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Sarah Husain April 12, 2016

Mitigating Sectarian Conflict in Iraq, Malaysia and Lebanon: an exploration of the consociational model and political elite behavior

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Abstract

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Since the fall of Saddam Hussein and establishment of democracy in the early 2000s, sectarian violence in Iraq has only increased. When creating a new political system, ethnic and religious were taken into consideration and certain institutions were put into place to facilitate cooperation between Sunni, Shia and Kurdish political leaders. Their institutions were directly inspired by political scientist Arend Lijphart's consociational democracy model. His model has four principle institutional characteristics: a grand coalition, proportional representation, segmental autonomy and mutual veto. I will compare the case of Iraq to two other cases of countries with sectarian conflict, Lebanon and Malaysia.

This thesis examines the extent to which Iraq, Malaysia and Lebanon are consociational democracies and whether or not those consociational institutions contributed to conflict mitigation. Additionally, this thesis focuses on the importance of political elite willingness to cooperate, a vital factor that Lijphart fails to sufficiently explain when evaluating the success of consociational democracies. While Lijphart considers Malaysia and Lebanon relatively successful cases of consociational democracies, I argue that Lijphart's analysis does not capture the full picture. Malaysia was successful in mitigating ethnic conflict however it was not truly a consociational democracy. Lebanon is definitely a consociational democracy, but its political elites were only willing to cooperate within those institutions for a short time, and when cooperation broke down, the country fell into a civil war. Iraq implemented some consociational institutions but political elites were unwilling to cooperate within those institutions. Lijphart overgeneralized his model and did not adequately consider the role of political elites' willingness

to cooperate when assessing the success of a consociational democracy to mitigate sectarian conflict Therefore Iraq should not further implement the consociational characteristics of Lijphart's model to mitigate conflict. Looking forward, Iraq should focus on the behavior of its political elites in addition to institutions they work within.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Following the U.S. invasion and the fall of Sadaam Hussein, Iraq began the process of reconstructing its government into a free and fair democracy. Despite foreign aid in forming the government and writing the constitution in 2005, Iraq is one of the least peaceful countries in the world. In 2015, the Global Peace Index ranked Iraq 161 out of the 162 countries, with Syria in last place. Instead of the successful democracy the world envisioned, insurgency groups and terrorist organization such as the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda plague the country. Many scholars argue that the root of the issue is the Shia-Sunni conflict. Iraq is one of few countries in the world that have a Shia majority. The Pew Research Center estimates that Shias make up about 51% of the population whereas Sunnis make up about 42%. Christians and other minority groups such as the Yazidis are estimated to make up the remaining 7%. Under Saddam Hussein's rule, Sunnis dominated the government and Shias were treated like second-class citizens (Al-Ali 2014). Shias were denied access to political power and not allowed to publically celebrate or commemorate events specific to their sect. Since Saddam Hussein fell from power, Iraqi Sunnis feared that the oppressed Shia majority would take over the government. Their fears came true when a small group of Shia elites were successful in capturing public sympathy by using their identity and religion to promote themselves. This was the beginning of the sectarian rather than inclusive government that the world had hoped for (Munson 2009). Currently, the government is dominated by Shias and Sunnis are both politically and socially excluded (McGarry & O'Leary 2007). Human Rights Watch (2015) reported that hundreds of Sunnis have been kidnapped or killed and thousands have fled the country since 2005. The Shia dominated government has failed to stop militias from attacking Sunni civilians. Another compounding issue is the ethnic

conflict between the Arab and Kurdish populations. The Kurdish population in Iraq wants independence from Iraq, rather than to be included in the government.

These sectarian and ethnic tensions existed long before the new government was created in 2005 and were taken into consideration when writing the constitution. When drafting the constitution, political leaders implemented democratic institutions informed by accommodation or consociational theory, in hopes of mitigating further conflict (McGarry & O'Leary 2007). A consociational framework attempts to accommodate multiple identity groups into a political system, based on the cooperation of political elites. Numerous organizations such as the Carnegie Corporation and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance have identified the consociational model as the political system best equipped to moderate ethnic conflict (Wilkinson 2000). Previously or currently conflict-prone countries such as Belgium and Lebanon have successfully applied the consociational model. Scholars, such as Lijphart (1977), cite Belgium as a concrete example of a country that has employed the consociational model and currently has a stable democracy. Despite Belgium's history of conflict, today it is considered one of the most peaceful countries in the world, ranking 14 of 162 countries according to the 2015 Global Peace Index. The consociational model has also been successful in what Lijphart calls the "Third World". Two examples of relative success are Malaysia and Lebanon. According to the 2015 Global Peace Index, Malaysia ranked 28th most peaceful country in the world. Lebanon on the other hand is not yet considered a peaceful country, however it is considered one of the more peaceful countries in the Middle East.

These examples beg the question, why has the consociational model failed to bring about peace in Iraq? In other countries, consociational designs seem to have helped mitigate sectarian conflict. But in Iraq, where we see the application of consociational design, sectarian conflict has

only increased since 2005. What factors explain this phenomenon? This paper examines the conditions under which consociational design has succeeded or failed to minimize ethnic and religious violence. I pay special attention to the role of political elite willingness to cooperate as a condition necessary for a consociational democracy to succeed in mitigating sectarian conflict, which Lijphart does not clearly address. I will primarily focus on the case of Iraq and compare it to two other cases of consociational democracies, Lebanon and Malaysia.

Definitions:

In order to understand what type of political regime works best for a country, it is important to distinguish between the types of society a country could have. This paper focuses on plural societies, in which there are "religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic" divisions (Lijphart 1977, 4). I refer to these divisions as *segmental cleavages* or as *segments* when referring to a specific group. Political parties, interest groups and other associations can be organized along these segmental cleavages. This paper specifically looks at segmented societies.

Segmented societies, as opposed to homogenous societies, often involve cooperation between multiple groups. Therefore scholars agree that a *majoritarian democracy* is not the best fit for a segmented society (Lijphart 1984). Majoritarian rule refers to a democracy based on the support of a majority of the population. There is no guarantee that all significant segments of society will be represented in the government. Lijphart (1984) argues that a majoritarian government is more suitable for a homogenous society. He also states that majority rule works well when the opinions of the majority and the minority are not ideologically far apart, their interests are not opposed and there is more general consensus across the board. Majoritarian governments create a system of adversarial politics encompassing a party or parties in

government facing a party or parties in opposition, such as in Great Britain. The adversarial politics generated by majoritarian democratic systems are not well-suited to go against accommodation theory of power sharing between the majority and minority segments (Lijphart 1984).

Scholars argue that there are better forms of institutional design that focus on mitigating conflict between divided groups such the consociational model. Arend Lijphart coined the term consociational democracy in his 1997 work, *Democracy in plural societies: a comparative exploration*. Lijphart (1977) describes a consociational democracy as a political arrangement in which "tensions between political segments of a plural society can be accommodated within a single sovereign state." Consociational democracies are naturally more weak and decentralized compared to other types of political regimes. This is because of consociational characteristics such as giving segments autonomy within the government that I will explain in the next section. Instead of attempting to unite segments of society together, Lijphart's consociational democracy recognizes the deep cleavages in many plural societies. "It is in the nature of consociational democracy, at least initially, to make plural societies more thoroughly plural. Its approach is not to abolish or weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments into constructive elements of stable democracy" (Lijphart 1977, 42). We can see this goal underlying Lijphart's four characteristics of a consociational democracy I outline next.

The Consociational Model:

The consociational model is arguably well suited to societies in which political groups are organized along sectarian lines. Lijphart (1977) emphasizes that the cooperation of segmental political elites is crucial for a consociational democracy. The consociational model assumes that segmented groups have leaders who will represent their voice in the government. For all of these

groups to be equally represented, the political elites need to reach a consensus on a suitable political framework in which all groups gain a fair measure of representation. The consociational model has four specific institutional characteristics: *a grand coalition, proportional representation, mutual veto, and segmental autonomy* (Lijphart 1977). Understanding the importance of proportional representation provides a basis for the other three characteristics. *Proportional representation* ensures that each segment of society is represented and contrasts the winner-takes-all principle in majority rule. Lijphart says that, "Proportionality, as a neutral and impartial standard of allocation, removes a larger number of potential divisive problems from the decision-making process and thus lightens the burdens of consociational government" (Lijphart 1977, 35). Proportionality also refers to the proportional influence every segment has on decision-making. It includes the makeup of the parliament as well as executive appointments such as cabinet members. However, proportionality in cabinets or parliament does not solve the issue of proportional influence in cases when a policy decision is dichotomous. There will be winners and losers in most cases, which is why a *mutual veto* is needed to protect minority interests. It is also why there are multiple variations on proportional representation. Parity representation entails the overrepresentation of a minority groups to equal that of the largest or majority group. It is used to augment the strength of a particular segment, that is a smaller group. One example of this is in the Belgian cabinet, where there must be an equal number of Dutch and French-speaking ministers even though French-speakers are a minority in the country (Lijphart 1977). This is an example of the deliberate overrepresentation of small segments.

Some terms that are important to understand are: corporate consociationalism and liberal consociationalism. A corporate or predetermined consociation is a very strict application of proportional representation in which there are quotas for every political segment in a country

(Schwerna, 2010). This predetermination assumes that groups are fixed and internally homogenous therefore intra-group identities are not taken into consideration. A liberal or self-determined consociation "rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections whether they are based on ethnic or religious groups, or on subgroup or transgroup identities" (McGarry & O'Leary 2007, 675). This would be a more liberal example of proportional representation. However both of these options focus on there being a broad representation of all the segments of society rather than a majority party using its electoral advantages to manipulate power. This is why *presidentialism* is often considered less suitable for a consociational government because it entails one figurehead for a segmented society. Hence the consociational model in its purest form is a parliamentary type of democracy.

Additionally, it is important to note the difference between formal and informal consociational institutions. Formal institutions refer to characteristics that are explicitly stated in a country's constitution. Informal institutions are nor explicitly written into the constitution but are practiced in the political system. Lijphart does not address any difference in formal versus informal consociational institutions and he does consider characteristics that are practiced but not written into the constitution as part of a consociational democracy (Lijphart 1977). However, objectively, there is a lot more room for a characteristic to be overlooked or misinterpreted if it is not written into the constitution so I will take that into consideration when evaluating consociational democracies.

Lijphart (1977) views the *grand coalition* as the most important characteristic of a consociational democracy. A grand coalition creates a more united government as opposed to the adversarial nature of a majoritarian government. Lijphart (1977) notes that adversarial politics fit well in homogeneous societies but do not work well in plural societies because the risk of

conflict is too high. When there are "clearly separate and potentially hostile population segments, virtually all decisions are perceived as entailing high stakes and strict majority rule places a strain on the unity and peace of the system" (Lijphart 1977, 28). Therefore the grand coalition is a more appropriate form of government in plural societies than a majoritarian government.

Lijphart explains that, "The essential characteristic of the grand coalition is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the participation by the leaders of all significant segments in governing a plural society" (Lijphart 1977, 31). The most "prototypal" form is a grand coalition cabinet, in which members of different parties make up the executive branch. Lijphart cites Switzerland as the best example of a grand coalition cabinet. Switzerland has a seven-member federal executive body called the Federal Council. It is made up of members of the four main political parties (Radicals, Socialists, Catholics and Peasant's party) proportional to their electoral strengths. These parties represent both the different languages and regions in Switzerland. However, a grand coalition can take other forms as well. Belgium employs a variation on the grand coalition known as a shifting coalition within its cabinets, in which "over a period of several years each party move into and out of the government (Lijphart 1977, 30)." This alternative to a grand coalition may only work if the minority parties do not have strong preferences for their coalition partners. Even though the cabinets were not always grand coalitions, they did have a broad political base, in the sense that they were larger than the minimum majority size. However, because of this design, Belgium implemented grand coalitions in other parts of the government, like "permanent or ad hoc grand councils and committees with formally not much more than an advisory function, but with actually often decisive influence" (Lijphart 1977, 32). As I stated earlier, *presidentialism* is often considered less suitable for a consociational government because it entails one figurehead for a plural society. However

consociationalism can still be compatible with presidentialism. One solution is having a diachronic grand coalition in which two rival parties agree to alternate the presidency. Another solution is to have other top executive positions in addition to a president such a prime minister and deputy prime minister and speaker of the assembly. This is how Lebanon implemented the concept of a grand coalition (Lijphart 1977). Lebanon formed a grand coalition from three executive members, a Sunni Prime Minister, a Christian President and a Shia Speaker of the Assembly.

Grand coalitions do provide political protection for minorities however it is not always able to protect minority interests. Decisions made in grand coalitions require a majority vote so the majority could still outvote the minority. This is especially problematic when the issue at hand is crucial to a minority segment. For this reason, Lijphart (1977) advocates a *mutual veto* principle to give each segment a vote against the majority to protect their interests. The mutual veto serves as a check on the majority and gives minorities a “guarantee of political protection” (Lijphart 1977, 39). If any opposition minorities feel that their interests are not being well represented or considered at all, minority leaders can veto the decision of the majority leaders. Lijphart states that the mutual veto can be unwritten and informal or formally written into the constitution.

Lastly, each segment of society should have autonomy and control over issues that are specific to them. Lijphart refers to this as *segmental autonomy*, which ensures all political leaders will negotiate issues concerning the general public, whereas issues specific to one group can be left to the political elites of that group. This functions as the logical check on the grand coalition. “On all matters of common interest, decisions should be made by all of the segments together with roughly proportional degrees of influence. On all other matters, however, the decisions and

the execution can be left to the separate segments" (Lijphart 1977, 41). In practice, this could give segments freedom to decide their own schooling systems or cultural institutions. Segmental autonomy could also be practiced as federalism in which these segments are concentrated in specific geographic areas and enjoy a high level of autonomy in sub-national districts. Overall the goal of segmental autonomy is to provide each group with a sense of political security and freedom to make decisions on issues relevant to their particular group.

Examining application of the consociational model

There are different types of consociational democracies depending on the type of consociational elements politicians have applied to their government. Some countries have applied the consociational model in a traditional sense or the way Lijphart envisioned**.** Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria are hailed as the most successful examples of the consociational model. However, Lijphart (1977) argues that successful European consociational democracies fall into a different categories than "Third World" consociational democracies. Lijphart (1977) notes that non-Western democracies have different types of cleavages and different degrees to which a society is divided. But he thinks scholars have exaggerated the differences between Western and non-Western countries in the past, such as homogeneity and political development. Therefore he feels that the consociational model can be applied to both Western and non-Western countries. In *Democracy of Plural Society*, Lijphart applies the consociational model to a few non-Western countries including Lebanon, Malaysia, Cyprus and Nigeria. Lijphart cites Lebanon and Malaysia as examples of relatively successful consociational democracies and Cyprus and Nigeria as cases of failure. In order to better understand the case of

Iraq, I will compare it to the cases of Lebanon and Malaysia during their first fourteen or fifteen years after Lijphart claims they implemented the consociational models.

Figure 1: Application of Consociational Model in Iraq, Lebanon and Malaysia

Country	Grand Coalition	Mutual Veto	Proportional Representation	Segmental Autonomy
Iraq (2005-2014)	Yes however it is up to the Prime Minister to appoint cabinet members from each segment	No but Kurdish population does have an effective veto	Yes, closed list proportional representation	Unwritten
Lebanon (1943-1958)	Grand coalition of top executive leaders: President, Prime Minister and Speaker of the Assembly	Unwritten provision of political system	Yes but inaccurate representation for Muslims and Christians	Unwritten; Regime cannot interfere with decisions pertaining to a specific segment.
Malaysia (1945-1969)	Yes, in the form of the Alliance party which comprises Malays, Chinese and Indian segments	No	No	No

The case of Lebanon:

Lijphart examines Lebanon from is independence from the French in 1943 up until 1975 when the country fell into civil war. Lijphart says that “Compared with the frequent revolutionary upheavals to which other Middle Eastern countries have been prone, and in spite of the flaws in its consociational institutions, the Lebanese consociational regime established a remarkable– although obviously far from perfect– record of democratic stability” (Lijphart 1977, 150). It is an example of a corporate or predetermined consociational system, which has set quotas for each segment of the population. Though there has been no formal survey done since 1932, it was

estimated in 1943 that Muslims made up 60-65% of the population and Christians made up 35% to 40% (Schwerna 2010). Of the Muslims, Shias were the largest group, making up 32% and Sunnis were the second largest, making up 21%. The nation officially recognized 17 different religious sects (Schwerna 2010).

Lebanon, either formally or informally, meets all four of Lijphart's characteristics for a consociational democracy. Lebanon uses proportional representation electoral systems however there are quotas for Christian and Muslims. Lebanon's parliamentary system overrepresented Christians at the time. Christians and Muslims each held 50% of the seats in parliament. Then subsets within each of these religions are given seats proportionally. Additionally, the presidency, premiership and speaker of legislature are each headed by one of the three religions. With very few exceptions, the President has been Christian, Prime Minister has been a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of parliament has been a Shia Muslim (Schwerna 2010). This arrangement serves as Lebanon's *grand coalition* in the form of an executive cabinet. Both segmental autonomy and mutual veto are informal aspects of Lebanese political system that are practiced as well.

However, there are many criticisms of Lebanon's corporate consociational design. One critique is that it is hard to account for changes in population demographics when there are fixed quotas (Lijphart 1977). It is difficult to add seats or redistribute seats if the population of one group increases or decreases. Scholars also question how the government would redistribute key political actors if there were a drastic demographic change. Muslims and Christians each make up 50% of the seats in parliament, however that is not the actual demographic breakdown of the country as noted above (Schwerna 2010). Regardless, Lijphart is correct in characterizing Lebanon as a consociational democracy.

The case of Malaysia:

Lijphart considers Malaysia from 1955 to 1969 another relatively successful example of a consociational democracy in the "Third World" (Lijphart 1977). Malaysia is comprised of three major ethnic groups: the Malays, Chinese and South Asians (Indians and Pakistanis). The Malays make up 53 percent of the population and are mostly present in West Malaysia. The Chinese segment makes up 35 percent and the Indians and Pakistanis make up 11 percent. Lijphart notes that these segments are separated further from each other by "mutually reinforcing cleavages of language, religion, culture and race" (Lijphart 1977, 150).

Malaysia won independence from Great Britain in 1957 however it already had consociational characteristics in place before this. Lijphart praises Malaysia for having a grand coalition in the form of a coalition political party. In the early 1950s, Malay, Chinese and Indian political parties came together and set up the Alliance Party. The Alliance won more than four-fifths of the votes in the first federal elections in 1955. The Alliance then formed a cabinet in which all of these segments were represented. Following independence, the Alliance won two more federal elections and then temporarily broke down in 1969. Intense violence breaking out during this time is one reason that scholars do not consider Malaysia a completely successful consociational democracy (Lijphart 1977).

While the Alliance provided an effective grand coalition in which each segment is represented, many of Lijphart's major characteristics were missing. Malaysia did not employ *proportional representation* but employed the British model of plurality vote in single-member districts (Lijphart 1977). Because of this, the system padded the representation of a Malay political leaders. However the Alliance partners took this into consideration and appointed non-

Malays to civil service positions. Because of the dominance of the Malays in parliament, there was a very weak *mutual veto*. Segmental autonomy also was only applicable to the Malays. Both the mutual veto and segmental autonomy were not addressed in the constitution either. However the strength of the consociational application in Malaysia is in the coalition party, the Alliance (Lijphart 1977).

While some scholars believe that Lebanon's formal consociational features play a role in why the country didn't fall into a civil war in more recent years, I argue that Malaysia was not a true consociational democracy by Lijphart's standards from the beginning. It only formally implemented the grand coalition characteristic and did not even informally implement *mutual veto, segmental autonomy or proportional representation.*

Applying the Consociational Model to Iraq:

Sectarian conflict was heavily considered in Iraq's reconstruction after the fall of Sadaam Hussein. The United States along with the interim Iraqi government applied the consociational model to 2005 Constitution of Iraq and today it is considered a liberal consociational democracy (McGarry & O'Leary 2007, 674). Parts of the constitution resemble self-determined consociationalism which McGarry and O'Leary (2007) describe as one which, "…rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic or religious groups, or on subgroup or transgroup identities." The Iraqi government uses a closed-list *proportional representation* in which the entire country is considered a single electoral district. The country is divided into 18 governates that are largely administrative boundaries and do not correspond to ethno-sectarian divides (McGarry & O'Leary 2007, 676). The elected parliamentary body appoints a president and then he appoints a prime minister from

the majority coalition in Parliament. Each office has set term limits. Iraq has a unicameral parliament, which is called the Council of Representatives. It has 328 seats and each member is elected for four years. The Council of Representatives currently has a coalition of five parties to make up the majority. The Council of Representatives is primarily charged with passing legislation. Though Iraq does not formally have *mutual veto* power, there is a check on constitutional changes that affect particular regions. For an amendment concerning the rights of a specific region to be made to the Constitution, there needs to be a referendum. For the amendment to pass, a majority of the public must vote in favor and the amendment cannot be rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates. This aspect is crucial for the Kurdish population, who hold a majority in three governorates. Even though there is no formal mutual veto, this design creates an effective Kurdish veto on constitutional amendments (McGarry & O'Leary, 2007).

Despite these consociational features, there does not seem to be much cooperation because there are still a lot of majoritiarian practices. The Council of Representatives elects the President of the Republic by a two-thirds majority, who in turn appoints the Prime Minister (Constitution of Iraq, Articles 61 and 73). The Prime Minister then appoints his cabinet, the Council of Ministers (Constitution of Iraq, Article 76). While the Council of Representatives can have a vote of no confidence for the Prime Minister or any of the Council of Ministers, they need an absolute majority to do so (Constitution of Iraq, Article 61). This has created a situation in which the Shia parties could easily take charge of the government. In this type of liberal consociational democracy, in order to truly have a representative government, Shia political leaders should have a broad base grand coalition and include members of the Kurdish and Arab Sunni populations. The actions and attitudes of political elites in Iraq are crucial in

accommodating all significant members of society in the government because the majority political parties ultimately have control over who gets elected president, prime minister and subsequently the executive cabinet. I argue that Iraq is a liberal consociational democracy however that form of government has not been successful in reducing sectarian conflict. In this system, too much responsibility is placed on Iraqi political leaders to actively include all sectarian groups and cooperate with them to truly achieve the reduction in conflict that a consociational democracy is meant to do.

Conditions under which the consociational model is successful:

John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary argue in *Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription*, that no matter how inclusive the system is, as specified by the constitution, it cannot guarantee peace. Similarly, Lijphart (1977) argues that there are some favorable conditions under which consociational democracies are likely to be more successful than other. He states that there are some factors that have stood out to him as conducive for elite cooperation. He lists eight factors that appeared important based on comparative studies of four Western European cases of consociational democracies, Belgium, Switzerland, Netherlands and Austria. A prior *history of political elite accommodation* is conducive to a successful consociational democracy (Lijphart 1977). "A predemocratic historical tendency toward moderation and compromise can indeed by an independent factor that can appreciably strengthen the chances of a consociational democracy" (Lijphart 1977, 100). Lijphart contrasts a history of absolutism or straight majority rule with the informal creation of a *grand coalition* to determine this. A *multiple balance of power* is another condition that is conducive for a consociational democracy. Lijphart explains that, "A multiple balance of power among the segments of a plural society is more conducive to consociational democracy than a dual balance of power or a

hegemony by one of the segments because if one segment has a clear majority its leaders may attempt to dominate rather than cooperate with the rival minority" (Lijphart 1977, 55). There are two elements to this balance of power. One is that there is equilibrium between the segments and the second is that there are at least three segments in that society. *Size of the country* is another factor to take into consideration when assessing the prospects for success of consociational democracies. Lijphart states that "Small size has both direct and indirect effect on the probability that consociational democracy will be established and will be successful: it directly enhances a spirit of cooperativeness and accommodation and it indirectly increases the chances of consociational democracy by reducing the burdens of decision making and thus rendering the country easier to govern" (Lijphart 1977, 65). Lijphart suggests that it is possible that the consociational model is better suited for smaller countries because political elites are more likely to meet up frequently and actually know each other personally. Also, Lijphart explains that smaller countries might have stronger solidarity because they are more likely to be threatened by larger foreign powers, so that insecurity can bring a nation closer together (Lijphart 66). A *representative party system,* the existence of political parties to represent sectarian groups, is another favorable condition for successful consociational democracy because "Political parties are the principal institutional means for translating segmental cleavages into the political realm (Lijphart 1977, 83)." Lastly, the *type of cleavage structure* is an important condition to take into consideration. Cleavage structure refers to "the number of cleavages and the degree of fragmentation that they cause, the extent to which different cleavages crosscut or coincide, the types and intensities of cleavages, the countervailing effects of overarching loyalties and finally the manner in which segmental cleavages and party system cleavages are related (Lijphart 1977, 71)." Of particular importance for the success of consociational systems is the presence of *cross-*

cutting cleavages. Lijphart emphasizes that importance of "cross-cutting-ness" of segments or the degree to which segments overlap geographically and socially. Lijphart says that societies in which segments do not overlap at all in daily activities is a high degree of fragmentation and are less likely to achieve peace (Lijphart 1977).

However there are other types of factors that Lijphart does not consider in his explanation. He focuses on the institutional and structural factors that would help to mitigate sectarian conflict. However Lijphart does not really explain the role of political agency as a causal mechanism for mitigating sectarian conflict. One factor in particular that Lijphart does not explore that would be helpful in a study of the success of the consociational model: the willingness of political elites to cooperate. Lijphart states that "[Political elites] must have a basic willingness to engage in cooperative efforts with the leaders of other segments in a spirit of moderation and compromise. At the same time, they must retain the support and loyalty of their own followers" (Lijphart 1977, 53). While he lists the favorable structural conditions that would make this situation more likely, he does not explain how factors like political elite orientation would play into cooperation efforts. Lijphart does not address the possibility that political elites in a consociational democracy will not want to cooperate with one another and how his model would work to fix that. What is to say that political elites will come together to form a grand coalition if there are not formal quotas for each sectarian group? Even if a country has a grand coalition, what is to say that each political actor will not act in the interest of his or her own segment or sabotage other segments? I argue that while structural factors are important, political agency has a greater causal importance than what Lijphart acknowledges and merits further attention and emphasis in understanding sectarian conflict.

Donald Horowitz (2001) argues that the actions and attitudes of political elites are particularly important to the governance of any democratic. Barbara Kellerman (1988) argues that scholars have underplayed the "human element" of political leaders or refer to it in ways that does not clearly state the significance of a country's leader (Kellerman, 1988, 2). Even if all the divided groups in a country are fairly represented, how can an institutional design guarantee that their political elites will act ethically and not abuse their power? Kellerman (1988) explains that, "…scholars often become so wrapped up in tactics and strategies that they neglect the psychopolitical imperatives governing those must perforce initiate and implement them".

In this paper, I examine the role of institutional consociational democracies versus political elite behavior in reducing ethno-sectarian conflict. What role did the institutional consociational features in increasing or decreasing conflict? What was the role of political elite behavior within these consociational institutions? Lijphart concluded that Malaysia and Lebanon were both "relatively successful" consociational democracies. Lijphart has not done this analysis of Iraq as a consociational democracy therefore I do not have his conclusions on whether he would consider Iraq a successful consociational democracy or not. However, a few scholars have studied Iraq as a consociational democracy so I compare my conclusions to theirs. I use the same standards to analyze each of these three cases. In each country I determine a) if the country is truly consociational by Lijphart's standards b) whether or not it was successful at mitigating conflict and c) whether political elite were willing to cooperate. My hypotheses are:

1) Malaysia is not truly a consociational democracy however the role of British intervention and political elites willing to work together which helped mitigate conflict

2) Lebanon does have an institutional consociational democracy however conflict increased when political elites failed to cooperate within those institutions

3) Iraq has failed to reduce conflict because political elites are not willing to cooperate despite some of its institutional consociational features

4) Lijphart overgeneralized his model and did not adequately consider the role of political elites willing to work together when assessing the success of a consociational democracy to mitigate sectarian conflict

Chapter 2: Methodology

In this paper, I conduct a qualitative case study of Iraq, Malaysia and Lebanon during their first 10 to 15 years after consociational implementation. This paper explains the causal mechanisms for why conflict in Iraq has only increased since 2005 despite the application of the consociational model. To do this, I compare it to two other examples of consociational democracies, Lebanon and Malaysia. These cases exhibit different levels of success, with Malaysia being the most successful, Lebanon being relatively successful and Iraq being the least successful. I consider the willingness of political elites to cooperate as a vital condition for mitigating ethno-sectarian conflict. This will therefore be a qualitative rather than quantitative study.

I divide the paper into three chapters by case study. Within each case study, I look at how the country implemented the consociational model in further depth, specifically looking at the four characteristics of consociationalism identified Lijphart's model. I then determine the extent to which each country can be considered a consociational democracy. I then systematically examine how many of Lijphart's Favorable Conditions were present in each case. As I

mentioned, Lijphart provides analysis of this for the Lebanon and Malaysia cases but not for Iraq. For Malaysia and Lebanon, I further analyze Lijphart's findings and determine whether or not each condition is present. For Iraq, I use Lijphart's methods to determine whether each condition is present or not and compare the results to Malaysia and Lebanon. I also look for the presence of Lijphart's "unfavorable conditions" for successful consociational democracies in each country.

Then I look at other factors or events in history that could explain why each country failed or succeeded in mitigating conflict aside from Lijphart's consociational institutions and favorable conditions. I focus on political elite willingness to cooperate and mitigate conflict across all countries. In Malaysia and Iraq specifically, I be looking at the effect of third party intervention as it affected political elite willingness to cooperate.

When looking at political elite willingness to cooperate with each other, I distinguish between political elite cooperation before the introduction of consociational institutions and after. I model my analysis off of Daniel Sullivan's work. Sullivan critiques Lijphart's model arguing that, "…how and where elite cooperation fits into Lijphart's model is less clear and thus it is the potential cause of some confusion" (Sullivan 2005, 82). He argues that ideally there needs to be some sort of initial political elite cooperation, then implementation of consociational institutions (grand coalition, proportional representation etc.), then further elite cooperation due to political security each leader feels for himself and the segment he represents and this will lead to peace.

Sullivan (2005) argues that separating these two phases of elite cooperation will help in understanding how and why political elites fail to cooperate. "In other words, cooperation at the elite level must exist for a grand coalition to form, but without a grand coalition this cooperation

cannot continue to the point of providing enough political security to guarantee peace. Thus a distinction between elite cooperation before the formation of a grand coalition and afterwards needs to be made. The first phase is one that allows the proposition and setting up of a grand coalition. The second phase is an increasing cooperation fed by this grand coalition which leads to peace" (Sullivan 2005, 82). In Sullivan's analysis of Burundi as a consociational democracy, he begins by looking for initial cooperation before formation of a grand coalition, then he evaluates the presences of Lijphart's four consociational characteristics. If all the characteristics were present, then he went on to see where the political elite cooperation broke down because Burundi failed to bring about peace. Sullivan (2005) correlated Burundi's failure to bring about peace with a breakdown of political elite cooperation after the establishment of a consociational democracy. Sullivan does not outline a clear, general sequence of political elite cooperation through this process, he specifically looks at this in Burundi.

Sullivan (2005) emphasizes the different of political elites acting within consociational institutions because they are affected by political security. Political security, as understood by Sullivan, refers to political elites perceived threat to their power and position. He argues that lack of political elite cooperation is due to lack of political security that the foundations of consociational democracies are intended to provide. Threats to political security could include distrust of a majority group for fear they will overpower interests of a minority group (Sullivan 2005). However, as Sullivan explains every characteristic of consociationalism, he notes how each characteristic increases a group's political security because they decrease this perceived threat.

Under initial elite cooperation, he examines office assignments, acceptance of election results and overall peaceful elections (Sullivan 2005). Office assignments refer to who gets

appointed to office and whether nominations included politicians from all segments of society. Acceptance of election results and peaceful elections refers to the reaction of the losing party or opposition to election results and if violence resulted from election outcomes. For elite cooperation strengthened by political security, Sullivan (2005) also examines peaceful elections, acceptance of the opposition but also calls for resignation from the opposition. For each country, I look at the period leading up to the establishment of democracy to see how political leaders acted in this initial period and then focus on the country of the leadership of the first and possibly second executive since independence. In these periods I will look for political elite cooperation strengthened by political security.

In addition to Sullivan's criteria, I examine political elite responses to relevant events in each countries history such as the role of the French in Lebanon or communists in Malaysia. I pay special attention to political elite responses to ethno-sectarian outbreaks of violence. I consider the speed at which they responded, whether they condemned or supported the violence and whether they took action to stop the violence. For this I will look at speeches given both over the radio and television as well as interviews in newspapers.

For each country, I draw a conclusion on whether the consociational institutions of each country helped to mitigate conflict. I also draw a conclusion on the political elite behavior during that time period in each country. Additionally, I consider other possible explanations for why a country succeeded or failed in mitigating conflict. Based on my analysis of Malaysia, Lebanon and Iraq so far, I will provide policy recommendations for how Iraq should move forward.

Chapter 2: Malaysia

Malaysia is a country in which there are still significant ethnic tensions however they have mostly been kept in check since 1957. While the Malays dominate the political system, ethnic violence has been minimal. Lijphart attributes this to the consociational institutions of the Malaysian political system (Lijphart 1977). Some scholars, including Harold Crouch, view Malaysia as a political system that "exhibits some characteristics of consociationalism" (Crouch 1996, 154) rather than a fully consociational democracy. Lijphart states that Malaysia's consociational institutions developed very differently than those of Europe and Lebanon. Malaysia's constitution is based on the model of a British democracy, which employs a single-district plurality electoral system. This, as I will explain further, is not typical of consociational democracies. However Lijphart argues that Malaysia's "all-important consociational device" is its strong grand coalition (Lijphart 1977, 151).

Figure 2: Consociational Characteristics in Malaysia

Consociational Characteristic	**Present/Absent**
Grand Coalition	Present (Informal)
Proportional Representation	Absent
Segmental Autonomy	Present (Informal)
Mutual Veto	Absent

The strong grand coalition Lijphart is referring to is the Alliance Party, which was formed in 1952, five years prior to Malaysia's independence from Great Britain in 1957. The Alliance Party was a combination of the three major ethnic parties in Malaysia: the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the

Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). This alliance formally became known as the Alliance and won all the national elections between 1955 and 1969. The Alliance Party remained in effect throughout the country's transition from Malaya to Malaysia with the addition of Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah in 1963. It also remained dominant after Singapore left the federation in 1965. After the formation of the Alliance, it formed a cabinet that represented all three of these segments (Lijphart 1977).

The electoral system was not *proportional*, but a single-member district plurality, based on the British model. Because Malays constitute a majority, they are favored in this electoral system. In addition, "it was tilted even more in their favor by the malapportionment of the constituencies to the advantage of the rural areas with Malay majorities" (Lijphart 1977, 152). Though its estimated that non-Malays held about two-thirds of the top professional and managerial positions in civil service due to their educational superiority that arguably did not balance the scales the way proportional representation would have. The nature of the Malay dominated government meant that there was a weak *minority veto* as well.

The Alliance party did practice *segmental autonomy*, according to Lijphart. "The Alliance arrangement entailed a high degree of freedom for the segments in the conduct of their internal social and cultural affairs. It should be noted that this autonomy is not a function of the federal setup of Malaysia, because the segmental boundaries are not geographical and do not coincide with the state boundaries, and because the federation is a highly centralized one with the exception of the special status enjoyed by the two East Malaysian states" (Lijphart 1977, 151). Therefore segmental autonomy was not a function that was purposefully put into place as Lijphart had intended for a consociational democracy. It is just a characteristic that is practiced among the Alliance party leaders.

Overall, in its first 13 years after independence, Malaysia did not exhibit a traditional consociational democracy according to Lijphart's standards. Objectively looking at the Malaysian political system, it informally practices a grand coalition in the form of a coalition political party and informally practices segmental autonomy.

However Malaysia did have relatively low conflict in its first 10 years after independence. Lijphart looked at if Malaysia had any preconditions that would make it more likely to succeed as a consociational democracy. However I don't think it is fair to say Malaysia was a truly consociational democracy by Lijphart's own standards since it doesn't meet all of his characteristics. I will examine some of Lijphart's analysis of the presence of his "Favorable Conditions" in Malaysia to see if there is any further explanation for why he believed that Malaysia was a relatively successful example of a consociational democracy in mitigating sectarian conflict.

Malaysia's Favorable Conditions:

Lijphart (1977) addresses how Malaysia meets his "Favorable Conditions" in *Democracy in Plural Societies.* He mentions that both Lebanon and Malaysia "…strengthen the case for consociational democracy as a normative model not only because they provide concrete evidence of its applicability and feasibility in two plural societies in the Third World but also because the conditions for consociationalism in these countries were not uniformly favorable" (Lijphart 1977, 53).

Lijphart (1977) suggests that to have a *multiple balance of power*, there should be three or four ethnic groups in a society in which no one group makes up the majority. While Malaysian society is made up of more than three ethnic groups, Malays do make up a majority of the population. The Malay, Chinese and Indian populations are not balanced in Malaysian society. In

1957, a little less than 50 percent of the population was Malay or aborigines, 37 percent were Chinese and 12 percent were Indians.

Figure 3: Malaysia's Favorable Conditions

Favorable Condition	Present/Absent
Multiple balance of power	Absent
Multiparty system	Present
Small country	Present
Crosscutting or coinciding between segments	Absent
Overarching loyalties	Absent
Representative party systems	Present
Segmental isolation along geographic lines	Absent
Tradition of elite accommodation	Present

Even smaller percentages were Pakistanis or Ceylonese. These numbers only changed slightly after Singapore was kicked out of the federation in 1965. Therefore Malaysia does not meet the *multiple balance of power* condition. In fact, Lijphart (1977) states, "The numerical imbalance between the near-majority Malays and the minority segments also accounts for the politically dominant role of the Malays in the Alliance and in Malaysian government – a feature that throws some doubt on the consociational character of the Malaysian regime even in the 1955-1969 period" (Lijphart 1977, 154).

Lijphart explains that segmental isolation across geographic lines is preferable to segmental isolation across social lines. There is not *segmental isolation across geographic lines* in Malaysia. In fact there is very little interaction and communication between Malaysian segments. Therefore Malaysia does not meet the *crosscutting or coinciding* condition. Malays, Chinese and Indians in Malaysia have many reinforcing divisions in addition to ethnicity. One

example is economic divisions. Aside from the Malays that work in civil service, a majority works in agriculture as farmers or as unskilled laborers. The Chinese dominate all other sectors of the economy as explained above. Therefore the Chinese make on average two to three times more than the average Malay (Lijphart 1977). This creates a problem of economic inequality between segments, which surely cannot make cooperation between groups easier. Malays are the largest community in Malaysia and also the most homogenous. They are all Muslims and speak Malay. There may be some differences in dialects however it is the same standard written language. But Chinese and Indians communities are divided along religious, linguistic and cultural lines.

Malaysia does meet Lijphart's *country size* condition; he considers Malaysia a small country. Another condition it somewhat meets is *history of political accommodation*. Malaysia had a history of leaders from different segments working together under the British. The British formed Communities Liaison Committees in 1949 that were made up of six Malays, six Chinese, one Indian and three other representatives from minority groups. Lijphart says this does not count as a form of traditional "history of political accommodation" but it could arguably have been good experience for these groups to work together before the Alliance party was created a few years later (Lijphart 1977).

Overall Lijphart concludes that while some conditions in Malaysia were favorable, most of them were unfavorable. He states therefore, inevitable success cannot be guaranteed. Lijphart does address the fact that he drew his favorable conditions from analysis of his European consociational democracies, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium and Netherlands. So when applying the favorable conditions to the Third World, he reevaluated some of his conditions and added on some unfavorable conditions. One unfavorable condition that Malaysia meets is a country

recently struggled to gain independence. The struggle to gain independence could have been a unifying factor for the country, but if independence was won years ago, that common struggle may have faded (Lijphart 1977). Malaysia could definitely have been less unified by the time of the 1969 conflict.

Overall, it seems that Malaysia is not truly an example of a consociational democracy by Lijphart's original standards. Multiple times he expresses doubt about whether it truly can be considered consociational. For the most part, Malaysia did not meet many of Lijphart's Favorable Conditions either, which could have potentially explained why Malaysia managed to minimize conflict since independence for a while. In fact Malaysia met some of Lijphart's "Unfavorable Conditions". Malaysia only employed one of Lijphart's four consociational features, did not meet many of its Favorable Conditions and did meet some of his Unfavorable Conditions. It calls into to question why Lijphart chose to examine Malaysia as a case of consociational democracy in the Third World.

I believe that Lijphart's analysis does not get at the entire picture of why Malaysia has been relatively successful at mitigating conflict. I plan to look more closely at the record and see what aspects of Malaysian history and politics Lijphart did not address or put enough emphasis on. I hypothesized that political elites were more willing to cooperate in Malaysia and Lijphart did not emphasize this enough in his analysis. I will be paying close attention to the role of British intervention in Malaysia prior to their independence.

I will break down Malaysia's history into two periods, post-World War II to the establishment of the Alliance Party (1945-1953) and then the period of leadership under the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman (1943-1969). In accordance with Daniel Sullivan's

analysis of political elite cooperation, I will distinguish between initial elite cooperation and then sustained cooperation.

Malaysia from Post World War II to Alliance Party formation (1945-1953):

Under British rule and prior to Japanese occupation, political elites from each segment in Malaya dealt with the British rather than with each other. There were also different forms of government in each parts of the country and the British were forced to coordinate between all of them. An overall sense of nationalism was lacking in Malaya in 1945 compared to other Southeast Asian countries. "[The British] tried to hold a balance between the races, at the same time having a sentimental attachment to the Malays as the 'original' inhabitants" (Milne 1967, 26). The British saw non-Malays as "temporary guests" (Crouch 1996, 16). It is not quite clear why this was the case however this attachment definitely showed as the nation's politics unraveled in the coming decades.

After World War II, the British took control over Malaya again and formed the Malaya Union, which excluded Singapore. The exclusion could have been to please the Malays because Singapore's population was mostly made up of Chinese (Milne 1967). The Malay rulers had to give up power to the British governor who resided in Malaya. These rulers presided over the Advisory Malay Council, which dealt with policy relating to Islam.

In 1948, the Communists resorted to violence and created the "Emergency" period, which lasted for 11 years. They wanted to take action because they were unable to control the trade unions (Milne 1967). They also wanted reforms on issues such as limited rice supply since the end of the war. The Communists used guerrilla warfare and killed approximately 11,000 during this period of conflict. The ethnic Malays used this conflict as an argument for independence

from the British. They argued that the Communists were fighting against the imperial forces in the country therefore the government should be Malay rather than British. However a crucial step was the creation of a political party that the British could hand over the power to. "In view of the racial composition of Malaya it was necessary that this party should represent at least the two major races" (Milne 1967, 34). At this point, the Malays felt a need for a large organization to represent their interest in wake of Communist violence and British intervention. James Jesudason notes "The Malays, already deeply insecure because of their economic position and the communist challenge, felt betrayed by the British, who were seen as the vital protectors of Malay society. ...Numerous Malay associations rapidly transcended their particularistic local village and state identities and coalesced against the Malayan Union scheme. The oppositionist movement, which culminated in the United Malays National Organization (or UMNO), was led by the elite stratum of Malay administrators. Using their links with district level Malay authorities right down to the Malay headman, the elites succeeded in mobilizing most of the Malay population and, in doing so, laid the basis for UMNO as a mass political party (Jesudason 1996, 42-43)".

It was the Malay nationalists, led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, who cooperated with the British to create UMNO and worked with them for full independence in August 31, 1957. Dan Slater (2010) notes that, "Although UMNO is often portrayed as having been a vehicle for anti-British sentiment at its inception, it is more accurate to see it as an instrument for distinctly anti-Chinese ends… So long as the British did not aim use their powers to favor the Chinese, the Malay leadership was willing to see the British accrue the added political powers they desired. Indeed, the 1945-57 period consistently shows Malay leaders welcoming, even inviting the expansion of the colonial state's powers, in response to the chronic challenge of Chinese mass

mobilization" (Slater 2010, 229-230). The Malays wanted to make sure that British did not impose more liberal citizenship requirements, which would allow more Chinese to become citizens. This motivated Chinese all over Malaya to unite and push for Chinese citizenship.

In June 1948, the British declared the communist guerilla violence in Malaysia an "Emergency". The growing issue of this violence pushed the British and Malays to take action. However one problem was the support base for the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which got most of its support from the Chinese population within Malaya. A month later, the government declared the MCP illegal and hundreds of its members were arrested. While many Chinese did support the MCP, there were also many anti-Communist Chinese who were killed in the insurgency violence (Slater 2010). "This elite collective action was expressed through the continued strengthening of the colonial Malayan state, the birth of a highly effective Chinese political party, and the construction of a broad party coalition linking elite figures across Malaya's deep communal chasms. Yet these new political institutions emerged only gradually - even grudgingly - as lower-cost means of fighting the Emergency and restoring social stability consistently proved inadequate to the challenge" (Slater 2010, 245-246).

In February 1949, the Malayan Chinese Association was formed, largely in response to the "Emergency". "Immediately, it could provide a rival focus for Chinese loyalties from the Communists… Looking beyond the immediate future, it was a respectable body which could see to it that Chinese interests were fully taken into account in any constitutional changes" (Milne 1967, 35). The MCA also well-represented the Chinese diversity in Malaya and quickly gained wide-spread support across the numerous dialects present in the country (Slater 2010). The British supported the MCA because they hoped it would draw support away from the communist insurgency. The Malay political elites also supported the emergence of the MCA. Following the

declaration of the Emergency and banning of the MCP, UMNO leader Onn Bin Jaafar issues a statement calling on "law-abiding Chinese" to come together and form a political party and join the British and UMNO effort to end the communist insurgency violence (Slater 2010). "The Emergency thus presented the kind of palpable pressure for collective action among Chinese elites - along with a clear rationale for Malay and British elites to support such collective action - that was sorely lacking before the eruption of mass mobilization that immediately followed World War II" (Slater 2010, 257).

During the period of the 1950 to 1951, the insurgency violence had reached a height. Both the Malays and British feared that they were going to lose the battle to the communists because they were failing to reduce violence. This fear really brought political elites together. The British wanted to further unite the main groups in Malaya to confront the increasing guerilla violence and facilitated meetings between the Malay, Chinese and later Indian political elites (Slater 2010). Specifically for the Malay and Chinese political elites, they did not come together because of any "natural affinity" for the other group. However they saw the benefit in uniting together to fight off the communist insurgency and further prevent any racial conflict (Slater 2010).

The national Alliance was formally set up in 1953. "Communal divisions in Malaya were so deep that it was impossible to form successful a single non-communal party; but they were not too deep to destroy an alliance of communal parties" (Milne 1967, 35). By 1954 the Alliance party included UMNO, MCA and the MIC. "[It] showed at a number at a number of local elections that it had enough support from all the different communities to qualify as the prospective government when the British handed over power" (Milne 1967, 35).

These groups were initially united by the fear of the communist insurgency and heavily encouraged to do so by the British. However the British eventually granted Malaya independence additionally the "Emergency" period ended in 1960. Would political elite still be willing to cooperate without that uniting factor and external pressure? One would expect that without this common cause, the Alliance Party would fall apart or overall support for the party would decrease. And lack of an external pressure like the British would make it more difficult to reunite political elites.

Malaysia under Tunku Abdul Rahaman:

Malaya held its first general elections in 1955 for its Legislative Council. The Alliance won 51 out of the 52 seats and UMNO president, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was appointed as the Chief Minister and formed a cabinet. In his first speech over the radio on May 9, 1955, Tunku Abdul Rahman said, "The election has shown that all those loyal to this country, no matter what their race or creed may be, are prepared to sink all differences in the case of Malaya as a whole" (Rahman 1984, 100). This was the first time that all communities in Malaya had come together to elect a government and was promising for Malaya's future as an independent country. Tunku Abdul Rahman recalled that Malays cheered on the politicians they'd elected into office as they paraded down the streets of Kuala Lumpur without regard of their nationality. They cheered for them because they were part of the Alliance Party (Rahman 1984).

The period between 1955 and 1957 served as a transitional period for the Alliance party to have authority over Malaysian government. In terms of rights of non-Malays, Tunku Abdul Rahman felt that Malays were being very generous with how many rights they were sharing. In a speech he gave over Radio Malaya on April 22, 1956, Tunku explained:

> *"There are certain people who demand equal rights with the Malays. If they would only look around them, they would find that all the big businesses, mines and estates are in the*

> *hands of non-Malays having no share or any right whatsoever in them. The Malays' only chance of keeping our identity in this country alive is to insist on the retention of our inherent rights guaranteed by the Federation of Malays Agreement, by treaties made between the British Government and the Rulers. Under the changes visualized by the new constitution, the Malays are prepared within reason to share those rights with others who owe loyalty to this country. I must ask non-Malays to be fair and be considerate and not make unreasonable demands, for it is well to remember that no natives of any other country in the world have given away so much as the Malays have done. No natives have been as friendly to immigrant people as the Malays have been. Nobody need have any fear as to their future well-being in independent Malaya" (Rahman 1984, 102-103).*

From the beginning, Tunku Abdul Rahman preached the inherent rights Malays had as the original habitants of the country and that non-Malays were lucky for all the rights they'd been given. However true equality between Malays and non-Malays was not part of the plan according to the Tunku. While there was an understanding among the Malays and non-Malays that the Malays would remain dominant, this does not seem like a sustainable form of political elite cooperation. It is understandable that after a few years, non-Malays would become frustrated with this status quo of Malay dominance.

In the negotiations leading up to independence facilitated by the British, UMNO, MCA and MIC leaders agreed that non-Malays would be able to keep their positions in the economy as long as Malays remained dominant in the government. This agreement became known as the "Bargain". "The Bargain included such arrangements as constitutional advantages to the Malays; support for a Malay as head of state, chosen from among the sultans of nine peninsular Malay states; Malay as the country's official language; and Islam as the official religion. Also the constitution provided special privileges to Malays in land acquisition, educational assistance and civil service employment" (Daley & Neher 2013, 280).

This agreement was reinforced by nature of the Alliance party, in which Indians, Chinese and Malays were all represented, however Malays were dominant. Nonetheless, the Malays acknowledged that they needed support of their entire party to make decisions. Tunku Abdul

Rahman explained that he could not refer to the Federation of Malay Government as his government. “Every act of mine and every word of mine will have to be carefully weighted and considered not by me alone but by the parties to this Agreement” (Rahman 1984, 122). While it was understood that the Malays were dominant, Tunku made clear that he was not an absolute ruler of Malaya. This language that the Tunku used was cooperative and showed that he was willing to work with his fellow political leaders within the Alliance party. However it is important to note the difference between political elites willing to cooperate and political elites considering the others as equals *and* willing to cooperate. It is not surprising that over time, this sustained sense of inequality would result in opposition to the Malay-dominated Alliance Party.

The British formally handed power over to Tunku Abdul Rahman and the Alliance party on August 31, 1957 (Rahman 1984). “The Alliance formula worked well for its constituent parties during the first dozen years after independence. The top party leaders not only cooperated closely in the government but also became “warm personal friends” (Crouch 1996, 32). This relationship between Malaysian leaders was better than those of many European consociational democracies which Lijphart deemed success stories. There were always conflicts in making decisions involving the interests of each racial group but they were worked out through a compromise in the cabinet. “Certainly UMNO’s dominance was not doubted; but its leaders headed by Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, were usually sensitive to the interests represented of their MCA and MIC partners” (Crouch 1996, 32-33).

Following the end of the Emergency Period, there was no longer an immediate threat to the MCA and tensions between Malays, Chinese and Indians were relatively low. According to Sullivan’s (2005) analysis, it would seem that political elites in Malaysia did not have any immediate threat to their political security, which could explain this period of cooperation. While

there was still inequality within the Alliance, each major group still got to take part in the political process and the Alliance Party continued to do well in elections.

However opposition to the Alliance Party was growing and racial tensions in the country were rising. Increased electoral competition with the opposition parties put stress on the Alliance Party and the partnership and cooperation between parties began to break down (Slater 2010). In May 1969, Malaysia was expected to hold its fourth parliamentary election. “The election was held in an atmosphere in which non-Malays feared further encroachments on what they considered their established rights and Malays demanding a more vigorous assertion of Malay interests” (Crouch 1996, 23). The Alliance party had won a vast majority of seats in the 1955, 1959 and 1964 elections. However by 1969, support for the Alliance Party was still pretty broad but it had decreased. In the 1969 parliamentary elections, the Alliance Party won only 48.5 percent of the votes and opposition parties won 51.5 percent. “Although Alliance candidates still controlled a majority in the Parliament despite losing 23 seats, the 1969 election showed that the Alliance coalition’s capacity to govern was seriously impaired” (Daley & Neher 2013, 280). The anti-Alliance opposition parties decided to celebrate their victory by marching down the streets of Kuala Lumpur. This prompted the Alliance party supporters to also march. Tensions between the two groups quickly turned into mob violence in the streets that lasted for four days and resulted in 196 deaths (Daley & Neher 2013). The Malaysian government broke down following the riots and violence and the country was placed under the rule of an emergency council until 1971.

The government declared a state of emergency in 1969 to preserve Malay dominance in the political system. They disbanded parliament and curbed civil rights. A new governing body, the National Operations Council, had total authority over the country and was charged with

returning order to Malaysia. “The twenty-one-month period was a time of suspended democracy” (Daley & Neher 2013, 280).

The election and subsequent riots showed the pent up aggravation in both the Chinese and Malay groups with the current government, especially among Malays. This would shape racial politics in Malaysia after the violence ended. “The Malay elite came to the conclusion that the moderate, gradual approach to racial questions exemplified by the policies of Tunku Abdul Rahman was no longer sufficient to retain mass support among the Malays” (Crouch 1996, 24). Following the 1969 conflict, Malaysia restored its parliamentary democracy by 1972. The Alliance party came back as the Barisan Nasional (BN) under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Razak. The BN coalition functioned as a *grand coalition* the same way the Alliance Party did and consisted of the original Alliance parties, UMNO, MCA and MIC as well as the opposition parties who won seats in the 1969 elections such as the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS). “In all, Barison Nasional was composted of element component parties, but UMNO remained the senior partner, with final say over coalition decisions” (Daley & Neher 2013, 288). The BN has remained the dominant party in Malaysia since 1972.

Conclusion:

As predicted, there were numerous casual mechanisms that would explain increases or decreases in sectarian conflict tin Malaysia that Lijphart did not address in his analysis. While the Alliance party was successful in minimizing tensions in Malaysia for a few years, its model was not sustainable because there was not true equality between ethnic groups in the political system. Political elites in Malaysia exhibited both initial political cooperation as well as political elite cooperation sustained by political security. Tunku Abdul Rahman spoke of cooperating with other political elites and fostering harmony between the Malays, Chinese and Indians. However

he also always emphasized the dominance of the Malays and how non-Malays are lucky for all the rights they've been provided in Malaysia. That sense of inequality was ever-present throughout Tunku Abdul Rahman's time as prime minister. The Alliance Party itself never fell apart and political elites within it did not stop cooperating. The "Bargain" that set the tone for the Alliance Party and Malaysian politics during this time appears to be an important reason for the 1969 riots.

However, there was never a real breakdown in political elite cooperation within the Alliance Party up until the 1969 riots. The Alliance Party worked together and won a majority in three consecutive parliamentary elections over the course of nine years. Also during this time, violence was minimal after the end of the Emergency Period in 1959. This is all despite the fact that Malaysia did not really implement the consociational model and should not be considered a consociational democracy. This shows that Lijphart did not sufficiently consider the role of agency as opposed to structure when evaluating the success of Malaysia to mitigate conflict.

The representative nature of Malaysian political parties is also really important to consider when looking at the success of the Alliance party. While there was support and pressure from the British for each sectarian group to create a representative political party, it was the Malays, Chinese and Indians that ultimately formed political groups themselves to represent their needs. Political parties therefore had to be responsive to their constituents. When the population felt that their political elites were no longer representing their needs, they turned to opposition political parties and supported them in elections. Because of Malaysia established institutions, citizens could work within the political system to voice their opinions and express discontent.

Chapter 3: Lebanon

Lebanon is another example of what Lijphart refers to as a "reasonable successful consociational democracy in the Third World" (Lijphart 1977, 150). Lijphart says that Lebanon was consociational from its independence from the French in 1943 to the civil war that broke out in 1975. Unlike Malaysia, there is more scholarly consensus that Lebanon is a consociational democracy (El-Husseini 2012). Lebanon manifested Lijphart's formal institutional characteristics for a consociational democracy more strictly than other countries like Malaysia for example. All these characteristics have been present since Lebanese independence.

Figure 4: Consociational Characteristics in Lebanon

Consociational Characteristic	Present/Absent
Grand Coalition	Present (Formal)
Proportional Representation	Present (Formal)
Segmental Autonomy	Present (Informal)
Mutual Veto	Present (Informal)

Lebanon employs a *grand coalition* in the form of a cabinet, which serves as a collective head of state. The cabinet or troika consists of a president, prime minister and speaker of the parliament. Each position is set aside for a particular faction therefore the president is required to be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister is Sunni Muslim and the speaker of the parliament is a Shia Muslim. While there are three members of the executive cabinet, Lebanon has a two-head or dual executive system that consists of a president and a prime minister (El-Husseini 2012). The president is elected for a six-year term by a majority vote in parliament, but because he is predetermined to be a Christian, only Christians can run for this office. The president serves as

the official head of state and has the power to appoint and dismiss cabinet members and dissolve parliament. The prime minister is the head of the executive cabinet and is appointed by the president. The duties of the prime minister according to the 1926 constitution include “management of affairs of state, the development of policy, and the implementation of laws” (El-Husseini 2012).

Lebanon’s parliament, the “Chamber of Deputies", consists of a single chamber and was made up of 99 members until 1972. It is elected through *proportional representation* however Christians are slightly overrepresented. Lebanon employs a plurality multimember district system. Lebanon consists of five large governates that are subdivided into about 30 smaller counties (Ekmekji 2012). In each constituency, the candidate with a plurality of the votes wins a seat in parliament. There are 17 officially recognized segments in Lebanese society, within Islam and Christianity, and they are all proportionally represented within their respective religions in parliament. The overall ratio, which varied a bit from 1943 to 1977, was six Christians to five Muslim members of parliament. “It has often been praised as a proportional system that produced compromise and harmony because in order to be elected a candidate needed the votes of members of both his own and other sects” (Lijphart 1977, 149). Lijphart does address that this system has its drawbacks because it is usually the moderate representatives of each segment that are elected rather than the “champions” because they need broad support. The political leaders that take very strong stances for the group they represent struggle to gain support from voters of other groups. Therefore, the Chamber of Deputies consists of moderate representatives of each major faction. Lijphart also notes that at times, the legislature could be ineffectual so serious issues were then passed up to the cabinet, “a true Parliament on a small scale”. El-Husseini (2012) explains that while the parliament does have a lot of power, members try to avoid

publically debating controversial issues. On the other hand, the executive cabinet deliberations are kept secret, so they can debate tough issues behind closed doors.

While it is not formally included in the constitution, *segmental autonomy* is enforced and is a crucial feature of Lebanese democracy. "Each sect has its own schools, and social, recreational, and welfare organizations. Furthermore, the personal status laws (concerning such matters as marriage, divorce, and inheritance) differ from sect to sect and are administered in separate sectarian courts" (Lijphart 1977, 149). Overall, Muslims and Christians have high levels of autonomy to live their lives according to their own cultural practices. Similarly, *mutual veto* is another important but unwritten aspect of Lebanon's political system.

A general criticism that Lijphart addresses is how Lebanon's quota system in parliament and the cabinet makes the country very inflexible to demographic changes in the country. This has been a source of conflict because the Christians, who did constitute a majority in Lebanon's 1932 census, decreased in population over the years. However the preset allocation of offices in the constitution made it difficult to adjust to those changes. Therefore the strict quota system makes it difficult for the Lebanese political system to adapt to changing demographic realities and hence be truly representative. In fact, Lijphart partly blames the democratic breakdown in 1975 on this rigid application of these consociational institutions (Lijphart 1977).

Overall, Lebanon was relatively peaceful during its Second Republic (1943-1975). It did however experience more conflict than Malaysia during its first 10 years as an independent country. Lijphart explained that he analyzed Lebanon in the context of its surrounding countries at the time. "Compared with the frequent revolutionary upheavals to which other Middle Eastern countries have been prone, and in spite of the other flaws in its consociational institutions, the Lebanese consociational regime established a remarkable – although far from perfect– record of

democratic stability" (Lijphart 1977, 150). Lijphart justifies some of the flaws in stability by saying that comparatively, Lebanon did well in establishing a consociational democracy, which ultimately led to less conflict than would have occurred had these institutions not been in place.

The next question I will address is did Lebanon have some pre-conditions that made it more likely to establish a successful consociational democracy in the first place? Aside from its consociational characteristics, Lijphart examines how many of his "Favorable Conditions" are present in Lebanon, the same way he did in Malaysia.

Favorable Conditions for a Consociational Democracy in Lebanon

Figure 5: Lebanon's Favorable Conditions

Favorable Condition	**Present/Absent**
Multiple balance of power	Present
Multiparty system	Present
Small country	Present
Crosscutting or coinciding between segments	Absent
Overarching loyalties	Absent
Representative party systems	Present
Segmental isolation along geographic lines	Absent
Tradition of elite accommodation	Present

Unlike Malaysia, Lebanon had did have a majority of the favorable conditions present. The main differences between Lebanon and Malaysia were on the basis of size, configurations of power domestically and the impact of external threats on the country (Lijphart 1977). Lebanon does have a *multiple balance of power*. Lijphart states that for a country to have a multiple balance of power, it must have more than three segments and that there is equilibrium between

segments. Lebanon has many minority segments and the four largest ones only make up 80 percent of the population (Lijphart 1977). Lebanon also has a population of roughly 2 million people, so it definitely qualifies for Lijphart's definition of a *small country*. Lijphart notes that its size is important in terms of domestic unity against external threats. The various religious groups in Lebanon united together for independence from the French in 1943.

Lebanon did have a prior *history of elite accommodation*. The country's constitution in 1926, inspired by French rule, did use proportionality to appoint civil servants. This gradually became the way highest offices were allotted in the 1930s. Under French rule, these officers representing various segments of society had to work together in some capacity. Lebanon did also exhibit a previous history of consociational democracy. "The Lebanese pattern of segmental autonomy has roots in the 'millet' system of the Ottoman Empire: the minority religious communities were accorded an inferior but internally autonomous status" (Lijphart 1977, 155). Lebanon also has a *multiparty political system* in which *political parties are representative* of segmented groups.

However there were three conditions that were absent. Aside from their shared Arabic language, the Lebanese people did not share much in common. There was no real national Lebanese identity either and they did not have *overarching loyalties* to the "nation-state". There was also limited *crosscutting or coinciding* between Christians and Muslims. Christians tended to be wealthier and Muslims were generally poorer. Each sect also specialized in one or two fields of the economy, otherwise known as "ethnic division of labor" (Issawi 1956, 37). Lijphart explained that it is beneficial for a country to have divided groups separated by geographic lines rather than social lines. In Lebanon, *Segmental isolation* was also only along social lines and not geographic. There was little communication or interaction between sects, with the exception of

the leaders of each sect. Each sect did have some areas that were more densely populated by their sect however it was definitely not a federal system. Overall, Lebanon is a highly divided country. Lijphart calculates that Lebanon is even further divided than Malaysia (Lijphart 1977).

Between Lebanon and Malaysia, there were a number of favorable conditions absent however Lijphart sees both these countries as successful consociational democracies. "Because the conditions were by no means overwhelmingly favorable, the considerable success of both consociational experiments cannot be considered inevitable in any way. This conclusion strengthens the theoretical and normative significance of the two cases" (Lijphart 1997, 157). First, this analysis of the favorable conditions is strange because five of the eight favorable conditions were present in Lebanon. For Lebanon at least, it is safe to say that a majority of the favorable conditions were present, which contradicts Lijphart's understanding of it. In addition, by making this conclusion, Lijphart rules out the possibility that there may have been other factors aside from the application of his consociational institutions that account for each country's success in mitigating conflict.

As I explained in the Malaysia chapter, I do not feel Lijphart is correct in calling Malaysia a consociational democracy. On the other hand, I do think it is a democracy that was relatively successful at mitigating conflict. It is clear that Lebanon is a consociational democracy. What is not clear is if its consociational institutions are responsible for its relative lack of violence. Further, Lebanon did experience more violence than Malaysia in its first decade after independence so what explains this difference? In addition, why did Lebanon experience more conflict in some periods than others? I argue that political elite behavior is crucial to understanding increase or decreases in sectarian conflict and must be taken into consideration when exploring both these questions. These are the questions I will answer when going through

the history of Lebanon's political system from before its independence in 1943 through the 1958 conflict and United States intervention. This time period shows the development and effect of political elite actions in the initial period since Lebanese independence.

Pre-1943 Independence:

In early 1943, the French had their own plan to create a large Christian quota in Lebanon and they attempted to pass a law to that effect. "But actually it was a thinly disguised attempt by the Maronites to reestablish their claim to constitute 'the historic majority'" (Ziadeh 2006, 111). This was an attempt to create a Christian identity for Lebanon, which the French were in favor of. In opposition was Bishara al-Khoury, a Maronite Christian, who allied with leading Sunni elite, Riad Al-Solh. "In backing the Solh-Khoury alliance, the British saw an opportunity to ingratiate itself with the Arab nationalist elites" (Ziadeh 2006, 112). It was the British who worked to ensure the Sunni-Maronite duo had a fair chance to win the 1943 elections because they saw it as a very strategic move for the Arab world. At this time, support for an independent Lebanon from other Arab states also increased, further weakening the power and influence of the French in Lebanon. Great Britain, Iraq and Egypt wanted to end direct French colonial rule. There were two main opposition groups to this, the Free French and the Lebanese nationalists. The Lebanese nationalists rejected Arab nationalism and the Solh-Khoury partnership. "Equally the Free French opposed what they conceived as a liquidation of the colonial possessions and the historic role of France in the Levant. They considered the situation a de facto re-allocation of the French Mandate to the British, which moreover replaced France's traditional allies, the Maronite nationalist Lebanese elite, with an Arab oriented, pro-British, intercommonal elite" (Ziadeh 2006, 112). This fight for power between the French and British, as well as support from other Arab states, played a crucial role in influencing political leaders in Lebanon at the time. All of

these countries had a vested interest in a stable Lebanon. However it was the British support for the Khoury-Solh partnership that came out ahead in the 1943 elections.

Riad al-Solh and Bishara al-Khoury were elected to parliament in the September 5, 1943 elections (Seale 2010). Bishara al-Khoury was elected president in the September 21 elections. Al-Khoury appointed Riad Al-Solh to serve as his prime minster the day after being elected president. This alliance formed under significant pressure and intervention by the British. Before Al-Khoury announced Al-Solh as his prime minister, the British facilitated a meeting between the two so they could potentially come an agreement about how they would run Lebanon. They met in secret on September 19 and established an agreement, which later became known as the National Pact of 1943. "How exactly they struck their deal, however and what they said to each other at that historically crucial meeting, remains shrouded in mystery" (Seale 2010, 504). However, Al-Khoury and Al-Solh were the architects of the first political elite coalition in Lebanon's history.

A couple of weeks later on October 8, Al-Solh and Al-Khoury presented the agreement to the parliament when they announced their cabinet. The National Pact of 1943 was an unwritten agreement that along with the constitution of 1926 dictated political life in Lebanon from its independence to the outbreak of civil war in 1975 (El-Husseini 2012). "The resulting coalition among members of different elite was based on negotiation and compromise, rather than on the dictates of a majority. The government arrangements of this elite pact went beyond the basic outlines of the constitution to ensure that the representatives of each important faction would share in the organization of power" (El-Husseini 2012, 4). The pact stipulated that the president will always be a Maronite Christian, prime minister will be a Sunni Muslim and speaker of the parliament will be a Shia Muslim. Other aspects of the pact included Lebanon's foreign relations.

Christians agreed to give up French protection while Muslims agreed not to unify with Syria. Also Christians agreed that while Lebanon has a unique relationship with the West, it is part of the Arab world (El-Husseini 2012). It also famously introduced the six Christians to five Muslims formula (Ziadeh 2006). “This formula, a cornerstone of the National Pact, came about as a compromise for the parliamentary representation of the Muslims in the election of 1943, in which their shares of political power were divided according to the numerical size of each community as shown in the last official census to be conducted in Lebanon, that of 1932” (Ziadeh 2006, 118). The Maronite majority in this census was strategically used to maintain their slight advantage in the political system (Ziadeh 2006).

During this October 8 parliamentary session, Al-Solh moved to abolish the French Mandate by passing the “Constitutional Law on Independence”. All the deputies present unanimously voted for it, which affected nine articles of the 1926 constitution. French officials did not accept this decision and Al-Khoury and Al-Solh continued to struggle together against the French throughout their time in office. However, this vote to end the French Mandate did mark the official end of French rule and the beginning of the next phase in Lebanese political life.

The Second Republic:

In the weeks following the October 8 parliamentary session, the French made it clear that they did not accept this declaration of independence. On November 11, 1943, French officials ordered to have Al-Khoury, Al-Solh and the rest of their cabinet arrested. They were released 11 days later and Al-Khoury and his cabinet continued to lead the Lebanese government. While they would continue to struggle with the French over the next few years, Lebanese independence was eventually accepted.

Between 1943 and 1951, a rift arose between Al-Khoury and Al-Solh because of pressure Al-Khoury was facing to preserve Maronite political power. Al-Khoury's brother Salim saw Al-Solh as a threat to Maronite power and Salim encouraged his brother not to work with Al-Solh. Al-Solh left office in 1951 after serving as the head of two executive cabinets however he was assassinated by members of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) a few months later on July 17, 1951. The SSNP was a secular nationalist party that advocated for combining Lebanon and Syria. They assassinated Al-Solh as revenge for cracking down on the Syrian Social Nationalist Party during his time in office and ordering the execution of one of the groups founding leaders, Anton Saadeh. Support for President Al-Khoury diminished after Al-Solh's death. El-Husseini notes that, "It undermined the balance achieved by the National Pact, as power shifted notably toward the president (who showed no inclination to reestablish the balance)" (El-Husseini 2012, 8). The public began protesting and calling for President Al-Khoury's resignation on the grounds of corruption. In September 1952, President Al-Khoury resigned.

Before 1943, Al-Khoury and Al-Solh showed willingness to work together by allying and creating the National Pact. They thought through a political system in which all relevant groups would be proportionally represented. But it is unclear how much of that partnership was their own free will or a result of British pressure. In the end, their desire to acquire more power kept these political elites from maintaining that cooperation after the consociational institutions were put into place. According to Daniel Sullivan, this can be attributed to their lack of political security. Al-Khoury felt that Al-Solh could threaten the political strength of Maronite Christians and therefore did not want to work with him anymore. Patrick Seale (2010) makes a similar observation in his book, *The Arab Struggle.* "Their partnership had worked well, perhaps

because Riad el-Solh was so dominant a partner, and had managed to set the pace and to build on an already towering reputation on the Arab scene. But it could not have remained agreeable for a president to be so overshadowed by a prime minister, and resentment inevitably built up" (Seale 2010, 701). Their partnership was successful going into their coalition, but over the years, Al-Khoury became insecure about his power. He lacked political security and that drove him to end his partnership with Al-Solh, subsequently ending the first successful coalition of cooperative political elites in Lebanon.

The 1952 elections brought Camille Chamoun to power as the Republic's second president. He ran on the platform of upholding the principles of the National Pact and to "reestablish the political consensus in Lebanon" (El-Husseini 2012, 8). However this effort was not entirely successful because he did not follow through in creating a true sense of accommodation across all segments. Chamoun was pro-West and worked to consolidate power into the presidency so this combination led to resentment from Muslim communities. He also chose Hussein al-Oweini as prime minister who had a weak political network compared to that of Riad al-Solh. This choice could have been a reflection of the fact that Chamoun did not want to be feel overpowered by his Sunni prime minister the way Al-Khoury was.

Chamoun's foreign relations decisions did not correlate with the agreements in the National Pact either. At the time, the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser was preaching an expansion of Arab nationalism throughout the Middle East. This had sparked tensions within Lebanon because Muslim communities were more drawn towards Nasser's ideologies while Christians gravitated towards the opposing ideology of American President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his "Eisenhower Doctrine". Chamoun embraced the "Eisenhower Doctrine",

which angered Sunnis in Lebanon. "In the eyes of many, Chamoun had re-allied Lebanon with Western powers and thus had broken the consensus of the National Pact" (El-Husseini 2012, 9).

His intentions to overpower Muslim communities became especially clear when Chamoun tried to seek presidential election by a constitutional amendment rather than a parliamentary majority. Though the Sunnis did have a representative in the form of prime minister, they did not feel like he was as influential as the Maronite Christian president. This led to growing resentment and the formation of anti-Chamoun opposition groups. These groups included various sects of Muslims as well as Christians. In May 1958, a journalist known to oppose the Chamoun administration was assassinated. This led to riots in Tripoli and later uprisings in Beirut and Sidon (southern Lebanon). "Soon, the country became divided into numerous warring factions, with major battles occurring between government and opposition forces from May 9 and May 18" (El-Husseini 2012, 9). Political leaders did try to come to a compromise and end the conflict however an agreement seemed unlikely. Chamoun feared for his power and hinted at involving the United States to defend his administration. Sure enough, after weeks of conflict, US Marines landed on the shores of Beirut on July 15 on a "peacekeeping mission" (El-Husseini 2012).

From the beginning, Chamoun made decisions to consolidate power for the Maronites and keep Muslims from gaining too much power. While he claimed that he wanted to reestablish the principles of consensus in the National Pact, his actions did not represent this. He took very pro-West or pro-Christian stances and put a weaker cabinet into place that would not actively oppose him. And when he feared opposition in Parliament, he attempted to forgo elections.

While this is a fault in political behavior, this is also a fault in Lebanon's constitution. The Lebanese political system did not have any checks on the power of the presidency. No one could question the decisions of the president. Parliament could question the prime minister or the cabinet, which are both appointed by the president, however they could not directly question the decisions of the president (Ziadeh 2006). Therefore, whoever is elected president has to be acting in the interest of the people and willing to cooperate with the other political elites. If they do not, there is no way to counter his decisions.

Conclusion:

In the 15 years after Lebanon's independence, political leaders only briefly maintained the principles of cooperation set forth in the National Pact of 1943. The partnership of Al-Khoury and Al-Solh was very promising and successful at first however even these architects of the first coalition fell victim to what Sullivan (2005) would have seen as insecurity of power in office. They had put up a strong partnership in the face of the French and during their arrest and continued to do so for a few years. But when their partnership very publically and tragically fell apart, it may have set a tone of distrust rather than cooperation for future political leaders. This seems to hold true for Chamoun during his presidency. His decisions and attempts to consolidate power quickly sparked tensions across Lebanon that ended in violence in 1958.

While there were institutions in place for political elite cooperation in Lebanon, it was up to the political leaders themselves to be willing to cooperate. We can see that the consociational democracy was initially successful because Al-Khoury set up a government that was willing to cooperate. This was a relatively peaceful time in Lebanon when tensions were low. But once was a perceived threat to these political elite's political security, the political elite cooperation fell

apart. As tensions between Christian and Muslim political leaders arose, the public mirrored their hostility by staging protests and riots to which the government responded with force.

Chapter 4: Iraq

Unlike Malaysia and Lebanon, Lijphart did not study the case of Iraq, so it is unknown whether he would have considered Iraq a consociational democracy. However many scholars have looked at whether or not Iraq should be considered a consociational political system. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary argue that consociational features were applied in Iraq's transitional government and informed its 2005 Constitution. Other scholars agree that Iraq is a liberal consociational democracy (McCulloch 2014).

Since 2005, Iraq has employed a closed list *proportional representation* parliamentary electoral system in which the country is considered a single electoral district (Pollack 2006). The Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq states that each political party or coalition create an ordered list of candidates and depending on how many votes the party gets, it will allocate seats starting from the top of the list. This method reduces the possibility of candidates being individually targeted in political violence and overall helps keep the elections more peaceful. Iraq's parliament, the Council of Representatives is made up of 275 members (Pollack 2006). Lists can be as short at 12 candidates and as long as 275. Article 47 of the Iraqi Constitution states, "The Council of Representatives shall consist of a number of members, at a ratio of one representative per 100,000 Iraqi persons representing the entire Iraqi people. They shall be elected through a direct secret general ballot. The representation of all components of the people in it shall be upheld." In addition to the closed-list PR system, each governorate has a quota of representatives, which is calculated after the election depending on how many people voted. This

system ensures that representatives are proportionally represented from each political party as well as from each governorate. The Council of Representatives also has quotas for minorities such as the Christians and Yazidis and for women as well. At least a quarter of the Council of Representatives has to be women. To meet this requirement, the IECI states that one of every three candidates in a party's list must be a woman.

Figure 6: Consociational Characteristics in Iraq

Consociational Characteristic	**Absent/Present**
Grand Coalition	Present (Informal)
Proportional Representation	Present (Formal)
Segmental Autonomy	Absent (with exception of the Kurds)
Mutual Veto	Absent

Iraq's Cabinet of Ministers has usually taken the form of a *grand coalition*. The constitution does not explicitly state that the Prime Minister needs to appoint ministers from all main groups in Iraq; therefore this would be an informal grand coalition. However the makeup of the cabinet has been relatively representative of the country's ethnic makeup. In 2007 for example, the 38-person cabinet was made up of 19 Shia Arabs, eight Sunni Arabs, eight Kurds and one Christian (McGarry & O'Leary 2007). It is up to the Prime Minister to appoint whomever he wants. His nominations need to be approved by the Council of Representatives, which in theory would include political leaders from all groups.

Mutual veto is not mentioned in the constitution and also not practiced informally in Iraq. There are a lot of instances of "majority vote" in the constitution, such as for passing bills in the Council of Representatives or cabinet appointments (Iraq Constitution, 2005). It does not seem

like there would be many instances where minorities could go against the majority if they wanted to. Majority votes would favor the Shia population and not require consent from the Arab Sunni or Kurdish population necessarily. Therefore, Iraq does not meet Lijphart's standards for mutual veto.

Iraq does not have *segmental autonomy* by Lijphart's standards. Iraq is a federalist state in which governorate do have some delegated powers within the federal government (Iraq Constitution 2005). However, governorates do not correspond to sectarian groups for the most part. There are 19 governates in Iraq and there are far fewer sectarian groups. However, the government does recognize 3 governorates (Erbil, Dohuk and Suleymanieh) that are overwhelmingly populated by Kurds as Iraqi Kurdistan (Iraq Constitution 2005). This ethnic region does have considerable autonomy however the Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs do not have that same level of autonomy because they don't have designated regions. Kurdistan has its own National Assembly that it holds elections for on a separate election cycle (Independent High Electoral Commission).

Overall, I would agree with scholars' designation of Iraq as a liberal consociational democracy. It does not strictly apply the institutional characteristics the way that Lebanon did, but it is much more consociational than Malaysia for example. Iraq only formally implemented a proportional representation electoral system. Its grand coalition in the form of an executive cabinet is informally implemented and is at the will of the prime minister to appoint a representative group of ministers. Lebanon on the other hand formally implemented a grand coalition and proportional representation and informally practice mutual veto and segmental autonomy. Comparatively Malaysia only formally enforces the grand coalition in the form of a coalition party. There is a clear attempt to implement Lijphart's institutional characteristics to get

political elites from the main segments of society to work together. I would also assume that Lijphart would consider Iraq a consociational democracy.

Despite the grand coalition and proportional representation employed, I would not consider Iraq an example of a successful consociational democracy. In fact, I would consider it a failed consociational democracy, like Cyprus or Nigeria. Perhaps Iraq did not have the preconditions that would have helped in creating a successful consociational democracy. As I did with Lebanon and Malaysia, I will see how many of Lijphart's Favorable Conditions were present in Iraq.

Favorable and Unfavorable Conditions for a successful consociational democracy:

Lijphart stipulates that for a country to have a *multiple balance of power*, it must have equilibrium between the segments and at least three different segments. According to the CIA World Fact book, 60-65% of the population is Shia, 32-37% of the population is Sunni and approximately 1% is Christian. It is unclear how ethnic Kurds factor into these percentages however 75-80% of the population is Arab and 15-20% is Kurdish. Kurds are predominantly Sunni Muslims. While these demographics do meet Lijphart's requirement of more than three segments, there is not equilibrium between the segments.

These groups, Arab Sunnis, Arab Shias and Kurds are *isolated along geographic lines*. Arab Sunnis are heavily concentrated in the western and central part of the country. Arab Shias predominantly make up the lower eastern part and Kurds make up the northeastern portion.

Figure 7: Favorable Conditions in Iraq

Favorable Condition	**Present/Absent**
Multiple balance of power	Absent
Multiparty system	Present
Small country	Absent
Crosscutting or coinciding between segments	Absent
Overarching loyalties	Absent
Representative party systems	Present
Segmental isolation along geographic lines	Present
Tradition of elite accommodation	Absent

Iraq would also not be considered a *small country* by Lijphart's standards. It has a population of over 37,000,000 according to the CIA World Fact book, which is nearly 4 times Malaysia's population in the 1950s and more than 10 times the size of Lebanon in the 1940s.

Iraq does a have *multiparty system* as opposed to a two-party political system. The political parties also coincide with the sectarian groups, so it fits Lijphart's definition of representative political parties. Political parties are aimed at representing and aggregating the interests of specific ethnic and religious groups in Iraq.

Iraq also does not have a sense of *overarching loyalty*. Iraqi nationality does not seem to be something that unites the entire country because it does not come before being Sunni, Shia or Kurdish. Iraq also does not have a *history of elite accommodation*. Since its independence from the British in 1932, Iraq has been under either a dictator or military rule. In recent decades, under

the dictatorial rule of Sunni President, Saddam Hussein, there was extreme exclusion and repression of Shia and Kurdish Iraqis.

Lijphart's Favorable Conditions were overwhelmingly negative in Iraq. Iraq had three Favorable Conditions present, which is the fewest number compared to Malaysia and Lebanon. Malaysia had four of eight present and Lebanon had five of eight present. I predict that Lijphart would attribute part of Iraq's failure as a consociational democracy to the fact that it only had three of these preconditions present. However, as I've demonstrated with the cases of Malaysia and Lebanon, there are many other factors, which must be considered in explaining why a country failed or succeeded in mitigating sectarian conflict. Lijphart focuses on the institutional characteristics and the favorable conditions. However, he does not actually analyze the narrative of each country and look at the causal mechanisms that better explain why the country failed or succeeded in reducing conflict. I begin my analysis of Iraq in 2003 when the United States military invaded Iraq and later captured Saddam Hussein. I will analyze events up until March 2016. I will break the analysis into two sections: 1) U.S. invasion of Iraq until the establishment of a new constitution in 2005 and 2) Iraq the leadership of Prime Minister of Nouri al-Maliki from 2006 to 2014

U.S. invasion and establishment of a new democracy:

Following the September 11 attacks, the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein caught the attention of the Bush administration, despite the fact that the Al-Qaeda extremists were completely unconnected to Iraq. The Bush administration feared that Saddam Hussein had the capabilities to develop and distribute weapons of mass destruction. Scholar and former Iraqi exile, Zaid Al-Ali explained that, "[The Bush administration] also contended, rather implausibly, that [Saddam Hussein] could send some of those weapons to al-Qaida – even thought the two

were ideological opposites. Despite the unconvincing nature of all the evidence presented by the Bush administration to support its plans, despite international consensus against the conflict and in the absence of a United Nations Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force, the US and the UK invaded Iraq in March 2003 and swept through the entire country in just a few weeks" (Al-Ali 2014, 37-38).

After the fall of the Sadaam Hussein regime, the United Kingdom and the United States occupied the entire country and saw it as their duty to establish peace in Iraq. The country was plagued with violence due to numerous and growing insurgency groups. Between 2004 and 2006, it was estimated that there were about 20,000 insurgents in Iraq (Robinson 2007). "All types of violent attacks dramatically increased from 2004 to 2005, including car bombs, suicide car bombs and roadside bombs. The lethality of the attacks [had] also steadily increased, with about 2500 Iraqis dying violently every month in 2006…" (Robinson 2007, 270). The United States presence in Iraq plays a very important role in insurgency group activities in the country (Robinson 2007). While insurgency groups (both Sunni and Shia) have perpetrated many acts of violence against Iraqi civilians, it is important to note that their main target were the U.S. troops. These actions against the United States helped insurgent groups, especially Sunni insurgency groups, gain broad support. The insurgency groups use the presence of the United States troops as a way to show the rest of Iraq that they are valiantly fighting to get their country back from foreign occupiers. However, this has turned into a battle between insurgency groups or what Glenn Robinson describes as the "battle for the story". A 2006 poll stated that 47% of all Iraqis supported the insurgencies attacks on U.S. troops and an overwhelming 88% of Arab Sunnis supported such attacks (Robinson 2007). "The longer US troops remain in Iraq, the easier it will

be for these insurgencies to win the battle for the story in Iraq and therefore to win over the fence-sitters in Iraqi society.

The United States, aware of the growing insurgency problem, had specifically established alliances with various political groups in Iraq (Al-Ali 2014). The first was with the Kurds. The US viewed the Kurdish community as political organized. Another was the Iraqi National Accord or Wifaq. The group did not have a following in Iraq because former Baathists established the group in London in the early 1990's after being exiled from Iraq. The other group was the Iraqi National Congress (INC), which similarly did not have a strong following in Iraq before 2003. In the 1990's, the group was known for being liberal and secular and had a close relationship with the United States and the United Kingdom. Both of these groups received material support from the US (Al-Ali 2014).

A group that also had an important relationship with the West, but did not receive financial support, was the Shiite Islamic Dawa Party. Unlike the previous two groups, this party was created to promote religious values. The party was banned under Saddam Hussein due to numerous assassination attempts, so its leadership was either exiled, imprisoned or murdered. Due to its repression under the Sadaaam era, the party's influence and support was weak compared to other political parties in 2003 so other major parties did not consider it much of a threat. Later, this proved to be crucial to the party's success because they were not seen to be as radical as other Shia parties, such as the Sadrists.

One last Shia party that is important to mention is the Sadrist movement led by the Shia cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr. The group drew its support from the millions of disenfranchised Shia Iraqis living in poverty. While the group was heavily repressed under Sadaam Hussein's regime, it retained a very strong following and has maintained consistent support. "It is the only major

political movement outside of Kurdistan not to have significant numbers of exiles within its ranks, and it is also the only mainstream group to have actively opposed the US occupation and to have rejected any form of collaboration" (Al-Ali 2014, 44).

The Sadrists biggest opponents were Arab Sunnis. The Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq, for example, formed five days after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime to unite Sunnis together as one community (Meijer 2005). Unlike the Sadrists, this Sunni group did not have an insurgency group they were directly in charge of. "The exact nature of the Association's relations with the insurgency is unclear, and it is unknown which groups it represents… The fact that the Association has developed such a broad ideology shows that it tries to represent a broad spectrum of insurgent groups." (Meijer 2005, 13-14). The Association plays an important role in influencing Sunni insurgent groups as well as Sunni participation in the political system, which I will describe further later on.

Political groups and leaders, especially those who were in exile, faced a difficult decision on whether or not to collaborate with the United States. They had to grapple with the reality that the United States had formerly supported Saddam Hussein in the war against Iraq, and questioned the true motivations of why the United States invaded Iraq in the first place. Zaid al-Ali, for example, felt very strongly against the United States. "My perspective – and that of many others in the exile community – was that one could not possibly hope to achieve an honest result if the objective was dishonest. If the US and the UK were guilty of constructing an artificial rationale for war, of distracting world attention for close to a year, and of wasting inordinate amounts of time and effort – and of doing so in a way that was transparently dishonest – then I could not bring myself to trust them on any of their other stated objectives, including their supposed desire to bring democracy to Iraq" (Al-Ali 2014, 47).

There were other exiles who felt otherwise and were willing to work with the United States to reform the political system and establish democracy. One example was the Shia politician, Ayad Allawi, an early leader of the Wifaq party. While he was not well known among the Iraqi people in 2003, he rose to power with the support of the United States.

The American forces occupying Iraq created the Iraqi Government Council (IGC) in July 2003, which was the country's first attempt at a representative government to take charge after the Americans left. The United States appointed all 25 members, including Allawi. The IGC consisted of political leaders of Shia, Sunni and Kurdish backgrounds and seats were allocated through a "sectarian ethnic-quota system" (Meijer 2005) (Cohen & Efrati 2011). Iraq's first form of leadership in its democratic transition was determined by who the United States thought was fit to rule the country. By appointing these political leaders, the US chose which formerly exiled Iraqis to bring back into the limelight. The basis for their decisions also remain unclear since many of these IGC members, like Allawi, had little or no experience in government before their exile and had not accomplished much since then (Al-Ali 2014). The Iraqis did of course have a chance to choose their leaders in the county's 2005 elections, however these US supported political leaders who did not necessarily have the qualifications to be in government were already in the limelight. By appointing the IGC, the United States influenced the preferences of the Iraqi people and played a crucial role in which political leaders came to power.

Many of these political actors, especially exiled Shias and Kurds, heavily advocated for Shia and Kurdish interests in the IGC (Meijer 2005). They also began the process of "de-baathification" of ministers who were considered to be loyal to the Saddaam regime. This left many Sunni Arabs, who had previously held high leadership positions, out of work. This intense "de-baathification" created an environment for the rise of groups to vouch for Sunni interests.

Another factor that influenced the rise of Sunni groups was the Falluja crisis in April 2004, when the United States led a counter-insurgency mission in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province. The mission was an attempt of the U.S. Marines to take down the town of Falluja, a Sunni-insurgency stronghold. However as the U.S. attacks on the town increased, it only spurred other Sunnis in the area to come join the struggle against the foreign occupiers. After a few weeks of fighting, the U.S. withdrew from Falluja because it saw that the violence was only feeding the insurgency (Negus 2004).

The Falluja crisis had united a larger Sunni community together against the United States in addition to deter Sunnis from participating in the U.S. supported transitional government. Many Sunni political leaders also did not necessarily view Shia cooperation with the U.S. as a personal attack against Sunnis, but merely a means to get more power. The U.S. wanted to establish a system of proportional representation that still favored the majority in many regards and Shia political leaders realized that they would benefit politically from that system (Meijer 2005). Therefore, the hardliner Sunni leaders from the Association called for Sunnis to boycott the January 30 elections to elect the country's transitional national assembly. "Against this background, any attempt by Sunni moderates to join the "democratic process" offered by the January 30, 2005 elections would have meant committing suicide" (Meijer 2005, 15). Voter turnout in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province was as low as 2 percent. Therefore, Arab Sunnis were not proportionally represented and Shias and Kurds dominated Iraq's transitional national assembly (Meijer 2005). This initial political system was Shia-dominated because the Sunni community did not participate, not because Shias actively excluded them.

Immediately after the January 30 elections, moderate Sunni leaders realized that it had been a mistake for the Sunni community to boycott the elections. Dulaymi, head of the another

more moderate Sunni group, the Sunni Endowment, announced that the Sunni community should no longer boycott elections otherwise they risk being permanently excluded from the political and economic spheres. Dulaymi's first suggestion was to make sure that the Sunni community's interests were represented in the new Iraqi constitution. He advised other Sunni political leaders to join him in trying to share their inputs constitutional committee. The transitional government had recently appointed the 55-member constitutional committee to draft the permanent constitution of which only two members were Sunni (Meijer 2006, 16). These more moderate Sunni political leaders such as Dulaymi saw the flaws in the hardline Sunni leaders shortsightedness. They realized that the Sunni community has to work within the political process to make sure their interests are considered rather than engage in violence.

However, Shia and Kurdish political leaders in the transitional government did not initially welcome these Sunni political leaders' involvement in the political process. It was only after the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice came to visit Iraq and urge Shia political leaders to include more Sunnis on the constitutional committee did 13 more Sunnis get appointed to the committee. However, the existing Shias and Kurds made it difficult for the new Sunni members on the committee to have a say in the final constitution. "By the time they were included in June, the Kurds and Shi'a had already tailored the draft constitution to their liking. Due to the intense pressure exerted by the US to reach an agreement before the deadline of August I5, the negotiations brought out the differences between the groups instead of bringing them closer to each other" (Meijer 2005, 16). But in the end, Sunni political leaders from the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Sunni Endowment urged the Sunni community to vote in favor of the constitution because they managed to negotiate some of the intense "de-baathification" measures

out of the constitution. Hardline Sunni leaders from the Association condemned this call and maintained their stance against participating in the transitional government.

This was replaced later that year in December by the permanent legislature, the Council of Representatives. In October, the Iraqi public ratified the country's new constitution by a majority in a nationwide referendum. Allawi was appointed interim prime minister from 2004 to 2005. Under Ayad Allawi's rule, Sunni leaders were given the option to take part in the political process if they detached themselves from their terrorist actions, specifically sever any connections with Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi (Negus 2004). However the Sunni insurgents did not seem to respond to this invitation and instead continued their violence. His term ended following the January 2005 Provisional Assembly elections and the election of Shite Islamic Dawa Party leader, Ibrahim al-Jaffari. However Jaffari's term only lasted until the end of the year, before another Dawa Party leader, Nouri al-Maliki, succeeded him.

"Maliki was unexpectedly catapulted onto the world stage after the parliamentary elections of December 2005, when US leaders decided to block the return of interim Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafaari, whom they deemed to be too closely aligned with the Iranian regime and the Iranian-sponsored militias inside Iraq, especially Muqtada Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi or, 'Mahdi Army'" (Rayburn 2014, 23). The U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalizad urged Maliki to run for prime minister against the incumbent Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi who was the prime ministerial candidate for the SCIRI Party. Maliki won by a vote of 64 to 63.

Iraq under Nouri al-Maliki:

From the very beginning of his premiership, Maliki's actions were influenced by his ability to retain a parliamentary majority. Almost half of his support came from the Sadrists, who put all 29 of their votes in favor of Maliki. This put Maliki in a position to be dependent on

Sadrist support while in office. "His problematic dependence upon Sadrist support also mean he could do little to rein in the Sadrist militia that were wreaking havoc upon the Sunni population of greater Baghdad, for fear of losing his parliamentary base" (Rayburn 2014, 25). This relationship consolidated a lot of political power into the Shias and limited repression of Shia militias.

To the Sunnis, it appeared that Maliki's government was complicit with Shia militias killing Sunnis as well as U.S. military operations against Sunni communities. As a result, the Sunni Tawafuq bloc withdrew their ministers. This left only Shias and Kurds in Maliki's coalition government. "By fall of 2007, Shia leaders from outside Maliki's Dawa Party had grown resentful of the prime minister's practice of making government decisions in consultation with only a small circle of Dawa allies, not all of whom held senior government positions" (Rayburn 2014, 27). Shia parliamentary members outside of the Dawa Party attempted to gain a majority against Maliki so they could hold a vote to withdraw confidence in the prime minister. When asked for support of the vote of no confidence from the United States, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declined to give support for fear of a failure to produce a full coalition. Though possibly a majority in parliament no longer supported Maliki, the initiative to hold a vote of no confidence fizzled out.

In August 2007, Maliki made a decision to rightly condemn the actions of violent Sadrist militias. Footage had been released depicting members of the Sadrist "Mahdi Army" firing against Iraqi troops in the holy city of Karbala. The footage showed Shia pilgrims killed by militiamen in the crossfires of violence. "The prime minister gained widespread approval when he led a police force from Baghdad to Karbala and arrested hundreds of Sadrist officials and militiamen. The incident was embarrassing enough to compel Muqtada Sadr to announce a six-

month ‘freeze’ of Jaysh al-Mahdi into a less militant social services organization” (Rayburn 2014, 28). While this decision strained the relationship between Maliki and the Sadrists, Maliki felt actions needed to be taken against the Shia militias and he continued to do so against the Sadrist “Mahdi Army” and other Shia militia groups. This was the beginning of what Maliki perceived as threats to his political power and the political insecurity Sullivan (2005) refers to.

Before long, the peace between Maliki and Muqtada Sadr was broken and full-blown assaults were launched on the other. This intra-Shia warring continued for months and the Sadrists gained a stronghold in the city of Basra. After many attacks and counterattacks, other political leaders wanted to put an end to the violence. “Forced to chose between Maliki and the Sadrists, the leaders of Iraq’s other parties shocked the Sadrists by unanimously choosing Maliki during a pivotal April 5, [2008] meting of Iraq’s major political blocks that made the Sadrists’ isolation clear” (Rayburn 2014, 33). While the Sadrists were politically isolated, violence against Maliki continued. Eventually the growing Iraqi military defeated the weakened Sadrist military.

Maliki saw his victory as a demonstration that his government was the strongest of all the Shia groups. “He also sought to take full control of the Dawa Party, marginalizing other candidates for party leadership and making it his personal political organization. Once in complete control of Dawa, he would seek to make himself the only plausible choice for leadership of the Shia community as a whole” (Rayburn 2014, 37). His leadership and premiership had been under threat by Muqtada al-Sadr and once he defeated that threat, Maliki clearly did not want to take any chance of his power being in jeopardy again. Therefore he began consolidating power in his own hands instead of recreating a coalition government. He excluded the other parties from decision making, including those with representatives in the Council of Ministers and only turned to a small group of Dawa Party advisors. However, his stance against

the Sadrists did gain him support from the Sunni and Kurdish parliamentary blocs, which kept him from losing the premiership. Instead of fostering better relations with political elites within his own Dawa party and other political groups, Maliki continued to better his relations with the United States, which was still occupying Iraq at the time.

In January 2009, Iraq held parliamentary elections and for the first time in the country's history, the elections were internationally monitored. This gave the polls more credibility than the 2005 elections. In addition, the elections were largely peaceful. Maliki and the Dawa Party was by far the most popular in the elections. The party won 20 percent of the vote while no other party won more than 7 percent. Violence had also drastically decreased nationwide as well. "This political development coincided with the country's sharp drop in violence from almost a thousand violent attacks per week in mid-2007 to fewer than two hundred per week in January 2009, allowing a semblance of normal life to return to major cities" (Rayburn 2014, 44).

This period of relative stability lasted only a few months. In August 2009, Iraqi Al-Qaeda operatives launched an attack on the perimeter of Baghdad that killed and wounded more than 560 people. Later in October, terrorists launched an even larger attack within the city limits that killed and wounded more than 900 civilians. Political parties immediately came together to form coalitions to further protect the county from terrorism. Maliki however separated his coalition from the alliances forming. He no longer truly represented the Dawa party. "The original Dawa had held a distinct ideology that envisioned Iraq's gradual transformation into an Islamic society, from which an Islamic state would natural spring in a long-term, bottom-up political process. The Maliki coalition by contrast, seemed to operate without any clear long-term vision for Iraqi society, certainly non that promised to resolve the fundamental open question of how Sunnis,

Shiites, Kurds and other minorities could finally live and thrive together in one state" (Rayburn 2014, 48).

From this point onward, Maliki continued to make decisions, with the primary focus of maintaining power. He spent the next two years repressing opposition and consolidating power. In 2011, with the rise Arab Spring protests, Iraqi's felt inspired to protest Maliki's authoritarian regime and started protests in Baghdad. Iraqi Sunnis especially wanted Maliki out of government (Rayburn 2014). The government responded by opening fire on the crowds and using a combination of lethal and nonlethal force to break up the protests. Unlike Egypt and Libya, no Western forces supported an uprising in Iraq nor did they condemn Maliki for his use of lethal force against protesters. The protests fizzled out by the end of the summer and there was no "Iraqi Spring". It was clear that Maliki had no intention of fostering peace in the country and continued to suppress any opposition parties or anti-government protests (Rayburn 2014). This only got worse after the last of the American troops officially left Iraq in December 2011. Specifically, treatment of the Iraqi Sunnis got worse.

During this time of increased Sunni repression, the terrorist organization now known as the Islamic State or Daesh was on the rise in Iraq. The organization sought out disenfranchised Sunni recruits to help gain strength. While Maliki was continuing his corrupt and repressive rule, the Islamic State was quickly growing in force under the prime minister's radar (Rayburn 2014).

On April 30, 2014, Iraqis went to the polls for the nations fourth parliamentary elections. Maliki's alliance won the most seats however no single party won the majority so a broad coalition needed to be formed as in previous elections (Rayburn 2014). Negotiations went on until July 24 when the Council of Representatives elected Fuad Masum as president. On August 11, Masum appointed Dawa Party leader, Haider al-Abadi as prime minister. Nouri al-Maliki

rejected the appointment and refused to give up office to Abadi. After international and domestic pressure, Maliki stepped down on August 14.

Maliki is a key example of a political leader falling victim to the pressure of political security. From the beginning of his rivalry with the Sadrists, Maliki decreased his attempts to cooperate and began to fear for his political power. His consolidation of power and repression of opposition immediately heightened after the 2007-2008 intra-Shia wars between Maliki and the Sadrists. Even though Maliki had always been motivated by support from the United States and gaining power, he did initially somewhat cooperate with the other political groups and consult his coalition in the Cabinet of Ministers. However we never saw any great efforts to promote inclusion and fair representation for all segments of Iraqi society. Maliki is another example of a political leader who was not willing to cooperate within consociational institutions. His repression of any opposition only worsened the divides that were already present among the various sectarian groups within the Iraqi political system.

Conclusion:

There are many lessons to be learned from the last 10 years of Iraq's history. Just like Lebanon and Malaysia, looking at the country's political institutions or set of pre-conditions does not explain the casual mechanisms of why a country failed or succeeded in mitigating sectarian conflict. In Iraq, political elite behavior and unwillingness to cooperate with other political leaders of other sectarian groups as well as his own did not reduce conflict. Disenfranchised Iraqi's who did not feel that they were being represented in the government went outside of the political system and joined insurgency groups like the Sadrist militias.

While political elite behavior was crucial, the United States also heavily influenced why conflict in Iraq has increased since 2003. The US played a crucial role in the formation of the

Iraqi party system and was responsible for setting up Iraq's interim government during its democratic transition and looked for the support of political groups or leaders. Depending on their stance, many political leaders wanted the support of the United States and would be dependent on their approval. A major flaw in this is that this kept political leaders and political parties from prioritizing the interests of the Iraqi people. Kenneth Pollack explains in his paper, "A Switch in Time: A New Strategy for America in Iraq", that the consequences of the United States bringing certain figures into power rather than letting the Iraqi people choose for themselves. "By bringing to office political exiles and extremist groups neither of which truly represented the will of the Iraqi people (and in many cases were unknown to them), we created a political elite that did not come to power via a popular mandate and were, in fact, threatened by true leaders emerging from the people. As a result, Iraq's current leaders have mostly spent their time haggling over the division of power within the government and snuffing out legitimate efforts by charismatic figure to organize new political movements that would genuinely represent the will of the Iraqi people" (Pollack 2006, 54-55). This has been the tradition in Iraqi politics since 2003 and needs to change. While there may always be a struggle to create a coalition in parliament when there are numerous political parties, a political group or leader should not constantly fear they will lose power and let that fear guide their relations with other political groups. If political groups had strong social support, in theory they should feel more political security.

Moving forward, creating truly representative political parties will be crucial for Iraq. Currently the Iraqi people do not feel particularly connected to their political leaders, which is problematic in a deeply divided society in which people should be able to look their political leaders to represent their group's needs in the political system. The country needs political

groups that truly represent the will of the people and will be responsive in government. This will help deal with two other major issues in Iraq at the moment, corruption and military insurgencies.

Whatever reforms are put into place to ensure a more representative political system, I do not think further implementing a consociational democracy is the solution for Iraq. We have seen that with the case of Lebanon, a country considered a corporate consociational democracy, in which political leaders were not willing to cooperate within those institutions. That would likely be the case if more formal consociational institutions were put into place. Before the focus is put on reforming the institutions, it should be placed on the political party and political elites representing the Iraqi people. This would align with the case of Malaysia, a country that had minimal ethnic conflict even though it was not truly consociational. Political elites in Malaysia made an effort to cooperate with each other and create an inclusive government. The Iraqi people need to see that their government is responsive to their needs and acting on their behalf and not just fighting for more political power.

Conclusion:

Sectarian conflict has existed for a very long time but the rise and spread of democracy across the world poses a new way to deal with issue. Establishing a stable democracy is difficult to achieve and even more difficult in countries that are plagued with violence between ethnic or religious groups. Institutional design is very important when establishing a new democracy and the types of institutions should vary depending on factors such as if the country has a segmented society. The consociational model has been widely used to influence institutional design in many divided societies. However there is a clear difference in applying the consociational model in what Lijphart refers to as the "Third World" compared to the West.

There is not much debate surrounding the success of countries like Switzerland, Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands to end any sectarian conflict after they implemented the consociational model. All four of these small European democracies were relatively similar in nature and sectarian conflict. They also very similarly applied the consociational model. In seeing the success in these countries, Lijphart began applying his theory to "Third World" countries. Each country I examined had implemented the consociational model differently and also had differences in the levels of sectarian violence in the following years. However, a stricter application of the consociational model did not correspond to a decrease in sectarian conflict. It also did not correspond to an increase in political elites willing to cooperate.

In this study, I had two major key findings. The first, as I hypothesized, was that political elites must to be willing to cooperate for consociational institutions to work. Without that cooperation, consociational democracies will not succeed in mitigating conflict. However, while conducting my case studies, I discovered another interesting part of political elite behavior that I feel is important in mitigating sectarian conflict; political elites need to well represent their

constituents. The public needs to feel that these political elites, who claim to be representing them, are actually acting in their best interest and are responsive to their needs. This is crucial to keep constituents from finding means outside of the political system to express their discontent, such as violence. We see this as a problem in Malaysia and Iraq specifically.

While Malaysia did have a strong institution, the Alliance Party, that encouraged political elite cooperation, I argue that did not necessarily qualify it as a consociational democracy by Lijphart's standards. It would be better to say that Malaysia was influenced by the consociational model or has a political system based on the principles of political elite cooperation in the consociational model. Regardless, political elite cooperation did not fall apart the way it did in Lebanon and Iraq especially. Despite Malaysia's weak application of the consociational model, political elites did cooperate up until the outbreak of the 1969 riots, which were spearheaded by the public, not political elites. The Chinese and Malays especially did not feel that the Alliance was best representing their interests. The Alliance slowly lost their mass-support from Malays because Malays began supporting rising opposition parties that better represented their interests. Here it is important to note that Malaysians did work within the democratic system to express their discontent with the ruling party. However, tensions were so high between the opposition and Alliance Party supporters that violence broke out after the election results. After this period of violence and reestablishment of democracy in 1971, the new coalition party, the Barisan Nasional (BN), included UMNO, MCA and MIC in addition to the top opposition parties. This was a strategic move on the part of the BN political elites to maintain public support. By including parties that many Malays supported, they decreased their chances of people feeling their interests were not being met.

Lebanon on the other hand applied the consociational model the most strictly of the three cases. While there was initial peace in Lebanon after the adoption of the consociational model, tensions rose after a few years and ended in outright violence in 1958. This corresponds to the initial period of political elite cooperation and partnership, which soon fell victim to distrust and political insecurity. This set a tone of distrust among Muslims and Christians in government for later executive cabinets to come. Political elites wanted to consolidate power for themselves rather than cooperate and make concessions to promote an inclusive political system. This was the clearest example of how political elites need to be willing to cooperate within consociational institutions for them to succeed in mitigating conflict.

Lastly, I examined the liberal consociational democracy of Iraq, which exhibited the highest levels of sectarian violence of all three case studies. While it has a proportional representation electoral system and an informal practice of a grand coalition, political elites, especially executive ruling elites, did not show any willingness to cooperate or attempt foster an inclusive political system in Iraq. In addition, the Iraqi political elites did not well represent their constituents. The United States propped up political parties that did not have a broad support base and therefore were not best representing their constituents' interests. However the discontent and disenfranchised Iraqis joined insurgency groups and engaged in violence instead of expressing discontent within the democratic system. Moving forward, Iraq needs to establish more representative political parties and then have the political elites within those new parties cooperate.

As I stated earlier, I do not think that the consociational model should be further implemented as a means to reduce violence in the future. Having strict quota systems and formally included all four characteristics in the constitution will not change the fact that the

existing political elites do not want to cooperate and are part of political parties that do not truly represent the Iraqi people. While I'm sure there is room for improvement, Iraq does have a relatively strong constitution and existing democratic institutions. Therefore, the focus should be placed on understanding the elites working within those institutions and possibly finding ones that are supported by the Iraqi people and bring them to power. Kenneth Pollack, a researcher at the Brookings Institute, suggested that there needs to be new political parties that form at the grassroots level in Iraq that truly represent the interests of the people. Having those political parties contest in elections could serve as an outlet for people to voice discontent with the existing rulers by voting for these opposition parties. This could possibly decrease the amount of people going outside of the political system and joining insurgencies to express discontent. I agree with Pollack's recommendation and think that focus should be placed on creating representative parties to work within the existing democratic institutions.

Overall, I think that Lijphart overgeneralized his theory when applying it to the "Third World". Lijphart was correct in stating that there is a difference in applying the consociational model to "Third World" but he does not address how different some of these "Third World" countries are from one another and how the nature of their sectarian conflict is different. Having a broad model for establishing democratic institutions to best mitigate conflict may not be able to encompass the unique causal mechanisms for sectarian conflict in each country. Malaysia, for example, did not implement a fundamental characteristic of the consociational model, proportional representation. However it was relatively successful in mitigating conflict. Though it is out of the scope of my study, Malaysia today is the most peaceful country of the three I examined according to the Global Peace Index, and it still employs a plurality single-member district electoral system. That only makes me further question the importance of structure versus

agency when applying the consociational model. These countries have various democratic institutions and levels consociationalism (corporate or liberal). But one thing all of these countries have in common is that there are political elites working within those institutions. However they differ in how much political elites are willing to cooperate with each other, whether they have strong ties with their constituents and whether are willing and able to represent their interests in the formal political system.

Rather than focusing on applying a broad model for democratic institutions, it may be more helpful to understand the factors that go into political elite behavior, both within democratic institutions and relationships with their constituents. No matter what types of political institutions are in a country, there are political elites working within them. While it may be difficult to create and apply to a broad range of countries, it could be useful to create a model for political elite behavior to go alongside existing institutional framework of the consociational model. This would combine structure and agency into one model and could better explain more casual mechanisms for mitigating sectarian violence.

Lijphart did not adequately consider the role of political elite behavior when evaluating the success of consociational democracies. Therefore I do not think that the consociational democracy alone is the solution for new democracies with segmented societies. In conjunction with 1) a better understanding of political elite behavior within democratic institutions, 2) a better understanding of political elites' relationship with their constituents and 3) clear strategies for dealing with political elites when they are not cooperating and/or being responsive to their constituents' interests, then the model of consociational democracy could be applied more effectively in the "Third World".

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