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Bennett Ostdiek March 29, 2015

The Rhetoric of Recognition: Henry Hotze, the *Index*, and Confederate Propaganda in Britain

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Abstract

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Henry Hotze served the Confederacy as a propaganda agent in London during the Civil War, publishing articles in the London press arguing that Britain should extend diplomatic recognition to the South. His tactics developed over time in accordance with his evolving understanding of his mission and the events of the war. When he first arrived in London in late January of 1862, his work emphasized the South's view on states' rights and the Confederate government's accomplishments. However, he soon recognized that successful diplomacy requires appealing to a foreign power's interests, and accordingly he began writing from a British perspective. In May he founded an ostensibly British newspaper, the *Index*, and used it to argue that recognition accorded with Britain's rights, duties, and commercial interests. The British Cabinet briefly considered recognition in the aftermath of the Confederacy's victory at the Second Battle of Bull Run, but decided against it after the South's defeat at the Battle of Antietam. At this point Abraham Lincoln issued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, once again forcing Hotze to change his propaganda tactics. He had largely ignored the issue of slavery up to this point, but in October he began defending the South's relationship to the institution from the editorial pages of the *Index*. However, his arguments proved ineffective, for the Emancipation Proclamation caused the British people to view the North as fighting to end slavery and consequently oppose recognition of the Confederacy. The tone of Hotze's propaganda became increasingly angry and desperate in response. He had recognized that the Confederacy would not gain diplomatic recognition unless its armies defeated the Union. Hotze's failure to secure recognition for the South reveals the ultimate hopelessness of the Confederacy's arguments. He argued for recognition with as much skill as anyone could have. However, Britain simply had no vital interest in Southern independence. For that reason, unless the Confederacy could defeat the North conclusively in battle, Britain had no intention of recognizing the South and thereby offending the United States.

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Introduction

During the Civil War, the Confederacy tried and failed to obtain diplomatic recognition from Great Britain and other European powers. Southerners believed that British recognition would induce the Union to concede the Confederacy's independence, and indeed, it seems likely that recognition would have altered the course of the war. Many blame this failure on the Confederacy's diplomatic corps, characterizing its members as inexperienced, inept, and excessively reliant on the righteousness of their cause and the economic power of cotton. However, the case of Henry Hotze provides a counter-example to this caricature. Intelligent, articulate, and hard working, Hotze possessed the attributes required for success as a foreign agent. Serving the Confederacy as a propaganda agent in London, he quickly set aside the South's traditional states' rights rhetoric and argued for recognition from a British perspective, appealing to his host country's rights, duties, and interests. He also analyzed British public opinion for the Confederacy, and consistently displayed remarkable observational and analytical abilities in his reports to the Confederate State Department. If any operative could have convinced Britain to recognize the Confederacy, Hotze could have, and his failure to do so reveals the fundamental hopelessness of the South's diplomatic efforts. The Confederacy did not fail to obtain British recognition because it possessed a flawed diplomatic strategy or inept diplomats. Rather, Britain had no vital interest in Southern independence, and thus would not recognize the Confederacy so long as the outcome of the war remained in doubt.

The career of Henry Hotze makes for one of the most interesting and unique stories of the Civil War era. Born on September 2, 1834, in Zurich, Switzerland, Hotze

came to the United States around 1850, becoming a naturalized citizen on June 27, 1856. Fluent in French and German as well as English, Hotze had received an excellent Jesuit education in his youth, and soon after arriving in the United States he found work as a private tutor on a plantation near Montgomery, Alabama. He still held this position in the late fall of 1854, when Dr. Josiah C. Nott, a prominent Mobile physician and racial theorist, asked him to adapt Arthur de Gobineau's famous work of scientific racialism, *Essai sur L'inégalité des Races Humaines* (Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races), for an American audience. Hotze agreed, translating Gobineau's work and adding a 100-page long "Analytical Introduction" that served to turn the pseudo-scientific treatise into a pro-slavery manifesto.[1] Around this time Hotze moved to Mobile, where he quickly entered into elite social and intellectual circles. In 1858 the mayor of Mobile appointed him as the city's delegate to the Southern Commercial Convention in Montgomery, and in 1859 he served as the secretary and *chargé d'affaires* for the American legation in Belgium. He returned to the United States a year later and took up the position of associate editor at the Mobile *Register*. He also joined the Mobile Cadets, an aristocratic social club and military company, and upon the outbreak of the Civil War Hotze and the rest of the cadets volunteered their services to the Confederate cause.[2]

Hotze served on active duty for three months, never engaging in combat but submitting numerous articles to the *Register* that described the tedium of life in the army camps. In July a friend recommended Hotze to the War Department for an officer's commission, but the request was ignored. Growing frustrated, Hotze complained about

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[1] Lonnie A. Burnett, *Henry Hotze, Confederate Propagandist: Selected Writings on Revolution, Recognition, and Race* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2008), 1-5.
[2] Charles P. Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda in Europe, 1861-1865* (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1969), 19-21.

how "the Revolution of 1861 could find no better use for me than that of a common soldier." However, the War Department had other duties in mind for him than command. In late August, Secretary of War Leroy Walker dispatched Hotze to Britain in order facilitate the procurement of war materials. However, upon arriving in London at the beginning of October 1861, Hotze recognized that the Confederacy faced bigger problems abroad than the purchase of arms. The North possessed a monopoly on distributing information through the British press, costing the South in the battle for British public opinion.[3] The Confederacy cared about this public opinion because it hoped for British intervention on their behalf in the conflict. Intervention did not necessarily imply military action but rather functioned as an umbrella term that covered many possible British actions: recognition, which would give the Confederacy a degree international legitimacy that would hopefully deter the Northern effort; an offer of mediation, which would presuppose recognition and bring international pressure on the North to end the war; an armistice proposal, which would encourage the two belligerents to lay down their arms but did not imply recognition; or, finally, military intervention, as France had done in the American Revolution.

Upon returning to Richmond, Hotze informed the new Secretary of War, Judah P. Benjamin, of his findings. Moreover, he suggested that the Confederacy needed a propaganda agent in Britain and argued that he was the man for the job. Benjamin forwarded the plan to the State Department, and on November 14, 1861, Confederate Secretary of State Robert M.T. Hunter commissioned Henry Hotze as the South's commercial agent in London.[4] Ostensibly he would serve as a consular officer for the

[3] Burnett, *Henry Hotze,* 8-16.
[4] Ibid*,* 15-16.

Confederacy, protecting the interests of Southern citizens living in Great Britain; however, this position only existed to provide cover for Hotze's real mission. Charged with both advising the State Department on "the tone of the English press and the current of public sentiment" regarding the Confederacy and impressing "upon the public mind abroad" the ability of the South to maintain its independence, the tyranny of the Northern government, and the importance of the trade connections that could develop between Britain and an independent South, Hotze would function both as an analyst of British opinion and a propagandist.[5] He accepted the assignment, and on January 29, 1862, he arrived in London and began carrying out his mission.[6] He published a number of editorials in the *Morning Post*, a respected British newspaper, over the next several months, and eventually founded his own newspaper, the *Index*. He used the *Index* to argue for recognition throughout the rest of the war. All the while, he sent back reports to the Confederate State Department that analyzed British opinion regarding the Confederacy.

A wealth of primary material documents Hotze's mission, including the forty-nine dispatches that he sent to the Confederate State Department while overseas and the pages of the *Index*, the newspaper that he founded to support his propaganda efforts.[7] Historians of Anglo-American relations during the Civil War frequently use these sources to provide support to their broader claims, but never discuss Hotze or his mission more than in

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[5] R.M.T. Hunter to Henry Hotze, Nov. 14, 1861, in *Official Records of the Union and Confederste Navies in the War of the Rebellion,* series II, vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 293-294 (hereafter cited as *ORN*).

[6] Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda,* 31.

[7] Correspondence of Henry Hotze, Box 7, Records of the Confederate States of America, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. I studied Hotze original papers on microfilm in the Library of Congress for this thesis. However, since the *ORN*, series II, vol. 3 contains the majority of his dispatches, I have cited it when possible for ease of reference. *Index,* Manuscripts, Archives, and Rare Books Library, Emory University, Atlanta, Ga. Besides Emory, several other libraries own copies of the *Index.*

passing.[8] He has received a slightly more detailed treatment from scholars of Confederate foreign relations. Frank Owsley devotes eight pages to Hotze in *King Cotton Diplomacy,* his monumental treatment of the Confederacy's foreign relations, characterizing Hotze as "a very able man - as able as any agent who went abroad during the Civil War" and applauding him for "his fastidiousness, his deftness, and his lightness of touch in a delicate situation," while Charles Hubbard dedicates three pages to him in *The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy* and concludes that Hotze's mission represented "one of the few successful diplomatic initiatives of the Confederacy."[9] However, these authors provide little evidence to back up their assertions, never discussing his work in meaningful detail. They appear to have based their conclusions more on a cursory inspection of the reports that he sent back to Richmond while abroad, in which he described his successful propaganda efforts in charming prose and confidently asserted his views on British opinion regarding recognition, than on a rigorous analysis of the content of his propaganda and quality of his assessments of the situation in Britain.

Charles Dufour, Stephen Oates, and Joseph Trahan III each offer chapter or article length treatments of Hotze. They all describe Hotze's operation as impressive and the man himself as a brilliant propagandist, gifted reader of public opinion, and sophisticated socialite who provided the Confederacy with more valuable services than any other foreign operative. They rely primarily on the dispatches that Hotze sent back to the Confederate State Department from London and provide value to historians simply by

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[8] See, for instance: Ephraim Douglass Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1925), 2:154n1, 2:240; Howard Jones, *Blue and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 68, 122; D.P. Crook, *The North, the South, and the Powers 1861-1865* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), 207, 243n38.

[9] Frank L. Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy: The Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America,* 3rd ed. (1931; repr., Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2008), 154-161; Charles M. Hubbard, *The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1998), 98-100.

documenting his actions. However, they all neglect to describe, let alone analyze, the nature of his propaganda.[10] As such, these three pieces describe the flavor of Hotze's mission, but they do not delve into its substance. Hotze described the *Index* as his "little kingdom," saying that he cared for it in the same way that a man cares "for his estate which he has amassed by his own industry and perseverance."[11] Any thorough discussion of Hotze's wartime activities must closely examine its pages. Additionally, these authors do not evaluate the quality of the information on British opinion regarding recognition that Hotze sent back to Richmond.

Charles Cullop offers the most complete discussion of Hotze's mission in the first four chapters of his monograph, *Confederate Propaganda in Europe*, arguing that Hotze demonstrated "adroitness, deftness, and perceptive skill as a propagandist." He thoroughly documents Hotze's early activities in London, explaining how he earned acceptance from both London society and the British press, and describes in excellent detail the establishment and operations of the *Index*. However, Cullop's discussion of the actual content of Hotze's propaganda proves wanting. He does not comment at all on Hotze's pre-*Index* propaganda efforts except to acknowledge their existence. He goes into slightly more detail while analyzing the content of *Index*, correctly noting that Hotze used the *Index* to argue that cultural and economic bonds connected Britain with the South, that the Confederacy's accomplishments entitled it to recognition, and that Britain's fear that recognition would drag it into a war with the North was irrational. However, he

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[10] Charles L. Dufour, "Rebel Propagandist: Henry Hotze" in *Nine Men in Gray* (1963; repr., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993); Stephen B. Oates, "Henry Hotze: Confederate Agent Abroad," *Historian* 27, no. 2 (February 1965): 131-154; Joseph V. Trahan III, "Henry Hotze: Propaganda Voice of the Confederacy" in *Knights of the Quill: Confederate Correspondents and their Civil War Reporting,* ed. Patricia G. McNeely, Debra Reddin Van Tuyll, and Henry H. Schulte (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2010).

[11] Burnett, *Henry Hotze*, 30.

inexplicably fails to discuss the *Index*'s stance on slavery, a glaring omission. Furthermore, he condenses over three years worth of propaganda activities into ten pages. In this quick survey of the material, he never assesses the quality of Hotze's arguments or analyzes how they changed over time. For this reason, his conclusion that Hotze presented the South's arguments for recognition "in a well-planned, coordinated, and even brilliant manner" proves unconvincing. Furthermore, he rarely discusses Hotze's assessments of Britain's attitude towards recognition and never evaluates their quality.[12] Thus, while Cullop's study offers a good starting place for one looking to learn about Hotze and his mission, it leaves the door open for further study.

Thomas E. Sebrell II extensively discusses Hotze's activities in his book *Persuading John Bull: Union and Confederate Propaganda in Britain, 1860-1865*. This work attempts to document and analyze the history of both the *Index* and its Northern counterpart in Britain, the *London American*, and it proves valuable for a number of reasons. Sebrell's examination of the *Index*'s readership allows historians to better understand who, exactly, among the British supported the Confederacy, and his analysis of the journal's relationship with the British-based, aristocratic Southern Independence Association demonstrates just how successfully Hotze and his newspaper permeated upper class society in London. However, Sebrell's study of the actual content of Hotze's propaganda comes up short. He focuses on the *Index*'s news section, in which the paper covered the events of the Civil War with a Southern bias, and convincingly demonstrates that Hotze's journal twisted the news so as to favor the Confederacy, sensationalizing

[12] Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda,* 9-66.

their victories, minimizing their defeats, and exaggerating the North's atrocities.[13] While Sebrell's conclusions prove convincing, his study of the *Index*'s content ultimately offers little of value. After all, soft power, the category into which Hotze's operation would fall in modern diplomatic terminology, resides, in the words of historian Don Doyle, in the ability "to appeal to the fundamental values and interests of the foreign country… not in crude propagandizing," such as what appeared in the *Index*'s news section.[14] Thus, the paper's exaggerated reporting only played a superficial role in Hotze's propaganda operation. Rather, the sophisticated arguments that he made for recognition from the journal's editorial pages formed the heart of his efforts, and Sebrell discusses these with little detail and less analysis. Additionally, Sebrell never even mentions Hotze's pre-*Index* propaganda efforts.

Robert E. Bonner offers the single best scholarly treatment of Hotze in his article "Slavery, Confederate Diplomacy, and the Racialist Mission of Henry Hotze." He convincingly argues that Hotze transformed "from a Confederate editor into an international racial propagandist" after the Confederacy abandoned its hopes of British intervention in the middle of 1863, demonstrating how the focus of Hotze's propaganda efforts shifted from recognition to the ways in which the South's "defining system of slavery exemplified the scientific principles of racial anthropology." Bonner further suggests that, though Hotze proved unsuccessful in his attempts to convince Britain to support the slaveholding South, his scientific arguments for a racial hierarchy played a role in creating the "international racist consensus" that ultimately resulted in such state

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[13] Thomas E. Sebrell II, *Persuading John Bull: Union and Confederate Propaganda in Britain, 1860-1865* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014).
[14] Don H. Doyle, *The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 4.

sponsored racism as the Holocaust in Europe, apartheid in South Africa, and Jim Crow laws in the American South.[15] However, Bonner focuses exclusively on Hotze's racial propaganda, and does not analyze Hotze's efforts relating to recognition.

Lonnie Burnett provides a valuable collection of Hotze's papers in *Henry Hotze, Confederate Propagandist: Selected Writings on Revolution, Recognition, and Race*. The introduction skillfully summarizes the existing scholarship on Hotze, offering a particularly interesting discussion of his early life. The body of the compilation includes editorials spanning his entire mission, including his early pieces in the *Morning Post* that most historians ignore. However, this collection provides little analysis, leaving readers to determine for themselves the quality of Hotze's arguments and the ways in which they developed over time. Furthermore, it fails to include any number of significant pieces that appeared in the *Index* arguing for recognition, including Hotze's discussions of cotton and international law. Finally, it gives readers no means to evaluate the quality of his assessments of British opinion regarding recognition.

This thesis closely examines the content of Hotze's propaganda efforts during his first year in London to determine the nature of the arguments that he made for recognition, the quality of these arguments, and the ways in which these arguments developed over time. Chapter One explains how Hotze published in the British press eloquent descriptions of Southern theories of states' rights and the Confederacy's stability and unity in his early days as a propaganda agent. However, arguments such as these proved unable to inspire the British to support recognition, for they approached the issue from an American perspective rather than attempting to convince the British that

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[15] Robert E. Bonner, "Slavery, Confederate Diplomacy, and the Racialist Mission of Henry Hotze" *Civil War History* 51, no. 3 (September 2005): 288-316

recognition would serve their best interests. Hotze soon recognized this, and he shifted the tone of his propaganda accordingly. The turning point in his career as a propagandist came in late March, when he argued in a letter to the editor in an influential London newspaper that Southern independence would best serve Britain's cultural and commercial interests. From this point forward, Hotze would write all of his propaganda from a British perspective. Chapter Two describes how he took the remarkable step of founding an ostensibly British newspaper, the *Index*, to facilitate his propaganda efforts, and over the course of the summer of 1862 he skillfully argued in its editorial pages that Britain had not only a right but a duty to recognize the South and that a Confederate victory would benefit British industry by enabling it to once again access Southern cotton.

However, British recognition did not prove forthcoming, and the issuance of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in September forced Hotze to once again change his tactics. Chapter Three documents Hotze's attempt to use the *Index* to defend the South's relationship to slavery and question the good intentions of the North. However, his logically dubious arguments proved ineffective, and by January the British, who vehemently opposed slavery, had inextricably linked the causes of union and liberty in their minds and become intractably opposed to recognition. Sensing that his mission had become desperate, Hotze began writing editorials that recklessly attacked the British Cabinet for lacking courage and statesmanship. However, they served no purpose other than to allow Hotze to vent his frustrations, for by this point it had become apparent that if the Confederacy were to win recognition, it would not be through diplomacy or propaganda but military victory.

This thesis also analyzes Hotze's reports to the Confederate State department, evaluating them for accuracy and insight. Hotze consistently offered Richmond keen insight into British public opinion regarding recognition during his first year in London. In the spring of 1862 he accurately recognized that the British generally desired to see the Union divided, which would check the growth of a rival power, but that slavery and a fear of war with the North provided obstacles to recognition. Additionally, he accurately believed that the Confederacy's cotton diplomacy strategy had failed because the British economy did not rely as much on the South's staple as Southern leaders had thought it did. Furthermore, he properly identified the period after the Second Battle of Bull Run as the period at which British support for recognition reached its peak, with only the cotton operatives of Lancashire opposing the South on account of their aversion to slavery. Finally, he correctly argued that the British initially viewed the Emancipation Proclamation as a desperate Northern attempt to win European favor and incite a slave insurrection in the South. In all of these instances, Hotze demonstrated his gift for reading public opinion. This ability makes sense, given his background as a journalist. Having served as an associate editor of the Mobile *Register*, Hotze arrived in London already experienced at analyzing popular sentiment.

At the same time, however, Hotze displayed a limited understanding of British politics. He underestimated the support that the North enjoyed both in the Conservative Party and among members of parliament; failed to understand that the government's decision to recognize the legality of the Union's blockade of Southern ports constituted a major defeat for the Confederacy; mistakenly attributed the government's decision not to offer recognition in the aftermath of the Seven Days' battles to a failure of British

statesmanship; constantly accused Foreign Minister Lord Russell of opposing recognition, when he in fact emerged as its biggest advocate in the British Cabinet in the aftermath of Second Bull Run; and never realized that recognition depended primarily on Confederate victories on the battlefield. Perhaps Hotze's partisanship caused him to misunderstand the political situation, or perhaps he simply disliked sharing bad news with his superiors in Richmond. However, his keen assessment of British opinion regarding the fear of war, slavery, and cotton reveals his ability to confront unfavorable facts. One can only conclude, then, that he simply did not understand British politics. This hardly proves surprising, as he had never held a political position or spent any significant amount of time studying politics before arriving in London.

Thus, Hotze possessed a tremendous ability to read public opinion but a limited understanding of British politics. However, despite his limited understanding of politics, Hotze still unfailingly offered the Confederate State Department a more accurate and insightful assessment of the situation in Britain than did James Murray Mason, the Confederacy's official representative in London. Possibly, Mason viewed analyzing politics and public opinion as beneath his position as the Confederacy's minister plenipotentiary to Britain. However, when he did attempt to assess British opinion, he reported generally accurate facts but never provided Richmond with the level of detail, nuance, or analysis that Hotze did. Even Hotze's frequently inaccurate and always limited assessments of British politics offered the State Department more of value than Mason's did. Though Mason could claim significantly more experience than Hotze, it appears that the young man possessed superior observational and analytical abilities. As a result, the majority of the quality information that the Confederate State Department received about

the situation in Britain regarding recognition came not from its official representative in the country, but from its propagandist.

Henry Hotze's career sheds light on the question of why Britain never recognized the Confederacy, a topic of debate among historians. Owsley argues that the British never intervened in the Civil War because their industry profited from the conflict and their government feared war with the North.[16] Hubbard does not deny the importance of these factors, but he suggests that they did not act alone in preventing recognition. Rather, he argues that Southern leaders developed a diplomatic strategy that relied too much on theories of states' rights and the economic power of cotton and that Southern diplomats implemented this already flawed strategy with tremendous ineptitude. He suggests that the Confederacy could have secured recognition if only it had appealed to Britain's interests in its diplomacy.[17] However, the ultimate failure of Hotze's propaganda efforts reveals the flaw in this argument. Though Hotze initially argued for recognition of the basis of states' rights and cotton, in accordance with the Confederacy's diplomatic strategy, he quickly recognized that this strategy would never succeed, and began arguing for recognition from a British perspective. Hotze implemented this well-conceived strategy as skillfully as any agent could have, articulating his arguments with eloquence and skill. However, his actions did not result in recognition. This demonstrates that Confederate diplomacy did not fail because of a flawed strategy or inept diplomats. Rather, it failed because the Confederacy had nothing to offer the British in exchange for recognition. As D.P. Crook argues, "considerations of strategy, national interest, and imperial security" could have overwhelmed the economic considerations and fear of war

[16] Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy,* 542-558.
[17] Hubbard, *Confederate Diplomacy,* 19, 22, 177-181.

that Owsley describes and compelled Britain to recognize the Confederacy.[18] Hotze attempted to appeal to considerations such as these but proved unable to convince the British that recognition would benefit them. This failure did not result from ineptitude; rather, Hotze had an impossible task in front of him. As Howard Jones concludes, the British "had no vital interests worth fighting for in the American war."[19] For this reason, hopelessness, rather than failure, provides the defining characteristic of Confederate diplomacy. As Henry Hotze's lack of success makes clear, a different strategy or more able diplomats would not have changed the outcome of the Confederacy's efforts to secure British recognition.

[18] Crook, *The North, the South, and the Powers,* 372.
[19] Jones, *Blue and Gray Diplomacy,* 323.

Chapter One

Henry Hotze proved himself to be a highly capable foreign agent in his first two months in London. He displayed a gift for reading public opinion, correctly recognizing that the British supported the Confederacy but opposed recognition because of they feared war with the United States and opposed slavery. Furthermore, his explanation of cotton diplomacy's failure demonstrated his tremendous analytical abilities. He did not prove flawless, however. He assessments of the British parliamentary landscape and Parliament's debate on the Northern blockade of Southern ports revealed that he possessed a limited ability to understand and analyze British politics. Furthermore, he focused too much on the Confederacy's accomplishments and legal justifications for secession in his opening propaganda efforts, failing to recognize that successful diplomacy requires two countries to share a mutual interest. Operating under a strategy based entirely on the justice of their cause and the economic power of cotton, Southern diplomats generally failed to take a British perspective when making appeals for recognition, and Hotze initially proved to be no exception. However, he appears to have recognized the need to appeal to British interests in his propaganda by late March, for at this time he suggested in a letter to the editor in an influential London newspaper that a Southern victory would better serve Britain's cultural and commercial interests than a Northern one. This letter provides the first instance of Hotze arguing for recognition from a British point of view, a perspective that would characterize his later propaganda efforts.

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Upon arriving in London at the end of January 1862, Hotze declined to rush headlong into the fray of diplomacy and propaganda. In his first report back to

Richmond, written on February 1, he chose not to include any preliminary impressions of British public opinion regarding the Confederacy, believing that to do so would be "premature, after a sojourn of barely three days." Furthermore, he explained that he did not intend to attempt to publish any of his writing in British newspapers in the immediate future and expected to "have little to transmit of my own composition for some three or four weeks to come." Rather than writing, Hotze planned to spend some time surveying the landscape in front of him, in order to "form an intelligent estimate of the relative importance of conflicting interests and views as well as of those who advocate and hold them." Only after he had done this would Hotze venture to publish any of his writing in the British press or send back his assessment of British public opinion to Richmond.

Hotze viewed the case of Thurlow Weed as a perfect example of what could happen if he were to take action before thoroughly understanding the situation in front of him. Weed, a friend and political adviser to United States Secretary of State William Seward, served as a political emissary in the Union's London delegation, and according to Hotze, he led "an indefatigable and unscrupulous agency" that was constantly working "to damage [the South] in public estimation." Hotze did not feel threatened by Weed, however, for he believed that Weed carried out his task in a manner "most repulsive to the English taste and habits," and that in so doing he only injured "the cause which he means to serve." Attuned to Weed's mistakes and by nature cautious, Hotze did not intend to write until he felt that his pen could do the Confederate cause some good, and

he would not assess British sentiment towards the Confederacy until he felt qualified to do so.[20]

Over the next several weeks, Hotze spent his time establishing relationships with various leading figures in the worlds of British journalism and politics. He had initially worried about his ability to accomplish this. In order to carry out his mission of serving as the advocate of the Southern cause in the British press successfully, Hotze knew that he first needed to gain the friendship and support of other journalists, influential editors, and powerful political figures. However, he arrived in London lacking friends, introductory letters, or an "extensive political or literary reputation to precede me and smooth my way," and when he considered the difficulty of establishing a reputation from scratch, Hotze "felt almost disheartened." His worry proved to be for nothing, however. Though he had expected himself to spend time "almost exclusively among the humble members of the editorial and literary fraternity," he proved "fortunate enough to gain almost immediate access to a higher social sphere."[21] In the words of historian Frank L. Owsley, Hotze possessed a "master-hand at dispensing good cigars and choice whiskey at the proper moment, and he became quite a favorite with all those whom he cultivated."[22] As a result, by the end of February Hotze found himself with "a wider range of influence and immeasurably greater facilities for usefulness than I had hoped to attain in so short a period of time," having spent less than four weeks in London.[23]

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[20] Henry Hotze to R.M.T. Hunter, Feb 1, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:325-326; for background on Thurlow Weed, see Amanda Foreman, *A World On Fire: Britain's Crucial Role in the American Civil War* (New York: Random House, 2010), 38, 164, 186.
[21] Henry Hotze to R.M.T. Hunter, Feb 23, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:346-347.
[22] Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy,* 157; see also Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, Mar 14, 1863, *ORN* ser. II, 3:710-712.
[23] Henry Hotze to R.M.T. Hunter, Feb 23, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:346-347.

Though Hotze mentioned few of his new friends by name in his reports back to Richmond, presumably he developed a relationship with Algernon Borthwick, the editor of the *Morning Post*. The *Morning Post* held an influential position among British newspapers. As the only political daily in London besides the *Times* and the mouthpiece for Prime Minister Lord Henry Palmerston in the press, the *Morning Post* enjoyed an avid readership amongst important and influential persons.[24] For this reason, Hotze described it as "the journal to which I most desired access," and, after several weeks of surveying the landscape before him, he published his first contribution to the British press, in the form of an editorial, in its February 22 issue.[25]

Hotze had three main points that he hoped to get across to the paper's readers. First, he attempted to convince his audience of the Confederacy's stability; next, he described how the South's unity would ultimately prevent the North from subduing it; finally, he argued that foreign powers should not require the Confederacy to demonstrate its ability to defend itself from the North before recognizing it as a fellow member of the community of nations. Though Hotze attempted to maintain "an English point of view" in this piece, his line of reasoning clearly demonstrates that Hotze wrote from an American perspective in this opening propaganda effort.[26] He focused on how the Confederacy had proved itself deserving of recognition rather than appealing to the interests of the British people and government.

Hotze first argued that the South had created a stable government. For evidence, he pointed to the fact that on the same day as his piece's publication, the Confederacy

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[24] H.R. Fox Bourne, *English Newspapers: Chapters in the History of Journalism* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1887), 2:243-244.
[25] Henry Hotze to R.M.T. Hunter, Feb 23, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:346-347.
[26] Ibid.

was inaugurating its permanent constitution and government. After the Southern states had seceded from the Union, they immediately established a temporary government under a provisional constitution. They then drew up a permanent constitution and government, which would replace their provisional predecessors in one year. Over the course of this year, "despite the exhaustive strain and the fearful uncertainties of a war for existence," the Confederacy managed not only to survive but also to inaugurate its permanent government under its permanent constitution. The South accomplished this, Hotze noted, through broad popular support. Each separate Southern state had "promptly and unanimously" ratified the constitution, and the people had confirmed it peacefully and "with all the formalities of law" in numerous popular elections. Hotze suggested that, with its government now officially established and enjoying the full support of the South's states and people, "the Southern revolution acquires an air of solidity and stability."

Additionally, Hotze suggested that the Southern people's unity in their allegiance to the Confederacy and opposition to the United States would prevent the restoration of the old Union. When one considered the size of the Confederacy's population and territory and the fact that it was fighting a defensive war, Hotze suggested that it would be somewhere between extremely difficult and impossible for the North to reestablish control over the region so long as Southerners stood "united in a desperate resistance." Hotze argued that the Southern people possessed the necessary unity. All classes of people displayed this unity, from politicians and government officials to poor whites and slaves. The majority of the Confederacy's elected officials had played prominent roles in the politics of the old Union, and together they represented a fair cross-section of "all

former political parties." This continuity demonstrated that the new Southern order received support not only from radicals and fire-eaters, but also from the men who had formed the antebellum South's leadership class. Furthermore, hardly any officeholders of the old government, "from the judge of a Federal circuit to the pettiest village postmaster," had left their positions after the Confederacy's establishment, demonstrating that this class also recognized the legitimacy of the new government. The actions of the South's lower classes offered further proof of Southern unity. The Confederate military relied on the service of poor whites, among whom "the slaveholding interest might be supposed to be least deeply rooted." Yet the Confederacy had not needed to resort to conscription to fill its military quotas, as poor whites were willingly and enthusiastically volunteering. Even slaves gave their support to the new government, toiling in the fields to produce food for the army and often accompanying their masters to the battlefield. In this manner, the South had shaken off its loyalty to the old Union "with as much ease and unconcern as a worn-out garment would be by its wearer."[27] When Hotze considered this unity and the fact that the Confederacy had just established a permanent government, he found it impossible to come to any other conclusion than that the South would eventually secure its independence.

Finally, although Hotze felt confident in the Confederacy's odds of eventually achieving military victory, he did not think that the British should make such a victory a requirement for recognition. In the aftermath of the Confederacy's victory in the First Battle of Bull Run in July of 1861, British Foreign Minister Lord John Russell explained to the South's representatives in London that his country would not recognize the

[27] *Morning Post* (London), Feb 22, 1862, quoted in Burnett, *Henry Hotze,* 114-118.

Confederacy until it had established its independence on the battlefield.[28] Hotze felt that this position violated historical precedent. In the past, established nations had offered "timely assistance" to a newcomer without demanding, "as a proof of her right to exist, that she should exhibit the strength of full maturity and be able to defend herself against all assailants." The Netherlands had only secured its independence from Spain in the 17th century after receiving "men and money from England and Germany," and the United States could not have broken free from Great Britain in the 18th century without the support of France. In more recent times, Italy had gained independence only by "incurring a heavy debt of obligations" to foreign powers. However, the South was experiencing none of this support that previous independence movements had enjoyed. The Confederacy found itself not only bereft of material aid from European powers, but also, due to the blockade, "almost wholly excluded from the moral and commercial communication with the rest of the world… which a nation at war so imperatively needs."[29] Hotze argued that established powers should not isolate the Confederacy from the family of nations just because it had not yet finished securing its independence by force of arms, since historical precedent showed this to be an unfair standard. Striving "to forcibly suggest rather than positively assert conclusions in [the South's] favor," Hotze does not explicitly mention recognition in this piece.[30] Nonetheless, he clearly implies that Britain should consider the stability of the Confederate government and the unity of the Southern people sufficient reason to recognize the independence of the Confederacy, regardless of the success or failure of the South's armies.

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[28] Howard Jones, *Union in Peril: The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 59
[29] *Morning Post* (London), Feb 22, 1862, quoted in Burnett, *Henry Hotze,* 114-118
[30] Henry Hotze to R.M.T. Hunter, Feb 23, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:346-347.

All in all, the results of Hotze's opening efforts proved quite satisfactory to him. Though he recognized in his writing "the timidity of a first step on untried ground," the success of his initial attempt to win over the British press left Hotze feeling encouraged. The piece served to publicize the Confederacy's stability and unity, necessary precursors to recognition. Certainly he wrote with too much of an American perspective in this editorial, describing the Confederacy's accomplishments rather than trying to convince the British that recognition served their best interests, but time enough remained at this point for Hotze to learn how to write from "an English point of view." The significance of this propaganda effort lay simply in the fact that Hotze had managed to publish his writing in a British newspaper, and not just any paper but the influential columns of the *Morning Post*. Furthermore, he learned from friends that his editorial had made a strong impression in the social clubs that were "the principal foci of public opinion" in London. Having successfully established a relationship with an important British newspaper, Hotze believed that he had overcome his greatest challenge, and he felt confident when he considered the future of his propaganda efforts. Hotze believed that his pen, judiciously wielded, had the potential to persuade Britain to recognize the Confederacy. Given the speed with which he had gained access to the world of London journalism and the social success that he had enjoyed, Hotze's optimism at this early stage of his mission does not appear unreasonable.

Hotze found social and literary success to be expensive, and by the end of February he was asking his superiors in Richmond for more money. Not desiring to make any personal profit while his country was engaged in a struggle for its life and having been "weaned by six months duty in the field as a private from whatever self-indulgence

I might have been disposed to consider as a necessity," Hotze had initially suggested to Confederate Secretary of State Robert Hunter that he be paid a salary of $1500 a year and be given a like amount for operating expenses, and Hunter had agreed to his terms. However, Hotze quickly found this amount of money to be insufficient. His newfound social status had allowed him to obtain access to the columns of the *Morning Post*, but membership in high society proved expensive. As Hotze explained to the Hunter, "There is no country or city where the conventionalities of society are so exacting and their observance so rigorously enforced, as [London]. And there is also no place where that observance is so expensive." Influential Londoners often came to Hotze for information concerning the South, and he did not wish to "hold conversations on confidential topics in the common drawing room of a boarding house" or to "receive a Peer of England in a third story bedchamber." Hotze requested that Hunter increase his operating budget from £300 to £500, so that he could properly observe the niceties of London society. As Hotze explained to his superior, with "my sphere of usefulness having expanded beyond the original plan, my necessary expenditures have increased proportionally beyond the original estimate."[31]

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Having entered the ranks of high society and published his writing in a leading London newspaper, after a month in London Hotze finally felt qualified to send back to Richmond his assessment of British popular opinion regarding recognition of the Confederacy. At the war's outbreak, Southerners had held high hopes for immediate British recognition. However, Hotze thought that those high hopes had been misplaced, observing, "Most of us have been too rapid in our conclusions and too sanguine in our

[31] Henry Hotze to R.M.T. Hunter, Feb 23, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:346-347.

expectations as regards the policy of Europe and especially England."[32] The South had based its entire diplomatic strategy on the belief that Britain's dependence on Southern cotton would cause it to quickly intervene in the war on the side of the Confederacy. However, the Confederacy had not received recognition from Britain by February of 1862, and Hotze explained to the Confederate State Department that this fact resulted from a failure of the South's diplomatic strategy. He argued that Britain had proved to be not as reliant on cotton as Southerners had believed it to be, an assessment that accords with existing scholarship on the subject. Nonetheless, Hotze believed that the British, generally desiring to see the United States divided in two, remained favorably disposed to the Southern war effort. However, he suggested that a fear of war with the North and the country's widespread and long-standing opposition to slavery caused the government to hesitate in recognizing the Confederacy. This analysis proves more difficult to evaluate. Hotze's assertion that the British generally supported the South but feared war with the North appears true. However, the extent to which the country's anti-slavery sentiment provided an obstacle to recognition remains less clear. Regardless, in his first month in London Hotze displayed an impressive ability to analyze the factors at play in the recognition debate and to read British public opinion. On the other hand, he proved less adept at reading the British political landscape regarding the American question. His reports to Richmond demonstrate that he did not fully understand the extent of both the Conservative Party's opposition to recognition and the North's support among members of parliament. Nonetheless, Hotze provided the Confederate State Department with a far more valuable assessment of British opinion than did James Mason, the Confederacy's official representative in London and a far more experienced politician.

[32] Henry Hotze to R.M.T. Hunter, Feb 28, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:352-354.

Adhering to a strategy that historian Frank Owsley terms "King Cotton Diplomacy" in the title of his monumental treatment of the Confederacy's foreign relations, Southern leaders crafted their foreign policy around the expectation that Britain would intervene in the Civil War in order to obtain Southern cotton. Fully aware that Britain's massive textile industry obtained between three-fourths and five-sixths of its annual cotton supply from the South, by the late antebellum period Southerners believed without a shadow of doubt that that Britain's prosperity depended upon a steady supply of Southern cotton. Armed with this confidence in the power of their staple, at the outbreak of the Civil War Southern planters, merchants, newspapermen, and local citizen's committees established an unofficial embargo on cotton, working together to prevent any cotton from leaving Confederate ports until Britain recognized their independence.[33] The embargo served no point, however, unless it could be leveraged into diplomatic recognition, and that task fell to the South's diplomatic corps. Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs dispatched three initial envoys to London in March 1861 and instructed them to request diplomatic recognition on the basis of the legality of secession and the Confederacy's ability to govern and defend; if the British rejected this appeal the envoys were to then make "a delicate allusion" to "the condition to which the British realm would be reduced if the supply of our staple should suddenly fail."[34] Confident in the economic power of cotton, Jefferson Davis and other Southern leaders looked forward to recognition as an "assumed fact."[35]

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[33] The Confederate Congress did not place an official embargo on cotton for political reasons, but the embargo enjoyed the full support of the government. For a full discussion of the origins of cotton diplomacy, see Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy,* 1-56.

[34] For a full discussion of the Confederacy's first diplomatic mission to Britain, see Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy,* 51-86; for Toombs' instructions, see Robert Toombs to William L. Yancey, Pierre A. Rost, and A Dudley Mann, March 16, 1861, *ORN* ser. II, 3:191-195.

[35] Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy,* 19.

However, the prompt recognition that the Confederacy had expected did not prove forthcoming. Hotze correctly believed, as he explained in a February dispatch to the Confederate State Department, that Britain had not recognized the South's independence by February of 1862 because the cotton embargo had not devastated the textile industry in the way that Southerners had thought it would. In fact, Hotze argued that the embargo proved to be "a cause of gain to many to whom it was supposed to be certain ruin," with many large cotton manufacturers having made tremendous profits directly as a result of the embargo. Before the war broke out, many of these manufacturers had accumulated a large surplus stock of cotton, driving down the prices of cotton goods, in accordance with the law of supply and demand, and causing textile manufacturers to struggle to simply break even. However, as Southern cotton began to disappear from the market, these manufacturers found themselves able to charge high prices for their surplus stock, and they watched their expected losses turn into profit. Additionally, Hotze noted that many small cotton operations were going bankrupt because of the embargo, further benefiting the large interests. Numerous small manufacturers had sprung up in the years leading up to the war, and competition from them had been endangering the profits of large cotton operations. Finally, Hotze explained that some in the textile industry hoped that the lack of Southern cotton on the market would stimulate the supply of Indian cotton, as the industry's dependence on Southern cotton had long troubled many in Britain.[36]

Hotze displayed remarkable insight into the economic factors surrounding recognition in his discussion of the failure of the King Cotton diplomatic strategy. Owsley, in the definitive treatment of the economics of recognition, makes much the same arguments that Hotze did, noting especially that the embargo helped large cotton

[36] Henry Hotze to R.M.T. Hunter, Feb 28, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:352-354.

manufacturers make a profit on their surplus stock. However, Owsley takes his economic analysis further. He notes that the textile industry did suffer during the war. Over four million people depended on cotton for their livelihood in Britain before the war, either directly or indirectly, and at one point during the embargo 500,000 of them depended on charity. However, the war proved to be such a boon to British commerce that other sectors picked up the slack that the slowdown in cotton manufacturing had created in the economy. The linen and wool industries experienced a revival during the embargo years, the munitions and shipbuilding industries experienced enormous profits selling war goods to the American belligerents, and the merchants who could slip goods through the Northern blockade of the South realized fabulous profits on their goods. Thus, even with the massive level of unemployment in the cotton industry during the war, across the British economy the unemployment rate stood at its normal level – meaning that in industries besides cotton it stood at far lower rates than normal.[37] If Hotze noticed any of these other economic factors working against recognition, he did not note them in his reports back to Richmond. Nonetheless, for an on-the-ground observer thoroughly steeped in the doctrine of King Cotton, Hotze's analysis of the failure of cotton diplomacy remains impressive.

Hotze further explained to Richmond that Britain's fear of war with the United States also served to prevent recognition. He had not found public opinion to be "positively hostile" to the Confederacy, and indeed a Southerner could find "many friends and well-wishers" in London. However, since they tended to interact primarily with those among the British who supported their cause, Southerners were "liable to mistake the exceptions for the rule." As a whole, Hotze assessed the British to be "cold

[37] Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy,* 8, 542-558.

and indifferent" towards the question of Southern recognition, viewing "in this great war for a nation's life only a vexatious interruption to its wonted routine of thought and pursuits." Hotze believed that if all else were equal, Britain would prefer to see the United States divided into two parts, thereby checking the growth of a rival power. However, all else was not equal. The British believed that the North would declare war on them if they recognized the Confederacy, and Britain's desire to see the Union divided did not prove strong enough to overcome the country's aversion to war.[38]

Hotze's delivered an accurate assessment to Richmond. Contemporary British observers, even those favoring the North, expressed similar sentiments. John Bright, one of the Union's chief advocates in the House of Commons, lamented the "ignorance and flunkeyism" that caused the middle class to desire the United States' destruction, and the Earl of Kimberly noted, "Sympathies with the North are very scarce.[39] It appears that the British people truly wished to see the power of United States checked and the continent divided between two lesser powers. As Lord Russell himself remarked of the British people in the summer of 1862, "The great majority are in favour of the South."[40] Historians also agree with Hotze's analysis. As Frank Owsley argues, the British viewed the division of the Union as "a greatly desired end" that would significantly weaken their rival across the Atlantic. However, he points out that Britain chose not to take action towards this end "because of the conviction that it would involve the two countries in a war," a fear which the cabinet, members of parliament, and the press "constantly

[38] Henry Hotze to R.M.T. Hunter, Feb 28, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:352-354.
[39] Sebrell, *Persuading John Bull,* 84.
[40] Russell to Lyons, July 19, 1862, quoted in Jones, "The British Conservatives and the American Civil War," *The American Historical Review* 58 no. 3 (April 1953), 529.

expressed."[41] Lord Russell himself would articulate this exact fear in early March, stating in the House of Lords that if Parliament were to speak out against the Northern blockade of Southern ports, no course would remain open for Britain other than "war with the United States."[42] Indeed, this fear would prove to be the primary factor preventing the Confederacy from experiencing diplomatic success, causing the Cabinet to hesitate to recognize the Confederacy even at the most opportune moments, as discussed at length in the second and third chapters. In this manner, Hotze's initial assessment of British public opinion regarding recognition displayed impressive accuracy and perceptiveness.

Hotze further argued that Britain's longstanding opposition to slavery also provided an obstacle to recognition. He did not believe that the British could discard, "even for a moment, that repugnance to our institutions which is really what I have always been reluctant to believe it, a part of the national conscience and therefore an honest article of the national creed."[43] The British certainly abhorred slavery. Having abolished the slave trade in 1807 and emancipated the slaves in their sugar colonies in the 1830s, the British had by come to view their country as the world's foremost enemy of the institution by the time of the Civil War.[44] Thus, it seems natural for Britain to have supported the North on these grounds alone. Certainly, John Bright and William Forster, the two leading opponents of the South in the House of Commons, were Quakers and committed abolitionists, and the South's initial envoys to Britain reported sensing hostility to the Confederacy on account on slavery.[45] However, historians have generally

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[41] Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy,* 557-558.
[42] UK Parliament, *Hansard 1803-2005,* 165:1243 (Lords, March 10, 1862).
[43] Henry Hotze to R.M.T. Hunter, Feb 28, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:352-354.
[44] Richard Huzzey, *Freedom Burning: Anti-Slavery and Empire in Victorian Britain* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 1, 5, 40.
[45] Foreman, *World on Fire,* 95; Hubbard, *Confederate Diplomacy,* 35.

concluded that anti-slavery sentiments did not prevent the British from sympathizing with the South. After the North refused to take an explicitly abolitionist stance at the beginning of the war, the British began to doubt the morality of the Northern cause and distrust Lincoln's government. Furthermore, many believed that moral pressure from the rest of the world and the laws of economics would force an independent Confederacy to emancipate its slaves shortly after independence. For these reasons, opposition to slavery did not stand in the way of British recognition of the Confederacy, at least before Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation.[46] Nonetheless, as Charles Hubbard rightly concludes, "Although slavery was not the reason Southern diplomats failed, it did contribute to their burden."[47] Even if slavery did not prevent recognition, it certainly cost the Confederacy support and gave the British government one more reason to withhold recognition. Thus, Hotze appears to have correctly identified it as an obstacle to recognition. All in all, Hotze's initial assessment of Britain's attitude towards the Confederacy, written after having lived in the country for only a month, demonstrates tremendous insight into public opinion.

Hotze also described to his superiors the British political landscape regarding recognition. Though he displayed an impressive ability to read public opinion, he demonstrated a limited ability to understand and analyze British politics. Hotze expressed his surprise that the two major political parties had not aligned themselves on opposing sides of the debate surrounding recognition. He noted that even as the Liberal Palmerston Ministry proclaimed neutrality on the American question, Lord Derby, the leader of the

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[46] Lorimer, Douglas A. "The Role of Anti-Slavery Sentiment in English Reactions to the American Civil War," *The Historical Journal* 19, no. 02 (June 1976): 405-20; see also Huzzey, *Freedom Burning,* 24, and Doyle, *Cause of All Nations,* 145.
[47] Hubbard, *Confederate Diplomacy,* 177.

opposition Conservatives, remained "careful not to commit himself" and avoided "advancing one inch beyond the position which Lord Palmerston is supposed to hold." Due to its traditional, aristocratic base, the Conservative Party probably seemed to Hotze like a natural supporter of the traditional, aristocratic South. However, he believed that the issue of Confederate recognition possessed such political volatility that if a party were to take any stance on it other than neutrality, it would accomplish nothing more than ensuring their "crushing defeat."[48] Hotze correctly observed the Conservative Party's neutrality, but he mistakenly believed that this neutrality had resulted from the party's leadership submitting to political necessity. Though he did not state as much, Hotze certainly implied to his superiors that in the proper political climate the South could expect Conservative support. However, in reality members of the Conservative Party generally felt indifferent towards the American question, and the party's tradition demanded strict neutrality regarding the domestic affairs of foreign nations. Furthermore, if the sympathies of Lord Derby, the leader of the party, and Benjamin Disraeli, the party's leader in the House of Commons, lay anywhere on this issue, they lay on the side of the North.[49] Hotze's analysis of the Conservative Party's feelings regarding recognition, while not blatantly incorrect, proves wanting.

Hotze's assessment of the general feeling regarding recognition within Parliament further testifies to his poor understanding of British politics. He noted that only two politicians of any weight had declared themselves foes of the South. The first was Earl Russell, the foreign minister, whom Hotze described as "the apologist of the federal government in the House of Lords." The second was John Bright in the House of

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[48] Henry Hotze to R.M.T. Hunter, Feb 28, 1862, *ORN* ser. II 3:352-354.
[49] Jones "British Conservatives," 527-43.

Commons, who, fortunately for the South, spoke for "no party but himself."[50] Hotze's comments about Bright reveal his limited understanding of the situation within the House of Commons. While Bright certainly opposed the South, historian E.D. Adams points out that the famous reformer and fiery orator proved "more influential out of parliament than in it," as he spent more time organizing mass meetings and giving public speeches than organizing support for the North within Parliament. William Forster, on the other hand, led the Northern sympathizers in Parliament, who, in contrary to Hotze's assertion, formed a sizable faction.[51] In the blockade debates that would take place less than two weeks after Hotze provided this initial assessment of the political landscape, Forster gave the primary speech defending the Union's position, and more than twenty MPs stood ready to speak after him in the North's favor.[52] Perhaps Hotze allowed his partisanship to blind him to the truth, or perhaps he hesitated to share bad news with his superiors in Richmond, preferring to provide them with an optimistic interpretation of events. However, his discussion of Britain's fear of war and opposition to slavery reveal his ability and willingness to observe and report factors that worked against recognition, contradicting both of these hypotheses. One can only conclude then that he did not understand British politics, probably due to inexperience.

In spite of his failures in judging the British political landscape regarding recognition, Hotze nonetheless provided the Confederate State Department with a more thorough and nuanced assessment of the situation in Britain than the vastly more experienced Mason did. In his reports back to Richmond in the first half of 1862, Mason offered only a very abbreviated discussion of why Britain had not yet recognized the

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[50] Henry Hotze to R.M.T. Hunter, Feb 28, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:352-354.
[51] Adams, *Great Britain,* 2:58; Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy,* 545.
[52] Foreman, *World on Fire,* 217.

South's independence. He first noted the "pervading disinclination" among the British to undertake any dramatic actions that might have disturbed the mourning of Queen Victoria, whose husband, Prince Albert, had recently died. Mason also explained that cotton diplomacy had not proved to be as effective as the South had hoped. Recognizing, at Hotze did, the fact that many British textile manufacturers had accumulated a surplus stock of cotton goods before the war and now found themselves able to profit from the increased prices that the embargo had caused, Mason also noted that the owners of the profiting cotton mills silenced any potential complaints from "the working classes by sufficient alms… to keep them from actual starvation, " and that some hoped that the absence of Southern cotton would lead to "the increase of its culture in India."[53] While Mason made no inaccurate claims, his reports back to Richmond notably lacked several important insights that Hotze's included. On the subject of cotton, Mason does not mention that large cotton manufacturers benefitted from the bankruptcies that the embargo caused among their smaller competitors. Furthermore, he did not offer any assessment of the British political landscape, any observations of the attitude of different political parties or politicians regarding the Confederacy. The Confederacy's official representative in London also never discusses the role that Britain's fear of war and opposition to slavery played in the country's stance towards recognition. The absence of any comment of Britain's anti-slavery feelings from Mason's dispatches provides a particularly noteworthy point of contrast with Hotze's reports. As discussed above, the issue carried enormous significance, and Mason's decision not to even mention it indicates that he possessed a reluctance to address difficult issues that Hotze did not. For all these reasons, during the first months of 1862 Hotze provided the Confederate State

[53] James Mason to Secretary of State, March 11, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:358-360.

Department with information of a significantly higher quality than Mason did, even though they had both been in London for the same amount of time and Mason enjoyed the advantages of political experience and official status.

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Hotze's assessment of Parliament's debate on the Union blockade of Southern ports further demonstrates his limited understanding of British politics. Sir William Gregory, an Irish MP and committed friend of the South, introduced a motion on March 7 asking the Palmerston Ministry to declare the blockade ineffective and therefore illegal. The Declaration of Paris stated that a blockade must be effective to be legal; if a maritime power simply declared certain ports blockaded without actually enforcing the blockade, they were violating international law. Gregory argued that the Union's blockade violated the Declaration in exactly this way. In his speech, he characterized the blockade as nothing more than a "mockery" of the treaty of Paris, citing statistics that Mason had given him in order to demonstrate that "nothing like an effective blockade of the greater part of the Southern Coast exists."[54] Hotze informed Richmond that Gregory's speech received "rapt attention and unexpectedly hearty applause" from other MPs, leaving his readers with the impression that the House of Commons generally supported the motion.[55] However, Hotze neglected to mention the strong rebuttal that the federal sympathizers in Parliament had delivered to Gregory's argument. Speaking in response to Gregory, William Forster, a MP from northern England, pointed out that tiny coasting vessels, rather than commercial ships, had carried out the massive amounts of blockade violations that Gregory had described and argued that the lack of Southern cotton in

[54] UK Parliament, *Hansard 1803-2005,* 165:1158-1181 (Commons, March 7, 1862).
[55] Henry Hotze to Secretary of State, March 11, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:358-360

Britain provided evidence of the blockade's effectiveness. Solicitor-General Roundell Palmer, speaking for the Palmerston Ministry, agreed with this assessment, stating that the government had no intention to challenge the blockade's legality.[56] Conceding defeat, Gregory withdrew his motion.[57] Hotze made an egregious oversight in his failure to include the responses of Forster and Palmer in his report. He portrayed the debate as a Confederate victory, when in reality it served only to affirm the blockade's legality.

The debate continued in the House of Lords on March 10, and Hotze continued to exclude key points of the proceedings from his dispatches to Richmond. Lord Campbell, a Liberal Peer and avid support of the Confederacy, opened the debate and argued that the government's decision to uphold a blatantly illegal blockade demonstrated that "neutrality may be on the lips of official men, but has lost its place among their counsels."[58] Historian E.D. Adams characterizes Campbell's speech as "of importance only as offering Russell… an opportunity to speak for himself," as Russell sat in the upper chamber of Parliament and thus had been unable to participate in the debate in the House of Commons.[59] Hotze appears likely to have shared this sentiment, for though he offered no comments on the text of Campbell's speech in his report to Richmond, he observed that it "had the good effect of eliciting from Earl Russell the reluctant admission, in substance, that a reconstruction of the American Union was not possible."[60] Russell did indeed state at the end of his reply to Campbell, "I do trust that within three months… we may see the close of this unfortunate civil war in America… It will, perhaps, be impossible to renew the old feeling of union between the North and South;

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[56] UK Parliament, *Hansard 1803-2005,* 165:1187-1230 (Commons, March 7, 1862).
[57] Jones, *Blue and Gray Diplomacy,* 118.
[58] UK Parliament, *Hansard 1803-2005,* 165:1233-1236 (Lords, March 10, 1862).
[59] Adams, *Great Britain,* 271.
[60] Henry Hotze to Secretary of State, March 11, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:358-360.

and if that be so, I trust that… the North will consent to a peaceful separation."[61] However, when one considers Russell's entire speech, Hotze's positive interpretation of his words seems misguided. Russell never even implied that the war would come to an end within his predicted time frame because of any actions his Government intended to take, and he spent the body of his speech explaining why he considered the blockade to be both effective and legal. On the whole, Adams views Russell's speech as "an unneeded but emphatic negative of the pro-Southern effort."[62] Clearly Hotze misunderstood the significance of Russell's speech.

Though Hotze's description of the blockade debates further testifies to his limited understanding of British politics, it appears to be the work of an accomplished political scientist when compared with Mason's. Though Mason mailed the issue of the *Times* that covered the debates to Richmond, he only commented on them so far as to draw attention to Russell's prediction, ignoring all the other speeches entirely.[63] Once again, Hotze proved to be a more valuable on-the-ground observer in Britain for the Confederate State Department than Mason.

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Lord Russell's prediction that the war would be over in three months provided the basis for Hotze's next published propaganda effort, a series of four letters to the *Morning Post* that he signed 'Moderator' and wrote in late March 1862. Hotze penned the letters at the request of some of the South's friends in Parliament, friends who would inform Hotze upon the publication of these letters that many important figures had read and commented

[61] UK Parliament, *Hansard 1803-2005,* 165:1237-1243 (Lords, March 10, 1862).
[62] Adams, *Great Britain,* 272.
[63] Mason to Secretary of State, March 11, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:358-360.

on them.[64] In the letters, Hotze "endeavored to show that justice, humanity, the best interests of Government and of civilization, require Europe to [recognize the Confederacy]."[65] He argued that the Union would continue its war effort indefinitely unless Britain recognized the Confederacy; that the nature of the American Union justified Southern secession and would equally justify British recognition of the Confederacy; and that Southern independence would benefit Britain by furthering civilization's growth and increasing free trade. As in his initial propaganda effort in the *Morning Post*, Hotze wrote mostly from an American perspective. However, in his third letter he demonstrated for the first time the ability to appeal to British interests, an ability that sets Hotze apart from the Confederacy's other foreign agents.

Hotze attempted to demonstrate that recognition would bring about a quick end to the war in his first letter. In fact, he went to so far as to argue that Russell's prediction that the war would end in three months would come true if and only if Britain first recognized the Confederacy's independence. Hotze did not doubt that the Confederacy would ultimately secure its independence with or without British support, but he suggested that, rather than months, it would take "long years of bloodshed, of individual suffering, of mutual exhaustion and ruin" for the war to conclude if the status quo regarding recognition remained unchanged. He compared Northern public opinion to a pendulum, and though he expected it to eventually swing to the side of peace, "in the present war the pendulum still obeys the original impetus with accelerating velocity; and… who can decide at what point the arc will stop before it does return?" The pendulum would not necessarily change the direction of its arc after a crushing Northern

[64] Henry Hotze to Secretary of State, March 11, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:358-360; Henry Hotze to Secretary of State, March 24, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:370-371.
[65] *Morning Post* (London), Mar 31, 1862, quoted in Burnett, *Henry Hotze,* 129-132.

defeat in battle. After all, no "defeat could be more disastrous and more bitterly humiliating that that at Bull Run," and yet after it the North fought on. But Hotze suggested that recognition of the Confederacy's independence on the part of Britain would cause the pendulum to alter its course and start swinging towards peace. Without this recognition, the Union would continue to view itself as "engaged in a holy and necessary war of self-defense and self-preservation." Northerners considered themselves "the greatest, the freest, mightiest, most enlightened, most moral, most prosperous, and the bravest people on the earth," and believed it their destiny both "to propagate these blessings" across the continent and "to exterminate… those who by 'wicked rebellion' place obstacles in their path." So long as they saw their cause as the cause of righteousness, the North would not give up the fight. But in recognizing the Confederacy, Britain would be declaring to the North "that they are engaged, not in a civil, but in a foreign war; not in preserving the integrity of their own territory, but in taking by force the territory of others; not in sustaining a lawful Government, but in seeking to subvert one as lawful as their own." In other words, recognition of the Confederacy would say to the North that they were not defending liberty within their own borders, but violating the autonomy of a foreign power. Though Hotze thought that upon recognition Yankees would initially express shock and outrage, he felt certain that international pressure would soon force the Union to accept the idea "that a country need not necessarily extend from the Atlantic to the Pacific, to be a great and powerful country." Once Northerners came to understand this, the war would inevitably transform from a holy war into "one of boundaries, of adjustment of debts, of future commercial and other relations," and after it

found itself fighting solely for these lesser objects, the North would quickly agree to peace.[66]

Hotze further argued that "the logic of the facts" regarding the history and nature of the American Union served to justify recognition. Offering the same states' rights rhetoric that defenders of secession had spouted for years in the United States, Hotze described the United States as "a league between the two great rival Powers of the North and the South." Lord Russell himself had admitted as much, noting that the two sections existed as "two States inhabited by men of very different education and perhaps very different natures." With this being the case, Hotze saw no reason why the South should not be able to leave the Union if and when it so chose. In fact, he found it absurd for the governments of the world to respect the twenty-two Northern states' claim of jurisdiction over the eleven Southern states, "unless we suppose the eleven States to be subjects or provinces of the twenty-two, or unless we admit, to its fullest extent, that might makes right."[67] In Hotze's understanding, the North was treating the South as an "insurgent province," imposing military governors on Southern states and confiscating "the lands of men whose only crime is that they defend their own homes." What gave the North that right? Surely not "the fact that the South once consented to live under a common government with the North." Thirteen free and independent states had voluntarily come together to form the United States as equals; "what has occurred since to make some of the States subjects of the others, and what clause is there in the compact expressly entered into for the common good to make that compact irrevocable for the sole good of one

[66] *Morning Post* (London), Mar 17, 1862, quoted in Burnett, *Henry Hotze,* 119-123.
[67] *Morning Post* (London), Mar 20, 1862, quoted in Burnett, *Henry Hotze,* 123-126.

party and the lasting injury of the others?"[68] If independent states had entered into the Union because it served their interests at the time, Hotze saw no reason why independent states should not be able to leave the Union when it no longer served their interests. And if the nature of the relationship between the North and the South and the constitutional history of the United States justified the South in leaving the Union, then they would equally justify Britain in recognizing the Confederacy.

Hotze went on to argue in his third letter that recognition was not only justified, but also in Britain's best interest. First, for the sake of civilization's growth, Britain undoubtedly would prefer for the United States to remain divided in two than for North America to "again be the dominion of a single haughty, overgrown, defiant power." As the case of Europe demonstrated, the division of men into independent societies, "allowing the development of many phases of national character, each influencing and correcting the other, and by their mutual friction promoting the intellectual development of all," best promoted the advancement of civilization. Indeed, Britain had proved willing to spend blood and treasure to prevent Napoleon from dominating all of Europe; could she possibly consider it "more desirable or less injurious to the healthy growth of civilization that one despot Power should sway America?" Additionally, would Britain "consent to see the cotton and tobacco fields of the world walled in by a Chinese policy imposed by fire and sword on the lawful proprietors?" Just as the Chinese famously avoided foreign trade, a re-unified United States would possess "an empire embracing every climate and production" and have no need of foreign commerce. The North had already revealed its intention through the Morrill tariff, a piece of legislation passed after Southerners had left Congress that more than doubled the pre-war tax on imported goods.

[68] *Morning Post* (London), Mar 24, 1862, quoted in Burnett, *Henry Hotze,* 126-129.

Hotze predicted that a victorious North would use tariffs like this to exclude all other countries from the American market. The South, on the other hand, stood firm in its commitment to free trade.[69] Clearly, Hotze argued, Southern independence would serve the interests of civilization in general and Britain in particular.

This third letter provides the first instance of Hotze attempting to offer the British an incentive to recognize the Confederacy, an important step in Hotze's development as a propagandist. It seems unlikely that propaganda written from a foreign perspective could affect British policy in any meaningful way. After all, as historian Charles Hubbard points out, successful diplomacy requires cooperation "based on the mutual interest of the nations entering into an alliance." However, Confederate agents generally ignored this maxim, to the detriment of their cause. As a case in point, the instructions Confederacy's initial envoys to Britain contained "a complete treatise on states rights," but no mention of difficult issues such as slavery or the potential for the North to declare war on Britain. Hubbard argues that Confederate diplomats' inability to look at the recognition from a British perspective doomed their initial efforts. As Hubbard points out, Britain possessed "a wide range of interests," but these interests did not include "an appreciation of the legal reasons the South used to justify its existence."[70] In other words, recognition would not be forthcoming as long as the Confederacy's diplomats continued to talk about states' rights. Hotze did not initially grasp the importance of appealing to British interests in his propaganda, as his February 23 editorial in the *Morning Post* and the first two of these letters demonstrate. However, Hotze certainly recognized the British interests at stake in the conflict, for he observed in a dispatch to Richmond that the British people generally

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[69] *Morning Post* (London), Mar 24, 1862, quoted in Burnett, *Henry Hotze,* 126-129.
[70] Hubbard, *Confederate Diplomacy,* 22, 29-30.

desired a Southern victory and were "not indisposed to be persuaded into the direction whither after all the instinct of true self-interest points."[71] In his third letter he finally appealed to this self-interest, arguing that Southern independence would benefit Britain both culturally and commercially. This development foreshadows the British perspective that Hotze's increasingly sophisticated propaganda would assume in the summer of 1862.

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When, at the end of April, Hotze reflected on his first three months in London, he felt satisfied, and with good reason. Though he had arrived in London with no contacts and little experience, he immediately began carrying out his mission with great success. He developed a nuanced understanding of British opinion regarding recognition, correctly observing the generally Southern sympathy that existed, the failure of cotton diplomacy, and the British's fear of war with the United States and opposition to slavery, though he displayed a limited understanding of political issues. He also proved adept as a propaganda agent, publishing several pieces in the *Morning Post* that eloquently argued for recognition. Though his early efforts had approached the Civil War from too much of an American perspective to significantly impact British opinion, by late March he had recognized that his writing needed to appeal to British interests to have any effect, a realization that would cause him to dramatically alter his propaganda strategy going forward. All in all, when he considered the success of his propaganda efforts and the trends that he observed in British public opinion, by March Hotze had felt "almost sanguine in my hopes of speedy recognition," and in April he expressed confidence "that

[71] Henry Hotze to R.M.T. Hunter, Feb 28, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:352-354.

the Government will soon be forced to act."[72] Indeed, events would occur over the next several months that would push the British government to the brink of recognition. Having established himself in the world of British journalism and recognized the need to write from a British perspective, Hotze had positioned himself to capitalize on this opportunity.

[72] Henry Hotze to Secretary of State, March 11, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:358-360; Henry Hotze to Secretary of State, April 25, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:399-401

Chapter Two

On May 1, 1862, Henry Hotze published the first issue of the *Index*, a newspaper that he established to further his mission as a propaganda agent. This date marked a major turning point in Hotze's career. His early propaganda efforts had emphasized the Confederacy's accomplishments, but by late March he had realized that he would only find success in his mission if he could appeal to his host country's interests. Accordingly, his writing took on a British perspective. Around this same time, he decided that having an entire newspaper at his disposal would enable him to better advocate for the Southern cause, and he took the remarkable step of founding the *Index*. To lend credibility to the *Index*'s claim of being a British newspaper, Hotze ensured that the journal followed traditional British newspaper practice in every respect, and he used its editorial pages to argue for recognition with an ostensibly British voice, explaining that recognition accorded with the country's rights, obligations, and economic interests. The British government decided against recognition in the summer of 1862, but this choice did not result from any failure on Hotze's part. He had appealed to the mutual interests of the two countries with remarkable skill. Rather, the British did not recognize the Confederacy because the two countries did not share any interests significant enough to overcome the Cabinet's fear of war with the United States. However, by September the South's victory at the Second Battle of Bull Run made it appear increasingly likely that the Confederacy would win on the battlefield the recognition that it had failed to secure through diplomacy and propaganda.

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By late April, Hotze had decided that the Confederacy would benefit from having in Britain "a weekly journal, exclusively devoted to the exposition of our views and the advocacy of our interests."[73] Having coming to this conclusion, Hotze, in a truly astounding display of initiative, created just such a newspaper. Crucially, the *Index* served the Southern cause from an ostensibly British perspective, referring to the British people in the first person and described Parliament and the Cabinet as "our Government."[74] Reassuring British readers who might have found the idea of a London-based newspaper advocating for an American cause confusing, Hotze explained that the *Index* only did so because "the mutual interests of Great Britain and the South extend to almost every subject of national policy in peace and war," and, indeed, he used the editorial pages of the *Index* to point out many of these mutual interests.[75] Thus, Hotze used the paper to argue for recognition not as a Southerner believing in the justice of his cause, but as a British citizen concerned about his country's rights, duties, and interests. However, the *Index* would have to be British in more than just name for this charade to work, and for this reason Hotze took great pains to ensure that the *Index*'s appearance, operations, and tone all reflected British sensibilities. Though these efforts proved successful, Hotze would struggle to find writers and funding for his paper during its first year of existence.

When deciding on the paper's physical layout and daily operations, Hotze made conservative choices that accorded with the *Index*'s aspirations to be a respectable British publication. The journal consisted of sixteen pages measuring ten by thirteen inches, with each page divided into three columns, and its name appeared on the masthead in neat and

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[73] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, May 15, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:423-424.
[74] "Recognition: Europe, England, and the English Government," *Index*, September 4, 1862.
[75] "A Word with our Readers," *Index*, July 31, 1862.

unpretentious gothic-style letters. Furthermore, he produced the *Index* in an appropriate location for a respectable British newspaper. He prepared the paper for the printer in two rooms located at 13 Bouverie Street, London, just off Fleet Street, the traditional home of the British newspaper industry, while the printer, Henry F. Mackintosh, and the publisher, William Freeman, both had offices on Fleet Street. Hotze published a new issue of the *Index* weekly on Thursday afternoons, with single copies selling for six pence and an annual subscription costing twenty-six shillings. All told, as historian Charles Cullop concludes, "Hotze had relatively little difficulty in making the *Index* conform to English tastes."[76]

In order to make his newspaper British not just in appearance but also in tone, Hotze strove to avoid "the great error of American journalism, that of mistaking forcible words for forcible ideas" within the pages of the *Index*.[77] Indeed, the editors and writers of the late antebellum South had defended slavery so uncompromisingly and called for secession so aggressively that they had come to be known as "fire-eaters."[78] On the other hand, their counterparts across the Atlantic generally took a more dispassionate stance on issues, focusing on, in the words of one historian of British journalism, "the public communication of contemporary affairs and the discussion of those affairs."[79] Hotze intended for the *Index*'s content to accord to this more restrained tradition of journalism. In the paper's opening issue, he explained to his readers that he had founded the newspaper so that the British could hear both sides of the story about the Civil War. He asserted that the North exercised a "rigid blockade" on information crossing the Atlantic,

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[76] Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda,* 37-40.
[77] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, Jan 17, 1863, *ORN* ser. II, 3:661-664.
[78] Doug Cumming, *The Southern Press: Literary Legacies and the Challenge of Modernity* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009), 79.
[79] Martin Conboy, *Journalism in Britain: A Historical Introduction* (London: Sage, 2011), 7.

preventing Southern perspectives on the war from reaching Britain.[80] Hotze did not exaggerate, for the Northern press had enjoyed an almost complete monopoly in supplying the British with information on the war before the establishment of the *Index*, and had often used this privilege to distort events to their advantage.[81] Hotze intended for the *Index* to correct this imbalance by publishing letters written by people residing in the South and printing Northern reports on the war accompanied with "a commentary, in which we shall endeavor to point out what may appear to us entirely fictitious and what exaggerated." However, the paper would not serve as an overzealous advocate of the Southern cause. Rather than hiding the Confederacy's shortcomings, it would call "an error an error, and a defect a defect."[82] In this manner, its British readers could look to it as a source of reliable information regarding American affairs.

In addition to providing him with a venue from which he could advocate for recognition from a British perspective, the *Index* would serve several other purposes for Hotze. For one, it would function as a place to which British supporters of the South "could look for facts and arguments."[83] Previously, Hotze's published arguments had been scattered about in various newspapers. The establishment of the *Index* would allow them all to be centralized in one place. The *Index* would also provide "a standard toward which the timid and the disheartened" among these British friends of the South could rally.[84] Finally, the *Index*'s existence would enable Hotze to create a school of British writers that would advocate for the Southern cause in both his journal and in other British newspapers. He would employ the pens of British journalists who "had but imperfect

[80] "Our Object," *Index*, May 1, 1862.
[81] Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda,* 18.
[82] "Our Object," *Index*, May 1, 1862.
[83] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, August 4, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:505-508.
[84] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, May 15, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:423-424.

knowledge of… the South" in the *Index* and indoctrinate them with his perspective on the war. Since "one writer usually writes for several publications," Hotze thus had "the opportunity of multiplying myself, so to speak, to an almost unlimited extent."[85] He expected that every contributor that he employed at the *Index* would go on to "become an ally in the columns of some other paper."[86] In this manner, Hotze hoped the *Index* would enable him to establish an entire cadre of writers that would argue for recognition from a British perspective in the British press. And the best part of the plan was that these writers, unlike Hotze, actually would be British.

Despite this grand plan, however, Hotze initially struggled to find contributors for his newspaper. In fact, lacking a reliable "staff of correspondents and contributors," Hotze found it necessary to write himself most of the pieces that the *Index* published in its early days. Serving double duty as editor and writer, Hotze initially found himself "in the position of the leader of an orchestra who has himself to play every instrument." He had expected to employ the pens of numerous Southerners living in Europe, but he found many of these men to be unwilling to write for him. He thought that his high journalistic standards and insistence that his paper maintaining a British perspective on affairs had something to do with this. Hotze suspected that many of his countrymen mistook the *Index*'s intentional "tone of studied moderation… for lukewarmness, timidity, or lack of spirit" and chose not to write for him for this reason.[87] This assessment appears reasonable, given Hotze's intentional rejection of the fire-eating tradition of Southern journalism. Furthermore, Hotze struggled to find among British writers a sufficient amount of "able and available pens sufficiently versed in American affairs to be made

[85] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, August 4, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:505-508.
[86] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, November 7, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:601-602.
[87] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, January 17, 1863, *ORN* ser. II, 3:661-664.

useful."[88] He hoped to educate native writers on the issue, but this would take time. Though by the spring of 1863 he would employ at least seven regular contributors and in the fall of 1864 he hired Englishman John Witt as associate editor, in the early days of the *Index* necessity forced Hotze to function as the paper's primary writer in addition to its editor.[89]

In addition to writers, Hotze also struggled to secure a stable source of funding for the *Index*. Upon his decision in late April to establish the paper, two Southerners living in Britain had provided him with enough funds to publish the *Index* "for at least three months, in a manner worthy of the cause, beyond the possibility of failure, even if every copy of the paper had to be given away during that time."[90] However, it soon became necessary for Hotze to contribute £15 per week to the paper from his operational allowance. He possessed limited contingent funds, however, and even after he learned in August that the Confederate State Department had increased his operating budget to £600 per year, he knew that his allowance could not provide the *Index* with a sustainable source of funding. Additionally, the paper would never have enough subscribers to make it self-sufficient. The paper cost £40 a week to produce, while it never brought in more than £20 a week in sales.[91] As a result, Hotze constantly asked Richmond for more money during the early days of the *Index*. However, Hotze believed in the importance of the *Index* strongly enough to declare to the Confederate State Department that he would

[88] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, August 4, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:505-508.
[89] Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda,* 45-52.
[90] Henry Hotze to Secretary of State, April 25, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:399-401.
[91] Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda,* 40-45.

willingly make up this deficit out of his private means if the government proved unwilling to approve the necessary expenditure.[92]

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The *Index*'s masthead declared it to be "a weekly journal of politics, literature, and news," and it indeed published a wide variety of material, including the latest news regarding the war, reports on the activities of Parliament concerning America, and reviews of literature related to the war or the South.[93] In these various ways, the *Index* enabled Hotze to fulfill his mission as the Confederacy's propaganda agent, and he used its pages to make "the manners and customs of the Confederate States, their resources and capabilities, and the real status of their people in the work of civilization" better known to the British.[94] As important a role as these aspects of the paper played in helping Hotze to carry out his mission, however, the heart of the *Index* lay in its editorial pages. In the words of historian Don Doyle, successful diplomacy must appeal "to the fundamental values and interests of the foreign country," and Hotze attempted to do just this in his paper's opinion columns.[95] Hotze knew that his journal did not enjoy a broad enough readership for him to address the general public directly. However, he hoped that the arguments contained within the *Index*'s opinion columns would "reach those by whom public opinion is formed," namely the Cabinet, allowing him to indirectly influence their policy towards the Confederacy.[96]

Within the editorial pages of the *Index*, Hotze refined and developed the arguments for recognition that he had first advanced in the *Morning Post* in February and

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[92] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, August 4, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:505-508.
[93] Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda* 38-39.
[94] "Our Name," *Index*, May 1, 1862.
[95] Doyle, *Cause of All Nations,* 4.
[96] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, August 4, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:505-508.

March. In these initial propaganda efforts Hotze had written from a distinctly American perspective, focusing on the right of the Southern states to secede, the stability of the Confederate government, the speedy end to the war that recognition would bring, and the trade barriers that the United States would erect in the event of Northern victory. However, his tone changed during the summer of 1862, and he began to emphasize the rights, obligations, and interests of Britain. Instead of offering a constitutional history of the Union that justified secession, he explained how international law gave Britain the right to recognize the Confederacy; instead of articulating the accomplishments of the government in Richmond, he argued that the British had an obligation to humanity to stop the atrocities that the North was committing in New Orleans; and instead of describing the North's isolationist trade policies, he emphasized Britain's need for Southern cotton. Ultimately, many of these arguments proved ineffective; nonetheless, they demonstrate Hotze's tremendous development as a propagandist.

Hotze sought to establish that Britain had the right to recognize the Confederacy at any time of its choosing. He had attempted to do the same thing in the *Morning Post* several months earlier, but this time he focused international law, rather than Southern views on states' rights. He asserted the recognition of a new government required certain conditions. First, the new government must have "the power to enforce obedience to its authority" within its territory; second, it must possesses a sufficiently large population and territory to justify "independent national existence, as well as a hold upon the affections of the former, and the ordinary means of defense for the latter"; finally, recognition of the new government must not affect any existing powers in such a way "as to endanger the balance of power or the public peace." Hotze contended that the South's

situation met all of these conditions. The Confederate government enjoyed universal obedience within its borders, as testified to by the fact that the internal peace of the Confederacy had "never been disturbed," and its military had "displayed a massive power under extraordinary and exceptional disadvantages." Additionally, an independent Confederacy would possess "territory and population amply sufficient for all the purposes of national existence," while leaving the North "with the territory and population of a first-rate Power." On the other hand, the Union had "confessed its inability to govern [the Southern states], except as conquered provinces, by the appointment of military governors wherever its armies gain a precarious footing." Thus, Hotze argued that if European governments "should take the facts as they find them, and apply to those facts the usages of international law… there can be no difficulty in deciding which of the two Governments claiming to be *de facto* and *de jure* Governments of the Confederate States is the one entitled to recognition." That government, obviously, was Jefferson Davis' government. [97] Clearly, Hotze's propaganda techniques had developed since his early efforts in the *Morning Post*. He had realized that the British would find appeals to international law more convincing than descriptions of the Southern view of federalism.

Hotze further argued that Britain had more than just a right to recognize the Confederacy – it had an obligation, arising out of a civilized power's duty to protect the common interests of humanity. In order to promote both commerce and the progress of civilization, established nations may "band together as a police" to enforce international law and ensure that no state violates the rights of any others. Hotze described this "right of interference" as "a very solemn responsibility," one that a nation ought not to exercise

[97] "Recognition versus Mediation," *Index*, June 19, 1862.

"except upon a clear, defined, and unmistakable necessity." However, he argued that the atrocities that the Federal government had committed against the South and its people during the war created just such a necessity. Calling attention to "the rule of the Federals in the Confederate cities that have fallen into their power," he asked rhetorically, "was ever military despotism so harsh and unrelenting?"[98] Hotze took as an example the Northern occupation of New Orleans. General Benjamin Butler had declared martial law upon taking command in the city, and he soon closed local businesses, arrested church leaders, confiscated the property of foreign consuls, forced foreign citizens to take loyalty oaths to the Union, and issued his infamous "Woman's Order," which authorized Union soldiers to treat any woman who disrespected a Northern soldier "as a woman of the town plying her avocation."[99] Reminding his readers that Butler had authorized "his soldiers to treat the ladies of [New Orleans] as harlots," Hotze suggested that if "Europe does not interfere, she virtually sanctions the crimes at which she shudders."[100] In his early propaganda efforts, when he wrote from an American perspective, Hotze would have argued that Southerners deserved justice because of the atrocities that had been committed against them. However, writing from his new British perspective, Hotze chose instead to emphasize his host country's obligations to humanity.

Nonetheless, Hotze's appeals for British intervention on the basis of the situation in New Orleans proved ineffective. The *Index* kept Butler's actions in front of its readers throughout the summer of 1862, and the British certainly came to abhor the general. The *Times* described New Orleans as being governed by "military rule of intolerable brutality," and Lord Palmerston sent a letter to Charles Francis Adams, the United States

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[98] "The Right of Interference," *Index*, July 10, 1862.
[99] Sebrell, *Persuading John Bull,* 59-67.
[100] "The Right of Interference," *Index*, July 10, 1862.

Ambassador to Britain, in which he explained that he found it "impossible to express adequately the Disgust which must be excited in the mind of every honorable man by the general order of General Butler." However, after calming down he explained to Lord Russell that he had "no intention at present" to make an offer of recognition or mediation as a result of Butler's order, and Russell assured Adams that Palmerston's letter implied no change in the Cabinet's policy toward the American question.[101] Though skillfully made, Hotze's argument about Britain's duty to humanity did not prove strong enough to overcome the government's oft-stated fear that intervention could lead to war with the United States.

If discussions of their moral obligations could not inspire the British to risk war, Hotze hoped that appeals to their economic interests might. He used the *Index* to argue that Southern independence would relieve the suffering of British cotton workers by enabling cotton to once again reach textile manufacturers. Though, as discussed in the first chapter, the cotton embargo had not initially produced the economic suffering that Southerners had expected it would, by the summer of 1862 a cotton famine had arrived in Britain. The small mills had begun shutting down in the winter of 1862, and by April the cotton operatives were averaging no more than half-time employment. By December, prolonged unemployment had made 2,000,000 people destitute.[102] Hotze drew attention to this suffering, describing in detail "the heartrending misery of the manufacturing districts." He explained that tens of thousands in the cotton districts relied on charity for their next meal, and that these numbers did not tell the full story, for unemployed cotton workers would only turn to charity when they had not other options left. Pauperism

[101] Sebrell, *Persuading John Bull,* 62-64; Jones, *Union in Peril,* 126
[102] Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy,* 134-145.

always served as a last recourse for the British working classes, for in their eyes "the distinction between a duke and a day-labourer is trifling as compared with the distinction between a labourer and a pauper." Tens of thousands of people resorting to charity, then, indicated the tremendous extent of the suffering in these districts. And this charity did little to mitigate their suffering. While it might have warded off "sheer starvation," it did not provide these paupers with enough bread to "maintain the health and vigour necessary to resist disease."[103] Hotze praised the cotton operatives for their thrift, honesty, and hard work, and blamed the Cabinet and its policy of neutrality on American affairs for their suffering.[104] Recognition, he argued in the *Index*, offered the best solution to the problem of starvation in the cotton districts.

However, Hotze must have known that appeals to the sufferings of cotton operatives would have little effect on the Britain's ruling class. After all, the working class in Britain did not possess the right to vote at this time, and thus had little political power.[105] Their suffering would not affect the government's policy as long as they could be kept from insurrection. Accordingly, British leaders preferred to mitigate the sufferings of the working class through charity than to risk a war with the United States. As John Bright observed, "It would be cheaper to feed these workers on champagne and venison than to have them force England into intervention."[106] Though it certainly did not hurt the Southern cause to draw attention to the sufferings of the cotton operatives, such appeals would not result in recognition.

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[103] "The Cotton Famine," *Index*, July 3, 1862; "The Cotton Manufacture and the Cotton Famine," *Index*, August 14, 1862
[104] Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda,* 60.
[105] Hubbard, *Confederate Diplomacy,* 22.
[106] Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy,* 546.

For this reason, Hotze also used the *Index* to address the interests of the large cotton manufacturers, who possessed significantly more political clout than their workers. Though the South's cotton embargo had initially allowed them to profit off their surplus stock, by this point less than twenty percent of that cotton remained.[107] Hotze attempted to convince cotton manufacturers that neither a Northern victory nor investment in Indian cotton would replace this supply; only Southern independence would save the textile industry. He explained that a Union victory in the war would only serve to transform cotton fields into "smoking piles of ash," for "the patriotic people of the South" would unhesitatingly burn their staple rather than let it fall into Northern hands. Additionally, he reminded his readers that the Yankees had recently enacted the Morrill Tariff, which more than doubled the pre-war export tax rate, and assured them that if the North were to win the war, they would place an export duty on cotton high enough "to enable the American manufacture to undersell all competitors in every market in the world." Furthermore, he unequivocally rejected the idea that Indian cotton could sustainably supply the British textile industry. Cotton simply could not be grown profitably on the subcontinent. Many had tried to do so and many had failed, for India's dry climate caused its indigenous cotton plant to produce both lower quality fiber and smaller yields than the Southern plant. Though the cotton famine had raised prices high enough to make Indian cotton profitable for the moment, Hotze suggested that the price would inevitably fall below this point when the American crop reentered the market, which it would eventually. Most importantly, even if Indian cotton could eventually be grown profitably, the necessary infrastructure, capital, and experience to bring significant amounts of cotton to the market did not yet exist in India, making it unable to provide the immediate

[107] Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy,* 137.

relief that the British cotton industry so desperately needed. Thus, Hotze argued that the sector's only hope of relief lay in Southern independence.[108]

Events would prove this claim incorrect, however. After the famine hit its low point in December of 1862, increased cotton imports from China, Brazil, and Egypt, along with those from India, helped stabilize the industry on the basis of non-American cotton.[109] Additionally, as discussed in the first chapter, the wool and linen industries experienced a revival that further limited the economic suffering resulting from the South's cotton embargo. As the *Times* would remark in 1864 when reflecting on the cotton famine, "We are as busy, as rich, and as fortunate in our trade as if the American was had never broken out… Cotton was no king, notwithstanding the prerogatives which had been loudly claimed for him."[110] Hotze, like most Southerners, had believed that British greatness depended on Southern cotton. However, as Charles Hubbard observes, this belief in the power of King Cotton "reflected a Southern appreciation of the commodity rather than its value to the Europeans."[111] Hotze failed to understand that while the British valued Southern cotton, they did not rely on it in the same way that the South did, and certainly would not risk war with the United States to obtain it.

However, Hotze insightfully recognized that Britain feared a Northern attack on Canada, and in an attempt to mitigate this concern, Hotze argued that Britain's best hope for avoiding war actually lay in recognizing the Confederacy. Hotze agreed with those who felt "that in America intervention by force of arms… would be a great evil to this country." However, he posited that recognition offered the only "sure escape from this

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[108] "The Supply of American Cotton," *Index*, May 29, 1862; "India and the Cotton Supply," *Index*, September 25, 1862.
[109] Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy,* 137-138.
[110] Ibid, 557
[111] Hubbard, *Confederate Diplomacy,* 19.

danger." After all, a "victorious North," inflamed with "lust of dominion," possessing a vast army, and bitter over the Trent Affair, might soon "discover that it needed the St. Lawrence as well as the Mississippi," and the British would find themselves forced into a war to defend Canada. However, recognition of the Confederacy would serve to remove "from the future that danger of war… which impends as an event certain to follow one possible result of this contest." As recognition caused Northern war fever to sober "down into reason," Yankees would realize that the conflict required of them expenditures so great that "nations of the accumulated wealth, and with the vast revenues of England of France would shrink aghast." Additionally, recognizing that they had exhausted the patience of Europe, they would decide to end the war while they still possessed leverage, lest the European powers should decide to "adopt other means to save their working classes from misery" and dictate to them unfavorable terms of peace. For all these reasons, Hotze argued that the British should view recognition as "a peacemaker, and nothing more."[112]

This editorial exemplifies Hotze's ability to assume a British perspective. The Cabinet undoubtedly distrusted the intentions of the United States. Lord Palmerston had been a junior minister in the British government when the United States invaded Canada in the War of 1812, and since that point he had heard many in the North talk about their desire to annex Canada and seen several border skirmishes occur.[113] Additionally, as recently as 1848 he had witnessed the U.S. attack Mexico without provocation and seize over 500,000 square miles of territory. Thus, Hotze's suggestion that Britain recognize the South in order to prevent a victorious North from crossing the St. Lawrence River

[112] "What Does Intervention Mean?" *Index*, May 22, 1862.
[113] Brian Jenkins, *Britain and the War for Union* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980), 2:1.

with an invading army demonstrates his ability to identify Britain's interests and explain how Southern independence supported them, regardless of whether or not his logic proved convincing to the British government.

Having argued passionately over the course of the summer that recognition accorded with Britain's rights, interests, and obligations, Hotze declared in the middle of July that the time for decisive action had arrived. News of the Confederacy's victory in the Seven Days' battles had just reached London, and Hotze decided that this presented Britain with an ideal moment for recognition. The Seven Days' battles functioned as the culminating conflict of the Union's failed Peninsula Campaign. Though this campaign had brought Federal troops to within six miles of the Confederacy's capital earlier in the summer, Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had repelled the North's advances and caused the Army of the Potomac to retreat to Washington in a series of battles that occurred between June 25 and July 1. In the aftermath of this "overthrow of the great army before the rebel capital," Hotze described the Northern mood as "suffering from a chill of unprecedented severity."[114] However, he did not believe this chill would result in the North abandoning the war "by its own spontaneous act." After all, the Northern mind constantly vacillated "between the extremes of hope and fear," and Hotze felt confident that within a few months the Yankees would once again find themselves delirious with "fever visions of triumph and conquest." However, British recognition of the Confederacy would immediately put these visions to rest. Hotze argued that the North viewed British inaction as "an implied acknowledgement that its undertaking is not a

[114] Though the South lost 20,000 men over the course of the Seven Days' battles and won only a single tactical victory, Northern commander George C. McClellan had repeatedly chosen to retreat rather than go on the offensive, causing the Peninsula Campaign to result "in a strategic Confederate victory, with all that meant for morale in the respective armies and on the home fronts." James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 427, 464-471, 488-489

hopeless one, and that by renewed efforts it may yet succeed." But if Britain were to "recognize that just title to independence which a gallant people has written with its best blood, the most fatal Northern delusions would vanish." With its armies already "demoralized by defeat," upon recognition the Northern advocate of peace could start speaking "in tones of command instead of supplication," the new recruit in the Federal ranks would doubt for the first time "the power of his country's arms" and the certainty of his country's success, and the North as a whole would for the first time truly understand the "utter hopelessness" of subduing the South. Thus, events had presented Britain with an "opportunity of ending the war by a mere diplomatic act" in the aftermath of the Seven Days' battles.[115] Though Hotze did not believe that recognition should depend on Confederate military success, having argued that recognition accorded with Britain's rights, duties, and interests, he now argued that the opportune moment for it had arrived.

In the summer of 1862, Hotze demonstrated his tremendous abilities as a propagandist. He convincingly wrote from a British perspective, informing his readers that international law gave them the right to recognize the South, General Butler's crimes against humanity gave them a duty, and the need for cotton and a potential Northern invasion of Canada gave them an interest. Moreover, he made these arguments with great eloquence and skill. Nonetheless, his efforts would prove ineffective, for, as discussed further below, Lord Palmerston would actively decided against recognition in the aftermath of the Seven Days' battles. However, one struggles to imagine any better arguments that Hotze could have made that would have resulted in recognition. He skillfully appealed to fundamental interests that the two powers shared, as successful

[115] "What the Situation Requires," *Index,* July 17, 1862

diplomacy requires. Therefore, the fact that recognition did not occur indicates that Britain and the South simply did not possess mutual interests of enough significance for Palmerston to risk war with the United States by recognizing the Confederacy. Hotze could do nothing to change this.

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Hotze did not manage to send a dispatch back to Richmond in either June or July, presumably because the operations of the *Index* occupied all his time. He resumed communication at the beginning of August, however, and at this time he again deemed it appropriate to provide the Confederate State Department with his assessment of British feeling regarding the Confederacy. Writing in the aftermath of the Seven Days' battles and the failure of a parliamentary motion calling upon the Government to mediate the American conflict, Hotze declared that the British had not yet recognized the Confederacy because Prime Minister Lord Palmerston's fear for the safety of Canada resulted in weak leadership. However, this assertion only serves to further reveal Hotze's limited understanding of British politics, for in the parliamentary debate on recognition Palmerston had actually displayed remarkably strong leadership. Though concerned about Canada, in actuality, Palmerston decided against recognition primarily because the North had convinced him that such an act would cause a slave uprising in the South that would permanently damage the region's capacity to produce cotton, thereby harming Britain's long-term economic interests.

On July 18, William Lindsay, one of the foremost ship owners in London and a leading British support of the Confederacy, introduced a motion into the House of Commons that urged the Palmerston Ministry to make an offer of mediation to the

warring parties on the basis of the separation of the North and South. In advocating for the motion, Lindsay described the Union as irreparably broken and the South's cause as just; furthermore, he argued that British textile mills needed cotton and that a division of the United States would benefit Britain by checking a rival's power. After Lindsay finished his speech the debate raged on for hours. Lord Palmerston spoke last. He declared that any decision regarding mediation belonged solely to his ministry, not Parliament, for only the Cabinet possessed the ability to respond to the matter responsibly "according to the varying circumstances of the moment." At this moment an offer of mediation would only prove futile, since neither party was prepared to lay down their arms. Furthermore, Palmerston asserted that the Government would take no steps towards recognition until the South had "firmly and permanently established" its independence. He believed that otherwise recognition would only prove effective if Britain were to follow it with "some direct active interference," and this would only result in "greater evils, greater sufferings, and greater privations." Palmerston did not rule out the possibility of British interference at some later date, but he made it clear that his cabinet would be the body to decide "what can be done, when it can be done, and how it can be done." The House met his speech with hearty applause. Lindsay, sensing the mood of the chamber, withdrew the motion.[116]

In the aftermath of the failure of Lindsay's motion, Hotze correctly informed Richmond that Palmerston's concern for the safety of Canada contributed to his decision not to recognize the Confederacy, but he misinterpreted this fear as cowardice. He argued that though the British government hoped for the Union to be divided, they wanted this to be achieved "without danger to themselves," that is, they would not intervene in the

[116] Jones, *Union in Peril,* 133-137

conflict if they thought that doing so would cause the United States to invade Canada in retribution. Hotze suggested that this fear paralyzed the Cabinet regarding the American question and caused it to ignore the will of the people. He argued that the British "ardently desired" Southern independence but their leaders lacked "the decision, I might say the courage, to act." After all, "extreme old age" had chilled Lord Palmerston's blood and Lord Russell saw in "procrastination the perfection of statesmanship."[117] In other words, he did not think that either the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister possessed the strength and vigor necessary to overcome their fear for the safety of Canada and take decisive political action regarding recognition. This conclusion proves incorrect. The Cabinet certainly worried that the North might attack Canada if they recognized the Confederacy.[118] However, given the conclusive manner in which Palmerston had closed the Parliamentary debate on recognition in July, Hotze's accusation of weak leadership missed the mark. Palmerston's convincing explanation of why the correct moment for recognition had not arrived and Parliament's immediate concession of absolute authority on the American question to him both demonstrate the strength of the Prime Minister's leadership. Palmerston possessed the necessary political courage to overcome his concern for the safety of Canada and recognize the Confederacy if he believed that such a course would best serve Britain's interests. He decided against recognition not because of weakness, but because he did not believe that the act would benefit his country.

U.S. Secretary of State William Seward's argument that recognition would serve to prolong the war rather than end it may have influenced Palmerston's decision not to intervene. Seward claimed that recognition would only cause Northerners to increase

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[117] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, August 4, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:505-508.
[118] Jones, *Union in Peril,* 228.

their devotion to the Union cause, for rather than viewing the act as a sign of the futility of their efforts, they would interpret such a step as an insult to their honor.[119] Furthermore, Seward suggested that recognition would only increase the South's obstinacy, encouraging the insurgents to continue their efforts. He warned that if the war continued long enough, the Confederacy's slaves, who "naturally, necessarily, inevitably" viewed the Northern army as "a harbinger of freedom," would rise up in revolt, organizing a "servile war" that would cripple the South's export economy and prove "completely destructive of all European interests in this country."[120] Faced with these arguments, Lord Lyons, the British minister in Washington, agreed that British involvement in the conflict would only increase the tensions between the two belligerents.[121] If Palmerston concurred with Lyons, as seems likely, then he feared that recognition would decrease the likelihood peace between the North and South in addition to embroiling his country in a war with the United States. Thus, the Prime Minister's response to Lindsay's motion represented the caution of an experienced statesman rather than the cowardice of a man whose blood old age has chilled.

Once again, Hotze misunderstood the political situation in Britain. He had no way of knowing about Seward's behind-the-scenes diplomatic activity. Nonetheless, he should have recognized that more factors than weak leadership played a part in Palmerston's decision. His condemnation of the Prime Minister's statesmanship appears to be more the result of disappointment and anger than thoughtful analysis. However, at the very least Hotze's assessment of the situation displays more insight and analysis than

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[119] William Seward to Charles Francis Adams, May 28, 1862*, Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs* (University of Wisconsin Digital Collections), 101-105.
[120] William Seward to Charles Francis Adams, May 28, 1862*, Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs* (University of Wisconsin Digital Collections), 101-105.
[121] Jones, *Union in Peril,* 129.

James Mason's. In describing the failure of Lindsay's motion, Mason characteristically offered no thoughts beyond an observation that "the Government here cannot be driven to a decided position" and that the Palmerston ministry appeared to be "willingly deaf" to the South's arguments.[122] If Hotze did not fully understand the situation, at least he offered the Confederate State Department something to work with, which is more than Mason could claim.

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As the summer drew to a close, the South continued to experience success on the battlefield, and Hotze's hopes for recognition rose along with the military fortunes of his cause. At the end of August the Confederacy delivered a crushing defeat to Union forces at the Second Battle of Bull Run, killing over 16,000 Northerners and sending the Federal army retreating back into Washington.[123] Writing to his superiors in Richmond, Hotze found it "difficult to exaggerate the profound impression produced in this country by the brilliant success of our arms." The "intelligent classes" had always sympathized with the South, but that sympathy was now intensifying "into a feeling of sincere admiration to which even the few presses that continue hostile to us cannot altogether withhold utterance." Though the lower classes did not necessarily share this feeling, they still found themselves "swayed by that British instinct which hurrahs for the combatant who deals the hardest blows."

However, Hotze perceptively recognized that one segment of British society remained staunchly opposed to the South: the working classes of Lancashire. Describing these cotton operatives as being as instinctually averse to slavery as "any portion of New

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[122] James Mason to Judah P. Benjamin, July 30, 1862, *ORN* ser. II 3:490-495.
[123] McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom,* 528-534.

England," Hotze lamented that they looked upon the South, "and by as a strange confusion of ideas, upon slavery, as the author and source of their present miseries." Indeed, he believed that they only endured the miseries of the cotton famine with such "fortitude and patience" because they recognized "that by any other course they would promote our interests."[124] Though the feelings of the Lancashire operatives have been the subject of debate between historians, Hotze's assessment appears to be correct. Representing the traditional view, historians Donaldson Jordan and Edwin J. Pratt argue that the Lancashire operative's fierce opposition to slavery and love of popular democracy caused them to support the North, which they identified with free labor, and oppose the aristocratic, slave-holding South.[125] Mary Ellison attempted to challenge this narrative in her 1972 monograph *Support for Secession: Lancashire and the American Civil War*, asserting that a close study of the area's newspapers reveals that these workers supported the South, in accordance with their economic self-interest.[126] However, in the most comprehensive study of British opinion regarding the Civil War to date, Richard Blackett defends the traditional view, arguing that a majority of workers supported the Union.[127] Given the staggering amount of newspaper articles, pamphlets, petitions, speeches, and accounts of public meetings that Blackett consulted, his conclusion proves more convincing than Ellison's, who examined a significantly smaller array of sources. Thus, Hotze's impressive insight into the feelings of the Lancashire operatives provides further evidence of his ability to read public opinion.

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[124] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, September 26, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:534-537.
[125] Donaldson Jordan and Edwin J. Pratt, *Europe and the American Civil War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1931), 97, 147.
[126] Mary Ellison, *Support for Secession: Lancashire and the American Civil War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), ix, 1, 189-196.
[127] R.J.M. Blackett, *Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 212.

Regardless of the opposition of the cotton workers, Hotze confidently informed the Confederate State Department that "the triumphant success of our arms" had rendered recognition "probable at any moment."[128] Indeed, Palmerston and Russell began seriously considering making an offer of mediation on the basis of separation to the two warring parties in the aftermath of Second Bull Run. Up to this point the two men had insisted on the futility of recognition, arguing that it would result not in the North laying down their arms but in a war between the United States and Britain. However, the Union's crushing defeat caused them to reconsider this position. As Palmerston wrote to Russell on September 14, "The Federals got a very complete smashing, and it seems not altogether unlikely that still greater disasters await them, and that even Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the Confederates." If this were to happen, Palmerston asked, "would it not be time for us to… address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation?" If the North rejected this offer of mediation, Palmerston suggested that Britain then "acknowledge the independence of the South as an established fact." Russell concurred, and over the next two weeks he drew up plans for the European powers to make a joint offer of mediation. Palmerston, however, did not intend to take any "actual step… without the sanction of cabinet," which would not meet again until October.[129] As Hotze had accurately observed, all apparent signs pointed towards imminent recognition.

Eager to win just the sort of decisive victory that would leave Britain with no choice but to recognize the Confederacy, immediately after his victory at Second Bull Run Robert E. Lee led the Army of Northern Virginia across the Potomac and into

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[128] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, No. 10, Sept 26, 1862, Confederate States of America Records, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
[129] Adams, *Great Britain,* 33-40.

Maryland in an attempt, in the words of historian James McPherson, "to conquer a peace." McPherson suggests that the Confederacy's diplomatic fate "rode with Lee in this campaign," and this conclusion is hard to dispute.[130] After learning of the invasion, Palmerston wrote to Russell, "If the Federals sustain a great defeat, they may be at once ready for mediation, and the iron should be struck while it is hot." However, he suggested that if the Union "should have the best of it, we may wait awhile and see what may follow." Then, after he and Russell wrote the other cabinet members to inform them of their plan for mediation, Lord Granville replied on September 27 and expressed his belief that if the war were to continue for any length of time after recognition, "it would be impossible for us to long avoid drifting into it."[131] After reflecting on Granville's letter, Palmerston decided to take a more cautious position.[132] With the Southern army on the move in Maryland and his fear of war not entirely assuaged, by the end of September Palmerston intended to let events play out a little more before making up his mind about intervention.

Historian Howard Jones contends that the Confederacy "might have won a mediation followed by recognition" if it had delayed the invasion of Maryland and allowed "the full impact of Second Bull Run" to settle upon the British.[133] However, this seems unlikely. Palmerston made it clear in his September 14 letter to Russell that the South remained one major victory away from recognition, and there is no reason to take Palmerston at anything less than his word in this situation. On the other hand, historian Phillip E. Myers suggests that Britain did not even come close to recognizing the

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[130] McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom,* 555.
[131] Adams, *Great Britain,* 41-42.
[132] Hubbard, *Confederate Diplomacy,* 120.
[133] Jones, *Union in Peril,* 162-164; see also Jones, *Blue and Gray Diplomacy,* 215-216.

Confederacy after its crushing victory at the end of August. Myers argues that Anglo-American interactions during the Civil War should be viewed in the context of the broader history of the relationship between Britain and America, and that in this context, "the mutual desire to continue peaceful relations" continuously characterized the interactions between the two countries.[134] Describing Palmerston as "the great nineteenth-century practitioner of realpolitik," Meyers believes that the prime minister "toyed with intervention, but his characteristic caution enabled him to survive the debate because his thinking was with public opinion, which was quite content with isolationism and prosperity."[135] Indeed, the British economy did experience tremendous growth thanks to wartime trade, providing an economic incentive against intervention, as explained in the first chapter. However, Myers does not adequately credit the seriousness with which Palmerston considered mediation in September of 1862. He neglects to reference Palmerston's letters to Russell of the 14th and 23rd, in both of which the prime minister stated in no uncertain terms that he was prepared to offer mediation in the aftermath of another Southern success on the battlefield. Myers' failure to mention these letters is at best an egregious oversight and at worst a deliberate deception. Jones overstates his case when he proposes that Britain would have recognized the Confederacy if only Lee had held off on his invasion. But as the summer of 1862 turned to fall, the Confederacy stood only one victory away from British recognition.

Henry Hotze spent the summer of 1862 arguing that recognition served Britain's best interests. His propaganda efforts demonstrated passion, eloquence, and skill, and yet they also proved unsuccessful, with the British government explicitly deciding against

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[134] Phillip E. Myers, *Caution and Cooperation: The American Civil War in British-American Relations* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2008), 2.
[135] Myers, *Caution and Cooperation,* 6, 102.

intervention in the summer of 1862. However, the Cabinet came to the brink of intervention early that fall, after the South's armies had started experiencing success in battle. Ultimately, Britain simply did not have sufficient interest in Southern independence to risk war with the United States, and thus Palmerston would not recognize the Confederacy before it defeated the North on the battlefield. Henry Hotze did not fail in his mission that summer. Rather, he performed an impossible task as well as any man could have. Even the most skilled diplomats could not have succeeded in winning recognition for the South. The Confederacy's army would have to accomplish what its propagandist could not.

Chapter Three

Upon first arriving in London in late January of 1862, Henry Hotze had emphasized states' rights, the stability of the Confederate government, and the North's oppression of the South in his propaganda efforts. He adopted a more British perspective after founding the *Index* in May, using the paper to discuss his host country's rights, obligations, and interests in relation to recognition. In October of 1862, Hotze shifted gears again. Abraham Lincoln's decision to issue to preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in the aftermath of the Union's victory at the Battle of Antietam forced Hotze to address an issue that thus far he had largely ignored: slavery. He used the editorial pages of his newspaper to defend the South's relationship to slavery in an attempt to turn Britain's initial distrust of the proclamation into support for his cause. However, by January of 1863, the British had come to view the Northern war effort as an anti-slavery campaign and consequently firmly opposed recognition of the Confederacy. As a result, in January Hotze's propaganda took on a desperate tone. Hotze's frustration with the British government for denying his nation recognition angrily manifested itself in the *Index*, where he published editorials that unapologetically attacked British politicians for lacking statesmanship and courage. Though he claimed in his reports to Richmond that the British press was continuing to reject the Emancipation Proclamation, one struggles to believe that this expert at analyzing public opinion could fail to read the writing on the wall. The angry tone of his editorials suggests that Hotze recognized that popular support for Lincoln's decree was causing his mission to become more and more hopeless by the day. By the end of his first year in London, Hotze must have recognized

that the only path to recognition for the South now lay not in propaganda or diplomacy, but in military victory.

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Just as he was finishing his September 26 dispatch to Richmond, Hotze received "news of a defeat of our armies and their retreat into Virginia." He did not know the report's veracity, but even if it were true, he did not believe that such a defeat would "now affect public opinion materially." The British had, in Hotze's opinion, become "decidedly adverse to the North," and they viewed the Confederacy's "formal admission into the family of nations as a foregone conclusion."[136] By the time Hotze wrote his next report, on October 24, the news of the Confederacy's defeat at the Battle of Antietam and Lee's resulting retreat had been confirmed. However, this failure did nothing to damper Hotze's hopes for imminent recognition. He informed his superiors that the British public had become impatient for their government to put forth a solution "of whatever kind" to the "vexatious question" of the American Civil War. Hotze did not view the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, which President Abraham Lincoln had issued in the aftermath of Antietam, as an obstacle to recognition, even though it directly connected slavery to the war for the first time and potentially added a moral element into the struggle. With the British people viewing the proclamation as nothing more than "a bid for European sympathies" that utterly lacked "the slightest merit or sincerity," Hotze believed that the pressure of public opinion would force the government to act when Parliament reassembled in February. Describing Palmerston as "incapable of mistaking

[136] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, Sept 26, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3: 534-537.

public opinion, and… ever the ferret to follow it," Hotze expected the prime minister to "throw in his weight with the advocates of speedy recognition" in the near future.[137]

Indeed, some form of British intervention in the conflict still appeared likely in the immediate aftermath of Antietam. Historian Howard Jones goes so far as to argue that Lee's defeat only served "to intensify British interest in mediation," at least initially. Many in Britain questioned the proclamation's sincerity, viewing it as a desperate Northern attempt to avoid defeat by provoking a slave uprising in the South. Others rejected the proclamation on theoretical grounds. Since Lincoln had only declared slaves residing in states still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, to be freed, the pro-North *Spectator* of London declared Lincoln's principle to be "not that a human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot own him unless he is loyal to the United States," and the *Times* believed Lincoln to be "more like a Chinaman beating his two swords together to frighten his enemy than like an earnest man pressing on his cause." Though many in the North had hoped that the Emancipation Proclamation would convert their war effort into a crusade for liberty in the eyes of the world, the British instead viewed it, in Jones' words, "as an exploitative move against slavery that would escalate the war." Additionally, the Battle of Antietam served to convince many overseas observers that the North and South stood locked in a bloody stalemate that only outside assistance could break. British Foreign Minister Lord Russell held this view, emerging in the cabinet as the chief proponent of ending the war for humanitarian reasons. He argued that Britain should extend an offer of mediation to the two warring parties complete with a recommendation that the North and South remain separated, and recognize the Confederacy if the Union were to refuse the offer. With the press denouncing

[137] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, Oct 24, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:565-567.

emancipation and the foreign minister himself arguing for intervention, the Union's representative in Britain, Charles Francis Adams, feared the worst for his cause, writing in his diary in early October, "We are now passing through the very crisis of our fate."[138] Thus, Hotze's assessment of the British as unimpressed by Lincoln's proclamation and still interested in recognition after Antietam proves correct.

However, the ultimate responsibility of determining British policy regarding recognition lay with Lord Palmerston, and in suggesting to Richmond that the prime minister would soon become an advocate of recognition, Hotze offered an overly optimistic assessment of his position. Upon receiving news of the South's defeat at Antietam, Palmerston decided to take a cautious, conservative approach to the American policy. Writing to Russell on October 2, he declared, "The whole matter is full of difficulty, and can only be cleared up by some more decided events between the contending armies," and expressed hope that the next ten days would lend clarity to the issue.[139] The matter would indeed gain clarity, but as a result of events occurring at home rather than in America. After two speeches and two memoranda over the course of the next three weeks, Palmerston's Ministry would effectively put the question of recognition to rest.

On October 7, Chancellor William Gladstone gave a speech in Newcastle that many observers incorrectly interpreted as a prelude to recognition. Speaking to a cheering crowd, Gladstone declared, "We may have our own opinions about slavery, we may be for or against the South; but there is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made

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[138] Jones, *Union in Peril,* 162-183.
[139] Adams, *Great Britain,* 2:44.

what is more than either – they have made a nation."[140] From the editorial pages of the *Index*, Hotze cautioned against reading too much into Gladstone's words. Gladstone often expressed opinions that did not represent the rest of the government, and for this reason Hotze advised his readers not draw from the speech "any peremptory conclusions as to the probable action of the Cabinet." He viewed the speech as significant, but "rather as indicating what the great majority of capable and impartial public men in England think, than affording a clue as to what the English Ministry intends to do."[141] However, given that Gladstone held one of the most important positions in the cabinet, the public initially believed this speech to be foreshadowing government policy, and the price of cotton abruptly dropped in anticipation of a resumption of trade with a newly independent South. Indeed, from as far away as Belgium, A. Dudley Mann, who had served as one of the Confederacy's initial envoys to Britain, celebrated the Confederacy's impending recognition. However, Hotze's instincts proved correct. Travelling in the north of England, Gladstone had fallen out of touch with Palmerston and Russell and remained unaware of the prime minister's shift to a policy of caution.[142]

Eager to correct the false impression that Gladstone's speech had created, Sir George C. Lewis, the Secretary for War, delivered a speech in Hereford one week later. He argued that because the South had not yet achieved independence, it would be a violation of international law for Britain to recognize the Confederacy. In the *Index*, Hotze attempted to prove that Lewis' argument "resolves itself into a simple and absolute absurdity." He suggested that, according to Lewis' doctrine, foreign governments never had the right to recognize a revolutionary state "so long as the dispossessed Power can

[140] Jones, *Union in Peril,* 182.
[141] "Mr. Gladstone on America," *Index,* October 16, 1862.
[142] Adams, *Great Britain,* 2:47-48; Jones, *Union in Peril,* 182.

and will maintain the war," which could potentially be for decades. If this were the case, then Britain's recognition of Greece, the Latin American republics, Belgium, Italy, and indeed "every existing precedent on the subject," would all have been violations of international law. However, since precedents make up the law, Britain in fact had the right to recognize a government whenever it pleased, and had the duty to recognize a government "when it has proved beyond doubt its ability to maintain its independence." Given the lack of logic and rationality in Lewis' speech, Hotze could come to no other conclusion than "that the English Government has no policy whatever" regarding America. As Hotze explained matters to his British readers, while the nation's commerce suffered and cotton workers starved, the Palmerston Ministry was sitting around indecisively, with "no plan, no idea, no intention to do anything but fold their hands, talk of strict neutrality, spare the excited feelings of the North, and wait… for something to turn up."[143]

Indeed, Hotze's accusation that the government lacked a strong policy on America rings true, for the Cabinet remained divided on the question of recognition. As E.D. Adams notes, Lewis' speech, taken in tandem with Gladstone's, "gave public notice that no Cabinet decision had been reached."[144] However, in the same editorial he had incorrectly asserted that Lord Russell provided the primary "obstacle to a just, wise, and really pacific policy." In fact Lord Russell led the interventionist party in the Cabinet. The day before Lewis gave his speech, the foreign minister had circulated a "memorandum on America" that argued that the South had conclusively demonstrated its ability to defend itself and that the Emancipation Proclamation would soon incite a

[143] "The Want of a Policy," *Index,* October 23, 1862.
[144] Adams, *Great Britain,* 2:51.

servile war. For these reasons, he urged Britain to propose an armistice in conjunction with other powers.[145] Lewis issued a reply to Russell on October 17, in which he suggested that unintended consequences, such as war between Britain and the United States, would follow any policy other than one of strict neutrality. Even though he sympathized with Russell's desire for peace, Lewis suggested that, "of this philanthropic proposition, we may doubt whether the chances of evil do not preponderate over the chances of good."[146]

With Gladstone and Lewis having spoken for each side of the issue, the time came for Palmerston to make a decision. Hotze believed that the Cabinet's public division on the American question damaged the Palmerston Ministry's authority, and he suggested that the public disagreement between the two prominent ministers was making the Cabinet's "destruction, or at least reorganization, a more probable event than at any time since I have been on my post."[147] The issue certainly created an unstable situation for the prime minister. As historian Stephen Myers points out, Palmerston knew that any mistakes in his foreign policy "might topple his government, which hinged on a slim majority."[148] Accordingly, Palmerston opted to follow the more cautious course of action. On October 22, he wrote Russell to explain that he felt "much inclined to agree with Lewis." Palmerston believed that both parties would refuse an offer of mediation and that such a proposal would only cause both parties to pledge themselves "more strongly to the object for which they are fighting." For this reason, Palmerston decided that the British

[145] Hubbard, *Confederate Diplomacy,* 120-121.
[146] Adams, *Great Britain,* 2:53.
[147] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, Oct 24, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:565-567.
[148] Myers, *Caution and Cooperation,* 102.

"must continue merely to be lookers-on till the war shall have taken a more decided turn."[149] In other words, British intervention in the conflict would not the forthcoming.

Palmerston made it clear, however, that he had not decided against recognition; he had simply decided to wait for a more opportune moment. He wrote to Russell on October 23 to clarify his position. Echoing criticisms that Hotze had made, he explained that he found "Lewis's Doctrine" of "no recognition of Southern independence until the North had admitted it" to be neither "sound in Theory, [nor] consistent with historical events," and three days later he informed Russell, "I believe you are right in fixing next Spring for the period for the acknowledgement of the Confederate States." Palmerston penned this note on the same day that Hotze offered Richmond his prediction that the prime minister would present Parliament with a plan for recognition the following February, placing Hotze's timeline well within the realm of possibility. However, Hotze failed to realize that Palmerston did not plan to offer recognition as long as the military situation remained unchanged. Rather, Palmerston intended to wait until Southern independence had been "converted into an Established Fact by the Course of Events alone."[150] The Prime Minister had fixed the following spring as a potential date for recognition because he believed that the South could gain the advantage in the war by that point. Though he disagreed with the Lewis Doctrine, he still believed that Britain should withhold recognition until the Confederacy possessed a clear upper hand in the conflict. In the words of historian Stephen Myers, Britain's policy had become "one of watchful waiting."[151] Despite both prominent cabinet officials and the press opposing continued bloodshed and the Emancipation Proclamation, recognition would not be

[149] Adams*, Great Britain,* 2:54-55
[150] Jones, *Union in Peril,* 193, 197; Adams, *Great Britain,* 2:56.
[151] Myers, *Caution and Cooperation,* 100.

forthcoming if the South did not achieve a major military victory, a fact that Hotze failed to appreciate properly in his reports back to Richmond.

For all intents and purposes, Palmerston had closed the matter. However, in early November Hotze heard a rumor that French Emperor Napoleon III had proposed to the British and Russians that the three powers make a joint recommendation of an armistice to the American belligerents.[152] The rumor turned out to be true. With France desperate for cotton and the Emperor's personal feelings in favor of the South, Hotze correctly understood the Emperor to be in favor of recognition but unwilling to perform such an act without British support.[153] Napoleon had remained silent during the mediation debate in October because of internal turmoil in his government, but at the beginning of November he instructed his ministers in London and Moscow to request that the three powers jointly suggest to the belligerents a six-month armistice that would include, crucially, a suspension of the Federal blockade of Southern ports. The British Cabinet debated the proposal on November 11 and 12 before rejecting it on the grounds that the North would never agree to its terms. Napoleon published the text of Britain's refusal, thus making the decision public, unlike Palmerston's decision back in October.[154] The British would never again seriously consider intervention.

Hotze's assessment of the Cabinet's debate over mediation in the fall of 1862 demonstrates his faulty and limited understanding of British politics. Though he realized that the South's window of opportunity for recognition had not yet closed and that the press viewed the Emancipation Proclamation as disingenuous, he remained unaware of

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[152] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, November 7, 1862, *ORN* ser. II 3:601-602.
[153] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, October 24, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:565-567; see also Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy,* 153, 543-544.
[154] Adams, *Great Britain,* 2:59-66.

the Confederacy's need to win recognition on the battlefield and of Lord Russell's support for mediation. However, he certainly provided the Confederate State Department with deeper insight into and keener analysis of the British political situation than James Mason did. Mason provided Richmond with correct facts in his dispatches, reporting that the Cabinet was considering recognition and the British public had met the Emancipation Proclamation with derision, but the Confederacy's official representative in London provided his State Department with none of the nuance or depth that Hotze offered them in his assessments of British opinion.[155] Even given Hotze's flawed understanding of British politics, he once again offered Richmond keener and more detailed analysis than Mason did.

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In the aftermath of Antietam, events conspired to force Hotze to change the tone of his propaganda and address the issue of slavery head on. Even though, as Hotze correctly noted in his October dispatch to Richmond, the British initially viewed the Emancipation Proclamation cynically, Lincoln's decree had still brought the issue of slavery to the fore, and once raised the issue demanded a response from Hotze. Beginning in October of 1862, he used the editorial pages of the *Index* to defend the South's relationship to slavery, arguing that the Southerners would keep the African slave trade closed, owned slaves only thanks to an accident of history, treated their existing slaves kindly, and would free their slaves for moral and economic reasons soon after achieving independence. On the other hand, he suggested that the Emancipation Proclamation revealed the Union's hypocrisy on the issue of slavery. Though his argument that the Confederacy would not reopen the slave trade proves convincing and his treatment of the

[155] Mason to Benjamin, November 7, 1862, *ORN* ser. II, 3:600

Emancipation Proclamation accorded to already established British beliefs, his suggestion that an independent South would emancipate its slaves proves unconvincing. Thus, it hardly comes as a surprise that Hotze failed to convince anti-slavery Englishmen to support the Confederacy. By the beginning of 1863, the British correctly understood the Emancipation Proclamation as a step along the road to abolition, and as a result public opinion became firmly opposed to recognition.

Recognizing that the British fiercely opposed the African slave trade and that their government had worked tirelessly over the previous decades to suppress it, Hotze attempted "to demonstrate the palpable absurdity" of the charge that the Confederacy would start importing slaves upon independence. He pointed out at though a few "men of isolated views" had raised the subject of renewing the slave trade upon secession, the South's leaders had "most energetically disclaimed any toleration with the trade" and enshrined its prohibition in the Confederacy's constitution. Not only did the South's slave owners disdain the trade on moral grounds, but the "powerful and obvious considerations of self-interest" committed them to implacable hostility against the African slave trade." The trade's renewal would damage the value of their existing slaves by increasing the supply of chattel labor, in accordance with the law of supply and demand.[156] Hotze's argument proves convincing. The Confederacy's constitution did indeed prohibit the trade, and the British government never expressed doubt that the South would agree to sign a treaty prohibiting it as a precondition to recognition.[157]

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[156] "The South and the African Slave Trade," *Index*, October 2, 1862; for a full discussion of Britain's efforts to stamp out the international slave trade, see Huzzey, *Freedom Burning,* 40-74.
[157] Emory M. Thomas, *The Confederate Nation: 1861-1865* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 63; Jones, *Union in Peril,* 20.

Having established that the Confederacy would not reopen the slave trade, Hotze defended the South's relationship to the institution. Portraying Southerners as accidental slave-owners, he unconvincingly argued that they would emancipate their slaves soon after independence for moral and economic reasons. He described Southern slave owners as victims of history, economics, and geography. Hotze conceded that the Confederate States used "a system of labour which the other nations have united in condemning and warring against." However, he pointed out that the Confederacy had not created the system but rather inherited it from a period when slavery enjoyed general toleration amongst European nations. In fact, even the most outspoken opponents of slavery could not accuse the South of lagging more than "one generation behind," because "within the memory of living men, every nation of Europe approved of slaveholding by the example of its practice." The "industrial and commercial development" of most nations had "favoured and promoted the change of sentiment which led to the abandonment" of slavery. The South's course of development, however, had "welded the system more closely to her," and for the section to suddenly abandon it would shake "the very foundation, not only of her own, but of the world's prosperity."[158]

Hotze further characterized Southern slave owners as kind and gentle masters, suggesting that the South's peculiar institution benefitted the enslaved race. He noted that over the previous fifty years, a period for which the African slave trade had been closed, the black population in the South had grown from 500,000 to nearly 4,000,000. This growth, Hotze suggested, demonstrated that Southern slaves possessed a higher level of both physical and moral well-being that the British generally assumed. After all, "a race… living in the habitual violation of natural and moral laws could [not] thus grow

[158] "The South and Slavery," *Index*, November 6, 1862.

and multiply." But the Confederacy's enslaved workers led peaceful, Christian lives. More than 400,000 of them, over ten percent of the slave population, regularly attended church, a number which compared favorably to the religious statistics for the working class in any other country, especially those without established churches. Additionally, a glance at the South's crime statistics showed blacks to be free from "offences against law and order" both great and small. In this manner, the South's labor system enabled "the fierce sanguinary African" to transform himself into "a Christian labourer," with "the white man serving as a "friend, teacher, and protector."[159]

Having noted that they held slaves only thanks to a cruel twist of fate and that they made for good masters, Hotze argued that moral pressure from the outside world would cause the Confederacy to free its slaves after achieving independence. He suggested that Southerners would prove willing to listen to European views on slavery if only Europeans would stop attacking their morals and instead recognize their nationhood. After all, Southerners did not view themselves or their institution as evil, and they became defensive when attacked as such. They understood slavery to be "an inherited obligation of mutual and reciprocal duty," and considered themselves tasked with the responsibility of using their institution to promote the welfare of the enslaved race and to facilitate the flow of global commerce. For this reason, whenever Europeans painted Southerners "in the grotesque colours of stage banditti," they responded to "the absurd caricature" with scorn and indignation. Hotze recognized the gravity of the slavery issue, and admitted that the South needed "advice and assistance" from Europe on how best to proceed. However, he suggested that if the opponents of forced labor would "treat the Southern slaveholders as ordinary men and women," rather than monstrous barbarians,

[159] "A Word for the Negro," *Index,* February 12, 1863.

"it would be the greatest step yet made towards bringing the South under the influence of European public opinion" as regarded the issue of slavery.[160] Though he did not state as much explicitly, Hotze clearly implied that the South would begin the process of eliminating its peculiar institution if the existing powers welcomed it into the family of nations.

Additionally, he argued that "the certain operation of economic causes" would result in the ultimate death of the South's peculiar institution. The price of slaves had already risen "above their intrinsic value, that is, so high as to make their labour dearer than free labour," and Hotze suggested that eventually this discrepancy would grow to the point where "a judicious scheme of emancipation" would provide "the cheapest remedy for the anomaly."[161] In other words, planters would soon find it more financially efficient to pay wages to free blacks than to buy slaves, and the South's system of forced labor would gradually fade away. Thus, Hotze suggested that an independent South would emancipate its slaves for economic as well as moral reasons.

However, these arguments proved ineffective, for the British had already heard and rejected them. James Spence, a journalist, pamphleteer, and prominent British supporter of the Confederacy, had suggested that once the South achieved independence and stood alone facing the pressure of the world opinion, "emancipation would come gently as an act of conscience," and economist John Elliot Cairnes, who supported the North, believed that slavery violated the law of supply and demand and suggested that economic realties would eventually force an independent South to emancipate its

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[160] "The South and Slavery," *Index,* November 6, 1862.
[161] "The South and the African Slave Trade," *Index*, October 2, 1862.

slaves.[162] However, Cairnes and Spence appear to have underestimated the South's devotion to its peculiar institution. As Hotze surely knew, the Confederacy had no intentions of willingly emancipating its slaves in the near future. In the words of the Confederacy's Vice-President, Alexander Stephens, the "cornerstone" of the South's new government rested "upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery… is his natural and normal condition."[163] The extent to which slavery permeated Southern society and culture meant that Southerners would undoubtedly resist its abolition, even in the face of moral and economic pressure. The British government appears to have understood what Spence and Cairnes did not, for no Cabinet minister ever argued for recognition on the grounds that the Confederacy would eventually free its slaves.

Hotze also used the *Index* to attack the sincerity of the North's anti-slavery sentiments. Reiterating and expanding on the criticisms of the Emancipation Proclamation that the British press had already made, he argued that "Northern abolition" consisted of nothing more than an "excuse for the attempt to subjugate and despoil the South." After all, the proclamation had only freed the slaves over whom the Union had no control, leaving in bondage those whom Lincoln actually had the power to liberate. Thus, rather than condemning slavery, Lincoln "strongly sanctions it," having made it a right "to be enjoyed by loyal citizens, and… of which 'rebels' are to be deprived, as a punishment." But this position appeared consistent with Northern values to Hotze, who argued that Yankees could not possibly have the welfare of the enslaved people at heart, for they hated the African race. A Northern abolitionist did not wish for black men to

[162] Doyle, *Cause of All Nations,* 249; Lorrimer, "Anti-Slavery Sentiment," 416; see also Crook, "The North, the South, and the Powers," 38.
[163] McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom,* 244.

"ride in the same carriage, walk on the same side of the street, worship God in the same house of prayer, or even live in the same country" as white men. Lincoln had admitted as much when he proposed to establish a colony of free blacks on "some insalubrious spot of earth." Hotze did not think that the British "should sympathize with that zeal for the negro which aims at depriving him of home and country." In truth, he argued, the North fought only to control the resources of the South, not to end slavery. Yankees would willingly pass "the most stringent laws… to protect the institution of slavery" if only the South would return to the Union; however, if the Confederacy were to immediately outlaw slavery, "Lincolnites would not consent to a separation without further warfare, and the North would not, without a further effort, give up the monopoly of Southern wealth." For this reason, he believed that Lincoln's sham of a decree deserved nothing more than "silence and contempt" from the British.[164] Hotze argued that, rather than expressing a truly benevolent sentiment, the Emancipation Proclamation exposed the North's hypocrisy and desire to subjugate the South.

Hotze's efforts to convince the British that a Southern victory would further the interests of the anti-slavery cause ultimately proved unsuccessful, however, for by the beginning of 1863 the British public had realized that the Emancipation Proclamation functioned as an anti-slavery measure. Though Palmerston and Russell had expected to recognize the Confederacy at some future, more opportune moment, when they decided not to offer mediation in the fall of 1862, historian E.D. Adams correctly asserts that by the beginning of 1863 Lincoln's decree had erected "a positive barrier of public opinion"

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[164] "The English View of Federal Abolitionism," *Index,* January 22, 1862. For Lincoln's colonization plan, see Michael P.Johnson ed., "Address on Colonization to a Delegation of Black Americans," in *Abraham Lincoln, Slavery, and the Civil War: Selected Writings and Speeches,* 2nd ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2011 125-129.

that served to eliminate the any possibility of British recognition of the Confederacy, short of an outright Confederate military victory in the war.[165] Once it became clear that the proclamation would not cause a slave insurrection, workers, religious groups, and Emancipation societies called public meetings and issued resolutions that vilified the South and declared their support for the North's crusade against slavery. The Palmerston Ministry could not ignore this turn in public sympathy. If the British government were now to recognize the South, it would be aligning itself with the forces of slavery, a politically and morally untenable situation for British statesmen. As historian Don Doyle argues, at this point "the North had successfully aligned the causes of Union and Liberty."[166]

Hotze either remained blind to these public displays of opposition to his cause or refused to accept their implications. He failed to communicate to the Confederate State Department that the tide of public opinion had turned against their cause, informing Richmond as late as January 17, 1863, that the Emancipation Proclamation "really appears to have awaked the fears of both Government and people," with the press having been "unanimous and even vehement in its condemnation."[167] Doyle suggests that the aristocratic Hotze and many other supporters of the Confederacy did not recognize the diplomatic implications of the proclamation because they "were sorely out of touch with the 'nobodies.'"[168] However, even though Hotze had demonstrated a limited understanding of British politics while stationed in London, he had consistently displayed a remarkable ability to read public opinion up to this point in his mission. It seems more

[165] Adams, *Great Britain,* 74.
[166] Doyle, *Cause of All Nations,* 240-256.
[167] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, January 17, 1863, *ORN* ser. II, 3:661-664
[168] Doyle, *Cause of All Nations,* 249.

likely, then, that Hotze chose either to hide the true impact of the proclamation from his superiors or to deny its effects even to himself.

The increasingly angry tone of Hotze's propaganda in January of 1863 further supports this conclusion. Hotze had long made it a point to write with restraint and moderation in the *Index*, lest excessive zeal and partisanship alienate his British readers. In truth, however, Britain's lack of support for the South disgusted Hotze. He viewed the Civil War as a great moral struggle, not between slavery and freedom, but between tyranny and national self-determination. He saw Southerners as a "great people" engaged in "a heroic struggle for all the rights that man holds sacred and dear" and believed that this fact alone should have sufficed for Britain to offer "at least sympathy, if not aid" to the South. Hotze explained to his reports to Richmond that he found it abhorrent for Britain to choose sides in the conflict for reasons so base and trivial as economic considerations or political expediency. Furthermore, Hotze viewed Britain's aversion to war as "unaccountable – I am almost tempted to say cowardly." Thus, at the beginning of his mission he had found it difficult to withhold from his editorials "expressions of pain and indignation at the gross, callous, undisguised selfishness and almost brutal indifference with which the great spectacle on the other hemisphere is viewed on this."[169] However, by January of 1863, with the British government appearing less and less likely to offer recognition by the day, Hotze stopped hiding his true feelings and started using the editorial pages of the *Index* to condemn and ridicule the government. Possibly he hoped that angry accusations of weak statesmanship would succeed where reasoned arguments had failed. Possibly he had simply grown frustrated. Either way, he appears to have become desperate.

[169] Henry Hotze to R.M.T. Hunter, Feb 28, 1862, *ORN* ser. II 3:352-354.

Why, Hotze, asked, did the government refuse to offer the Confederacy recognition, even though ninety percent of the British people supported the South and the country's commercial interests depended on Southern cotton? British statesmen commonly replied to this type of question that recognition offered a "dangerous, useless, and unnecessary" course, as it would not do anything to promote peace or Britain's interests, but would potentially embroil the country in a war. To this, Hotze replied that justice demanded recognition, and he reminded his readers "that the first duty of a great nation is to be just." Additionally, though some doubted that recognition would lead to peace, Hotze argued that if recognition "were useless the South would not so earnestly desire it nor the North so zealously deprecate it." Finally, to those who considered intervention unnecessary because the South had secured its *de facto* independence, Hotze replied that as long as the South's ports remained blockaded, Britain's commercial interests demanded recognition. Thus, when history asked Britain's leaders why they had not taken action to end the war, they would only be able to offer the meekest of responses. They would not be able to claim that a lack of ability, public backing, or international support had "overawed their superior wisdom and foresight." After all, recognition would bring about the end of the war, international law allowed recognition, and both the British public and the French government supported it. Yet Palmerston and Russell still hesitated, and they would only be able to explain this hesitation to posterity by saying that they had "deemed it dangerous, useless, and unnecessary to stop the American war."[170] Hotze did not believe that future generations would find this answer satisfactory.

[170] "What Prevents the Recognition of the Confederate States," *Index,* January 22, 1863.

In fact, Hotze went so far as to accuse Palmerston and Russell of cowardice. He dismissed all other explanations the government's refusal to recognize the South, for all knew "that they are afraid lest the recognition of the South should involve England in war with the North." However, Hotze described this apprehension as "groundless," arguing that Lincoln would "not, under any circumstances, make the recognition of the Confederacy the ground of a declaration of war against England."[171] He explained that this hypothetical war would take the form of an invasion of Canada and that if Britain sent as few as 20,000 soldiers to assist the Canadian militia, the Union would need to send 100,000 men to defeat them. But the North, with every available man engaged in fighting the South, had "no such army to spare." Additionally, the Royal Navy would easily defeat the Northern fleet, thereby depriving the Yankees of their greatest advantage over the South. In punishing Britain for recognizing the South's independence, the North would have made "that independence at once secure and absolute." Finally, a war with Britain would prove devastating to Northern commerce, and as much as New England merchants hated the South, they would "hate still worse such a commercial crash as would follow a quarrel with England." For all these reasons, Hotze argued that the United States would never intentionally "incur the fearful calamity of a war with England." Yet the government still allowed Seward's threats of war to dissuade it from recognizing the South. This hardly proved surprising to Hotze, however, for the Palmerston Ministry was only acting in accordance with "the habit of English statesmen." Always anxious "to keep the peace on any terms," Britain's political leaders had often found themselves involved

[171] Britain's fear that recognition of the South would necessarily result in war with the United States is discussed on pages 13-14.

in wars that "ministers of a less pacific temper" would have avoided.[172] Hotze did not explicitly state that recognition of the South would help Britain avoid war with the North, as he had argued in a May editorial discussed in the previous chapter, but he certainly implies as much. Additionally, he clearly suggests that by failing to overcome their cowardly fear of war, Palmerston and Russell were damaging Britain's international power and prestige. Hotze's angry words hint at the increased desperation that he was feeling as the Confederacy's hopes for recognition were growing fainter and fainter.

In a last ditch effort to win British support for the Confederacy, Hotze made the absurd suggestion that a victorious North would reopen the African slave trade. He argued that if Yankees were to conquer the South and attempt to cultivate its lands, they would find their cotton, rice, and sugar fields to be of no value "without the negro's toil" and forces blacks to labor for them "under one form of servitude or another." However, given the North's hatred of blacks, a Yankee would make "a far more exacting, more mercenary, less considerate, and less patient master" than a Southerner. Hotze claimed in support of his argument that the free black population in the North had not grown at all during the past fifty years, while the slave population of the South had grown at an annual rate of sixteen percent over the same period. This clearly indicated to Hotze "that under his new Northern master the negro would not multiply so rapidly as he has heretofore done." However, since the demand for labor would remain unchanged, the deficiency in the black population would have to "be supplied from abroad." Hotze argued that, though the conquering Yankees might choose to hide the practice "under the disguise of a more euphonious name," for all intents and purposes Northern victory in the

[172] "The Fear of War," *Index,* January 22, 1863.

war would result in a reopening of the African slave trade.[173] This theory is so ridiculous that it almost does not merit refuting. Though racism certainly remained prevalent in the North at this time, Yankees firmly opposed slavery, and the thought that victorious abolitionists would even allow the institution to survive, let alone reopen the slave trade, proves absurd upon the slightest reflection. Hotze surely knew that his arguments could not hold up under scrutiny. However, by this point his cause had grown so desperate that he had no choice but to make outlandish claims.

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By the beginning of 1863, Hotze justifiably considered the *Index* to be an unconditional success. Though he had struggled to secure writers in the paper's early days, the newspaper, as he explained to the Confederate State Department in January of 1863, quickly obtained "a position of respectability which enabled me to select from among the professional talent of the English press such assistance as I could pay for." The operation did struggle financially at times, and indeed Hotze constantly asked his superiors for more money, but he had never expected his venture to become a commercial success, and it satisfied him simply to manage to print an issue every week. With the paper having overcome most of the difficulties that it had faced in its first months of life, Hotze felt satisfied with what the *Index* had become. All in all, when he considered the circumstances and compared "the *Index* with other English papers of the same grade," he felt that he had "reason to congratulate myself, on having succeeded so well with so little." In fact, he believed that "more valuable services have never been rendered by any publication to any cause at so small a cost." Though he had not succeeded in winning recognition for the Confederacy, through hard work, intelligence,

[173] "A Word for the Negro," *Index,* February 12, 1863.

and surely a certain measure of good luck, over a little more than seven months Hotze had succeeded in creating a respectable British newspaper from scratch, a remarkable accomplishment, especially for a young man of twenty-seven.

However, by this point Hotze had realized that the Confederacy would only experience diplomatic success if it first succeeded on the battlefield. He reported that he had recently learned of the South's "glorious victory at Fredericksburg" in his January 17, 1863, report to Richmond. Several months earlier he would have exulted over impending British action, but Hotze correctly realized that this victory did not necessarily foreshadow recognition. After all, he observed, no matter if "the tide of victory is in our favor" or if "reverses befall us" Britain's leaders always bade their countrymen to wait for a more opportune time to recognize the South. Hotze's caution proves understandable. In October, he had witnessed the Cabinet, in the form of Lewis and Gladstone, publicly debate the issue of recognition, and though he could not have known of Palmerston's decision on October 22 not to intervene, he had seen the Cabinet reject Napoleon's proposal for recognition. Then over the ensuing months the British public had discarded their initial cynical view of the Emancipation Proclamation and come to view the Northern war effort as a struggle for liberty. Though Hotze had done his best to convince the antislavery interests that the South furthered their cause more than the North did, he failed to counteract the groundswell of public support for the Union and condemnation of the Confederacy that had emerged in Britain by the beginning of 1863. By January the public had made it clear that they viewed the South to be fighting to perpetuate slavery and the North to eradicate it, and consequently they could not support the South. Reflecting on the Confederacy's victory at Fredericksburg, Hotze sincerely believed "that

the new year, so auspiciously begun, will not close ere our bleeding country reposes in peace and acknowledged independence."[174] He realized, however, that the Confederacy would not secure recognition unless it first won its independence on the battlefield. Thus, The Confederacy's diplomatic fortunes resided not with its propagandist or its diplomats, but with its armies.

[174] Henry Hotze to Judah P. Benjamin, January 17, 1863, *ORN* ser. II, 3:661-664.

Epilogue

Though Henry Hotze appears likely to have realized on some level by January of 1863 that the British had wedded the causes of union and liberty in their minds and become firmly opposed to recognition, he nonetheless continued serving the Confederacy abroad until the end of the war. Robert E. Lee's resounding victory in the Battle of Chancellorsville in early May of that year and subsequent invasion of Pennsylvania inspired MP John Roebuck to introduce into Parliament a motion for recognition and made Hotze optimistic that the British would finally act; however, after Roebuck's fellow MPs met his speech with derision and laughter and the South suffered a disastrous defeat at the Battle of Gettysburg on July 3, the Confederacy realized once and for all that they would not receive recognition from the British.[175] Explaining that the "Government of her Majesty has determined to decline" the Confederacy's offer of "friendly relations," on August 4, 1863 Confederate Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin informed James Mason that he was terminating his mission.[176] The Confederacy had decided to sever diplomatic relations with Britain.

Still determined to serve the Confederacy in Europe, Hotze shifted the focus of his propaganda efforts to France, displaying there the same skill that had characterized his work in Britain. By May of 1864 he had established a relationship with Auguste Havas, the head of the Havas-Bullier Telegraphic and Correspondence Agency, the French equivalent of the Associated Press.[177] Hotze used Havas to distribute correspondence from Richmond, New Orleans, and New York to French newspapers, and

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[175] Burnett, "Henry Hotze, Confederate Propagandist," 22-23; Doyle, "The Cause of All Nations, 252-253
[176] Benjamin to Mason, August 3, 1862, ORN Ser. II Vol. 3, 852
[177] Hotze to Benjamin, May 7, 1864, ORN Ser.II vol. 3, 1115-1117

in September he felt comfortable claiming that the Confederacy now occupied "a dominant and almost impregnable position" in the French press. Nonetheless, Hotze recognized that successful propaganda efforts did not equate to diplomatic success. As he wrote to Richmond, "I can not blind myself to the fact that the immediate object toward which our efforts were directed has failed, and whatever may be our triumphs in the arena of public opinion we no longer expect the political action of these government of western Europe to have any direct influence upon the issue of duration of the war."[178]

Hotze remained stationed in London during this time, and he continued editing the *Index*. However, having set aside his hopes for British intervention, Hotze gave his a paper a new objective. He had joined the Ethnological Society of London, an organization interested in using science to justify racism, and he used the editorial columns of the *Index* to advocate for what people of the time referred to as "scientific racialism." He accepted earlier than most Southerners that the institution of slavery would soon disappear and thus began advocating for the next best alternative – white supremacy. Denouncing "the dogma of the equality of man," he argued that racial hierarchy benefitted everyone in society. Though "the Negro's place in nature is in subordination to the white man… that subordination, the result of intellectual inferiority, does not preclude happiness."[179]

Hotze initially intended to keep publishing the *Index* in the aftermath of the Confederacy's defeat in April of 1865, perhaps in the form of a commercial journal focusing on the cotton industry. However, he found that the public associated the *Index*'s with the failed Southern cause and viewed its continued existence "as a kind of protest

[178] Hotze to Benjamin, September 17, 1864, ORN Ser. II Vol. 3, 1207-1210; see also Dufour, "Nine Men in Gray," 288-291, and Burnett, "Henry Hotze, Confederate Propagandist," 23-24
[179] Burnett, "Henry Hotze, Confederate Propagandist," 24-26

against the decrees of Providence." Furthermore, with his operation no longer receiving a subsidy from the Confederate government, Hotze struggled to support the journal financially. Lacking funds and sensing that the British no longer welcomed the *Index*'s existence, Hotze decided to shut down his press. The *Index* published its last issue on August 12, 1865. At this point, Hotze all but disappears from the historical record. We only know that he married Ruby Senac, the daughter of another Confederate foreign agent, in 1868, and lived in Europe for the rest of his life, working as a journalist and eventually dying in Zug, Switzerland, the country of his birth, on April 19, 1887, at the age of 52.[180]

Henry Hotze lived a short life, and history recorded but a small portion of it – from 1855, when he published his translation of Gobineau's *Essai*, to 1865, when he stopped printing the *Index*. Yet in this brief time he displayed, to name just a few qualities, tremendous intelligence, empathy, passion, insight, and initiative – in short, the kinds of attributes that enable men to accomplish great things. During the Civil War, Hotze attempted to use these gifts to secure British diplomatic recognition for the Confederacy, and if anyone could have persuaded the British to recognize the South's independence, Hotze could have. But his efforts proved unsuccessful, and this failure demonstrates the ultimate futility of the Confederacy's diplomatic efforts. No amount of propaganda or diplomacy could change the fact that the British had no fundamental interest connected to Southern independence and therefore no incentive to risk war with the United States, a risk that would exist unless the South definitively defeated the North on the battlefield. In other words, the Confederacy's only hope for recognition lay in military success. For this reason, even if the Confederacy had possessed an entire corps

[180] Burnett, "Henry Hotze, Confederate Propagandist," 28-30

of supremely skilled foreign operatives, Britain still would not have intervened in the conflict. Ultimately, the Confederacy did not receive recognition because its military failed, not its diplomats.

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