Distribution Agreement

In presenting this thesis or dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree from Emory University, I hereby grant to Emory University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive, make accessible, and display my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known, including display on the world wide web. I understand that I may select some access restrictions as part of the online submission of this thesis or dissertation. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis or dissertation. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

Signature:

_____ _____

Brian Gronewoller Date

Rhetorical Economy in the Theology of Augustine

By

Brian Gronewoller
Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Division of Religion
Historical Studies in Theology and Religion

_____
Anthony A. Briggman
Advisor

_____
Kevin Corrigan
Committee Member

_____
Philip Lyndon Reynolds
Committee Member

_____
Lewis Ayres
Committee Member

Accepted:

_____
Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph.D.
Dean of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies

_____
Date

Rhetorical Economy in the Theology of Augustine

By

Brian Gronewoller
Th.M., Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, 2011
M.Div., Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, 2010
B.S., Texas Christian University, 1998

Advisor: Anthony A. Briggman, Ph.D.

An abstract of
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Religion
2018

Abstract

Rhetorical Economy in the Theology of Augustine
By Brian Gronewoller

Previous scholarship on Augustine has recognized that Augustine was trained in rhetoric, but few scholars have investigated how this affected the substance of his theology. This study demonstrates that Augustine integrated the rhetorical concept of 'economy' (*oeconomia*) – wherein a rhetor arranged all of the parts of a speech into a cohesive unit – into his theologies of creation and history, as well as into his theodicy, in a substantive manner. The argument is presented across five chapters by means of close readings of several texts. Chapter One provides an introduction to the concept of rhetorical economy, a *status quaestionis*, and an argument that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic in the early years of his Christian career. Chapter Two contains arguments for two claims. The primary claim is that Augustine uses the media of literary and rhetorical theory – namely the book and the speech – to conceptualize creation, its history, and God's activity. The secondary claim is that Augustine conceived of the sensible aspects of creation functioning as signs for things in the same manner that he conceived of words functioning as signs for things. Chapter Three demonstrates that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of creation. Chapter Four shows that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of creation. Finally, Chapter Five demonstrates that Augustine utilized rhetorical economy in the logic which he used in his theodicy to harmonize his understanding that sin does not come from God with his commitment to divine providence.

Rhetorical Economy in the Theology of Augustine

By

Brian Gronewoller
Th.M., Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, 2011
M.Div., Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, 2010
B.S., Texas Christian University, 1998

Advisor: Anthony A. Briggman, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Religion
2018

For Morgan, Peyton, Parker, and Taylor

sine quibus non

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

ACW	Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation (New York: Newman Press).
ANF	Ante-Nicene Fathers (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1951-).
AugLex	*Augustinus-Lexikon*, ed. C. Mayer (Basel: Schwabe & Co. 1986-).
AttA	*Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*. Edited by Allan D. Fitzgerald, John Cavadini, Marianne Djuth, James J. O'Donnell and Frederick Van Fleteren. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999.
AugStud	*Augustinian Studies* (Villanova: Villanova University Press, 1970-)
BA	Bibliothéque Augustinienne, Œuvres de Saint Augustin (Paris: Desclée, De Brouwer, 1949).
CCSL	Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina (Turnhout: Brepols, 1953-)
CPL	E. Dekkers, *Clavis Patrum Latinorum*, 3rd ed. (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995).
CSEL	Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (Vienna: Tempsky, 1865-).
DOL	Dolbeau, François. 'Sermon inédit de saint Augustin sur la providence divine.' *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 41, no. 2 (1995): 267-89.
FC	The Fathers of the Church, ed. R.J. Deferrari (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1947-).
GL	*Grammatici latini* (7 vols.), ed. Heinrich Keil and Theodor Mommsen (Leipzig: Teubner, 1855-80; Reprinted by Cambridge University Press, 2009-10).
HTR	*Harvard Theological Review* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1908-).
JECS	*Journal of Early Christian Studies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 1993-).
LCL	The Loeb Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Henderson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1912-).
LSJ	[BG: Complete this entry...and add a reference in chapter one that notes that all pre-Classical Greek abbreviations, such as for Aristotle, come from the list in the 1940 LSJ).
MA	*Miscellanea Agostiniana : Testi e Studi* (2 vols.), ed. G. Morin (Rome: Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana, 1930-1).
Mariotti	*Marii Victorinii Ars grammatica, introduzione, testo critico e commento,* ed. Italo Mariotti (Florence: Felice Le Monnier, 1976).
MT	*Modern Theology* (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1984-).
MTC	*M.Tulli Ciceronis Scripta quae manserunt omnia* (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1880-).
NPNF	Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church (Oxford; rep.: Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans, 1994).
OLD	Oxford Latin Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
Pinborg	Augustine, *De dialectica.* Edited by Jan Pinborg. In *Augustine: De dialectica*, trans. B. Darrell Jackson, 83-120 (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975).
PG	Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca, ed. J. P. Migne (Paris: 1857-66).

PL	Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina, ed. J.P. Migne (Paris: 1844-64).
PPS	Popular Patristics Series (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press).
REAug	*Revue d'Études Augustiniennes et Patristiques* (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1955-).
RechAug	*Recherches Augustiniennes et Patristiques* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1958-).
RLM	*Rhetores latini minores.* Edited by Karl Halm. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863.
SC	Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf).
SP	*Studia Patristica*, ed. Markus Vinzent (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1951-).
STAC	*Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998-).
SVF	*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Stuttgart: Teubner).
TLL	Thesaurus Lingua Latinae (München: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1894-).
VC	*Vigiliae Christianae* (Leiden: Brill, 1947-).
WSA	The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, ed. J.E. Rotelle (New York: New City Press, 1990-).

INTRODUCTION

Everyone knows that Augustine was trained in rhetoric, but few have investigated how this affected the substance of his theology.[1] This dissertation contributes to this new movement in scholarship which argues that Augustine integrated rhetorical theory into his theology in a substantive manner by demonstrating that Augustine integrated rhetorical economy into his theologies of creation and history, as well as into his theodicy. Within itself, this thesis has ramifications for our understanding of each of these three aspects of Augustine's theology.

However, while making these arguments I am also making a secondary, indirect argument for a new movement within the field of Augustine studies: If others find my argument convincing, then we must admit a new fountainhead of documentary evidence into our research on Augustine's theology – in terms of both influence and content.[2] Most previous scholarship has given serious treatment to three fountainheads for Augustine's theology – the Classical philosophical tradition, the Christian theological tradition, and the Christian scriptures.[3] There

---

[1] For examples of works which do engage how Augustine's use of rhetoric affected his theology, see: Michael Cameron, *Christ Meets Me Everywhere: Augustine's Early Figurative Exegesis*, ed. David C. Steinmetz, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Mark F.M. Clavier, *Eloquent Wisdom: Rhetoric, Cosmology and Delight in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo*, ed. Thomas O'Loughlin, Studia Traditionis Theologiae 17 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014); Robert Dodaro, *Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[2] This secondary argument is also implicit in the works listed in n.1.

[3] Studies usually treat all three of these fonts. Examples of works that focus on the Classical philosophical tradition as influencing Augustine include: John M. Rist, *Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Gerard O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Robert J. O'Connell, *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, AD 386-391* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). Examples of works that focus on the Christian theological and scriptural tradition as influencing Augustine include: Chad Tyler Gerber, *The Spirit of Augustine's Early Theology: Contextualizing Augustine's Pneumatology* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2012); Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

has been some work done on Augustine's use of ideas from his training in rhetoric, but most of this research has been restricted to topics treated in rhetorical manuals, such as the formation of arguments, the writing of speeches, and the proper manner in which to read a text.[4]

By introducing rhetorical economy as a substantive concept in Augustine's theology, then, this dissertation argues for a fourth fountainhead to Augustine's theology – the broader rhetorical tradition. Thus, it is my hope that this project serves as a catalyst for future research into Augustine's incorporation of rhetorical ideas and concepts into his theology.

I present my argument that Augustine utilized rhetorical economy in his theology across five chapters. Chapter One focuses on Augustine's use of rhetorical economy in his scriptural hermeneutic. I begin with this focus because, conceptually, it is one of two places wherein rhetorical theory naturally intersects with Christian thought and practice. Since rhetorical theory was concerned with texts and speeches, we would expect to find touchpoints between it and Christianity on thought surrounding the scriptures (texts) and sermons (speeches). After

---

[4] Scholarship on Augustine and rhetorical theory has largely focused on his scriptural hermeneutic and his homiletical theory. For examples of work on Augustine's homiletical theory, see: Richard Leo Enos et al., eds., *The Rhetoric of Saint Augustine of Hippo: De Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric* (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008); Paul R. Kolbet, *Augustine and the Cure of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). For examples of work on Augustine's use of rhetorical theory in his scriptural hermeneutic, see: Gerhard Strauss, *Schriftgebrauch, Schriftauslegung, und Schriftbeweis bei Augustin* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1959); Cameron, *Christ Meets Me Everywhere*; Robert Dodaro, 'Literary Decorum in Scriptural Exegesis: Augustine of Hippo, Epistula 138,' in *L'esegesi dei Padri latini : dalle origini a Gregorio Magno : XXVIII Incontro di studiosi dell'antichitàcristiana, Roma, 6-8 maggio 1999* (Roma: Institutum patristicum Augustiniana, 2000); Robert Dodaro, 'Quid deceat videre (Cicero, Orator 70): Literary Decorum and Doctrinal Orthodoxy in Augustine of Hippo,' in *Orthodoxie, christianisme, histoire = Orthodoxy, Christianity, History: Travaux du groupe de recherches 'Défenir, maintenir et remettre en cause l'‹‹orthodoxie›› dans l'histoire du christianisme*, ed. S. Elm, É. Rebillard, and A. Romano (Rome: École française de Rome, 2000); Robert Dodaro, 'The Theologian as Grammarian: Literary Decorum in Augustine's Defense of Orthodox Discourse,' *SP* 38 (2001): 70-83.

introducing the concept of rhetorical economy, I then demonstrate in the *status quaestionis* that previous scholarship confirms this expectation, at least with regard to rhetorical economy and Augustine's treatment of the scriptures. And, in the final section of this chapter, I contribute to scholarship on this topic by demonstrating that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic in the early years of his Christian career by means of a close reading of *On the Practices of the Catholic Church and the Manichees* 1.17.30 and 1.28.56.[5]

In Chapter Two I argue for two claims. My primary claim is that Augustine uses the media of literary and rhetorical theory – namely the book and the speech – to conceptualize creation, its history, and God's activity. I argue that Augustine conceives of creation as a book by means of readings of *Letter* 43.9.25, *Against Faustus the Manichee* 32.20, *Exposition of Psalm* 45.6-7, and *Sermon* 68.6. I then demonstrate that Augustine conceptualizes God's activity as a speech through a close reading of *Letter* 102.6.33. Finally, I show that Augustine conceives of history as a speech by means of plain readings of *On Free Choice* 3.15.42, *Questions from the Gospels* 2.49, *On the Nature of the Good* 8, and *Against Secundinus the Manichee* 15. I build my secondary claim through readings of the first five of these texts which show that Augustine's concept of creation as a book and God's activity as speech involves the sensible aspects of each, in order to show that Augustine is consistent in applying his word-sign theory to creation and God's activity when he frames them according to the media of literary and rhetorical theory. This secondary argument is important because it reveals that, for Augustine, just as words function as signs for things, the sensible aspects of creation also function as signs for things. In the chapters

[5] The third section of Chapter One has previously appeared as an article: Brian Gronewoller, 'God the Author: Augustine's Early Incorporation of the Rhetorical Concept of *Oeconomia* into His Scriptural Hermeneutic,' *AugStud* 47, no. 1 (2016).

that follow I build upon these points, arguing that Augustine incorporated one aspect of rhetorical theory – rhetorical economy – into the substance of his theology.

In Chapter Three I argue that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of creation. I do this by means of a close reading of three texts – *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32, *Sermon* 29D.4-7, and *On Order* 1.7.18. Each text serves a different purpose. *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 shows that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of creation in his earliest work dedicated to the creation narratives of Gen 1 and 2. *Sermon* 29D.4-7 shows us that this was not an early phenomenon, but rather Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his notion of God's work in arranging creation in the middle of his career. Finally, *On Order* 1.7.18 suggests that Augustine's utilization of rhetorical economy in his theology of creation derives from his integration of rhetorical economy into the heart of his concept of order.

In Chapter Four I argue that rhetorical economy is foundational to Augustine's view that God has arranged all parts of history into a unified whole. As a byproduct of making this argument, I also demonstrate that Augustine's concept of history as a song (and a speech) is not incidental, but rather a substantial component in his theological project. I make my argument in this chapter in three movements which are chronologically ordered. First, I demonstrate that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of history by AD 390-1 by means of a close reading of *On True Religion* 22.42-3. Then, I show that he continued to do so into the mid to late 390s through a close reading of *On Music* 6.11.29-30. In the final section of this chapter, I establish that Augustine continued to conceive of history as economically arranged by means of evidence from four texts written between AD 402 and 417 – *On the Nature of the Good* 8, *Against Secundinus the Manichee* 15, *Letter* 138.5, and *City of God* 11.18.

In the final chapter, I demonstrate that Augustine utilized rhetorical economy in the logic which he used in his theodicy to harmonize his understanding that sin does not come from God with his commitment to divine providence. I demonstrate this in two steps. First, I use a reading of *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.3.5 to show that Augustine differentiates between the divine activities of creation and arrangement at the moment of creation, to suggest that he builds this distinction on the logic of the first two principal parts of rhetoric (invention and arrangement), and to show that he utilizes rhetorical economy in his conception of arrangement at creation. Once I have shown this, I then demonstrate that Augustine employs rhetorical economy in his theodicy in *On Free Choice* 3.9.27.

CHAPTER ONE

Rhetorical Economy and Augustine's Scriptural Hermeneutic

> And, indeed, an arrangement is not only about the parts,
> but within these parts there is a certain thought which is first,
> another second, and another third, whereby we must toil
> so that they are not only assembled into an order,
> but also so that they are fettered to each other
> and closely joined with one another,
> lest a joint be visible:
> it should be a body, not limbs.
>
> Quintilian, *Oratorical Instructions* 7.10.16-7[1]

Just as students in late antiquity first studied with 'grammarians' (*grammatici*) in order to gain necessary knowledge and skills before beginning their advanced studies with the 'rhetoricians' (*rhetorici*), this chapter provides readers with concepts, narratives, and arguments that are prerequisites for engaging my central thesis in this dissertation – that Augustine incorporated the notion of rhetorical economy into his theology.[2] Before we can discern that Augustine did this, we must first become acquainted with the concept of economy as it functioned within the Latin rhetorical tradition, and then familiarize ourselves with his incorporation of it into his scriptural hermeneutic.

I begin with Augustine's scriptural hermeneutic because of logic and precedent. Rhetorical theory focused on the composition, delivery, and consumption of speeches and

---

[1] Quint., *Inst.* 7.10.16-17 (LCL 126N: 294-6): *neque enim partium est demum dispositio, sed in his ipsis primus aliquis sensus et secundus et tertius : qui non modo ut sint ordine conlocati laborandum est, sed ut inter se uincti atque ita cohaerentes ne commissura perluceat ; corpus sit, non membra*. All translations are my own.

[2] Throughout this project I will use the term 'theology' to refer to the substance of Augustine's thought on God's being, activity, and works. I will thus distinguish this area of Augustine's thought from other closely related topics, such as his scriptural hermeneutic and his homiletical theory.

texts. Thus, the most conspicuous intersections between Augustine's past training in rhetorical theory and his daily work as a Christian clergyman are the two forms of discourse within Christianity that would have consumed the largest quantity of his time – written scriptures and spoken sermons. Previous scholarship on Augustine and rhetorical theory agrees, focusing on both Augustine's scriptural hermeneutic and his homiletics.[3] Scholarship that has restricted its focus to Augustine and rhetorical economy has done much of the same, concentrating on his scriptural hermeneutic.[4] Thus, I will begin there.

In this chapter I familiarize readers with Augustine's incorporation of rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic in three steps. I begin by introducing the concept of rhetorical economy and the terminology associated with it. I will then present previous scholarship on Augustine's incorporation of rhetorical economy into his thought. Taking this scholarship as my starting point, I will then show that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic within eighteen months of his conversion by means of a close reading of *On the Practices of the Catholic Church and the Manichees* (*Practices*)[5] 1.17.30 and 1.28.56. This argument serves as a foundation for

---

[3] Scholarship on Augustine and rhetorical theory has largely focused on his scriptural hermeneutic and his homiletical theory. I will introduce scholarship that engages his scriptural hermeneutic later in this chapter. For work focused on his homiletical theory, see: Richard Leo Enos et al., eds., *The Rhetoric of Saint Augustine of Hippo: De Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric* (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008); Paul R. Kolbet, *Augustine and the Cure of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010).

[4] I demonstrate this in the *status quaestionis* provided later in this chapter.

[5] In order to make this work more widely readable, my standard procedure will be to use the English titles for Latin works in the main text, and Latin abbreviations for those same titles in my footnotes. For the works of Augustine I have used the *AugLex* abbreviation system. For the titles and abbreviations of works by Latin Classical authors I have followed the OLD. For the titles and abbreviations of other patristic works I have followed the system of the TLL. For the ease of the reader I have included two lists of primary sources in the back matter. Appendix A is organized alphabetically by author and

the work I will do in later chapters, as it raises the possibility that rhetorical economy also appears in the theology of Augustine quite early.

Only after we have acquainted ourselves with rhetorical economy and observed Augustine's incorporation of this concept into his scriptural hermeneutic will we be prepared to see that he also incorporated it into areas of his thought which one might not expect to intersect with rhetorical theory – namely his theologies of creation and history, as well as his theodicy. Thus, the final section of this chapter serves as the capstone of our initial preparation, a liminal space between the prerequisites in the first two sections and the arguments that I make in Chapters Two through Five. Having grasped these prerequisites, readers will be sufficiently prepared for me to provide them with a detailed argument that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology. But before we can run, we must walk.

An Introduction to Rhetorical Economy

Since accommodation lies at the center of the art of rhetoric, we must first appreciate its function and place in rhetoric before we can fully understand the rhetorical concept of 'economy' (*oeconomia*).[6] Cicero best summarized accommodation's central

---

then English title. Appendix B is organized alphabetically by author and then Latin abbreviation.

[6] For the sake of brevity, throughout this project I will use the phrase 'rhetorical economy' as shorthand for 'literary and rhetorical economy.' Likewise, I will use 'rhetorical theory' for 'literary and rhetorical theory.' In the ancient world, the distinction between literary and oral culture was blurred. Carol Harrison, in her recent monograph on listening in early Christianity, has argued for the close relationship between literary and oral/aural culture in that setting. She concludes: 'In all of these respects, then, it is difficult to make strict distinctions between oral and literary culture in early Christianity.

place in rhetoric while writing on the primary duties of an orator. He writes: 'The first duty is to speak accommodatingly (*accommodate*) in order to persuade.'[7] For Cicero and many others who wrote in the rhetorical tradition that Augustine would later inherit, the goal of rhetoric was persuasion. But the tool of the art was accommodation.[8]

Within this tradition, to speak accommodatingly involved the 'virtue' (*uirtus*) of *aptum*.[9] In this way, *aptum* – the fittingness of particulars to one another both internally, within the text or speech, and externally, between the text or speech and its historical context – permeated every aspect of the art of rhetoric. Thus, for rhetoricians,

---

The evidence we have just considered suggests that, in almost every respect, they were closely interdependent. Even where books existed, the oral/aural was almost always given priority. The text was composed by speaking to oneself or by dictation to a scribe; it was written in a spoken, rhetorical form; "published" by public reading; "read" by being read aloud; taught by oral exegesis and discussion in the schoolroom, or by *ex tempore* preaching and catachesis in the Church. Everywhere, the "voices of the page" sounded in the ears of the early Christians, inscribing themselves on their minds and memories.' Carol Harrison, *The Art of Listening in the Early Church* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 9.

[7] Cicero, *de Orat.* 1.31.138 (LCL 348: 96): *primum oratoris officium esse, dicere ad persuadendum accommodate*. In Cicero's dialogue, this statement is made by Crassus.

[8] For more on accommodation as the core of the art of rhetoric, see: Kathy Eden, *Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition: Chapters in the Ancient Legacy and its Humanist Reception* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 14; Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study*, trans. Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, and David E. Orton (Boston: Brill, 1998), §§ 256, 258.

[9] See Lausberg's note that '*accommodate dicere* contains the *uirtus* of *aptum*,' as well as his description of the way in which *aptum* permeates all levels and aspects of the art of rhetoric. Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, §§ 256, 258, 1055-62. Because *aptum* permeates the rhetorical tradition at every level and has translations that cross over with so many other technical terms that I use throughout this project, I have chosen to leave it untranslated. It is one of the few words that I have chosen to leave in its Latin form, rather than giving it an English equivalent, throughout this work.

accommodation, which produces *aptum*, was also a key principle in every step of the creation and consumption of texts and speeches.[10]

Consequently, accommodation was central to the second and third principal parts of rhetoric, arrangement (*dispositio*) and style (*elocutio*).[11] For an author to achieve his goal of persuasion, both his arrangement and style would need to demonstrate an internal and external *aptum*.[12] These internal and external aspects of *aptum* worked together to achieve the orator's goal – speaking in an accommodating manner in order to persuade his audience. When it comes to arrangement, an author applies the principle of accommodation to the work as a whole – ordering particular ideas (*res*) and words (*uerba*) in a manner that integrates them into the purpose and structure of the entire work.[13] *Aptum* is key to accommodation within arrangement – the ideas and words within

---

[10] By 'consumption' I mean the skills of listening and reading that were taught by the grammarians. See Quintilian's description of *oeconomia* and *decorum*, described in the following paragraphs.

[11] The five principal parts of rhetoric in the Latin tradition were: invention (*inuentio*), arrangement (*dispositio*), style (*elocutio*), memorization (*memoria*), and pronunciation and gesticulation (*pronuntiatio*). Lausberg organizes his discussion of the five principal parts by these categories. Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, §§ 255-1091. My summary of the rhetorician's accommodative work in the second and third principal parts of rhetoric follows the scholarship of Eden and Lausberg. Eden, *Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition*, 14, 27-40; Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, §§ 256, 258, 443-54, 460, 1055-62

[12] It is key to remember that persuasion was the goal. In this way, all aspects of accommodation are subordinated to that goal. Beyond the specifics of *aptum* within the principal parts of rhetoric, there also needed to be an *aptum* between the principal parts. Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, § 1055.

[13] The taxonomies of arrangement vary widely among rhetoricians in part because arrangement involved both words and ideas, whereas invention (*inuentio* – the first principal part of rhetoric) dealt with ideas, and style dealt with applying words to those ideas. For example, whereas Cicero and Quintilian placed arrangement second and third in the principal parts of rhetoric, Aristotle had them in the opposite order. Aristotle, *Rh.* 3.1, 1403b1. Lausberg's opinion is that Aristotle did this to express the comprehensive role of arrangement. Ibid., § 454.

the work must be fitted to one another (internal *aptum*) and to the audience and occasion (external *aptum*) so that the orator might persuade them. When it comes to style, accommodation is concerned with the individual choices of words that are attached to an author's ideas. Cicero once described this as an orator 'clothing and decorating [the ideas that he has found and ordered] with speech.'[14] Once again, *aptum* is the key to accommodation. In order to be persuasive, a word must be well-fitted to the idea and the words around it (internal *aptum*) in a manner that fits the setting of its reception (external *aptum*).[15] Whereas accommodation proper to arrangement always begins with the whole and searches to integrate particulars into it, accommodation proper to style is concerned with the individual relationships of particulars.[16]

Conceptually, since the purpose of rhetoric was to persuade through accommodated speech, the rhetorical tradition was consistent in its understanding that accommodation was central to arrangement and style.[17] However, this is not always evident in the nomenclature. Indeed, the name given to the concept of accommodation proper to arrangement and that given to the concept of accommodation proper to style

---

[14] Cicero, *de Ora*t. 1.31.142 (LCL 348: 98): tum ea denique uestire atque ornare oratione.

[15] I am using the phrase 'setting of its reception' in order to include every particular aspect of the reception of a speech or text by its intended audience.

[16] We see this whole/particular differentiation again in the logical and symbiotic relationship between arrangement and style – once an author arranges his ideas, he then works through the principal part of style by choosing particular words to fittingly express his idea to a specific audience. After these words are chosen, he then moves back into arrangement by ordering the words in a manner that fits them into the unity of the entire speech.

[17] This is not to say that the concepts of arrangement and style were consistent in all of their particulars from author to author.

could vary between authors and across time.[18] There are also times when no terminology was given to distinguish between the two. Augustine's own usage of the concepts of accommodation in arrangement and accommodation in style follow this pattern – sometimes Augustine employed them without naming them, and at other times he referred to them with various terms.[19]

This lack of consistent terminology in Augustine and across the rhetorical tradition can make discussion of the concepts difficult. Thankfully, Quintilian gives us a clear and consistent terminology for the concepts of accommodation proper to arrangement and style, and we can base our discussion on his definitions.[20]

---

[18] With regard to time, there were approximately five centuries separating Quintilian from Gorgias, who is often considered the first rhetorician. This time span extends to nearly eight centuries if we consider the time between Gorgias and Aelius Donatus, a 4th c. AD rhetorician in Rome who was Jerome's teacher. In the same way, Augustine participated in a rhetorical tradition that had been around for nearly eight centuries. For the little that we know of Quintilian's life, see: George A. Kennedy, *Quintilian* (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1969).

[19] See the next section for a list of scholarship that has already shown that Augustine incorporated the rhetorical concept of accommodation proper to arrangement into his scriptural hermeneutic. As I will show over this dissertation, Augustine often assumed *oeconomia* in his framing of God's arrangement of all things without naming it. When he did, his terminology varied. For example, later in this chapter I demonstrate that he expressed the concept with the phrases *mirifica dispositio* (*mor.* 1.17.30) and *admirabilis ordo* (*mor.* 1.28.56). Cameron has also remarked on Augustine's use of *mirifica dispositio* in *mor.* 1.17.30. Michael Cameron, *Christ Meets Me Everywhere: Augustine's Early Figurative Exegesis*, ed. David C. Steinmetz, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 87. He has also argued that Augustine often expressed this concept with the term *dispensatio*, and has given a helpful listing of Augustine's movement toward that terminology. Michael Cameron, '"She Arranges All Things Pleasingly" (Wis. 8:1): The Rhetorical Base of Augustine's Hermeneutic,' *AugStud* 41, no. 1 (2010): 307n15.

[20] This is not meant to be unfair to Augustine, who wrote two works that specifically engaged rhetorical theory, of which only one survived. V. Law has argued that fragments of *gramm.* exist. Vivien Law, 'St. Augustine's «De grammatica»: Lost or Found?,' *RechAug* 19, no. 1 (1984). But the fragments do not present much upon which to base significant arguments. The Maurists discounted the authenticity of *dial.*, but scholars in the latter half of the 20th c. have made significant arguments in favor of it.

Writing in the 1st c. AD, Quintilian used the terms economy (*oeconomia*) and decorum (*decor*) when referring to the principles of accommodation proper to arrangement (*dispositio*) and style (*elocutio*).[21] Quintilian's choice of terms was not normative for the discipline of rhetoric. Indeed, no terminological convention applies throughout the rhetorical tradition. However, for the sake of brevity and clarity I believe that a consistent terminology needs to be adopted for the principles of accommodation that are proper to arrangement and style. I have chosen to co-opt Quintilian's terminology in this dissertation for several reasons.

The most immediately relevant of these reasons is that scholars have already framed the current conversation on Augustine's use of rhetorical economy according to

---

See: B. Darrell Jackson, *Introduction to Augustine's De Dialectica* (Boston: Reidel, 1975), 43-71; Jean Pépin, *St. Augustin et la dialectique* (Villanova: Villanova University Press, 1976), 24-60. It is likely that we do possess Augustine's *dial.*, though I am less convinced that *gramm.* is extant, even in fragments. Thus, the overwhelming majority of Augustine's extant works present him as a practitioner rather than an expositor of rhetorical theory – perhaps akin to Cicero if, of *Orat.*, *Inu.*, and *de Orat*., only one had survived. One might be tempted to argue that *doctr. Chr.* is an exception to this, but would have to concede that Augustine's project in that work contains key differences when compared to the great rhetorical handbooks of late antiquity – with the exception of Book 4, most of the work holds rhetorical theory in a secondary or tertiary position, using it when it is relevant to his primary project of instruction on scriptural interpretation. Quintilian, by comparison, wrote the lengthiest surviving work on rhetorical theory in late antiquity. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that he would explicitly give terminology where Augustine does not.

[21] Quint., *Inst.* 1.8.17. Plutarch parsed them similarly, naming them τὸ οἰκεῖον and τὸ πρέπον (*Moralia*, 18D). This demonstrates that Quintilian's terminological usage was not peculiar to the Latin world, or even to Quintilian himself. Rather, with these two authors we see a similar distinction, made with similar terms, by authors who are writing in distinct locales and languages. Eden makes an argument for similarity in the terminology of Quintilian and Plutarch: Eden, *Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition*, 32. She includes *Moralia* 18A in her treatment of Plutarch. I did not include that above because I was not able to find τὸ οἰκεῖον in the version of the text I consulted (LCL 147).

Quintilian's terminology.[22] But there are further reasons for this choice. Quintilian's work had regained popularity among 3rd and 4th c. Latin grammarians as well as Christian authors such as Lactantius, Rufinus, and Hilary of Poitiers.[23] Augustine was familiar with the latter three. Thus, though we are uncertain about Augustine's particular debt to Quintilian, we do know that Quintilian's handbook had a great influence upon the world in which Augustine received his rhetorical training and interacted as a Christian clergyman. In addition to these reasons, the term 'economy' was used to represent the accommodating principle proper to arrangement in a letter written to Augustine by Volusianus, the uncle of Melania the Younger.[24] Thus, though we do not know if

---

[22] With regard to previous scholarship, both Kathy Eden and Michael Cameron have previously used his terminology when engaging Augustine's use of the concepts of accommodation proper to both arrangement and style. I will introduce their scholarship in the next section of this chapter.

[23] Paul Kesseling, in a short article from 1954, argued that a direct dependence of Augustine on Quintilian cannot be established. Paul Kesseling, 'Augustin und Quintilian,' *Augustinus Magister* 1 (1954): 204. I have not seen an argument that has disproven Kesseling. However, there is evidence that Augustine was probably indirectly influenced by Quintilian. Ezio Bolaffi states that Quintilian experienced a revival in the fourth century, mainly among grammarians like Diomedus. Bolaffi also notes that Christian authors often imitated and quoted him in the third through the fifth centuries, namely Lactantius, Rufinus, Hilary of Poitiers, and Sidonius Apollinaris. Ezio Bolaffi, *La critica filosofica e letteraria in Quintiliano* (Bruxelles: Latomus, 1958), 8. Thus, it is probable that Quintilian's thought reached Augustine, at the very least, in a second-hand manner. For more on parallels between Hilary and Quintilian, see: Franciscus Barone, 'Quintilianus et Hilarius,' *Vita Latina* 78 (1980).

[24] See Volusianus's use of *oeconomia* in *ep.* 135.1. Volusianus was the uncle of Melania the Younger, and he remained a follower of the paganism of his Roman ancestors. Volusianus spent important periods of his life both in Roman North Africa and in Italy, so his use of the term does not mean that he learned it while in North Africa. In the years after writing this letter to Augustine, which describes a conversation had between he and some friends in Carthage, Volusianus would rise to the positions of Proconsul of Africa, then Prefect of Rome (*praefectus urbi*), and eventually all the way to Praetorian Prefect of Italy (*praefectus praetorio Italiae*). For a brief summary of Volusianus's life, see: Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography*, New ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 298-300.

Augustine ever adopted Quintilian's technical terminology for rhetorical economy, we can presume that he was familiar with the range of meaning for the term economy which matched Quintilian's taxonomy.

Since I will be using Quintilian's terminology for the principle of accommodation proper to arrangement for the remainder of this work, let us look more closely at how Quintilian framed it. For Quintilian, an author produced a praiseworthy arrangement of a text when that text resembled the orderliness of a Roman household.[25] In *Oratorical Instructions* 7.10.11-2 he refers to such an arrangement as an 'economical arrangement (*oeconomica dispositio*).'[26] A few lines later, in *Oratorical Instructions* 7.10.16-7,

---

[25] Quintilian (*Inst.* 3.3.9) thought that οἰκονομία was a concept borrowed from the domestic arena by the Greek rhetorician Hermagoras in order to cover the various elements of style (*elocutio*). For more on the distinction between the use of οἰκονομία by Greek rhetoricians and *oeconomia* by Latin rhetoricians, especially the Latin tradition's placement of it under *dispositio* after Quintilian, see: Kathy Eden, 'Economy in the Hermeneutics of Late Antiquity,' *Studies in the Literary Imagination* 28, no. 2 (1995): 13-4; Eden, *Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition*, 27-31. For a more general treatment of οἰκονομία, see Lausberg's treatment of its relationship to both *dispositio* and *ordo artificialis.* Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, §443, §452.

[26] He states: 'For that is the most potent, and what is rightly called economical arrangement (oeconomica....dispositio) of an entire case, which can in no way be established except in the present matter: where the Prooemium should be inserted and where it should be omitted; where a continuous Exposition should be used, and where a partial; where it should be started from the beginning, where, by the mode of Homer, from the middle or from the end; where it should not be put forth at all; when we should begin with our own propositions and when with [the propositions] of our adversaries; when [we should begin] with the strongest proofs, when with the weakest…' Quint, *Inst.* 7.10.11-2 (LCL 126N: 292-4): *illa enim est potentissima quaeque uere dicitur oeconomia totius causae dispositio, quae nullo modo constitui nisi uelut in re praesente potest : ubi adsumendum prohoemium, ubi omittendum : ubi utendum expositione continua, ubi partita : ubi ab initiis incipiendum, ubi more Homerico a mediis uel ultimis : ubi omnino non exponendum : quando a nostris, quando ab aduersariorum propositionibus incipiamus, quando a firmissimis probationibus, quando a leuioribus*. I have provided the text from the new Loeb with one exception. I have kept the earlier edition's use of the term *oeconomica* (LCL 126: 168) rather than the new edition's term *oeconomia* since the standard expression has been 'economical arrangement' in scholarship surrounding this topic. Either edition of the text works at the level of concepts – an 'economical

Quintilian explains that an author has arranged a text economically when he has given each section a logical order and cohesion. In addition to this, the author must then arrange those sections into a coherent sequence, thus forming an economically arranged text. Concluding this explanation, he compares an economical arrangement to the unity of the human body, stating that such an arrangement is not merely a collection of limbs:

> And, indeed, an arrangement is not only about the parts (*neque enim partium est demum dispositio*), but within these parts there is a certain thought which is first, another second, and another third, whereby we must toil so that they are not only assembled into an order (*in ordine*), but also so that they are fettered to each other and closely joined with one another, lest a joint be visible: it should be a body, not limbs (*corpus sit, non membra*).[27]

For Quintilian, an author should strive to make a seamless body when arranging the parts of a text. Likewise, a charitable reader recognizes the author's intention to provide such an arrangement and presupposes the unity of the disparate parts.[28]

Over the course of this dissertation I will demonstrate that, writing nearly 300 years later, Augustine applied this concept of economy to God's authorship of all things and our attempts to understand them. Let us begin by looking at previous scholarship that has established that Augustine incorporated this concept that Quintilian named economy into his scriptural hermeneutic.

---

arrangement' is an 'arrangement with economy.' Also, throughout this project I will use the term *oeconomia* to refer to the principle itself as well as the type of *dispositio* that it produces (*oeconomica dispositio*).

[27] Quint., *Inst.* 7.10.16-17 (LCL 126N: 294-6): neque enim partium est demum dispositio, sed in his ipsis primus aliquis sensus et secundus et tertius : qui non modo ut sint ordine conlocati laborandum est, sed ut inter se uincti atque ita cohaerentes ne commissura perluceat ; corpus sit, non membra.

[28] Quintilian paired economy and decorum as the chief points that should be taught by grammarians (*Inst.* 1.8.13). These two tools were intended not only for composition, but also for the interpretation of literature and speeches composed by others.

STATUS QUAESTIONIS[29]

[29] In order to keep this section manageable, I have chosen to focus upon secondary literature that directly intersects my topic. Thus, I focus on literature that engages Augustine's use of grammatical and rhetorical theory rather than the entire corpus of literature on Latin grammatical and rhetorical theory. Where it is appropriate within my dissertation, I will be drawing from wider literature. For example, where I need to engage the educational models in late antiquity, I refer to the work of Henri-Irénée Marrou, Stanley Bonner, and the more recent work of Raffaella Cribiore. Henri-Irénée Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, trans. George Lamb (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956); Stanley Frederick Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Raffaella Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Augustine's interaction with this culture of education has been explored by Marrou: Henri-Irénée Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1938). However, much of Marrou's work has been surpassed by Konrad Vössing's recent monograph on education in Roman North Africa: Konrad Vössing, *Schule und Bildung im Nordafrika der Römischen Kaiserzeit*, Collection Latomus 238 (Bruxelles: Latomus, 1997). George Kennedy has written two books that are central to the development of rhetoric from its origins in Athens to its use in late antiquity: George A. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); George A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). I will supplement his work with more recent scholarship by Catherine Chin, John Tapia, and Derek Krueger: Catherine M. Chin, 'Christians and the Roman Classroom: Memory, Grammar, and Rhetoric in Confessions X,' *AugStud* 33, no. 2 (2002); Catherine M. Chin, *Grammar and Christianity in the Late Roman World* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); John Edward Tapia, *Rhetoric and the Centers of Power in the Greco-Roman World: From Homer to the Fall of Rome* (New York: University Press of America, 2009); Derek Krueger, *Writing and Holiness: The Practice of Authorship in the Early Christian East* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). Robert Kaster also has a helpful monograph on grammarians and their relationship to Roman society: Robert A. Kaster, *Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity*, ed. Peter Brown, The Transformation of the Classical Heritage 11 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). Teresa Morgan has a work with a similar focus, but Cribiore's review of it should be consulted: Teresa Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Raffaella Cribiore, Review of *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*, by Teresa Morgan, Bryn Mawr Classical Review (1999). I have included works that focus on education and rhetorical theory in the late antique East for two reasons. At a general level, just as with theology and philosophy, the language border was quite porous. Specific to Augustine, many of the Latin authors that he depended upon were proficient in Greek (e.g. Marius Victorinus and Ambrose of Milan).

My central thesis – that Augustine incorporated the rhetorical concept of economy into his theology – is built upon the work of previous scholars who have shown that Augustine integrated rhetorical theory into his understanding of God's authorship of scripture and history. Gerhard Strauss first called attention to Augustine's use of rhetorical theory in the late 1950s.[30] However, only recently have scholars begun to explore how rhetorical theory affected Augustine's scriptural hermeneutic.[31]

Kathy Eden began writing on the impact of the rhetorical tradition on Augustine's scriptural hermeneutic in 1990, and scholarly inquiry into the topic began to multiply in the wake of her first foray into the topic.[32] One year later Robert Bernard demonstrated

---

[30] Gerhard Strauss, *Schriftgebrauch, Schriftauslegung, und Schriftbeweis bei Augustin* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1959), 104-13.

[31] In the past decade scholars have also begun to focus on Augustine as a rhetorician in a more general sense. Robert Enos and others edited a series of essays focused on Augustine and rhetoric. Enos et al., *The Rhetoric of Saint Augustine of Hippo*. Paul Kolbet wrote a monograph arguing that Augustine saw the Christian bishop as Cicero's ideal orator, healing the community through the practice of rhetoric. Kolbet, *Augustine and the Cure of Souls*. Most recently, Mark Clavier published a dissertation in which he frames Augustine's view of God as an orator through the lens of delight – God the orator offering himself to the human will as a divine delight in competition with worldly delights. Mark F.M. Clavier, *Eloquent Wisdom: Rhetoric, Cosmology and Delight in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo*, ed. Thomas O'Loughlin, Studia Traditionis Theologiae 17 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014). Robert Dodaro has also written on Augustine's incorporation of rhetorical theory into his sacramental theology. Robert Dodaro, *Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 151-3. The move to explore the role of rhetorical theory in Augustine's scriptural hermeneutic also has parallels elsewhere in patristic scholarship. For example, Anthony Briggman and Lewis Ayres have recently explored the role of rhetorical theory in Irenaeus's exegetical method. Anthony Briggman, 'Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1,' *VC* 69, no. 5 (2015); Anthony Briggman, 'Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 2,' *VC* 70, no. 1 (2016); Lewis Ayres, 'Irenaeus vs. the Valentinians: Toward a Rethinking of Patristic Exegetical Origins,' *JECS* 23, no. 2 (2015). Adam Ployd has also written on the role that judicial rhetorical theory plays in Augustine's anti-Donatist ecclesiology: Adam Ployd, '*Non poena sed causa*: Augustine's Anti-Donatist Rhetoric of Martyrdom,' *AugStud* Online First Edition (2017).

[32] Kathy Eden, 'The Rhetorical Tradition and Augustinian Hermeneutics in *De doctrina Christiana*,' *Rhetorica* 8, no. 1 (1990): 45-63.

that Augustine had conceptualized God's revelation as verbal, showing how this works in Augustine's thought through an application of his language theory to both scriptural texts and historical events.[33]

In her 1995 article, Eden brought Quintilian's aforementioned twin principles of accommodation, economy and decorum, to the attention of patristic scholars. Since Classical scholarship had given ample attention to the concept that Quintilian referred to as decorum, she focused on 'the special role of *oeconomia* in the rhetorical and grammatical tradition of interpretation up through the fourth century,' and then gave a case study on Basil of Caesarea's use of rhetorical economy.[34] Two years later, in her monograph on the intersection between the rhetorical tradition and hermeneutics, Eden first connected economy to Augustine's scriptural hermeneutic.[35]

---

[33] Robert W. Bernard, 'The Rhetoric of God in the Figurative Exegesis of Augustine,' in *Biblical Hermeneutics in Historical Perspective: Studies in Honor of Karlfried Froehlich on His Sixtieth Birthday*, ed. Mark S. Burrows and Paul Rorem (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1991).

[34] Eden, 'Economy in the Hermeneutics of Late Antiquity,' 13.

[35] For *oeconomia*, Eden points to *doc. Chr.* 1.37.41, stating: 'In describing here the errant interpreter's frustration, Augustine takes for granted not only the standard of authorial intention but the hermeneutical expectation of the integrity or wholeness of Scripture based on that intention – its *oeconomia*, in the terminology of ancient rhetoric and grammar. He takes for granted, in other words, the subordination of the parts to the whole; and he describes in turn the interpreter's gradual reception of these individual passages as parts of a larger whole with the verb *contexere*: to weave together. Like *oeconomia* and *decorum*...the analogy between weaving and discourse serves literary reception as well as literary composition. To interpret Scripture, for Augustine, is in effect to weave its meaning.' For decorum, Eden focuses on similarities between Cicero's *Inu.* 2.40.117 and *doc. Chr.* 3.12.19 and 3.20.29, stating: 'Like Cicero in the *De inuentione*, however, Augustine considers not only the immediate textual context – the *partes praecedentes et consequentes* – but also the work as a whole, what Cicero had called *omnis scriptura* (*De inuentione* 2.40.117) and what Augustine, as we shall see, understands as the *summa* of scripture, or *caritas*. And like Cicero, Augustine also recommends considering the whole set of circumstances that inform the composition – times, places, persons, and so on (3.12.19, 3.20.29). The rhetorical and grammatical

In an article published in 2010, Michael Cameron entered the scholarly discussion on Augustine's use of rhetorical theory in his scriptural hermeneutic. In that article, and then again in his 2012 monograph, he built upon Eden's connection of Quintilian's concept of economy with Augustine's scriptural hermeneutic, arguing that the young Augustine's famous shift from scorn to appreciation of the Christian scriptures occurred because Ambrose of Milan taught him that the scriptures had been given an 'economical arrangement' (*oeconomica dispositio*) by their divine author.[36] Cameron's work gave significantly more depth and breadth to Eden's initial claim that Augustine was employing rhetorical economy in his scriptural hermeneutic. His project is also significant because he framed the relationship between the scholarly projects of Eden and Robert Dodaro.

At the turn of the millennium, about a decade before Cameron entered the scene, Robert Dodaro began writing several pieces that focused on the role of 'literary propriety' in Augustine's exegetical method.[37] Though both his project and Eden's are

---

traditions, as we have seen in previous chapters, call this principle *decorum* as it applies to composition. As a principle of interpretation, it constitutes the historical context; and Augustine refers to it in one place simply as *historia* (2.28.42) and in another as *circumstantia*.' Eden, *Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition*, 54-5.

[36] Cameron first made this claim in: Cameron, 'The Rhetorical Base of Augustine's Hermeneutic,' 55-67. He restates his thesis and treats the concepts of *oeconomia* and *decorum* in: Cameron, *Christ Meets Me Everywhere*, 30-4.

[37] Robert Dodaro, 'Literary Decorum in Scriptural Exegesis: Augustine of Hippo, Epistula 138,' in *L'esegesi dei Padri latini : dalle origini a Gregorio Magno : XXVIII Incontro di studiosi dell'antichitàcristiana, Roma, 6-8 maggio 1999* (Roma: Institutum patristicum Augustiniana, 2000); Robert Dodaro, 'Quid deceat videre (Cicero, Orator 70): Literary Decorum and Doctrinal Orthodoxy in Augustine of Hippo,' in *Orthodoxie, christianisme, histoire = Orthodoxy, Christianity, History: Travaux du groupe de recherches 'Défenir, maintenir et remettre en cause l'‹‹orthodoxie›› dans l'histoire du christianisme*, ed. S. Elm, É. Rebillard, and A. Romano (Rome: École française de Rome, 2000); Robert Dodaro, 'The Theologian as Grammarian: Literary Decorum in Augustine's Defense of Orthodox Discourse,' *SP* 38 (2001): 70-83; Robert Dodaro,

focused on rhetorical theory in Augustine's method of interpreting scripture, Dodaro never shows an awareness of Eden's project. Indeed, that Dodaro never engages Eden's work is key to understanding how his project stands apart from Eden's.[38] Whereas Eden began her project with the specific concepts represented by Quintilian's terms economy and decorum, Dodaro begins with the general concept of accommodation which permeates the entire art of rhetoric.[39] Dodaro refers to this concept with two phrases – 'literary propriety' and 'literary decorum.' But unlike Quintilian, and thus Eden, Dodaro frames his concept of 'literary decorum' in close accordance with the definitions of *aptum* given in Lausberg's handbook.[40] Therefore, while Quintilian's decorum, which Eden brought to the forefront of scholarship, focuses on the principle of accommodation that is proper to style, Dodaro's concept of 'literary decorum' involves both arrangement and style.[41] I will use Dodaro's phrase 'literary decorum,' rather than his alternate phrase 'literary propriety,' for the remainder of this section in order to demonstrate for the reader the confusing state of scholarship that has resulted from Dodaro, Eden, and Cameron using the same term to represent different concepts.

Cameron seems to have misunderstood Dodaro, framing Dodaro's work according to Quintilian's taxonomy and, thus, treating Dodaro's work as if it only

---

'Language Matters: Augustine's Use of Literary Decorum in Theological Argument,' *AugStud* 45, no. 1 (2014).

[38] It is also key to understanding Cameron's critique of Dodaro, which I will engage later in this section.

[39] See my explanation of accommodation earlier in this chapter.

[40] Dodaro, 'Literary Decorum in Scriptural Exegesis,' 161; Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, §1055-62.

[41] Again following Lausberg, Dodaro notes that literary decorum is both a *uirtus elocutionis* and a *uirtus dispositionis*. Dodaro, 'Literary Decorum in Scriptural Exegesis,' 161; Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, §§1055-62.

engages rhetorical style.[42] However, Cameron's misapprehension of Dodaro is somewhat understandable. Dodaro's presentation of 'literary decorum' can be confusing to those who have read Eden's work first. While Dodaro defines 'literary decorum' broadly in his early studies, his actual engagement of the concept is largely restricted to 'literary decorum' within rhetorical style.[43] This treatment, combined with his choice of the term 'literary decorum,' gives the impression that he defines decorum according to Quintilian's taxonomy. This impression is incorrect on the level of Dodaro's definitions, but somewhat correct with regard to his treatment of the concept. Though Dodaro defines 'literary decorum' in a manner that includes arrangement and style, he routinely restricts his treatment of the concept to style alone. Thus, perhaps unwittingly, he is often working within the boundaries of Quintilian's taxonomy.

This lack of congruence between Dodaro's definition of 'literary decorum' and his treatment of the concept renders Cameron's basic critique of Dodaro – that Augustine does emphasize the fittingness of the parts of scripture to each other and to the audience

---

[42] For example, see his treatment of Dodaro in his 2010 article. After summarizing Dodaro's concept, he treats it as if it is the partner to Quintilian's concept of economy. This is most clearly seen when he states: 'While acknowledging Dodaro's work, I want to highlight Quintilian's other great tool of accommodating speech, *oeconomica dispositio*, which he portrayed as *decorum*'s complement and premise.' Cameron, 'The Rhetorical Base of Augustine's Hermeneutic,' 61.

[43] Dodaro's engagement of Augustine's use of literary decorum in *ep.* 138 is one example of this. After briefly stating that literary decorum involves both style and arrangement, he quickly focuses on literary decorum as it relates to style: 'Thus literary decorum (or literary propriety, as it can also be termed) is too easily undervalued when the issues of style (λέξις, *dictio*, *elocutio*) with which it is concerned are either considered narrowly, or are relegated dismissively to the sidelines, as if content and style were not somehow co-determinative.' Dodaro, 'Literary Decorum in Scriptural Exegesis,' 161. The remainder of his article deals with the fittingness of particulars to one another, with only brief acknowledgments that Augustine understood that the decorous pieces were parts of an integrated whole. Ibid., 168, 170.

in *Letter* 138, but such fittingness derives from Augustine's presupposition of a whole scriptural unit into which the parts fit – as both incorrect and correct.[44] Dodaro does state that his own concept of 'literary decorum' extends to rhetorical arrangement. And he does, implicitly, recognize that Augustine's argument for the fittingness of different parts of scripture flows from his understanding that both the Old and New Testaments are 'a single, integral work of art.'[45] However, he spends no time focusing on this theme, and thus pragmatically restricts 'literary decorum' to rhetorical style. In this way, then, Cameron's critique of Dodaro's treatment of literary propriety is correct because Dodaro does not engage the *aptum* of arrangement, from which the *aptum* of style derives.

Dodaro might have eventually noticed this lack of congruence between his definition of 'literary decorum' and his treatment of it, though at no time does he show that he is aware of either Eden's work or Cameron's critique, which flows from Eden's categories. In his later articles he tightens his definition of the term so that it no longer includes an explicit reference to arrangement. One clear example of this shift can be seen in his most recent article on the topic, in which he restricts his definition to style, claiming that '[i]n classical rhetorical writings it is sometimes treated as one of the four virtues of elocution (*uirtus elocutionis*).'[46]

Because the scholarship of Dodaro and Eden (and by extension Cameron) create conflicting terminological taxonomies, I want to briefly revisit the discussion of terminology that I began above. When I use the terms economy (*oeconomia*) and

---

[44] Cameron, 'The Rhetorical Base of Augustine's Hermeneutic,' 62.

[45] Dodaro, 'Literary Decorum in Scriptural Exegesis,' 165.

[46] Dodaro, 'Language Matters,' 3. Also see: Dodaro, *Christ and the Just Society*, esp. 136-7; Dodaro, 'The Theologian as Grammarian.'

decorum (*decorum*), I am following Quintilian's use of them to refer to the principles of accommodation proper to arrangement (*dispositio*) and style (*elocutio*). In order to avoid confusion, I will not use Dodaro's phrase 'literary decorum' when I refer to the tool of accommodation (*accommodatio*) which is the core of the art of rhetoric and permeates every aspect of it. Rather, when speaking of accommodation, and Dodaro's work on it, from this point forward I will use either *aptum* (noting in the text that I am using it in a technical fashion to represent this particular concept) or Dodaro's second phrase – 'literary propriety.'

While scholarship over the past twenty-five years has greatly increased our knowledge of the impact of rhetorical theory on Augustine's hermeneutic, the majority of work in the field of Augustine studies – as with Eden, Dodaro, and Cameron – has remained within the confines of his scriptural exegesis.[47] However, scholarship is

[47] Though some of these scholars note that Augustine's use of rhetorical theory in his hermeneutic has a wider scope than his reading of scripture, they do not provide sustained commentaries on the topic since their projects are focused on his treatment of the scriptures. For example, in an important section of his monograph on Augustine's figurative exegesis Cameron briefly notes that Augustine extends the rhetorical concept of *oeconomia* to the level of divine providence's work in both history and the universal order. As far as I have been able to find, Cameron is the first scholar to have this insight, connecting *oeconomia* to Augustine's theology. However, though Cameron makes the insight, he neither explores the topic's nuance nor provides a detailed argument for it. Understandably, he returns to his monograph's project of exploring Augustine's exegetical method. Cameron states: 'In other early works like the *Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis*, *dispositio* rendered the mysterious ordering of images in the creation account in Gen. 1 (7.28), as well as the whole order of Providence and its calibration of number, measure, and weight that gives the universe its luminous coherence (Wis. 11:21). A passage in *Catholic and Manichean Practices* identified the figure of Wisdom 'arranging all things pleasingly' with the Word 'through whom all things were made' (John 1:3) (1.16.27). The *dispositio* referred not to the ordering and unifying of Scripture as such but to the ordered unity of creation whose interlocking coherence Scripture replicates. Augustine's first work as a priest, *The Advantage of Believing*, explained that God unified all things in creation by a *dispositio* that also ordered the times of history reflected in Scriptures (3.6). *Sermon* 8 later saw Wisdom's

beginning to emerge which explores the interaction between rhetorical theory and theology in patristic authors.[48] This dissertation contributes to this current move in scholarship by focusing on Augustine's incorporation of the rhetorical concept of economy into his theology and the impact that this integration had upon the substance of his theology. But before moving on to that project, in the next section I will establish that Augustine incorporated the notion of rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic almost immediately after his conversion to Christianity.[49] In so doing, I will extend the work that Eden and Cameron have done on rhetorical economy in Augustine's scriptural hermeneutic.

AUGUSTINE'S EARLY INCORPORATION OF RHETORICAL ECONOMY INTO HIS SCRIPTURAL HERMENEUTIC (*ON THE PRACTICES OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE MANICHEES* 1.17.30, 1.28.56)

In this section, I argue that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic from the beginning of his Christian career by means of a focused reading of *On the Practices of the Catholic Church and the Manichees* (*Practices*) 1.17.30 and 1.28.56. This investigation extends the work of Cameron and Eden on rhetorical economy in Augustine's scriptural hermeneutic.[50] Specifically, in the latter part

---

'divine providence spread abroad in all things' and encourages trust that the same power orders the events of the Scriptures (8.1).' Cameron, *Christ Meets Me Everywhere*, 32-3.

[48] Anthony Briggman has released two recent articles engaging the use of rhetorical theory in the theology of Irenaeus of Lyons: Briggman, 'Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1'; Briggman, 'Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 2.'

[49] Augustine's conversion, as narrated in *conf.*, reached its terminus in late August of AD 386. For this date, see: Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, 64.

[50] See the previous section of this chapter.

of Cameron's 2010 article he lists a constellation of texts from throughout Augustine's corpus in order to demonstrate that Augustine incorporated the rhetorical concept of economy into his thought.[51] However, Cameron's primary interest does not lie in establishing Augustine's earliest incorporation of economy into his scriptural hermeneutic, so he does not provide a sustained commentary on that topic. In this section I will expand on Cameron's work by providing a focused reading of two texts from *Practices* in order to demonstrate that Augustine had integrated rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic by AD 387 or 388.[52] I make this argument by demonstrating

---

[51] Cameron, 'The Rhetorical Base of Augustine's Hermeneutic,' 62-7.

[52] This argument lends support to a portion of Cameron's thesis with regard to Augustine's early adoption of rhetorical *oeconomia* into his scriptural hermeneutic, but does not engage his particular thesis that Augustine learned this from Ambrose while he was living in Milan.

Peter Brown dates Augustine's baptism in Milan to the evening of April 24-25, 387. Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, 117. Though *mor.* is not the earliest of Augustine's works, he began it soon after his baptism and wrote it over AD 387-8. *AttA,* xlvi. Augustine began the work in Rome, and finished it soon after his return to Africa. Goulven Madec, *Introduction aux "Révisions" et à la lecture des œuvres de Saint Augustin*, Collection des Études Augustiniennes : Série Antiquité 150 (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1996), 35, 160. Kevin Coyle argues that the chronological order of works Augustine gives in *retr.* is a list of the inception of the works, not the completion of them. While Augustine gives the order as *imm. an.*, the incomplete '*libri disciplinarum*,' *mor.* 1 and 2, *an. quant.*, *lib. arb.*, and *Gn. adu. Man.*, Coyle concludes that the order of completion was: *imm. an.*, the incomplete '*libri disciplinarum*,' *an. quant., Gn. adu. Man.*, *mor.* 1 and 2, and finally *lib. arb*. John Kevin Coyle, *Augustine's De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae: A Study of the Work, its Composition and its Sources* (Fribourg: University Press, 1978), 66-76. Coyle's arguments for both this order and that Augustine began *mor.* in Rome and finished it in Thagaste are compelling to me. Since the first pericope that I am using in this study is well within the first half of Book 1, I think it more likely that it was written in the earlier portion of 387-8. However, even if it was written in the latter portion of the date range offered by scholars (388), it is still contained in one of Augustine's earliest writings as a Christian and demonstrates that he was incorporating the rhetorical concept of *oeconomia* into his scriptural hermeneutic within his first years as a Christian.

how Augustine's terminology and logic in *Practices* 1.17.30 and 1.28.56 mirror the terminology and logic of the Latin rhetorical tradition.

Augustine never used Quintilian's phrase *oeconomica dispositio*, but I contend that he did express the concept with the phrase *mirifica dispositio* in *Practices* 1.17.30 and *admirabilis ordo* in *Practices* 1.28.56.[53] I will now turn to the first of these.

mirifica dispositio (*Practices* 1.17.30)

We find one of the earliest examples of Augustine pointing to the economical arrangement of the scriptures in *Practices* 1.17.30.[54] In the first line of *Practices* 1.1.1 Augustine states that the Manichaeans make a practice of disparaging the Old Testament before an audience. In 1.9.14, he argues against the Manichaeans that the Old Testament

[53] That Augustine expresses the concept through different terminology is not problematic. Though I have focused on Quintilian's rendering of the concept as an *oeconomica dispositio*, this appellation was not a normative convention. Eden, when she first called attention to the concept, noted that Aelius Donatus referred to it as *bona oeconomia* and Sulpitius Victor referred to it as *ordo artificiosus*. Eden, 'Economy in the Hermeneutics of Late Antiquity,' 14, 21n3.

[54] This could be the earliest instance of Augustine incorporating rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic. Regardless, it is still one of the earliest. And it is difficult to parse the exact dates within which Augustine wrote certain chapters within his earliest works. For example, if we look outside of his scriptural hermeneutic, we see that *mor.* 1 is not the only text in his early corpus that incorporates rhetorical economy into his thought. I will argue in Chapter Three that he incorporates rhetorical economy into his doctrine of creation in *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32. Even if we were certain that these represented the three earliest instances of his use of rhetorical economy, I see no clear way to determine which of these vignettes is the oldest. Despite Coyle's helpful argument for the order in which Augustine began and completed his early works (see n.52), the exact order in which Augustine wrote each chapter within those works is lost to us in the fog of history.

is authoritative, a defense that harmonizes several passages from the Old and New Testaments.[55] This argument continues into 1.17.30 where he states:

> For, just as those [previous passages] which we offered from each of the two [testaments] harmonized (*congruunt*) with each other, so other [passages] also [harmonize], if you are willing to study diligently and with impartial judgment. But since many things are said in a more subdued manner (*submissius*) and are better accommodated (*accommodatius*) to souls creeping on the ground, so that they might rise through human things into divine things, so that the studious mind might be profitably trained by questions and abundantly delighted by discoveries, you are improperly using the wonderful arrangement of the Holy Spirit (*mirifica dispositione spiritus sancti*) for the purpose of deceiving your audience.[56]

Where the Manichaeans see a lack of consistency between the two testaments, Augustine sees the Spirit skillfully accommodating divine truths to human minds. His logic behind this point has four steps. First, each of the two testaments has a demonstrable harmony that can be inferentially extended to the entirety of the two. Second, 'many things' contained within the two testaments are 'accommodated' to the earthly audience by being delivered in a 'more subdued manner.' Though there is no inconsistency in content, there is variety of style. Third, both the harmony of the whole and the variety of the particular come from a single divine author, namely the Holy Spirit.[57] Therefore, the Manichaeans

---

[55] In the initial argument offered in *mor.* 1.9.14-16 Augustine pairs Mt 22.37 with Dt 6.5 and Rom 8.35-36 with Ps 44.22. In *retr.* 1.6(7).2 Augustine states that he had a defective manuscript of Ps 44.22 at the time that he wrote *mor.* which caused him to draw a connection between Rom 8.35-36 and Ps 44.22 that does not exist. However, in spite of this one error, he states that the rest of his argument in *mor.* 1.9.14ff. 'sufficiently demonstrated the same harmony [of the two testaments] from other testimonies.' (CSEL 36: 29.15-16): *ex aliis uero testimoniis eandem conuenientiam sufficienter ostendi*.

[56] *mor.* 1.17.30 (CSEL 90: 34.16-35.3): nam ut ista sibi congruunt, quae de utroque posuimus, ita etiam cetera, si diligenter et aequo iudicio uelitis attendere. Sed quia multa dicuntur submissius et humi repentibus animis accommodatius, ut per humana in diuina consurgant, multa etiam figurate, ut studiosa mens et quaesitis exerceatur utilius et uberius laetetur inuentis, uos mirifica dispositione spiritus sancti ad decipiendos uestros auditores et illaqueandos abutimini.

[57] Augustine will attribute the arrangement of the scriptures to the Spirit in 1.17.30 and to God (*deus*) in 1.28.56. In this section I will treat this authorship as a single

are misleading others when they claim that a stylistic inconsistency is a substantive inconsistency. A further look at the first three steps of his logic will reveal that Augustine is portraying the Spirit as an author who utilizes Latin rhetorical theory.

In his first step Augustine claims that a litany of scriptural examples which began in *Practices* 1.9.14 demonstrates that all passages between the Old and New Testaments harmonize with each other. In so doing, he is drawing on the concept of textual harmony from Latin rhetorical theory. While the verb he uses, *congruere*, was a term denoting the production of harmony, it was also used to praise an author's skill in weaving together disparate parts into a unified whole. Quintilian offers an example of this when he gives instructions to judicial rhetors who, having a weak case, need to invent a false narrative. After imagining the false narrative, he teaches that a rhetor should then make sure that his

---

authorship of the Trinity for two reasons. First, Augustine presents the three members of the Trinity as having a unity in *mor.* 1.14.24. He states there that God is 'a certain triple oneness' (CSEL 90: 28.7-8): *trinam quamdam unitatem*. Additionally, recent scholarship agrees that Augustine had at least an inchoate understanding of the Pro-Nicene doctrine of inseparable operations by AD 387-8. Though he did not explicitly list the doctrine until he wrote *ep.* 11 in 388-391, Lewis Ayres argues that he already knew it by the time that he wrote *mor.* Ayres claims that *mor.* 1.12.22-14.24 contains an argument that, though not a clear argument from common and inseparable operations, is dependent on such arguments. Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 52-9. Chad Gerber agrees that '[t]he principle of inseparable operations is intimated in Augustine's earlier argument for the divinity of the Spirit in *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae* 13.23, and possibly implied in other earlier passages in which he interprets the prepositional phrases of Romans 11:36 in a Trinitarian manner.' Chad Tyler Gerber, *The Spirit of Augustine's Early Theology: Contextualizing Augustine's Pneumatology* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2012), 169. Though Augustine's understanding of inseparable operations is not yet fully developed, he does affirm a unity of the Trinity in both substance and action by 387-8. Therefore, when Augustine attributes the arrangement to the Spirit in 1.17.30 and to God in 1.28.56 – regardless of whether he is using *deus* to refer to the first member of the Trinity or the Trinity itself – he is referring to one divine author. On the potential meanings of *deus* in Augustine's corpus, see: Goulven Madec, 'Deus,' in *AugLex*, ed. Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 1999).

story 'harmonizes (*congruat*) the person, place, and time, and that it has a credible structure and order (*ordinem*).'[58] Though Augustine does not think that God has a weak case to present, he does portray the Spirit as a rhetor who produced a text in which the many parts are harmonized.

In his second step Augustine praises the Spirit's employment of language that accommodates the divine material of the scriptures to his audience, writing:

> But since many things are said in a more subdued manner (*submissius*) and are better accommodated (*accommodatius*) to souls creeping on the ground, so that they might rise through human things into divine things...[59]

For Augustine, the sections of scripture that the Manichaeans judge awkward are, in reality, signs of the Spirit's rhetorical skill. The Spirit has chosen to express some sections of scripture in a more subdued (*submissius*) manner because it better accommodates (*accommodatius*) his divine material to his human audience.

---

[58] After noting that such a false narrative can depend on either external support or the talent of the speaker Quintilian states: 'But whichever it is, our first concern is that the narrative which we invent is realistic; second, that it harmonizes the person, place, and time, and that it has a credible structure and order.' Quint., *Inst.* 4.2.89 (LCL 125N: 264): *sed utrumcumque erit, prima sit curarum ut id quod fingemus fieri possit, deinde ut et personae et loco et tempori congruat et credibilem rationem et ordinem habeat*. Quintilian gives another example when he praises Cicero's skillfulness in constructing sentences in which a remarkable mixture of figures (*mira figurarum mixtura*) properly harmonize (*congruunt*): 'Truly, that remarkable mixture of figures is discerned in Cicero, in which the first word is repeated at the end after a long interval, and the middle words harmonize with the first words, and the last words harmonize with the middle words: "Yours is the work which we discern, conscript fathers, not mine, and a most beautiful work too, truly, as I said, not mine but yours."' Quint., *Inst.* 9.3.40 (LCL 127N: 122): *illa uero apud ciceronem mira figurarum mixtura deprehenditur, in qua et primo uerbo longum post interuallum redditum est ultimum, et media primis et mediis ultima congruunt : 'uestrum iam hic factum deprehenditur, patres conscripti, non meum, ac pulcherrimum quidem factum, uerum, ut dixi, non meum, sed uestrum.'*

[59] *mor.* 1.17.30.5-7 (CSEL 90: 34.18-20): sed quia multa dicuntur submissius et humi repentibus animis accommodatius, ut per humana in diuina consurgant.

Here, Augustine is drawing on the rhetorical concept of a gentle manner of expression (*summissus*), a subset of the third principal part of rhetoric, style (*elocutio*).[60] Whereas arrangement involves accommodating a text's parts to each other, style involves accommodating the words and expressions to a particular occasion and audience.[61] For example, in *On Rhetorical Invention* 1.7.9, Cicero defines style as 'the accommodation (*accommodatio*) of appropriate words to the invented material.'[62] For Augustine, the Spirit displays his rhetorical skill through a mastery of style by choosing a more subdued (*submissius*) manner of expression at certain places within his text that better accommodates (*accommodatius*) his divine theme to a human soul, and thus provides that soul a way of rising from its current place toward the divine.

---

[60] According to LS *summissus* and *submissus* are alternative forms of the same word. Cicero and Quintilian use the former, while Augustine uses the latter in *mor.* 1.17.30.

Cicero teaches that a *summissus* manner is an option that an orator can employ in order to accommodate a speech to its situation in *de Orat.* 3.50.212. Here he states that an orator will need to choose between a more copious, a more restrained, or an intermediate manner of expression in order to accommodate (*accommodatum*) his material to the situation. After this, he notes that each of those manners can be further divided into a more vigorous (*contentius*) or a more subdued fashion (*summissius).* Cic., *de Orat.* 3.55.212 (LCL 349: 168): *itaque hoc loco nihil sane est quod praecipi posse uideatur nisi ut figuram orationis plenioris et tenuioris et item illius mediocris ad id quod agemus accommodatam deligamus. ornamentis eisdem uti fere licebit alias contentious, alias summissius ; omnique in re posse quod deceat facere artis et naturae est, scire quic quandoque deceat prudentiae.* Quintilian also spoke of the *summissus* manner as an option that an orator could employ to properly accommodate his speech to the occasion. Quintilian stated that certain situations – such as funerals, consolatory speeches, and the defense of accused persons – called for the use of a subdued manner of speech. Quint., *Inst.* 11.3.153. With regard to *summitto* referring to speech that is subdued or displays a sense of submission, see Quint., *Inst.* 11.1.9, 64.

[61] Recall my introduction to the concepts of accommodation and style earlier in this chapter.

[62] Cic., *Inu. Rhet*. 1.7.9 (LCL 386: 18-20): elocutio est idoneorum uerborum ad inuentionem accommodatio.

In addition to this, Augustine also draws upon Latin rhetorical theory for the order in which he engages the Spirit's text in this pericope – first noting the harmony of the arrangement and then continuing to the more subdued manner of the style. This mirrors the order of the principal parts of rhetoric. In Latin rhetorical theory, as mentioned earlier, arrangement took priority over style, the first serving as the foundation for the second. The handbooks reflected this foundational priority by discussing arrangement before style.[63] Augustine's engagement of the scripture's harmonious arrangement and then more subdued manner of style reflects this rhetorical convention.

In the first two steps we have seen that Augustine drew upon Latin rhetorical theory to frame the Spirit's authorship of the scriptures through praising the harmony of the Old and New Testaments, noting their gentle manner, and addressing their arrangement before their style. In drawing my analysis of this pericope to a close, I want to briefly turn to the third step of Augustine's logic in *Practices* 1.17.30 in order to note that he names the Spirit's arrangement of the scriptures according to the second principal part of rhetoric – *dispositio*.[64] Augustine's employment of the logic and terminology of

---

[63] In his interaction with Dodaro's work on 'literary propriety' Cameron has also called attention to the foundational priority of arrangement over style in the rhetorical handbooks of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. Cameron, 'The Rhetorical Base of Augustine's Hermeneutic,' 61.

[64] With regard to Augustine's choice of the term *mirifica*, I do not see enough evidence to make a strong claim about its source or significance. Augustine could be drawing this term from Ps. 16.7, in which David asks God to reveal to him his wonderful mercies (*mirifica misericordias tuas*). In the entire *Biblia Sacra Vulgata* the root *mirific-* only appears three times, all in a verbal form (Pss. 4.4, 15.3, 30.22). Of course, Augustine could have had an alternative Latin interpretation of the scriptures which used the term elsewhere. *Mirific-* was also used in the Latin rhetorical tradition. Quintilian had once praised Virgil's deriding of Thucydides as 'marvelously' (*mirifice*) executed (Quint., *Inst.* 8.3.27 [LCL 126N: 354]). Augustine could have been drawing from this tradition instead, or he could have been synthesizing it with Christian scripture. At this point I can only claim that Augustine did have precedent to use the term to praise God's activity and

rhetorical theory throughout this passage reveals that his choice of the term *dispositio* here is neither generic nor merely philosophical – it is rhetorical. For Augustine, the Holy Spirit is an author who has woven the scriptures into an economical arrangement that was expressed in an appropriate, accommodated manner.[65] Thus, Augustine's *mirifica dispositio* is Quintilian's *oeconomica dispositio*.[66] We will see this same concept expressed with different terminology in *Practices* 1.28.56.

admirabilis ordo (*Practices* 1.28.56)

In *Practices* 1.28.56 we find Augustine again affirming God's economical arrangement of the Old and New Testaments against his Manichaean interlocutors.[67] He admits that the two testaments are certainly different in focus, but argues that they are harmonized by their accommodation to the need of sick human souls to be healed through both deterrence (through fear) and instruction (by love). Though both testaments instruct

---

to praise an author's work. For more on Augustine's use of the term *dispositio*, see: Karl-Heinz Schwarte, 'Dispositio,' in *AugLex*, ed. Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 1999).

[65] Based upon the multiple aspects of rhetorical theory Augustine used in *mor.* 1.17.30, I would suggest that Augustine employed the term *auditores* as a homonymic pun, using the technical term for Manichaeism's first level of participation to argue for the superiority of the Spirit's rhetorical skill in communicating to his audience over and above that of the Manichees. Coyle's commentary on *mor.* details the position of *auditor* within Manichaeism: Coyle, *Augustine's De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 348-51. See also Jason BeDuhn's work on Augustine and Manichaeism: Jason David BeDuhn, *Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma, Volume 1: Conversion and Apostasy, 373-388 C.E.* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 70-105.

[66] Cameron claims that Augustine's phrase *mirifica dispositio* in *mor.* 1.17.30 will become the phrase *dispensatio temporalis* throughout his career. *Dispensatio temporalis* first appears in Augustine's corpus in AD 391 in *uer. rel.* 7.13, 10.19, and 55.110. Cameron, *Christ Meets Me Everywhere*, 87, 307n15.

[67] As I discussed earlier (n.53), in *mor.* 1.16.28 Augustine names God (*deus*) as the author of the Old and New Testaments. CSEL 90: 59.4.

a soul through fear and love, fear is dominant in the Old Testament while love is dominant in the New Testament.[68] Having made his point, Augustine states:

> It would take a very long time to speak about the admirable arrangement[69] (*admirabili…ordine*) and divine harmony (*diuinoque concentu*) of these [two] testaments, and many religious and learned men have done so.[70]

For Augustine, though the two testaments have different foci they exhibit a praiseworthy order and harmony. For further evidence of this order and harmony he will point to the consistent appearance of the themes of love of neighbor and love of God in Lev 19.18, Sir 24.32, and Mt 22.39.[71] Beyond this, in the next chapter (1.28.57) Augustine will state that this ordered scripture is a tool by which God arranges human life, stating that it is 'most salubriously and optimally arranged (*saluberrime atque optime humana uita disponitur*)' by the two commandments contained in the Great Commandment (Lev 19.18; Mt 22.39).[72]

---

[68] As Coyle's commentary notes, Augustine soon backs away from the severity of this early fear/love dichotomy between the two testaments (e.g. *c. Adim.* 7 and 17 [AD 394]). Coyle, *Augustine's De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, 392-4. With regard to the date of *c. Adim.*, see: *AttA*, xliii.

[69] With regard to my translation of *ordine* as 'arrangement,' see n.76 and the text above it.

[70] *mor.* 1.28.56 (CSEL 90: 59.11-13): *de quorum testamentorum admirabili quodam ordine diuinoque concentu, longissimum est dicere et multi religiosi doctique dixerunt.* BA 1 contains a typo where it renders the word concentu as consentu (BA 1: 216). That word form cannot be found in the LS or OLD. Furthermore, a search of the LLT-A yields no instance of such a word in Classical and late antique Latin literature. It appears to be a combination of the terms *concentu* (*concinere*) and *consensu* (*consentire*). CSEL and PL both have *concentu* (CSEL 90: 59.10; PL 32: 1334). Furthermore, *consentu* is not among the variants listed in CSEL 90: 59.12n. The only two variants listed there are *contentu* and *conceptu.*

[71] *mor.* 1.28.56-57 (CSEL 90: 58.18-61.7). Augustine also includes the theme that such love leads to salvation.

[72] *mor.* 1.28.57 (CSEL 90: 61.2-3).

Two points reveal that Augustine is using the phrase *admirabilis ordo* to express an economical arrangement according to Latin rhetorical theory: his consistent use of the concept of harmony in 1.17.30 and 1.28.56 and his consistent invocation of the concept of an arrangement. To begin, Augustine couples the phrase *admirabilis ordo* with *diuinus concentus*. Augustine uses *concentus* to accomplish the same purpose for which he had used *congruere* in 1.17.30 – to express harmony between the two scriptural testaments. However, whereas Augustine was quoting particular scriptural texts to demonstrate this harmony in 1.17.30, in 1.28.56 he is discussing harmony between the two testaments with regard to the themes of love and fear. He states: 'Although both are found in each of them, nevertheless fear prevails in the Old [Testament], love in the New [Testament].'[73] Augustine's choice of the term *concentus* also has precedent in Latin rhetorical theory as a word that describes harmony among distinct things, usually in an analogy between rhetoric and music.[74]

In addition to this harmony language, we see Augustine applying the same idea of arrangement that he has already used in 1.17.30. The admirable arrangement

---

[73] *mor.* 1.28.56 (CSEL 90: 59.7-8): quamquam enim utrumque in utroque sit, praeualet tamen in ueteri timor, amor in nouo.

[74] Quintilian, in a discussion on a speech or text's artistic structure (*compositio*) and its usefulness for directing the mind of the reader or listener, uses the term as part of an analogy with music. Quintilian notes that, just as there are different varieties of *compositiones* that are appropriate for a rhetor on different occasions and for different ends, so there is no agreement between the harmony of signs (*signorum concentus*) that lead an army to battle and the song that calls for its retreat. Quint., *Inst.* 9.4.12 (LCL 127N: 166). Similarly, Cicero used the example of the need for harmony (*concentus*) among different members of a choir to explain the need for consistent pronunciation throughout a speech. Cic., *de Orat.* 3.50.196 (LCL 349: 156). Cicero also used the term to describe an underlying unity of all of the *artes,* 'a certain wonderful thing, like a harmony and unanimity of all teachings.' Cicero, *de Orat.* 3.6.21-22 (LCL 349: 18): *mirus quidam omnium quasi consensus doctrinarum concentusque*.

(*admirabilis…ordine*) is describing the same aspects of the two testaments as the divine harmony (*diuinoque concentu*) – the interplay between the themes of love and fear in the Old and New Testaments. This matches Augustine's use of the concept of arrangement that we saw in 1.17.30. Augustine's use of the term *ordo* in 1.28.56 to articulate the same concept that he expressed with *dispositio* in 1.17.30 accords with Latin rhetorical theory, which taught that *dispositio* and *ordo* are synonyms. Cicero, in a description of the principal parts of rhetoric that Marius Victorinus would later summarize, states: 'Arrangement (*dispositio*) is the distribution of invented things into an order (*in ordine*).'[75] Quintilian had a similar opinion. In *Oratorical Instructions* 3.3.8, he taught that *dispositio* is nothing less 'than an assembly of matters into the best possible order' (*rerum ordine quam optimo conlocatio*).[76] In addition to this, Quintilian also taught that

---

[75] Cic., *Inu. Rhet*. 1.7.9 (LCL 386: 18): *dispositio est rerum inuentarum in ordinem distributio*. Marius Victorinus summarized Cicero's teaching in Expl. in Cic. 1.7 (CCSL 132: 45.19-20): *dispositionem dicit esse ut inuenta locis necessariis per ordinem disponamus*.

[76] Quintilian states that some previous rhetoricians proposed that *ordo* was a separate part of rhetoric from *dispositio*, which he sees as nonsensical: '…others have added order (*ordinem*), although they had already mentioned arrangement (*dispositionem*), as if arrangement (*dispositio*) was something other than an assembly of matters into the best possible order (*ordine quam optimo*).' Quint., *Inst.* 3.3.8 (LCL 125N: 26): *qui adiecerunt ordinem cum dispositionem dixissent, quasi alius sit dispositio quam rerum ordine quam optimo conlocatio*. *Auct. ad Her.* is yet another rhetorical handbook that affirms this synonymous treatment in the Latin rhetorical tradition. The anonymous author states, 'Arrangement is the order and distribution of matters.' *Auct. ad Her.* 1.2.3 (LCL 403: 6): *dispositio est ordo et distributio rerum*. See also *Rhet. Her.* 3.9.16 (LCL 403: 184): *quoniam dispositio est per quam illa quae inuenimus in ordinem redigimus ut certo quicquid loco pronuntietur, uidendum est cuiusmodi rationem in disponendo habere conueniat*.

Scholars usually regard Augustine's use of *ordo* as a philosophical and theological construct. An example of this can be found in V. Pacioni's survey of the term in *AttA*. Virgilio Pacioni and Matthew O'Connell, 'Order,' in *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, et al. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999), 598. Those scholars who have acknowledged that *ordo* had a technical rhetorical meaning in late antiquity have failed to demonstrate a clear connection between rhetorical

an author from the Greek rhetorical tradition, Hermagoras, had placed *ordo* underneath the category of economy.[77] Thus, in *Practices* 1.28.56 Augustine makes use of the precedent in rhetorical theory for using *ordo* not only with regard to an author's textual arrangement (*dispositio*), but also with regard to the quality of that arrangement (*oeconomia*).[78]

Concluding Remarks on *Practices* 1.17.30 an 1.28.56

Augustine's use of terminology and logic from Latin rhetorical theory in *Practices* 1.17.30 and 1.28.56 shows that he was already explaining God's authorship of the Old and New Testaments according to the rhetorical concept of economy by the time he wrote *Practices* 1 in AD 387 or 388. This further demonstrates Cameron's general claim that Augustine had begun to incorporate rhetorical theory into his scriptural hermeneutic around the time of his baptism. In addition to this, it also opens the

---

ordo and Augustine's use of the term. Jean Doignon, 'Introduction,' in *Dialogues Philosophiques: De Ordine - L'Ordre* (Paris: Institut D'Études Augustiniennes, 1997), 15-6; Schwarte, 'Dispositio.'; Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, *L'Ordre Caché : La notion d'ordre chez saint Augustin*, Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 174 (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2004), 99; Paul van Geest, 'Ordo,' in *AugLex*, ed. Robert Dodaro, Cornelius Mayer, and Christof Müller (Basel: Schwabe, 2014), 373-4.

[77] Quintilian stated that Hermagoras had placed judgment (*iudicium*) as well as division (*partitio*) and order (*ordo*) under the heading of economy (*oeconomia*): 'Hermagoras places judgment, division, order and everything relating to style under the heading of economy, which, in Greek, originally referred to the management of domestic matters and was brought into oratory through a new use of the term, and lacks a Latin equivalent.' Quint., *Inst.* 3.3.9 (LCL 125N: 26): *hermagoras iudicium partitionem ordinem quaeque sunt elocutionis subicit oeconomiae, quae graece appellata ex cura rerum domesticarum et hic per abusionem posita nomine latino caret*.

[78] Recall that the Latin rhetorical tradition viewed *oeconomia* as the principle of accommodation relative to *dispositio*.

possibility that Augustine had incorporated rhetorical economy into other areas of his thought by this early date. The remaining chapters of this dissertation focus on these other areas.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have introduced the concept of rhetorical economy and then focused on Augustine's incorporation of it into his scriptural hermeneutic. I began with this focus because, conceptually, it is one of two places wherein rhetorical theory naturally intersects Christian thought and practice. Since rhetorical theory was concerned with texts and speeches, we would expect to find touchpoints between it and Christianity on thought surrounding the scriptures (texts) and sermons (speeches).[79] Previous scholarship confirms this expectation, at least with regard to rhetorical economy and Augustine's treatment of the scriptures.[80] And I have added to scholarship on this topic by demonstrating, by means of a sustained commentary of *Practices* 1.17.30 and 1.28.56, that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic from the early years of his Christian career.

---

[79] There are two reasons why I have not focused on rhetorical theory and Augustine's homiletical theory and practice in this chapter. First, as far as I am aware, no extensive studies with this focus exist. Thus, there was no need to address it in the *status quaestionis*. Second, the purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to scholarship by demonstrating both that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into areas of his thought that are beyond the traditional purview of rhetorical theory, and how he did so.

[80] See the *status quaestionis* earlier in this chapter.

Now that we have a firm grasp on the concept of rhetorical economy and understand that Augustine incorporated it into an aspect of his thought where we would expect it, his scriptural hermeneutic, we are prepared to consider my argument that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into an area of his thought where one might not expect it – his theology. I will begin in the next chapter by demonstrating that Augustine conceived of the world and its history according to the media of literary and rhetorical theory.

CHAPTER TWO

Creation, History, and God's Activity as Speech

> Another person, in order to find God, reads a book. There is a certain great book: the very sight of creation. Look attentively above and below! Consider! Read! God did not make letters from ink, from which you might understand him; he placed before your eyes the very things which he made. Why are you seeking a louder voice? Heaven and earth cry out to you: 'God made me!'
>
> *Sermon* 68.6[1]

In this chapter I will argue that Augustine uses the media of literary and rhetorical theory – namely the book and the speech[2] – to conceptualize creation, its history, and God's activity over the course of his career. This is my primary claim in this chapter, and it serves as a fundamental proposition for each of the remaining three chapters.[3] I will make my argument through a presentation of nine texts gathered around three related themes: 1) Creation and its history as a book (*Letter* 43.9.25; *Against Faustus the Manichee* 32.20; *Letter* 43.9.25;

---

[1] *s.* 68.6 (CCSL 41 Aa: 443.161-6): *alius, ut inueniat deum, librum legit. est quidam magnus liber ipsa species creaturae : superiorem et inferiorem contuere, attende, lege. non deus, unde eum cognosceres, de atramento litteras fecit : ante oculos tuos posuit haec ipsa quae fecit. quid quaeris maiorem uocem ? clamat ad te caelum et terra : deus me fecit.* All translations are my own.

[2] Augustine understood both the written and spoken words as 'speech.' Written words were merely signs for spoken words. See *dial.* 5, *mag.* 4.8, and *doctr. Chr.* 2.4.5. Note that *dial.* and *mag.* are two of his earliest works. Clifford Ando agrees that, for Augustine, 'a text is simply the written representation of a speech.' However, he does not include any primary texts as evidence for his claim. He does quote *mag.* 4.8 later in his article while commenting on a different point. My reading of all three texts agrees with that of Christopher Kirwan. Clifford Ando, 'Augustine on Language,' *REAug* 40 (1994): 46, 55-6; Christopher Kirwan, *The Arguments of the Philosophers* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 43-4.

[3] Once I have demonstrated this, I contend that we should expect Augustine to incorporate concepts from literary and rhetorical theory – the ideas that governed the best writing and speech in Augustine's era – into the many areas of his theology which include creation, history, or divine activity. The three remaining chapters demonstrate that, with regard to rhetorical economy, that possibility was a reality.

Exposition of Psalm 45.6-7; *Sermon* 68.6)[4]; 2) God's activity as a speech (*Letter* 102.6.33); and 3) History as a speech (*On Free Choice* 3.15.42; *On the Nature of the Good* 8; *Against Secundinus the Manichee* 15; *Questions from the Gospels* 2.49).

In addition to this claim, I will also argue that the content of Augustine's notion of creation as a book is the sensible aspect of creation, of which particular sensible objects serve as signs representing intelligible things, following his understanding of words as signs of things, as defined in his early work *On Dialectic* 5. Augustine separated all things which are known into the categories of 'sensibles' (*sensibilia*), which are perceived by the bodily senses, and 'intelligibles' (*intelligibilia*), which are perceived by the mind.[5] I will argue that the content of Augustine's book of creation includes things which can be apprehended by the senses, such as the Corinthian church, which we will see Augustine classify as part of the book of creation in the section on *Letter* 43.9.25. This second argument lends support to my primary argument by demonstrating that the content of Augustine's notion of creation as a book and God's activity as

[4] Although Augustine uses various terminology, I will use 'creation' for the sake of brevity.

[5] Augustine separated all things which are known into the two categories of things perceived by the bodily senses (*sensibilia, carnalia*) and those perceived by the mind (*intelligibilia, spiritalia*) in his early work, *mag.* (AD 389). He added a third category, which accounts for images that both the memory and imagination form based on data from the sensible world, after he wrote most of the works I will consider in this chapter. However, while it does not appear that Augustine had clearly developed this third category by the time of most of these writings, I think that it is most likely that he still conceived of his audience's endeavor of reading the book of creation's history as a sensible endeavor since the object in two instances (*ep.* 43.9.25 and *en. Ps.* 45.6-7) was change that the senses perceived. For Augustine's threefold division, see: *ep.* 120.2.11 and *Gn. litt.* 12.11.22. For concise explanations of Augustine's threefold model of vision, see: B. Darrell Jackson, 'Semantics and Hermeneutics in Saint Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana*' (Dissertation, Yale University, 1967), 18; Todd Breyfogle, '*Intellectus*,' in *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, et al. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999), 452-3. For the date of *mag.*, see: *AttA*, xlvi. On Augustine's division of things perceived in *mag.*, see: Gerard O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 171-8.

a speech is consistent with his understanding of the function of words. That is, just as words function as signs for things, the sensible aspects of creation and divine activity also function as signs for things.[6] I will make this secondary argument from the first five texts that I engage in this chapter. In those cases, then, I will offer a twofold reading that first addresses my primary argument and then my secondary one. Furthermore, once I have demonstrated that Augustine includes the sensible aspects of the universe in these five texts, I will discuss the importance of this for my argument and our understanding of Augustine's theology in a section titled 'Signs, Signs, Everywhere Signs,' before closing this chapter with a section demonstrating that Augustine also conceived of history as a speech.[7]

CREATION IS A BOOK I: *LETTER* 43.9.25

The earliest extant text in which Augustine conceived of creation as a book is *Letter* 43.9.25 (AD 396).[8] Augustine addresses the letter to several Donatist laymen in order to plead the Catholic case for Christian unity, and spends the majority of the letter discussing textual evidence presented by both Donatists and Catholics with regard to the case of Caecilian.[9] But by

[6] I will introduce Augustine's semiotics in the first section of this chapter by means of a quotation from *dial.* 5.

[7] Since these final four texts do not engage the theme of sensible objects, I engage them after concluding my secondary argument.

[8] For the date of *ep.* 43, see: Johannes Divjak, 'Epistulae,' in *AugLex*, ed. Cornelius Petrus Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 2001), 1028.

[9] I have capitalized Catholic in order to distinguish Augustine's tradition of Christianity from the Donatist tradition. In *ep.* 45.1.1 Augustine addresses the letter to Glorius, Eleusius, the Felixes, Grammaticus, and others. Roland Teske notes that these were 'Donatist laymen from Thiave in Numidia.' Augustine, *Letters 1-99*, ed. Boniface Ramsey, trans. Roland Teske, WSA 2.1 (Hyde Park: New City Press, 2001), 158n1. Augustine states his intention for writing the letter in *ep.* 45.1.1-3.

43.9.25 Augustine has shifted to a critique of the contemporary state of the Donatists – particularly their lack of geographical breadth.[10] He states:

> You have read what was done then; you see what is being done now. If you doubt anything with regard to those [past events], notice these [present ones]! At any rate, let us move forward neither with old writings, nor with public records, nor with judicial or ecclesiastical proceedings. Our book is greater – the earth (*maior liber noster orbis terrarum est*). In it I read as completed that which in the book of God I read as promised. 'The Lord,' it says, 'said to me: "You are my son, today I have begotten you. Ask of me and I will give you the Gentiles as your inheritance, and the ends of the land as your possession" (Ps 2.7-8).' Let the person who does not share in this inheritance know that he himself has been disinherited, regardless of whatever books he holds; let whoever assaults this inheritance sufficiently announce that he himself is a stranger to the family of God. Surely, the question is centered on the surrendering of the divine books in which this inheritance was promised. Therefore, let it be believed that that person who litigates against the will of the testator has himself surrendered the testament to the flames. What did they do to you, O sect of the Donatists; what did the church of the Corinthians do to you? Moreover, I want what I say about this [church of the Corinthians] to be understood with regard to all such [churches] placed so far away. What did [those churches] do to you, who were unable to fully know either what you did or whom you accused? Could it be the world lost the light of Christ because Caecilian offended Lucilla in Africa?[11]

Augustine asks his Donatist readers to turn to a different book, the earth, so that he can demonstrate to them that they are not included in the inheritance described in Ps 2.7-8. His point

---

[10] This transition can be seen in *ep.* 45.8.24 and the first lines of 43.9.25.

[11] *ep.* 43.9.25 (CCSL 31: 185.555-73): quae tunc acta sint legistis, quae nunc agantur uidetis. si de illis in aliquo dubitatis, ista iam cernite ! certe non chartis ueteribus, non archiuis publicis, non gestis forensibus aut ecclesiasticis agamus, maior liber noster orbis terrarum est. In eo lego completum, quod in libro dei lego promissum. dominus, inquit, dixit ad me : filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te ; postula a me et dabo tibi gentes hereditatem tuam, et possessionem tuam terminos terrae. huic hereditati qui non communicat, quoslibet libros teneat, exheredatum se esse cognoscat ; hanc hereditatem quisquis expugnat, alienum se esse a familia dei satis indicat. certe de traditione diuinorum librorum uertitur quaestio, ubi hereditas ista promissa est. ille ergo credatur testamentum tradidisse flammis, qui contra uoluntatem litigat testatoris. quid tibi fecit, o pars Donati, quid tibi fecit ecclesia Corinthiorum ? quod autem de ista dico, de omnibus talibus et tam longe positis intellegi uolo. quid uobis fecerunt quae nec omnino quid feceritis, nec quos infamaueritis nosse potuerunt ? an quia Lucillam Caecilianus in Africa laesit lucem Christi orbis amisit ?

is that a group cannot claim the Gentiles as their inheritance if they are not in communion with churches around the world, such as the Corinthian church.[12]

A plain reading of *Letter* 43.9.25 serves as evidence that Augustine conceived of creation as a book. Augustine writes: 'our book is greater – the earth (*maior liber noster orbis terrarum est*).' In so saying, Augustine places this book of the earth in parallel with other written documents mentioned in the previous sentence – 'old writings,' 'public records,' and 'judicial or ecclesiastical proceedings.' Moreover, he mentions throughout the letter that several such texts have been and continue to be used as evidence in the disagreement between the Catholics and the Donatists.[13] When, then, in *Letter* 43.9.25 he refers to the book of the earth, he is using it in the same way; it is a text from which to draw evidence for his claim that the Donatists have not received the world as an inheritance since they are strangers to churches such as the Corinthian church. Additionally, just as a book has readers, Augustine frames the book of the earth as also having readers – human beings.[14]

That Augustine is referring to the sensible, rather than intelligible, creation in *Letter* 43.9.25 is revealed by his use of the term earth (*orbis terrarum*) and the particular example that he gives in the remainder of the letter.[15] In the Classical world and Late Antiquity, the Latin term

---

[12] Augustine's accusation against the Donatists in 43.8.21 provides context for his meaning in this text. There Augustine accuses the Donatists of the crime of 'an abominable separation from the heritage of Christ, which is spread through all nations' ([CSEL 31: 182.457-8]: *ab hereditate Christi, quae per omnes gentes diffusa est, nefariam separationem*).

[13] For example, he mentions records brought forth by the Donatists in 43.2.3, letters read at a previous council in 43.2.5, and proceedings that exist in the possession of a governor in 43.6.17.

[14] This is seen in Augustine's statement 'our book is greater.' His continued use of the first-person plural from the previous sentence and into this one leaves the readership open, ostensibly including Donatists, Catholics, and perhaps anyone else who might read *ep.* 45. This is not restricted by his singular statement in the following sentence, 'I read.' Rather, at this point he is offering his reading of the earth to other readers of the earth.

[15] Regarding Augustine's terminology of *sensibilia* and *intelligibilia*, see n.5.

orbis terrarum had no inherent range of meaning that included anything beyond sensibles.[16] Furthermore, nothing in the context affirms that Augustine is including the intelligible aspects of creation in his conception of creation as a book here.[17] Rather, Augustine points them to a sensible – Gentiles; in particular, the Corinthian church. Yet Augustine couples this sensible reality with an intelligible, and spiritual, one.[18] According to him, Ps 2.7-8 states that the Gentiles are the inheritance of those who are included in God's family; whoever does not have the Gentiles has been 'disinherited.' Thus, the Gentiles function as the sign representing inclusion in (or exclusion from) God's inheritance.

Augustine's treatment of the Gentiles as signs which are part of the book of the earth coincides with his understanding of the function of words, the content of books. Augustine provides a concise explanation of his theory on the function of words in one of his earliest writings, *On Dialectic* 5 (AD 387).[19] He writes:

> A word (*uerbum*) is a sign (*signum*) of any such thing which can be understood by hearing and pronounced by speaking. A thing (*res*) is whatever is sensed, understood, or hidden (*latet*). A sign is that which shows itself to the sense and [shows] something beyond itself to the mind.[20]

Augustine states in *On Dialectic* 5 that words (*uerba*) are a subcategory of signs (*signa*). As signs, words present themselves to the senses in order to signify things (*res*) which are beyond

---

[16] See the entry in LS.

[17] Augustine does not make any statement restricting the aspects of creation which are a book to sensibles. However, my point here is merely that Augustine explicitly mentions a sensible aspect of creation in *ep.* 43.9.25.

[18] Augustine used *intelligibilia* and *spiritalia* synonymously. I have included the second term here because the reader might not immediately recognize that Augustine understands that a spiritual reality is an intelligible reality.

[19] For the date of *dial.* see: B. Darrell Jackson, *Introduction to Augustine's De Dialectica* (Boston: Reidel, 1975), 3.

[20] *dial.* 5 (Pinborg: 86): uerbum est uniuscuiusque rei signum, quod ab audiente possit intellegi, a loquente prolatum. res est quidquid uel sentitur uel intellegitur uel latet. signum est quod et se ipsum sensui et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit.

them. But, whereas words are perceived by the senses, the things which they represent might remain hidden (*latet*).[21]

Augustine treats the content of the book of the earth in *Letter* 43.9.25 as functioning in the same manner as words in *On Dialectic* 5. He conceives of the Gentiles as words which show themselves (Gentiles) to the senses and something beyond themselves (spiritual inheritance) to the minds of their readers (human beings). Building upon this literary model, Augustine argues that by not including certain Gentiles in their church, the Donatists lack the promised inheritance, and are thus 'disinherited.' Thus, the sensible separation of the predominantly North African Donatist church from churches in other geographic locations serves as a second sign indicating another spiritual truth – the Donatists are outside of the family of God. In *Letter* 43.9.25, therefore, the contents of the book of creation are sensible, but they also represent things which are beyond them.

CREATION IS A BOOK II: *AGAINST FAUSTUS THE MANICHEE* 32.20

Among the four texts in which Augustine explicitly conceives of creation as a book, scholars only disagree on the date of *Against Faustus the Manichee* (*Against Faustus*) 32.20 (AD 398-400 or 408-10).[22] I have placed this treatment of *Against Faustus* 32.20 between *Letter*

---

[21] The hiddenness of things is relevant to my reading of *c. Faust.* 32.20 in the next section.

[22] Kevin Coyle says that the work 'possibly dates between 398 and 400.' J. Kevin Coyle, '*Faustum Manicheum, Contra* (Against Faustus, a Manichee),' in *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, et al. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999), 56. Roland Teske dates it much later, 'probably...between 408 and 410:' Roland Teske, 'Introduction and Notes,' in *Answer to Faustus, a Manichean*, ed. Boniface Ramsey, WSA 1.20 (Hyde Park: New City Press, 2007), 10. Neither gives an argument for their proposed time frame. We do know that it was written after *conf.* 5 since Augustine states in *c. Faust.* 1.1 that he has already spoken of Faustus in *conf.* (e.g. *conf.* 5.3.3).

43.9.25 and *Exposition of Psalm* 45.7 because it might have been written between those two works.[23]

In 32.20 we find Augustine arguing against Faustus's claim that Manichaeism represents the truest form of Christianity.[24] Though Augustine addresses his former Manichaean teacher directly, Faustus has been dead for at least eight years; Augustine is writing for a wider audience.[25] He quotes Faustus and then responds:

> 'But,' you say, 'I believed what [Mani][26] did not show me because he manifestly showed me the two natures (*duas naturas*), the good and the evil, in this very world.' Yet this is the very place, O unfortunate man, from which you were deceived. Because, just as in those evangelical scriptures, so also in this world you could think of nothing evil except that by which your carnal sense was stricken, such as a snake, fire, poison, and similar things; nor [could you think of] anything good, except for that which pleasantly stroked your very same carnal sense, such as the pleasantness of flavors, the sweetness of scents, the appearance of this light, and any other thing that was similarly alluring to your ears, eyes, nostrils, or palate. But if you first considered the entire creation and assigned God as the author, as if you were reading some great book of the nature of things (*at si uniuersam creaturam ita prius aspiceres, ut auctori deo tribueres, quasi legens magnum quendam librum naturae rerum*), if, in that condition, something offended you, you would more safely believe that the cause [of its existence] can be hidden from you, a human being, instead of daring to find fault with anything in the works of God.[27] And

---

[23] The earlier date places it just after *ep.* 43.9.25 but well before *en. Ps.* 45.7. The later date puts it just after *en. Ps.* 45.7. For the dating of these other works, see n.8 and n.35.

[24] Dieter Groh has very briefly mentioned *c. Faust.* 32.20 and *en. Ps.* 45.7 in a chapter he has written tracing what he calls the doctrine of the 'Book of Nature' in patristic thought up to Augustine. Dieter Groh, 'The Emergence of Creation Theology: The Doctrine of the Book of Nature in the Early Church Fathers in the East and the West up to Augustine,' in *The Book of Nature in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, ed. Arjo Vanderjagt and Klaas van Berkel, Groningen Studies in Cultural Change 16 (Leuven: Peeters, 2005), 33. However, Groh does not give a sustained commentary on either text.

[25] Augustine is responding to Faustus's *Capitula*, probably written between his exile in AD 386 and his death in 390. The work was written to a former Manichee who had converted to Christianity, possibly Augustine himself, and only survives in quotations by Augustine. Coyle, '*Faustum Manicheum, Contra* (Against Faustus, a Manichee),' 355.

[26] Mani is the implied subject of the verb in this sentence. A few lines above, in 32.19 (CSEL 25/1: 781.3), Augustine quotes Faustus as saying that Mani (*Manichaeus*) taught him.

[27] I have translated the first section of this sentence as three consecutive protases because Augustine connects the three clauses with the adverbs *ita*, *ut*, and then *ita* again (*ita...aspiceres*; *ut...tribueres*; *ita...offenderet*). The LS entries for both *ita* and *ut* note that the terms can have this connective function when used together. By translating the second clause (*ut...tribueres*) as one

> you would have never fallen into sacrilegious nonsense and blasphemous fictions by which, not understanding the source of evil, you try to fill God with all evils.[28]

Augustine is arguing against Faustus's claim that there are 'two natures' in the material world, one evil and one good.[29] According to him, Faustus has incorrectly concluded that there is a material evil nature in this world because of particular things which offended his 'carnal sense.' Augustine states that such a view is both 'blasphemous,' because it makes God the 'source of evil,' and it is corrected by contemplating 'the entire creation' as if it is a book whose author is God. Augustine thus claims that a change of perspective corrects this blasphemy. He then explains how it does so: Those who consider the entire creation will no longer think that

---

of three protases I am disagreeing with Roland Teske, who translates it as a purpose clause: 'But, in order to attribute it to God as its author (*ut...tribueres*), you should first look at the whole of creation (*ut...aspiceres*) as if you were reading a kind of large book of the nature of reality' (WSA 1.20, 423). Both translations are grammatically justified, but by translating this as a purpose clause Teske is forced to move the second clause before the first in order to make sense of the following participial clause, thus losing the natural flow of the Latin. My argument in this chapter works with either translation of this clause.

[28] *c. Faust.* 32.20 (CSEL 25/1: 781.22-782.14): Sed, inquis, propterea credidi, quae non mihi ostendit, quia duas naturas, boni scilicet et mali, mihi in hoc ipso mundo euidenter ostendit. at hoc ipsum est, infelix, unde decepta es, quia sicut in illa scriptura euangelica, ita in hoc mundo nihil mali putare potuisti, nisi quo tuus carnalis sensus offensus est, sicut serpentem, ignem, uenenum et similia, nec aliquid boni, nisi quod eundem tuum carnalem sensum aliqua iucunditate permulsit, sicut saporum iucunditas et odorum suauitas et lucis huius aspectus et si quid aliud uel auribus uel oculis tuis uel naribus uel palato similiter forte blanditum est. at si uniuersam creaturam ita prius aspiceres, ut auctori deo tribueres, quasi legens magnum quendam librum naturae rerum atque ita si quid ibi te offenderet, causam te tamquam hominem latere posse tutius crederes quam in operibus dei quicquam reprehendere auderes, numquam incidisses in sacrilegas nugas et blasphema figmenta, quibus non intellegens, unde sit malum, deum inplere conaris omnibus malis.

[29] This view is an ongoing subject of debate for Augustine in *c. Faust*. For example, see *c. Faust.* 21.13. Augustine's framing of Faustus as holding this view fits scholarly understanding of Manichaean views on good and evil as being material substances in this world. Jason Beduhn writes (emphasis is his): 'Manichaean texts describe light and darkness, good and evil, as two totally alien *material* substances whose cataclysmic mixture has brought about the current state of our existence.' Jason David BeDuhn, 'A Regimen for Salvation: Medical Models in Manichaean Asceticism,' *Semeia* 58 (1992): 113. Augustine's description of Faustus's position in this text fits BeDuhn's description of Manichaean theology – the evils to which Faustus has pointed are things which offended his 'carnal sense.'

something which offends their 'carnal sense(s)' is evidence for a material evil nature. Rather, they will recognize that such a thing has a cause of being which is beyond their understanding. Augustine thus provides a theological argument against Manichees by arguing that they have no evidence for an evil nature, and thus God as the source of evil, because the individual things which offend their carnal senses have a cause for existence within the whole creation. This cause might be hidden from us, but these individual things are fitting within the whole.

As with *Letter* 43.9.25, a plain reading of *Against Faustus* 32.20 shows that Augustine conceives of creation as a book. Augustine not only exhorts Faustus to consider 'the entire creation' as if he is 'reading some great book,' he also frames this creation-book as having an author (God) and a reader (humanity).[30] Furthermore, Augustine's opinion that the parts of this book of creation which offend Faustus's carnal senses could have a cause behind its existence which might be 'hidden (*latere*)' from him aligns with his understanding of the relationship between words and the things they signify which we have already seen in *On Dialectic* 5.[31]

If we read Augustine's instruction to Faustus alongside *On Dialectic* 5 we gain a better understanding of his meaning and conclusion. Augustine states that, if Faustus would consider creation as a he would a book, he will recognize that particular words – in this case corporeal objects which offend his carnal senses, such as poison – signify things which might lie hidden

---

[30] Although the term *auctor* has a range of meaning beyond that of an author of a book, this is the most likely reading of the term in this passage because it is contained within his conceptualization of creation as a book. For the semantic range of *auctor*, see the entries in OLD and LS.

[31] 'A word is a sign of any such thing which can be understood by hearing and pronounced by speaking. A thing (*res*) is whatever is sensed, understood, or hidden. A sign is that which shows itself to the sense and [shows] something beyond itself to the mind.' *dial.* 5 (Pinborg: 86): *uerbum est uniuscuiusque rei signum, quod ab audiente possit intellegi, a loquente prolatum. res est quidquid uel sentitur uel intellegitur uel latet. signum est quod et se ipsum sensui et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit.*

from him.[32] Thus, in *Against Faustus* 32.20 Augustine both frames creation as a book and treats parts of creation in accordance with his understanding of the relationship between words and things.[33] In this case, however, the 'thing' – that is, the cause for something's existence, which is an intelligible – might remain hidden from a person. Augustine thus justifies the existence of corporeal objects which offend the senses against the Manichaean claim that they are evidence of an evil nature.

---

[32] Signs function in the same way as words in the comparison I have provided above. Thus, the function of the objects does not change when Augustine conceives of them as parts of a speech.

[33] Since I am arguing that Augustine conceived of creation as a book, I have restricted my discussion of hidden causes in *c. Faust.* 32.20 to that topic. However, this pericope serves as a potential example of Augustine seizing ideas from several areas of ancient thought and synthesizing them for his own purposes. While his understanding of words as signs of things is consistent with both his conception of creation as a book and his claim that the causes of existence of objects might be hidden from humanity, Augustine might have received the latter idea from several other sources. It might have come from his reading of poetry – Vergil famously wrote that Aeneas, after having put his fleet out to sea from Carthage, looked back to see the flames of Dido's funeral pyre over the city, but the cause of the flames was hidden from him: Verg., *A.* 5.4-5 (LCL 63: 472.4-5): 'what kindled such a fire, the cause is hidden' (*quae tantum accenderit ignem causa latet*). Augustine reveals in *conf.* 1.13.21ff. that he had been quite familiar with the story of Dido in his youth, and even quotes *A.* 6.457 concerning her in *conf.* 1.13.21, so it is possible that this is a source behind his concept of hidden causes. Two other possible sources are the theological and philosophical traditions. Irenaeus writes in *AH* 2.28.7 that we know 'that (*quoniam*)' God produced the substance of matter, but we do not know 'whence (*unde*) or how (*quemadmodum*)' God did so (SC 294: 284.176, 178). Irenaeus then states that we must concede to God and God's Word 'the cause for which (*causam propter quam*)' certain created things transgressed while the majority persevered in obedience (SC 294: 284.183). Augustine is making a different point than Irenaeus, but might be using his epistemological framework that certain *causae* are beyond human beings. William Schoedel offers two more possibilities – the medical and philosophical traditions. Equating the term *quoniam* with ὅτι and the term *quemadmodum* with πῶς, Schoedel argues that Irenaeus's epistemology in *AH* 2.28.7 parallels those of the empiric medical approach against those who held the dogmatic approach (e.g. Galen, *De sectis* 3), and the position of the Sceptics against the Dogmatists (e.g. Diogenes Laertius, *Vit.* 9.102-5). William R. Schoedel, 'Theological Method in Irenaeus (*Aduersus Haereses* 2.25-28),' *JTS* 35, no. 1 (1984): 31-7. Also see Anthony Briggman's recent engagement of Schoedel on this topic. Anthony Briggman, 'Theological Speculation in Irenaeus: Perils and Possibilities,' *VC* 71, no. 2 (2017): 181-3. All four positions are possible sources for Augustine's epistemology in *c. Faust.* 32.20, and the topic would benefit from focused research. Unfortunately, such research is outside of the purview of this project.

That Augustine frames creation as a book in *Against Faustus* 32.20 is now clear, but it is more difficult to determine how broadly we should interpret Augustine's statement that God is the author of 'the entire creation (*uniuersam creaturam*).' Unlike Augustine's use of the term earth (*orbis terrarum*) in *Letter* 43.9.25, there is no clue in either the text or context of *Against Faustus* 32.20 that provides a definitive answer to the scope of his phrase 'the entire creation,' leaving us with two possible readings. The first reading is that 'the entire creation' means both the spiritual and corporeal aspects of creation because Augustine also wrote around this time that creation *ex nihilo* included both spiritual material (*materies*/*materia spiritalis*) and corporeal material (*materies*/*materia corporalis*).[34] However, although Augustine uses the phrase 'the entire creation,' he also restricts the examples that he gives in this pericope to sensible things (snakes, fire, poison) which Faustus could perceive with his 'carnal senses' (eyes, nose, ears, mouth). These examples do not rule out the first reading, but they do make a stronger case for the second – at the very least, in *Against Faustus* 32.20 the content of the book of creation is the sensible world.

[34] Augustine first uses the terms *materies/materia corporalis* and *materies/materia spiritalis* to describe the material which was formed *ex nihilo* in Gen 1.1 in *conf.* 12.17.24ff. (AD 397-401) and *Gn. litt.* 1.1.3ff. (401-15). However, though he does not use the terms until the end of the 5th c., he distinguishes between two types of material quite early in his career. In *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.11.17 (AD 388-9), he states that the firmament of Gen 1.6-8 separates 'the corporeal material of visible things from that incorporeal [material] of invisible things' [(CSEL 91: 83.9-10): *materiam corporalem rerum uisibilium ab illa incorporali rerum inuisibilium*]. Regarding Augustine's use of the terms *materia* and *materies*, James O'Donnell has judged them as interchangeable in Augustine's writings. James J. O'Donnell, *Augustine, Confessions, Volume III: Commentary on Books 8-13 and Indexes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 324-5. For an introduction to Augustine's understanding of *materia corporalis* and *materia spiritalis*, see: Cornelius Mayer, 'Creatio, creator, creatura,' in *AugLex*, ed. Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Schwabe & Co. AG, 1996), 59-60; Marie-Anne Vannier, 'Materia, materies,' ibid. (Schwabe, 2004-10), 1201. For the dates of *conf.* and *Gn. litt.* see: *AttA*, xliii, xlv.

CREATION IS A BOOK III: *EXPOSITION OF PSALM* 45.6-7

Augustine also conceptualizes creation as a book in *Exposition of Psalm* 45.6-7 (AD 407-8).[35] Since he uses the medium of literary theory to justify his interpretations of Ps 45.3 in *Exposition of Psalm* 45.6 and Ps 45.4 in *Exposition of Psalm* 45.7, and since these are necessary for understanding Augustine's conception of creation as a book in 45.7, I will provide lengthy quotations from both chapters. In *Exposition of Psalm* 45.6 Augustine begins by directing his readers to a certain serenity described in Ps 45.3:

> Consider that serenity: 'Therefore we will not be afraid when the land is shaken and the mountains are transferred into the heart of the sea' (Ps 45.3). We will not be afraid at that time. Let us seek the transplanted mountains; if we find them, it is clear that this is our security. In fact, the Lord said this to the disciples: 'If you have faith the size of a mustard seed, you will say to this mountain, "Rise up and throw [yourself] into the sea," and it will happen' (Mt 17.20; 21.21). Perhaps he said 'to this mountain' about himself. For he was called a mountain: 'In the end times the mountain of the Lord will be manifest' (Is 2.2; Mi 4.1). But that mountain was placed above the other mountains, because the apostles [are] also mountains carrying 'this mountain.' Thus, it continues: 'In the end times the mountain of the Lord will be manifest, set on top of the mountains' (Is 2.2; Mi 4.1). Therefore, he transcends the peaks of all mountains and was placed on top of all mountains, because the mountains are announcing the mountain. Moreover, 'the sea' signifies this age just as, in comparison to this sea, 'the land' seems to be the Jewish people. They were not covered by the bitterness of idolatry, but were dry, as it were, from the bitterness of the Gentiles as if surrounded by the sea.[36] The time was coming when the land – the Jewish people – would be disturbed and the mountains would be transferred into the heart of the sea – the great chief mountain set on top of the mountains. He abandoned the Jewish people and was made among the Gentiles; he was transplanted from the land to the sea. Transferred by whom? By the apostles, to whom he said, 'If you have faith in you the size of a mustard seed, you will say to this mountain, "Rise up and throw [yourself] into the sea," and it will happen' (Mt. 17.20; 21.21). What he means is, 'Through your most faithful preaching it will come about that this mountain, which is me, will be preached among the Gentiles, glorified among the Gentiles, and acknowledged among the Gentiles. And what was foretold concerning me will happen: "A people I did not know served me" (Ps 17.45).' Moreover, when were those [other]

---

[35] Regarding the date of *en. Ps.* 45, see: Hildegund Müller, 'Enarrationes in Psalmos (A),' ibid., ed. Cornelius Petrus Mayer, Karl Heinz Chelius, and Andreas E. J. Grote (2001), 813.

[36] Augustine is employing the metaphor of an island surrounded by bitter sea water, though he never uses the term *insula*.

> mountains transferred? Let God's scripture reveal this to us, too. When the apostle was preaching to the Jews, they rejected the word[37] and the Apostle Paul said, 'We were sent to you, but since you rejected the word of God we are going to the Gentiles' (Acts 13.46). The mountains were transferred into the heart of the sea. The Gentiles rightly believed the mountains when they were in the heart of the sea, unlike the Jews, about whom it was said, 'This people honors me with their lips, but their heart is far from me' (Is 29.13; Mt 15.8). And the Lord promised this concerning the new covenant, saying through the prophet: 'I will place my laws in their hearts' (Jer 31.33). These laws and precepts, introduced by the apostles to the faith and credulity of all the Gentiles, were called mountains transported into the heart of the sea. We will not be afraid when that happens. Who will not be afraid? Those of us who have been pierced in the heart, lest we become numbered among the reprobate Jews, just as if [we were] severed branches. Now some of them believed and clung to the preaching of the apostles. Therefore, let those whom the mountains abandoned be afraid. We did not retreat from the mountains, and when they were transported into the heart of the sea, we followed.[38]

---

[37] Since Augustine proceeds to name the message that the Jews rejected as the gospel of Jesus Christ, it is possible that he employs the term *uerbum* here to refer to the second person of the Trinity.

[38] *en. Ps.* 45.6 (CCSL 38: 521.1-522.47): uidete ipsam tranquillitatem: propterea non timebimus, cum conturbabitur terra, et transferentur montes in cor maris. tunc non timebimus. quaeramus montes translatos ; et si inuenire potuerimus, manifestum est quia ipsa est securitas nostra. dominus quippe dixit discipulis : si habueritis fidem sicut granum sinapis, dicetis monti huic : tollere et mittere in mare, et fiet. forte monti huic de seipso dixit ; dictus est enim mons: erit in nouissimis temporibus manifestus mons domini. sed iste mons super alios montes collocatus est ; quia et apostoli montes, portantes montem hunc. ideo sequitur : erit in nouissimis temporibus, manifestus mons domini, paratus in cacumine montium. transcendit ergo cacumina montium omnium, et in cacumine omnium montium collocatus est ; quoniam montes sunt annuntiantes montem. mare autem significat hoc saeculum, in cuius maris comparatione tamquam terra uidebatur gens iudaeorum. non enim idololatriae amaritudine tegebatur, sed erat tamquam arida amaritudine gentium tamquam mari circumdata. futurum erat ut turbaretur terra, id est illa ipsa gens iudaea, et transferrentur montes in cor maris, id est primo ipse mons magnus paratus in cacumine montium. deseruit enim gentem iudaeam, et factus est in gentibus ; translatus est de terra ad mare. transferentibus quibus? apostolis, quibus dixerat : si habueritis fidem in uobis tamquam granum sinapis, dicetis monti huic : tollere et mittere in mare, et fiet ; id est, per fidelissimam uestram praedicationem fiet ut mons iste, hoc est ego ipse praedicer in gentibus, glorificer in gentibus, agnoscar in gentibus, et fiat quod de me praedictum est : populus quem non cognoui, seruiuit mihi. quando autem et illi montes translati sunt ? et hoc indicet nobis scriptura dei. quando apostolus praedicabat iudaeis, respuerunt uerbum, et ait apostolus paulus : ad uos missi eramus, sed quia respuistis uerbum dei, imus ad gentes. translati sunt montes in cor maris. uere enim gentes crediderunt montibus, ut in corde maris essent montes illi ; non sicut iudaei, de quibus dictum est: populus hic labiis me honorat, cor autem eorum longe est a me. hoc enim et de nouo testamento promittit dominus, per prophetam dicens : dabo leges meas in cordibus eorum. hae leges, haec praecepta per apostolos indita omnium gentium fidei et credulitati, montes dicti sunt translati in cor maris. tunc nos non timebimus. qui non timebimus ? illi qui compuncti sumus corde, ne fieremus de numero reproborum iudaeorum, tamquam

Augustine gives a figurative interpretation of Ps 45.3.[39] The land is the Jewish people and the sea is the world. Jesus is the highest mountain. The other mountains include the apostles and the laws and precepts which they taught. Augustine then connects his interpretation with history – the moving of the mountains to the sea in Ps. 45.3 represents the moving of Christ, his apostles, and their teachings from the Jewish people, who did not believe, to the Gentiles, who did. Those few Jews who also believed followed the mountains into the sea.

Augustine keeps his focus on history to support his reading and continued exposition of Ps 45.3-4 in *Exposition of Psalm* 45.7. And it is at this point that he conceives of creation – especially its development over time – as a book. He continues:

> Now what follows from that point when the mountains were transported into the heart of the sea? Pay close attention and see the truth. When these things were spoken they were obscure because they had not yet come to pass. Now, however, who does not know that they have already happened? Let the divine text be a book to you, so that you hear these things; let the earth be a book to you, so that you see these things (*liber tibi sit pagina diuina ut haec audias liber tibi sit orbis terrarum ut haec uideas*). Those who do not know their letters do not read these codices; [but] even an uneducated person reads in the whole world (*in toto mundo legat et idiota*). What, then, happened while the mountains were transferred into the heart of the sea? 'Its waters roared and were upset' (Ps 45.4). When the gospel was preached, the Athenians said, 'What is this? That herald seems [to proclaim] foreign deities' (Acts 17.18). Moreover, the Ephesians, in an uproar, wanted to murder the apostles when they made such a din in the theater on behalf of their Diana as they shouted, 'Great is Ephesian Diana!' (Acts 19.28). Among those waves and roars of the sea, those who had sought sanctuary in that refuge were not afraid. Accordingly, the Apostle Paul wanted to go into the theater, and he was restrained by the disciples since, at

---

ramorum fractorum. crediderunt enim quidam illorum, et adhaeserunt apostolis praedicantibus. timeant ergo illi quos deseruerunt montes ; nos a montibus non recessimus ; et quando translati sunt in cor maris, secuti sumus.

[39] For Augustine's figurative method of interpretation, see: Robert William Bernard, 'In figura: Terminology Pertaining to Figurative Exegesis in the Works of Augustine of Hippo' (Dissertation, Princeton University, 1984); Robert W. Bernard, 'The Rhetoric of God in the Figurative Exegesis of Augustine,' in *Biblical Hermeneutics in Historical Perspective: Studies in Honor of Karlfried Froehlich on His Sixtieth Birthday*, ed. Mark S. Burrows and Paul Rorem (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1991); Michael Cameron, *Christ Meets Me Everywhere: Augustine's Early Figurative Exegesis*, ed. David C. Steinmetz, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). I also discuss this in Chapter One.

> that time, it was necessary that he remained among them in the flesh. But still 'its waters roared and were upset; the mountains were shaken by the strength of it' (Ps 45.4). Of what? Surely not [the strength] of the sea. Rather, more likely [the strength] of God, who was called 'a refuge and strength, a helper in tribulations which too often find us' (Ps 45.2). For the mountains, the powers of this age, were upset. For some are the mountains of God, and others are the mountains of the age – the mountains of the age, for whom the head is the devil; the mountains of God, for whom the head is Christ. But those former mountains were shaken by these latter mountains. Then, when the mountains were shaken by waves and roars, they produced voices against the Christians. The mountains were shaken, and a great commotion was made with the disturbing of the water. But toward whom? Toward that city of God, founded on that rock. The waters roared and the mountains were shaken when the gospel was preached.[40]

Augustine moves into his exposition of Ps 45.4 with an encouragement to his readers to read both the 'divine text' and the 'earth.' He then continues his interpretation by pointing to historical events that were to come, from the perspective of the author of Ps 45, in Acts 17.18 and Acts 19.28. The negative responses that the apostles encountered from the people of Athens and Ephesus serve as evidence that the sea in Ps 45.3 represents the Gentiles. But the mountains

---

[40] *en. Ps.* 45.7 (CCSL 38: 522.1-31): quid iam sequitur ex eo quod translati sunt montes in cor maris ? adtendite et uidete ueritatem. haec enim quando dicebantur, obscura erant, quia nondum contigerant ; nunc autem quis iam facta non cognoscat ? liber tibi sit pagina diuina, ut haec audias ; liber tibi sit orbis terrarum, ut haec uideas. in istis codicibus non ea legunt, nisi qui litteras nouerunt ; in toto mundo legat et idiota. quid ergo factum est, dum translati sunt montes in cor maris ? sonuerunt et turbatae sunt aquae eius. quando praedicabatur euangelium: quid est hoc ? peregrinorum daemoniorum uidetur iste annuntiator esse ; hoc athenienses. ephesii autem quo tumultu occidere apostolos uoluerunt, quando in theatro pro diana sua tantum strepitum fecerunt, ut clamarent : magna diana ephesia ? inter quos fluctus et sonitus maris non timebant, qui ad refugium illud confugerant. denique apostolus paulus uolebat intrare in theatrum, et a discipulis reuocatus est, quia necessarium erat adhuc ut in carne maneret propter ipsos. sed tamen sonuerunt et turbatae sunt aquae eius ; conturbati sunt montes in fortitudine eius. cuius ? numquidnam maris, an potius dei, de quo dictum est : refugium et uirtus, adiutor in tribulationibus quae inuenerunt nos nimis ? turbati enim sunt montes, id est potestates huius saeculi. alii sunt enim montes dei, alii sunt montes saeculi : montes saeculi, quibus caput diabolus ; montes dei, quibus caput christus. sed per istos montes turbati sunt illi montes. tunc dederunt uoces contra christianos, quando turbati sunt montes sonantibus fluctibus ; et montes sunt turbati, et factus est magnus terrae motus cum motu aquae. sed cui haec ? ciuitati illi fundatae super petram. sonant aquae, turbantur montes, annuntiato euangelio. quid tu ciuitas dei ?

in Ps 45.4 are different than those in Ps 45.3; they are the authorities of this age, with the devil as their head.

As with the two other texts that we have already seen, Augustine's use of the medium of literary theory – a book – to conceptualize the 'earth' (*orbis terrarum*) at the beginning of *Exposition of Psalm* 45.7 is evident from a plain reading of the text. He draws a direct parallel between reading a book – in this case scripture itself – and reading the earth, juxtaposing the two within the same sentence.[41]

Also, similar to *Letter* 43.9.25 and *Against Faustus* 32.20, a closer look at this text reveals that Augustine's notion of the book of the earth includes sensible things. Augustine refers to this book by the terms *orbis terrarum* and *mundus*. In the two sentences that directly address his notion of the earth as a book he states:

> Let the divine text be a book to you, so that you hear these things; let the earth (*orbis terrarum*) be a book to you, so that you see these things. Those who do not know their letters do not read these codices; [but] even an uneducated person reads in the entire world (*toto mundo*).

The terms *orbis terrarum* and *mundus* have significantly overlapping semantic ranges. Broadly, they can both be translated with the English term 'world.' However, while the term *orbis terrarum* emphasizes land, such as the known lands of this earth, the term *mundus*, like the Greek term κόσμος, can also more broadly refer to the universe and everything within it.[42] Both usages, then, refer to the sensible realm. Due to Augustine's terminology in this passage, therefore, we should expect that he is conceiving of the sensible aspects of creation as a book.

---

[41] Also, as he did in *Letter* 43.9.25 and *Against Faustus* 32.20, Augustine names a reader for this book – humanity. Note that here Augustine includes both the educated and the uneducated. Specifically, Augustine is speaking of literacy: 'Those who do not know their letters do not read these codices; [but] even an uneducated person reads in the whole world.' For Augustine, even one who cannot read a book because he is illiterate can still read the world around him.

[42] See the relative entries in LS for this distinction.

Regarding *Exposition of Psalm* 45.7, context confirms this expectation. Let us consider Augustine's juxtaposed books and the manner in which each is read. He states: 'Let the divine text be a book to you, so that you hear these things; let the earth be a book to you, so that you see these things.'[43] Firstly, notice the parallel books. In 45.6-7, the only sacred text that Augustine quotes is the Christian scriptures. Therefore, he is referring to those scriptures when he uses the phrase 'divine text' (*pagina diuina*).[44] Thus, in 45.6-7 Augustine is positing a parallel between the scriptures and the earth. Since the first is sensible, it is probable that he means for the second to be understood in this way too.

Now let us proceed to the second set of juxtaposed concepts – hearing (the scriptures) and seeing (the earth). The notion of hearing a text would have been familiar to Augustine's audience because of the role that reading aloud played in the reading practices of Late Antiquity. They would have understood a hearing of the scriptures as an auditory experience – especially when listening to a lector in a public or liturgical setting, and possibly when reading aloud to themselves.[45] Since Augustine's encouragement to 'let the divine text be a book to you, so that

---

[43] *en. Ps.* 45.7.

[44] Context also confirms that Augustine is referring to the scriptures as a whole rather than one particular book or verse – in *en. Ps.* 45.6-7, Augustine quotes from several different books (Isaiah, Micah, Psalms, Matthew, Acts).

[45] The understanding that Classical and late antique readers read aloud almost exclusively has become a commonplace in scholarship. Most scholarship in the 20th c. points to the work of Eduard Norden to justify this position: Eduard Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1898). Yet it can be found a century earlier in a remark made by Christoph Wieland while translating Lucian of Samosata's *Aduersus indoctum et libros multos ementem* 2: Lucian von Samosata, *Sämmtliche Werke*, trans. Christoph Martin Wieland (Leipzig: Verlag der Weidmannischen Buchhandlung, 1788). However, this interpretation has been challenged by A.K. Gavrilov and M.F. Burnyeat, who have drawn on earlier work from Bernard Knox. For scholars of Augustine, Gavrilov offers an alternative reading of *conf.* 6.3.3-4 wherein Augustine is not shocked that Ambrose was reading silently, but rather shocked that he was doing so in the presence of others. Gavrilov's work also contains a helpful status quaestionis. A.K. Gavrilov, 'Techniques of Reading in Classical Antiquity,' *Classical Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (1997): esp. 61-6;

you hear these things' involves a sensible hearing of the scriptures, the most likely reading of his parallel statement 'let the earth be a book to you, so that you see these things' is that he is describing a similarly sensible experience – using the eyes to look at the world in order to perceive evidence that confirms Augustine's interpretation of Ps 45.3-4. The same interpretation applies to his follow-up statement that 'even the uneducated person reads in the whole world.' In both cases, Augustine is encouraging his audience to use their eyes.

If we apply this reading to the argument that Augustine has made in *Exposition of Psalm* 45.6-7, we see that it fits his logic. Even the uneducated could look and see that Christianity had moved out from its Jewish roots into the world, justifying his interpretation of Ps 45.3. By the time that Augustine wrote these lines, Christianity included Roman citizens of various heritages from across the empire – from Britain and Gaul in the West to Syria and Egypt in the East. Moreover, readers could find even more evidence by looking at Augustine himself, his congregation, and his fellow North African bishops. Christianity had become a religion that was predominantly inhabited by those lacking a Jewish heritage.[46] All of these are realities that are observable in the sensible realm. Therefore, the logic of Augustine's argument combines with his

---

M.F. Burnyeat, 'Postscript on Silent Reading,' ibid.; Bernard M.W. Knox, 'Silent Reading in Antiquity,' *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 9 (1968).

[46] Furthermore, for Augustine the uneducated could also look at the resistance that Christianity faced as it moved out into the nations as evidence for his reading of Ps 45.4. In *Exposition of Psalm* 45.7 he points specifically to the events that Acts 17.18 and 19.28 record as taking place in Ephesus and Athens for proof that the world raged against Christianity. But the illiterate could have also looked elsewhere in history for evidence, such as to the martyrdoms of Cyprian and Perpetua, which were well-known in Roman Africa (Augustine is aware of both martyrs. He names Cyprian hundreds of times throughout his corpus. He also discusses the case of Perpetua's brother, Dinocrates, in *an. et or.* 1.12). These examples would fit Augustine's third category of things – images which are formed in the memory or imagination based on data from the sensible realm. See my explanation in n.5.

terminology and the usage of that terminology to demonstrate that his concept of the creation as a book involves the sensible aspects of creation.

This reading reveals three more points that I want to make regarding Augustine's conceptualization of creation as a book in *Exposition of Psalm* 45.6-7. This text is consistent with what we saw in *Letter* 43.9.25 and *Against Faustus* 32.20: All three works refer to creation as a book.[47] But, firstly, *Exposition of Psalm* 45.6-7 has an added level of nuance beyond what Augustine describes in these other two texts. Here Augustine gives a historical dimension to his notion of creation as a book.[48] One not only reads creation as it is, but also sees how it changes over time by comparing one historical moment to another. In this sense, Augustine frames a person as reading creation telescopically – creation has an historical dimension.[49] Christ, his teachings, and the apostles had come from the Jews. But if his audience would look at the world around them, they would see that, four centuries later, Christ's Church was largely comprised of Gentiles. To see its current state is to see its historical development. Furthermore, secondly, by reading the Book of Acts they were not merely looking at words in a book, they were also looking at history. His audience should not merely read the words on the page, but should also understand the historical event that those words describe.[50] Finally, Augustine is again using the sensible creation to refer readers to something intelligible. In this text, Augustine instructs his readers to look at the sensible world in order to discern truth – his interpretation of Ps 45.3-4.

---

[47] See my arguments in the previous two sections.

[48] This might also be the case in *ep.* 43.9.25, where Augustine compares a prophecy from the Psalms to the contemporary state of the Donatist church (which itself is a result of historical development). But the role of history is less clear in that text than it is in *en Ps.* 45.6-7.

[49] Since Augustine understands humanity as a part of creation, changes in human history, such as religious divisions, are a part of creation's history.

[50] This is a fundamental concept in Augustine's language theory and semiotics. See my engagement of *dial.* 5 earlier in this chapter.

CREATION IS A BOOK IV: *SERMON* 68.6

Sermon 68.6 (AD 427-30) reveals that Augustine continued to conceive of creation as a book up to the end of his life.[51] While expositing Mt 11.25, Augustine considers what it might mean that God hid certain things from the wise but revealed them to 'little ones.' In 68.4-5 he focuses on people who were not able to find God by studying the stars. Then, in 68.6 he turns his focus to books as another potential path to God. He states:[52]

> Another person, in order to find God, reads a book. There is a certain great book: the very sight of creation (*est quidam magnus liber ipsa species creaturae*). Look attentively above and below! Consider! Read! God did not make letters from ink, from which you might understand him; he placed before your eyes the very things which he made. Why are you seeking a louder voice? Heaven and earth cry out to you: 'God made me!'[53]

After mentioning that some turn to a book, Augustine immediately turns his congregation's attention to 'a certain great book: the very sight of creation.' He then instructs them to 'look attentively' at this book, noting that heaven and earth cry out 'God made me!'

As with the other texts that we have considered, a plain reading of *Sermon* 68.6 confirms that Augustine conceived of creation as a book: 'There is a certain great book: the very sight of creation (*est quidam magnus liber ipsa species creaturae*).'[54] Once again, his focus is on sensible

---

[51] Augustine died on August 28, 430. Thus, it is possible that this sermon represents his thinking during the final year of his life. Regarding the date of *Sermon* 68: Éric Rebillard, 'Sermones,' in *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, et al. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999), 776. For the date of Augustine's death: Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography*, New ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 436.

[52] Augustine quotes Mt 11.25 in *s.* 68.1 and 3.

[53] *s.* 68.6 (CCSL 41Aa: 443.161-6): alius, ut inueniat deum, librum legit. est quidam magnus liber ipsa species creaturae : superiorem et inferiorem contuere, attende, lege. non deus, unde eum cognosceres, de atramento litteras fecit : ante oculos tuos posuit haec ipsa quae fecit. quid quaeris maiorem uocem ? clamat ad te caelum et terra : deus me fecit.

[54] Notice that, as with the other three texts, humanity is the reader.

things which point to intelligible things.[55] In this case, if his congregants will 'look' at what 'he placed before your eyes' they will hear the voice of God. The book is the aspect of creation that can be seen with the eyes. And it reveals an intelligible reality – the existence of God.

So far in this chapter we have seen that Augustine conceived of creation according to the medium of literary theory, the book, as early as AD 396 and as late as 427-30 – that is, over the course of most of his Christian life. Furthermore, the content of Augustine's notion of creation as a book is the sensible aspect of creation, of which particular sensible objects serve as signs representing intelligible things, following his understanding of words as signs of things, given in his early work *On Dialectic* 5. Finally, it is notable that in all four of these texts Augustine conceived of creation as a book in order to use it polemically, or in rhetorical terms, forensically. That is, in all but the final text Augustine employs some sensible aspect of creation to serve as evidence in service of a broader argument. In *Letter* 43.9.25 he employs the disconnection of the Donatists from the church of Corinth to justify his reading of *Ps* 2.7-8. In *Against Faustus* 32.20 he focuses on an assumed unity of the sensible creation to argue that there is no evil nature in this world. In *Exposition of Psalm* 45.6-7 he uses Christianity's demographic transition from a primarily Jewish religion to a primarily Gentile one to support his interpretation of Ps 45.3-4. And in *Sermon* 68.6 Augustine uses the book of creation as evidence for God's existence. By doing this, Augustine is operating as an orator would in a courtroom, bringing textual evidence in support of his case. The only novelty, of course, is that his text is the created world.

[55] For Augustine's use of 'sensible things' and 'intelligible things,' see n.5.

GOD'S ACTIONS ARE A SPEECH: *LETTER* 102.6.33

In addition to conceiving of creation as a book, Augustine also conceptualized God's actions in creation according to another medium of literary and rhetorical theory – the speech.[56] Several pertinent themes are found in *Letter* 102.6.33.

Letter 102 is an open letter written in AD 409 to Deogratias, a priest in Carthage.[57] Augustine writes:

---

[56] My claim in this section will build upon the short remarks that Gerhard Strauss, Michael Cameron, and Robert Bernard have made on *ep.* 102.6.33. All of their interactions with 102.6.33 are as correct as they are brief. Strauss refers to *ep.* 102.6.33 to note that Augustine sees divine actions as speech in the midst of his exploration of Augustine's theory of signs and its relation to his understanding of the figurative sense of the scriptures. Strauss states that, for Augustine, in the same way that one and the same thing can be said in many words and in various languages (*conf.* 8.24.35), so it can be expressed in symbolic actions (*s.* 260C.2). In this way, Strauss argues that Augustine holds actions, signs, and words as synonymous: *facta = signa = uerba*. He states: 'Auf dem Hintergrund seiner Zeichentheorie erklärt sich das wohl ohne Schwierigkeit. Wie ein und dieselbe Sache in vielerlei Worten und Sprachen auf mannigfache Weise gesagt werden kann, so kann sie auch durch zeichenhafte, „symbolische" Taten ausgedrückt werden. So kann Augustin vermittels seiner Zeichentheorie zu dem Schluss kommen : facta = signa = verba.' Gerhard Strauss, *Schriftgebrauch, Schriftauslegung, und Schriftbeweis bei Augustin* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1959), 109-10. Note that Strauss does not restrict his claim to divine actions. Cameron, also referring to *ep.* 102.6.33, agrees that 'Augustine thought divine power spoke through human events the way human beings speak through words.' Michael Cameron, '"She Arranges All Things Pleasingly" (Wis. 8:1): The Rhetorical Base of Augustine's Hermeneutic,' *AugStud* 41, no. 1 (2010): 34. Cameron, whose work is influenced by Strauss, demonstrates that Augustine connects rhetorical theory with divine action in: Cameron, *Christ Meets Me Everywhere*, 32-4. Bernard also comments on *ep.* 102.6.33, building off of Strauss's work: Bernard, 'The Rhetoric of God in the Figurative Exegesis of Augustine,' 96-7. My work in this section contributes to scholarship by providing sustained commentary on the text and making connections between it and the Latin rhetorical tradition that have previously gone unnoticed.

[57] For the date of *ep.* 102, see the entry edited by Johannes Divjak in *AugLex*: Divjak, 'Epistulae,' 967. This letter was written in response to six questions posed by a friend of Augustine who lived in Carthage, and whom Augustine desired to see converted to Christianity. This friend's questions had been forwarded to Augustine by Deogratias. Augustine notes that, though his friend said that the six questions had come from the philosopher Porphyry, he thought that they were from someone other than the famous student of Plotinus. See *retr.* 2.31. Furthermore, although Augustine addresses the letter to Deogratias (102.1), Augustine intended

> For, in the same way that it is human custom to speak with words, divine power speaks with actions. And, just as new words or less common words, temperately and decorously sprinkled, add splendor to human speech, so, in a certain way, divine eloquence is more superb in wonderful actions harmoniously signifying something else.[58]

Augustine asserts that divine power speaks with actions in the same way that human beings speak with words. In fact, the similarity between the two is such that both divine actions and human words are 'more superb' when new or less common actions and words are 'temperately and decorously sprinkled' throughout.

Gerhard Strauss (1959) and Michael Cameron (2010) both see Augustine as using rhetorical ideas in the way he frames salvation history in *Letter* 102.6.33. Strauss simply states that Augustine sees the entire salvation history 'in analogy to a speech composed according to certain rules.'[59] Cameron agrees, and names the second principal part of rhetoric, arrangement (*dispositio*), as one of the rhetorical principles that Augustine is using to conceive of God's arrangement of salvation history.[60] I agree with their readings, and my work in this section will build on theirs in two ways. Firstly, my claim is broader, focusing on divine activity in general rather than the particular activity of arranging history.[61] Secondly, I establish a more complex connection between Augustine's thought in *Letter* 102.6.33 and the rhetorical tradition.

---

it for a broader audience – in 102.1 he encourages Deogratias to keep the letter so that others could study it.

[58] *ep.* 102.6.33 (CCSL 31B: 30.612-6): nam sicut humana consuetudo uerbis ita diuina potentia etiam factis loquitur et, sicut sermoni humano uerba noua uel minus usitata moderate ac decenter aspersa splendorem addunt, ita in factis mirabilibus congruenter aliquid significantibus quodammodo luculentior est diuina eloquentia.

[59] 'zu einer bestimmten Regeln komponierten Rede.' Strauss, *Schriftgebrauch, Schriftauslegung, und Schriftbeweis bei Augustin*, 109-10.

[60] Cameron, *Christ Meets Me Everywhere*, 32-4.

[61] Strauss engages this broader idea of activity, but not in relation to *ep.* 102.6.33. Also, I address the divine activity of arranging history in Chapter Four, but approach the theme in Augustine's thoughts with texts other than *ep.* 102.6.33.

A close reading of *Letter* 102.6.33 reveals that Augustine conceived of God's activity as a speech – not the mere faculty of speech that is common to all people, but the refined speech taught by rhetoricians. When combined with Augustine's theological conviction that God is providentially at work everywhere at all times, we find that Augustine has framed all history as divine speech. I will first give my reading which extends the work of Strauss and Cameron, and then discuss this significant implication for Augustine's epistemology.

When Augustine writes that 'in the same way that it is human custom to speak with words, divine power (*potentia*) speaks with actions,' he means that God speaks with actions just as humans speak with words.[62] A plain reading justifies most of this interpretation. Augustine places the words of human beings parallel to actions and categorizes both as 'speech.' But one aspect of this interpretation – that Augustine equates the actor that he names, 'divine power,' with God – requires a closer look at the content of the pericope.

Letter 102.6.33 takes place in the midst of Augustine's response to those who would question the historical veracity of Jonah's three days in the belly of a fish, which takes up the final section of the letter (102.6.30-7). In 102.6.33 Augustine employs his figurative exegetical model to argue that the actions that took place in the story of Jonah signify something in the same ways that words signify something.[63] The action to which he refers in this particular context is the miracle of Jonah surviving for three days in the belly of a fish. Augustine,

---

[62] The context of this statement further confirms this reading. Augustine sees Jonah's three days in the belly of the fish as both historical event and also a sign for something else. In the first sentences of 102.6.33, Augustine is attempting to explain the meaning of Jonah's three days in the belly of a fish. In 102.6.34-5 Augustine explains that this and other events in Jonah's life symbolized Christ.

[63] Gerhard Strauss, Michael Cameron, and Robert Bernard all offer readings of these lines of 102.6.33 which agree with my own. Strauss, *Schriftgebrauch, Schriftauslegung, und Schriftbeweis bei Augustin*, 109-10; Cameron, *Christ Meets Me Everywhere*, 32-4; Bernard, 'The Rhetoric of God in the Figurative Exegesis of Augustine,' 96-7.

following the Christian tradition and scriptural text, understands God as the source of this miracle. God is, therefore, intimately related to the 'divine power' that spoke through this miracle.

If we look beyond the context of this pericope to Augustine's broader theology of divine simplicity, we see Augustine understood God himself as 'divine power.' In *Confessions* 7.4.6 (AD 397-401), written eight years before *Letter* 102, Augustine writes: 'The will and power (*potentia*) of God is God himself.'[64] Augustine's logic behind this statement is explained by his theology of divine simplicity. Lewis Ayres has established that, by AD 393, Augustine had developed a strand of language about divine simplicity which stated that there is nothing accidental in God.[65] Since God, therefore, lacks accidents, his power cannot be other than himself. The simple equivalence, then, that Augustine makes between God's power and God himself in *Confessions* 7.4.6 accords with Augustine's doctrine of divine simplicity. It also makes the most likely reading of 'divine power' in *Letter* 102.6.33 that Augustine is referring

---

[64] *conf.* 7.4.6 (CCSL 27: 95.17-8): *uoluntas enim et potentia dei deus ipse est*. Augustine wrote *conf.* between AD 397-401: *AttA*, xliii.

[65] See Lewis Ayres's discussion of divine simplicity in Augustine's thought, especially his treatment of accidents and predication. Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 208-17. Ayres demonstrates that Augustine has two strands of language on simplicity. The first 'links simplicity and number, specifically the simplicity of the monad that forms the basis of all multiplicity and harmony.' This strand appears in some of Augustine's earliest writings (e.g. *mor.* 2.6.8) and understands all composites as imitating God's oneness through the harmony of their parts. Augustine's second strand of language on simplicity states that 'there is nothing accidental in the immaterial divine substance and whatever is there is necessarily God's substance.' This second strand appears in another writing that is fairly early – *f. et symb.* 9.20 (AD 393). ibid., 208-17, 208, 210. Both strands of thought are established in Augustine's thought well before he wrote *ep.* 102.6.33. However, I only engage the second strand of language in the text above since the first text is not relevant to *ep.* 102.6.33. For the date of *f. et symb.* see *AttA*, xlv.

directly to God.[66] Therefore, in 102.6.33 Augustine is saying that God speaks with actions in the same way that human beings speak with words.

But Augustine does not equate God's actions with all human words. Rather, he reveals that he has in mind the type of refined speech taught by rhetoricians by using the phrases 'divine eloquence' and 'wonderful actions harmoniously signifying something else.' I will begin by examining his phrase 'divine eloquence.'

Previous scholarship, citing Augustine's many allusions to Cicero as well as his own testimony that he had trained in 'the books of eloquence,' agrees that Augustine's understanding of eloquence is derived from his study of rhetorical theory.[67] One text that they have understood as paradigmatic for Augustine's concept of eloquence is *Against Cresconius* 1.1.2, which Augustine wrote three to four years before *Letter* 102.[68] Writing against the Donatist grammarian, Cresconius, Augustine states: 'Eloquence is skill in speaking, harmoniously setting forth what we think.'[69] A few lines later he adds to this definition, stating that eloquence is 'proficiency and skill in speaking.'[70]

---

[66] Even if this reading is shown to be incorrect, Augustine is still referring to God indirectly because God is the source of divine power.

[67] Evidence for this can be found in his many allusions to Cicero and his own testimony that he studied the 'books of eloquence' while training in rhetoric. *conf.* 3.4.7 (CCSL 27: 29.29-30): *discebam libros eloquentiae*. For two works that treat Augustine's concept of eloquence as derivative of rhetorical theory, see: Wilhelm Blümer, 'Eloquentia,' in *AugLex*, ed. Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 2001); Robert Dodaro, *Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[68] *Cresc.* was written in AD 405-6, *ep.* 102 in 409. *AttA*, xliv. Note that both were written well before Book 4 of *doctr. Chr.*

[69] *Cresc.* 1.1.2 (CSEL 52/2: 326.11-2): eloquentia uero facultas dicendi est congruenter explicans quae sentimus.

[70] *Cresc.* 1.1.2 (CSEL 52/2: 326.22-3): ita eloquentiam, hoc est peritiam facultatemque dicendi.

While scholarship has called attention to *Against Cresconius* 1.1.2, it has missed a key connection between the second part of Augustine's definition of eloquence and a commonplace definition for an orator from the Latin rhetorical tradition – a connection which is key because it will reveal that the speech to which Augustine compares God's actions in *Letter* 102.6.33 is the type of speech employed by an orator.[71] Augustine's statement that eloquence is 'proficiency...in speaking (*peritiam...dicendi*)' resembles the second half of Cato the Elder's (3rd c. – 2nd c. BC) famous description of an orator: 'An orator, my son, is a good man, proficient in speaking (*dicendi peritus*).'[72] There are two differences between the definition of Cato and that of Augustine. The first is just an apparent difference: Augustine's subject is not the ideal orator but eloquence. This difference is not substantive but contextual. According to Augustine, Cresconius had attempted to make his audience suspicious of the skill of eloquence in a previous work in which he named Augustine.[73] Augustine is responding to this particular charge at the beginning of *Against Cresconius*, which explains why he focuses on that which an orator possesses (eloquence) rather than an orator. This context also explains why Augustine employs the noun

[71] For example, Wilhelm Blümer misses this connection in his article in *AugLex*, though he does recognize that Augustine quotes Cato's definition in *ep.* 2*, which I will address later in my argument. Blümer, 'Eloquentia.'

[72] Cato the Elder, *ad. fil. frag.* 14 (LCL 162: 80.1): orator est, Marce fili, uir bonus, dicendi peritus.

[73] At the end of 1.1.1 Augustine mentions that Cresconius had written a work against the Catholics that even mentions Augustine by name. At the beginning of 1.1.2 Augustine continues to refer to that work, stating: 'In the first parts of [that work] you labored so that eloquence would seem suspicious to men. For, while praising my mode of speaking on the one hand and on the other fearing lest by this mode I might ensnare you or anyone else with persuasive tricks, you proceeded in an indictment of eloquence itself.' (CSEL 52: 325.26-326.3): *In cuius primis partibus laborasti, ut suspecta hominibus eloquentia uideretur. nam uelut laudans genus dicendi meum et rursus uelut timens, ne hoc genere te uel quemquam falsa persuadendo deciperem, in accusationem ipsius eloquentiae perrexisti.*

peritia rather than the adjective *peritus* – it is absurd to state that eloquence is proficient. Thus, Augustine incorporates Cato's definition by changing *peritia* to its relative adjective, *peritus*.[74]

It is almost a certainty, moreover, that Augustine was aware of Cato's definition at the time that he wrote *Against Cresconius* 1.1.2. Augustine's understanding of foundational rhetorical concepts such as *eloquentia* would have been established during his early years training and teaching rhetoric. Well-known formulas which were memorized in their exact forms, such as Cato's definition, would have been familiar to Augustine – if not during his time as a gifted student of grammar and rhetoric in Madauros and Carthage, then certainly by the time he had risen to the position of state-sponsored professor of rhetoric in Milan, where the imperial court of the West resided.[75]

And Cato's definition was a well-known formula within the rhetorical tradition, having been repeated several times by prominent authors over the six centuries that separated Cato and Augustine. Seneca the Elder (1st c. – AD 1st c. BC) quoted it in *Judicial Declamations* 1.9-10.[76] Quintilian (AD 1st c.) attributed it to Cato in *Oratorical Instructions* 12.1.1.[77] He also presents it in various forms four other times, all in the midst of explaining the work of an orator.[78] Apuleius (AD 2nd c.), perhaps the most famous North African author before Augustine, used the phrase to

---

[74] The entry for *peritia* in LS lists *peritus* as its relative adjective.

[75] On Augustine's position of professor of rhetoric in Milan, see: Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, 58.

[76] Seneca the Elder, *Con.* 1.9-10 (LCL 463: 8-10): orator est, Marce fili, uir bonus dicendi peritus.

[77] Quint., *Inst.* 12.1.1 (LCL 494: 196): sit ergo nobis orator quem constituimus is qui a M. Catone finitur uir bonus dicendi peritus.

[78] Quint., *Inst.* 12.1.27 (LCL 494: 210): habemus igitur ante omnia uirum bonum: post hoc adiciet dicendi peritum; 12.1.31 (LCL 494: 212): nam si natura non prohibet et esse uirum bonum et esse dicendi peritum, cur non aliquis etiam unus utrumque consequi possit ?; 12.1.44 (LCL 494: 218-20): oratorem esse uirum bonum dicendi peritum; 12.11.9 (LCL 494: 328): qui eundem uirum bonum esse et dicendi peritum uelim.

praise letters he had received from Lollianus Avitus, to whom he had sent someone to study rhetoric.[79] Marius Victorinus (AD 4th c.), whom Augustine held in high esteem, employed the definition in his commentary on Cicero.[80] And, finally, Ambrose of Milan (AD 4th c.) mentioned the formula in *On Abraham* 2.10.76 during a discussion of wisdom 'from whom,' he writes, 'the sophists of this age derive their definition of a wise man, since a wise man is "a good man, skilled in speaking (*dicendi peritus*)."'[81] Presuming Ambrose is correct, and the sophists of the late fourth century were using this definition, then Cato's definition would have been common parlance in Augustine's era. If he had not read it in one of the authors listed above – or heard it from Ambrose, with whom he had a personal connection – it is highly improbable that he would not have learned it at some point during his pre-Christian life as a rhetorician.

When Augustine then quotes Cato's definition toward the end of his life in *Letter* 2*.12 (after AD 427), it confirms that he knew and used this definition which he almost certainly learned before his conversion to Christianity in 386. Commenting on the rhetorical ability of a certain young man, Augustine stresses the importance of combining eloquence with wisdom:[82]

---

[79] Apul., *Apol.* 94 (Helm: 103): rescripsit mihi per eum quas litteras, di boni, qua doctrina, quo lepore, qua uerborum amoenitate simul et iucunditate, prorsus ut uir bonus dicendi peritus.

[80] Victorinus, *Expl. in Cic.* 1.25 (CCSL 132.112.18-20): *itaque qui liberales litteras discit duplices habere debet magistros, qui faciant uirum bonum et qui faciant dicendi peritum, et his duobus plenus orator.* Concerning Augustine's high regard for Victorinus, see *conf.* 8.2.3-5.10. After Simplicianus narrates Victorinus's conversion narrative, Augustine states that he 'burned to imitate [(CCSL 27: 119.2): *exarsi ad imitandum*]' him.

[81] Ambrose, *Abr.* 2.10.76 (CSEL 32/1: 629.5-6): unde et saeculi istius sophistae traxerunt definitionem sapientis huiusmodi, quod sapiens uir bonus, dicendi peritus sit.

[82] Augustine turns to this topic at the beginning of *ep.* 2*.12. There is disagreement on whether this young man was Firmus's student or his son. For the date of *ep.* 2* see: Divjak, 'Epistulae,' 1018.

> Hence our forefathers thought that they should not define eloquence – for eloquence is able to exist without wisdom – but rather the orator himself. So they taught that he is 'a good man, proficient in speaking (*dicendi peritum*).'[83]

Augustine shrouds his source behind the term 'forefathers (*ueteres*),' but he provides an exact quotation of Cato.[84] And, since he almost certainly learned this definition during his training in rhetoric, then his earlier reference to eloquence as 'proficiency and skill in speaking' in *Against Cresconius* 1.1.2 is another quotation of Cato's definition.

By framing his definition of eloquence in *Against Cresconius* 1.1.2 according to Cato's definition of an orator, Augustine shows us that his understanding of eloquence involves the type of speech that would have been employed by an orator, the type of speech taught by rhetorical theory. Thus, when Augustine applies the phrase 'divine eloquence' to God's actions in *Letter* 102.6.33, we see that he is conceiving of divine activity according to the rules and ideas that govern the best of human speech – rhetoric.

The phrase at the end of the passage that I have provided from *Letter* 102.6.33, 'wonderful actions harmoniously signifying something else,' also indicates that Augustine conceives of divine activity as rhetorical speech. Let us return to the passage:

> For, in the same way that it is human custom to speak with words, divine power speaks with actions. And, just as new words or less common words, temperately and decorously sprinkled, add splendor to human speech, so, in a certain way, divine eloquence is more superb in wonderful actions harmoniously (*congruenter*) signifying something else.[85]

---

[83] *ep.* 2*.12 (CSEL 88: 20.20-23): unde non eloquentem – potest enim esse eloquentia sine sapientia – sed ipsum oratorem ita definiendum ueteres arbitrati sunt, ut eum esse dicerent uirum bonum dicendi peritum.

[84] Johannes Divjak, the editor of the critical edition of *ep.* 2*, agrees that this is a quotation of Cato's definition from *ad. fil. frag.* 14. See the note for line 23 in CSEL 88: 20.

[85] *ep.* 102.6.33 (CCSL 31B: 30.612-6): nam sicut humana consuetudo uerbis ita diuina potentia etiam factis loquitur et, sicut sermoni humano uerba noua uel minus usitata moderate ac decenter aspersa splendorem addunt, ita in factis mirabilibus congruenter aliquid significantibus quodammodo luculentior est diuina eloquentia.

Augustine maintains that both divine eloquence and human eloquence use signs to communicate meaning. The key difference is the type of signs that divine eloquence can use – human eloquence employs words whereas divine eloquence can also employ actions.[86]

Augustine's phrase 'wonderful actions harmoniously (*congruenter*) signifying something else' indicates that Augustine is referring to rhetorical speech in *Letter* 102.6.33 in two ways. Firstly, the manner in which he frames signification aligns with his statement we have already seen from *Against Cresconius* 1.1.2, where he states that eloquence is 'skill in speaking, harmoniously setting forth what we think.'[87] In both cases, the skill of eloquence uses a signifier to represent a referent other than itself. In *Against Cresconius* 1.1.2 the eloquent man uses words to represent 'what we think.' In *Letter* 102.6.33 God uses actions to represent 'something else.'

Secondly, Augustine's use of the term *congruenter* with reference to communication parallels its use in the rhetorical tradition, lending more support to the reading that Augustine is referring to rhetorical speech in this passage. As discussed in Chapter One, the rhetorical tradition taught that the best communications were accommodated to an audience. Julius Victor, a probable contemporary of Augustine, describes this type of harmonious accommodation in rhetoric while summarizing the writings of Cicero in *The Art of Rhetoric* 25.[88]

---

[86] I use the term 'also' here because we have already seen Augustine incorporate rhetorical theory into his understanding of God's authorship of the scriptures in Chapter One. Also, Augustine's framing of words as signs in this text is consistent with his statement on words as signs in *dial.* 5, which I have treated earlier in this chapter.

[87] *Cresc.* 1.1.2 (CSEL 52/2: 326.11-2): eloquentia uero facultas dicendi est congruenter explicans quae sentimus.

[88] Little is known of the life of Gaius Julius Victor, but scholarship places him in the fourth century AD. For example, see: 'Appendix 2: Authors and Prominent Individuals,' in *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rhetoric*, ed. Erik Gunderson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 307. Mary Carruthers, has referred to Julius Victor as 'more or less a contemporary of Augustine's.' Mary J. Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture*, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature 10 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 85.

> Moreover, there is a difference between a skilled person and an eloquent person, since Marcus Tullius [Cicero] held him to be skilled who could acutely and plainly state certain things from the common opinion. However, [Cicero held him to be] eloquent who [could] more admirably and more magnificently amplify and adorn anything he might wish; who distinctly, clearly, lavishly, and illuminatingly, brings forth words and things and who, in the oration itself, [brings forth] a sort of rhythm and cadence; and just as he is able to live aptly, so also he harmoniously (*congruenter*) accommodates communication to matters and to people.[89]

Julius Victor describes the 'eloquent person' as able to 'harmoniously (*congruenter*)' accommodate ideas to an audience. Augustine, similarly, ascribes eloquence to God and then states that he speaks with actions which 'harmoniously (*congruenter*)' signify something else. Thus, Augustine's use of this phrase and 'divine eloquence' in *Letter* 102.6.33 demonstrate that he is referring to rhetorical speech.

Having seen that Augustine conceives of God's actions in history as speaking with the type of speech that was taught by rhetorical theory in *Letter* 102.6.33, let us now turn our attention to the content of this divine activity as speech. The speech that Augustine refers to is an activity of God that takes place in the sensible world, namely the miracle of Jonah's survival for three days in a fish. Thus, Augustine's concept of divine activity as speech in this passage involves the sensible world.

However, this passage offers two possible different readings with regard to the scope of divine activity that Augustine classifies as eloquent divine speech since it includes a generic statement in the first sentence and a restrictive statement in the second. Let us return again to the text:

---

[89] Julius Victor, *rhet.* 25 (RLM: 444.35-445.5): inter disertum autem et eloquentem hoc interest, quod eum statuit M. Tullius esse disertum, qui possit satis acute atque dilucide ex communi quadam opinione dicere, eloquentem uero, qui mirabilius ac magnificentius augere atque ornare, quae uelit : qui distincte, qui explicate, qui abundanter, qui illuminate et uerbis et rebus et in ipsa oratione quasi quendam numerum uersumque conficere ; quique ita aptus esse possit, ut rebus et personis congruenter accommodet eloquium.

> For, in the same way that it is human custom to speak with words, divine power speaks with actions. And, just as new words or less common words, temperately and decorously sprinkled, add splendor to human speech, so, in a certain way, divine eloquence is more superb in wonderful actions harmoniously signifying something else.[90]

One could read the second sentence as restricting divine eloquence to miracles described in the scriptures because this pericope comes in the midst of Augustine responding to a friend's question about whether it is far-fetched (ἀπίθανον) that Jonah spent three days within the belly of a fish and then emerged unharmed and fully clothed.[91] In *City of God* 22.8 (AD 425-7) Augustine refers to a miracle in his own day as exhibiting the 'eloquence of God.'[92] Recalling a short sermon he preached the day after a man named Paulus had been healed while praying to the relics of Saint Stephen, Augustine writes:

> I said a few things appropriate to the time and the pleasantness of that joyful event. For I allowed them not merely to hear a certain eloquence of God (*dei eloquentiam*) in this work, but to examine it.[93]

Augustine states that God's eloquence was shown in a healing that took place in his own lifetime. Thus, if this second reading were correct, at the very least we could say that by

---

[90] *ep.* 102.6.33 (CCSL 31B: 30.612-6): nam sicut humana consuetudo uerbis ita diuina potentia etiam factis loquitur et, sicut sermoni humano uerba noua uel minus usitata moderate ac decenter aspersa splendorem addunt, ita in factis mirabilibus congruenter aliquid significantibus quodammodo luculentior est diuina eloquentia.

[91] For the question and response, see *ep.* 102.30-7. Augustine uses the Greek term ἀπίθανος (ἀπίθανον) in 102.30 (CCSL 31B: 27.551). The term ἀπίθανος had precedent as a technical term in the rhetorical handbooks. For example, see Aristotle, *Rh.* 1406b14. Aristotle includes the term in a discussion of unconvincing metaphors. The term was also used when addressing the topic of persuasion in works that scholars usually classify under the genre of philosophy. For example, see Plato, *Parm.* 133c. The use of this term demonstrates the difficulty in drawing a line between rhetorical and philosophical uses of a term, since the use of ἀπίθανος within Plato is in the midst of a discussion on the persuasiveness of an argument – a topic of importance to both rhetors and philosophers.

[92] Augustine was working on Book 18 in 425, and he finished the entire work in 427. *AttA*, xliii.

[93] *ciu.* 22.8 (CCSL 48: 826.447-50): dixi pauca pro tempore et pro illius iucunditate laetitiae. magis enim eos in opere diuino quandam dei eloquentiam non audire, sed considerare permisi.

approximately AD 425 Augustine conceives of miracles both in and beyond the scriptures as God's eloquent speech to humanity.

The second reading is that the first sentence governs the second, and thus Augustine conceives of all of God's activity in the sensible world as speech. This reading is, by far, the stronger of the two. Augustine's first sentence states the unqualified principle that divine power, like human speech, speaks with actions. He makes no explicit move to limit this, and neither the second sentence nor *City of God* 22.8 limit this principle. This reading also makes better sense of Augustine's description of divine eloquence as being 'more superb' in 'this work.' By 'this work,' he is referring to the miracle of Jonah in the fish. The reader is left to wonder what this miracle is more superb than, and Augustine explains that through his comparison to speech in the second sentence. The miracle is like 'new words or less common words, temperately and decorously sprinkled,' which 'add splendor to human speech.' The implication is that all of the words – both common and less common – are included in the speaker's eloquent speech. When we apply this comparison to divine activity, we see that this makes the best sense of his statement about miracles being 'more superb.' Miracles are not the entirety of the eloquent action. Rather, they make eloquent action more splendid.

Thus, in *Letter* 102.6.33 Augustine reveals that he conceives of all of God's activity as eloquent speech. And, since Augustine's doctrine of providence held that God is at work in all aspects of creation as it moves through time, we find that Augustine has extended the scope of divine activity as speech to include his activity at all places and at all times.[94] From the

[94] *Gn. litt.* 8.23.44: 'Therefore, the providence of God is ruling and administrating the entire creation, both natures and wills' ([CSEL 28/1: 262.17-8]: *ergo dei prouidentia regens atque administrans uniuersam creaturam, et naturas et uoluntates*).

perspective of humanity, who is the audience of this speech, this means that everything carries divine communication. It is to this idea of the sensible creation as divine communication to which I will now turn.

SIGNS, SIGNS, EVERYWHERE SIGNS

Every text that I have presented up to this point shows Augustine including the sensible world in his conceptualization of creation as a book and God's activity as a speech. In both *Letter* 43.9.25 and *Exposition of Psalm* 45.6-7 the earth is included in the book. In *Against Faustus* 32.20 the book includes snakes, fire, and poison. In *Sermon* 68.6 the visible aspects of creation are included in the book. And in *Letter* 102.6.33, the effects of God's activity in creation – in this case Jonah's three miraculous days in a fish – are included in the speech.

Augustine's framing of creation and God's activity in this manner reveals that he consistently applied his word-sign theory to creation and God's activity. Recall Augustine's clear statement of word-sign theory from *On Dialectic* 5 (AD 387):

> A word is a sign of any such thing which can be understood by hearing and pronounced by speaking. A thing is whatever is sensed, understood, or hidden. A sign is that which shows itself to the sense and [shows] something beyond itself to the mind.[95]

Augustine understood words as signs for things. What we have seen in his framing of creation as a book and God's activity as a speech is that Augustine treats the sensible aspects of creation in the same manner. Just as words function as signs for things, the sensible aspects of creation are words in a book or a speech, and thus function as signs for things. The sensible aspects are

[95] *dial.* 5 (Pinborg: 86): uerbum est uniuscuiusque rei signum, quod ab audiente possit intellegi, a loquente prolatum. res est quidquid uel sentitur uel intellegitur uel latet. signum est quod et se ipsum sensui et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit.

required to perform this function – signs must be able to be perceived in order to point toward something else.

Augustine's consistent treatment of words as signs in *On Dialectic* 5 and his treatment of the sensible aspects of creation and God's activity as words which are signs in the five texts we have seen in this chapter further supports my argument that he conceived of the creation as a book and God's activity as a speech. But this consistency also effects the way that we should understand his semiotics and epistemology.

With regard to semiotics, previous scholars have employed *On Dialectic* 5 as a clean differentiator between his understanding of words, signs, and things.[96] While this text does make clear distinctions between the three, the distinction between words and signs has been problematized by the five texts we have seen in this chapter. Since all words are signs within Augustine's semiotics, and Augustine classifies both creation and God's activity as words within a book and a speech, without restriction, Augustine has declared the entirety of creation to be signs – at least by the time that he wrote *Letter* 43.9.25 in AD 396.[97]

This reclassification of creation and divine activity as words, thus making them all signs, alters the manner in which we understand Augustine's epistemology. Augustine understood words as mediating communication from God to humans in their postlapsarian state. He writes in his early work *On Genesis against the Manichees* 2.4.5 (AD 388-9):[98]

---

[96] E.g. Gerard O'Daly's work on Augustine's epistemology and Darrell Jackson's work on Augustine's semiotics. O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*, 171n27; Jackson, 'Semantics and Hermeneutics in Saint Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana*,' 67n16.

[97] The earliest of the four works we have seen up to this point is *Letter* 43.9.25, which was written in 396. See n.8.

[98] My reading of *Gn. adu. Man.* 2.4.5 disagrees with that of Andrew Louth. Louth focuses his interpretation on signs rather than the subcategory of words. He states: 'Augustine says that it was the Fall of man that made necessary communication by means of signs.' Louth is correct, insofar as signs are words in Augustine's early thought. However, his interpretation

> Before sin...[God] was watering the invisible creature with an interior fountain, speaking into its intellect, so that it did not receive words from without, like rain from the previously mentioned clouds. But it was sated by its fountain. That is, [it was sated] by truth flowing from its innermost places.[99]

Augustine states that God communicated to Adam without words before the Fall. But after he sinned, words were necessary to mediate God's communication to Adam. By conceptualizing creation as a book and God's activity as a speech, Augustine has made everything in creation, and God's activity within it, divine communication (though, as we have already seen in *Against Faustus* 32.20, we might lack the ability to understand that communication).[100] And, since communication from God to humanity involves the passing of knowledge, Augustine has made everything in creation, and God's activity within it, potential carriers of divine knowledge.

HISTORY IS A SPEECH: *ON FREE CHOICE* 3.15.42, *ON THE NATURE OF THE GOOD* 8, *AGAINST SECUNDINUS THE MANICHEE* 15, AND *QUESTIONS FROM THE GOSPELS* 2.49

---

lacks precision regarding terminology. Augustine only uses the term *uerbum* in *Gn. adu. Man.* 2.4.5; nowhere does he use *signum.* Andrew Louth, 'Augustine on Language,' *Literature & Theology* 3, no. 2 (1989): 154. For the date of *Gn. adu. Man.*, see: *AttA*, xlv.

[99] *Gn. adu. Man.* 2.4.5 (CSEL 91: 123.18-124.3): ante peccatum uero cum uiride agri et pabulum fecisset deus, quo nomine inuisibilem creaturam significari diximus, irrigabat eam fonte interiore loquens in intellectum eius, ut non extrinsecus uerba exciperet tamquam de supradictis nubibus pluuiam, sed fonte suo, hoc est de intimis suis manante ueritate satiaretur.

[100] The ability of creation and divine activity to communicate plays a complementary role to the interpretation of the scriptures in the five texts we have seen. For example, the 'book' of the 'earth' confirms Augustine's interpretation of Ps 45.3-4 in *en. Ps.* 45.6-7. However, Augustine does not restrict the communicative ability of creation and God's activity to this complementary role in any of these texts. Further research on this topic is needed to understand the nuanced manner in which Augustine incorporates creation and divine activity into his epistemology by conceiving of them as a book and a speech. Such research might also inform scholarly understanding of Augustine's natural theology.

So far in this chapter I have demonstrated that Augustine conceived of creation as a book and God's activity as a speech.[101] In this final section I will show that Augustine also conceived of history, defined as creation's existence across time, as a speech.[102]

The first time that Augustine compares history to a speech is in *On Free Choice* 3.15.42, written at some point between AD 391-5.[103] This text occurs in the middle of his argument that one should not find fault in temporal things coming to an end because it is proper for one thing to give place to another in 'the order of mutable things (*ordine mutabilium*).'[104] He writes:

> Wherefore, we most absurdly say that all temporal things – which were so placed in this order of things that, unless they should pass away, future things would not be able to succeed past things, so that the total beauty of the times, in its kind (*tota temporum in sui generis pulchritudo*), would not be completed – should not pass away. For however much

---

[101] I did briefly engage the theme of history in my treatment of *en. Ps.* 45.6-7. The theme of history receives a more thorough treatment in this section.

[102] Though the texts I engage in this section present several interesting themes, I have restricted my focus to how each demonstrates that Augustine conceived of history as a speech. I have provided no commentary on the concepts of arrangement and order in these texts – even though they are readily apparent in several places. I will, however, return to some of these texts in Chapter Four in order to use them as evidence for my argument that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of history.

Also, my reading of the texts in this section agrees with Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, who has briefly stated that Augustine has given temporal beauty the traits of a speech, a poem, and a song in these texts and a few others. Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, 'Ordre manifeste et ordre caché dans *le Sermon sur la Providence* de saint Augustin,' in *Augustin Prédicateur (395-411): Actes du Colloque International de Chantilly (5-7 septembre 1996)*, ed. Goulven Madec (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1998), 286, 286n183. My work in this section builds upon Bouton-Touboulic's statement by providing a reading for each text that demonstrates the point.

[103] Augustine completed the second and third books of *lib. arb.* in Hippo between AD 391-5. *AttA*, xlvi.

[104] Augustine turns to 'the order of mutable things' in on *lib. arb.* 3.14.40 (CCSL 29: 299.33): *ordine mutabilium.* He clearly states the thesis that he is building toward in the first few lines of 3.15.43: 'Therefore, in those things which pass away since they did not receive existence beyond [their time], so that all things might be completed in their times, no one correctly finds fault with that which passed away, since no one is able to say, "It should have endured," for it cannot pass beyond [its] received boundaries [(CCSL 29: 300.33-301.36): *in his igitur rebus quae ideo deficiunt quia non ultra esse acceperunt, ut suis temporibus omnia peragantur, nemo defectum recte uituperat, quia nemo potest dicere : debuit permanere, cum acceptas metas transire non posset*].'

> they received, that much they utilize, and that much they give back to him to whom they owe that which they are in however much they are. For it is proper that he who bemoans that those things pass away should pay attention to his own speech (*sermonem suum*), undoubtedly that very thing by which he laments those things, if he judges that [his speech] is just and has proceeded from prudence. With regard to this speech, as far as it concerns its sound (*sonum*), if someone should love one little piece [of sound] and not want it to give [its] place to other things by passing away –by those [sounds] passing away and succeeding [one another] the entire speech is woven together – then he would be judged a wonderful [example] of insanity.[105]

Augustine begins by stating that it is 'absurd' to think that temporal things should not pass away. Rather, 'future things' rightly 'succeed past things,' thus forming a 'total beauty of the times.' Augustine then uses human speech to illustrate this point, stating that, just as an entire speech is formed out of sounds passing away and succeeding one another, the 'total beauty...of the times' is formed by 'temporal things' passing away and future things succeeding them.

Augustine places the transitory nature of temporal things which form the 'total beauty of the times' in parallel with the transitory nature of words which form an entire speech, thus showing that he conceives of history as speech. However, this passage does not provide evidence that Augustine is referring to the type of speech governed by rhetorical theory, because the term *sermo* can refer to both formal and informal speech, and there is no contextual evidence to support a claim that Augustine is referring to formal speech.[106] Thus, while we know that

---

[105] *lib. arb.* 3.15.42 (CCSL 29: 300.20-32): quapropter omnia temporalia quae in hoc rerum ordine ita locata sunt ut nisi deficiant non possint praeteritis futura succedere, ut tota temporum in suo genere pulchritudo peragatur, absurdissime dicimus non debere deficere. quantum enim acceperunt, tantum agunt, et tantum reddunt ei cui debent quod sunt in quantumcumque sunt. qui enim dolet ea deficere sermonem suum oportet adtendat, eum certe ipsum quo ista conqueritur, si iustum et a prudentia profectum esse arbitratur. cuius sermonis quod ad sonum eius attinet si quis unam particulam diligat nec eam uelit ceteris deficiendo locum dare, quibus decedentibus et succedentibus totus sermo ille contexitur, mirabilis dementiae iudicabitur.

[106] See the entry in LS for *sermo*.

Augustine conceived of history as speech by some point between 391-5, we cannot confirm that he meant the type of speech that was governed by rhetorical theory.

Questions from the Gospels 2.49 (AD 399-400) offers a second text in which Augustine conceives of history as speech.[107] Appealing once more to the passing nature of syllables, he writes:

> For just as now our speech is continued and completed by syllables passing away and succeeding [one another], so also human beings themselves, to whom speech belongs, by passing away and succeeding continue and complete the order of this age, which[108] is woven together by the beauty of temporal things.[109]

Augustine again compares the passing nature of syllables to the passing of temporal things. What is unique to this text from the other three in this section is that here he specifies human lives within the comparison – history is made up of human lives, which pass away and succeed one another, as syllables do in a speech. However, as with *On Free Choice* 3.15.42, in this passage Augustine does not specify whether he is referring to common speech or oratory.

However, *On the Nature of the Good* 8 serves as evidence that by 403-5 Augustine meant both.[110] He writes:

---

[107] For the date of *qu. eu.*, see: *AttA*, xlviii. My reading of this text disagrees with Bouton-Touboulic on a minor point. She incorrectly lists *qu. eu.* 2.49 as a text wherein Augustine compares the flow of time to that of a song. However, as the reader will see below, the term that Augustine uses in this text is *sermo*. Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, *L'Ordre Caché : La notion d'ordre chez saint Augustin*, Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 174 (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2004), 286n183.

[108] The antecedent to the pronoun *qui*, which is a masculine singular pronoun, is *ordo* rather than *saeculum*, since the latter is a neuter noun.

[109] (CCSL 44B: 115.4-8): sicut enim nunc sermo noster decedentibus et succedentibus syllabis peragitur atque perficitur, ita et ipsi homines, quorum sermo est, decedendo ac succedendo peragunt atque perficiunt ordinem huius saeculi, qui temporalium rerum pulchritudine contexitur.

[110] Regarding the date of *nat. b.*, I am following Pierre-Marie Hombert's chronology for both *nat. b*. and *c. Sec.* Hombert argues against François Decret's position that both works were

> Truly, other things, which were made from nothing, and which are undoubtedly more inferior than rational spirit, are able to be neither happy nor miserable. But since they themselves are also goods according to their measure and form[111], and the lesser and even the least goods were not able to exist except from God the highest good, they were so ordered, so that more unstable things yield to more stable ones, weaker things to stronger ones, and more impotent things to more powerful ones; and thus earthly things harmonize with celestial ones, as subordinate things to surpassing ones. Moreover, with things passing away and succeeding, a certain temporal beauty, in its kind, comes about, so that those very things, which die or cease to be what they were, do not defile or confuse the measure, form, and order of the entire universe. In the same way, a well-composed speech (*sermo bene compositus*) is undoubtedly beautiful, even though, in it, the syllables and all the sounds pass by, as if [they are] being born and dying.[112]

As with *On Free Choice* 3.15.42, Augustine here conceives of history as a speech – he places the transitory nature of things which are 'passing away and succeeding' in parallel with the transitory nature of syllables and sounds within a speech.[113] But while Augustine could have

---

written between 405-11. Of the two works, Hombert is more confident that *c. Sec.* should be dated between 403-5. Even if *n. bon.* is a later work it does not change my argument that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of history throughout his lifetime. Pierre-Marie Hombert, *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne*, Collection des Etudes augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 163 (Paris: Institut d'études augustiniennes, 2000), 31-2; François Decret, *L`Afrique manichéenne (IV^e - V^e siècles). Étude historique et doctrinale*, vol. 1 (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1978), 125-6. *AttA* places both texts in 399, but offers no justification for this date. *AttA*, xlvii-xlviii.

[111] Beginning in *nat. b.* 3, Augustine claims that God created everything with a triad of properties: *modus*, *species*, and *ordo.* The triad occurs in the latter half of this pericope. I agree with W.J. Roche's argument that 'form' is a good translation for Augustine's use of the term *species* when he uses it as part of his formula, and have translated it as such. W.J. Roche, *Measure, Number, and Weight in Saint Augustine* (Baltimore, Md.: American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1941), 355.

[112] *nat. b.* 8 (CSEL 25/2: 858.15-28): cetera uero, quae sunt facta de nihilo, quae utique inferiora sunt quam spiritus rationalis, nec beata possunt esse nec misera. sed quia pro modo et specie sua etiam ipsa bona sunt nec esse quamuis minora et minima bona nisi a summo bono deo potuerunt, sic ordinata sunt, ut cedant infirmiora firmioribus et inualidiora fortioribus et inpotentiora potentioribus, atque ita caelestibus terrena concordent tamquam praecellentibus subdita. fit autem decedentibus et succedentibus rebus temporalis quaedam in suo genere pulchritudo, ut nec ipsa, quae moriuntur uel quod erant esse desinunt, turpent ac turbent modum et speciem et ordinem uniuersae creaturae : sicut sermo bene compositus utique pulcher est, quamuis in eo syllabae atque omnes soni tamquam nascendo et moriendo transcurrant.

[113] Although Augustine did not use the term 'syllables' in *lib. arb.* 3.15.42, I do not think that his inclusion of the term here represents an advance in his thinking on the topic. In both texts he is speaking of the transitory nature of speech, and syllables are not classified separately from sounds but are merely measurements of sound.

meant common, informal speech in the earlier text, in this text he describes the speech as 'well-composed (*bene compositus*).' Since the rhetorical art governed excellence of a speech in late antiquity, Augustine's description of the speech as 'well-composed' reveals that by 403-5 he is conceptualizing history as a speech governed by the rules of rhetorical theory.[114]

Against Secundinus the Manichee (*Against Secundinus*) 15, also written in 403-5, provides further evidence that Augustine conceived of history as the type of speech governed by rhetorical theory.[115] Augustine is focusing on the topic of temporal beauty.[116] In the lines leading up to this text below, he states that substance is good, and thus evil is a defect of substance. After differentiating between voluntary defects, which he names sin, he turns to involuntary defects:[117]

> However, other defects which are not voluntary are either penal, so that sins are punished by justice, the highest moderator and orderer (*ordinatrice*), or they interfere with the measures of the lowest things, so that preceding things yield to succeeding ones – and thus every temporal beauty is carried through [to completion] by exchanges and with its kind. For a speech is carried through [to completion] in the same way, as if with dying and rising syllables, which are extended through fixed intervals of pauses and, their lengths [of time] having been satisfied, pass away by the ordered succession (*ordinata...successione*) of subsequent things, up to the time at which the entire oration (*oratio*) is brought forth to its end. And how long the syllable might be drawn out or hurried over, or with what form individual letters might preserve the moments of their positions is not placed in the passing sounds themselves, but in the moderation (*moderatione*) of the speaker, although the art itself (*ars ipsa*) – which makes the speech – neither resounds with sounds nor is it rolled out or varied in time. So, by the rise and fall, by the passing away and succession of temporal things, temporal beauty is woven together by certain and definite drawn out things until it returns to the foreordained end.

---

[114] I write 'by 403-5' because I am not convinced that this represents a development in Augustine's thought. Though *lib. arb.* 3.15.42 did not confirm that Augustine was referring to formal speech, it also did not deny it. Thus, it remains unclear whether Augustine's reference to formal speech in *nat. b.* 8 is a development or a fuller presentation of his previous position.

[115] Regarding the date of *c. Sec.*, see n.110.

[116] *c. Sec.* 15 (CSEL 25/2: 928.1-2): *temporalis pulchritudo*; and (CSEL 25/2: 928.13): *temporalis pulchritudo.*

[117] This portion of Augustine's argument comes from *c. Sec.* 15 (CSEL 25/2: 927.21-7): *aperi ergo iam cordis oculos et intuere, si potes, bonum aliquod esse qualemlibet substantiam, et ideo malum esse defectum substantiae, quia bonum est esse substantiam ; nec tamen omnem defectum esse culpabilem, sed solum uoluntarium, quo anima rationalis ad ea, quae infra illam sunt condita, conditore suo deserto declinat, adfectum ; hoc est enim, quod peccatum uocatur*.

> For that reason, [temporal beauty] is not evil, since we are able to understand and marvel at better things in spiritual creatures. But [temporal beauty] has a proper dignity (*decus*) in its kind and causes those living well to reach the supreme Wisdom of God, hidden on high and beyond everything in time, its maker and moderator (*moderatricem*).[118]

Augustine nuances his understanding of the relationship between evil and substance by stating that defects of substance which 'interfere with the measures of the lowest things, so that preceding things yield to succeeding ones' are not punishable defects. Rather, temporal beauty is brought to completion by such 'exchanges.' Augustine then compares this temporal beauty to that of a speech, particularly the passing away and succession of 'temporal things' to that of syllables within a speech.

That Augustine has in mind the type of speech governed by rhetorical theory is evident from the fact that he names the speech an 'oration (*oratio*)' and refers to the 'art (*ars*)' which makes the speech. Augustine, moreover, draws a parallel between history and speech which we have not seen before: He places the speaker's relationship to the speech in parallel with Wisdom's relationship to temporal things.[119] Just as the speaker controls the length of all of the

---

[118] *c. Sec.* 15 (CSEL 25/2: 927.28-928.18): ceteri autem defectus, qui non sunt uoluntarii, uel poenales sunt, ut peccata puniantur moderatrice summa atque ordinatrice iustitia, uel mensuris rerum infimarum interueniunt, ut praecedentia succedentibus cedant, atque ita omnis temporalis pulchritudo uicibus suis atque suo genere peragatur. sicut enim sermo peragitur quasi morientibus atque orientibus syllabis, quae per morarum certa interualla tenduntur et spatiis suis inpletis ordinata consequentium successione decedunt, donec ad suum finem tota perducatur oratio, nec in ipsis decurrentibus sonis, sed in loquentis moderatione positum est, quantum producatur corripiaturue syllaba, uel qua specie litterarum singulae suorum locorum momenta custodiant, cum ars ipsa, quae sermonem facit, nec sonis perstrepat nec peruoluatur uarieturque temporibus : sic ortu et occasu, decessu atque successu rerum temporalium certis ac definitis tractibus, donec recurrat ad terminum praestitutum, temporalis pulchritudo contexitur. quae non ideo mala est, quia in spiritalibus creaturis possumus intellegere mirarique meliora, sed habet proprium in suo genere decus atque insinuat bene uiuentibus summam dei sapientiam in alto secretam supra omnes temporum metas fabricatricem ac moderatricem suam.

[119] Augustine is referring to the second member of the Trinity when he mentions Wisdom at the end of this pericope. A.-M. La Bonnardière notes that Augustine faithfully held an 'alliance' between Wis 8.1, Jn 1.3 and 1 Cor 1.24 throughout his career. Anne-Marie la Bonnardière, *Biblia Augustiniana. A.T.-Le Livre de la Sagesse* (Paris: Études augustiniennes,

sounds which form a single speech, so also the Wisdom of God weaves together 'the passing away and succession of temporal things' – those things which link together to form history – into a single temporal beauty.

The texts presented in this section combine to reveal that Augustine conceived of history as speech. *On Free Choice* 3.15.42 demonstrates that he made this comparison by AD 391-5. *Questions from the Gospels* 2.49 provides a clear evidence that Augustine included human lives in this speech of history. Finally, *On the Nature of the Good* 8 and *Against Secundinus* 15 reveals that he was referring specifically to the type of speech governed by rhetorical theory by 403-5.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that Augustine uses the media of literary and rhetorical theory – namely the book and the speech – to conceptualize creation, its history, and God's activity throughout his career. I began by arguing that Augustine conceived of creation as a book by means of readings from *Letter* 43.9.25 and three other texts, all of which spanned from 396 to 427-30. I then demonstrated that Augustine conceptualized God's activity as a speech through a close reading of *Letter* 102.6.33. Finally, I showed that Augustine conceived of history as a speech by in *On Free Choice* 3.15.42 and three other texts.

I have also demonstrated, through readings of the first five of the texts offered in this chapter, that Augustine's concept of creation as a book and God's activity as speech involves the sensible aspects of each in order to show that Augustine is consistent in applying his word-sign

---

1970), 183. Particular to *c. Sec.*, Augustine connects the titles given to Christ in 1 Cor 1.24 (Wisdom and Power of God) with the activity of creation attributed to the Word in Jn 1.3.

theory to creation and God's activity when he frames them according to the media of literary and rhetorical theory. This secondary argument is important because it reveals that, for Augustine, just as words function as signs for things, the sensible aspects of creation also function as signs for things.

The arguments that I have made in this chapter combine with those that I made in Chapter One to establish precedent for my arguments in each of the remaining chapters in four ways. In Chapter One I demonstrated that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic within eighteen months of his conversion to Christianity. This establishes precedent that: (1) Augustine utilized rhetorical economy in his work as a Christian; and (2) he did this soon after his conversion.

In this chapter I have demonstrated that Augustine conceived of creation as a book, and both God's activity and history as a speech. This establishes precedent that (3) Augustine was willing to frame creation and history as a book and a speech. I have also showed that Augustine applied the rhetorical concept of eloquence to God's activity in *Letter* 102.6.33. This establishes precedent that (4) Augustine incorporated a concept from rhetorical theory into his theology. Thus, Augustine's incorporation of another rhetorical concept into his theology, for which I argue in the following three chapters, would not be unique.

My arguments in the chapters that follow build upon these four precedents. In the next Chapter I will demonstrate that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of creation. In Chapters Four and Five I will then show that he did the same with his theologies of history and evil.

CHAPTER THREE

Rhetorical Economy in Augustine's Theology of Creation

> So great is the force and power of completeness and unity, that even many things that are good are then more pleasing when they harmonize to some degree and come together into a whole. [The word] 'whole' (*uniuersum*), moreover, took its name from 'unity' (*unitate*). If the Manichees considered [the whole], then they would praise God, the author and founder of the whole, and that which offended them in a part [of the whole], on account of the condition of our mortality, they would bring back to the beauty of the whole and they would see how God made all things not only 'good,' but also 'very good,' since even in any ornate and composed speech, if we considered the individual syllables or even the individual letters, which immediately pass away after they have made a noise, we would not find in them anything that pleases or should be praised. For, the entire speech – not with regard to the individual syllables or letters, but with regard to everything – is beautiful.
>
> *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32[1]

In the closing section of his 2010 article, which argues that Augustine utilized the rhetorical concept of 'economical arrangement' (*oeconomica dispositio*) in his scriptural hermeneutic, Michael Cameron explores Augustine's use of the term *dispositio* ('arrangement').[2] Cameron's primary goal in that final section is to strengthen his main argument, but along the way he presents a constellation of texts in order to present,

---

[1] *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 (CSEL 19: 100.18-101.31): *tanta est uis et potentia integritatis et unitatis, ut etiam quae multa sunt bona tunc <plus> placeant, cum in uniuersum aliquid conueniunt atque concurrunt; uniuersum autem ab unitate nomen accepit. quod si manichaei considerarent, laudarent, uniuersitatis auctorem et conditorem deum et, quod eos propter condicionem nostrae mortalitatis in parte offendit, redigerent ad uniuersi pulchritudinem et uiderent, quemadmodum deus fecerit omnia non solum bona, sed etiam bona ualde; quia etiam in sermone aliquo ornato atque composito si consideremus singulas syllabus uel etiam singulas litteras, quae cum sonuerint statim transeunt, non in eis inuenimus quid delectet atque laudandum sit. totus enim ille sermo non de singulis syllabis aut litteris, sed de omnibus pulcher est.* All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. Regarding my choice to include the editor's conjectural emendation of *plus*, see n.14.

[2] The section is titled 'A Closer Look at *Dispositio*.' Michael Cameron, '"She Arranges All Things Pleasingly" (Wis. 8:1): The Rhetorical Base of Augustine's Hermeneutic,' *AugStud* 41, no. 1 (2010): 62-7. For a lengthy discussion of the importance of Cameron's work to my own project, see Chapter One.

briefly, a secondary claim: 'Augustine's sense of the divine *dispositio* derived from his analogy between the providential work of divine Wisdom and the ordering work of the speechmaker.'[3] Cameron suggests that Augustine utilized rhetorical economy not only in his notion of God's *dispositio* of the scriptures, but also in his *dispositio* of creation and history.[4] My work in this chapter and the next build upon Cameron's insight.

In this chapter I will argue that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of creation.[5] I will do this by means of a close reading of three texts – *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32, *Sermon* 29D.4-7, and *On Order* 1.7.18.[6] Each text serves a different purpose. *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 shows that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of creation in his earliest work dedicated to the creation narratives in Gen 1-2. *Sermon* 29D.4-7 reveals that this was not limited to his early thought, but rather Augustine continued to incorporate rhetorical economy into his notion of God's providential ordering of creation in the middle of his career. Finally, *On Order* 1.7.18 suggests that Augustine's utilization of

---

[3] Ibid., 62.

[4] As Cameron notes a few sentences later, Augustine often cited 1 Cor 1.24 in order to equate the Old Testament figure of Wisdom with the second person of the Trinity. I have used the generic term 'God' above because the texts that I present in this chapter do not all specifically reference Wisdom or the Son as the person of the Trinity to whom the act of arranging or ordering is proper.

[5] Previous scholarship on Augustine's use of literary and rhetorical theory has largely focused on two areas where it would naturally intersect his work as a churchman – his scriptural hermeneutic and his homiletics. My work in this chapter is both indebted to this scholarly foundation and moves beyond its boundaries. For work that addresses the interaction of literary and rhetorical theory and Augustine's homiletics, see: Richard Leo Enos et al., eds., *The Rhetoric of Saint Augustine of Hippo: De Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric* (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008); Paul R. Kolbet, *Augustine and the Cure of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). For work that focuses on his scriptural hermeneutic, see the status quaestionis in Chapter One.

[6] Cameron does not comment on these three texts.

rhetorical economy in his theology of creation derives from his integration of rhetorical economy into the heart of his concept of order.

Rhetorical Economy in Augustine's Early Theology of Creation: *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32

In AD 388-9, Augustine wrote his first work on the creation narrative contained in the Book of Genesis.[7] In this section I will demonstrate that Augustine incorporated

[7] For the date of *Gn. adu. Man.* see: *AttA* xlv.

rhetorical economy into his notion of the beauty[8] of creation[9] in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32.[10]

The pericope occurs in the midst of Augustine's commentary on the creation narratives in Gn 1-2. After explaining that he wrote the work to correct Manichaean interpretations of this narrative in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.1-2, Augustine then works through the scriptural text in the form of a typical commentary – quoting a short selection from the scriptures and then commenting on it before moving to the next

---

[8] Though Augustine's concept of the arrangement of the creation interacts with his notion of beauty, the latter is not the focus of my inquiry. Thus, I will only engage it, and relevant scholarship, as necessary. I have restricted my discussion of Augustine's notion of beauty because it is incredibly complex. Carol Harrison's (1992) monograph on it notably lacks a pithy definition. Rather, she has framed his notion of beauty as an intricate concept with influences from Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophy, aesthetics, the liberal arts, and the Christian tradition. Chapter One of Harrison's work provides a detailed *status quaestionis* with regard to the concept of beauty in Augustine's thought. Her monograph was an attempt to improve upon the two extensive treatments of Augustine's aesthetics before her own: Karel Svoboda, *L'esthétique de Saint Augustin et ses sources* (Brno: Filosofická fakulta s podporou Ministerstva školství a národní osvěty, 1933); Robert J. O'Connell, *Art and the Christian Intelligence in Saint Augustine* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978). Harrison's work also interacts with Hans Urs von Balthasar's treatment of Augustine's aesthetics in the first volume of *Herrlichkeit*: Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Herrlichkeit. Eine theologische Ästhetik*, 7 vols. (Freiburg: Johannes Verlag Einsiedeln 1961-9). Since Harrison's work, only one other extensive treatment of Augustine's notion of beauty has been published: Jean-Michel Fontanier, *La beauté selon saint Augustin* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1998).

[9] I have not restricted Augustine's treatment of creation in this section to the prelapsarian creation. Although the first two paragraphs of the quotation in this section concern creation in its prelapsarian state, in the third paragraph Augustine extends his concept of unified beauty to his disagreement with the Manichees in his own day. Thus, Augustine applies this concept of unified beauty across creation's prelapsarian and postlapsarian states.

[10] Outside of the work of Jörg Trelenberg, which I address later in this section, treatment of *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 is sparse in secondary scholarship. Jean-Michel Fontanier draws on it in his attempt to reconstruct the contents of Augustine's lost *De Pulchro et Apto.* Jean-Michel Fontanier, 'Sur le traité d'Augustin *De pulchro et apto* : convenance, beauté, et adaptation,' *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 73, no. 3 (1989): 418-9. For my engagement with Trelenberg, see n.21.

selection.[11] At the beginning of 1.21.32 Augustine turns his attention to the first half of Gn 1.31. He writes:

> Surely, it should not be carelessly overlooked that it was said: 'And God saw that everything he made was very good' (Gen 1.31). When it was talking about individual things, it only said: 'God saw that it was good' (Gn 1.10 *et al*). However, when it was declared about all things, it was not enough to say 'good,' unless 'very' was also added. Indeed, if the individual works of God, when examined by those who are skilled, are found to have praiseworthy 'measures, numbers, and orders' (Wis 11.21), each constituted according to its own kind, how much more [is this the case with] 'everything at the same time' (Sir 18.1), that is, the whole itself, which is completed by collecting all those individual things into one.
>
> For every beautiful thing which consists of parts is much more praiseworthy in its entirety than in a part.[12] Take, for example, the human body. If we praise the eyes alone, the nose alone, the cheeks alone, if we praise either the head alone, or the hands alone, or the feet alone and other things – if they are beautiful, individual, and alone – how much more [should we praise] the entire body, since all the members, which are beautiful individuals, together carry (*conferunt*) its beauty. Therefore, if a beautiful hand, which even alone was praised in the body, is separated from the body, both [the hand] itself loses its loveliness[13] and the other [parts] are dishonored without that [hand]. So great is the force and power of completeness and unity that even many things that are good are then more[14]

---

[11] Augustine introduces his polemical purpose for the text in *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.1-2. His text then begins to follow a common structure for commentaries. For an example of his structure of this commentary, see 2.3-4, where he quotes the opening lines of Gn 1.1 and then comments upon them before moving on to Gn 1.2 in 3.5ff.

[12] Augustine also uses the exact phrase *in toto quam in parte* in *ep.* 187.6 and *ciu.* 11.10. The phrase in its reversed form, *in parte quam in toto*, appears thirteen times in Augustine's corpus. According to a search of LLT-A, Augustine was the first author to use these phrases in these exact forms.

[13] I have translated the term *gratia* as 'loveliness,' which is included in its semantic range, due to the context of its use – an illustration of the beauty of the whole body in which the individual members participate. For the semantic range of *gratia*, see the listing in LS.

[14] My translation follows Dorothea Weber's addition of the term *plus* to line 19 of her critical text. She gives her argument for this addition in: Dorothea Weber, 'Textprobleme in Augustinus, De Genesi contra Manichaeos,' *Wiener Studien* 111 (1998). Weber's claim is that the omission of *plus* from all extant codices is the result of a haplography in the archetype. Her first premise for this claim is that an adverb is necessary to modify *placeant* in order for Augustine's analogy between the human body and the scriptural phrase *bona ualde* to function. For evidence, she notes that Augustine's analogy does not function correctly without an adverb. She also argues that this need for

> pleasing when they harmonize and come together (*conueniunt atque concurrunt*) into something whole. [The word] 'whole (*uniuersum*),' moreover, took [its] name from 'unity' (*unitate*).
>
> If the Manichees considered [the whole], then they would praise God, the author and founder of the whole, and that which offended them in a part [of the whole] on account of the condition of our mortality, they would bring back to the beauty of the whole and they would see how God made all things not only 'good,' but also 'very good,' since even in any ornate and composed speech, if we considered the individual syllables or even the individual letters, which immediately pass away after they have made a noise, we would not find in them anything that pleases or should be praised. For, the entire speech – not with regard to the individual syllables or letters, but with regard to everything – is beautiful.[15]

---

an adverb might have been discerned by the scribe who produced the Medieval variant *tunc placeant ualde* in Codex Troyes 40. However, if *ualde* was a conjectural emendation, she thinks it was an incorrect choice, probably supplied by the scribe because it was part of the scriptural text upon which Augustine was commenting (*bona ualde*). Weber's second premise is that, if an adverb was necessary for Augustine's analogy to function, then a haplography in the textual tradition is the most likely explanation, making the adverbs *plus* and *plurimum* the most likely candidates. Augustine made use of both terms in connection with *placere* in his corpus, but in this instance *plus* better fits the logic of his analogy. Weber's argument does not explore this logic, but we might state it as such: Since Augustine's claim is that every beautiful thing that consists of parts is 'more praiseworthy (*laudabilior*)' in the whole than in its parts, and since he makes a second comparative statement in his analogy of the human body, imploring 'how much more [we should praise] the entire body (*quanto magis totum corpus*)' than its individual parts, then it seems most likely that Augustine would continue his comparative theme and state that many things are not merely 'pleasing' (*placeant*) when they harmonize and come together into a whole, but 'more pleasing' (*plus placeant*). Jörg Trelenberg disagrees with this reading, opting for *placeant* with no adverb since it is the more difficult reading. Jörg Trelenberg, *Das Prinzip „Einheit" beim frühen Augustinus* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 26n36.

[15] *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 (CSEL 91: 100.1-101.31): sane non est neglegenter praetereundum quod dictum est : et uidit deus omnia quaecumque fecit esse bona ualde. cum enim de singulis ageret, dicebat tantum: uidit deus quia bonum est ; cum autem de omnibus diceretur, parum fuit dicere bona, nisi adderetur et ualde. si enim singula opera dei, cum considerantur a prudentibus, inueniuntur habere laudabiles mensuras et numeros et ordines in suo quaeque genere constituta, quanto magis omnia simul, id est ipsa uniuersitas quae istis singulis in unum collatis impletur ! omnis enim pulchritudo quae partibus constat multo est laudabilior in toto quam in parte ; sicut in corpore humano si laudamus oculos solos, si nasum solum, si solas genas aut solum caput aut solas manus aut solos pedes et cetera: si pulchra sunt singula et sola laudamus, quanto magis totum corpus, qui omnia membra quae singula pulchra sunt conferunt pulchritudinem suam, ita ut manus pulchra quae etiam sola laudabatur in corpore, si separetur a corpore, et ipsa amittat gratiam suam et cetera sine illa inhonesta sint. tanta est uis et potentia integritatis

Augustine opens this pericope by calling the attention of his readers to God's declaration that creation was 'very good' after its completion on the sixth day whereas God had 'only' declared it 'good' at the end of the previous five days. He begins his interpretation of this difference by referencing Wis 11.21 and Sir 8.1: If individuals works of God have 'praiseworthy "measures, numbers, and orders" (Wis 11.21),' then 'how much more [is this the case with] "everything at the same time" (Sir 18.1).' Augustine closes the first paragraph by clarifying what is meant by Sir 18.1 – 'the whole itself, which is completed by collecting all those individual things into one.'

At the beginning of the second paragraph Augustine asserts that 'every beautiful thing' which contains parts is 'more praiseworthy in its entirety than in a part.' He then explains this thesis by means of an illustration – the human body. The 'entire body' should be praised more than its 'beautiful' individual parts, such as the eyes or the nose, because the 'members' of the body 'together carry its [i.e. the body's] beauty.' Augustine's choice of the verb *conferre* ('to carry together') implies that this beauty which belongs to the whole body is the result of the presence of all of its members. He confirms this meaning in the sentence which follows; when a member of the body, such as a hand, is separated from the body it loses its 'loveliness' and 'the other [parts]' are also 'dishonored' without the presence of the hand. The beauty of the body is thus

---

et unitatis, ut etiam quae multa sunt bona tunc <plus> placeant, cum in uniuersum aliquid conueniunt atque concurrunt ; uniuersum autem ab unitate nomen accepit. quod si Manichaei considerarent, laudarent, uniuersitatis auctorem et conditorem deum et, quod eos propter condicionem nostrae mortalitatis in parte offendit, redigerent ad uniuersi pulchritudinem et uiderent quemadmodum deus fecerit omnia non solum bona, sed etiam bona ualde; quia etiam in sermone aliquo ornato atque composito si consideremus singulas syllabus uel etiam singulas litteras, quae cum sonuerint statim transeunt, non in eis inuenimus quid delectet atque laudandum sit. totus enim ille sermo non de singulis syllabis aut litteris, sed de omnibus pulcher est.

dependent upon its 'completeness and unity,' which occurs when the individual things 'harmonize and come together into something whole.'[16] Augustine similarly explains his thesis in the third paragraph. While attacking the Manichees for considering parts of creation rather than the whole, he explains his thesis by means of a second illustration – an 'ornate and composed speech.' It is not the 'individual syllables' or the letters, but 'the entire speech' that is 'beautiful.'

Thus, as demonstrated above, in the second and third paragraphs Augustine reveals a working thesis on unity and beauty: A beautiful complex whole, which exists when all of the parts are harmonized with one another in order to form a complete and unified whole, is more praiseworthy than its parts because there is a beauty proper to the whole which is carried by each constituent part.[17] Yet, Augustine's working thesis on

---

[16] Augustine's choice of the verbs 'to harmonize' (*conuenire*) and 'to come together' (*concurrere*) communicate that things join together and how they do so. Though the terms were rarely paired together in the Latin tradition, precedent existed for using them to describe the manner in which distinct things are joined together in a sermon that Ambrose gave which Augustine might have attended while living in Milan. In *Hel. et ieiun.* 5.12, Ambrose used these two terms to explain that each of the several circumstances surrounding Lot and his daughters in Gen 19.31-4 'harmonizes and agrees with drunkenness (*conuenit ebrietati atque concurrit*).' (CSEL 32/2: 419.19-23): *legimus etiam quod patrem Loth inebriauerint filiae in eo monte, ad quem timentes incendia Sodomitana confugerant et habitabant in spelunca. conuenit ebrietati atque concurrit aetas, sexus, solitudo, locus ferarum magis latibulis quam humanis aptior domiciliis*. William Harmless notes that Ambrose delivered *Hel. et ieiun.* in AD 387-90 and that Augustine might have been in attendance. William Harmless, *Augustine and the Catechumenate* (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1995), 112.

[17] My reading agrees with Carol Harrison's understanding of the role of unity in Augustine's aesthetics: 'Unity, he maintains, is always much more beautiful than its constituent parts, or than discord or division.' Carol Harrison, *Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine*, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 111. John Quinn also shares this reading. John M. Quinn, 'Anti-Manichean and Other Moral Precisions in Confessions 3.7.12-9.17,' *AugStud* 19 (1988): 177, 191n49. Furthermore, I agree with Chad Gerber, who uses *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 to argue that Augustine invoked Wis 11.21 in order to affirm both the beauty of individual things and the greater beauty of the whole creation. Chad Tyler Gerber, *The Spirit of*

unity and beauty in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 is not presented as an abstract philosophical assertion. Rather, he develops it in his attempt to explain why the completed creation is declared 'very good' on the sixth day in Gn 1.31. His thesis on unity and beauty, then, is the logic behind his answer: The entire creation is proclaimed 'very good' because it possessed[18] an additional beauty in the unity of the individual parts which themselves 'harmonize and come together into something whole.'[19]

A foundational piece of Augustine's thesis on unity and beauty is the manner in which he conceives of the arrangement of the parts in a beautiful complex whole. A complex whole is beautiful when all of its pieces 'harmonize and come together into a whole.' In accordance with this thesis creation itself is arranged so that all of its pieces are combined into a unified whole.

This understanding of arrangement is conceptually similar to rhetorical economy, the principal of accommodation proper to arrangement in rhetorical theory.[20] Just as

---

Augustine's Early Theology: Contextualizing Augustine's Pneumatology (Burlington: Ashgate, 2012), 20n30. W.J. Roche, whose article is still the standard treatment on Augustine's use of Wis 11.21, does not comment on *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32. W.J. Roche, *Measure, Number, and Weight in Saint Augustine* (Baltimore, Md.: American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1941).

[18] I have used the term 'possessed' in this text to account for Augustine's inclusion of Sir 18.1, which suggests that he understood God as having created all things at the same moment. Augustine has dropped the verb *creauit* from the phrase, but if we return it we find that a reference to God who 'created all things simultaneously.'

[19] Though the subject of the active verbs in this phrase is 'many things (*multa*),' Augustine is not implying that individual parts of creation are actors in harmonizing and coming together with one another. Augustine follows the traditional Christian understanding that God is the actor in both creating and arranging creation (e.g. *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.2.3, 9.15, 16.26). Thus, the individual parts harmonize with one another because God created and arranged them so.

[20] For more on the rhetorical concept of economy, see my treatment of it in Chapter One.

rhetorical theory held that an economically arranged speech is one in which the pieces of the speech are accommodated to one another and to the whole in order to form a whole speech, here Augustine describes the pieces of creation harmonizing with one another and joining together into the whole of creation.

This conceptual similarity between Augustine's understanding of the arrangement of beautiful complex wholes in 1.21.32 and rhetorical economy does not, by itself, prove that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of creation. When combined with four other aspects of this text, however, we will see that this conceptual similarity is no coincidence.[21]

---

[21] Jörg Trelenberg has given an alternative reading of *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32. We agree that Augustine's concept of unity is one in which the whole is more than the sum of its parts. However, Trelenberg sees Augustine as resolving an inner conflict between his Neoplatonic and Christian sensibilities in this text. For Trelenberg, Augustine is caught between his Neoplatonic commitment to unity as superior to multiplicity and the scriptural claim in Gen 1.31 that God named all things 'very good.' Trelenberg then claims that Augustine resolves this tension by having multiple things undergo a qualitative change when they come together into a unity. Trelenberg, *Das Prinzip „Einheit" beim frühen Augustinus*, 24-7. Trelenberg offers no argument for this reading. Indeed, it is *circulus in probando*: 1) Augustine is a Neoplatonist; ergo 2) His concept of unity is influenced by Neoplatonism. More recently, in his commentary on *ord.*, Trelenberg notes *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 while commenting on *ord.* 2.18.47. There he states: 'The claim of the aesthetic and ontological priority of the whole (*totum, uniuersum*) before the parts (*partes*) is a frequently expressed basic view of Augustinian Neoplatonism, which unmistakably has its roots in Stoic cosmology. See *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 [Die Behauptung des ästhetischen wie ontologischen Vorrangs des Ganzen (*totum, uniuersum*) vor den Einzelteilen (*partes*) ist eine häufig geäußerte Grundansicht des augustinischen Neuplatonismus, welcher seine Wurzeln unverkennbar in der stoischen Kosmologie hat. Vgl. z.B. *gen. c. Man.* 1,21,32].' Jörg Trelenberg, *Augustins Schrift De Ordine: Einführung, Kommentar, Ergebnisse* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 365. Again, Trelenberg offers no justification for this reading. Rather, he offers a footnote (365n109) that refers to the reading offered in his 2004 monograph, which, in addition to lacking an argument, has no reference to Stoic cosmology. Therefore, while Augustine certainly was influenced by Neoplatonism, it has not been shown that this is the case in *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32.

Firstly, Augustine appeals to the same referent – the human body – to describe the same type of arrangement as Quintilian discusses in his description of economical arrangement in *Oratorical Instruction* 7.10.16-7. Recall Quintilian's explanation of an economical arrangement, first introduced in Chapter One:

> And, indeed, an arrangement is not only about the parts, but within these parts there is a certain thought which is first, another second, and another third, whereby we must toil so that they are not only assembled into an order, but also so that they are fettered to each other and closely joined with one another, lest a joint be visible: it should be a body, not limbs. This will happen if we see what harmonizes (*conueniat*) with which location, so that we join words with words which are not fighting but mutually embrace, and [we join] facts in this same manner, so that they will not mutually collide like strangers from diverse and distant locations, but, having been bound together by some connection with what precedes and what follows, they will endure, and the oration will seem not only composed, but also continuous.[22]

Quintilian used the human body to illustrate how one piece of a speech 'harmonizes (*conueniat*)' with others to form a unified whole – an economical arrangement.[23] Similarly, in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32, Augustine uses the human body to illustrate how the pieces of creation 'harmonize (*conueniunt*)' with one another to form a complex whole. Though both authors are treating different objects – Quintilian a speech and Augustine creation – they are both appealing to the human body to describe the same concept of arrangement.

---

[22] Quint., *Inst.* 7.10.16-17 (LCL 126N: 294-6): neque enim partium est demum dispositio, sed in his ipsis primus aliquis sensus et secundus et tertius: qui non modo ut sint ordine conlocati laborandum est, sed ut inter se uincti atque ita cohaerentes ne commissura perluceat; corpus sit, non membra. quod ita continget si et quid quoque <loco> conueniat uiderimus et, ut uerba uerbis adplicamus non pugnantia sed quae inuicem complectantur, ita res non diversae distantibus ex locis quasi inuicem ignotae collidentur, sed aliqua societate cum prioribus ac sequentibus copulatae tenebunt, ac uidebitur non solum composita oratio sed etiam continua.

[23] Quintilian names this concept 'economical arrangement' a few lines earlier, in *Inst.* 7.10.11-2.

Secondly, Augustine uses a speech to illustrate this arrangement of creation in the closing lines of the pericope. Moreover, he names this speech as 'beautiful.' At this point in the passage, Augustine has already established his thesis on unity and beauty – a complex whole possesses beauty when all of its parts have 'harmonized and come together into something whole.' By describing the speech as 'beautiful,' then, he reveals that he understands the parts of the speech as arranged in this manner. And, since Quintilian describes a speech with this type of arrangement of parts as an economically arranged speech, as we have just seen, then Augustine employs an economically arranged speech in order to illustrate the arrangement of creation.

Thirdly, Augustine's notion of harmonized parts forming a unified whole in 1.21.32 is the same concept that has already been identified as rhetorical economy in one of his contemporaneous writings – *On the Practices of the Catholic Church and the Manichees* (*Practices*) 1.17.30 and 1.28.56.[24] In all three pericopes Augustine's argument is built upon the same concept: There is a divine arrangement that is a whole consisting of harmonized parts. As I have already demonstrated above, this matches the manner in which Augustine conceives of the arrangement of parts in a complex whole in his thesis on unity and beauty in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32. Various parts of the

[24] For my argument that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic in *mor.* 1.17.30 and 1.28.56 see either Chapter One or the portion of that chapter that appeared as an article: Brian Gronewoller, 'God the Author: Augustine's Early Incorporation of the Rhetorical Concept of *Oeconomia* into His Scriptural Hermeneutic,' *AugStud* 47, no. 1 (2016). For the date of *mor.* as AD 387-8, see *AttA*, xlvi. For my argument that Augustine wrote 1.17.30 in the earlier part of that date range, during his time in Rome, see Chapter One. Although I think that Augustine wrote 1.17.30 before he wrote *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32, I use the word contemporaneous above because I am not sure that he wrote *mor.* 1.28.56 before writing *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32. Thus, for simplicity, I have chosen to describe the three texts as contemporaneous.

creation 'harmonize (*conueniunt*) and come together into something whole.'[25] Likewise, in *Practices* 1.17.30 various passages from the scriptures 'harmonize (*congruunt*)[26] with each other,' forming 'the wonderful arrangement of the Holy Spirit.'[27] And again in *mor.* 1.28.56, the two testaments are not disparate texts, but form an 'admirable arrangement and divine symphony.'[28] All three texts contain the same idea: A divine arrangement that is a whole made up of parts; Augustine simply applies it to a different object in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 – creation.

Fourthly, Augustine makes a similar argument in 1.21.32 to the one he makes in *Practices* 1.17.30. In *Practices* 1.17.30, Augustine employs a notion of arrangement which I have identified as rhetorical economy in Chapter One as part of his defense of the Christian doctrine that the Old Testament is authoritative. He argues that the Old and New Testaments harmonize with one another and form a single authoritative text, even though some parts might seem incongruous with other parts.[29] Thus, the Manichees see

---

[25] *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 (CSEL 91: 100.19-20): cum in uniuersum aliquid conueniunt atque concurrunt.

[26] I translate both *conuenire* in *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 and *congruere* in *mor.* 1.17.30 as 'to harmonize' since they were commonly used as synonyms (see the entry for *congruere* in LS) and Augustine is using them to communicate the same concept in both places – multiple parts fitting together.

[27] *mor.* 1.17.30 (CSEL 90: 34.16-7): ista sibi congruunt; (CSEL 90: 35.2): mirifica dispositione spiritus sancti.

[28] *mor.* 1.28.56 (CSEL 90: 59.10): *admirabili...ordine diuinoque concentu*. Though I translated *concentus* as 'harmony' in Chapter One, I translate it here as 'symphony' in order to provide some variety in the three texts cited above. However, the term is also communicating the same idea as *conuenire* and *congruere*, and could be translated with the same term.

[29] Augustine states that the authority of the Old Testament had been challenged by the Manichees in *mor.* 1.1.1. He begins his defense of the authority of the Old Testament in 1.9.14. He then proceeds to harmonize several passages from the Old and New Testaments, leading to his statements in 1.17.30 that reveal that he incorporates rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic. This concept, however, undergirds his preceding argumentation – it is 'those [previous passages],' those given in 1.9.14ff.,

certain scriptural verses as incongruous because they do not recognize how those texts fit into the whole of scripture. Augustine uses a similar notion of arrangement in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 to respond to Manichaean 'offense' at certain unidentified parts of creation. He states that the Manichees should consider the 'whole' creation rather than observe a 'part' of creation so that they might see that God made all things 'very good.'[30] In this response, Augustine polemically employs his thesis on unity and beauty – having shown that the creation is declared 'very good' in Gn 1.31 because it is a unified whole with harmonized parts, Augustine then turns and uses this interpretation against the Manichees. And since, as I have shown above, a foundational piece of Augustine's thesis on unity and beauty is the conception of arrangement wherein parts are harmonized into a beautiful complex whole, Augustine has deployed this concept of arrangement in his response to the Manichees as well. In both texts, then, he employs a similar notion of arrangement to defend a Christian doctrine against the Manichaean objection of incongruity.

We have seen to this point that in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 Augustine describes an arrangement of creation that is a conceptual match with rhetorical economy. He appeals to the same referent – the human body – to describe the same type

---

which 'harmonize with each other.' (CSEL 90: 34.16-7): *ista sibi congruunt.* One example of a text Augustine says that the Manichees find as incongruous with the scriptures (they think it must have been inserted by someone and is a corruption of the text) is Paul's quotation of Ps 44.22 in Rom 8.36 (see 1.9.14).

[30] Augustine might be responding to the Manichaean theological position that evil is a material substance. On Manichaean understanding that good and evil were both material substances in this world, see: Jason David BeDuhn, 'A Regimen for Salvation: Medical Models in Manichaean Asceticism,' *Semeia* 58 (1992): 113. This is the same argument that Augustine will later make in *c. Faust.* 32.20, a text in which he compares the creation to a book (See my treatment of *c. Faust.* 32.20 in Chapter Two).

of arrangement that Quintilian referred to as an 'economical arrangement.' Furthermore, Augustine also utilizes an economically arranged speech to illustrate the beautiful complex whole of creation. Moreover, if we look elsewhere in Augustine's corpus we find that his concept that we recognize as rhetorical economy in *Practices* 1.17.30 and 1.28.56 is the same concept of arrangement that he applies to creation in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32. And, he deploys this concept of arrangement in the same manner, and against the same opponents, in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 as he had in *Practices* 1.17.30. Therefore, in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32, the concept of arrangement that Augustine applies to creation through his thesis on unity and beauty is rhetorical economy.

Finally, having seen that rhetorical economy is the concept of arrangement incorporated into his thesis on unity and beauty in this text, we have already seen several ways in which Augustine utilized rhetorical economy in his theology of creation. Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy in order to conceive of all parts of creation as harmoniously arranged. Furthermore, since rhetorical economy is inherent in his thesis on unity and beauty, and since he uses that thesis to interpret God's declaration of creation as 'very good' in Gn 1.31, Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy in his interpretation of Gn 1.31. Specifically, he employs it as the logic which explains why creation is more praiseworthy on the sixth day of creation – because it is a beautiful complex whole consisting of harmoniously arranged parts. Lastly, Augustine also employs rhetorical economy in his polemic against the Manichaean claim that there are objectionable parts of creation. Having used rhetorical economy as the logic which explains why creation is more praiseworthy on the sixth day, as I have just discussed, Augustine then turns this

interpretation against the Manichees. He argues that the individual parts of creation would not offend the Manichees if they understood that those things which they find offensive were harmoniously integrated into the whole creation – that is, if they understood that those things were part of God's economical arrangement of creation.

In this section we have seen both that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of creation and how he did so at this early point in his career. In the next section I will demonstrate that he continued to employ rhetorical economy in his theology of creation in the middle of his career.

AUGUSTINE'S CONTINUED INCORPORATION OF RHETORICAL ECONOMY INTO HIS THEOLOGY OF CREATION: *SERMON* 29D.4-7

Before François Dolbeau discovered a new set of Augustine's sermons in 1990, only a fragment of *Sermon* 29D was extant. The manuscript tradition referred to this yet to be discovered work as *On the Providence of God*.[31] The sermon's traditional title is apt. In *Sermon* 29D Augustine endeavors to show that God's providence extends over all things, including the minutiae of daily life.

---

[31] Before Dolbeau's discovery of the full text of this sermon, only a fragment of it had survived in the in Eugippius's anthology of Augustine (AD 6th c.). Those working in the manuscript tradition named the missing work *De prouidentia dei*, a title that Dolbeau, following Goulven Madec and those before him, continued to use. François Dolbeau, 'Sermon inédit de saint Augustin sur la providence divine,' *REAug* 41, no. 2 (1995): 267-8. In this project I will use the title *Sermon* 29D rather than *De prouidentia dei* for brevity and accuracy – this was a sermon, rather than a treatise, on providence. Also, for the sake of brevity, I will abbreviate it as *s.* in footnotes, recording that it is one of Dolbeau's sermons by adding a 'D' after the number. This breaks with my custom of following AugLex which, for this sermon, offers the much lengthier abbreviation *s. Dolbeau.*

In this section I will examine *Sermon* 29D.4-7 (~AD 408) to show that Augustine continued to incorporate rhetorical economy into his theology of creation two decades after he had done so in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32.[32] Since this text covers several chapters which contain a wealth of evidence, my treatment of it is lengthy. Therefore, I will present my argument in this section in three movements. In the first movement I will introduce Augustine's overarching argument in *Sermon* 29D.1-7 in order to orient the reader to the direction in which Augustine's argument will progress. I will do this by means of a question that Augustine asks in *Sermon* 29D.2 and a summary of his response which he offers in 29D.7. In the second I will present Augustine's theological argument and show his use of rhetorical concepts in 29D.4-7. Finally, in the third movement I will draw on evidence presented in the first two in order to provide concluding remarks on two closely related themes – that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of creation in this passage, and the manner in which he did so.

Framing Augustine's Argument: *Sermon* 29D.2, 7

Augustine's theme for *Sermon* 29D comes from his exegesis of the scriptural reading for that day, Rom 2.3-6.[33] In 29D.1-2 Augustine frames Paul's text as a response

---

[32] François Dolbeau argues for a date broadly between 399-410, but more probably around 408: ibid., 273-7.

[33] Augustine quotes Rom 2.3-6 at the end of *s.* 29D.1: 'Do you suppose this...O man, who judges them who do such things, and you do the same, that you will escape the judgment of God? Or do you disdain the riches of his kindness, patience, and longsuffering, not knowing that the kindness of God leads you to repentance? However, according to the hardness of your heart and [your] unrepentant heart, you gather up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath and the revelation of the just judgment of God, who will

to ‘a great many people’ who claim that God is not provident because he allows those who are unjust to live.[34] Augustine focuses on Rom 3.6, which states that God ‘will pay back each person according to his works.’[35] Interpreting this as scriptural proof that God providentially supervises human matters, Augustine then sets up his argument by speaking in the voice of those who object to the doctrine of providence. He states:

> ‘It is proper for everything,’ they say, ‘which is governed by providence to be ordered and arranged (*ordinatum...atque dispositum*). However,’ they assert, ‘what is more disordered and confused (*inordinatius et perturbatius*) than human matters where, for the most part, the wicked are distinguished by such great luck that they rule over the good, and the good are worn down by misfortune and forced to live under the wicked?’[36]

Augustine gives voice to this ‘great many people’ as objecting to God’s providence because of the seeming disorder of the distribution of misfortune to ‘the good’ and fortune to ‘the wicked.’

Several chapters later, in 29D.7, Augustine will give a concise summary of the response that he will develop to this objection over the course of this sermon in the form of an encouragement to his audience. He states there:

> Therefore, let us believe without any doubt that what seems confused and disordered in human matters is not from nothing at all, but rather is from a higher

---

pay back each person according to his works.’ (DOL 281.16-21): *existimas* [...] *hoc, o homo, qui iudicas eos qui talia agunt, et facis ea, quoniam tu effugies iudicium dei ? an diuitias benignitatis et patientiae eius et longanimitatis contemnis, ignorans quod benignitas dei ad paenitentiam te adducit ? secundum autem duritiam cordis tui et cor impaenitens, thesaurizas tibi iram in die irae et reuelationis iusti iudicii dei, qui reddet unicuique secundum opera sua.*

[34] *s.* 29D.1 (DOL 281.7): plerique.

[35] *s.* 29D.1 (DOL 281.20-1): qui reddet unicuique secundum opera sua.

[36] *s.* 29D.2 (DOL 282.26-30): quia omne, inquiunt, quod prouidentia gubernatur, ordinatum oportet esse atque dispositum. quid est autem, aiunt, inordinatius et perturbatius rebus humanis, ubi plerumque mali tanta felicitate praepollent, ut insuper etiam dominentur bonis, boni uero miseria conteruntur et malis subditi esse coguntur ?

> plan, from a greater divine order (*diuini maiorisque ordinis*) than is able to be comprehended by our littleness.[37]

Augustine's response is faith. Particularly, he encourages his parishioners to 'believe without any doubt' that things which appear 'confused and disordered' are, in fact, pieces of God's 'greater divine order.' The problem, he asserts, lies in our inability to comprehend that order, not in the lack of order itself.

Over the pages which follow I will show that, as Augustine builds to this response in 29D.4-7, his constant theme is God's order. As we will see, Augustine will employ an argument from the lesser to the greater in these chapters, establishing that God orders everything in creation – including human matters – by first demonstrating that he has done so with the parts which make up a human being (variously conceived) and then projecting that order to the entirety of creation. In 29D.4 he will focus on the order that God gives to the relationship between both the flesh and the soul, as well as the parts of the soul. Then, in 29D.5-6 Augustine will focus on God's arrangement of the bodily members into a whole body. Augustine's investigation of the order that God has given to the flesh, soul, and body in these three chapters will then set him up to reason from the order that God has given these smaller things to the order that God has similarly given to all other things, thus establishing an argument from the lesser to the greater for God's providential ordering of all things in 29D.7. By first grasping Augustine's theological argument, we will then be prepared to recognize his use of rhetorical theory in the next

---

[37] *s.* 29D.7 (DOL 285.124-7): igitur uel sine ulla dubitatione credamus hoc quod perturbatum et inordinatum uidetur in rebus humanis non omnino nullius, sed potius altioris consilii esse, diuini maiorisque ordinis quam ut possit a nostra exiguitate comprehendi.

movement.

Sermon 29D.4-7

In *Sermon* 29D.4 Augustine points to the soul (*anima*), and its relationship to flesh (*caro*), as evidence for God's providential ordering of all human matters. He begins with the relationship between the two, asserting that the soul and the flesh 'demonstrate the beauty of a splendid order' through their relationship with one another – the soul as the ruler and the flesh as the servant.[38] Augustine then asserts that God has established 'order (*ordo*)' within parts of the soul, which is revealed by the fact that 'reason (*ratio*) exceeds the other parts (*partibus*) of the soul.'[39] To justify this understanding of the soul as ordered, Augustine appeals to common knowledge. He states that, if asked, no one would affirm that 'he should be carried away by reckless desires rather than be governed by reason and counsel.'[40]

After establishing order with regard to the human soul in 29D.4, Augustine shifts his focus to God's arrangement of the human body in 29D.5-6. At the beginning of 29D.5 he states:

> Likewise, who has sufficiently considered, by contemplation, the body itself – how, with an admirable order (*mirabili ordinatione*) in its whole arranged

[38] *s.* 29D.4 (DOL 283.59-60): praeclari ordinis pulchritudinem monstrant.

[39] *s.* 29D.4 (DOL 283.60-1): *ratio* [...] *ceteris eius partibus [eius] praestat* [...] *ordo*. I have followed Dolbeau in treating the second *eius* as superfluous.

[40] *s.* 29D.4 (DOL 283.63-4): temeraria cupiditate fertur, an quod ratione atque consilio gubernatur

> structure (*in uniuersa sua mole disposita*), it consists of limbs (*membra contineat*)?[41]

Augustine begins by asking 'who has sufficiently considered' the 'whole arranged structure' of the human body. He then endeavors to ensure that his listeners might later be able to answer this question in the affirmative, calling their attention to the head as centrally placed upon the shoulders, the eyes, the ears, the hands, and several other 'members' of the body, all the way down to the feet. In 29D.6 he considers this focus upon the arrangement of the body. He states:

> Truly now, whom does it not delight to contemplate, so that he admires the artist (*artificem*) more and more in his handiwork – how consideration was given not only to health and utility, but also to rank and decorum (*decorique*). Corresponding pairs of body parts match one another (*paria paribus bina membra respondent*), such as the eyes, the ears, the cheekbones, the shoulder-blades, the hands, the flanks, the feet, and finally the fingers on the hands and the toes on the feet. Here and there the individual parts harmonize (*conueniunt*) with other individual parts, and all the parts [harmonize] with all the other parts, with appropriate and repeated equality. And, so that it might be more clearly discerned that it had a plan (*ratio*) not only regarding safety but also regarding beauty (*pulchritudinis*), the male chest, even though it will never lactate, is adorned with the congruity of twin nipples.[42]

Augustine asserts that it brings 'delight' to a person to contemplate the human body. In this practice, a person comes to admire God as an artist through his handiwork. And, in

---

[41] *s.* 29D.5 (DOL 283.68-9): corpus quoque ipsum quam mirabili ordinatione in uniuersa sua mole disposita membra contineat, quis sufficiente cogitatione consideret ?

[42] *s.* 29D.6 (DOL 284.83-90): iam uero quem non delectet intendere, ut in opere suo magis magisque miretur artificem, quemadmodum sit non solum saluti et utilitati, uerum etiam dignitati decorique consultum ? paria paribus bina membra respondent, sicut oculi, aures, iugalia, scapulae, manus, latera, pedes, ipsi denique in manibus et pedibus digiti. hinc atque inde singulis singuli atque omnes omnibus debita et reddita parilitate conueniunt, atque ut agnoscatur expressius non tantum incolumitatis, uerum et pulchritudinis habitam fuisse rationem, mamillarum congruentia geminarum etiam non lactaturum uirile pectus ornatur.

contemplating the body, a person will notice how all of the parts of the body 'harmonize' with all of the other parts.

Augustine's exploration of the order that God has given to the human soul, flesh, and body in 29D.4-6 then sets him up to connect how these orders establish God's providential ordering of all things in 29D.7. In this chapter Augustine advances his theological argument by projecting the order he has already demonstrated with regard to human beings onto a grander scale. He asserts that the 'manifest order'[43] extends to the 'minutest and outermost'[44] things within creation. Augustine then states:

> Omnificent Wisdom, containing within himself the immutable and invisible ideas (*rationes*) of mutable and visible things, like arranged [things] in an art (*in arte*), 'reaches,' just as it was written, 'reaches mightily from one end all the way to the other end and pleasingly arranges all things (Wis 8.1).' This being the case, and since we should not doubt that human matters, like humans themselves, are preeminent among all earthly matters, let us understand that, by such folly we deny the providence of God in great things which we admire in small things – unless, perchance, [we understand] that he who makes such [things] with skill and orders the definite number of contemptible hairs [on their heads] leaves human lives without any judgment! Therefore, let us believe without any doubt that what seems confused and disordered in human matters is not from nothing at all, but rather is from a higher plan, from a greater divine order (*diuini maiorisque ordinis*) than is able to be comprehended by our littleness.[45]

---

[43] *s.* 29D.7 (DOL 285.115): manifestus [...] ordo.

[44] *s.* 29D.7 (DOL 285.113): minutissimis et extremis.

[45] *s.* 29D.7 (DOL 285.116-27): omnifica sapientia, continens in se tamquam in arte positas mutabilium uisibiliumque rerum immutabiles inuisibilesque rationes, adtingit, sicut scriptum est, adtingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit omnia suauiter. quae cum ita sint cumque in terrenis omnibus rebus res humanas sicut ipsos homines non dubitemus excellere, qua tandem stultitia dei prouidentiam negamus in magnis, quam miramur in paruis, nisi forte sine ullo iudicio relinquere uitas hominum, qui tanta sollertia facit atque ordinat definitam numerositatem contemptibilium capillorum, intellegamus ! igitur uel sine ulla dubitatione credamus hoc quod perturbatum et inordinatum uidetur in rebus humanis non omnino nullius, sed potius altioris consilii esse, diuini maiorisque ordinis quam ut possit a nostra exiguitate comprehendi.

Augustine quotes Wis 8.1 to assert that the Son[46] arranges 'all things' according to the *rationes* that are contained within him, like arranged things in an art. He then asserts that it is 'folly' to deny the providence of God in 'great things' which we admire in 'small things,' before closing with an encouragement to his congregation toward faith in a 'greater divine order' than humans are able to comprehend.

Augustine's solution in 29D.7 expands the scope of God's providential ordering of all things in two ways. Firstly, he appeals to the statement in Wis 8.1 that Wisdom 'arranges all things.' Secondly, he makes an argument from the lesser to the greater to extend the 'providence of God' that humans admire in 'small things' to 'great things,' asserting that they are all part of a 'greater divine order.' Augustine's reference to 'small things' includes the hairs on a person's head, but it also includes the orders which we have seen him discuss in 29D.4-6. Augustine there asserts that God has given order to things with parts in three realities of human existence – the relationship between the soul and the flesh, the parts of the soul, and the 'members' of the human body. And in each of these examples Augustine uses a logic in which God has arranged multiple things into a singular order (*ordo*/*ordinatio*). The relationship between soul and flesh is 'a splendid

[46] Augustine equates the wisdom and power of God in 1 Cor 1.24 with the Son, and connects that interpretation with Wis 8.1, early in his career in *mor.* 1.16.27. Cameron has also argued that Augustine interprets Wisdom in Wis 8.1 as the Son. Michael Cameron, '"She Arranges All Things Pleasingly" (Wis. 8:1): The Rhetorical Base of Augustine's Hermeneutic,' *Augustinian Studies* 41, no. 1 (2010): 32-3. With regard to my treatment of the work of one person of the Trinity as both that person's work and also the work of all three, see my discussion of the doctrine of inseparable operations in Augustine's theological framework (n.54 in Chapter One). La Bonnardière notes that Augustine faithfully held an 'alliance' between Wis 8.1, Jn 1.3 and 1 Cor 1.24 throughout his career – a move that had no precedent in the Christian exegetical tradition. Anne-Marie la Bonnardière, *Biblia Augustiniana. A.T.-Le Livre de la Sagesse* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1970), 183.

order (*praeclari ordinis*).' The parts of the soul have been set into an 'order (*ordo*).' And the members of the body 'harmonize' with one another to form 'an admirable order (*mirabili ordinatione*).'

Having presented Augustine's theological argument, I will now turn to his use of rhetorical theory. Six aspects of Augustine's theological argument in 29D.4-6 combine to reveal that this concept of order that Augustine is employing is rhetorical economy. Firstly, in 29D.5-6 Augustine appeals to the human body to describe an arrangement of parts which are harmonized into a whole. This choice of the human body to describe parts of a thing harmonizing with one another to form a whole matches Quintilian's choice of the human body to illustrate the concept of rhetorical economy, which we have already seen in the first section of this chapter. Moreover, it also matches Augustine's own use of rhetorical economy in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32, which I also showed earlier in this chapter. In both texts he employs the harmonized arrangement of the parts of the human body into a whole in order to explain God's arrangement of all created things.

Secondly, Augustine ascribes similar terminology to God's arrangement of the human body in this text and to the economical arrangement of the scriptures in *Practices* 1.28.56, which I engaged in Chapter One. As we have seen, in *Sermon* 29D.5 Augustine refers to this order as an 'admirable order (*mirabilis ordinatio*).'[47] In *Practices* 1.28.56,

---

[47] *s.* 29D.5 (DOL 283.69): *mirabili ordinatione.* This pairing of terms is unique in Augustine's corpus. There are only two other times that he joined similar terms in his corpus (excluding his use of *ordinare* as a verb). The first is in the early work *c. Adim.* 3.4 (AD 394). Augustine uses the adverb *mirabiliter* to describe the distinct order that God gave to history. Augustine later quotes this phrase in *retr.* 1.21(22).2, but this instance is not substantive; rather, Augustine is correcting something he said in the

he similarly referred to the economical arrangement of the scriptures as an 'admirable order (*admirabilis ordo*).'[48] Augustine's change of terms from *ordo* in *Practices* 1.28.56 to *ordinatio* in *Sermon* 29D.5 is explained by his tendency to use the term *ordinatio* to describe an order that had been established at creation.[49] He thus describes the scriptures, which were written at various historical moments which came after creation, as an *ordo*. And he refers to the human body, which God formed at creation, as an *ordinatio*. As for the terms *mirabilis* and *admirabilis*, they shared overlapping semantic ranges.[50] Since these similar phrases are used to describe the same quality of arrangement, Augustine is using them synonymously.

---

sentence that follows. I will engage this text more closely in my discussion of Augustine's incorporation of rhetorical economy into his theology of history in Chapter Four. The second time that he joined similar terms was in *c. adu. leg.* 1.8.11, which was written a decade after *s.* 29D (AD 419-20). There he paired the adjective *mirabilis* with the superlative adjective *ordinatissimus* to describe 'the wonderfully distinct order of things ([CCSL 49: 44.273-4]: *distinctum mirabiliter ordinem rerum*)' in creation. Note that here, however, he uses *ordo* rather than *ordinatio*. For the dates of both works, see: *AttA*, xliii.

[48] *mor.* 1.28.56 (CSEL 90: 59.10): admirabili...ordine.

[49] Alexander Zerfaß notes that Augustine generally uses *ordinatio* in two ways. First, to refer to the end of the sacrament of the consecration of clergy. There is no evidence in the context of this passage that Augustine is using it with this meaning here. Second, to refer to divine order established at creation. This meaning fits within the argument that Augustine is making here. Alexander Zerfaß, 'Ordinatio,' in *AugLex*, ed. Robert Dodaro, Cornelius Mayer, and Christoph Müller (Basel: Schwabe, 2014), 353-4. Of course, this does not restrict Augustine to using only *ordinatio* for orders established at creation. He also used the term *ordo* for such orders, as we see with his use of *ordo* in connection with the soul in *s.* 29D.5. Also, by historical moment I mean the various points at which God established the arrangement of the human being and the arrangement of the scriptures on the timeline of history. This does not imply that Augustine denies their preexistence in God before they appeared in time and space.

[50] While *admirabilis* and *mirabilis* were distinct terms, they had semantic ranges that significantly overlapped. Because Augustine is using the terms to describe similar concepts I think that he is using them synonymously in these two texts.

Thirdly, Augustine's encouragement to his congregants to 'delight' (*delectare*) in the human body as God's work as an 'artist' (*artifex*) at the beginning of 29D.6 draws on the rhetorical principle that the work of an orator should delight his audience.[51] Mark Clavier (2014), expanding on previous work by Peter Brown, has demonstrated that Augustine incorporated the rhetorical concept of delight in his theology by framing God as an orator who attempts to persuade people by delighting them.[52] In Augustine's own

[51] Olivier Du Roy, commenting on Augustine's use of Wis 8.1 in *uera rel.* 39.72, argues that Augustine creates a Trinitarian taxonomy within which the Father is *artifex*, the Son is *sapientia*, and the Spirit is *bonitas*. Du Roy's assertion might be correct, but there is not enough evidence that Augustine's reference to an artist in 29D. 6 fits Du Roy's proposed taxonomy. Thus, I refer to the divine *artifex* here with the generic title 'God.' Olivier Du Roy, *L'Intelligence de la foi en la Trinite selon saint Augustin: genese de sa theologie trinitaire jusqu'en 391.* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1966), 353-6. Also, in addition to my work in this section on delight, see also Mark Clavier's work on Augustine's understanding of delight and creation, especially his conclusion that, at times in Augustine's work, the creation 'functions...like Cicero's orator.' Mark F.M. Clavier, *Eloquent Wisdom: Rhetoric, Cosmology and Delight in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo*, ed. Thomas O'Loughlin (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), 205.

[52] Particularly, he shows that Augustine conceived of God and the devil as competing orators who are always working to provide their audience with competing delights (*delecto, delectatio*). Clavier builds upon and critiques Brown's (1969) work on *simp.* (AD 396-8). Brown noted that Augustine portrays God's work in salvation in *To Simplicianus* as one of rhetorical persuasion. But Clavier notes that Brown's focus on *To Simplicianus* leads him to stop short of the full picture of Augustine's thought. Rather, Augustine portrays God and the devil as competing orators who are always working to provide their audience with competing delights. Mark Clavier states: 'Because Brown is focused on *Ad Simplicianum*, where Augustine's interest is about why some respond to God's call while others do not, he fails to note that Augustine conceives of the devil or sin working in the same manner as God. The question for the individual is not, as Brown implies, a matter of self-determination but an alternative between two forms of delightful bondage: one to God, the other to death. Augustine understands humankind as already in bondage to the devil through temporal and carnal delight. Because the human will has been overwhelmed by a diabolical oratory, God must now overcome it with his own oratory.' Clavier, *Eloquent Wisdom: Rhetoric, Cosmology and Delight in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo*, 151. For Brown's argument, see: Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography*, New ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 155. This portion of his book was originally published in 1969. For the date of *simpl.*: *AttA*, xlviii.

time, we find precedent for the way in which he deploys the concept of delight in Cicero's *The Orator* 21.69-70. Cicero writes of the work of an eloquent man:

> The eloquent (*eloquens*) man whom we seek will be, according to the author Antonius, he who speaks in the forum and in civil lawsuits in such a manner that he demonstrates, delights (*delectet*), and persuades. To demonstrate concerns necessity, to delight concerns pleasantness (*delectare suauitatis*), and to persuade concerns victory – for it is the one thing out of everything that is most able to win lawsuits. And for each office of the orator there is a corresponding method of speaking: the subtle in demonstrating, the middle in delighting, and the vehement in persuading; in this [last] one is the entire strength of an orator.[53]

We know that Augustine was aware of this particular selection later in his career because he connects portions of *The Orator* 21.69-70 with selections from *The Orator* 29.101 in *On Christian Teaching* 4.17.34 (AD 426-7).[54] Augustine writes:

> 'Therefore, he is eloquent who,' as he teaches (*ut doceat*), 'can discuss small things in the plain manner (*submisse*),' as he delights (*ut delectet*), 'can discuss moderate things in the temperate manner (*temperate*),' and as he persuades (*ut flectat*), 'can discuss great things in the grand manner (*granditer*).[55]

Augustine clearly indicates that he is aware of Cicero's understanding that producing delight in one's listeners is the work of an orator. And, since his rhetorical training came before his conversion to Christianity, there is every reason to think that Augustine would have been aware of this concept by the time that he delivered *Sermon* 29D. This becomes

---

[53] *Orat*. 21.69-70 (LCL 342: 356): erit igitur eloquens – hunc enim auctore antonio quaerimus—is qui in foro causisque ciuilibus ita dicet, ut probet, ut delectet, ut flectat. probare necessitatis est, delectare suauitatis, flectere uictoriae; nam id unum ex omnibus ad obtinendas causas potest plurimum. sed quot officia oratoris tot sunt genera dicendi: subtile in probando, modicum in delectando, uehemens in flectendo; in quo uno uis omnis oratoris est.

[54] For the date of *doctr. chr.*, see: *AttA*, xliv.

[55] *doctr. chr.* 4.17.34 (CCSL 32: 141.12-4): *is erit igitur eloquens, qui, ut doceat, poterit parua submisse, ut delectet, modica temperate, ut flectat, magna granditer dicere.* Augustine is weaving together the selection I have already quoted from *Orat.* 21.69-70 (further up in *doctr. chr.* 4.17.34) with the selections here from *Orat.* 29.101 (LCL 342: 378): *is erit igitur eloquens, ut idem illud iteremus, qui poterit parua summisse, modica temperate, magna grauiter dicere.*

even more likely when we note that both Cicero and Augustine connect the concepts of pleasantness (*suauitas*) and delight (*delectare*). For Cicero, 'pleasantness' (*suauitas*) is central to *delectare*. For Augustine, one delights (*delectare*; 29D.6) when he looks upon the work of the Son, who 'arranges all things pleasingly' (*disponit omnia suauiter*; 29D.7).[56]

One further piece of evidence supports that Augustine is drawing on a rhetorical understanding of delight in 29D.6: The only other time that Augustine used the terms *delectare*, *decor*, and *artifex* in such proximity in his corpus was to make a comparison between reading the words of a text and reading the miracles that Christ worked in *Treatise on the Gospel of John* (*Treatise on John*) 24.2 (AD 414 or 418/20).[57] In *Treatise on John* 24.2, Augustine compares the miracles of Christ to the beautiful script of a master artist. Then, while discussing the miracle of Jesus feeding the five thousand from Jn 6.1-14, he states:

> We saw, we observed something great, something splendid and altogether divine, which could not have happened unless it was from God; [and] we praised the

---

[56] This final phrase comes in the midst of Augustine quoting Wis 8.1 in *s.* 29D.7 (DOL 285.119).

[57] *Io. eu. tr.* 24.2 uses *decoras*, a form which comes from *decorus*, the adjectival form of *decor*. As shown in n.61, Augustine used *decor* and *decus* interchangeably. There is disagreement over when *Io. eu. tr.* 24 was delivered. Anne-Marie La Bonnardière argued that sermons 24-54 were given sometime after AD 418, possibly in the autumn of 419 or 420. Anne-Marie la Bonnardière, *Recherches de chronologie augustinienne* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1965), 117. More recently, Marie-François Berrouard has argued that, based upon links that he has made between the Arian and Pelagian controversies, sermons 17-54 were more likely given in autumn of 414. Marie-François Berrouard, *Introduction aux Homélies de Saint Augustin sur l'Évangile de Saint Jean* (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2004), 99. H.A.G. Houghton follows Berrouard's dating in his monograph on Augustine's text of the Gospel of John. H.A.G. Houghton, *Augustine's Text of John: Patristic Citations and Latin Gospel Manuscripts*, ed. Gillian Clark and Andrew Louth, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 108n3.

> maker because of what he made. But just as, if we are looking at beautiful letters anywhere, it is not sufficient for us to praise the finger of the writer for making [the letters] uniform, equal, and decorous (*decorasque*) unless we also read what he reveals to us through those [letters], in the same way anyone who looks into this deed is delighted by beauty (*delectatur pulchritudine*) while he admires the artist (*admiretur artificem*). He who understands, in a sense, reads (*qui autem intellegit, quasi legit*).[58]

Augustine sees a comparison between reading and looking at the miracles of Christ. The point of beautiful letters is to read them and understand the author's meaning that they represent. When a person looks into Christ's miraculous works and understands them, he reads them, so to speak; and he is delighted by their beauty. Augustine continues:

> Indeed, a painting is seen in one way, letters are seen in another. When you see a painting this is all that there is [to do] – to see and to praise (*uidisse laudisse*). When you see letters, that is not all that there is [to do] because you are also being urged to read [them]. And indeed, when you see letters, if by chance you do not know them and, thus, cannot read them, you say 'What do we think is written here?' You ask 'What is it?' since you already see something. The person you ask to help you understand what you saw will explain another [meaning] to you. That person has one set of eyes, you have another. Do you both not similarly see the forms of the letters? But you both do not similarly understand the signs (*signa cognoscitis*). Therefore, you see and praise; that person sees, praises, reads, and understands (*tu ergo uides et laudas; ille uidet, laudat, legit et intellegit.*). [59]

---

[58] *Io. eu. tr.* 24.2 (CCSL 36: 244.8-245.16): uidimus, spectauimus magnum quiddam, praeclarum quiddam, et omnino diuinum, quod fieri nisi a deo non possit ; laudauimus de facto factorem. sed quemadmodum si litteras pulchras alicubi inspiceremus, non nobis sufficeret laudare scriptoris articulum, quoniam eas pariles, aequales decorasque fecit, nisi etiam legeremus quid nobis per illas indicauerit ; ita factum hoc qui tantum inspicit, delectatur pulchritudine facti ut admiretur artificem ; qui autem intellegit, quasi legit.

[59] *Io. eu. tr.* 24.2 (CCSL 36: 245.16-25): aliter enim uidetur pictura, aliter uidentur litterae. picturam cum uideris, hoc est totum uidisse, laudasse ; litteras cum uideris, non hoc est totum, quoniam commoneris et legere. etenim dicis, cum uideris litteras, si forte non eas nosti legere : quid putamus esse quod hic scriptum est ? interrogas quid sit, cum iam uideas aliquid. aliud tibi demonstraturus est, a quo quaeris agnoscere quod uidisti. alios ille oculos habet, alios tu. nonne similiter apices uidetis ? sed non similiter signa cognoscitis. tu ergo uides et laudas ; ille uidet, laudat, legit et intellegit.

Augustine clarifies that he understands a difference between how we approach pictures and written words. The picture is seen and the artist is praised. But written words are seen, praised, read, and understood. Divine actions, like written words, are to be seen, praised, read, and understood.

There are four striking parallels between *Treatise on John* 24.2 and *Sermon* 29D.6. These are the only times that Augustine places the concepts of delight and decorum in such close proximity to conceiving of God as an artist. And, in both texts Augustine frames an artist's product as communicating something about the artist to us.[60] In *Treatise on John* 24.2, Augustine affirms that an artist's product tells us about the

[60] This understanding explains Augustine's ascription of a voice to order 29D.4. As I demonstrated in Chapter Two, Augustine conceived of creation as a book elsewhere in his corpus. And his treatment of creation in this pericope is consistent with that aspect of his thought. Just as a book speaks to a reader, the order of the soul speaks to those who listen. It is common for scholars to miss Augustine's understanding that all of creation is a text that carries the voice of its creator, which I demonstrated in Chapter Two. For example, in her study exploring Augustine's portrayal of *ordo* in *s.* 29D as compared to *ord.*, Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic frames Augustine's use of *uox ordinis* in 29D.4 as ethical and ontological – an awareness that causes a contemplative person to conform his actions to the ontological order of nature. Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, 'Ordre manifeste et ordre caché dans *le Sermon sur la Providence* de saint Augustin,' in *Augustin Prédicateur (395-411): Actes du Colloque International de Chantilly (5-7 septembre 1996)*, ed. Goulven Madec (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1998), 309. This is certainly so, insofar as Augustine engages the topic of human action in 29D.4. But, against the backdrop of rhetorical theory that we have engaged so far in this project we can now see that there is another layer to his meaning. Augustine is asking his audience to look at the order displayed within the human body and soul, wherein the soul is over the body and *ratio* is given primacy over all of the other parts of the soul, in the same way that a reader pays attention to an author's voice as it is contained in the book that he has written. In her 2004 monograph, Bouton-Touboulic adds to her interpretation. She still sees it as ontological and ethical, but also thinks that the voice that illumines the person is the divine Word, the *secretum oraculum* of *mag.* 14.46. Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, *L'Ordre Caché : La notion d'ordre chez saint Augustin* (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2004), 532. With this addition, she is closer to seeing rhetorical theory in *s.* 29D.4, but has only come to the point of seeing the communication of the Son in the divine product.

artist himself; in *Sermon* 29D.6 he implies that we learn enough about the artist through his product to grow in our admiration of him. Additionally, in both Augustine frames divine activity as akin to a word, which is also similar to his treatment of divine activity as a speech in *Letter* 102.6.33, which I presented in Chapter Two. Lastly, in both texts Augustine frames the artist's work as producing delight in the person observing it – a framework for delight which matches that of rhetorical theory. Although *Treatise on John* 24.2 was written after *Sermon* 29D.6, it does demonstrate a consistent connection between delight and the work of the artist which follows Cicero's portrayal of them in *The Orator* 21.69-70. By showing a consistent usage, *Treatise on John* 24.2 strongly suggests that Augustine was drawing on Cicero's text in *Sermon* 29D.6.

We now see that Augustine's reference to delighting in the human body as in the work of an artist in *Sermon* 29D.6 draws on the rhetorical principle of the work of an orator as delighting his audience. Furthermore, we also see that it is the arrangement of the human body in which we should delight. Yet, there are still four more aspects of Augustine's theological argument in 29D.4-7 which contribute to showing that Augustine is incorporating rhetorical economy into his concept of order in this text.

Fourthly, when describing the order of the human body in 29D.6, Augustine states that consideration was given to 'decorum (*decori*[61])' and then illustrates this by listing

[61] Augustine's term *decori* in 29D.6 could represent the dative singular form of either *decor* or *decus*. The terms are often difficult to differentiate from one another if there is no hint to the word's gender within the text (as there is not here) because they decline in a nearly identical fashion. Augustine uses both terms within his corpus. The LLT-A returns 77 instances of the nominative or accusative singular *decus,* 9 instances of the nominative singular *decor*, and 107 instances of the accusative singular form *decorem* (though some instances of *decorem* might be the first person present active subjunctive form of *decorare*). *AugLex* does not have an entry for either *decus* or *decor*, but Jean-

several 'corresponding pairs of body parts' in which the 'individual parts harmonize with other individual parts,' such as the eyes, ears, and feet. By illustrating the 'decorum' of the body by means of the relationship of particular parts of the body to one another, Augustine uses the concept in the same way that it was used in the rhetorical tradition; as I demonstrated in Chapter One, decorum was the accommodative principle proper to style and thus applied to the one-to-one relationship of pieces in a speech.

Fifthly, and most revealing, is Augustine's statement that '[c]orresponding pairs of body parts match one another (*paria paribus bina membra respondent*).'[62] Augustine

---

Michel Fontanier has a helpful study on them that shows that Augustine used them interchangeably to represent that which constitutes a creature's proper beauty. Fontanier, *La beauté selon saint Augustin*, 36-42. We find a clear example of Augustine using the term *decus* in this manner when he describes the *decus proprium* in *Gn. litt.* 3.24.31. The classical and late antique world has examples of authors using the terms both synonymously and in technically distinct manners. For example, while Augustine used them as synonyms for the same concept, classical authors often used *decus* to describe moral beauty and *decor* to describe sensible beauty. Isidore of Seville later summarized this position when he stated that *decus* refers to beauty or decorum in the soul and *decor* refers to beauty or decorum in the body. See *diff.* 1.22.163 (PL 83: 27): *inter decus et decorem. decus ad animum refertur, decor ad corporis speciem.* Because Augustine used the terms interchangeably I have not worked further to determine which of the terms Augustine is using in *s.* 29D.6, and question whether that is even possible since their dative singular forms are identical and Fontanier has established that Augustine used them as synonyms. In the text above I will represent the term as *decor* since that term better represents (to our sensibilities) the concept that Augustine reveals that he is communicating in the lines following lines his use of the term – fittingness and balance between parts of the body.

Finally, Fontanier's study is quite helpful, but I am not convinced by his argument that Augustine distinguishes between *decus/decor* as a particular's internal fittingness and *aptum* as a particular's fittingness as it relates to another particular. *S.* 29D.6 serves as evidence against such a clear distinction. In the sentences that follow his use of the term *decus/decor*, Augustine expands on the concept by describing the harmonious relationship between corresponding body parts (e.g. eyes, ears, shoulder blades). Augustine is not describing their decorum as an internal decorum of the body. Rather, he is describing their decorum in terms of the relationship to one another.

[62] Augustine uses this same phrasing in his early work, *mus.* 6.13.38 (CSEL 102: 227.17): *paria paribus bina membra respondeant*. His one change to the phrase is minor – he has put the verb in the subjunctive mood.

has taken this phrase from Cicero's discussion of the arrangement of words in a speech in *The Parts of Oratory* 6.21.[63] By using this direct quotation from Cicero's discussion of the arrangement of words in rhetoric, Augustine shows that he is conceptualizing God's arrangement of the human body according to rhetorical theory. Thus, he is conceiving of the human body as a rhetorically arranged work. And since he sees it as well-arranged, then he understands the human body as an economically arranged work.

Sixthly and finally, Augustine frames the objection of his opponents in *Sermon* 29D.1-2 as structurally similar to that of the Manichees in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32. In both texts, his opponents are denying the veracity of a foundational Christian doctrine based on their experience of this world. In the final paragraph of *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32, Augustine frames the Manichees as denying the goodness of creation because some parts of it offended them. In *Sermon* 29D.1-2, Augustine presents his unnamed opponents as doubting the providence of God because they have seen some wicked people prosper. Augustine presents similar solutions to these objections. In *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32, Augustine's solution is for the Manichees to consider the whole creation and

---

[63] Cicero pairs the phrase *paria paribus* with a form of the verb *respondere* twice in his corpus. The first similarly discusses the arrangement of particular things: *Part.* 6.21 (LCL 349: 326): *paria paribus respondeant*. The second does not seem to be related, but is essentially a statement of *quid pro quo* between Cicero and his interlocutor: *Att.* 115(VI.1).22 (LCL 8: 126): *paria paribus respondimus*. The phrase *paria paribus*, moreover, has a long history in rhetorical works. Outside of Cicero, see also (listed in probable chronological order): Aquila Romanus includes it in his definition of ἀντίθετον in *Fig.* 22 (RLM 29.30); Julius Victor includes it in a discussion of the three kinds of style in *rhet.* 22 (RLM 438.16-7); Martianus Capella also includes it in his definition of ἀντίθετον in *Rhet.* 40.531 (480.13); and Rufinus of Antioch, who might have been either a contemporary of Augustine or lived after him, includes the phrase in *Comp. et metr.* (RLM 581.28-31).

how the part that offends them fits into this unified whole. In *Sermon* 29D.7, Augustine's solution is to believe that things which seem disordered are part of a divine plan. These solutions are similar in that they are built upon the same concept: There is a whole into which God arranges all parts.[64] In *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32, all parts of God's creation are integrated into a unified whole. In *Sermon* 29D.7, everything that happens is part of God's providential plan. Furthermore, this is the same concept that undergirds Augustine's affirmation of the unity of scripture in *Practices* 1.17.30 and 1.28.56: All of the individual pieces of the Old Testament and the New Testament are part of God's unified scriptural book.[65] We have already shown Augustine to be drawing on rhetorical economy in *Practices* 1.17.30, 1.28.56, and *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32. So too is he utilizing rhetorical economy in *Sermon* 29D.7.

Concluding Remarks on Rhetorical Economy in *Sermon* 29D.4-7

Having elucidated Augustine's theological argument in *Sermon* 29D.4-7, and all of the evidence within it which pertains to rhetorical theory, I will now make some concluding remarks on Augustine's incorporation of rhetorical economy into his theology of creation in this text. To begin, while only the fifth of the six pieces of evidence which I

---

[64] Though similar, these solutions do have two differences. Firstly, they involve different objects: Augustine is referring to creation in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32, whereas he is speaking about God's plan in *Sermon* 29D.7. Additionally, Augustine offers two different responses. Whereas the Manichees should contemplate the whole creation to see how the offensive parts fit into it in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32, in *Sermon* 29D.7 Augustine encourages his audience to believe in the divine plan, which cannot be comprehended.

[65] See the section on *mor.* 1.17.30 and 1.28.56 in Chapter One.

have presented – his quotation of Cicero's *The Parts of Oratory* 6.21 – could establish Augustine's use of rhetorical economy on its own, all six pieces of evidence combine to make his use of rhetorical economy in this passage certain. Augustine's choice of the same referent – the human body – to illustrate the same concept of arrangement as Quintilian had done in his description of economical arrangement, his description of God's order as a *mirabilis ordinatio*, his portrayal of God as an artist whose work delights those who see it, his use of the term *decorum* in its rhetorical sense, his direct quotation of Cicero's phrase *paria paribus bina membra respondent* to characterize the arrangement of body parts, and his use of the same logic which he had utilized to respond to his opponents in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32, all combine to demonstrate that Augustine's concept of the order of created things in *Sermon* 29D.4-7 is that of an economical arrangement.

Furthermore, since Augustine's concept of the order of created things this passage is that of an economical arrangement, we can now observe three ways in which he utilizes rhetorical economy in this passage. Firstly, it is the logic behind his understanding of God's arrangement of all created things. Secondly, by functioning as his logic of the order of all created things, rhetorical economy allows Augustine to assert that all things are perfectly arranged. Since individual pieces find their meaning in the whole, and we lack the perspective to see that whole, even things which seem 'disordered' can be confidently affirmed as perfectly ordered according to the *ratio* of God the artist. Thirdly, rhetorical economy thus justifies Augustine's understanding of the totality of providence. Since everything is perfectly accommodated within the whole, then nothing can be claimed to be outside of God's judgment. Fourthly, rhetorical economy allows

Augustine to explain why there is seeming disorder. As with listeners to an oration or readers of a book, we cannot behold the whole of creation at once. Thus, lacking the perspective of the whole creation things will inevitably appear 'disordered' to us in our lives. Fifthly, and finally, Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy in a polemical argument against unnamed opponents who wish to challenge, or at least limit, the Christian doctrine of providence.

In this chapter I have shown that Augustine utilized rhetorical economy in his theology of creation in the middle of his career in *Sermon* 29D.7. In the final section of this chapter I will show that he incorporated rhetorical economy into his concept of order in *On Order* 1.7.18 in order to suggest that his use of rhetorical economy in his theology of creation in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 and *Sermon* 29D.7 derives from his integration of rhetorical economy into the heart of his concept of order.

RHETORICAL ECONOMY IN AUGUSTINE'S EARLY NOTION OF ORDER: *ON ORDER* 1.7.18

In this final section I will demonstrate that Augustine incorporates rhetorical economy into his notion of order in *On Order* 1.7.18. Previous scholars who have studied this passage have not recognized that Augustine is incorporating rhetorical theory into the substance of his thought in this text. Rather, for them his references to rhetorical concepts are inconsequential and the substance of his thought borrows from philosophical traditions. Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic's (2004) monograph on Augustine's concept of hidden order serves as one example of this pattern in scholarship. Although she recognizes that Augustine refers to rhetorical concepts in this passage, she treats his use

of the terms as incidental. Instead, before engaging the particulars of *On Order* 1.7.18, she frames Augustine's concept of God's incorporation of evil things into order as part of a long philosophical tradition:

> [Augustine] writes himself into a long tradition of ancient thought – inaugurated by Heraclitus, interpreted by Plato, and taken up again by the Stoics – according to which the harmony of contraries forms the unity of all, of the universe; the discord is, in fact, a source of accord, following the celebrated motif of the *concordia discors* ('discordant concord').[66]

Bouton-Touboulic, drawing from Leo Spitzer's (1944) work on the concept of *concordia discors*, argues that Augustine is participating in a philosophical tradition including Heraclitus, Plato, and the Stoics.[67]

This initial framework given by Bouton-Touboulic is a possible reading of *On Order* 1.7.18, but it has two significant problems. The first is that, beyond a general similarity concerning the concept of harmony from contrasting things, there are no other parallels between the three texts that she lists as evidence for her reading of *On Order* 1.7.18.[68] In *Fragment* 51, Heraclitus states: 'They do not perceive how, diverging, it

---

[66] 'Il s'inscrit ainsi dans une longue tradition de la pensée antique inaugurée par Heraclite, interprétée par Platon, et reprise à leur compte notamment par les stoïciens, selon laquelle l'harmonie des contraires forme l'unité du tout, de l'univers : le désaccord est en fait source d'accord ; d'après le célèbre motif de la *concordia discors.*' Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, *L'Ordre Caché : La notion d'ordre chez saint Augustin*, Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 174 (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2004), 166n36, 257-8.

[67] This is the obvious reading but, as I demonstrate, it has significant problems. Leo Spitzer, 'Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony: Prolegomena to an Interpretation of the Word "Stimmung", Part I,' *Traditio* 2 (1944): esp. 414-6.

[68] Bouton-Touboulic, as Jörg Trelenberg after her, is correct to assert that Augustine is drawing on the philosophical tradition for Licentius's argument that evil things are necessary in order. Bouton-Touboulic, *L'Ordre Caché*, 257-8; Trelenberg, *Augustins Schrift De Ordine: Einführung, Kommentar, Ergebnisse*, 120-1.

corresponds with itself: a contrary harmony, like of a bow and a lyre.'[69] In *Symposium* 187d, Plato interprets this phrase, stating that Heraclitus must be referring to things which were at variance with one another but have been brought into agreement by the musical art.[70] There is a generic similarity between the concept of harmony in these texts and the concept of order that we will see in *On Order* 1.7.18, but nothing else. Even more, I was not able to find a single reference in Augustine's corpus to Heraclitus's example of a bow and lyre.[71] The third and final text that Bouton-Touboulic cites suffers from the same problem. Cleanthes, the teacher of Chrysippus, states in his *Hymn to Zeus* 18-9: 'But you stand over immeasurable things to dispose complete things, and to order disorderly things, and unpleasant things are pleasant to you.'[72] Again, there is a general similarity

---

[69] Her., D49 (B51) (LCL 526: 160): οὐ ξυνιᾶσιν ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει· παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης. This new edition of Heraclitus's fragments in LCL has a new numbering system. I have referred to this fragment in the text above as *fragment* 51, which is the number it was given by Diels-Kranz. The LCL now lists it as D49, though it has retained the Diels-Kranz numbering in parentheses.

[70] Pl., *Symp.* 187A-B (trans. LCL 166: 127; Greek text LCL 166: 126): 'Now it is perfectly absurd to speak of a harmony at variance, or as formed from things still varying. Perhaps he meant, however, that from the grave and acute which were varying before, but which afterwards came to agreement, the harmony was by musical art created' (ἔστι δὲ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἁρμονίαν φάναι διαφέρεσθαι ἢ ἐκ διαφερομένων ἔτι εἶναι. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως τόδε ἐβούλετο λέγειν, ὅτι ἐκ διαφερομένων Βπρότερον τοῦ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, ἔπειτα ὕστερον ὁμολογησάντων γέγονεν ὑπὸ τῆς μουσικῆς τέχνης). Bouton-Touboulic lists her quotation as from *Symp.* 187D, but it appears to be from 187A-B. She does not offer the Greek text that she has translated. Bouton-Touboulic, *L'Ordre Caché*, 256n9.

[71] It is possible that such a reference exists, but I was not able to find it. This search was performed based upon several possible Latin terms that could have translated this term.

[72] Cleanthes, *Hymn to Zeus* 18-9 (STAC 33: 36.18-9): ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι, καὶ κοσμεῖν τἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν. I have followed J. Thom in both listing τἄκοσμα in the text and interpreting it as a contraction of τὰ ἄκοσμα. Johan C. Thom, *Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus: Text, Translation, and Commentary*, ed. Christoph Markschies, Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 33 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 37, 104. Thom's choice to place τἄκοσμα in his critical edition of the text is odd, however, since the term that he translates it as (τὰ

between Cleanthes's hymn and *On Order* 1.7.18 – both reference divine order – but there are not enough parallels between this text and *On Order* 1.7.18 to justify Bouton-Touboulic's reading. In addition to this, and most importantly, Augustine never uses Bouton-Touboulic's phrase 'discordant concord' (*concordia discors*).[73] But, as I will demonstrate in this section, he does name the rhetorical concept of *antitheton.*

In this section, I will offer an alternative reading of the concept of order that Augustine presents in *On Order* 1.7.18 (AD 386-7).[74] My primary focus will be to show that Augustine's very concept of order often includes rhetorical economy. Secondarily, then, I will also suggest that Augustine's incorporation of rhetorical economy into his notion of the order of creation in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 and *Sermon* 29D.4-7 derives from his earlier incorporation of rhetorical economy into his concept of order itself, which we see in *On Order* 1.7.18.

Augustine wrote *On Order* in the form of a dialogue, and in 1.7.18 we find two of Augustine's students at Cassiciacum, Licentius and Trygetius, in the middle of a disagreement. Their argument is over Licentius's concept of order. Accordingly, God

---

ἄκοσμα) is the very term written in the sole witness – Codex Farnesinus III D 15 (F). The reader can observe the presence of τὰ ἄκοσμα in the image of F that Thom has placed on pages 32-3 of his work, or consult the critical apparatus. That apparatus lists τἄκοσμα as a correction provided by Sauppe. This is ostensibly a reference to the 19th c. classical philologist, Hermann Sauppe. Unfortunately, I was not able to locate a volume in which Sauppe makes or justifies such an emendation. If located, such an argument should make for interesting reading since, according to TLG, the term τἄκοσμα only exists in this line of Cleanthus's hymn.

[73] Nor do the texts that Bouton-Touboulic cites.

[74] *On Order* is one of Augustine's earliest writings. He wrote it at Cassiciacum in the months between his conversion to Christianity in late August, AD 386, and his baptism in Milan during Easter Vigil, April 24-5, 387. For the dates of Augustine's conversion and baptism, see: Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, 64, 117. For the date of *ord.*, see: *AttA*, xlvii.

loves order and governs everything through it; nothing is outside of order – not even evil things.[75] Trygetius objects, arguing that Licentius's position leads to two impious positions: 1) Evil things come from God; and 2) God loves them.[76] Augustine writes:

> In this conclusion I feared for Licentius. But he, groaning at the difficulty of the words and not at all searching for what to answer, produced that which ought to be replied in this manner: 'God does not love evil things,' he said, 'and not on account of another thing, except that it is not of order that God should love evil things. And on account of that, he greatly loves order, since by it he does not love evil things. But truly, how can evil things themselves not exist in order (*in ordine*), even though God does not love them? For that itself is the order of evil things: that they are not loved by God. Or does it seem to you a small order of things, that God should both love good things and not love evil things? Thus, evil things, which God does not love, are not outside of order, but nevertheless God loves order itself. Indeed he loves this very thing – to love good things and not to love evil things – because this belongs to the great order and the divine arrangement (*quod est magni ordinis et diuinae dispositionis*). Whereby, since, by this very distinction, order and arrangement preserve the harmony of everything (*uniuersitatis congruentiam*), it happens that it is also necessary that evil things exist. So, in a certain manner, as if from antithetons, because this is also delightful to us in an oration, the beauty of all things is likewise formed from contraries (*ita quasi ex antithetis quodam modo, quod nobis etiam in oratione iucundum est, ex contrariis, omnium simul rerum pulchritudo figuratur*).[77]

---

[75] On the topic of causation, Licentius takes the position that nothing is outside of order in *ord.* 1.3.8 [(CCSL 29: 92.49-50): *nam praeter ordinem nihil mihi fieri uidetur*]. Licentius asks who could deny that God 'governs all things by order [(CCSL 29: 96.36): *cuncta ordine administrare*]' in 1.5.14. In 1.6.15 he affirms that order encompasses error. In 1.7.17 he affirms that order encompasses both good things and evil things.

[76] *ord.* 1.7.17.

[77] *ord.* 1.7.18 (CCSL 29: 97.19-98.35): in qua conclusione timui Licentio. at ille ingemescens difficultate uerborum nec omnino quaerens, quid responderet, sed quem ad modum quod respondendum erat promeret : non diligit deus mala, inquit, nec ob aliud, nisi quia ordinis non est, ut et deus mala diligat ; et ordinem ideo multum diligit, quia per eum non diligit mala. at uero ipsa mala qui possunt non esse in ordine, cum deus illa non diligat ? nam iste ipse est malorum ordo, ut non diligantur a deo. an paruus rerum ordo tibi uidetur, ut et bona deus diligat et non diligat mala ? ita nec praeter ordinem sunt mala, quae non diligit deus, et ipsum tamen ordinem diligit ; hoc ipsum enim diligit, diligere bona et non diligere mala, quod est magni ordinis et diuinae dispositionis. qui ordo atque dispositio quia uniuersitatis congruentiam ipsa distinctione custodit, fit, ut mala etiam esse necesse sit. ita quasi ex antithetis quodam modo, quod nobis etiam in oratione iucundum est, ex contrariis, omnium simul rerum pulchritudo figuratur.

Licentius answers Trygetius's challenge by including God's love for good things and hatred of evil things in 'the great order.' This allows him to continue to affirm his notion of order – God's hatred of evil things is part of the order that God loves. Licentius then closes his response by going one step further and arguing that evil things are necessary in God's order because they are the contraries of good things.

Most of Licentius's response in this passage represents the thought of Augustine at the time that he wrote *On Order.* Augustine has already affirmed the notion that nothing is outside of order in 1.3.8, and he further affirms Licentius's response in the opening lines of 1.7.18.[78] However, there is one caveat to Augustine's approval: he will undercut Licentius's position that evil things are necessary later in the work. In 2.7.21-4 Augustine establishes that God's order existed before there was anything evil. Moreover, Augustine does not argue that evil is necessary in God's order anywhere else in his corpus.[79] So, for Augustine, evil is included in, but not necessary to, God's order.[80] But the logic undergirding Licentius's overstep, which I will explain below, is affirmed by Augustine.[81]

---

[78] In 1.3.8 Licentius states: 'For it seems to me that nothing occurs outside of order [(CCSL 29: 92.49-50): *nam praeter ordinem nihil mihi fieri uidetur*].' Augustine responds to him: 'You have perceived very well [(CCSL 29: 92.55): *bene multum sensisti*].'

[79] Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic agrees that Augustine does not hold to the position of evil as necessary in order in *ord.* 1.7.18. Bouton-Touboulic, *L'Ordre Caché*, 160.

[80] This is made clear in *ord.* 2.7.21-4.

[81] Later in his career, Augustine will use the same logic, which I demonstrate on the following pages, to explain a slightly different claim: God has arranged evil things within the order of the ages (*ordinem saeculorum*). In *ciu.* 11.18 Augustine will again compare the use of antithetons in an oration to God's arrangement of evil things in order. However, in that text Augustine refers to order after angels and humans had sinned. Evil things are arranged in a certain manner when they came into existence, but the beauty of

Augustine's argument for the inclusion of evil things in order portrays God[82] as using 'the great order and divine arrangement' to preserve 'the harmony of everything.'[83] Augustine's reference to the concept of preservation represents a subtle but significant shift in the dialogue from production to preservation. Trygetius had objected in the final lines of 1.7.17 that, if God is the source of order, and order includes evil, then God must also be the source of evil. By clarifying that God uses order in order to preserve the harmony of everything, and giving that preservative function of order and arrangement the widest scope possible ('everything'), Augustine has found a logical framework upon which he can both exonerate God from responsibility for producing evil while also maintain that divine providence extends to all things.[84]

At the same location in the pericope, Augustine also explains how the great order and divine arrangement preserve the harmony between good and evil things. He states that they do so 'by this very distinction.' The distinction to which he is referring has been the topic of the previous lines – good things, and God's love for them, and evil things,

---

antithetons is a feature of this age of the world, rather than the justification for the necessity of evil in the world. (CCSL 48: 337.4-5): *ita ordinem saeculorum tamquam pulcherrimum carmen etiam ex quibusdam quasi antithetis honestaret*.

[82] Augustine has already established in 1.5.14 that God is the one who works through order. He states: 'Who can deny, O Great God, that you manage everything through order?' (CSEL 29: 96.35-6): *quis neget, deus magne, inquit, te cuncta ordine administrare ?* See also 1.1.2, where Augustine sets the range of God's arrangement as inclusive of everything – even down to the separate legs of a flea ([CSEL 29: 89.36-7]: *quod membra pulicis disposita mire atque distincta sunt*.)

[83] The concept of harmony had precedent in the philosophical tradition. However, as my argument above will show, Augustine's explicit references in *ord.* 1.7.18 to an oration and to the rhetorical concept of antithetons make the more likely reading of this pericope that he is drawing on the rhetorical tradition. At the least, he is synthesizing the rhetorical tradition with the philosophical tradition.

[84] This position might be an early expression of a position that he clearly states approximately a decade later in *conf.* 1.10.16: That God is the arranger of sin, but not the creator of it. However, Augustine does not make such a clear statement *ord.* 1.7.18.

and God's hatred of them. Augustine then compares this distinction to 'antithetons' within an oration. He writes:

> So, in a certain manner, as if from antithetons (*quasi ex antithetis*), because this is also delightful to us in an oration, the beauty of all things is likewise formed from contraries.[85]

Both 'distinction' and 'antitheton' were technical concepts in the rhetorical tradition. Within rhetorical theory 'distinction' (*distinctio*) was one of several forms of antitheton.[86] Since Augustine makes an unambiguous comparison between 'antithetons' within an oration and the 'distinction' of good and evil things in God's order, we will gain more insight into his meaning in this passage by first exploring the concept of antitheton.

According to Heinrich Lausberg, *antitheton* was a rhetorical concept of binary arrangement wherein two things of contrasting content were placed opposite one

---

[85] *ord.* 1.7.18 (CSEL 29: 98.33-5): ita quasi ex antithetis quodam modo, quod nobis etiam in oratione iucundum est, ex contrariis, omnium simul rerum pulchritudo figuratur.

[86] Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study*, trans. Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, and David E. Orton (Boston: Brill, 1998), §§ 797, 804-5. When Bouton-Touboulic moves from framing the conversation to a specific engagement of Augustine's concept of the *distinctio* of contrary goods and evils which produce the harmony of the universe, she makes the same move as she did in the initial framework which she offers for *ord.* 1.7.18. She begins by noting that Augustine uses the rhetorical terms *distinctio* and *antitheton*, but immediately turns to Plotinus to explain the substance of this idea, listing several proof-texts from *Ennead* 3 as evidence without an accompanying argument (3.2.16.28-34, 40-1, 49-50, 53-4). Bouton-Touboulic, *L'Ordre Caché*, 257-8, 257n19, 258n20. In those lines, Plotinus does engage the concept of opposing (ἀντιθείς) parts forming a whole in the world as similar to musical harmony (ἁρμονία). But, again, the texts lacks the specific parallels that I have enumerated between *On Order* 1.7.18 and rhetorical economy. Curiously, in *Enn.* 3.2.16.37-42 Plotinus compares the unity of the conflicting parts of the universe to a play (δρᾶμα) which brings conflicting things into harmony. If Plotinus would have left his description there, the concept of universal harmony would be similar to the one Augustine describes in *On Order* 1.7.18. However, Plotinus immediately judges that the concept he is describing is better represented by the analogy of the harmonization of conflicting sounds, which is not present in *On Order* 1.7.18.

another.[87] A key aspect of antitheton[88] was that it was a tool of both the second and third principal parts of rhetoric – arrangement (*dispositio*) and style (*elocutio*).[89] Such concepts were not uncommon in rhetorical theory because arrangement focused on both things (*res*) and words (*uerba*). Style and the first principle part of rhetoric, invention (*inuentio*), each dealt with one of those two – invention with things and style with words.[90] Thus antitheton, which involved the arrangement of things (*res*) and the arrangement of words (*uerba*), concerned both arrangement and style.[91] The concept had a long history in the

[87] Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, § 483, 781, 787-807.

[88] Though *antitheton* can be translated as 'antithesis,' I have not done so because it would confuse technical terminology from the rhetorical tradition. In rhetoric, *antithesis* was the replacement of one letter with another. Ibid., § 495. Consentius, probably an early 5th c. grammarian and thus a possible contemporary of Augustine, defined *antithesis* as such. Cons., *Ars.* (GL 5: 390.16-7): *antithesis est, cum littera pro littera ponitur.* On Consentius, see: Robert A. Kaster, 'Consentius,' in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, ed. Simon Hornblower, Antony Spawforth, and Esther Eidinow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[89] Though Quintilian discusses antitheton in Book 9 of *Inst.*, which is concerned with style (*elocutio*), Lausberg is correct to categorize it as a phenomenon of arrangement because it involves the ordering of words, word-pairs, and ideas. This is consistent with Quintilian's definition of economical arrangement in *Inst.* 7.10.16-7, which focuses on the arrangement of thoughts into an order. For a more nuanced discussion on the categories of arrangement and style in the rhetorical tradition, see the section titled 'An Introduction to Rhetorical Economy' in Chapter One.

[90] Lausberg has commented on the intertwined relationship that *dispositio* has with *inuentio* and *elocutio*: 'The binomial *res et verba* (cf. § 255) which determines a speech (*oratio*) is distributed among the parts of rhetoric (cf. § 255) in such a way that *inventio* is concerned with *res* ("ideas"; cf. § 260) and *elocutio* is concerned with *verba* ("linguistic expression"), whereas *dispositio* refers both to *res* and to *verba* (cf. § 455) [...] Therefore, even within *elocutio* there are questions of *dispositio* to be dealt with. Thus aspects of *elocutio* (§§ 496-527, 537, 599-1054) which are concerned with *verba coniuncta* are parts of *dispositio* as is also the virtue of *aptum* (§ 1055-1062). Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, § 454.

[91] Lausberg's treatment of *antitheton* reflects this. He discusses it in his section on arrangement as well as his section on style. Ibid., §§ 443, 787-807.

rhetorical tradition, and was discussed as early as the 4th c. BC.[92] In the 1st c. AD Quintilian writes of antitheton in *Oratorical Instructions* 9.3.81:

> *Contrapositum* or, as some say, *contentio* (it is called ἀντίθετον), is not restricted to one mode. For instance, single [words] can be placed opposite single [words], as in the manner I stated above: 'Lust conquered shame, daring fear.'[93] Also, a word-pair [can be placed opposite] word-pairs, [as in]: 'It is not from my talent (*nostri ingeni*), it is from your assistance (*uestri auxili*).' And a thought [can be placed opposite] thoughts, [as in]: 'Let it dominate in the assemblies, let it die in the courts.'[94]

Quintilian's text provides a helpful summative statement on the understanding of antitheton in the rhetorical tradition: An author employed antitheton by contrasting single words, word groups, or thoughts.[95]

---

[92] Anaximenes, *Rh. Al.* 1435b.26-8: 'Antitheton is, at the same time, the opposite expression and meaning being held in opposition, or one of the two of them ([LCL 317: 564.26-8]: ἀντίθετον μέν οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἐναντίαν τὴν ὀνομασίαν ἅμα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν <ἐν> τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις ἔχον, ἢ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων).' Though originally attributed to Aristotle, scholars think this work was probably written by Anaximenes (ca. 380-320 BC). Both served as tutors to Alexander the Great. David C. Mirhady, 'Introduction to *Rhetoric to Alexander*,' in *Aristotle XVI*, ed. Robert Mayhew and David C. Mirhady, LCL 317 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 451. Thus, regardless of which one wrote this text, it demonstrates that *antitheton* had a long history as a technical term in the rhetorical tradition.

[93] Cic, *Clu.* 15. The two quotations that follow are also from this work: *Clu.* 4 and 5, respectively.

[94] Quint., *Inst.* 9.3.81 (LCL 127: 150): contrapositum autem uel, ut quidam uocant, contentio (ἀντίθετον dicitur) non uno fit modo. nam et singula singulis opponuntur, ut in eo quod modo dixi : uicit pudorem libido, timorem audacia, et bina binis : non nostri ingeni, uestri auxili est, et sententiae sententiis : dominetur in contionibus, iaceat in iudiciis.

[95] Quintilian's statement also gives the framework for terminology surrounding antitheton – while Augustine used a transliterated form of the Greek term ἀντίθετον, other Latin authors often used the terms *contrapositum* or *contentio*. Augustine's transliteration of the Greek term ἀντίθετον in *On Order* 1.7.18 represents the third time that it had been transliterated in extant Latin literature. This is based on a search of LLT-A, which produced only two instances of the transliterated form, *antitheton*, before *ord.* 1.7.18. The first is in Persius's *Satires* (*Pers.* 1.85). The second is in a letter from Fronto to Antoninus Pius (*Ant.* 2.6).

Augustine's employment of antitheton in *On Order* 1.7.18 accords with this tradition in definition and result. Regarding definition, Augustine uses antitheton to describe a unit – an oration – that is built 'from contraries (*ex contrariis*).'[96] Cicero gave a similar definition in *The Orator* 50.166-7. He states that 'these things, which the Greeks call antithetons (ἀντίθετα),' occur 'when contraries are placed opposite contraries (*cum contrariis opponuntur contraria*).'[97] The author of the *Rhetorical Handbook for Herennius* (*Herennius*), using the synonym *contentio*, states the same thing: 'Antitheton (*contentio*) is when an oration is composed from contrary things (*ex contrariis rebus*).'[98] Augustine's phrasing (*ex contrariis*) nearly matches that of the anonymous author of Herennius (*ex contrariis rebus*).

Regarding result, Augustine states that the use of antithetons produces a positive response in an audience: 'it is pleasing (*iucundum est*) to us in an oration.' Cicero described a similarly positive response just after the definition given above. He states: 'The ancients before Isocrates were pleased (*delectabantur*) by this kind [of speech], particularly Gorgias.'[99]

Now that we understand antitheton as a concept and recognize that Augustine's usage of it followed the rhetorical tradition in both definition and result, let us turn to the

---

[96] Augustine will give a similar description of antitheton much later in his career in *ciu.* 11.18. There he defines it as 'contraries opposite contraries ([CCSL 48: 337.18-9]: *contraria contrariis opposita*).'

[97] Cicero gives this definition as an aside while arguing that antitheton produces rhythm in both poetry and oratory. Cic., *Orat.* 50.166 (LCL 342: 444): *semper haec, quae graeci* ἀντίθετα *nominant, cum contrariis opponuntur contraria.*

[98] *Auct. ad Her.* 4.15.21 (LCL 403: 282): contentio est cum ex contrariis rebus oratio conficitur.

[99] Cic., *Orat.* 50.167 (LCL 342: 444): hoc genere antiqui iam ante Isocratem delectabantur et maxime Gorgias.

two ways in which his use of it is significant for *On Order* 1.7.18. Firstly, Augustine's comparison of antithetons in an oration to distinction in God's order of everything elucidates the logic that he employs to explain God's ordering of evil things. Just as an orator forms a delightful oration by arranging contrary words and ideas next to one another, so God's order forms 'the beauty of all things' – and preserves 'the harmony of everything' – by arranging good things and evil things next to one another. In this way, the logic that Augustine employs to explain God's incorporation of evil things, and indeed 'everything,' into his order is the logic of rhetorical arrangement. Thus, we see that Augustine's use of the term is not incidental[100], but rather central to Augustine's concept of order in this text.

Secondly, since antitheton was a tool of arrangement within rhetorical theory by which an author produced an economical arrangement, then Augustine's very use of the concept of antitheton has also revealed that Augustine is utilizing rhetorical economy to conceive of God's order in this passage. Therefore, since Augustine uses antitheton to illustrate God's ordering which encompasses all things, he is incorporating rhetorical economy into his concept of God's ordering of all things. This is supported by four similarities between Augustine's use of antithetons in this passage and his incorporation of rhetorical economy into his theology of creation in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32, which I demonstrated at the beginning of this chapter. The first similarity is that, in both texts, Augustine is defending the existence of particular things which seem unfit to exist within God's creation. In *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 Augustine is explaining the existence of things which offend the Manichees, and in *On Order* 1.7.18

[100] Pace Bouton-Touboulic. See the introduction to this section.

he is justifying the existence of evil things. Another similarity is that Augustine explains that those things are arranged into a whole by God. The remaining two similarities are found in the last sentence of *On Order* 1.7.18. Note that similar to *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 Augustine here brings the concept of beauty into his discussion of the relationship between particular things and a whole.[101] The last similarity is that, in both texts, Augustine employs concepts from rhetoric in order to illustrate the arrangement of particulars things into a whole. In *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 Augustine uses the arrangement of words and syllables within a 'well-composed speech.' In *On Order* 1.7.18 Augustine is using the rhetorical concept of *antitheton*.

In exegeting *On Order* 1.7.18 we have already engaged with how Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy in this passage, but before ending this section I would like to highlight it and expand upon our previous engagement of it. In this passage Augustine's use of the concept of antitheton reveals that he utilized rhetorical economy as the logic by which he explains how God incorporates evil things into his order.

But we have also seen that Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy as the logic by which he explains God's ordering of 'everything.' This second usage reveals that, at least at this early date, Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his concept of divine order. This suggests that we should understand his incorporation of rhetorical economy into particular aspects of his theology, such as his theology of creation *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 and *Sermon* 29D.4-7, as derivative of his incorporation of

[101] In *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 Augustine describes a whole speech as *pulcher* when all of its pieces are considered as a whole. In *ord.* 1.7.18 Augustine states that the *pulchritudo* of all things is formed from contraries.

rhetorical economy into his very understanding of divine order. And we see that this is the case in both texts. Augustine's incorporation of rhetorical economy into his theology of creation in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 takes place in the midst of a discussion on God's arrangement of everything in the creation narrative of Gn 1.[102] Similarly, Augustine's incorporation of rhetorical economy into his theology of creation in *Sermon* 29D.4-7 takes place in the midst of Augustine discussing God's arrangement of created things which might seem objectionable into God's greater order.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown that Augustine incorporates rhetorical economy into his notion of the harmonious unity of all things within God's creation. I demonstrated that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of creation in his earliest work dedicated to the creation narratives in Gen 1-2, *On Genesis Against the Manichees* 1.21.32. I also showed that Augustine continued to utilize the concept in his theology of creation in the middle of his career in *Sermon* 29D.4-7. And, I provided a close reading of *On Order* 1.7.18 in order to suggest that Augustine's utilization of rhetorical economy in his theology of creation derives from his integration of rhetorical economy into the heart of his concept of order. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate that Augustine similarly utilized rhetorical theory in his theology of history.

[102] See the first section of this chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

Rhetorical Economy in Augustine's Theology of History

> In the first times, the sacrifice which God had commanded was fitting. But now this is not so. For he commanded another [form of worship] which is fitting for this time; [he] who knows much better than a human being what should be suitably employed at what time, [and] what he should bestow, add, withdraw, remove, augment, or diminish at what time – as the immutable creator of mutable [things] so also [is he] the [immutable] musical director [of mutable things] – until the beauty of the whole age, the particles of which are those things which are fitting to their own periods of time, plays out as a great song of a certain ineffable musical director, and [until] those who correctly worship God, even when it is a time of faith, cross over from that time into the contemplation of eternal vision.
>
> *Letter* 138.5[1]

Robert Markus writes of Augustine's understanding of history: 'He often thought of the whole vast fabric of human history as a majestically ordered whole, an extended song or symphony.'[2] Markus is correct that Augustine viewed history as an ordered whole and that he compared it to a song, but he fails to recognize that the two ideas are fundamentally connected in Augustine's mind. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that rhetorical economy[3], the accommodative principle of rhetorical arrangement by which an author formed the individual pieces of a text or speech into a unified whole, lies behind

---

[1] *ep.* 138.5 (CCSL 31B.277.73-278.82): *Aptum fuit primis temporibus sacrificium, quod praeceperat deus, nunc uero non ita est. Aliud enim praecepit, quod huic tempori aptum esset, qui multo magis quam homo nouit, quid cuique tempori accommodate adhibeatur, quid quando impertiat, addat, auferat, detrahat, augeat minuatue immutabilis mutabilium sicut creator ita moderator, donec uniuersi saeculi pulchritudo, cuius particulae sunt, quae suis quibusque temporibus apta sunt, uelut magnum carmen cuiusdam ineffabilis modulatoris excurrat atque inde transeant in aeternam contemplationem speciei, qui deum rite colunt, etiam cum tempus est fidei.* All translations are my own.

[2] R.A. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 16-7.

[3] See Chapter One for a detailed discussion of the literary and rhetorical concept of economy.

Augustine's view that God has arranged all parts of history[4] into a unified whole. I will also show how rhetorical economy functions in his theology of history in each of the texts which I present in this chapter, thus demonstrating that Augustine's conception of history as a song (and a speech) is not incidental, but rather a substantial component in his theological project.

I will make my argument in this chapter in three movements which are chronologically ordered. First, I will demonstrate that Augustine incorporated rhetorical

---

[4] In this chapter I will use the term 'history' to refer to all past, present, and future time. This breaks from the use of the term by R.A. Markus in his work distinguishing 'sacred' from 'secular' history within Augustine's thought, wherein he uses the term to refer to statements made about the past: Markus, *Saeculum*, 14. Additionally, as the reader will see in the texts that I present in this chapter, Augustine simply speaks of the passing of time. In fact, for Augustine the term *historia* represents a literary genre. He discusses the term and clearly defines it in two of his earlier texts – *util. cred.* 3.5 (AD 391-2) and *Gn. litt. inp.* 2.5 (393-4). In both texts Augustine mentions history in his list of the four senses according to which the scriptures are interpreted – according to history (*secundum historiam*), according to aetiology (*secundum aetiologiam*), according to analogy (*secundum analogiam*), and according to allegory (*secundum allegoriam*). And in both he treats *historia* according to its common usage in late antiquity – as a recording of past events (See *historia* in LS). In *util. cred.* 3.5, we see this in the way that he defines reading the scriptures 'according to history.' He states that to read the scriptures according to history is to read them 'according to what was written and what was done [(CSEL 25/1: 8.8-9) *quid scriptum aut quid gestum sit*].' In *Gn. litt. inp*. 2.5 he explicitly states this definition of *historia* as he introduces his four-fold manner of scriptural exegesis: 'History is when a thing done by either God or a human is recounted [(CSEL 28/1: 461.13-4): *historia est, cum siue diuinitus siue humanitus res gesta commemoratur*].' My reading of *Gn. litt. inp.* 2.5 agrees with that of R.A. Markus: Robert A. Markus, 'History,' in *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, et al. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999), 433. For the dates of *util. cred.* 3.5 and *Gn. litt. inp.* 2.5, see: *AttA*, xlv, il. R. Teske notes that Augustine later added a paragraph or two to *Gn. litt. inp.* while writing *retr.* in the mid-420s. Roland J. Teske, 'Genesis Accounts of Creation,' in *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, et al. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999), 380. I have chosen to use the term 'history' to refer to all past and future time in this chapter for two reasons: first, it more closely approximates contemporary understandings of history and thus will communicate the correct concept to the reader; and second, it is briefer than writing out variations of the phrase 'the passing of time' throughout this chapter.

economy into his theology of history by AD 390-1 by means of a close reading of *On True Religion* 22.42-3. Then, I will show that he continued to do so into the mid to late 390s through a close reading of *On Music* 6.11.29-30. In the final section of this chapter, I will establish that Augustine continued to conceive of history as economically arranged by means of evidence from five texts written between AD 402 and 417 – *On the Nature of the Good* 8, *Against Secundinus the Manichee* 15, *Letter* 138.5, and *City of God* 11.18.

AUGUSTINE'S USE OF RHETORICAL ECONOMY IN HIS THEOLOGY OF HISTORY IN AD 390-1: *ON TRUE RELIGION* 22.42-3

An early instance of Augustine employing rhetorical economy in his theology of history is found in *On True Religion* 22.42-3 (AD 390-1).[5] The vignette occurs in the midst of a discussion of temporal things which begins in 21.41 wherein Augustine states that corporeal beauty is the lowest beauty because it is temporal and cannot simultaneously 'hold' all things.[6] In 22.42 Augustine begins by appealing to syllables passing in a song in order to illustrate his point. He writes:

---

[5] This is the earliest text that I present in this chapter. It is possible that *mus.* 6.11.29-30, which I present in the next section, represents Augustine's thought from this early period as well. However, Augustine probably emended Book 6 of that work in the mid to late 390s. For more on that emendation, see n.18. Also, I have already demonstrated that Augustine conceives of history as a speech in *uer. rel.* 21.41-22.43 in Chapter Two. In this chapter I will focus on Augustine's conception of the order of history as the order of a speech. For the date of *uer. rel*., see: *AttA*, il.

[6] Augustine states this clearly in *uer. rel.* 21.41: 'Now truly: "The body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul, and the earthly dwelling presses down the thinking sense with many things" (Wis 9.15) because the lowest beauty of bodies is hurried away in the order of succession. It is the lowest [beauty] because it is not able to simultaneously hold all things; rather, while different things yield and succeed, they fill up the number of temporal forms into one beauty' [(CCSL 32: 213.17-23): *nunc uero corpus, quod corrumpitur, aggrauat animam et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum*

(22.42) And this whole [number of passing temporal forms which form one beauty][7] is not evil because it passes by. For, in such a way a verse is also beautiful in its kind, even though two syllables can in no way be simultaneously spoken. For the second is not uttered unless the first has passed by, and so through order (*per ordinem*) it is brought to an end so that, when the sole last [syllable] sounds, without the previous [syllables] sounding with it, [that last syllable] – woven together (*contexta*) with the past ones – completes the form and decorum (*decus*) of the meter. Yet, the art itself (*ars ipsa*), by which the verse is fashioned, is not subject to time in this way so that its beauty might be dispersed through measures of pauses. But rather, it simultaneously holds all things, from which it brings about a verse [which is] not simultaneously holding all things but rather replacing earlier things with later ones, yet beautiful since it displays the footprints of that beauty, which the art itself constantly and incommutably preserves.

(22.43) Therefore, just as some perverse [people] love a verse more than the art itself by which the verse is brought about, since they have surrendered themselves more to [their] ears than [their] understanding, so also many [people] are fond of temporal things. They do not pursue divine providence, the founder and moderator of periods of time, and, in the midst of the very delight of temporal things, they do not wish that which they love to pass on. And they are as absurd[8] as someone who, in a recitation of a celebrated song, wants to perpetually hear

---

multa cogitantem, quia rapitur in ordinem successionis extrema corporum pulchritudo. nam ideo extrema est, quia simul non potest habere omnia, sed dum alia cedunt atque succedunt, temporalium formarum numerum in unam pulchritudinem complent].

[7] The 'whole (*totum*)' that Augustine refers to here is the 'number of temporal forms (*temporalium formarum numera*)' that forms into 'one beauty,' which he mentions in the previous sentence. See the last line of *uer. rel.* 21.41 in n.6.

[8] For the full semantic range of the term *absurdus*, see the entry in OLD: 'absurdus,' in *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, ed. P.G.W. Glare (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). Augustine's use of the adjective *absurdi* (*absurdus*) in this pericope exploits the term's full semantic range, which has no English equivalent. This range of meaning shares space with that of the English term absurd, meaning awkward, uncouth, preposterous, or ridiculous. This fits Augustine's argument in the text above – those who want to hold on to temporal things rather than letting them pass are acting in a silly manner because the intelligent person understands that temporal things must, eventually, pass on. However, the Latin term *absurdus* was also used to describe noise that was discordant or out of tune. With this range of meaning, it was synonymous with *absonus* (See the entries for *absurdus* and *absonus* in LS, as well as Cicero's treatment of them as a synonymous couplet in *de Orat.* 3.11.42 [(LCL 349: 32): *mollis uox aut muliebris aut quasi extra modum absona atque absurda*]). Furthermore, the term *absurdus* is a compound word formed from the preposition *ab* and the adjective *surdus*, which means 'deaf.' This second range of meaning also fits Augustine's argumentation in the above text. The person who desires to hear one syllable perpetually must do so from a deficiency in his ability to hear. This intended meaning becomes clear with the next sentence: 'But such hearers of songs are not found.'

> only one single syllable. But such hearers of songs are not found. However, all [places] are filled with such judges of things. With that in view, not only is there no one who is unable to easily hear the entire verse, but [there is] also [no one who is unable to hear] the entire song. However, no human being is able to perceive the entire order of the ages (*totum...ordinem saeculorum*). Humanity comes to this place not because we are parts of a song (*carminis...partes*), but rather because we have been made parts of the ages (*saeculorum...partes*) by condemnation.[9]

In 22.42 Augustine asserts that the beauty of a verse lies in the completed verse and not in its smaller parts – its syllables. Once the final syllable has sounded, then 'the form and decorum of the meter' is complete. He then clarifies the relationship between the art of music and a particular verse – the art simultaneously holds all things and is thus higher than the song; but the song still contains the 'footprints' of the beauty of the art, and even though it cannot hold all things at once, it can still be beautiful. Following this treatment of syllables in a song, in 22.43 Augustine draws a comparison between a song, 'the ages,' and their attendant parts. He concludes from this comparison that human beings in 'the

---

[9] *uer. rel.* 22.42-3 (CCSL 32: 213.1-214.28): et hoc totum non propterea malum, quia transit. sic enim et uersus in suo genere pulcher est, quamuis duae syllabae simul dici nullo modo possint. nec enim secunda enuntiatur, nisi prima transierit, atque ita per ordinem peruenitur ad finem, ut, cum sola ultima sonat, non secum sonantibus superioribus formam tamen et decus metri cum praeteritis contexta perficiat. nec ideo tamen ars ipsa, qua uersus fabricatur, sic tempori obnoxia est, ut pulchritudo eius per mensuras morarum digeratur. sed simul habet omnia, quibus efficit uersum non simul habentem omnia, sed posterioribus priora tollentem, propterea tamen pulchrum, quia extrema uestigia illius pulchritudinis ostentat, quam constanter atque incommutabiliter ars ipsa custodit. (22.43) itaque ut nonnulli peruersi magis amant uersum quam ipsam artem, qua conficitur uersus, quia plus se auribus quam intellegentiae dediderunt, ita multi temporalia diligunt, conditricem uero ac moderatricem temporum diuinam prouidentiam non requirunt atque in ipsa dilectione temporalium nolunt transire quod amant, et tam sunt absurdi, quam si quisquam in recitatione praeclari carminis unam aliquam syllabam solam perpetuo uellet audire. sed tales auditores carminum non inueniuntur. talibus autem rerum existimatoribus plena sunt omnia, propterea quia nemo est, qui non facile non modo totum uersum, sed etiam totum carmen possit audire. totum autem ordinem saeculorum sentire nullus hominum potest. huc accedit, quod carminis non sumus partes, saeculorum uero partes damnatione facti sumus. illud ergo canitur sub iudicio nostro, ista peraguntur de labore nostro.

ages' are like syllables in a song. They cannot perceive the beauty of 'the entire order of the ages' because, like syllables which come and go within a whole song, they only exist for a short span within the whole of time.

In the first paragraph of this pericope, Augustine asserts that the form of a verse's meter is completed when the pieces of the verse – its syllables – are 'woven together' into the whole meter 'through order' by means of an 'art.' Three aspects of this description combine to reveal that Augustine is employing rhetorical economy in this passage.[10] Firstly, Augustine draws on classical prosody to describe an order that is conceptually similar to rhetorical economy. In classical prosody, as I will demonstrate in the next section, the order of syllables chosen by an author determined both if a meter had been formed and, if so, which type of meter it was.[11] Words, then, which contain varying numbers of syllables with various lengths, had to be carefully chosen and arranged to form a whole verse of a certain meter. The order that the syllables are given is thus key to completing the meter. Without being given a certain order, the syllables would not fit a particular meter, and would not produce a verse that contains the 'footprints' of the

[10] Augustine's use of the term *decus* might represent a fourth aspect of this passage which reveals that he is employing rhetorical economy. Within rhetorical theory, decorum and economy were the twin principles of accommodation associated with, respectively, style and arrangement. It is possible that Augustine's reference to both the 'form and decorum' of the completed verse refers to both the arrangement of all of the individual pieces to the whole (economy) as well as the arrangement of the individual pieces to one another (decorum). However, there is not enough evidence in the text to confirm this reading. See Chapter One for more on the relationship between decorum and economy.

[11] For more on meter in classical prosody, see: James W. Halporn, Martin Ostwald, and Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, *The Meters of Greek and Latin Poetry*, rev. ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980). Also, see my extensive treatment of meter in the next section of this chapter, which focuses on *mus.* 6.11.29-30.

beauty of the art of music. Rather, an author would have produced a pell-mell collection of syllables.

Secondly, this ordering of syllables, which are by definition temporal, is performed according to an art (*ars*) 'which is not subject to time.' Heinrich Lausberg notes that in the Classical world there were only two arts which 'made it their object to keep in check the natural unrestrained succession of long and short syllables: the *ars poetica* and the *ars rhetorica*.'[12] Since the poetic art was concerned with words in music, Augustine's reference to an 'art' in this passage must be to the poetic art. Yet, since both arts used the same rules with regard to arrangement, Augustine is also referring to rhetorical economy.[13] Cicero provides a helpful illustration of the similarity between the two arts when he writes in *The Orator* 227 that the difference between an oration and a poem is simply the order of the feet (a small unit of syllables from which meter is formed).[14]

Thirdly, Augustine's use of the verb *contexere* ('to weave together') to describe how the parts of the verse are placed together into a whole follows the term's usage to describe an economical arrangement in the rhetorical tradition. Both Quintilian and

---

[12] Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study*, trans. Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, and David E. Orton (Boston: Brill, 1998), § 978.

[13] It is at this point that my shorthand throughout this project of 'rhetorical economy' for the phrase 'literary and rhetorical economy' is problematic. The longer phrase inherently includes the *ars poetica*, whereas the shorthand gives the appearance that the *ars poetica* and *ars rhetorica* would have different understandings of arrangement and economy.

[14] Cicero understood rhetoric and poetry as differentiated only by the order of the metrical feet. He writes: 'But the order of feet makes that which is uttered seem like an oration or a poem.' Cic., *Orat.* 227 (LCL 342: 498.227): *sed ordo pedum facit, ut id quod pronuntiatur aut orationis aut poematis simile uideatur*.

Cicero used the term to describe the same process with regard to the parts of a speech and the whole speech. Cicero used the verb's supine form in reference to a speech having been brought together, referring to 'the entire weaving together (*contextu*) of an oration.'[15] Quintilian also used the verb in the same manner while describing how a speech can be pulled together by thinking alone in situations that do not allow an orator to write down his or her thoughts. He states:

> And this not only arranges the order (*ordinem*) of things among themselves, which would be sufficient itself, but also connects words, and thus weaves together (*contexit*) the entire oration so that it lacks nothing except for handwriting.[16]

Similar to Quintilian, Augustine explicitly mentions the order (*ordo*) of the verse while also stating that it is woven together (*contexere*) into a unified whole. Thus, Augustine's manner of use of the term *contexere* and his reference to an 'art' indicates that his description of the arrangement of a verse in 22.42 is an employment of rhetorical economy.

Augustine brings this same concept of economical arrangement into his theology of history in 22.43 by means of the comparison that he draws between the arrangement of a verse and that of 'the ages.' In both sides of his comparison things that are not temporal arrange particular temporal things into orders that form unified wholes. In 22.42, the art of poetry places syllables into an ordered whole – the meter of a verse. In 22.43, divine providence places human lives into an ordered whole – 'the entire order of the ages

---

[15] Cic., *Part.* 82 (LCL 349: 370): toto quasi contextu orationis.

[16] Quint., *Inst.* 10.6.2 (LCL 127: 368.2): Neque uero rerum ordinem modo, quod ipsum satis erat, intra se ipsa disponit, sed uerba etiam copulat, totamque ita contexit orationem ut ei nihil praeter manum desit.

(*totum...ordinem saeculorum*).' Augustine proceeds to clarify that human beings are not parts of a song, but the logic that he uses to explain the entire order of the ages, of which all temporal things including human lives are a part, is that of rhetorical economy.

Augustine employs the logic of rhetorical economy in his theology of history in 22.43 in two ways.[17] Firstly, he uses it to explain God's providential ordering of all of history: God's providence orders all of history in the same way that the art of poetry orders an entire verse. Secondly, he uses the logic of rhetorical economy to explain why 'no human being is able to perceive the entire order of the ages.' According to Augustine, even as a syllable might be perfectly integrated into a beautiful verse, a human being might be perfectly integrated into history. Moreover, just as the syllable is unable to perceive the beauty of the whole verse due to its temporal existence, human beings are similarly limited in their ability to see the beauty of God's arrangement of history.

In this section we have seen that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of history by means of a comparison that he draws between the arrangement of a verse and the arrangement of 'the entire order of the ages' in *On True Religion* 22.42-3. We have also seen that he employed rhetorical theory in this early work to explain the order that divine providence has given to the entirety of history, human inability to perceive that order, and the integral role that human disgrace plays in that

[17] Augustine's comparison also affirms the beauty of temporal things which, just as the passing syllables in a verse bear the 'footprints' of the art's beauty, bear 'footprints' of God's beauty. However, this employment of the comparison does not directly relate to Augustine's use of rhetorical economy, and thus I have not included it in the above text.

order. In the next section I will show that Augustine continued to incorporate rhetorical economy into his theology of history in the mid to late 390s.

Augustine's Use of Rhetorical Economy in His Theology of History in the Mid to Late 390s: *On Music* 6.11.29-30

On Music 6.11.29-30, written in AD 387-91 and then emended in the mid to late 390s[18], provides a second instance of Augustine incorporating rhetorical economy into

[18] Augustine probably emended Book 6 in the mid to late 390s, though scholars disagree over the timing. The debate largely concerns a statement that Augustine made to Memorius of Capua in AD 408 or 409. In *ep.* 101.1 Augustine tells Memorius that he could not send him all six books of *mus.* because he had not had time to emend them. However, in 101.4 he states that he is sending Book 6, 'which I found emended (*quem emendatum reperi*).' This statement indicates that Book 6 underwent some sort of emendation by Augustine after he initially wrote all six books between 387-91 (see *AttA*, xlvii). Scholars disagree on the date and extent of this emendation. Martin Jacobsson and Lukas Dorfbauer, in their introduction to the new critical edition of *mus.* (CSEL 102), give a thorough and helpful *status quaestionis*. Martin Jacobsson and Lukas J. Dorfbauer, 'Introduction,' in *Augustinus, De musica*, ed. Martin Jacobsson, CSEL 102 (Boston: De Gruyter, 2017), 1-10. They conclude that the *emendatio* 'happened at a time not very far from the composition of the rest of book 6, but far enough for Augustine's obvious change of mind regarding the importance of the *artes liberales*.' ibid., 9. This disagrees with other scholars, who distrust Augustine's claim that he found Book 6 already emended. For example: Erika T. Hermanowicz, 'Book Six of Augustine's *De musica* and the Episcopal Embassies of 408,' *AugStud*, no. 35 (2004): 174. However, I do not see sufficient reason to doubt Augustine's statement and date the emendation near the time that Augustine wrote *ep.* 101, and I agree with the judgment of Jacobsson and Dorfbauer that the emendation was made at an earlier date. Unfortunately, the extent of the *emendatio* and its precise time cannot be determined with certainty. Thus, I tentatively assign the *emendatio* to the mid to late 390s, which is late enough for him to have returned to the text to emend it and early enough for him to have forgotten about the emendation by 408. Also, Augustine's quotation of the Christian scriptures in *mus.* 6.11.29-30, something that does not take place in the first five books of *mus.*, makes it likely that the pericope was included in the later *emendatio*. For the date of *ep.* 101, see: Robert B. Eno, 'Epistulae,' in *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, et al. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999), 301. Keller states that Augustine never quotes scripture in *mus.* 1-5. Adalbert Keller, *Aurelius Augustinus und*

his theology of history.[19] The pericope presents several relevant themes, so I will begin by quoting it in its entirety. Following this, I will provide a lengthy treatment of the pericope which will show that Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy in this text while concomitantly explaining his meaning in the passage. This treatment has three movements. In the first and most extensive movement, I will present key themes from 6.11.29 while demonstrating that Augustine's concept of equality and his phrase 'the law of equality' both draw on rhetorical theory. In the second movement I will focus on Augustine's thought in 6.11.30 while showing that Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy in his concept of order. In the final movement, I will draw upon the work done in the previous two in order to demonstrate that Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy in his theology of history to explain three things in this passage – God's providential ordering of all of history, human inability to perceive this order, and the inclusion of sin in this order.

Before I begin this treatment, however, let us take a look at *On Music* 6.11.29-30. Augustine writes:

> (29) Therefore, let us not envy things inferior to us. And let us – with our God and Lord helping – order (*ordinemus*) ourselves between those things which are underneath us and those things which are above us so that we are not offended by inferior things; rather, let us delight in superior things alone. For delight is like the weight of the soul. Therefore, delight orders the soul. 'For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also' (Mt 6.21). Where [your] delight [is], there [is your] treasure; moreover, where [your] heart [is], there [is] either [your] happiness or [your] misery. Truly, those things are superior in which the highest, unshakeable,

---

die Musik: Untersuchungen zu „De musica" im Kontext seines Schrifttums, Cassiciacum XLIV (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1993), 155.

[19] Two helpful introductions to *mus.* are: Jacobsson and Dorfbauer, 'Introduction.'; Brian Brennan, 'Augustine's *De Musica*,' *VC* 42 (1988). While Brennan's article offers a helpful overview of *mus.*, he neglects to engage sources for Augustine's ideas outside of the Neoplatonic tradition.

> incommutable, and eternal equality (*aequalitas*) remains, where there is no time, since there is no mutability, and whence periods of time (*tempora*) are made and ordered (*ordinat*) and moderated, imitating eternity while the rotation of heaven returns to the same [state], restores celestial bodies to the same [place], and, in the days, months, years, lustrals[20], and other orbits of the stars, complies with the laws of equality (*aequalitatis*), unity (*unitatis*), and order (*ordinationis*). So, with earthly [bodies] placed under celestial [bodies], the orbits of their times are joined together with a rhythmic[21] succession, like a song of the universe (*carmini uniuersitatis*), (30) in which many things seem to us disordered and confused, since we are sewn into their order according to our merits, not knowing what beautiful thing divine providence carries for us since, for example, if someone is placed, just as a statue, in one certain corner in the most distinguished and most beautiful part of a temple, he will not be able to sense the beauty of that architecture of which he himself will be a part; nor does the soldier on the front line have the power to observe the order of the whole army; and in whatever poem, if the syllables sound for however great an interval [of time], for such [time] as they are living and sensing, in no way are the rhythm and the beauty of the composed work pleasing to them, as much as each one cannot observe and approve the whole, since [the whole] was constructed and perfected from those passing single [syllables]. So, God ordered the sinning human being as foul, but not foully. For, he was made foul by [his] will, by losing that which he, complying with the precepts of God, possessed. And he was ordered in a part (*in parte*) so that he who did not wish to follow the law was pursued by the law.[22]

---

[20] Augustine's use of the term 'lustrals' (*lustris*) could refer to the lustral sacrifices which were performed every five years, but more probably refers to the five-year period of time from which the sacrifices took their name.

[21] Augustine chooses the term *numerositas*, which can be translated several ways. Broadly, it can refer to either the quantity ('numerous/multitudinous') or the quality ('rhythmic/harmonious/melodious') of things. Unfortunately, the term is not included in *AugLex* and, as far as I am aware, there has been no focused treatment of Augustine's use of it. I have chosen the translation 'rhythmic' in this text since Augustine's use of the term takes place in the context of a discussion of the equality of metrical units in prosody. See my treatment of *mus.* 6.10.16-7 later in this section.

[22] *mus.* 6.11.29-30 (CSEL 102: 215.1-12): non ergo inuideamus inferioribus quam nos sumus nosque ipsos inter illa, quae infra nos sunt, et illa, quae supra nos sunt, ita deo et domino nostro opitulante ordinemus, ut inferioribus non offendamur, solis autem superioribus delectemur. delectatio quippe quasi pondus est animae; delectatio ergo ordinat animam. ubi enim erit thesaurus tuus, ibi erit et cor tuum : ubi delectatio, ibi thesaurus ; ubi autem cor, ibi beatitudo aut miseria. quae uero superiora sunt nisi illa, in quibus summa, inconcussa, incommutabilis, aeterna manet aequalitas ubi nullum est tempus, quia mutabilitas nulla est, et unde tempora fabricantur et ordinantur et modificantur aeternitatem imitantia, dum caeli conuersio ad idem redit et caelestia corpora ad idem reuocat diebusque et mensibus et annis ac lustris ceterisque siderum orbibus legibus aequalitatis et unitatis et ordinationis obtemperat. ita caelestibus terrena subiecta orbes temporum suorum numerosa successione quasi carmini uniuersitatis

Augustine begins this pericope by encouraging his readers to delight in 'superior things' because delight orders the soul.[23] Following this, he focuses on the equality of these superior things. They are 'those things in which the highest, unshakeable, incommutable, and eternal equality remains.' Augustine then states that superior things are from that eternal existence 'whence periods of time (*tempora*) are made and ordered (*ordinat*) and moderated.' At this point in the pericope, Augustine shifts to a consideration of temporal existence. He compares the orbits of earthly and celestial bodies to a 'song of the universe,' in which many things appear to human beings as 'disordered and confused' because we are 'sewn into their order.' Augustine then spends the remainder of the pericope discussing the order that God has given to 'periods of time.' He explains human inability to see this order by means of three illustrations in which an individual thing lacks the necessary perspective to 'perceive' the whole into which it is integrated – a

---

associant. (30) in quibus multa nobis uidentur inordinata et perturbata, quia eorum ordini pro nostris meritis assuti sumus nescientes, quid de nobis diuina prouidentia pulchrum gerat, quoniam si quis uerbi gratia in amplissimarum pulcherrimarumque aedium uno aliquo angulo tamquam statua collocetur, pulchritudinem illius fabricae sentire non poterit, cuius et ipse pars erit; nec uniuersi exercitus ordinem miles in acie ualet intueri; et in quolibet poemate, si quanto spatio syllabae sonant, tanto uiuerent atque sentirent, nullo modo illa numerositas et contexti operis pulchritudo eis placeret, quam totam perspicere atque approbare non possent, cum de ipsis singulis praetereuntibus fabricata esset atque perfecta. ita peccantem hominem ordinauit deus turpem, non turpiter. turpis enim factus est uoluntate uniuersum amittendo, quod dei praeceptis obtemperans possidebat, et ordinatus in parte est, ut, qui lege agere noluit, lege agatur.

[23] Catherine Pickstock sees the first lines of *mus.* 6.11.29 as evidence that Augustine thought that the soul could be jealous of the beauty of lower things. Catherine Pickstock, 'Ascending Numbers: Augustine's *De musica* and the Western Tradition,' in *Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community*, ed. Lewis Ayres and Gareth Jones (New York: Routledge, 1998), 204; Catherine Pickstock, 'Music: Soul, City and Cosmos after Augustine,' in *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology*, ed. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward (London: Taylor and Francis, 1998), 264.

statue in a temple, a soldier in an army, and a syllable in a poem. Finally, Augustine closes the pericope by asserting that God has even ordered the 'sinning human being.'

Equality is a key concept for Augustine in 6.11.29, but it is not clear within the text itself how he understands the concept. Augustine does, however, give the concept a full treatment in the three chapters which precede this passage. His most robust treatment is in 6.10.26. There, he is in the midst of an inquiry into what delights the highest part of the soul, reason (*ratio*), when he turns his attention to the concept of rhythm (*numerositas*).[24] He writes:

> And now, with regard to [reason's] own delight – by which it inclines toward movements of times and shows its approval with excellent rhythms which ought to be controlled[25] – it thus it leads [to this question]: 'What is that which we love in sensible rhythm?' [Is it] anything other than equality (*parilitatem*) and equally (*aequaliter*) measured intervals? Does the pyrrhic foot, or the spondee, or the anapest, or the dactyl, or proceleusmatic, or dispondee delight us for any other reason than it brings together its part with the equal division (*aequali diuisione*) of another part? And, truly, what do the iamb, trochee, and tribrach have of beauty, if not that they equally divide their major part with their lesser part in two such [parts]?'[26]

According to Augustine reason delights in music because of the equality of metrical units. As proof, he offers several classical metrical units which possess equality in the

---

[24] In 6.10.25 Augustine writes that reason (*ratio*) is the head of the soul in a brief phrase: 'the soul, of which [reason] itself is the head.' (CSEL 102: 213.11): *anima, cuius caput ipsa esset*]'.

[25] Augustine uses a gerundive here (*modificandis*) to express that such rhythms ought to be controlled.

[26] *mus.* 6.10.26 (CSEL 102: 213.1-8): et nunc cum ipsa sua delectatione, qua in temporum momenta propendet et talibus numeris modificandis nutus suos exhibet, sic agit : quid est, quod in sensibili numerositate diligimus ? num aliud praeter parilitatem quandam et aequaliter dimensa interualla ? an ille pyrrhichius pes siue spondeus siue anapaestus siue dactylus siue proceleumaticus siue dispondeus nos aliter delectaret, nisi partem suam parti alteri aequali diuisione conferret ? quid uero iambus, trochaeus, tribrachus pulchritudinis habent, nisi quod minore sua parte maiorem suam partem in duas tantas aequaliter diuidunt ?

distribution of the lengths of their component parts. The first list that Augustine gives includes metrical units which possess an even number of syllables. They are as follows [note that two short syllables (˘˘) have the same length-value as one long syllable (–)]:[27]

Metrical Unit	**Length**
Pyrrhic Foot[28]	˘ ˘
Spondee	– –
Dactyl	– ˘˘
Anapest (Reverse Dactyl)	˘˘ –
Proceleusmatic	˘˘ ˘˘
Dispondee (Double Spondee)	— —

This first list illustrates that, in music, the equality that reason loves in complex wholes – that is, metrical units which contain multiple syllables – is an equality of balance. Augustine's choice of which metrical units from classical prosody to include in this list demonstrate his point. The syllables that make up each composite metrical unit

[27] In this table, I have provided a space at the middle point of each metrical unit to assist the reader in discerning the equality of lengths that each half of the metrical unit contains. Long syllables are represented by '–' and short syllables by '˘'. For an anapest, see the entry for *anapaestus* in LS. For a dispondee, see the entry for *dispondeus* in LS. For all others, see: Halporn, Ostwald, and Rosenmeyer, *The Meters of Greek and Latin Poetry*, 62, 129-32.

[28] There is disagreement over whether the foot or the dactyl were considered meter. See: W. Sidney Allen, *Accent and Rhythm: Prosodic Features of Latin and Greek: A Study in Theory and Reconstruction*, ed. W. Sidney Allen, et al., Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 12 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 122-5. Since the status of the foot or the dactyl as meter does not affect my argument, I have included both under the category of 'metrical unit' for the sake of brevity.

can be divided so that there are equal total length-values of syllables in each half.[29] The metrical units that Augustine excludes from this list further reinforce this point. Those that cannot be divided into halves with equal length-values, such as the iamb (˘–) and the trochee (–˘), are not included in the list.[30]

Yet these two metrical units, along with the tribrach (˘˘˘), are included in a second list in order to demonstrate that metrical units with odd total length-values can be similarly pleasing to reason.[31]

Metrical Unit	**Length**
Iamb	˘ –
Trochee	– ˘
Tribrach	˘ ˘˘ , ˘˘ ˘[32]

Although these metrical units do not split into equal halves, Augustine notes that they are also pleasing to reason because 'they equally divide their major part with their lesser part in two such [parts].' By this he means that the part with the shorter length-value, the

[29] My reading of *aequalitas* as equality of length-values in this and other texts that I consider in this section agrees with the broader reading of Beierwaltes, who claims that number is the base of Augustine's concept of equality in sound, movement, and physical form. Werner Beierwaltes, 'Aequalitas numerosa. Zu Augustins Begriff des Schönen,' *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 38, no. 2 (1975): 148.

[30] For the values of an iamb and trochee, see: Halporn, Ostwald, and Rosenmeyer, *The Meters of Greek and Latin Poetry*, 62.

[31] For the value of a tribrach, see: ibid., 132. As with the first table, I have used a space to represent how each foot can be split into two parts.

[32] Because the tribrach has three short syllables, it can be divided in two different manners.

'lesser part,' can divide the part with the greater length-value, the 'greater part,' into two parts that match the lesser, or 'two such [parts].' For example, in the case of an iamb (˘–), since one long syllable has the same length value as two short syllables, the lesser part (˘) can divide the greater part (–) into two equal parts that also match the lesser (˘˘). The table below demonstrates how this works for each of these three metrical units in Augustine's second list:[33]

Metrical Unit	**Length**
Iamb	˘– = ˘ ˘ ˘
Trochee	–˘ = ˘ ˘ ˘
Tribrach	˘ ˘˘ = ˘ ˘ ˘ ˘˘ ˘ = ˘ ˘ ˘

Conceived in this way, both lists contain metrical units that are pleasing to the highest part of the soul, reason, because they possess equality with regard to their parts. Augustine's argument for the superiority of six-foot[34] meter over seven-foot meter, which he gives in the remaining lines of 6.10.26, further demonstrates that he is focusing on equality with regard to the parts of metrical units. He begins by noting that six-foot meter can be divided with equality in two ways: first, it can be divided into two halves with

[33] Similar to the first table, I have used spaces in this table so that the reader can easily discern how the lesser part has divided the greater part into two equal parts which also match the lesser. Regarding the length of all three of these metrical units, see: Halporn, Ostwald, and Rosenmeyer, *The Meters of Greek and Latin Poetry*, 130-32.

[34] As I pointed out in the first section of this chapter, a 'foot' is a small unit of syllables from which meter is formed.

three feet each; second, if one divides it into two parts consisting of two and four feet, the lesser part can subdivide the greater part into two equal parts that also match the lesser – two parts containing two feet divided by a third part which also consists of two feet. Seven-foot meter cannot be equally divided in either of these ways. If one divides it into two parts, one part has three feet while the other has four. While the lesser part can divide the greater into two even halves of two feet each, those halves do not match the lesser part, which consists of three feet.[35] Thus, seven-foot meter does not possess equality in all of its parts. Six-foot meter does. So, we see that in 6.10.26 Augustine uses meter and its units, feet, to clarify that he defines equality in complex wholes as symmetry of that whole's parts.

This definition of equality is the first way that we see Augustine drawing on rhetorical economy. To reach this definition he has used a medium of literary and rhetorical theory, the song.[36] Specifically, Augustine has focused on metrical feet within his definition, a topic of concern for rhetoricians such as Cicero.[37] More specific still, Augustine's definition of equality as an even distribution of parts also has precedent in the rhetorical tradition. In *Oratorical Instruction* 11.3.43 Quintilian writes:

---

[35] For Augustine's argument for the superiority of six-foot meter, see *mus.* 6.10.26 (CSEL 102: 213.8-19). Jean-Michel Fontanier briefly engages this idea in 6.10.26 in his discussion of Augustine's use of the term *aequalitas.* Fontanier agrees with my reading of the first list of texts. But his reading of the second list fails to recognize the nuance of Augustine's point that the lesser part must divide the greater part into two parts equal to the lesser. Jean-Michel Fontanier, *La beauté selon saint Augustin* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1998), 49n35, 49n36.

[36] For my discussion of the song as within the purview of the *ars poetica* and the *ars rhetorica*, both of which are included in 'literary and rhetorical theory,' and both of which use the same rules of arrangement, see n.13 and the text related to it.

[37] See, for example, Cicero's discussion of the anapest in *de Orat.* 3.185 and his treatment of the iamb and the dactyl in *Orat.* 196-7.

> Equality (*aequalitas*) is the first rule of correctly delivering [a speech], lest the speech jerk about with uneven spaces and sounds – mixing longs with shorts, graves with acutes, highs with lows – and wobble from the inequality of all these just as [with the inequality] of feet.[38]

Quintilian here defines equality within a speech as an even distribution of different groupings of parts – long (syllables) with short (syllables), graves and acutes, and highs and lows. Augustine's definition of equality in 6.10.26 echoes Quintilian's first category, equality as an even distribution of long and short syllables. Taken together, we see that Augustine's definition of equality in 6.10.26 uses a medium of literary theory (a song), focuses on an aspect of the song which concerned rhetoricians (poetic meter), and follows Quintilian's definition of the term equality. Thus, we see that Augustine's definition of equality in 6.10.26 comes from literary and rhetorical theory.

Augustine will continue to expound on this rhetorical understanding of equality in 6.10.27-8. Then, in 6.11.29-30, he considers how equality bears on time and the universe. Augustine begins the pericope by encouraging readers to delight in 'superior things,' and then defines those superior things by the equality that that they possess. They are 'those things in which the highest, unshakeable, incommutable, and eternal equality remains.' In 6.10.26, we saw Augustine assert that reason, the head of the soul, delights in the equality of a song's rhythm. In this text, he encourages the soul to delight in superior things, which he defines by their equality – a concept that he has already defined in terms of rhetorical theory.

---

[38] Quint., *Inst.* 11.3.43 (LCL 494: 106.43): nam prima est obseruatio recte pronuntiandi aequalitas, ne sermo subsultet inparibus spatiis ac sonis, miscens longa breuibus, grauia acutis, elata summissis, et inaequalitate horum omnium sicut pedum claudicet.

Beyond the characteristic of equality, however, Augustine does not precisely define the *superiora* ('superior things'). The reading of these lines from the first half of 6.11.29 given by Laurent Cesalli and Nadja Germann (2008) glosses over this detail, treating the *superiora* and other terms as equal to God. They briefly write before moving on to other topics: 'The principle of all things and their structures consequently forms the *summa aequalitas*, which is identifiable with God.'[39] There are two problems with this reading.[40] Firstly, none of the evidence that they offer provides sufficient support for their claim.[41] Indeed, their reading draws upon later works in Augustine's corpus, for Augustine will not clearly write that the *summa aequalitas* is identifiable with God until AD 414-6.[42] Additionally, their reading fails to account for Augustine's use of a plural noun and plural pronoun to refer to the *superiora – superiora sunt...in quibus* ('superior

[39] Laurent Cesalli and Nadja Germann, 'Signification and Truth Epistemology at the Crossroads of Semantics and Ontology in Augustine's Early Philosophical Writings,' *Vivarium* 46, no. 2 (2008): 147.

[40] These two problems are in addition to the lack of engagement that they give to particular terms in this passage.

[41] For evidence, they offer three texts: *mus.* 6.8.20, 6.12.36, and *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.16.26. However, these three texts, by themselves, do not establish God as the *summa aequalitatis* in Augustine's thought.

[42] Augustine makes this connection in three places: discussing the Trinity in *trin.* 7.4.9 (CCSL 50: 259.124-5): *illa summa aequalitate* ('that highest equality'); discussing Christ's statement from Jn 10.20 that he and the Father are one in *s.* 229G.5 (MA 1: 477.12): *unum, quia summa aequalitas* ('one, since the highest equality'); and discussing the inclusion of the Trinity in the Nicene Creed in *symb. cat.* 13 (CCSL 46: 196.340-3): *ista trinitas unus deus, una natura, una substantia, una potentia, summa aequalitas, nulla diuisio, nulla diuersitas, perpetua caritas* ('That Trinity is one God, one nature, one substance, one power, highest equality, no division, no diversity, perpetual love'). Book 7 of *trin.* is likely the earliest of the three, probably written between AD 414-6. See the excursus on dating *trin.* in: Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 118-20. Augustine's *s.* 229G was delivered in 416-7. Éric Rebillard, 'Sermones,' in *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, et al. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999), 782. The sermon *symb. cat.* was delivered in 425. *AttA*, il.

things...in which').[43] This may be due to their dependence on Martin Jacobsson's translation of 6.11.29, which renders both terms in the singular ('what is superior except that in which').[44]

Even if Augustine did equate the *summa aequalitatis* with God at this point in his career, his treatment of the *superiora* in the plural demonstrates that he here probably has in mind something other than God. Unfortunately, Augustine does not specify the exact nature of the *superiora*. But in 6.11.29 he does provide three hints as what he has in mind. The first two he clearly states in the text: The *superiora* are defined by their equality and they are above human beings. The third I have already established from his use of the plural *superiora*: They are something other than God.

Thankfully, although Augustine leaves his understanding of the *superiora* in an ambiguous state, he does clarify that the equality of the *superiora*, and indeed everything eternal, comes from God.[45] Toward the end of 6.11.29-30 he states that God is the source

---

[43] I have excluded the pronouns *quae* and *illa* since they do not prove either reading. However, the existence of the plural nouns *superiora* and *quibus*, as well as the plural verb *sunt*, prove that *quae* and *illa* are plural neuter pronouns rather than singular feminine pronouns.

[44] As quoted in: Cesalli and Germann, 'Signification and Truth Epistemology,' 147. The translation is from: Aurelius Augustinus, *De musica liber VI*, edited and translated by Martin Jacobsson (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 2002). Clavier and Harrison both use the same translation, though they do not make the same claim as Cesalli and Germann. Mark F.M. Clavier, *Eloquent Wisdom: Rhetoric, Cosmology and Delight in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo*, ed. Thomas O'Loughlin, Studia Traditionis Theologiae 17 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), 196-7; Carol Harrison, 'Augustine and the Art of Music,' in *Resonant Witness: Conversations between Music and Theology*, ed. Jeremy S. Begbie and Steven R. Guthrie (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2011), 33n5, 37-8.

[45] Augustine's statement that the *superiora* 'come from' God is another proof that they are not God. That which 'comes from' is not the same as the thing from which it comes.

of such equality – divine providence orders the pieces of the universe and God orders the sinful human being within the universe. A few chapters later Augustine will further clarify that God is the source of equality, writing in 6.12.36: 'From where should we believe that [equality] is given to the soul, which is eternal and incommutable, unless from the one eternal and incommutable God?'[46]

So far in 6.11.29 Augustine has moved from the idea that equality delights the soul in music to the idea that the soul should be similarly delighted in superior things, which are defined, in part, by the equality that they possess.[47] And, though he does not make clear what these superior things are, toward the end of this pericope and later in Book 6 he clarifies that God is the ultimate source of these superior things and the equality that they possess.

After Augustine states that equality is the characteristic of superior things that delights the soul, he proceeds to explain the relationship that periods of time (*tempora*) have with these superior things. That is, periods of time come from (*unde*) the 'eternal equality'[48] that 'remains' in superior things. It is this eternal equality by which periods of

---

[46] *mus.* 6.12.36 (CSEL 102: 220.8-9): Unde ergo credendum est animae tribui, quod aeternum est et incommutabile, nisi ab uno aeterno et incommutabili deo?

[47] Augustine does not further define the *superiora* in 6.11.29-30. However, I have added the qualifier 'in part' because he does not state that the *superiora* are defined only by their equality.

[48] Augustine does not clarify what he means by 'eternal equality' in *mus.* 6.11.29-30, but we can infer from his previous discussion of equality in 6.10.26ff. that it is a sense of equal distribution of something (if the *superiora* exist in a way which can be 'distributed' in some manner). However, that equal distribution cannot include time, since eternal things are, by definition, atemporal.

time are 'made and ordered and moderated.' Augustine explains how this relationship works by illustrating how periods of time imitate eternal equality. He states:

> ...in that place there is no time, since there is no mutability, and from that place periods of time (*tempora*) are made and ordered (*ordinat*) and moderated, imitating eternity while the rotation of heaven returns to the same [state], restores celestial bodies to the same [place], and, in the days, months, years, lustrals, and other orbits of the stars, complies with the laws of equality (*aequalitatis*), unity (*unitatis*), and order (*ordinationis*). Thus, with earthly [things] placed under celestial [bodies], the orbits of their times are joined together with a rhythmic succession, like a song of the universe (*carmini uniuersitatis*)...[49]

Periods of time imitate eternal equality in the cyclical movement of the stars and other heavenly bodies that all return to the place whence they began. Stars and other celestial bodies travel their orbits and return again to where they began in an equal amount of time in each orbit.[50] When orbits are combined, there is a sort of equality at play – each orbit is equal to the previous orbit. In this way, by demonstrating equality, periods of time, which are measured by these orbits as days, months, and years, imitate eternal equality.[51] While Augustine states that periods of time imitate eternal equality by their orbits, he does not explain how they do so.[52] Instead, Augustine then notes that these orbits of corporeal

---

[49] *mus*. 6.11.29 (CSEL 102: 215.8-13): ubi nullum est tempus, quia mutabilitas nulla est, et unde tempora fabricantur et ordinantur et modificantur aeternitatem imitantia, dum caeli conuersio ad idem redit et caelestia corpora ad idem reuocat diebusque et mensibus et annis ac lustris ceterisque siderum orbibus legibus aequalitatis et unitatis et ordinationis obtemperat. ita caelestibus terrena subiecta orbes temporum suorum numerosa successione quasi carmini uniuersitatis associant.

[50] Jean Guitton agrees that Augustine's focus in these lines is on the measure of time that celestial bodies take in their orbits. Jean Guitton, *Le temps et l`éternité chez Plotin et Saint Augustin*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1959), 158-9.

[51] Augustine's portrayal of time in this section resembles that of Aristotle, who defined time as the measure of motion. See Arist., *Ph.* 4.12.

[52] It is improbable that Augustine understood the equality of these orbits as defining eternity. Rather, it seems that Augustine uses the equality of these orbits to demonstrate how a temporal thing can best approximate an equality which is eternal – and thus, by definition, atemporal. See also n.48.

bodies join together 'with a rhythmic succession,' and compares it to a song – a 'song of the universe.'

This section of 6.11.29 introduces us to the second way in which Augustine draws on rhetorical theory in this passage – through his phrase the 'law of equality.' Augustine names the 'law of equality' in the chapters leading up to 6.11.29-30. Immediately following his definition of equality as an even distribution of parts within a whole in 6.10.26, Augustine provides several examples of this equality from classical prosody before naming this equality of parts as the 'law of equality (*aequalitatis lege*)' in 6.10.27.[53] The phrase is Augustine's invention, but this is not the first time that he has used it in *On Music*.[54] He previously used the term twice while assessing the quality of the verse *roma, roma, cerne quanta sit eum benignitas* in *On Music* 5.7.14-8.16.[55] In 5.7.14 Augustine judges the quality of the verse if the final two words (*eum benignitas*) are dropped from it:

> And so, if there are four and five half-foots, as this is – *roma, roma*, *cerne quanta sit* – it is not pleasing. And for this reason it will be a meter rather than a verse, since the members are unequal so that they are not able to be brought back to any law of equality (*aequalitatis legem*) by division. Surely you perceive, as I suppose, that the four half-feet of the former member – *roma, roma* – are able to

---

[53] *mus.* 6.10.27 (CSEL 102: 214.16): *aequalitatis lege*. For a general introduction to Augustine's use of the term *aequalitas*, see: Cornelius Mayer and Basil Studer, 'Aequalitas,' in *AugLex*, ed. Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 1986). However, Mayer and Studer do not address Augustine's phrase *aequalitatis lex.* To my knowledge, the analysis that I have offered here is the first detailed analysis of the content of Augustine's *aequalitatis lex* in *mus.* 5 and 6. Other works have mentioned the concept without exploring the details of its content. See: Cesalli and Germann, 'Signification and Truth Epistemology.'; P.K. Ellsmere, 'Augustine on Beauty, Art, and God,' in *Augustine on Music: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays*, ed. Richard R. La Croix, Studies in the History and Interpretation of Music 6 (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1988).

[54] I have not found any Latin author that used the phrase *aequalitatis lex* before Augustine.

[55] Augustine introduces the verse in *mus.* 5.4.7.

> separate into two each; however, the latter five [half-feet] – *cerne quanta sit* – [separate] into two and three half-feet, where equality (*aequalitas*) appears by no law (*iure*).[56]

Augustine explains that the first member of this verse, which is made up of four half-feet, can be split into two equal parts with two half-feet each. However, if truncated, the entire verse cannot be split because the second member can only be further divided into parts containing two and three half-feet. Thus, if the final two words are dropped from the verse it is no longer considered a verse, but only a meter, because it no longer follows 'any law of equality.'

The verse that Augustine uses to explain his 'law of equality' was penned by the 4th c. grammarian Aelius Festus Aphthonius in his work *On Meters*.[57] However, the

---

[56] *mus.* 5.7.14 (CSEL 102: 180.14-181.23): itaque si fuerint quattuor et quinque semipedes, sicuti hoc est roma, roma, cerne quanta sit, non ita probatur et propterea metrum erit potius quam uersus, quia ita sunt membra inaequalia, ut ad nullam aequalitatis legem sectione aliqua possint referri. cernis quippe, ut opinor, superioris membri quattuor semipedes roma, roma in binos posse discedere : quinque autem posteriores cerne quanta sit in duos et tres, ubi nullo iure apparet aequalitas.

[57] Though there has been disagreement over the author of the verse, it was probably written by Aelius Festus Aphthonius. See GL 6: 52.33-4: *trochaici tetrametri catalectici, ut roma, roma, cerne quanta sit deum benignitas*. Keil includes it in his 19th c. edition of Marius Victorinus's *Ars grammatica*. However, Italo Mariotti (1967) concludes that the author of this section of the text is Aphthonius, whose name appears at the end of *gramm.* 4 (see GL 6: 173.32). Mariotti argues that, in this case, the subscription of an author's name should receive more confidence in the argument over authorship than prescription – Victorinus's name is last mentioned well before *gramm.* 1.12.25. Thus, he concludes that the section of text up through *gramm.* 1.5.49 is Victorinus's *gramm.*, and the rest, which occurs after a significant gap in the manuscript tradition (between GL 6: 31.16 and 6: 31.17), is a second work – the *De metris* of Aphthonius. For Mariotti's argument, see: Italo Mariotti, *Marii Victorinii, Ars grammatica: Introduzione, Testo Critico e Commento*, ed. Alessandro Ronconi and Giovanni Pugliese Carratelli, Biblioteca Nazionale Serie dei Classici Greci e Latini: Testi con Commento Filologico 6 (Firenze: Felice le Monnier, 1967), 47-50. Pierre Hadot gives a helpful summary of the arguments in favor of both hypotheses, and concludes that the second is much more likely. He also notes that, since a passage of the section probably written by Aphthonius was later quoted by Rufinus of Antioch, then Aphthonius must have been a contemporary of Victorinus and a copyist probably combined the texts

manuscript was appended to Marius Victorinus's *The Grammatical Art* by the 5th c. Thus, Augustine might have read it in either form before he wrote *On Music*.[58] Either way, the text would have represented to him a work connected to grammar – either the work of a grammarian (Aphthonius) writing on meter, the or the work of a rhetorician writing on grammar (Victorinus). And training in grammar, of course, was the incipient stage of literary and rhetorical education. Thus, Augustine's employment of this verse in order to explain his concept of the 'law of equality' reveals that Augustine's concept of the law of equality was drawing on literary and rhetorical theory.

The second time Augustine uses the term 'law of equality,' he again draws on the literary and rhetorical tradition in 5.8.16. There he argues that two famous verses from Latin literature follow the 'law of equality,' even though both are split into two parts with an odd number of half-feet – one with five half-feet and the other with seven.[59] Augustine

---

in the 4th c. Pierre Hadot, *Marius Victorinus : Recherches sur sa vie et ses œuvres* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1971), 62-8. More recently, Robert Kaster has asserted that Rufinus and Aphthonius were both independently citing the verse from a third source, but offers no argument for this position. Robert A. Kaster, *Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity*, ed. Peter Brown, The Transformation of the Classical Heritage 11 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 407. I agree with Hadot that Mariotti's hypothesis is the more likely of the two. Thus, I will refer to the quotation as from *Aphth.* 1.12.25, which notes the authorship of Aphthonius while using the only available numbering system, that given in GL. Additionally, based on Hadot's conclusion that Aphthonius was probably a contemporary of Victorinus, it is probable that he wrote this verse before Augustine wrote *mus.* in AD 387-91 (see my discussion of the dating of *mus.* in n.18). It is unclear whether or not Augustine understood the work to be that of Victorinus or Aphthonius. However, if Hadot's conclusion is correct and a copyist combined the texts in the 4th c., it is possible that Augustine thought that Victorinus had written the verse. Finally, this Aphthonius should not be confused with Aphthonius of Antioch, a student of Libanius whom George Kennedy lists as a student of Libanius who wrote a handbook of progymnasmata in the second half of the 4th c. George A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 203.

[58] See n.57.

[59] See his argument in *mus.* 5.8.16 (CSEL 102: 182.15-30).

states that, if you divide the two parts of such a line, you are left with parts that have two, three, three, and four half-feet. He is confident in applying the 'law of equality' to the middle two parts, which each have three half-feet. He is less confident in doing so with the other two, though he does allow that they have an equality of some sort because, if you combine the parts that have two and four half-feet, that produces six half-feet, which is equal to the total of the remaining two parts.

Augustine's application of the 'law of equality' to the middle six feet of these verses in 5.8.16 matches his application of equality to six-foot meter that we have already seen in 6.10.26. In both texts, in order for a metrical unit or verse to possess equality, it must either divide into two parts with equal total length-values, or it must divide in such a manner that the lesser of the two parts can divide the greater part into two parts which match the lesser. These texts combine to define Augustine's 'law of equality' with regard to time and demonstrate a consistent use of this concept across them: A length of time follows a 'law of equality' if, in some manner, it can be subdivided into equal parts.

In 6.11.29 Augustine refers to the orbits of celestial bodies, which divide into equal times, as 'complying with' this same law of equality. Thus, we see that Augustine continues his consistent application of the law of equality in this pericope with one significant change – the object. Rather than apply this law of equality to verses in literature, in 6.11.29 he applies it to the movement of celestial bodies. And now we see that Augustine's concept of the 'law of equality' in this passage also draws on rhetorical theory.

Having demonstrated that Augustine's concept of equality and his 'law of equality' in 6.11.29 both draw on rhetorical theory, I will now begin my second movement by focusing on Augustine's thought in 6.11.30 in order to build my argument that Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy in his concept of order in this passage. After introducing the concept of a law of 'order' into his discussion in 6.11.29, Augustine then states in 6.11.30 that 'many things' in the 'song of the universe' seem 'disordered and confused' to us because 'we are sewn into their order.' He then offers three illustrations to explain why human beings struggle to see the order in which we are included. Augustine writes:

> Thus, with earthly [things] placed under celestial [bodies], the orbits of their times[60] are joined together with a rhythmic succession, like a song of the universe (*carmini uniuersitatis*), in which many things seem to us disordered and confused, since we are sewn into their order (*ordini*) according to our merits, not knowing what beautiful thing divine providence carries for us since, for example, if someone is placed, just as a statue, in one certain corner in the most distinguished and most beautiful part of a temple, he will not be able to sense the beauty of that architecture of which he himself will be a part; nor does the soldier on the front line have the power to observe the order of the whole army; and in whatever poem, if the syllables sound for however great an interval [of time], for such [time] as they are living and sensing, in no way are the rhythm and the beauty of the composed work pleasing to them, as much as each one cannot observe and approve the whole, since [the whole] was constructed and perfected from those passing single [syllables]. So, God ordered (*ordinauit*) the sinning human being as foul, but not foully.[61]

---

[60] Augustine's use of the phrase 'the orbits of times' (*orbes temporum*) while discussing our marking of time by the orbits of celestial bodies seems to draw on Lactantius. In a discussion on the creation narrative, Lactantius notes that years are marked by the perpetual *orbes temporum.* Lactantius, *Diu. inst.* 2.9.11 (CSEL 19: 143.22-144.2): *secundum harum partium dimensionem diem quoque fecit ac noctem, quae spatia et orbes temporum perpetuos ac uolubiles, quos uocamus annos, alterna per uices successione conficiant.*

[61] *mus.* 6.11.29-30 (CSEL 102: 215.29-10): ita caelestibus terrena subiecta orbes temporum suorum numerosa successione quasi carmini uniuersitatis associant. in quibus multa nobis uidentur inordinata et perturbata, quia eorum ordini pro nostris meritis assuti sumus nescientes, quid de nobis diuina prouidentia pulchrum gerat, quoniam si quis uerbi

Augustine states that a human being is like a statue in a temple, a soldier in an army, and a syllable in a poem in that he 'cannot observe and approve the whole.' Thus, human beings cannot see 'the whole.' He then concludes this selection by stating that God orders 'the sinning human being.'[62]

Earlier in this section I established that God is the one behind all equality in 6.11.29-30. Augustine's closing statement here reveals that God is also behind the order that he describes in this pericope. Thus, in the illustrations that Augustine gives, God is the architect who placed the statue, the general who placed the soldier, and the poet who placed the syllable. The human being – as the statue, the soldier, and the syllable – lacks the perspective to see the manner in which his or her existence fits within the ordered whole. I will begin by analyzing the illustration of the syllables in order to reveal Augustine's meaning in all three illustrations.

Augustine's illustration of syllables within a poem is of particular interest as it describes the order and unity of one of the media of literary and rhetorical theory – the poem.[63] Augustine's illustration points out that syllables are part of a 'composed work'

---

gratia in amplissimarum pulcherrimarumque aedium uno aliquo angulo tamquam statua collocetur, pulchritudinem illius fabricae sentire non poterit, cuius et ipse pars erit ; nec uniuersi exercitus ordinem miles in acie ualet intueri; et in quolibet poemate, si quanto spatio syllabae sonant, tanto uiuerent atque sentirent, nullo modo illa numerositas et contexti operis pulchritudo eis placeret, quam totam perspicere atque approbare non possent, cum de ipsis singulis praetereuntibus fabricata esset atque perfecta. ita peccantem hominem ordinauit deus turpem, non turpiter.

[62] Augustine's incorporation of rhetorical economy into his understanding of God's activity of ordering sinning human beings is a topic that I explore in more depth in Chapter Five.

[63] Cicero understood rhetoric and poetry as differentiated only by the order of the metrical feet. In one of his works on oratory, he writes: 'But the order of feet makes that which is uttered seem like an oration or a poem.' Cic., *Orat.* 227 (LCL 342: 498.227): *sed ordo pedum facit, ut id quod pronuntiatur aut orationis aut poematis simile uideatur*.

that is a 'whole.' The phrase 'composed work' implies that there is an author. And this author has arranged the syllables, of which one comes after another, into a 'whole' (though the syllables cannot descry their function within the whole).[64]

This conceptualization of the syllables as being placed into a whole 'composed work' is similar to the concept of rhetorical economy, according to which an author creates an economically arranged text when each part has been arranged in a manner that forms a unified whole – an oration. Furthermore, this conceptualization of order in *On Music* 6.11.29-30 displays several similarities with the concept of rhetorical economy which I have already identified in several other texts in Augustine's corpus. In *On the Practices of the Catholic Church and the Manichees* (*Practices*) 1.17.30 and 1.28.56, where Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic, he portrays the whole scriptural text as having a 'wonderful arrangement' (*mirifica dispositio*) and an 'admirable arrangement' (*admirabilis ordo*), wherein seemingly dissimilar parts had been put together into a unified whole through the authorship of God.[65] In *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32, in which Augustine incorporates rhetorical economy into his understanding of God's arrangement of creation, Augustine frames the various parts of creation as having been arranged by God so that they form a

---

[64] Joseph Torchia also recognizes that Augustine is using the poem to illustrate the orderly arrangement between the parts and the whole, and he implies that this comes from Augustine's rhetorical background. Torchia writes: 'The image of the poem is an apt one. For Augustine the rhetorician, such language provides the ideal illustration of the subtle relationship between an orderly arrangement of parts and the goodness of the whole.' N. Joseph Torchia, *Creatio ex nihilo and the Theology of St. Augustine: The Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond*, American Univesity Studies Series VII: Theology and Religion 205 (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), 171.

[65] See my treatment of both texts in Chapter One.

complex whole.[66] Augustine even uses a similar illustration in that text to the one he uses in *On Music* 6.11.29-30, comparing the ordering and unity of creation to a composed speech in which the praiseworthiness lies not in the individual letters and syllables which come and pass away, but in the entire speech. This idea of parts being ordered into a unified whole also appears in *Sermon* 29D.4-7 and *On Order* 1.7.18.[67]

In addition to using the same concept of order that we have seen in some of these passages, in some of these passages Augustine uses this conceptualization of order to make the same apologetic argument that he is making in *On Music* 6.11.29-30 – that there is an order that God has given to all things, according to his understanding of divine providence, but humans cannot grasp this order because we lack God's perspective to see the whole. This argument is explicit in the middle of 6.11.29-30 and implicit in his illustration of syllables – human beings lack the perspective to see how they fit into the whole of history just as syllables lack the perspective to see how they fit within a composed work. Similarly, Augustine uses his incorporation of rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic to rebuke the Manichaeans for their portrayal of the scriptures as containing inconsistencies in *Practices* 1.17.30 and 1.28.56. Their lack of perspective keeps them from seeing how all of the pieces form a unified whole.[68] In *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32 Augustine also used his incorporation of rhetorical economy into his theology of creation in order to rebuke the Manichees for finding

[66] See my treatment of *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 in Chapter Three.
[67] See my treatment of both in Chapter Three.
[68] See my treatment of both in Chapter One.

singular parts of creation offensive, stating that they only found them offensive because they could not see how each of those pieces fit into the whole.[69]

The other two illustrations function in the same fashion for Augustine. Just as syllables are ordered into an entire composed work, statues are placed within a temple and soldiers are put on the front line. All three represent a part which has been incorporated into a whole. And all three show a lack of perspective – if they were able to see (as syllables and statues are not), they could not see that they were part of a whole.

We are now prepared to see that Augustine is utilizing rhetorical economy in *On Music* 6.11.29-30. In 6.11.29 we saw that Augustine drew upon rhetorical theory in his definition of equality and his concept of the 'law of equality.' This shows that Augustine was already bringing rhetorical theory into his understanding of history in this text. In 6.11.30 Augustine shows that he did so with rhetorical economy as well in his treatment of order. There Augustine employs a concept of order which has been identified as rhetorical economy elsewhere in his writings, for the same apologetic purpose for which he used it elsewhere in his writings, and he illustrates it by means of an example from literary and rhetorical theory – the placement of syllables within a poem. Moreover, he frames this entire discussion around a 'song of the universe,' a second medium from literary and rhetorical theory. It is now beyond a doubt that Augustine is using rhetorical economy in this passage.[70]

---

[69] See my treatment of *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 in Chapter Three.

[70] The only alternative reading to the one I have provided with regard to Augustine's concept of order in *mus.* 6.11.29-30 is given by Adalbert Keller, who suggests that Augustine's 'song of the universe' might represent *Sphärenharmonie* ('aspheric harmony'), the Pythagorean idea that the respective distances of heavenly

But in 6.11.29-30 Augustine is not merely utilizing rhetorical economy to describe the order of poetry. Rather, he is using the economical arrangement of a poem to illustrate the the perfect arrangement that God has given to human lives across the periods of time which extend to form the whole of human history.[71] Furthermore, he uses it to explain God's ordering of the orbits of all celestial things, which make up the 'song of the universe.' In this way, he uses rhetorical economy for the same purpose as he did in *On True Religion* 22.42-3 – to explain God's providential ordering of all of history. Augustine also employs rhetorical economy in *On Music* 6.11.29-30 in the second way that he did in *On True Religion* 22.42-3 – to explain why human beings cannot perceive this order. They cannot perceive this temporal order because they only exist for a moment

---

bodies from the center of the universe are in an analogous relationship to the tonal divisions of a musical scale. Keller, *Aurelius Augustinus und die Musik: Untersuchungen zu „De musica" im Kontext seines Schrifttums*, 140n31. Keller provides no argument for this reading. Rather, he offers two secondary sources that are encyclopedic entries for the concept of *Sphärenharmonie* which do not engage *mus.* 6.11.29-30. The concept of spherical harmony does not fit Augustine's thought with regard to the *carmen uniuersitatis* in *mus.* 6.11.29-30 in at least two ways. First, if we look at the earliest instance of the idea of the harmony of spheres, given by Plato in *Republic* 10.617b and the surrounding chapters, we see that Plato's orbit of the spheres focuses on the distance of the planets from a spindle around which they rotate. Augustine, on the contrary, is focused on the equal time that it takes for celestial bodies to return to their starting points, by which human beings measure time. Furthermore, Plato engages the concept of the colors of the spheres, which Augustine does not. The two secondary sources that Keller references are: *Der Kleine Pauly: Lexikon der Antike*, vol. 5 (Schaf - Zythos) (München: Alfred Druckenmüller Verlag, 1975), 306-7; Günther Wille, *Musica Romana: Die Bedeutung der Musik im Leben der Römer* (Amsterdam: P. Schippers, 1967), 438-42.

[71] My reading that Augustine sees the totality of history as a complex whole agrees with Catherine Pickstock's assertion that Augustine envisages 'an assemblage of all the relations that it encompasses, in such a way that since there is nothing else with which it can be compared or to which it is related [...] One might say that the totality of reality is not one big note, but instead, as Augustine says, a poem or song (carmen), and so, in other words, the total series of numerical interactions.' Pickstock, 'Music: Soul, City and Cosmos after Augustine,' 247.

within history. Human beings are born and then they die, all while God's order of history continues to unfold.

Moreover, Augustine employs rhetorical economy in this passage in one way that we have not seen before. After offering his three illustrations of order, Augustine notes that God's ordering of everything includes the 'sinning human being.' By employing rhetorical economy into his theology of history, Augustine is able to state that God orders everything. And here he notes that everything includes sin.[72] This allows him to assert God's providence in the midst of sin, a topic that I will engage at length in Chapter Five.

In this section we have seen that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of history in *On Music* 6.11.29-30 through his comparison between human lives and the syllables in a poem. Furthermore, we have also seen that he employed rhetorical economy to explain God's providential ordering of all things, human inability to perceive that order, and God's ordering of 'the sinning human being.' In the next section we will see that Augustine continued to utilize rhetorical economy in his theology of history in the decades which followed his emendation of *On Music* 6.11.29-30.

Rhetorical Economy in Augustine's Theology of History in AD 403-417

In this final section I will argue that Augustine habitually utilized rhetorical economy to frame God's arrangement of history for nearly two decades after he wrote *On*

[72] Rhetorical economy is not, however, the logic on which Augustine builds his explanation for how God orders the sinning human being. Rather, Augustine explains in the lines which follow in 6.11.30, which I have not quoted in the text above, that the law is the means by which God orders the sinning human being.

True Religion 22.42-3 and *On Music* 6.11.29-30. I will briefly present evidence from four texts which were written between AD 403 and 417.[73]

The first of these four texts is *On the Nature of the Good* 8 (AD 403-5), which was probably written several years after Augustine's emendation of *On Music* 6.[74] Augustine wrote the work against the Manichees in order to argue that everything is good that proceeds from God, the highest good.[75] In the chapters immediately preceding *On the Nature of the Good* 8 Augustine establishes that all natures are good and that some natures are better than others.[76] He then defines this gradation of good things based upon the corruptibility of natures. God is the highest good because God's nature is incorruptible.[77] And rational spirits are the best of creatures, because they are only

---

[73] My treatment of texts in this section will be briefer than it was in the previous two sections since my focus here is Augustine's continued employment across a period of time. This differs slightly from my focus in the previous two sections, which was to provide a thorough reading of each text in order to demonstrate both that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of history and how he was using it.

[74] With regard to the emendation of *mus.* 6 and the resulting difficulty in determining a specific date for the text, see n.18. Regarding the date of *nat. b.*, I am following Pierre-Marie Hombert's chronology for both *nat. b*. and *c. Sec.* Hombert argues against François Decret's position that both works were written between 405-11. Of the two works, Hombert is more confident that *c. Sec.* should be dated between 403-5. Even if *n. bon.* is a later work it does not change my argument that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of history throughout his lifetime. Pierre-Marie Hombert, *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne*, Collection des Etudes augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 163 (Paris: Institut d'études augustiniennes, 2000), 31-2; François Decret, *L`Afrique manichéenne (IV^e - V^e siècles). Étude historique et doctrinale*, vol. 1 (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1978), 125-6. *AttA* places both texts in 399, but offers no justification for this date. *AttA*, xlvii-xlviii.

[75] Augustine asserts that God is the highest good in the opening lines of *nat. b.* 1. He explains his purpose for the work in *retr.* 2.9(36).

[76] Augustine claims that all natures are good in *nat. b.* 5.

[77] See *nat. b.* 6.

corruptible in their will.[78] Augustine then considers earthly things whose existence is limited by time in *On the Nature of the Good* 8. He writes:

> Truly, other things, which were made from nothing, and which are undoubtedly more inferior than rational spirit, are able to be neither happy nor miserable. But since they themselves are also goods according to their measure and form[79], and the lesser and even the least goods were not able to exist except from God the highest good, they were so ordered (*ordinata sunt*), so that more unstable things yield to more stable ones, weaker things to stronger ones, and more impotent things to more powerful ones; and thus, earthly things harmonize with celestial ones, as subordinate things to surpassing ones. Moreover, with things passing away and succeeding, a certain temporal beauty, in its kind, comes about, so that those very things, which die or cease to be what they were, do not defile or confuse the measure, form, and order of the entire universe (*ordinem uniuersae creaturae*). In the same way, a well-composed speech (*sermo bene compositus*) is undoubtedly beautiful, even though, in it, the syllables and all the sounds pass by, as if [they are] being born and dying.[80]

Augustine begins by affirming that 'earthly things' which are created from nothing are good. These are 'lesser' goods, 'inferior' to rational spirit. But Augustine sees this inferiority as proper to the nature of their existence. That which is 'unstable' is beneath that which is 'more stable,' producing a harmonious existence between these types of

---

[78] See *nat. b.* 7.

[79] Beginning in *nat. bon.* 3, Augustine claims that God created everything with a triad of properties: *modus*, *species*, and *ordo.* I agree with W. Roche's argument that 'form' is a good translation for Augustine's use of the term *species* when he uses it as part of this formula, and have translated it as such. W.J. Roche, *Measure, Number, and Weight in Saint Augustine* (Baltimore, Md.: American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1941), 355.

[80] *nat. b.* 8 (CSEL 25/2: 858.15-28): cetera uero, quae sunt facta de nihilo, quae utique inferiora sunt quam spiritus rationalis, nec beata possunt esse nec misera. sed quia pro modo et specie sua etiam ipsa bona sunt nec esse quamuis minora et minima bona nisi a summo bono deo potuerunt, sic ordinata sunt, ut cedant infirmiora firmioribus et inualidiora fortioribus et inpotentiora potentioribus, atque ita caelestibus terrena concordent tamquam praecellentibus subdita. fit autem decedentibus et succedentibus rebus temporalis quaedam in suo genere pulchritudo, ut nec ipsa, quae moriuntur uel quod erant esse desinunt, turpent ac turbent modum et speciem et ordinem uniuersae creaturae : sicut sermo bene compositus utique pulcher est, quamuis in eo syllabae atque omnes soni tamquam nascendo et moriendo transcurrant.

goods. Augustine then affirms that the temporary existence of earthly things produces a 'certain temporal beauty' which is integrated into the 'order of the entire universe.' He closes the pericope by comparing this temporal beauty to the beauty of 'a well-composed speech.'

In Chapter Two I demonstrated that Augustine's comparison between the transitory nature of syllables and sounds within 'a well-composed speech' and the transitory nature of earthly things which are 'passing away and succeeding' reveals that he conceived of history as a rhetorical speech in this text.[81] Focusing now on the content of this comparison, we see that Augustine is comparing God's ordering of earthly things within history to the order of syllables within a 'well-composed speech.' By definition, within rhetorical theory the order of a 'well-composed speech' was an economical order – all of the individual parts must be accommodated to one another to form a unified whole. The order that Augustine describes in this passage matches this concept of an economical arrangement: The order that earthly things receive from God is one in which individual earthly things join together to form a unity, a 'certain temporal beauty' which itself fits into the 'order of the universe.'

Augustine uses rhetorical economy in this text in two interrelated ways. Firstly, he uses it as a tool in his polemical argument against the Manichees in which he affirms that all things which come from God are good. In *On the Nature of the Good* 8 Augustine is arguing that 'earthly things' are good and belong in God's ordered universe despite their temporal limitations. Here he employs rhetorical economy in his theology of history in a

[81] See my treatment of *nat. b.* 8 in Chapter Two.

manner that we have not seen before: As the logic behind his theological positions that (1) just as an author orders syllables which have a limited temporal existence within a 'well-composed speech,' God orders temporal things within 'a certain temporal beauty' and (2) this temporal beauty is included within God's 'order of the entire universe.' Secondly, by employing rhetorical economy in this manner, he is also utilizing it to explain God's providential ordering of all things in history, a usage that we have already seen in *On True Religion* 22.42-3 and *On Music* 6.11.29-30.

Within the same time period, Augustine also incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of history in *Against Secundinus the Manichee* (*Against Secundinus*) 15 (AD 403-5), another of Augustine's anti-Manichaean polemical works.[82] In the lines leading up to this text, Augustine states that substance is good, and thus a defect of substance is evil. However, he differentiates between voluntary defects, which he names sin, and involuntary defects.[83] He then writes concerning involuntary defects:

> However, other defects which are not voluntary are either penal, so that sins are punished by justice, the highest moderator and orderer (*ordinatrice*), or they interfere with the measures of the lowest things, so that preceding things yield to succeeding ones – and thus every temporal beauty is carried through [to completion] by exchanges and with its kind. For a speech is carried through [to completion] in the same way, as if with dying and rising syllables, which are extended through fixed intervals of pauses and, their lengths [of time] having been satisfied, pass away by the ordered succession (*ordinata...successione*) of subsequent things, up to the time at which the entire oration (*oratio*) is brought forth to its end. And how long the syllable might be drawn out or hurried over, or with what form individual letters might preserve the moments of their positions is

---

[82] For my dating of *c. Sec.*, see n.74.

[83] This portion of Augustine's argument comes from *c. Sec.* 15 (CSEL 25/2: 927.21-7): *aperi ergo iam cordis oculos et intuere, si potes, bonum aliquod esse qualemlibet substantiam, et ideo malum esse defectum substantiae, quia bonum est esse substantiam ; nec tamen omnem defectum esse culpabilem, sed solum uoluntarium, quo anima rationalis ad ea, quae infra illam sunt condita, conditore suo deserto declinat, adfectum ; hoc est enim, quod peccatum uocatur*.

> not placed in the passing sounds themselves, but in the moderation (*moderatione*) of the speaker, although the art itself (*ars ipsa*) – which makes the speech (*sermonem*) – neither resounds with sounds nor is it rolled out or varied in time. So, by the rise and fall, by the passing away and succession of temporal things, temporal beauty is woven together (*contexitur*) by certain and definite drawn out things until it returns to the foreordained end. For that reason, [temporal beauty] is not evil, since we are able to understand and marvel at better things in spiritual creatures. But [temporal beauty] has a proper dignity (*decus*) in its kind and causes those living well to reach the supreme wisdom of God, hidden on high and beyond everything in time, its maker and moderator (*moderatricem*).[84]

Augustine asserts that there is a category of involuntary defects which 'interfere with the measures of the lowest things.' This produces the type of defect that is seen in temporal substances, which rise and pass away. Augustine then spends the majority of the pericope drawing a comparison between the 'dying and rising syllables' which follow one another in an 'ordered succession' in order to complete the 'entire oration' and temporal substances succeeding one another in order to complete 'temporal beauty.' Ultimately, Augustine asserts that the passing nature of temporal beauty is not evil; rather it has 'a proper dignity in its kind.'

---

[84] *c. Sec.* 15 (CSEL 25/2: 927.28-928.18): ceteri autem defectus, qui non sunt uoluntarii, uel poenales sunt, ut peccata puniantur moderatrice summa atque ordinatrice iustitia, uel mensuris rerum infimarum interueniunt, ut praecedentia succedentibus cedant, atque ita omnis temporalis pulchritudo uicibus suis atque suo genere peragatur. sicut enim sermo peragitur quasi morientibus atque orientibus syllabis, quae per morarum certa interualla tenduntur et spatiis suis inpletis ordinata consequentium successione decedunt, donec ad suum finem tota perducatur oratio, nec in ipsis decurrentibus sonis, sed in loquentis moderatione positum est, quantum producatur corripiaturue syllaba, uel qua specie litterarum singulae suorum locorum momenta custodiant, cum ars ipsa, quae sermonem facit, nec sonis perstrepat nec peruoluatur uarieturque temporibus : sic ortu et occasu, decessu atque successu rerum temporalium certis ac definitis tractibus, donec recurrat ad terminum praestitutum, temporalis pulchritudo contexitur. quae non ideo mala est, quia in spiritalibus creaturis possumus intellegere mirarique meliora, sed habet proprium in suo genere decus atque insinuat bene uiuentibus summam dei sapientiam in alto secretam supra omnes temporum metas fabricatricem ac moderatricem suam.

Augustine includes two characteristics with which we are now familiar in his comparison between the 'passing away and succession of temporal things' which come together to form a unified 'temporal beauty' and the 'ordered succession' of syllables which complete a unified oration. Firstly, he includes the concept of order in his comparison. Just as syllables rise and fall in an 'ordered succession' so too temporal things have a 'succession.' Since Augustine mentions order in the first half of the parallel, the succession of syllables, it should be applied to the second half of the parallel, the succession of temporal things. Secondly, Augustine's comparison involves particulars which come together to form a whole thing. Just as the ordered succession of syllables forms an entire oration, temporal things are 'woven together' into a singular 'temporal beauty.'

These two characteristics are, as we have seen, features of rhetorical economy. They are also central characteristics in the comparisons that he offers in *On True Religion* 22.42-3, *On Music* 6.11.29-30, and *On the Nature of the Good* 8. In all four texts Augustine compares the order of history to the order of the media of literary and rhetorical theory. In *On Music* 6.11.29-30 and *On True Religion* 22.42-3, the comparisons are to the order of a song; in *On the Nature of the Good* 8 and *Against Secundinus* 8 the comparisons are to the order of a speech.[85] And in all four texts the comparisons involve individual things which are ordered into a whole unit.[86] Furthermore, Augustine uses his comparison in *Against Secundinus* 15 to make the same

[85] Augustine even uses the same term to describe the rising and passing of things in *mus.* 6.11.29-30 and *uer. rel.* 21.41: *successio*. In *mus.* 6.11.29-30 the orbits of the times of earthly things are joined in a 'rhythmic succession.' In *uer. rel.* 21.41, The lowest beauty, the beauty of bodies, is hurried away in the 'order of succession.'

[86] See my treatment of these texts earlier in this chapter.

argument that he did when he employed rhetorical economy in *On True Religion* 22.42-3.[87] In that text, he compared the passing of syllables within a song to the passing of human lives in history to argue that '[temporal beauty] is not evil because it passes by.' Similarly, in this text he compares the passing of syllables within a speech to the passing of temporal things in order to argue that '[temporal beauty] is not evil.'[88] Since the order of history that Augustine uses in the three earlier texts is that of rhetorical economy, and since he uses it to make the same argument, then the order that he is describing in *Against Secundinus* 15 must also be that of rhetorical economy.[89]

Finally, Augustine employs rhetorical economy in his theology of history in this text as the logical framework for his theological position that temporal things are ordered into a unified whole. Thus rhetorical economy is the logical framework upon which he justifies his position that temporal things are not evil because of their temporal natures, but play a proper role in history like syllables within a song.

---

[87] See the reading that I provide of *uer. rel.* 22.42-3 in the first section of this chapter.

[88] Moreover, this text has an additional parallel with *uer. rel.* 22.42-3. In both texts Augustine compares the relationship between the timeless art and the time-bound product of that art to the relationship between the timelessness of God's wisdom and providence and the time-bound product of them – temporal things. In *uer. rel.* 22.42-3 Augustine refers to 'divine providence.' In *c. Sec.* 15 he refers to 'the wisdom of God.'

[89] Augustine might have also utilized rhetorical economy in two other texts: *lib. arb.* 3.15.42, which was written between AD 391-5, and *qu. eu.* 2.49, which was written in either 399 or 400. The first shares both parallels described above. Additionally, it shares a third parallel theme with *uer. rel.* 22.42-3. In both texts, Augustine remarks on the absurdity of a person who desires for a single sound to remain instead of passing by, as naturally occurs in speech. However, in *lib. arb.* 3.15.42 it is unclear whether Augustine is comparing the order of history to the composed speech of literary and rhetorical theory or everyday speech. Augustine is also unclear in *qu. eu.* 2.49 as to which type of speech he means. Furthermore, while this latter text does share the two parallels with *mus.* 6.11.29-30, Augustine is not making the same argument in it that he makes in *uer. rel.* 22.42-3. For the date of both works, see: *AttA*, xlvi, xlviii.

Beyond AD 403-5, Augustine continued to incorporate rhetorical economy into his doctrine of history by comparing periods of time in history to parts in a song. In *Letter* 138.5 (AD 411-2), Augustine responds to a question that was sent to him by Volusianus: If the God of the New Testament is the same as the God of the Old Testament, why does he now reject the old sacrifices and delight in new ones?[90] Augustine responds that God commanded various but 'fitting (*aptum*)' sacrifices for different historical periods. He writes:

> In the first times, the sacrifice which God had commanded was fitting (*aptum*). But now this is not so. For he commanded another [form of worship] which is fitting for this time; [he] who knows much better than a human being what should be suitably employed at what time, [and] what he should bestow, add, withdraw, remove, augment, or diminish at what time – as the immutable creator of mutable [things] so also [is he] the [immutable] musical director (*modulator*) [of mutable things] – until the beauty of the whole age (*uniuersi saeculi pulchritudo*), the particles of which are those things which are fitting to their own periods of time, plays out as a great song of a certain ineffable musical director (*magnum carmen cuiusdam ineffabilis modulatoris*), and [until] those who correctly worship God, even when it is a time of faith, cross over from that time into the contemplation of eternal vision.[91]

Augustine affirms that the sacrifice commanded in the Old Testament was fitting. 'But now' God has commanded that human beings should worship him in a different manner

---

[90] The question is stated in *ep.* 138.2. For the date of *ep.* 138, see: Johannes Divjak, 'Epistulae,' in *AugLex*, ed. Cornelius Petrus Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 2001), 1032.

[91] *ep.* 138.5 (CCSL 31B.277.73-278.82): Aptum fuit primis temporibus sacrificium, quod praeceperat deus, nunc uero non ita est. Aliud enim praecepit, quod huic tempori aptum esset, qui multo magis quam homo novit, quid cuique tempori accommodate adhibeatur, quid quando impertiat, addat, auferat, detrahat, augeat minuatue immutabilis mutabilium sicut creator ita moderator, donec uniuersi saeculi pulchritudo, cuius particulae sunt, quae suis quibusque temporibus apta sunt, uelut magnum carmen cuiusdam ineffabilis modulatoris excurrat atque inde transeant in aeternam contemplationem speciei, qui deum rite colunt, etiam cum tempus est fidei.

which is 'fitting for this time.'[92] Augustine then asserts that God knows, much better than a human being, what should be 'suitably' employed at what period of time until the 'beauty of the whole age...plays out' and those who worship God pass into 'the contemplation of eternal vision.'

Two aspects of this passage reveal that Augustine is utilizing rhetorical economy. Firstly, Augustine appeals to music to illustrate that different modes of worship are 'fitting' in different periods of time. Within his illustration, God functions as a 'musical director (*modulatoris*),' knowing what is fitting 'to give, add, remove, subtract, increase, or decrease' during each period of time in order to bring together 'the beauty of the entire age' like 'a great song.' In this manner, Augustine conceives of God as working as a musical director in a manner similar to an orator's work in delivering a speech: Having prepared the speech, the orator executes the arrangement that he has given to the speech as it progresses in real-time. By framing God as a musical director who knows where to place each piece, Augustine frames the 'whole age' like an economically arranged song. Just as an orator of a song decides where to place all of the individual words and syllables in order to make a single economically arranged song, which is beautiful in part due to its economy, God decides what to place in history and where to place it, arranging all of the parts into a single 'beauty of the whole age.'[93]

---

[92] Augustine's concept of the *lex temporalis* ('temporal law') in *lib. arb.* 1.6.15 is also built upon a similar understanding of history. There Augustine states that a law which invests the right to choose societal leaders in the people might be just in one period of time, whereas a law investing the right to choose societal leaders in a soupçon of people, or even one person, might be just in a different period of time.

[93] My reading of this passage agrees with that of M. Cameron. Cameron appeals to both *ep.* 138.5 and *mus.* 6.11.29 to justify his reading that, for Augustine, '[t]he spiritual mind sees God's salvation plan as a unified work of art.' Michael Cameron,

Augustine's use of the term *aptum* ('fitting') is the second aspect of this passage which reveals that he is utilizing rhetorical economy in this text. In rhetorical theory, the virtue of *aptum* – the fittingness of particulars to one another both internally and externally in an oration – permeated every part of the art. And *aptum* was central to rhetorical economy; an economical arrangement included parts that were arranged with *aptum* so that they formed a unified whole. By using the *aptum* of a song to illustrate the *aptum* of the parts of history, Augustine is using *aptum* in its rhetorical sense.[94] Thus, by framing God as choosing what is *aptum* at various historical moments, Augustine is framing God as a musical director using *aptum* to form an economical arrangement of time.

Now that we see that Augustine is utilizing rhetorical economy in this text, we can recognize that we have already seen the manner in which he employs it in his theology in this text. Augustine employs rhetorical economy as the logic upon which he builds his description of God's arrangement of fitting 'particles' into the singular 'beauty of the whole age.' And, thus, it is also the logic upon which he constructs his justification for the differing modes of worship in the Old and New Testaments in his reply to Volusianus: Just as an author employs various fitting words at various moments in order

---

Christ Meets Me Everywhere: Augustine's Early Figurative Exegesis, ed. David C. Steinmetz, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 33, 301n31.

[94] Robert Dodaro agrees with this reading of the role of *aptum* in *ep.* 138.5. Dodaro gives a lengthy treatment of this passage, with a particular focus on the concepts of rhetorical *aptum* and *decorum*. Recall from my treatment of Dodaro's scholarship on rhetorical *decorum* in Chapter One that Dodaro frames *decorum* as a general accommodative principle in rhetorical theory and not in terms of the particular accommodative principle of *elocutio*. Robert Dodaro, *Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 135-8. Also, see my treatment of *aptum* in Chapter One, Section I.

to form a whole speech, God has employed various fitting modes of worship at various periods of time in order to form a whole 'age.'

The final text that I want to engage in this chapter is *City of God* 11.18 (AD 417).[95] In this text, Augustine is arguing that God would not have created human beings that he foreknew would be evil unless he also knew to what good uses he would 'accommodate' them. Augustine writes:

> For God would not have created any – I do not say any of the angels, but any of [us] humans – whom he had foreknown would be evil, unless he had equally known to what uses of goods he would accommodate them, and [unless] he had also [known] from what certain things – as if [from] antithetons (*quasi antithetis*) – he would adorn the order of the ages (*ordinem saeculorum*) just as a most beautiful song (*pulcherrimum carmen*). For those things which are called antithetons are among the most becoming ornaments of style, which are called 'opposites' in Latin or, more plainly, 'contrapositions.' There is not a usage of this noun among us, although Latin speech – indeed the tongues of all people – use the same ornaments of style. The Apostle Paul in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians sweetly sets forth by antithetons at that place: 'By the armor of justice on the right and on the left, by glory and obscurity, by infamy and a good reputation; as misleaders and truth-tellers; as we who are not known and are recognized; as if dying and, behold, we live; as surrounded and not destroyed; as downcast, but always rejoining; as destitute but however enriched [with] many things; as having nothing and possessing everything (2 Cor 6.7-20). As, therefore, those contraries opposite contraries lend beauty to language, so the beauty of the course of this world is achieved by the opposition of contraries, arranged, as it were, by an eloquence not of words, but things.[96]

---

[95] For the date of Book 11, see: *AttA*, xliii.

[96] *ciu.* 11.18 (CCSL 48: 337.1-24): neque enim deus ullum, non dico angelorum, sed uel hominum crearet, quem malum futurum esse praescisset, nisi pariter nosset quibus eos bonorum usibus commodaret atque ita ordinem saeculorum tamquam pulcherrimum carmen etiam ex quibusdam quasi antithetis honestaret. antitheta enim quae appellantur in ornamentis elocutionis sunt decentissima, quae latine ut appellentur opposita, uel, quod expressius dicitur, contraposita, non est apud nos huius uocabuli consuetudo, cum tamen eisdem ornamentis locutionis etiam sermo latinus utatur, immo linguae omnium gentium. his antithetis et paulus apostolus in secunda ad corinthios epistula illum locum suauiter explicat, ubi dicit : per arma iustitiae dextra et sinistra : per gloriam et ignobilitatem, per infamiam et bonam famam ; ut seductores et ueraces, ut qui ignoramur et cognoscimur ; quasi morientes, et ecce uiuimus, ut coherciti

Augustine spends the majority of this pericope exploring one of the tools by which God knew that he would 'adorn' the 'order of the ages' – antitheton. He recognizes that this is a concept employed in songs, and recognizes it as one of the 'most becoming' ornaments of style, a rhetorical category. Augustine then demonstrates that Paul uses antithetons in 2 Cor 6.7-10 before closing the pericope by comparing the use of antithetons to God's work in history – just as antithetons lend beauty to language, so 'the beauty of the course of this world is achieved by the opposition of contraries, arranged, as it were, by an eloquence not of words, but of things.'

A proper understanding of the concept of antitheton will illuminate Augustine's meaning in this passage. As I have already shown in Chapter Three, antitheton was a concept of binary arrangement in rhetorical theory wherein two things of contrasting content were placed opposite one another.[97] Thus, when Augustine states that antitheton is one of the good uses to which God foreknew that he would use human beings who

---

et non mortificati ; ut tristes, semper autem gaudentes, sicut egeni, multos autem ditantes, tamquam nihil habentes et omnia possidentes. sicut ergo ista contraria contrariis opposita sermonis pulchritudinem reddunt : ita quadam non uerborum, sed rerum eloquentia contrariorum oppositione saeculi pulchritudo componitur. Apertissime hoc positum est in libro ecclesisastico isto modo : contra malum bonum est et contra mortem uita ; sic contra pium peccator. et sic intuere in omnia opera altissimi, bina bina, unum contra unum.

[97] See my full treatment of the concept of antitheton in *ord.* 1.7.18 in Chapter Three. As noted in that section, Lausberg defines antitheton as a rhetorical 'phenomenon' of binary arrangement. Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, §§ 443, 787-807. Additionally, A.-I. Bouton-Touboulic recognizes that Augustine uses the rhetorical concept of antithetons in both *ord.* 1.7.18 and *ciu.* 11.18, and even states that Augustine sees the world as a divine discourse which is the product of the divine Word of God. However, she only engages the concept at a superficial level and does not recognize that Augustine is incorporating rhetorical theory into his notion of God's activity of arrangement in both texts in a substantive manner. Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, *L'Ordre Caché : La notion d'ordre chez saint Augustin*, Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 174 (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2004), 260, 442-3.

would become evil, he means that such human beings 'adorn' the 'order of the ages' by accentuating that which is good by means of contrast. In the last few lines, therefore, he can state that evil persons play a role in bringing about 'the beauty of the course of this world,' which through the use of antithetons evinces an eloquence of things.

Augustine's appeal to antithetons as a tool of God, whereby he arranges the 'beauty of the course of this world' with 'eloquence,' reveals that he is incorporating rhetorical economy into his theology of history in this text in two ways. Firstly, he frames God's work in arranging history as demonstrating eloquence. Eloquence was the skill possessed by orators, and thus Augustine is conceiving of God's work in history as evincing rhetorical skill. Secondly, as I have already shown in my treatment of *On Order* 1.7.18 in Chapter Three, antithetons are a tool that a skilled orator uses to form an economically arranged speech. Thus, the very attribution of the use of antitheton to God's arrangement of history reveals that Augustine conceives of God as giving history an economical arrangement.[98]

In this passage, then, we can now discern that Augustine employs rhetorical economy to explain how God integrates evil human beings into his 'order of the ages.' Just as an author, like Paul, made his second letter to the Corinthians more beautiful by

[98] My reading of this text disagrees with Guitton, who uses this text to justify his opinion that, if Augustine thinks that harmony exists in the universe, it is a terrible harmony ('une harmonie terrible'). Guitton, *Le temps et l`éternité chez Plotin et Saint Augustin*, 373. By failing to recognize that Augustine's comparison of antithetons in a speech to God's arrangement of periods of time within history is substantive, Guitton incorrectly weakens the quality that Augustine attributed to God's arrangement of history.

arranging contrasting words next to one another, so God makes history more beautiful by arranging evil human beings next to those who are good.

The texts that I have presented in this section demonstrate that Augustine continued to incorporate rhetorical economy into his theology of history in different ways until at least AD 417. When combined with his earliest use of the concept, we see that Augustine utilized rhetorical economy for at least 26 or 27 years, beginning as early as 390 or 391 with *On True Religion* 22.42-3.[99]

Conclusion

The arguments that I have made in this chapter lead to three interrelated conclusions. Firstly, Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of history over the majority of his career. A close reading of *On True Religion* 22.42-3 reveals that he was doing so as early as AD 390-1. *On Music* 6.11.29-30, *On the Nature of the Good* 8, *Against Secundinus* 15, *Letter* 138.5, and *City of God* 11.18 all provide evidence that he continued to utilize rhetorical economy in his theology of history until at least AD 417.

Secondly, these texts also demonstrate that Augustine employed rhetorical economy in his theology of history in a variety of ways. In *On True Religion* 22.42-3, he

[99] Augustine, who was born in 354, would have been 63 years old at the time that he wrote *ciu.* 11.18 in 417. Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography*, New ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 3. I would like to propose that his advanced age, when combined with the long period of time over which Augustine had already been incorporating rhetorical economy into his theology of history over his lifetime, suggests that he probably continued to do so over the final 13 years of his life.

uses rhetorical economy to explain God's providential ordering of all of history and to explain why no human being can see the order that God has given to history. Augustine uses rhetorical economy in these same two ways in *On Music* 6.11.29-30, but in that text he also employs it in order to illustrate the perfect arrangement that God has given to human lives within the whole of human history, to explain God's ordering of the orbits of all celestial things, and to justify the inclusion of sin within God's ordering of everything. In *On the Nature of the Good* 8, Augustine employs rhetorical economy in his polemical argument agains the Manichees to affirm that all things which come from God are good to explain God's providential ordering of all things. In *Against Secundinus* 15 Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy as the logical framework for his theological position that temporal things are not evil on account of their temporal nature, but play a proper role in the whole of history like syllables within a song. In *Letter* 138.5 Augustine employs rhetorical economy as the logic upon which he builds his description of God's arrangement of fitting 'particles' into the singular 'beauty of the whole age' and, thus, it is also the logic upon which he constructs his justification for the differing modes of worship in the Old and New Testaments. Finally, in *City of God* 11.18, Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy to explain how God integrates evil human beings into his 'order of the ages.'

Thirdly, the work that I have done on rhetorical economy in this chapter also has implications for two areas of contemporary scholarship on Augustine's thought. The first is his theology of beauty. All seven of the texts that I have presented in this chapter

discuss the concept of beauty.[100] Indeed, in each passage the order that he discusses, which draws upon the rhetorical concept of economy, is integral to his concept of beauty. However, despite rich scholarly engagement of Augustine's concept of beauty, I am aware of no study that explores how Augustine's integration of rhetorical economy into his notion of order affects his theology of beauty.[101] I would like to suggest that such a project would provide us with a more robust undertanding of the bishop of Hippo's concept of beauty.[102]

The second is scholarship on his understanding of order as applied to history and time. Up to this point in Augustine studies, the majority of approaches to Augustine's concept of order have seen Neoplatonic and Stoic philosophy as the underlying logic behind his concept of order.[103] The work that I have done in this chapter suggests that our

---

[100] The concept of beauty is included in Augustine's discussions in *uer. rel.* 22.42-3, *mus.* 6.11.29-30, *nat. b.* 8, *c. Sec.* 15*, ep.* 138.5, and *ciu.* 11.18.

[101] E.g. Fontanier, *La beauté selon saint Augustin*; Carol Harrison, *Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine*, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

[102] There is precedent for advancement of scholarship on Augustine's thought through an exploration of his incorporation of rhetorical ideas into his theology. For example, M. Cameron has advanced our understanding of Augustine's scriptural hermeneutic by including rhetorical *dispositio* and *decorum* in his investigation. Cameron, *Christ Meets Me Everywhere*, 30-4. R. Dodaro has similarly advanced our understanding of Augustine's political thought by including rhetorical concepts in his investigation of Augustine's concept of a just society. Dodaro, *Christ and the Just Society*.

[103] The work of J. Trelenberg, which I engaged in Chapter Three, serves as an apt example. In one work, he frames Augustine's concept of order in *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 as Neoplatonic without offering any justification for the claim. Jörg Trelenberg, *Das Prinzip „Einheit" beim frühen Augustinus* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 24-7. In a separate work, Trelenberg notes *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 while commenting that Augustine's concept of order in *ord.* 2.18.47 comes from Neoplatonic and Stoic ideas. Once again, his claim lacks any justification. He states: 'The claim of the aesthetic and ontological priority of the whole (*totum, uniuersum*) before the parts (*partes*) is a frequently expressed basic view of Augustinian Neoplatonism, which unmistakably has its roots in Stoic cosmology. See *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 [Die Behauptung des

understanding of Augustine's concept of order will become more robust if we account for his use of the rhetorical concept of order.

Finally, I would like to suggest that this chapter can serve as a foundation for future work on Augustine's notion of the order of history and his use of rhetorical economy to frame that order. My work in this chapter has limited the discussion to texts in which he explicitly compares the order of history to the order of the media of literary and rhetorical theory. But now that the point has been proven, further studies on the manner in which Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his understanding of the order of history in texts that do not explicitly mention the media of literary and rhetorical theory might do much to expand our understanding of Augustine's thought, particularly on time, history, providence, and order.

ästhetischen wie ontologischen Vorrangs des Ganzen (*totum, uniuersum*) vor den Einzelteilen (*partes*) ist eine häufig geäußerte Grundansicht des augustinischen Neuplatonismus, welcher seine Wurzeln unverkennbar in der stoischen Kosmologie hat. Vgl. z.B. *gen. c. Man.* 1,21,32].' Jörg Trelenberg, *Augustins Schrift De Ordine: Einführung, Kommentar, Ergebnisse* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 365. I offer a more thorough treatment of Trelenberg's claims in my section on *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.21.32 in Chapter Three.

CHAPTER FIVE

Rhetorical Economy in Augustine's Theodicy

And so I sinned,
O Lord God,
the arranger and creator of all natural things,
but only the arranger of sins,
O Lord my God,
I sinned by acting against the precepts
of my parents and of those masters.

Confessions 1.10.16[1]

Augustine's doctrine of evil presupposed the two seemingly antithetical positions that God created everything and that God is not the source of evil.[2] His solution to this theological Gordian Knot was twofold. Firstly, he employed a definition of evil similar to that of the Platonic tradition; evil is not substantial, but the lack of the good. Secondly, Augustine identified the source of evil as the will rather than a substance. Thus, as William Babcock has noted, Augustine insisted 'that the origin of evil lies precisely in something that comes forth from God, the human soul.'[3]

Previous scholars have noted the parallels that Augustine's solution has within ancient philosophical literature. G.R. Evans, for example, explains that Augustine's early shift away from evil as being to evil as non-being might have been a shift from the Aristotelian understanding of being that he had read in the *Categories*, and which would have been reinforced

---

[1] *conf.* 1.10.16 (CCSL 27: 9.1-4): *et tamen peccabam, domine deus, ordinator et creator rerum omnium naturalium, peccatorum autem tantum ordinator, domine deus meus, peccabam faciendo contra praecepta parentum et magistrorum illorum*. All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

[2] For Augustine's doctrine of evil, see: G.R. Evans, *Augustine on Evil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

[3] William S. Babcock, 'Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency,' *JRE* 16 (1988): 31.

by his pre-Christian Manichaean teachers, to Plotinus's doctrine of being.[4] However, while scholars have focused on the logic of Augustine's solution to this first problem presented by evil, they have not focused on the logic of his solution to a second problem which arises in his theodicy – how he harmonizes his commitment to God's providential ordering of all things with his understanding that God is not the source of sin.[5]

In this chapter I will demonstrate that Augustine employs rhetorical economy as the logic by which he solves this second problem within his theodicy by means of a close reading of *On Free Will* 3.9.27. However, in order to fully grasp the manner in which Augustine's employs rhetorical economy in this text, we must first recognize his distinction between the divine activities of creation and arrangement.[6] Thus, I will begin this chapter by showing that Augustine distinguishes between these divine activities by means of an argument that I will make from *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.3.5. I will use this text to suggest that Augustine used the logic of the first two principal parts of rhetoric to conceive of the divine activities of creation and arrangement in his early doctrine of creation. In the final stages of this argument, I will also demonstrate that Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy to conceive of this divine activity of arrangement at creation. Once I have shown this, I will then spend the remainder of this chapter showing that Augustine used rhetorical economy in his solution to the second problem which arises in his theodicy in *On Free Will* 3.9.27.

---

[4] Evans, *Augustine on Evil*, 32-6.

[5] Throughout this chapter I will use the term 'theodicy' to refer to Augustine's theological vindication of God's goodness and providence despite the existence of evil.

[6] I am using 'creation and arrangement' as shorthand to refer to Augustine's use of any combination of the verbs 'to create' (*creare*) or 'to make' (*facere*) on the one hand, and 'to arrange' (*disponere*) or 'to order' (*ordinare*) on the other hand, in the texts that I engage in this chapter. I have done this for the sake of brevity in the text above.

DIVINE CREATION AND DIVINE ARRANGEMENT: *ON GENESIS AGAINST THE MANICHEES* 1.3.5

In this section I will show that Augustine distinguishes between the divine activities of creation and arrangement in his early theology of creation in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.3.5 while also suggesting that this distinction between the divine activities of creation and arrangement is built upon the logic of the first two principal parts of rhetorical theory – 'invention' (*inuentio*) and 'arrangement' (*dispositio*) As I have shown in Chapter One, rhetorical theory held that an orator first invented the material of his speech before he then arranged all of the particular pieces into an order. Toward the latter half of this argument, I will also demonstrate that Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy in his notion of arrangement as a distinct activity at creation.

Two arguments which I have made in previous chapters will inform my approach to this text. Firstly, I have already shown that Augustine framed creation according to the media of literary and rhetorical theory in Chapter Two. Having framed creation according to this media, it makes sense for Augustine to use the steps of rhetorical theory in order to portray God's process of bringing creation into being. Secondly, and likewise, I have already demonstrated that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy, a rhetorical concept of arrangement, into his theology of creation in Chapter Three. Furthermore, in that chapter I showed that Augustine incorporates rhetorical economy into his theology of creation within this same work, in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32. This provides precedent for Augustine to incorporate other rhetorical concepts into his theology of creation in this same text. Both of these points together suggest that we should see Augustine employing the rhetorical concepts of invention and arrangement in texts in which he discusses God's activities of making and arranging creation

within *On Genesis against the Manichees*. Over the course of this section, I will suggest that this is the case in 1.3.5. Let us now turn to the text.

Augustine's distinction between the divine activities of creation and arrangement is found in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.3.5 (AD 387-8), his earliest commentary on the creation narrative.[7] Responding to the Manichaean claim that Gn 1.2 conflicts with Gn 1.1 because God could not have created something which was already there, Augustine writes:[8]

> Indeed, what could be more clearly said than this? It was said: 'In the beginning God made (*fecit*) heaven and earth, but the earth was invisible and unassembled (*incomposita*)' (Gn. 1.1-2). That is, 'in the beginning God made heaven and earth,' however the earth itself, which God made (*fecit*), was invisible and unassembled before God arranged by well-ordered distinction (*ordinata distinctione disponeret*) the forms of all things in their locations and dwelling-places. [That is,] before he said 'let there be light (Gn 1.3),' 'let there be a firmament (Gn 1.6),' 'let the waters congregate' and 'let dry land appear (Gn 1.9),' and other things which, through an order (*per ordinem*), were so laid out in that book in such a way that little children could grasp them.[9]

Augustine harmonizes Gn 1.1 and 1.2 by arguing that the creation narrative should be read as a two-step process. God first 'made' the earth in an 'invisible and unassembled' state. Then God 'arranged' the 'unassembled' creation into individual 'forms.'[10] He justifies this reading by

---

[7] For the date of *Gn. adu. Man.*, see: *AttA*, xlv.

[8] Augustine states the claim of the Manichees in the preceding lines of *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.3.5.

[9] *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.3.5 (CSEL 91: 72.6-14): quid enim manifestius dici potuit quam hoc ? dictum est : in principio fecit deus caelum et terram ; terra autem erat inuisibilis et incomposita, id est : in principio fecit deus caelum et terram; terra autem ipsa quam fecit deus, inuisibilis erat et incomposita, antequam deus omnium rerum formas locis et sedibus suis ordinata distinctione disponeret, antequam diceret : fiat lux, et fiat firmamentum, et congregentur aquae, et appareat arida, et cetera quae in eodem libro per ordinem sic exponuntur, quemadmodum possint ea paruuli capere.

[10] Rowan Williams clarifies that Augustine understood matter in a similar manner as Plotinus – as pure potentiality. Within this model, the action of form on matter is not imposition, but the actualization of matter into order. Rowan D Williams, ''Good for Nothing'? Augustine on Creation,' *AugStud* 25 (1994): 17. Williams bases his definitions on a text from *conf.*, which was written approximately a decade after *Gn. adu. Man.* It is unclear whether Augustine is using 'form' in this sense in this text. For more on 'form' and 'formlessness' in Augustine's thought on creation, see also: Rowan Williams, 'Creation,' in *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, et al. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999).

calling attention to the order of the verses. The creation of all things is described in Gn 1.1, the initial state of the created earth in Gn 1.2, and then the arrangement of the initially 'unassembled (*incomposita*)' terrestrial creation in Gn 1.3ff. In supplying this interpretation of Gn 1.1-3, Augustine distinguishes between the divine activities of creation and arrangement. He frames God as creating everything *ex nihilo* in one act and arranging it in a distinct act.[11] It is to these two distinct acts to which I will now turn.

If we compare Augustine's distinction between the divine activities of creation and arrangement to the rhetorical steps of invention (*inuentio*) and arrangement (*dispositio*) we will

---

[11] Augustine will later state that the two stages of creation are a logical, not temporal, ordering. The universe is created/made and ordered/arranged at the moment of creation. Augustine does give the distinction a temporal aspect in texts where he is dealing with the Son's work in preserving the created order after the order has been established, but the temporal aspect is attributed to the continuation of the original ordering and not the original ordering itself (e.g. *Gn. litt.* 4.12.23, *Gn. litt. inp.* 15.51). In addition to this, while dealing with Gen 1.5 Augustine argues that the arrangement which took place at the moment of creation is presented to us in a temporal fashion because humans are unable to contemplate it as atemporal (*Gn. litt. inp.* 7.28).

In *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.3.5, however, Augustine is not as clear. Thus, he might be representing a temporal or logical progression. This text is an outlier, though, and, if he is expressing a temporal ordering in which there are two creations, it is explained by a development in Augustine's thought away from an early two-creation theory that is often associated with Origen (*Gn. adu. Man.* is the earliest of Augustine's writings on Genesis). Roland Teske provides the argument for Augustine's development away from a double-creation model. Teske argues that, though Augustine posited a first creation of the incorporeal inner man in Gen 1.26 and a second creation of corporeal man in Gen 2.7 in *Gn. adu. Man.* 2.7.9, by the time he wrote *Gn. litt.* 3.22.34 he had moved away from this double-creation model. Roland J. Teske, 'Origen and St. Augustine's First Commentaries on Genesis,' *Origeniana Quinta* (1992): 181. This development away from a double-creation model explains why Augustine might be expressing a temporal progression between creating/making and arranging/ordering in *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.3.5, but do not see that separation in his later texts. Teske's argument also builds upon previous work done by Herman Somers, especially his work on the timing of Augustine's reading of Rufinus's translation of Origen's *Hom. in Gen*. Somers argues that, though at the time of the writing of *Gn. adu. Man.* Augustine demonstrates indirect knowledge of the ideas of Philo and Origen with regard to the creation narrative in Genesis, he does not demonstrate that he has read their texts until later in his career. Furthermore, Somers argues that Augustine's early indirect knowledge of the teachings of Philo and Origen is not sufficiently explained by appealing to his dependence on Ambrose. Herman Somers, 'Image de Dieu. Les sources de l'exégèse augustinienne,' *REAug* 7, no. 2 (1961): 116-7.

see that they are conceptually similar. Augustine states that God first 'made (*fecit*)' everything in an 'unassembled (*incomposita*)' state. Though he does not use the term *inuentio* anywhere in this passage, the concept that Augustine describes is similar to the orator's activity in the initial stage of invention, which was to discover the ideas of his speech.[12] In both cases, the activity involves originating something. Following this, Augustine states that God then 'arranged (*disponeret*)' all created things in their 'locations (*locis*).' Here Augustine does use the verb associated with the rhetorical term *dispositio*. And the concept that he describes is similar to rhetorical arrangement, wherein an orator arranged the material of the speech after he had invented it.[13] In both cases, the activity involves taking things which have been originated and placing them into an arrangement. Thus, Augustine's divine activities of creation and arrangement in this passage are conceptually similar to the two steps of rhetorical invention and arrangement in both content and sequence.

While Augustine does name the second divine activity (*disponere*) according to its technical terminology in rhetorical theory (*dispositio*), he does not clearly identify the first divine activity (*facere*) according to the terminology of rhetorical theory (*inuentio*). However, since Augustine conceived of creation according to the media of literary and rhetorical theory and since he incorporated rhetorical economy – the accommodative principle of rhetorical arrangement – into his theology of creation later in this very work as I have shown in Chapter Three, then we should expect that he would use the logic of rhetorical invention and arrangement to conceive of God's activity of bringing creation into being.

---

[12] For more on the rhetorical concept of *inuentio*, see my treatment of the concept in Chapter One. See also: In rhetoric, *inuentio* was the process of the discovery of ideas. For more on *inuentio*, see Lausberg's lengthy treatment of the concept: Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study*, trans. Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, and David E. Orton (Boston: Brill, 1998), §§ 260-442.

[13] See my introduction to the concept of rhetorical *dispositio* in Chapter One and my treatment of the concept throughout this dissertation.

This reading is suggested by the manner in which Augustine discusses the divine activity of arrangement in this passage. Specifically, two places within this passage reveal that Augustine uses rhetorical economy to conceptualize God's arrangement of creation.

Firstly, Augustine's description of the divine activity of arrangement (*disponere*) as executed 'with well-ordered distinction (*ordinata distinctione*)' follows the description of the second principal part of rhetoric, arrangement (*dispositio*), given in the closing lines of the *Rhetorical Handbook for Herennius* (*Herennius*). In *Herennius* 4.56.69, the anonymous author writes:

> If we follow [the principles about which I have written], we will invent[14] acutely and quickly, arrange distinctly and [in an] orderly [manner][15] (*distincte et ordinate disponemus*), deliver impressively and attractively, remember firmly and perpetually, and style [our speech] ornately and sweetly. So then, there is nothing else in the rhetorical art. We will gain all these things if we will pursue the reasons of the precepts with exercises.[16]

The author summarizes his entire project by naming the five principal parts of rhetoric in their verbal forms, as actions to be performed by his readers.[17] And to each of the five principal parts of rhetoric he attaches two adverbs to specify the quality of each that the art of rhetoric seeks.

---

[14] The entry in LS for the verb *reperire* (*reperiemus*) notes that the term can be properly translated as 'to invent.' Since I have referred to the first principal part of rhetoric as 'invention' throughout this project, for the sake of clarity I have translated *reperiemus* as 'we will invent' rather than 'we will discover.'

[15] The author attaches a simple couplet of adverbs to each of the verbs from this point in the sentence forward. While I can translate most of these as simple couplets as well, it is difficult to express the adverb *ordinate* with one term because the adverbial use of 'orderly' has become rare in English. Thus, I have provided extra terminology in my translation of *ordinate* in order to bring across that it is an adverb.

[16] *Auct. ad Her.* 4.56.69 (LCL 403: 410): quae si sequimur, acute et cito reperiemus, distincte et ordinate disponemus, grauiter et uenuste pronuntiabimus, firme et perpetue meminerimus, ornate et suauiter eloquemur. ergo amplius in arte rhetorica nihil est. haec omnia adipiscemur, si rationes praeceptionis diligentia consequemur exercitationis.

[17] The order in which he presents them differs from my presentation of the five principal parts in Chapter One. There I list them as invention, arrangement, elocution, memorization, and delivery. The author of *Auct. ad Her.* lists them here as inventing, arranging, delivering, and remembering (memorization), and speaking with style.

For him, proper arrangement (*disponere*) is done 'distinctly and in an orderly manner (*distincte et ordinate*).' The language is slightly different but the point is the same.

Augustine's description of divine arrangement in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.3.5 matches that of *Herennius* 4.56.69. Both authors use words which derive from the verbs *distinguere* and *ordinare* to describe the quality of arrangement. Augustine simply changes the manner in which this quality is expressed. Whereas the author of *Herennius* 4.56.69 used the verb *disponere* and then expressed the quality through adverbs (*distincte* and *ordinate*), Augustine uses the verb *disponere* and then expressed the quality through an adverbial phrase employing the ablative of means (*ordinata distinctione*) – God arranged creation 'by well-ordered distinction.'[18]

Secondly, Augustine's use of the term *distinctio* in this passage matches its use as a technical concept of arrangement within rhetorical theory. As I showed in Chapter Three, within rhetorical theory *distinctio* was a form of *antitheton*, a tool of binary arrangement wherein two things of contrasting content were placed opposite one another.[19] If we look at Augustine's usage of the term *distinctio* in this passage we see that it accords with this technical use. Augustine provides four illustrations for God's arrangement of creation 'by well-ordered distinction

---

[18] Both the adverb *distincte* and the ablative adjective *distinctione* are derived from the verb *distinguere.* Likewise, both the adverb *ordinate* and the ablative adjective *ordinata* are derived from the verb *ordinare*. See the entries for the terms in LS. On an additional note, Augustine's close following of the phrasing of *Auct.ad Her.* 4.56.69 suggests that he had read the work before he wrote *Gn. adu. Man.* in 387-8. If this was the case, it is likely that he read it well beforehand, during his training or career in rhetoric.

[19] Specifically, *distinctio* was one way by which an orator could produce *antitheton*, which itself was one tool that an orator might employ to produce an economically arranged speech. Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, §§ 797, 804-5. For a lengthier discussion of *distinctio* and *antitheton*, see my treatment of Augustine's incorporation of the two rhetorical concepts into his doctrine of order as it applies to created things in *ord.* 1.7.18 in Chapter Three.

(*distinctione*)' by partially quoting three verses: 'let there be light (Gn 1.3),' 'let there be a firmament (Gn 1.6),' 'let the waters congregate' and 'let dry land appear (Gn 1.9).' If we reference the full verses that he partially quotes, we see that Augustine sees God as arranging creation into particular things which are opposites of one another. In Gn 1.3 the *distinctio* is between light and darkness. In Gn 1.6 the *distinctio* is between the firmament and the waters, which it separates. And Augustine lists both halves of the *distinctio* from Gn 1.9 – water and dry land.

I have already shown in Chapter Three that Augustine utilized rhetorical *distinctio* and *antitheton* in his theology of creation in *On Order* 1.7.18, which was written in AD 386-7, approximately a year before he wrote *On Genesis against the Manichees*.[20] In the relevant lines of *On Order* 1.7.18, Augustine writes:

> Indeed he loves this very thing – to love good things and not to love evil things – because this belongs to the great order and the divine arrangement (*dispositionis*). Whereby, since, by this very distinction (*distinctione*), order and arrangement (*dispositio*) preserve the harmony of everything, it happens that it is also necessary that evil things exist. So, in a certain manner, as if from antithetons (*ex antithetis*), because this is also delightful to us in an oration, the beauty of all things is likewise formed from contraries.[21]

In this earlier text, Augustine explicitly connects the divine activity of arrangement (*dispositio*) to an orator's use of *antitheton*, which is produced by using *distinctio*.[22] Furthermore, Augustine used *distinctio* in the same manner in *On Order* 1.7.18 that he does in *On Genesis against the*

---

[20] *On Order* is one of Augustine's earliest writings. He wrote it at Cassiciacum in the months between his conversion to Christianity in late August, AD 386, and his baptism in Milan during Easter Vigil, April 24-5, 387. For the dates of Augustine's conversion and baptism, see: Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography*, New ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 64, 117. For the date of *ord.*, see: *AttA*, xlvii.

[21] *ord.* 1.7.18 (CCSL 29: 98.29-35): hoc ipsum enim diligit, diligere bona et non diligere mala, quod est magni ordinis et diuinae dispositionis. qui ordo atque dispositio quia uniuersitatis congruentiam ipsa distinctione custodit, fit, ut mala etiam esse necesse sit. ita quasi ex antithetis quodam modo, quod nobis etiam in oratione iucundum est, ex contrariis, omnium simul rerum pulchritudo figuratur.

[22] See Chapter Three for my exegesis of *ord.* 1.7.18.

Manichees 1.3.5. In both texts he highlights God's arrangement of opposites next to one another. In *On Order* 1.7.18 he focused on 'good things' and 'evil things.' In *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.3.5 he focuses on the *distinctiones* between light and darkness, the firmament and the water, and the dry land and the waters.[23]

Since Augustine's description of divine arrangement in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.3.5 makes the same point as the description of economical arrangement in *Herennius* 4.56.69, since he names and uses *distinctio* in the same way that it functioned as a technical concept of arrangement within rhetorical theory, and since Augustine uses *distinctio* in the same manner that he used it in his own earlier text in which he incorporates rhetorical theory into his concept of order (*On Order* 1.7.18) there is no question that Augustine is also incorporating the concept of rhetorical economy into his understanding of God's activity of arrangement in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.3.5. His conception, then, of one of the two divine activities in this passage according to rhetorical theory, combined with the conceptual

---

[23] Outside of *Gn. adu. Man.* 1.3.5 and *Auct. ad Her.* 4.56.69, there is only one other text in the extant Latin tradition which places the ideas of arrangement, order, and *distinctio* in such proximity. Tertullian, expositing 1 Cor 15.42-3 in *res. mor.* 53.11, writes: 'The apostle, arranging this order, distinguished it in Adam and also in Christ, as in the heads of the very distinction [*res. mor.* 53.11 (CCSL 2: 999.38-9): hunc ordinem apostolus disponens, in adam quoque et in christo eum merito distinguit ut in capitibus distinctionis ipsius].' It is possible that Augustine was aware of this text and transferred Tertullian's use of these three concepts together to his own exegesis of a different scriptural passage. However, if this is the case, it does not nullify my argument that they come from a rhetorical source. Tertullian, having received training in rhetoric, applies the same rhetorical principles that I have exposited from *Auct. ad. Her.* 4.56.69 to 1 Cor 15.42-3. In the lines that follow the quotation that I have given, Tertullian clarifies that the order he is speaking about is that the natural body comes before the spiritual body. Thus, Tertullian thinks that Paul, the author of 1. Cor 15.42-3, illustrates this order of the natural body before the spiritual body by means of a *distinctio* – Adam, the representative of natural bodies, coming before Christ, the representative of spiritual bodies. Tertullian's use of rhetorical concepts is well-documented in scholarship. Sider wrote an entire volume on the theme: Robert Dick Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).

match between his distinction between the two activities of creation and arrangement and the rhetorical concepts of invention and arrangement suggests the reading that Augustine is framing both the divine activities of creation and arrangement in this text according to the logic of rhetorical invention and arrangement.

Having seen that Augustine applied a rhetorical notion of arrangement to the initial act of creation in *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.3.5, in the next section I will demonstrate that Augustine extends this notion of arrangement so that it also includes God's ongoing activity of arrangement as creation moves through time. Specifically, I will show that this notion of arrangement underlies the solution that Augustine provides to a problem raised by his theodicy in *On Free Choice* 3.9.27.

God's Economical Arrangement of Sin: *On Free Choice* 3.9.27

Augustine's doctrine of evil presupposed two seemingly antithetical positions which I introduced at the beginning of this chapter: 1) God created everything; and 2) God is not the source of evil. This position produces two problems for Augustine. His solution to this first problem, also introduced at the beginning of this chapter, was to locate the source of sin in human free will. But once Augustine solves this first problem presented by his doctrine of evil, he is faced with a second – harmonizing his understanding that sin does not come from God with his commitment to divine providence.

Augustine's solution to this second problem utilizes his distinction between the divine acts of creation and arrangement just introduced. Several times in his corpus he asserts that, though God arranges evil things such as sin, he did not create them. He states this clearly and

succinctly in *Confessions* 1.10.16 where he writes that God is 'the arranger (*ordinator*) and creator (*creator*) of all natural things, but only the arranger (*ordinator*) of sins.'[24] Augustine similarly states that God did not create sin elsewhere in his corpus. For example, in *City of God* 14.4, he writes concerning the specific sin of lying: 'The author and creator of [the human being] is God, who is by no means the author and creator of lying.'[25] And in *Exposition of Psalm* 141.15 he writes: 'God made (*fecit*) human beings themselves, but he did not make them lovers of the world. For to love the world is sin, and God did not make (*fecit*) sin.'[26] Thus we see that Augustine broadened the notion of arrangement that we saw him apply to the initial act of creation in the last section so that it also includes God's ongoing activity as creation moves through time.

A close look at *On Free Choice* 3.9.27 (AD 391-5)[27] will reveal that Augustine addressed this second problem in his theodicy by using rhetorical economy to explain this divine arrangement of sin.[28] But before we engage the text, we first need to understand what Augustine

---

[24] *conf.* 1.10.16 (CCSL 27: 9.1-2): *ordinator et creator rerum omnium naturalium, peccatorum autem tantum ordinator.* In addition to this text, Augustine differentiates between God as the creator of all things and God as only the arranger of evils such as sins, sinners, and darkness, in: *en. Ps.* 7.19, 9.20; *c. Faust.* 22.78; *Gn. litt.* 3.24.37; *ciu.* 11.17-8. J.J. O'Donnell offers the same reading of these texts. James J. O'Donnell, *Augustine, Confessions, Volume II: Commentary on Books 1-7* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 65. O'Donnell also includes several texts in his list in which I think that the concept is not as evident. I have not included those texts here.

[25] *ciu.* 14.4 (CCSL 48: 418.12-3): sit eius auctor et creator deus, qui non est utique auctor creatorque mendacii.

[26] *en. Ps.* 141.15 (40: 2055.41-2056.4): homines enim ipsos fecit deus ; dilectores mundi non eos fecit. mundum enim diligere peccatum est ; peccatum autem non fecit deus.

[27] Augustine completed the second and third books of *lib. arb.* in Hippo between AD 391-5. *AttA*, xlvi.

[28] Augustine's theodicy incorporates several areas of his theology which I will engage to varying degrees in this section, such as his doctrines of evil, foreknowledge, providence, and human free will.

is doing up to this point. Therefore, I will begin by summarizing the salient points of Augustine's argument from the earlier chapters of the text before quoting and engaging 3.9.27.

On Free Choice 3.9.27 occurs within Augustine's response to the fear of his interlocutor, Evodius, that one cannot affirm both God's foreknowledge and human free will.[29] Evodius states this fear in 3.1.1 and, as the dialogue proceeds, Augustine begins to caution him against reaching two conclusions – that sinful souls should be 'other than they are' and that they should not exist at all.[30]

In 3.9.24 Augustine builds his argument against these two positions on the assertion that there is a just and gradated order of all created things. He writes:

> I will respond that the order of all creatures runs from the highest all the way down to the lowest with just[31] steps so that that person is envying[32] who will have said 'that should not be,' [and] that person is also envying who will have said 'that should not be such.' For if he wishes that such [a thing] is as if it is higher, already that [thing] is and is such that [nothing] should be added to it, since it is perfect.[33]

---

[29] The dialogue between Augustine and Evodius shifts as it progresses, but the twin concepts of God's foreknowledge and free will are consistently present from *lib. arb.* 3.1.1-9.27. Evodius begins Book 3 by affirming that free will is a good, but then he states that he cannot see how one can affirm both God's foreknowledge and the soul's culpability for moving from the unchangeable good to mutable goods (*lib. arb.* 3.1.1). Augustine restates Evodius's position in 3.3.6, and Evodius affirms in that same passage that his position is that those things which happen according to God's foreknowledge must happen by necessity and thus are not the product of free will.

[30] *lib. arb.* 3.5.13. Augustine also addresses the extreme of this position – that certain things, such as sinful souls, should not even exist.

[31] The Latin term here is *iustis*. Thus, the English term 'just' should be understood in its meaning which is related to the concept of justice.

[32] English lacks a verb which approximates the Latin verb *inuidere*, instead rendering the concept with an adjective accompanied by a verb of being (e.g. 'to be envious'). I have translated the verb in an active form which, though it is less familiar in English, retains the force of the active Latin verb.

[33] *lib. arb.* 3.9.24 (CCSL 29: 289.5-10). *respondebo ordinem creaturarum a summa usque ad infimam gradibus iustis ita decurrere ut ille inuideat qui dixerit : ista non esset, inuideat etiam ille qui dixerit : ista talis esset. si enim talem uult esse qualis est superior, iam illa est et tanta est ut addi ei non oporteat, quia perfecta est.* By the time that Augustine makes this statement in 3.9.24, he has already given several examples along the way. In 3.5.14-5 he writes that, among creatures who have free will, those who have never sinned, such as a portion of the

Augustine states that it is an act of envy to assert that anything which exists either should not exist or should exist in a different state. Rather, everything is perfect, as we will see.

In 3.9.25-6 Augustine continues to focus on this concept of a perfect order of all things, expressing it through the phrase 'the perfection of the universe (*perfectio uniuersitatis*)' five times over these two chapters.[34] He also adds nuance to his concept of this perfectly ordered whole. In 3.9.25 Augustine affirms variation within the perfection of the universe. Particularly, he addresses celestial bodies which produce various amounts of light, noting that some are dimmer while others are brighter. Augustine denies that the dimmer lights should be made as bright as the others, and affirms that it is proper for greater and lesser things to exist within the perfect whole which God has created.

After considering the example of celestial bodies that produce varying degrees of light, Augustine connects this example of variation to the topic of free will, stating that the perfection of the universe includes 'souls which ought to be made miserable since they willed to be

---

angels, are superior to those who have. In 3.5.15, he writes that creatures with free will are superior to those who lack it. As an example, he writes that even an errant horse is superior to a stone, even though the stone cannot err. In 3.5.15 he writes that soul is superior to body, and in 3.5.16 he writes that corporeal things also possess an order, among which light is superior to all others.

[34] The phrase *perfectio uniuersitas*, variously declined, appears five times in *lib. arb.* 3.9.25-26 (CCSL 29: 290.40, 46, 52-3, 56, 59). The Latin term *perfectio* communicates the idea of perfection in both the sense of quality and the sense of completion. The term should be read with this duality of meaning in my translation of it above. I have translated *uniuersitas* as 'universe' because Augustine is using the term with both of its meanings. For much of his argument, he is speaking of celestial bodies, and thus 'the universe.' But at the same time, he is also speaking of 'all that exists.' This can be seen in his consideration of both the perfect ordering of celestial bodies and the perfect ordering of human souls. For two instances of Augustine treating these topics in juxtaposition to one another, see 3.25.89-91 and 3.27.96-9.

sinful.'[35] He then proceeds to explain how sin is part of the variety that is characteristic of God's perfect whole.[36]

Augustine's position is based on a key distinction that he makes a few lines later between natures and their affections. He writes: 'For sin and the punishment of sin are not some natures but affections of natures, the one voluntary, the other penal.'[37] Augustine explains in the lines that follow that these 'affections of natures' are part of the perfection of the universe – when a soul sins, punishment is a tool that is used to bring it back into order. Therefore, Augustine understands that punishment is fitting within God's *perfectio uniuersitatis.* We will see in a moment that this includes punishment of higher things by means of lower things.

Having seen the framework of Augustine's argument so far, let us now turn to 3.9.27. In this passage, Augustine uses a well-ordered home to illustrate the fittingness of punishing sin by lower means within the whole of the created order. He writes:

> Indeed, is anything in a house so great as a human being? And is anything so abject and completely vile in a house as the sewer drain? Nevertheless, a slave who is discovered in so great a sin that he is considered worthy for cleaning the sewer drain bestows honor [on the sewer drain], even in the midst of his disgrace. And either of these [two] things – that is, the disgrace of the slave and the cleansing of sewer drain – now united and restored into a certain unity of its own kind, is thus fitted and added to the arrangement (*dispositae*) of the home so that it decorously harmonizes (*decore conueniat*) with the most ordered whole (*uniuersitati ordinatissimo*) of [the house]. Yet, if the slave had not wished to sin, some other provision of domestic learning[38] would have been made, by which necessary things are made clean.[39]

---

[35] *lib. arb.* 3.9.25 (CCSL 29: 290.46-7): animae quae miserae fieri debuerunt quia peccatrices esse uoluerunt.

[36] In 3.9.26 Augustine also clarifies that, while sin is incorporated into the perfect whole, it is not necessary to it.

[37] *lib. arb.* 2.9.26 (CCSL 29: 391.70-2): non enim peccatum et supplicium peccati naturae sunt quaedam, sed adfectiones naturarum, illa uoluntaria, ista poenalis.

[38] With the phrase 'domestic learning' (*domesticae disciplinae*), Augustine is referring to the school of thought behind household management.

[39] *lib. arb.* 3.9.27 (CCSL 29: 291.80-9): *quid enim tam magnum in domo est quam homo ? et quid tam abiectum et infimum quam cloaca domus ? seruus tamen in tali peccato*

Augustine begins by recognizing that nothing in a house is 'so great' as a human being, the slave, or 'so vile' as a sewer drain.[40] He then states that a slave discovered in sin is 'considered worthy' of cleaning the sewer drain. This cleaning forms 'a certain unity' between the slave and the sewer drain which is 'added to the arrangement' of the home, 'decorously' harmonizing it with the 'whole of [the house].'

In this passage, Augustine advances his theological argument by using the illustration of order within a house. By placing the human being and the slave on opposite ends of the hierarchy of natures within a household at the beginning, he has prepared his readers to recognize how unfitting it would seem for a human being to be placed in a subservient position to the lowest object – the sewer drain. But Augustine endeavors to show how this seemingly unfitting situation actually accords to the 'most ordered whole' of the house. He explains that the slave who has sinned and is deemed 'worthy' to clean the sewer drain as punishment for the sin 'bestows honor' on the drain by cleaning it in the midst of his 'disgrace.' In this way, these two things – the disgrace of the slave and the cleaning of the sewer drain – form 'a certain unity.' Thus, the

---

detectus ut mundandae cloacae dignus habeatur ornat eam etiam turpitudine sua. et utrumque horum, id est turpitudo serui et mundatio cloacae, iam coniunctum et redactum in quamdam sui generis unitatem ita dispositae domui coaptatur atque subtexitur, ut eius uniuersitati ordinatissimo decore conueniat. qui tamen seruus si peccare noluisset, non defuisset domesticae disciplinae alia prouisio qua necessaria mundarentur. Cameron has noticed that *subtexitur* is misspelled *subtextiur* in CCSL 29: 291.86. Michael Cameron, '"She Arranges All Things Pleasingly" (Wis. 8:1): The Rhetorical Base of Augustine's Hermeneutic,' *AugStud* 41, no. 1 (2010): 63n32. I have followed him in making this correction in my representation of the text in this footnote.

[40] Franco De Capitani, in his commentary on *lib. arb.*, provides a helpful cross reference to *en. Ps.* 103(4).10. Franco De Capitani, *Il «De Libero Arbitrio» di S. Agostino : Studio introduttivo, testo, traduzione e commento*, Scienze filosofiche (Vita e pensiero) 36 (Milan: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1987), 499n63. The cross reference is apt. In *en. Ps.* 103(4).10 Augustine also uses a well-ordered house to illustrate the entire created order and specifically mentions sewer drains. The date of *en. Ps.* 103(4) has not been established. Hildegund Müller, 'Enarrationes in Psalmos (A),' in *AugLex*, ed. Cornelius Petrus Mayer, Karl Heinz Chelius, and Andreas E. J. Grote (Basel: Schwabe, 2001), 821.

slave and the sewer drain are properly accommodated to one another through sin and punishment: The sin of the slave brings the punishment which places him under the lowest object in the house, the sewer drain.

But Augustine does not stop at this level of separate things forming a unity. This unity between these two things extends further. Indeed, this unity between two things, the slave and the sewer drain, 'decorously harmonizes (*decore conueniat*) with the most ordered whole (*uniuersitati ordinatissimo*) of [the house].' Augustine's use of the term 'to harmonize' (*conuenire*) denotes that the unity of the slave and the sewer drain is joined together with 'the most ordered whole.'[41] His choice of the adverb 'decorously' (*decore*) declares the quality of this joining together, though Augustine does not further explain what makes it so. Thus, within the illustration, the sin of the individual slave does not throw the house into disorder. Rather, the sin is met with appropriate punishment – in this case the cleaning of the sewer drain – which maintains the unity of the whole household. Augustine closes the pericope by clarifying that the order of the household does not depend upon the existence of sin – if the slave had not sinned, the need for the drain to be cleaned would have been met by 'some other provision of domestic learning.'

From the context of the passage we know that Augustine is attempting to explain how sin and punishment fit within God's *perfectio uniuersitatis*. Thus, we can infer that the house represents everything which exists (the *perfectio uniuersitatis*), which he refers to as a 'most ordered whole,' humanity is represented by the slave, and the cleaning of the drain serves as one example of the variety of ways in which human beings can be punished through lower things.

[41] See the entry for *conuenire* in LS.

Augustine's argument up to and through this passage presents several complex and intriguing themes, but I want to focus on his concept that God incorporates sin, which is the result of human free will, into his 'most ordered whole' of everything. We will have a better understanding of his meaning in this passage if we grasp the source for this idea in his thought. Previous scholars have recognized that Augustine incorporates sin and its punishment into his concept of a perfectly ordered whole in this chapter. They have not, however, provided an argument for the source of this concept in this passage. Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, in her monograph on the concept of hidden order in Augustine's thought, has relegated his concept of a unified whole which includes punishment for sin to an aesthetic paradigm, but does not explore sources for this aesthetic paradigm.[42]

Jean-Michel Fontanier, writing on Augustine's concept of the beauty of the whole (*pulchra uniuersitatis*), has argued that Augustine's concept comes from Plato.[43] Fontanier focuses on a statement which comes a few lines after the quotation from 3.9.27 which I have provided above, in which Augustine mentions 'the ordered beauty of the whole (*pulchra uniuersitatis*) from fitting parts.'[44] Fontanier sees this idea as coming from Plato's *Timaeus* 33a, where Plato writes of the construction of the cosmos: 'Wherefore, because of this reasoning, He fashioned it to be One single Whole, compounded of all wholes, perfect and ageless and

---

[42] Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic, *L'Ordre Caché : La notion d'ordre chez saint Augustin*, Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 174 (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2004), 332-3.

[43] Jean-Michel Fontanier, *La beauté selon saint Augustin* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1998), 23-4. In the 1998 work, Fontanier restates his opinion given in an earlier work, with a few changes in wording. See: Jean-Michel Fontanier, 'Sur le traité d'Augustin *De pulchro et apto* : convenance, beauté, et adaptation,' *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 73, no. 3 (1989): 415-6.

[44] *lib. arb.* 3.9.27 (CCSL 29: 291.95-6): pulchra uniuersitatis decentissimis partibus ordinata.

unailing.'[45] Fontanier also implies the concept might have been mediated to Augustine through Cicero's incomplete translation of the *Timaeus*.[46] Fontanier points readers to *Timaeus* 17, where Cicero writes:

> Therefore, the producer and framer of the world, God, held this *ratio*, so that he completed one total and perfect work from all totalities and perfections, because he was free from all sickness and decay.[47]

Fontanier gives no argument in support of Augustine's familiarity with Plato's *Timaeus* 33a through either Cicero or some other source, but one can observe two similarities between all three texts – the totality of things which have been brought into existence by the divine form one thing, and that one thing is formed out of smaller unities. Plato states that the one whole is 'compounded of all wholes,' and Cicero describes it as 'one total and perfect work from all totalities and perfections.' One could read these as similar to Augustine's framework which we have already seen, in which the disgrace of the slave and the cleansing of the sewer drain form 'a certain unity,' which is incorporated into the entire order of the household, which illustrates the order that God has given to all things.

There are two arguments, however, against Fontanier's position that Augustine is drawing from either Plato's *Timaeus* 33a or Cicero's *Timaeus* 17 in *On Free Choice* 3.9.27. First, beyond the general similarity that all three texts describe the divine creation of a unified

---

[45] Plato, *Ti.* 33a (trans. LCL 234; LCL 234: 60): διὰ δὴ τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν τόνδε ἓν ὅλον ὅλων ἐξ ἁπάντων τέλεον καὶ ἀγήρων καὶ ἄνοσον αὐτὸν βἐτεκτήνατο.

[46] In the footnote for *Ti.* 33a he directs the reader to also see Cicero, *Tim.* 17. Fontanier, *La beauté selon saint Augustin*, 24n16. Regarding Cicero's translation of Plato's *Timaeus*, see: David N. Sedley, 'Cicero and the *Timaeus*,' in *Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC: New Directions for Philosophy*, ed. Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[47] Cicero, *Tim.* 17 (MTC 46: 163^{b}.17-164^{b}.2): hanc igitur habuit rationem effector mundi et molitor deus, ut unum opus totum atque perfectum ex omnibus totis atque perfectis absolueret, quod omni morbo et senio uacaret.

whole, Augustine's terminology and treatment of the whole universe in this selection from *On Free Choice* 3.9.27 does not match that described by either Plato or Cicero. At the level of terminology, the two Latin texts show little in common with one another. Whereas Cicero ascribes to god the titles 'producer and framer (*effector...et molitor*),' Augustine names God as 'founder and administrator (*conditor et administrator*).'[48] Of particular importance is Augustine's second term, 'administrator (*administrator*),' which ascribes to God an ongoing activity that is outside of the purview of either of Cicero's titles, both of which focus on the moment of production. Augustine also does not allude to Cicero's *ratio*, a term pregnant with meaning. In fact, the only terminological similarity is Augustine's repeated use of the term *perfectus*, which Cicero also used twice in *Timaeus* 17. However, even here there is a significant difference – Augustine uses the term to describe the universe and everything in it (*uniuersum*), whereas Cicero restricts the term to a description of the world (*mundus*).

Beyond terminological disparities, differences between the unified wholes presented in these passages abound at the level of ideas. Augustine's illustration of the slave cleaning the sewer drain in this passage demonstrates all of these differences. To begin, whereas the texts of Plato and Cicero portray a moment at which divine activity produces a unity, Augustine accounts for both God's work of unifying everything at the beginning (God as *conditor*) and continuing to do so while it moves through time (God as *administrator*). This is the work of the implied master of the house, who has the slave in one position before he sins, and moves him to a different position of punishment – one of punishment – after he has sinned. Additionally, from the perspective of the 'unity' that Augustine describes between the slave and the drain, Augustine

[48] *lib. arb.* 3.9.27 (CCSL 29: 291.96). This line occurs a few lines after the pericope that I have translated in the above text.

accounts for variation and movement while Plato and Cicero do not.[49] Finally, and perhaps most obviously, their subject matter differs. Neither Plato nor Cicero account for the integration of human free will into the unity of the whole, which is the very point of Augustine's illustration – God's arrangement of wills which choose sin.

What is more, there is no strong argument that Augustine had read Cicero's translation of *Timaeus* by the time that he wrote *On Free Choice* 3 in AD 391-5. In fact, based on Augustine's extensive quotation of Cicero's *Timaeus* in *City of God* 8, but not beforehand, James O'Donnell tentatively places Augustine's close reading of Cicero's *Timaeus* in AD 415-7, approximately two decades after he wrote *On Free Choice* 3.[50] Furthermore, O'Donnell also notes that outside of Augustine's quotation of Cicero's *Timaeus* in *On the Agreement of the Evangelists*, which is difficult to date but was possibly written as early as AD 399/400, there are no other quotations of Cicero's translation in Augustine's corpus before 410.[51] Thus, there is no evidence that Augustine had read Cicero's translation of *Timaeus* by the time that he wrote *On Free Choice* 3.

In contrast to these other possibilities, three aspects of this passage reveal that a use of rhetorical economy better explains the concept of unity that we see. Firstly, Augustine employs two terms in this passage which were also used in Quintilian's description of an economical arrangement – *dispositio* and *conuenire*. In *Oratorical Instructions* 7.10.16 Quintilian writes that an economical 'arrangement (*dispositio*)' of a whole speech is brought about 'if we see what harmonizes (*conueniat*) with which location.'[52] Similarly, in this text Augustine describes a unity

---

[49] This is similar to the previous point, but from the point of view of the objects which are acted upon rather than that of the actor.

[50] James J. O'Donnell, 'Augustine's Classical Readings,' *RechAug* 15 (1980): 156.

[51] Ibid., 174. For the date of *cons. eu.*, see: *AttA*, xliv.

[52] Quint., *Inst.* 7.10.16-7 (LCL 126N: 294-6): *dispositio...quid quoque <loco> conueniat uiderimus.* Quintilian names this concept 'economical arrangement' a few lines earlier, in *Inst.*

of the slave and the sewer drain which is then 'fitted and added to the arrangement (*dispositae*) of the home so that it decorously harmonizes (*conueniat*) with the most ordered whole (*uniuersitati ordinatissimo*) of [the house].' Both texts use the terms to describe an arrangement (*dispositio*) formed of pieces which are harmonized (*conuenire*) with respect to something else in order to be integrated into a whole. In Quintilian's text, it is the pieces of the speech with their location in the speech. In Augustine's text, it is the unity of the slave and the sewer drain with the whole of the household itself.

Secondly, Augustine's portrayal of God managing everything, including sin, as a 'most ordered whole' in this passage matches rhetorical economy at the conceptual level. The concept of rhetorical economy stated that all pieces of a speech are accommodated to one another and the speech as a whole in order to form a single, unified speech.[53] As we saw, in this passage Augustine shows God as incorporating four particular things – a human, his sin, his punishment, and the means of his punishment – into 'the most ordered whole' of the *perfectio uniuersitatis.*[54] The logic behind both concepts of unity is the accommodation of all particular things to one another and to the whole in order form a single unit.

This second point receives further support from Chapters Three and Four, in which I have shown that Augustine used rhetorical economy to explain God's perfect arrangement of multiple things to form a unit in his theologies of creation and history. In Chapter Three, I demonstrated that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his concept of the unity of creation by AD

7.10.11-2. For full quotations and longer treatments of *Inst.* 7.10.16-7, see Chapters One and Three.

[53] See Chapter One for a full description of rhetorical economy.

[54] Recall that the context of the passage is a discussion of God's inclusion of sin and punishment in the *perfectio uniuersitatis.*

388-9 in *On Genesis Against the Manichees* 1.21.32.[55] And, in Chapter Four, I demonstrated that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his understanding of God's ordering of creation's history into a unified whole by AD 390-1 in *On True Religion* 22.42-3.[56] These readings show that Augustine was utilizing rhetorical economy to explain the manner in which God arranges all of creation and history by the time that he wrote *On Free Choice* 3.9.27. Thus, since Augustine focuses on four pieces of 'everything' which are integrated into God's order, and with the exception of sin the other three are part of God's creation as it moves through time, we should expect to see Augustine utilize rhetorical theory as the logic undergirding his understanding that these pieces are arranged into a whole. This expectation is justified by the last point in this series.

Thirdly, and finally, Augustine uses the illustration of an ordered household. This illustration was at the base of the understanding of economy in the rhetorical tradition. In fact, Quintilian states that rhetorical economy (*oeconomia*/οἰκονομία) was a concept borrowed from the domestic arena by the Greek rhetorician Hermagoras in order to cover the various elements of rhetorical style.[57] Since Eden has argued that Quintilian's text was highly influential upon the Latin rhetorical tradition that came after him, a tradition in which Augustine fully participated

---

[55] See Chapter Three.

[56] See Chapter Four.

[57] Quintilian stated that Hermagoras had placed judgment (*iudicium*) as well as division (*partitio*) and order (*ordo*) under the heading of economy (*oeconomia*): 'Hermagoras places judgment, division, order and everything relating to style under the heading of economy, which, in Greek, originally referred to the management of domestic matters and was brought into oratory through a new use of the term, and lacks a Latin equivalent.' Quint., *Inst.* 3.3.9 (LCL 125N): *hermagoras iudicium partitionem ordinem quaeque sunt elocutionis subicit oeconomiae, quae graece appellata ex cura rerum domesticarum et hic per abusionem posita nomine latino caret*.

during the first half of his life, it is likely that Augustine was aware of this connection.[58] Therefore, since Augustine employs terminology associated with rhetorical theory, his description of particulars being arranged into a whole matches the concept of rhetorical theory, and he employs an illustration – the order of the house – that is tied to the very beginning of the concept of economy in the rhetorical tradition, rhetorical economy is the concept of unity that he is employing in this passage.

Now that we see that rhetorical economy is the logic undergirding Augustine's concept of divine arrangement in this passage, we can recognize that he employs rhetorical economy as the logic by which he understands God's maintenance of the *perfectio uniuersitatis* when confronted with sin. The logic underlies his illustration of the sin of the slave as 'fitted and added' to 'the

[58] For more on the distinction between the use of οἰκονομία by Greek rhetoricians and *oeconomia* by Latin rhetoricians, especially the Latin tradition's placement of it under *dispositio*, see: Kathy Eden, *Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition: Chapters in the Ancient Legacy and its Humanist Reception* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 27-31. One alternative reading of this illustration has been given by Jörg Trelenberg, who points out that 'the comparison of the cosmos (*uniuersitas*) with an orderly household is a popular *topos* in the Old Stoa' ['Der Vergleich des Kosmos (Aug.: *universitas*) mit einem geordneten Hauswesen ist ein schon in der Älteren Stoa beliebter Topos']. Jörg Trelenberg, *Das Prinzip „Einheit" beim frühen Augustinus* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 40n98. Trelenberg then suggests that Augustine might be drawing on this concept, perhaps through Cicero. However, none of the primary texts to which Trelenberg directs readers in order to justify this assertion make the connection as clearly with Augustine's theology in *lib. arb.* 3.9.27 as Quintilian's text does. Most of the texts Trelenberg offers are from SVF 2: 1127-31 (a typo in his book mistakenly lists this as 3: 1127-31). Those texts are: Cicero, *N.D.* 2.78, 133; *D. Chr.* 36.29, 37; and *Stob.* 1.372.7. The last selection in that list is attributed to Iamblichus in Stobaeus's *Eclogues*. Trelenberg also directs readers to Cicero, *N.D.* 2.154. The topos discussed in the SVF texts is a well-ordered city rather than a well-ordered home. In fact, *D. Chr.* 36.37 is the only text that even mentions a home. In that text Dio Chrysostom, discussing Zeus's reign over the cosmos, states that it is more appropriate to make a comparison 'to a city than to a home [(LCL 358: 454): πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ οἴκῳ].' Cicero does address the concept of a home (*domus*) in the final text that Trelenberg suggests, *N.D.* 2.154. However, in that text Cicero is not commenting on a divine order or arrangement of the world. Rather, he discusses the world as a common home for gods and humans. Thus, Trelenberg's suggestion remains merely that – a suggestion which has little basis in the evidence that he provides.

most ordered whole [of the house].' For Augustine, there is a whole into which God 'decorously harmonizes' all things – even such things as sinful actions, which proceed from human free will and not himself – in the same way that a house is organized as a whole unit when a slave has sinned. In both cases, punishment for sin maintains the proper relationship of all things to one another, even when the tool of punishment is something which is a lower nature than a human being.

Within his broader theodicy, this logic allows Augustine to maintain the two seemingly antithetical positions that characterize his problem of evil, which I introduced at the beginning of this chapter, while also maintaining his commitment to the doctrine of divine providence. Augustine posited that, though God created all things, he did not create sin. Rather, the source of human sin is human free will. But once he solves this problem he is faced with another – harmonizing his understanding that sin does not come from God with his commitment to divine providence. This chapter demonstrates that Augustine solves this second problem by employing rhetorical economy to explain how God arranged all things including sin: God meets sin with punishment, and thus the sinful human and the sinful act are integrated into the perfect whole of the universe.

CONCLUSION

Over the course of this study I have demonstrated that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy, the accommodative principle proper to arrangement, into his theologies of creation and history, as well as his theodicy. I have made this argument across five chapters.

In Chapter One I provided a lengthy treatment of the concept of rhetorical economy and then focused on Augustine's incorporation of it into his scriptural hermeneutic. I began with this focus because, conceptually, it is one of two places wherein rhetorical theory naturally intersects Augustine's thought and practice as a churchman. Since rhetorical theory was concerned with texts and speeches, we would expect to find touchpoints between it and Christianity in his thought surrounding the scriptures (texts) and sermons (speeches). Previous scholarship confirms this expectation, at least with regard to rhetorical economy and Augustine's treatment of the scriptures. And I have added to scholarship on this topic by demonstrating, by means of a close reading of *On the Practices of the Catholic Church and the Manichees* 1.17.30 and 1.28.56, that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic from the early years of his Christian career.

After providing this introduction to rhetorical economy and Augustine's use of it in his scriptural hermeneutic, in Chapter Two I demonstrated that Augustine uses the media of literary and rhetorical theory – namely the book and the speech – to conceptualize creation, its history, and God's activity throughout his career. I began by arguing that Augustine conceived of creation as a book by means of readings from *Letter* 43.9.25 and three other texts, all of which spanned from 396 to 427-30. I then demonstrated that Augustine conceptualized God's activity as a speech through a close reading of *Letter* 102.6.33. Finally, I showed that Augustine conceived of history as a speech in *On Free Choice* 3.15.42 and three other texts.

In this chapter I also demonstrated that Augustine's concept of creation as a book and God's activity as speech involves the sensible aspects of each in order to show that Augustine is consistent in applying his word-sign theory to creation and God's activity when he frames them according to the media of literary and rhetorical theory. This secondary argument is important because it reveals that, for Augustine, just as words function as signs for things, the sensible aspects of creation also function as signs for things.

The arguments that I made in these first two chapters thus established precedent for my arguments in the final three chapters in four ways. In Chapter One I demonstrated that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his scriptural hermeneutic within eighteen months of his conversion to Christianity. This established precedent that: (1) Augustine utilized rhetorical economy in his work as a Christian; and (2) he did this soon after his conversion. In Chapter Two I demonstrated that Augustine conceived of creation as a book, and both God's activity and history as a speech. This established precedent that (3) Augustine was willing to frame creation and history as a book and a speech. I also showed that Augustine applied the rhetorical concept of eloquence to God's activity in *Letter* 102.6.33. This established precedent that (4) Augustine incorporated a concept from rhetorical theory into his theology. These four precedents undergird my work in the final three chapters.

In Chapter Three I showed that Augustine incorporates rhetorical economy into his notion of the harmonious unity of all things within God's creation. I demonstrated that Augustine incorporated rhetorical economy into his theology of creation in his earliest work dedicated to the creation narratives in Gen 1-2, *On Genesis against the Manichees* 1.21.32. I also showed that Augustine continued to utilize the concept in his theology of creation in the middle of his career in *Sermon* 29D.4-7. And, I provided a close reading of *On Order* 1.7.18 in order to suggest that

Augustine's utilization of rhetorical economy in his theology of creation derives from his integration of rhetorical economy into the heart of his concept of order.

In Chapter Four I demonstrated that Augustine incorporates rhetorical economy into his theology of history over the majority of his career by means of close readings of *On True Religion* 22.42-3, *On Music* 6.11.29-30, *On the Nature of the Good* 8, *Against Secundinus* 15, *Letter* 138.5, and *City of God* 11.18. I also demonstrated that Augustine employed rhetorical economy in his theology of history in a variety of ways. In *On True Religion* 22.42-3, he uses rhetorical economy to explain God's providential ordering of all of history and to explain why no human being can see the order that God has given to history. Augustine uses rhetorical economy in these same two ways in *On Music* 6.11.29-30, but in that text he also employs it in order to illustrate the perfect arrangement that God has given to human lives within the whole of human history, to explain God's ordering of the orbits of all celestial things, and to justify the inclusion of sin within God's ordering of everything. In *On the Nature of the Good* 8, Augustine employs rhetorical economy in his polemical argument agains the Manichees to affirm that all things which come from God are good and to explain God's providential ordering of all things. In *Against Secundinus* 15 Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy as the logical framework for his theological position that temporal things are not evil on account of their temporal natures, but play a proper role in the whole of history like syllables within a song. In *Letter* 138.5 Augustine employs rhetorical economy as the logic upon which he builds his description of God's arrangement of fitting 'particles' into the singular 'beauty of the whole age' and, thus, it is also the logic upon which he constructs his justification of the differing modes of worship in the Old and New Testaments. Finally, in *City of God* 11.18, Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy to explain how God integrates evil human beings into his 'order of the ages.'

In Chapter Five I demonstrated that Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy to harmonize his understanding that sin does not come from God with his commitment to divine providence in two steps. Firstly, Augustine separates the divine activities of creation and arrangement in his theodicy – God created all things except sin, but he arranges all things. Secondly, Augustine employs rhetorical economy to explain how Augustine arranged all things including sin: God meets sin with punishment, and thus the sinful human and the sinful act are integrated into the perfect whole of the universe.

Over the course of this dissertation I have demonstrated that Augustine took a rhetorical concept, rhetorical economy, and integrated it into the substance of his theologies of creation and history, as well as his theodicy. In the process, I also showed that his employment of rhetorical economy in these aspects of his theology overlapped with several other areas of his thought, such as his understandings of order, divine providence, sin, free will. Since this is the first work to demonstrate that Augustine integrated rhetorical economy into these areas of his thought, future work on how his use of rhetorical economy impacts our understanding of them would provide the world with a more robust understanding of the Bishop of Hippo's theology.

APPENDIX A: PRIMARY SOURCE ABBREVIATIONS
(ALPHABETICAL BY ENGLISH TITLE)

(Note: Sources are organized by author's name, then English title)

English Title	**Latin Title**	**Lat. abbrev.**
Aelius Festus Aphthonius		
On Meters	*De metris*	*Aphth.*
Ambrose of Milan		
On Abraham	*De Abraham libri duo*	*Abr.*
On Elijah and Fasting	*De Helia et ieiunio*	*Hel. et ieiun.*
On the Holy Spirit	*De spiritu sancto*	*De spirit.*
Letters	*Epistulae*	*ep.* (*epp.*)
On the Six Days of Creation	*Hexaemeron*	*Hex.*
Anaximenes of Lampsacus		
Rhetoric to Alexander	*Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*	*Rh. Al.*
Anonymous		
Rhetorical Handbook for Herennius	*Auctor ad Herennium*	*Auct. ad Her.*
Apuleius		
Apology	*Apologia*	*Apol.*
Aquila Romanos		
On Figures of Thoughts and of Style	*De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis*	*Fig.*
Aristotle		
The Art of Rhetoric	*Ars rhetorica*	*Rh.*
Metaphysics	*Metaphysica*	*Metaph.*
Physics	*Physica*	*Ph.*
Augustine		
83 Diverse Questions	*De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*	*diu. qu.*

On Admonition and Grace	*De correptione et gratia*	*corrept.*
On the Advantage of Believing	*De utilitate credendi*	*util. cred.*
On the Agreement of the Evangelists	*De consensu euangelistarum libri quattuor*	*cons. eu.*
On Christian Teaching	*De doctrina Christiana*	*doctr. chr.*
City of God	*De ciuitate Dei*	*ciu.*
Comments on Job	*Adnotationes in Job*	*adn. Job*
Confessions	*Confessionum Libri XIII*	*conf.*
On the Creed to the Catechumens	*De symbolo ad catechumenos*	*symb. cat.*
Against Cresconius	*Ad Cresconium grammaticum partis Donati libri quattuor*	*Cresc.*
On Dialectic	*De dialectica*	*dial.*
Expositions of the Psalms	*Enarrationes in Psalmos*	*en. Ps.*
On Faith and the Creed	*De fide et symbolo*	*f. et symb.*
Against Faustus the Manichee	*Contra Faustum Manicheum*	*c. Faust.*
On Free Choice	*De libero arbitrio*	*lib. arb.*
On Genesis against the Manichees	*De Genesi aduersus Manicheos*	*Gn. adu. Man.*
On the Greatness of the Soul	*De animae quantitate*	*an. quant.*
Handbook for Laurentius on Faith, Hope, and Love	*Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide spe et caritate*	*ench.*
On the Immortality of the Soul	*De immortalitate animae*	*imm. an.*
Against Julian	*Contra Iulianum*	*c. Iul.*
Against Julian (Unfinished)	*Contra Iulianum opus inperfectum*	*c. Iul. inp.*

Letter(s)	*Epistulae*	*ep. (epp.)*
On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis	*De Genesi ad litteram*	*Gn. litt.*
On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis (Unfinished)	*De Genesi ad litteram inperfectus liber*	*Gn. litt. inp.*
Against Mani's Letter Called 'The Foundation'	*Contra epistulam Manichaei quam uocant fundamenti*	*c. ep. Man.*
On the Master	*De magistro liber unus*	*mag.*
Against Maximinus the Arian	*Contra Maximinum Arianum*	*c. Max.*
On Music	*De musica libri sex*	*mus.*
On the Nature of the Good	*De natura boni liber unus*	*nat. b.*
On Order	*De ordine*	*ord.*
On the Practices of the Catholic Church and the Manichees	*De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum*	*mor.*
Questions from the Gospels	*Quaestiones euangeliorum libri duo*	*qu. eu.*
Reconsiderations	*Retractiones*	*retr.*
Against Secundinus the Manichee	*Contra Secundinum Manicheum liber unus*	*c. Sec.*
Sermons	*Sermones*	*s.*
To Simplicianus	*Ad Simplicianum libri duo*	*Simpl.*
On the Soul and its Origin	*De anima et eius origine libri quattuor*	*an. et or.*
On the Spirit and the Letter	*De spiritu et littera*	*spir. et litt.*
Treatises on the Gospel of John	*In Iohannis euangelium tractatus*	*Io. eu. tr.*
On the Trinity	*De trinitate*	*trin.*
On True Religion	*De uera religione*	*uera rel.*

Cato the Elder (M. Porcius)		
Writings to Marcus (fragments)	*Libri ad Marcum filium (fragmenta in aliis scriptis seruata)*	*Fil.*
Catullus (C. Valerius)		
The Poems of Catullus	*Gai Valeri Catulli liber*	*Catul.*
Cicero		
Letters to Atticus	*Epistulae ad Atticum*	*Att.*
Letters to Friends	*Epistulae ad familiares*	*Fam.*
On Behalf of Cluentius	*Pro Cluentio*	*Clu.*
On the Ends of Good and Evil	*De finibus bonorum et malorum*	*Fin.*
On Divination	*De diuinatione*	*Diu.*
On Duties	*De officiis*	*Off.*
On the Nature of the Gods	*De natura deorum*	*N.D.*
On the Orator	*De oratore*	*de Orat.*
On Rhetorical Invention	*De inuentione rhetorica*	*Inu. Rhet.*
The Orator	*Orator*	*Orat.*
The Parts of Oratory	*Partitiones Oratoriae*	*Part.*
Timaeus	*Timaeus*	*Tim.*
The Tusculan Disputations	*Tusculanae Disputationes*	*Tusc.*
Consentius		
On Barbarisms and Irregularities	*Ars de barbarismis et metaplasmis*	*Ars*

Dio Chrysostom		
Dio Chrysostom	*Dio Chrysostomus*	*D. Chr.*
Fronto (M. Cornelius)		
Letters to Antoninus Pius	*Epistulae ad Antoninum Pium*	*Ant.*
Heraclitus		
Heraclitus (Fragments)	*Heraclitus*	*Her.*
Herman of Tournai		
On the Restoration of the Church of St. Martin of Tournai	*De restauratione ecclesiae sancti Martini Tornacensis*	*rest. Mart.*
Irenaeus of Lyons		
Against Heresies	*Aduersus haereses*	*AH*
Isidore of Seville		
On Differences Between Words	*Differentiarum libri duo*	*diff.*
Julius Victor		
Ars Rhetorica	*The Art of Rhetoric*	*rhet.*
Lactantius		
Divine Instructions	*Diuinae institutiones*	*Diu. inst.*
Marius Victorinus		
Explanations in the Rhetoric of Cicero	*Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam*	*Expl. in Cic.*
The Grammatical Art	*Ars grammatica*	*gramm.*
Macrobius		
Saturnalia	*Saturnalia*	Macr.
Martianus Capella		
On the Rhetorical Art	*De arte rhetorica*	*Rhet.*

Novatian		
On the Trinity	*De Trinitate*	*Trin.*
Origen		
Homilies on Genesis	*Homiliae in Genesim*	*Hom. in Gen.*
Persius (A. Persius Flaccus)		
Satires	*Saturae*	*Pers.*
Plato		
Parmenides	*Parmenides*	*Prm.*
Symposium	*Symposium*	*Symp.*
Timaeus	*Timaeus*	*Ti.*
Pliny the Younger		
Letters	*Epistulae*	*Ep.*
Plutarch		
On Stoic Self-Contradiction	*De stoicorum repugnantiis*	*St. rep.*
Quintilian		
Oratorical Instruction	*Institutio Oratoria*	*Inst.*
Rufinus of Antioch		
On Composition and on the Meters of Orators	*De compositione et de metris oratorum*	*Comp. et metr.*
Seneca the Elder		
Judicial Declamations	*Controuersiae*	*Con.*
Seneca the Younger		
Letters	*Epistulae*	*Ep.*
Tacitus		
Annals	*Annales*	*Ann.*

Tertullian		
On the Resurrection of the Dead	*De resurrectione mortuorum*	*res. mor.*
Vergil (Verg.)		
Aeneid	*Aeneis*	*A.*
Vitruvius Pollio		
On Architecture	*De architectura*	*Uitr.*

APPENDIX B: PRIMARY SOURCE ABBREVIATIONS (ALPHABETICAL BY LATIN ABBREVIATION)

(Note: Sources are organized by author's name, then Latin abbreviation)

Lat. abbrev.	Latin Title	English Title
Aelius Festus Aphthonius		
Aphth.	*De metris*	*On meters*
Ambrose of Milan		
Abr.	*De Abraham libri duo*	*On Abraham*
ep. (epp.)	*Epistulae*	*Letters*
Hel. et ieiun.	*De Helia et ieiun.*	*On Elijah and Fasting*
Hex.	*Hexaemeron*	*On the Six Days of Creation*
De spirit.	*De spiritu sancto*	*On the Holy Spirit*
Anaximenes of Lampsacus		
Rh. Al.	*Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*	*Rhetoric to Alexander*
Anonymous		
Rhet. Her.	*Rhetorica ad Herennium*	*Rhetorical Handbook for Herennius*
Apuleius		
Apol.	*Apologia*	*Apology*
Aquila Romanos		
Fig.	*De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis*	*Fig.*
Aristotle		
Metaph.	*Metaphysica*	*Metaphysics*
Ph.	*Physica*	*Physics*
Rh.	*Ars rhetorica*	*The Art of Rhetoric*
Augustine		

adn. Job	*Adnotationes in Job*	*Comments on Job*
an. et or.	*De anima et origine libri quattuor*	*On the Soul and its Origin*
an. quant.	*De animae quantitate*	*On the Greatness of the Soul*
ciu.	*De ciuitate Dei*	*City of God*
conf.	*Confessionum libri XIII*	*Confessions*
cons. eu.	*De consensu euangelistarum libri quattuor*	*On the Agreement of the Evangelists*
corrept.	*De correptione et gratia*	*On Admonition and Grace*
Cresc.	*Ad Cresconium grammaticum partis Donati libri quattuor*	*Against Cresconius*
dial.	*De dialectica*	*On Dialectic*
diu. qu.	*De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*	*83 Diverse Questions*
doctr. chr.	*De doctrina Christiana*	*On Christian Teaching*
en. Ps.	*Enarrationes in Psalmos*	*Expositions of the Psalms*
ench.	*Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide spe et caritate*	*Handbook for Laurentius on Faith, Hope, and Love*
ep. (epp.)	*Epistulae*	*Letter(s)*
c. ep. Man.	*Contra epistulam Manichaei quam uocant fundamenti*	*Against Mani's Letter Called 'The Foundation'*
f. et symb.	*De fide et symbolo*	*On Faith and the Creed*
c. Faust.	*Contra Faustum Manicheum*	*Against Faustus the Manichee*
Gn. adu. Man.	*De Genesi aduersus Manicheos*	*On Genesis against the Manichees*
Gn. litt.	*De Genesi ad litteram*	*On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis*

Gn. litt. inp.	*De Genesi ad litteram inperfectus liber*	*On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis (Unfinished)*
imm. an.	*De immortalitate animae*	*On the Immortality of the Soul*
Io. eu. tr.	*In Iohannis euangelium tractatus*	*Treatises on the Gospel of John*
c. Iul.	*Contra Iulianum*	*Against Julian*
c. Iul. inp.	*Contra Iulianum opus inperfectum*	*Against Julian (Unfinished)*
lib. arb.	*De libero arbitrio*	*On Free Choice*
mag.	*De magistro liber unus*	*On the Master*
c. Max.	*Contra Maximinum Arianum*	*Against Maximinus the Arian*
mor.	*De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum*	*On the Practices of the Catholic Church and the Manichees*
mus.	*De musica libri sex*	*On Music*
nat. b.	*De natura boni liber unus*	*On the Nature of the Good*
ord.	*De ordine*	*On Order*
qu. eu.	*Quaestiones euangeliorum libri duo*	*Questions from the Gospels*
retr.	*Retractiones*	*Reconsiderations*
s.	*Sermones*	*Sermons*
c. Sec.	*Contra Secundinum Manicheum liber unus*	*Against Secondinus the Manichee*
Simpl.	*Ad Simplicianum libri duo*	*To Simplicianus*
spir. et litt.	*De spiritu et littera*	*On the Spirit and the Letter*
symb. cat.	*De symbolo ad catechumenos*	*On the Creed to the Catechumens*

trin.	*De trinitate*	*On the Trinity*
util. cred.	*De utilitate credendi*	*On the Advantage of Believing*
uera rel.	*De uera religione*	*On True Religion*

Cato the Elder (M. Porcius)

Fil.	*Libri ad Marcum filium (fragmenta in aliis scriptis seruata)*	*Writings to Marcus (fragments)*

Catullus (C. Valerius)

Catul.	*Gai Valeri Catulli Liber*	*The Poems of Catullus*

Cicero

Att.	*Epistulae ad Atticum*	*Letters to Atticus*
Clu.	*Pro Cluentio*	*On Behalf of Cluentius*
Diu.	*De diuinatione*	*On Divination*
Fam.	*Epistulae ad familiares*	*Letters to Friends*
Fin.	*De finibus bonorum et malorum*	*On the Ends of Good and Evil*
Inu.	*De inuentione*	*On Rhetorical Invention*
N.D.	*De natura deorum*	*On the Nature of the Gods*
Off.	*De officiis*	*On Duties*
de Orat.	*De oratore*	*On the Orator*
Orat.	*Orator*	*The Orator*
Part.	*Partitiones Oratoriae*	*The Parts of Oratory*
Tim.	*Timaeus*	*Timaeus*

Tusc.	*Tusculanae Disputationes*	*The Tusculan Disputations*
Consentius		
Ars	*Ars de barbarismis et metaplasmis*	*On Barbarisms and Irregularities*
Dio Chrysostom		
D. Chr.	*Dio Chrysostomus*	*Dio Chrysostom*
Fronto (M. Cornelius)		
Ant.	*Epistulae ad Antoninum Pium*	*Letters to Antoninus Pius*
Heraclitus		
Her.	*Heraclitus*	*Heraclitus (Fragments)*
Herman of Tournai		
rest. Mart.	*De restauratione ecclesiae sancti Martini Tornacensis*	*On the Restoration of the Church of St. Martin of Tournai*
Irenaeus of Lyons		
AH	*Aduersus haereses*	*Against Heresies*
Isidore of Seville		
diff.	*Differentiarum libri duo*	*On Differences Between Words*
Julius Victor		
rhet.	*Ars Rhetorica*	*The Art of Rhetoric*
Lactantius		
Diu. inst.	*Diuinae institutiones*	*Divine Instructions*

Marius Victorinus

Expl. in Cic.	*Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam*	*Explanations in the Rhetoric of Cicero*
gramm.	*Ars grammatica*	*The Grammatical Art*

Martianus Capella

Rhet.	*De arte rhetorica*	*On the Rhetorical Art*

Macrobius

Macr.	*Saturnalia*	*Saturnalia*

Novatian

Trin.	*De Trinitate*	*On the Trinity*

Origen

Hom. in Gen.	*Homiliae in Genesim*	*Homilies on Genesis*

Persius (A. Persius Flaccus)

Pers.	*Saturae*	*Satires*

Plato

Prm.	*Parmenides*	*Parmenides*
Symp.	*Symposium*	*Symposium*
Ti.	*Timaeus*	*Timaeus*

Pliny the Younger

Ep.	*Epistulae*	*Letters*

Plutarch

St. rep.	*De stoicorum repugnantiis*	*On Stoic Self-Contradictions*

Quintilian

Inst.	*Institutio Oratoria*	*Oratorical Instruction*

Rufinus of Antioch

Comp. et metr.	*De compositione et de metris oratorum*	*On Composition and on the Meters of Orators*
Seneca the Younger		
Ep.	*Epistulae*	*Letters*
Tacitus		
Ann.	*Annales*	*Annals*
Tertullian		
res. mor.	*De resurrectione mortuorum*	*On the Resurrection of the Dead*
Vergil (Verg.)		
A.	*Aeneis*	*Aeneid*
Vitruvius Pollio		
Uitr.	*De architectura*	*On Architecture*

APPENDIX C: PRIMARY SOURCES

Aelius Festus Aphthonius

Aphth. *De metris.* GL 6 (attributed to Marius Victorinus).

Ambrose of Milan

Abr. *De Abraham libri duo.* CSEL 32/1; [BG: insert translation]
ep. (epp.) *Epistulae.* CSEL 82/1-4.
Hel. et ieiun. *De Helia et ieiunio.* CSEL 32/2.
Hex. *Hexaemeron.* CSEL 32/1.
De spirit. *De spiritu sancto.* CSEL 79; FC 44.

Anaximenes of Lampsacus

Rh. Al. *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum.* LCL 317 (originally attributed to Aristotle).

Anonymous

Rhet. Her. *Rhetorica ad Herennium.* LCL 403 (incorrectly attributed to Cicero; also commonly labeled *Auctor ad Herennium*).

Apuleius

Apol. *Pro se de magia liber (Apologia)*, ed. Rudolf Helm (Leipzig: Teubner, 1912).

Aquila Romanos

Fig. *De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis.* RLM.

Aristocles

Aristocl. Fragments of Aristocles. *SVF*; *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols., ed. and. trans. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

Aristotle

Metaph.	*Metaphysica.* LCL 271 (Books 1-9), 287 (Books 10-4).
Ph.	*Physica.* LCL 228.
Rh.	*Ars rhetorica.* LCL 193.

Augustine of Hippo

adn. Job	*Adnotationes in Job*. CSEL 28/2.
an. et or.	*De anima et eius origine libri quattuor.* CSEL 60; WSA 1/23.
an. quant.	*De animae quantitate.* CSEL 89; WSA 1/4.
c. Adim.	*Contra Adimantum.* CSEL 25.1; [BG: Insert Translation here]
ciu.	*De ciuitate Dei*. CCSL 47-8; *Augustine: The City of God against the Pagans*, trans. by R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
conf.	*Confessionum Libri XIII*. CCSL 27; *Saint Augustine: Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
cons. eu.	*De consensu euangelistarum libri quattuor.* CSEL 43; WSA 1/15.
corrept.	*De correptione et gratia*. PL 44; FC 2.
Cresc.	*Ad Cresconium grammaticum partis Donati libri quattuor.* CSEL 52/2.
dial.	*De dialectica*. Pinborg; *Augustine: De dialectica*, trans. B. Darrell Jackson (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975).
diu. qu.	*De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus.* CCSL 44A; WSA 1/12.
doctr. chr.	*De doctrina Christiana*; BA 11/2 (contains the text of CCSL 32 with corrections); *Augustine: On Christian Teaching*, trans. R.P.H. Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
en. Ps.	*Enarrationes in Psalmos*. CCSL 38-40; WSA 3/14-7.
ench.	*Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide spe et caritate*; CCSL 46; WSA 1/8.
ep. (epp.)	*Epistulae*. CCSL 31 (1-50), 31A (51-100), 31B (101-139); CSEL 34, 44, 57, 88; WSA 2/1-3.
c. ep. Man.	*Contra epistulam Manichaei quam uocant fundamenti*. CSEL 25; WSA 1/19.
f. et symb.	*De fide et symbolo.* CSEL 41; WSA 1/8.
c. Faust.	*Contra Faustum Manicheum.* CSEL 25/1; WSA 1/20.
Gn. adu. Man.	*De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos*. CSEL 91; WSA 1/13.
Gn. litt.	*De Genesi ad litteram*. CSEL 28/1; WSA 1/13.
Gn. litt. inp.	*De Genesi ad litteram imperfetus liber.* CSEL 28/1; WSA 1/13.
imm. an.	*De immortalitate animae*. CSEL 89; WSA 1/3.
Io. eu. tr.	*In Iohannis euangelium tractatus*. CCSL 36; WSA 3/12.
c. Iul.	*Contra Iulianum.* PL 44; WSA 1/24.

c. Iul. inp.	*Contra Iulianum opus inperfectum.* CSEL 85/1 (bks. 1-3); PL 45; WSA 1/25.
lib. arb.	*De libero arbitrio*. CCSL 29; *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, ed. J.H.S. Burleigh (Westminster: John Knox University Press, 1953).
mag.	*De magistro liber unus.* CCSL 29.
c. Max.	*Contra Maximinum Arianum*. PL 42.
mor.	*De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum.* CSEL 90; WSA 1/19.
mus.	*De musica libri sex.* PL 32; FC 2.
nat. b.	*De natura boni liber unus.* CSEL 25; *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, ed. J.H.S. Burleigh (Westminster: John Knox University Press, 1953).
ord.	*De ordine.* CCSL 29; WSA 1/3.
qu. eu.	*Quaestiones euangeliorum libri duo.* CCSL 44B.
retr.	*Retractiones*. CCSL 57; WSA 1/2.
s.	*Sermones.* CCSL 41; SC 116; PL 38; MA 1-2; DOL; WSA 3/1-11.
c. Sec.	*Contra Secundinum Manicheum liber unus.* CSEL 25/2; WSA 1.19.
Simpl.	*Ad Simplicianum libri duo.* CCSL 44; WSA 1/12.
symb. cat.	*De symbolo ad catechumenos* (alternatively known as *s.* 398). CCSL 46; WSA 3.10.
spir. et litt.	*De spiritu et littera*; CSEL 60; WSA 1/23.
trin.	*De trinitate.* CCSL 50/50A; WSA 1/5.
util. cred.	*De utilitate credendi.* CSEL 25/1; WSA 1/8.
uera rel.	*De uera religione.* CCSL 32; *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, ed. J.H.S. Burleigh (Westminster: John Knox University Press, 1953).

Calcidius

Calc.	Fragments of Calcidius. *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols., ed. and trans. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

Cato the Elder (M. Porcius)

Fil.	*Libri ad Marcum filium (fragmenta in aliis scriptis seruata)*, in *M. Catonis praeter librum de re rustica quae extant*, ed. H. Jordan (Leipzig: Teubner, 1860).

Catullus (C. Valerius)

Catul.	*Gai Valeri Catuli Liber.* LCL 6.

Cicero

Att.	*Epistulae ad Atticum.* LCL 8.
Clu.	*Pro Cluentio.* LCL 198.
Diu.	*De diuinatione.* LCL 154.
Fam.	*Epistulae ad familiares.* LCL 205.
Fin.	*De finibus bonorum et malorum.* LCL 40.
Off.	*De officiis.* LCL 30.
Inu.	*De inuentione rhetorica.* LCL 386.
N.D.	*De natura deorum.* LCL 268.
de Orat.	*De oratore.* LCL 348-9.
Orat.	*Orator*. LCL 342.
Part.	*Partitiones Oratoriae.* LCL 349.
Tim.	*Timaeus*. MTC 46.
Tusc.	*Tusculanae Disputationes.* LCL 141.

Cleanthes

Hymn to Zeus	Thom, Johan C. *Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus: Text, Translation, and Commentary.* STAC 33. Edited by Christoph Markschies. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005

Consentius

Ars	*Ars de barbarismis et metaplasmis*. GL 5.

Diogenes Laertius

Laert.	Fragments of Diogenes Laertius. *SVF*; *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols., ed. and. trans. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

Dio Chrysostom

D. Chr.	*Dio Chrysostomus.* LCL 257, 339, 358, 376, 385.

Fronto (M. Cornelius)

Ant.	*Epistulae ad Antoninum Pium*. LCL 113.

Heraclitus

Her. *Heraclitus (Fragments)*. LCL 526.

Herman of Tournai

rest. Mart. *De restauratione ecclesiae sancti Martini Tornacensis.* CCSL 236. *The Restoration of the Monastery of St. Martin of Tournai,* ed. and trans. Lynn H. Nelson, Medieval Texts in Translation (Washington, DC: Cathlolic University Press, 1996).

Irenaeus of Lyons

AH *Aduersus haereses.* SC 263-4 (Book I); SC 293-4 (Book II); SC 211 (Book III); SC 100 (Book IV); SC 152-3 (Book V).

Isidore of Seville

diff. *Differentiarum libri duo.* PL 83 (Book I); CCSL 111A (Book II).

Julius Victor

rhet. *Ars Rhetorica. Rhetores latini minores* (RLM). Edited by Karl Halm. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863.

Lactantius

Diu. inst. *Diuinae institutiones.* CSEL 19.

Marius Victorinus

Expl. in Cic. *Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam.* CCSL 132.
gramm. *Ars grammatica.* Mariotti; GL 6.

Martianus Capella

Rhet. *De arte rhetorica.* RLM.

Macrobius

Macr.	*Saturnalia.* LCL 510-12.

Novatian

Trin.	*De Trinitate.* CCSL 4.

Origen

Hom. in Gen.	*Homiliae in Genesim*. PG 12; FC 71.

Persius (A. Persius Flaccus)

Pers.	*Saturae.* LCL 91.

Plato

Prm.	*Parmenides.* LCL 167.
Symp.	*Symposium.* LCL 166.
Ti.	*Timaeus*. LCL 234.

Pliny the Younger

Ep.	*Epistulae.* Schuster T 1952.

Plutarch

St. rep.	*De stoicorum repugnantiis. SVF* 2.997, part.

Quintilian

Inst.	*Institutio Oratoria.* LCL 124-7, 494.

Rufinus of Antioch

Comp. et metr.	*De compositione et de metris oratorum.* RLM.

Seneca the Elder

Con.	*Controuersiae.* LCL 463.

Seneca the Younger

Ep.	*Epistulae.* LCL 75-7.

Tacitus

Ann.	*Annales.* LCL 312.

Tertullian

res. mor.	*De resurrectione mortuorum.* CCSL 2.

Vergil (Verg.)

A.	*Aeneis.* LCL 63.

Vitruvius Pollio

Uitr.	*De architectura*. LCL 251.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

‘absurdus.’ In *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, edited by P.G.W. Glare, 15. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Allen, W. Sidney. *Accent and Rhythm: Prosodic Features of Latin and Greek: A Study in Theory and Reconstruction*. Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 12. Edited by W. Sidney Allen, Eugenie J.A. Henderson, Fred W. Householder, John Lyons, R.B. Le Page, F.R. Palmer and J.L.M. Trim Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

Ando, Clifford. ‘Augustine on Language.’ *REAug* 40 (1994): 45-78.

‘Appendix 2: Authors and Prominent Individuals.’ In *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rhetoric*, edited by Erik Gunderson, 299-313. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Augustine. *Letters 1-99*. Translated by Roland Teske. WSA 2.1. Edited by Boniface Ramsey Hyde Park: New City Press, 2001.

Aurelius Augustinus. *De musica liber VI*, edited and translated by Martin Jacobsson. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 2002.

Ayres, Lewis. *Augustine and the Trinity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

———. ‘Irenaeus vs. the Valentinians: Toward a Rethinking of Patristic Exegetical Origins.’ *JECS* 23, no. 2 (2015): 153-87.

Babcock, William S. ‘Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency.’ *JRE* 16 (1988): 28-55.

Balthasar, Hans Urs von. *Herrlichkeit. Eine theologische Ästhetik*.7 vols. Freiburg: Johannes Verlag Einsiedeln 1961-9.

Barone, Franciscus. ‘Quintilianus et Hilarius.’ *Vita Latina* 78 (1980): 10-5.

BeDuhn, Jason David. *Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma, Volume 1: Conversion and Apostasy, 373-388 C.E.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012.

———. ‘A Regimen for Salvation: Medical Models in Manichaean Asceticism.’ *Semeia* 58 (1992): 109-134.

Beierwaltes, Werner. ‘Aequalitas numerosa. Zu Augustins Begriff des Schönen.’ *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 38, no. 2 (1975): 140-57.

Bernard, Robert W. ‘The Rhetoric of God in the Figurative Exegesis of Augustine.’ In *Biblical Hermeneutics in Historical Perspective: Studies in Honor of Karlfried Froehlich on His Sixtieth Birthday*, edited by Mark S. Burrows and Paul Rorem, 88-99. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1991.

Bernard, Robert William. ‘In figura: Terminology Pertaining to Figurative Exegesis in the Works of Augustine of Hippo.’ Dissertation, Princeton University, 1984.

Berrouard, Marie-François. *Introduction aux Homélies de Saint Augustin sur l'Évangile de Saint Jean*. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2004.

Blümer, Wilhelm. ‘Eloquentia.’ In *AugLex*, edited by Cornelius Mayer, 775-97. Basel: Schwabe, 2001.

Bolaffi, Ezio. *La critica filosofica e letteraria in Quintiliano*. Bruxelles: Latomus, 1958.

Bonner, Stanley Frederick. *Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Bouton-Touboulic, Anne-Isabelle. *L'Ordre Caché : La notion d'ordre chez saint Augustin*. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2004.

———. *L'Ordre Caché : La notion d'ordre chez saint Augustin*. Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 174. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2004.
———. 'Ordre manifeste et ordre caché dans *le Sermon sur la Providence* de saint Augustin.' In *Augustin Prédicateur (395-411): Actes du Colloque International de Chantilly (5-7 septembre 1996)*, edited by Goulven Madec, 303-19. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1998.
Brennan, Brian. 'Augustine's *De Musica*.' *VC* 42 (1988): 267-81.
Breyfogle, Todd. '*Intellectus*.' In *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, edited by Allan D. Fitzgerald, John Cavadini, Marianne Djuth, James J. O'Donnell and Frederick Van Fleteren, 452-4. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999.
Briggman, Anthony. 'Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1.' *VC* 69, no. 5 (2015): 500-27.
———. 'Literary and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 2.' *VC* 70, no. 1 (2016): 31-50.
———. 'Theological Speculation in Irenaeus: Perils and Possibilities.' *VC* 71, no. 2 (2017): 175-98.
Brown, Peter. *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography*. New ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
Burnyeat, M.F. 'Postscript on Silent Reading.' *Classical Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (1997): 74-6.
Cameron, Michael. *Christ Meets Me Everywhere: Augustine's Early Figurative Exegesis*. Oxford Studies in Historical Theology. Edited by David C. Steinmetz New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
———. '"She Arranges All Things Pleasingly" (Wis. 8:1): The Rhetorical Base of Augustine's Hermeneutic.' *Augustinian Studies* 41, no. 1 (2010): 55-67.
———. '"She Arranges All Things Pleasingly" (Wis. 8:1): The Rhetorical Base of Augustine's Hermeneutic.' *AugStud* 41, no. 1 (2010): 55-67.
Carruthers, Mary J. *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture*. Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature 10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Cesalli, Laurent, and Nadja Germann. 'Signification and Truth Epistemology at the Crossroads of Semantics and Ontology in Augustine's Early Philosophical Writings.' *Vivarium* 46, no. 2 (2008): 123-54.
Chin, Catherine M. 'Christians and the Roman Classroom: Memory, Grammar, and Rhetoric in Confessions X.' *AugStud* 33, no. 2 (2002): 161-82.
———. *Grammar and Christianity in the Late Roman World*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
Clavier, Mark F.M. *Eloquent Wisdom: Rhetoric, Cosmology and Delight in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo*. Studia Traditionis Theologiae 17. Edited by Thomas O'Loughlin Turnhout: Brepols, 2014.
———. *Eloquent Wisdom: Rhetoric, Cosmology and Delight in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo*. Edited by Thomas O'Loughlin Turnhout: Brepols, 2014.
Coyle, J. Kevin. '*Faustum Manicheum, Contra* (Against Faustus, a Manichee).' In *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, edited by Allan D. Fitzgerald, John Cavadini, Marianne Djuth, James J. O'Donnell and Frederick Van Fleteren, 355-6. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999.
Coyle, John Kevin. *Augustine's De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae: A Study of the Work, its Composition and its Sources*. Fribourg: University Press, 1978.

Cribiore, Raffaella. Review of *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*, by Teresa Morgan. Bryn Mawr Classical Review (1999).

———. *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

De Capitani, Franco. *Il «De Libero Arbitrio» di S. Agostino : Studio introduttivo, testo, traduzione e commento*. Scienze filosofiche (Vita e pensiero) 36. Milan: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1987.

Decret, François. *L`Afrique manichéenne (IV^e - V^e siècles). Étude historique et doctrinale*. Vol. 1, Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1978.

Der Kleine Pauly: Lexikon der Antike. Vol. 5 (Schaf - Zythos), München: Alfred Druckenmüller Verlag, 1975.

DeWitt, Helen. 'Quo Virtus: The Concept of Propriety in Ancient Literary Criticism.' DPhil Thesis, Brasenose College, University of Oxford, 1987.

Divjak, Johannes. 'Epistulae.' In *AugLex*, edited by Cornelius Petrus Mayer, 893-1057. Basel: Schwabe, 2001.

Dodaro, Robert. *Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

———. 'Language Matters: Augustine's Use of Literary Decorum in Theological Argument.' *AugStud* 45, no. 1 (2014): 1-28.

———. 'Literary Decorum in Scriptural Exegesis: Augustine of Hippo, Epistula 138.' In *L'esegesi dei Padri latini : dalle origini a Gregorio Magno : XXVIII Incontro di studiosi dell'antichitàcristiana, Roma, 6-8 maggio 1999*, 159-74. Roma: Institutum patristicum Augustiniana, 2000.

———. 'Quid deceat videre (Cicero, Orator 70): Literary Decorum and Doctrinal Orthodoxy in Augustine of Hippo.' In *Orthodoxie, christianisme, histoire = Orthodoxy, Christianity, History: Travaux du groupe de recherches 'Défenir, maintenir et remettre en cause l'‹‹orthodoxie›› dans l'histoire du christianisme*, edited by S. Elm, É. Rebillard and A. Romano, 57-81. Rome: École française de Rome, 2000.

———. 'The Theologian as Grammarian: Literary Decorum in Augustine's Defense of Orthodox Discourse.' *SP* 38 (2001): 70-83.

Doignon, Jean. 'Introduction.' In *Dialogues Philosophiques: De Ordine - L'Ordre*, 9-65. Paris: Institut D'Études Augustiniennes, 1997.

Dolbeau, François. 'Sermon inédit de saint Augustin sur la providence divine.' *REAug* 41, no. 2 (1995): 267-89.

Du Roy, Olivier. *L'Intelligence de la foi en la Trinite selon saint Augustin: genese de sa theologie trinitaire jusqu'en 391*. Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1966.

Eden, Kathy. 'Economy in the Hermeneutics of Late Antiquity.' *Studies in the Literary Imagination* 28, no. 2 (1995): 13-26.

———. *Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition: Chapters in the Ancient Legacy and its Humanist Reception*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.

———. 'The Rhetorical Tradition and Augustinian Hermeneutics in *De doctrina Christiana*.' *Rhetorica* 8, no. 1 (1990): 45-63.

Ellsmere, P.K. 'Augustine on Beauty, Art, and God.' In *Augustine on Music: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays*, edited by Richard R. La Croix. Studies in the History and Interpretation of Music 6. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1988.

Eno, Robert B. 'Epistulae.' In *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, edited by Allan D. Fitzgerald, John Cavadini, Marianne Djuth, James J. O'Donnell and Frederick Van Fleteren, 298-310. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999.

Enos, Richard Leo, Roger Thompson, Amy K. Hermanson, Drew M. Loewe, Kristi Schwertfeger Serrano, Lisa Michelle Thomas, Sarah L. Yoder, David Elder, and John W. Burkett, eds. *The Rhetoric of Saint Augustine of Hippo: De Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric*. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008.

Evans, G.R. *Augustine on Evil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Fontanier, Jean-Michel. *La beauté selon saint Augustin*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1998.

———. 'Sur le traité d'Augustin *De pulchro et apto* : convenance, beauté, et adaptation.' *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 73, no. 3 (1989): 413-21.

Gavrilov, A.K. 'Techniques of Reading in Classical Antiquity.' *Classical Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (1997): 56-73.

Gerber, Chad Tyler. *The Spirit of Augustine's Early Theology: Contextualizing Augustine's Pneumatology*. Burlington: Ashgate, 2012.

Groh, Dieter. 'The Emergence of Creation Theology: The Doctrine of the Book of Nature in the Early Church Fathers in the East and the West up to Augustine.' In *The Book of Nature in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, edited by Arjo Vanderjagt and Klaas van Berkel. Groningen Studies in Cultural Change 16. Leuven: Peeters, 2005.

Gronewoller, Brian. 'God the Author: Augustine's Early Incorporation of the Rhetorical Concept of *Oeconomia* into His Scriptural Hermeneutic.' *AugStud* 47, no. 1 (2016): 65-77.

Guitton, Jean. *Le temps et l`éternité chez Plotin et Saint Augustin*. 3rd ed. Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1959.

Hadot, Pierre. *Marius Victorinus : Recherches sur sa vie et ses œuvres*. Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1971.

Halporn, James W., Martin Ostwald, and Thomas G. Rosenmeyer. *The Meters of Greek and Latin Poetry*. rev. ed. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980.

Harmless, William. *Augustine and the Catechumenate*. Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1995.

Harrison, Carol. *The Art of Listening in the Early Church*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

———. 'Augustine and the Art of Music.' In *Resonant Witness: Conversations between Music and Theology*, edited by Jeremy S. Begbie and Steven R. Guthrie, 27-45. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2011.

———. *Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine*. Oxford Theological Monographs. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

Hermanowicz, Erika T. 'Book Six of Augustine's *De musica* and the Episcopal Embassies of 408.' *AugStud*, no. 35 (2004): 165-98.

Hombert, Pierre-Marie. *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustinienne*. Collection des Etudes augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 163. Paris: Institut d'études augustiniennes, 2000.

Houghton, H.A.G. *Augustine's Text of John: Patristic Citations and Latin Gospel Manuscripts*. Oxford Early Christian Studies. Edited by Gillian Clark and Andrew Louth Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Jackson, B. Darrell. *Introduction to Augustine's De Dialectica*. Boston: Reidel, 1975.

———. 'Semantics and Hermeneutics in Saint Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana*.' Dissertation, Yale University, 1967.

Jacobsson, Martin, and Lukas J. Dorfbauer. 'Introduction.' In *Augustinus, De musica*, edited by Martin Jacobsson. CSEL 102. Boston: De Gruyter, 2017.
Kaster, Robert A. 'Consentius.' In *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, edited by Simon Hornblower, Antony Spawforth and Esther Eidinow. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
———. *Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity*. The Transformation of the Classical Heritage 11. Edited by Peter Brown Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
Keller, Adalbert. *Aurelius Augustinus und die Musik: Untersuchungen zu „De musica" im Kontext seines Schrifttums*. Cassiciacum XLIV. Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1993.
Kennedy, George A. *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
———. *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
———. *Quintilian*. New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1969.
Kesseling, Paul. 'Augustin und Quintilian.' *Augustinus Magister* 1 (1954): 201-4.
Kirwan, Christopher. *The Arguments of the Philosophers*. New York: Routledge, 1989.
Knox, Bernard M.W. 'Silent Reading in Antiquity.' *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 9 (1968): 421-35.
Kolbet, Paul R. *Augustine and the Cure of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010.
Krueger, Derek. *Writing and Holiness: The Practice of Authorship in the Early Christian East*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
la Bonnardière, Anne-Marie. *Biblia Augustiniana. A.T.-Le Livre de la Sagesse*. Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1970.
———. *Recherches de chronologie augustinienne*. Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1965.
Lausberg, Heinrich. *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study*. Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen and David E. Orton. Boston: Brill, 1998.
Law, Vivien. 'St. Augustine's «De grammatica»: Lost or Found?'. *RechAug* 19, no. 1 (1984): 155-183.
Louth, Andrew. 'Augustine on Language.' *Literature & Theology* 3, no. 2 (1989): 151-8.
Lucian von Samosata. *Sämmtliche Werke*. Translated by Christoph Martin Wieland. Leipzig: Verlag der Weidmannischen Buchhandlung, 1788.
Madec, Goulven. 'Deus.' In *AugLex*, edited by Cornelius Mayer, 313-65. Basel: Schwabe, 1999.
———. *Introduction aux "Révisions" et à la lecture des œuvres de Saint Augustin*. Collection des Études Augustiniennes : Série Antiquité 150. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1996.
Mariotti, Italo. *Marii Victorinii, Ars grammatica: Introduzione, Testo Critico e Commento*. Biblioteca Nazionale Serie dei Classici Greci e Latini: Testi con Commento Filologico 6. Edited by Alessandro Ronconi and Giovanni Pugliese Carratelli Firenze: Felice le Monnier, 1967.
Markus, R.A. *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*. rev. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Markus, Robert A. 'History.' In *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, edited by Allan D. Fitzgerald, John Cavadini, Marianne Djuth, James J. O'Donnell and Frederick Van Fleteren, 432-434. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999.

Marrou, Henri-Irénée. *A History of Education in Antiquity*. Translated by George Lamb. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956.
———. *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*. Paris: E. de Boccard, 1938.
Mayer, Cornelius. 'Creatio, creator, creatura.' In *AugLex*, edited by Cornelius Mayer, 56-116. Basel: Schwabe & Co. AG, 1996.
Mayer, Cornelius, and Basil Studer. 'Aequalitas.' In *AugLex*, edited by Cornelius Mayer, 141-50. Basel: Schwabe, 1986.
Mirhady, David C. 'Introduction to *Rhetoric to Alexander*.' In *Aristotle XVI*, edited by Robert Mayhew and David C. Mirhady. LCL 317. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011.
Morgan, Teresa. *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Müller, Hildegund. 'Enarrationes in Psalmos (A).' In *AugLex*, edited by Cornelius Petrus Mayer, Karl Heinz Chelius and Andreas E. J. Grote, 804-38. Basel: Schwabe, 2001.
Norden, Eduard. *Die antike Kunstprosa*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1898.
O'Connell, Robert J. *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, AD 386-391*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.
O'Connell, Robert J. *Art and the Christian Intelligence in Saint Augustine*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
O'Donnell, James J. *Augustine, Confessions, Volume II: Commentary on Books 1-7*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
O'Daly, Gerard. *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
O'Donnell, James J. *Augustine, Confessions, Volume III: Commentary on Books 8-13 and Indexes*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
———. 'Augustine's Classical Readings.' *RechAug* 15 (1980): 144-75.
Pacioni, Virgilio, and Matthew O'Connell. 'Order.' In *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, edited by Allan D. Fitzgerald, John Cavadini, Marianne Djuth, James J. O'Donnell and Frederick Van Fleteren, 598-9. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999.
Pépin, Jean. *St. Augustin et la dialectique*. Villanova: Villanova University Press, 1976.
Pickstock, Catherine. 'Ascending Numbers: Augustine's *De musica* and the Western Tradition.' In *Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community*, edited by Lewis Ayres and Gareth Jones, 185-215. New York: Routledge, 1998.
———. 'Music: Soul, City and Cosmos after Augustine.' In *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology*, edited by John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward, 243-77. London: Taylor and Francis, 1998.
Ployd, Adam. '*Non poena sed causa*: Augustine's Anti-Donatist Rhetoric of Martyrdom.' *AugStud* Online First Edition (2017).
Quinn, John M. 'Anti-Manichean and Other Moral Precisions in Confessions 3.7.12-9.17.' *AugStud* 19 (1988): 165-94.
Rebillard, Éric. 'Sermones.' In *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, edited by Allan D. Fitzgerald, John Cavadini, Marianne Djuth, James J. O'Donnell and Frederick Van Fleteren, 773-92. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999.
Rist, John M. *Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Roche, W.J. *Measure, Number, and Weight in Saint Augustine*. Baltimore, Md.: American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1941.

Schoedel, William R. ‘Theological Method in Irenaeus (*Aduersus Haereses* 2.25-28).’ *JTS* 35, no. 1 (1984): 31-49.
Schwarte, Karl-Heinz. ‘Dispositio.’ In *AugLex*, edited by Cornelius Mayer, 498-504. Basel: Schwabe, 1999.
Sedley, David N. ‘Cicero and the *Timaeus*.’ In *Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC: New Directions for Philosophy*, edited by Malcolm Schofield, 187-205. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Sider, Robert Dick. *Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Somers, Herman. ‘Image de Dieu. Les sources de l'exégèse augustinienne.’ *REAug* 7, no. 2 (1961): 105-25.
Spitzer, Leo. ‘Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony: Prolegomena to an Interpretation of the Word “Stimmung”, Part I.’ *Traditio* 2 (1944): 409-64.
Strauss, Gerhard. *Schriftgebrauch, Schriftauslegung, und Schriftbeweis bei Augustin*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1959.
Svoboda, Karel. *L'esthétique de Saint Augustin et ses sources*. Brno: Filosofická fakulta s podporou Ministerstva školství a národní osvěty, 1933.
Tapia, John Edward. *Rhetoric and the Centers of Power in the Greco-Roman World: From Homer to the Fall of Rome*. New York: University Press of America, 2009.
Teske, Roland. ‘Introduction and Notes.’ In *Answer to Faustus, a Manichean*, edited by Boniface Ramsey. WSA 1.20. Hyde Park: New City Press, 2007.
Teske, Roland J. ‘Genesis Accounts of Creation.’ In *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, edited by Allan D. Fitzgerald, John Cavadini, Marianne Djuth, James J. O'Donnell and Frederick Van Fleteren, 379-81. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999.
———. ‘Origen and St. Augustine's First Commentaries on Genesis.’ *Origeniana Quinta* (1992): 179-85.
Thom, Johan C. *Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus: Text, Translation, and Commentary*. Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 33. Edited by Christoph Markschies Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005.
Torchia, N. Joseph. *Creatio ex nihilo and the Theology of St. Augustine: The Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond*. American Univesity Studies Series VII: Theology and Religion 205. New York: Peter Lang, 1999.
Trelenberg, Jörg. *Augustins Schrift De Ordine: Einführung, Kommentar, Ergebnisse*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009.
———. *Das Prinzip „Einheit“ beim frühen Augustinus*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004.
van Geest, Paul. ‘Ordo.’ In *AugLex*, edited by Robert Dodaro, Cornelius Mayer and Christof Müller, 373-9. Basel: Schwabe, 2014.
Vannier, Marie-Anne. ‘Materia, materies.’ In *AugLex*, edited by Cornelius Mayer, 1199-1203. Basel: Schwabe, 2004-10.
Vössing, Konrad. *Schule und Bildung im Nordafrika der Römischen Kaiserzeit*. Collection Latomus 238. Bruxelles: Latomus, 1997.
Weber, Dorothea. ‘Textprobleme in Augustinus, De Genesi contra Manichaeos.’ *Wiener Studien* 111 (1998): 211-30.
Wille, Günther. *Musica Romana: Die Bedeutung der Musik im Leben der Römer*. Amsterdam: P. Schippers, 1967.

Williams, Rowan. ‘Creation.’ In *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, edited by Allan D. Fitzgerald, John Cavadini, Marianne Djuth, James J. O'Donnell and Frederick Van Fleteren, 251-4. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999.

Williams, Rowan D. ‘'Good for Nothing'? Augustine on Creation.’ *AugStud* 25 (1994): 9-24.

Zerfaß, Alexander. ‘Ordinatio.’ In *AugLex*, edited by Robert Dodaro, Cornelius Mayer and Christoph Müller, 353-7. Basel: Schwabe, 2014.