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Sophia C. Rice   April 6, 2022

"'Us versus Them': Tracking Trends in European Ideological Party Families' Foreigner-Related Rhetoric in the Face of Economic and Cultural Crises"

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Abstract

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Globalization and technological innovation are giving rise to the possibilities of mass migration and economic integration between groups all over the world. While these processes aid in multicultural appreciation and connectivity, they also create tensions between peoples with different ideological values. Much past research has been devoted to group identity formation theories, as well as how cultural identities in particular are connected to periods of crisis. Many scholars cite institutional processes, informal societal norms, and influential political leaders as the creators, shapers, and disseminators of these "us versus them" identity conceptualizations. However, few have properly examined political parties as influential actors who use in-group/out-group rhetoric to gain - and maintain - power, often at the expense of the entire population whom they "other."

This thesis fills these gaps by investigating "us versus them" rhetoric trends of political parties as aggregated into *ideological party "families"* across nine EU nations from 2001-2019, paying special attention to the foreigner-related rhetoric they use in light of the financial crisis of 2008 and the Syrian refugee crisis of 2015. I use MaxQDA software and Comparative Manifestos Project data to accomplish this goal, coding a total of 305 party manifestos from nine main party families over the 18-year period. I find that party families' foreigner-related rhetoric is more frequent following a cultural crisis than an economic one, and that Liberal and Nationalist/Populist families particularly show opportunistic and polarizing usage of foreigner-related rhetoric. Hand-coding 41 manifestos from the UK, my results also demonstrate that the combination of opinions about EU-membership and about culturally foreign "others" is a key feature of the cultural cleavage emerging from voters and their parties today.

Future research must link social media and news to these forms of foreigner-related rhetoric to better understand how political community in-group/out-group ideas from parties become cemented in the minds of their constituents - to often multigenerational, disastrous effects.

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Table of Contents

Words — so innocent and powerless...standing in a dictionary, how potent for good and evil they become in the hands of one who knows how to combine them.

- Nathaniel Hawthorne, *The American Notebooks* (1835 - 1853)

I. INTRODUCTION

In their 2021 manifesto, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) states that they aim to create a "hostile environment towards illegal immigra[nts]" and repeal the 2010 Equality Act because it "...empowers those of minority races, cultures, and religions to trump traditions and cultures built on liberal democratic norms and Judaeo-Christian traditions." (13-14).[1] UKIP's far-right, nationalist, and populist platform can be summarized by their declaration that "immigrants have brought barbaric cultural practices to our shores….[and] these third world customs have no place in the United Kingdom" (2021, 66). These statements reveal that the political in-group whom UKIP stands for is the white, English-speaking, British-born, Christian majority, while the out-group whom UKIP stands *against* is the shadowy, "barbaric," and criminal "third world" cultural "Other." This political party's statements are short, but laden with discrimination, xenophobia, Orientalism, racism, and above all - the main theme of this thesis - "us versus them" rhetoric that centers around cultural or ethnic identities.

As UKIP's campaign statements illustrate, our globalizing and diversifying world is constantly met with resistance by those who ideologically disagree with such changes. Moreover, because of our growing world, what we choose to say – as well as *to* whom and *about* whom we choose to say it – has the potential to reach a much wider audience than it once did. In this way,

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[1]UKIP also seeks to enforce that "British citizens…marry [only] from within the British population," as well as to amend the "citizenship law (including the availability of dual citizenship) so that it is only available to those who…have fluent spoken and written English" (2021, 13-14).

globalization is a double-edged sword: it can allow dialogue between people with different identities and viewpoints, but it can also exacerbate the conflicts between them. Through this thesis, I seek to uncover the nuanced trends in political parties' foreigner-related rhetoric in their election manifestos to better understand how they shape "us versus them" mentalities in relation to their political communities versus foreign "others." To guide my research, I ask the following questions:

1. **How do periods of crisis change the percentages of total foreigner-related "us versus them" rhetoric in European political parties' election manifestos?**

2. **How does the "ideological family" to which a specific political party belongs:**
   a. **affect the percentage of its identity-based manifesto rhetoric?**
   b. **influence the particular attitudes and brands of "us versus them" ideology it promotes in its manifestos?**

To answer these questions, I review the literature related to political parties, crises, and forms of group identity. These three camps often do not overlap, which is why it is necessary to bring them into conversation. I then synthesize scholars' theories about identity-rhetoric formation and dissemination. I build upon these theories to test the relationship between my main independent variable, ideological party "family" type, and my main dependent variable, foreigner-related rhetoric (both percentage of it and attitude present in foreigner-related manifesto excerpts) In Phase I, I show how party families' cultural-focused "us versus them" rhetoric is sensitive to the *type* of crisis currently affecting their nations. Using the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) database and the MaxQDA program, I accomplish this goal by evaluating the total percentages of foreigner-related rhetoric in 305 manifestos from parties within nine different ideological "families" and across nine different EU nations.[2] This study

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[2] The nine party families are the following: Ecological (ECO), Leftist/Socialist/Communist (SOC), Social Democratic (SOCDEM), Liberal (LIB), Christian or Jewish Democratic (CHRDEM), Conservative (CON),

accounts for 18 years of party families' rhetoric (2001-2019) and encompasses both the

economic recession of 2008 and the Syrian refugee crisis of 2015. Also in Phase I, I illustrate

how cultural-specific "us versus them" rhetoric across - and within - party families *changes* in

response to both economic and cultural crises. In Phase II, I shed light on which particular

in-group/out-group themes of identity are employed per party family in response to both crises. I

accomplish this goal by hand-coding the positive and negative attitudes expressed toward

foreigners and/(or) foreign influences by UK parties from six of the main party families. I then

review the salience of my results, which explain how party families' foreigner-related rhetoric

changes over time and is amplified in the presence of a cultural crisis. Lastly, I discuss potential

limitations of my thesis and future directions for it.

Aided by the press and the media, political parties are some of the most pervasive

agenda-setters of in-group/out-group mentality today, and their platforms are constantly

evolving. That is why the exploration of political rhetoric's role in the portrayal of cultural

"others" - particularly in times of crisis - is so important to understand in today's polarized

world. Without exploring these questions, we will remain in the dark about how to not only

recognize trends in harmful "us versus them" rhetoric, but also how to prevent it from inciting or

prolonging mass violence stemming from people's unavoidable and intrinsic identities.

Key Terminology & Definitions

Before turning to the literature review, it is necessary to briefly explain how I use the

terms "political party," "crisis," "conflict," and "ideological family" throughout this thesis. First,

I understand political parties to be organizations that are composed of "groups of individuals

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Agrarian/Rural Labor (AGR), Ethnic/Regional (ETH), and Nationalist/Populist (NAT-POP). The nine EU nations
are Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives" (North 1990, 5). Additionally, these

parties can exist within a "wide variety of political systems at various stages of social, political,

and economic development" (La Palombara and Weiner 2015, 3).

Second, I expand upon Brecher, Potter, and Durocher (2008)'s definition of crises, which

they consider to be "acts, events, or environmental changes that occur prior to the outbreak of

military hostilities" which are often "accentuated by war" (37).[3] The two episodes I study

between the 2001-2019 time period in Europe are the economic recession of 2008 and the Syrian

refugee crisis of 2015. The latter situation fits the criteria to be deemed a "crisis," while the

former seems to be more of a "conflict" or time of "heightened threat" considering the many

deaths and mental health problems *indirectly* caused by the financial collapse (Uutela 2010).

Nonetheless, the phrase "economic crisis" has become commonplace in both scholarly and

everyday settings, so this thesis also considers the economic recession a "crisis" for the sake of

consistency (Hallgrimsdottir et. al 2020, 6). The last crisis-related nuance I provide is labeling

the Syrian migrant situation as a "cultural crisis" because it not only involved economic strife,

but it also caused major cultural demographic changes and/(or) ideology clashes in both the

refugees' home and host countries.

Third, I subscribe to Hunt (1990)'s explanation of ideology as an "interrelated set of

convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily

comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality" (108). It is

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[3] Conversely "conflicts" are overt interactions in which "two or more parties engag[e] in mutually hostile actions and us[e] coercion to injure or control their opponents" (Brecher, Potter, and Durocher 2008, 6). "Conflict" can encompass everything from "insurrection, revolution, and riot" to "protracted conflict, crisis, and war" (Brecher, Potter, and Durocher 2008, 6). Cases of "heightened threat" are not full-blown conflicts or crises; rather, they are situations in which tensions are high, but no actions have yet been taken. Times of heightened threat can also describe situations when the general population has the mere *perception* that something *could* be going awry.

common knowledge that political parties often vary greatly in their core ideological principles.

Laver and Budge operationalized this spectrum of political ideologies in 1992, naming their

method the "rile" (right-left) index (Volkens et. al 2021). Since its inception, the rile index has

come under criticism from certain scholars like Mölder (2016), Jahn (2011), and Franzmann and

Kaiser (2006), who have said that it is too "western-centric" and simplistic (Volkens et. al 2021).

Despite these critiques, the rile index is still used today as a uniform method of identifying where

parties fall on the ideological spectrum (Camia and Caramani 2012, 51). The rile index is

relevant to this thesis because the main database I use, the Comparative Manifestos Project

(CMP), codes party manifestos according to 24 categories specifically related to this index.[4]

Because parties' ideologies differ, their rhetoric does, too. The ideological family to

which a party belongs incorporates both the *party members'* shared values (on policies regarding

immigration, national security, or government involvement in the economy, for example), and

the similarity that the party *as an organization* shares with the ideological values of *other* parties

within its same *family*. I base the nine main party families for this investigation on Camia and

Caramani (2012), the coding of the Comparative Manifestos Project's "parfam" variable

(Volkens et al. 2021), and the EU European Parliament's seven main political groups.[5] The

political parties within the nine ideological families I study, as well as the two main crises, will

be revisited in greater detail in subsequent sections.

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[4] The rile index is bounded by values of -100 and +100. If a party solely refers to what are considered "left-wing" issues it would receive the value of -100, while a party solely referring to "right-wing" issues would receive a score of +100 (Volkens et. al 2021; Jahn 2011). No rile calculations are performed in this thesis, but it is still beneficial to provide mathematical context for the party family characteristics I investigate. To learn more about the CMP database, range of rile values within each family, or to access all manifestos I used, visit the CMP's website.
[5] "The Political Groups of the European Parliament." *European Parliament*. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/organisation-and-rules/organisation/political-groups.

**II.	LITERATURE REVIEW**

The dependent variable of this thesis is foreigner-related rhetoric, and the independent variable is the ideological party family. I position my thesis within the current body of literature by first discussing how scholars have defined and investigated different forms of group identity, and then by reviewing how others have explained individual elites or institutional structures as the main shapers of identity rhetoric, while largely neglecting one of the most important drivers of cultural-based identity rhetoric: political parties and their broader ideological families.

Dependent Variable: Identity Rhetoric

      **i.	Racial and Ethnic Identities**

Palestinian-born literary critic Edward W. Said's work *Orientalism* revolutionized how scholars understand what "othering" is and how it functions in society. Radically, Said posits that at its most fundamental level, Orientalism is a "style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and…'the Occident'" (1979, 2). The "Occident" refers to the Western European colonizers, while the "Orient" encompasses the diverse array of Eastern and Southern colonized peoples. Said's explanation of Orientalism as a constructed relationship between Occident and Orient is one of hegemonic domination and power that strategically "depends…on this flexible *positional* superiority, which puts the Western colonizer in a whole series of possible relationship with the Orient without ever losing…the relative upper hand" (1979, 5-7). Artificially "constructed" identity and "positional superiority" are still two fundamental features of the European countries I analyze in this thesis.

Though Said's analysis focuses solely on the Orient/Occident dichotomy, his is a keen example of the institutionalized "othering" that undergirds modern society.[6] These notions of "otherness," passivity, dehumanization, non-autonomy, and essentialization are key tactics utilized by political drivers of xenophobic and racist rhetoric to justify their policies and behaviors. Cultural or ethnic "othering" can precipitate multi-generational harm. Understanding the subtle ways in which party families circumstantially discuss foreign "others" in their manifestos provides future researchers a strong basis for evaluating the trends of violence and crisis associated with "us versus them" rhetoric.

Rzepnikowska (2019) applies Said's concept of "othering" in her exploration of discrimination against Polish immigrants in Manchester before, during, and after the Brexit proceedings finished. Rzepnikowska (2019) explains that Greek root words xénos (meaning the "guest" or "stranger") and phóbos (meaning "fear") result in the term xenophobia, which "can be defined as 'fear of the stranger,' and…is understood as…hostility against 'foreigners'" (63). Hjerm (1998) notes that xenophobia has been "...a common feature of human societies" for all of human history (Miller-Gonzalez and Rensmann 2010, 4). However, other scholars like Fetzer (2000) argue that data from projects like the World Values Survey reveal that immigration, a process that often brings out xenophobia in the domestic population, "...has only recently become a salient issue in both advanced and developing countries, [which suggests] a new wave of politicized opposition to immigration and ethnic diversification on a global level" (Miller-Gonzalez and Rensmann 2010, 4). It is clear that in the context of the EU nations I

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[6] Another important aspect of Orientalism is that those prescribed with "Oriental" identity by "Occidental" groups are considered "objects" of study that are "stamped with an otherness—as all that is different, whether it be 'subject' or 'object'—but of a constitutive otherness, of an essentialist character….passive, non-participating… non-autonomous, [and] non-sovereign with regard to itself" (Said 1979, 97).

investigate, xenophobia is both a longstanding "feature of human societies" (Hjerm 1998) and an increasingly politically-driven mode of power attainment in today's world (Miller-Gonzalez and Rensmann 2010).

In addition to xenophobia, racism is perhaps the most systemically institutionalized mode of "us versus them" discrimination that is reinforced through cultural norms.[7] Some political scientists suggest that there is even an overlap between the two modes of identity discrimination. Sivanandan (2001) uses the example of western EU citizens' discriminatory reception of white Central and Eastern European asylum seekers and refugees entering their nations to show that "xeno-racism" is "a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism, except that it is not colour-coded (2)." Like xenophobia and racism, xeno-racism is a prevalent manner of "othering" individuals based on their places of birth, regardless of whether or not they share physical characteristics with the majority race of their host population.

Xenophobia, racism, and xeno-racism are modes of discrimination that are used to prescribe identity, construct difference, and build barriers between individuals. However, it has not been properly investigated how political party families with differing core ideologies alter their discriminatory identity rhetoric in times of crisis to achieve party goals. I seek to fill this gap by exploring the trends of culturally- or ethnically-discriminatory "us versus them" rhetoric produced by party families across different crises.

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[7] Scholars Milner, Franz, and Braddock (2020) explain the overarching concept of racism as "the ways in which individuals are privileged or disadvantaged, overtly and covertly, on a macro and micro level, based on perceived biological and cultural differences between groups, most often relative to skin color" (397). They emphasize that racism can "result from the actions of individuals or institutions and can unfold in ways that are both intentional and unintentional" (Milner, Franz, and Braddock 2020, 397).

ii.   Nationality as Identity

The previously discussed modes of "othering" relate to racial and ethnic characteristics. The conceptualization of nationalism is another common way in which "us versus them" identities are reinforced. In his pivotal work *Imagined Communities*, sociologist Benedict Anderson defines a nation as an "imagined political community" that is "both inherently limited and sovereign" (1991, 6). Anderson (1991)'s explanation makes it clear that there is an aspect of political community - whether real or imagined - and an "us versus them" element in any form of nationalism. To better discern which forms of nationalism are most readily weaponized in party family rhetoric across the EU, as well as which forms specifically accompany the economic crisis and the Syrian refugee crisis, it is pertinent to briefly discuss civic, cultural, and ethnic nationalism as related, but distinct forms of identity creation.

1. Civic Nationalism

Shulman (2002) posits that civic nationalism comes from a person's attachment to "common territory [and] citizenship, belief in the same political principles or ideology, respect for political institution and enjoyment of equal political rights, and will to be a part of the nation" (559). Thus, if a person agrees with others to uphold and abide by the same political rules within a bounded physical space, the civic form of nationalism is a comparatively easy community to join: it neither requires a kinship prerequisite, nor a cultural one.

In times of crisis, civic identity is something that can be discarded and hidden. Though they can also be disguised sometimes, ethnic and cultural identities cannot be discarded. Because of this difference, I believe ethnic and cultural national modes of identity are more frequently preyed on by political parties in times of crisis because they are easier to point out. Conversely,

civic nationalism does not require an individual to possess ethnic or cultural conditions of membership. Thus, this civic identity can be a particularly helpful tool for political parties' self- and group-identification purposes. Parties in families that define their political communities as larger than or equal to their national borders can strategically employ appeals to a common civic nationality to gain - or maintain - power across a population that possesses many ethnic and cultural identities, but generally shares a civic identity.

2. Cultural Nationalism

While civic nationalism is focused on cohesion of political institutions and ideologies, cultural nationalism is a mode of identity that stems from "nonpolitical cultural traits" such as religion, tradition, and language (Shulman 2002, 559). Another key distinction between civic and cultural nationalisms is that civic nationalism does not promote cultural assimilation while cultural nationalism requires it (Shulman 2002; Nielsen 1996). This means that cultural nationalism tolerates - and often, celebrates - multiculturalism on the surface. Still, there are features of a common cultural identity that individuals must assimilate to if they wish to become fully fledged members of that nation. After all, if an imagined community is reinforced through newspapers, media, sports, consumption of goods, education, and institutionalized rules, it cannot be explained without the presence of an underlying, shared culture (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008, 551; Nielsen 1996, 46-7).

Because the uniting mode of identity here is a common culture, the assimilation of minorities is a necessity for cultural nationalism's project: the state will "actively promote the majority ethnic group's history and culture in education and language policies as the core around which to build a national culture" (Shulman 2002, 561). I argue that political parties harp on

cultural and ethnic forms of national identity more than civic national identity. Moreover, I

contend that a 'hierarchy of vagueness' is tied to how frequently parties choose to appeal to these

national forms of identity in their manifesto rhetoric.[8]

3. Ethnic Nationalism

Shulman (2002) notes that "to some extent, the three [brands] of national identity differ in

their level of inclusiveness" (559). Ethnic nationalism is the most deeply-rooted and exclusive of

the three because it defines the political community in terms of bloodline, kinship, and ancestry

(Freeden 1998, 754). Simply put, civic criteria are relatively simple to meet, cultural criteria are

adoptable and harder to meet, and ethnic criteria are nearly impossible for "outsiders" to meet,

since "one cannot choose or change one's genes or ancestors" (Shulman 2002, 559). Where civic

nationalism is neutral toward multiculturalism and cultural nationalism is adamant about the

necessity for cultural assimilation, ethnic nationalism encourages neither multiculturalism, nor

assimilation (Shulman 2002, 561).[9]

Jenne et al. (2021) explain this exclusionary aspect of ethnic nationalism as a "discourse

[in which] the state belongs to a dominant ethnonational group to the exclusion, or at the

expense, of non-national others" (171). In their view, ethnic nationalism requires that the "ethnos

or national core of the state…be protected from enemy nations, minorities, immigrants or

refugees" (Jenne et al. 2021, 171). The danger of such sentiments are evident in recent research

on both Western and Eastern European politics, where it is clear that the ethnic brand of

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[8]Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008) argue that cultural nationalism incentivizes assimilation through institutionalized constraints and rewards. Cultural nationalism progresses via institutions created and governed by the cultural majority, which teach newcomers that ethnicity is a "resource that can be strategically deployed or concealed or manipulated to secure access to these rewards" (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008, 543).

[9]Shulman (2002) notes that assimilation is not encouraged by groups adhering to the ethnic brand of nationalism because their nation would "not be strengthened or expanded in any meaningful way by such assimilation" (561).

nationalism particularly coalesces with far-right populist (and sometimes far-left) ideologies.

Jenne et al. (2021) call this fusion "ethnopopulism" (short for ethno-nationalist populism), which

is an "even more exclusionary discourse that holds that the state belongs to the dominant

ethnopolitical group, excluding both political and non-national 'others'" (Jenne 2018, 171). This

combination of populism and ethnocentric national identity is crucial to this thesis because even

ideological families that are *not* explicitly ethnic-based, far-right, or populist contain parties that

are continuing to use highly ethnopopulist rhetoric to either gain or maintain political power.

In sum, all three brands of nationalism are constructions of identity that enable one to

distinguish "us" from "them" (Bieber 2018, 524).[10] Despite their differing levels of inclusivity,

Jenne et al. (2021) emphasize that "exclusionary nationalist framing - particularly nativist

framing against immigrants, migrants or refugees - can occur in so-called civic and ethnic

national contexts alike" (176). Their findings reveal that national identities can be subject to

manipulation by powerful political parties (Jenne et al. 2021, 176). Identity of any kind is

extremely difficult to boil down into a binary 'yes' or 'no' answer. For this reason,

conceptualizations of national identity along civic, cultural, and ethnic lines can never

completely encompass or capture the nature of a person based on their characteristics or relative

place in the world. Nevertheless, national identity is an important tool for politicians to entrench

"us versus them" mentalities within their general population in order to gain political power.

iii.   Partisanship as Identity & Pillars of Far-Right Ideology

Just like "loyalty to a team helps fans know who to root for…admire, and…actively

support," so does partisan attachment for voters (Dalton 2019, 189). Dalton (2019) summarizes

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[10] See *Figure A* in the Appendix A for a visual representation of membership in a nation based on the three forms.

that "parties help to make politics 'user-friendly'" because when "political parties take clear and consistent policy positions, the party label provides an information shortcut on how 'people like me' should decide" (189). Notable works from Huddy, Bankert, and Davies (2018); Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema (2017); Mayer (2017); and Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012) also discuss partisanship in terms of social identity theory, noting that within the past century, partisanship is an important indicator of in-group/out-group identity for many citizens in democratic countries. This notion of partisanship as a mode of social identity is important to this thesis because it is a historical tactic that European parties from different party families have used in order to gain and maintain loyal "fans."

Partisanship as a relevant social identity cannot be discussed without integrating Cas Mudde's discussion of the ideological "pillars" or "core" of the Nationalist/Populist (or far-right) party family (2010, 1170). In his article investigating the "pathological normalcy" of Western European far-right populism, Mudde (2010) argues against previous scholars who have contended that far-right ideologies like populism are "alien to western democratic values" and only "become politically relevant under 'extreme conditions'" or "*Extrembedingungen*" (1170; Scheuch et al. 1967, 86). This thesis provides direct evidence for Mudde (2010)'s argument that populist, far-right ideologies pervasively (albeit, latently) exist in all European societies already, but can be worsened by crises (1172). I subscribe to Mudde (2010)'s assertion that far-right and populist ideas are "well connected to mainstream ideas and [are] in tune with broadly shared mass attitudes and policy positions," and I also aim to provide via my analysis the "complex measurement model" he notes is needed to better understand far-right trends (1178).

Nativism is one of the pillars of traditional far-right ideology that is another form of "othering" based on ethnic or cultural identity. Mudde explains nativism as the belief that "states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state" (2012, 19; 2010, 1173). Nativism postulates that an individual's ethnic characteristics make them a "native" member of the group, and thus, a "legitimate" member of the group. In this way, nativism is used as a tool by self-ordained "natives" to contrast themselves from their ethnic "others." Mudde (2010) demonstrates through Eurobarometer data how surveyed citizens across Europe express both racist and nativist responses about foreign "others" like immigrants who are not members of the majority race or ethnicity and possess cultural, linguistic, or religious identities that set them apart from the surveyed participants (1175-6). The apparent connection in participants' responses between nativism, exclusion, and "one nation, one state" is evident in many of their nations' constitutions (Mudde 2010, 1173-4). Though nativism is present everywhere, this focus on European expressions of it is directly related to the geopolitical context of the party families analyzed in this thesis.[11]

Populism, another far-right pillar, is a "thin-centred ideology that [typically] considers society to be…separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people,' versus 'the corrupt elite' (Mudde 2012, 23; 2010, 1175). Populism says politics ought to be "an expression of the *volonté générale,* i.e. the general will of the people" (Mudde 2012, 23; 2010, 1175). Who exactly "the people" are is a recurring question in this thesis. The traditional

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[11] Authoritarianism is another ideological "pillar," but is not the focus of this thesis. Mudde defines it as "the belief in a strictly ordered society in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely (2010, 1174; 2007, 23). Authoritarian attitudes toward societal organization and control are prominent in citizens' Eurobarometer responses about increased policing, severer capital punishment, and greater jail time for convicts (Mudde 2010, 1176).

explanation of "the people" is an "us versus them" dichotomy that pits the common blue-collar worker against the corrupt elite. Populism is largely characterized by its "moral" convictions as well. The "thin" nature of populism is evident in the fact that the 'moral common man versus immoral elite' idea can be stretched to include the "othering" of people on the basis of culture, ethnicity, class, or anything else that can be considered "corrupt."

Distrust toward elite-led political institutions and toward the immoral, foreign "others" is an evolving feature of European public sentiment within the past 20 years, and something that I track in this thesis. Brexit is evidence of the rising populist distrust in Europe toward the supranational European Union and national democratic governments within it. What is more, Europe's populist distrust of immoral "others" has been mainly focused on the foreign migrants entering European nations, whom the corrupt elites help instead of the "moral," "deserving," or "rightful" common folk. Mudde (2010) explains populism requires that "*The* common sense of *the* people should always take precedence and cannot be curtailed by 'undemocratic' institutional constraints such as constitutional protections of minorities" (1175). Jenne et. al (2021)'s discussion of ethnopopulism adds that "*the* people" are often not only of the same class, but also of the same race.

Like nativism, populism is used by parties who scapegoat certain minority groups. Such rhetoric brings a party's desired political community of voters together based on shared "morality" and/(or) "native" identity; thus, bolstering the bandwagon effect. Because populism provides an enemy of "the people," it allows "the people" to place the blame upon the "immoral other" for their own problems. Mudde argues that nativism and populism are effective "us versus them" mobilization tools for political party families because both ideologies are "deeply

connected to mainstream opinions and beliefs held by the public" (2010, 1181). I apply Mudde's ideas about traditionally far-right ideologies to foreigner-related rhetoric trends of both Nationalist/Populist and *non*-Nationalist/Populist party families in Europe.

Independent Variable: Who or What Shapes Identities?

The previous section discussed several main manifestations of group identity which often separate the political community in-group from the foreign "other." I focus on party families as disseminators of these forms of foreigner-related "us versus them" identities, but similar tactics are used by other actors. The next group of scholars fail to bring my independent variable, the political party family, into the larger discussion about identity formation and dissemination. Nevertheless, they provide context about how influential elites and institutions contribute to the nuanced expressions of foreigner-related "us versus them" rhetoric I track across the nine party families surrounding the economic and migrant crises.

An influential individual who possesses political power is a commonly-researched shaper of "us versus them" mentality.[12] Zaller (1992) argues that the public depends on "unseen and usually unknown others" for their information about the world, and that powerful political elites are these "unknown others" (6). Zaller (1992)'s research demonstrates how political elites can shape public opinions with their rhetoric (14). His research also shows that elites are motivated to present a constructed reality that is both "simple and vivid [so] that ordinary people can grasp it" (Zaller 1992, 13-14). Of course, information and rhetoric disseminated by political elites does not have to be ill-intentioned, but due to personal biases, their rhetoric is "unavoidably selective

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[12] Zaller (1992) defines such political elites as "persons who devote themselves full time to some aspect of politics or public affairs" (6). These political elites can include "politicians, higher-level government officials, journalists, some activists, and many kinds of experts and policy specialists" (Zaller 1992, 6).

and…enmeshed in stereotypical frames of reference" that show only a curated portion of the whole story (Zaller 1992, 13-14).[13] Though this thesis focuses on party families as shapers of "us versus them" rhetoric, Zaller (1992)'s research about individual elites provides relevant context about the influence individual elites have on their parties' political communities, as well as across their aggregated party families.

I now move from influential elites to influential institutional structures. The first factor which influences a population's expression of in-group/out-group identity is political regime type, which Kailitz (2013) defines as a "set of rules that identifies: who has access to power; who is allowed to select the government; and under what conditions and limitations authority is exercised" (39). Mukand and Rodrik (2020) add to this definition by classifying regime type based on the presence of civil, political, and property rights along an "elite/non-elite" cleavage and a "majority/minority," "politics of identity" cleavage (789). Neo-institutionalists like North (1990), Ostrom (2010; 1990), and Shepsle (2006) posit that institutional choices influence a population's ability to cooperate, succeed economically, and sustainably share common pool resources. As a major institutional choice, the type of political regime in a population trickles down to informally and structurally shape its peoples' ideology, norms, and behaviors.

Particularly relevant to this thesis, North (1990) states that these informal constraints that shape human behavior come from "socially transmitted information and are a part of the heritage

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[13]Zaller (1992)'s four-axiom "Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS)" model predicts that a person with a higher level of political awareness is more likely to receive messages from elites and also to "resist information that is inconsistent" with his basic partisanship or political values (266). He argues that every opinion a person creates is a combination of information and "predisposition": "...information to form a mental picture of the given issue, and predisposition to motivate some conclusion about it" (Zaller 1992, 6). Though I do not evaluate media or internet influences in this thesis, see Tsai et. al (2020), Alamillo et. al (2019), Slavickova and Zvagulis (2014), Vu and Lee (2012), Cox (2010), and Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) for research about how technological connection and innovation in a globalized world is a double-edged sword for racial, ethnic, and cultural relations between groups.

that we call culture" (37).[14] He also emphasizes that a group's culture not only "provides a language-based conceptual framework for encoding and interpreting…information," but it also "makes those informal constraints important sources of continuity in long-run societal change" (North 1990, 37). These informal constraints directly connect to the specific forms of identity that groups adhere to over time. It is essential to remember this point within the context of this thesis: the surveyed party families' specific trends of foreigner-related rhetoric is underpinned by their nations' parliamentary or semi-presidential democratic regimes and their memberships within the supranational institution of the European Union.

There are many political regime types, but most pertinent to this thesis are democratic regimes. Democracy has been heralded as the golden standard of governance for decades by political science scholars because democracies seem to not only have leaders who face higher audience costs when they commit acts that their publics disapprove of, but also seem to promote more transparency, rights, and trade than non-democracies do, which in turn leads to more transnational peace (Yasui and Nakai 2016; Fearon 1994; Lake 1992). The *movement* or *changing* of democratic regimes is also integral to scholars' focus on democratic theory and on the democratization process. As another feature of democratic theory, regime transition is the "life-cycle of present-day democracy" (Dean et. al 2019, ix-x).

Connected directly to this thesis, democratic regime transitions (to or from) represent large-scale change, and thus, extensive instability in a population that can spill over into changes in identities, too. For example, Erkoc and Ozturk (2019) uphold that democratic regimes allow for less harmful "us versus them" rhetoric than other regime types, noting that based on a

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[14] North (1990) cites Boyd and Richerson (1985, 2)'s definition of culture as the "transmission from one generation to the next, via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, values, and other factors that influence behavior" (37).

regression of World Values Survey data and V-Dem data, democratic status of a nation and skepticism toward immigrants and foreigners is negatively correlated (14-17). They emphasize that "the strongest indicator of declining democracy is xenophobia," so a democratic regime's "life-cycle" bears significant consequences in regards to how "us versus them" rhetoric and mass attitudes change and intensify (Erkoc and Ozturk 2019, 20).

It is particularly Ronald Inglehart's research that articulates how processes that have been commonly lumped together with democratic regimes (and their transitions) - modernization, economic development, and industrialization - relate to "changes [in] worldviews and motivations" regarding topics like multiculturalism and in-group versus out-group identification (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 39). In their work *How Development Leads to Democracy*, Inglehart and Welzel (2009)'s general argument supports the core idea of modernization theory, which posits that "economic and technological development bring a coherent set of social, cultural, and political changes" (39).[15] They highlight four important points about modernization as a process. First, modernization is neither linear, nor irreversible (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 37). Rather, each subsequent phase of modernization causes "inflection points" of "distinctive changes in people's worldviews" (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 37).[16] The pair demonstrates that the higher the level of economic development a nation has, the more "tolerant and trusting" its people are (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 37).

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[15] They argue that the original modernization theory was "ethnocentric and patronizing" because it implied wealthy Western democracies "could instill modern values and bring progress to 'backward' nations through economic, cultural, and military assistance" (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 35).

[16] The pair explains that the process of industrialization led to institutionalized hierarchies, centralized authority, and secularization, but the rise of a postindustrial society brought a cultural reversal to these previous ideas, which moved the world toward individualism and freedom, and away from authority (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 36).

Thus, increased economic performance gives a population the luxury to focus more on non-material values like self-expression, multicultural tolerance, and popular participation in national decision-making than material goods for survival (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 37) (Inglehart and Norris 2017, 443). On the other hand, nations facing economic insecurity experience "authoritarian xenophobic reaction[s] in which people close ranks behind strong leaders, with strong in-group solidarity, rejection of outsiders, and rigid conformity to group norms" (Inglehart and Norris 2017, 443). These points inform my thesis theory. In times of economic hardship, I expect party families to become less inclusive and trusting about who counts as one of "us" versus one of "them."

The next point about modernization is that a nation's history influences the ways culture and society change, too (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 37). Economic development does shape ideas about identity, but a nation's heritage "leaves a lasting imprint on its worldview" as well (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 37). This sentiment relates back to the significance of national identity and incorporates North's notions about informal structuring of peoples' "us versus them" ideologies. Inglehart and Norris (2017)'s research shows that intergenerational shifts toward Postmaterialist values in economically growing nations receive "cultural backlash" from older generations and majority groups who cling to tradition because such historical modes of life have supported their successes over others (443). Furthermore, such backlash "explains why given individuals support Populist Authoritarian movements" more prominently today in current democracies (Inglehart and Norris 2017, 443). Though globalization, industrialization, modernization, and economic development are pervasive processes, ethnic traditions and cultural

heritages are remarkably resilient - even resistant - to change (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 38).[17] This thesis' Phase I investigation of European party families and its Phase II case study of the UK parties shed more light on these generational ideological shifts about foreign "others."

Inglehart and Welzel (2009)'s final point about modernization is that it does not catalyze democracy, but makes democratization more "difficult to avoid…because repressing mass demands for more open societies becomes increasingly costly and detrimental to economic effectiveness" (38). Modernization brings about economic development, security, and technological innovation, which spurs the cultural and social changes that "make[s] democratization increasingly probable" (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 38). Inglehart's evaluations of the relationship between democratization, modernization, and sociocultural change undergirds this thesis. Overall, Inglehart, Zaller, and others reveal how individuals and institutions deeply shape group identities and cement "us versus them" ideologies in their populations. While these explanations provide necessary context about the complicated process of identity formation, they do not investigate the political party family as another key piece in this process.

Remaining Gaps

These scholars have provided necessary context for my thesis about forms of identity and about the factors that shape "us versus them" rhetoric. Many scholars have examined phenomena like xenophobia and nationalism, but few have studied identity-based rhetoric in the context of crises. Moreover, most have not focused on political party families as important shapers of identity. My thesis aims to fill these gaps by acknowledging that political parties play important

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[17] Fox (2000) demonstrates how religious traditions in particular are powerful shapers of ideology because "any attack, real or perceived, on one's religious framework is…also an attack on a vital element of one's identity" (7). Rzepnikowska (2019), Slack and Doyon (2011), and Sahdra and Ross (2007) also show how historical memory contributes to a population's understanding of identity.

roles in how their populations understand who counts as one of "us," and who does not. I now turn to my theoretical framework and my hypotheses about party families and their foreigner-related rhetoric in relation to economic and cultural crises.

III. THEORY

Within the Ideological Party Families: Political Parties

The political party is an important building block of my main independent variable, the broader party "family." I assume political parties are rational and opportunistic actors at both the organizational and individual levels.[18] As an organization, a party's collective goal is to gain, exert, and maintain political power through election wins. However, individual elites within a party are motivated by two main aims: altruism or power-seeking.[19] Whether a party elite seeks office out of the goodness of her heart, or because she wants to attain power and connections, her end goal irrespective of her motivation is to have a say in how the world operates according to her normative beliefs.[20] In sum, parties on both organizational and individual levels aim to be "agents of institutional change" who create the world as they wish to see it (North 1990, 5).[21]

Ostrom (2010; 1990) demonstrates that collective action problems arise when individual actors pursue their own interests which results in suboptimal outcomes for the overall group. Because political parties exist at these two levels, their members face significant collective action

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[18] For a relevant and compelling examination of party opportunism, see White (2020)'s work on xenophobic rhetoric and physical violence toward Asians and Asian Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic.

[19] This is not to say that all elites solely pursue one aim or the other. Every individual possesses a nuanced mixture of motivations and overlapping incentives to pursue office.

[20] What is often missing from the rational choice model of economics is the fact that an agent's "own utility function - his or her own sense of the way the world ought to be - appears to play a role in the outcomes" (North 1990, 21).

[21] North (1990) says parties (as organizations) are "created with purposive intent in consequence of the opportunity set resulting from the existing set of constraints (institutional ones as well as the traditional ones of economic theory) and in the course of attempts to accomplish their objects are…major agent[s] of institutional change" (5).

problems as well. For instance, political elites may feel that what benefits their personal career trajectories most may be worth damaging their current party - and even the public they serve - in the long run. I add to North (1990) and Ostrom (2010; 1990)'s works by asserting that members of political parties are rational actors with often self-motivated interests, but they acknowledge that the consequences of reneging on party rules and expectations may do detriment to their future career prospects. Suboptimal collective outcomes often occur when political elites choose to frame, cover up, or sensationalize a particular crisis for self-motivated reasons like re-election or retaliation avoidance. Thus, the combination of public pressure (Gauri et. al 2015; Simpser and Donno 2012) and mutual monitoring by fellow elites (Strøm and Smith 2010) often (but not always) holds democratic party elites accountable to their party and to their constituency.

I have argued that individuals within a party can act opportunistically and rationally. I also argue that political parties as mass organizations are also strategic and opportunistic actors. Though the usage of online metrics is now out-pacing traditional canvassing, these tactics all aim to meet the same goal: parties need information about the public in order to get elected (or re-elected), because as Dalton (2019) aptly puts it,

> The selection of leaders - along with the ability to "throw the rascals out" at the next election - is the public's penultimate power. Political elites may not always deliver what they promise, but the selection of a government produces popular control over these elites. (137)

While the possibility of "throwing the rascals out" can be an almost impossible task in non-democratic systems, it is a defining feature of modern democracies today. As Przeworski (2004) notes, "...democracy is a regime in which incumbents lose elections and leave office if they do" (3). The behaviors of prospective and incumbent politicians in high profile roles are

constrained by the threats of deposition by the public and fellow officials, as well as the reputational and financial costs that accompany government scandals.

A lot of debate surrounds this question of who influences whom to the greatest degree. Zaller (1992) argues that parties are the ones to set the positionality and tone of their agendas, and the majority of the public cluelessly follows their lead, while others like Fearon (1994) argue that the audience costs faced by democratic parties demonstrates that the relationship between parties and their publics is a two-way street. I insert myself into this debate to argue that political parties have the upper hand when it comes to agenda-setting because they have access to the tools, power, money, and authority that most of their constituents do not. One caveat I make is that parties also must alter their rhetoric to resonate with their voters to avoid being thrown out.

In sum, regardless of their individual members' motives, political parties as organizations act rationally, strategically, and opportunistically to accomplish their goals of attaining - and wielding - considerable political power. To accomplish this goal in a democratic (or semi-democratic) system, parties must gain support of voters by taking clear stances on issues that the public cares about greatly. As Inglehart, Dalton, and others emphasize, these key issues differ greatly across generations and identity groups. Crises often appear to be involved in these changes. In the following hypotheses, I speak to this point by discussing how economic and cultural crises may change party families' foreigner-related rhetoric.

Ideological Party Families ("Parfams")

I have explained how I believe parties function and what potential costs constrain their choices. I now zoom out to the independent variable of my thesis: the ideological party family ("parfam"). The ideological party family is the umbrella under which parties of comparatively

similar ideology and "rile" index scores are grouped. I posit that there is a significant relationship between the ideological family to which a party belongs and the percentage/attitude of foreigner-related rhetoric the party uses in its manifestos. Camia and Caramani (2012) support my expectation, finding that parties in the same family have statistically high levels of "ideological cohesiveness," meaning that their principles align very closely over time (71).

Camia and Caramani (2012)'s evidence leads into the crux of my argument: periods of crisis change the patterns of parties' foreigner-related rhetoric in different ways because they belong to different ideological families. Though the "rile" index method is related to the Comparative Manifestos Project database's "parfam" variable, I believe solely conceptualizing party families along a Left/Right sliding scale is too simplistic to fully grasp the nuances of their ideologies and histories. This is why I agree that it is necessary to superimpose party families' Left/Right alignments on a plane which indicates where each party falls in regards to economic questions and cultural questions (Dalton 2019; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Inglehart 1981; 1977; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The topics included in party campaign manifestos have shifted greatly over the past few generations, and issues about culture, equality, and human rights are now considered as important as economic issues (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Inglehart 1981; 1977).

Because of cultural issues' rise to prominence in politics, it is crucial for my thesis to compare party families' responses toward foreign "others" in both economic and cultural crises. I largely agree with Hooghe and Marks (2018, 126)' take on Lipset and Rokkan (1967)'s original cleavage theory, which posited that a political party's reaction to a new division or upheaval in society is "constrained by [the party's] location on a prior social division."[22] Hooghe and Marks

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[22] The industrial revolution and nineteenth century nation-state revolution reveal how change is a "disruptive," rather than "incremental" process in party systems (Hooghe and Marks 2018, 126; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

(2018) argue that the economic fall out and the refugee crisis have created a new cleavage, resulting in the rise of GAL ("green/alternative/libertarian") and TAN ("traditional/authoritarian/nationalist") parties in Europe (127-8). My analysis of the same geopolitical region and crises enriches both Lipset and Rokkan (1967)'s cleavage theory and Hooghe and Marks (2018)' assertion that new parties are born from new cleavages.

Nevertheless, my theory diverges from Hooghe and Marks (2018)' when they suggest that older parties do not adapt their rhetoric to changing constituencies and ideologies. The Green Party in the United States is a good example of a new party created from a new cleavage; however, the two main historical parties in the U.S. have transformed their platforms greatly within just the last half century. For instance, immigrant-related identity rhetoric was nearly nonexistent in 1960 Democratic and Republican manifestos, but is now prevalent on both sides of the aisle.[23] This gradual amplification of foreigner-related rhetoric on both sides of the aisle feeds into "zeitgeist," the first of three points that support why I expect all party families to increase their foreigner-related rhetoric following economic *and* cultural crises.

First, I expect that all nine party families will incorporate more foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric following any crisis because of the phenomenon Mudde (2004) refers to as "zeitgeist," which is the defining "set of ideas, beliefs, feelings…that is typical of a particular period of history." Any crisis can set the tone (or "spirit" or "geist") of the decades that follow it. This thesis seeks to discern how the foreign "other" fits into parties' specific ideologies. The concept of "zeitgeist" is an important part of my argument because I investigate how all party

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[23] This finding comes from my trial analysis of Democratic and Republican Parties' raw frequency count of the words "immigrant," "migrant," "refugee," "asylum," "migration," and "foreigner" in their election manifestos. In 1960, the Republican Party made reference to these terms 9 times, and 29 times in 2020. The Democratic Party made reference to these terms 16 times in 1960, and 81 times in 2020.

families' "us versus them" rhetoric changes over time due to their shared temporal and geographical experiences.

Second, because political parties aim to win elections, I argue they opportunistically tailor in-group/out-group appeals to fit the salient topics of the day in order to rally voter support. Crises of any kind often challenge and polarize society because of the distress that they cause (Whitt 2014). Because political elites often have the power and resources to frame a particular group as the culprit of a crisis, they can eradicate the blame for the crisis from their own party and their prospective voter base. No one enjoys feeling responsible for creating a problem, so this strategy not only encourages bandwagoning and mobilization by a party's voters, but it also allows for false vindication of their guilt. In this way, political parties can use the foreign "other" as a convenient scapegoat to blame for the economic collapse, the influx of newcomers, or the overall "decline" of domestic society. When all is said and done, parties can pursue such rhetoric because foreigners are often not permitted to vote; thus, they only have a metaphorical say, not a literal say in the policies of their host country. The domestic voters are the audience to which political parties must appeal, so parties will focus their efforts on presenting plans of governance which aid domestic voters more than foreigners and/(or) minorities without legal voting power.

Third, increased "us versus them" identity rhetoric during - and following - a crisis may help to mobilize a party's support base and win political power. Especially if all parties in a country during an election cycle use similar "us versus them" rhetoric, then no one party is singled out to be punished by the public or by their opposition for doing so. In a Prisoner's Dilemma framework, this strategy may seem counterintuitive, but it holds: a party desires other parties to be punished, but wants itself to remain unpunished by the public. This net reduction of

transaction costs prevails because parties realize that if other parties use inflammatory rhetoric, so can they, and without major repercussions (Jones and Hudson 1998; North 1990).

The theories about "zeitgeist," opportunistic bandwagoning, and party transaction costs ground my first hypothesis (H1), which predicts that all party families will show raw percent increases of foreigner-related rhetoric occupying their manifestos following economic *and* cultural crises. The attitude, volatility, brands of "us versus them" ideology, and statistical significance of foreigner-related rhetoric will likely differ greatly by party family and by crisis type, which is why the hypotheses following H1 expand these expectations in greater detail.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Both economic and cultural crises lead to raw percent increases of foreigner-related rhetoric in all ideological party families' manifestos.


Figure 1.
Interpretation: This figure summarizes assumptions made in this thesis. Quadrant I includes Ethnic/Regional and Nationalist/Populist party families because they are in the far-left/right "rile" group and often define political

community membership as highly exclusive. Quadrant II includes Ecological, Social Democratic, and Socialist families because they are also in the far-left/right group, but more broadly define the inclusivity of their political communities, appealing to global, civic, or class-based identities, not ethnic or cultural ones. The Liberal family occupies Quadrant III because it defines its political community broadly, but is in the moderate "rile" group. Quadrant IV includes Agrarian/Rural Labor, Christian/Jewish Democratic, and Conservative families, which are also in the moderate "rile" group, but define their political communities very exclusively.

Note: The color assigned to each family simply distinguishes them. The positionality of families within each quadrant has no significance. The x-axis shows the size of a family's political community. The y-axis shows which group the family falls into based roughly on its "rile" index values from the CMP database.

Source: Chart rendered from the author based on Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) estimations of Right-Left ("rile" index) political alignment per party family and its overall designations of different party families (coded as the "parfam" variable). Estimations of political community size are based on the author's own interpretation, which integrates previously mentioned scholars' findings and the author's own assumptions based on their own research.

Figure 1 above summarizes the nine party families I investigate based on the scholarship of the Comparative Manifestos Project (Volkens et. al 2021), Dalton (2019), and Camia and Caramani (2012). These nine families differ greatly along the "rile" index and by the sizes of their political communities, which are determined by the identity (or identities) a person must possess to become a member of the community. Despite these clear differences, my subsequent hypotheses reveal why some families may show similar trends in their discussions of foreigners and foreign influences surrounding the 2008 and 2015 crises.

Economic Crisis Expectations

Dalton (2019) hones in on British parties to highlight how their stances on economic issues have changed greatly over a relatively short period of time. He notes that while UK parties a century ago were polar extremes on issues of social welfare and government involvement in the British economy, they are now grouped more closely together and trend rightward on the "rile" scale (Dalton 2019, 109). Whether parties elsewhere are becoming more split on economic issues or more similar, Dalton (2019)'s example still leaves us wondering if political parties opportunistically increase how much - and in what tone - they discuss foreigners following a crisis that is not explicitly related to cultural demographic changes and/(or) ideology clashes.

Because political parties are by nature strategic and opportunistic, I argue that they tap into the "zeitgeist" of the current time and harp on the most relevant, pressing issues. During - and following - an economic crisis, it makes sense to expect that talking points about economic issues would take up a major percentage of total rhetoric in all nine party families' manifestos. However, I also argue that several party families' foreigner-related in-group versus out-group rhetoric also takes up sizable manifesto space in times of economic crisis, since such a crisis provides a clear example of Inglehart (1981)'s *scarcity hypothesis*, which states that people "'place the greatest value on those things that are in relatively short supply,' like employment, food, shelter, stability, and steady income (881)" (Dalton 2019, 91). When a crisis like this happens, people first become worried and afraid. Then they turn to those closest to them in their in-group communities for comfort. Finally, they seek to blame someone from the out-group for their suffering in order to cope with their own misfortune. For their electoral benefit, opportunistic political parties can often deliver this easily identifiable enemy on a silver platter for their voter base to tear apart.[24]

With these theories in mind, I do not expect to find a statistically significant increase of foreigner-related rhetoric employed by any of the five party families within the far-left/right "rile" group: Ecological (ECO), Far-Left/Socialist/Communist (SOC), Social Democratic (SOCDEM), Ethnic/Regional (ETH), and Nationalist/Populist (NAT-POP). The first three party families in this group, Ecological, Socialist, and Social Democratic, do not base their ideologies

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[24] The public also does not like indecisive politicians who are vague on critical issues and beat around the bush - especially not in tense situations. In other words, for political parties, public trust is a key component of likeability and winning "hearts and minds" (Beehner 2011). Thus, in economic crisis periods (such as that after World War I, World War II, or 2008), I argue that some party families may increase their percentages of foreigner-specific manifesto rhetoric to assuage domestic voters by painting the foreign "others" as the exacerbators of the crisis (because they compete with "locals" for jobs), and the instigators of the public's financial instability.

about membership to the political community on ethnic or racial identities; rather, they focus on class-based and global citizenship identities. Conversely, Nationalist/Populist and Ethnic/Regional party families often focus their ideologies around cultural signifiers of political belonging.[25]

The Ecological family's parties discuss cultural identity very little because it does not correspond with their main environmental focus, so I do not expect a change in this family's foreigner-related rhetoric (Hooghe and Marks 2018). The Ecological party family also defines its political community as inclusive one that is globally united by green civic initiatives; thus, their scope is not resigned to one group within their nation, so they are less likely to use culturally, ethnically, or racially discriminatory rhetoric as a tactic to gain more voters. In a similar manner, the Socialist and Social Democratic party families' parties may define their political communities as larger than - or equivalent to - their nation's borders, but not smaller. Due to their economic focus, party families are likely to blame the current administration for failing the people due to the corrupt system.

By nature of their ideologies, members, and voter bases, the Ethnic/Regional and Nationalist/Populist party families already focus heavily on cultural or ethnic identities as criteria for political community membership, which is more insular than the size of their nation's borders. The Ethnic/Regional family's parties focus on one main demographic of the population, so they are likely to blame the government itself for failing to help their group thrive during an economic crisis, and even emphasize that they have been discriminated against. The

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[25] Hypotheses 4 (H4) and 5 (H5) are indirectly discussed throughout both *Economic* and *Cultural Crises* sections because H4 pertains to the opportunism of moderate party families (operationalized as range of percent foreigner rhetoric), and H5 pertains to the way in which each party family defines the scope of its political community.

Nationalist/Populist family's parties may blame 'corrupt' elites for the economic fall out, and may focus less of their blame on cultural or ethnic factors.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Ideological party families within the Far-Left/Right group will not demonstrate statistically significant percent increases of their foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric in the wake of an economic crisis.

Contrastingly, I *do* expect to find a small, albeit statistically significant increase in foreigner-related rhetoric from the four party families in the more moderate/center "rile" group, which are the Liberal (LIB), Christian/Jewish Democratic (CHRDEM), Conservative (CON), and Agrarian (AGR) party families. I believe some of the most significant data may be gleaned from how these more moderate party families opportunistically adjust their usage of cultural identity rhetoric according to the "zeitgeist" of the time (H4). Though the Liberal family often defines its political community as larger than or equal to its national borders, it may still prove beneficial for parties within this family to consolidate their ranks regarding who counts as one of "us" (because "we" deserve more resources) (H5). If not an incumbent, the Liberal party family may blame the current administration for allocating funds to the foreign "them" instead of the native "us" to appeal to domestic voters, which is why I expect a statistically significant percent increase in foreigner-related rhetoric from this family.

I also expect statistically significant percent increases in foreigner-related rhetoric by Christian Democratic, Conservative, and Agrarian party families. Though all three party families may not be founded explicitly upon exclusionary ethnic or racial ideologies, these notions are increasingly expressed by European party elites and voters (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). What is more, all three families define the political community as smaller than the nation; i.e., the "good" commoners who are likely upstanding,

white, blue-collar Christians (H5). In the case of the Christian Democratic party family's parties, I expect them to place blame on the government for providing resources to the non-Christian "ne'er do wells" instead of helping the "good," faithful citizens. I expect the Conservative and Agrarian party families to behave similarly. Cultural- and ethnic-focused definitions of political community seem to be relatively important to the Conservative family, and I believe its parties will blame foreigners for using up resources that local, middle-upper class citizens need. Agrarian parties may blame the government for not allocating enough resources to their agricultural sectors, or harp on the idea that foreigners create too much domestic competition for their given professions.

> **Hypothesis 3 (H3): Ideological party families within the central/moderate group *will* demonstrate statistically significant percent increases of their foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric in the wake of an economic crisis.**

> **Hypothesis 4 (H4): Ideological party families within the central/moderate group will act *more opportunistically* in their usage of foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric than party families in the Far-Left/Right group.**

> **Hypothesis 5 (H5): Ideological party families that define their political community as *larger* than or equal to their national borders will demonstrate higher percentages of *positive* manifesto rhetoric toward foreigners and(or) foreign influences, while party families that define their political community as *smaller* than their national borders will demonstrate higher percentages of *negative* "naming and shaming" manifesto rhetoric toward foreigners and/(or) foreign influences.**

Cultural Crisis Expectations

The political world is slowly diversifying to better resemble its constituents, and as a result, cultural topics are becoming equally - if not more - salient than economic ones. Dalton (2019) emphasizes that cultural "attitudes toward immigrants, European integration, [and] environmentalism" are increasingly discussed by citizens and their political parties (151). In their

analysis of Muslim immigrants in Europe, Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) also find that cultural threats are more significant on the majority population than economic ones. This finding lines up Blumer (1958)'s "group threat theory," which assumes that people become "averse toward out-groups when they feel threatened by members of those groups," but it is "not the existence of immigrants that matters but the existence of immigrants who threaten the host residents' positions [that matters]" (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011, 818). Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) demonstrates how crises related to cultural identities may be more relevant today than economic issues alone because cultural topics combine domestic majority populations' economic *and* xenophobic fears that politicians spin for their own electoral advantages.

To evaluate the significance of a cultural crisis, I chose the Syrian refugee crisis of 2015 as a test case. I expect the nine party families to increase their percentages of foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric during and following the crisis (2015-2019), as compared to before the crisis (2008-2014). Hypothesis 6 (H6) predicts that the five party families from the far-left/right group will increase their percentages of foreigner-related rhetoric following the Syrian refugee crisis. As *Figure 1* highlights, Socialist parties focus more on class identity than race, ethnicity, and citizenship status. However, this family may still resort to painting the migrant crisis as a situation in which lower classes face danger of ideological poisoning by foreign intruders. Parties within the Social Democratic family may increase their foreigner-related rhetoric as well if they either argue that the government needs to provide more welfare for migrants and refugees, or argue that those in the political community deserve first access to government welfare.

The Comparative Manifestos Project database and Hooghe and Marks (2018) corroborate that Ecological party family's members are often considered far-left, especially within this EU

context. Thus, it is expected that the Ecological party family will react similarly to the Socialist and Social Democratic party families. All three of these party families tend to define their political communities as larger or equivalent to national borders, and none of them focus on ethnicity or race as an aspect of political community membership (H5). Rather, they often focus on class or civic ideology as the political community characteristic their members share (H5). This implies that they will not use cultural-based rhetoric as an opportunistic "name and shame" tool as more moderate party families might (H4).

Still within the far-left/right group, I expect Ethnic/Regional and Nationalist/Populist party families to increase their percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in the 2015-2019 period. A migrant crisis is the prime moment for either family to emphasize their beliefs that "foreigners or immigrants [are] a threat to...national solidarity" (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011, 824). As *Figure 1* illustrates, ethnic and cultural identities are crucial features of membership within Ethnic/Regional and Nationalist/Populist party families' political communities. Thus, they may show less fluctuation in their cultural-related rhetoric than moderate party families (H4). However, I maintain that I still expect significant increases in their foreigner-related rhetoric pre- versus post-refugee crisis. Both Ethnic/Regional and Nationalist/Populist party families also conceptualize their political communities as smaller than national borders, so the fifth hypothesis (H5) predicts that the migrant crisis would encourage their exclusionary ideologies.

Hypothesis 6 (H6): Ideological party families within the Far-Left/Right group *will* demonstrate statistically significant percent increases of foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric in the wake of a cultural crisis.

Within the more moderate/central "rile" group, Hypothesis 7 (H7) also expects Liberal, Conservative, Christian Democratic, and Agrarian party families to significantly increase their

percentages of foreigner-related rhetoric following the cultural crisis (in part) due to their central positionality along the "rile" spectrum. As H4 predicts, more moderate party families may have more freedom to fluctuate on their positions about cultural issues, so they will more opportunistically utilize the 2015 crisis to mobilize and rally domestic voters around their causes. What is more, Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) find that the "perception that there is a serious cleavage between…Christian…and Islamic values is strong in Europe," which leads me to expect that the Christian Democratic, Conservative, and Agrarian party families will portray foreign migrants as dangerous Islamic extremists, murderers, and terrorists whom threaten the religious values the white majority and take away their jobs, as well as their culture (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011, 821).

Lastly, H7 expects that the Liberal party family will also significantly increase its percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in the post-refugee crisis period. Per *Figure 1*, parties in the Liberal family define their political communities as larger than or equal to their national borders. The Liberal family comparatively emphasizes diversity and pluralism as pinnacles of democracy; nonetheless, I believe that its parties will act as opportunistically as Conservative parties might, also framing foreigners as the main source of national instability (H4). In line with the fifth hypothesis (H5), I maintain that even though I expect overall greater increases in the percentages of foreigner-related rhetoric when a cultural crisis occurs instead of an economic one, party families who define their political communities with larger scopes are generally more inclusive and will not be as likely to resort to "naming and shaming" of foreigners or minorities to cull favor with their domestic voters.

Hypothesis 7 (H7): Ideological party families in the center/moderate group will also demonstrate statistically significant percent increases of foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric in the wake of a cultural crisis.

Overall, the seven hypotheses expanded in this section draw heavily from scholars who have contributed invaluable research about political parties, ideological party families, European politics, group-threat theory, and large-scale trends in "us versus them" behavior surrounding crises of different natures. Hypothesis 1 (H1) prefaces my theoretical predictions by assuming that all party families are at least somewhat reactive to all crises, as shown by raw increases in percent foreigner-related rhetoric following both the economic and migrant crises. Hypotheses 2 (H2) and 3 (H3) pull from Mudde's "zeitgeist" theory, Blumer's "group-threat" theory, and Inglehart's "scarcity hypothesis" to predict that far-left/right party families will not increase their foreigner-related rhetoric following the economic crisis, but moderate/central party families will.

Hypothesis 4 (H4) draws from these theories as well as those from Dalton, North, and others regarding opportunism and audience costs to predict that moderate/central party families will exhibit more opportunism in their foreigner-related rhetoric over the 18–year period than far-left/right party families will. Hypothesis 5 (H5) utilizes Dalton, Inglehart and Norris, Hooghe and Marks, and Camia and Carmani's findings to predict that party families that define their political communities as larger than or equal to the size of the nation will yield more positive attitudes in their foreigner-related rhetoric, while those that define their political communities as smaller than the nation will demonstrate more negative attitudes about foreigners.

Lastly, Hypotheses 6 (H6) and 7 (H7) combine research from previous scholars to predict that all party families, regardless of "rile" index scores or political community size, will significantly increase their usage of foreigner-related rhetoric following the refugee crisis of 2015 due to its highly cultural nature. To test my theoretical expectations, I now walk through my research design.

IV. METHODS OVERVIEW

To review, this thesis seeks to evaluate the relationship between different ideological party families (the independent variable) and the prevalence of political community in-group/out-group rhetoric as related to foreigners and foreign influences (the dependent variable). I analyze changes in foreigner-related rhetoric from nine main party families in nine EU nations before both crises (2001-2007), post-economic/pre-Syrian refugee crisis (2008-2014), and after both crises (2015-2019). My research design is informed by the methods of Jenne et al. (2021), Nantkes (2021), Biancalana and Mazzoleni (2020), Carlotti and Gianfreda (2020), McGregor (2019), and Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), all of whom use either computer keyword analysis, hand-coding, or a mixture of both to successfully code for populist, Euroskeptic, and/(or) anti-foreigner rhetoric in European political parties using MaxQDA or similar programs like Yoshikoder. These studies greatly add to our overall understanding of how populist and xenophobic ideologies are evolving and functioning in Europe. My thesis takes these results further by incorporating large-N and small-n data about foreigner-related rhetoric trends from distinct party families when different crises occur.

Unit of Analysis: The Manifesto

Because the focus of this thesis is party family rhetoric, the most appropriate unit of analysis is the party election manifesto. Three main features make this a robust unit of analysis. Firstly, it stems from the main database I use, the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP).[26] Secondly, as Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) highlight, the manifesto is a clear snapshot of a

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[26] The CMP database provides hundreds of political manifestos from parties all over the world as early as 1945. Recently countries in Asia, Latin America, South America, and Africa have been added to the database, but the region with the largest catalog of manifestos in the CMP database is still Western Europe.

party's ideology during a specific election, which is particularly useful for tracking both major

and subtle changes in a party's platform, self-defined political community, and sensitivity toward

specific crises over time (1274). Thirdly, party manifestos are useful for making cross-country

comparisons over long time periods - especially because the largest collection of manifestos in

the CMP database come from Western European nations (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011, 1274).

Region Selection: Western & Southern Europe

The CMP's abundance of European manifesto data directed my analysis toward mainly

Western and Southern European nations. This regional limitation allows me to properly (1)

access and analyze manifestos from all nine party families across the 2001-2019 time period, (2)

control for common European Union membership among selected nations, and (3) internally

compare the selected nations based on Eurostat foreigner influx data about the migrant crisis.

European nations in the EU were hit hard by the financial crisis, the Eurozone crisis two years

later, and then the refugee crisis. Additionally, many of these nations are hotspots of rising

far-right movements; repression of LGBTQIA+, immigrant, and domestic minority communities;

and backsliding democracies (Jenne et al. 2021; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Mudde 2012; 2010;

2004; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). For these reasons, this geopolitical region is a strong case to

exhibit how political community membership is transformed in light of different crises.

To select which European Union member states' manifestos to code, I eliminated all

countries that either had too few election cycles present between 2001-2019, could not be

translated in the Google Translate *and* PDF2Go programs, or did not have consistently original

(not scanned) manifestos between 2001-2019 available in the CMP database. For the remaining

EU nations, I charted how many of the nine families were represented by that nation's parties, as

well as how many elections each party participated in. After identifying EU nations with robust

ranges of party families and/(or) election cycles, I utilized Frontex and Eurostat data presented

by Pew Research Center on estimated unauthorized immigrants between 2014-2017 in Europe.[27]

I averaged the low and high estimates for the selected years separately, and then averaged these

values to create one data point per country. I sorted the remaining EU nations into three brackets:

high influx (>150,000 unauthorized immigrants per country per year), moderate influx

(=150,000), and low influx (<150,000). There were three high influx, four moderate influx, and

ten low influx EU nations. From this result, I made the final selection of three countries per

influx bracket: UK, France, and Germany (high influx); Greece, Sweden, and Austria (moderate

influx); and Hungary, Denmark, and Finland (low influx).[28]

Preliminary Data Selection & Preparation

After country selection, I procured 305 manifestos from the CMP database which came

from the nine selected EU countries, spanned the 2001-2019 range, and included parties within

all nine party families. I then downloaded these manifestos, translated them via Google

Translate, formatted them via the PDF2Go program, and loaded them into the MaxQDA

(maximum qualitative data analysis) program to be coded.

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[27] "European Unauthorized Immigrant Population Estimates with Waiting Asylum Seekers, 2014-2017 | Pew Research Center." 2019. Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. I solely focused on data from 2015-2016 to account for lagged arrivals in 2015, which I define as the pivotal year for the migrant crisis in my thesis.
[28] When there were more than three countries in a given bracket, I selected countries based on their variety of party family representatives, number of election years, and accessibility of manifesto files.

Figure 2 and Figure 3.
Interpretation: The first map indicates the EU status of European nations, while the second map highlights the nine countries which contributed manifestos in this thesis' analysis.
Note: As the first map indicates, the UK is no longer a member of the European Union.
Source: *Figure 2* is from (Kästle 2021). *Figure 3* was rendered by the author via Archer (2013)'s webpage software.

V.   PHASE I METHODS

This thesis includes two phases of data analysis. Both phases make use of the MaxQDA (maximum qualitative data analysis) program to organize and code the party manifestos. The first phase is a large-N evaluation of the percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric to total manifesto rhetoric per party family across the nine EU countries before, during, and after the 2008 economic crisis and 2015 refugee crisis. The goal of Phase I is to survey the rhetorical "landscape" and compare how frequently the nine party families discuss foreigners and foreign influences on their political communities across the two crises.

To achieve this goal, I created a "go-list" of 45 relevant terms like "immigrant," and "refugee" that capture instances in which parties from the nine families discuss cultural "others" (foreigners) and their interactions with the political community via terms like "migration" and

"asylum." I tailored my list of key terms based on example codes from the research methods of Jenne et al. (2021), Nantkes (2021), Biancalana and Mazzoleni (2020), Carlotti and Gianfreda (2020), McGregor (2019), and Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011). A downside to computer-coding can be the lack of empirical validity. To avoid this disadvantage as much as possible, I performed a pilot study similar to Biancalana and Mazzoleni (2020, 288)'s approach to ensure my go-list terms would capture variation in rhetoric as expected.[29]

Next, I installed Sinclair and Rockwell (2016)'s "stop-list" of terms and added to it the exclusion of all numbers (0-9999), garbled translation error characters, Euro signs, and other irrelevant symbols. The removal of these characters ensured that they would not be considered in the final word count per manifesto, which is needed to calculate percent of foreigner-related rhetoric. I then utilized the Lexical Search tool to run a frequency search from the go-list of foreigner-related terms across all nine countries' political parties from 2001 to 2019. The breadth of quantifiable data generated in Phase I allows for large-N comparisons between the nine party families across the Western and Southern European EU nations.[30]

VI. PHASE I RESULTS

The "Word Frequency" function in MaxQDA found 42 out of the 45 foreigner-related go-list terms in at least one manifesto. The 42 terms were used a total of 11,807 times across 289 of the 305 manifestos.[31] The top three most frequent words from the go-list were "immigration" (with 1,385 hits), "asylum" (1,227 hits), and "refugee*" (1,031).[32] The percentage of go-list

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[29] For more information about the pilot study, see 1. in Appendix B.
[30] For additional details about the data preparation process, see 2. in Appendix B.
[31] The lack of data from 16 manifestos occurred because manifestos from early years were not machine-readable, and others did not have any foreigner-related rhetoric.
[32] For the full list of go-list terms and their raw data from Phase I's coding, see 3. (*Table B)* in Appendix B.

words to total words per party family ranged between 0% and 9.67%, with the Agrarian party

family respectively demonstrating the lowest percentage in 2015, and the Nationalist/Populist

party family demonstrating the highest percentage (also in 2015).

Hypothesis 1 (H1)

The first hypothesis (H1) predicted all nine party families' would display raw percent

increases in foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric after both crises because of their sensitivity to

the "zeitgeist" of the time. For my results to support H1's prediction, each family would need to

show a raw percent increase in the post-economic crisis period (2008-2014) as compared to the

pre-economic crisis period, as well as an increase in the post-refugee crisis period (2015-2019)

as compared to the pre-refugee crisis period (2008-2014). This hypothesis was tested by

calculating the average percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric per family via the excel function

"=sum(all foreigner-related percentages from selected period)," followed by the function

"=sum/(number of election years with data that occur in the selected period)." These commands

were repeated three times (for 2001-2007, 2008-2014, and 2015-2019 data) to determine the

percent change in each party family's foreigner-related rhetoric pre- versus post-crisis.

Overall, *Figure 4* below indicates that Phase I's results did not support Hypothesis 1

(H1). The Ethnic/Regional and Nationalist/Populists party families were the only two to show

raw increases in foreigner-related rhetoric after both crises. Both families' percent changes were

higher following the refugee crisis than the economic crisis, with increases of +0.07% (ETH) and

+0.21% (NAT-POP) after the economic crisis, and increases of +0.94% (ETH) and +3.25%

(NAT-POP) after the migrant crisis. The remaining seven families all showed raw percent

decreases in their foreigner-related rhetoric after the economic crisis and raw percent *increases*

in their foreigner-related rhetoric after the refugee crisis. This result goes against H1's

expectation that all party families would react to any crisis by discussing foreign "others" more

frequently. Nonetheless, H1's finding contributes to this thesis' overall contributions because it

preliminarily supports the later hypotheses' results, which indicate that all party families are

more reactive (H4) and forthcoming (H2-3 versus H6-7) with their foreigner-related rhetoric

following a crisis of a cultural nature than one of a mainly economic nature.

Figure 4.

Interpretation: Overall, party families exhibited much higher percent changes in their respective foreigner-related rhetoric related to the migrant crisis. All families' percent changes surrounding the migrant crisis were positive, which preliminarily supports H6 and H7. All but the Ethnic/Regional (ETH) and Nationalist/Populist (NAT-POP) families demonstrated raw percent decreases after the economic crisis, which does not preliminarily support H2 and H3. There is a significant decrease in the Conservative (CON) family's foreigner-related rhetoric after the economic crisis as compared to other families' percent changes in the period. There is also a significant increase in the Nationalist/Populist (NAT-POP) family's foreigner-related rhetoric after the migrant crisis.
Note: Orange bars show percent change per party family in the post-economic/pre-migrant crisis period (2008-2014) versus the period after both crises (2015-2019). Blue bars show percent change per family in the pre-economic crisis (2001-2007) versus post-economic/pre-migrant crisis period (2008-2014). Percent change (in increments of 0.5%) per family includes data from parties within each family across the nine surveyed nations.
Source: CMP data prepared in MaxQDA and rendered in Microsoft Excel by the author.

Hypothesis 2 (H2)

The second hypothesis (H2) posits that the five party families in the far-left/right "rile" group would not increase their foreigner-related rhetoric to a statistically significant degree in the wake of an economic crisis. The rationale behind this prediction was that far-left/right party families would direct their blame for the economic fall-out on the government or would already discuss foreigners more frequently than moderate party families due to the role cultural/ethnic identities play in these far-left/right families' conceptualizations of political community membership. I graphed each of the five families over the 18-year period and examined the statistical significance of the pre- (2001-2007) versus post-economic crisis (2008-2014) periods.

As shown below, the results from the Socialist (*Figure 5*), Ethnic/Regional (*Figure 8*), and Nationalist/Populist (*Figure 9*) party families support H2: there was no significant difference in their respective percentages of foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric in the pre- (2001-2007) versus post- (2008-2014) economic crisis periods. Also shown below, the Social Democratic and Ecological party families did *not* support H2. *Figure 6* displays that the Social Democratic family's foreigner-related rhetoric percentages in 2006 (1.71%) and 2007 (2.65%) were statistically *higher* than those in the post-economic crisis period (2008-2014 values range 0.21% to 0.86%). *Figure 7* shows the opposite is true of the Ecological party family, which displayed a significantly higher percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in 2013 (1.55%) than at any point before the economic crisis (2001-2007 values range 0.50% to 1.22%). This result illustrates that the percentage of foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric from Ecological parties was significantly higher *after* the economic crisis.

Figure 5.
Interpretation: The Socialist party family showed no statistically significant percent change in foreigner-related rhetoric before versus after the economic crisis, which supports H2. However, this family did show a significant increase in its foreigner-related rhetoric after the refugee crisis period, which supports H6. 2015 was the pivotal year for the refugee crisis. There are a large number of Socialist parties in Greece (one of the nations to initially bear the brunt of the crisis) and in the other eight nations studied. For these reasons, this sharp increase in rhetoric in 2015 is backed by large-N data and is also representative of the sensitivity of parties in this family toward the migrant crisis.
Note: For a larger version, see 4. in Appendix B. 2001-2007 is the period before both crises. 2008-2014 is the post-economic/pre-refugee crisis period. 2015-2019 is the period after both crises. The x-axis notes each election year in which Socialist family data was available. 2003 and 2016 lack Socialist family data. The y-axis shows total percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in aggregated Socialist manifestos per year. The highest percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in Socialist party family manifestos was 4.97% in 2015. The lowest was 0.34% in 2013.
Source: Data from Comparative Manifestos Project. Author applied MaxQDA's Lexical Search tool to this data, calculated the results, and rendered them graphically in Microsoft Excel.

Figure 6.
Interpretation: The Social Democratic party family showed a statistically significant percent decrease in foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric after the economic crisis, which does not support H2. This spike in 2006-2007 could potentially capture rhetoric about foreign influences related to the EU's newly ratified Lisbon Treaty, but is likely due to some other combination of factors. In the post-refugee crisis period, the Social Democratic family showed a significant increase in foreigner-related rhetoric, which supports H6. The same reasons for the Socialist

family's trajectory applies to this party family, which is why their divergence after the economic crisis is interesting. Further research should examine the 2006-2007 foreigner-related rhetoric in these two families for more context.
Note: For a larger version, see 5. Appendix B. 2001-2007 is the period before both crises. 2008-2014 is the post-economic/pre-refugee crisis period. 2015-2019 is the period after both crises. The x-axis notes each election year in which Social Democratic party family data was available. 2003 and 2016 have no Social Democratic party family data. The y-axis shows total rhetoric percent of foreigner-related rhetoric in this party family's manifestos per year. The highest percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in Social Democratic party family manifestos was 4.15% in 2015. The lowest percentage was 0.21% in 2011. These trends are similar to that of the Socialist party family.
Source: Data from Comparative Manifestos Project. Author applied MaxQDA's Lexical Search tool to this data, calculated the results, and rendered them graphically in Microsoft Excel.


Figure 7.
Interpretation: The Ecological party family showed no statistically significant percent change in foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric after the economic crisis, which does not support H2. This family showed a significant increase in foreigner-related rhetoric in the post-refugee crisis period, which supports H6. Future research should examine its 2006-2007 and 2013 foreigner-related rhetoric as well.
Note: For a larger version, see 6. in Appendix B. 2001-2007 is the period before both crises. 2008-2014 is the post-economic/pre-refugee crisis period. 2015-2019 is the period after both crises. The x-axis notes each election year in which Ecological party family data was available. 2003, 2004, and 2016 have no Ecological family data. The y-axis shows total percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in this family's manifestos per year. The highest percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in Ecological party family manifestos was 2.19% in 2017; the lowest, 0.33% in 2012. These trends are similar - yet smaller in range - to those of the previous two party families.
Source: Data from Comparative Manifestos Project. Author applied MaxQDA's Lexical Search tool to this data, calculated the results, and rendered them graphically in Microsoft Excel.

Figure 8.
Interpretation: The Ethnic/Regional party family showed no statistically significant percent increase in foreigner-related rhetoric after the economic crisis, which supports H2. In the post-refugee crisis period, the Ethnic/Regional family showed a significant increase in foreigner-related rhetoric, which also supports H6. Due to a comparable lack of data for this family, more research is needed to provide generalizable and valid results.
Note: For a larger version, see 7. Appendix B. 2001-2007 is the period before both crises. 2008-2014 is the post-economic/pre-refugee crisis period. 2015-2019 is the period after both crises. The x-axis notes each year in which Ethnic/Regional family data was available. Only the UK and Finland have Ethnic/Regional parties; thus, only six elections yield results. The y-axis shows total percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in this family's manifestos per year. Its highest percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric was 1.94% in 2019. Its lowest was 0.15% in 2001.
Source: Data from Comparative Manifestos Project. Author applied MaxQDA's Lexical Search tool to this data, calculated the results, and rendered them graphically in Microsoft Excel.


Figure 9.
Interpretation: The Nationalist/Populist party family showed no statistically significant percent increase in foreigner-related rhetoric after the economic crisis, which supports H2. Like most other families, its foreigner-related rhetoric spiked in 2006. In the post-refugee crisis period, it showed a significant increase in foreigner-related rhetoric, which also supports H6. This trajectory is similar to that of the Ecological party family, likely because both have been exponentially on the rise since the early 2010s. Note the overall slight increases and decreases in the economic crisis period compared to the larger and more rapid increases in the migrant crisis period.
Note: For a larger version, see 8. in Appendix B. 2001-2007 is the period before both crises. 2008-2014 is the post-economic/pre-refugee crisis period. 2015-2019 is the period after both crises. The x-axis notes each election

year in which party family data was available. 2003-04, 2009, and 2016 lack Nationalist/Populist data. The y-axis shows total percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in this family's manifestos per year. The highest percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in this family's manifestos was 9.67% in 2015. Its lowest was 1.49% in 2014.
Source: Data from Comparative Manifestos Project. Author applied MaxQDA's Lexical Search tool to this data, calculated the results, and rendered them graphically in Microsoft Excel.

Hypothesis 3 (H3)

The third hypothesis (H3) posits that the four party families in the center/moderate "rile" group would employ a slight, albeit statistically significant, percent increase of foreigner-related rhetoric in the wake of an economic crisis. The theoretical rationale behind H3's prediction was that moderate party families would also direct their blame for the economic crisis on the government, but would act more opportunistically, using the leeway that their central "rile" locations provided to discuss foreigners more readily as well. To determine statistical significance of foreigner-related rhetoric percentages before (2001-2007) and after (2008-2014) the economic crisis, I graphed all four families in the same manner as the previous five families.

Figure 10 illustrates that the Liberal party family was the only central party family to support H3 because there was a significant difference between its percentages across the pre- and post-economic crisis periods. Specifically, the Liberal party family's 2011 percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in its manifestos (5.06%) was statistically different than any of its percentages during the pre-crisis period (ranging from 0.64% to 3.38%), indicating that this family's parties displayed higher percentages of foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric *after* the economic crisis. In isolation, the Liberal family's post-economic crisis percent increase would also support the H1 expectation that central party families act more opportunistically than far-left/right families in terms of their usage of foreigner-related rhetoric regardless of crisis type.

Total Percentage of Foreigner-Related Rhetoric in the Liberal (LIB) Party Family's Manifestos Per Election Year (2001-2019)

Figure 10.
Interpretation: The Liberal party family showed a statistically significant percent increase in foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric after the economic crisis, which supports H3. Note the small 2007 spike here as well. In the post-refugee crisis period, this family showed a significant increase in foreigner-related rhetoric, which supports H7. Future research should examine the Liberal family's foreigner-related rhetoric after 2019 to monitor these trends.
Note: For a larger version, see 9. in Appendix B. 2001-2007 is the period before both crises. 2008-2014 is the post-economic/pre-refugee crisis period. 2015-2019 is the period after both crises. The x-axis notes each election year in which Liberal family data was available. 2003-04, 2008, and 2016 have no Liberal party family data. The y-axis shows total percent of foreigner-related rhetoric in this family's manifestos each year. The Liberal party family's highest percentage of foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric was 6.6% in 2019, and the lowest percentage was 0.35% in 2009. This is similar, yet wider in range to the Ecological party family's results.
Source: Data from Comparative Manifestos Project. Author applied MaxQDA's Lexical Search tool to this data, calculated the results, and rendered them graphically in Microsoft Excel.

As shown below, the remaining Christian Democratic (*Figure 11*), Conservative (*Figure 12*), and Agrarian (*Figure 13*) party families did *not* support H3. These families did show significant differences between their pre- and post-economic crisis percentages of foreigner-related rhetoric. However, instead of an increase in foreigner-related rhetoric after the economic crisis, all three showed statistically significant *decreases*. The percentages of foreigner-related to total manifesto rhetoric from the Christian Democratic family in 2002 (1.79%), the Conservative family in 2001 (2.76%) and 2007 (1.90%), and the Agrarian family in 2002 (0.90%) were significantly higher than their percentages in the post-crisis (2008-2014) period. The percentages of foreigner-related rhetoric were significantly higher in the

pre-economic crisis period for these families, confirming that when examining Christian

Democratic, Conservative, and Agrarian party families' discussions of foreign "others" and

influences on their political communities, the crisis type matters.

Figure 11.
Interpretation: The Christian/Jewish Democratic party family showed a statistically significant percent decrease in foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric after the economic crisis, which does not support H3. In the post-refugee crisis period, this family showed a significant increase in foreigner-related rhetoric, which supports H7. The percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in 2002 was statistically no different from that of 2019, calling into question whether this party family ought to be examined with a longer time line in mind to see if these small changes amount to a relatively steady usage of foreigner-related rhetoric over many decades.
Note: For a larger version, see 10. in Appendix B. 2001-2007 is the period before both crises. 2008-2014 is the post-economic/pre-refugee crisis period. 2015-2019 is the period after both crises. The x-axis notes each election year in which Christian Democratic family data was available. 2003, 2004, and 2016 have no data from this family. The y-axis shows total percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in this family's manifestos per year. Its highest percentage of foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric was 1.86% in 2019, and its lowest was 0.17% in 2010.
Source: Data from Comparative Manifestos Project. Author applied MaxQDA's Lexical Search tool to this data, calculated the results, and rendered them graphically in Microsoft Excel.

***Figure 12.***

Interpretation: The Conservative party family showed a statistically significant percent decrease in foreigner-related rhetoric after the economic crisis, which does not support H3. Despite this, the Conservative family's volatility throughout the 18 years is extremely similar to the Liberal family's trajectory. In the post-refugee crisis period, the Conservative family showed a significant increase in foreigner-related rhetoric, which supports H7. Future research should compare the Conservative and Liberal party families' foreigner-related rhetoric in detail, and extend the period to after 2019. Moreover, like the Christian Democratic family, the Conservative family's return to 2001 values in 2019 needs to be examined with a longer time line in mind.

Note: For a larger version, see 11. in Appendix B. 2001-2007 is the period before both crises. 2008-2014 is the post-economic/pre-refugee crisis period. 2015-2019 is the period after both crises. The x-axis notes each election year in which this family's data was available. 2003-04, 2008-09, 2013, and 2016 have no Conservative party family data. The y-axis shows total percent of foreigner-related rhetoric in this family's manifestos per year. Its highest percentage of foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric was 3.23% in 2018; its lowest, 0.32% in 2002.

Source: Data from Comparative Manifestos Project. Author applied MaxQDA's Lexical Search tool to this data, calculated the results, and rendered them graphically in Microsoft Excel.

Figure 13.

Interpretation: The Agrarian/Rural Labor party family showed a statistically significant percent decrease in foreigner-related rhetoric after the economic crisis, which does not support H3. Like the high percentages in Christian Democratic and Conservative party families' 2001 foreigner rhetoric, the 9/11 crisis and subsequent wars in the Middle East could account for the Agrarian party family's comparatively large percent of foreigner-related rhetoric in its manifestos. In the post-refugee crisis period, this family showed a significant increase in foreigner-related rhetoric, which supports H7. Like the Ethnic/Regional party family, more information is needed before this data about the Agrarian/Rural Labor party family can be generalized and validated.

Note: For a larger version, see 12. in Appendix B. 2001-2007 is the period before both crises. 2008-2014 is the post-economic/pre-refugee crisis period. 2015-2019 is the period after both crises. The x-axis notes each election year in which this party family's data was available. 2003-05, 2008-09, 2012-13, and 2016-17 have no Agrarian party family data. The y-axis shows the total percent of this family's foreigner-related rhetoric per year. Its highest percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric was 0.99% in 2018, and its lowest percentage was 0.0% in 2015.

Source: Data from Comparative Manifestos Project. Author applied MaxQDA's Lexical Search tool to this data, calculated the results, and rendered them graphically in Microsoft Excel.

Hypothesis 4 (H4)

The fourth hypothesis (H4) predicted that over the 18-year period, the center/moderate group of Liberal, Conservative, Christian Democratic, and Agrarian party families would act more opportunistically (reactionarily) with their usage of foreigner-related rhetoric than the far-left/right group of Socialist, Social Democratic, Ecological, Ethnic/Regional, and Nationalist/Populist party families would. I operationalized opportunism as the range of each party family's percentages of foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric over the 18-year period. Because I expected moderate party families to act more opportunistically, I expected their collectively averaged range to be greater than that of the far-left/right party family group. However, as *Figure 14* illustrates, the Phase I data did not support the fourth hypothesis.

The averaged percentage range of the five far-left/right party families' foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric over the 18-year period was 4.08%. When the Ecological party family was excluded from the calculation due to its rather unique nature as a sometimes far-left, sometimes special interest party family, the averaged percentage range for the remaining four party families was even higher: 4.64%. The averaged percentage range for the four moderate/center party families' foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric over the same 18 years was 2.96%. This result contradicts H4's expectation that moderate party families would show greater volatility in the 2001-2019 period due to their proclivity for vote-gaining via opportunistic usage of foreigner-related rhetoric.

Figure 14.
Interpretation: The data does not entirely support H4 because moderate families do not show greater opportunism (via their ranges) than far-left/right families. However, the range in foreigner-related rhetoric over the 18 years is statistically larger for Nationalist/Populist (NAT-POP) and Liberal (LIB) families compared to ranges of the other families depicted. These two families' significant trends in their rhetoric hold across both phases.
Note: The Ecological (ECO) family is included because the CMP project considers many green parties in EU countries left/far-left. The x-axis depicts nine families grouped by far-left/right (red) versus center/moderate (blue) alignment. The y-axis depicts family range in foreigner-related rhetoric (per 1%) during the 2001-2019 period.
Source: Data generated and rendered from Comparative Manifestos Project database via MaxQDA by author.

Hypothesis 6 (H6)

The sixth hypothesis (H6) posits that party families in the far-left/right group would

demonstrate statistically significant percent increases of their foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric

in the wake of a cultural crisis. The theoretical rationale behind H6's prediction rested on how

expansively far-left/right party families define their political communities.[33] On the far-left, the

Socialist, Social Democratic, and Ecological party families are expected to define their political

communities along class- or civic-based features of membership, not cultural or racial ones. On

the far-right, the expectation for Ethnic/Regional and Nationalist/Populist families is that because

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[33] Phase II discusses the expected positive attitudes of the leftmost party families (Socialist, Social Democratic, and Ecological) and the negative attitudes of the rightmost party families (Ethnic/Regional and Nationalist/Populist) toward foreigners. This includes an in-depth discussion about H5 and about the implications of H4, H6, and H7.

their political communities are smaller and more culturally homogenous than their nations, they

will have many grievances against community "infiltrators" during - and following - the migrant

crisis. On both sides, it was expected that there would be statistically significant increases in

foreigner-related rhetoric because of the attention these families pay to cultural or ethnic

identities as either *crucial* or *unacceptable* criteria to base political community membership on.

    To evaluate this prediction, I examined the five party families (using the latter halves of

Figures 5-9, which were previously analyzed for their economic crisis data) to determine

whether there were significant changes in foreigner-related rhetoric percentages in the

pre-migrant (2008-2014) versus post-migrant crisis (2015-2019) periods. As *Figures 5-9*

demonstrate above, Phase I results support H6 because all five far-left/right party families

demonstrated statistically significant percent increases in their foreigner-related manifesto

rhetoric between the pre- (2008-2014) and post-refugee (2015-2019) crisis periods. This means

that each family's percentage of foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric was statistically higher *after*

the migrant crisis (2015-2019), as compared to before it (2008-2014).

    For the Socialist party family, the 2015 percentage (4.97%) was significantly higher than

the pre-migrant crisis period percentages (ranging 0.34% to 2.39%) (*Figure 5*). For Social

Democratic and Ethnic/Regional party families (*Figures 6* and *8*), it was their 2015 and 2019

percentages. The Social Democratic family's foreigner-related rhetoric was 4.15% in 2015 and

1.37% in 2019. The Ethnic/Regional party family's foreigner-related rhetoric was 1.27% in 2015

and 1.94% in 2019. For the Ecological party family, it was 2017 (2.19%) (*Figure 7*). Finally, for

the Nationalist/Populist party family, it was its 2015 (9.67%), 2017 (5.72%), and 2019 (7.80%)

percentages of foreigner-related rhetoric that were significantly higher than its percentages from the pre-refugee crisis period (*Figure 9*).

Hypothesis 7 (H7)

Like the sixth hypothesis (H6), the seventh hypothesis (H7) posited that the four moderate/center party families would also yield statistically significant percent increases in their foreigner-related rhetoric in the wake of a cultural crisis. H7's theoretical rationale stemmed from the expectation that these party families would not only act more opportunistically regardless of the the crisis type (H1 and H4), but would also be just as privy to the "zeitgeist" phenomenon as any of the other party families (Mudde 2010; 2004). To determine statistical significance, I examined the pre- and post-refugee crisis percentages for each of the four moderate party families in *Figures 10-13* in the routine manner.

As *Figures 10-13* illustrate above, Phase I results also support H7 because all four moderate party families showed statistically significant percent increases in their foreigner-related rhetoric from the pre- to the post-refugee crisis periods. This means that each of these families' foreigner-related rhetoric percentages were also statistically significantly higher after the migrant crisis (2015-2019), as compared to before it (2008-2014). The Liberal (*Figure 10*) and Christian Democratic (*Figure 11*) party families' 2019 percentages were significantly higher than their pre-migrant crisis percentages: 6.6% for the Liberal family, and 1.86% for the Christian Democratic family. For the Agrarian (*Figure 13*) and Conservative (*Figure 12*) families, it was both their 2018 and 2019 percentages of foreigner-related rhetoric that were statistically significant. The Agrarian party family's percentages were 0.99% in 2018 and 0.60% in 2019. The Conservative party family percentages were 3.27% in 2018 and 1.70% in 2019.

Below, *Figure 15* summarizes all nine party families' foreigner-related rhetoric

percentages from 2001-2019. Altogether, Phase I's results support H6 and H7's expectations that

there would be significant increases in the amount of space that foreigners and foreign influences

occupy in party manifestos following a cultural crisis. H1's prediction that there would be raw

increases in foreigner-related rhetoric by all party families after both crises was inconclusive

because several families used *less* foreigner-related rhetoric in the post-economic/pre-refugee

crises period (2008-2014) as compared to the period before both crises (2001-2007) (shown by

H2 and H3). Finally, H4's prediction that moderate party families would show greater

opportunism (higher collective range) in their foreigner-related rhetoric than the far-left/right

party families over the 18-year period was also inconclusive. Phase II examines these hypotheses

with an emphasis on the fifth hypothesis (H5) to add nuance to Phase I's findings by hand-coding

attitudinal trends within the UK's specific political context.

Figure 15.
Interpretation: The Nationalist/Populist (NAT-POP) and Liberal (LIB) families exhibited significantly higher percentages of foreigner-related rhetoric than others from 2001-2019, particularly in the post-migrant period (2015-2019). These two families' recurrently significant results are explored further in Phase II.
Note: See 13. in Appendix B for a larger version. Abbreviations correspond to families. The x-axis shows years. Missing data indicates that elections were not held by many countries in 2003-04, 2008-09, and 2016. The y-axis (per 1%) shows each family's per year percentage of foreigner rhetoric.
Source: Data downloaded from CMP database and rendered via MaxQDA and Microsoft Excel by the author.

VII. PHASE I DISCUSSION

Before discussing the implications of each hypothesis, it is necessary to both mention inevitable challenges in Phase I's research design, and to note how I did my best to overcome these challenges. One possible limitation would be that the go-list terms did not accurately capture parties' mentions of foreigners in the manner I intended. To tailor my go-list to appropriately fit my data, I studied the go-lists of other scholars, such as McGregor (2019) and Jenne et. al (2021). I also performed my own pilot study so I could tailor the go-list terms to more accurately capture foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric for the official tests later on.

Another challenge was that the Agrarian/Rural Labor and Ethnic/Regional party families clearly yielded fewer data points than the other seven families. In this thesis, the Agrarian party family consists solely of manifestos from the Centre Parties of Finland and Sweden. The Ethnic/Regional party family consists of manifestos from Finland and the UK: Plaid Cymru (or Party of Wales), the Scottish National Party (SNP), and the Northern Ireland Democratic Union Party (DUP), and the Swedish People's Party of Finland (SPF or RKP). This lack of data is a downside when it comes to closely evaluating the trends of these two party families specifically. However, the methods of this thesis are clear and replicable enough that future researchers can use its steps and tools to further examine foreigner-related "us versus them" rhetoric trends in Agrarian and Ethnic/Regional party families in a more concrete and generalizable manner that does not have to be limited to the EU or to European nations.

Finally, several simplifications had to be made to properly analyze the data. Firstly, the party family categorizations pulled from the Comparative Manifestos Project's "parfam" variable do not account for the possibility that an individual party can change from one party family to

another over time (Volkens et. al 2021). My analysis attempts to overcome this challenge by accounting for the changes and ranges (H4) in party family rhetoric over time, which implies how parties within a given party family might fluctuate a great deal more than parties in other party families. Secondly, it cannot be said that either crisis in question "started" or "stopped" by a specific year because the effects of both crises have been felt to this day. The method by which I partitioned the 18-year period into three sections aimed to simplify a messy, overlapping period into an analyzable one that could be better evaluated with data. Thirdly, to evaluate statistical significance, it was necessary to binarily label pre- versus post-crisis dates for all manifestos based on year, which simplified when the crises were "beginning" and "ending." Fourth, Phase I is solely large-N analysis and computer-based, so the final challenge is that there is not a possibility for nuanced interpretation. To mitigate this problem, I include both computer- and hand-coding to improve the validity and robustness of this thesis' overall conclusions.

Discussion of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 (H1)

Hypothesis 1 (H1) revealed that only the Ethnic/Regional and Nationalist/Populist party families increased their raw percentages of foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric after both crises. As I will return to in Phase II, European parties in the Ethnic/Regional family are often in a unique position because they can be considered part of the "us" (white majority) *and* the "them" (minority cultural/linguistic group, or group with fewer legal rights) depending on their identities. In response to the financial crisis, parties in the Ethnic/Regional family probably requested economic aid from their nations by appealing to a shared in-group identity, rather than noting their political communities' differences from the majority population (at the expense of

being labeled an out-group, and thus, being refused economic benefits). It is also possible that this family's parties employed more rhetoric about "us" during the 2001-2014 periods instead of rhetoric about foreign "others." In response to the refugee crisis, Ethnic/Regional parties may have either called for better treatment of refugees because they understood being political community outsiders themselves, or they may have called for increased border control out of fear that they would have to compete for economic "scraps" with new, foreign "others."

The Nationalist/Populist party family was present in all nine countries in the 18-year period (unlike the Ethnic/Regional family), so its raw increases in foreigner-related rhetoric after both crises are more robust and generalizable. The Nationalist/Populist family has been gaining traction during the 21st century, and it seems that 9/11, upsurges in terrorist attacks in Europe, the economic recession, the Eurozone crisis, and the refugee crisis have all resulted in increased prominence of far-right support out of growing concerns from the shrinking white majority about the infiltration of racial and cultural "others" into their traditional, stable ways of life.

Contrastingly, the other seven party families showed *decreases* in foreigner-related rhetoric after the economic crisis period (2008-2014) as compared to before it (2001-2007). It is likely that the Islamophobic, paranoid "zeitgeist" of the time inspired parties everywhere to focus more on the "them" (specifically Muslim foreigners) in their rhetoric. Though statistical significance was not part of H1, it is still worth noting that only the Conservative party family's decrease in foreigner-related rhetoric was statistically significant when compared to the other eight families' percent changes from 2001-2007 to 2008-2014. Future research focusing on the intersection of economic and Islamophobic rhetoric in party families during this period might be able to better speak about the implications about weaponizing economic and cultural paranoia.

Hypotheses 2 and 3 (H2 and H3)

Results related to these hypotheses focus solely on the economic crisis. Their results also suggest that 9/11 and the European/American involvement in the Iraq and Iran conflicts stirred up a lot of rhetoric surrounding "foreign" elements invading the majority-white political communities of these nine nations. Within the far-left/right group, Socialist, Ethnic/Regional, and Nationalist/Populist party families supported H2 because they did not show statistically significant increases in foreigner-related rhetoric pre- versus post-economic crisis (2001-2007 versus 2008-2014). As discussed above, the Ethnic/Regional party family needs more data points to unpack this trend. The Socialist party family largely focuses on welfare and government structure, so it is possible that the parties in this family did not discuss foreigners or foreign influences much at all, instead focusing on its usual points about allocation of resources, labor support, and fair rights for the domestic proletariat (the "us"). However, this ought to be dissected more thoroughly on a country-to-country basis.

The Nationalist/Populist party family was expanding rapidly in the 2001-2007 period, which possibly explains why the periods before the migrant crisis (2001-2014) were not as saturated with foreigner-related rhetoric as the post-migrant and post-economic crises period (2015-2019). Unlike its counterparts on the right, this family is specifically known for focusing on cultural "us versus them" talking points. However, as we have seen, economic factors are intrinsically tied to cultural issues. Nationalist/Populist parties may have been subduing their cultural rhetoric under economic jargon to appeal to the post-economic crisis "zeitgeist," too.

The same explanation of the Nationalist/Populist party family can be applied to the Ecological family, which did *not* support H2 because it showed a significantly higher percentage

of foreigner-related rhetoric in the *post*-economic period (2013) compared to the pre-crisis period. Future research ought to examine 2013 specifically to better understand exactly what occurred around the elections in this year that spurred the Ecological families' parties to talk so much about foreigners. The Ecological family has also been on the rise throughout the 21st century, which could conversely answer why foreigner-related rhetoric is taking up more space in its parties' manifestos as their family establishes and aligns itself with more leftist ideology.

The Social Democratic party family was the other far-left/right party family that did not support H2 because it showed a statistically higher percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric in the *pre*-economic crisis period (2006 and 2007) than in the post-economic crisis period. This result is surprising, considering that Socialist and Social Democratic families were expected to act more similarly than other party families. However, as scholars like Bale et. al (2010) emphasize, the Social Democratic party family in Europe has become increasingly aligned with private business interests and ironically, capitalism, since its inception, so it holds that its parties would react to the terrorist-related events of the early 2000s in a way that is actually more comparable to the moderate party families than the Socialist party family.

As for the more moderate "rile" group the only one of four to support H3 was the Liberal party family, which yielded a significant percent increase in its foreigner-related rhetoric after the economic crisis. When not related to the refugee crisis period, this result suggests that the Liberal family's political strategy was to incorporate more talking points about foreigners to gain more votes and possibly to expand its voter demographics (racially and spatially). Phase II's UK case study provides more information about the strategies employed by the Liberal party family in

this period, but additional research about other countries' Liberal family presence would be beneficial as well.

Alternatively, the Agrarian, Conservative, and Christian Democratic party families did not seem to utilize the Liberal family's political strategy in the post-economic crisis period (as H1 suggests). The Agrarian family's comparative lack of data makes it difficult to draw conclusions, which is why examining other regions that perhaps have a more prominent Agrarian party family presence would be useful in future research. It is likely that the Conservative and Christian Democratic party families also employed more foreigner-related rhetoric which emphasized the threat of Islam and/(or) foreign terrorists during the 2001-2007 period as a strategy to mobilize voters. It is logical to guess that these families focused their attention on more economic talking points *after* the economic crisis ensued. H3 reveals that either the key terms were not common vernacular for these three moderate party families, or they were just more preoccupied with shielding their communities (the "us") from financial fall-out.

Hypothesis 4 (H4)

The expectation that moderate party families would be more opportunistic in their foreigner-related rhetoric than far-left/right party families (as operationalized by the per family percentage range of foreigner-related rhetoric over the 18-year period) went largely unsupported. Ethnic/Regional, Ecological, Agrarian, and Christian Democratic party families each yielded <2% range in their foreigner-related rhetoric over the 2001-2019 period, and the Conservative party family yielded a range that was 3% (as shown by *Figure 14*). For the Ethnic/Regional and Agrarian party families, this small range could certainly be a byproduct of their comparative lack of data points.

However, if the Agrarian and Ethnic/Regional families' lack of rhetoric fluctuation somehow points toward a larger trend, then it is possible that these two families generally stick to the "us first" talking points that they know their relatively insular political community (the "us") will always support, rather than engaging with current events or discussing the irrelevant "them." Alternatively, *Figures 8* and *13* do indicate an upward trend in both Ethnic/Regional and Agrarian party families, which could be interpreted as their slight "zeitgeist" sensitivity that the Liberal and Nationalist/Populist party families demonstrate in spades. The Christian Democratic party family's small range could be due to missed captures of subtle references to foreigners that are country-specific that I could not account for. But most likely, this family's small range is also due to its maintenance of a steady platform that sticks to its parties' "tried and true" talking points (which include comparatively little rhetoric about foreigners). Christian Democratic parties in these EU nations seem to focus more attention on traditional values, religious identity, and economic prosperity of the white Christian "us," and not of the foreign "other."

The Ecological party family also displayed a small range in its rhetoric, but likely for different reasons. As mentioned in the H2 and H3 discussion, the Ecological family is newer than some of the others and does not have as much data in the earliest years of the 2001-2019 period evaluated. Such a small range in percent foreigner-related rhetoric indicates that Ecological parties have come in strongly and have maintained their level of foreigner-related rhetoric throughout the years that they have been active in these countries. In sum, if the Ecological party family could be examined in isolation, its stable rhetoric range would support H4, indicating that as a member of the far-left/right group, this family seems to maintain its level of foreigner-related rhetoric throughout various crises.

Hypotheses 6 and 7 (H6 and H7)

With the exception of H5, the final two hypotheses are by far the most important to this thesis.[34] They yield the most statistically significant results. The data support these hypotheses, which predicted that all party families (far-left/right, per H6, and moderate, per H7) would exhibit statistically significant increases in their foreigner-related rhetoric in the post- (2015-2019) versus pre-refugee crisis (2008-2014) period. One might suggest that the obvious explanation is that a larger number of manifestos coded in the latter half of the 18-year period skews this data to render an inevitable upward trend across all party families. I contend that it is always important to pay attention to which party families are waxing and waning, because the political movements they are a part of may be "disruptive" and quick to emerge, but are not random (Hooghe and Marks 2018, 126; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

Lipset and Rokkan (1967)'s original cleavage theory - as reassessed by Hooghe and Marks (2018) and Mukand and Rodrick (2020) - supports these results because they identified party families' increases in foreigner-related rhetoric as well. My results also correspond with Hooghe and Marks (2018)' findings that crises in the 21st century are causing a growing cultural cleavage between the so-called "GAL" and "TAN" parties in Europe specifically (127-8). The patterns I present about Ecological and Nationalist/Populist party families' foreigner-related rhetoric and election participation mirrors Hooghe and Marks (2018)' findings, and the growing prominence of these two families is confirmation of their idea.

On one side, the Ecological party family has been gaining traction all over the world due to widespread concerns about the dire consequences of global warming - concerns which have

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[34] Hypothesis 5 (H5) is only debriefed in Phase II because it pertains to specific attitudes surrounding the usage of foreigner-related rhetoric, which is outside the scope of Phase I intentionally.

been amplified by voters young and old, as 19-year old Swedish activist Greta Thunberg has

shown in the past few years. Her condemnation of incumbent party leaders' refusals to restrain

big businesses for their disproportionate roles in the climate crisis feeds into the larger trend of

voters becoming unsatisfied with well-established party families' responses to unfolding crises,

and subsequently "jumping ship" to join new political communities that fit their specific

interests. On the other side, the Nationalist/Populist party family has also been gaining support

due to widespread concerns from white, religious, and straight traditionalists about the

demographic diversification and ideological change brought about by globalization and

technological innovation. Slogans like "take back our borders" from UKIP's "Leave" (the EU)

campaign is echoed throughout the Nationalist/Populist party family all over the world, and is

just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to its ideological platform and goals.[35]

Altogether, Phase I's results corroborate the notion emphasized by Dalton (2019) and

other scholars in the field who argue that newer parties are always developing in response to new

interests and new interactions made possible by globalization. In support of Mudde's explanation

of zeitgeist in politics, one can also interpret this mass upward trend in foreigner-related rhetoric

as an expression of sensitivity (to varying degrees) by all party families toward crises that are

occurring in the world. Lastly, Phase I provides compelling evidence for La Palombara and

Weiner (2015)'s argument when they state that "the European cases…call our attention to the

fact that parties often grow out of crisis situations. Under some circumstances they are the

creatures of a systemic political crisis, while in other circumstances their emergence itself creates

a crisis for the system" (13-14). Unequivocally, the trends discussed in Phase I illustrate the

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[35] The Jobbik Party, United Kingdom Independence Party, Peoples Party of Denmark, True Finns, Freedom Party of Austria, Swedish Democrats, Independent Greeks, Golden Dawn, Le Front National, and Alternative For Germany are the parties from the Nationalist/Populist (NAT-POP) family that are surveyed in this thesis.

complex interactions of politics and crises, as well as the dynamism of party family rhetoric throughout periods of war and peace.

VIII. PHASE II METHODS

Computer coding can generate quantitative data efficiently and accurately, but it lacks the nuanced interpretative skills that researchers achieve by hand-coding. Phase I's large-N study reveals an uptake in the foreigner-related rhetoric of several party families across all nine countries - most notably, Nationalist/Populist and Liberal. Phase II adds to Phase I's results by hand-coding manifesto passages where party families' foreigner-related rhetoric was identified. This method allows one to contextually understand party families' attitudes toward foreigners entering their political communities, as well as the identities they say makes one "foreign" in the first place. Phase II also seeks to more deeply explore how portrayals of the political community in relation to the cultural "other" change per/across families throughout this 18-year time period.

To determine which nation's manifesto data to hand-code, I created a spreadsheet detailing the number of viable (coded) election years in Phase I (from 2001 to 2019) and the presence or absence of each of the nine party families in each nation. Because the Liberal and Nationalist/Populist families were important to include in the analysis, I created an additional column to account for whether they were both present for each year coded in Phase I per nation. After creating this chart, I constructed a scale to rank each nation based on three categories: (1) number of data points (election year data used in Phase I), (2) presence of Liberal and/(or) Nationalist/Populist families, and (3) number of missing party families. I summed the values from these three categories to determine which nation would be best to hand-code.

The highest scoring country was the United Kingdom, so it was selected as the case study for Phase II. The UK is a valuable case because it has election data from 2001-2019, strong Liberal and Nationalist/Populist family presences, is a "high influx" case, and is only missing consistent data from two families. To prepare the UK data for hand-coding, I created an autocode from Phase I's foreigner-related go-list terms. To account for context, I set autocode parameters to include one sentence before and after the go-list term was used in the manifesto. In Phase I, there were 1717 total go-list hits used in UK manifestos. Once autocoded, there were 765.[36]

After autocoding, I created two parent codes. The first parent code captures UK parties' positive attitudes toward foreigners and foreign influences. The subcodes included under this umbrella come directly from scholars' research on identity as it relates to culture and to the "nation." The positive attitudes I code are expressed through parties' statements of pro-civic nationalism (POS01); anti-isolationism, anti-superiority, and/(or) anti-exclusivity (POS02); pro-multiculturalism and/(or) pro-pluralism (POS03); and of "looking forward" or of embracing the political community's future, instead of wishing for days gone by (POS04).

The second parent code captures parties' negative attitudes toward foreigners and foreign influences. Also stemming from the literature surrounding identity in relation to the political community, the subcodes under this umbrella take the forms of populism (NEG01); pro-isolationism, pro-superiority, and/(or) pro-exclusivity (NEG02); anti-multiculturalism and/(or) anti-pluralism (NEG03); pro-cultural nationalism (NEG04); "looking back" fondly on tradition, rather than embracing the changing future (NEG05): and of pro-ethnic nationalism (NEG06).[37] After loading these parent and sub-codes into the Code System panel of MaxQDA, I

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[36] This number is much smaller because it is common that several terms occur within the same sentence, so they are not counted twice.

[37] See 1. in Appendix C for the full list of codes and example phrases that used to guide the hand-coding process.

hand-coded the 765 identified segments in context for 41 individual manifestos that encompassed six party families (Conservative, Ecological, Ethnic/Regional Liberal, Nationalist/Populist, and Socialist) and six of the United Kingdom's election cycles (2001, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2017, and 2019).[38]

IX. A UNITED KINGDOM? - Briefly Placing Phase II in Context

Recent authors of *Brexitland*, Sobolewska and Ford, begin their discussion about the historical conditions leading up to Brexit by stating that "parties do not just passively respond to social and demographic change – they help to shape its political meaning and electoral effects" (2020, 4). This active role has been the case of the political parties in the UK long before the 2001-2019 period in question.[39] Until the late 1990s and early 2000s, the British political system had been mainly dominated by the Conservative, Labor, and Liberal Democratic parties. However, three phenomena have spurred unprecedented political change in the UK. The first change in the mid-90s was a slow ideological convergence between the Conservative and Labor parties (Sobolewska and Ford 2020, 122-25).[40] The second change between the three most prominent parties was a widening gap between liberal-leaning elites and their conservative-leaning voters (Sobolewska and Ford 2020, 132). The third change during this period was a transformation in the composition of the political elites themselves, with a

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[38] In most instances, multiple codes were attached to each segment. If the segment was a title of a manifesto chapter, nonsensical, or irrelevant, it was not coded. Phase II provides the necessary nuance to better evaluate why specific trends in foreigner-related rhetoric occur in the context of the UK's history, geopolitical situation, and demographics.
[39] See Cracknell and Pilling (2021) for a full statistical report on UK elections since 1918.
[40] As the authors point out, this convergence was in large part due to Tony Blair's attempts to make Labor into a "catch-all" party that could capture the middle-class voters and engage with global, free-market capitalism rather than solely fighting for the "working man" and the local economy (Sobolewska and Ford 2020, 122-25).

"professionalization" of a new "political class" of MPs that almost eradicated working-class and/(or) conservative politicians from the stage (Sobolewska and Ford 2020, 122).

These three changes are important to this thesis' analysis because of the shifts toward cultural, ideological, and generational - and away from economic - in-group/out-group alignment in the British voter base. Related to Dalton (2019) and Inglehart (1981; 1977)'s previous discussion about cultural and economic cleavages, Sobolewska and Ford (2020) find that these changes "weaken[ed]...the tribal attachments that bound voters to the traditional parties" (123). Essentially, these political transformations caused partisanship to lose its significance as a major historical marker of identity among UK voters by 2008 (Sobolewska and Ford 2020, 123). When combined with the second migration wave in the 2010s and the plethora of events triggering sensationalized Islamophobia in the press and in policy, these two main changes in voters' views about their partisan identities particularly "activated" latent ethnocentric beliefs in former conservative-identifying voters who felt out of place and left behind in the changing world (Rzepnikowska 2019, 65; Sobolewska and Ford 2020, 123).

The radical right (the British National Party (BNP), and later, UKIP[41]) was slower to gain traction than the more well-established parties, but the UK's feelings of disillusionment and distrust in politics (exacerbated by Conservative and Labor governments' failures to "control" migration) resulted in the 2010s becoming the decade of UKIP's rise to fame (Sobolewska and Ford 2020, 87). Since the 1960s, the UK has seen education access expand to the diverse masses; two major migration waves take place; and a generation divide widen because of voters' attitudes toward diversity and multiculturalism, partisan identity, and overall trust of EU and British

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[41]One should note that BNP party manifestos are not included in this project because its manifestos are not included in the CMP database. However, for more information about the British National Party, see Goodwin (2014).

institutions. These changes have all greatly encouraged the emergence of parties like the Liberal

Democrats and later, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), to fill the policy gaps

resulting from the Conservative and Labor Parties' slowly-merging stances and ineffective

responses to economic and demographic change in the decades leading up to Brexit (Sobolewska

and Ford 2020, 5). Like the Alternative for Germany and Le Front National parties, UKIP used

the episodes of Islamic extremism (2001-2007), the domestic fall-out from the financial crises

(2008-2014), and the continuing influx of foreign migrants (2015-2019) to cultivate an

anti-Muslim and anti-EU political community that led voters to abandon the Socialist,

Conservative, and Liberal communities, which were, according to voters, failing to push forward

legislation that would effectively separate "us" from "them" (Hallgrimsdottir et. al 2020, 6).

The combination of growing anti-immigrant and anti-EU sentiment that has resulted in

the UK's full withdrawal from the EU is, for now, a uniquely British phenomenon. However, the

UK's politicized "us versus them" responses over the decades makes it strong case study which

sheds light on the broader trends of increasing political polarization, blatant discrimination, and

tensions sparked by the ideological and demographic diversification of predominantly white

and/(or) traditional societies. The UK general population's movement from basing group

identities on class and partisanship to now generations, races, cultures, and ideologies is not

anomalous. The effects of the Syrian refugee crisis is part of a larger narrative that tells how

demographic changes in host countries are further triggering identity conflicts across many

regions and nations, not just the UK, and not just within the EU (Sobolewska and Ford 2020, 4).

X.   PHASE II RESULTS

Phase I analyzed large-N trends in foreigner-related rhetoric from nine prominent party families in nine EU member states within the context of the global economic crisis of 2008 and Syrian refugee crisis of 2015. Phase II's analysis fills the remaining gaps about these party families. It enriches Phase I's findings by thoroughly hand-coding specific *attitudes* in context that UK party families have expressed about how culturally foreign "others" and foreign influences can - or cannot - find membership in their political communities (H5). The six UK elections evaluated in this thesis are from 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2017, and 2019. This range of years fits into each of the three delineated periods (2001-2007, 2008-2014, and 2015-2019), which improves Phase II's ability to make inferences about the changes in UK parties' foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric over the 18-year period.

Phase II also provides evidence that strengthens Phase I's analysis of hypotheses 1 through 7 (H1-H7) as they relate to the statistically significant Liberal and Nationalist/Populist party families. Moreover, Phase II directly evaluates the fifth hypothesis (H5), which posits that the self-defined size of a party family's political community directly corresponds with how positively or negatively that family's parties discuss cultural "others." Specifically, H5 expects party families that define their political communities as larger than or equal to their national borders would demonstrate higher shares of positive than negative attitudes about foreigners in their manifestos. In the UK case, this includes the Socialist, Ecological, and Liberal party families. Conversely, H5 expected party families that define their political communities as smaller than their national borders would demonstrate higher shares of negative than positive

attitudes about foreigners in their manifestos. This includes UK parties that represent the Conservative, Ethnic/Regional, and Nationalist/Populist party families.

All ten sub-codes were hand-coded at least 11 times across the 41 UK party manifestos from 2001-2019. *Figures 16-19* below summarize the distribution of the 1,081 total sub-codes which were added to segments within the 765 autocoded sections. *Figure 16* demonstrates that over the 18-year period, UK party manifestos collectively showed more positive (65%) than negative (35%) attitudes toward foreign "others" and foreign influences. Directly related to the fifth hypothesis (H5), *Figure 17* reveals how positively or negatively UK parties reacted to foreigners and/(or) foreign influences based on inclusivity (size) of their self-defined political communities and their "rile" group orientation. Based on their metrics and shares of attitudes toward foreigners, the Nationalist/Populist, Liberal, and Ecological families' UK parties support H5. The Conservative and Socialist families' parties are weakly supportive of H5 because while they do fit the expectations, they also demonstrate major fluctuation in positive versus negative attitudes over the 18-year period toward foreigners and foreign influences. Surprisingly, the Ethnic/Regional family's UK parties completely oppose H5's expectations, showing almost entirely positive attitudes toward foreigners in the four years with available family data.

Lastly, MaxQDA-rendered *Figures 18* and *19* illustrate the instances in which sub-codes co-occurred with other sub-codes or parent codes within their "POSITIVE ATTITUDE" or "NEGATIVE ATTITUDE" group, or even co-occurred with codes from the other group. *Figure 18* shows that the sub-codes POS03, POS02, POS01, and NEG02 occurred the most frequently in the UK parties' manifestos over the 18 years. *Figure 19* illustrates how party rhetoric in manifestos does not reveal solely positive or solely negative attitudes toward foreigners and

foreign influences. In actuality, the situation is usually much more nuanced: positive and

negative sentiments were coded within the same paragraph, if not even within the same sentence.

Total Combined Count of Coded Sub-Codes Within All UK Parties' Foreigner-Related Manifesto Rhetoric From 2001-2019

Legend:
- ■ NEG01 - POPULISM
- ■ NEG02 - PRO-ISOLATIONISM / PRO-SUPERIORITY / PRO-EXCLUSIVITY
- ■ NEG03 - ANTI-MULTICULTURALISM / ANTI-PLURALISM
- ■ NEG04 - PRO-CULTURAL NATIONALISM
- ■ NEG05 - LOOKING BACK
- ■ NEG06 - PRO-ETHNIC NATIONALISM / PRO-NATIVISM
- ■ POS01 - CIVIC NATIONALISM
- ■ POS02 - ANTI-ISOLATIONISM / ANTI-SUPERIORITY / ANTI-EXCLUSIVITY
- ■ POS03 - PRO-MULTICULTURALISM / PRO-PLURALISM
- ■ POS04 - LOOKING FORWARD

Figure 16.

Interpretation: All 1,081 sub-coded segments from the UK party manifestos appear here. The most prevalent strategies that were hand-coded throughout the overall period were pro-multiculturalism, pluralism, and civic nationalism appeals, as well as pro-isolationism and national or racial/ethnic superiority and exclusivity appeals.
Note: Parent codes were excluded because their counts overlapped with the counts of their sub-codes. Thus, including parent codes would have erroneously doubled the total number of coded segments.
Source: CMP data downloaded, calculated, and rendered via MaxQDA and Microsoft Excel by the author.

Figure 17.
Interpretation: This chart illustrates the hand-coded findings for H5 and is the same in structure as *Figure 1*.
Note: To see the full-page version, go to 2. in Appendix C. The six families that are represented by UK parties are grouped based on their political community size (x-axis) and "rile" index group (y-axis). Total manifesto rhetoric is not shown here because the highest percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric was <1.6%, which is too small to visualize properly on a 100-point scale. Red denotes negative rhetoric and green denotes positive rhetoric toward foreigners and foreign influences. Within each quadrant, the placement of the party family has no meaning. The individual x-axes per party family show election year, and the individual y-axes show percentage of overall foreigner-related rhetoric employed per year / per party family (ranging from 0-1.6% in 0.1% increments). The subtitle for each chart documents the UK parties in each of the six party families.
Source: Raw data created and downloaded via MaxQDA and rendered in Microsoft Excel by author.

Code Co-occurrence Model (Code Intersection across all codes and subcodes)

Figure 18.
Interpretation: This visual is essentially *Figure 16* in an alternative format.
Note: See 3. in Appendix C for a larger version. Thicker lines indicate more frequent overlapping between two codes. The number beside each code (and on each line) indicates the number of times that sub-code was marked. Parent code totals do not total to 1,081 because there is overlap between both parent codes and their sub-codes.
Source: Data based on CMP manifestos were coded and rendered graphically in MaxQDA by the author.

Code Co-occurrence Model (Code Intersection between occurrence of Positive codes/subcodes and Negative codes/subcodes)

Figure 19.
Interpretation: The co-occurrence of NEG02 and the positive parent code is particularly important to the UK case.
Note: See 4. in Appendix C for a larger version. Thicker lines denote more overlap between two codes. The number beside each code (and on each line) indicates the number of times that sub-code was marked.
Source: Data based on CMP manifestos were coded and rendered graphically in MaxQDA by the author.

UK Party Families' Positive Attitudes Toward Foreigners and/(or) Foreign Influences

      Figure 20 shows that the UK's Liberal Democratic Party in the Liberal family had the

highest number of hand-coded positive attitude segments toward foreigners and foreign

influences (31 coded segments in 2015) out of all UK parties in the 2001-2019 period. This

result aligns with Phase I and further supports H3, H4, and H7: Liberal parties particularly took

advantage of the migrant crisis to talk more about immigration and other issues related to

international influence(r)s. This result also supports H5 because the Liberal family defines its

political community as larger than or equal to its national borders; thus, was expected to use a

higher percentage of positive than negative attitudes in its foreigner-related rhetoric.

Code Distribution Model - Positive attitudes toward foreigners by UK party manifestos 2001-19

Figure 20.
Interpretation: Phase I revealed how the Liberal (LIB) and Nationalist/Populist (NAT-POP) party families were the most outspoken about foreigners in their manifestos. This model from Phase II adds to Phase I's finding, showing that the Liberal Democratic Party's manifestos (Liberal family) were the most positive of all UK parties' manifestos.
Note: See larger version in 5. of Appendix C. Thicker lines denote more coded segments of positive sub-codes in the manifesto. The number on each line indicates the number of times that sub-code was marked.
Source: Data based on CMP manifestos were coded and rendered graphically in MaxQDA by the author.

The most frequently tagged sub-code showing UK parties' positive attitudes toward cultural "others" and/(or) influences was POS03, the pro-multiculturalism and/(or) pro-pluralism sub-code. POS03 was coded a total of 284 times. This sub-code was found in all six party families and was present in 39 of the 41 available UK manifestos. An example of POS03 comes from page 21 of the 2015 Ulster Unionist Party (Conservative family) manifesto:

> "**We embrace the richness of our new, diverse society**, as evidenced by multi-coloured and multi-cultural events like the annual Mela celebration in Belfast, which packs 25,000 people into the Botanic Gardens…to experience cultural diversity in song, dance and food."

In addition to containing other positive sub-codes like "looking forward" (POS04), this statement takes a pro-multiculturalism stance that appreciates the value and contributions that ethnic, racial, and cultural diversity brings to the party's political community. This example suggests that loyalty to the political community does not rely on any racial, ethnic, or cultural identities.[42]

The anti-isolationism, anti-superiority, and/(or) anti-exclusivity sub-code (POS02) was the second most popular positive attitude code, yielding a total of 211 coded segments. POS02 is coded in 36 of the 41 UK manifestos and occurs at least once in all six party families. An example of the anti-isolationism/superiority/exclusivity sub-code occurs on page 68 of the 2015 Green Wales Party (Ecological party family) manifesto:

> **"Greens are internationalists and want to live in a world that is just and fair, secure and peaceful, and where human rights are universally respected."**

This example demonstrates that the political community is committed to safeguarding rights that are applicable to all people and universally-recognized. Moreover, this statement is explicitly in

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[42] Most sentences are coded for multiple sub-codes, but for the sake of simplicity, one example per sub-code is presented in this section.

favor of international cooperation, and thus, suggests that the boundaries of the Green Party of

Wales' political community are more expansive than Welsh and British geographical boundaries.

The third most popular positive sub-code was civic nationalism (POS01), which yielded a

total of 172 coded segments. POS01 occurred at least once in all six party families and appeared

in 35 of the 41 UK manifestos. An example of coded civic nationalism comes from page 24 of

the Conservative Party's 2019 manifesto:

> **"We believe the enduring beliefs that unite us are far more important than our differences.** Our society has been enriched by immigration and we will always recognise the contribution of those who have helped build our public services, businesses, culture and communities. **We will ensure no matter where in the world you or your family come from, your rights will be respected and you will be treated with fairness and dignity**."

These sentences are strong examples of civic nationalism because they state that shared political

beliefs form the political community, not religious or cultural ones. Here, the willingness to

cooperate and coalesce on common governmental rules within a political realm is key.

Finally, the least frequent positive sub-code was POS04, the "looking forward" sub-code,

with a total of 32 coded segments. POS04 appears in 22 of the 41 UK manifestos and occurs in

UK parties representing all party families except for the Nationalist/Populist party family. An

example of this code occurs on page 3 of the 2017 We Ourselves (Socialist) Party manifesto:

> **"The opportunity to build a new agreed united Ireland with rights and equality for all. This election is an opportunity to stand against borders, against Brexit and against cuts. It is your opportunity to stand for equality, for rights and for unity."**

This example demonstrates that the political community is not founded upon a mythologized

notion of the "great past" before globalization and mass migration took place. Rather, the We

Ourselves Party's political community is implied to be founded upon a common embrace of the

changes that the future brings which result in evolution and prosperity for *all*.

UK Party Families' Negative Attitudes Toward Foreigners and/(or) Foreign Influences

As *Figure 21* indicates, UKIP from the Nationalist/Populist party family had the highest frequency of negative attitude statements toward foreigners and foreign influences (36 coded negative mentions in 2017) out of all UK parties over the 2001-2019 period. This finding supports H6: Nationalist/Populist parties also took advantage of the migrant crisis to talk even more about immigration, an already pivotal feature of their platform. This finding also supports H5 because the Nationalist/Populist party family is one of the families that defines its political community as smaller than its national borders; thus, it is expected to demonstrate a higher percentage of negative attitudes than positive ones in its foreigner-related rhetoric.

Code Distribution Model - Negative attitudes toward foreigners by UK parties in 2001-19 manifestos

Figure 21.

Interpretation: Phase I revealed how the Liberal (LIB) and Nationalist/Populist (NAT-POP) party families were the most outspoken about foreigners in their manifestos. This Phase II model adds that UKIP (Nationalist/Populist party family) was the most negative toward foreigners out of all UK parties' manifestos over the 18-year period.
Note: See 6. in Appendix C for a larger version. Thicker lines denote more coded segments of positive sub-codes in the manifesto. The number on each line indicates the number of times that sub-code was marked.
Source: Data based on CMP manifestos were coded and rendered graphically in MaxQDA by the author.

The most frequent sub-code indicating UK parties' negative attitudes toward foreigners and foreign influences was NEG02, the pro-isolationism, pro-superiority, and/(or) pro-exclusivity sub-code, with 169 total coded segments across all six party families and within 28 of the 41 UK manifestos. The pro-cultural nationalism sub-code (NEG04) yielded a total of 81 coded segments across 20 manifestos and was present in all families except for the Ecological party family. The anti-multiculturalism and/(or) anti-pluralism sub-code (NEG03) yielded 53 coded segments in only 9 UK manifestos from the Socialist, Conservative, and Nationalist/Populist party families. The populism sub-code (NEG01) yielded 41 segments. NEG01 was present in 14 manifestos and was coded at least once in all families except for Ethnic/Regional. The "looking back" sub-code (NEG05) yielded 27 hits in 11 manifestos belonging to all party families except for the Ecological and Ethnic/Regional party families.

Page 22 of the 2019 Conservative Party manifesto also demonstrates examples of both pro-isolationism (NEG02) and "looking back" (NEG05) sub-codes when it says,

> **"The vote to leave the EU was, among other things, a vote to take back control of our borders.** That is why a majority Conservative Government will get Brexit done, and then introduce a firmer and fairer Australian-style points-based immigration system, so that we can decide who comes to this country on the basis of the skills they have and the contribution they can make – not where they come from. **Migrants will contribute to the NHS – and pay in before they can receive benefits. Our new system gives us real control over who is coming in and out.** It allows us to attract the best and brightest from all over the world."

This paragraph suggests that the political community is imagined to be smaller than the national borders. It also notes the goal of regaining "control" of a once-great society that was enjoyed by the political community members before outsiders disrupted them. No international openness or cooperation with the EU or the civic brand of nationalism seem to be allowed here.

Next, page 35 of the 2017 UKIP (Nationalist/Populist family) manifesto demonstrates

clear examples of the next two sub-codes (NEG04 and NEG03):

"Britain has always welcomed people of whatever faith, nationality or creed who have wanted to make their home in this country, but a lack of vision for an integrated Britain has led to our society becoming more and more fragmented. UKIP will take integration as seriously as we have immigration, and we will not tolerate the intolerable. **Over many years, the policy of 'multiculturalism' has fragmented British society by allowing new migrants to Britain to behave in exactly the same way as they would if they were still in their countries of origin. Multiculturalism has prevented criticism of certain religious beliefs and cultural practices, even those the overwhelming majority of British people would consider repugnant, and which threaten rights and equalities established in Britain for decades. Nobody voted for multiculturalism, yet all of us are living with the results of it. It is generally those who have little interest in preserving British identity, or who are…hostile to the very idea of it, who champion multiculturalism most fiercely. They are vociferous in shutting down debate.**"

These statements explicitly oppose multiculturalism. They also champion cultural nationalism

above civic nationalism, suggesting that the migrant influx is detrimental to upholding "our"

traditional "British" culture and society. Here, the political community can only consist of those

within the British cultural sphere, and any other identities or viewpoints will not be tolerated.

Then, page 11 of the 2015 UKIP (Nationalist/Populist family) manifesto presents an

example of the populism sub-code:

"The British public has every right to be concerned. Surveys consistently show immigration as one of the top three issues for voters. **Yet, instead of listening, the old parties have responded with insults and contempt: even our prime ministers have labelled good, decent people 'closet racists' and 'bigots.'** Immigration is not about race; it is about space. Immigrants are not the problem; it is **the current immigration system that is broken. Our current immigration rules ignore the wishes of the British people.** They discriminate in favour of EU citizens and against the rest of the world. **The system is failing so badly that we cannot even properly identify how many people enter and leave our country.**"

UKIP's statement makes it clear that their political community only includes the "decent

people," which excludes individuals who do not possess "good" morals and/(or) belong to

different partisan groups. This particular flavor of populism relates directly to the anti-EU,

pro-isolationist rhetoric used to promote Brexit proceedings. Here, UKIP suggests that corrupt

politicians from opposing parties "fail" the "good (true)" citizens with their allowance of

immigrants entering the political community against the will of said "decent" citizens.

Lastly, the least frequent negative sub-code was NEG06, the pro-ethnic nationalism

and/(or) pro-nativism sub-code, with a total of 11 coded segments in 10 of the 41 UK manifestos.

An example of this sub-code occurs on page 21 of the 2005 Conservative Party manifesto:

> **"There should be popular consent for further demographic change.** And the best way
> to secure continuing support for future migration is by showing that government has
> control of our borders. Refusing to set a limit on new migrants is irresponsible politics.
> Only the Conservatives take this issue seriously enough to insist on a limit, and will
> introduce the policies necessary to police it."

Among other negative attitudes coded here, the first sentence of this paragraph explicitly defends

the idea of the political community as only being accessible to those of a specific race and/(or)

ethnicity (in the manifesto's terms, "demographic"). It suggests that the in-group - i.e., the

designated racial majority - should be in charge of determining who from the out-group can join

the political community; however, few can ever join unless they meet the inherited criteria.

Altogether, Phase II complements Phase I by providing details about the exact attitudes

toward foreign "others" and ideas about political community membership commonly employed

by six party families in the UK. Phase II supports H5 by integrating Phase I's results within the

context of party families' political community sizes and "rile" groups. Lastly, Phase II adds to

Phase I's H3, H4, H6, and H7 findings by enriching our knowledge about the specific strategies

that Liberal and Nationalist/Populist families (as represented by Liberal Democratic Party and

UKIP) employ to gain political power in times of crisis.

XI. PHASE II DISCUSSION

A downside to Phase II's research design is that hand-coding inherently involves a level of subjectivity brought on by the coder's unconscious biases. To reduce the expression of potential bias as much as possible, manifestos were coded by year, not by individual party or by party family affiliation. Despite the potential shortcomings, the UK still proves to be a strong case that helps one better understand Phase I's findings about broader trends in EU party families' foreigner-related rhetoric. If this research is to be replicated in the future, employing a large number of coders would create a robust level of intercoder reliability that this thesis lacks.

Moreover, selecting a coding team that includes native speakers of all languages of the original manifestos would improve analytical validity, because it would ensure that no nuances of the original language would be missed or mistranslated by the software or by the coder. The UK's manifestos are the only ones in this thesis that were originally written in English. Because the UK was also the country selected to be coded by hand, the translation problem was mitigated. All in all, Phase II's analytical contributions make up for these few unavoidable shortcomings of its research design. In relation to the three periods within the 2001-2019 time frame, the UK manifestos support the larger trends of foreigner-related rhetoric that were displayed in Phase I.

Rhetoric Trends in Context
Pre-Crises Period (2001-2007)

Phase I revealed that across the nine EU member states, the Christian/Jewish Democratic, Conservative, and Agrarian/Rural party families did not support H3 because they demonstrated higher percentages of foreigner-related rhetoric in the pre-economic crisis period (2001-2007) as opposed to after it (2008-2014). These changes were interpreted as relating to the party families'

political community sizes and their opinions about global current events; namely, 9/11 and the

Islamophobic zeitgeist of the early 2000s. Phase I also revealed that collectively, the UK parties'

pre-economic crisis foreigner-related rhetoric from the 2001 (2.2%) and 2005 election (2.0%)

years were each collectively and separately greater than the 2010 election year's total percentage

of foreigner-related rhetoric (1.04%) (representative of the 2008-2014 period).

To place Phase II's results in context, it is important to understand the events that

specifically affected the UK in addition to the overarching Islamophobic zeitgeitst surrounding

the 9/11 terrorist attack of 2001. Directly before the 2001-2007 period in question, the UK's

involvement in the 1991 Gulf War, the 1993 murder of young black citizen Stephen Lawrence,

and the growing far-right movement culminated in growing dissent among second- and

third-generation immigrants (Poynting and Mason 2007, 69-73). These tensions peaked in the

spring of 2001 when far-right activists spearheaded xenophobic protests and attacks on residents

in the Northern UK areas of Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford, which were predominantly

inhabited by individuals of South Asian descent (Rhodes 2017, 4).

Not only did these xenophobic acts provoke police involvement, mass arrests, and mass

violence, but they also led to what some refer to as a "watershed in 'race relations' in Britain"

that would be seen in the London bombings of 2005 and all other extremist-related incidents

afterward (Rhodes 2017, 1). Scholars Poynting and Mason (2007) explain that these conflicts led

> opponents of cultural diversity [to] call upon a sort of ideological 'I told you so'...to
> legitimate their attacks on multiculturalism, especially with regard to non-Christian,
> non-Western cultures which they have represented as barbaric, uncivilized and incompatible
> with mainstream British…culture. (81)

 Phase II coded segments from 2001 and onward, such as the Conservative Party's 2005

statement on page 21 that "there should be popular consent for further demographic change,"

provide critical pieces of evidence that support Poynting and Mason (2007)'s claim. The hand-coded sentiments throughout the 2001-2019 period also illustrate the transformation of "us versus them" rhetoric in the context of the UK's increasing far-right and xenophobic sentiments.

The other significant factor likely related to the heightened foreigner rhetoric of UK parties during the 2001-2007 period was the massive "second wave" of immigrants. This influx was due to the Labor government's open arm policy in the hopes that work from incoming migrants would boost the UK's economy (Sobolewska and Ford 2020, 143). As my Phase II results confirm, UK party manifestos' increased attention to foreigners corresponds with their voters' rising anxieties about the new influx of Central European migrants. As *Figure 17* showed, the Conservative, Nationalist/Populist, and Socialist UK parties increasingly reported higher percentages of negative than positive attitudes toward foreigners throughout this period.

Specifically, UKIP and the Conservative Party used this "demographic change" from mass migration to their advantage, lamenting that the Labor government had "lost effective control of our borders," "our asylum system is in chaos," "Britain has reached a turning-point," and immigration needs to be brought "back under control" (Conservative Party 2005, 21). On their own, such statements convey the UK's general feelings of surprise and stress during this period. However, when added to the bigger picture, these comments are examples of fueling the fires of growing popular distrust toward the UK government and toward the cultural and national "others" it has sought to help.

Post-Economic / Pre-Migrant Crises Period (2008-2014)

Phase II results largely supported H5, but interestingly revealed that even the UK's

parties from the Liberal and Socialist families increased their raw percentages of negative

rhetoric toward foreigners during the 2008-2014 period. For example, the Liberal Democratic

Party's 2010 manifesto states that

> The global recession proved the need for better international regulation of the financial
> markets. New security threats are emerging, for which Britain's armed forces are not yet fully
> equipped, whilst terrorists and organised criminals exploit international networks. (29)

This statement concisely embodies how rising fears of terrorism fused with the economic

instability of the time. The previous seven-year period was certainly a prime time to discuss

foreigners in UK politics. However, the fact that foreign "others" were still discussed in negative

ways by the party families expected to be the most positive toward them illustrates that for most

parties, the topic of foreigners had been so potent in the public's mind for the past several

decades, that immigration was still "one of the top three issues on the agenda throughout the

severe recession of 2008-9" (Sobolewska and Ford 2020, 146).

Another factor driving the UK parties' largely negative, though less frequent

foreigner-related rhetoric during this period was the Eurozone financial crisis of 2009-2010,

which put strains on all EU nations and sparked further fears about stability and employment

competition among domestic publics. Even among families that are considered to define their

political communities as larger than or equal to their national borders, negativity was an enticing

trend parties used to gain voters. In the UK, the combination of economic insecurity and rising

xenophobia resulted in public dissent over previous Conservative and Labor cabinet failures to

"control" immigration and "ineffectual attempt[s] to block an EU-wide treaty agreement to shore

up the Euro in late 2011," which "left Britain looking isolated and weak" (Sobolewska and Ford 2020, 183). These political decisions also led to slow upswings in opportunistic foreigner-related rhetoric by oppositional parties, who eagerly pointed out how they would deliver where their predecessors had failed. For instance, the Liberal Democratic 2010 manifesto also eagerly emphasizes its desire to protect the British taxpayer in ways that the Conservatives had not:

> New threats are emerging and yet Britain's armed forces remain largely equipped to fight the old ones. The Iraq War, and allegations over British complicity in torture and in secret 'rendition' flights of terrorist suspects, highlight the dangers of a subservient relationship with the United States that neglects Britain's core values and interests. The threats of tomorrow are likely to be driven by failed states, mass migration, climate change and regional instability. So we will ensure that taxpayers' money is spent more effectively on equipping the forces for the tasks of the future, not old Cold War threats. (64-65)

This rhetoric is part of the larger (and obvious) trend, in which the failure of a party is the key talking point of its opposition in the next elections.

Mainstream Islamophobia sparked by terrorism attacks, racist activism, rising migration rates, a declining economy linked to the UK's EU membership, and previous governments' failures neither altogether, nor immediately result in an increase of party families' foreigner-related rhetoric in this 2008-2014 period. However, the economic crisis, Central European migration influx, and public discontent with the British government allowed foreigner-related "us versus them" mentalities to boldly surface again after some of the worst shocks of the recession had subsided. These Phase II trends add to the contributions of Dalton (2019), Hooghe and Marks (2018), and Lipset and Rokkan (1967). The UK case in the 2008-2014 period illustrates how partisanship - at one time the main source of political identity - and economic issues have been slowly overtaken and absorbed into more culture-focused platforms in this new "cultural cleavage" era of politics.

Post-Crises Period (2015-2019)

Also supporting H6 and H7, Phase II data reveals that the period following both crises was the most eventful for the UK. Spilling over from the previous decades, UK parties rapidly expanded their talking points about foreigners entering the country and seeking asylum, as well as upon what grounds such entries would be allowed. The key words "Islam*," "Mediterranean," "Muslim*," "nationalit*" (nationality/nationalities), and "Syria*" were utilized by UK parties almost exclusively during the 2015-2019 period. Phase II shows how events like the Syrian refugee crisis, the 2014 "Trojan Horse" scandal, and the Manchester 2017 suicide bombing made their way into the UK's political rhetoric. Interestingly, it seems that most parties across the six families had a lot to say about homegrown terrorism, foreigners entering the UK, threats to British values, and the UK's humanitarian past. Notably, very few focused directly on the Syrian refugees themselves, other than to explain who was considered in need of UK support.

The "Trojan Horse" scandal in reference began in 2014 after an anonymous note was leaked which exposed a "plot" to turn school children in the predominantly Muslim area of Birmingham into Islamic extremists (Awan 2018; Abbas 2017). Abbas (2017) notes that in the end, no evidence was found to provide legal cause for such claims about "Islamicization" occurring in Birmingham schools (426). Regardless of its falsity, this incident received enough negative press and political attention that the 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act was passed shortly afterward (Abbas 2017, 426). Such sensationalized accounts prompting legal follow-up can be seen in UKIP's 2017 manifesto under the heading "ENDING ISLAMIST EXTREMISM IN OUR SCHOOLS," where it states,

> Three years ago, the 'Trojan Horse' scandal revealed how Islamists had attempted to take over several schools in Birmingham and use them to propagate their warped ideology. The plot nearly succeeded, and hundreds of young minds were at risk. We must never again be

caught napping like this: we must wake up to the reality that extremism is taking hold in our country. Until such time as the Muslim community is better integrated, UKIP proposes: Immediately putting into Special Measures schools found to be exposing children to Islamism. (38)

UKIP's reaction to the "extremism…taking hold in our country" fits well within its Nationalist/Populist family framework, in which political community membership is reserved for predominantly white, Christian/agnostic citizens. Though perhaps not as sensationalized, similar sentiments about Islamic extremism are also found on the opposite side of the "rile" aisle during this period, with the Labor Party from the Socialist family exclaiming in its 2015 manifesto that

> The threat from Islamist extremism is increasing. Hundreds of British citizens have joined Islamic State – a movement that has engaged in savage violence, and racial and religious hatred….With Labour, the security services will have the powers they need to disrupt and tackle terrorism….With Labour, dangerous suspects will be subject to proper controls. (54)

It is clear that the Labor Party's rhetoric still aligns with the general Islamophobic zeitgeist of the time. However, this party discusses providing sanctuary for Syrian refugees in this period as well, which is represented in Phase II's hand-coded positive attitudes via pro-civic nationalism, pro-multiculturalism/pluralism, and anti-isolationism. UK parties that belong to the Ecological, Socialist, and Liberal party families followed this pattern, which altogether loosely supports H5's prediction, since these three families define their political communities much more inclusively and broadly than other families.

Unexpectedly, yet also significant to my thesis, the positive sentiments toward refugees were also abundant in parties from the Ethnic/Regional party family. For example, Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales) notes in its 2015 manifesto that it seeks to make Wales a place of "sanctuary" and take "our fair share of displaced people, such as refugees from wars in Syria and Iraq" to ensure that "they are given a stable life and security" (39). Additionally, the Scottish National

Party (SNP) echoes this idea in 2017, championing the Scottish government's "partnership with the United Nations to empower the women of Syria and promote Scotland as a centre for training…female peacemakers" (43). SNP goes further, stating that it will "continue to support UN Security Council Resolution 1325 reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts" and use "international justice and civic tolerance" to defeat Daesh "without recourse to violence and barbarity" (Scottish National Party 2017, 43). Whether these are just empty words or hopeful promises, rhetoric from these Ethnic/Regional family parties combines the promotion of Syrian humanitarian aid and civic nationalism with fears of being left behind by Brexit, the other main event during the 2015-2019 for the UK.

Phase II highlights how the abundance of pro-multiculturalism and pro-pluralism rhetoric by the Ethnic/Regional family sheds light on the fact that the rights of these parties were hanging by a thread, so they relied heavily on the UK's EU membership to maintain some semblance of autonomy. Most sentiments from the Ethnic/Regional parties during this period echo the Ireland Alliance Party's statement that its community "...recognise[s] the huge benefits of EU membership, which is why the majority voted to remain" (2019, 6). Without EU membership, many of these parties who represented Ireland, Wales, and Scotland would lose a great deal of governmental leverage in the global space and in the UK Parliament. Thus, maintaining a cooperative stance and remaining open to working with other countries under the umbrella of civic nationalism (as opposed to cultural or ethnic nationalism) was a self-preservation strategy for parties like the Green Party of Wales (Ecological) or the 2019 Ireland Alliance (Liberal). From this, one must ask, are these parties focused solely on self-preservation and/(or) retaliation? Or do they practice what they preach? All in all, it seems that Brexit caused a lot of parties in the

UK to double down on pro-immigrant and pro-EU sentiments, leading one to also ask if this was

a situation in which they didn't realize what they had until it was gone?

      The desire of UK Ethnic/Regional parties to remain attached to the European Union

network (as evident in their positive attitudes toward foreigners and foreign influences) must also

be met with a discussion of the rising negativity toward such influences by farther right parties in

the UK. It is interesting, but not surprising that the most frequent sub-code in the UK manifestos

was pro-isolationism, pro-superiority, and/(or) pro-exclusivity (NEG02). As scholars like Jenne

et. al (2021), Carlotti and Gianfreda (2020), and McGregor (2019) have shown, European radical

right parties outside of UKIP like Le Front National or the Italian Northern League have also

gained momentum throughout the 21st century because of their populist, racist, and isolationist

ideals. Unique to the British case however is the fact that positive and negative sentiments are

highly related to the Brexit proceedings. UKIP immediately comes to mind when thinking about

anti-foreigner attitudes and pro-isolationism; however, an extremely important nuance from

Phase II was that *all* party families to some degree utilized language about foreigners that was

cloaked in images of subtle British *superiority* or *exceptionalism*.

      As Ibrahim and Howarth (2018) emphasize, this modern sense of superiority dates back

to Britain's long standing obsession with the concept of humanitarianism from the Enlightenment

period, which brings together "concerted action" "moral responsibility," and "human

compassion" (358). Still evident from Socialist to Liberal to Nationalist/Populist party families'

rhetoric today, this humanitarianist mindset guides the UK's political rhetoric, wherein which

"The notion of sanctuary and humanitarian refuge, while rooted in mythological and religious

traditions…[still enacts] the provision of refuge through the binary of the host and guest -

inscribing power, moral superiority, and patronage to the act of refuge" (Ibrahim and Howarth 2018, 358). An example of this superiority comes into play under the subheading "Other Cultural Crimes" in UKIP's 2017 manifesto when it explicitly details "we" (traditional, white, and Christian British citizens) must "save" "their" (foreign Muslim men's) women from the violence they face in "their" cultural communities (37). While the previous section discussed stopping FGM, this section remained vague and touted with suspicion and scapegoating, illustrating the subtle and quick oscillations in foreigner-related rhetoric present in all parties.

Though expressions of this "moral" superiority are explicit in far-right rhetoric, they appear in other parties, too, and this is the most pressing feature of modern politics that must be better studied in the future. For example, the Labor Party insists that "we" have a "duty to stand up for the security and sovereignty of our overseas territories, including the Falklands, and for the rights of our citizens and dual-nationals abroad" (2019, 97). In the election prior, the Labor Party also argued that "Unlike the Tories, we will uphold the proud British tradition of honouring the spirit of international law and our moral obligations by taking our fair share of refugees" (2017, 31). The Liberal Democratic Party also speaks to the sanctity of British influence, stating that it is the only party "with a credible plan to enhance the UK's soft power" so that the UK can "be playing a leading role" in world affairs as it ought to be (2019, 60-64). These sentiments from the Labor and Liberal Democratic Parties can be generalized to any party in the world because they make voters feel good about their national legacy. However, within this British context, it is important to see that there is more to this rhetoric than just patriotism.

Overall Remarks

At their core, UK parties' both positive and negative attitudes toward foreigners reveal that no matter what, unless the cultural "other" has legal rights, they are not legitimately a member of any parties' political communities because they cannot contribute to those parties' successes. To summarize, British "immigration policy and immigration controls are seen as vital to electoral success; and in tandem successive governments since the turn of the 1900s have cumulatively restricted their obligations to the Other as a means to assuage domestic politics" (Ibrahim and Howarth 2018, 353). Essentially, foreigners make for good talking points, but will not take more of a priority than the domestic audience who wields the voting power.

Zooming out to see the current state of "western" politics as a whole, my Phase I and II data from the 2001-2019 period provide evidence for exactly what Inglehart and Norris (2017) mean when they say, "The classic economic issues did not disappear [from politics]. But their relative prominence declined to such an extent that non-economic issues became more prominent than economic ones in Western political parties' campaign platforms" (447). As observed on smaller scales in the 2001-2007 and 2008-2014 periods, it is a mistake to think that economic issues disappear from political platforms as cultural issues appear. However, it must be emphasized again that the notion of a cultural-based cleavage is a very real, opportunistic, and evolving response from political parties to their voters and to the "zeitgeist" of the time.

Brexit is so far a uniquely British experience, but as my work and previous scholars' works illustrate, it likely will not stay this way for long. The UK trends that my Phase II results showcase feed into the larger narrative of the global political trend from economic-based to cultural-based cleavages. Possibly foreshadowing what is to come for other EU nations, the 2016

Brexit referendum marked the very first "national political choice to be structured primarily around identity divides" that were not based in traditional class conflicts, but instead resulted from conflicts between people of different cultures, races, education levels, national identities, and generations (Sobolewska and Ford 2020, 10-11).

What is more, both phases of my analysis also speak to my thesis' theoretical underpinnings, which argue that the very *emergence* of new parties is extremely significant in and of itself. In the context of the UK, parties like the Green Party of Wales, the Liberal Democrats, and UKIP give insight into the trends of the Nationalist/Populist, Liberal, and Ecological party families. Along these cultural lines, these families' parties became increasingly vocal in response to shifting voter bases and new - and intensified - political interests. This phenomenon is an absolutely crucial takeaway from my thesis. It is illustrated by the Liberal and Nationalist/Populist families' statistically significant percent increases in their foreigner-related manifesto rhetoric. This phenomenon is also evident in the widening gap between Liberal and Ecological party families, which are both growing more positive toward foreigners, and the Nationalist/Populist party family, which is maintaining no less than a 95% negative attitude toward foreigners at all times (as shown by UKIP).

As Mudde would agree, it seems that new and evolving parties are pursuing opportunistic, zeitgeist-related behaviors by increasing their intensity about cultural-identity topics and squaring off against one another. The UK is a clear example of how the harshness and explicit xenophobia of the radical right in a diversifying world certainly will be met with both genuine and manufactured opposition by those who champion everything that the radical right stands against. In the future, it will prove valuable to replicate the hand-coding procedures

performed on the UK parties in order to see if nations that express satisfaction with their EU

memberships would also demonstrate such extensively polarized views that intersect

EU-membership, Islamophobia, the Syrian refugee crisis, and additional cultural-identity issues.

XII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

Previous studies about crises, political parties, and group identities are rarely put into

conversation with one another. Large-scale processes and influential individuals are usually

chalked up to be the main facilitators of "us versus them" identities within populations over time.

Few scholars acknowledge political parties - or as aggregated ideological party families - as the

creators, shapers, and disseminators of identity-based rhetoric that they prove to be. Without

additional research that elucidates trends between the who creates and disseminates the "us

versus them" ideologies that become the poster children of crises, it will not be possible to

predict when and where discriminatory "us versus them" rhetoric might incite violence next.

This gap in the research has prompted this thesis to ask how episodes of crisis correspond

with in-group versus out-group rhetoric that party families employ related specifically to racial,

ethnic, cultural, and sometimes national "otherness." This thesis has also asked how the

particular family to which a party belongs also plays a role in the percentage of "us versus them"

rhetoric it utilizes before, during, and after crises. The 18-year period of 2001 to 2019, which

encompassed the global economic recession and the Syrian refugee crisis, was selected for this

reason. Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) data from 305 individual party manifestos

representing nine ideological party families (Ecological, Socialist, Social Democratic, Liberal,

Christian/Jewish Democratic, Conservative, Agrarian/Rural Labor, Ethnic/Regional, and

Nationalist/Populist) was evaluated closely across nine EU member states (Austria, Denmark,

Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) in the MaxQDA

program over two research phases.

The first phase, a large-N analysis of percentage of foreigner-related rhetoric to total

rhetoric per party family, demonstrated that the type of crisis (economic versus cultural) *does*

relate to how frequently parties discuss foreign "others," with seven of the nine party families

decreasing their usage of foreigner-related rhetoric following the economic crisis, but all nine

increasing their foreigner-related rhetoric after the migrant crisis (H1–3 and 6-7). Phase I

revealed that the Liberal and Nationalist/Populist party families in particular stood out, with

statistically significant percent increases of their foreigner-related rhetoric pre- versus

post-migrant crisis when compared to each other and the seven other party families. These

results suggest that Liberal and Nationalist/Populist families' opportunism over cultural issues

regarding refugees, immigrants, and foreigners proved worthy of their efforts. Finally, Phase I

indicated that contrasting far-left/right and moderate/central families based on their "rile" index

scores was not necessarily telling on its own how opportunistic a family's rhetoric about

foreigners would be (H4).

Phase II, a small-n, hand-coded analysis of nuanced positive and negative attitudes

toward foreign "others" by UK parties presented a compelling case for the ways in which all

parties, regardless of their purposes, mobilized around the intersecting EU-membership and

immigration talking points to increase their discussions of foreigners and foreign influences.

Phase II revealed how in the UK's case, prominent Liberal, Ethnic/Regional, Ecological, and

Socialist parties' expressions of pro-multiculturalism, pro-pluralism, and pro-civic nationalism

were almost direct responses to far-right expressions of pro-isolationism and pro-superiority

from Conservative and Nationalist/Populist parties who championed the Brexit proceedings.

Bolstering the statistical findings from Phase I, Phase II showcased that the UK's main

Liberal family representative, the Liberal Democratic Party, yielded the most positive attitudes

toward foreigners in its manifestos, while the UK's main Nationalist/Populist family

representative, UKIP, yielded the most negative attitudes. Though other family representatives

may not prove that the size of the party's political community dictates how positive or negative it

will respond toward the foreign "other," the two most significant party families do showcase

H5's prediction quite well.

Few scholars combine large-N computer-coding with small-n hand-coding analyses,

which is what makes this thesis particularly comprehensive and valuable. Unavoidably however,

each phase was met with weaknesses due to its research design. For Phase I, the main challenge

was ensuring validity, which was assessed and mitigated by intensive research and a tailored

pilot study. For Phase II, the main challenge was a lack of intercoder reliability, which was

managed as much as possible by coding manifestos by year, rather than by party affiliation.

When combined, both phases complement each other and make up for what the other lacks.

The choices of the unit of analysis, time period, crises, and geopolitical region all have

their own strengths and weaknesses as well. The party manifesto is mainly a European solution

to an official political platform, and Europe is a continent with mainly democratic structures

(whether they are facades or not) of democratic governance. As a unit of analysis then, the party

manifesto for the purpose of democratic elections cannot be so easily applied to the context of

countries within different regime types and party organizations. On a deeper level, party

manifestos are also much more idealistic and vague than the real policies that elected parties actually push forward in government. Despite these shortcomings, the party manifesto is a strong unit of analysis because it can capture the details of a political party's goals, its intended audience, and ideology at a specific moment in time like a snapshot. Decades of electronic party manifestos are readily available through the peer-reviewed Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) database. For the purposes of this thesis, the party manifesto allows one to quantitatively and qualitatively track trends of specific words, phrases, and themes about foreign "others" within one party or across many.

The selections of time period, crises, and geopolitical region were based on the research questions and the unit of analysis. Thus, a time period with enough data was needed in order to draw strong conclusions about the relevance of crises on political party families' foreigner-related rhetoric. 2001-2019 provides almost two decades of information via 305 individual documents. Due to manifesto availability limitations, extending the time period earlier would have resulted in less data from countries with newer democracies. The selection of the economic crisis and refugee crisis was based on the literature from Hallgrimsdottir et. al (2020), Dalton (2019), Hooghe and Marks (2018), Inglehart and Norris (2017), and Lipset and Rokkan (1967) (among others) who directly contrast economic and cultural crises via political cleavages.

The geopolitical selection of nine nations in the European Union was also related to the selection of variables and parameters. Far-right "us versus them" ideologies are present all over the world, but a limitation of this thesis is that the far-right movements and trends evaluated in the nine EU countries are quite different from others occurring elsewhere. For instance, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2015) show that a main difference between European and South American

modes of populism is that the former region's political movements are "predominantly right-wing, yet mobilize within highly emancipated societies," while the latter region's movements are "mainly left-wing and mobilize in strongly patriarchal societies" (16). Peters and Pierre (2020) add that far-right populism ought to be divided into exclusionary versus inclusionary forms, with the former occurring mainly in European and North American countries, and the latter occurring in mainly Latin American and African countries (930). Thus, attempting to generalize European political trends to different regions might be like comparing apples to oranges. Despite these limitations, the selected parameters allow this thesis to present a compelling case about political party families in a range of countries, crises, and ideologies.

Limitations aside, my results largely support many of the scholars' points that inform the theoretical backbone of this thesis. For one, my thesis supports Mudde's notion that the characteristic elements of far-right movements - nativism, populism, and authoritarianism - do not come into existence merely because of a crisis. People have been - and always will be - racist and xenophobic. However, political parties do gain power by taking advantage of the atmosphere (or "zeitgeist") of the day and harping on the most salient issues - which are increasingly along cultural lines of identity, not economic class-based ones (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Dalton 2019; Sobolewska and Ford 2020). My results also convey how this growing cultural cleavage is transforming European politics by bringing parties from rising Ecological and Nationalist/Populist families into the fight against long standing Socialist and Conservative families, possibly out-competing them as society becomes more diverse as a whole.

However, one major point from Dalton (2019) that this thesis disagrees with is the idea that parties largely do not change. For example, the UK's Labor Party (under the Socialist party

family) and Conservative Party have both fluctuated *greatly* in terms of voter base, economic

stances, and intensity toward cultural issues just within the past 40 years alone. It is not to say

that issues that were popular then are not going to be popular now. But as Sobolewska and Ford

(2020) put it, "With no universally agreed rules available, the politics of identity is…a

tug-of-war over social norms…" (7). Over time, these norms are shaped, edited, and framed by

new *and* old political parties in ways that best suit their political communities and prime their

candidates for electoral success. After all, what is talked about now will be framed differently in

the future because how one defines "who is 'us' and who is 'them'" - as well as what

"expressions of loyalty to 'us' and suspicion of 'them' are acceptable" - is something that is

always changing "in response to social change" (Sobolewska and Ford 2020, 7).

The implications of this thesis are multidisciplinary and far-reaching. The notion of

ideological party families and the parties within them as growing and evolving mass actors is an

incredibly important takeaway necessary for better understanding the dynamism and layers with

the interactions between state and non-state actors around the world. Even more significantly,

this thesis highlights how racism, xenophobia, and cultural "othering" is *always* present.

However, these modes of hatred and discrimination can take many forms, and can also be

intensified in the public eye following periods of cultural crisis in particular. With Ukraine and

Russia currently less than two months into fighting, never has there been a more important time

to understand how politicians create arbitrary in-groups and out-groups to suit their purposes at

the expense of millions for generations to come.

Thus, it is time to pair what this thesis reveals about trends in the rising Ecological party

family and newly intensified Liberal and Nationalist/Populist party families with an exploration

of how free media and state-controlled propaganda fit hand-in-hand with the pointed, essentialized, and opportunistic expressions of who "we" are and who "they" are. Future studies should use the literary, theoretical, and technical frameworks provided by this thesis to examine changes in frequency and attitude toward the foreign "other" by other actors, like media platforms and even online celebrities. As we are constantly seeing in real time - particularly in the Ukrainian and Russian case - anyone can go from "brother" to "other" in mere moments. All it takes is an actor powerful enough to pull new identity-based divisions out of thin air. Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) remind us that in the end, "Xenophobia is partly an attitude, but also includes an affective part: fear….The fear is a result of being in a situation where individuals perceive that their group's position is threatened" (824). All of this thesis' findings revolve around politicians and parties' opportunistic manufacturing of this solidarity and fear. That problem is why is it crucial now more than ever to educate the masses and fight for democracy, for freedom of the press, and for human rights. After all, words *do* have power, and unfortunately it is the most subtle "us versus them" sentiments that are the most pervasive and the most difficult to recognize and remove from our popular vocabulary.

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XIV. APPENDICES

Appendix A:

Figure A.
Interpretation: This chart depicts the comparative level of membership inclusivity for each brand of nationalism. Ethnic nationalism is the most narrow and exclusive, while civic nationalism is the most broad and inclusive.
Notes: This diagram is not meant to be a one-size-fits-all model. There is no numerical scope or scale rendered here.
Source: Author's own rendering based on scholars' research, as discussed in the Literature Review section.

<u>Appendix B: *Phase I*</u>

1. **Pilot Study:**

To learn the MaxQDA interface before creating the official go-list, I performed a pilot study. I examined the intersection between positive versus negative mentions of foreigners and of the European Union by the major Hungarian and British parties in their 2010, 2014-15, and 2018-19 elections. From this study, I evaluated how well each term captured the desired mentions of the EU and of foreigners. For example, I was able to remove terms like "alien," which I initially believed would capture "illegal aliens," but almost always only captured ecological references to invasive "alien" species. This trial and error process helped me discover which terms were used in the intended context, and which terms were continuously irrelevant to my research. Nonetheless, there will still be instances in which the lexical search hits do not properly capture the cultural-identity rhetoric I am looking for in Phase I - either by fault of the translation or the list's terms.

2. **Phase I Data Preparation:**

After establishing which parfams, countries, and crises to focus on, I downloaded, formatted, machine-translated, and imported 305 documents into the MaxQDA interface to be evaluated using its lexical search feature.

Downloading:

I created a folder for each country's manifestos. Within each folder (excluding the UK folder), I created a subfolder titled "Original [insert language]." For each country, I selected its appropriate range of election years into the CMP database. I then clicked the specific country's name, enabled the family of each of its parties to be displayed, and made sure that the only

displayed manifesto results were those that were accessible in original PDF format. Annotated copies are often scanned into the CMP database, and translating software often cannot review scanned documents. Moreover, said copies are often covered in the annotated numbering related to the presence of specific traits such as "Anti-Europeanism" or "Pro-multiculturalism," so it is difficult to evaluate in any language, albeit a foreign one.

To maintain uniformity, I downloaded one country's data at a time, moving from the countries with the highest to the lowest suspected number of illegal migrants in 2015-16. To download a country's manifestos for the given elections, I downloaded by parfam. The CMP database accounts for the following party families: Ecological, Socialist, Communist, Nationalist, Christian Democratic, Social Democratic, Conservative, Liberal, Agrarian, Ethnic and Regional, Special Interest Party, and Electoral Alliance of Diverse Origins. The latter two are rarely ever used, and when they are, the parties displayed are often neither mainstream parties, nor parties that return for another election. I abided by the parfam designations assigned by the CMP researchers, who carefully coded each manifesto according to the project's specific criteria. The only alteration I made was that when parties listed as "COM" appeared in the Socialist Parfam search, I used them as well, and labeled them accordingly. I saved each untranslated file (apart from the UK manifesto files) into the "Original [language]" subfolder.

Formatting and Translating:

For all UK manifestos, there was no translation needed, and the file sizes were not too large, so I was able to immediately save and import the manifestos into my MaxQDA workspace without any additional steps. I named each manifesto file by year, country name, parfam, and party name. When there was a manifesto that had to be split apart, it would have a 1 or 2 at the

end of the party name. When there was a manifesto with 'a' or 'b' following the party name, this indicated that there were two elections that the same party participated in within one year. For example, the 2010 manifesto for the Nationalist-Populist Hungarian party Jobbik is named "10_HUN_NAT-POP_Jobbik."

However, many of the remaining eight countries' manifestos had to be formatted before they could be translated. If the original manifesto PDF was larger than 10MB, the maximum size for upload into the Google Translate program, I used the PDF2Go Premium software to compress the file and/(or) split it into several documents in order to be translated and uploaded successfully. If the original PDF was scanned, I used PDF2Go to convert it into a .txt file that I could then copy into a word document, save as a PDF, translate in Google Translate, and then re-save as a translated PDF with the proper label for MaxQDA importation. On occasion, I had to refer to the .csv text of the manifesto if the conversion into a .txt file was incomprehensible. I then would copy the .csv text into Google Translate, save as a PDF, and import.

Importing:

Lastly, I put all nine countries into the same document group in MaxQDA so that I could easily run searches on all of them when I had imported everything. However, I also created a "set" per each country and copied their manifestos into it so that I could also run a search on one single country's manifestos at a time.

3. MaxQDA "Go-List" (*Table B).*

Word	Frequency	%	Rank	Documents	Documents %
immigration	1385	11.73	1	195	63.93
asylum	1227	10.39	2	176	57.70
refugee*	1031	8.73	3	173	56.72
abroad	943	7.99	4	177	58.03
immigrant*	802	6.79	5	157	51.48
borders	673	5.70	6	181	59.34
<(migration)	608	5.15	7	138	45.25
citizenship	515	4.36	8	136	44.59
foreigner*	428	3.62	9	117	38.36
<(migrant)	389	3.29	10	116	38.03
entry	376	3.18	11	137	44.92
ethnic*	370	3.13	12	128	41.97
islam*	326	2.76	13	71	23.28
traffick*	283	2.40	14	119	39.02
homeland*	269	2.28	15	91	29.84
humanitarian	251	2.13	16	92	30.16
terrorist*	240	2.03	17	100	32.79
deport*	231	1.96	18	90	29.51
visa*	197	1.67	19	68	22.30
nationalit*	166	1.41	20	57	18.69
mediterranean	153	1.30	21	55	18.03
muslim*	139	1.18	22	45	14.75

syria*	97	0.82	23	40	13.11
passport*	73	0.62	24	44	14.43
<(fleeing)	71	0.60	25	45	14.75
multicultur*	70	0.59	26	34	11.15
identities	64	0.54	27	38	12.46
(flee)>	53	0.45	28	38	12.46
resettl*	50	0.42	29	30	9.84
diaspora*	49	0.42	30	21	6.89
assimilat*	47	0.40	31	25	8.20
influx*	41	0.35	32	33	10.82
(fled)>	38	0.32	33	29	9.51
newcomer*	35	0.30	34	27	8.85
alienat*	34	0.29	35	24	7.87
undocumented	31	0.26	36	22	7.21
amnesty	25	0.21	37	16	5.25
illegali*	10	0.08	38	10	3.28
jihad*	9	0.08	39	8	2.62
illegals	6	0.05	40	6	1.97
accultur*	1	0.01	41	1	0.33
naturalisation	1	0.01	41	1	0.33
greencard*	0	0.00	0	0	0.00
horde*	0	0.00	0	0	0.00
naturalise*	0	0.00	0	0	0.00

4. *Figure 5* (page 46)

Percentage (%) of Total Foreigner-Related Rhetoric to Total Manifesto Rhetoric Per Year

Total Percentage of Foreigner-Related Rhetoric in the Socialist (SOC) Party Family's Manifestos Per Election Year (2001-2019)

Election Years

5. *Figure 6* (page 46-7)

Total Percentage of Foreigner-Related Rhetoric in the Social Democratic (SOCDEM) Party Family's Manifestos Per Election Year (2001-2019)

6. *Figure 7* (page 47)

Total Percentage of Foreigner-Related Rhetoric in the Ecological (ECO) Party Family's Manifestos Per Election Year (2001-2019)

7. *Figure 8* (page 48)

Figure 8: Total Percentage of Foreigner-Related Rhetoric in the Ethnic/Regional (ETH) Party Family's Manifestos Per Election Year (2001-2019)

8. *Figure 9* (page 48-9)

Total Percentage of Foreigner-Related Rhetoric in the Nationalist/Populist (NAT-POP) Party Family's Manifestos Per Election Year (2001-2019)

9. *Figure 10* (page 50)

Total Percentage of Foreigner-Related Rhetoric in the Liberal (LIB) Party Family's Manifestos Per Election Year (2001-2019)

10. *Figure 11* (page 51)

Total Percentage of Foreigner-Related Rhetoric in the Christian/Jewish Democratic (CHRDEM) Party Family's Manifestos Per Election Year (2001-2019)

11. *Figure 12* (page 51-52)

Percentage (%) of Total Foreigner-Related Rhetoric to Total Manifesto Rhetoric Per Year

Total Percentage of Foreigner-Related Rhetoric in the Conservative (CON) Party Family's Manifestos Per Election Year (2001-2019)

Election Years

12. *Figure 13* (page 52)

13. *Figure 15* (page 57)

Percent (%) of Total Manifesto Rhetoric About Foreigners and/(or) Foreign Influences per Party Family Per Year

Percent of Foreigner-Related Rhetoric to Total Manifesto Rhetoric each Election Year per Party Family (2001-2019)

Appendix C: *Phase II*

1. **Parent and Sub-Codes List:**
PARENT CODE: POSITIVE ATTITUDE; color - DARK GREEN
      POSITIVE SUBCODES:
            POS01 - CIVIC NATIONALISM; color - GREEN
            POS02 - ANTI-ISOLATIONISM / ANTI-SUPERIORITY /
            ANTI-EXCLUSIVITY; color - AQUA
            POS03 - PRO-MULTICULTURALISM / PRO-PLURALISM; color - BLUE
            POS04 - LOOKING FORWARD; color - PURPLE

PARENT CODE: NEGATIVE ATTITUDE; color - DARK RED
      NEGATIVE SUBCODES:
            NEG01 - POPULISM; color - RED
            NEG02 - ISOLATIONISM / SUPERIORITY / EXCLUSIVITY; color - HOT
            PINK
            NEG03 - ANTI-MULTICULTURALISM / ANTI-PLURALISM; color - DARK
            ORANGE
            NEG04 - CULTURAL NATIONALISM; color - ORANGE
            NEG05 - LOOKING BACK; color - YELLOW
            NEG06 - PRO-ETHNIC NATIONALISM / NATIVISM; color - HIGHLIGHTER
            YELLOW

Guiding Phrasebook for Phase II Coding Procedure:
"POSITIVE ATTITUDE" Parent Code
Example statements:
- *We have a moral obligation to help foreigners*
- *Foreigners bring value to the nation*
- *Foreigners should be able to honor their cultures/languages/religions here*
- *It is possible for foreigners to become members of our political community*
- *Foreigners face many difficulties outside of their control*
- *Foreigners deserve the same respect/resources as anyone else*
- *Foreigners strengthen our economy*
- *More diversity leads to a brighter future for our nation*
    Positive attitudes toward foreigners like the example statements above demonstrate the following definitions of the political community:
    - CIVIC NATIONALISM - community defined by willingness to cooperate and coalesce on common governmental rules within a political realm
    - ANTI-ISOLATIONISM / ANTI-SUPERIORITY/ ANTI-EXCLUSIVITY - openly against erecting literal or metaphorical barriers against other nations and ethnic/racial groups; notes specifically that its nation does not possess some kind of superior quality above all others
    - MULTICULTURALISM / PLURALISM - pro-global citizenship / pro-EU citizenship and cooperation; loyalty to the community transcends national boundaries (in any sense: racial, ethnic, cultural, class-based, etc.)

■ LOOKING FORWARD - not relying on mythologizing the past; rather, embracing the changes that the future will have on the prosperity of the evolving nation

**"NEGATIVE ATTITUDE" Parent Code**
Example statements:
○ *Foreigners possess alien and dangerous cultural/religious/morals and behaviors that we don't want to align ourselves with*
○ *Foreigners de-value/dirty the nation*
○ *If foreigners are even allowed to enter our nation, they must fully assimilate to our prescribed culture/language/traditions/religion*
○ *It is not possible for foreigners to become members of our political community*
○ *Foreigners bring challenges upon themselves; i.e., it is not our problem*
○ *Foreigners are less than us and don't deserve the same respect/resources*
○ *Foreigners are a competitive burden on our economy and push us out of jobs*
○ *We want our country back*

Negative attitudes toward foreigners like the example statements above demonstrate the following definitions of the political community:
■ POPULISM - moral (domestic / culturally dominant commoners, or "us") versus immoral (foreigners, or "them") people
■ ISOLATIONISM / SUPERIORITY / EXCLUSIVITY - we are superior in our identity and should protect the purity/sanctity of our community from outsiders
■ ANTI-MULTICULTURALISM / ANTI-PLURALISM - we do not want outside influences or overlapping social groups/structures/identities calling the shots (either globally or from other EU members)
■ ETHNIC NATIONALISM / NATIVISM - our community is only accessible via the correct birthright and heritage
■ CULTURAL NATIONALISM - begrudgingly admitting outsiders if they properly assimilate into our dominant way of life and leave their identities at the door
■ LOOKING BACK - desire to return the nation to the mythologized state of how it once "was"; the homogenous majority (may that be ethnically, in a populist light, religiously, etc.); opposed to demographic societal change

2. *Figure 17* (page 75)

UK Party Family Parties' Total Percentages of Foreigner-Related Rhetoric as Separated by Share of Positive versus Negative Sentiments per Election Year (2001-2019)

3. *Figure 18* (page 76)

Code Co-occurrence Model (Code Intersection across all codes and subcodes)

130

4. *Figure 19* (page 76)

Code Co-occurrence Model (Code Intersection between occurrence of Positive codes/subcodes and Negative codes/subcodes)

5. *Figure 20* (page 77)

Code Distribution Model - Positive attitudes toward foreigners by UK party manifestos 2001-19

6. *Figure 21* (page 80)

Code Distribution Model - Negative attitudes toward foreigners by UK parties in 2001-19 manifestos