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Taylor N. Randleman

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Pathways to Gender Equality: An Analysis of the Impact the Relationship Between Religion and
the State and Committing to CEDAW Have on Women's Rights

by

Taylor N. Randleman

David Davis, Ph.D.
Adviser

Department of Political Science

David Davis, Ph.D.
Adviser

Beth Reingold, Ph.D.
Committee Member

Pamela Scully, Ph.D.
Committee Member

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Abstract

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By Taylor N. Randleman

The effectiveness of CEDAW on improving women's rights is commonly debated as it is one of the most ratified international treaties. I analyze whether the level of commitment to the CEDAW treaty influences its effectiveness in increasing women's rights. I conceptualize commitment to CEDAW by looking at the level of treaty action and the length of time since committing to the treaty. Religion is an important societal factor that's influence on women's rights is understudied. This paper seeks to examine how the relationship between religion and the state may limit the realization of women's rights. I conceptualize the relationship between religion and the state by looking at the level of government involvement in religion, specifically when there are strong ties between religion and the state, and the presence of religious legislation. I hope to uncover how the impact of CEDAW will be conditioned by the strength of religion within the political and legal system of the state. Drawing on previous theory and literature, I hypothesize that strong religion-state ties and a large amount of religious legislation will negatively impact the realization of women's rights. I further hypothesize that a greater level of commitment to CEDAW will result in a greater realization of women's rights. To test these hypotheses, I utilize a cross-sectional, time-series design and include five different measures of women's rights. My data analysis is for the period of 1981 to 2012 and includes all countries with available data. My findings indicate that a greater level of commitment to CEDAW has a significant and positive impact on the realization of women's rights. I also found that strong-religion state ties and a large amount of religious legislation significantly and negatively impact the realization of women's rights.

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1. Introduction

Examining the factors that influence the effectiveness of current women's rights law is vital to guiding future policy that further advances the realization of women's rights worldwide. While there are many factors at play in each country, all interacting in unique ways, religion and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) appear to be two major factors affecting women's human right to equality and non-discrimination. I conceptualize religion by looking at the relationship between religion and the state to see whether a strong relationship between religion and the state limits the realization of women's rights. I explore how CEDAW influences women's rights by looking at the level of commitment a state has made to the treaty. My goal is to see whether a deeper level of commitment to CEDAW leads to further improvements in women's rights. I connect CEDAW and religion to see if a state with a strong relationship with religion causes CEDAW to be implemented less effectively than in states that do not have a relationship with religion.

I incorporate and analyze several different measures of women's rights into my study to overcome conceptual and methodological issues present in other women's rights studies and explore how religion and CEDAW uniquely influence the different dimensions of women's rights. I re-evaluate factors such as the level of democracy, economic development, and presence of women's governmental organizations that previous studies have suggested impact women's rights. My findings indicate that in order to improve women's rights, it is critical that a state limits the influence of religion on the government and state-level actors and that a state commits to CEDAW at the highest level, which is by signing the Optional Protocol.

CEDAW, adopted by the U.N General Assembly in 1979, was drafted to encourage states to combat discrimination against women. CEDAW, also known as the 'women's bill of

rights', represented a significant step forward in expanding and protecting the fundamental civil, political, economic, and social rights of women (Cole 2012; Campbell and Swenson 2016). CEDAW is one of the most ratified international treaties ever; all UN member states having ratified or acceded the treaty- except for the United States, Iran, Nauru, Somalia, Sudan, and Tonga, who only signed the treaty. (United Nations, UN Treaties, Treaties Accessed Nov 13, 2017; International Models Project on Women's Rights, Accessed Mar 20, 2018). However, despite being one of the most broadly endorsed human rights treaties, the rights laid out in CEDAW have not been fully realized, resulting in a debate over whether CEDAW has actually been effective in improving the lives of women (Campbell and Swenson 2016; Cole 2012; Hill 2010). The comprehensiveness of the rights and circumstances covered in CEDAW represents a significant step forward for women's human rights to equality and non-discrimination, but it is imperative that a commitment to these rights be reflected in legislation around the world, which includes an increase in the involvement of women in politics, the economy, and the social sphere of society.

While religion's negative effects on women's rights are commonly discussed within political sphere and the world news, there is a need for evidence-based studies to support this claim (Cherif 2010; Sweeney 2008; Englehart and Miller 2014). While some prior studies on religion focus on the religious practices of a population to measure the effect of religion on women's rights, I will not include this measurement in my study. I focus on how a strong relationship between religion and the state may negatively influence the expansion of women's rights. Recent studies suggest that religion can influence the beliefs and practices of institutions, including governments, and this relationship could negatively influence women's rights (Assouad and Parboteeah 2017; Fox and Sandler 2003). Based on this premise, looking at the

effects of a strong relationship between religion and the state on women's rights could yield insight into which specific aspects of religion limit the realization of women's rights (Sweeney 2008). I conceptualize the relationship between religion and the state by measuring the government involvement in religion and religious legislation (Fox and Sander 2003). *Strong religion-state ties* is the term used in this paper to signify large government involvement in religion. I look at the *number of religious laws* to represent religious legislation.

Research Question

First, I will examine how strong religion-state ties and the number of religious laws influence the level of respect for women's rights. Second, I will explore how the level of commitment to the CEDAW treaty influences and effects the realization of women's rights. Finally, I will look to see how the impact of CEDAW is conditioned by the strength of religion within the political and legal system of the state.

2. Theory and Literature

There is considerable doubt among scholars regarding the influence of religion on women's rights and the effectiveness of CEDAW. Surveying the previous literature shows a need to develop a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between religion, CEDAW, and women's rights (Cole 2012; Hill 2010; Sweeney 2008). Even though the existing literature concludes that religion does affect women's rights, the literature does not explain adequately the causes behind this relationship (Sweeney 2008; Fox and Sandler 2003). My research contributes to the scholarship on religion by considering how strong religion-state ties and the number of religious laws may negatively impact women's rights. I hope to analyze the effectiveness of

CEDAW by looking at how the level of commitment to the treaty impacts the realization of women's rights. I look at commitment by which level of action a state has taken for the treaty and the length of time since doing so. Women's rights can be defined and measured in various ways and scholars commonly address the shortcomings of the different measurements (Murdie 2014; Hill and Karim 2017; Cole 2012). Below, I address why I have selected religion and CEDAW as potential influences on the realization of women's rights and how I will define these rights.

2.1 Defining Women's Rights

In the majority of the studies on women's rights, the scholar must address how they are defining "women's rights" for the purpose of their research (Murdie 2014; Hill and Karim 2017; Cole 2012). Women's rights are challenging to operationalize because the concept has multiple dimensions and multiple ways of measuring each dimension. Due to this challenge, it is important that a study clearly defines "women's rights" and explains the method of measurement. While some scholars choose a single indicator, such as fertility rates, to represent women's rights overall, many scholars choose to measure and define women's rights by looking at the realization of rights in law and practice. Moreover, by separating them into the dimensions of political, economic, and social rights, scholars allow for the possibility that each dimension of rights could be affected by different societal factors (Sweeney 2014; Englehart and Miller 2014; Murdie 2014, Cole 2012).

The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project (CIRI) is commonly used to measure the political, economic, and social rights (Sweeney 2014; Englehart and Miller 2014; Cole 2012; Murdie 2014). The CIRI measurement aims to capture whether a government

respects international laws that prohibit the discrimination against women in law and practice for each dimension (Murdie 2014). However, a typical concern in studying women's rights is the possibility that by combining factors of law and practice into a single category, one limits the nuanced understanding of what factors impact women's rights (Cherif 2010; Englehart and Miller 2014). Therefore, the restructuring of the measure of women's rights to separate indicators in the categories of law and practice has been called for in addition to the dimensions of political, economic, and social. The purpose of this restructuring is to see if different factors affect laws and practices within the same dimension of women's rights (Cherif 2010). Women may have certain rights protected and guaranteed by law, but they do not enjoy these rights in practice. For example, a state may appear to have improved political rights for women by incorporating the right to vote into the constitution but have made no progress on including the actual participation or representation of women in politics. Given this scenario, it cannot be determined if a woman's rights are truly guaranteed.

An alternative method of measurement has been suggested by Hill and Karim (2017) to restructure the measure of women's rights into three main categories: women's inclusion, women's institutional rights, and women's vulnerability and risk. The subgroups would be: political inclusion, economic inclusion, social inclusion, political institutional rights, economic institutional rights, social institutional rights, vulnerability in health, vulnerability in security, and economic vulnerability (Hill and Karim 2017). This categorization focuses firstly on the categories of laws and practices, and secondly on the dimensions of political, economic, and social rights. Hill and Karim (2017) argue that organizing the dimensions of rights into these groups addresses the problem of combining rights that are distinct and influenced by different societal factors. Women's inclusion captures the level to which women are represented in the

public sphere, whereas women's institutional rights capture the government's commitment to women's rights through the legal frameworks and structure in place to protect women. The institutional rights look at whether the rights are legally protected, not whether they are enforced in practice. Women's vulnerability and risk cover whether women are harmed physically or emotionally by individuals, groups, or structural conditions of the state (Hill and Karim 2017).

2.1.1 Political

The concept of political rights covers the laws and practices related to women participating in the political activity of society. Political rights include measuring what types of laws exist to protect women participating in politics and measuring how many women are involved in politics. Included in the measurement of political inclusion of women in the Hill and Karim (2017) model is percentage of women who are in the judiciary, in national parliaments, and who hold seats in the central banks. Institutional rights include the legal frameworks in place, such as laws allowing women to vote and run for office and quotas for women to participate in political parties (Hill and Karim 2017). The benefits of measuring political rights using these two categories are that political rights are separated into the distinct categories of laws and practice and different approaches are required for changing laws and not for changing government practices. Therefore, using these two measures makes it easier for governments to plan effectively how to improve women's rights. CIRI measures the percentage of women who are actually present in the political sphere and the legal frameworks protecting the political rights of women would all be included within the group of political rights. Indicators included in the CIRI political rights include the right to vote, run for political office, hold elected and appointed positions, and join political parties, and the number of women who are involved in these

activities (CIRI Master Coding Guide). This approach is beneficial because the measure paints a clear picture of the overall status of women's rights in relation to politics but is limiting in that it does not distinguish between law and practices.

2.1.2 Economic

The concept of economic rights relates to the financial freedoms of women, their roles in the job market, and the laws protecting equality within the job market. Hill and Karim (2017) look at economics as economic inclusion, economic institutional rights, and economic vulnerability. Within economic inclusion, they measure the percentage of women in various roles within the labor force such as the number of women in manager positions. Economic institutional laws measure the presence and number of laws regarding maternity leave, inheritance rights, and whether women are allowed to pursue trades. Economic vulnerability looks at women's unemployment rates and monthly wages as compared to men. CIRI measures economic rights by looking at laws and practices. The indicators include looking at equal pay, free choice of profession, equality in hiring, job security, the right to work in the military and police force (CIRI Master Coding Guide).

2.1.3 Social

Social rights focus on the security and freedoms of women within the public and personal sphere and cover a wide range of rights. Hill and Karim (2017) measure it by looking at the vulnerability in health and the vulnerability in security. Vulnerability in health covers fertility rates, age of death, ratio of men to women, infant mortality, life expectancy, and risk factors. Vulnerability in security relates to physical safety from rape, murder, infanticide, domestic

violence, trafficking, and other violence (Hill and Karim 2017). CIRI measures social rights by looking at laws protecting these rights and government practices regarding these rights. These include the right to equal inheritance, travel abroad, initiate divorce, receive an education, and participate in community activities (CIRI Master Coding Guide). Social rights cover the largest range of indicators, which means that the nuanced understanding is especially important because there is a high possibility that these indicators are affected by different factors.

2.2 The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

CEDAW was developed due to the sentiment that previous international human rights treaties were not comprehensive enough in regard to women's rights (Heyns and Viljoen 2001; UN Women, Accessed Mar 20, 2018). It has been described as the 'International Bill of Rights for Women' as it is the only international treaty to focus exclusively on women's rights (Merry 2005). As the most comprehensive international treaty protecting women's rights that has been signed by the majority of countries, CEDAW has received a considerable amount of scholarly attention (Simmons 2009; O'hare 1999; Murdie 2014; Merry 2003; Keith 1999; Hathaway 2002). One reason for the extensive scholarship is that despite the number of states that have formally committed to CEDAW, there is a much smaller number that have seen the treaty implemented into state practices and policies (Cole 2012). My study will focus solely on CEDAW instead of other treaties focused on women's rights to determine whether the level of commitment to the specific treaty impacts the realization of women's rights (Hill 2010).

A higher level of commitment to CEDAW promotes the realization of women's rights because there are greater enforcement mechanisms attached to higher levels of commitment. A greater length of time since committing to CEDAW also positively impacts its effectiveness

because some rights take longer to improve. Further, some changes can be indirect results of ratifying the treaty, which is why ratifying the treaty, even though not the highest level of commitment, may still positively impact women's rights. Within this section, I explain the different levels of commitment to CEDAW, the requirements of each level, and how previous scholars have measured commitment to CEDAW.

2.2.1 Level of Commitment to CEDAW

A state has several actions it can take to commit itself to the CEDAW treaty. A state can sign, which is an expression of a willingness to work with the treaty process and make good faith efforts to refrain from acts that would violate the treaty (The Dag Hammarskjöld Library Online, Accessed Mar 20, 2018). A state can ratify, which means the state is bound to the treaty and is supposed to implement the treaty and legislation on the domestic level (The Dag Hammarskjöld Library Online, Accessed Mar 20, 2018). The act of accession, which is legally equivalent to ratification, is when a state becomes party to a treaty that has already been signed by other states (The Dag Hammarskjöld Library Online, Accessed Mar 20, 2018). A state can sign the Optional Protocol, which means that the state agrees to fulfill the mandate of the Optional Protocol and grant the CEDAW committee more power to enforce the treaty (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner Online, Accessed Mar 20, 2018).

The scale of committing to CEDAW is ordinal. Ratification is a stronger commitment than signing. Some states signed and ratified while others have only ratified, but both are held to the same standard. When a state signs the Optional Protocol, it is committing to a higher level than a state that has only ratified. Previous studies have measured commitment to CEDAW in several ways. One method is to use a dummy variable to measure whether or not a state has

signed the treaty, ratified it, or signed the Optional Protocol (Keith 1999; Cole 2012; Englehart and Miller 2014; Murdie 2014). The shortcoming of this practice is that a state that ratified in 1981 has the same score now as they did then. To overcome this issue, another way to measure commitment to CEDAW is by recording the number of years since a country has signed the treaty, ratified it, or signed the Optional Protocol (Hathaway 2002; Cole 2012). This method gives greater weight the longer a state has been a party to the treaty to account for the time it takes for long term changes in behavior to be present. I have included both methods of measurement within my research model.

2.2.2 Enforcement Mechanisms of CEDAW

The enforcement mechanisms of international human rights treaties are important to ensure that the rights included in international law are respected as binding international standards (Merry 2005). When a state signs or ratifies CEDAW, the CEDAW committee has insufficient methods of enforcement at its disposal. The Committee creates periodic reports (every four years) that are meant to create constructive dialogue around the improvements, concerns, and recommendations that the committee has regarding the state's commitment to human rights (O'Hare 1999; Ross 2008). These reports function as the primary implementation mechanism, which is problematic because it depends on the cooperation of states to accurately submit their reports knowing that there is no punishment for not meeting treaty obligations (O'Hare 1999). Many states may ratify the treaty as a form of international diplomacy and to create the image of supporting human rights instead of as an actual commitment to the rights (Heyns and Viljoen 2001). As a result, ratification may not impact the reality of women's rights as significantly and positively as one would expect in theory.

Following the creation of the original CEDAW treaty, the CEDAW Committee acknowledged the problem of lacking international enforcement mechanisms to ensure the effective implementation of the treaty. As a result, throughout several conferences and meetings in the 1990's, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol of CEDAW in 1999 that requires states to recognize the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against women-- the group that monitors a state's compliance with the treaty and drafts the aforementioned reports (UN Women, Accessed Mar 20, 2018). This procedure expanded the ability of the CEDAW Committee to hold states accountable to the treaty that they had agreed to uphold. The implementation of this procedure raised the status of CEDAW to that of other human rights treaties that have communications procedures that increase the ability of the committee to enforce the treaty (UN Women, Accessed Mar 20, 2018). After the introduction of the Optional Protocol, the Committee called on all state parties to sign this new instrument protecting women's rights (UN Women, Accessed Mar 20, 2018). To date, 80 states have signed the Optional Protocol. The higher level of commitment to the Protocol provides clarification and guidance on CEDAW and strengthens the resources for enforcement, which in turn empowers individuals to bring forward concerns. The increased powers of the CEDAW Committee in states that signed the Optional Protocol could explain why women's rights have been improved more in these states than in states that have only signed or ratified the original treaty.

2.2.3 The Influence of Societal Factors on Domestic Implementation of CEDAW

A state's level of compliance depends on the will and commitment of various actors, primarily the national government, within the state to implement the treaty through legislative or policy reforms on the domestic level (Heyns and Viljoen 2001; Hill 2010; Merry 2005).

Domestic level structures in which change should occur include the legislative branch, military, interest groups, judiciary, and the executive branch (Hill 2010). The ratification of CEDAW should lead to the incorporation of treaty principles in a domestic legal system, which then influence the pace of progress in countries and affect the variation in the improvement of women's rights (Englehart and Miller 2014). Several studies have looked at whether an international treaty will produce a direct observable impact on the state party's actual behavior (Keith 1999; Heyns and Viljoen 2001). These studies measured the success of the treaties by the extent to which states adopted, incorporated, and transformed domestic legislation, policy, and the constitution to reflect the intentions of the treaty (Heyns and Viljoen 2001). Knowing how international treaties influence the domestic practices of states is important for understanding what improvements can be attributed to the ratification of CEDAW (Englehart and Miller 2014; Cherif 2010; Heyns and Viljoen 2001). Even when states implement certain aspects of CEDAW in a minimal capacity, the implementation has equal potential for being a catalyst for change. For example, the CEDAW Committee's General Recommendation No. 6 states that parties should establish national machinery "at a high level of government" to advise government, to monitor women's rights, and to advance new policies (Englehart and Miller 2014). Such machinery can be achieved through minimal use of resources, such as providing an office or a women's bureau, and benefits the state by making it appear cooperative (Englehart and Miller 2014). However, once the machinery is in place, it has the potential to expand and truly have an impact.

2.3.4 The Effects of CEDAW Over Time on the Institutionalization of International Norms

CEDAW sets cultural and international standards, norms and guidelines, which may have the effect of transforming the domestic jurisprudence and practice in countries that ratify the

treaty (Campbell and Swenson 2016; Cherif 2010; Heyns and Viljoen 2001; Merry 2005). The establishment of domestic institutions and legal reform to institutionalize and enforce international norms suggests the CEDAW had an impact on the state (Cherif 2010; Heyns and Viljoen 2001). When a treaty norm has been made a part of the general culture of the individual country, whether through media coverage or educational programs, it suggests that the state is turning the human rights norms into domestic norms (Cherif 2010; Heyns and Viljoen 2001). The ratification of the treaty sets in motion societal dynamics that lead to improvements in women's rights (Englehart and Miller 2014). Research has supported the belief that when a state adheres to CEDAW, it is more likely to replace or modify their discriminatory religious laws and practices than states that are not party to the treaty (Englehart and Miller 2014). For example, Bangladesh and Malaysia both initially signed CEDAW with reservations based on the religious practices of their countries. However, they withdrew their reservations because they did not want it on record that they upheld Islamic laws at the expense of CEDAW (Cole 2012, Mayer 1999). Cherif (2010) called for a systematic evaluation of what types of norm building endeavors within states provide an effective path to reform so that other states can mirror the endeavors and work to develop the norms of women's rights within their countries. Since these changes may not be immediate, I look at the time since ratification to see if being party longer increases the influence of CEDAW on the realization of women's rights.

2.3.5 CEDAW Impact on Women's Rights

Even though CEDAW promotes respect for women's rights, its noble task of mandating changes and expanding women's rights in the public sphere, private sphere, and in the attitudes of individuals, means that states have to utilize numerous methods of change and enforcement to

make the expansion of women's rights present (Cole 2012; Englehart and Miller 2014). CEDAW's attempts to hold states accountable for discrimination from the state level all the way to the individual level suggests an extensive range of rights being protected. Due to the broad range of rights being protected, it makes sense that improvements happen for certain rights and not others after the ratification of CEDAW. Previous studies have found that CEDAW does not affect the various dimensions of women's political, economic, and social rights uniformly (Hafner-Burton, Leveck, and Victor 2016; Campbell and Swenson 2016). Cole (2012), Hill (2010), and Englehart and Miller (2014) all found that CEDAW had the strongest, statistically significant impact on women's political rights and no statistically significant effect on economic rights. Regarding social rights, the studies disagreed. Cole (2012) found CEDAW to have a partially negative effect; Hill (2010) found no statistically significant effect; and Englehart and Miller (2014) found a positive significant effect on social rights. Further research into how the knowledge that political, economic, and social rights are affected differently by the ratification of CEDAW could be utilized by states to adjust their approaches for improving women's rights.

2.3 Religion

Religion is an illuminating variable to be studied for its effects on women's rights at all levels of society since its influence is seen from the level of the individual all the way to the level of the state. Important theories about the institutional relationship between religion, the state, and its effect on women's rights are lacking (Sweeney 2008). The lack of study on this topic is partially due to the complications of conducting large-scale cross-cultural studies of religion. Since religion varies based on the individual cultural practices of each state, results pertaining to the effects of religion on women's rights will also be influenced by the regional and cultural

belief systems, which makes it difficult to collect generalizable conclusive results (Abdalla 2000; Al-Hibri 2000). While scholars agree that religion is a multidimensional concept, they continue to use different ineffective scales or methods to measure it (Flannelly, Jankowski, and Flannelly 2014; Cornwall 1986; Hackett 2014; Hodge 2017).

I have chosen to look at religion as it relates to and influences women's rights on the state level. Religion can be connected to the state by having political authority, being institutionalized, and being codified into legislation. Through these forms, religion influences laws regarding women's rights and how women experience rights in practice. To determine the influence of religion on the state, I will look specifically at the impact of a strong relationship between religion and the state. I analyze how a strong religion-state ties and the number of religious laws influence women's rights. By utilizing these measures of religion, I am able to observe the influence religion has on institutions and how that affects women. By isolating strong religion-state ties and the number of religious laws, I expect to be able to draw a more direct relationship between religion and women's rights. I will contribute to the study of religion on women's rights by establishing the significance of religion across the dimensions of women's rights. I expect my research to support the previous literature that establishes a negative relationship between state religion and women's rights, but I believe that the more specific measures I am using will have a clearer theoretical and practical foundation because they allow for a more precise measurement of dimensions that are more readily comparable.

2.3.1 Strong Religion-State Ties

When religion is given political authority within a government and state to control and set societal norms and practices, women's rights are directly impacted (Fox and Sandler 2003;

Assouad and Parboteeah 2017). Religion influences the decisions, policy, and practices of the state based on the beliefs, practices, and doctrines of each specific religion. States utilize religion to determine the rights encompassed and enforced rather than using international treaties, such as CEDAW to guide the rights afforded to women. Therefore, when religion is given the political authority to set the norms and practices through the highly structured institution of the government, it is understandable why a connection between religion and its impact on rights, specifically women's, has been drawn (Assouad and Parboteeah 2017).

The dominant religion in states with an official state religion tends to have a substantial status and influence over government policy, the judicial system, and the incorporation of religious law into state law (Sweeney 2008). Cole (2012) found the effects of CEDAW to be most influential in countries without an official state religion and Sweeney (2014) found that states with secular governments better advance women's political, social, and economic rights. However, only looking at whether a state has an official/established state religion to determine the impact of CEDAW is not a sufficient measurement of the influence a state religion has on the government due to the wide diversity of states with official religions (Fox Religion and State dataset). For example, Saudi Arabia, Greece, and the UK are all examples of states with official religions, but the relationships between religion and state within each of these countries varies substantially (Fox Religion and State dataset). In some of these states, the official religion is merely a vestige of history when the religion of each country greatly influenced its policy, alliances, and actions. However, in other states, the official religion still influences these aspects of state. On one hand, a state may have an official state religion, but they may also have a more accommodating, benevolent, or neutral relationship with that religion (Fox and Sandler 2003). On the other hand, the official state religion within a state may be mandatory for all members of

the state or hold substantial control over the institutions within the state (Fox and Sandler 2003). Instead of looking at whether a country has an official state religion, I will look at the relationship between religion and the state. This measurement provides a better idea of how religion influences the state because it focuses on how religion dictates the policy and actions of the state, therefore, illustrating whether or not women's rights fares worse in states with a close relationship to religion.

2.3.2 Number of Religious Laws

Religion influences women's rights on the institutional level through the legislation in a state. In some states, there are religious laws, traditions, and biases that are codified into state legislation (Fox and Sandler 2003). The legislation covers a variety of practices and beliefs, including ones that affect women's rights. Therefore, specific practices, whose justification comes from a religious base instead of from an international human rights treaty, are practiced and supported (Abdalla 2000; Coccia 2014). It is essential to look at the relationship between the government and the dominant religion to see the extent to which religious laws and beliefs influence legislation (Fox and Sandler 2003). When a society allows religion to have a strong influence on policy creation, a reduction in the protection of women's rights results (Assouad and Parboteeah 2017; Sweeney 2014). Furthermore, the freedom of religion for members of these states is limited since the religious identities and beliefs of the population may not be congruent with the religious practices supported and enforced by the state (Hackett 2014, Abdalla 2000). It is difficult to change the realization of women's rights in practice when there are official laws limiting these rights. When certain restrictions on women's rights are codified into legislation, it reaffirms to the general population that these restrictions are right and justified.

In order to change the practices, it is imperative that the laws are changed to reflect a commitment to women's rights. Women have no avenue to pursue their rights if their rights are not even recognized by the state.

2.3.4 The Conceptualization of Religion

A critical aspect in the discussion of religion is how to conceptualize it since it can manifest in personal, public, social, institutionalized, and formalized ways (Cornwall et al 1986; Hodge 2017; Fox and Sandler 2003). Many scholars conceptualize religion by its various dimensions such as belief, commitment, or behavior (Abdalla 2000; Al-Hibri 2000; Hackett 2014; Flannelly, Jankowski, and Flannelly 2014; Hodge 2017). They look at these dimensions through the beliefs and practices of the population. Cornwall (1986) claims that the contradiction and variety in the results of studies on religion occur because scholars define and measure the relevant dimensions of religion differently and apply the measures to populations that practice religion differently.

Similar to women's rights, studies on religion will utilize a single measure of religion, such as religious identity, to measure its impact (Hackett 2014). However, Hackett (2014) acknowledged that the "variation in how religious identity is measured often produces divergent claims about religious populations". Others, including Assouad and Parboteeah, Flannelly and Hodge, use typologies that range from five to nine dimensions (Assouad and Parboteeah; Flannelly, Jankowski, and Flannelly 2014; Hodge 2017). Similarities within their scales include measuring ideological beliefs, experiences, practices, commitment, and involvement (Assouad and Parboteeah; Flannelly, Jankowski, and Flannelly 2014; Hodge 2017).

While some scholars choose to look at the influences of specific religions, such as Islam and Christianity, I will not be doing so in this paper. Religions have been intermixed with a variety of traditional cultural practices, values, and attitudes that are representative of the area they are practiced within and not of the religion itself (Abdalla 2000). Therefore, studying a specific religion from a global sample could lead to generalizations about certain religions that are inaccurate due to the variety of practices in the different areas of the world. Furthermore, several scholars agree that it is not the type of religion that influences women's rights but the extent to which the religion is connected to the state (Sweeney 2014; Cole 2012).

3. Statements of Hypotheses

Based on the literature and theory discussed, I have constructed my theoretical argument regarding the influence of religion and CEDAW on women's rights. I have developed multiple hypotheses for women's rights dependent on the aspect of religion and level of commitment to CEDAW. In the following sections, I introduce the hypotheses that follow from the religion, CEDAW, and women's rights explanations, operationalize my variables, explain my research method, and describe the data used to analyze the hypotheses. I present the empirical tests that examine how CEDAW and religion influence women's rights.

H₁ States with strong religion-state ties are less likely to improve respect for women's rights than states with weak religion-state ties.

H₂ States that have implemented religious laws are less likely to improve respect for women's rights than states without religious laws.

H₃ The longer the period of time since a state has signed CEDAW, ratified CEDAW, or signed the Optional Protocol of CEDAW, the more likely they are to have improved women's rights than states that have not.

H₄ States in which there are strong religion-state ties and who have committed to CEDAW will be slower to improve respect for women's rights than in states with weak religion-state ties.

H₅ States in which there are religious laws and who have committed to CEDAW will be slower to improve respect for women's rights than states without religious laws.

4. Research Design: Variables and Methods

In this section, I discuss the measures and methods used in my analysis. To test the theoretical claims in the preceding section, I utilize a cross-sectional, time-series design for assessing women's rights and employ control variables (Ross 2009; Murdie 2014, Englehart and Miller 2014; Sweeney 2008; Hathaway 2002, Hill 2010). The unit of analysis is the country-year. My data analysis is for the period of 1981 to 2012 and includes all countries with available data. The coverage of years and countries varied based on the availability of data on women's rights and the availability of religion data. Unfortunately, data is not always available for all the years covered in the study (Murdie 2014). For women's rights data, the Hill and Karim data covers 1995-2012, the political empowerment index (Vdem Gender) data covers 170 countries from 1990-2012, and the CIRI data covers 202 countries from 1981-2011, except for the social rights measure which was discontinued in 2006. The religion dataset covers 1990-2008. The CEDAW data is available from 1981 onward for signing or ratifying the original treaty and the data for signing the Optional Protocol is available since 1999, when it was created. I decided to include all the years available for the different analyses, even if this meant that some analyses

had greater coverage than others. This created the most comprehensive analysis for each test. Refer to *Appendix A* for the complete summary statistics for each variable. This section provides a detailed account of the operationalization of the dependent, independent, and control variables, and of the methodological approach.

4.1 Dependent Variables- Sets of Women's Rights Measures

This study uses the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) gender measurements for political, economic, and social rights, the political empowerment index (Vdem-Gender), and the political inclusion measurement from the Hill and Karim (2017) dataset to measure women's rights. Including the range of measures allows me to compare any variety in the effects of religion and commitment to CEDAW on women's rights. By measuring the political rights of women using three different measures, I can determine whether the effects of religion and CEDAW on these rights could be attributed to the measurement choice.

4.1.1 Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI)

The CIRI dataset on women's rights is collected by the US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and is available from 1981-2011 for political and economic rights and 1981-2006 for social rights, covering 177 countries. CIRI consistently covers a large number of countries over an extended period and has the added benefit of disaggregation, which allows me to look at and compare the effects of CEDAW and religion on women's political, economic, and social rights. All of these categories are measured by looking at the laws pertaining to the type of rights, how effectively the government enforces these rights, and how government practices affect women (CIRI Master Coding Guide). A state scores between one

and three, where a one represents some rights under the law and a moderate level of societal discrimination, and a three represents when all or most of women's rights are guaranteed under the law, and the "government effectively enforces these laws in practice" (CIRI Master Coding Guide). A summary of the indicators included in the CIRI measures of political, economic, and social rights are located in *Appendix B*.

4.1.2 *The Political Empowerment Index (V-dem Gender)*

The political empowerment index (V-dem Gender) covers over 170 countries from 1900-2012 and looks at women's civil liberties, civil society participation, and political participation (Sundström, Paxton, Wang and Lindberg 2015). This measure was created to overcome the issues with existing women's rights measures such as combining disparate dimensions and a lack of spatial and temporal coverage (Sundström, Paxton, Wang and Lindberg 2015). The index was created using ordinal scales for dozens of indicators (Sundström, Paxton, Wang and Lindberg 2015). Women's political empowerment is defined as "a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making" (Sundström, Paxton, Wang and Lindberg 2015, page 4). Choice focuses on the ability of individuals to make choices over areas of their lives within the domestic life and formal realm. Agency focuses on whether women are significant actors in the "process of change" through influencing the political agenda and participating in the public sphere (Sundström, Paxton, Wang and Lindberg 2015). Participation covers whether women are present in the political arena in sufficient numbers to engage in decision-making that influences their rights. A summary of the indicators included in the Vdem-Gender measures of political, economic, and social rights are located in *Appendix C*.

4.1.3 *Hill and Karim (political inclusion)*

The women's rights categories created by Hill and Karim (2017) organize indicators into women's inclusion in the public sphere, institutional rights and protections, and vulnerability to harm and discrimination. Hill and Karim collected their data from the Clinton Foundation's "No Ceilings: The Full Participation Project", which includes around 900 indicators from various datasets beginning in 1995 and going until 2015 (Hill and Karim 2017). I will be looking at the measure for political inclusion, which captures how many women are physically present in the world of politics, economics, law, security, medicine, and any other field that is historically dominated by men (Hill and Karim 2017). A summary of the indicators included in the Hill and Karim political inclusion measures of political, economic, and social rights are located in *Appendix D*.

4.2 Independent Variables- CEDAW and Religion

4.2.1 *Level of Commitment to CEDAW*

To measure whether a state has signed CEDAW, ratified CEDAW, or signed the Optional Protocol, I used the States Parties list from the UN Women website (un.org, accessed Oct 20, 2017). The list includes the date they signed, and the date they either ratified, acceded, or succeeded. This data is cumulative, where when a state has ratified the treaty, even if it did not sign the treaty, it is committing to a higher level that includes the same requirements as if it had been signed. When a state signs the Optional Protocol, it means that the state has either signed or ratified the original CEDAW treaty. However, there are currently no states that have signed the original CEDAW treaty and the Optional Protocol but have not ratified the original treaty (un.org, accessed Oct 20, 2017). From this information, I was able to make a dataset to measure firstly, whether a state has signed CEDAW, ratified CEDAW, or signed the Optional Protocol,

and secondly, the number of years since they had done so. This dataset began in 1981, the first year states could sign the treaty, and ended in 2017 when I accessed the information on the website.

Since I am looking at commitment to CEDAW as an ordinal scale, a possible way to measure it would be by looking at the highest level of commitment a state has adopted at each point in time. Instead, I used dummy variables to record whether a state had signed the treaty, ratified the treaty, or signed the Optional Protocol. I decided to use this type of measurement because it simplifies evaluating the effect each additional year since committing to the treaty has on women's rights. I chose to measure the number of years since committing to CEDAW because the theory suggests that some rights may take longer to be realized. Furthermore, by using a dummy variable for the CEDAW commitment level, the interaction between commitment to CEDAW and strong religion state ties is easier to observe.

4.2.2 Religion

It is difficult to study a complex concept like religion in a project with such a large sample since religion can vary drastically between countries and within countries. Therefore, it is important to use a variable that measures religion in a way that is generalizable enough to cover all different religious beliefs and states (Fox and Sandler 2003). Fox and Sanders (2003) worked to develop more accurate and useful indicators to measure religion on a state level so that more accurate data on religion could be analyzed in quantitative cross-sectional studies (Fox and Sandler 2003). Their dataset includes official religion, official government involvement in religions, official restrictions, measures of religious discrimination against minority religions, and religious legislation (Fox and Sandler 2003). Depending on what aspects of government they

cover, I expect some measures to have an effect on women's rights while others will not. After running initial tests, the measures of official government involvement in religions and religious legislation had the strongest measurable impact on women's rights. Official government involvement in religions measures the formal relationship between religion and the state by categorizing them into fourteen different options that range from hostility to accommodation to supportive. I use this variable to represent strong religion-state ties. The religious legislation variable refers to government laws and policies that legislate and support aspects of religion, including religious precepts, funding religion, and providing official powers and influence on religious institutions (Fox and Sandler 2003). I operationalize religious legislation as number of religious laws in my analysis. I selected strong religion-state ties and number of religious laws because in addition to having the strongest theoretical support, initial tests were able to draw much more precise results between these aspects of religion and women's rights.

These indicators are drawn from Fox's Religion and State Project, which coded "several aspects of government activities with regard to religion that are encompassed by the concepts of separation of religion and state and government involvement in religion" to look at the relationship between the religion and state over time (Fox and Sandler 2003). For each state, the coder prepared a report based on "human rights reports, academic resources, as well as news media sources" from which they prepared a code-sheet for the state (Fox and Sandler 2003). This dataset covers 177 states yearly from 1990 to 2008.

4.3 Control Variables

To isolate the impact of CEDAW and religion, I must control for other things that influence women's rights. Since women's rights cover political, economic, and social realms, there are

many different factors that affect them. Some studies have claimed that any positive effects treaties have on the observance of human rights are conditional on state-level characteristics, such as democracy, that promote human rights practices regardless of the treaty (Hill 2010). In order to account for the possibility that the practices of states regarding women's rights appear altered by CEDAW and religion due to other societal factors, my model includes several control variables. I have selected the variables based on their potential to affect women's rights within my sample. The control variables included in my sample are: *population size*, *level of state economic development*, *level of democracy*, *civil and international war*, and *presence of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs)*. I collected data for the majority of these variables from Quality of Government (QOG) database, and I have indicated next to the variable whether the data came from another source.

4.3.1 *Population Size*

The *population size* of a state may strain the national resources needed to ensure and protect women's rights and may cause the government to utilize repression to maintain control (Keith 1999; Sweeney 2008; Hill 2010). I control for *population size* because states with larger populations are associated with higher women's rights abuses and repression (Hill 2010; Englehart and Miller 2014; Hathaway 2002; Murdie 2014).

4.3.2 *The Level of State Economic Development*

The *level of state economic development* influences women's rights for several reasons (Sweeney 2008; Murdie 2014; Hill 2010; Ross 2008; Keith 1999). States with higher levels of economic development may have more capacity and resources to provide for women's rights due

to increased stability (Sweeney 2008). Economic scarcity tends to exacerbate sociopolitical tensions and increase the probability of governments using repressive measures to maintain order (Keith 1999). Economic prosperity and higher levels of development tend to provide women more economic and social opportunities that enable them to improve their autonomy, economic freedom, and socio-economic empowerment (Cole 2012; Hathaway 2002; Sweeney 2008; Englehart and Miller 2014; Murdie 2014; Ross 2008). The entry of women into the labor force enables them to share ideas and mobilize to overcome collective action problems, which helps eradicate gender-based discrimination (Ross 2008; Murdie 2014). When women have independent sources of income, they tend to have more influence within their families (Ross 2008). The entry of women into the labor force is also connected to a boost in female political influence (Ross 2008).

I measure *level of economic state development* using *log wealth* from the Quality of Government dataset. I will supplement the data from the QOG dataset with data from the Global Health Data Exchange, which created the Socio-demographic Index (SDI). SDI is a “summary measure of a geography's socio-demographic development based on average income per person, educational attainment, and total fertility rate” where zero represents the “lowest income per capita, lowest educational attainment, and highest TFR observed across all GBD geographies from 1970 to 2016”, and one represents the “highest income per capita, highest educational attainment, and lowest TFR” (Global Health Exchange Dataset).

4.3.3 *Level of Democracy*

The *level of democracy* in a state is directly proportionate to the level of respect for women's rights (Cherif 2010; Hill 2010; Cole 2012; Keith 1999; Hathaway 2002; Murdie 2014).

Democracies allow citizens to utilize procedures and institutions in place to prevent and correct abuse from the state (Murdie 2014). Hathaway (2002) found that democracies are more likely than other state regime types to comply with the human rights treaties they have ratified and attributes this finding to the mobilization of the public and the strength of legal institutions. Cherif (2010) found that democracies have more equitable citizen rights. CEDAW has the strongest influence in democracies, which some attribute to a democratic government being more responsive to its citizens and willing to compromise on rights and issues (Cole 2012; Murdie 2014). I control for *level of democracy* because higher levels of democracy and democratic regimes are positive predictors of human rights conditions and better follow women's rights treaties (Cole 2012; Hill 2010; Englehart and Miller 2014; Sweeney 2008).

4.3.4 *Civil Conflict and International Conflict*

I control for *civil and international conflict* because these situations exert a negative influence on human rights, specifically women's rights, and severely limit the potential impact of treaties (Heyns and Viljoen 2001; Keith 1999; Sweeney 2008; Murdie 2014). In highly volatile and insecure environments, there are more human rights abuses, particularly against women (Englehart and Miller 2014; Kandiyoti 2007). Conflict exposes women to various forms of direct violence and reinforces patriarchal traditions and practices (Sweeney 2008).

Many scholars control for *civil and international war* in their studies of women's rights because governments, when faced with threats to their power, often resort to political repression as a tool for maintaining domestic order (Hathaway 2002; Keith 1999). In environments of conflict and unrest, governments struggle with enforcing even the basic protections, let alone the implementation of new policies expanding the rights of women (Mayer 1999; Campbell and

Swenson 2016; Kandiyoti 2007). Therefore, states experiencing active conflict are less likely to implement CEDAW and states that have already ratified the treaty are prevented from making any real changes or improvements when involved in the conflict (Hill 2010; Cole 2012; Kandiyoti 2007).

To measure *civil conflict and international conflict*, I use the Quality of Government Institute's standard time-series dataset (Quality of Government Institute's dataset). This data includes country-year-level data on conflict from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) armed conflict data set and covers all conflicts from 1946 to the present.

4.3.5 *Presence Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)*

States with strong transnational networks, and national and international NGOs, have seen a greater realization of women's (Cherif 2010; Cole 2012; Hafner-Burton, Leveck, and Victor 2016; Keith 1999; Hill 2010). NGOs and CEDAW complement each other in the pursuit of women's rights because CEDAW sets the laws and standards that NGOs then mobilize to realize and protect (Hafner-Burton, Leveck, and Victor 2016). NGOs use the recommendations from the CEDAW committee to provide information and to pressure states to enforce the international norms (Hafner-Burton, Leveck, and Victor 2016). The activists use the reports to criticize and pressure countries that are not following the requirements to which they agreed, which has proven to be an effective and influential application of CEDAW (Hafner-Burton, Leveck, and Victor 2016). NGOs also employ techniques such as naming and shaming, educating governments, initiating and funding lawsuits, sharing information through research, writing reports, and compiling data about the causes of women's rights violations (Hafner-

Burton, Leveck, and Victor 2016; Merry 2005; Murdie 2014). Therefore, the presence of NGO's should impact the realization of women's rights. Women's rights groups are limited in states with strong religion-state ties, which suggests NGOs would have a harder time influencing the realization of rights in these states (Hafner-Burton, Leveck, and Victor 2016; Merry 2005; Murdie 2014).

Presence of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) needs to be controlled since its long-term strategies of public awareness and education have been associated with the expansion of women's rights (Cole 2012; Merry 2005). HF 2016). I use data from Women's International Non- Governmental Organizations, 1950-2013 collected by Hughes, Paxton, Quinsaat, and Reith (Hughes, Paxton, Quinsaat, and Reith 2017). The data covers country-level memberships for women's international nongovernmental organizations (WINGOs) for 160 countries every five years from 1950-2013.

I address the influence all of these explanations have on women's rights by controlling for their effects. This allows me to focus on the effects of religion and commitment to CEDAW on women's rights. However, I will analyze the results of these controls to see if their impact in my study is consistent with that of previous studies. There is a possibility of collinearity between strong religion-state ties and commitment to CEDAW. This collinearity could make the relationship between commitment to CEDAW and women's rights appear weaker than it actually is. I am controlling for democracy to overcome this issue, but I still may be missing the indirect effects by not including strong religion state ties as a control in my analyses on commitment to CEDAW. Refer to *Appendix E* for the tests on collinearity.

5. Methodological Approach

To create my dataset covering women's rights, religion, CEDAW, and all of my control variables, I merged and reformatted several datasets to ensure the most expansive and accurate coverage of my subjects. I began with the Quality of Government dataset, which consists of approximately 400 different variables collected from 75 different data sources. After trimming down the list of indicators to include all the ones relating to my study, I checked and compared any duplicate indicators and evaluated their sources to use the ones covering the longest timeframe and largest breadth of countries. I included Vdem Gender, CIRI measures, log wealth, and level of democracy from this dataset. I then merged the data on international and civil conflict from UCDP/PRIO dataset and recoded all the missing conflict data as a 0, which signifies no war was occurring. The dataset does not include unclear conflicts where key information, such as incompatibility, actors and intensity, is missing. However, the data from 1980 onward is more likely to be recorded and accurate so it is unlikely that a conflict would have been overlooked, so missing data most likely means that no war was occurring. I incorporated the data on presence of NGOs from the Hughes, Paxton, Quinsaat, and Reith dataset. I had to manually fix several countries that changed names between 1981 and 2012 so that the data would align properly for the entire time period of my study. I interpolated the measure, thereby replacing the placeholder measures with their corresponding values since the data is only recorded every five years in this dataset. I added the SDI data from the Global health data exchange, which covers 1970-2016. After running initial tests comparing SDI and log wealth and finding the results to be similar, I decided to only use *log wealth* in my final analysis. I chose *log wealth* because it follows the general practice in the current literature.

To measure women's rights, I utilized CIRI's disaggregated measures of political, economic, and social rights instead of their index of women's rights because I wanted to see if and how the types of rights were affected by religion and commitment to CEDAW. I included the Vdem Gender index of political empowerment, which covered all of the years in my study. By the time I conducted the analysis, I only had access to the political inclusion data from the Hill and Karim (2017) dataset. I merged this data with the rest of my dataset.

To measure commitment to CEDAW, I created dummy variables for whether they had 1) signed CEDAW, 2) ratified CEDAW, or 3) signed the Optional Protocol. Then, I created a variable that records the number of years since a state had 1) signed CEDAW, 2) ratified CEDAW, or 3) signed the Optional Protocol. I coded ascension to be included in the ratification measure because it is an equivalent level of commitment to ratifying. I collected this data from the UN website (un.org, accessed Oct 20, 2017).

After running initial tests looking at all of the religion variables from the Fox Religion and State dataset, I decided to only use the relationship between religion and the state and religious legislation. For the relationship between religion and the state, I had to recode the variable so that it would run better in the analysis. In the original measure from Fox, the official government involvement in religions is separated into fourteen distinct categories ranging from hostile to religion, neutral to religion, and strongly tied to religion. For my study, I wanted to only look at strong religion-state ties, so I included the three categories in the official government involvement in religion variable that represented a strong relationship between the state and religion. I merged these categories into a single category to represent strong religion-state ties. In my tests, a state either was part of this category or it was not.

After collecting the time-series cross-sectional data, I ran 21 different models to establish the relationship between religion and CEDAW on women's rights. For complete regression results, see *Appendix F*. I used the generalized estimating equation, which is beneficial for analyzing panel-data models due to its ability to handle multiple observations on the same experimental unit over time. In each Table, I include the five different measures of women's rights and all of my control variables. I began by looking at the number of religious laws, strong religion-state ties, and the different levels of commitment to CEDAW. I decided not to include signing CEDAW and the number of years since signing in my analysis because signing the treaty is the lowest level of commitment and holds a state to the lowest level of responsibilities. I utilized the years since ratifying CEDAW and years since signing the Optional Protocol instead of simply using the measure of whether a state has ratified or signed the Optional Protocol. It is expected that states will change current laws and practices as well as implement new ones to support women's rights after ratifying CEDAW and signing the Optional Protocol. However, these changes do not occur right when states ratify; it usually takes time for the effects of the ratifying to be seen. Therefore, I believe looking at how length of time since ratifying CEDAW and signing the Optional Protocol better represents a state's level of commitment and how this commitment influences women's rights.

After analyzing the effects of religion and CEDAW on women's rights, I wanted to see how the concepts interact and if those interactions change their influence on women's rights. This interaction is important to look at because there are approximately fifteen countries that have strong religion-state ties and that have also ratified CEDAW. Looking at this interaction would show how religion influences the effectiveness of CEDAW in certain states. I created a measurement looking at the effects of the number of years since signing CEDAW, ratifying

CEDAW, and signing the Optional Protocol in states with strong religion-state ties. I excluded signing CEDAW for the same reasons as previously stated. Since most states that have signed have also ratified, this did not significantly influence my sample size. In this model, I did not include years since signing the Optional Protocol in states with strong religion-state ties because there was not a single state in my study that had strong religion-state ties and had signed the Optional Protocol. This reveals that states with strong religion-state ties are more unlikely to sign the Optional Protocol than states with weak religion-state ties. My dataset includes whether a state has ratified CEDAW or signed the Optional Protocol as separate measures, so I can look at only ratification without concern for whether a state has signed the Optional Protocol impacting the results. While this is interesting, it does not require further analysis within my study. I made a similar measure looking at the interaction between the number of religious laws and the years since ratifying CEDAW. Lastly, I wanted to test my measures of religion against another measure of religion to compare the results. I decided to use Muslim percentage of the population since it is the religion most discussed as having a negative impact on women's rights and it is the dominant religion of many of the states that have strong religion-state ties. My variable for Muslim percentage of the population came from the Quality of Government dataset.

6. Results and Discussion

The following section includes the significant results from my cross-sectional regressions. I begin by addressing my general findings before detailing the analysis for each Table. In the discussion of Table 1, I provide a brief analysis of the control variables. Regarding religion, my findings indicate that strong religion-state ties and a number of religious laws significantly and negatively influence women's rights, even when other key factors are

controlled. Regarding commitment to CEDAW, my results indicate that a higher commitment to CEDAW and a greater number of years since committing to it has a positive effect on women's rights. Additionally, the results indicate a more positive and significant outcome from signing the Optional Protocol than ratifying the original treaty.

My analyses of the effects strong religion-state ties and number of religious laws have on women's rights yield statistically significant and substantive results. The analyses provide quantitative data regarding the institutional relationship between religion, the state, and their effect on women's rights. The results show how religion negatively influences women's rights when it is codified into legislation and institutionalized. They also pinpoint the significant impact of religion across the different dimensions of women's rights. Regarding the CIRI political, economic, and social rights, both measures of religion impact social rights the most, followed by political, and then economic rights. My research establishes a negative relationship between state religion and women's rights.

My analyses on the effects of committing to CEDAW indicate that a higher level of commitment is associated with a more statistically significant and positive impact on women's rights. The level of commitment impacted the dimensions of women's rights differently. CIRI political rights were most impacted by signing the Optional Protocol. The results indicated a negative and statistically significant effect from signing the Optional Protocol of CEDAW on CIRI economic rights, whereas the data of other scholars found no statistically significant effect of CEDAW on CIRI economic rights. This was one of the most surprising results in the study. Regarding CIRI social rights, my results were insignificant.

For each Table, I discuss the impact of my independent variables on the five different measures of women's rights: Hill and Karim political inclusion, Vdem Gender (political

empowerment index), CIRI economic rights, CIRI political rights, and CIRI social rights. The scale for Hill and Karim political inclusion goes from -1.35- to 3.24. The scale for Vdem Gender goes from .039 to .965. The scale for CIRI is a 3-point scale where a score of 0 indicates the absence of rights. The middle scores of 1 and 2 represent the existence of some rights with limited enforcement or continued discrimination. A score of 3 indicates that women's rights are guaranteed in law and practice (Cingranelli, David L., David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay; Cole 2012). The Hill and Karim political inclusion, Vdem Gender, and CIRI political rights, are three different measures looking at the same political dimension of women's rights. By including all three, I can see whether the measurement of women's rights influences the results. If all three measures of women's political rights are affected by my explanatory variables at a statistically significant level, then I know that the results are sound. If all three are not affected significantly, then it could be the scale and the indicators incorporated into the categories that influence the measured relationship.

6.1 Religion and Women's Rights

My initial tests involved strong religion-state ties and number of religious laws as measures of religion to provide a baseline understanding of what my data reveals about the relationship between religion and women's rights. Strong religion-state ties and number of religious laws were both significant, even when analyzed alongside the range of controls included. The coefficients and standard errors for each of the women's rights regressions, as well as the number of observations, are included in each Table. The finding from these tests, as presented in the Tables, show that strong religion-state ties and number of religious laws significantly and negatively impact women's rights, but strong religion-state ties have a larger

negative impact. For example, strong religion-state ties negatively impacted CIRI political rights by .549, CIRI economic rights by .447, and CIRI social rights by .749 more than the number of religious laws. Strong religion-state ties affected Hill and Karim political inclusion by .24 more than the number of religious laws. For Vdem Gender, the results for strong religion-state ties were more substantial but at a lower significance than the number of religious laws.

6.1.1 Table 1: Cross-national Regressions on Strong Religion-State Ties

	Hill & Karim	Vdem Gender	Ciri Econ. Rights	Ciri Pol. Rights	Ciri Social Rights
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Strong Rel. State Ties	-0.253***	-0.102*	-0.465***	-0.576***	-0.748***
	-0.079	-0.062	-0.145	-0.18	-0.149
W. INGOs	0.009***	0.002***	0.004***	0.010***	0.007***
	-0.002	0	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002
Log Wealth	0.004	0.032***	0.164***	-0.02	0.192***
	-0.022	-0.008	-0.025	-0.029	-0.032
Democracy	-0.014	0.033***	0.032	0.072	0.150**
	-0.049	-0.01	-0.052	-0.06	-0.065
Log Pop	-0.110***	-0.011	-0.080***	-0.089***	-0.100***
	-0.03	-0.008	-0.026	-0.027	-0.033
Int'l War	-0.01	-0.001	-0.005	-0.044	0.123*
	-0.022	-0.002	-0.069	-0.03	-0.071
Civil War	0.002	-0.007**	-0.029	-0.004	-0.039
	-0.035	-0.003	-0.029	-0.035	-0.039
constant	0.607*	0.434***	0.594*	2.472***	0.319
	-0.32	-0.102	-0.335	-0.318	-0.387
chi-square	60.414	293.585	203.715	84.453	179.592
df_r					
N (country-year observations)	2021	2320	2354	2397	2096
bic					

Note: Entries are coefficients and standard errors are preceded by a minus sign
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Table 1, I report the results from the model measuring the effects of strong religion-state ties on women's rights. Across all of the measures of women's rights, I find that strong religion-state ties are associated with less respect for women's rights. These results support my first hypothesis that states with strong religion-state ties are less likely to improve respect for women's rights than states with weak religion-state ties. For Hill and Karim political inclusion, strong religion-state ties had a significant and negative impact at the 0.01 significance level. This result means that in states with strong religion-state ties, the women's political inclusion score is .253 lower on a 4-point scale than in states with weak religion-state ties. The Women's Vdem

Gender score is .102 lower on a .039 to .965 scale than in states with weak religion-state ties. For the CIRI measurements, strong religion-state ties have a significant and negative effect on economic, political, and social rights. Women's CIRI economic rights are .465 lower on a 3-point scale than in states with weak religion-state ties. Women's CIRI political rights are .576 points lower on a 3-point scale than in states with weak religion-state ties. Women's CIRI social rights are .748 lower on a 3-point scale than in states with weak religion-state ties.

In regard to the CIRI measures, strong religion-state ties negatively impact women's social rights most, then women's political rights, and affects women's economic rights the least. Social rights are the most impacted by religion because they encompass rights such as marriage, divorce, and education, which are all addressed specifically within religious doctrine and practices. Political rights are limited in states with strong religion-state ties because women are excluded from participating in the political sphere and exercising their political rights. Economic rights are affected the least by religion because religion would likely have an indirect effect on equal pay, free choice of profession, equality in hiring, and job security.

Because of the large number of analyses, I will discuss the results for the controls in detail for this first Table and then will only discuss them in the analyses that follow if they change in significance. *The presence of women's NGOs* has a significant and positive effect on all the measures of women's rights indicating that the higher the number of women's NGOs, the greater the respect for women's rights. Regarding the CIRI measures, the number of women's NGOs had the strongest effect on improving women's political rights, then social rights, and the least effect on economic rights.

Log Wealth represents the level of state economic development. It had a significant impact on Vdem Gender, CIRI economic rights, and CIRI social rights. For Vdem Gender,

women's rights improve by .032 on a .039 to .965 scale for each increase in *Log Wealth*. CIRI economic rights improve by .164, and CIRI social rights improve .192 on a 3-point scale for each increase in *log wealth*. These results indicate that in states with higher levels of economic development, women have more political empowerment, economic rights, and social rights than in states with lower levels of economic development. Higher levels of economic development typically offer women more economic and social opportunities that enable them to improve their socio-economic empowerment and autonomy (Cole 2012; Hathaway 2002; Sweeney 2008; Englehart and Miller 2014; Murdie 2014; Ross 2008).

Democracy positively affects Vdem Gender at the .01 significance level and the CIRI social rights at the 0.05 significance level. Women's Vdem Gender rights increase by .033 on a .039 to .965 scale. CIRI social rights improve by around .2 on a 3-point scale. It is curious that *democracy* influences CIRI social rights but not CIRI political or economic rights because one would expect that if a state were a democracy, then women would have more opportunities to experience their political rights and participate in the economy. The effect of strong religion-state ties on CIRI social rights and Vdem Gender is negative, more significant, and more substantial than the positive effect of being a democracy. This result means that the improvement a state makes in CIRI social and Vdem Gender rights by being a democracy does not have the same impact as the negative effects of being a state with strong religion-state ties.

The *population size* has a significant and negative impact on all the measures of women's rights except for Vdem Gender. This result is because countries with larger populations tend to have a harder time providing for all of their citizens and enforcing the international rights and protections for women. *International and civil conflict* did not have any significant results on women's rights, except for a slightly significant effect of *civil war* on Vdem Gender. *Civil war*

can lead to repressive government practices, the breakdown of legal systems, and the inability to enforce women's rights.

6.1.2 Table 2: Cross-national Regressions on Number of Religious Laws

	Hill & Karim	Vdem Gender	Ciri Econ. Rights	Ciri Pol. Rights	Ciri Social Rights
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
# of Rel. Laws	-0.013***	-0.006***	-0.018***	-0.027***	-0.031***
	-0.004	-0.002	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006
W. INGOs	0.010***	0.002***	0.004***	0.010***	0.008***
	-0.002	0	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002
Log Wealth	0.008	0.033***	0.161***	-0.013	0.189***
	-0.022	-0.008	-0.025	-0.027	-0.034
Democracy	-0.015	0.034***	0.042	0.07	0.166**
	-0.049	-0.01	-0.052	-0.058	-0.064
Log Pop	-0.100***	-0.008	-0.071**	-0.068***	-0.083**
	-0.033	-0.007	-0.028	-0.026	-0.036
Int'l War	-0.009	-0.001	-0.013	-0.043	0.121*
	-0.022	-0.002	-0.069	-0.03	-0.071
Civil War	0.007	-0.007**	-0.005	0.009	-0.026
	-0.035	-0.003	-0.03	-0.035	-0.036
constant	0.562*	0.443***	0.621*	2.392***	0.34
	-0.339	-0.094	-0.349	-0.293	-0.414
chi-square	62.969	325.014	197.541	98.906	178
df_r					
N (country-year observations)	2020	2319	2353	2396	2095
bic					

Note: Entries are coefficients and standard errors are preceded by a minus sign.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Table 2, I report the results from the model measuring the effect the number of religious laws has on the five different measures of women's rights. Across all measures of women's rights, I find that the number of religious laws has a significant and negative effect on women's rights, which is consistent with my second hypothesis that states that have implemented religious laws are less likely to improve respect for women's rights than states without religious laws. For Hill and Karim political inclusion, each additional religious law reduces women's political inclusion by .013 on this 4-point scale. For Vdem Gender, women's political empowerment goes down by .006 for each additional religious law on this .039 to .965 scale. Regarding the CIRI measures of women's rights, the number of religious laws most negatively

influences women's social rights. Each additional law reduces women's social rights by .031, political rights by .027, and economic rights by .018 on this scale.

6. 2 CEDAW and Women's Rights

This paper explores how commitment to CEDAW impacts women's rights. My findings, using years since ratifying CEDAW and years since signing the Optional Protocol, show that committing to CEDAW for a more extended period of time impacts women's rights positively. The results specifically show that signing the Optional Protocol has more substantial and statistically significant effects on women's rights than ratifying the treaty. Regarding the political rights measures, CIRI political rights were significantly affected in both Tables, Hill and Karim Political Inclusion was only significantly affected by the years since signing the Optional Protocol, and Vdem Gender was only significantly impacted by the years since ratifying CEDAW. Tables 3 and 4 present the coefficients, standard errors, and the number of observations for each measurement of women's rights as well as a set of controls.

6.2.1 Table 3: Cross-national Regressions on Years Since Ratifying CEDAW

Table 3. Cross-national Regressions on Years Since Ratifying CEDAW

	<u>Hill & Karim</u>	<u>Vdem Gender</u>	<u>Ciri Econ. Rights</u>	<u>Ciri Pol. Rights</u>	<u>Ciri Social Rights</u>
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
CEDAW ratified- years	0.008*	0.003***	-0.008*	0.017***	-0.002
	-0.004	-0.001	-0.004	-0.003	-0.005
W. INGOs	0.009***	0.001***	0.007***	0.008***	0.009***
	-0.002	0	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
Log Wealth	-0.004	0.023**	0.110***	-0.02	0.141***
	-0.022	-0.01	-0.035	-0.041	-0.042
Democracy	-0.002	0.045***	0.144***	0.120**	0.259***
	-0.048	-0.015	-0.052	-0.059	-0.06
Log Pop	-0.116***	0.020**	-0.090***	-0.073***	-0.094***
	-0.029	-0.008	-0.03	-0.028	-0.035
Int'l War	-0.023	-0.002	-0.041	-0.047**	0.017
	-0.026	-0.002	-0.077	-0.023	-0.056
Civil War	0.005	-0.002	-0.047	0.012	-0.053
	-0.035	-0.003	-0.029	-0.028	-0.033
constant	0.611**	0.184*	0.992**	2.137***	0.578
	-0.301	-0.106	-0.404	-0.408	-0.441
chi-square	43.598	191.861	177.716	120.988	128.914
df_r					
N (country-year observations)	2035	3050	2842	3214	3044
bic

Note: Entries are coefficients and standard errors are preceded by a minus sign

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Table 3, I analyze the impact the number of years since ratifying CEDAW has on women's rights. There is a significant and positive impact on the number of years since ratifying CEDAW and women's rights measurements of Vdem Gender and CIRI political rights. For each additional year since ratifying CEDAW, women's rights on the Vdem Gender scale go up by .003 on the .039 to .965 scale. On the CIRI political rights scale, each additional year since ratifying improves women's rights by .017. Thus, 10 years after ratifying CEDAW would yield a 0.8 increase in CIRI political rights. These results support the premise that it takes time to improve the realization of women's rights and supports my third hypothesis that the longer the period of time since the state has signed CEDAW, ratified CEDAW, or signed the Optional Protocol of CEDAW, the more likely they are to have improved women's rights. Interestingly, the number of years since ratifying CEDAW has a negative effect on CIRI economic rights, though only at the .10 significance level. This is a curious and puzzling finding because this means that for each additional year since ratifying CEDAW, women's economic rights decrease

by .08. CIRI social rights are not significantly influenced by the number of years since ratifying CEDAW. This finding is similar to previous studies but remains surprising because it would be expected that social rights would at least be slightly improved over time.

While the effects of many of the control variables remained similar in this model to the previous Tables, *democracy* had a significant change in its impact on the CIRI measures. Within this model, being a democracy increases CIRI economic rights by .144, CIRI political rights by .120, and CIRI social rights by .259 on a 3-point scale. In the previous case of Table 1, being a democracy led to a .2 on a 3-point scale and only for CIRI social rights. These results reveal that the effects of being a democracy have a more significant influence when combined with the number of years since ratifying CEDAW instead of strong religion-state ties. It would be unlikely for a state to be a democracy and have strong religion-state ties, therefore, the influence of democracy in these states would be limited. However, it is much more likely for a state that is a democracy to improve women's rights after ratifying the treaty since its citizens would have the ability to pressure and influence the government to encourage them to uphold the treaty.

6.2.2 Table 4: Cross-national Regressions on Years Since Signing the CEDAW Optional Protocol

Table 4. Cross-national Regressions on Years since Signing the CEDAW Optional Protocol

	<u>Hill & Karim</u>	<u>Vdem Gender</u>	<u>Ciri Econ. Rights</u>	<u>Ciri Pol. Rights</u>	<u>Ciri Social Rights</u>
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
CEDAW opt protocol signed- years	0.047*** -0.009	0.001 -0.001	-0.023*** -0.009	0.029*** -0.008	0.001 -0.014
W. INGOs	0.009*** -0.002	0.002*** 0	0.006*** -0.002	0.010*** -0.002	0.008*** -0.002
Log Wealth	-0.01 -0.021	0.027*** -0.01	0.120*** -0.034	-0.046 -0.038	0.144*** -0.04
Democracy	-0.016 -0.048	0.046*** -0.015	0.145*** -0.051	0.124** -0.059	0.258*** -0.06
Log Pop	-0.106*** -0.029	0.020** -0.009	-0.088*** -0.029	-0.084*** -0.03	-0.092*** -0.034
Int'l War	-0.021 -0.026	-0.002 -0.002	-0.038 -0.076	-0.050** -0.022	0.018 -0.056
Civil War	0.004 -0.034	-0.002 -0.003	-0.046 -0.029	0.01 -0.028	-0.052 -0.033
constant	0.633** -0.297	0.156 -0.108	0.864** -0.393	2.489*** -0.388	0.527 -0.42
chi-square	58.102	186.249	180.881	113.737	127.58
df_r					
N (country-year observations)	2035	3050	2842	3214	3044
bic					

Note: Entries are coefficients and standard errors are iproceeded by a minus sign.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Table 4, I analyze the impact the number of years since signing the Optional Protocol has on women's rights. For Hill and Karim political inclusion and CIRI political rights, there were significant and positive effects for the number of years since signing the Optional Protocol, which is in line with my third hypothesis that the longer the period of time since the state has signed CEDAW, ratified CEDAW, or signed the Optional Protocol of CEDAW, the more likely they are to have improved women's rights. For each additional year since signing the Optional Protocol, women's rights improved by .047 on the Hill and Karim political inclusion scale of -1.35- to 3.24. On the CIRI scale, political rights improved by .029 for each additional year since signing the Optional Protocol. These results indicate that the more years since signing the Optional Protocol, the greater improvement in Hill and Karim political inclusion and CIRI political, economic, and social rights. Interestingly, CIRI economic rights were significantly and negatively impacted by the number of years since signing the Optional Protocol. This result is

perplexing because it suggests that for each additional year since signing the Optional Protocol, women's economic rights decrease by .023. Similar to Table 3, *democracy* had a significant and positive impact on the CIRI rights. In this model, being a democracy increased CIRI economic rights by .145, CIRI political rights by .124, and CIRI social rights by .258, which are essentially the same results as in Table 3. A democracy is more likely to sign the Optional Protocol, which could be why these rights were improved.

By comparing the results between Table 3 and Table 4, I look at whether the different level of commitment to CEDAW, ratifying versus signing the Optional Protocol, affects women's rights. For the Hill and Karim political inclusion measure, each additional year since ratifying CEDAW improves women's rights by .008 at the .10 significance level, whereas each additional year since signing the Optional Protocol improves women's rights on this scale by .047 at the .01 significance level. This result reveals that each additional year since signing the Optional Protocol results in a .039 greater respect for women's rights than each year since ratifying CEDAW. Women political inclusion is greatly influenced by the number of years since signing the Optional Protocol, which stands to reason since the Optional Protocol is a greater commitment and improving the actual inclusion of women in the political sphere is a greater hurdle than other rights. For Vdem Gender, each additional year since ratifying CEDAW improves women's rights by .003 at the .01 significance level, whereas each additional year since signing the Optional Protocol does not significantly impact women's rights. For CIRI political rights, each additional year since ratifying CEDAW improves women's rights by .017 at the .01 significance level, whereas each additional year since signing the Optional Protocol improves women's rights on this scale by .029 at the .01 significance level. While each additional year since ratifying CEDAW does increase CIRI political rights, the effect of each

year is .012 less than the effect of each additional year since signing the Optional Protocol. For CIRI social rights, the results were insignificant for both years since ratifying CEDAW and years since signing the Optional Protocol. For CIRI economic rights, each additional year since ratifying CEDAW decreases women's rights by .008 at the .10 significance level, whereas each additional year since signing the Optional Protocol decreases women's rights on this scale by .023 at the .01 significance level. The level of significance for this result is puzzling and concerning because the level of significance indicates that there is something in the economic rights measure that is being negatively impacted by each additional year since the state signed the Optional Protocol.

6.3. The Interacting Effects of CEDAW and Religion on Women's Rights

In Table 5 and Table 6, I test the effects of the number of years since ratifying CEDAW when there are strong religion-state ties or a large number of religious laws. The results indicate that the impact of years since ratifying CEDAW is limited when there are strong religion-state ties or a large number of religious laws. In Table 5, the effect of strong religion-state ties was only significant for the CIRI variables.

6.3.1 Table 5: Cross-national Regressions on Strong Religion-State Ties and Years Since Ratifying CEDAW

Table 5. Cross-national Regressions on Strong Religion State Ties and Years since Ratifying CEDAW

	Hill & Karim	Vdem Gender	Ciri Econ. Rights	Ciri Pol. Rights	Ciri Social Rights
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Strong Rel. State Ties and CEDAW Ratified-years	-0.032***	-0.002	0.022**	0.028**	0.017*
	-0.009	-0.003	-0.011	-0.013	-0.009
CEDAW ratified- years	0.010**	0.004***	-0.003	0.016***	0.003
	-0.004	-0.001	-0.004	-0.003	-0.006
Strong Rel. State Ties	0.063	-0.094	-0.655***	-0.784***	-0.874***
	-0.106	-0.058	-0.175	-0.195	-0.172
W. INGOs	0.009***	0.001**	0.004**	0.006***	0.006***
	-0.002	0	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
Log Wealth	0	0.032***	0.168***	0.013	0.201***
	-0.022	-0.009	-0.024	-0.028	-0.033
Democracy	-0.026	0.031***	0.037	0.057	0.148**
	-0.049	-0.01	-0.052	-0.057	-0.065
Log Pop	-0.112***	-0.008	-0.080***	-0.073***	-0.096***
	-0.029	-0.008	-0.026	-0.024	-0.033
Int'l War	-0.009	-0.001	0.002	-0.029	0.130*
	-0.023	-0.002	-0.068	-0.031	-0.071
Civil War	0.002	-0.007**	-0.03	0.004	-0.037
	-0.035	-0.003	-0.029	-0.035	-0.039
constant	0.545*	0.402***	0.599*	2.012***	0.211
	-0.31	-0.104	-0.332	-0.303	-0.396
chi2-square	62.346	338.318	208.867	125.304	193.622
df_r					
N (country-year observations)	2021	2320	2354	2397	2096
bic					

Note: Entries are coefficients and standard errors are preceded by a minus sign.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Table 5, I look at the effects of the interaction between strong religion-state ties and the number of years since ratifying CEDAW. For the number of years since ratifying, the results were significant for Hill and Karim political inclusion, Vdem Gender, and CIRI political rights, all three measures of women's political rights. For strong religion-state ties, the results were significant for all three of the CIRI measures. When looking at the effect of each additional year since ratifying CEDAW in states with strong religion-state ties, the results were significant for Hill and Karim political inclusion, CIRI economic rights, and CIRI political rights.

For Hill and Karim political inclusion in Table 5, each additional year since ratifying CEDAW improved women's rights by .010 at the .05 significance level on this scale whereas women's rights were improved by .008 at the .10 significance level in Table 3. For Vdem Gender and CIRI political rights, the results were the same at the same significance level as in Table 3. For CIRI social rights in Table 5 and Table 3, the results were insignificant for each

additional year since ratifying CEDAW. For years since ratifying CEDAW, only the measures looking at the political dimension of women's rights were affected. It is interesting that the results were essentially the same for these variables between the two Tables with the exception of Hill and Karim political inclusion, which had the same impact in Table 5 as in Table 3 but at a higher level of significance.

For Hill and Karim political inclusion in Table 5, the results were insignificant for strong religion-state ties whereas in Table 1, states with strong religion-state ties had a significant score that was .253 lower than states with weak religion-state ties. For CIRI economic rights in Table 5, states with strong religion-state ties have a score that is .655 lower on a 3-point scale compared to states with weak religion-state ties. In Table 1, the score for CIRI economic rights was .465 lower in states with strong religion-state ties. In this model, the negative effect of strong religion-state ties on economic rights was stronger than in Table 1. For CIRI political rights in Table 5, states with strong religion-state ties have a score that is .784 lower on a 3-point scale compared to states with weak religion-state ties. In Table 1, the score was .576 lower in states with strong religion-state ties. Again, negative effect of strong religion-state ties is more impactful in this model than in the earlier one. For CIRI social rights in Table 5, states with strong religion-state ties have a score that is .874 lower on a 3-point scale compared to states with weak religion-state ties. In Table 1, the score was .748 lower in states with strong religion-state ties.

While these results reveal that strong religion-state ties are bad for women's rights, there is still some improvement over time for CIRI economic and political rights in states with strong religion-state ties. It is perplexing that the effect the number of years since ratifying CEDAW in a state with strong religion-state ties is positive and significant when it was negative and

insignificant in the original model (Table 3). For states with weak religion-state ties, each year leads to improvement for the Hill and Karim political inclusion, Vdem Gender, and CIRI political rights measures, which is in line with the results from Table 3.

6.3.2 Table 6: Number of religious laws and Years Since Ratifying CEDAW

Table 6. Number of Religious Laws and Years since Ratifying CEDAW

	<u>Hill & Karim</u>	<u>Vdem Gender</u>	<u>Ciri Econ. Rights</u>	<u>Ciri Pol. Rights</u>	<u>Ciri Social Rights</u>
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
# of Rel. Laws and CEDAW Ratified- years	-0.001***	0	0.001	0	0
	0	0	-0.001	0	-0.001
CEDAW ratified- years	0.018***	0.004***	-0.009	0.013***	0.003
	-0.005	-0.001	-0.006	-0.005	-0.007
# of Rel. Laws	0.002	-0.005**	-0.025***	-0.029***	-0.031***
	-0.004	-0.002	-0.007	-0.007	-0.006
W. INGOs	0.010***	0.001***	0.004***	0.007***	0.008***
	-0.002	0	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
Log Wealth	0.002	0.033***	0.165***	0.01	0.192***
	-0.022	-0.008	-0.026	-0.027	-0.034
Democracy	-0.017	0.033***	0.042	0.059	0.165**
	-0.048	-0.01	-0.053	-0.057	-0.064
Log Pop	-0.101***	-0.006	-0.072***	-0.058**	-0.082**
	-0.032	-0.007	-0.028	-0.024	-0.035
Int'l War	-0.011	-0.001	-0.008	-0.031	0.123*
	-0.023	-0.002	-0.069	-0.032	-0.071
Civil War	0.007	-0.007**	-0.006	0.015	-0.025
	-0.035	-0.003	-0.029	-0.035	-0.036
constant	0.412	0.404***	0.697**	2.056***	0.292
	-0.326	-0.097	-0.354	-0.278	-0.42
chi-square	80.612	367.114	210.608	136.564	179.493
df_r					
N (country-year observations)	2020	2319	2353	2396	2095
bic					

Note: Entries are coefficients and standard errors are preceded by a minus sign.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Table 6, I look at the interaction between the number of religious laws and the number of years since ratifying CEDAW and its effect on women's rights. For years since ratifying CEDAW, the results were significant for Hill and Karim political inclusion, Vdem Gender, and CIRI political rights. The impact of the number of years since ratifying CEDAW remained the same as in the original model (Table 3), except for the Hill and Karim political inclusion measure. In Table 6, for each additional year since ratifying CEDAW, women's rights were increased by .018 at the .01 significance level. For the number of religious laws, the results were significant for Vdem Gender, CIRI economic, CIRI political, and CIRI social rights. The effect

of the number of religious laws remained the same for Vdem Gender and for CIRI economic, political, and social rights. However, the measure for Hill and Karim political inclusion was no longer significant. When looking at the effect of each additional year since ratifying CEDAW for each additional law, the results were significant for Hill and Karim political inclusion. For each of the other measures of women's rights, the impact was zero or arbitrarily small. For each additional law, the impact of the years since ratifying CEDAW was negative .001 for the Hill and Karim political inclusion measure. While the number of laws negatively impacts women's rights, each additional year since ratifying CEDAW does help improve women's rights compared to the effect of only the number of religious laws.

6.4 Comparing Measures of Religion

In Tables 7 and 8, I hope to see how the effects on women's rights vary depending on whether I measure the Muslim percentage of the population, strong religion-state ties, or number of religious laws. Overall, I found that the Muslim percentage of the population does have a negative effect on women's rights. However, the impact was not as significant or substantial as the impact of strong religion-state ties or number of religious laws. This result shows that the different methods of measurement for religion are significant and impact the results. For strong religion-state ties in Table 7, there were significant results for Vdem Gender, CIRI economic rights, and CIRI political rights. Muslim percentage of the population significantly impacted Hill and Karim political inclusion, CIRI political rights, and CIRI social rights. For number of religious laws in Table 8, Vdem Gender and CIRI political rights were significantly impacted. For Muslim percentage of the population, only CIRI social rights were significantly affected.

6.4.1 Table 7: Strong Religion State Ties and Muslim Percentage of the Population

	Hill & Karim	Vdem Gender	Ciri Econ. Rights	Ciri Pol. Rights	Ciri Social Rights
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Strong Rel. State Ties	-0.049	-0.215***	-0.380**	-0.390**	-0.284*
	-0.112	-0.023	-0.168	-0.158	-0.152
Religion: Muslim	-0.002**	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.003**	-0.006***
	-0.001	0	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
W. INGOs	0.010***	0.002***	0.003*	0.010***	0.007***
	-0.002	0	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
Log Wealth	-0.012	0.027***	0.172***	-0.042	0.167***
	-0.026	-0.007	-0.028	-0.03	-0.034
Democracy	-0.006	0.035***	0.019	0.093	0.137**
	-0.055	-0.009	-0.056	-0.067	-0.068
Log Pop	-0.104***	-0.003	-0.073**	-0.092***	-0.088**
	-0.034	-0.008	-0.029	-0.031	-0.035
Int'l War	0.003	-0.001	-0.011	-0.054	0.128
	-0.017	-0.002	-0.08	-0.033	-0.078
Civil War	0.006	-0.006**	-0.014	0.032	-0.027
	-0.037	-0.003	-0.033	-0.041	-0.041
constant	0.671*	0.402***	0.509	2.660***	0.468
	-0.347	-0.096	-0.365	-0.332	-0.42
chi-square	62.438	461.374	189.756	127.414	204.435
df_r					
N (country-year observations)	1654	2113	1970	1998	1787
bic					

Note: Entries are coefficients and standard errors are preceded by a minus sign.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Table 7, I compare the effects of the Muslim percentage of the population to strong religion-state ties. CIRI social rights were impacted at the 0.01 significance level by Muslim percentage of the population, while Hill and Karim political inclusion and CIRI political rights were negatively impacted at the 0.05 significance level, and the effects on women's CIRI economic rights were insignificant and close to zero. These results reveal that Muslim population does negatively impact women's rights and that women's CIRI social rights are most affected. The religious practices and beliefs of the population can directly impact women's social rights, whereas they affect political rights indirectly by influencing lawmakers, voting, and preventing women from exercising certain rights.

In regard to strong religion-state ties, within this model (Table 7), Vdem Gender is negatively impacted at the 0.01 significance level; CIRI economic and political rights are negatively impacted at the 0.05 significance level; social rights are negatively impacted at the

0.10 significance level; and Hill and Karim political inclusion is not significantly affected. Hill and Karim political inclusion was affected more significantly and substantially in Table 1, whereas Vdem Gender was affected more significantly and substantially in Table 7. The only measure of women's rights that was significantly impacted by both strong religion-state ties and Muslim percentage of the population was CIRI political rights. The effect of strong religion-state ties was -.39, whereas the negative effect of Muslim percentage of the population was only -.003. The drastic difference on the same scale indicates that the negative influence of strong religion state ties is greater than Muslim percentage of the population on women's rights.

These results reveal that while Muslim percentage of the population does influence women's rights, strong religion-state ties has an effect on women's rights that extends beyond Muslim percentage of the population. This finding is supported by the greater influence strong religion-state ties have on women's rights compared to the effect of Muslim percentage of the population.

6.4.2 Table 8: Number of religious laws and Muslim Percentage of the Population

	Hill & Karim	Vdem Gender	Ciri Econ. Rights	Ciri Pol. Rights	Ciri Social Rights
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
# of Rel. Laws	-0.009	-0.007**	-0.013*	-0.018**	-0.011
	-0.006	-0.003	-0.007	-0.007	-0.008
Religion: Muslim	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003*	-0.006***
	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002
W. INGOs	0.010***	0.002***	0.004**	0.011***	0.008***
	-0.002	0	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
Log Wealth	-0.001	0.027***	0.165***	-0.039	0.163***
	-0.025	-0.007	-0.029	-0.03	-0.035
Democracy	-0.008	0.037***	0.029	0.097	0.145**
	-0.055	-0.009	-0.056	-0.066	-0.067
Log Pop	-0.095**	0	-0.068**	-0.081***	-0.084**
	-0.037	-0.008	-0.03	-0.03	-0.038
Int'l War	0.006	-0.001	-0.02	-0.054	0.126
	-0.017	-0.002	-0.08	-0.033	-0.078
Civil War	0.009	-0.006**	0.007	0.04	-0.022
	-0.037	-0.003	-0.035	-0.041	-0.04
constant	0.561	0.414***	0.563	2.624***	0.495
	-0.377	-0.098	-0.384	-0.319	-0.454
chi2	63.31	396.265	181.619	133.19	208.565
df_r					
N (country-year observations)	1654	2113	1970	1998	1787
bic					

Note: Entries are coefficients and standard errors are preceded by a minus sign.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Table 8, I compare the effects of the number of religious laws and the Muslim percentage of the population. Regarding all measures of women's rights, the effect of the number of religious laws was more significant and strong in Table 2 than in Table 8. When looking at the effect of Muslim percentage of the population on the different measures of women's rights within this model, it is only significant for CIRI social rights. The significant effect on the CIRI social rights indicates that an increase in the Muslim percentage of the population results in a .006 decrease in women's CIRI social rights. A more significant Muslim percentage of the population would suggest that more people are practicing and adhering to conservative religious beliefs and practices that could limit the realization of women's rights.

7. Conclusion

This paper began by asking how commitment to CEDAW and the relationship between the state and the dominant religion influence the realization of women's rights. I laid a theoretical foundation for examining strong religion-state ties and the number of religious laws, as specific aspects of religion that limit the realization of women's rights. I explored how level of commitment to CEDAW advances the improvements in women's rights. Lastly, I explore how the impact of CEDAW will be limited by the strength of religion within the political and legal system of the state. My findings ultimately suggest that strong religion-state ties and number of religious laws significantly and negatively impact the realization of women's rights. The results suggest that a higher level of commitment to CEDAW affects women's rights significantly and positively.

Through empirical data, I have shown how strong religion-state ties lead to a decrease in respect for and protection of women's rights across all measures and dimensions. I maintain that

limiting the influence of religion on the state will lead to improvements for women's rights since all dimensions of women's rights are negatively impacted by this relationship. Therefore, states that wish to improve rights of women should work to get rid of strong religion-state ties within their government. The CEDAW Committee, NGOs, the domestic population, and other governments should use this recommendation to promote change. While weakening the relationship between religion and the state, states should also work to reform current religious legislation and work to establish more secular based policy. Instituting these recommendations is not swift or easy but will result in tangible improvements in women's rights around the world.

In addition to providing quantitatively supported recommendations, my research contributes to the general study on religion and women's rights by employing two specific measures of the relationship between religion and the state, which allowed me to reach conclusions on specific ways that religion influences women's rights. This method worked to overcome the practice in previous theories that oversimplify the effects of religion, and the results lack nuance from this practice. I contribute to this research by highlighting specific aspects of religion that influence women's rights and by providing quantitative analysis to support the relationship. I specifically show that women's rights are strongly affected by strong religion-state ties and religious legislation. By using these specific measurements, I have illustrated that the relationship between religion and the state is a major factor limiting the expansion of women's rights around the world. The sizeable amount of data with consistent results suggest that states should focus their efforts on secularizing the government, state actors, and official legislation in order to better women's rights within their state. By employing five different measures of women's rights, I was able to develop a more nuanced understanding of how the rights are affected by religion. My findings suggest that women's social rights are most

impacted by religion, followed by political rights (as defined by all three measures), and lastly economic rights. The Hill and Karim political inclusion measure and the Vdem Gender political empowerment index have both been introduced into the literature as more precise and nuanced measures of women's rights. I also included the CIRI measures, which provide more temporal coverage and a more holistic coverage of women's rights.

While the religious beliefs and practices of a society most likely influence women's rights as well, addressing the relationship at the state level could have a trickle-down effect on the society by establishing women's rights as a norm within the society and by limiting the allowance of gender discrimination based on religion. It is a more difficult task to change the beliefs of people but changing how these beliefs are codified in official legislation and supported by the state is more realistic. Furthermore, religion affects different societies uniquely depending on how the other domestic characteristics interact with it.

In regard to CEDAW, my goal was to analyze whether a stronger level of commitment to CEDAW leads to more improvements in women's rights. In general, the analyses show that commitment to CEDAW has a positive effect on women's rights and that a higher level of commitment to the treaty is related to an increase in improvements of women's rights. The results from the statistical analysis show that signing the Optional Protocol is better than simply ratifying CEDAW but that both levels of commitment have a positive effect on women's rights. Therefore, actors and states should be strongly encouraged to sign the Optional Protocol.

Previous research has concluded that the effectiveness of CEDAW is likely conditioned by domestic characteristics of the state (Hill 2010). My research has examined how the specific domestic characteristic of strong religion-state ties and number of religious laws effects the implementation of CEDAW. I found that states with strong religion-state ties implement

CEDAW less effectively compared to states with weak religion-state ties. A large number of religious laws limit the effective implementation of CEDAW. Future research might probe further into how other states have changed their laws and practices to weaken the religion-state ties to best understand what these countries need to do.

To reach a robust conclusion on how religion and CEDAW affect women's rights, it was essential to fully and comprehensively measure women's rights. I incorporated and analyzed several different measures of women's rights in my study to overcome conceptual and methodological issues present in other women's rights studies. In this study, I utilized three different measures of women's political rights: Hill and Karim political inclusion, Vdem Gender political empowerment index, and CIRI political rights. In every Table, at least two out of the three measures of political rights were significant. This evidence supports previous theories by providing evidence that the treaty impacts women's political rights. The puzzling results for economic rights reveal that we may need a different measure to achieve significant results or that economic rights need to be studied independently. While I wish I could have included the other Hill and Karim (2017) measures to compare to the CIRI measures of economic and social rights, using three measures of the political dimension was a good start. One challenge has been accessing all of the data on the different forms of measurement of women's rights. In a future study, it would be interesting to include the other measures from Hill and Karim (2017), such as social and economic inclusion, to compare the results to the CIRI measures of economic and social rights. This would be particularly beneficial given the puzzling results from my research for CIRI economic rights as well as the lack of significant results for social rights in the analyses of the number of years since ratifying CEDAW or the signing of the Optional Protocol.

In addition to looking at my explanatory variables of religion and CEDAW, I re-evaluated factors such as the level of democracy, economic development, and presence of women's governmental organizations that previous studies have suggested impact women's rights significantly and positively. My findings reveal that these variables do influence the realization of women's rights. Being a democracy is an important factor in increasing the effect the number of years since ratifying CEDAW has on improving women's rights. The policy implication of this finding is that being a democracy and weakening the ties between religion and the state are crucial institutional factors for increasing women's rights. While organizations and treaties can be put in place to support women's rights, these two societal factors must change for large-scale and long-term improvements in women's rights to occur. Further, the work completed by NGOs does have an effect, so these initiatives should be continued and expanded. To continue the advancement of women's rights, NGOs should focus on and work to limit and replace religious legislation.

While my analysis focuses on how specific aspects of religion can be changed to better increase women's rights, my results contribute to the general literature on human rights by suggesting strong religion state ties and the number of religious laws are variables that could influence the advancement of other human rights. Religion tends to be studied by looking at specific religious denominations and measured by percentage of the population that practices the religion. Studies should utilize the measurements of the relationship between religion and the state to see if it influences other groups in society. Uncovering a specific aspect of society that effects women's rights generates hope that women's rights can be improved at a systematic level in countries that many maintain will never see an improvement in women's rights. It is imperative that a commitment to women's rights is visible through changes in legislation and an

increase in the involvement of women in politics, the economy, and the social sphere of society. An understanding of how the different rights are affected by religion and CEDAW can guide policy makers, activists, and organizations working to increase the effectiveness of global women's rights law. Identifying factors that can best promote reform is vital and these results highlight an important opportunity for state-level reform that could lead to substantial improvements in women's rights.

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9. Appendices

9.1 Appendix A. Summary Statistics for All Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
HKWR	3,638	-.0145609	.6568828	-1.349239	3.239775
vdem_gender	8,523	.5949061	.2225863	.0399408	.9654208
ciri_wecon	4,853	1.329487	.6977396	0	3
ciri_wopol	4,904	1.78854	.6456235	0	3
ciri_wosoc	3,632	1.248899	.8489622	0	3
SBX1214	3,268	.0988372	.298489	0	1
LX	3,264	8.573836	7.040494	0	42
cedawratyrs	15,967	4.865159	8.846622	0	37
cedawoptyrs	15,967	.7361433	2.842557	0	18
RSCRY	3,268	.5232558	2.658575	0	27
LXCry	3,264	79.54841	88.37513	0	783
wingoimp2	7,875	27.5554	27.1446	0	152
logwealth	7,980	8.177445	1.513863	4.751814	11.87928
chga_demo	8,931	.4407121	.4965003	0	1
logpop	9,380	8.444959	2.119732	1.791759	14.09643
intwar2	16,040	.0211347	.1438377	0	1
civwar2	16,040	.0737531	.2613768	0	1
lp_muslim80	10,936	22.42722	35.54741	0	99.9

HKWR: Hill and Karim Political Inclusion

SBX1214: Strong religion state ties

LX: Number of religious laws

Cedawratyrs: Years since ratifying CEDAW

Cedawoptyrs: Years since signing the Optional Protocol of CEDAW

RSCRY: Strong religion state ties and years since ratifying CEDAW

LXCry: number of religious laws and years since ratifying CEDAW

Wingoimp2: Presence of women's NGOs

Chga_demo: democracy

Lp_muslim: Muslim percentage of the population

9.2 Appendix B: Summary of CIRI Indicators

Political Rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the right to vote • the right to run for political office • the right to hold elected and appointed government positions • the right to join political parties • the right to petition government officials
Economic Rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • equal pay for equal work • free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent • the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent • equality in hiring and promotion practices • job security (maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or layoffs) • non-discrimination by employers • the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace • the right to work at night • the right to work in occupations classified as dangerous • the right to work in the military and the police force
Social Rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the right to equal inheritance • the right to enter into marriage on a basis of equality with men • the right to travel abroad • the right to obtain a passport • the right to confer citizenship to children or a husband • the right to initiate a divorce • the right to own, acquire, manage, and retain property brought into marriage • the right to participate in social, cultural, and community activities • the right to an education • the freedom to choose a residence/domicile • freedom from female genital mutilation (FGM) of children and of adults without their consent • freedom from forced sterilization

Source: Data from Cingranelli, David L., David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay.

9.3 Appendix C: Summary of Women's Political Empowerment Index Indicators

Civil Liberties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • freedom of domestic movement • freedom from forced labor • property rights • access to justice
Agency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • freedom of discussion • participation in civil society organizations • representation in the ranks of journalists
Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the legislative presence of women and political power distribution by gender • percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature that is female.

Source: Data from Sundström, Aksel, Pamela Paxton, Yi-ting Wang and Stefan I. Lindberg.

9.4 Appendix D: Summary of Hill and Karim Dataset Indicators

Political Inclusion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seats held by women in central banks • Central bank governor, female • Binary indicator demonstrating whether Chief Justice is a woman • Female representation in national parliaments • Women's share of government ministerial positions • National legislated quotas for women in public • Women in the judiciary • Women justices on the Constitutional Court • Women junior environment ministers • Women senior environment ministers
Economic Inclusion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agricultural holders • Early stage entrepreneurial activity • Percentage of firms with female participation in ownership • Percentage of firms with female top manager • Share of employers, Female • Ratio of females to males (aged 15+) that are part of the labor force • Ratio of female to male wage & salaried employees
Social Inclusion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Educational attainment (primary) of the population aged 25 and older, female • Educational attainment (post-secondary) of the population aged 25 and older, female • Educational attainment (lower secondary) of the population aged 25 and older, female • Educational attainment (upper secondary) of the population aged 25 and older, female • Educational attainment (tertiary) of the population aged 25 and older, female • Ratio of female to male enrollment in tertiary education, per 100,000 inhabitants • Share of engineering, manufacturing and construction graduates at tertiary level, female • Share of science graduates at tertiary level, female • Lower secondary completion rate, female • Net enrollment ratio in pre-primary school, female • Adjusted net enrollment ratio in primary school, female • Net enrollment ratio in secondary school, female • Persistence to last grade of primary school, female • Ratio of female to male primary completion rate • Ratio of female to male secondary completion rate • Elective transition rate from primary to secondary school, female • Ratio of female to male enrollment in tertiary education, agriculture • Ratio of female to male enrollment in tertiary education, all programs

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ratio of female to male enrollment in tertiary education, education • Ratio of female to male enrollment in tertiary education, engineering • Ratio of female to male enrollment in tertiary education, general programs • Ratio of female to male enrollment in tertiary education, health and welfare • Ratio of female to male enrollment in tertiary education, humanities and arts • Ratio of female to male enrollment in tertiary education, social sciences, business and law • Ratio of female to male enrollment in tertiary education, science, female • Ratio of female to male enrollment in tertiary education, services, female, Number • Ratio of female to male mean years of schooling
Economic Institutional Rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Must employers give employees an equivalent position when they return from maternity leave? • Do employees with minor children have rights to a flexible/part-time schedule? • Do unmarried men and unmarried women have equal ownership rights to property? • What is the mandatory minimum length of paid maternity leave (in calendar days)? • What is the mandatory minimum length of paid paternity leave (in calendar days)? • What percentage of wages are paid during paternity leave? • Do sons and daughters have equal inheritance rights to property? • Do male and female spouses have equal inheritance rights to property? • Are employers required to provide break time for nursing mothers? • Are there laws penalizing or preventing the dismissal of pregnant women? • Can married women pursue a trade or profession in the same way as a man? • Can married women register a business in the same way as a man? • Can married women sign a contract? • Can non-pregnant and non-nursing women work the same night hours as men? • Can non-pregnant and non-nursing women do the same jobs as men?
Vulnerability in Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women, ages 15-19) • Antiretroviral therapy coverage, female • Births attended by skilled staff, female • Contraceptive prevalence, female • Fertility rate, female, number of children • Female share of people living with HIV • Full immunization, female

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mean age at first birth, Years of age • Malnutrition prevalence, height for age, stunting, female • Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age, underweight, female • Maternal mortality ratio, female, Deaths Per 100,000 Live Births • Unmet need for contraceptive prevalence, female • Neonatal mortality rate, total, Deaths Per 1,000 Births • Sex ratio at birth, Males Born Per One Female • Malnutrition prevalence, weight for height, wasting, female • Ratio of female to male risk factor, alcohol use, DALYs per 100,000 • Ratio of female to male mean age of death, Years • Mean age of death, male, Years • Ratio of female to male deaths per 100,000, Self-harm, ages 15-19, DALYs per 100,000 • Ratio of female to male deaths per 100,000, total, female, DALYs per 100,000 • Ratio of female to male risk factor, drug use, DALYs per 100,000 • Ratio of female to male infant mortality rate, Deaths Per 1,000 Births • Ratio of female to male life expectancy at birth, Years • Ratio of female to male mean age at first marriage, Years of age • Ratio of female to male DALYs per 100,000 • Ratio of female to male risk factor, physical inactivity, DALYs per 100,000 • Ratio of female to male under 5 mortality rate, Deaths Per 1,000 Births
Economic Vulnerability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ratio of unemployed females to males, Thousands • Ratio of female to male total long-term unemployment rate • Ratio of female to male monthly wages, Local currency units • Ratio of female to male total time-related underemployment rate

Source: Data from Hill, Danny and Sabrina Karim.

9.4 Appendix E. Collinearity Tests

SBX1214	Robust		z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	Coef.	Std. Err.				
cedawratyrs	.0004816	.0008044	0.60	0.549	-.001095	.0020581
wingoimp2	-.0005413	.0002771	-1.95	0.051	-.0010845	1.86e-06
logwealth	.0094076	.0062033	1.52	0.129	-.0027506	.0215659
chga_demo	-.0018589	.0007031	-2.64	0.008	-.0032369	-.0004809
logpop	.0151612	.0146383	1.04	0.300	-.0135294	.0438518
intwar2	.0003072	.0001483	2.07	0.038	.0000165	.0005979
civwar2	.0000966	.0001063	0.91	0.364	-.0001118	.000305
_cons	-.1161958	.1141232	-1.02	0.309	-.3398731	.1074815

SBX1214: Strong religion state ties

Cedawratyrs: Years since ratifying CEDAW

Wingoimp2: Presence of women's NGOs

Chga_demo: democracy

LX	Robust		z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
	Coef.	Std. Err.				
cedawratyrs	.0215997	.0121206	1.78	0.075	-.0021562	.0453555
wingoimp2	.0026117	.005026	0.52	0.603	-.007239	.0124625
logwealth	.177379	.126109	1.41	0.160	-.0697901	.4245481
chga_demo	.0741355	.0617247	1.20	0.230	-.0468427	.1951138
logpop	.5783969	.3226145	1.79	0.073	-.0539158	1.21071
intwar2	.0227532	.0483754	0.47	0.638	-.0720609	.1175672
civwar2	-.0312797	.0257348	-1.22	0.224	-.0817191	.0191597
_cons	1.284147	3.153919	0.41	0.684	-4.897421	7.465715

LX: Number of religious laws

Cedawratyrs: Years since ratifying CEDAW

Wingoimp2: Presence of women's NGOs

Chga_demo: democracy

9.3 Appendix F. Additional Analyses

9.3.1 Table 9

	Hill & Karim	Vdem Gender	Ciri Econ. Rights	Ciri Pol. Rights	Ciri Social Rights
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
CEDAW ratified	-0.023	0.007**	-0.070*	0.062*	-0.027
	-0.036	-0.003	-0.041	-0.037	-0.035
W. INGOs	0.010***	0.002***	0.006***	0.011***	0.008***
	-0.002	0	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
Log Wealth	-0.013	0.028***	0.119***	-0.046	0.142***
	-0.022	-0.009	-0.034	-0.038	-0.041
Democracy	0.011	0.046***	0.147***	0.124**	0.260***
	-0.048	-0.015	-0.052	-0.058	-0.06
Log Pop	-0.120***	0.017**	-0.085***	-0.089***	-0.094***
	-0.03	-0.008	-0.029	-0.029	-0.034
Int'l War	-0.028	-0.002	-0.035	-0.051**	0.017
	-0.025	-0.002	-0.077	-0.023	-0.056
Civil War	0.001	-0.002	-0.047	0.01	-0.053
	-0.035	-0.003	-0.029	-0.028	-0.033
constant	0.786**	0.171	0.894**	2.487***	0.567
chi2	-0.32	-0.105	-0.398	-0.39	-0.424
df_r	41.256	160.441	181.041	86.6	130.802
N	2035	3050	2842	3214	3044
bic

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

9.3.2 Table 10

	Hill & Karim	Vdem Gender	Ciri Econ. Rights	Ciri Pol. Rights	Ciri Social Rights
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
CEDAW opt protocol signed	0.076**	0	-0.065*	0.051	0.102**
	-0.036	-0.003	-0.037	-0.036	-0.046
W. INGOs	0.010***	0.002***	0.006***	0.011***	0.007***
	-0.002	0	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
Log Wealth	-0.011	0.027***	0.122***	-0.049	0.147***
	-0.021	-0.009	-0.034	-0.038	-0.041
Democracy	0.001	0.046***	0.144***	0.126**	0.253***
	-0.048	-0.015	-0.052	-0.059	-0.061
Log Pop	-0.115***	0.019**	-0.085***	-0.090***	-0.088***
	-0.029	-0.009	-0.029	-0.03	-0.034
Int'l War	-0.026	-0.002	-0.036	-0.051**	0.018
	-0.026	-0.002	-0.076	-0.023	-0.056
Civil War	0.002	-0.002	-0.045	0.009	-0.052
	-0.034	-0.003	-0.029	-0.028	-0.033
constant	0.713**	0.163	0.835**	2.546***	0.476
chi2	-0.306	-0.106	-0.392	-0.388	-0.418
df_r	44.163	154.318	176.998	86.237	140.655
N	2035	3050	2842	3214	3044
bic

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

9.3.3 Table 11

	Hill & Karim	Vdem Gender	Ciri Econ. Rights	Ciri Pol. Rights	Ciri Social Rights
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
CEDAW signed- years	0.012***	0.002***	0.002	0.015***	0.007
	-0.003	-0.001	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004
W. INGOs	0.008***	0.002***	0.005**	0.008***	0.006***
	-0.002	0	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
Log Wealth	0.008	0.029***	0.128***	-0.027	0.155***
	-0.021	-0.009	-0.035	-0.041	-0.042
Democracy	-0.002	0.046***	0.142***	0.127**	0.257***
	-0.048	-0.015	-0.052	-0.058	-0.06
Log Pop	-0.114***	0.012	-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.087***
	-0.028	-0.008	-0.028	-0.028	-0.033
Int'l War	-0.025	-0.002	-0.033	-0.050**	0.019
	-0.025	-0.002	-0.075	-0.022	-0.055
Civil War	0.005	-0.002	-0.045	0.011	-0.052
	-0.035	-0.003	-0.029	-0.028	-0.033
constant	0.514*	0.214**	0.753*	2.291***	0.391
chi2	-0.294	-0.105	-0.394	-0.402	-0.421
df_r	54.871	177.812	180.129	118.581	127.603
N	2035	3050	2842	3214	3044
bic

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

9.3.4 Table 12

	Hill & Karim b/se	Vdem Gender b/se	Ciri Econ. Rights b/se	Ciri Pol. Rights b/se	Ciri Social Rights b/se
RSCS	-0.21 -0.145	-0.229** -0.095	0.098 -0.252	-0.132 -0.222	0.066 -0.238
CEDAW signed	0.198*** -0.063	0.248** -0.1	0.151** -0.062	0.213*** -0.067	0.242*** -0.086
Strong Rel. State Ties	-0.163** -0.08	-0.047 -0.033	-0.478*** -0.139	-0.497** -0.223	-0.734*** -0.172
W. INGOs	0.008*** -0.002	0.002*** 0	0.003* -0.002	0.009*** -0.002	0.005*** -0.002
Log Wealth	0.011 -0.021	0.029*** -0.01	0.168*** -0.025	-0.02 -0.029	0.202*** -0.032
Democracy	-0.024 -0.048	0.030*** -0.01	0.024 -0.05	0.064 -0.058	0.141** -0.063
Log Pop	-0.112*** -0.029	-0.020* -0.011	-0.083*** -0.026	-0.095*** -0.027	-0.100*** -0.032
Int'l War	-0.012 -0.022	-0.001 -0.002	-0.002 -0.067	-0.045 -0.03	0.127* -0.07
Civil War	0.003 -0.035	-0.007** -0.003	-0.028 -0.029	-0.004 -0.035	-0.038 -0.039
constant	0.505 -0.312	0.420*** -0.125	0.544 -0.341	2.448*** -0.329	0.161 -0.381
chi2	72.982	230.731	231.785	95.15	190.049
df_r					
N	2021	2320	2354	2397	2096
bic					

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

RSCS: Strong religion state ties and CEDAW signed

9.3.5 Table 13

	Hill & Karim b/se	Vdem Gender b/se	Ciri Econ. Rights b/se	Ciri Pol. Rights b/se	Ciri Social Rights b/se
RSCR	-0.133** -0.056	0.008 -0.011	0.126 -0.133	0.375** -0.182	0.238* -0.129
CEDAW ratified	-0.006 -0.044	0.007 -0.005	-0.022 -0.063	0.063 -0.049	0.008 -0.052
Strong Rel. State Ties	-0.154* -0.081	-0.110* -0.061	-0.558*** -0.128	-0.817*** -0.193	-0.909*** -0.135
W. INGOs	0.010*** -0.002	0.002*** 0	0.004*** -0.001	0.009*** -0.002	0.007*** -0.002
Log Wealth	0.001 -0.022	0.032*** -0.008	0.166*** -0.025	-0.01 -0.028	0.197*** -0.032
Democracy	-0.014 -0.049	0.032*** -0.01	0.035 -0.051	0.068 -0.059	0.151** -0.064
Log Pop	-0.112*** -0.03	-0.011 -0.008	-0.080*** -0.026	-0.083*** -0.026	-0.097*** -0.033
Int'l War	-0.01 -0.022	-0.001 -0.002	-0.004 -0.069	-0.042 -0.03	0.123* -0.071
Civil War	0 -0.035	-0.007** -0.003	-0.029 -0.029	0.002 -0.035	-0.035 -0.039
constant	0.642* -0.328	0.427*** -0.102	0.601* -0.34	2.314*** -0.313	0.26 -0.395
chi2	63.035	305.041	212.247	103.913	233.543
df_r					
N	2021	2320	2354	2397	2096
bic					

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

RSCR: Strong religion state ties and CEDAW ratified

9.3.6 Table 14

Table 14. Strong Religious State Ties and CEDAW Optional Protocol Signed

	Hill & Karim b/se	Vdem Gender b/se	Ciri Econ. Rights b/se	Ciri Pol. Rights b/se	Ciri Social Rights b/se
RSCO	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
CEDAW opt protocol signed	0.074** -0.037	0.006* -0.004	-0.028 -0.035	0.057 -0.035	0.109** -0.045
Strong Rel. State Ties	-0.245*** -0.078	-0.102* -0.062	-0.468*** -0.145	-0.571*** -0.18	-0.744*** -0.149
W. INGOs	0.009*** -0.002	0.002*** 0	0.004*** -0.001	0.009*** -0.002	0.007*** -0.002
Log Wealth	0.005 -0.022	0.032*** -0.008	0.163*** -0.025	-0.019 -0.029	0.195*** -0.032
Democracy	-0.021 -0.049	0.032*** -0.01	0.035 -0.052	0.068 -0.06	0.142** -0.065
Log Pop	-0.107*** -0.03	-0.01 -0.008	-0.081*** -0.026	-0.087*** -0.027	-0.095*** -0.033
Int'l War	-0.008 -0.022	-0.001 -0.002	-0.006 -0.069	-0.043 -0.03	0.125* -0.071
Civil War	0.002 -0.035	-0.007** -0.003	-0.029 -0.029	-0.004 -0.035	-0.039 -0.038
constant	0.571* -0.316	0.429*** -0.102	0.605* -0.337	2.446*** -0.318	0.262 -0.388
chi2	62.661	295.219	203.602	94.948	198.515
df_r					
N	2021	2320	2354	2397	2096
bic					

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

RSCO: Strong religion state ties and Optional Protocol signed

9.3.7 Table 15

Table 15. Strong Religious State Ties and the Years Since Signing CEDAW

	Hill & Karim b/se	Vdem Gender b/se	Ciri Econ. Rights b/se	Ciri Pol. Rights b/se	Ciri Social Rights b/se
RSCSy	-0.014 -0.009	-0.003 -0.003	0.016 -0.011	0.005 -0.012	0.005 -0.013
CEDAW signed- years	0.013*** -0.003	0.003*** -0.001	0.005 -0.003	0.013*** -0.003	0.010** -0.004
Strong Rel. State Ties	-0.144* -0.082	-0.096 -0.062	-0.558*** -0.161	-0.587** -0.24	-0.770*** -0.178
W. INGOs	0.007*** -0.002	0.001*** 0	0.003 -0.002	0.007*** -0.002	0.005** -0.002
Log Wealth	0.017 -0.021	0.034*** -0.009	0.176*** -0.024	-0.003 -0.03	0.209*** -0.033
Democracy	-0.026 -0.049	0.032*** -0.01	0.033 -0.051	0.071 -0.057	0.146** -0.064
Log Pop	-0.108*** -0.028	-0.012 -0.008	-0.077*** -0.025	-0.084*** -0.025	-0.093*** -0.032
Int'l War	-0.009 -0.022	-0.001 -0.002	0.005 -0.068	-0.04 -0.03	0.129* -0.071
Civil War	0.004 -0.035	-0.007** -0.003	-0.026 -0.029	-0.001 -0.035	-0.037 -0.039
constant	0.427 -0.302	0.422*** -0.103	0.469 -0.323	2.256*** -0.329	0.1 -0.379
chi2	72.257	324.248	230.085	118.2	188.324
df_r					
N	2021	2320	2354	2397	2096
bic					

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

RSCSy: Strong religion state ties and years since signing CEDAW

9.3.8 Table 16

	Hill & Karim	Vdem Gender	Ciri Econ. Rights	Ciri Pol. Rights	Ciri Social Rights
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
	0	0	0	0	0
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
RSCOy					
CEDAW opt protocol signed- years	0.046***	0.002***	-0.014*	0.027***	0.003
	-0.009	-0.001	-0.008	-0.007	-0.013
Strong Rel. State Ties	-0.222***	-0.099	-0.472***	-0.560***	-0.747***
	-0.076	-0.06	-0.145	-0.181	-0.149
W. INGOs	0.008***	0.002***	0.004***	0.009***	0.007***
	-0.002	0	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
Log Wealth	0.004	0.031***	0.163***	-0.019	0.192***
	-0.021	-0.008	-0.025	-0.028	-0.032
Democracy	-0.036	0.032***	0.038	0.065	0.149**
	-0.049	-0.01	-0.052	-0.06	-0.065
Log Pop	-0.099***	-0.01	-0.083***	-0.083***	-0.099***
	-0.029	-0.008	-0.026	-0.027	-0.034
Int'l War	-0.003	-0.001	-0.008	-0.042	0.123*
	-0.022	-0.002	-0.069	-0.03	-0.071
Civil War	0.004	-0.007**	-0.03	-0.002	-0.039
	-0.035	-0.003	-0.029	-0.035	-0.039
constant	0.510*	0.435***	0.623*	2.415***	0.313
	-0.306	-0.103	-0.337	-0.315	-0.391
chi2	73.983	335.252	202.641	115.339	180.303
df_r					
N	2021	2320	2354	2397	2096
bic					

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

RSCOy: Strong religion state ties and years since signing Optional Protocol

9.3.9 Table 17

	Hill & Karim	Vdem Gender	Ciri Econ. Rights	Ciri Pol. Rights	Ciri Social Rights
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
LXCS	-0.008*	-0.006**	0.002	0.003	0.01
	-0.005	-0.003	-0.008	-0.007	-0.009
CEDAW signed	0.235***	0.275**	0.127	0.132	0.135
	-0.083	-0.117	-0.093	-0.082	-0.115
# of Rel. Laws	-0.008*	-0.001	-0.017***	-0.027***	-0.033***
	-0.004	-0.003	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
W. INGOs	0.009***	0.002***	0.004**	0.009***	0.006***
	-0.002	0	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
Log Wealth	0.013	0.029***	0.162***	-0.012	0.199***
	-0.021	-0.009	-0.026	-0.027	-0.033
Democracy	-0.018	0.031***	0.036	0.066	0.158**
	-0.047	-0.01	-0.051	-0.057	-0.064
Log Pop	-0.105***	-0.02	-0.076***	-0.073***	-0.084**
	-0.032	-0.012	-0.028	-0.026	-0.034
Int'l War	-0.01	-0.001	-0.012	-0.043	0.125*
	-0.022	-0.002	-0.068	-0.03	-0.07
Civil War	0.008	-0.007**	-0.006	0.008	-0.027
	-0.035	-0.003	-0.031	-0.035	-0.036
constant	0.469	0.418***	0.596*	2.374***	0.225
	-0.333	-0.117	-0.344	-0.291	-0.395
chi2	79.228	279.061	210.377	104.429	195.865
df_r					
N	2020	2319	2353	2396	2095
bic					

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

LXCS: number of religious laws and CEDAW signed

9.3.10 Table 18

	Hill & Karim	Vdem Gender	Ciri Econ. Rights	Ciri Pol. Rights	Ciri Social Rights
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
LXCR	-0.005**	0.000*	0.006	0.01	0.009*
	-0.003	0	-0.004	-0.006	-0.005
CEDAW ratified	0.024	0.003	-0.068	0.016	-0.055
	-0.041	-0.004	-0.074	-0.073	-0.072
# of Rel. Laws	-0.009**	-0.007***	-0.022***	-0.034***	-0.037***
	-0.004	-0.002	-0.005	-0.007	-0.006
W. INGOs	0.010***	0.002***	0.004***	0.009***	0.008***
	-0.002	0	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002
Log Wealth	0.006	0.033***	0.162***	-0.006	0.193***
	-0.022	-0.008	-0.026	-0.027	-0.034
Democracy	-0.013	0.034***	0.045	0.064	0.167***
	-0.049	-0.01	-0.051	-0.057	-0.063
Log Pop	-0.101***	-0.008	-0.072***	-0.065**	-0.082**
	-0.033	-0.007	-0.028	-0.025	-0.036
Int'l War	-0.009	-0.001	-0.012	-0.04	0.122*
	-0.022	-0.002	-0.069	-0.031	-0.071
Civil War	0.005	-0.007**	-0.005	0.013	-0.023
	-0.035	-0.003	-0.03	-0.035	-0.036
constant	0.563*	0.440***	0.670*	2.311***	0.348
	-0.341	-0.095	-0.36	-0.277	-0.423
chi2	65.963	333.824	206.475	116.284	205.675
df_r					
N	2020	2319	2353	2396	2095
bic					

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

LXCR: number of religious laws and CEDAW ratified

9.3.11 Table 19

	Hill & Karim	Vdem Gender	Ciri Econ. Rights	Ciri Pol. Rights	Ciri Social Rights
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
LXCO	-0.003	-0.001	0.011	-0.003	0.008
	-0.009	-0.001	-0.008	-0.01	-0.01
CEDAW opt protocol signed	0.098	0.014*	-0.101	0.079	0.052
	-0.063	-0.008	-0.071	-0.072	-0.083
# of Rel. Laws	-0.012***	-0.006***	-0.019***	-0.027***	-0.032***
	-0.004	-0.002	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006
W. INGOs	0.009***	0.002***	0.004***	0.010***	0.007***
	-0.002	0	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002
Log Wealth	0.008	0.033***	0.163***	-0.013	0.193***
	-0.022	-0.008	-0.025	-0.027	-0.034
Democracy	-0.021	0.034***	0.039	0.068	0.156**
	-0.049	-0.01	-0.053	-0.059	-0.065
Log Pop	-0.097***	-0.008	-0.072***	-0.066**	-0.078**
	-0.032	-0.007	-0.028	-0.026	-0.035
Int'l War	-0.007	-0.001	-0.012	-0.042	0.124*
	-0.022	-0.002	-0.069	-0.031	-0.071
Civil War	0.007	-0.007**	-0.006	0.009	-0.026
	-0.035	-0.003	-0.03	-0.035	-0.036
constant	0.525	0.439***	0.631*	2.367***	0.283
	-0.332	-0.095	-0.35	-0.29	-0.411
chi2	70.434	325.973	203.696	109.459	200.944
df_r					
N	2020	2319	2353	2396	2095
bic					

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

LXCO: number of religious laws and Optional Protocol signed

9.3.12 Table 20

Table 20. Number of Religious Laws and the Years Since Signing CEDAW

	Hill & Karim	Vdem Gender	Ciri Econ. Rights	Ciri Pol. Rights	Ciri Social Rights
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
LXCSy	-0.001	0	0.001	0	0
	0	0	0	0	-0.001
CEDAW signed- years	0.016***	0.002**	0.001	0.008**	0.005
	-0.005	-0.001	-0.005	-0.004	-0.006
# of Rel. Laws	-0.006	-0.006***	-0.021***	-0.028***	-0.033***
	-0.004	-0.002	-0.007	-0.008	-0.006
W. INGOs	0.008***	0.002***	0.003**	0.007***	0.006***
	-0.002	0	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
Log Wealth	0.016	0.035***	0.170***	0.001	0.204***
	-0.021	-0.008	-0.025	-0.028	-0.033
Democracy	-0.016	0.034***	0.039	0.071	0.162**
	-0.048	-0.01	-0.051	-0.057	-0.064
Log Pop	-0.104***	-0.01	-0.068**	-0.065***	-0.077**
	-0.031	-0.007	-0.027	-0.025	-0.034
Int'l War	-0.009	-0.001	-0.006	-0.04	0.126*
	-0.022	-0.002	-0.068	-0.03	-0.07
Civil War	0.008	-0.007**	-0.006	0.01	-0.025
	-0.035	-0.003	-0.03	-0.035	-0.036
constant	0.409	0.433***	0.537	2.233***	0.175
	-0.32	-0.095	-0.337	-0.29	-0.395
chi2	80.428	343.579	213.424	121.827	192.48
df_r					
N	2020	2319	2353	2396	2095
bic					

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

LXCSy: number of religious laws and years since signing CEDAW

9.3.13 Table 21

Table 21. Number of Religious Laws and Years Since Signing the CEDAW Optional Protocol

	Hill & Karim	Vdem Gender	Ciri Econ. Rights	Ciri Pol. Rights	Ciri Social Rights
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
LXCOy	-0.001	0	0.001	-0.001	0
	-0.002	0	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003
CEDAW opt protocol signed- years	0.056***	0.004**	-0.023	0.036***	0.004
	-0.015	-0.002	-0.015	-0.013	-0.024
# of Rel. Laws	-0.011***	-0.006***	-0.019***	-0.026***	-0.031***
	-0.004	-0.002	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
W. INGOs	0.008***	0.002***	0.005***	0.009***	0.008***
	-0.002	0	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002
Log Wealth	0.007	0.031***	0.161***	-0.013	0.190***
	-0.021	-0.008	-0.026	-0.027	-0.034
Democracy	-0.037	0.034***	0.045	0.064	0.165**
	-0.048	-0.01	-0.052	-0.058	-0.065
Log Pop	-0.089***	-0.007	-0.074***	-0.062**	-0.082**
	-0.031	-0.007	-0.028	-0.026	-0.036
Int'l War	-0.002	-0.001	-0.015	-0.041	0.121*
	-0.022	-0.002	-0.069	-0.03	-0.071
Civil War	0.009	-0.007**	-0.006	0.01	-0.026
	-0.035	-0.003	-0.03	-0.035	-0.036
constant	0.456	0.443***	0.648*	2.333***	0.331
	-0.318	-0.095	-0.352	-0.283	-0.416
chi2	91.998	368.007	200.742	132.927	181.274
df_r					
N	2020	2319	2353	2396	2095
bic					

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

LXCOy: number of religious laws and years since ratifying CEDAW