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Ashley Parcells	March 30, 2018

Ethnic Sovereignty and the Making of a Zulu Homeland in Apartheid South Africa

By

Ashley Parcells

Doctor of Philosophy

History

Dr. Clifton Crais
Advisor

Dr. Kristin Mann
Committee Member

Dr. Pamela Scully
Committee Member

Accepted:

Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph.D.
Dean of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies

Date

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By

Ashley Parcells

B.A., University of Washington

M.A., Emory University

Advisor: Clifton Crais, Ph.D.

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Abstract

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This project is a social and political history of the territorialization of ethnic identity. In the face of global decolonization, the apartheid state attempted to create ethnically defined self-governing "homelands" that could be fashioned within the mold of "independent" nation-states. In the 1970s, KwaZulu became a self-governing homeland for Zulu language speakers in South Africa. My research explores how KwaZulu, which was fashioned as the reincarnation of the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom, came to include territory and populations that never recognized the Zulu monarchy.

The creation of the homeland system required local and regional African actors – most prominently members of the Zulu royal family – to negotiate new arrangements of land and authority with the apartheid state. Leaders in the royal family referenced the history of the Zulu kingdom, past treaties with colonizers, and land rights accorded to chiefs under colonialism to advocate for an expanded homeland centered around the Zulu monarch. Ultimately, the government and the royal family moved forward with the creation of a single large homeland for all Zulu speakers in 1970 – even those who had never been part of the Zulu kingdom. The Zulu king, however, was made a powerless constitutional monarch to prevent opposition from people who did not see themselves as subjects of the monarchy.

By exploring how the Zulu royal family negotiated with the apartheid state to make claims over territory and subjects that were never part of the Zulu kingdom, I offer a new understanding of the formative years of apartheid with broader implications for the study of ethnicity under colonialism. Historians have argued that colonial states often used ethnic divisions to control subject populations. This research, however, show that indigenous leaders played a crucial role in defining the relationship between ethnicity and territory as they sought to access political power through the state. Furthermore, while historians of South Africa have primarily studied the development of apartheid ideology and policy at the level of national politics, this research shows that struggles to define the organization of the homeland system –and the apartheid political order itself – were often deliberative and local.

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Table of Contents

Introduction

In 1994, on the eve of South Africa's first democratic elections, the Ingonyama Trust Act placed all the land of KwaZulu, an ethnically-defined self-governing territory for black Zulu speakers during apartheid, under the trusteeship of Zulu King[1] Goodwill Zwelithini. The new trust encompassed a full third of the post-apartheid province of KwaZulu-Natal. While South Africa's democratic transition brought about one of the most progressive constitutions in the world, the regulations of the Trust prevented land ownership for millions of rural South Africans in KwaZulu-Natal. The new constitution also recognized Zwelithini as a hereditary Zulu king within the new democracy.

The boundaries of this territory and its relationship with the Zulu monarchy were rooted in apartheid politics. On February 1st, 1977, the Republic of South Africa had proclaimed KwaZulu a self-governing territory. KwaZulu included all of the Zulu speakers of the Province of Natal and recognized King Goodwill Zwelithini, heir of the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom, as an apolitical constitutional monarch. KwaZulu's political leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, portrayed the homeland as a continuation of the

[1] The terminology surrounding the Zulu monarch has multiple variations both within South African history and in his dissertation. The Zulu term for monarch remained *ingonyama,* or the lion, for the duration of the period this dissertation is concerned with. The apartheid state referred to the monarchs as Paramount Chiefs for much of the mid twentieth century, and then the KwaZulu government and the post-apartheid government recognized Zwelithini as a King rather than Paramount Chief. In the parts of the dissertation up until the mid 1970s, I use either Paramount Chief or *Ingonyama* depending on context. In the final chapters and conclusion that cover the period after Zwelithini received government recognition as King, I use either King or *Ingonyama.*

kingdom once led by the famous nineteenth century warrior king Shaka Zulu. KwaZulu's boundaries, however, did not align with those of the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom or any other pre-colonial polity. Moreover, the idea of a constitutional monarch did not emerge until the 1960s.

This dissertation explores how the Zulu homeland came into being under apartheid in this specific form that rewrote history and redefined ideas of Zulu ethnic sovereignty in South Africa's hinterland. The coming of apartheid led to new debates in both Pretoria and Zululand about ethnicity, subjecthood, and political authority. In the 1950s, the government sought to create economically and politically self-sufficient African reserves. It rapidly expanded bureaucracies to handle native administration.[2] The 1951 Bantu Authorities Act created the framework for three tiers of authority in the reserves under the control of the Department of Native Affairs:[3] tribal authorities, regional authorities, and territorial authorities. The Act sought to devolve significant bureaucratic functions to African chiefs, who previously were primarily responsible for civil court cases.

From 1959, in the face of global decolonization, South Africa shifted to the policy of "grand apartheid." The 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act set up distinct "national units," based on government-recognized ethnic groups, and provided the framework for the transformation of territorial authorities, which were never meant to be independent under the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act, into self-governing and then independent homelands. Transkei became the first self-governing territory in 1963, and it became "independent" in 1976. Other territorial authorities formed throughout the 1960s

[2] Ivan Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race Native Administration in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 180.
[3] Later the Department of Bantu Administration and Development.

and later became independent, though these "states" were never economically viable or recognized internationally. The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 provided a framework to strip Africans of their South African citizenship and make them citizens of the independent homelands.[4]

The complex historical relationships between Zulu speaking populations in the province of Natal and the Zulu royal house presented special difficulties as the state sought to implement apartheid policy. In Natal, the apartheid state initially sought to rebuild power around the former Zulu kingdom in order to develop a new single Zulu territorial authority, and eventually, a Zulu homeland. During the 1950s, the assumption that the Zulu royal house would eventually head a territorial authority that would include all Africans in Natal drove government policy. The 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act defined a single "Zulu National Unit" for all of Natal based on the idea of the "Zulu nation" as a single linguistic and ethnic community, despite the fact that it had never been politically unified.

The definition of national units in the 1959 legislation yielded new political crises in the making of apartheid. During the 1960s, the government, the Zulu royal family, and other leaders in Zululand faced several pressing questions about the region's political future. What were the boundaries of Zulu ethnicity, and what was the relationship between Zulu ethnicity and the historic Zulu kingdom? Should all Zulu speakers be placed in one homeland, or should several homelands be formed to accommodate historic political divisions among Africans in the region? What would be the relationship between

[4] Citizenship as a concept has a complicated and often fraught history. In this context, I refer to citizenship as it was defined by South African law under apartheid. While homeland citizenship was never recognized internationally, it became a salient feature of life within apartheid South Africa.

the South African government and the new Zulu political entity/entities? Who could hold power in this new political arrangement?

The forging of the apartheid political order required the government, the Zulu royal family, and other African leaders to reimagine and negotiate new arrangements of territory and power, and, importantly, to define the legal boundaries of ethnicity. Rural elites in Zululand embraced collaboration with the apartheid state to secure the creation of a Zulu self-governing territory within the borders of apartheid South Africa. In doing so, they were able to make claims over territory and subjects that were never part of the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom. Ultimately, the government and African leaders in Zululand moved forward with the creation of a single territorial authority for all Zulu-speakers – even those who had never been part of the Zulu kingdom –under the compromise that the King Zwelithini was made a constitutional rather than executive monarch. This created the opportunity for Mangosuthu Buthelezi, a politically ambitious cousin of the king, to seize political control in the new homeland. He was a controversial and authoritarian leader, selectively collaborating with and defying the apartheid state based on shifting political imperatives. Under his administration, which lasted until the democratic transition in 1994, the KwaZulu government and Inkatha propagated a specific form of Zulu ethnic sovereignty that painted KwaZulu as the Zulu kingdom reborn, as a constitutional monarchy with Buthelezi as a hereditary prime minister wielding real political power.

This research on the history of the KwaZulu homeland makes two broader contributions. First, the creation of the Zulu homeland offers a case study to explore the negotiations between local officials and African intermediaries in the territorialization of

ethnic identity. The homelands were, ultimately, experiments in creating a system of multi-layered sovereignty structured around ethnicity. While states in colonized societies across the world used ethnic divisions as tools of political control, this research shows that indigenous political actors also played a crucial role in defining the relationship between ethnic identity and territorial boundaries. Apartheid officials sought to answer seemingly basic questions: who is Zulu, and how can a polity be constructed around that identity? Zulu leaders, however, made legally and historically based claims to land, subjects, and authority in both their interactions with the apartheid state and among themselves.

Secondly, this research moves beyond a focus on the central state to show how local and regional politics— and the actions of local officials and African intermediaries—were central to the making of grand apartheid. While homelands became the "dumping ground" of apartheid, they were also strange, corrupt experiments in creating new polities based on ethnic identity. This required sorting out the relationships between subjects and rulers, creating new geographic boundaries, and legitimizing for these new territories. While the apartheid state can easily be imagined as a totalitarian entity ruling from Pretoria, in reality, the making of the apartheid order was a deliberative endeavor shaped by actors in various spheres across South Africa.

Zulu Identity and Political Authority before Apartheid

State attempts to define forms of indigenous political jurisdiction have a long history in South Africa and across the globe.[5] Creating a Zulu homeland was not a simple

[5] David Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation; Native Policy in Colonial Natal, 1845-1910*. (Cape Town, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); Martin Chanock, *Law, Custom, and Social*

matter of identifying local chiefs and subjects. It meant defining the limits of a "Zulu nation" from the ashes of a short-lived pre-colonial kingdom characterized by complex relationships of authority and subjecthood that had never been previously defined on a territorial basis. While the apartheid state sought to draw political boundaries around discrete ethnic identities, here, I show that Zulu identity was bound up in historical and political complexities that dated from the pre-colonial era.

Determining the geographic footprint of the Zulu kingdom would become a perplexing problem for the apartheid state. The pre-conquest Zulu kingdom existed for about forty years in the nineteenth century as a amalgamation of chiefdoms primarily north of the Tugela River. In the late eighteenth century, political centralization and expansion brought newly emergent states and polities into conflict in eastern Southern Africa.[6] One of these was the Mthethwa Paramountcy under Dingiswayo, where Shaka Zulu went after being exiled by his father, Senzagakona. Shaka became leader of the Zulu clan after his father's death. After Dingiswayo's death, Shaka expanded his influence. By

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Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Leroy Vail ed., *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (London; Berkeley: Currey ; University of California Press, 1989); Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts eds., *Law in Colonial Africa* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Educational Books ; London James Currey, 1991); Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Lauren Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900* (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Clifton Crais, *The Politics of Evil: Magic, State Power, and Political Imagination in South Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); J. Michael Williams, *Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Mahmood Mamdani, *Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012).

[6] Andrew Duminy and Bill Guest, *Natal and Zululand from Earliest Times to 1910: A New History* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press: Shuter & Shooter, 1989); Carolyn Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty: The Power of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998); John Wright, "Turbulent Times: Political Transformations in the North and East, 1976-1830s," *The Cambridge History of South Africa. Volume 1,* eds. Carolyn Hamilton, Bernard Mbenga, and Robert Ross (New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

1826, the Zulu became the dominant clan north of the Tugela River.[7] The historic center of the Zulu kingdom was around the White Mfolozi River, with client chiefdoms further from the center.[8] The Zulu kingdom under Shaka was a collection of different chiefdoms paying tribute to the king and controlled through the *amabutho,* or age-group, system, in which each chieftaincy contributed manpower to age groups.[9] This political centralization, however, did not immediately yield a generic or uniform Zulu ethnic identity. In the nineteenth century, the majority of subordinate chiefdoms did not identify as "Zulu."[10] Until as late as the time of Cetshwayo in the 1870s, people in Zululand only used the term Zulu to describe the ruling Zulu descent group. Europeans, in fact, were the first to describe all inhabitants of Natal and Zululand as Zulus.[11]

The Zulu kingdom did temporarily establish a physical presence south of the Tugela River lasting less than half a decade. In 1826, Shaka established a new capital at KwaDukuza, near the lower Mvoti River and about seventy kilometers from Port Natal, a white settlement established in 1820.[12] After Shaka's death in 1828, however, Dingane recentralized the Zulu kingdom's power north of the Tugela River, and many politically discontent Zulus fled south towards Port Natal.[13] In 1839, Dingane's half-brother, Mpande, fled across the Tugela to seek refuge among the Boers.[14] Mpande struck an

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[7] Wright, "Turbulent Times," 236.
[8] John Laband, *Rope of Sand: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1995), 13.
[9] Wright, "Turbulent Times," 23.
[10] John Wright, "Reflections on the Politics of Being "Zulu,'" in *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present,* eds. Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 35-43.
[11] Wright, "Reflections on the Politics of Being 'Zulu'" 36-38.
[12] Laband, *Rope of Sand,* 35.
[13] Ibid, 76.
[14] Ibid, 110.

alliance with the Boers, leading to the overthrow of Dingane and the proclamation of Mpande as king in February of 1840.[15]

The British established the Colony of Natal in 1843. Mpande and the British both recognized the Tugela River as the boundary between the Zulu kingdom and the new colony. The Tugela remained the externally recognized southern boundary of the Zulu kingdom for much of its existence. From the beginning of colonial rule in Natal, the British used chiefs (*amakhosi*) and headmen (*izinduna*) to maintain order. Theophilus Shepstone, Natal's first Secretary for Native Affairs, introduced indirect rule in the 1840s, several decades before the conquest of Zululand. The Natal government attempted, though never with total success, to define chiefly authority spatially instead of through the existing system of flexible, interpersonal relations between chiefs and followers.[16] Natal's system of codified customary law and native administration would eventually be expanded to Zululand after conquest.

In 1879, the British invaded and conquered the Zulu kingdom. They exiled Cetshwayo and ended the *amabutho* system, but they left Africans in control of most of their land. Governor Wolsely appointed thirteen independent chiefs to rule on behalf of the British. Meanwhile, settlers from Natal called for the annexation of Zululand to take advantage of its land and labor. The outbreak of the Zulu Civil War in 1884 led to the unmaking of the old Zulu order as the royal house lost its cattle, which decimated its

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[15] Ibid, 123.

[16] John Lambert. *Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press:1995); Jill E. Kelly, "'Only the Fourth Chief:' Conflict, Land, and Chiefly Authority in 20th Century KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Michigan State University, 2012); Percy Ngonyama, "Bounding Chiefly Authority in Colonial Natal," in *Ekhaya: The Politics of Home in KwaZulu-Natal*, eds. Meghan Healy-Clancy and Jason Hickel (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press:2014).

pastoral and agricultural political economy.[17] In 1887, Britain made Zululand its colony. In 1897, the Colony of Natal finally annexed Zululand.

The position of the heirs of the former Zulu monarchy continued to be a political problem after conquest. By the early twentieth century, Zulu identity gained wider traction outside of the former Zulu kingdom. In the 1906 Bambatha Rebellion, Dinuzulu became a symbol of anti-colonialism for Natal's African population, which had been subjected to land dispossession, the codification of customary law, wage labor, increased missionary influences, and the subjugation of chiefs to colonial rule. [18] The British accused Dinuzulu of starting the rebellion. They stripped the royal house of the Usuthu chieftaincy in Nongoma and exiled Dinuzulu.[19] During this time period, Africans in the Natal midlands outside of the former Zulu kingdom developed a new sense of Zulu ethnic consciousness as a result of labor migration to the Witwatersrand.[20] However, the full extent to which people across Natal came to identify as subjects of the royal house, and sought political leadership under a restored Zulu monarchy, remains uncertain.

In the 1920s, the royal house played a crucial role in the formation of an even broader Zulu identity. In 1916, the government recognized Dinuzulu's heir, Solomon kaDinuzulu, as the chief of the re-constituted "Usutu tribe."[21] Solomon attempted to re-empower the Zulu monarchy through the creation of an ethnic nationalist movement,

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[17] Jeff Guy, *The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 1879-1884* (London: Longman, 1979).
[18] Shula Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 148-164.
[19] Shula Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion;* Jeff Guy, *The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law and Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005).
[20] Michael Mahoney, *The Other Zulus: The Spread of Zulu Ethnicity in Colonial South Africa* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).
[21] Nicholas Cope, *To Bind the Nation: Solomon kaDinuzulu and Zulu Nationalism:1913-1933* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1993).

Inkatha, in alliance with a growing African Christian middle class in Natal. The movement sought the political recognition of the Zulu monarchy and broader political rights for Africans.[22] Zulu speaking Africans in Natal began express greater support for the royal house under Solomon. For example, royal tribute collectors were able, for the first time, to gather money from urban and migrant workers outside of Zululand.[23] This would add significant complexity to the government's attempt to draw territorial boundaries around Zulu identity under apartheid.

Ethnic Sovereignty, Global Politics, and the Making of Apartheid

Grand apartheid was the creation of a system of multi-layered sovereignty in South Africa organized around ethnic identity. This facilitated new territorialized forms of ethnic politics and new articulations of ethnic sovereignty. In each homeland, however, the apartheid government and African leaders had to negotiate the shape of the homeland, the organization of authority within it, and the division of sovereignty between the homeland government and the apartheid state. In the two decades leading up to the creation of the Zulu homeland, a diverse set of actors debated not only the relationship between the territory and political rule in the history of the Zulu kingdom, but also contemporary arrangements of authority, identity, land, and subjecthood.

Grand apartheid must be situated within its global context. In the third quarter of the twentieth century, sovereignty was fundamentally reworked across the globe. In the 1950s, European empires, often with the cooperation of African leaders, sought some

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[22] The government decided in 1930 not to recognize Solomon as a Paramount Chief due to his alcoholism. Cope, *To Bind the Nation;* Shula Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism, and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

[23] Cope, *To Bind the Nation,* 51.

alternative to decolonization into nation-states. After 1960, however, the idea that the nation-state was the only legitimate "sovereign" in Africa had major implications for the future of the homeland policy in South Africa.[24] By the 1970s, President Voster attempted to redefine apartheid according to the norms of the post-independence era Africa, justifying the bantustan system as a horizontally structured multinational confederation that protected "the inalienable right of each national group."[25] This reworking of sovereignty was structured explicitly around ethnicity.[26] Moreover, there was a discursive shift within apartheid policy: ethnic groups also became "national groups" that, by virtue of their status as "nations," needed their own autonomous or semi-autonomous political territories.[27]

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[24] Frederick Cooper, "Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective," *The Journal of African History* 49, no. 2 (January 1, 2008): 167–96.

[25] Quoted in Jamie Miller, "Africanizing Apartheid: Identity, Ideology, and State-Building in Post-Independence Africa," *The Journal of African History* 56, no. 3 (November 2015): 455.

[26] In considering the reworking of sovereignty into a multi-layered system within a Southern African confederation, I am particularly influenced by literature pointing to the flexible arrangements of sovereignty in world history from the peace of Westphalia to the present day. For historical literature on the subject, see Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010); Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010*);* Lisa Ford, *Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-1836* (Cambridge, Massachuesetts: Harvard University Press, 2010). For discussions in political science, see Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi- States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Thomas J Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robert H Jackson, *Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea* (Malden, Massachusetts: Polity, 2007); Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner, *Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Dieter Grimm, *Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept*, trans. Belinda Cooper (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

[27] There are interesting parallels in discussions of indigenous sovereignty in settler colonialism. See Loretta Fowler, *Tribal Sovereignty and the Historical Imagination: Cheyenne-Arapaho Politics* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2002); David Kamper, *The Work of Sovereignty: Tribal Labor Relations and Self-Determination at the Navajo Nation* (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2010); Christine K. Gray, *The Tribal Moment in American Politics: The Struggle for Native American Sovereignty* (Lanham, Maryland: AltaMira Press, 2013); N. Bruce Duthu, *Shadow Nations: Tribal Sovereignty and the Limits of Legal Pluralism*

Debates over sovereignty in apartheid South Africa were deeply intertwined with local politics. Sovereignty is forged through debates over authority, populations, and territory, and "is continually negotiated on the ground—over what a state does, to whom, and where."[28] State formation unfolded "messy, typically highly localized and contingent histories that everywhere constituted the colonial encounter,"[29] especially in critical moments when colonial and apartheid governments sought to identity coterminous boundaries between identity and territory.[30] The formation of the Zulu homeland—and the development of conceptions of Zulu ethnic sovereignty in mid to late twentieth century South Africa—took place not only in the halls of Pretoria, but also in the hills of Zululand. Multiple interlocking spheres of power shaped these arrangements of authority and territory.

The apartheid era saw the birth of an idea of modern Zulu ethnic sovereignty within a system of multilayered sovereignty, with component polities defined around ethnic boundaries. This history offers an opportunity to reconsider both ethnic politics in Africa and the creation of the apartheid political order. State-centered perspectives influenced South African scholarship on the politicization of Zulu ethnicity under Buthelezi and Inkatha.[31] Early Africanist scholarship treated ethnicity as either a pre-

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(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); David J. Carlson, *Imagining Sovereignty: Self-Determination in American Indian Law and Literature* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016).

[28] Douglas Howland and Luise White, eds., *The State of Sovereignty: Territories, Laws, Populations,* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 2.

[29] Clifton Crais, ed., *The Culture of Power in Southern Africa: Essays on State Formation and the Political Imagination* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Heinemann, 2003), 8.

[30] Clifton Crais, "Custom and the Politics of Sovereignty in South Africa," *Journal of Social History* 39, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 721–40; Mamdani, *Define and Rule.*

[31] Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987); Gerhard Maré and Workshop on Regionalism and Restructuring in Natal, eds., *Tradition and Control: The Presence of the Past in*

modern social organization that would decline with modernization, or alternatively, as a new response to capitalist exploitation.[32] From the 1970s, scholars began to portray ethnicity as an invention of the colonial state.[33] Following this tradition of state construction of ethnicity, Mahmood Mamdani argued that the bifurcated colonial state in Rwanda politicized and polarized racial categories of Hutu and Tutsi.[34] These analyses, however, often left unexplored the intense deliberation between African leaders and the state in the creation of official ethnic categories under colonialism and apartheid.

Constructivist models, focusing on ethnicity as a socially constructed form of community rather than a colonial category, gained wide salience from the 1990s.[35] Several Africanists have pointed to the relationship between resource allocation and identity, showing that ethnicity could be malleable as people used identity to access patron-client networks and guard against potential loss.[36] Influenced by the model

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Natal (Durban: University of Natal, Department of African Studies, 1988); Gerhard Maré, *Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa* (London; New Jersey: Zed Books, 1993).

[32] For a historiographic overview for ethnicity in Africa that goes back nearly 70 years, see John Lonsdale, "Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism," in *Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism: Papers from the Researcher Training Course Held at Sandbjerg Manor, 23 to 29 May 1993,* eds. Preben Kaarsholm and Jan Hultin, (Roskilde, Denmark: International Development Studies, Roskilde University, 1994), 132.

[33] John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 318-341; Terence Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition of Colonial Africa," *The Invention of Tradition,* eds. E.J. Hobsbawm, and T. O Ranger. (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 248-253.

[34] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001); see also Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject;* Mamdani, *Define and Rule.*

[35] These were influenced by a renewed focus on nationalism and ethnicity in world history, including Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[36] Bruce Berman, "Ethnicity, Bureaucracy & Democracy: The Politics of Trust," in *Ethnicity and Bureaucracy in Africa,* eds. Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka (Oxford: James Curry: 2004), 38-54; Gabrielle Lynch, *I Say to You Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011).

proposed in Vail's 1989 edited collection, South Africanists have largely considered ethnicity as a product of social and economic upheaval; ethnicity held popular appeal for ordinary people who sought "traditional values to hold onto in times of rapid economic and social change."[37] In moving away from the role of the state in the construction of ethnicity, however, this body of literature has largely neglected how ethnicity functioned in the state and formal politics.

Attempts to re-focus the historiography of ethnicity beyond the framework of constructivism have similarly neglected the realm of formal political institutions, and, thus, inadvertently obscured how the local and cultural work of ethnicity unfolded within the very real realms of power and politics. John Lonsdale and Derek Peterson explore ethnicity as a form of social control and cultural work explicitly divorced from formal politics. Lonsdale used the idea of "moral ethnicity" to describe the "common human instinct to create out of the daily habits of social intercourse and material labour a system of moral meaning and ethical reputation within a more or less imagined community."[38] He specifically separated out the concepts of ethnicity and "political tribalism," labeling the latter as a means of internal group cohesion and the latter as the use of ethnic identity in political competition with other groups.[39] While still focusing on ethnicity as a form of social control, Peterson argues against the "invention" paradigm, instead considering ethnicity as a "forum of argument, not an invented tradition to which people were obliged" to conform.[40] He suggests that "ethnic patriotism" was a form of cultural work

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[37] Leroy Vail, ed., *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 11.
[38] John Lonsdale, "Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism," 132.
[39] Ibid, 132-141.
[40] Derek R. Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival a History of Dissent, c.1935-1972* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 3.

meant to protect social morality: "The architects of eastern Africa's ethnic patriotisms were not involved in the anti-colonial struggle for political self-government. Neither were they engaged in efforts to build nations. They were driven by the urgent need to find institutions that could protect civic virtues and define honorable conduct."[41] For both Peterson and Lonsdale, ethnicity is a form of cultural work within a group. I suggest, however, that separating of ideas of ethnicity and political tribalism obscures the connections between internal and external notions of political identity. In the history of the Zulu homeland, ethnic boundaries morphed in conversation with state actors who sought to allocate resources and political power along easily identifiable ethnic lines.

Examining the creation of an apartheid homeland provides a lens to examine the politics of ethnicity in a context where sovereignty was explicitly reworked around ethnic identity. A growing literature has shown how Africans instrumentally seized upon state languages of tribalism and reformulated ethnic and political identities in contexts where, as Julie MacArthur pointed out in the case of colonial Kenya, "bounded tribes provided a certain capital within the colonial economy."[42] Luyia political thinkers in Kenya used maps to claim a distinct political identity within a political system built around government-recognized tribes.[43] In South Africa, Ndebele speakers constituted themselves as an ethnic group in order to gain access to resources from the state.[44]

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[41] Ibid, 16.
[42] Julie MacArthur, *Cartography and the Political Imagination: Mapping Community in Colonial Kenya* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2016), 12.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Deborah James, "A Question of Ethnicity: Ndzundza Ndebele in a Lebowa Village." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 16, no. 1 (1990): 33–54; Sekibakiba Peter Lekgoathi, "From Homeboy Networks to Broader Ethnic Affiliations: Migrants from Zebediela and Shifting Identities on the Rand, 1930s–1970s," *African Studies* 73, no. 3 (December 2014): 445-447.

My research, however, moves beyond instrumentalist considerations of resource access to explore the specific ways in which Zulu leaders drew on both the pre-colonial past and the reworking of sovereignty within the homeland system to make new claims to territory and subjects. At a moment when conceptions of sovereignty across the globe underwent profound shifts, the apartheid state sought to divide administrative power between the central state and the homelands and to define each homeland along ethnic boundaries. This meant defining a new form of regional Zulu ethnic sovereignty. Ethnicity becomes territorialized in dialogue between African leaders and the state. African actors in Zululand and the state contested the boundaries and political structures of this polity and the meaning of Zuluness. This process resulted in a seemingly contradictory homeland that stretched far beyond the historic limits of the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom, and yet drew its legitimacy from a carefully constructed historical narrative that KwaZulu was Shaka's empire reborn.

New Historiographies of the Homelands

Examining the implementation of the homeland system only from the perspectives of the "architects of apartheid" in the National Party obscures the deliberative, and at times messy, practices of "state formation" within homelands like KwaZulu. Newly discovered archival materials show in detail how white officials, royal family members, and prominent Zulu leaders negotiated the project of bantustan "state building" and attempted to define political boundaries around ethnic identity. This history of KwaZulu provides an unprecedented opportunity to reconsider the complex and at

times contradictory struggles shaping the apartheid political order and their implications for ethnic politics in South Africa's hinterland.

Earlier generations of scholars largely studied bantustans to prove their illegitimacy. For scholars and activists writing during apartheid, homelands became the dumping grounds for surplus labor and places of social, economic, and political marginalization.[45] They examined poverty in the homelands, proving their lack of economic or social viability as independent states.[46] The earliest scholarship written with significant access to apartheid archival material sought to understand the development of the apartheid state and apartheid policy as it unfolded in Pretoria.[47]

Understanding homeland politics requires delving into the complex politics of traditional leadership in South African history, moving beyond the portrayal of chiefs as "apartheid stooges" and considering their political negotiations with the apartheid state and between each other. The implementation of self-government surrounding the former Zulu kingdom ushered in a period in which traditional leaders, their subjects, and the apartheid state negotiated and reimagined Zulu ethnic sovereignty in the emergent homeland. Mamdani's model of "decentralized despotism" shaped much of the scholarship on chieftaincy and rural politics under apartheid.[48] Such perspectives obscure

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[45] Anne Kelk Mager, *Gender and the Making of a South African Bantustan: A Social History of the Ciskei, 1945-1959* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Heinemann, 1999).
[46] C. J De Wet, *Moving Together, Drifting Apart: Betterment Planning and Villagisation in a South African Homeland* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995); also discussed in Jeffrey Butler, Robert I Rotberg, and John Adams, *The Black Homelands of South Africa: The Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977);
[47] Deborah Posel, *The Making of Apartheid, 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Ivan Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race Native Administration in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
[48] Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*; Fred Hendricks and Lungisile Ntsebeza, "Chiefs And Rural Local Government In Post-Apartheid South Africa," *Afrijpoliscie African Journal of Political Science / Revue Africaine de Science Politique* 4, no. 1 (1999): 99–126; Lungisile Ntsebeza,

how, even under apartheid, people still worked out rural political arrangements in contentious local processes. In the heart of the former Pedi Kingdom, for example, common people and chiefs debated the position of the chieftaincy within the Bantu Authorities system, emphasizing the idea that "kgosi ke kgosi ka batho," or a "chief is a chief by the people."[49] Throughout the colonial and apartheid periods, chiefly authority rested not only on government appointment, but also on participatory politics, hereditary descent, land allocation, and the ability to offer physical protection.[50] The homelands themselves often became new epicenters of nation-building and ethnic nationalism, especially as people sought to access state resources.[51]

Examining the formation of KwaZulu complicates narratives of authoritarianism under apartheid, and, in doing so, takes up Beinart's call for a nuanced understanding of

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Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of the Land in South Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Fred T. Hendricks, Lungisile Ntsebeza, and Kirk Helliker, *The Promise of Land: Undoing a Century of Dispossession in South Africa* (Auckland Park, South Africa: Jacana Media, 2013).

[49] Peter Delius, *A Lion amongst Cattle: Reconstruction and Resistance in the Northern Transvaal* (Oxford: James Currey, 1997), 109. Delius's research was based primarily on 180 oral histories in Sekhukhuneland. He only gained access to relevant materials the Central Archives near the end of his research during the democratic transition, and he was unable to benefit from archival materials from the Lebowa government. As a result, his research does not explore the intricacies of the Lebowa state. This task has recently been taken up by Laura Phillips. See Laura Phillips, "Boxes in the Bantustan Basement: The Trajectories and Possibilities of the Lebowa Archive – Opinions – Archival Platform," *The Archival Platform*, Otober 25th, 2013, http://www.archivalplatform.org/blog/entry/boxes_in_the_bantustan/.

[50] Heather Ann Hughes, *Politics and society in Inanda, Natal: the Qadi under Chief Mghawe, c1840-1896.* (University of London, 1996); Williams, *Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy*; Kelly, "Only the Fourth Chief," 29; Jill E. Kelly, "Bantu Authorities and Betterment in Natal: The Ambiguous Responses of Chiefs and Regents, 1955-1970," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 41, no. 2 (2015): 273–97; Ngonyama, "Bounding Chiefly Authority."

[51] James, "A Question of Ethnicity"; Peris Sean Jones, "From `nationhood' to Regionalism to the North West Province: `Bophuthatswananess' and the Birth the "New" South Africa," *African Affairs* 98, no. 393 (October 1999): 509; Peris Sean Jones, "`To Come Together for Progress': Modernization and Nation-Building in South Africa's Bantustan periphery- The Case of Bophuthwatswana," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 25, no. 4 (December 1999): 579; Isak Niehaus, "Ethnicity and the Boundaries of Belonging: Reconfiguring Shangaan Identity in the South African Lowveld," *African Affairs* 101, no. 405 (October 2002): 557; Shireen Ally, "'If You Are Hungry, and a Man Promises You Mealies, Will You Not Follow Him?' South African Swazi Ethnic Nationalism, 1931–1986," *South African Historical Journal* 63, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 414–30; Lekgoathi, "From Homeboy Networks."

apartheid rural governance "through analytical lenses that are not necessarily dominated by a critique of 'homeland' policy."[52] Apartheid was utterly contradictory. Certain apartheid officials, including government ethnologists, seemed to believe that they were creating new states and were responsible for doing it "right." They competed with a faction of the government that sought to create the homelands as quickly and cheaply as possible, regardless of the implications for their economic, political, or social viability, in order to maintain white supremacy. Likewise, while homeland leaders quite often ruled through violence and oppression, they also implemented significant advancements in rural education and healthcare.[53] The Bantu Education system was meant to limit African opportunities beyond unskilled labor, but it also facilitated a mass expansion of primary education and created spaces for black teachers to make art.[54] By the 1970s, when Wolpe wrote his famous thesis,[55] state expenditure on the homelands likely exceeded their role in subsidizing cheap labor in South Africa.[56]

The apartheid era is full of these contradictory histories. Authoritarianism and art. Disenfranchment and rural development. Police shootings and primary healthcare. And,

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[52] Beinart notes that a significant portion of homeland budgets went to education, public works, development, and agriculture. William Beinart, "Beyond 'Homelands': Some Ideas about the History of African Rural Areas in South Africa," *South African Historical Journal* 64, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 5.

[53] Elizabeth Hull, "The Renewal of Community Health under the KwaZulu 'Homeland' Government," *South African Historical Journal* 64, no. 1 (2012): 40; Linda Chisholm, "Bantustan Education History: The 'Progressivism' of Bophutatswana's Primary Education Upgrade Programme (PEUP), 1979–1988," *South African Historical Journal* 65, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 403–20; Laura Phillips, "Principals, Chiefs and School Committees: The Localisation of Rural School Administration in Lebowa, 1972-1990," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 41, no. 2 (2015): 299–314;

[54] Daniel Magaziner, "Two Stories about Art, Education, and Beauty in Twentieth-Century South Africa," *The American Historical Review* 118, no. 5 (2013): 1403–29; Timothy Gibbs, *Mandela's Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites & Apartheid's First Bantustan* (Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, 2014).

[55] Harold Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid," *Economy and Society* 1, no. 4 (November 1, 1972).

[56] Beinart, "Beyond 'Homelands," 14.

in this particular story, white supremacy and the seemingly sincere belief that ethnologically authentic "countries" could be formed around different ethnic groups in South Africa with enough care and investment. Writing these contradictory histories is necessary in developing a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of apartheid.

These homelands were experiments in creating new semi-independent territories within a South African confederation. This necessitates studying the unexplored processes of state formation in the homelands. Apartheid officials attempted to create territories loosely justified on a historical and ethnic basis. Historians have largely taken at face value the categories created by the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, leaving unexamined the intense struggles that occurred in the debates about the homelands' boundaries and the structures of authority.

The politics shaping the creation of the KwaZulu homeland, and a form of rural Zulu ethnic sovereignty in South Africa's hinterland, is conspicuously absent from the vast historiography on Zulu history during apartheid. The anti-apartheid movement and mass violence in the 1980s and the 1990s shaped scholarship on the homelands, especially KwaZulu. Scholars focused on ethnic nationalism and neo-traditionalism,[57] violence,[58] and collaboration with the apartheid state and capitalist interests.[59] Historians

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[57] Maré and Workshop on Regionalism and Restructuring in Natal, eds., *Tradition and Control*; Maré, *Ethnicity and Politics*; Sandra Klopper, "'He Is My King, but He Is Also My Child': Inkatha, the African National Congress and the Struggle for Control over Zulu Cultural Symbols.," *The Oxford Art Journal.*, 1996, 53–66.; Scott Everett Couper, "Chief Albert Luthuli and the Bantustan Question," *Journal of Natal and Zulu History Journal of Natal and Zulu History* 24/25 (2007): 240–68; Paul Forsyth, "Manipulating the Past: The Political Use of History by Chief A.N.M.G. Buthelezi," 1992; Patrick Harries, "Imagery, Symbolism and Tradition in a South African Bantustan: Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Inkatha, And Zulu History," *History & Theory* 32, no. 4 (December 1993): 105; for more on Buthelezi's use of Shaka, see Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty*.

[58] Catherine Campbell. "Learning to Kill? Masculinity, the Family and Violence in Natal." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (September 1992).614.

know much about Zulu nationalism and Buthelezi's controversial role as KwaZulu's leader from the mid-1970s,[60] but the boundaries of the homeland and its political structures have largely been taken for granted. Since archival materials from provincial and central archives were still classified, scholars writing in the 1980s and 1990s relied in large part on newspaper sources, Buthelezi's speeches, and the public proceedings of Inkatha and the Zulu Territorial Authority/KwaZulu. In contrast, newly discovered archival materials show that the intersection of regional and national politics in the 1960s, before the establishment of the homeland, laid the foundation for the political arrangements that emerged in apartheid KwaZulu during the following decades. These negotiations over the future homeland, moreover, allowed for the emergence of the form of authoritarian ethnic-nationalism surrounding Buthelezi during the 1970s.

Homeland state-building also unfolded in the moment of decolonization, and yet we know very little about how decolonization shaped the actions and desires of homeland leaders. Historians how shown that Vorster sought to legitimize apartheid as a post-colonial form of government that would protect "self-determination" for each of South Africa's ethnic groups.[61] Both the apartheid state and the homeland governments inscribed notions of state and nationhood through everyday objects like postage stamps.[62]

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[59] Roger Southall, "Buthelezi, Inkatha and the Politics of Compromise," *African Affairs* 80, no. 321 (1981): 453–81; Colleen MacCaul, *Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe* (Johannesburg: SARS/DSG, 1983); Maré and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*; Mzala*, Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda* (London: Zed Books, 1988);

[60] MacCaul, *Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe*; Maré and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*; Gerhard Maré and Workshop on Regionalism and Restructuring in Natal, eds., *Tradition and Control: The Presence of the Past in Natal* (Durban: University of Natal, Department of African Studies, 1988); Forsyth, "Manipulating the Past"; Maré, *Ethnicity and Politics.*

[61] Miller, "Africanising Apartheid"; Miller, *An African Volk: The Apartheid Regime and Its Search for Survival* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[62] Daniel Hammett, "Expressing "nationhood" under Conditions of Constrained Sovereignty: Postage Stamp Iconography of the Bantustans," *Environment and Planning* 46, no. 4 (2014): 901–19.

Certain homelands sought to engage in foreign relations, even in the absence of international recognition.[63] Laura Evans has argued for a new focus on the concept of a homeland "gatekeeper" state and resource distribution within the homelands as a way to understand Bantustan politics.[64] Actors in the homelands, however, also both actively observed and drew on events from other decolonizing states as they forged new political orders—and made new claims to ethnic sovereignty—in South Africa's hinterland. Rather than considering South Africa as an exceptional case and eschewing comparative analyses, examining how these global processes shaped the actions of African intermediaries provides an opportunity to reintegrate the apartheid era into the broader history of African decolonization.

Studying the processes of homeland "state-building" is crucial to understanding both apartheid history and contemporary power in rural South Africa. An important challenge is to study the roles of individuals and groups, rather than only national policy writ-large, in the implementation of separate development.[65] This requires moving beyond policy as formulated and directed from Pretoria, emphasizing that arrangements of territory and power in the Zulu homeland were shaped by struggles taking place in government offices in Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg, and Nongoma, in the kraals of prominent Zulu leaders and royal family members in Zululand, and across the reserve land of Natal.

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[63] Arianna Lissoni, "Africa's 'Little Israel': Bophuthatswana's Not-so-Secret Ties with Israel," *South African Review of Sociology* 42, no. 3 (December 2011): 79–93l. For more on the politics of foreign relations for unrecognized territories that claim statehood, see Luise White, **"**What Does it take to be a State? Sovereignty and Sanctions in Rhodesia, 1965-1980," in Howland and White, eds., 40.

[64] Laura Evans, "South Africa's Bantustans and the Dynamics of 'Decolonisation': Reflections on Writing Histories of the Homelands," *South African Historical Journal* 64, no. 1 (2012): 117–37.

[65] Robert McIntosh, "State Policies in Rural South Africa C. 1948 to C. 1960: Bantu Authorities, Policy Formation and Local Responses." (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1999).

Writing Histories of the Homelands

Apartheid cannot be understood without detailed knowledge of what happened on the ground in the homelands. A central argument of this study is that local and regional actors far from Pretoria shaped the formation of the Zulu homeland. In order to understand this, my research relied in large part on fieldwork and archival research in the former KwaZulu. There, I accessed unique collections that offer an unparalleled window into issues of sovereignty and ethnicity that continue to shape South Africa today.

This research is a product of a combined sixteen months of fieldwork across Pretoria, Johannesburg, Ulundi, Durban, Pietermaritzburg, and the Zululand District Municipality. Government records spanned three different archives due to both 1) divisions between African, provincial, and national administration under apartheid and 2) the reorganization of archival administration in the post-apartheid era. I also consulted special collections at several universities, including the University of South Africa (UNISA), the University of KwaZulu-Natal in both Pietermaritzburg and Durban, and the University of the Witwatersrand. Combining research from several archives along with oral histories allowed me to triangulate my sources to understand how different actors debated the future of the Zulu homeland.

At the Central Archives in Pretoria, I used the records from the Department of Native Affairs (NTS), and its successor, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAO) to understand the interface between African leaders in Nongoma and district, provincial, and national apartheid officials during debates about betterment planning and Bantu Authorities in the 1950s. The BAO series also contained records on

the lead up to the creation of the Zulu Territorial Authority in 1970. The archival materials from the mid-1970s onward thinned out significantly, and it is unclear if the records remain uncatalogued or if they are simply lost.

At the Ulundi Archives Repository, I accessed several collections crucial to understanding the implementation of apartheid policy from the vantage point of the KwaZulu homeland itself. The Ulundi Archives Repository has historically been neglected by many scholars. Beyond the challenge of its location in a small town a significant distance away from major urban centers and universities, its materials are not included in South Africa's online catalogue, the National Automated Archival Information Retrieval System (NAAIRS), and there was no real finding guide available until 2015.[66] When I first arrived in Ulundi in 2014, I worked with the archival staff and cast a wide net based on their knowledge of the holdings. However, I quickly realized that a significant amount of material was filed under the wrong series. For example, the records of the Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Nongoma were split between three different series. Despite these challenges, the archive contained untouched materials that allow for a significant reinterpretation of the creation of KwaZulu.

Records from the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) and the Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner series formed an important part of my research. The Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner series contained records from the Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Nongoma from the 1950s up through the early 1970s, providing insight into the establishment of Bantu Authorities in Nongoma and the later politics surrounding the role of the Zulu monarch in the creation

[66] Part of the archive had been catalogued in a finding guide when I arrived back in August 2015, but I found that it contained several errors.

of the Zulu Territorial Authority. Furthermore, in 2013, the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Authorities (COGTA) transferred nearly 40 years of materials from the Zulu National Unit to the Ulundi Archives. During my 2014 visit, the archivist informed me that I was the first researcher to view these materials.

This research is the first to cite records of the Commissioner-General, the main official in the Zulu National Unit responsible for the creation of the territorial authority. I discovered the Commissioner-General files scattered in several places, including the COGTA series, a collection titled "Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs," and the records of the Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner. While many scholars have depended on newspapers and other publically available materials in their work on the early Zulu Territorial Authority, these records allowed me to examine the establishment of the homeland government for the first time with government archival materials concerning developments taking place in the Zulu homeland at the time.[67]

The Buthelezi Museum Document Centre in Ulundi, which opened in 2015, was also an unexpected resource. Buthelezi opened the archive to house his personal papers. The Document Centre holds a significant amount of the archival records for the former KwaZulu government, which were likely taken into Buthelezi's personal possession rather than transferred to government archives during the incorporation of KwaZulu-Natal at the end of apartheid. While I primarily used records from the 1970s, in the future, the archive has the potential to be a valuable resource for historians working on the functioning and bureaucracy of the KwaZulu government through 1994.

Beyond government archives in Ulundi and Pretoria, this dissertation drew on several other collections. The Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository, while its materials

[67] Most of these files were stamped "*Streng Vertroulik*," meaning strictly confidential or secret.

after 1950 are much thinner, holds records from the Chief Native Commissioner during the years preceding Cyprian Bhekuzulu's reign. I examined the speeches of Buthelezi and other Inkatha and KwaZulu-related records at the Document Centre for African UNISA in Pretoria and the Historical Papers research archive at the University of the Witwatersrand. The Alan Paton Centre at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Pietermaritzburg contained valuable information on betterment planning.

Oral histories in Ulundi and Nongoma proved crucial to understanding how these struggles over the relationship between authority and territory played out in Zululand. During the course of my research, I completed 51 group and individual interviews, totaling over 80 informants, in Nongoma and Ulundi.[68] I began interviewing elderly people in the urban and peri-urban areas around Ulundi and Nongoma. These interviews focused on critical events that I had identified in archival research, the role of the *ingonyama,* the functioning of the KwaZulu government, and the position of Gatsha Buthelezi. The most fruitful information concerned on events from the 1970s onward.

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[68] Upon arriving, I employed Mbali Thusini as a research assistant both to help schedule interviews and to conduct English-Zulu interpretation as needed. During Zulu-medium interviews, I chose to have Ms. Thusini utilize a consecutive interpretation method, meaning that the speaker stopped every minute or few minutes, and then Ms. Thusini stepped in to interpret into the target language. While I am conversational in basic Zulu, this interpretation method both ensured that 1) the conversation took place primarily as a dialogue between myself and the interviewee, and 2) both myself and the interviewee were confident that we did not misunderstand each other due to language barriers. We were conducting interviews at a very tense time in a region fraught with a history of political violence. Ulundi remains one of the last strongholds of the Inkatha Freedom Party, which has lost the majority of its base since the 1994 elections. I arrived in Ulundi in the run-up to local elections. There were heavy tensions in the area between the ANC, the National Freedom Party, and the IFP. There has been a steady increase in political assassinations in KwaZulu-Natal since 2009. Many people were hesitant to be interviewed until we reassured them that their names could remain anonymous and none of the questions were primarily interested in contemporary political parties or the upcoming elections. Even after that, some people declined to be interviewed at that time and suggested I come back after the dust had settled from the elections. Out of respect for the tense political situation in Zululand and out of concern for the safety and peace of mind of my informants, several names are kept anonymous in my dissertation.

From my initial informants, I used further snowball sampling to make new contacts. An interview with Buthelezi's Acting Chief, Mr. Mtshali, led me to Prince Herbert Zulu and several other chiefs in Zululand. Prince Herbert Zulu, who was a grandson of Dinuzulu and a cousin of both the current King and Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, had a sharp memory of the history surrounding the royal family back through the time of Cyprian Bhekuzulu. Other chiefs and indunas in Zululand provided rich and at times conflicting commentaries on the positions of the *ingonyama* and Buthelezi, thus confirming the complex political tensions surrounding the control of historical narratives in the Zulu kingdom.

I initially was unsuccessful in my attempts to make contacts in rural areas in the Ingonyama Trust. Most people were not willing to speak to me until I had met with the local *izinduna* and chiefs at the tribal courts. Later, one informant claimed that "we cannot accept anyone if they have not been to the court, we would get arrested or the *induna* would get arrested for allowing people to go and talk to us without the knowledge of the court."[69] While such an arrest would not be legal under post-apartheid South African law, I visited the Ndebele, Zungu, Mpongose, and Buthelezi tribal courts to explain my project and secure approval before I commenced interviewing both indunas and residents within their areas.

In my analysis of oral histories, I treated individual stories of informants as part of constantly transforming perceptions of political institutions and leaders. My approach draws from cultural historians who argue that stories remembered over time can reveal

[69] Group interview 1, 4 anonymous males, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 11, 2016, Ceza, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

more generalizable viewpoints of actors at specific points in history.[70] I also recognize the complexity of historical memory. Shifts in larger societal perceptions over time influence how people remember and tell stories.[71] Memory transferred in an oral history can therefore be seen as a communal, rather than individual, product. I cross-referenced individual oral histories against other interview transcripts and archival materials.[72] I also understand gaps and contradictions in oral sources to reveal fissures in dominant ideology.[73] This triangulation of oral and archival data helped me to both establish the historical narrative of my dissertation and better understand the interplay between history, politics, and ideology surrounding the history of the Zulu homeland.

Chapter Outline

The first two chapters examine how early attempts to implement certain apartheid policies in the 1950s led to new debates between the government and local leaders about the division of power and sovereignty between the apartheid state and Zulu chiefs. Chapter one shows that from 1951, apartheid officials sought to implement soil rehabilitation programs in Nongoma, the home district of Zulu Paramount Chief

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[70] Luise White, *Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Luise White, Stephan Miescher, and David William Cohen, eds., *African Words, African Voices: Critical Practices in Oral History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).

[71] Gary Kynoch, *We Are Fighting the World: A History of the Marashea Gangs in South Africa, 1947-1999* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2005).

[72] Chronology and terminology were sometimes a challenge in interviews. For example, sometimes people would not recognize terms such as betterment planning, but would then go into great detail about how once, perhaps in childhood or at some vague date, the government informed them they had to move their homestead and only graze their cattle in designated locations. I was able to triangulate this type of information with archival data to better interpret the stories people told.

[73] Carolyn Hamilton, "Ideology and Oral Tradition: Listening to the Voices from Below." *History in Africa.*, no. 14 (1987): 67–86.

Bhekuzulu. These programs brought to the surface fundamental questions about political authority in South Africa's hinterland during the first years of apartheid, leading to a backlash from the royal family that temporarily halted the programs. Chapter two explores debates over the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act in the Usuthu area, where Cyprian Bhekuzulu was chief. While the government envisioned the Bantu Authorities Act as a program that would be implemented first in each chieftaincy, Zulu leaders in Nongoma presented a vision of *Zibuse*—self-rule—implemented at the level of the "Zulu nation." By 1957, however, Bhekuzulu backtracked and agreed to the initial creation of the Usuthu Tribal Authority based on the idea that he would eventually hold authority within the future Zulu Territorial Authority. Both Bantu Authorities and various soil conservation efforts—including betterment planning—brought up debates about the role of the Paramount Chief, his authority, and the proper relations between the government and Zulu leadership. Bhekuzulu ultimately accepted both government policies to strengthen the position of the monarchy and its claim as the proper representative of the Zulu speaking people across Natal under apartheid.

Chapters three and four examine the breakdown of the idea that the Zulu Territorial Authority could simply be built out of the ashes of the former Zulu kingdom, which led to new debates about the relationship between ethnic boundaries, political authority, and territory. Chapter three shows that while the government of the 1950s assumed Bhekuzulu would take a central place in the Zulu territorial authority, in 1962 and 1963, debates about the historical and ethnological basis for a Zulu polity surrounding the Zulu royal family and the failure of Natal's chiefs to follow Bhekuzulu in accepting the Bantu Authorities Act challenged this vision. These debates signaled a

major crisis in conceptions of ethnic sovereignty in South Africa's hinterland as the government sought to market apartheid internationally as a form of "internal decolonization." Chapter four shows that in the late 1960s, three main groups of actors—apartheid officials, core members of the Zulu royal house, and Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his supporters—deployed competing ideas of history and ethnic sovereignty as they debated the future of the Zulu homeland. Ultimately, the Zulu Territorial Authority emerged with a marginalized monarchy and Mangosuthu Buthelezi as an elected Chief Executive Officer. Moreover, it stretched over significant territory and populations that were never part of the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom. The context of decolonization—including the independence of the British High Commissioner Territories—both shaped the actions of the apartheid state and presented opportunities for African leaders in the homeland to assert new political claims.

The final two chapters examine the politics of Zulu ethnic sovereignty from the creation of the ZTA to the democratic transition. Chapter five looks at the consolidation of Zulu ethnic nationalism and the emergence of an authoritarian political order in the Zulu Territorial Authority (later renamed KwaZulu). Buthelezi gained control of the symbolism of the monarchy, constructed a new form of Zulu ethnic nationalism, and neutralized political opposition through accusations of treason and apartheid state collaboration. From this position of power, Buthelezi successfully refashioned the apolitical position of the king as a "traditional" Zulu practice rather than an apartheid invention. In doing so, he redefined the legitimate exercise of authority within a political system shaped by claims of Zulu ethnic sovereignty. Chapter six examines the politics of Zulu ethnicity through the democratic transition. Reinventions of the history of the Zulu

kingdom during apartheid became central to Buthelezi's hold on power during the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, aspects of apartheid arrangements of ethnic sovereignty were preserved in post-apartheid political structures. Finally, the epilogue examines the afterlife of Buthelezi's particular ideology of Zulu ethnic sovereignty in KwaZulu among ordinary people after the transition.

Chapter 1: Rural Development, Royal History, and the Struggle for Authority in Early Apartheid Zululand, 1951 to 1954

In the early 1950s, Zulu royal family members and their allies in Nongoma pressured the Department of Native Affairs (DNA) to delay or abandon unpopular soil rehabilitation programs. The government had linked Zulu Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu's authority to his cooperation with government policy, believing that if he, as a descendant of the pre-colonial Zulu kings, accepted these transformations, other chiefs would follow suit. These controversial measures included stock limitations, the division of reserve land into arable, residential, and grazing zones, and a small number forced relocations. The DNA saw these initiatives as a necessary step in creating economically and politically self-sufficient rural areas. However, a faction led by Isaac Zulu, a grandson of King Cetshwayo, the last independent Zulu king before British conquest, countered with a curious and unexpected argument. Citing nineteenth century treaties with the British, the 1936 Native Lands and Trust Act, and the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act, Isaac Zulu and others argued that these programs violated the rights of the Zulu monarchy to administer land in the Usuthu area in Nongoma. The DNA, therefore, could not force development policies on their district without violating both past agreements between the Zulu monarchy and successive white governments and the very principles of responsible self-government that apartheid officials espoused.

For elder royal family members such as Isaac Zulu, conquest and the colonial era were not distant times consigned to history books. The apartheid government passed the Bantu Authorities Act only seventy-two years after the conquest of the Zulu kingdom, well within the living memory of elder residents of Zululand and royal family members. Conquest, land dispossession, the creation of native reserves in Zululand, and the imposition of the Natal Native Code and other colonial laws shaped Zulu leaders' views of the proper administration of land in the reserves. When Zululand became first a British colony and then part of the colony of Natal, the government redefined chiefly authority on a territorial basis.[1] The right to allocate land in the locations remained with chiefs, giving them a sort of limited sovereignty over that territory. Soil rehabilitation in Nongoma challenged the rights of chiefs to control land use in the reserves. However, this paradoxically occurred at the same time that the government sought to strengthen the power of chiefs and to promote African self-government through the Bantu Authorities Act.

Soil conservation programs in Nongoma from 1951 to 1954 emerged as a critical site within which African leaders debated the new political order with the state, asserting their claims to continued sovereignty over reserve land based on agreements and laws from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries along with new apartheid legislation. African leaders and apartheid officials utilized competing ideas about the boundaries of authority between Zulu people and the apartheid state to advance their positions. DNA officials saw rural development, primarily through soil rehabilitation, as a prerequisite for the

[1] For an account of similar processes that occurred earlier in Natal, see Percy Ngonyama, "Bounding Chiefly Authority in Colonial Natal," in *Ekhaya: The Politics of Home in KwaZulu-Natal*, eds. Meghan Healy-Clancy and Jason Hickel (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2014).

creation of self-sufficient African spheres of life in the reserves. African leaders surrounding Cyprian Bhekuzulu called upon both the colonial past and the apartheid present to protest what they saw as violations of their land and authority and to articulate a vague vision of sovereignty for the Zulu kingdom nearly a century after conquest. They argued that government attempts to regulate land use violated treaties and promises from the era of Queen Victoria that protected Nongoma's land for the future use by descendants of the royal family. Moreover, they seized the language of the Bantu Authorities Act to proclaim the autonomy of their chiefs over land in the reserves, thus rejecting the idea that the government had the right to implement development schemes without their consent.

These struggles over rural development in Nongoma show how people used law and history to contest power arrangements under apartheid. Practices of strategically invoking the responsibilities and past promises of colonizing powers have been well documented in legal history.[2] Across colonial New Spain, for example, indigenous peoples utilized colonial courts to protect access to land.[3] Indigenous litigants strategically appropriated the language of the colonizer, portraying themselves selectively as "good servants of the king" or "*idios miserable"* (vulnerable members of society deserving protection) to assert their claims.[4] In the latter half of the twentieth century,

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[2] Lauren Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Brian Philip Owensby, *Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Ethelia Ruiz Medrano, *Mexico's indigenous communities their lands and histories, 1500-2010* (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2010); Saliha Belmessous, ed., *Native Claims: Indigenous Law against Empire, 1500-1920* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[3] Yanna Yannakakis, "Witnesses, Spatial Practices, and a Land Dispute in Colonial Oaxaca," *Americas* 65, no. 2 (2008): 161–92.

[4] Jovita Baber*, "*Law, Land, and Legal Rhetoric in Colonial New Spain: A Look at the Changing Rhetoic of Indigneous Americans in the 16th Century" in Belmessous, ed.

indigenous peoples across the Commonwealth used their understandings of history, colonial law, and treaties to claim land and citizenship rights in independent settler states.[5]

The colonial and segregationist-era history of Zululand, including its relatively late conquest and legal history surrounding land tenure, shaped an articulation of rural resistance rooted in the claim that chiefs and the Zulu royal family, rather than government officials, had the right to control land. Zululand locations had been delineated decades before and placed under government-recognized chiefs, who had the right to allocate the land. Furthermore, the specific timing of these programs in Nongoma—immediately after the passage of the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act—meant that the government sought to control land use in chiefs' locations at the very moment they sought to strengthen chieftaincies.

Soil conservation in Nongoma was never simply a matter of material dispossession. Instead, it became a site where various actors contested the division of power between the central government and chiefs under the new apartheid political order. The events chronicled in this chapter preceded the creation of the Zulu Territorial Authority in 1970 by over fifteen years, but it is in these localized interactions surrounding soil conservation that the government and African leaders in Nongoma first began debating the relationship between the apartheid state and Zulu leadership in the reserves. These debates would continue in various iterations for decades, having major implications for the creation of the Zulu homeland.

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[5] Miranda Johnson, *The Land Is Our History: Indigeneity, Law, and the Settler State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2016).

Territory and Authority in Nongoma

In Nongoma, the apartheid state attempted to implement soil rehabilitation on rural land with a particularly rich history of chiefly control. While the Cape Colony government marginalized chiefs at the expense of magistrates and headmen in the nineteenth century,[6] in Zululand, the British delineated native locations under chiefs from the early years of colonial rule. Moreover, the British initially left Africans in possession of most of their land after conquest, albeit under 13 government-recognized chiefs.[7] Zululand became a British colony in 1887, but it remained closed to white settlement for over fifteen years. At the end of the Zulu civil wars in 1888, the British exiled Dinuzulu to St. Helena.[8] In 1891, the British government in Zululand created a commission to define tribal boundaries between the Usuthu and Mandlakazi in the Ndwandwe district, which would later be renamed Nongoma. The location boundaries for the district thus were drawn years before Zululand was opened to white settlement.[9]

When Zululand became part of the colony of Natal in 1897, the British proclaimed that no land would immediately be alienated from Africans or the crown.[10] In 1898, Dinuzulu had been allowed to return to Nongoma, where he was recognized as chief over the Usuthu locations.[11] Four years later in 1902, the Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission was set up to "provide sufficient reserves" for all 82 tribes that the government recognized in Zululand. These were to be "in-aliable without the consent

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[6] Clifton Crais, *The Politics of Evil: Magic, State Power, and Political Imagination in South Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002),18-27.
[7] Jeff Guy, *The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 1879-1884* (London: Longman, 1979), 59.
[8] Laband, *Rope of Sand*, 425-426.
[9] Laband, *Rope of Sand*, 428-431.
[10] PAR CSO 2709, Proclamation No. 37 of 1897 "To provide for the Annexation to the Colony of Natal of the Territory of Zululand."
[11] Laband, *Rope of Sand*, 434-436.

of the Secretary of State for the Colonies."[12] Ultimately, however, forty percent of Zululand was opened to white settlement. In Ndwandwe, the Commission chose to maintain the locations drawn in 1891 and prohibited white settlement with the exception of a small township surrounding the magistracy seat.[13]

Colonial land arrangements in Nongoma limited African access land outside of the reserves. Nongoma's territory was clearly defined as native locations.[14] After Natal was granted self-government in 1883, white settlers enacted legislation to curb African land access, effectively ending African acquisition of freehold land by 1910.[15] Thus, while in the early history of Natal many Africans bought or rented land in freehold, this fell out of practice for the most part before the creation of the reserves and white settlement in Zululand. Africans were outright prohibited from purchasing land in Zululand outside of the reserves.[16] In Natal, over half of Africans lived as tenants on white-owned land. This was not a significant practice around Nongoma, however, where

[12] PAR SNA 1/9/7, "Brief Sketch of the Zulu History During the Last Century and a Half," Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission, 1902-1904.
[13] PAR CSO 2844, "Fourth Interim Report of the Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission," September 12, 1903.
[14] In contract, in the Molopo Reserve in British Bechuanaland on northern frontier, although territories were officially reserves, they effectively became crown land after exemption from the 1884 Native Location Act in the Cape Colony. At one point, the government was not even sure if the Mopolo reserve was location or crown land. This was in stark contrast to the historical development of the legal delimitation of Zululand's reserves. Barolong chiefs enjoyed unusual autonomy, and their activities as landlords for both white and black residents blended lines of communal and private tenure. See Khumisho Moguerane, "Black Landlords, Their Tenants, and the Natives Land Act of 1913," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 42, no. 2 (2016): 243–66.
[15] Cross and Haines, "An Historical Over view of Land Policy and Tenure in South Africa's Black Areas", in *Towards Freehold,* ed. Cross and Haines, 75-76.
[16] Aran Stuart MacKinnon, "The Impact of European Land Delimitations and Expropriations on Zululand, 1880-1920" (M.A. Thesis, University of Natal, 1990), 150.

nearly all land was defined as locations.[17] There were simply fewer avenues to access land than in areas where several systems of land tenure were interspersed.[18]

The 1891 Natal Native Code, which was eventually extended to Zululand, provided a basic legal framework for land tenure in the locations. The locations were to be "held in common by the respective tribes for the exclusive benefit and use of the members of the tribes lawfully residing there."[19] Headmen were responsible for preventing new settlements without the permission of the chief.[20] A chief held the right to "direct and grant kraal sites to the people of his tribe, and when necessary afford agricultural lots and irrigation rights."[21] Occupancy of kraal sites was vested in the kraalhead, "subject to his good behavior or that of his family, to actual occupancy, or to the mandate of the administration of Native Law, acting as deputy of the Supreme Chief."[22] The Code protected commonage grazing for all residents of the location.[23]

These principles were further articulated in the "Regulations for the Administration of Native Locations and Reserves in the Natal Province," promulgated originally in 1931 and further amended in 1939. The regulations stated: "A chief or

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[17] Most of the land opened to white settlement in Zululand in the early twentieth century was in productive agricultural areas, such as the coastal belt and flatter open land in southern Natal. In such areas, tenancy was much more common. See MacKinnon 146-166.

[18] In the northern Transvaal, there was a greater mix of locations, land bought by Africans, and white owned farms. Furthermore, in the Ciskei, people often accessed land through four main avenues: locations, quitrent, freehold, and the SANT. See Michelle Dominique Hay, "South Africa's Land Reform in Historical Perspective: Land Settlement and Agriculture in Mopani District, Limpopo, 19th Century to 2015" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2015); Michael Mncedisi Cokwana, "A Closer Look at Tenure in the Ciskei', in *Towards Freehold,* ed. Cross and Haines, 305-214.

[19] PAR SNA 1/6/18, "1891 Natal Native Code," Chapter VII: Land Tenure.

[20] Ibid, Chapter V: District Headmen.

[21] Ibid, Chapter VII: Land Tenure.

[22] Cross has argued that effectively, allocated land was held in perpetuity. See C.R. Cross, "Land Reform and the Black Rural Economy in South Africa," in *Towards Freehold,* ed. Cross and Haines, 17.

[23] PAR SNA 1/6/18, "1891 Natal Native Code," Chapter VII: Land Tenure.

headman shall allot to each married Native or kraalhead resident within his jurisdiction sufficient land for the requirements of his house or houses for arable and residential purposes."[24] The chief or headman maintained the power to settle disputes over allotments. Occupation rights could be cancelled if the land was not cultivated for three years, if the land was used for purposes other than for which it was granted, or "in the interests of public order or welfare."[25] The regulations did permit enquiries into the distribution of arable and residential allotments, including allowing the Native Commissioner to suggest boundaries to the chief and headmen.[26] Any person whose land was not in the correct zone was theoretically to be allocated new land within three months.[27] These regulations would have provided the legal support for resettlement under rehabilitation, but they were not used in Nongoma during the 1930s or 1940s.

Officials in the 1930s were concerned that interfering in land allocation in Natal in the name of agricultural development would undermine chiefs. At a conference of Natal Native Commissioners in Durban in 1933, Secretary for Native Affairs J.F. Herbst opposed the proposal that agricultural officers and native commissioners be allowed to dictate land allocation in the reserves: "the adoption of this proposal is practically going to kill the Chief. The right to dispose of land is essentially the chief's prerogative, the only binding thing between the chief and his people."[28] Nongoma Native Commissioner E.D. Braatvedt also emphasized the relationship between chiefs, indunas, and land at this

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[24] PAR 1/NGA 3/3/3/1, N1/15/4, C.N.C. Circular of No. 7 of 1840. "No. 123/1931 (Amendments to 1/1/39 incorporated): Regulations for the Administration of Native Locations and Reserves in the Natal Province," April 13th, 1940.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] PAR CNC 109A, 94/9, "Notes of a Proceeding of Native Commissioners' Conference Held in Durban on 15th, 16th, and 17th November, 1933."

meeting, noting that indunas allocated land on behalf of chiefs in his district. This practice, however, did not have universal support among government officials. The Native Commissioner from Nqutu in Zululand complained that native commissioners and agricultural officers exercised no control over land allocation and too much power lay with the chiefs. Another official suggested that agricultural officers "point out the areas suitable for garden lands, kraal sites, etc., and the actual allocation be left in the hands of the Chiefs." The conference passed a resolution that agricultural officers assist chiefs by pointing out preferable land use patterns, but actual allocation decisions be left up to chiefs and their headmen.[29]

The image of a chief ruling over a discrete location was not always a reality across South Africa, especially in areas of significant white settlement. In Natal, several recognized chiefs lived on white-owned farms. This issue came up in 1918 before the Natal Native Lands Committee, most frequently in the Midlands and the South Coast.[30] It was also common in areas of the Transvaal where white settlement preceded the establishment of native locations.[31] However, the British administration recognized the locations and chieftaincies years before Zululand was opened to white settlement. While the government temporarily divided the Usuthu ward among other chieftaincies after the

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[29] Ibid.
[30] For examples in Umzinto, Ixopo, and Richmond, see the following: PAR SNA 2/2/5, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, to Secretary, Natal Natives Land Committee, February 3rd, 1918; PAR SNA 2/2/5, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, to Secretary, Natal Natives Land Committee, April 9, 1918; PAR SNA 2/2/5, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, to Secretary, Natal Natives Land Committee, April 12th, 1918.
[31] Hay, "South Africa's Land Reform," 33-73.

1906 disturbances, the government recognized Solomon kaDinuzulu, Cyprian Bhekuzulu's father, as chief of the reconstituted Usuthu in 1916.[32]

Newly purchased trust land, rather than pre-existing native locations, was often the first affected by rehabilitation and betterment.[33] In the late 1930s, the DNA resolved that all land purchased by the SANT would immediately be protected and rehabilitated.[34] In 1943, the DNA proclaimed that farms purchased by the SANT would automatically be proclaimed betterment areas. Chiefs were recognized in the trust lands, but in areas like Sekhuneland, that recognition often remained inconsistent and partial. About half of the land to be purchased by the SANT was in the Transvaal. In Pietersburg, the trust purchased 250,000 morgen from private holders. About 10,000 Africans already lived on the land, having obtained occupation through means other than chieftaincies. In the mid-1940s, in the midst of rural resistance, the DNA limited and culled stock, fenced land, demarcated plots, and regulated land use.[35]

Rehabilitation in Nongoma and many other native locations emerged only in the 1950s, at the very moment the apartheid state sought to strengthen the power of chiefs through the Bantu Authorities Act. The history surrounding chiefs' rights over location land clashed with the apartheid state's development imperatives. In Nongoma and northern Zululand in particular, concern about erosion only emerged in the late 1930s. The government did not commit to any anti-soil erosion programs until the 1950s due to

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[32] Nicholas Cope, *To Bind the Nation: Solomon KaDinuzulu and Zulu Nationalism: 1913-1933* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1993), 78.
[33] Peter Delius, *A Lion amongst Cattle: Reconstruction and Resistance in the Northern Transvaal* (Oxford: James Currey, 1997); Siphamandla Zondi, 'Peasant Struggles of the 1950s: gaMatlala and Zeerust,' in South African Democracy Education Trust, *The Road to Democracy in South Africa: 1960-1970* (Cape Town, 2004), 147-176.
[34] Delius, *Lion amongst Cattle,* 55.
[35] Ibid, 60-71.

administrative and financial shortcomings. The long history of the chieftaincies in the area, and the district's position at the center of the historic Zulu kingdom, created an unexpected crisis for the apartheid state.

Soil Reclamation and Nongoma's Chiefs: Early Cooperation

In 1951, the same year the National Party government passed the Bantu Authorities Act, the DNA began planning anti-soil erosion programs in Nongoma in cooperation with chiefs Cyprian Bhekuzulu (Usuthu), Moses Zulu (Matheni), and Phumanyova Zulu (Mandlakazi). DNA officials considered cooperation with these chiefs necessary given both the Bantu Authorities Act's focus on cultivating self-government in the reserves and Nongoma's symbolic position within the Zulu kingdom. The unpopularity of betterment elsewhere in South Africa placed Bhekuzulu, who had not yet been recognized as Paramount Chief, in a difficult position between the government and his subjects. Both Cyprian Bhekuzulu and his father, Solomon kaDinuzulu, utilized a politically moderate *hamba kahle,* or "go slowly," strategy to straddle the demands of the state and the desires of their own subjects.[36] In the early 1950s, Bhekuzulu was close to Natal ANC leaders such as A.W.G. Champion, but his position and stipend still depended on the apartheid state.[37] With considerations of his position likely in mind, Bhekuzulu and the other two chiefs in his district initially cooperated with the government.

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[36] For more on the history of the *hamba kahle* strategy, see Cope; Anna Kolberg Buverud, *The King and the Honeybirds: Cyprian Bhekuzulu kaSolomon, Zulu Nationalism and the Implementation of the Bantu Authorities System in Zululand, 1948-1957* (Ph.D. thesis, University of Oslo, 2007); in discussions of African elites caught between the state and African populations, both scholars drew on Shula Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa : Class, Nationalism, and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

[37] Buverd, *King and the Honeybird,* 49-63.

After 1948, economically and politically self-sufficient African reserves became a political imperative for the South African state. Under the Bantu Authorities Act, limited governing authority would theoretically be transferred from national, provincial, and district level white officials to African chiefs, including, eventually, Cyprian Bhekuzulu. The tribal authority, at the base of the system, would hold administrative and executive powers in addition to the judicial powers already held by chiefs, and it was to govern "in accordance with native law and custom."[38] Several tribal authorities would combine into a regional authority. In turn, regional authorities would combine to form a territorial authority supposedly reflecting a discrete ethnic unit. The government saw the tribal authorities as the natural political structures to carry out development efforts.

Soil conservation had been central to rural development planning across South Africa for over two decades. In 1929, Russell Thornton, the first Director of Agriculture in the DNA, toured the African reserves and identified soil erosion as a crisis demanding immediate action. He identified Northern Zululand as one of the few areas of South Africa without significant soil erosion,[39] which spared Nongoma from early initiatives. While the government did not undertake mass cattle culling until after World War II, efforts in the 1930s across South Africa included donga filling, dam construction, grazing schemes, and animal husbandry. After World War II, the South African government began to push for more drastic measures. The Betterment Areas Proclamation No. 116 of 1949 granted Native Commissioners sweeping powers to control land use through

[38] "Bill seeks to abolish N.R.C," *Natal Witness,* Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, June 7, 1951.
[39] William Beinart, *The Rise of Conservation in South Africa: Settlers, Livestock, and the Environment 1770-1950* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 340.

delimitation, assignment of individual land plots, and cattle culling.[40] After the victory of the National Party in 1948, these development schemes became linked to the larger project of Bantu Authorities. From 1951, the DNA committed to soil rehabilitation programs with a fresh zeal, including a new focus on locations in Zululand.

By 1950, no area of Zululand had been declared a betterment area. In early 1951, the DNA turned its attention to Nongoma, believing that its position as the "headquarters" of the "Zulu nation" made it a powerful example for the rest of the region. Nongoma Native Commissioner, R. Ashton, wrote to Chief Native Commissioner Liefeldt that Nongoma urgently needed anti-soil erosion measures.[41] His immediate recommendations did not include a full betterment proclamation. The more coercive and unpopular aspects of betterment planning, including cattle culling and mass displacement and resettlement, were not yet on the table. However, he proposed limits on new stock, the construction of dams, grass strips, and contour banks, the demarcation of arable and residential land, and the formation of an Ad Hoc Committee consisting of agricultural officers and the chief in each of the three wards.[42]

The government believed that the state of agriculture in Nongoma had become dire. The district of 264,656 morgen[43] was split evenly between high and low veld. It had 37,000 people and 100,000 head of cattle. The majority of the population was divided between the Usuthu and Mandlakazi locations, but about 3,000 people lived in the smaller Matheni location under Chief Moses Zulu. Households largely depended on

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[40] William Beinart, "Soil Erosion, Conservationism and Ideas about Development: A Southern African Exploration, 1900-1960," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 11, no. 1 (October 1, 1984): 75-78.
[41] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, R. Ashton, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to M.D.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, February 7, 1951.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Roughly 226,810 hectares or 480,145 acres

migrant labor wages rather than agriculture.[44] The district, moreover, was drought prone. Soil rehabilitation projects did hold some appeal for chiefs and local residents because they typically included water projects such as dam construction. However, the prospect of land reallocation and cattle culling, which had taken place in other regions, remained unpopular.

In April 1951, Secretary for Native Affairs Eiselen made a major decision involving the government in land management in Nongoma. He recommended that Native Commissioner Ashton proceed with an enquiry under section fourteen of Proclamation No. 123 of 1931. This entailed an investigation into the existing distribution of arable and residential allotments in Nongoma and the potential reallocation of these lands. Eiselen asked the Ad Hoc Committee to assess the local soil erosion situation and propose a program of action.[45] Ashton, in cooperation with three engineers and agricultural officers, drafted initial proposals to present to the chiefs.[46]

On May 19th, Chiefs Cyprian Bhekuzulu, Pumanyova Zulu, and Moses Zulu met with Ashton to discuss the initial proposals, which included demarcation of arable and residential land, some small-scale resettlement, and the construction of dams, contour banks, and grass strips. The chiefs were still very cooperative at this point, saying they agreed in principle with the need to fight soil erosion. However, they requested that

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[44] SAB BAO 20/627, 128/1467, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, February 7, 1951.
[45] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, W.W.M. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs to H.F. Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs, April 10, 1951.
[46] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, R. Ashton, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to M.D.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, August 1, 1951.

powers to carry out these plans be transferred to them from the DNA, with the understanding that the department would assist when requested.[47]

With this request, the chiefs attempted to assert their continued authority over the control of land while cooperating with government policy. Ashton, however, rejected their proposal. "I cannot think that the unfavorable reply of three people who are insufficiently intelligent for the position," he wrote back to Chief Native Commissioner Liefeldt, "be allowed to unfavorably influence the decision in such an important matter as the saving of miles of country and the well-being of a large population."[48] Ashton decided that chiefs would serve as ex-officio members of the Ad Hoc Committees in their respective wards, working under white officials. By rejecting the idea that chiefs could be placed in charge of soil reclamation, he departed from a long tradition under colonial and union law in Natal that had preserved chiefly rights over the control of land.

The Ad Hoc Committee began its work with optimism. In early August, Ashton proposed that they should begin rehabilitation in one corner of the district and then eventually demarcate the whole district.[49] He also proposed that the committee take chiefs Bhekuzulu, Pumanyova Zulu, and Moses Zulu to the Zwartkop location near Pietermaritzburg to see an example of a successful anti-erosion project.[50] Ashton quite optimistically proposed that the Ad Hoc Committee immediately survey the 873 square mile district so that work could begin by the end of September. He submitted an application for equipment funds to Chief Native Commissioner Liefeldt, who forwarded

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[47] SAB BAO 20/627 H128/1467 R. Ashton, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to M.D.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, May 23, 1951.
[48] Ibid.
[49] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, R. Ashton, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to M.D.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, August 1, 1951.
[50] Ibid.

it to Eiselen with a note that while "the location has not been declared a Betterment Area…the natives…are interested in the protection of demarcated arable land and the protection of springs."[51] The government already had begun beaconing land into two-acre lots, which the chiefs were eventually supposed to allocate to their followers. No other land was to be cultivated and any landless residents were to receive smaller plots in village areas.[52]

The manner in which officials undertook rehabilitation in Nongoma was an experiment in a less coercive method than had been undertaken in the 1940s on SANT land.[53] It was also significantly less coercive than the approach the government would take from the late 1950s, when betterment across South Africa's reserves was characterized by rapid resettlement and villagization without significant economic or ecological benefit.[54] Liefeldt optimistically wrote, "If conservation farming can be achieved in this manner, i.e. by development from within instead of by arbitrary imposition from without, as has been the case, in effect, up until now, it is felt an important step forward will have been made."[55] However, while Liefeldt referred to the Ad Hoc Committee as a sort of development from below, the chiefs occupied a powerless ex-officio role.

After the Bantu Authorities Act came into effect in July of 1951, officials in Natal and across South Africa accelerated anti-soil erosion efforts, placing chiefs at the center

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[51] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, M.D.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal to W.W.M. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs, August 22, 1951.
[52] Ibid.
[53] For examples see Delius, *Lion Amongst Cattle*; Zondi, "Peasant Struggles."
[54] Fred T. Hendricks, "Loose Planning and Rapid Resettlement: The Politics of Conservation and Control in Transkei, South Africa, 1950-1970," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15, no. 2 (January 1, 1989):340.
[55] Ibid.

of rural development more than ever before. The erosion of the reserves' soil and the "disintegration" of the tribal system seemed intertwined as twin evils to DNA officials. In December, Eiselen traveled to Vuma, near Eshowe, to meet with chiefs attending lectures on agriculture, law, administration, and soil conservation.[56] He proposed that it would be possible to transform "tribal forms of administration" into an effective instrument of government in which chiefs would have a central place in development and administration.[57] Eiselen emphasized:

> The Bantu Authority must realize that its main function is not to deal with family feuds and courts cases but to deal with community life in all its ramifications just as in the tribal life of old but on a higher level, for example, the allocation of fields not to all and everyone but to those who are prepared to farm progressively… agricultural shows replacing or supplementing first fruit ceremonies; water conservation as the most effective rain ceremony; labour squads to replace regimental training; clinics instead of the witch-doctors; schools serving the community and so forth.

He continued:

> It is essential that the Bantu Authority should itself undertake such community services such as the dipping of cattle, culling of surplus cattle, control of grazing, contouring and anti-soil erosion measures, planting of trees, making of fire belts, fencing and so on, and that it should earn Government subsidy for these services by taking the initiative itself and by providing the necessary labour from the ranks of the community.[58]

Eiselen also emphasized that the Bantu Authorities would be in charge of their own treasuries, African civil servants, and schools.[59]

Keeping with this emphasis on revitalizing tribal governance, Eiselen officially recognized Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu as the "Paramount Chief of the Zulus."[60] The

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[56] "Eiselen to See Zulu Chiefs," *Natal Witness,* Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, December 11, 1951.
[57] "Effective Tribal Rule Possible: Eiselen," *Natal Witness,* Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, December 14, 1951.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.

appointment did not define the limits of the "Zulus," nor did it provide Bhekuzulu with any political authority beyond the Usuthu locations. The appointment recognized him as the "social head of the Zulus," which meant he would be "consulted by the Government and asked to assist in matters which are of concern to the Zulus."[61] The government prohibited Bhekuzulu from summoning other chiefs, attending meetings outside his own district without the consent of the Chief Native Commissioner, or making visits outside of Natal without the consent of the Secretary for Native Affairs in Pretoria.

At this point in 1951, the government continued rehabilitation planning in Nongoma without allowing Bhekuzulu or other chiefs to have any real role, thus undermining the relationship between chiefly authority and land that had been in place since the 1890s. However, they simultaneously sought to empower the chiefs and strengthen frameworks of "tribal governance" through the Bantu Authorities Act. Ultimately, the state's development initiatives undermined its principles of African self-government. Eiselen later wrote in Bhekuzulu's appointment papers that "What his future position and jurisdiction will be, will depend upon the development which will take place in terms of the Bantu Authorities Act and also upon Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu's own wisdom and leadership."[62] This made it clear that Bhekuzulu's position depended on his cooperation with government policy. However, this paradoxically required Bhekuzulu to yield control of land use in Nongoma, a central aspect of chiefly authority since the colonial era, to apartheid development officials.

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[60] SAB NTS 249, 78/53 (2), W.W.M. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs to M.D.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, draft letter, January 11, 1952.
[61] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/1/3/9, M.L.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal to W.W.M. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs, September 26, 1952.
[62] Ibid.

Political Struggle and Plans Delayed

The government's early optimism that Cyprian Bhekuzulu would be a useful ally in influencing the rest of Natal to accept government policy would be dashed in 1952. DNA officials tied Bhekuzulu's future position to his cooperation with policies that stripped him of his control over land allocation in Nongoma. In doing so, they ignored a long history of government practices that had made the control of land in the reserves as a central aspect of chiefly authority. Placed in this impossible position, Bhekuzulu and other leaders began to use rhetoric of self-governance to delay rehabilitation.

While Ashton and Liefeldt sought to begin anti-soil erosion efforts in earnest in late 1951, they faced several administrative setbacks. In 1952, after preliminary investigations, the Ad Hoc Committee in the Usuthu locations decided that it would be impossible to commence with most aspects of rehabilitation within the fiscal year. They recommended that only fencing be undertaken immediately.[63] In March of 1952, the Ad Hoc Committee, consisting of Ashton, agricultural officers, and the chiefs—as ex-officio members only—presented a new proposal to Chief Native Commissioner Liefeldt and Secretary for Native Affairs Eiselen. The committee recommended starting rehabilitation at a section of the Usuthu ward comprising the Tokazi and upper Ivuna areas. The area was heavily populated, and 50 kraals would have to be removed into new residential blocks. The committee also recommended that significant land be removed from cultivation, grazing systems be introduced at the expense of arable land, and arable land be contoured to prevent further erosion.[64]

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[63] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, R. Ashton, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to M.D.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, January 22, 1952.
[64] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, R. Ashton, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to M.D.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, March 11, 1952.

Correspondence between Native Commissioner Ashton and Chief Native Commissioner Liefeldt show that officials on the committee had to force Bhekuzulu's cooperation. By 1952, some residents began to express discontent over the prospect of any rehabilitation efforts. "The attitude of some of the residents concerned is hostile to the proposals," Ashton reported, "but some are in favour of them, while others are prepared to follow the leaders. Only careful handling, liberal treatment and favourable conditions will ensure a successful outcome."[65] Bhekuzulu objected to the report crafted by the committee. He cited the will of his people, saying, "if the people want to have the work done, I have no objection."[66] At a moment when the government attempted to foster African self-government, he idealized consultation as the cornerstone of Zulu political culture in order to resist unpopular programs.

While in 1951 Bhekuzulu and the other chiefs in Nongoma asked to be put in charge of all rehabilitation efforts, at this point in 1952, he changed course. He told the Ad Hoc Committee, "I want the people to be told and made to agree and co-operate with the proposals. The people should be told by the Native Commissioner and me, together and I will support the Native Commissioner."[67] By placing Ashton at the forefront of the rehabilitation efforts, Bhekuzulu attempted to shift potential popular discontent from himself towards the government.

Ashton viewed this purely as an act of defiance. Bhekuzulu informed Ashton that while he agreed with the report, he was afraid to sign it because some of his people were opposed to rehabilitation. Ashton reminded Bhekuzulu that Secretary for Native Affairs

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[65] Ibid.
[66] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, March 11, 1952.
[67] Ibid.

Eiselen had emphasized the previous year that "Chiefs must lead their people" and Bhekuzulu's future status and jurisdiction depended on his own "wisdom and leadership."[68] This veiled threat served to remind Bhekuzulu that the future of the Zulu royal house depended on his cooperation.

By October of 1952, more obstacles emerged from within the state itself. First, in early October, the Director of Native Agriculture rejected the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee, claiming that they did not include enough details on the district, and that its costs were simply too high. He also recommended that chiefs be put directly in charge of kraal removal. This would effectively counter Bhekuzulu's attempts to shift responsibility for the less popular aspects of rehabilitation to the government. Ultimately, he recommended that the report of the Ad Hoc Committee only be considered a preliminary report, and that the committee should undertake more investigations to produce a comprehensive plan for the future.[69] This effectively dashed any hope for a quick implementation of soil rehabilitation projects in Nongoma.

Second, there was growing discontent among Africans in the district. On September 17th, Theophilus Masondo informed Native Commissioner Ashton that rumors had been flying around the district that the government would soon seize arable lands and stock from residents.[70] In an issue of *People's World,* Mr. E. Mate, an African National Congress organizer, reported that the "misery of the people in [Nongoma] was

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[68] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, R. Ashton, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to M.D.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, April 21, 1952.
[69] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, Direkteur van Naturelle Landbou to Ondersekretaris (Ontwikkeling), October 7, 1952.
[70] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, R. Ashton, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to M.D.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, September 19, 1952.

immeasurable."[71] E. Mate was the son of Reverend Timothy Mate, a strong opponent of soil rehabilitation who often accompanied Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu to meetings with government officials.[72] Mate claimed that in the face of mass starvation and famine, the government planned to cut the acreage of people's fields and reduce cultivation. Mate also claimed—incorrectly—that Bhekuzulu had refused to give his consent to rehabilitation and sign the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.[73]

While several of Mate's claims were significantly embellished, the veracity of his report is less relevant than its testament to the political tensions brewing in Nongoma. While no mass relocations or cattle cullings were immediately on the table, the statements from this Nongoma-born ANC organizer raised alarm among DNA officials. Native Commissioner Ashton feared that ANC presence could incite violent protest once kraal removal began.[74]

"Land of Cetshwayo's Children"

From late 1952 to the mid 1954, these chiefs and other African leaders utilized multiple delaying tactics to block rehabilitation in Nongoma. Bhekuzulu's non-cooperation was especially notable given that Eiselen had linked his cooperation with the future position of the Zulu Paramountcy. His followers and family members, most prominently Isaac Zulu and Timothy Mate, argued that rehabilitation would destroy the

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[71] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, R. Ashton, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to M.D.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, November 10, 1952.
[72] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, Mr. J.P. Cowan, Acting Chief Native Commissioner "Notes of Interview Granted to Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu and Party on November 28, 1952."
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.

"Zulu nation," break treaties made during colonial conquest, and violate principles of self-government and legal rights of chiefs.

In December 1952, Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu, Chiefs Pumanyova Zulu and Moses Zulu, and others travelled from Nongoma to Pietermaritzburg to present a list of grievances to the government. Among the dozen or so signatories to the grievances were major political actors within the royal family. While Bhekuzulu remained silent for large parts of the meeting, both in this list of grievances and in the meeting with Liefeldt, he flat out denied his past involvement in soil rehabilitation in the presence of his followers.[75] While Bhekuzulu remained silent for large parts of the meeting, he denied his past involvement in rehabilitation efforts in the presence of his followers.[76] While it is difficult to know Bhekuzulu's motivations based on the archival records, it is probable that he allowed his uncle and others to lead the opposition to avoid alienating the government officials who had orchestrated his recognition as Paramount Chief.

The delegation brought forth a wide variety of complaints. The written statements demanded that the "tribesmen" be shown the regulations governing rehabilitation and be allowed to send representatives to other reclaimed areas. Delegates at the meeting denied any knowledge of the regulations surrounding rehabilitation. Reverend Timothy Mate, the father of the ANC organizer E. Mate, protested that the delegation had not seen other areas where the government had implemented similar programs. He suggested that the government abandon rehabilitation altogether. Isaac Zulu, the last living son of Dinuzulu and the uncle of the Paramount Chief, requested authority to convene meetings in other

[75] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, Mr. J.P. Cowan, Acting Chief Native Commissioner "Notes of Interview Granted to Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu and Party on 28th November, 1952."
[76] Ibid.

rehabilitated areas to speak with residents before carrying on with such programs in Nongoma.

Isaac Zulu, Timothy Mate, and the others claimed that soil conservation policies threatened both the letter and spirit of laws and agreements governing relations between Zulu people and white people. They cited overcrowding in the reserves as a result of colonial land dispossession and the ejection of Africans from white farms, asking, "The tribe would like to be enlightened as to whether in a period of a hundred years their generation would still have any land left to live in?"[77] In addition to asking the government to purchase more land under the 1936 Native Land Trust Act to add to the reserves, members of the royal family in the delegation invoked claims of treaties and promises from the era of colonial conquest.

The conversation between the delegation and government officials was full of misunderstandings surrounding the history each side invoked. While they did not seem to know the exact written terms of the colonial era peace treaties, the delegation believed these terms protected their land rights in Nongoma. It is likely that their understanding of the terms of the 1879 surrender was also shaped by subsequent practices of the successive white governments.[78] They demanded that the government produce "the position which was created by the terms at the end of the war between the British and the Zulu—these

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[77] Ibid.

[78] An emergent historiographical issue is how colonized people often call upon treaties and past agreements in legal arguments in ways they understand them, rather than by the terms written and enforced by the colonizing power. During the 1970s and 1980s, for example, indigenous activists and lawyers from Canada and New Zealand emphasized principles of treaty interpretation to "legitimate the oral traditions and communal interpretations of historical agreements made by indigenous peoples." See Johnson, *Land is our History,* 8.

terms being between the late Cetshwayo and the late Queen Victoria."[79] Liefeldt, who became very frustrated, countered that Cetshwayo had ceded the territory in Natal—likely referring to territory south of the Tugela River—decades ago and the matter could not be re-opened. Liefeldt likely misspoke in this statement, given that the boundary between British Natal and Zululand was established in 1843 during the reign of Dingane.

Isaac Zulu, Mnyayiza Zulu, and Mgatsha Zulu, all elder members of the royal family, argued that the fencing of land in rehabilitation programs violated the territory allocated to them under British rule. Isaac Zulu protested, "We thought that the land given to Cetshwayo after the Zulu War would be his forever. We say that our land at Nongoma is getting less, first of all fences and now the rehabilitation. The fenced in area does not belong to the chief, because the stock-owners are fined for allowing their stock to enter the camp."[80] In referring to "land given to Cetshwayo after the Zulu War," Isaac Zulu may have referred to both the return of Cetshwayo to Zululand in 1883 and the subsequent definition of the Usuthu reserve in 1891. Regardless, he understood this land to be free from white interference. For these Zulu leaders, the idea of coercive attempts to repurpose land was anathema to the limited land rights they saw as accorded to them during conquest and colonialism. "After Cetshwayo's defeat," Mnyayiza Zulu went on to claim, "the Queen [Victoria] took him but afterwards returned him to his land. The Queen spoke good words to Cetshwayo and said that Her Government would not take anything belonging to him and his people; Her Government would allow him to keep the land and property because she desired that there be peace and friendship between the two

[79] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, Mr. J.P. Cowan, Acting Chief Native Commissioner "Notes of Interview Granted to Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu and Party on 28th November, 1952.".
[80] Ibid.

Governments. These words are written in the old books and we know that those books do not get old. We want these old books to be referred to."[81]

These statements articulated a belief that the Zulu kingdom held authority over the land in Nongoma even after colonial conquest and called upon the government to uphold its obligations. The written complaints also cited the Bantu Authorities Act, arguing that by seeking to divide the locations into arable, grazing, and residential lands, the government sought to co-opt the chiefs in violation of the principles of the Act. The grievances warned that if the government compelled the chiefs to do its wishes, the integrity of the chiefs would be compromised.[82]

In the face of such opposition to rehabilitation works, Bhekuzulu defied the government that had appointed him as Paramount Chief. As his followers denied that the community had been informed of any details about rehabilitation planning, Cyprian Bhekuzulu stayed silent. Acting Chief Native Commissioner Cowan noted in his summary of the interview that even though Cyprian Bhekuzulu was a member of the Ad Hoc Committee, **"**he did not admit to any knowledge of what work it planned to do there. It is clear that neither he nor the other Chiefs concerned are prepared to openly support these measures which are opposed by a large number of their people."[83] Cowan expressed doubts about the potential position that future tribal and regional authorities in Nongoma would hold towards soil erosion and the "development" of the Zulu people.[84] Eiselen responded that the DNA was disappointed with this opposition to rehabilitation, which

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[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, J.P. Cowan, Acting Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg to W.M.M. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs, December 15, 1952.
[84] Ibid.

the government believed represented a "great benefit to this and succeeding generations," despite the "inconvenience" it might temporarily bring to Nongoma.[85]

Rehabilitation planning continued into 1953 and 1954 with little actual action, and the government grew weary of the delays. While officials preferred to deal directly with Bhekuzulu and Chiefs Moses Zulu and Phumanyova Zulu, their followers in Nongoma continued to bypass what the government saw as the proper hierarchical channels of communication. On June 4, 1953, Bhekuzulu appeared with his followers, including the ones who had been present at the meeting on November 28th, 1952, to speak with Ashton and submit a letter to him.[86] Bhekuzulu told Ashton that the delegation wished to speak with him, but the chief implied that he was not associated with either the actions of his followers or with the contents of their letter, which was signed "the Usuthu Tribe Nongoma District."[87]

Theophilus Masondo read the letter out loud, protesting the lack of government response to the demands they had made to Chief Native Commissioner Liefeldt on November 28th the previous year. The deputation issued the following words of caution to Ashton: "Now as it appears that you persist in not agreeing with us we hope that you and the minister will remember that the district of Nongoma is the head of the Zulu people in Natal and Zululand."[88] They then asked that the government convene a meeting of all chiefs in Zululand to discuss soil rehabilitation. During this meeting, the leaders

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[85] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, W.W.M. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs to the Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, January 12, 1953.
[86] SAB BAO 20/627 H128/1467, Meeting at the office of R. Ashton at his office in Nongoma, June 4, 1953.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.

strategically used the position of the Zulu paramountcy in Nongoma and the rhetoric of self-governance for a united Zulu political front in order to delay rehabilitation.

The proceedings troubled officials, who believed that the cooperation of these leaders was necessary for the success of government policy both in Nongoma and across Natal. Ashton later reported that the deputation's letter was either "unhappily worded or is intentionally rude."[89] He reported that while Bhekuzulu did not associate himself with the deputation, there was no way that he was not involved in their actions.[90] After hearing of this meeting, Liefeldt re-emphasized that the cooperation of both chiefs and subjects was essential for the success of government policy in the reserves.[91]

The year 1953 ended with a continued back and forth of meetings and letters without any progress. By March of 1954, several officials began to consider abandoning talks with leaders in Nongoma. Liefeldt pointed out that replies had already been sent to their complaints, and he refused to grant another interview for them merely to repeat grievances.[92] Ashton disagreed with his superior, recommending that Liefeldt see the deputation in order to temper rural opposition.[93] By May, however, the attitude of the Undersecretary for Native Affairs, C.B. Young, had also soured. He wrote to Liefeldt:

> In regard to the general question of the undertaking of rehabilitation work in areas where the people are uncooperative, our attitude generally is hardening towards a point that where people will not co-operate in our efforts to do things for their betterment, we will not lightly give them such things as water supplies, schools and other facilities, which they want. In other words, they cannot expect the

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[89] SAB BAO 20/627 H128/1467, R. Ashton, Native Commissioner, Nongoma, to M.D.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, August 7, 1953.
[90] Ibid.
[91] SAB BAO 20/627 H128/1467, M.D.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal to W.W.M. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs, Pretoria, July 8, 1953.
[92] SAB BAO 20/627 H128/1467, M.L.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal to R. Ashton, Native Commissioner, Nongoma, March 25, 1954.
[93] SAB BAO 20/627 H128/1467, R. Ashton, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to M.D.C. Liefelfdt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, April 15, 1954.

> Government to give them all the "pleasant" things and then turn around and adopt an unco-operative or hostile attitude when it comes to things which may be "unpleasant" but which are nevertheless, in the long run, for the ultimate benefit of themselves and their areas.[94]

He judged that full rehabilitation would not be possible in Nongoma due to the uncooperative nature of the leaders and their subjects, but he thought that smaller stabilization efforts should be made to prevent further soil deterioration. He suggested that Liefeldt meet with the deputation from Nongoma one last time, emphasizing that "if they will accept the principle of Bantu Authorities they can expect help and assistance in the betterment of their own areas by themselves."[95]

Secretary for Native Affairs Eiselen responded on July 3rd with a similar recommendation that rehabilitation no longer be carried out in areas where people were uncooperative.[96] Liefeldt met once again with Bkekuzulu and his followers. Most prominent in the party were Timothy Mate and Isaac Zulu. In the meeting, Liefeldt took a threatening tone. He reiterated that rehabilitation was entirely for the people's own benefit. He emphasized the large sums of money that the DNA spent in this district, which was about four times the taxes collected. He specifically warned Isaac Zulu that the "Government's attitude now where people are uncooperative is not to spend any money in their areas… It will for example, not destroy termites, it will stop dam building and it will not make available any money for roads."[97]

While Liefeldt presented rehabilitation as a central responsibility of chiefs, Isaac Zulu and others articulated their opposition as a complaint against violations of both their

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[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.
[96] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, W.M.M. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs to Major M.L.C. Liefeldt, Natal, July 3, 1954.
[97] SAB BAO 20/627, 128/1467, G.T. Ackron, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to M.L.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner Natal, October 5, 1954.

land and the autonomy of their leaders. In particular, they rejected the beaconing of land into grazing, residential, and arable zones. They submitted a written complaint, which Isaac Zulu read aloud:

> land which was solely reserved for the occupation by Cetshwayo's children has been taken and surveyed. Where are the children of the Chief going to stay? Where is the Paramount Chief going to stay because the small Usuthu Area in which the Paramount Chief and his tribe live is small?.We now see ourselves being deprived of the small property without our consent.[98]

In referencing the land reserved for the occupation of Cetshwayo's children, he likely referred to the 1891 definition of the boundaries of the Usuthu area, where Dinuzulu, Cetshwayo's son, returned to as chief after his exile in St. Helena.

While Liefeldt cited their position as the headquarters of the "Zulu Nation" to attempt to persuade them to accept rehabilitation planning, Isaac Zulu saw this very position as a reason to reject the division of lands into arable, residential, and grazing areas. He seized on a long history of chiefly control of Nongoma's locations to argue that the land belonged to the descendants of Cetshwayo and Usuthu residents. The meeting, like others before it, adjourned with no real agreement reached. The new Native Commissioner, Mr. Ackron,[99] suggested a few months later that Bhekuzulu personally meet with all of his followers to discuss the scheme.[100] However, Liefeldt replied that such a meeting would serve no purpose, claiming, "these people have no intention of cooperating with the Department."[101] Rehabilitation was to be set aside as Eiselen and Liefeldt's great hope of using Nongoma as an example for the rest of Zululand was, at least temporarily, dashed.

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[98] Ibid.
[99] Ackron took over as Native Commission for Ashton in mid 1954.
[100] Ibid.
[101] SAB BAO 20/627, H128/1467, M.L.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner Natal to Secretary for Native Affairs, Pretoria, October 14, 1954.

Conclusion

In this story of the failed attempt to implement soil rehabilitation in Nongoma in the early 1950s, common themes emerge: displacement, rural resistance, and the failures of what might be termed a high modernist development program. In the following years, shifts in local and national politics eventually led Bhekuzulu to accept betterment planning in Nongoma in 1957, which might yield another analysis of the tightrope politics that African chiefs played under apartheid. However, this chapter has argued that these struggles also tell a different story, one embedded in treaties over a century old, colonial land arrangements, and in the profound, but uncertain, political shifts occurring in the first years of apartheid.

The years from 1951 to 1954 marked the beginning of a two-decade long process in which the state attempted to transfer limited power to African leaders and advocated a stronger form of self-government. Ambiguities within rural native policy immediately after the passage of the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act created a situation in which massive state intervention in land use in Nongoma emerged at the same time as the apartheid government attempted to strengthen the power of chiefs. Chiefly authority under colonialism and apartheid in Zululand, however, had rested in large part on the territorialization of authority and a chief's ability to distribute land within the native reserves. African leaders in Nongoma exploited these tensions within apartheid policy, calling on colonial treaties, prior land arrangements, and the very principles of self-government espoused by the new apartheid government to resist soil rehabilitation.

Studying South Africa's hinterland with attention to localized struggles over new arrangements of territory and power offers a fresh window through which to reconsider the complex processes shaping the apartheid political order. Both the opponents of rehabilitation and the government drew on an ambiguous vision of African self-governance and some sort of sovereignty for the reserves in order to justify their positions. Opponents of rehabilitation used the concept of responsible tribal governance and the history of African control of reserve land to oppose the enforcement of Department of Native Affairs rehabilitation programs. For the government, the implementation of these development programs was crucial to creating the foundations for self-governing African territories. The next chapter will show how these ideas continued to clash through the 1950s.

Chapter 2: “Return the Crown of Cetshwayo": Bantu Authorities and The Royal House, 1954 to 1957

Across South Africa in the latter half of the1950s, the government renewed its focus on both rural development and the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act. Persuading Cyprian Bhekuzulu to accept these policies again became a main government priority. While a faction of the royal family led by Isaac Zulu continued to oppose soil rehabilitation and later the creation of tribal authorities, by 1957, in the interest of extending the power of the monarchy, Cyprian Bhekuzulu reversed course and accepted these two policies that he had once denounced.

The Bantu Authorities system was not imposed swiftly or unilaterally by the apartheid state. As the DNA sought local acceptance of these institutions, African actors interpreted and made meaning out of apartheid rural governance legislation. Struggles over the implementation of both betterment planning and the Bantu Authorities Act in Nongoma were part of very contentious debates about the making of the apartheid political order. It was a critical event in which the apartheid state, Cyprian Bhekuzulu, and other leaders in Zululand contested the limits of the Zulu nation and the legitimacy of alternative systems of authority. It was a time of what might be called future making, as various actors debated what form the “Zulu nation” would take under apartheid. While the government envisioned the Bantu Authorities Act creating a political structure that would be implemented first on a chieftaincy-by-chieftaincy basis, Zulu leaders in Nongoma demanded the right to negotiate future political arrangements as part of a collective of

all Zulu chiefs with the Paramount Chief as a mouthpiece. These actors called upon different narratives of Zulu history as they imagined the political future.

At the center of this debate lay variations of major questions that re-appeared consistently throughout the first twenty-five years of apartheid. What would the authority of the *Ingonyama* be in the apartheid political order? How far did his authority—and presumable the boundaries of this vague entity referred to as the Zulu nation—ultimately extend? How much authority could the government exercise in the reserves without undermining the legitimacy of African chiefs, and thereby going against the very ideologies underpinning the Bantu Authorities Act? Finally, and most importantly for this chapter, would *Zibuse*—or self-rule—be implemented at first at the level of a tribal authority or at the level of the "Zulu nation?"

The clarification in apartheid ideology presented in the Tomlinson Commission lent new urgency to the government's mission to encourage Cyprian Bhekuzulu and other leaders in Nongoma to accept both betterment planning and the Bantu Authorities Act. As the government renewed its efforts to push soil rehabilitation programs in Nongoma, local leaders used both the pre-colonial past and apartheid discourses of responsible self-government to argue for a political arrangement allowing the royal house to negotiate with the apartheid state on behalf of all Zulu people. From 1955 to 1957, Bhekuzulu and other Zulu leaders debated the structure and merits of the Bantu Authorities Act, making demands on the government for a more central role for the Paramount Chieftaincy within the apartheid political order.

At stake was the future of the Zulu kingdom. The "tribe-by-tribe" model of the Bantu Authorities Act did not seem to offer any significant benefits to the Zulu monarchy. Bhekuzulu and his followers advocated for an implementation of "self-rule" first at the level of the "Zulu nation" rather than at the level of tribal authorities as required by the Bantu Authorities Act.

Ultimately, however, Cyprian Bhekuzulu accepted both the creation of the Usuthu Tribal Authority and betterment planning in order to secure a greater role in the regional and territorial authority that would become central apartheid governance structures in the Zulu reserve land in the years to come.

National Politics and Apartheid Ideology after 1955

The early idea of a Zulu polity in Natal with significant government authority can only understood by discerning the complex shifts in state policy—and the demands of chiefs and their subjects—in the mid-1950s. In the first decade of apartheid, independent homelands and homeland citizenship were not yet political goals. While the apartheid government was committed to some sort of tribal governance and racial segregation, the idea of the homelands was still developing through the 1950s until the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act. Even Verwoerd, commonly labeled the "architect of apartheid," did not embrace the idea of independent homelands until 1959.[1] Throughout the 1950s, the main focus of the central government remained on creating "responsible" local tribal government and enhancing agricultural development in the reserves to curb African urbanization. Explicit in these programs was the notion of a political partnership between African chiefs and the state.

The Bantu Authorities Act had little immediate impact across South Africa. It required chiefs to agree to the creation of tribal, then regional, and finally territorial authorities, but many chiefs remained suspicious of the legislation.[2] However, in 1955, the Bunga in the Transkei

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[1] Deborah Posel, *The Making of Apartheid, 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1991); Ivan Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Hermann Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders: A Supreme Test of Power* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2012).

[2] Jeffrey Butler, Robert I. Rotberg, and John Adams, *The Black Homelands of South Africa the Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu* (Berkeley: University of California Press,

voted to create the Transkei Territorial Authority.[3] Furthermore, the Tomlinson Commission of 1954 called for a massive acceleration of separate development, in particular the implementation of betterment planning, industrial development, and the Bantu Authorities Act.[4]

The Tomlinson Commission represented a major hardening of apartheid principles. The proposals of the Tomlinson Commission were meant to preserve racial segregation by making the African reserve land economically viable. The Tomlinson Commission rested on the historical myth that black South Africans had no prior claim to large swaths of the land in the country, and their "natural" territory was in native reserves that could be distinctly divided on ethno-linguistic terms. This was despite the fact that only 44 percent of Africans lived within the boundaries of the reserves.[5] "Each race has its own traditions and background," the Tomlinson Commission asserted, "its own social structure, culture, and customs…No race can advance through the development of a few. It is essential that … the Bantu themselves should be integrated into the structure of their own development in such a way that they should play an increasing part in such development through appropriate machinery."[6]

The three major economic policy recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission included the separation of farmers from non-farmers and the resettlement of half of the African population in villages, land rehabilitation, and industrialization in the reserves. The Commission called for an investment of £30 million over ten years, with the aim of creating fifty thousand

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1991), 28. See also Jill E. Kelly, "Bantu Authorities and Betterment in Natal: The Ambiguous Responses of Chiefs and Regents, 1955-1970," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 41, no. 2 (2015): 273–97.
[3] Butler, *Black Homelands,* 29.
[4] Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa (Tomlinson Commission), *Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa.* (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1955).
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid, 68.

jobs in the reserves each year.[7] The Tomlinson Commission ultimately found its recommendations too great a financial commitment for the state. Factions within the National Party and the apartheid government hesitated to redistribute significant government revenue from South Africa's white taxpayers to the rural reserves. The apartheid government tabled the White Paper on the Tomlinson Report in 1956, rejecting the infusion of European capital into the reserves, the expansion and consolidation of reserve lands, and mass government expenditures on industrial development.

Verwoerd thus effectively ripped the economic investment out of the Tomlinson Commission while embracing the territorial segregation of races.[8] Without industrial development, the potential for self-sufficiency of the reserves plummeted, transforming them into territories designed to "contain and discipline the reserve army of African labor."[9] However, the government sought to implement recommendations on both soil rehabilitation through betterment planning and the development of greater African self-government in the reserves.

The Commission addressed white anxiety over African detribalization by endorsing the strengthening of chiefs, thereby embracing the principles of separate political and economic development along ethnic lines. The Commission wholeheartedly endorsed the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 as a framework for governing Africans along tribal lines.[10] The report portrayed chiefs as trustees who managed the land and allowed subordinates to use plots. After the release of the Tomlinson Commission, the government began a campaign of aggressive persuasion to

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[7] Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race,* 242.
[8] Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race,* 243; See also Ashforth, Adam. *The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth-Century South Africa* (Oxford England: Clarendon Press; New York Oxford University Press, 1990).
[9] Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race,* 244.
[10] Tomlinson Commission, *Summary of the Report*, 68.

convince Cyprian Bhekuzulu and other leaders to accept the Bantu Authorities Act and betterment planning.

Soil Reclamation and Authority in Nongoma, 1954 to 1955

A few months after the government abandoned soil conservation efforts in Nongoma in mid-1954, national level political imperatives led officials in the Department of Native Affairs to make another push for cooperation with Cyprian Bhekuzulu. Development planning once again became an arena in which local leaders contested the institutional divisions of governing power between African leaders and the white government. In another wave of localized struggle that lasted slightly over half a year, leaders in Nongoma protested soil rehabilitation on the grounds that it violated the political autonomy and land rights of the Paramount Chief and Zulu-speaking people in Nongoma. In doing so, they made claims to a past—and a future—in which the royal house could negotiate with the government on a more equal footing.

On November 12, 1954, the Undersecretary for Native Affairs, C.B. Young, wrote to Chief Native Commissioner M.L.C. Liefeldt that the officials in Natal should try again to secure the cooperation of Cyprian Bhekuzulu and his people in the rehabilitation of Nongoma. Young ordered that the Native Commissioner convene a meeting of the chief and his subjects to reopen discussions on rehabilitation.[11] On December 12th, 1954, Bhekuzulu, Isaac Zulu, and roughly 130 followers met with Native Commissioner Ackron in Nongoma, Bhekuzulu.

At this meeting, Nongoma's leaders demanded that all Zulu chiefs be allowed to negotiate in a unified manner with the government, with the Paramount Chief as their representative. Bhekuzulu's subjects advocated for both a council of all Zulu chiefs and

[11] SAB BAO 20/627, 128/1467, C.B. Young, Department of Native Affairs and M.L.C. Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, November 12, 1954.

recognition of the independence of chiefs from government policy.[12] They claimed that the plans, and the government's attempt to force Cyprian to carry them out, violated the rights of Zulu people to have their own independent leadership. However, Cyprian Bhekuzulu, Timothy Mate, and Isaac Zulu objected that the government could not simply use the chiefs as conduits for state policy.[13]

This strategy sought to enhance the position of the royal house and the monarchy within the apartheid political order. Timothy Mate[14] challenged both the validity of the committee and the government's refusal to allow all Zulu chiefs in Natal to meet and discuss rehabilitation, advocating instead for the unified political action of all Zulu people under the Paramount Chief. When Ackron opened the floor to comments, Mate claimed that the government had not appropriately responded to their earlier representations. Mate suggested that all Zulu chiefs be allowed to come together and decide on a unified opinion on rehabilitation. He claimed that General Botha, Prime Minister of South Africa from 1910 to 1919, had previously allowed the Zulus to hold unified meetings led by the Paramount Chief.[15] Mate further pointed out that the government had previously said that rehabilitation schemes would be voluntary, yet it seemed they would now be compulsory.[16]

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[12]SAB BAO 20/627, 128/1467, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, December 15, 1954

[13] Ibid.

[14] Isaac Zulu is an *umntwana* (direct descendent of a king/paramount chief) and Timothy Mate and Ntindili Ndwandwe were *izinduna*, or headmen, for Cyprian Bhekuzulu.

[15] It is unclear if Mate is referring to meetings when Botha was Prime Minister or before the Union In the late nineteenth century, Botha was a member of Parliament in the Transvaal for Vryheid, an Afrikaans farming town 100 kilometers west of Nongoma. He later became the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

[16] SAB NTS 249, 78/52 (2) Part 3, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, December 15, 1954.

Isaac Zulu drew on the language of apartheid policy to object to the activities of the Ad Hoc Committee. He insisted repeatedly that they had previously requested a "constitution"[17] to these schemes in the form of the text of Proclamation 123/31, under which the Ad Hoc Committee had been formed. Isaac Zulu objected to the unilateral implementation of Proclamation 123/21, claiming that Zulu leaders had the right to read government regulations and then choose which to accept or reject.[18]

The larger issue at stake was the location of authority and how much the government could control the chiefs while still advocating responsible self-government. Isaac Zulu, Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu, and Matolana Ndwandwe criticized Ackron for placing the Paramount Chief in an inappropriate position. Bhekuzulu accused the government of placing him between the state and his people seeking to force him to accept rehabilitation without proper consultation with his subjects.[19] While Isaac Zulu suggested that another representative be placed on the committee alongside Bhekuzulu, Ackron retorted that the Bhekuzulu was the "mouth piece" of the people and his presence was sufficient. Matolana Ndwandwe sharply responded back directly to the Native Commissioner, "Why do you steal him from his fathers? He is controlled by his people."[20] Through these protests, Cyprian Bhekuzulu, Isaac Zulu, and

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[17] There was no "constitution" governing soil rehabilitation. Rehabilitation and betterment were legally enacted through government proclamation. Regardless, the aim of Isaac Zulu in this context was to seek the legal texts governing these programs.

[18] NTS 249, 78/52 (2) Part 3, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, December 15th, 1954.

[19] For issues surrounding the tightrope walked by such leaders in African history, see Shula Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism, and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal,* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Anna Kolberg Buverud, *The King and the Honeybirds.: Cyprian Bhekuzulu kaSolomon, Zulu Nationalism and the Implementation of the Bantu Authorities System in Zululand, 1948-1957* (Ph.D. thesis, University of Oslo, 2007); Kelly, "Bantu Authorities and Betterment in Natal."

[20] SAB BAO 20/627, 128/1467, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, December 22, 1954.

Matolana Ndwandwe all asserted that the government's attempts to channel policy through Bhekuzulu violated the political rights of the Zulu people.

These leaders continued to oppose rehabilitation through early 1955. On February 28th, 1955, Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu, Ndhlangwe Tshandu, Ntindile Ndwandwe, and Theophilus Nasondo arrived at the office of Native Commissioner Ackron carrying a collective letter from their community, for whom they claimed to be acting as a "mouthpiece." They rejected the idea of forced relocations and demanded greater participation in decision making for residents of Nongoma. They once again demanded a "constitution" of what the government planned to do in Nongoma, threatening that they would not accept the actions of the government without a "constitution" with which they could agree.[21]

After this final meeting, Ackron pushed his superiors to abandon their previous commitment to securing local consent for rehabilitation policies. He wrote to Chief Native Commissioner Liefeldt that rehabilitation work should be carried out despite the fact that neither local residents nor leaders were willing to cooperate. Ackron suggested that if rehabilitation was not forced, then Africans in the reserves would develop the perspective that nothing could be done on their land unless they were consulted and willing to cooperate.[22] While the government in principle was interested in devolving governing power to African leaders in the reserves, local officials still sought to maintain control over development planning and infrastructure at the expense of the authority of the chiefs.

Political imperatives through the end of 1955 led Bhekuzulu to temper his opposition slightly. Other royal family members, however, continued to petition the government to abandon plans for soil rehabilitation in Natal. In June of 1955, Isaac Zulu, Timothy Mate, and Ntindili

[21] SAB BAO 20/627, 128/1467, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, March 7, 1955.
[22] Ibid.

Ndwandwe met with A.W.G. Champion, a former president-general of the Natal branch of the ANC and member of the Native Representative Council. Champion then petitioned the national government on their behalf. Champion claimed that the three men were sent by their community to ask for an interview with the Minster for Native Affairs, Henrik Verwoerd.

Once again Zulu leaders invoked what they saw as a long history of promises that white governments had made to the Zulu people. "There are promises which were made [to the Zulu nation] many years ago by the successive Governments from the Imperial Governments, Government of Natal and the Union which seem to hold no water these days," Champion noted.[23] Implicit in these statements was the idea that Zulu chiefs had the right to control land in Nongoma. According to the prince and the two indunas, Ackron sought to force rehabilitation on Nongoma, despite the Chief Native Commissioner and the central government's claims that these plans would be voluntary. They urged Verwoerd to meet with them as representatives of the royal family and the Usuthu tribe so they might air their grievances.[24]

When Eiselen heard of these complains, he wrote that he was willing to see African chiefs and leaders as long as they went through the proper channels of the government. While Eiselen insisted that he was always willing to speak to Bhekuzulu because of his position as chief of the Usuthu and Paramount Chief, he was unwilling to make the same accommodations for other royal family members and indunas. At this point, Native Commissioner Ackron grew irate. He advised Chief Native Commissioner Liefeldt that he never informed Isaac Zulu or anyone else that he would force rehabilitation on the Usuthu ward. Furthermore, he stated that even if he had made such remarks, they would not have been made to Isaac Zulu as Bhekuzulu was chief. Both Eiselen and Ackron were unwilling to deal with any leader besides Bhekuzulu himself.

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[23] SAB BAO 20/627, 128/1467, A.W.G. Champion to Senator C. Cowley, N.C., June 3, 1955.
[24] Ibid.

When Ackron challenged Bhekuzulu on the actions of Isaac Zulu and the others, Bhekuzulu claimed that he had no knowledge of his uncle's and his indunas' actions.[25]

Bhekuzulu's seemingly mysterious retreat from his opposition to soil erosion was actually a product of secret talks with the government that had taken place for several months prior. Isaac Zulu and others still opposed soil reclamation and used assertions of the rights of the Zulu royal house and people to advance their position. After the middle of 1955, however, Cyprian Bhekuzulu remained publically silent in terms of any official opposition to betterment planning. Just three months before Bhekuzulu denied involvement with his uncle's opposition to rehabilitation, the government had begun pushing more aggressively for the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act in the Usuthu area. As government policy hardened surrounding the centrality of agricultural development and the Bantu Authorities Act to the overall success of apartheid, the BAD was willing to go further to secure Bhekuzulu's cooperation. While soil rehabilitation and betterment were still unpopular, increased powers for the monarchy under the Bantu Authorities Act led the head of the royal house to reconsider these policies.

The Zulu Paramountcy and the Future of Bantu Authorities in Nongoma

From 1954, the government, Cyprian Bhekuzulu, and other Zulu leaders debated the meaning of the Bantu Authorities Act and the position of the Zulu royal house within this system. Relations between the government and the royal house became a matter of national, regional, and local debate. Zulu leaders and apartheid officials, in their negotiations concerning the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act in Nongoma, presented competing visions of Zululand's—and South Africa's—political future. For the government, implementing the Bantu

[25] SAB BAO 20/627, 128/1467, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to M.L.C Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, June 30, 1955.

Authorities Act at the tribal authority level in Nongoma was to be the first step in reforming rural governance. For leaders surrounding Cyprian Bhekuzulu, however, the position and authority of the Zulu royal house and "Zulu nation" was far more important than local tribal authorities.

The opposition that had led the DNA to temporarily suspend soil rehabilitation efforts in Nongoma in October 1954 had temporarily worsened the relationship between the government and Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu. In November 1954, a memo circulated the DNA containing a long list of complaints about Bhekuzulu. In addition to allegations of alcoholism, the memo suggested that he had been fraternizing with politically undesirable individuals. It reported that Bhekuzulu had fallen under the influence of a politically active University of Fort Hare graduate or student, likely his cousin Mangosuthu Buthelezi.[26] Chief Native Commissioner Liefeldt suggested that this close relationship between the cousins had always existed, but it still sparked scrutiny within the DNA. Bhekuzulu also allegedly visited Durban without government permission and sought to establish a trust fund without any explanation of its purposes. Finally, and most seriously, the memo highlighted that neither Cyprian Bhekuzulu nor his people had shown any inclination towards cooperating with the government on soil rehabilitation.[27]

On November 2nd, Cyprian Bhekuzulu met with Secretary for Native Affairs Eiselen in Pretoria. This meeting was called by the government in order to convince Bhekuzulu to cooperate. Representatives at the meeting from the DNA included C.B. Young, the Under Secretary for Native Affairs, M.L.C. Liefeldt, the Chief Native Commissioner of Natal, and G.T. Ackron, the Native Commissioner of Nongoma. Eiselen began the meeting by reiterating the

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[26] The University of Fort Hare was a stomping ground of several future African political including ANC leaders Nelson Mandela and Oliver Thambo, future IFP President Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Desmond Tutu, future Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, and future Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. For more on the University of Fort Hare and elite black education, see Gibbs, *Mandela's Kinsmen.*

[27] SAB BAO 20/627, 128/1467, Memo, Department of Native Affairs, "Matters to be raised at Discussions with Chief Cyprian. 2 November 1954."

claim that the government had recognized Bhekuzulu as Paramount Chief so that the Zulu people could "make progress," but he had thus far been a disappointment.[28] Eiselen claimed that he had summoned Cyprian Bhekuzulu to Pretoria to convince to him that he could become a great leader, but only if he committed to showing people how they could improve their own conditions. Eiselen suggested:

> [If Bhekuzulu] could show that his own lands were better than land elsewhere, his pastures were better than pastures elsewhere, the children of his tribe came to school more regularly than children elsewhere, if his people led more healthy lives, less infants died and better huts were built—then his people would praise him. The only way to greatness was by making one's own people great. The more prosperous the people, the greater the chief.[29]

Eiselen concluded his remarks by asking how the Department could help Bhekuzulu become a better leader for his people. He reiterated that Bhekuzulu was first responsible for building up the Usuthu area; only then could he begin to build up the "Zulu nation." Despite claims that Bhekuzulu had not been called to Pretoria to be scolded, Eiselen implied that Bhekuzulu's position depended on his cooperation with the government.[30] Through these remarks, Eiselen once again placed the success of Nongoma as the lynchpin of apartheid policy in Zululand. Moreover, he placed the tribal authority as the immediate unit of concern rather than a unified Zulu polity.

The Undersecretary for Native Affairs, C.B. Young, echoed Eiselen's points. He reminded Bhekuzulu that the government had spent thousands of pounds on roads, boreholes, windmills, dipping tanks, and termite control. Young pressed Bhekuzulu on the issue of Bantu Authorities, claiming that if he accepted this legislation, the money allocated for these projects would be funneled through the chiefs and tribal authorities. Young claimed that although the

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[28] SAB NTS 249, 78/52 (2) Part 3, "Notes of Interview with Chief Cyprian at Head Office, Pretoria, at 11:00am on Tuesday, 2 November, 1954."
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.

government would help and advise the tribal authorities, they would not tell the chiefs what to do. According to Young, Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekezulu would hold executive power within this system.

Implicit in both Eiselen's and Young's statements were the pretentions of royal authority. The officials suggested a vision of some sort of eventual devolution of authority from the national government to a Zulu territorial authority with Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu as an executive leader, but this self-government would be highly conditional. From the perspective of the DNA, Zulu self-government could exist only if Bhekuzulu first cooperated with the government on soil reclamation and formed an Usuthu Tribal Authority. Only after he successfully carried out government policy in his own district and influenced, by example, other Zulu leaders to accept tribal and regional authorities in their own districts, would Bhekuzulu be able to assume a position that recognized his political leadership over other Zulu-speaking chiefs and subject populations. At this time, the idea of a territorial authority was still a distant ambition for the DNA, and its boundaries remained undefined.

Bhekuzulu countered by advocating for an immediate elevation of his position. Although Eiselen emphasized that his only political authority remained in the Usuthu ward, Bhekuzulu requested that he be allowed to form a council of all the chiefs in Zululand. Bhekuzulu still did not agree to the creation of tribal or regional authorities, suggesting that a council should be formed outside the framework of the Bantu Authorities Act that would incorporate all "Zulus."[31] For both the apartheid officials and the Paramount Chief, the idea that Zulu speakers would eventually form some political entity in Natal was a given. The form, however, of this entity and the path to its creation remained undecided at this point.

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[31] Ibid.

The next month, on March 7th, 1955 Native Commissioner Ackron held a meeting with Cyprian Bhekuzulu, Pumanyova Zulu, and Moses Zulu, and various advisers of the chiefs to discuss the creation of tribal authorities in Nongoma. Ackron explained the details of the Bantu Authorities Act, including the creation of tribal, regional, and territorial authorities, emphasizing that the creation of tribal authorities was the most immediate priority. While he claimed that the legislation did nothing more than legally recognize pre-existing practices and institutions, the chiefs countered that it was drastically different. Bhekuzulu protested that chiefly authority was hereditary, and thus the creation of a tribal authority would undermine chiefs by placing power within a council. Pumanyova Zulu suggested that it would be more prudent for the government to continue carrying out administrative duties and exclude chiefs all together, thereby negating the possibility of the members of the tribal authority usurping the power of the chiefs.

History once again became a central weapon of political argument. Chief Moses Zulu claimed that the Bantu Authorities system would further erode the power of the Paramount Chief. Moses claimed that before the arrival of Europeans in Natal in the time of Shaka, the Zulus had only one leader ruling over them. After British conquest, the government appointed various chiefs and weakened the power of the Zulus, presumably as embodied in the authority of a single king through the subordination of other chiefs. Moses Zulu likened accepting the creation of tribal authorities to someone being "given a stick to thrash himself."[32] Moses' statements expanded the claim of the Zulu kingdom beyond the historic limits of the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom and presented the Zulu king as having power over all chieftaincies in Natal.

The minutes of the proceedings were sent to Secretary for Native Affairs Eiselen in Pretoria, who was keenly interested in the success of the Act in Zululand. In his commentary,

[32] SAB NTS 8993, 214/362 (0), "Meeting in connection with the Bantu Authorities Act, held at Nongoma on 28.3.55, Attendees include Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu, Chief Pumanyova Zulu, Chief Moses Zulu, members of the ibandhla, and Mr. G.T. Ackron, Native Commissioner."

Eiselen noted the important role Bhekuzulu could play in convincing the rest of Natal to accept the Bantu Authorities Act. Eiselen suggested that the Native Commissioner and Chief Native Commissioner communicate to Bhekuzulu that he could **"**either remain a tolerated paramount chief—more a relic of the past— or that he can become a great chief by becoming the champion of better and more progressive ways of living for the Zulus."[33] Eiselen also suggested that the situation might improve if Bhekuzulu was surrounded by better advisers and trained in "proper leadership." Eiselen asked that Liefeldt and Ackron renew their efforts through both conventional and unconventional means to secure Bhekuzulu's cooperation.

Eiselen's understanding of Zulu history shaped his actions. Behind Eiselen's unwillingness to force government policy upon Nongoma was his belief that Bhekuzulu had significant influence over all the Zulu speakers in Natal. Eiselen cautioned Chief Native Commissioner Liefeldt that if they forced Bhekuzulu to accept Bantu Authorities, they would "have to tackle every tribal unit in Natal by itself and fight the same battle over and over again." Eiselen's goal was to convert Bhekuzulu to their point of view, not to force his hand.[34] Even though the government recognized Bhekuzulu's position as Paramount Chief as a "social" rather than a political head, Eiselen still viewed the Paramount Chieftaincy as highly influential across all of Natal. This belief was underpinned by the idea that all Zulu speakers viewed themselves as subjects of the monarchy. In Eiselen's mind, if the government was not careful in its dealings with Cyprian Bhekuzulu, it could jeopardize the success of apartheid policy across all of Natal.

On July 9th, 1955, the majority of the chiefs in Zululand met behind closed doors, without government officials present, in a school hall in Dhalamhlahla in the Nongoma district to discuss the Bantu Authorities Act. The resolutions they presented to the government in the aftermath

[33] SAB BAO 20/627, 128/1467, W.W.M. Eiselen, Secretary of Native Affairs to M.L.C Liefeldt, Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, April 3, 1955.
[34] Ibid.

illuminate the politics surrounding the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act in Zululand. These leaders debated the position of the *ingonyama,* the authority of the chiefs, and the lands allocated to the "Zulu nation." They objected to the Bantu Authorities Act as a "divide-and-rule" strategy, but they used the principles of increased African self-government to advocate for a central Zulu governing authority.

The debates over the Bantu Authorities Act show how Africans grappled with, appropriated, and made local meaning out of new apartheid policy. While the government sought to present the Bantu Authorities Act as legislation that simply formalized pre-existing practices, the chiefs expressed reservations about the meaning and intention of the Act. The government had translated the Act's name to the Zulu term *Zibuse,* meaning "rule yourself." The interpretation created a great deal of confusion since the legislation included a regimented progression from tribal, to regional, and finally to territorial authority. The chiefs challenged the government on the use of *Zibuse* in this context, protesting, "does it mean as an individual, or as a group? If a group, which group? Or as a nation?"[35]

The chiefs seized on the language of the Act to argue instead that there was a central "Zulu nation" that should immediately be granted the ability to rule itself. For this purpose, they made three main demands. First, they demanded the revival of Inkatha, the Zulu ethnic nationalist association that had been formed and disbanded during the life of Solomon kaDinuzulu, the prior chief of Usuthu and the father of Cyprian Bhekuzulu. Second, they demanded that the government plan an annual conference for all Zulu chiefs to meet with the Paramount Chief in Nongoma. Third, and finally, they asked that the chiefs' school at Nongoma, which had existed in the 1930s, be reopened and expanded for the sons of Zulu chiefs and *izinduna.*

[35] SAB NTS 8993, 214/362 (0), Minutes of Chiefs Meeting July 9, 1955 at Dhalmahlahla, Nongoma.

The resolutions further advocated for a central role for the Paramount Chief and for the creation of some sort of province-wide Zulu political body. The chiefs reiterated the desire for a more defined role for the Paramount Chief from the beginning, stating that "the Chiefs Conference wish to place on record, that if this Bantu Authorities Act gives them great powers and high prestige in the governing of their people under the guidance of the Paramount Chief not otherwise as united, we stand divided the Government may fail."[36] The chiefs resolved further that the government "return the crown of Cetshwayo" to Paramount Chief Cyprian. They asked that in the future, if there were any matters affecting the public interests of the "Zulus," the government refer the matters to the Paramount Chief, who would in turn summon all the chiefs to come together, discuss the issue, and give a single and unified reply to the government.[37]

These resolutions effectively rejected the tribe-by-tribe implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act and advocated for a stronger role for the Zulu paramount chieftaincy. They pushed for less interference from the central government in the affairs of the Zulu people. In the aftermath of the meeting, Native Commissioner Ackron met with Bhekuzulu to assure him that the Bantu Authorities Act would not lessen his power. Ackron believed that protecting Bhekuzulu's future position would secure his support. He wrote to Chief Native Commissioner Liefeldt that "if Cyprian is assured of an elevated position in the Territorial Authority once such a body is established for the Province of Natal, and that his Council will be given full control of the Tribal Fund of the Usuthu Tribe," he would accept the Bantu Authorities Act.[38]

Despite the hope that officials in the DNA held for a quick acceptance of the Bantu Authorities Act in Zululand, it progressed at a snail's pace in comparison to other homelands.

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[36] Ibid.
[37] SAB NTS 8993, 214/362 (0), Native Commissioner, Nongoma to Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, August 4, 1955.
[38] Ibid.

Bhekuzulu told the government that his people had not yet decided if they wanted to accept the Bantu Authorities Act. Bhekuzulu's response irritated officials in the DNA. The government, however, believed that Bhekuzulu was misleading them and people were waiting on the "word" from the chief. In December of 1955, an information officer in the DNA wrote that "the fact that so little progress has happened in Natal and Zululand is generally attributed to the negative attitude of the Zulu Paramount Cyprian. Although he is regarded as a weakling by the outside world… it is clear that a Zulu, even the most educated urbanite, would not tolerate such criticism. Any criticism of Cyprian, no matter how insignificant, is seen as a direct affront against the Zulu nation, because as Paramount Chief he symbolizes Zulu tradition."[39] The DNA believed that despite the difficulties of working with Bhekuzulu, they had no other choice.

The information officer also believed also that Bhekuzulu did not oppose the Bantu Authorities Act on principle, but instead the Paramount chief was unsure about the position he would take within these new governing structures. He also judged Bhekuzulu to be a poor leader based on his relative silence when differences of opinion arose at meetings between other Zulu leaders, in particular when those leaders were educated and well-spoken. While Bhekuzulu's silence was not unusual based on practices of consensus and discussion in Zulu political culture, the information officer interpreted the situation differently, arguing that "when Cyprian is in a meeting and there is a chief, headman, or common person with good speaking skills, learning and competence, their actions would be a threatening power against Zulu tradition."[40]

The information officer saw a way out of this dual conundrum of 1) well-educated leaders potentially marginalizing and embarrassing the Paramount Chief, and 2) the question of the Paramount Chief's role. He suggested that Bhekuzulu's role be modeled after the British

[39] SAB NTS 8993, 214/362 (0), Memo from Inligtingsbeampte (information officer) to the Undersecretary, Department of Native Affairs, December 8, 1955.
[40] Ibid.

monarchy, endowed with a greater ceremonial rather than political power. He suggested that Bhekuzulu be appointed as senior chief in the regional, and eventual territorial authority, that he formally open sessions, and that he ceremonially sign the decisions of the body. This would give him some status while preventing him from being an "obstacle" to government policy. The officer was unable to think of the monarch outside of the terms of "absolute" or "constitutional." While the idea of a constitutional monarchy would not take hold in the 1950s, the proposal foreshadowed debates that would take place in the 1960s leading up to the creation of the Zulu Territorial Authority.

1956-1957: Making Tribal Authorities to remake a Kingdom

At the beginning of 1956, Eiselen endorsed the proposal that the government assure Bhekuzulu that he would hold be a higher position within the Bantu Authorities system if he accepted the creation of tribal and regional authorities in Nongoma.[41] Contrary to the recommendations of the information officer, Eiselen still suggested that this higher position for the Paramount Chief be a political one. There were still reports that Bhekuzulus's uncle Isaac kaDinuzulu continued to travel around Nongoma agitating against soil rehabilitation.[42] The government speculated that the situation might be improved if Bhekuzulu would gain another adviser more willing to carry out government policies.[43]

With the issue of his paramount chieftaincy at stake, Bhekuzulu became more amenable to both soil rehabilitation and the creation of a Usuthu Tribal Authority and a Nongoma Regional

[41] SAB NTS 8993, 214/362 (0), W.W.M. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs, to Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, January 12, 1956.
[42] SAB BAO 20/627, 128/1467, B.J. Steyn, Inligtingsbeampte, Kantoor van die Inligtingsafdeling to Die Hoofinligtingebeampte, Dept. van Naturellesake, June 28, 1956.
[43] SAB NTS 8993, 214/362 (0), W.W.M. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs, to Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, January 12, 1956.

Authority. In March 1956, Native Commissioner Ackron met privately with Bhekuzulu about the formation of an Usuthu Tribal Authority.[44] Shortly after, DNA Information Officer B.J. Steyn met with the three chiefs in Nongoma about both soil conservation measures and the Bantu Authorities Act. In light of Eiselen's instructions, he promised that Bhekuzulu would hold a special role after the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act in Zululand. Ackron reported that senior members of the family received the statement quite warmly, although he did not specify which members.

Steyn turned back to the issue of soil reclamation, introducing for the first time the idea of a betterment proclamation under the 1949 legislation. He emphasized that Nongoma's soil had deteriorated even further since they first began discussing rehabilitation in 1951. Chief Pumanyova Zulu said that he agreed in principle with the law, but he claimed that they needed to prepare their people and investigate the matter further. However, Bhekuzulu, who had just been promised an elevated position within the Bantu Authorities system contingent on his cooperation with the government, expressed for the first time in nearly five years support for soil reclamation, saying that "it is law, and it is time that we obey it…. We are subjects of the government, let us accept this scheme."[45]

Bhekuzulu's affirmation that they were government subjects shows how Africans navigated and understood the unfolding of this new system of multi-layered sovereignty. This meeting was a major tipping point. The Nongoma district, whose leaders had previously resisted both the Bantu Authorities Act and different types of soil conservation efforts, became poised to be the first district in Zululand to accept both betterment planning and tribal authorities. In doing

[44] SAB NTS 8993, 214/362 (0), Chief Native Commissioner, Natal to W.W.M. Eiselen, Secretary of Native Affairs, July 19, 1956.
[45] Ibid.

so, they also accepted a new political system in which power would be divided between the apartheid state and tribal authorities.

At a quarterly meeting of chiefs in Nongoma on January 11th, 1957, which was attended by Native Commissioner A.F. Vosloo, who replaced G.T. Ackron, and about 500 izinduna and subjects, Cyprian Bhekuzulu designated a new deputy, Ndesheni Zulu, for appointment by the government as his new deputy. Ndesheni Zulu was the son of Mnyayiza Zulu, a royal family member and induna who had previously cooperated with Isaac Zulu in opposing soil rehabilitation. Ndesheni Zulu, however, was more supportive of Bantu Authorities and soil improvement efforts.[46] While the central government technically appointed Ndesheni, Cyprian Bhekuzulu emphasized to the attendees that the appointment was made on his request, and "he is not a government official…he is our man." After this new appointment, the influence of Isaac Zulu and other royal family members who opposed Bantu Authorities and betterment waned.

While there had been little to no progress towards the creation of tribal authorities for the first six years after the initial passage of the Bantu Authorities Act, the situation rapidly shifted. Vosloo informed the attendees that the time had come when "they could no longer stand more careless or indifferent to Bantu Authorities."[47] Vosloo stated that he would spend the next month explaining the law and regulations of the Bantu Authorities Act to chiefs and their councils. Subsequently, Vosloo, the chiefs, and the izinduna would seek to educate all the members of the "tribe" in Nongoma on the details of the Bantu Authorities Act. Vosloo wrote shortly afterwards to Chief Native Commissioner Liefeldt, expressing great hope that opposition to government

[46] SAB NTS 8993, 214/362 (0), A.F. Vosloo, Native Commissioner, Nongoma, to Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, January 17, 1957, "Minutes of a Meeting of the Paramount Chief and Chiefs held at Nongoma on January 11th, 1957."
[47] SAB NTS 8993, 214/362 (0), A.F. Vosloo, Native Commissioner, Nongoma to Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, January 22, 1957.

policy would soon cease. He reported a week later that "the appointment of Ndesheni is a step in the right direction and that it will pay in the course of time rewarding dividends."[48]

Within the last few months of 1957, Cyprian Bhekuzulu agreed to both betterment planning and Bantu Authorities in a move to consolidate the position of the royal house within the apartheid order. On August 9th, 1957, Bhekuzulu, Ndesheni Zulu, and other senior izinduna visited Vosloo's office to announce that they accepted both betterment planning and the creation of the Usuthu Tribal Authority.[49] For the DNA, the long-standing goal of using the Usuthu area and the Nongoma district as an example for the rest of Zululand was beginning to be realized. Vosloo shortly thereafter wrote to Chief Native Commissioner Liefeldt that the propaganda value of the installation of the Usuthu Tribal Authority could be significant.[50]

This cooperation paid off for Cyprian Bhekuzulu, yielding immediate improvements in his position. Vosloo advocated for a more public role for Bhekzulu outside his own district. Previously, at a conference for all Native Commissioners in Natal, there was a request that Bhekuzulu call together all the chiefs in Zululand personally to meet with them and make a statement regarding his acceptance of the act. Vosloo recommended that all chiefs be invited to the installation of the Usuthu Tribal Authority, thus killing two birds with one stone.[51]

For Cyprian Bhekuzulu, the acceptance of the Usuthu Tribal Authority and the Bantu Authorities Act as a whole represented for the first time since conquest that the political recognition of the Zulu royal house was imaginable. The acceptance of the Bantu Authorities Act in Nongoma also marked a critical moment when local leaders struggled with the government

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[48] Ibid.
[49] SAB BAO 20/627, 128/1467, A.F. Vosloo, Native Commissioner, Nongoma, to Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, August 10, 1957.
[50] Ibid.
[51] SAB NTS 8993, 214/362 (1), A.F. Vosloo, Native Commissioner, Nongoma, to Chief Native Commissioner, Nongoma, August 27, 1957.

over visions of the political future in the Zulu speaking areas of Natal. The *Ingonyama* had not held any powers outside of Nongoma district since the nineteenth century. By accepting the creation of the Usuthu Tribal Authority, Bhekuzulu sought to consolidate the centrality of the royal house in the apartheid political order. While Bhekuzulu and others had originally rejected the tribe-by-tribe implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act, by this point, he embraced it as the most logical path towards a political resurgence of the Zulu royal house.

The formal installation of the Usuthu Tribal Authority was held in Nongoma on December 4th, 1957. Mr. De Wet Nel, a member of Parliament,[52] presided over the ceremony. He pointed out the historic significance of the ceremony's location. In 1840, Voortrekker Andries Pretorius installed Mpande as King of the Zulus. De Wet Nel stated that "one of the fathers of my people, and one of the fathers of the current chiefs met here together to decide the limits of the Zulu nation. I speak of [Andries] Pretorius and Mpande."[53] While De Wet Nel brought this up as an example of historic relations between the Boer/Afrikaner and Zulu peoples, the story was far more complicated.

Mpande had been the half-brother of both Shaka and Dingane, whom he later succeeded as King. The conflict between Mpande and Dingane became known among Zulu-speaking people in the region as "the breaking of the rope that held the nation together." In 1838, Mpande fled from Dingane and took his followers across the Tugela River. Dingane famously killed the voortrekker leader Piet Retief and his followers later that year. In response, Andries Pretorius led 470 voortrekkers against the Dingane's forces in the Battle of Blood River on December 16th, 1838. Approximately 3,000 Zulus were killed, severely weakening Dingane's kingdom. In

[52] De Wet Nel was a prominent member of the Afrikaner Broederbond. He eventually replaced Verwoerd as Minister of Bantu Administration and Development.
[53] SAB NTS 8993, 214/362 (1), "Mnr. De wet Nel, L.V. se Toespraak te Nongoma op 4.12.1957: Geleentheid: Formele Instelling van Stamowerheid vir Usuthustam."

January 1940, Mpande overthrew his half-brother in a revolt with the assistance of 400 of Pretorius's voortrekkers.[54] Pretorius then proclaimed Mpande "King of the Zulus" on the very spot where his great-great-grandson, Cyprian Bhekuzulu, would be installed as the head of the first tribal authority in Zululand.

De Wet Nel positioned the installation of the Usuthu Tribal Authority not only as a major event within Nongoma, but also as a significant leap forward for all Zulu people. He proclaimed that, one day, all the chiefs in Natal would "accept the government of their forefathers as legalized by that Bantu Authorities Act…and their eyes [will] turn to Nongoma" as they celebrate the creation of a territorial authority under the leadership of Cyprian Bhekuzulu. De Wet Nel also emphasized that the government wished to see the tribal authorities and eventually the territorial authorities extend their reach towards those working in the city, so that the "sons and daughters of the Zulu nation will not be lost."[55] While Bhekuzulu accepted the Bantu Authorities Act to solidify his position, the government saw it as a way to develop a sense of Zulu ethnic identity tied to a land separated from the "white homeland."

The success of the tribal authority and betterment planning were central to the government's plans, but there were several early stumbling blocks. Betterment first re-started in the Tokazi area in the Usuthu ward in March of 1958, just a few months after the establishment of the tribal authority.[56] The planning committee believed that because this area was in "the Paramount Chief's Capital," it would be an example for the rest of Zululand. [57] The committee

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[54] Andrew Duminy and Bill Guest, *Natal and Zululand from Earliest Times to 1910: A New History* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1989); John Laband, *Rope of Sand: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1995).
[55] SAB NTS 8993, 214/362 (1), "Mnr. De wet Nel, L.V. se Toespraak te Nongoma op 4.12.1957: Geleentheid: Formele Instelling van Stamowerheid vir Usuthustam."
[56] SAB BAO 20/627, 128/1467/1/1, "Herwinning en Nedersetting Nkomokazulu: Afdeling van die Usuthu Wyk: Nongoma District," March 31, 1958.
[57] Ibid.

recommended that only 125 "economic units" could be supported in the area, despite the presence of 365 families. The committee recommended that the best farmers receive the 125 units and the rest of the residents be relocated to residential villages. While these plans were initially to be carried out by white officials, the committee recommended that the newly established Usuthu Tribal Authority take charge of most plans. While the area did not have extensive cattle culling, relocations did occur, often targeting poorer households with fewer buildings to move.[58]

Oral sources suggest that Bhekuzulu was not very cooperative and continued to obstruct betterment planning even after 1957, but he still had to make some efforts to appease the government. There were small incidents of discontent towards Bhekuzulu. In 1959, there was a report of two people traveling around Natal spreading rumors that the Paramount Chief was selling their land, and it would be better to kill him.[59] There is a mention of Bhekuzulu temporarily leaving Nongoma due to supposed threats, and at times residents criticized his deputy Ndesheni Zulu. Beyond these isolated incidents, however, the archival material shows surprisingly few instances of outright opposition to the Paramount Chief. In an interview in 2016, Prince Herbert Zulu stated that "all of these problems [regarding betterment planning] started in Nongoma. They said that Cyprian was the king. So that the other areas could accept it, it must be pressurized with Cyprian first." However, Herbert Zulu insisted that this did not lead to any significant animosity towards the *ingonyama* himself. He told a story of a community meeting in the Usuthu area in the late 1950s with Cyprian Bhekuzuu and the Native Commissioner, presumably Vosloo. At the meeting, the community members listened to

[58] Prince Herbert Zulu, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 1, 2016, Nongoma, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
[59] SAB NTS 249, 78/52 (2) Part 3, P.J.A. Carsten, Waarn. Bantoesakekommissaris, Nongoma to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, December 30, 1959.

Bhekuzulu, but when it came time for the Native Commissioner to speak, someone shouted "We only listen to the king!" Afterwards, they shouted "*bayete*" in a salute to Bhekuzulu, and then they left in protest before the Native Commissioner could address them.[60]

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, betterment planning and the activities of the Usuthu Tribal Authority continued in Nongoma. However, like many places across South Africa's homelands, betterment never succeeded in improving agricultural production. By 1970, there were reports of dams, which had been built at significant expense, silting up. Water remained in scarce supply. This was exacerbated by several droughts throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, including 1962, 1965, 1968, and 1970.[61] While units of land were only supposed to be given to "progressive farmers," there were so many people who wanted land that no practical way could be found to distribute it. Grazing land and arable land was still in short supply, and as a result, people plowed across grass strips and contour banks meant to protect the soil from further erosion. Informants during my interviews in 2016 often pointed out large dongas that posed a huge danger to children playing in the area.

The government's attempts to use Bhekuzulu to encourage other chiefs to accept the Bantu Authorities Act also failed to bear immediate fruit. This was in large part because they refused to elevate his position outside his own ward before the creation of a territorial authority. According to the letter of appointment presented to him in 1951, Bhekuzulu had no political

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[60]Prince Herbert Zulu, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 1, 2016, Nongoma, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

[61] UAR, Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 5, N1/26/2 (1), "Verslag van Werksaamheide, Kommissaris-Generaal: Zoeloe Volkseenheid," C.G. Nel, Commissioner-General, Zulu National Unit, April 26th, 1962; UAR, Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 41, 23/7/51, Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Nongoma, to Secretary, Nongoma Regional Authority, July 19th, 1965; UAR, Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 41, 23/7/51, Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Nongoma, to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, August 26th, 1968; UAR, Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 54, N11/2/3/4, Minutes of Meeting of Nongoma Regional Authority, March 17, 1970.

recognition outside of the Usuthu area.[62] He did exercise some informal influence over other chiefs, especially those in the Nongoma area. The other two Nongoma district tribal authorities, the Mandhlalkazi Tribal Authority under Chief Pumanyova Zulu,[63] and the Matheni Tribal Authority under Chief Moses Zulu, formed in 1957 shortly after the establishment of the Usuthu Tribal Authority.[64] On September 11th, 1959, Bantu Affairs Commissioner[65] of Nongoma A.F. Vosloo wrote to his superior, the Chief Bantu Commissioner Coertze, advocating that Bhekuzulu be given full recognition across all of Natal as the lawfully appointed Zulu Paramount Chief beyond his current role as "social head."[66]

Vosloo based his suggestion on three factors. First, he claimed that the "Zulu nation" recognized Bhekuzulu as their Paramount Chief. Second, the Department had used Bhekuzulu to propagate government policy across Natal, which he judged to be unreasonable since the government would not recognize his political authority outside of Nongoma. Third, and finally, Vosloo noted that Bhekuzulu now fully cooperated with both the Bantu Authorities Act and betterment within his district.[67] The Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner replied that while he agreed in principle, there was nothing in the Bantu Authorities Act or the in Native Administration Act of 1929 that could define the position of a Paramount Chief across an entire province. He suggested that Bhekuzulu's position could only be elevated once the "Zulu nation"

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[62] SAB NTS 249, 78/52 (2) Part 3, A.F. Vosloo, Native Commissioner, Nongoma, to Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, September 11, 1959.
[63] UAR COGTA 85, N11.1.3.1 (32) 3, Mandlakazi Tribal Resolution: Bantu Authorities, June 7, 1957.
[64] UAR COGTA 85, N11.1.3.1 (32) 3, A.F. Vosloo, Native Commissioner, Nongoma, to the Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, June 14, 1957.
[65] Around this time the Department of Native Affairs changed its name to the Department of Bantu Affairs and Development. Officials previously known as "Chief Native Commissioner" were re-titled "Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner," and "Native Commissioner" titles were changed to "Bantu Affairs Commissioner."
[66] SAB NTS 249, 78/52 (2) Part 3, A.F. Vosloo, Native Commissioner, Nongoma, to Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, September 11, 1959.
[67] Ibid.

created a territorial authority. At the end of 1959, Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, J.O. Doods, expressed his agreement that nothing further could be done until a Zulu territorial authority was created.

CONCLUSION

After over half a decade of struggle between the government and local leaders, the Bantu Authorities Act and betterment planning came to the Nongoma district in the late 1950s. Both Bantu Authorities and various soil conservation efforts—including rehabilitation and betterment—brought up debates about the role of the paramount chief, his authority, and the proper relations between the government and Zulu leadership. In these debates, the government and Zulu leaders used narratives of Zulu history as they imagined the political future.

Cyprian Bhekuzulu ultimately accepted both government policies in order to strengthen the position of the royal house and its claim as the proper representative of the Zulu people across Natal. In doing so, however, he temporarily retreated from the initial vision of *Zibuse*—or self-rule—implemented primarily first at the level of the "Zulu nation," with the Zulu monarchy at the head, rather than at the level of the tribal authority. The government, moreover, hitched the future apartheid policy in the region to the Paramount Chief. Bhekzulu's position in the province was by no means secured. He still had no official political authority recognized outside of Zululand. This could only come with the creation of a territorial authority. However, the following chapters will show that the very geographical boundaries of the hypothetical Zulu Territorial Authority for the "Zulu nation" was not a foregone conclusion. By the late 1960s, uncertainty about these boundaries would ultimately undermine the position of the Zulu royal house.

Chapter 3: Zulus Or Zulu-Speakers?: History, Ethnicity, and the Boundaries of a "Zulustan," 1962 to 1963

In 1960, in what has since been referred to as the "Year of Africa," several colonies became independent. In France's African colonies, the idea of a French Community collapsed as the majority of the former colonies became new nation-states. Belgium suddenly gave up the Congo, which almost immediately descended into civil war. On February 3rd, Harold Macmillan made his "winds of change" speech in Cape Town. North of the Limpopo, while colonial governments and African leaders had at times previously sought some solution outside of either nation-state or empire, by 1960, the nation-state had prevailed.

Decolonization across Africa contributed to new political imperatives within South Africa. The framework of the Bantu Authorities Act was no longer sufficient. Verwoerd introduced the controversial 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act without even consulting his parliamentary caucus.[1] The Act designated eight African "national units" based on ethnic and linguistic divisions. Each unit would be assigned a Commissioner-General, who answered directly to the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development in Pretoria. The Commissioner-Generals were charged with the task of guiding their assigned unit into a self-governing and independent homeland. In this project that Verwoerd termed "internal decolonization," the bantustan policy attempted to construct new forms of sovereignty that

[1] Saul Dubow, "Were there political alternatives in the wake of the Sharpeville-Langa Violence in South Africa, 1960?," *The Journal of African History* 56, no. 1 (March 2015): 119–42.

would preserve white supremacy in the majority of South Africa's territory while fashioning the new homelands as "independent" countries.

Events within South Africa in 1960 lent urgency to the policies of grand apartheid. On March 21st, police opened fire on protestors in Sharpeville, killing 69 people. Two weeks later on April 9th at the Rand Easter Show in Johannesburg, a wealthy English farmer with a history of mental illness but no political affiliations fired two shots at Prime Minister Verwoerd's face. Verwoerd somehow survived. After his recovery, he insisted, in May 1960, that the government move forward with the creation of independent homelands.[2] The events of 1960 have often been interpreted as turning points in South African history leading inevitably towards both the ANC's turn to armed struggle and Verwoerd's single-minded pursuit of grand apartheid and republicanism.[3]

At the beginning of the 1960s, this project of "internal decolonization" still seemed to be a viable political option to actors both inside and outside of South Africa. In January of 1961, when United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold visited South Africa, he suggested that the bantustans could be a competitive alternative to full integration, on the condition that the white government set aside coherent territory for Africans, present a plan for their economic and political development based on the will of their people, and provide protection for workers in South Africa.[4] Herman Giliomee has pointed out an uncomfortable reality at this point in history:

> Verwoerd had a unique opportunity here to develop a plan that could gather sufficient international support for the 'decolonisation' of South Africa. The indications are that, supremely confident as always, he felt his government could rise to the challenge. Hammarskjold reported to the UN that Verwoerd indicated he found the talks

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[2] Ibid, 130.
[3] Recently this interpretation has come under criticism by Dubow, who has suggested that if Verwoerd had not survived the assassination attempt, apartheid might not have been implemented in such a rigorous and oppressive manner. See ibid, 120.
[4] Hermann Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders: A Supreme Test of Power*, (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2012), 78.

> constructive and intended to invite him again to explore further the matters that were raised.[5]

During the 1970s, political unrest, lack of rural investment, and the transition of bantustans into "dumping grounds" for surplus labor made the homeland policy politically unpalatable.[6] At this moment in 1960, however, many actors both domestically and internationally saw the homeland system as an imaginable future.

The definition of these distinct national units, however, created a new host of political problems. In comparison to places like the Ciskei, which lacked pre-colonial historical unity, the history of the Zulu kingdom in the nineteenth century seemed to provide the government with a framework to approach the political unification of the region under grand apartheid.[7] By 1960, the apartheid state still believed that placing Cyprian Bhekuzulu as head of the eventual territorial authority would incentivize all Africans in Natal to accept grand apartheid. For Bhekuzulu, this moment represented a potential rebirth of the Zulu kingdom that would exceed even its pre-colonial territorial limits. The creation of the Zulu National Unit assumed a one-to-one relationship between the Zulu language and Zulu political identity. This relationship did not exist.

The creation of a Zulu National Unit sparked new, and thus far unstudied, debates about history, authority, and Zulu ethnicity spanning local, provincial, and national spheres of power. From 1962 to 1963, government debates about the relationship between the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom and apartheid-era Zulu speakers nearly erased the possibility of a territorial authority headed by the Zulu royal family. In 1962, a memo from government ethnologist Nicholaas

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[5] Ibid.
[6] Laura Evans, "South Africa's Bantustans and the Dynamics of 'Decolonisation': Reflections on Writing Histories of the Homelands," *South African Historical Journal* 64, no. 1 (2012): 119.
[7] For more on the Ciskei, see Laura Evans, "Resettlement and the Making of the Ciskei Bantustan, South Africa, c.1960–1976," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 40, no. 1 (2014): 21–40.

Jacobus Van Warmelo challenged the historical and ethnological basis for a territorial authority tied to the royal family. Eventually, the government decided that Bhekuzulu's role would be dependent on his ability to persuade other chiefs to accept the Bantu Authorities Act. This failed to happen, setting the stage for another seven years of delays in the implementation of the homeland system in Natal. More importantly, it marked the beginning of the end of a future in which the *ingonyama* could assume a central position in the Zulu homeland.

These developments signaled a major crisis for the apartheid state. Under the Promotion of Bantu-Self Government Act, the creation of "national units" implied that boundaries of authority were supposed to align with ethnic identity. The government initially presumed that a single Zulu identity existed or could be constructed. In one way, this was a common theme in colonial history: the challenge of defining the "native" as a tribal and ethnic subject.[8] In South Africa, this became linked to ethnos theory—which assumed that all people belonged to distinct and primordial ethnic groups that needed to be preserved.[9] However, in the context of global decolonization and an era of "self-determination," the stakes were much higher. If a nation-state was the only legitimate holder of sovereignty, South Africa had to build homeland "states" around African "nations."[10]

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[8] Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996); Mamdani, *Define and Rule Native as Political Identity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012);

[9] Hermann Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People*, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003); Adam Kuper ""Today we have the naming of parts: The Work of Anthropologists in Southern Africa," in *Empires, Nations, and Natives: Anthropology and State-Making, eds.* Benoit de L'Estoile, Federico G Neiburg, and Lygia Sigaud (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Evelyn Plaice, "Debating Indigeneity in Canada and South Africa" in *Culture Wars: Context, Models and Anthropologists' Accounts*, in eds. Deborah James, Evelyn Mary Plaice, and Christina Toren (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010); Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders.*

[10] For the development of this idea through the 1970s, see Jamie Miller, "Africanising Apartheid: Identity, Ideology, and State-Building in Post-Independence Africa," *The Journal of African History* 56, no. 3 (November 2015): 449–470; Jamie Miller, *An African Volk: The Apartheid Regime and Its Search for Survival* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

Government Ethnology and the Crisis of 1962

Government officials had spent the 1950s persuading Bhekuzulu to support the Bantu Authorities Act and soil rehabilitation programs, thinking that he held influence over all Zulu speakers. While they delayed the creation of the territorial authority at the beginning of the 1960s after the Pondoland Revolt, most officials still believed that once the time was right, they would be able to use Bhekuzulu's influence to move forward swiftly with the establishment of a Zulu territorial authority. In June 1962, however, BAD Chief Ethnologist Nicolaas Jacobus Van Warmelo pointed out a critical flaw in this thinking.

Van Warmelo served as Chief Ethnologist of the BAD from 1934 to 1969. He shaped the intellectual and ideological development of both ethnos theory and native administration writ large in South Africa. He was a prominent German-trained cultural anthropologist who had written several influential ethnological works, including the 1935 *Preliminary Survey of the Bantu Tribes of South Africa*.[11] In 1952, he created a language map of South Africa dividing the region into ten geographically distinct "tribes," which then served as the basis for the creation of the homelands.[12] On June 13th, 1962, Warmelo wrote a memo to the Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development C.B. Young,[13] in which he argued that the establishment of a territorial authority in Natal was out of the question. Warmelo asserted that for years, white government officials had developed policy based on an insufficient distinction between "Zulu people" and "Zulu speaking" people. Warmelo insisted that "real Zulus" were those with the *isibongo,* or clan name, Zulu, and those who were more or less subjects of the pre-colonial Zulu

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[11] Plaice, 37; see also Dubow, *Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race*; Giliomee, *Afrikaners*; Adam Kupyer "Today we have the naming of parts."
[12] Dubow, *Scientific Racism,* 81.
[13] Coertze's replacement.

kingdom. However, he used the term "Zulu-speaking" to refer to a group of people with a common language and certain common customs.

Warmelo argued that Zulu was actually spoken by many people who were never actually "Zulu," which had major implications for the political makeup of the Zulu National Unit:

> Another misrepresentation is that the political unit that we know as the "Zulu kingdom" included all Zulu speakers at one time or another. On the contrary, many tribes fled to avoid being made to fight for the Zulus, and thus were never "made Zulu." Many of the tribes returned back from Natal only after Zulu power was broken, and some battled with whites against the Zulus. When these people are addressed as "Zulu," it is only out of courtesy that they do not rebuke the speaker.[14]

For over a decade, officials in the Department of Native Affairs, and its successor, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, assumed that all Zulu speakers in Natal were part of the "Zulu nation" or "Zulu kingdom."

Van Warmelo's objections had major implications for both the creation of a territorial authority and the role of the Paramount Chief within it. Warmelo pointed out that many Zulu speakers had only a vague affinity for the Zulu royal house if any at all. Warmelo suggested there was outright animosity towards the Zulu kingdom among many chiefs and residents in southern Natal, where, historically, many people had fled from violence north of the Tugela.[15]

Despite the flexibility and complexity surrounding Zulu identity through the twentieth century, of which historians are now well aware, it is important to recognize that van Warmelo was primarily concerned with the historic boundaries of the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom. Based on this concern, he proposed a drastically different solution. Van Warmelo suggested that few Zulu speaking people outside of the geographic limits of the historic Zulu kingdom in northern Natal were currently willing to speak of the Zulu royal house as their own. He argued, therefore,

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[14] Ibid.
[15] UAR COGTA 104, N11/3/2 (X), N.J. van Warmelo, State Ethnologist to the Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, June 13, 1962.

that after years of misrepresentation and incompetence by white officials, policy would have to be quickly re-worked.

Van Warmelo proposed uncoupling the Zulu kingdom from the future territorial authority. He recommended that the BAD initially form a territorial authority centered north of the Tugela River and then allow other surrounding areas to join if they desired. Once that process was complete, the government should establish several separate territorial authorities for other Zulu speakers.[16] Van Warmelo also recommended that the meeting with chiefs to discuss the establishment of the territorial authority should be held in Eshowe instead of Nongoma to avoid placing Bhekuzulu as the de facto head of the future polity.[17] This marked the first time the archival materials show a government official proposing that 1) the Zulu king would not become the head of a territorial authority for the Zulu speakers in Natal, and 2) the government might establish more than one territorial authority for Zulu speakers.

The government subsequently debated the idea of creating three separate territorial authorities for Zulu speaking people. On July 5th, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner J.O. Cornell, Dr. van Warmelo, Dr. Bothma, and Mr. Myburgh from the BAD headquarters in Pretoria, and Bantu Affairs Commissioner Vosloo met in Nongoma. One unnamed attendee of the meeting, most likely Dr. van Warmelo, insisted that three meetings of chiefs be held to discuss the creation of several territorial authorities. Under this plan, one meeting would have been held in Nongoma for the Zululand chiefs, one in Pietermaritzburg for the Nqutu, Msinga, Ndwedwe, Mapumulo, Greytown, and Pietermaritzburg chiefs, and a final meeting in southern districts of Natal for the chiefdoms around Port Shepstone.[18] According to this scenario, Natal

[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] UAR COGTA 104, N11/3/2 (X) Vol 5, J.O. Cornell, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal, to Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, Pretoria, July 11, 1962.

would ultimately have three territorial authorities. The officials did not reach a consensus on this proposal, and the matter continued to be discussed within the BAD.

In the aftermath of the July 5th meeting, Cornell wrote to Pretoria, urging the BAD to swiftly decide if there would be one or more territorial authorities for Natal.[19] Cornell broke with the ethnologist van Warmelo and advocated that the BAD create a single territorial authority. While he did not present any sort of historical or academic knowledge of the region, he continued to see all Zulu speakers as one ethnic group. He insisted, "I personally consider that only one authority would be in the tradition of the Zulu Nation…I do not think there is any dispute that the Bantu in the Harding-Ixopo-Port Shepstone area are more affiliated to the Pondo and other people of the Transkei than they are to the Usuthu, Mandlakazi, and Ndwandwe people."[20] As a result of this conviction, he recommended that only one meeting of chiefs for the establishment of a territorial authority be held. He believed that holding this meeting in Nongoma, and using Bhekuzulu as a figurehead, could be effective propaganda for the creation of a single Zulu Territorial Authority[21]

The shape of the eventual territorial authority came under debate two months later at a conference of all the Bantu Affairs Commissioners in Natal, which was held from the 7th to the 9th of August, 1962. The conference, chaired by Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner Cornell, discussed the challenges and the future of the Bantu Authorities system in Natal. Cornell opened the floor to the Bantu Affairs Commissioners from across Natal, asking if a single territorial authority should be formed for all Zulus in Natal, or if the province's native reserves should be

[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

divided up into several territorial authorities.[22] The debates that followed demonstrated significant divisions within the government based on differing understandings of history and the relationship between the Zulu kingdom and all Zulu speakers across Natal.

On one side were those—primarily officials with closer ties either either the central government or Zululand—who wanted to create a single Zulu territorial authority. They generally believed that Zulu language, ethnicity, and political identity were one and the same. Vosloo, the Bantu Affairs Commissioner from Nongoma, was the first to speak. He claimed that Dr. van Warmelo's position was based on pure "technicalities."[23] Vosloo noted that other chiefs from outside of Zululand frequently visited the Paramount Chief, indicating that these chiefs saw themselves as his subjects. Mr. Van der Merwe, a development specialist from Pretoria, supported his position. The Commissioner-General C.G. Nel, also a Pretoria appointee, suggested that although the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom did not stretch across all of Natal, many people south of the Tugela River still showed respect to the Paramount Chief and his representatives. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Mapumulo affirmed that the seventeen chiefs in his area would be subordinate to the Paramount Chief.[24]

A few Bantu Affairs Commissioners from outside of Zululand were open to the idea of a single Territorial Authority, but they suggested that it might take significant persuasion. Bantu Affairs Commissioner Munick of Port Shepstone suggested that Bhekuzulu needed to travel more, especially in southern Natal. He stated—despite the ethnologist's objection that the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom existed only further north—that "the Port Shepstone Bantu owe their

[22] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 9, N1/26/2 (3), "Minutes of the Bantu Affairs Commissioners Conference," August 7th, 8th, and 9th, 1962.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.

allegiance to the Zulu nation and not to the Xhosa."[25] Munick's statements indicate an ideological framework that saw all Africans as part of distinct ethnic and "national" groups based solely on language. He argued that Africans in southern Natal would need to be "educated" on where their allegiance should lie. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Ingwavuma suggested that much more could be done to "propagate love" for the royal house across Natal.

An opposing faction, however, aligned with van Warmelo's view that the relationship between Zulu ethnicity, language, and political authority was much more complicated. Several other Bantu Affairs Commissioners reported that the chiefs and the people in their districts felt no attachment to the Zulu royal house. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Msinga, which is on the border of Zululand, reported that people there still remember fleeing Shaka in the nineteenth century. When Walting had suggested that the Msinga chiefs invite Bhekuzulu to open their agricultural show, the chiefs had looked at each other sideways and nobody would approve of the idea. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Nqutu noted that some of the population in his district was actually Basuto and would openly oppose being put under a Zulu king.[26] Even in Nkandla, in Zululand proper, Bantu Affairs Commissioner Malan reported that the sixteen chiefs in the district felt no affinity to the Paramount Chief.[27] After Bhekuzulu's last visit to the district, the chiefs stated that they would not invite him again, nor would they contribute financially to the building of the new royal household residence.[28] The Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Port

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[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] For a more interesting backstory on the history of Nkandla and its relationship with the Zulu Kingdom, see Jacob Dlamini, "Collaborators and the riven truth behind Zuma's Nkandla," *Business Day,* July 27, 2015.
[28] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 9, N1/26/2 (3), "Minutes of the Bantu Affairs Commissioners Conference" August 7, 8, and 9, 1962.

Natal, Mr. Elston, stated bluntly: "The Zulus do not all accept Cyprian."[29] He suggested that Natal be divided into three zones with a territorial authority for each.

These debates demonstrated that the creation of a territorial authority with Bhekuzulu as head might not be as simple as previously thought. It also placed into doubt the government's assumptions throughout the 1950s that all other districts in Natal would fall into line with tribal authorities and betterment planning as soon as the Paramount Chief accepted these policies in Nongoma. At the core of these debates were the definitions of ethnicity and political subjecthood. Advocates of a single territorial authority saw the Zulu nation, Zulu ethnicity, and Zulu language as largely congruent. For this faction, language defined ethnic and national identity.

Ultimately, the political expediency of a single territorial authority won out. Minister de Wet Nel asserted that all Zulu people belonged to a single nation: "We already have eight Bantu ethnic groups in South Africa and one should respect their national units…Difficulties are not insurmountable and the Zulu Nation should be made politically aware."[30] Cornell proposed that a territorial authority first be established out of the existing tribal and regional authorities in Zululand, and then other chieftaincies be brought in as they formed tribal and regional authorities. When Cornell put his proposal to a vote, the Bantu Affairs Commissioners passed the motion. The Minister, the Commissioner-General, and the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner thereafter advocated that Bhekuzulu be allowed to invite all of Natal's chiefs to a meeting to discuss the Bantu Authorities Act.

In the aftermath of the meeting, Cornell continued to advocate that the government enhance the Paramount Chief's position. He argued that the BAD needed to undertake more

[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.

effective propaganda on behalf of the royal house. In late August, he requested that Minister de Wet Nel attend the inaugurations of the Pietermaritzburg, Port Shepstone, and Umzinto Regional Authorities with Bhekuzulu. Cornell felt that this would help create a greater sense of Zulu identity and loyalty to the royal house in the midlands and Southern Natal.[31]

At this moment in the middle of 1962, Cornell and others hoped that the territorial authority would be established within a year. However, the fact that the majority of areas in Natal had not yet formed tribal and regional authorities raised doubts in the minds of officials in Pretoria. On October 3, BAD Secretary C.B. Young announced that no immediate steps could be taken for the establishment of a territorial authority for the Zulu National Unit.[32] Young noted that they hoped that the establishment of all other territorial authorities in South Africa would be completed by the end of the year, and then the Bantu Authorities branch in Pretoria would soon be able to devote more time to Natal.

This turn was rather sudden. On the very same day, the *Natal Mercury* had published an article claiming that a "Zulustan" was supposed to be established by the end of 1962. It reported that three new regional authorities—Mehlwesizwe, Ndlovu, and Inkanyezi—were either just formed or in the process of being established.[33] It is worth noting that this "Zulustan" was not without controversy in Natal. Natal's agricultural and industrial economy relied on the native reserves for cheap unskilled labor. White-owned businesses were concerned that the development of a territorial authority would take Natal's two million Africans out of the labor market.

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[31] UAR COGTA 104, N11/3/2 (X) Vol 5, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal, to Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, August 26, 1962.
[32] UAR COGTA 104, N11/3/2 (X), Vol 5, C.B. Young, Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, October 3, 1962.
[33] UAR COGTA 104, N11/3/2 (X), Vol 5, "Building a Zulustan," Newspaper Clipping, *Natal Mercury,* Wednesday, October 3, 1962.

On the other hand, former Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner A.D. Turton shortly thereafter published an editorial in the *Daily News* discussing the complexity of establishing a territorial authority. He emphasized that the current "underdevelopment" of the region meant that it would take years to create a self-sufficient African economy in the homeland.[34] For Turton, the commitment to separate development and the success of grand apartheid was more important than white industries' dependence on cheap, unskilled labor. These differing perspectives demonstrate the tensions and conflicting interests both within government and in broader business and society regarding the homeland policy.

Young suggested that the BAD officials focus instead on establishing regional and tribal authorities, which would later come together to form a territorial authority. Young still supported the idea of a single meeting of all chiefs in Natal, but that meeting would instead be to convince chiefs to accept both tribal and regional authorities. A territorial authority would have to wait. Young suggested that Bhekuzulu still send invitations to the meeting. This way, the government could maintain the illusion that the implementation of the Bantu Authorities system came from Africans themselves. To this end, Young recommended that all "propaganda in this connection must be unobtrusive and must be directed to the enhancement of the prestige of the Zulu royal house."[35] The government's greatest fear remained the prospect of an uprising against Bhekuzulu, such as the one faced by Pondo Paramount Chief Botha Singcau a few years earlier.

[34] UAR COGTA 104, N11/3/2 (X), "The African's World: Success of Zulustan is ruled by many factors," *Daily News,* November 8, 1962.
[35] UAR COGTA 104, N11/3/2 (X), Vol 5, C.B. Young, Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, October 3, 1962.

1963 Gathering at KwaKhethomthandayo Royal Kraal

Cyprian Bhekuzulu, with the cooperation of the Nongoma Bantu Affairs Commissioner and the Commissioner-General, began planning a meeting of chiefs from across Natal to be held in Nongoma at KwaKhethomthandayo Royal Kraal. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, Bhekuzulu's cousin, chaired the meeting. At this gathering, the formation of tribal and regional authorities across Natal, the very foundations of the eventual territorial authority, was to be debated by all the chiefs in the province.

However, in the lead up to the meeting, factions within the BAD in Pretoria were still concerned about granting Cyprian Bhekuzulu such a central place in the proceedings. The Private Secretary to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development wrote a memo expressing concern that Bhekuzulu was in a sensitive position.[36] The Private Secretary suggested that the initial appointment of Cyprian Bhekuzulu as Paramount Chief created two fundamental problems that had now spiraled out of control. First, it remained unclear over whom he had actually been appointed Paramount Chief. There was no certainty which Africans in Natal recognized the royal house. Secondly, the Paramount Chief had no concrete geographical jurisdiction.[37] The Private Secretary understood the Paramount Chief traditionally to have held a political position over a conglomerate of other chieftaincies based on genealogical blood status within his own tribe. The matter of determining which chieftaincies recognized the Zulu royal family was another issue. This led the Private Secretary to recommend against the government

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[36] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs 3, N1/1/3/1 (Stamped from the Personal Clerk, Commissioner-General, Zulu National Unit, Nongoma), Private Secretary, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development to Commissioner-General, Zulu National Unit, March 14, 1963; This clerk's name is not given in the document. I was unable to determine who it was based on other archival materials from the series.
[37] Ibid.

recognizing a political role for Bhekuzulu before the formation of the territorial authority. He suggested that once the territorial authority was formed, they could see how far Cyprian Bhekuzulu's jurisdiction stretched based on how many chiefs would follow him and accept the creation of tribal authorities. Based on that, they could decide how to recognize—or not recognize—Cyprian Bhekuzulu in a political role. Minister de Wet Nel also endorsed the idea that the creation of one territorial authority would eventually have to go forward. However, he decided that Bhekuzulu could only be considered as a potential chairman if all of the chieftaincies in Natal followed him in accepting government policy.[38]

In effect, the acceptance of Bantu Authorities became a litmus test for royal recognition and subjecthood. While in the 1950s officials thought that Cyprian Bhekuzulu was the inevitable head of a future territorial authority, by 1963, a critical faction in the apartheid government came to see his role as contingent on whether or not all other chiefdoms across Natal would follow his lead in accepting the Bantu Authorities Act. On March 27, 1963, all the chiefs of Natal met at the royal kraal. At this meeting, Bhekuzulu was to attempt to convince the chiefs who had not yet accepted the Act to move ahead and establish tribal and regional authorities.

The opening remarks by Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner Cornell and Commissioner-General C.G. Nel portrayed this meeting as a magnificent moment for Zulu nationalism. Nel, who had been and remained a strong supporter of the creation of one territorial authority under the Paramount Chief, referred to all of the chiefs as belonging to the "Zulu nation" and the "Zulu people," implying that all these chiefdoms would eventually be politically unified under one homeland. Nel recognized that in the past the Zulu people were "scattered and divided," making superficial reference to the fact that the African population of Natal had never been under one

[38] UAR COGTA 104, N11/3/2 (X), Memo from the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, 1963 based on context (undated file).

kingdom. However, he proclaimed that now, due to modern transportation and communication technologies, a new unit could be created to encompass all of the "Zulu nation."[39] This nation, according to Nel, was gathering for the first time at this meeting. Embedded in his statement were several assumptions. "Tribe" was made compatible with modernity through a rebirth as "nation." Language defined boundaries of nation, and people were united through twentieth century communication and transportation technologies.

Drawing on this theme of Zulu nationalism, the officials attempted to sell the Bantu Authorities Act to the chiefs. Nel suggested that the acceptance of Bantu Authorities could drastically speed up the educational, political, and economic development of the Zulu people.[40] Cornell then emphasized the budgets that would be available to all those who accepted Bantu Authorities.[41] Nel and Cornell told the chiefs that tribal authorities would simply formalize and fund pre-existing structures surrounding chieftaincies.

Bhekuzulu then took the floor to plead with the chiefs. He attempted to appeal to a sense of nationalism, saying, "We are all Zulus and as such we should be proud of our race. We must not allow bad people to divide us. If we are divided we shall fail and our nation will eventually disappear."[42] Bhekuzulu portrayed the acceptance of tribal and regional authorities in Natal as the first step towards Zulu independence. While he cautioned that he did not want to force the chiefs into action, he strongly advised them to accept the Bantu Authorities Act "so [we] are able to work together and speak with one mouth when we have a request or complaint to the government…so that we can work as one in our plans and not be divided."[43] Bhekuzulu claimed

[39] SAB BAO 4997, F56/10 (1), Speech by the Commissioner-General C.G. Nel during the meeting of Zulu Leaders at Khethomthandayo Royal Kraal, March 27, 1963.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] SAB BAO 4997, F56/10 (1), Meeting at Khethomthandayo Royal Kraal on March 27, 1963.
[43] Ibid.

to be king of all the Africans in the Natal.[44] He concluded by implying that he would fill a central role in the territorial authority's government only if the chiefs were to accept the Bantu Authorities Act.

After these speeches, however, the meeting did not go as government officials, or Cyprian Bhekuzulu, had hoped. The Pondoland Revolt had been suppressed three years earlier. Chiefs in Natal remained hesitant about the Bantu Authorities Act.[45] Before the meeting, unbeknownst to the Paramount Chief or white government officials, an anti-apartheid and anti-Bantu Authorities pamphlet, titled, "The Mouth that does not lie. Sounds a warning to the chiefs and izinduna at a meeting at Nongoma" had been circulated among the chiefs.[46] The pamphlet, whose authorship is still unknown, compared the proposals for Bantu Authorities in Natal to what had been implemented in Pondoland and the Transkei as a whole. The author criticized Bhekuzulu for not regularly consulting chiefs as his father and his uncle had done. The pamphlet claimed that while it was feared that the *ingonyama* would attempt to force chiefs to accept the Bantu Authorities Act, the system was actually meant to alienate chiefs from their people and tie them to the government.

At its very core, the objections and complaints lay in opposition to the policies of apartheid writ large. The text claimed that through Bantu Authorities, the government would

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[44] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs 3, N1/1/3/1 (Stamped from the Personal Clerk, Commissioner-General, Zulu National Unit, Nongoma), "Verslag aan my oorgedra op versoek van die Opperhoof insake die Vergadering of Woensdag 27 Maart 1963: By Kwethomthandayo."

[45] Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton wrote in 1987 that it is unclear why chiefs in Natal were slow to accept the Bantu Authorities Act in the 1960s. Based on archival materials I discovered in my research and on current literature, however, an explanation likely lies in lingering uncertainty about the Bantu Authorities Act after the Pondoland Revolt and pockets of rural resistance to Bantu Authorities and apartheid in Natal; see Gerhard Maré, *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 36.

[46] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs 3, N11/3/2 (Territorial Authority- Stamped from the office of the Commissioner-General), March 1963, anonymous pamphlet, "The Mouth that does not lie. Sounds a warning to the chief s and indunas at a meeting at Nongoma."

"encourage evil and trouble brought about by their policy of discrimination." It would recognize chiefs, but would not address dire land shortages in the reserves.[47] The pamphlet scathingly called out the oppression faced by Africans both in the reserves and across South Africa:

> In the reserves we are deprived of our father's arable land and sites. We are separated from the graves and the fortunes of our deceased fathers. We are deprived of our livestock and it is reduced against our wishes. Sometimes by inoculating it. We do not get permits to work in towns. General tax, school fees, ect have to be paid, yet we have no work and have no stock. And now the Bantu Authority Levy is coming![48]

Using the issue of consent and ideals of proper chief-subject-king relations, the pamphlet claimed that chiefs first had to obtain the views of their people and take lessons from what had happened in Pondoland. The pamphlet did not deny the importance of the Zulu king, but it claimed that Zulu chiefs must not allow their king to be controlled by the government. Self-rule, it claimed, "makes wizards of Chiefs and Izinduna with whom to bewitch and kill the black nation." [49]

During the meeting, the majority of chiefs, even those who had accepted tribal and regional authorities, opposed endorsing the Act unilaterally without further consultation with their people. Breaking with his cousin Bhekuzulu, Buthelezi cautioned that the chiefs needed to go back and consult their people. Chiefs Calalabakubo Kawula and Botha Zulu echoed this need for consultation, especially with people in urban areas. Even Chief Pumanyova Zulu, who was the head of a tribal authority in the Mandlakazi area in Nongoma, stated that people must be given a chance to think the matter over.

Other chiefs and headmen claimed ignorance about the Bantu Authorities Act, and then cited that ignorance as a justification for needing more time to discuss the proposals in their home areas. Chief Charles Hlwenga questioned, "what is it that is called a Bantu Staan? Most

[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.

people do not really understand it. That is why there are such differences of opinions."[50] He then suggested that a committee of men be elected to go to towns, farms, and reserves to meet with the people to discuss the Bantu Authorities Act. Chief Siphoso Mpungose, who had accepted the creation of a tribal authority in his area, claimed that his people did not understand it, but they only accepted it to safeguard the interests of the Paramount Chief.[51]

After hearing this opposition to the Bantu Authorities Act, Bhekuzulu rose again and expressed the notion that all were welcome in the "Zulu Nation," regardless of their position on the Bantu Authorities Act. However, he spoke against going back to consult the people, saying that "the people should not rule us but we must rule them. It is for the chiefs to speak for their subjects. Chief must not go against the Government policy. We are the leaders of the people and we must lead them and not allow them to lead us."[52] While arguing that the acceptance of Bantu Authorities at this meeting by all the chiefs would strengthen the Zulu nation as a whole, he held back from attempting to force the chiefs to take action. He fell back onto ideas of consensus, claiming that his position as their leader was more akin to an "adviser" than a "dictator," and neither he nor the government would force the chiefs to defy their subjects and unilaterally create tribal and regional authorities.[53]

Buthelezi then rose to argue against the position of the Paramount Chief and the government. He stressed that the attitude of the government to meet with only the chiefs instead of the people was the wrong approach. Even Prince Sithela Zulu chimed in to suggest that urban residents must also be consulted. Chiefs then began to bring forward other complaints, including salaries for chiefs and teachers and influx control. Ultimately, the chiefs at the meeting voted to

[50] SAB BAO 4997, F56/10 (1), Meeting at Khethomthandayo Royal Kraal on March 27, 1963.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.

request that Cyprian Bhekuzulu call a meeting of all Zulu people to make a decision on the Bantu Authorities Act.[54]

Buthelezi emerged at this point as a figure who was often at odds with the royal house—the same royal house whose image he used from the 1970s onwards in propaganda for Inkatha. C.B. Young later referred to Buthelezi's behavior at the meeting as disappointing: "The fact that he left untrue statements unchallenged and saw fit to criticize the decisions of the Paramount Chief is to be deprecated."[55] Shortly after the meeting, an Afrikaans newspaper *Dagbreek en Sondagnuus* referred to Buthelezi as a "Rebel Chief."[56] Later in May, *Ilanga Lase Natal* reported that a rift had emerged between Buthelezi and Commissioner-General C.G. Nel over the Bantu Authorities Act.[57]

This proposed meeting of the entire nation was not the outcome that either the government or the Paramount Chief wanted. In addition to the logistical impossibility of bringing several million people together for a meeting, this marked another serious delay in the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act. More importantly, this March meeting was a test for Cyprian Bhekuzulu in the eyes of the government. If all the chiefs followed him and accepted Bantu Authorities, then the government would believe that he could take a central position within an eventual territorial authority that covered all of Natal. That failed to happen.

Despite their opposition to Bantu Authorities, other chiefs from Zululand still pushed for the recognition of the Paramount Chief as king. Buthelezi denounced the government's refusal to

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[54] Ibid.
[55] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs, N11/3/2 (Territorial Authority- Stamped from the office of the Commissioner-General), C.B. Young, Secretary for Native Affairs, to J.O. Cornell, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, April 17, 1963.
[56] UAR Black Affairs and Bantu Affairs, N11/3/2, "Nie gekant teen gebiedoswerheid nie: Rebelle-Hoofman Stel Sy Saak," *Dagbreek en Sondagnuus,* April 7, 1963.
[57] UAR COGTA 104, N11/3/2 (X), Vol 5, "Bantu Authorities in Zululand: No Reply has been received," *Ilanga Lase Natal*, Saturday May 25, 1963.

recognize Cyprian Bhekuzulu as king. He also announced that there were rumors that the government sought to divide Natal into three parts. Drawing parallels to the British division of Zululand into 13 divisions under appointed chiefs after the Anglo-Zulu War, he proclaimed, "all of us here in Natal fall under one Paramount Chief. The iNgonyama is our Royal leader. We do not regard him as a Paramount Chief but our King."[58] Several chiefs in the audience responded with salutes to Bhekuzulu. Chief Matilongwana Dlamani seconded Buthelezi's opinion about the need for one body, saying, "We are not in favour of separate authorities. All Bantu Authorities must come under the leadership of the Paramount Chief, whom we always regard as our head." Chief Mbanbane Nyowe emphasized that Bhekuzulu was not a Paramount Chief, as the government called him, but their king.[59] Headman A.T. Mathenjwa, who had claimed that people did not understand Bantu Authorities, proclaimed that crown land must be given back to the Zulus and the Paramount Chief must be provided for financially. While these calls came from chiefs in Zululand, the majority of chiefs in Natal also voted that the people be taxed to meet Bhekuzulu's financial needs.[60]

Despite their calls to recognize Bhekuzulu as king, the chiefs' refusal to immediately endorse Bantu Authorities was a brutal blow to the prospect that Cyprian Bhekuzulu would soon be the head of a territorial authority. In the aftermath of the meeting, Cornell reported to C.B. Young, Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development: "The behavior at the meeting was consistent with that experienced at other tribal meetings where the chiefs have been afraid or loathe to commit themselves to accept the Tribal Authorities system. Those chiefs who have not accepted tribal authorities spoke at the meeting, but those who have accepted Bantu Authorities

[58] SAB BAO 4997, F56/10 (1), Meeting at Khethomthandayo Royal Kraal on March 27, 1963.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.

did not have the courage to explain their action."[61] Cornell was slightly optimistic that after consultation with their people, the chiefs would let go of their fear of revolt.[62] Young recommended that steps be taken to advance and better fund tribal and regional authority structures in Cyprian Bhekuzulu's area in Nongoma.[63] However, the proceedings at the meeting ultimately put a hold on the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act in Natal.

On April 10th, the government learned of the circulation of the "Mouth that does not lie" pamphlet after Chief Bangani Miya gave it to the Bantu Affairs Commissioner in his home district in Bergville.[64] At this point, the government was still concerned that ANC or communist factions were behind this opposition. With Pondoland and Sharpeville only three years prior, the existence of the pamphlet gave the government pause. Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner Cornell sent a letter to all the chiefs in Natal to counter the pamphlet:

> It was alleged that you are being snared or tricked into accepting tribal authorities. You know as well as I do that you were not forced and that the Bantu Affairs Commissioners and officials of this department have for many years explained the functions of tribal authorities and regional authorities to you. You were never told to ignore your people.[65]

He countered claims that separate development was a system of racial discrimination, saying that Zulus could most successfully find their satisfaction through the self-government provided by a territorial authority. Cornell noted that despite the government giving Zulus the opportunity to

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[61] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs, N11/3/2 (Territorial Authority- Stamped from the office of the Commissioner-General), J. O. Cornell Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg to Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, April 23, 1963.
[62] Ibid.
[63] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs, N11/3/2 (Territorial Authority- Stamped from the office of the Commissioner-General), C.B. Young, Secretary for Native Affairs to J.O. Cornell, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, April 17, 1963.
[64] UAR COGTA 104, N11/3/2 (X), Vol. 5, Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Bergville to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, April 10th, 1963.
[65] UAR COGTA 104, N11/3/2 (X), Vol 5, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner: Natal to all chiefs in Natal and Zululand, undated, but likely late May 1963 based on context.

unite under their king, the chiefs chose not to do so by their actions at the meeting.[66] At this point, only half of the chiefdoms in Natal had formed tribal authorities. The aftermath of this meeting would exacerbate this situation for the apartheid government. Natal lagged behind the rest of South Africa in the implementation of grand apartheid, and it would continue to do so for several years.

Conclusion

From the turn of the 1960s, the aims and principles of apartheid in South Africa shifted drastically. The Department of Native Affairs became the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. Homeland independence was the next goal after the creation of tribal, regional, and territorial authorities. If all went according to plan, the eight "national units" created under the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act would evolve into independent homelands. While dominant narratives of the KwaZulu often take for granted the geographic boundaries and political arrangements that emerged in the homeland by the 1970s, this chapter on political developments in the early 1960s demonstrates that these arrangements were products of highly contingent historical processes.

At the beginning of the 1960s, Government officials thought that a single Zulu territorial authority in Natal could be quickly created under Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu. The 1962 debates about the historical and ethnological basis for a Zulu polity surrounding the Zulu royal family, as well as the failure of Natal's chiefs to follow Bhekuzulu in accepting the Bantu Authorities Act, jeopardized this vision. Ultimately, these events led the government to begin to retreat from the imagined association between the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom and the future Zulu homeland. While Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu continued to claim that all Africans in

[66]Ibid.

Natal were subjects of the "Zulu nation," the actions of the chiefs at KwaKhethomthandayo Royal Kraal in March 1963 supported the government's suspicion that the boundaries of the "Zulu nation" and the definition of subjecthood was far more complicated than previously thought. In addition to delaying the implementation of the homeland policy in Natal by several years, this meeting marked the beginning of the end of the possibility that a Zulu monarch could ever hold political power over a Zulu homeland stretching across all of Natal. The question of the political structure of the future territorial authority—and the role of the royal house within in it—remained unsolved for another several more years.

Chapter 4: "The Empire that Shaka Zulu Was Unable to Bring About": Homeland State-Building, 1967 to 1970

As the apartheid government pursued its homeland policy in South Africa, the United Kingdom granted its three protectorates in southern Africa independence. Two of these were built around major pre-colonial kingdoms. In 1966, Basutoland gained independence and became the Kingdom of Lesotho. A year later, the British recognized Sobhuza II as the King of Swaziland, and his political party, the *Imbokodvo National Movement,* swept the 1967 pre-independence election. In 1968, Swaziland formally became independent. In interviews I conducted in Zululand, informants often insisted that the Zulu, the Basotho, and the Swazi were the only real kingdoms in Southern Africa.[1] One can imagine, then, that the Zulu royal family and its followers must have watched these developments with great interest.

In the second half of the 1960s, three main groups of actors—government officials, core members of the Zulu royal house, and a new center of power surrounding Mangosuthu Buthelezi—imagined the future Zulu homeland. Their competing visions of the ZTA began from initially vague and muddled ideas about the relationship between ethnicity, authority, and political territory. During this historical moment, these actors deployed different narratives of nineteenth century history to debate the political future and envision some form of Zulu ethnic sovereignty in the new homeland.

[1] This assertion is obviously one that would be disputed by both professional historians and certain segments of the South African population outside of the core of the Zulu kingdom.

Apartheid officials saw the future homeland as part of a confederation of ethnically defined territories under white South Africa. They saw grand apartheid as central to the survival of white rule in South Africa,[2] and thus the Zulu homeland needed to be a successful political entity. In internal discussions about the boundaries of the Zulu homeland and the arrangement of authority within it, apartheid officials debated the relationship between identity and territory. On one side of the division were central government ethnologists, who might be considered apartheid intellectuals. They sought to create what they saw as the most ethnologically authentic arrangement of ethnicity, territory, and authority. Highlighting the complexities of Zulu identity and the disjuncture between the historic Zulu kingdom and the current Zulu speaking population, they argued against tying the homeland policy to the Zulu monarchy. They were opposed, however, by regional level administrators—including the Commissioner-General of the Zulu National Unit and the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Natal—charged with the daily work of Bantu Administration in Natal. These officials saw the Zulu language, Zulu ethnic identity, and the territorial reach of the historic Zulu kingdom as largely coterminous.

African actors in the Zulu homeland also used competing narratives of Zulu history as they imagined the political future. Most of the Zulu royal family in Nongoma presented a vision of Zulu ethnic sovereignty over all Zulu speakers of Natal. They drew on the image of a strong nineteenth century Zulu kingdom and demanded a new executive monarchy with a level of autonomy similar to that of neighboring independent countries—primarily Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland—a level of sovereignty that the

[2] Jamie Miller, *An African Volk: The Apartheid Regime and Its Search for Survival* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 14-21.

South African government refused to grant. Finally, with the government hesitant to grant the Zulu monarchy executive power in the new homeland, a third center of power, led by Mangosuthu Buthelezi presented a "modern" vision of a resurgent and unified Zulu nation with a traditional prime minister, rather than a monarch, serving as the head of the homeland. In Buthelezi's version of history, he inherited from his father the position of a hereditary "traditional prime minister, or "*induna-enkhulu,"* which had exercised political power in the Zulu kingdom in the name of the king since the time of Cetshwayo.

The ultimate creation of KwaZulu as a constitutional monarchy in the 1970s emerged from years of negotiation within and between these factions. After 1967, members of the Zulu royal house drew on the examples of Swaziland and Lesotho to demand that the government recognize Zulu sovereignty in a similar manner. From 1967 to 1970, officials from both the provincial and central governments debated the shape of the territorial authority and the position of the Zulu *ingonyama* within it. As in previous years, these debates were concerned with questions of political identity among Zulu speakers in Natal. As the government moved away from the idea of an executive monarch, officials debated how—if at all—the *ingonyama* could be recognized in a non-executive capacity.

In 1968, Cyprian Bhekuzulu's death plunged both the royal house and homeland planning into chaos. The power vacuum sparked a major struggle between Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Bhekuzulu's cousin, and Acting Paramount Chief Israel Mcwayizeni, Bhekuzulu's brother. Buthelezi successfully positioned himself as a "spokesman" of the monarchy despite his major dispute with the regent. This feuding within the royal house helped finally to confirm the government's decision to go forward with an elected

chairman for the Zulu Territorial Authority (ZTA) after years of debate. The role of the *ingonyama*, however, was subsequently left up to the new homeland government. After Buthelezi's election as the chief executive officer of the ZTA, he would marginalize the *ingonyama* within this new homeland that presented itself as a continuation of Shaka's kingdom.

These processes of homeland state-building in the 1960s laid the foundations for the forces of authoritarianism and ethnic-nationalism that plagued the region during the last two decades of apartheid. The context of decolonization both shaped actions of the apartheid state and presented opportunities for homeland leaders to make new political claims. The main questions were over the territorial boundaries of the homeland and the arrangement of power within it. This was not to be a struggle over the existence of the apartheid state itself, but instead over the relationship between history, Zulu identity, territory, and political authority within the apartheid system.

From uncertainty to self-government?

The government largely postponed the creation of a territorial authority for the Zulu National Unit after chiefs in Natal failed to follow Cyprian Bhekuzulu in accepting the creation of tribal and regional authorities. Even after the Transkei moved forward with self-government in 1963, BAD officials remained far more cautious. They focused instead on propaganda that would enhance the position of the royal house and convince Natal's African population to accept the creation of tribal and regional authorities. Ultimately, however, the proposal for the creation of a Zulu homeland government

ultimately came not from the state, but from leaders in Nongoma who were energized by the independence of the neighboring kingdoms.

During the second half of the 1960s, the independence of the former British protectorates in southern Africa sparked support in Nongoma for the creation of some higher level of Zulu political autonomy. While the government had postponed the creation of the Zulu territorial authority until the far-off time when each chieftaincy had created a tribal authority and joined a regional authority, actors surrounding the Zulu royal family used the examples of neighboring kingdoms in the newly independent Swaziland and Lesotho to advocate for a new vision of a Zulu homeland as an independent country. At a meeting of the Nongoma Regional Authority on October 21st, 1966, Chief Moses Zulu used the idea of a territorial authority as a starting point to argue that the government should "make the Zulus independent" like Lesotho and Botswana, and they should not wait for other chieftaincies across Natal to form tribal and regional authorities. For leaders in the Nongoma Regional Authority, this proposal of an independent homeland modeled after the newly independent former protectorates offered the chance for the remaking of an independent "Zulu nation."

The government had not seriously discussed creating a Zulu territorial authority for over three years. The Commissioner-General encouraged their nationalist sentiment, but he quickly situated this sentiment within the structures of grand apartheid, insisting that this unit would be like a "house being built with a foundation (tribal authority), wall (regional authority), and a roof (territorial authority)."[3] He emphasized that the Zulu

[3] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 54, N11/2/3/4, Personal Clerk to the Commissioner General of the Zulu National Unit, "Indrukke oor vergadering van Nongoma Streeksowerheid op 21.10.66," December 7th, 1966.

homeland would be a self-governing territory in relationship with South Africa, like the Transkei, rather than an independent country like Botswana or Lesotho.

In the following months, the Nongoma Regional Authority fiercely advocated for the creation of a territory authority with Cyprian Bhekuzulu as head. On January 6th, 1967, the body's secretary, Walter Kanye asserted that it was "unbelievable that the other Bantu groups are no more advanced than the Zulus and yet the majority of the other groups have reached territorial status of authority." In this statement, he likely referred primarily to the Transkei. It is worth noting that in both homelands and independent African countries, the creation of "gatekeeper" states opened new avenues for elite resource capture and distribution.[4] It is highly likely that this was at least a partial consideration for these leaders.

The Nongoma Regional Authority's support was a major turning point. The government, encouraged by these developments, began secretly discussing the eventual creation of a single territorial authority in Natal for the first time in three years. In late October, the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner Coertze wrote to B.T.D. Liebenberg, the Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, to request that more attention be given to the creation of a territorial authority for the Zulu people in Natal.[5] Senior BAD officials subsequently held secret meetings about the territorial authority for the Zulu National Unit.[6]

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[4] Laura Evans, "South Africa's Bantustans and the Dynamics of 'Decolonisation': Reflections on Writing Histories of the Homelands," *South African Historical Journal* 64, no. 1 (2012): 117–37.
[5] SAB BAO 4997, F56/10 (1), B.T.D. Liebenberg, Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal, October 25, 1966.
[6] UAR COGTA 57, N11/3/2 (x) vol 2, B.T.D. Liebenberg, Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal, October 25, 1966.

Debate and Dissent: Planning the Zulu homeland

While leaders in Nongoma drew inspiration from the recent independence of Lesotho and Swaziland, apartheid officials envisioned a single self-governing Zulu territorial authority on the model of the Transkei. However, major officials on the ground in Zululand and Natal clashed with government ethnologists over the definition of Zulu identity and the relationship between Cyprian Bhekuzulu and Zulu speakers across Natal. Given the context of African decolonization, the prior stumbles of the Bantu Authorities program in Natal, and the uprising in Pondoland just a few years earlier, the stakes were high in determining a successful arrangement of authority and territory in this new homeland. These debates demonstrate fissures in the apartheid state surrounding the meaning of ethnic self-government and the very program of grand apartheid.

In early 1967, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development M.C. Botha directed officials in Zululand to draft preliminary regulations and a constitution for a territorial authority. The officials formed a small committee including Commissioner-General J.J. Boshoff, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner T.F. Coertze, Assistant Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner A.F. Vosloo, T.C. van Rooyen and ethnologist E. Oltman. Coertze travelled to Nongoma to meet with Vosloo and Boshoff, and they drafted a rough sketch of the future "Zulustan" during a late evening at Boshoff's home in Nongoma.[7] On February 17th, the three men submitted this memorandum containing proposals for the establishment of a territorial authority.[8]

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[7]UAR Black and Bantu Affairs 55, N11/3/2 (1). J.J. Boshoff, Commissioner-General of the Zulu National Unit to Mr. Liebenverg, Undersecretary of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, March 7, 1967.

[8] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs, 55, N11.3.2 (Territorial Authority- Stamped from the office of the Commissioner-General), T.F. Coertze, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal to Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, February 16, 1967.

This initial proposal was drafted without the assistance of government ethnologists, and it reflected the belief among Natal administrators that a single territorial authority constructed around the Paramount Chief would be the fastest path to creating a homeland. They recommended that Bhekuzulu approach each existing regional authority and encourage them to ask the government that a territorial authority be formed. The initial proposal envisioned an Executive Committee composed of several members, half appointed by the Paramount Chief and half elected by the Legislative Assembly. Moreover, this committee of administrators recommended that the Paramount Chief serve as the chairman of the Executive Committee.[9] There was some concern that placing the Paramount Chief as the chairman of the Executive Committee might stifle debate, but the officials drafting the document noted that the recommendation on the position of the Paramount Chief was open to further discussion between the central government and local officials.[10]

Talks about this proposal commenced on March 2nd, in the Commissioner-General's office in Nongoma. Several officials from Pretoria joined, including Mr. Liebenberg, Adjunct Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, P.A. Franken, the Undersecretary of Bantu Homelands, and the ethnologist Dr. Bothma.[11] The attendees debated the committee's recommendations, and in particular, the role of the Paramount

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[9] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs,, N11.3.2 (Territorial Authority- Stamped from the office of the Commissioner-General), J. J. Boshoff Kommissaris-Generaal, die Secretaris van Bantoe Administrasie en ontwikkeling, Messrs. A. Vosloo, T. van Rooyen, and E. Oltmann Departement van Bantoe Administrasie en Ontwikkleing "Memorandum bevattende voorstelle vir die daarstelling van 'n Zulugebiedsowerheid," February 16, 1967.

[10] Ibid.

[11] UAR COGTA 7, N11/3/2 (x), "Verslag van Samesprekings gehou in die kantoor van die kommissaris-generaal van die Zoeloe en Swazi Volkseenheid te Nongoma io 2 Maart 1967-insake artivering van Bantoegebied in Natal" (Report of talks held in the office of the Commissioner-General of the Zulu National Unit and Swazi Unit in Nongoma on March 2, 1967 relating to the Territorial Authority in Natal).

Chief and the composition of the executive committee. Government ethnologists, excluded from the initial drafting of the proposals, had major objections based on their understanding of history and ethnic identity among Zulu speakers in South Africa. For these officials, the apartheid policy of separate development meant a commitment to the preservation of African "nations" based on ethnological classification, regardless of political expediency.

The officials remained split on the relationship between the Paramount Chief and other Africans across Natal.[12] The senior ethnologist at the meeting, Dr. Bothma, stated that there was still a rift with the Zulus in southern Natal, whom other Zulus in the north allegedly considered inferior. It is worth noting that in the early twentieth century, Zulus in Zululand often scorned Natal Africans, describing them as *amakhafula,* or "those who have been spat out" by the Zulu kingdom.[13] However, the extent to which those sentiments lingered into the mid-to-late twentieth century is uncertain. Regional officials from Natal brushed off this point. Boshoff claimed that Zulus had high regard for the Paramount Chief in the Umlazi township near Durban, and as far south as the Umzinto Regional Authority on the South Coast. Vosloo insisted that those rifts had disappeared, but Bothma and a few other officials were unconvinced.[14] A major undercurrent in this discussion was the extent to which nineteenth century political identities endured. Natal-based BAD officials, who had previously supported propaganda efforts to improve public opinion surrounding the royal house, believed that a sense of loyalty to the Zulu royal house either had developed or could be cultivated among people who were not part of the

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[12] Ibid.
[13] Nicholas Cope, *To Bind the Nation: Solomon KaDinuzulu and Zulu Nationalism: 1913-1933* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1993), 49.
[14] Ibid.

Zulu kingdom before its conquest, whereas government ethnologists took a much more cautious and skeptical position.

The ethnologists and other central government officials also objected to the regional administrators' proposal that the Paramount Chief appoint half of the executive committee and serve as chairman. Liebenberg, the adjunct-secretary from Pretoria, believed that such an approach would lead to friction. Dr. Bothma concurred, suggesting that the Paramount Chief would immediately have enemies filling half of the seats on the executive committee. One official, Mr. Franken, proposed that the Paramount Chief select all members of the executive committee, while other officials suggested that all members be elected.

Ultimately, the members of the gathering on March 2nd were unable to come up with a decision regarding either the Paramount Chief's position or the composition of the executive committee.[15] Furthermore, the issue of divisions among the African population in Natal was still unaddressed. The officials did not clarify the question of representation in the legislative assembly, and many details of the territorial authority's constitution remained unsolved. In short, this meeting to discuss the proposals submitted in February ended in stalemate between central government ethnologists and regional officials from Natal.

Several months later, on September 27th, 1967, officials from the central government met with ethnologists and more than a dozen Bantu Affairs Commissioners from Natal to revisit these issues. BAD Minister M.C. Botha attended along with other top-ranking officials from both the central and provincial governments. They set out to

[15] UAR COGTA 7, N11/3/2 (x), "Verslag van Samesprekings gehou in die Kantoor van die Kommissaris-Generaal van die Zoeloe en Swazi Volkseenheid te Nongoma op 2 Maart 1967 – Insake Artivering van Bantoegebied in Natal."

answer several questions: How many territorial authorities should be established in Natal? How would these authorities be established? What procedures would ensure consultation with the Africans in Natal? Where would the headquarters be? Finally, what position would the Paramount Chief take? Not all of these questions would be answered, but some major decisions did emerge.[16]

Most importantly, the group firmly ruled that "the Paramount Chief not enmesh himself too much in the activities of the territorial authority."[17] Going against the recommendations of the memorandum earlier in the year, they recommended that a chairman be elected from the legislative assembly. This was the first time the government decisively moved towards creating an elected leader for the Zulu homeland.[18] While officials in the 1950s assumed Bhekuzulu would inevitably be the head of the eventual Zulu Territorial Authority and officials in the early to mid-1960s were undecided, at this point, the government began building a new vision of a territorial authority with an elected chairman and a non-political Paramount Chief. What exactly his non-political position would be, however, remained to be seen. The officials confirmed that only one territorial authority would be formed for Natal, brushing away previous concerns about a lack of historic unity among people in the Zulu National Unit.

Ultimately, the government swept aside the ethnologists' objections—and the particular narrative of Zulu history underpinning it—that all of Natal's African population could not be referred to as Zulu. In October, Dr. Bothma penned a dissenting

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[16] The records for this meeting contain only a list of issues and their solutions, so the actual discussions can only be speculated upon.
[17] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs, N11.3.2 (Territorial Authority- Stamped from the office of the Commissioner-General), "Samespreking Insake die Instelling van 'n Gebiedsowerheid vir Natal: 27 September 1967."
[18] Ibid.

memorandum on the scope and history of the Zulu kingdom, noting that many "tribes" in Natal were not historically under the Zulu kingdom, and thus they had been wrongly referred to as Zulu. While some of his colleagues had claimed that there was support for the Paramount Chief outside of Zululand, Bothma challenged the evidence underpinning their statements, arguing that he had found no evidence in government files of visits by people from the Zulu royal house to the south of Natal.[19] The royal house held no collections for funds there, and the Paramount Chief never intervened in any disputes outside of Zululand. Furthermore, the chieftaincies in the south never sent gifts north to the royal house. Based on these claims, Bothma concluded that these people did not see themselves as subjects of the Zulu kingdom.[20]

Despite these objections, the BAD pushed forth with the creation of a single territorial authority. In November of 1967, the *Natal Mercury* reported that Commissioner-General Boshoff expected that the "Zulustan" would be created in about six months once there were enough regional authorities to come together to form the territorial authority. He claimed, "the majority of Zulus are definitely in favour of the territorial authority."[21] A few weeks later, Boshoff reported to Minister M.C. Botha that the activation of the "Zulu nation is on fire" and would be completed soon.[22]

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[19] In the 1930s, however, Solomon was able to collect tribute in urban areas outside of the core of Zululand. See Cope, *To Bind the Nation,* 51.
[20] UAR COGTA 7, N11/3/2 (x), Dr. C.V. Bothma to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal, October 6, 1967.
[21] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs 55, N11.3.2 (Territorial Authority- Stamped from the office of the Commissioner-General), "Zulustan in Six Months, Says boshoff," *Natal Mercury,* Durban, November 25, 1967.
[22] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affair 55, N11.3.2 (Territorial Authority- Stamped from the office of the Commissioner-General), J.J. Boshoff, Commissioner-General, Zulu National Unit, to M.C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, December 5, 1967.

Competing Centers of Power in the Royal House

As government officials sought to create a framework for the Zulu Territorial Authority that would include an elected chairman, an alternate center of power emerged surrounding Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Throughout the 1960s, Buthelezi gained political influence despite at times being alienated from the royal house. While Buthelezi had been close to Cyprian Bhekuzulu several years earlier, they drifted apart after 1963. From the late 1960s onward, political differences and familial disputes between Buthelezi and factions of the royal family threw the royal house into chaos just as the government sought to determine the role of the monarchy in the new territorial authority. Although these disputes fully erupted after 1968, they began simmering in 1967. At the center were debates over the history of political authority in the Zulu kingdom.

In a move that would position him to claim power in the future territorial authority, Buthelezi began to articulate a version of Zulu history in which he played a central political role and held royal status based on his lineage. On February 22nd, 1967, both Ndesheni Zulu and Walter Kanye separately visited the Commissioner-General to complain that Gatsha Buthelezi sought to use the symbolic power of the monarchy to inappropriately enhance his own image. From the mid-1960s, Buthelezi had begun referring to himself as an *umntwana*, or a prince of the royal house, despite the fact that he was descended from Dinuzulu through his mother. Zululeand society was patrilineal, so many believed Buthelezi was actually a member of the Buthelezi clan and not a member of the Zulu royal house. Prince Ndesheni Zulu claimed that for this reason, Buthelezi had no right to refer to himself as an *umntwana*. Ndesheni Zulu provided Boshoff with a family tree illustrating this point. Kanye confirmed Ndesheni's statements

and claimed that Buthelezi identified himself with powers and privileges to which he was not at all entitled. Buthelezi had allegedly attempted to position himself next to the Paramount Chief at multiple public occasions, even taking a seat next to him at important meetings without Bhekuzulu's permission.[23]

Boshoff grew more suspicious of Buthelezi. He conveyed his thoughts in a letter to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner Coertze, stating his agreement that Buthelezi had no right to refer to himself as an *umntwana*. He warned that "Gatsha ought to have no part in the establishment of a territorial authority because with his ideas he will be a disturbing factor."[24] Boshoff already believed that Buthelezi was an ANC sympathizer.[25] These records demonstrate that relations soured between factions in Nongoma and Buthelezi before the death of Cyprian Bhekuzulu in 1968. Tensions between Buthelezi and other members of the royal house would reach a boiling point in the coming years, seriously destabilizing the legitimacy of the monarchy in the eyes of the government.

State Intelligence and Constitutional Monarchy

The rise of Buthelezi brought forth concern in the government over the future of homeland politics. The BAD had firmly decided that the Zulu monarch would not hold an executive position in the future territorial authority, but this decision raised the separate

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[23] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 5, N1/5/2, J.J. Boshoff, Commissioner-General, Zulu National Unit, to T.F. Coertze, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal, February 22, 1967.

[24] Ibid.

[25] During Buthelezi's time at Fort Hare from 1958 to 1950, he had joined the ANC Youth League. There is no significant evidence that he was significantly involved in the ANC after he took the chieftaincy in 1953. Buthelezi would later claim that he had the support of the ANC in taking launching Inkatha and holding office in the homeland. Regardless, his relationship with ANC in exile deteriorated during the 1970s. For more on Buthelezi's complicated relationship with the African National Congress, see Roger Southall, "Buthelezi, Inkatha and the Politics of Compromise," *African Affairs* 80, no. 321 (1981): 453–81.

question of who would hold political leadership. The government also entertained the idea of making Bhekuzulu a constitutional monarch, but officials disagreed about how such an arrangement would be received. Questions of ethnic subjecthood and authority weighed heavy in these considerations. In a project led by P.S. van der Merwe, the state intelligence branch conducted secret interviews to ascertain public opinion on the creation of the territorial authority, the royal house, and the role of Buthelezi. The interviewees were primarily members of the African middle class and elites living around Durban. These interview transcripts and Van der Merwe's commentary reveal divisions among prominent Zulus at the time that were not evident from newspapers or the materials found in the Central Archives.[26] These interviews tell a story of ethnic sovereignty as a contested and debated forum rather than a static concept as sought by the apartheid state. As the idea of a constitutional monarchy emerged, major actors in the government largely accepted the prospect of a power vacuum within the emergent territorial authority. With it, they accepted the significant possibility that Buthelezi would gain power.

A central question was who would hold power in the new territorial authority. The names of two main actors—Gatsha Buthelezi and Cyprian Bhekuzulu—dominated the interviews. Many informants raised concerns about Buthelezi's rising public profile. One informant referred to Buthelezi as a "savage" and an "opportunist," stating that "with all his education, he is groping in darkness of selfishness. He undermines the King's

[26] While most of the records of state intelligence are not preserved in the Central Archives, copies of these interviews were sent to the office of the Commissioner-General. Afterwards they were archived in Ulundi not under the Commissioner-General series, but under the series "Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs."

standings."[27] K.E. Masinga, a prominent Zulu radio announcer, suggested that many uneducated people only believed Buthelezi was the *ingonyama*'s "right hand man" because he strategically positioned himself close to the king at public events. Van der Merwe interpreted these interviews to suggest that Buthelezi wanted to usurp Bhekuzulu's power. Van der Merwe noted that nobody close to the royal house recognized Buthelezi as the king's main adviser.

Despite these claims that Buthelezi had no legitimate power within the royal house, he remained a reality that the government would have to deal with. In his commentary on the report, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner Coertze noted that Buthelezi would likely maneuver himself into a position in the territorial authority: "although he cannot technically claim the title of "umntwana," he still persists in calling himself an "umntwana" and seeks a unique position in the "Royal" hierarchy as the "Hoofinduna" of the King."[28]

Many informants advocated for Bhekuzulu's recognition as King rather than Paramount Chief. These statements, however, demonstrate the contested nature of ethnic subjecthood and authority. Van der Merwe reported that "traditionalists and sympathetic scholars believe that the King's position and status must first be corrected before [a meeting for the creation of a territorial authority] may be arranged."[29] He also suggested that the "Zulu of today is not the same as the Zulus of Shaka. All sorts of sociological, political and cultural influences" were responsible for the spread of Zulu identity across

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[27] Ibid.
[28] UAR COGTA 57, N11/3/2 (x), vol, 2, T.F. Coertze, Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal to the Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, February 6, 1968.
[29] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affair 55, N11.3.2 (Territorial Authority- Stamped from the office of the Commissioner-General), "Verslag: Openbare Mening Opname Deur P.S. van Der Merwe," undated, January, 1968 based on context.

Natal. Despite this, Masinga stated that "the people in southern Natal…are confused-they do not know whether they are Zulu or Pondo." Masinga advocated that such people be "educated" in Zulu nationalism.[30] While the interviews reported that many people who identified as Zulu did not hold any particular affinity to the *ingonyama*, loyalists to the monarchy believed that this could be cultivated.

The reception of these reports largely reflected the divisions between day-to-day administrators and government ethnologists, and they were again linked to larger competing narratives of Zulu history. The ethnologist N.J. van Warmelo again objected to the creation of a single territorial authority or any recognition for the Zulu monarch. Van Warmelo wrote a scathing response, asserting that half of the estimated population of current Zulu-speakers were descended from people who fled Shaka. He argued that creating one territorial authority, and especially recognizing Bhekuzulu within it, would immediately lead to chaos. His minority position asserted, "it is…not our task to work to provide the royals with a rule that they never had."[31] He also harshly criticized how the intelligence branch gathered data. He suggested that intelligence agents only spoke to "genuine Zulus…[and] it is therefore not surprising that they strive to expand Zulu Authority over Natal and establish a territorial authority. They will welcome it if the Department establishes the empire that Shaka Zulu was unable to bring about."[32] He warned that incorporating "non-Zulus" into the Zulu Territorial Authority would both

[30] Ibid.
[31] SAB BAO 4997, F56/10 (2), N.J. van Warmelo, "Commentary on report of Mr. van der Merwe," March 22, 1968.
[32] Ibid.

violate of the principles of separate development and create political instability.[33] Implicit in his statement was the fear of ethnic violence.

Despite this disagreement, on May 15th, the Adjunct-Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development confirmed the decision to create a single territorial authority, noting at this point:

> The tribes of Natal in terms of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act no. 46 of 1959, now [are] officially known as the Zulu National Unit and that this position was reaffirmed when his honor the Minister indicated that only one territorial authority should be introduced for the Zulu National Unit. Officially, they are now also moving in that direction. I am further satisfied that historical political positions and existing political trends and relationships among Natal's Zulu tribes and Paramount Chief will be carefully considered when the Territorial Authority is composed and created.[34]

P.A. Franken from the BAD in Pretoria supported his position and suggested that a constitutional monarchy be established. Franken noted that while some negative or indifferent sentiments might exist, "with the passage of time, and with visits of the Paramount Chief to the tribes, a much better attitude will be created."[35]

The outcomes of the discussions on the intelligence briefings provided the basis for the recognition of the *ingonyama* as a constitutional monarch while opening the door for the rise of other political leaders. Although government officials had received intelligence about Buthelezi's manipulation of the symbolism of the royal house and his negative reputation among royal family supporters, they largely were unconcerned. In strong opposition to the views of the government ethnologists, this faction believed that placing Bhekuzulu in a ceremonial position and electing a political head could solve

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[33] Ibid.
[34] SAB BAO 4997, F56/10 (2), Adjunk-Sekretaris (Gemeenskapsake) to the Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, May 25, 1968.
[35] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs, 55, N11.3.2 (Territorial Authority- Stamped from the office of the Commissioner-General), J.J. Boshoff, Commissioner-General to Mr. P.A. Franken, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, May 8, 1968.

these tensions surrounding ethnic sovereignty and authority within a single territorial authority uniting all Zulu speakers.

On March 4th, 1968, the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development informed Commissioner-General Boshoff that the program for the activation of a territorial authority had been approved.[36] This program rested on the idea that the Paramount Chief would be involved in the territorial authority as some sort of constitutional monarch. During the first half of 1968, several regional authorities asked the Paramount Chief to approach the government and request the formation of a territorial authority.[37] On August 14th, 1968, Bhekuzulu met with Minister Botha in Pretoria and did so.[38]

Certain prominent Zulu political leaders outside of the royal house continued—unsuccessfully—to advocate for a strong executive monarchy. Until the mid-1970s when he turned his support to Buthelezi and became a member of Inkatha, A.W.G. Champion[39] advocated for the King to have executive powers within the Zulu Territorial Authority. Champion was a prominent trade unionist, politician, and Durban businessman throughout the mid twentieth century. Over his long political career, he was particularly well known for his activities in the ICU, the African National Congress, and the Native Representative Council. After the demise of the NRC, Champion saw the Bantu

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[36] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affair 55, N11.3.2 (Territorial Authority- Stamped from the office of the Commissioner-General), Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development to J.J. Boshoff, Commissioner-General of the Zulu National Unit, March 4, 1968.
[37] Ibid.
[38] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs, 55, N11.3.2 (Territorial Authority- Stamped from the office of the Commissioner-General), Organizer: Intuthuko Yama Afrika to T.F. Coertze, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, September 13, 1968.
[39] For more on the complexity of Champion's earlier position in the 1920s and 1930s and the "tight-rope" positions of other major political leader in Zulu-Natal history, see Shula Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism, and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

Authorities system as a political vehicle that could be used to fight for African political interests. Champion also later advocated for educated Africans to gain representation in the Zulu Territorial Authority alongside chiefs.[40] In September 1968, Champion attended Swaziland's independence celebrations at the invitation of King Sobhuza, and this visit strengthened his resolve to see a Zulu homeland with a sovereign and executive King.[41]

The government had already accepted what many believed to be the imperfect reality of a single Zulu Territorial Authority with an elected chairman. While many elites close to the royal family still believed that the Paramount Chief should hold an executive position, the government rejected this vision out of fear that it would marginalize Zulu speakers who did not see themselves as subjects of the Zulu royal house. An executive elected by representatives from across the homeland did not present such a risk. While a constitutional monarchy had been proposed as a compromise, government opinion remained split as of the middle of 1968 over the wisdom of giving the Zulu royal house even symbolic recognition over large populations that were not part of the pre-colonial kingdom.

The Feud between Nongoma and Mahlabathini

The morning of September 16th, Cyprian Bhekuzulu saw Dr. L.V. Pearson at the Benedictine Mission Hospital in Nongoma. Pearson believed that Bhekuzulu had either bronchitis or tuberculosis. Moreover, the doctor noted that Bhekuzulu suffered from chronic conditions including diabetes, "alcoholic cirrhosis and portal hypertension." After eating breakfast that day, the Paramount Chief allegedly missed lunch and dinner,

[40] Wonga Fundile Tabata, "AWG Champion, Zulu Nationalism, and 'Separate Development' in South Africa, 1965-1975" (M.A. Thesis, University of South Africa, 2006), 86-87.
[41] Ibid, 95-96.

and then visited a friend and partook in large quantities of whiskey. Around midnight, Bhekuzulu drove back to his home, but he was found unconscious in his car after arriving. Someone carried him to bed, but the next morning, on September 17th, Bhekuzulu still lay unconscious. He was taken to Benedictine Hospital. Pearson's medical report noted, "his blood sugar levels were found to be in the region of 40 mgms. In other words, this patient probably had, in the view of the fact that his liver is depleted of starch, a blood sugar in that region for about 8 hours which is almost always associated with irreversible brain damage." Bhekuzulu died later that day.[42]

Royal death and succession, especially one as sudden as this, is often a moment of drama and anxiety. The Zulu kingdom did not practice primogeniture. The king could choose any son of his great wife to succeed him. The successor was kept secret until after the king's death, leaving open significant space for succession disputes.[43] While Bhekuzulu's great wife only had one son, Goodwill Zwelithini, he was not yet of age.[44] Bhekuzulu and his close family members had previously chosen his brother, Prince Israel Mcwayizeni, to rule as regent if need be. The aftermath of Bhekuzulu's death saw major debates surrounding the definition of majority and the eligibility for succession, the rights and powers of regents, and the formation of factions within the royal family.[45]

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[42] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/1/3 (9), Dr. G.D. Campbell, M.D., F.R.C.P. Edin, Physician, Durban to Dr. L.V. Pearson, F.R.C.S., Medical Superintendent, Benedictine Mission Hospital, Nongoma, Zululand, September 19, 1968.

[43] Cyprian Bhekuzulu's own succession was a product of a major dispute with his half-brother, Tandayiphi, which had to be adjudicated by the Department of Native Affairs. Prince Herbert Zulu, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 1, 2016, Nongoma, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

[44] Prince Herbert Zulu, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 1, 2016, Nongoma, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

[45] These trends are not unique to the Zulu kingdom. For an example in Dahomey, see Edna Bay, *Wives of the Leopard: Gender, Politics, and Culture in the Kingdom of Dahomey* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998).

The opportunity to seize political power and resources within the new territorial authority made this moment particularly tense. Mangosuthu Buthelezi gathered allies within the royal house—including prominent royal women[46]—and across Zululand and developed an alternative center of power in opposition to the new regent, Acting Paramount Chief Israel Mcwayizeni.[47] From this new position of strength, he cultivated claims to a "traditional" role of prime minister, or *induna-enkhulu,* to the late king. This conflict bled into the creation of the Zulu Territorial Authority, placing the relationships between history, identity, and authority once again at the center of homeland politics.

Immediately after Bhekuzulu's death, there were allegations that Buthelezi had attempted to publically upstage the Acting Paramount Chief.[48] In February of 1969, when Mcwayizeni missed the beginning of the opening of the Mpongose tribal court near modern day Ulundi, Buthelezi stepped in and made a speech on behalf of the royal family.[49] When Mcwayizeni arrived, he was livid, believing that it was inappropriate for Buthelezi to speak on behalf of the royal house given that he was only connected to the family through his mother. Later, the Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Nongoma, N.A. Otte, reported that many at the royal kraal felt that another senior surviving male descendant of Mpande, based on patrilineal descent, should have been asked to fill in.[50]

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[46] For a longer history of the power of royal women within the Zulu kingdom, see Sean Hanretta, "Women, Marginality and the Zulu State: Women's Institutions and Power in the Early Nineteenth Century" *Journal of African History* 39, no. 3 (November 1998): 389-415; Jennifer Weir, "'I Shall Need to Use Her to Rule': The Power of 'Royal' Zulu Women in Pre-Colonial Zululand," *South African Historical Journal* 43, no. 1 (November 1, 2000): 3–23.

[47] Bay has also highlighted the important of royal family in succession disputes in Dahomey, see Bay, *Wives of the Leopard,* 88.

[48] SAB BAO 4997, F56/10 (1), Mr. Otte, Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Nongoma, to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, February 25, 1969.

[49] SAB BAO 4997, F56/10 (2), P.W. Van Niekerk, Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Nkandla to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, February 14, 1969.

[50] SAB BAO 4997, F56/10 (2), Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal, to the Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, February 26, 1969.

Otte, who agreed that Buthelezi had violated protocol, further reported that Buthelezi had been involved in clandestine activities in Nongoma to destabilize the regent.[51]

Knowledge of this familial infighting raised concern within the government. In the aftermath of this event at the Mpongose court, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner Coertze wrote to the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, stating that after Bhekuzulu's funeral, conflict erupted between members of the "King's House on one side and supporters of Chief Mangusuthu Buthelezi of Mahlabathini on the other.[52]

At the beginning of March, news of this feud became public in *Ilanga Lase Natal*. *Ilanga* reported that Mcwayizeni had forbidden Buthelezi from entering the royal homestead in Nongoma.[53] Prince Clement Zulu, another senior prince, informed *Ilanga* that Mcywayizeni had told his brothers that he did not want anyone who was not a member of the family interfering in the affairs of the royal house. Prince Clement alleged that on several occasions, high-ranking members of the royal family had told Chief Buthelezi that his presence was unwanted.

In the year before the creation of the ZTA, Buthelezi began to gain more allies among other chiefs and leaders outside of Nongoma. He likely sought to increase his political influence in anticipation of future elections within the ZTA. On March 7th, 1969, the Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Mahlabathini, J.P. Swemmer, reported that if the feud continued, the Mahlabthini chiefs would side with Buthelezi over the Acting Paramount Chief:

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[51] SAB BAO 4997, F56/10 (1), Mr. Otte, Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Nongoma, to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal, February 25, 1969.
[52] SAB BAO 4997, F56/10 (2), Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal, to the Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, February 26, 1969.
[53] Ibid.

> I wish to urge that it is imperative that the differences between Buthelezi and the Acting Paramount Chief be settled. I fear that if it is not done, Buthelezi will eventually win over this entire district. For instance, Chief Mpungose has openly told me that Buthelezi is regarded as the Prime Minister of Zululand. There is no doubt that the Chiefs of this district regard Buthelezi as the positive choice of Prime Minister should a Territorial Authority be established.[54]

Swemmer emphasized that Buthelezi, rather than the Acting Paramount Chief, held strong control over all the chiefs in the Mahlabathini district as the chairman of the local regional authority.

From the late 1960s, Buthelezi continued to position himself close to the royal house to enhance his own position. He built his own legitimacy around the claims to the position as a chief adviser to the *ingonyama.* A number of Buthelezi's allies began to publicly endorse this claim. Chief Zungu compared the relationship between King George and Churchill to the relationship between Buthelezi and the office of the *ingonyama*. Chief Mpongose stated that Buthelezi was the "mouthpiece" of the royal family. While Mpungose referred to Buthelezi as the "Prime Minister" of Zululand, he stated that "in fact the whole of Zululand and Natal is aware of this and they regard that as correct because even Chief Buthelezi's grandfather, Mnyamane, was Chief Cetswayo's mouthpiece. Like his grandfather and his father, Chief Buthelezi is in charge of all the affairs of the Zulus."[55]

Both the government and Bhekuzulu during his lifetime refuted these claims. Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner Coertze reported that "during the late Cyprian's lifetime [Buthelezi] always came to public events, especially when there was the

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[54] SAB BAO 4997, F56/10 (2), Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Mahlabathini, to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, March 7, 1969.
[55] SAB BAO 4997, F56/10 (2), Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Mahlabathini, "notes of meeting of Chief Zungu, Principal Induna Robengu Cebekulu, Kemus Zungu (Chiefs brother) and Lifa Sibiya Tribal Cont.," March 13, 1969.

possibility of publicity. He always stood in the foreground near Cyprian during the royal salute, 'Wena WeNdlovu.'"[56] Before his death, Bhekuzulu had told the Nongoma Native Commissioner that Buthelezi did not serve him and Ndesheni Zulu remained his chief adviser. Bhekuzulu had also informed Coertze that he and Buthelezi disagreed over government policy and only spoke during family events.[57] Government officials believed that Buthelezi could not be "chief councilor" or "prime minister" unless appointed by the Paramount Chief, which he had not been. Regardless, the claim that the post was hereditary emerged as a central aspect of Buthelezi's political persona in the aftermath of Bhekuzulu's death.

Prince Israel Mcwayizeni's alleged poor treatment of certain members of the royal family, especially royal women, soured public opinion against him. On May 3rd, 1969, *Ilanga Lase Natal* published an article questioning the actions and motivations of the Acting Paramount Chief. At this time, the succession of Goodwill Zwelithini was still shrouded in mystery, and *Ilanga* reported that "Rumours have spread that the son of the late Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu, who is at present attending school at the sons of the Chief's college, might be the one who will become the Chief of the Zulus. It was also revealed that he was still a young man, unmarried, and besides, that he must be well-educated."[58] *Ilanga* speculated that the Acting Paramount Chief wanted to hold on to his regency as long as possible. The newspaper also suggested that Mcwayizeni neglected the widows of his late brother, Cyprian Bhekuzulu.[59] The following day, the *Sunday*

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[56] UAR COGTA 57, N11/3/2 (x), T.F. Coertze, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal, to Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, Pretoria, June 30, 1969.
[57] Ibid.
[58] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/1/3/9. "On Behalf Of Who Is Israel Acting?", clipping from *Ilanga lase Natal,* May 3, 1969.
[59] Ibid.

Times reported that the regent kept Bhekuzulu's three widows in isolation at the royal kraal at Nongoma, allegedly prohibiting them from leaving or receiving visitors without his permission. Other members of the royal family claimed that Prince Mcwayizeni had not extended traditional courtesies to them when they visited.[60]

Due to the rising unpopularity of the Acting Paramount Chief, a faction in the royal family aligned with Buthelezi in Mahlabathini to advocate for an early installation of 19-year-old Prince Goodwill Zwelithini as Paramount Chief. Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner Coertze reported that Buthelezi had secretly made contact with Goodwill Zwelithini. Buthelezi was close to the widows in the royal kraal through his mother, Magogo, and these women had helped raise Zwelithini since infancy. This was a secret campaign to unseat the regent.[61]

In the second half of 1969, Prince Goodwill Zwelithini began to take action that would allow him to seek the throne early. The government had stated previously that Goodwill could only become *ingonyama* once he was 25 years of age and married. In the absence of his uncle's approval, Zwelithini announced his desire to marry Sibongile Dlamini, a Nongoma schoolteacher. In a scandal that played out in national headlines, prominent Zulu leaders and royal family members debated Zwelithini's right to marry without the regent's permission.[62]

Royal women played a crucial role in what followed. In September 1969, Princess Greta, Zwelithini's aunt and Buthelezi's cousin, reported shocking rumors of an

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[60] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/1/3/9. "Clash over Zulu regent Could split Nation," clipping from *Sunday Times,* May 4, 1969.
[61] UAR COGTA 57, N11/3/2 (x), T.F. Coertze, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner to Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, Pretoria, June 30, 1969.
[62] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/1/3(10). "Zulus Will Not Allow Young Prince to Marry": Royal Wedding, No Chance," *Daily News,* September 4, 1969.

assassination plot against Goodwill.[63] Zwelithini left Bhekuzulu College in Nongoma and temporarily fled to Middleburg. Afterwards, he refused to return to school. Evidence for these assassination rumors was scant. Nongoma Bantu Affairs Commissioner Otte later reported that Princess Greta's testimony changed each time she told the story, and the inconsistencies confirmed his belief that "this murder plot story was a fabrication concocted as a convenient excuse… to take [Goodwill] out of school and get into motion their long planned scheme to get him married."[64] On September 16th, the Acting Paramount Chief, Goodwill Zwelithini, and several other royal family members met with Nongoma Bantu Affairs Commissioner Otte to discuss the Zwelithini's situation.[65]

Despite objections from the regent, Zwelithini announced that he had no intention of returning to school. Zwelithini insisted that since he had already obtained cattle from another maternal uncle and paid *lobolo*, there was no need to seek permission from the regent to marry. He also requested to take his place as head of his father's kraal and retake possession of Bhekuzulu's personal belongings.[66] Otte reported afterwards, "Throughout the meeting Goodwill showed hostility and insolence not only towards the members of the family—i.e. uncles and cousins—but to the regent himself. He conducted

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[63] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/1/3(10). "Confidential: Meeting in the office of the Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Nongoma on September 16, 1969."
[64] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/1/3(10), N.A. Otte, Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Nongoma to the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, September 17, 1969.
[65] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/1/3(10). "Confidential: Meeting in the office of the Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Nongoma on September 16, 1969."
[66] Ibid.

himself as if he was already the Chief and the regent had to reprimand him 3 or 4 times for the disrespectful manner he treated his uncles and cousins."[67]

Relations worsened between Zwelithini and the regent, and the fault lines of this dispute ran through the entire royal family. Buthelezi's allies in the royal house included Princess Greta, her husband Nelson Shamase, some of Cyprian Bhekuzulu's widows, and Prince Peter Zulu. The regent's allies included Ndesheni Zulu, some of the widows of Solomon, and Nongoma Regional Authority member Walter Kanye. Outside of Nongoma, the regent continued to enjoy the support of ANC activist and major Durban political figure A.W.G. Champion.

Despite the regent's opposition, in late October, it was announced that Prince Goodwill Zwelithini's marriage to Sibongile Dlamini would go ahead. The *Daily News* reported that "the Prince, by marrying, becomes eligible for the Paramount Chieftaincy, which he would not otherwise have done until he was 25. Observers say it is clear that he intends to make a bid for the leadership of the Zulu people who would displace the present regent, Prince Israel Mcwayizeni ka Solomon." The paper further reported that Zwelithini did not intend to go back to school after his marriage and a large portion of the royal family supported the prospect of Zwelithini becoming the *ingonyama*.[68]

Shortly afterwards, Boshoff wrote to Minister Botha that "the tension among members of the Royal Family have reached such a magnitude that they may erupt and

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[67] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/1/3(10), N.A. Otte, Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Nongoma to the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, September 17, 1969.

[68] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/2/3(10) "Zulu Royal Wedding will go ahead," clipping from the *Daily News,* January 3*,* 1969.

bloodshed may occur at any moment."[69] Boshoff reported that Mcwayizeni had alienated large parts of the royal family and led them towards a closer alliance with Buthelezi: "it is very clear that Israel's authority as Acting Paramount Chief and head of Cyprian's kraal are grossly undermined and he has [no ability] to enforce it."[70] Later in December, M.C. Botha stated that the Acting Paramount Chief derived his authority from the royal family, and if he lost their support, the government could not enforce his position.[71] Mcwayizeni's days as regent seemed numbered.

The power struggle in the aftermath of Cyprian Bhekuzulu's death saw the rise of Mangosuthu Buthelezi at the expense of the Acting Paramount Chief Israel Mcwayizeni. With the Acting Paramount Chief publicly discredited, Buthelezi gained allies in the royal house and quickly developed his image as the traditional prime minister to the late Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu. As power shifted away from Mcwayizeni, Buthelezi positioned himself as a political leader of the Zulu kingdom. This entire debacle occurred as the government sought to finalize the regulations for the Zulu Territorial Authority and define the role of the monarchy.

Planning in the Midst of Chaos

As infighting tore the royal house apart, the government considered regulations for the new Zulu Territorial Authority. On June 30th, 1969, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner Coertze sent another set of draft regulations to the Secretary of Bantu

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[69] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 10, N1/26/ 2 (5), J.J. Boshoff, Commissioner-General, to M.C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, October 30, 1969
[70] Ibid.
[71] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/1/3/9, M.C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, to J.J. Boshoff, Commissioner-General, December 11, 1969.

Administration and Development.[72] While the idea of the Paramount Chief as the chairman of the territorial authority was no longer under serious consideration, officials considered proposals to create a constitutional monarchy for the homeland. At the core of the debates within the government over a constitutional monarchy was the relationship between ethnicity, territory, and political authority.

Competing histories of the Zulu kingdom, and the relationship between the former kingdom and the future territorial authority, split major Natal-based administrators and government ethnologists. Pretoria-based ethnologist Woerner strongly objected to recognizing a Zulu constitutional monarchy within the ZTA. For him, such recognition was unthinkable because it would expand the reach of the Zulu kingdom beyond its historic borders. Other officials, primarily based in Pietermaritzburg and Nongoma, believed that at this point, all Zulus in Natal either did, or eventually would, recognize the authority of the Paramount Chief. This faction believed that not recognizing the monarchy would jeopardize the stability of the new polity. At the core of these opposing viewpoints was the past and future of Zulu ethnic and political identity.

Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner Coertze still clung to the idea of an executive monarch, which had been largely discarded by most officials. In support of his minority viewpoint, Coetze argued:

> the fact is that the Paramount Chief has integrity as the head of all Zulus over all Natal and Zululand. The inclusion of the Paramount Chief is a sine que non. His inclusion as a constitutional monarch (which he is not) and therefore "paramount chief" is inconsistent with modern tendencies, and is inconsistent with the traditional role of the head of the Zulus and his activities. It is felt that it fits for him to be the chairman of the territory authority.[73]

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[72] UAR COGTA 57, N11/3/2 (x), T.F. Coertze, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal, to Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, Pretoria, June 30, 1969.
[73] Ibid.

For nearly all other relevant government officials at this point, however, the Paramount Chief as the chairman was politically unpalatable. A constitutional monarchy, however, was still under consideration.

In opposition, another state ethnologist, this time Mr. Woerner, drew once again on the history of the Zulu kingdom during the nineteenth century to argue that the recognition of the Zulu *ingonyama* as a constitutional monarch would not reflect the authentic ethnic and political makeup of the ZTA. In his response penned August 22nd, 1969, Woerner focused on historic cleavages within the Zulu kingdom and their implications for the standing of the Paramount Chief : "When Dingane's military power was broken up, many of the refugee tribes, which had been incorporated by Shaka and Dingane, returned Natal to their original settlements, weakening the authority that had been built when Dingange ordered all of his subjects to go across the Tugela."[74] Woerner argued that during the time of Mpande, internal struggles and factionalism broke the unity of the Zulu kingdom north of the Tugela River.

Woerner insisted that Zulu speaking people in Natal and Zululand were heterogeneous. He argued that chieftaincies south of the Tugela River consisted of "detached units without groupings of political significance, except for some very southern tribes that support the Pondo Paramount Chief in the Transkei."[75] He went as far as arguing that much of the population even in Zululand could not be considered subjects of the Paramount Chief:

> The Usuthu influence covers Central Zululand (districts of Nongoma, Mahlabatini, Melmoth, Empangeni, Mtunzini, Eshowe, Nkandla, Nqutu)…On the

[74] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs 55, N11/3/2 (part 2), "Politieke Indeling Van Die Stemme Van Natal En Zululand," Memorandum from Mr. Woerner, state ethnologist; discussed in the office of the Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development August 22, 1969.
[75] Ibid.

> other hand, there are a number of tribes in central Zululand [that] definitely cannot be regarded as Zulus within the meaning of Zulu people. The most important [are] the tribes that were placed as buffers against the Zulus, the great South Sotho tribe of Nqutu and Zondi Nqutu and Nkandla and the Kimba tribe of Mahlabatini.[76]

Woerner argued that recognizing the authority of the "Usuthu Chief" over all Zulu speakers could not be a precondition for the establishment of the territorial authority. He insisted that the government should not extend the reach of the Zulu kingdom past its historic boundaries, both in terms of geography and subject populations. He instead suggested that, as a compromise, the Paramount Chief's position be extended across Zululand with the exception of the areas of Nqutu where there were large numbers of Sotho speakers.[77]

While BAD officials generally agreed that there was little historical basis for a Zulu polity encompassing all of Natal, the Zulu Territorial Authority was at this point a foregone conclusion.[78] T.C. van Rooyen, a major BAD official previously based both in Nongoma and Pietermaritzburg, argued that although they were engaged in a sort of "nation-building" to create an artificial unit, similar practices had taken place across the world in places like Switzerland and Britain. He argued that as a result of the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, all Africans in Natal were labeled as "Zulu," and while it was "certainly ethnologically incorrect, political unity is a fait accompli."[79] Van Rooyen did not see any problem with creating a new polity out of a historically

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[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs 55, N11/3/2 (part 2), "Kommentaar Insake Gebiedsowerheid Vir Die Zoeloes Met Besondere Verwysing Na Die Memorandum Van Sy Edele Dr. W.M. Eiselen," T.C. Van Rooyen, Eerste Bantosakekommissaris (Bantoe-owerhede), Pietermaritzburg, October 15, 1969
[79] Ibid.

divided region, despite the fact that the practice contradicted the very principle of separate development based on ethnic identity.

This perspective, which assumed that the historic divisions in the future ZTA were either non-existent or could be mended, overpowered the objections of the state ethnologists. It also left room for the consideration of a constitutional monarchy. Despite the political impossibility of recognizing the *ingonyama* as the head of the territorial authority, van Rooyen did not believe that he could be treated as any other chief: "Many of the tribes and people were under the Shaka dynasty and it is just unthinkable that chiefs should be on par with the Paramount Chief."[80] Instead, he suggested that, as a compromise, the *ingonyama* be recognized as a ceremonial "head," but not king, of the territorial authority.[81]

For a moment in late 1969, it seems as if the government might have decided to recognize the Zulu *ingonyama* as a ceremonial or constitutional monarch within the new territorial authority. As the government finalized these draft regulations, however, upheaval in the Zulu royal family created new levels of caution. Goodwill Zwelithini's disputes with his uncle and regent, Acting Paramount Chief Israel Mcwayizeni, and his decision to leave school early gained him a negative reputation even among government officials who had previously supported tying the future ZTA to the royal house. In January 1970, Commissioner-General Boshoff commented in a letter:

> I have never met such a stubborn and disrespectful young man as Zwelithini. His advisers are some of the Royal House and some women and a few young men outside. They are making things very difficult for Mcwayizeni who was chosen by the Royal House in case something should happen to the late Cyprian.

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[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.

Boshoff stated that although this was a family affair and he did not wish to interfere, "All I can say is I hope that the Territorial Authority will be a Zulu Authority outside the influence of this Royal House."[82] A few months later in May 1970, when Zwelithini sought the throne early—bringing forth the prospect of the young prince as a future constitutional monarch—Commissioner-General Boshoff wrote to Minister Botha, "Goodwill is so inexperienced and incompetent at this stage that it really would be a disaster to appoint him."[83]

When the government distributed draft copies of the regulations of the Zulu Territorial Authority to all of the regional authorities in February 1970, it defined no role for the Paramount Chief. The draft regulations called for the election of a chief executive officer by the Legislative Assembly, which would be made up of chiefs and representatives from each regional authority. [84] Despite objection from the Nongoma Regional Authority that the *ingonyama* was a central figure in the "Zulu nation" and merited a central role in the ZTA, the government decided to leave the issue of the position of the *ingonyama* up to the new homeland government.[85]

Buthelezi's Triumph

Public speculation about the potential election of Buthelezi as chief executive officer began immediately, supported by a new historical narrative of how authority

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[82] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 10, N1/26/ 2 (5), J.J. Boshoff, Commissioner-General, to Mr. E. Manyosi, January 21, 1970.
[83] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/2/3(10). "Verslag van onderhoud wat plaasgevind het 14 April 1970" (Report of Interview held of 14 April 1970, with Peter kaDinizulu), J.J. Boshoff, Commissioner-General, Zulu National Unit, May 5, 1970.
[84] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 54, N11/2/3/4, Meeting of Nongoma Regional Authority, February 17, 1970.
[85] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 54, N11/2/3/4, Meeting of Nongoma Regional Authority, February 23, 1970; See also Tabata, 88.

functioned in the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom. Almost overnight, the idea of an apolitical Paramount Chief and Buthelezi as some sort of "traditional prime minister" gained traction in the public sphere. The *Daily News* reported that "Zulus have also taken the lead in deciding that the chief executive of the Territorial Authority need not be the Paramount Chief, whose traditional position outside the political arena is to be maintained, thus opening the way for the best brains to be placed at the service of the territory."[86] These headlines obfuscated the decades of political debates that had occurred among Zulu leaders and various branches of government concerning the role of the *ingonyama.*

Labeling this new apolitical position as "traditional" allowed for an escape from the historical complexities of the region and from the scandal undermining the royal house. The claim that the Paramount Chief had a traditional position "outside" of politics was a new development, but it became a major legitimizing myth surrounding the arrangement of power first in the ZTA and then in KwaZulu. Despite the shallow historical basis of the claim that Buthelezi was a hereditary prime minister, the following chapters will show that it was one many people believed in. This myth became central to the arrangement of power that marginalized the *ingonyama* in the homeland while simultaneously drawing legitimacy from the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom.

After years of deliberation, on June 9th, 1970, the first session of the ZTA opened in Nongoma.[87] The body voted to use Nongoma as a temporary capital until another solution could be found. At the first meeting, the Legislative Assembly was charged with

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[86] UAR COGTA 104, N11/3/2 (X), "Zulu Authority: Buthelezi Willing to Lead," clipping from *The Daily News,* May 20, 1970.
[87] UAR Department of Bantu Administration (stamped Commissioner-General) 9, N11/3/2 (3), "Verbatim Report of the session of the Zulu Territorial Authority held at Nongoma, 9 June, 1970."

the task of electing a chairman, a vice-chairman, members of the Executive Committee, and a Chief Executive Officer for the Territorial Authority.

Prince Clement Zulu, a member of the royal house and a close ally of Buthelezi, ran unopposed for the position of chairman of the Legislative Assembly. After his election, Clement Zulu reminded the body in his acceptance speech, "I am a member of the Royal House, being the son of King Solomon. I assure you that in this office as chairman, I will not let it go to my head that I am of royal blood and therefore must exalt myself above you."[88] He positioned his election as an affirmation of support for the monarchy, but in doing so he articulated a new and admittedly vague relationship between the royal house and the ZTA.

The election of the Chief Executive Officer was slightly more complicated. After Clement Zulu took the chairmanship, he called for nominations for Deputy Chairman. Chief Lindelihle Mzimela nominated Chief Charles Hlengwa, and Chief Puza Luthuli seconded. Charles Hlengwa was a close confidant of Prince Israel Mcwayizeni. Chief Mfelafuthu Mdlalose nominated Buthelezi to the same position, but Buthelezi quickly declined the nomination. Hlengwa was then unanimously elected as the deputy chairman. Finally, Elias Bulose then rose to nominate Gatsha Buthelezi as the chief executive officer. Nobody stood against him, and he was elected unanimously.[89]

Conclusion

When Buthelezi took the floor to give his acceptance speech, he painted a long history of a unified Zulu nation that was finally being renewed with the creation of the

[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.

ZTA.[90] He suggested that the "late *Ingonyama* saved the situation" by meeting with Minister Botha in August 1968 and requesting the creation of the ZTA. Buthelezi proclaimed that, provided that the territorial authority succeed, "it will be the first time that a metro political power as South Africa relinquishes power voluntarily to a subject nation such as we are."[91] Buthelezi claimed that this new territorial authority would shoulder the great responsibility of representing the 3,340,000 Zulus scattered across all of South Africa. Throughout his speech, Buthelezi frequently made reference to the "Zulu nation" as a unified body under the royal house.

The references to South Africa "relinquishing" power to a unified Zulu nation echoed statements at the beginning of this chapter in which allies of the royal family asked the government to "make Zulus independent." When Moses Zulu first uttered those words at the meeting of the Nongoma Regional Authority in 1966, he likely imaged that Cyprian Bhekuzulu would have stood as King of the new polity. Instead, Buthelezi became Chief Executive Officer and claimed that this new territorial authority under his leadership had unified the Zulu nation once more.

The movement towards the inauguration of the ZTA, which was sparked by requests in 1966 that the Zulus be made "independent" like the former British protectorates, demonstrates how power shifts during decolonization facilitated new debates about ethnic sovereignty in apartheid South Africa. In the struggle to form this new homeland, state actors debated the limits of Zuluness and the potential reach of Zulu ethnic sovereignty. Ultimately, once the state marginalized the Zulu royal house,

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[90] UAR Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs 55, N11/3/2 (part 2), Speech by Chief Executive Officer Mangosuthu Buthelezi during the installation of the Territorial Authority in Nongoma on June 11, 1970.
[91] Ibid.

Mangosuthu Buthelezi built his authority as an elected leader around a refashioned Zulu ethnic nationalism with a powerless constitutional monarchy. This moment of homeland state-building sparked new debates over the relationship between territory and identity. As the following chapter will show, it also opened the door for an increasingly authoritarian articulation of Zulu ethnic nationalism under Mangosuthu Buthelezi.

Chapter 5: "Between Westministers And Royalists?": Conspiracy Accusations and Authoritarianism in Buthelezi's KwaZulu, 1970 to 1976

In the 1970s, as war raged on in Rhodesia and Mozambique, white rule in southern Africa seemed more fragile than ever. Grand apartheid gained more urgency as Voster positioned homeland independence and separate development within the framework of national self-determination and decolonization.[1] Leading officials in the apartheid government abandoned the idea that economic development needed to be a prerequisite to homeland independence. On September 8th, 1970, the *Natal Mercury* reported that Minister of Bantu Administration and Development M.C. Botha was willing to grant the bantustans autonomy before they were economically viable, stating "No country in the world was so self-sufficient that it could achieve independence only when it was totally self-sufficient economically."[2] A few days later, President Vorster also proclaimed that the homelands "need not be economically self-sufficient" in order to be granted independence." Voster noted that no South African had ever been jailed for saying, "I want to be myself. I want to develop my nation," while others across Africa

[1] For more on this tactic in the realm of international relations and diplomacy, see Jamie Miller, "Africanising Apartheid: Identity, Ideology, and State-Building in Post-Independence Africa." *The Journal of African History* 56, no. 03 (November 2015): 449–470; Miller, *An African Volk: The Apartheid Regime and Its Search for Survival* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
[2] "Govt. in Bantustan Switch: Independence may now be granted earlier," *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, September 8, 1970.

had been jailed for similarly advocating "self-determination."[3] The political moment manifested in a heightened need to establish and legitimize new political systems within the individual homelands, including the Zulu homeland.

Politics in the Zulu homeland became linked with an increasingly complex and sophisticated state intelligence apparatus. The Bureau for State Security (BOSS), officially formed in 1969, served as a central point for intelligence gathered by all departments within the South African government. In 1972, the Military Intelligence Division (DMI) of the South African Defense Force (SADF) was authorized to engage in covert counter-intelligence activities within the Republic. Both BOSS and the DMI fell under the larger State Security Council (SSC).[4] Kevin O'Brien has argued that "While nominal authority rested with the elected ministers who composed the Cabinet…by 1970, the true center of power resided in the central security structures of government …while the Cabinet oversaw and acquiesced to all the major decisions affecting the country, the SSC was the "super-Cabinet."[5] SSC considered activities covering nearly all facets of life in the Republic of South Africa. It became far more powerful than other departments, including the Department of Bantu Administration and Development.[6] By the mid 1970s, the SSC and its subsidiary departments carried out complex covert operations both abroad and domestically, including in the new Zulu homeland.

As part of an intricate political strategy, apartheid intelligence agents crafted false political parties and painted them as state attempts to undermine Buthelezi. Buthelezi

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[3] "Banustans 'can ask for Freedom Now'," *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, September 16, 1970.
[4] Kevin A. O'Brien, *The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005* (Abingdon, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2012), 25-28.
[5]Ibid, 6.
[6] Ibid, 30.

then used the specter of outside interference to solidify his position. KwaZulu politics in the early 1970s were truly convoluted. Only by exploring new archival records can we understand how these complex politics led to the rise of Buthelezi's authoritarian bantustan regime.

The creation of a single Zulu homeland without a recognized king necessitated the forging new political order. Through the 1970s, Buthelezi solidified a new form of authoritarian ethnic nationalism in the KwaZulu homeland. He gained control of the symbolism of the monarchy, constructed a new national history, and neutralized any alternative centers of power—including the royal house. Buthelezi and his allies shifted power away from the royal house, first physically with the choice of Ulundi as a capital, and then legally with the approval of the KwaZulu constitution in 1972 that defined the role of the king as "above politics." The recognition of the king as a constitutional monarch allowed Buthelezi to draw on the monarchy's influence while neutralizing any political challenge it could present. From 1972 to 1976, Buthelezi—with the secret cooperation of the apartheid state—marginalized both political opponents and the *ingonyama,* countering any whispers of legitimate opposition to his power with accusations of outside meddling by the South African government. In the face of these manufactured conspiracy accusations, the King signed an oath to withhold himself from political activity. Buthelezi, as the head of his new Inkatha movement, secured unchallenged position of power. Debates within the KwaZulu homeland about the legitimate role of the King were suppressed by accusations of treason. Through myths of an "outside force," Buthelezi successfully solidified his position within KwaZulu politics and within the apartheid political order.

Buthelezi gained a position from which he could reshape popular understandings of the legitimate arrangements of authority and territory not only in apartheid KwaZulu, but in the history of the Zulu kingdom. Buthelezi recast KwaZulu as the Zulu kingdom reborn, stretching across all of Natal and ruled by a hereditary "traditional prime minister." In linking Zulu ethnicity to new claims over territory and the proper arrangement of political power, he also forged a new ideology about Zulu ethnic sovereignty in South Africa.

Shifting the Center of Power: Capital, Coronation, and Constitution, 1970-1972

Locating Power in Ulundi

In its first session on June 9th, 1970, the ZTA voted to meet temporarily in Nongoma at Bhekuzulu College, a school for the sons of chiefs, until a permanent capital could be chosen and constructed. Debates over the location of the Zulu capital brought forth underlying tensions surrounding the relationship between the Zulu royal house and the new territorial authority. By establishing the permanent capital in Ulundi, close to his home in Mahlabathini, Buthelezi and his allies attempted to disassociate the political activities of the ZTA from the royal house. Members of the royal house, however, used arguments about Zulu history to counter Buthelezi and advocate that the permanent capital remain in Nongoma.

As Buthelezi took leadership of the ZTA, royal family members insisted on Nongoma as the capital, and by extension, articulated a strong association between the ZTA and the royal house. Public debate about the capital arose first at a meeting of the

Nongoma Regional Authority on November 17th, 1970. Walter Kanye reported that other sites were being considered alongside Nongoma, including Eshowe, Ulundi, and Msinga. Chief Israel Mcwayizeni responded sharply: "Many people all over Natal and Zululand have visited the Acting Paramount Chief expressing their wishes and requesting that Nongoma be taken as the capital of the Zulu Territorial Authority." "The choosing of another district as capital," he continued, "will undermine the importance and dignity of the seat of the Zulu Paramountcy and the Royal Family as a whole." His comments demonstrate the growing tension between Buthelezi and the royal family: "Mahlabathini is one of the places to which some members of the Executive Committee of the Territorial Authority belong…many loyal Zulus who respect and uphold the dignity of the Zulu Paramountcy and Royal Family will regard [the choice of Mahlabathini as capital] as if the Executive Committee members are merely stringing for their own rights and privileges."[7] When the Nongoma Regional Authority reconvened on November 23rd, another member seized on the discourses of the apartheid government itself, claiming that "It is the policy of the Department that we must follow our own customs and traditions. We should respect and follow the words of the late Paramount Chief."[8]

This was a debate not only about the location of buildings, but also about the location of political power. Leaders in Nongoma believed that Buthelezi pushed the Acting Paramount Chief, and the monarchy writ large, out of the new homeland administration. Chief Phumunyova Zulu objected that if Nongoma was not the capital, chiefs would find it difficult to pay their respects to the Paramount Chief. Councilor E. Nyoka accused Pretoria officials of not upholding Bhekuzulu's vision for the territorial

[7] UAR, Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 54, N11/2/3/4, Meetings of Nongoma Regional Authority, November 17, 1970 and November 23, 1970.
[8] Ibid.

authority. Prince Israel Mcwayizeni accused the Executive Committee of not keeping him informed about the ZTA's activities. He asserted that as Acting Paramount Chief, he should not have to rely on hearsay or gossip.

The Nongoma Regional Authority chose to bypass Buthelezi and appeal directly to the apartheid government. On December 3, 1970, the delegation met with Commissioner-General P.H. Torlage to advocate that Nongoma become the capital. Mcwayizeni warned Torlage: "Should the headquarters be built elsewhere than in Nongoma that will cause the people to revolt. If built elsewhere that will destroy the prestige of the Zulu Royalty, and the pride of the Zulu nation."[9] The delegation, which also included Chief Moses Zulu, Chief Phumanyova Zulu, Walter Kanye, and Ndesheni Zulu, complained that Cyprian Bhekuzulu had requested that the capital be placed in Nongoma and to do otherwise would violate Zulu tradition.

Torlage attempted to remove himself from the dispute, requesting that the delegation meet instead with Chief Executive Officer Buthelezi. He stated that the BAD had already decided that the ZTA needed to choose the capital.[10] Chief Phumanyova Zulu, however, insisted that Minister Botha personally resolve the matter. Phumanyova further alleged that Buthelezi disrespected the monarchy by excluding the Acting Paramount Chief from the Executive Committee's activities. Ndesheni Zulu then requested that Botha grant the Nongoma delegation a personal interview on the matter. Torlage, frustrated with the situation, agreed to speak to Botha.[11]

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[9] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 10, N1/26/ 2 (6), Meeting Minutes of Deputation of the Usutu Regional Authority, Nongoma to the Office of P.H. Torlage, Commissioner-General of the Zulu National Unit, December 3, 1970.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.

The government, however, did not seem sympathetic to the appeals from Nongoma. A committee of BAD technical officials had already begun preliminary research on possible sites, considering topography, proximity to industry, and transportation. The committee examined sites in Nongoma and Ulundi—in the home districts of the royal family and of Buthelezi respectively. Ulundi, specifically, was in the Mahlabathini district about ten kilometers south of Buthelezi's homestead. Mr. van Heerde, a BAD engineer, preferred Ulundi due to water access and infrastructure. Unlike Ulundi, Nongoma lacked a railway line, and it was further away from the Black and White Mfolozi Rivers.[12]

The technical report gave Buthelezi and his supporters in the Executive Committee justification to move the physical center of power in the ZTA to Ulundi. The Executive Committee, with the exception of Walter Kanye, all supported placing the capital in Ulundi after hearing this report. The Executive Committee voted to refer the matter to the full Legislative Assembly. Moreover, Barney Dladla, a member of the Executive Committee, stated that it was inappropriate for the Nongoma Regional Authority and the Acting Paramount Chief to make their representations directly to the Commissioner-General without consulting the Executive Committee. Buthelezi also chastised the royal family, stating that their campaign to place the capital in Nongoma was based solely on sentiments. Buthelezi further added that if Bhekuzulu was still alive and had seen the technical report, he would have chosen Ulundi as a capital.[13]

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[12] UAR COGTA 22, N11/3/2 (1), "Annexure A, Sitting of Zulu Capital" A.B. Colenbrander, Liaison Officer, Zulu Territorial Authority, October 15, 1970.
[13] UAR Department of Bantu Administration (stamped Commissioner-General) 9, N11/3/2 (3), "Report by Chief Executive Officer in Terms of Section 76(B) Of Proclamation 139/70 To The Zulu Territorial Authority On The Activities Of The Executive Committee For The Period 10/6/70 To 13/1/71."

At the meeting of the Legislative Assembly on January 13, 1971, Buthelezi opened discussion on the placement of the Zulu capital. He urged people to consider the geographic distribution of Zulu populations, existing infrastructure, and future water supply. All of these considerations conveniently made Ulundi an obvious choice.[14] Countering the royal family's attempt to use history to justify placing the capital in Nongoma, Buthelezi painted Ulundi, where the British had defeated Cetshwayo a century early, as a historic site for the Zulu kingdom. He proclaimed that it could be a place of resurgence for the "Zulu nation."[15] With these statements, Buthelezi used both ideas about technical expedience and Zulu history to justify physically shifting the center of power in the Zulu homeland from Nongoma to Ulundi, which was near his home.

There was no movement on the matter until June 1971, when the full Legislative Assembly considered the location of the capital. Executive Committee Member Barney Dladla presented a vision of the ZTA as a future independent country, pleading with the members of the Legislative Assembly to consider that the capital would be a major social, political, and economic hub for years to come. He emphasized the infrastructure needs of the future capital. Dladla, like Buthelezi months before, made alternative historical arguments for choosing a capital other than Nongoma.[16]

While the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom emerged in the nineteenth century between the Black and White Mfolozi rivers, Dladla presented an alternative historical narrative decoupling the history of the Zulu people from not only the Nongoma district, but central Zululand as a whole. He implored the body, "Now good Zulus, you all know that our

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[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] UAR Department of Bantu Administration (stamped Commissioner-General) 9. N11/3/2 (4), Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal to Administrative Officer, Commissioner-General, Nongoma, June 8, 1971.

history starts down from Durban and right up to Nongoma. I do not agree that our history started in the north and came down to the south."[17] Dladla pointed out several other sites of historic importance:

> Now, Mr. Chairman, if we were to follow the annals of our Zulu history which is good, we can get confused…There is also a spot where the grave of the King himself is situated in Stanger. There is a place called Ondini – Ulundi where the King who is the root of the Zulu nation and of whom the present Zulu kings are direct descendants, had his kraal. There is uMgungungdlovu (Dingaanstad) just opposite Babanango where King Dingane used to have his kraal, where the fire-places are still there to be seen.[18]

Dladla argued that the royal family only lived in Nongoma now because they were pushed there by the British and South African governments. With these claims challenging both the economic and historical basis for establishing the capital in Nongoma, he set the tone for subsequent debate. The Legislative Assembly passed a motion requesting that government engineers further investigate the viability of both sites, and then the matter be turned over to a decision of the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee was, conveniently, stacked with Buthelezi allies. The following month, on July 7, 1971, the Executive Committee made quick work of choosing the capital of the Zulu Territorial Authority. Barney Dladla moved to recommend Ulundi as the capital. After Chief Xolo seconded the motion, five members of the Executive Committee voted in favor of the resolution. One member, presumably Walter Kanye from Nongoma, withdrew his opposition and abstained from the vote in view of overwhelming support for Ulundi from the rest of the Executive Committee.[19]

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[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] UAR COGTA 88, N11/3/3/6 Vol 2, "Resolutions Adopted by the Executive Committee of the Zulu Territorial Authority at its Meeting Held at the at Nongoma on Monday the 5th July 1970."

While members of the royal family previously took for granted the location of the Zulu capital in Nongoma, Buthelezi's rapid rise changed everything. The debates about the location of the Zulu capital, while concerned with technical considerations, were also struggles over the physical location of power in the new Zulu homeland. With the ZTA's capital established in Ulundi, Buthelezi and his supporters physically separated the royal house from the new homeland administration. Moreover, by emphasizing Ulundi's historical significance as the place where Cetshwayo established his homestead, Buthelezi and his allies countered claims of tradition that were so central to the political strategy of those who demanded greater power for the royal family.

Coronation and Conspiracy Accusations

Relations continued to sour between Buthelezi and the royal family leading up to the coronation of Goodwill Zwelithini and the negotiations of the homeland constitution. By mid-1970, Zwelithini and Mcwayizeni overcame their disagreements.[20] On December 17, Herbert Zulu informed the Commissioner-General that the young prince and the regent spent significant time together. He reported that the royal family "expressed special gratitude that Goodwill was now turning to the correct "father" instead of letting himself be led by "Uncles" who were misleading him."[21] Herbert Zulu, when using the term "uncles," likely referred to Nelson Shamase, Clement Zulu, and Peter Zulu, all allies of Buthelezi in the late 1960s. Buthelezi, moreover, remained at odds with Mcwayizeni.

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[20] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/1/3/9, N.A. Otte, Bantu Affairs Commissioner, "Notes of enquiry held at Kwa Nxingiphilile on 16 November, 1970."
[21] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/1/3/9, N.A. Otte, Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Nongoma to Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, December 17, 1970.

The Executive Committee had pushed the Acting Paramount Chief aside and did not brief him on the ZTA's activities.[22]

In the midst of this conflict between Buthelezi and Prince Israel, the succession of Goodwill Zwelithini became a priority for members of the royal family. On March 31, 1971, Prince Israel and 65 relatives visited the office of the Commissioner-General, where they informed Torlage that the *umndeni,* the closest extended members of the royal family living in Nongoma, had decided that it was time for Zwelithini to take the throne.[23] Torlage subsequently wrote to Minister Botha to recommend that the BAD accept the royal family's wishes and move forward with a coronation within a year.[24] In the following months, Buthelezi attempted to enhance his power by taking control of the coronation planning. When he faced opposition from senior members of the royal house, he accused them of conspiring to undermine the ZTA.

During coronation planning, Buthelezi, who was traveling overseas, claimed that a group of prominent Zulus sought to use the monarchy for their own personal gain. Members of the Zulu royal family chose Prince Herbert Zulu as a master of ceremonies and relegated Buthelezi to a minor role. Newspapers seized on Buthelezi's claims, reporting that a small, highly-placed group of Zulus sought to gain unprecedented executive powers for the young Goodwill Zwelithini. One newspaper referred to this an "effective assault on the …popularity enjoyed by Chief Buthelezi, who with the backing of the executive committee of the ZTA insists that the Zulu King should be purely a Head of State." It claimed that Prince Clement Zulu and Prince Sithela Zulu had visited the

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[22] UAR COGTA 88, N11/3/3/6 Vol 2, H.J.R. Myburg, Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development to A.B. Colenbrander, Liaison Officer, Zulu Territorial Authority, April 7, 1971
[23] Ibid.
[24] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 1, N1/1/2 (2), P.H. Torlage, Commissioner-General, to M.C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, March 31, 1971.

Prime Minister Vorster and Minister Botha in Pretoria in Buthelezi's absence to request executive power for the Paramount Chief.[25]

Coronation master-of-ceremonies, Prince Herbert Zulu, who later became one of Buthelezi's most adamant supporters, told a very different story. As I quite often found while conducting any oral histories surrounding Buthelezi or comparing Buthelezi's public claims to archival record, the interview presented a dubious alternative history. He claimed that Buthelezi fought for Zwelithini to be recognized as a King:

> When the English fought the Zulus, they said he is no longer a king. The king is only in England, it was Queen Victoria in those days. Now there can't be kings all over. If he is here, he does govern the people of KZN, but he is not regarded as king. The king or the queen was only in England. Then he was to be called a Paramount Chief. Buthelezi did a lot of things to try and revive the Zulu kingdom. It is him who did all that has got to be done for the king. He went to England and ordered a crown for the king, when he was supposed to installed as the king in 1972.

After positioning Buthelezi as a force pushing for the government to recognize Zwelithini as a King rather than a Paramount Chief, Herbert Zulu continued:

> Now because there was politics involved, the other political party, which was ANC… They didn't want him to be installed as king. So now some of the princes here worked with Pretoria, without the knowledge of Buthelezi and his government. But they went to Pretoria and said, "it's high time that the chief be installed." I forgot the minister who was in charge of that. But they stipulated a date that was very early, before the crown could come from England. They did that without the crown, he was installed without the crown.

Herbert Zulu concluded by claiming that the ANC coordinated the plot to prevent Goodwill Zwelithini from receiving a crown at his coronation, claiming, "They don't want anything to do with what is known as the *ubukhosi*, or the kingship."[26]

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[25] UNISA ACC 22/2, KwaZulu Collection, "Buthelezi claims power grab plot," publication not listed, April 28, 1971.

[26] Prince Herbert Zulu, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 1, 2016, Nongoma, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

There is no evidence, and it is highly unlikely, that the ANC coordinated the early coronation of Goodwill Zwelithini to prevent Buthelezi from bringing a crown to the coronation. The meeting of members of the royal family with Minister Botha did occur. Members of the royal family did advocate for early coronation of Goodwill Zwelithini. Buthelezi, however, was never originally to be part of the coronation ceremony. While he may have searched for a crown for the coronation, a claim for which I found no corroborating evidence, his trip to England had been political. Regardless, by painting either the ANC or the government as co-conspirators with his enemies in the royal family, Buthelezi used the image of the Zulu monarchy to enhance his own position in the face of political opposition.

On July 5th, 1971, the ZTA Executive Committee passed a resolution in support of making Zwelithini the "Paramount Chief of the Zulu Nation and Chief of the Usuthu Tribe." Immediately thereafter, Buthelezi and the royal family clashed over the date of the coronation. Radio Bantu made an announcement that Zwelithini was to be installed on September 17th, 1971. Minutes from a meeting between Buthelezi and the royal family, however, show that neither party knew anything about this announcement. Buthelezi accused Prince Clement of feeding these rumors to the press. Buthelezi also claimed that Prince Goodwill treated him with disrespect, refusing to postpone his coronation to accommodate Buthelezi's travel plans. In the aftermath of this meeting, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner J.J. Van der Watt reported that there were rifts both between Chief Buthelezi and Zwelithini and between Prince Clement and Buthelezi.[27]

[27] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/2/3(10), N.A. Otte, Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Nongoma, to J.J. Van der Watt, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal, July 30, 1971.

Several BAD officials grew frustrated with Buthelezi. Bantu Affairs Commissioner Otte claimed that Buthelezi's demand to be given a major voice in the coronation planning was "highly presumptuous." Otte insisted that "He is NOT a member of the *Mndeni* and need not to have been consulted in this matter at all…He is again throwing his weight around in the royal family matters to emphasize his importance."[28] Otte further wrote that royal family members had grown fearful of criticizing Buthelezi since he had become so powerful.

Buthelezi took these disputes public, claiming that both the government and certain members of the royal family sought to destabilize the ZTA. Upon his return from overseas, he held a rally with more than 2000 attendees in Durban, proclaiming that politics had once again torn apart the Zulu royal family. He accused royal family members of ill-advising Goodwill Zwelithini to involve himself in politics. Buthelezi alleged that these people had changed the date of the installation several times in an attempt to exclude him.[29] Buthelezi claimed that before his travels overseas, he had prepared a detailed program for the coronation, but it had been altered in his absence and he would likely play little role in the ceremony. While members of the royal family and even the Bantu Affairs Commissioner believed that Buthelezi had no hereditary right to be involved in a major role in Zwelithini's installation*,* Buthelezi's public speeches portrayed his marginalization as a major power grab by royalists, likely with state support, who exploited the king to enhance their own power.

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[28] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/2/3(10), N.A. Otte, Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Nongoma, to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, August 11, 1971.

[29] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 22/1, KwaZulu Collection 1, "Rumble of Zulu Royal Rift," *Natal Mercury,* Durban, South Africa, November 15, 1971; UNISA, Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 22/1, KwaZulu Collection 1, "Chief Buthelezi Returns: Royal Zulu Row Starts up Again," *Natal Mercury,* Durban, South Africa, November 17, 1971.

Buthelezi did not place any blame on Goodwill Zwelithini in these public statements. This was likely because he depended—and would continue to depend for decades to come—on the image of the Zulu monarch and the history of the Zulu kingdom to legitimize KwaZulu and his own position of power. Attacking Zwelithini directly was not politically feasible. Instead, he painted the young prince as a victim of scheming relatives. These very public statements occurred just before debates on the new constitution began, suggesting that Buthelezi likely sought to stir up more public support to centralize power.

On November 24th and 25th, the Executive Committee considered a draft constitution, ultimately passing several resolutions proposing clauses that marginalized the monarchy. The Executive Committee emphasized that the Paramount Chief must not be involved in politics in any way. Furthermore, it stated unequivocally that when members of the Legislative Assembly took their oaths, there would be no reference to the Paramount Chief. The resolutions passed also stated that the Paramount Chief would not be allowed to either appoint or nominate the Chief Executive Officer.[30] This meeting was closed and its minutes marked confidential. This secrecy allowed Buthelezi to use the Executive Committee to marginalize Zwelithini while publically painting himself as a victim of political scheming by the royal family and the apartheid government.

Buthelezi then went on Radio Bantu, claiming—quite falsely based on archival evidence from the 1960s—that the late Cyprian Bhekuzulu supported a system that would

[30] UAR COGTA 88, N11/3/36 Vol 3, "Resolutions Adopted by the Executive Committee of the Zulu Territorial Authority at its Meeting Held at Temporary Offices at Nongoma on Wednesday and Thursday, 24 and 25 November, 1971."

remove the Zulu monarch from "the heat and dust of politics."[31] Buthelezi and his supporters reported rumors that the apartheid government sought to designate Goodwill Zwelithini as an executive monarch. South Africans newspapers reported these rumors. The press portrayed Buthelezi in a positive light as an educated African leader standing up to the apartheid government and embracing "modern" methods of rule. One reported that the "young prince ousted Buthelezi from his traditional and elected position as the man responsible for organizing his installation."[32] With this, the newspaper embraced the idea that Buthelezi was both an elected Chief Executive Officer and a hereditary leader or "Prime Minister" of the royal house. Buthelezi had also gained the respect of several white liberals and international circles. He developed a public persona as a well-educated and cosmopolitan African leader who stood up to the apartheid state. One South African newspaper reported that "Zulus are demanding the right to elect a modern government to develop their homeland on modern lines without the shackles of a medieval monarchy. They fear that the Government is backing Goodwill's wish for power over his Chief Minister and Cabinet as a last ditch means to get rid of Buthelezi."[33]

The evidence surrounding these claims that the government sought to oust Buthelezi deserves a brief moment of pause. Many of the common narratives told in newspapers depend on the claims of Buthelezi himself. Archival materials found in Ulundi and Pretoria show no evidence that the government attempted to subvert Buthelezi. The records of the Commissioner-General and the Nongoma Bantu Affairs Commissioner show little signs of document destruction, containing significant quantities

[31] UNISA ACC 22/2, KwaZulu Collection, "Zulu 'cabinet' tells Pretoria: We don't want a political king," unknown publication, November 28, 1971.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.

of materials marked as classified. The Commissioner-General's files do discuss tensions between the royal family and Buthelezi. The records of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) are for the most part unavailable in the Central Archives in Pretoria and likely have been destroyed. BOSS manufactured plots against Buthelezi from at least 1972 onward to create the appearance of an outside enemy that Buthelezi could rally support again. It is highly possible that they deployed a similar here as early as 1971. As BOSS and the SSC gained more power under Vorster, civil servants within the BAD likely did not know about the operations that BOSS undertook in the Zulu homeland. This was a moment when the South African state was increasingly illegible even to itself.

On December 3, 1971, Goodwill Zwelithini was officially installed as Paramount Chief. That morning, in a meeting with Commissioner-General P.H. Torlage, Zwelithini voiced concern about the diminishing power of the royal house and firmly situating himself within political struggles for the future of the ZTA. Zwelithini indicated that his uncle, Prince Israel Mcwayizeni, would advise him. He further requested that he be allowed to meet with Botha and that Prince Clement, the Chairman of the Zulu Legislative Assembly, be allowed to accompany him.[34] While Clement had previously been Buthelezi's ally in the late 1960s, his allegiance had since switched. By asking to meet directly with Minister Botha, Zwelithini attempted to sidestep Buthelezi. Zwelithini asked the Commissioner-General whether he would be allowed to inspect the draft constitution of the ZTA. In the privacy of this meeting, Zwelithini spoke directly against Buthelezi. He claimed that opposition to Buthelezi remained strong among Zulu people,

[34] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/2/3(10), P.H. Torlage, Commissioner-General, Zulu National Unit, to M.C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, December 3, 1971.

and he foresaw "the day the Zulu Nation will deal with him."[35] While this previously classified document confirms the divisions between Buthelezi and Zwelithini, it does not confirm any actual plot by Zwelithini to seize power for himself.

Constitution and its aftermath

Buthelezi used allegations of collaboration between the apartheid government and the royal family to gain support for a constitution that would place strict controls on Goodwill Zwelithini. Following Zwelithini's installation, the Executive Committee met again in early January. This meeting was widely reported in national newspapers. The *Rand Daily Mail,* embracing the portrayal of the Zulu king as a "traditional" constitutional monarch, reported that Zwelithini "seems determined to play a more active role than the usual constitutional monarch. He is backed by powerful allies in the Zulu Royal Family, including Prince Clement Zulu, who is the chairman of the ZTA."[36] The claim that a constitutional monarchy was "usual" demonstrates how quickly this invention became accepted as historical fact. At the meeting of the Executive Committee, however, the entire body signed a statement declaring its confidence in Chief Buthelezi. During the meeting, the Executive Committee and the government agreed on a draft constitution. The *Daily News* reported that this was the end of government efforts to oust Buthelezi as a political leader.[37] Another publication reported speculations that "Prince

[35] Ibid.
[36] "Top talks on role of Zulu King," *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, January 4, 1972.
[37] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 22/1, KwaZulu Collection 1, "State in Back Down on Vital Zulu Issue," *Daily News,* Durban, South Africa, January 5, 1972.

Goodwill was promised executive powers, the right to appoint his own prime minister, the right to veto, through an upper house, any legislation of which he did not approve."[38]

National media painted this as a government plot to establish Zwelithini as a despotic ruler in the Zulu homeland:

> Suddenly the sky darkened. It is obvious at this distance that promises were made to Prince Goodwill that turned his eyes back to Shaka and the day of near-absolutism—a dangerous and illusory ambition for a man so young and ill-equipped for the world of power politics…About this time members of the royal family, led, it is understood, by the Regent, Prince Israel ka Solomon travelled to Pietermaritzburg to ask the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner to do something about the growing stature of Chief Buthelezi.[39]

Articles like this painted Buthelezi as "modern" leader standing up against both a despotic monarchy and the apartheid state. They fed rumors that the state sought to bolster the royal family and marginalize Buthelezi, claiming "Chief Buthelezi and several prominent Zulus are now on record as saying that about that time Security Branch men and perhaps other State officials began to talk against the Chief and among other chiefs and even tribesmen."[40] With the agreement on a draft constitution, Buthelezi claimed victory over alleged interference from the government.

M.C. Botha denied that the government attempted to push the king into a position of power: "All sorts of false allegations are being made that hold no good for anyone involved. The Government has not, at any stage, involved itself with the matter of the

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[38] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 22/1, KwaZulu Collection 1, "Scuffles behind Zulu throne grow louder," date and publication missing; The article also claimed that chiefs from Msinga had publically stated that the King must not enter politics. However, chapter 3 of this dissertation has shown that in the early 1960s the Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Msinga reported that the chiefs in his district disliked the Paramount Chief and did not even consider themselves subjects of the royal house. It is unsurprising that they would support Buthelezi's faction.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

political leadership of the Zulus."[41] Botha further re-iterated his opinion that the Paramount Chief should not be involved in the day-to-day administration of the government, but instead that Zwelithini should "carry out his traditional role in such a way that he does not run the danger of becoming a colourless figure-head."[42]

At a regional level, it seemed that no officials knew of any plots. Confidential memos from the BAD indicate that the Department was uninvolved in attempts to sow discord within the royal family. Adjunct Secretary H.J.R. Myburg wrote to BOSS on February 17, 1972 questioning the veracity of a report he had received from a Zulu informant about the disputes between the royal family and Buthelezi. Myburgh's informant in Zululand alleged that members of the royal family feared that Buthelezi would gain independence for KwaZulu and set himself up as a dictator, in part through by allegations that the apartheid government sought to unseat him. The informant said that they wanted the Paramount Chief to have veto power over certain legislation to prevent Buthelezi from becoming a dictator. The informant indicated that Prince Clement was forming a political party with the aim of gaining more power for the King, and that "the dispute between the royalist and Westminster supporters" would be a bitter and long one.[43] Myburgh's communication, however, does not suggest he and the BAD were involved in any subversive action surrounding Buthelezi.

The ignorance of the BAD surrounding the allegations might also be indicative of the increasingly powerful role of BOSS and the development of a more authoritarian state structure in Pretoria. From at least late 1972, BOSS worked to support phantom political

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[41] "Govt. did not hint to Zulus in talks," *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, January 7, 1972.
[42] Ibid.
[43] SAB BAO 8/350, X109/6/4 (40), H.J.R. Myburg, Adunk-Sekretaris (Departement Administrasie), Memo: "Zulu Politieke Aangeleenthede," February 7, 1972.

parties in opposition to Buthelezi in order to strengthen him. While there is not yet any evidence available from the BOSS records that can confirm this, it is highly likely that BOSS possibly also assisted in exaggerating the threats to Buthelezi during the constitutional debates in order to stabilize the new homeland government. The lack of communication between state intelligence and the BAD during this period is suggestive of the secretive and powerful nature of the security and national intelligence service under President Vorster.

On January 11th, 1972, members of the Zulu Legislative Assembly considered the draft constitution. This constitution called for Zulu self-government and a constitutional monarch with the title of "King" rather than "Paramount Chief."[44] At this same meeting, Clement Zulu, who had been a major advocate for a stronger role for Goodwill Zwelithini, shockingly resigned his position as chairman of the Legislative Assembly. Chief Charles Hlengwa replaced him. Reports from newspapers suggested that Prince Clement had been dismissed from Goodwill Zwelithini's group of councilors after a meeting at the royal kraal at the beginning of the week.[45] Clement later denied rumors that he had conspired with the government to topple Buthelezi. Buthelezi, however, publically alleged that Prince Clement wanted Goodwill Zwelithini to be given political powers under the constitution, which had led to the breakdown in relations within the homeland government.[46] After the resignation, the Legislative Assembly passed the

[44] "King limited in Zulu draft constitution," *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, January 12, 1972.
[45] "Shock Resignation by Zulu Chairman," *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, January 12, 1972.
[46] "Move to Settle Zulu Row," *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, January 14, 1972.

constitution with only minor amendments. They also voted to bar the Paramount Chief from politics.[47]

While Goodwill Zwelithini had privately indicated that he was frustrated with his lack of powers under the Zulu constitution, he publically rejected the royalist cause and announced that he did not want to be involved in politics.[48] It was evident, however, that political debate was not very robust in the Legislative Assembly, and Buthelezi and his allies had suppressed political dissent within the homeland government. After the new constitution passed, the Commissioner-General noted in his correspondence that "the impression is created that Chief Buthelezi has enormous influence on members of the Territorial Authority, and though there were those who disagreed with him, they were not prepared or did not have the courage to voice their views with conviction."[49] The Commissioner-General also noted that the only amendments discussed at the meeting were passed without any real discussion, and that Buthelezi and his allies seem to have stifled debate on anything controversial.[50]

After the constitution passed, however, both domestic and international newspapers celebrated Buthelezi as a major opponent of apartheid. The *New York Times* reported that South Africa's white rulers were dismayed initially at Buthelezi's election as Chief Executive Officer, but there is no evidence of this in government archival files.[51]

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[47] "Major Surprise from the Zulus," *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, January 13, 1972.
[48] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 22/2, KwaZulu Collection I, press cuttings, "KwaZulu Top man denies power fight: I back Gatsha says Zulu King," *Sunday Tribune,* Durban South Africa, July 2, 1972.
[49] UAR COGTA 88, N11/3/36 vol3, Discussions with the Zulu Territorial Authority on the draft Constitution for the KwaZulu-Legislative Assembly, January 11 to 13, 1972.
[50] Ibid.
[51] "Zululand's Dramatic Departure," *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, January 17, 1972.

One Japanese daily paper portrayed this as a struggle between a "Zulu Warrior" and the Afrikaner government, reporting that Buthelezi was the most "outspoken black leader on the South African scene."[52] Other publications referred to him as an "outstanding opponent of the South African political system" who used the homeland as a "legal platform" to put forward his ideas to the world.[53]

As Buthelezi centralized power, on March 28, 1972, the Parliament of South Africa voted to grant self-government to the ZTA, which was then renamed KwaZulu, or "home of the Zulus." KwaZulu took control of education, administrative structures, infrastructure and development works, and anti-soil erosion and stock control. The apartheid government gave KwaZulu the authority to manage its own Department of Authority Affairs and Finance, Department of Education and Culture, Department of Community Affairs, Department of Works, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Justice. It also passed legislation allowing the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) to conduct its own elections.[54] KwaZulu came into full self-government in April 1972.[55]

After KwaZulu became self-governing, Buthelezi and Zwelithini clashed over the planning of the Shaka Day celebration. When Goodwill and Buthelezi disputed the location of the celebration, an emergency meeting of the Executive Council decided that Buthelezi's plans would prevail. Newspapers widely reported that this was another battle

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[52] SAB BAO 8/350, X109/6/4 (40), Gordon Winter, "Zulu "Warrior" vs. Afrikaner Gov't", Mainichi Daily News, February 7, 1972
[53] UAR Black Affairs and Bantu Affairs 3, N1/1/2/3 (2), Dr. Claur Baron von der Ropp, Research Institute for International Politics, Evenshausen, paper, *Afrika* Vol 73 No 4 (1972.8) August 1972
[54] SAB URU 6151 Minute No. 425, March 28, 1972.
[55] Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), 43.

between royalists and Buthelezi.[56] At the celebrations, which were attended by approximately 10,000 people, Buthelezi very publically relegated Zwelithini to a symbolic position, claiming that the monarch should always be "above the head and dust of politics…. No king can serve his people better in the 20th century than merely continuing to be a symbol of his people's unity."[57] Goodwill Zwelithini sat close to Buthelezi during this dressing down in front of thousands of followers.

Buthelezi continued to marginalize the king through the beginning of 1973. In January, Zwelithini publically supported striking workers at the Coronation Brick Ltd, who were advocating for a new minimum weekly wage. Zwelithini spoke to the company's management on behalf of the workers. Buthelezi immediately denounced the king in the press, proclaiming that industrial disputes were the concern of the KwaZulu Government and the Executive Councilor for Community Affairs, Mr. B.I. Dladla.[58] A few days later, the Executive Council reprimanded Zwelithini. They passed a resolution to impress upon the King the "dangers of his involvement in controversial matters in contravention of the clear provision of the Constitution which removes him from the arena of political and controversial matters."[59] As pointed out by Maré and Hamilton, Buthelezi's concern was likely not for the dignity of the King, but instead he feared

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[56] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 22/1, KwaZulu Collection 1, "Buthelezi heads for new clash," *Daily News,* Durban, South Africa, September 12, 1972.
[57] "Buthelezi tells king- keep out," *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, September 25, 1972.
[58] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 22/1, KwaZulu Collection 1, "Chief criticizes Zulu leader's role in dispute over wages," *Natal Mercury,* Durban, South Africa, January 11, 1973.
[59] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, KwaZulu Collection 1, Accession Number 22/ 1, Memorandum to the Executive Council: KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: Certain Involvements of the Paramount Chief in Controversial Matters and his request to Address the Assembly at the very beginning of the special session on the 17th, January 1973."

"alternative bases of power that could challenge his still-uncertain position in KwaZulu and later in national politics."[60]

Goodwill Zwelithini had asked the KwaZulu Executive Council for permission to speak to the full KwaZulu Legislative Assembly at its January 18th meeting. Likely out of fear that the king would speak out about the Coronation Brick factory incident, the KwaZulu Executive Council refused the request.[61] In the days after, Buthelezi once again publically claimed that people were attempting to manipulate the monarchy for their own advantage. Rumors spread that members of the royal family wanted to use Zwelithini's cancelled address to the KLA to politically damage Buthelezi.[62]

Meanwhile, on January 24th, a copy of a secret letter allegedly from Zwelithini to Minister of Bantu Administration and Development M.C. Botha arrived in government offices. The letter denounced the KwaZulu constitution and Buthelezi's administration, claiming that the KwaZulu government violated the rights of the Zulu monarchy:

> according to Zulu custom and tradition a King appoints his headmen or Izinduna and they are responsible to him directly. The present Izinduna (Chief Executive Councilor of Z.L.A. and his fellow Councilors) were elected by the people and are refusing to be responsible to me; they feel that they would rather respect those who elected them.[63]

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[60] Maré and Hamilton, 119; for more on Buthelezi's attempt to solidify Inkatha's influence in economic policy and labor, see Chapter 6, "A Pinch of African Communalism."
[61] "Death Threats for Buthelezi," *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, January 17, 1973.
[62] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 22/1, KwaZulu Collection, "Celebration after Zulus defy Govt.," *Natal Mercury,* Durban, South Africa, January 19, 1973.
[63] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/2/3(10), Letter of Petition (allegedly) from Paramount Chief Goodwill Zwelithini Zulu to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, January 24, 1973.

The letter asked that the central government amend the constitution and re-empower the king.[64] This letter never made it to the press, and I have found no reference of it thus far beyond the copy in the Ulundi Archives with the records of the Commissioner-General.

Goodwill Zwelithini denied that he was the author. [65] He bemoaned the fact that he had been "squeezed" out of politics by Buthelezi and his allies. He claimed that his political enemies in KwaZulu were "taunting him through all sorts of attacks of this nature." After meeting with Zwelithini, Bantu Affairs Commissioner Otte suggested that the King likely did not write the letter, and it was possibly part of some larger unknown conspiracy. At this moment when the SSC and its component intelligence agencies grew increasingly powerful, covert activities in the homeland remained unknown at times even to BAD officials. It is possible, therefore, that this letter may have also been a product of state intelligence interference in the homeland to bolster Buthelezi.

The Emergence of Political Parties in KwaZulu

Over the course of the 1970s, three political parties emerged in the Zulu homeland and among Zulu speakers in urban areas: the Zulu National Party, *Umkhonto ka Shaka* (Shaka Spear Party), and *Inala*. These parties have been referred to as "royalist parties" because they called for increasing the power of the monarchy. The first two of these parties likely were BOSS funded, and they failed to ever gain significant support in KwaZulu. My informants claimed that they never knew of anybody involved in these parties, speculating that they were shells set up by the ANC or potentially by the apartheid government. One elderly pastor, speaking on the condition of anonymity,

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[64] Ibid.
[65] UAR Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27, N1/2/3(10), N.A. Otte Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Nongoma to Director of Authority Affairs and Finance, February 5, 1973.

stated, "Many ministers in apartheid government. They tried to destabilize KwaZulu. They formed parties to fight...but (later) they just vanished. The thing was to destabilize the KwaZulu government."[66] Another older woman who had lived in the Ulundi area for decades stated, "No one has ever had contact with those political parties. No one could tell you anything about them. There would be hearsays. There was a certain political party that existed, but nobody could give you concrete proof." Her husband echoed her statements, adding that these parties "came from members who were already in the ANC."[67]

Early scholarship on the "royalists parties" argued that these were formed with the support of the apartheid government—mainly the information and intelligence services—in order to unseat Mangosuthu Buthelezi and replace him with an executive king. For example, Gerhard Maré suggested that in the 1970s, "Powerful forces were trying to set up a system of government similar to that in Swaziland, another monarchy, but with an executive King," in large part because "their allies within the state did not want a sometimes rebellious Buthelezi running the Bantustan for the largest ethnic group in South Africa."[68] Furthermore, Roger Southall wrote that Goodwill eagerly associated himself with this succession of King's parties.[69] Southall claims these parties represented

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[66] Anonymous man, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, March 16, 2016, Matshona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

[67] Elderly Husband and wife (names anonymous), interviewed by Ashley Parcells, March 16, 2016, Mashona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

[68] Maré and Hamilton, 42; For a similar narrative, see Jabulani Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan politics" in SADET, ed., *The Road to Democracy in South Africa: Volume 2* (Cape Town: UNISA Press, 2007).

[69] Roger Southall, "Buthelezi, Inkatha and the Politics of Compromise," *African Affairs* 80, no. 321 (1981): 453–81. This early research also contained certain factual errors, likely in part due to the sources the authors were able to access before the end of apartheid. Southall lists the succession of parties as follows: Zulu National Party, 1975; Umkhonto ka Shaka, 1973-1975, and Inala, 1975-1976. The archival materials in my research, however, trouble this timeline. The Zulu

the royalists cliques excluded from office and enjoyed the support of the King.[70] The first two of these parties, however, did not have any leadership close to the royal family or even from Nongoma.[71] Their only support seemed to lie outside of Zululand. The majority of the literature on this era was written during the 1980s and 1990s before government archival materials were available.

In reality, the apartheid government and Buthelezi cooperated in setting up a false multi-party system in order to create a single party authoritarian regime. During the 1960s, the BAD had firmly rejected the idea of an executive king. It is highly unlikely that the government would immediately reverse its decision and attempt to make Zwelithini an executive monarch. Buthelezi used rumors of external sabotage through these "king's parties" to prevent the emergence of any centers of political opposition and to establish KwaZulu as a one-party system dominated by Inkatha. Both the Zulu National Party and *Umkhonto Ka Shaka* were laughably weak, with little support in Zululand and small membership elsewhere. Both parroted government ideas of immediate Zulu independence. Only *Inala* actually formed a legitimate center of political opposition to Buthelezi through its leadership in Chief Maphumulo.[72]

Evidence now available demonstrates not that the apartheid government was attempting to overthrow Buthelezi in the 1970s, but instead that they feigned treasonous

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National Party, only really existed from 1970 to 1973, and was not a party in 1975 as Southall suggests. The founder, in fact, had actually joined *Umkhonto ka Shaka* by 1973.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Jeffrey Butler wrote that ZNP party counted among its backers A.W.G. Champion, Prince Israel, Prince Clement, and E.B. Tshabalala. However, there is little evidence of communication between these people and several of them immediately denounced the party after the party leader publically circulated their names in the print media. See Jeffrey Butler, Robert I Rotberg, and John Adams, *The Black Homelands of South Africa the Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

[72] Jill. E. Kelly, "'Only the Fourth Chief:' Conflict, Land, and Chiefly Authority in 20th Century KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa" (Ph.D. thesis, Michigan State University, 2012), 199.

plots in order to allow him to centralize power in the homeland. This counterintuitive approach meant that the apartheid state and Buthelezi sought to create a false multi-party system in order to justify the creation of a single party system. These king's parties in KwaZulu—two of the three formed as part of an attempt by apartheid intelligence services to increase Buthelezi's power—are part of a larger story about the emergence of two intertwined authoritarian states. One was a Zulu nationalist government under Buthelezi. The other was an apartheid state increasingly dominated by a powerful security apparatus engaged in every aspect of South African life.

Zulu National Party

The Zulu National Party had emerged in Johannesburg under Lloyd Ndaba by at least 1969.[73] On October 1st, 1970, a few months after the creation of the ZTA, Ndaba wrote to Buthelezi expressing support for homeland independence along the lines of the Transkei.[74] During the 1960s as the editor of the publication *Africa South*, Ndaba had written extensively on the clashes between Buthelezi, Prince Israel Mcwayizeni, and Goodwill Zwelithini. He claimed, however, that he was writing to Buthelezi in his capacity as the leader of the Zulu National Party. Buthelezi responded tersely to Ndaba's letter, refusing to recognize the ZNP or to make personal statements in *Africa South.*[75] The ZNP remained relatively quiet until October 1972, when Ndaba styled it as an opposition party to Buthelezi. Ndaba announced that several prominent Zulu leaders were

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[73] Southall incorrectly states that the ZNP started in 1972, but Lloyd Ndaba publically referred to himself as the head of the party as early as 1969 as shown in the previous chapter.
[74] UAR Black Affairs and Bantu Affairs 3, N1/1/3/2, Mr. Lloyd N. Ndaba, Zulu National Party to M.G. Buthelezi, Chief Executive Officer, Zulu Territorial Authority, October 1, 1970.
[75] UAR Black Affairs and Bantu Affairs 3, N1/1/3/2, M.G. Buthelezi, Chief Executive Officer, Zulu Territorial Authority, to Mr. Lloyd N. Ndaba, Zulu National Party, October 6, 1970.

on its board, including Mr. Tshabalalala, a Johannesburg businessman, A.W.G. Champion, and Paul Zulu, who was actually an employee of the Department of Information.[76] Ndaba claimed that the ZNP had the support of the royal family.[77]

Immediately, however, these supposed party members denied their involvement. Tshabalala's wife stated that there were no connections between her husband and Lloyd Ndaba, and her husband was neither a member nor a financier of the party. Paul Zulu, a resident of Umlazi, stated immediately: "I am not a member of the Zulu National Party, and I belong to no other political organization. Mr. Ndaba has never contacted me."[78] Three other alleged members of the executive committee, Bishop W. Dimba, president of the Federation of Bantu Churches in South Africa, Mr. B. Skhosana, a member of the Standerton Urban Bantu Council, and R. D. Sishini from Johannesburg, all denied their involvement. There is no evidence that there was any contact between the ZNP and the royal family. Ndaba, however, published a pamphlet outlining a plan to replace Chief Buthelezi with Prince Clement Zulu.[79]

Buthelezi quickly moved against the ZNP. In February, he called upon Ndaba to meet him and debate the issue of homeland independence.[80] Two months later in April, *Ilanga* claimed to have confidential documents proving that Ndaba was seen with P.H. Torlage, Commissioner-General of the ZTA, and the ZNP was conspiring with the

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[76] UNISA Document Center for African Studies, ACC 23/3, DA Kotze, Homelands, Political Parties, "Zulus deny support for new party," *Natal Mercury,* Durban, South Africa, January 28, 1972.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] "Stand up and Say it- Buthelezi," *Rand Daily Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, February 12, 1972.
[80] Ibid.

government to overthrow Buthelezi."[81] Buthelezi alleged that BOSS and other forces within the government funded the party. This revelation permanently damaged the ZNP, and afterwards it seemingly disappeared from public discussion.

Ndaba, an otherwise obscure political figure, strongly advocated homeland independence, echoed government propaganda, and opposed Buthelezi's leadership. The fact that certain people whom he claimed were members of his executive board denied any involvement, which indicated that something was suspect. While it is unclear when the government began supporting the ZNP, one could speculate that its support started in the 1971 or early 1972 as Buthelezi centralized power during the constitutional debates in the Zulu Territorial Authority.

Umkhonto kaShaka and the ZTA's attempt to ban political parties

On October 24th, 1973, *Umkhonto kaShaka* launched with a much more sophisticated base and platform. The party, chaired by KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Chairman Charles Hlengwa, also listed Lloyd Ndaba as one of its national board members. The party's platform included concern with the "lack of development economically and constitutionally" under Buthelezi's rule and with the "breaking down of our identity, culture, customs and traditional institutions of authority."[82] The party stood for "a democratic government under the leadership of the Zulu king and within this framework pledges to honour all Zulu traditional political institutions and shall at all times protect and promote the rights and privileges of chiefs." It also claimed to stand for

[81] UAR Black Affairs and Bantu Affairs 3, N1/1/3/2, newspaper clipping, "The Evidence Which Has Come to Light About Those Who Are Fighting Buthelezi," Weekend*, Ilanga Lase Natal*, April 1 1972.
[82] UNISA Document Center for African Studies, ACC 22/2, KwaZulu, J. Langer, "Correspondence statement: Press Release of the Shaka Spear Party," October 24, 1973.

"mutual and reciprocal cooperation and friendly relations with the various peoples and nations in South Africa" while devoting itself to the development of the "Zulu nation." These aims echoed the very ideologies underpinning separate development. In its press release at the launch, it announced an officer list lacking any important members of the royal family. At the launch, Hlengwa announced that he would resign as the Chairman of the Legislative Assembly in order to pursue the work of his new political party.

Goodwill Zwelithini did not support the party. On November 16th, he released a statement denouncing *Umkhonto ka Shaka*, forbidding Chief Hlengwa from using the name of his ancestor or any past Zulu king for his political party. He further forbad the use of the war cry "Usuthu" by any political party. Goodwill Zwelithini again stated, "I am satisfied with my position of King of the Zulus as enshrined in the Constitution of KwaZulu...I wish my people to know that while I cannot enter the political arena and take sides, I deeply regret the formation of a political party at this stage of our development as a people. I am against the founding of political parties at this stage."[83] Zwelithini also refused to meet with members of the party's executive committee.[84]

Roughly a week later, at a meeting of 500 chiefs and subjects near Durban, Gatsha Buthelezi denounced Charles Hlengwa, claiming that Hlengwa had proposed that KwaZulu be split into two and governed by separate legislatures. This claim was not actually present in *Umkhonto ka Shaka*'s platform, but likely the crowd embraced Buthelezi's statements as truth. Buthelezi warned that anyone who attempted "to use the King or the institution or chieftainship against the interests of the Zulu people is playing

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[83] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 22/2, KwaZulu Collection I, press cuttings, "Shaka Party under Fire," *Natal Mercury,* Durban, South Africa, November 5, 1973.
[84] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 22/2, KwaZulu Collection I, press cuttings, "'Spear' Meeting Rejected." *Natal Mercury,* November 30, 1973.

with fire" and the only surviving monarchies in the world were constitutional monarchies.[85] He further accused Hlengwa, Paul Zulu, and Prince Sithela Zulu of launching plots against the KwaZulu government with the cooperation of the apartheid government. After this rousing speech, Mr. Dlomo, chairman of the KwaMashu Urban Bantu Council and Mr. Winnington Sabelo, an Umlazi town councilor, called for a vote of no confidence in Charles Hlengwa.[86]

Later in the 1980s, former BOSS agent Martin Dolincheck revealed that the agency had established *Umkhonto Ka Shaka* to deliberately discredit it and boost Buthelezi's popularity.[87] Instead of destabilizing Buthelezi, it allowed him to more effectively rally support around himself. The same scenario is likely true regarding the earlier Zulu National Party. Nearly six months after the launch of *Umkhonto Ka Shaka*, representatives from Msinga—which had historical held some animosity towards the royal house—introduced a bill in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly to ban the creation of political parties in KwaZulu.[88] Buthelezi gave support to this legislation, and it is likely that he was behind the initial proposal.[89]

Buthelezi's support for this proposal to ban political parties sent shockwaves through elite political circles. In certain other homelands, even in the face of political repression, political parties remained legal. In the Transkei from 1964, for example, the Transkei National Independence Party under Matanzima faced opposition from the

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[85] Ibid.
[86] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 22/2, KwaZulu Collection I press cuttings, "press cuttings, "'Spear' Meeting Rejected." *Daily News,* November 30, 1973.
[87] Kelly, "Only the Fourth Chief," 199.
[88] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 22/2, KwaZulu Collection I press cuttings, "One Party State Move in KwaZulu," *Natal Mercury,* May 5, 1974.
[89] SAB BAO 12/600, R2/8/2/1 (Vol 2), John Dlangamadhla to board of *Ilanga lase Natal*, May 9, 1974.

Democratic Party.[90] In KwaZulu, Barney Dladla, the Executive Councilor for Community Affairs, criticized Buthelezi for supporting the banning of political parties, leading to a full day of debate with the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.[91] While Buthelezi had previously been a darling of white liberals in South Africa and abroad, they began turning away from him. The South African Institute of Race Relations penned a scathing editorial of him, noting:

> Some English newspapers like to represent KwaZulu's Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi, as the most sophisticated black politician in South Africa. He himself is assiduously helping to build up this image of himself as the great Black democrat…The contradiction, however, lies in the fact that the Chief Minister, for the benefit of the outside world, advocates a democratic system for the whole of South Africa. But in KwaZulu itself he pursues exactly the opposite course. Thus, the Zulu is not ripe enough for party politics in KwaZulu… It's incongruous and it puts a serious question-mark behind Chief Buthelezi's political credibility.[92]

The South African government ultimately did not allow Buthelezi to ban political parties. Despite this public outcry, however, no real opposition from within the KLA was successful. Buthelezi once again rallied claims of government subversion, accusing Hlengwa of being connected to BOSS. Buthelezi referred to Hlengwa as a "discredited agent of the National Party."[93] At a meeting of the KLA on May 31st, 1974, S.Z. Chonco moved that Hlengwa be expelled from the house. Walter Kanye seconded the motion. Kanye was a supporter of the King, which suggests that there was not support for the

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[90] For more, see Timothy Gibbs, *Mandela's Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites & Apartheid's First Bantustan* (Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, 2014).
[91] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 22/2, KwaZulu Collection I, press cuttings, "KwaZulu Cabinet unity lies in shreds," Unidentified newspaper, May 14, 1974.
[92] SAB BAO 12/600, R2/8/2/1 (Vol 2), "It does not Square, Buthelezi," editorial by South African Institute for Race Relations, published in *Die Vaderland,* May 9, 1974.
[93] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 7, GHS Melhaulose Association, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, "Press Release: Reply to The So-Called: "Spear Leader Makes an Offer," *The Daily News*, May 23, 1974

Umkhonto ka Shaka within the royal house. Hlengwa thereafter retreated from the assembly after the expulsion vote, his political party dead and discredited.

Inala and Inkatha

At the same time that Umkhonto ka Shaka fell, a legitimate opposition party emerged in KwaZulu. Josiah Kumalo, the president of the Johannesburg African Chamber of Commerce, described himself as the founder of *Inala,* the king's regiment. Khumalo claimed that members of his regiment felt that the constitution had stripped the king of his rightful position: "We Zulus have a tradition that the King has always been a political head, and in him is embodied the aspirations and traditions of the Zulus."[94] Khumalo refused to call *Inala* a party, saying he was personally against the creation of political parties. *Inala* remained quiet for another year, but it would soon become the first real threat to Buthelezi.

On March 22, 1975, in a move to solidify his power, Buthelezi had launched *Inkatha Yakwa Zulu*, which he fashioned as a Zulu cultural nationalist movement in the mold of Solomon kaDinuzulu's 1920's organization, Inkatha ka Zulu.[95] At the meeting, there were over 100 people, including representatives from eighteen of KwaZulu's

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[94] UNISA Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 7, GHS Melhaulose Association, ACC 7, "Bring Back King- Kumalo," *Rand Daily Mail,* May 18, 1974.

[95] For more on Inkatha, see Maré and Hamilton; Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda* (London: Zed Books, 1988); Maré, *Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa* (London: Zed Books, 1993); for more on Solomon's 1920s movement, see Shula Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa : Class, Nationalism, and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Nicholas Cope, *To Bind the Nation: Solomon KaDinuzulu and Zulu Nationalism : 1913-1933* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1993).

twenty-six Tribal Authorities.[96] Buthelezi fashioned it as an organizations for all in the KwaZulu homeland, stating, "all members of the Zulu nation are automatically members of Inkatha if they are Zulus."[97] This statement rested, of course, on a static and unitary idea of Zulu identity. The organization was shortly renamed *Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe*. Inkatha's constitution defined the king as a patron rather than a political leader, and it required the president of the organization to be the Chief Minister of KwaZulu.[98] Inkatha used the tribal and regional authorities established through the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act to increase its membership.[99]

Not all were pleased with the launch of Inkatha or Buthelezi's consolidation of power. At a June 16th, 1975 meeting of the Nongoma Regional Authority, King Goodwill Zwelithini complained of the "difficulty he has experienced in the past because of his passive capacity in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly."[100] While *Inala* was initially formed in 1974, it gathered significant support from late 1975. On December 13, 1975, Chief Mbhele hosted a meeting at his home in Ndaleni, near Richmond. Chief Maphumulo, from Maqongqo, reported later that the meeting was to discuss the formation of a political party by Prince Clement Zulu.[101] Attendees at the meeting included King Goodwill Zwelithini and other prominent chiefs and businessman. At the meeting, the men allegedly criticized the Inkatha constitution and voiced concerns that Buthelezi had become a dictator. This party was the first opposition that was not

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[96] Maré and Hamilton, 46; a more detailed analysis of the founding of Inkatha can be found in Chapter 3 of that text.
[97] Maré and Hamilton, 57.
[98] Maré and Hamilton, 51.
[99] Maré and Hamilton, 66
[100] UNISA, Document Center for African Studies, ACC 22/2, KwaZulu Collection, Meeting of the Nongoma Regional Authority, June 16, 1975.
[101] Kelly, "Only the Fourth Chief," 205

coordinated by BOSS. *Inala* was a real threat to Buthelezi's power. In a press statement, Maphumulo asserted that "one other thing that hurts us most is to witness the total destruction of the King's dignity…People only know the present. In this Legislative Assembly people are allowed to talk as they please about His Majesty knowing every well that he was banned and told not to say a word in politics."[102]

Just a month later, however, Buthelezi moved to quickly counter both *Inala* and Goodwill Zwelithini. On December 22, 1975, the KwaZulu Executive Council met to discuss reports that the king was present at the formation of a new political party in Richmond. They retaliated by stripping Zwelithini of his right to be involved in the appointment of new chiefs, passing a resolution stating that "The Paramount Chief not be allowed to install chiefs, this function is to be performed by the Commissioner-General…or the Executive Councilor for Justice and it should no longer be obligatory for chiefs-designate to be introduced to the Paramount Chief."[103] The prohibition on the Paramount Chief installing chiefs was likely a direct response to allegations that he was using his position to undermine Buthelezi.[104]

At a meeting of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly on January 19th, 1976, Buthelezi dismissed *Inala* as another government conspiracy, complaining that a Durban officer in the Department of Information was behind the party. Buthelezi accused Maphumulo and *Inala* of conspiring with the apartheid government to drag the

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[102] Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs."
[103] UAR, Department of Authorities Affairs 1976, G3/4/6/2, "Resolution of Executive Council of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Adopted at a special meeting at Nongoma on 22 December 1975."
[104] UAR, Department of Authorities Affairs 1976, G3/4/6/2, Resolution 6/2/2/4/122, "Pre-installation meetings with the Paramount Chief and installation of Chiefs by the Paramount Chief," December 22, 1975.

Ingonyama into politics.[105] During Maphumulo's address to the Legislative Assembly, Maphumulo asserted that KwaZulu was under the leadership of a dictator and the structures of the KLA had actually abolished the traditional rights of chiefs rather than preserved them. He requested that the KwaZulu and the Inkatha constitutions be amended to protect the free establishment of political parties in KwaZulu.[106]

After the KLA meeting, Maphumulo issued a scathing press release denouncing undemocratic practices within the homeland.:

> It was with great dismay to discover that the Members of Parliament of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly are still in an embryotic stage in as much that they do not make any distinction between a man who wants to manipulate them and a man who wants to lead them into a democratic world of independence. When I speak of democratic world of independence, I mean a world whose government is by the people for the people of the people in the true sense of the word. Most unfortunately this democracy is something still a dream in KwaZulu.

Maphumulo's statements discredited both the homeland system and the increasingly authoritarian nature of Buthelezi's rule.

> This finds its corroboration in the treatment I was given on Monday. To most sincere and deepest regret, I was surprised to learn that as a member of Parliament for KwaZulu, I am not expected to express difference of opinion and ideas, but instead I must accept everything ad hoc what the Chief Minister had decided. Must I believe that he is a Dictator? Is this democracy? How and where are the individuals supposed to express their views is it true that as long as one has different opinion to what the Chief Minister has, he must be treated like a criminal?[107]

By 1976 within Buthelezi's KwaZulu, there was no space for political opposition. As pointed out by Sithole, "dismissal of political opponents as apartheid agents was repeated

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[105] UNISA Document Center for African Studies, ACC 23/3, Kotze, "KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Special Session of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in the Bhekuzulu Hall at Nongoma," January 19, 1976.
[106] Ibid.
[107] UNISA Document Center for African Studies, ACC 22/2, "KwaZulu Collection, Press Release: By Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo: On the Event of Monday the 19th January 1976 at Nongoma."

so much that it became some form of orthodoxy," even to the point where many academics came to repeat these views.[108]

Buthelezi used this showdown with Maphumulo to marginalize the *Ingonyama* for years to come. At 6:30pm during this special section of the KLA, Zwelithini, likely under great pressure, addressed the house and disassociated himself from *Inala*. Buthelezi afterwards made a motion that the *Ingonyama* sign a declaration of faith before the Assembly. The motion was quickly seconded and passed, and Goodwill Zwelithini signed a declaration promising to withhold himself "from any participation in any form of politics and from any actions or words which could possibly be interpreted as participation in politics."[109]

Buthelezi called for Maphumulo to be tried for treason for taking part in activities meant to facilitate an "unconstitutional overthrow of the KwaZulu government." During a 1977 inquiry, Maphumulo was found guilty of involving the king in politics. He was not, however, found guilty of attempting to overthrow the KwaZulu government. Tensions between Buthelezi and Maphumulo continued for the next few years, with implications for both KwaZulu and Maphumulo's chieftaincy.[110] After 1976, Buthelezi effectively gained control of the symbol of the monarchy in Zulu politics and countered legitimate political opposition within KwaZulu for years to come.

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[108] Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs," 832.
[109] UNISA, Document Center for African Studies, ACC 23/3, Kotze, KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, "Special Session of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in the Bhekuzulu Hall at Nongoma: January 19th, 1976."
[110] Kelly, "Only the Fourth Chief."

Conclusion

By the end of the 1970s, Buthelezi gained even more control over Zwelithini. In 1979, the KwaZulu cabinet passed a ruling that required the king to request its approval before traveling outside of Nongoma. This, ironically, was a similar rule to what the apartheid government had previously placed on Cyprian Bhekuzulu. Furthermore, the KwaZulu government chose to screen all of the King's invitations before he was allowed to accept them.[111] By 1979, Goodwill Zwelithini was utterly powerless. KwaZulu's capital sat not in his home in Nongoma, but in Ulundi near Buthelezi's homestead. The King could not from make any political statements, appoint chiefs, or travel outside his own district without Buthelezi's approval. Buthelezi and the KwaZulu government also controlled his salary. Placed in this powerless position, Goodwill Zwelithini ultimately avoided major political confrontation with Buthelezi throughout the 1980s.

By the end of the 1970s, Buthelezi began to restyle the "historic" role of chiefs as protecting the king from political involvement. Furthermore, he began to more intensely assert the "historic" role of the Buthelezi patriarchs as traditional "prime ministers" to an apolitical Zulu king. Buthelezi's early marginalization of a monarchy into an apolitical role in the early 1970s rested on claims that all successful modern monarchies were constitutional ones. By the end of the 1970s, however, his claims shifted to assert that an apolitical Zulu monarchy was part of the history of the Zulu kingdom all along. Moreover, he used the paranoia surrounding BOSS involvement—subversive actions actually meant to strengthen his position—in order to centralize power around this new national ideology.

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[111] Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs," 834.

Chapter 6: From Inkatha to the Ingonyama Trust: The Politics of Zuluness in the Late Apartheid and Post-Apartheid Eras

Through the 1980s and early 1990s, Buthelezi's legitimacy rested on the several myths. Shaka Zulu originally created KwaZulu in the nineteenth century. Buthelezi was a hereditary leader who pragmatically participated in the apartheid system in order to protect Zulu people from the apartheid state. Inkatha was an anti-apartheid organization born out of the mission of the ANC. Buthelezi held a hereditary position as "prime minister" to the Zulu King.

Buthelezi, and the KwaZulu government writ large, spoke as if the current territory of KwaZulu was previously all part of the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom. A 1982 publication by the KwaZulu Government noted that KwaZulu, "the proud kingdom of the might warrior, Shaka," must always been seen from two points of view:

> In the first place it is KwaZulu "the place of the Zulu." It is an area living in the hearts and minds of over 5 000 000 people. In this idiom it comprises the whole of Natal, parts of the Transvaal, and parts of the Transkei. This is the area over which King Shaka had extended his sphere of interest. It is the home of military and political achievement and it is a place greatly loved by many millions. KwaZulu, from another point of view, is 40 bits and pieces of land left over after the colonial English grabbed what they could of Natal or the subsequent governments after the Act of Union made available to the Zulu people. It is 40 pieces of land, left-overs, the fragments after White self-interest had been satisfied.[112]

[112] UNISA Document Center for African Studies, ACC 22/1, KwaZulu Collection, "KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 1972-1982," Published by the Bureau of Communications, Department of the Chief Minister, KwaZulu Government Service, Ulundi, South Africa. 1982.

With this claim, Buthelezi and the KwaZulu administration laid claimed to both subjects and territory far beyond original reach of Shaka's kingdom.

During the 1980s, Buthelezi portrayed himself at the center of Zulu history as the embodiment of modern Zulu nationalism. A publication of the KwaZulu government proclaimed:

> The recent history of the Zulu people and that of its charismatic leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, is virtually synonymous…Chief Buthelezi was born to be a chief and a political leader. Being of royal blood, he was brought up with royal children and herded royal cattle. His great grandfather, Chief Mnyamana, was the prime minister of the Zulus, a chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the Zulu army in the Zulu War of 1879. He was probably a more powerful figure than the Zulu king himself, as the king's army was under his command.[113]

KwaZulu and Inkatha carefully crafted an image of Buthelezi as the rightful heir to power in the Zulu kingdom.

Rather than justifying his position within the KwaZulu government based on his election, Buthelezi articulated his position as both Chief Minister and the head of Inkatha as a historic and hereditary right. On January 16, 1983, he claimed "I do not owe my political power to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly or to Pretoria. King Shaka never owed his political eminence to any political power. The solidarity of the Zulu people was not dependent on white-created institutions when they defeated the might of the British Army. "[114] By positioning himself in the footsteps of Shaka, he presented his authority as derived from a hereditary and traditional position within the Zulu kingdom rather than through apartheid political structures.

The carefully constructed ideology supporting Buthelezi's rule had profound implications for the susqequent history of the region. This chapter explores how how

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[113] Ibid.
[114] Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 40.

history and ideology shaped politics in KwaZulu from the height of Bantustan administration through the democratic transition. Buthelezi propagated a specific ideology of Zulu ethnic sovereignty through public speeches, the school system, and every level of administration in KwaZulu. The rise of the anti-apartheid movement, however, threatened Buthelezi's political future. Debates over this ideology—and the control of historical narratives underpinning it—shaped the political order in what became KwaZulu-Natal. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Buthelezi clung to ideas of Zulu ethnic sovereignty to advocated for a federalist system that would guarantee his place in the post-apartheid political order. Eventually, however, he lost control of the monarchy, and by extension, he lost his monopoly on Zulu ethnicity as a political force.

Vehicles of Political Education

Inkatha developed a very specific form of Zulu ethnic nationalism in KwaZulu despite the historical fallacies underlying its platform.[115] While the epilogue explores how ordinary people engaged the historical mythology underpinning the Bantustan regime in the KwaZulu, we first must understand how Buthelezi and Inkatha attempted to spread among KwaZulu's population. The use of the education system to cultivate a sense of ethnic nationalism is common throughout the world.[116] In KwaZulu, the school system and public rallies constituted the main avenues through which people received political information. In schools, the *Ubuntu-botho* syllabus, commonly referred to as the Inkatha syllabus, taught the political ideology and historical mythology of Inkatha to

[115] Maré and Hamilton; Gerhard Maré, *Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa* (London: Zed Books, 1993).
[116] Crawford Young, Boston University, and African Studies Center, *Ethnicity and Politics in Africa* (Boston, Massachusetts: Boston University African Studies Center, 2002),

hundreds of thousands of schoolchildren. For adults, however, Buthelezi used public rallies and networks of chiefs and *izinduna* allowed the messages of Inkatha to reach the far corners of the population, especially in areas of low literacy where the spoken word was the primary avenues of information.

The school system became a vehicle for political indoctrination among younger people almost immediately after KwaZulu became self-governing. From 1977, Inkatha formed branches of its Inkatha Youth Brigade at schools across the KwaZulu.[117] In 1978, the KLA repealed the Bantu Education Act, giving KwaZulu control over the educational content in its own schools. Oscar Dlomo, who was KwaZulu's Minister of Education and Culture and the secretary-general of Inkatha, warned that teachers who did not embrace Inkatha's mission would be "suspect."[118] One informant, who lived in Ulundi during the 1980s, recalled attending school and automatically becoming an Inkatha member.

> Everybody! Everybody was IFP. Once you take your child to school, he or she becomes an IFP member, by virtue of the fact that you paid the school fees. And then, the membership fee was deducted from the school fees! We were receiving red cards about this size [makes shape with his hands about the side of a business card], it was signed by O.B. Dlomo, General-Secretary.[119]

The Natal African Teacher's Union, an Inkatha affiliate, initially drew up the *ubuntu-botho* syllabus, or the "Inkatha syllabus," in 1978. The KwaZulu government subsequently introduced it into the schools in 1979.

While Buthelezi referred to the Inkatha syllabus as a form of "civics" class, the syllabus brought Buthelezi's political ideology into the classroom. The textbooks include passages on history, politics, and aims of Inkatha. It taught that the ANC's armed strategy

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[117] Maré and Hamilton, *Ethnicity and Politics,* 182.
[118] Maré and Hamilton, *Ethnicity and Politics,* 183.
[119] Thokazani Zulu, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, May 3, 2016, Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

was doomed to fail. Class activities included singing Zulu war songs, memorizing the names of senior officials of KwaZulu and Inkatha, and collecting pictures of Chief Buthelezi from newspapers.

The Inkatha syllabus carefully cultivated the political centrality of Buthelezi as the "hereditary prime minister" and political leader of KwaZulu. Praisley Mduli observed:

> Since Inkatha is presented largely as the political vehicle for Zulu aspirations and the leader of Inkatha is Buthelezi, he is therefore placed in a more visible position than the Zulu king. In fact, in all of these books a lot more is said about Buthelezi than the king. This firmly inverts the traditional roles about the relationship between the king as his 'prime minister,' a rather crude reflection of the de facto situation in the KwaZulu bantstuan's internal politics.[120]

While Buthelezi had previously portrayed a constitutional monarchy as a modern reform needed for the Zulu nation to survive, his tactic shifted by the late 1970s as Inkatha came to espouse the position that the king had always been apolitical and members of the Buthelezi clan had always wielded power over the Zulu nation.

The *Ubuntu-botho* syllabus closely linked Zulu identity and Inkatha. The syllabus presented Inkatha as "continuing in Shaka's tradition and completing his task of unifying the 'African nations' into one big nation."[121] It presented Inkatha as the protector of Zulu cultural traditions. The syllabus neglects to mention, conveniently, populations in KwaZulu that historically refused to recognize the Zulu kingdom.[122] These stories, it seems, did not fit into the narrative of a single "Kingdom of KwaZulu."

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[120] P Mdluli, "Ubuntu-Botho: Inkatha's People's Education," *Transformation* 19, no. 5 (1987): 60–77.
[121] Mduli, "Ubuntu-Botho," 75.
[122] UNISA, Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 7, GHS Melhaulose Association, "Meeting of Ingwavuma Chiefs with the Chief Executive Councilor," November 29, 1974.

Buthelezi also reinforced his political ideology through the 1980s on repetition of political ideology in speeches, in government publications, and at cultural events such as Shaka Day celebrations. Through these projects, he continued to refashion history in order to present the "Zulu nation," which he portrayed as under his command, as a major political force. He relied on personal charisma, speaking frequently at rallies of hundreds of onlookers. Much of his support came from older and more conservative rural populations, especially rural women.[123]

Buthelezi strategically drew connections between the Zulu past and pressing political issues of the day. In the 1980s, he sparred with the apartheid government over the boundaries of KwaZulu, refusing to accept homeland independence until the government added more land to the bantustan. On September 27th, 1980, Buthelezi spoke at the unveiling of a tombstone for King Cetshwayo in the Nkandla district. At this event, Buthelezi emphasized the "absolutely impossible circumstances under which King Cetshwayo acceded to the Zulu throne," referring to the "rape" of the Zulu kingdom that was already underway by white colonists in Natal. Buthelezi quickly brought this history to the present day, proclaiming the developments during the time of Cetshwayo to be "the very beginning of our present land problems."[124] Buthelezi made parallels between the struggles Cetshwayo faced with the British and those faced by KwaZulu with the white apartheid government.

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[123] Roger Southall, "Buthelezi, Inkatha," 457.

[124] UNISA, Document Centre for African Studies, ACC 8/3, Speeches by Buthelezi, 1979-1980, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, "Unveiling of Cetshwayo's Tombstone," Saturday, September 27, 1980, Nkandla, South Africa.

When referencing Cetshwayo's arrest and exile, moreover, Buthelezi used the term KwaZulu rather than Zululand or Zulu kingdom.[125] Through statements like these, Buthelezi equated KwaZulu –the modern apartheid creation under his leadership—with the pre-colonial kingdom with a much different geographical and political footprint. While this 1980 event was a memorial of Cetshwayo, the reference to parallel struggle also implicitly placed Buthelezi as the main defender and political leader of the "Zulu nation" in the struggle the apartheid state.

Zulu Nationalism and the Threat of the Anti-Apartheid Movement

In the mid-1980s, only a few years after Buthelezi gained control of the monarchy and the KwaZulu government, the anti-apartheid movement threatened the future of all homeland leaders. Despite his attempts to tightly control politics in KwaZulu, Buthelezi's position was already weakening. In 1985, polls from the Institute of Black Research demonstrated that Buthelezi only held 34 percent support in urban areas of Natal and KwaZulu.[126] From the late 1980s, Inkatha and the United Democratic Front (UDF) engaged in a regional civil war. The worst violence remained in areas, such as the Natal Midlands, where both the UDF and Inkatha enjoyed significant strength. In centers of Inkatha power such as Ulundi and Nongoma, one informant, Thokazani Zulu, currently a civil servant in Ulundi, recalled "by those times it was not an open thing to start any organization contrary to the IFP."[127] Zulu, who went to high school in Ulundi during the peak of IFP-UDF violence, recalled that at school, the principal would publically name

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[125] Ibid.
[126] "Buthelezi hasn't got majority urban Zulu support, shows poll," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, October 11 to 17, 1985
[127] Thokazani Zulu, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, May 3, 2016, Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

students who were allegedly aligned with the UDF, and these students would have to "fly" and leave the area to avoid murder.[128]

From the mid 1980s, Pretoria provided assistance to Inkatha in order to destabilize the UDF. In January 1986, Inkatha launched a competing labor union, the United Workers of South Africa (UWUSA), which began to violently clash with COSATU.[129] Negotiations to end the violence largely failed through the late 1980s.[130] UDF leaders accused Buthelezi of both cooperating with the apartheid government and coercing Zulu speakers to join Inkatha's ranks.[131] The banning of the UDF in early 1988 wrecked peace talks. On the same day, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly gave the KwaZulu police (KZP) jurisdiction over the black township areas that were torn apart by violence. Inkatha and Buthelezi loyalists dominated the KZP and the civil service writ large.[132]

In the late 1980s, it became public knowledge Inkatha members had undergone paramilitary training. On December 6, 1986, at least nine Inkatha members were involved in the murder three members of the COSATU-allied Metal and Allied Workers Union in Howick, a small town outside of Pietermaritzburg. Six Inkatha members, who were ultimately found guilty, had been trained at KwaZulu's Emandleni-Matleng camp, a "community development" center that was essentially a paramilitary camp. Prior to the

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[128] ibid
[129] Carmel Rickard, "Inkatha Launched pro-free labour market labour federation *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, January 24 to 30, 1986; "Inkatha-Cosatu conflict escalates," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, June 13 to 19, 1986.
[130]Truce! UDF and Inkatha agree to stop the killings," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, October 9, 1987; "Buthelezi on violence", *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, January 15, 1988.
[131] "Buthelezi on violence", *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, January 15th, 1988.
[132] UDF Banning wrecks Natal peace talks," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, February 26 to March 3, 1988.

murders, Buthelezi had referred to himself as the "commander-in-chief of the *amabutho* and Embandleni-Matleng."[133]

During the last years of apartheid, Buthelezi advocated for a federal system of post-apartheid government that would allow him to maintain significant power within what would become KwaZulu-Natal. Buthelezi used public speeches to an even greater extent to recast the relationship between the Zulu royal house, Inkatha, and himself. He repeatedly used the image of the king in public rallies to raise support for Inkatha, claiming that the ANC sought to either coopt or destroy the King. In doing so, he presented himself as the protector of the Zulu kingdom in a time of political turmoil.

In late 1989, in the face of political instability, Buthelezi continued to rely on a cult of personality to reinforce his position. This was especially effective in the heart of Zululand. At an Inkatha conference in early July 1989, Buthelezi's position at the center of a major cult of personality was fully on display. [134] At the beginning of the conference, one of the speakers proclaimed to the crowd, "We are following the Moses of South Africa!" At the conference and other similar events, a typical pattern emerged. Buthelezi would make a speech narrating his version of events and what he believed should be done. The delegates would then vigorously debate and propose resolutions "from the floor" that codified Buthelezi's visions.[135] Inkatha "peace rallies," which were portrayed as Inkatha-sponsored peace initiatives for the region, mainly valorized Buthelezi. The attendees often sang songs praising "Shenge," Buthelezi's clan name:

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[133] "Six Inkatha inquest accused attended 'paramilitary' camp," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, March 25 to 30, 1988.
[134] "Law laid down by the Moses of Ulundi," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, July 8, 1988.
[135] Ibid.

Wena muni omusha wahlala wathula thina silandela uShenge
Young person, why do you stand and watch while we are following Shenge?

Ngelanga lenkululeko thina siyakhetha uShenge
On freedomday, we will choose Shenge

At such events, Buthelezi often brought up his prior involvement in the ANC, presenting Inkatha as the liberation front for South Africa while the ANC remained in exile. He read sections of letters Nelson Mandela, his former classmate at Fort Hare, had sent him in order to position himself and Inkatha as the dominant "liberation" movement in South Africa.

Inkatha's hold on KwaZulu and Natal was tenuous, and the future of Buthelezi's power—and the power of traditional leadership in South Africa—was uncertain. While Inkatha asserted in July of 1989 that its paid membership had reached 1.8 million people, these numbers were likely exaggerated.[136] The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA), which formed in 1987 as a nominally anti-apartheid group under the Bantu Holomisa, the President of the Transkei, threatened to strip Inkatha of its hold on some chiefs. There was also dissent within KwaZulu's civil service.[137] Conflict continued to rage, especially in the Natal midlands and Gauteng. Inkatha repeatedly scuttled peace talks with the UDF through 1989 and 1990. The prospect of a power transfer in South Africa approached, fueling violent political competition.[138]

The situation shifted at the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990. In December 1989, Prince Israel Mcwayizeni Zulu, the former regent who had gone on to serve as Zwelithini's personal representative in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, denounced

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[136] "Highly disciplined, or hidden rifts," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, July 14, 1989
[137] ibid.
[138] "In Natal's 'year of peace', more and more devastation," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, December 21, 1989.

the homeland system and the KwaZulu government. He pledged his support to the Mass Democratic Movement and joined CONTRALESA. Afterwards, arsonists burned down his home in Zululand. IFP supporters also circulated smear pamphlets in Nongoma and Mahlabathini with unsubstantiated claims that Mcwayizeni sought to destroy the King.[139] Some political observers believed that even Goodwill Zwelithini would eventually also abandoned the KwaZulu homeland government and Inkatha and break with Buthelezi.

Negotiating the Future

In February 1990, the apartheid government released Nelson Mandela, bringing greater urgency to the battle for the new political order. Buthelezi had often brought up his association with Mandela at Fort Hare in order to claim that Inkatha was a non-violent movement developed from the early tradition of the ANC. Shortly after Mandela's release, however, the ANC called upon the government to strip Buthelezi of his power as KwaZulu Minister of Police and to disband the homeland's police force. Mandela claimed that the government could "end [the conflict] in days if it chose to do so." Mandela accused the government of allowing violence to continue in order to weaken the ANC.[140] In the face of these accusations, it became increasingly difficult for Inkatha to claim legitimacy based on its supposed historical association with the ANC.

In the wake of Mandela's release, violence escalated across all of South Africa, but most acutely in Natal. Of the 20,000 political fatalities between 1984 and 1994, 70 percent occurred between February 1990—when Mandela was released—and the

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[139] "Zulu prince gives MDM support," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, December 1 to 7, 1989.
[140] "Natal Conflict: just who is going to sort it out?" *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, May 25 to 31, 1990.

democratic elections of April 1994. In cities ranging from Johannesburg to Durban at the end of 1990, crowds of armed Inkatha supporters rallied in the streets. In KwaZulu, the government repealed laws preventing the carrying of dangerous weapons, allowing Inkatha activists to carry "traditional"—but very lethal—weapons into political rallies.[141]

In late 1990, Inkatha rebranded itself as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The IFP's strategy shifted towards proving that the party, and Buthelezi, had a right to an independent seat at the negotiating table alongside Mandela and De Klerk.[142] Inkatha attempted to fashion itself as a national and multiracial party, rather than Zulu ethnic nationalist movement. In mid-1991, the Inkatha Institute, an academic think tank affiliated with the party, claimed that, "This 'Zulu' thing is an ANC ploy to marginalize Inkatha. Politics is now a national game."[143]

At the IFPs launch in Ulundi, it claimed to "make the reduction of violence a top priority."[144] At this point, however, the IFP still received clandestine military and police support from the South African government. Negotiations between the ANC and the IFP continued as the two parties met in February 1991. Buthelezi and Mandela agreed to jointly tour the areas worst hit by violence. The ANC and IFP also set up a joint committee to address violence in Natal.[145] However, within a month, another 120 people

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[141] "KwaZulu disarms the law and violence goes on," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, November 30 to December 6, 1990.
[142] Carmel Rickard, "Inkatha and ANC set hostility aside," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, February 1 to 7, 1991.
[143] Carmel Rickard, "Inkatha conference will look at negotiations," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, July 19 to 25, 1991.
[144] Carmel Rickard, "ANC, Inkatha move closer to Natal peace," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, December 14 to 19, 1990.
[145] Carmel Rickard, "Committee to implement peace accord *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, February 1 to 7, 1991.

were killed in political violence. Reports emerged that Inkatha continued to rely on forced recruitment campaigns in schools, workplaces, and communities.[146]

In 1991, Inkatha suffered a significant blow as more evidence of government support came forth. In mid-1991, secret police documents revealed that the South African Police (SAP) and Inkatha jointly coordinated the creation of United Workers of South Africa (UWUSA) to provide opposition to COSATU. The evidence also revealed that the SAP had provided assistance to Inkatha and UWUSA in carrying out violence against COSATU and the UDF. UWUSA at this point was under the control of KwaZulu Minister of the Interior, Steven Sithebe. There were also reports that SAP officer Louis Botha was a regular visitor to Buthelezi's office[147]

The scandal shook the leadership of KwaZulu and Inkatha. Top officials, including IFP secretary-general Oscar Dhlomo, resigned in June. The next month in August, De Klerk confirmed rumors that the South African Defense Force (SADF) had trained an elite unit of 150 Zulu fighters in counter-insurgency tactics in the Caprivi Strip in South West Africa (now Namibia) in 1986. This elite unit, under orders from KwaZulu cabinet member Samuel Jamile, conducted hit squad missions against ANC and UDF supporters. This unit was incorporated into the KwaZulu Police (KZP) in 1989. The National Party government claimed that it had stopped funding Inkatha in early 1990, however, it emerged that the SAP funneled money through the Inkatha Institute for major rallies to boost Buthelezi's public image throughout 1991.[148] A few weeks after the

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[146] Philippa Garson, "The false face of peace in Natal's killing fields," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, March 8 to 14, 1991.
[147] "More top Inkatha men may resign," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, July 26 to August 1, 1991.
[148] "New secrets of Inkatha's funding," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, November 29 to December 5, 1991.

funding of these rallies became public, newspapers broke the story that the IFP receiving funding and paramilitary training from the SADF, including support for a secret paramilitary training camp at Mkuze in northern Natal. The camp contained equipment marked "SADF," and the SADF also paid up to R2.25 million per year for the prior three years for salaries and equipment.

The scandal further devastated the IFP's credibility. The Legal Resource Centre and Human Rights Commission in Durban released a statement that the KwaZulu Police (KZP) had become one of "the biggest obstacles to lasting peace in Natal," and reported that the KZP was largely responsible for fueling violence in Natal.[149] Mbongeni Khumalo, the former head of the Inkatha Youth Bridgade and member of the Inkatha Central Committee, announced that he had quit Inkatha because he believed it to be responsible for instigating black-on-black violence in Natal. He also confirmed that the SAP and SADF had supported Buthelezi for years, and the KZP, with apartheid government assistance, acted as the "military wing of Inkatha."[150] Government support for Inkatha tapered off in 1992. Furthermore, after the ANC dropped nationalization from its platform, the IFP also lost appeal among businessmen. In October 1992, a former Inkatha official told the *Weekly Mail* that Buthelezi was backed into a corner, and he refused to tolerate of any dissent within the party.

As Buthelezi's position eroded, he retreated "to his most trusted support base as a self-proclaimed leader of the Zulu nation, [appealing] more desperately to Zulu

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[149] Casandra Moodley "'KZP the obstacle to Natal Peace," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, December 13 to 18, 1991.
[150] Eddie Koch and Drew Forrest, "Inside Inkatha," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, January 10 to 16, 1992.

nationalism and traditional respect for royalty."[151] In 1992, Buthelezi still controlled the purse strings of the monarchy. The king was not even allowed to receive visitors or travel without Buthelezi's permission. Given these controls, Zwelithini publically supported him and made speeches, penned by IFP Central Committee member Walter Felgate, at rallies across the province. The collapse of the homeland, however, also presented the prospect that Buthelezi could lose control over the king.[152] Speculation emerged that if the new democratic government severed Buthelezi's official control over the king, Zwelithini might be willing to speak out against him.

The IFP made its participation in negotiations and elections conditional on "federalism and devolution of powers."[153] Buthelezi desperately tried to ally with white conservatives in late 1992 to advocate for a federalist system that would preserve his regional power base, and by extension, his control over the monarchy.[154] Through 1993, Buthelezi continued to advocate for a federal constitution that would recognize the Zulu kingdom in the new democracy.[155] The IFP increasingly used the king at public rallies to stir up sentiments of Zulu nationalism in advance of the election.[156]

The IFP's claim to be the exclusive representative of Zulu culture, however, also came under challenge. In 1993, on the 165th anniversary of Shaka Zulu's death, the ANC and the IFP held competing rallies in Natal. Buthelezi used the IFP's Shaka Day celebration in Stanger to present a version of Zulu nationalism centered around himself.

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[151] "Beware the cornered chief," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, October 2 to 8, 1992.
[152] "The Real and Would be Zulu King," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, November 20 to 26, 1992.
[153] Eddie Koch and Paul Stober "IFP, ANC engage in political horse trading," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, June 25 to July 1, 1993.
[154] Jan Taljaard, "Inkatha tests Pretoria- and Catches a chill," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, December 11 to 17, 1992.
[155] "King wants a Kingdom," *Weekly Mail,* Johannesburg, South Africa, July 9 to 15, 1993.
[156] Ibid.

As people chanted "Shenge!" Shenge!," Buthelezi claimed that "If we allow the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) to take over the running of KwaZulu, we are saying it is ok to allow foreigners to rule over us—this no patriotic Zulu can ever allow."[157] At KwaXimba, about halfway between Durban and Pietermaritzburg, the ANC held a cultural festival aimed at reclaiming Zulu culture from the Inkatha Freedom Party. ANC aligned-chiefs attended the event at KwaXimba, and they rallied for a broader conception of Zuluness outside of the control of Buthelezi.

At this competing Shaka Day celebration, ANC Midlands Deputy President Blade Nzimande accused Buthelezi of depicting all opposition as "unpatriotic." While Buthelezi's power had rested on the idea of a "non-political king," Nzimande accused Buthelezi of corrupting the monarchy by using it to prop up the IFP. Nzimande claimed that the ANC would restore the prestige of the monarchy by removing it from IFP politics. Nzimande also challenged Buthelezi's claim that he was a hereditary prime minister to the Zulu royal house: "The prime minister of Shaka, Dingaan and Mpande was not a Buthelezi. It was only with Cetshwayo that Buthelezi's grandfather became prime minister."[158] By challenging Buthelezi's right to serve as *induna-enkulu,* the ANC also rejected the prospect that he could serve alongside the Zulu king in any post-apartheid political settlement. During the early 1990s, the ANC in the Midlands and southern Natal began to embrace Zuluness as a cultural and political identity.[159]

As 1993 drew to a close, Buthelezi and the IFP worked within the "Freedom Alliance," a political front with the governments of the Ciskei and Bophuthatswana and

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[157] Farouk Chothia, "The battle for the Zulus," *The Weekly Mail and Guardian* Johannesburg, South Africa, October 1 to 7, 1993.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Jabulani Sithole, "The African National Congress in Natal, 1990-1994," in SADET, ed., *The Road to Democracy in South Africa: Volume 6* (Cape Town: Unisa Press, 2007), 251

several right-wing parties, to advocate for a federalized system. In August 1993, the Freedom Alliance walked out of multiparty negotiations, claiming that their concerns were being ignored. An interim constitution was ultimately agreed on in December 1993. Buthelezi, however, continued to reject the document and the April 27th, 1994 election date. Among the IFP's demands were 1) a clear division of power between regional and central governments, 2) an amendment to the interim constitution to allow each regional state to have its own basic constitution, 3) some recognition of "self-determination" for different groups, and 4) a stronger regional power in the process of constitutional amendment. Buthelezi and the IFP threatened to boycott the election if these demands were not met.[160] Such a federalist system would allow Buthelezi to maintain his power base and retain control over the king in a new regional constitution.

Buthelezi also attempted to subdue moderates within his own party who wanted to avoid a boycott of the elections. In December 1993, Buthelezi warned that "Those who will be with me will be with me and those who move to oppose me will be against me. That will be their prerogative. All I want is clarity on who is with me. I am confident that I will be getting the mandate I am looking for."[161] He sought to hold a special general conference to seek a mandate from Inkatha members for a boycott of the elections unless his demands were met. However, as the election approached and Buthelezi attempted to maintain control over moderates within his own party, King Zwelithini criticized Buthelezi and the Freedom Alliance for walking out of multiparty negotiations.[162]

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[160] Chris Louw, "IFP dissenters back Buthelezi," *The Weekly Mail and Guardian* Johannesburg, South Africa, December 3 to 9, 1993.
[161] "Buthelezi blusters as IFP gets ready," *The Weekly Mail and Guardian* Johannesburg, South Africa, November 28 to December 2, 1993.
[162] Farouk Chothia, "Buthelezi's back is against the wall," *The Weekly Mail and Guardian* Johannesburg, South Africa, December 10 to 18, 1993.

Sources within the IFP suggested that Zwelithini would attempt to protect the interests of the monarchy by breaking with Buthelezi and negotiating with other political parties, including the ANC, if needed.

Buthelezi threatened to boycott the election until just a week before the voting. Meanwhile, however, another political maneuver was underway that would inadvertently give Zwelithini more freedom from Buthelezi's control. On April 25, 1994, right before the first democratic election, De Klerk coordinated a secret piece of legislation, the Ingonyama Trust Act. The legislation put all of the land in KwaZulu under this trust established under the sole control of the Zulu king.[163]

Democracy and the Battle for the "Soul of the Zulus"

Buthelezi agreed at the eleventh hour to participate in elections. While the ANC won the national vote, the IFP ultimately won KwaZulu-Natal in the midst of accusations of election intimidation and irregularity. The IFP won 50.3 percent and the ANC 32.3 percent on the provincial ballot. The IFP's support was concentrated heavily in rural areas. After the election, Zwelithini aligned himself with the ANC and attended Nelson Mandela's inauguration against Buthelezi's wishes.[164] ANC midlands spokesman Blade Nzimande proclaimed that Buthelezi had lost his "two main pillars of support," referring to the KwaZulu government and King Zwelithini.[165] The *Weekly Mail and Guardian* quoted a conversation between King Zwelithini and Mandela in which Zwelithini

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[163] "Threats to a New Democracy: Continuing violence in KwaZulu-Natal," Human Rights Watch Reports, Vol. 7, No.3, New York: Human Rights Watch, May 1995, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Safrica.htm.
[164] Sithole, "African National Congress," 252.
[165] "Edged out, but Buthelezi fights back," *The Mail and Guardian,* Johannesburg, South Africa, June 17th, 1994.

allegedly said, "you were a prisoner for 27 years, I was a prisoner for 24 years."[166] Under the new government, the power to inaugurate chiefs shifted to Zwelithini, weakening Buthelezi's hold on traditional leadership.[167] Zwelithini also publically criticized IFP chiefs for "abusing" their powers while supporting the IFP in elections.[168] Buthelezi continued to remind Zwelithini publically that he would be dependent on the Inkatha-controlled KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature for the salary and budget for the royal house.[169]

In mid-1994, Zwelithini totally split with Buthelezi, jeopardizing the legitimizing myth that positioned the former KwaZulu leader as a traditional prime minister, or *induna-enkhulu,* ruling on behalf of the King. Rumors spread that Zwelithini would strip Buthelezi of his power as "traditional prime minister" by excluding him from the Royal Council that was to be formed. In spite of these rumors, Buthelezi continued to proclaim that this position was a hereditary birthright that could not be taken away. However, the IFP continued to lose influence.[170] In September, Zwelithini also invited President Nelson Mandela to the Shaka Day celebrations, much to Buthelezi's anger.[171] At this point, Zwelithini severed ties with Buthelezi and proclaimed that Buthelezi was not his "traditional prime minister."[172]

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[166] Sithole, "African National Congress," 252.
[167] "Who's got the power: Shaka Day will tell," *The Mail and Guardian,* Johannesburg, South Africa, September 23, 1994.
[168] "Edged out, but Buthelezi fights back," *The Mail and Guardian,* Johannesburg, South Africa, June 17, 1994.
[169] Ibid.
[170] Ibid.
[171] "Buthelezi seeks settlement," *The Mail and Guardian,* Johannesburg, South Africa, September 9, 1994.
[172] "Who's got the power: Shaka Day will tell," *The Mail and Guardian,* Johannesburg, South Africa, September 23, 1994.

The IFP responded by using government vehicles to bus its supporters to the royal homestead, where they demonstrated and allegedly threw stones at the King's residence. This turned out to be a serious miscalculation for the IFP. It clearly shattered the image of the party as the custodian of the Zulu kingdom. Afterwards, Zwelithini reportedly said of the IFP: "This is a clear indication that they are invading the kingdom of kwaZulu and it's a clear indication that death is knocking on the door."[173] Prince Sifiso Zulu criticized Buthelezi on national television, accusing him of "weakening the pillars of the kingdom" during apartheid when he centralized power through the IFP and KwaZulu government and controlled the image of the King. Sifiso reported that under Buthelezi's rule "The king was isolated from even his immediate family. If we wanted to meet as a family, we had to do so secretly." He also reported "Buthelezi used the king as his political shield; as his political tool. Whenever he was politically and constitutionally challenged and marginalized, he rushed to draw in the king so that his political opponents would be deemed to be undermining the kingdom."[174]

In 1995, Buthelezi and Zwelithini engaged in what the *Mail and Guardian* referred to as the "battle for the soul of the Zulus." Mangosuthu Buthelezi formed the KwaZulu-Natal House of Traditional Leadership without consulting Zwelithini. The House of Traditional Leadership was an attempt by Buthelezi to maintain control of chiefs in the run-up to the 1995 local elections. Zwelithini challenged the creation of the body, signing an affidavit that he, as Zulu king, chairman of the Usuthu Tribal Authority, and chairman of the Nongoma Regional Authority, was never consulted. Zwelithini also

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[173] "Who's got the power: Shaka Day will tell," *The Mail and Guardian,* Johannesburg, South Africa, September 23, 1994.
[174] "The Minister would be King says the Prince," *The Mail and Guardian,* Johannesburg, South Africa, September 30, 1994.

claimed that Buthelezi had contravened "traditional Zulu law and custom" by summoning the king to a meeting about the creation of the body. Furthermore, the rules for the House of Traditional Leaders guaranteed a seat to the "traditional prime minister of the *Ingonyama*."[175] Using competing histories of the Zulu kingdom, Zwelithini rejected the existence of a hereditary prime minister, proclaiming "there is no such institution or functionary in traditional Zulu customary law." Echoing a competing historical narrative presented by ANC midlands President Blade Nzimande the prior year, Zwelithini claimed that, traditionally, a King would appoint an *induna-enkhulu* (chief induna) to represent him; while Buthelezi claimed this was a hereditary position passed down in his family since the time of Cetshwayo, Zwelithini argued that only King Cetshwayo had appointed a Buthelezi as *induna-enkulu*. He stated that Shaka's *induna-enkulu* had been Ngomane Mdlethshe, King Dingane's had been Ndelea Ntuli, Mpande's had been Masiphula Ntshangase, Dinuzulu's had been Mankulumane Ndwandwe, Solomon's had been Prince Gilbert Zulu, and Bhekuzulu had not made an appointment. Zwelithini also claimed that when he ascended the throne, Prince Ndesheni Zulu and then Aaron Mthenjane had served as his *induna-enkulu*, rather than Buthelezi. This statement countered one of Buthelezi's main claims to power and legitimacy in KwaZulu and Zulu speaking areas in South Africa.[176]

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[175] "Right royal battle for soul of the Zulus," *The Mail and Guardian,* Johannesburg, South Africa, March 17th, 1995.
[176] Ibid.

The Fall of Inkatha

Buthelezi and Zwelithini continued to clash in the House of Traditional Leaders. The IFP initially dominated the House. In August 1995, Zwelithini refused to attend an *imbizo* called by the House to adopt a "Zulu covenant" supporting the IFP's federalist principles. With Buthelezi no longer controlling his visitors, Zwelithini met with several groups and individuals in South Africa who were unaffiliated with the IFP. He advocated for the payment of traditional leadership through the central government rather than provincial governments, which would fully remove control of his purse strings—and those of all chiefs—from the Inkatha-controlled KwaZulu-Natal provincial government.[1]

In the coming years, the IFP's electoral hold on KwaZulu-Natal collapsed as its hold on the history and symbolism of the Zulu kingdom faded away. The IFP abandoned Zulu nationalism and instead attempted to remarket itself as a national party. This approach was largely ineffective. In combining the 1996 local election results to consider the entire province, the IFP won 44.5 percent and the ANC 33.3 percent. In the 1999 elections, the IFP secured only 40.45 percent of the vote in the province and the ANC earned 39.78 percent. Moreover, by 1999, the ANC gained significant inroads into rural areas in southern KZN.[2] In 2004, Buthelezi and the IFP launched a major national campaign focused on winning new voters. It spent half of its limited campaign budget outside of KwaZulu-Natal, taking for granted its rural base. At the same time, however, the ANC was aggressively campaigning across rural KZN.[3]

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[1] "IFP clash with King reaching climax," *The Mail and Guardian,* Johannesburg, South Africa, August 18, 1995.
[2] Laurence Piper, "Nationalism without a Nation: The Rise and Fall of Zulu Nationalism in South Africa's Transition to Democracy, 1975-99," *Nations and Nationalism: Journal of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 2002, 86-88.
[3] Ibid.

The relationship between chiefs, the former backbone of the IFP, and the ANC had also drastically changed. KwaZulu-Natal had 280 recognized chieftaincies. In 2003, the ANC controlled government passed the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Amendment Act, which dramatically increased the powers of chiefs in rural areas. By the early 2000s, the ANC had become the party doing the to most of protect traditional leadership, a claim previously held by the Inkatha Freedom Party.[4]

With this failure to campaign to its base and the ANC's inroads with rural populations and leaders, the IFP lost control of KwaZulu-Natal in 2004.[5] In 2014, it received only 9.8 percent of the vote in KwaZulu-Natal, and it lost even its status as the opposition party in the province. Today, the IFP controls only a few districts in the province, Nongoma, Nkandla, and Ulundi. In October 2017, after years in Parliament and as head of the IFP, Mangosuthu Buthelezi announced his retirement from public politics.

[4] Clifton Crais, "Custom and the Politics of Sovereignty in South Africa," *Journal of Social History* 39, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 722.
[5] Piper.

Epilogue

What is the afterlife of a historical invention after an authoritarian regime that constructed it falls? After over four decades of National Party rule, twenty-four years of homeland administration, the rise and fall of Inkatha and its specific articulation of Zulu ethnic nationalism, the creation of the Ingonyama Trust recognizing the King's authority over one-third of the province of KwaZulu-Natal, and the empowerment of traditional leaders under the ANC political order—major questions remain about history, ideology, and ethnic politics. To what extent do the KwaZulu-era ideological underpinnings of Zulu ethnic sovereignty still shape local politics? How do people use history, ethnicity, and tradition to make political claims in the post-apartheid era? What is the relationship between ideology and current politics?

The extent to which people engaged the historical narrative Buthelezi spun under apartheid brings to the surface fundamental theoretical questions about ideology. The Comaroffs define ideology as an "articulated and contestable system of meanings, values, and beliefs that can be abstracted as the worldview of any social group."[1] A key distinction between hegemony and ideology is the factor of human consciousness. In studying KwaZulu, and the politics surrounding contested visions of Zulu ethnic sovereignty that emerged under apartheid, we must understand the human factor shaping the relationship between ideology and politics. In doing so, we must also come to terms

[1] Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution. Vol. 1* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 23.

with the reality, as argued by the Comaroffs, that people are not merely "reflections of monolithic colonial or social forces."[2]

History is particularly powerful and contested in this part of South Africa. Rather than relying on paradigms of invention of tradition, which typically place power solely in the hands of the inventors, such as Buthelezi in this case, historians need to understand how dominant ideologies surrounding narratives of Zulu history are shaped, to borrow from Hamilton, by "contesting and conflicting versions of the past."[3] In this epilogue, I analyze the fissures in how ordinary people engage previously dominant ideologies, and then reflect on their implications for post-apartheid politics.

Oral history and oral tradition offer a critical entry point into the questions of ideology and the politics of Zulu ethnic sovereignty. In 2016, I conducted interviews in Ulundi and Nongoma to explore how people understood aspects of Zulu history and politics after years of Inkatha-dominated political education. I sought to assess the success of political indoctrination and the salience of ideologies of ethnic nationalism and Zulu sovereignty through the democratic transition. I asked about the historic and current responsibilities of the *Ingonyama* and *induna-enkhulu*, the boundaries of the "Zulu nation," and the proper exercise of authority in KwaZulu and post-apartheid rural KwaZulu-Natal. I also asked about Zulu history, the KwaZulu government, and Buthelezi, situting the stories people told me within the context of the popular mythology cultivated by Inkatha.

I was particularly interested in the salience of a fallen authoritarian regime's ideology. Hamilton has pointed out that oral historians are faced with "the peculiarities

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[2] Comaroff and Comaroff, *Revelation and Revolution,* 10.
[3] Carolyn Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty: The Power of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998), 24.

and fallibility of human memory, the overlaying of oral tradition with successive group histories ruling group histories, and the functioning of oral traditions as cultural characters."[4] We need to move beyond examining "oral tradition as the products of artefacts of ruling group ideologies," and understand that sources reflect "the conflict between interests underlying different world views"[5] In approaching oral sources in the former KwaZulu, a region shaped for years by authoritarian ruling government ideology, I did not discard inconsistent narratives as uncorroborated evidence, but instead identified them as arenas of ideological struggle.[6]

Oral sources reveal fissures in what was seemingly a dominant ideology supporting a specific version of Zulu ethnic sovereignty in KwaZulu. They allow us to study the limits of elite inventions of history during a period of major political change.[7] While scholars of Inkatha have examined the "invented" narratives of Zulu history as constructed by Buthelezi, we must interrogate the life of this ideology among ordinary people. Residents of Inkatha strongholds in KwaZulu, even those who claimed to support the IFP and Buthelezi, did not simply repeat the historical narratives central to Inkatha ideology. The cracks in their stories provide a window to examine the complex politics of historical ideology and Zulu ethnic sovereignty.

Studying the relationship between history, politics, and ideology also shed light on the persistence of the idea of Zulu ethnic sovereignty over rural land in the former KwaZulu after the democratic transition and the collapse of the Inkatha Freedom Party. These final pages explore oral sources in depth, but major themes are summarized here.

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[4] Carolyn Hamilton, "Ideology and Oral Tradition: Listening to the Voices from Below.," *History in Africa.*, no. 14 (1987): 67.
[5] Hamilton, "Ideology and Oral Tradition," 71.
[6] Hamilton, "Ideology and Oral Tradition," 67.
[7] Comaroff and Comaroff, *Revelation and Revolution,* 26.

These interviews reveal that, by and large, people understood the Zulu kingdom to include all Africans speakers across KwaZulu-Natal, and even into the Transkei and former Transvaal. They overwhelmingly believed that Shaka Zulu had conquered all of these areas in the nineteenth century, and all of the land in the former KwaZulu rightfully belonged to the Zulu kingdom.

The issue of authority was a major fault line. Rural residents embraced the official apolitical status of the king, an invention of the 1960s, as a timeless practice going back to the days of Shaka. However, when it came to the question of the position of Buthelezi as *induna-enkhulu*, the responses were split, even among strong IFP supporters. Only a few people told me that Buthelezi's position as *induna-enkhulu* was hereditary through his father. Despite Buthelezi's claims that his position was passed through his father's family from the time of Cetshwayo, informants presented different narratives of how Buthelezi came to the position, ranging from inheritance from his maternal ties to the Zulu royal family to appointment solely as the prerogative of the king.

The belief in the position of the Zulu king and the broader boundaries of the Zulu kingdom, in combination with the contention over the historical origins of Buthelezi's power, has created a situation in which Zulu sovereignty over large swaths of South Africa's territory remains central to the political beliefs of millions of Zulu speakers. However, the right of a "traditional prime minister" to wield political power on behalf of the monarchy did not survive as part of the worldviews of many Zulu speakers, leaving room for other political parties such as the African National Congress under Jacob Zuma to exploit Zulu ethnic politics in the post-apartheid era.

The King and the Nation

The king remained central to political culture in rural Zululand. When discussing the Pondoland Revolt in the Eastern Cape and the moment in people revolted against the Paramount Chief, Alfred Khowane, a young *induna* in Nkonjeni, remarked:

> It is part of our history that we have never revolted against the king. It is one of the things that makes the Zulu nation so special, the Zulu people know their place when it comes to the kingdom, there is a certain line you cannot cross. As Zulu people, we know, you are not even allowed to talk about revolting, because you know that you will receive a very harsh, harsh, harsh punishment. You may even be banished for raising such an opinion as a Zulu person, so we are proud of knowing that we have never revolted.[8]

In interviews, many people brought up the King as a point of pride, a special figure that was exclusive to Zulus and without parallel in other areas of South Africa.

When people spoke of fondness for the King, I often used these moments as avenues to discuss the boundaries of the King's authority—in short, who was a subject of the Zulu monarchy? One popular response centered around language, which was rather ironic given the 1960s debates over the boundaries between "Zulus" and "Zulu-speakers."[9] One man insisted "everyone who speaks Zulu is taken as under the Zulu, even if you are in Pondoland or among Xhosas."[10] Another older woman articulated the Zulu nation to include all Zulu speakers who were in or originally from KwaZulu-Natal, saying that "the Zulu nation belongs to the king…[it] includes all Zulu speakers in KZN. It is the whole of KZN."[11]

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[8] Alfred Khowane, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 1, 2016, Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
[9] Gibson Zwane, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 18, 2016, Matshona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
[10] M. Buthelezi, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 22, 2016, Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
[11] Elderly Husband and wife (names anonymous), March 16, 2016, Mashona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

Others more explicitly stated the boundaries of the Zulu nation in geographic terms, often narrating the spread of the Zulu kingdom under Shaka. Mbombiseni Zungu, a relative of Chief Zungu in Matshona, recounted the early history of the Zulu kingdom: "After Shaka defeated your nation, you would automatically fall under the Zulu nation and Shaka would rule over you, so that is how all the chiefs came to be under one king, one Zulu king, so he is actually responsible for all the chiefs under the Zulu nation."[12] When asked about the size of the "Zulu nation," Zungu stated "From the Swaziland border going all the way to just before Transkei. Going back to Bergville...then the Transvaal, that's the Zulu nation."[13] Zungu insisted that Shaka expanded the Zulu nation over that entire territory by going to war and subordinating all the chiefs.[14] Phakattikwampi Ephraim Buthelezi, a praise poem singer for King Goodwill Zwelithini, presenting a similar narrative, saying that the "Zulu nation" under the king went "all the way to the Swaziland borders and all the way down to Port Shepstone."[15] While recognizing that there were non-Zulu speakers within the territory, the praise poem singer insisted, "Geographically they are under the Zulu nation. All those people around the border, you find them speaking different languages, but they are under the Zulu."[16]

A few informants in Ulundi and Nongoma brought up complexities of Zulu ethnic identity, demonstrating a minor fault line in Inkatha's once seemingly dominant ideology. Chief Ndebele, a young chief whose area is located off the R66 between Ulundi and Nongoma, noted that at cultural events such as the reed dance, people from the South

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[12] Mkhombiseni Zungu, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 9, 2016, Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
[13] Ibid.
[14] ibid.
[15] Phakattikwampi Ephraim Buthelezi, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 14, 2016, Ceza, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
[16] Ibid.

Coast, many of whom spoke Xhosa as a primary language, would still come and participate. He claimed that at those events, they would be treated "as Zulu."[17] Even one of Buthelezi's *izinduna*, Dumsani Mgaga, stated that it was sometimes hard to determine who was Zulu, because "the Transkei people don't have their own king…If there is a reed dance and you find other nations and races coming up, on that day they are regarded as Zulus because they were here under the Zulu nation under the Zulu kingdom."[18]

There could be several interpretations of these statements. The former KwaZulu did contain Swazi, Xhosa, and Pondo speakers who would participate in cultural events tied to the Zulu monarchy in the KwaZulu homeland. At the same time, Ndebele's and Mgaga's recognition that there were people who were "not Zulu," but could be "taken as" Zulu in such events, demonstrates the slipperiness of ethnic identity in South Africa.[19] It contradicts the hard line taken by Buthelezi under apartheid. It also resonates to a certain extent with ideas of pre-colonial flexibility of relationships of *ukukhoza*, and of the idea of *inkosi yinkhosi ngabantu,* or the idea that a leader is a leader because people pay loyalty to him at a given time.[20]

Power and Legitimacy

Much of Buthelezi's power rested on his claim to the position as the hereditary *induna-enkhulu,* or "traditional prime minister" of the Zulu royal house, a post he claims

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[17] Chief Ndebele, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 4, 2016, Ceza, KwaZulu-Natal.
[18] Dumsani Mgaga, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 9, 2016, Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
[19] For more on the deeper past surrounding flexible relations of authority in South African history, see Paul Landau, *Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400-1948* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
[20] Jill. E. Kelly, "'Only the Fourth Chief:' Conflict, Land, and Chiefly Authority in 20th Century KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa" (Ph.D. thesis, Michigan State University, 2012).

ran in his family from the time of Cetshwayo. During my interviews, I brought up the role of both the King and the *induna-enkhulu* to my informants, allowing them to present their understandings of these positions in both historical and post-apartheid contexts.

The idea of an apolitical king seemed to have been ingrained in the minds of rural Zulu speakers around Nongoma and Ulundi. My informants almost universally embraced the idea that all traditional leadership was supposed to be apolitical. This idea also extended to chiefs and *izinduna* in addition to the king. One informant insisted: "Should the *induna* or the chief be involved in politics, that means they will not bring enough infrastructures. It would mean he would make sure his members of that certain party would be looked after more than the members of the party who are opposing him, and we think he would be more biased when it comes to certain matters or giving out information"[21] Others indicated that the duties of the *ingonyama*, *amakhosi*, and *izinduna* requires impartiality from party politics.[22]

These claims to the apolitical nature of *amakhosi* and *izinduna* were highly suspicious in certain cases. During one interview at the Matshona tribal court, we were quite ironically seated on chairs marked "IFP" in black markers as an *induna* insisted to me that traditional leaders were not at all involved in politics "because their duty is to look after the people."[23] At the Mpungose tribal court, when I arrived to speak to all of the *izinduna* about my project and research before I began interviewing people in their

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[21] Ceza, Group interview, 7 anonymous interviewee, mixed gender, April 11, 2016, Matshona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
[22] Balawake Ntulu, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 18, 2016, Matshona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
[23] Balawake Ntulu, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 18, 2016, Matshona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

areas, a supposedly "apolitical" *induna* drove up to the courthouse with his truck covered in "National Freedom Party" stickers.

People did articulate a clear relationship between the king and the chiefs. These chiefs hold significant power over land distribution and aspects of rural governance. Bhekinkosi Sibiya, an induna of Chief Zungu Mpungose, stated that "The *ingonyama* is responsible for the chiefs, and he tells him how to rule the people. He gives them the procedures. He tells them how to treat people around their communities."[24] Several informants said that chiefs reported directly to the *ingonyama* if they had any issues.[25] Others articulated a primarily cultural role for the king. Edward Buthelezi, an induna for Buthelezi, claimed of the king: "His duty is to give protocol and make sure everything is being followed accordingly for the Zulu nation because he is responsible for the Zulu nation."[26]

Several informants, even those who lived in Buthelezi's chieftaincy near Ulundi, gave perspectives on the relationship between the *induna-enkulu* and the king that did not fit with Buthelezi's claims that a political prime minister ruled on behalf of the king. Some saw Buthelezi's role as that of a middleman communicating the *ingonyama's* messages down to chiefs. Edward Buthelezi, an induna for Buthelezi himself, stated that "He is the one looking after all of the other chiefs. One of the duties is to take all the matters revolving the chief, and then take them to the king."[27] Gibson Zwane, an *induna*

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[24] Bhekninkosi Sibiya, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 18, 2016, Matshona, KwaZulu-Natal; Elijah Jiyane, Interviewed by Ashley Parcells, Ulundi, April 22

[25] Bhekithemba Khoza,, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 22, 2016, Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

[26] Edward Buthelezi, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 9, 2016, Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

[27] Edward Buthelezi, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 9, 2016, Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

for the Mpongose chief, "*Induna-unkulu* gets to be very close to the king. He keeps the king's secrets. They can to discuss something, and the king gets to decide what will be told to the chiefs and the *izinduna*, and only then the *induna-unkhulu* will tell them."[28]

My informants in Zululand largely skimmed over controversy regarding the strained relationship between Zwelithini and Buthelezi. One pastor strongly emphasized to me that Buthelezi's position had nothing to do with the apartheid state: "The Prime Minister of KwaZulu?...He was not imposed by the government. He was the prime minister of KwaZulu before. His father Mathole, he was the Prime Minister of the Zulus before."[29] The pastor insisted that Buthelezi was the King's close confidant, and ultimately, Buthelezi would never take any action that would go against the King's wishes. [30] Chief Ndebele, who I interviewed near Ceza, noted that "there is too much politics" and people now go directly to the King, rather than Buthelezi with their issues because of his position in the IFP.[31]

Earlier parts of this dissertation have shown that the role of the *induna-enkhulu* was heavily debated through the 1960s and 1970s. Oral sources were much more split on this matter, and there were serious inconsistencies in how informants, even traditional leaders, understood the basis of Buthelezi's claim to the position. Informants told conflicting stories about the basis of Buthelezi's power, crediting it to patrilineal succession through the Buthelezi family, descent from the royal family, or simple appointment.

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[28] Gibson Zwane, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 18, 2016, Matshona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
[29] Anonymous pastor, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, March 16, 2016, Matshona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Chief Ndebele, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 4, 2016, Ceza, KwaZulu-Natal, April 4.

Several informants, many of whom were aligned with the IFP, referred to the position as Buthelezi's birthright. Many made the comparison to the relationship between the British Prime Minister and the Queen of the United Kingdom. For those who voiced this perspective, Buthelezi logically had the right to be the leader of the "Zulu nation" in political matters. This perspective seemed to embrace the mythology surrounding a "hereditary prime minister" that Buthelezi espoused in the *Ubuntu-botho* syllabus and in public speeches and propaganda.

Others presented different stories. An *induna* in Ulundi who witnessed the rise of the KwaZulu government close to his home, stated that Buthelezi's appointment was based on political circumstances after the death of Cyprian Bhekuzulu:

> They gave him that name, because the king was a bit young, he was actually younger than Buthelezi, Buthelezi felt that as an elder that he was the one who should attend more to certain areas, and then come back and give the feedback to the king, and that is how he is given that name… he is the head of all the chiefs around the Zulu nation.[32]

According to his understanding, Buthelezi became *induna-enkhulu* after Cyprian Bhekuzulu's death in 1968. He believed that the family appointed Buthelezi to watch over Zwelithini in his youth. This understanding actually contradicts Buthelezi's own claims that he served first an *induna-enkhulu* under Cyprian Bhekuzulu. Other informants stated that his position was instead one of a close advisor to the king and a main conduit for communication between the king and the chiefs.[33]

The issue of how Buthelezi became *induna-enkhulu* demonstrates the cracks in the ideology surrounding authority in the "Zulu nation." In oral histories, several

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[32] Bhekithemba Khoza, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 22, 2016, Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
[33] Gibson Zwane, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 18, 2016, Matshona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

informants told me that while the *ingonyama* traditionally had an *induna-unkulu*—literally head *induna*—that position was not at all hereditary. Several informants insisted that the each *ingonyama* had the right to appoint his *induna-unkhulu.* Others claimed that the Buthelezi held the *induna-unkhulu* position because he was related to the royal house through Princess Magogo.[34] Other still stated that the position was hereditary through the Buthelezi clan, and thus was Buthelezi's birthright.[35] These stories indicate the fluidity of ideology surrounding the right to wield political power through a period in which the relationships between authority, ethnicity, and sovereignty were drastically challenged.

Tales of the Transition

During the democratic transition, Buthelezi attempted to use the image of the king to defend his own power and the position of the Inkatha Freedom Party. The King broke with Buthelezi in the mid-1990s, securing his position both in the constitution and as chair of the Ingonyama Trust independently from Buthelezi. Several people in Ulundi and Nongoma, however, told a different story, one that seemed to come entirely from the campaign rallies held by Buthelezi in the 1990s.

Phakattikwampi Buthelezi recounted a story of the transition that placed Buthelezi as a protector of the Zulu nation and the creator of the Ingonyama Trust

> De Klerk called on Buthelezi and told him to protect the nation before the new government takes over. Even though Buthelezi didn't want to do that at that time, De Klerk said, "no, let's do it now" and then they went to Cape Town and signed

[34] Dumsani Mgaga, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 9, 2016, Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
[35] Anonymous man, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, March 16, 2016, Matshona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa; Gibson Zwane, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 18, 2016, Matshona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

> over the rules and regulations saying that the Ingonyama Trust belongs to the ingonyama and his nation. That is how the Ingonyama trust still stands.[36]

Pkakatikwampi continued, stating that "we were very afraid" that the government would "take over everything," and Zulus were pleased when "Buthelezi decided to sign those documents in Cape Town, to protect the Zulu nation, so when the new government takes over they won't have any opportunity to take over Zululand…and what belongs to the King."[37] Another informant told me that during the transition, they were afraid that the "government wanted to erase everything concerning the Zulu culture, the Zulu history."[38]

These people all lived in the former stronghold of the Inkatha Freedom Party deep in Zululand, where Buthelezi maintained the most support through the transition. Another man, Gibson Zwane, told me that Buthelezi "assured us that the Zulu kingdom was not going anywhere" during the transition.[39] During a group interview in Ceza in Buthelezi's chieftaincy, I asked a group of older men if they were worried about the position of the Zulu king during the transition. Immediately, one man responded, insisting that they feared what the new ANC government might do. However, he also portrayed Buthelezi as the savior of the day: "Luckily, because we had Buthelezi, he was there to make sure that the kingdom was not being shaken at all. He fought for the Zulu kingdom not to be touched at all."[40]

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[36] Phakattikwampi Ephraim Buthelezi, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 14, 2016, Ceza, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Mgezwa Mpongose, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 21, 2016, Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
[39] Gibson Zwane, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 18, 2016, Matshona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
[40] 5 anonymous males (group 2), interviewed by Ashley Parcells, April 14, 2016, Ceza, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

While I conducted over 50 interviews in Ulundi and Nongoma, only three people brought up the fact that the King and Buthelezi became political adversaries during the transition. The reluctance to discuss this moment is perhaps tied to fear of retaliation. Of those three, two blamed the ANC for sabotaging the "Zulu nation" by driving a wedge between Zwelithini and Buthelezi. An elderly man, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told me that the ANC "could easily involve themselves and take over the Zulu nation and control it under the name of Zwelithini. They managed to loosen, to break the bond between Buthelezi and Goodwill, the bond in which the community came first. But they wanted the political parties to come first."[41]

Another informant, who was a member of the National Freedom Party, a recent splinter group from the IFP, recognized that several members of the royal family, including Prince Zeblon Zulu and Prince Israel Mcwayizeni, the former regent, had joined the ANC during the transition. When I asked what people around Ulundi thought about this in the 1990s, he stated "They were hated! Those members who came out openly as ANC members. There was no ANC [present in Ulundi at the time], [but then] you learn that they are now in Parliament. You learn that they are in National Executive Council, without even knowing that they were ANC members!"[42] The electoral base in rural KwaZulu-Natal proved crucial to the IFP and Buthelezi during elections in the 1990s. Its dominance, however, would soon begin to slip as Buthelezi lost control of the monarchy.

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[41] Elderly Husband and wife (names anonymous), March 16, 2016, Mashona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

[42] Thokazani Zulu, interviewed by Ashley Parcells, May 3, 2016, Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

Ethnic Politics and the Future of South Africa

Despite the relative faithfulness of many informants to Buthelezi, they were ultimately willing to splinter and vote NPF or ANC. The electoral collapse of the Inkatha Freedom Party and the seeming victory of liberal democracy in South Africa in large part led scholars and political commentators to declare that Zulu nationalism is dead.[43] My research suggests something different. Ethnicity is always uneven and exists in a matrix with forces of class, race, religion, and geography.[44] Members of groups often experience nationalism in different ways. South Africa has a hybrid political system that recognizes the authority of traditional leadership and chiefly authority alongside the liberal democratic apparatuses of the state.[45] In this context, sovereignty continues to be split between a modern democratic state and an order of hereditary traditional rulers in the former homelands.

Zulu nationalism, and the notion of some sort of Zulu ethnic sovereignty over land in KwaZulu-Natal, still exists. It is preserved not in the Inkatha Freedom Party, but in the Ingonyama Trust, the recognition of the Zulu king in the constitution, and the growing support within the African National Congress—led for years by Jacob Zuma—for traditional leadership. It remains in the attempts of King Zwelithini and the Ingonyama Trust to make land claims on behalf of the Zulu people covering large swaths of South Africa. Speaking to people today in the heart of the former KwaZulu, rural and

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[43] Piper, "Nationalism without a Nation," 2002.
[44] Crawford Young, *Ethnicity and Politics in Africa*, ed. Boston University (Boston, Mass.: Boston University African Studies Center, 2002), 1-27.
[45] Leslie Bank and Roger Southall, "Traditional Leaders in South Africa's New Democracy," *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 37 & 38 (1996): 407; Lungisile Ntsebeza, *Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of the Land in South Africa* (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Barbara Oomen, *Chiefs in South Africa: Law, Power & Culture in the Post-Apartheid Era* (New York: Palgrave, 2005); Steven L. Robins, ed., *Limits to Liberation after Apartheid: Citizenship, Governance & Culture* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2005).

peri-urban residents remain committed to the apartheid boundaries of the Zulu nation and the 1960s invention of an apolitical King as a trustee of Zulu nationalism. Ethnic nationalism exists in modern KwaZulu-Natal, but it has found form within a system of multi-layered sovereignty under the post-apartheid political order. This newly refashioned idea of Zulu ethnic sovereignty has implications for both rural governance and land rights in post-apartheid South Africa and for situations across the world where people make claims to political rights and authority based on ethnic identity.

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BAO 12/600
BAO 20/627
BAO 4997

Department of Native Affairs (NTS)
NTS 249
NTS 8993

Ulundi Archives Repository (UAR)

Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs
Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs 3
Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs (Unnumbered box)
Bantu Affairs and Black Affairs 55

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Department of Bantu Administration 9

Department of Authority Affairs
Department of Authorities Affairs 1976

Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner
Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 1
Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 5
Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 9
Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 10
Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 27
Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 41
Nongoma Magistrate and Commissioner 54

Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs (COGTA)

COGTA 7
COGTA 57
COGTA 85
COGTA 88
COGTA 104

Government Proclamations
URU 6151

Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository (PAR)

Colonial Secretary (CSO)
CSO 2709
CSO 2844

Chief Native Commissioner (CNC)
CNC 109A

Nongoma Native Commissioner (1/NGA) (double check reference title)
1/NGA 3/3/3/1

Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA)
SNA 1/6/18
SNA 1/9/7
SNA 2/2/5

University of South Africa (UNISA) Document Center for African Studies
ACC 7, GHS Melhaulose Association
ACC 8/3 Buthelezi Speeches
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2. Zeblon Zulu, September 1st, 2015, Nongoma, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
3. Anonymous pastor, March 16, Mathlabathini, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
4. Anonymous husband and wife; March 16, 2016, Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
5. Mr. Mkhize, March 17, 2016 Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
6. Mr. Nxumalo, March 17, 2016.Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
7. Anonymous 666, March 23, 2016. Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
8. Mpongose wife/secretary, March 24, 2016. Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
9. Mpongose Elder, March 24, 2016. Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
10. Acting Chief Mtshali, March 29, 2016. Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
11. Prince Herbert Zulu, April 1, 2016 Nongoma, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
12. Chief Ndebele, April 4, 2016. Ceza, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
13. Mandlakayise Mbaba, April 9, 2016. Madeka, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
14. Mlungeloni Buthelezi, April 9, 2016. Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
15. Edward Buthelezi, April 9, 2016. Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
16. Mkhombiseni Zungu, April 9, 2016. Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
17. Dumsani Mgaga, April 9, 2016. Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
18. Alfred Khowane, April 9, 2016. Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
19. KwaKakuni Mnyandu, April 9, 2016. Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
20. Group interview 1, 4 anonymous males, April 11, 2016. Ceza, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
21. Group interview 2, 5 anonymous females, April 11, 2016. Ceza. KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
22. Group interview 3, 7 anonymous informants, mixed gender, April 11, 2016. Ceza KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
23. Group interview 4, 5 women, April 14, 2016. Ceza, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
24. Phakattikwampi Ephraim Buthelezi, April 14, 2016. Ceza KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
25. Group interview 5, 5 anonymous males, April 14, 2016. Ceza, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
26. Group interview 6, 4 anonymous males, April 14, 2016. Ceza, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
27. Mr. Ngocobo, April 15, 2016. Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
28. Mr. Khumalo, Nkonjeni, April 15, 2016. KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
29. Wilson Zwana, April 18, 2016. Matshana, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
30. Balawaka Ntulu, April 18, 2016. Matshana, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
31. Bheknikosi Sibiya, April 18, 2016 Matshana, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
32. Thembiyse Khumalo, April 18, 2016, Matshana, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
33. Gibson Zwane, April 18, 2016. Matshana, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
34. M. Mvubu, Matshana, April 18, 2016. KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
35. Mgezwa Mpongose, April 21, 2016. Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
36. Jacob Mbatha, April 21, 2016. Mathlabathni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

37. M. Buthelezi, April 22, 2016. Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
38. Elijah Jiyane, April 22, 2016. Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
39. Bhekithemba, April 22, 2016. Khoza, Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
40. Milton Khumalo, April 25, 2016. Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
41. Themba Mkhize, April 28, 2016. Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
42. Sipho Zungu, April 28, 2016. Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
43. P.M. Ntombelo, April 28, 2016. Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
44. Antony Majola, May 3, 2016. Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
45. Thokozani Zulu, May 3, 2016. Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
46. Vusumuzi Lamula, May 3, 2016. Ulundi, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.i
47. Bongiseni Ndwandwe, May 4, 2016. Mathlabathini, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
48. Z.H. Ntombele, May 5, 2016. Mashona, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
49. Phindaliphi Khattela Myowose, May 6, 2016. Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
50. Mzomutile Mtshali, May 6, 2016. Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
51. Michael Sibiya, May 6, 2016. Nkonjeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

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