 'historical'" (PRL 7). The basic character of factical life becomes visible through memory.[42] A philosophical approach to factical life thus must adopt categories hermeneutically and interpretatively—that is as grounded and immersed in what they attempt to understand.

Heidegger focuses on factical life, however, more explicitly in relation to the world. Life always implies a world for Heidegger. The concrete sense of 'to live' always implies "to live 'in' something, to live 'out of' something, to live 'for' something, to live 'with' something, to live 'from' something" (PIA 65). Heidegger explains that life is always directed to something—in, out of, for, with, from—and that something is the world. The 'world' names "what is lived, the content aimed at living, that which life

[41] Heidegger's emphasis on life as a whole reflects Dilthey's life-philosophy. See Chapter Two, especially section 2.2 on the acquired psychic nexus, pp. 80 - 86.
[42] Heidegger's emphasis on memory relates to Dilthey's notion of autobiography and Hölderlin's sense of remembrance.

holds to" (PIA 65). For Heidegger, the directedness of facticity designates our *thrownness* in the world. Life is relational. This relational sense of life is *caring* (*Sorgen*) (PIA 68). Factical life operates as *care* because it is defined by its directedness towards the world and comportment with other beings.[43] Care expresses the idea that factical life is being-there (*Da-sein*) in a world with others, not being an isolated object or self-subsisting entity. Care describes the world as always there as a part of our existence: "The world is there as always already having been taken up in care in one way or another" (Supplements 115). To care is to "live on the basis of something" (PIA 68). Heidegger's approach to facticity emphasizes the way in which we are always already immersed in the world that we attempt to understand. The directedness of factical life to a world prefigures the being-in-the-world in *Being and Time* and the worlding of the work of art in "The Origin of the Work of Art."[44]

This thrownness differs from Dilthey's notion of the contextuality of the acquired psychic nexus, because for Heidegger subjectivity and intersubjectivity are explicitly co-constitutive. Heidegger moreover attempts to overthrow the inner-outer distinction that Dilthey uses to describe poetic imagination and the relation between the individual and world.[45] Heidegger also expands factical life by reformulating Dilthey's notion in terms of existence and being. In his Aristotle course, Heidegger states that life is existence: "life = existence, 'being' in and through life" (PIA 64). Similarly, in his draft introduction for the Aristotle book, Heidegger describes the object of philosophy—the question of being

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[43] Heidegger, "Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation," trans. John van Buren, in *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*, ed. John van Buren, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 111 - 145. 115. Henceforth cited as Supplements. This introduction shares similar ideas as the lecture course, but has original content as well.
[44] See Chapter 3, sections 3.2 - 3, pp. 136 – 150.
[45] Makkreel points out that Heidegger replaces Dilthey's concept of life (*Leben*) with existence (*Dasein*) to avoid the inner-outer distinction. Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies*, 370.

(Dasein)—as "an explicit taking up" of factical life (Supplements 113). Already at this time Heidegger begins to shift from life to being.[46]

Moreover, unlike Dilthey, Heidegger thinks that factical life calls for deconstruction. "The question of what will show up in such existence cannot in any sense be asked in direct and universal terms. Insight into existence itself can be gained only through that kind of actualizing in which facticity is rendered questionable, i.e., through a concrete *destruction* of facticity at some particular time with respect to the motives of its movement, its directions, and what is available to it on a volitional level" (Supplements 120). Heidegger's adoption of the paradox of facticity recognizes the need for an indirect and immanent method, yet Heidegger adopts facticity destructively. By destructively, Heidegger implies a way of questioning facticity in a more fundamental way and discovering its possibilities and limits; i.e. by asking what makes facticity a question for philosophy. For Heidegger, "To grasp philosophy authentically means to encounter absolute questionability and to possess this questionability in full awareness" (PIA 29). Heidegger's deconstruction aims at radical questioning, not the elaboration of a positive method. From the start, Heidegger is more interested in pursuing questions than constructing positive answers. His approach to philosophy is fundamental questioning.

How Dilthey and Heidegger pose facticity differs because of where each thinker places meaning. For Dilthey, meaning must be articulated by making aspects lived experience more explicit. The implicit meaning of life-relations must be brought to a

[46] See a discussion of the shift from life to being see Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Being and Time*, David Farrell Krell, *Daimon Life*, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), and the introduction to Scott M. Campbell, *The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language*, especially 2 – 4.

more explicit meaning through poetic metamorphosis or philosophical thought.[47] For Heidegger, meaning is more primordial. Dilthey places emphasis on what is disclosed by our engagement with factical life, whereas Heidegger places emphasis on its hidden source. As Rudolf Makkreel explains this difference, Dilthey constructs meaning from life-relations, whereas Heidegger proceeds by deconstruction to arise at relational meaning: "Dilthey's constructive *Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt* [formation of the historical world] from the *relations of life* (*Lebensbezüge*) is inverted to become a deconstructive Abbau *der geschichtlichen Welt* into the *relational meaning of life* (*Bezugssinn des Lebens*)."[48] Their philosophical approaches take the paradox of factical life in different directions.

Despite these differences between Dilthey's and Heidegger's accounts of factical life, the demand for philosophy remains the same. That is, since factical life is not an object apart from us but a part of where we find ourselves as always already a part of that which we investigate, we cannot simply conceptualize life but must pursue it hermeneutically. As David Farrell Krell describes, "Hermeneutics is not the chilly science of facticity, not a methodology that allows us coolly to approach life matter-of-factly; rather, hermeneutics is factical life surprised in the act, vigilantly caught in the act of interpreting itself."[49] Like Dilthey, for Heidegger factical life defines the situation we

[47] See Chapter Two section 2.2 for an explanation of poetic metamorphosis in Dilthey's aesthetics, 77 – 80.
[48] Rudolf Makkreel, "The genesis of Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutics and the rediscovered 'Aristotle introduction' of 1922" *Man and World* 23 (1990): 305 – 320.
[49] David Farrell Krell, *Daimon Life*, 36. Yet according to Krell, after struggling to find a proper way to situate life in relation to Dasein, Heidegger abandons his efforts to describe factical life and can only pursue it indirectly or *daimonically* (Krell 55, 7). As Chapters Four and Five will show, Heidegger continues to think about factical life in his turn to poetry. I will argue that Heidegger's concern with poetry is an attempt to think through the paradox of facticity, which could be considered a mediating or daimonic approach.

find ourselves in: constant self-interpretation. In both thinkers, moreover, this need for interpretation seems to lead to art.

3. From Factical Life to Art

3.1 The Centrality of Art in Dilthey's Philosophy

Dilthey's approach to facticity, or the standpoint of life, allows him to reconceive of philosophy as descriptive and interpretative rather than explanatory and aimed at universal objectivity. Life problematizes philosophical method because facticity denies the application of unconditioned categories and concepts. Yet despite the impossibility of analyzing life in terms of concepts, philosophy must be grounded in the standpoint of life. In "Life and Cognition," Dilthey describes what it means to philosophize from this standpoint: "Thought arises in the process of life. Accordingly, to ground thought is to go back to this process of life and describe it… However, broadly we grasp its concept, thought is everywhere a manifestation of life, connected to life" (SW II 69). Philosophizing from the standpoint of life requires a return to the source of thought. Yet this source eludes concepts and systematic approaches to grasp it. For this reason, Dilthey calls for "broadening the descriptive horizon" to get beyond limitations of introspective or merely intellectualized speculative approaches (SW II 71). This broadening means focusing on differences and connections, not concepts or abstractions. Moreover, approaching the paradox of facticity *descriptively* means that there is no possibility of forming a complete philosophical system or discovering an absolute, grounding principle: "Thought can only express life more articulately, more distinctly in terms of differences and connections" (SW II 72). Poetry takes up this task of expression and articulation. For Dilthey, poetry articulates life without abstract concepts in a manner that can preserve the

facticity of life, i.e. its qualitative characteristics and contextuality that remain unanalyzable in their depth and richness. "Art tries to articulate what life is. The entire individuation of the human-historical world first becomes intelligible in poetry, long before science strives to cognize it."[50] Dilthey's attempt to transform philosophical method mirrors his description of art and its power to articulate life.

Furthermore, as Makkreel has argued, Dilthey's aesthetic theory does not simply exemplify his theory of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, his aesthetics transforms his way of philosophizing.[51] In his unpublished notes "Fragments for a Poetics" (1907-1908), Dilthey describes the poet's ability to understand life. Unlike other ways of seeing the world, the poetic attitude does not subordinate things to a goal or purpose. The poet is not engaged in a specific action that would interpret an event or object into a determinate framework that could restrict the meaning of life's broader relations. Thus, for Dilthey the poet "apprehends the significance of life" (SW V 230). As Dilthey explains, "In youth, life and poetic attitude coincide—life can still be spontaneous. Deliberate action forces life and poetic attitude to diverge. It is then that our poetic powers usually disappear" (SW V 230). The poetic attitude describes the way of thinking that Dilthey finds necessary to approach life in its factical complexity and concreteness. We see this throughout these incomplete notes, since Dilthey's revisions discuss not only aesthetic theory but also the need for "a different method" for approaching lived experience that "can lead us further" (SW V 229). Dilthey sees the need to revise his approach to

[50] Dilthey, *Contributions to the Study of Individuality*, trans. Erdmann Waniek, SW II, 211 – 284. 248.
[51] Scholars have treated Dilthey's aesthetics as peripheral to his philosophy, whereas Makkreel considers Dilthey's aesthetics to be central in the formation and development of his philosophy. Makkreel argues that Dilthey provides an aesthetics of history and that his inquiry into art allows him to reformulate and refine his philosophical approach throughout his career. See Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies*, 15 – 17.

understanding life through a less direct method that does not force lived experience into determinate distinctions for the sake of clarity, but instead proceeds "through an intermediary" (SW V 229). This intermediary between lived experience and understanding is expression—which lived experience generates on its own through art and literature in particular (SW V 229). For Dilthey, thinking about life requires the mediation of art—a necessity that will be explained further in the following chapter.

3.2 Reading Dilthey's Aesthetics and Heidegger's Philosophy of Art Together

The attempt to philosophize from the standpoint of life explicitly impels Dilthey to take up art. Since Heidegger's thought also moves from the paradox of factical life to the work of art but lacks a clear motivation for this shift, rereading Heidegger's turn to art through Dilthey can provide insights into the possible connections between his phenomenological hermeneutics and his concern with art. By demonstrating the relation between factical life, art, and philosophy, this project will bring Dilthey and Heidegger into a new dialogue. This is not to say that there is an explicit connection between Dilthey's aesthetics and Heidegger's philosophy of art. Heidegger did not have access to many of the writings that demonstrate the depth of Dilthey's insight into art's relation to life. Moreover, throughout his early lectures, Heidegger's account of Dilthey is subordinated to one theme and one theme only—the problematic historicity of human life—and not art or aesthetic theory. While Heidegger's account highlights important aspects of Dilthey's thought, he also disregards the significance and originality of Dilthey's aesthetic thought and its meaning for his theory of human understanding. Heidegger's early engagement with Dilthey does not fully appropriate his thought or its insights—particularly when it comes to art and poetry.

These gaps in Heidegger's understanding of Dilthey's insights also suggest the need to reappropriate Dilthey beyond Heidegger. By reappropriating Dilthey's overlooked contributions to philosophy of art, I will pose Dilthey not simply as a figure in the history of ideas or a forerunner to Heidegger, but as a thinker who is relevant to the concerns of contemporary philosophy. In taking up Dilthey's aesthetics, the following chapters will develop a poetics of factical life that illuminates the power of art to transform our ways of being in the world.

PART II: ART AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF EXPERIENCE

Chapter Two

The Poetic Metamorphosis of Life: Dilthey's Aesthetics

The philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833 – 1911) provides a particularly rich source of insight for considering the relation between factical life and art, since he describes art as a *metamorphosis of life*. For Dilthey, art must be understood in terms of life not in contradiction to it, just as philosophy must seek its principles in life and the richness of lived experience. As a life-philosopher, Dilthey emphasizes the significance of life and orients all philosophical inquiry toward the articulation of life's inherent meaning. Life and understanding are interwoven. Yet even as Dilthey's thought draws art and philosophy together through their mutual relation to life, he does not reduce art to intellectual content or meaning that subsumes the sensible aspects of the work of art. Likewise, his notion of life is not purely biological, so he does not reduce art to physiological explanation or any notion of natural instinct. Accordingly, his aesthetics can demonstrate the possibility of relating art to philosophy without reducing art to its theoretical components and to life without naturalizing art. In particular, Dilthey's method, descriptive psychology, is suitable for such a task. Dilthey's descriptive psychology emphasizes the transformative powers of the mind, which provides a common epistemological ground for relating everyday perception to poetic experience. This transformative power also compels us to re-examine everyday experience in light of the processes of imaginative metamorphoses that characterize art. That is, art becomes a model for understanding experience.

Dilthey's account of art and experience is particularly interesting because of its place in the history of aesthetics. Not only is his philosophy situated within a philosophical crisis[1] but his philosophy of art responds to a crisis in the art world of his time—namely, the disjunction between aesthetic concepts and actual works of art caused by the rise of modernism in the mid-nineteenth century. Artists of Dilthey's time attempted to renew art's relation to life by breaking from traditional concepts of artistic representation, which left art theorists and critics at a loss. Dilthey's first major work on aesthetics reacts to these the art movements—his aesthetic theory arises from this dialogue with early modern art, not simply German aesthetics and art theory. In light of these art movements, Dilthey recognized the need to consider the living, historical contexts of art and the depth of feeling, which expresses the connection between self and world in lived experience. In particular, Dilthey's aesthetic theory responds to artists' emphasis on the new reality of modern life by investigating the relation between art and our everyday lived experience. Dilthey describes art's relation to reality as a transformation or "metamorphosis of life."

This chapter will give an overview of Dilthey's aesthetics by discussing: (1) the historical context that shaped his approach to art, as well as his place in the history of aesthetics, (2) his expansive notion of feeling as both formative and transformative, which is distinct from the notion of feeling in previous aesthetic theories because it permeates lived experience in the full complexity of its factical relations, and (3) his development of a hermeneutical aesthetics that connects art to the whole of life. These aspects will illuminate how Dilthey's aesthetics takes up the paradox of factical life.

[1] See Chapter 1 for Heidegger's explanation of Dilthey's place in the crisis of foundations, p. 29.

1. Art in Crisis and the Task for Aesthetics

1.1 The Rise of Modernism and the Anarchy of Taste at the End of the Nineteenth Century

To understand Dilthey's aesthetics, it helps to have a sense of his historical context and the status of art at the time. When Dilthey wrote *The Imagination of the Poet* in 1887 and *Three Epochs of Modern Aesthetics* in 1892, there was a major shift in the art scene that made previous philosophy of art and art criticism appear obsolete. In these two essays, Dilthey notes a profound discord between previous theories of art and the works of art of his time. At the time there were two main approaches to philosophy of art and art criticism: what Dilthey refers to as "the Classicists" and the Romantics.[2] The Classicists include eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century philosophers and art critics who adopt Aristotle's *Poetics* as the model for art, e.g. Boileau, Gottsched, and Lessing, and approach art through general forms and rules about what art should portray and how it should be portrayed. Since Aristotle thinks of art as mimesis, an imitation of what we observe in reality, these theorists approach art as a representation of reality, or a re-presentation of reality, a copy of it. This concept of art gives formal rules that determine whether or not art is successful in representing reality. By contrast, for the Romantics, art does not imitate reality; art transcends reality. Romantics considered art to be the highest form of thought because it expresses the spiritual reality of the mind, which creates the world.

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[2] Wilhelm Dilthey, *The Imagination of the Poet*, translated by Louis Agosta and Rudolf A. Makkreel in *Poetry and Experience*, *Wilhelm Dilthey Selected Works*, vol. V, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, 2nd printing, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 29 - 173. This work is referred to as Dilthey's *Poetics* (*Poetik*). Henceforth cited as SW V.

Artists at the end of the nineteenth century, however, were not interested in idealizing reality like the Classists or transcending reality like the Romantics and came into direct conflict with the expectations of what art is. In literature, Balzac and Dickens' commonplace subject matters, urban settings, depiction of mundane details, and mass appeal contradicted traditional theories of art. The lofty concepts of the Romantics with their emphasis on the sublime, transcendence, and art as the highest form of thought did not seem applicable to the realism of such novels. Similarly, the Classicists with their emphasis on traditional form, nature, and the idyllic became irrelevant as "soon as Dickens and Balzac began to write the epic of modern life" (SW V 31). In *The Three Epochs of Modern Aesthetics and Its Present Task*, Dilthey describes these new literary styles as an effort to "express the oppressive feeling that the structures of life in society have become old, senile, and untenable."[3] By emphasizing the mundane and commonplace, art attempted to overthrow these worn-out structures and rediscover the world in a genuine sense: "It wants to manifest reality, as it actually is…" (SW V 176). The visual arts demonstrated the same tendency.

In the visual arts, this conflict is marked by a particular historical event: the Salon des Refusés, which is considered the birth of modernism in the visual art. In 1863, nearly three-thousand works of art were rejected from the Paris Salon. In response to this unprecedented number of rejections, Napoleon III formed an exhibition of rejected art, the Salon des Refusés (salon of the rejects), which allowed the public to decide what was and was not fine art. This event was significant for a number of reasons. Saving the rejected works and displaying them to the public demonstrates a radically new

[3] Wilhelm Dilthey, *The Three Epochs of Modern Aesthetics and Its Present Task*, translated by Michael Neville in *Poetry and Experience*, 175 – 222. 176. Henceforth cited as SW V followed by page number.

democratization of art and a schism between works of art, art theory, and art criticism. Moreover, the content and style of the works expressed a new sense of art. As Dilthey describes the style of this new art: "Painting has returned to color as its fundamental means of expression. It is seeking to do away with all traditional schemata of perception and composition, and to look at the world as though with new eyes" (SW V 178). Not only did French impressionist and post-impressionist painters defy the traditional standards of art maintained by the Académie des Beaux-Arts with their innovative techniques, but they painted common life and reality with new intensity and emphasized the basic elements and medium of painting rather than symbolic meaning or ideals. Manet's "Dejeuner dur L'Herbe" is considered the most exemplary piece from the 1863 Salon de Refusés. Manet paints a nude woman posed like many classic works of art but portrayed her in an everyday context, which was considered scandalous. The woman is at a picnic with two clothed men; she is not Venus lounging in scenic nature or in a luxurious boudoir. Placing the woman in this mundane situation makes her nudity real, not ideal. Degas and Cézanne were also among the rejected artists that reflect Dilthey's description of art's "new eyes." Degas's subject matters are always in mundane settings, which conveys a sense of realism, yet the style and technique of the painting is not realistic. The perspective is not linear. The brush strokes are visible. The color is more vivid. Degas paints ordinary scenes with intensity. Along similar lines, Cézanne's landscapes are not idyllic like Classical works or sublime like Romantic landscapes. Yet the entire scene takes on an intense, emotional quality because of the intensity of the colors and lines. The painting makes this scene vivid—we have a sense of what it is like to be there.

Movements in literature, the visual arts, and theater at the end of the nineteenth century – what we now recognize as the beginning of modernist art[4] – expressed the same trend: the rejection of traditional concepts of art in order to "ground each art more firmly and solidly in reality and in the nature of its particular medium" (SW V 177). For Dilthey, these new art movements reveal that "a new feeling of reality has shattered the existing forms and rules" and "new forms of art are striving to unfold" in relation to this reality (SW V 31). This impulse towards representing common, mundane reality made traditional aesthetic principles irrelevant and overthrew important theoretical distinctions that defined art. In particular, it challenged the distinction between the ordinary and the artistic, or aesthetic. Dilthey expressed concern that "the artist's need for honesty and gripping effects of all kinds today drives him onto a path whose goal is still unknown to him. It leads him to sacrifice the clear delimitations of forms and the pure elevation of ideal beauty above common reality" (SW V 31). Without principles or even a proper framework for situating such works, these art movements regressed into a chaotic state that Dilthey describes as an *anarchy of taste* in which "the artist is forsaken by rules; the critic is thrown back upon his personal feeling as the only remaining standard of evaluation" (SW V 31). This anarchy of taste is not simply pernicious to art theory or criticism, however; it also affects the status of art in society and the development of art in general. For Dilthey, the role of aesthetics is to support the status of art in society, clarify its purpose, and establish principles that encourage the development of "a lasting style and a coherent artistic tradition" (SW V 33). Aesthetic theory provides reflection on the significance of art and cultivates the intellectual attitudes that allow for artistic creation

[4] See Kurt Müller-Vollmer, *Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Literature*: *A Study of Wilhelm Dilthey's* Poetik, (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963), 51. Henceforth cited as Müller-Vollmer followed by page number.

and art appreciation. For Dilthey, "art requires the thorough schooling and education of the artist and the public through aesthetic reflections if its higher aspirations are to be unfolded, appreciated, and defended" (SW V 33).

For these reasons, the anarchy of taste at the end of the nineteenth century seemed particularly dangerous to the status of art. These works of art expressed the fact that artists "had developed an aversion to thinking about art, sometimes even to every kind of higher culture" (SW V 31). Artists' aversion to theory and the democratization of taste seemed to deny any possibility for re-establishing a relationship between aesthetics and works of art. Yet Dilthey did not identify such a crisis as "the end of art."[5] For Dilthey, such an "anarchy of taste always characterizes periods when a new feeling of reality has shattered the existing forms and rules, and when new forms of art are striving to unfold" (SW V 31). Dilthey understood the need for art to reflect the changes in society and new ways of thinking. Art movements that emphasize reality above theory, which Dilthey describes as *naturalism*, designate such shifts in society. According to Dilthey, in "every such time of crisis, naturalism appears. It destroys the worn-out language of form; it attaches itself to reality, seeking to obtain something new from it" (SW V 220). At times it is necessary for art to break from previous aesthetic concepts, but this does not mark an essential dissonance between art and theory. Instead the task for aesthetics is to respond to these new forms of art by revising its theory. As Dilthey states, "It is one of the most vital tasks of contemporary philosophy to re-establish, through the further development of aesthetics, the natural relationship among art, criticism, and an engaged public" (SW V

[5] Hegel's "end of art" is taken up in a variety of ways by contemporary art theorists, especially in cases where art movements seem to defy art critics' categories or art theorists' ways of conceptualizing them. For example, Donald Kuspit argues that the rejection of aesthetic principles in contemporary art movements undermine the nature and value of art, and thus designates "the end of art." See Kuspit, *The End of Art*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

175). Moreover, to accomplish this task, we cannot disregard works of art that do not accord with accepted theories of art or traditional ideals of beauty. For Dilthey, if "the artist, the aesthetician, the critic, and the public are to influence one another and to learn from one another, aesthetics must proceed from an unbiased understanding of the vast artistic movement within which we live today" – which means that "a few displeasing works of art produced by this new movement should not make aesthetics blind or deaf to its legitimacy" (SW V 176). If art theory is to remain relevant, it must respond to actual works of art and account for new movements introduced by innovative artists. We cannot rely upon unchanging principles to evaluate art.

Consequently, the art critic and theorist must learn "to understand art in relation to its time" (SW V 210). As the art world continually changes and adopts new forms, aesthetic theory must have a sense of time and place – a sense of history. For Dilthey, "we must replace abstract theorems … with ideas acquired from an analysis of the living historical nature of art" (SW V 206). In appealing to the historical nature of art, Dilthey is not simply invoking art history – although he considers these historical considerations to be important in furthering aesthetic theory (SW V 179). For Dilthey, we must understand art in terms of our relation to the world, which *is historical* in nature (SW V 200). The historicity of life and the historicity of art are related. Thus the task for a new aesthetics must be historical in more than one sense: (1) as it addresses the insufficiencies of timeless principles in traditional aesthetic theory, it must be posed within the history of aesthetics, and (2) as it addresses the continual changes that occur in the art world, it must be able to account for the historicity of art and life. The following section will address the

former issue and describe how it establishes the latter issue as an important question for Dilthey's approach to aesthetics.

1.2 The History of Aesthetic Principles and the Task for a New Aesthetics

Dilthey's account of the history of aesthetics narrates how art theory changes according to our concepts of knowledge and reality. A historical account of these concepts reveals two problematic tendencies in aesthetic theory: (1) the tendency to naturalize art, which is present in objectivist theories of reality, like Aristotle, and (2) the tendency to idealize art, which is present in the aesthetic theory of German Romantics who see reality as a product of the mind. In the first case, art is reduced to a form of knowledge, which means that its emotional effects are taken for granted. In the second case, the world is reduced to a product of the mind, which elevates art as an expression of the mind's world-making power but overemphasizes the unity between the mind and the world. Both tendencies fail to properly address the relation between the mind and world without conflation. They assume an unproblematic unity between mind and world and thus lack a framework for situating the naturalistic impulse of art movements in the late nineteenth century, which expressed disenchantment and the need to recover the everyday world in a real and meaningful sense. Moreover, traditional approaches to aesthetics intellectualize art, which means that the felt aspects of art remain vague and unexplored. For Dilthey, feeling is the catalyst for the transition from ordinary experience to aesthetic experience, i.e. for poetic metamorphosis. Feeling is thus essential to understanding the relation between everyday life and art, as well as the transformative power of art. Since previous aesthetic theories do not adequately address feeling, they

cannot properly explicate this relation. Examining the history of aesthetic theory helps us to understand Dilthey's project in light of these concerns.

Dilthey considers Aristotle's theory of art to be "a naturalistic conception of knowledge as well as of art" (SW V 38). Aristotle's *Poetics* establishes art as imitation, which is pleasurable because we learn through imitation and learning satisfies our natural desire for knowledge. For Dilthey, this naturalistic account of imitation is reductive because it "subordinates the pleasure of poetry to that of learning and contemplation" (SW V 38). This subordination takes the emotional effects of art for granted. While Aristotle provides some explanation of the effects of art (fear and pity) based upon evaluations of the object and means of imitation – e.g. that the tragic hero be neither despicable nor uncommonly good, that the plot be connected in terms of beginning, middle and end, that the best way to evoke fear and pity is through peripety – he provides no investigation into the nature of fear and pity or why these are the reactions to tragedy. Instead, Aristotle provides a formal model of rules according to what is assumed to create a definite effect upon the spectator. For Dilthey, these fixed determinations and rules must assume an objectivistic theory of knowledge in which "perception and thought correspond to being, so that being manifests itself in thought" (SW V 38). Aristotle's description of poetry is sufficient as an explanation only if we can assume that the emotional effects of art can be reduced to ideas because of their mutual relation to our nature and being (SW V 38). Aristotle's account of imitation is an attempt to define art under the lawfulness of nature, which assumes an overarching schema determined by necessity.

This assumed lawfulness and necessity shifts with the concept of the human mind in modern epistemology. According to Dilthey, the "new standpoint of consciousness" requires a new exploration of art, one that seeks its principles in terms of human creativity, not necessity (SW V 43). With Addison, Young, Shaftesbury and Dubos, the principles for aesthetics must be derived from the imagination, the creative power of the mind. This power is not subordinated to nature or laws of necessity, but is contrasted to it. Like nature, which is a power of production, the human mind has the power to produce. Within modernity, the faculties of the human mind begin to be explored independently of nature, although the mind is still seen in conjunction with nature. As a result, the creative power of the mind in relation to the productive beauty of nature makes aesthetics a "systematic whole" (SW V 43). This systematic whole sets the stage for German idealist aesthetics.

Dilthey describes German idealist aesthetics in four tenets. The first tenet of modern German aesthetics that he describes is "Schiller's Law," which expresses a new concept of the human mind in terms of genius, or the capacity "to generate a world of its own" (SW V 44). For Dilthey, Schiller's Law breaks from the Aristotelian tradition of aesthetics because it recognizes the *fundamental truth* that "poetry is not the imitation of a reality which already exists prior to it; nor is it the adornment of truths or spiritual meanings which could have been expressed independently. The aesthetic capacity is a creative power for the production of a meaning that transcends reality and that could never be found in abstract thought. Indeed, it is a way or mode of viewing the world" (SW V 44). Poetry does not mirror what is distinct and separate from it in the world, but rather expresses our understanding of the world. This principle is reflected in Dilthey's

concept of poetic metamorphosis. Yet even though Dilthey refers to this tenet as a fundamental truth, he still notes that it exaggerates "the unity of inner and outer, of life and form" such that the world and nature become the expression of intellect (SW V 45). Schelling's aesthetics exemplify this exaggerated unity between the mind and world.

For Schelling, reality is a unified system of identity in which the world is the product of genius or absolute reason (SW V 45). Within this system, only art can conceive of Infinite reality as an undivided, absolute whole because only the work of art unifies subjectivity and objectivity, or mind and world.[6] Other forms of knowledge, such as philosophy and science, see reality only in terms of individual, analyzable parts, whereas art understands reality as absolute unity and thus achieves a higher intuition. "Art is paramount to the philosopher, precisely because it opens to him, as it were, the holy of holies, where burns in eternal and original unity."[7] For Dilthey, however, this complete unification of nature and spirit blurs the distinctions between intuition, scientific thought, and philosophy (SW V 46). The facticity of experience and the specific contributions of different disciplines, or ways of knowing, are subordinated to one form of knowledge. For Dilthey this would undermine knowledge, which he sees as taking root within the particularity and complexity of lived experience. Romanticism leaps over the facticity of lived experience. Accordingly, Dilthey's poetic metamorphosis must address the creative power of the mind and the world in relation to each other, but without reducing the world to a product of the mind. His descriptive psychology must describe this relation between self and world without relying upon a system of absolute unity.

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[6] F.W.J. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*, translated by Peter Heath, Fifth printing, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001), 232.
[7] Ibid., 231.

The second tenet of modern German aesthetics that Dilthey considers is aesthetic disinterest. Aesthetic disinterest claims that judgments of taste are rooted in feeling (pleasure and displeasure), but not desire. We see this tenet in the first moment of beauty that Kant outlines in *The Critique of the Power of Judgment* – "Taste is the faculty for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction without any interest. The object of such a satisfaction is called beautiful."[8] By *interest,* Kant means "a relation to the faculty of desire" (C3 5: 204). He does not mean that such judgments are uninteresting, but that they are characterized by contemplation rather than desire (C3 5: 205). Desire expresses a will to possess or attain something. By contrast, when we experience something as beautiful we are concerned with it insofar as it is beautiful for our contemplation, not something to be gained.

According to Dilthey, Schopenhauer provides a more complete expression of this tenet. For Schopenhauer, aesthetic experience is a state of pure cognition, a release from the constant desires and striving of individual will, a loss of the self-interest that characterizes a person's individual existence. Aesthetic experience "tears the object of its contemplation out of the stream of the world's course and holds it isolated before itself."[9] This pure contemplation is entirely absorbed in its object and thus "is nothing other than the most complete *objectivity*, i.e., an objective orientation of the spirit as opposed to one that is subjective, directed at one's own person, i.e., the will."[10] The artist is distinguished by a special capacity for pure contemplation and for "entirely losing sight of one's

[8] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, edited by Paul Guyer, translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5: 211. Original boldface. Henceforth cited as C3.
[9] Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Presentation*, Volume I, translated by Richard E. Aquila and David Carus, (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008), 218.
[10] Ibid., 218.

interest, one's willing, one's purposes, and thus getting utterly outside one's own personality for a time, so as to remain as *purely cognizant subject*, clear eye of the world."[11] Disinterest in Schopenhauer's account describes the complete loss of individual experience and the unity between the self and the world. Schopenhauer's more metaphysical account of aesthetic reflection thus extends the nature of disinterest beyond Kant's third critique.

Yet for Dilthey, neither Kant nor Schopenhauer provides a full account of aesthetic disinterest, because neither account addresses feeling or its effects upon the creation of art adequately. One can see how feeling remains vague and abstract in each philosopher's formulations. In Kant, aesthetic feeling expresses the state of free-play between faculties of the mind, but this relation is addressed only very generally. In Schopenhauer, feeling has more of a metaphysical significance than a personal or embodied significance. In Kant, feeling becomes incorporated into a larger epistemological framework rather than explored concretely. In Schopenhauer, feeling takes on metaphysical meaning and thus is not addressed directly. In light of Kant's and Schopenhauer's inadequate accounts of feeling, Dilthey clearly states the task of his aesthetic investigations as "a completion and deeper grounding [for aesthetics] by investigating the significance of feelings for the processes of creativity, the metamorphosis of images, and composition" (SW V 46). For Dilthey, this means approaching aesthetics through descriptive psychology. We must keep this context in mind as we investigate Dilthey's psychological approach to art. Dilthey wants to account for human feeling through and in relation to art; he is not attempting to reduce art to our physical or emotional response to stimuli. Dilthey's descriptive psychology approaches

[11] Ibid., 218 – 219.

feeling in relation to the formation and transformation of images in poetry and lived experience. His approach is thus more akin to phenomenology than to what we would consider psychology.[12] Accordingly, we should not mistake Dilthey's emphasis on psychology for psychologism.[13] Dilthey is careful to distinguish his investigation of the spheres of human feeling from more reductive approaches, which he refers to as *psychophysical* explanations. For Dilthey, knowing the psychophysical relation that mediates between stimuli and feeling "does not illuminate the rule according to which the value of a state or a transformation is experienced in a feeling. For value is indeed only the representational expression of what is experienced in feeling" (SW V 79). Thus we should think of Dilthey's psychology very broadly.

The third and fourth tenets of German aesthetics further ground the task for Dilthey's approach to aesthetics. The third tenet recognizes an essential relation between the artist and external reality: "The creativity of the artist intensifies qualities that already exist in reality" (SW V 47). Dilthey takes up this tenet in his own description of art as a metamorphosis of life that intensifies particular qualities. Yet Dilthey considers previous aesthetic theories to be inadequate formulations of this tenet because they do not specify what qualities are present in the world or how these qualities are recognized and intensified. Just as Schiller's Law lacks a proper exposition of the relation between the

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[12] In 1983 the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and Pennsylvania State University held a conference on the topic of Dilthey's relation to phenomenology. See a selection of papers from this conference in *Dilthey and Phenomenology*, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and John Scanlon, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press, 1987).

[13] Certain scholars have characterized Dilthey's early thought as psychologism, which they contrast to his valuable contributions to philosophy, i.e. his discussion of the human sciences. Theodore Plantiga claims that "It was not until Dilthey finally got psychology out of his system that he was able to develop a new and more fruitful conception of understanding and its significance for human life" (40). See Theodore Plantiga, *Historical Understanding in the Thought of Wilhelm Dilthey*, (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1980). My account of Dilthey's thought will instead relate the descriptive psychology of his early aesthetics to his later writings. Both periods of his thought show important insight for developing a hermeneutic approach to aesthetics.

self and world, so the third tenet also fails to explain what the artist encounters in the world and how the world can be transformed in art. The relation between the artist and the world remains vague and idealized in these tenets. Dilthey's descriptive psychology and his account of feeling thus attempt to address these problems in aesthetic theory. For Dilthey, art intensifies ordinary experience through feeling. Thus a fuller account of feeling and its role in the formation and transformation of experience can allow us to understand the artistic metamorphosis of life as well as our relation to the world in greater depth.

The fourth tenet of German aesthetics also necessitates a deeper examination of our relation to the world. The fourth tenet encompasses historical poetics as developed by Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744 – 1803) and the Historical School. Herder addresses our relation to the world in more concrete terms because he acknowledges how a particular time and place conditions our perception of beauty, which is the strength and insight of historical poetics. For Dilthey, "The perspective of historical poetics thus begins to open up with Herder. The infinite variations of man's sensuous-spiritual constitution in its relation to the external world is for him the conditions of beauty as of taste, and these change as man's disposition changes" (SW V 49). Yet by emphasizing the variability of our relation to the external world, this tenet raises an issue with Kantian aesthetics. If works of art and the conditions for beauty are specific to the conditions of different times and places, we have no foundation for the universal necessity that characterizes aesthetic judgment in Kant's second and fourth moments of the beautiful. In the second moment, Kant defines the beautiful as "that which, without concepts, is represented as the object of a *universal* satisfaction" (C3 5:211). This universal

satisfaction is *subjective*, which means that it pertains to the feeling subject and does not ascribe beauty as a quality of the object (C3 5:215). As subjectively universal, however, judgments of taste must assert "validity for everyone" (C3 5:215). Similarly, the fourth moment describes the beautiful as "the object of a necessary satisfaction" (C3 5:240). When we experience something beautiful, we feel that others should also recognize its beauty, even if we cannot prove it. For Kant, this necessity is grounded in the universal communicability of art (C3 5:238). He grounds this universal communicability in the idea of *common sense*, i.e. the assumption that we hold the conditions for aesthetic feeling in common, which pertains to our constitution for feeling (C3 5:238). Together these principles describe how we can share an experience of the beautiful and communicate it to others. Herder's historicism undermines this possibility because he accounts for art in terms of the socio-historical conditions that form the individual's constitution, which denies the possibility of common sense and thus universal communicability and necessity.

According to Dilthey, this problematic between historical contingency and universal necessity forms the most pressing task for aesthetics.[14] Dilthey states that *the central question of all poetics* is the question "concerning the universal validity or historical variability of the judgment of taste," which Herder only addresses on the side of historicism (SW V 54). In only addressing one side of the issue, Herder did not recognize the full extend of the problem of history and thus lacked clarity and a proper grounding for his aesthetics (SW V 49). Accordingly, Dilthey's approach to aesthetic

[14] The problem between historicism and universal concepts is central throughout Dilthey's thought, not simply his aesthetics. Heidegger also recognizes Dilthey's intervention in the crisis. See Chapter 1, pp. 29 - 31. Also see Charles R. Bambach, *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995).

theory must take up this issue of universal necessity and historical contingency in his account of the relation between self and world. This issue requires investigating the relation between the particularity of lived experience and the universality of concepts – a relation that Dilthey considers to be mediated by the productive processes of the mind and thus proper to the domain of descriptive psychology. In explicating the productive processes of the mind in experience and poetic metamorphosis, Dilthey attempts to address this central question in aesthetics.

Given the history of German aesthetics and Dilthey's critique of each tenet, we can recognize the space that has opened for a new approach to aesthetics. First of all, previous aesthetic theories have not explored the depth or breadth of feeling and thus fail to give a proper account of how art evokes feeling (Aristotelian imitation and aesthetic disinterest) and transforms ordinary experience through the intensification of feeling (the third tenet of German aesthetics). Secondly, previous theories have failed to establish the relation between artistic imagination and reality or between the self and world, because they either overemphasize the unity between inner and outer cognition (Schiller's Law) or they do not address the question of historical contingency and universal necessity in experience (the fourth tenet of German aesthetics). The following section will address feeling and its role in the formative processes of experience and the metamorphosis of images in poetry. The third section will explain how Dilthey addresses the conflict between historicism and universal necessity in his descriptive psychology by describing poetic metamorphosis as the expression of both individual lived experience and the totality of life, which establishes universal necessity without sacrificing the concrete

historical character of human existence. In both these issues, Dilthey describes how art relates to and transforms ordinary lived experience in ways that preserve its facticity.[15]

2. Feeling and the Formation and Transformation of Lived Experience

Dilthey amends the history of aesthetics in three general ways: (1) by providing a detailed and broader account of feeling to establish a firmer foundation for aesthetics, (2) by addressing the relations between contingent particulars and universal concepts without falling into the dualism of prior metaphysical methods,[16] which Dilthey accomplishes through his emphasis on the mind's formative processes, and (3) by introducing an experiential and mental framework, *the acquired psychic nexus*, that unifies life-experience without establishing an abstract totality and establishes how poetic metamorphosis transforms life and situates aesthetics in relation to everyday experience. For Dilthey, feeling is not simply an emotional effect instigated by art, but it is a meaningful transformation of the everyday. Feeling intensifies the qualities of ordinary experience in a way that underlines a deeper, more universal significance. To understand this role of feeling, we must first examine how Dilthey expands and deepens the philosophical account of feeling in a way that integrates bodily sensation, emotion, and ideas. Then we can explore how feeling allows for the transformation of experience and explicates the relation between poetic imagination and the world.

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[15] Facticity denotes the complex relation between self and world, framed by historical contingency and the integration of feeling, sensation, and thought. Dilthey's critiques of these tenets shows how German aesthetics has ignored the factical.

[16] Dilthey contrasts his descriptive psychology to his predecessor's "metaphysical method" (SW V 51). The translators note that *metaphysical* might refer to "the construction of polarities and dialectic opposites" (footnote SW V 51). Bambach describes Dilthey's anti-metaphysical position as a critique of Hegel and the idea that philosophy can posit an absolute ideal (Reason). See Bambach, 136 – 137. This distinction is important for establishing Dilthey's resolution of the fourth tenet of German aesthetics as hermeneutic, rather than dialectic. Dilthey's solution is not a continuation of Hegelian aesthetics.

2.1 Dilthey's Psychology of Art: The Six Spheres of Feeling

One of Dilthey's great contributions to aesthetics is to break the duality that separates feeling from the perceptual and intellectual operations of the mind. Since antiquity, philosophy has separated these spheres and assigned feeling to the domain of the emotions or the will in contrast to the domain of intellectual knowledge. Within Dilthey's psychology, feeling is not limited to the emotions and has a broader application that unites it to the perceptual and intellectual processes of thought. Feeling is not restricted to one aspect of experience, but is incorporated throughout all aspects, from our concrete lived experience to the more abstract operations of thought. Feeling is not contained within narrow concepts of the will or the passions, but rather presents a complex web of relations: "In real life, feelings always confront us with intricate complexities" (SW V 77). We see how Dilthey broadens the notion of feeling and gives it greater epistemological significance in his account of the six spheres of feeling.

The first sphere of feeling includes the traditional notion of feeling – feeling as bodily pain or pleasure (SW V 79). This sphere of feeling is bodily and requires no conceptual mediation. The second sphere of feeling, however, creates a clear divide between Dilthey and previous thinkers, including Kant. In the second sphere of feeling, Dilthey introduces the notion of interest. As Dilthey defines it, the "*second sphere of feelings* is constituted by those elementary feelings which emerge from the *contents of sensation* when accompanied by a concentrated interest" (SW V 79). Unlike Kant, who distinguishes aesthetic feeling from interest in *The Critique of the Power of Judgment* to separate aesthetic pleasure from practical interest, Dilthey relates feeling to a more general notion of interest. The interest that characterizes the second sphere of feeling is

not a practical interest, i.e. the interest that accompanies an intended goal or object of desire, but instead the interest that shapes our attention.[17] For Dilthey, feeling affects our attention and brings about "in conjunction with other causes, the appearance, the gradual unfolding, and the disappearance of representations" (SW V 68). Perception is not pure but is always shaped by feeling.

The *concentrated interest* of the second sphere also counters Kant's notion of aesthetic feeling by relating it to "the *principle of sensuous charm*" (SW V 80, original italics). Whereas Kant separates aesthetic beauty from charm,[18] Dilthey establishes aesthetic pleasure at the sensuous level, i.e. "in a regular relation to pleasure and displeasure" (SW V 79). This charm or sensuous pleasure of the second sphere is not the same as the first sphere, however, because it is related to interest and has some distinction from the purely bodily pleasure and pain of the first sphere. Dilthey gives the example of particular sounds that characterize lyric poetry and also references Goethe's color theory, which attempts to define aesthetic principles at the level of particular, sensory qualities (SW V 80). This sphere of feeling mediates between the level of direct physical sensation and the level of harmony that characterizes the third sphere of feeling, which allows us to discuss concrete elements of the work of art as beautiful before bringing them together into formal aspects of the work of art. Contemporary art analysis makes distinctions at this level, and there are many artists who have challenged us to examine art at this very elementary level. Rothko brought out the pure feeling of color; Mondrian allowed us to

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[17] See Rudolf Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies*, 3rd printing, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). "For Dilthey, however, all feelings reflect a mode of interest, but this may manifest itself in a free-floating kind of interestedness which is not specifically channeled in terms of particular ends" (122).

[18] Kant separates what is agreeable from what is beautiful in the first moment. "The agreeable is that which pleases the senses in sensation" (C3 5: 205). The agreeable is "an incentive for the desires" and thus its influence on the mind is insignificant according to Kant, since "it is only a matter of the number of the charms" and has no other significance (C3 5: 267).

experience the beauty of lines; Pollock expressed intense emotion through texture. In expositions of poetry, we discuss the particular syllables used and the accompanying feeling provoked by them. Part of Wallace Stevens' success as a poet was his ability to make syllables sing and individual words expressive in and of themselves. Anyone who recites "The Idea of Order at Key West" will note the beauty of each phoneme, which mimics the sound of ocean waves with its repetition of sounds. While Dilthey's second sphere of feeling contradicts Kantian aesthetics, it demonstrates an effort to distinguish a concrete sensuous level of feeling for aesthetic analysis and find a way to discuss the facticity of the sensible, i.e. the *haecceitas* of the sensuous elements of art.

The third sphere of feeling is still concrete but is distinguished by the relation of sensuous elements to each other, e.g. rhythm and meter. The aesthetic principle of this sphere is *the principle of pleasurable proportion* (SW V 81). Dilthey attributes this sphere as expressing "the feeling of life itself" (SW V 80). He looks at the rhythmic and symmetrical aspects of life – e.g. our body's rhythmical heartbeat and breath, the waxing and waning of waves, the way in which water drips – and describes this sphere of feeling in terms of the "primal power of rhythm" (SW V 80). Thus, this sphere of feeling still remains close to the perceptual level while the fourth sphere begins to draw out the more conceptual aspects of Dilthey's notion of feeling. This sphere of feeling is less sensuous than the prior spheres and more cognitive: "The *fourth sphere of feeling* comprises the great variety of feelings that spring from the cognitive *connection* of our *representations* and which are aroused by the mere forms of our representational and thought processes, without regard to the relationship of their content to our being" (SW V 81). This sphere of feeling is very significant for aesthetics because Dilthey considers the fourth sphere to

explain how the relations between representations have their own particular feelings separate from the meaning-content of the work of art as a whole. It is necessary to distinguish between the feelings associated with the formal aspects of the work of art and the feelings associated with the content or meaning of the work of art, otherwise there would be no way to account for the elation we can feel while experiencing a work of art that has tragic or disturbing meaning-content. From various examples of art, we know that we can experience pleasure and joy while observing tragic scenes or reading melancholic lines. A progression of tones, a combination of hues, or a turn of phrase can bring together a powerful effect that is felt separately from the meaning of that particular song, painting, poem or scene.[19] Dilthey is aware of the intricacy of feeling in art and thus states that form is composite, a complex of combined feelings (SW V 81).

In the fifth sphere of feeling, which relates to the content of the work of art, Dilthey introduces the notion of meaning. The fifth sphere of feeling encompasses all of the drives that define life – "the particular *material impulses* which pervade the whole of life and whose entire content is possessed in a reflexive awareness obtained through feelings" (SW V 83). These feelings demonstrate a clear break from the former spheres, which are more receptive and perceptual. This sphere includes the impulses and drives that define our entire existence – nourishment, self-preservation, procreation, and love of offspring (SW V 83). According to Dilthey, these drives "are interwoven with our instincts, welling up from the depths of our sensuous feelings" – the first sphere of feeling or pleasure and pain – yet "pervade the entire moral world" (SW V 83). Within this sphere, Dilthey includes sympathy, love, pity, and all feelings that allow for human

[19] This distinguishes Dilthey's aesthetic from Hegelian aesthetics, which has a dialectical approach that subordinates sensuous aspects to the meaning of the content. See Chapter Four, section 1.2, pp. 174 – 178.

society. As such, these feelings address how we live and what we value. Yet the sphere of feeling associated with meaning is not purely intellectual or related to ideas that have no foundation in the sensations. Instead, Dilthey describes the essential unity between these spheres of feeling, which are all grounded in life. By reflecting on life with its variety of feeling and drives, we arrive at an awareness of life as a whole. This awareness is not a purely intellectual state, but also a state of feeling. Meaning is felt, not simply known.[20]

In terms of art, this sphere of feeling accounts for the powerful effect of art has on us. Art does not simply present us with pleasant shapes, charming sounds, or mildly interesting ideas. Art strikes us, captivates us, changes our minds, and pulls at our hearts. In reading a novel, the reader can feel as though she lived through the events of the narrative and her life will never be the same. An audience member at the opera can become so lost in the action and music of a climatic moment that he forgets he is watching a spectacle. A poem can leave an indelible mark on someone's mind and heart so that it becomes an ensign of her life. For Dilthey, these effects are the result of art's relation to our most basic impulses and to life as a whole. The content, meaning, plot and motifs present within art speak to our sense of life and draw us in. Yet art does not need to replicate life exactly to play upon our feelings and drives within this sphere. For Dilthey, art intensifies this sphere of feeling beyond our ordinary experience: "What makes a poet great is the fact that these drives operate much more powerfully, extensively, and concretely in him than in his reader or listener; this produces an expansion and intensification of the sense of life which is the most elementary effect of all poetry on the reader or listener" (SW V 84). For Dilthey, this aspect of art is true no matter what the work of art represents. Without giving us a literal picture of reality, the

[20] See also section 3 of Chapter Four, "Poetry, Feeling, and the Passion of Facticity."

work of art describes the world of feeling that we experience. Even architecture and music present us with elementary drives rooted in human life (SW V 84). Accordingly, the fifth sphere demonstrates how Dilthey achieves a broad yet unified concept of feeling that spans from the most basic sensations to the impulses of the will and its valuations for life. Life is the source of feeling and meaning. As such, life is the touchstone for art. Dilthey roots art in life and our basic instincts in his description of feeling. Feeling, however, is not reduced to basic instincts but also pertains to higher levels of reflection and evaluation in the sixth sphere.

The sixth sphere of feeling relates to our capacity to reflect on the more general aspects of our will and the function of our passions. This sphere includes qualities of the will that we recognize as virtue – "loyalty, courage, disregard of danger or suffering in upholding what is essential to one's character" – as well as "the rich content of life appropriated and unified by the will, enjoyed in a joyous expansion of the feelings of life" (SW V 84). Dilthey notes that there is a great variety of feelings at this level because there is a multiplicity of passions and characteristics of the will, as well as diversity among our experiences of them (SW V 84). While reflecting on the more general aspects of the will does not present us with any clear sense of unity, it does allow us to posit ideals. This sphere of feelings examines the principles of life in general, and thus operates as an idealization of the life of the will. Here idealization does not carry the sense of positing some ultimate good – a telos – or viewing the world idealistically, as we might typically use these terms, but instead reflects all the aspects of the will that we experience in life, both good and bad. For Dilthey, art perfects this process of reflective generalization, or idealization. The artist reflects on general characteristics of the will and

understands them so deeply that she can bring them to life in her own work. Dilthey notes the artist's ability to grasp this level of feeling in his *principle of idealization*: "When the images of these grand attributes of the will and the feelings stemming from them are at work in the poet, an ideal of life becomes the soul of his poetry" (SW V 85). Dilthey attributes the efficacy of art to this more general sphere of feeling. As our evaluations and judgments about life, our personal worth, and ideals are not purely intellectual but are rooted in particular experiences, we respond to art when it evokes our experience with idealizations or more general forms of it.

While Dilthey does not adopt these spheres of feeling in his later poetics,[21] we can see what he attempts to achieve through these distinctions in his *Poetics*: a more thorough investigation of feeling, its effects, and its relation to art. More importantly, these six spheres allow us to see how feeling is joined to our reflections and thought. Our ideals and general notions bear some relation to our sensuous feelings and most basic impulses. Our thought processes thus cannot be understood apart from feeling. The underlying relations between these spheres of feelings indicate Dilthey's attempt to revise the psychology of his time. At his time, psychology did not consider perceptual experience in relation to feeling but in terms of discrete, quantifiable representations that could be combined through specific processes, "association, fusion, and apperception" (SW V 68). For Dilthey, the abstractions of this method were insufficient for explaining how we actually perceive, think and feel because the complexity and process of development are ignored for the sake of establishing determinant concepts and fixed relations. Such psychology dissects our living experience, thus covering over the essential unity between

[21] Dilthey later finds the spheres of feeling to be too abstract and attempts to find more concrete distinctions within life-experience. We see this shift in his *Fragments for Poetics* (1907-1908), which I will discuss in the following section.

the sensory and mental faculties, which Dilthey rejoins through his notion of feeling. The quantitative approach also covers over the complex processes of our mind by reducing experience to discrete units that are merely combined. Dilthey corrects this psychological approach by noting that our perceptions and representations are "permeated, colored and enlivened by feelings" (SW V 68).

This means that psychology cannot approach experience and thought in terms of units of sensory data that combine to form representations. For Dilthey, our experience is characterized by complex processes at every level. "In the real psyche, therefore, every representation is a *process*. Even the sensations which are connected in an image, and the relations existing among them, are subject to *inner transformations.* Perception and the image itself are also processes subject to lively transformations" (SW V 68). Every perception and representation is formed by a process. Dilthey contrasts the notion of a *formative* process to the abstract methods of psychology that understand thought as a logical and determinate process of combining, distinguishing, and relating "fixed, self-subsisting elements" (SW V 71). Moreover, as a formative process, every perception and representation is subject to transformation. For these reasons, Dilthey's psychology attempts to find a more genuine account of perception, feeling, ideas and their interrelations by exploring these formative processes. Dilthey's notion of formative processes in perception and thought emphasizes how the mind enacts transformation at every level of its functioning, which will be significant for understanding how ordinary perception relates to aesthetic experience. This will become clearer when we consider the nature of these transformations.

2.2 The Formation and Transformation of Experience: Dilthey's Laws of Imaginative Metamorphosis

For Dilthey, there are no fixed elements, no static points of perceptual data; experience is instead formed. It is shaped by the influence of feelings, the passing of time, and a network of associations that an individual acquires through his or her life. Experience is continually formed and transformed through a variety of processes. Without attempting to determine the entirety of these processes, an impossible task, Dilthey specifies three formative processes, or *laws of imaginative metamorphosis*: *exclusion*, *intensification or diminution*, and *completion* (SW V 71). These formative processes shape and transform perceptual and representational images (*Bilder*) and their constituents. Dilthey does not use the term "image" (*Bild*) in the narrow sense that is limited to visual images, but in the extended sense that applies to the great variety of mental contents. These images include perceptions, representations and their constituents, all of which share certain qualities. For Dilthey, these images "interpenetrate one another" and are "equally near and equally far from one another" (SW V 70). For Dilthey, our mind's content is not a contiguous set or a causal chain of perceptions and representations. We cannot trace a line of associations or a trajectory of causation from single points of experiential data to the whole of consciousness. Rather, all images are conditioned by the entire network of our psyche (the acquired psychic nexus), as well as various processes, acts, interest, stimulation, and complex relations within the content itself. These qualities of our perceptions and representations as well as the overall nexus of our psyche prevent abstract or logical simplifications and require a different understanding of psychic processes. These processes, moreover, are best exemplified by

the artistic imagination. In Dilthey's explanation of these three functions of the artistic imagination he provides a model for his approach to epistemology and articulates the way in which aesthetics relates to everyday experience as a "metamorphosis of reality" (SW V 67).

Our everyday perception is shaped by immediate interests that preoccupy our attention. We think and act according to habitual practices and assumed givens. We experience a multitude of minute and mundane details that do not necessarily have any profound meaning. While art begins with these common experiences, the artist reflects upon everyday experience and transforms it. In art, certain elements are excluded deliberately "for clarity and harmony in the constituent of images" (SW V 102). Not only would it be impossible to write a novel with as many details as a lived experience, but it would be boring and difficult to locate what is important. All meaning would get lost in the details. Hence, Dilthey's concept of imaginative metamorphosis includes the notion of exclusion. Exclusion, however, is not enough to create a work of art – mere exclusion can only create "the superficial harmony of an empty ideal if other laws did not also operate in transforming images" (SW V 102). Images are not merely simplified for the sake of unity in the work of art; they are also *expanded* or *contracted* through the influence of feeling. Dilthey sees all experience as colored by feeling. Feeling can intensify and expand experience, or dissipate and contract it. The artist's use of feeling is more intense than the feeling of a typical life-experience. According to Dilthey, the artist is "set apart by a capacity to truly *enliven* images, and the attendant satisfaction gained from perception is *saturated with feeling*" (SW V 64). Dilthey uses the example of Dickens and other English writers to explain how images can receive a "nervous

intensification of reality where things become larger than life. Cliffs become more steep and meadows more lush" (SW V 103).

Yet these processes of exclusion and intensification or diminution do not distinguish art from other altered states of perception. Dilthey attributes similar effects to dreams and insanity, in which aspects of reality can disappear or become exaggerated. Together exclusion and intensification do not provide any meaningful reflection of everyday experience – "An imagination which only excludes, intensifies or diminishes, increases or decreases, is feeble and attains only a superficial idealization or caricature of reality" (SW V 104). Art is distinct from the transformations of reality in dreams or states of madness because it enacts "an unfolding of the nucleus of an image through positive completion" (SW V 104). The process of completion distinguishes poetic metamorphosis by not merely repeating the experience, but adding new relations: "Images and their connections are transformed when new components and connections penetrate into their innermost core and thus complete them" (SW V 104). This process of completion thus involves relating a particular image to the whole of life, so that "we obtain from images and their connections what is essential about a state of affairs: what gives it its meaning in the nexus of reality" (SW V 104). The fragments, distractions, interruptions, and meaningless details of everyday life are thus excluded, condensed, and gathered to point to the meaning that underlies those experiences and unites them into the narrative of life. "In short, poetry constantly restores the totality of lived experience" (SW V 104). We must note, however, that while the artist can transform experience, she does not create meaning or value from nowhere; meaning is already inherent within life and our everyday experience. As such, completion requires an understanding of Dilthey's

acquired psychic nexus and his references to *the totality of lived experience*. The acquired psychic nexus explains how experience in general is a process of continual transformation and why Dilthey uses the artist's imagination as a model for this process.[22]

2.3 The Acquired Psychic Nexus

The acquired psychic nexus (*erworbener seelischer Zusammenhang*) conditions the formative processes of experience and describes the overall structure of our everyday experience. A perception or experience is neither isolated nor a set of mere associations. Instead, everything "stands in relation to the dim mass of representations, drives, and feelings of my acquired psychic nexus; it is oriented and conditioned by this nexus" (SW V 199). Dilthey's nexus, moreover, takes into account the historical nature of our existence and thought. Our perception is not a piecing together of sensory data and concepts, but a formative process shaped by the whole of our lived experience. The ideas, feelings, evaluations, and habits we acquire over time shape every perception, representation, evaluation, and act (SW V 72). As Makkreel notes, the "term 'acquired' [*erworbener*] indicates that the nexus or structuring of our experience is not abstract and inferred, but concretely 'possessed' through the individual's life history. The nexus is thus a system which is historically acquired and reveals the structural ordering of past experience."[23]

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[22] The complexity of this nexus reflects the facticity of lived experience rather than simplifying it through a more determinate framework. Although Dilthey introduces the acquired psychic nexus in *The Imagination of the Poet*, it becomes a concept that is central to his descriptive psychology and his broader epistemological projects, such as providing a new ground for the human sciences and revising Kant's critique of historical reason. See Dilthey's *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (1883), *Selected Works*, vol. I, trans. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) and *Ideas for a Descriptive Psychology and Analytic Psychology* (1895/6), trans. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Donald Moore, in *Understanding the Human World*, *Selected Works*, vol. II (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010).
[23] Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies*, 98.

The acquired psychic nexus expresses the dynamic relationality and contextuality that underlies all experience and constitutes its facticity. The nexus operates hermeneutically, as parts to a whole, and the relations are significant in themselves. Dilthey notes that while the acquired psychic nexus is complex and ever changing, it continually "works as a whole on the representations or states on which our attention is focused" (SW V 72). The sense of nexus, *Zusammenhang*, expresses the coherence of a plurality of things that *hang together* (*hangen zusammen*) as a unity and express something meaningful through their interrelations. The nexus is a complex interweaving of relations and not simply mental content in the sense of data: "This nexus consists not only of contents, but also of the connections which are established among these contents; these connections are just as real as the contents. The connections are lived and experienced as relations between representational contents, as relations of values to one another, and as relations of ends and means" (SW V 72). The relations of value, ends and means, form a purposive structure which gives coherence to the totality of life. "The structural psychic nexus is at the same time teleological. A nexus that tends to produce fullness of life, the satisfaction of our drives and happiness, is a purposive system."[24] Yet Dilthey emphasizes that this structure is characterized by *immanent subjective purposiveness*, not *objective purposiveness* (SW II 178). Objective purposiveness would involve an external telos or force that determines the individual. Subjective purposiveness is established by inner feeling, not external forces like nature. Moreover, as *immanent* these connections are not impressed upon the content of experience, but are inherent within our experiences. As Jacob Owensby notes, Dilthey's sense of "purposiveness

[24] Dilthey, *Ideas for a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology* in *Understanding the Human World*, SW II, 115 – 210. 178. Henceforth cited as SW II.

refers to the manner in which the interrelation of psychic components – instinct, feeling, representation, and volition – promote an increasing articulation of the relation of individuals to their environment for the sake of enhancing or sustaining the value of life."[25] As immanent, this purposiveness is proper to the life of the individual, yet relates to the world in which the individual lives. "Dilthey stresses that psychic structure is formed in the interaction of agents with their world. Because individuals are situated in a socio-historical context and the acquired psychic nexus is formed through interaction with the milieu, the acquired nexus at least indirectly reflects the influence of such a context."[26] The nexus is not limited to pure mental content, the isolated Cartesian "I", but instead expresses the confluence of inner life and external reality: "there is a constant interaction between the self and the milieu of external reality in which the self is placed, and our life consists of this interaction" (SW V 72). The acquired psychic nexus exposes the facticity of our relation to the world. We are caught up in that which we try to understand, not set apart from it.

The nexus, moreover, as a coherent unity, does not simply provide an abstract framework or general background for experience; it *articulates* experience: "This complex nexus is characterized by an *articulation* which is rooted in the structure of psychic life" (SW V 72). The nexus articulates our experience by *orienting it*, by *bounding* and *determining* it, and by *grounding* it (SW V 72). We act and make decisions based upon the influence of our acquired experiences, ideas and feelings – they orient us. Our perceptions and evaluations are bound and determined by what we have experienced in the past and what is made accessible to us through our acquired understanding. We

[25] Jacob Owensby, *Dilthey and the Narrative of History*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University, 1994), 93.
[26] Ibid., 95

find concrete ground for our feelings, thoughts, and actions in terms of who we are as a whole, which means looking at our existence in its historical rootedness and not in terms of definitions and abstract concepts.

> Through [the acquired psychic nexus] principles derive their certainty, concepts receive their sharp delineations, and our position in space and time obtains its orientation. Likewise, it is from this nexus that feelings receive their significance for the totality of our life. Finally, it is because of this same nexus that our will, which is usually occupied with means, remains constantly certain about the system of ends in which the means are grounded. These are the ways in which the acquired psychic nexus works in us, although we possess it obscurely. (SW V 72-73)

Thus despite the fact that *we possess it obscurely* – i.e. we cannot grasp it immediately or as a determinate and unchanging conceptual framework due to the intricacies of its relations and their development – the acquired psychic nexus expresses the totality of consciousness as a unified complex of interrelations and temporal development. The acquired psychic nexus references the unity of an individual's lived experience and as such provides coherence and the possibility of articulating meaning by connecting particular instances to the whole of life.[27]

The articulative role of the acquired psychic nexus allows us to understand the process of completion and its significance for art. The acquired psychic nexus draws upon the entirety of one's lived experience to ground the meaning of particular experiences, just as Dilthey sees each work of art as grounding its meaning in reference to the totality of life through the process of *completion*. As stated in the previous section, the processes of exclusion and intensification are not sufficient for providing any

[27] David Carr discusses the idea of meaning in Dilthey's description of the temporal structure of lived experience as *Zusammenhang*, or coherence in terms of narrative. See David Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History*, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986), especially Chapter 3, "The Self and the Coherence of Life."

meaningful reflection on everyday experience, especially since we can experience such transformations in dreams or fits of strong emotion and madness. It is only through completion – which relates the image to the totality of human experience, the nexus of life – that the transformations of images provide meaning and significance. Just as the acquired psychic nexus orients, determines, and grounds our perception, desire, values, actions, and beliefs by drawing together our representations, will, and feelings as a whole and as established through the course of time, so the significance of a particular transformed image requires reference to the complex network of relations to which it belongs, i.e. to life as a whole. "Thus we obtain from images and their connections what is essential about a state of affairs: what gives it its meaning in the nexus of reality" (SW V 104). It is not enough to simply relate images to each other to create more inclusive or larger structures, as such relations would lack necessity and meaning and appear arbitrary or superficial. The relation to the whole presents us with what is essential about a particular image and its connections to the whole of life. As Dilthey states, "association contains no principle that goes beyond the efficacy of actual contiguity, and fusion produces mere integration. *Only when the whole acquired psychic nexus becomes active* can images be transformed on the basis of it: *innumerable, immeasurable, almost imperceptible changes* occur in their nucleus. And in this way, the completion of the particular originates from the fullness of psychic life" (SW V 104). Completion thus requires this relation to the whole of life through the acquired psychic nexus in order for its transformation of an image to be essential and meaningful, rather than random and merely external to the image. The image as it is present within everyday life is already in relation to the whole of life through our acquired experience, although this relation is

implicit and indeterminate, not immediate or distinct. Through completion, the artist can transform images so that they express their relation to the whole more explicitly. As the relation is already implicit in our everyday experience, the artist's transformation is not imposed or external to the image, but instead reveals the depth and breadth of relations that were already present. Moreover, this connection to the whole allows the work of art to affect its spectator – the shared meaning of human experience resonates with us all.

Likewise, just as the acquired psychic nexus is not a static structure for experience but formed and transformed through time, so the formation and transformation of images is not a single act – "psychic life is only able to produce these image formations in a temporal sequence… The mode and manner in which the transformations occur is that of *unfolding"* (SW V 105). Thus the formation of images is "a living process" (SW V 105). Life not only serves as the reference for the artistic process of completion, but it also characterizes the nature of our mind and all its functions. From these relations between the acquired psychic nexus, which describes the totality of our conscious experience, its processes of formation, and the metamorphosis of life, we can see the intimate relation between the everyday and art in Dilthey's aesthetics. Dilthey does not separate artistic creation and aesthetic experience from the processes of our everyday experience; instead, "the *substratum of poetic creativity* was sought in the processes that develop our sphere of experience" (SW V 115). Art thus bears witness to the functions of our mind and life as a whole and provides concrete ways of articulating the inner transformations that constitute our experience and thought.

Poetic metamorphosis, moreover, relates art to the everyday without creation an absolute system. Even though Dilthey sees every perception, thought, and feeling as

connected in the acquired psychic nexus, we cannot grasp it as a whole. The coherence of the acquired psychic nexus is distinct from the absolute system of consciousness put forward by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The totality of life provides a general structure in which we can articulate the significance of a particular image, but there is no absolute meaning that can be assigned to it. The concrete particular is not subsumed by the universal. Completion is not absolute for Dilthey. The sense in which completion remains tied to the concrete, historical particular – rather than universals or absolute truths – can be seen in his discussion of the typical and style in art, which are both products of the poetic metamorphosis of images. Dilthey's discussion of the typical and style in art allow us to understand completion and the transformation of images as a way of relating parts to the whole without subsuming the parts to an absolute whole, i.e. as hermeneutical and factical rather than dialectical.

3. Poetic Metamorphosis and Dilthey's Hermeneutical Aesthetics

Dilthey's *Poetics* is meant to address the problematic between historical contingency and universal concepts mentioned in his evaluation of the third tenet of German aesthetics. According to Dilthey, this problematic forms "[t]he central question of all poetics—that concerning the *universal validity* or historical variability of the judgment of taste, of the concept of beauty, of technique and its rules…" (SW V 54, original italics). The issue of historical contingency or universal validity is important because it determines what gives meaning and value to art, as well as to what extent a work of art, artistic technique, style or art movement retains its meaning and value outside of its socio-historical context. Over-emphasis on historical contingency reduces the work of art and artist's technique to its socio-historical context such that the work of

art lacks meaning outside of its limited circumstances, and the artist becomes merely representative of that specific time and place. However, the opposite problem arises when we approach works of art in terms of absolute universal validity – the concrete particularity of the work of art becomes lost in abstract ideals. How can we locate the significance of a work of art without reference to its place in history, its expression of a particular culture, or its relation to specific elements of human experience? Moreover, art history makes us aware of the great diversity in works of art and artistic technique, making it difficult to establish a universal theory of art or timeless standards of taste with any authority. With these issues in mind, Dilthey's poetics attempts to resolve the tension between the logical, normative approaches to art that characterize seventeenth-century aesthetics and the historicism of nineteenth-century German philosophers like Winckelmann and Herder. Dilthey's solution to this dilemma is grounded in the formative processes of his psychology—to be specific, his acquired psychic nexus. [28]

The acquired psychic nexus grounds the individual in the diversity and contingency of concrete lived experience while continually articulating meaning by focusing relations towards the whole of life. We have seen this in Dilthey's description of the formative processes of the mind. This nexus of interrelations is acquired concretely in the socio-historical context of an individual person, yet the individual is not limited to her socio-historical context because the relations that determine meaning are not simply given—they are *formed*. As relations to be formed, articulation achieves a particular freedom from what is given. Experience as a whole is an indeterminate complex of

[28] For a more detailed account of Dilthey's psychology of the imagination in relation to the history of aesthetics, see Rudolf A. Makkreel, "Toward a Concept of Style: An Interpretation of Wilhelm Dilthey's Psycho-Historical Account of the Imagination." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*. (1968): 27. 171-181.

relations that requires us as individuals to formulate ideas that transcend the singularity and specificity of that experience. We transform experience by transcending its singularity and creating meaningful relations. For Dilthey, this transformation allows art to speak to its audience since "only those figures, situations, and actions that completely transcend the horizon of everyday experience live for mankind at large" (SW V 96). Art speaks to us only insofar as it can extend beyond the artist's individual perspective and the singularity of a particular experience. Art must achieve some sense of universality. Nonetheless, this transcendence is not absolute for Dilthey because it must always communicate to the experience of the individual, which is acquired concretely and thus contingently. Dilthey does not dictate universal principles for art, because the possibility of art and aesthetic experience rests in the acquired psychic nexus of the individual: "the experience of what is human is the foundation; generalization and inferences are applied to develop this experience further" (SW V 115). Thus the work of art is a product of the socio-historical context of an individual as it is freely transformed and brought to a more expansive meaning.

There are two main aspects of the work of art addressed by Dilthey that illustrate the ability of his poetics to mediate between historical contingency and universal validity: the typical and style. The typical describes how the meaning-content of a work of art is derived from individual lived experience and yet achieves "universal validity" and "necessity" through poetic metamorphosis (SW V 116). Style describes artistic technique as both particular to an individual artist's proclivities and indicative of universally valid norms (SW V 106). Together, the typical and style demonstrate how poetic metamorphosis can account for the work of art in reference to its particular time and

place without limiting it to its time and place, which would diminish the significance of the work of art and hinder the ability of artists to speak to a wider audience.

3.1 The Typical and Motifs: Historical Variability and Universal Necessity in Art

We expect works of art to move us, to speak to us in a meaningful way. With great works of art this communication often occurs across historical and cultural circumstances. We do not experience great art as limited to the circumstances in which it arose, because it still bears meaning for us and our lives. Moreover, in order for the artist to speak to a spectator or audience at all, she must overcome the particularity of her individual experience. The artist cannot speak of her own isolated, private experiences, or her art would lack meaning to others and would not evoke an aesthetic response: "Only to the degree that the work succeeds in forming lived experience so that it contains many experiences in the most intensified form can it attract the attention of a reflective person experienced in the world and satisfy him. What is presented is at the same time supposed to move the mind of the reader or listener. This cannot be accomplished through mere particulars" (SW V 115 - 116). This is true not only of art, but also of any reflection on a lived experience. When we reflect on a particular experience, we do not retain it in all its particularity – we transform it through exclusion, intensification or diminution, and completion. We disregard what is accidental or insignificant, we intensify or diminish the emotional aspects and focus on what is relevant and meaningful. Without these transformations, the particular experience remains confused, obscure, and opaque to our understanding. For this reason, Dilthey notes that "singularity as such is not what moves us" (SW V 116). Transformations allow for art to communicate to us by referring to more

generalized images of lived experience, such that "the very stuff of [our] own being is encompassed by these images" (SW V 116).

This communication of feeling is what Dilthey refers to as "universal necessity." The transformed image necessitates a response in the viewer or listener such that "every heart with feelings can re-create and appreciate the work in question" – i.e. it necessitates a response that can be felt by everyone (SW V 116). Universal necessity in art describes the communication of feeling that resonates with everyone, which is similar to Kant's notion of aesthetic judgment. Yet Dilthey does not rely upon the notion of common sense. Instead, the work of art has this power because it relates to what is essential about particulars, what grounds a particular event and relates it to the whole of life. Unlike the necessity described by the physical sciences, the necessity of the work of art is established because it bears a relation to what is essential about human experience.[29] This essential aspect of lived reality is "the typical."[30]

The typical is a generalized image that "transcends reality so that it can be felt and understood more profoundly" (SW V 101). We must note that Dilthey's sense of transcendence does not assert a higher reality or the creation of an alternate reality, but is instead a more intense and profound picture of everyday reality. For Dilthey, the typical is "an intensification of what is experienced, but not in the direction of empty ideality" (SW V 116). Unlike universal concepts, which are often determined as logically necessary in contradiction to the contingency of particulars, the typical is a generalization

[29] Müller-Vollmer discusses Dilthey's notion of the "essential" in terms of the "felt awareness of value", which involves "the experiencing individual's entire being" (139). See Kurt Müller-Vollmer, *Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Literature*: *A Study of Wilhelm Dilthey's* Poetik, (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963). Müller-Vollmer attaches the essential to self-reflection (*Selbstbesinnung*). His account, however, only captures one aspect of the essential: its felt quality for the individual. Yet Dilthey describes what is essential to life in terms of the typical, which goes beyond feeling and the individual. The typical mediates beyond individual experience and abstract concepts, which Müller-Vollmer does not address in his account.

[30] For distinction between type and typical see Makkreel, "Toward a Concept of Style," 176.

that maintains its relation to the particular and thus still bears a resemblance to the richness of lived experience. Unlike universals, the typical can "represent multiplicity in an image whose powerful and clear structure makes intelligible the meaning of our ordinary unfocused experiences of life" (SW V 116). The typical, which unlike universal concepts, allows for unity in diversity without becoming abstract.[31] As essential, the typical expresses what is significant within human experience for the individual in relation to the whole of life. The typical thus preserves the facticity of lived experience, its concreteness that bears a dynamic relation between the self and world, the here and now, and life as a whole. Through the typical, poetic metamorphosis conveys the irreducible relations and contexts of life.

As we possess the whole of life indeterminately and obscurely in the acquired psychic nexus and can arrive at sharper distinctions and greater meaning through the processes of exclusion, intensification and completion, so the poetic imagination can form images that recreate this psychic process and demonstrate a multiplicity of experiences in the unity of one powerful image. This power of poetic metamorphosis is demonstrated in the typical: "In a poetic work, everything is typical" (SW V 116). Just as the interrelations between the singular experiences of an individual's life can be drawn together to form a more significant whole, so the artist can invest a particular image with more general meaning by formulating what is essential about that image, i.e. its relation to the whole of life. Dilthey also describes this relation in terms of "motif." For Dilthey, "The significance of a life-relationship is apprehended in the material of reality through the poetic process. This produces a motivating force which then transforms what was

[31] "The typical as produced by the imagination is an image which has developed from a concrete experiential context and relates to that context alone." Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Sciences*, 112.

found to be poetically moving. The life-relationship thus apprehended, felt, generalized, and thereby made into a force which is effective in this way is called a 'motif'" (SW V 146). In artistic creation, what is typical or essential in life becomes a poetic force that can speak to us. We sense this life-relation in terms of motifs, which are more rich and evocative than concepts, yet broader than singular events, particular experiences, or limited socio-historical circumstances. In music, a composer can use a motif, a repeating succession of notes, to express a continued theme. A musical motif can change in terms of scale, key, or musical instruments, but it remains recognizable and ties the piece together by emphasizing a particular theme. In all the arts motifs create a unified entity that can change and take on new meaning and tones in its different expressions. Dilthey uses the example of the figure of Undine as a motif for our mysterious attraction to water. We see this motif in a great variety of forms, from the lure of water nymphs in Greek mythology to Ishmael's opening narrative in *Moby Dick*. Uniting these works in terms of a single motif does not take away from their particular contexts. Ishmael's description of how we are drawn to water as "the image of the ungraspable phantom of life" derives its particular force from the details of *Moby Dick.*[32] Herman Melville expresses qualities of this motif that are distinct from the water nymphs of ancient mythology. As a result, the multiplicity of expressions makes it impossible to unite the motif to a single, universal concept. Although a motif can express a unified idea or theme, we lack a determinate concept that could replace that motif by encompassing all its varied expressions. We cannot grasp a motif as an abstract concept; we can only understand it by unfolding its complex relation to life: "Motifs are extracted from the fullness of lived experience" (SW V 167). The motif thus presents us with unity while preserving the diversity that

[32] Herman Melville, *Moby Dick*, 8th printing, (Boston: C.H. Simonds Company, 1922). 9.

contributes to its meaning for life. Just as the acquired psychic nexus allows Dilthey to discuss the whole of life without determining it in absolute concepts, so motifs can refer to the whole of life without detracting from the concrete and diverse elements of lived experience.

By referring to what is essential about the concrete relations and contexts of lived experience, the typical and motifs refer to the whole of life. By situating poetic metamorphosis, the typical, and motifs within the framework of the acquired psychic nexus, we can see how it develops a more general account of human life while preserving the great variety of experience. Within the acquired psychic nexus, there are no isolated experiences. Moreover since the connections between the content of our experience are "just as real as the contents," what is essential to an image remains just as concrete as everyday experience (SW V 72). The typical thus speaks to what is essential in experience, without determining it as an absolute universal. The "universal validity" of art thus holds necessity only through experience: "This necessity is thus in accord with freedom" (SW V 117). In this way, Dilthey's notion of the typical allows him to explain the concrete aspects of art as it relates to its particular climate without denying its ability to transcend its circumstances and speak to humanity at large.

3.2 Style and Poetic Metamorphosis

Dilthey's approach to art through descriptive psychology does not simply refer to how art can move the spectator. We should not confuse his *Poetics* with mere spectator aesthetics. Instead, the formative and transformative processes in the *Poetics* allow Dilthey to account for the artist and her ability to create. Moreover, just as the typical mediates between the concrete particularity and universal necessity of aesthetic

experience, so Dilthey's notion of artistic creation expresses both the individual artist's stylistic idiosyncrasies and how that artist's style fits within a larger historical context or art movement. In Dilthey's *Poetics*, style is both an expression of the artist's individual lived-expression as well as the more general art movements of the time that manifest their socio-historical context. The processes of exclusion, intensification and completion allow Dilthey to account for style without reducing it to the mere expression of the spirit of an artist's time and place, a reductive approach that takes away from the individual artist's contribution to the art world.

Style expresses art's transformation of lived experience according to the habits and tendencies of the individual artist. An artist may favor or emphasize one process of transformation (exclusion, intensification or diminution, and completion) over another, which determines the style of her work. "A poet's style depends on the predominance of one or another of these principles" (SW V 106). Thus the processes of poetic metamorphosis do not simply transform the content of lived experience to create art: they also determine the style of a work of art. For example, we might recognize a tendency toward powerful emotional and psychological tension in Flannery O'Connor's writing in contrast to the graceful subtlety of Eudora Welty's more subdued style. Even though both women are characterized as Southern Gothic, O'Connor's style demonstrates her tendency towards intensification, while Welty's more minimalist style tends towards exclusion and diminution. We cannot fully account for their writing styles in general categories.

Style is particular to the individual artist. Dilthey describes an artist's style as "a habit based in his nature" – i.e. based on the living, formative and transformative

processes of the artist's mind that can become habitual (SW V 105). The formation and transformations of psychic processes that are expressed within the acquired psychic nexus are not completely free and without order, otherwise the mind could not establish anything. The acquired psychic nexus grounds and gives substance to the transformative power of imagination. As such, the establishment of relations in the acquired psychic nexus can form habits and tendencies at an individual level. We see these personal habits and tendencies expressed in the style of an individual artist.

Yet we also discuss style in more general terms, especially insofar as a style may be more relevant to certain culture or time periods than others. We can identify an artist's style as belonging to a circle in a very specific geographical setting, to the tastes and values of society at that time, to a particular art movement in history, or to a certain period's notion of art. We can evaluate the place of an artist's style in ever broadening socio-historical contexts. An artist's style is not an isolated expression of personal taste, otherwise it would not elicit a response in others. Nevertheless, despite Dilthey's emphasis on style at the level of the individual artist, he does not contradict the broader concept of style. As Makkreel notes, "Dilthey was sure that his proposed descriptive psychology could do justice not only to the ability of the poet to transform images creatively but also to the historical framework within which the poet must work."[33] Here we can see the strength of Dilthey's account of poetic metamorphosis: because the acquired psychic nexus roots the individual in both the concrete particularity of the personal as well as the larger contexts of social and historical values – and the largest possible context, life as a whole – we do not need to sacrifice the individual for the sake of the universal when we describe poetic metamorphosis. The psychic processes that

[33] Makkreel, "Towards a Concept of Style," 173.

characterize an individual's tendencies towards certain stylistic transformations also make the transformed image more general, more typical, and thus more expressive of human experience. The acquired psychic nexus provides an account not of isolated subjective experience, but of the confluence between inner feeling and external forces from the world, i.e. between the individual and the variety of historical and cultural contexts to which she belongs, without reducing the concrete particularity of the individual's experience to her context.[34] Accordingly, style mediates between the limits of historical contingency and the universal import of artistic creation. Dilthey's account of poetic metamorphosis thus allows him to negotiate between the salient aspects of Kant's universal necessity and Herder's historicism, which he had described as the "central question of all poetics" (SW V 54).

3.3 Dilthey's Hermeneutical Aesthetics

Dilthey's treatment of the typical, motifs and style provide an account of general aspects of art without sublating the concrete elements of artworks or the individuality of the artist into absolute, universal concepts. In this way, Dilthey is able to mediate between the historicism of Herder and the universal necessity of Kant without relying upon an Absolute like Fichte or a dialectic account of art history like Hegel. Dilthey's ability to negotiate between particularity and generalization and between individuals and their broad historical contexts bears close relation to Schleiermacher's method of hermeneutics.

[34] See Bambach: "Dilthey claimed that it is not the transcendental, transhistorical, and transcultural 'self' that experiences historical life but the vital, living, pulsating human being conditioned in its historical place and time" (149). Bambach provides an excellent account of how Dilthey addresses the problem of historicism.

Friedrich Schleiermacher introduced the idea of the hermeneutic circle to account for how we should approach interpreting written texts. Interpretation is not a straight-forward method, but always proceeds in a circle because in order to understand any part of a book we must understand the general argument of the book, and in order to fully understand the book we must examine each part. This circle extends beyond how we read and applies to knowledge in general: "Complete knowledge is always in this apparent circle, that each particular can only be understood via the general, of which it is a part, and vice versa. And every piece of knowledge is only scientific if it is formed in this way."[35] The hermeneutic circle provides a general account of understanding and of language. It extends beyond the pages of the book, however, and relates to individual understanding and language and more general rules. Schleiermacher states that "every person is a location in which a given language forms itself in an individual manner, on the other hand their discourse can only be understood via the totality of language."[36] We must approach language in terms of both individual usage and universal rules without reducing one aspect to the other. We cannot simplify the complexity of these relations through reductive explanations. Language as such is not a system of single representations; it is a system of *relatedness* in which every word is a relation. For Schleiermacher, every single utterance must be understood in terms of "the whole life to which it belongs."[37]

We can see how Dilthey's approach in *Poetics* draws from Schleiermacher's hermeneutical method. Dilthey's concept of poetic metamorphosis relies upon relating

[35] Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics and Criticism*, trans. Andrew Bowie, Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1998. 24.
[36] Ibid., 8.
[37] Ibid., 9.

particulars to the whole of life, and yet individual lived experience remains significant and meaningful. The typical, motifs, and style cannot move us unless they bear a relation to our lived experience in a general yet concrete manner. Thus to provide an account of art we must continually move from particulars to universals and back again. Dilthey's psychological account allows this possibility by characterizing the unity of our experience in terms of the acquired psychic nexus. The acquired psychic nexus describes the individual's life as a whole, while remaining grounded in singular life events as well as the values and ideas of the socio-historical context to which the individual belongs. The acquired psychic nexus relies upon the same structures of relation and meaning as the hermeneutic circle.[38]

As hermeneutical, Dilthey's aesthetics addresses the relation between art and life, while allowing for the historical development of art and the historical variability of taste. In this way, Dilthey's method addresses the enduring significance of art without denying the importance of new art movements. In his conclusion to *Poetics,* Dilthey describes this dual nature of art when he states that there "is a core to the meaning of life, as the poet would like to portray it, which is the same for all ages. Thus, there is something eternal about a great poet. But man is simultaneously a historical creature. When a new social order has been instituted and the meaning of life has changed, the poets of the preceding epoch no longer move us as they once moved their contemporaries" (SW V 171). Thus Dilthey recognizes the "historical relativity of even the most perfect form" (SW V 170).

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[38] Other scholars have also noted this connection between Dilthey's *acquired psychic nexus* and Schleiermacher's hermeneutic circle. See Jos de Mul, *The Tragedy of Finitude: Dilthey's Hermeneutics of Life*, trans. Tony Burret, (New Haven and London: Yale University, 2004): "Although Dilthey does not use the term himself, the model of human development formed following Schleiermacher's hermeneutics could be called *hermeneutic*, or *narrative*" (176). See also Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer*, (Northwestern: Northwestern University, 1969), especially pp. 118 – 121.

Every artistic style and form is historically formed and subject to change. Yet Dilthey's aesthetics does not fall into Herder's complete historical relativity, because he roots poetic metamorphosis in what remains essential to life despite its variability. By grounding poetic metamorphosis in the facticity of life, Dilthey develops a hermeneutic model for understanding art that can negotiate the tensions between historical variability and felt meaning.

4. The Relation between Factical Life and Art in Dilthey's Later Aesthetics

Dilthey's *Poetics* discusses the centrality of life in relation to art, but his approach to art does not fully reflect the ambiguity and complexity of its facticity. Life forms an unchanging and impenetrable nucleus, a *facticity*, that grounds the great variety of artistic transformations (SW V 129, 156). Dilthey explains that "[f]acticity has always proved to be the ultimate fresh and firm nucleus of every poetic work. Therefore a poetic work always contains more than can be expressed in a general proposition, and its gripping force comes precisely from this surplus" (SW V 137). This relation to life can never be exhausted, and what is essential to life can never be fully articulated. A great work of art "is as irrational and incommensurable at its nucleus as the life that it portrays" (SW V 149). Dilthey's *Poetics* focuses more on the transformative power of poetic imagination, whereas his later aesthetics shifts toward the question of how life-relations are expressed in poetry. While Chapters Four and Five will discuss Dilthey's later aesthetics in greater detail, I will note a few key developments in Dilthey's understanding of the facticity of art here.

While Dilthey's *Poetics* discusses facticity, this work focuses more on the inner processes of artistic transformation than on life itself. *Fragments for a Poetics* (1907 –

1908), Dilthey's unfinished manuscript that was meant to revise his *Poetics*, demonstrates an attempt to redefine his early, more subjective approach with one that is more "object-oriented."[39] Dilthey begins his revisions by describing lived experience as a dynamic unity with a structural nexus of parts that "are connected through the unity of the object" (SW V 226). Dilthey writes, "We move not in the sphere of sensations, but that of objects; not in the sphere of feelings, but that of value, meaning, etc." (SW V 228). Dilthey's *Fragments* establish that artistic expressions are not purely subjective or internal, but "always contain a relation of subject and object" (SW V 229). Dilthey's descriptive approach treats lived experience as a nexus of relations and interweaving of self and world. These fragments also revise his *Poetics* because they critique his earlier approach to psychology and instead point to the difficulty of delimiting feelings. Rather than forming distinct spheres, feelings "merge into each other" and lack clear distinctions (SW V 228). Although the spheres of feeling give a more holistic account of experience than previous philosophical accounts and deepen the significance of feeling for experience and understanding, Dilthey recognizes that these spheres impose an artificial structure on lived experience. A more descriptive and "indirect" method is needed (SW V 229).

Dilthey's 1894 essay *Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology* attempts to outline such a method and exemplifies a revised approach to feeling. In this essay Dilthey explains that in "life itself, feelings regularly confront us as concretely fused" (SW II 161). Dilthey uses the work of art to illustrate this fusion—this complex interweaving that characterizes lived experience, which cannot be dissected into discrete

[39] See editors' footnote on p. 228 of Dilthey, "Fragments for a Poetics" in *Selected Works*, volume 5, 223 – 231. Henceforth cited as SW V.

parts: “In a painting, the affective tonality of specific colors, their harmonies and contrasts, formal beauty, expression, and the enjoyment of ideal content all work together to form a total impression” (SW II 161). The work of art is Dilthey’s model for the facticity of lived experience.

Dilthey’s re-examination of lived experience and psychology privileges art to an even greater degree. In posing the task of a descriptive psychology, Dilthey writes, “One longs for a psychology capable of catching in the web of its descriptions that extra dimension in the works of writers and poets that has eluded past and present psychological theories” (SW II 128). Art provides a superior understanding of feeling and lived experience than psychology, and thus seems to serve as a model for Dilthey’s descriptive approach. Similarly, the *Fragments* emphasize the privileged role of art in understanding life. In this manuscript, Dilthey emphasizes that it is impossible to grasp lived experience in clear, conceptual terms, because life has its own inherent relations and meaning. Dilthey critiques his earlier psychological approach when he states that the “[gathering together and completing of lived experience] is more basic and more natural than the move to psychology. Lived experience obtains an expression, which represents it in its fullness: It brings out something new. It neither utilizes nor in any way requires psychological concepts” (SW V 228). Life-relations and life-categories are felt, articulated, and understood through art in a way that psychology does not capture. Whereas explanative psychology seeks differences and clear categories for the sake of delimitation, Dilthey wants to pursue a descriptive and analytic approach that recognizes the limits of such a task.

Dilthey's critique of explanatory psychology and its psychological concepts, which fail to get at lived-relations, relates to his distinction between 'formal categories' and 'real categories' in "Life and Cognition" (circa 1892 – 1893). Here Dilthey defines 'formal categories' as those that create "relations by which thought elucidates what is actual. These relationships occur in thought" (SW II 87). Dilthey distinguishes formal categories from 'real categories,' which

> are completely different from these. [Real categories] are not grounded in reason at all, but in the nexus of life itself. The characteristic feature of those formal categories is that they are completely transparent and unequivocal. This points to their origin in thought. The mark of real categories is that their content is unfathomable for thought. They are the nexus of life. This is certain and explicit for reflexive awareness, but unfathomable for the intellect. (SW II 87)

Real categories are rooted in life—that is, in the complex nexus of life-relations and the implicit meaningfulness of life. While these categories are "unfathomable for thought," they are still available to us and can be given expression through articulation. For this reason, the nexus of life "is not to be derived from concepts" but must be articulated instead (SW II 87). Here Dilthey expresses the idea that he developed in "Life and Cognition"—namely, that "life articulates itself."[40] Or, as Dilthey states in his *Fragments,* lived experience "generates its own expressions" (SW V 229). The facticity of life presents us with implicit meaning that defies clear concepts at the same time that it demands expression. For Dilthey, art exemplifies the expression of life. Not only do his descriptions of lived relations and real categories take up examples of art, but his characterization of descriptive psychology looks to art as a model.

[40] "Life and Cognition: A Draft for an Epistemic Logic and a Theory of Categories," trans. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Jacob Owensby, in *Understanding the Human World*, *Wilhelm Dilthey Selected Works*, vol. II, 58 – 114. 70. Henceforth cited as SW II.

Thus in his late aesthetics, rather than seeking the inner processes that characterize artistic imagination, Dilthey emphasizes art as a meaningful engagement with the world. In this sense, his revised aesthetics is more attuned to the facticity of lived experience and the limits that facticity imposes on thought. Chapters Four and Five will expand upon the relation between facticity and art in Dilthey's aesthetics through his essay on Hölderlin, which will also serve as the basis for comparing Dilthey's aesthetics and Heidegger's philosophy of art.

Chapter Three

Art as Origin: Heidegger's Transformation of the Sensible

Before bringing Dilthey's aesthetics and Heidegger's philosophy of art into dialogue, this chapter will address Heidegger's unique contributions to thinking about art. Like Dilthey, Heidegger's approach to art notes a divorce between works of art and theories of art. Heidegger questions whether or not art history, criticism, curatorship, and the art industry as a whole can approach the work of art at all. Heidegger explains the status of art as follows: "Works are made available for public and private art appreciation. Official agencies assume the care and maintenance of works. Connoisseurs and critics busy themselves with them. Art dealers supply the market. Art-historical study makes the works the objects of a science. Yet in all this busy activity do we encounter the work itself?"[1] Art appreciation approaches the work of art as an object to satisfy the spectator's sensibilities or edify her in some way. Curators are concerned with the physical preservation of a work of art, its display for an audience, and its authenticity. Critics are concerned with evaluating and comparing works to note important movements, techniques, breakthrough, and contributions to the artworld, while art dealers are concerned with the market value of works. Art history approaches art as a cultural product to be collected and classified like a specimen. Each of these approaches objectify the work of art and treat it as something secondary to the subject, as an object projected by a subject, rather than something that strikes us and opens up a world. "The whole art industry, even if carried to the extreme and exercised in every way for the sake of the works themselves, extends only to the object-being of the works. But this does not

[1] Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, (New York: Perennial Classics, 2001), 15 – 86. 39. Henceforth cited as PLT followed by page number.

constitute their work-being" (PLT 40). The work-being of art is only accessible when we recognize what happens in art, i.e. what art gives rather than simply what we take from it.

For Heidegger, the work of art is an origin, a unique way in which truth happens. He presents art as our very access to things and the creation of our world, an idea that reworks the subject-object distinction by providing a deeper relation. Heidegger's account of art goes beyond previous ideas of subjectivity and objectivity, which in turn transforms our relation to the sensible world. This chapter will consider how Heidegger's association of art and truth dismantles the subject-object distinction by transforming the relation between sensibility and intelligibility in "The Origin of the Work of Art" (1935/36) and in his l936 – 1937 winter seminar "The Will to Power as Art," which also takes up the question of art and truth. By resisting the opposition of art and truth in Plato and Nietzsche, Heidegger transforms the sensible-intelligible divide and its meaning for art. In particular, revising the sensible in a way that does not exclude truth, Heidegger allows art to be a unique way of accessing the thing in its fullness, rather than abstracting from its complex relations through rational frameworks. Art opens up the world by maintaining the facticity of things.

1. The Transformation of the Sensible in Heidegger's Philosophy of Art

Heidegger's critiques of art theory, especially aesthetics, reflect his concern with facticity for two main reasons. First, aesthetics is based on sensuous apprehension, which treats the world as mere empirical data and experience as the product of representation. Sensuous apprehension treats the world as a collection of inert things to be grasped. Secondly, aesthetics relies on dichotomies such as subject-object, intelligible-sensible, and form-matter, which impose a logical structure on everything. This logical structure

adds clarity, but abstracts from the complex relationality of things and ignores their unfathomable depths. In both ways, sensuous apprehension fails to account for facticity. Facticity expresses the way the self is always already caught up in the world and not a subject detached from the world. Facticity implies a world is not merely a collection of empirical data or an a priori framework for the possibility of experience. Moreover, facticity describes the patency of things in the world that is irreducible and resists conceptual frameworks. By *patency,*[2] I mean an openness that is present and felt, yet contingent because this process of opening requires being exposed or wrested from a deeper, hidden source. In this sense, Heidegger's critiques of sensuous apprehension and aesthetics in the 1930's express the same issues as his earlier concern with factical life.

This section will outline his critiques of aesthetics as the science of sensuous apprehension to explain how Heidegger revises theories of art.

1.1 Overcoming Aesthetics: Heidegger's Critique of Sensuous Apprehension

The Epilogue to "The Origin of the Work of Art" describes the necessity of overcoming aesthetics. Heidegger writes:

> Aesthetics takes the work of art as an object, the object of *aesthesis*, of sensuous apprehension in the broad sense. Today we call this apprehension lived experience. The way in which man experiences [erlebt] art is supposed to give information about its nature. Lived experience is the source that is standard not only for art appreciation and enjoyment, but also for artistic creation. Everything is a lived experience. Yet perhaps lived experience is the element in which art dies. (PLT 77)[3]

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[2] Patency is used in contemporary French phenomenology, especially Merleau-Ponty's and Jean-Luc Nancy's works. Patency, or *patence* in French, describes the openness of things and world, but is not meant to be completely opposed to latency, or hiddenness. Patency relates to facticity because it has a sense of a deeper, hidden source that allows its disclosure. See my discussion of Nancy in Chapter Five, p. 247. See also Ian James, *The Fragmentary Demand: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), especially pp. 219 – 220.

[3] Translation modified to reflect Heidegger's use of *Erlebnis*, which he contrasts to *Erfahrung*. See further explanation in Chapter Three, pp. 151 – 159. See Heidegger, *Holzwege*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 5, ed. F.W. von Hermann, (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 67.

For Heidegger, aesthetics treats the sensuous apprehension of the subject as the determining factor of art. Within the narrow perimeters of sensuous apprehension, everything about the work of art becomes subsumed into the experience of the subject in contrast to the work of art itself and its meaningful relations to the world and truth. This narrow sense of aesthetics reduces art to mere appreciation and enjoyment. Heidegger plays off the language of life and death to argue that emphasizing the *lived* experience of the subject results in the *death* of art. That is, when art becomes a matter of subjective experience, the more fundamental comportment between the self and the work of art is covered over. By contrast, for Heidegger, the relation between the self and the work of art is one of resonance. The work of art speaks to us; it cannot be reduced to subjective experience. If the work of art is a mere object to be experienced, its meaning becomes a projection that has no depth.[4] As a result, aesthetics covers over the truth of the work of art and the depth of its meaning. Heidegger's description of the work of art as an origin is meant to dismantle the modern metaphysics of presence by opposing the tendency of aesthetics to define art in terms of the subject.[5]

Heidegger also problematizes sensation at the beginning of "The Origin of the Work of Art." Heidegger's critique of aesthetics follows from his initial critique of the thing-concept *aistheton*, or "the unity of a manifold of sensations."[6] This concept makes the thing the product of sensation, which does violence to the thing by bringing it into such close proximity to ourselves. *Aistheton* does not allow the thing to rest in itself and determines it entirely according to our own sensibilities. This mode of determining the

[4] This concern mirrors his critique of representation in "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" and "The Age of the World Picture." Such truth cannot be *alētheia*, or unhiddenness. See discussion in sections 1.2 and 1.3.
[5] Heidegger's use of the word *aesthetics* is very narrow and relies upon a restrictive definition of the sensible as sensuous apprehension. See my introduction for a less reductive definition of aesthetics.
[6] See fuller discussion of his critique of *aistheton* on pp. 124 – 125 of this section.

thing's sensible qualities abstracts from the thing, which is actually closer to us than any isolated sensation could be.[7] In attempting to bring the thing closer, sensuous apprehension pushes it away and forms an abstraction in its place. Aesthetics cannot grapple with the thingly aspects of art, nor recognize the way the work of art allows us to approach the thing without violence. Sensuous apprehension makes the work of art an abstraction.

Heidegger's lecture course on Nietzsche's notion of art as will to power critiques aesthetics along similar lines and draws out its history in terms of sensation. This lecture course discusses how art is divorced from truth in the history of aesthetics and sheds light on the significance of this opposition for the sensible [*Sinnlich*].

1.2 Art vs. Truth: Plato, Nietzsche, and the Sensible-Intelligible[8] Distinction

Heidegger's 1936–1937 winter semester lecture course on Nietzsche's "Will to Power as Art" takes up the entire history of Western aesthetics. Heidegger describes aesthetics as "*aisthētikē episteme*: knowledge of human behavior with regard to sense, sensation, and feeling, and knowledge of how these are determined."[9] Since the beautiful determines feeling, Heidegger looks at aesthetics as "consideration of the beautiful to the extent that it stands in relation to man's state of feeling" (N I 78). The work of art is the object of this consideration, or "the bearer and provoker of the beautiful with relation to our state of feeling" (N I 78). According to Heidegger, aesthetics arises when philosophy develops a distinction between the subject and object in experience. Thus the early

[7] See explanation in 2.1 of this chapter.
[8] Heidegger uses the language of sensible [*Sinnlich*] and supersensible [*Übersinnlich*] to describe the conflict between the material and ideal in Plato and Nietzsche. I describe this conflict as *sensible* and *intelligible* instead since English translations of Plato's divided line use 'intelligible' rather than 'supersensible.'
[9] Heidegger, *Nietzsche I: The Will to Power as Art*,trans. David Farrell Krell, (New York: Harper & Row, 1991). 78. Henceforth cited as N I.

Greeks had no sense of aesthetics because there was no subject-object division that would allow for an epistemology of sense and feeling. Moreover, since early Greek thought had no subject-object distinction, art originally had no sense of cognitive-conceptual mediation that could separate art and truth (N I 80). The rise of aesthetics marks the division of truth and art.

To grapple with this sense of truth, we can turn to Heidegger's earlier reworking of truth developed in "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" (1931-32). In this essay, Heidegger gives a close reading of Plato's allegory of the cave to describe a dramatic shift in how the essence of truth is defined in Western thought. Plato's allegory of the cave presents us with a metaphor for education, which Heidegger refers to as a formation [*Bildung*].[10] In the allegory of the cave, education is a transformative process—"a series of movements"— in which the soul turns away from the shadows on the wall and moves toward being. Heidegger describes this transformative process as "removing human beings from the region where they first encounter things and transferring and accustoming them to another realm where beings appear" (PDT 165, 167). This education means moving through regions where being becomes unhidden. By thinking of truth as unhiddenness, a*lētheia* describes a continual unveiling of what was hidden. *Alētheia* acknowledges that truth, or unhiddenness, relies upon something more fundamental: hiddenness. According to Heidegger, "for the Greeks hiddenness, as an act of self-hiding, permeated the essence of being and thus also determined beings in their presentness and accessibility" (PDT 171). In acknowledging the hidden that allows for unhiddenness,

[10] Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" in *Pathmarks*, Thomas Sheehan, trans., William McNeill, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1998), 155-182. 166. Cited henceforth in the text as PDT followed by the page number.

alētheia conveys the idea that truth is given by being.[11] Yet because hiddenness permeates being, truth cannot simply be given. The truth must be "wrested from hiddenness" (PDT 172). *Alētheia* recognizes that the "unhidden must be torn away from a hiddenness; it must be stolen from hiddenness" (PDT 171). Truth grapples with being. This sense of truth thus gestures toward the impenetrable source of what is given as presence.

Yet this sense of wresting truth from hiddenness disappears when Plato's allegory moves to the exterior of the cave and describes the sun. Outside of the cave, the sun represents *idea* (ίδεά , appearance or visibility), which is the source of truth. Whereas *alētheia* indicates a sense of the hiddenness of being (the hiddenness that provides the possibility for unhiddenness), idea has only the sense of appearance and pure presence. According to Heidegger, "The 'idea' is the visible form that offers a view of what is present. The ίδεά is pure shining… The essence of the idea consists in its ability to shine and be seen" (PDT 173). Rather than the unhiddenness of being, pure shining becomes the basis of truth. *Alētheia* becomes grounded in *idea*. This shift is significant because truth and being become essentially tied to presence and the ability to be seen, which presupposes someone who sees. The visibility of idea requires a seer: "insofar as the access is necessarily carried out through 'seeing,' unhiddenness is yoked into a 'relation' with seeing, it becomes 'relative' to seeing" (PDT 173). With this redefinition of truth, education becomes a matter of how we learn to see what is external and present to us– "a process whereby the gaze becomes more correct" (PDT 177). The locus of truth shifts to

[11] See explanation of *Es gibt* in Chapter Five, pp. 213 – 215.

our gaze, which disregards how being discloses itself.[12] When the idea of *alētheia* becomes yoked to *idea*, truth becomes "correctness." For Heidegger, this idea of truth marks the beginning of metaphysics. Metaphysics redefines truth as a correct correspondence between thought and being, which covers over its deeper, hidden source in being. Consequently, when truth is defined as "correct vision" there is no longer a sense of wresting what is hidden. Correctness pertains only to what is before us now. Moreover, correct vision is a relation of the knower to what is known. Truth becomes a characteristic of thought and not being; as a result, truth loses its roots in this fundamental experience of the unhiddenness of being.

Unlike Plato, for Heidegger there is no ultimate, universal being, only a limit that we cannot fully uncover.[13] Reducing truth to presence covers over being. From Heidegger's perspective, Plato's ideas render us oblivious to being by assuming that being can be fully revealed as presence. Our obliviousness to being means we cannot participate in the transformative process that continually wrests truth and brings it into presence from what is hidden. Our world becomes a picture, a display of shadows on the wall, instead of a dynamic experience of the unfolding of being. In "The Age of the World Picture" (1938), Heidegger describes the metaphysics of presence in this way. By defining truth as presence, metaphysics frames being in terms of the subject, which makes the world a picture, a representation projected by the subject: "Beings as a whole are now taken in such a way that a being is first and only in being insofar as it is set in

[12] The gaze is also present in Heidegger's discussion of Plato within the Nietzsche lectures, where he describes *eidos* as "outward appearance." Since *eidos* is the outer appearance of a thing, the *eidos* indicates the presence of a thing, or its being. Heidegger notes that we have forgotten that *eidos* is visual and not simply rational, a distinction that allows him to read Plato in such a way that he relates to Nietzsche. See "Plato's *Republic*" (N I 172).

[13] See Joan Stambaugh, *The Finitude of Being* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), especially Chapter 1.

place by representing-producing humanity."[14] Instead of unhiddenness, the "being of beings is sought and found in the representedness of beings."[15] Metaphysics makes truth representational and deflates the being of beings by framing truth in terms of correctness. In "The Origin of the Work of Art" Heidegger calls this concept of truth "correctness in representation" (PLT 50). Truth becomes a representation, a picture, a flattening of the dimensionality of being. While the representation may be correct in fact—or correspond to what is unhidden and in plain sight—unless a deeper origin is recognized, this representation remains a flat and lifeless picture that stands apart from us. Truth as correctness covers over the deeper sense of truth as unhiddenness. Representational thought fails to realize its place in a larger reality—a reality that is concealed as well as revealed, a reality in which truth happens and must be wrested from hidden depths. In this way, representational thought never approaches an authentic experience of being. Heidegger presents truth as *alētheia* in "The Origin of the Work of Art" so as to recall its source in being, i.e. to "[remind] ourselves of what, unexperienced and unthought, underlies our familiar and therefore outworn nature of truth in the sense of correctness" (PLT 50). Relating truth to art also challenges our concept of truth as correctness and opens up a more originary mode of relating to the world.

Heidegger attributes the origin of both metaphysics and aesthetics to Plato. Plato develops the matter-form distinction to define art as *technē*. *Technē* defines art as a "knowledge that guides and grounds confrontation with and mastery over beings" (N I 81). T*echnē* comes to designate an activity of forming matter, i.e. giving a shape to

[14] Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," 67 – 68. See also Babette Babich, "Heidegger's Philosophy of Science: Calculation, Thought, and *Gelassenheit*" in *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire: Essays in Honor of William J. Richardson, S.J.* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 589-599. Especially pp. 590-591.
[15] Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," 68.

matter according to some use. Since *technē* refers to both handicraft and art, use defines the work of art rather than truth. Here *technē* is a form of knowing that subordinates things to our way of thinking—it is not open or engaged. Use establishes art in relation to the subject and, divorced from truth, art becomes a matter of beauty. The separation of art from truth thus leads to the subjectivity of modern aesthetics. The distinguishing characteristic of modern aesthetics for Heidegger is that art becomes defined entirely in terms of feeling and taste. That is, the definition of art is reduced to the sensible enjoyment of the spectator, i.e. taste. Aesthetics becomes a "logic of sensuousness" that culminates in "a psychology that proceeds in the manner of the natural sciences: states of feeling are taken to be facts that come forward of themselves and may be subjected to experiments, observations, and measurement" (N I 83, 89).[16] This approach to art sets up the same problematic distinctions that Heidegger discusses in "The Age of the World Picture." That is, thought assaults what it attempts to understand by defining everything in terms of the subject.

For Heidegger, Hegel represents the complete fulfilment of modern aesthetics—"its greatest possible height, breadth, and rigor of form" (N I 84). Hegel takes aesthetics to its farthest limit by reshaping it into "a metaphysics of spirit" (N I 91). Yet art also finds its demise in Hegel, who proposes that "it was art—in contrast to religion, morality, and philosophy—that fell victim to nihilism and became a thing of the past, something nonactual" (N I 90). The history of aesthetics begins with Plato and ends with Hegel, a path that grows more and more subjective until the work of art becomes a mere thing of

[16] Here, Heidegger quotes Dilthey's "Vom Aufgang des geschichtlichen Bewusstseins: Jugendaufsätze und Erinnerungen" (GS XI) to support his point and adds that Dilthey is an exception to this method.

the past, its use outworn with time.[17] Heidegger contrasts Nietzsche to this trajectory of aesthetics and makes his physiology of art the *counter-movement* to Hegel (N I 90 – 91).

In contrast to Hegel, Nietzsche reverses the concept of truth that is put forward in Plato's philosophy by reversing the relation between sensibility and intelligibility. If we recall the divided line from *The Republic*, Plato's metaphysics distinguishes between the sensible realm of opinion and the intelligible realm of truth: "the supersensuous is the true world. It stands over all, as what sets the standard. The sensuous lies below, as the world of appearances." (N I 201). Due to this division, "art stands far below truth in Plato's metaphysics" (N I 187). In *The Republic*, Plato describes the artist as below the craftsman. The idea of the bed, its first and truest form, is created by the god. The craftsman creates a bed through knowledge of what a bed is and thus has access to the idea of the bed, but replicates it imperfectly by making it particular. The artist sees the bed and mimics it, which requires no knowledge of what a bed is, only appearances. The artist thus does not know the idea of the bed or anything about the particular concrete bed and creates from a mere appearance. The work of art is thus thrice removed from truth.[18]

By contrast, for Nietzsche, the sensuous world of appearances is the standard of truth. Nietzsche defines art in terms of bodily drives, rather than ideas. In *The Case of Wagner* Nietzsche references a work entitled "Toward a Physiology of Art" – which was not a completed work at the time, but we have in *Will to Power* as unfinished notes. Nietzsche's *Will to Power* gives us a sensual, bodily account of art—relating its genesis

[17] For further discussion of Heidegger's critique of Hegelian aesthetics see Chapter Four, section 1.2, pp. 175 – 179. Julian Young mistakenly attributes Heidegger's critique of aesthetics and discussion of the end of art as an "endorsement of Hegel." See Julian Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[18] Plato, Book X, *Republic*, trans. G.M.A. Gruce and C.D.C. Reeve, in *Plato Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper, John M. and D. S. Hutchinson. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,1997), 595a – 621d.

and creation to sexuality and animal drives. "The demand for art and beauty is an indirect demand for the ecstasies of sexuality communicated in the brain" (WTP §805). Like sexuality, art is organic, instinctual and life-giving – "Here we discover *art* as an organic function: we discover it in the most angelic instinct, 'love'; we discover it as the greatest stimulus to life" (WTP §808). Despite Nietzsche's emphasis on the bodily qualities and natural functions of art, his physiological account of art is not reductive. Nietzsche speaks of *intelligent sensuality* (WTP §800).[19]

For Heidegger, Nietzsche's physiology of art reverses Plato's concept of truth by pushing us toward the realization of *perspective*. The perspective of physiology opposes Plato's sense of truth: "The body and physiology the starting point: why? … In short, we… gain a valuation of *not-knowing*, of seeing things on a broad scale, of simplification and falsification, of perspectivity."[20] While the perspectivity of the senses was a justification for Plato to posit truth in a supersensuous realm for *what is* and cannot be seen as otherwise, Nietzsche embraces perspectivity as truth. For Nietzsche truth is – or perhaps more accurately, *truths are* – necessarily error. This means that any truth is open to constant revision, constant reworking; it has no possibility of being fixed as a constant. Nietzsche insists that "The most strongly believed a priori 'truths' are for me—*provisional assumptions*" (WTP §497). Thus, what was seen as error and illusion in Platonic metaphysics becomes truth in Nietzsche: "Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live" (WTP §493). Nietzsche continues to see art

[19] Nietzsche's suggestion of an intelligent sensuality could be considered an attempt to dismantle the sensible-intelligible division in Plato, but his metaphysics is not radical enough to overcome the truth-art distinction so his physiology is inadequate for resolving this problematic dichotomy—at least in terms of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche. For an interpretation of Nietzsche that demonstrates his radical rethinking of sensation see Gary Shapiro, *Archaeologies of Vision: Foucault and Nietzsche on Seeing and Saying*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

[20] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1967). §492. Cited henceforth in the text as WTP followed by the section number.

in opposition to truth, but treats lies as necessary for life. "We possess *art* lest we *perish of the truth*" (WTP §822). Or as Heidegger summarizes Nietzsche's aesthetics, "creation, as art, is will to semblance; it stands in severance from truth" (N I 218). Nietzsche overturns Plato's hierarchy of truth and art.

In this manner, Nietzsche's subversion of metaphysics opens up thought to new possibilities. This act of reversal should be seen as an affirmation of possibility, a positive undertaking of creating new horizons for truth. Heidegger describes Nietzsche's will-to-power metaphysics as *panoramic*, or "a looking beyond narrow perspectives" in such a way that it is "a looking that opens up perspectives" (N III.148). Nietzsche's aesthetics thus reverses the relation between truth and art and between the sensible and intelligible in Plato. Yet Nietzsche takes up the same dichotomies as Plato without transforming them to reveal a more originary relation. Heidegger sees Nietzsche as adopting the same metaphysical framework that operates in Plato's account of art, only inverted. Nietzsche thus constitutes an "end" – both an end to metaphysics and an end to aesthetics: "Here indeed the aesthetic inquiry into art in its ultimate consequences is thought to an end" (N1). The duality between the sensual and the ideal that defines traditional aesthetics has exhausted every possibility with Nietzsche.

Nietzsche's reversal of Plato's metaphysics, however, does not upend the problem of subjectivity in aesthetics but reinscribes it by denying that appearances have any underlying truth. The truth of appearances that replaces the Platonic notion of truth also covers over the more primordial notion of truth as *alētheia*. For Heidegger, Nietzsche's metaphysics might open up a more panoramic notion of perspective, but it still relies upon the modern subject. Nietzsche's philosophy can only resolve the metaphysics of

representation by conveying its contradictions; he offers no alternatives to the dichotomies of Plato. Truth and art remain in opposition. Nietzsche's physiological aesthetics thus does not break from metaphysics or representational thought in a way that transforms the sensible.

1.3 Beyond the Sensible-Intelligible Divide: The Facticity of the Sensible

These notions of art conceal a more originary notion *technē*. According to Heidegger, the more original sense of *technē* was not handicraft or some form of action. Instead, *technē* meant "to have seen, in the widest sense of seeing [*sehen*]…to apprehend what is present as such" (PLT 57).[21] This widest sense of seeing is ambiguous and not tied to a bodily, perceptual, or intellectual function. Heidegger exploits the ambiguity of the word *sehen* to avoid casting it as sensible or intelligible. Moreover, he connects this sight to being. To apprehend what is present means bringing beings out of concealment and into presence (PLT 57). By connecting *technē* to the unconcealment of beings, seeing is not simply determined by the seer. In "The Age of the World Picture" Heidegger describes being as that "which rises up and opens itself" and in doing so becomes present to those who open themselves to its presence.[22] Heidegger argues against representation, i.e. subjective perception, and claims that "man is the one who is looked upon by beings, the one who is gathered by self-opening beings into presencing with them."[23] This notion of perception describes a mutual relation, one that cannot be delineated into representation models of sensory perception that make the world a projection of the subject. Along similar lines Heidegger's undelivered lecture entitled "The Provenance of

[21] "Das Wort τέχνη nennt vielmehr eine Weise des Wissens. Wissen heiβt: gesehen haben, in dem weiten Sinne von sehen, der besagt: vernehmen des Anwesenden al seines solchen." Heidegger "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" in *Holzwege* (Vittorio Klostermann, 2003), 1 – 74. 46.
[22] Heidegger, "Age of the World Picture," 68.
[23] Ibid., 68

Thinking" (1973), which addresses *the experience of thought*, describes perception in a more originary way such that perception and the perceivable are open to one another. Heidegger claims that "[f]or perception to be able to be encountered at all by the perceivable, it must hold itself open… Both perception as well as presencing require for their own possibility—and this means at the same time for their 'to one another'—a free and open dimension, within which they encounter one another."[24] For Heidegger, perception is neither a subjective process nor the passive reception of an object, but the mutual opening up of self and world, an entanglement that allows an encounter to happen.

This idea of perception as an open dimension can include the body. In his 1968 seminar in Le Thor, Heidegger ties perception to the body as "the lived-body that utterly characterizes perception." [25] Heidegger quickly draws our attention to the ambiguity of the body as the site of perception and its possible dangers. He states, "the word 'body' that just appeared could jeopardize everything. We need to grasp the difference between 'lived-body' and 'body.' For instance, when we step on a scale, we do not weigh our 'lived-body' but merely the weight of our body.' Or further, the limit of the 'lived-body' is not the limit of the 'body.' The limit of the body is the skin. The limit of the 'lived-body' is more difficult to determine" (Z 32). Andrew Mitchell describes Heidegger's engagement with sculpture as shaping his sense of the lived-body. Mitchell explains, "For an experience of the sculptural confrontation with space, the human body cannot be an inert mass (Körper), it must be a lively responsive body (Leib), sensitive to the

[24] Heidegger, "The Provenance of Thinking" in *Four Seminars*, trans. Andrew Mitchell and Francois Raffoul, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 93.
[25] Heidegger, "Seminar in Le Thor" (1968) in *Four Seminars*, trans. Andrew Mitchell and Francois Raffoul, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 10-34. 32

qualifications of space that sculpture renders sensible."[26] The work of art transforms how Heidegger thinks of bodily, living perception, just as it transforms how he thinks of the thing.

While Heidegger does not take up the task of reworking sensation explicitly, his approach to philosophy of art transforms the sensible. By *sensible*, I do not mean sense data, sensory perception, or the sensuous apprehension of a subject. Instead, I intend the sensible to describe what is there for sense, what is given to sense in more originary manner and precedes the division between the sensing subject and sensed object—that is, the factical. Recasting sensibility in terms of facticity requires a subject that is sensitive and open and something that offers itself to sense without it necessarily giving itself over completed to sensory apprehension. The given of facticity always retains something that is hidden and incommensurable. Considering the sensible in terms of facticity rescues sensation from the metaphysics of pure presence—our perception is not complete and does not grasp the thing, but gestures toward what is hidden. This notion of the sensible allows the thing to come into presence.

As Heidegger critiques the metaphysical and representational frameworks that define aesthetics, his approach to the work of art must break from the dualism that ties Nietzsche to Plato –which we can see clearly in "The Origin of the Work of Art." By describing art as the happening of truth, Heidegger opposes Plato's elevation of truth above art and Nietzsche's elevation of art above truth. Bringing art and truth together reworks the sensible-intelligible divide that dominates the history of aesthetics from Plato to Nietzsche. By focusing on what the happening of truth in the work of art means for the

[26] Andrew J. Mitchell, *Heidegger Among the Sculptors*: *Body, Space, and the Art of Dwelling* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). 40.

sensible, we can see the truly radical nature of Heidegger's philosophy of art and its challenge to representational thought.

While Heidegger is critical of theories of sensation that are violent in their attempt to grasp things, his critiques gesture toward a new way of thinking about sensation. In "The Origin of the Work of Art" Heidegger attempts to overthrow accounts of art that do violence to the thingly aspect of the work of art, that impose a logical structure on the work of art as something sensible, and that create a false dichotomy between feeling and intellectual ideas. The following sections will take up Heidegger's discussion of the thing and art as the happening of truth to demonstrate this new sense of the relation between the sensible and intelligible.

2. Recovering the Thing through Art

Representational models of sensory perception and truth cover over the factical, especially insofar as they treat things as pure presence and ignore the dynamic between unhiddenness and concealment. For Heidegger, art reveals concealment. That is, art allows a way of approaching things that does not treat them as pure presence. In this way, art allows us access to things in the world. The following sections will explain the relation between the thing and art in "The Origin of the Work of Art."

2.1 Art as Thingly

Heidegger's investigation into art begins with this seemingly obvious and insignificant detail: that works of art are things, like other things in the world. That is, a "picture hangs on the wall like a rifle or a hat. A painting… travels from one exhibition to another. Works of art are shipped like coal from the Ruhr and logs from the Black Forest. During the First World War Hölderlin's hymns were packed in the soldier's knapsack

together with cleaning gear. Beethoven's quartets lie in the storerooms of the publishing house like potatoes in a cellar" (PLT 19). These comparisons are strange. We do not think to compare great works of art to hats or coal as Heidegger does here. Yet these comparisons, though seemingly mundane, break from both Kantian aesthetics, which emphasizes the subjective experience of the artist and spectator, and Hegelian philosophy of art, which emphasizes the idea of the work of art. More importantly, the *thingly aspect* of works, i.e. that they are things, is undeniable. Heidegger argues that "even the much-vaunted aesthetic experience cannot get around the thingly aspect of the art work. There is something stony in a work of architecture, wooden in a carving, colored in a painting, spoken in a linguistic work, sonorous in a musical composition" (PLT 19). Whereas philosophy of art so frequently leaps over the thingly aspect of art to address its intellectual meaning, Heidegger delves into this overlooked detail.

Yet, as Heidegger notes, the work of art is not a mere thing. Works are not mere things, but are made, i.e. created, and thus distinct from natural things. Heidegger states that "the art work is something else over and above the thingly element" not only because it is made, but also because "it says something other than the mere things itself… The work makes public something other than itself; it manifests something other; it is an allegory" (PLT 19). Here Heidegger acknowledges a common philosophical idea that the work is an allegory or symbol,[27] i.e. a sensuous manifestation that expresses an idea, but emphasizes that the thingly aspect of art is more essential than this "something other." That is, the thingly aspect of a work of art is more essential than the idea it expresses.

In addressing the thingly aspect first, Heidegger quickly reveals that we do not really know what the thing is. The first issue is one of classification. Establishing the

[27] Heidegger critiques the concept of allegory in other works. See Chapter Four, pp. 178 – 179.

domain for what can be called a thing proves difficult. Should we include everything? A stone, a clod of earth, a beetle, a deer, a person, God…? Or do we only include "mere" things such as "[l]ifeless beings of nature and objects of use" (PLT 21)? How broad or narrow is the domain of things? The second issue is that the idea of a thing has become so self-evident in the history of Western thought that it no longer seems questionable or significant—much like the question of being in *Being and Time*.[28] Heidegger describes three concepts of the thing that the history of philosophy has produced: the thing as (1) *hupokeimenon*, which becomes *subiectum*, or the "bearer of its characteristic traits," (2) *aistheton*, "the unity of a manifold of sensations," or (3) the combination of *hule* and *morphe*, "formed matter." One by one Heidegger demonstrates the insufficiencies of each thing-concept for addressing the thingly aspect of the thing.

The first thing-concept, *hupokeimenon*, treats the thing as the core of its characteristics (*ta subebekota*) (PLT 22). When the Romans adopt this Greek concept, *hupokeimenon* becomes *subiectum*, i.e. the "bearer of its characteristic traits," and *sumbebokos* is translated as *accidens* (PLT 23). The thing is thus the substance underlying its accidents. For Heidegger, the substance-accident distinction is problematic because it imposes a propositional structure by treating the thing as the subject of a predicate.[29] Consider the following proposition about a thing: snow is white, crystalline,

[28] Heidegger's turn to art resituates the question of being by returning to the ontic. Part of this movement from ontology to the ontic is due to Heidegger's attempt to reverse *Being and Time*, a task referred to as the *Kehre* (reversal). In *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger proposes a metontology, which returns to the particular thing through fundamental ontology, rather than moving from things to ontology. Whereas Heidegger's *Being and Time* suggests that we know beings but do not know being, "The Origin of the Work of Art" seems to assert that we do not even know beings, or things, and need to re-examine them in light of being.

[29] The Greek terms *hupokeimenon* and *ta subebekota* do not imply the same separation that exists between the Latin terms *subiectum* and *accidens*. The Latin translation separates the thing from its characteristics and thus covers over "the basic Greek experience of the Being of beings", which is why Heidegger considers the "rootlessness of Western thought to begin with this translation" (PLT 23).

frozen droplets of water. Snow is the subject, the substance or thing. White, crystalline, and frozen comprise the predicate and the properties of the thing. With this proposition we have said something about the characteristics of snow, but not snow itself as a thing, and certainly not what it means by "snow *is*." The being of snow as a thing is still untouched. This propositional structure moreover does not examine the relation between the thing and its characteristics—the "is" is unexamined. This thing-concept completely separates the thing from the characteristics that give any indication of what it is. More importantly, the fact that the structure of the thing mirrors the structure of propositional logic betrays a kind of violence (*Gewalt*) against the thing. The fact that this thing structure so closely resembles propositional logic suggests that we have imposed our way of thinking on the thing, rather than approaching the thing as it is. This thing-concept "does not lay hold of the thing as it is in its own being, but makes an assault on it" (PLT 25). In attempting to grasp the thing, we assault it. By an assault, Heidegger means that we have forced a false definition on being; we have limited it to the constraints of our thought. Heidegger reflects that "we still have the feeling that violence [*Gewalt*] has long been done to the thingly element of things and that thought has played a part in this violence, for which reason people disavow thought instead of taking pains to make it more thoughtful" (PLT 24). Recovering the thing requires making thought less violent and more thoughtful. For Heidegger, making thought less violent and "more thoughtful" requires recognizing the way that things are not fully grasped or contained by thing-concepts (PLT 25). Heidegger notes that "[p]erhaps what we call feeling or mood, here and in similar instances, is more reasonable—that is, more intelligently perceptive—because more open to Being" (PLT 24). Feeling allows a more open relation that does not

define the thing in terms of concepts. Feeling expresses how the thing strikes us, moves us, calls us to respond, rather than how we grasp it within a propositional structure or set of concepts. Feeling reveals the thing as given by being, as unconcealed rather than grasped. Since Heidegger defines truth as *aletheia* or as the unconcealment of being, feeling is perceptive to truth.

The second thing-concept, *aistheton*, defines the thing in terms of all the sensations that accompany our perception of it. Heidegger sees two issues with this concept of the thing. First, it is inaccurate. We do not relate to the thing as an accumulation of sensations. Rather we experience sensations in immediate relation to things. Heidegger says

> We never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g. tones and noises, in the appearance of things…rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen. Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds. In order to hear a bare sound we have to listen away from things, divert our ear from them, i.e. listen abstractly. (PLT 25 – 26)

These examples illustrate that sensations are not prior to things or, in other words, things are not inferred from their sensations. I do not hear mere sounds, I hear a door close. To experience a mere sound or any isolated sensation would require abstracting it from the thing. Defining the thing as the manifold of sensations assumes an abstract notion of sensation that is prior to how we actually engage with things. These examples are also interesting insofar as they anticipate Heidegger's more open and relational concept of the thing. The throng of sensations that define the wind as a thing are not isolated, but includes the chimney. The chimney allows the whistling of the wind, while the wind gives sound to the hollow space of the chimney.

The second issue is that the thing-concept *aistheton* loses this intimacy with things and instead marks "an inordinate attempt to bring [the thing] into the greatest proximity to us" (PLT 26). This definition of the thing does not allow any distinction between the thing and how we experience it. Without any distinction between the thing and our sensations, the thing is defined entirely in terms of us. Heidegger opposes this dependency of the thing upon our sensations and asserts that the "thing must be allowed to remain in its self-containment. It must be accepted in its own constancy" (PLT 26). The thing cannot be defined by this abstract notion of sensation that treats the world as something assembled by the mind. By making the thing a mere product of the mind, a synthesis of the manifold of sensation, *aistheton* defines the thing completely in terms of human cognition.

The third thing-concept, *morphe* and *hule,* defines the thing as "the interfusion of form and matter" (PLT 28). This thing-concept is most significant for Heidegger's consideration of the work of art, because form and matter are used so frequently within aesthetics and philosophy of art. Yet Heidegger demonstrates that the form-matter distinction inevitably conceptualizes the thing in terms of equipment rather than getting at the thingly aspect of the thing. When we talk about matter and form, we often choose equipment rather than other types of objects—which betrays something about the very notion of form. Form serves a purpose or function. We talk about a chair, not a pebble or clod of dirt. Heidegger uses a jug as an example to illustrate the connotations of the form-matter distinction. The matter of the jug is clay. The form is in part the shape of the jug, i.e. the "distribution and arrangement of the material parts in spatial locations, resulting in a particular shape", as well as the idea of the jug, or what "determines the arrangement of

matter" (PLT 27). Form refers to both the arrangement of matter and the idea that determines its arrangement. In each of these cases, what determines the matter, the arrangement of matter, and the idea of the jug is its use: holding and pouring water. Clay is used because it is water-tight and firm. The jug's shape allows it to hold water at rest and pour out a controlled amount when tilted. The jug's form and matter thus cannot be separated from its use. For Heidegger, the concepts form and matter imply use: "Usefulness is the basic feature from which this entity regards us, that is, flashes at us and thereby is present and thus is this entity" (PLT 28). Usefulness is fundamental to the idea of formed matter that we identify the thing's form by its use. Form always speaks to us – "flashes at us" – as usefulness. And usefulness again defines the thing in terms of us: our uses, our purposes. The form-matter thing-concept once again assaults the thing rather than approaching it as thingly. Thus with each of these three thing-concepts the "unpretentious thing evades thought most stubbornly" (PLT 31).

Unfortunately, as soon as we try to talk about "mere things" – things not defined by their usefulness – we are at a loss. In considering the history of the matter-form thing-concept and its prevalence in Western thought, Heidegger suggests that equipment has dominated how we think about things. Philosophy has treated things as equipment implicitly for so long that we no longer have any concept of a thing aside from its purpose. According to Heidegger, Thomas Aquinas' account of matter and form (*materia* and *forma*) as *ens creatum* defines all things in relation to purpose (PLT 29). Medieval philosophy translates form into *telos*, the purpose of a thing established through a divine or metaphysical order. In modernity, the idea of purpose continues without its divine framework, and form becomes defined in terms of our uses rather than a larger order or

schema. The thing becomes equipment when the broader notion of form in Greek thought has been reduced to a more limited sense of purpose, i.e. use. As a result, it "remains doubtful whether the thingly character comes to view at all in the process of stripping off everything equipmental" (PLT 30). Form and its relation to use obscure the thing rather than reveal it. "This long-familiar mode of thought preconceives all immediate experience of beings" (PLT 30). The thing continues to resist our attempts to grasp it.

To recover the thing as thingly, Heidegger initially proposes adopting a new examination of equipment. Heidegger notes that equipment has a "peculiar intermediate position between thing and work" (PLT 31). Equipment seems to be an intermediary because it is not a mere thing, but something *made*, like the work of art. Yet the work of art is something more than equipment. For this reason, Heidegger suggests inquiring into equipment to understand both the thingly aspect of art and its workly aspect, i.e. that it is made. To inquire into equipment, Heidegger does not choose just anything—he chooses a work of art, Van Gogh's painting of shoes. This move signifies a reversal.[30] Heidegger proposes to discover the work of art through equipment, but he sets up an example where he will discover equipment through the work of art. Equipment is not the intermediary whereby we understand the thing, rather the work of art allows access to the thing: "we never know thingness directly, and if we know it at all, then only vaguely and thus

[30] Heidegger's rhetoric here is interesting because he proposes that equipment can serve as an intermediary for art but uses a work of art to serve as an intermediary for equipment. This interplay between his critique of equipment and his new approach to the thing through art could be interpreted as a revision of the role of equipment in *Being and Time*. My reading of "The Origin of the Work of Art" takes issue with Graham Harman's claim that Heidegger's notion of equipment in *Being and Time* characterizes the entirety of his philosophical project. To support his claim, Harman dismisses the role of the work of art in "The Origin of the Work of Art"—which he calls a "disappointment." Harman fails to note the significance of the work of art for Heidegger's fundamental ontology, because he does not recognize how the work of art gains access to the thing in ways that equipment cannot. Heidegger's work of art becomes a more primordial and authentic way of understanding things. See Graham Harman, *Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects* (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2002).

require the work" (PLT 68). After investigating the painting, Heidegger tells us that the work of art is not merely an illustration of equipment, an example that serves its purpose no better than an actual pair of shoes, but rather "the equipmentality of equipment first genuinely arrives at its appearance through the work and only in the work" (PLT 35). The work of art uproots the dominance of the matter-form thing-concept and allows a way to approach the thing without assaulting it. To explain how the work of art emerges as the medium by which we can understand the thing, I will give a close reading of Heidegger's account of Van Gogh's painting.

2.2 Equipment and the Desolation of Van Gogh's Shoes

Van Gogh's painting frames Heidegger's discussion of the need to re-examine the thing without violence. [31] Heidegger's description of Van Gogh's painting of shoes—which he interprets as a peasant woman's shoes is posed as an inquiry into equipment, yet he implicitly reorients this inquiry to art through the example he chooses and the poetic language he employs. His description of the shoes is as follows: [32]

> From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, and trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death.

[31] Iain Thomson argues that the Van Gogh painting is the most important part of "The Origin of the Work of Art" because it is the only example Heidegger gives that allows us to "learn how to transcend modern aesthetics" (72). See Chapter 3 of Thomson, *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[32] Derrida points out that Van Gogh painted multiple paintings of shoes, and so the exact painting Heidegger references is not certain. See Derrida, "Restitutions of the truth in pointing" in *The Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 255 – 382. The painting often used by scholars is "Pair of Shoes" (1895), Van Gogh Museum.

> This equipment belongs to the *earth* and it is protected in the *world* of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself. (PLT 33)

The first thing we can note is that this description does not rely upon or even mention the use of the shoes to consider them as equipment, but instead opens up all the relations that pertain to the shoes. The shoes are worn—they show that someone has toiled in them. Their stiffness and heaviness give us a sense of how the person walked in them. They are weatherworn from rough wind and wet soil. The shoes are dirty, and the dirt connects the shoes to the earth and the fields that give us grain to sustain our lives. Yet the same earth that grants us sustenance can refuse it during times of drought. The shoes lying discarded in their "undefined space" are not laboring in the field. This undefined space and the absence of the person who labors in them reminds us of times of scarcity and the threat of death. The dark colors, deep shadows, and rough brushstrokes—which Heidegger does not mention—also evoke this sense of abandonment and feeling of desolation. The painting shows a mundane object of use, but its use is not thematic. The shoes remind us of uncertainty and death. Rather than limit his description of the shoes to their form or use, Heidegger has described the shoes' relation to the peasant woman's entire world, to life and death, and to the world and earth in an even larger context. He moves from her concrete relation to the world to life as a whole and gestures toward their interconnections.

Van Gogh's painting of shoes expresses a different, more open approach to the thing. Van Gogh allows the thing to shine or appear without limiting it to our conceptual frameworks, i.e. without doing violence to the thing. Unlike the substance-accidents distinction, the painting does not limit the shoes to what can be contained in a predicate.

The painting addresses the plurality of meanings and feelings that belong to the shoes without attempting to exhaust it. Similarly, the painting does not treat the thing as merely a manifold of sensations. Van Gogh's work reveals the entanglement of the shoes with its world, as well as the facticity of the shoes. The shoes strike us. The painting speaks to our experience of things in the world in a deeper way than merely mirroring the sensations associated with a type of object. Lastly, the function or use of the shoes does not come to the fore. The shoes are desolate and discarded. This detail might be the most significant part of Heidegger's description and the reason he chose this painting in particular. The shoes are not in use, nor are they given a particular context by which we could deduce how they are used. The use of the shoes remains hidden so that their thingly aspect can come to the fore without preconceptions. In this way, the painting "lets us know what shoes are in truth" (PLT 35). The painting reveals the shoes as they are. Instead of imposing a preconceived structure or concept onto the thing, the painting allows the thing to rest in itself.

As exemplified in the painting, the thing must be understood in terms of the many relations that form its context or its world as a whole. The work of art allows us to approach the thing in this way because it does not define the thing in terms of our uses and purposes. The work of art—and Van Gogh's painting in particular—recognizes that the thing cannot be exhausted. Heidegger tells us: "Color shines and wants only to shine. When we analyze it in rational terms by measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained" (PLT 45). Art allows the thing to remain hidden and unexplained; it lets the thing rest in itself. The painting lets the

shoes be as they are in their being, i.e. apart from how we use them.[33] Furthermore, the shoes do not symbolize an idea or truth. Instead, the painting allows us to approach the thing—the shoes—as they are.

Additionally, Heidegger's account of the peasant shoes defines equipment beyond the sense of use by introducing the notion of reliability (*Verläßlichkeit*). Use is not the most fundamental character of equipment. Use rests in reliability, i.e. in what is prior to use, lies outside of use, and thus determines use in a deeper sense. Instead of focusing on the use determined by the subject, reliability is grounded in the equipment and its availability for use, which can also be taken away. Heidegger's description of the shoes describes their reliability when the peasant woman takes off her shoes at night, reaches for them in the morning, and passes by them as they lay discarded on the floor, as depicted in the painting. The shoes are useful as long as they remain reliable. Neither use nor reliability is timeless. Equipment wears out, runs down, and decays. It use, its "equipmentality wastes away, sinks into mere stuff. In such wasting, reliability vanishes" (PLT 34). Reliability, allows for a sense of wearing away and fading into non-use. As Andrew Mitchell explains, the uncertainty of the shoe destabilizes the narrow limits of our concept of equipment and allows it to be open yet remain in itself: "The openness of reliability keeps the tool from closing in on itself and falling into orbit around Dasein. The tool thus serves to maintain a relationship with this beyond, to manage and negotiate it. The trick of reliability is to maintain this openness to the unexpected, for this reliability relation can all too easily decay through habituation and be worn away, yielding the sense of sheer utility and serviceability that was operative in *Being and*

[33] "But perhaps it is only in the picture that we notice all this about the shoes. The peasant woman, on the other hand, simply wears them" (PLT 33).

Time."[34] Heidegger's description of reliability and its fading away parallels his description of the withdrawal of Dasein's world into the earth—which is described in the following section—and allows equipment to fall away from use. This falling away reveals something prior to use—a mysterious, groundless ground. By pointing at what is prior to use, Heidegger demonstrates that "matter and form and their distinction have a deeper source" and are not essential to the thing (PLT 34). Heidegger's account of the shoes in Van Gogh's painting thus undermines the matter-form distinction in art.

At this point, Heidegger notes that he has discovered the equipmentality of equipment not in a pair of shoes that were present to him, nor by investigating the process of making shoes, or by examining how shoes are used. Instead, this discovery was possible "only by bringing ourselves before Van Gogh's painting. This painting spoke." (PLT 35). Heidegger thus ascribes to the work of art the power to illuminate the equipmentality of equipment and the thingly aspect of things. The work of art allows access to the thing.[35] The thingly must be approached through the work, not the work through the thing: "the road toward the determination of the thingly reality of the work leads not from thing to work but from work to thing" (PLT 38). Heidegger thus reverses the path he had set out at the beginning of his lecture. To approach the thing without violence, we must proceed through the work of art.

For Heidegger, the work of art mediates our attempt to understand things because it "opens up in its own way the Being of beings" (PLT 38). Heidegger connects this opening up of the being of beings to art by defining art in terms of truth—"Art is truth

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[34] Mitchell, *Heidegger Among the Sculptors*, 9.
[35] The thing becomes increasing important in Heidegger's late thought, especially in relation to the Fourfold. See Heidegger's 1949 Bremen lecture *Insight into that Which Is,* in *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, trans. Andrew J. Mitchell (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 3 – 73.

setting itself to work" (PLT 38). The following section will explain how art sets truth into work.

3. The Happening of Truth in the Worlding of the Work of Art

Heidegger's unification of truth and beauty is significant when he asserts art as the happening of truth. Philosophers often place art and philosophy in opposition by defining the former in terms of beauty and the latter in terms of truth. This division is often called the ancient quarrel due to its origin in Book X of Plato's *Republic* when Socrates bans the poets from his philosophical city. Art must perish so philosophy can thrive. Heidegger, however, unseats this division by calling art "the becoming and happening of truth" (PLT 69). For Heidegger, truth and art are not opposed to each other.[36] Art is not illusion set apart from what is real, because art does not represent or point at something in the world that can be confirmed or denied. Instead, art makes a world and creates a people.

In this way, Heidegger grants the work of art the substance and ground that metaphysics would reserve only for the real or actual. This relation between art and truth is significant because it indicates how Heidegger overcomes the dichotomies present in representational accounts of art (form and matter, thought and sensation) by re-conceptualizing both art and truth as processes of transformation instead of static and discrete givens. The traditional division between art and truth, illusion and reality, the created and the actual, falters here to open the space for a new concept of the work of art:

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[36] Dilthey also thinks that truth should be considered a characteristic of art – especially due to art's relation to life-experience. Dilthey sees the artist and philosopher as sharing the same "substratum of his creativity with the philosopher… For all of them the experience of what is human is the foundation; generalizations and inferences are applied to develop this experience further", and states that that Schiller too "expressed the wish that aesthetics might substitute the concept of truth for that of beauty." Dilthey, *The Imagination of the Poet,* translated by Louis Agosta and Rudolf A. Makkreel in *Poetry and Experience*, *Wilhelm Dilthey Selected Works,* vol. V, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, 2nd printing, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 29 - 173. 115.

art as world-making. In the following section I will: (1) clarify how art sets truth into work, (2) examine the relation between art and world, and (3) discuss the significance of the artistic creation of a world.

3.1 The Happening of Truth: Art as Transformative

The relation between art and truth in "The Origin of the Work of Art" relies upon a different sense of truth—one in which truth *happens* and can be *set into work*. When Heidegger refers to art as the "happening of truth" he poses art as a way to overcome representational concepts of truth, or correctness. Art does not treat things as correct. Works of art do not simply represent (re-present) what is there or treat things as present objects to be grasped. Instead, works of art allow the thing to shine in itself. Works of art "do not just make manifest what this isolated being as such is—if indeed they manifest anything at all; rather, they make unconcealedness as such happen in regard to what is a whole" (PLT 54). Works of art reveal the being of being, i.e. they illuminate "self-concealing being", by allowing the thing to shine in itself (PLT 54).[37] Van Gogh's painting does not attempt to exhaust the shoes, but allows them to rest in themselves, which allows hiddenness even while it reveals the shoes and their world. In this way the work of art allows a more originary truth, an experience of the being of beings. The work of art sets truth to work by illuminating the thing in a way that still allows concealment.

Heidegger describes the truth of art as a *happening*, a transformation or displacement of our ordinary comportment that allows what is given to strike us. Art sets truth into work by *wresting* it from what is ordinary and simply present. Heidegger quotes Albrecht Dürer to describe this effect: "For in truth, art lies hidden within nature;

[37] Here Heidegger relates truth and beauty to each other. Heidegger calls this shining *the beautiful* (PLT 54). "Beauty is one way in which truth occurs as unconcealedness" (PLT 54).

he who can wrest it from her, has it" (PLT 68). Like the transformative process of *alētheia*, art wrests truth from what is hidden. For Heidegger, "[t]ruth is never gathered from objects that are present and ordinary" (PLT 69). Truth happens as a transformative process that opens up the world by revealing the extraordinary in the ordinary. This openness of the work of art is one in which "everything is other than usual" (PLT 70). Or, as Heidegger describes, "The setting-into-work of truth thrusts up the unfamiliar and thrusts down the ordinary and what we believe to be such" (PLT 73). Art grounds us by displacing us; it "transport[s] us out of the realm of the ordinary."[38] Van Gogh's painting of shoes allows the shoes to speak to us in an unfamiliar way. In our ordinary comportment to things, we do not approach our shoes as desolate reminders of death, but as objects of use. This dimension of the shoes is hidden until exposed by the work of art: "In the vicinity of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be" (PLT 35).

Heidegger describes the work of art as a *bringing forth*— "to create is to cause something to emerge as a thing that has been brought forth" (PLT 56, 58). As something that is brought forth and seen as brought forth, it appears as new and out of the ordinary. Art acts as displacement by bringing forth what has been hidden, while indicating that it has been brought forth and was not present before – an important distinction that prevents art from establishing truth as objectively given, always available, or ever present. For Heidegger art "thrusts the extraordinary to the surface" and "thrusts down the long-familiar" (PLT 64). Art transforms by displacing us and the world in which we live. "To

[38] Heidegger's notion of origin (*Ursprung*) also suggests a sense of displacement. *Ursprung* can be thought of as *Ur-sprung* or "primal leap" (PLT 75). The notion of leaping is an important theme at this time in Heidegger's thought, which we see most clearly in his *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*. Art is a origin, a primal leap into the hidden depths of being.

submit to this displacement means: to transform our accustomed ties to world and to earth and henceforth to restrain all usual doing and prizing, knowing and looking, in order to stay within the truth that is happening in the world" (PLT 64). This displacement, however, does not designate escapism. For Heidegger, the work of art remains tied to the world, even though the work of art is its own creation of a world. To understand this transformation that allows truth to happen, we must explore Heidegger's notion of world.

3.2 The Worlding of the Work of Art

For Heidegger, the work of art lets things be as they are; and in letting things be as they are, the work of art opens up the world for us. Heidegger tells us that "To be a work means to set up a world" (PLT 43). By world, Heidegger wants to avoid definitions that determine it as (1) an empirical reality that is simply there for us as an object or a set of objects, or (2) the subjective a priori conditions for the possibility of experience (PLT 43). Instead, "World is the ever-nonobjective to which we are subjects" (PLT 43). The *world worlds* (PLT 43). The world is a happening, a "self-disclosing openness" (PLT 47). The world is not an object or conditions determined by the subject; the world is the open relation that allows the possibility of an object or subject.

This account of world in "The Origin of the Work of Art" is similar to the world in Heidegger's earlier writings on factical life, as well as the world in *Being and Time* and *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (1928), all of which emphasize that the world is relational rather than an object or collection of objects. In *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*,[39] Heidegger describes the world as a term for the mode of being of

[39] Note that the missing section from *Being and Time*. i.e. the division Heidegger entitled "Time and Being," was meant to explain transcendence. Heidegger describes this section as "The overcoming of the horizon as such. The return into the source. The presencing out of this source." Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, (New York: SUNY Press, 1996). Henceforth cited as BT followed by page number

beings.[40] Heidegger uses the verb *welten* (to world) to express that the world is a mode of being. As a mode of being, the world is a *how*, not a *what*. The world is "the how of beings" – their mode of being (MFL 172). Similarly, in the "Origin of the Work of Art" the world is not the collection of objects that exist or a "merely imagined framework added by our representation to the sum of such given things" (PLT 43). Rather, "[t]he world worlds, and is more fully in being than the tangible and perceptible realm in which we believe ourselves to be at home" (PLT 43). The world is all the relations and happenings, the dynamic unfolding of being—which cannot be broken into discrete categories such as thing, person, history, culture, etc. Instead, the world unfolds as dynamic, interwoven relations.

These earlier texts are distinct from "The Origin of the Work of Art" insofar as they emphasize the transcendence of the world. This transcendence is temporal, not metaphysical or spiritual. In *Being and Time*, the temporal unity of past, present, and future opens up the world by reaching beyond beings to being. Heidegger emphasizes that this opening of the world does not break away from the subject to reach an exterior world. The transcendence of the world is not a separation.[41] In these texts, the world is "a feature of transcendence as such" (MFL 172). Heidegger clarifies that this transcendence is not a comportment, but the basic constitution of Dasein as being-in-the-world.

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with pagination of original text in brackets. BT 35 [40]. *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* is one of Heidegger's attempts to articulate this missing section directly after *Being and Time*, before he abandons the project. See Theordore Kisiel, "The Demise of *Being and Time*: 1927-1930" in *Heidegger's Being and Time: Critical Essays*, ed. Richard Polt (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 189-214.

[40] Heidegger, *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 170. Henceforth cited as MFL.

[41] The transcendence of the world breaks down the subject-object framework by addressing the very possibility of being. "If the 'subject' is conceived ontologically as existing Da-sein, whose being is grounded in temporality, we must say then that the world is 'subjective.' But this 'subjective' world, as one that is temporally transcendent, is then 'more objective' than any possible 'object" (BT 335 [366]). For this reason, "[t]he world is, so to speak, already 'further outside' than any object could ever be" (BT 335 [366]).

Transcendence is "the primordial constitution" of Dasein because "existence originally means to cross over. Dasein is itself the passage across" (MFL 165). That is, Dasein is not first an interior that needs to go beyond itself; Dasein is always "out there" (da) with beings as being-in-the-world. Dasein is always transcending, always beyond itself within the world.[42] Heidegger's notion of Dasein is not a self-enclosed ego.[43]

Heidegger offers this transcendence of the world in contrast to theological and epistemological definitions of transcendence. Theological and epistemological accounts define the transcendent in opposition to the immanent and the contingent (MFL 160). That is, the transcendent is the unconditioned conditions that determine contingent beings. In these accounts, the transcendent and immanent are oppositional. For Heidegger, this concept of transcendence treats the self as a self-enclosed entity that must overcome its limits to reach the exterior world (MFL 161). That is, the subject is treated as a self-enclosed entity that must transcend its limits to reach the world. Heidegger's notion of transcendence as being-in-the-world revises this model by insisting that

> transcendence is not a relation between interior and exterior realms such that a barrier belonging to the subject would be crossed over, a barrier that would separate the subject from the outer realm. But neither is transcendence primarily the cognitive relationship a subject has to an object, one belonging to the subject in addition to its subjectivity. Nor is transcendence simply the term for what exceeds and is inaccessible to finite knowledge. (MFL 165)

The transcendence of the world, of being-in-the-world breaks down the distinction between interior and exterior, between subject and object, between contingency and

[42] For a more thorough discussion see Ingtraud Görland, *Transzendenz und Selbst. Eine Phase in Heideggers Denken* (Frankfurt: M.: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1981).
[43] See François Raffoul, *Heidegger and the Subject*, trans. David Pettigrew and Gregory Recco (New York: Humanity Books, 1998).

conditions, and between the immanent and the transcendent.[44] The subject and object already transcend themselves in a more originary relation. Being-in-the-world expresses the idea that we are always already out there in the world; we are always already transcendent. Transcendence thus expresses the more originary relation from which subjectivity and objectivity arise—not in opposition to each other, but always already in relation to one another.

In "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger does not describe the world of the work of art as transcendent.[45] Yet the transcendence of the world of the work of art is suggested in the way that art overcomes representational thought. Art breaks the presupposition of a Cartesian ego as an intellectual entity set apart from the sensible world and reveals a more originary relation, i.e. being-in-the-world. By approaching the thing without grasping it, art allows us to recognize the thing as more than what is simply present.[46] Art reveals the transcendence of the immanent. More importantly, art does not denote a mere mode of thought, but a way of being, an ecstatic existence that is grounded in the immanent without reducing the immanent to sensory data. The work of art, moreover is a happening of truth that opens the worlding of the world. This worlding suggests that art is not an object of artistic creation or a subjective experience but a *how*. From Heidegger's previous discussions of the world as a *how*, it would seem that art is a how. We can think of art not so much as a particular type of thing or object but as a how

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[44] In Heidegger's 1919-1920 winter semester course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, he describes the "transcendent" as that "which also includes the factically immanent" (25). See Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Scott M. Campbell (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

[45] Heidegger, however, uses similar phrasing to describe existence—"in existence, man does not proceed from some inside to some outside; rather, the nature of *Existenz* is outstanding standing-within the essential sunderance of the clearing of beings" (PLT 65).

[46] In *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, Heidegger describes things as more than "bare realities" and expresses the need to consider them as "relational" (68 – 69). See Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).

that reveals the thing as thingly. As the world is the how of beings that reveals the transcendence of Dasein, so art is the how of things that reveals their transcendence.

Heidegger's lecture on the work of art expands and deepens his concept of the world by introducing the earth. Just as his discussion of reliability opens a hidden source for the equipmentality of equipment, so Heidegger's introduction of earth provides a deeper source for the world. The worlding of the world discloses being to us at the same time that it rests on the earth. That is, the world's unconcealment relies upon a more original concealment, i.e. the earth. The world reveals, while the earth conceals. The earth is a ground, but as Mitchell explains, "the earth provides no stable and present *terra firma*, but always a groundless ground. The earth supports and bears precisely by withdrawing."[47] In this conflict, the world allows the earth to rise and "stand forth as that which bears all, as that which is sheltered in its own law and always wrapped up in itself" (PLT 61). Yet the earth struggles to keep itself concealed and closed. Heidegger describes this conflict not as a rift that separates, but as "the intimacy with which opponents belong to each other" (PLT 61).[48] The conflict between world and earth allows truth to be set into work: "Truth is present only as the conflict between lighting and concealing in the opposition of world and earth" (PLT 60). As truth is a happening, a process of unconcealment that relies upon a deeper concealment, the strife between earth and world describes *alētheia*.

As truth must be set into work or wrested from hiddenness, the work of art situates itself within this strife between the concealment of earth and the openness of world. This strife allows truth to happen. We see this strife between earth and world and

[47] See Andrew J. Mitchell, "The Fourfold" in *Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts*, ed. Bret W. Davis (Durham: Acumen, 2010), 208 – 218.
[48] This notion of intimacy comes from Hölderlin's philosophical writings. See Chapter Four, pp. 198 - 199.

the happening of truth in Heidegger's description of the Greek temple. The relational, dynamic unfolding of being strikes us in this work of art:

> Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground. This resting of the work draws up out of the rock the mystery of the rock's clumsy yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the building holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so first makes the storm itself manifest in its violence. The luster and gleam of the stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, yet first brings to light the light of day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of night. The temple's firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air. The steadfastness of the work contrasts with the surge of the surf, and its own repose brings out the raging of the sea. (PLT 41)

The temple reveals the multidimensionality of truth in its happening. The temple's foundation rests on the earth that bears its weight and "draws up out of the rock the mystery of that rock's clumsy yet spontaneous support" (PLT 41). The temple reveals the mystery of earth. At the same time the marble of the temple reflects the sun and shows the expanse of the sky, which makes the air visible. The temple's firm shape contrasts with the churning sea and wind of the storm. The temple gives shape and relation to the world. As such the temple is not a discrete, self-enclosed world that represents something within a separate "real" world. The temple bears a relation to everything and in doing so gives a unique place at which all these dimensions intersect. From these relations, things "come to appear as what they are" (PLT 41). Things appear in truth. Heidegger calls this "emerging and rising in itself and in all things *phusis*. It clears and illuminates, also, that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. We call this ground the *earth*" (PLT 41). Heidegger's earth describes a ground that is not a static, unchanging foundation, but one that gives and withdraws, emerges and recedes. The earth shelters and hides, which allows the thing to shine. The thing "shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate into it" (PLT 45).

The work of art sets itself within this intimacy between world and earth, unconcealment and concealment, and brings this relation to light because art does not exhaust the thingly. That is, a work of art does not exhaust a thing in terms of use or ideas. The work of art does not treat the thing as something that is completely available to human representation. As Adorno suggests, the work of art always has a remainder, something that cannot be fully captured by a use, concept, or actuality.[49] As Heidegger expresses it,

> the sculptor uses stone just as the mason uses it, in his own way. But he does not use it up… To be sure, the painter also uses pigment, but in such a way that color is not used up but rather only now comes to shine forth. To be sure, the poet also uses the word—not, however, like ordinary speakers and writers who have to use them up, but rather in such a way that the world only now becomes and remains truly a world. (PLT 46)

The work of art draws us to the thingly—to the stone, the pigment, or the word—as thingly. A painting makes colors more vivid, a sketch makes lines more meaningful, and poetry grants words greater feeling and weight. The work of art as such is an *overflow*, an excess of materiality that "can therefore never be compensated and made up for by what is already present and available" (PLT 73). The work of art preserves the thingly and allows it to shine rather than violently grasping it. Heidegger describes art as a beginning—an origin (*Ursprung*) or primal leap (*Ur-sprung*)—that founds a new world. Art is a "grounding in openness" (PLT 74).

Yet how does allowing the thingly to shine in itself open up a world? The following section will take up this question by examining art as world-making.

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[49] Theodor Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006): "Artworks that unfold to contemplation and thought without any remainder are not artworks" (121).

3.3 Art as World-Making

Earlier in the lecture, Heidegger drew a comparison between equipment and the work of art, because they are both *made*. Equipment and works of art are not mere things because they are created. The work of art, however, differs from equipment because "its createdness is part of the created work" (PLT 62). When I use a tool, I do not think about it as created, but as useful. When I behold a work of art, its createdness characterizes it. Yet Heidegger carefully distinguishes his discussion of createdness from accounts that define art in terms of artistic genius, e.g. Kant's account of art. In *The Critique of the Power of Judgment* Kant begins his section on fine art by defining art as something *made* in contradiction to nature, which is *caused*.[50] Art is a *doing* (*facere*, which also means *making*) while nature is an *acting* (*agere*). Nature acts as a cause and produces an effect. By contrast, art is a making. Art is not constrained to a causal relationship and is "production through freedom" (C3 5:303). Freedom, "a capacity for choice that grounds its actions in reason", defines artistic production (5:303). Kant discusses this freedom in terms of the genius of the artist.

Heidegger, however, emphasizes the event of creation and not the artist. Accounts based on genius define art subjectively. "All creation, because it is such a drawing-up, is a drawing, as water from a spring. Modern subjectivism, to be sure, immediately misinterprets creation, taking it as the self-sovereign subject's performance of genius" (PLT 73). Heidegger opposes this subjectivism and privileges the work of art above the artist. In "The Origin of the Work of Art" and Heidegger's lectures on Hölderlin, the genius of the artist is insignificant. For Heidegger, "the artist remains inconsequential as

[50] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007. (5: 303). Henceforth cited in the text as C3.

compared with the work, almost like a passageway that destroys itself in the creative process for the work to emerge" (PLT 39). Creation does not have to emphasize the artist. Gustav Mahler expressed this idea when he stated, "I don't compose, I am composed."[51] The work of art stands on its own apart from its creator at the same time that its createdness comes to the fore. The createdness of the work of art does not emphasize the artist, but rather simply that it happened, i.e. the work came into being as created. With the work of art, "the simple 'factum est' is to be held forth… that as this happening it happens here for the first time; or, that such a work *is* at all rather than is not" (PLT 63). Art highlights that it has been brought forth, that it happened and came into being. "The event of its being created does not simply reverberate through the work; rather, the work casts before itself the eventful fact that the work is as this work, and it has constantly this fact about itself" (PLT 63). Like *alētheia*, the work of art emphasizes a process of becoming, a transformation that reveals something that was previously hidden. As created, the work of art does not present itself as a timeless, eternal truth or as pure presence, but as something that was once not and now is. Its truth is completely conditional. As Heidegger reminds us, "Truth is un-truth, insofar as there belongs to it the reservoir of the not-yet-uncovered, the un-uncovered, in the sense of concealment" (PLT 58). The work of art does not pose its truth as correctness, but as a conditional moment of becoming. In doing so, the work of art exposes truth as unconcealment and creates a world.

While Heidegger's notion of world-creation is expressed in terms of the intimate conflict between earth and world and the happening of truth, the poet Wallace Stevens also develops this idea of art in his poetry. Steven's "The Idea of Order at Key West"

[51] Kurt Blaukopf, *Mahler: A Documentary Study* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). 177.

exemplifies this transformative power of artistic creation. Stevens' poem describes a woman singing by the sea. Within the poem, the woman's song personifies the poetic act as a making, creating, and transforming. Like a poet finding an expression through language, the woman's song calls forth order from chaotic nature. Stevens claims that the woman "sang beyond the genius of the sea."[52] Although she was repeating the sounds of the ocean "word by word" and "in all her phrases stirred / The grinding water and the gasping wind," she still achieves something more than the sea (11-13). What does she achieve that the sea cannot? The first stanza seems to assert that the sea is lesser in genius because it lacks the form that mind and voice can impose upon its subject. The sea is "wholly body, fluttering / Its empty sleeves" (3-4). It has no mind guiding its movements and so its song is simply a constant crashing. Stevens says the sea "[m]ade constant cry, caused constantly a cry" (5). The persistent guttural alliteration of this line imitates the sound of the ocean and also personifies its mindless repetition. This line also acts as an epanorthosis. Stevens says that the ocean *makes* a constant cry, and then he changes the statement and say that the ocean *causes* a constant cry. The difference between making and causing is significant. The sea does not create, the woman does. The woman is "the maker of the song she sang" (l5). The listeners in the poem who hear the song can ask, "Whose spirit is this?" (18).

The distinction between causing sound and making a song is further developed in the fourth stanza. Stevens declares the sea is "meaningless plungings of water and the wind" (30). Because the ocean mindlessly causes sounds, its sounds have no meaning. The formal aspects of this stanza imitate the sea's "meaningless plungings." Stanza Four

[52] Wallace Stevens, "The Idea of Order at Key West," *Wallace Stevens Collected Poetry and Prose* (New York: Library Classics of the United States, 1997), 105 – 106. (1). Cited by line number.

is the longest stanza of the poem and contains the most metrical substitutions. With its sporadic meter and its first grammatical sentence that sprawls across eight lines, the verse takes on an erratic tone. There are so many dependent clauses that the main subject and verb are difficult to locate. The complexity of syntax forces the reader to shift focus from the search for meaning to the pure sounding of the syllables. The poem takes on the sound of the ocean. Yet the chaos of the ocean is mere sound – "a summer sound / Repeated in a summer without end / And sound alone" (26-28). It is sound without meaning, body without intelligence, formlessness. Although the poem and the woman's song mimic the ocean, they achieve something greater than the ocean. They create, they impose form. From form comes meaning.[53] The meaningful order of the song contrasts with the chaos of the ocean.

Stevens further develops the idea of order by describing its transformative power. Making order is not simply a rearranging of chaotic elements. The singing woman does not simply imitate the sounds of the sea. Her song transforms what it sings.

> It was her voice that made
> The sky acutest at its vanishing.
> She measured to the hour its solitude.
> She was the single artificer of the world
> In which she sang. And when she sang, the sea, the sea
> Whatever self it had, became the self
> That was her song (34 - 40).

Her song makes the sky *more* acute. She does not simply behold the sky but she becomes the measure of the sky. The sky is transformed by her; her song changes it. The sea is not separate from the song; it is transformed by the song and its transformed self is united to the song. The lights of the fishing boats in Stanza 6 parallel her song by transforming the

[53] Heidegger refers to figure in "The Origin of the Work of Art." Figure allows the work of art to be solitary and stand on its own, as if removed from human ties (PLT 64).

sea. They "[m]astered the night and portioned out the sea, / Fixing emblazoned zones and fiery poles, / Arranging, deepening, enchanting night" (49-51). The lights transform the sea into a grid of "emblazoned zones" and "fiery poles." The lights master, portion, fix, arrange, deepen, and enchant the sea, just as the song. As if to stress the force of these words, "mastered" and "fixing" are disruptions to the metrical order of stanza 6. These words embody their meaning, they work against the natural flow to impose a new order.

This order not only transforms the sea but also creates a world. As the speaker of the poem observes the woman singing, he reflects "there never was a world for her / Except the one she sang and singing, made" (42-43). Her song creates her world. The world of the sea is not separate from the world created by her song. After meditating upon the song as an ordering and transformation of chaos, the speaker suddenly interrupts his meditation with an exclamation:

> Oh! Blessed rage for order, pale Ramon,
> The maker's rage to order words of the sea,
> Words of the fragrant portals, dimly-starred,
> And of ourselves and of our origins,
> In ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds.

There is a "blessed rage" that seeks to impose order on the words of the sea and all other sensory experiences. But the maker is ordering *words* of the sea and not *sounds*. Stevens has already drawn the distinction between the sound of waves and the words of the song in previous stanzas. Now there is no distinction between the sea's sound and the words used to describe the sound. The sea's self has become the self of the song. The implications of this equivocation are significant. If the world becomes the world described in words, words not only transform the world—they *create* the world. Language allows the world to come into being. As Heidegger writes later in 1946,

"Language is the House of Being."[54] The world is not a collection of objects or a subjective framework for the possibility of experience, but the meaningful relations that precede objects and subjects. For Heidegger, the word precedes the world and imbues it with meaning.[55] In this way, the poetic act is not simply a matter of imposing order on the world. It creates the world in which we live.

Stevens' poem describes art as a bringing into being, a happening that creates a world. The poem illuminates truth as a happening, a rift that wrests something from what is hidden and brings it to expression. The poem tells us something about the sea, about song, about a concrete moment in Key West. At the same time, the poem does not grasp the sea or attempt to exhaust its qualities. The poem gestures toward what remains hidden—the chaos that remains outside of language, song, and verse. While allowing for this tension between concealing and revealing, the poem makes all of these relations tangible and its mystery vivid. The poem does not simply tell, it sings. It makes a tangible world for us.

For Heidegger, creation is also world-making because of the historical nature of art. The work of art is not a singular event, a sudden moment of ecstatic transcendence, but the grounding of a people. Art creates the world a historical people. The creation of a world in the work of art is not abstract or removed from how people live. Heidegger describes how the Greek temple belongs to the world of a people and "fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the

[54] Heidegger, "Letter on 'Humanism,'" trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 239 - 276. 239.
[55] Heidegger, "Words," trans. Joan Satmbaugh, *On the Way to Language* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971): "Where word breaks off, no thing may be" (140).

shape of destiny for human being" (PLT 41). The people who belong to the Greek temple can know who they are, their place, their nature, and their history in a concrete way in relation to the world that the temple opens up. Heidegger does not pose the world of the work of art as eternal, timeless or removed from the concrete human world, but describes the happening of truth within human history and cultural phenomena. It is the ground on which history takes place: "Wherever those decisions of our history that relate to our very being are made, are taken up and abandoned by us, go unrecognized and are rediscovered by new inquiry, there the world worlds" (PLT 43) For Heidegger, art creates the world of a people. That is, art is the origin of a people: "Whenever art happens—that is, whenever there is a beginning—a thrust enters history… History means here not a sequence in time of events of whatever sort, however important. History is the transporting of a people into its appointed task as entrance into that people's endowment" (PLT 74). The work of art grounds what is given to a people, the possibilities that form their world, and transports them into their history.[56] Heidegger connects the happening of truth in the work of art to the history of being. It is important to note that this happening is not simply an ontological realization, it is also ontic. That is, art reveals the being of beings *and* creates the world in which we live. Art creates the possibilities that are open for human life.

Heidegger's concept of art as the creation of a people within a specific historical world departs from traditional concepts of art in two significant ways. First of all, the history of art acts as a history of being. Truth happens in art, revealing the being of

[56] Heidegger's interest in the founding of a people in this lecture and his Hölderlin seminars has significant nationalistic undertones, especially considering his politics at the time. The scope of this dissertation is insufficient to address the political connotations of Heidegger's lectures on art in the 1930's and 40's, but others have addressed this issue. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's collected lecture for a discussion of the relation between art and politics in Heidegger's thought. Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry*, trans. Jeff Fort (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

beings. What is possible is made possible through the happening of truth in the work of art. That is, the possibility of beings is thus determined by the work of art. Secondly, Heidegger reverses how we normally think of the relation between a people and art. Works of art are not a cultural product; culture is a product of works of art. For Heidegger, the work of art does not proceed from an already established people and their culture, the world of art makes a people. The world of art creates a world for a people to dwell. Art is a founding. This reversal emphasizes that art is not a product, i.e. art is not caused but is a making that transforms the world. In this manner, Heidegger defies the superficiality of a "cultivated acquaintance with the past" that would treat art as a "routine cultural phenomenon" (PLT 75). This dynamic between the work of art, the work, and a people demonstrates the mutual entanglement between self and world that characterizes the paradox of facticity in Heidegger's early works.

4. Heidegger's Philosophy of Art in Relation to Dilthey

By tracing the problem of truth, world, and thing in Heidegger's approach to art, we can note three connections to his earlier concern with the paradox of facticity. First, as just mentioned, the work of art illuminates an interweaving of self and world that defies subject-object dichotomies. Secondly, the happening of truth and the conflict between earth and world in the work of art reinterpret the more primordial source behind what is given. Facticity recognizes the limits of what is present and what can be thought. What is given in lived experience has an unfathomable depth that cannot be fully brought to light. Lastly, Heidegger's emphasis on the thingly aspect of art recognizes the insufficiency of the matter-form and sensible-intelligible distinction. The thingly aspect recognizes the patency of things, their *thisness*, that resists a conceptual framework. Heidegger's

approach to art thus allows us to rethink of the sensible as factical. In these ways, Heidegger's approach to art reflects his earlier engagement with Dilthey and the paradox of factical life.

Moreover, thinking of the sensible as factical can mediate between Dilthey's and Heidegger's different notions of experience. Dilthey uses *Erlebnis* for 'experience,' whereas Heidegger uses *Erfahrung*. In German, these words' differences in connotation and usage imply a direct conflict between Dilthey and Heidegger. The following section will discuss these different notions of experience to address the challenge of reading Heidegger's philosophy of art in light of Dilthey. By focusing on the shared notion of the facticity, I will attempt to bridge this potential conflict between *Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung*.

4.1 Erlebnis vs. Erfahrung

Dilthey takes up *Erlebnis*, which is translated as 'lived experience,' to counter the objective concept of experience posed by the natural sciences. For Dilthey, lived experience is historical—a complex, dynamic, and changing set of relations that cannot be reduced to the explanatory framework of the natural sciences. Unlike objects that are experienced as distinct and separate from oneself, *Erlebnis* conveys a sense of living-through, i.e. a living perspective that changes over time.[57] Dilthey's adoption of *Erlebnis* relates to his attempt to revise Kantian epistemology, which uses *Erfahrung* to describe experience. As Makkreel explains, "Instead of considering experience as a conceptual

[57] Husserl adopts the same *Erlebnis* / *Erfahrung* distinction. See David Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986: "An experience is a subjective or conscious episode we live through: experiencing is 'living through' something in this sense. Husserl wants to distinguish the awareness that belongs to this 'living through' from any kind of awareness of objects. For the latter he uses the term *Erfahrung*. This is also Kant's term, and Husserl uses it in exactly the same sense: *Erfahrung* is the experience of objects in the world. In perception, for example, which is a species of *Erfahrung*, I perceive some object—e.g. a tree in the garden—but I 'experience' or 'live through' (*ich erlebe*) the perception itself. I do not 'live through' the tree, and unless I explicitly reflect, I do not perceive my perception" (36).

ordering of inert sensations, as Kant had defined *Erfahrung*, Dilthey claims the basic unit of consciousness is already experiential, namely, an *Erlebnis* (a lived experience)."[58] In contrast to this living, dynamic sense of experience, "*Erfahrung* is a phenomenal construct."[59] In his *Fragments for a Poetics*, Dilthey states that "A lived experience is a distinctive and characteristic mode in which reality is there-for-me. A lived experience does not confront me as something perceived or represented."[60] *Erlebnis* conveys the facticity of experience—the way in which we are entangled in the world.[61]

Heidegger uses *Erlebnis* in his early Freiburg lectures on factical life but explicitly rejects the word during his turn to art. Since Heidegger's attempt to overthrow aesthetics motivates his rejection of *Erlebnis*, he appears to directly attack Dilthey's *Poetry and Lived Experience* (*Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung*). In "A Dialogue on Language" (1953-1954), Heidegger makes this connection between his rejection of *Erlebnis* and his critique of Dilthey clear. In this dialogue, Heidegger mentions Dilthey's book *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung* by name in relation to the problem of *Erlebnis* then claims that "experience in this sense always means to refer back—to refer life and lived experience back to the 'I.' Experience is the name for the referral of the objective back to the subject. The much-discussed I/Thou experience, too, belongs within the metaphysical

[58] Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Philosopher of the Human Sciences*, 3rd edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 8.
[59] Ibid. 8.
[60] Dilthey, "Fragments for a Poetics" in *Selected Works*, volume 5, 223 – 231. 223. Henceforth cited as SW V.
[61] This "there-for-me" relates to Dilthey's notion of reflexive awareness. See Chapter 1, pp. 32 - 34. For Gadamer, Dilthey's notion of lived experience, especially the way experience is given to oneself, is Cartesian because it requires that everything be rooted in the subject. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 56. But reflexive awareness precedes the subject-object distinction, which is not true of the Cartesian ego. In Chapter 1 I argue that Dilthey's notion of the self does not resemble the Cartesian ego.

sphere of subjectivity."[62] If we examine Heidegger's critiques of *Erlebnis*, however, he emphasizes particular uses and connotations of the word that Dilthey did not intend. Moreover, Heidegger's critique of *Erlebnis* overlaps with his Dilthey-period. Heidegger was always ambivalent of the term, even when he adopted it in his own work. In his 1919 lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview*, Heidegger uses *Erlebnis* in his discussion of the question "Is there something?" Here Heidegger addresses the phrase "there is … " (*Es gibt*, literally 'it gives' in English). For Heidegger this question and the response *Es gibt* are not purely intellectual or reflective; we experience the question and answer as lived. He says, "The question is lived, is experienced [*erlebt*]. I experience. I experience something vitally."[63] Heidegger's use of *Erlebnis* reflects Dilthey's living sense of experience, although Heidegger also emphasizes the comportment towards a world that grounds experience. Heidegger states that there is no 'I' that grounds experience, but instead "only an 'ex-perience [*Er-leben*] of something', a '*living towards something*'", which he describes as comportment (TDP 55). Heidegger also searches for new language to describe this living sense of experience and takes up the expression *Ereignis* (event or appropriation), which characterizes the *Kehre* and provides the groundwork for his attempts to overcome representational thought and the metaphysics of presence in the 1930's and after. In this 1919 lecture, Heidegger explains that lived experience (*Erlebnis*) is "an event [Er-eignis] – meaningful, not thing-like" (TDP 56). This emphasis on an event of appropriation conveys Heidegger's intention to avoid a Cartesian ego that relates to an external world through

[62] Heidegger, "A Dialogue on Language," *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 1 – 54. 35 – 36. Heidegger also discusses the dangers of aesthetics in this lecture course.
[63] Heidegger, "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview" in *Towards a Definition of Philosophy*, trans. Ted Sadler, (London: Continuum, 2008), 3 – 90. [GA 56/57]. Henceforth cited as TDP.

representation. For Heidegger, the event of appropriation grounds lived experience such that there is not a distinction between inner and outer, nor a determinate 'I' that serves as a foundation. Appropriation does not mean a process of internalizing something external. Instead, "experiences are events of appropriation in so far as they live out of one's 'own-ness', and life lives only in this way" (TDP 60).[64] *Erlebnis* conveys the vitality and relationality of our relation to the world. Heidegger's early approach to lived experience and the event of appropriation thus echoes Dilthey's language and concerns with the facticity of experience.

There are other similarities in Heidegger's use of *Erlebnis* at this time. In this same 1919 lecture course, Heidegger also contrasts *Erfahrung* with *Erlebnis* along the same lines as Dilthey. Heidegger describes *Erfahrung* as a reflective form of experience, a "looked-at experience" which is a "de-vivifaction" of experience. "Through reflection every living experience can be turned into something looked at" (TDP 77). In this sense, *Erfahrung* adopts the structure of Cartesian epistemology. That is, *Erfahrung* describes experience as a relation between a subject that looks at a separate, external world. Like Dilthey, Heidegger connects this de-vivified concept of experience with science and its tendency to objectify and decontextualize:

> Science determines and fixes objects in an objective manner. A science of experiences would have to objectify experiences and thus strip away their non-objective character as lived experience and event of appropriation. Already when I speak of *two* of my experiences I have objectified them: the one and the other, both are a something. For every experience that I want to consider I must isolate and lift out, break up and destroy the contexture of the experience so that in the end and despite all efforts to the contrary, I have only a heap of things. (TDP 60)

[64] Heidegger's description here reflects Dilthey's notion of lived experience and the acquired psychic nexus. There is not a foundational I that grounds everything, rather a self that is acquired through lived experience. See Chapter Two section 2.3 for description of the acquired psychic nexus, pp. 81 – 87.

Here the objective sense of *Erfahrung* conveys experience as discrete points of data abstracted from their context in opposition to the relational and dynamic sense of *Erlebnis*. In this way, Heidegger frames the distinction between *Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung* with the same concerns as Dilthey.

In the same lecture course, however, Heidegger expresses dissatisfaction with the use and connotations of *Erlebnis*, which foreshadows his eventual adoption of *Erfahrung*. Heidegger deplores that *Erlebnis* is "so faded and worn thin that, if it were not so fitting, it would be best to leave it aside" (TDP 53). In his 1919-1920 lecture course *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger begins to explore other connotations of *Erfahrung* and eventually abandons *Erlebnis*. In "The Idea of Philosophy," Heidegger used *Erlebnis* to convey comportment, the toward-which that characterizes experience, and the relation between self and world that precedes the subject-object distinction. Just a semester later, Heidegger uses *Erfahrung* to convey the idea of experience as a "factical encountering."[65] By factical encountering, Heidegger means that experience is not centered on the self of experience but relation between self and world in which things strike us and move us. As Heidegger explains

> it is a fact that in our factical lives we—each one of us—encounters this and that, or that this and that encountering 'befalls' us, that we get to know this and that, which makes an impression on us… We describe this as 'ex-periencing' [*er-fahren*], acquiring, meeting on the road [*Fahrt*] of life and doing so in various modifications of that *in whose factical progression* of a world, the environing-world and every life-world is constructed upon. (BPP 54)

Heidegger adopts *Erfahrung* in its Hegelian sense, i.e. in the sense of going [*fahren*] or traveling always in relation to something. Here the more object-oriented connotation of

[65] Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Scott M. Campbell (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 54.

Erfahrung allows Heidegger to shift the dynamic of experience away from the subject.[66] But in adopting *Erfahrung* Heidegger also maintains the language of facticity, which reflects his engagement with Dilthey. This shift from *Erlebnis* to *Erfahrung* conveys an attempt to shift to less subject-centered and more object-oriented language.

While Heidegger seemed to think that *Erlebnis* could express the relationality of experience (comportment) in 1919, this is not the case by the 1930's. Heidegger's turn to art takes up *Erfahrung* and rejects *Erlebnis*. During this shift, the object-oriented connotations of *Erfahrung* serve his attempt to reinterpret the thing, and the more subject-centered sense of *Erlebnis* becomes an impediment to his attempt to approach the thing as thingly. In Heidegger's notebooks from 1936 – 1938, *Contributions to Philosophy: On Enowning*, Heidegger gives a very different definition of *Erlebnis* than he had in his 1919 lecture course. Heidegger states that *Erlebnis* is "the certainty of the I" and interprets all being through this I.[67] What counts as lived experience is only "what man is able to bring to and before himself, [only that] can count as 'a being'" (C 90). Here Heidegger describes lived experience as the culmination of metaphysics, which determines being according to the representational thought of the subject. He maps the progression of metaphysics beginning from Plato's use of 'idea' in the allegory of the cave to 'constant presence,' 're-presentedness,' and finally 'lived experience' (C 90). Lived experience thus expresses the idea that the world and everything in it is the representation of a subject. Everything exists and is meaningful insofar as it can be experienced (*erleben*) by

[66] This idea of 'befalling' is similar to the idea of experience that Heidegger maintains through his middle and late works: "When we talk of 'undergoing' an experience [*Erfahrung*], we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it." Heidegger, "The Nature of Language" in *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1982, 57 -108. 57 [GA 12]. See discussion of this passage in following subsection.

[67] Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), 90, 92. Henceforth cited as C.

the subject. Heidegger expresses the same idea in "The Age of the World Picture." Modern thought no longer recognizes the being of beings and determines everything in relation to the subject, which turns the world into a mere representation or picture: "the world becomes a picture as soon as man makes his life as subject the primary center of reference. This means: the being counts as in being only to the degree and extent that it is taken into, and referred back to, this life, i.e., is lived out [erlebt], and becomes life-experience [Er-lebnis]."[68] Heidegger's use of *Erlebnis* in the 1930's thus stands for the ego-centric dilemma of metaphysics and the violence of representational thought, instead of the broader notion of comportment and *living toward* from his early Freiburg lectures.

Contributions further undermines any positive notion of *Erlebnis* by connected lived experience to machination (*Machenschaft*). For Heidegger, lived experience belongs to and verifies machination in modern thought. Machination is domination, namely "the domination of making… The pattern of generally calculable explainability, by which everything draws nearer to everything else equally and becomes completely alien to itself" (C 92). Machination treats everything as something to be calculated, explained, and determined.[69] By connecting lived experience to machination, Heidegger sees *Erlebnis* as yet another instance of the violence of thought, which imposes its own structures on things rather being responsive to them. This relation between lived experience and machination becomes even more explicit in Heidegger's critique of museum installations in *Mindfulness* (1938-1939). In this posthumously published book that follows directly after *Contributions*, Heidegger describes the modern museum

[68] Heidegger, "Age of the World Picture," 71.
[69] See Heidegger's critique of enframing, which treats everything as standing-reserve (*Bestand*) in "The Question Concerning Technology," trans. William Lovitt, *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Collins, 1993), 307 - 341.

experience as a form of machination. A museum installation installs, or enframes, works of art in a way that is meant to calculate a specific response.[70] Installation does not treat art as the happening of truth or grounding of a people, but as the representation of a lived experience that can be appropriated as one's own, like a form of training. The works of art are presented as "liveable" so that they can be incorporated into the viewer's own life and digested whole. For Heidegger, the museum installation is *training-in-lived experience*.[71] This sense of art treats the work of art as mere means to an end and as an object that is wholly determined by the subject without any remainder.[72] Heidegger makes the same connection between *Erlebnis* and the violent subjectivism of modern aesthetics in "A Dialogue on Language." Heidegger explains, "Aesthetics… from the very start turns the art work into an object for our feelings and ideas. Only when the art work has become an object, only then is it fit for exhibitions and museums."[73] If works of art are treated as an occasion to acquire some experience, a mere means to an end, they lose the sense of presencing and happening—they are mere goods to be consumed like any other resource in the world. Lived experience thus treats the work of art as a consumable good. 'Life' here, however, is not open and relational, but simply another form of calculation.

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[70] Heidegger, *Mindfulness*, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (London: Continuum, 2006). 25

[71] Heidegger, *Mindfulness*, 26.

[72] As Berhard Radloff explains, "The museum as installation is the form of integration of the aesthetic, institutional, and historical-critical apparatus that together determines how 'art' will be experienced. The installation is the active installing (integration) of sectors of production into each other, in such a way as to make them more functional, efficient, more fully operational. The installation serves the intensification of the lived experience (Erlebnis) of art through an integration of consciousness and technical-historical objectivity. Lived experience is the way in which the essential sway of technology—that is, machination (Machenschaft) – is experienced" (151). See Berhard Radloff, "Preliminary Notes on Divine Images in the Light of Being-Historical Thinking" in *Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking: Essays in Honor of Parvis Emad*, ed. Frank Schalow, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 145 – 171.

[73] Heidegger, "A Dialogue on Language," 43.

From this trajectory of Heidegger's treatment of *Erlebnis* we see how far his critiques depart from his original adoption of the word, which was more in keeping with Dilthey's use. More importantly, we see that Heidegger's reading of Dilthey's aesthetics disregards many of his more interesting insights and reduces everything to the problem of Cartesian subjectivism. Heidegger's derogatory use of *Erlebnis* expresses exactly the opposite intention that Dilthey's use expresses. For Dilthey, *Erlebnis* is meant to avoid the determinate explanations of the natural sciences and empirical epistemologies, which treat experience as a collection of data to calculate. The sense of 'life' in lived experience is factical for Dilthey—i.e. relational, unfathomable, and never fully given or unhidden.[74] *Erlebnis* does not calculate or dominate but is responsive and grounded in the world. There is not a Cartesian subject that grounds *Erlebnis*, because for Dilthey the self can only be formed over time in relation to an other and the resistance of the world. The acquired psychic nexus describes the self as historical and relational.[75] Moreover, *Erlebnis* precedes the reflective act that separates the subject and object. Dilthey was opposed to rationalism, naïve realism, and positivism; his notion of lived experience is not narrowly defined. Heidegger's rejection of *Erlebnis* is not necessarily an attack on Dilthey, and his use of *Erfahrung* expresses some of the same concerns as Dilthey. For this reason, we should think of Dilthey's *Erlebnis* and Heidegger's *Erfahrung* as different ways of approaching the facticity of experience. For both thinkers, experience is factical: the self is always already immersed in the world of experience and the things of the world always already strike the self and form what can be experienced.

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[74] For a discussion of the relationality of lived experience, see Giovanni Matteucci, *Dilthey: Das Ästhetische als Relation* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004), especially 59 – 82.
[75] See section 2.3 in Chapter Two, pp. 80- 86.

4.2 Bridging Dilthey's Aesthetics and Heidegger's Philosophy of Art

While Heidegger's and Dilthey's writings on art differ dramatically in language and emphasis, some similarities come to the fore. Both thinkers find traditional concepts of art to fall short of what is at stake in actual works of art. Dilthey and Heidegger take up art as a model for understanding the world in opposition to scientific knowledge and treat the relation between art and history as a dynamic hermeneutics that grounds the meaning of human life without positing any absolute or timeless values. Both thinkers emphasize feeling as a way of understanding the world, rather than either the harmonization of the faculties or an inner irrational state of mind. As a result, Dilthey and Heidegger both frame art more in terms of truth and understanding than in terms of beauty. Furthermore, both thinkers emphasize the power of art as transformative in a way that reworks our relation to the ordinary, sensible world around us. Although Heidegger criticizes Dilthey explicitly and implicitly throughout his works, this is because he fails to recognize the dynamic, transformative quality of experience in Dilthey's philosophy. A more thorough engagement with Dilthey's aesthetics reveals the deeper connections in their approach to art.

Nevertheless, we must note that in some ways Dilthey's aesthetics and Heidegger's philosophy of art conflict with each other. Dilthey develops his early aesthetics theory by examining the imagination of the poet, whereas Heidegger states that the imagination is insufficient for explaining art (PLT 70). Dilthey's later aesthetics approaches art more broadly in terms of the lives of the artists, whereas Heidegger's lecture course on Hölderlin's hymn "The Rhine" state that approaching art through the biography of the artist is psychologism or anthropologism. Dilthey's emphasis on the

individual artist's lived experience and her power to bring expression to the meaning of life as a whole contrasts with Heidegger's interest with the ontology of the work of art and its ability to illuminate the being of beings.

If one were to draw a distinction in broad brushstrokes, we could say that Dilthey focuses on the subjective or experiential aspects of art and Heidegger on the objective or ontological. These differences between Heidegger and Dilthey would then seem to preclude any possibility of bringing them into dialogue. Yet to divide their contributions to philosophy of art in this simplistic way would be a disservice to both thinkers. As explained in Chapter One, for Dilthey the individual is always shaped by the world. Dilthey's epistemology is not pure or Cartesian, so to reduce his account of art to subjectivism would be to misunderstand his project completely. Similarly, to make Heidegger's work of art an object is to misunderstand its relation to the world. The poet is significant for Heidegger. The poet builds a place for us to dwell and creates a world. Likewise, while Heidegger does not discuss an audience or spectator, the work of art founds a people who preserve it. The work of art is not an object in a vacuum: "Just as a work cannot be without being created but is essentially in need of creators, so what is created cannot itself come into being without those who preserve it" (PLT 64). Preservation also implies that the work of art can decay; its world can collapse and "sink into oblivion" (PLT 65). The work of art bears an intimate relation to people by founding them and being preserved by them. So while Heidegger does not emphasize the artist or spectator through an account of genius or aesthetic experience, he also does not exclude the person. Instead, Heidegger finds a deeper ground for our relation to works of art, a relation that can subvert the subjectivism of modern aesthetics.

Heidegger overcomes aesthetics not by abandoning experience or perception, but by revealing their deeper source. Even late Heidegger's lectures and essays frequently use the language of experience and perception. For example, Heidegger discusses transformative experience in "The Nature of Language" (1957). Here Heidegger again rejects the notion of experience defined in terms of Cartesian subjectivity to discuss experience as a happening that transforms us. Heidegger emphasizes experience as an event that we undergo, not as a product of a priori conditions of subjectivity that we project as exterior to us: "When we talk of 'undergoing' an experience [*Erfahrung*], we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it."[76] Here Heidegger wants to discuss the experience of language, an experience that "touch[es] the innermost nexus of our existence" to transform us. It is this sense of experience that we might apply to the transformed world of the work of art. Dilthey's notion of experience is not that of an isolated Cartesian subject, but a dynamic interweaving of self and world.

Similarly, for Dilthey the work of art is important, not simply the lived experience of the artist or spectator. The work of art is not an individualistic culmination of the artist's personal experience. For Dilthey, the artist has a disinterested relation to the work of art. This disinterest grants the work of art independence from its creator (SW V 227). Heidegger adopts a similar notion of disinterest. In his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger claims that disinterest has been continually misinterpreted as apathy (N I 109). For Heidegger, aesthetic disinterest allows "the essential relation to the object itself comes into play" (N I 110). When we regard an object without interest and without determinate

[76] Heidegger, "The Nature of Language" in *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1982, 57 -108. 57 [GA 12].

concepts, we create a new relation to that object. As Heidegger describes, "for the first time the object comes to the fore as pure object and that such coming forward into appearance is the beautiful. The word 'beautiful' means appearing in the radiance of such coming to the fore" (NI 110). Both Dilthey and Heidegger treat disinterest as a comportment that allows the work of art to stand on its own. In Dilthey's case, disinterest shows his concern for the actual work of art. In Heidegger's case, disinterest gestures toward the fact that his ontology of the work of art does not preclude a meaningful dialogue with aesthetics.

To divide Dilthey's aesthetics from Heidegger's philosophy of art under the auspices of the subjective-objective divide would be to impose the very dichotomy that both thinkers find so problematic. Moreover, since both thinkers were concerned with what precedes and grounds the subject-object distinction, overemphasizing this distinction to parse out their differences is a disservice that robs their contributions of their nuances. Instead, bringing Dilthey and Heidegger into dialogue might illuminate the ties that connect the self, world, and work of art without reducing this account to subjectivity or objectivity. Due to the tendency of post-Heideggerian philosophy to obliterate the subject, reading Heidegger in terms of Dilthey can perhaps restore a sense of the self that dwells in the world founded by the work of art.[77] Without attempting to

[77] This is Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei's project in *Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic Language: Toward a New Poetics of Dasein* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004). Gostetti-Ferencei argues for a poetic self in Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin. Her book was received as reading Heidegger "against the grain" through Hölderlin's sense of the subject. By contrast, I consider Heidegger to have a sense of the subject that is not the Cartesian subject, which means that discussing the poetic self is not "against" Heidegger. Heidegger's *Being and Time* was misinterpreted as subjectivism due to reductive accounts of Dasein, which meant he needed to distance himself from the use of subjective language—at times violently creating distance. Heidegger's attempt to overcome the language of metaphysics which is centered on the Cartesian subject also required finding other language to discuss the person, perception, and experience. See also François Raffoul, *Heidegger and the Subject*, trans. David Pettigrew and Gregory Recco (New York: Humanity Books, 1998).

dissolve their distinct approaches to art into a superficial unity, the following chapters will bring Dilthey and Heidegger into conversation to develop a factical approach to aesthetics.

PART III: A FACTICAL AESTHETICS

Chapter Four

Interpreting Life from Life Itself

As explicated in Chapter One, Heidegger and Dilthey both attempt to philosophize from the standpoint of life—i.e. to think through the felt, living contexts that form lived experience, rather than concepts or schemas that abstract from life. Facticity describes the complexity of lived experience as both (1) given, i.e. there for us in terms of the here and now, the *thisness* [*haecceity*] of experience, and yet (2) neither immediately understood nor reducible to conceptualization since it emerges from interweaving relations between the self and world. Factical life describes how we are always already caught up in that which we try to analyze. We are caught up or thrown into what we attempt to understand because life provides the ground for and limit of thought. For Dilthey, "The expression 'life' formulates what is most familiar and most intimate to everyone, yet at the same time something most obscure, indeed totally inscrutable." [1] We cannot get outside of life to analyze it objectively nor can we reduce it to a set of concepts. Instead, we must interpret and describe life from our lived perspective. In *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*, Heidegger explicitly takes up Dilthey's "ultimate philosophical motive: to interpret life from out of itself, primordially." [2] In this way both thinkers' philosophical projects begin with the hermeneutic goal to interpret life

[1] Wilhelm Dilthey, "Life and Cognition: A Draft for an Epistemic Logic and a Theory of Categories," trans. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Jacob Owensby, in *Understanding the Human World*, *Wilhelm Dilthey Selected Works*, vol. II, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). Cited as SW II.

[2] Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*, trans. by Tracy Colony, (London: Continuum, 2010), 119. Heidegger's phrasing refers to Dilthey's claim that *Das Leben legt sich aus* : "Life lays itself out, it articulates itself, it interprets itself,' generating its own meaning and sense of direction." Theodore Kisiel, "On the Genesis of Heidegger's Formally Indicative Hermeneutics of Facticity" in *Rethinking Facticity*, ed. François Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), 41 – 67. 43

from life itself. This demand calls for a new approach to philosophy—an approach that appears to be modeled after the work of art in Dilthey's and Heidegger's writings.

Chapters Two and Three set the stage for an aesthetic approach to the paradox of facticity by giving an overview of Dilthey's and Heidegger's distinct contributions to thinking about art. In responding to the rise of modernism in the nineteenth century, which expressed a return to the everyday and a new feeling of reality, Dilthey's aesthetics connects art to life by developing a broader notion of feeling and its role in the formation and transformation of experience. Dilthey moreover recognized the transformative nature of art—not only by examining the significance of historical change in artistic style, but also by defining art as a metamorphosis of life. As Chapter One explains, Dilthey's *The Imagination of the Poet* develops the concept of facticity directly in relation to art. This relation indicates that the work of art provides a model for understanding the facticity of life, especially its incommensurability and depth of mystery. Like Dilthey, Heidegger attempts to address what is overlooked by art theory in "The Origin of the Work of Art," which is why he takes up the thingly aspect of art. The thingly is not simply brute materiality for Heidegger since he breaks from the standard distinction between form and matter. Instead the thingly demonstrates art's unique ability to let the thing shine in itself, which gives us access to things in the world, opens up the world for us, and allows truth to happen. Since for Heidegger truth is unhiddenness that comes from a deeper, hidden source, art reveals concealment. This interplay between the hidden and unhidden in art and the happening of truth expresses the paradox of facticity, which suggests that art becomes a way for Heidegger to grapple with facticity. In light of these broad

considerations of Dilthey's and Heidegger's writings on art and facticity, this chapter will bring them into conversation.

This chapter intends to clear the ground for a factical aesthetics. To create a space for a factical aesthetics and to explain why the paradox of facticity calls for a new aesthetics, I will first discuss their critiques of previous aesthetic theories. Both Dilthey and Heidegger critique mimesis and Hegelian aesthetics, which reveal similar concerns that underlie the differences in their language and emphasis. From these critiques, we will be able to locate two main issues that call for a new approach to thinking about art: (1) the tendency of philosophers to treat art as a mere representation or copy of reality, which misunderstands our relation to the world, and (2) the difficulty of addressing the sensible itself instead of subordinating all material aspects of art to the expression of ideas. These two issues rest on an even more fundamental problem for philosophy. Namely, both of these issues treat art, thought, and being as a whole through a representational framework that separates the subject and object and divides sensation, feeling, and thought. A factical aesthetics restores the more essential unity of experience, which is an intertwining of self and world, feeling and thought, sensibility and intelligibility.

To consider this factical aesthetics in terms of art and not simply in terms of theory, I will also take up Hölderlin's poetry and theoretical writings. Hölderlin serves as a further intersection for Dilthey and Heidegger because both thinkers discuss the poet at length and treat his poetry as exemplary for thinking about art. My discussion of Hölderlin will focus on the aspects of his poetry and thought that exemplify the need for and possibility of a factical aesthetics: his concern with the sensible that is expressed through his evocative poetic images, his uncanny sensitivity for the expressivity of

language, his understanding of the weight of history, and the intensity of feeling in his narratives that culminate in profound existential realizations. Hölderlin's poetic voice bears witness to the facticity of art and its power for articulating the mysteries of what is given in human experience. For these reasons, I will adopt the insights of Hölderlin's poetry to form a fuller account of art than what representative models of aesthetic theory can provide.

1. Dismantling Aesthetic Theory

In *The Imagination of the Poet* (1887), Dilthey highlights two problematic tendencies in aesthetic theory: (1) the tendency to treat art as a representation of reality, which is present in objectivistic theories of art, and (2) the tendency to idealize art, which is present in the aesthetic theory of German idealists who see reality as a product of the mind.[3] That is, art is treated either as a mere copy of reality or as a pure creation of the mind. In the first case, art is reduced to a form of knowledge, which means that its felt aspects are ignored. In the second case, the world is reduced to a product of the mind, which elevates art as an expression of the mind's world-making power but overemphasizes the unity between mind and world. Both tendencies fail to properly address the relation between the self and world without conflation. For Dilthey and Heidegger, however, art is not a representation of the world or ideas impressed onto sensuous material, but the very interweaving of the self and world.[4] By contrasting

[3] Dilthey, *The Imagination of the Poet*, translated by Louis Agosta and Rudolf A. Makkreel in *Poetry and Experience*, *Wilhelm Dilthey Selected Works*, vol. V, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, 2nd printing, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 29 - 173. This work is referred to as Dilthey's *Poetics* (*Poetik*). Henceforth cited as SW V.

[4] Heidegger does not recognize this aspect of Dilthey's aesthetics because he misconstrues Dilthey's self as an isolated Cartesian ego. Chapter One, "Re-appropriating Dilthey," defuses Heidegger's criticism of Dilthey's notion of subjectivity and Chapter Two explains how Dilthey's aesthetics is embodied and shaped by our relation to the world. For another defense of Dilthey's philosophy that addresses Heidegger's criticism, see Eric S. Nelson, "The World Picture and its Conflicts in Dilthey and Heidegger" *Humana*

Dilthey's and Heidegger's philosophies of art to representational and idealist theories, I will argue that understanding art in terms of factical life radicalizes aesthetics by problematizing conceptual frameworks based on subject-object dichotomies and by emphasizing the sensuousness of art.

1.1 Mimesis and Representational Accounts of Art

In classical accounts of art as representation, the artist perceives or experiences something in the world and then represents (re-presents) it in a medium. Representational accounts argue that art is essentially a mimetic activity, a way of understanding the world by imitating it. This account treats the world as if it were an object for the mind to receive and recreate.[5] In his *Poetics* Dilthey describes Aristotle's notion of mimesis as objectivism because it assumes an unproblematic continuity between the mind and world (SW V 38). For Aristotle art is pleasurable because we learn through imitation, which satisfies our natural desire for knowledge. For Dilthey, this naturalistic account of art is reductive because it "subordinates the pleasure of poetry to that of learning and contemplation" (P 38). Art becomes a mere "reproduction of life" simply for the sake of portrayal (SW V 38). As a result of this objectivism, the function of art is summed up in its mimetic value for knowledge.

In *Three Epochs of Modern Aesthetics* (1892), Dilthey also characterizes Leibniz's account of aesthetics as mimetic due to Leibniz's emphasis on the ability of the

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Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2011): 19 – 38; Jos de Mul, *The Tragedy of Finitude: Dilthey's Hermeneutics of Life*, trans. Tony Burrett (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 307 – 325.

[5] This concept of mimesis differs from Gadamer's hermeneutical interpretation of mimesis in *Truth and Method*. For Gadamer mimesis is an example of play, which does not form an objectivistic framework but allows multiple relations and levels of recognition. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London: Continuum, 2004), especially 112 – 113.

mind to represent the world.[6] Dilthey explains that Leibniz's "[a]esthetic frame of mind operates as an impetus in the soul… Thus, alongside the capacity for grasping the harmony of the universe through the architectonic unity of thought, there appears the other capacity to architectonically imitate an object and to create something in virtually the same way as God would" (SW V 185). This relation between mind as subject and world as object abstracts from the lived perspective and substitutes an ideal perspective, the vantage point of God.[7] This attempt at an objective vantage point is a reductive abstraction because it cannot account for art as reflective of a particular lived perspective and as a part of the living contexts of the world. With this conceptual framework the meaning of art is circumscribed by the work's correspondence to an objective, external reality that is simply there for us, not a world that forms us or that we take part in creating. Dilthey challenges the mimetic concept of art because it treats our relation to the world as transparent rather than interpretive. For Dilthey, "the only real artist is one who can advance our ability to interpret reality. Those who merely copy reality teach us nothing which a bright person and good observer would not know without them" (SW V 211). Both classical and early modern notions of mimesis fail to see art as an interpretation of life. Mimesis thus overlooks our interpretative and hermeneutic relation to the world that is manifested in art.

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[6] Wilhelm Dilthey, *The Three Epochs of Modern Aesthetics and Its Present Task*, translated by Michael Neville in *Poetry and Experience*, SW V, 175 – 222. 176. Henceforth cited as SW V.

[7] Merleau-Ponty describes early modern epistemology in a similar way—i.e. philosophers "wanted to forget what they disdainfully called *perspectiva naturalis*, or *communis*, in favor of a *perspectiva artificialis* capable in principle of founding an exact construction." By creating a geometrical perspective for how objects are seen, early modern thinkers hoped to establish the ideal vantage point, the absolute perspective, from which objects could be seen in perfect clarity with absolute determination. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind" in *Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader*: *Philosophy and Painting*, trans. Michael B. Smith, ed. Galen A. Johnson (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1993), 121 – 149. 135.

Similarly, Heidegger critiques representational theories of art because representation misconstrues subject-object relations. Heidegger explains in "The Age of the World Picture" that representation posits a subject who re-presents an object.[8] In his lecture on "Germania," Heidegger explains that "the representational relation between subject and object" makes the separation of subject and object primary. The way in which subjects are attuned to or respond to objects becomes feeling in the sense of "merely something added on—a coloring."[9] Within this conceptual framework, how art moves us is not necessarily significant because representational models assume that the way things solicit reactions from us is a secondary relation, not a defining one. Heidegger opposes this notion of representation, because he thinks that attunement is prior to the division between subjects and objects:

> attunement does not start from a subject and an object that lie independently present at hand, such that an attunement would impose itself between the two and go back and forth between subject and object. Rather, the attunement and its arising or receding is primary and originary, first drawing the object into the attunement in its own particular way in each instance, and making the subject that which is attuned (GA 39, 140-141).

Attunement describes the relation from which subjectivity and objectivity arise. What we encounter, what solicits a response in us shapes us and how we approach the world. How we approach the world shapes what is there for us. We are not isolated subjects that encounter the world as an object (*Gegenstand*). We are always already a part of interpreting that which we encounter. Heidegger rejects representational theories of art,

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[8] See discussion of "Age of the World Picture" in Chapter Three, pp. 111 – 112.

[9] Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine,"* trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis (Indiana University Press, forthcoming). Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein*,' *Gesamtausgabe* 39, ed. Susanne Ziegler (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980), 141. Note that these English translations of GA 39 are from an unpublished manuscript that I am using with the translators' permission. Henceforth cited as GA 39.

because the world is not an object simply present to our perception that can be re-presented through art.

For Heidegger, the concept of art as symbol continues the problematic framework of representational thought.[10] Instead of merely representing an object to a subject, the symbol or analogy represents an object via another object. If we define the entire value of art in terms of the power to symbolize things and ideas, art simply points at things in the world and reveals nothing about our relation to it. The idea of art as symbol makes works of art mere indications of something on the outside. In doing so, symbolic accounts of art set the object at a distance by presuming that objects are discrete entities that can indicate each other remotely.

These symbolic relations moreover can become abstract and arbitrary. Hegel calls symbolic art the lowest form of art because it establishes relations between form and content in a thoughtless way. Poor interpretations of works of art attempt to summarize every element in terms of what the painting, poem, sculpture, or song "symbolizes" or "represents"—e.g. the ray of bright light that pierces the darkness of the room in Caravaggio's "The Calling of St. Matthew" represents God, the cold blue tones in Van Gogh's "The Old Guitarist" symbolize his sadness, the bull in Picasso's "Guernica" represents Spain. If this type of interpretation does not ground the symbolic relation—e.g.

[10] Heidegger, following Hegel, sees the symbol as an exterior, sensuous image that indicates an inner, spiritual meaning. Yet unlike Hegel, Heidegger conflates 'symbol,' 'allegory,' and representation because he thinks that the same "pervasive framework" underlying "these variations of 'symbolic images'" is more important than the distinctions between these ideas. Namely, symbol and allegory rely upon the division between sensuous image and nonsensuous truth that Heidegger sees as dominating Western philosophy of art since Plato. See Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister', trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 16 - 17. See also GA 39 147-148. Dilthey, however, does not critique symbols and sees them as important to art and understanding history hermeneutically. Dilthey, however, defines "symbol" differently than Heidegger and writes, "all literature is *symbolic* since the material and goal of poetic representation is always formed by lived experience" (SW V 117). See also, introduction to Dilthey, *Hermeneutics and the Study of History*, *Selected Works* vol. 4, ed. Rudolf Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

between the bull and Spain—in a more complex network of meaningful relations, the work of art becomes a simple message abstracted from its elements. It would not make sense for Picasso to paint "Guernica" rather than write an anti-war treatise on the bombing of the Spanish town, if all of the painting's elements can be summed up as symbolic of an external object, event, or idea that is already understood. Art would be redundant.

Representational and symbolic[11] accounts of art share in common the idea that art indicates or points at something exterior to it. These accounts derive the significance of the work of art from a subject or object external to it. This reduces art to mirroring or pointing at what is already there in the world or what is already understood. By contrast, Dilthey and Heidegger assert an interpretative notion of art that draws a more complex relation between self and world. As factical and intertwined with life, art cannot simply be a portrayal of the world. Since the world and life are not objects apart from us, we do not merely re-present what is present and already there. The work of art grapples with the complex knot of interrelations that are present even before we distinguish subjects and objects. In critiquing representational accounts of art, Dilthey and Heidegger develop an aesthetics that reveals our hermeneutic relation to the world. This factical approach to art, moreover, must be distinguished from Hegel's dialectical philosophy of art, which both Dilthey and Heidegger critique.

[11] Symbolic as Heidegger defines it, not as Dilthey. Gadamer presents a much more generous definition of the symbol. For Gadamer, the symbol points at itself and "rests upon an intricate interplay of showing and concealing" not meaning. Gadamer places the symbol within a part of a hermeneutic framework, not a representational one. See Gadamer, *The Relevance of the Beautiful*, trans. Nicholas Walker, ed. Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), especially 31 – 34.

1.2 Hegel's Metaphysical Abstraction from Sensation

Hegel's aesthetic lectures also attempt to critique representational accounts of art, but his approach subsumes art's material form into conceptual content and ignores the significance of the sensuous material of art. Hegel rejects art as representation because he considers art to be a product of spirit, which reveals something greater than what is present to mere sensation: "Art liberates the true content of phenomena from the pure appearance and deception of this bad, transitory world, and gives them a higher actuality, born of the spirit."[12] This account of the work of art is dualistic, especially since Hegel uses body-soul analogies to explain his philosophy of art. For Hegel, just as the exterior of the body points beyond itself to the soul, so every external element of the work of art "hints at a meaning and counts for nothing in itself" (LFA 20). In this sense, Hegel's emphasis on the content of art is an ideal spiritualization of the work of art. For Hegel, the central question of aesthetics has been lost in concern with what is merely external—the lifeless material form of art which affects the dullest region of our mind—and reorients his inquiry by asking, "what, then, is the *content* of art, and why is this content to be portrayed?" (LFA 46). Hegel emphasizes spiritual content, not art's materiality or facticity.

Hegel's account of art history as a dialectic between form and content conveys this emphasis on the conceptual rather than sensual. In Hegel's account of the historical and spiritual development of art, he describes the dialectic between inner spirit and its "external medium" of expression as an evolution of the spirit toward the Concept (LFA 81). Art comes to an end when its spiritual content transcends the possibility of

[12] G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, vol. 1, trans. T.M. Knox, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), 9. Henceforth cited as LFA followed by the page number of the translation.

expression in form, during the development of Romantic art. This dialectical relation thus privileges content, because the evolution of art relies upon the advancement of art forms as expressions of more spiritualized contents. Hegel's aesthetics depends on content and the spiritual evolution of art form into something that can transcend itself by its relation to the Concept, which is why Adorno describes Hegel's philosophy of art as "content-aesthetics [*Inhaltsästhetik*]."[13] Art is meant to be the expression of spiritual reality. Hegel proposes an "end of art" because art ends when religion progresses in its spiritual realization and transcends the need for material examples. Art is a vehicle that becomes obsolete.

Dilthey critiques this aspect of Hegelian aesthetics, because it reduces art to concepts and fails to recognize the way in which art flows from factical, lived experience, which is irreducible to concepts. For Dilthey, "every attempt to capture the airy soaring spirit of this [poetic] view of life in concepts or systems strips it of its luster and light; it leaves behind only miserable shadows" (SW V 290). In his *Poetics*, Dilthey states that "the interpretation of literary works as presently dominated by *Hegelian aesthetics* must be opposed" and gives the example of trying to reduce Shakespeare's *Hamlet* to an idea or concept (SW V 138). *Hamlet* cannot be reduced to one idea or a single interpretation. The variety of interpretations, throng of feelings, and complexity of the material resist a totalizing account.

For Dilthey, Hegelian philosophy of art detracts from what makes art significant: its factical relation to life. Instead of confining an artwork to the expression of one idea,

[13] Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. by Robert Hullot-Kentor, ed. by Robert Hullot-Kentor and Gretel Adorno, in *Theory and History of Literature*, vol. 88, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006). For an overview of Adorno's critique of Hegel's aesthetics see Rebecca Longtin Hansen,"Between Theory and Praxis: Art as Negative Dialectics" in *Studies in Social and Political Thought* 21 (2013): 26 – 51.

Dilthey states that "the lived experience of the poet and its unnerving symbols constitute a dramatic core that cannot be expressed in any proposition… everything comes together into a graphic, felt unity of the deepest life-experiences, and that is precisely the significance of poetry" (SW V 139). A work of art resonates with us and is meaningful because of this dramatic core, not a propositional truth or idea. For Dilthey, "a poetic work always contains more than can be expressed in a general proposition, and its gripping force comes from this surplus" (SW V 137). The surplus of the work of art—i.e. its resistance to a complete interpretation or overarching concept—is not only a matter of meaning. All the aspects of the work of art contribute to this surplus—the meaning, feeling, and tangibility of the work. The core of a work of art cannot be separated from its material, formal elements, confluence of feeling, and complex relations between ideas, or it becomes a symbolic abstraction from life. Dilthey also opposes the way in which Hegel ignores the significance of aesthetic form, or the sensuousness of art. In *Three Epochs of Modern Aesthetics*, Dilthey points out that Hegel's aesthetics neglects art's sensuous media, forms of expression, style, and technique (SW V 204). For Dilthey, this lack of attention to concrete works of art and practices neglects the world and imposes an external, dialectical pattern on art (SW V 204, P 51). While Hegel has a historical notion of art, his aesthetics is still disembodied. For Dilthey, art is rooted in the facticity of life such that "every poem is a living creation" (SW V 253). Art makes life more tangible, more deeply felt, and more meaningful. Art cannot abstract from life. Instead "the recalcitrance of the factical proves invincible" in art (SW V 139). The facticity of art moreover cannot be divided into sensuous form and content. In Dilthey's aesthetics, the

work's content does not transcend the sensuous materiality of lived experience, but remains caught up in factical life-relations.[14]

Heidegger's lecture on "The Ister" (1942) also describes Hegel's philosophy of art as dualistic in his description of the "metaphysical interpretation of art," which he attributes to ancient philosophy and Hegel.[15] For Heidegger, the metaphysical interpretation reduces art to a άλλο-άγορεύειν (allegory). "Allegory" is derived from άλλο (other) and άγορά (agora), an open, public place of gathering where people make proclamations. Heidegger uses these root words to argue that the purpose of allegory is "to proclaim something else by way of something, namely, by way of something familiar that can be experienced sensuously" (I 16). Allegories proclaim an idea through a sensuous image. This metaphysical interpretation treats art as a mere sensuous appearance (*sinnlich*) or "image" (*Bild*) that "points towards a 'spiritual' content, a 'sense' ["Sinn"]" (I 16). This assumption—i.e. that art is a mere image that points at a higher nonsensuous meaning or metaphysical truth—rests on the idea that "the sensuous realm is a preliminary and subordinate state" (I 17). Heidegger ascribes this view to Hegelian philosophy of art and quotes the passage in *Lectures on Aesthetics* where Hegel claims that "What is sensuous in the work of art is meant to have existence only insofar as it exists for human spirit, and not insofar as it itself exists for itself as something sensuous" (I 17). The metaphysical account of art sees the sensuous material of art as a

[14] Chapter Two explains how Dilthey revises German aesthetics by grounding it in a more expansive concept of feeling that includes the body and higher values. For Dilthey, our perception, ideas, and ideals flow from our sensuous feelings and most basic impulses. Our thought processes thus cannot be understood apart from feeling and our embodied connection to the world.

[15] Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister', trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996). [GA 53] Henceforth cited as I.

mere vehicle for spiritual meaning. As a result, Hegel spiritualizes art to the point that it transcends facticity and cannot shed light on concrete, sensuous, lived experience.

By contrast, both Dilthey and Heidegger recognize the way in which art does not exhaust its materiality in its expression of meaning. Since the paradox of facticity asserts the resistance of the particular to conceptualization and the inability to find a complete expression for the concreteness of lived experience and life-relations, Dilthey and Heidegger each pursue a way of thinking about art that does not sublate the sensuous elements of art into intellectual content.

1.3 Recovering Feeling and Sensuousness in Aesthetics—Hölderlin's Poetry

From Dilthey's and Heidegger's critiques of mimetic and dialectic accounts of art, a few intersecting ideas emerge. First of all, for both thinkers the work of art is not a copy of an object set apart from us as subjects. The work of art creates meaning; it does not merely copy an already existing object. The idea of art as a copy of the world rests on a problematic subject-object dichotomy that misunderstands how we relate to the world. The world is not an object (*Gegenstand*). Instead, feeling (*Stimmung*) reveals that we are not isolated egos that project a world, we are caught up in the world. The things of the world elicit a response and shape our perception. Representational accounts that see the work of art as a copy, however, treat feeling as a mere effect and not an indication of our intimate relation to things. Mimesis thus diminishes the significance of art for understanding the world.

Both Dilthey's and Heidegger's accounts of art take up the significance of feeling (*Stimmung*). For Dilthey and Heidegger, feeling constitutes our perception and everyday experience as well as reveals what is meaningful in art. For Dilthey, feeling is not simply

an emotional effect instigated by art, but it is a meaningful transformation of the everyday. *The Imagination of the Poet* describes how feeling intensifies the qualities of ordinary experience in a way that underlines a deeper, more universal significance. Feeling is not restricted to one aspect of experience, but is incorporated throughout all aspects, from our concrete lived experience to the more abstract operations of thought. Feeling cannot be restricted to narrow definitions of the will or the affects, but rather presents a complex web of relations. Heidegger adopts a similar notion of feeling in *Being and Time* and his writings on art. In "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger questions the distinction between feeling and reason. For Heidegger, if we define our understanding of things in terms of reason and logic, we force everything into a limited structure. We do violence to the thing, rather than approach it openly as something that is self-contained and gives itself to thought. To counter this violence of reason, Heidegger suggests that "what we call feeling or mood… is more reasonable—that is, more intelligently perceptive—because more open to Being than all that reason which, having meanwhile become *ratio*, was misinterpreted as being rational" (PLT 24 - 25). For Heidegger, making thought less violent and "more thoughtful" requires recognizing the way that things are not fully grasped or contained by thing-concepts (PLT 25). Feeling allows a more open relation that does not define the thing in terms of concepts. Feeling expresses how the thing strikes us, moves us, calls us to respond, rather than how we grasp it within a propositional structure or set of concepts. Feeling reveals the thing as given by being, as unconcealed rather than grasped. Since Heidegger defines truth as *aletheia* or as the unconcealment of being, feeling is perceptive of truth.

Not only do Dilthey and Heidegger broaden and deepen the significance of feeling for philosophy and art, they also ground art in the everyday, sensuous world. In contrast to Hegel's dialectical spiritualization of art, Dilthey and Heidegger do not treat art as a vehicle for ideas. For Dilthey, art transforms ordinary experience through feeling, which he roots in the body.[16] This transformation is significant because it makes the implicit meaning of life explicit, which is not purely spiritual but instead involves a complex interweaving of life-relations. Art articulates life by bringing it to completion, i.e. by connecting specific aspects of lived experience to the totality of life. Yet for Dilthey, the totality of life provides a general structure in which we can articulate the significance of a particular image, but there is no absolute meaning that can be assigned to it. The concrete particular is not subsumed by the universal. For Dilthey, "The imagination lives in concrete images alone" (P 149). The completion of poetic metamorphosis is not absolute for Dilthey, and remains concrete, historical, and particular, which is exemplified in his discussion of the typical and motifs in art.[17] For Dilthey, the core of the work of art is connection to the factical. The work of art does not point at something else but brings something to life. Heidegger also takes up what is overlooked by Hegelian aesthetics, although Heidegger emphasizes not only feeling but also the thingly aspect of art. Since Heidegger's undermines the form-matter distinction in his discussion of traditional thing-concepts, the thingly aspect of art is not to be equated with its materiality. The thingly presents a complete reworking of perceptual experience such that art becomes a happening of truth. The truth of art is not ideal or

[16] See explanation of the spheres of feeling in Chapter Two, section 2.1, pp. 68 – 76.
[17] See Chapter Two, section 3.1, pp. 90 – 94.

purely intelligible, it is particular and sensible. Heidegger's account of art blurs the division between the sensible and the intelligible.[18]

Compared to other accounts of art, Dilthey's aesthetics and Heidegger's philosophy of art share some key concerns and characteristics—concerns and characteristics that are tied to their notion of the factical. Other accounts of art divide subject and object, feeling and idea, sensibility and intelligibility. Since the factical describes the given as a complex interweaving of all these relations, these dichotomies obfuscate rather than clarify the work of art and its relation to the world. A factical aesthetics restores art to its more essential unity—the unity between us and the work of art, between the work of art and the world, between feeling and thought, and between the sensible and the intelligible. The following section will attempt to articulate what a factical poetics entails by developing this dialogue further through Dilthey's and Heidegger's engagement with the poet Friedrich Hölderlin. Hölderlin's poetry counters mimetic and abstract concepts of art by expressing the recalcitrance of the sensuous and the irreducibility of images to ideas.

2. Hölderlin's Rehabilitation of the Sensible

To sketch a preliminary delineation of factical poetics, I will turn to a poet that Dilthey and Heidegger both take up and explore in depth: Friedrich Hölderlin. Dilthey is largely responsible for Hölderlin's reception in Germany as he wrote the first philosophical account of the poet. [19] During Hölderlin's lifetime, his writings were

[18] See Chapter Three, especially section 1.3, pp. 118 – 121.

[19] For an overview of Hölderlin's reception see chapter 9 "Hölderlin and His German Readers" in Richard Unger, *Friedrich Hölderlin*, (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984). Unger notes that Nietzsche was one of the earliest thinkers to take Hölderlin's poetry and thought seriously—Hölderlin largely influenced Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* and *Thus Spake Zarathustra*—but Nietzsche unfortunately turned against Hölderlin's 'Romanticism' when he began articulating his notion of will to power. Unger thus credits Dilthey as the thinker who brought Hölderlin to light: "even greater influence on Hölderlin's reception was Wilhelm

misunderstood and he was regarded as "an unstable sentimentalist consumed by nostalgia for ancient Greece."[20] Dilthey's essay on Hölderlin comes from the volume *Lived Experience and Poetry,* [21] which was published by his students during his lifetime. In this essay Dilthey emphasizes not only the singularity of Hölderlin's style but also his redefinition of tragedy that opens new possibilities for modern poets. As Unger notes, "It is Dilthey's premise that our fundamental experience of life is communicated most immediately and thus most accurately through art and especially poetry. The true poet is thus a visionary who perceives the meaning of life and Dilthey declares Hölderlin is the greatest of visionary poets."[22] Dilthey thus draws out the significance of Hölderlin for poetry and for philosophy.

Similarly, Heidegger treats Hölderlin as someone who opens up a new path for thought. Heidegger's long and sustained reflections on Hölderlin begin with his 1934-35 Freiburg lecture course on the hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine," where he names him the "most futural thinker" (*zukünftigster Denker*) and the greatest poet (GA 39: 6). Similarly in his *Contributions to Philosophy: On Enowning,* he calls Hölderlin "the one who *poetized the furthest ahead*, in an epoch when thinking once again aspired to know all history up to that point absolutely."[23] Not only does Heidegger constantly discuss or refer to Hölderlin from this point onward, but these notes reveal the extent to which

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Dilthey, who in his famous treatise *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung* elaborated an interpretation of Hölderlin and his work that virtually established the image of Hölderlin that was most widely held in the early twentieth century" (Unger 128).

[20] Unger, 128.

[21] Dilthey, "Friedrich Hölderlin," trans. by Joseph Ross in *Poetry and Experience*, SW V, 303-383. Henceforth cited as SW V followed by page number. This essay was one of his best-known writings from *Poetry and Lived experience* and plays a key role in Dilthey's attempt to create a new model for literary analysis.

[22] Unger, 128.

[23] Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), 143. Henceforth cited as C followed by page number in English translation.

Hölderlin became the most significant thinker for Heidegger.[24] Heidegger begins *Contributions* with the idea that we must "wrest [Hölderlin's] path and his work from being buried—wrest it in the direction of the truth of being" (C 142-143). He emphasizes the importance of this task by posing the question, "To what extent does the poet Hölderlin, who has already gone ahead of us, become *now* our necessity, in his most unique poetic experience and work?" (C 247). Heidegger views Hölderlin's poetry as *necessary* for thought, or more specifically as necessary for overcoming the limitations of representation thought. While these statements and questions surrounding Hölderlin are somewhat enigmatic in his *Contributions,* Heidegger's lectures on Hölderlin are clearer and provide insights as to why this poet became such a central figure for Heidegger's philosophy. Heidegger's 1942 Freiburg lecture on the hymn "The Ister" provides us with the mature development of his reflection on Hölderlin and also suggests that Heidegger was still contemplating facticity at this time, even if he no longer wanted to frame it in terms of "life." Examining Heidegger's conversation with Hölderlin thus reveals how poetry motivates and shapes his philosophical questions as well as his approach to art.

In addition to Dilthey's and Heidegger's discussions of the poet, Hölderlin was a philosopher in his own right. His works mediate between philosophy and poetry, as well as between Dilthey and Heidegger. Hölderlin philosophizes about poetry, and his theoretical works reveal the intensity of his engagement with philosophy. He studied Kant and Fichte and developed his own philosophical projects in response. Hölderlin attempted to revise Fichte's systematic method, expanded Kant's moral philosophy by reconciling him with Plato, and sought to reinvigorate his contemporary German

[24] Heidegger presents Hölderlin as the most significant thinker for us—even more significant than Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, whom Heidegger names as being able to "intimate their gods most intimately" and elucidate the hidden history of our thought most fully (C 142-143).

intellectual landscape with the "fire" of ancient Greek thought. His engagement with philosophy, moreover, cannot be separated from his poetry. His theoretical writings are dense, fragmentary, and gesture beyond what he can establish in language. His literary works explore these ideas in poetic verse and dramatic plot, often going beyond the typical forms and expectations of literature. As a result, it is difficult to read his theoretical works apart from his poetry and vice versa. Hölderlin philosophizes poetry and at the same time brings his philosophical reflection to its fulfillment in poetry. As Heidegger describes it, with Hölderlin "thinking and poetizing, poetizing and thinking are interwoven with one another in a single and wondrous way, if not completely joined together."[25] For these reason, Hölderlin's poetry easily lends itself to rethinking aesthetic theory from the perspective of art.

Furthermore, not only is Hölderlin a philosophical poet who has captured the interest of many philosophers, his poetry also illustrates the facticity of art and its ability to make the given more vivid while maintaining its limits. This section will address Hölderlin's insights into art by examining (1) his treatment of the sensible through poetic imagery, (2) his revision of the relation between self and world in terms of love, and (3) the role of remembrance and mediation in poetic thought.

2.1 The Sensuous Image

Hölderlin's poetry meditates on the world as sensuous. The intensity of his poetry is derived not from abstract metaphysical ideas, but from his highly evocative imagery that draws us to the mysteriousness and concrete particularity of things in the world. Hölderlin was enthralled with the depth and beauty of sensuous experience and his

[25] Heidegger, *Introduction to Philosophy—Thinking and Poetizing*, trans. Phillip Jacques Braunstein, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 13. [GA 50]. Henceforth cited as IPTP.

images depict this reverence for the smallest detail. "In lovely blueness…" Hölderlin writes that "these images are so simple, so very holy are these, that really often one is afraid to describe them."[26] For Hölderlin, the concrete particular is imbued with divinity and not simply its embodiment. The image itself is holy; the image does not point towards what is holy as a symbol or allegory. Hölderlin's poetry thus attempts to reveal the divinity of the ordinary or, as Dilthey expresses it, "the divine mystery that slumbers in all things" (SW V 304).

Dilthey connects the power of the sensuous image in Hölderlin's poetry to Hölderlin's pantheism and sense of life. According to Dilthey, "Hölderlin possessed a poetic enthusiasm for the beauty and harmony of the universe, a pure devotion to the divine ground of things from which they flow, and a peculiar ability to transfigure reality into something beautiful, to revere and enjoy every appearance as embodying the divine" (SW V 316). Each poetic image is an appearance of the divine. At the same time, Dilthey does not reduce Hölderlin's poetic images to the expression of a pantheistic metaphysics. Dilthey claims that Hölderlin's *Hyperion* "transcended every previous form of pantheistic metaphysics and every rule of our classical poets" (SW V 338). Hölderlin's images achieve a new sense of the divine in the ordinary. The sensuous particular carries a new depth of meaning through the vividness of his poetic images and the unique lyricism of his verses. For Dilthey, Hölderlin's poetry captures "the eternal rhythm of life itself, which surrounds us inaudibly" through his "innate sense for the melody of language" (SW V 304, 317). The lyricism of Hölderlin's language—his rhythmic energy, sensitivity to sound, and feel for what words can intimate—imbues the poetic image with a surplus

[26] Hölderlin, "In lovely blueness…" in *Friedrich Hölderlin: Poems and Fragments*, 4th bilingual edition, trans. Michael Hamburger, (London: Anvil Press Poetry, 2005), 789.

of meaning. For Dilthey, Hölderlin's poetry captures life and makes us receptive to its meaning.

Heidegger's discussions of the poet also recognize his reverence for the sensuous image. Heidegger emphasizes that Hölderlin's poetic images do not function as symbols or allegories for ideas, but present the sensuous image in itself. For example, the rivers in "The Ister" are not mere symbols for another idea. As Heidegger interprets Hölderlin, these poetic images of rivers defy any symbolic meaning: "The 'rivers' are therefore not to count as symbols of a higher level or of 'deeper,' 'religious' content. Hölderlin's hymnal poetry, which is the vocation of the poet after 1799, is not concerned with symbolic images at all" (I 18). The rivers in Hölderlin's hymns do not point at an idea outside of themselves such as the German nation or the forces of nature. Hölderlin creates a poetic image that does not reveal a higher meaning or metaphysical truth, but rather presents the sensuous as an enigma. Instead of allowing a symbolic or spiritual interpretation, "Hölderlin poetizes more mysteriously than these other poets" (I 18). For Heidegger, the rejection of symbolism in Hölderlin's poetry suggests a poetics that overcomes metaphysics. Metaphysics asserts a division between sensuous form and supersensuous content that treats the image as a symbol for a higher idea, which fails to appropriate Hölderlin's poetic images. The mystery of Hölderlin's images resists concepts and defies a complete interpretation. Yet this resistance is not mysticism. Unlike a metaphysical interpretation which can point at the expression of a supersensuous idea, Hölderlin's images seem "as though the poet himself were saying that we can know nothing of the rivers" (I 19). That is, the poet does not claim to know the river or its activity in a positive or absolute sense. The poet poetizes the mystery of the river, what

remains concealed from our efforts to grasp it conceptually even as it is revealed through poetic expression. Hölderlin's "poetic word unveils this concealment of the river's activity" (I 19). By recognizing how things remain concealed, Hölderlin does not sublate the ambiguity of the sensuous into a supersensuous truth, but allows for the sensuous to be meaningful in itself. For Heidegger, Hölderlin's poetry reveals concealment; his images recognize the aspects of things that resist our attempts to grasp them. Hölderlin's poetry allows truth as unconcealment, or *aletheia*. In Heidegger's analysis of Hölderlin's poem "In lovely blueness…", he talks about the poet as someone who yields to the appearance of the unknown.[27] Heidegger contrasts the poetic image, or "genuine image", which "let[s] something be seen" to the idea of the image as a representation, a copy, or a mere imitation (PLT 223). Poetic images are "not mere fancies and illusions but imaginings that are visible inclusions of the alien in the sight of the familiar" (PLT 224). This notion of the image is at the core of Hölderlin's poetry. Hölderlin's poetic image thus overcomes the problematic metaphysical notion of presence that Heidegger critiques.

For Dilthey, Hölderlin's image presents us with the depth, complexity, and mystery of life itself. For Heidegger, Hölderlin's image presents us with the truth of being by allowing an unconcealment that gestures toward what remains concealed. Both of these interpretations of Hölderlin's poetic images echo the dynamic of the factical as both given and hidden. Dilthey even describes Hölderlin's poetry as an effort "to interpret life in terms of itself," a phrase that characterizes his own philosophical attempts to address the factical (SW V 336). Facticity, however, describes more than an image.

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[27] Heidegger, "…Poetically Man Dwells…" in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, (New York: Perennial Classics, 2001), 211 - 227. 223. Henceforth cited as PLT.

Facticity describes our relation to the world as thrown, as always already a part of that which we attempt to understand. Hölderlin's poetic image is not enough to exemplify what a factical poetics would entail—we need to explore the relation between self and world in his poetry.

2.2 The Relation between Self and World

Hölderlin's poetry exposes not only the sensuousness of things and words, but also the complexity of relations between the self and world. Hölderlin's concern with the individual's relation to the whole comes from the tension between his pantheism, his Neo-Platonism, his study of Kant, who challenges the idea that we have an intuitional relation to nature, and his critique of Fichte, who attempts to resolve all contradictions within an absolute subject. Hölderlin's pantheistic worldview implies that there is unity—that the individual is a part of the universe in its highest undivided state and the divine is not separate from the material world. Yet in reading his theoretical works, we see how problematic this relation is for Hölderlin. Hölderlin does not simply resolve the tension between the individual and the whole, the particular and the universal, or the material and spiritual. Instead, he brings this tension into a higher relation than simple separation or difference. This relation is love, the meta-principle that defines the relation between subjects and objects in Hölderlin's philosophy.

Hölderlin's description of love is not simply an emotion or human connection, but the very principle for the possibility of relations. Dilthey explains, "Love is the metaphysical or mystical nexus that pervades reality, enlivens nature, and binds everything human" (SW V 315). For Hölderlin love "flows from the cup of life" (SW V

315).[28] Love exceeds human emotion or relations for Hölderlin; it is the harmony of the entire world. As Dilthey notes, Hölderlin's concept of love separates his speculative philosophy from Hegel's, who thought of love as merely a part of ethical life, not metaphysics. In his essay "Reflection" (1799), Hölderlin describes love as the most encompassing and highest relation, because it can allow difference and divergence. Love "will not overlook anything, and where it discovers so-called errors or mistakes (parts which in what they are or through their position and movement momentarily diverge from the tone of the whole), feels and intuits the whole only more intrinsically."[29] Instead of subsuming all differences into a complete unity, love allows the parts within the whole to be distinct. Love relates and brings together without cancelling difference, otherness, or particularity.

The importance of this type of relation—i.e. unification that preserves difference—is found in Hölderlin's critique of Fichte in "Judgment and Being" (1795). [30] Here Hölderlin asserts that "Being must not be confused with identity."[31] For Hölderlin, the unification of subject and object is impossible even within self-consciousness. With self-consciousness, the I must make itself an object, which is a "separation of the I from the I" (JB 38). Once the I is opposed to itself as an object, it is not the same. There is no reconciliation, even though for Hölderlin the subject and object are united originally.

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[28] Dilthey here quotes Hölderlin's poem "Hymn about Love."
[29] Hölderlin, "Reflection" in *Friedrich Hölderlin: Poems and Fragments*, 47.
[30] Dilthey explains Hölderlin's differences with Fichte in terms of Schleiermacher, the first hermeneutic thinker who was a large influence on Dilthey. Like Schleiermacher, Hölderlin recognized that "pure theory could not lead beyond the reality of consciousness. When Fichte sought to go behind the facts of consciousness to an absolute ego, he seemed thereby to annihilate consciousness and hence every content of this ego. Even then Hölderlin saw that a poetic intuition of the universe was the only basis for the objective understanding of the world as a coherent whole. The affinity of his position with Schleiermacher's holds also in this respect. For Schleiermacher this intuition was given in religion; for Hölderlin it was given in poetry" (SW V 322).
[31] Hölderlin, "Judgment and Being," in *Essays and Letters on Theory*, trans. and ed. Thomas Pfau (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 37. Henceforth cited as JB.

That is, "Being—expresses the connection between subject and object" (JB 37). In relation to Being, judgment acts as a primordial separation of subject and object, individual and world. Hölderlin plays with the word judgment (*Urteil*) to convey a primordial (*Ur*) division (*teil* – part, from verb *teilen* – to divide). Hölderlin writes: "Judgment. in the highest and strictest sense, is the original separation of object and subject which are most deeply united in intellectual intuition, that separation through which alone object and subject become possible, the arche-separation" (JB 37). Judgment separates the subject and objects and, moreover, cannot reunite what was separated since this separation is what makes it possible. Unification would dissolve the distinction. Hölderlin, however, recognizes that this separation is a relation itself, flowing from the original unity: "In the concept of separation, there lies already the concept of the reciprocity of object and subject and the necessary presupposition of a whole of which object and subject form the parts" (JB 37). Hölderlin's notion of judgment and being, subject and object, thus sets up a complex relation for the individual and the whole that is not naïve pantheism or mysticism. The mind cannot unite seamlessly with the world, but they are nonetheless intimately related to one another. The separation of subject and object, or self and world, rests on a mutual reciprocity. Hölderlin works through this complex relation in his notions of love and the desire for the unconditioned, which is thematized in *Hyperion* and *The Death of Empedocles*.

Hölderlin's early thought revolves around the question of how it is possible to preserve selfhood while surrendering oneself. Dietrich Henrich traces this problem back to Schiller's influence on Hölderlin, especially Schiller's discussion of love in his letter

"Theosophy of Julius."[32] For Schiller, love is not the sacrifice of the self, but "an act of self-expansion, even though it is also a tearing down the barriers of self before another being."[33] If we think of judgment as the original separation of Being, then love as a relation between self and world has metaphysical and epistemological significance: "Love thus becomes a metaprinciple for the unlimited, the boundless readiness for self-surrender, and particularly the urge to achieve and to reveal a unity between these opposites."[34] Yet despite the fact that Hölderlin uses love as a metaprinciple, he does not divorce it from its concrete circumstances within life. Henrich describes Hölderlin's love as belonging to "human life which finds fulfillment in the uniting of its opposite tendencies of life."[35] Hölderlin's metaphysical concern with love is not abstract or separate from lived experience but intrinsic to it, especially insofar as an individual's existence is a conflict. Hölderlin makes the conflict between the individual and the whole particularly salient as the life-course of a person and the history of humankind, which he articulates and illuminates through his narratives.

Hölderlin's novel—or more specifically, *Bildungsroman*—*Hyperion* draws out love as a relation of unity and separation, or a series of alternations between oppositions that unfold over time.[36] Hölderlin introduces the epistolary novel with an epitaph from Ignatius Loyola: "Not to be confined by the greatest, yet to be contained within the

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[32] Dietrich Henrich, "Hegel and Hoelderlin" in *Idealistic Studies* 2:2 (1972): 151-173. 155. Dilthey also notes many similarities between Schiller and Hölderlin throughout *Poetry and Lived Experience*.
[33] Henrich, 155.
[34] Henrich, 156.
[35] Henrich, 157.
[36] Dilthey describes a *Bildungsroman* as the portrayal of a person's formation in terms of "how he enters life in a happy state of naivete seeking kindred souls, finds friendship and love, how he comes into conflict with the hard realities of the world, how he grows to maturity through diverse life-experiences, finds himself, and attains certainty about his purpose in the world" (SW V 335). The *Bildungsroman* is especially significant for Dilthey because it "is distinguished from all previous biographical compositions in that it intentionally and artistically depicts that which is universally human in such a life-course" (SW V 335).

smallest, is divine."[37] The novel thus begins with the idea that one must be able to bear the greatest without collapsing and losing one's identity, yet one must also be attuned to the very smallest things—two demands that force us in different directions. Human life is pulled between these poles—between the desire to know the unconditioned, the absolute truth of the whole, and the particularity of our concrete, individual existence, which has its own meaningfulness apart from and irreducible to the whole. Hölderlin addresses another opposition in the preface, which addresses the reader's possible reception of his book. Hölderlin recognizes that it is possible to read his book as either a treatise disguised in verse or as a work of light fiction with no deeper meaning. Hölderlin tells his reader, "He who merely inhales the scent of my plant does not know it, and he who plucks it merely in order to learn from it does not know it either" (H 1). We must not read it simply as beautiful verse or as a philosophical idea embodied in dramatic narrative. We are not to reduce the story to concepts such as a moral or life lesson, nor are we to simply enjoy it for its beauty. Yet Hölderlin only tells us how *not* to read; he does not tell us how to read his book. He simply offers the space between these two poles for the reader to navigate. These poles mirror the opposition of the story as a whole. Hölderlin describes Hyperion's story as the "resolution of dissonances in a particular character" (H 1).[38] Hölderlin thus presents his novel as a set of complex relations between opposing forces.

The story of Hyperion follows a path of oppositions in the formation of his self-identity, which unfolds as a vacillation between the desire to be one with the whole of

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[37] Non coerceri maximo, contineri minimo, divinum est. Hölderlin, *Hyperion*, trans. Willard R. Trask and David Schwarz, in *Hyperion and Selected Poems*, ed. Eric L. Santner, (New York: Continuum, 1990), 1. Henceforth cited as H followed by page number. Henrich translates as "Not dominated by the greatest, awed by the smallest" (156-157).

[38] Dilthey uses this same language to describe life in *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*, *Selected Works* III: "life thus appears as an infinite multiplicity of positive and negative existential values. It is like a chaos of harmonies and dissonances" (223). Henceforth cited as SW III.

nature and the desire for individuality. Hyperion's narrative begins with a preliminary, intuitive unity with the world—"The fullness of the living universe feeds and satisfies my starving being with its intoxication" (H 3)—and moves toward self-realization through separation and division from the world. Reflection drives this separation and self-realization, which is not simply an intellectual realization but also felt: "an instant of reflection hurls me down. I reflect, and find myself as I was before—alone, with all the griefs of mortality, and my heart's refuge, the world in its eternal oneness, is gone; Nature closes her arms, and I stand like an alien before her and do not understand her" (H 4). This movement from immersion and understanding to separation and self-reflection continues throughout the plot. Hyperion's experience of unity and division continues in his encounters with others throughout his journey, e.g. his friendship with Alabanda and his infatuation with Diotima. The plot further plays on the complex and contradictory relation between parts and the whole as it is set against the political background of Greece's struggle for independence from the Turks. The entire novel has a sense of unrest and constant strife. Love does not bring rest and complete unity, as difference must prevail. The novel ends with Hyperion's statement that: "Like lovers' quarrels are the dissonances of the world. Reconciliation is there, even in the midst of strife, and all things that are parted find one another again. The arteries separate and return to the heart and all is one eternal glowing life" (H 133). Difference must be preserved; strife prevails in the relations that bind everything together as a whole. For Hölderlin, the individual cannot be united to the world absolutely and in whole. Yet the desire for the unconditional always pulls us: "And always / There is a yearning that seeks the unbound." [39] This tension characterizes life and the tragedy of human existence.

[39] Hölderlin, "Mnemosyne" in *Friedrich Hölderlin: Poems and Fragments*, 587.

The conflict between the particularity of the individual and the desire for the unconditioned also forms the dramatic core of "The Death of Empedocles: A Mourning-Play." Hölderlin takes up the legend of Empedocles, the Presocratic philosopher who envisioned all being in terms of love and strife and declared himself immortal.[40] Empedocles is the center of two conflicts: first with the members of his community that despise his following and secondly with the gods because he has called himself a god. For Hölderlin, Empedocles' solution—throwing himself into the volcanic crater of Mount Etna—is an act of love, not simply destruction. Empedocles embraces his death as the fulfillment of his life and his desire to be one with nature.[41] Empedocles represents the two opposing forces of life at work in love: the desire for selfhood and the desire for unconditioned. In the tragedy of Empedocles, Hölderlin makes the strife of love especially salient. The unity of what is irreconcilable ends in destruction.

Hölderlin's poetry presents a different notion of relation between self and world. His idea of love does not describe the subject-object dichotomy that characterizes representational accounts of art, nor does it express a simplistic pantheism that completely collapses the distinction between self and world. This tension distinguishes Hölderlin's metaphysics from the German idealists. Unlike Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, for Hölderlin there is no reconciliation or totality. Being cannot be the accumulated relations between all things over time for Hölderlin, because strife and difference

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[40] See Fragment from Empedocles in *A Presocratic Reader*, trans. Richard D. McKirahan, ed. Patricia Curd (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996): "For the coming together of all things produces one birth and destruction, and the other is nurtured and flies apart when they grow apart again. And these never cease continually interchanging, at one time all coming together into one by Love and at another each being borne apart by the hatred of Strife." (63). Hölderlin's notion of love differs from Empedocles' because for Hölderlin, love contains strife within it.

[41] Empedocles's last words: "death alone ignites / My life now at the end, and you extend / To me the terrifying chalice, the fermenting cup, / Nature! that he who sings you drink a draft of it, / His spirits ultimate enthusiasms!" Friedrich Hölderlin, *Death of Empedocles: A Mourning-Play*, trans. David Farrell Krell, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), 103.

underlie these relations. Hegel's dialectic, i.e. the notion of truth as a process that comes to realize itself, is not possible within this framework.[42] Hölderlin's love is not simply a concept or universal principle, particularly since this uniting of opposite tendencies within life cannot be conceived as static or absolute—"It is only conceivable, therefore, as the result of a course of life through time."[43] Hölderlin's notion of love is not a static relation, but develops over time. This development is not productive and does not have a completion or end, however, which is why memory is needed. Hölderlin presents poetry as a mode of remembrance that gathers oppositions through its eccentric path.

2.3 Hölderlin's Eccentric Path: Remembrance and Mediation

For Hölderlin, poetry is significant not only for its relation to love but also for its act of gathering past moments into one whole without canceling the strife of its parts. Poetry interrupts the movement between oppositions to trace them to their origin and bring them into a whole. Yet poetry does so only as an interruption or caesura, since the essential difference of the parts cannot be overcome.[44] As Henrich explains, "The alternation of tendencies and their tones only leads to what is momentarily new. Therefore, in order to reveal the totality itself, an interruption must occur in the alternation. Within it the entire sequence of what is past is joined together and surveyed and simultaneously compared with what is new that can already be sensed and that announces itself as the other in the perfected entity."[45] Interruption gathers together and gives form to the totality, but as a caesura or moment of silence, not as a moment of

[42] See Henrich, 172. Henrich does acknowledge the similar relation between memory and philosophy in Hölderlin and Hegel, yet Hölderlin's path of remembrance is eccentric rather than dialectic, which the next section explains.
[43] Henrich 157.
[44] See following chapter for longer treatment of Hölderlin's use and theory of caesura.
[45] Henrich, 169.

absolute synthesis.[46] Hölderlin's continual use of alternations between unification and separation would be meaningless without something guiding it. At the same time, Hölderlin rejects anything absolute that would ground these alternations because unity is not fundamental. Memory gathers into a whole by interrupting the strife of oppositions but without creating a totalizing absolute.

For Hölderlin, this interruption is poetic in nature. The poet gathers and preserves what has passed. Hölderlin's poem "Remembrance" alludes to this structure of poetic memory.

> The current sweeps out. But it is the sea
> That takes and gives remembrance,
> And love no less keeps eyes attentively fixed,
> But what is lasting the poets provide.[47]

The course of life and history continually change, move, and shift. To provide an account of the whole seems impossible with this movement. Yet Hölderlin suggests that the poet is able to give an account of the whole through memory.[48] The poet does so not through the representative faculties of the mind, which require clear distinctions, but through feeling—which in Hölderlin's account of love can apprehend unity and difference at once.[49] The poet thus has a special role in creating an understanding of life because poetry can capture a sense of whole without falling into the desire to separate things for

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[46] See explanation of caesura in Chapter Five, pp. 226 – 227.

[47] Hölderlin, "Remembrance" in *Friedrich Hölderlin: Poems and Fragments*, 541.

[48] Memory is also significant for Dilthey and Heidegger. For Dilthey, "When we look back through memory, we see the nexus of the past parts of a life-course in terms of the category of meaning. When we live in the present, the positive or negative value of the realities that fill it are experienced through feeling. And when we face the future, the category of purpose arises through a projective attitude… None of these categories can be subordinated to the others, because each of them makes the whole of life accessible to the understanding from a different perspective. In this sense they are incommensurable. And yet we can differentiate the way they are related to the understanding of a life-course" (SW III 223). See also Heidegger, "Remembrance" in *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, trans. Keith Hoeller (New York: Humanity Books, 2000), and Heidegger's 1941 lecture *Hölderlins Hymne "Andenken," Gesamtausgabe* 52.

[49] For a fuller account, see Véronique M. Fóti, *Epochal Discordance: Hölderlin's Philosophy of Tragedy* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), especially Chapter 3.

clarity or to dissolve differences for the sake of unity. "Hoelderlin shows that life and poetry become one through *recollection*…This is the divine moment, the transcendental instant. The poet must know how to calculate it and produce it."[50] The task of poetry is recollection, i.e. to gather what cannot be complete and understand the unity without dissolving difference. Hölderlin's idea of recollection is thus an eccentric path, a wandering, rather than a dialectical one like Hegel's.

Heidegger emphasizes the distinction between Hölderlin and German idealism by contrasting Hölderlin's mode of poetic revealing, which he calls intimacy [*Innigkeit*],[51] to Hegel's metaphysical, dialectical approach in his lecture courses on "Germania" and "The Rhine." Heidegger explains the divergent path of these two friends as follows: Hegel follows the path of philosophy and its desire for absolute truth, whereas Hölderlin follows the eccentric path of the poet—a path without a center or clear trajectory because it must respond to that which it seeks to understand.[52] According to Heidegger, "[a]s absolute thinking, Hegel's thought seeks to bring opposites into a universal fluidity and thus to resolution" (GA 39: 215). Hegel's dialectical thought seeks the absolute, the truth of the whole, which must sublate the sensuous into the supersensuous. By contrast, Hölderlin's intimacy conveys a comportment towards things that is responsive because it allows for the mysteriousness of things. Heidegger describes intimacy as a comportment that preserves mystery, which allows genuine understanding. Revealing concealment is

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[50] Henrich, 169.

[51] Heidegger argues that *Innigkeit* in Hölderlin's theoretical works, especially "The Ground for 'Empedocles'" has been misconstrued as 'inwardness' rather than its other connotation, 'intimacy.' Heidegger emphasizes intimacy because he thinks that Hölderlin's poetry overcomes subject-object, inner-outer distinctions. Thomas Pfau, however, uses both "inwardness" and "intimacy" in his English translations of Hölderlin's essays and letters. In his introduction, he describes *Innigkeit* in relation to Hölderlin's revival of sensuous intuition (6).

[52] "Hölderlin and Hegel grew up in a common spiritual world and together struggled to shape it anew. One of them went the path of the poet, the other, that of the thinker" (GA 39: 210).

not a failure to know something, but a primordial comportment with being: "Intimacy has the nature of a mystery, not because others fail to penetrate it; rather, in itself it prevails in essence as mystery" (GA 39: 406-407). Intimacy approaches beings in terms of the springing forth of being,[53] which cannot be conceptualized or brought into a complete interpretation, since "[w]hat has purely sprung forth is never simply inexplicable in some respect… it remains enigma through and through" (GA 39 406). Unlike Hegel's absolute, Hölderlin's intimacy is attached to the ambiguity and mystery of being as it springs from the sensuous.[54]

Moreover, unlike Hegel, Hölderlin's theoretical framework has no unconditioned conditions, but is entirely relational and contingent. That is, Hölderlin's poetry takes up existence as conditional. Dilthey sees Hölderlin's poetry as "coming to terms with our conditional existence" (SW V 357). As finite individuals, our conditional existence is a source of suffering since "the law of individuation is the source of a deep contradiction in us between the striving for the infinite and the happiness of a limited existence" (SW V 357). This is the very theme of Hölderlin's *The Death of Empedocles*, in which Empedocles' striving for divinity as a mortal culminates in his death. Hölderlin's poetry explores the tragedy of human life as conditional and subject to the greater forces that shape it—life, death, growth, decline, the world, the universe at large. To come to terms with our conditional existence requires confronting our relation to the forces that form life in general. These forces describe the "destructive reality of life," which conflict with

[53] *The springing forth of being* relates to Heidegger's emphasis on origin [*Ursprung*] as a primal leap or primordial springing forth, which he connects to art. Art is an origin—it is productive and generative of truth, not a reproduction of an already existing truth. The springing forth of being also describes Heidegger's notion of being which is not static or eternal, but dynamic and relational. See Chapter Three.
[54] Henrich describes Hölderlin's poetry as "wandering amid the unthinkable" (173), which he contrasts to Hegel's Absolute.

and work against the individual (SW V 345). For Dilthey, the self is not an isolated ego, but an individual that is always defined in relation to a world that resists the self.[55] Poetry allows us to come to terms with our finitude because we discover our relation to the world in these forces that work against and form our existence (SW V 351).

Coming to terms with the conditionality and finitude of human experience establishes a hermeneutic relation between the individual and life as a whole. Namely, we come to terms with conditionality through the entirety of our life, through our own temporality: "This process of coming to terms does not take place in a specific period of our life; it is constantly being aroused anew by what we enjoy, suffer, experience; it leads us gradually into new depths of life" (SW V 351). The strife between the individual and the whole is never resolved in Hölderlin's poetry, but forms the irreducible core of factical life. The irreducibility of this strife drives the necessity for interpretation, which is an ongoing process, an infinite task. Dilthey explains that "reflection on life constantly flows from life itself…It is an interpretation of existence on its own terms…" (SW V 275). Poetry flows from and returns to life as an interpretation of life itself. Moreover, this poetic reflection is not purely introspective or solipsistic. Poetry goes beyond the limits of an isolated self, or Cartesian ego, as a "person's life is intertwined with the destinies of many others" (SW V 279). The poet is caught up in life as a whole, not private experiences that are universalized later to create poetry. Poetic creation does not stand apart from the world. Instead, *the world is first poetic* (SW V 286-287). Thus

[55] See description of resistance in Chapter One, pp. 33 – 34. Also, Eric Sean Nelson describes Dilthey's notion of the individual's formation and relation to the world as traumatic because the self is shaped by the blows of the world's resistance. See "Traumatic Life: Violence, Pain, and Responsiveness in Heidegger" in *The Trauma Controversy: Philosophical and Interdisciplinary Dialogues*, ed. Kristen Brown and Bettina Bergo (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), 189 – 204.

poetry must form an “eccentric path” that moves hermeneutically from the individual to the whole of existence and back.

Heidegger also draws out the hermeneutic relations in Hölderlin’s poetry, which he describes as mediation between the finitude and contingency of human existence and the eternal or divine. Hölderlin’s poems present the poet as a demigod, i.e. as someone who can mediate between the conflicting aspects of existence, especially between mortals and the divine. In his lecture on "The Rhine," Heidegger describes poetry as a demigod who occupies an intermediary position that allows for genuine questioning (GA 39: 273). Mediation breaks through the limits of oppositional thought or dialectical thought, because questioning no longer requires a determinate concept that can capture the totality of two distinct objects. Mediation allows questioning to become open-ended because it can occupy the space in between that allows for relation, rather than seeking to overcome opposition.

This notion of mediation differs from Hegel’s dialectic sublation (*Aufhebung*) which requires oppositional relations and ends in complete synthesis, i.e. the truth of the whole. The mediation of Hölderlin’s poet-demigod does not exhaust itself by simply relating one term to the other, but must span between both—uniting them in their contradiction without denying their distinction. To be *in-between* signifies a complex mode of relation, not simply negation or double negation. This mode of relation, or mediation, preserves complexity by allowing there to be relation in difference. Mediation is a broader, more flexible relation than conjunction, disjunction, affirmation, and denial. It is a relation that spans and allows for breadth.

Whereas determinate thought thinks in terms of categories and operations (negation, affirmation, disjunction, conjunction), poetic thought mediates by thinking in terms of what is between, not what is one way or the other. Take for example, the poem "In the Station of the Metro" by Ezra Pound:

> The apparition of these faces in the crowd;
> Petals on a wet, black bough.

In this poem, the image of the faces of the crowd is not separate from the image of a wet, flowering branch. We do not mistake the people in the station for the flower petals on the branch, yet the people and flowers cannot be thought separately since the poem joins them into one image. The poetic relation here is ambiguous, which is indicated even in the punctuation. Pound uses a semi-colon rather than a conjunction that might indicate the nature of the relation. The juxtaposition of lines suggests a metaphor—i.e. the faces look "as if" they were petals—but Pound does not even make this small claim. Pound brings together two images at the same time that he refuses to give them a clear relation. This poetic ambiguity of the interposed images gives rise to a feeling in which I recognize that the world is vaster and broader than I can ever conceive of and familiar and close in the beauty of a mundane experience like waiting in a metro station. Pound describes a poetic moment, in which the ordinary becomes extraordinary such that my relation to the world is transformed and felt more keenly. This felt relation is not one of a subject apart from an object, or of an idea that can be expressed as a proposition. This felt relation is one of mediation, or *spanning* between self and world, familiar and unfamiliar.

Instead of confining the complexity of human beings, historicity, and the world to categories and distinctions, poetry creates a constellation of dynamic relations that mutually shape each other. We are not separate from the world that shapes us; the world

is not separate from the way in which it given to us. Being-in-the-world resists these simple oppositional distinctions. For Heidegger, poetry "thoroughly spans the being-in-the-world of human beings" in "the way it illuminates the world for them and indeed illuminates human beings themselves, putting in place the way in which art is art…" (I 23). Poetry's ability to span what we take to be distinct and mediate between contradictions allows it to take on the breadth of existence and history.

From this eccentric path of unresolved relations, Hölderlin's poetry makes representational or metaphysical accounts of art insufficient. There is no subject standing apart from a world as a spectator, so art cannot merely copy or re-present what is there. Instead the individual is continually entangled in the complex and conflicting forces that determine the self and world. This conflict does not find a final resolution. There is also no evolution or development of a concept that emerges from this temporal process. The individual cannot be reconciled with the universal, nor can the sensuous material of life be sublated into a concept. Instead, poetry evokes the irreducible facticity of life and the patency of the sensible world.

Hölderlin's poetry and theoretical works not only provide a mutual ground to discuss Dilthey's and Heidegger's concerns with art, they also demonstrate the aspects of facticity that poetry can bring to the fore. Hölderlin's gives poetic language to the sensuous and the relation between the individual and whole in a way that expresses the same worry over factical life taken up by Dilthey and Heidegger. Hölderlin's conflict between the desire for individuality and desire for the unconditioned creates a hermeneutic circle between part and whole that requires a complex mode of understanding. That is, Hölderlin's formation of this problem draws out the way in which

facticity must be understood as entanglement with life as we attempt to understand it. Hölderlin's sensitivity for what remains separate, hidden, and unconcealed draws out the paradox of facticity. There is no ideal vantage point or perfect state of reconciliation that provides an absolute interpretation. We are immersed in the situation that we want to analyze and cannot proceed by concepts alone. Since feeling forms a vital part of life and penetrates to the core of its meaning, interpreting life from life itself requires a mode of understanding that does not abstract from feeling. This interpretation is not simply intellectual, but also felt—which poetry captures so fully through its power to resonate the felt aspects of life in language. Poetry gives voice to feeling. The following section will consider the relation between feeling (*Stimmung*) and facticity.

3. Poetry, Feeling, and the Passion of Facticity

Interpreting life from life itself requires delving into the meaning of existence in its full sense, which is not devoid of feeling. For Dilthey, this task is poetic at its core due to the relation between poetry and feeling. For Dilthey, poetry flows from feeling and finds the language to express and articulate it. Poetry springs from the depths and force of feeling: "Feeling is the vital source of all poetry" (SW V 243). In his *Poetics*, Dilthey describes feeling as what characterizes the poet from others:

> The great elemental drives of human existence, the passions that derive from them and the fate of these passions in the world, these constitute the authentic basis of all poetic ability when they are lived and experienced… What makes a poet great is the fact that these drives operate much more powerfully, extensively, and concretely in him than in his reader or listener; this produces an expansion and intensification of the sense of life which is the most elementary effect of all poetry on the reader or listener. (P 83 - 84)

Like all people the poet relates to the world and reflects on life through feeling, but with the poet the passions that drive life and shape the world are more powerful, extensive,

and concrete. Moreover, this intensity of feeling gives poetry its power to express the meaning of life. The sense of life that poetry offers is transformed through the intensified feelings of the poet, and this intensification of feeling allows us to understand life in greater depth. Dilthey describes this same effect in *Poetry and Lived Experience*: "poetry in its simplest and most moving form gives voice to the feeling of existence as it is evoked by lived experience. This is intensified when emotion culminates in general contemplation" (SW V 313). Poetry finds a voice for lived experience and brings feeling and thought together in contemplation. Poetic feeling responds to the feelings that permeate and give shape to life by intensifying them to convey greater expression. What is expressed "is not knowledge of reality, but the most vivid experience of the interconnectedness of our existential relations in the meaning of life. Beyond this there is no idea of a poetic work and no special aesthetic value which poetry should realize. This is the fundamental relation between life and literature upon which every historical form of poetry depends" (SW V 238). By plunging into depths of life and conveying the unification of sensation, feeling, and thought, poetic feeling penetrates the core of the factical. Poetry restores the more original unity between feeling and thought and reveals the meaningful interconnections of life.

Poetic feeling does not simply revert to what is already understood in life, but transforms life. As explained in Chapter Two, Dilthey locates the transformative power of art in feeling. Feeling ties art to life at the same time that it allows art to transform and draw out deeper meaning from ordinary experience. In his essay on Goethe in *Poetry and Lived Experience*, Dilthey describes Goethe as transforming everything around him through feeling or mood (*Stimmung*): "His moods transform everything real, his passions

intensify the meaning and form of situations and things beyond the realm of the usual, and his restless creative drive changes everything around him into form and image" (SW V 238). Poetic mood transforms by drawing out meaning and revealing the extraordinary in the ordinary. This transformation, moreover, reveals our entanglement with the world because we see how feeling colors all perception and shapes our relation to things.

Heidegger also discusses the significance of poetic mood in his lecture course on Hölderlin's hymn "Germania." In his discussion of Hölderlin's poetic thought, Heidegger insists that mood is not subjective. That is, mood does not belong to an autonomous ego set apart from the sensible world. Yet because representational models of experience and thought—i.e. the Cartesian ego or 'I'—dominate philosophy, Heidegger notes that we often treat moods as if they are in us and pertain only to us. Heidegger explains, "Since cognition and willing as subjective processes at least always relate to and have to do with objects, yet moods for the most part also lack this relation to objects, they are naturally something purely 'subjective'" (GA 39: 149). Moods, if taken to be purely subjective, do not have any essential relation to an object. They are produced by a subject, who can then "in turn transposes them into the objects with the aid of so-called empathy" (GA 39: 149). Representational thought thus treats mood as something projected onto the objects of the world. "Attunements are then something like gloves: sometimes worn, sometimes set aside somewhere" (GA 39: 149). For Heidegger, however, we do not simply take on a feeling like an article of clothing or experience feelings as something inside. Moods come over us and strike us. "Attunements are powerful forces that permeate and envelop us; they come over us and things together at one fell swoop" (GA 39: 149). Moods as such

are not felt as belonging to the subject, but as drawing out a relation to something that can be felt deeply and intimately.

Heidegger's notion of *Stimmung* resists reductive psychological accounts of mood and instead describes them ontologically. That is, mood designates a prior relation between human existence and beings. For Heidegger, mood decenters human existence, which cannot be self-contained but is always already among beings. Mood characterizes our existence as being-with. Heidegger describes this being-with of mood as a transposition: "Attunements are not placed into the subject or into objects, rather we, together with beings, are *trans-posed* into attunements" (GA 39: 149). This transposition signifies the very interweaving of mood in every aspect of existence and being.[56] Feelings do not simply attend a subjective experience of an object as epiphenomena, like "appearances arising in the interiority of the subject, like air bubbles in a glass of water… Rather the Dasein of the human being is transposed into attunements equiprimordially together with beings as such" (GA 39: 149 - 150). Moods recognize the being-with that precedes the division of subject and object. Mood does not follow a subject's encounter with an object, but precedes both subject and object and allows the very possibility of experience.

Just as Hölderlin's notion of love is not a psychological feeling belonging to a subject, but a metaphysical principle that describes the harmonies and dissonances of the world, so Heidegger's notion of mood relates to existence and the facticity of what is given in experience. Fundamental attunement, or mood, describes the factical as

[56] *Stimmung* plays a similar role in Dilthey's account of experience in his *Poetics* and in his account of worldviews (*Weltanschauungen*). See Dilthey, *Weltanschauungslehre Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. VIII (Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960, especially pp. 81 - 82. See also Rudolf A. Makkreel's explanation of *Lebensstimmung* in *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 350-351.

something that is not simply present for thought. That is, attunement describes the given as something that cannot be possessed or grasped. Giorgi Agamben's interpretation of the paradox of facticity in Heidegger's philosophy follows Hölderlin's line of thinking as he connects it directly to love. Agamben describes love as the *passion of facticity* because—just as Hölderlin insists—love must bear a unifying relation that does not dissolve its parts into one identity. Agamben writes that "Love is the *passion of facticity* in which man bears this nonbelonging and darkness, appropriating them while guarding them as such."[57] Here, Agamben adopts the same definition of love as Hölderlin but expands it to include the concept of facticity: "Love is thus not…the affirmation of the self in the negation of the loved object; it is, instead, the passion and exposition of facticity itself and of the irreducible impropriety of beings. *In love, the lover and the beloved come to light in their concealment, in an eternal facticity beyond Being*."[58] By connecting love and facticity, Agamben emphasizes the role of passion and feeling in expressing the inexhaustibility and dynamic relationality of the factical. Love maintains otherness at the same time that it allows relation. This tension reveals concealment and preserves it. Since facticity is given to us as inexhaustible and incommensurable and bears witness to our entanglement in the world, love characterizes the attunement of facticity. To approach the paradox of factical life, we must have the passion of a poet. Hölderlin models such an approach because his poetry reflects the complex interrelations at work in facticity and expresses their tensions with the depths of poetic feeling. Whereas representational thought separates these interrelations into problematic dichotomies—subject and object,

[57] Giorgio Agamben, "The Passion of Facticity" in *Rethinking Facticity*, ed. François Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), 89 – 112. 107.
[58] Ibid., 107.

sensible and intelligible, self and world—Hölderlin's poetry delves into their deeper connections.

From reading Dilthey and Heidegger together in light of Hölderlin, we have a sense of why representative accounts fail to account for meaningful aspects of art and why a factical aesthetics is needed. An aesthetics shaped by the paradox of facticity (1) does not treat the self as standing apart from the world, (2) does not abstract from the meaning of the sensible itself, and (3) does not subordinate feeling to thought, but instead draws out the more originary relation between the sensible, intelligible, and felt aspects of experience. This chapter has laid out some of the preliminary concerns for a factical approach to aesthetics; the next chapter will describe the implications of a factical aesthetics for art and philosophy. Chapter Five, "What is Given in Art?", looks at what art offers us when it is considered in relation to the factical. In particular, facticity will allow us to examine how the sensible world is transformed by art and what this transformation means for philosophy.

Chapter Five

What is Given in Art? Toward a Factical Aesthetics

Things exist rooted in the flesh,
Stone, tree and flower… Space and time
Are not the mathematics that your will
Imposes, but a green calendar
Your heart observes ; how else could you
Find your way home or know when to die …

- *Green Categories*, R.S. Thomas[1]

Facticity pertains not only to life, but also to the haecceity of the world—the very 'here' and 'now' of experience or 'thisness' of things. Facticity thus reinterprets the 'given.' What is given in experience, the factical, is not transparent or immediately understood, and yet we feel it and it strikes us with its force. Poetry finds expression for *haeccity*, the 'thisness' of things. This expression is needed because representational models of experience strip away sense and feeling to achieve order and calculability, which separates us from the world and impoverishes thought. As explained in Chapter Four, poetry restores experience to its fullness because it delves into and articulates the dynamic interweaving of sensation, thought, and feeling. Feeling is not purely introspective, nor is it a subjective mood that is imposed on things. Feeling is relational and reveals a correspondence between self and world that precedes the distinction between subject and object. Through its sensitivity to and expression of feeling, poetry responds to the way things call to us, rather than imposing a conceptual framework onto the world. Not only feeling, but also the sensible itself resists giving way to concepts. The sensible is irreducible and cannot be treated as a manifestation of an idea—which we see

[1] R.S. Thomas, "Green Categories" in *Collected Poems: 1945 – 1990* (London: Phoenix Books, 2004), 77. This poem is particularly fitting for this chapter since in it Thomas gives a poetic response to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, particularly the a priori conditions of space and time. For Thomas, categories are not a priori or transcendental, but "green" and "rooted in the flesh."

in Dilthey's and Heidegger's critiques of Hegelian aesthetics. Chapter Four explored Hölderlin's poetry as an engagement with the paradox of factical life to argue that Dilthey's and Heidegger's confrontation with the poet introduces a new understanding of art and aesthetics.

This chapter will argue that art allows us to rethink the given because art maintains the complexity of relations and contexts that form the world. Consequently, art brings the implicit meaning of ordinary, everyday experience and the things around us to expression in a way that transforms our understanding of the world. In particular, art transforms our understanding of experience, especially in terms of space and time. In this chapter, I will explain how Dilthey and Heidegger rethink time and space in poetic terms to overcome the limitations of scientific models, which prepares the way for a new approach to not only aesthetics and thinking about the sensible but also philosophical inquiry. The significance of a factical aesthetics extends beyond philosophy of art and has connotations for how we should approach philosophy and thinking in general. To explore the significance of factical aesthetics for philosophy, this chapter will (1) explain how facticity re-defines the given in a way that requires a new approach to everyday experience, (2) investigate this new approach to experience in Dilthey's and Heidegger's discussions of Hölderlin, which demonstrate a poetic reinterpretation of space and time, and (3) outline the implications of factical aesthetics for the sensible, for art, and for philosophy in general.

1. What is Given?

The given refers to what is given in experience. In German, the given (*Gegeben*) has a broader sense as well, since the phrase 'there is/there are' (*Es gibt*) literally means 'it gives.' This literal meaning of 'there is' suggests that everything that exists is given by an unnamed it. The term 'given' (*Gegeben*) would seem to imply that experience is transparent or immediate in its reception. It is given, and we receive it. The given could also imply that experience is purely receptive, i.e. a passive process whereby a subject is given objects. For Kant, experience is not passive or purely receptive, but instead the synthesis of concepts and perceptual data. Kant's transcendental idealism recognizes the synthetic nature of experience and imposes a limit so that philosophical reason cannot go beyond the boundaries of experience. The thing as phenomenon is given, not the thing-in-itself. The term 'given' can also be associated with empirical data that is self-evident—that is, with facts. Facticity, however, denies the idea that the given can be exhausted in terms of facts.

Facticity problematizes the given. Facticity recognizes that experience is not transparent or immediate because of the incommensurability and un-derivability of the given. [2] Unlike a fact that is analyzable and can be correct or incorrect, the factical denies this dichotomy because it conveys the unfathomable depths of experience. There is a

[2] See Chapter One, section 2. See also, Raffoul and Nelson's editors introduction for a broader historical definition of facticity in the introduction to *Rethinking Facticity*, ed. François Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008). The concept of facticity is derived from the debates between Neo-Kantians and life-philosophers at the end of the nineteenth century Facticity takes up the idea of a fact, something given empirically, but also has the sense of something that is made (*factum*) or fabricated. "Facticity designates a kind of 'fact' that has not been previously thematized in the history of philosophy. Although clearly contrasted with transcendental ideality and normative validity, it nonetheless does not designate empirical 'factuality', a fact of nature, or an ontic occurrence. It points to another kind of fact, one that falls out of and subverts the transcendental/empirical duality" (2- 3). Facticity subverts the idea of the experiential given in both positivism and idealism. It problematizes both naïve realism and transcendental idealism.

deeper source to what is given that cannot be revealed. Facticity presents the paradox of the given— what is there for us and cannot be fully grasped. What is given always has a remainder, something that remains incommensurable and points beyond itself. Facticity stands for the given that is never fully or immediately given, but always in need of interpretation. In turn this need for interpretation requires a more open way of thinking. The distinction between fact and facticity opens up a space for art. Before explaining how this notion of facticity calls for an aesthetic approach, this section will explain how Dilthey and Heidegger take up the given in new ways and why these reinterpretations of the given call for a new way of thinking that can recover the everyday.

1.1 Facticity and the Limits of the Given

For Dilthey, the given is not simply empirical data or a subjective representation (*Vorstellung*). Instead, the given of lived experience describes a prior relation, a nexus of relations (*Zusammenhang*). Dilthey's *acquired psychic nexus* (*erworbener seelischer Zusammenhang*) takes into account the historical nature of our existence and thought. Our perception is not a piecing together of sensory data and concepts, but a formative process shaped by the whole of our lived experience. The ideas, feelings, evaluations, and habits we acquire over time shape every perception, representation, evaluation, and act (P 72). This formative process underlying lived experience means that the given is a complex interplay of many elements in relation to each other, none of which can be reduced to explanation. Thus for Dilthey, what is given, the contents of experience "are incommensurable due to their various sources, we can merely accept them as givens; their facticity is unfathomable for us."[3] The plurality of relations and contexts that form

[3] Dilthey, *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, *Dilthey Selected Works*, vol. I, ed. Rudolf Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 62. Henceforth cited as SW I.

lived experience limit our ability to know it completely, especially since Dilthey considers life itself to be unfathomable. Lived experience has limits not simply because it is phenomenal, but because life itself is a limit: "What life is cannot be expressed in a formula or be explained. For thought cannot go behind the very life from which it arises and in whose context it appears" (SW II 72). Life is the source of all experience and thought, we cannot go beyond it. For this reason, there are limits "inherent in the very conditions of our experience… not external barriers imposed on our knowledge of nature, but conditions immanent to experience itself" (SW I 62). The hermeneutics of Dilthey's life-philosophy thus serves as a critique of positivism and naïve realism. For Dilthey, nothing is simply given to experience; we do not passively receive something that is given. Instead, facticity describes the complex puzzle of understanding what is given in lived experience.

With this notion of the given, understanding experience requires interpretation at every level. That is, there is no level of a pure given that is without interpretation. In "Life and Cognition," Dilthey explain that "no given as such can be immediately observed or perceived in inner experience." [4] Everything experienced is "interpreted in intellectual processes" so that "no matter how hard I struggle to obtain the pure experience of the given, there is no such thing. The given lies beyond my direct experience" (SW II 60). Experience does not provide a self-evident foundation of undeniable givens. Nor does experience present us with an absolute synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity. Yet due to Dilthey's hermeneutics, the limits that deny a pure empiricism do not throw lived experience into irrationalism or mysticism. As Eric

[4] Dilthey, "Life and Cognition: A Draft for an Epistemic Logic and a Theory of Categories," trans. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Jacob Owensby, in *Understanding the Human World, Wilhelm Dilthey Selected Works* II, 58 – 114. 60. Henceforth cited as SW II.

Sean Nelson notes, "facticity evokes the conditions, the operational contexts, and the limits of experience. The givenness, materiality, and positivity of things not only potentially limits and disrupts our knowledge and mastery of the world, it makes it possible and is at the same time its affair."[5] Facticity limits our ability to grasp the given completely and analyze it, yet this limit provides another possibility: interpretation. Dilthey tells us that even though life is unanalyzable, "we can trace, as it were, the accents and rhythms of the melody it arouses" (SW II 72). Rather than analyzing life, we must approach it like a melody. We must treat it in its fullness of sense, feeling, and expression, rather than reduce it to an explanatory framework of formal categories.

Heidegger also takes up the problem of the given, although he moves it in a more radical direction after his initial formulation of givenness (*Gegebenheit*).[6] From 1919 onward, Heidegger repeatedly discusses the philosophical significance of the phrase 'there is/are' (*Es gibt*), or literally, 'it gives.' In the early Freiburg lectures, Heidegger's treatment of the given reflects his engagement with Dilthey. In his 1919 lecture course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview*, Heidegger connects the problem of the given to lived experience (*Erlebnis*) because 'there is' is experienced (*erlebt*) vitally.[7] The question "is there something?" is felt and lived in a way that does not ask for an explanation. Instead, Heidegger describes this vital question as a comportment, i.e. as

[5] Eric Sean Nelson, "Empiricism, Facticity, and the Immanence of Life in Dilthey," *PLI: Warwick Journal of Philosophy* 18 (2007), 108-128. 112.
[6] Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Scott M. Campbell (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), especially Appendix A.
[7] *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview* in *Towards a Definition of Philosophy*, trans. Ted Sadler, (London: Continuum, 2008), 3 - 90. 53. [GA 56/57]. See Chapter Three section 4.1 *Erfahrung* vs. *Erlebnis*, especially pp. 153 - 156, for my discussion of Heidegger's adoption of Dilthey's notion of lived experience in this lecture course. See also Theodore Kisiel's analysis of this lecture course, in which he connects Heidegger's treatment of *Es gibt* to facticity in the Diltheyan sense through formal indication and reflexive categories. Kisiel, "Heidegger's Formally Indicative Hermeneutics" in *Rethinking Facticity*, 41 – 67.

relational and indicative of the interweaving of self and world.[8] Heidegger's 1919-1920 lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* presents a very Diltheyan treatment of givenness (*Gegebenheit*). In this lecture course, Heidegger frames the given in relation to the facticity of "life in itself" and develops a method for approaching the given that is based on the expression and understanding—which are terms that Dilthey explicitly develops as central to his method. Moreover, not only Heidegger's terminology but also the way he casts the given reflects his engagement with Dilthey. Dilthey emphasizes the groundlessness and unfathomability of the given. Similarly, Heidegger emphasizes the given as a question:

> The 'there is' stands in question or, more accurately, stands in questioning. It is not asked whether something moves or rests, whether something contradicts itself, whether something works, whether something exists, whether something values, whether something ought to be, but rather whether *there is* something. What does 'there is' mean?[9]

For Heidegger the given is a question, the ultimate question, that gestures beyond itself. It does not ask something specific, but asks if there is anything at all—"Is there something?" In 1929 Heidegger adopts a similar question as the fundamental question of metaphysics—"Why are there beings at all, and why not … Nothing?"[10] Heidegger's discussion of the given follows the trajectory of his thought from life to being—yet his concern with the given as *Es gibt* remains.

For Heidegger, 'it gives' is the most fundamental idea that we can have. Every statement about any being, can be framed by 'there is.' 'Snow is white' can be expressed

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[8] See also John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), especially Chapter 12, for a more thorough explanation of the given and lived experience in this lecture.

[9] Heidegger, *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview*, 54.

[10] Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?" (1929), trans. David Farrell Krell, *Pathmarks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 82 – 96. 96.

as 'there is white snow.' Since everything can be restated as *Es gibt*, this giving indicates something primordial that relates to the being of beings. For Heidegger, moreover, *Es gibt* is the groundless ground of both being and time. In "Time and Being" (1962), Heidegger explains that *Es gibt* is the only way we can speak about the essence of being and time.[11] We can say 'there is being' and 'there is time'—even if we can say nothing more. Yet *Es gibt*, 'it gives,' sets a limit for thought, since what is given comes from a nameless and identity-less 'it.' *It* gives, but we have no sense of what this *it* is. Heidegger explains that the 'it' in 'it gives' is completely undetermined—it is not an object or a subject (TB 16 – 17). This statement indicates that experience and the world are not completely contained within the concept of subjectivity. What is given comes from a source that we cannot discern. Heidegger describes this giving as a gift. Being and time are characterized by a giving or a sending—they are gifts (TB 10). The idea of gift emphasizes the *given* nature of the given—not its transparency or self-evidence, but that it comes from a source other than a self-enclosed subject. Heidegger turns the structure of representational thought in on itself. That is, this notion of the given as gift means that the world cannot be a picture represented by a subject. If being and time are gifts, they cannot originate in the subjective framework of representation. *Es gibt* is more fundamental than representation. Heidegger discusses the mysterious ground of the given as *Es gibt* from his earliest to his latest lecture courses, and thus always takes up the paradox of facticity despite the changes in his language from 'life' to 'being.'[12]

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[11] Heidegger, "Time and Being" in *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 1 – 24. Henceforth cited as TB.

[12] As Theodor Kisiel, notes, "Throughout his long career, Heidegger will never seek to surpass this central insight which gives priority to the impersonal event [Es gibt] enveloping the I which 'takes place' in that Event… The original something is an original motion, the facticity of our being is an event or happening, the facticity of Time itself." Kisiel, *The Genesis of Being and Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 25.

While Dilthey and Heidegger critique and revise the notion of the given in different ways, they both assert a dynamic and interpretative relation to the limits of what is given. For both thinkers, facticity breaks down representational models of experience because they recognize that what is given is a surplus of meaning that exceeds the narrow limits of rationality. What is given in experience is not data to be broken down into analyzable parts. Instead, facticity presents us with the limits of the given. These limits open up the depths of experience and call for an interpretative approach—or, more specifically, an aesthetic approach. For both thinkers, poetry illuminates the need to think of the given through facticity. In particular, poetry reveals the hidden depths of the everyday that philosophy so often leaps over in its attempt to move to conceptual clarity. The following subsection will address how poetry takes a factical approach to the everyday by breaking from preconceptions and habitual opinion and reorienting philosophical inquiry toward the depth and complexity of what is given in everyday experience.

1.2 The Need to Recover the Everyday

Facticity not only describes the given in the broadest terms—it also refers to the *thisness* of experience, i.e. the concrete everyday particulars. Both Dilthey and Heidegger recognize how philosophy tends to abstract from the concrete world of everyday lived experience and the relations that ground us in the world. Dilthey explains the need for philosophy to approach the everyday—i.e. the ordinary, the commonplace, life—at the same time that philosophy fails to capture it fully, and relates this need to poetry. In his *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (1883), Dilthey asserts the "commonplace" as the object of philosophy, poetry, and religion: "According to Heraclitus, it is precisely the

commonplace, visible to everyone, that evokes wonder and thought in the philosophy… the poet, the prophet, and the philosopher seek to interpret and elucidate the same reality, the same life" (SW I 464). Yet Dilthey does not think philosophy has succeeded in elucidating this reality because philosophy fails to recognize that this reality is at once "intelligible, accessible to our thought" and "yet at the same time unfathomable," i.e. that our lived reality is factical (SW I 464). Instead of recognizing "this unfathomability of life", which "can be expressed only in metaphor," philosophy attempts to conceptualize and systematize (SW I 464). Philosophy fails to recognize the facticity of life, and we lose the relational, felt, contextual aspects of experience in the attempt to clarify and explain, rather than articulate and understand.

The task of philosophy is to recover the everyday world. Yet recovering the everyday world does not mean abandoning philosophy or returning to a pre-philosophical mode of thinking. Our everyday comportment toward things in the world can be unreflective, since we often operate according to mindless habits and assumptions. Heidegger's 1955 memorial address for the German composer Conradin Kreutzer addresses our tendency to pass through life thoughtlessly: "Thoughtlessness is an uncanny visitor who comes and goes everywhere in today's world. For nowadays we take in everything in the quickest and cheapest way, only to forget it just as quickly, instantly." [13] Dilthey notices the same tendency during his own lifetime, which motivates his attempt to revitalize philosophical inquiry: "Today philosophical thought hungers and thirsts for life. It wants to return to a heightened job of living, to art, etc." (SW III 287). The recovery of the world thus requires a mode of thinking that avoids both the

[13] Heidegger, "Memorial Address" in *Discourse on Thinking*: *A Translation of Gelassenheit*, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 46. Henceforth cited as G.

unreflective attitude that covers over the significance of the everyday and the philosophical tendency to abstract from life. Poetic thought fulfills both these demands. Namely, poetry frees everyday modes of thinking from assumptions and habits and grounds philosophical thought in life.

Dilthey's *Poetics* and later essays in *Poetry and Experience* draw out the ways in which poetic reflection allows us to understand life. For Dilthey, "poetry opens up our understanding of life. Through the eyes of the great poets we perceive the value and connectedness of things human" (SW V 251). Poetry heightens our human existence by allowing us to re-experience the world. Yet this poetic world is not confined to the necessities of actuality and thus broadens the scope of lived experience to the context of life as a whole. The poet's "significance lies in this understanding of life in terms of itself and in the joyful affirmation of this life. He pursues the sense and significance not only of his own life, but also of the world" (SW V 291). The poet's joining of the facticity of lived experience and the broader contexts of possibility present us with a transfigured world. We experience the world as intimately familiar and entirely new through poetry. In this way, "poetry reconciles us with the world and transfigures it" (SW V 291). Poetry is the beginning and end of philosophy because it presents us with concrete events while raising us above the "noise of everyday life" to a world that is foreign yet akin to our own (SW V 348, 369).

Heidegger also revises his approach to philosophical thought through poetry. For Heidegger, poetry does not bind thought to a specific concept, purpose, or framework, but instead allows a new, more fundamental way of thinking. In his manuscript for the 1944/1945 winter course *Introduction to Philosophy—Thinking and Poetizing*, Heidegger

describes a way of thinking that lets go of preconceptions and determined concepts and responds to what approaches it. Poetic thinking breaks from other modes of thinking by "awakening our understanding to the fact that the blind obstinacy of habitual opinion must be shattered and abandoned" (I 63). We recognize the limitations we put on thought: the tendency to assume rather than reflect, to bind thinking to utility rather than allow openness, to follow what has already been thought rather than question. For this reason, we must "exert ourselves differently" – that is, "we must *never* remain at a fixed interpretation" (IPTP 17). For Heidegger, "all genuine thinking… is a wandering" (IHTP 17). We must be open and responsive to genuinely think.

Heidegger's 1955 "Memorial Address" describes a similar way of thinking, not as wandering but as meditative. Heidegger states that "contemporary man is in flight-from-thinking" signified by the predominance of calculative thought, which is unthinkingly determined by the principles of economy and utility: "Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself" (G 47). Heidegger contrasts meditative thought to calculative thought, because meditation does not operate according to the same demands. Meditation breaks from the practical demands of calculation but without rejecting the concrete world. Instead, "meditative thinking need by no means be 'high-flown.' It is enough if we dwell on what lies close and meditate on what is closest" (G 48). Heidegger roots meditation in what is close, the very here and now of our existence and relation to the world, which allows us to have a more genuine relation to the world. Meditative thought does not abstract from the world, but rather transforms our relation to

the world. Meditation is rooted in the everyday without being confined to the limits of habitual assumptions. The openness and responsiveness of meditative thought is not removed from the world, but instead allows us to experience the world more deeply and dwell in it.[14] Meditation serves a practical purpose that calculation does not: the praxis of dwelling in the world.

From these perspectives, poetry offers a different way of thinking that does not fix its objectives and perimeters in advance but responds to what it discovers and is flexible enough to allow for paradoxical relations. The plasticity of poetic relations can hold together the complex relations and contradictions of our existence, as demonstrated in Hölderlin's poetry. This plasticity allows poetic thought to approach life and provide an interpretation that is not determinate or complete, but wandering and open. This hermeneutic and interpretative approach to life means that art does not re-enact what we see, but changes how we see. Art transforms how we understand the world without being a mirror of reality and without overcoming reality to achieve a higher synthesis. The work of art "thrusts up" the extraordinary in the ordinary, it does not point at a higher, disembodied meaning (PLT 72). In these ways, poetry allows philosophy to return to the everyday world lived experience without entrapping philosophy in habitual thought. This return to the everyday, however, is not simply through reflective or meditative thought—it also signals a radical rethinking of what is given in experience and how it is given spatially and temporally.

[14] Poetic mediation is also related to releasement [*Gelassenheit*] or openness to things. For an explanation of the relationship between *Gelassenheit*, poetry, and dwelling in Hölderlin and Heidegger, see also Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, *Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of a Poetic Language*: *Towards a New Poetics of Dasein* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004).

The following section develops an account of poetic space and time in Dilthey's and Heidegger's writings on Hölderlin's poetry to illustrate how art transforms ordinary perception. Instead of relating to space and time as calculative measures, poetry exposes space and time as our particular "thereness" in the world, i.e., as the interweaving of subjectivity and objectivity that forms the concrete world that is there for us.

2. The Poetics of Space and Time

Both Dilthey and Heidegger revise Kant's transcendental philosophy by making the conditions for the possibility of experience—space and time—factical and lived, rather than a priori and formal. Dilthey's critique of Kant's transcendental philosophy reflects his concern with the facticity of life. Dilthey emphasizes the unfathomability of life in his distinction between 'formal' and 'real' categories. For Dilthey, formal categories are grounded in reason, whereas real categories are grounded "in the nexus of life itself" (SW II 87). Since formal categories are grounded in reason, they are "completely transparent and unequivocal. This points to their origin in thought" (SW II 97). By contrast, "[t]he mark of real categories is that their content is unfathomable for thought. They are the nexus of life. This is certain and explicit for reflexive awareness, but unfathomable for the intellect" (SW II 87).[15] Real categories are not transparent to thought because they reflect the facticity of life. This distinction reflects Dilthey's critique of transcendental idealism and his attempt to rethink space and time. In particular Dilthey is known for rethinking time in radically new ways, which is why the young

[15] See Chapter 1, pp. 32 – 34 for explanation of reflexive awareness.

Heidegger was so drawn to him.[16] This section will look at the relation between poetry, space, and time in Dilthey's philosophy.

Heidegger's works also critique representational accounts of space and time, but he describes them as calculative rather than formal. In Heidegger's lecture on "The Ister," he contrasts poetic time with ways in which we do not have a fundamental experience of time, i.e. calculative approaches to time. As Heidegger explains, "the modern era gives rise to the calculation of flux" (I 41). Time becomes another dimension added to space and the world, which is thoroughly calculable (I 41). As the order imposed by such calculations and formulas "continues to be reconfirmed within its own realm through whatever has been ordered, and because it is becoming increasingly confirmed through the amassing of successful results, the fundamental traits of this ordering, and it itself above all, must appear as something that requires no further confirmation" (I 41). That is, the framework of calculative time appears to form a complete system of explanation and resists the attempt to provide another explanation, especially types of explanation that do not yield the same results. The clarity and success of science oppose the wandering, reflective way in which poetry considers time, as a "mediation on the essence of time…accomplishes nothing in terms of improving our apparatus for measuring time" (I 42). In the end, this clarity of calculation means that we no longer feel the need to think about time. We measure time for specific ends. Clocks help us to keep track of time and can measure our productivity. Calendars allow for planning. Even historiography, which Heidegger opposes to history,[17] allows us to keep track of significant events.

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[16] Georg Misch argues that Heidegger's existentialia are based on Dilthey's real categories. See Misch, *Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie* (Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner, 1967), especially pp. 53 – 56.

[17] Heidegger draws the distinction between history, which takes up factical life, and historiography, which is positivistic. See "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview," trans.

This calculative approach, however, treats time as an object (*Gegenstand*) that stands apart from us as subjects. Heidegger asks, "Are space and time something 'objective'—present at hand in the manner of 'objects,' like some gigantic containers in which all possible spatial and temporal positions are accommodated?" (I 45). Drawing from Kant, Heidegger explains that this notion does not make sense as space and time are "forms of representation in accordance with which we human beings grasp objects and objectively given sequences of events," i.e. they are the conditions that make experience possible. Yet space and time cannot be "merely a subjective representation" or a construct that is proper only to the subject (I 46). We experience space and time in terms of objects. Space and time are not simply objects apart from us or subjective constructs that have nothing to do with the world. For this reason, Heidegger asks "[if] space and time can neither be something objective nor something subjective, what then are they, if they are at all?" This question leads to the significant conclusion that "[w]hatever the case, they are something that cannot be accommodated within the schema of 'either objective'—'or subjective'" (I 46). The poetic experience of space and time defies the distinction of subject and object and instead opens up a new, more fundamental experience. Poetry thus reveals the way in which the fundamental-experience of time evokes what calculations cannot, even if it is not useful in the sense of creating a better apparatus to determine time. As modern, technological, and calculative approaches to time cover over this more original experience of time, or the living-moment, poetry

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Charles Bambach, in *Supplements,* ed. John van Buren, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002). Cited as WDR. Heidegger describes history as the following: "In disclosing the past in a primordial manner, the past is no longer seen to be merely a present that preceded our own present. Rather, it is possible to emancipate the past so that we can find in it's the authentic roots of our existence and bring it into our own present as a vital force. Historical consciousness liberates the past for the future, and it is then that the past gains force and becomes productive" (WDR 175).

becomes necessary for genuine thinking to ask "what now is?" In this way, poetic thought becomes essential for Heidegger's attempt to pose philosophy as genuine thinking.

This rethinking of time through poetry is significant for both Dilthey and Heidegger, although Heidegger's attempts to approach time in a more radical way. For Dilthey, this temporality is specific to the human sciences as opposed to time in natural science. Heidegger radicalizes this idea by making this experiential time the foundation for scientific time—as logically prior to it. Poetry is a more fundamental way of understanding time, especially insofar as poetic time relates to space as locality for Heidegger. Scientific thought attempts to fix space as a calculative coordinate plane, not as the place in which we are (I 40). In both thinkers' considerations of Hölderlin's poetry, space gets caught up in the discussion of time. This section will first discuss Dilthey's and Heidegger's approaches to rethinking time through Hölderlin's poetry then connect this new sense of temporality to their discussions of space.

2.1 Poetry, Rhythm, and Time

In both of their descriptions of Hölderlin's poetry, Dilthey and Heidegger emphasize its musicality, rhythm, and flow. According to Dilthey, "the fullness and melodious flow of Hölderlin's verses is unsurpassed by any other writer" (SW V 377). Hölderlin's poetic voice is marked by a strong rhythm, especially due to his study of Greek and Roman poetry, which inspired his adoption of ancient metrical forms for his hymns and elegies. As Dilthey notes, "The symmetrical distribution of trochees and dactyls produces a movement in his hexameters by which feeling is carried along as if by waves. By frequently weakening the first stressed syllable of the pentameter, he creates

the impression of a crescendo" (SW V 377). The cadence of his verses rises and falls, the movement of which is often interrupted suddenly by an exclamation or enjoinder. Hölderlin's poetry also displays an acute sensitivity to language, which he maintains with what Dilthey calls "his unique economy with words [that] induces us to dwell on the words. Feeling comes forth naked, as it were, from behind its simple designation" (SW V 376). Dilthey describes this sensitivity to language as an ability to "bring the values of the words" forward with their entire "meaning context in harmony with the use of stressed and unstressed syllables" (SW V 376). He draws upon the connotations of words, historically sedimented in their usage over time, to add to richness of his meaning along with their very sound and rhythm that we respond to with feeling—creating an overflow of meaning in each verse. His poetry is also syncopated with interruptions and further fragmented by ambiguous modifiers and unfinished phrases. As Alice Kuzniar describes his writing, "Hölderlin interrupts, complicates, and even at times suspends articulated language. He discovers a speech that maintains silence. Paradoxically then, displacement serves to orient Hölderlin's poetic voice; it renders his verse unique and distinct."[18] How Hölderlin speaks as a poet, not simply what he says, is meaningful.

Hölderlin's musicality also creates its own meaning. Dilthey describes the rhythm of Hölderlin's poetry like the development of a musical piece in which "each subsequent part refers back to a beginning, whereby what is first given is given in greater and greater depth" (SW V 362). This description reflects a musical motif. In operas, musical motifs suggest certain moods or can refer to particular characters or plot points. The repetition of a motif, however, does not simply act as framework of references. Instead, a musical

[18] Alice A. Kuzniar, *Delayed Endings: Nonclosure in Novalis and Hölderlin* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987), 166.

motif develops with each repetition and takes on new meaning in its variety of expressions. Motifs heighten both the complexity of expression and emotional resonance of a piece by creating an inner coherence, a nexus of meaningful or evocative connections. Hölderlin's poetry achieves this musical complexity by building a "state of feeling [that] unfolds in its parts and ultimately returns to itself, and no longer with its initial indeterminateness. By recollecting the process of its unfolding, the feelings can be integrated into a harmony in which the individual parts resonate" (SW V 373). In this unfolding and resonance, the poem "raises the sequence of our feelings to a nexus in which the essential parts are made conscious, even those that occurred fleetingly and went unnoticed" (SW V 373). Hölderlin's poetry realizes and finds a voice for the indeterminate, fleeting, unnoticed aspects of lived experience. Their depth becomes vivid and accessible through the musicality of Hölderlin's words. Dilthey compares Hölderlin's poetry to songs that express "the obscure, only half-noticed relations" of our greater feelings, "those points in the development of feelings where they continue to flow underground" and "do not find expression in words" (SW V 373). Dilthey presents Hölderlin's musicality as a new lyrical form of poetry that "expresses the exuberance of feeling, the nonobjective power of mood which arises from the inner recesses of the mind itself, the infinite melody of a psychic movement which seems to emanate from indiscernible distances only to disappear in them again" (SW V 376). Lyrical poetry penetrates into the moods and feelings that shape our perception of the world and that make lived experience irreducible to concepts. This penetration, however, is not simple presence. It resonates, emanates, and disappears again. Hölderlin's rhythm thus describes

temporality not as an ongoing flow or stream of now-moments, but as an interweaving of past, present, and future. Time is not the pure presence of the now.

Hölderlin's narrative structure for tragedies also reflects a rhythmic and musical notion of time, which he conveys in his discussion of caesura in his notes on Oedipus and Antigone. Hölderlin discusses peripety—the tragic climax or turning point of a tragedy that Aristotle defines in his *Poetics*—as a musical caesura, a pause or moment of silence.[19] Dilthey explains, "the development of a tragedy is for him a rhythm, and what we call a *caesura* in verse appears as the climax or *peripeteia* in the tragic plot where all that had been presented to the spectator is recapitulated in his consciousness" (SW V 362). The tragic moment gathers all parts together, recapitulates them, but does so as a pause. The gathering of the narrative moments in the caesura is an absence—yet this absence resonates with the whole like a rhythm. With rhythm, pauses are as significant as the sounds. In Hölderlin's tragedies, the caesura is the most significant moment and determines the connections and meaning of the entire narrative structure and gives it meaning. In this way, the caesura does not only give a structure to the temporal structure of a tragic narrative, it also provides a point where "every subsequent part refers back to a beginning, whereby what is first given is given greater and greater depth" (SW V 362). In this way, Hölderlin's narrative structure also treats temporality as a resonance or rhythm rather than simply a constant stream of pure presence.

[19] Dilthey is the first to note the importance of the caesura in Hölderlin's tragedies. Others have explored the significance of the caesura for rethinking time. Walter Benjamin discusses this in "Goethe's Elective Infinities," trans. Stanley Corngold, *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings 1913-1926*, volume I (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2004), 297 – 360. Lacoue-Labarthe thinks Hölderlin's caesura is a critique of Hegel. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, "The Caesura of the Speculative" in *Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics*, ed. Christopher Fyrnsk (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 208 – 235.

In a similar manner, Heidegger describes the rhythm of Hölderlin's poetry as a waxing and waning, a presencing that withdraws again, in his lecture on the poem "Germania." In this lecture, Heidegger discusses how the rhythm (*Schwingungsgefüge*) of Hölderlin's poem goes beyond the individual meters of each line and acts as a source of expression that reverberates through the entire poem (*vorausschwingende Ursprung*).[20]

This rhythm, as a movement of waxing and waning, becomes thematic in Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin's poems about rivers. Heidegger's lecture on Hölderlin's hymn "Der Ister," focuses on the Danube river, which the poem refers. The river flows and in flowing intimates what is coming and close then vanishes and goes away into what is hidden. The river appears from primordial depths and then returns.

Both the rhythm of the poem and the movement of the river suggests a particular way of experiencing or understanding time. According to Dilthey, the rhythm and style of Hölderlin's poetry conveys a moment that is filled with the past and anticipating the future: "Every present was replete with memories. He found a language of new simplicity for all that. A new melody unfolded in this musical genius. It was a prophetic creation" (SW V 304). The unfolding of Hölderlin's lyrical verse continually evokes the past and future, which breaks from the idea of time as simply the present—which is explored but not fully worked out in Dilthey's earlier work. In his "Fragments for a Poetics" (1907-1908), Dilthey begins to reformulate his understanding of time. In these notes,[21] Dilthey

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[20] Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein,' Gesamtausgabe 39, ed. Susanne Ziegler (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980)*: "Neben der Wortwahl, Wortstellung und Wortfolge ist es dann vor allem das ganze Schwingungsgefüge des dichterischen Sagens, was den sogenannten Sinn «ausdrückt». Dieses Schwingungsgefüge des Sagens aber ist nicht erst das Ergebnis der Wortstellung und Verteilung der Verse, sondern umgekehrt: das Schwingungsgefüge des Sagens ist das erste, die Sprache erst ahnende schöpferische Schwingen, der standing der Wortwendung schon verausschwingende Ursprung nicht nur für Wortverteilung und –stellung, sondern auch für die Wortwahl" (14 – 15).

[21] These notes were a draft for a revised version of his *Poetics*. See Dilthey, "Fragments for a Poetics," trans. Rudolf A. Makkreel, in SW V, 223-231. Henceforth cited as SW V.

re-examines the experience of time. Time cannot simply be a continuum in which we continually advance from past to future—i.e. a linear timeline—because the present would be a mere "cross-section in this stream" which cannot be experienced (SW V 225). Instead, "lived experience is not merely something present, but already contains past and future within its consciousness of the present" (SW V 225).[22] Given this aspect of the experience of time, Dilthey asks, "How then is the present really experienced?" and answers that

> It is the nature of the present to be filled or ful-filled with reality in contrast to the representation of reality and its peculiar modifications either in memory or in the anticipation of reality and the will to realize it…The present as experienceable is not this cross-section, but the continuously advancing being ful-filled with reality in the course of time (SW V 225).

The present is not a point that advances along a line from past to future. Rather, the present is the advancing fulfillment of reality that unifies past and future. This image of time becomes more vivid through Hölderlin's poetry, which conveys the recalcitrance of the past and weight of the future.

Hölderlin's poetry reflects the way in which the present is filled with and shaped by the past and future. Dilthey contrasts Hölderlin's fullness of time to Goethe's complete submission to a single moment (SW V 370). Whereas Goethe's poetic time was of the present moment, Hölderlin "always lived in the context of his whole existence. His present feeling was constantly being influenced by what he had suffered and by what might still happen" (SW V 370). This contrast is apparent in the difference between the

[22] These notes reflect the influence of Husserl's time consciousness lectures on Dilthey. It is interesting that Husserl's account of time consciousness uses the example of music to describe how the present requires retention of the past and an anticipation of the future. For a comparison of these thinkers concepts of time see David Carr, "The Future Perfect: Temporality and Priority in Husserl, Heidegger, and Dilthey" *Phenomenologica* 106 (1987): 197-211.

two poets' epistolary novels, *The Sufferings of Young Werther* and *Hyperion*. In Goethe's novel, Werther's letters occur in the present, which allows the story to unfold as if the reader is always a part of that moment. Hölderlin's Hyperion writes letters about events in the past, and instead of addressing a reader his letters seem more like a reflective monologue.[23] Dilthey emphasizes Hölderlin's sense of time in his poetry, which demonstrates that "the past has an efficacy just like the present" (SW V 370). Dilthey points to the "existence of the hermit Hyperion" who "is completely saturated by the spirits of what has been" and Empedocles who "feels the pressure of the past so strongly that he can only hope for liberation from it through death" (SV 370). Hölderlin's poems not only take up Greek myth and bear witness to the past, they also anticipate and envision a future. For Dilthey, Hölderlin's poetry present the fullness of time.

Hölderlin's rhythm—like the flow of the river that intimates and vanishes—not only expresses that which is given and hidden through time, but the paths that we take in living and trying to understand our existence. For both Dilthey and Heidegger, this rhythm expresses something of our existence as historical and finite. Dilthey's account of Hölderlin's poetry takes into account where he lived, the location that shaped his experience of the world. For Dilthey, Hölderlin presents us with "a poetry expressing the eternal rhythm of life itself, which surrounds us inaudibly" (SW V 304). In these expressions of life itself, the poet "probed ever more deeply into the experiences of the mixed and ambiguous nature of human existence" (SW V 304). For Dilthey these expressions of human existence are not abstract, but are rooted in the particulars of Hölderlin's life. According to Dilthey, living among the infinite horizons of sea and

[23] Walter Silz discusses this difference between Goethe and Hölderlin in *Hölderlin's Hyperion: A Critical Reading* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969). See especially Chapter 2, "A Novel in Letters."

plains made Hölderlin attune to the infinite in nature and the divine in all. Our finite existence cannot be approached abstractly or simply through speculation, but requires exploring concrete lived-relations, i.e. how we live and dwell in the world. For Heidegger, the river in Hölderlin's hymn "The Ister" conveys not only time but also human dwelling. The river creates a locality, a space for dwelling—the unique "timespace" of what Hölderlin poetizes (I 8-9). Just as poetic time is not a simple object standing apart from us, so space cannot simply be a coordinate plane of discrete locations. Rather, space is a locality, a place for dwelling, in which we are drawn into a fundamental experience of being (Dasein) that does not make sense in terms of the subjective-objective distinction. Poetic space opens up the possibility for world and dwelling.

The following section will take up Dilthey's and Heidegger's rethinking of space through poetry. For Dilthey, space is living and relates dynamically to the body, rather than an a priori condition for experience. For Heidegger, space is more essentially a location, i.e. a place for dwelling. Art shapes both thinkers' approaches to space. I will argue that poetry reflects the facticity of space and allows a more genuine understanding of experience. In this way, the poetic transformation of space demonstrates the power of art to reunite us to the everyday and provides an immanent approach to phenomenology that can develop an ethos, a way of living, or *dwelling* to use Heidegger's language.

2.2 Poetic Space and Dwelling

Dilthey's notion of space involves the living body and the facticity of sensation. As explained in Chapter One, the relation to the world is one of resistance for Dilthey, which is first felt as tactile: "from the properties of space we arrive at the notion of matter

only by means of the facticity of tactile sensations in which resistance is experienced" (SW I 62). Dilthey's notion of space, moreover, presents the interweaving of self and world. In *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, Dilthey explains, "The space which my body occupies, as given in outer perception, is progressively filled, so to speak, with inner states through accumulating experience, through practice, through the establishment of a context for the feeling of life, the exertions of the will, muscular sensations, and a variety of specifically localized feelings" (SW I 269). Dilthey's notion of space is not geometrical, a plane of identical points. Instead, space relates to the context of feeling in addition to bodily sensation. Space describes a relation between self and world, an orientation or directedness to things. As Jacob Owensby describes, "this lived spatial orientation is not the abstract space of the natural sciences. The external world is given at this level of awareness as a predominantly volitional and evaluative fact through the reflexive awareness of intention and resistance, whereas the natural sciences present a spatially ordered field of surfaces."[24] The factical or living sense of space is prior to reflection, which separates subjects and objects. Space is reflexive and denotes a prior belonging together of self and world. Yet this prior relation is not abstract—it is bodily, lived, and permeated with feeling.[25]

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[24] Jacob Owensby, "Dilthey's Conception of the Life-Nexus" Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 (1987), 557 – 572. 568

[25] Owensby explains: "Space is not an a priori condition for this original visual and tactile experience. Rather, the conception of an absolute space is a construction which arises from this original experience, and geometry is the intellectual analysis of this representational construct. As Dilthey states, "From the combination of these images... , a spatial image emerges . . . . whereupon this becomes itself independent of the particular objects within it. Geometry is the analysis of this . . , space which is independent from particular objects" *(GS,* 19:183- 84). Natural scientific knowledge situates sense objects in an idealized, geometrical space. In lived experience, however, objects of outer perception are oriented around the volitional and emotional focal point of inner life, not absolute space" (569).

Heidegger's notion of space also avoids the abstraction of geometry, but his account is more clearly connected to poetry.[26] For Heidegger, space is essentially location, a place for dwelling, and not a coordinate plane. In "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" (1951), Heidegger defines space (*Raum*) as "a place cleared or freed for settlement and lodging."[27] This place is created by boundaries or horizons that allow something to come to presence. For Heidegger, locations are prior to space, not vice versa. Heidegger contrasts this notion of space (*Raum*) with *spatium*, which is an "intervening space or interval" (PLT 153). *Spatium* is defined by distances and thus has dimensions: height, breadth, and depth. *Spatium* is an abstraction of *Raum* because it has positions rather than locations. Heidegger goes on to define another level of spatial abstraction: space as *extensio,* or extension. Extension defines space according to "analytic-algebraic relations," which have an infinite amount of possible dimensions (PLT 153). While *spatium* and *extensio* allow calculations, they have no sense of place, i.e. the originary notion of space. Space and our relation to it become rootless. For Heidegger these rootless notions of space that cover over the primacy of place. Like Dilthey, for Heidegger space is not an a priori condition for the possibility of experience, but a living relation: "space is not something that faces man. It is neither an external object nor an inner experience" (PLT 154). Instead of an a priori condition, we relate to "locations, and through locations to spaces, inheres in [our] dwelling. The relationship between man and space is none other than dwelling, strictly thought and spoken" (PLT

[26] For a more in-depth discussion of Heidegger's notion of space from his early to late works, see Jeff Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), especially Chapter 5 "The Poetry that Thinks: Place and 'Event'", and his more recent book *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*: *Explorations in the Topology of Being* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012), especially Chapters 6 and 12.
[27] Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, pp. . Henceforth cited as PLT.

156). Since poetry allows dwelling, Heidegger's connects poetry directly to the possibility of rethinking space and freeing it from calculative thought.

In "…Poetically Man Dwells…" (1951), Heidegger tells us that our relation to space—i.e. dwelling—is possible only through poetry: "Poetry is what really lets us to dwell… Through building. Poetic creation, which lets us dwell, is a kind of building."[28] Poetry is a *letting-dwell*. Heidegger adopts this sense of poetic dwelling from Hölderlin's poem "In lovely blueness…" : "Full of merit, yet poetically, man / Dwells on this earth" (PLT 217) For Heidegger, poetry and dwelling belong together. Poetry allows dwelling because it connects us to the world as a place, "Poetry does not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and hover over it. Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, and thus brings him into dwelling" (PLT 216). Like calculation, poetry measures space. But poetry is "a high and special kind of measuring" because it grounds its measuring in being (PLT 219). Poetry measures by mediating or spanning the space between mortals and gods and between earth and sky. For Heidegger, "man dwells by spanning the 'on the earth' and the 'beneath the sky'" (PLT 221). As explained in Chapter Four, *spanning* is significant for Heidegger because it describes poetry's ability to allow for breadth. Whereas calculative thought measures and defines things in discrete and self-contained categories, poetic thought mediates by thinking in terms of what is between, not what is one way or the other. For Heidegger, poetry "thoroughly spans the being-in-the-world of human beings" in "the way it illuminates the world for them and indeed illuminates human beings themselves, putting in place the way in which art is art…" (I 23). Poetry's ability to span what we take to be distinct and

[28] Heidegger, "…Poetically Man Dwells…" in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, (New York: Perennial Classics, 2001), 211 - 227. 213. Henceforth cited as PLT.

mediate between contradictions allows it to take on the breadth of existence. Poetry allows us for a deeper and more expansive sense of space because it defies simple distinctions and treats space as a place for dwelling.[29]

When space is not simply a coordinate plane, when space has a sense of being-there as a world in which we dwell, it becomes difficult to address it in isolation. In poetry, space is not simply there, but it is the world that we encounter, i.e. what is there for us and beyond us. Space as a condition for the possibility of experience, as the formation of world, does not define simply a container occupied by objects. Poetic space describes the conditions for our existence, for our being-in-the-world, which is not simply there. In thinking through poetic time-space, we will also encounter our existence in a more fundamental way. For this reason, we cannot think of space apart from the tensions of existence. In particular, the idea of dwelling relates to the tension between mortals and gods or between our finitude and desire for the infinite.

Like Heidegger's description of poetry as the measure of human mortality in relation to the gods, Dilthey describes the way in which we encounter our existence in Hölderlin's poetry as a conflict between the finite and infinite. In Dilthey's description of Hölderlin's tragedy *The Death of Empedocles*, he describes the way in which we encounter the divine through our own finitude. This encounter describes the contradiction between the particular individual and the whole of existence, which must be related despite their contradiction: "The existence of every individual exhibits a duality. Existence is, on the one hand, the appearance of a power present in nature, and as such it

[29] See also Heidegger, "Art and space" *Man and World* 6, no. 1 (1973): 3-8. Here Heidegger discusses the relation between space, place, and sculpture. For Heidegger, "Sculpture would not deal with space. Sculpture would be the embodiment of places. Places, in preserving and opening a region, hold something free gathered around them which grants the tarrying of things under consideration and a dwelling for man in the midst of things" (7).

has an infinite value. Since, however, it manifests itself as something finite, individual, limited by particulars, separated from every being that lives for itself, its happiness and beauty are accompanied by finitude and suffering" (SW V 344). Dilthey describes this duality between the infinite and finite as Hölderlin's insight into tragedy. The tragedy of Empedocles expresses how we come to terms with our finite existence after confronting the infinite divine.[30] This tragedy of our finite existence is one with the rhythm and flow of Hölderlin's poetry and the "tragic feeling of transience which is grounded in the passage of time" (SW V 345).[31] The possibilities for our being-in-the-world are shaped by this conflict between our finitude and the pull of the infinite. The divine presents a fundamental excess that cannot be calculated or measured through abstract categories.

For Heidegger, calculative thought covers over existence, which is pulled between the finitude of mortality and the infinite gods. Heidegger describes this confrontation between infinite and finite existence in the gods' flight from humanity in Hölderlin's hymn "Germania." Hölderlin depicts Germania[32] as a girl overpowered by the gods, who recreate her as a priestess. Unlike the grandeur that usually accompanies depictions of Germania, the theophany and sacred imagery in Hölderlin's poems have a sense of loss, a quality of mourning. The poem begins by denying the ability to appeal to the gods, unlike the ancient bards who invoked the divine muses to guide their verses:

> Not them, the blessed, who once appeared,
> Those images of gods in the ancient land,
> Them, it is true, I may not now invoke, but if,
> You waters of my homeland, now with you

[30] Chapter Four section 2.2 also explains this tension in Hölderlin's poetry. See pp. 187 – 194.
[31] For a fuller account of this tragic finitude of existence in Dilthey's philosophy, see Jos de Mul, *The Tragedy of Finitude: Dilthey's Hermeneutics of Life*, trans. Tony Burrett, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004). De Mul sees the finitude of life as the grounding insight behind Dilthey's critique of historical reason.
[32] Germania is a symbolic personification of Germany as a woman in armor, which was created when the German state arose from the Revolutions of 1848. She is not normally depicted as a young, vulnerable girl.

> The love of my heart laments, what else does it want, in
> Its hallowed sadness?[33]

Instead of invoking a divine muse, Hölderlin denies the gods and refers to the waters of Germany. Yet the gods are not completely absent, they linger in subtle forms even if they no longer belong to this time or place as they did in the past:

> Gods who are fled! And you also, present still,
> But once more real, you had your time, your ages! . . .
> Only as a funeral pyre henceforth
> A golden smoke, the legend of it, drafts
> And glimmers on around our doubting heads
> And no one knows what's happening to him. He feels
> The shadowy shapes of those who once were here,
> The ancients, newly visiting the earth.

The gods appear in smoke and shadows, leaving traces in the world that they have left and where they no longer dwell.

For Heidegger this flight bears directly on the possibility of dwelling in the world because it resonates with the death of god as described by Nietzsche and signals the beginning of representational models of the world that replace genuine relations with calculations. In his *Introduction to Philosophy*, Heidegger describes Nietzsche's fundamental experience of his time as the experience of the *godlessness and worldlessness of the modern human* (IPTP 15). For Nietzsche, the issue is not just that God is dead, but rather that humans no longer know how to create a god. We have lost the ability to create gods, which means we lose the possibility of the world and dwelling. The concept of God makes the world a creation for human life. God represents both a foundational principle of truth and a telos. Without God, the foundation and purpose of the world is thrown into question—the world is suspended by doubt—which in turn

[33] Hölderlin, "Germania," in *Friedrich Hölderlin: Poems and Fragments*, 4th bilingual edition, trans. Michael Hamburger, (London: Anvil Press Poetry, 2005), 491 - 497.

makes dwelling difficult: "Without God and without a world, humans no longer have *that* in which they belong, to which they can listen, whence they can be addressed and claimed" (IPTP 24). Without a system of meaningful relations, we are set apart from the world. Due to this separation, meaning is easily subverted by the clarity and usefulness of calculative thought. This calculative thought does not allow dwelling. We no longer seek the fundamental experience of the way in which the world is there for us, "Having become God-less and world-less, the modern human is home-less" (IPTP 24). Instead of the fullness of experience, the modern human stands apart from the world and measures it in only the narrowest of terms: "Nietzsche saw a mediocrity and narrowness everywhere around him; rationality that merely calculates, which cannot envision the great, looming historical decisions and is therefore also incapable of preparing humanity and the peoples for them" (IPTP 29). Heidegger describes this narrow rationality as the "inability for reflection [Besinnung]" (IPTP 29). Without the creation of meaning, i.e. the creation of God, the world becomes a flat and desolate place in which we have no place.

By contrast, poetry announces a more expansive and meaningful sense of space, which allows us to dwell again. Poetry allows for dwelling in a modern world where the gods have fled by reestablishing a relation to the world. The ground for our existence, our dwelling, and the revelation of Being, is poetry. Poetry is not opposed to reality but instead reveals reality by engaging in the world in a way that is authentic and open to possibility. Whereas Nietzsche announces the death of god and the need to create a new god, Hölderlin's gods are still present in the world as a trace, which creates greater ambiguity between creation and reality, between presence and absence, and between the divine and human. Nietzsche's vision of the artist is based on the power of creation,

whereas Hölderlin's vision of the poet is someone who mediates between the gods and humans. In Hölderlin, meaning is not a pure product of poetic creation. That is, meaning must be recovered, not invented anew. In this sense, Hölderlin's poetry has a problematic relation to the world. The world as a meaningful place for us to dwell is not simply there or not there for us; we need to create a place for us in it. The problematic position of dwelling reflects the contradiction between the finite and infinite, which Heidegger describes as the uncanny.

Heidegger's description of the uncanny shows the same problematic of factical life that he poses in his early works but in response to poetry. The uncanny reveals the conflict between our finitude and the infinite and our struggle to dwell in the modern world. Hölderlin's translation of the chorus of Sophocle's *Antigone* reads: "Manifold is the uncanny [Unheimliche], yet nothing more uncanny looms or stirs beyond the human being" (I 71). Heidegger reads this statement to mean that the human being is uncanny in so far as what is closest and most intimate to us is also what is farthest and most foreign, what is most difficult to know: "One's own is what is most remote" (I 143). This dynamic reflects the factical as the given that is at once closest to us and most difficult to grasp. The world, being, and our existence is there for us in one sense and not there for us in another. Yet the uncanny does not simply deny our experience of the world; it brings us to a more fundamental experience of the world as neither objective nor subjective. For Heidegger, the uncanny "is not 'given' at all in the sense of being present at hand" (I 74). The uncanny instead denotes a "coming forth (looming), and in such a way that in all its stirring it nonetheless abides within the inaccessibility of its essence" (I 43). As coming forth, looming, and stirring, the uncanny describes the way in which the world is there

and yet not simply given to us. The world is there apart from us in the sense that we do not merely project it; the world is not the product of subjectivity. And yet the world is not simply there apart from us. We must make a dwelling for ourselves within the world. The uncanny [Unheimliche], as Heidegger notes, also has the sense of "un-homely." The uncanny describes how our relation to the world is a constant stirring of not being at home completely that must continually seek out the homely (I 43). Like the fundamental experience of time that requires a reflective and responsive comportment, the fundamental experience of the world cannot simply measure and dominate it as calculative thought. The fundamental experience of the world must be willing to wander and respond to way in which the world resists our concepts and attempts to make it our dominion. In this way, poetic dwelling responds to the factical, rather than limiting it.

Unlike calculative thought, poetic thought can respond to the conflict between the finite and infinite, the uncanny, or the factical. This space of the uncanny opens up the possibility of dwelling and, moreover, articulates the facticity of life as there for us without being transparent or self-evident. Poetry allows us to encounter and grapple with the factical without resolving it through unification or dualistic divisions that would separate us from the world.

2.3 Poetic Time-Space and Facticity

The poet encounters space and time not as objects that are merely there for us nor as empty subjective forms projected onto the world—but as dynamic, meaningful relations. These relations cannot be reduced to clear and distinct concepts, nor can they be explained strictly in terms of calculation or instrumental thought. The poet does not seek to clarify her experience of the world, but to delve into its meaningfulness.

Meaningfulness is not a value that can be calculated or made into a means to some end—which is why the modern, technological, scientific approach flattens and reduces space and time. "Space and time comprise the framework for our calculative dominion and ordering of the 'world' in nature and history. This pervasive measurement of the world in a calculative, discovering, and conquering manner is undertaken by modern human beings in a way whose distinctive metaphysical features is modern machine technology" (I 49). The poet becomes the necessary antithesis to the narrow rationality of modern calculative thought because her approach is more expansive and less determinate. Poetry wanders and responds to the world in its facticity rather than trying to subordinate everything to use.

Poetic time-space,[34] the sense of time and space that is present in poetic thought, thus allows us to approach the paradox of factical life in its ambiguity, contradictions, and surplus of meaning—i.e. in all the ways that facticity denies commensurable concepts. Poetic time is broad enough to encompass the way in which the moment is not simple presence, but the fulfillment of time. Poetic space is broad enough to make vivid the world as a meaningful place for dwelling. When we approach the world poetically, or *reflectively*, we do not seek fixed determinations or clear distinctions. We moreover do not attempt to set ourselves apart from the world as something that is extended and separate from our minds. We recognize the way in which we are intertwined with the world.

[34] For Heidegger, time-space relates to the facticity and uniqueness of Dasein: "Time-space and 'facticity' of Dasein. The inbetween of the turning and indeed as, historically, specifically abiding! It is determined as the now and the here! The *uniqueness* of *Da*-sein. Hence the uniqueness of knowing stand-steadfast of what is assigned *and* what is given along with" (C 259).

This intertwinement with the world, however, is not simply a union. The world is not simply there for us. Experience is not transparent; instead, what is given in experience is also what is most difficult to understand. These qualities, contradictory and paradoxical, nonetheless are *determined as the now and the here*, or as *what is given*. Facticity is what is given (*Es gibt*), but never fully present or actual. Facticity always relates to what is at once given and hidden, the primordial depths that ground our being-in-the-world. Other forms of thought fail before this contradiction because it cannot be exhausted by a formal framework of rational concepts. The contradiction at the center of existence requires more than reductive explanation or mere description—mediation is needed. The paradox of facticity requires a way of thinking that does not reduce the complexity of lived-relations to concepts or abstract frameworks, but flows from and returns to our concrete being-in-the-world. The following section will expand this sense of facticity by outlining how poetry transforms the sensory perception and reveals the intelligibility of sense in a way that changes our comportment towards the material world.

3. Art and the Transformation of the Sensible

For both Dilthey and Heidegger, space and time are not a priori conditions for the possibility of experience or formal structures that determine perceptual experience. Instead, space and time are living relations that reveal our intertwinement with the world. By breaking from representational accounts of experience, Dilthey and Heidegger introduce a new notion of the sensible. In this way, the poetic transformation of space and time signifies a radical rethinking of the relation between the sensible and intelligible.

3.1 The Intelligibility of the Sensible

In "Life and Cognition," Dilthey recognizes that no pure given can be located in experience, as explained earlier. For Dilthey, a "consequence of this important general thesis is the intellectuality of sense perception" (SW II 60). Dilthey recognizes that experience is an interweaving of sense and thought, which is evident in his revision of transcendental idealism in *Introduction to the Human Sciences*. This means reinvestigating the relation between thought and sensory experience by taking up the immanent relations that determine life. Dilthey's more immanent method recognizes the value of the sensible, which German idealism overlooks. In his "Ideas for a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology" (1894), Dilthey contrasts explanation with description to give a more holistic account of experience. The descriptive account of experience restores the unity of the sensible and intelligible. Dilthey writes, "If we consider how every spatial distance, musical interval, or shade of gray is grasped in an act of thought that is inseparable from the coexistence of sensations, then the false opposition between visual instruction and the development of thinking—which has up to this day played such an important role in both theoretical and practical pedagogy—will disappear" (SW II 156). The opposition between the sensible qualities of experience and thought is superficial. When sense and thought are joined, we recover a more authentic sense of our experience of the world.

Dilthey's philosophy attempts to reorient philosophy from transcendental conditions to lived experience by taking up immanence, in particular "the immanent values of life, so that philosophy can accomplish its task of bringing about a noble transformation of life" (SW I 489). Not only does Dilthey emphasize the need for an

immanent approach to philosophy, he also distinguishes his theory of perception from Kant's transcendental idealism. Rather than hypostasizing an ahistorical a priori—i.e. the unconditioned conditions for the possibility of experience—like Kant, Dilthey sees perception as shaped by lived experience and subject to historical change. Dilthey argues that the "real conditions of consciousness" are "a living historical process, a development" that has a history and is shaped by "its engagement with things" (SW I 500 – 501). Dilthey's philosophy of perception does not have unconditioned conditions. Instead, our engagement with things continually changes how we see and participate in the world.[35] This reciprocity between the transcendental conditions for experience and the concrete world of lived experiences requires a hermeneutic approach to phenomenology and also suggests that sensation is not purely determined. Sensory perception is colored by a variety of conditions that constitute our being in the world. By creating a hermeneutic interplay between the transcendental conditions for experience and the immanent relations of our being in the world, Dilthey elevates sensory perception. Sensory perception reveals our living, historical, and meaningful relation to the world.

This broader and more complex notion of sensation is also present in Heidegger's philosophy. Sallis' reading of Heidegger's *The Origin of the Work of Art* describes the interplay between truth (the intelligible and unconditioned) and sense (the sensible and conditioned). Instead of setting truth and sense in opposition, "*The Origin of the Work of Art* brings to bear on art redeterminations both of the sense of truth and of the truth of sense. These two operations repeatedly intersect, and their interweaving forms the very

[35] See Chapter 4, "The Historical A Priori of Life" in de Mul, *The Tragedy of Finitude: Dilthey's Hermeneutics of Life*, 129 – 159.

fabric of Heidegger's text."[36] While Heidegger is critical of theories of sensation that are violent in their attempt to grasp things, he also expands the notion of art (as *technē*) to denote "a mode of knowing" which he claims "means to have seen, in the widest sense of seeing, which means to apprehend what is present as such" (PLT 57). Along similar lines, Heidegger's preface to his seminar in Zähringen describes perception in a more originary way such that perception and the perceivable are open to one another. Heidegger claims that "[f]or perception to be able to be encountered at all by the perceivable, it must hold itself open… Both perception as well as presencing require for their own possibility—and this means at the same time for their 'to one another'—a free and open dimension, within which they encounter one another."[37] That is, perception is not determined by the unconditioned conditions of consciousness nor by the perceived object itself, but by their open and mutual relation to one another. Here Heidegger's hermeneutic relation between perception and the world of things to be perceived reflects Dilthey's concept of sensory perception. Sensation is not determinate or fixed by unconditioned conditions for Dilthey and Heidegger. Instead, sensation is responsive, creative, plastic, alive, and dynamic.

3.2 Art and the Facticity of the Sensible

Art exposes the entanglement of sense and thought. Art makes the hermeneutic dynamism of sensation evident because through art we witness the transformation of sensation. Works of art thus do not mirror what is simply there, but make the sensible appear as such. Klee tells us, "Art does not reproduce the visible; rather, it makes

[36] John Sallis, *Transfigurements: On the True Sense of Art*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 171.
[37] Heidegger, "The Provenance of Thinking" in *Four Seminars*, trans. Andrew Mitchell and Francois Raffoul, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 93.

visible."[38]Art makes sensation sensible in its plasticity, receptivity, and dynamism. Colors, lines, shapes, tones, rhythms, and patterns become meaningful. Mikel Dufrenne notes the significance of the sensible in his phenomenological approach to poetry. Dufrenne states that "in the poetic use of language, where we hesitate between meaning and sound, it is the very sound that compels us, can even seduce us. In poetry, words are like things, palpable and tasty as a fruit. The kind of familiarity our body has with them is different. Savoring is not using."[39] The sounds of the word are not exhausted by their definition or connotations in the poem. Instead, the sound of words, the feeling of pronouncing them, their rhythm, the tone of their cadences, and their resonance in one's mouth all strike us as meaningful. Poetic words mean more than how they are used and thus preserve the facticity of the sensible. Poetry does not use words, it savors them—just as Heidegger claims the work of art does not exhaust its thingly aspects. For Heidegger

> the sculptor uses stone just as the mason uses it, in his own way. But he does not use it up… the painter also uses pigment, but in such a way that color is not used up but rather only now comes to shine forth. To be sure, the poet also uses the word—not, however, like ordinary speakers and writers who have to use them up, but rather in such a way that the world only now becomes and remains truly a word. (PLT 46)

In art, the sensible is not exhausted. The material aspects cannot be subordinated to a particular use or idea. Instead, art allows the facticity of the sensible to shine, rather than subordinating sensation to a particular use or idea. Art delves into a deeper experience with the sensible that cannot be exhausted by calculative or representational thought. The

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[38] Paul Klee, "Creative Credo," in *Theories of Modern Art: A Source Book by Artists and Critics*, ed. Herschel B. Chipp (Berkely: University of California Press, 1968), 182-186. English translation by Norbert Guterman from *The Inward Vision: Watercolors, Drawings and Writings by Paul Klee* (New York: Abrams, 1959, 5-10.

[39] Mikel Dufrenne, "The Phenomenological Approach to Poetry" *Philosophy Today* 20, no. 1 (1976): 109-119. 16.

sensible is an excess, an overflow of meaning because it is tied to the facticity of life and the given. As Dufrenne describes the sensible in art,

> the sense surges within the sensuous in the reciting body as perfume surges within a flower in the heat of summer. Poeticalness realizes and actualizes expressivity. Here language is driven back to its origin. Here signs are not yet arbitrary, they somehow imitate the object they refer to and conjure up its presence instead of being merely representational. Onomatopoeia comes to mind here. But expressivity is more subtle than imitation. The sounds imitate and evoke some sensuous properties of the object rather than the object itself. [40]

Poetry renders the sensible qualities of language more vivid. Words that are not onomatopoeias somehow evoke the object and make it tangible. Dufrenne notes that this is not representation or mimesis, but a deeper sense of bringing the thing to presence.

In making the sensible vivid and tangible as sensible, art draws out the *thisness* or *haecceity* of things in the world. For the poet Denise Levertov, the deepest, most essential source of language is the exclamation "This! This!" Her poem "Primal Language" claims that

> If there's an Ur-language still among us,
> hiding out like a pygmy pterodactyl
> in the woods, sighted at daybreak sometimes,
> perched on a telephone wire, or like
> prehistoric fish discovered in ocean's
> deepest grottoes, then it's the exclamation,
> universal whatever the sound, the triumphant,
> wondering, infant utterance, "This! This!,
> showing and proffering the thing, anything,
> the affirmation even before the naming.[41]

Poetry evokes this primal language, the *wondering, infant utterance* that cries "This! This!" Art does not represent the thing—art gives the thing and offers it in the fullness of

[40] Dufrenne, 17.
[41] Denise Levertov, "Primal Language" *Sands of the Well*, (New York: New Directions Publishing, 1994), 95.

its factical relations. The facticity of the given—its patency and irreducible thisness—finds expression in the work of art.

The given in art breaks from the dualism of subject-object and sensible-intelligible dichotomies and from the deflated sense of sensation that is offered by representational theories of experience. Art offers a way to think about experience in the full richness of its complexity. As Jean-Luc Nancy argues, art is not simply a metaphor for the practice of phenomenology. Rather, art is phenomenology since it reveals "the patency of the world."[42] That is, art presents us with how the world opens to us, how it becomes present. In Nancy's words, art is the *presentation of presentation* (M 34). By *presentation*, Nancy does not mean a self-evident or transparent sense of presence, but evokes the Kantian meaning of presentation (*Darstellung*). Kant introduces presentation in the third *Critique* to characterize the freedom of aesthetic judgment from determinant concepts, which characterize representation, and to describe a mode of relating ideas to sensation. [43] Nancy adopts this same sense of presentation, which does not convey simply sensuous apprehension, but mediates between the sensible and intelligible. Nancy reframes the *presentation of presentation* by describing it as *the transcendence of immanence* (M 34). For Nancy, art exposes the interweaving of self and world. Art

[42] Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Muses*, trans. Peggy Kamuf, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 33. Henceforth cited as M.

[43] The Kantian notion of *Darstellung* is distinct from *representation* (*Vorstellung*). Whereas representation in the first *Critique* describes the schematizing power of the imagination in terms of the lawfulness of sensory perception, presentation introduces an expanded role of the imagination that mediates between the sensible and intelligible. See Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), especially pp. 128 – 129. For a discussion of presentation in Nancy and its significance for aesthetics, see Alison Ross, *The Aesthetic Paths of Philosophy: Presentation in Kant, Heidegger, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Nancy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). Ross argues that continental philosophy necessarily takes an aesthetic path after Kant introduces the representation-presentation (*Vorstellung-Darstellung*) distinction. Ross explains: "In Kant 'presentation' is the name he gives to the problem of how to define a mode of relation able to reconcile human freedom with the constraints of materiality. The exigency of this relation follows from the need of finite beings to render in aesthetic or sensible forms what would otherwise be impotent, errant ideas" (1 – 2). Ross sees Nancy as particularly aware of the aesthetic significance of Kant's notion of *Darstellung*.

allows us to experience *how* we experience the world and makes the conditions for that experience salient. In sensing sensation, art has a reflexive relation to sensation that draws out the meaningful relations that determine our experience of the world. As art presents how things are present, it reveals being-in-the-world. Nancy explains "[a]rt does not deal with the 'world' understood as simple exteriority, milieu, or nature. It deals with being-in-the-world in its very springing forth" (M 18). Art discloses the way that being becomes present, not as an object standing apart from us but as a deeper relation between self and world.

Art is not the symbolic representation of a reality that is set apart from us as subjects, but the disclosure of our factical entanglement with the world. In art we recognize the relations that make our being and the world inextricable from one another. Art achieves this recognition because it displaces the way in which we ordinarily sense and participate in the world. Art displaces or frees sensation from utility and necessity, the constraints of calculative thought. The world is not set apart from us as something to be mastered or measured, but as something that moves us as we move within it. Art is the destabilization of our normal relations and ways of thinking—subject and object, sense and sensation, real and ideal, immanent and transcendent—that allows us to understand the more originary dynamism from which these relations emerge without trying to determine or fix them. Art thus describes not only phenomenology as a mode of thought, but also as a way of being, an existence that is grounded in the immanent without reducing the immanent to sensory data. Nancy thus calls art "the transcendence of immanence as such" (M 34-35).

For both Dilthey and Heidegger, poetry embodies a particular way of thinking and comporting oneself within the world that does not treat the world as mere objects apart from us as subjects, but instead reveals the meaningful relations within the world to which we belong and in which we partake. Art allows us to think about our living perspective without reduction or conflation. The relational correspondences of sensations in art make the features of lived experience more vivid without the idealizations of perception in representational thought or idealism. As a relational and dynamic mode of thinking and being-in-the-world, poetry revises how thought approaches life. Poetic thought approaches the complexity of factical life that is grounded in sensory experience and living relations. In turn, this understanding transforms our mode of being-in-the-world and opens new possibilities for human life and for philosophy. In this way, poetry restores the depth, complexity, and meaning of experience and bears witness to our intimate relation to things.

Timeline of Primary Texts

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833 - 1911)

1883	*Introduction to the Human Sciences*	SW I [GS I]
1887	*The Imagination of the Poet: Elements for a Poetics*	SW V [GS VI]
1890	"The Origin of Our Belief in the External World and Its Justification"	SW II
1892	*Three Epochs of Modern Aesthetics and the Present Task*	SW V [GS VI]
1892/1893	"Life and Cognition"	SW II
1895/1896	*Ideas for a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology*	SW II [GS V]
1907/1908	"Fragments for a Poetics"	SW V
1910	*Poetry and Lived Experience* 1. *Goethe* 2. *Hölderlin*	SW V
1910	*The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*	SW III [GS VII]

Martin Heidegger (1889 - 1976)

1919	*Towards the Definition of Philosophy* *1. The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews* *2. Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value*	[GA 56/57]
1919/1920	*The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*	[GA 58]
1920	*Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*	[GA 59]
	The Phenomenology of Religious Life	[GA 60]
1921	*Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*	[GA 61]

1923	*Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*	[GA 63]
1927	*Being and Time*	[GA 2]
1934	*Hölderlin's Hymns "Germanien" and "The Rhine"*	[GA 39]
1935/1936	"The Origin of the Work of Art" in *Off the Beaten Track*	[GA 5]
1936/1937	*The Will to Power as Art, Nietzsche I*	[GA 6]
1936/1938	*Contributions to Philosophy*: *(From Enowning)*	[GA 65]
1938	"The Age of the World Picture" in *Off the Beaten Track*	[GA 5]
1942	*Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister"*	[GA 53]

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Volume IV. *Hermeneutics and the Study of History*. 1996.
Volume V. *Poetry and Experience*. 1985.

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