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Kant and the "I": A Reappraisal

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Abstract

Kant and the “I”: A Reappraisal

By: Apaar Kumar

Kant never developed a coherent theory of the “I” (or apperception). Interpreters have hitherto stressed either the feeling or act character of apperception. Although Kant repeatedly claims (or implicitly presumes) that the “I” is twofold in form and singular in content from the late 1770s onwards, this claim has not been seriously investigated. I argue that the characterization of the “I” as twofold in form (“I as subject” and “I as object”) and singular in content offers not merely textual illumination vis-à-vis conflicting descriptions of the “I” but also the basis for a coherent theory of the same. The relative incomprehensibility of the singular phenomenon of the “I” lies in the fact that the same word (“I”) describes different aspects -- the active “I” as directedness of attention and the perceiving “I” that is not so directed. I show that Kant implicitly distinguishes between these aspects in characterizing the “I” as twofold in form. The “I” as sensed awareness of the unity of mind is always “obscurely” built into all perceptions while self-reference in thinking requires the “I” as directedness of attention to “clarify” the obscurely sensed “I” built into all perceptions by actively directing attention towards it as an object (“I as object”). Beyond explicating Kantian apperception, such a theory can resolve the problems of circularity and regress that have plagued theories of self-consciousness since perception does not involve reflection and self-reference in diachronic thinking involves the relation between distinguishable aspects of the “I.”

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Introduction

Kant's idealist successors rightly discerned that Kant had not offered a proper theory of self-consciousness, and attempted to make up for the shortfall. Given that Kant's primary aim was the elaboration of the transcendental conditions for experience, he neglected to formulate the concept the transcendental unity of apperception systematically or even consistently. It is well known that Kant had merely offered suggestions and contradictory descriptions of apperception – as "logical," "mere consciousness," "form of consciousness," intuition, *Empfindung*, perception, feeling, and neither concept nor intuition. And, hence, it is hardly surprising that there is little consensus among Kant-interpreters on what the "transcendental unity of apperception" is, how it relates to the empirical unity of apperception and the role it plays in the constitution of experience.

In this dissertation, we will restrict ourselves to the question of what the transcendental unity of apperception is, and adjudicate on the debate between interpreters stressing the "act" character of apperception (Allison, Ameriks, Heidegger) and those stressing the "feeling" character of apperception (Frank, Makkreel, Carr).[1] Not many Kant-interpreters have attempted to offer a comprehensive theory of the "I" (or "apperception," or "self-consciousness") that (a) philologically scours the Kantian *oeuvre* for remarks, suggestions, vacillations vis-à-vis the concept of apperception and (b) attempts to investigate if it is possible to make explicit a consistent theory of the "I"

[1] Manfred Frank, *Selbstgefuehl: Eine historisch-systematisch Erkundung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), 44. Rudolf Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the* Critique of Judgment (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), 105. Karl Ameriks, "Kantian Apperception and the Non-Cartesian Subject," in *Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 59. Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Trans. James S. Churchill, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), 83. Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*, Revised and Enlarged Second Edition, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2004), 163-74, 277. David Carr, *The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press), 1999, 50-52, 65.

through systematic interpretation and argumentative reconstruction. I will attempt to offer a (preliminary) sketch of such a comprehensive theory laying out the logical structure of the "I" that can be seen as establishing the groundwork for a fuller articulation of the concept of the transcendental unity of apperception. In a fuller account (which I am attempting elsewhere), we would have to interpret the distinction between the analytical and synthetic unity of apperception more substantially and we would have to interpret the deductions of the first *Critique* (especially the B deduction) in light of the theory of the "I" offered in this work.

Although Kant repeatedly claims (or implicitly presumes) that the "I" is twofold in form and singular in content from the late 1770s onwards, few interpreters have investigated this claim either as representing Kant's general view or as potentially providing a consistent theory of the "I." I argue that the characterization of the "I" as twofold in form ("I as subject" and "I as object") and singular in content offers not merely textual illumination vis-à-vis Kant's contradictoriness regarding the "I" and, once interpretively developed, a coherent theory of the same, but also avoids the treacherous infinite regress afflicting many theories of self-consciousness.[2]

The relative incomprehensibility of the phenomenon of "I" lies in the fact that the same word ("I") describes different functional roles: the "I" acts and actively directs itself; and the "I" can perceive without actively directing attention. Kant is an interesting

[2] While I have tried to be textually exhaustive in exploring the possibilities of the view that the "I" is twofold in form and singular in content, I have not used all the evidence in this work. My aim has been to argue in a more limited way. Given the notorious difficulty of the issue of apperception, Kant's contradictoriness and the fact that a fuller story would require explicating the distinction between the analytical and synthetic unity of apperception and concentrating far more on the deductions of the first *Critique*, I am only suggesting in this work that (a) there is reason to believe that the view "I"-is-twofold-in-form-and-singular-in-content was indeed Kant's view; and that (b) we can find a consistent theory of the "I" if we re-read Kant on apperception in light of this view -- or, in other words, methodologically speaking, I have explored the possibility of developing a consistent theory of the "I" in light of the view that the "I" is twofold in form and singular in content.

case of a philosopher who recognized that the singular phenomenal content of the "I" can play two theoretically differentiable functional roles. If we textually and systematically analyze Kant's formulation of the "I" as twofold-in-form-and-singular-in-content, we find Kant distinguishing between the acting and perceiving "I," and indicating that the "I" has a different logical structure in the activities of thinking and perceiving.

In terms of form and content, the "I" can be classified into – "I as subject" (formally, the horizon forming the boundaries of consciousness, and in content, *sensed* awareness of the mind as unified where "sensed" is not the same as "sensation"); "I as subject of thinking" (formally, the very possibility of directedness of attention (spontaneity *of* apperception), and in content, the *sensed* awareness of directedness of attention); and the "I as object." In perceiving "red" at time *t*, we perceive "red" and not the "I," but the "I as subject" is always "obscurely" built into all conscious representations; and, hence, the subject-object distinction has no relevance regarding perception. In thinking, however, the "I as subject of thinking" as directedness of attention refers (*refériren*) to the "I as object" as a moment in a chain of thoughts, and the "I as object" has the same content as the "I as subject," the sensed awareness of the mind as unified. This is possible because the unity of consciousness ("I as subject") is prior to the unity of judgment (requiring the "I as subject of thinking"). In general, all self-reference requires the "I as subject of thinking" to "clarify" the obscure "I as subject," the sensed awareness of the unity of mind built into every representation, by actively directing attention towards it as an object ("I as object").

Such a historical-textual and systematic reconstruction not merely resolves thorny problems in Kant scholarship but can also systematically contribute to current debates on

the self. The problems of circularity and regress would fall away if we admitted the aforesaid peculiarity of the phenomenon of the "I" and the thinking-perception distinction. The erstwhile theories of self-consciousness assumed the subject and object of reflection to be the same, thus falling into a regress. But this threat is averted if the subject does not need to "reflect" (turn back) upon itself in perception and if the referring "I as subject of thinking" differs from the "I as object" in both form *and* content in the process of thinking (naturally within the confines of the ontologically singular content of the "I".)

In Chapter 1, I will explore the difficult notion of spontaneity in the Kantian system, and argue that the "spontaneity of apperception" (a case of spontaneity in general) glossed as the active directedness of attention makes possible the attentive directedness and steadfastness that must necessarily form a precondition of thinking. Hence, the relationship between spontaneity and apperception can be seen as concretized in the possibility that the discursively cognizing subject can actively direct its attention in the Kantian system, and the spontaneity of apperception can be seen as constituting the spontaneity of thinking.

In Chapter 2, I will show that Kant broadly adhered to the view that the "I" is twofold in form and singular in content from the silent period onwards to as late as the *Anthropologie* (and even to some extent, in the *Opus Postumum*), and that Kant can be interpreted as implicitly classifying the "I" in the following way: (i) "I" as *a priori Grenzbegriff*, or the "I" as (form of) subject in general; (ii) the "I as (form of) subject of thinking" or the "I of intelligence;" (iiia) the "I" as form of object of perception, and (iiib) the "*Ich als Mensch*" including the "I of apprehension," the empirical "I think," or,

in general, the “I” as content. It is within such a framework that I will formulate questions regarding the “I”: What is the relationship between the “I as subject of thinking” and “I as object of perception”? How is it possible that the “I as subject of thinking” and “I as object of perception” can belong to one and the same “I as subject”? Why do we need to conceptualize the “I” as having a twofold form if it is one and the same subject and has a singular content? I will enlist Kant’s own regressive method of analysis in order to answer these questions.

In Chapter 3, I will explicate the forms of the “I as subject,” “I as subject of thinking,” and “I as object,” and specify the relationship between them. The “I as subject” is the horizon of consciousness built into every case of conscious perception while the “I as subject of thinking” can be seen as the “spontaneity of apperception” or directedness of attention that must direct itself to the form of the “I as object” (which can be intuited just the way space and time are intuited, and so has the same form as the latter) in the process of thinking. In other words, the logical structure of the Kantian “I” can be consistently explicated only if we distinguish between the structure of the “I” in thinking and perceiving: in the former case, the “I” can be seen as formally splitting into a subject-object relation while in the latter case there can be no such distinction between subject and object.

In Chapter 4, I will specify the content of various forms of the “I” – “I” as subject, subject of thinking and object. The “I” as subject and subject of thinking can be seen as “*Empfindungen*” that are intrinsically a-temporal because, though “*Empfindungen*” always accompany perception (*Wahrnehmung*), the subject cannot be conscious of the “*Empfindung*” if she is perceiving something at a moment of time. Because the

discursively-cognizing subject needs a moment of time to perceive anything, in the case of perceiving “red” she can, hence, only sense (*empfinden*) the “I as subject” as obscurely built into the perception “red” at time, *t*, but not perceive the “I as subject” clearly at time, *t*, because she would be perceiving “red” at that moment. In the case of thinking, on the other hand, the discursively cognizing subject can make an object out of the “I,” or intuit the “I as object” (which has the same content as the “I as subject,” the sensed awareness of the unity of mind) via the “I as subject of thinking,” the directedness of attention.

Part I

Chapter 1

Spontaneity and Apperception

It is well-known that the relationship between spontaneity, apperception and thinking is highly obscure in Kant's theoretical philosophy. In this chapter, I aim to conceptually clarify the concept of spontaneity as it relates to apperception and such clarification would not be possible if we were to ignore the characterization of thinking in the Kantian system. Through philological investigation and argumentative reconstruction, I will argue that spontaneity of apperception (as case of spontaneity in general) can be glossed as the directedness of attention, and constitutes (*ausmacht*) a precondition for the process of thinking.

The argument goes as follows: In the *Anthropologie*, Kant defines spontaneity as "*innere Handlung*," and, hence, in order to further clarify the concept of spontaneity, we would need to understand the term "*Handlung*." The concept of "*Handlung*," the power of acting in general (*ueberhaupt*) and distinguishable from terms like "*Taetigkeit*" and "*Vermoegen*," can be divided into real "*Handlungen*" that "posit" (*setzen*) representations as representations and logical "*Handlungen*" that order (*setzen*) representations vis-à-vis each other. The concept of spontaneity can be characterized as (a) generally, the reactive action (*Handlung*) or active reaction vis-à-vis a manifold of intuition; (b) more specifically, a real "*Handlung*" that posits the characteristic way in which the discursively cognizing subject comports itself in the face of a manifold of intuitions; (c) as the power to act in its own particular (thinking) way; and, finally, (d) it can be distinguished from receptivity -- receptivity implies the being affectedness of the discursively cognizing subject by itself in its own way, which means being passively

affected in consonance with the forms of space and time without actively employing its powers while spontaneity means that the discursively cognizing subject can reactively act or actively react, or the general employment of its powers can be occasioned, in the face of a manifold of intuitions in its own particular way.

In the case of the discursively cognizing subject, "its own particular way" indicates a close relationship between spontaneity and understanding, and we can characterize the spontaneity of judgment (a case of spontaneity in general) as the striving (*Bestrebung*) implied in thinking (concept formation, judgment, inference). If, however, the discursive subject did not have the possibility of actively directing attention at its disposal, thinking would be impossible. The "spontaneity of apperception" (again, a case of spontaneity) glossed as the active directedness of attention makes possible the attentive directedness and steadfastness that must necessarily form a precondition of thinking. Hence, the relationship between spontaneity and apperception can be seen as concretized in the possibility that the discursively cognizing subject can actively direct its attention in the Kantian system, and the spontaneity of apperception can be seen as constituting the spontaneity of thinking. It is in this way that we can illuminate the highly obscure relationship between spontaneity, apperception and thinking in Kant's theoretical works, and, more importantly, in our present context, the relationship between spontaneity and apperception.

In the first section, I investigate the term "*Handlung*" philologically by (a) explicating and distinguishing the Kantian terms "*Handlung*," "*Taetigkeit*," and "*Vermoegen*," and (b) articulating the relationship between a "*Handlung*" which is a "*reale Funktion*" (or "real" *Handlung* in short) and a "*logische Handlung*" mainly by

drawing on the *Reflexionen* from the silent decade, but argumentatively showing that this distinction also appears in the first *Critique* in an implicit way. In the second section, I argue that the concept of spontaneity can be characterized as (a) real "*Handlung*," glossed as (b) reactive action (*Handlung*) or active reaction vis-à-vis a manifold of intuition, and differs from receptivity in the fact that discursive spontaneity is active reacting in the face of representations from outside, not merely passively being affected by itself in its own way (receptivity) but actively reacting *in its own way* to being affected from the outside. In the third section, I explore the relationship between spontaneity, reflection and thinking since Kant also describes the concept of spontaneity as "*die Reflexion*." I argue that the spontaneity of the understanding (or judgment) is the active reaction that strives (*Bestrebung*) for order through thinking and judging in the face of the manifold of intuition gained from outside. In the fourth section, having characterized the general concept of spontaneity and spontaneity of the understanding (or judgment), I exemplify and clarify the relationship between the spontaneity *of* apperception and the spontaneity of judgment, arguing that (a) the spontaneity of apperception is a real "*Handlung*, and (b) describable as the directedness of attention that forms a precondition that constitutes thinking. Finally, in the conclusion, I briefly summarize my interpretation, and indicate that my interpretation can make sense of the relationship between spontaneity, apperception and thinking in a far more detailed and conceptually differentiated way than Robert Pippin's influential interpretation of spontaneity.

I

The Concept of *Handlung*

To understand Kant's description of the concept of spontaneity as "*innere Handlung*," we should distinguish two terms which, in my view, Kant himself tends to distinguish for the most part, implicitly if not explicitly: "*Handlung*" and "*Taetigkeit*."[3] *Handlung* is usually translated as "act," "acting," or "action," and *Taetigkeit* as "activity." *Handlung* refers to the exertion by a discursively cognizing subject (henceforth interchangeably "discursive intellect" or "discursive subject") of the power associated with thinking, imagining and acting in general. *Taetigkeit*, on the other hand, not merely marks conceptually the actual employment of the particular abilities of a discursive subject (imagination, understanding, etc.), but also the fact that the mind can be receptively employed (*taetig*) such that it passively receives impressions in consonance with the forms of space and time without actually using its active (*handelnd*) powers.

In this section, I will show the following: (a) I will clarify the distinctions between the terms *Handlung* (power of acting in general), *Taetigkeit* (the general employability and actual employment of the mind) and *Vermoegen* (ability of the mind as horizon of representability) mainly to understand the term, *Handlung*. (b) I will explicate the distinction between real and logical *Handlung* in order to further clarify the nuances of the term, *Handlung*, and argue that space, time and the categories can be justifiably glossed as "*Handlungen*," albeit "*unwillkuerlich*." Finally, (c), I will show that the power to act in general (*Handlung*) is an empty conceptual placeholder required for making the distinction between real and logical *Handlungen*; and that the real and logical *Handlungen* constitute the necessary conditions for any kind of employment (*Taetigkeit*) of the mind (whether active or passive), and any particular employment of the mind can

3 In what follows, since the issue is terminological, I will be using these German terms without translation and without quote marks. The usual translations for these terms, as I indicate below, are "act," "action" or "acting" for "*Handlung*" and "activity" for "*Taetigkeit*."

only take place within the horizon of any given ability (*Vermoegen*). Note: this is a long (but necessary) section for developing my view. I have argued in a progressive, step-by-step way in this section, and it only makes sense as a whole when one has reached the end of this section.

(a) In the *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (henceforth *Anthropologie*), based on how the mind relates to its representations, Kant divides the mind (*Gemueth*) into two parts: an active (*handelnd*) part that indicates (*zeigt*) abilities or powers (*Vermoegen* (facultas)) and a passive (*leidend*) part which consists in receptivity (*Empfaenglichkeit* (receptivitas)). Cognition, it appears, requires both, and the ability to cognize (*Erkenntnisvermoegen*) may be characterized as the "*Thaetigkeit* [sic] *des Gemueths Vorstellungen zu verbinden oder von einander zu sondern*" (AA VII: 140).[4] Although Kant only vaguely refers to the actions of combining or keeping apart, which, as we will see, relate to the concept of *Handlung*, the term *Taetigkeit* in this passage clearly refers to the employment of the mind in performing such functions. In other words, a discursive intellect can be employed in performing particular kinds of actions, say combining and keeping representations separate. On any particular occasion, the mind could be employed in performing the roles of combining or keeping representations apart. In this passage, Kant says that the general employment (*Taetigkeit*) of the mind in combining or keeping representations separate makes for the most excellent part of the ability to

4 Immanuel Kant, *Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Hrsg. von der koeniglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1917), *Band* I-XXIX. All references to these volumes as (AA Volume: page/s). "*In Ansehung des Zustandes der Vorstellungen ist mein Gemüth entweder handelnd und zeigt Vermögen (facultas), oder es ist leidend und besteht in Empfänglichkeit (receptivitas). Ein Erkenntniß enthält beides verbunden in sich, und die Möglichkeit eine solche zu führt den Namen des Erkenntnißvermögens von dem vornehmsten Theil derselben, nämlich der Thätigkeit des Gemüths Vorstellungen zu verbinden, oder von einander zu sondern*" (AA VII: 140).

cognize, the active (*handelnd*) part. *Prima facie*, then, the active (*handelnd*) roles that the mind can play can be characterized as *Taetigkeiten*. At the very least, this suggests a distinction between *Handlung* and *Taetigkeit* because there is a subtle difference between the power that enables the employment of the mind (*Handlungen*) in combining or keeping separate and the actual employment of the mind in playing these roles (*Taetigkeit*). On the basis of this passage, we begin to suspect that Kant could be using the term, *Taetigkeit*, to conceptually characterize the employment of the mind in actually playing particular kinds of roles, and *Handlung* may be conceptually different from *Taetigkeit*. That this is indeed the case can be seen more explicitly as we now explore the meaning of the terms "employment" and "role playing" in the present context.

In the second edition of the first *Critique*, Kant uses the term *Taetigkeit* in a very similar vein. His gloss on the term matches the way he implicitly glossed it in the *Anthropologie* passage discussed in the previous paragraph. Introducing the notoriously difficult idea of self-affection, he says, "*Nun ist das, was, als Vorstellung, vor aller Handlung irgend etwas zu denken, vorhergehen kann, die Anschauung, und, wenn sie nichts als Verhaeltnisse enthaelt, die Form der Anschauung, welche, da sie nichts vorstellt, ausser so fern etwas im Gemuete gesetzt wird, nichts anders sein kann, als die Art, wie die Gemuet durch eigene Taetigkeit, naemlich dieses Setzen seiner Vorstellung…*" (*KrV*, B67-8).[5] As discursive intellects, we receive impressions having their origin outside us in accordance with the forms of our receptivity, space and time,

5 Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998). Henceforth, (*KrV*, A/B) & Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Translated and Edited by Paul Guyer and Allan Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Henceforth (CPR, A/B).

conceived as pure forms of intuitions.[6] Whatever the difficult doctrine of self-affection may signify, *Taetigkeit* is being characterized as the employment of the mind owing to the fact that representations have been posited (*Setzen*) in the mind, or the mind is employed as passively receiving impressions in the form of space and time.

This can be understood as follows: As pure intuitions, space and time make possible a particular set of relations (*Verhaeltnisse*) between impressions as opposed to another set of relations. The particular set of relations is the "positing" (*Setzen*) of the mind where the term "positing" should be understood as the very possibility of passively receiving impressions in spatiotemporal terms. There is a particular set of mutually related elements characterizing the manifold of spatiotemporal representations, and a particular *Taetigkeit* (say, one associated with a discursive intellect having space and time as forms of intuitions) is a particular set of mutually related elements. Thus, the term "*Taetigkeit*" is the actual particular employment of the mind in passively receiving representations in accordance with the forms of space and time (Cf. *KrV*, B67-68, quoted above). We need to say actual "particular" employment because the adjective "particular" indicates the difference between any particular employability of the mind rather than another.

And the mind of any discursive intellect can indeed be employed (*taetig*) in various ways – actively (*handelnd*) combining or separating representations or passively receiving impressions from outside in a set of spatiotemporal relations.[7] Kant describes

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[6] "*Die Faehigkeit, (Rezeptivitaet) Vorstellungen durch die Art, wie wir von Gegenstaenden affiziert werden, zu bekommen, heisst Sinnlichkeit*" (*KrV*, A19/B33) & "*Raum und Zeit sind die reinen Formen derselben, Empfindung ueberhaupt die Materie*" (*KrV*, A42/B60).

[7] In the context, the following *Reflexion* is also relevant: "*Aber die Erscheinungen haben noch eine Form, einen in unserm Subject liegenden Grund, wodurch wir entweder die Eindruecke selbst oder das, was ihnen correspondiert, ordnen und jedem Teile derselben seine Stelle geben. Dieses kann nichts anderes als eine*

the particular abilities of the mind like reason, imagination and apperception as "*taetig.*" Firstly, when Kant says that the deduction would help illuminate reason's (*Vernunft*) "*ganze Feld ihrer zweckmaessig Taetigkeit* (*KrV*, B128)," he is referring to the whole field in which reason can be employed in a goal-oriented way, and not any particular actions of reason. Secondly, in the A-deduction, Kant describes the imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) as a "*taetiges Vermoegen der Synthesis dieses Mannigfaltigen*," and adds that we call apprehension the immediate acting (*Handlung*) of the imagination on perception ("*unmittelbar an den Wahrnehmungen ausgeuebt Handlung ich Apprehension nenne*," *KrV*, A120). In §15 of the B-deduction, Kant characterizes the action of the understanding (*Verstandshandlung*) as the "*Actus seiner Selbsttaetigkeit*" (*KrV*, B130).

In these passages, we find four different terms, which we should clarify in relation to each other: *Handlung*, *Taetigkeit*, *Vermoegen* and *Actus* (to which we add "*Kraft*"): (i) While Kant is not always consistent, it appears that (for the most part) the terms *Actus* and *Handlung* are interchangeable (for an apparent distinction between *Actus* and *Handlung*, see R4631, quoted below). Kant describes the reproductive synthesis of imagination as the transcendental *Handlungen* of the mind (*Gemuet*), and, for this reason, designates it as the "*transzendentale Vermoegen der Einbildungskraft*" (*KrV*, A102). Immediately thereafter, discussing the synthesis of recognition, he claims that the synthesis of reproduction is an *Actus* (*KrV*, A103), suggesting that the terms "*Handlung*" and "*Actus*" could be considered interchangeable since they can both be used to designate synthesis, whether reproductive synthesis or synthesis of recognition. The terms "*Handlung*" and "*Kraft*" are also interchangeable. In a *Reflexion*, Kant says --,

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Taetigkeit sein, die zwar natuerlich durch die Eindruecke erregt wird, aber doch fuer selbst erkannt werden kann" (AA XVII: 4634, 1772)

"*Vermoegen und Kraft:* potentia und actus. *Die Kraft handelt, das Vermoegen nicht*" (AA XVII: R3584, late in silent decade or early 1780s). If the terms "*Kraft*" and "Actus" can be used as synonyms and (as we have seen) the terms "Actus" and "*Handlung*" are interchangeable, then the terms "*Kraft*" and "*Handlung*" can also be seen as interchangeable. (ii) The distinction between *Handlung* and *Taetigkeit* appears yet again in the above passages. The former designate actions or acting while the latter designates the particular employment of the mind: the employment of the understanding (which could consist of many kinds of actions) characterizes a discursively cognizing subjectivity (*Selbsttaetigkeit*) instead of any other kind of subjectivity; or, we can apprehend when the imagination has been employed in actively combining representations into an image. We will return to this distinction in a fuller way once we have characterized the concept of *Handlung* in detail, but before that (iii) we need to explore the distinction between *Taetigkeit* and *Vermoegen*.

In a *Reflexion* devoted to explicating the category of modality, Kant clearly makes a distinction between *Taetigkeiten* and *Vermoegen* (or what is the same thing, "*Faehigkeiten,*" Cf. *KrV*, A19/B33; AA IX: 40). He says that the categories of possibility, reality and necessity are not metaphysical but logical predicates. Having merely logical status, these categories do not enable us to cognize the things themselves (*Sachen (etwas anderes*)), but only the relation (*Verhaeltnis*) of the concepts of these things to the ability (*Vermoegen*) of the mind to combine (or set apart) representations. The category of possibility relates representations to the ability (*Vermoegen*) of the mind; the category of reality (*Wirklichkeit*) relates representations to the operation or employment (*Taetigkeit*)

of the mind; and, finally, the category of necessity relates representations to the "*Taetigkeit, deren Gegenteil nicht in unserm Vermoegen ist*."[8]

In this *Reflexion*, *Vermoegen*, as ability of the mind, designates the general horizon (*horizont*) of possible cognizing.[9] Irrespective of whether I can presently cognize a particular object or not, I can potentially cognize it because it falls within the horizon of my cognizing ability. A representation can be characterized as real if, at any given point of time, it relates to the employment of the mind vis-à-vis that representation. Alternatively said, if I am aware of any particular representation at time, *t*, then my mind is employed (*taetig*) in perceiving that representation. Hence, *Taetigkeit* characterizes, as already indicated, the employment of the mind when cognizing a representation. Finally, a representation can be considered necessary if we cannot represent the opposite, or that the mind cannot be so employed (*taetig*) as to represent its opposite. And such a representation is to be considered impossible as it lies outside the horizon of our cognizing ability (*Vermoegen*). Compared with the concept of *Vermoegen* as the general horizon of our ability to cognize, the concept of *Taetigkeit* designates the actual employment of the mind within the realm of its abilities (*Vermoegen*). At time, *t*, if my mind considers a representation "real" or "necessary," it is employed in particular ways, or, more specifically, it is employed in applying the categories. But it can only be so

[8] "*Moeglichkeit, Wirklichkeit und Notwendigkeit sind zwar logische, aber keine metaphysische Praedicate, d. i. Bestimmungen. Wir erkennen dadurch nicht die Sachen (etwas anderes), sondern das Verhaeltnis ihrer Begriffe zum Vermoegen des Gemuets, zu setzen und aufzuheben. 1) Das Verhaeltnis zum Vermoegen (Moeglichkeit), 2) zur Taetigkeit, 3) zur Taetigkeit, deren Gegenteil nicht in unserm Vermoegen ist*" (AA XVIII: R5228, 1773-8).

[9] In the *Jaesche Logik*¸ in the context of talking about perfecting or expanding our cognition, Kant says that it is good to make an estimate as to how far our cognition agrees with our ends and capabilities. For this, he says, we require reflection (*Ueberlegung*) in order to determine the "*horizont unserer Erkenntnis*." The horizon (*horizont*) is determined "*logisch, nach dem Vermoegen oder den Erkenntniskraeften in Beziehung auf das Interesse des Verstandes* (AA IX: 40). In this passage, Kant is talking of the logical horizon as the relationship between our abilities and the goals of understanding. Yet, we could think of the word "horizon" as relating to the "*Vermoegen*" themselves, for these, too, form horizons of what we are capable of doing and being.

employed within the confines of its general ability to cognize, and, in this case, within the confines of the general horizon of a discursive ability to understand. Hence, the concept, *Taetigkeit*, seems to mark the employment of the general abilities (*Vermoegen*) of the mind, whether the imagination or the understanding. It is the general possibility for the discursive mind to be employed whether actively or passively. It is the employment of abilities like the imagination or the understanding, but it can also indicate the fact that the mind is receptive, or pre-set (*setzen*) in such a way that it receives impressions in a spatiotemporal way. The difference between the active and passive, then, lies in the fact that the latter is not associated with power or *Handlung* and yet it is an employment of the mind. And we have seen that abilities (*Vermoegen*) are more associated with *Handlung*. Hence, the term "*Taetigkiet*" can be seen as different from both "*Handlung*" and "*Vermoegen*."

(b) We know *prima facie* that *Handlung* designates action or acting while *Taetigkeit* designates the actual particular employment of the mind. Let us now explore the validity the concept of *Handlung*, but we will return to the *Handlung*-*Taetigkeit* distinction in (c) below.

In the *Reflexionen*, Kant says,

"*Die logischen Handlungen sind actus, wodurch wir die Data zu Vorstellungen der Dinge respective gegen einander setzen und ordnen. Dadurch bekommen die Vorstellungen logische Functionen. Die reale Function besteht in der Art, wie wir eine Vorstellung an und fuer sich selbst setzen; also ist es eine Handlung (a priori), welche jeglichem dato (a posteriori) correspondiert und wodurch dieses zum Begriffe wird. Diese Handlungen sind die Quellen, woraus die logischen moeglich sind. Daraus entspringen alle Erkenntnisse, wie wir naemlich*

Data fassen und uns selbst etwas, was Erkenntnis heisst, formieren koennen" (AA XVII: R4631, 1772 or later)

A logical *Handlung* is an action (or set of actions) that make possible the representations of things by ordering or setting (*setzen*) the "data" vis-à-vis each other and, thus, constituting the thing. On the other hand, a real *Handlung* makes possible or posits (*setzen*) the very possibility of representation *as* representation, "in and for itself," and hence paves the way for concept formation and cognition of things (and, as we will see, even the very possibility of spatiotemporal ordering). It appears that things are complex but ordered sets of representations; and two different sorts of *Handlungen* are required for cognition of things like tables and chairs to be made possible. One sort of action provides the representations as representations of one kind rather than another, the other sort orders the representations; and former (real) are required for the latter (logical) to be possible. In relation to the term "*Handlung*," then, we can distinguish two senses of the term "*setzen*:" the real *Handlung* posits (*setzen*) or makes possible representation as representation while the logical *Handlung* orders the representations by "setting" or ordering (*setzen*) them in relation to each other.[10] But what exactly is the relationship between "data" and the real *Handlungen*? What is the difference between "data" and "representations"?

The key to answering such questions lies in another related *Reflexion*. Kant makes a distinction between *Vorstellungen* and *Eindruecke*, the latter term finding a place in the

[10] Wolfgang Carl explores the distinction between *reale* and *logische Handlungen* in his work, *Der Schweigende Kant: Die Entwuerfe zu einer Deduktion der Kategorien vor 1781* (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 58-60. This is not surprising because he gives much importance to the notes from the silent decade, and, as will already have been noticed, my own use of this distinction rests on *Reflexionen* from the same period. I am only interested in these *Reflexionen* because (i) I believe they are consistent with Kant's statements in the first *Critique*, and, further, (ii) can illuminate the obscurities of Kant's general critical position.

first *Critique* in this distinction between sensible intuition (or, the appearances as spatiotemporal intuitions) and the "*Eindruecke der Rezeptivitaet*" (*KrV*, A68/B93). Kant makes a similar distinction between *Vorstellung* and *Eindruecke* in the following *Reflexion*, as relating to the ability to understand and not the reception of impressions.

"*Der Verstand gibt den Eindruecken das Logische, d. i. das Gemeingiltige, d. i. die Funktion des Praedicats zu einem moeglichen Urteile. Aber dadurch formt er nur Vorstellungen zu Begriffen. Macht er nicht auch welche? Die Eindruecke sind noch nicht Vorstellungen, denn diese muessen auf etwas anderes bezogen werden, welches eine Handlung ist. Nun ist die Reaction des Gemuets (der Rueckschlag) eine Handlung, welche sich auf den Eindruck bezieht, und wenn sie allein genommen wird, nach ihren besondern arten Kategorien heissen*" (AA XV: R413, difficult to date but in the silent decade, 1770s).

Akin to Humean impressions, impressions (*Eindruecke*) are not to be considered representations (*Vorstellungen*). In the passage quoted, impressions cannot be considered representations (*Vorstellungen*) because impressions need to be related to something else in order to qualify as representations. In other words, bare impressions cannot qualify as representations for a discursively cognizing mind unless these impressions are related to something "in" the mind, or the mind itself. And Kant defines a *Handlung* as being the very relation of the mind in relation to impressions (*auf etwas bezogen werden*). It is *in* the relationship of mind and impression that a *Handlung is*. A stone, for instance, cannot act (*handeln*) on impressions in the way a discursive intellect can. Taken by itself as a concept, the *Handlung* that makes possible the transmutation of impressions into representations is the pure category (AA XV: R413). If real *Handlungen* make possible representations *as* representations and pure categories are the particular relationship *de*

jure between the discursively cognizing mind and the impressions it receives in its own particular way, then categories are cases of real *Handlung*.[11]

In what way, then, can these representations be related to the mind? Kant's answer seems to be: the mind acts in reacting, as it were ("*die Reaction des Gemuets (der Rueckschlag)*"), to these impressions in its own unique way, and, in the process, the action of the mind makes possible either the transmutation of these impressions into representations or the transmutation of the representations into cognition, depending on how we interpret the role of the categories (in the passage we are discussing, Kant seems to be favoring the former option). In other words, the mind "reacts" by acting, or acts by reacting, which rehearses Kant's oft-quoted thesis that concepts without intuitions are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind on the more fundamental theoretical level of the relationship between the mind and impressions. Irrespective of the question whether the understanding relates directly to impressions or not, we can certainly say that the categories can be described in terms of real and logical *Handlungen*. This is not merely interpretively important in the context of my argument, but can illuminate the notion of category itself. In the first *Critique*, Kant describes pure *a priori* concepts as "*Handlungen des reinen Denkens*," which are neither empirical nor aesthetical (*KrV*, A57/B81). If we interpret categories as real *Handlungen* that posit representations as representations and as logical *Handlungen* that have pre-set the order of representations

[11] At present, I am ignoring the difficult problem of the extent to which the understanding can (or cannot) relate directly to impressions. Broadly, there can be two views on the question: the categories do relate to the impressions in some way if we accept the primacy of the understanding in the B deduction of the first *Critique*; but if we accept the view that categories can only be applied to impressions that have been spatiotemporally synthesized, then this reflection would have to be jettisoned. We do not need to worry about this problem at present because all we need to know is that the categories are real *Handlungen* that make possible representations as representations, whether these "representations" are intuitions or concepts should not matter (Cf. *KrV*, A 320/B377, where both concepts and intuitions are said to be representations).

vis-à-vis each other, then we can view categories as "actions" (*Handlungen*) without provoking any incredulity.

Hence, the representations, which the discursive intellect gains in the face of impressions, require the action (*Handlung*) of the mind. From the two passages quoted above (R4631 & R413, quotes on pages 18 & 19 above), we can interpretively gather the following conclusions: (i) The real *Handlungen* can be seen as the acting as reaction of the mind that makes possible representation *as* representation, and make for the very possibility of logical ordering, and, hence, all logical *Handlungen* are real *Handlungen* but not all real *Handlungen* need be logical. (ii) The logical *Handlung* "orders" representations such that the cognition of things is made possible, and, associated with the faculty of the understanding, logical *Handlungen* order impressions (or representation, as the case may be) for the sake of predication in a possible judgment (R4631).

In this context, it is essential to note that the real-logical *Handlung* distinction relates not only to the faculty of the understanding and but also to sensibility. In fact, as we will now learn, the distinction between logical and real *Handlungen* in relation to the understanding (R413) is only a case of a general distinction between logical and real *Handlung*.

What does Kant mean when he says that "*Der Verstand gibt den Eindruecken das Logische…*" (AA XV: R413, 1770s)? In the *Reflexionen*, he defines logical form (*logische Form*) as "*eben das fuer die Verstandesvorstellungen von einem Dinge, was Raum und Zeit fuer die Erscheinungen derselben sind; naemlich jene enthalten die Stellen, sie zu ordnen*" (AA XVII: R4629, 1772 or later). In other words, there is an

analogy between the forms of intuitions, space and time, and the function of the understanding. Space and time are forms in accordance with which appearances are given as ordered for the discursive intellect. Similarly, the ordering of the understanding makes possible the perception (or possibly the understanding only gets involved in cognition) of a thing *as* ordered set of representations for the discursive intellect. The analogous roles of the forms of intuition vis-à-vis appearances and the understanding vis-à-vis the perception (or cognition) of things helps in interpreting the distinction between logical and real *Handlung* because Kant does speak of the notion of *Handlung* with respect to the forms of intuitions, space and time. He says,

> *Wenn wir in den Raum und in die Zeit etwas setzen, so handeln wir; wenn wir es neben- und nacheinander setzen, so verknuepfen wir. Diese Handlungen sind nur Mittel, jene Stellen zu Stande zu bringen; aber man kann sie besonders nehmen. Wenn wir einerlei etliche Mal, oder in der einen Handlung zugleich die andere setzen, so ist dieses eine Art von Handlungen, dadurch wir etwas der Regel der Erscheinungen gemaess setzen, wobei dieses Setzen seine besondere Regel haben muss, die von den Bedingungen der Form, wie sie in Ansehung der Erscheinung zu stellen sind, unterschieden ist* (AA XVII: R4634, 1772 or later).

In this rather obscure passage, we can nevertheless clearly see that Kant distinguishes two kinds of *Handlungen* – actions that posit (*handeln*) and actions that combine (*verknuepfen*). The former make possible or posits representations *as* representations (*Stellen zu Stande zu bringen*), and the latter are only means (*Mittel*) for setting something next-to- or one-after-another.

We have seen that Kant defines real and logical *Handlung* with respect to the understanding in the following way: a real *Handlung* makes possible representations *as* representations, and a logical *Handlung* is analogous to the logical actions of combining

representations vis-à-vis each other. We now learn that there is a distinction between real and logical *Handlung* with respect to the forms of intuitions, space and time, as well – there is an action (*Handlung*) required for positing (*setzen*) something in space and time and there is an action (*Handlung*) that ties together that which has been posited either next to each other or one after the other (*verknuepfen*). But this seems like a contradiction. The discursive subject is supposed to passively (*leidend*) receive impressions in the form of space and time, but actively (*handelnd*) exert its abilities. How can we, then, speak of *Handlungen* in relation to the forms of intuition, space and time, which form the condition for the possibility of passive receptivity? Could we classify the forms of intuition as active (*handelnd*) powers of the mind that nevertheless form the conditions for the possibility of the mind's receiving possibilities?

We can answer in the affirmative if we read the relevant passage more closely. We can then interpret Kant's view (though carelessly articulated) in the following way. When the discursive subject consciously posits (*setzen*) something in space and time, it is consciously giving spatial or temporal form to something non-spatial and non-temporal – for instance, when she draws a triangle on paper, or sets something to music, etc. In such instances, the actions of positing and the ordering of the posited can be viewed as conceptually separable (eg. I decide to draw as triangle (posit in space), but I could draw many different types of triangles, each drawn differently from the other (logical ordering)). But when *appearances* (*Erscheinungen*) are supposed to be posited in the form of space and time, says Kant, both these actions, *Handlung* and *Verknuepfung*, must take place concomitantly. It is obscure how these new kinds of *Handlungen* through which we posit something in accordance with the rule of appearances (*dadurch wir etwas*

der Regel der Erscheinungen gemaess setzen) differs from the conditions of the form of space and time, or how these data are supposed to be posited in appearance. And yet, it is clear that something received as appearance comes concomitantly as posited and ordered, which is different from the discursive subject's conscious positing and ordering something in space or time. Hence, the passively received representations in the spatiotemporal form can be characterized as a *Handlung*, just the way the pure categories can be characterized as *Handlungen* even if they are not consciously posited (though they can also be consciously applied).[12] Hence, the sensibility of the discursive intellect can also be characterized in terms of *Handlung*.

It is interpretively significant that Kant adheres to the distinction between real and logical *Handlung* in the first *Critique*, which is perhaps the most important work he himself published. A real *Handlung*, Kant says in the *Reflexionen* I have quoted, is *a priori*, makes possible or posits representations *as* representations, or the very fact that the discursive intellect has one kind of representation and not another, and is required if we are to eventually gain concepts ("*es eine Handlung (a priori), welche jeglichem dato (a posteriori) correspondiert und wodurch dieses zum Begriffe wird*" (R4631, quoted above). Such a *Handlung* is the basis for (*wodurch*) logical *Handlungen* that make concepts possible. Concomitantly, he says that the action that makes possible representations out of impressions is an active reaction (or reactive action) of the mind, a "*Rueckschlag*" (R413, quoted above). If a real *Handlung* as *a priori* action is viewed as reacting in the face of impressions and makes representations *as representations* possible; if there is a distinction between logical and real *Handlungen* related to the understanding

[12] For more on the relationship between real and logical *Handlungen* and the extent to which these are "*willkuerlich*," see pp. 28-9 below.

and the *Handlungen* in accordance with which something is posited as a spatiotemporal appearances (including both actions of positing and ordering occurring simultaneously): -- then we should be able to characterize both the pure categories and the pure intuitions of space and time as real *Handlungen*.

In the first *Critique,* Kant does indeed (in my view) characterize space, time and the categories in a way that *matches* his characterization of real *Handlungen* in the *Reflexionen,* although he does not employ the terms "real" and "logical" to distinguish the two kinds of *Handlungen*. The forms of intuition, space and time, he says, contain (*enthalten*) a manifold of pure intuition *a priori*, and belong to the receptivity of the mind that makes possible our being able to have (*empfangen*) representations in the first place.[13] On the other hand, the "spontaneity of thinking" makes synthesis possible, which Kant defines as a "*Handlung*" that consists of the acts of having "*durchgegangen, aufgenommen, und verbunden*" any manifold of intuitions.[14] Further, he makes a distinction between synthesis and pure synthesis. "*Ich verstehe aber unter Synthesis in der allgemeinsten Bedeutung die Handlung, verschiedene Vorstellungen zu einander hinzutun, und ihre Mannigfaltigkeit in einer Erkentnnis zu begreifen. Eine solche Synthesis ist rein, wenn das Mannigfaltige nicht empirisch, sondern a priori gegeben ist (wie das im Raum und der Zeit*)" (*KrV,* A77/B103; also see B145 where Kant similarly speaks of the "*Handlung des Subjekts*").

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[13] "*Raum und Zeit enthalten nun ein Mannigfaltiges der reinen Anschauung a priori, gehoeren aber gleichwohl zu den Bedingungen der Rezeptivitaet unseres Gemuets, under denen es allein Vorstellungen von Gegenstaenden empfangen kann, die mithin auch den Begriff derselben jederzeit affizieren muessen*" (*KrV*, A77/B102).

14 "*Allein die Spontaneitaet unseres Denkens erfordert es, dass diese Mannigfaltige zuerst auf gewisse Weise durchgegangen, aufgenommen, und verbunden werde, um daraus eine Erkenntnis zu machen. Diese Handlung nenne ich Synthesis*." (*KrV*, A77/B102)

In my view, the concept of pure synthesis is analogous to the notion of *Handlung* (real and logical). A real *Handlung* is the *a priori* (and unique) way of acting in the face of empirical impressions (or the empirical manifold) such that it corresponds to the way the mind reacts by acting in its own particular way. How the mind reacts is not given in that which the mind does not itself create, or that which comes from outside it. Similarly, the synthesis of "pure" synthesis, whether of space, time or the understanding, is not given in that which comes from the outside, but constitutes a form to which the data from outside must conform if the discursive intellect is to be able to represent (and cognize) at all. In other words, we have the following picture: if we assume that categories do not directly organize impressions but turn spatiotemporal appearances into empirical cognition, then the forms of space and time as real *Handlungen* make representations of appearance possible and the real *Handlungen* relating to the categories make possible cognition.

Thus, the *a priori* forms of space and time and the pure categories are real *Handlungen* that make for the minimal basic conditions that posits a representation *as* representation (whether as appearance or cognition), and, thus, characterizes the discursively cognizing subject. And "form," as Kant says in various places but explicitly in the *Jaesche Logik*, can be characterized as that without which a cognition cannot possibly be a cognition for a discursively cognizing subject.[15]

It is unimportant whether categories relate directly to impressions or only to a spatiotemporal manifold because the fact that the category is not already given in the

[15] "*Um diese Wichtige Frage entscheiden zu koennen, muessen wir das, was in unserem Erkenntnisse zur Materie desselben gehoert und auf das Object sich bezieht, von dem, was die blosse Form, als diejenige Bedingung betrifft, ohne welche ein Erkenntnis gar kein Erkenntnis ueberhaupt sein wuerde, wohl unterscheiden*" (*Jaesche Logik*, AA IX 50).

data, which the subject has not created herself, makes it a posit of the subject. Hence, we can say that the category plays a role in positing a representation *as* representation because cognitions are ultimately representations in Kant's epistemology. In the same way, the forms of space and time can be considered "*Handlungen*" despite the fact these are instrumental in making the reception of impressions possible because they are not given in the impressions themselves, and can be seen as posits of the subject, even if posits responsible for how the subject receives impressions. Hence, real *Handlungen* are posits of the subject; and space, time and the categories can all be classified as real *Handlungen*.

Just as the faculty of understanding has two types of *Handlungen*, real and logical, we have seen that in the case of the forms of intuition, space and time, there are two kinds of *Handlungen* that must occur concomitantly for appearances to be possible, "*Handlung*" and "*Verknuepfung*." We have seen that real *Handlungen* make possible the positing of representations *as* representation (whether spatiotemporal representation or cognition), and logical *Handlungen* (or "*Verknuepfung*") order representations vis-à-vis each other, whether next to each other (space), one after another (time) or put representations together in terms of quantity, quality, relation or modality (categories). And we have seen that, in the final analysis, the term "*Handlung*" (including real and logical *Handlungen*) can be described as the possibility of acting (actively reacting or reactively acting) in general (*ueberhaupt*) in the face of data from outside itself, and then divided in functional terms into real *Handlungen* (that posit representations as representations) and logical *Handlungen* (that order representations vis-à-vis each other). Space, time and the categories are *Handlungen* to the extent they are all posits of the

subject and make representation as representation possible; but differs in the mode in which it logically orders its data.

Having explicated real *Handlungen*, let us now explore the notion of logical *Handlung* in more textual detail. In the *Reflexionen*, "*verknuepfen*" has the same meaning irrespective of whether it relates to the forms of intuition or to the understanding: putting together representations next to each other or following each other (if it is in relation to the forms of intuition) or putting together representations of a cognizable object vis-à-vis each other (if it is in relation to the function of the understanding, and characterized as logical *Handlung*). In the Schematism part of the first *Critique*, Kant defines the notion of "*verknuepfen*" in the same way he does in the *Reflexionen*. "*Verknuepfung* (nexus)" is the synthesis of the manifold of representations to the extent these belong necessarily to each other (accident to substance, etc.), and refer to the *a priori* combination of heterogeneous representations. It is "dynamic" because it concerns the "*Verbindung des Daseins des Mannigfaltigen.*" And appearances (*Erscheinung*) require such "*verknuepfung*" in the same general way as the understanding requires it.[16]

In this passage in the Schematism, Kant also says something significant about the notions of "*Handlung*" and "V*erknuepfung*." He says that "*verknuepfen*" as combination is not free (*willkuerlich*) (*KrV*, B201-2n). This seems to be true of both types of actions, "*Handlung*" and "V*erknuepfung*." These "*Handlungen*" are simply the acting of the mind as reacting to a manifold of impressions (or representations) in its own particular way,

16 "*Alle Verbindung (conjunctio) ist entweder Zusammensetzung (compositio) oder Verknuepfung (nexus)…Die zweite Verbindung (nexus) ist die Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen, so fern es notwendig zu einander gehoert, wie z. B. das Akzidenz zu irgend einer Substanz, oder die Wirkung zu der Ursache, -- mithin auch als ungleichartig doch a priori verbunden vorgestellt wird, welche Verbindung, weil sie nicht willkuerlich ist, ich darum dynamisch nenne, weil sie die Verbindung des Daseins des Mannigfaltigen betrifft (die wiederum in die physische der Erscheinung unter einander…*" (*KrV*, B201-2n)

and the discursively cognizing subject has no choice on the question of whether or not she wishes to act/react in such and such a way. In logical *Handlungen* or *Verknuepfungen*, there is no such choice (*Willkuer*) for the subject either. In other words, neither type of action need be necessarily self-consciously directed (*willkuerlich*) by the discursive intellect. The real *Handlungen* of the understanding and those related to the forms of intuition are to be considered *a priori*, for these actions make possible representations *as* representations peculiar to the discursive intellect. The discursive intellect formulates objects by acting in reaction to (*Reaktion auf*, AA XV: R413, quoted above) the impressions (or representations, in the case of the categories) she encounters vis-à-vis herself, and faced with such impressions, she has no choice but to react by acting in her own characteristic way. To put the matter more simply: the discursive subject does not choose its own way of positing representation either in exerting its powers or its positing the mode of receiving its impressions (real *Handlungen* related to space, time and the categories) or in ordering impressions (or representations) vis-à-vis each other, the fact that the subject cannot order impressions such that they are not in accordance with the forms of space and time or order representations that not in sync with the categories (logical *Handlungen* related to space, time and the categories). Hence, both real and logical *Handlungen* can be considered "*unwillkuerlich*." (Of course, as we had briefly seen earlier (p. 17 above) and would see in greater detail in the following sections, real and logical *Handlungen* can also be consciously directed by the discursive intellect, see especially sections III and IV below).

In sum, in making the distinction between logical and real actions (*Handlungen*), Kant distinguishes logical *Handlungen* which order and arrange impressions (or

representations) vis-à-vis each other from real *Handlungen* which are actions that make possible representations *as* representations. The real and logical *Handlungen* relating to space, time and the categories are required for the very possibility of cognition, and real *Handlungen* are prior to logical *Handlungen*. Even though (i) as real *Handlungen*, space and time work upon impressions and categories (probably) upon spatiotemporal representations and (ii) as logical *Handlungen*, the mode of ordering of space, time and the categories is entirely different, the three modes of representation – space, time and the categories – can be characterized as *Handlungen* (the very possibility of acting in general in the face of impressions and representations) and can each be divided into real and logical *Handlungen*. Finally, in a minimal sense, a discursively cognizing subject can neither refuse predication in accordance with the pure categories of the understanding in the sense that it cannot choose to have categories other than the ones allowed her nor can she refuse spatiotemporal perception in the face of impressions; hence, real and logical *Handlungen* are "*unwillkuerlich*."

(c) We have already seen that the concept of "*Vermoegen*" denotes the general horizon of our abilities and the concept of "*Taetigkeit*" denotes the employment of these abilities. But, having now explicated the concept of *Handlung*, we must further explore the distinction between the concepts of "*Handlung*" and "*Taetigkeit*" in order to understand the characteristics of the former term in a fuller way. Until now, we have learnt that we can distinguish between *Taetigkeit* and *Handlung* in the following way: the former designate the employment of the mind, and the latter are related to the power and possibility of acting. In the context of Kant's distinction between real and logical

Handlungen as kinds of *Handlungen* in general (*ueberhaupt*), we should re-formulate the distinction between *Handlung* and *Taetigkeit* in a more differentiated way.

A real *Handlung,* Kant says, is *a priori*, and makes possible representation *as* representation, and is the condition for the possibility of concepts ("*es eine Handlung (a priori), welche jeglichem dato (a posteriori) correspondiert und wodurch dieses zum Begriffe wird*" (R4631, quoted above). In other words, it is the involuntary (*unwillkuerlich*) real *Handlungen* that make concepts possible. Concomitantly, he says that the action that makes possible a representation out of impressions is a reaction of the mind, a "*Rueckschlag,*" (R413, quoted above). In both these passages, Kant seems to be referring to the actual acting or reacting of the discursive intellect, not a static state of mind, and the mind's action in positing something that eventually plays a role in concept-formation is concomitantly actively reacting or reactively acting. In other words, what is *a priori* in the real *Handlung* is the fact *that* the discursive intellect has the power of reactively acting or actively reacting in the face of impressions, which have their origin outside of the subject. It is concomitantly the power of acting and reacting, a power residing in the subject but instantiated in relation to the object, and glossed this way, we can comprehend why Kant characterizes space, time and the categories as real *Handlungen*.

In the concept of real *Handlung*, then, Kant attempts to nominally mark the power of acting (concomitantly reacting in the face of something from outside) that characterizes the discursively cognizing subject as opposed to the particular abilities (*Vermoegen*) of the mind or its employment (*Taetigkeiten*) in tandem with these abilities. A logical *Handlung* can be viewed in a similar way – the ordering of impressions in the

form of space and time and the ordering of representations into empirical cognition by means of the categories. And like real *Handlung*, the term "logical *Handlung*" can be distinguished from "*Taetigkeit*" since the ordering (*setzen*) associated with the latter term denotes employability of the mind and its particular employment at any point of time within the confines of the general abilities (*Vermoegen*) of the mind while the former are specific actions (albeit *unwillkuerlich*) "ordering" (*setzen*) representations in relation to each other.

Finally, we can consider real and logical *Handlungen* as cases of *Handlung*, just the way Kant, in the first *Critique*, thinks of representations in general (*Vorstellung ueberhaupt*) as a general conceptual label required as placeholder in his classificatory scheme (*Stufenleiter*) (*KrV*, A320ff.). We can say, then, that there are different kinds of *Handlungen* (logical or real) and can (at least) interpret the term "*Handlung*" as a conceptual label denoting the power and possibility of acting (actively reacting or reactively acting) in general (*ueberhaupt*) in the face of impressions. Given that Kant thinks of real *Handlungen* as prior to logical *Handlungen* and defines the former in terms of the action (concomitantly reaction) of the mind in the face of impressions, we should think of a real *Handlung* as conceptually marking the actual power of acting (of positing) and the general concept of *Handlung* as merely an empty conceptual label required only so that one could conceptually posit the difference between different kinds of *Handlungen*. By "actual power of acting," I mean the power enabling the mind to act (or react) in the face of impressions or representations.

This power, or real *Handlung*, is different from the general modes of employment (*Taetigkeiten*) of the mind whether in tandem with the various abilities of the mind

(imagination, understanding, etc.) or employment (*Taetigkeit*) when the subject is passive vis-à-vis impressions and receptively gains representations in spatiotemporal form. Different *Taetigkeiten* mean different roles, or modes of employment, and these roles could be diverse – predication through categorization, turning representations into images, receiving impressions – but each of these requires a real *Handlung* as condition for its possibility, the power that makes possible the particular employment (*Taetigkeit*) within the horizon of any given ability (*Vermoegen*). For instance, in forming the different images of a tree and a desk, the imagination is actually employed (*Taetigkeit*) in different ways at particular points of time, but within the horizon of the mind's ability (*Vermoegen*) for imagination; but, in both instances, there could be no employment of the faculty of imagination if it were not for the instantiations of real *Handlungen* (and also logical *Handlungen*) as reacting (*Rueckschlag*) in the face of impressions. Similarly, one could say that the understanding at point x may be employed in predicating reality in relation to an object and, at point y, may be employed in predicating possibility in relation to an object.

Hence, the concept of *Handlung* (including real and logical *Handlungen*) conceptually marks the very possibility of a discursively cognizing subject's power of acting (or reacting) in the face of data from outside itself, and ordering it. We have explicated the notion of "*Handlung*," and now have the means to further explore the concept of spontaneity as "*innere Handlung*."

II

On Spontaneity as "*innere Handlung*"

In this sub-section, I will argue that spontaneity is (i) a real *Handlung*, and the mind's power of acting in general. (ii) This power consists in reacting/acting in its own particular way in the face of representations it can be "affected by" from the outside. (iii) Spontaneity cannot be characterized as an appearance, and (iv) it is intrinsically "*willkuerlich*."

In the *Anthropologie*, Kant defines spontaneity as "*innere Handlung*" (AA VII: 134n). Having explicated the concept of *Handlung* in the previous section, we are now in the position to judge how the word "*Handlung*" is being used to define spontaneity. It is the *a priori* power of the subject metaphorically (or non-spatially) "inside" of her: the power to act (or react) in the face of impressions that do not have their origin in her. We have said that the concept of "*Handlung*" as general power to act (or react) to impressions can be used in relation to the forms of intuition and the understanding, but spontaneity is its own kind of *Handlung*. Kant makes that very clear in the first *Critique*. He says,

"*Wenn eine jede einzelne Vorstellung der andern ganz fremd, gleichsam isoliert, und von dieser getrennt waere, so wuerde niemals so etwas, als Erkenntnis ist, entspringen, welche ein Ganzes verglichener und verknuepfter Vorstellungen ist. Wenn ich also dem Sinne deswegen, weil er in seiner Anschauung Mannigfaltigkeit enthaelt, eine Synopsis beilage, so korrespondiert dieser jederzeit eine Synthesis und die Rezeptivitaet kann nur mit Spontaneitaet verbunden Erkenntnisse moeglich machen*" (*KrV*, A97).[17]

If, says Kant, we were only given individual and isolated representations, we would not be able to cognize. In the context of the way we have conceptualized this function of the

17 Although I quote from the A-deduction, the general characterization of "synthesis," important for the point I am trying to make here, does not change in the B-deduction, although the primacy of the understanding is far more stressed (see B130ff.).

discursive intellect, it means that we would not have representations if it were not for the real "*Handlungen*" related to the forms of intuitions and the understanding, both of which give us representations *as representations*. However, isolated representations cannot by themselves constitute cognition. As related to the forms of space and time, "V*erknuepfung*" is required to set representations next-to- or following-each-other, and logical *Handlungen* related to the understanding are required if any discursive intellect is to be able to put the representations of things vis-à-vis each other.

In the A deduction, Kant distinguishes spontaneity and receptivity. "Synthesis" of the manifold is required if we are to have cognition defined as "compared and combined (*verknuepft*) whole" (*verglichener und verknuepfter Vorstellungen*, A97, quoted above). If synthesis is "*verknuepfen*," then the "synthesis of apprehension" (*KrV*, A98) makes possible the concomitance of objects in space or succession of representations in time; and logical *Handlung*, defined as putting representations of things in relation to each other, makes predication possible. We have seen that receptivity is as much characterized as a "*Handlung*" of the discursive mind to represent impressions as appearances. If "synthesis" relates not only to the sensibility ("*verknuepfen*" in the *Reflexion*, and "*Synopsis*" in the A deduction) but the understanding and receptivity requires spontaneity, then, on the basis of A97, spontaneity can (at the very least) be characterized in terms of binding (*verbundene*) in general or the act of connecting (*Verknuepfung*), and, from the syntax of the sentence, spontaneity seems to be related to the understanding rather than sensibility. While both functions of "H*andlung*" and "*Verknuepfung*" relate to the forms of intuition and the understanding, it appears that the term "spontaneity," when defined as "*innere Handlung*," may be more specifically related to the understanding as

ability of the mind rather than sensibility or receptivity of the mind, except insofar as the spontaneity of the discursive intellect ultimately requires impressions that have their origin outside it.

But what kind of "*innere Handlung*" is spontaneity? Is it logical or real *Handlung*? To begin with, there is ample textual evidence for the idea that spontaneity is the power of acting in a general sense. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says that cognizing requires both concepts and intuitions ("*Es gibt aber, ausser der Anschauung, keine andere Art, zu erkennen, als durch Begriffe* (*KrV*, A68/B93)"), that all intuitions are supposed to require the mind to be affected ("*beruhen auf Affektionen*") and that concepts are related to functions ("*die Begriffe also auf Funktionen*") (Ibid.). A "function" is a mode of the mind for ordering various representations through a unified action (*Einheit der Handlung*), and, hence, says Kant, concepts are related to the spontaneity of thinking, just the way sensible intuitions are related to the receptivity.[18] The mind, thus, is able to perform some kind of unified action (*Handlung*) to "order" various representations, which suggests that (a) the mind requires representations to enable its function of ordering and (b) that concepts required for such ordering are somehow based on the "spontaneity" of thinking, which is related somehow to the notion of acting (*Handlung*).

Further, the notion of spontaneity, when defined in opposition to the notion of receptivity, certainly relates to thinking and the higher powers of the mind, like the understanding or judgment, but it is not as if spontaneity necessarily logically requires receptivity (though discursive spontaneity certainly does). In the "Leningrad *Reflexion* on Inner Sense," characterizing spontaneity, Kant says "[*Ich*] *mir nicht so fern Erscheinung*

18 "*Ich verstehe aber unter Funktion die Einheit der Handlung, verschiedene Vorstellungen unter einer gemeinschaftlichen zu ordnen. Begriffe gruenden sich also auf der Spontaneitaet des Denkens, wie sinnliche Anschauungen auf der Rezeptivitaet der Eindruecke*" (*KrV*, A68/B93).

bin als ich mich selbst durch Vorstellungen aeusserer Sinne afficiert ([dann] diese sind [diese] Vorstellungen [die] von Erscheinungen) denn das ist Spontaneitaet…" (IPQ, XXIX, 253). In this passage, he characterizes spontaneity as the very possibility of being affected by the representations of the outer senses. Similarly, in the first *Critique*, Kant insists that the inner perception of the manifold cannot emerge spontaneously in the mind, or we would have intellectual intuition, the idea that we might be able to create our own representations at will. In order, then, to conceptually limit the reach of spontaneity for the discursively cognizing being (*Wesen*), we need to theoretically posit the concept of receptivity or sensibility.[19] Spontaneity, then, is being characterized, in terms of the possibility of being affected by my outer sense. It is owing to the fact that I *can* act spontaneously that I can be affected by representations that do not have their origin in me but arise outside me, or, alternatively said, that discursive spontaneity is intrinsically relational. Yet, at the same time, intuitions, relating to impressions (*Eindruecke*) and receptivity of the mind, are to be considered prior to thinking ("*vor aller Handlung irgend etwas zu denken*," *KrV*, A49/B67). This suggests, then, that only if there is the possibility of being affected by the representations of outer sense could discursively cognizing beings be seen as possessing spontaneity. And Kant makes that clear in the first *Critique* when he uses the terms "*durchgegangen*" and "*aufgenommen*" when characterizing the spontaneity of thinking, suggesting that the subject has to go through and take something (*etwas*) up, which means that there is something already received in the first place. "*Allein die Spontaneitaet unseres Denkens erfordert es, dass diese Mannigfaltige zuerst auf gewisse Weise durchgegangen, aufgenommen, und verbunden*

19 "*Im Menschen erfordert dieses Bewusstsein* [consciousness of one's self] *innere Wahrnehmung von dem Mannigfaltigen, was im Subjekte vorher gegeben wird, und die Art, wie dieses ohne Spontaneitaet im Gemuete gegeben wird, muss, um dieses Unterschiedes willen, Sinnlichkeit heissen*" (*KrV*, B68).

werde, um daraus eine Erkenntnis zu machen. Diese Handlung nenne ich Synthesis (A77/B102).” In other words, only a mind going through, taking up, and binding representations in a particular way can be said to have spontaneity.

We have seen that (for Kant) appearances concomitantly require two kinds of actions: of positing something as representation in space or time (*handeln*) and the connection between these representations (*verknuepfen*). We have also seen that the discursively cognizing mind is spontaneous to the extent it can be affected by outer sense, and that synthesis corresponds to each “synopsis” of the manifold, and that the “*Handlung*” related to the forms of intuition is prior to the “*Handlung*” related to the understanding (Cf. A49/B67, quoted above). If the spontaneity of discursive subject, by definition, includes (in the last analysis, even if not directly) the possibility of existence of impressions (*Eindruecke*) and the possibility of the discursive intellect to be affected by the representations of outer sense, and, at the same time, appearances (*Erscheinungen*) require both “*Handlung*” and “*Verknuepfung*,” then it seems to be the case that the notions of “*Handlung*” and “spontaneity” have different conceptual contents, or at least, the term “*Handlung*” is being used in a very specific sense with respect to spontaneity. In other words, spontaneity is characterized as “*innere Handlung*” but the term “*Handlung*” is also used when we posit something in space or time; and, hence, we need to specify the kind of *Handlung* associated with spontaneity.

In the Leningrad *Reflexion,* Kant defines receptivity as my being affected by myself (“*ich durch mich selbst afficirt werde*;” also see *KrV*, B67-8 “*wie die Gemuet durch eigene Taetigkeit…affiziert wird*”). If we construe receptivity as the condition for the possibility of appearances for the discursive intellect, then (discursive) spontaneity

relates to the fact that I can be affected by something outside me. In other words, Kant can quite consistently use the terms "*Handlung*" and "*Verknuepfung*" in relation to forms of intuition because receptivity is the particular characteristic of the subject. Just like the subject of (discursive) cognition introduces spontaneity into the process of cognition, as the possibility of being affected from outside, it introduces also receptivity which is the power (*Handlung*) of the mind to be affected by itself (whatever such affection might mean). To put it bluntly, it is a feature of the mind that it can be receptive in the face of impressions from outside itself and receptive such that it can have appearances via real and logical *Handlungen* associated with the forms of intuition, space and time.

Hence, if spontaneity is to be defined as "*innere Handlung*," then the general term "*Handlung*" used in combination with the term "spontaneity" has to include the power of being affected by something from outside, or at least, if there are many kinds of *Handlungen* (as there are, see below), a particular kind is defined as having such a power. In essence, it requires impressions that the subject has herself not created; and it requires the prior possibility of receptivity (since, as we have seen, intuitions are prior to concepts). By definition, then, spontaneity in a discursively cognizing intellect includes the possibility of being affected by representations of outer sense, or, in other words, a discursive spontaneity (as opposed to one with intellectual intuition) is axiomatically relational in the face of representations of receptivity, and, thus, in the last instance, in the face of impressions that have their origin outside it. But this appears to be a kind of "*Handlung*" analogous to the "*Handlung*" that makes possible the positing of representations in space and time. The latter makes possible the positing of representations in space or time, while the *Handlung* associated with spontaneity has to

be such that it includes the possibility of affection of the discursive subject from the outside.

Because the "*Handlung*" that makes spatiotemporal representations *as* representations possible is a real *Handlung*, could we say that the real *Handlung* associated with the understanding makes for spontaneity characterized as including the possibility of being affected by the outer senses? In my view, we can. We have seen that the distinction between logical and real *Handlung* relates to the understanding. If spontaneity is to be opposed to receptivity and if spontaneity is characterized as the possibility of being affected by the impressions of outer sense, then we can gloss the "being affected" as a re-presentation (*Vor-stellung*) of the understanding of the representations it gains from the outside in the form of receptivity where "re-presentation" means "affected in its own way in the face of representations." We have already seen that the understanding posits (*handelt*) and connects (*verknuepft*) in its own way, just as the forms of intuition do, but that the difference lies in the content of "*Handlung*": while the sensibility, as receptivity, relates to the positing and ordering of something in space or time, the understanding, as spontaneity, relates, in part, to the possibility that the discursive intellect can be affected by representations of something from outside itself in the form of receptivity. If concepts without intuitions are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind, then the discursive intellect can only be spontaneously affected by representations from the outer senses in a particular way. In other words, spontaneity involves the possibility of being affected from the outside, but *in a particular way*. Kant characterizes real *Handlung* as "*eine Handlung (a priori), welche jeglichem dato (a posteriori) correspondiert und wodurch dieses zum Begriffe*

wird," and as the "*Rueckschlag*" of the mind. Spontaneity, thus, is (i) the possibility of being affected from the outside by representations already posited in the forms of receptivity (space and time), but (ii) the "being affected" is hardly a passive act (as it is when the mind is merely receptive), but an *a priori* action (*Handlung*) (or reaction) of the mind, an act of its own kind, that makes possible a representation *as* representation. It is the particular mode of acting (*Handlung*) in relation to the representations connected to the understanding, no different from the positing of representation *as* representation (*Handlung*) connected to the receptivity of the mind except that it is actively reacting or reactively acting *in its own way* in the face of representations delivered by the forms of receptivity, space and time.[20]

Thus, the definition of spontaneity has the following features: (i) the power of acting (real *Handlung*) in the face of a manifold of impressions from the outside that have been acted upon by the forms of receptivity (space and time), which (ii) implicitly includes the very possibility of being affected in this way and acting, characterized as reactively acting or actively reacting *in its own way*, or in a spontaneous way; and (iii) such spontaneous acting is related to the understanding rather than sensibility. In other words, spontaneity as "*Handlung*" is a way of acting distinguishable from the "*Handlung*" associated with the forms of intuition. Spontaneity, as real *Handlung*, is, therefore, the mind's power of acting in general, and this power consists in reacting/acting in its own particular way in the face of representations it can be "affected

[20] It is in the context of such a definition that we should understand Sturma's view that the "*Spontaneitaetsgedanken*" is the "*Bedingung der Moeglichkeit der Erfassung von mentalen Daten…ohne selbst ein Datum zu sein*," Sturma, *Kant ueber Selbstbewusstsein: Zum Zusammenhang von Erkenntniskritik und Theorie des Selbstbewusstseins* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1985), 38. This is how we can define spontaneity in a general way; but in what follows, we will see that the concept of spontaneity can be further specified, something Sturma (and other commentators) have ignored.

by" from the outside. Hence, the "*Handlung*" associated with the forms of intuition as real *Handlung* constitutes representations in its own way just as the real *Handlung* associated with spontaneity in its own particular way. In the former case, the "*Handlung*" is responsible for constituting spatiotemporal *representations* in the face of impressions while in the latter case, the "*Handlung*" is responsible for constituting empirical cognition in the face of spatiotemporal representations. The difficult term "impression" may be seen as the conceptual placeholder in the system, marking the fact that something (*etwas*) arises outside the subject as modification of the mind. In my view, the term "impressions" relates to Kant's very complex systematic engagement with the thing in itself, but, at present, this issue has no relevance for this work.

To add the (iv) feature characterizing spontaneity: in the Leningrad *Reflexion* (IPQ, XXIX, 253, quoted above), Kant clearly indicates that spontaneity cannot be an appearance (*Erscheinung*), but simply the power to act, in the mode of thinking, vis-à-vis a spatiotemporally synthesized intuition. Kant defines appearances (*Erscheinung*) as "the undetermined object (*Gegenstand*) of an empirical intuition" (*KrV,* A20/B34). According to Gerold Prauss, appearances relate to objects analogous to the way alphabets relate to the act of reading. Prauss argues that we conceptually determine appearances ("*bestimmen Erscheinungen*") in order to procure (*erzielen*) empirical cognition of objects through these "*Erscheinungen*," but just like alphabets remain un-thematized when we are reading, so appearances (*Erscheinungen*) remain un-thematized in empirical cognition.[21] Spontaneity, however, is not an appearance, but a kind of acting (*Handlung*) that comes into being if any discursively-cognizing subject happens to encounter

21 Gerold Prauss, *Erscheinung bei Kant: Ein Problem der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft"* (*Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, Band* 1, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1971), 49.

spatiotemporal representations whose origins are outside her. Hence, if we were to philosophically characterize rational beings with discursive cognition, that is, requiring both concepts and intuitions, then (discursive) spontaneity, in the most general sense, is the power of being able to act (*handeln*) on the manifold of the intuitions gained from outside the mind. By "acting," we mean not only actions like moving tables, etc., but actively ordering something as something, and, with reference to the discursive subject, it means actively understanding the world by thinking about, and ordering it (as we will see below, Section III). Such acting cannot be characterized as an appearance if appearances (as opposed to things in themselves) require both concepts and intuitions. As the general power of acting upon spatiotemporal representations in its own way, spontaneity cannot itself be an appearance, but the condition for the possibility of the discursive mind to cognize objects. Finally, (v), it is in the nature of the *Handlung* of spontaneity (as opposed to the *Handlung* of receptivity) to be "*willkuerlich*" (as we will see in detail in the next two sections, III and IV). In this trait, it can be differentiated from the *Handlungen* (real and logical) relating to space, time and the categories, each of which are *unwillkuerlich.*

From the above discussion, it is now clear why receptivity and spontaneity can be described in terms of the concept of "*Handlung*" and yet can be distinguished from each other. It appears that the concept of "*Handlung*" denotes the general power of the subject of being affected by something (*etwas*) and taking up something in its own way in an active reacting (or reactive acting). While this concept can be applied not only to spontaneity but receptivity, there are crucial differences. Spontaneity is the power of acting (*Handlung*) such that the subject is affected by, goes through, takes up and binds

spatiotemporal representations in its own (thinking) way. Receptivity, on the other hand, is the possibility of acting (*Handlung*) in its own way, or in the forms of space and time -- which the subject brings to experience and which leads to the curious doctrine of self-affection – in the face of impressions. If spontaneity is actively (and *willkuerlich*) relating to representations, receptivity is the passive taking up of representations in inner sense. The "*Handlung* of spontaneity is opposed to the *Handlungen* relating to the pure categories and those related to space and time as forms of intuition: the former are "*willkuerlich*" and can be willfully employed by the discursive subject (at least within discursive limits) while the latter, as we had seen in the previous section, are "*unwillkuerlich*," or their employment is not subject to the choice of the discursive subject (for example, there is no choice for such a subject but to intuit spatiotemporally or think relationally (category) and so on). And, finally, spontaneity is related to the ability to understand while receptivity is the characteristic of the sensibility of the discursive subject. Hence, even though both these concepts are *Handlungen*, the concepts of spontaneity and receptivity can be distinguished by specifying the kind of *Handlung* relating to each of them.

Having conceptually explicated the specific way in which Kant characterizes spontaneity as "*innere Handlung*," I attempt to analyze his characterization of spontaneity as "reflection" (*Reflexion*), and Kant's characterization of spontaneity as the mind's power of producing representations out of itself, or in its own way ("*Vorstellungen selbst hervorzubringen*," *KrV*, A51/B75).

III

Spontaneity of Judgment

(a) Kant has characterized spontaneity as the "*innere Handlung*" or "*die Reflexion*" (AA VII: 134n, quoted above). If Spontaneity is not only inner *Handlung* but also reflection, what is reflection (*Reflexion*)? To which faculty of the mind does reflection belong?

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant characterizes the role of spontaneity in cognition (*Erkenntnis*) as the mind's power of producing representations out of itself, and equates this with the understanding ("*so ist dagegen das Vermoegen, Vorstellungen selbst hervorzubringen oder die Spontaneitaet des Erkenntnisses, der Verstand*") (*KrV*, A51/B75; *Metaphysik L1*, 1777-80, AA XXVIII: 230). In the Metaphysics lectures from the late-1770s (1777-80), Kant explicates what he means by the mind's power of producing representations out of itself, and in its own way. It means that we can, for instance, mix colors that do not exist in nature if we have a concept of color.[22] In the *Anthropologie*, Kant says, "*Man sieht wohl, dass, wenn das Vermoegen der Erkenntnis ueberhaupt Verstand (in der allgemeinen Bedeutung des Wortes) heissen soll, dieser das Auffassungsvermoegen (*attentio*) gegebener Vorstellungen, um Anschauung, das Absonderungsvermoegen dessen, was mehreren gemein ist (*abstractio*), um Begriff, und das Ueberlegungsvermoegen (*reflexio*), um Erkenntnis des Gegenstandes hervorzubringen, enthalten muesse* (AA VII: 138)". In other words, the faculty of cognition in general, the understanding, would have to contain (*muesse enthalten*): (a) the ability to fasten upon (*auffassen*) given representations in order to gain intuition (*Auffassungsvermoegen* (attentio)); (b) the ability to abstract what is common in things

[22] "*Die Materie und den Stoff muessen uns die Sinne geben, und diese Materie wird durch den Verstand bearbeitet. Was aber die Form der Begriffe anlangt, so ist sie intellectuell. Die erste Erkenntnissquelle liegt also in der Materie, die die Sinne darreichen. Die zweite Erkenntnisquelle liegt in der Spontaneitaet des Verstandes. Wenn der Mensch erst den Stoff hat; so kann er sich immer neue Vorstellungen machen*" (AA XXVIII: 232).

(*Absonderungsvermoegen* (abstracto)) in order to gain concepts; and (c) the "*Ueberlegungsvermoegen* (reflexio)" that makes the cognition of the object possible.

On the basis of the passages cited above, we can derive three claims: (i) reflecting is one feature in the general ability to cognize (or the understanding in the general sense of the word (*allgemeinen Bedeutung des Wortes*), AA VII: 138); (ii) spontaneity is related to the understanding in cognition (*KrV*, A51/B75); (iii) the notion of reflection relates to spontaneity since spontaneity has been defined as "*die Reflexio*." Hence, *prima facie*, we should be able to speak of reflection as the "spontaneity of the understanding."

Before turning to the main task of investigating the concept of "reflection," we require some clarification regarding the term "*auffassung* (attentio)" in the above passage from the *Anthropologie*. Kant uses the term "attentio" to characterize the ability to gain intuitions (*auffassen*) (AA VII: 138 quoted above). In Section II, we have seen that the spontaneous discursive subject does not merely come to be passively affected by, go through, take up and bind representations gained via the receptive forms of space and time, but actively performs all these actions (including the "affected by" which should be seen simply as the general label constituted of the more concrete actions of "going through," "taking up," and "combining" representations in the sense that a discursive spontaneity can be seen as "affected" in its own (thinking) way if it is actively performing these actions). In other words, it means that the understanding actively fastens upon intuitions relevant for its process of thinking from a manifold of spatiotemporal intuitions passively "received" by the discursive subject. Hence, the term "*auffassen* (attentio)" can be translated as active "fastening upon" rather than the passive "apprehension" (*Apprehension*) which Kant associates with the forms of receptivity,

space and time (*KrV*, A97).[23] Further, it is significant that Kant speaks of "*Auffassungsvermoegen*"in the *Anthropologie* passage. If "*Auffassung*" is required to be characterized as ability (*Vermoegen*), then it cannot be equated with apprehension (*Apprehension*) because the latter is passive and relates to the receptive forms of intuition while "*Vermoegen*" are active (*handelnd*) rather than passive (*leidend*) (AA VII: 140, quoted above, Section I, p. 5). Hence, the term "*auffassen* (attention)" must relate to the active "fastening upon" of representations by the understanding, and distinguished from passive apprehension.

We can now return to the task of investigating the concept of reflection. In the *Anthropologie* passage under discussion, the exact role of reflection is unclear. Kant characterizes the "*Ueberlegungsvermoegen* (reflexio)" as making cognition of the object possible.[24] We gain intuitions by fastening upon (*auffassen* (attentio)) representations in a spontaneous way and gain concepts through abstraction, and the question is to specify the exact role of reflection in making cognition possible? Given that concepts can be gained merely through abstraction, reflection might be seen as playing some particular role in the process of understanding that uses concepts; but what role exactly?

Kant's characterization of reflection in other texts, particularly the first *Critique*, seems helpful in this context. He defines reflection (*die Ueberlegung* (reflexio)) in the "Amphiboly" in the context of rejecting both the Leibnizian intellectualization of the senses and the Lockean sensitization of concepts. We do not gain concepts of objects through reflection (which agrees with the *Anthropologie* passage cited in which we are

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[23] In the A deduction, Kant speaks of the "*Apprehension der Vorstellungen, als Modifikationen des Gemuets in der Anschauung…*" (*KrV*, A97), and to the extent intuitions are passive, apprehension should also be considered passive.

24 Terminologically, according to Paul Guyer, "*Ueberlegung*" and "*Reflexion*" are interchangeable terms, see Guyer, *CPR*, p. 366n), and Kant does use them as interchangeable in various places.

supposed to gain concepts through abstraction). Instead, Kant characterizes reflection as "*der Zustand des Gemuets*" and as "*das Bewusstsein des Verhaeltnisses gegebener Vorstellungen zu unseren verschiedenen Erkenntnisquellen, durch welches allein ihr Verhaeltnis unter einander richtig bestimmt werden kann*" (*KrV,* A260/B316). If the goal is the "correct determination (*richtig bestimmt*)" of representations, which Kant affirms, then reflection consists in actions of the mind involved in classifying correctly, and thus ordering, particular representations as aptly belonging to one particular source of cognition or other, whether sensibility or understanding. While some judgments are immediate and require no reflection (habitual judgments or judgments from inclination) and not all judgment require an investigation (that between two points there can only be one straight line exemplifies a proposition about which no further mark of truth can be gained), all judgments, or all comparison, requires reflection which includes not merely "attention to the grounds of truth" (*Aufmerksamkeit auf die Gruende der Wahrheit*) but also distinguishing concepts on the basis of the faculty (*Erkenntniskraft*) to which they may belong (sensibility, imagination, understanding) (*KrV*, A260-1/B316-7, *passim*). For instance, we would be reflecting if we were trying to decide if something is chimerical or real.

It appears then that reflection in general makes possible (i) further marks of truth, and (ii) more specifically, makes this possible by distinguishing concepts in terms of the cognitive power to which they belong ("*Ueberlegung, d. i. einer Unterscheidung der Erkenntniskraft, wozu die gegebenen Begriffe gehoeren*," *KrV*, A261/B317), whether to sensibility or the understanding. Transcendental reflection is a case of reflection in general, and, through such reflection, we can classify representations as belonging to the

sensibility or the understanding; it is a "duty" we have to perform if we have to judge anything about things *a priori* (*KrV,* A263/B319). Before making any objective judgments, Kant says, we make comparisons between the content of concepts, whether things are identical or different, in agreement or opposed, inner or outer, or determinable or determination. In such comparisons, the discursive subject, however, remains unconcerned about classifying representations in terms of the cognitive power to which they belong, and reduces all representations belonging to the mind to being simply representations, as logical reflection does (*KrV,* A262-3/B318-9).

In the *Jaesche Logik,* Kant makes a similar distinction between transcendental and logical reflection, except that he characterizes logical reflection more clearly (AA, IX: 40, 73, 76, 93-4). Universal logic, he says, does not have to investigate the source of concepts or how they arise, but merely *how given representations become concepts in thought*; these concepts, moreover, may contain something that is derived from experience, or something invented, or borrowed from the nature of the understanding. "*Dieser logische Ursprung der Begriffe - der Ursprung ihrer bloßen Form nach - besteht in der Reflexion, wodurch eine mehreren Objecten gemeine Vorstellung (conceptus communis) entsteht, als diejenige Form, die zur Urtheilskraft erfordert wird. Also wird in der Logik bloß der Unterschied der Reflexion an den Begriffen betrachtet*" (AA, IX: 94). Thus, all judgment and all comparison requires reflection, or in general, the correct determination or ordering of representations. This ordering may aid logical understanding by classifying representations as empirical, a priori or invented, or it may aid correct transcendental *a priori* understanding of objects as either belonging to the understanding or sensibility. Both logical and transcendental reflection, however, are higher level

reflection in the sense that they aid the higher forms of self-knowledge, but Kant's definition of reflection in the *Anthropologie* should be seen as characterizing reflection in general as the ordering of representations in a judgment in the correct way in any simple act of cognition (Cf. AA VII: 138, quoted above, p. 37). If "*Auffassung* (attentio)" bring intuitions into the process of thinking and "abstractio" makes possible concepts by enabling the mind to mark what is common in things, then "reflexio" orders the representations that go into making any particular cognition in the correct way. Therefore, the act of reflecting includes both empirical concept formation and higher level empirical thinking.

And reflection is an action (*Handlung*) within the horizon (*Horizont*) of the general ability of reflecting (*Ueberlegungsvermoegen*). In the present context, it is significant that Kant characterizes transcendental reflection as a "*Handlung*" (*KrV*, A261/B317). If transcendental reflection is a case of reflection in general, which latter includes all judgments or all comparison, and transcendental reflection can be characterized as "*Handlung*," then reflection in general can be described as "*Handlung*." It is an action through which a discursive subject can order representations vis-à-vis each other, and in the "correct" way. Kant also defines reflection as "the consciousness" of the relation of representations to their cognitive source, and, hence, the relationship between representations, and as a "state of mind" in the "Amphiboly," but I will not spend time analyzing these characterizations since I need only to show two things, that (i) reflection is a type of *Handlung*, and that all judgment (or comparison) requires reflection in order to "correctly" determine the relation of representations in any given state of mind, and that (ii) transcendental reflection is a particular kind of reflection, a higher level

philosophical reflection, though still a case of reflection in general. Reflection, then, orders representations in the right way, and thus forms the third part of the general ability to understand, apart from "attentio" and "abstractio." But now the question is: if reflection orders (or strives to order) representations in the right way, what exactly does it do, how does it act (*handeln*)? The answer lies in Kant's characterization and relating of thinking, reflecting and the general task of the faculty of the understanding.

In the *Reflexionen*, Kant says that the understanding consists in different kinds of "*Handlungen*," some that bring representations under concepts and others that enable our "thinking" about the very thing we have brought under concepts. "*Einige Handlungen des Verstandes gehen bloss darauf, eine objective Ordnung unter die Begriffe zu bringen, andere die Handlungen, wodurch man durch dieselben Dinge denkt*" (AA XV: R401, 1772-5). In other words, there are many actions of the understanding, some that make possible empirical concepts, and others that connect concepts in empirical thinking in general maxims, or natural-scientific laws. If real *Handlung* denotes the action that makes possible the very existence of concepts, or the very process of thinking (Section I above), and reflection orders representations vis-à-vis each other into empirical concepts or higher-level empirical thinking, we can argue that the two roles of the understanding, concept formation and empirical understanding, are made possible by logical *Handlungen*.

This seems to be especially the case if we read it in combination with the passage from the *Anthropologie* (Cf. AA VII: 138, quoted above, p. 37). The understanding (considered in the general sense as the ability to cognize) needs to "fasten upon" (*auffassen* (attentio)) in its own active and spontaneous (thinking) way, and that requires

that the discursive subject passively "apprehend" impressions through the *Handlungen* (real and logical) associated with space and time, or, the "*Handlung des Subjekts*," as Kant calls it in the first *Critique*. In Section II, we have seen that the *Handlungen* associated with spontaneity forms the condition for the possibility of the discursive subject "going through" and "taking up" of spatiotemporal representations *in its own way*. The "in its own way" can only be glossed as the subject's "going through" (*durchgegangen*) and "taking up" (*aufnehmen*) of spatiotemporal representations into the process of thinking. Such an interpretation makes sense if we take into account the fact that we can imagine another kind of spontaneous "taking up" of spatiotemporal representations if the subject (*Wesen*) were not characterized by a discursive (human) intellect. Or, alternatively stated, we can imagine subjects with intellectual intuition that may be rational, but do not need the spontaneity of thinking. Such subjects would not need to "go through" (*durchgehen*) and "take up" (*aufnehmen*) spatiotemporal representations into the process of thinking.

We have seen that there are three sorts of *Handlungen* associated with the spontaneity of thinking (*Spontaneitaet des Denkens*) -- *durchgegangen, aufgenommen, und verbunden* (Cf. *KrV*, A77/B102, quoted above). The *Handlungen* of "going through" and "taking up" make possible the induction of spatiotemporal representations into the process of thinking, and, hence, can be seen as real *Handlungen* uniquely characterizing the discursive subject's ability to act spontaneously in the face of representations *in its own way* (or, in the mode of going through and taking up representations). Apart from these real *Handlungen*, the "spontaneity of thinking" requires the *Handlung* of combining (*verbinden*), and these *Handlungen* can be seen as logical *Handlungen*. It is owing to the

logical *Handlungen* constituting the spontaneity of thinking that the discursive subject can actively combine and order representations. And the combining and ordering for the sake of the "correct determination" of the relationship between representations, or reflection in general, should be thought of as logical *Handlungen*. Hence, we can characterize the ability to reflect (*Ueberlegungsvermoegen*) as constituted of logical *Handlungen* that are engaged in the process of deliberating or thinking about representations that have their origin outside the subject.

In sum, the *Handlungen* of "going through" (*durchgehen*) and "taking up" (*aufnehmen*) spatiotemporal intuitions (themselves gained through *Handlungen* (real and logical) associated with space and time) constitute the real *Handlungen* of the spontaneity of thinking, and, given such real *Handlungen*, the exercise of logical *Handlungen* of combining and ordering (*verbinden*) makes possible empirical thinking and deliberating.

(b) Kant calls the understanding the faculty of thinking, the representation of something (*etwas*) using concepts.[25] We have seen that reflecting, too, relates to the process of deliberating about something. If the understanding plays the role of "thinking," we need to grasp what thinking means. Kant relates the concept of thinking to spontaneity as it relates to the understanding, which brings the manifold of intuitions under concepts. He says, "*Das Denken, fuer sich genommen, ist bloss die logische Funktion, mithin lauter Spontaneitaet der Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen einer bloss moeglichen Anschauung …* (*KrV*, B428). If we were to define thinking, says Kant, we would characterize it as the very possibility of combining any manifold of intuition possible for the discursive

25 "*Verstand, als das Vermoegen zu denken (durch Begriffe sich etwas vorzustellen…*" (AA VII: 196). Also see *KrV*, A126 & A69/B94 where Kant calls the understanding the "*Vermoegen zu denken*," as he does in the *Jaesche Logik*, AA, IX: 11.

intellect, and this very possibility of combining is spontaneity, including both real and logical *Handlungen*. In other words, characterized in general terms, thinking expresses the possibility (and power) of spontaneously combining the manifold of intuition. The action of thinking requires concepts, and Kant defines thinking as cognition through concepts ("*Erkenntnis durch Begriffe*," *KrV*, A69/B94). Concepts are "predicates of any possible judgment," and the understanding, apart from being an ability (*Vermoegen*) to think, is also an ability to judge since all its actions (*Handlungen*) can be traced back (*zurueckfuehren*) to judgments (Ibid.). Hence, the understanding as thinking plays the role of predication in judgments.

In the *Anthropologie*, Kant distinguishes between understanding and judgment quite vividly. The understanding, he says, is like a domestic civil servant under express orders while judgment is like an officer who is given the general rule and must apply it to a particular case (AA VII: 198).[26] In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant describes pure *a priori* concepts as "*Handlungen des reinen Denkens*," which are neither empirical nor aesthetical (*KrV*, A57/B81). We have seen that these *a priori* actions (*Handlungen*) refer to the real *Handlungen*, which form the condition for the possibility of thinking and are analogous to the real "*Handlungen*" associated with spatiotemporal receptivity. A discursive subject cannot violate these categories in thinking. These *a priori* categories make empirical concepts possible, and empirical concepts are important not only in making determinative and reflective judgments, but also higher level reasoning about

26 In this passage, Kant also defines reason as a general who has to think up all contingencies in any situation and think up a rule that takes account of all the contingencies. The relationship between spontaneity as *Handlung*, reason, apperception and autonomy is very interesting in Kant's system, but I will not be engaging these issues in my thesis. At present, I am attempting only to explicate the notion of self-consciousness in Kant's system. I will only point to a key passage in the *Grundlegung*. "Moralitaet *ist also das Verhaeltnis der Handlungen zur Autonomie des Willens, das ist zur moeglichen allgemeinen Gesetzegebung durch die Maximen desselben. Die Handlung, die mit der Autonomie des Willens zusammen bestehen kann, ist* erlaubt; *die nicht damit stimmt, ist* unerlaubt (*Grundlegung*: AA IV: 439).

complex problems. And in describing real *Handlung*, Kant does indeed say that the *a priori Handlung* makes concepts possible ("*zum Begriffe wird*", AA XVII: R4631, 1772 or later, quoted above, p. 18).

The understanding, then, is under express orders only to the extent that its actions must necessarily possess the form of the *a priori* categories. This does not mean, however, that the understanding is not the source of empirical concepts, and if thinking is cognition through concepts, then the action of thinking as related to the understanding includes the task of forming empirical concepts. Kant says this clearly in the *Jaesche Logik*. He says, "*Alle Definitionen der mathematischen und -- wofern anders bei empirischen Begriffen überall Definitionen stattfinden könnten -- auch der Erfahrungsbegriffe, müssen also synthetisch gemacht werden. Denn auch bei den Begriffen der letztern Art, z. B. den empirischen Begriffen Wasser, Feuer, Luft u. dgl. soll ich nicht zergliedern, was in ihnen liegt, sondern durch Erfahrung kennen lernen, was zu ihnen gehört. Alle empirischen Begriffe müssen also als gemachte Begriffe angesehen werden, deren Synthesis aber nicht willkürlich, sondern empirisch ist*" (AA IX: 141n). In other words, the formation of empirical concepts is empirical not arbitrary (*willkuerlich*) in the sense that these concepts must conform to the pure categories of the understanding. It is in this sense that the understanding can be seen as being "under express orders," and if the discursive subject can only form empirical concepts through experience and if experience requires both sensibility and understanding, the understanding plays a role in empirical concept formation.

Thus, thinking is the function of the understanding and thinking includes both empirical concept formation and empirical thinking. A logical *Handlung* makes possible

the ordering of the predicates of a particular thing vis-à-vis each other. The ordering of these predicates, which, as we have seen, are possible concepts in a judgment (like “one” table, or “unreal” unicorn, etc.) makes possible the cognition of object. The understanding, employed (*taetig*) in relation to the manifold, makes predication possible, but the collection of predicates requires synthesis of these predicates, or combination, at the same time. With respect to the understanding, logical *Handlungen* perform the particular function of synthesizing or combining representations vis-à-vis each other either combining representations into an object or combining objects into judgments and empirical thinking in general.

Hence, the pure categories are the real *Handlungen* that posit the mode in which the discursive subject spontaneously “goes through” and “takes up” representations in thinking and logical *Handlungen* “combine” representations vis-à-vis each other in any act of understanding. If we recall, the act of reflecting is the ability to correctly determine concepts in relation to each other; and empirical thinking/judging is reflective when geared towards judging correctly. Thus, despite differences between understanding (empirical concept formation) and reflection (correct ordering of representations through comparison) in the particular roles they play, the act (*Handlung*) of reflection ultimately plays the same role as the understanding in the process of thinking: empirical concept-formation and empirical thinking/judging. And like the understanding, reflection includes real and logical *Handlungen*, the former positing the very act of reflecting and the latter combining representations vis-à-vis each other. It is for this reason that spontaneity of thinking includes not merely the *Handlungen* (real and logical) of the understanding but can also be defined as “*die Reflexion*” at the same time. Kant uses the term “spontaneity”

in association with both the act of understanding and the act of reflection because both these acts are engaged in the same process, the process of thinking that includes empirical concept-formation and empirical judging; and though Kant does conceptually differentiate the acts of reflection and the understanding, these acts would be hard disentangle if we were trying to specify their respective roles in empirical concept formation and empirical judgment. In other words, the discursive subject acts (*handelt*) in its own (thinking) way in the face of spatiotemporal representations through the employment of the acts of understanding and reflection. The "*Spontaneitaet des Denken*" (or the spontaneity of the understanding or judgment) requires concomitantly (and inextricably) the acts of understanding and reflection in the process of thinking, and Kant tends to conflate these two acts together.

(c) Having established the general relationship between spontaneity (real and logical *Handlungen*), reflecting, thinking and the faculty of understanding, it is important to systematically address the constitutive role of the understanding in judging. In other words, we should attempt to exemplify the various *Handlungen* of the understanding, and how they make empirical concepts and empirical judging possible.

It is commonly known that Kant objected to Leibniz's view that sensibility could be philosophically viewed as confused intellect. Probably owing to the fact that Kant's systematic edifice is based on rejecting Leibniz on this issue, the fact that Kant continues to use the framework of clarity and distinctness (not only in the Deductions of the two

editions of the first *Critique*,[27] but also as late as the *Anthropologie*) is less well-known. In my view, the conceptual framework of clarity and distinctness, so salient for the "dogmatic" rationalists, remains embedded in Kant's philosophical system and finds re-interpretation. Because Leibniz believed in intellectual intuition, says Kant, he viewed the senses as confused, as lacking clarity, but also believed that the senses could be "analyzed and illuminated by attention." But the senses, Kant says, are as important as the understanding if we are to have cognition ("*etwas sehr Positives und ein unentbehrlicher Zusatz*" [to the understanding if we are to have cognition] (AA VII: 140)). The senses cannot be simply seen as confused and amenable to being made distinct by the intellect, but play an important role in cognition.

In the *Anthropologie*, in the context of asking how we could have representations without being conscious of them, Kant distinguishes clear, obscure and distinct representations. "*Allein wir koennen uns doch mittelbar bewusst sein eine Vorstellung zu haben, ob wir gleich unmittelbar uns ihrer nicht bewusst sind. – Dergleichen Vorstellungen heissen dann dunkele; die uebrigen sind klar und, wenn ihre Klarheit sich auch auf die Theilvorstellungen eines Ganzen derselben und ihre Verbindung erstreckt, deutliche Vorstellungen, es sei des Denkens oder der Anschauung*" (AA VII: 135). Unlike the rationalists, Kant thinks that both thoughts and intuitions can be obscure, confused and distinct. If we are conscious of representations without being immediately (*unmittelbar*) conscious of them, then these are termed obscure (*dunkel*); but if we are immediately conscious of these representations, then these are clear. We have distinct

[27] Roughly speaking, references to the concepts of *Klarheit* and *Dunkelheit* in the first *Critique*, A103-4, A117n & B414-5n; in the *Reflexionen*, AA XVIII: R5930, 1783-4 & AA XVIII: R5708, 1783-4); in the *Jaesche Logik*, AA IX: 33-4.

representations if we can connect representations into a whole (or system), and explicate how these representations are interconnected in the whole.

In order to explain the notion of distinctness, which is achieved if we are able to connect representations as parts in a connected whole, Kant offers an interesting example. If, he says, I am conscious of seeing a person (*Mensch*) but not conscious of his eyes, nose, mouth, etc., then I can only conclude that it might (*sei*) be a person. In fact, if I am not conscious of any representation that characterizes a general characteristic belonging to persons in general, then I cannot say that I am conscious of seeing a person, for the object "person" is made up of a collection (*zusammengefasst*) of features.[28] In the *Lectures on Metaphysics* (*Metaphysik L1* (1777-80), 28: 227-8), Kant suggests that obscure representations form the largest field in human beings ("*So ist das Feld dunkler Vorstellungen das groesste im Menschen*" (AA VII: 136)).

At the same time, however, Kant says that the understanding can help make these obscure representations clearer and more distinct. He says, "*Dass das Kleid den Mann mache, gilt in gewisser Masse auch fuer den Verstaendigen. Das russische Sprichwort sagt zwar: 'Man empfaengt den Gast nach seinem Kleide und begleitet ihn nach seinem Verstande'; aber der Verstand kann doch den Eindruck dunkler Vorstellungen von einer gewissen Wichtigkeit, den eine wohlgekleidete Person macht, nicht verhueten, sondern allenfalls nur das vorlaeufig ueber sie gefaellte Urtheil hinten nach zu berichtigen den Vorsatz haben* (AA VII: 137)." In the face of obscure impressions (*Eindruecke*), the

28 "*Wenn ich weit von mir auf einer Weise einen Menschen zu sehen mir bewusst bin, ob ich gleich seine Augen, Nase, Mund u. s. w. zu sehen mir nicht bewusst bin, so schliesse ich eigentlich nur, dass dies Ding ein Mensch sei; denn wollte ich darum, weil ich mir nicht bewusst bin, diese Theile des Kopfs (und so auch die uebrigen Theile dieses Menschen) wahrzunehmen, die Vorstellung derselben in meiner Anschauung gar nicht zu haben behaupten, so wuerde ich auch nicht sagen koennen, dass ich einen Menschen sehe; denn aus diesen Theilvorstellungen ist die ganze (des Kopfs oder des Menschen) zusammengefasst*" (AA, VII: 135)"

understanding can only in retrospect judge in the correct way. We judge a well-dressed person on the basis of his clothes, although we know (as it were) that clothes don't necessarily make a person. If we judge the person from her clothes but allow the understanding to investigate further, the understanding could either redeem or reject the initial judgment. This example (I believe) shows Kant's characterization of the understanding: to think in order to understand something distinctly, or, understanding something clearly in connection with other representations.

In the two examples above (of perceiving a person from afar and judging a person by her clothes), we find that the understanding not only gives us some initial indication about any object in question, but, given time, the understanding can offer a more clear and distinct appraisal of any object. Moreover, apart from the fact that the understanding organizes the non-conceptual manifold, the task of the understanding in making something (*etwas*) distinct remains uniform across the mental modes of perceiving and thinking. In my view, these examples clearly reveal Kant's view of the functions of the understanding. (a) In the first example, it would not be possible to say that the something (*etwas*) that we perceive is a person if there weren't some feature (whether the head, nose, etc.) that we could mark in a categorial way. In other words, we can perceive something *as* something only if we can mark a feature of an object as belonging to an object of that kind (eg. mark such and such a nose as belonging to human beings, etc.) in terms of the mathematical categories (one nose; unified human nose) and dynamical categories (nose in relation to the human face (the category of relation); real not imagined nose (the category of modality)), apart from the spatiotemporal positing of the manifold of intuitions, or the "*Theilvorstellungen*." In other words, any cognition requires, at least

minimally, the categories of the understanding. In the second example, too, as Kant says himself ("*in gewisser Masse auch fuer den Verstaendigen,*" AA VII: 137), the understanding is already implicated in the initial judgment. (b) In both examples, a further directed exercise of the understanding can offer a more complete appraisal of the object. In the first example, we might strive (*Bestreben*, AA VII: 131) to see if what we see is really a person, and, if we can make a face distinct to ourselves, that is, combine a manifold of representations that we can represent as similar to the combination of representations we usually associate with a "face," then we can say with a degree of certainty that we do indeed see a person. In the second example, too, we can say that a further effort to understand either justifies or annuls our initial judgment. In the example, as we get to know the person, we ascertain if his behavior reveals, say, his ability to judge, and, if his behavior matches the behavior we normally associate with people with good judgmental powers, then we affirm that the person is a good judge, etc.

Therefore, the understanding may be seen as playing the role of clarification, especially in light of Kant's own definition of clarity: "*Das Bewusstsein seiner Vorstellungen, welches zur Unterscheidung eines Gegenstandes von anderen zureicht, ist Klarheit* (AA VII: 137)." In other words, we clearly mark features of the object such that it is distinguished from other objects through the use of the understanding. Kant's use of object (*Gegenstand*) refers, using the first example, to particular features of the human face, and, hence, we can clearly mark the nose as nose in the faraway object, which means that we can "clearly" distinguish our perception of the nose from other objects. Clarity, then, is my immediate consciousness that I see a nose instead of any other object. Kant characterizes concepts in terms of marks. Concepts, he says, relate to objects in a

mediated way, through marks, which can belong to many things ("*mittelbar, vermittelst eines Merkmals, was mehreren Dingen gemein sein kann" KrV,* A320/B377). If I am able to clearly cognize a nose as a nose, it means that I have been able to mark the nose as an object separate from other objects, and that I can mark the nose as nose (which means that I have the concept of a nose) in the first place.

And distinctness Kant defines further as clearly putting together representations. "*Dasjenige aber, wodurch auch die Zusammensetzung der Vorstellungen klar wird, heisst Deutlichkeit*" (AA VII: 138). In other words, when I clearly put together all the representations in order to perceive a human face, I can perceive the human face distinctly. In fact, we gain knowledge when we can make distinct (in this passage, given other references to "*Deutlichkeit*," "*Erkenntnis*" should be translated as knowledge). Kant says, "*Die letztere [Deutlichkeit] macht es allein, dass eine Summe von Vorstellungen Erkenntnis wird; worin dann, weil eine jede Zusammensetzung mit Bewusstsein Einheit desselben, folglich eine Regel fuer jene voraussetzt, Ordnung in diesem Mannigfaltigen gedacht wird* (AA VII: 138)." The opposite of distinct is not confused (*verworrene*) but indistinct. In simple representations, we can find neither order nor confusion. Thus, every confused representation is complex, that is, has parts and has been "*zusammengesetzt*," and we can make this complex perception distinct by gaining consciousness of the ordering of the complex perception. While Kant does not make it explicit in these passages, we can achieve distinctness not only at the level of cognizing faces *as* faces but also scientifically make the workings of an object, or its hidden properties, distinct to ourselves.

We distinctly cognize the human face *as* human face when we have clear representations of the various marks for indicating the complex representation "human face" as an ordered whole (*Zusammensetzung*). It is through the understanding ("*Vermoegen der Erkenntnis ueberhaupt Verstand (in der allgemeinen Bedeutung des Wortes),*" AA VII: 138) that we can cognize, and "understanding" should be taken in its everyday sense, as in "I understand the well-dressed person better now," etc., but equally "I can understand the properties of trees better" or even, at the most basic level, a basic understanding that the object far away is a human face. Hence, we could speak of both relatively more basic and higher levels of the understanding.

But how do we gain the complex representation of a human face (example a) or the understanding that X possesses good judgment (example b)? In Kant's system, there is nothing in the understanding which has not come from the senses. In the first *Critique*, he says, "*Dass alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anfange, daran ist gar kein Zweifel; denn wodurch sollte das Erkenntnisvermoegen sonst zur Ausuebung erweckt werden, geschaehe es nicht durch Gegenstaende, die unsere Sinne ruehren und teils von selbst Vorstellungen bewirken, teils unsere Verstandestaetigkeit in Bewegung bringen*" (*KrV*, B1). Thus, we gain the general concept of the human face or the relationship between clothes and human behavior empirically (or inductively), and acquisition of the empirical concepts may be seen as the expansion of the power of the understanding. And this expansion takes place through thinking, judging and reflecting on objects, and hence it is not surprising that Kant variously characterizes the understanding as the "faculty of judgment" or the "faculty of thinking" (*KrV*, A126).

Kant says that the understanding is the faculty of cognitions in general (*ueberhaupt*), and that we achieve understanding, in the general sense of "I understand him better now" or, at a more basic level, "I understand now that that thing I saw was a human face" (AA VII: 137-8, *passim*). We have seen that, according to Kant, there are three necessary features we would need in order to have cognition at all. (i) We should be able to "fasten upon" representations if we are directed towards something in a (thinking) way (*Auffassung* (attentio)). In general, Kant uses the term "*Aufmerksamkeit*" in order to characterize attention, but also uses the Latin "attentio" in order to characterize the act of "auffassen." Hence, "attentio" in general could refer to the very possibility of being so directed that we can represent anything to ourselves at all *in the mode of thinking*, and "*auffassen*" and "*aufmerken*" (or *Acht haben*) could be seen as forms of attention differentiable in terms of degree of active directedness involved – the latter is more actively directed than the former. With "attentio," we can fasten upon (*auffassen*) (and hence mark), say, a far off object *as* something (*etwas*) in the process of thinking, and only say that it seems like a person's face (Cf. example a); but we can also be more actively directed towards or attend (*aufmerken*) to that object in a thinking way . (ii) With the ability to abstract, we are able to mark the commonality and differences between things, and, thus, distinguish between them in a (potentially) increasingly variegated way. In other words, we gain clear representations. (iii) But it is only with reflection, which is not some kind of turning inwards upon oneself (as is generally believed), but the ability to actively deliberate about and order representations in the correct and distinct way (*Ueberlegungsvermoegen*), that we can gain cognition of an object.

If the understanding is an ability to be actively directed towards something in order to grasp it distinctly, then it is reflection that actively enables making an object distinct. We strive (*Bestrebung*), as it were, given that we have already fastened upon something (*auffassen*) (attentio)) and already possess a conceptual scheme (abstractio), to understand the object *as* object through reflective deliberation – Eg. Is it really the object I thought it was? Or, is the well-dressed person really rich? Reflection, then, is simply another name for thinking or deliberating, and it is clearly related to the actions (*Handlungen*) which the subject spontaneously undertakes in relation to an object – if I am reflecting on myself and my past deeds, say, then I am the object of my reflections, and am directed to these past deeds with the purpose of understanding (and judging well) the correct "determination" of the relations of the representations that constitute the representations of my past with respect to each other and so on.

(d) From (a)- (c), above, the term "spontaneity" can be characterized as "*die Reflexion*" because reflection, as part of the general ability to understand, consists in the directedness geared to thinking about something in a more distinct way. The discursive subject acts (*handelt*) in its own spontaneous (thinking) way in the face of spatiotemporal representations through the employment of the acts of understanding and reflection. The spontaneity of thinking (or judgment) is the "striving" (*Bestrebung*) to make something clear or distinct in the process of thinking. The discursive subject "goes through," "takes up," and "combines" spatiotemporal representations in its own way -- in the (spontaneous) mode of thinking, and, given that spontaneity is "striving" and understanding and reflecting form an inextricable part of the general process of thinking

engaged in empirical concept-formation and empirical thinking, Kant tends to identify these concepts more often than not.

IV

Spontaneity of Apperception

We have seen that spontaneity as "*innere Handlung*" is the mind's power of actively reacting (or reactively acting) in its own particular (thinking) way in the face of the spatiotemporal representations which have their origin outside the discursive subject who can nevertheless be affected by them. The spontaneity of the understanding (or judgment) -- as real ("going through" and "taking up" in the form of categories and via the very possibility of reflection into the process of thinking) and logical *Handlung* ("combining" in the process of thinking)) -- is a case of spontaneity in general (*ueberhaupt*), which we had described as a real *Handlung* in Section II, and makes possible the process of thinking including forging empirical concepts or empirical laws or any kind of judgment. But Kant speaks of another case of spontaneity in general: the spontaneity of apperception (*Spontaneitaet der Apperzeption*). Is spontaneity of apperception real or logical *Handlung*? What is the difference in the constituting roles of spontaneity of understanding and the spontaneity of apperception?

(a) In describing the "*willkuerlichen*" (voluntary) consciousness of one's representations, Kant says in the *Anthropologie*, "*Das Bestreben sich seiner Vorstellungen bewusst zu werden ist entweder das Aufmerken* (attentio) *oder das Absehen von einer Vorstellung, deren ich mir bewusst bin* (abstractio)" (AA VII: 131; also see AA VII: 138). To have the voluntary power (since "*Willkuer*" is often translated as power of choice), or the active

power, to come to be conscious of something could mean fastening upon (*auffassen*) a representation, marking it to oneself (minimally conceptually rather than merely becoming conscious of it), or to be able to keep one representation separate from another, which is abstraction. The understanding of the discursive subject selectively fastens upon "*auffasst* (attentio))" particular representations from a given set of spatiotemporal representations in the process of thinking, and it also has the power to keep two representations from mixing with each other (abstraction). These acts (especially abstraction) represent the "*Eigenmacht des Gemueths*" and display the power (*Gewalt*) of the discursive subject to have the representation in its own control. "*Von einer Vorstellung abstrahieren zu koennen, selbst wenn sie sich dem Menschen durch den Sinn aufbringt, ist ein weit groesseres Vermoegen, als das zu attendieren: weil es eine Freiheit des Denkungsvermoegen und die Eigenmacht des Gemueths beweist, den Zustand seiner Vorstellungen in seiner Gewalt zu haben* (animus sui compos) (AA VII: 131).

If the "*Freiheit des Denkungsvermoegen*" points to the "*Eigenmacht des Gemueths,*" how does Kant describe such a power of the mind? In the *Anthropologie*, as I have already indicated, he defines "*Spontaneitaet*" (spontaneity) as "*innere Handlung*" and "*die Reflexion*" through which a concept (or a thought) is made possible (*Wenn wir uns die innere handlung (Spontaneitaet), wodurch ein Begriff (ein Gedanke) moeglich wird, die Reflexion*…" AA VII: 134n). He says, further, that spontaneity is distinct from receptivity (*Empfaenglichkeit* (*Receptivitaet*)) through which perception or empirical intuition ("*Wahrnehmung* (perceptio), *d. i. empirische Anschauung,*" or apprehension) is made possible (AA VII: 134n). Both acts (Acte), of apprehension and reflection, are said to be represented with consciousness, and, thus, the consciousness of the self

("*Bewusstsein seiner selbst* (apperceptio)") can be divided into two parts – (a) the consciousness of reflection, which is the consciousness of the understanding, and (b) consciousness of apprehension, which is the consciousness of inner sense. The former is pure while the latter is empirical apperception. In psychology, we study the representations of inner sense, and in logic we use what we gain in "intellectual consciousness" (consciousness of reflection) (Ibid.). Having thus connected spontaneity, apperception, thinking and the power of the mind (*Eigenmacht* or *Gewalt*), he defines the "*Spontaneitaet der Apperzeption*" as the "*reinen Bewusstseins der handlung* [sic], *welche das Denken ausmacht*" (AA VII: 141).

Spontaneity of apperception is defined as pure consciousness where "pure," as always in Kant's system, indicates that the source (*Quelle*) of the spontaneity of apperception is in the subject. It is the consciousness of an action (*Handlung*) that constitutes thinking, or makes thinking possible such that the action (*Handlung*) can be characterized as "spontaneous" and "apperception" at the same time. We are aware that spontaneity is the general power of acting (*handeln*) characterizing discursive rational beings, but now it seems that, just like spontaneity of the understanding, the spontaneity of apperception is a special case of a general spontaneity and consists in the possibility for the discursive subject of being conscious that she acts (*handeln*) or *that* she acts in such a way that makes thinking possible (since apperception by definition is the consciousness of self). The spontaneity of apperception is the consciousness of that action (*Handlung*) without which thinking would not be possible, or my consciousness of that action of mine which constitutes my being able to think, or, in still other words, the possibility of my being able to bring to awareness an action (*Handlung*) implicit in the

process of thinking. If thinking is reflecting in order to judge correctly, or to order representations in the "correct" way (Section III), then, in my view, there are (at least) two sorts of actions involved – the directedness of the actions characterizing reflecting in order to judge correctly (spontaneity of the understanding) but also a further, but not necessarily a second-order *Handlung* that makes possible our being able to be aware (or become aware) that the act of reflecting is (as it were) underway at any particular point of time. Hence, there are two sorts of directedness – (i) the directedness of reflection and (ii) the directedness *that* I am reflecting which somehow seems to constitute the process of reflecting. And these two different cases of spontaneity, spontaneity of understanding and apperception need not be viewed as first- or second-order acts respectively.

But apperception, according to Kant, is not merely required for being conscious of the act of reflecting but equally the act of apprehending. If inner sense is empirical apperception, as Kant says explicitly in the *Anthropologie* but also in the A-deduction of the first *Critique* (*KrV*, A107), apperception is required for inner sense to "see" the flow of representations. In pure apperception, however, the representation is the representation of the act of reflecting. In other words, no empirical representation is involved -- neither sensation nor empirical intuition -- but only the conscious representation of the power of reflecting. If the power of reflecting is to be characterized as "*ein Bewusstsein des Verstandes* (AA VII: 134n)" and associated with (pure) thinking and characterized as "consciousness of reflection" and the spontaneity of apperception (or pure apperception) constitutes thinking, then "pure apperception" can be seen as inextricably linked to the ability to think, understand and reflect in the way we generally conceive of thinking, understanding and reflecting in logic (to use Kant's own example). In logic, we abstract

from the empirical, and think with the conceptual, and perform deductive or inferential tasks that require us to either combine or keep representations apart. Hence, the kind of consciousness (consciousness of reflection) we need for such tasks would require us to exercise particular powers of the mind, the ability to reflect/understand/judge. And, in such an exercise, we are conscious (in some way) of the power (*handeln*) that constitutes reflecting, understanding and thinking, even if we cannot yet say how we can be conscious *of the process of* reflecting and understanding. We are conscious of the spontaneity of apperception that constitutes (*ausmacht*) thinking. The key word here is "constitutes" (*ausmacht*), and question is: how can we think of spontaneity of apperception as "constituting" reflecting?

It is fairly clear that Kant is ambiguous about the relationship between apperception and understanding, though if we only consider the B-deduction, we find that the understanding has a clear explanative primacy over apperception in the act of cognizing (cf. B131-2, the "Actus of Spontaneity;" B134n, the idea of the faculty of apperception is the understanding). Kant gives primacy to the understanding in the passages I have quoted from the *Anthropologie* as well. Kant defines spontaneity as "*Reflexion*," and, although he does not call it the "spontaneity of the understanding," I have shown that understanding/reflecting/judging relate to the same process of making distinct the correct determination of representations required for empirical concept-formation and empirical thinking (and hence, knowledge); and he defines the spontaneity of apperception as the consciousness of the action that constitutes (*ausmacht*) thinking. Thus, it appears to be the case that spontaneity in general (*ueberhaupt*) always relates to the understanding, and the spontaneity of apperception is a special case of it. This may

well be the case if we take the primacy-of-the-understanding view in the B deduction and the *Anthropologie*. However, in this chapter, my aim in distinguishing between the spontaneity of understanding and spontaneity of apperception as cases of spontaneity in general has been simply to mark (i) spontaneity as the power of acting in general in relation to the manifold of data, as a particular kind of *Handlung* constitutive of the discursively cognizing subject, and (ii) to mark the distinctive ways in which the spontaneity related to reflecting/thinking/judging is different from the spontaneity of apperception. In what follows, I will further investigate how spontaneity relates to apperception.

If spontaneity as "*innere Handlung*" can be characterized as "*Reflexion*," then spontaneity of understanding is nothing other than the actions that constitute thinking, and if apperception is consciousness of reflecting, then (pure) apperception, or spontaneity of apperception, relates to the consciousness of our activity of thinking (cf. AA VII: 134n & AA VII: 137-8, analysis above). We have seen that reflecting is the power of thinking and spontaneity is the implicit action (*Handlung*) required for the power of thinking and the "consciousness of reflection" is the consciousness of the power of thinking. If (pure) apperception is to be related to the process of thinking, then apperception (or consciousness of oneself) in the process of thinking does not mean that the discursive subject thinks x or y, this particular thought or that, has this particular way of thinking as opposed to that, but implies that the discursive subject is conscious that it has the power of thinking, and, at any particular point, can consciously mark to itself that

it is engaged in thinking, including the awareness that it can begin thinking about something if it so wanted at any moment of time.[29]

(b) We have conceptually elucidated the constitution of the spontaneity of the understanding in the previous section (Section III). In this section, we have learnt of the distinction between the spontaneity of judgment (or understanding) and spontaneity of apperception. Let us now explore the nature of "spontaneity of apperception" more fully. Is it a real or logical *Handlung*? If it is a real *Handlung* no different from the spatiotemporal *Handlungen* or the *Handlung* that characterizes the categories, could we elucidate it further within the confines of Kant's system? More concretely, how should we characterize the actions (*Handlungen*) implicitly constitutive of thinking? We begin with the question of whether the spontaneity of apperception is a real *Handlung*, and subsequently discuss the notion of attention as providing a clue for elucidating what kind of real *Handlung* spontaneity of apperception is.

I have remarked that spatiotemporal *Handlungen* and the *Handlung* associated with the categories are real *Handlungen*. Kant defines a real *Handlung* as "[*d*]*ie reale Function besteht in der Art, wie wir eine Vorstellung an und fuer sich selbst setzen*" (R4631, quoted above). The description of the categories as *Handlungen* and the notion of self-affection relating to the forms of intuition (or receptivity) are two means through which a discursively-cognizing subject represents any representation *as* representation, ("*Vorstellung an und fuer sich selbst setz[t]*"). In order to understand if the spontaneity of apperception is a real *Handlung* or a logical one, we should distinguish between Kant's

29 It is in this sense that Heidegger said that the "I think" can be characterized as the "I can" in his work *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 83.

use of "*Bestreben*" and "attention." The latter term is more ambiguous than the former. In the *Anthropologie,* Kant uses the Latin term "attentio" as equivalent to the German terms "*auffassen*" and "*aufmerken,*" but we have seen that the latter can be characterized as more actively directed attention than the former, which only relates to the attentive fastening upon representations in the process of thinking. In the B-deduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant distinguishes between "*Acht haben*" and "*Handlung* (*KrV,* B154). In the context of discussing the example that we cannot represent time without drawing a straight line, Kant makes a distinction between the *Handlungen* making such representation possible (successive synthesis of the manifold) and attending to (*Acht haben…auf*) these *Handlung* where *Handlung* can only mean real *Handlung* in the way Kant defines it, positing representations *as* representations (in this case, the spatiotemporal *Handlungen*). Hence, *prima facie,* there seems to be a distinction between *Handlungen* and terms like "*auffassen,*" "*aufmerken,*" "*Acht haben,*" or even "*Bestrebung.*"

In the analysis of the ability to understand and reflect, Kant seems to use the term "attentio" to characterize the ability to gain intuitions (*auffassen*) (AA VII: 138 quoted above), but, as we remarked earlier, the term "*auffassen*" can be viewed as the understanding fastening upon representations in its own (thinking) way. In other words, it means that the understanding fastens upon intuitions relevant for its process of thinking from a manifold of spatiotemporal intuitions passively "received" by the discursive subject; and we had translated the term "*auffassen*" as active "fastening upon" rather than the passive "apprehension" (*Apprehension*) (*KrV,* A98) which Kant mainly associates with the form of receptivity, space and time. Interpreted in this way, we can make sense

of "*auffassen*" as "attentio." The understanding *attends* to particular spatiotemporal intuitions in the process of thinking, or it fastens upon those intuitions that are required in the process of thinking.

But Kant uses the concept of attention in another way as well. Apart from the actions of fastening upon intuition in a (thinking) way (*auffassen*) and the striving (*Bestrebung*) to constitute something *as* object in thinking, we find the idea of "*Acht haben*" in the first *Critique* where one *attends* to the *Handlungen* relating to synthesis. This concept of "attention" seems to include a power of being conscious of one's representations, as actively making conscious one's representations and voluntarily so. Hence, it should not surprise us that Kant uses the same Latin term "attentio" but classifies it into two German terms, "*auffassen*" (fastening upon in a (thinking) way) and "*aufmerken*" or "*Acht haben*" (voluntarily attending to something). The former term is related to the understanding, but the latter meaning of "attention" cannot be seen as part of the understanding. It can be described as voluntary "directedness" of attention. And in a significant discussion about the terms, apperception, attention, abstraction, clarity/obscurity of representations and the notion of active directedness in *Metaphysik Mongrovius*, 1782-3, we do find Kant using the term "*gerichtet*" (directedness) that can best characterize the directedness of attention we are discussing.[30] Finally, the

[30] "*Was nun die Identitaet seines Selbst ausmacht, ist schwer zu wissen; auf dieses bezieht sich alles, alles kann sich aendern, nur das Bewusstsein und die Apperception oder das Vermoegen, die Vorstellungen auf sein Selbst zu referiren, bleiben. Diese Apperception in gewissem Grade giebt deutliche, im mindern Grade dunkle Vorstellungen. Diese sind also nicht der Art, sondern dem Grade nach unterschieden. Die Klarheit in der Anschauung ist aber von der Klarheit im Begriffe sehr unterschieden. Jenes ist die aesthetische, dieses die logische Klarheit. Die Actualisierung der Attention, wodurch nur eine einzige Vorstellung klar gemacht und alle uebrige verdunkelt werden, ist Abstraction. Bei der Abstraction hoert nicht die Attention auf, sondern sie wird nur von einem oder mehreren Objecten auf eines gerichtet und die uebrigen Vorstellungen alle verdunkelt, und die eine klar. {para} Die erste und die Haupt Vorstellung ist die vom ich oder das Bewusstsein meiner Selbst, die Apperception (wie sie Herr Prof. Kant in seiner Critic nennt)*" (AA XXVIII: 878).

directedness of attention can be distinguished from abstraction (another action of the understanding), as we have seen above (*Anthropologie*, AA VII: 131, quoted above). Abstraction as voluntary action can combine or keep apart representations, but the discursive subject exerts far more power in abstracting as compared to the power exerted in the "directedness of attention" (*aufmerken*; *Acht haben*; *Attention*). Thus, the idea of attention as directedness for the sake of clearly focusing on something (*Acht haben*) ("clear" in the Kantian sense (see Section III (c) above)) appears different from the notion of "attentio" associated with the understanding.

An example from the *Anthropologie* might make this clearer. In the context of speaking of false sense impressions, Kant says that we might judge something *as* something at one moment and, then, at another moment, we might say that it is not what we thought it was (or that it was differently constituted) when we apply our attention (*Attention*). For instance, if X is seeing himself in the mirror and something flutters past, X may judge it as a bird flying past, but, a moment later, on attending to the impression, X may judge it as not being a bird. In this case, X, as discursively cognizing subject, has exercised an action (*Handlung*) of attending to a representation. This act of attending is not the same as the act of reflecting, but it appears that we would not be able to reflect if we could not attend in this way.

Kant defines the spontaneity of apperception as the consciousness implicit in the actions (*Handlungen*) that constitute (*ausmacht*) thinking. Since Kant has made a distinction between apperception of apprehension and apperception of reflection, we can say that, in this example of X above, the attending, or apperceiving as action (*Handlung*) in general, could relate to making conscious to oneself all the representations that

ostensibly constitute the object, bird-flying, and finding that it wasn't a bird flying after all. This apprehension of the bird flying is accomplished by inner sense as empirical apperception, or apprehending representations of sense in the form of space and time, and if the inner sense is only the condition for the possibility of interiority and primarily has the task of "*aufnehmen*" of intuitions (*KrV,* A120),[31] then apperception of apprehension relates to the receptive apprehension of impressions in the form of space and time.

But, as we have seen, the discursive subject does not merely apprehend (*Apprehension*) spatiotemporal representations, but fastens upon (*auffassen*) spatiotemporal intuitions through the understanding in the process of thinking. What is the difference between apprehending intuitions and fastening upon (*auffassen*) spatiotemporal intuitions in the process of thinking? The above example of X judging something as a bird flying past, and then revising her judgment could serve as a good example to distinguish the terms "apprehension" (*Apprehension*) (*KrV,* A98), "*auffassen*" (fastening upon through the understanding) and "*Attention*; *aufmerken*; *Acht haben*." We

[31] The imagination brings the manifold of intuition into a "*Bild*" (image), but to do this it must antecedently take up (*aufnehmen/apprehendieren*) the impressions (*Eindruecke*) "*in* [into] *ihre* [its] *Taetigkeit*" (*KrV,* A120; but also A97). The "taking up" is not active but passive to the extent the imagination is employed (*taetig*) in apprehending impressions (*Eindruecke*) which the imagination must necessarily receive from the outside ("*vorher muss sie also die Eindruecke in ihre Taetigkeit aufnehmen, d. i. apprehendieren,*" *KrV,* A120). We should indicate here the difficult dual function of the imagination as active (forms the image) and passive (before (*vorher*) forming the image, it must apprehend the impressions). It is active to the extent that the imagination must belong to the subject (and not object) and passive to the extent it must apprehend impressions from outside ("passive" in Kant's system means receiving something from outside, see fn. 5 above). Futher, it is possible that imagination has its own way of apprehending impressions, but apprehension primarily relates to sensibility. It would be a very difficult question if we were to ask ourselves if the imagination has its own way of apprehending, but we need not be concerned with this question here because we need to only show that apprehension is passive to the extent it receives impressions and active only in the minmal sense that it requires an "*unwillkeurliche*" *Handlung* constituting the forms of intuition in the subject vis-à-vis impressions from outside (see Section 1 above). Finally, the term "*aufnehmen*" is a neutral term because it could be used to describe both "*aufnehmen*" as "*apprehendieren*" (*Handlung* related to forms of intuition and not *willkuerlich*) and the "*aufnehmen*" related to spontaneity (the subject willfully (*willkuerlich*) takes something up) (Cf. *KrV,* A77/B102, quoted above). In this context, Mohr's view that inner sense gives representations as representations is relevant, Georg Mohr, *Das sinnliche Ich: Innerer Sinn und Bewusstsein bei Kant* (Wuerzburg: Koenighausen & Neumann, 1991), 197.

can construct three cases from the example. Case 1: if X perceives something flying past, but cannot even judge that it could be a bird flying, then she has only apprehended (*Apprehension*) a particular spatiotemporal representation. It can be said that X is merely conscious of the representation. The "apperception of apprehension" simply marks the fact that X is conscious of representing something. Case 2: If X judges the representation as bird-flying, then she has fastened upon (*auffassen*) the representation through the understanding, and seen that representation *as* something, however mistakenly. Perceiving the representation as bird-flying would require that she already possesses the concepts of "bird," "flying," "bird flying," which means that the categories are already in play, and *a fortiori*, the understanding. Hence, when she mistakenly judges something as bird flying, the representation has "caught her attention" – something can catch our attention only in an understanding way, even if the understanding of the representation is false. Hence, Kant uses the term "*auffassen* (attentio) to describe the way the understanding fastens upon spatiotemporal representations: in its own attentive way. Case 3: Once X has judged something as a bird flying, she can be said to actively direct her attention to the representation she had perceived (in her mind's eye or perhaps the actual object in other situations) in order to judge if it had indeed been a bird flying. In such cases, she would be actively directing her attention (*Attention*; *aufmerken*; *Acht haben*) as opposed to judging something as something on the basis of the match between the thing seen at time *t*, and the concept of thing which the subject already possesses. Hence, we can make a distinction between the directedness of attention and something "catching our attention."

Both cases (Cases 2 and 3) can be related to the understanding and Kant characterizes both as “attentio” but there is a difference. The directedness of attention is active and voluntary act of spontaneity while initially the spontaneity of reflection is only built into the representation that “catches our attention” in the form of a match between pre-existent concept of the object “in” the mind of the subject and the object that has caught one’s attention. Once the representation has “caught our attention” (*auffassen*) (Case 2), the shift from the judgment, bird-flying to not-bird-flying in the example above (from Case 2 to Case 3) only means the “correct determination” of representations, or the ordering of representations, which, in Kant’s view, is the task of reflection. Hence, apart from the apperception of apprehension, we would need another notion of apperception, the apperception required in reflection (this could be the reason why Kant distinguished between apperception of apprehension and apperception of reflection).

Could we speak of attention as characterizing the apperception of reflection? In order to interpret the role of the spontaneity of apperception as distinguished from the spontaneity of understanding, we need to take into account two other key passages in the *Anthropologie* relating to the spontaneity of apperception. In the *Anthropologie*, Kant associates the intellectual ability of cognition (*Erkenntnisvermoegen*) with representations that only contain “*ein blosses Thun (das Denken)*” (AA VII: 140). This he connects to the passage I have already quoted: the mere doing (thinking) is the spontaneity of apperception, the pure consciousness of action (*Handlung*) that constitutes (*ausmacht*) thinking. Further, in the same text, he distinguishes between inner sense and pure apperception. “*Der innere Sinn ist nicht die reine Apperception, ein Bewusstsein dessen, was der Mensch thut, denn dieses gehoert zum Denkungsvermoegen, sondern was*

er leidet, wiefern er durch sein eignes Gedankenspiel afficirt wird" (AA VII: 161). As opposed to inner sense, pure apperception is the consciousness of what a person does (*thut*), and this belongs to the ability to think (*Denkungsvermoegen*). Spontaneity of apperception is a "mere doing" that constitutes thinking, which as we have seen, relates to the understanding and judging. It relates to something that the discursive subject *does* in thinking (and which is important for the ability to think) such that this *doing* is related to the spontaneity of apperception that constitutes thinking. It is something the discursive subject does voluntarily (*willkuerlich*) (Cf. AA VII: 131, quoted above). In the first *Critique*, as we have already seen, Kant refers to the notion of attention (*Acht haben*) in §§ 24 and 25 (see especially B154-5, B157-8n).[32]

Let us return to the examples we had used to characterize the role of reflecting in understanding – (i) making distinct that what we think is a person's face far away is indeed a person's face and (ii) concluding that a well-dressed person, whom we thought had good judgment, does indeed have good judgment.

In example (i), we reflect with the purpose of making distinct our initial perception by matching the predicates we see in the object presented with what we know a person's face looks like. In other words, we are trying to gauge the correct determination of representations – "Am I imagining things?" "A nose can't be that long!"

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[32] Henry Allison seems to characterize attention in very much the same way as I have suggested. He says that "Kant confuses matters by suggesting that attention is merely an empirical illustration of the seemingly paradoxical claim that the mind affects itself," but rejects this view (just as I do), claiming that attention should be seen as an "act involv[ing] an active seeking out by the mind of the representations it endeavors to make into objects of inner sense." According to Allison, there are two senses of self-affection, one related to the transcendental synthesis and constituting a condition of all experience and the other connected to the empirical synthesis of apprehension. The latter relates to the "act whereby these representations are referred to an object" while the former, or the act of attention, is the "act whereby the representations themselves become objects," Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press), 283-4. Although Allison does not relate apperception to attention in the way I am suggesting, he seems to view attention as transcendental in the way I am suggesting.

etc. The attempt to gauge is a striving, or, as Kant would have it, a "*Bestrebung*." Does such striving belong to the ability to reflect or the ability to attend? The ability to reflect makes thinking possible and thinking means combining representations in order to judge correctly. The directedness of reflecting (*Bestreben*) is geared to good judgment. In this example, it would mean the exercise of abilities like comparing, inferring, rightly classifying within the confines of the pure categories and in the context of empirical concepts which the subject already possesses, etc. In other words, the very act of reflection, conceived as a striving to order representations, includes a real *Handlung* (the fact of the striving (*Bestreben*) itself) and a logical *Handlung* (the ordering of representations vis-à-vis each other). But such striving (*Bestrebung*) is not the same as the ability to attend.

Kant described the apperception of reflection (or the spontaneity of apperception) as the consciousness of and directedness implicit in thinking and constitutive of it. It appears, then, that, in this example, it would be my directedness for the sake of figuring out (for whatever reason) that the object presented is (or is not) a person's face. In example (ii), similarly, over a period of time, through the power of reflecting, I would be able to figure out if the well-dressed person has good judgment, but it is *I* who has directed my attention, the power of my mind, for the sake of judging in the first place. And, further, in such directedness I am attentive not only to the representations connected to each other in the process of thinking but could, in principle, also be attentive to the fact that I am reflecting.

Hence, when Kant says that pure apperception or the apperception of reflection is the consciousness implicit in the constitutive act of thinking, he means (in my view) that

the idea of the directedness of attention as "*Acht haben*" or "*aufmerken*" makes possible the very act of thinking. This interpretation is quite plausible. In either example, if there were no directedness on my part, there would be no unity to my reflecting. If the attention was always "scattered," or if I were always distracted, I would neither be able to reflect nor would I be able to judge correctly, perhaps would not be concerned about judging in the first place. In the *Anthropologie,* Kant defines distraction as the state in which our attention is turned away (abstractio) from certain dominant representations by being dispersed among others, dissimilar ones (AA VII: 206). In such a state, thinking in a concerted way about these dominant representations would not be possible. Without the directedness of attention, then, there would be little scope for reflective thinking and deliberating in a concerted way. In other words, the spontaneity of apperception is the steadfastly directed attention implicit in any process of thinking.

And, further, when Kant says that apperception is prior to the determinate ordering of representations, we can plausibly show just how apperception as the directedness of attention would have to be prior to the determinate ordering of representations, especially in light of other evidence I have provided. In the Amphiboly section of the first *Critique*, in the context of explaining how we mistakenly endorse the concept of the *noumenon*, Kant says, "[*D*]*ie Apperzeption, und, mit ihr, das Denken vor aller moeglichen bestimmten Anordnung der Vorstellungen vorhergeht*" (*KrV*, A289/B345). If thinking (or reflecting) orders (*Anordnung*) representations in the "correct" way, or at least attempts such an ordering; apperception is different from thinking; and, finally, both thinking and apperception are prior to the determinate ordering of representations; -- we could, then, argue that apperception as directedness of

attention would have to be prior to any determinate ordering of representations because there can be no possibility of thinking, diachronic by definition, without the concerted and attentive directedness implicit in the process of thinking and designated by Kant as the "apperception of reflection." And the spontaneity *of* apperception, or that "*innere Handlung*" relating to apperception, or the very possibility of being able to direct one's attention, has to be prior to the determinate ordering in the logical sense because there can be no determinate ordering without concerted directedness of attention. Hence, the spontaneity *of* apperception, therefore, occupies the same functional node as the spatiotemporal "*Handlungen*" or the "*Handlungen*" characterizing the pure categories. If the latter, as I have argued, should be characterized as real *Handlung*, then the spontaneity *of* apperception is also a real *Handlung*, the general *a priori* power enabling the voluntary directedness of attention.

In my view, then, the spontaneity of apperception consists in the voluntary directedness towards our own representations (which may have a gradation), and constitutes the process of thinking. It is different from the attentive fastening upon spatiotemporal representations by the understanding ("catching our attention") and the representation apprehended in accordance with the forms of space and time. As directedness of attention, spontaneity of apperception is the apperception of reflection distinguishable from the apperception of apprehension, which is related to the receptivity of the discursive subject (we will explore the two different sense of the term "apperception" in the following chapters). The distinction between "catching our attention" and the "directedness of our attention" is more subtle because they can be both related to the understanding and labeled "attentio." But we can clarify the distinction

fairly well in terms of Kant's own framework that distinguishes between obscure, clear and distinct representations. In the case of something "catching our attention" (*auffassen*), we are attentive obscurely, and we do not direct our attention. On the other hand, we must voluntarily direct attention if we are "categorizing" an object as something in a preliminary way, or if we are trying to judge clearly if something can indeed be categorized as an object, or, finally, if we are experimentally or inferentially making something distinct to ourselves in empirical thinking.

V

Conclusion

In sum, I have argued that: (a) Spontaneity as "*innere Handlung*" is the *a priori* possibility for the discursively cognizing subject to actively react or reactively act in the face of spatiotemporal representations, and, thus, discursive spontaneity is intrinsically relational in the sense that it requires something originating from outside in order to be employed (*taetig*); (b) it is an *a priori* real *Handlung* relating to the understanding; (c) there is a distinction between the spontaneity of understanding (or judgment) and spontaneity of apperception (also a real *Handlung* as a case of spontaneity in general (*ueberhaupt*), which is merely a conceptual placeholder like "*repraesentatio*" or representation in general in Kant's system (Cf. *KrV,* A320/B377) since spontaneity is always related to the understanding for a discursively cognizing subject); (d) the spontaneity of judgment makes possible cognition and judgment/understanding through various *Handlungen*, including the action (*Handlung*) of reflection, and the spontaneity of apperception is the possibility that the discursive subject can voluntarily direct its attention in general, and, more specifically, in a concerted way such that it makes

thinking possible; and, finally, (e) the spontaneity of apperception can be justifiably glossed as the active directedness of attention (*aufmerken*; *Acht haben*) and can be opposed to both something "catching our attention" (*auffassen*) in an obscure and involuntary way through the understanding and our merely apprehending (*Apprehension*) something which is related only to the receptivity of the mind (and hence passive).

Naturally, this is not the whole story regarding the so-called "transcendental unity of apperception" or self-consciousness. In order to fully understand this issue, we would need the notion of the "I," and ask how the "I" may be related to the apperception of apprehension and reflection. At the moment, we can, however, say that (a) the spontaneity of apperception is conceptually different from the spontaneity of the understanding and (b) the former consists in the active (or voluntary) directedness of attention for the sake of good judgment.

We can now show that such a view has advantages over Robert Pippin's influential view of Kantian spontaneity (influential in part because Henry Allison, the foremost Kant interpreter in the United States, accepts Pippin's view).[33] In his essay, Pippin articulates the problems relating to the concepts of spontaneity, thinking and apperception succinctly. He says, "Admittedly, relying on Kant's discussion of apperception to explain his characterization of thinking as spontaneous can appear a classic case of *obscurus per obscurius* (Pippin (1987), 461)," and somewhat further in the text, he says that if you understand Kant's characterization of thinking as apperceptive, you could make sense of his "other enigmatic synonym for thinking, spontaneity (Ibid.

[33] Robert Pippin, "Kant on the Spontaneity of the Mind," in the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 17, No. 2 (June 1987), 449-76 (henceforth, Pippin (1987)) & Robert Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1989, Chapter 2, 16-41 (henceforth, Pippin (1989)).

463).” In making the distinction between the spontaneity of understanding and the spontaneity of apperception, and showing how spontaneity of apperception as directedness of attention makes thinking/reflecting/ understanding possible, I have offered a possible resolution to the question Pippin articulates.

Pippin’s own account of the definition of spontaneity in Kant seems, however, deficient even when we consider (as I have in this chapter) only the definition of spontaneity and the general relationship between spontaneity, perception, understanding and apperception. As I have explicated it, spontaneity is the (a) general power of acting in the face of impressions, (b) the spontaneity of understanding relates to reflectively determining the correct order of representations in understanding/judging, and (c) the “spontaneity of apperception,” different from spontaneity of understanding, can be characterized as the active (or voluntary) directedness of attention that constitutes the process of thinking. The spontaneity of apperception is pure apperception while the apperception of apprehension is empirical apperception, and, as pure apperception, it is involved closely with the understanding in making clearer concepts and judgments in the diachronic process of thinking.

As I have said, Pippin recognizes that we have to understand Kant’s view of thinking as apperceiving, and he interprets the “absolutely fundamental” highest principle (*KrV*, B135) of apperception to mean that “all human experience is ineliminably reflexive. It is reflexive because, according to Kant, whenever I am conscious of anything I also ‘apperceive’ that it is *I* who am *thusly* conscious. And all the problems arise from trying to understand what he means by this (Pippin (1987), 459; Pippin (1989), 21).” Pippin also uses this to gloss how the “I think” is supposed to accompany (*begleitet*) all

our cognitions. Very briefly, Pippin's adverbial theory can be characterized as follows. Pippin thinks that "S is P" is not an assertion of mine unless I am aware that I am asserting (and not just entertaining the possibility of asserting) that S is P. "The apperceptive characteristic does not mean that the fact that I am perceiving rather than imagining is itself directly attended to, but that such an awareness is an inseparable component of *what it is* consciously to perceive, imagine, remember, etc." (Ibid.)

Drawing on the *Anthropologie* (which very strangely Pippin doesn't take into account at all, but which has been important in my account) I remarked on Kant's distinction between apperception of apprehension and apperception of reflection (which can also be found elsewhere in his *oeuvre*). The former relates to inner sense as empirical apperception, and the latter relates to pure apperception as directedness of attention in the process of thinking. While it is indeed true that we perceive apperceptively and reflect apperceptively for Kant, Pippin tends to conflate the apperception of apprehension and reflection. It appears that, for Pippin, there seems to be no difference in apprehending and reflecting as far as apperception is concerned. In fact, he seems to conflate apperception, reflection and attention, which I have tried to distinguish and interpret through a close textual analysis. In *Hegel's Idealism*, he says, "It is a *condition* of experience because, according to Kant, experience itself is 'implicitly' reflexive. That is, if the claim is that consciousness of objects could not possess the unity necessary for it to be an experience of an identical subject unless that subject effected that unity, then although it need not follow that such a subject must always be attending to its own judging in experience, it is required that such a subject be making such judgments *in a way* that permits such an attending" (Pippin (1989), 21). In this passage, experience is "implicitly reflexive" and

no different conceptually from apperception and attending -- notice how he uses the terms/expressions “attending,” “subject effected that unity,” “subject…attending to its own judging,” “reflexive” in an undifferentiated and (ultimately) unilluminating way (“*in a way* that permits”). As opposed to this view, I have claimed that (a) the striving (*Bestreben*) to reflect is directedness towards the correct determination of representations, and this is geared towards empirical concept formation/empirical thinking/judging, (b) apperception is the concerted and unified directedness of attention in the process of thinking, and that there are varying degrees of attention in obscure, clear and distinct cognition, and the concerted directedness of attention (or apperception) in thinking is a condition for the possibility of the “correct” determinations of representations in judgment.

In addition, what does “implicitly” mean in “implicitly aware” (which is the same as “potentially self-conscious” (Pippin (1989), 21))? The so-called adverbial theory, that we perceive apperceptively, means that there is implicit awareness that I am thinking or remembering when I am thinking or remembering. As Pippin says, “The apperceptive characteristic does not mean that the fact that I am perceiving rather than imagining is itself directly attended to, but that such an awareness is an inseparable component of *what it is* consciously to perceive, imagine, remember, etc.” (Pippin (1987), 459-60) Pippin uses the term apperception as related to pure apperception synonymously with attention and reflection. He does not take into account (a) the relationship between the “I” and spontaneity of apperception if we have to fully understand “apperceptio” as consciousness of self (see Chapters 2-4 below), and (b) he does not distinguish between spontaneity of understanding and spontaneity of apperception as directedness of

attention, and, hence, does not mark the distinction between merely apprehending something, perceiving something apperceptively (*auffassen*) and the concerted directedness of attention required in the process of thinking, or the apperception of reflection, which includes (i) merely apprehending something in consciousness (*Apprehension*), (ii) fastening upon (*auffassen*) something as something preliminarily and obscurely through the use of the categories, and (iii) actively directing my attention to think about something in a sustained way. Even speaking only of matters of definition then, it seems that Pippin's view lacks conceptual distinctions, which he ought to have made, and lacks detail in general.

Part II

Prefatory Remarks

Kant characterizes the "I" in a disturbing variety of ways that are often contradictory. The "I" is to be construed as logical, as "mere consciousness," "form of consciousness," intuition, *Empfindung*, perception, even as feeling; at the same time, it ought to be described neither as concept nor as intuition. And if confusion about the correct description of the term were not enough, Kant asserts that the "I" is twofold in form but singular in content. It is, therefore, readily apparent that Kant did not characterize or employ the "I" in any consistent manner. Broadly speaking, interpreters of Kantian apperception (or the "I") may be divided into two kinds, those who stress (or, at least, taken into account) the "feeling" character of apperception (Frank, Makkreel, Carr) and those who stress its act character (Allison, Ameriks, Heidegger). Despite the fact that Kant often claims that the "I" is twofold in form and singular in content in an explicit or implicit way, starting from late in the silent decade to as late as the *Anthropologie* and the *Opus Postumum*, few interpreters have cared to investigate if this claim could not be established as Kant's general view of the "I." In this part of my dissertation, I attempt to make sense of Kant's notion of the "I" in light of the view that the "I" is twofold in form and singular in content. In other words, could we reconcile the many contradictions in Kant's characterization of the "I" if we were to accept (and argumentatively develop) the view that the "I" is twofold in form – "I as subject" and "I as object" – but singular in content?

The method, to which I adhere in order to resolve this question, consists in (a) collecting and dividing the various usages of the term "I" in Kant's texts under various classificatory heads ("I as subject," "I as subject of thinking," "I as object," and "I as

content"), a task requiring both philological detail and argumentation, and, subsequently, (b) argumentatively reconstructing a consistent description of the "I." And in the course of this investigation of the "I," I argue the following claims: (a) the difficulty in comprehending the phenomenon of the "I" lies in the fact that the same term "I" seems to perform different roles in the life of the discursive subject: the "I" feels itself even if it is not acting, and the actions of the discursive subject can also be attributed to the same "I." (b) We can attempt to make sense of the phenomenon of the "I" if we accept (and develop) the Kantian view that the "I" is twofold in form and singular in content. In the context of Kant's *oeuvre*, if we sharply demarcate thinking and perceiving, then we can argue that (i) the "I as subject of thinking" is the transcendental description of the spontaneity of apperception, or the discursive subject's attentive directedness towards objects (which I have depicted in Chapter 1 above); (ii) the form of the "I as subject" is the horizon of consciousness marking the boundary between consciousness and non-consciousness; (iii) the "I as content" includes the content of the "I as subject" as the first-person sensed (*empfindet*) awareness of the existence of a unified mind, and the content of the "I as subject of thinking" is the sensed (*empfindet*) awareness of the directedness of attention; and (iv), finally, the form of "I as object" is only pertinent *in relation to* the form of the "I as subject of thinking" in the activity of thinking, and the subject-object model cannot be considered appropriate if we were characterizing the first person sensed awareness of the "I as subject" in cases of perception. (c) In essence, the apt description of the "I" depends on the context of the description. In thinking, the form of the "I as subject of thinking," or content wise the directedness of the discursive subject towards something, relates to the form of "I as object," having the sensed awareness of

the existence of a unified mind as its content, which is the same as the "I as subject" formally characterized. In perception, on the other hand, the "I" has the form of "I as subject," and the sensed awareness of the existence of a unified mind ("I as content") is "built into" every conscious representation of the discursive subject.

In the three chapters that follow I will argue for these claims (a)-(c). In the next chapter (Chapter 2), I isolate the conceptual content of the "I" from related terms like the "soul" and the "I think;" explicate Kant's distinction between the "I as subject" and the "I as object;" and articulate the question of the "I" along with the mode of resolving it. In chapters that follow, I explicate the twofold form of the "I" (which I argumentatively interpret as threefold for textual reasons and reasons of clarity) and the "I as content," and offer a consistent description of the "I" (Chapters 3 and 4). In Chapter 3, I investigate the twofold form of the "I," "I as subject" and "I as object." I explore the meaning and significance of Kant's characterization of the "I" as a "form of consciousness," and depict the form of the "I as subject" as *Grenzbegriff*. Subsequently, I depict the "I of intelligence," or the form of the "I as subject of thinking," as distinguished from the "I as subject" as *Grenzbegriff*. And, finally, I explicate the meaning of the form of the "I as object." In Chapter 4, I explicate the content of the "I" as opposed to its form, specifying the content of the forms of the "I as subject" and the "I as subject of thinking," and then articulate a comprehensive and consistent view of the "I" as twofold in form and singular in content.

Chapter 2

The Puzzle of the "I"

In this chapter, I will attempt to articulate the puzzle of the "I" and the method of resolving it in the context of the Kantian system. Through textual analysis, I will show that Kant broadly adhered to the view that the "I" is twofold in form and singular in content from the silent period onwards to as late as the *Anthropologie*. Kant can be interpreted as implicitly classifying the "I" in the following way: (i) "I" as *a priori Grenzbegriff*, or the "I" as (form of) subject in general; (ii) the "I as (form of) subject of thinking" or the "I of intelligence;" (iiia) the "I" as form of object of perception, and (iiib) the "*Ich als Mensch*" including the "I of apprehension," the empirical "I think," or, in general, the "I" as content. In terms of this classification, the inquiry into the "I" would require investigating the relationship between the forms of the "I as subject of thinking" and the "I as object of perception," how they can be seen as belonging to one and the same "I as subject," and explicating the pre-theoretical phenomenal "singular" content of the "I." Such an investigation would require Kant's own regressive method of beginning from the pre-theoretical empirical awareness of the "I" in order to articulate the nature of the "I" theoretically or transcendentally and within the confines of the abilities of the discursive intellect.

In this chapter, I begin by exploring the term "I" in relation to terms like "soul" and "I think" in Section I. In Section II, I treat of the myriad descriptions of the "I" in Kant's *oeuvre*, and formulate a classification of the various ways the term "I" is employed in order to set the stage for further analysis of the term. On the basis of this

classification, I articulate the questions that constitute the puzzle of the "I" in the context of Kant's system, and rearticulate Kant's own regressive method for its resolution.

I

Prior to tackling the problem of Kant's seemingly contradictory descriptions of the "I," we need to clarify the conceptual boundaries of the term "I" vis-à-vis closely related terms like the "soul" and the "I think." Kant himself never attempted to distinguish or identify these terms systematically. Most traditional interpreters of Kant on the self (or the "I") identify the concepts "I," "I think" and the "I am" or "I exist," and take their view as self-evident. In what follows, we will (1) investigate the relationship between the "I" and the "soul" and, then, (2) compare Kant's use of the terms, "I" and the "I think," in a detailed way in order to ascertain if such views are indeed justified.

(1) The relationship between the terms "soul" and the "I" is a vexed one. Kant makes the following claims regarding the soul in relation to the "I": (i) the "I" can either be the "I as intelligence" or the "I as person" & (ii) the soul is the "thinking I." The problem lies in how we should construe the "thinking I." Is the "thinking I" the "I" abstracted from the body, the "I as intelligence," the "I" that is empty and the only persisting representation in the ebb and flow of the soul? Or, does the "thinking I" imply the "I as person"? Kant seems to have dithered on the issue. Sometimes he says that the soul is the "I as intelligence" and sometimes identifies the soul with the "I as person," the broader category subsuming the "I as intelligence."

In the *Lectures on Metaphysics* (*Metaphysik L1* (1777-80)),[34] Kant makes a distinction between the "*Ich als Mensch*" and the "*Ich als Intelligenz,*" and explicates the concept of soul (*Seele*) in terms of this distinction. "*Dieses Ich kann im zweifachen Verstande genommen werden: Ich als Mensch, und Ich als Intelligenz. Ich, als ein Mensch, bin ein Gegenstand des innern und aeusseren Sinnes. Ich als Intelligenz bin ein Gegenstand des inneren Sinnes nur; ich sage nicht: ich bin ein Koerper, sondern: das an mir ist, ist ein Koerper. Diese Intelligenz, die mit dem Koerper verbunden ist, und den Menschen ausmacht, heisst Seele; aber allein betrachtet ohne den Koerper heisst sie Intelligenz. Die Seele ist also nicht blos denkende Substanz, sondern in so fern sie mit dem Koerper verbunden eine Einheit ausmacht. Demnach sind die Veraenderungen des Koerpers meine Veraenderungen*" (AA XXVIII: 224-6).[35] The "I as intelligence" has no object in outer sense while the "I as person" is the unity of the body and the powers of the mind. And the concept of the "soul" is not simply to be associated with intelligence, but includes all changes in the body. In other words, the soul is to be identified with the "*Ich als Mensch,*" the person (*Mensch*), and not merely the "I as intelligence."

In the A paralogisms of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant defines the "soul" as the "thinking I" ("*Nun ist die Seele, oder das denkende Ich*…." (*KrV*, A351)). If we interpret this passage in light of Kant's view that the soul is to be identified with the "I as person" rather than the "I as intelligence," which we would have to do because Kant has distinguished the soul from the "I as intelligence," then the "thinking I" encompasses all representations associated not only with the mind but also with the body. We do not

[34] The dating of these lecture notes has been controversial. I follow Wolfgang Carl on the issue, who dates these lectures as emerging between 1777 and 1780.
[35] In the lecture notes and the *Reflexionen*, there are many old spellings and spelling mistakes. It would be too cumbersome to mark all of these with a "[sic]," and, therefore, I leave them as they are.

merely think about aspects of our life relating to our mind, but also think of aspects relating to the body. Thus, the soul may be viewed as the "thinking I," and the "thinking I" can be identified with the "I as person" rather than "I as intelligence," and we can say that Kant's remark in the A paralogisms bolsters the characterization of the soul as identified with the "I as person" but different from the "I" as intelligence.

If the soul is the "I as person" and distinguishable from the "I as intelligence," what is the relationship between the soul and the "I as intelligence"? In the A paralogisms, Kant says, "*Denn, in dem was wir Seele nennen, ist alles im kontinuierlichen Flusse und nichts Bleibendes, ausser etwa (wenn man es durchaus will) das darum so einfache Ich, weil diese Vorstellung keinen Inhalt, mithin kein Mannigfaltiges hat, weswegen sie auch scheint ein einfaches Objekt vorzustellen, oder besser gesagt, zu bezeichnen*" (*KrV*, A381-2). The soul is to be construed as a general "container" for representations that are forever appearing and fading away, and the "I" is to be seen as only one of its representations – a special kind of representation because, unlike other representations, it may somehow be seen as persisting (*Bleibendes*). Hence, in classificatory terms, the representation "I" clearly has to belong to the soul rather than the other way round. And Kant emphasizes this again when he says in the A paralogisms that the "I" is the only persisting representation in the soul ("*da, wir an der Seele keine beharrliche Erscheinung antreffen, als nur die Vorstellung Ich, welche sie alle begleitet und verknuepft*" (*KrV*, A364)).

If the soul is the "I as person" and different from the "I as intelligence;" the soul "contains" the "I" as a representation; and the soul, characterized as the "I as person," contains all representations whether relating to the body or the mind; -- then we can say

that the soul could be seen as also "containing" the "I." If the "I as person" is the "thinking I" or the soul and the soul "contains" the "I," we can only make sense of this statement if we say that the soul "contains" the "I" because the "I as person" is the soul itself and cannot be logically seen as "containing" itself as a representation. Hence, on Kant's view, the soul consists of all the representations of a person, and the "I" as a simple and empty (*keinen Inhalt*) representation is one such representation.

But Kant does not seem to be consistent on the issue. In the lecture notes dating from the time after the A edition of the first *Critique* had been published, *Metaphysik Mrongovius* (1782-3), Kant speaks of the "I" in the broader and narrower senses. He says, "*Die Seele ist bloss unser Ich, nicht der Koerper, aber Koerper und Seele heissen zusammen als menschliches Bewusstsein auch Ich*" (AA XXVIII: 876). And further, "*Dieses Selbst koennen wir aber 3fach betrachten: Ich denke als Intelligenz, d. h. das Subject des Denkens ist Intelligenz. Ich denke als Subject, das Sinnlichkeit hat, und bin Seele*" (AA XXVIII: 878). In these passages, Kant seems to be sometimes characterizing the soul as the "I" (*Die Seele ist bloss unser Ich*) because the "I" does not include the body, and sometimes identifying the soul with the "I as person" (*Ich denke als Subject, das Sinnlichkeit hat, und bin Seele*) which is the unity of body and mind. On the one hand, the soul is merely the "I" and not the body, but, on the other hand, it can also be characterized as the "I as person" including both soul and body. How can the soul be the "I" that excludes the body and the "I as person" that includes the "I of intelligence" as only one of its representations at the same time?

But this apparent contradiction can easily be resolved. The soul can be taken as the "I as person" (inner and outer object) and distinguished from the "I of intelligence"

(inner object only), and, hence, can be seen as referring to the broader rather than the narrower definition of the "I." The narrower definition would, then, refer to the "I of intelligence" amenable to characterization as the subject of thinking and interpretable as one of the representations of the broader category "I as person," which includes all representations whether originating in the body or the mind. But the distinction between the "I as person" and "I as intelligence" may itself be seen as articulating two aspects of a general notion of the "I" (or "soul") and this general notion of the "I" (*Die Seele ist bloss unser Ich*) could be seen only as an inner object like the "I of intelligence" but could be distinguished from both the "I of intelligence" and "I as person." In *Metaphysik L1*, Kant says that the "I" refers only to the soul in the strict sense ("When I speak of the soul, then I speak of the "I" in the strict sense <in sensu stricto>," AA XXVIII: 265). And he says further, "*Die Seele ist aber ein Gegenstand des innern Sinnes. So fern ich mich nun als einen Gegenstand fuehle und dessen bewusst bin; so bedeutet dies das Ich* in sensu stricto *oder die Selbstheit nur allein, die Seele. Diesen Begriff der Seele wuerden wir nicht haben, wenn wir nicht von dem Object des inneren Sinnes alles Aeusere abtrahieren koennten; mithin druecke das Ich* in sensu stricto *nicht den ganzen Menschen, sondern die Seele allein aus*" (Ibid.). In this passage, the "I" in sensu stricto is restricted to being an inner object, and obtainable only if we abstracted everything outer from it. The "I as person" is both inner and outer object (since it includes the body), and, though the "I of intelligence" is only inner object like the "I" in stricto sensu, there is no reason to think that the "I of intelligence" and "I" in stricto sensu need to be necessarily identified with each other. (In fact, in the course of this dissertation, we will see that such identification would be an error). The "I" in sensu stricto is also called the "soul," just like the "I as

person," but the character of the "I" in sensu stricto (the "soul" as "*bloss Ich*") is different from the body because we can excise some portions of the body without affecting the unity of the "I" in the least (eg. if you cut a leg off, you still retain the ability to say the "I," Cf. *Metaphysik* L1, AA XXVIII: 225).

Hence, Kant designates both the "I" in sensu stricto and the "I as person" as "soul," but both of these must be separated from the "I of intelligence." We can make this account interpretively consistent if we say that the "I" in sensu stricto can be seen as distinguishable from the body, and this general concept of the "I" can be further subdivided into the "I as person" (also termed "soul") and the "I as intelligence." In order to characterize the relationship between the "soul" and the "I," we can, thus, say that the "soul" can be used to characterize the "I as person" or the "I" in sensu stricto, but not the "I of intelligence." [36] In the *Anthropologie,* the identity or self-sameness (*ebenderselbe*) of the discursive subject emerges in accordance with the soul (*Seele*) (AA VII: 134n). If we have successfully delineated the term "soul" and its relationship to the "I," we would have to say that the self-sameness of the discursive intellect can only be attributed to the soul if the soul is not equated with the "I as person" but instead with the "I" in sensu stricto gained through the abstraction from everything outer. If the soul were to be equated with the "I as person," we would be including the body, and that cannot be the

[36] In his essay reflecting on the "soul," Richard Aquila does not make the distinctions I have made, and restricting himself to the claim that the "I," as thinking, is an object of inner sense, and called "soul" (Cf. *KrV*, A342/B400). It is unclear how Aquila construes the "'I', as thinking" which is supposed to refer to the soul. Is it the "I" as person or the "I" in sensu stricto? Are the "I" and "soul" synonymous terms for Aquila? What is the "object of inner sense" – the "I as person" or "I" in stricto sensu? Aquila does not explore the relationship between the terms "soul" and "I," and focuses on a single definition of the "soul" in order to explore the possibility of "identifying" the "I" as inner subject rather than as a merely empty center of reference. Or, alternatively said, Aquila does not explore the notion of "soul" itself and its relationship to the "I," but merely uses a particular characterization of the "soul" in Kant's works in order to resolve the question of whether the "I" should be taken as "empty" center of reference or as identifiable as inner subject (Aquila, 48-9, fns. 5, 6). See Richard Aquila, "Self as Matter and Form: Some Reflections on Kant's View of the Soul," in *The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy*, eds. Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma (Albany: State University of New York Press), 1996, 31-54, 33.

reason for the self-sameness because we have just seen that the "I" remains unaffected even if parts of the body are excised.

Many questions still remain unresolved: Why does Kant use the same term, "soul," to characterize both the "I" in sensu stricto and the "I as person"? What is the relationship between the soul characterized as "I" in stricto sensu and the "I of intelligence"? Even if we can assume that Kant speaks of the soul, or "I" in stricto sensu, as demarcating the subject from her body, what is the relationship between the "I of intelligence" and the "I as person"? These are difficult questions, but some insights may be gained from our analysis. (a) The term "soul" can be used to conceptually distinguish the "I" from the body, and it can be used to distinguish the "I as person" from the "I as intelligence." (b) The soul, or the "I" in stricto sensu gained through the possibility of abstraction from outer perceptions, can be seen as conceptually separable from the body in principle, but, concomitantly, the soul, or "I as person" includes representations associated not only with the mind (inner) but also with the body (outer). (c) The term "soul" can be identified with the "I" in stricto sensu to the extent we speak of the "I" as the possibility of possessing an inner life abstracted from outer perception. (d) Hence, although Kant himself does not say how the self is threefold ("*3-fach*," AA XXVIII: 878, quoted above), we can characterize the soul in the broader and narrower senses: the soul is simply the limiting concept (*Grenzbegriff*) separating the mind from the body, and the soul is the "I as person" or the "thinking I" encompassing all representations whether relating to the body or mind. The concept of the soul can be taken as synonymous with the concept of the "I" because the "I" can also be divided into a narrower *Grenzbegriff* and a broader concept of the person (Cf. AA XXVIII: 876, quoted above). However, the

self, or the "I," includes a third conceptual component, the "I of intelligence," which does not apparently seem to be included in the way Kant conceptualizes the soul, although if the soul is to be characterized as the "thinking I" or "I as person," then the "I of intelligence" has to be seen as forming part of the "soul" in the broader sense, and as conceptually distinguished from the "I in stricto sensu." Conceptual divisions in philosophy have their foundation in the overall system of philosophy, and, for reasons not yet entirely clear, Kant wished to characterize the self, or the "I," in a threefold way – (i) "I" as *Grenzbegriff*, (ii) "I as intelligence" and (iii) "I as person." The difference between the concepts of "I" and the "soul" lie in the fact that, unlike the term "I," the term "soul" can be used to characterize (i) and (iii), but not (ii).

(2) Not only did Kant leave the relationship between the "soul" and the "I" conceptually inexplicit, Kant also failed to specify the similarity or distinction between the usages of the terms "I" and "I think." In this sub-section, I show that (i) textual aporias emerge if we conflate the terms "I" and the "I think," and that (ii) Kant employs an implicit distinction between the "I" and the "I think" which, if taken seriously, can help make better sense of the term "I," and, more specifically, of the puzzling contradiction in his presenting the "I think" as both *a priori* and empirical. In what follows, ((a)-(e)), I will be offering reasons for accepting these two claims.

(a) In the B-paralogisms of the first *Critique*, Kant says, "*Das Ich denke ist, wie schon gesagt, ein empirischer Satz, und haelt den Satz, Ich existiere, in sich. Ich kann aber nicht sagen: alles, was denkt, existiert; denn da wuerde die Eigenschaft des Denkens alle*

Wesen, die sie besitzen, zu notwendigen Wesen machen. Daher kann meine Existenz auch nicht aus dem Satze, Ich denke, als gefolgert angesehen werden, wie Cartesius dafuer hielt, (weil sonst der Obersatz: alles, was denkt, existiert, vorausgesehen muesste,) sondern ist mit ihm identisch" (*KrV*, B422n). In this passage, Kant contests Descartes's conclusion that the "I am" or the "I exist" may be derived from the "I think." The existence of the "I," he counters, is already contained in the expression "I think," or, alternatively said, the existence of the "I" is always already built into the fact that thinking exists. The proposition "I exist" can be viewed as identical with the proposition "I think."

In refusing to make any conceptual distinction between the "I exist" (or "I") and the "I think," most Kant interpreters might probably draw on this statement by Kant if questioned about why they thought the equation of the "I" and "I think" as self-evident.[37] But I would like to offer some reasons for conceptually distinguishing between the "I" and "I think" in the Kantian system.

In the passage quoted, Kant is concerned mainly with refuting Descartes, and he offers the following arguments. Firstly, we cannot say that everything which thinks must necessarily exist because that would invalidly mean drawing a necessary connection between thinking and existing. And, secondly, owing to the fact that we cannot make such a connection between thinking and existing, Kant asserts the fact that "I exist" is identical with the empirical proposition "I think."

[37] Few commentators care to even mention let alone investigate the validity of conflating the "I" and "I think," but that such a view is common can be seen in Henry Allison's commentary, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, where he simply identifies the "I" and "I think" without justification ("this identical *I think*, that is, 'the bare representation I'….," Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 172.

Yet, it would be an unfair reading of Kant if we conflated the concepts “I” and “I think” on the basis of this passage. The conflation of the terms, “I” and “I think,” ought to be viewed in the context of criticizing Descartes. Kant argues against Descartes in a way the latter would not himself have argued: by refusing the necessary connection between thinking and existing because we can intelligibly imagine beings that could think without existing. Hence, it could be argued that these terms may be considered synonymous only in relation to the concept of existence. In other words, it is possible to assert the synonymy of the “I” and “I think” if we are required to describe these terms in relation to the concept of existence, and, more specifically, in the context of the question of whether we can infer the “I exist” from the “I think” apodictically.

But this does not mean that the “I” and “I think” ought to be taken to be synonymous in general. This is especially the case if we consider the general mode of conceptual division in Kant’s system. Kant says that the “I think” is an empirical proposition (*empirischer Satz*), and contains the proposition “I exist” (*Ich existiere*) in itself (*KrV*, B422n). If a proposition x can be seen as falling under another proposition y analogous to the way a concept falls under another concept and if the subordination of concepts in Kant’s logic requires that we make conceptual divisions between singular concepts before we can undertake such subordination (as it does), then the possibility of the distinction between the “I” and the “I think” exists in general. The “I,” or “I am” or “I exist,” are marks denoting a particular phenomenological existent, and should be seen as conceptually demarcated from a more complex phenomenological existent, “I think.” Only if such a distinction between these two phenomenological existents already exists could we say that the “I exist” ought to be seen as *contained* (*haelt in sich*) in the “I

think," as Kant does. In other words, Kant can contradict Descartes and posit the identity of the "I" and the "I think" only if he is himself aware of a phenomenological distinction between them. If Kant can understand the distinction, then the distinction is possible at the very least.

Hence, the passage from the B-paralogisms (*KrV*, B422n), which seems to substantiate the conflation of "I" and "I think," does not really show that these terms should be taken as synonymous.

(b) In (1) above, we had seen that Kant uses the term "I" in three senses – (i) "I" as *Grenzbegriff* (called the "soul"), (ii) the "I as intelligence," and (iii) the "I as person" or the "thinking I" (can also be called the soul in the broader sense because it includes both inner mental and outer bodily representations).

In the B paralogisms of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant characterizes the "I think" as an indeterminate empirical intuition (*KrV*, B422n), but also as judgment (*KrV*, A341/B399). Apart from that, he describes the "I think" as an *a priori* proposition. In a handwritten note in the margins of A401 (Paralogisms),[38] Kant says "'*Ich denke' ist ein Satz a priori; ist eine blosse Categorie des Subjects, intellectuale Vorstellung ohne irgendwo und irgendwenn, also nicht empirisch*" (E CLX; E XLVI where it is described as "*Spontaneitaet des Denkens*"; *KrV*, B429 where it is described as "*blosse logische Funktion*"). How can the "I think" be an intuition, a judgment and an intellectual representation at the same time? Could we reconcile this apparent inconsistency if we make a distinction between the "I" as *Grenzbegriff* and the "I think"?

[38] All references to Kant's handwritten notes from Benno Erdmann (Hrsg.), *Nachtraege zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Kiel: Lipsius & Tischer, 1881), and henceforth referred to as "E (Roman numeral)."

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant characterizes the "I think" as a priori and as judgment. In the Paralogisms, having said that there is a transcendental concept which does not belong to the table of categories, Kant says of this concept, "*Dieses ist der Begriff, oder, wenn man lieber will, das Urteil: Ich denke. Man sieht aber leicht, dass er das Vehikel aller Begriffe ueberhaupt, und mithin auch der transzendentalen sei, und also unter diesen jederzeit mit begriffen werde, und daher eben sowohl transzendental sei, aber keinen besondern Titel haben koenne, weil er nur dazu dient, alles Denken, als zum Bewusstsein gehoerig, aufzufuehren*" (*KrV*, A341/B399). Kant presents the "I think" as a concept (or rather judgment) which is the vehicle of all concepts since there could be no use of the categories if the possibility of the "I think" did not exist. And the task of the "I think" is to introduce (*auffuehren*) all thinking to consciousness. The term "*auffuehren*" is vague and difficult to translate in this passage. Thinking proceeds through the application of the pure categories, but, in principle, thinking could proceed without consciousness even if there were no employment of the "I think" (for instance, in the case of another kind of being), and the task of the "I think" is to bring all thinking to consciousness. If we translate "*auffuehren*" with "bringing something to something" rather than Guyer's "introducing," then we can say that the "I think" as judgment may be seen as the *a priori* condition for the possibility of thinking in general and the conscious articulation of such thoughts. And for a discursive subject "bringing" thinking to consciousness can be construed as directing attention to thoughts such that they can be consciously articulated.

Hence, the "I think" is a concept (or judgment) separate from the categories whose task consists in bringing thinking to consciousness or conscious articulation. But

Kant denies explicitly that the "I" can be a concept. In the *Prolegomena* (1783), Kant says that the "I" is "*gar kein Begriff* (AA IV: 334n). And in the *Metaphysische Anfangsgruenden der Naturwissenschaft*, he says, "*Der Gedanke Ich ist dagegen gar kein Begriff…*" (AA IV: 543). In the *Reflexionen*, Kant says that the "I" cannot be a concept ("*Ich, welches gleichwohl kein Begrif…*," AA XVII: 3921). If the "I think" is construed as a concept or judgment that makes thinking possible (and momentarily leaving aside the controversy about whether the "I think" is an *a priori* or an empirical proposition), we can say that the "I think" should be distinguished from the "I" at the pain of contradiction. If the "I" cannot be a concept and the "I think" has been characterized as a concept (or judgment) and if the "I think" is supposed to be interchangeable with the "I" (as many Kant interpreters assume), then a contradiction results. In other words, if the "I" is taken to be interchangeable with the "I think," then the "I" would have to be described as both concept and not-concept, which is contradictory.

(c) We have seen that the "I think" is a concept (or judgment) separate from the categories whose task consists in directing attention to my thoughts and, thus, bringing them to conscious articulation. If we explore further the judgment "I think," we find clear differences in the way Kant thinks of judgments (and, hence, the "I think" if it is seen as judgment) and the "I," which cannot be seen as concept or judgment.

In the *Jaesche Logik*, Kant relates the notion of judgment and the unity of consciousness in the following way. "*Ein Urtheil ist die Vorstellung der Einheit des Bewusstseins verschiedener Vorstellungen oder die Vorstellung des Verhaeltnisses derselben, sofern sie einen Begriff ausmachen*" (AA IX: 101). A judgment is the

representation of the unity of consciousness of different representations or the representation of the relationship of these different representations to the extent the representation (or judgment) constitutes a concept. In other words, a judgment is *a* representation consisting of a unity of consciousness in which different representations come together under a concept. For example, from time, t1 to t4, I might be perceiving features of the table, and, then, at t5, when I judge the table as table, I bring all the representations from t1 to t4 under one representation at t5. In other words, I am conscious of the table as table when I can judge it as a table. Or, to take another example, I may see something reddish at time, t1, and judge it as red in time, t2.

In light of such a characterization of the "I think" as a judgment, let us examine the notion of the transcendental unity of apperception (or the "I") in order to investigate if we can distinguish between the "I" and the "I think."

In the A deduction of the first *Critique*, Kant says, "*Diese urspruengliche und transzendentale Bedingung ist nun keine andere, als die transzendentale Apperzeption. Das Bewusstsein seiner selbst, nach den Bestimmungen unseres Zustandes, bei der innere Wahrnehmung ist bloss empirisch, jederzeit wandelbar, es kann kein stehendes oder bleibendes Selbst in diesem Flusse innrer Erscheinungen geben, und wird gewoehnlich der innre Sinn genannt, oder die empirische Apperzeption* (*KrV*, A107)" & "*Das, was notwendig als numerisch identisch vorgestellt werden soll, kann nicht als ein solches durch empirische Data gedacht werden. Es muss eine Bedingung sein, die vor aller Erfahrung vorhergeht, und diese selbst moeglich macht, welche eine solche transzendentale Voraussetzung geltend machen soll*" (Ibid.). In other words, the identity of the "I" cannot be thought through empirical data which is ever in flux. It has to be

presupposed as being prior to experience. And further, no cognition and combination of representations can occur if there were no prior unity of consciousness -- "*Nun koennen keine Erkenntnisse in uns statt finden, keine Verknuepfung und Einheit derselben unter einander, ohne diejenige Einheit des Bewusstseins, welche vor allem Datis der Anschauungen vorhergeht, und, worauf in Beziehung, alle Vorstellung von Gegenstaenden allein moeglich ist,*" (Ibid.).

The "I," thus, is prior to experience and condition for the possibility of all combination, unity and cognition. But construed this way, the "I" cannot be seen as performing the same conceptual task as the "I think" characterized as judgment. We have seen that the task of the "I think" as judgment is to bring all thinking *to* consciousness where the dative "to" could indicate some kind of activity that enables the discursive subject to consciously judge something as something at a particular point of time, *t*. On the other hand, the task of the "I" is different. The "I" is the pre-condition for consciousness in general. It marks the horizon or boundary of what can be conscious in general (*ueberhaupt*). And it is only following from the fact of unified consciousness that the possibility of unified experience (or judgment) can emerge (Cf. Carl, 113-4). If the precondition of the possibility of a unified consciousness is not fulfilled, then judgment is not possible: the discursive intellect must be amenable to being conscious of something in the first place in order to judge it *as* something. A judgment can only bring all thinking to consciousness (*auffuehren*) if there is the possibility of a unified consciousness in the first place. And the condition for the possibility of a unified consciousness is the "I." Hence, the "I think" as judgment presupposes the "I," and, given that the former is associated with the unification in judgment and the latter is associated with the

unification of consciousness itself, we can say that the “I think” would have to be distinguished conceptually from the “I.”

(d) In the B paralogisms of the first *Critique*, there are some passages that implicitly make a distinction between the “I” and “thinking” or implicitly describe the “I think” as a complex that includes the “I” as part of its content. This is despite the fact that, at first glance, Kant often seems to conflate the “I” and the “I think” in the B paralogisms. In a particularly interesting passage, Kant says that the “I think” can be reduced to simpler parts, which supports my view that, in theoretical terms, the “I” should be seen as a logical concept subordinated to the more complex concept or judgment, “I think.” In the B paralogisms, describing the analytical procedure in general, he states that the “I think” can be analyzed (*zergliedern*) (*KrV*, B418), but, at the same time, he seems to identify the “I” and the “I think” in the syntax of the statement, “*Befolgen wir dagegen das analytische Verfahren, da das Ich denke, als ein Satz, der schon ein Dasein in sich schliesst, als gegeben, mithin die Modalitaet, zum Grunde liegt, und zergliedern ihn, um seinen Inhalt, ob und wie naemlich dieses Ich im Raum oder der Zeit bloss dadurch sein Dasein bestimmt, zu erkennen…*” (*KrV*, B418). The “*dieses*” suggests that Kant is referring to the “I think” in the beginning of the sentence. However, we can equally easily mark the difference between the “I think” and the “I”: the former is seen as a *proposition* that can be analyzed, while the “I” cannot be seen as an analyzable proposition because, as Kant says many times, it is a logical simple. Hence, the “I” can only be seen as belonging to the complex proposition, “I think,” as its content (*Inhalt*). Considering that Kant never explicitly identified the “I” and the “I think,” we can venture

that the "I" is not synonymous with the "I think" because we need to analyze (*zergliedern*) the "I think" in order to explore the question of the cognition of the "I," the question of whether the "I" can be determined in space or time merely through its existence. If the "I" and "I think" were synonymous, there would have been no need for any analysis of the "I think" as a *proposition* in order to explicate the question of the cognition of the "I;" and if we need to analyze the "I think" in order to infer something about the "I," then the latter can be seen as conceptually subordinated to the former.

Similarly, there are other passages in which Kant conceptually separates the "I" from the concept of "thinking." Kant says, "*In allen Urteilen bin ich nun immer das bestimmende Subjekt desjenigen Verhaeltnisses, welches das Urteil ausmacht. Dass aber Ich, der ich denke, im Denken immer als Subjekt, und als etwas, was nicht bloss wie Praedikat dem Denken anhaenge, betrachtet werden kann, gelten muesse, ist ein apodiktischer und selbst identischer Satz*" (*KrV*, B407). In this passage, Kant speaks of the "I" as the "determining subject," as determining the relation constituting judgment, and asserts that it is a self-identical proposition that the "I," which I *think*, can only be subject and not a predicate in relation to thinking. If the "I" seems to ontologically require thinking and, as noted above, the "I think" is a judgment constituted of both the "I" as subject of thinking and thinking, then the terms "I" and "I think" cannot be (at least) taken as coterminous. In another passage, Kant seems to distinguish the "I" and "thinking" more clearly. "*Allein in dem dritten Satz* [*Ich als einfaches Subjekt*] *wird die absolute Einheit der Apperzeption, das Einfache Ich, in der Vorstellung, drauf sich alle Verbindung oder Trennung, welche das Denken ausmacht, bezieht…*" (*KrV*, B419). In this passage, Kant uses "*sich beziehen auf*" to describe the relationship between the "I"

and thinking, which latter is (further) described as the combination and separation of representations, and he says that all thinking, combination or separation of representations, relate to the "*absolute Einheit der Apperzeption, das Einfache Ich*…" The distinction between "I" and the "I think" is clear even if implicit: the "I" is supposed to be related to thinking, and the "I think" is a complex constituted of "I" and thinking. In general, if the "I" is empty (*leer*) and requires thinking; if the "I think" is a judgment that brings thinking to consciousness ((a)-(c) above); and if the "I" is the horizon of consciousness, or the *Grenzbegriff*, that makes possible the unity of consciousness which, in turn, makes judgment possible ((a) above); -- then, we can certainly say that the "I" is conceptually distinguishable from the "I think."

In another complex passage, Kant defines the "I" as only the consciousness of my thinking. "*Nun haben wir aber in der inneren Anschauung gar nichts Beharrliches, denn das Ich ist nur das Bewusstsein meines Denkens; also fehlt es uns auch, wenn wir bloss beim Denken stehen bleiben, an der notwendigen Bedingung, den Begriff der Substanz, d. i. eines fuer sich bestehenden Subjekts, auf sich selbst als denkend Wesen anzuwenden, und die damit verbundene Einfachheit der Substanz faellt mit der objektiven Realitaet dieses Begriffs gaenzlich weg, und wird in eine blosse logische qualitative Einheit des Selbstbewusstseins im Denken ueberhaupt, das Subjekt mag zusammengesetzt sein oder nicht, verwandeln*" (*KrV*, B413). We had earlier seen that it is the "I think" that brings thinking to consciousness, and now we learn that the "I" is the consciousness of my thinking. I believe we can accommodate the new claim that the "I" is the consciousness of my thinking and yet distinguish the "I" and the "I think" the way I have hitherto done if we harness three Kantian claims. (i) The "I" can be distinguished from thinking (*KrV*,

B407, quoted above). (ii) Kant often describes the "I think" as an *a priori* proposition -- in a handwritten note in the margins of A401 (Paralogisms) of the first *Critique*, Kant says "'*Ich denke' ist ein Satz a priori; ist eine blosse Categorie des Subjects, intellectuale Vorstellung ohne irgendwo und irgendwenn, also nicht empirisch*" (E CLX; E XLVI where it is described as "*Spontaneitaet des Denkens*"; *KrV*, B429 where it is described as "*blosse logische Funktion*"). (iii) We have seen that the "I" is the horizon of consciousness and the condition for the possibility of the "I think," which is to be characterized as judgment. The argument, then, runs as follows. If the "I" and "thinking" can be conceptually distinguished (*KrV*, B413) and the "I" makes possible the consciousness of my thinking and also forms the horizon of consciousness, then we can say that the "I think" as judgment requires not merely the possibility of thinking but also the possibility of being conscious of this thinking. At the same time, however, the "I" is the consciousness of my thinking to the extent we have the *a priori* (or even empirical, if we take particular cases of the "I think," eg. "I think that is red" or "I think that it will rain," etc.) "I think" as function bringing thinking (the first element) to consciousness (the second element, whose unity requires the "I" so that it is the "I" that forms the horizon of consciousness). Hence, we find a reciprocal relationship between the *a priori* "I" and *a priori* "I think," and if two concepts can be reciprocally related, they must be assumed to be conceptually separate from each other; but further, the "I" can be conceptually subordinated to the "I think" theoretically, but not vice versa because the "I think" is a complex constituted of not only the "I" but "thinking."

In another very important passage, Kant again seems to distinguish the "I" and "I think," and takes the "I" as forming part of the more complex concept, "I think." He says,

"*Denn es ist zu merken, dass, wenn ich den Satz: ich denke, einen empirischen Satz genannt habe, ich dadurch nicht sagen will, das Ich in diesem Satze sei empirische Vorstellung; vielmehr ist sie rein intellektuell, weil sie zum Denken ueberhaupt gehoert. Allein ohne irgend eine empirische Vorstellung, die den Stoff zum Denken abgibt, wuerde der Actus, Ich denke, doch nicht stattfinden, und das Empirische ist nur die Bedingung der Anwendung, oder des Gebrauchs des reinen intellektuellen Vermoegens*" (*KrV,* B423n; also "*Der Satz, Ich denke, oder, ich existiere denkend, ist ein empirischer Satz,*" *KrV,* B428). The "I" can be seen as forming part of the complex concept "I think" and even if the "I think" is to be seen as empirical, the "I" must remain a purely intellectual ability (*Vermoegen*). All discursively cognizing subjects can be associated with the "I" and "I think;" and both the "I" as purely intellectual representation and the *Actus* "I think" can become operational (*taetig*) only if, apart from the "I," the stuff of thinking is also given. In other words, only if the elements, "I" and "thinking," are given can the Actus "I think" be conceived as possible, which obviously suggests that the "I think" is conceptually more complex than the "I" and, hence, not coterminous with it. The "I" is a logically necessary representation. It is required if we are to be able to think in general, and the "I" forms part of the "I think." Kant says "*Dass das Ich der Apperception, folglich in jedem Denken, ein Singular sei, der nicht in eine Vielheit der Subjekte aufgeloeset werden kann, mithin ein logisch einfaches Subjekt bezeichne, liegt schon im Begriffe des Denkens, ist folglich ein analytischer Satz*" (*KrV,* B407-8) & "*Dass aber Ich, der ich denke, im Denken immer als Subjekt, und als etwas, was nicht bloss wie Praedikat dem Denken anhaenge, betrachtet werden kann, gelten muesse, ist ein apodiktischer und selbst identischer Satz*" (*KrV,* B407). In other words, the fact that the "I" forms part of

the “I think” is an analytical proposition. But, as we have seen from the numerous passages above, the “I” can be conceptually isolated from “thinking,” and, thus, the “I” and “I think” would have to be seen as having different conceptual extensions in the Kantian system.

Moreover, if we interpret the above-mentioned passage (B423n) closely, we can resolve the apparent contradiction of describing the “I think” as both *a priori* and empirical. If the “I think” requires the “I” and the stuff of thinking in order to be possible and if the “I think” is a judgment potentially made by all discursive intellects, then the “I think” has to be construed as *a priori*, as depicting the particular form of judgment characterizing the discursive intellect. Yet, the “I think” may be seen as an empirical proposition as well when it relates to particular cases of judging. Different people are different spatiotemporal unities with different sets of sensible and cognitive representations, and, hence, the stuff of thinking and *a fortiori* the content of judgments can be seen as different for different people. And because thinking presupposes space, time and (empirical) inner sense in general for any discursive intellect, the “I think” can be thought of as an empirical proposition because different discursive intellects are individuated by a different combination of representations whether sensible or cognitive. Hence, each individual discursive intellect can be viewed as having a different set of representations and, thus, different thoughts, and it is in this sense that each of these spatiotemporal unities or individualities have, as it were, a different empirical “I think.” Yet, the fact *that* the discursive intellect possesses the “I” and the fact *of* “thinking” must be seen as remaining uniform across individual discursive intellects, and hence the combination of the “I” and “think” can be conceived of as an *a priori* proposition (the *a*

priori "I think) if we abstract from the sensible representations required for thinking. Even if our thoughts are different, the "I" and the fact of "I think" in general remains the same across beings having a discursive intellect.[39]

Some passages in Kant's works support such an interpretation. Kant says clearly that the "I think" is not merely a logical function but also an empirical proposition to the extent it includes representations of inner sense (or receptivity). In fact, the *a priori* "I think" requires sensible representations before the "I think" can be considered an empirical proposition. He says, "*Der Satz aber, Ich denke, so fern er so viel sagt, als: ich existiere denkend, ist nicht blosse logische Funktion, sondern bestimmet das Subjekt (welches denn zugleich Objekt ist) in Ansehung der Existenz, und kann ohne den inneren Sinn nicht stattfinden, dessen Anschauung jederzeit das Objekt nicht als Ding an sich selbst, sondern bloss als Erscheinung an die Hand gibt* (*KrV*, B429-30)" Then, B430, Kant says that the "*innere empirische Anschuung*" is "*sinnlich*." But he comes to this by saying, "*In ihm* [*der Satz "ich denke"*] *ist also schon nicht mehr blosse Spontaneitaet des Denkens, sondern auch Rezeptivitaet der Anschauung, d. i. das Denken meiner selbst auf die empirische Anschauung eben desselben Subjekts angewandt* (*KrV*, B430)." In Kant's system, the representations of inner sense individuate particular human beings, and if the "I think" as empirical proposition includes the stuff of thought but as *a priori* only means that discursive intellects must employ the "I" in relation to thinking in order to judge something in the form of "I think that x," then we can characterize the "I think" as *a priori* or empirical depending on the context, just as Kant does.

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[39] Such an interpretation does not naturally contradict the fact that Kant makes a distinction between objective and subjective judgments. In the present context, we are less concerned with this distinction and more concerned with explicating the *a priori* "I think" in general. An objective judgment abstracts from the various individual positions while the subjective judgment does not; but in each case, it is the *a priori* "I think" that forms the precondition for judgment.

We can find other evidence to support the view that Kant can consistently describe the "I think" as both *a priori* and empirical. Kant asserts that the *a priori* features can be expressed in empirical terms, which indicates that there is no contradiction in describing the "I think" as *a priori* or as empirical in different contexts, or, for that matter, describing the "I" as *a priori* or empirical. In a letter to Beck, Kant says that the *a priori* ability cannot be found in the representations of sense, but it can always be viewed from the perspective of sensibility, or the empirical, spatiotemporal point of view. "*Ich fange damit an, daß ich Erfahrung durch empirisches Erkentnis definire. Erkentnis aber ist die Vorstellung eines gegebenen Objects als eines solchen durch Begriffe; sie ist empirisch, wenn das Object in der Vorstellung der Sinne (welche also zugleich Empfindung und diese mit Bewustseyn verbunden d. i. Wahrnehmung enthält) Erkentnis aber a priori, wenn das Object zwar, aber nicht in der Sinnenvorstellung (die also doch nichts desto weniger immer sinnlich seyn kan) gegeben ist* (AA XI: 313-6, 315-6, 1792)." An *a priori* cognition can always be viewed as sensible (*nichts desto weniger immer sinnlich seyn kan*). Similarly, in the A deduction, Kant describes the "I" as "*Erkenntnisquelle*," and says that it can be viewed both as empirical and as making the empirical possible, as *a priori*. "*Es sind drei subjective Erkenntnisquellen, worauf die Moeglichkeit einer Erfahrung ueberhaupt, und Erkenntnis der Gegenstaende der selben beruht: Sinn, Einbildungskraft und Apperzeption; jede derselben kann als empirisch, naemlich in der Anwendung auf gegebene Erscheinungen betrachtet werden, alle sind auch Elemente oder Grundlagen a priori, welche selbst diesen empirischen Gebrauch moeglich machen*" (*KrV,* A115).

Hence, the “I” and the “I think” can be seen as having different conceptual extensions, and, therefore, cannot be seen as coterminous. Even if a skeptic may accept my argument that the “I” and “I think” have different conceptual extensions, she may wonder why Kant himself did not specify the difference. Apart from the fact that Kant himself never offered a theory of self and therefore could not have been expected to be highly self-conscious on such issues, the answer could lie in Kant’s indecision regarding terminology. In (1) above, we had seen that Kant uses the term “I” in three senses – (i) “I” as *Grenzbegriff* (can also be called the “soul”), (ii) the “I as intelligence,” and (iii) the “I as person” or the “thinking I” (can also be called the soul in the broader sense). The question, then, is: Is the term “I” to be restricted to (i)? Or can it accommodate the broader scope of (iii)? This issue becomes especially pressing if we are aware that we use the word “I” in both these senses in everyday life. And Kant seems to have been aware of this terminological ambiguity when he says “*Die Seele ist bloss unser Ich, nicht der Koerper, aber Koerper und Seele heissen zusammen als menschliches Bewusstsein auch Ich*” (AA XVIII: 876, *Metaphysik Mongrovius* (1782-3)).

(e) From (a)-(d), we have seen that the “I” and “I think” can indeed be distinguished, and we have arrived at the following classification: (i) the “I” as purely intellectual and *a priori* but conceptually different from the *a priori* “I think,” and (ii) the “I” as purely intellectual and different from the empirical “I think.” The “I” is purely logical and forms the horizon of consciousness while the “I think” is a judgment classifiable as both *a priori* and empirical from different perspectives. It is *a priori* to the extent the concepts “I” and “think” must hang together *a priori* if the discursive intellect is to be able to

judge in the form “I think that x” in the first place. On the other hand, the “I think” is an empirical proposition to the extent it must include not only the purely intellectual “I” and the possibility of thinking but also the contribution of the inner sense, which constitutes the stuff of thinking. In (1) above, we had come across another classification. According to this classification, Kant uses the term “I” in three senses – (i) “I” as *Grenzbegriff* (can also be called the “soul”), (ii) the “I as intelligence,” and (iii) the “I as person” or the “thinking I” (can also be called the soul in the broader sense). The question to be posed is: can we think of the two classifications as cohering with each other? I will treat of this question again once I have delineated yet another classificatory schema – “I as subject,” “I as object,” and “I as content” – in the next section.

II

Throughout the critical *oeuvre*, Kant is remarkably consistent in distinguishing the “I as subject” from the “I as object.” In this section, I characterize the distinction.

(1) In the *Anthropologie*, Kant makes a distinction between the “I of reflection” and the “I of apprehension.”

“*Weil Erfahrung empirisches Erkenntniß ist, zum Erkenntniß aber (da es auf Urtheilen beruht) Überlegung (reflexio), mithin Bewußtsein der Thätigkeit in Zusammenstellung des Mannigfaltigen der Vorstellung nach einer Regel der Einheit desselben, d. i. Begriff und (vom Anschauen unterschiedenes) Denken überhaupt, erfordert wird: so wird das Bewußtsein in das discursive (welches als logisch, weil es die Regel giebt, voran gehen muß) und das intuitive Bewußtsein eingetheilt werden; das erstere (die reine Apperception seiner Gemüthshandlung) ist einfach. Das Ich der Reflexion hält kein Mannigfaltiges in sich und ist in allen Urtheilen immer ein und dasselbe, weil es blos dies Förmliche des Bewußtseins, dagegen die innere Erfahrung das*

Materielle desselben und ein Mannigfaltiges der empirischen inneren Anschauung, das Ich der Apprehension, (folglich eine empirische Apperception) enthält" (AA VII: 141-2).

In this passage, Kant makes the following points: (a) Experience is empirical cognition which requires reflection (*Ueberlegung (reflexio)*), or concepts, judgments and thinking in general, apart from the manifold of representations. Hence, "consciousness" can be divided into discursive and intuitive consciousness. (b) The discursive consciousness is *Gemuethshandlung*, or pure apperception; it is logically simple; as "I of reflection," it has no manifold in itself, and it is the same in all judgments because it consists of (*enthaelt*) only the form of consciousness; on the other hand, the intuitive consciousness is the "I of apprehension" which consists of the inner experience of the material of the "I of reflection" (reading "*desselben*" as referring back to "*Das Ich der Reflexion*" and the "*es*") and a manifold of the empirical inner intuitions, and, hence (*folglich*) is associated with empirical apperception. In another passage of the *Anthropologie*, Kant speaks again of the consciousness of the self as divided into that of reflection and that of apprehension ("*das Bewußtsein seiner selbst (apperceptio) in das der Reflexion und das der Apprehension eingetheilt werden*," AA VII: 134n). The former is the consciousness of the understanding (pure apperception) and the latter is the consciousness of inner sense (empirical apperception) ("*Das erstere ist ein Bewußtsein des Verstandes, das zweite der innere Sinn; jenes die reine, dieses die empirische Apperception, da dann jene fälschlich der innere Sinn genannt wird*," Ibid.).

Hence, the "I of reflection" is the pure apperception associated with thinking, judging and concepts. The "I of apprehension," on the other hand, seems to include the material content of the "I of reflection" apart from the empirical content associated with

any spatiotemporally individuated discursive intellect. Both types of "I" can be described as "consciousness," either pure (or discursive) consciousness or intuitive consciousness.

In the same text, Kant makes an important distinction between "I as subject" and "I as object."

"*Ich, als denkendes Wesen, bin zwar mit Mir, als Sinnenwesen, ein und dasselbe Subject; aber als Object der inneren empirischen Anschauung, d. i. so fern ich innerlich von Empfindungen in der Zeit, so wie sie zugleich oder nach einander sind, afficirt werde, erkenne ich mich doch nur, wie ich mir selbst erscheine, nicht als Ding an sich selbst. Denn es hängt doch von der Zeitbedingung, welche kein Verstandesbegriff (mithin nicht bloße Spontaneität) ist, folglich von einer Bedingung ab, in Ansehung deren mein Vorstellungsvermögen leidend ist (und gehört zur Receptivität). Daher erkenne ich mich durch innere Erfahrung immer nur, wie ich mir erscheine* …. (AA VII: 142)."

"*Hier scheint uns nun das Ich doppelt zu sein (welches widersprechend wäre): 1) das Ich als Subject des Denkens (in der Logik), welches die reine Apperception bedeutet (das blos reflectirende Ich), und von welchem gar nichts weiter zu sagen, sondern das eine ganz einfache Vorstellung ist; 2) das Ich als das Object der Wahrnehmung, mithin des inneren Sinnes, was eine Mannigfaltigkeit von Bestimmungen enthält, die eine innere Erfahrung möglich machen. Die Frage, ob bei den verschiedenen inneren Veränderungen des Gemüths (seines Gedächtnisses oder der von ihm angenommenen Grundsätze) der Mensch, wenn er sich dieser Veränderung bewußt ist, noch sagen könne, er sei ebenderselbe (der Seele nach), ist eine ungereimte Frage; denn er kann sich dieser Veränderungen nur dadurch bewußt sein, daß er sich in den verschiedenen Zuständen als ein und dasselbe Subject vorstellt, und das ich des Menschen ist zwar der Form (der Vorstellungsart) nach, aber nicht der Materie (dem Inhalte) nach zweifach*" (AA VII: 134n).

In these passages, Kant makes many important claims relating to the term "I." In the first passage, he makes a distinction between construing the "I" as a subject and as an object (AA VII: 142). The "I" as thinking nature includes both aspects of the discursive

intellect, the thinking and the sensing, and its self-identity encompasses both these aspects and constitutes the "I" as subject. A discursive intellect possesses the object "I" as an inner empirical intuition and only to the extent it can be affected innerly by sensations in time, and, hence, the discursive intellect can cognize (*erkennen*) itself only as an appearance and not as a thing in itself. The "I" as subject seems to be a broader concept than the "I" as object because it encompasses both the thinking and sensing natures of the discursive intellect while the "I" as object relates only to the sensory aspect of the discursive intellect. In the second passage, however, Kant seems to describe the "I" as subject more narrowly when he says that the "I" as subject is the "*Ich als Subjekt des Denkens*" ("I as subject of thinking") and can be identified with pure apperception, or the reflecting "I," or the "I as intelligence," of which we had spoken earlier.

Thus, there seems to be a tension between these two passages in the way Kant characterizes the "I" as subject. We can avoid the seeming contradiction in the characterization if we interpret Kant's intentions in the following way: (i) in the first passage, the "I" as subject is the unity of the discursive intellect in general (*ueberhaupt*), and in this sense, includes both the thinking and sensing aspects of such an intellect – Kant says clearly ""*Ich, als denkendes Wesen, bin zwar mit Mir, als Sinnenwesen, ein und dasselbe Subject*" (AA VII: 142). And when Kant characterizes the "I" as subject in this way, he is speaking of the nature (*Wesen*) or characteristic form of the discursive intellect, that which makes the discursive intellect uniquely itself, and, therefore, he must characterize the "I" as subject as somehow including both its thinking and sensing natures. This would have to be the case because, as Kant says, the "I" may be twofold in form but it is singular in content (AA VII: 134n). In other words, the "I," which is always

the subject and never mere predicate, is phenomenologically singular in its pre-theoretical appearance but it ought to be described as possessing a twofold form on the theoretical level. Hence, the "I" as subject, in the first passage, can be seen as a *Grenzbegriff*, demarcating the "I" of any discursive intellect in its general form, and, hence, including both its thinking and sensing natures. This does not, however, mean that the "I" as subject in general cannot be conceptually separated from the body (eg. we can excise some body parts, and the "I" would not be divided), but that the "I" is form of the discursive intellect and includes both the thinking and sensory aspects of the discursive intellect as such. (ii) But, the "I" as subject as *Grenzbegriff* that is singular in content can be twofold in form, the "I as subject of thinking," the reflecting "I" or pure apperception and the "I" as object of perception. The "I as the subject of thinking" is the reflecting "I" or the "I of reflection" and needs to be distinguished from the "I as object of perception" or the "I of apprehension." The "I of reflection" underlies the formation of concepts and judgments while the "I of apprehension" belongs in the non-conceptual realm of appearances ("*Erscheinung ist aber gar kein Urtheil, sondern blos empirische Anschauung, die durch Reflexion und den daraus entspringenden Verstandesbegriff zur inneren Erfahrung und hiemit Wahrheit wird*" (AA: VII 142)). Thus, the general notion of the "I" as subject may be seen as a *Grenzbegriff* including both the intellectual and sensing natures of the discursive intellect, but it appears that this "I" can be twofold in form, the "I as subject of thinking" and the "I as object of perception," such that the former restricts itself to the intellectual and the latter to the sensory aspect of the discursive intellect (iii) Hence, we have a threefold characterization: "I" as subject in general; "I as subject of thinking" ("I

of reflection"); and "I as object" ("I of apprehension"). This classification of the "I" is formal or theoretical, though it is still unclear what that might mean.

Hence, we encounter three different classifications relating to the use of the term "I," and the task now is to explore if these apparently different classifications cohere with each other. The three classifications are:

(a) The "I" can be divided into -- (i) "I" as *Grenzbegriff* (can also be called the "soul"), (ii) the "I as intelligence," and (iii) the "I as person" or the "thinking I" (can also be called the soul in the broader sense).[40]

(b) Taking "I" and "I think" to have different conceptual extensions, we get the following division – (i) "I" as purely intellectual and *a priori*, (ii) the *a priori* "I think," which includes the pure "I" and the general possibility of synthetic thinking, and (iii) the "I think" as empirical proposition which includes the stuff of thinking.

(c) The three fold characterization of the "I": "I" as subject in general, as *Grenzbegriff*; "I as subject of thinking" ("I of reflection"); and "I as object" ("I of apprehension").

We begin with a comparison of (a) and (c). The "I" as *Grenzbegriff* can be taken as identical with the "I" as subject in general because each of these formulations marks the general nature (or form) of the discursive intellect. The "I of intelligence," the "I of

[40] As we had seen earlier, the "I as person" can be seen as the "thinking 'I'" because "thinking" requires the stuff of thinking, and the stuff of thinking is constituted of the representations of inner sense, which, in turn, include not merely thoughts, but desires, acts, bodily perceptions, images, etc. The "I as person" can only be possible if the stuff of thinking has been included.

reflection," and the "I as subject of thinking" are each associated with thinking exclusively, associated with understanding and judgment – it is characterized as a form, as the thinking principle (*denkenden* principio), though the "I of intelligence" also has its own content (for the content of "I of intelligence," see Chapter 4 below).

The identification of the "I of apprehension" and the "I as person" is more complicated. As we have seen, Kant makes a distinction between "I of intelligence" and "I as *Mensch*." The "I of intelligence" excludes representations relating to the bodily senses, just as the "I" as *Grenzbegriff* may include the bodily representations but cannot be reduced to the body. Kant characterizes the "I of reflection" as the "*bloss reflectierende Ich*." The word "*bloss*" is significant. In a hermeneutically important *Reflexion*, Kant says that the word "*bloss*" relates not to the limiting, but it is the act of limiting. It signifies a theoretical abstraction from the sensory representations. "*Das Wort: 'lediglich, bloss, allein, nur, ganz'; die Woerter: 'ueberhaupt, schlechthin, schlechterdings'. Jenes sind Woerter nicht der Schranken, sondern des Actus der Einschraenkung*" (AA XVIII, R5107). Thus, if any theorist needs to focus on the "I of intelligence" for theoretical reasons, she must actively limit herself to some representations out of a much wider horizon of representations. In other words, from the much broader concept of the "*Ich als Mensch*," we abstract the narrower concept of "*Ich als Intelligenz*."

The "*Ich als Mensch*" is the phenomenological appearance of the "I" that can be apprehended. It is singular in content, but twofold in form. "[*Der Mensch] kann sich dieser Veraenderungen nur dadurch bewusst sein, dass er sich in den verschiedenen Zustaenden als ein and dasselbe Subject vorstellt, und das Ich des Menschen ist zwar der*

Form (der Vorstellungsart) nach, aber nicht der Materie (dem Inhalte) nach zweifach" (AA, VII: 134n)). The twofold form consists in (i) the "I of intelligence," and (ii) the "I" as object of perception, or of inner sense. The distinction between pure apperception and inner sense (which Kant thinks as crucial) is analogous to the distinction between the "I of reflection" and "I of apprehension." The "I of reflection" or the "I as subject of thinking" is pure apperception while the "I" of apprehension relates to inner sense. Kant says, "*Daß die Wörter innerer Sinn und Apperception von den Seelenforschern gemeinhin für gleichbedeutend genommen werden, unerachtet der erstere allein ein psychologisches (angewandtes), die zweite aber blos ein logisches (reines) Bewußtsein anzeigen soll, ist die Ursache dieser Irrungen. Daß wir aber durch den ersteren uns nur erkennen können, wie wir uns erscheinen, erhellt daraus, weil Auffassung (apprehensio) der Eindrücke des ersteren eine formale Bedingung der inneren Anschauung des Subjects, nämlich die Zeit, voraussetzt, welche kein Verstandesbegriff ist und also blos als subjective Bedingung gilt, wie nach der Beschaffenheit der menschlichen Seele uns innere Empfindungen gegeben werden, also diese uns nicht, wie das Object an sich ist, zu erkennen giebt*" (AA VII: 142). Hence, in order to apprehend any representation, the discursive intellect requires inner sense. The form of inner sense is time, which cannot be construed as a concept of the understanding in Kant's system. The "I of apprehension" is a representation belonging to appearances, or, as Kant says, it can be an object of perception. It is one among the many representations of inner sense, and it is only through inner sense that we can apprehend (*Apprehension*) any representation as representation in general, as Georg Mohr interprets the concept of inner sense, and which, therefore, includes the inner intuition or apprehension of the "I."[41]

[41] Georg Mohr, *Das sinnliche Ich*, 197.

Hence, the “I of apprehension” can be viewed as an intuitive apprehension of the “I” in any irreducible moment of time, and, given that intuitions are singular and immediate representations in the Kantian system, the apprehended “I” is an immediate and singular representation. The “*Ich als Mensch*,” on the other hand, is a broader category because it includes not merely the “I of apprehension” but the “I of intelligence.” It appears to be conceptually more complex because it marks the persistence of the “I” over a period of time. Even though both the “I of apprehension” and the “*Ich als Mensch*” are ultimately objects of inner sense and distinguished conceptually from both the “I” as *Grenzbegriff* and the “I of intelligence” or pure apperception, it is still unclear wherein the distinction lies. Is there a separate intuitive awareness of the “I” as person interpreted as the personal, spatiotemporally individuated intuition of the “I” and the apprehended “I”? Could we think of cases in which we apprehend the “I” as an *impersonal* object of inner sense which can, then, be distinguished from cases in which we might intuit the spatiotemporally individuated personal “I”? These are difficult and important questions, but beyond the purview of this dissertation. At present, we need only to note that the “I of apprehension” can (at least) can be identified with the “*Ich als Mensch*” to the extent both these concepts are taken as objects of inner sense and as distinguishable from pure apperception. The “*Ich als Mensch*” has broader conceptual extension because it seems to include the “I” in relation to all kinds of representations of inner sense over time, whether thoughts, acts, desires, emotions, images, etc.

Hence, if we put together the two classificatory schemas (a) and (c), we arrive at the following classification (d): (i) “I” as *Grenzbegriff*; (ii) “I of intelligence” or pure

apperception; and (iii) "I" as object of inner sense which includes the "*Ich als Mensch*" and the "I of apprehension," though the relationship between these concepts is not yet clear. We can now compare the classifications (b) and (d). The classification (b) consisted in: (i) "I" as purely intellectual and *a priori*, (ii) the *a priori* "I think," which includes the pure "I" and the general possibility of synthetic thinking, and (iii) the "I think" as empirical proposition which includes the stuff of thinking.

With regard to (i), the "I" as *Grenzbegriff*, and the *a priori* "I" can be seen as identical in both these classifications because they refer to the "I" as the form of the discursive intellect and as conceptually separable from the body. With regard to (ii), the "I of intelligence" can be seen as identical with the *a priori* "I think" to the extent that the *a priori* "I think" is the form in which any discursive intellect must necessarily judge, and, hence, deals with the pure intellect abstracted from sensibility, though we have seen that the "I" of intelligence can be distinguished from the *a priori* "I think." Finally, with regard to (iii), the empirical "I think" includes the stuff of thinking, or sensibility, and in this respect, it can be seen as identical with the "I of apprehension" and "*Ich als Mensch*" which are empirical as well. The relationship between the empirical "I think," the "*Ich als Mensch*" and the "I of apprehension" needs to be investigated, but since both the "I of apprehension" and "I think that x" as empirical judgments are singular, it might be best to *prima facie* take the "*Ich als Mensch*" as the broader category subsuming the other two.

Hence, putting together classifications (b) and (d), we gain the following preliminary classification (e) for further investigation. (i) "I" as *a priori Grenzbegriff*; or "I" as subject in general, (ii) "I as subject of thinking," the "I" associated with the understanding and abstracted from sensibility and including "I of intelligence" and the *a*

priori "I think" (the former is thinking principle (*denkenden* principio) and the latter the *a priori* relationship between the "I" of intelligence and other non-I representations required for thinking) and (iii) the "I as object of perception," which has a formal component, (iiia) the form of "I as object" (given the "I" is twofold in form) and (iiib) the "I" as object of inner sense, including the concepts, "*Ich als Mensch*" which includes both the "I of intelligence" and "I of apprehension," and the empirical "I think."

Given the fact that the three sets of classifications could (at least broadly) be conflated into one classification shows that Kant adhered to a single broad classification regarding the term "I" throughout his career. I have already quoted from his pre-critical lectures on metaphysics (1777-80), the post-critical lecture notes between the two editions of the first *Critique* (*Mongrovius*, 1782-3), and a late work like the *Anthropologie*.[42] The distinction, however, also exists in the heart of Kant's published *oeuvre*, the *Critique of Pure Reason* where Kant seems to have dealt more substantially with the notion of the "I" than in the rest of his *oeuvre*, even if he can hardly be seen as offering a theory of the "I" in this work. Kant did indeed implicitly presume the broad classification (e) in the first *Critique*, and he would probably have expressed himself far better if he had been more explicit about it, even in his own mind. A deeper engagement

[42] The distinction appears in the *Opus Postumum* intertwined with the concepts of the analytic and synthetic unity of apperception. Dieter Sturma points to this passage, but his own interpretation is very different from mine (he views apperception only as act; he does not distinguish thinking and perception; and he pays scant attention to the fact that the distinction between "I as subject" and "I as object" already existed in Kant's *oeuvre* even prior to the *Opus Postumum*). Sturma says correctly that Kant's view of apperception is idealistic in the *Opus Postumum* but that this is not the case in earlier works where the subject makes itself an object but only structurally (which could be seen as analogous to the view highlighted in this chapter that the "I" is twofold in form). See Sturma, *Kant ueber Selbstbewusstsein*, 86. The fact that Kant was more idealistic in the *Opus Postumum* can be seen in his seeming to adopt the idea of self-positing. For instance, he says, "The consciousness of myself (*apperceptio*) is the act of the subject to make itself into an object. It is merely logical (*sum*) without determination of the object (*apprehension simplex*)…All cognition commences with the consciousness of myself; i.e., with representing myself, who is thinking (the subject), at the same time as object of this thinking" (XXVIII: 89, quoted in Eckhart Forster, *Kant's Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the Opus Postumum*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 102-3).

of the issue would require another chapter, and, thus, it is enough (at present) to point to a significant passage that broadly suggests such a classification, even though Kant may not have been always distinctly aware of my interpretive classification of the "I."

The relevant passage occurs in §24 of the second edition of the Transcendental Deduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant says,

"*Wie aber das Ich, der ich denke, von dem Ich, das sich selbst anschauet, unterschieden (indem ich mir noch andere Anschauungsart wenigstens als moeglich vorstellen kann) und doch mit diesem letzteren als dasselbe Subjekt einerlei sei, wie ich also sagen koenne: Ich, als Intelligenz und denkend Subjekt, erkenne mich selbst als gedachtes Objekt, so fern ich mir noch ueber das in der Anschauung gegeben bin, nur, gleich andern Phaenomenen, nicht wie ich vor dem Verstande bin, sondern wie ich mir erscheine, hat nicht mehr auch nicht weniger Schwierigkeit bei sich, als wie ich mir selbst ueberhaupt ein Objekt und zwar der Anschauung und innerer Wahrnehmungen sein koenne* (*KrV*, B155-6)."

In this passage, Kant distinguishes between the "I" that thinks and the "I" that intuits itself, and asks how the two aspects can together form one and the same subject. He describes the former as the "I, as intelligence, and thinking subject" cognized as a "thought object" (*KrV*, B155-6) while he characterizes the "I" that intuits itself as an appearance, as intuition and inner perception. Such a classification matches quite perfectly with my interpretive classification (e), and shows that Kant can be taken to adhere to such a classificatory schema, even if it often manifests itself merely implicitly and in stray remarks. The classification runs as follows: (i) the "I" as subject in general; (ii) the "I as subject of thinking" or "I of intelligence; (iii) "I" as object of intuition including the "I of apprehension" and the "*Ich als Mensch*." Given that the "I" is singular in content and two fold in form, we can modify the classification in the following way: (i) "I" as *a priori Grenzbegriff*, or the "I" as (form of) subject in general; (ii) the "I as (form

of) subject of thinking or the "I" of intelligence; (iiia) the "I" as form of object of intuition, and (iiib) the "*Ich als Mensch*" including the "I" of apprehension, the empirical "I think," or in general, the "I" as content. Thus, we obtain the final version of classification (e).

And if we take this classification seriously, the puzzle of the "I" can be articulated in a sharper way. If we take the "I" as the *a priori* form characterizing the discursive intellect and the "I" is taken to be singular in content and twofold in form, then we can say that we have to resolve the following questions in order to understand the notion of the "I" in the Kantian system. In other words, the questions regarding of the "I" can be formulated as follows. What is the relationship between the "I as subject of thinking" and "I as object"? How is it possible that the "I as subject of thinking" and "I as object" can belong to one and the same "I" as subject? Why do we need to conceptualize the "I" as having a twofold form if it is one and the same subject and has a singular content?

To a list of such questions, another question can be added which not merely poses the general puzzle of the "I," but could be seen as pointing to the way Kant might have wanted to resolve the question of the "I." How can the mere consciousness [of the unity of apperception or the "I"] that is contained or at least can be contained in all thinking should, even though it is to this extent a simple representation, lead to the consciousness and knowledge (*Kenntniss*) of a thing in which alone thinking can be contained (*KrV*, A784-5/B812-3). In other words, what kind of knowledge could we obtain of the pre-theoretical phenomenon of the "I" which seems to be contained in all our conscious representations? It is a question demanding a descriptive answer to the question "what is the "I"?", and, hence, an ontological rather than an epistemological

question that might inquire into the way we can know ourselves as the "I," albeit within the limits of the discursive boundaries which means that the Kantian answer to this question cannot violate the discursive limits in the way transcendentally realist ontology allows. And given the ontological rather than epistemological nature of the question that demands a philosophical description of the "I," classification (e) can be seen as the framework for such a description.[43]

Further, the very formulation of this question reveals the method of analyzing and resolving it. In articulating the question, Kant refers to the possibility of gaining knowledge of the "I" if we take the mere pre-theoretical consciousness of the "I" as our starting point. And this matches with Kant's methodological prescription for resolving the puzzle of the "I": the employment of the so-called analytical or regressive method beginning from ordinary awareness (*Wirklichkeit*) and explicating the content of the "I." In the B paralogisms, Kant says, "*Befolgen wir dagegen das analytische Verfahren, da das Ich denke, als ein Satz, der schon ein Dasein in sich schliesst, als gegeben, mithin die Modalitaet, zum Grunde liegt, und zergliedern ihn, um seinen Inhalt, ob und wie naemlich dieses Ich im Raum oder der Zeit bloss dadurch sein Dasein bestimmt, zu erkennen, so wuerden die Saetze der rationalen Seelenlehre nicht vom Begriffe eines denkenden Wesens ueberhaupt, sondern von einer Wirklichkeit anfangen, und aus der Art, wie diese gedacht wird, nachdem alles, was dabei empirisch ist, abgesondert worden, das was einem denkenden Wesen ueberhaupt zukommt gefolgert*

[43] Naturally, the term "ontology" does not indicate pre-Kantian rationalist ontology, which Kant would reject as transcendentally realist. If the Copernican revolution is to be seen as heralding the program of epistemology (*Erkenntnistheorie*) and as opposed to traditional ontology, then the answer to the question "what is the 'I'?" can be classified as epistemological. But if epistemological analysis means restrictively explicating the role of the "I" in experiential knowledge, then the question "what is the 'I'?" is broader and requires a broader answer that explicates the "I" for its own sake rather than as a piece required for completing the puzzle of experiential knowledge.

werden…"(*KrV*, B418-9). In this passage, Kant describes the method of analysis which consists in proceeding from the ordinary actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) of the complex empirical proposition "I think," analyzing (*zergliedern*) it into its parts, and explicating the content (*Inhalt*) of the "I" where "content" means the nature of the "I" to the extent it can be known by a discursive intellect.

Such a mode of analysis is related to the difficult notion of the "transcendental" as opposed to the "empirical" in Kant's works; and, hence, it is important to clarify the meaning of the term "transcendental" before we proceed any further.

In a relatively recent essay, "Kantian Apperception and the Non-Cartesian Subject," Karl Ameriks makes a distinction between transcendental and empirical apperception in the following way. Transcendental apperception is the pure act of apperception and a necessary condition of the possibility of experience in general. The empirical unity of apperception, on the other hand, marks the fact that different persons are different spatiotemporal unities (eg. different people are discrete spatiotemporal unities, they have different experiences, varying degrees of self-consciousness, etc.), and should not be confused with "empirical apperception" which is simply the "instances of apperception," or a particular instance of pure apperception.[44] The transcendental-empirical distinction, which Ameriks employs in order to mark the distinction between transcendental and empirical apperception, has the following dimensions. (a) If a feature must necessarily adhere to all discursive intellects, then it is transcendental. (b) If a feature relates to what the subject brings to experience, then it is transcendental. (c) Any particular actualization (connoting in my view the German word "*ausueben*") of a

[44] Karl Ameriks, *Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 51-66, 55.

particular feature describable as a real or actual act of any *a priori* transcendental feature is to be considered empirical. (d) If a case of the exercise of any transcendental feature adhering to the discursive intellect can be either spatially or temporally or spatiotemporally marked, then it is to be considered empirical.

To this acceptable characterization of the terms "transcendental" and "empirical," we can add three further characteristics of the term "transcendental": (a) a transcendental argument is a conditional if-then type of argument. In the "Preface" to the first *Critique*, Kant says clearly that transcendental idealism is an attempt to solve traditional philosophical problems by *assuming* (*annehmen*), unlike the transcendental realists, that the subject constitutes the object. "*Bisher nahm man an, alle unsere Erkenntnis muesse sich nach den Gegenstaenden richten;…Man versuche es daher einmal, ob wir nicht in den Aufgaben der Metaphysik damit besser fortkommen, dass wir annehmen, die Gegenstaende muessen sich nach unserem Erkenntnis richten, welches so schon besser mit der verlangten Moeglichkeit einer Erkenntnis derselben a priori zusammenstimmt, die ueber Gegenstaende, ehe sie uns gegeben werden, etwas festsetzen soll*" (*KrV*, BXVI). Following from this general characterization, we can say that a transcendental argument regarding the question of the "I" would be: if we assume that the discursive subject constitutes objects, then the discursive subject would justifiably be able to make a particular set of claims about the nature of the "I." (b) A transcendental proposition (as opposed to the metaphysical or transcendental realist proposition) can only offer definitions of concepts in internal terms. In other words, a particular concept can only be adequately characterized in terms of the existing constellation of possible concepts that can possibly be given intuitive content. In a *Reflexion* dated between 1764 and 1768,

Kant characterizes "transcendental unity" of a thing in terms of the conceptual difference between the categories of the "one" and the "many" when he says "*Ein jades* [sic] *Ding ist nicht viel, bedeutet die transcendentale Einheit*" (AA XVII: R3765). In another *Reflexion* dated between 1785 and 1788, Kant says, "*Bestimmung eines Dinges in Ansehung seines Wesens (als Ding) ist transcendental*" (AA XVIII: R5738). In this passage, Kant says clearly that a transcendental proposition expresses the determination of a thing in its essence. However, the essence is not be construed as metaphysical essence, but as theoretical articulation of the essence within the confines of the cognitive and epistemic possibilities of the discursive intellect. In fact, the transcendental idealist can offer merely the rule of synthesis of an object without ever being able to give the intuition of the object *a priori* ("*… die blosse Regel der Synthesis desjenigen, was die Wahrnehmung a posteriori geben mag, niemals aber die Anschauung des realen Gegenstandes a priori liefern, weil diese notwendig empirisch sein muss*" (*KrV*, B748)). And Kant does indeed define transcendental philosophy in this way. He says that we consider understanding and reason itself in a system of all concepts and principles which are related to an object in general without assuming that these objects might actually be given, as in traditional ontology, or transcendental realism (*KrV*, A845/B873).

This suggests that transcendental analysis must always proceed regressively: the object must be given *a posteriori* and pre-theoretically and must find a place in the system of concepts and principles through analysis. The given-ness of such an object does not warrant that such an object be perceived by the discursive intellect in all its ramifications, as a thing in itself. Instead, it is only the pre-theoretical given-ness within the limits of the representational abilities of the discursive intellect that can be

conceptually (or theoretically) articulated and brought into a system of concepts and principles. We have already seen that the theoretical articulation of the "I" emerges from the regressive analysis of the pre-theoretical empirical perception of the "I" (Cf. B418-9, quoted above). But even in the A deduction of the first *Critique*, we find passages that support the interpretation that (a) every *a priori* feature can be seen as empirical when applied to a given set of appearances, which are accidental (the "*empirisch*" is "*zufaellig,*" B142) and not necessary, including the "I," -- "*Es sind drei subjective Erkenntnisquellen, worauf die Moeglichkeit einer Erfahrung ueberhaupt, und Erkenntnis der Gegenstaende der selben beruht: Sinn, Einbildungskraft und Apperzeption; jede derselben kann als empirisch, naemlich in der Anwendung auf gegebene Erscheinungen betrachtet werden, alle sind auch Elemente oder Grundlagen a priori, welche selbst diesen empirischen Gebrauch moeglich machen*" (*KrV*, A115), and (b) empirical apperception may be seen as the empirical counterpart to the transcendental "*durchgaengige Identitaet seiner selbst bei allen moeglichen Vorstellungen* (A116)," or the "I."

In general, therefore, we find three conceptions of the notion of the "transcendental" or the "pure." (a) A transcendental feature is *a priori* and characterized as that which the subject brings to experience and which cannot be gained from experience. (b) A transcendental feature marks the condition for the possibility of something (*etwas*) within the limits of discursive understanding, and, hence, we can conceive of a coherent system of "transcendental" features as descriptively gained and logically connected to each other, or as joining together theoretically what goes together anyway when viewed pre-theoretically. (c) A transcendental feature can be distinguished

from an empirical if the feature or proposition can be validly attributed to all discursive intellects while empirical propositions can be seen as valid only for this particular individual or that or as relating to one accidental set of appearances rather than another. In other words, empirical propositions mark the differences between discursive intellects while transcendental propositions mark the common features.[45]

Drawing on the above delineated distinction between the transcendental and the empirical, any conclusions about the "I" would have to use the following as criteria of validity: (a) In order to judge the consistency of any conceptual characterization of the "I," our touchstone for the validity or invalidity of our conclusions about the nature of the "I" (after the regressive analysis) would have to be our ordinary pre-theoretical awareness of the existence (*Dasein*) of the "I." (b) Keeping faith with the Kantian discursive limits, nothing can be intelligibly endorsed about the nature of the "I" which violates the boundaries of discursivity. (c) And, finally, we would have to carefully demarcate the transcendental and empirical conceptualizations of the "I," and clearly represent the notion of the "I" from both perspectives.

Hence, to summarize:

[45] My view of the transcendental has been influenced by (and further builds on) Heidegger's view of transcendental philosophy. Drawing on a passage from the first *Critique* (B873f.), Heidegger conceives of transcendental philosophy as "metaphysica generalis," and says that the *Critique of Pure Reason* should be seen neither as system or theory of experience, but as a "treatise on method," Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), 16-23, *passim*. Some recent philosophers like David Carr could be seen as having similar views on the nature of transcendental philosophy. "To call transcendental philosophy dualism would be to make the mistake…of thinking that transcendental idealism is some third metaphysical doctrine between realism and idealism. Instead…it is not a metaphysical doctrine at all but a method of reflection, what today is called a 'research program'," David Carr, *The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 137.

(a) A philological examination of the "I" in Kant's works yields the following classification (e): (i) "I" as *a priori Grenzbegriff*, or the "I" as (form of) subject in general; (ii) the "I as (form of) subject of thinking" or the "I of intelligence;" (iiia) the "I" as form of object of perception, and (iiib) the "*Ich als Mensch*" including the "I of apprehension," the empirical "I think," or, in general, the "I" as content – same as (e) above.

(b) In terms of this classification, the puzzle of the "I" can be articulated in terms of the following questions: What is the relationship between the "I as subject of thinking" and "I as object of perception"? How is it possible that the "I as subject of thinking" and "I as object of perception" can belong to one and the same "I as subject"? Why do we need to conceptualize the "I" as having a twofold form if it is one and the same subject and singular in content? What kind of knowledge could we obtain of our pre-theoretical phenomenon of the "I" which seems to be contained in all our conscious representations?

(c) In order to answer these questions, we follow the regressive method. Beginning from the pre-theoretical empirical awareness of the "I," we articulate the nature of the "I" theoretically or transcendentally and within the confines of the abilities of the discursive intellect.

In the following chapters, I will be dealing with each of the various characterizations of the "I" in more detail. My method consists in classifying Kant's myriad (often inconsistent) characterizations of the "I" in terms of my interpretive general classification

(e) above. Because Kant himself never articulated such a classification himself, he used the terms “I,” “I think,” “soul,” and “apperception” in a loose manner. Inconsistencies resulted as a consequence, and my attempt is to classify the various references to the “I” in Kant’s works under four classificatory heads only taking the terms “I” and “apperception” as synonyms. We have seen that the twofold form of the “I” can be explicated in terms of a three-fold classification -- “I as subject,” “I as form of subject of thinking,” and “I as form of object of perception,” and I will be explicating each of these in more detail in next chapter (Chapter 3). Apart from being twofold in form, the “I” is singular in content, and I will be delineating the “I” as content in Chapter 4. In this chapter, I will also summarize the insights gained into the “I” as whole, and indicate the advantages of my interpretation vis-à-vis the secondary literature. Given that Kant had himself never offered a theory of self, the proof of my interpretation would consist in the degree to which it can illuminate us, and the reader would have to decide for himself or herself if my classification of different passages under the various heads is convincing or not. If the reader finds the interpretation convincing, then we would be able to conclude that we should focus on Kant’s claim that the “I” is twofold in form and singular in content if we wish to further investigate Kant’s theory of the “I.”

Chapter 3

The Twofold Form of the "I"

In the previous chapter, we have seen that the inquiry into the "I" would require investigating the relationship between the forms of the "I as subject," "I as subject of thinking" and the "I as object," and explicating the pre-theoretical phenomenal "singular" content of the "I." In this chapter, we will characterize the form of the "I as subject," "I as subject of thinking," and "I as object," leaving the specification of the singular content for the following chapter. I will argue that the form of the "I as subject" should be seen as the horizon of consciousness, and as necessarily built into every conscious perception, and the "I as subject of thinking" should be glossed as the spontaneity of apperception, or the subject's directedness of attention towards something. Distinguishing between perception and thinking, I will show that while the discursive subject can only consciously perceive something within the horizon of consciousness since the "I" is necessarily built into every conscious representation, the "I as subject of thinking" needs to refer to the "I as object" in the diachronic process of thinking. Thus, if the subject-object relationship is structurally impossible in the case of perception, it appears in the process of thinking but in a way that avoids the scourge of the infinite regress that plagues many theories of self-consciousness.

In Section I, I explicate the form of the "I as subject" as the horizon of consciousness. In Section II, I show that the form of the "I as subject of thinking" should be interpreted as the spontaneity of apperception (or the active directedness of attention). And, finally, in Section III, I characterize the form of the "I as object" based on the analogy Kant repeatedly draws between the "I," space and time in the first *Critique*, and

point out that the "I as object" can be perceived if the "I as subject of thinking" refers to it, or, in other words, directs its attention towards it. In this section, I will articulate the formal relationship between the "I as subject," "I as subject of thinking," and "I as object," and then take into account the theory of Kant interpreters who stress the act-character of apperception.

I

The Form of "I" as Subject, or "I" as *Grenzbegriff*

In the *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Kant explicates and justifies the philosophical motivation for differentiating the "I" and the body. "*Es kann ein Mensch, dem sein Leib aufgerissen worden ist, seine Eingeweide und alle seine inner Theile sehen; also ist dieses Innere blos ein koerperliches Wesen, und von dem denkenden Wesen ganz unterschieden. Es kann ein Mensch viele von seinen Gliedern verlieren, deswegen bleibt er doch, und kann sagen: Ich bin. Der Fuss gehoeret ihm. Ist er aber abgesaeget, so sieht er ihn eben so an, als jede andere Sache, die er nicht mehr gebrauchen kann, wie einen alten Stiefel, den er wegwerfen muss. Er selbst aber bleibt immer unveraendert, und sein denkendes Ich verliert nichts. Es sieht also jeder/leicht ein, auch durch den gemeinsten Verstand: dass er eine Seele habe, die vom Koerper unterschieden ist*" (AA XXVIII: 225). We have seen that the soul can be equated strictly with the "I" but it can also be equated with the "thinking I" which includes representations relating to the body but only as mental versions of bodily representations, that is, to the extent these representations can potentially appear in thinking. In this passage quoted, Kant makes the following points -- (a) a human can lose some of its body parts, but still possess the ability to say: I am; (b) if a foot is sawed off, his thinking loses nothing; (c) all of us comprehend the fact that our

souls are different from our bodies; and (d) the "mere concept" of the "I," unalterable and not describable any further except insofar as it expresses and distinguishes a particular object of inner sense, makes for the foundation of many other concepts.

It appears that it is the very nature of the phenomenon of the "I" that justifies the conceptual distinction between the "I" and the body. The "mere concept" of the "I" is the conceptual remnant that would have to remain necessarily irreducible if thoughts or even certain body parts were to be subtracted. In essence, the phenomenon of the "I" is such that it cannot be reduced to the body. But what kind of phenomenon is it, then?

In the A paralogisms, Kant claims that the "I" is neither concept nor intuition, and instead describes it as "form of consciousness." "*Allein dieses Ich ist so wenig Anschauung, als Begriff von irgend einem Gegenstande, sondern die blosse Form des Bewusstseins, welches beiderlei Vorstellungen begleiten, und sie dadurch zu Erkenntnissen erheben kann, so fern naemlich dazu noch irgend etwas anders in der Anschauung gegeben wird, welches zu einer Vorstellung von einem Gegenstande Stoff darreichet*" (*KrV*, A382). The "I" is neither concept nor intuition of some kind of object. It is rather the mere form of consciousness which accompanies (*begleitet*) both kinds of representations (ostensibly concepts and intuitions), which is no different from the characterization of the "I" as subject encompassing both the intellectual and sensory aspects of the discursive intellect, of which we had spoken earlier in this essay. And it is the "I" that raises (*erheben*) the stuff gained from the object to cognition, which implies that there could be no cognition if there were no "I." The "I" as form of consciousness is, thus, the condition for the possibility of cognition, and, more importantly, it must accompany (*begleitet*) all representations, whether concepts or intuitions. The term

"*begleiten*" means that all conscious representations must fall under the form of consciousness, the "I," or, alternatively stated, the "I" forms the horizon of that which can be potentially conscious for the discursive intellect.

In the A deduction, Kant asserts that the "I" must accompany all consciousness when he says that all particular cases of consciousness must belong to a self-same consciousness. "*Denn nur dadurch* [that all empirical consciousness belongs to one consciousness]*, dass ich alle Wahrnehmungen zu einem Bewusstsein (der urspruenglichen Apperzeption) zaehle, kann ich bei allen Wahrnehmungen sagen: dass ich mir ihrer bewusst sei*" (*KrV*, A122). In another passage from the A paralogisms, Kant says the same thing when he says that the representation "I" must accompany all representations. ("*In dem Standpunkte eines Fremden aber koennen wir dieses darum noch nicht vor gueltig erklaeren, weil, da wir an der Seele keine beharrliche Erscheinung antreffen, als nur die Vorstellung Ich, welche sie alle begleitet und verknuepft*" (*KrV*, A364)). In another passage from the A paralogisms, Kant describes the representation "I am" in similar terms. He says, "*[D]as die einzelne Vorstellung, Ich bin, sie insgesamt regiert, welche eben darum, weil sie die reine Formel aller meiner Erfahrung (unbestimmt) ausdrueckt, sich wie ein allgemeiner Satz, der vor alle denkende Wesen gelte, ankuendigt, und, da er gleichwohl in aller Absicht einzeln ist, den Schein einer absoluten Einheit der Bedingungen des Denkens ueberhaupt bei sich fuehrt, und dadurch sich weiter ausbreitet, als moegliche Erfahrung reichen koennte*" (*KrV*, A405). The individual representation "I am" expresses indeterminately the pure form of experience, and can be seen as valid for all thinking natures. It forms not merely the condition for the possibility of all thinking, but also the boundaries of possible experience. We have seen

that experience is to be characterized as empirical cognition and the "I" is the horizon of consciousness. We have also seen that Kant describes the "I" as form of consciousness that raises (*erheben*) the possibility of cognition (or experience) of the object to the extent the stuff of thinking is given. From these propositions, we can infer that: If there existed no notion of the "I" characterizable as form of consciousness for a discursive intellect, there would be no possibility of experience, and it is in this sense that the "I," which forms the bounds of consciousness, can be seen as ultimately forming the bounds of possible experience. In describing the representation "I am" as forming the bounds of possible experience, Kant does not, however, say anything about the "I am" also being the horizon of consciousness. Given that the "I" is characterized as the horizon or form of consciousness, it might seem that Kant is distinguishing between the representations, "I" and "I am." But this is not the case. He conceptualizes the "I am" in the same way as the "I": both can be characterized as "forms" of experience; as singular (*einzeln*) representations; and as accompanying all conscious representations whether he uses the word "*begleitet*" (A382 above) or says that the "I am" "*insgesamt regiert*" (completely rules) (A405 above). Hence, the "I" and the *representation* "I am" can be taken as interchangeable; and the "I" can be characterized as the horizon of consciousness, as a *Grenzbegriff*, and, following from it, the bounds of experience.

We must now explicate the characterization of the "I" as form of consciousness in more detail. What does it mean to speak of the "I" as "form of consciousness"? In the *Jaesche Logik*, Kant characterizes "form" in the following way: "*In jeder Erkenntnis muss unterschieden werden Materie, d. i. der Gegenstand, und Form, d. i. die Art, wie wir den Gegenstand erkennen*" (AA IX: 33). Although Kant is speaking of the "form of

cognition" in this passage, he employs the general form-material distinction in the Kantian system. The material is formulated by the form, and the form specifies the kind of thing something is. Hence, the "form of consciousness" that the discursive intellect possesses represents the material that falls within the parameters of the form of the kind of being the discursive intellect is. In other words, the discursive subject, for example, would *form* the material in terms of mode of representation uniquely characterizing it. If the discursive subject has the "I"-form of consciousness, then impressions (stuff) in tandem with the form of the "I" could be deemed conscious or potentially conscious.

In the description "form of consciousness," we have now explicated the expressions "form" and "form of." We need to now explicate the term "consciousness." In both editions of the paralogisms, Kant says, "[*U*]*m welches wir uns daher in einem bestaendigen Zirkel herumdrehen, indem wir uns seiner Vorstellung jederzeit schon bedienen muessen, um irgend etwas von ihm zu urteilen; eine Unbequemlichkeit, die davon nicht zu trennen ist, weil das Bewusstsein an sich nicht sowohl eine Vorstellung ist, die ein besonderes Objekt unterscheidet, sondern eine Form derselben ueberhaupt, so fern sie Erkenntnis genannt werden soll; den von der allein kann ich sagen, dass ich dadurch irgend etwas denke*" (*KrV*, A346/B404). If consciousness were to be itself characterized as a representation, we would fall into theoretical circularity: we would have had to have been aware of being conscious in order to re-present consciousness as consciousness. In order to avoid such a circle, we would have to say that consciousness is not a representation which identifies or re-presents any kind of object. Instead, it is the form in which objects can be cognized by discursive intellects; and the discursive intellect can only think or cognize an object as object in the form of consciousness.

On the basis of the characterization of consciousness as "form" of cognized object, we can further explicate the expression "form of consciousness." Firstly, if "consciousness" is to be taken as the form of cognition and "consciousness" cannot be characterized as a representation on pain of circularity, then we can make an analogous case for the "I." If the "I" is the form of consciousness, then the "I" as *Grenzbegriff*, or as horizon of consciousness, cannot itself be a representation of an object, but merely the form in which consciousness might be given for a discursively cognizing subject. Alternatively stated, the "I" as *Grenzbegriff* would need to be always already present if there were to be consciousness in general. Secondly, it appears that consciousness has the form of the "I" and the cognition of an object has the form of consciousness. For a discursive subject, consciousness is an "I"-consciousness, and such an "I"-consciousness makes possible cognition of an object. An implication of such a view is that we could imagine beings that have consciousness but not "I"-consciousness, and that might nevertheless be able to cognize objects. It is unclear if the cognition of objects in such a case would be the same as cognition via an "I"-consciousness. But as far as the discursive subject is concerned, consciousness is necessarily "I"-consciousness. In fact, Kant asserts that the statement or thought "I am not" is a contradiction because it is impossible for the discursive intellect to think "I am not" if she lacks the "I." "*Der Gedanke 'Ich bin nicht' kann gar nicht existieren; denn bin ich nicht, so kann ich mir auch nicht bewusst werden, dass ich nicht bin. Ich kann wohl sagen: ich bin nicht gesund, u. d. g. Praedicata von mir selbst verneinend denken (wie es bei allen* verbis *geschieht); aber in der ersten Person sprechend das Subject selbst verneinen, wobei alsdann dieses sich selbst vernichtet, ist ein Widerspruch*" (AA VII: 167).

If the consciousness of a discursive subject must necessarily possess the "I" as the form of its consciousness and the "I" makes for the horizon of consciousness, then it should be possible to view the "I" as (a) logically unified because it forms the horizon of consciousness, and logically simple because the "mere concept" of the "I" remains even if all else has been subtracted from the concept of the discursive subject, (b) necessary, and (c) as a transcendental concept. And Kant does indeed characterize the "I" or "transcendental unity of apperception" in all of these ways.

(a) The representation "I" can be viewed as a logical simple because the representation "I" cannot be subtracted from the mind of the discursive subject without contradiction. Kant says as much in a handwritten note to the first antinomy (A436), "*In Intellectuellen, wenn alle Theilung zu Ende gebracht worden, bleibt das Einfache. Im Sinnlichen kann sie nie zu Ende gebracht werden. In Gedanken, wenn sie aufgehoben werden, bleibt nichts*" (E CLXVII). This does not naturally mean that Kant is contradicting his view in the Paralogisms of the first *Critique* that the "I" cannot be construed as a simple. There is a subtle distinction between saying that the "I" is a simple and saying that the "I" appears to be logically simple because it is that mental entity or state which remains when everything abstractable from the mental has been abstracted. Kant makes such a distinction clearly in the A paralogisms. "*Der Satz: Ich bin einfach, muss als ein unmittelbarer Ausdruck der Apperzeption angesehen werden, so wie der vermeintliche cartesianische Schluss, cogito, ergo sum, in der Tat tautologisch ist, indem das cogito (sum cogitans) die Wirklichkeit unmittelbar aussagt. Ich bin einfach, bedeutet aber nicht mehr, als dass diese Vorstellung: Ich, nicht die mindeste Mannigfaltigkeit in sich fasse, und dass sie absolute (obzwar bloss logische) Einheit ist*" (*KrV*, A355; A356;

B419). In other words, the "I" is simple if it is an absolute but logical unity and if it contains no manifold of representations.

In the same vein, the "I" can be seen as a substance only in concept because the discursive intellect can find no intuition that would cognitively establish the "I" as substance. "*Nun ist die blosse Apperzeption (Ich) Substanz im Begriffe, einfach im Begriffe* etc…." (*KrV,* A400). And in the A paralogisms of the first *Critique*, he also speaks of the "*logischen Identitaet des Ich*" as the "*formale Bedingung meiner Gedanken und ihres Zusammenhanges*" (*KrV*, A363), but refuses to attribute the "I" any real identity because we could philosophically imagine identity in a way that makes the idea of a persisting "I" inessential. For instance, if there were a series of balls, and each ball could transfer its momentum to the subsequent ball, then the final ball in the series would carry the momentum of all the previous balls, and we could say that the unity of the final ball in the series is a unity of all the balls in the series. Hence, we could explain identity over time in this way instead of explaining it in terms of a representation "I" that persists (Ibid., A363-4n).

(b) & (c) In a passage from the *Prolegomena*, Kant denies that the "I" can be a concept if we wanted to specify the nature of the "I" (AA IV: 334n). However, the discursive intellect can certainly have a concept of the "I" to the extent she can mark features of the "I" -- that it is always subject and never merely a predicate, that it is logically simple, that it is an absolute but logical unity, etc. But this is a different sense of the term "concept." The term "concept" can have two meanings: (i) it can act as a predicate with respect to different objects; and (ii) one can theoretically grasp something *as* something through concepts (*begreifen*). Kant uses the term "concept" in sense (i) in

order to deny that the "I" can be a concept in the *Prolegomena* passage. On the other hand, he uses the term concept in sense (ii) when he characterizes the nominalist mark "I" through a series of attributes (logically simple, absolute, not a concept, etc.) about the phenomenon "I."

Thus, the "mere concept" of the "I" (sense (ii)) can be viewed as simple, as subject and identical with itself in a logical rather than an absolute way. The "I," even though it is the form of consciousness for the discursive subject, can be attributed features that are only logically-valid or valid for any rational intellect that cognizes discursively. In fact, Kant rejects even the possibility of validly asserting the proposition that the "I" may be required as a condition for the possibility of cognizing for all intelligent natures. Rejecting rational psychology, Kant characterizes the "*Form der Apperzeption*" (or the "I") as the "*bloss subjective Bedingung*," and rejects the possibility of characterizing it as the condition for the possibility of the cognition of objects, namely make it a concept of a thinking nature in general (*denkenden Wesen ueberhaupt*) since we cannot represent this to ourselves without putting ourselves in the place of other intelligent natures (*KrV*, A354).

But in the case of the discursive subject, given that the "I" is the horizon of consciousness and ultimately the bounds of experience, the concept of the "I" can be seen as having the greatest possible extension. In the *Jaesche Logik*, Kant speaks of the extension of the sphere of the concept. The more things stand under a concept and can be thought through it, he says, the greater is its extension or *sphere*. "*Der Umfang oder die Sphaere eines Begriffes ist um so grosser, je mehr Dinge unter ihm stehen und durch ihn gedacht werden kann*" (AA IX: 96). From the first person perspective, the "I," as horizon

of consciousness and ultimately the bounds of cognition, could be viewed as possessing the greatest possible conceptual extension because, as we have seen, there can be no consciousness outside the horizon of the "I as (logical) subject."

If such is indeed the case, then we can also characterize the "I" as a necessary and transcendental concept in Kant's system ((b) and (c)) where the terms "necessity" and "transcendental" merely mark the features of the "I" as form of consciousness. The former indicates that the consciousness of the discursive subject must necessarily occur in the form of the "I"-consciousness while the latter could be seen as just another way of saying that the "mere concept" of the "I" is the form under which all stuff of thinking (impressions) must ultimately stand. It is in this light that we should understand Kant's statements about the necessary and transcendental unity of apperception, most clearly articulated in the A deduction of the first *Critique*.

Moreover, it is possible to reciprocally define the concepts of "necessity" and the "transcendental." In the A deduction, Kant says, "*Aller Notwendigkeit liegt jederzeit eine transzendentale Bedingung zum Grunde*" (*KrV*, A106). If we judge something necessary, then we can conclude that a transcendental condition lies at the foundation of it. If, as we have seen, the "I" as form of consciousness is the condition for the possibility of consciousness (and experience) for a discursive subject, then the "I" must both be necessary and transcendental. Kant continues, "*Also muss ein transzendentaler Grund der Einheit des Bewusstseins, in der Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen aller unserer Anschauungen, mithin auch, der Begriff der Objekt ueberhaupt, folglich auch aller Gegenstaende der Erfahrung, angetroffen werden, ohne welchen es unmoeglich waere, zu unsern Anschauungen irgend einen Gegenstand zu denken: denn dieser ist nichts*

mehr, als das Etwas, davon der Begriff eine solche Notwendigkeit der Synthesis ausdruckt" (*KrV,* A106). We require the condition of the "*transzendentaler Grund der Einheit des Bewusstseins*" in order to have the concept of an object in general (*der Begriff der Objekt ueberhaupt*), and in order to, consequently (*folglich*), possess the object of experience. This original and transcendental condition ("*urspruengliche und transzendentale Bedingung*") Kant defines as "*transzendentale Apperzeption*." Even though the jargon may be different, Kant is defining the "I" or "transcendental apperception" in these passages in just the way he characterized the "I" as form of consciousness. The "I" is the transcendental condition or form of consciousness necessarily required if the discursive subject were to become conscious of an object in general (*ueberhaupt*) and if she were to ultimately (*folglich*) be able to cognize objects. And the fact that the terms "transcendental" and "form" can be equated can be seen if we consider that both these concepts refer to the mode of synthesizing material stuff. We have already seen that the notion of "form" refers to the mode of synthesis, and in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method of the first *Critique*, we can confirm that the notion of the "transcendental" has a similar function. Kant says that a transcendental concept, of which the "transcendental unity of apperception" is a case, includes concepts like "*Realitaet*, *Substanz*, *Kraft*, etc. These concepts form the basis for the synthesis of possible empirical intuitions ("*Grundsatz der Syntheses moeglicher empirischer Anschauungen entspringen*" (*KrV,* A722/B750)). Thus, the "I" or "transcendental apperception" can be seen as a form of consciousness, or the condition for the possibility of consciousness (and finally experience) in general.

And the necessity of "transcendental apperception" refers to the necessity of the "I" as form of consciousness for the discursive subject. The discursive subject cannot think the "I am not" without contradiction, and, thus, the "I" as form of consciousness can be characterized as necessary. In the A deduction, Kant says, "*Das was notwendig als numerisch identisch vorgestellt werden soll, kann nicht als ein solches durch empirische Data gedacht werden. Es muss eine Bedingung sein, die vor aller Erfahrung vorhergeht, und diese selbst moeglich macht, welche eine solche transzendentale Voraussetzung geltend machen soll*" (*KrV*, A107). The logical identity of the "I" cannot be found in empirical data, and, therefore, we have to assume that it belongs to the subject (as Kant says, it is a "subjective condition," A354, quoted above) and precedes experience. At the same time, the awareness of the "I" should justify the transcendental presupposition of the necessary logical identity of the "I." If it is impossible to experientially think of the proposition "I am not," then the "I" must necessarily be the form or "transcendental ground" of consciousness. In this mode of argumentation, we can interpret the concept of necessity of a condition as "necessary presupposition." And in a *Reflexion* dated between 1778 and 1783, Kant does indeed characterize necessity as a presupposition. "*Das notwendige Dasein ist entweder abgeleitet oder urspruenglich: necessitas originaria vel derivative. Die Notwendigkeit als Bedingung ist eigentlich hypothetisch, aber doch nicht bedingt…; es ist die Notwendigkeit als Voraussetzung*" (AA XVIII: R5569). In other words, if we are discursive subjects unable to experientially say "I am not" without contradiction, then we have to assume that the form of our consciousness is necessarily an "I"-consciousness. And if we speak of something as necessary, then it has a transcendental condition as ground. The transcendental ground is nothing other than the

form, and if the “I” is the form of consciousness, it can also be characterized as the transcendental ground or “transcendental apperception.”

In sum, we have seen that the “I” is describable as form of consciousness, which means that the “I” marks the horizon of consciousness and accompanies all possible representations whether concepts or intuitions. As form of consciousness, the “I as subject” in general (henceforth “I as subject”) must be (a) conceptually separable from the body, (b) as “mere concept” of the “I,” it must be unalterable, (c) a necessary transcendental concept, (d) always the logical subject and never a predicate, and (e) an absolute but logical unity.

II

The Form of the “I as Subject of Thinking” or the “I of intelligence”

In this section, I will argue for the following: (1) the “I as subject of thinking” is the horizon of thinking just the way the “I as subject” is the horizon of consciousness. (2) The form of “I as subject of thinking” or “I of intelligence” can be glossed as spontaneity of apperception or the directedness of attention, and we can enumerate its characteristics as follows: (a) the *a priori* judgment, “I think,” subsumes the activity of thinking (related to the faculty of the understanding) under the horizon of consciousness (“I as subject”) through the directedness of attention (“I as intelligence”). (b) The “I of intelligence” is causally independent of empirical representations but cannot be operational in the absence of the latter. (c) The “I of intelligence” is conceptually separable from the body. (d) The true nature of the “I of intelligence” cannot be known by the discursive intellect.

(1) We have seen that the "I as subject" must necessarily accompany (*begleiten*) any conscious representation of the discursive intellect.[46] It is the condition for the possibility of consciousness in general. In the B deduction of the first *Critique*, however, Kant might be seen as saying something contradictory if we insist on equating the "I" (or "I as subject") and the *a priori* "I think."

In §16 of the B deduction, Kant says, "*Das: Ich denke, muss alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten koennen; denn sonst wuerde etwas in mir vorgestellt werden, was gar nicht gedacht werden koennte, welches eben so viel heisst, als die Vorstellung wuerde entweder unmoeglich, oder wengistens fuer mich nichts sein. Diejenige Vorstellung, die vor allem Denken gegeben sein kann, heisst Anschauung. Also hat alles Mannigfaltige der Anschauung eine notwendige Beziehung auf das: Ich denke, in demselben Subjekt, darin dieses Mannigfaltige angetroffen wird*" (*KrV*, B131-2). The 'I think' *must be able to accompany* (*begleiten koennen*) all my representations. If not, then something would be represented in me, which could not be thought (*gedacht*) at all, that is, either the representation is impossible or, at least, nothing for me (*fuer mich nichts*). We can make the distinction between the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking" for the following reasons: (a) the claim that the "I think" should be able to accompany (*begleiten koennen*) all my representations is weaker than the claim that the "I" must *always* accompany all representations for them to be conscious. It means that the "I think" must be able to relate to all representations involved in any particular process of

[46] In the first *Critique*, Kant vacillates on the question of how apperception accompanies (*begleitet*) representations. While he certainly says "*begleiten koennen*" in the B deduction, he speaks of often of "*begleiten werden*," that apperception always accompanies representations, especially in the A edition (see *KrV*, A123, A398). We have distinguished between the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking," and we can say that the "I as subject" always accompanies representations while the "I as subject of thinking" can accompany representations only if it is thinking (and cannot when it is merely perceiving).

thinking. It does not mean that the "I think" must relate to every *conscious* representation in the way the "I as subject" must be related. (b) Such an interpretation can be confirmed if we consider the argument that the "I think" should be able accompany all my representations if they are not to be "nothing to me." Kant characterizes intuitions as representations that must be given prior to all thinking, and argues that the "I think" must have a necessary relation to the manifold of intuition in the same subject in which the manifold is given.

If we take this subsequent claim (b) seriously, then the argument can be depicted in the following way. If the "I think" were not to be able to accompany all my representations, then something could be represented in my mind which cannot be *thought* and, hence, would be "nothing to me." Intuiting is prior to thinking, and hence, we can have intuitions given in my unified subject that do not or cannot become part of my thinking. Hence, if we are to distinguish thinking and intuiting in this way, then the manifold of intuition must necessarily relate to the "I think" in the unified mind of the discursive subject *when it is thinking*. In other words, we can say the following: it is the "I as subject," the horizon of consciousness that makes possible the manifold of intuition as belonging to one discursively-cognizing mind; and the "I think" must necessarily relate to the manifold of intuition if that mind is involved in the activity of thinking. In other words, if the "I as subject" is given, then the manifold of intuition belongs to one subject; and if the subject is involved in thinking, then the "I think" must necessarily relate to the manifold. If the "I think" does not accompany the manifold in thinking, then we can say either that the intuition is impossible (the broader negation indicating that the "I think" cannot be operational because there is no unified subject) or it is nothing to the

subject (the narrower negation indicating that a particular intuition of the unified mind has no relevance for any particular process of thinking or that the subject cannot assert "I think *Intuition a*," etc.). Hence, the claim that the "I think" must have a necessary relationship to all the manifold of intuition can only amount to the claim that the "I think" must necessarily have a potential relationship to all the manifold given in a unified mind. This potential relationship may become operational in acts of thinking but, thinking seems to require intuitions prior to it and the manifold of intuitions require a unified mind. We have seen that the "I as subject," the horizon of consciousness, makes the logical unity of the mind possible, which means that the "I think" would have to be seen as not merely conceptually distinguishable from the "I as subject" but also theoretically presuming the latter.

In essence, then, the *a priori* "I think" can be seen as forming the horizon of thinking while the "I as subject" can be seen as forming the horizon of consciousness (or the unity of the discursive subject).

(2) The "I as subject" is the horizon of consciousness while the *a priori* "I think" forms the horizon of thinking. The term "I of intelligence" can be described as the "I as subject of thinking" ("*Ich, als Intelligenz und denkend Subjekt*, *KrV*, B155-6). We have to now ask: what is the form of the *a priori* "I think"? And what is the form of the "I" of intelligence embedded in the *a priori* (or even empirical) "I think," (Cf. B423n, quoted above) or, alternatively stated, what is the nature and function of the "I" of intelligence in relation to the *a priori* "I think"?

Kant defines thinking as cognition through concepts (*KrV*, A69/B94). Intuitions are supposed to be prior to thinking (*KrV*, B132). And the activity, "*Denken*," can take place to the extent we can abstract from all objects ("*indem man von allem Objekte abstrahiert*," *KrV*, B412n) which enables us to distinguish it clearly from intuitions of objects. Thus, we can be justified in taking the term "thinking" as denoting something specific as opposed to intuiting or merely perceiving something, and we do not need to construe "thinking" as merely a general label for perceiving and including sensing, feeling, or willing, as might have been the case with the Cartesian *cogito*.

It is important to specify clearly the distinction between thinking and intuiting for Kant because the "I of intelligence" is to be associated with thinking rather than intuiting. In the B paralogisms, Kant says that the "I of intelligence" has to be characterized as pure intellectual irrespective of whether we characterize the "I think" as *a priori* or as an empirical proposition because it belongs to the activity of thinking in general. "[*W*]*enn ich den Satz: ich denke, einen empirischen Satz genannt habe, ich dadurch nicht sagen will, das Ich in diesem Satze sei empirische Vorstellung; vielmehr ist sie rein intellektuell, weil sie zum Denken ueberhaupt gehoert*" (*KrV*, B423n). And thinking, as has already been remarked, is intellectual because it abstracts from objects unlike intuitions. Hence, to the extent that the "intellectual I" or the "I of intelligence" belongs to thinking, it cannot be considered empirical, but purely intellectual. Moreover, the "I of intelligence" can only serve as subject in relation to thinking. "*[I]ch kann im Denken meiner Existenz, mich nur zum Subjekt des Urteils brauchen, welches ein identischer Satz ist, der schlechterdings nichts ueber die Art meines Daseins eroeffnet*" (B412n). In thinking, the "I" of intelligence is the subject of a judgment.

Apart from characterizing the "I of intelligence" as associated with thinking and as subject of judgment, Kant can be clearly seen as characterizing the "I think," of which the "I" of intelligence" is supposed to be a part, as a judgment. In the Paralogisms, after saying that there is a transcendental concept which does not belong to the table of categories, Kant says of this concept, "*Dieses ist der Begriff, oder, wenn man lieber will, das Urteil: Ich denke. Man sieht aber leicht, dass er das Vehikel aller Begriffe ueberhaupt, und mithin auch der transzendentalen sei, und also unter diesen jederzeit mit begriffen werde, und daher eben sowohl transzendental sei, aber keinen besondern Titel haben koenne, weil er nur dazu dient, alles Denken, als zum Bewusstsein gehoerig, aufzufuehren*" (*KrV*, A341/B399).

From this key passage, many propositions follow that help in specifying the form of the "I as subject of thinking" or "I of intelligence."

Kant speaks of the "I think" as a concept or rather judgment. In the *Prolegomena*, however, Kant denies that the "I" can be a concept. He says, "*Waere die Vorstellung der Apperzeption, das Ich, ein Begriff, wodurch irgend etwas gedacht wuerde, so wuerde es auch als Praedikat von andern Dingen gebraucht werden koennen, oder solche Praedikate in sich enthalten*" (AA IV: 334n). Is Kant contradicting himself? Not if we accept that there is a distinction to be made between the "I as subject" and the *a priori* "I think." The "I as subject" as horizon of consciousness cannot be seen as a concept through which anything can be thought. If that were to be the case, then the "I" could have been used as a predicate of objects and could have subordinated other such predicates under its own aegis. However, this cannot be the case. The concept "red" can be used as a predicate to describe a variety of objects, and it can accommodate under

itself various shades of red as sub-concepts. But the "I" cannot be predicated for other things nor can it be seen as subordinating other predicates (eg. a statement like the "I" is red is nonsense). It can only be seen as the horizon of consciousness for the discursive intellect from the first person perspective, or, in short, as the "I as subject."

On the other hand, the "I think" can be seen as a transcendental concept or judgment. Unlike the "I as subject," the "I think" can be seen as forming the horizon of thinking rather than consciousness. It is supposed to be the vehicle of all concepts since there could be no use of the categories if there were no "I think." And its task is to "*auffuehren*" all thinking to consciousness. In this context, the term "*auffuehren*" is vaguely used and difficult to translate. Paul Guyer translates the verb as "introduce." According to the above-quoted passage (*KrV*, A341/B399), thinking proceeds through the application of the pure categories, and it could apparently proceed without consciousness if there were no "I think." This is because if we translate "*auffuehren*" with the more literal "bringing something to something" rather than Guyer's "introducing," we find that it is the task of the "I think" to bring all thinking to consciousness. In other words, Kant seems to be making a distinction between thinking something vaguely and articulating my thoughts, by marking them in the mind if not actually putting them in words.

We know that the "I as subject" is the horizon of consciousness, and we now learn that the transcendental "I think" as judgment, which includes the "I of intelligence" and forms the horizon of thinking, is needed to bring all acts of thinking to consciousness. How should we characterize the *a priori* "I think" that could perform the function of bringing acts of thinking within the horizon of consciousness?

In Chapter 1, I had argued that there is a difference between apprehending and reflecting upon something, and that the latter requires the directedness of my attention (spontaneity of apperception) as opposed to merely apprehending (attentio/*auffassen*) something. We will now see that the "I of intelligence," the intellectual representation that remains pure even if the "I think" is empirical, can be glossed as the spontaneity of apperception, the "I" as directedness of my attention in the process of reflecting and judging. The form of "I as the subject of thinking," then, can be differentiated from the form of the "I as subject" in the following way: the latter refers to the horizon of consciousness making possible the mere apprehension of representations while the former relates to the directedness of attention (spontaneity of apperception) associated with the process of reflecting, and forms the horizon of thinking. Moreover, the difference between the *a priori* "I think" and the *a priori* "I of intelligence" mirrors the distinction between the spontaneity of judgment and spontaneity of apperception (Cf. Chapter 1). As in the case of the latter distinction where the spontaneity of apperception constitutes the spontaneity of judgment, the "I of intelligence" forms as much the horizon of thinking in its capacity as directedness of attention as the *a priori* "I think" forms the horizon of thinking because the "I of intelligence," as part of the *a priori* "I think," can be seen as constituting the *a priori* "I think."

We can gloss the "I of intelligence" as the spontaneity of apperception for textual reasons and, on these textual grounds, also draw significant conclusions about the form of the "I of intelligence."

(a) Kant speaks of the empty "I" of intelligence as *Gemuethshandlung* (AA VII: 141-2). In a handwritten note, Kant describes the "I think" as spontaneity ("*Ich denke ist Spontaneity*," E XLVI, margin of A116). In the B deduction of the first *Critique*, Kant describes the "I think" as "*Actus der Spontaneitaet*" (*KrV*, B132). In the B paralogisms, Kant again speaks of the "I think" as "*Actus*" (*KrV*, B423n). In the previous chapter, I had argued that the spontaneity of apperception, as "*innere Handlung*," refers to the directedness of attention that constitutes the process of thinking (spontaneity of judgment relating to the faculty of the understanding) for a discursive subject. If we accept that argument, then Kant's description of the "I of intelligence" as *Gemuethshandlung* can only be seen as the spontaneity of apperception, the directedness of attention.

We have seen that Kant describes the "I think" as a concept or judgment (*KrV*, A341/B399) that brings all thinking to consciousness. We have seen that the "I as subject" which forms the horizon of consciousness has to be distinguished from the "I think." And finally, we have seen that the "I of intelligence" or the "intellectual I" is always pure whether the "I think" is empirical or *a priori*, and can be glossed as the spontaneity of apperception that forms the horizon of thinking. But, in both editions of the first *Critique*, Kant also describes the "I think" as "mere apperception" and as transcendental. He says "*Denn diese innere Wahrnehmung* [perception of oneself] *ist nichts weiter, als die blosse Apperzeption: Ich denke; welche sogar alle transzendentale Begriffe moeglich macht, in welchen es heisst: Ich denke die Substanz, die Ursache, etc. Denn innere Erfahrung ueberhaupt und deren Moeglichkeit, oder Wahrnehmung ueberhaupt und deren Verhaeltnis zu anderer Wahrnehmung, ohne dass irgend ein besonderer Unterschied derselben und Bestimmung empirisch gegeben ist, kann nicht als*

empirische Erkenntnis, sondern muss als Erkenntnis des Empirischen ueberhaupt angesehen werden, und gehoert zur Untersuchung der Moeglichkeit einer jeden Erfahrung, welche allerdings transzendental ist" (*KrV,* A342-3/B400-1).

Thus, if the "I of intelligence" is spontaneity of apperception; the "I think" is spontaneity, describable as "apperception," and equally as judgment or transcendental concept; and thinking relates to the employment of the faculty of the understanding; -- then, we are forced to conclude that the *a priori* "I think" is a transcendental judgment, or an *a priori* link between (i) the "I of intelligence" or the directedness of attention and (ii) the synthesis of thinking via the understanding. Hence, we should conceptually distinguish between the "I of intelligence" and the *a priori* "I think."

While Kant does not himself make these fine distinctions, his various statements lead us to such a view. In the first section of this chapter, we have seen that the distinction between the "I think" and the "I" can be made. We can now further accept the distinction between the *a priori* "I think" as judgment and the "I of intelligence" as directedness of attention. If the "I of intelligence" is the directedness of attention; thinking requires the "I of intelligence" since sustained thinking requires sustained attention, but the actual thinking is carried forth by the employment of the understanding; the role of the "I think" as judgment is to bring thinking to consciousness; -- then, the *a priori* "I think" can be seen as a form or transcendental concept that forms the mediating link between the (i) the "I of intelligence or directedness of thinking, (ii) the "I as subject" as horizon of consciousness, (iii) thinking as related to the use of the understanding. In Kant's system, judgments subsume the particular under the universal. It appears that the *a priori* judgment, "I think," subsumes the activity of thinking (related to

the faculty of the understanding) under the horizon of consciousness ("I as subject") through the directedness of attention ("I as intelligence"). Since we are only trying to articulate the form of the "I as subject of thinking," we leave the further elaboration of this structure for another time, especially the puzzle of how the "I think" can be termed both judgment and apperception at the same time, satisfying ourselves for the present with merely drawing the distinction between the "I" of intelligence and the *a priori* "I think" as judgment, and indicating the relationship between the two.

(b) In the B paralogisms, Kant says, "*Allein ohne irgend eine empirische Vorstellung, die den Stoff zum Denken abgibt, wuerde der Actus, Ich denke, doch nicht stattfinden, und das Empirische ist nur die Bedingung der Anwendung, oder des Gebrauchs des reinen intellektuellen Vermoegens* (*KrV*, B423n). And in the margins of A116, Kant says in a handwritten note, "*Bewusstsein und innerer Sinn sind verschieden. Ich denke ist Spontaneitaet und haengt von keinem Gegenstand ab. Die Vorstellung aber, mit welcher ich mich denke, muss mir in der Anschauung (durch Imagination) vorher gegeben seyn. In Ansehung deren bin ich afficiert*" (E XLVI). In these passages, Kant can be seen as making the following points: that the "I think" cannot be seen as dependent on any object, and that any representation must already be seen as given in intuition if the discursive subject is able to employ the representation in thinking. The explication of the "I of intelligence" as spontaneity of apperception, as delineated in the previous paragraphs, is perfectly consistent with these claims. Firstly, the "I of intelligence" cannot be taken as causally dependent on the object because it is the subject that contributes the directedness of attention to the act/s of thinking about a set of

representations given in intuition. If such a subject cannot sustain the directedness in the processual activity of thinking, then it cannot sustain and complete that act of thinking. In the *Metaphysik Mongrovius*, Kant says, "*Das Bewusstsein nach Willkuehr ist Aufmerksamkeit – das Wiederspiel derselben Abstraction*" (AA XXVIII: 878). If the "I of intelligence" as spontaneity of apperception is directedness of attention; attention can be defined as the choice (*Willkuehr*) of the subject; abstraction requires higher degrees of attention and thinking, apart from requiring, as we have seen, abstraction from the object; -- then, the directedness of attention would be necessarily required if sustained thinking were to take place, not merely because thinking requires sustained attention but also because thinking requires abstraction which can only be accomplished by the directedness of attention, or the employment of the "I of intelligence." Without the directedness and sustenance of attention, there could be no abstraction because attention is willful consciousness of something and abstraction is simply the compounding of attention, or willful attentiveness taken forward into the task of concept formation. Secondly, the "I of intelligence" could not be directed to anything if there were no representations already given in intuition.

(c) The "I think" as spontaneity of judgment includes the "I of intelligence" as spontaneity of apperception. Kant takes pain to distinguish the *a priori* "I think" -- and, by implication, the "I of intelligence," or spontaneity of apperception -- from empirical representations in time. In a handwritten note to A401 (Paralogisms), Kant says that the *a priori* "I think" is an intellectual representation neither spatial nor temporal, neither anywhere nor anytime. "'*Ich denke' ist ein Satz a priori; ist eine blosse Categorie des*

Subjects, intellectuale Vorstellung ohne irgendwo und irgendwann, also nicht empirisch. Ob darin die Categorie der Realitaet liege; ob daraus objective Schluesse zu ziehen sind" (E CLX). In the *Anthropologie*, Kant distinguishes between inner sense and logical (pure) apperception. As Mohr has argued, the former gives the representation as representation for a discursive subject (Mohr, *Das sinnliche Ich*, 197, *op. cit.*). It has nothing to do with the concepts of the understanding, which Kant associates with the ability to think or judge. On the other hand, the logical (pure) apperception relates to concepts of the understanding in the way we have seen in the previous two paragraphs: the "I of intelligence" as directedness of attention makes thinking and the "I think" as judgment possible.[47]

And finally, just like the "I as subject" forming the horizon of consciousness, the "I of intelligence" that forms the horizon of thinking can be distinguished from the body. We have seen that the "I as subject" remains unaltered even if parts of the body are excised, and that the pure "I as subject of thinking" is not spatiotemporally determined (*ohne irgendwo und irgendwann*). In the lectures on metaphysics (*Metaphysik L1*), Kant says specifically that the "I of intelligence" as subject of thinking is nonspatial and separable from the body. "*Ich als Intelligenz bin an keinem Orte; denn der Ort ist eine Relation der aeussern Gegenstand, der in Ansehung der Relation bestimmt werden kann…Meinen Ort werde ich also nicht unmittelbar bestimmen koennen, sondern ich also Seele bestimme meinen Ort in der Welt durch den Koerper; aber meinen Ort im Koerper*

[47] "*Das die Woerter innerer Sinn und Apperception von den Seelenforschen gemeinhin fuer gleichbedeutend genommen werden, unerachtet der erstere allein ein psychologisches (angewandtes), die zweite aber bloss ein logisches (reines) Bewusstsein anzeigen soll, ist die Ursache dieser Irrungen. Dass wir aber durch den ersteren uns nur erkennen koennen, wie wir uns erscheinen, erhellt daraus, weil Auffassung (apprehensio) der Eindruecke des ersteren eine formale Bedingung der inneren Anschauung des Subjects, naemlich die Zeit, voraussetzt, welche kein Verstandsbegriff ist und also bloss als subjective Bedingung gilt, wie nach der Beschaffenheit der menschlichen Seele uns innere Empfindungen gegeben werden, also diese uns nicht, wie das Object an sich ist, zu erkennen giebt*" (AA VII: 142).

kann ich nicht bestimmen, denn sonst muesste ich mich in einer aeussern Relation anschauen koennen" (XXVIII: 225). In this passage, Kant says that the "I as intelligence" is not locatable in space. As soul (defined previously as "thinking I" and "I"), the "I" can determine its location in the world through the body; but the place of the "I" cannot be determined in the body in the same way because that would require intuition of the relationship between the "I" and the body in outer sense, in space, which is not possible for a discursive intellect. But then Kant poses the important question of the relationship between the soul and the brain. Could we not perhaps think of the brain as the seat of the soul? Yes, he says, but points out that the fact that we think of the soul as being in the brain does not necessarily mean that the soul is located in the brain, but only means that we are conscious that the soul works most on the part of the body called the brain. The brain is the analogon of the place of the soul in the body, but not its position ("*Es ist ein Analogon des Orts, aber nicht ihre Stelle*" (AA XXVIII: 225)). Finally, characterizing the "I of intelligence" clearly as the thinking principle (*denkenden* principio), Kant makes a distinction between the soul and body on the basis of "*das blosse Bewusstsein*." "*Schon das blosse Bewusstsein giebt mir den Unterschied von Seele und Koerper; denn das aeussere, was ich an mir sehe, ist offenbar von dem denkenden prinicipio in mir unterschieden; und dieses denkende Princip ist wieder von alle dem, was nur ein Gegenstand der aeusseren Sinne seyn kann, unterschieden*" (AA XXVIII: 225). In other words, the fact that the discursive subject is aware of the distinction between body and soul via "mere consciousness" simply means that such a subject treats of the soul-body distinction as obvious or taken-for-granted.

If we take the fact that Kant describes the "I of intelligence" as "*denkenden* principio" and accept the distinction between the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking," then we can make the distinction between the "I" and "thinking I" in the passage I have quoted previously in order to indicate that the "I as subject" remains the same even if some parts of the body are excised. In the same passage, Kant also says that the thinking "I" or the "I of intelligence" remains the same even if certain body parts have been excised. This passage bears quotation again. Kant says, "*Es kann ein Mensch viele von seinen Gliedern verlieren, deswegen bleibt er doch, und kann sagen: Ich bin. Der Fuss gehoeret ihm. Ist er aber abgesaget, so sieht er ihn eben so an, als jede andere Sache, die er nicht mehr gebrauchen kann, wie einen alten Stiefel, den er wegwerfen muss. Er selbst aber bleibt immer unveraendert, und sein denkendes Ich verliert nichts. Es sieht also jeder/leicht ein, auch durch den gemeinsten Verstand: dass er eine Seele habe, die vom Koerper unterschieden ist*" (AA XXVIII: 225). In this passage, Kant seems to be saying that the "I" of the discursive subject remains the same *and* its "thinking I" loses nothing even if the subject loses some of its body parts. If, as we have seen, the representations are to be given in intuition prior to thinking, then the "I as subject" as horizon of consciousness, the idea that the discursive subject is aware that she is the same subject, must be taken as prior to the "I" that thinks, or the "I of intelligence." If such is indeed the case, then we can distinguish the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking" not merely in a general sense, which is the case as we have seen, but even in this passage. And, hence, when Kant says, "*Er* [the self-same subject] *selbst aber bleibt immer unveraendert, und sein denkendes Ich verliert nichts,*" we can assume that both ("*und*") the fact that (i) the subject can be conscious of itself as self-same and (ii) the "I of

intelligence" that constitutes the possibility of thinking can be seen as separable from the body. If we accept the argument that there is enough evidence to suggest that Kant implicitly distinguishes the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking," then the interpretation of this passage would not seem implausible.

(d) Finally, Kant asserts that the "I of intelligence" cannot be known as it is in itself. In the A paralogisms, Kant says that we cannot generally answer the question of that which makes the thing move ("*was wohl das vor ein Ding sein muesse, welches beweglich ist?*" *KrV*, A398). "*Ob ich nun zwar allgemein auf jene Frage keine Antworth weiss: so scheint es mir doch, dass ich sie im einzelnen Falle, in dem Satze, der das Selbstbewusstsein ausdrueckt: Ich denke, geben koenne. Denn dieses Ich ist das erste Subjekt, d. i. Substanz, es ist einfach, etc. Dieses muessten aber alsdenn lauter Erfahrungssaetze sein, die gleichwohl ohne eine allgemeine Regel, welche die Bedingungen der Moeglichkeit zu denken ueberhaupt und a priori aussagte, keine dergleichen Praedikate (welche nicht empirisch sein) enthalten koennten*" (*KrV*, A398-9). In this passage, Kant could be seen as using the terms "I think" and "I" interchangeably. But given my extended argument that Kant makes this distinction, often implicitly but sometimes even explicitly, as in the case of the B paralogisms (*KrV*, B422-3n, quoted above) where he distinguishes the "I of intelligence" and the "I think," we can take the A passage as an exception, but we can still use the quotation to explicate why it is impossible to know the "I of intelligence" in itself – a view we could say Kant does not reject in the B edition (Cf. *KrV*, B422-3n & B429; §16 of the B deduction for the use of the term "*hervorbringen*"), though this passage from A is far more useful in the present context. This relates to Kant's

observation that we cannot answer the question of what makes a thing move, or, more specifically what makes the discursive intellect move or direct its attention or act. No general *a priori* answer can be given for this question, asserts Kant. The "I think" can be seen as the motive for acting in particular cases, and if we are considering particular cases, the "I think" would have to be construed as empirical owing to the fact that spatiotemporal detail is required for the "I think" to be operational in any particular case. It is not the case that all discursive subjects would judge "I think that x" in a particular spatiotemporal circumstance, and, hence, generalized theorems cannot be given regarding the true nature of the "I of intelligence" or spontaneity of apperception.

We have seen that the "I of intelligence" remains pure even if the "I think" is taken to be empirical. If the empirical proposition or judgment, "I think x," can be provisionally viewed as the basis for motivating a discursive subject to act, then the "I of intelligence," glossed as directedness of attention, could be seen as the ultimate source of action. We can, however, only point to such a source, and, if we were to stay within discursive limits in our inquiry, we would be unable to offer any other propositions describing the "I of intelligence" such that we can offer general *a priori* rules for action among discursive subjects. In this sense, we cannot know the true nature of the "I of intelligence" as directedness of attention. The "I of intelligence" appears to be the source of movement in a discursive subject, but we cannot further specify its nature.

In fact, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says clearly that we cannot know the "I" in itself (*an sich*). Kant does not specifically speak of the "I of intelligence" in this passage, but the fact that he describes the "I" as the persisting logical subject of *thinking* makes it possible to associate the "I" with the "I of intelligence" according the

interpretive distinction between the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking" that we have drawn in this chapter. "[*D]as bestaendige logische Subjekt des Denkens, vor die Erkenntnis des realen Subjekts der Inhaerenz ausgibt, von welchem wir nicht die mindeste Kenntnis haben, noch haben koennen, weil das Bewusstsein das einzige ist, was alle Vorstellungen zu Gedanken macht, und worin mithin alle unsere Wahrenehmungen, als dem transzendentalen Subjekte, muessen angetroffen werden, und wir, ausser dieser logischen Bedeutung des Ich, keine Kenntnis von dem Subjekte an sich selbst haben, was diesem, so wie allen Gedanken, als Substratum zum Grunde liegt*" (*KrV,* A350). We cannot have any knowledge (*Kenntnis*) of the subject in itself, except that we can characterize the "I" (or "I of intelligence") as the logical subject of thinking.

Hence, to summarize this section: The form of the "I as subject of thinking" or the "I of intelligence" can be described in the following way: The "I" of intelligence is the spontaneity of apperception or directedness of attention; it can be distinguished from the "I as subject" which is the horizon of consciousness, and described as the horizon of thinking owing to the fact that it relates to thinking rather than perceiving; it is the subject of thinking, and part of the *a priori* "I think;" and, finally, we cannot know its nature in itself, but it appears to be the source of movement in a discursive subject.

III

The Form of "I" as Object

We have seen that the "I as subject" is the horizon of consciousness and the "I as subject of thinking" is the horizon of thinking. The former necessarily accompanies all representations while the latter could accompany all representations. Kant says that the "I" is twofold in form: "I" as subject and "I" as object, and the two must necessarily go

together. If there were no subject, nothing could be an object. In exploring the meaning and significance of the form of the "I" as object, we need to explicate the form of the "I" if it were to be an object. Kant often speaks of the "I" as object of inner sense, but seldom about the "I" as object having a distinctive form of its own, except when he remarks that the "I" is twofold in form. In this sub-section, we will discover that the form of "I" as object is only cognitively relevant in relation to the "I as subject of thinking," and, hence, in the activity of thinking. If the discursive subject is not thinking, the form of the "I" as object would be irrelevant, and, thus, in the case of perception, the "I as subject" cannot objectify itself.

Kant seems to have repeatedly drawn an analogy between the form of the "I" and the forms of sensibility, space and time. While Kant himself never really explored the possibilities of such an analogy for the theory of the "I," we can (argumentatively) draw out the formal features of the "I" as object on the basis of these statements. Like space and time, we can view the form of the "I" as object as having the following features: (a) all representations must stand under the "I" just as all representations stand under space and time. (b) The analogy with space and time indicates that the form of the "I" as object is best describable as intuition rather than as concept, and as necessary. Given that Kant is avowedly a transcendental idealist and empirical realist, space and time can be seen as transcendental rules, and particular spatial and temporal representations can be seen as real and conscious representations. (c) The "I" can only be considered object in form if there were a subject that construed it as object. The form of the "I as subject of thinking" relates to the "I" as form of object *if the discursive subject is involved in thinking*, and, in empirical terms, involves a relationship between the directedness of attention and the "I"

as empirical object of inner sense. If the discursive subject is perceiving rather than thinking, then the distinction between "I as subject of thinking" and "I as object" is irrelevant if we are to avoid falling into an infinite regress. In the case of perception, the "I as subject" or horizon of consciousness must be necessarily built into every conscious representation.

We must now explicate and justify (a)-(c) in more detail.

(a) In both editions of the first *Critique*, Kant says that all representations must stand under (*stehen unter*) the "I" just as all representations stand under space and time.

In the A edition of the first *Critique*, Kant says, "*Dieses reine urspruengliche, unwandelbare Bewusstsein will ich nun die transzendentale Apperzeption nennen. Dass sie diesen Namen verdiene, erhellet schon daraus: dass selbst die reinste objective Einheit, naemlich die der Begriffe a priori (Raum und Zeit) nur durch Beziehung der Anschauungen auf sie moeglich sei. Die numerische Einheit dieser Apperzeption liegt also a priori allen Begriffen eben so wohl zum Grunde, als die Mannigfaltigkeit des Raumes und der Zeit den Anschauungen der Sinnlichkeit*" (*KrV,* A107). And in similar vein, "*Es ist also schlechthin notwendig, dass in meinem Erkenntnisse alles Bewusstsein zu einem Bewusstsein (meiner Selbst) gehoere. Hier ist nun eine synthetische Einheit des Mannigfaltigen, (Bewusstseins) die a priori erkannt wird, und gerade so den Grund zu synthetischen Saetzen a priori, die das reine Denken betreffen, als Raum und Zeit zu solchen Saetzen, die die Form der blossen Anschauung angehen, abgibt* (*KrV,* A117n). And, most importantly, "[*Alle Erscheinungen*] *eben sowohl in der Erfahrung unter Bedingungen der notwendigen Einheit der Apperzeption, als in der blossen Anschauung*

unter den formalen Bedingungen des Raumes und der Zeit stehen muessen, ja dass durch jene jede Erkenntnis allererst moeglich werde" (*KrV*, A110). The numerical unity of apperception, or the self-same "I," forms the *a priori* ground for all concepts in just the way space and time form the ground for the manifold of sensible intuitions. In both cases, something must stand under (*stehen unter*) something. Kant draws an analogy between the way all appearances must stand under the "I" and the way all sensible intuitions must stand under the forms of space and time. We have seen that the "I as subject" as horizon of consciousness forms the condition for the possibility of consciousness, but ultimately the condition for the possibility of thinking, or the use of concepts in general, as well. If a representation were to lie outside the horizon of the "I," it could not be conscious for the discursive subject just the way a representation could not be characterized as spatiotemporal if it lay outside the form of spatiotemporality.

The notion of horizon can be explicated through the notion of "correlate." Kant says, "*Denn das stehende und bleibende Ich (der reinen Apperzeption) macht das Correlatum aller unserer Vorstellungen aus, so fern es bloss moeglich ist, sich ihrer bewusst zu werden, und alles Bewusstsein gehoert eben so wohl zu einer allbefassenden reinen Apperzeption, wie alle sinnliche Anschauung als Vorstellung zu einer reinen innern Anschauung, namelich der Zeit*" (*KrV*, A123-4; see also A110). In this passage, Kant says: (i) the "I" is a correlate of all representations, just the way space or time would have to be correlates to the extent we can be conscious of such representations, which suggests that the "I" is built into conscious representations just the way space and time are built into sensory intuitions, and (ii) all consciousness belongs to the pure apperception just the way all sensible intuitions belong to pure intuition, time (but also

space considering the fact that space and time have been conflated in this context, Cf. *KrV*, A107, A117n, A110, just quoted). Thus, the "I" forms the horizon or correlate of all consciousness in just the way the forms of sensibility, space and time, forms the horizon or correlate of all sensible intuitions. In the metaphysics lecture of 1782-3 (*Mongrovius*) immediately after the first edition of the first *Critique*, Kant says, "*Der Sinn (sensatio) ist zweifach: 1. der innere und 2. der aeussere Sinn. Das Vermoegen der inner Anschauung ist der innre Sinn. Der innre Sinn ist das Bewusstsein unserer Vorstellungen selbst. (Die Apperception liegt dem innern Sinn zum Grunde)* (AA XXVIII: 882)." The "I" is correlate of all representations or built into every representation (*liegt dem inner Sinn zum Grund*).

In the B deduction, Kant makes similar claims, which further indicates that the formal similarity between the "I," space and time can be taken as interpretively significant. In §21 of the B-deduction, after saying that the manifold in the intuition which I call "mine" is represented through the synthesis of the understanding as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness, Kant says, "*Diese zeigt an: dass das empirische Bewusstsein eines gegebenen Mannigfaltigen Einer Anschauung eben sowohl unter einem reinen Selbstbewusstsein a priori, wie empirische Anschauung unter einer reinen sinnlichen, die gleichfalls a priori Statt hat, stehe* (*KrV*, B144)." And, "*Der oberste Grundsatz der Moeglichkeit aller Anschauung in Beziehung auf die Sinnlichkeit war laut der transz. Aesthetik: dass alles Mannigfaltiges derselben unter den formalen Bedingungen des Raums und der Zeit stehe. Der oberste Grundsatz eben derselben in Beziehung auf den Verstand: dass alles Mannigfaltige der Anschauung unter Bedingungen der uersprunglich-synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption stehe*" (*KrV*,

B136). Owing to the fact that we have not yet discussed the terms like "self-consciousness" or the "original synthetic unity of consciousness,"[48] we need to presently bracket these terms. If we, however, equate the terms "I" and "self-consciousness," then the argument is similar to the one from the A deduction: that the "I" is horizon of all empirical consciousness just like space and time form the horizon for all sensible intuitions. It is well known that Kant was deeply uncertain about the relationship between the "I" and the faculty of the understanding in the B deduction and that he subsumed the "I" under the aegis of the faculty of the understanding ("*Verstand unter der Benennung der Apperzeption*," *KrV*, B160). More specifically, representations under pure forms of intuition, space and time, consist in all that has been given (*gegeben werden*) and under the latter (the original synthetic unity of apperception) all that "*muessen verbunden werden koennen*" (*KrV*, B137). We have seen that the "I as subject of thinking" has been attributed the task of combining (*verbinden*); but we have also seen that the "I as subject," the horizon of consciousness, forms the condition for the possibility of consciousness, and, thus, the "I as subject of thinking." Hence, irrespective of the differences between the A and B deductions of the first *Critique*, we can presently say that the analogy between the form of the "I" and the forms of sensibility articulated in the A deduction lies at the base of the analogy drawn in the B deduction, even if other novel considerations influence Kant's terminology and argument in the latter case.

[48] As has been pointed out in the Introduction, I am focusing on the term "I" in this work, which, in my view, forms the preliminary step in characterizing the structure of self-consciousness or the "I" in the Kantian system in complete way. If we are to offer a genuine structure of self-consciousness, we would have to engage questions like "How is the 'I' built into all conscious perception?" and "What is the relationship between the 'I as subject of thinking' and the 'I as object' in the process of thinking?" in light of further work requiring (a) the textual clarification of terms like "synthetic unity of apperception" and "analytical unity of apperception" and how these terms can be accommodated in the framework of the "I" that we have established in the present work, and (b) explicating the relationship between the "I" as we have presently characterized it and the notion of experience.

(b) The analogy with space and time indicates that the form of the "I" as object is best describable as form of intuition rather than as concept, and as necessary.

(i) We have seen that the "I as subject" as horizon of consciousness is a necessary condition for the possibility of consciousness in general (*ueberhaupt*). Kant describes the forms of sensibility is an analogous way.

In the first *Critique*, the argument for the necessity of space and time runs analogous to the way the "I as subject" can be viewed as necessary (see Chapter 2 above). A discursive subject can never have a sensible representation that is not in space or time in just the way she can never have a conscious representation lying outside the horizon of "I as subject." Kant says, "*Man kann sich niemals eine Vorstellung davon machen, dass kein Raum sei.…*" (*KrV,* A24/B38). And further, just like the "I as subject" as horizon of consciousness analytically includes the notion of necessity in itself, space and time, too, include the concept of necessity analytically within themselves. In a handwritten note to the "*Allgemeine Anmerkungen zur Transcendentalen Aesthetik*" (*KrV,* A42), Kant draws the relationship between space and time and the notion of necessity. "*Der Raum und die Zeit fuehren in ihrer Vorstellung zugleich den Begriff der Nothwendigkeit mit sich. Nun ist dieses keine Nothwendigkeit eines Begriffs. Denn wir koennen beweisen, dass sich die Nichtexistenz desselben nicht widerspreche. Auch kann Nothwendigkeit nicht in der empirischen Anschauung liegen. Denn die kann zwar den Begriff der Existenz, aber nicht der nothwendigen Existenz mit sich fuehren. Also ist diese Nothwendigkeit gar nicht im Objecte – objective; folglich ist sie nur eine dem*

Subject nothwendige Bedingung vor allen Wahrnehmungen der Sinne" (E XVII). The necessity of space and time is not the necessity of a concept: it is not self-contradictory that the concept "red" does not exist at time *t*, but it is necessary that representations are always given spatiotemporally to a discursive intellect. Further, it is not the necessity of an empirical intuition either: if I empirically intuit red at time *t*, I must necessarily be intuiting red at time *t* but my intuiting red at time *t* is contingent and not necessary. Hence, says Kant, the fact that representations are necessarily spatiotemporal means that the necessity of spatiotemporal representation is an *a priori* characteristic of the subject and not the object.

(ii) In a significant passage which Kant added in the B deduction, Kant makes a distinction between contained in (*enthalten in*) and standing under (*enthalten unter*). Concepts can be used to characterize an infinite number of representations, and all these representations may be seen as standing under (*enthalten unter*) the concept – an infinite number of objects may be red, and all of these could stand under the label "red." But we cannot think of a concept that contains all these representations in itself (*enthalten in*), and, therefore, can be differentiated from the intuition of space (or time) which can contain an infinite number of representations in itself at the same time. "*Nun muss man zwar einen jeden Begriff als eine Vorstellung denken, die in einer unendlichen Menge von verschiedenen moeglichen Vorstellungen (als ihr gemeinschaftliches Merkmal) enthalten ist, mithin diese unter sich enthaelt; aber kein Begriff, als ein solcher, kann so gedacht werden, als ob er eine unendliche Menge von Vorstellungen in sich enthielte. Gleichwohl*

wird der Raum so gedacht (denn alle Teile des Raumes ins Unendliche sind zugleich)" (*KrV*, B40).

In the A deduction, however, Kant describes space and time as *a priori* concepts ("*selbst die reinste objective Einheit, naemlich die der Begriffe a priori (Raum und Zeit) nur durch Beziehung der Anschauungen auf sie moeglich sei*…" *KrV*, A107). But this description of space and time as concepts comes in the wake of merely indicating the fact that space and time are transcendental concepts that can be operationalized only if some given data exists. We have seen that the "I as subject" as horizon of consciousness can be characterized as a transcendental concept in the same way. If the "I as subject" is seen as built into the consciousness of any representation, we must assume that there exist representations that make it possible for the "I" to be built-into them. Kant makes that very clear in a reflection from the 1780s on the nature of the rule in general. "*Von der Regel ueberhaupt. Sie ist die objective Einheit des Bewusstsein des Mannigfaltigen der Vorstellungen (folglich die, so allgemein gilt). Die Regel ist entweder empirisch, wenn die Bedingung der Einheit in blossen Wahrnehmungen liegt. Sie kann also nicht anders objectiv sein, als in Beziehung auf moegliche Erfahrung als Erkenntnis der Objecte der Wahrnehmung. Die Moeglichkeit der Erfahrung ist also der Grund der objectiven Giltigkeit der Regeln der Wahrnehmung; oder diese Moeglichkeit der Erfahrung gruendet sich auf die notwendige Einheit des Bewusstseins der Vorstellungen, sofern daraus Erkenntnis (der Objecte) werden soll*" (AA XVIII: R5708, 1780s). A transcendental rule or concept can only be objectively valid if there were given the possibility of experience in general. In other words, if there were no impressions given to the subject, the application of the rule could not take place, or, alternatively said, if there

were no impressions, nothing would be given in space or time, and the "I as subject" could not be a horizon of consciousness if there were no impressions to be conscious of.

Hence, space, time and the "I as subject" can be viewed as transcendental concepts having an analogous structure, and the crucial question in establishing the analogy between space, time and the "I as subject" is: can we think of all conscious representations as contained in (*enthalten in*) the "I as subject" (horizon of consciousness)?

We have seen that all representations stand under the forms of intuition, space and time, just like all conscious representations stand under the "I" as horizon of consciousness. Kant says that we can describe space as containing an infinite number of representations at the same time, and all sensible representations of objects are in space. In the same way, could we say that all conscious representations are "in" the "I" as horizon of consciousness? We can if we interpret the "in" in the expression "contained in" as a metaphor. All conscious representations are "in" consciousness because the "I" makes the horizon of consciousness. The "in" as metaphor can be explicated through the term "horizon": at any moment of its existence, the "I" forms the boundary not merely of an occurrent consciousness, but all consciousness in general, occurrent or potential. In the same way, space and time, as pure intuitions, can be seen as forming the horizon of intuitability, and, thus, at any moment, all representations of space (or time), occurrent or potential, can be seen as existing "in" space (or time). The metaphoric "in"-ness of representations (space, time) or consciousness ("I as subject") representations indicates the notion of form in the Kantian system: either a representation is *within* the parameters set by the form or outside it. In the A deduction, Kant says as much when he says, "*Denn*

als Erscheinungen machen sie einen Gegenstand aus, der bloss in uns ist, weil eine blosse Modifikation unserer Sinnlichkeit ausser uns gar nicht angetroffen wird. Nun drueckt selbst diese Vorstellung: dass alle diese Erscheinungen, mithin alle Gegenstaende, womit wir uns beschaeftigen koennen, insgesamt in mir, di. i. Bestimmungen meines identischen Selbst sind, eine durchgaengige Einheit derselben in einer und derselben Apperzpetion als notwendig aus. In dieser Einheit des moeglichen Bewusstseins aber besteht auch die Form aller Erkenntnis der Gegenstaende, (wodurch das Mannigfaltige, als zu Einem Objekt gehoerig, gedacht wird" (*KrV,* A129). All possible objects that we could have (*beschaefitgen koennen*) are in me (*insgesamt in mir*), and can be seen as determinations of my self-identity or the "I as subject." And this unity (or horizon) of the "I" can be seen as the form of all cognition of objects, or, in other words, it is the *Grenzbegriff,* or horizon of consciousness that ultimately forms the condition for the possibility of cognition.

We have seen that the "I as subject," space and time can be described as both transcendental concept (rule) and as having the form of intuition. But Kant goes further, and says that these can be described as consciousness at the same time. In the *Schematismus* of the first *Critique*, Kant says, "*Alle Erscheinungen enthalten, der Form nach, eine Anschauung im Raum und Zeit, welche ihnen insgesamt a priori zum Grunde liegt. Sie koennen also nicht anders apprehendiert, d. i. ins empirische Bewusstsein aufgenommen werden, als durch die Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen, wodurch die Vorstellungen eines bestimmten Raumes oder Zeit erzeugt werden, d. i. durch die Zusammensetzung des Gleichartigen und das Bewusstsein der synthetischen Einheit dieses Mannigfaltigen (Gleichartigen)*" (*KrV,* A162/B202). All appearances

(*Erscheinungen*) contain an intuition in space and time, which forms the *a priori* ground of all appearances. These appearances could not be "apprehended" (*apprehendiert*), which Kant defines as "*ins empirische Bewusstsein aufgenommen werden*" except as (*als*) the synthesis of the manifold through which the representation of a definite (*bestimmten*) space or time is generated, that is, through the putting together ("*Zusammensetzung*") of homogenous units and the consciousness of this synthetic unity of the manifold of such homogeneous units. In this passage, Kant presents three characteristics of the *a priori* intuitions of space and time that lend themselves for comparison with the "I as subject" as horizon of consciousness: (a) Space and time are conditions for the possibility of intuitability and empirical consciousness. (b) Space and time put together homogeneous units. (c) In a particular representation of space and time, there occurs not merely the putting together of homogeneous units according to the rule, but there occurs, concomitantly, the consciousness of this putting together (*Zusammensetzung*) or synthesis. In other words, if it is possible to see an object in space, the impressions belonging to the object have been organized in the form of space or time, and, at the same time, there is consciousness of the object in space or time.

The "I as subject" shares all of these features of *a priori* space and time. With respect to (a), Kant says clearly in the A deduction that all consciousness must belong to the "I"-consciousness in a discursive subject, and at the same time, the "I," like space and time, forms the ground for the very possibility of consciousness in general. Kant says that all empirical consciousness has a necessary relation to transcendental consciousness, namely the consciousness of my self as the "*urspruengliche Apperzeption*" (*KrV*, A117n), and the thoroughgoing identity of one's self in relation to all possible

representations forms the *a priori* ground of empirical consciousness ("*dem empirischen Bewusstsein die reine Apperzeption, d. i. die durchgaengige Identitaet seiner selbst bei allen moeglichen Vorstellungen, a priori zum Grund*" (*KrV*, A116)). And, further, he makes a comparison between the "I" and space and time in this context. He says, "*Es ist also schlechthin notwendig, dass in meinem Erkenntnisse alles Bewusstsein zu einem Bewusstsein (meiner Selbst) gehoere. Hier ist nun eine synthetische Einheit des Mannigfaltigen, (Bewusstseins) die a priori erkannt wird, und gerade so den Grund zu synthetischen Saetzen a priori, die das reine Denken betreffen, als Raum und Zeit zu solchen Saetzen, die die Form der blossen Anschauung angehen, abgibt*" (*KrV*, A117n). Further, these same passages show (b) and (c) in equal measure. (b) The "I" forms the horizon of all occurrent or potential consciousness, and, analogous to space and time, the units of consciousness are homogeneous in the sense that it is irrelevant whether a representation is consciousness of a bird or tree. And regarding (c), it is clear from these passages that the "I as subject" not merely forms the basis for all conscious representations (*a priori zum Grund*) but it must also be described as consciousness (*Bewusstsein (meiner Selbst)*).

If the "I as subject," space and time are each describable as both transcendental rules and consciousness, then these must also be amenable to being described as real in the sense of existing. There are two significant passages that vouch for the fact that the "I as subject," space and time can be seen as existing in some way. Firstly, in response to Lambert and Mendelssohn, Kant says in a handwritten note to A53 of the first *Critique*, "*die Zeit ist allerdings etwas Wirkliches*." And then he says the same things about space, "*Ebenso der Raum. Dieses beweiset, dass, da hier eine Wirklichkeit (folglich auch*

einzelne Anschauung) gegeben ist, der doch immer die Wirklichkeit [als Ding] zum Grunde liegt, Raum und Zeit nicht zur Wirklichkeit der Dinge, sondern nur unserer Vorstellungsart gehoeren" (E XXVIII). In this passage, Kant says clearly that space and time are actual (*wirklich*). And, secondly, in the B paralogisms, Kant says, "*Die Apperzeption ist etwas Reales, und die Einfachheit derselben liegt schon in ihrer Moeglichkeit* (*KrV,* B419). The "I" is something real. While the real-actual distinction would form a crucial part of the content of the "I" in the next chapter, we can assert for the present that space, time and the "I" can all be seen as really existing in some way.

And, finally, in the first *Critique*, Kant offers a clear statement on what it means for Kant to be a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist. Though he uses the example of space, this can easily be extended to the notion of the "I," especially in light of the analogy between space, time and the "I" delineated above. He says, "*Der transzendentale Idealist kann hingegen ein empirischer Realist, mithin, wie man ihn nennt, ein Dualist sein, d. i. die Existenz der Materie einraeumen, ohne aus dem blossen Selbstbewusstsein hinauszugehen, und etwas mehr, als die Gewissheit der Vorstellungen in mir, mithin das cogito, ergo sum, anzunehmen. Denn weil er diese Materie und sogar deren innere Moeglichkeit bloss vor Erscheinung gelten laesst, die, von unserer Sinnlichkeit abgetrennt, nichts ist: so ist sie bei ihm nur eine Art Vorstellungen (Anschauung), welche aeusserlich heissen, nicht, als ob sie sich auf an sich selbst aeussere Gegenstaende bezoegen, sondern weil sie Wahrnehmungen auf den Raum beziehen, in welchem alles ausser einander, er selbst der Raum aber in uns ist*" (*KrV,* A370). Now, we have seen that, like space and time, the "I" can be seen as being "*in uns*." And regarding space and time, Kant says, "*Von ihm aber ist auch nicht die Rede,*

sondern von dem empirischen, welcher alsdenn ein aeusserer heisst, wenn er im Raume, und ein innerer Gegenstand, wenn er lediglich im Zeitverhaeltnisse vorgestellet wird; Raum aber und Zeit sind beide nur in uns anzutreffen" (*KrV,* A373). It is just in this way that the representations of the "I" are "in" the "I." It is this sense of "in-ness" that Kant refers to in the summary of the A deduction (A129), and not the "in-ness" that has compelled numerous readers to suspect Kant of empirical idealism. Kant says "*Denn alle Erscheinungen machen sie einen Gegenstand aus, der bloss in uns ist, weil eine blosse Modifikation unserer Sinnlichkeit ausser uns gar nicht angetroffen wird. Nun drueckt selbst diese Vorstellung: dass alle diese Erscheinungen, mithin alle Gegenstaende, womit wir uns beschaeftigen koennen, insgesamt in mir, d. i. Bestimmungen meines identischen Selbst sind, eine durchgaengige Einheit derselben in einer und derselben Apperzpetion als notwendig aus*" (A129). Any possible experience is "in me" to the extent it lies within the horizon of my apperceptive reach, which is, concomitantly, the horizon of consciousness in general.

(iii) Hence, from (i) and (ii), the "I" can be described as having the form of intuition (*enthalten in*) and as transcendental concept (*enthalten unter*) in the same way as space and time, except that the former forms the horizon of consciousness and the latter forms the horizon of intuitability. Vis-à-vis the discursive subject, the necessity of the "I" is analogous to the necessity built into space and time. And, finally, the "I as subject," space and time can be described not merely as transcendental rules or intuitive in form, but as "consciousness" and real.

(c) From (a) and (b), there is an analogy between the form of the "I as subject" and the forms of sensibility, space and time. The "I as subject" in its role as "I as object" is intuitive rather than conceptual in form; forms the horizon of consciousness; and it can be described as "mere consciousness." If the "I as subject" can be seen as analogous to forms of intuition, space and time, then the "I as subject" cannot be viewed as the "I" as object in formal-structural terms for the following reason. In perceiving a table in space, the discursive intellect perceives the table in space, but she does not perceive "space" as an object at the same time. In the same way, the "I as subject" as horizon of consciousness constitutes the unity of mind. Given the unity of the mind, the discursive subject can have consciousness (and ultimately cognition) of something, say the representation "red." In the consciousness of "red," however, the discursive subject is conscious of "red" as object of consciousness, but she cannot be conscious of the "I as subject" as an object at the same time. The fact that the discursive subject cannot be conscious of the "I as subject" as an object in the moment of consciousness, "red," makes sense not only phenomenologically, but theoretically. As Kant himself points out, there could be no subject-object distinction with respect to conscious representations if we wish to avoid falling into an infinite regress (Cf. *KrV,* A346/B404, quoted above).

The "I as subject" can be characterized as analogous to the forms of intuition (space and time), and like these forms, it cannot be an object for itself in the moment of consciousness of something. How should we, then, interpret the fact that the "I" can be an object in Kant's system? If the form of the "I as subject" is analogous to the forms of sensibility and sensibility belongs to the receptive side of the divide between spontaneity and receptivity in the Kantian system, then the "I" as subject can be seen as: (a) the

"subject" constituting the unity of consciousness and mind, but equally as (b) formally receptive like space and time (after all, both space and time belong to the subject in the Kantian view). On the other hand, we have seen that the "I as subject of thinking" falls on the spontaneity side of cognition. While it is true that the "I as subject" cannot be an object for itself in any moment of consciousness of an object, this does not exclude the possibility that the "I" can be an object vis-à-vis some other feature of the discursive mind. We have seen that the "I as subject of thinking" can be seen as falling on the spontaneity side of cognition. If the form of the "I as subject" can be seen as belonging to the receptivity side in the way space and time are subjective and receptive in the Kantian system, we can argue that the "I as subject" forming the unity of consciousness (or mind) can be formally viewed as object *in relation to* the "I as subject of thinking," or the spontaneity of apperception. But the form of the "I as subject of thinking," as we have seen, can be operative only when the discursive subject is *thinking* and not merely perceiving. Hence, the form of the "I as subject" as object relates to the form of the "I as subject of thinking" *if the discursive subject is involved in thinking*. In perceiving, the "I as subject" forms the unity (and horizon) of consciousness, but it cannot perceive itself as an object in the moment of perception. In any act of perception, the "I" perceives the representation and not itself. Hence, the "I as subject" cannot play the formal role of being an object in perception, but indeed plays the formal role of being an object vis-à-vis the "I as subject of thinking" if the discursive subject is thinking.

We have arrived at this conclusion on the basis of what we have hitherto learnt in this chapter, but we can find further evidence for this view if we analyze Kant's oft-repeated assertion that the "I" is an object of inner sense.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic, characterizing inner sense, Kant says, "*Der innere Sinn, vermittelst dessen das Gemuet sich selbst, oder seinen inneren Zustand anschauet, gibt zwar keine Anschauung von der Seele selbst, als einem Objekt; allein es ist doch eine bestimmte Form, unter der die Anschauung ihres innern Zustandes allein moeglich ist, so, dass alles, was zu den innern Bestimmungen gehoert, in Verhaeltnissen der Zeit vorgestellt wird*" (*KrV*, A22-3/B37). The inner sense does not bring forth any intuition of the soul as an object. Instead, it is the form that makes the intuition of an inner state possible such that everything that belongs to the inner determinations can be represented in relations of time. In other words, as Mohr has shown, Kant characterizes inner sense as a form that makes a representation as representation possible, and any possible representation must be in the form of time. At the same time, Kant denies that the inner sense can provide an intuition of the soul (or the "I") itself as an object, which means that the inner sense cannot itself apprehend the "I" as object.

But Kant does not seem to adhere to this general picture for two reasons. (i) In the lectures on metaphysics, he equates inner sense and consciousness but then also characterizes it as "empirical apperception, so that it is not clear how inner sense can be both empirical apperception and consciousness at the same time. "*Diese urspruengliche und transzendentale Bedingung ist nun keine andere, als die transzendentale Apperzeption. Das Bewusstsein seiner selbst, nach den Bestimmungen unseres Zustandes, bei der inneren Wahrnehmung ist bloss empirisch, jederzeit wandelbar, es kann kein stehendes oder bleibendes Selbst in diesem Flusse innrer Erscheinungen geben, und wird gewoehnlich der innre Sinn genannt, oder die empirische Apperzeption*" (*KrV*, A107).

(ii) Kant characterizes the "I" as object (*Gegenstand*) of inner sense on numerous occasions, which seems to contradict the idea that the inner sense cannot provide an intuition of the "I" as an object. In the A-paralogisms, he says, "*Nun aber bin ich ein Gegenstand des innern Sinnes und alle Zeit ist bloss die Form des innern Sinnes* (*KrV*, A362)." Then again, he says, "*der Gegenstand des inneren Sinnes (Ich selbst mit allen meinen Vorstellungen) unmittelbar wahrgenommen wird, und die Existenz desselben gar keinen Zweifel leidet*" (Ibid., A368). Or, "*Ich, als denkend, bin ein Gegenstand des innern Sinnes, und heisse Seele*" (Ibid., A342/B400). In this context, he says further in the A-paralogisms: "[*D*]*ass unser denkendes Subjekt nicht koerperlich sei, dass heisst: dass, da es als Gegenstand des inneren Sinnes von uns vorgestellet wird, es, in so fern als es denkt, kein Gegenstand aeusserer Sinne, d. i. keine Erscheinung im Raume sein koenne*" (Ibid., A357). In the B deduction, he says, "*Also bleibt die Beharrlichkeit der Seele, als bloss Gegenstandes des inneren Sinnes, unbewiesen, und selbst unerweislich, obgleich ihre Beharrlichkeit im Leben, da das denkende Wesen (als Mensch) sich zugleich ein Gegenstand aeusserer Sinne ist, fuer sich klar ist…*"(Ibid., B414-5). And as late as the *Anthropologie*, Kant continues to describe the "I" as an object of inner sense. "[*D*]*as Ich als das Object der Wahrnehmung, mithin des inneren Sinnes, was eine Mannigfaltigkeit von Bestimmungen enthaelt, die eine innere Erfahrung moeglich machen* (AA VII: 134n)" Further, continues Kant, the "*Gedanken, Bewusstsein, Begierden*" (he adds to the list in the first *Critique*, A358, where he includes "*Gedanken, Gefuehl, Neigung oder Entschliessung,*" and says that these are not objects (*Gegenstaende*) of outer intuition) can never be appearances for outer sense while thoughts, consciousness, appetites, etc. belong (*vor*) to inner sense – "*[E]s koennen uns niemals unter aeusseren Erscheinungen*

denkende Wesen, als solche, vorkommen, oder wir koennen ihre Gedanken, ihr Bewusstsein, ihre Begierden etc. nicht aeusserlich anschauen; denn dieses gehoert alles vor den innern Sinn." In other words, the "I" that thinks (thinking subject or "I as subject of thinking") can be seen as an object of inner sense and not outer sense; not merely the "I as subject of thinking" but thoughts, consciousness, desires, feelings, inclinations, considered willing (*Entschliessung*) can be seen as belonging to inner sense; and the "I as subject" (*(Ich selbst mit allen meinen Vorstellungen)*, A342/B400), the horizon of consciousness is also an object of inner sense.

If we accept the general picture that the "I as subject" can have the form of the "I as object" in relation to the "I as subject of thinking" when the discursive subject is thinking and the "I as subject" cannot be made into an object when the discursive subject is perceiving, we can not only resolve the inconsistencies (i) and (ii) regarding the description of the "I" as the object of inner sense but also characterize the form and content of the "I" as object in a more differentiated way.

Regarding (i) and the question of how the inner sense can be described as consciousness and empirical apperception: the "I as subject" cannot objectify itself in moment of consciousness, *c*, but, given that the "I as subject" forms the horizon of consciousness, it must be present in some way; if we reconcile these propositions by saying that the "I as subject" is built into conscious representation, *c*, even if the discursive subject is not conscious of it; if the term "empirical" refers to the fact that a representation is in time; -- then, the conscious representation, *c*, can be an object of inner sense only if *c* has been empirically apperceived -- "empirical" because *c* occurs at time, *t*, and "apperceived" because the "I as subject" is built into *c*.

Regarding (ii) and the question of how we can accommodate the "I" as object of inner sense in the general picture sketched above regarding the interrelationships between the "I as subject," "I as subject of thinking," and "I as object", we can say the following. As we have seen, both the "I as subject" and the "I as subject of thinking" can be considered objects of inner sense (see (ii)), and, given that the objects of inner sense are empirical, and, consequently, in time, we can venture that the content of the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking" can be specified in inner sense (see Section IV below). What remains presently is the question of the relationship between the forms, "I as subject," "I as subject of thinking," and "I as object." As we have indicated, a full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but presently we can broadly sketch the argument in order to locate the form of the "I" as object vis-à-vis the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking." If the "I as subject" is the form of consciousness such that it is built into every conscious temporal representation, then the "I"-consciousness would have to have been built into conscious representation "red" at time *t*, and at time *t*, the "I as subject" cannot be an object vis-à-vis itself. At the same time, the "I as subject" can become an object of inner sense at time *t1* where "object" simply represents one of the contents of inner sense. Thus, conscious representation at time *t* would require only the form of the "I as subject," and the other two forms – form of the "I" as object and "I as subject of thinking" – would be irrelevant. If, however, the discursive subject is thinking, which requires a series of moments, *t*, *t1*, *t2*, and so on, then the "I as subject" could be an object at *t1* if the "I as subject of thinking" focused its directedness (attention) upon the "I as subject" in its avatar as the object of inner sense at time *t1*. Alternatively said, the act of thinking requires a series of representations, which

include not merely representations of objects like “red” but self-representation, the representation of the “I as subject” in the form of the object of the “I as subject of thinking.” In thinking, the “I as subject,” built into every conscious perception, can be seen as being made explicit through the directedness of the “I as subject of thinking,” and, in this way, turned into an object at particular moments of time. While the full story that includes the content of the various forms of the “I” can only appear in the next chapter, we have presently raised the possibility of the relating the forms of “I as subject,” “I as subject of thinking,” and “I as object” in a coherent way.

The question, now, is: what might be the content of the form of the “I as subject” that can make for the object in relation to the form of “I as subject of thinking,” apart from the question of the content of the latter? These questions we are going to explore in the next chapter. But before we proceed further, we need to remark on the fact that (a) our model could be seen as an alternative and consistent picture escaping the problems of the *Reflexionsmodell* (Henrich) and (b) it can offer another way of criticizing Henrich’s view than hitherto accomplished by interpreters like Dieter Sturma and Karl Ameriks.

According to Dieter Henrich, reflection, construed as the subject turning back upon itself and making itself an object, is the essence of the self in theories of self-consciousness mired in the *Reflexionsmodell*; and the phenomenon to be explained is the subject’s awareness of itself as identically itself (the Fichtean “I=I”). Because Henrich assumes that the essence of the self is reflection and the question of the self is to understand its self-identity, he believes that we cannot genuinely grasp the self-identity of the self within the *Reflexionsmodell* of self-consciousness. There are two arguments against such a model. (a) The Regress argument: to get to the subject, we have to make it

into an object and, given that the original subject would, therefore, have been objectified, we would not be able to grasp it purely as subject and would need another subject to objectify the subject-object of the first act of reflection, which means that we would need another act of reflection and another *ad infinitum*. The argument is as follows: (i) We have to get to the pure subject, but (ii) given that we must reflect and, thus, necessarily make an object out of ourselves, we can never (iii) grasp the subject in its purity because we can grasp ourselves only as a reflected object, and hence (iv) cannot grasp ourselves as the pure subject as it might have been prior to being objectified, which means that we would have to again make the reflecting subject into an object and because that would also mean objectification, we would be forced to make the reflecting subject into an object yet again and so on. Hence, the attempt to grasp the pure subject leads to an infinite regress. (b) Circularity Argument: to know what the pure subject is, the subject has to make itself into an object, but how can the subject make itself into an object if it did not already know itself as a subject. Thus, we can "only revolve around it [the pure subject] in a perpetual circle."[49] In other words, reflection cannot be something that brings about self-consciousness in the first place.

More recent interpreters like Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma have argued that that Kant's theory of self-consciousness escapes the difficulties of the *Reflexionsmodell* for three reasons. (a) As Sturma has shown, "reflectio" in Kant cannot be seen as a turning back upon itself but as "attentio" (*Aufmerksamkeitszustand*). Sturma focuses on some of the same passages on which I focused earlier (Chapter 1) in order to argue that

[49] Dieter Henrich, "Fichte's Original Insight," Trans. David R. Lachterman, in *Contemporary German Philosophy*, 1, 19, 15-52, 18-21, *passim*. For an extended treatment of the several theories of self-consciousness in light of whether they fall prey to the regress and circularity problems, see Manfred Frank, *Selbstgefuehl*.

reflection can be seen as "*transzendentale Ueberlegung*" (though Sturma does not characterize apperception itself as directedness of attention in the way I have), and he says that apperception cannot be an act of turning back because (according to Kant) concepts that are constitutive are supposed to be transcendental and to that extent "*irreflexiv*."[50] (b) Ameriks criticizes Henrich for assuming that Kant wants to offer an explanation of how self-consciousness originates, and asserts that this is not the case. In other words, Henrich views Kant through Fichte's problematic, and hence falls into error.[51] While it may not be quite correct to say that Henrich wants Kant to explain how self-consciousness "*originates*," it would be acceptable to say (as we will see below) that Henrich does Kant an injustice when he attributes the problems of the *Reflexionsmodell* to the latter. (c) According to Sturma and Ameriks, Kant avoids Henrich's *Reflexionsmodell* because the Kantian "I think" is always already built into representations, a primitive self-referentiality that is neither cognitive nor acquired via reflection.[52]

While I accept criticisms (a) and (b), I would like to argue that, compared to the Ameriks/Sturma view (c), my own view in the present work not only explicates Kant in a

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[50] "*Wenn Kant in einigen Textstellen 'Reflexion' als Begriff fuer einen Apperzeptionsakt verwendet, dann meint er damit die constitutive Funktion derApperzeption, wie sie etwa im §24 der TD B dargelegt wird, und eine so bestimmte Reflexion bzw. Apperzeption ist gerade kein in sich zurueckgewandter Akt, denn Konstitutionsbestimmungen sind nach Kant allesamt transzendental und insofern irreflexiv*" Sturrma, *Kant ueber Selbstbewusstsein*, 114. For the point about attention, see 110-114, *passim*.

[51] Karl Ameriks, "Kant and the Self: A Retrospective," in *Figuring the Self: Subject, Absolute and Others in Classical German Philosophy*, eds. David E. Klemm and Guenter Zoeller (eds.), *Figuring the Self: Subject, Absolute and Others in Classical German Philosophy* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 55-72, 61.

[52] According to Ameriks, the question for Kant is "what else is needed by what are *already* in some sense one's self-conscious representations" and his answer is that "there is an implicit 'I think' in the original experience," Ameriks, "Kant and the Self," 61-2. Sturma says, "*Selbstbewusstsein ist insofern ein mentaler Sachverhalt der implizit immer schon so strukturiert ist, dass die nicht empirischen Komponenten des'logischen Selbstbewusstseins', die nicht zum deskriptiv erfassbaren Bestand des Subjektiven gehoeren, gedacht werden muessen als intern bezogen auf diejenigen Erlebnisse, die das Subjekt des Denkens auch hat, wenn es Selbstbewustsein hat*," Sturma, *Kant ueber Selbstbewusstsein*, 98-9; also 123, where Sturma asserts that there is no cognitive self-consciousness of immediate self-familiarity.

textually more differentiated manner but also outlines a more consistent view of Kantian apperception and how it can avoid the problems of the *Reflexionsmodell*. The difficulty with Amerik's view lies in the fact that while he characterizes apperception as a "primitive self-referentiality" neither cognitive nor reflectively acquired on the one hand, he insists, at the same time, that the "I think" is to be seen as an act and intentional. In my view, these two propositions should be seen as being in tension with each other.

Ameriks thinks that not all representations must be "susceptible to apperception" but that all representations that are "something to" one must "*already* have some kind of personal quality," which is to be understood as presuming that individual representations are "already at least *implicitly* of the form 'I think that so and so…'"[53] But this implicit form "I think that…" is not transcendental apperception, which is of the form "I think that (I think that x, I think that y, I think that z, etc…)," and can be attributed to a being that can have thoughts of thoughts, or can say that the thought she had at time, *t*, and the thought she had at time, *t1*, are her own thoughts, even if they completely contradict each other.[54] At the same time, however, he claims that the "primitive self-consciousness" is "obviously intentional: here the I [sic] must be in at least some minimal sense thinking about something with some kind of objectivity" (Ibid., 59). In other words, like Henry

[53] Ameriks, "Kant and the Self," 61

[54] Ibid., 57-8. See also Ameriks, "Kantian Apperception and the Non-Cartesian Subject" in *Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpretation* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 51-66. In this text, Ameriks seems to endorse the adverbial theory of apperception, the theory asserting that we perceive apperceptively, found in the Kant interpretations of Robert Pippin and Henry Allison. Ameriks says, "Whenever one is actually judging something, the judgment's content is always given subjectively, insofar as the self of the judging subject must be constantly active. Thus it is present 'adverbially', so to speak. In this sense, even for the pre-reflective acts of simple apperception, Kant's theory can allow that there is already a self 'in' consciousness, a primitive 'self'-consciousness," Ibid., 59. Also see, Robert Pippin, "Kant on the Spontaneity of the Mind," in the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 17, No. 2, June 1987, pp. 449-76 & Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 165-77. Allison's view is, of course, that Kant's doctrine of apperception is a formal model of the analysis of the understanding and its logical activities. Allison only discusses cognition and ignores the distinction between thinking and perception in characterizing apperception (as I have done), and is content with specifying the role of the "I think" in the synthesis of the understanding.

Allison and drawing mainly on the B deduction, Ameriks seems to interpret the "I think" in the context of the activity of judging or understanding. Further, he clearly thinks of transcendental apperception as an "act" because he says that "[w]henever one is actually judging something, the judgment's content is always given subjectively, insofar as the self of the judging subject must be constantly active." In other words, the self is present "adverbially."[55]

From the perspective of the theory of the "I" sketched in this work, the following problems could be specified in Ameriks's view. (a) Because Ameriks does not distinguish the "I" and the "I think" in Kant's *oeuvre*, he needs to assume that the conceptual nature of the "I think" (as act) is the same in the case of (i) any individual representation structured as "I think that x" (Ameriks' empirical apperception) and the case of (ii) the "I think that (I think that x, I think that y, and so on) (Ameriks' transcendental apperception). But this is problematic. If X says "I think a" at time *t*, "I think b" at time, *t1*, and "I think that (I think a, and I think b)" at time, *t2*, we would have to say that the character of the act of the "I think" at time, *t2*, would have to be different from the character of the act at times, *t* and *t1*. The act at time, *t2*, would have to be a higher level thought about other thoughts, and, thus, should be amenable to being marked as different, both theoretically and phenomenologically, from the lower level "I think a" or "I think b," especially in light of the fact that, unlike thought at times, *t* and *t1*, the "I think" at time, *t2*, (transcendental apperception) is special because it is perennially potentially actualizable, or, alternatively, it must always in principle be actualizable in a

[55] Ameriks, "Kantian Apperception," 59. Or, " [R]epresentations are 'something to me' just when they can be understood as involving at least an implicit 'I think', an 'I think' that functions as a prefix to a that-clause and marks the fact that here we have some intentional and propositional content" Karl Ameriks, "From Kant to Frank: The Ineliminable Subject," in *The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy*, 217-30, 225.

being capable of thinking about thoughts (as Ameriks says himself). The necessity of marking the distinction between the transcendental "I think" and the empirical "I think" lies in the fact that an infinite regress would ensue if we (like Ameriks) did not make such a distinction. If empirical and transcendental apperception are the same kind of act, then the statements "I think that this is blue" today and "I think that this is green" tomorrow would require the same kind of mental act, but so would the statement "I think that I thought this blue yesterday but think it green today." But if both the transcendental and empirical "I think" are supposed to have essentially the same act-character, then there seems to be no reason to think that we need to mark another second-level act "I think that (I think a & I think b)" (transcendental apperception) as being different in nature from the acts "I think that a" or "I think that b" (empirical apperception) in the first place. And if we cannot explain why we need another second-level act (the "I think" of transcendental apperception), there would be no reason for precluding the (theoretical) positing of third level or fourth level acts of apperception. If the essentially same act can be divided into two kinds of apperception, there is no reason why we could not theoretically multiply levels of apperception infinitely? Why should we not need yet another mental act "I think that (I think that (I think that a)" and so on (infinitely)?

In other words, there is no theoretical reason for believing that thinking about thoughts is the end of the story if empirical and transcendental apperception have the same act-character because then there is no clear criterion for distinguishing between these two kinds of apperception, and in the face of such a lack, nothing can stop us from either conflating transcendental and empirical apperception because they are the same kind of act or infinitely multiplying thinking about thoughts, in which case it would be

impossible to coherently define “transcendental” apperception (eg. there could be a thinking about my thoughts of yesterday on one act-level, thinking about a complex strategy using the thoughts of yesterday on another act-level, and so on).

If Ameriks responds to such an argument by saying that we should be satisfied with a phenomenological criterion and accept that there is a difference between the statements “I think that this is red” and “I think that I had the thought ‘I think that this is red’ yesterday and the thought ‘I think that this is not quite red’ today” and even if we accept such an argument vis-à-vis the question of the validity of distinguishing transcendental and empirical apperception on phenomenological grounds, this would still not make Ameriks’ general theory coherent because we would, then, have to invalidly assume that his whole theory justifies itself on phenomenological rather than logical grounds (and it cannot be so justified). Ameriks’ theory cannot be justified solely on the basis of a phenomenological criterion because it does not make any phenomenological sense to say that perceiving something as “red” at time, *t*, requires an *active* “I think” in the first place (as we have seen in this dissertation, it does not). In other words, it is quite possible that I might be perceiving red at time, *t*, but not directed towards it in an active thinking way, even though the “I as subject” may be obscurely built into the perception of red at *t*.

Alternatively stated, Ameriks cannot have his cake and eat it: if he were to justify his view using a phenomenological criterion, it would be highly suspect that an active “I think” can correctly describe cases of perception (as opposed to acts of thinking); and if he were to justify his view in purely theoretical terms, there would exist no clear criterion for making a distinction between transcendental and empirical apperception if they are

both supposed to possess the same act-character. Hence, Ameriks' theory cannot be viewed as internally consistent.

(b) The claim that apperception just means that representations of the subject are structured in the form of "I think that x" in the process of judging something as something means that Amerik's Kant would not be able to adequately describe bare perception, or judgments of perception. In §18 of the *Prolegomena*, Kant says, "*Empirische Urteile, sofern sie objective Gueltigkeit haben, sind Erfahrungsurteile; die aber, so nur subjektiv gueltig sind, nenne ich bloss Wahrnehmungsurteile. Die letzteren beduerfen keines reinen Verstandesbegriffs, sondern nur der logischen Verknuepfung der Wahrnehmung in einem denkenden Subjekt*" (AA IV: 299). Judgments of perception do not require concepts of the understanding. Ameriks account of the "I think" seems to closely relate to the understanding (especially Kant's near-identification of the understanding and apperception in the B deduction). Hence, Ameriks cannot take into account judgments like "This is red" at time *t* as opposed to judgments like "I think this is red" asserted in the context in which the subject is not quite certain that what she sees is indeed red (eg. she is aware that she is looking at the red-seeming object in artificial light).[56]

[56] My difficulties with Dieter Sturma cannot be fully articulated in this work because they would require a fuller description of questions relating to the way the "I" can be obscurely built into every conscious representation and the exact relationship between the "I as subject of thinking" and "I as object" in thinking. At present, we can say that Sturma is the only commentator who, however briefly, underlines the importance of exploring the twofold form of the "I;" and accepts that self-consciousness would need to have some sort of a referential sense that can fundamentally distinguish it from other referential everyday cases of outer reflection -- he says, for instance, that the "*intentionale Korrelat des Selbstbewusstseins hat demnach die konzeptuale Eigenschaft eines Quasiobjekts.*." (Sturma, 90). However, he does not make a distinction between perception and thinking when explicating the logic of the "I," and does not obviously work with the formal divisions "I as subject," "I as subject of thinking" and "I as object," as has been done in the present work.

Because the theory of the "I" sketched in this work (a) distinguishes between the "I" and "I think;" (b) between the spontaneity of judgment and spontaneity of apperception, the latter being solely the directedness of attention and separable from the actions of the understanding; (c) makes a distinction between perception and thinking; and (d) explicates the "I" as-twofold-in-form-and-singular-in-content, which interpretively means that we have essentially the forms of the "I as subject" (horizon of consciousness), "I as subject of thinking" (directedness of attention) and "I as object," (in the next chapter, the content of the former two will be described as "*Empfindungen*" and the latter as object of intuition); -- it can offer not only a more comprehensive view of the "I" than Amerik's view, but also show how Kant's theory of the "I" (once suitably drawn out, as in the present work) can avoid the infinite regress. In the case of perception, the "I as subject" is built into every conscious perception as an obscure representation, and the subject cannot objectify it *in the moment* of perception, signifying that there can be no subject-object distinction in cases of perception. In the diachronic process of thinking, however, the "I as subject of thinking" can direct attention and objectify the "I as subject" in the form of "I as object" at a particular moment of time. Such objectification would occur at particular moments in a chain of moments; and there would be no reflection but only the directing of attention on the part of the "I as subject of thinking" and intuiting the "I as subject" (which, as we will see in the next chapter, will turn out to be the sensed unity of the mind) in the form of an "I as object." In other words, in a process of thinking that proceeds from times *t* to *t8*, we could imagine the "I as subject of thinking" as directing attention at, say, *t2* and *t6*, in a chain constituting a complete thought (or perhaps every second moment, but we are not interested in specifying the details at the

moment). In this case, given that the "I as subject of thinking" and the objectified "I as subject" possess a different logical structure – former is directedness of attention and the latter is the horizon of consciousness (and, as we will see in the next chapter, the sensed (*empfindet*) (but perceived when objectified) awareness of the unity of the mind) – there can be no question of regress, especially since (a) the act of reflection is not involved, (b) our task does not consist in explaining the "I=I" (Henrich) but offering the logical structure of the "I," and (c) we would not fall into a regress, as Ameriks does, because the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking" would not have the same act-character (the "I as subject," as we will see, is the sensed unity of the mind which is not an act while the "I as subject of thinking" is active directedness of attention).

Hence, the theory we have sketched can not only avoid the pitfalls of the *Reflexionsmodell*, but also the weaknesses of Ameriks's position because it can (a) avoid the question of why we would need to distinguish transcendental and empirical apperception if the active "I think" has essentially the same act-character in both cases (problematic for Amerik's view) and (b) it can accommodate the case of judgments of perception (which Ameriks' view cannot) by making the distinction between the "I" and "I think," spontaneity of apperception and spontaneity of judgment and, hence, can articulate better the different logic of the "I" in cases of thinking and perceiving.

Chapter 4

"I" as Content

We have explicated the form of the "I" in the previous chapter, but the "I" is supposed to also have a singular content. In this chapter, I will explicate the content of the "I." I will argue that the term "*Empfindung*" (modification of the mind and translated as "sense" rather than sensation) can be seen as characterizing the content of both the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking." Because "*Empfindungen*," unlike "*Wahrnehmung*" (perception) which are necessarily conscious, are intrinsically atemporal, it is possible for Kant to describe the "I as subject" built into perception and the "I as subject of thinking" involved in the process of thinking as "transcendental." The "I as subject" can be viewed as the sensed unity of the mind while the "I as subject of thinking" can be sensed as the directedness of attention involved in the active process of thinking. However, the "I" can also be made conscious if the "I as subject of thinking" directs attention to the "I as subject" redescribable as the "I as object," in which case the "I" can be seen to be intuited in the process of thinking, though this is not possible if the subject is only perceiving something at a singular moment of time.

In Section I, I will argue that perceptual consciousness requires "*Empfindungen*" as modifications of the mind, but cannot be reduced to it; and cognition requires conscious perceptions because there would be no cognition if there were only "*Empfindungen*" and no conscious perception. In Section II, I will explore how Kant uses the terms "*Empfindung*," "*Wahrnehmung*" and "*Bewusstsein*" vis-à-vis the "I," arguing that the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking" can be characterized as atemporal "*Empfindungen*" while the "I as object" (or the sensed unity of mind) can be intuited by

the “I as subject of thinking” in the process of thinking. In this section, I will briefly summarize the general theory of the “I” articulated in this work, and critically examine the view of commentators who stress the feeling aspect of apperception.

I

(1) We have seen that the “I” (“I as subject”) and “I think” (including the “I of intelligence” or the “I as subject of thinking”) can be distinguished in the Kantian system. Kant describes both the “I” and “I think” as something (*etwas*) that can be conceptually distinguishable from something else, and as real.

(a) In the first *Critique,* Kant often describes the “I” as something (*Etwas*) presumably as opposed to nothing, and it can be described as something real (*Real*).

In the paralogisms of the A edition of the first *Critique,* Kant speaks of the “I” as merely something (*etwas*) we cannot really intuit, signifying that it is not possible to have an intellectual intuition of the “I.” “*Wenn ich ein Ding einfach in der Erscheinung nenne, so verstehe ich darunter, dass die Anschauung desselben zwar ein Teil der Erscheinung sei, selbst aber nicht geteilt werden koenne usw. Ist aber etwas nur vor einfach im Begriffe und nicht in der Erscheinung erkannt, so habe ich dadurch wirklich gar keine Erkenntnis von dem Gegenstande, sondern nur von meinem Begriffe, den ich mir von Etwas ueberhaupt mache, das keiner eigentlichen Anschauung faehig ist. Ich sage nur, das ich etwas ganz einfach denke, weil ich wirklich nichts weiter, als bloss, dass es Etwas sei, zu sagen weiss. Nun ist die blosse Apperzeption (Ich) Substanz im Begriffe, einfach im Begriffe….*” (*KrV,* A400).

In the B edition of the first *Critique*, we find the following passages. In the Deduction, §23, Kant speaks of the subject as "*Etwas*," and denies that the category of substance can be applied to it. "*Aber das Vornehmste ist hier, dass auf ein solches Etwas auch nicht einmal eine einzige Kategorie angewandt werden koenne: z. B. der Begriff einer Substanz, d. i. von Etwas, das als Subjekt, niemals aber als blosses Praedikat existieren koenne, wovon ich gar nicht weiss, ob es irgend ein Ding geben koenne, das dieser Gedankenbestimmung korrespondierte, wenn nicht empirische Anschauung mir den Fall der Anwendung gaebe* (*KrV*, B149)." In the same vein, the "absolute unity of apperception" or the "simple I" is characterized as "*Real*" in the B paralogisms. Kant says, "*Allein in dem dritten Satz wird die absolute Einheit der Apperzeption, das Einfache Ich, in der Vorstellung, drauf sich alle Verbindung oder Trennung, welche das Denken ausmacht, bezieht, auch fuer sich wichtig, wenn ich gleich noch nichts ueber das Subjekts Beschaffenheit oder Subsistenz ausgemacht habe. Die Apperzeption ist etwas Reales, und die Einfachheit derselben liegt schon in ihrer Moeglichkeit*" (*KrV*, B419; B407). In this passage, Kant says that the "I" is something real, and the flow of thoughts must be related to the simple "I" or apperception.

(b) Like the "I," Kant can be seen as describing the "I think" as something and as real. In the B paralogisms, in a very important footnote in which Kant describes the "I think" as an indeterminate empirical intuition, the "indeterminate perception" of the "I think" is described as "real" (*Real*). Kant says, "*Eine unbestimmte Wahrnehmung bedeutet hier nur etwas Reales, das gegeben worden, und zwar nur zum Denken ueberhaupt, also nicht als Erscheinung, auch nicht als Sache an sich selbst, (Noumenon) sondern als Etwas, was*

in der Tat existiert, und in dem Satze, ich denke, als ein solches bezeichnet wird (*KrV*, B423n)." In the same footnote, Kant says, "*Das Ich denke ist, wie schon gesagt, ein empirischer Satz, und haelt den Satz, Ich existiere, in sich*" (*KrV*, B422n). This means that the empirical "I think" must be seen as existing in some way. Elsewhere in the B-paralogisms, speaking of the "I think," Kant says that apperception is something real (*Etwas Reales*) (*KrV*, B419, quoted above).

(2) We have seen that the "I as subject," space and time are each describable as both transcendental rules and consciousness, and, hence, amenable to being described as real in the sense of existing (Cf. Chapter 3 above, pp. 174-82). And we have seen that the "I" is something (*etwas*) and real (*Real*) (See (1) above). When Kant, then, describes the "I" as "mere consciousness," we can interpret it as the further specification of the content of the "I": from the vague something (*etwas*), Kant describes the "I" in terms of a significant systematic term, "consciousness."

In the Transcendental Doctrine of Method of the first *Critique*, Kant articulates the general question of the self (or the "I") in the context of a warning that we would fall into a paralogism if we were to think of the "I" as absolutely simple. -- "[*W*]*ie mich das blosse Bewusstsein, welches in allem Denken enthalten ist, oder wenigstens sein kann, ob es zwar so fern eine einfache Vorstellung ist, zu dem Bewusstsein und der Kenntnis eines Dinges ueberfuehren solle, in welchem das Denken allein enthalten sein kann*" (*KrV*, A784-5/B812-3). In this passage, the "*blosse Bewustsein*" could be interpreted as referring to the "I as subject" because, as we have seen, the "I" is contained in (or built into) all thinking. The question in the passage runs as follows: how can the mere

consciousness of the "I," built into all thinking (and consciousness), make possible the knowledge of a thing that occasions thinking? The "mere consciousness" refers to the "I" built into all thinking (and consciousness), and this "I" has to be the "I as subject" built into all consciousness, and ultimately into all thinking.

In the A deduction, Kant characterizes the pure "I," the "I as subject" or transcendental apperception, as "*reine urspruengliche, unwandelbare Bewusstsein*" (*KrV,* A107). As mere consciousness, the "I as subject" is inalterable; the "I as subject" is the horizon of consciousness and the correlate of all representations; -- hence, we might say that the "I" is some kind of consciousness built into all my conscious representations. In a handwritten note to A592, Kant says, "'*Ich bin' ist also kein Erkenntnis des Subjects, sondern blos das Bewusstseyn der Vorstellung des Objects ueberhaupt* (E CLXXX)." The "mere consciousness" of the "I" is awareness of the "I as subject" as something distinguishable from something else. In the B paralogisms of the first *Critique,* Kant distinguishes between clear, obscure and distinct consciousness. "[*E*]*in Vorstellung is klar, in der das Bewusstsein zum Bewusstsein des Unterschiedes derselben von andern zureicht. Reicht diese zwar zur Unterscheidung, aber nicht zum Bewusstsein des Unterschiedes zu, so muesste die Vorstellung noch dunkel genannt werden*" (*KrV,* B414-5n). If we use this criterion, then the "I am" would have to be classified as clear consciousness if the discursive subject is conscious of the representation "I am" at a particular point of time because she can distinguish it from other representations. However, the "I as subject" can be characterized as obscure if the aim is to understand how the representation "I" can be built into a representation, say, "red." In such a case, if a discursive subject consciously represents "red" at a particular point of time and if, as we

have seen, the "I" is the horizon of consciousness such that nothing can be represented outside the boundaries of "I"-consciousness, then the "I as subject" is built into the representation "red" in an obscure way such that the difference between the built-in "I"-consciousness cannot be distinguished from the "red"-consciousness in the moment of consciously representing "red." Hence, the "mere consciousness" of the "I" can either be interpreted as clear or obscure, especially given that consciousness has a degree in the Kantian system ("*Denn selbst das Bewusstsein hat jederzeit einen Grad, der immer noch vermindert werden kann*" (*KrV*, B414-5). And the "I" as horizon of consciousness would include not merely sensations like "red" (feeling, desires, etc.) but all representations including thoughts.

At the same time, the "I as subject of thinking," too, can be interpreted as mere consciousness. In other words, the discursive subject can be taken as merely (and obscurely) conscious of the "I as subject of thinking" or "I as intelligence" in the activity of thinking. In the first *Critique*, Kant says "*Nun haben wir aber in der inneren Anschauung gar nichts Beharrliches, denn das Ich ist nur das Bewusstsein meines Denkens*" (B413). In this passage, the "I" is the consciousness of my thinking, thereby suggesting that the "I" is not merely built into the activity of thinking but it can itself be characterized as a conscious representation at the same time. In Chapter 1, we had seen that the spontaneity of judgment constitutes thinking, and the spontaneity of apperception (which, as we have seen in Chapter 3, is the same as the "I as subject of thinking") constitutes thinking by sustaining the directedness of attention. In the activity of thinking, the "I as subject of thinking" is transcendentally constitutive but merely (and obscurely) conscious in the activity of thinking.

Hence, both the “I as subject” and “I as subject of thinking” can be characterized as mere and obscure consciousness. We have now the task of further specifying the content of the “I as subject” and “I as subject” of thinking.

(3) In order to further specify the content of the “I as subject” and “I as subject of thinking,” we have to (a) clarify the terms, “*Empfindung*” (sensation), “*Wahrnehmung*” (perception) and consciousness, and, subsequently, (b) explore the relationship these terms can be seen to have with the “I as subject” and “I as subject of thinking.” We will deal with (a) in this section and deal with (b) in the subsequent section, Section II.

(a) The term sensation (*Empfindung*) has the following meanings: (i) it is a modification of the state of the subject; (ii) as opposed to perception (*Wahrnehmung*), it denotes the material that the subject cannot generate out of itself; (iii) the term “real” (*Real*) relates to sensation while the term “*wirklich*” relates to perception and empirical consciousness; (iv) the term “consciousness” can be seen simply as interchangeable with perception, and consciousness requires sensation but every sensation need not be conscious.

(i) Kant defines sensation (*Empfindung*) as “[*e*]*ine Perzeption, die sich lediglich auf das Subjekt, als die Modifikation seines Zustandes bezieht*…” (*KrV*, A320/B376), and a “*Perzeption*” is a “*Vorstellung mit Bewusstsein*” (Ibid.). Kant says that sensations are representations simply (*lediglich*) relating to the subject, and, on the basis of this definition, we can venture that both triangles-in-the-mind and triangles-on-paper, pure and empirical intuitions respectively (*KrV*, A713/B741), must always relate to the

subject. But could the appearance of a triangle in my mind be considered a "modification of the state of a subject" in the same way as sensory apprehension through the five senses?

(ii) Kant identifies sensation (*Empfindung*) closely with the material which the subject cannot self-generate but which it must receive from outside itself. In the section "*Antizipationen der Wahrnehmung*" of the first *Critique,* Kant says, "*Wahrnehmung ist das empirische Bewusstsein, d. i. ein solches, in welchem zugleich Empfindung ist. Erscheinungen, als Gegenstaende der Wahrnehmung, sind nicht reine (bloss formale) Anschauungen, wie Raum und Zeit, (denn die koennen an sich gar nicht wahrgenommen werden). Sie enthalten also ueber die Anschauung noch die Materien zu irgend einem Objekte ueberhaupt (wodurch etwas Existierendes im Raume oder Zeit vorgestellt wird), d. i. das Reale der Empfindung, also bloss subjective Vorstellung, von der man sich nur bewusst werden kann, dass das Subjekt affiziert sei, und die man auf ein Objekt ueberhaupt bezieht, in sich*" (*KrV,* A166/B207-8). Perception of an object is empirical consciousness within the spatiotemporal framework. In such a perception is contained (concomitantly) sensation (*Empfindung*), and sensation makes for the material of perception. In the B deduction of the first *Critique,* Kant makes a similar point when he says, "*Dinge im Raum und der Zeit werden aber nur gegeben, so fern sie Wahrnehmungen (mit Empfindung begleitete Vorstellungen) sind, mithin durch empirische Vorstellung*" (*KrV,* B147). To the extent things are spatiotemporally concretized, they can be classified as empirical representations, or perceptions (*Wahrnehmung*). Perceptions are sensation-accompanied representations. The term

"*begleiten*" is vague, but perceptions can be characterized as spatiotemporal empirical representations like table-legs or bed-corners, etc. involving sensations in some way. In a handwritten note to the "*Axiomen der Anschauung*", Kant says, "*Man muss die Wahrnehmungen unter die Categorien subsumiren. Aber aus denen Categorien fuer sich kan man gar nichts schliessen, sondern aus der Moeglichkeit der Warnehmung, welche nur durch Bestimmung der Zeit und in der Zeit geschehen kan, darin der Actus, der die Anschauung bestimmt, nur nach einer Categorie moeglich ist*" (E LXVI; note to *KrV*, A162). In this passage, perception is characterized as determination of time and something that happens "in" time. If, as we have seen, sensations form the real material of inner sense rather than its form and if perceptions are perceptions owing to the form of inner sense, time, then perceptions can be seen as emerging as they do owing to the form of inner sense rather than its material while sensations can be seen the material of inner sense.

Hence, compared to the term "*Wahrnehmung*," Kant seems to define the term "sensation" (*Empfindung*) narrowly: it is to be construed materially, as the relationship between the sense organs of the subject, and the material constituting the object which the subject cannot generate from within. It is to be analytically divorced from perception which includes the objects of appearances related not merely to the material of sensation but also to the pure intuitions of space and time. The distinction is subtle. It marks the distinction between an alphabet of appearance (to use Prauss's interpretation) like part of a table-leg seen at time *t* from my particular spatiotemporal positionality and the fact that the table leg is made of a certain material (wood not water, a particular color and not another) which I as subject could not have engendered merely out of my own self.

Interpreting the distinction between perception and sensation in this way and taking "*Perzeption*" to be "representation with consciousness," we can say that perception is the general term for the consciousness of ordinary objects we encounter in space and time while sensation is the special term that captures the material aspect of the subject's perception of objects in abstraction from the pure intuitions of space and time. In fact, we will see that the term "*Perzeption*" could be seen as a synonym for consciousness while the term "*Wahrnehmung*" relates to empirical intuitions of spatiotemporal (or even mental objects).

If the difference between sensations and perceptions lies in the fact that the former denotes the real material of objects while the latter denotes the consciousness of spatiotemporally organized objects, then we can also describe sensations as having merely intensive magnitude and no extensive magnitude while perceptions or empirical intuitions can be seen as having extensive magnitude. A sensation is different from empirical intuition in the sense that the latter presumes the pure intuitions of space and time while the former does not. An empirical intuition is a kind of perception in which the subject relates to the object in appearance, not merely through the narrowly defined concept of "sensation," which is the material relationship between the five senses of the subject and properties of the object, but locates this material relationship in a spatiotemporal framework. For this reason, perceptions have extensive magnitude while sensations have only an intensive magnitude. "*Da nun Empfindung an sich gar keine objective Vorstellung ist, und in ihr weder die Anschauung vom Raum, noch von der Zeit, angetroffen wird, so wird ihr zwar keine extensive, aber doch eine Groesse (und zwar durch die Apprehension derselben, in welcher das empirische Bewusstsein in einer*

gewissen Zeit von nichts = 0 bis zu ihren gegebenen Masse erwachsen kann), also eine intensive Groesse zukommen…ein Grad des Einflusses auf den Sinn" (*KrV,* A166/B208). In this passage, Kant makes a distinction between perception and sensation in the following way: perceptions can have extensive magnitude, and can consist of a manifold of representations spatiotemporally organized as in, say, perceiving a table; but sensations, on the other hand, can only have intensive magnitude, or the degree to which the discursive subject can see, hear, taste, smell or touch something. In other words, a perception could be of a table-leg in space and extended beyond merely a single moment while a sensation would include only the interaction of the material of my eye and the material of the table-leg abstracted from the spatial dimension and temporal extendedness. The difference between sensations, thus, would be the difference in the particular interactions of my senses and the properties of the object, and Kant describes such differences as differences in intensive magnitude.

(iii) Kant seems to mostly associate the term "*Real*" with the material of perception and says that the "real" can be said to have intensive magnitude; and in the Kantian system, it is sensations that are supposed to mark the materiality of perception. The real (*Real*) of sensation is a subjective representation which can only indicate that the subject has been affected by something outside itself. "[*D*]*as Reale der Empfindung, also bloss subjective Vorstellung, von der man sich nur bewusst werden kann, dass das Subjekt affiziert sei, und die man auf ein Objekt ueberhaupt bezieht, in sich*" (*KrV,* A166/B207-8). Secondly, Kant says that a representation is apprehended in a moment by means of a sensation (*Empfindung*), but the intensive magnitude of the sensation cannot itself be apprehended

in time. In other words, the intensive magnitude of sensations is built into the moment of perception, but the materiality of the sensation is itself not perceived in the moment of perception. "*Die Apprehension, bloss vermittelt der Empfindung, erfuellt nur einen Augenblick, (wenn ich naemlich nicht die Sukzession vieler Empfindungen in Betracht ziehe*)" (*KrV*, A167/B209) & "*das Reale in der Erscheinung hat jederzeit eine Groesse, welche aber nicht in der Apprehension angetroffen wird, indem diese vermittelst der blossen Empfindung in einem Augenblicke und nicht durch sukzessive Synthesis vieler Empfindungen geschieht, und also nicht von den Teilen zum Ganzen geht; es hat also zwar eine Groesse, aber keine extensive*" (*KrV*, A168/B210). Finally, in a handwritten note to his copy of the first *Critique*, probably in the context of the statement, "*Realitaet ist im reinen Verstandesbegriff das, was einer Empfindung ueberhaupt korrespondiert,*" (*KrV*, A143) Kant says, "*Empfindung ist das eigentliche empirische unserer Erkenntnis, und das Reale der Vorstellungen des inneren Sinns im Gegensatz gegen die Form desselben, die Zeit. Empfindung liegt also ausser alle Erkenntnis a priori. Allein sie blos darin, wie sie sich der Qualitaet nach von andern unterscheidet, [ausser den Graden a priori], aber nicht der Quantitaet derselben*" (E LX). In this passage, Kant says clearly that sensations provide the true (*eigentlich*) material of inner sense while the form of inner sense is time. The "*Reale*" does not have extensive magnitude, but instead intensive magnitude. Sensations may occur in a moment of perception, and require successive synthesis (of space and time) for objects to acquire extensive magnitude; yet, the materiality of sensation is not perceived in the moment of perception. Hence, the term "*Real*" is a term of art representing the material stuff of perception.

As opposed to the term "*Real*," Kant seems to use the term "*Wirklich*" to describe objects that are actual in some way because the subject can perceive, or consciously represent, such objects, but which have differing relationships with the real (*Real*) of sensation. In the A deduction of the first *Critique*, Kant says, "[*W*]*ahrnehmung stellet also, (damit wir diesmal nur bei aeusseren Anschauungen bleiben) etwas wirkliches im Raume vor*" (*KrV*, A374). In space, the discursive subject can perceive objects as actual (*wirklich*). In §22 of the B Deduction, Kant uses the terms "*wirklich*" and "*Empfindung*" in the context of speaking of space and time. He says, "*Sinnliche Anschauung ist entweder reine Anschauung (Raum und Zeit) oder empirische Anschauung desjenigen, was im Raum und der Zeit unmittelbar als wirklich, durch Empfindung vorgestellt wird*" (*KrV*, B147). An empirical intuition is "*wirklich*" and represented through "*Empfindung*." Empirical intuitions are the same as perceptions, and, hence, we can say that sensations form the material and real (*Real*) aspects of actual (*wirklich*) objects of perception. We can find a good illustration of the distinction between "*Real*" and "*wirklich*" in a passage in the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method" of the first *Critique*. Kant says that a triangle drawn in "mere imagination" has to be classified as pure intuition, but that the same triangle has to be classified as an empirical intuition if drawn on paper (*KrV*, A713/B741). Empirical intuitions like the triangle drawn on paper are actual (*wirklich*). Such intuitions require not merely the possibility of spatiotemporal representation, but sensations (*Empfindung*) emanating from spatial objects. In our example, drawing the triangle requires a quantum of time and, once the triangle is drawn on paper, it occupies a quantum of space. At the same time, we can see the triangle as an object not merely in the mind, but through one of our senses, the eyes. Hence, the drawn-triangle can also be

viewed as a sensation in the eyes vis-à-vis the material nature of the paper, marks of the pencil, etc.

(iv) We need to now take account of the term "consciousness," and its relationship to the above-discussed terms "sensation" and "perception" in the Kantian system.

In the first *Critique*, Kant defines perception as "*Vorstellung mit Bewusstsein* (perceptio)" (*KrV*, A320/B376). In the margins of his own copy of *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says, "*Warnehmung ist das Bewusstseyn einer Erscheinung (vor allem Begriffe)*" (E LXIV; note to *KrV*, A161) – perception is the consciousness of an appearance prior to all concepts, and perception can be characterized as empirical consciousness ("*Wahrnehmung ist das empirische Bewusstsein…*" (*KrV*, A166/B207-8)). In the B paralogisms, Kant says that "consciousness" has an intensive magnitude, and, therefore, a degree of reality. He says, "*einen Grad der Realitaet in Ansehung aller ihrer Vermoegen, ja ueberhaupt alles dessen, was das Dasein ausmacht…Denn selbst das Bewusstsein hat jederezeit einen Grad, der immer noch vermindert werden kann, folglich auch das Vermoegen sich seiner bewusst zu sein, und so alle uebrige Vermoegen…*"(*KrV*, B414-5). Consciousness has a degree of reality (*Realitaet*), and, given that the "*Real*" is to be associated with the material stuff of sensation, we can say that the degree of consciousness relates to the degree of sensation.

In the metaphysics lectures from 1782-3 (*Metaphysik Mongrovius*), Kant characterizes consciousness in the following way: "*Das Bewusstsein ist Princip der Moeglichkeit vom Verstande, aber nicht von der Sinnlichkeit*" (AA XXVIII: 878). We can have understanding only if we have consciousness, but this is not the case with the

sensibility. We do not need x to be conscious if we are to be able to sense it. In fact, the order is just the reverse: we begin by sensing x, and many degrees of consciousness may be associated with the different degrees of x-sensing possible. Such a proposition lies at the base of the relatively complex and largely unarticulated relationship between the terms "consciousness," "sensation," and "perception." Consciousness requires sensing, but sensing need not necessarily be fully conscious for the subject. (We can justify Kant defining "*Empfindung*" as "*Perzeption*" relating solely (*lediglich*) to the subject (Cf. *KrV*, A320) because it is possible that some "*Empfindungen*" are not fully conscious since degrees of consciousness is possible, and we can distinguish "Perzeption" (consciousness) from "*Wahrnehmung*" because the latter term relates to empirical intuition of spatiotemporal objects). And perceiving is always conscious but not necessarily conceptually determined. In a letter to Beck, Kant says, "*Ich fange damit an, daß ich Erfahrung durch empirisches Erkentnis definire. Erkentnis aber ist die Vorstellung eines gegebenen Objects als eines solchen durch Begriffe; sie ist empirisch, wenn das Object in der Vorstellung der Sinne (welche also zugleich Empfindung und diese mit Bewustseyn verbunden d. i. Wahrnehmung enthält) Erkentnis aber a priori, wenn das Object zwar, aber nicht in der Sinnenvorstellung (die also doch nichts desto weniger immer sinnlich seyn kan) gegeben ist*" (AA XI: 313-6, 315-6, 1792). In other words, any object represented through the senses can be characterized as sensation (*Empfindung*) and as perception (*Wahrnehmung*) at the same time ("*zugleich*") if it is a sensation bound up with consciousness. A discursive subject may have perceptions if she is conscious of something rather than nothing but she can have sensation without being necessarily conscious of it. And, further, apart from the fact that perceptions are to be

considered prior to concept application (or cognizing something as something), Kant also distinguishes between sensation (*Empfindung*) and cognition (*Erkenntnis*). The latter requires concepts and, thus, cognition is representation through concepts or seeing something as something (AA XVIII: R5934, 1783-4).

We can (further) make sense of the fine distinction between sensations and perceptions if we take account of the details of Kant's description of sensation (*Empfindung*) as "modification of the mind" (cf. *KrV*, A320, quoted above). In the A deduction of the first *Critique*, Kant says, "*Unsere Vorstellungen moegen entspringen, woher sie wollen, ob durch den Einfluss aeusserer Dinge, oder durch innere Ursachen gewirkt sein, sie moegen a priori, oder empirisch als Erscheinungen entstanden sein; so gehoeren sie doch als Modifikationen des Gemuets zum innern Sinn, und als solche sind alle unsere Erkenntnisse zuletzt doch der formalen Bedingung des innern Sinnes, naemlich der Zeit unterworfen, als in welcher sie insgesamt geordnet, verknuepft und in Verhaeltnisse gebracht werden muessen*" (*KrV*, A98-9). In this passage, the "modifications of the mind" include not only representations gained owing to the influence of outer things but also representations gained through "inner causes." Apart from sensations like warmth or color which the discursive subject gains from outside itself, Kant characterizes sensations originating from the subject, like pleasure and pain, as "sensations" or "modifications" as well ("[*M]an mag nun die Empfindungen Lust und Schmerz, oder auch des Aeusseren, als Farben, Waerme etc. nehmen, so ist Wahrnehmung dasjenige, wodurch der Stoff, um Gegenstaende der sinnlichen Anschauung zu denken, zuerst gegeben werden muss*" (*KrV*, A374, quoted above)).

Once such “modifications” have been gained, the discursive subject can be said to be able to perceive when these “modifications” are applied to an object in general without determining the object (“*Ist Empfindung einmal gegeben, (welche, wenn sie auf einen Gegenstand ueberhaupt, ohne diesen zu bestimmen, angewandt wird, Wahrnehmung heisst)* …” (*KrV*, A374)). If, as we have seen, perception is conscious representation that relates sensations to an object in general (*ueberhaupt*), or an object that has not been seen as something, then sensations are simply occurrences or modifications of the mind classifiable as something rather than nothing while perceptions are conscious representations of an object(s) consisting of a variety of sensations. Thus, the term “consciousness” or “perception” requires “sensation.” But, more importantly, if a discursive subject is conscious of an object without conceptually determining it, she requires the “real” (*Real*) material of sensation and the attribution of these sensations to an object in general (*ueberhaupt*) in the act of perception. And, further, the term “perception” (or “consciousness”) is systematically important as mediator between the terms “sensation” and “cognition.” Kant says, “[*M]an mag nun die Empfindungen Lust und Schmerz, oder auch des Aeusseren, als Farben, Waerme etc. nehmen, so ist Wahrnehmung dasjenige, wodurch der Stoff, um Gegenstaende der sinnlichen Anschauung zu denken, zuerst gegeben werden muss. Diese Wahrnehmung stellet also, (damit wir diesmal nur bei aeusseren Anschauungen bleiben) etwas wirkliches im Raume vor*” (*KrV*, A374). We have seen that perceptions require sensations, but it seems now that thinking or cognizing something as something requires perceptions. In order to be able to “think” the stuff of sensation, the discursive subject requires perception. We have seen that perceptions are conscious representations, consist of the stuff of sensations

defined as modification of the mind (any representation rather than nothing), and relate these sensations to a yet-to-be conceptualized object in general. Thus, the discursive subject cannot "think" sensations directly, but requires conscious representations of such sensations or perceptions in order to think or cognize an object. In other words, cognition requires consciousness and perception requires sensation.

We can exemplify this view in the following way. If a discursive subject is conscious of something that looks like a table from afar at time *t*, then she senses all the representations (color, material, etc.) that constitute the conscious representation (perception) of the possible-table as indeterminate object at time *t*. But at time *t*, she is *conscious* only of the table, and, despite the fact that she senses the features of the table, she is not conscious of all these sensed features individually in themselves. If she were to direct herself to a particular characteristic of the table at time *t1*, say, the color, she would no longer be sensing the color but perceiving or consciously representing it, and she would no longer be consciously aware of the object in general (*ueberhaupt*), the possible-table. In other words, she needs to sense in order to perceive, but she cannot be conscious of her sensations except as perceptions. In addition, we have seen that sensations form the material of inner sense while perceptions are conscious representations in time, and this characterization bolsters the conclusion that, unlike conscious perceptions which are always temporal, sensations can be thought of as a-temporal in two senses – first, we are not conscious of sensations if we are perceiving an object at a particular point of time, and, second, if we could consciously perceive a representation in time, then we are not sensing it at all in that moment even if sensations as "modifications of the mind" always accompany (*begleitet*) the perception.

In the first *Critique*, Kant says, "*Die Apprehension, bloss vermittelt der Empfindung, erfuellt nur einen Augenblick, (wenn ich naemlich nicht die Sukzession vieler Empfindungen in Betracht ziehe*)" (*KrV*, A167/B209). In other words, the subject can apprehend something by means of "*Empfindungen*" (sensations denoting the material relationship between subject and object or, as I will argue, a sensed modification of the mind) in a moment. The "*Empfindungen*" have intensive rather than extensive magnitude (A166-7/B208-9); the beginnings of any intensive magnitude is a "*Moment*" -- "*Die Groesse eines Ganzen ist extensive, die Groesse eines Grundes ist intensive oder Grad. Der Anfang eines Grades (minimum) heisst Moment*" (AA XVII: R4411); and this "minimal" moment is without duration (and hence, a-temporal in the sense that it could not be perceived if the subject did not focus attention on it) -- "*Der Augenblick ist das Dasein ohne alle Dauer; die Ewigkeit ist ein Dasein mit aller Dauer*" (AA R797). In other words, there could exist an "*Empfindung*" without our perceiving it, and it would be a-temporal; but as soon as we perceived it, it would be temporal because it has been turned into a conscious perception. It is the beginnings of a magnitude that can be seen as a moment, but, though such a moment need not necessarily be temporally (and consciously) perceived, it would always be sensed (whether as material relationship between my eye jelly and something in the world or, as we will see, as a mere modification of my own mind).

To summarize: Perceptual consciousness necessarily requires sensations, but it cannot be reduced to it. And cognizing requires conscious perceptions because there can be no cognition if there were only sensations and no conscious perceptions.

II

Let us now explore how Kant uses (or could possibly use in systematic terms) the terms "consciousness," "sensation," and "perception" in relation to the "I" (including "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking"). If sensations form the material content of any representation and can be seen as the content of perception and the "I" is describable as "mere consciousness," then the "I" requires some sort of content that makes the conscious representation (perception) of the "I" possible. But if the "I" needs to be sensed (*empfindet*) and thus perceived, should we characterize the "I" as a "perception (*Wahrnehmung*)" or as "sensation" (*Empfindung*)? Or should we say that the "I" can be characterized both as perception and sensation under different conditions? If we accept that the "I" can be characterized as both sensation and perception, then we must specify the difference between the sensation of "I" and what such a sensation might entail, and the perception of "I" and how such a perception might be viewed as spatiotemporally synthesized.

In the *Anthropologie*, Kant describes the awareness of the "I" in inner sense as "*innere Empfindung*." He says, "*Dass die Woerter innerer Sinn und Apperception von den Seelenforschern gemeinhin fuer gleichbedeutend genommen werden, unerachtet der erstere allein ein psychologisches (angewandtes), die zweite aber bloss ein logisches (reines) Bewusstsein anzeigen soll, ist die Ursache dieser Irrungen. Dass wir aber durch den ersteren uns nur erkennen koennen, wie wir uns erscheinen, erhellt daraus, weil Auffassung* (apprehensio) *der Eindruecke des ersteren eine formale Bedingung der inneren Anschauung des Subjects, naemlich die Zeit, voraussetzt, welche kein Verstandsbegriff ist und also bloss als subjective Bedingung gilt, wie nach der Beschaffenheit der menschlichen Seele uns innere Empfindungen gegeben werden, also*

diese uns nicht, wie das Object an sich ist, zu erkennen giebt" (AA VII: 142). The logical apperception is only the formal condition of the inner intuition of the subject. It is the subjective condition responsible for the way the human soul is given to human beings in the form of inner sensation (*innere Empfindung*). The soul, we have seen, could refer to the "I" ("I as subject") or "thinking I" ("I as subject of thinking"), and, hence, both of these aspects could be characterized as "*innere Empfindung*." Given that the term "*Real*" is associated with "*innere Empfindung*," we can say that both the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking" can be characterized as "*Real*," as "modification of the mind" glossed as the existence of any representation rather than nothing.

On the other hand, Kant describes apperception as "pure (logical) *consciousness* [my emphasis]." In the Paralogisms of the first *Critique*, Kant describes the "I" as "*blosses Bewusstsein*," and empty of any sensory content or "*leer*." He says, "*Zum Grund derselben koennen wir aber nichts anderes legen, als die einfache und fuer sich selbst an Inhalt gaenzlich leere Vorstellung: Ich; von der man nicht einmal sagen kann, dass sie ein Begriff sei, sondern ein blosses Bewusstsein, das alle Begriffe begleitet*" (*KrV*, A345-6/B404). How can the pure apperception (including the distinction stressed in this essay between the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking") be characterized as sensation (*Empfindung*) and devoid of sensory content (*leer*)? We have seen that both the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking" can be described as "mere consciousness," and, thus, these aspects of the "I" can be described as perceptions (*Wahrnehmung*). But perceptions necessarily require sensory content, which brings us to back to the question of how we could describe the sensory content (*Empfindung*) of the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking." In what follows, we explore these questions in more detail. I

argue that (i) the material content of the "I as subject" can be characterized as modification of the mind (and thus, as *Empfindung*), and as the feeling of existence from the first person perspective of the discursive subject; and (ii) the "I as subject of thinking" can be characterized as an indeterminate empirical intuition devoid of any sensory material content arising from outer affections or inner mental causes in the moment in which the discursive subject represents it, even if it requires some modification of the mind in order to be conscious perception in the first place. In other words, the content of the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking" is the same to the extent that both are modifications of the mind, and both can be characterized as "mere consciousness," but differ to the extent we must describe these modifications differently in each case, as feeling of existence and indeterminate empirical intuition respectively.

(i) Phenomenologically speaking, the "I as subject" cannot be related to the five senses, and, hence, the content of the "I as subject" cannot be the content provided by the five senses. We cannot see, smell, hear, touch or taste the "I as subject," and, as we have seen, some parts of the body may be excised without affecting the representation "I as subject" in the least. The discursive mind usually gains sensory content through the affection of its senses via outer objects where the term "affection" signifies the fact that the subject must necessarily take into account (*affizieren*) object-al content originating outside itself. But the case of the "I as subject" is exceptional in this respect. Despite the fact that Kant describes the "I as subject" as "*innere Empfindung*" (inner sensation), the "I as subject" cannot be seen as gaining its content from outside itself through the mediation of the five senses. And yet we find Kant describing the "I" as "*Empfindung*," and the task is to

understand why the "I as subject" could be justifiably characterized as "*Empfindung*" even though it cannot be gained through the five senses. It would not be enough simply to say that the "I as subject" is a modification of the mind, something as opposed to nothing, because we are presently interested in the content of the "I as subject" from the empirical first person perspective (from the transcendental standpoint, we have seen that it is the horizon of consciousness). It would be insufficient in the same way to become satisfied with Kant's description of the "I as subject" as "mere consciousness" because we have seen that the mere consciousness of the "I as subject" must necessarily involve some modification of the mind, and, hence, we would simply have to return to the question from which we had started: what does it mean to say that the "I" could be described as a modification of the mind? What kind of modification? In my view, Kant can be seen as having an answer for these questions if we focus on his particular use of the terms "feeling," "existence," and "life."

Kant did not often describe the "I" as feeling, but we can consistently find characterizations of the "I" as feeling from the silent decade onwards. In his Metaphysics lectures late in the silent decade, Kant says that the "I" as object of inner sense is a feeling. In the context of speaking of the fact that the "I" can, strictly speaking, be taken as synonymous with the soul but can also refer to the whole human being (*Mensch*) including body and soul at the same time, Kant says, "*Die Seele ist aber ein Gegenstand des innern Sinnes. So fern ich mich nun als einen Gegenstand fuehle und dessen bewusst bin; so bedeutet dies das Ich* in sensu stricto *oder die Selbstheit nur allein, die Seele. Diesen Begriff der Seele wuerden wir nicht haben, wenn wir nicht von dem Object des inneren Sinnes alles Aeusere abstrahieren koennten; mithin drueckt das Ich* in sensu

stricto *nicht den ganzen Menschen, sondern die Seele allein aus*" (AA XXVIII: 265). We have seen that the "I" as object of inner sense is a temporal representation, and, therefore, empirical. In this passage, Kant says that the "I" in the strict sense, or the soul, rather than the whole person (body and soul) is the object of inner sense; and, as object of inner sense, the discursive subject can consciously feel itself as an object. In other words, if the discursive subject can feel itself (the "I") as an object of inner sense, then she feels the "I" in the strict sense, only the soul rather than both the body and the soul. She feels the "I" in the strict sense when she feels herself as object of inner sense because she must necessarily abstract everything outer from inner sense in order to arrive at the notion of the "I" in the strict sense. In *Metaphysik L1*, Kant says "*Die Ursache, dass die Menschen sich geistige Wesen gedacht, ist die Zergliederung dessen geschehen, was sie dachten, wenn sie sich selbst als Gegenstaende des innern Sinnes vorstellen; denn nach ihrem Bewusstsein musste es ihnen einleuchten seyn, dass dieses kein Gegenstand des auessern Sinnes ist, das ist immaterial*" (AA XXVIII: 226). This means that access to the "I" in the strict sense can be made possible through abstraction, and even though the "I" is an empirical object of inner sense and can be "felt" by the discursive subject from the first person perspective, it can be seen as transcendental because (i) if the "I" in the strict sense is a representation that remains in inner sense even when everything has been abstracted from inner sense, then the "I" must be a representation which belongs to the subject and given that everything that the subject brings to experience is "transcendental," the "I" as object of inner sense could be seen as the empirical version of the transcendental "I as subject," the horizon of consciousness; and (ii) potentially, every

discursive subject must be able to abstract the “I” in the strict sense if it is an object of inner sense and can be “felt” by the discursive subject from the first person perspective.

Hence, the “I as subject” in the strict sense can be “felt” from the first person perspective. In its empirical avatar as operationalization of a transcendental ability, it is an object of inner sense, or a moment in the mental life of the discursive subject, and it can be described as the horizon of consciousness from the transcendental standpoint. The empirical expression of the “I as subject” as horizon of consciousness is a feeling from the first person perspective. This feeling of the “I as subject” represents only the “I” in stricto sensu rather than the “I as *Mensch*,” and, hence, excludes the representations of the body. The fact that it is an object of inner sense means not only that the “I as subject” can be made conscious as a representation in a moment of time but equally that the discursive subject can have no intellectual intuition of the “I.” Inferring on the basis of these statements, the “I as subject” as feeling can be viewed as an object of inner sense from the empirical perspective, but this does not mean that the transcendental “I as subject” can be taken as a contingent fact about discursively cognizing beings. This might have been the case if, say, we had been speaking of the “I as *Mensch*” (which includes the body) rather than the “I” in the strict sense. Different discursive subjects have different bodily configurations, and if the “I” were dependent (or even partly dependent) on the configuration of the body, it could have brought about a situation in which some discursive subject might have had the feeling of the “I” while others might have never had such a feeling depending on the way their bodies had been configured. But such is not the case. All discursive subjects can “feel” the “I,” and, hence, the Kantian philosopher can justifiably take the “I as subject” in the strict sense as transcendental.

In sum, the transcendental "I as subject" can be characterized as a feeling from the empirical standpoint (as case of exercise of a transcendental ability) and from the first person perspective; and since Kant describes the transcendental "I as subject" more generally as "mere consciousness," we can view the term "feeling" as the further specification of the expression "mere consciousness." We turn to exploring what it might mean to "feel" the "I" that makes for one of the contents of inner sense.

Terminologically speaking, the word "feeling" is ambiguous. Kant uses "*fuehlen*" to refer to touch. Kant says that the discursive subject has five senses – *Sehen*, *Hoeren*, *Riechen*, *Schmecken*, and *Fuehlen*. All of these relate to organs of the body through which we can receive impressions (*Eindruecke*) of objects (*Gegenstaende*). But the term "*fuehlen*" can be distinguished from "*Gefuehl*." The latter relates to the whole body and not any particular organ. "*Wir haben aber auch noch andere sinnliche Empfindungen, zu denen wir keine besondern Organe haben, und die wir also auch nicht unterscheiden koennen; z. E. das Gefuehl der Kaelter und Waerme, des Druckes etc. ist ueber unsern ganzen Koerper verbreitet* (AA XXVIII: 231). Sometimes, however, Kant seems to use "*fuehlen*" and "*Gefuehl*" interchangeably in order to describe the sense of touch (AA XXVIII: 232), and we have already seen that Kant can use the term "*sich fuehlen*" to describe the feeling of oneself as an object (or particular content) of inner sense (Cf. "*Die Seele ist aber ein Gegenstand des innern Sinnes. So fern ich mich nun als einen Gegenstand fuehle und dessen bewusst bin*…," AA XXVIII: 265), quoted above, p. 23). Hence, the term "feeling" can be used for a variety of purposes: to describe awareness unrelated to any particular sense organ whether relating to an inner representation (the

"I") or the body (feeling of cold), and to describe touch when it is related to the particular sense organ of touch.

The feeling of the "I" as content (or object) of inner sense, however, can be distinguished not only from the sense of touch and kinesthesia, but also, as we will see, from the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. In the *Prolegomena*, Kant says, "*Waere die Vorstellung der Apperzeption, das Ich, ein Begriff, wodurch irgend etwas gedacht wuerde, so wuerde es auch als Praedikat von andern Dingen gebraucht werden koennen, oder solche Praedikate in sich enthalten. Nun ist es nichts mehr als Gefuehl eines Daseins ohne den mindesten Begriff und nur Vorstellung desjenigen, worauf alles Denken in Beziehung (*relationae accidentis*) steht* (AA IV: 334n). In this passage, Kant denies that the "I" can be classified as a concept through which something might be thought because if that had been the case, it could have been used as a predicate of other things, or could have contained such predicates in itself. But Kant stresses the fact that the "I" is not a concept. Instead, it is nothing more than the "feeling of existence," and only a representation to which all thinking (or cognizing) relates. In this passage, Kant characterizes the "I" as a "*Gefuehl*," and this passage from 1783 can be seen to be in continuity with the passage from *Metaphysik L1*, dated 1777-80, discussed above.

It is curious that Kant never characterized the "I" as a feeling in the two editions of the first *Critique*, despite the fact that such a characterization occurs in the late 1770s and subsequently in the *Prolegomena* published in 1783. In the *Prolegomena* passage, the "I" is clearly characterized as "feeling of existence," which would have to be seen as involved in the process of cognition if we accept the fact that Kant merely wanted to popularize the first *Critique* in the *Prolegomena*. This is because Kant was dealing with

the power of representation of things in the first *Critique*, and he generally associated "feelings" with practical concepts. In the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method" of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says that it is the practical concepts that pertain to objects of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, of pleasure and displeasure, and thus indirectly to feelings. But such concepts are different from theoretical concepts. In the practical sphere, we are not dealing with the "power of representation of things," which is the task of theoretical philosophy and the "Transcendental Analytic" of the first *Critique* -- the sum total of transcendental philosophy concerned with pure *a priori* cognitions ("*den Inbegriff der Transzendentalphilosophie*," *KrV*, A801/B829n). Later, in the third *Critique*, when Kant truly works out the notion of "feeling," he says that our feelings of pleasure or pain have no cognitive reference to an object, except that the object is merely referred to the subject, and so feeling is entirely subjective (*KdU*, V: 206, AA:VI, 210-11). It is possible that Kant did not characterize the "I" as feeling of existence in the B deduction, published after the *Prolegomena*, because he was unsure about how to use the term "feeling," the logic of which he seems to have worked out only in the third *Critique*. It is equally possible that he wanted to avoid sullying the transcendental "I" with anything physiological, which is how he himself thought of the notion of "feeling" and which forms the foremost reason why recent commentators have refused to take the *Prolegomena* passage describing the "I" as "feeling of existence" seriously.[57]

In characterizing the "I" as feeling of existence, Kant was clearly toying with the idea of conceiving of feeling as playing a part in cognition, as a theoretical rather than only a practical concept. That he pulled back from that idea in the second edition should not deter us from exploring the merits of this idea, especially since there is enough

[57] For instance, Dieter Sturma, *Kant ueber Selbstbewusstsein*, 116.

evidence that the expression "feeling of existence" could be interpreted in cognitive terms, quite apart from its role and importance in Kant's practical philosophy.

In the metaphysics lectures from the late 1770s (*Metaphysik L1*), we find Kant asking the question "What is feeling?" He says, "*Was ist aber ein Gefuehl? das ist etwas schwer zu bestimmen. Wir empfinden uns selbst. Die Vorstellungen koennen zweifach seyn: Vorstellungen des Objects und des Subjects. Unsere Vorstellungen koennen verglichen warden, entweder mit den Gegenstaenden, oder mit dem gesammten Leben des Subjects. Die subjective Vorstellung der gesammten Lebenskraft, die Gegenstaende zu recipiren oder auszuschliessen, ist das Verhaeltniss des Wohlgefallens oder Missfallens. Also ist das Gefuehl nicht das Verhaeltniss der Gegenstaende zur Vorstellung, sondern zur Kraft des Gemueths, dieselben entweder innigst zu recipiren oder auszuschliessen. Das Recipiren ist das Gefuehl der Lust, und das Ausschliessen der Unlust*" (AA XXVIII: 247-8).[58] In this passage, Kant characterizes the notion of "feeling." In a feeling, we "sense" ourselves ("*wir empfinden uns*"). A "feeling" of pleasure and displeasure does not refer to the relationship between a representation and an object -- the cognitive relationship. Instead, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure refers to the "power of the mind" (*Kraft des Gemueths*) either to receive or exclude representations. It appears then that the general characterization of feeling can be given by the term "*Empfindung*," and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure can be viewed as a particular case of it. Consequently, the "feeling" of the "I" can be characterized as a "feeling" in general, as "*Empfindung*," and, unlike the feeling of pleasure and displeasure that is not cognitive, the general notion of feeling could be seen as cognitive if it can be

[58] Manfred Frank points to *Reflexionen* in which Kant speaks of apperception or the "I" as *Empfindung*" or "*Selbstempfindung*," Frank, *Selbstgefuehl*, 42-4

described through the cognitive term "*Empfindung*." In this context, the term "*Empfindung*" can be taken as cognitive to the extent "cognitive" deals with the relationship of a representation to an object (*Vorstellungen koennen verglichen warden…mit den Gegenstaenden*). In other words, it is possible for the discursive subject to "feel" something without necessarily wanting to embrace or reject it.

Furthermore, Kant clearly distinguishes the "feeling" of "I" from the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. In the *Anthropologie*, Kant makes a distinction between inner sense and interior sense. "*Die Sinne aber werden wiederum in den äußeren und den inneren Sinn (sensus internus) eingetheilt; der erstere ist der, wo der menschliche Körper durch körperliche Dinge, der zweite, wo er durchs Gemüth afficirt wird; wobei zu merken ist, daß der letztere als bloßes Wahrnehmungsvermögen (der empirischen Anschauung) vom Gefühl der Lust und Unlust, d. i. der Empfänglichkeit des Subjects, durch gewisse Vorstellungen zur Erhaltung oder Abwehrung des Zustandes dieser Vorstellungen bestimmt zu werden, verschieden gedacht wird, den man den inwendigen Sinn (sensus interior) nennen könnte* (AA VII: 153; also see *KrV*, B68 for the doctrine of self-affection). The feeling of pleasure and displeasure relates to the interior sense of the discursive subject, and involves the power to receive or exclude representations. On the other hand, inner sense is merely the ability to make possible representations as representations. We have seen that perception is conscious representation in time, and every perception necessarily requires sensation (*Empfindung*). The "I" is an object of inner sense, and the discursive subject *feels* the "I" as content (or object) of inner sense. In such a feeling, there is no involvement of the ability to receive or reject representations associated with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Hence, the "I" as feeling can be

distinguished from the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and it can be characterized as "*Empfindung*."[59]

We have seen that the discursive subject can feel itself as content (or object) of inner sense, and we have now seen that the feeling of the "I" can be distinguished from the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. We have seen that the feeling of the "I" is sensed (*empfindet*) but not through the senses. And, finally, we have seen that Kant describes the "I" as the feeling of existence in the *Prolegomena*, which was meant only to popularize the results of the first *Critique*. Hence, we can construe the feeling of the "I" as theoretical and related to cognition in Kant's system rather than as practical or physiological. The question to be explored now is: what is the content of the feeling of

[59] It is this distinction between such a feeling and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure that makes it problematic to conclude, as Rudolf Makkreel does, that "the feeling of the existence of the transcendental ego may be none other than the pure aesthetic feeling of life, which is defined as the 'bare consciousness of existence'," Rudolf Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the* Critique of Judgment, 106. While Makkreel deserves credit for (at least) taking into account the feeling aspect of the "I," his portrayal of the "I" is rather undifferentiated and somewhat obscure. Firstly, Makkreel correctly says that the "I" is pure even if the "I think" can be empirical vis-à-vis the oft-quoted B422-3n, and points to the fact that Kant speaks of transcendental apperception as a feeling in the *Prolegomena*. Having argued for the fact that "the purity of the aesthetic feeling of life" is not compromised by the fact that it can be related to the body, Makkreel concludes that the transcendental ego "may be none other than" the pure aesthetic feeling of life, which is the "bare consciousness of existence." It is unclear how Makkreel is able to equate the two together, especially in light of the fact that Kant clearly associates aesthetic feelings with the interior sense and connected to the power to receive or exclude representations (see p. 30 of this chapter above). Or, in other words, it is unclear why Makkreel insists on speaking of an "aesthetic feeling of life" rather than simply the "feeling of existence," as Kant does in the *Prolegomena*. Furthermore, we have seen that "consciousness" can be further specified as *Empfindung* when it comes to characterizing the content of apperception, something which Makkreel does not take into account (when he does speak of sensations, he speaks of them in the context of "interior sense," which is his main interest, see pp. 76-7). Secondly, the view becomes even more problematic when he says that the "bare consciousness of existence" (or aesthetic feeling of life) can be "interpreted as the subjective counterpart of the transcendental 'I think'," and further specifies it as the "transcendental feeling of spontaneity (the *actus* of life) that corresponds to the spontaneity of the intellect (the *actus* 'I think')." From the perspective of the way I have construed the "I," Makkreel seems to have conflated many concepts without any clear argument. What does it mean to say that the aesthetic feeling of life be a "counterpart" of the transcendental "I think"? How can we go from speaking of the transcendental ego as the "bare consciousness of existence" to speaking of it as the transcendental feeling of spontaneity: are the feeling of spontaneity and "bare consciousness of existence" one and the same, and if so, why? What does it mean to say that "transcendental feeling of spontaneity" "corresponds" to the spontaneity of the intellect? Corresponds in what way? Hence, from the perspective of the theory of the "I" offered in the present work, we can say that Makkreel's view is not very well worked out, though, to be fair, Makkreel was hardly aiming at offering a well-developed theory of the "I" in these passages.

the "I" as "*Empfindung*" (or feeling) unrelated to the sensations originating in the five senses, and that can play a role in cognition?

The answer lies in the fact that the term "*Empfindung*" can be characterized as "modification of the mind," as something in the mind rather than nothing, and need not be related to the bodily senses. The feeling of the "I" is something rather than nothing; it is in time because it is a particular content (or object) of inner sense; and Kant describes it as an "*Empfindung*." In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says, "*Die Gattung ist Vorstellung ueberhaupt* (repraesentatio). *Unter ihr steht die Vorstellung mit Bewusstsein* (perceptio). *Eine Perzeption, die sich lediglich auf das Subjekt, als die Modifikation seines Zustandes bezieht, ist Empfindung* (sensatio), *eine objective Perzeption ist Erkenntnis* (cognitio) (*KrV*, A320/B377)." A perception (*Perzeption*), or simply bare consciousness, is a representation with consciousness, and when such a perception relates to the modification of the (presumably) mental state of the subject, it is to be characterized as "*Empfindung*." Hence, the term "*Empfindung*," describing (a) the content of representation in a moment of perception and (b) having intensive magnitude, can also be described as modification of the mental state of the discursive subject (including not merely outer but inner representations). In this context, there is a significant handwritten note that distinguishes between intuitions and sensations where the latter relates only to the subject. Kant writes, "*Anschauung bezieht sich aufs Object, Empfindung blos aufs Subject*" (E XII, S. 34). Hence, unlike empirical intuitions (or *Wahrnehmungen*, which are to be distinguished from the general classificatory term "*Perzeption*" or any representation that can be conscious) that relate to the object, "*Empfindungen*" relate to the subject. "*Empfindungen*" relate to the subject and the "I as

subject" constitutes the horizon of consciousness and can be described as content (or object) of inner rather than outer sense. If the discursive subject "*empfindet*" itself and the feeling of the "I" can be characterized as an "*Empfindung*," then the "I" as content could be viewed as a particular modification of the mind different from the modifications of the mind associated with the five senses.

If we translate the term "*Empfindung*" as "sense" rather than "sensation" in relation to the "I," then we can make sense of the term "*Empfindung*" as a modification of the mind without conflating it with sensations attributable to the bodily senses. In English, we speak of a person having a sense for a language. In German, too, it is not uncommon to hear people say, "*Du hast ein Gefuehl fuer die Sprache*." The word "sense" or "*Gefuehl*" indicates the idea that a person knows the language well enough to be able to judge the subtleties involved in any language correctly. This "sense" or "*Gefuehl*" is the general orientation vis-à-vis a language such that the person can understand subtle variations in speech, connotations of words, etc. It is the general sense that refers to the fact of someone comprehending and using the rules of grammar correctly in actual speech. Another use of the word "sense" in English can be relevant in the present context. In statements like "I sense something there," the word sense marks the fact that the person can mark to herself that something is present rather than nothing, but she is unable to say in words what that something might be (*merken* or *spueren* could be the German equivalents in this example). Such a "sensing" or "*Gefuehl*" would have to be associated with the cognitive rather than the physiological constitution of the discursively-cognizing subject, and not merely owing to the fact that Kant describes the "I" as "feeling of existence" in theoretical rather than practical terms in the *Prolegomena*. It would have to

be related to the cognitive constitution of the subject because such "sensing" or "*Gefuehl*" can be seen as modification of the mind relating (a) only to the inner unlike the bodily feeling of touch and relating (b) only to the representation of the object, whether inner or outer, unlike the feeling of pleasure and displeasure which mark the subject's reception or repulsion of objects. For example, regarding (a), the discursive subject does not need anything outer to feel the "I" as in the case of touch, and regarding (b), she can sense the "I" in the way that she can sense that an argument is specious even if she cannot say how or why and which has nothing to do with reception or repulsion.

In my view, we can make sense of the "I" as "*Empfindung*," or modification of the mind, if we interpret the term "*Gefuehl*" as "sensing" something. When the discursive subject "feels" the "I" as content (or object) of inner sense, she senses something rather than nothing, that she exists as a unity of some sort, but she is unable to articulate the nature of the "I" using concepts such that its nature could be clearly articulated. The "I" is something (*etwas*); it is "mere consciousness" of something; it is a sense of self-identity; -- and yet, the discursive subject cannot articulate the ultimate nature of the "I" in words and concepts. As Kant says in the B deduction of the first *Critique*, the discursive subject cannot say what the "I" is, but only that the "I" is (*KrV*, B155). And she senses (*empfindet*) the "I" because the "I" is the content (or object) of inner sense which can only be gained if we abstract from everything outer in inner sense (though, as we will see, this does not have to necessarily mean that the sensed "I" is temporal). In the first *Critique*, Kant speaks of "*Empfindung*" as the means through which perception can take place ("*Die Apprehension, bloss vermittelt der Empfindung, erfuellt nur einen Augenblick, (wenn ich naemlich nicht die Sukzession vieler Empfindungen in Betracht*

ziehe)" (*KrV*, A167/B209)). This suggests we can make a distinction between the feeling or sensing the "I" in the strict sense, and the perception of the "I." In the latter case, the discursive subject would be conscious of the "I" as a moment, but this moment could only emerge if there were available the sense (*Empfindung*) of the "I" in the first place. Hence, there is a distinction between sensing the "I" obscurely and perceiving it clearly, which is clearly present in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[60] And it is the "*Empfindung*" of the "I" as modification of the mind that forms the basis for the conscious perception of the "I" in a moment of time and equally the fact that a representation like the "I" is in existence in the first place.

In fact, Kant's use and explication of the term "*Gefuehl*" in a relatively late essay "*Was heisst: Sich Im Denken zu Orientieren*?" can be viewed as supporting my interpretation. Kant says, "*Sich orientieren heisst, in der eigentlichen Bedeutung des Worts: aus einer gegebenen Weltgegend (in deren vier wir den Horizont einteilen) die uebrigen, namentlich den Aufgang zu finden. Sehe ich nun die Sonne am Himmel, und weiss, dass nun die Mittagszeit ist, so weiss ich Sueden, Westen, Norden und Osten zu finden. Zu diesem Behuf bedarf ich aber durchaus das Gefuehl eines Unterschiedes an meinem eigenen Subjekt, naemlich der rechten und linken Hand. Ich nenne es ein Gefuehl; weil diese zwei Seiten aeusserlich in der Anschauung keinen merklichen Unterschied zeigen* (AA VIII: 134-5). In order to orient herself in space, the discursive subject requires the "feeling" of the difference between its left and right hands if she has to be able to make the distinction between north, south, east or west from the direction of the sun. Kant says that this ability must be subjective because there is nothing outside the

[60] I will not explicate what this means in detail, except to point out that Kant says this in the first *Critique* – for instance, *KrV*, A117n, A124.

subject that can be seen as the basis for the subjective "feeling" distinguishing the left and right hands. Hence, the inner subjective "feeling" of the difference between the left hand and the right is to be seen as subjectively orientational. The "feeling" of the "I," as we have explicated it, involves the same kind of subjective orientation, and it could be the case that Kant characterized the "I" as a "feeling" for the same reasons: the "I" is a subjective and sensed awareness that serves an orientational role, just like the subjective and sensed (or felt) distinction between the left and right hands. This comparison between the feeling of the "I" and orientational feeling that enables the discursive intellect to distinguish her right and left hands is especially significant given the analogy between space, time and the "I" in Section III above.

In the present context, the notion of "life" (*Leben*) seems to play an important role in my view, and its exploration would help in further explicating the content of the expression "feeling of existence."[61] In some passages, the concept of "life" can be viewed as simply marking the horizon of existence as opposed to non-existence (or death in the case of human beings). In a handwritten note to the A paralogisms (A343), Kant makes this very clear when he says, "*Die Saetze der rationalen Psychologie gruenden sich alle auf das "Ich bin". Denn wuerden sie auch nur die Zeit hinzusetzen, so waere es ein Gegenstand der Erfahrung, von dem sie handelte, und alles, was dadurch herausgebracht werden wuerde, [muesste nie] weiter als auf dies Leben reichen* (E CLVIII)." In this passage, "*leben*" marks the discursive limits of cognition or experience, but equally the circumscription of potential consciousness or the very existence from the

[61] Rudolf Makkreel seems to be the only Kant interpreter who recognizes the importance of the notion of life, and, though there are differences in our respective characterizations of the term (Makkreel relies much more on the third *Critique*; we employ the term for different purposes) it was Makkreel's work that alerted me to the significance of the concept, see Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, Ch. 5.

first-person perspective of the discursive subject because, as we have seen, the unity of consciousness is prior to the unity of experience. In the B paralogisms, Kant says that the soul has an intensive magnitude, and a degree of reality ("*Grad der Realitaet*) in relation to its other abilities just as consciousness has a degree. The soul, as content (or object) of inner sense, cannot be seen as persisting beyond this life, but can certainly be judged as persisting in this life (*Leben*). "*Also bleibt die Beharrlichkeit der Seele, als bloss Gegenstandes des inneren Sinnes, unbewiesen, und selbst unerweislich, obgleich ihre Beharrlichkeit im Leben, da das denkende Wesen (als Mensch) sich zugleich ein Gegenstand aeusserer Sinne ist, fuer sich klar ist…*" (B415). In other words, the "I" or the "soul" can be seen without controversy as persisting within the bounds of discursivity, or existence or consciousness (it was always the nature of the persisting which was at issue).

To the extent Kant characterizes the concept of "*leben*" as the horizon of existence, or consciousness, it can be taken as interchangeable with the term "*Dasein*" (existence) because both terms mark the very existence of something rather than nothing for a discursive intellect. Hence, the expression "feeling of existence" from the *Prolegomena* can be translated as the "feeling of life," and if the "I" is the "feeling of existence," then we can further explicate the content of the "I" as "feeling of life" apart from saying that it is a sensed representation of the existence of something rather than nothing. But then the question arises: if the "I" is a sensed representation of something, could we say something about what this "something" is? In the *Metaphysik Mongrovius* (1782-3), dated after the publication of the first edition of the first *Critique*, Kant characterizes the concept of "life" in terms of the powers of the whole mind. "Taken

together, these three major powers [power of desire; cognitive power; and feeling of pleasure and displeasure] of the soul constitute its life" (AA XXIX: 878). If the discursive subject possessing the three powers could be said to have "life" and if the "I" is feeling of life, then we could say that the "I" is unity of mind as a whole. In other words, the terms "life and the general notion of mind seem to overlap because the "I" can be said to "contain" the three major powers of the mind, and, given that these different powers can be said to belong to the same mind, we can conclude that the "I" is the unity of mind, and, from the first person perspective, it is the feeling (or sensing) of the unity of mind. And the feeling (or sensing) of the unity of the mind cannot be taken as different from the "feeling of existence" because if there had been no unity of mind or the "I," there would be no consciousness and, hence, nothing could exist for the discursive subject. In the first *Critique*, too, Kant connects the ideas of the irreducible simplicity of the soul from the limited mental perspective of the discursive intellect and the unity of the discursive mind. Reiterating the results of the Paralogisms, he says "*Die Seele sich als einfach denken, ist ganz wohl erlaubt, um, nach dieser Idee, eine vollstaendige und notwendige Einheit aller Gemuetskraft, ob man sie gleich nicht* in concreto *einsehen kann, zum Princip unserer Beurteilung ihrer inneren Erscheinungen zu legen*" (*KrV*, A771/B799). In this passage, Kant speaks of the idea of simplicity of the soul that the discursive intellect can legitimately think. It is the complete and necessary unity of the power of the mind taken as the principle that makes possible judgments regarding the inner appearances of the discursive intellect even if such an intellect cannot have any real insight into (or intellectual intuition of) such a unity.

Thus, the "I" is the "sensed" awareness that the mind is unified and this awareness orients the discursive subject in its world. Further, viewed as an "*Empfindung*" or a sensed modification of the mind, the "I" has to be seen as a special case and distinguished from other states of mind like pains, red-sensations, thoughts, beliefs, etc. In the lectures on metaphysics (1777-80), Kant says "*Ich bin mir zweifacher Gegenstaende bewusst: (1) meines Subjects und meines Zustandes; (2) der Dinge ausser mir* (AA XVIII: 226)." In other words, the discursive subject can distinguish the awareness of her self and her state of mind. And further, if the subject is aware of herself as content (or object) of inner sense which implies that the "I" senses (*empfindet*) itself as one of the contents (or objects) of inner sense at time *t*, it cannot be aware of its other states of mind. In the metaphysics lecture notes (1782-3), Kant says, "*Es hat zum Object die Seele. Wenn die Seele sich selbst ihrer bewusst ist, ohne ihres Zustandes bewusst zu sein, so ists Apperception. Ist sie auch ihres Zustand bewusst, so ist es Empfindung oder Wahrnehmung*" (AA XXVIII: 882). If, however, the subject not only "senses" itself, but also its states like pain, pleasure, red-sensation, thought, etc., then we have sensations or perceptions of pain, pleasure, or red-sensations, etc. that have the built in "sense" of the "I." And because the "I" is itself a sensing (*Empfindung*), it cannot be a cognition, and, hence, if we were determining the nature of the "I" (as we are), we would not be able to say that the nature of "I" is such that we could cognize it from the first person perspective. In a Reflexion dated 1783-4, Kant says "*Erfahrung ist Erkenntnis (a posteriori, d. i.) dessen, was [im] object der Empfindung ist (a posteriori). Empfindungen geben gar kein Erkenntnis*; …" (AA XVIII: R5934). The fact that the sense (or feeling) of the "I" plays a role in cognition does not mean that the "I" can be characterized as a

cognition in its kernel; instead, it refers to the fact that the “I” as sensed awareness of the unity of the mind relates to the mere representational ability of the discursive subject rather its practical endeavors or its ability to receive or repulse representations.

From the first person perspective of the discursive subject, the “I” as feeling of existence can be glossed as the sensed awareness of the unity of the discursive mind that orients the discursive subject, and the “I” demarcates the horizon of existence or consciousness. And it is subjective or relating to the subject itself rather than an object outside the subject. In Section II, we had seen that it was the transcendental “I as subject” (as opposed to the transcendental “I as subject of thinking”) that constituted the horizon of consciousness and now we have seen that the “I” is a sensed awareness of the unity of the mind. In one sense, the relationship between these two descriptions of the “I” is fairly clear. The transcendental “I as subject” is the theoretical description of the phenomenon of the “I” as sensed awareness of the unity of the mind gained from the first person perspective of the discursive subject. From the first person pre-theoretical perspective of the discursive subject (“I” as content), the phenomenon of the “I” is such that the discursive subject senses (or feels) the “I” and, in this way, orients itself as a unified and existing subject. And it is only due to this reason that the theoretical description of the “sensed I” can be described as the “I as subject” or the transcendental horizon of consciousness.

(ii) If the “I” as feeling of existence/life forms the content of the transcendental “I as subject” and if there is a distinction between the transcendental “I as subject” and the

transcendental "I as subject of thinking," what is the content of the "I as subject of thinking" or the "I of intelligence"?

a. We have seen that the concept of "life" demarcates existence from non-existence of consciousness. But there is another usage of the term "*Leben*" in Kant's texts: beings that can act in accordance with an inner principle can be said to have "life."

In *Metaphysik L1* (1777-80), Kant says,

"[Das] *Leben ist das Vermoegen, sich selbst aus dem innern Princip nach Willkuehr zu bestimmen. Materie aber, als Materie, hat ein inneres Princip der Selbstthaetigkeit, keine Spontaneitaet, sich selbst zu bewegen; sondern alle Materie, die belebt ist, hat ein inneres Princip, welches abgesondert ist von dem Gegenstande des aeusseren Sinnes und ein Gegenstand des innern Sinnes ist; es ist in ihr ein besonderes Princip des innern Sinnes.. Ein inneres Princip der Selbstthaetigkeit ist nur Denken und Wollen; dadurch kann nur Etwas durch den innern Sinn bewegt werden; dieses ist allein ein Princip, nach Belieben und Willkuehr zu handeln. Wenn sich also ein Materie bewegt; so folgt, dass in ihr ein solches besonderes Princip der Selbstthaetigkeit sey. Dieses Principes aber des Denkens und Wollens ist nur ein Wesen, das Erkenntniss hat, faehig. Die Materie kann sich blos vermittelst eines solchen Princip bewegen. Solches Princip der Materie aber ist die Seele der Materie. Also: alle Materie, die da lebt, lebt nicht als Materie, sondern hat ein Princip des Lebens und wird belebt. Sofern aber Materie belebt wird; sofern ist sie auch beseelt*" (AA XXVIII: 275).

If a being can be considered "*belebt,*" then it has the ability to act from an inner principle or spontaneity. It should be able to move itself in accordance with its own choices, and Kant says that the activities of thinking and willing are to be associated with such movement or action. Hence, the concept of "life" signifies not merely the boundary line between existence of consciousness and its non-existence but also the principle of action. To the extent any kind of material has "life" (*belebt*), it can also be seen as "*beseelt*," as

possessing some kind of an "I." Thus, the beings that are "*belebt*" have two features – (a) spontaneity, or the capacity to act from an inner principle and (b) some kind of "soul" or the "I."

In the same lecture notes, Kant can be seen as extending the concept of life. Kant says, "*Wir haben ein inneres Princip, aus Vorstellungen zu handeln, und das ist das Leben. Wenn nun eine Vorstellung mit, mit dem Princip des Lebens zusammenstimmt; so ist dieses die Lust….Es ist also die Lust und Unlust ein Vermoegen der Uebereinstimmung oder des Widerstreits des Princips des Lebens, gegen gewisse Vorstellungen oder Eindruecke der Gegenstaende*" (AA XXVIII: 247). And he says, "*Leben ist das innere Princip der Selbsttaetigkeit* [self-employment]. *Lebende Wesen, die nach diesem innern Princip handeln, muessen nach Vorstellungen handeln*" (Ibid.). Living natures (*lebende Wesen*) act not merely from an inner principle, or spontaneity, but act in the face of representations, and the principle of life, as we have already seen, can be taken as the whole power of the mind (*der gesammten Kraft des Gemueths*). A discursive intellect gains representations from outside, which she has not created. If a representation agrees with the power of the whole mind, or the principle of life, then the feeling of pleasure is engendered, and a feeling of displeasure is engendered if a representation disagrees with the power of the whole mind. And lest we think such a view might have been pre-crticial, we can find such an idea of life even after the first *Critique*, in Kant's handwritten notes to the A edition. In a handwritten note to A358, Kant says, "*Transcendentale Definitionen: Die Causalitaet der Vorstellungen eines Wesens in Ansehung der Gegenstaende derselben ist das Leben*" (E CLXXIII). The concept of "life" is a transcendental concept defined as the causality of a being in relation to its

objects. This definition is no different from the characterization of "life" in the late 1770s that living natures (including the discursive subject) are able to act spontaneously from an inner principle in the face of representations.

We have seen that the "I as subject" or the "I" can be distinguished from the "I of intelligence" or "I as subject of thinking." We have seen that the notion of "life" has two interrelated meanings – (a) something has life if it has consciousness and (b) something has life if it spontaneously acts from inner principle in the face of representations. And, finally, we have seen that the "I as subject of thinking" can be glossed as the spontaneity of apperception understood as the directedness of attention that makes possible the spontaneity of judgment (Chapter 1). In the passage from *Metaphysik L1*, Kant says that the fact of spontaneously acting in the face of representations involves thinking and willing presumably for discursive subjects ("*Ein inneres Princip der Selbstthaetigkiet ist nur Denken und Wollen; dadurch kann nur Etwas durch den innern Sinn bewegt werden; dieses ist allein ein Princip, nach Belieben und Willkuehr zu handeln*" AA XXVIII: 275). This means that the "I as subject of thinking" or "I of intelligence" can be seen as another version of the notion of "life," as spontaneous action in the face of representations, especially in the context of Kant's claim that whatever lives (*belebt*) has some kind of "I" (*beseelt*). The combination of the notions of "life" and the "I" suggests the existence of a spontaneous "I" acting in the face of representations and involved in the activities of thinking and willing. And, given that we had seen in Chapter 1 that there can be no thinking or even willing without the spontaneity of apperception or directedness of attention, we can say that the "I as subject of thinking" or "I as intelligence" can be

characterized as the directedness of attention, or the ability to spontaneously act in the face of representations.

Hence, the notion of "life" can be seen as expressing not only the "I as subject" as the horizon of consciousness but also the "I as subject of thinking" as the self-directed movement of a discursive subject expressed in activities like thinking and willing and founded on the ability to direct attention. But the notion of "life" is far too general a term, and we need to specify the content of the "I as subject of thinking" in a more satisfactory way. I would like to argue that the "I as subject of thinking" could be best characterized as an "indeterminate empirical intuition" as opposed to the "I as subject" which has been interpreted as the sensed and orientational feeling of existence.

b. In the B paralogisms, Kant says that the "I think" can be described as an "indeterminate empirical intuition." The "I think" "*drueckt eine unbestimmte empirische Anschauung, d. i. Wahrnehmung aus, (mithin beweiset er doch, dass schon Empfindung, die folglich zur Sinnlichkeit gehoert, diesem Existentialsatz zum Grunde liege,) geht aber vor der Erfahrung vorher, die das Objekt der Wahrnehmung durch die Kategorie in Ansehung der Zeit bestimmen soll, und die Existenz ist hier noch keine Kategorie, als welche nicht auf ein unbestimmt gegebenes Objekt, sondern nur ein solches, davon man einen Begriff hat, und wovon man wissen will, ob es auch ausser diesem Begriffe gesetzt sei, oder nicht, Beziehung hat*" (*KrV*, B423). The "I think," Kant says, can be characterized as an indeterminate empirical intuition, and yet says that it is prior to experience ("*vor der Erfahrung vorher*"). It does not relate to an indeterminate and given object ("*unbestimmt gegebenes Objekt*") but rather to such an object of which we can

only have a mere concept, and even though there exists the urge to know if there is an object apart from the mere concept, we cannot achieve knowledge of it. Hence, we can say that the "I think" can be described as an indeterminate empirical intuition. It is a representation in time, or perception, and we can only have a mere concept of it where the term "concept" means merely grasping (*begreifen*) without cognizing. In the Paralogisms, he says, "*Nun kann ich von einem denkenden Wesen durch keine aeussere Erfahrung, sondern bloss durch das Selbstbewusstsein die mindeste Vorstellung haben* (A347/B405)" We can only have the "least possible representation" (*mindeste Vorstellung*) of being "thinking natures." The "*mindeste Vorstellung*" is the indeterminate empirical intuition, or, what is the same thing, a perception (*Wahrnehmung*). We have seen that there can be no perception (*Wahrnehmung*) without sensation (*Empfindung*). And if sensations are modifications of the mind relating to the subject, then in order to figure out the modification of the mind associated with the "I think" or the indeterminate empirical intuition (or perception), we would need to understand the expression "*unbestimmte empirische Anschauung*" by analyzing the terms "*Anschauung*," "*unbestimmte*," and "*empirische*."

Kant defines intuition (*Anschauung*) as a type of "*objective Perzeption*" (the other type being concept) that relates immediately to an object and is to be characterized as singular (*bezieht sich unmittelbar auf den Gegenstand und ist einzeln*, *KrV*, A320/B376-7). The difference between intuitions and sensations lies in the fact that the latter relate merely to the subject while the former relate to the object ("*Anschauung bezieht sich aufs Object, Empfindung blos aufs Subject*" (E XII, S. 34)). It follows that if the pure "I" of intelligence, or the "I as subject of thinking," is built into the "I think" (whether empirical

or pure) and the “I think” can be described as an indeterminate empirical *intuition*, then we would have to assume that the “I of intelligence” or “I as subject of thinking” relates to an object. From the first person perspective, the “I of intelligence” or the “I as subject of thinking” can be taken to be the intuitive directedness towards an object if the “I think” is an indeterminate empirical intuition or perception. In other words, the “I of intelligence,” or “I as subject of thinking,” can only exist if there is a corresponding object in relation to which the “I as subject of thinking” is subject. Hence, the “I as subject of thinking” is different from the “I as subject”: the former can be classified as an intuition (as Kant does, B423, quoted above) because it is oriented to an object while the latter is the sensed awareness of the“I,” the feeling of life, which relates only to the subject. In other words, the “I as subject of thinking” must be something definitionally related to an object.

We have seen that Kant speaks of intuitions as objective perceptions because such representations relate to an object as opposed to sensations that relate only to the subject, but we have also seen that every perception must necessarily be accompanied (*begleitet*) by sensation (*Empfindung*) and that sensations turn into perceptions as soon as we are conscious of them. If we now learn that the “I think” (spontaneity of judgment, Cf. Chapter 1 & Section II above) is a perception relating to an object and if we accept (as we should) the idea that the “I of intelligence” or “I as subject of thinking” is directedness of attention, we would need to specify the “*Empfindung*,” as modification of the mind, which lies at the ground of the “I think” characterizable as an intuition (or objective perception). In the case of the “I as subject” the discursive subject can sense the phenomenon of the “I,” the unity of mind as the feeling of life. Similarly, in the case of

the "I as subject of thinking," the discursive subject can "sense" (*empfindet*) its own intentional directedness, or the ability to act from an inner principle in the face of representations. If the "I think" as spontaneity of judgment is an indeterminate empirical intuition or perception and the "I of intelligence" or "I as subject of thinking" is the subject's sense of its own directedness (spontaneity of apperception) and forms a conceptual element of the conceptually relatively more complex "I think," then the "I of intelligence" can be seen as the "*Empfindung*" lying at the base of the indeterminate empirical intuition or perception, "I think" (alongwith other "*Empfindungen*" that forms the stuff of thinking).

Thus, in everyday language, the "I as subject" refers to the sense that I perceive while the "I as subject of thinking" refers to the sense that I can act.[62] In both cases, if we perceive the "I" itself (whether the "I as subject" or the "I as subject of thinking") it no longer remains a sense (*empfinden*), but becomes conscious perception – in the case of the "I as subject," it is the perception of unity of the mind while in the case of the "I as subject of thinking," it is an objective perception or intuition of the possibility of directing one's attention in the context of the spontaneity of judgment.

The inner sense makes representations as representations possible, and the "I of intelligence" or "I as subject of thinking" can be seen as a content (or object) of inner sense if it is perceived. Kant says, "*Dieses Ich kann im zweifachen Verstande genommen werden: Ich als Mensch, und Ich als Intelligenz. Ich, als ein Mensch, bin ein Gegenstand des innern und aeusseren Sinnes. Ich als intelligenz bin ein Gegenstand des inneren Sinnes nur;*" (AA XXVIII: 224, 1782-3). If the "I as subject of thinking" can be an object of inner sense, it can also be perceived and, thus, characterized as "*wirklich*." Kant

[62] Cf. Heidegger's description of the "I think" as "I can," *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 83

glosses the term "*wirklich*" as "*unmittelbar durch empirische Anschauung gegeben*" (*KrV*, A375) – the perceived is something given immediately through empirical intuition; and perception (*Wahrnehmung*) is consciousness prior to concepts (*das Bewusstseyn einer Erscheinung (vor allem Begriffe)* (E LXIV)).

In the A deduction, having said that the unity of synthesis according to empirical concepts would be entirely accidental unless tied to general and necessary laws (*Gesetzen*), Kant makes a distinction between "*gedankenlose Anschauung*" and "*Erkenntnis*." The former consists of representations if there were no general and necessary laws while the latter is only made possible if concept application could take place ("*synthetische Einheit der Erscheinungen nach Begriffen*" (*KrV*, A111). Thus, despite the fact that in Kant's epistemology, concepts without intuitions are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind, and the blind play of representations can hardly even be characterized as a dream ("*blindes Spiel der Vorstellungen, d. i. weniger, als ein Traum sein*" (*KrV*, A112), there exists a place for intuitions sans conceptualization. The "I as subject of thinking" can be characterized as such an intuition: the discursive subject *senses* that she can direct her attention towards objects, and, thus, can be characterized as an intuition in epistemic terms; and, at the same time, she can become conscious of (or perceive) her own directedness of attention, the "I of intelligence or the "I as subject of thinking."

However, the discursive subject cannot grasp the "I as subject of thinking," or even the "I as subject," as an intuition in the usual sense of the word, that is, in the way the discursive subject can be said to intuit spatiotemporal objects. Intuitions are representations relating, by definition, to objects. Although both aspects of the "I" ("I as

subject" and "I as subject of thinking") can be described as forming the content (or object) of inner sense as general representations of the mind that can be potentially perceived, the discursive subject cannot have objective perception of the "I" (whether "I as subject of thinking" or "I as subject") because the "I" as object cannot be given in itself (*an sich*) via an intellectual intuition.[63] In the Kantian system, objects like tables and chairs cannot themselves be known as objects in themselves, but the "I" can be considered even more ambiguously an "object," a fact to which the Paralogisms attest. It is in this context that we can make sense of a curious handwritten note by Kant in which he says, "*Dieselben Dinge als Sinnen- oder Verstandswesen. Ich selbst bin das einzige, was sich [nicht] anschaut*" (E CX, note to *KrV*, A235), and means that the "I" cannot intuit itself, or, alternatively said, it cannot become aware of itself as a spatiotemporal "object" but only become conscious of (or perceive) the "I" as a temporal representation in inner sense. In the case of the "I," therefore, there can be no genuine intuition. In other words, neither the "I as subject of thinking" nor the "I as subject" can intuit itself. In the case of the "I as subject," it cannot be intuited because intuition requires relationship to an object, and no corresponding object seems to be available; and in the case of the "I as subject of thinking," there is indeed an object, the empirical formulation of the transcendental "I as subject" as content (or object) of inner sense, but the "I as subject of thinking" cannot intuit itself as an object. The "I as subject" does not sense itself as an object in any act of perception, but can be described as the object (sensed awareness of the unity of mind, the feeling of life) in relation to the "I as subject of thinking" in any act

[63] In this context, in the A deduction we find a passage in which Kant denies that we can have an intellectual intuition. "*Dieses Ich muesste eine Anschauung sein, welche, da sie beim Denken ueberhaupt (vor aller Erfahrung) vorausgesetzt wuerde, als Anschauung a priori synthetische Saetze lieferte, wenn es moeglich sein sollte, eine reine Vernunfterkenntnis von der Natur eines denkenden Wesens ueberhaupt zu Stande zu bringen*" (*KrV*, A382).

of thinking. If there had been an intuitive (subject-object) relationship of the "I as subject" with its own self in any act, we would not be able to escape an infinite regress. In the act of thinking, however, we can make the case that no such regress would accrue (see Chapter 3 above).

Further, even though the "I as subject of thinking" cannot be seen as an intuition, it can only be seen as an indeterminate intuition. The question is: what does the word "indeterminate" mean? We have seen that intuitions are objective perceptions, and, thus, "*wirklich*;" we have seen that "*gedankenlose Anschauungen*" and "perceptions" can exist prior to concept application; and, finally, we have seen that the "I as subject of thinking" cannot be intuited in the way spatiotemporal objects are intuited. The adverbial qualification of the term "intuition" through the term "indeterminate" can help make sense of the kind of intuition the "I as subject of thinking" might be.

In interpreting the term "indeterminate," a couple of handwritten notes can be useful. Kant says, ""*Was unbestimmt in irgend einer Zeit gedacht werden kann*" *ist moeglich* (E LXXXIX; to A272)" & ""*Was in der Zeit bestimmt ist*" *is wirklich* (E XC; to A272)." Whatever is determined in time is actual (*wirklich*). If the "I as subject of thinking" is indeterminate intuition, it cannot be determined in time. But then, according to Kant, there exists the possibility of representations that might be "indeterminate" in time (E LXXXIX) but which, if they can be thought (or merely conceptualized or minimally marked), can be considered possible representations. If the "I as subject of thinking" is an *indeterminate* intuition, it can be in time in some way different from a determinate representation in time. In other words, it cannot be like an objective perception of, say, the representation "red," and cannot be classified as either conscious

perception of an object or even a sensation (*Empfindung*). Yet, the discursive subject can immediately perceive the "I" of intelligence as one of the contents of inner sense, and to this extent, it can be considered to be in time.

We have seen that the "I think" can be characterized as judgment, and the "I of intelligence" forming part of the "I think" can be characterized as the spontaneity of apperception, the directedness of attention, that makes the spontaneity of judgment/thinking possible. The "I as subject of thinking," or "I of intelligence" as directedness of attention, can be intuited by the discursive subject in an indeterminate manner if she were interested in grasping its content from the first person perspective. On the other hand, the "I think" can be conceived of as an indeterminate empirical intuition from the theoretical perspective owing to the fact that the "I think" (which includes the "I of intelligence" as directedness of attention) requires directedness to an object in the process of thinking, or many other representations apart from the "I of intelligence" or "I as subject of thinking" that form the stuff of thinking. And the "I as subject of thinking" can not only potentially have all the representations of inner sense as its object, but it can be directed to the "I as subject" in the form of "I as object" in the act of thinking or judging. It cannot, however, make *itself* an object in the act of thinking just the way the "I as subject" cannot make itself an object in act of perceiving. In both cases, the "I" would have to be considered built in – the "I as subject of thinking" is built into the act of thinking as directedness of attention, while the "I as subject" as sensed cognitive awareness of the unity of the mind is built into the moment of perception but plays the role of object in the act of thinking.

The "I as subject of thinking" can be seen as an intellectual representation that does not belong at any particular place or any particular time -- "'*Ich denke' ist ein Satz a priori; ist eine blosse Categorie des Subjects, intellectuale Vorstellung ohne irgendwo und irgendwenn, also nicht empirisch*" (E CLX). Instead, it is an intellectual representation that can nevertheless be sensed (*empfindet*) as a particular modification of the mind, and characterized as the spontaneity of apperception or directedness of attention. If it is perceived, it is a content (or object) of inner sense, and in time; but if it is only sensed (*empfindet*), it cannot be considered in time (See Section I of this chapter, pp. 212-7 above for the justification of the intrinsic atemporality of "*Empfindungen*"). We may, consequently, claim that the "I as subject of thinking" cannot itself be intuited as an object except indeterminately, the discursive subject can be aware of the "I as subject of thinking" only as a sensed awareness of the directedness of attention rather than as a genuine spatiotemporal object or an object that could be intellectually intuited. The adverbial "indeterminate" qualifies the "I as subject of thinking" as a special kind of intuition, which can be justifiably designated as an intuition because the "I as subject of thinking" can relate to the "I as subject" as object (or "I" as object) in the act of thinking. This implies that the "I as subject of thinking" as directedness of attention need not be necessarily viewed as built into every act of perception, but must necessarily be built into every act of thinking. For instance, I may perceive "red" at time *t* without being actively *directed* to perceiving "red," in which the "I as subject" would be "obscurely" built into the perception of "red."[64]

[64] As I have remarked in the "Introduction," the present work cannot accommodate showing how the "I as subject" can be viewed as built into a conscious perception or how the "I as subject of thinking" can be seen as referring to the "I as object" in the process of thinking. Suffice it to say that there are passages in Kant that help in further clarifying these questions and form the basis for further reconstruction. I will only

Thus, the "I as subject of thinking" can be classified as an intuition because it relates to the "I as object" (and something can only be an intuition if it relates to an object) but the nature of the "I as subject of thinking" cannot itself be intuited; and it can only be indeterminately marked to itself by the discursive subject. The discursively-cognizing subject cannot intuit the "I as subject of thinking" as an object in itself, or even as a spatiotemporal object. Hence, in the process, of thinking, the "I as subject of thinking" can be seen as an indeterminate intuition.

And, finally, there remains the question of explicating the "empirical" in the expression "indeterminate empirical intuition." We have seen that the "I think" is *a priori* because the "I of intelligence" (or "I as subject of thinking") in the "I think" is always pure (*KrV*, B423n), and yet the "I think" can be an indeterminate *empirical* intuition. We have also seen that the "I" of intelligence is empty of sensory content where "sensory" relates to the five senses,[65] and yet it can be seen as "*Empfindung*," modification of the mind, glossed as the directedness of attention. The term "empirical" in the expression describing the "I think" as an "indeterminate empirical intuition" is related to the very idea of intuition: by definition, all intuitions of a discursive subject must relate to an object. Having said that, however, Kant does not mean to characterize the "I of intelligence" as empirical when he speaks of the "I think" as an indeterminate empirical intuition because the "I of intelligence" contained in the "I think" must always be considered pure (*KrV,* B422-3n, quoted above). Kant characterizes the "I think" as indeterminate empirical intuition for the following reasons. In Chapter 1, we saw that the

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briefly point to these passages – *KrV*, B150-60; A124; B414-5; also the distinction Kant draws between the analytical and synthetic unity of apperception can help in formulating the argument in a fuller way.

[65] "*Zum Grund derselben koennen wir aber nichts anderes legen, als die einfache und fuer sich selbst an Inhalt gaenzlich leere Vorstellung: Ich; von der man nicht einmal sagen kann, dass sie ein Begriff sei, sondern ein blosses Bewusstsein, das alle Begriffe begleitet*" (KrV, A345-6/B404).

"I think" is a judgment, and the "I of intelligence" as spontaneity of apperception, or directedness of attention, constitutes the very act of thinking. The "I as subject of thinking," or "I of intelligence" as directedness of attention, would have nothing to be directed towards if no stuff of thinking, or empirical representations, were to exist. In other words, the "empirical" is the condition for the possibility of the employment of a purely intellectual ability, the "I of intelligence" as intellectual representation; and the "I think" as judgment may simply be seen as a complex marking the necessary components of a judgment -- the "I of intelligence" as directedness of attention and the manifold of empirical representations.

c. From a. and b. above, we can say that the content of the "I as subject of thinking" can be characterized as follows: (a) it is the ability to act in the face of representations, and its content can be glossed as the directedness of attention or spontaneity of apperception. (b) From the transcendental (or theoretical) perspective, it can be characterized as an indeterminate intuition. It is indeterminate because it has no determinate "when" and "where," and cannot be intellectually intuited as an object. It is the Wittgensteinian eye that cannot see itself. The discursive subject cannot perceive or cognize her directedness in the moment of directedness, but only in retrospect and even then, she can merely sense (*empfindet*) the fact that she can direct her attention. (c) Hence, in its content, the "I as subject of thinking" is sensed awareness of the ability to be directed, of the very fact of attention. (d) Finally, the *a priori* "I think" as judgment is a complex made up of the "I of intelligence" or "I as subject of thinking" and the stuff of thinking. Without the latter, the

former would not be possible, or, alternatively said, the "I as subject of thinking" needs the stuff of thinking to be activated (*ausgeuebt*).

(iii) Hence, from the transcendental point of view, the form of the "I as subject" is obscurely built into every conscious representation while the form of the "I as subject of thinking" must refer to the form of the "I as object" in the process of thinking. The "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking" are "*Empfindungen*" in content, and, thus, intrinsically a-temporal, which justifies Kant's characterization of the "I" as transcendental in the first place. The actualization of the "I as subject" can be glossed as the sensed (*empfindet*) awareness of the unity of the mind and the actualization of the "I as subject of thinking" can be glossed as the sensed (*empfindet*) awareness of the directedness of attention. In perceiving, the sensed awareness of the unity of mind ("I as subject") must necessarily be built into every conscious representation, and in the process of thinking, the directedness of attention must necessarily refer to the sensed unity of the mind ("I as object") at some moments in the chain of representations that constitute thinking. As we had seen in the previous chapter, there is no problem of the infinite regress because the "I as subject" as horizon of consciousness, or the sensed awareness of the unity of mind, is the originary form of the discursive mind such that in cases of perception, neither a subject-object distinction nor a relationship of reflection between subject and object is possible. Manfred Frank makes a distinction between those who view the "I" originarily as "*Tathandlung*" and those who view the "I" originarily as "*Selbstgefuehl*." Frank says, "*Die Geschichte des Ichs (oder des Bewusstseins) beginnt ihm* [Novalis, but building on Kant, according to Frank] *also nicht mit einer*

'Thathandlung' [like Fichte] *sondern mit einem Selbstgefuehl*."[66] In my view, too, Kant seems to view the "I" in its most basic form as "*Selbstgefuehl*" (the form of "I as subject") rather than as "*Thathandlung*" (which would be more akin to the "I as subject of thinking"), even though active self-ascription cannot be possible without the "I as subject of thinking" for a discursive intellect.

While Frank's stress on "*Selbstgefuehl*" as "*unmittelbar und nicht-inferentielle Kenntnisnahme*"[67] in order to characterize the "I" not merely in Novalis but also in Kant is correct and agrees with my own view in this work, Frank's interpretation of the Kantian "I" is more problematic for two reasons. (a) Frank does not seem to take into account the distinction between the "I as subject," the sensed awareness of the unity of the mind obscurely built into conscious representations, and the "I as subject of thinking," the directedness of attention, and seems to completely deny the existence of the latter impulse in Kant. From the perspective of the theory of "I" I have offered, this means that Frank's general view of the "I" can be seen as partial at best.

(b) Even though Frank speaks rightly of the "I" as built into the consciousness of objects and, concentrating on B422-3n, attempts to show how the "I" can be a-temporal, he seems to think that the "I" can be characterized as a "*Wahrnehmung*" in content. But this is problematic. Frank argues in the following way: Sartre says that consciousness is always consciousness of something, and that the empirical existence of consciousness is not given in the "I" but comes from the objects whose consciousness it is. According to

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[66] Frank, *Selbstgefuehl*, 39-40.

[67] *"Der Bewusstseinsmodus, der der Existenz entspricht, ist darum (wie bei Kant) nicht der Gedanke, sondern die unmittelbare und nicht-inferentielle Kenntnisnahme, die in der empiristischen Tradition 'Empfindung' gennant wird*" (Ibid., 49). Also, "*Das reine Ich existiert also, und es besteht hinsichtlich seiner eine unmittelbare (das heisst vorbegriffliche und auch vorreflexive) Kenntnis,*" Frank, "*Kant ueber Selbstbewusstsein,*" in Manfred Frank, *Auswege aus dem deutschen Idealismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007), 182-93, 192.

Frank, Kant says something similar: the "I" corresponds not only to an intuition (which could be divorced from existence) but rather a perception (*Wahrnehmung*). And this perception, through which existence comes into play, is to be considered prior to the temporal data of inner sense just like the categories; and the perception of the "I" is "undetermined" because the categories cannot be applied to it.[68] In this chapter, however, we have seen that "*Wahrnehmungen*" must be distinguished from "*Empfindungen*," and that it is the latter kind of representations that can be seen as a-temporal while the former cannot be seen as a-temporal. This is because "*Empfindungen*," as modifications of the mind, can escape consciousness, and as soon as something becomes a conscious perception, it comes to be in time and ceases to be an "*Empfindung*," even though the conscious perception has an "*Empfindung*" built into it (See Section I above). Further, we have also seen that Kant can be textually interpreted as characterizing the "I as subject" and "I as subject of thinking" as "*Empfindungen*." Hence, it is difficult to sustain Frank's view that the "I" can be a perception and still outside time, especially in light of the fact that we can find no clear argument in Frank's text for why perception of the "I" should be considered prior to the temporal data of inner sense (*Und diese Wahrnehmung, durch die Existenz verbuergt wird, geht den zeitlichen Daten des inneren Sinn ebenso voraus*, Frank, 226-7, see fn.11 above).

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[68] "*Das Bewusstsein ist immer Bewusstsein* von *etwas und tritt nie isoliert auf. Aber Sartre sagt mehr: Die (empirische)* Existenz *des Bewusstseins ist nicht des Ich eigene, sie ist bei den Gegenstaenden geborgt,* deren *Bewusstsein es ist. Kant sagt etwas Aehnliches: Der Vorstellung 'ich' entspricht nicht nur eine Anschauung (der die Existenz abgehen koennte), sondern eine 'Wahrnehmung'. Und diese Wahrnehmung, durch die Existenz verbuergt wird, geht den zeitlichen Daten des inneren Sinn ebenso voraus wie den Kategorien. 'Existenz ist heir [also] noch keine Kategorie'. Die Wahrnehmung ist gerade darum 'unbestimmt', weil sie noch nicht die Praegung durch einen Begriff/eine Kategorie erfahren hat*," Frank, *Selbstgefuehl*, 226-7.

Conclusion

(1) The peculiarity of the phenomenon of the "I" lies in the fact that the same word (the "I") characterizes different functional roles: the discursive intellect has the ability to be directed towards objects and act in the face of these objects (it is the "I" that acts) but, at the same time, it is the "I" that perceives even when the "I" may not be acting or directed towards something. And it is the distinctiveness of the phenomenon of "I" that makes it difficult to adequately describe it. Kant is a very interesting case of a philosopher who probably recognized the fact that the word "I" refers to two different functions which can be conceptually distinguished even if they are *as phenomenon* inextricably intertwined. In order to make sense of the phenomenon, Kant says that the "I" is twofold in form and singular in content, and, as I have argued, implicitly distinguishes between the "I" that acts and the "I" that perceives. However, offering a theory of the "I" was not his prime motivation, and, thus, often he neither explicated, developed or even consistently adhered to his own insights nor did he make explicit the distinction between the "I" that acts and the "I" that perceives, often conflating the two, which resulted in contradictions and inconsistencies over which commentators have often despaired over the years. In this work, I have simply attempted to investigate if Kant's view that the "I" is twofold in form and singular in content can be consistently developed.

(2) The analysis of the "I" involves two levels and three dimensions: (A) on the level of empirical phenomenon, the "I" can be pre-theoretically conceived of as the indivisible knot (to speak metaphorically) of the "I that acts" and the "I that perceives," reflecting the fact that the word-label "I" can be used to describe both our actions and our feelings

(at least in some languages). (B) Hence, in my interpretation, when Kant describes such a phenomenon, he says that the "I" is singular in content (the pre-theoretical knot), but conceptually expresses the two aspects of the "I" by saying that the "I" has a twofold form on the transcendental (theoretical) level – the "I" as subject" and the "I as object." If we investigate Kant's *oeuvre*, as I have tried to do in this work, we can arrive at a philologically informed and argumentatively reconstructed classificatory schema of the "I," to which Kant adhered from the silent decade onwards to the *Anthropologie*. The classification runs as follows: (i) "I" as *a priori Grenzbegriff*, or the "I" as (form of) subject in general, or "I as subject;" (ii) the "I as (form of) subject of thinking" or the "I" of intelligence; (iiia) the "I as (form of) object" of intuition, and (iiib) the "*Ich als Mensch*" including the "I" of apprehension, the empirical "I think," or in general, the "I" as content. Hence, the phenomenon of the "I" can be seen as having three dimensions on the transcendental (theoretical) level) and a singular content on the pre-theoretical level (Chapter 2).

(3) On the formal (transcendental-theoretical) level, the "I as subject" can be characterized as: (a) marks the horizon of consciousness; (b) conceptually separable from the body; (c) as "mere concept" of the "I," it must be unalterable; (d) necessary transcendental concept; (e) always the logical subject and never a predicate; (f) an absolute but logical unity; and (g) built into every act of perception (Chapter 3). The content of the "I as subject" consists in the following: from the first person (pre-theoretical) perspective of the discursive subject, the "I as subject" as feeling of existence

can be glossed as the sensed (*Empfindung*) awareness of the unity of the discursive mind that orients the discursive subject. (Chapter 4)

The form of the "I as subject of thinking" or the "I of intelligence" can be described in the following way: (a) The "I" of intelligence is the spontaneity of apperception or directedness of attention; (b) it can be distinguished from the "I as subject" which is the horizon of consciousness, and described as the horizon of thinking owing to the fact that it relates to thinking rather than perceiving; (c) it is the subject of thinking, and forms an element in the conceptually more complex *a priori* "I think;" (d) we cannot know its nature in itself, but it appears to be the source of movement in a discursive subject (Chapters 1 & 3); and, finally, (e) from the transcendental (or theoretical) perspective, it can be characterized as an indeterminate intuition. The content of the "I of subject of thinking" consists in the following: it is the ability to act in the face of representations, and its content can be glossed as the sensed (*Empfindung*) awareness of the directedness of attention or spontaneity of apperception. (Chapter 4)

Finally, I argue for the theoretical usefulness of a sharp distinction between perception and thinking in the Kantian system if we are to make sense of Kant's view that the "I" is twofold in form and singular in content. The "I as subject" can be characterized as analogous to the forms of intuition (space and time), but it cannot be an object for itself in the moment of perception of something if we are to avoid falling into an infinite regress (just as the "I as subject of thinking" cannot be an object for itself in the moment of directedness for similar reasons). However, the "I as subject" can have the form of the "I as object" in relation to the "I as subject of thinking" when the discursive subject is thinking. Hence, the form of the "I as subject" can be described as formal object (form of

"I as object") *in relation to* the form of the "I as subject of thinking" *if the discursive subject is involved in thinking*. Thus, the "I as subject" cannot play the formal role of being an object in the case of perception, but indeed plays the formal role of being an object vis-à-vis the "I as subject of thinking" if the discursive subject is thinking (Chapters 3 & 4). At the level of content, the "I" is singular. However, we can describe, and in this way exemplify, the relationship between the "I as subject," "I as subject of thinking," and "I as object" at the level of content. In the case of perception, the "I as subject" as sensed (*empfindet*) unity of mind is built into every moment of perception such that there is no subject-object distinction possible. In the case of thinking, on the other hand, the "I as subject of thinking" as the sensed (*empfindet*) directedness of attention must refer to the sensed unity of the mind ("I as subject") as to an object in the diachronic unfolding of a thought in the just the way the subject would direct its attention to an object in the external world (Chapter 4).

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