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The Politics of Peace:
Ephesians, Dio Chrysostom, and the Confucian Tradition

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the *topos* of peace in Ephesians by comparison with Colossians, Dio Chrysostom's orations, and the Confucian classics; and shows that Ephesians can be read as a politico-religious letter *περὶ εἰρήνης* within the *ἐκκλησία*.

The study unfolds in six chapters. Beginning with a feasibility study grounded on key exegetical terms and motifs, the first chapter surveys prior research and lays out the task, assumptions, and guidelines of this project. Chapter two compares Ephesians with Colossians, demonstrating how their differences and similarities at both the macro and micro level affirm the prominence of the topic of peace in Ephesians. Building on the work of chapter two, chapter three investigates the political character of Ephesians and summarizes its vision of peace. Together, chapters two and three argue that Ephesians can be read profitably as a political discourse on peace.

Chapter four examines the vision of peace in Dio Chrysostom's orations, and chapter five the Confucian classics. Chapter six then puts the three visions of peace—the Ephesian, Dionian, and Confucian—in conversation with one another, analyzing their understanding of the nature of peace and the elements that undergird their vision. Through comparison with analogous political documents both within and without the cultural milieu of Ephesians, chapters four to six refine our portrait of the Ephesian vision of peace. Chapter six also concludes with a summary exploring the implications of this study.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE TASK

Throughout the history of biblical interpretation, theologians consider Eph 2:11–22, which describes the reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles in Christ, as the focal text in Ephesians for the theme of peace, unity, and reconciliation.¹ Augustine frequently uses the passage to address the Donatist schism, calling for unity within the church.² Aquinas understands the text and its description of Christ breaking the wall (2:14) to speak of a unity not only between Jewish and Gentile Christians but of all humanity.³ Ferdinand C. Baur reads Ephesians through the lens of 2:11–22, affirming the entire letter as an argument for unity between Jews and Gentiles.⁴ More recently, C. H. Dodd believes that this passage has much relevance for the present age; the “effectual overcoming of a long-standing and deep-rooted enmity” between Jews and Gentiles serves as a paradigm for reconciliation between nations.⁵ Peter Stuhlmacher considers this pericope an essential

¹ For a history of interpretation on this passage, see William Rader, *The Church and Racial Hostility: A History of Interpretation of Eph 2:11–22* (BGBE 20; Tübingen: Mohr, 1978).

² Rader, *Church and Radical Hostility*, 46–49.

³ Rader, *Church and Radical Hostility*, 60.

⁴ Rader, *Church and Radical Hostility*, 130–33.

⁵ C. H. Dodd, *Christianity and the Reconciliation of the Nations* (London: SCM, 1952), 25.

part of the biblical tradition on peace and reconciliation.⁶ Finally, Peter O'Brien considers this passage to be the *locus classicus* on peace in the Pauline letters.⁷

Although 2:11–22 is clearly an important text and perhaps the theological center of the letter,⁸ scholars have paid insufficient attention to the motif of peace, unity, and reconciliation that runs throughout the entire letter. I propose to examine peace in Ephesians by comparing it with Paul's letter to the Colossians, with Dio Chrysostom's Orations, and with the Confucian classics.⁹

Here are some exegetical data that suggest the fruitfulness of such a reading. The noun εἰρήνη occurs eight times in Ephesians (1:2; 2:14, 15, 17 [twice]; 4:3; 6:15, 23). Apart from its fourfold occurrence in 2:14–18, εἰρήνη occurs in the opening and final greetings and in the paraenetic section of chs. 4–6. The argument for the prominence of peace within the entire letter is stronger when we consider other terms besides εἰρήνη that fall within its semantic domain. These terms include ἐνότης (4:3, 13), ἀμφοτέροι (2:14, 16, 18), εἶς (2:14, 15, 16, 18; 4:4 [three times], 5 [three times], 6, 7; 4:16; 5:31, 33), ἀποκαταλλάσσω (2:16), and ἔχθρα (2:14, 16). The concept of peace and unity is also emphasized by the use of συν-prefixed words such as συζωποιέω (2:5), συνεγείρω (2:6), συγκαθίζω (2:6),

⁶ Peter Stuhlmacher, *Reconciliation, Law, and Righteousness: Essays in Biblical Theology* (trans. Everett Kalin; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), 182.

⁷ Peter O'Brien, *Ephesians* (Pillar New Testament Commentary; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 193.

⁸ So H. Conzelmann, *Die kleineren Briefe des Apostels Paulus* (NTD 8; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 67; Helmut Merklein, *Christus und die Kirche: die theologische Grundstruktur des Epheserbriefes nach Eph 2,11–18* (Stuttgart: KBW, 1973), 12; Markus Barth, *Ephesians* (AB; Garden City: New York, 1974), 1:275.

⁹ The modern term "Confucian classics" is technically a misnomer. Michael Nylan, *The Five "Confucian" Classics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 2, writes that the modern rubric has "tended to skew understandings of these texts, as it implies both a direct connection with the historical Confucius (ca. 551–479 BC) and a closer relationship among them than is warranted by their early histories. Most of the texts were evolving in oral as well written forms for centuries before they acquired

συμπολίτης (2:19), συναρμολογέω (2:21; 4:16), συνοικοδομέω (2:22), συγκληρονόμος (3:6), σύσσωμος (3:6), συμμετοχος (3:6; 5:7), σύνδεμος (4:3), συμβιβάζω (4:16), and συγκοινωνέω (5:11). The presence of these terms in various parts of the letter suggests that the motif of peace is not limited to 2:11–21.

The literary and thematic differences between Colossians and Ephesians further demonstrate the prominence of the topic of peace throughout the letter of Ephesians. Ephesians is undeniably similar to Colossians. Both claim Pauline authorship, both share common thematic material, and both contain major sections that proceed roughly in the same sequence. The differences between Colossians and Ephesians, however, highlight the topic of peace in Ephesians. Both compositions emphasize the exalted cosmic Christ who brings peace and unity to the universe. Ephesians, however, develops a more thoroughly conceived doctrine of the church, shifting the Christological emphasis in Colossians to ecclesiology.¹⁰ Within this doctrine of the church, the mandate that Ephesians gives to the church is of fundamental importance--the church is to embody peace and unity so as to reflect both the reality of the cosmic reconciliation accomplished by Christ and the possibility of what the world may become. Important words shared by Colossians and Ephesians, moreover, carry different significance, emphasizing the topic of peace and suggesting that its character in Ephesians has a strong socio-political dimension. For example, σύνδεσμος refers to ἀγάπη in Col 3:14 but to εἰρήνη in Eph 4:3. The word ἀποκαταλλάσσω, which occurs only in Colossians and Ephesians, is also used

the designation ‘classics’ or ‘Confucian’; hence vastly different approaches to social, political, and cosmic issues are discernible among and even within the texts.”

¹⁰ For example, although the concept of πλήρωμα is applied to Christ in Colossians (1:19), its referent is the church in Ephesians (1:23).

differently. In Colossians it describes the reconciliation of creation and men to God (1:20, 22); in Ephesians it describes the reconciliation, not of man to God, but of Jews and Gentiles (2:16). As another example, Ephesians uses the term εἰρήνη *explicitly* to describe the peace between different bodies of people. Colossians uses the same term *explicitly* to describe the peace between creation and God (Col 1:20), and only *implicitly* to describe the peace between men (Col 3:15). The thematic comparison of these two letters highlights the topic of peace and the socio-political character of peace in Ephesians. Consequently, William Klassen remarks, “The richest source for understanding peace in the NT is found in the letter to the Ephesians.”¹¹

The thread of peace and reconciliation within Ephesians does not stand alone. The composition employs diction found particularly in Greco-Roman political discourses such as πολιτεία (2:12), συμπολίτης (2:19), ξένος (2:12, 19), and πάροικος (2:19). The interweaving of political and peace language suggests that Ephesians resembles Greek political tracts concerning peace, unity, and reconciliation. In political discourses, the term εἰρήνη, for example, is often used with other political terms that contrast public order and social peace vis-à-vis discord and sedition. Plato considers civil strife (στάσις) as internal war and the cessation of civil war as εἰρήνην τῆς στάσεως.¹² Furthermore, many Greek writers pair εἰρήνη with ὁμόνοια to describe the relationship between members of a political body. The word εἰρήνη can be linked to ὁμόνοια with the conjunction καί, forming a hendiadys that describes political peace and concord between

¹¹ William Klassen, “Peace, New Testament,” *ABD* 5:210.

¹² Plato, *Leg.* 1.628B.

different parties.¹³ Greek authors also use the two terms interchangeably in contexts that express unity between social and political parties.¹⁴ This conceptual linking of εἰρήνη and ὁμόνοια is not limited to Greek works; Latin authors also pair the Latin equivalents of εἰρήνη and ὁμόνοια to form *pax et concordia*.¹⁵

The topic of peace, unity, and reconciliation is found especially in discourses περὶ εἰρήνης or περὶ ὁμονοίας.¹⁶ Dio Chrysostom notes that philosophers and orators who aspire to advise and legislate for the state share a common pool of topics. “The main question [from this common pool], and one with which many [philosophers and orators] often had to deal, concerns peace and war (περὶ τε εἰρήνης καὶ πολέμου).”¹⁷ In such political discourses, the focus of peace is on the relationship between warring states, disputing cities, or mutually antagonistic social bodies. Although Ephesians does not address the relationships between warring countries or disputing cities, its discussion can be read within a political framework for the following reasons. First, Eph 2:11–22 discusses the power dynamics between two socio-ethnic groups (Jews and Gentile),

¹³ Odd Magne Bakke, *Concord and Peace: A Rhetorical Analysis of the First Letter of Clement with an Emphasis on the Language of Unity and Sedition* (WUNT 2:141; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 82, considers the phrase εἰρήνη καὶ ὁμόνοια or ὁμόνοια καὶ εἰρήνη to function as a hendiadys. Examples of this usage in Greco-Roman literature include Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.6; 38.14; 39.2; 40.26; 49.6; Demosthenes, *De Cor.* 167; Diodorus Siculus, 3.64.7; 16.60.3; Plutarch, *Caes.* 23.6; Plutarch, *Oth.* 15.6; *Garr.* 17 (*Mor.* 511C); *1 Clem.* 60:4; 65:1; Dio Cassius, 44.25.4; 53.5.1; Lucian, *Hermot.* 22.

¹⁴ Diodorus Siculus, 11.87.5; 22.8.5; Plutarch, *Ages.* 33.2.7; *Caes.* 12.1.8; *Oth.* 13.3; *Mor.* 824.C.5; Dio Cassius, 41.15.4; 48.31.2; 53.5.4.

¹⁵ See Livy, 4.10; Cicero, *Clu.* 101; *Deiot.* 11; *Phil.* 5.40.

¹⁶ Examples of political discourses περὶ εἰρήνης include Demosthenes, *De Pace* (περὶ εἰρήνης); Andocides, *On Peace with Sparta* (Περὶ τῆς πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους εἰρήνης); Isocrates, *De Pace* (περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης); Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 22.

¹⁷ Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 22.3. See also *Or.* 26.8: “For it is absurd that ... those who are deliberating about public matters should display neither intelligence, nor knowledge, nor experience, although these matters are sometimes of the greatest importance, such as concord and friendship of families and states, peace and war.” When Greek and Latin texts require translation in this study, I primarily quote the English translation provided by the LCL.

focusing on issues such as insider-outsider status, πολιτεία, and ἔχθρα or πόλεμος.¹⁸ Second, the mandate for peace in Ephesians is located within the ἐκκλησία. The term ἐκκλησία in the Pauline corpus typically refers to local communities of believers. Nevertheless, all nine occurrences of ἐκκλησία in Ephesians (1:22; 3:10, 21; 5:23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 32) refer to the heavenly assembly gathered around the throne of Christ, but manifested in various local communities. If the concept of peace is located within this wider understanding of ἐκκλησία, one then recognizes that the call for inter-ecclesiological peace is analogous to that between states or cities.

Ephesians also resembles Greco-Roman political discourses because its rhetoric, like that of political treatises, is deliberative. While Ephesians appears to exhibit a combination of epideictic and deliberative elements, the overall letter has a primarily deliberative goal—to foster peace within the ἐκκλησία as a testament of the reconciliation that Christ has accomplished within the cosmos and within humanity (3:10–11). If the οὖν in 4:1 forms the transitional conjunction between the theological and the paraenetic sections, the call to live lives worthy of their calling is both a response and necessary correlative to what God has accomplished in Christ.

Deliberative rhetoric typically appeals to advantage.¹⁹ When Dio appeals to the Nicomedians to establish concord with the Nicaeans, he argues that such concord will

¹⁸ Although Ephesians uses ἔχθρα rather than πόλεμος to describe the relationship between Jews and Gentiles, the semantic domains of the two nouns overlap. Indeed, some Greco-Roman writers consider πόλεμος to be an adequate description of the ἔχθρα between social and ethnic groups. For example, Plato, *Resp.* 5.470c, writes: “We shall then say that Greeks fight and wage war with barbarians, and barbarians with Greeks, and are enemies by nature, and that war is the fit name for this enmity and hatred (καὶ πόλεμον τὴν ἔχθραν ταύτην κλητέον).”

¹⁹ Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1991), 25–32.

result in mutual aid between the two cities and multiplication of each city's resources. In a similar manner, Ephesians argues that peace and unity within diversity is necessary for the body to build itself up in love (4:16). Deliberative rhetoric also typically appeals to examples.²⁰ For example, Dio appeals to nature, providing examples of ants and bees working contentedly together. In Ephesians the reconciliation between Jews and Gentiles serves as the paradigmatic example of what the church is to be. Furthermore, believers are called to imitate the examples of God and Jesus in forgiving and loving one another (4:32–5:2).

The above survey of exegetical data suggests that political elements and rhetoric are embedded within the theme of peace and reconciliation so that Ephesians can be profitably read as a politico-religious letter on peace. It also highlights the rich possibilities of comparing the topic of peace in Ephesians, Colossians, and Dio's orations. There are, however, questions that remain unanswered: How do we account for the lack of common political terms such as *ὁμόνοια*, *ἔρις*, *στάσις*, and *σχίσμα*? Although many Greco-Roman political discourses on peace and concord address specific situations between warring states and cities, are we able to discern any specific situation in Ephesians? If Ephesians is to be read as a letter on peace, how do its various themes fit under the rhetoric of peace? For example, what is the relationship between ethics and the call for unity? What is the relationship between the moral and political textures of Ephesians?²¹ What factors or elements, both internal and external to the community,

²⁰ Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 39–46.

²¹ Texts display multiple textures of discourse as they are located interactively between representing worlds and evoking worlds. I define the moral texture of a text as that which seeks to promote and discourage certain character or disposition based on a particular notion of right and wrong,

threaten the letter's vision of peace? And why does a letter so committed to peace end with a clarion call for military readiness (6:10–17)? Finally, how does the religious character of Ephesians impact our understanding and appreciation of the political rhetoric of the letter? These questions have not previously been pursued vigorously in the history of interpretation of Ephesians.

History of Investigation

The prominence of the motif of peace, unity, and reconciliation in Ephesians has been noticed especially by scholars who focused their attention on the Jew-Gentile issue. For example, Baur reads Ephesians together with Colossians and considers the central theme of these letters to be Christology—Christ is the “center of the unity of all opposites.”²² However, the reconciling unity of Christ is only the starting point from which the object and content of Ephesians can be satisfactorily understood. What is most important for Baur is the placement of Ephesians within his construal of the dialectical struggle between a particularistic Jewish Christianity and a universalistic Paulinism, a struggle that is finally resolved in the Catholic Church. Seen within this framework, Baur considers both Ephesians and Colossians as post-Pauline writings that

or good and evil. I define the political texture of a text as that which pertains to the government and policy of a body of citizens. The boundaries between moral and political textures cannot be held rigidly since their respective spheres intersect. For example, political discourses that promote a particular set of social behavior or norm for the sake of the greater societal good are also moral in texture. Similarly, moral discourses that impact the behavioral patterns of a body of citizens will clearly have social and political implications. For a discussion on examining the multiple textures of a text via socio-rhetorical criticism, see Vernon K. Robbins, *The Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse* (New York: Routledge, 1996).

²² F. C. Baur, *Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ* (2 vols.; London: Williams & Norgate, 1873–1875; repr., Peabody: Hendrickson, 2003), 2:35.

mediate between Jewish Christianity and Paulinism.²³ They emphasize nothing more than the εἰρηνοποιεῖν and ἀποκαταλάττειν through Christ (Col 1:20; Eph 2:14) that eliminate any distinction between Jews and Gentiles.

Other scholars follow Baur's lead in reading the reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles as the primary purpose of Ephesians. In order to substantiate their claim, they develop different scenarios that suggest tension between the two groups. For example, some consider the first believers in Asia Minor to be Jews. Since these early Jewish believers oppose the acceptance of Gentiles as equals in the church, Ephesians is written to refute Jewish opposition against Gentile membership within the church.²⁴ Other scholars reverse this vector of animosity. The earliest believers in Asia Minor are now Gentiles, and tensions arise from the influx of Jewish Christians from Palestine into Asia Minor after the Jewish war.²⁵ For example, W. Schmithals reads the occasion of the letter as the expulsion of Jewish Christians from the synagogue after the destruction of Jerusalem. As these Jewish Christians attempt to join the post-Pauline churches that were organized from the start outside the jurisdiction of the synagogues, Ephesians is primarily written "to secure the acceptance by the gentile Christians from the Pauline communities of their Christian brothers who came from the synagogue and at the same time to acquaint the latter with the Pauline tradition."²⁶

²³ Baur reads Ephesians together with Colossians, and he comments, "The actual practical purpose of these letters is the uniting of Jews and Gentiles into one and the same religious fellowship" (F. C. Baur, *Das Christentum und die christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte* [Tübingen: L. F. Fues, 1860], 117).

²⁴ John B. Polhill, "An Introduction to Ephesians," *RevExp* 76 (1979): 465–79.

²⁵ W. Grundmann, "Die νήπιοι in der Urchristlichen Paränese," *NTS* 5 (1959): 188–215.

²⁶ W. Schmithals, "The *Corpus Paulinum* and Gnosis," in *The New Testament and Gnosis* (ed. A. H. B. Logan and A. J. M. Wedderburn; Edinburgh: T&T Clark; 1983), 122. Schmithals's assertion that Ephesians serves to acquaint readers with the Pauline tradition falls within the trajectory laid out by E. J.

But these proposals that focus solely on the Jew-Gentile issue make no attempt to understand the *entire* letter as an argument for peace and unity. This lack is addressed in several recent commentaries.

Commentary tradition

The commentary tradition generally recognizes the importance of the theme of unity and peace for Ephesians. A few commentaries also rightly elevate this theme to be the central message or content of the letter. For example, Arthur Patzia suggests that Ephesians can be read, among other things, as a “discourse on the unity of the church”²⁷; O’Brien remarks, “Cosmic reconciliation and unity in Christ are the central message of

Goodspeed and Francis Beare. Goodspeed argued that a collector assembled the letters of Paul and wrote Ephesians as a letter of introduction. In this letter, the collector sought to make Paul’s letters relevant to his contemporary situation and to “set forth Paul’s great characteristic presentations of the Christian faith” (*The Meaning of Ephesians* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933], xiv). Although Beare criticizes Goodspeed’s theory concerning the formation of the Pauline corpus as speculative, he nevertheless agrees that Ephesians is a letter of introduction to Pauline theology. He writes, “Ephesians is, and is meant by the author to be, a commendation of Paul’s theology to the Church of another generation. No other intelligible construction can be put upon the opening verses of ch 3.... The book is more than a summary of Pauline doctrine; more even than a commentary on the Pauline letters. It is an attempt to formulate a philosophy of religion, which is at the same time a philosophy of history, out of Pauline materials” (“Ephesians,” *The Interpreter’s Bible* [12 vols.; New York: Abingdon, 1951–57], 10:603–604). For a recent work advocating Ephesians as a pseudonymous attempt to preserve and interpret Paul’s legacy for another generation, see Micahel Gese, *Das Vermächtnis des Apostels* (WUNT 2.99; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997). Despite the pedigree of Goodspeed and Beare, Schmithals’s assertion regarding the twofold purposes of Ephesians is unfounded. First, Werner G. Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament* (trans. Howard Clark Kee; rev. ed.; Nashville: Abingdon, 1975), 364n. 52, notes, “There is no trace of tensions between Gentile Christians of Asia Minor and Jewish Christians who left Palestine after the Jewish war.” Second, if Ephesians is the introduction to the Pauline collection, one would expect to find it at the beginning or at the end of the list of Pauline letters. See G. Zuntz, *Text of the Epistles* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 276. There is, however, no textual evidence that Ephesians was ever placed at the head or end of any list. Third, Ephesians seems ill-equipped to serve as a commendation or summary of Paul’s doctrine. Although Ephesians contains many Pauline ideas, it lacks certain key elements such as the concepts of justification or God’s righteousness.

²⁷ Arthur G. Patzia, *Ephesians, Colossians, Philemon* (NIBCNT; Peabody: Hendrickson, 1990), 133–39. Other possible readings of Ephesians include a summary of Paul’s theology, a reminder and congratulation, an antiheteretical tract, and a liturgical document (128–33).

Paul's Letter to the Ephesians"²⁸; and Harold Hoehner suggests that the theme of love, which provides the basis for unity, has a "dominant place within the Book of Ephesians."²⁹

Although noting the centrality of the motif of peace, commentaries are hindered from providing a sustained treatment of this theme due to the very nature of their genre. The extent of their discussion typically runs only a couple of pages, and they do not trace the development of this theme throughout the letter.³⁰ Moreover, they are unable to explore how certain sections of Ephesians that are typically not included may profitably fit under the rubric of peace and unity. One such section is the discussion of spiritual warfare in Eph 6:10–20. More important, the above commentaries neglect the political dimension of the theme of peace, thereby forgoing the opportunity to compare Ephesians with other analogous political documents so as to attain a clearer picture of its vision of peace.

Two recent monographs address the motif of peace and unity in major portions of Ephesians while acknowledging its political character. They are the dissertations of Eberhard Faust and Ann Holmes Redding.

²⁸ O'Brien, *Ephesians*, 58. See also Max Turner, "Ephesians," in *New Bible Commentary: 21st Century Edition* (ed. D. A. Carson et al.; Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994), 1223.

²⁹ Harold Hoehner, *Ephesians* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002), 106. He writes, "This frequent use of love [in Ephesians] seems to furnish the key to the purpose of the book.... It seems reasonable to conclude that the purpose of Ephesians is to promote a love for one another that has the love of God and Christ as its basis" (105–106).

³⁰ O'Brien's commentary is an exception, providing the most sustained treatment on this theme among the various commentaries. But even then, he limits his discussion to eight pages.

Eberhard Faust

In his revised dissertation, Faust examines the general themes of Ephesians in order to infer the *Sitz im Leben* of the letter.³¹ Employing a history of religions, traditio-historical, and socio-historical methodology, Faust argues that Ephesians, and especially Eph 2:11-22, should be read in light of the social and political realities of 70–80 C.E., in particular the treatment of Jews by the Roman empire.

Faust develops his thesis in four stages.

1. Faust argues that the “gnoseologisches Heilsverständnis” of Hellenistic Judaism, especially in the writings of Philo, forms the underlying substructure for understanding Eph 1–3. According to this gnoseological understanding of salvation, believers who recognize the cosmological mysteries through noetic-pneumatic inspiration are caught up into the heavenly realm. Moreover, Faust considers the Logos in Philo to be analogous to Christ in Ephesians. Thus, just as the Logos is head over the noetic cosmos and the enlightened souls, so also is Christ head over the church.³² Recognizing the gnoseological underpinning of Ephesians is important within Faust’s larger thesis as it provides the rationale why Gentile Christians should esteem Jewish Christians: they (Jewish Christians) are the ones who mediated this understanding of salvation to the Church.³³

2. Faust conducts a thorough tradition-historical exegesis of 2:11–22, concluding that the description of the two epochs—before and after Christ—assigns priority and privilege to Jewish Christians. In the period before Christ, the Jewish πολιτεία existed as

³¹ Eberhard Faust, *Pax Christi et Pax Caesaris: Religionsgeschichtliche, traditionsgeschichtliche und sozialgeschichtliche Studien zum Epheserbrief* (NTOA 24; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993).

³² For a synopsis of the parallels between the Logos and Christ, see Faust, *Pax Christi et Pax Caesaris*, 70–72.

the preliminary stage of the Christian pneumatic πολιτεία since it was grounded on the promise of the Messiah. Faust then understands the “saints” (2:19), with which Gentile Christians are now συμπολιται, to refer not to Christians in general but specifically to Jewish Christians. In the Christian epoch, Jewish Christians still maintain an abiding priority since the church is built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets (2:20)—Jewish Christians who mediated the gnoseological understanding of salvation.

3. Faust highlights the contemporary and social-historical contexts of the letter. He considers Ephesians to be a pseudonymous letter addressed to Gentile Christians in Asia Minor, and reads the letter within the context of the late first century C.E. In the aftermath of the Jewish revolt, Vespasian and Titus forcibly integrated Jews into the *corpus imperii* to reestablish peace, resulting in the loss of Jewish status before Gentile eyes. In response to this perceived humiliation, Eph 2:11–22 sought to promote the status of Jewish Christians by reminding Gentile Christians of the priority of Jewish Christians within the salvation history of the church.

4. Faust examines the political character of the church in Ephesians, noting conceptual similarities between discussions of the household code in Ephesians and discussions of political stability within the Roman Empire. He further argues that the political character of the church in Ephesians presents Christ’s rule as a counterpart to Flavian rule.³⁴ The peace of Christ stands in opposition to the *pax Romana*,³⁵ and Christ who produces peace between Jews and Gentiles within the body of his church is the

³³ Faust, *Pax Christi et Pax Caesaris*, 473.

³⁴ Faust, *Pax Christi et Pax Caesaris*, 400–401.

³⁵ See also Klaus Wengst, *Pax Romana: And the Peace of Jesus Christ* (trans. John Bowden; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987).

counterpart to the emperor who enforces peace among the nations within his imperial body. Faust writes, “The church under her head, Christ, appears as a universal social entity in opposition to the Roman Empire under her imperial head. What is decisive for this interpretation by the Judeo-Christian author is probably the negative experience of the peace of Caesar after the Jewish war” (my translation).³⁶ This counterpoint between Christ and Caesar is important within Faust’s overall argument as it demonstrates the inversion of Jewish-Christian status between the two spheres: Jewish Christians were humiliated under Flavian rule, but they now enjoy an honored position within Christ’s rule.

Although Faust’s work contributes to current studies in Ephesians through its engagement with the social and political realities of 70–80 C.E., it has several deficiencies. His work is too dependent upon a historical reconstruction of Jew-Gentile relations following the forced integration of Jews into the body of the state. Faust uses his historical reconstruction of the events behind Ephesians as a leverage that guides his reading of the letter. But such a reconstruction must remain tenuous. Given the general tone of Ephesians and the lack of any identifiable heresy or persecution, we cannot reliably determine the occasion of the letter or the situation that the readers faced. J. C. Beker is right in claiming that it is difficult to discern a contingency factor with respect to Ephesians.³⁷ Any attempt to reconstruct the historical occasion in order to obtain a

³⁶ Faust, *Pax Christi et Pax Caesaris*, 482.

³⁷ J. C. Beker, *Heirs of Paul* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 68–71. Similarly, Andreas Lindenmann, *Der Epheserbrief* (ZBK; Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1985), 14, writes, “Auf welche <<Gegenwart>> sich der Epheserbrief bezieht, bleibt leider ganz unklar: Nicht nur die aktuelle kirchengeschichtliche Situation, sondern auch das zeitgeschichtliche religiöse und soziale Umfeld des Epheserbriefes ist nahezu unbekannt.”

profitable reading of Ephesians therefore runs the danger of circular reasoning: data selected from the text of Ephesians are used to postulate the historical situation behind the text, leverage from archaeological data or data obtained from extrabiblical sources fills out the picture, and then the data of Ephesians are reinterpreted within the framework of this reconstructed historical situation. However often this approach is employed in historical critical work, it must always be viewed with caution. Faust builds his argument on the central premise that Gentile Christians had contempt toward Jewish Christians as a result of the humiliating and forced integration of Jews within the *pax Romana* after the Jewish war.³⁸ This position is nevertheless speculative since there is no historical evidence of tension between Gentile Christians and Jewish Christians after the Jewish war.³⁹

Faust considers Philo's gnoseological system to be the underlying substructure of Eph 1–3. Moreover, he argues that the symbolic world of Ephesians is Roman imperial ideology, reading elements in Ephesians as a reactionary counter-response to Roman rule.⁴⁰ But sufficient controls are lacking to support these claims. Can there not be multiple systems of reference? Instead of a gnoseological system of understanding, are there not other strands of Judaism or the OT that support the data better? Instead of an overtly anti-Roman polemic, is it not possible to read Ephesians within a general political

³⁸ So also Karl M. Fischer, *Tendenz und Absicht des Epheserbriefs* (ed. Ernst Käsemann and Ernst Würtheim; FRLANT 111; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973), 79–94.

³⁹ See Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 364n. 52.

⁴⁰ Other recent works which argue for an anti-Roman polemic in Paul's gospel include Richard A. Horsley, ed., *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society* (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1997), 140–204; N. T. Wright, "Paul's Gospel and Caesar's Empire," in *Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium* (ed. Richard A. Horsley; Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2000), 160–83; idem, *Paul: In Fresh Perspective* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005), 59–79; Jacob Taubes, *The Political Theology of Paul* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 13–16.

framework? The purpose of Ephesians then is not to subvert the Roman order but to reorient the worldview and perspective of the community of faith to a far greater spiritual reality, thereby empowering its members to live productively in the present age while relativizing the reigning temporal-political entity.

Finally, Faust relies methodologically on “Strukturhomologien”⁴¹ or parallels between the structures of social reality and religious symbolism. In this schema, “social (or political) structures are not reproduced linguistically unchanged in the religious symbolic world, but they appear transposed in the linguistic realm of religious means of thought (traditions)” (my translation).⁴² While one can imagine why and how certain social structures may be transposed and reconfigured, I am not sure how accurately and to what extent we can reconstruct entire social and political realities from the transposed symbols within a religious symbolic world.

Ann Holmes Redding

Ann Holmes Redding’s dissertation argues that the author of Ephesians employs the motif of unity as a rhetorical “mask” to promote the hierarchical relationships of the household codes.⁴³ Her methodology combines narrative criticism, social analysis, and rhetorical study built upon a liberationist hermeneutic. Using narrative criticism, Redding argues that Ephesians recounts a creation myth of the church on a cosmic scale, a myth in which Jesus overcomes Jew-Gentile antagonism, creates one new

⁴¹ Faust, *Pax Christi et Pax Caesaris*, 224–225, 403–407.

⁴² Faust, *Pax Christi et Pax Caesaris*, 225.

⁴³ Ann Holmes Redding, “Together, Not Equal: The Rhetoric of Unity and Headship in the Letter to Ephesians” (Ph.D. diss.; Union Theological Seminary, 1999).

people out of two warring parties, and empowers the new body politic to demonstrate unity in all aspects of its life.

Redding next interprets this narrative from a social analytic perspective, arguing that it tells a story of characters standing in social relations and power dynamics to one another. God is the *pater familias*; Christ is the broker between God and humanity, the master and Lord of the universe, and the head of the church; Jews and Gentiles are equals within the body of Christ. This power matrix stems from and reflects a deep concern for unity. Thus, the hierarchical cosmic order and the subjection of the church to Christ is a picture of cosmic unity, and the reconciliation between Jews and Gentiles is a picture of ethnic and communal unity.

Having developed this narrative and social framework, Redding then turns toward a rhetorical analysis of Ephesians. She argues that the primary rhetorical goal of Ephesians up to 5:21–33 is to motivate the audience to accept the household codes. The creation myth of the church, together with the cosmic rule of Christ and the reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles, emphasize the importance of unity, thereby necessitating the unequal relationship between husband and wife. But what was the rhetorical situation that prompted the establishment of this code? Redding believes that the situation of women in Ephesians was similar to that of the women prophets in 1 Corinthians.⁴⁴ The wives were assuming more than their fair share of responsibility and leadership in the home and the church. They took active roles in worship, they felt empowered by their direct relationship to Christ, they adopted an ascetic devaluation of

marriage in response to the radical call of Christ, and they understood their reception of spiritual gifts as a means for gaining social status. Such movements destabilized the conservative social order within the family, necessitating the author of Ephesians to reestablish the balance of harmony via the imposition of the household codes.

Redding's reading of Ephesians has merit. She attempts a rhetorical analysis of the entire letter; she raises the possibility that a political rhetoric of unity can be used to maintain a particular power relationship; and although Redding considers Ephesians as a pseudonymous work, her overall approach does not depend on this supposition. Despite these positive traits, Redding's work also has several problems. Redding's ideological stance against the hierarchical structures of Ephesians leads her to adopt a socio-pragmatic rather than a socio-critical hermeneutical approach. In contrast to a socio-critical approach that embodies some trans-contextual or transcendental principle of critique, Redding's hermeneutic, which is based only on the narrative-experience of a community within a given context, effectively curtails in advance all interpretive options other than those that affirm the journey of the community.⁴⁵ Thus, Redding's theological approach effectively filters out from the biblical text any strand that does not affirm the hopes and ambitions of her ideology.⁴⁶ Her hermeneutics does not offer a truly critical enquiry since it forecloses certain interpretive options even before they are interrogated.

⁴⁴ Here, Redding is clearly influenced by the work of Antoinette C. Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990).

⁴⁵ This distinction between socio-pragmatic and socio-critical hermeneutical approaches is from Anthony C. Thiselton, *New Horizons in Hermeneutics* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 440.

⁴⁶ Feminist and liberation theologians typically advocate an a priori ideological stance, insisting that hermeneutical interpretation cannot be neutral. For example, Kwok Pui-Lan, *Discovering the Bible in the Non-Biblical World* (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1995), 51, argues that feminist scholars cannot rely on the historical-critical method or literary criticism since these methods give primacy to the written texts of the Bible. She writes, "The historical-critical method is perhaps the most suitable praxis for white, male,

Redding's reconstruction of the situation of Ephesians based on the women prophets of 1 Corinthians is also highly speculative. There is no actual evidence that the wives of Ephesians were prophesying, leading worship, or vying for upward social mobility. Moreover, Redding considers the rhetorical proposition or thesis of the letter to be 2:14–18. But if this is true, why does Redding consider the rhetorical nexus to fall on the household code? It is true that the household code recapitulates the Christ-church analogy, but 5:21–32 contains no mention of the Jew-Gentile issue and cannot function as the rhetorical nexus of the letter. The household code turns out to be Redding's focus rather than the text's focus.

The Task

My review of the textual data suggests the possibility of reading the entire letter of Ephesians as a politico-religious letter on peace. In addition, my review of earlier investigations reveals the difficulties and missteps associated with such a project. This inquiry examines the topic of peace in Ephesians and alleviates some of the difficulties of prior attempts by comparing the character of the vision of peace in Ephesians with Dio's

middle-class academics, because they alone can afford to be 'impartial', which literally means 'non-committed'. Oppressed women and men of all colors find that the historical-critical method alone cannot help to deal with the burning questions they face" (86). The critical principle of interpretation cannot lie in the Bible itself. Instead, the Bible must be refracted through the lens of the community's experience so that the community can appropriate texts for their own liberation (85). While it is true that any interpreter reads the biblical text through the lens of his or her own experience and is therefore not a neutral interpreter, one must make the distinction between impartiality and neutrality. Even though none of us are neutral interpreters, we should nevertheless strive to be impartial and not exclude certain interpretive options even before we investigate them. As Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (trans. Joe Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall; 2d ed.; London: Sheed and Ward, 1989), 269, remarks, "The important thing is to be aware of one's own bias so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one's own fore-meanings." In a sporting match, one does not expect the referee to be neutral. However, one does expect the referee to be impartial such that he or she will apply the rules of the game equally to both teams.

orations and the Confucian classics. I argue that Ephesians can be profitably read as a political letter on peace and that its vision of peace can best be grasped through comparison with analogous compositions.

I begin with some clarifying comments.

1. Although I acknowledge that there are multiple issues concerning the literary form and genre of Ephesians, Ephesians is *prima facie* a letter. As with other Pauline letters, Ephesians follows the normal pattern of an opening address (1:1–2), a body (1:3–6:20), and closing greetings (6:21–24). Nevertheless, there are variations: Ephesians does not address specific issues and lacks personal greetings; it has an extended eulogy (1:3–14) before the customary thanksgiving and intercession section (1:15–23); the language of eulogy, praise, prayer, and doxology permeates the entire letter, suggesting the presence of hymnic and liturgical fragments; and the intermingling of thanksgiving and paraenetic language blurs the boundaries between the tripartite structure of opening address, body, and closing greetings. These variations lead some scholars to suggest that Ephesians lacks a letter body and thereby deny the epistolary character of Ephesians.⁴⁷

This view gains further support from David Aune. He notes that letters can function not as true letters in the traditional sense but as literary framing devices. He further writes, “Epistolary prescripts and postscripts could be used to frame almost any kind of composition. The epistolary conventions of many letter-essays, philosophical letters, and novelistic and fictional letters functioned frequently in this way.”⁴⁸ In lieu of recognizing the epistolary character of Ephesians, some scholars search for the real form

and genre of the document under its epistolary guise.⁴⁹ However, none of these attempts has proven successful. Given the failure and difficulty of finding an underlying literary form in Ephesians, Rudolf Schnackenburg is probably right when he writes, “The epistolary pattern is not an assumed cloak but a literary form deliberately chosen by the author because it was probably in keeping with the objective or aim of his writing.”⁵⁰ There are theological tendencies in this letter, but “the ‘character’ of the document is consequently so shaped that we must take the epistolary form seriously and look upon Eph. as a theologically-based, pastorally-oriented letter.”⁵¹ Although I accept the

⁴⁷ Martin Dibelius and H. Greeven, *An die Kolosser, Epheser, An Philemon* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1953), 78; and Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 351, suggest that Ephesians lacks a letter body.

⁴⁸ David Aune, *The New Testament in its Literary Environment* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1987), 170.

⁴⁹ For example, E. Käsemann, “Epheserbrief,” *RGG*³ 2:517, considers Ephesians to be fundamentally a theological tractate in epistolary guise (“ein brieflich nur eingekleideter Traktat”), and Heinrich Schlier, *Der Brief an die Epheser* (Düsseldorf: Patmos: 1957), 21, considers Ephesians to be a wisdom discourse (“eine ‘Weisheitsrede’, eine Sophiarede, ein σοφίαν λαλεῖν im Sinn von 1 Kor 2, 6ff”). Although these two views take account of the theological discussions of the church in Ephesians, they do not do justice to the long paraenetic sections in Eph 4–6. John C. Kirby, *Ephesians, Baptism, and the Pentecost* (London: SPCK, 1968), compares Ephesians with the liturgical forms of its milieu, suggesting that “Ephesians has close connections with Jewish liturgical forms and also with Jewish and Christian traditions of Pentecost in the late first century” (149). He further argues that when “the epistolary sections of Ephesians are removed, we are left with a document complete in itself which could be used in an act of worship” (149). While Kirby correctly notes the liturgical character of Ephesians, his proposal cannot be taken seriously since his exegetical foundation for relating Ephesians to Pentecost is tenuous. He argues that the sovereignty of Christ is one of the major themes of Ephesians. For example, Eph 1:20–22 pictures Christ as seated on the right hand of God. Kirby next links 1:20–22 with 1 Pet 3:21–22, a baptismal passage. He argues that the “quotation” of Psa 110:1 in these two passages is also found in Peter’s Pentecostal speech in Acts 2:13–36. Kirby then argues that this motif of the sovereignty of Christ “is also one of the great themes of Hebrews, which we have associated with Pentecost. Its centrality in Ephesians leads us to suggest that Ephesians also has a connection with Pentecost” (139). The steps that Kirby employs in order to move from Ephesians to Acts to the Pentecost are highly speculative. Furthermore, our present knowledge of worship in the first century is far from certain. P. Bradshaw, *The Search for the Origins of Christian Worship* (2d ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 47–59, asserts that we now know much less about the liturgical practices of the first three centuries of Christianity than we once thought we did. He argues that earlier conclusions about worship in the NT were based on flawed methodologies. For example, these conclusions about worship were “arrived at only by assuming that liturgical practices found in later centuries must have been in continuous existence from the first century” (51). The certainty with which we can thus classify Ephesians as a liturgical document is greatly diminished. I do not deny liturgical elements in Ephesians. However, a distinction must be made between the use of liturgical language and the structural form of a liturgy.

⁵⁰ Rudolf Schnackenburg, *Ephesians* (trans. Helen Heron; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 23.

⁵¹ Schnackenburg, *Ephesians*, 23.

epistolary character of Ephesians, the focus of my inquiry is not on the literary form and genre of Ephesians, but on the language and rhetorical character of Ephesians especially concerning the *topos* of peace.⁵²

2. By using the term *topos*, I enter disputed territory. Here is my understanding. The term *topos* lacks any singular meaning. Among ancient authors, Aristotle did not define *topos*; he assumed the word would be easily understood.⁵³ Cicero, on the other hand, defined *topic* as “the region of an argument, and an argument as the course of reasoning which firmly establishes a matter about which there is some doubt.”⁵⁴ Among modern authors, the term *topos* has a wide range of meaning. Michael Leff notes, “The term ‘topic’ incorporates a bewildering diversity of meanings. Hence, among modern authors we find conceptions of the topics ranging from recurrent themes in literature, to heuristic devices that encourage the innovation of ideas, to regions of experience from

⁵² In this study, I use the terms “letter” and “epistle” interchangeably. Although Deismann attempted to make a distinction between literary and non-literary letters (or between “letters” and “epistles”), his view has been adequately refuted by William G. Doty, “Classification of Epistolary Literature,” *CBQ* 31 (1969): 183–99; and E. Randolph Richards, *The Secretary in the Letters of Paul* (WUNT 2.42; Tübingen: Mohr, 1991), 211–216. For further arguments in support of the epistolary character of Ephesians, see A. van Roon, *The Authenticity of Ephesians* (NovTSup 39; Leiden: Brill, 1974), 43–56. For further literature on the NT letter genre in general, see the extensive bibliography in Hoehner, *Ephesians*, 69.n 2.

⁵³ So Carolyn R. Miller, “The Aristotelian *Topos*: Hunting for Novelty,” in *Rereading Aristotle’s Rhetoric* (ed. Alan G. Gross and Arthur E. Walzer; Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000), 132, and George Kennedy, *Aristotle On Rhetoric* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 45. Although Aristotle may not have defined the term, H. M. Hubbell asserts that Aristotle used τόπος to “denote [primarily] the pigeon-hole or region in the mind where similar arguments are stored, and secondarily the type of such similar arguments” (see footnote to Cicero, *Top.* 2.8 [LCL]). In line with Aristotle’s assumed usage, George Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 28, suggests that *topos* literally means “‘place,’ and a ‘topic’ may originally have been the place in a handbook or other written work from which the idea, argument, or form of expression could be borrowed.” See also Thomas Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991), 88–89.

⁵⁴ Cicero, *Top.* 2.8.

which one draws the substance of an argument.”⁵⁵ Some NT scholars go further and consider *topos* as a literary form.⁵⁶ Given the diversity of views, Abraham J. Malherbe suggests that it is perhaps profitable to consider *topoi* as “traditional, fairly systematic treatments of moral subjects which make use of common clichés, maxims, short definitions, and so forth, without thereby sacrificing an individual [author’s] viewpoint.”⁵⁷ This understanding of *topos* falls in line with Aristotle’s usage of the term. Most rhetoricians agree that Aristotle used *topos* in two ways: specific and common.⁵⁸ *Specific topoi* (ἴδια or στοιχεῖα) refer to particular or special material belonging to separate disciplines; *common topoi* (κοινά) refer to common rhetorical strategies or arguments that can be used in different subject matters as discussed by Aristotle in *Rhet.* 2.23 (1397A–1400B). In this study, I use the former sense of *topos*: a familiar set of deliberative arguments, strategies, and motifs that deal especially with the specific subject of peace.

3. I define “politics” or “the political” broadly as activities that concern the allocation and determination of values, resources, power, and status within a

⁵⁵ Michael Leff, “The Topics of Argumentative Invention in Latin Rhetorical theory from Cicero to Boethius,” *Rhetorica* 1 (1983): 23–24.

⁵⁶ See D. Bradley, “The *Topos* as a Form in the Pauline Paraenesis,” *JBL* 72 (1953): 238–46, who considers *topos* as a literary form. T. Y. Mullins, “*Topos* as a New Testament Form,” *JBL* 99 (1980): 541–47, extends upon Bradley’s work and suggests that the “*Topos* is a form with three essential elements: *injunction, reason, and discussion*” (547). These two views adopt too stringent a formal analysis. I agree with Luke T. Johnson, “James 3:13–4:10 and the *TOPOS* ΠΕΡΙ ΦΘΟΝΟΥ,” *NovT* 25 (1983): 334n. 33, who writes, “*Topoi* in the Hellenistic writings resemble clusters of themes, and they can be fit to many forms and are found in many variations.”

⁵⁷ Abraham J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 144.

⁵⁸ Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.2.21–22 (1358A); see Kennedy, *Aristotle On Rhetoric*, 46n. 71.

community.⁵⁹ Politics does not involve only the government; it is found in all organized social groups. Adam Leftwich remarks,

Politics is *not* a separate realm of public life and activity. On the contrary, politics comprises all the activities of co-operation and conflict, within and between societies, whereby the human species goes about organizing the use, production and distribution of human, natural and other *resources* [material or non-material things that further various ends] in the course of the production and reproduction of its biological and social life. These activities are nowhere isolated from other features of life in society, private or public. They everywhere both influence *and* reflect the distribution of power and patterns of decision-making, the structure of social organization, and the systems of culture and ideology in society or groups within it.⁶⁰

By focusing on activities, either actions or thoughts, which allocate or determine resources and power structures, politics can be understood and observed within multiple frames of reference: the household, the empire, the state, the heavenly and earthly realms (Eph 1:10; 3:15; 4:9–10), and the ἐκκλησία in its local, global, and heavenly manifestations. More important, the focus on activities rather than formal structures of political institutions allows us to compare the similarities and differences in “the political” within the Ephesian, Dionic, and Confucian frames of reference.

4. In calling Ephesians a politico-religious letter, I am consciously acknowledging that the subject matter of Ephesians straddles both political and religious dimensions. Unlike present day America which draws a sharp division between church and state, the

⁵⁹ David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 50, remarks, “What distinguishes political interactions from all other kinds of social interactions is that they are predominantly oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values (or valued things) for a society. Political research would thus seek to understand that system of interactions in any society through which such binding or authoritative allocations are made and implemented.” See also my discussion in the introductory section of chapter 3.

⁶⁰ Adam Leftwich, *What is Politics? The Activity and its Study* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 64–65.

categories of *political* and *religious* cannot be easily separated in antiquity.⁶¹ For example, divination, the interpretation of supernatural signs and portents, and the adoption of consequent practical steps was an essential part of Roman political machinery.⁶²

Moreover, in arguing that Ephesians is political, I am not claiming that it is a letter crafted *solely* for the *topos* of peace; neither do I claim that every pericope in the letter can be mined for its contribution to this *topos*. I only make the more modest claim that there is a dominant and palpable *topos* of peace that runs through a significant portion of the entire letter.

5. This study focuses not so much on the linguistic term εἰρήνη but on the concept of *peace* in Ephesians. While texts effect an integration of terms and ideas such that there is a particular set of relations between lexis and concept, we must differentiate between the study of words and the study of concepts.⁶³ In this study, I understand *peace* at least to be freedom from hostilities, divisions, disorder, quarrels, and dissensions. The focus of my study centers on the inter-relational dynamics between communities, groups,

⁶¹ See chapter one of S. R. F. Price, *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). On the religious and political nature of concord, see Eiliv Skard, *Zwei religiös-politische Begriffe: euergetes-concordia* (Avhandlingar utgitt av Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo, II; Hist.-filos. Klasse 1931, no. 2; Oslo: Dybwad, 1932).

⁶² M. I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 93, writes, “It was equally characteristic of the Romans that this great power of [divination], and indeed all aspects of official religion, were fully incorporated into the governmental apparatus; that the pontiffs, the augurs and the others entitled to perform sacrifices, organize cult activities and interpret the divine signs were men who also sat in the Senate and held magistracies.... Every public act in antiquity was preceded by an attempt to gain supernatural support, through prayers, sacrifices or vows. [The Romans on the other hand went further] and also sought to divine the attitude of the gods in advance.”

⁶³ The failure to maintain this distinction is seen in Kittel’s TDNT. Although the TDNT seeks to deal with the task of NT conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*; preface to TWNT, vol. 1), the nature of TDNT is a dictionary of Greek words rather than a dictionary of concepts. See the critique by James Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 206–62. For a study of the lexical term εἰρήνη in the NT linguistic system, see Matthys Klemm, *EIPHNH im neutestamentlichen Sprachsystem: Eine Bestimmung von lexikalischen Bedeutungen durch Wortfeld-Funktionen und deren Darstellung mittels EDV* (Forum Theologiae Linguisticae 8; Bonn: Linguistic Biblica Bonn, 1977).

and peoples, rather than on the intra-personal or psychological dimension such as freedom from fear, anxiety, or guilt. My understanding of peace therefore includes political concepts such as harmony, stability, unity, reconciliation, and concord.⁶⁴

Providing an initial working definition of peace may seem odd since my project seeks to elucidate the character of peace in Ephesians, Dio's orations, and the Confucian classics. Am I presupposing my conclusions? No. The problem that interpreters face in discussing ideas encapsulated in languages that are as different as my twenty-first-century English, pre-Han-dynasty (206 B.C.E. – 220 C.E.) literary Chinese, Dio's first-century C.E. atticized Greek, and Paul's first-century koine Greek, is to develop a focal concept with which we can then use to interrogate texts from the above linguistic and cultural worlds. The Greek word εἰρήνη and the Chinese word 和平 *heping* can both be roughly translated by the English word *peace*. However, the semantic fields of the three terms *peace*, εἰρήνη, and 和平 *heping* do not correspond exactly. Given this lack of univocal correspondence, it is perhaps prudent to derive *initially* the meaning of my focal concept from contemporary English usage, and then *subsequently* adjust the semantic field of the concept of peace as we interrogate each set of texts. I choose the English *peace* rather than εἰρήνη or 和平 *heping* as my starting point because I am most familiar with the nuances of contemporary English usage. Moreover, most of the theological literature

⁶⁴ This understanding of peace coheres with the first four entries for *peace* in the second edition of the *OED*. The *OED* defines *peace* as: "1.a. Freedom from, or cessation of, war or hostilities; that condition of a nation or community in which it is not at war with another.... 2. Freedom from civil commotion and disorder; public order and security.... 3.a. Freedom from disturbance or perturbation (esp. as a condition in which an individual person is); quiet, tranquility, undisturbed state.... 4.a. Freedom from quarrels or dissension between individuals; a state of friendliness; concord, amity.... 5. Freedom from mental or spiritual disturbance or conflict arising from passion, sense of guilt, etc.; calmness.... 6.a. Absence of noise, movement, or activity; stillness, quiet; inertness."

that I access is in the English language, and English is the language medium of my primary readers.

Assumptions and Guidelines

Any reading of Ephesians carries with it a particular set of assumptions and guidelines. For example, both Faust and Redding assume that Ephesians is pseudonymous; Redding moreover reads Ephesians within the framework of feminist ideology. Here are the assumptions and guidelines of my inquiry.

Ephesians is authentic

In contrast to the majority scholarly opinion that considers Ephesians to be pseudonymous, I assume Paul either authored or supervised the writing of the letter. It is beyond the scope of this section to treat the issue of authenticity in detail; nevertheless, a few brief remarks are in order.⁶⁵

1. Scholars consider Ephesians to be inauthentic because of its “non-Pauline” style and language. Ephesians contains long sentences that are extended by relative clauses or participial phrases (e.g. 1:3-14, 15-23) and uses synonyms linked by genitival constructions for rhetorical effect (e.g. κατὰ τὴν βουλήν τοῦ θελήματος, 1:11; κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ κράτους τῆς ἰσχύος, 1:19). The letter also employs words or phrases that are not found in the “genuine” Pauline corpus (e.g. ἀσωτία, 5:18; ἐνότης, 4:3, 13; πολιτεία, 2:12) or uses different words to refer to the same thing. For example, the “authentic” Paul

⁶⁵ For further arguments on the authenticity of Ephesians, see van Roon, *The Authenticity of Ephesians*; Ernst Percy, *Die Probleme der Kolosser- und Epheserbriefe* (Acta Regiae Societatis Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis 39; Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1946); H. J. Cadbury, “The Dilemma of Ephesians,” *NTS* 5

typically uses “Satan” (Σατανᾶς, Rom 16:20; 1 Cor 5:5; 7:5; 2 Cor 2:11; 11:14; 12:7; 1 Thess 2:18) while Ephesians uses “devil” (διάβολος, 4:27; 6:11) instead.⁶⁶ But the occurrence of distinctive vocabulary should not be surprising since many of the undoubtedly genuine epistles demonstrate a higher percentage of *hapax legomena*. P. N. Harrison notes that Ephesians has 4.6 *hapax legomena* per page while Philippians and 2 Corinthians have a higher ratio of 6.2 and 5.6 respectively.⁶⁷ Furthermore, it is difficult to determine authorship based on style and language since such attempts set arbitrary limits on the creative freedom that authors can exercise.

2. A more serious challenge to the authenticity of Ephesians comes from its distinctive theological perspective. Werner Kümmel remarks, “The theology of Eph makes the Pauline composition of the letter completely impossible.”⁶⁸ Ephesians sees the church to be built on the “foundation of the apostles and prophets, with Christ Jesus himself as the cornerstone” (2:20); Paul considers the foundation to be Jesus Christ (1 Cor 3:11). Ephesians presents the reconciliation between Jews and Gentiles as a present reality; Romans 9–11 speak of it as a future hope. Moreover, Ephesians describes believers as being “saved (σώζω) through faith (διὰ πίστεως)”; Paul typically uses “justified (δικαίω) out of faith (ἐκ πίστεως).” Ephesians may manifest variations from the other Pauline epistles, but this need not imply different authorship. The theology of Ephesians still falls within the boundaries of the other Pauline letters. Frederick W. Danker begins

(1958): 91–102; Luke T. Johnson, *The Writings of the New Testament* (rev. ed.; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 401–12; Hoehner, *Ephesians*, 2–61; O’Brien, *Ephesians*, 4–47; Barth, *Ephesians*, 1:36–50.

⁶⁶ Both Σατανᾶς and διάβολος occur in 1 Timothy. This evidence is, however, discounted since many consider the Pastorals to be deutero-Pauline.

⁶⁷ P. N. Harrison, *The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles* (Humphrey: Oxford University Press, 1921), 20.

⁶⁸ Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 360.

his section on the theology of Ephesians with the remark, “Beyond question this Epistle fits within boundaries largely familiar in other Pauline letters.”⁶⁹ The theological variations can be attributed to a development of Paul’s thought or to the different circumstances and purposes surrounding the letter.

3. A majority of scholars argue that the literary relationship between Ephesians and Colossians makes Pauline authorship impossible. For example, Andrew T. Lincoln states, “Most decisive against Paul as author of Ephesians is its dependence on Colossians and its use of other Pauline letters, particularly Romans.”⁷⁰ In this view, a pseudepigrapher copied major portions of Colossians (which some consider to be authentic) and supplemented it with vocabulary and themes from the other Pauline letters in order to give the impression that Paul wrote Ephesians. But this view is weak since “the whole idea behind pseudepigraphy is to replicate the thought and style of the exemplar as closely as possible.”⁷¹ We should therefore not expect to see substantive theological variations between Ephesians and Colossians or the other Pauline letters. Another central issue in Lincoln’s argument is the vector of dependence between Colossians and Ephesians. There are four possible solutions: (A) the author of Ephesians used Colossians; (B) the author of Colossians used Ephesians; (C) neither author used the other’s letter; or (D) each author used the other’s letter.⁷² Current scholarship assumes the first option, a position so entrenched that many introductory books on the New

⁶⁹ F. W. Danker, “Ephesians,” *ISBE* 2:113–14.

⁷⁰ Andrew T. Lincoln and A. J. M. Wedderburn, *The Theology of the Later Pauline Letters* (ed. James D. G. Dunn; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 84.

⁷¹ Johnson, *Writings of the New Testament*, 409.

⁷² Ernest Best, “Who Used Whom? The Relationship of Ephesians and Colossians,” *NTS* 43 (1997): 96.

Testament espouse this view without further discussion.⁷³ The issue is, however, more complex since various parallel passages suggest the priority of Ephesians.⁷⁴ Nils Dahl remarks that that the oldest strata of common material between Ephesians and Colossians are found in both letters, and there is the strong possibility that both letters reproduce common traditions.⁷⁵ Thus, the vector of dependence cannot be definitively answered, and the force of Lincoln's argument is diminished.

Emphasis on the rhetorical character

My investigation of the *topos* of peace focuses on the overall rhetorical character of Ephesians. Since any attempt to find an architectonic structure within a particular document is prone to the subjectivity of the investigator, what are my controls? An internal control is provided by the coherence between hypothesis and data. My suggestion as to the character of Ephesians must explain material in both the theological and paraenetic sections of the letter, and it must have sufficient explanatory power to tie most of the various themes and motifs of the letter together. An external control is

⁷³ Dennis C. Duling, *The New Testament: History, Literature, and Social Context* (4th ed.; Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson, 2003), 272, writes, "Ephesians constantly quotes and develops Colossians."

⁷⁴ One such example is the parallelism between Eph 1:4 (ἅγιους καὶ ἀμώμους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ) and Col 1:22 (παραστήσαι ὑμᾶς ἁγίους καὶ ἀμώμους καὶ ἀνεγκλήτους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ). Several points suggest that Colossians is dependent on Ephesians: (1) The phrase ἅγιους καὶ ἀμώμους in Eph 1:4 is a natural and integral part of the larger pericope of 1:3–14 which deals with election. (2) If we follow the text critical principle that the shorter reading is to be preferred, we may argue that the author of Colossians added ἀνεγκλήτους to the phrase ἅγιους καὶ ἀμώμους. (3) The phrase ἅγιους καὶ ἀμώμους in Eph 1:4 also occurs in Eph 5:27. It may be easier to assume that the author of Colossians combined both occurrences in Eph 1:4 and 5:27 into Col 1:22 rather than the author of Ephesians removing ἀνεγκλήτους and inserting the phrase ἅγιους καὶ ἀμώμους into two separate places. For other arguments concerning the priority of Ephesians, see Heinrich J. Holtzmann, *Kritik der Epheser- und Kolosserbriefe* (Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1872); J. Coutts, "The Relationship of Ephesians and Colossians," *NTS* 4 (1958): 201–207; van Roon, *The Authenticity of Ephesians*, 414–15.

⁷⁵ Nils Dahl, "Der Epheserbrief und der verlorene, erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther," in *Abraham unser Vater: Juden und Christen im Gespräch über die Bibel* (Leiden: Brill, 1963), 71. See also Dibelius and Greeven, *An die Kolosser, Epheser, An Philemon*, 113.

provided by the coherence between my hypothesis concerning Ephesians and the presence of the same motifs in analogous documents. If I argue that Document A uses X motif in support of a particular purpose, I should also be able to demonstrate how an analogous document (Document B) uses X motif in support of a similar purpose. On a practical level, external and internal controls influence each other since an exegetical analysis within the internal control process necessitates some comparison with external documents. For example, an assessment of the political character of the term εἰρήνη is best done in comparison with other political texts.

Given the general nature of the letter and its lack of specific details, it is more profitable to focus on the text rather than on issues behind the text. I do ask historical and social questions, and I locate Ephesians within the 60s of the first century C.E. in Asia Minor. I, however, eschew detailed discussions of provenance or occasion, structuring my analysis so that it is not dependent on the reconstruction of a *specific* Ephesian community or historical situation behind the writing of the letter. Moreover, I also employ a comparative literary-rhetorical approach, seeking to determine the rhetorical character of Ephesians by way of comparison with Colossians, Dio's orations, and the Confucian classics.

Comparison of Ephesians vis-à-vis Colossians

The thematic, lexical, and literary similarities between Ephesians and Colossians are clear. Carl Holladay remarks, "No other pair of Pauline letters exhibits the kind of

kinship patterns we find between Colossians and Ephesians.”⁷⁶ Given the similarities, I believe that a comparison of these two works will serve as a satisfactory starting point in our investigation of the rhetorical character of Ephesians. One could, to be sure, begin the investigation by comparing Ephesians with another Pauline letter such as Romans. Nevertheless, the broad differences in themes and motifs between Ephesians and Romans would generate multiple points of enquiry that would not necessarily provide sufficient focus and precision for perceiving the rhetorical character of Ephesians.

While the thematic and literary similarities between Ephesians and Colossians are clear, the vector of dependence between these two works is not, and is related to issues of authorship. In contrast to the scholarly consensus, I proceed with the assumption that the apostle Paul authored both Colossians and Ephesians—Paul wrote or supervised the writing of both works.⁷⁷ The similarities and differences between the two works arise from the presupposition that both works were probably written at about the same time and that the thoughts of each letter were crafted and modified for a different readership facing a different set of circumstances. Colossians is written to the church at Colossae to address the crisis of the Colossian φιλοσοφία (Col 2:8). Ephesians, however, is a circular letter intended for various churches in and around Ephesus and perhaps more broadly within Asia Minor. If we are correct in our assumption that Paul authored both works *at about the same time*, it is then difficult if not impossible to postulate any definite vector of

⁷⁶ Carl R. Holladay, *A Critical Introduction to the New Testament: Interpreting the Message and Meaning of Jesus Christ* (2 vols.; Nashville: Abingdon, 2005), 578.

dependence between them. Even if we agree with van Roon that Paul wrote an original document that was later reworked by his disciples to produce Colossians and Ephesians,⁷⁸ we do not have enough data to reconstruct this hypothetical document. Thus, any attempt to construct a complete vector of dependence between Ephesians and Colossians is suspect.

My approach examines the similarities and differences between the two texts in order to determine the theological and thematic emphases of Ephesians. The tools that I use in my comparison are similar to those used in redaction analysis *except* that I am not assuming any vector of dependence between Ephesians and Colossians.⁷⁹ I compare parallel material between the two works, examining them at both the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, I seek to determine if there is any divergence in the metanarratives that each composition relates. Questions that I ask include the following: What is the overall context of the narrative of alienation and reconciliation? What is the role of the apostle Paul within this narrative? What is the function of the church? What are the ethical injunctions? At the micro level, I seek to determine whether similar words and phrases are used with different meanings and nuances. Apart from parallel texts, I

⁷⁷ See arguments presented by O'Brien, *Ephesians*, 47; Johnson, *Writings of the New Testament*, 387; Markus Barth and Helmut Blanke, *Colossians* (AB 34B; New York: Doubleday, 1994), 125; Barth, *Ephesians*, 1:41; van Roon, *The Authenticity of Ephesians*, 431.

⁷⁸ Van Roon, *The Authenticity of Ephesians*, 429.

⁷⁹ In contrast to my approach, Jennifer Kay Berenson Maclean, "Ephesians and the Problem of Colossians: Interpretation of Texts and Traditions in Eph 1:1-2:10" (Ph.D. diss.; Harvard University, 1995), presupposes the pseudonymity of Ephesians and the priority of Colossians. Her work examines the "technical redactional practices applied by the author of Ephesians to his use of Colossians and of the general Pauline letters, and the theological tendencies revealed by this redaction" (7). See also George H. van Kooten, *Cosmic Christology in Paul and the Pauline School: Colossians and Ephesians in the Context of Graeco-Roman Cosmology, with a New Synopsis of the Greek Texts* (WUNT 2.171; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), who argues, "The author of *Eph* is literarily dependent on *Col*, adopted almost its entire structure, but modified its cosmological tenets" (6).

also examine material that is unique to Ephesians since such material accentuates the particular contribution and character of the letter. I do not examine in detail material that is unique to Colossians since such an inquiry will not yield significant fruit in my understanding of the character of Ephesians except by way of negative example.

Comparison of the vision of peace in the orations of Dio Chrysostom and Ephesians

I next compare Ephesians with the orations of Dio Chrysostom. My reasons are twofold. First, the works of Dio and Ephesians share a common milieu. Although the location of Ephesians cannot be determined precisely, its similarity to Colossians suggests that it was written in Asia Minor.⁸⁰ Dio was a native of Asia Minor. He traveled widely, giving speeches in Rhodes, Alexandria, Tarsus, Nicomedia, Nicaea, and the Bithynian cities. Furthermore, Paul and Dio are also roughly contemporary. Dio lived between 45–115 C.E., and I date Ephesians to approximately 62 C.E.⁸¹ Finally, both Ephesians and Dio's orations are written in Greek and share common philological features, most notably of which is the presence of εἰρήνη and semantically related words.

Second, both Dio and Paul serve as intermediaries between different interest groups and powers. Dio functions as a mediator between emperors and subjects, between governors and cities, and between the elite and the populace. Paul, on the other hand, is an apostle of Christ Jesus through the will of God (1:1), a prisoner of Christ Jesus on behalf of the Gentiles (3:1), a herald of the mystery of Christ (3:4), and a herald of the peace that now exists between Jews and Gentiles. As communicators and intermediaries between

⁸⁰ Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 366; Schnackenburg, *Ephesians*, 36–37; Andreas Lindemann, *Epheserbrief* (ZBK; Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1985), 12; Udo Schnelle, *The History and Theology of the New Testament Writings* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 303.

different groups and powers, both Dio and Paul seek to promote peace, unity, and harmony within the communities they address.

The process of comparing Ephesians with Dio's orations begins first by selecting the appropriate texts for comparison. The works of Dio that I primarily examine include the *Kingship Orations* (Or. 1–4) and a selection of the *Bithynian Orations* (Or. 38–41, 48). The second stage is to elucidate Dio's vision of peace. I approach his orations with the following diagnostic questions: What is the nature of peace? What is its basis? How is it attained and maintained? What are its impediments? How does Dio structure his appeals for peace? What are the elements underpinning his vision of peace? What is its scope and frame of reference? The third stage in the comparative process is the actual comparative work. Although I pay particular attention to how each author understands the nature of peace and constructs his vision, the specific items of comparison will arise from the results of the prior investigative stage.

Comparison of the vision of peace in the Confucian classics and Ephesians

The other set of analogous documents with which I compare Ephesians are the Confucian classics.⁸² The choice is less farfetched than it may at first appear. It is a

⁸¹ See Barth, *Ephesians*, 1:51.

⁸² Although there are several monographs that compare Christianity and Confucianism in broad strokes, I am not aware of any that carefully compares Ephesians with Confucian texts. Monographs that compare Christianity and Confucianism include Julia Ching, *Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1977); Yo Sub Yang, *Vollkommenheit nach paulinischem und konfuzianischem Verständnis: Ein Vergleich der Begriffe "téleios" bei Paulus und "Chéng" beim Verfasser des Buches "Chung-Yung"* (St. Ottilien: EOS, 1984); Lee H. Yearley, *Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990); Peter K. H. Lee, *Confucian-Christian Encounters in Historical and Contemporary Perspective* (Religions in dialogue 5; Lewiston: E. Mellen, 1991); Heup Young Kim, "Sanctification and Self-Cultivation: A Study of Karl Barth and Neo-Confucianism (Wang Yang-Ming)" (Ph.D. diss.; Graduate Theological Union, 1992); John H. Berthrong, *All Under Heaven: Transforming Paradigms in Confucian-Christian Dialogue* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994); Xinzhong Yao, *Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study of Jen and Agape* (Brighton, U.K.: Sussex Academic Press, 1996); Yanxia

mistake to consider Confucian thought to be *utterly different* or *unique* with respect to Ephesians such as to make any comparison futile or illegitimate. I argue that the differences or *otherness* between Confucian thought and Ephesians should generate cognitive possibilities because “something is ‘other’ only with respect to something ‘else.’ Whether understood politically or linguistically, ‘otherness’ is a situational category [not a descriptive category]. Despite its apparent taxonomic exclusivity, ‘otherness’ is a transactional matter, an affair of the ‘in between.’”⁸³ The issue is thus not the cultural or temporal distance between the two objects of study but the mode of relationship that the scholar brings the two objects into dialogue.

The comparison of Ephesians with the Confucian classics serves as a counterbalance to the comparison with Dio’s orations. Some of the dangers of comparing works from the same cultural milieu are an overdependence on philology and the danger of drawing large conclusions from small linguistic details.⁸⁴ Thus, by comparing Ephesians with the Confucian classics, we guard against these dangers and ensure that our overall comparative project is both philological and conceptual. By comparing Ephesians to authors both *within* and *without* its milieu, we obtain a more accurate picture of the *topos* of peace in Ephesians.

In comparing Ephesians to the Confucian classics, I do not follow the method of the History of Religions School; I look for analogy rather than homology (or genealogy). I

Zhao, *Father and Son in Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study of Xunzi and Paul* (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2007).

⁸³ Jonathan Z. Smith, “What a Difference a Difference Makes,” in *Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 275.

⁸⁴ See Luke Johnson, *Religious Experience in Earliest Christianity* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 18n. 64, regarding Reitzenstein’s precipitous conclusions based on overdrawn linguistic parallels.

do not attempt to determine how things “are,” but how things might be conceived or “redescribed.”⁸⁵ The vision of peace in Ephesians can be examined without comparing it to similar arguments in the Confucian classics. Indeed, the vision of peace in Ephesians can also be analyzed without comparison to Dio’s orations. But when we place Ephesians alongside other similar texts, be they of the same or different milieus, similarities in differences and differences in similarities are amplified, enabling a clearer perspective of the political character of the vision of peace in Ephesians.⁸⁶

The Confucian classics make for a good comparison with Ephesians because both share a grand vision of peace. The Ephesian vision of peace encompasses the family, the local church, the universal church, and the cosmic universe; the Confucian vision of peace likewise encompasses the family, the feudal states, the empire, the world, and the cosmos. Furthermore, both texts demonstrate a complex relationship between ethics, politics, and metaphysics or cosmology. For example, the Confucian vision of social order is heavily dependent on proper social and familial ethics and etiquette. An understanding of the Confucian relationship between ethics, politics, and metaphysics, may then give us

⁸⁵ Jonathan Z. Smith, *Drudgery Divine* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 52–53, writes, “A comparison is a disciplined exaggeration in the service of knowledge. It lifts out and strongly marks certain features within difference as being of possible intellectual significance, expressed in the rhetoric of their being ‘like’ in some stipulated fashion. Comparison provides the means by which we ‘re-vision’ phenomena as *our* data in order to solve *our* theoretical problems.... Comparison ... is an active, at times even playful, enterprise of deconstruction and reconstitution which, kaleidoscope-like, gives the scholars a shifting set of characteristics with which to negotiate the relations between his or her theoretical interests and data stipulated as exemplary. The comparative enterprise provides a set of perspectives which ‘serve different analytic purposes by emphasizing varied aspects’ of the object of study.” Arvind Sharma, *Religious Studies And Comparative Methodology: The Case For Reciprocal Illumination* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005), 247, also stresses the need for *reciprocal illumination*, a comparative approach that seeks to compare “things not in order to judge one item in terms of another, but to see how our understanding of the items themselves is enhanced in the process.”

⁸⁶ The comparative nature of my method is important for “as in language, as in any science, the absolutely vital principle is that of comparison. To argue from one single religious tradition is to cut

fresh insight to appreciate and understand the rhetorical character of the Ephesian vision of peace.

My comparative literary and rhetorical approach does not necessitate comparison with Chinese Confucian texts. Ephesians can equally be compared to an East Indian political text. The Confucian texts are appropriate for the following reasons. My interest in the Confucian texts arises from my own social location as a Chinese exegete. Confucianism is also not a moribund religion or philosophy. On the contrary, it forms a prominent part of the political, religious, and cultural landscape of modern Asia and South-East Asia. Moreover, the attempt to put Ephesians in conversation with Confucian texts will help foster inter-religious dialogue and enable us to address the challenges of Asia's pluralistic society.

The procedure for comparing the visions of peace in Ephesians and the Confucian classics follows the same steps as that for Dio. The major difference is the selection of the appropriate texts for comparison. In this study, I investigate the Confucian *Four Books* (*Sishu* 四书), focusing especially on the *Great Learning* (*Daxue* 大学) and the *Practice of the Mean* (*Zhongyong* 中庸).⁸⁷ Specific reasons for the selection of these texts are provided in chapter five.

oneself off from the springs of the new knowledge" (Eric J. Sharpe, *Comparative Religion: A History* [2d ed.; London: Duckworth, 1986], 31).

⁸⁷ The *Daxue* is also rendered as *The Highest Order of Cultivation*; the *Zhongyong* is also rendered as *The Mean*, *The Doctrine of the Mean*, or *Application of the Inner*. Apart from these two texts, the *Sishu* also contains the *Analects* (*Lunyu* 论语) and the *Book of Mencius* (*Mengzi* 孟子). The authorship and dating of these Confucian classics is a matter of great debate. In this footnote, I can only provide a brief introduction to current scholarship consensus. The *Analects* is the primary source by which we know Confucius and his teachings. According to the *History of the Han* (汉书; 30:1717), the historian Ban Gu (班固; 32–92 C.E.) stated that the disciples of Confucius remembered the teachings of their master to varying degrees and compiled their notes to form the *Analects* after his death. Although all scholars acknowledge

I recognize that doing cross-cultural comparative work is fraught with methodological pitfalls, not least is the danger of imposing Western assumptions about rhetoric on the Confucian texts as I seek to determine their character and argument. One should however keep in mind that although the Chinese did not have a fully codified and canonized rhetorical system such as that found in Greco-Roman rhetoric,⁸⁸ this does not imply that rhetoric did not exist in ancient China.⁸⁹ On the contrary, classical Chinese

that the present edition of the *Analects* is a heterogeneous collection, the degree of disparity and heterogeneity is a matter of dispute. D. C. Lau (*Confucius: Analects* [2d ed.; trans. D. C. Lau; Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1993], 274–275) divides the text into three strata of varying dates. However, E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks, *The Original Analects* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), see each of the twenty books of the *Analects* as representing a different stratum. The earliest stratum is book four which goes back to Confucius himself; the latest stratum is book twenty which they date to around 249 B.C.E. Recently, Edward Slingerland follows Cui Shu's (崔述; 1740–1816 C.E.) division of the *Analects* into two strata of different ages, but he considers no stratum to be composed after the early-fourth century B.C.E. (*Confucius: Analects* [trans. Edward Slingerland; Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003], xv).

Early tradition attributes the *Daxue* to Zengzi (曾子; ca. 505–432 B.C.E.) and the *Zhongyong* to Zisi (子思; ca. 483–402 B.C.E.), grandson of Confucius. However, Andrew Plaks asserts that these two works whose textual history are intertwined were “in all probability compiled and eventually put into their final versions after the Ch'in period and before the end of the first century BCE” (Andrew Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung* [London: Penguin, 2003], 121). As for the text of *Mencius*, there is debate as to whether the book was written by Mencius (ca. 372–289 B.C.E.) or was compiled by his disciples. The latter option seems preferable. However, D. C. Lau considers the extant text of *Mencius* to be authentic in that “the words contained in it are [Mencius's] very words, or as near to being his very words as to make little difference, and carry with them the same authority as if he had written them himself” (*Mencius* [trans. D. C. Lau; London: Penguin, 1970], 221).

⁸⁸ The study of Chinese rhetoric in the English language is still in its infancy. For a survey of the current set of issues and questions, see Bo Wang, “A Survey of Research in Asian Rhetoric,” *Rhetoric Review* 23 (2004): 171–181.

⁸⁹ This faulty view stems from the misconception that the Eastern mind is irrational and non-logical. For example, Robert Oliver, *Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971), 10, writes, “The ancient East has not been much interested in logic, which necessarily correlated unlike elements, nor has it favored either definition or classification as aids to clear thought.” Carl C. Becker, “Reasons for the Lack of Argumentation and Debate in the Far East,” *International Journal of Intercultural Relation* 10 (1986): 84, attributes this condition to the “consequent ambiguities,” the “inabilities to make fine distinctions and abstractions,” and “the lack of logical rules and constraints” in the Chinese language. As an example of the lack of formal logical systems in the Chinese language, Becker writes, “One can add characters to a sentence in order to negate it, but adding two of them does not make a double negation, as a Western observer might wish, nor return the sentence to its unnegated meaning” (83). But Becker is clearly mistaken in assuming that the inability of a language to un-negate a clause by the placement of two negative particles indicates a language's inability to formulate logical systems. An example from Koine Greek (a language which Becker clearly acknowledges to possess a formal logical system) will prove my point. In Koine Greek, the construction “οὐ μή + aorist subjunctive” is a stronger prohibition than “μή + aorist subjunctive.” Thus, the

texts evince a clear understanding of the power and impact of language on political, moral, and social contexts. Furthermore, it is a mistake to consider Chinese rhetoric and modes of reasoning to be diametrically different from Greco-Roman rhetoric.⁹⁰ Xing Lu suggests that despite the differences between Chinese and Greco-Roman rhetorical systems, there are similarities that “point to the possibility of a universal sense of rhetoric which transcends culturally specific factors even while embracing them.”⁹¹ Such similarities suggest that it is possible and even fruitful to compare how Ephesians, Dio Chrysostom, and the Confucian texts develop, structure, present, and argue their respective vision of peace. While questions about formal categories of cross-cultural rhetoric are interesting, my focus in this study is on how things are said and how

combination of the two negative participles οὐ and μή does not result in non-negation. On the contrary, it intensifies the force of the negative injunction. As for the Chinese language, Christoph Harbsmeier, *Language and Logic* (vol. 7, part 1 of *Science and Civilisation in China*; ed. Joseph Needham; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954–1998), 111–12, writes, “The system of Chinese negation shows considerable subtlety and precision. Moreover, when it comes to the problems of so-called ‘cumulative negation’, Classical Chinese shows distinctly greater logical discipline than, say, Classical Greek or Modern English.” He also notes, “The Chinese language is reasonably well equipped to express rational argumentation, ... and the ancient Chinese have many current forms of argumentation in common with their contemporary Greeks” (xxiii). For discussions on negation in Classical Chinese grammar, see idem, *Aspects of Classical Chinese Syntax* (Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series 45; London: Curzon, 1981), 17–48; Edwin G. Pulleyblank, *Outline of Classical Chinese Grammar* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995), 103–11.

⁹⁰ For example, Sharon Blinn and Mary Garrett, “Aristotelian *Topoi* as a Cross-Cultural Analytical Tool,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 26 (1993): 93–112, examine the *Zhan Guo Ce* (战国策), and their analysis indicates that this text does employ Aristotelian *topoi* such as more and less (*a fortiori*), cause to effect, and simple consequences. J. I. Crump, Jr., *Intrigues: Studies of the Chan-kuo Ts’e* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964), 100, also argues, “Every conceivable stylistic device is employed in [the stories of the *Zhan Guo Ce*], and the type of attention devoted to polished language found in it is so completely analogous to Greek rhetorical preoccupations that it makes one uncomfortable.” See also Ulrich Unger, *Rhetorik des Klassischen Chinesisch* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1994), who shows how various Greek rhetorical concepts, such as τρόποι or ἀναφορά, may be found in pre-Han texts, even though none of these rhetorical phenomena is defined or named in pre-Han Chinese. For a careful review of Unger’s work and a brief overview of published works on Chinese rhetoric, see Christoph Harbsmeier, “Chinese Rhetoric,” *T’oung Pao* 通報 85 (1999): 114–26.

⁹¹ Xing Lu, *Rhetoric in Ancient China, Fifth to Third Century B.C.E.: A Comparison with Classical Greek Rhetoric* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 303.

language, themes, and motifs are used in argumentation rather than on identifying structural or semantic correspondences between rhetorical systems.

Summary and Looking Ahead

In this chapter I presented initial evidence that shows the possibility of reading the entire letter of Ephesians as a politico-religious letter on peace. I then examined the works of two scholars, Faust and Redding, who undertook a similar enterprise, noting the difficulties of their approaches and suggesting various guidelines to alleviate them. Specifically, my investigation of the *topos* of peace in Ephesians focuses on its rhetorical character. Furthermore, I adopt a literary-rhetorical approach as I compare Ephesians to Colossians, Dio's orations, and the Confucian classics.

My study unfolds in five chapters. Chapter two compares Ephesians vis-à-vis Colossians and argues that the motif of peace is prominent in Ephesians. Chapter three builds on the results of the previous chapter, investigating the argument of Ephesians as a tractate *περὶ εἰρήνης*. Chapter four examines the vision of peace in Dio's orations, chapter five in the Confucian classics. Chapter six then compares these two visions with Ephesians. Chapters two and three demonstrate that Ephesians can be profitably read as a political discourse on peace, and provide an initial sketch of its vision of peace; chapters four to six refine this sketch by comparison to analogous documents. Chapter six also describes some implications that result from this study.

CHAPTER 2

COMPARISON OF EPHESIANS WITH COLOSSIANS

Ephesians contains a rich vocabulary of words and phrases that fall within the semantic domain of peace, unity, and reconciliation. Apart from Luke and Romans, the eight occurrences of εἰρήνη in Ephesians are the highest within the NT.¹ The noun ἐνότης occurs twice in Ephesians (4:3, 13) and nowhere else in the NT. The numeral εἷς signifying unity occurs fourteen times.² Ephesians also presents God as the Father from whom all social groups are named (3:14–15) and Christ as the summation and union of all things (1:10). The phrase ἐν Χριστῷ, ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐν ᾧ or other similar expressions, signifying the means or the locative sphere where this unity is achieved, occurs more often than any other Pauline literature. Moreover, Ephesians portrays the ἐκκλησία—the instrument through which cosmic reconciliation in Christ is manifested to the heavenly powers—as a body (σῶμα) united under Christ (1:23; 2:16; 4:4, 12, 16; 5:23, 30), as a biological organism (4:16), as a unified building or temple (2:19–22), and as the

¹ Luke has fourteen occurrences, and Romans has ten. If we account for the total number of words in each letter, Ephesians has a high ratio of 3.3 occurrences of εἰρήνη for every thousand words (8/2.422); much smaller are the ratios of Luke with 0.7 (14/19.484) and Romans with 1.4 (10/7.112). The high occurrence of εἰρήνη in Ephesians leads Peter Stuhlmacher, “‘He is Our Peace’ (Eph. 2:14): On the Exegesis and Significance of Eph. 2:14–18,” in *Reconciliation, Law, and Righteousness: Essays in Biblical Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), 185, to consider it a favorite word of the letter.

² They include ποιήσας τὰ ἀμώτερα ἓν (2:14); ἓνα καινὸν ἄνθρωπον (2:15); ἐνὶ σώματι (2:16); ἐνὶ πνεύματι (2:18); ἐν σῶμα, ἐν πνεῦμα, μιᾷ ἐλπίδι (4:4); εἷς κύριος, μία πίστις, ἐν βάπτισμα (4:5); εἷς θεὸς καὶ πατήρ (4:6); ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ (4:7); ἐνὸς ἐκάστου μέρους (4:16); σάρκα μίαν (5:31); οἱ καθ’ ἓνα (5:33).

bride of Christ (5:25–30). Ephesians is also rich in σύν and μετά prefixed words, indicating union with Christ or other believers.

This rich vocabulary suggests that the motif of peace, unity, and reconciliation is dominant in Ephesians. In order to confirm this hypothesis and to provide an initial investigation into this motif, I compare Ephesians with Colossians. Within the Pauline corpus, no other two letters bear such resemblance to one another. According to statistics compiled by C. Leslie Mitton, 26.5% (638 out of 2,411) of the words in Ephesians appear in Colossians, and 34% (534 out of 1,570) of the words in Colossians appear in Ephesians.³ Most of this lexical overlap comprises short phrases of identical words. It is only in one section, the note concerning Tychichus (Eph 6:21–22 || Col 4:7), where there is almost verbatim agreement of thirty-two consecutive words.⁴ Other long parallel agreements comprise eight (Eph 1:2 || Col 1:2), seven (Eph 1:1 || Col 1:1), or five (Eph 1:7 || Col 1:14; Eph 6:1 || Col 3:20) identical consecutive words. The styles of Colossians and Ephesians are also similar in their long complex sentences, and strings of genitive modifiers and synonymous expressions.⁵

Statistics alone do not reveal the full extent of the similarity between Ephesians and Colossians. More important for the purposes of this inquiry, Ephesians and

³ C. Leslie Mitton, *The Epistle to the Ephesians: Its Authorship, Origin, and Purpose* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1951), 57. Mitton's statistics are now out of date. In NA²⁷, Ephesians contains 2,422 and Colossians 1,582 words.

⁴ “ἵνα δὲ εἰδῆτε καὶ ὑμεῖς τὰ κατ’ ἐμέ, τί πράσσω, πάντα γνωρίσει ὑμῖν Τύχικος ὁ ἀγαπητὸς ἀδελφὸς καὶ πιστὸς διάκονος ἐν κυρίῳ, ὃν ἔπεμψα πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἵνα γνῶτε τὰ περὶ ἡμῶν καὶ παρακαλέσῃ τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν (Eph 6:21–22) || Τὰ κατ’ ἐμέ πάντα γνωρίσει ὑμῖν Τύχικος ὁ ἀγαπητὸς ἀδελφὸς καὶ πιστὸς διάκονος καὶ σύνδουλος ἐν κυρίῳ, ὃν ἔπεμψα πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἵνα γνῶτε τὰ περὶ ἡμῶν καὶ παρακαλέσῃ τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν (Col 4:7–8)

⁵ See Col 1:27; 2:2, 12; Eph 1:7; 2:2, 18; 3:7 for some examples of the long strings of genitive modifiers.

Colossians are structurally similar. Both letters contain theological (Eph 1–3; Col 1–2) and paraenetic sections (Eph 4–6; Col 3–4); both exhibit common thematic material and present them approximately in the same sequence. The following chart based on the work of Josef Schmid,⁶ and followed by many others,⁷ shows the structural and thematic similarities, as well as differences, between Ephesians and Colossians. Common themes that appear in both letters include the cosmic Christ, a narrative of the reader's alienation and reconciliation, Paul's apostolic ministry of the mystery, and the household codes. Ephesians differs from Colossians in its inclusion of the eulogy (1:3–14), the exhortation toward church unity (4:1–16), and the call for battle against evil (6:10–17).

⁶ Josef Schmid, *Der Epheserbrief des Apostels Paulus: Seine Adresse, Sprache und literarischen Beziehungen* (Freiburg: Herder, 1928), 412.

⁷ See Josef Ernst, *Die Briefe an die Philipper, an Philemon, an die Kolosser, an die Epheser* (RNT; Regensburg: Pustet, 1974), 254–55; Andrew T. Lincoln, *Ephesians* (WBC 42; Dallas: Word, 1990), xlix; Peter T. O'Brien, *The Letter to the Ephesians* (The Pillar New Testament Commentary; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 9–10. See also Markus Barth and Helmut Blanke, *Colossians* (AB 34B; Garden City: Doubleday, 1994), 85–86.

Table 2-1. Comparison of Ephesians and Colossians

<i>Col</i>	<i>Unique to Col</i>	<i>Parallel Material</i>	<i>Unique to Eph</i>	<i>Eph</i>
1:1, 2		Opening address		1:1, 2
			Eulogy	1:3-14
1:3-12		Thanksgiving and intercessory prayer	Cosmic Christ and the church	1:15-23
1:13-14		Readers' experience of salvation		2:1-10
1:15-20	Cosmic Christ in creation and reconciliation			
1:21-23		Readers' former alienation and present reconciliation		2:11-22
1:24-29		Paul's suffering and his ministry of the mystery		3:1-13
2:1-3:4	Paul's pastoral concern and countering false teaching		Intercessory prayer and doxology	3:14-21
			Exhortation to church unity	4:1-16
3:5-17		Ethical injunctions: Put off the former and put on the new.		4:17-5:20
3:18-4:1		Household codes		5:21-6:9
			Warfare against evil	6:10-17
4:2-4		Petition for prayer		6:18-20
4:5, 6	Interactions with outsiders			
4:7-9		The mission of Tychicus.		6:21, 22
4:10-17	Personal greetings			
4:18		Farewell greetings	Peace greeting	6:23, 24

Apart from structural and thematic categories, Ephesians differs from Colossians in its extensive use of OT citations and allusions.⁸ The editors of NA²⁷ italicize six portions of the Ephesian text (1:22; 4:8-10, 25-26a; 5:31; 6:2, 3), judging them to be direct quotations from the OT; none of the Colossian text is italicized. Furthermore, Ephesians

differs from Colossians in its heavy use of “Trinitarian” language. The activity of the three persons of the Trinity is found in eight passages (1:3–14, 17; 2:18, 22; 3:4–5, 14–17; 4:4–6; 5:18–20); Colossians, with its few references to the Holy Spirit, lacks such language.

A quick comparison of the presence of εἰρήνη in the two letters suggests the prominence of peace in Ephesians vis-à-vis Colossians. The word occurs four times more often in Ephesians, and the peace farewell (εἰρήνη τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς) occurs only in Eph 6:23 and not in Colossians. The motif of peace, however, cannot be determined just by counting the number of times εἰρήνη appears in Ephesians; the motif permeates the entire letter. This chapter therefore compares the similarities and differences in themes and language between Ephesians and Colossians. Through this analysis, I demonstrate that the motif of peace, unity, and reconciliation is dominant in Ephesians. Moreover, this comparison provides an initial analysis concerning the character of the topic of peace in Ephesians. As it is not possible to do an exhaustive comparison of Ephesians and Colossians within this study, I focus on the following central themes: the narrative of alienation and reconciliation, Paul’s apostolic ministry, the “in Christ” phrase, the body of Christ, the use of Scripture, the “Trinitarian” formulas, and love. Of the above, the last three are prominent only in Ephesians.

The thematic and linguistic comparison of Ephesians and Colossians has been carried out by prior scholars. Although much of this work focused on issues concerning

⁸ Contra J. Christiaan Beker, *Heirs of Paul* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 93, who places Ephesians among the pseudepigraphical letters that show a “nearly complete neglect of the Old Testament.”

the authenticity of Ephesians,⁹ some examined the similarities and differences between the two letters in order to determine the theological interests of Ephesians. Much of this theological investigation, however, has operated from the presupposition that Ephesians is a redaction of Colossians.¹⁰ My approach in this chapter differs from prior works as I do not assume any vector of dependence between the letters. Although working from this agnostic stance may not yield results that are markedly different from one which presupposes the dependence of Ephesians on Colossians, I nevertheless proceed with this assumption since the data does not allow one to determine definitively the vector of dependence.¹¹ More important, in contrast to prior work that only compares linguistic elements and motifs that are present in both letters, my approach also looks at themes that are present only in Ephesians. For example, previous studies have not examined what the extensive use of scriptural traditions and “Trinitarian” language in Ephesians informs us about its theological emphases vis-à-vis Colossians. I believe that an exploration of these elements will sharpen my comparison of the two letters.

⁹ Mitton, *The Epistle to the Ephesians: Its Authorship, Origin, and Purpose*, 55–97; Ernst Percy, *Die Probleme der Kolosser- und Epheserbriefe* (Acta Regiae Societatis Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis 39; Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1946); Ernest Best, “Who Used Whom? The Relationship of Ephesians and Colossians,” *NTS* 43 (1997): 72–96.

¹⁰ Jennifer Kay Berenson Maclean, “Ephesians and the Problem of Colossians: Interpretation of Texts and Traditions in Eph 1:1–2:10” (Ph.D. diss.; Harvard University, 1995); H. Merklein, “Eph 4, 1–5, 20 als Rezeption von Kol 3, 1–17,” in *Kontinuität und Einheit* (ed. P. G. Müller and W. Stenger; Freiburg: Herder, 1981), 194–210; Werner Ochel, *Die Annahme einer Bearbeitung des Kolosser-Briefes im Epheserbrief* (Würzburg: Konrad Triltsch, 1934); Lincoln, *Ephesians*, lv–lvi.

¹¹ See my arguments on “Comparison of Ephesians vis-à-vis Colossians” in chapter one.

Narrative of Alienation and Reconciliation

Both Colossians and Ephesians provide narratives of alienation and reconciliation.¹²

Although the overall narrative is similar in describing the reconciliation of the cosmos and humanity to God, Ephesians adds and emphasizes the reconciliation of humanity to humanity.

The Colossian account of cosmic reconciliation is found in the Christ-hymn (1:15–20). Although not stated, the hymn presupposes that the world did not remain in the condition in which God created it. The original unity and harmony of the cosmos suffered a rupture that required a reconciliation or new creation to restore conditions to its original state. The hymn thus draws a tight relationship between creation and reconciliation,¹³ presenting Christ as the agent and mediator of God in both events. Christ is the center and Lord of creation as well as reconciliation, indicated by the parallel structure of *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως* (1:15) and *πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν* (1:18). As one who perfectly reflects the nature and character of God (*εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀόρατου*; 1:15), Christ is both prior to and supreme over creation (1:15; 1:17; 2:10). All things, including the principalities and the powers, have been created in him (*ἐν αὐτῷ*), through

¹² For a narrational presentation of the worldview of Colossians, see Walter T. Wilson, *The Hope of Glory: Education and Exhortation in the Epistle to the Colossians* (NovTSup 88; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 183–218.

¹³ The close relationship between creation and redemption is frequently found in the OT, especially in Isaiah and the Psalms. The exact relationship between creation and redemption has been much debated in OT scholarship. Gerhard von Rad, “Das theologische Problem des alttestamentlichen Schöpfungsglaubens,” in *Werden und Wesen des Alten Testaments* (BZAW 66; Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1936), 138–47, argues that creation is subordinated to redemption, functioning as a foil to soteriological considerations. On the other extreme, Hans Heinrich Schmid, “Schöpfung, Gerechtigkeit, und Heil: Schöpfungstheologie als Gesamthorizont biblischer Theologie,” *ZTK* 70 (1973): 1–19, considers the doctrine of creation as fundamental. For a recent work that re-examines this debate and adopts a mediating position, see Orland McArthur Moncrieffe, “Cosmic Creation and Creative redemption in the Old Testament: The Witness of the Hymns Ps. 33 and Ps. 136” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1993).

him (δι' αὐτοῦ), and for him (εἰς αὐτόν; 1:16). Not only is Christ the sphere in which creation takes place, the divine agent, and the ultimate goal of creation, he is also the one who alone sustains the universe (τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν; 1:17), the uniting force and unifying principle of the cosmos. As one in whom all the fullness of God dwells (1:19; 2:9), Christ mediates between God and creation. The hymn reaches its high point with the proclamation that God through Christ reconciles (ἀποκαταλλάσσω) all things to himself (1:20).¹⁴ Christ returns the cosmos to its “divinely created and determined order.... Now the universe is again under its head and thereby cosmic peace has returned.”¹⁵ As one preeminent over the cosmos, Christ exerts his rule, subjugates the principalities and the powers (2:15), and restores peace and unity to the cosmos.

Christ's cosmic reconciliation encompasses humanity. Paul writes that the Colossian readers were once alienated (ἀπαλλοτριόω) from God (1:21). They were God's enemies (ἐχθροί), engaging in evil deeds (1:21) and living among the sons of disobedience (3:7). Although they were Gentiles and dead in their trespasses, God raised them up and made them alive together with Christ (2:13; 3:1), erased the record that stood against them with its legal demands (2:14), forgave their trespasses (2:13), rescued them out of the authority of darkness, and transferred them into the kingdom of Christ (1:22). He reconciled (ἀποκαταλλάσσω) them to himself in Christ's body so that they might be holy, blameless, and irreproachable before him (1:22). Their lives are now hidden with Christ in God (3:3), and they will appear with Christ in glory when he is revealed (3:4).

¹⁴ So Nikolaus Kehl, *Der Christushymnus im Kolosserbrief: Eine motivgeschichtliche Untersuchung, zu Kol. 1,12-20* (Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1967), 125.

The Ephesian story of alienation and reconciliation follows the same framework of Colossians. Although Ephesians does not emphasize Christ's role in creation, nor is the language of cosmic reconciliation as rich as Colossians, the text still presents a cosmic Christ seated at the right hand of God, far above all rule, authority, power, dominion, and name (1:20–21). He subjugates all things, including the powers (1:22); he is the head (κεφαλή) of all things (1:21); and he sums up and unites all things (ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα; 1:10). There are three main alternatives for interpreting ἀνακεφαλαιώω, each emphasizing one lexical element of the word. The first emphasizes κεφαλή and Christ's headship or rule over the universe.¹⁶ The second emphasizes κεφάλαιον with the meaning "to sum up," "to bring something to a main point," or "to bring all parts into a coherent whole."¹⁷ The third emphasizes the ἀνα- prefix and connotes repetition or renewal, suggesting the restoration of a ruptured harmony with Christ as the central focus, a motif also present in Col 1:20.¹⁸ Given the "pleonastic and allusive style of Ephesians," Martin Kitchen is probably right in asserting that the term ἀνακεφαλαιώω is

¹⁵ Eduard Lohse, *Colossians and Philemon* (trans. William R. Poehlmann and Robert J. Karris; Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 59.

¹⁶ H. Schlier, "ἀνακεφαλαιόμαι," *TDNT* 3:681–82.

¹⁷ Maclean, "Ephesians and the Problem of Colossians," 52–58, examines more than 400 references of ἀνακεφαλαί- and concludes that the primary usage in classical literature is to "sum up an argument." She, however, rejects any metaphorical meaning and argues that ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι in Eph 1:10 should be interpreted as an infinitive absolute introducing a summary quotation of Col 1:16a. She thus translates Eph 1:10 as follows: "... when he made known to you the mystery of his will, in accordance with his good pleasure, which he purposed in Christ, for the administration of the fullness of times; to state it briefly: 'All things in Christ; things in heaven and things on earth in Him.'" (italics mine; 59). Although Maclean presents an interesting proposal, the use of infinitive absolutes is rare in the NT. Moreover, as she herself notes, infinitives absolutes are often introduced by ὡς (BDF §391a; Smyth §2012), a situation not present in our text.

¹⁸ Lincoln, *Ephesians*, 33; Franz Mussner, *Christus das All und die Kirche: Studien zur Theologie des Epheserbriefes* (Trier: Paulinus, 1955), 66.

polyvalent and encompasses all the above possible meanings.¹⁹ Christ therefore sums up and unites under his headship all things—things in heaven and things on earth.²⁰

The narrative of humanity’s reconciliation to God in Ephesians is also similar. The Gentile readers were dead in their trespasses and their sins (2:1, 5), walking according to the course of this world and following the spirit that is now at work in the sons of disobedience (2:2). In spite of their hopeless estate, God lavished his grace upon them, sealing them with the promised Holy Spirit (1:13) and granting them access to him. Despite this basic framework, Ephesians differs from Colossians by presenting the Gentile story of salvation as a parallel to that of Jewish believers. This parallel presentation is seen when we note how Paul shifts between using the second person (ὁμεῖς) and the first person plural pronouns (ἡμεῖς). In the eulogy of chapter one, Paul begins with the first person plural to indicate the spiritual blessings that all believers have in general (1:3–10): all believers were chosen before the foundation of the world and predestined for adoption, obtaining redemption through the blood of Christ. Paul then addresses both groups separately in 1:11–14, arguing that salvation has come equally to both Jews (1:11–12) and Gentiles (1:13–14). One might imagine that the first person plural of 1:11 has the same referent as that in 1:3–10 (believers in general). The adjectival phrase in 1:12 (τοὺς

¹⁹ Martin Kitchen, *Ephesians* (New Testament Readings; New York: Routledge, 1994), 36–42. See also idem, “The ἀνακεφαλαίωσις of All Things in Christ: Theology and Purpose in the Epistle to the Ephesians” (Ph.D. thesis; University of Manchester, 1989).

²⁰ Chrys C. Caragounis, *The Ephesian Mysterion: Meaning and Content* (ConBNT 8; Lund: Gleerup, 1977), 144, suggests that the “things in heaven” represent the cosmic powers and the “things on earth” the Church, two important domains that run throughout the letter.

προηλικότας ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ), however, clarifies that the “we” refers to Jews.²¹ Jewish believers, who were the first to hope in the messiah, have an inheritance. Paul then uses the second person plural “you” to address his Gentile readers (1:13):²² when you (ὕμεῖς) heard and believed the “gospel of your salvation” (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς σωτηρίας ὑμῶν), you were sealed (ἐσφραγίσθητε) in the promised Holy Spirit. The structure of 1:11–14 further enhances the Jew-Gentile dichotomy. The Jewish “ἐν ᾧ καὶ + first person plural” (1:11) stands in contrast to the Gentile “ἐν ᾧ καὶ + second person plural” (1:13). Furthermore, the common refrain of εἰς ἔπαινον τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ in 1:12 and 1:14 claims that the purpose and result of salvation for Gentiles is the same as that for the Jews—it is all to the praise of God’s glory.

The two parallel narratives of salvation continue in 2:1–10. By the rapid interchange of the first and second person plural, Paul asserts that both Jews and Gentiles were in the same predicament prior to Christ. Just as Gentiles were dead in their trespasses and sins (2:1), so also were Jews (2:5); just as Gentiles walked according to the custom of this world (2:2), Jews also (καὶ) lived in the passions of their flesh (2:3). Both Jews and Gentiles were destined for God’s wrath (2:3). Despite their dire circumstances, God raised Jewish believers and seated them with Christ (2:6). Gentile believers were similarly saved through the grace of God (2:8). Finally, Paul reverts back to the inclusive

²¹ So G. B. Caird, *Paul’s Letters from Prison* (New Clarendon Bible; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 40–41; Ernst, *Die Briefe*, 278; F. F. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), 264; O’Brien, *Ephesians*, 116–17; F. W. Beare, “The Epistle to the Ephesians,” in *IB* (ed. G. A. Buttrick and others; 12 vols; New York: Abingdon, 1951–57), 10:621–22; Barth, *Ephesians*, 92; Heinrich Schlier, *Der Brief an die Epheser* (Düsseldorf: Patmos: 1957), 66; Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer, *Critical and Exegetical Hand-book to the Epistle to the Ephesians* (trans. Maurice J. Evans; New

“we,” stating that both Jews and Gentiles are the workmanship of God created for good works. The present ethics required of Jewish and Gentile believers (περιπατήσωμεν; 2:10) contrasts and forms an *inclusio* with their former behavior (περιεπατήσατε for Gentiles in 2:2; ἀνεστράφημεν for Jews in 2:3).

This parallel presentation sets the stage for the amazing revelation that Jewish and Gentile believers are not only reconciled to God but also to each other. The horizontal reconciliation between Jews and Gentiles is explicitly stated in 2:11–22. Gentiles were called the “uncircumcision” by Jews. They were once without Christ, separated from the πολιτεία of Israel, strangers to the covenants of promise, without hope, and without God (2:11–12). Christ, however, is the peace of Jews and Gentile. He came and preached peace to both Jews and Gentiles (2:17) such that both parties have access to God in one spirit (2:18). As a consequence (ἄρα οὖν; 2:19) of Christ’s reconciling work, the previous divisions between Jews and Gentiles have been eradicated. Christ destroyed the hostility between Jews and Gentiles, made both groups into one, and created one new humanity in place of the two (2:14–15). Gentiles are therefore no longer strangers and aliens but fellow citizens with the redeemed of all ages (οἱ ἅγιοι; 2:19) and fellow members of the household of God.

This emphasis on horizontal reconciliation between Jews and Gentiles is further seen when we examine how Ephesians and Colossians employ the same words to address their different concerns. In Colossians, ἀπαλλοτριόω refers to the alienation between the

York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1884), 328. Rudolf Bultmann, “προελπίζω,” *TDNT* 2:534–35, considers this option to be more likely.

²² The “we-you” contrast, referring to Jews and Gentiles, occurs in 1:11–14; 2:1–3, 11–13, 17–18.

reader and God (1:21); in Ephesians, the alienation of Gentiles from τῆς πολιτείας τοῦ Ἰσραήλ (2:12). In Colossians, ἐχθρός denotes the enmity between the reader and God; in Ephesians, the enmity between Jews and Gentiles (2:14, 16). In Colossians, δόγμα symbolizes the decrees that stood between humanity and God (2:14); in Ephesians, the enmity and distance between Jews and Gentiles (2:15). In Colossians, ἀποκαταλλάσσω references the reconciliation between the reader and God (1:22); in Ephesians, the reconciliation between Jews and Gentiles (2:16). An examination of the use of εἰρήνη in both letters also bears out this tendency. In Colossians, εἰρηνοποιέω (1:20) *explicitly* refers to the establishing of peace between the cosmos and God, and εἰρήνη (3:15) only *implicitly* refers to the peace within the church. Ephesians does use εἰρήνη once to reference the peace between humanity and God (2:17); in most instances, however, the word εἰρήνη (2:14; 4:3) and the phrase “ποιέω + εἰρήνη” (2:15) *explicitly* reference the peace among humans.

Apart from the above words, the emphasis of Ephesians on horizontal reconciliation is seen in the author’s use of σύν and μετά--two prepositions that function as linkage markers. When the objects of these prepositions are persons, the expression denotes accompaniment and association. An examination of σύν, μετά, and words with these prepositional prefixes highlights particular sets of interpersonal relationships that are significant in Colossians and Ephesians. These relationships operate on a horizontal or vertical plane. Horizontally, the relationships are between the readers and other saints, between Paul and other believers, among the readers themselves, and between the

readers and the sons of disobedience. Vertically, the relationship is between the reader and Christ. Table 2-2 illustrates these sets of relationships.

Table 2-2. Occurrences of σύν and μετά in Ephesians and Colossians

		<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Colossians</i>	<i>Ephesians</i>
σύν	between readers and Christ	Vertical	2:13, 20; 3:3, 4	
	between readers and other saints	Horizontal		3:18
	between readers and Paul	Horizontal	2:5	
	other uses	Horizontal	4:9	
words with συν prefix	between Christ and creation	Vertical	συνίστημι (1:17)	
	between readers and Christ	Vertical	συνθάπτω (2:12) συνεγείρω (2:12; 3:1) συζωοποιέω (2:13)	συζωοποιέω (2:5) συνεγείρω (2:6) συγκαθίζω (2:6)
	between readers and other saints	Horizontal	συμβιβάζω (2:2, 19) σύνδεσμος (2:19, 14)	συμπολίτης (2:19) συναρμολογέω (2:21; 4:16) συνοικοδομέω (2:22) συγκληρονόμος (3:6) σύσσωμος (3:6) συμμέτοχος (3:6) σύνδεσμος (4:3) συμβιβάζω (4:16)
	between readers and sons of disobedience	Horizontal		συμμέτοχος (5:7) συγκοινωνέω (5:11)
	between Paul and his fellow workers	Horizontal	σύνδουλος (1:7; 4:7) συναιχμάλωτος (4:10) συνεργός (4:11)	
μετά	among readers	Horizontal		4:25
words with μετά prefix	among readers	Horizontal		μεταδίδωμι (4:28)

If we focus only on the sets of relationships between Paul's readers and another party, the data show that Colossians accentuates the vertical dimension while Ephesians

the horizontal. In Colossians, only 33% of the occurrences reflect a horizontal dimension; in Ephesians, the percentage is as high as 82%. Colossians highlights the readers' mystical union with Christ—they have died with Christ (2:20; 3:3); they have been buried with Christ (2:12); they have been raised with Christ (2:12; 3:1); they are made alive with and in Christ (2:13); their life is hidden with Christ (3:3); and they will appear with Christ in glory (3:4). While Ephesians recognizes the believers' new relationship with Christ (2:5, 6), it nevertheless accents the corporate identity that the readers have with other believers—they are fellow citizens with the saints (2:19); they are joined, united, and built together with other believers into a dwelling place of God (2:12, 22; 4:16); they are fellow heirs, fellow members, and fellow partakers of the promise (3:6); and they are called to comprehend with *all* the saints (σὺν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἁγίοις) the great love of Christ (3:18–19). As a consequence of their identity within the ἐκκλήσια, they are to share with those within the community who have need (4:28), and they are to distance themselves from the outsiders, the sons of disobedience (5:6–7).²³ This emphasis on a unified corporate identity with other believers erases any previous socio-ethnic boundaries that are characterized by enmity (2:14). At the same time, it reminds readers of the common bond, the bond of peace (σύνδεσμος τῆς εἰρήνης; 4:3), that they now share with other believers in Christ.

Ephesians and Colossians both contain accounts of alienation and reconciliation. Colossians emphasizes cosmic unity in Christ and the reconciliation of the cosmos and

²³ Ernest Best, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Ephesians* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 483–484; and Barth, *Ephesians*, 566, argue that the sons of disobedience are insiders. It appears, however, more

humanity to God. Although Ephesians does not ignore the vertical scope of reconciliation, it nevertheless stresses the horizontal reconciliation within humanity at various places. Stig Hanson goes so far as to state, “Unity in Eph aims at the unity of the Church whereas that of Cl (Colossians) chiefly refers to cosmos.”²⁴

Paul’s Apostolic Ministry of the Mystery

Ephesians and Colossians give common statements of Paul’s apostolic ministry. Paul is an apostle through the will of God (Col 1:1; Eph 1:1) and a minister of the gospel (Col 1:23; Eph 3:7) who proclaims the mystery that has been revealed to him (Col 1:25; Eph 3:8). He also petitions his readers to pray that he might boldly proclaim this mystery (Col 4:2; Eph 6:19). Despite these similarities, Ephesians considers Paul’s ministry to be primarily directed toward the Gentiles. For example, Paul is charged to preach to the Gentiles (3:8), and he is a prisoner of Christ Jesus for the sake of Gentiles (3:1). Colossians, on the other hand, simply notes that Paul is imprisoned on account of the mystery of Christ (4:3).²⁵ A further examination of how each letter uses key terms—the will of God, the gospel, and the mystery—suggests also that Ephesians considers peace and reconciliation, especially that between Jews and Gentiles, as an important facet of Paul’s apostolic ministry.

likely that τὸν υἱὸν τῆς ἀπειθείας should refer to outsiders since the phrase appears within the context of the “now-then” contrast (ἦτε γὰρ ποτε σκότος, νῦν δὲ φῶς ἐν κυρίῳ, 5:8; see also 2:2).

²⁴ Stig Hanson, *The Unity of the Church in the New Testament: Colossians and Ephesians* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1946), 107.

²⁵ Note, however, that Paul’s ministry to the Gentiles is implied in Col 1:27; 3:11.

The will of God (τὸ θελήμα τοῦ θεοῦ)

The phrase “the will of God” (τὸ θελήμα τοῦ θεοῦ) occurs 3x in Colossians (1:1, 9; 4:12) and 5x in Ephesians (1:1, 5, 9, 11; 5:17; 6:6). Apart from the common statement that Paul is an apostle by the will of God (Col 1:1; Eph 1:1), both letters use the phrase differently. Colossians never explicitly details the content of God’s will; nevertheless, the phrase typically occurs in the context of moral perfection. At 1:9, Paul prays that God would fill his readers with the knowledge of his will ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ καὶ συνέσει πνευματικῇ. Knowing God’s will consists in grasping what is spiritually important with the result that they conduct their lives in a manner that is pleasing to the Lord (1:10).²⁶

At 4:12, Epaphras also prays that the Colossian readers may stand perfect and be filled with every will of God (ἵνα σταθῆτε τέλειοι καὶ πεπληροφορημένοι ἐν παντὶ θελήματι τοῦ θεοῦ). The “will of God” clarifies “perfection” such that the perfect person is fully committed to the will of God. This relationship does not define the content of the will of God. Nevertheless, if we examine the only other occurrence of “perfection” in Colossians, we see that the perfect man (ἄνθρωπος τέλειος; 1:28) refers to a mature Christian in Christ.²⁷ Paul states in 1:28 that he admonishes (νουθετέω) and teaches (διδάσκω) every man so that he may present them “perfect” or “complete” in Christ. The verb νουθετέω appears in the NT only in the exhortatory contexts of Pauline writings. Furthermore, the two verbs, νουθετέω and διδάσκω, appear in Col 3:16 within the

²⁶ See C. F. D. Moule, *The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Colossians and to Philemon* (CGTC; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 47.

²⁷ Wilson, *The Hope of Glory*, 71, notes, “The idea of the ‘perfect’ or ‘mature’ person in Colossians does not encompass the goal of ethical perfectionism, as it might, say, for a Stoic thinker, but conforms

context of moral admonition. In line with Jewish and other NT writings, Colossians considers a perfect man as one who obeys the moral will of God—that which is good and acceptable and perfect (Rom 12:2).²⁸ Thus, τὸ θελήμα τοῦ θεοῦ in Colossians concerns Christian growth and maturity.

Ephesians also uses the phrase τὸ θελήμα τοῦ θεοῦ within the context of proper Christian behavior and ethical norms. Believers are not to be foolish but to understand the will of God (5:17); slaves are to be obedient to their earthly masters, doing the will of God from the heart (6:6). Nevertheless, the use of τὸ θελήμα τοῦ θεοῦ is colored by its heavy occurrence in the eulogy of 1:3–14 with its rich motifs of reconciliation and salvation (1:5, 9, 11). Christian believers are predestined for adoption according to God’s will (1:5), and Jewish believers have obtained an inheritance according to the purpose of God who works all things according to his will (1:11). More significant, at the high point of the eulogy in 1:9–10,²⁹ Paul declares that the content of the mystery, which is the will of God (τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ),³⁰ is to sum up all things in Christ—things in heaven and things on earth (ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ, τὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐν αὐτῷ). God’s purpose, which he has put forth in Christ, is to unify and bring all things together in and under Christ. The usages of τὸ θελήμα τοῦ

to the eschatological expectation of a new humanity in Christ that lives in divine knowledge (3:10) and as God’s elect (3:12), recovering what God originally intended for human creation.”

²⁸ See also LXX Deut 18:13; 3 Kgdms 8:61; 11:4, 10; 15:3, 14; 1 Chr 28:9; Sir 44:17; 1 QS 1:8; 2:2; 8:20; CD 1.21; 2.15; 7.6; Matt 5:48; Rom 12:2; Jas 1:4, 25; 3:2.

²⁹ Thorsten Moritz, “‘Summing Up All Things’: Religious Pluralism and Universalism in Ephesians,” in *One God, One Lord in a World of Religious Pluralism* (ed. Andrew D. Clarke and Bruce W. Winter; Cambridge: Tyndale House, 1991), 96.

³⁰ The genitive τοῦ θελήματος stands in apposition and clarifies τὸ μυστήριον. The phrase τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ can thus be rendered as “the *mysterion*, namely, what he willed.” See Caragounis, *Ephesian Mysterion*, 93–94.

θεοῦ in both theological and paraenetic sections of Ephesians are probably related, with the paraenetic founded on the theological. The τὸ θελήμα τοῦ θεοῦ that consists in proper Christian etiquette is based on the τὸ θελήμα τοῦ θεοῦ that intends to sum up all things in Christ. Paul's injunction for Christian believers to discern how they should ethically behave is the natural outworking of the implications of the larger narrative of God's plan of reconciliation and peace in Christ.

The gospel (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον)

The noun εὐαγγέλιον (gospel) and its verbal form εὐαγγελίζω occurs 2x in Colossians (1:5, 23) and 6x in Ephesians (1:13; 2:17; 3:6, 8; 4:11; 6:15, 19). The context and recipients of the gospel are different in both letters. The two occurrences of the word in Colossians describe the content of the gospel as a certain hope (ἐλπίς). This hope is anchored in Christ, the Lord who is seated at the right hand of God (3:1) and whose presence within the Colossian readers generates the hope of participating in the future glory that is to be revealed (ἡ ἐλπίς τῆς δόξης; 1:27). Colossians also understands the gospel as the word of truth (ὁ λόγος τῆς ἀληθείας; 1:5) that stands in contrast to the false philosophy with its empty deceit (2:8).³¹ While the recipients of the gospel are the Colossian readers, the letter also states that the gospel is growing in the entire world (1:6) and is preached among all creation (ἐν πάσῃ κτίσει; 1:23) under heaven. Κτίσις can refer to all mankind; if, however, we follow the universalistic and cosmic scope of Colossians, the word should refer to all created things. The gospel is then declared to all creation as God seeks to

³¹ In 1:5, the genitive τοῦ εὐαγγελίου stands in apposition to τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἀληθείας.

reconcile all things, whether things on earth or things in the heavens, to himself through Christ (1:20).

The context and recipients of τὸ εὐαγγέλιον are different in Ephesians. Ephesians, as Colossians, considers the gospel to be the word of truth (1:13); nevertheless, it does not link τὸ εὐαγγέλιον to hope but to peace—vertical peace with God and horizontal peace between Jews and Gentiles. In Eph 2:17, Christ proclaims the good news (εὐαγγελίζω) of peace with God to both Gentiles and Jews, the basis (ὅτι) of which is the salvation and access that both parties have to God (2:18). While Jews have been predestined to receive an inheritance (1:11–12), Gentiles have the gospel as the means of their salvation (1:13). Both Jewish and Gentile believers have salvation, and it is because of this common access and peace with God that they too now have peace with one another (2:14). The linking of τὸ εὐαγγέλιον to peace is further stressed when Paul exhorts his readers to shoe their feet with the readiness for battle that comes from the gospel of peace (ὑποδησάμενοι τοὺς πόδας ἐν ἐτοιμασίᾳ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τῆς εἰρήνης; 6:15). The genitive τῆς εἰρήνης is a genitive of content,³² indicating that the content of the gospel proclaims peace—a peace that is embodied in Christ who himself is our peace (2:14).

The mystery (τὸ μυστήριον)

The noun “mystery” (μυστήριον) occurs 4x in Colossians and 6x in Ephesians. Paul generally uses the word in the same sense in both letters to refer to a secret that has been hidden (τὸ μυστήριον τὸ ἀποκεκρυμμένον) but now (νῦν) revealed by God to his people

³² So also Rudolf Schnackenburg, *Ephesians: A Commentary* (trans. Helen Heron; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 278.

(Col 1:26; Eph 3:9). Nevertheless, there are differences. In Colossians, the rich and glorious mystery is revealed to the saints (1:27). More important, the content of the mystery is “Christ in you, the hope of glory” (Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, ἡ ἐλπὶς τῆς δόξης; 1:27). Christ indwells the Colossian readers such that they share in the hope of the fullness of the glory that will be revealed when he appears (3:4). The stress of the mystery is not so much on the Gentile Colossian readers, or their inclusion into the community of faith, but on Christ; Christ himself is God’s revealed mystery (2:2). The difficult reading τοῦ μυστηρίου τοῦ θεοῦ, Χριστοῦ indicates that Christ is the content of the mystery.³³ Here, Χριστοῦ is an exegetical genitive explaining τοῦ μυστηρίου. This rendering, “God’s mystery, which is Christ,” is explicitly supported by a Western textual variant τοῦ μυστηρίου τοῦ θεοῦ ὃ ἐστὶν Χριστός (D* ar vg^{ms}; Aug).³⁴

The use of μυστήριον in Ephesians is similar in that the content of the mystery involves the eschatological fulfillment of God’s plan of salvation in Christ. Ephesians, however, emphasizes different aspects of this central mystery as it highlights the uniting of all things in Christ. In 1:9–10, Paul declares that the content of the mystery is the will of God (τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ) to sum up all things in Christ (1:10). Within this broad cosmic scope of unification, Ephesians also presents a narrower dimension

³³ The manuscripts present a great variety of readings that modify εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν. This includes τοῦ θεοῦ; τοῦ Χριστοῦ; τοῦ θεοῦ Χριστοῦ; τοῦ θεοῦ ὃ ἐστὶν Χριστός; τοῦ θεοῦ ὃ ἐστὶν περὶ Χριστοῦ; τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἐν Χριστῷ; τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ; τοῦ θεοῦ πατὴρ τοῦ Χριστοῦ; τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ Χριστοῦ; and τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατὴρ καὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ. The reading τοῦ θεοῦ, Χριστοῦ is preferred because it has strong external witnesses (ϕ⁴⁶ B vg^{ms}; Hil) and it alone explains the other variants as scribal attempts to ameliorate the difficulty of this reading. See Bruce M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (2d ed.; New York: United Bible Societies, 1994), 555; idem, *The Text of the New Testament: Its Transmission, Corruption, and Restoration* (3d enl. ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 236–38.

³⁴ The NRSV clarifies the RSV and translates 2:2 as “so that they may have all the riches of assured understanding and have the knowledge of God’s mystery, that is, Christ himself.”

that focuses on Jew-Gentile reconciliation (3:1–13). This pericope is critical since it contains half of the occurrences of μυστήριον in Ephesians. Here, Paul first states that he has earlier written about the mystery in a few words (προέγραψα ἐν ὀλίγῳ; 3:3). The referent is probably either 1:9–10 or 2:11–22 with its emphasis on the creation of one new man from Jews and Gentiles.³⁵ Paul then explicitly clarifies that the content of the mystery concerning Christ (τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ Χριστοῦ)³⁶ is that Gentiles are fellow heirs (συγκληρονόμα), fellow members of the body (σῶμα), and fellow partakers (συμμέτοχα) of the promise in Christ (3:6). The συν-prefix accentuates the relational aspect of the union of Jews and Gentiles in Christ.

The occurrences of μυστήριον in Paul’s petition for prayer also show the different emphases of each letter. Colossians has Paul asking his readers to pray that God would provide opportunities for him to speak the “the mystery, which is Christ” (τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ Χριστοῦ; 4:3). As in 2:2, the genitive τοῦ Χριστοῦ is exegetical and clarifies the meaning of μυστήριον in Colossians. Ephesians, however, has Paul asking his readers to pray that he will be able to make known boldly “the mystery, which is the gospel” (τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ εὐαγγελίου; 6:19). The genitive τοῦ εὐαγγελίου is exegetical and clarifies the meaning of μυστήριον in Ephesians; the mystery is the gospel message with its emphasis on the proclamation of peace, peace with God and peace among believers.

³⁵ It is more likely that the referent of 3:3 is to be found in Ephesians than in other Pauline letters “for the other Pauline texts are not ‘brief’ nor can their knowledge be presupposed in Ephesus around 60 C.E.” (Barth and Blanke, *Colossians*, 84). The referent is also unlikely to be Col 1:26. Colossians remarks that the mystery was made known to the saints (1:26); in Ephesians, it was made known to Paul (3:3) and the “holy apostles and prophets” (3:5).

³⁶ I take τοῦ Χριστοῦ as an objective genitive, so also T. K. Abbott, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1897), 80.

Colossians and Ephesians both provide brief statements of Paul’s apostolic ministry. Our examination of three key terms, however, suggest that the crux of this ministry in Ephesians centers on the mystery—a mystery that reveals God’s will to sum up all things in Christ, a mystery that proclaims the marvel of Jew-Gentile reconciliation, and a mystery that has at its core the gospel of peace.

The “In Christ” Phrase

According to G. Adolf Deissmann, ἐν Χριστῷ, ἐν κυρίῳ, and other similar expressions occur 164 times in Paul’s letters (excluding Ephesians, Colossians, and the Pastorals) or 6.6 times per thousand words (164/24.917).³⁷ The occurrences of these phrases are proportionally much higher in Colossians and Ephesians. In Colossians, they occur 19 times in the entire letter giving a density of 12.0 times per thousand words (19/1.582); in Ephesians, they occur 37 times, a density of 15.3 times per thousand words (37/2.422). The “in Christ” phrase thus occurs in Ephesians more often than Colossians and about 2.3 times more often than the “authentic” Pauline letters. Not only is the phrase numerically significant, it also exhibits a wider variety of form in Ephesians, with phrases such as ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (3:11), ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ (4:21), and ἐν τῷ κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ (1:13) appearing only in this letter.

³⁷ G. Adolf Deissmann, *Die neutestamentliche Formel “in Christo Jesu”* (Marburg: N. G. Elwert, 1892), 75.

The meaning of the phrase in Pauline literature, especially the preposition ἐν, is a matter of debate.³⁸ Although Deissmann emphasizes the local aspect, remarking that the phrase can *only* be correctly rendered as “in Christ,”³⁹ F. Büchsel, F. Neugebauer, and Albrecht Oepke suggest that “in Christ” is not a formula with a single meaning.⁴⁰ On the contrary, its meaning must be determined from its context. After examining 153 instances, Büchsel remarks, “Überblickt man die behandelten 153 Stellen, so ergibt sich: ἐν ist in den meisten instrumental, seltener modal, noch seltener kausal, einigemal lokal im übertragenen Sinne zu verstehen.”⁴¹ On the other hand, Oepke argues that the “spatial concept gives us the true significance of the formula ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ and its parallels ... [although] there is both a local and an instrumental element.”⁴²

My examination of the phrase in Ephesians and Colossians classifies its occurrences according to the following categories.⁴³

(1) The phrase denotes the *basis of fellowship with God*. The text usually consists of the form “God gives or does x for us in Christ” such that God is the subject within the triangular relationship—God, Christ, and the church. The instrumental sense of ἐν dominates here; thus ὁ θεὸς ἐν Χριστῷ ἐχαρίσατο ὑμῖν (Eph 4:32) can be rendered as “God

³⁸ BDF §219(4) writes, “The phrase ἐν Χριστῷ (κυρίῳ), which is copiously appended by Paul to the most varied concepts, utterly defies definite interpretation.”

³⁹ Deissmann, *Die neutestamentliche Formel*, 81–82, remarks, “Die Formel charakterisiert das Verhältnis des Christen zu dem lebendigen Christus als ein lokales und ist daher zu übersetzen »in Christus«. Das ungewöhnliche »ἐν« ist nur durch ein ungewöhnliches »in« korrekt wiederzugeben.... Die Formel ist der technische Ausdruck für den paulinischen Centralgedanken der κοινωνία mit Christus.”

⁴⁰ Friedrich Büchsel, “In Christus’ bei Paulus,” *ZNW* 42 (1949): 141–58; Fritz Neugebauer, “Das paulinische ‘In Christo,’” *NTS* 4 (1958): 124–38; Albrecht Oepke, “ἐν,” *TDNT* 2:541–42. So also A. J. M. Wedderburn, “Observations on Paul’s Use of the Phrases ‘In Christ’ and ‘With Christ,’” *JSNT* 25 (1984): 87.

⁴¹ Büchsel, “In Christus’ bei Paulus,” 149.

⁴² Oepke, “ἐν,” *TDNT* 2:542.

by Christ (or through Christ) forgave you.” Given the fluid meaning of the preposition, it is however difficult to determine a single specific meaning of the phrase;⁴⁴ it is probably polyvalent with both an instrumental and local sense.⁴⁵ If only the instrumental sense was intended, Paul could have easily used *διά* with the genitive. Michel Bouttier notes that Paul differentiates between the use of *διά* and *ἐν* in the context of reconciliation.⁴⁶ In 2 Cor 5:18, God reconciles us to himself *διὰ Χριστοῦ* and reconciles the world to himself *ἐν Χριστῷ*. The difference in Paul’s usage may perhaps be that *ἐν* carries connotations of inclusion and unity, an idea that is not present in *διά*.⁴⁷ Thus, not only does Christ make salvation possible, he is also the sphere in which believers are and in whom salvation is.⁴⁸ We may then paraphrase 4:32 as “God forgave you through Christ and brought you into Christ.” Similarly, 1:3 argues that the blessings of the heavenly realm are made available

⁴³ My categories are a modification of those found in Oepke, “*ἐν*,” *TDNT* 2:541, and Ernest Best, *One Body in Christ* (London: SPCK, 1955), 1–8.

⁴⁴ BDAG, s.v. “*ἐν*,” states, “The uses of this prep. are so many and various, and oft. so easily confused, that a strictly systematic treatment is impossible.”

⁴⁵ A. T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical research* (4th ed.; Nashville: Broadman, 1934), 590, remarks that the instrumental use of *ἐν* is an extension of the local sense. Christian Maurer, “Der Hymnus von Epheser 1 als Schlüssel zum ganzen Briefe,” *EvT* 11 (1951): 159, considers the background of the “in Christ” formula to be an oriental myth of the universal “Erlöserversöhnlichkeit.” He therefore argues that the meaning of the formula is primarily in the local and secondarily in the instrumental sense. He writes, “Die Formel meint also primär im lokalen Sinne das Sein innerhalb der Gemeinde des Erlösers, wobei sekundär auch die instrumentale Bedeutung hinzukommt.”

⁴⁶ Michel Bouttier, *En Christ: Étude d'exégèse et de théologie pauliniennes* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1962), 31–35.

⁴⁷ Contra Büchsel, “In Christus’ bei Paulus,” 144, who remarks, “Zwischen *ἐν* X und *διὰ* X ist nicht der geringste Unterschied.” See Bouttier, *En Christ*, 34, who writes, “*Διά* distingue, *ἐν* unit. *Διά* est objectif, *ἐν* pose une relation. *Διά* établit J.-C. dans sa solitude de Sauveur et sa souveraineté de Seigneur, *ἐν* le conjoint sans cesse à nous et nous inclut en lui. *Διά* désigne Jésus à toujours comme l’unique rédempteur du monde, *ἐν* nous associe pour jamais à son œuvre. *Διά* ouvre la voie à *ἐν*; *ἐν* est l’aboutissement du *διά* dans la recapitulation de toutes choses.” In summary, *ἐν* carries the meaning of *διά* but also includes other senses.

⁴⁸ Best, *One Body in Christ*, 29.

to believers not only through Christ's agency, but also because they are incorporated into their representative, the exalted Christ.⁴⁹

(2) The phrase describes a person's *membership in Christ* or in the church. The text usually consists of the form "A is in Christ." Examples of this usage are typically found in personal greetings (Eph 1:1; 4:1; 6:21; Col 1:2; 4:7). The local sense dominates here, although there may also be a causal sense in some cases ("I, a prisoner, in the locale of the Lord and because of the Lord" [Eph 4:1]).

(3) The phrase characterizes an *activity or state as a Christian*. The text usually consists of the form "A is x in Christ," "A does x in Christ," or "A does x to B in Christ."⁵⁰ Thus, we have "Children, obey your parents in the Lord" (Eph 6:1) and "Be strong in the Lord" (6:10). John Allan argues that, in these cases, the "in Christ" phrase can be substituted by the adjective "Christian," reducing the form to "A is an x Christian" or "A does x as is expected of Christians." Thus, 4:21 (ἐν αὐτῷ ἐδιδάχθητε) should be rendered as "taught as Christians" and 6:1 (ὑπακούετε τοῖς γονεῦσιν ὑμῶν [ἐν κυρίῳ]) as "obey your parents as good Christian children ought to do."⁵¹ Such a move, however, downplays the believer's relationship to Christ. On the contrary, the "in Christ" phrase reminds believers that their being in Christ has definite ramifications for conduct (Col 2:6).

⁴⁹ Schlier, *Der Brief an die Epheser*, 48. For a discussion on this metaphorical locative sense, see C. F. D. Moule, *The Origin of Christology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 54–69.

⁵⁰ The ἐν κυρίῳ formula is typically employed in this category, and Fritz Neugebauer, *In Christus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), 131–49, has argued that this formula is typically used in imperatival constructions. He writes, "ἐν Χριστῷ und ἐν κυρίῳ Verhalten sich also wesentlich wie Indikativ zu Imperativ" (149).

⁵¹ John A. Allan, "The 'In Christ' Formula in Ephesians," *NTS* 5 (1958–59): 57.

(4) The phrase denotes the *basis of the fellowship that believers have with one another*. The text usually consists of the form “You are x-ed in Christ.” The passive voice of the verb is probably a divine passive with God as the subject, and the form can be rewritten as “God does x for us in Christ.” Since the basis of the fellowship that believers have with one another is dependent upon their common fellowship with God, this category is closely related to the first category.

(5) The phrase is used in contexts that speak of the *gathering of the cosmos into one*. The text of this category takes the form “God does x in Christ.” Although the instrumental sense in this category is clear if we understand Christ as the mediator of creation (Col 1:16),⁵² the preposition ἐν nevertheless still points to Christ as the sphere in which the work of creation or reconciliation takes place.⁵³ Instead of believers being in Christ, it is now the cosmos; instead of the reconciliation of believers to God in Christ, it is now the creation of the cosmos and its reconciliation.

(6) The phrase is used in contexts that provide a *description or attribute of Christ*. The text of this category takes the form “x is in Christ” or “x dwells in Christ.” Examples of this usage include Eph 4:21 (ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ) and Col 2:6 (ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς). It is clear that the local sense dominates in this category.

The complete catalog of the “in Christ” occurrences in Ephesians and Colossians according to the above categories is found in the appendix. An examination of this

⁵² Lohse, *Colossians and Philemon*, 50.

⁵³ So Percy, *Die Probleme der Kolosser- und Epheserbriefe*, 69–70; Abbott, *Ephesians and Colossians*, 214.

catalog shows similarities and differences concerning the use of this phrase in Ephesians and Colossians. Both letters, in contrast to other Pauline literature, expand the spatial metaphor of “in Christ” to a cosmic scale. The divine purpose of creation and redemption of the cosmos is bound up within the sphere of Christ (Eph 1:9, 10; 3:11; Col 1:17, 17; 2:15). Ephesians, however, differs from Colossians in that the phrase is heavily used (twice more than Colossians) to denote the basis and the sphere in which believers have fellowship with God. This suggests that Ephesians emphasizes the triangular relationship (Dreieckverhältnis) of God, Christ, and the Church; a relationship where Christ serves as the connecting link between God and the Church.⁵⁴ God redeems the church in Christ, God causes the growth of the church in Christ, and God builds up the church in Christ. The centrality of the existence of the church in Christ is further strengthened when we note how Ephesians, again differing from Colossians, emphasizes the inclusion of believers in Christ before the foundation of the world (ἐξελέξατο ἡμᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου; 1:4). The ἐν αὐτῷ cannot simply be taken to mean that God chose believers through (διὰ) Christ’s agency. Rather, the text suggests that believers were chosen by God and were mysteriously united with the pre-existent Christ before the foundation of the world.⁵⁵ Ephesians also goes on to state explicitly what is only implied in Col 3:1—God raised and seated believers in Christ in the heavenlies (συνήγειρεν καὶ

⁵⁴ Maurer, “Der Hymnus von Epheser 1,” 159.

⁵⁵ Schlier, *Der Brief an die Epheser*, 49, writes concerning ἐν Χριστῷ, “Es ist weder von einem σὺν Χριστῷ (vgl. 2,5) noch von einem διὰ Χριστοῦ die Rede, noch hat das ‘in ihm’ nur einen repräsentativen Sinn. Es ist vielmehr gemeint, dass wir auch schon in unserer Erwählung in Christus waren. Sofern wir Erwählte sind und als Erwählte prä-existieren, prä-existierten wir schon in Christus. Das ist eine christliche Umbildung des jüdischen Theologumenon von der Präexistenz nicht nur des Messias, sondern auch des Heilsvolkes und der Heilsgüter.” See also R. G. Hammerton-Kelly, *Pre-existence, Wisdom, and the*

συνεκάθισεν ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ; Eph 2:6).⁵⁶ Thus, Ephesians presents a grand sweep, both backwards and forwards, of the believers' union with Christ. Not only are believers united together with the pre-existent Christ before the foundation of the world, they are also united with the exalted Christ in the eschatological age.⁵⁷ Allan is mistaken when he writes, "'In Christ' is no longer for this Writer [of Ephesians] the formula of incorporation in Christ, but has become the formula of God's activity through Christ."⁵⁸ Far from "[watering down or completely ignoring] the deep Pauline sense of incorporation into Christ and union with the corporate or inclusive personality of Christ,"⁵⁹ Ephesians actually expands the concept such that the church is the body and the fullness of Christ (1:23), and that believers are incorporated in Christ on both sides of the Christ-event: in his pre-existence and in his exaltation.

Ephesians also differs from Colossians by using "in Christ" to denote the basis and the sphere of the fellowship that believers have with one another. There are seven occurrences of this category in Ephesians compared to none in Colossians. This statistic is not surprising and correlates with the similarly high occurrences of the "*basis of fellowship with God*" category. Ephesians notes that Christ creates Jews and Gentiles into one new humanity ἐν αὐτῷ (2:15); Christ kills the enmity between Jews and Gentiles ἐν αὐτῷ (2:16); Jews and Gentiles are fellow heirs, fellow members of the body, and fellow partners of the promises ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (3:6). The local and the instrumental senses are present in this

Son of Man: A Study of the Idea of Pre-existence in the New Testament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 180–82.

⁵⁶ Lincoln, *Ephesians*, 106.

⁵⁷ See Lincoln, *Ephesians*, 22.

⁵⁸ Allan, "The 'In Christ' Formula in Ephesians," 59.

category, although one sense may dominate in some instances. For example, Chrys Caragounis argues that the local sense is dominant in 2:13 which contrasts ἦτε τῷ καιρῷ ἐκείνῳ χωρὶς Χριστοῦ with νυνὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.⁶⁰ Although most translations render the χωρὶς Χριστοῦ ... ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ contrast as “separate from Christ ... in Christ Jesus,” a more appropriate translation might be “outside Christ ... in Christ Jesus.” This χωρὶς-ἐν contrast is also reflected in 2 Cor 12:3, a passage typically rendered as “in the body... out of the body.” Furthermore, an instrumental sense of the “in Christ” formula in Eph 2:13 is also unlikely since the presence of two instrumental phrases (ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ἐν τῷ αἵματι) in one clause is awkward. Thus, the local sense dominates in this instance. Gentiles were once outside Christ, alienated from the πολιτεία of Israel; as a consequence of being in Christ, they are now συμπολιταὶ τῶν ἁγίων (2:19). The “in Christ” phrase therefore not only denotes the basis, but also the sphere, in which believers have fellowship with one another.

The numerous occurrences and varied forms of the ἐν Χριστῷ phrase demonstrate its significance in Ephesians. Furthermore, its heavy concentration in contexts describing the reconciliation that believers have with God and with one another suggests the relative importance of these motifs in Ephesians vis-à-vis Colossians. At the same time, the ἐν Χριστῷ phrase provides us with a better understanding of these reconciled unities. Although one cannot determine the precise meaning of the phrase, our study suggests that the two main emphases of the phrase in Ephesians are the

⁵⁹ Allan, “The ‘In Christ’ Formula in Ephesians,” 60.

⁶⁰ Caragounis, *Ephesian Mysterion*, 156n. 36.

instrumental and the local sense. Either sense may be dominant in any single occurrence, but it does not appear that the other is totally absent. We can then perhaps conclude that the ἐν Χριστῷ phrase in Ephesians demonstrates not only the importance of the motif of unity, it also denotes the basis and the sphere in which this unity occurs.

Body of Christ

The phrase τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, or its equivalent variants (τὸ σῶμα, τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, ἐν σῶμα), is occasionally used in the Pauline literature in reference to the church. In the earlier Pauline literature of 1 Corinthians and Romans, Paul typically uses analogical language to compare the church to a body: “For just as (καθάπερ) the body is one and has many members, ... so (οὕτως) also [the body of] Christ” (1 Cor 12:12; see also Rom 12:4–5). The common life of the church is compared to the interdependence of the various members of a body, the head being just one member among the many (1 Cor 12:21). Although implied, these texts do not *specifically* denote the body of Christ as the body to which Christians belong. Even in 1 Cor 12:27 (ὁμοῖς δὲ ἐστε σῶμα Χριστοῦ), which is typically rendered as “You are the body of Christ,” the lack of the definite article suggests that the clause need only mean “You are a body belonging to Christ.” In contrast to the earlier Pauline literature, Colossians and Ephesians extend and advance the imagery of the church (ἡ ἐκκλησία) as the body of Christ, thus making explicit what may only be implied in 1 Cor 12:27–28. Instead of the language of simile, both letters consistently employ the language of metaphor to equate the church as *the* body of Christ (Eph 1:23; 5:30; Col 1:24), the body of which Christ is the head (Col 1:18; 2:19; Eph 1:22–23; 4:15–16; 5:23). This shift in language deepens the interpersonal relationship between the church

and Christ.⁶¹ As head of the body, Christ not only is the overlord of the body (Eph 1:22–23), he also provides the nourishing and sustaining source and power (ἐξ οὗ) that enables the body to grow (Col 2:19; Eph 4:16; see also 5:29).⁶² Given these similarities of Colossians and Ephesians vis-à-vis the earlier Pauline literature, a comparison between Colossians and Ephesians may provide us with insights regarding the particular emphasis of Ephesians.

The use of τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ in Ephesians emphasizes the cosmic church. While Colossians may use the phrase to refer to the physical body of Christ (1:22 and possibly 2:11) or to the reality in contrast to mere appearance (σκία; 2:17),⁶³ Ephesians consistently uses the phrase to refer to the church, emphasizing its relationship to Christ and the interrelationship of its members. Both Colossians and Ephesians regard Christ as the head, the source of life and unity of the body. Nevertheless, Ephesians advances the unity of the church with Christ by stating that the church is the fullness of Christ who fills all in all (τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν πληρουμένου; 1:23).⁶⁴ Christ fills his body with all the divine graces that reside in him resulting in a deep relationship of the two. Ephesians also portrays this deep relationship via a marriage metaphor: the church is the bride of Christ. Christ nurtures, loves, and takes tender care of the church because we are members of his body (5:30). The unity between Christ and his body, the church, is so intense and intimate that Ephesians labels it a profound mystery (5:32), a secret that

⁶¹ Vincent Taylor, *The Names of Jesus* (New York: St Martin's, 1953), 101–102, writes, “The name ‘the Head’ asserts His inseparability from the Church, but excludes His identity with it.”

⁶² In Col 2:19, the focus on Christ is so strong that the relative pronoun οὗ is masculine, being constructed according to sense rather than following the grammatical antecedent of ἡ κεφαλή.

⁶³ In discussing allegorical interpretation, Philo writes that “the letter is to the oracle but as the shadow to the substance (σκιὰς τινὰς ὡσανεὶ σωμάτων) and that the higher values therein revealed are what really and truly exists” (*Conf.* 190). See also *Migr.* 12.

cannot be unraveled by human ingenuity but that can only be understood by revelation from God.

The use of τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ in Ephesians also emphasizes the interdependence of the individual members of the church. This is seen by comparing Col 2:19 and Eph 4:15–16.

Col 2:19 καὶ οὐ κρατῶν τὴν κεφαλὴν, ἐξ οὗ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα διὰ τῶν ἀφῶν καὶ συνδέσμων ἐπιχορηγούμενον καὶ συμβιβαζόμενον αὖξει τὴν αὖξησιν τοῦ θεοῦ.

Eph 4:15–16 ... ὅς ἐστιν ἡ κεφαλὴ, Χριστός, ἐξ οὗ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα συναρμολογούμενον καὶ συμβιβαζόμενον διὰ πάσης ἀφῆς τῆς ἐπιχορηγίας κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐν μέτρῳ ἑνὸς ἐκάστου μέρους τὴν αὖξησιν τοῦ σώματος ποιεῖται εἰς οἰκοδομὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν ἀγάπῃ.

The similarity between the two letters in these verses is clear: both contain κεφαλὴ, ἐξ οὗ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, διὰ + ἀφή, συμβιβαζόμενον, ἐπιχορηγ*, and αὖξησιν; and both note the dependence (ἐξ οὗ) of the body upon Christ. There are, however, differences. Through the use of “οὐ κρατῶν τὴν κεφαλὴν” and the question in the following verse, “εἰ ἀπεθάνετε σὺν Χριστῷ ...” (2:20), Colossians stresses the body’s dependence upon its head. Ephesians, on the other hand, stresses the necessity of mutual interdependence of each member for growth with the additional prepositional phrase ἐν μέτρῳ ἑνὸς ἐκάστου μέρους. Growth can only occur when each member is properly related to one another with each member making his or her unique contribution. The type of growth also emphasizes this mutual interdependence. Ephesians notes that it is not the growth of individuals that is the focus here but the growth of the entire body (τὴν αὖξησιν τοῦ σώματος). Furthermore, while Colossians notes that τὴν αὖξησιν is a divine growth (τοῦ

⁶⁴ The participle πληρουμένου in 1:23 refers to Christ. It is in the middle voice and carries an

θεοῦ) in moral and ethical perfection (see Col 1:10), Ephesians stresses that τὴν αὐξήσιν is a growth that builds up itself in love for one another (εἰς οἰκοδομὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν ἀγάπῃ; 4:16) until all attain unity (see 4:12–13; εἰς οἰκοδομὴν τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, μέχρι καταντήσωμεν οἱ πάντες εἰς τὴν ἐνότητα τῆς πίστεως). I do not wish to imply that the concept of the body of Christ in Colossians has no reference to the horizontal relationship between individual members. It has; Col 3:15 exhorts and reminds believers to let the peace of Christ rule in their lives since they were called in ἐνὶ σώματι. The emphasis on mutual interdependence and cohesion is, however, not as strongly emphasized as in Eph 4 with its discussions on the use of individual gifts for the common good.

Ephesians also differs from Colossians (and 1 Corinthians and Romans) in two other aspects. Ephesians broadens the concept of the unity of the body to encompass the two great divisions of humanity: Jews and Gentiles. Christ reconciles both Jews and Gentiles ἐν ἐνὶ σώματι (2:16), and Gentiles are members of the same body (σύσσωμος; 3:6) as Jews. Moreover, Ephesians mixes organic and building metaphors to describe the church: the church as a building grows (αὐξάνω; 2:21), and the church as the body of Christ is being fitted together (συναρμολογέω; 4:16).⁶⁵ Both metaphors present the church as a single entity comprising multiple members working cohesively together for the corporate good.⁶⁶

active meaning.

⁶⁵ The verb means “to fit together, to join” especially in buildings constructed of stones. See Christian Maurer, “συναρμολογέω,” *TDNT* 7:855.

⁶⁶ This mingling of metaphors suggests that Paul’s appreciation of the church in Ephesians is so nuanced and varied that no one metaphor is able to adequately capture its nature and function. Contra

In summary, the use of the body of Christ metaphor in Ephesians is extremely rich, emphasizing the unity of both horizontal and vertical relationships. Ephesians stresses the unity between Christ and the church, regarding her as the fullness of Christ and as the body of which Christ is the head. At the same time, Ephesians not only stresses the mutual interdependence between individual members of the church, it also announces the elimination of all causes for social and ethnic enmity in the body of Christ.

Use of Scripture in Ephesians

Ephesians differs from Colossians in its extensive use of Scripture. Apart from italicizing six portions of the text, the editors of NA²⁷ include 55 marginal references to the OT, Apocrypha, and OT Pseudepigrapha. Clearly, not all of these references are significant. The number of references, however, does indicate Paul's extensive use of Scripture in Ephesians, of which the more significant are in 1:20, 22 (Ps 110:1; 8:6); 2:17 (Isa 52:7; 57:19); 4:8–10 (Ps 68:18); 4:25–26a (Zech 8:16; Ps 4:4); 5:18 (Prov 23:31); 5:31–32 (Gen 2:24); 6:2–3 (Exod 20:12; Deut 5:16); 6:14–17 (Isa 11:5; 49:2; 52:7; Wis 5:17–21).⁶⁷ In a recent dissertation, Mary Hinkle examines these OT references and argues that “the author of Ephesians

Schlier, *Der Brief an die Epheser*, 143–45, who suggests that Gnosticism is the background for this mingling of metaphors.

⁶⁷ J. Paul Sampley, *“And the Two Shall Become One Flesh”: A Study of Traditions in Ephesians 5:21–33* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 161, writes, “The OT continues as a guide ... to the church as a whole, to the understanding of what she is, and, in fact, to God's purposes. The theological stance and ethical perspective of the author of Ephesians are informed by and grounded in the OT.” Andreas Lindemann, *Die Aufhebung der Zeit* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Mohn, 1975), 89, takes an opposing view and argues that Ephesians makes no direct use of the OT in any specific sense. He writes, “Es hat sich gezeigt, daß der Verfasser des Epheserbriefes über einen ‘Schriftgebrauch’ im spezifischen Sinne nicht verfügt.” Lindemann's view stems from his theological argument that the church is discontinuous with Israel. Sampley's and Lindemann's views claim too much. Ephesians uses the OT extensively. The use of the OT, however, is in a supportive rather than a formative role. The OT is one

reads each text of the OT included in his letter for how it may be heard to proclaim unity, or harmony, or peace.”⁶⁸ The author cites and alludes to scriptural traditions within the context of proclaiming the union of believers in Christ, proclaiming the union of Jews and Gentiles within the church, and exhorting the church to maintain the unity Christ has created. As space does not permit me to examine each reference, I examine three that are representative of Paul’s use of scriptural traditions in Ephesians: one in the theological (2:17) and two in the paraenetic section (4:8–10; 25–26a).⁶⁹

Ephesians 2:17

Ephesians 2:11–22 describes the unity that Jews and Gentiles have in Christ. Within this pericope, Eph 2:17 presents a christological reading of Isa 52:7 (ὡς πόδες εὐαγγελιζομένου ἀκοὴν εἰρήνης) and 57:19 (εἰρήνην ἐπ’ εἰρήνην τοῖς μακρὰν καὶ τοῖς ἐγγύς οὖσιν). Paul uses Isa 52:7 to describe Christ’s task (εὐηγγελίσσατο εἰρήνην) and Isa 57:19 to describe the audiences of Christ’s proclamation (τοῖς μακρὰν καὶ ... τοῖς ἐγγύς). Any discussion of the use of OT in Eph 2:14–18 must first examine the debate concerning the form, origin, and traditions of 2:14–18. It is not possible to provide a nuanced treatment of this extensive debate. Here are some brief comments. Scholars have suggested various options for the underlying form and material: a pre-Christian gnostic

source among many authoritative traditions which the author employs to further the purposes of the letter. See Andrew T. Lincoln, “The Use of the OT in Ephesians,” *JSNT* 14 (1982): 49–50.

⁶⁸ Mary Hinkle, “Proclaiming Peace: The Use of Scripture in Ephesians” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1997), 204. So also M. Barth, “Traditions in Ephesians,” *NTS* 30 (1984): 22, who writes, “Just as every great thinker and writer, so also the author of Ephesians used traditions as well as his own mind and language to create *ex pluribus unum*.”

⁶⁹ For a fuller treatment of the use of the OT in Ephesians, see Thorsten Moritz, *A Profound Mystery: The Use of the Old Testament in Ephesians* (NovTSup 85; Leiden: Brill, 1996).

redeemer myth,⁷⁰ an early Christian hymn,⁷¹ or baptismal material.⁷² Ernest Best, however, is probably right in arguing that the author did not use a section of preformed material.⁷³ In summary, I consider the passage to be an original argument that employs Isa 52:7 and 57:19 in a supportive role.⁷⁴

An examination of the original context of Isa 52:7 and 57:19 shows that, in both cases, peace is the content of the proclamation. Furthermore, the recipients of the words of consolation are Jews in both cases. The “near” and “far” of Isa 57:19 should be understood in geographical categories, referring to Jews that are in Judah (“the near”) and in the diaspora communities (“the far”). The allusion to Isa 57:19 in Eph 2:17 is, however, a dramatic reversal of the Isaianic prophetic text since Eph 2:13 makes clear that “the near” refers to Jews, and “the far” to Gentiles.⁷⁵ Paul further emphasizes the reference to its Gentiles readers by inserting ὑμῖν before τοῖς μακρὰν. Ephesians 2:17 also differs from Isa 57:19 in that “peace” between humanity and God is proclaimed separately to the two categories (εὐηγγελίσατο εἰρήνην ὑμῖν τοῖς μακρὰν καὶ εἰρήνην τοῖς ἐγγύς).

⁷⁰ Heinrich Schlier, *Christus und die Kirche im Epheserbrief* (BHT 6; Tübingen: Mohr, 1930), 18–37; Petr Pokorný, *Der Epheserbrief und die Gnosis* (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1965), 114–15; Lindemann, *Die Aufhebung der Zeit*, 160–70.

⁷¹ Jack T. Sanders, “Hymnic Elements in Ephesians 1–3,” *ZNW* 56 (1965): 216–18; Joachim Gnilka, “Christus unser Friede—ein Friedens-Erlöserlied in Eph 2,14–17,” in *Die Zeit Jesu: Festschrift für Heinrich Schlier* (ed. Günther Bornkamm and Karl Rahner; Freiburg: Herder, 1970), 190–207.

⁷² Wayne A. Meeks, “In One Body: The Unity of Humankind in Colossians and Ephesians,” in *God’s Christ and His People* (ed. J. Jervell and Wayne A. Meeks; Oslo: Universitets Forlaget, 1977), 215.

⁷³ See Best, *Ephesians*, 247–50.

⁷⁴ Stuhlmacher, “He is Our Peace,” 187–91, considers 2:14–18 to be a christological exegesis of Isa 9:5–6; 52:7; and 57:19. Nevertheless, the link between Eph 2:14 and Isa 9:5–6 is weak.

⁷⁵ *Num. Rab.* 8.4 interprets the “far” of Isa 57:19 to refer to Gentile proselytes, according even a certain advantage to them on the basis of the word order of 57:19: “Why [were the proselytes given a prominent share in the building of the temple]? To inform you that the Holy One, blessed be He, brings nigh those that are distant and supports the distant just as the nigh. Nay more, He gives peace to the distant sooner than to the nigh, as it says, ‘Peace, peace to him that is far off and to him that is near’ (Isa 57:19).”

The text therefore sees the message of peace affecting both groups in the same way such that there is no distinction in God’s gift to them; both Jews and Gentiles are now reconciled to God. Nevertheless, Ephesians immediately draws out the necessary implication. Since (ἄρα οὖν) both Jews and Gentiles have access to God, they are no longer estranged (2:19); both are members within God’s household.

Ephesians 4:8–10

In Eph 4:1–16, Paul urges believers to maintain the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. Different gifts have been given to each member, but all these gifts originate from one person—Jesus Christ. In order to validate this claim, Ephesians cites (διὸ λέγει; 4:8) a passage that is commonly thought to be either a modification of Ps 67:19a (LXX) or the textual tradition found in the Targum. Here are the parallel passages.

GNT: ἀναβάς εἰς ὕψος ἠχμαλώτευσεν αἰχμαλωσίαν, ἔδωκεν δόματα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

LXX: ἀνέβης εἰς ὕψος, ἠχμαλώτευσας αἰχμαλωσίαν, ἔλαβες δόματα ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ.

Targum: “You ascended the firmament, Prophet Moses; you took captivity captive; you learned the words of the Law; you gave them as gifts to the sons of man.”⁷⁶

The substantive difference between Eph 4:8 and the LXX occurs in the last line as ἔδωκεν replaces ἔλαβες.⁷⁷ Paul may have made this change, or he may be quoting another tradition such as that represented in the Targum of Ps 68:18, which reads “gave” rather

⁷⁶ This translation of the targumic version of Ps 68:68 is from Martin McNamara, *The New Testament and the Palestinian Targum to the Pentateuch* (AnBib 27; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1966), 79.

⁷⁷ Ephesians 4:8 also differs from the LXX in the use of ἀναβάς rather than ἀνέβης. Note, however, that the Vaticanus text of Ps 67:19a already has the aorist participle ἀναβάς.

than “received.”⁷⁸ Multiple scholars have attempted to solve this exegetical difficulty.⁷⁹ But regardless of the interpretation one adopts, it is clear that Paul employs a christological and ecclesial hermeneutic in the appropriation of this tradition. Instead of Yahweh or Moses, Christ is the one who ascends victoriously. Paul then provides a midrashic interpretation of the quotation: τὸ δὲ ἀνέβη τί ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ ὅτι καὶ κατέβη εἰς τὰ κατώτερα [μέρη] τῆς γῆς. Given the ordering of ἀνέβη-κατέβη and the presence of καί (“also”), the text emphasizes the descent of Christ before his ascent. The descent therefore probably refers to Christ’s incarnation and death; the genitive τῆς γῆς is a genitive of apposition (“the lower regions [below the heavens], i.e., the earth”). Through this interpretation, Paul reminds his readers that the one who ascended is the one who first descended in his incarnation and death on the cross (Eph 2:14–17). Christ’s ascension is not a rupture but a continuation and culmination of the ministry that he began on earth.

Christ ascended far above the heavens in order that he might fill all things (ἵνα πληρώσῃ τὰ πάντα; 4:9). The concept of “filling” is related to subjugation, power, and rule.⁸⁰ Christ therefore exercises sovereign rule over the universe,⁸¹ unifying all things

⁷⁸ The apparent misquote of Ps 67:19a (LXX) and the presence of the citation formula διὸ λέγει here as in Eph 5:14b, where it introduces a non-scriptural quotation, leads Moritz, *A Profound Mystery*, 84, to conclude that Paul is citing an early Christian tradition.

⁷⁹ Richard Rubinkiewicz, “PS LXVIII 19 (= EPH IV 8) Another Textual Tradition or Targum?” *NovT* 17 (1975): 219–24; Barnabas Lindars, *New Testament Apologetic: The Doctrinal Significance of the Old Testament Quotations* (London: SCM, 1961), 52–56; Richard A. Taylor, “The Use of Psalm 68:18 in Ephesians 4:8 in Light of the Ancient Versions,” *BSac* 148 (1991): 319–36; Gary V. Smith, “Paul’s Use of Psalm 68:18 in Ephesians 4:8,” *JETS* 18 (1975): 181–89.

⁸⁰ J. Gewieß, “Die Begriffe πληροῦν und πλήρωμα im Kolosser- und Epheserbrief,” in *Vom Wort des Lebens. Festschrift für Max Meinertz zur Vollendung des 70. Lebensjahres 19. Dezember 1950* (ed. Nikolaus Adler; Münster: Aschendorff, 1951), 129, notes that in Philo, God’s transcendence, power, and rule is related to his filling all things. See Philo, *Post.* 14; *Gig.* 47; *Mos.* 2.238.

under his power (1:10) and distributing gifts, not to all men as stated in the LXX or the Targum, but to the church (4:7, 11). Christ not only makes peace possible (2:11-22), he also provides the means for maintaining it. The divisions that formerly existed along socio-ethnic lines have now been replaced with divisions in functions and tasks. Instead of Jews and Gentiles, there are now apostles, prophets, evangelists, shepherds, and pastors (4:11). Although diverse, these gifts all originate from the same Christ, assisting in the continuation of his ministry on the cross when believers work together and build up the church until everyone attains to the unity of faith (4:12-13). Although diverse, these gifts have a unity of source and a unity of goal.

Ephesians 4:25-26a

As a redeemed community, believers in the church are called to put on the new man that is created in the likeness of God, exhibiting proper ethical behavior that promotes peace and unity within the church. Ephesians 4:25-26 provides examples of such behavior: speaking the truth to one another and not sinning in the midst of one's anger. The verbatim agreement of the Ephesian text with the OT is striking. Ephesians 4:25 (λαλεῖτε ἀλήθειαν ἕκαστος μετὰ τοῦ πλησίον αὐτοῦ) is the same as Zech 8:16 (λαλεῖτε ἀλήθειαν ἕκαστος πρὸς τὸν πλησίον αὐτοῦ; LXX), the only difference being the use of the preposition μετὰ rather than πρὸς. Furthermore, Eph 4:26a (ὀργίζεσθε καὶ μὴ ἁμαρτάνετε)

⁸¹ Ephesians and Colossians both contain rich πλήρωμα and πληρώω language. Their respective use, however, indicate different emphases. In the use of πλήρωμα, Colossians emphasizes the unity of Christ with God (Christ embodies τὸ πλήρωμα of God; Col 1:19; 2:9) but Ephesians the unity of the ἐκκλησία with Christ (the body, the church, is the τὸ πλήρωμα of Christ; Eph 1:23). In the use of πληρώω, Colossians notes that Christ fills believers (Col 2:10), but Ephesians emphasizes the cosmic unifying rule of Christ as the one who fills (or subjugates) all in all (Eph 1:23; 4:10). Both of these differences stress the motif of cosmic unity and the ἐκκλησία in Ephesians.

is exactly the same as Ps 4:5a (ὀργίζεσθε καὶ μὴ ἁμαρτάνετε; LXX). Despite these similarities, Ephesians may not allude to the OT directly but to Jewish ethical traditions such as the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*. In *T. Dan* 5:2, the command to speak the truth to one another is found in the context of lying, anger, and the devil, all of which are also found in Ephesians. Dan instructs his children,

Observe, therefore, my children, the commandments of the Lord and keep his law; and depart from anger, and hate lying, that the Lord may dwell in you, and Beliar may flee from you. Speak truth each one with his neighbor, and so you will not fall into pleasure and confusions, but you will be in peace, having the God of peace, and no war will prevail over you. (*T. Dan* 5:1–2)⁸²

Admittedly, the command to speak the truth (ἀλήθειαν φθέγγεσθε ἕκαστος πρὸς τὸν πλησίον αὐτοῦ) differs from Eph 4:25 in the use of φθέγγεσθε rather than λαλεῖτε. The overall echoes of *T. Dan* 5:1–2, however, resonate well with Eph 4:25–27.⁸³ If this is so, the allusion promotes the theme of peace and unity since *T. Dan* 5:2 relates speaking the truth with peace, the God of peace, and the absence of war (ἀλλ' ἔσεσθε ἐν εἰρήνῃ, ἔχοντες τὸν Θεὸν τῆς εἰρήνης, καὶ οὐ μὴ κατισχύση ὑμῶν πόλεμος).⁸⁴ Furthermore, although *T. Dan* ties the injunction to speak the truth with the nearness of the Lord and the subsequent flight of the devil, Ephesians provides a sociological justification—ὅτι

⁸² The English translation is from H. W. Hollander and M. De Jonge, *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A Commentary* (SVTP 8; Leiden: Brill, 1985), 283–85. The Greek text from TLG is as follows: (1.) Φυλάξατε οὖν, τέκνα μου, τὰς ἐντολὰς τοῦ Κυρίου, καὶ τὸν νόμον αὐτοῦ τηρήσατε· ἀπόστητε δὲ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ, καὶ μισήσατε τὸ ψεῦδος, ἵνα Κύριος κατοικήσῃ ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ φύγῃ ἀφ' ὑμῶν ὁ Βελίαρ. (2.) Ἀλήθειαν φθέγγεσθε ἕκαστος πρὸς τὸν πλησίον αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μὴ ἐμπέσητε εἰς ἡδονὴν καὶ ταραχάς, ἀλλ' ἔσεσθε ἐν εἰρήνῃ, ἔχοντες τὸν Θεὸν τῆς εἰρήνης, καὶ οὐ μὴ κατισχύση ὑμῶν πόλεμος.

⁸³ So Lincoln, *Ephesians*, 300; Joachim Gnilka, *Der Epheserbrief* (HTKNT; Freiburg: Herder, 1971), 234.

⁸⁴ This relationship is also found in Zech 8:16 where God commands his people to speak the truth and render judgments that promote peace (λαλεῖτε ἀλήθειαν ἕκαστος πρὸς τὸν πλησίον αὐτοῦ καὶ κρίμα εἰρηνικὸν κρίνατε ἐν ταῖς πύλαις ὑμῶν; LXX).

ἐσμὲν ἀλλήλων μέλη (4:25). We speak the truth not because we are members of Christ's body (an argument which Paul uses in 5:30), but because we are members of one another. The rationale lies within the structure of the community, within the close reciprocal relationship that believers have with each other. Speaking the truth, or more precisely, speaking the truth in love (4:15) results in peace with other members; conversely, speaking falsehood results in war and conflict.

The above survey shows that Ephesians reads scriptural traditions ecclesiologically, with Christology serving as the foundation for this ecclesiocentric hermeneutic.⁸⁵ Citations and allusions to these traditions appear in strategically important places that emphasize peace and unity within the church. The traditions themselves do not play a formative role. Ephesians, nevertheless, uses them as supporting arguments in helping the church come to a better understanding of herself as a redeemed community of Jews and Gentiles. At the same time, these traditions serve as guides for the church on the proper ethical behavior necessary to maintain the unity that Christ brought through his blood (2:13).

Trinitarian Formulas⁸⁶

Ephesians differs from Colossians with its multiple references to the three persons of the Trinity, its suggestive Trinitarian language, and its emphasis on the oneness or unity of

⁸⁵ This coincides with the findings of Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scriptures in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 84–121.

⁸⁶ For a discussion showing the relationship between Pauline Trinitarian formulas and church unity, see Francis Martin, "Pauline Trinitarian Formulas and Church Unity," *CBQ* 30 (1968): 199–210.

God.⁸⁷ For example, the RSV text contains eleven occurrences (1:13; 2:18, 22; 3:5, 16; 4:3, 4, 30; 5:18; 6:17, 18) of “Spirit” while Colossians has only one (1:8). Ephesians also puts Christ in a coordinating relationship with God the Father. Colossians has τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ (4:11); Ephesians has τῆ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ θεοῦ (5:5).⁸⁸ Furthermore, Christ is at times used interchangeably with the Spirit. In Eph 1:13, believers are sealed in Christ; in 4:30, believers are sealed in the Spirit. In 3:16, the Spirit is in the inner man; in the next verse, which stands in apposition to 3:16, Christ dwells in the hearts of believers. In 1:23, the church is the fullness of Christ; in 5:18, believers are exhorted to be filled with the Spirit. Some interpreters also understand the descent of Christ in 4:9 as his descent in the Spirit during Pentecost.

More important, Ephesians emphasizes the oneness of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (4:4–6). The church fathers adopted such Trinitarian language as the basis for the unity of the Trinity,⁸⁹ and used the unity of the Trinity as an argument for the unity of the church. For example, Clement addressed the factious Corinthians with the following statement, “Why are there strife and passion and divisions and schisms and war among you? Or have we not one God, and one Christ, and one Spirit of grace poured out upon us? And is there not one calling in Christ?” (1 *Clem.* 46:5–6). Similarly, Ignatius

⁸⁷ Applying the terms Trinity or Trinitarian to Ephesians would be anachronistic since these were only developed in the fourth century C.E. Ephesians does not contain any explicit Trinitarian theology. My use of this terminology for Ephesians only conveys the observation that the letter makes frequent triadic references to the Father, Son, and the Spirit, thereby laying the foundation for later Trinitarian theology.

⁸⁸ While Colossians leaves Christ out in the letter’s greeting (χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν; 1:2), Ephesians follows the typical Pauline formula of χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (1:2). The anomaly in Colossians cannot be taken to mean that the letter maintains a low view of Christ since it proceeds to an exalted description in the Christ hymn.

⁸⁹ Ign. [*Phi.*] 2 (*ANF* 1:116) alludes to Eph 4:4 in defense of the unity of the three divine persons.

alludes to Eph 4:4–6 when he writes, “Since, also, there is but one unbegotten Being, God, even the Father; and one only-begotten Son, God, the Word and man; and one Comforter, the Spirit of truth; and also one preaching, and one faith, and one baptism; and one Church ...; it behooves you also, therefore, ... to perform all things with harmony in Christ.”⁹⁰ Cyprian also writes concerning “a people united in one in the unity of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.”⁹¹ Thus, the unity of the Trinity implies the unity of the church.⁹²

Central to Paul’s understanding of the Godhead is his emphasis on the fatherhood of God and his monotheistic belief in God. Ephesians contains more references to God as Father than any other Pauline letter. There are eight references in Ephesians (1:2, 3, 17; 2:18; 3:14–15; 4:6; 5:20; 6:23) compared to the four in Romans, in Galatians, or in Colossians. This emphasis on God as the Father of the cosmos is intimately related to his understanding of the oneness of God. Paul declares: εἷς θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ πάντων, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ διὰ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν (4:6). There is one creator God and Father who governs the cosmos, who works through them, and is in them all. The text suggests that the oneness of God means more than his singularity; it includes his power to reconcile

⁹⁰ Ign. *Phld.* 4 (ANF 1:81).

⁹¹ Cyprian, *The Lord’s Prayer* 23 (ANF 5:454). Similarly, *On the Unity of the Church* 6 (ANF 5:423) states, “The Lord says, ‘I and the Father are one’; and again it is written of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, ‘And these three are one.’ And does any one believe that this unity which thus comes from the divine strength and coheres in celestial sacraments, can be divided in the Church, and can be separated by the parting asunder of opposing wills?” See also Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 7:17.

⁹² L. Cerfaux, *The Church in the Theology of St. Paul* (trans. Geoffrey Webb and Adrian Walker; Freiburg: Herder, 1959), 235, writes, “The divine unity of God, the Lord and the Spirit is necessarily continued in the unity of the whole body of Christians. It makes of the multitude a unity, as a people and as a Church.”

and unite those that are hostile to him or to each other.⁹³ As the one God and Father, every social grouping (πατριά) in heaven and earth derives its name—its life, strength, and essence—out of (ἐξ οὗ; 3:15) him.⁹⁴ This move from the oneness of God to the unity of the world or his people is not a Pauline innovation; the OT and Jewish writings already consider the unity or oneness of God as the presupposition for the oneness of the temple, the law, and the people of God. For example, Philo describes the Midianites' fear of the Jews in the following manner, "You see how unlimited is the number of the Hebrews, but their number is not so dangerous and menacing a weapon as their unanimity and mutual attachment. And the highest and greatest source of this unanimity is their creed of a single God, through which, as from a fountain, they feel a love for each other, uniting them in an indissoluble bond."⁹⁵

What is significant for Paul and Ephesians is that this oneness with its unifying force is not only an aspect of God the Father; it is also inherent in the one Spirit and the one Lord. In Ephesians, the oneness of the Spirit, Lord, and Father forms the basis for the

⁹³ Harald Hegermann, *Die Vorstellung vom Schöpfungsmittler im hellinistischen Judentum und Urchristentum* (TUGAL 82; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961), 186n. 2, notes that Ignatius considers the unity of God to mean more than singularity; "die göttliche ἐνότης ist ein Kräftebereich."

⁹⁴ Best, *Ephesians*, 338, argues that πατριά should be translated as "social grouping." He notes that Theodoret of Mopsuestia "read φπατριά here and understood by it a social grouping."

⁹⁵ Philo, *Virt.* 7.35. See also Philo, *Spec.* 1.67; 4.159; Josephus, *A.J.* 4.200–201; 5.112; *C. Ap.* 2.193; *2 Bar.* 48:24; *Deut* 6:4–6; *Zech* 14:9; and *Num. Rab.* 18.8. Jacques Dupont, *Gnosis: La Connaissance Religieuse dans les Épîtres de Saint Paul* (Louvain: Nauwlaerts, 1949), 340, suggests that while Jewish thought moved from the unity of God to the unity of the world, Greek philosophical thought moved inductively from the unity of the world to the unity of God ("La pensée grecque était remontée de l'unité du monde à l'unité de Dieu; la pensée juive suit le mouvement inverse: on descend de l'unité divine à l'unité du monde"). This direction of movement is, however, not clear. For example, Cleanthes, *Hymn to Zeus*, 20–21, declares that the unity of the world, the one rational λόγος, arises out of Zeus's harmonizing activity. The hymn reads: "For you have thus joined everything into one, the good with the bad, that there comes to be one over-existing rational order for everything" (Johan C. Thom, *Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus: Text, Translation, and Commentary* [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005], 107; see also his discussion on p. 112).

unity of the church.⁹⁶ In 4:1–6, Paul urges believers to maintain the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace (τηρεῖν τὴν ἐνότητα τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν τῷ συνδέσμῳ τῆς εἰρήνης; 4:3). The πνεῦμα here is not a human spirit but the Holy Spirit, and τοῦ πνεύματος is a genitive of producer meaning that the Holy Spirit is the one who produces the unity.⁹⁷ Believers are therefore not called to produce this unity but to maintain it. Paul follows this exhortation with a list of declarations in which the unity of each item is stressed by the use of the word “one” (4:4–6). Although there is no connecting particle or the conjunction γάρ, the declaration nevertheless has the force of an appeal and serves as the motivation for church unity.⁹⁸ The sevenfold list is fundamentally a triad that focuses on the three persons of the Trinity: three of the unities refer to the three persons of the Trinity (ἐν πνεῦμα, εἷς κύριος, εἷς θεός) while the remaining four allude to believers’ relationship to the Trinity.⁹⁹ If so, the oneness of the Trinity serves as the basis or reason for the unity of the church. Despite the different socio-ethnic makeup of the church, there can be no discord within the church since there is one Father, one Spirit, and one Son. Despite the diversity of gifts, there can be no division since all these gifts have their source in the one Lord (4:7–11; cf. 1 Cor 12:4–11).

Ephesians, admittedly, has no developed Trinitarian theology or any notion of a unified “divine nature” as the church fathers understood it to be. Neither does Ephesians, unlike the Fourth Gospel, contain any explicit Trinitarian language which states that the

⁹⁶ Barth, *Ephesians*, 465, writes, “In [Ephesians] God’s oneness is directly, i.e. causatively, dynamically, effectively, but also epistemologically, related to the unity of the Church. Because God is one, his people are one and are to live on the basis and in recognition of unity.”

⁹⁷ Daniel B. Wallace, *Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 105.

⁹⁸ So Abbott, *Ephesians and Colossians*, 107–108; Schnackenburg, *Ephesians*, 160.

Father and the Son, or the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one. Nevertheless, Ephesians does speak of the three persons of the Trinity working together to affect salvation and reconciliation for humanity and the church. Here are some examples: (A) Ephesians teaches that the Trinity is the basis for the spiritual blessings and salvation that believers enjoy due to the election of the Father (1:3–6), the sacrifice of the Son (1:7–12), and the sealing of the Holy Spirit (1:13–14). (B) The triadic reference to the Father, Christ, and Spirit, also occurs in discussions concerning believers’ access to God. For example, Christ provides the means whereby both Jews and Gentiles have access in one Spirit to the Father (2:18).¹⁰⁰ (C) In his discussion on the mystery, Paul notes that it was God the Father who revealed (note the divine passive ἐγνωρίσθη) the mystery of Christ by means of the Spirit (ἐν πνεύματι; 3:4–6). Other triadic references include 1:17; 2:22; 3:14–17; 5:18–20, but the above should suffice to show that Ephesians uses triadic references of the Trinity within the context of unity and reconciliation.

Although one may debate whether Ephesians contains the nascent beginnings of Trinitarian theology, Ephesians does contain implicit Trinitarian language. The letter stresses the unities of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, and makes multiple triadic references to the Trinity in discussions concerning unity, salvation, and reconciliation. The overall force of this language suggests the prominence of the motif of unity in Ephesians, a unity that has its basis in the unity of the Father, Son, and Spirit.

⁹⁹ O’Brien, *Ephesians*, 280.

¹⁰⁰ We should also note that the “in one Spirit to the Father” of 2:18 parallels the “in one body to God” of 2:16, thereby suggesting that the one body of Christ is united by the one Spirit (cf. 4:4). Erich Haupt, *Die Gefangenschaftsbriefe* (KEK; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1897), 89, states, “Das ἐν ἐνὶ

Love

The noun ἀγάπη and its verbal form ἀγαπάω occur extremely frequently in Ephesians. Ἀγάπη occurs 2 times and ἀγαπάω occurs 3.5 times more often in Ephesians than Colossians. The statistic is more revealing when we compare Ephesians to all the Pauline letters.

Table 2-3. Occurrences of ἀγάπη and ἀγαπάω in the Pauline letters

Book	Total Number of occurrences	Number of words in letter (in thousands)	Number of occurrences per thousand words
Eph	17	2.422	7.02
Rom	14	7.112	1.97
1 Cor	13	6.83	1.90
2 Cor	12	4.477	2.68
Col	7	1.582	4.42
1 Thess	7	1.481	4.73
2 Tim	6	1.238	4.85
Gal	5	2.23	2.24
2 Thess	5	0.823	6.08
1 Tim	5	1.591	3.14
Phi	4	1.629	2.46
Phlm	3	0.335	8.96
Tit	1	0.659	1.52

The above tables show that Ephesians has the highest concentration of ἀγάπη and ἀγαπάω in all the Pauline letters, surpassing 1 Corinthians with its chapter on love.¹⁰¹

Furthermore, the phrase ἐν ἀγάπῃ occurs with such frequency that almost half of the

πνεύμ. sagt nur in anderer Form, was im Vorigen von der Beseitigung des Unterschiedes zwischen Heiden und Juden, von dem εἷς καινὸς ἄνθρ., dem ἐν σῶμα gesagt ist.”

¹⁰¹ Technically, Philemon has the highest concentration of ἀγάπη and ἀγαπάω (8.96) in the Pauline letters. The relatively small size of this letter, however, renders this figure unsuitable for statistical comparison. I also disregarded a statistical analysis of ἀγαπητός since this adjective is commonly used in personal greetings rather than in the argument of the letter. For example, five out of the seven occurrences of ἀγαπητός in Romans are used in this manner (Rom 1:7; 16:5, 8, 9, 12). Since Ephesians is a circular letter with few specific greetings, the occurrence of this adjective is understandably negligible.

13 occurrences in the entire NT are in Ephesians (1:4; 3:17; 4:2, 15, 16; 5:2). These statistics reveal the importance of the motif of love in Ephesians.

Ephesians uses ἀγαπ* words primarily within the context of love for one another (1:4, 15; 4:2, 15, 16; 5:2, 25, 28, 33) and secondarily within the context of God's love for believers (3:19; 6:23), especially as the source and motivation for God's gift of salvation (2:4; 5:2, 25).¹⁰² The two dimensions of love are related; the horizontal dimension of love for fellow believers is the natural outflow of experientially acknowledging the vertical dimension of God's love for us as demonstrated in the sacrificial death of Christ. For example, Paul exhorts believers to be "kind to one another, tenderhearted, forgiving each other just as (καθώς) God in Christ forgave you" (4:32). The conjunction καθώς has both a comparative and causal force: what God has done for believers becomes the paradigm and the ground for their behavior toward other believers. The implication of God's work on behalf of believers is again reinforced by the following consequential οὖν in 5:1;¹⁰³ believers are to be imitators of God as beloved children (τέκνα ἀγαπητά). Since believers have been adopted as sons (1:5), they are to imitate their heavenly father.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² The phrase ἐν ἀγάπῃ in 1:4 can be attached to what precedes or what follows. Following the editors of NA²⁷, I connect it with the preceding phrase (εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἀγίους καὶ ἀμώμους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ ἐν ἀγάπῃ). God's purpose for his people is that they live a holy and blameless life before him, showing love for one another. A comparison of this reading with Col 1:22 demonstrates Ephesians's concern with love and unity. Both letters stress the need to live a holy and blameless life (παραστήσαι ὑμᾶς ἀγίους καὶ ἀμώμους καὶ ἀνεγκλήτους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ; Col 1:22). Colossians, however, inserts ἀνεγκλήτους instead of ἐν ἀγάπῃ, emphasizing proper ethical behavior toward God rather than love within the community.

¹⁰³ The οὖν of 5:1 either (1) draws out the implications of 4:32 ("God in Christ forgave you"), or (2) is resumptive, going back to the οὖν of 4:1 and 17, and further drawing out the implications of what God has done for believers in Eph 1–3.

¹⁰⁴ For a discussion on father-child imagery as the basis for imitation, see Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles* (AnBib 105; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1986), 178–80; E. M. Lassen, "The Use of the Father Image in Imperial Propaganda and 1 Cor 4:14–21," *TynBul* 42 (1991): 127–36.

Furthermore, believers are to “walk in love just as (καθώς) Christ loved us and gave himself up for us” (5:2). The life of love that believers are called to follow is modeled on Christ’s death on the cross. Costly sacrificial love, then, is the trademark of the believer’s relationship with one another.

The relationship between love and peace is readily apparent. God’s love for us is the basis for the reconciliation and peace we have with God, God’s love for us is the paradigm and basis for our relationship with one another, and our sacrificial love for one another is the means for maintaining the peace and unity that God has created between fellow believers. Paul clearly understood the importance of love for maintaining unity within the church. After his discourse on the creation of one new humanity from Jews and Gentiles in 2:11–22, Paul specifically prays in 3:14–21 that God would help them fulfill the implications of this unified humanity (τούτου χάριν; 3:1, 14).¹⁰⁵ Paul’s prayer comprises three requests, each marked with a ἵνα clause (3:16, 18, 19). The first is a request that believers would be strengthened with power—that Christ would dwell in their hearts—with the result that they would be rooted and grounded in love for one another (3:17). The second is a request that believers would be able to comprehend the various facets of Christ’s love, to know the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge. The love of Christ is not to be grasped individually; it is to be experienced collectively. Paul emphasizes the corporate nature of this request with the phrase σὺν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἁγίοις (3:18). The third request summarizes the previous two as Paul prays that his readers

¹⁰⁵ The τούτου χάριν in 3:14 resumes the prayer begun in 3:1, but interrupted by the long digression of Paul’s role as the administrator of the mystery to the Gentiles (3:2-13).

might be filled with all the fullness of God (3:19). The fullness of God, in general, refers to his attributes or the spiritual gifts that he imparts. Nevertheless, the context since 3:17 focuses on love, suggesting that the fullness of God here emphasizes his nature of love.¹⁰⁶ Paul prays that God would fill his readers with the love that summarizes his essence so that they in turn would be able to imitate his likeness (5:1). Through the above three requests, Paul prays that his readers would be strengthened with love for one another so that they would be able to work out the unity that God has created within the church.

The relationship between love and unity is further seen in 4:1–16. The phrase ἐν ἀγάπῃ begins and ends this paragraph on unity and diversity within the body of Christ (4:2, 15, 16). It thus forms an *inclusio* of 4:1–16, suggesting again that love for one another is a fundamental requisite for maintaining unity within the church.

Summary

The above analysis compared various themes and motifs in Ephesians and Colossians. Themes that occur significantly only in Ephesians demonstrate the prominence of unity, peace, and reconciliation. Ephesians reads scriptural traditions for how they may be heard to proclaim unity, harmony, or peace; Ephesians employs Trinitarian language as a foundation for the unity of the church; and Ephesians reminds its readers to demonstrate sacrificial love for one another, thereby maintaining the peace and unity that God has created within the church.

¹⁰⁶ Best, *Ephesians*, 348. See also Harold W. Hoehner, *Ephesians: An Exegetical Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002), 490–91; Johannes E. Belsler, *Der Epheserbrief des Apostels Paulus* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1908), 102.

Themes that occur in both Ephesians and Colossians reflect the different emphases of each letter. Colossians stresses cosmic reconciliation, the vertical unity that believers have with Christ, and presents Christ as the content of the mystery. Ephesians does not ignore the cosmic scope and the vertical plane of reconciliation. Christ is the summation and unity of things in the heavens and things on the earth; believers are incorporated in Christ before the foundation of the earth, and have been raised up and seated with him in the heavenlies; the universal church is the body of Christ of which Christ is the head; and believers have peace with God in Christ. Ephesians, however, moves from the vertical to the horizontal plane of reconciliation. Not only do both Jews and Gentiles have peace with God, they also have peace with one another. As a consequence of Christ's death on the cross, Jews and Gentiles are no longer strangers but fellow citizens. They are no longer two distinct groups of people. Their calling to one common hope (4:4) cancels the previous distinction between Jews, who were the first to hope in the Messiah (1:12), and Gentiles, who were without hope (2:12). Any cause for socio-ethnic enmity have been erased and rendered powerless when Christ created them both into one new humanity in the one body of Christ, a body that not only acknowledges its dependence upon Christ but also its dependence upon each member for growth. Although Ephesians presents both vertical and horizontal dimensions of peace, it at times stresses the horizontal. Words that appear in both letters are used in Ephesians to reference relationships between members of the church. Furthermore, Ephesians devotes a major portion of the paraenetic section (4:1-16) to church unity. It is clear that Ephesians emphasizes the horizontal dimension to a much greater degree than

Colossians. But the question whether the horizontal dimension dominates and controls the vertical still needs to be examined further.

This chapter demonstrates the prominence of the motif of peace in Ephesians and provides an initial investigation into the character of its vision of peace. In the next chapter, I examine political terms and *topoi* in Ephesians that are related to peace and present the argument of Ephesians as a letter *περὶ εἰρήνης*.

CHAPTER 3
THE POLITICAL IN EPHESIANS

My comparison of Ephesians and Colossians demonstrated the prominence of the motif of peace, especially the horizontal dimension with its emphasis on the stability, unity, and flourishing of the community. When we situate Ephesians within its cultural milieu, we find that the topic of peace between and within peoples is common in Greek and Roman writings, especially political discourses *περὶ εἰρήνης* and *περὶ ὁμονοίας*. Before noting specific conceptual parallels and *topoi* between Ephesians and these political discourses, it may be helpful to lay out the political landscape of Ephesians in broad strokes. I begin with my working definition of “the political.”

Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explicate fully the concept of “the political” or to chart its change in meaning through history, some brief comments may help in framing the discussion of this chapter. The proper subject matter of “the political” is debated, and opinions concerning it are usually themselves political. At an abstract and culturally generic level, the concept of “the political” refers to “a field of activity in which power is exercised or contested and in which collective forms of ‘association and dissociation’ are realized.”¹ The emphasis of “the political” lies not so

¹ Ryan K. Balot, *Greek Political Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 2. Regarding fields of association and dissociation, Christian Meier, *The Greek Discovery of Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 4, writes, “*The political* denotes a ‘field of association and dissociation,’ namely, the field or

much in the structure and form of political institutions but in the activities or political fields “in which issues of identity and organization are both addressed and expressed.”²

With this understanding, one can appreciate several activities as being political. These include the generation and distribution of wealth, the deliberation of ethical behavior and individual responsibilities especially in regard to its impact on the well-being of the community, the rise and resolution of conflicts that threaten the integrity of the community, the debate over legitimate authority, and cultic practices. In the study of these activities, we may come across political institutions, “but these institutions should be regarded as instances of political processes—a particular set of formalized relationships that emerge from, are constituted by, and continue to be altered through political activity.”³

In the ancient Greek world, Thomas Sinclair argues, political activity and thought regarding communal flourishing revolve around “three bases—maintenance of adequate subsistence, character (ἦθος) of the people, and political institutions or constitution (πολιτεία). We tend to separate the study of these three into Economics, Ethics, and Politics; Greek thinkers kept them together. The study of behaviour and of goods and supplies were as much part of πολιτική as questions of forms of government.”⁴ Although

ambience in which people constitute orders within which they live together among themselves and set themselves apart from others. It is at the same time the field in which decisions are made about order and delimitation, as well as other questions of common interest, and in which there is contention for positions from which these decisions can be influenced.”

² Dean Hammer, *The Iliad as Politics: The Performance of Political Thought* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002), 26–27. See also my discussion on “the political” on pages 23–24 of chapter one.

³ Hammer, *The Iliad as Politics*, 27.

⁴ Thomas A. Sinclair, *A History of Greek Political Thought* (2d ed.; Cleveland: World, 1967), 3. Ancient Greek political thought stands in contrast to the modern period. Modern political thought emphasizes “the ideals of justice, freedom, and community which are invoked when evaluating political institutions

Aristotle kept these three elements in balance,⁵ other thinkers may emphasize one or the other, depending on the social and political environment and the audience whom they were addressing. An example of such differing emphases can be seen in two documents that offer advice to men seeking political ambition. In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 3.6, Socrates encourages Glaucon to gain expertise in public finances, military defenses, silver mines, and food production. In *Precepts of Statecraft*, however, Plutarch exhorts Menemachus with quotations from Greek and Latin writers concerning the need for good and noble character, honesty, a temperate way of life, the proper choice of friends, and rhetoric.

Regardless of the different emphases of particular thinkers, ancient Greek and Roman political thought on communal flourishing generally revolves around the three spheres of economics, ethics, and constitution. Common topics under these spheres include the household, property, wealth, moral education, citizenship, war, peace and concord, and forms of government (monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy). An examination of Ephesians using these categories suggests that major portions of the letter can be

and policies" (Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1990], 1). See also Agnes Heller, "The Concept of the Political Revisited," in *Political Theory Today* (ed. David Held; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 340, who argues that the "*the practical realization of the universal value of freedom in the public domain is the modern concept of the political.*" With the separation of the public and the private, the political sphere is portrayed as separate and distinct from personal, family, and business life. Political institutions are equated with the government and the proper concerns of political thought is "the nature of, and the proper ends of, government" (David Held, ed., *Political Theory Today* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991], 3). Modern political study also tends to be separated from other disciplines. Within academia today, the political, economic, social, and educational systems are divided into separate entities resulting in the highly specialized, but separate, disciplines of Politics, Economics, Sociology, Education, Religion, and Ethics.

⁵ R. G. Mulgan, *Aristotle's Political Theory: An Introduction for Students of Political Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), 52, writes, "Aristotle's approach to politics reminds us that the spheres of economics, law, morality, and education are not isolated but closely interdependent."

considered political. These include the reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles into one new humanity (2:11–22), the call for communal unity (4:1–16), the ethical injunctions (4:17–5:20), the household codes (5:21–6:9), and the call to warfare (6:10–20).

The respective political institutions found in the larger Greco-Roman world and in Ephesians are clearly different. On one side is the πόλις, on the other, the ἐκκλησία. The activities that constitute “the political” are, nevertheless, similar in both instances. Furthermore, there are structural and functional similarities between the two. For example, just as the οἶκος forms the fundamental unit of the πόλις or the βασιλεία,⁶ so also of the ἐκκλησία. The early church probably began with the conversion of individual households.⁷ The meeting places of these congregations were in private homes, designated in the Pauline letters as the “assembly at X’s house” (ἡ κατ’ οἶκον + possessive pronoun + ἐκκλησία; 1 Cor 16:19; Rom 16:5; Phlm 2; Col 4:15). The household assembly thus became the basic cell of the early Christian movement. Wayne Meeks notes, “Our sources give us good reason to think that [the individual household] was the basic unit in the establishment of Christianity in the city, as it was, indeed, the basic unit of the city itself.”⁸ Furthermore, although ἐκκλησία can denote a household assembly or the assembly of specific cities or provinces,⁹ the term in Ephesians always refers to a

⁶ See the “Household” section of this chapter, which explores further the relationship between οἶκος and the πόλις/βασιλεία.

⁷ Acts 16:15 (Lydia); 16:31–34 (Philippian jailer); 18:8 (Crispus); 1 Cor 1:16; 16:15 (Stephanas).

⁸ Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 29, 75. See also Robert Banks, *Paul’s Idea of Community: The Early House Churches in their Historical Setting* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980).

⁹ We have the churches in Corinth (1 Cor 14:23), in Rome (Rom 16:23), in Philippi (Phi 4:15), and the churches of Asia (1 Cor 16:19), Macedonia (2 Cor 8:1), Galatia (Gal 1:2; 1 Cor 16:1), and Judea (1 Thess 2:14).

heavenly assembly gathered around the throne of Christ,¹⁰ comparable to a political kingdom or the empire.¹¹ Just as kingdoms have kings or ultimate rulers, so does the ἐκκλησία in Eph 5:23–24; just as kingdoms prescribe appropriate ethical behavior, so does the ἐκκλησία in Eph 4:1–5:20; just as kingdoms wage war, so does the ἐκκλησία in Eph 6:10–17; just as kingdoms concern themselves with the proper distribution of material goods, so does the ἐκκλησία in Eph 4:28; just as kingdoms are considered the οἶκος of the king, so also is the ἐκκλησία in Eph 2:19 the οἶκος of God. These structural and functional similarities suggest that the ἐκκλησία functions in Ephesians as the political analogue of the πόλις/βασίλεια, serving as the primary frame of reference for discussing the political aspects of Ephesians.

In this chapter, I explore the political character of Ephesians in five sections: the reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles, the call to unity, the ethical injunctions, the household codes, and the call to spiritual warfare. I compare these representative sections of Ephesians with classical Greek and Roman political thought as found in a broad range of ancient texts including orations, historical narratives, poems, tragedies, and systematic treatises.¹² By comparing lexical parallels and the development of themes,

¹⁰ The reference to ἐκκλησία in Eph 3:10 may also refer to a local church. For arguments advocating the enlarged understanding of ἐκκλησία as a heavenly church vis-à-vis a universal church, see Banks, *Paul's Idea of Community*, 44–47.

¹¹ The comparison cannot be unduly forced. Although a province or city is *part* of a political kingdom, the local church is not considered *part* of the global church. Paul considers them *the church* at that particular place. Banks, *Paul's Idea of Community*, 47, remarks, “Even when we have a number of gatherings in a single city, the individual assemblies are not regarded as *part* of the church in that place, but as *one* of the ‘churches’ that meet there.”

¹² I distinguish between *political thought* and *political theory*, which focuses on the systematic philosophical treatment of politics. The more inclusive category of *political thought* does justice to the pervasiveness of politics in the ancient world. By focusing on *political thought*, I argue that non-systematic political treatises such as Aristophanes’s comedy *Lysistrata* can also be mined for their political opinions

I argue that Ephesians can be profitably read as a political letter. It contains political subjects, terms, and *topoi*. Furthermore, I argue that these political materials serve the deliberative function of promoting peace within the ἐκκλησία.

Similarities in language between the Pauline letters and ancient Greek political writings have been examined by various scholars. Most of the work, however, has focused on the Corinthian epistles.¹³ Even writings that notice these parallels in Ephesians have not given the matter close attention, nor have they attempted to find these parallels within the entire letter of Ephesians. Apart from the work of Faust which I reviewed in the first chapter, Greg Fay likewise notes the political character of Ephesians. He asserts, “Ephesians fits into the basic genre of ancient deliberative speeches ‘On Peace.’”¹⁴ Fay, however, spends only about 1% of his 754-page dissertation highlighting similarities between Ephesians and such ancient political discourses.¹⁵ The particular concern of his dissertation is the function of Eph 3:1–13 within the epistolary and rhetorical structure of the letter. Furthermore, Fay, following Margaret Mitchell’s work

regarding war and peace. For an example of how such an investigation may be fruitful in Homer’s *Iliad*, see Hammer, *The Iliad as Politics: The Performance of Political Thought*.

¹³ Some recent works include Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1991); L. L. Welborn, “On the Discord in Corinth. 1 Corinthians 1–4 and Ancient Politics,” *JBL* 106 (1987): 83–113; idem, *Politics and Rhetoric in the Corinthian Epistles* (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1997); Dale B. Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); P. Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul’s Relations with the Corinthians* (WUNT 2.23; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1987); S. M. Pogoloff, *Logos and Sophia: The Rhetorical Situation in 1 Corinthians* (SBLDS 134; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992); Bruno Blumenfeld, *The Political Paul: Justice, Democracy and Kingship in a Hellenistic Framework* (JSNTSup 210; London: Sheffield Academic, 2001); David M. Reis, “The Politics and Rhetoric of Discord and Concord in Paul and Ignatius,” in *Trajectories through the New Testament and the Apostolic Fathers* (ed. Andrew F. Gregory and Christopher M. Tuckett; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 307–24.

¹⁴ Greg Fay, “Paul the Empowered Prisoner: Eph 3:1–13 in the Epistolary and Rhetorical Structure of Ephesians” (Ph.D. diss.; Marquette University, 1994), 648.

¹⁵ Fay, “Paul the Empowered Prisoner,” 611–15, 653–59.

on 1 Corinthians,¹⁶ focuses on the *dispositio* (arrangement) of Ephesians. Instead of determining which part of Ephesians forms the *exordium*, *narratio*, or *confirmatio*, my approach emphasizes the *inventio* (invention) of the letter, the selection and shaping of topics that make the argument of Ephesians plausible. Finally, Tet-Lim N. Yee draws lexical parallels between Eph 2 and ancient political texts.¹⁷ Yee, however, limits his investigation to 2:11–22, since his focus is a reevaluation of the Jew-Gentile ethnic reconciliation in light of the new perspective on Paul. The lacuna in recent studies suggests the need for a fresh re-examination of the political character of Ephesians.

Jew-Gentile Reconciliation: One New Humanity

Any new community that is formed from previously diverse ethnic groups has the potential to be politically unstable. Ethnic tension, if left unchecked, leads to unrest and possibly war. Ancient political thinkers and figures were mindful of this danger. For example, Aristotle considers racial differences a cause of political disorders and revolutions. He writes, “Difference of race (τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον) is a cause of faction (στασιωτικός), until harmony of spirit is reached.... Hence most of the states that have hitherto admitted joint settlers or additional settlers have split into factions.”¹⁸ Aristotle goes on to provide numerous examples of such states that had collapsed. Issues of race relationships is therefore of paramount political consideration.¹⁹ Sufficient attention

¹⁶ Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*.

¹⁷ Tet-Lim N. Yee, *Jews, Gentiles and Ethnic Reconciliation: Paul's Jewish Identity and Ephesians* (SNTSMS 130; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹⁸ Aristotle, *Pol.* 5.2.10 (1303a25).

¹⁹ See also Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 3.10.6: “Your city is still without order and discipline, due to its being newly founded and a conglomeration of many races (ἐκ πολλῶν συμφορητῶς

must be paid to the creation of a new communal identity; otherwise, former ethnic forms of self-identification and differentiation will reassert themselves and create civil instability. Such was the case in Rome after the death of Romulus and Tatius. Although there was stability under their joint rule, Plutarch notes how old ethnic pride and prejudices resurfaced into quarrels between the followers of Tatius (the Sabines) and Romulus (the Romans) regarding the choice of the next king after the death of Romulus.²⁰ It was only through the skillful social and political engineering of Numa that he “banished from the city the practice of speaking and thinking of some citizens as Sabines, and of others as Romans; or of some as subjects of Tatius, and others of Romulus, so that his division resulted in a harmonious blending of them all together.”²¹

Ephesians 2 describes the reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles, and their creation as one new humanity. In this section, I examine the ethnic tension and enmity between Jews and Gentiles, and the strategy Paul employs in establishing peace between them. I

ἐθνῶν), and it will require long ages and manifold turns of fortune in order to be regulated and freed from those troubles and dissensions with which it is now agitated.”

²⁰ Plutarch, *Num.* 2.4–5: “The city was now beset with fresh disturbance and faction over the king to be appointed in his stead, for the new comers were not yet altogether blended with original citizens, but the commonalty was still like a surging sea, and the patricians full of jealousy toward one another on account of their different nationalities. It is indeed true that it was the pleasure of all to have a king, but they wrangled and quarreled, not only about the man who should be their leader, but also about the tribe which should furnish him. For those who had built the city with Romulus at the outset thought it intolerable that the Sabines, after getting a share in the city and its territory, should insist on ruling those who had received them into such privileges; and the Sabines, since on the death of their king Tatius they had raised no faction against Romulus, but suffered him to rule alone, had a reasonable ground for demanding now the ruler should come from them. They would not admit that they had added themselves as inferiors to superiors, but held rather that their addition had brought the strength of numbers and advanced both parties alike to the dignity of a city. On these questions, then, they were divided into factions.”

²¹ Plutarch, *Num.* 17.3. See *Num.* 17.1 for the strategy that Numa employed and for which he was “most admired.” For ethnic assimilation within Roman history, see also Emilio Gabba, *Dionysius and The History of Archaic Rome* (Sather Classical Lectures 56; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 208–10; Frank W. Walbank, “Nationality as a Factor in Roman History,” *HSCP* 76 (1972): 145–68.

highlight the political character of this subject matter, dealing with relationships between two social entities and the formation of a new citizenry. Furthermore, I note that the language and terminology of Eph 2 is similar to Greek and Roman political discourses.

Ethnic tension and enmity between Jews and Gentiles

The tension between Jews and Gentiles is palpable in Eph 2, not least in the Jewish portrayal of the Gentile other. The readers of Ephesians are called “Gentiles in the flesh” (τὰ ἔθνη ἐν σαρκί; 2:11), an ideological epithet used by Jews to depict non-Jews since Greeks or Romans would not consider themselves “Gentiles.”²² This label is clarified by another ethnic slur, the “so-called uncircumcision” (οἱ λεγόμενοι ἀκροβυστία).²³ The Gentile uncircumcision in the flesh is contrasted with the Jewish circumcision in the flesh (περιτομή ἐν σαρκί; 2:11). Through this mark in the flesh, the Jews divided the world into two camps: Jews and Gentiles.²⁴ Other peoples did indeed

²² The term “Gentile” is an ideological, not a sociological, term. C. D. Stanley, “Neither Jew Nor Greek,” *JSNT* 64 (1996): 105, writes, “The use of the term ‘Gentiles’ (ἄλλοφύλοι or ἔθνη) to designate all non-Jews represents a ‘social construction of reality’ developed by a particular people-group (the Jews) in a concrete historical situation. Those whom the Jews lumped together as ‘Gentiles’ would have defined themselves as ‘Greeks’, ‘Romans’, ‘Phrygians’, ‘Galatians’, ‘Cappadocians’, and members of various other ethnic populations.” For non-biblical references to the use of “Gentile” as an external definition of non-Jews by Jews, see *T. Sim.* 7:2; *T. Jud.* 22.2; *T. Ash.* 7.3; *T. Benj.* 3.8; *Apoc. Sedr.* 14:5.

²³ J. Marcus, “The Circumcision and the Uncircumcision in Rome,” *NTS* 35 (1989): 77–78, writes, “From the very beginning, then, ἀκροβυστία was a derogatory word for a part of the body that was shameful in Jewish eyes; our theory is that the term eventually became an ethnic slur designating the whole Gentile person. Such instances are not rare in the unhappy history of ethnic and racial animosity; insulting names for groups of people are often coined on the basis of certain real or assumed distinctive physical characteristics.”

²⁴ Michael Avi-Yonah, *Hellenism and the East: Contacts and Interrelations from Alexander to the Roman Conquest* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms for the Institute of Languages, Literature and the Arts, the Hebrew University, 1978), 136, remarks, “The Egyptians, the Jews, and the Greeks are the only three nations of antiquity who, to our knowledge, drew a dividing line between themselves and all other people.”

practice circumcision.²⁵ Circumcision, however, became the *sine qua non* of Jewish self-identification,²⁶ and non-Jewish writers considered Jews as the “circumcised *par excellence*.”²⁷

The Jewish categorization of the Gentile other proceeds further in 2:12–13. They are without the Messiah, separated from the body politic of Israel, strangers to the covenants of promise, lacking hope, without God, and far from the presence of God.²⁸ In essence, Gentiles have no part in the rights and privileges that belong exclusively to the Jews. Greeks and Romans would not have objected to the first three accusations of 2:12, but they would have rejected the notion that they were without hope or were atheists. On the contrary, they might have counter-charged the Jews with atheism due to their failure to participate in the city cult.²⁹ Charges of atheism or impiety were highly

²⁵ Herodotus, 2.36–37, 104; Strabo, *Geogr.* 17.2.5 (824); Josephus, *A.J.* 8.262; *C. Ap.* 1.169–71; 2.141.

²⁶ See *m. 'Ed.* 5:2; *m. Ned.* 31b. Philo, *Spec.* 1.1–1.11, mentions circumcision at the beginning of the essay, even before he begins his exegesis on the Ten Commandments. See further George F. Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era* (3 vols.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927–1930), 2.17–18; Shaye J. D. Cohen, “Cross the Boundary and Becoming a Jew,” *HTR* 82 (1989): 27.

²⁷ Menahem Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism* (3 vols.; Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1974–1984 [=GLAJJ]), 1.444. Tacitus strongly connects circumcision to Jewish self-identity. He writes, “They adopted circumcision to distinguish themselves from other peoples by this difference. Those who are converted to their ways follow the same practice, and the earliest lesson they receive is to despise the gods, to disown their country, and to regard their parents, children, and brothers as of little account” (*Hist.* 5.5.2; *GLAJJ* §281). See also Peter Schäfer, *Judeophobia: Attitudes Toward the Jews in the Ancient World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 83; Louis H. Feldman, *Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World: Attitudes and Interactions from Alexander to Justinian* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 153–158; John P. V. D. Balsdon, *Romans and Aliens* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 231–32.

²⁸ See also Yee, *Jews, Gentiles and Ethnic Reconciliation*, 116–21, who argues that “far” and “near” refers to the “social distance” between Jews and Gentiles. Gentiles who once lived at the periphery of Jewish social geography have now been brought within the circle of Jewish centrality through the work of Christ.

²⁹ See Josephus, *C. Ap.* 2.148; Dio Cassius, 67.14.1–3; Pliny, *Nat.* 13.9.46.

polemical and dangerous since religious piety was not a private but political matter, necessary for maintaining the social integrity of the city.³⁰

This Jewish presentation of the Gentile other provided an ethnocentric grid by which the Jews defined an outsider vis-à-vis the insider. Not only did it provide a mental map for dividing the world into two separate categories, it facilitated the privileging of insiders and the stigmatizing of outsiders.³¹ Paul, being a Jew, would no doubt have agreed with the Jewish categorization of the state of Gentiles before Christ. But another question needs to be asked: how were the Jews understood by others? Our text does not explicitly indicate how Jews were perceived by Greeks or Romans. The phrase τῆς λεγομένης περιτομῆς ἐν σαρκὶ χειροποιήτου (2:11) may reflect non-Jewish disparagement of circumcision as the most distinguishing mark of Jews in relation to peoples of other nations and religions.³² The presence of χειροποιήτου, however, suggests that the phrase

³⁰ Cicero, *Nat. d.* 1.4, remarks that when piety, reverence, and religion are gone, “life soon becomes a welter of disorder and confusion; and in all probability the disappearance of piety toward the gods will entail the disappearance of loyalty and social union among men as well, and of justice itself, the queen of all virtues.” See also Hans Conzelmann, *Gentiles, Jews, Christians: Polemics and Apologetics in Greco-Roman Era* (trans. M. Eugene Boring; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 143.

³¹ Jane Morgan, Christopher O’Neill, and Rom Harré, *Nicknames: Their Origins and Social Consequences* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 12, writes, “In those societies where there are stigmas attached to belonging to a particular race or religious community ethnically revealing names begin to acquire an emotional or attitudinal load in proportion to the stigma attached to the ethnicity.” For Greek perception of the barbarian other, see T. J. Haarhoff, *The Stranger at the Gate* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1948; repr., Westport: Greenwood, 1974), 51–59. For Roman perception of Greeks and other peoples, see Balsdon, *Romans and Aliens*, 30–71. See also A. N. Sherwin-White, *Racial Prejudice in Imperial Rome* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967).

³² Marcus, “The Circumcision and the Uncircumcision in Rome,” 76, notes, “In spite of the supreme significance of circumcision in Judaism, ‘circumcision’ does not seem to be used in Jewish literature as a term for a circumcised person or persons.” Thus, it suggests that περιτομή is probably a derogatory term given to Jews. Marcus continues, “I would suggest that ‘foreskin’ and ‘circumcision’ originally were epithets hurled at Gentiles and at Jews respectively by members of the opposite group in Rome and elsewhere” (79). For Greek and Roman critique of circumcision, see Petronius, *Satyricon* 102.14 (GLAJJ §194); *Fragmenta* 37 (GLAJJ §195); Juvenal, *Sat.* 14.96–106 (GLAJJ §301); Persius, *Sat.* 5.176–83 (GLAJJ §190); Martial, *Epigrammata* 7.82 (GLAJJ §243); 11.94 (GLAJJ §245); Molly Whittaker, *Jews and Christians: Graeco-Roman Views* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 80–85.

probably represents Paul's own negative evaluation of the spiritual inefficacy of circumcision.³³

Apart from stereotypification, Ephesians describes the ethnic discord between Jews and Gentiles as a dividing wall (τὸ μεσότοιχον τοῦ φραγμοῦ; 2:14) that separates the two groups. The meaning of τὸ μεσότοιχον τοῦ φραγμοῦ is strongly debated. Heinrich Schlier suggests a cosmic wall between heaven and earth,³⁴ but this notion appears weak since the focus of 2:11–22 is on Jew-Gentile reconciliation. The barrier between Jews and Gentiles is therefore *primarily* horizontal, not vertical. Others consider the term as a referent to the balustrade that marked out the area in the Jerusalem temple into which Gentiles were prohibited from entering;³⁵ the Jewish law which functioned as a wall, separating and protecting Jews from Gentiles;³⁶ or a metaphorical barrier.³⁷ The meaning of τὸ μεσότοιχον τοῦ φραγμοῦ is probably polyvalent, incorporating all three views, and suggests the whole complex of ethnic exclusions that separates Jews and Gentiles. The

³³ The adjective χειροποιήτος is used in the LXX for idols (Lev 26:1, 30; Isa 2:18; 10:11; 16:12; 19:1; 21:9; 31:7; 46:6; Dan 5:4, 23; 6:28) and in the NT for the Jewish temple (Mark 14:58; Acts 7:48; 17:24; Heb 9:11, 24), stressing always the inadequacy of the noun it modifies.

³⁴ Heinrich Schlier, *Christus und die Kirche im Epheserbrief* (BHT 6; Tübingen: Mohr, 1930), 18–26. See also Petr Pokorný, *Der Brief des Paulus an die Epheser* (THKNT 10; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1992), 117–24.

³⁵ Josephus *A.J.* 15.417; *B.J.* 5.193–94. In *m. Mid* 2:3, the wall is called the “soreg.” For the inscriptions, see *OGIS* 2.598; *SEG* 8.169; *CIJ* 2.1400. See also E. J. Bickermann, “The Warning Inscription of Herod’s temple,” *JQR* 37 (1947): 387–405; Emil Schürer, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C.-A.D. 135)* (rev. and ed. Geza Vermes et al.; 3 vols.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1973), 2.222n. 85, 2.284–87; Peretz Segal, “The Penalty of the Warning Inscription from the Temple of Jerusalem,” *IEJ* 39 (1989): 79–84.

³⁶ See *Let. Aris.* 139, 142; *1 En.* 93:6; *Lev. Rab.* 1.10; Nils A. Dahl, “Gentiles, Christians, and Israelites in the Epistle to the Ephesians,” in *Studies in Ephesians* (ed. David Hellholm, Vemund Blomkvist, and Tord Fornberg; WUNT 131; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 445, writes, “The commandments of the Law are envisaged as a set of rules for common life and worship, a fence around Israel and a dividing wall that kept aliens outside and became a cause of hostility.”

dividing wall of 2:14 is the enmity (τὴν ἔχθραν) generated by the Jewish Torah (τὸν νόμον τῶν ἐντολῶν ἐν δόγμασιν; 2:15) with its regulations that precluded any true κοινωνία between Jews and Gentiles.³⁸

Pauline strategies to relieve ethnic tension

Paul attempts to relieve ethnic tension between Jews and Gentiles in five ways.

1. Paul reminds both Jews and Gentiles that their salvation is a gift from God. He presents parallel narratives of salvation for both Jews and Gentiles. Jews and Gentiles were in the same predicament prior to their salvation. They were both dead in their trespasses and sins (2:1, 5). Gentiles walked according to the temporal values of this world, according to the rulers of the power of the air (2:2); Jews conducted their lives in the lusts of their flesh (2:3). Both Jews and Gentiles were therefore destined for God's wrath (2:3). But God's rich mercy and love saved them. Salvation through faith originates in God, not humanity (οὐκ ἐξ ὑμῶν);³⁹ it comes from God as a gift rather than from any human work (οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων). Consequently, no group has cause to boast (ἵνα μή τις καυχῆσθαι; 2:9), and boasting can only be in what God has done to effect their salvation (1:6, 12, 14; 3:21).⁴⁰

³⁷ Ernest Best, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Ephesians* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 256; Yee, *Jews, Gentiles and Ethnic Reconciliation*, 149–152; Harold W. Hoehner, *Ephesians: An Exegetical Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002), 371.

³⁸ The phrase τὸν νόμον τῶν ἐντολῶν stands in apposition to τὴν ἔχθραν, which in turn stands in apposition to τὸ μεσότοιχον τοῦ φραγμοῦ.

³⁹ I take τοῦτο (2:8b) as referring to the entire clause of 2:8a (τῇ γὰρ χάριτι ἐστε σεσωσμένοι διὰ πίστεως).

⁴⁰ For discussions on the topic of boasting in Paul and Greco-Roman literature, see Duane Watson, "Paul and Boasting," in *Paul in the Greco-Roman world: A Handbook* (ed. J. Paul Sampley; Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2003), 77–100; Christopher Forbes, "Comparison, Self-Praise and Irony: Paul's

Boasting means to praise and to seek glory and honor for oneself.⁴¹ The results of boasting are envy, contempt, and resentment by others;⁴² the disparagement of others,⁴³ and insolence (ὑβρις) toward others:⁴⁴ all of which can lead to factions and revolutions.⁴⁵ Instead of boasting, Paul urges believers to walk in humility and meekness (ταπεινοφροσύνη, πραΰτης; 4:2). Ταπεινο* words generally have a negative meaning in classical and Hellenistic usage, denoting the ‘lowly’, ‘servile’, ‘weak’, ‘impotent’, ‘ignoble’, or ‘degrading’ conditions of a person. There are, however, instances where it is regarded positively.⁴⁶ In these cases, it is associated with virtues such as σωφροσύνη, γνώμη, and μετριότης, which promote unity, and contrasted with vices such as ὑβρις and ὑπερηφάνια, which lead to factions.⁴⁷ By eliminating any reason for boasting concerning their admission into the new community of faith (οὐκ ἐξ ὑμῶν, θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον; 2:8) and reminding them to walk in humility, Paul removes a potential cause of political division.

Boasting and the Conventions of Hellenistic Rhetoric,” *NTS* 32 (1986): 1-30; E. A. Judge, “Paul’s Boasting in Relation to Contemporary Professional Practice,” *ABR* 16 (1968): 37-50.

⁴¹ Plutarch, *De laude* 1 (*Mor.* 539A–C) links τὸ καυχᾶσθαι with τὸ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγειν ὡς τι ὄντος ἢ δυναμένου (“to speak of one’s own importance or power”).

⁴² Plutarch, *De laude* 1; 3; 4 (*Mor.* 539D; 540A; 540C).

⁴³ Plutarch, *De laude* 3 (*Mor.* 540B).

⁴⁴ Aristotle links insolence with boasting. As an example of an uprising provoked by insolence, Aristotle gives the example of the attack by Derdas on Amyntas that happened because Amyntas vaunted (καυχῆσασθαι) over Derda’s youth (*Pol.* 5.8.9–10 [1131A–1131B]). For a recent study on ὑβρις, see N. R. E. Fisher, *Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honor and Shame in Ancient Greece* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1992).

⁴⁵ Aristotle, *Pol.* 5.2.3–4 (1302A–1302B), notes that some of the causes of factions and revolutions are insolence (ὑβρις) and a sense of superiority (ὑπεροχή). Furthermore, “it is clear also what is the power of honor (τιμῆ) and how it can cause party faction; for men form factions both when they are themselves dishonored (ἀτιμαζόμενοι) and when they see others honored (τιμωμένους; 5.2.4 [1302B]).” See also 2.4.7 (1266B): “Civil strife is caused not only by inequality of property, but also by inequality of honors (τιμῆ);” 5.2.1–2 (1302A); 5.3.7 (1304A35); Philo, *Decal.* 151–53.

⁴⁶ See Stefan Rehl, *Das Problem der Demut in der profan-griechischen Literatur im Vergleich zu Septuaginta und Neuen Testament* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1961), 32–33, 39–40, 45–54.

⁴⁷ C. Spicq, “ταπεινός κτλ.,” *TLNT* 3:370: “*Tapeinōsis* was also considered a virtue even by pagans, namely, the virtue of modesty or moderation, associated with *praütēs*, *hēsychia*, *metriotēs*, *kosmiotēs*, and even *sōphrosynē*; the opposite of *hybris*, *authadeia*, and *hyperēphania*. S. Rehl has provided abundant evidence of this.”

2. Ephesians also diffuses this ethnic tension by reminding its readers that the prior (μνημονεύετε ὅτι ποτὲ ὑμεῖς ...; 2:11) ethnic categorization of Gentiles by Jews is *now* (νυνί; 2:13) no longer valid because of what Christ has done on the cross. Christ not only proclaims and creates peace, he himself is the peace between Jews and Gentiles (2:14). In describing the accomplishment of Christ in bringing Jews and Gentiles together, Paul uses terms and motifs commonly employed in the reconciliation of political entities. For example, peace is commonly viewed as a political blessing that is expedient for the state.⁴⁸ Consequently, the pursuit of peace and concord between rival political bodies is a noble activity of every statesman.⁴⁹ The language of reconciliation also carries political overtones, καταλλάσσω being frequently used to denote the reconciliation between antagonistic political parties and the restoration of harmony.⁵⁰ Furthermore, by abolishing the law with its ordinances and commandments, Christ destroyed the wall of enmity and made peace (ποιῶν εἰρήνην; 2:15) between Jews and Gentiles. The phrase

⁴⁸ Polybius, 4.74.3: “Peace is a blessing for which we all pray to the gods; we submit to every suffering from the desire to attain it, and it is the only one of the so-called good things in life to which no man refuses this title”; Aristotle, [*Rhet. Alex.*] 1422A.5–15: “Expedient for a state are such things as concord, military strength, property and a plentiful revenue, good and numerous allies”; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 38.10; 40.26; 41.13; Aristophanes, *Pax* 290–309; Isocrates, *De Pace* 16; Aristides, *Or.* 7.28, 31.

⁴⁹ See Plutarch, *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 13 (*Mor.* 808C), especially 32 (*Mor.* 824C-D): “But the best thing is to see to it in advance that factional discords shall never arise among them and to regard this as the greatest and noblest function of what may be called the art of statesmanship. For observe that the greatest blessings which states can enjoy—peace, liberty, plenty, abundance of men and concord—so far as peace is concerned the peoples have no need of statesmanship at present.... There remains, then, for the statesman, of those activities which fall within his province, only this—and it is the equal of any of the other blessings:—always to instill concord and friendship in those who dwell together with him and to remove strifes, discords, and all enmity.”

⁵⁰ Diodorus Siculus, 22.8.4 “Pyrrhus effected a reconciliation (κατήλλαξε) between Thoenon and Sosistratus and the Syracusans and restored harmony (ὁμόνοιαν), thinking to gain great popularity by virtue of the peace.” See also Plato, *Resp.* 566E; Dio Cassius, 1.5.6; 5.18.7; 5.18.9; 7.29.6; 37.7.5; 37.56.1; 41.35.3; 46.1.3; 46.2.2; 48.10.2; 48.20.1; 48.36.1; 55.10a.4; 56.30.1; 58.23.6; 59.26.3; 64.18.3; 68.12.3; 71.18.1; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 38.21, 34, 41, 47; 40.16. For a lexical study of καταλλάσσω, see Stanley E. Porter,

ποιέω + εἰρήνη is frequently used in political discourses to describe the cessation of hostilities between two warring people groups or cities,⁵¹ denoting either a peace settlement between two equal parties or the imposition of a truce by the conqueror upon the vanquished.⁵²

3. More important, Ephesians relieves ethnic tension by casting the vision of a new humanity that totally eliminates the former rivalry and hostility between Jews and Gentiles (2:15). The political survival of any new community formed from previously diverse social and ethnic groups must of necessity seek grounds for a common identity. Numa, for example, rallied the Sabines and the Romans around a new common name—“Latins.”⁵³ Paul accomplishes a similar goal, exhorting members of the newly formed church to relinquish their former ethnic hostility, and embrace their common humanity, identity, and calling in Christ (κλήσις; 1:18; 4:1, 14). Christ takes both Jews and Gentiles and creates a new corporate person in himself. This new humanity is not achieved by

Καταλλάσσω in *Ancient Greek Literature, with Reference to the Pauline Writings* (Estudios de filologia Neotestamentaria 5; Cordoba: Ediciones el Almendro, 1994).

⁵¹ In Andocides, *De Pace*, the phrase ποιέω + εἰρήνη occurs as a recurring catchphrase 23 times (1.1, 2.2, 2.5, 6.2, 6.6, 8.3, 11.3, 12.5, 13.8, 16.6, 19.2, 20.2, 20.8, 21.2, 23.8, 24.4, 25.5, 27.3, 27.5, 28.3, 30.3, 41.11, 41.6). See also Isocrates, *De Pace* (Or. 8) 16.1–2; *Phil.* (Or. 5) 7.7; *Archid.* (Or. 6) 11.2; 13.8–9; 29.4; 33.2–3; 34.1–2; 55.8; *Panath.* (Or. 12) 105.7; *Paneg.* (Or. 4) 116.3–4; Demosthenes, *In epistulam Philippi* 1; 2 *Philip.* 28.6; Diodorus Siculus, 14.15.1; 14.110.3; Xenophon, *Hell.* 2.2.20, 22.

⁵² An example of such an unequal truce is the Treaty of Antalcidas negotiated by Sparta in which the Ionian cities of Asia Minor with its neighboring islands were handed over to Persia. See Isocrates, *Paneg.* (Or. 4) 122; Xenophon, *Hell.* 5.1.31. Andocides, *De Pace* 11, differentiates between a peace settlement and a truce when he remarks, “There is a wide difference between a peace (εἰρήνη) and a truce (σπονδός). A peace is a settlement of differences between equals: a truce is the dictation of terms to the conquered by the conquerors after victory in war, exactly as the Spartans laid down after their victory over us that we should demolish our walls, surrender our fleet, and restore our exiles.” See Andocides, *De Pace* 12, for specific differences between the current peace treaty and the former truce agreement.

⁵³ Dionysius Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 1.60.2. See also Polybius, 4.1.8 where the Peloponnesians united under one name.

transforming Gentiles into Jews, but by incorporating Jews and Gentiles together into the one new body of the church.

The concept of *one* new humanity (εἷς καινὸς ἄνθρωπος; 2:15),⁵⁴ *one* corporate body (ἐν σῶμα; 2:16) in *one* spirit (ἐν πνεῦμα; 2:18) that breaks social and ethnic barriers, resonates with the political vision of a world-state and the unity of all mankind that was generated by the conquests of Alexander the Great and the *pax Romana*. A purported letter from Aristotle to Alexander reads:

I know that if *mankind* in general is destined to reach true felicity within the duration of this world, there will come about that concord and order which I shall describe. Happy is he who sees the resplendence of that day when men will agree to constitute *one rule* and *one kingdom*. They will cease from wars and strife, and devote themselves to that which promotes their welfare and the welfare of their cities and countries. (italics mine)⁵⁵

Plutarch, who lived under the *pax Romana*, describes Zeno's ideal πολιτεία in the following manner:

That *all the inhabitants of this world* of ours should not live differentiated by their respective rules of justice into separate cities and communities, but that we should consider *all men* (πάντας ἀνθρώπους) to be of *one community* and *one polity*, and that we should have a *common life* (εἷς βίος) and an *order common* to us all, even as a herd that feeds together and shares the pasturage of a common field. (*Alex. fort.* 6 [*Mor.* 329A-B]; italics mine)

It is debated whether Zeno held to this ideal of a world in which there would be no Greeks or barbarians; it is more probable that Plutarch “attributed to the founder of the

⁵⁴ P⁴⁶ F G has κοινόν (“common”) rather than καινόν (“new”).

⁵⁵ The earliest source for this text is an Arabic translation from the early-twelfth century by Moses b. Ezra. He claimed that he found the text in a treatise *On Justice* written by Aristotle to Alexander. This English translation is from Samuel M. Stern, *Aristotle on the World State* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), 7. For a text-critical reconstruction of the Arabic text, see Stern, *Aristotle on the World State*, 8–10.

Stoic school the ‘world-state’ conception which was its normal doctrine in his time.”⁵⁶

Nevertheless, Plutarch writes that Alexander put into effect Zeno’s dream of a well-ordered community.⁵⁷ Alexander

believed that he came as a heaven-sent governor to all, and as a mediator for the whole world, those whom he could not persuade to unite with him, he conquered by force of arms, and he brought together into *one body all men* everywhere, uniting and mixing in one great-loving cup, as it were men’s lives, their characters, their marriages, their very habits of life. He bade them all consider as their fatherland the whole inhabited earth, as their stronghold and protection his camp, as akin to them all good men, and as foreigners only the wicked; they should not distinguish between Grecian and foreigner by Grecian cloak and targe, or scimitar and jacket; but the distinguishing mark of the Grecian should be seen in virtue, and that of the foreigner in iniquity. (Plutarch, *Alex. fort.* 6 [Mor. 329C-D]; italics mine)

He rendered “*all upon earth* subject to *one law of reason* (ένὸς ὑπήκοα λόγου) and *one form of government* (μιᾶς πολιτείας) and to reveal *all men* as *one people* (ένα δῆμον).”⁵⁸ In so doing, Alexander attempted “to win for *all men* concord and peace and community of interest.”⁵⁹

Despite the achievements of Alexander, Aelius Aristides in his speech *Regarding Rome* argues that the Roman Empire under Antoninus Pius was far superior to Macedonian rule. The Roman Empire succeeded in achieving unity of the civilized world such that the world has become one city-state (μιᾷ πόλει πάση τῇ οἰκουμένη; Or. 26.36) with the existence of a single harmonious government (μία ἀρμονία πολιτείας; Or. 26.66) that embraces all men. Just as Zeus brought order out of the primordial chaos with the overthrow of the Titans, so also did Rome bring new order (τάξις) to a world filled with

⁵⁶ H. C. Baldry, *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 162. See also idem, “Zeno’s Ideal State,” *JHS* 79 (1959): 3–15; Malcolm Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), appendix A.

⁵⁷ Plutarch, *Alex. fort.* 6 (Mor. 329B).

factions and disorder (*Or.* 26.103). The Roman Empire has now become the world-state, and Rome the center of the world. M. Rostovtzeff remarks that “in this [world-state] there are no Greek and barbarians, native and foreigners: all, we may say (though Aristides does not), are men.”⁶⁰ Before the world-state, “there is a great and fair equality between weak and powerful, obscure and famous, poor and rich and noble.”⁶¹ Yet, there are distinctions. Rome divided the world into two classes: the rulers who are Roman citizens and the masses who must obey or be forced into obedience.⁶² As an encomium, one would not expect Aristides’s speech to criticize the empire. One nonetheless expects the speaker to highlight the positive aspects of the empire without undue flattery. In this regard, Aristides’s speech provides important insights into the thinking of the Roman elite of his day.⁶³

The Pauline understanding of the εἶς καινὸς ἄνθρωπος exhibits similarity to Greek and Roman views on the unity of mankind within the one world-state: the vision of a global body politic that encompasses all mankind; the establishment of peace and

⁵⁸ Plutarch, *Alex. fort.* 7 (*Mor.* 330D); italics mine.

⁵⁹ Plutarch, *Alex. fort.* 7 (*Mor.* 330E); italics mine.

⁶⁰ M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (2 vols.; 2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1957), 1:133.

⁶¹ Aristides, *Or.* 26.39.

⁶² Aristides, *Or.* 26.59.

⁶³ See the positive evaluation of the speech in Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, 130–131: “The best general picture of the Roman Empire in the second century, the most detailed and the most complete that we have, may be found in the speech Εἶς Ἰώμην, which was delivered at Rome in A.D. 154 by the ‘sophist’ Aelius Aristides. It is not only an expression of sincere admiration for the greatness of the Roman Empire but also a masterpiece of thoughtful and sound political analysis.... The speech of Aristides is to me one of the most important sources of information not only on the general structure of the Roman Empire as viewed by contemporaries but also on the mentality of the age of the Antonines, on the political ideas current at the time. In an ‘encomium’ no one would expect to find a criticism of the Empire. The speaker’s task was to seize and to point out the positive aspects, and to do it without exaggeration and without undue flattery. In this task Aristides succeeded fairly well.”

concord concomitant with the formation of a new singular body politic; the erasure of former group boundaries within this new body; the provision of a single πολιτεία or manner of life within this new unified community;⁶⁴ and the characterization of insiders within this body politic as virtuous and outsiders as evil (Eph 4:17, 24; 5:8, 15; Plutarch, *Alex. fort.* 6 [Mor. 329D]). Despite the similarities, there are differences between these two views, the fundamental difference being the means by which unity is achieved. Christ reconciled and made the two into one by his death on the cross (ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ [2:14]; διὰ τοῦ σταυροῦ [2:16]); Alexander and the Roman Empire established unity by the sword.⁶⁵ The path to the *pax Christi* passes through Golgotha, but the path to the peace of Alexander or the *pax Romana* traverses numerous battlefields and streams of blood.

4. Furthermore, Ephesians diffuses ethnic tension by arguing that the civic status of Gentiles has been fundamentally changed since their incorporation into Christ. The status terms that Paul employs are inherently political: ξένος, πάροικος, συμπολίτης, and οἰκεῖος τοῦ θεοῦ (2:19). Gentiles were once aliens (ξένος) and resident aliens (πάροικος) of Israel (cf. 2:12).⁶⁶ Like the previous ethnic slurs, the labels ξένος and πάροικος when contrasted to πολίτης are markers that designate the Gentiles as outsiders vis-à-vis the insiders.⁶⁷ They are marginalized, living on the periphery of society, not allowed to

⁶⁴ Aristotle, *Pol.* 4.9.3 (1295A.40–1295B.1): “A constitution is a certain mode of life of a state” (ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως).

⁶⁵ Plutarch, *Alex. fort.* 6 (Mor. 329C): “Those whom [Alexander] could not persuade to unite with him, he conquered by force of arms.” See also Klaus Wengst, *Pax Romana: And the Peace of Jesus Christ* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 11–26.

⁶⁶ For the significance of ξένος and πάροικος, see Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, 255–57; John Hall Elliott, *A Home for the Homeless: A Sociological Exegesis of 1 Peter, its Situation and Strategy* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), 24–37.

⁶⁷ See for example Plato, *Leg.* 850; Isocrates, *De pace* 48; Diodorus Siculus, 11.76.6. The suspicious attitude toward outsiders is also seen in how Cicero’s opponents derided him as a foreigner. For example,

participate fully in the civic life of the community,⁶⁸ and generally looked upon with disfavor and hostility.⁶⁹ For example, Aristotle argues that human beings can only flourish if they are citizens of a polis.⁷⁰ A person without a polis is either low in the scale of humanity or a god. “It is not enough simply to live in the polis as a non-citizen; carrying out the functions of citizenship enables individuals to exercise irreplaceably moral and intellectual virtues—specifically, justice and other social virtues, and practical reasoning.”⁷¹ Furthermore, Aristotle warned against building a city close to the sea since visits by foreigners, especially foreign traders, might introduce new and corrupting ideas that are detrimental to the citizen’s respect for tradition and authority.⁷² The contempt toward foreigners and resident aliens is invariably linked with loyalty toward one’s own culture, such as the ability to speak the local language fluently. As Ramsay MacMullen

Catiline labeled Cicero an *inquilinus* (“resident alien”; Sallust, *Bell. Cat.* 31.7), and a patrician opponent called him a *peregrinus rex* (“foreigner tyrant”; Cicero, *Sull.* 22–25).

⁶⁸ See Aristotle, *Pol.* 7.2.2 (1324A15) where he contrasts the “life of active citizenship and participation in politics” with “the life of an alien and that of detachment from the political partnership.”

⁶⁹ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 3.10.4–6; Diodorus Siculus, 40.3.1–2; Juvenal, *Sat.* 3.58–125; Cicero, *Flac.* 15–16. See also A. N. Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship* (2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1973), 258–59; Paul McKechnie, *Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the Fourth Century BC* (London: Routledge, 1989), 16–33; Balsdon, *Romans and Aliens*, 30–71; Haarhoff, *Stranger at the Gate*, 51–59; David L. Balch, “Attitudes towards Foreigners in 2 Maccabees, Eupolemus, Esther, Aristeas, and Luke-Acts,” in *The Early Church in its Context* (ed. Abraham J. Malherbe, Frederick W. Norris, and James W. Thompson; NovTSup 90; Leiden: Brill, 1998), 22–47.

⁷⁰ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1.1.9 (1253A2–3): “Man is by nature a political animal (πολιτικὸν ζῷον), and a man that is by nature and not merely by fortune citiless (ἄπολις) is either low in the scale of humanity or above it (like the ‘clanless, lawless, hearthless’ man reviled by Homer, for one by nature unsocial is also a ‘lover of war’) inasmuch as he is solitary, like an isolated piece at draughts.”

⁷¹ Balot, *Greek Political Thought*, 238.

⁷² Aristotle, *Pol.* 7.5.3 (1327A15). See also Plato, *Leg.* 704D–705A: “For if the State was to be on the sea-coast, and to have fine harbors, ... in that case it would need a mighty savior and divine lawgivers, if, with such a character, it was to avoid having a variety of luxurious and depraved habits.... For the sea is, in very truth, ‘a right briny and bitter neighbor’, although there is sweetness in its proximity for the uses of daily life; for by filling the markets of the city with foreign merchandise and retail trading, and breeding in men’s souls knavish and tricky ways, it renders the city faithless and loveless, not to itself only, but to the rest of the world as well.”

noted, the emperor Claudius highlighted the common prejudice against foreigners and rural dwellers when he revoked the citizenship of a man who could not speak good Latin.⁷³ “*Urbanitas* opposed not only *rusticitas* but *peregrinitas* as well.”⁷⁴

Instead of their former disenfranchised status as aliens, Paul’s Gentile readers are now fellow-citizens with the saints (συμπολιται τῶν ἁγίων; 2:19). The identity of τῶν ἁγίων is much debated. It may refer to Israel and the Jews;⁷⁵ Jewish Christians;⁷⁶ angels;⁷⁷ or all believers.⁷⁸ Given the previous statement that Gentiles are separated from τῆς πολιτείας τοῦ Ἰσραήλ (2:12), τῶν ἁγίων possibly refers to the Jews. It is however better to understand τῶν ἁγίων as a reference to all believers; in Ephesians, ἅγιοι is used of Christians (1:1, 15, 18; 3:8, 18; 4:12; 5:3; 6:18), and σύν compound words denote unity with other believers (2:21, 22; 3:6; 4:3, 16).

Ephesians’s use of ἄρα οὖν ... ἐστὲ συμπολιται (2:19) also suggests a connection with political discussions concerning the criterion of citizenship and the definition of

⁷³ Dio Cassius, 60.17.4.

⁷⁴ Ramsay MacMullen, *Roman Social Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 31.

⁷⁵ Markus Barth, *Ephesians* (AB; Garden City: New York, 1974), 1:269–70; Margaret Y. MacDonald, *The Pauline Churches: A Socio-historical Study of Institutionalization in the Pauline and Deutero-Pauline Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 95–96; J. J. Meuzelaar, *Der Leib des Messias: Eine exegetische Studie über den Gedanken vom Leib Christi in den Paulusbriefen* (Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp., 1961), 63–64.

⁷⁶ Martin Dibelius and H. Greeven, *An die Kolosser, Epheser, An Philemon* (3d ed.; HNT 12; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1953), 71; G. B. Caird, *Paul’s Letters from Prison* (New Clarendon Bible; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 60; O. Proksch, “ἅγιος,” *TDNT* 1:106; Edwin D. Roels, *God’s Mission* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), 145.

⁷⁷ Heinrich Schlier, *Der Brief an die Epheser* (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1957), 140–41; Joachim Gnllka, *Der Epheserbrief* (HTKNT; Freiburg: Herder, 1971), 154; Andreas Lindemann, *Die Aufhebung der Zeit* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Mohn, 1975), 183; Franz Mussner, *Der Brief an die Epheser* (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1982), 89–91.

⁷⁸ Rudolf Schnackenburg, *Ephesians: A Commentary* (trans. Helen Heron; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 121; Andrew T. Lincoln, *Ephesians* (WBC 42; Dallas: Word, 1990), 150–51; Helmut Merklein, *Das kirchliche Amt nach dem Epheserbrief* (Munich: Kösel, 1973), 132; Stig Hanson, *The Unity of the Church in the New Testament: Colossians and Ephesians* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1946), 147; Franz Mussner, *Christus*

boundaries between citizen and non-citizen. Aristotle defines a citizen as one who has the “knowledge and the ability both to be ruled and to rule” (*Pol.* 3.2.10 [1277B]). Other formulations equate citizenship with “the four abilities—to fight, to vote, to hold office, to own land—and thereby to make citizen bodies into closed, privileged, all-male corporations, outside which lay various inferior or adjunct statuses such as *perioikoi* (‘dwellers-round’), *metoikoi* (‘metics’) or *paroikoi* (‘resident free aliens’), and *apeleutheroi* (‘freedmen’).”⁷⁹ In Ephesians, a citizen has access to God the king and is a member of his imperial household. Ephesians 2:18 describes the relationship that believers have with God as one of προσαγωγή, a political term indicating an audience with a king.⁸⁰ The corollary (ἄρα οὖν; 2:19) of such access is a change in civic status, from ξένος and πάροικος to συμπολίτης. Furthermore, the phrase οἰκεῖοι τοῦ θεοῦ parallels συμπολίται τῶν ἁγίων, further clarifying citizenship as membership within God’s household, or more specifically, God’s imperial household. This presentation of God as the father of the household in which Gentiles are citizens supports understanding this household language politically. I investigate the political character of this household language further in a later section, especially noting that Roman Emperors are given the title *pater patriae* (“Father of the Country”) and Ptolemaic kings frequently claim the kingdom as their personal house.

das All und die Kirche: Studien zur Theologie des Epheserbriefes (Trier: Paulinus, 1955), 105–106. Best, *Ephesians*, 278, considers the “saints” to refer to angels and all glorified believers.

⁷⁹ J. K. Davies, “Citizenship, Greek,” *OCD* 334. For discussions on attaining Roman citizenship, see Balsdon, *Romans and Aliens*, 82–96; Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*.

⁸⁰ Xenophon, *Cyr.* 1.3.8; 7.5.45.

5. Finally, Paul urges unity, describing the new community of Jews and Gentiles as a building that is established on a common foundation,⁸¹ a building in which *every part* (ἐν ᾧ πᾶσα οἰκοδομή; 2:21) is fitted together (συναρμολογέω; 2:21) and built together (συνοικοδομέω; 2:22) into a holy temple—a symbol of unity and the dwelling place of God who is the father of all (3:14).⁸² The building metaphor to which Paul appeals is a *topos* found in political literature urging concord and unity. Aristides remarks, “We do not judge that house best established which is built of stones which are as beautiful as possible, but which is dwelled in with the greatest harmony (μιᾶ γνώμη μάλιστα οἰκῆται), so also it is fitting to believe that those cities are best inhabited which know how to think harmoniously (ταυτὸν φρονεῖν).”⁸³ Seneca too uses this metaphor and writes, “Let us possess things in common; for birth is ours in common. Our relations with one another are like a stone arch (*societas nostra lapidum fornicationi simillima est*), which would collapse if the stones did not mutually support each other, and which is upheld in this very

⁸¹ The standard treatments of the building metaphor as applied to the church include Philipp Vielhauer, *Oikodome: Aufsätze zum Neuen Testament* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1979); Josef Pfammatter, *Die Kirche als Bau: Eine exegetisch-theologische Studie zur Ekklesiologie der Paulusbriefe* (Analecta Gregoriana 110; Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1960); O. Michel, “οἶκος,” *TDNT* 5.119–59.

⁸² Greco-Roman writers such as Aristides consider the temple a symbol of unity. In *Or. 27 (Panegyric in Cyzicus)*, he intersperses his praise for the temple of Hadrian at Cyzicus with his favorite theme, the harmony between the cities of Asia. He writes, “It is friendship and sharing which holds together the gods themselves and the whole Universe and heaven, ... in the houses and the ways of the gods there neither is nor arises envy and hostility (35)... These adornments of construction [an allusion to the temple] are fair and exercise a remarkable persuasion over the masses. But what is perfect and truly the gifts of some god occurs whenever both adornments are in harmony, that in the soul and that of construction. For just as we praise the harmony in the latter and the fact that each element preserves its proper relationship, so it is also fitting to think that a well lived life takes place whenever harmony and order prevail throughout (40–41).” The concept of “one temple” is also an important element of unity in Hellenistic Judaism and early Christian literature. See Ignatius, *Magn.* 7; Josephus, *A.J.* 4.200; *C. Ap.* 2.193; Philo, *Spec.* 1.67 and 1.70 (which includes a reference to ὁμόνοια). P. I. Bratsiotis, “Paulus und die Einheit der Kirche,” in *Studia Paulina in honorem Johannis de Zwaan Septuagenarii* (ed. J. N. Sevenster and W. C. van Unnik; Haarlem: Bohn, 1953), 29, remarks, “Auch in den anderen von Paulus gebrauchten Bildern

way.”⁸⁴ Paul further heightens the emphasis on unity in Eph 2 by overlaying the building metaphor with an organic one: the church as a building grows (ἀυξάνω; 2:21). Paul compares the church to a body, employing a similar *topos* used by Greco-Roman political thinkers urging concord. I examine this body metaphor in greater detail in the next section.

The narrative of ethnic tension and reconciliation in Eph 2 is clearly political. Not only is the subject matter political, Paul uses politically laden language in his deliberative attempt to foster peace within the new community of faith. Given the importance of this pericope, with some considering 2:11–22 as the theological center of Ephesians,⁸⁵ the overall political character of Eph 2 suggests that the entire letter should be read in a similar light.

Call to Unity (4:1–16)

The topic of unity and concord (ὁμόνοια or *concordia*) is an important political subject.⁸⁶ The word ὁμόνοια appeared in the late-fifth century B.C.E.,⁸⁷ and was commonly used to

von der Kirche als Gottes Pflanzung und Gottes Bau—dessen Hauptfundament Christus ist—sogar als Tempel Gottes und als Braut Christi kommt der gedanke der Einheit der Kirche zum Ausdruck.”

⁸³ Aristides, *Or.* 23.31. See also *Or.* 24.8.

⁸⁴ Seneca, *Ep.* 95.53.

⁸⁵ So H. Conzelmann, *Die kleineren Briefe des Apostels Paulus* (NTD 8; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 67; Helmut Merklein, *Christus und die Kirche: die theologische Grundstruktur des Epheserbriefes nach Eph 2,11–18* (Stuttgart: KBW Verlag, 1973), 12; Barth, *Ephesians*, 1:275.

⁸⁶ Although Arnaldo Momigliano, “Camillus and Concord,” *CQ* 36 (1942): 111–20, distinguishes between Greek and Roman practical applications of ὁμόνοια and *concordia*, he finds no theoretical distinction between them. He writes, “The Roman notion of Concord is almost entirely under the influence of the static ὁμόνοια” (119). The standard treatments on ὁμόνοια include H. Kramer, “Quid valeat ὁμόνοια in litteris Graecis” (Diss.; Göttingen, 1915); Harald Fuchs, *Augustin und der antike friedensgedanke: Untersuchungen zum neunzehnten buch der Civitas Dei* (Neue philologische Untersuchungen

describe the harmonious relationship between cities and between the citizens of a single city. Xenophon, for example, understands *ὁμόνοια* as obedience to the laws.⁸⁸ Aristotle, on the other hand, considers *ὁμόνοια* as political friendship (*πολιτική φιλία*),⁸⁹ comprising unanimity among the citizens regarding their common interests, adoption of the same policy, and common actions.⁹⁰ Numerous authors wrote and orators spoke concerning concord (*περὶ ὁμονοίας*),⁹¹ lauding it as the greatest blessing for cities.⁹² Polybius extols *ὁμόνοια* throughout his works,⁹³ Aristides considers it essential for a flourishing civic life,⁹⁴ and other writers view it as the precondition for any successful

3; Berlin: Weidmann, 1926), 96–138; Eiliv Skard, *Zwei religiös-politische Begriffe: euergetes-concordia* (Avhandlingar utgitt av Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo, II; Hist.-filos. Klasse 1931, no. 2; Oslo: Dybwad, 1932); A. Moulakis, *Homonía: Eintracht und die Entwicklung eines politischen Bewusstseins* (Munich: List, 1973); chapter 4 “Concord and Discord” in Francis Cairns, *Virgil’s Augustan Epic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Klaus Thraede, “Homonoía (Eintracht),” *RAC* 16:176–289. Recent monographs that examine concord in early Christianity include Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*; Odd Magne Bakke, *Concord and Peace: A Rhetorical Analysis of the First Letter of Clement with an Emphasis on the Language of Unity and Sedition* (WUNT 2:141; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001).

⁸⁷ For a study on the emergence of the word, see Jacqueline de Romilly, “Vocabulaire et propagande ou les premiers emplois du mot ‘Ὁμόνοια,’” in *Mélanges de linguistique et de philologie grecques offerts à Pierre Chantraine* (Études et commentaires 79; Paris: Klincksieck, 1972), 199–209.

⁸⁸ Xenophon, *Mem.* 4.4.16: “Agreement (*ὁμόνοια*) is deemed the greatest blessing for cities: their senates and their best men constantly exhort the citizens to agree (*ὁμονοεῖν*), and everywhere in Greece there is a law that the citizens shall promise under oath to agree (*ὁμονοήσειν*), and everywhere they take this oath. The object of this, in my opinion, is not that the citizens may vote for the same choirs, not that they may praise the same flute-players, not that they may select the same poets, not that they may like the same things, but that they may obey the laws. For those cities whose citizens abide by them prove strongest and enjoy most happiness; but without agreement (*ὁμονοίας*) no city can be made a good city, no house can be made a prosperous house.”

⁸⁹ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 9.6.2 (1167B2).

⁹⁰ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 9.6.1 (1167A).

⁹¹ Iamblichus, *Concerning Concord* (Ἰάμβλιχος Μακεδονίῳ περὶ Ὁμονοίας; Stobaeus 2.33.15); Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 38–41; Isocrates *Paneg. (Or. 4)*; Aristides, *Or.* 23–24; Antiphon, *Περὶ ὁμονοίας* (H. Diels and W. Kranz, ed., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* [6th ed.; Berlin: Weidmann, 1952], 2:356–66). This list also includes the lost speech of Gorgias, *On Concord*.

⁹² See Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 38.6, 10; 39.5; Lysias, *On the Confiscation of the Property of the Brother of Nicias (Or. 18)* 17. See also Aristides, *Or.* 23.31, who writes that concordant cities are the best in which to live.

⁹³ Skard, *Zwei religiös-politische Begriffe*, 74–75; D. G. Kagan, *The Great Dialogue: History of Greek Political Thought from Homer to Polybius* (New York: Free Press, 1965), 255.

⁹⁴ Aristides, *Or.* 24.42.

enterprise within a city.⁹⁵ As a political virtue, ὁμόνοια is the fundamental aim of politics.⁹⁶ Isocrates notes that kings must be benefactors of concord;⁹⁷ and Musonius Rufus encourages kings to imitate Zeus and be a father of his people, “effecting good government (εὐνομία) and harmony (ὁμόνοια), suppressing lawlessness (ἀνομία) and dissension (στάσις).”⁹⁸

The opposite of concord (ὁμόνοια) is discord (στάσις).⁹⁹ The concept of στάσις has a long history in political thought,¹⁰⁰ and is a frequent topic in political discussions,¹⁰¹ occurring especially in the turbulent period of internecine fighting and war between different states during the fourth and fifth century B.C.E. In the literature of that period, στάσις commonly refers to civil war.¹⁰² It also has a broader meaning, designating factions, seditions, discords, divisions, and dissent.¹⁰³ Given the broad range in meaning, it is

⁹⁵ Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 39.7.

⁹⁶ Plutarch, *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 19 (*Mor.* 814F–815B), 32 (*Mor.* 824A–D), writes that concord is the goal of local politics. He pragmatically notes that cities which degenerate into discord either destroy themselves or are subject to Roman intervention. See also C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), 112; A. R. R. Sheppard, “HOMONOIA in the Greek Cities of the Roman Empire,” *Ancient Society* 15–17 (1984–86): 241.

⁹⁷ Isocrates, *Or.* 3.41; 5.16, 30, 83.

⁹⁸ Musonius Rufus, *That Kings also should study Philosophy* (Stobaeus 4.7.67.97; ET Cora E. Lutz, *Musonius Rufus: “The Roman Socrates”* [YCS 10; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947], 65).

⁹⁹ Thraede, *RAC* 16:245, examines ὁμόνοια in 1 Clement and notes, “Dass στάσις ... ausdrücklich den Gegensatz [zur *homonioia*] bildet, unterstreicht folgerichtig den ‘weltlichen’ Zuschnitt von H[omonoia].” See also Dellling, “στάσις,” *TDNT* 7.569n. 15: “Ὁμόνοια is obviously the opp. of στάσις.”

¹⁰⁰ For a discussion of the term in general, see Kostas Kalimtzis, *Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease: An Inquiry into Stasis* (New York: SUNY Press, 2000); H.-J. Gehrke, *Stasis: Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Vestigia 35; Munich: Beck, 1985); A. Lintott, *Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982); M. I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 105–21.

¹⁰¹ Werner Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1961), 113n. 2, notes, “Stasis (discord, party strife) is one of the most discussed problems in Greek political thought.”

¹⁰² Gehrke, *Stasis*, 7.

¹⁰³ LSJ, s.v. “στάσις.”

difficult to produce an adequate translation of the word.¹⁰⁴ While noting the limitations of any translation, I render στάσις as “civil discord” in this study.

The sentiment toward στάσις is decidedly negative. Bacchylides remarks that στάσις is the destroyer of all things (πάμφθερσις στάσις);¹⁰⁵ Decius, in a speech before the senate, considers διχοστασία the “greatest of the evils that befall states and the cause of the swiftest destruction”;¹⁰⁶ Diodorus Siculus notes that in the city of Argos “civil strife (στάσις) broke out accompanied by slaughter of a greater number than is recorded ever to have occurred anywhere else in Greece”;¹⁰⁷ and Aristides tells the Rhodians that even tyranny is preferable to discord.¹⁰⁸

Concord and discord in Eph 4:1-16

Paul, in Eph 4:1–16, exhorts (παρακαλέω) the church to be united. Having described the privileges and significance of their calling as members of the church in Eph 1–3, Paul draws out the implications (οὖν) of what God has done for them. He exhorts both Jewish and Gentile readers to live worthy of their calling (4:1), maintaining the unity that has already been given to them (σπουδάζοντες τηρεῖν τὴν ἐνότητα τοῦ πνεύματος; 4:3).¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁴ See Kalimtzis, *Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease*, 3–7. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World*, 105, writes, “All levels of intensity were embraced by the splendid Greek portmanteau-word *stasis*. When employed in a social-political context, *stasis* had a broad range of meanings, from political grouping or rivalry through faction (in its pejorative sense) to open civil war. That correctly reflected the political realities. Ancient moralists and theorists, who were hostile to the realities, understandably clung to the pejorative overtones of the word and identified *stasis* as the central malady of their society.”

¹⁰⁵ Bacchylides, Frag. 2.3. Greek text is from Stobaeus 1.5.3.3; or J. Irigoien, *Bacchylide: Dithyrambes, épinicies, fragments* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1993), 247.

¹⁰⁶ Dionysius Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 7.42.1.

¹⁰⁷ Diodorus Siculus, 15.57.3.

¹⁰⁸ Aristides, *Or.* 24.20.

¹⁰⁹ Although σπουδάζοντες can be interpreted as a participle of means modifying περιπατήσαι, it probably also carries an imperatival force. See BDF §468(2); G. B. Winer, *A Treatise on the Grammar of New Testament Greek* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1870), 716; James H. Moulton, W. F. Howard, and Nigel Turner, *A*

Believers are not called to create unity; it is produced by the Spirit.¹¹⁰ Believers, however, are to maintain and demonstrate this unity (ένότης) by means of peace, a peace that functions as the bond uniting the people together (έν τῷ συνδέσμῳ τῆς εἰρήνης; 4:3).¹¹¹ Paul then reinforces this central call to unity, appealing to the unifying elements of their faith (4:4–6), and arguing that the diversity of gifts among believers must lead to the maturity and strengthened unity of the body (4:7–16).

The call for unity in Eph 4:1–16 can be understood within the ancient political frame of concord and discord. These political valences were applicable not only to cities and kingdoms, but also to smaller communities and social units.¹¹² Moreover, I have previously argued that the ἐκκλησία functions as the political analogue of the πόλις/βασιλεία. Although the common term used to describe political concord is ὁμόνοια, its absence in Ephesians does not suggest that its conceptual sphere is lacking since ένότης, σύνδεσμος, and εἰρήνη are representative terms signifying political concord, and are frequently collocated with ὁμόνοια. For example, the pre-Socratic Iamblichus uses ἔνωσις to clarify the meaning of ὁμόνοια;¹¹³ Ignatius typically uses ένότης, ἔνωσις, and

Grammar of New Testament Greek (4 vols.; 3d ed.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1929–76), 1:181, 182; 4:89; A. T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research* (4th ed.; Nashville: Broadman, 1934), 946; C. F. D. Moule, *An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek* (2d ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 31.

¹¹⁰ The genitive τοῦ πνεύματος is a genitive of production or producer. See Daniel B. Wallace, *Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 105.

¹¹¹ The preposition έν carries both an instrumental and locative sense. The genitive τῆς εἰρήνης is a genitive of apposition explicating σύνδεσμος.

¹¹² Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 64n. 210, cites SEG 33.1165 as an instance where ὁμόνοια is applied to two associations of bakers. The term can also be applied to the family. See for example the speech of Philip to his sons (Polybius, 23.11; Livy, 40.8); Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 38.15; Plutarch, *Conj. praec.* 43 (*Mor.* 144C).

¹¹³ Iamblichus, *Concerning Concord* (Ἰάμβλιχος Μακεδονίῳ περὶ Ὁμονοίας): “Concord (Ἡ ὁμόνοια), as its name goes to show, comprises the bringing together, common activity and unity (ἔνωσιν) of similar minds” (Stobaeus 2.33.15; or Diels and Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 2.356; ET H. Diels and R.

ένόειν to express concord,¹¹⁴ and he links ένότης with όμόνοια;¹¹⁵ Plato uses σύνδεσμος to describe the effect of the law in binding the citizens of a πόλις together;¹¹⁶ and Julius Pollux, the tutor of Commodus, published a Greek lexicon of Attic synonyms that connected σύνδεσμος with όμόνοια.¹¹⁷ Moreover, although ειρήνη adequately designates political peace and unity, it is also frequently paired with όμόνοια to form a hendiadys describing political concord between different parties.¹¹⁸ Klaus Thraede notes that όμόνοια “schon seit dem 4. Jh. vC., hauptsächlich bei Philosophen, in Verbindung zB. mit

Sprague, eds., *The Older Sophists: A Complete Translation by Several Hands of the Fragments in Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker, Edited by Diels-Kranz. With a New Edition of Antiphon and of Euthydemus* [Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972; repr., Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001], 225).

¹¹⁴ For ένότης, see *Ign. Eph.* 4.2; 5.1; 14.1; *Phld.* 2.2; 3.2; 5.2; 8.1; 9.1; *Smyrn.* 12.2; *Pol.* 8.3; for ένωσις, see *Magn.* 1.2; 13.2; *Trall.* 11.2; *Phld.* 4.1; 7.2; 8.1; *Pol.* 1.2; 5.2; for ένόειν, see *Eph.* greeting; *Magn.* 6.2; 7.1; 14.1; *Rom.* greeting; *Smyrn.* 3.3.

¹¹⁵ *Ign. Eph.* 4.1–2: “For this reason it is fitting for you to run together in harmony with the mind of the bishop.... Therefore Jesus Christ is sung in your harmony (όμονοία) and symphonic love. And each of you should join the chorus, that by being symphonic in your harmony (όμονοία), taking up God’s pitch in unison (ένότητι), you may sing in one voice through Jesus Christ to the Father, that he may both hear and recognize you through the things you do well, since you are members of his Son. Therefore it is useful for you to be in flawless unison (ένότητι), that you may partake of God at all times as well.” For other later writers who link όμόνοια with ένωσις, see Epiphanius, *Panarion (Adversus haereses)* 69.11 (PG 42:220.7; or *Epiphanius III: Panarion haer. 65-80: De fide* [ed. Karl Holl; 2d ed.; Die griechischen christlichen schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1985], 161.1–2; Basil of Caesarea, *Constitutiones asceticae* 18.4 (PG 31:1385.51); Cyril of Alexandria, *Commentarii in Joannem* Lib. 11, Cap. 11 (PG 74:557.34–35; P.E. Pusey, *Sancti patris nostri Cyrilli archiepiscopi Alexandrini in D. Joannis evangelium* [3 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1872; repr., Brussels: Culture et civilisation, 1965], 2:734.7).

¹¹⁶ Plato, *Resp.* 519E–520A: “The law is not concerned with the special happiness of any class in the state, but is trying to produce this condition [of happiness] in the city as a whole, harmonizing and adapting (συναρμόττων) the citizens to one another by persuasion and compulsion, and requiring them to impart to one another any benefit which they are severally able to bestow upon the community, and that it itself creates such men in the state, not that it may allow each to take what course pleases him, but with a view to using them for the binding together (τόν σύνδεσμον) of the commonwealth.” Note also that Plato’s use of συναρμόζω is related to συναρμολογέω in *Eph* 2:21; 4:16.

¹¹⁷ Pollux, *Onom.* 8.152.2.

¹¹⁸ Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.6; 38.14; 39.2; 40.26; 49.6; Dio Cassius, 44.24.3–4; 44.25.4; 53.5.1; Plutarch, *Caes.* 23.6; *Oth.* 15.6; *Garr.* 17 (*Mor.* 511C); *Alex. fort.* 1.9 (*Mor.* 330E); Lucian, *Hermot.* 22; Demosthenes, *Cor.* 167; *1 Clem.* 20.10, 11; 60:4; 63:2; 65:1; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 7.60.2; See also Diodorus Siculus 11.87.5; 16.7.2; Plutarch, *Oth.* 13.3; *Ages.* 33.2; *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 32 (*Mor.* 824C); Dio Cassius, 41.15.4; 48.31.2; 53.5.4; *1 Clem.* 61.1; Epictetus, *Diss.* 4.5.35.

εἰρήνη order φιλία antreffen.”¹¹⁹ Furthermore, although Paul does not use the term ὁμόνοια, that did not prevent early Greek commentators from using it in their exegesis of Ephesians.¹²⁰

Any attempt to explain why Ephesians emphasizes εἰρήνη rather than ὁμόνοια is speculative, but possible reasons include the presence of εἰρήνη in the Isaianic allusions in Eph 2:14, 17; 6:15. Moreover, Paul stresses that political peace (εἰρήνη) between peoples is dependent and linked to peace (εἰρήνη) between humanity and God. Although the word ὁμόνοια has cultic significance,¹²¹ it is not commonly used to designate the relationship between humanity and God especially in Jewish and Christian circles;¹²² εἰρήνη is more apt. Furthermore, in tandem with the letter’s animadversion of spiritual forces (6:10–20), the absence of ὁμόνοια may be to avoid reference to the pagan goddess and her cult. It is true that εἰρήνη was also worshipped as a pagan goddess,¹²³ but its heavy use in the LXX precludes this connection.

¹¹⁹ Thraede, *RAC* 16:178.

¹²⁰ John Chrysostom, *Homiliae in epistolam ad Ephesios* 11 (*PG* 62.79.47; *NPNF*¹ 13:102); 20 (*PG* 62.135.15; *NPNF*¹ 13:143); 20 (*PG* 62.136.11; *NPNF*¹ 13:143); 20 (*PG* 62.141.27; *NPNF*¹ 13:147); 20 (62.143.29; *NPNF*¹ 13:148); *Catena in epistolam ad Ephesios* 169.5 (J. A. Cramer, *Catena Graecorum patrum in Novum Testamentum* [8 vols.; Oxonii: E Typographeo Academico, 1844], 6:169.5).

¹²¹ H. Zwicker, “Homonoia,” *PW* 8:2265–67; John Ferguson, *Moral Values in the Ancient World* (London: Methuen & Co, 1958), 127–30; Skard, *Zwei religiös-politische Begriffe*, 69, 102–105; Thraede, *RAC* 16:205–11. The image of the goddess was often placed on coins. See Zwicker, “Homonoia,” *PW* 8:2268; Antony J. S. Spawforth, “Homonoia,” *OCD* 526; H. Alan Shapiro, “Homonoia,” *LIMC* 5.1:476–79; Tonio Hölscher, “Concord,” *LIMC* 5.1:479–98; Peter R. Franke and Margret Nollé, *Die Homonoia-Münzen Kleinasiens und der thrakischen Randgebiete* (Saarbrücker Studien zur Archäologie und alten Geschichte 10; Saarbrücken: Saarbrücker Druckerei und Verlag, 1997).

¹²² Dio Chrysostom does however use ὁμοῦ-language to describe the friendship between kings and gods. He remarks, “Friends are most truly likeminded and are at variance in nothing. Can anyone, therefore, who is a friend (φίλος) of Zeus and is likeminded (ὁμονοῖ) with him by any possibility conceive any unrighteous desire or design what is wicked and disgraceful?” (*Or.* 4.43).

¹²³ For example, there was a statue of the goddess Eirene carrying the small Pluto child in the Athenian agora (Pausanias, 1.8.2; 9.16.2). For further evidence, see E. Dinkler, “Friede,” *RAC* 8:438–40; O.

The word στάσις is absent in Eph 4:1–16; nevertheless, its concept is palpable.¹²⁴

Paul writes that Christ gave gifted members of the community πρὸς τὸν καταρτισμὸν τῶν ἁγίων (4:12).¹²⁵ Although typically rendered as “for the equipping of the saints,” the basic idea of καταρτισμός is a medical term.¹²⁶ Galen in *Definitiones medicae* defines it as the “transfer of bone or bones from an unnatural position into a natural position” (translation mine).¹²⁷ The metaphorical use of the verbal form καταρτίζω to refer to the mending of human relationships, especially those between disputing factions, is well attested. Dionysius Halicarnassus uses it to refer to a city that must be restored and freed from “those troubles and dissensions (στασιάζουσα) with which it is now agitated.”¹²⁸ Herodotus uses both the verbal and agential form of καταρτίζω to refer to the Parians who ended the dispute (στάσις) between Naxos and Miletus.¹²⁹ In light of this usage and the contextual motif of unity in 4:1–16, the meaning of καταρτισμός in 4:12 probably

Wasser, “Eirene,” PW 5:2128–30; G. Wissowa, “Pax,” in Wilhelm H. Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* (6 vols.; Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1884–1937), 3.2:1719–22.

¹²⁴ Kalimtzis, *Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease*, 1–2, writes, “Oftentimes the concept of *stasis* will dominate a theme, without a single appearance of the word.” He cites several works where this phenomenon occurs.

¹²⁵ For Paul’s use of καταρτίζω in 1 Cor 1:10, see Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 74–75.

¹²⁶ The four definitions provided in LSJ are (1) restoration, reconciliation; (2) setting of a limb; (3) furnishing, preparation; (4) training, discipline. LSJ does not provide any evidence, apart from Eph 4:12, for the fourth meaning.

¹²⁷ Galen, *Claudii Galeni opera omnia*, (ed. C.G. Kühn; 20 vols.; Leipzig: Knobloch, 1830; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1965), 19:461.7: “Καταρτισμός ἐστὶ μεταγωγὴ ὁστού ἢ ὁστῶν ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν τόπου εἰς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν.”

¹²⁸ Dionysius Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 3.10.6. The B manuscript uses καταρτισθῆ, but the A manuscript uses καταρτυθῆ.

¹²⁹ Herodotus, 5.28: “But for two generations before this she had been very greatly troubled by faction (στάσις), till the Parians made peace (κατήρτισαν) among them, being chosen out of all Greeks by the Milesians to be peace-makers (καταρτιστήρας).” See also Plutarch, *Marc.* 10.1: “On entering Nola, [Marcellus] found a state of discord (στάσις), the senate being unable to regulate and manage (καταρτίσαι) the people, which favored Hannibal.” Ign. *Phld.* 8.1 links καταρτίζω with ἐνότης. He writes, “I was therefore acting on my own accord as a person set on unity (κατηρτισμένος). But where there is division

includes the cessation of any στάσις and the reconciliation of the saints that is needed εἰς οἰκοδομὴν τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

The concept of στάσις is also present in the ἀνὴρ τέλειος (“mature man”) and νήπιοι (“children”) language of 4:13–14. The “mature man” represents what the church is to become; the “children” represent what the church currently is, but is to no longer (μηκέτι; 4:14) be. The contrast between ἀνὴρ τέλειος and νήπιοι runs along two lines. First, the plural νήπιοι contrasted with the singular ἀνὴρ τέλειος suggests that individualism is a sign of childishness, but unity is a sign of maturity.¹³⁰ Childish individualism destroys unity and frequently leads to quarrels and dissensions, a trait that political writers at times apply to feuding cities.¹³¹ Second, the ἀνὴρ τέλειος possesses a unity that is centered on a common objective faith content and knowledge of Christ (ἐνότης τῆς πίστεως καὶ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως; 4:13),¹³² exhibiting ὁμόνοια (literally “sameness of mind”) regarding this fundamental doctrinal and ethical teaching of the community.¹³³

(μερισμός) and anger, God does not dwell. Thus the Lord forgives all who repent, if they return to the unity (ἐνότητα) of God and the council of the bishop.”

¹³⁰ See Ernest Best, *One Body in Christ* (London: SPCK, 1955), 148; Best, *Ephesians*, 401–402, 404.

¹³¹ Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 38.21, compares two cities at odds with each other to children squabbling over a trifling matter and refusing to be reconciled. He writes, “But if at best the prize for which this evil is endured is a mere nothing and the supposed issues are both small and trifling and it is not fitting even for private persons to squabble (στασιάζειν) over them, much less cities of such importance, then let us not behave at all like foolish children (τοῖς ἄφροσι τῶν παίδων) who, ashamed lest they may seem to their fathers or their mothers to be enraged without a cause, do not wish to make it up (καταλλάττεσθαι) with one another lightly.”

¹³² The two genitives (τῆς πίστεως and τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως) are objective genitives. Furthermore, their parallel relationship suggests that πίστις should be understood as objective faith (*fides quae creditur*) rather than subjective faith (*fides qua creditur*).

¹³³ Concord embodies the sameness of mind, thought, and opinion. Iamblichus, *Concerning Concord* (Ἰάμβλιχος Μακεδονίῳ περὶ Ὁμονοίας), remarks: “Concord (Ἡ ὁμόνοια), as its name goes to show, comprises the bringing together, common activity and unity of similar minds (ὁμοίου τοῦ νοῦ)” (Stobaeus 2.33.15; or Diels and Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 2.356; ET Diels and Sprague, *The Older Sophists*, 225). For other references, see Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 76–80. Note however that Aristotle considers ὁμόνοια to be more than intellectual agreement; it must also include

The νήπιοι, in contrast, are incapable of understanding the truth, possessing an immaturity that is characterized by instability and susceptibility to deception, error, and manipulation (4:14). They are like small boats or flotsams entirely at the mercy of the wind and the waves, tossed (κλυδωνιζόμεαι) and carried (περιφέρω) in all directions. Such fickleness of mind destroys the common mind (ὁμόνοια) of the community and foments dissension (στάσις).¹³⁴

The political context of concord and discord in Eph 4:1–16 becomes more apparent when we recognize that Paul’s rhetorical appeals are similar to *topoi* used by ancient political writers urging unity among divided groups. These include (1) appeals to “ones”; and (2) appeals to the political unit as a body and to the common advantage.

Appeals to “ones”: The unity of divine beings, and things in common

Paul follows the exhortation to maintain the unity of the Spirit with a sevenfold declaration of oneness: one body; one Spirit; one hope of your calling; one Lord; one faith; one baptism; one God and Father of all (4:4–6). Although no conjunction is supplied, the

political friendship. He writes, “Concord also seems to be a friendly feeling (φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται). Hence it is not merely agreement of opinion (ὁμοδοξία), for this might exist even between strangers. Nor yet is agreement in reasoned judgments (ὁμογνωμονέω) about any subject whatever, for instance astronomy, termed concord (ὁμονοέω); to agree about the facts of astronomy is not a bond of friendship. Concord (ὁμονοέω) is said to prevail in a state, when the citizens agree as to their interests, adopt the same policy, and carry their common resolves into execution” (*Eth. nic.* 9.6.1 [1167A]).

¹³⁴ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 9.3–4 (1167B) remarks that concord exists between men when they are of the same mind and do not change their opinion like the tide. He writes, “Concord (ὁμόνοια) ... exists between good men, since these are of one mind both with themselves and with one another (ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ ἀλλήλοις), as they always stand more or less on the same ground; for good men’s wishes are steadfast, and do not ebb and flow like the tide (οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὡσπερ εὐρίπος).” See also Aristides, *Or.* 24.10, who likens a concordant city (ὁμονοοῦσαν πόλιν) to a man “who is unaffected, noble, truthful, constant in his judgments, and as concordant with himself as possible (ὁμονοῶν ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα αὐτὸς αὐτῷ).” A divisive city (στασιάζουσαν πόλιν), on the other hand, is like a man that is inconstant, fickle, never firm nor keeps his resolve, but is “borne up and down like a tide, at war and in a state of faction within himself (ὡσπερ Εὐρίπος ἄνω καὶ κάτω φέρεται, πολέμων καὶ στασιάζων αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ).”

declaration functions as the reason or the basis for the call to unity.¹³⁵ Paul's argument runs along two axes.

1. The oneness of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit implies the unity of the church. The church must be one because there is only one God. Moreover, the use of Trinitarian language here also evokes previous references to the partnership of the Trinity in effecting salvation and reconciliation for humanity and the church (1:3–14), suggesting that partnership within the Trinity serves as the paradigm for partnership within the church. Paul's appeal to "one Lord, one Spirit, one God and Father" is a variation of a *topos* in ancient literature urging concord on the basis of the friendship, unity, and partnership of divine and celestial beings.¹³⁶ For example, Aristides argues that the one divine principle that guides the heavens and universe forms the paradigm for concord among humanity. He writes,

Good sense is the closest thing of all to the gods, and not the least part of it is a disposition toward friendship.... Harmony is best. This is the true adornment of cities.... This is the part of those who look upwards, ... of those who have taken their share of that part of the divine government which falls to us. Indeed, one will (μία γνώμη) together with the power of friendship administers all the heavens and Universe.... And in conjunction with this power the sun proceeds in its course ever preserving its proper place, and the phases of the moon and the motion of the stars go on, and the revolutions and the positions of each in respect to one another and their proper distances, and again their harmonies are preserved, since agreement prevails among them, and there are no differences present nor

¹³⁵ So T. K. Abbott, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1897), 107; Hoehner, *Ephesians*, 514. The early church fathers also base their call for unity on this cultic unity. See *1 Clem.* 46.6; *Ign. Eph.* 20.2; *Phld.* 4.1; *Magn.* 7.1–2. William R. Schoedel, *Ignatius of Antioch* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 116, comments on *Ign. Magn.* 7.1–2: "The word 'one' appears in some nine times in this section (7.1–2) and reflects the central concern of Ignatius' letters."

¹³⁶ Thraede, *RAC* 16:200: "Bei all dem ist in Reden *περὶ ὁμονοίας* zweierlei wichtig; erstens dient hier die H. des Weltalls (*ἁρμονία, σύνδεσμος, συμφωνία* usw.) als mahnendes Vorbild ... der gewünschten H. zwischen Menschen."

do they arise, but all things have yielded to the law of nature and they use one will (μία γνώμη) concerning all their duties, so that if imitation of the gods is an act of men of good sense, it would be the part of men of good sense to believe that they are all a unity (ἕν), as far as is possible.¹³⁷

Similarly, Dio Chrysostom bases his appeal for concord on the “one single purpose and impulse (μιᾶ γνώμη καὶ ὁρμηῆ),”¹³⁸ the “one spirit and force (μιᾶ ψυχῆ καὶ δυνάμει)”¹³⁹ that operates among the gods and the universe.

2. Paul urges Jewish and Gentile believers toward unity since they have many things in common: they are part of one common body politic; they share a common hope; they embrace a common faith content; and they participate in the common ritual of baptism.¹⁴⁰ This appeal for unity on the basis of sharing a common set of elements is also a *topos* found in ancient political writings. For example, Dio Chrysostom calls the Apameians to concord with the people of Prusa, writing,

You should show yourselves gentle and magnanimous toward men who are so close to you, virtually housemates, and not harsh and arrogant neighbors, since they are men with whom you have common ties of wedlock, offspring, civic institutions, sacrifices to the gods, festive assemblies, and spectacles; moreover, you are educated together with them individually, you feast with them, you entertain each other, you spend the greater portion of your time together, you are almost one community (εἷς δῆμος), one city (μία πόλις) only slightly divided.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ Aristides, *Or.* 23.75–77. See also *Or.* 27.35 where he remarks that friendship and sharing holds the gods and the whole universe together.

¹³⁸ Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 36.22

¹³⁹ Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 36.30. See also *Or.* 38.11; 40.35, 38; 48.14.

¹⁴⁰ Meeks, *First Urban Christians*, 140–63, notes that baptism and the Eucharist are the two central unifying rites in the early church. Another minor ritual mentioned in Ephesians is the speaking of “psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs” (5:19).

¹⁴¹ Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 41.10. See also *Or.* 38.22 (“We have everything in common—ancestors, gods, customs, festivals, and, in the case of most of us, personal ties of blood and friendship”); 38.46 (“You worship the same gods as they do, and in most cases you conduct your festivals as they do”); 40.28. Aristides, *Or.* 24.31, writes: “But now what cause is there for faction, or what lack of opportunity for a pleasant life? Is not all the earth united, is there not one emperor and common laws for all (οὐ κοινὴ μὲν ἅπαντα γῆ, βασιλεὺς δὲ εἷς, νόμοι δὲ κοινοὶ πᾶσιν), and is there not as much freedom as one wishes, to

The appeal to common rituals, sacrifices, and festivals is particularly significant. Many writers acknowledge the cohesive force generated by the shared experience of participation in a common set of sacred rites. For example, Philo remarks that the friendship and ties developed between fellow pilgrims constitute the surest pledge that they are all of one mind (ὁμόνοια).¹⁴² Aristides notes that the bond between fellow pilgrims at the Temple of Asclepius far surpasses that generated by membership in a chorus, or companionship in a voyage, or having the same teachers.¹⁴³ Consequently, allies and reconciled factions typically celebrate their unity in common games, festivals, and sacrifices.¹⁴⁴ Enemies, on the other hand, “are not able to partner together in sacrifices or libations (οὔτε θυσιῶν οὔτε σπονδῶν οὔθ’ ἐστίας ... κοινωνεῖν).”¹⁴⁵

Appeals to the political unit as a body and to common advantage

Paul considers the church comprising Jews and Gentiles as a single body (ἐν σώμα) under the headship of Christ. The identity of Christian believers is no longer to be defined by their former socio-ethnic allegiance, but by their common allegiance to Christ. They are therefore not separate entities, but members of the same body (σύσσωμος). The body

engage in politics and to keep silent, and to travel and to remain at home? What need is there of imported evils or this wholly superfluous madness?”

¹⁴² Philo, *Spec.* 1.70.

¹⁴³ Aristides, *Or.* 23.16.

¹⁴⁴ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 4.25.4, relates how “[the Ionians and the Dorians] joined together in sacrificing and celebrating the festival, engaged in various contests, equestrian, gymnastic and musical, and made joint offerings to the gods. After they had witnessed the spectacles, celebrated the festival, and received the other evidences of goodwill from one another, if any difference had arisen between one city and another, arbiters sat in judgment and decided the controversy; and they also consulted together concerning the means both of carrying on the war against the barbarians and of maintaining their mutual concord.” See also *Ant. rom.* 4.26.3; 4.49.3.

¹⁴⁵ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 8.28.3. Plutarch, *Frat. amor.* 7 (*Mor.* 481D), writes that enmity between brothers is highly detrimental because brothers must share the same sacrifices and sacred rites.

imagery also stresses the necessity for interdependence. Although members of the community have different gifts, each one is to utilize his or her respective gift for the common good, for the building up of the body (4:15–16).¹⁴⁶

Paul’s use of the body metaphor to urge unity is well attested in ancient political writings.¹⁴⁷ Regardless of the variation in details, authors primarily use the metaphor positively to foster concord and interdependence within a city. Citizens, as members of one body, need each other to survive and to grow (cf. τὴν αὐξήσιν τοῦ σώματος; Eph 4:16),¹⁴⁸ sympathizing with the sufferings and not taking advantage of one another.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, each citizen ought “to treat nothing as a matter of private profit, [nor] plan about anything as though he were a detached unity, but to act like the foot or the hand, which ... would never exercise choice or desire in any other way but by reference to the

¹⁴⁶ See my “Body of Christ” section in chapter 2.

¹⁴⁷ The political context of this “body” language has been examined by previous scholars. I cite only the major references in this section. For other references, see Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 157–64; Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 36–47, 92–96. On the Roman use of this metaphor, see J. Béranger, *Recherches sur l’aspect idéologique du principat* (Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft 6; Basel: Reinhardt, 1953), 218–39; D. Kienast, “*Corpus imperii*: Überlegungen zum Reichsgedanken der Römer,” in *Romanitas-Christianitas: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Literatur der römischen Kaiserzeit* (ed. Gerhard Wirth; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1982), 1–17.

¹⁴⁸ Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.3.18–19; Marcus Aurelius, 2.1. For discussions concerning the growth of the body politic, see Plutarch, *Arat.* 24.5: “The Greek states which were weak would be preserved by mutual support when once they had been bound as it were by the common interest, and that just as the members of the body have a common life and breath because they cleave together in a common growth (συμφύαν), but when they are drawn apart and become separate they wither away and decay, in like manner the several states are ruined by those who dissever their common bonds, but are augmented (αὐξεσθαι) by mutual support, when they become parts of a great whole and enjoy a common foresight.” Aristotle, *Pol.* 5.2.7 (1302B33–1303A3), remarks, “Revolutions in the constitutions also take place on account of disproportionate growth (δι’ αὐξήσιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον); for just as the body is composed of parts (σῶμα ἐκ μερῶν) and needs to grow proportionately in order that its symmetry may remain, and if it does not it is spoiled, ... so also a state is composed of parts.”

¹⁴⁹ Plutarch, *Sol.* 18.6; Cicero, *Off.* 3.5.22; Seneca, *Ep.* 95.52.

whole.”¹⁵⁰ In this model, concord is viewed as the harmonious hierarchical functioning of the body whereby each member executes its respective function for the common good.¹⁵¹

At the same time, the body metaphor is used negatively to combat factionalism. For example, Menenius Agrippa compares the dispute between the plebs and the senate with the internal dissension within a body. He relates an apologue in which the hands, mouth, and teeth rebelled against the belly, attempting to starve the belly into submission but ultimately weakening the entire body.¹⁵² Strife harms the entire body. It is a form of self-mutilation,¹⁵³ and it is a disease that destroys the body. Aristides writes, “Everywhere faction (στάσις) is a terrible, disruptive thing, and like consumption. For having fastened itself to the body politic it drains off, sucks out, and depletes all its strength, and does not cease until it has entirely worn it away, using the sick themselves as a means for their own destruction.”¹⁵⁴

The political context of Paul’s use of the body metaphor is further strengthened when he stresses the need for the entire body to be reconciled and united together. The verbs that Paul employs (συναρμολογέω and συμβιβάζω) occur in political discussions

¹⁵⁰ Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.10.4–5. See also Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 15.4–5.

¹⁵¹ Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 39.5: “When a city has concord, as many citizens as there are, so many are the eyes with which to see that city’s interest, so many the ears with which to hear, so many the tongues to give advice, so many the minds concerned in its behalf.”

¹⁵² This fable is found in Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita* 2.32.7–33.1; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 6.86.1–5; Plutarch, *Cor.* 6.2–4. For a study of the fable, see W. Nestle, “Die Fabel des Menenius Agrippa,” *Klio* 21 (1927): 350–60. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 33.16, also relates a similar fable of Aesop.

¹⁵³ Aristides, *Or.* 24.38–89: “You destroy [your country] by our own actions ... and you await the victory of Cleomenes the Laconian, who chopped up his body, beginning with his feet.... And how shall you differ from the women who tore Pentheus apart, when you yourselves have torn apart with your own hands the body of the city (τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα τῆς πόλεως) which you all share?” See also Marcus Aurelius, 8.34; 9.23; Seneca, *Ira* 2.31.7; Lucan, 1.2; 10.416.

¹⁵⁴ Aristides, *Or.* 23.31. For other passages that compare στάσις to a disease (νόσος), see also Aristides, *Or.* 24.18; Plutarch, *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 32 (*Mor.* 824A); Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 38.12; 41.9;

urging concord. Plato uses συναρμόζω, a cognate of συναρμολογέω,¹⁵⁵ to depict the harmonizing of the citizens either by the law or a statesman;¹⁵⁶ and various authors use συμβιβάζω to denote the reconciliation of warring states or disputing parties.¹⁵⁷

The concepts of ὁμόνοια and στάσις dominate Eph 4:1–16 even without the specific appearance of these words. Not only does the text use words that are semantically linked to these themes, the appeals for unity are similar to *topoi* in political writings urging concord. This suggests that the call for unity in 4:1–16 can be read within the ancient political frame of concord and discord.

Ethics and Politics

Every political system has to wrestle with the relationship between the political and the moral spheres. Although Machiavelli granted politics a certain autonomy that was exempt from moral considerations,¹⁵⁸ ancient Greek and Roman political thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, and Seneca argued that political philosophy

Demosthenes, *3 Philip*. 12; Aristotle, *Ath. pol.* 13.3; Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 660–62; *Pers.* 715; Euripides, *Herc. fur.* 34, 273, 542–43. See also Kalimtzis, *Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease*, 17–22.

¹⁵⁵ The word συναρμολογέω is rare. According to TLG, the earliest occurrence is in the GNT. Furthermore, LSJ does not cite any other reference except Eph 2:21; 4:16.

¹⁵⁶ Plato, *Leg.* 628A9: “And what of him who brings the State into harmony (συναρμόττων)? In ordering its life would he have regard to external warfare rather than to the internal war, whenever it occurs, which goes by the name of ‘civil’ strife? For this is a war as to which it would be the desire of every man that, if possible, it should never occur in his own State, and that, if it did occur, it should come to as speedy an end as possible”; Plato, *Resp.* 519E–520A.

¹⁵⁷ Herodotus, 1.74.3: “So ... the Lydians and Medes ... stopped fighting, and both were the more eager to make peace. Those who reconciled (οἱ συμβιβάσαντες) them were Syennesis the Cilician and Labynetus the Babylonian”; Thucydides, 2.29.6; Plato, *Prot.* 337E.

¹⁵⁸ Federico Chabod, *Machiavelli & the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 195. But see Alistair Edwards and Jules Townshend, eds., *Interpreting Modern Political Philosophy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 35, who argue that Machiavelli advocates a different form of morality—a consequentialist morality—that is incompatible with any form of moral absolutism or idealism.

was deeply enmeshed with the ethical.¹⁵⁹ The emphasis that each thinker placed on the political or the ethical varied according to the individual. Aristotle considered political philosophy as supreme and ethical thought as a necessary component. The Hellenistic schools, on the other hand, shifted Aristotle's paradigm, considering ethics as a part of political philosophy.¹⁶⁰ For example, although Plutarch's *Lives* is replete with political actions and events, his primary concern is with the moral character of the individual person.¹⁶¹ Similarly, Seneca regarded moral philosophy as supreme and *civilis* as one of its subdivisions.¹⁶² But despite the varying emphases, ancient thinkers closely connected the political with the ethical.

An example of this tight interrelationship between ethics and politics is seen in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*. These two books are meant to be read together

¹⁵⁹ I use the term "ethical" decidedly in contrast to "moral." Although "ethics" is the academic study of "morality" in much the same way that "theology" is the study of "faith," the adjectives "ethical" and "moral" are generally interchangeable in current usage. See James H. Burtness, *Consequences: Morality, Ethics, and the Future* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 48–53. There may, however, be a slight difference arising from their different etymology. Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 6, writes, "One difference is that the Latin term from which 'moral' comes emphasizes rather more the sense of social expectation, while the Greek [from which 'ethical' comes] favors that of individual character." Furthermore, the ἠθος—the inner life, custom, character, and disposition—of the individual plays a central role in Aristotle's moral philosophy. See William Charlton, "Aristotle's Identification of Moral Philosophy with Ethics," in *Polis and Politics: Essays in Greek Moral and Political Philosophy* (ed. Andros Loizou and Harry Lesser; Aldershot: Avebury, 1990), 35–49. I consequently use the term "ethical" for its etymological connection to ἠθος.

¹⁶⁰ Christopher Rowe and Malcom Schofield, eds., *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5. See also Miriam Griffin, "When is Thought Political?" *Apeiron* 29 (1996): 281–82, who writes, "There was therefore no fundamental shift when the Hellenistic Schools placed politics in the ethical branch of philosophy.... It might seem more convincing to posit purely intellectual reasons for this apparent change in emphasis, if we think not so much in terms of a shift, as of an enlargement of the pool of concept in which political thinking can be done."

¹⁶¹ Gerhard J. D. Aalders, *Plutarch's Political Thought* (trans. A.M. Manekofsky; New York: North-Holland, 1982), 43, writes, "The political ideal of Plutarch ... is not based first and foremost on political and social institutions, however important these might be in a given case, but on the moral quality of the rulers, and not primarily on the ability of the rulers, however much that is required, but on the moral values which bear this ideal."

since they comprise a logical order: the former provides the foundations for the latter, and it is only through the latter that the former can achieve its purpose.¹⁶³ Aristotle announces at the beginning of his ethical treatise that the subject he undertakes to examine—the supreme good (τὸ ἄριστον), the well-being (εὐδαιμονία) of human beings—is the goal of political science (πολιτική).¹⁶⁴ As Aristotle progresses in his discussion, he constantly reminds his readers of the political nature of the material.¹⁶⁵ This culminates in the final section of the *Ethics* where Aristotle provides an outline of the sequel, the *Politics*.¹⁶⁶

Communal ethos

A key component that makes ethics political is the acceptance and adoption by the community of a particular ethical standard. Political ethical thought is not individual but social. There must necessarily be a fusion of horizons between the individual and the communal ἦθος. Citizens cannot live their lives as they please; they must be trained and educated in the πολιτεία so as to live the life of the community.¹⁶⁷ Such conformity should not be considered as slavery; rather, it ensures the survival and stability (σωτηρία)

¹⁶² Seneca, *Ep.* 89.10.

¹⁶³ See Malcolm Schofield, “Aristotle’s Political Ethics,” in *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics* (ed. Richard Kraut; Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 305–22; Richard Bodéüs, *The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics* (trans. Jan Edward Garrett; Albany: SUNY Press, 1993); and A. W. H. Adkins, “The Connection between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” *Political Theory* 12 (1984): 29–49.

¹⁶⁴ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 1.2.2–6 (1094A22–27). See also *Rhet.* 1.2.8 (1356A26–27) where he remarks that ethics, the enquiry regarding matters of character, “may be reasonably called Politics.”

¹⁶⁵ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 1.3.5 (1095A2–3); 1.4.1 (1095A14–17); 1.4.6 (1095B4–6); 1.9.8 (1099B29–32); 1.13.4 (1102A7–9); 1.13.7 (1102A18–21); 2.3.10 (1105A10–12); 7.11.1 (1152B1–2).

¹⁶⁶ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 10.9.23 (1181B17–22).

¹⁶⁷ Aristotle, *Pol.* 5.7.20 (1310A14).

of the community.¹⁶⁸ The development of a communal ethos then suggests that the ethical aspirations of the individual and political structures of the community share fundamentally the same goal. Aristotle makes this point clearly when he argues that the well-being of a state is the same as that of each individual.¹⁶⁹ He continues, “Let us take it as established that the best life, whether separately for an individual or collectively for states, is the life conjoined with virtue furnished with sufficient means for taking part in virtuous actions.”¹⁷⁰ Moreover, it is not possible for the state to possess well-being unless most or all of its citizens also possess well-being. The well-being of a city is different from the “evenness” of an even number. Although two odd numbers added together may make an even number, two sections that do not possess well-being will not add up to form a city that possesses well-being.¹⁷¹

The above framework suggests that not all ethical discussions by ancient philosophers should be considered political. For example, Theophrastus, Aristotle’s successor at the Lyceum, wrote an influential book *Characters* that belongs to the sphere of ethics, but an ethics that is divorced from politics. His treatment on ethical behavior centers on the character of the individual rather than the ἦθος of the polis.¹⁷² Ethical

¹⁶⁸ Aristotle, *Pol.* 5.7.20 (1310A35): οὐ γὰρ δεῖ οἶεσθαι δουλείαν εἶναι τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ σωτηρίαν.

¹⁶⁹ Aristotle, *Pol.* 7.2.1(1324A5).

¹⁷⁰ Aristotle, *Pol.* 7.1.6 (1323B40-1324A2).

¹⁷¹ Aristotle, *Pol.* 2.2.16 (1264B17–20).

¹⁷² Sinclair, *History of Greek Political Thought*, 248.

discussions that are political necessarily involve civic virtues and vices, and the formation of a communal ἦθος.¹⁷³

A particular problem arises when we remember that a polis can comprise multiple communities. It is therefore possible that the ἦθος of a particular community may be at variance or even be at odds with that of the larger group of which it is a subset. Take for example the political philosophy of Epicurus. Epicurus urges the wise man to refrain from political activity. He should free himself from the prison of politics;¹⁷⁴ he will not participate in civic life (οὐδὲ πολιτεύεσθαι);¹⁷⁵ he urges his followers to avoid public service (ἀποτρέποντες τοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν);¹⁷⁶ and if he writes about political matters, he writes with the intent of dissuading others from taking part in politics (γράφουσι περὶ πολιτείας ἵνα μὴ πολιτευώμεθα).¹⁷⁷ Such thinking necessarily put Epicureans in direct conflict with the ἦθος of the city. Plutarch succinctly sums up the common charges against Epicureans, arguing that the Epicurean sage is a parasite, enjoying the benefits of the city but refusing to make any contributions to it.¹⁷⁸ Although the teachings of Epicurus are subversive to the state, his ethical system is nevertheless political since it forms the ethos of a particular social unit, albeit a much smaller one than the state; namely, the community of Epicureans.

¹⁷³ Aristotle, *Pol.* 3.5.11 (1280B), underscores this civic dimension of ethics. He writes, “All those ... who are concerned about good government do take *civic* virtue and vice (ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς) into their purview” (emphasis mine).

¹⁷⁴ Epicurus, *Sent. Vat.* 58.

¹⁷⁵ Diogenes Laertius, 10.119.

¹⁷⁶ Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 34 (*Mor.* 1127E).

¹⁷⁷ Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 33 (*Mor.* 1127A).

¹⁷⁸ Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 33 (*Mor.* 1127A).

In a similar manner, I consider the ethical teachings of Eph 4:17–5:20 to be political.¹⁷⁹ Although the ethics in Ephesians is in some respects countercultural, inverting the value systems of the larger Greco-Roman society, it nevertheless truly seeks to establish and develop a corporate ethos and identity. The inferential conjunction in τοῦτο οὖν λέγω (4:17) is resumptive, picking up the discussion begun in 4:1–3 (παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς ἐγώ; 4:1), which refers back to the preceding chapters, in particular, the reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles in one body and the creation of a new humanity. The formation of a new people and a new citizenry necessarily entails the establishment of guidelines, norms, and customs to ensure communal flourishing. Paul accomplishes this by exhorting his readers to live according to their new ἥθος. Ephesians 4:17–24 presents believers with two different corporate identities: the old and new humanity. The old humanity represents their former Gentile identity. The new humanity created in the likeness of God (τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα ; 4:24) echoes the creation of Jews and Gentiles into one new humanity in 2:15. It therefore represents the corporate entity for believers in Christ. Against these two choices, Paul exhorts his readers to live lives that are consonant with their new identity. Since they are no longer Gentiles, they should put away their former pattern of life and put on the new.

¹⁷⁹ The ethical section of Ephesians is generally considered to be 4:1–6:20. This, however, does not suggest that “theology” and “ethics” occupy two tightly disjunctive sections. Paul combines theological and ethical statements just as Aristotle merged political and ethical discussions together in *The Nicomachean Ethics* and *The Politics*. Examples of “theology” in Eph 4:1–6:20 include 4:4–16; 5:2, 23–32. In this particular section, I focus primarily on 4:17–5:20.

Education and imitation

The unity of ethics and politics necessarily suggests that structures must be present to educate citizens about the ethos of the city so as to prevent conflict between the behavior of individuals and the values of the community. Plato recognizes this importance of education when he considers

right education (τὴν ὀρθὴν φιλοσοφίαν) as the only basis for right action by cities or by individuals; and ... that the nations of mankind would never be rid of their troubles until either men who were rightly and truly educated should come to hold the ruling offices in the state or else by some miracle those who hold power in cities become truly educated (ὄντως φιλοσοφήσῃ).¹⁸⁰

In order to establish such a system, the political leader must truly be capable of educating, and he himself must be just and good. If Plato had to interview a candidate for a political career, he would question him thus:

[Have you] ever made any of the citizens better? Is there one who was previously wicked, unjust, licentious, and senseless, and has to thank [you] for making him an upright, honorable man, whether stranger or citizen, bond or free.... What human being will you claim to have made better by your intercourse? [You may have your ideas as to what a statesman should do, but let me tell you that his sole duty is in] making us, the citizens as good as possible.¹⁸¹

Aristotle also recognizes that the primary way of maintaining a constitution and promoting a virtuous citizen is through education.¹⁸² A virtuous disposition depends not

¹⁸⁰ Plato, *Ep.* 7 (326A–B). This translation is by Sinclair, *History of Greek Political Thought*, 124. He notes that φιλοσοφία here should preferably be translated as “education” rather than “philosophy.”

¹⁸¹ Plato, *Gorg.* 515A–C. Malcolm Schofield, *Plato: Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), recognizes the importance of education within Plato’s political thought. He writes, “Education—interpreted in the broadest possible sense—has a claim to be considered perhaps the greatest preoccupation of both the *Republic* and the *Laws* alike” (35).

¹⁸² The eighth book of the *Politics*, which appears to be a treatise on education, opens with the following words: “Now nobody would dispute that the education (παιδείαν) of the young requires the special attention of the lawgiver. Indeed the neglect of this in states is injurious to their constitutions; for education ought to be adapted to the particular form of constitution, since the particular character

only on acquiring the right habits;¹⁸³ a virtuous disposition must also know and deliberately choose the right course of action for its own sake,¹⁸⁴ developing the fundamental correlative of real virtue—practical wisdom (φρόνησις).¹⁸⁵ Although some states relegate the responsibility of moral training to individual parents, Aristotle argues that this method is not preferable since paternal authority does not have the power to compel obedience. For Aristotle, the proper instrument for maintaining and establishing virtue is the law—legislated regulations and unwritten customs and conventions.¹⁸⁶ It is through the educative role of the law that the state can be made a partnership and a unity.¹⁸⁷

Ephesians does not present any specific systematic regimen or structures by which members are instructed in the ethos of the community. There are nevertheless hints as to how this might occur. Some scholars argue that the *putting on* and *putting off* coupled with the *then* and *now* language in Ephesians reflects catechetical instructions to baptismal candidates.¹⁸⁸ This suggests that there was some formal instructional process

belonging to each constitution both guards the constitution generally and originally establishes it” (Aristotle, *Pol.* 8.1.1 [1137A11–15]). See also *Pol.* 5.7.20 (1310A12–15).

¹⁸³ Aristotle, *Pol.* 7.12.6 (1332A39–40); *Eth. nic.* 10.9.6 (1179B20–21).

¹⁸⁴ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 2.4.3 (1105A28–33).

¹⁸⁵ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 6.13.2–3 (1144B16–18): “True Virtue cannot exist without Prudence (φρονήσεως).” See also 6.13.6 (1144B30–32): “It is not possible to be good in the true sense without Prudence (φρονήσεως), nor to be prudent (φρόνιμον) without Moral Virtue.”

¹⁸⁶ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 10.9.12–14 (1180A18–b7).

¹⁸⁷ Aristotle, *Pol.* 2.2.10 (1263B): “The proper thing is for the state, while being a multitude, to be made a partnership and a unity by means of education (διὰ τὴν παιδείαν κοινὴν καὶ μίαν ποιεῖν), as has been said before, and it is strange that the very philosopher who intends to introduce a system of education and thinks that this will make the city morally good should fancy that he can regulate society by such measures as have been mentioned instead of by manners and culture and laws.”

¹⁸⁸ See P. Carrington, *The Primitive Christian Catechism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 31–57; Dahl, *Studies in Ephesians*, 415–16; Schnackenburg, *Ephesians*, 199–201.

in the early church, possibly conducted by those who are gifted as διδάσκαλοι (4:11).¹⁸⁹ Supposedly, the reading of Ephesians itself during the assembly of the church would also play an educative role. Moreover, if Ephesians was a circular letter written to various communities in Asia Minor, the importance of this document in shaping the ethical outlook of the early church is readily apparent.¹⁹⁰ Apart from the public reading of Ephesians, believers mutually instruct and admonish one another with psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs (5:19; cf. Col 3:16), refraining from obscene, silly, and vulgar talk (αἰσχρότης καὶ μωρολογία ἢ εὐτραπελία; 5:4).¹⁹¹ Furthermore, they are also to expose (ἐλέγχετε) the unfruitful deeds of darkness perpetrated by those outside the community of faith (5:11). The call for communal ethical development and participation is perhaps also seen in the command ὀργίζεσθε καὶ μὴ ἁμαρτάνετε (4:26). Aristotle notes that although an individual is easily overcome by anger, a multitude is less susceptible to be roused to anger (ὀργισθῆναι) and to commit wrong (ἁμαρτεῖν).¹⁹² Eph 4:26 may then be understood as a call for collective judgment rather than individual action. Finally,

¹⁸⁹ For the role of teachers in the development of unity within a sociological framework, see Peter W. Gosnell, “Networks and Exchanges: Ephesians 4:7–16 and the Community Function of Teachers,” *BTB* 30 (2000): 135–43.

¹⁹⁰ For examples regarding the use of letters as means of moral instruction, see Abraham J. Malherbe, ed., *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 79–85.

¹⁹¹ In Aristotle’s educational program, he argues that children must be sheltered from corrupting influences such as vulgar language, stories, plays, and music. He writes, “The lawgiver ought therefore to banish indecent talk (αἰσχρολογία), as much as anything else, out of the state altogether (for light talk about anything disgraceful [τῶν αἰσχροῶν] soon passes into action)” (*Pol.* 7.15.7 [1336B1–7]). See also *Pol.* 7.15.7–10 (1336B1–35).

¹⁹² Aristotle, *Pol.* 3.10.6 (1286A33–35): “Also the multitude is more incorruptible—just as the larger stream of water is purer, so the mass of citizens is less corruptible than the few; and the individual judgment is bound to be corrupted when he is overcome by anger (ὀργῆς) or some other such emotion, whereas in the other case it is a difficult thing for all the people to be roused to anger (ὀργισθῆναι) and go wrong together (ἁμαρτεῖν).”

Ephesians gives more weight to paternal instruction than Aristotle does, urging fathers to bring up their children in the discipline and instruction of the Lord (6:4).¹⁹³

Although Ephesians does not present formal structures for education, it nevertheless presents more clearly the content of the readers' ethical instruction. Using pedagogical terms, Paul reminds his readers of the ethical teaching they received in the gospel message—they *learned* Christ (ἐμάθετε τὸν Χριστόν), *heard* him (αὐτὸν ἠκούσατε), and was *taught* in him (ἐν αὐτῷ ἐδιδάχθητε; 4:20–21). Paul then spells out the specifics of this education with three infinitives. They were taught to put aside (ἀποθέσθαι) their old humanity (4:22); to be renewed (ἀνανεοῦσθαι) by the Spirit in their mind (τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοῦς ὑμῶν; 4:23);¹⁹⁴ and to put on (ἐνδύσασθαι) the new humanity created in the likeness of God (τὸν κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα; 4:24).¹⁹⁵ Central to this educative process is a reconfiguration of the mind (νοῦς), the “constellation of thoughts and beliefs which provides the criteria for judgments and actions,”¹⁹⁶ according to the mindset of the new humanity patterned κατὰ θεόν (4:24). Paul, like Aristotle, is arguing for the necessity of developing a particular φρόνησις. Believers are not to be foolish (ἄφρονες); rather, they are to understand what the moral will of the Lord is (τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ κυρίου; 5:17).

¹⁹³ H. I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (trans. George Lamb; New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956), 314, writes, “[The] Christian education of children ... was the parents' fundamental duty. There was more in this than was contained in the Roman tradition; it was essentially a continuation of the Jewish tradition, which emphasized the importance of the family in the development of religious consciousness.”

¹⁹⁴ Contra Peter T. O'Brien, *The Letter to the Ephesians* (The Pillar New Testament Commentary; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 330, who understands πνεύματι as a reference to the human spirit.

¹⁹⁵ In Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 11.5.2, “τὸν Ταρκύνιον ἐκεῖνον ἐνδύομενοι” means “to play the role of Tarquin.”

¹⁹⁶ Robert Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms* (AGJU 10; Leiden: Brill, 1971), 361, 367. Jewett's definition follows Adolf Schlatter, *Die Theologie des Judentums nach dem Bericht des Josefus* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1932; repr., New York: Georg Olms, 1979), 27.

Paul, like Aristotle, notes that the formation of the “right” φρόνησις requires the inculcation of the “right” habits and character. The call to cultivate the mind such that it understands the will of the Lord is enjoined with the call to imitate God,¹⁹⁷ or more specifically, to conform their lives after Christ’s cruciform pattern. Ephesians conflates the call to imitate God with the call to imitate the cruciform pattern of Christ. This is borne out in 5:1 where the injunction to imitate God (γίνεσθε οὖν μιμηταὶ τοῦ θεοῦ) is tightly bracketed by two καθὼς καὶ clauses, “conformity patterns” that present Christ’s peacemaking act on the cross as a prototype of human behavior.¹⁹⁸ In 4:32, believers are to forgive one another καθὼς καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἐν Χριστῷ forgave them; in 5:2, believers are urged to walk in love καθὼς καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς ἠγάπησεν ἡμᾶς καὶ παρέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν προσφορὰν καὶ θυσίαν τῷ θεῷ εἰς ὁσμὴν εὐωδίας. Furthermore, Paul relates the cruciform love of Christ with the life, essence, power, and character of God. He prays that his readers would know the love of Christ so that they would be filled up to the fullness of God (3:19).

The call to imitate God, especially Christ’s cruciform pattern, echoes throughout the letter. Believers are reminded that they are redeemed through Christ’s blood (1:7) and that the new humanity is made possible only through the cross (2:16); Paul prays that Christ will dwell in their hearts (3:17); believers are to attain to the knowledge of the Son of God, to the measure of the full stature of Christ (4:13); they are to grow up into Christ

¹⁹⁷ See Robert A. Wild, “‘Be Imitators of God’: Discipleship in the Letter to the Ephesians,” in *Discipleship in the New Testament* (ed. Fernando F. Segovia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 127–43.

¹⁹⁸ Nils A. Dahl, “Form-Critical Observations on Early Christian Preaching,” in *Jesus in the Memory of the Early Church* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976), 34, remarks that in these conformity patterns, “Christ is

in every way by speaking the truth in love (4:15); husbands are to love their wives καθὼς καὶ Christ loved the church and παρέδωκεν himself for her (5:25); and finally, believers are to imitate God by putting on his armor (6:10). Since believers are now “in Christ” (ἐν Χριστῷ) and are part of the new humanity, they are to consciously embrace the paradigm that Christ displayed on the cross: breaking divisive walls, establishing peace, and building up the body in love.

Paul’s appeal to imitate God-Christ is similar to the political advice writers give to aspiring rulers.¹⁹⁹ Philo urges kings and rulers to imitate (μιμέομαι) God’s virtue of creating order out of disorder, harmony out of discordance.²⁰⁰ The *Letter of Aristeas* urges kings to imitate (μιμέομαι) the beneficence of God.²⁰¹ Plutarch’s *To an Uneducated Ruler* notes that rulers should form themselves in the likeness of God (ὁμοιότητα θεῷ) through imitation. They are not to display the marks of outward deification, common among the Hellenistic monarchs or the Roman emperors; rather, they are to emulate the virtues of

not seen simply as a model to be imitated; his conduct is prototypical precisely to the degree that it is of saving significance.”

¹⁹⁹ The political advice to imitate rulers is built on the assumption that there is a fundamental analogy between the king’s function in the state and God’s operation of the universe. Diotogenes, *Concerning a Kingdom*, writes, “As God is to the world, so is a king to his kingdom; and as a city is to the world, so is a king to God” (ἔχει δὲ καὶ ὡς θεὸς ποτὶ κόσμον βασιλεὺς ποτὶ πόλιν· καὶ ὡς πόλις ποτὶ κόσμον βασιλεὺς ποτὶ θεόν; Stobaeus 4.7.61.33–35; Holger Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period* [Åbo: Åbo akademi, 1965], 72.19–20; ET David R. Fideler, ed., *The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library: An Anthology of Ancient Writings which relate to Pythagoras and Pythagorean Philosophy* [Compiled and translated by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie with additional translations by Thomas Taylor and Arthur Fairbanks Jr.; Grand Rapids: Phanes, 1987], 222).

²⁰⁰ Philo, *Spec.* 187–88: “[God] called the non-existent into existence and produced order from disorder, qualities from things devoid of quality, similarities from dissimilars, identities from the totally different, fellowship and harmony from the dissociated and discordant, equality from inequality and light from darkness.... These things good rulers must imitate (μιμῆσθαι) if they have any aspiration to be assimilated to God (εἴ γέ τις αὐτοῖς φροντίς ἐστὶν ἑξομοίωσης τῆς πρὸς θεόν).” See also idem, *Abr.* 144.

²⁰¹ *Let. Aris.* 188, 210, 281.

God.²⁰² Through such imitation, the ruler becomes an image of God to be contemplated,²⁰³ and a model of behavior to which others should conform.²⁰⁴ In contrast to this hierarchical ordering of imitation (subjects → king → God),²⁰⁵ Paul urges his believers to directly imitate God since each of them has direct access to God (2:18).

Communal harmony and peace

I have so far examined how ethics in Ephesians is generally political in nature. But it is also instructive to note that specific ethical injunctions in 4:17–5:20 are also *topoi* in political writings promoting concord and peace. These include the exhortations to shun vices that sow discord such as greed (πλεονεξία), and adopt virtues that promote unity such as justice (δικαιοσύνη) and love (ἀγάπη, φιλία).

Πλεονεξία

Ephesians remarks that the Gentile lifestyle is marked by greed (πλεονεξία; 4:19; 5:3, 5). Etymologically, πλεονεξία comes from πλεόν + ἔχω, suggesting either one has more or

²⁰² Plutarch, *Princ. iner.* 3 (*Mor.* 780F–781A): “Now just as in the heavens God has established as a most beautiful image of himself the sun and moon, so in states a ruler ‘who in God’s likeness, Righteous decision upholds’, that is to say, one who, possessing god’s wisdom, establishes, as his likeness and luminary, intelligence in place of scepter or thunderbolt or trident God visits his wrath upon those who imitate his thunders, lightnings, and sunbeams, but with those who emulate his virtue and make themselves like unto his goodness and mercy he is well pleased.”

²⁰³ Plutarch, *Princ. iner.* 5 (*Mor.* 781F–82A): “As the sun, his most beautiful image, appears in the heavens as his mirrored likeness to those who are able to see him in it, just so [God] has established in states the light of justice and of knowledge of himself as an image which the blessed and the wise copy with the help of philosophy modeling themselves after the most beautiful of all things.”

²⁰⁴ Plutarch, *Princ. iner.* 2 (*Mor.* 780B–C); Aristides, *Or.* 27.34–37. See also Ecphantus, *On Kings*: “But kings who cannot on earth find anything better than their own nature to imitate should not waste time in seeking any model other or lower than God himself (Stobaeus 4.7.64.45–48).... A king’s manners should also be the inspiration of his government. Thus its beauty will immediately shine forth, since he who imitates God through virtue will surely be dear to him who he imitates, and much more dear will he be to his subjects (Stobaeus 4.7.64.50–55).... By assimilating himself to one, and that the most excellent nature, he will beneficently endeavor to assimilate all his subjects to himself (Stobaeus 4.7.65.25–27)” (ET Fidler, *Pythagorean Sourcebook*, 257–59).

wants more.²⁰⁶ The word also conveys the idea of avarice and a desire to cheat, steal (cf. 1 Cor 6:10), and pursue one's advantage at the expense of the common advantage.²⁰⁷ In line with other Jewish teachings, Ephesians stresses the danger of πλεονεξία and links it with idolatry (5:5).²⁰⁸ It is clear that this character trait has no place within the new community of believers. Not only does it cause a shift of allegiance from God to oneself, πλεονεξία with its individualistic focus is the greatest social vice, destroying the communal spirit and ultimately bringing civic instability through gross inequality of material wealth.²⁰⁹ Paul, consequently, exhorts believers to put aside greed (5:3) and to stop stealing (4:28). On the contrary, he encourages liberality and a willingness to share property and goods with those in need (4:28).

The unequal possession of goods fueled by πλεονεξία is also frequently condemned by political commentators as a major factor of civic instability.²¹⁰ Thucydides points out that one of the primary causes of civil war in the fifth century was avarice (διὰ

²⁰⁵ See also Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.44–45.

²⁰⁶ Gerhard Dellling, “πλεονέκτης, πλεονεκτέω, πλεονεξία,” *TDNT* 6:266.

²⁰⁷ Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.6.12; Thucydides, 3.84.1. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 34.19, includes greed as one of the civil ills that seeks personal advantage in contrast to the common good (“envy, greed [πλεονεξίας], contentiousness, the striving in each case to promote one's own welfare at the expense of both one's native land and the common weal [τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον]”).

²⁰⁸ *T. Jud.* 19:1: “My children, love of money leads to idolatry, because once they are led astray by money, they designate as gods those who are not gods.”

²⁰⁹ See Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17 (*De avaritia*), especially *Or.* 17.6–7: “So I maintain in regard to covetousness (περὶ τῆς πλεονεξίας) too, that all men do know it is neither expedient nor honorable, but *the cause of the greatest evils* (τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν αἴτιον); and that in spite of all this, not one man refrains from it or is willing to have *equality with possessions with his neighbor* (μηδένα ἀνθρώπων ἴσον ἔχειν τῷ πέλας)... *But greed* (ἡ πλεονεξία) *is not only the greatest evil to a man himself, but it injures his neighbors as well*” (italics mine). He goes on to say, “In this passage, then, are enumerated all the consequences of greed (πλεονεξίας): that it is of advantage neither to the individual nor to the state; but that on the contrary, it overthrows and destroys the prosperity of families and of states as well ...” (*Or.* 17.10). See also Dio's negative portrayal of the covetous man in *Or.* 4.91–100.

πλεονεξίαν; 3.82.8). Aristotle, likewise, remarks that civil strife is caused by inequality of property,²¹¹ viewing πλεονεξία as a distinct vice because “he tacitly assumes that it involves a desire to have more *at the expense of others*.”²¹² Plutarch remarks that Sparta fell into moral decay as a result of inequality of possessions and unbridled greed for gold,²¹³ and considers πλεονεξία as a fundamental defect of Hellenistic dynasties.²¹⁴ In an address to the Roman senate, Scipio Nasica, according to Diodorus Siculus, argued that πλεονεξία was a severe threat to the ideal of ὁμόνοια.²¹⁵

The solution proposed by political commentators to combat this predicament is not so much different from that used by Paul. Lycurgus achieved equality of possession and curbed the thirst for wealth by implementing radical measures—redistributing land, banning gold and silver currency, and instituting a sober communal way of life for all.²¹⁶ Polybius, agreeing with such measures, writes, “Lycurgus by doing away with the lust for wealth (πλεονεξίαν) did away also with all civil discord (διαφοράν) and broils (στάσιν).”²¹⁷ In a similar vein, Aristotle notes that citizens in a well-governed society must take steps to eliminate poverty since poverty produces sedition and crime.²¹⁸ One of the ways to accomplish this is for citizens to practice the virtue of liberality (ἐλευτεριότητος), the

²¹⁰ See Skaard, *Zwei religiös-politische Begriffe*, 68–77. He writes, “Der Gegensatz der ὁμόνοια ist besonders die πλεονεξία, die Selbstsucht, die den Staat ins Verderben stürzt” (69), and “Die Ursachen des kommenden Niederganges sieht er [Polyb] in der πολυτέλεια und der πλεονεξία” (76).

²¹¹ Aristotle, *Pol.* 2.4.7 (1266B7).

²¹² Richard Kraut, *Aristotle: Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 138 (his italics).

²¹³ Plutarch, *Ag. Cleom.*, 5.3–4; 3.1.

²¹⁴ Plutarch, *Pyrrh.* 7.2; 12.2–3.

²¹⁵ Diodorus Siculus, 34/35.33.5.

²¹⁶ Plutarch, *Lyc.* 8; 9; 10. See also Aalders, *Plutarch's Political Thought*, 38–39.

²¹⁷ Polybius, 6.46.7.

²¹⁸ Aristotle, *Pol.* 2.3.7 (1265B10–12).

skill in deciding the level of wealth one needs and the appropriateness of giving and receiving money.²¹⁹ Likewise, Isocrates commends a high degree of public spirit and exhorts the wealthy to help the poor such that no one will be in need.²²⁰ This sentiment is moreover shared by Dio Chrysostom who remarks that “equality (τὸ ἴσον) ... establishes a common bond of friendship and peace for all (κοινήν φιλίαν καὶ πᾶσιν εἰρήνην) toward one another, whereas quarrels, internal strife, and foreign wars are due to nothing else than the desire for more” (*Or.* 17.10).

Δικαιοσύνη

In contrast to a previous lifestyle marked by πλεονεξία, Ephesians advocates δικαιοσύνη. Although δικαιοσύνη in other Pauline literature may denote a soteriological usage and emphasize God’s declaration of humanity to be in right relationship with him, δικαιοσύνη in Ephesians refers to an ethical virtue, justice. The new humanity has been created to be like God in justice and holiness (4:24); the κτίζω language in 4:24 echoes 2:10, suggesting that the good deeds which believers have been created for includes just deeds. The fruit of light is found in all that is good and just and true (5:9); and finally, believers are to put on the breastplate of justice (6:14).²²¹

The word δικαιοσύνη denotes fulfillment of duty, doing one’s own,²²² lawfulness,²²³ and equality.²²⁴ The emphasis on equality necessarily implies that a just

²¹⁹ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 4.1 (1119B22–1122A17).

²²⁰ Isocrates, *Or.* 4.79; 7.83.

²²¹ The occurrence of δίκαιον (6:1) will be dealt with later in the “The Household” section.

²²² Plato, *Resp.* 433A–434A, 443C–444A.

²²³ Kraut, *Aristotle: Political Philosophy*, 105, remarks that law (νόμος) includes “not only the enactments of a lawgiver but also the customs, norms, and unwritten rules of a community.”

²²⁴ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 5.1.8 (1129A34).

person does what is equal or fair, but an unjust person (ὁ ἄδικος) is greedy and grasping (πλεονέκτης).²²⁵ Since the time of Theognis (6th century BCE), δικαιοσύνη was also considered the primary virtue under which all other virtues were subsumed.²²⁶ When δικαιοσύνη is linked with other virtues, as in Ephesians, the combined terms present a comprehensive statement encompassing the sum of all virtue and excellence. Nevertheless, the word still retains its basic sense of lawfulness even when it is broadened to encompass all moral virtue.²²⁷

As the sum of all political and moral virtue, justice “produces and preserves the happiness (εὐδαιμονία), or the component parts of the happiness, of the political community.”²²⁸ Especially pertinent for this study is the positive correlation between δικαιοσύνη and ὁμόνοια. This relationship is not surprising since living in accord with the established norms and laws of a society is vital to the stability of a society.²²⁹ Thus, Socrates remarks, “For factions (στάσεις) ... are the outcome of injustice (ἀδικία), and hatreds (μίσση) and internecine conflicts, but justice (ἡ δικαιοσύνη) brings oneness of mind and love (ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν).”²³⁰ Similarly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus writes that

²²⁵ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 5.1.9 (1129B1–2).

²²⁶ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 5.1.15 (1129B30), cites a proverb of Theognis, “In Justice (δικαιοσύνη) is all Virtue (ἀρετή) found in sum.” See also *Eth. nic.* 5.1.19 (1130A8–9): “Justice in this sense is not a part of Virtue, but the whole of Virtue.” Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture* (3 vols.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), 1:105, writes, “The new dikaiosyné was a more objective quality [than courage]; but it became areté *par excellence* as soon as the Greeks believed that they had found, in written law, a reliable criterion for right and wrong. After *nomos*—that is, current legal usage—was codified, the general idea of righteousness acquired a palpable content. It consisted in obedience to the laws of the state, just as Christian ‘virtue’ consisted in obedience to the commands of God.”

²²⁷ G. Schrenk, “δίκη, δίκαιος κτλ.,” *TDNT* 2:193.

²²⁸ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 5.1.13 (1129B17–19).

²²⁹ See Xenophon, *Mem.* 4.4.16: “For those cities whose citizens abide by [the laws] prove strongest and enjoy most happiness.” See also Plutarch, *Per.* 3.1; *Lyc.* 4.1.

²³⁰ Plato, *Resp.* 351D. See also Plato, *Cleitophon* 409D–E, where Socrates notes that justice (δικαιοσύνη) produces true friendship, and the mark of true friendship is concord (ὁμόνοια).

Numa's regulations created a passion for "justice (δικαιοσύνης), which preserves the harmony of the State (ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ τὴν πόλιν)."²³¹ Dionysius further states in the discourse of Decius before the senate, "If justice and law (δίκη καὶ νόμος) are banished from a state, sedition (στάσις) and war (πόλεμος) are wont to enter there."²³²

Walk in love (ἀγάπη, ἀγαπάω, φιλία, φιλέω)

I argued in the previous chapter that Paul's strong emphasis and exhortation to love one another is essential to maintaining the unity and peace within the community of believers. But what is important for my investigation is the similar link Greco-Roman literature makes between love and concord.²³³ Although I have not found any text where ὁμόνοια is linked with ἀγάπη, ὁμόνοια and the elimination of στάσις is often connected with other words for love such as ἀγαπάω, ἔρωσ, φιλία, and φιλέω.

The dramatist Aeschylus considers "common love (κοινοφιλής)" as the proper antidote for στάσις.²³⁴ Plato notes that ἀγάπη and φιλοφρόνησις eliminates στάσις and πόλεμος,²³⁵ and ἔρωσ "makes peace (εἰρήνη) among men."²³⁶ Plutarch "sees love (ἔρωσ) as a force which can unify the state politically."²³⁷ Aristotle recognizes the power of φιλία to

²³¹ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 2.74.1.

²³² Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 7.42.2–3.

²³³ This is also demonstrated by Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 165–71; Bakke, *Concord and Peace*, 191–96.

²³⁴ Aeschylus, *Eum.* 985.

²³⁵ Plato, *Leg.* 678E, uses the verbal forms ἀγαπάω and φιλοφρονέομαι.

²³⁶ Plato, *Symp.* 197C–D. See also Plato, *Pol.* 311B–C; *Cleitophon* 409 D–E, where he links ὁμόνοια with φιλία.

²³⁷ Alan Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 60. Wardman considers Plutarch's ἔρωσ, which includes both homosexual and heterosexual love, to play a vital social role "since lovers and loved will act heroically for the good of the whole community" (63). See also Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 39.6, where he prays to Φιλία and Ὅμόνοια with this request: "That from this day forth they may implant in this city a yearning for itself, a passionate love (ἔρωσ), a singleness of purpose, a

unite a city and considers it to be almost synonymous with ὁμόνοια.²³⁸ Φιλία is the greatest blessing a city could have; it forms the bond that unites the state; it is the best safeguard against στάσις; and politicians value it more than justice (δικαιοσύνη) itself.²³⁹ Arius Didymus also defines φιλία as ὁμόνοια.²⁴⁰ The unifying quality of love is further seen when various authors use ἀγαπάω and φιλέω/φιλία to describe political treaties, alliances, and reconciliations;²⁴¹ and the bond that a political leader has with his people.²⁴²

unity of wish and thought; and, on the other hand, that they may cast out strife (στάσις) and contentiousness and jealousy.”

²³⁸ Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 9.6.1 (1167A): “Concord also seems to be a friendly feeling (φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται);” *Eth. nic.* 8.1.4 (1155A): “Concord, which seems akin to friendship (ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὁμοίων τι τῇ φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι).” For a study on the political aspect of friendship, see Horst Hutter, *Politics as Friendship* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1978). For Aristotle’s theory of political friendship, see Kraut, *Aristotle: Political Philosophy*, 465–70; Suzanne Stern-Gillet, *Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 147–69; chapter 16 “Political Animals and Civic Friendship” in John M. Cooper, *Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 356–77.

²³⁹ Aristotle, *Pol.* 2.1.16 (1162B): “For we think that friendship (φιλία) is the greatest of blessings for the state, since it is the best safeguard against revolution (στασιάζειν), and the unity of the state (τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), which Socrates praises most highly, both appears to be and is said by him to be the effect of friendship (φιλία);” *Eth. nic.* 8.1.4 (1155A): “Moreover, friendship (φιλία) appears to be the bond of the state; and lawgivers seem to set more store by it than they do by justice (δικαιοσύνη), for to promote concord, which seems akin to friendship, is their chief aim, while faction (στάσις), which is enmity (ἔχθρα), is what they are most anxious to banish.” See also Aristides, *Or.* 23.53: “Thus friendship and concord (φιλία καὶ ὁμόνοια) with one another is naturally the cause of the great good for the nation, the leading cities, and each individual city in common, and on the contrary faction (στάσις) the cause of the most extreme evils.”

²⁴⁰ See Arius Didymus, *Epitome of Stoic Ethics*: “Furthermore, it is their view that every stupid person is an enemy of the gods. For enmity is disharmony and discord in matters of life, just as friendship (φιλία) is harmony (συμφωνία) and concord (ὁμόνοια). But the worthless are in disharmony with the gods in matters of life” (Stobaeus 2.7.11K.66–71; ET Arius Didymus: *Epitome of Stoic Ethics* [ed. Arthur J. Pomeroy; Texts and Translations 44; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1999], 85). See also Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 26.8; 34.45; 36.32; 38.8, 15; 40.36, 37; 41.13; Ecphantus, *On Kings*: “The friendship (φιλία) existing in a city, and possessing a certain common end, imitates the concord (ὁμόνοια) of the universe” (Thesleff, *Pythagorean Texts*, 81.22; Stobaeus 4.7.64.75–76; ET Fideler, *Pythagorean Sourcebook*, 258).

²⁴¹ For φιλέω/φιλία, see Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 2.45.3–4; 2.46.1; 3.29.4; 3.50.4; 4.49.1; 5.26.3–4; 5.30.3; 5.34.4; 5.45.2; 5.49.2; 5.50.1; 6.21.2; 6.47.4; 8.32.5; 8.34.1–3; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 38.11, 36. For other examples, see John T. Fitzgerald, “Paul and Friendship,” in *Paul in the Greco-Roman World* (ed. J. Paul Sampley; Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2003), 334–37. Note also that the fifth century C.E. lexicographer Hesychius formally defines “to reconcile” (ἀποκαταλλάξαι) as “to make a friend” (φίλον ποιῆσαι). See entry α.6374 in *Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon* (ed. Moritz Schmidt; 5 vols; Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1965). For ἀγαπάω, see Polybius, 9.29.12; Josephus, *B.J.* 1.211; Plutarch, *Lys.* 4.2. See also Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 167n. 619.

Some may critique the above investigation, noting the absence of φιλέω and φιλία in Ephesians. One should, however, bear in mind that ἀγαπάω and φιλέω share the same semantic domain.²⁴³ Despite differences in lexemes, Paul's exhortation to walk in love follows the general Greco-Roman commonplace that love and friendship promotes concord and unity.

The above references show ancient political thinkers agreeing that πλεονεξία and the corresponding unequal distribution of wealth leads to civic and social instability. On the other hand, δικαιοσύνη, ἀγάπη, and φιλία result in peace and concord. As representative ethical characteristics of the old and new humanity, their use in Ephesians suggests that Paul's ethical injunctions are not only political in character, but are similar to *topoi* promoting peace and harmony within the community of believers.

²⁴² For ἀγαπάω, see Plutarch, *Caes.* 5.2; *Dem.* 18.4; *Pomp.* 65.1; *Oth.* 4.1; *Publ.* 10.4; *Marc.* 5.1; Josephus, *B.J.* 1.171; 2.359; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 3.89, 112.

²⁴³ The traditional understanding of ἀγαπάω endorsed by C. Spicq emphasizes the uniqueness of the term in regard to its frequency and semantic meaning in the LXX and in the NT. See most recently Spicq, "ἀγάπη, *agapē*," *TLNT* 1:10–11. The diachronic study of Robert Joly, *Le vocabulaire chrétien de l'amour, est-il original? Φιλεῖν et Ἀγαπᾶν* (Brussels: Presses universitaires de Bruxelles, 1968), however, argues that the preference for ἀγαπᾶν over φιλεῖν is not a LXX innovation since this phenomenon is generally attested in Hellenistic literature from the fourth century onwards. He explains that ἀγαπᾶν became the standard verb for "to love" because φιλεῖν had acquired the meaning of "to kiss" as part of its semantic range. The change in φιλεῖν was due to the disappearance of the older word κυνέω ("to kiss"), and the disappearance of κυνέω was itself due to its homonymic clash with κύω ("to impregnate"). Both the aorist of κυνέω and κύω share the same form of ἔκυσα (33). Joly notes that ἀγαπᾶν and φιλεῖν typically have the same meaning. Furthermore, J. P. Louw and Eugene Nida, *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament: Based on Semantic Domains* (2 vols.; 2d ed.; New York: UBS, 1989), 1:294, writes, "Though some persons have tried to assign certain significant differences of meaning between ἀγαπάω, ἀγάπη and φιλέω, φιλία ..., it does not seem possible to insist upon a contrast of meaning in any and all contexts.... It would ... be quite wrong to assume that φιλέω and φιλία refer only to human love, while ἀγαπάω and ἀγάπη refer to divine love. Both sets of terms are used for the total range of loving relations between people, between people and God, and between God and Jesus Christ."

The Household

Household motifs and language are strong within the Pauline literature since “the household remains the basic context within which most if not all the local Pauline groups established themselves.”²⁴⁴ The household motif is, however, especially pervasive in Ephesians, containing the second highest percentage of οικ* words within the Pauline corpus.²⁴⁵ Such words include οἰκονομία, κατοικητήριον, κατοικέω, πάροικος, οἰκεῖος, οἰκοδομή, ἐποικοδομέω, and συνοικοδομέω. Furthermore, members of the ἐκκλησία are given familial designations. Believers are adopted as God’s children (υἰοθεσία, 1:5; τέκνα ἀγαπητά, 5:1); believers are called ἀδελφοί (6:21, 23); and believers are members of the household of God (οἰκεῖοι τοῦ θεοῦ) with God presiding as the father (1:2, 3, 17; 2:18; 3:14; 4:6; 5:20; 6:23). Moreover, the household code in Ephesians occupies a major portion of the letter (5:22–6:9) and is the most fully developed among the other NT codes (Col 3:18–4:1; Tit 2:1–10; 1 Pet 2:18–3:7; 1 Tim 2:8–15; 6:1–10). This section examines the Ephesian household motif, suggesting that it is political and serves to promote peace within the ἐκκλησία.

Οἶκος motif in the Hellenistic-Roman world

When we examine the household motif within the larger Hellenistic-Roman world,²⁴⁶ we see that the οἶκος is intimately intertwined with the politics of the πόλις.²⁴⁷ For example,

²⁴⁴ Meeks, *First Urban Christians*, 84. Meek’s conclusion comes after surveying other possible models for the formation of the ἐκκλησία, including voluntary associations, the synagogue, and philosophic or rhetorical schools (75–84).

²⁴⁵ Ephesians contains 5.37 οικ* words per thousand words of text. 1 Timothy has the highest percentage at 6.29.

²⁴⁶ For studies on the household in the Hellenistic-Roman world, see David C. Verner, *The Household of God: The Social World of the Pastoral Epistles* (SBLDS 71; Chico: Scholars Press, 1983), 27–82; D. B.

Aristotle begins his *Politics* with a discussion of the household. Plato considers marriage as a responsibility that a citizen should undertake with the interest of the state in mind.²⁴⁸ Similarly, Epictetus attacks the Epicureans for their opposition to marriage, arguing that the failure to marry and procreate implies a citizen's abdication of his or her civic responsibilities, an action tantamount to political subversion.²⁴⁹ Household affairs were a fundamental part of τὰ πολιτικά ("the things of the polis"). The reason for this tight connection between the household and the politics of society is because

the family is bound up with all the great crises and transitions of life. It is the focus of the most intimate relationships, those in which the personality of man and of woman is most profoundly expressed and most thoroughly tested. It is the primary agent in the molding of the life-habits and the life-attitudes of human beings. It is the center of the most impressive celebrations and rituals, those associated with marriage, with death, and with the initiation of the child into the beliefs and ways of the community. It is the hearth, the home, the place where the generations are brought continuously together, where old and young must learn to make ever changing adjustments to their ever changing roles in the life-cycle.²⁵⁰

Martin, "The Construction of the Ancient Family: Methodological Considerations," *JRS* 86 (1996): 40–60; Carolyn Osiek and David Balch, *Families in the New Testament World* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1997); Suzanne Dixon, *The Roman Family* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); Carolyn Osiek and David Balch, eds., *Early Christian Families in Context* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003)

²⁴⁷ Rowe and Schofield, *Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, 14.

²⁴⁸ Plato, *Leg.* 773 B–C, writes, "Regarding marriage as a whole there shall be one general rule: each man must seek to form such a marriage as shall benefit the State (τὸν γὰρ τῆ πόλει δεῖ συμφέροντα μνηστεύειν γάμον ἕκαστον), rather than such as best pleases himself. There is a natural tendency for everyone to make for the mate that most resembles himself, whence it results that the whole State becomes ill-balanced both in wealth and in moral habits, and because of this, the consequences we least desire are those that generally befall most States."

²⁴⁹ Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.7.19–20: "In the name of God, I ask you, can you imagine an Epicurean State? One man says, 'I do not marry.' 'Neither do I,' says another, 'for people ought not to marry.' No, nor have children; no, nor perform the duties of a citizen... Your doctrines are bad, subversive of the State (ἀνατρεπτικά πόλεως), destructive to the family (λυμαντικά οἴκων), not even fit for women."

²⁵⁰ Robert M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (rev. ed.; New York: Macmillan, 1965), 17–18.

Ancient authors commonly consider the οἶκος to be the fundamental unit of the πόλις.²⁵¹ Aristotle argues that any investigation of the city must start from its beginning (ἐξ ἀρχῆς) and fundamental association—the household. He therefore begins with the union of male and female for the continuance of the species. The addition of a slave to this partnership (κοινωνία) forms a household (οἰκία); the partnership of several households form a village (κώμη); and that of several villages form the city-state (πόλις).²⁵² Each progression is a natural development. Thus, “the city arises out of a feature of our psychology that is neither chosen nor inculcated by habit, but is fixed by our nature—namely our desires to survive, meet our everyday needs, and procreate.”²⁵³ The city results from the natural growth of the household, and “every state is composed of households (πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκιῶν)” (*Pol.* 1.2.1 [1253b]). This perception of the household as a fundamental unit of the city also occurs in later writers. Philo considers the house as “a city compressed into small dimensions” (*Ios.* 38); the Stoic Hierocles remarks that there would be no cities if there were no households (οὔτε γὰρ πόλεις ἂν ἦσαν μὴ ὄντων οἴκων);²⁵⁴ and Cicero considers the household as the “foundation (*principium*) of civil government, the nursery (*seminarium*), as it were of the state.”²⁵⁵

²⁵¹ For Aristotle’s perspective, see D. Brendan Nagle, *The Household as the Foundation of Aristotle’s Polis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

²⁵² Aristotle, *Pol.* 1.1.4–8 (1252A–1252B)

²⁵³ Kraut, *Aristotle: Political Philosophy*, 242.

²⁵⁴ Hierocles, *On Marriage* (Stobaeus 4.22A.21). See also the other section of Hierocles in Stobaeus 4.24A.14: “Our country especially urges us to [have children]. For I dare say that we raise children not so much for ourselves as for our country by planning for the constitution of the state that follows us and supplying the community with our successors” (ET Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation*, 104).

²⁵⁵ Cicero, *Off.* 1.54.

Since the household is the fundamental unit of the state, the hierarchical relationships within the household are similar and analogous to those of the state. Aristotle initially argues that there are fundamental differences in nature between the rule of the statesman and the master of a family. There is not just a difference in the number of people over whom one rules; rather, there is a difference in kind (*Pol.* 1.1.2 [1252a]). Aristotle, however, later acknowledges the analogy between an absolute monarch and the master of a household.²⁵⁶ Philo also explicitly relates a household manager to a statesman. In his treatment of the life of Joseph, he argues,

The future statesman (πολιτικόν) needed first to be trained and practiced in house management (οἰκονομίαν); for a house is a city compressed into small dimensions, and household management may be called a kind of state management (τις πολιτεία), just as a city too is a great house and statesmanship the household management of the general public (πολιτεία δὲ κοινή τις οἰκονομία). All this shows clearly that the household manager is identical with the statesman (τὸν αὐτὸν οἰκονομικόν τε εἶναι καὶ πολιτικόν), how much what is under the purview of the two may differ in number and size.²⁵⁷

The difference between a household manager and a statesman is not one of kind, but of the number of people over whom one rules. Furthermore, Philo considers household management and statesmanship as sister-virtues.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁶ See Aristotle, *Pol.* 3.10.2 (1285B); *Eth. nic.* 1160A31–36; 1160B24–35; [*Oec.*] 1343A1–4. See also Colson’s note in Philo, *Ios.* 38 (Philo [LCL] 6:600): “The idea is combated in Aristotle at the beginning of the *Politics*, but admitted by him of monarchy iii.10.2”.

²⁵⁷ Philo, *Ios.* 38–39. See also *Spec.* 3.170–71: “Organized communities are of two sorts, the greater which we call cities and the smaller which we call households. Both of these have their governors; the government of the greater is assigned to men under the name of statesmanship (πολιτεία), that of the lesser, known as household management (οἰκονομία), to women.”

²⁵⁸ Philo, *Fug.* 36: “Begin, then, by getting some exercise and practice in the business of life both private and public; and when by means of the sister virtues, household-management and statesmanship (καὶ γενόμενοι πολιτικοί τε καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ δι’ ἀδελφῶν ἀρετῶν, οἰκονομικῆς τε καὶ πολιτικῆς), you have become masters in each domain, enter now, as more than qualified to do so, on your migration to a different and more excellent way of life.” See also Erwin R. Goodenough, *The Politics of Philo Judaeus* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), 48–50.

The political valence of the household is further seen when we note how the Ptolemaic kings consider the entire land of Egypt as their personal estate or οἶκος,²⁵⁹ Consequently, the king’s administrators in these districts and administrative units are called οἰκονόμοι.²⁶⁰ As a native of Alexandria, Philo is well aware of this ideology, consistently using the terms ἡ Καίσαρος οἰκία,²⁶¹ ὁ Σεβαστὸς οἶκος,²⁶² ἡ τῶν Πτολεμαίων οἰκία,²⁶³ and ὁ Κλαυδίων οἶκος²⁶⁴ to refer not to the imperial household but to the political administration of the Ptolemaic and Roman imperial kingdoms. This political ideology of the οἶκος was also adopted by Roman writers. For example, Tacitus considers Augustus’s addition of Egypt into the Roman Empire as its subjugation and control under the house of Caesar (*Aegyptum ... domi retinere; Hist. 1.11*).

The language “the house of Caesar” necessarily implies that the Emperor was the acknowledged father figure. This is apparently formalized when the senate bestowed the

²⁵⁹ M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (3 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1941), 2:1309, writes, “The whole of Egypt was the οἶκος of the [Ptolemaic] king, his private household, which he owned in his character of a living god. Parts of this οἶκος he might entrust to the management of priests for the maintenance of the worship of the gods, or might bestow on members of his household—generals or other military officers and men, officials, members of his family, or favorites. But the whole of Egypt remained nevertheless his οἶκος, partly subdivided into smaller and less important οἶκοι.” See also idem, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (2d ed. rev. P. M. Fraser; Oxford: Clarendon, 1957), 1:278, where he notes, “The Ptolemies regarded Egypt as their personal property, acquired by conquest. For them Egypt was their ‘house’ (οἶκος) or personal estate. The natives were a subject population whose task it was to support the ‘house’ of the kings by work and payments.”

²⁶⁰ Martin Hengel, *Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in their Encounter in Palestine during the early Hellenistic Period* (trans. John Bowden; 2 vols.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974), 1:19, writes, “The first man in the state beside the king was the *dioikētēs*.... He bore responsibility for the entire possessions and income of the king, i.e. everything concerned with the finances, the economy and the administration of the state.... Egypt itself had of old been divided into nomes, and these in turn into toparchies. The smallest administrative unit was the village. The most important officials in any district were the military *stratēgos*, the *oikonomos* for administration of finance and commerce, and a series of further functionaries presumably of equal status; under them was a hierarchically ordered host of subordinate officials.”

²⁶¹ Philo, *Flacc.* 35. See also *Phi* 4:22.

²⁶² Philo, *Flacc.* 23, 49.

²⁶³ Philo, *Mos.* 2.30.

²⁶⁴ Philo, *Legat.* 33.

title *pater patriae* (“Father of the Country”) on Caesar Augustus in Feb 5, 2 B.C.E. The *Res Gestae divi Augusti* 35 states,

While I was administering my thirteenth consulship, the senate and the equestrian order and the entire Roman people gave me the title of Father of my Country, and decreed that this title should be inscribed upon the vestibule of my house and in the senate-house and in the Forum Augustum beneath the quadriga erected in my honor by decree of the senate.²⁶⁵

The title of *pater patriae* or *pater* was used by Greek and Latin writers. Dio Cassius notes the significance of the *pater* (πατήρ) title when he writes,

The term “Father” perhaps gives them a certain authority over us all — the authority which fathers once had over their children; yet it did not signify this at first, but betokened honor, and served as an admonition both to them, that they should love their subjects as they would their children, and to their subjects, that they should revere them as they would their fathers. (Dio Cassius, 53.18.3)

The title of *pater* was also bestowed on subsequent emperors.²⁶⁶ After the destructive eruption of Mount Vesuvius, Suetonius describes Titus’s fatherly goodness as follows: “In these many great calamities he showed not merely the concern of an emperor, but even a father’s surpassing love.”²⁶⁷ Similarly, Pliny the Younger considers Trajan “as a fellow-citizen, not a tyrant, one who is our father not our over-lord.”²⁶⁸

Political character of the Ephesian household motif and household code

Given the political valence of the οἶκος in ancient Greco-Roman thought, it appears highly probable that the household language of Ephesians should also be read against a

²⁶⁵ Suetonius, *Aug.* 58, describes the bestowal of this title in detail. See also Strabo, *Geogr.* 6.4.2.

²⁶⁶ See Clifford Ando, *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 398–405.

²⁶⁷ Suetonius, *Tit.* 8.3.

²⁶⁸ Pliny, *Pan.* 2.3.

political backdrop. The presentation of God as father parallels the common perception of the Emperor as the *pater patriae*, and the language of οἰκεῖοι τοῦ θεοῦ (2:19) evokes the political ideology of Ptolemaic and Roman rulers who consider the empire as their household. The political timbre of οἰκεῖοι τοῦ θεοῦ is further accentuated by the presence of συμπολιταί in the same verse. All this is not to say that the household language of Ephesians has its direct source in current political ideology; it probably draws as much from OT usage that considers the household (*bayit*) of God as God's people or Israel (Num 12:7; Jer 12:7; Hos 8:1).²⁶⁹ Rather, a first century reader of Ephesians could easily have linked the household language of Ephesians with the prevailing political motif.

One sees more clearly the political character of the Ephesian household language in the household code. In contrast to 1 Corinthians and Romans which use ἀδελφός language to promote ethical considerations among members of the community,²⁷⁰ Ephesians uses a different set of household language—the social positions within the household. The use of hierarchical relationships that determine power dynamics draws the household code into the political sphere. Scholars have not always acknowledged this dimension. Their research centered on determining the source for the NT household

²⁶⁹ The Targum Onqelos to Num 12:7 paraphrases “my house” (MT) as “my people.” The fusion of political and religious meanings of “house” is also seen in the OT. Although the “house of God” refers to the community of God's people, the OT also follows the ANE practice of considering the “house of X” as the “political dynasty and administration of X.” For example, you have the “house of Saul” (2 Sam 3:1, 6, 8, 10; 9:1–3; 16:5, 8; 19:17), the “house of David” (1 Sam 20:16; 1 Kgs 12:16; 13:2), the “house of Ahab” (2 Kgs 8:18, 27), the “house of Jehu” (Hos 1:4); “house of Jeroboam” (1 Kgs 13:34; 14:10; 15:29; 16:3; 21:22); and the “house of Baasha” (1 Kgs 16:3; 21:22).

²⁷⁰ For example, 1 Cor 8:11 states, “And so by your knowledge this weak man is destroyed, ὁ ἀδελφός for whom Christ died” (RSV). For Paul's use of ἀδελφός or ἀδελφή to structure social

codes,²⁷¹ with some arguing that they are lightly Christianized version of Stoic codes,²⁷² specifically Christian codes,²⁷³ or Hellenistic Jewish codes.²⁷⁴ Recent work, however, shows that the primary sources of influence are discussions regarding household management (περὶ οἰκονομίας) in the Hellenistic world under the influence of Aristotle.²⁷⁵ Along with this general consensus also came the acknowledgement regarding the political character of the codes.

Although one may make the case that the Ephesian household code is political without claiming at the same time that the code has its source in the Hellenistic world, the argument is nevertheless strengthened since *τοιοὶ περὶ οἰκονομίας* are clearly political. Aristotle notes that any examination of civil management must first begin with household management.²⁷⁶ Moreover, ancient literature tightly relates *τοιοὶ περὶ*

relationships, see David G. Horrell, “From ἀδελφοί to οἶκος θεοῦ: Social Transformation in Pauline Christianity,” *JBL* 120 (2001): 293–311.

²⁷¹ For a survey of the literature and bibliography, see David Balch, “Household Codes,” in *Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament* (ed. David E. Aune; SBL S 21; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 25–36.

²⁷² Dibelius and Greeven, *An die Kolosser, Epheser, An Philemon*, 48; Karl Weidinger, *Die Haustafeln, ein Stück unchristlicher Paränese* (UNT 14; Leipzig: J.C. Mohr, 1928).

²⁷³ Karl Heinrich Rengstorff, “Die neutestamentlichen Mahnungen an die Frau, sich dem Manne unterzuordnen,” in *Verbum Dei Manet in Aeternum* (ed. Werner Foerster; Witten: Luther-Verlag, 1953), 131–45.

²⁷⁴ James E. Crouch, *The Origin and Intention of the Colossian Haustafel* (FRLANT 109; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 74–101.

²⁷⁵ Dieter Lührmann, “Neutestamentliche Haustafeln und antike Ökonomie,” *NTS* 27 (1980): 83–97; David L. Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (SBLMS 26; Chico: Scholars Press, 1981); idem, “Household Codes,” 25–50; Klaus Thraede, “Zur historischen Hintergrund der >Haustafeln< des NT,” in *Pietas* (FS for Bernhard Kötting; ed. Ernst Dassman and K. Suso Frank; JAC Ergänzungsband 8; Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1980), 359–68; Verner, *Household of God*, 20, 84–85; Elliott, *Home for the Homeless*, 213–14. For a survey on the art of household management in the Hellenistic period, see Carlo Natali, “*Oikonomia* in Hellenistic Political Thought,” in *Justice and Generosity* (ed. André Laks and Malcolm Schofield; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 95–128.

²⁷⁶ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1.2.1 (1253B) writes, “And now that it is clear what are the component parts of the state, we have first of all to discuss household management (περὶ οἰκονομίας); for every state is composed of households. Household management falls into departments correspond to the parts of which the household in its turn is composed.... The investigation of everything should begin with its smallest parts, and the primary and smallest parts of the household are master and slave, husband and

οικονομίας and περιὶ γάμου with *τοροὶ περιὶ πολιτείας*.²⁷⁷ One such example is seen in Arius Didymus, a friend and philosophical teacher of Augustus Caesar,²⁷⁸ who wrote an *Epitome* of Aristotle's ideas περιὶ τοῦ οἰκονομικοῦ τε καὶ πολιτικοῦ (Stobaeus 2.7.26).²⁷⁹

The political character of the Ephesian household code is accentuated when we note how it is similar to Aristotle's comparison of household hierarchical relationships with those within their larger framework. Although Aristotle compares household relationships to those found in the πόλις,²⁸⁰ Ephesians compares the husband-wife relationship with that found in its larger political unit, the ἐκκλησία,²⁸¹ arguing that a husband's rule and authority over his wife is similar to that of Christ's over the church.²⁸²

The Ephesian household code is also analogous to the Aristotelian code as both compare household relationships to political relationships of authority. Ephesians 5:22–23 argues that the wife should submit to her husband because he is the head of the wife

wife, father and children; we ought therefore to examine the proper constitution and character of each of these three relationships, I mean that of mastership, that of marriage, and thirdly the progenerative relationship.”

²⁷⁷ Friedrich Wilhelm, “Die Oeconomica der Neupythagoreer Bryson, Kallitratidas, Periktione, Phintys,” *RhM* 70 (1915): 163–164, 222, as cited in Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive*, 14.

²⁷⁸ Suetonius, *Aug.* 89.1; Plutarch, *Ant.* 80.1; Dio Cassius, 51.16.4.

²⁷⁹ For a translation of Arius Didymus's *Epitome*, see Balch, “Household Codes,” 41–44.

²⁸⁰ Aristotle, *Pol.* 3.10.2 (1285B): “But a fifth kind of kingship is when a single ruler is sovereign over all matters in the way in which each race and each city is sovereign over its common affairs; this monarchy ranges with the rule of a master of a household, for just as the master's rule is a sort of monarchy in the home, so absolute monarchy is domestic mastership over a city, or over a race or several races (ὡσπερ γὰρ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστίν, οὕτως ἡ βασιλεία πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἐνὸς ἢ πλειόνων οἰκονομία).” See also *Eth. nic.* 8.10.1–2 (1160A31–36) where Aristotle does compare various forms of household relationships with the three forms of constitutions (πολιτείας) of the state—kingship (βασιλεία), aristocracy (ἀριστοκρατία), timocracy (τιμοκρατία). He writes, “One may find likenesses and so to speak models of these various forms of constitution in the household. The relationship of father to sons is regal in type, since a father's first care is for his children's welfare.... The relation of master to slaves is also tyrannic, since in it the master's interest is aimed at.... The relation of husband to wife seems to be in the nature of an aristocracy: the husband rules in virtue of fitness, and in matters that belong to a man's sphere” (*Eth. nic.* 8.10.4–5 [1160B24–35]).

²⁸¹ Contra Hoehner, *Ephesians*, 724; and O'Brien, *Ephesians*, 406, who argue that the NT does not compare the household with a political entity.

in much the same way that Christ is the head (κεφαλή) and savior (σωτήρ) of the church. The relationship of Christ over the church is political in character. Although κεφαλή can imply “source” (4:16; Col 2:19), it also denotes political rule and authority over an entity (Eph 1:22). For example, Plutarch uses “head of the people” as a metaphor for a political leader instigating a revolt against Cicero.²⁸³ Moreover, Seneca compares Nero to the head from whom the good health of the body, the empire, depends.²⁸⁴ The meaning of κεφαλή as source is unlikely in Eph 5:23 since it is difficult to understand how the husband can be the source of his wife, given the lack of any indication of an Adam-Eve motif.²⁸⁵ Furthermore, since the next verse 5:24 specifically notes that ἡ ἐκκλησία ὑποτάσσεται τῷ Χριστῷ, κεφαλή here probably means “rule” and “authority over.”

The noun σωτήρ also has political connotations. Although the LXX uses it to denote Yahweh as the deliverer of Israel, σωτήρ was also applied to Roman generals and

²⁸² Ephesians differs from the other NT household codes in this regard.

²⁸³ Plutarch, *Cic.* 14.6–7: “Catiline, thinking that there were many in the senate who were desirous of a revolution, and at the same time making a display of himself to the conspirators, gave Cicero the answer of a madman: ‘What dreadful thing, pray,’ said he, ‘am I doing, if, when there are two bodies, one lean and wasted, but with a head, and the other headless, but strong and large, I myself become a head for this?’ Since this riddle of Catiline’s referred to the senate and the people, Cicero was all the more alarmed.”

²⁸⁴ Seneca, *Clem.* 2.2.1: “We are pleased to hope and trust, Caesar, that in large measure this will happen. That kindness of your heart will be recounted, will be diffused little by little throughout the whole body of the empire (*per omne imperii corpus*), and all things will be molded into your likeness. It is from the head that comes the health of the body (*a capite bona valetudo*).” See also *Clem.* 1.5.1 where Seneca considers “[Nero] the soul of the state and the state [his] body”; Philo, *Mos.* 2.30: “As the head takes the highest place (or ruling place, τὸ ἡγεμονεῦον) in the living body, so he [Ptolemy] may be said to head the kings”; Plutarch, *Galb.* 4.3: “Vindex ... wrote to Galba inviting him to assume the imperial power, and thus to serve what was a vigorous body in need of a head”; Polyaeus, 3.9.22: “Iphicrates used to resemble an army marshaled for action to the human body. The phalanx he called the breast, the light-armed troops the hands, the cavalry the feet, and the general the head. If any of the inferior parts were wanting, the army he said was defective; but if it wanted a general, it wanted every thing.” For other Greek references, see Wayne Grudem, “Does ΚΕΦΑΛΗ (‘Head’) mean ‘Source’ or ‘Authority Over’ in Greek Literature? A Survey of 2,336 Examples,” *TrinJ* 6 (1985): 38–59; idem, “The Meaning of Κεφαλή (‘Head’): A Response to Recent Studies,” *TrinJ* 11 (1990): 3–72.

emperors throughout the first century.²⁸⁶ Inscriptions proclaim Julius Caesar as the σωτήρα καὶ εὐεργέτην of the citizens of Athens (SIG 759), and Vespasian as the σωτήρα καὶ εὐεργέτην τοῦ κόσμου (CIG 4271). Josephus notes that, during the Jewish war, the citizens of Tiberias acclaimed Vespasian as σωτήρα καὶ εὐεργέτην (B.J. 3.459). On Vespasian's return to Rome, the people enthusiastically greeted him, hailing him as their "benefactor," "savior," and "only worthy emperor of Rome" (B.J. 7.71). The use of αὐτὸς σωτήρ τοῦ σώματος (Eph 5:23) reinforces and supports the reason why Christ is the κεφαλή τῆς ἐκκλησίας; Christ has ultimate authority over the church since he is the one who died to redeem her, a body politic (σῶμα), from death (2:1–22; 5:2). It is unlikely that 5:23 suggests that the husband is also the σωτήρ of the wife.²⁸⁷ The text only notes that the husband's hierarchical authority over the wife is analogous to Christ's authority over the church, an authority depicted by the politically suggestive terms of κεφαλή and σωτήρ of a political σῶμα.

Function of the household codes in Ephesians

The function of the NT household codes has been greatly debated. Is it a reaction to emancipation tendencies on the part of women and slaves who appealed to Gal 3:28?²⁸⁸ Is

²⁸⁵ Contra S. Bedale, "The Meaning of κεφαλή in the Pauline Epistles," *JTS* 5 (1954): 211–16, who argues that "source" is the meaning in 5:23.

²⁸⁶ Dominique Cuss, *Imperial Cult and Honorary Terms in the New Testament* (Fribourg: University Press, 1974), 63–71. Adolf Deismann, *Light from the Ancient Near East* (New York: Doran, 1927), 364, remarks that "the full title of honor, 'Savior of the world', ... was bestowed with sundry variations in the Greek expression on Julius Caesar, Augustus, Claudius, Vespasian, Titus, Trajan, Hadrian, and other Emperors in inscriptions of the Hellenistic East."

²⁸⁷ Contra Werner Foerster, "σωτήρ," *TDNT* 7:1016; Margaret Y. MacDonald, *Colossians and Ephesians* (SP; Colledgeville: Liturgical, 2000), 327.

²⁸⁸ David Schroeder, "Die Haustafeln des Neuen Testaments: Ihre Herkunft und ihr theologischer Sinn" (Doctoral diss., Hamburg, 1959), 89–91. Similarly, Crouch, *Origin and Intention of the Colossian*

it an ethic encouraging Christians to acculturate to Roman society, thereby functioning as an apologetic to silence Roman slanders against Christians?²⁸⁹ Is it an instrument to promote and maintain “internal sectarian cohesion and external social contrast”?²⁹⁰ The Ephesian household code is probably not an apologetic since the letter is addressed to insiders rather than outsiders. Furthermore, there is no indication that Ephesians is interested in dialogue with outsiders. The injunction to walk worthily in Eph 5:15–16 lacks the phrase πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω found in the parallel passage in Col 4:5. At the same time, the lack of information regarding the social setting of the letter cautions that taking the code as a reaction against emancipation tendencies must remain speculative.

An examination of the Ephesian household codes must examine the setting and function of the household management *topos* prior to its incorporation, as well as its adaptation and function within the general argument of the letter. *Τοιοὶ περὶ οἰκονομίας* were commonly employed to advocate conformity to social norms so that peace and stability prevailed within the state. Plato, in discussions concerning the justice of the state, remarks that each person must perform the social duty for which his or her nature is best suited. To do one’s own business and not be a busybody is justice (*δικαιοσύνη*; *Resp.* 433A). Furthermore, if everyone does his own task, the excellence of the state will be achieved (*πρὸς ἀρετὴν πόλεως*; *Resp.* 433C–D). Men are imbued with reason, but women

Haustafel, 141, argues that the household code in Colossians is an attempt by Paul to curb the “excesses created by an overemphasis on the equality created by the Spirit.”

²⁸⁹ So Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive*, 81–116, 119, concerning the household codes in 1 Peter.

²⁹⁰ Elliott, *Home for the Homeless*, 231. Elliott’s proposal on the household codes in 1 Peter is a critique of Balch’s argument. For further exchanges between Elliott and Balch, see John H. Elliott, “1 Peter, its Situation and Strategy: A Discussion with David Balch,” and David Balch,

and slaves are plagued with sundry appetites and pleasures and pains. Thus, women, children, and slaves must be ruled just as the appetites of a man are ruled by reason and right opinion (*Resp.* 431B).²⁹¹ Submission in accord with rule by reason leads to friendship and concord (*Resp.* 442D); lack of submission in these particular relationships spills over into others, ultimately resulting in the collapse of the state as people disregard laws and lose all respect for oaths, pledges, and divinities (*Leg.* 701A-B).

Aristotle considers adherence to the household codes as a fundamental necessity for the stability of the state. Women, children, and slaves, should be ruled because they lack or possess an undeveloped form of rationality (*Pol.* 1260A). If these hierarchical relationships are overturned, destruction befalls the state as was the case in Sparta when the supposed rulers were instead ruled by women (*Pol.* 1269B-1270A). In the first century C.E., Dionysius of Halicarnassus acknowledges the

general principle that every State (πόλις), since it consists of many families (οἴκων), is most likely to enjoy tranquility when the lives of the individual citizens are untroubled, and to have a very tempestuous time when the private affairs of the citizens are in a bad way, and that every prudent statesman, whether he be a lawgiver or a king, ought to introduce such laws as will make the citizens just and temperate in their lives.²⁹²

Such laws, as constituted by Romulus, urge the subordination of women to their husbands (*Ant. rom.* 2.24.3-2.26.1),²⁹³ the duty of children to parents (2.26.1- 2.27.4), and

“Hellenization/Acculturation in 1 Peter,” in *Perspectives on First Peter* (ed. Charles H. Talbert; NABPR Special Studies Series 9; Macon: Mercer University Press, 1986), 61–78, 79–101.

²⁹¹ Plato also argues that just as each person has superior and inferior parts, so also the state and the household (*Leg.* 627A). The details of these hierarchical relationships are outlined in *Leg.* 689E-690C.

²⁹² Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 2.24.2.

²⁹³ See especially *Ant. rom.* 2.26.1: “These, then, are the excellent laws which Romulus enacted concerning women, by which he rendered them more observant of propriety in relation to their husbands.”

the regulation of the type of work for slaves and free men (2.28).²⁹⁴ This sentiment was also shared by the Neopythagoreans. Callicratidas compared the city with a house and advocated the subordination of wives, children, and slaves.²⁹⁵ Similarly, Ocellus Lucanus argued that since families are parts of cities, the “concordant (συναρμογή) condition of families greatly contributes to the well or ill establishment of a polity.”²⁹⁶

Given our assumption that the Ephesian household code has its source in Hellenistic *τοpoi περὶ οἰκονομίας*, coupled with our understanding that the ἐκκλησία is the political analogue of the πόλις, I argue that the Ephesian household code emphasizes the authority of the *pater familias*, promoting stability within the ἐκκλησία and reinforcing the overall theme of peace and unity in Ephesians. The three set of hierarchical relationships in Ephesians follow that found in Aristotle: the master and slave, the husband and wife, and the father and child. Furthermore, Ephesians follows the Aristotelian mould in outlining one social class as the ruling body within each of the three sets of relationships: wives are to submit (ὑποτάσσω) to their own husbands (5:22), children are to obey (ὑπακούω) their parents (6:1), and slaves are to obey (ὑπακούω) their earthly masters (6:5). The Ephesian instruction on the household codes is fairly limited. It does not deal with sexual relations between masters and slaves, relations

²⁹⁴ See also *Ant. rom.* 7.66.5 where he likens Roman rule to a well-governed family (ἐν οἰκίᾳ σώφρονι).

²⁹⁵ Callicratidas, *De dom. felic.* (Thesleff, *Pythagorean Texts*, 105.23-24; ET Fideler, *Pythagorean Sourcebook*, 236): “A family (οἶκος) and a city stand in relation analogous (ἀναλογίαν) to the government of the world.” See the same work (Thesleff, *Pythagorean Texts*, 105.8-9; 106.1-10) for advice concerning the subordination of various members of the household.

²⁹⁶ Ocellus Lucanus, *De univ. nat.* (Thesleff, *Pythagorean Texts*, 137.4-5; ET Fideler, *Pythagorean Sourcebook*, 210).

between siblings, or other problems commonly encountered in the household.²⁹⁷ Rather, it emphasizes the establishment of hierarchical relationships that promote the stability of the household and ultimately the ἐκκλησία. Furthermore, since the code is socially conservative, it allows believers to be perceived by outsiders as politically harmless elements of the status quo, ensuring non-interference from external political forces and maintaining the viability of the community. But although Ephesians adopts the basic ethical perspective of the Hellenistic household codes, it nevertheless adapts it in conformity with its own worldview.

The schema of the household codes in Ephesians is unparalleled in Hellenistic literature and comprises the elements of address, imperative, amplification, and reason.²⁹⁸ They are laid out as follows:

²⁹⁷ See Ps.-Phoc. 175–227 for the range of issues that a household code may address.

²⁹⁸ See Verner, *Household of God*, 86–91.

Table 3-1. Elements of the Ephesian Household Code

<i>Passage</i>	<i>Address</i>	<i>Imperative</i>	<i>Amplification</i>	<i>Reason</i>
5:22–24	αἱ γυναῖκες	[ὑποτάσσεσθε] τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνδράσιν	ὡς τῷ κυρίῳ	ὅτι ἀνὴρ ἐστὶν κεφαλὴ τῆς γυναικὸς ὡς καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς κεφαλὴ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, αὐτὸς σωτὴρ τοῦ σώματος
5:25–33	οἱ ἄνδρες	ἀγαπᾶτε τὰς γυναῖκας	ὡς τὰ ἑαυτῶν σώματα	ὁ Χριστὸς ἠγάπησεν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ ἑαυτὸν παρέδωκεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς
6:1–3	τὰ τέκνα	ὑπακούετε τοῖς γονεῦσιν ὑμῶν; τίμα τὸν πατέρα σου καὶ τὴν μητέρα	ἐν κυρίῳ	τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν δίκαιον; ἵνα εὖ σοι γένηται καὶ ἔση μακροχρόνιος ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς
6:4	οἱ πατέρες	μὴ παροργίζετε τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν	ἀλλὰ ἐκτρέφετε αὐτὰ ἐν παιδείᾳ καὶ νουθεσίᾳ κυρίου	
6:5–8	οἱ δοῦλοι	ὑπακούετε τοῖς κατὰ σάρκα κυρίοις	ὡς τῷ Χριστῷ; ὡς δοῦλοι Χριστοῦ	ἕκαστος ἐάν τι ποιήσῃ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο κομίζεται παρὰ κυρίου
6:9	οἱ κύριοι	τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖτε πρὸς αὐτούς	ἀνιέντες τὴν ἀπειλήν	αὐτῶν καὶ ὑμῶν ὁ κύριος ἐστὶν ἐν οὐρανοῖς καὶ προσωποληψία οὐκ ἔστιν παρ' αὐτῷ

The most radical difference between Ephesians and the Hellenistic household codes is the transformation of relationships in Christ. Wives are to submit ὡς τῷ κυρίῳ; children are to obey ἐν κυρίῳ; slaves are to obey ὡς τῷ Χριστῷ. Husbands are to love as Christ loved the church, and masters are to remember that they have yet another master in heaven. This reconfiguration brings the cosmic rule of Christ (1:22) to bear on the household, acknowledging God in Christ as the true *pater familias* (2:19). All members of the household are subordinate to Christ; all are therefore equally addressed within the

codes, not only those in supposed positions of authority. The codes address wives, children, and slaves equally with the husbands, fathers, and masters, reminding each of them that they are ethically responsible partners who are called to exercise their roles and do what is just (δίκαιον; 6:1) as to the Lord. By bringing Christ's rule into the household, Ephesians reminds us that household unity is a demonstration of church unity, and church unity is a demonstration of ultimate cosmic unity (3:10).

The reconfiguration of household relationships in Christ further suggests that the code is addressed to wholly Christian households. Unlike 1 Peter, Ephesians does not give advice to wives who have non-Christian husbands (1 Pet 3:1). Implicit within the code is a tacit endorsement of endogamous marriages.²⁹⁹ Although Ephesians does not require community members to obtain prior approval from church leaders before they marry (as in *Ign. Pol.* 5:1-2), the code does suggest that they should marry within the community of believers. Such endogamous marriages insulate the fundamental unit of the community from external influences, thereby strengthening its overall cohesion.

The Ephesian household code ensures communal stability by providing a template of how different members of the community are to relate to one another. Unlike Colossians, the household code in Ephesians is not abruptly inserted into the flow of the text, but is grammatically and thematically tied to its surrounding context. The lack of ὑποτάσσεσθε in 5:22 suggests that the submission motif must be supplied from 5:21 (ὑποτασσόμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἐν φόβῳ Χριστοῦ). Ephesians 5:21 is, however, not directly

²⁹⁹ Margaret Y. MacDonald, "The Ideal of the Christian Couple: *Ign. Pol.* 5:1-2 Looking Back to Paul," *NTS* 40 (1994): 105-25.

part of the household code since ὑποτασσόμενοι is structurally parallel to λαλοῦντες and εὐχαριστοῦντες (5:19–20), and dependent on πληροῦσθε ἐν πνεύματι (5:18). Rather, 5:21 links the code with the prior section and asserts that fulfilling the household mandate is evidence of being filled with the Spirit. Ultimately, the household code forms a subset of the ethical identity of the community, an ethical identity that exhorts its members to walk in a manner worthily of the Lord (4:1), in contrast to the surrounding Gentile ethic (4:17–5:20, esp. 4:17).

War and Politics

War (πόλεμος) is a quintessential Greek political activity,³⁰⁰ dealing directly with issues of power, authority, economics, land, and influence. Plato notes that the art of war (πολεμική) is a fundamental aspect of political art (πολιτική τέχνη),³⁰¹ and military preparation and organization is the topic of many laws.³⁰² The Pythagorean Diotogenes remarks that leading an army for war is a necessary task of a king.³⁰³ Dio Chrysostom asserts that philosophers and orators who aspire to legislate the state must be ready to debate the merits of peace and war.³⁰⁴

³⁰⁰ Rowe and Schofield, *Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, 13.

³⁰¹ Plato, *Prot.* 322B.

³⁰² Plato, *Leg.* 942A-B: “Military organization (στρατιῶν) is the subject of much consultation (συμβουλίη) and of many appropriate laws (πολλοὶ νόμοι).” Plato goes on to lay down stringent rules for military training, meting out penalties for cowardice or desertion, and lavishing honors for bravery and valor.

³⁰³ Diotogenes, *Concerning a Kingdom*, writes, “There are however 3 peculiar employments of a king: leading an army, He will be able to lead an army properly only if he knows how to carry on war (πολεμὲν) properly” (Stobaeus 4.7.61.7–10; Thesleff, *Pythagorean Texts*, 71.23–72.1; ET Fideler, *Pythagorean Sourcebook*, 222).

³⁰⁴ Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 22.3.

In order to obtain a better appreciation of ancient political thinking toward war, it may be helpful to contrast war (πόλεμος) and civil discord (στάσις). The conflict that any social or political order faces can be divided into two categories: external and internal. War is the conflict against outsiders, but civil discord is hostility between those who belong together.³⁰⁵ Although the general stance toward στάσις is decidedly negative, the attitude toward πόλεμος is more positive. Many consider external war to be far better than civil strife since internal conflict is harder to detect and harder to heal.³⁰⁶ Furthermore, although στάσις does not appear to have any redeeming value since destruction falls on both the conqueror and the conquered,³⁰⁷ political thinkers provide various justifications for war. War is legitimate in cases of defense, retaliation, revenge,³⁰⁸

³⁰⁵ Plato, *Resp.* 470B: “In my opinion, just as we have the two terms, war and faction (πόλεμός τε καὶ στάσις), so there are also two things, distinguished by two differentiae. The two things I mean are the friendly and kindred on the one hand and the alien and foreign on the other. Now the term employed for the hostility of the friendly is faction (στάσις), and for that of the alien is war (πόλεμος).” See also *Resp.* 470C–D.

³⁰⁶ For example, Herodotus writes, “Civil strife (στάσις ἔμφυλος) is as much worse than united war (πολέμου ὁμοφρονέοντος) as war is worse than peace” (8.3). Similarly, Aristides, *Or.* 23.55 states, “Actually where there is faction, there is also war against ourselves; but where there is proper war, the danger is both simple and easier.” See also *Or.* 24.19. Polybius remarks about a mutiny in the Roman army as follows: “When a sedition broke out among some of the soldiers in the Roman camp, Scipio, though he had by this time gained considerable practical experience, never found himself in such difficulty and perplexity. And this was only to be expected. For just as in the case of our bodies external causes of injury, such as cold, extreme heat, fatigue, and wounds, can be guarded against before they happen and easily remedied when they do happen, but growths and abscesses which originate in the body itself can with difficulty be foreseen and with difficulty be cured when they happen, we should assume the same to be true of a state or an army. As for plots and wars from outside, it is easy, if we are on the watch, to prepare to meet them and to find a remedy, but in the case of intestine opposition, sedition, and disturbance it is a difficult task to hit on a remedy, a task requiring great adroitness and exceptional sagacity” (11.25).

³⁰⁷ The pre-Socratic Democritus, *Frag.* 249, notes, “Civil war is harmful to both parties, for both to the conquerors and the conquered, the destruction is the same (στάσις ἐμφύλιος ἐς ἑκάτερα κακόν· καὶ γὰρ νικέουσι καὶ ἡσσωμένοις, ὁμοίη φθορή).” Greek text is from Stobaeus 4.1.34; or Diels and Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 2:195; ET Kathleen Freeman, trans., *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 114.

³⁰⁸ Cicero, *Resp.* 3.23.34–35.

or to exercise authority over those who deserve to be slaves.³⁰⁹ War must also ultimately be for the sake of peace.³¹⁰

Although ancient politicians advocate war against hostile forces in order to secure peace from external threats, they also recognize that war with an external enemy fosters internal peace, unity, and cohesion within the state. In essence, πόλεμος curtails στάσις, and ὁμόνοια is best maintained when a state confronts a common enemy. It is therefore an ancient political *topos* that conflict with an external enemy compels the members of the state to lay aside their differences, channeling their mutual rivalries toward the common foe. For example, Isocrates urges the Greek states to establish concord, putting aside their mutual strife so as to turn in one united force against the Persians. Instead of battling one another, they must take the war from the Hellenes to Asia; instead of grasping for wealth and power from the other states, they must wrest it from the Persians.³¹¹ Polybius recognizes the galvanizing force a common danger from abroad

³⁰⁹ Aristotle, *Pol.* 7.13.14 (1333B-1334A): “The proper object of practicing military training is not in order that men may enslave those who do not deserve slavery, but in order that first they may themselves avoid becoming enslaved to others; then so that they may seek suzerainty for the benefit of the subject people, but not for the sake of world-wide despotism; and thirdly to hold despotic power over those who deserve to be slaves.”

³¹⁰ Aristotle, *Pol.* 7.13.8 (1333A35): “War must be for the sake of peace.” See also Cicero, *Off.* 1.11.35 (“The only excuse, therefore, for going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed”); 1.23.80.

³¹¹ Isocrates, *Paneg.* 173–74: “We must clear from our path these treacherous designs and pursue that course of action which will enable us to dwell in our several cities with greater security and to feel greater confidence in each other. What I have to say on these points is simple and easy: It is not possible for us to cement an enduring peace unless we join together in a war against the barbarians, nor for the Hellenes to attain to concord until we wrest our material advantages from one and the same source and wage our wars against one and the same enemy. When these conditions have been realized, and when we have been freed from the poverty which afflicts our lives—a thing that breaks up friendships, perverts the affections of kindred into enmity, and plunges the whole world into war and strife—then surely we shall enjoy a spirit of concord, and the good will which we shall feel towards each other will be genuine. For all these reasons, we must make it our paramount duty to transfer the war with all speed from our boundaries to the continent, since the only benefit which we can reap from the wars which we have

brings to bear on a formerly divided community;³¹² Sallust remarks that a common fear preserves the good morals of a state and drives out strife among the citizens;³¹³ and Dionysius of Halicarnassus notes that external war banishes all sedition and reconciles all differences.³¹⁴ The harmonizing benefits of a common external enemy is so great that some politicians “regarded it as an answer to prayer if a foreign war arose; and when their enemies were quiet, they themselves contrived grievances and excuses for wars.”³¹⁵

Warfare in Ephesians

Greco-Roman writers understand war to be a paramount political activity, possessing implications for peace within and outside the city-state. I argue that such considerations are also at play in Ephesians. In this section, I examine the martial imagery of Ephesians, arguing that it affirms the political character of Ephesians and supports the letter’s concern for cosmic and ecclesial peace.

waged against each other is by resolving that the experience which we have gained from them shall be employed against the barbarians.”

³¹² Polybius, 6.18.2–3: “For whenever the menace of some common danger from abroad compels them to act in concord and support each other, so great does the strength of the state become, that nothing which is requisite can be neglected, as all are zealously competing in devising means of meeting the need of the hour, nor can any decision arrived at fail to be executed promptly, as all are co-operating both in public and in private to the accomplishment of the task they have set themselves.”

³¹³ Sallust, *Bell. Jug.* 41.1–5: “There was no strife among the citizens either for glory or for power; fear of the enemy preserved the good morals of the state. But when the minds of the people were relieved of that dread, wantonness and arrogance naturally arose, vices which are fostered by prosperity. Thus the peace for which they had longed in time of adversity, after they had gained it proved to be more cruel and bitter than adversity itself.”

³¹⁴ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 8.26.2: “The Romans, as you yourself know, have a numerous body of youth of their own nation, whom, if the sedition (τὸ σασιάζον) is once banished from among them—and banished it will now inevitably be by this war, since a common fear is wont to reconcile all differences—surely not the Volscians, nay, no other Italian nation either, will ever overcome.” See also *Ant. rom.* 8.82.3.

³¹⁵ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 10.33.2.

Ephesians has strong martial imagery. Apart from 4:8, which presents Christ as a triumphant warrior who takes captive the spiritual forces of darkness (ἠχμαλώτευσεν αἰχμαλωσίαν), the military motif is primarily located in 6:10–20. Here, Ephesians employs OT allusions to depict Yahweh as a conquering warrior; uses the military term ἀντίστημι to describe the posture of believers in battle;³¹⁶ and exhorts believers to put on the complete set of metaphorical armor (πανοπλία), the full range of equipment used by heavily armed foot soldiers. The call to arms is moreover reminiscent of speeches delivered by generals before battles.³¹⁷ Among the topics dealt with in these speeches include the call to patriotism and valor; a comparison with enemy forces and the recognition that bravery, not numbers, ultimately prevails; praise for the commander as one superior to that of the enemy; the recognition of the gods as their allies; and the acknowledgement that they have conquered the enemy before.³¹⁸ Ephesians too emphasizes the need for valor with its exhortation to be strong and alert, and it mentions the schemes (μεθοδεΐα)³¹⁹ and strengths of the enemy and provides strategies to counter them. It assures its readers that they can be confident of victory since their enemy is a defeated foe (1:21–22; 4:8); and it points out that not only do they have God as their ally, they also have his full armor at their disposal.³²⁰ Unlike the rhetorical flourishes and

³¹⁶ LSJ defines ἀντίστημι as “set against, ...; esp. in battle, ...”

³¹⁷ Examples include speeches given by Hannibal and Scipio in Polybius, 3.63–64; Alexander in Arrian, *Anab.* 2.7; 5.25–26; Cyrus in Xenophon, *Cyr.* 6.4.12–20; Fabius in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 9.9; Caesar in Dio Cassius, 38.36–46.

³¹⁸ For a brief survey of such battle speeches, see Theodore C. Burgess, “Epidictic Literature,” *Studies in Classical Philology* 3 (1902): 209–14.

³¹⁹ The word μεθοδεΐα is not common, but the cognate μέθοδος is used in 2 Macc 13:18 to depict a military stratagem.

³²⁰ The genitive in τὴν πανοπλίαν τοῦ θεοῦ is a genitive of origin (“the armor that God supplies”).

excesses of some Greco-Roman battle speeches,³²¹ Ephesians is restrained, eliciting a confident stance in a measured tone.

The use of πάλη (“wrestling”), instead of πόλεμος or μάχη (“battle, combat”), to describe the conflict between believers and the dark spiritual forces in no way diminishes the overall martial tenor of 6:10–20. The word is used in classical Greek for battles,³²² and other athletic terms such as ἀγών are often used by Greek authors to describe military conflicts.³²³ Furthermore, Ephesians’s juxtaposition of wrestling and armor motifs finds expression in ὀπλιτοπάλας—a mighty soldier, fully armored and adept at wrestling. Plutarch uses the term to describe the formidable soldiers who defeated the Spartans at the battle of Leuctra,³²⁴ and he even considers Alexander the Great as a “weighty wrestler-at-arms (βριθὺς ὀπλιτοπάλας), terrible to his rivals.”³²⁵

Martial imagery and politics

The martial imagery in Ephesians is not unique. Other Greco-Roman thinkers, for example, describe the life of a philosopher as a battle.³²⁶ Seneca’s dictum “Life ... is really

³²¹ Plutarch, *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 6.7 (Mor. 803B), recognizes the excessive character of some of them. He writes, “But as for the rhetorical efforts and grand periods of Ephorus, Theopompus, and Anaximenes, which they deliver after they have armed and drawn up the armies, it can be said of them: ‘None talks so foolishly when near the steel.’”

³²² Aeschylus, *Cho.* 866; Euripides, *Heracl.* 159.

³²³ Thucydides, 2.89.8, 10; 2 Macc 10:28; 14:18; 15:9. Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 2.5.2 (Mor. 639D), comments, “All these sports [i.e., boxing, wrestling, and racing] seemed to me to mimic warfare and to train for battle; ... military fitness is the aim of athletics and competition.”

³²⁴ Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 2.5.2 (Mor. 639F–640A).

³²⁵ Plutarch, *Alex. fort.* 2 (Mor. 334D). This translation is from Michael E. Gudorf, “The Use of ΠΑΛΗ in Ephesians 6:12,” *JBL* 117 (1998): 333.

³²⁶ See James Moffatt, “War,” *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church* 2:657–60; Johannes Leipoldt, “Das Bild vom Kriege in der griechischen Welt,” in *Gott und die Götter: Festgabe für Erich Fascher zum 60. Geburtstag* (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1958), 16–18; Hilarius Emonds, “Geistlicher Kriegsdienst der Topos der Militia Spiritualis in der antiken Philosophie,” in Adolf Harnack, *Militia Christi* (repr. ed.;

a battle (*vivere militare est*)”³²⁷ is noteworthy. Lucian similarly notes, “I am a soldier ..., fighting against pleasures, no conscript but a volunteer, purposing to make life clean.”³²⁸ Epictetus, like Plato before him,³²⁹ compares the life of a philosopher to that of a soldier under God’s command. He writes in book three of the *Discourses*:

Do you not know that the business of life is a campaign (στρατεία)? One man must mount guard, another go out on reconnaissance, and another out to fight (3.24.31).... Each man’s life is a kind of campaign (στρατεία), and a long and complicated one at that. You have to maintain the character of a soldier, and do each separate act at the bidding of the General, if possible divining what He wishes (3.24.34–35).... The good and excellent man, bearing in mind who he is, and when he has come, and by whom he was created, centers his attention on this and this only, how he may fill his place in an orderly fashion, and with due obedience to God (3.24.95).... Men who are engaged in the greatest of contests (ἀγών) ought not to flinch, but to take also the blows; for the contest (ἀγών) before us is not in wrestling or the pancratium ... but it is a contest (ἀγών) for good fortune and happiness itself (3.25.3).³³⁰

The presence of martial imagery by itself does not demonstrate the political character of the subject material. What makes Ephesians political, in distinction to the depictions of Seneca or Epictetus, is the communal dynamics and epic scope of its martial imagery. The conflict in Ephesians does not impinge only upon the solitary individual; it impacts the entire community, and every member is to be ready for battle.³³¹ Moreover, in contrast to the Stoic emphasis on self-reliance, Ephesians emphasizes the need for

Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), 133–62; A. J. Malherbe, “Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War,” *HTR* 76 (1983): 148.

³²⁷ Seneca, *Ep.* 96.5.

³²⁸ Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 8.

³²⁹ Plato, *Apol.* 28D–29A; *Phaed.* 62D.

³³⁰ Note that ἀγών can also be rendered as “battle.” Athletic and military metaphors mingle in the ἀγών tradition since athletic training was primarily for military purposes. See Victor C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature* (NovTSup 16; Leiden: Brill, 1967), 9, 12, 16, 42–43, 69, 71, 73.

³³¹ In this regard, Ephesians’s martial imagery is similar to the Qumran documents such as 1QM.

mutual cooperation and interdependence. The Stoic philosopher relies on his own strength. Surrounding himself with only reason and philosophy, the Stoic philosopher stands self-sufficient behind an invincible fortress. Seneca writes, “Gird yourself about with philosophy, an impregnable wall. Though it be assaulted by many engines, Fortune can find no passage into it. The soul stands on unassailable ground, if it has abandoned external things; it is independent in its own fortress, and every weapon that is hurled falls short of the mark.”³³² In contrast, not only do believers in Ephesians have to rely on the Lord for strength (ἐνδυναμοῦσθε ἐν κυρίῳ; 6:10), they are also to pray with all prayer and petition at all times for one another (περὶ πάντων τῶν ἀγίων; 6:18). Interdependence, not independence, is the slogan for the Ephesian community. The call for each individual to “put on” (ἐνδύσασθε) the full armor of God (6:11) should also be understood in communal categories. The “put on” language parallels and strengthens the earlier exhortation to “put on” (ἐνδύσασθαι) the new humanity created according to the likeness of God (4:24), the corporate ethos and identity of the new community comprising Jews and Gentiles.

Finally, the martial imagery in Ephesians is also political as the depicted enemies are persons rather than metaphorical elements, or what Seneca calls the vicissitudes of fate or the passions. Regardless of whether we agree with Bultmann that the

³³² Seneca, *Ep.* 82.5. See also Seneca, *Ira.* 1.17.2: “Nature has given to us an adequate equipment in reason; we need no other implements. This is the weapon she has bestowed; it is strong, enduring, obedient, not double-edged or capable of being turned against its owner.” For a brief comparison between Paul’s and Seneca’s use of military imagery, see J. N. Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca* (Leiden: Brill, 1961), 160–64.

supernatural worldview is a meaningless descriptor for the modern scientific world,³³³ Paul perceives the conflict to be a genuine conflict against real beings with specific agendas, strategies, and organizational structures.³³⁴ The conflict may take the form of a tangible struggle against devious humans (false teachers; 4:14; 5:6) or an intangible struggle against greed or vice. These are, however, only the outward manifestations of the ultimate conflict between two armies, an army of believers under the headship of Christ and an army of malevolent entities under the leadership of the devil (4:27; 5:16; 6:11–12), locked in a conflict of global and cosmic proportions, a conflict fraught with political implications. Issues at stake here include spheres of power (1:20–22), influence (4:27), authority, and allegiance (2:2).

War and peace

More pertinent to my study is the relationship between war and peace in Ephesians. Although the call to arms may at first glance seem incongruous to the overall tenor of peace in Ephesians, the advocacy and justification for war is similar to that found in Greco-Roman literature: for the sake of peace; more specifically, for the sake of the peace and unity of the church.

³³³ See Rudolf Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in *Kerygma and Myth* (London: SPCK, 1972), 1–43.

³³⁴ So Ernst Käsemann, “Eschatological Royal Reign of God,” in *Your kingdom Come: Mission Perspectives; Report on the World Conference on Mission and Evangelism, Melbourne, Australia, 12–25 May, 1980* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, Commission on World Mission and Evangelism, 1980), 65, who comments, “We may criticize and demythologize the language and ideas of an antique worldview as out of date. We must indeed do so, since only in this way can we have a true perception of the reality of our contemporary life and present world. But this reality does not abrogate the experiences of the first Christians; it heightens them rather.”

The battle in Ephesians is a battle for peace, both external and internal to the church. Externally, the battle is for cosmic and universal peace; internally, the battle concerns the unity of the church. The call to battle in Ephesians is not a jingoistic trumpet to rape, pillage, and plunder, but a rousing challenge to protect, maintain, and promote the peace. The decisive battle has already been won by God in Christ; Christ has effectively subjugated the cosmic powers (1:20–22; 4:8). The eschatological perspective of Ephesians, however, stands in tension between the “already” and “not yet.”³³⁵ The crucial battle has been won; but the consummation of cosmic harmony still lies in the future, a future harmony that is proleptically realized in the church. The very existence of a united church comprising Jews and Gentiles thus sounds the death knell for the inevitable doom of the evil cosmic powers, bringing about an intensification of attacks against the integrity of the church. If the cosmic powers are able to disrupt or destroy the peace and unity within the church, not only will the reality of a future cosmic harmony be thrown into question, but God will be deemed foolish in entrusting the church to be heralds of his cosmic plan (3:10). If however the church prevails and stands firm (ἵστημι, 6:11, 13, 14; ἀνθίστημι, 6:13), they proclaim the reality of a new age of peace under the headship of Christ. The battle for cosmic peace in Ephesians is thus intimately connected with the battle for the peace and unity within the church.

Although Ephesians does not explicitly identify the target or the strategy of the evil cosmic forces, the description of the full armor of God does allow us to suggest some possibilities. It may be their intent to destroy the very existence of the church, luring

³³⁵ Compare 1:10, 22 with 6:12.

believers away from their faith and subjecting them to bondage again (2:2–3). Believers are therefore called to hold on to their salvation (6:17)—the act of God in making them alive in Christ, raising them up, and seating them in the heavenlies in Christ Jesus (2:5–6). I, however, suggest that the focus of their attacks is the peace and unity within the church, interpreting the six referents of the metaphorical armor (truth, justice, readiness, faith, salvation, and word of God) as adequate defenses against such attacks.

Truth (ἀλήθεια; 6:14) and *justice* (δικαιοσύνη; 6:14) should be understood in ethical categories,³³⁶ and their function in promoting political harmony and unity within a community is well known. The phrase ἐν ἐτοιμασίᾳ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τῆς εἰρήνης (6:15) does not mean “with a *readiness* to proclaim the gospel of peace,” but “with a *readiness* [for battle] that comes from the gospel of peace.”³³⁷ The message of Ephesians appears puzzling, asserting that peace is a necessary requisite for war, but Democritus makes a similar argument. He remarks, “The greatest undertakings are carried through by means of concord (ἀπὸ ὁμονοίης), including wars (πόλεμος) between City-States: there is no other way.”³³⁸ In a paradoxical manner, Ephesians notes that peace and unity with other members of the community prepares the church for spiritual battle precisely because the focus of the enemy’s attack is on the unity of the church itself. *Faith* (πίστις; 6:16), as in 4:5 and 4:13, refers to the common objective faith content of the community. When all

³³⁶ So Abbott, *Ephesians*, 185; Lincoln, *Ephesians*, 447–48; Schnackenburg, *Ephesians*, 277; Schlier, *Der Brief an die Epheser*, 66; Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer, *Critical and Exegetical Hand-book to the Epistle to the Ephesians* (trans. Maurice J. Evans; New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1884), 543.

³³⁷ The genitive τοῦ εὐαγγελίου is not an objective genitive (Schlier, *Der Brief an die Epheser*, 295–96; A. Oepke, “ὑποδέω,” *TDNT* 5:312), but a genitive of source (Meyer, *Ephesians*, 544; Abbott, *Ephesians*, 185; Lincoln, *Ephesians*, 448–49).

members embrace this common faith, the common mind (ὁμόνοια) of the community is strengthened, able to extinguish all the alienating and fragmenting attacks of the enemy represented by the flaming arrows. *Salvation* (σωτήριον; 6:17),³³⁹ like peace, is two-dimensional in Ephesians. As believers hold on to their reconciliation with God, they are implicitly reminded to maintain their reconciliation with one another (2:14–22). Finally, the *word of God* (ῥῆμα θεοῦ; 6:17) refers not so much to a particular OT saying behind which God stands,³⁴⁰ but to the gospel.³⁴¹ The referent of the sixth element of the armor (τὴν μάχαιραν τοῦ πνεύματος) parallels the third (ὑποδησάμενοι τοὺς πόδας ἐν ἔτοιμασίᾳ), both referring to the gospel and both highlighting its importance for offensive and defensive initiatives in this cosmic battle. As believers take hold (δέξασθε) of the gospel of peace, as they embrace the unity and reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles, not only are they enabled to stand ready against the onslaught of the cosmic forces, they are also empowered to strike at their enemies, announcing their inevitable demise. With the above interpretive moves, Paul’s call to put on the armor of God can and should be understood as a call to preserve the peace and unity of the church.

Paul’s concern for the unity of the church can also be seen from the portrayal of the battle as a conflict not against flesh and blood (πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα), but against heavenly rulers, authorities, and powers (6:12). Here, “flesh and blood” probably refers to humanity *both* inside and outside the community of faith.

³³⁸ Democritus, Frag. 250 (Diels and Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 2:195; or Stobaeus 40.1.40; ET Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, 114).

³³⁹ The adjective σωτήριον functions as a noun here. See Moule, *Idiom Book*, 96.

³⁴⁰ Best, *Ephesians*, 604; Hoehner, *Ephesians*, 853.

With this referent to humanity *inside* the community, Paul exhorts his readers to shift their focus away from internal strife toward an external foe. Our study of Greco-Roman writers suggests that Paul's identification of the evil cosmic forces as a common external enemy enhances concord within the community of believers in a very tangible manner. Studies in the sociology of conflict confirm ancient political thinking regarding the group-building benefits of war. Lewis Coser, building on the work of Georg Simmel, writes, "Conflict serves to establish and maintain the identity and boundary lines of societies and groups. Conflict with other groups contributes to the establishment and reaffirmation of the identity of the group and maintains its boundaries against the surrounding social world."³⁴² But conflict not only sharpens the identity and values of a particular group, it also mobilizes the energies of individual members, leading to increased cohesion of the group.³⁴³ This general principle, however, only holds true when there is recognition that the outside threat concerns the entire community, not just part of it.³⁴⁴ In Ephesians, Paul frames the spiritual battle as a conflict involving the entire community. The battle does not concern only the apostles, the prophets, the evangelists, or the teachers (4:11); all members of the community are called to put on the armor and stand firm. Moreover, by the use of the inclusive first person pronoun in ἡμῖν ἡ πάλη (6:12),³⁴⁵ Paul identifies with his readers, considering himself a fellow combatant.

³⁴¹ Schnackenburg, *Ephesians*, 280; Lincoln, *Ephesians*, 451; O'Brien, *Ephesians*, 482; Barth, *Ephesians*, 777.

³⁴² Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1956), 38.

³⁴³ Coser, *Functions of Social Conflict*, 95.

³⁴⁴ Robin M. Williams, *Reduction of Intergroup Tensions* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1947), 58.

³⁴⁵ The exclusive second person pronoun ὑμῖν occurs in \mathfrak{P}^{46} B D* F G.

Paul's statement that our fight does not involve humanity *outside* the community of believers may be surprising given his earlier exhortation not to associate with them (5:7) nor mimic their practices (4:17-5:20). If the intent of the text is to enforce the unity of the community, boundaries should be rigidly circumscribed along ideological, ethical, and faith considerations; and unbelievers should be categorized as enemies along with the cosmic forces. One can understand Paul's shift toward spiritual enemies as a defensive political move, reminding the community not to provoke people outside their community and arouse the attention of the governing authorities, actions that may eventually threaten the survival of the believing community. Such a move to divert attention from oneself is comparable to the way the Ephesians household codes do not deviate greatly from socially accepted norms. But it is also possible that this frame of the battle boundaries presents a community that is more inclusive than sectarian. Sociologists note that conflict can create associations and coalitions between parties that may otherwise have nothing to do with each other.³⁴⁶ The depiction of a common foe enables two groups to form an alliance, albeit temporary. A more permanent relationship is possible only when common core values are adopted.³⁴⁷ The identification of cosmic forces as the common enemy of humanity *both* inside and outside the community of faith can be seen as a move to promote the peace of the community by assimilating potential adversaries into the community of faith. Paul sees Jew-Gentile reconciliation of believers

³⁴⁶ Coser, *Functions of Social Conflict*, 139.

³⁴⁷ Coser, *Functions of Social Conflict*, 146: "Unification against a common foe tends to remain on the level of temporary association or coalition when it is limited to instrumental ends and temporary, limited purposes. At times, however, common values and norms develop in the course of struggling

in Christ as the precursor and paradigm for the reconciliation of the whole of humanity. He therefore reminds his readers that unbelievers are not the ultimate enemies. On the contrary, all humanity shares a common bond: they are all subject to the oppressive attacks of the cosmic forces. This liminal bond is however tenuous, and outsiders need to be formally brought within the community of faith through the preaching of the gospel of peace, an action for which Paul asks for prayer (6:19–20).

Summary and Synthesis

This chapter provided an initial exploration of the political character of Ephesians. I began my analysis by first defining “the political” as fields of activity in which power is contested and in which issues of identity are addressed. In the ancient Greek and Roman world, “the political” revolves primarily around the three bases of Economics, Ethics, and Politics, covering topics such as moral education, wealth, household management, forms of government, citizenship, war, and peace. I then argued that these topics occur in major sections of Ephesians, supporting my argument by an analysis of several major sections of the letter: the ethnic reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles into one new humanity (2:11–22); the call for communal unity (4:1–16); the ethical injunctions (4:17–5:20); the household codes (5:21–6:9); and the call to spiritual warfare (6:10–20). A comparison of these sections with Greek and Roman political thought shows similarities in subject matter, terms, and themes. Moreover, Paul’s various appeals to peace and unity within the ἐκκλησία are similar to *topoi* found in political writings. These include:

together. In this event the coalition or association may slowly become transformed into a more

Appeal to the concept of one new humanity and the vision of a world-state.
 Appeal to the household codes.
 Appeal to imitate the virtues of God.
 Appeal to the body metaphor.
 Appeal to the common advantage.
 Appeal to the building metaphor.
 Appeal to tradition.
 Appeal to “ones.”
 Appeal to adopt virtues that promote concord.
 Appeal to shun vices that sow civil discord.
 Appeal to a common enemy.

Such similarities suggest that Ephesians can be profitably read as a political letter. There are nevertheless differences, most of which are shaped by the symbolic universe of the Christian community. The political frame of reference is not the πόλις but the ἐκκλησία; the development of a community ethos based on the cruciform pattern of Christ seeks to reverse the common Greco-Roman penchant for honor and status; household social relations are reconfigured under the authority of God in Christ as the true *pater familias*. Thus, any examination of the “political” character of Paul’s argument in Ephesians must not neglect its “religious” character; Ephesians is a politico-religious letter. In this study, I stress the political primarily because of its neglect within Ephesian studies.

My analysis further indicates that the various political materials serve the deliberative function of promoting peace and concord within the ἐκκλησία. The reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles in 2:1–22 seeks to dissipate ethnic tension and stereotypification by casting the vision of one new humanity and citizenry that eliminates former ethnic hostilities and rivalries; the exhortation in 4:1–16 urges unity, appealing to “ones” and the body metaphor; the ethical injunctions in 4:17–5:20 promote

permanent group.”

a singular corporate ethos for all members of the community, spurring them to exhibit virtues that promote concord while shunning vices that lead to civic instability; the household code in 5:21–6:9 establishes social order within the household, and implicitly reminds its members that household unity is intricately linked to church unity; and the call to warfare (6:10–20) against a common enemy enhances group identity and unity. More important, the findings of this chapter confirm my investigations in chapter two; namely, the horizontal dimension of peace is a prominent motif in Ephesians.

The data analyzed in this and the previous chapter show that Ephesians can be read as a deliberative argument promoting peace within the ἐκκλησία. I now synthesize the data and construct an initial picture of this *topos* of peace in Ephesians using the following categories: the character of ecclesial peace, the means of maintaining ecclesial peace, and the impediments to ecclesial peace.

A major element in the Ephesian vision of peace is the reconciliation of humanity within the ἐκκλησία. The humanity that was formerly fractured into the two main categories of Jews and Gentiles can now be reconciled in Christ and created into a new humanity without ethnic rivalry. Due to Christ's sacrificial death, believers are reconciled to God and consequently to one another. Peace with God is the reason that believers are able to have peace with one another. But Christ is not only the basis that believers have unity with God and with one another, he is also the sphere of that unity. Believers are able to have fellowship with God and with one another only when they are in Christ.

The vision of ecclesial peace does not stand alone. Paul locates it within the larger narrative of initial cosmic order followed by chaos and the recreation of order under the

headship of Christ. Central to this narrative is God's ultimate purpose to unify all things under Christ, a uniting that has implications for all levels of society and the universe. The multiple levels of Paul's vision of peace can be seen in his use of *μυστήριον*. At the cosmic level, it signifies the will of God in summing up all things under the headship and unity of Christ (1:9–10); at the ecclesial level, it depicts the unity between Christ and the church (5:32); at the socio-ethnic level, it describes the reconciliation and unity between Jews and Gentiles (3:1–13); and at the household level, it alludes to the unity between husband and wife (5:32). Placed within this larger narrative, Paul's call for ecclesial peace and unity now assumes an urgent and cosmic role since the reconciliation of humanity within the church is the initial phase of God's plan of reconciliation, testifying to the angelic powers that God is indeed summing up all things in and under Christ (3:10).

Given the importance of the church's role within the overall narrative of cosmic reconciliation, Paul deals extensively with how the church is to maintain (*τηρεῖν*; 4:3), not create, the unity and peace of the church. He reminds his readers that they have been blessed with every spiritual blessing (1:3–14), including those necessary for the growth of the community as a unified body; he prays for his readers to know the full extent of these spiritual blessings (1:15–23); he prays that they will be rooted and grounded in Christ's love (3:14–21) so that they in turn will be able to love other members of the community; he exhorts members to adopt virtues that promote concord and to shun vices that sow discord; he encourages members to imitate the virtues of God, adopting the cruciform pattern of Christ and showing sacrificial love for one another; he appeals to the body and building metaphor for the necessity of interdependence; he advocates the household

codes as the way to establish stability in the household and ultimately in the community; he cites the unity and oneness of the Spirit, Lord, and Father as evidence for the necessity of unity within the ἐκκλησία; and he alludes to scriptural traditions as supporting arguments in his concern for peace and unity. Political pragmatism also suggests that any new community that is formed from previously diverse ethnic groups must build a common identity and set of values. To this end, Paul promotes the concept of a single new humanity that does away with former ethnic tensions. He depicts a common enemy for the church in order to foster group solidarity; and he further establishes a common heritage, a common narrative, a common ethos, a common purpose, and a common teleological goal for the community of believers.

The impediments to ecclesial peace are in many respects the mirror opposite of the means for maintaining ecclesial peace. This includes the failure to imitate the virtues of God; the failure to adopt the communal ethos of the new humanity; and the failure to embrace the common identity of the community, coupled with undue emphasis on their former ethnic particularities. Furthermore, false teaching and deceitful scheming by some undermine the ὁμόνοια (“sameness of mind”) and unity regarding the fundamental doctrinal and ethical teachings of the community (4:13). More important, the major forces that threaten the vision of peace in Ephesians are the rulers, powers, and spiritual forces under the leadership of the devil (6:10–17). As the very existence of a united church prefigures the cosmic uniting of all things under Christ and hence the inevitable doom of these powers, the devil and his followers unleash their attacks on the church, attempting to destroy the unity and peace within the church.

The vision of ecclesial peace in Ephesians is politico-religious, a blending of political and religious language and subject matter. God is the primary initiator in the cosmic plan of reconciliation; Christ is the sphere and means by which reconciliation occurs; reconciliation between humanity is possible only because of their reconciliation to God; and Christ's rule over all powers and authorities extend into the hierarchical relationships within the human household. At the same time, the ἐκκλησία is the political analogue of the πόλις within the Christian sphere; the relationship of the household to the ἐκκλησία mirrors that of the household to the πόλις; peace within the ἐκκλησία requires the removal of ethnic tension and categories; the concept of the one new humanity resonates with the political vision of a world-state; and more important, Paul's various appeals to peace and concord within the ἐκκλησία are similar to appeals found in ancient political writings. I now refine this sketch of the vision of peace in Ephesians through comparison with analogous documents: the writings of Dio Chrysostom and the Confucian tradition.

CHAPTER 4

THE VISION OF PEACE IN DIO CHRYSOSTOM

Dio Cocceianus,¹ later called Chrysostom,² is one of the leading figures of the Second Sophistic. He was born of wealthy parents in Prusa of Bithynia around 40 C.E. He was banished from Rome and his native Bithynia by Domitian in 82 C.E. because of his reputed friendship with Flavius Sabinus,³ a disgraced Roman noble executed by Domitian (*Or.* 13.1). Rather than bemoan his fate, Dio consulted the oracle at Delphi where he received the puzzling instruction to proceed with his wandering until he came “to the uttermost parts of the earth” (*Or.* 13.9). Donning humble attire and chastening himself, he wandered from place to place. When people called him a philosopher and asked him for advice, he was obliged to think about issues of good and evil (*Or.* 13.10–12). Dio therefore became a sort of Socrates. After the death of Domitian in 96 C.E., Dio was recalled. He cultivated warm relationships with Nerva and Trajan, obtaining several favors for Prusa. The last years of Dio were mired in legal trouble. He was accused by a local political opponent on

¹ For surveys of secondary literature, see B. F. Harris, “Dio of Prusa: A Survey of Recent Work,” *ANRW* 33.5:3853–81; Simon Swain, “Reception and Interpretation,” in *Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy* (ed. Simon Swain; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 13–50.

² W. Schmid, “Dio Cocceianus,” *PW* 5:848, notes, “Der Name Χρυσόστομος ist ihm wohl erst zur Unterscheidung von dem Historiker D. im 3 Jhd. beigelegt worden.” The first occurrence is in Menander Rhetor, *Περὶ ἐπιδεικτικῶν* (*Rhetores Graeci* [ed. L. Spengel; 3 vols.; Lipsiae: B. G. Teubneri, 1853–56], 3:390; ET *Menander Rhetor* [ed. D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson; Oxford: Clarendon, 1981], 117). For a recent study on Dio’s name, see Alain M. Gowing, “Dio’s Name,” *CP* 85 (1990): 49–54.

two points: of terminating his responsibilities for beautifying the city before his accounts were inspected, and of *maiestas*, allowing the graves of his wife and son to be situated in the same building as a statue of Trajan. Dio pleaded his case before Pliny. The charge of *maiestas* was dropped, but it is not known what the result of the other charge was. In all probability, the legate did not find him guilty.

The basic outline of Dio's life is clear; his intellectual development is subject to debate. Dio eclectically combines Stoic with Cynic and Platonic motifs. He frequently uses Diogenes as a model and his discourses on kingship carry many Cynic features.⁴ He leads the lifestyle of a Cynic, but he is certainly also influenced by Musonius Rufus.⁵ More debatable is the issue of his "conversion" and the characterization of Dio as a sophist or philosopher. This difficulty arises from three factors.⁶ First, the educational culture or *paideia* of the age does not make a sharp distinction between philosophy and rhetoric. Second, there is much confusion of nomenclature surrounding the label "sophist" and "philosopher."⁷ Third, the testimonies of Philostratus and Synesius diverge. Philostratus

³ Harry Sidebottom, "Dio of Prusa and the Flavian Dynasty," *CQ* 46 (1996): 447, argues that it is more likely to be L. Salvius Otho Cocceianus, the nephew of Emperor Cocceius Nerva.

⁴ Ragnar Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Lund: C. Bloms Boktryckeri, 1948), claims that Dio's theory of Cynic kingship can be directly traced to Antisthenes. See also the extended discussion in John L. Moles, "The Date and Purpose of the Fourth Kingship Oration of Dio Chrysostom," *Classical Antiquity* 2 (1983): 268n. 65.

⁵ Anton C. van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1963), 14–15. Fronto, writing in the middle of the second century, considers Dio a student of Musonius Rufus. See *Marcus Cornelius Fronto* (trans. C. R. Haines; 2 vols.; LCL; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919–20), 2.50.

⁶ Christopher P. Jones, *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 12.

⁷ G. R. Stanton, "Sophists and Philosophers: Problems of Classification," *AJP* 94 (1973): 350–64, argues that boundaries between "philosopher" and "sophist" may not be as sharp as believed. See also Christopher P. Jones, "The Reliability of Philostratus," in *Approaches to the Second Sophistic* (ed. Glen W. Bowersock; University Park: American Philological Association, 1974), 12–14; Tim Whitmarsh, *The Second Sophistic* (Greece & Rome 35; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 15–19.

in *The Lives of the Sophists* considers Dio to be both a philosopher and a sophist at the same time. Synesius of Cyrene, a Christian bishop writing in the early-fifth century, on the other hand, argues that Dio began his career as a sophist. He wrote sophistic pieces such as *Encomium of Hair*, *Encomium of a Parrot*, and *Praise of a Gnat*. He further wrote polemical works in which he attacked philosophers. According to Synesius, the experience of exile is, however, decisive in awakening his moral and spiritual conscience, causing him to embrace the life of a philosopher. Although Dio's philosophical conversion has been generally accepted by many past scholars,⁸ one should not accept every detail of Dio's claim as a literal fact since Dio probably adorned certain portions of his exilic account, assimilating his own experiences to that of Odysseus and Socrates. John Moles, however, goes too far in calling Dio's philosophical conversion a "fraud."⁹ More probable is the notion that the exile compelled Dio to think deeply on moral questions and hastened his development as a Stoic philosopher.¹⁰

⁸ Hans Friedrich August von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa, mit einer Einleitung: Sophistik, Rhetorik, Philosophie in ihrem Kampfum die Jugendbildung* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1898), 223; Arthur D. Nock, *Conversion* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1933), 173–74; Ramsay MacMullen, *Enemies of the Roman Order* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 65–66.

⁹ John L. Moles, "The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom," *JHS* 98 (1978): 100. Employing the hermeneutics of suspicion, Moles contends that the theory of the conversion originates not from Synesius but from Dio himself, who "found it a convenient way both of suppressing the memory of his early time-serving attacks on philosophy under Vespasian and of gratifying his personal taste of self-dramatization" (79). See also Simon Swain, *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek world AD 50-250* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 189–90. Tim Whitmarsh, *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: The Politics of Imitation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 159–60, adopts a more sympathetic tone. Although he agrees with Moles that the evidence contradicts Dio's claim of conversion, he nevertheless argues that "Dio's comments on exile need to be considered in the context of rhetorical praxis, the contest for philosophical personae—and not simply as attempts to cloud the truth."

¹⁰ Albin Lesky, *A History of Greek Literature* (trans. James Willis and Cornelis de Heer; New York: Crowell, 1966), 834; Jones, *Roman World of Dio Chrysostom*, 50. See also D. A. Russell, ed., *Dio Chrysostom Orations VII, XII, and XXXVI* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 6, who remarks, "It is perhaps close to the truth to say that [Dio] used his exile (which was after all no disgrace) to refashion his literary career, using his great gifts of classical eloquence and his thorough training in λόγοι to convey a morally

In the first chapter, I briefly noted that Dio's *Orationes* can be profitably compared with Ephesians since both Dio and Paul are situated in the same milieu and both function as intermediaries between different interest groups. There are other similarities that make such a comparison interesting. Both authors address cities that are under Roman rule and offer strategies to cope with life in the Roman Empire. Both authors suffered under Roman rule. Dio was exiled; Paul was imprisoned. Although the details are debatable, both authors also experience some form of "conversion."¹¹ Moreover, both Dio and Paul are moral philosophers. Dio is aptly described as a "philosophic missionary."¹²

acceptable message to the educated in every city he visited." For a recent defense of Dio's "conversion," see Harry Sidebottom, "Studies in Dio Chrysostom on Kingship" (Ph.D. diss.; University of Oxford, 1990), 1-53. He concludes, "Dio, it has been argued, started his career as a sophist and, in a real sense, converted to philosophy while in exile (50)... The course of Dio's career can thus be seen as starting as a self-proclaimed sophist, who during his exile took the symbols of a philosopher. In exile his public statements hinted at the position of a Cynic. After his restoration he was still at pains to be seen as a philosopher, but not a Cynic. Instead he possibly made veiled hints that he was to be taken as a Stoic (52)."

¹¹ Like Dio, Paul's "conversion" is also subject to debate. For example, Krister Stendahl, *Paul Among Jews and Gentiles* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), 7-23, understands the Damascus Road experience as a call rather than a conversion. As a corrective to Stendahl's position, although one would not deny the Damascus Road experience to contain a call, nor that Paul's few references to this experience make no use of such terms as *μετάνοια* or *ἐπιστρέφω* that one would expect in a conversion account, one must also recognize that there was a certain transformation in his thought and outlook. Richard N. Longenecker, "Realized Hope, New Commitment, and Developed Proclamation," in *The Road from Damascus: The Impact of Paul's Conversion on His Life, Thought, and Ministry* (ed. Richard N. Longenecker; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 28, comments that the "grammatical counterpoint between formerly a persecutor of 'the church of God' but now a persecuted teacher of 'the faith he once tried to destroy' (1 Cor 15:9-11; Gal 1:13-17, 23, and Phil 3:6-7) indicates quite clearly ... that Paul's own self consciousness was that of having undergone a conversion." Similarly, Alan F. Segal, *Paul the Convert* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), 72, 117, also maintains that "conversion is an appropriate term for discussing Paul's religious experience, although Paul did not himself use it." See also Peter T. O'Brien, "Was Paul Converted?" in *The Paradoxes of Paul* (vol. 2 of *Justification and Variegated Nomism*; ed. D. A. Carson, Peter T. O'Brien, and Mark A. Seifrid; WUNT 2.181; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 361-91.

¹² See Samuel Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (New York: Macmillan, 1905), 367-83. He writes, "[Dio's] eighty orations are many of them rather essays than popular harangues. They range over all sorts of subjects, literary, mythological, and artistic, political and social, as well as purely ethical or religious. But, after all, Dion is unmistakably the preacher of a great moral revival and reform" (368).

He considers all men to be fools,¹³ but is compelled to heal them as a moral physician.¹⁴ Furthermore, both authors see themselves as ambassadors of God. They claim divine appointment (*Or.* 32.12, 14; 34.4; 38.18 || Eph 1:1; 3:2, 7–9),¹⁵ they pray for eloquence to proclaim God’s message of reconciliation (*Or.* 38.9 || Eph 6:19–20), and they pray that their audience will heed their message (*Or.* 38.9, 51 || Eph 1:15–23; 3:14–21). Finally, the theme of concord, unity, and peace is prominent in Dio’s thought, especially in the Bithynian orations.¹⁶ There are no doubt differences between Dio’s *Orations* and Ephesians, not least of which is their frame of reference: cities, provinces, and the Roman Empire vis-à-vis the ἐκκλησία. But it is these similarities and differences that enhance and sharpen my comparison.

¹³ *Or.* 13.13: “The opinion I had was that pretty well all men are fools, and that no one does any of the things he should do, or considers how to rid himself of the evils that beset him and of his great ignorance and confusion of mind, so as to live a more virtuous and a better life.”

¹⁴ In *Or.* 77/78, Dio compares the true philosopher to a physician who is “eager, in so far as he can, to aid all men” (40). He writes, “Take, for example, the physician; if he should find it necessary to treat father or mother or his children when they are ill, ..., in case he should need to employ surgery or cautery, he would not, because he loves his children and respects his father and his mother, for that reason cut with a duller knife or cauterize with milder fire, but, on the contrary, he would use the most potent and vigorous treatment possible.... Therefore toward oneself first of all, and also toward one’s nearest and dearest, one must behave with fullest frankness and independence, showing no reluctance or yielding in one’s words. For far worse than a corrupt and diseased body is a soul which is corrupt, not, I swear, because of salves or potions or some consuming poison, but rather because of ignorance and depravity and insolence, yes, and jealousy and grief and unnumbered desires” (43–45).

¹⁵ Dio in *Or.* 32.21–22 compares himself to Hermes sent by Zeus. See also *Or.* 13.9–10. Through these analogies, Dio presents himself as an authoritative philosopher whose message comes from God. Paolo Desideri, *Dione di Prusa: un intellettuale greco nell’Impero romano* (Messina: G. D’Anna, 1978), 109, 166–7nn. 86–87, as cited in Giovanni Salmeri, “Dio, Rome, and the Civic Life of Asia Minor,” in *Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy* (ed. Simon Swain; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 79–80n. 129, takes a different stance. Using the basic premise that the intellectual is constantly in the service of political power, he argues that the references to divinity are allusions to the Emperor: Dio is an envoy of Vespasian and Trajan to the Greek cities. See the refutations in Swain, *Hellenism and Empire*, 217n. 115.

¹⁶ B. F. Harris, “The Moral and Political Ideas of Dio Chrysostom with Special Reference to the Bithynian Speeches” (Thesis; University of Auckland, 1966), 173; Edmund Berry, “Dio Chrysostom the Moral Philosopher,” *GR* 30 (1983): 79–80.

This chapter seeks to describe and analyze the vision of peace in Dio's *Orations*. The texts that I examine fall into two main groups: the *Kingship Orations* (*Or.* 1–4) and a selection of the Bithynian orations (*Or.* 38–41, 48). The Bithynian orations directly address the issue of inter- and intra-city concord. The *Kingship Orations* approach the issue of concord indirectly. In outlining the principles of the ideal king, Dio works from the perspective that wise and prudent rule leads to stability and concord while tyrannical rule leads to instability. The frame of reference between these two sets of texts is also complementary. The *Kingship Orations* concern concord and peace at the level of the empire, while the Bithynian orations operate at the level of the city. In this chapter, I examine and characterize how each set of orations approach the issue of concord and peace. I conclude with a synthesis and overview of Dio's vision of peace.

The *Kingship Orations*

Although Trajan is never mentioned in the *Kingship Orations*, it is commonly accepted that they were dedicated to him. The first and third orations were spoken before Trajan; the second and fourth are in the form of dialogues—the second between Philip and Alexander, and the fourth between Alexander and Diogenes. They were either sent to Trajan or read before him.¹⁷

¹⁷ Von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa*, 398–410, maintains that all four were delivered before Trajan. For evidence of dialogues read to an emperor, see Suetonius, *Aug.* 89.3. It should be noted that even if we fundamentally agree with von Arnim's position, there is evidence that these orations were performed elsewhere (*Or.* 57.11). Furthermore, it is not certain whether the orations were delivered to Trajan in the form that we currently possess. For example, the Libyan myth (*Or.* 5) appears to be part of *Or.* 4 since it is mentioned in 4.73–74 (“Have you not heard the Libyan myth?”).

In composing and delivering these orations, Dio attempts to play the role of a counselor or educator to Trajan. Dio observes that kings entreat philosophers (φιλόσοφος) and men of cultivation (παιδευμένος) to be their counselors (σύμβουλος; *Or.* 49.3), and he looks to the past examples between Nestor and Agamemnon, Aristotle and Alexander, and Anaxagoras and Pericles (*Or.* 49.4, 6). Furthermore, by encouraging Trajan to look for true friends from all corners of the world, Dio alludes to the long history in which Greek intellectuals advised Roman masters. These include Polybius and Panaetius with Scipio Aemilianus, Posidonius and Theophanes with Pompey, and Arius and Athenodorus with Augustus.¹⁸ Apart from this political relationship, the degree of intimacy between Dio and Trajan cannot be definitively ascertained. Philostratus and Dio himself speak of a deep friendship.¹⁹ The correspondence between Pliny and Trajan (*Ep.* 82.2), however, does not *explicitly* indicate any intimacy between the emperor and the philosopher.²⁰

¹⁸ Salmeri, "Dio, Rome, and the Civic Life of Asia Minor," 91n. 188.

¹⁹ Dio's claims of friendship with Trajan are found in *Or.* 45.3; 47.22. Philostratus, *Vit. soph.* 488, describes Trajan remarking to Dio as he accompanied him in his triumphal chariot, "I do not understand what you are saying [Dio is speaking in Greek], but I love you as I love myself." R. Syme, *Tacitus* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1958), 40, and Sylvia Fein, *Die Beziehungen der Kaiser Trajan und Hadrian zu den litterati* (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 26; Stuttgart: Teubner, 1994), 233–34, accept Philostratus's account; K. H. Waters, "Trajan's Character in the Literary Tradition," in *Polis and Imperium: Studies in Honour of Edward Togo Salmon* (ed. J. A. S. Evans; Toronto: Hakkert, 1974), 237, rejects it; and G. W. Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969), 47–48, rejects the story but accepts the relationship.

²⁰ Scholars who assert that this correspondence demonstrates no intimacy between Dio and Trajan include Sidebottom, "Dio of Prusa and the Flavian Dynasty," 454n. 62; Swain, *Hellenism and Empire*, 195n. 33, 237. For a differing view, see Harris, "The Moral and Political ideas of Dio Chrysostom," 168; Desideri, *Dione di Prusa: un intellettuale greco nell'Impero romano*, 2; A. R. R. Sheppard, "Dio Chrysostom: The Bithynian Years," *L'Antiquité Classique* 53 (1984): 171–72.

Dio in these orations no doubt takes the Roman imperial monarchy as a given. He clearly promulgates monarchical rule as the ideal form of government,²¹ but it does not appear that he considers Roman monarchical rule to be ideal.²² The central question these orations raise thus concerns their function: are they primarily encomiastic or protreptic? The complimentary tone, especially in *Or.* 3, leads some to draw parallels between Dio's orations and Pliny's *Panegyricus*, concluding that they are all imperial orations (βασιλικὸς λόγος) that "express the ideology of a particular time."²³ They are primarily ceremonial and offer no genuine advice. There are, however, differences between the two authors.²⁴ The compliments that Dio makes are largely conditional upon Trajan's behavior;²⁵ Dio exhibits a more independent spirit;²⁶ and Dio's λόγοι περὶ

²¹ *Or.* 3.45–48. See also *Or.* 36.31–32. Dio, in line with many other Stoics in the Empire (the Later Stoa), considers monarchy as the best political order available. See Francis E. Devine, "Stoicism on the Best Regime," *JHI* 31 (1970): 323–36.

²² Swain, *Hellenism and Empire*, 200, writes, "The combination of Dio's ideas on monarchy in the *Orations on Kingship*, the *Olympicus*, and the *Borystheniticus* makes it extremely doubtful that he ever believed Trajan was an ideal, divine monarch, or indeed that Trajan was a particularly close imitation of such."

²³ Jones, *Roman World of Dio Chrysostom*, 118. For imperial orations, see Menander Rhetor, 368–77. Menander Rhetor, 368.3–7, defines an "imperial oration [as] an encomium of the emperor (ὁ βασιλικὸς λόγος ἐγκώμιον ἐστὶ βασιλέως). It will thus embrace a generally agreed amplification of the good things attached to the emperor, but allows no ambivalent or disputed features, because of the extreme splendor of the person concerned."

²⁴ Such differences probably arise from each writer's personality and political status. Pliny safely survived Domitian's reign of terror, but Dio was exiled. Moreover, Pliny is an official Roman proconsul, but Dio is a Greek moral philosopher. As one who is more directly tied to the Roman political system, Pliny seems less likely to be able to offer constructive independent analysis.

²⁵ See for example *Or.* 1.12: "Not every king derives his scepter or his royal office from Zeus, but only the good king, and that he receives it on no other title than that he shall plan and study the welfare of his subjects." Pliny, *Pan.* 67.4–8; 68.1; 94.5, also lists conditions, but the emphasis in Dio is more sustained and pointed. For a recent study on Pliny's *Pan.*, see Daniel N. Schowalter, *The Emperor and the Gods* (HDR 28; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993).

²⁶ George Alexander Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 300 B.C.-A.D. 300* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 579, writes, "Dio is less flattering than Pliny, less personal and specific, far more philosophical and concerned with setting forth classical models for imitation drawn from Homer, Socrates, and Diogenes. Pliny speaks as a Roman aristocrat and member of the government with immediate personal political involvement; Dio speaks as a Greek intellectual of some independence with philosophical and moral convictions."

βασιλείας are less ingratiatory and more abstract than Pliny's *actio gratiarum*.²⁷ Michael

Rostovtzeff remarks,

No doubt, in this program [of ideal kingship] as specified by Dio there are many points which are not theoretical but correspond to the character and activity of Trajan. But a mere glance at Pliny's consular speech in honor of Trajan, and a comparison of it with Dio's first and third speeches on kingship, show to what extent these latter were not only a registration of existing facts but, first and foremost, a registration of eternal norms which must be accepted or rejected by Trajan.²⁸

Despite his praise and flattery,²⁹ Dio's *Kingship Orations* truly attempts to establish the principles and guidelines of a model king.³⁰

²⁷ John Moles, "The *Kingship Orations* of Dio Chrysostom," *Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar* 6 (1990): 303.

²⁸ M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (2 vols.; 2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1957), 1:120. See also Moles, "The *Kingship Orations*," 301–303; Harris, "Moral and Political Ideas of Dio Chrysostom," 224–25; Sidebottom, "Studies in Dio Chrysostom on Kingship," 142–45.

²⁹ See *Or.* 1.36; 3.1–11. For Dio's self-justification and defense against charges of flattery, see *Or.* 3.12–28.

³⁰ Swain, *Hellenism and Empire*, 192, remarks, "In attempting to steer Trajan towards this model of kingship Dio has no choice, of course, but to take Roman monarchy as the given form of monarchical rule among men. But there is no reason to suppose that he thought Roman monarchy and its emperor actually came close to or fulfilled the ideal of divine monarchy—the speeches are intended rather to establish what the ideal is. The orations are not straightforward flattery of Trajan and do not offer unequivocal confirmation of his right to power." See also Moles, "The *Kingship Orations*," 364; idem, "The Date and Purpose of the Fourth *Kingship Oration* of Dio Chrysostom," 252. Whitmarsh, *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire*, 181–216, provides a creative reading of the *Kingship Orations*. He argues that Dio never performed any of these orations before the Emperor; they are further examples of his rhetorical self-dramatization (186–87, 325–27). He further maintains that the proper context for situating these orations is not the imperial, but the "public, performative frame" (187–88) in "one or more of the highly sophisticated rhetorical centers of the urban East, probably in a theater or civic assembly-space" (187). Reading the orations within this context, "what matters to Dio is the construction and dramatization of a philosophical persona for himself, for ... he is not so much attempting to communicate dogma as competing for public validation in the highly charged, highly agonistic space of sophistic performance" (215). According to Whitmarsh, "agonistic self-promotion [is] the primary aim of the [*Kingship Orations*]" (210). Whitmarsh's reading is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, his reading is dependent upon placing the *Kingship Oration* in a civic space. It is true that Dio also performed the orations outside an imperial context (*Or.* 57.11), and it is possible that self-promotion is a factor in such situations; nevertheless, internal evidence (*Or.* 1.5, 56; 3.2, 3) indicates that the orations were delivered before an Emperor. In the lack of definitive external evidence necessary to locate the orations either in an imperial or civic context, priority should perhaps be given to internal evidence. Second, although we do not disagree that literature in the Second Sophistic is playful and elusive, this does not mean that all literature in that period is devoid of serious concerns or are only means of self-aggrandizement. Such a move ignores the Cynic strategy of σπουδαιογέλοιον, a "pedagogical technique of presenting serious

In my exposition of the themes of the *Kingship Orations*, I first describe the portrayal of the two types of kings—the ideal and the tyrant. I then examine the education necessary for the development of the ideal king, noting the pedagogical process and the appeals for adopting such principles. I conclude with some statements on how Dio’s ideal kingship can be understood within the framework of concord and peace.

Portrayal of the ideal king

Dio presents a portrait of the good king in the four kingship orations. Although the general features remain the same, there are different emphases in each oration. In the first oration, Dio seeks to inspire courage and high-mindedness to a king that desires to be both a brave and law-abiding ruler.³¹ He lists the characteristics (ἦθος) and disposition (διάθεσις) of the ideal king as represented by Homer (11). The good king is devout (θεοφιλής; 43), “regardful of the gods, and holds the divine in honor” (15). He demonstrates care and concern for his fellow men as a herdsman or a shepherd over his flock (17, 20), and he takes pride in the title “‘Father’ (πατήρ) of his people and his

content in humorous and satirical form” (Philip Bosman, “Selling Cynicism: The Pragmatics of Diogenes’ Comic Performance,” *CQ* 56 [2006]: 94). Third, Dio is fond of utilizing myths, stories, allegories, and analogies in his orations, but the use of such narratives is constrained by his primary moral intent and is not solely for the purpose of the “indulgent pleasure” (Tim Whitmarsh, “Dio Chrysostom,” in *Narrators, Narratees, and Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature* [Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca Classica Batava 257; ed. Irene de Jong et al; Leiden: Brill, 2004], 451) of self-promotion. Graham Anderson, “Some Uses of Storytelling in Dio,” in *Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy* (ed. Simon Swain; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 143, examines several of Dio’s tales, including the ‘Choice of Heracles’ in *Or.* 1, and remarks, “One typical trait [is] apparent: there is a degree of reticence, and the sense of narrative resourcefulness is held in check by an overriding moral responsibility. We are looking at someone who sees himself as a philosopher or moralist telling stories rather than as an entertainer telling philosophically colored ones.”

³¹ *Or.* 1.5: “I should find words ... to inspire courage and high-mindedness—words, moreover, not set to a single mood but at once vigorous and gentle, challenging to war yet also speaking of peace, obedience to law, and true kingliness, inasmuch as they are addressed to one who is disposed, methinks,

subjects” (22). He loves to toil (φιλόπονος) on behalf of his people (21), and he is king not for his own sake but for the sake of all men (23). He inspires respect, not fear (25); he is sincere and truthful (26); he is courageous, yet peaceable (27); and he shows deep concern for his friends (φίλοι; 20, 30–32). Finally, the “clearest mark of a true king [is] one whom all good men can praise without compunction not only during his life but even afterwards” (33). The characteristics of the bad king are the converse. He is licentious, profligate, avaricious, lawless (14), impious to the gods (16), and unscrupulous and deceitful (26). He is a lover of pleasure (φιλήδονος; 21), he relishes the title “Master” (δεσπότης; 22), and he alienates his friends (20). Although his presence inspires terror (25), he exhibits cowardice in the battlefield (28). Furthermore, he has an excessive love of honor (φιλότιμος; 27).

Dio emphasizes the differences between the two kings by framing his speech with two examples: the one to be avoided (Alexander) at the beginning and the one to be emulated (Heracles) at the end. Although initially presented in a positive light, Alexander’s status as a role model is undermined as the speech proceeds. Like Sardanapallus, Alexander possesses inordinate passions and lacks justice,³² meting out excessive punishments. Furthermore, he is violent toward his friends and shows disdain for his own parents (7), traits that are antithetical to the ideal king (20, 30–32; 59, 73, 76). Not only was Trajan an admirer and imitator of the militant Alexander,³³ he was also

to be not only a brave but also a law-abiding ruler, one who needs not only high courage but high sense of right also.”

³² Tyranny is also depicted as a queen given to disproportionate mood swings (*Or.* 1.81).

³³ Dio Cassius, 68.29–30; Julian, *Caesars* 333A, 335D; *Historia Augusta*, *Hadrian* 4.9; Syme, *Tacitus*, 770–71; J. Rufus Fears, *Princes a diis Electus: The Divine Election of the Emperor as a Political Concept at Rome*

highly ambitious.³⁴ Dio's critique of Alexander thus serves as an indirect warning to Trajan that martial courage and military honor should not be overemphasized at the expense of the other virtues. What Dio advocates is moderation.³⁵

The positive example that Dio holds up is Heracles, who as a boy "wished to be a ruler, not through desire for pleasure and personal gain, which leads most men to love power, but that he might be able to do the greatest good to the greatest number" (65). Through the telling of an allegory, Dio contrasts the ideal king and the tyrant in the choice that Heracles makes between the two peaks of Royalty and Tyranny. Lady Royalty (Βασιλεία) is depicted seated on a resplendent throne with the ladies of her court: Justice (Δίκη), Civic Order (Εὐνομία), Peace (Εἰρήνη), and Law (Νόμος), who is also known as Right Reason (Λόγος), Counsellor (Σύμβουλος), or Coadjutor (Πάρδερος; 74–75). Tyranny (Τυρανίδα), on the other hand, is surrounded by her minions including Cruelty (Ὁμότης), Insolence (Υβρις), Lawlessness (Ἄνομία), Faction (Στάσις), and Flattery (Κολακεία) instead of Friendship (Φιλία; 82). Although Tyranny has the appearance of a queen, she is a counterfeit. Her throne rests on an insecure foundation and her ostentatious display of gold and ivory pales in comparison to the true inner virtue of Lady Royalty.

The second oration, in the form of a dialogue between Philip and Alexander, picks up many themes of the first. For example, the king should not focus on external

(Papers and monographs of the American Academy in Rome 26; Rome: American Academy, 1977), 249–50; Moles, "The *Kingship Orations*," 299–30.

³⁴ Pliny, *Ep.* 10.41.1, 5; Dio Cassius, 68.17.1; Fronto, 2.213: "With Trajan, as many judge from the rest of his ambitions, his own glory was likely to have been dearer than the blood of his soldiers, for he often sent back disappointed the ambassadors of the Parthian king when they prayed for peace."

trappings or honor but on his inner character and virtue (34, 50–51).³⁶ Dio writes, “[The king ought to] live simply and without affectation, to give proof by his very conduct of a character that is humane (φιλόανθρωπος), gentle, just, lofty, and brave as well, and above all, one that takes delight in bestowing benefits—a trait which approaches most nearly to the nature divine” (26). Of the various virtues, the two that best typify the “highly successful and exemplary king” is courage (ἀνδρεία) and justice (δικαιοσύνη; 54). The second oration adopts a more favorable martial outlook than the first: military music, dance, and decoration are held in high regard (34, 55–57, 60).³⁷ Dio, nevertheless, emphasizes other virtues, contrasting the good king vis-à-vis the tyrant through the imagery of a bull. The good bull exercises authority on behalf of his herd. He is gentle toward his own but valiant against the wild beasts (69, 71, 74), and he willingly submits himself to reason (λογισμός) and intelligence (φρόνησις; 70). The tyrant bull, on the other hand, treats his own herd with contempt, shielding himself behind the helpless multitude (73). He is violent, unjust, lawless, insatiate of pleasures and wealth, deaf to reason, and regards no man as his friend (75).

The third oration begins with the question “Does Socrates consider the Persian king happy?” and rapidly introduces the traits toward which a good king should aspire. Since “a man’s happiness is not determined by any external possessions, such as gold

³⁵ Or. 1.27: “[The ideal king] is warlike to the extent that the making of war rests with him, and peaceful to the extent that there is nothing left worth his fighting for. For assuredly he is well aware that they who are best prepared for war have it most in their power to live in peace.”

³⁶ This is probably a critique of the excesses of Domitian (see Suetonius, *Dom.* 4).

³⁷ Moles, “The *Kingship Orations*,” 347, believes that Dio is “adjusting his prescriptions to immediate realities—conceding the inevitability, even the desirability, of the first Dacian War and

plate, cities, or lands, for example, or other human beings, but in each case by his own self and his own character” (1),³⁸ Dio emphasizes the importance of inner ethical qualities. What defines a king is not the number of tiaras or scepters that he possesses, or the number of people who obey him (41); it is his inner disposition. The good king possesses virtue, wisdom, justice, self-control, and courage (10–11, 32–34, 58). He cares for his subjects (φιλόανθρωπος), and shares his happiness with others (38–39); he honors the gods and believes in their rule;³⁹ he considers prudence necessary and abstains from pleasure, refusing the allurements of high living, sloth, and carnal pleasure (58–59, 60–61).

The theme of friendship (φιλία) was mentioned in the first oration, but it receives its strongest emphasis in the third.⁴⁰ Here, Dio emphasizes the additional necessity of

granting more indulgence to Trajan’s military ambition and emulation of Alexander than ideally he would, yet at the same time trying to direct Trajan’s energies to more worthy and lasting goals.”

³⁸ Dio recapitulates this theme near the end of this discourse. He writes, “[The good king] alone holds that happiness (εὐδαιμονία) consists, not in flowery ease, but much rather in excellence of character (καλοκαγαθία); virtue (ἀρετή), not in necessity but in free-will” (3.123).

³⁹ According to Dio, honor of the gods requires both right action and right belief. He writes, “[A good ruler] will give the first and chief place to religion, not merely confessing but also believing in his heart (πεπεισμένος) that there are gods (51) He believes (οἶεται) that the gods also do not delight in the offerings of sacrifices of the unjust, but accepts the gifts made by the good alone (52).... Furthermore, he believes (ἠγείται) not only in gods but also in good spirits and demi-gods ...; and in confirming this belief (δόγμα) he does no small service to himself as well” (54). Dio’s emphasis on “belief” goes counter to some claims made by modern authors that “belief systems” are not appropriate for the study of Greek and Roman religions. For example, S. R. F. Price, *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 11, writes, “‘Belief’ as a religious term is profoundly Christian in its implications.... The emphasis which ‘belief’ gives to spiritual commitment has no necessary place in the analysis of other cultures. That is, the question about the ‘real beliefs’ of the Greeks is again implicitly Christianizing.”

⁴⁰ Within Dio’s entire corpus, φιλία and its cognates are found most frequently in *Or.* 3, occurring 18 out of a total of 91 times. For a discussion on the relationship between a ruler and his friends, see Ludwig Friedländer, *Roman Life and Manners under the Early Empire* (trans. Leonard A. Magnus; 4 vols.; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 1.70–82. The friendship between an emperor and his “friends” is not one between equals, but between patron and clients. The semantic fields of *amicitia* and *clientela* overlap, and *amici* are subdivided into categories of *superiores*, *pares*, and *inferiores*. See Richard P. Saller, “Patronage and Friendship in Early Imperial Rome: Drawing the Distinction,” in *Patronage in Ancient Society* (ed. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill; London: Routledge, 1989), 49–62.

friendship in maintaining the happiness of the king.⁴¹ Friends supersede the value of walls, arms, engines, and troops since friends provide utility and pleasure; friends are necessary to control the weapons of war; and friends are useful both in war and peace (91–95). They are the most important possessions of kings and are considered as extensions of the king’s own body (104–108). They are more important than relatives since friends are useful even without kinship while relatives are not of service without friendship (113–14, 120). The relationship between king and friend cannot be based on the law but must be established on loyalty and love (88–89). Only thus can the king fend off betrayal and treachery, attacks against which the law is impotent. Given the importance of cultivating such relationships, friends should not be selected only from the narrow imperial circle, but must be carefully chosen from all over the world (128–32). Ultimately, it is only friends who make a good king perfectly happy (τελέως εὐδαίμων; 103).

The fourth oration continues with the critique of Alexander begun in the first. Here, he is pictured as a slave of glory (6, 60) and the most ambitious of men, even willing to rule a third of the dead than to become a god and live forever (50, 52). By portraying Alexander’s own admiration of Diogenes’s courage (ἀνδρεία) and glory (δόξα; 7), Dio highlights the importance of the Cynic version of courage and glory instead of the

⁴¹ Or. 3.86: “Friendship, the king holds to be the fairest and most sacred of his possessions, believing that the lack of means is not so shameful or perilous for a king as the lack of friends, and that he maintains his happy state (εὐδαιμονία), not so much by means of revenues and armies and his other sources of strength, as by the loyalty of his friends.” Also, Or. 3.128: “[The good king] does not count himself fortunate just because he can have the best horses, the best arms, the best clothing, and so forth, but because he can have the best friends; and he holds that it is far more disgraceful to have fewer friends among the private citizens than any one of them has.”

military option that Trajan so admires. True courage consists not of boldness in the face of physical danger but of speaking the truth (10, 15, 59, 75–76),⁴² and true glory lies not in overthrowing empires and cities but in mastering one’s self (46–59). In the oration, Diogenes seeks to move Alexander from “his pride and thirst for glory” (77) by showing that the real king is a son of Zeus. Diogenes then proceeds to expound the Cynic doctrine that divine sonship is not a function of external factors such as accolades or titles (25, 47–49),⁴³ but of one’s mind (δῖα νοῖα; 17, 33; νοῦς; 80) and character (ἦθος; 88). The son of Zeus knows himself (57) and exercises self-control (21, 75) in contrast to the spirits of avarice (91–100), pleasure (101–115), and ambition (116–132) that rules the lives of ordinary men. He puts his trust not in arms but in well-doing (εὐεργεσία) and justice (τὸ δίκαιον; 65).

It is helpful to contrast Dio’s portrait of the ideal king vis-à-vis stereotypes found in ancient literature.⁴⁴ The following table provides a list of stereotypical elements of the

⁴² Note also that through the course of the first oration, Dio’s use of courage (θαρρέω/θάρος; 1.5, 25) shifts from a depiction of military bravery to the moral strength that is needed to gaze upon Lady Royalty (1.71, 73).

⁴³ Or. 4.25: “Do you think a man is a charioteer if he cannot drive, or that one is a pilot if he is ignorant of steering, or is a physician if he knows not how to cure? It is impossible, nay, though all the Greeks and barbarians acclaim him as such and load him with many diadems and scepters and tiaras like so many necklaces that are put on castaway children lest they fail of recognition. Therefore, just as one cannot pilot except after the manner of pilots, so no one can be a king except in a kingly way.”

⁴⁴ The standard modern works on ancient theories of kingship include Erwin R. Goodenough, “The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship,” *YCS* 1 (1928): 55–102; L. K. Born, “The Perfect Prince according to the Latin Panegyrists,” *AJP* 55 (1934): 20–35; Oswyn Murray, “Philodemus on the Good King according to Homer,” *JRS* 55 (1965): 161–82; idem, “Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship,” *JTS* 18 (1967): 337–71; Gerhard J. D. Aalders, *Political Thought in Hellenistic Times* (Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 1975); J. J. Farber, “The *Cyropaedia* and Hellenistic Kingship,” *AJP* 100 (1979): 497–514; Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, “The Emperor and his Virtues,” *Historia* 30 (1981): 298–323; idem, “Civilis Princeps: Between Citizen and King,” *JRS* 72 (1982): 32–48. For an important recent study, see chapter 1 “Divine and Human Kingship” in Francis Cairns, *Virgil’s Augustan Epic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

good king followed by references where such elements are found in the *Kingship*

Orations.⁴⁵

Table 4-1. Elements of the Good King in Dio Chrysostom

<i>Stereotypical Elements of the Good King</i>	<i>References in Dio Chrysostom</i>
Pre-eminent in virtue	1.34; 2.18; 3.5, 9, 123; 4.24
A model for imitation in virtue	1.34, 44; 4.124
The imitator of God to reach virtue	1.37–41; 2.7; 3.83
<i>Possessor of the four cardinal virtues:</i>	
Justice (δικαιοσύνη)	1.6, 16, 35, 38, 42; 2.26, 54; 3.5, 7, 10, 32, 58, 60; 4.24, 41, 65, 124
Self-control and abstinence from pleasure (σωφροσύνη)	1.6, 13, 21; 2.12, 54, 75; 3.3, 5, 7, 10, 32, 40, 58–59; 4.6, 21, 83, 101–15.
Wisdom (φρόνησις)	1.6, 26, 77; 3.6, 10, 39, 58; 4.57–58, 70
Warlike ability and courage (ἀνδρεία)	1.4–6; 2.19, 26, 29–31, 34–39, 44–48, 54, 57–65, 74, 77; 3.5, 7, 10, 32, 58, 133–38; 4.7, 24, 31, 76,
<i>Possessor of other virtues:</i>	
Piety (εὐσέβεια)	1.6, 15–16; 2.72; 3.51–54
Mercy, mildness, gentleness, pity (κατοίκτισις, ἐπιείκεια, ἡμερότης, πραότης)	1.5, 7, 82; 2.26, 67, 74–75
Kindness (φιλανθρωπία, εὐεργεσία, εὐνομία) and thus the source of benefits to his people	1.6, 18, 20, 23, 65, 74; 2.26, 75, 77; 3.5, 39, 82–83; 4.24, 65
Hardwork (σπουδή καὶ προθυμία, πόνος), labor	1.21; 2.67; 3.3, 5, 34, 57, 62–69, 73–85, 123–27, 137; 4.24, 112
Generosity, especially toward his friends	1.23–24, 30, 62; 2.26, 75; 3.39; 4.91–100
Foresight (πρόνοια)	3.43, 50, 52; 4.44
Observance of the law and being the living embodiment of the law and supreme lawgiver	1.5–6, 40, 43, 45, 75, 82; 2.75; 3.5, 39
Care for his people (μέριμνα, φροντίς, ἐπιμέλεια)	1.6, 12–13, 17, 21; 2.67; 3.39, 55–57, 62–69.
<i>Because of the care for his people, he is called:</i>	
Their father	1.22; 3.5
Their shepherd	1.13, 17; 2.6; 3.40; 4.43–44
Their savior (σωτήρ)	1.84; 3.6

⁴⁵ The list of stereotypical elements is from Cairns, *Virgil's Augustan Epic*, 19–21.

Lover of his city and its people	1.18, 28
Possessor of the love of his people as his best bodyguard and as the surest foundation of his kingdom	1.20, 35; 3.59, 86–90, 95; 4.8, 64–65
Lover of peace and harmony (ὁμόνοια)	1.6, 75, 82
Of good appearance	1.71, 83; 2.49
Endowed with good advisers and ministers-officials	1.64
Seeing and hearing everything, often through his agents	1.32; 3.87, 104–107
Ensuring that the citizens go about their several tasks	3.62–69, 73–81, 127
Deriving his kingship from Zeus-Jupiter	1.11–12, 45; 2.73–76; 3.62; 4.41

Dio's portrait of the ideal king bears many similarities to the ancient stereotype. The ideal king rules over his own passions, possesses the four cardinal virtues, imitates the kingship of Zeus, and exhibits other-benefiting virtues. He labors diligently on behalf of his people, caring and looking after them as a father, shepherd and savior. Dio, nevertheless, also emphasizes different aspects, not least of which is the importance of friends to a king and the necessity of seeking out loyal friends from all corners of the earth. On a wider socio-political level, this emphasis is related to the increasing role the elite of the Greek East plays in the administration of the Roman Empire. On a personal level, Dio is probably defending his political capital as one of Trajan's trusted friends or attempting to establish himself as one of Trajan's political advisers.⁴⁶

Another difference in Dio's sketch is his de-emphasis on the Hellenistic portrayal of the king as the Animate Law (νόμος ἔμψυχος) and a model of imitation. The

⁴⁶ On the relationship between Roman rulers and their philosophic advisers, see Elizabeth Rawson, "Roman Rulers and the Philosophic Adviser," in *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society* (ed. M. Griffin and J. Barnes; Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 233–57.

Pythagoreans believed in the existence of two laws: “One is living (ἔμψυχος), namely the king, and the other is inanimate, this being the written letter (γράμμα).”⁴⁷ As the Animate Law, the king is a vivid and incarnate representation of the universal law to men,⁴⁸ expressing its qualities and demands through his action and disposition.⁴⁹ As one who is pre-eminent in justice, the king becomes the paragon for all to imitate. This concept of the Animate Law proved to become the official political philosophy of the Hellenistic age and was familiar to both Plutarch and Musonius Rufus.⁵⁰ Although Dio does consider the king to be a law-abiding ruler (νόμιμον ἡγεμόνα; 1.5) and “a judge more observant of the law (νομιμώτερος) than an empanelled jury” (3.5), there is no explicit mention of the king as the Animate Law nor does he place unusual emphasis on the king as a model for imitation.⁵¹ This lack may result from Dio’s prejudice against the crude and uncivilized aspects of certain Roman emperors vis-à-vis the glorious past of the Greeks.⁵² Moreover,

⁴⁷ Archytas, *Περὶ νόμου καὶ δικαιοσύνης* (Holger Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period* [Åbo: Åbo akademi, 1965], 33.8; Stobaeus 4.1.135.8–9; ET David R. Fideler, ed., *The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library: An Anthology of Ancient Writings which relate to Pythagoras and Pythagorean Philosophy* [Compiled and translated by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie with additional translations by Thomas Taylor and Arthur Fairbanks Jr.; Grand Rapids: Phanes, 1987], 191).

⁴⁸ For a general study on the Animate Law in Hellenistic kingship, see Goodenough, “The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship,” 55–102. He remarks that the central meaning of the Animate Law is that “the king is personally the constitution of his realm, that all the laws of localities under him must ultimately be molded by and express his will. But more, he is the savior of his subjects from their sins, by giving them what the Hellenistic world increasingly wanted more than anything else, a dynamic and personal revelation of deity” (91). For a recent discussion, see John W. Martens, *One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law* (Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity 2; Boston: Brill, 2003), 31–66.

⁴⁹ Isocrates, *Demon*. (Or. 1) 36: “Obey the laws which have been laid down by kings, but consider their manner of life (τρόπος) your highest law.”

⁵⁰ Plutarch, *Princ. iner.* 3 (Mor. 780C); Musonius Rufus, *That Kings also Should Study Philosophy* (Stobaeus 4.7.67.97; ET Cora E. Lutz, *Musonius Rufus: “The Roman Socrates”* [YCS 10; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947], 65).

⁵¹ There may be a slight hint in Dio’s orations since his use of νόμιμον ἡγεμόνα is similar to Diotogenes, *Περὶ βασιλείας*: “But the king is Animate Law (νόμος ἔμψυχός), or a legal ruler (νόμιμος ἄρχων)” (Stobaeus 4.7.61.6).

⁵² See Salmeri, “Dio, Rome, and the Civic Life of Asia Minor,” 86–88.

the tyrannical degeneration of the Roman emperorship as witnessed in Nero and Domitian may have led Dio to adopt a more cautious stance toward Trajan. It should, however, be said that although Dio criticized Nero and Domitian,⁵³ his intention was never to overthrow Roman imperial rule.

The education of a king

Dio's portrait of the ideal king establishes the importance not of external titles or acclamations, but of internal virtue, character, and the development of the mind. Even though a ruler may already be endowed with a virtuous nature, he still needs a constant guide who will speak the wisdom of the ancient sages so as to nurture his virtues toward kingly excellence.⁵⁴ Dio is no doubt portraying himself as such an authoritative guide. Unlike Timotheus's music, which proved to be of no help to Alexander (1.8), Dio speaks the wisdom of Aristotle,⁵⁵ Socrates,⁵⁶ Diogenes,⁵⁷ and Homer; unlike Timotheus who only played when Alexander offered sacrifices, Dio hopes to be a constant companion of Trajan who will guide him "to follow peace and concord, to honor the gods and to have consideration for men" (1.6).

⁵³ For example, Dio calls Domitian "an evil demon (δαίμων; *Or.* 45.1)." See also Giovanni Salmeri, *La politica e il potere: saggio su Dione di Prusa* (Quaderni del Siculorum Gymnasium 9; Catania Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, Università di Catania, 1982), 113n. 97; T. Szepessy, "Rhodogune and Ninyas (Comments on Dio Chrysostomos' 21st Discourse)," *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 30 (1987): 355–62.

⁵⁴ *Or.* 1.8: "Only the spoken word of the wise (φρόνιμος) and prudent (σοφός), such as were most men of early times, that can prove a competent and perfect guide and helper of a man endowed with a tractable and virtuous nature (εὐπειθοῦς καὶ ἀγαθῆς φύσεως), and can lead it toward all excellence by fitting encouragement and direction."

⁵⁵ There are similarities between Dio and Aristotle. Just as Aristotle was honored by King Philip and Alexander (2.79), so was Dio by Emperor Nerva and Trajan.

⁵⁶ For a comparison of Dio Chrysostom's and Epictetus's use of the Socratic paradigm, see A. A. Long, *Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), 121–25.

⁵⁷ This point is explicitly made when Dio points out that he, like Diogenes, has "nothing else that demands [his] attention" (4.3).

The education that Dio proposes varies throughout the orations; yet, there is always a focus on character and action. In *Or. 2*, Dio speaks of the need for rhetoric and philosophy.⁵⁸ Rhetoric is needed to enable the king to lead, as Odysseus and Nestor did, not by force but by persuasion.⁵⁹ Philosophy, on the other hand, should be embraced so as to learn how to “live simply and without affectation, to give proof by his very conduct of a character (ἦθος) that is humane (φιλόανθρωπον), gentle (πραῦον), just (δίκαιον), lofty (ύψηλόν), and brave (ἀνδρείον) as well, and above all, one that takes delight in bestowing benefits—a trait which approaches most nearly to the nature divine” (2.26).

In *Or. 4*, Dio speaks of a double education (παιδεία)—the human and the divine.⁶⁰ Human education consists of familiarity with a broad sweep of literature. Although in some ways necessary, such education is primarily for children (4.30) and has value only in relation to the divine—that which is also called true manhood (ἀνδρεία) or high-mindedness (μεγαλοφροσύνη; 4.30–31). Divine education consists of knowledge and truth (4.41) that has its source in the supreme king Zeus (4.27). Humans partake of it by imitating Zeus, “directing and conforming their ways as far as possible to his pattern”

⁵⁸ *Or. 2.24*: “Rhetoric in the true meaning of the term, as well as philosophy, is a proper study for the king.”

⁵⁹ The same can be said of local politicians. Salmeri, “Dio, Rome, and the Civic Life of Asia Minor,” 76, writes, “Political activity in the *poleis* of the Empire did not—and could not—aim very high, but had to concentrate on maintaining the existing equilibria through subtle manoeuvres. Quite naturally, therefore, the study of rhetoric was of great importance for the *politikos anēr*.”

⁶⁰ *Or. 4.29*: “Do you not know that education (παιδεία) is of two kinds, the one from heaven (δαιμόνιος), as it were, the other human (ἀνθρωπίνη)? Now the divine (ἡ θεία) is great and strong and easy, while the human (ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη) is small and weak and full of pitfalls and no little deception; and yet it must be added to the other if everything is to be right.” Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King*, 56, 150–79, asserts that Dio’s double παιδεία has Cynic origins, being similar to Diogenes’s double training (διττῆ ἄσκησις; Diogenes Laertius, 6.70). The Cynic origin is debatable. There is some idea of a “divine” παιδεία in the Heracles-Prometheus dialogue mentioned in a Syriac fragment of Antisthenes preserved by Themistius (J. Gildemeister and F. Bücheler, “Themistios Περί ἀρετῆς,” *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 27

(1.37; see also 3.82). The epithets that are given to Zeus—Father, Protector of Cities, Lord of Friends and Comrades, Guardian of the Race, Protector of Supplicants, God of Refuge, God of Hospitality (1.39–41)—form the functions and tasks of the apprentice king (1.41). In this manner, true kings are “nurtured by Zeus” and become “sons of Zeus,” educated in the same manner as Heracles (4.31). Furthermore, they are called “dear unto Zeus (διφίλους; 4.41)”; and as much as friends are “truly likeminded (ὄμοιοεῖν) and are at variance in nothing” (4.42), true kings who are friends with Zeus and “likeminded with him (ὄμοιοῦν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον)” cannot conceive of any unrighteous desire or design that is wicked and disgraceful (4.43). Divine education and reason from Zeus ultimately produce a good and wise guardian spirit in a king (4.139).⁶¹

Dio stresses the importance and relevance of his counsel via various appeals. Examples from nature and stock heroes and villains play a central role. Positive examples serving as role models include Heracles,⁶² Zeus, the good bull, the king bee, and the sun; negative examples include the tyrant bull and Sardanapallus.⁶³ Using these examples as

[1872]: 450–51). Diogenes’s double training is, however, physical and mental; Dio’s double education is human and divine.

⁶¹ *Or.* 4.139: “But come, let us attain a pure harmony, better than that which we enjoyed before, and extol the good and wise guardian spirit or god—us who the kindly Fates decreed should receive Him when we should have gained a sound education and reason (παιδεία ὑγιής καὶ λόγος).” The meaning of this verse which abruptly ends *Or.* 4 is difficult. Moles, “The Date and Purpose of the Fourth Kingship Oration of Dio Chrysostom,” 255–60, suggests that “the good and wise guardian spirit or god” is polyvalent, denoting simultaneously the “‘good fortune’ (εὐδαιμονία) which men may acquire if they make the right choice in their way of life, and Trajan, the ‘good spirit’ of the Roman empire and Savior God (Θεός), whose accession has allowed ... the spiritual regeneration of the suffering world in general” (260).

⁶² Not only was Heracles a great exemplar of the Cynics, he was also a hero of Trajan. See Jones, *Roman World of Dio Chrysostom*, 117–18.

⁶³ Dio uses Alexander both as a positive and negative paradigm. Criticism of Alexander serves as a gentle warning, and praise of Alexander functions as a compliment to Trajan. This dual use of the Alexandrian paradigm probably arises because Trajan is an acknowledged imitator of Alexander.

teaching tools,⁶⁴ Dio highlights the results consequent on heeding or dismissing his advice. Heracles chooses the right path and is proclaimed “Deliverer (Σωτήρ) of the earth and of the human race” (1.84). The good bull that cares for his herd is “[left] in charge till extreme old age, even after he becomes too heavy of body” (2.74); the tyrant bull, on the other hand, is deposed and killed. Moreover, Dio stresses the permanent and enduring value of his counsel. While external titles and scepters may be taken away, divine education operates in the domain of the soul and its fruits can never be taken away or destroyed even though the physical body is immolated.⁶⁵ Furthermore, while Dio considers kings to be mortals,⁶⁶ he does hold out the possibility that a good king may posthumously come to be accepted as a good spirit (ἀγαθὸς δαίμων) or divine hero (ἥρωας; 3.54).⁶⁷

The strongest appeal that Dio makes in support of his counsel is his assertion of the existence of a principle and power that is superior to the Roman emperor. Dio propounds the Stoic idea of a law that does not derive its authority from the state but from right reason.⁶⁸ There exists only one ordinance and law within the universe—a law

⁶⁴ *Or.* 2.71–72: “Why should we not count this [i.e., the example of the bull] a training and lesson in kingship (παίδευμα καὶ δίδαγμα βασιλικόν) for prudent kings, to teach them that while a king must rule over men; ... yet the gods, who are his superiors, he must follow.”

⁶⁵ *Or.* 4.32: “But if the man were burned, as Heracles is said to have burned himself, yet his principles (τὰ δόγματα) would abide in his soul just as, I believe, the teeth of bodies that have been cremated are said to remain undestroyed though the rest of the body has been consumed by the fire.”

⁶⁶ See *Or.* 1.65. Aalders, *Political Thought in Hellenistic Times*, 25, notes that this was also the opinion of pseudo-Aristeas and the Stoics.

⁶⁷ See also *Or.* 2.78; 32.25–26: “Among these over-lords, then, are included kings, who have been deified for the general safety of their realm, real guardians and good and righteous leaders of the people, gladly dispensing the benefits, but dealing out hardships among their subjects rarely and only as necessity demands, rejoicing when their cities observe order and decorum.”

⁶⁸ For Stoic writers, see Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 11 (*Mor.* 1037F); Marcianus, *Inst.* 1.11.25 (*SVF* 3.314; ET A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* [2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987], 1.432); Cicero, *Resp.* 3.33: “True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal

that has its origin not in the emperor but in Zeus.⁶⁹ Since the cosmos is a community of gods and men, this singular universal ordinance and law governs not only the divine city but all human institutions.⁷⁰ Consequently, kings should comport themselves according to the polity (πολιτεία) established by the universal law.⁷¹ Moreover, Zeus, the supreme king who governs the universe as his house or city (36.36–37), is the final judge who sets up and deposes kings.⁷² The good king derives his authority from Zeus (1.12, 45; 2.72; 4.21–23), gains glory, and enjoys a happy lot (1.45). The tyrant king, on the other hand, suffers ignominy like Phaethon, who attempted to drive the divine chariot but failed

application, unchanging and everlasting.” Malcolm Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 69, writes, “For [Stoics] ... authority is not vested in the state, particularly not the state as we know it ‘on earth.’ The point of their equation of law with right reason is to identify an alternative source for its authority: not the state, but reason. Its effect is to internalize law, making it something like the voice of conscience or ... the moral law within.”

⁶⁹ Dio in *Or.* 4.22 notes that the universe is marshaled in order under one ordinance and law (ὅφ’ ἐνὶ θεσμῷ καὶ νόμῳ). A couple of verses later, the same phrase “ordinance and law” occurs in a genitival relationship to Zeus (τὸν τοῦ Διὸς νόμον τε καὶ θεσμόν; 1.45). See also *Or.* 3.43–44 where Dio follows Aristotle (*Politics* 7.2.7 [1324B]): “Government’ (ἀρχή) is defined as the lawful ordering of men and as oversight over men in accordance with law; ‘monarchy,’ (βασιλεία) as an irresponsible government where the king’s will is law (ὁ νόμος βασιλέως δόγμα).”

⁷⁰ Dio’s conception of the divine city and the kinship of gods and men is more fully brought out in the Borystheniticus discourse (*Or.* 36). See Russell, *Dio Chrysostom Orations VII, XII, and XXXVI*. For Stoic ideas on the divine or cosmic city, see Schofield, *Stoic Idea of the City*, 57–92.

⁷¹ *Or.* 1.42–45: “In consequence of the mutual kingship of ourselves and [the governing purpose which guides the universe], we are marshaled in order under one ordinance and law and partake of the same polity (πολιτεία). He who honors and upholds this polity and does not oppose it in any way is law-abiding, devout and orderly; he, however, who disturbs it ... and violates it or does not know it, is lawless and disorderly, whether he be called a private citizen or ruler, although the offence on the part of the ruler is greater and more evident to all.... The one who, keeping his eyes upon Zeus, orders and governs his people with justice and equity in accordance with the laws and ordinances of Zeus, enjoys a happy lot and a fortunate end.” See also *Or.* 2.70 where the good bull “willingly subordinates himself to reason and intelligence (λογισμῷ καὶ φρονήσει ἐκόντα ὑποταττόμενον).”

⁷² Dio’s admonition on the need of the good king to give the “first and chief place to religion (τὸ θεῖον; 3.51)” supports his argument that there is a power superior to the Roman emperor. The good king believes in gods ἵνα δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχη τοὺς κατ’ ἀξίαν ἄρχοντας “so that he might assure himself that he is under worthy rulers” (contra Cohoon’s LCL translation of “to the end that he too may have worthy governors under him”). See Moles, “The *Kingship Orations*,” 356n. 150.

(1.46).⁷³ Moreover, his reign, or perhaps even his life, will end (1.84). The recent murder of the archetypical tyrant Domitian in 96 C.E. no doubt adds greater weight to Dio's admonition.

The Kingship Orations and concord

The relationship between Dio's *Kingship Orations* and his vision of peace and concord can be seen in five ways.

1. Dio maintains that wise, just, and kind rule will lead to concord while tyrannical rule leads to strife and instability. There is an inextricable relationship between the king and his subjects, between his inner moral character and their well-being. The repercussive effects of the king are seen in the example of the sun; just as the sun would destroy the order of the universe if it strayed from its appointed course,⁷⁴ so also would the king destroy the order and harmony of the kingdom if he did not put on the character of the ideal king. Dio therefore calls upon kings to exercise mastery over self, curb excesses, and display other-benefiting virtue. Through the demonstration of care and concern for his people, through his selfless toil on behalf of the kingdom, through his use of rhetoric rather than force to persuade his people, through his own love for peace

⁷³ This idea is also found in neo-Pythagorean kingship texts. Ecphantus, writes, "For [a king] is judged and approved by [the light of royalty], as is the mightiest of winged creatures, the eagle, set face to face with the sun. Thus royalty is explained in the fact that by its divine character and excessive brilliance it is hard to behold, except for those who have a legitimate claim. For bastard usurpers are confuted by complete bedazzlement, and by such vertigo as assails those who climb to a lofty height" (Goodenough, "The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship," 77). The story of the eagle that forces its young to stare into the sun, regarding as legitimate only those that can withstand its light, is found in Aristotle, *Hist. an.* 9.34; Pliny, *Nat.* 10.3.10. The moral of the story is that only legitimate kings can withstand the bright light of the royal office.

and concord, through the proper administration of justice and fairness, the ideal king provides the conditions and environment necessary for concord to flourish. If the king sets the proper example, then his subordinate governors in the various provinces would follow his lead and govern well. They would not be corrupt officials who interfered in local politics for their own ends, but would provide some measure of freedom so that the cities could manage their own affairs with dignity. Local civic leaders no doubt have to seize the opportunity and ensure that concord prevails in their own respective city, but a central government that embraces the qualities of the ideal king is the prerequisite and basis for establishing peace within the whole empire. As Dio's myth about Heracles and the two peaks reminds us, true royalty (βασιλεια) results in peace (εἰρήνη), tyranny (τυραννίς) leads to factions (στάσις).

2. Dio is aware that certain cities will rebuff opportunities for establishing concord.⁷⁵ They will riot and create disturbances despite the favorable environment provided by the ideal king. In such situations, the natural way to achieve concord is through the personal intervention of the benevolent king. This relationship between ὁμόνοια and the regal beneficence or φιλανθρωπία of the king goes all the way back to Isocrates. When Isocrates could not get the various cities to follow his plan of Hellenic unity, he considered Philip as one who might be able to impose concord upon the Greek

⁷⁴ Or. 3.75: "If [the sun] were to be careless but for a moment and leave his appointed track, absolutely nothing would prevent the whole heavens, the whole earth, and the whole sea from going to wrack and ruin, and all this fair and blissful order from ending in the foulest and most dread disorder."

⁷⁵ See my discussion of Alexandria's failure on page 238.

world, emphasizing his φιλανθρωπία and εὐνομία and describing him as the new Heracles.⁷⁶ John Ferguson remarks concerning this move,

It is at this point that *homonoia* becomes linked with *philanthropia*. Hitherto *homonoia* has been regarded as the natural product of a society in which the citizens practice *philia*. Now it is to be imposed upon the citizens by a ruler whose own motive is *philanthropia*.⁷⁷

Dio's call for the ideal king to imitate Heracles and exhibit φιλανθρωπία and εὐνομία echoes the vision and hope that Isocrates himself had; namely, the desire that the ideal king will exercise his beneficent will upon the fractious cities and usher in a period of stability. Dio is not as sanguine as Isocrates concerning such foreign imposition. The intervention of Roman rule in the local politics of Greek cities is not a favored option, and Dio's speeches to the cities clearly demonstrate this fear. But if there is to be any intervention, Dio would prefer that such invasive policies derived from a beneficent rather than a despotic king, a Savior (Σωτήρ) rather than a Tyrant (Τύραννος).

3. The ideal king is a son of Zeus, educated by him and brought up in the same manner as Heracles. The king honors the gods, believes in the gods, and more important, imitates Zeus and is likeminded with him. Just as Zeus is the god of peace,⁷⁸ the Lord of friends and Comrades, so also should the king embody peace and seek to reconcile all men. Just as Zeus rules and harmonizes the heavenly city, so also should the king rule

⁷⁶ Isocrates, *Phil.* (*Or.* 5) 114: "I do not mean that you will be able to imitate Heracles in all his exploits; for even among the gods there are some who could not do that; but in the qualities of the spirit, in devotion to humanity (τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν), and in the good will (τὴν εὐνοίαν) which he cherished toward the Hellenes, you can come close to his purposes. And it lies in your power, if you will heed my words, to attain whatever glory you yourself desire."

⁷⁷ John Ferguson, *Moral Values in the Ancient World* (London: Methuen & Co, 1958), 122.

⁷⁸ Dio does not call Zeus "God of Peace." Nevertheless, Dio remarks, "Our god is peaceful and altogether gentle, such as befits the guardian of a fraction-free and concordant Hellas" (*Or.* 12.74).

and harmonize the earthly city.⁷⁹ The king-God comparison and its link with ὁμόνοια is a common feature of the political philosophy of Hellenistic kingship, appearing especially in neo-Pythagorean kingship texts. Diotogenes, for example, remarks that the king must worship and imitate the gods, arguing from the assumption that there is a fundamental analogy between the king's function in the state and God's operation of the universe. He writes,

The third characteristic of a king's dignity is the worship of the Gods. The most excellent should be worshipped by the most excellent; and the leader and ruler by that which leads and rules. Of naturally most honorable things, God is the best; but of things on the earth and human, a king is the supreme. As God is to the world, so is a king to his kingdom; and as a city is to the world, so is a king to God (ἔχει δὲ καὶ ὡς θεὸς ποτὶ κόσμον βασιλεὺς ποτὶ πόλιν· καὶ ὡς πόλις ποτὶ κόσμον βασιλεὺς ποτὶ θεόν). For a city, indeed, being organized from things many and various, imitates the organization (σύνταξιν) of the world and its harmony (ἁρμονίαν); but a king whose rule is beneficent, and who himself is animated by law, exhibits the form of God among men.⁸⁰

Note that Diotogenes explains the God-king analogy in the context of harmony, implying that just as God harmonizes the cosmos, so also the king harmonizes the state. But not only does the king harmonize the public affairs of the state, “private matters of detail must [also] be brought into accord with this same harmony and leadership.”⁸¹ The harmony that the king brings about encompasses all relationships within the state. Ecphantus likewise also calls for kings to imitate God, and he goes so far as to remark

⁷⁹ Dio states that concord within the divine city is a pattern offered by Zeus to mortal kings. He writes, “And this [royal governance in complete friendship and concord] is precisely what the wisest and elder ruler and law giver [i.e., Zeus] ordains for all, both mortals and immortals, he who is the leader of all the heaven and lord of all being, himself thus expounding the term and offering his own administration as a pattern (παράδειγμα) of the happy and blessed condition” (36.32).

⁸⁰ Diotogenes, *Concerning a Kingdom* in Thesleff, *Pythagorean Texts*, 72.15–23; Stobaeus 4.7.61.27–39; ET Fideler, *Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library*, 222.

that the ruler of the earth and the ruler of the universe share a certain communion of virtue.⁸² Through the exercise of such virtue, the king produces harmony in his city in imitation of the harmony of the cosmos.⁸³

4. The ideal king values friendship and carefully selects his friends. The link between friendship and concord is clear. Dio defines *φιλία* as *ὁμόνοια*,⁸⁴ and at times uses the two terms interchangeably.⁸⁵ The cultivation of personal friends therefore constantly reminds the king in an intimate manner concerning the importance of peace and concord. Moreover, these actions of the king function as illustrative paradigms, impressing upon his subjects the necessity of fostering friendship among themselves. A more important political role that friends can play in advancing concord is to assist the king in maintaining control of the kingdom.⁸⁶ Dio remarks that friends are necessary to control the weapons of war; friends are allies, functioning as extensions of the king's own body; and friends must be selected from all corners of the empire. With the development of a network of friends who have political leverage in the various local governments

⁸¹ Diotogenes, *Concerning a Kingdom* in Thesleff, *Pythagorean Texts*, 72.11–13; Stobaeus 4.7.61.24–25; ET Goodenough, “The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship,” 67.

⁸² Ecphantus, *On Kings*: “Now as an earthly king is something foreign and external, inasmuch as he descends to men from the heavens, so likewise his virtues may be considered as works of God and descending upon him from divinity” (Thesleff, *Pythagorean Texts*, 81.10–13; Stobaeus 4.7.64.60–63; ET Fideler, *Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library*, 258).

⁸³ Ecphantus, *On Kings*: “The friendship (*φιλία*) existing in a city, and possessing a certain common end, imitates the concord (*ὁμόνοια*) of the universe. No city could be inhabited without an institution of magistrates. To effect this, however, and to preserve the city, there is a necessity of laws, a political domination, and a governor and the governed. All this happens for the general good, for unanimity, and the consent of the people in harmony with organic efficiency” (Thesleff, *Pythagorean Texts*, 81.22–26; Stobaeus 4.7.64.75–80; ET Fideler, *Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library*, 258).

⁸⁴ *Or.* 38.15: “And what is friendship save concord among friends?”

⁸⁵ *Or.* 38.8. For the phrase *φιλία καὶ ὁμόνοια*, see *Or.* 26.8; 34.45; 36.32; 38.15; 40.36, 37; 41.13.

⁸⁶ See Richard P. Saller, *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 73–78, for a discussion on the relationship between imperial *benefica* and social

throughout the vast reaches of the empire, the ideal king is then able to exercise full control. The friends of the ideal king can therefore function as imperial agents or personal envoys in establishing the beneficent rule of the king. Although the direction of influence generally flows downstream from the king to his friends in the local provinces, the reverse is also true. These same friends may ask for favors and bring grievances against corrupt provincial governors, quelling the restlessness of the local citizens and arresting any pernicious development of discontent before it develops into riotous disorder.

5. Apart from general notions of promoting concord, Dio's vision of peace should also be situated within the more specific context of promoting Greek vitality under Roman rule. In the *Kingship Orations*, Dio appropriates traditional Greek thought to address a non-Greek monarch, demonstrating the importance and relevance of Hellenic culture to the Roman Empire. Greek παιδεία is the essential element of stability and good rule; Greek philosophy and poetry by Aristotle, Socrates, Diogenes, and Homer are fundamental for developing kingly excellences; and Hellenistic theories of kingship are the proper scales to evaluate Roman Emperors.⁸⁷ Through such means, Dio attempts to build a symbiotic relationship between Greek cities and Rome, arguing that Greek wisdom is the handmaiden to Roman *imperium*.⁸⁸

cohesion. See also Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage in Roman Society: From Republic to Empire," in *Patronage in Ancient Society* (ed. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill; London: Routledge, 1989), 63–87.

⁸⁷ Murray, "Philodemus on the Good King according to Homer," 161–82, also notes that Philodemus is another author who crafted Hellenistic kingship discourses to the Roman world. Philodemus, however, paid more attention to the Roman Republic and conceived of kings in the plural, as Homer did, rather than in the singular.

⁸⁸ Whitmarsh, *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire*, 211.

The Concord Orations Delivered in Bithynia

Although issues of concord and peace do occur in other orations,⁸⁹ the Bithynian orations especially *Orations* 38–41 and 48 specifically treat these topics, containing within the entire *corpus Dioneum* the highest occurrences of key lexemes such as εἰρήνη, ὁμονοέω, and ὁμόνοια.⁹⁰ *Oration* 38 addresses inter-city concord between Nicomedia and Nicaea, and *Orations* 40–41 address the same issue between Prusa and Apameia. *Oration* 39 addresses intra-city concord or civil strife in Nicaea; *Oration* 48 in Prusa. In this section, I examine *Or.* 38–41 and 48 individually,⁹¹ noting the causes for discord and the appeals and strategies that Dio employs. I end with some observations on Dio’s rationale and motivation for concord.

Concord between cities

The longest and most important speech delivered by Dio on concord is that addressed to Nicomedia (*Or.* 38) concerning its rivalry with neighboring Nicaea. Both cities were economically important within the Roman Empire: Nicomedia for its harbor and Nicaea for its strategic location on an important trade route. Furthermore, Nicomedia was considered the metropolis (μητρόπολις) of the district, and Nicaea was honored with the title “First” (πρώτη). Domitian, however, allowed Nicomedia to add “First” to its other titles. Nicomedia subsequently wanted exclusive rights, demanding that Nicaea no longer

⁸⁹ Others include *To the People of Alexandria* (*Or.* 32), the *Second Tarsic Discourse* (*Or.* 34), and the fragmentary and incomplete *Concerning Peace and War* (*Or.* 22).

⁹⁰ Εἰρήνη occurs 11 times in *Or.* 38–41, 48 out of a total of 43 occurrences in the entire corpus, ὁμόνοια 40 out of 56, and ὁμονοέω 11 out of 19.

⁹¹ Although I primarily focus on *Or.* 38–41, 48, I will reference other orations when necessary.

be allowed to use this title.⁹² The bitter dispute between the two cities therefore centered on the issue of primacy (πρωτεῖον), the desire to be “First.”

Dio attempts to diffuse the animosity between the two cities, reminding the Nicomedians of the futility of war and enmity (38.20–21), and declaring that the reason for their strife is foolish. They are behaving like “foolish children” since their dispute is not over land, sea, or revenue, but over trifles.⁹³ Their quest for titles is fundamentally nothing but petty boasting; and even if they were to obtain the primacy, their victory would not result in any increase in economic revenue, legislative authority, or military power (38.26). Implicit in Dio’s statement is the acknowledgment that ultimate authority and power lie in the Roman Empire; inter-city feuds between Greek cities are therefore futile and pointless.⁹⁴ Dio appeals, as Aelius Aristides also does (*Or.* 23.42–52; 24.25–26), to the historical example of Athens and Sparta, illustrating the foolishness of such a dispute. Both cities went to war over primacy, but both lost it in the end (38.25). Instead of titles, what Nicomedia should strive for is *true* primacy, showing concern for the welfare of the whole Bithynian people, expressing indignation at wrongs inflicted not only on her citizens but also on others, and giving aid to those who seek shelter. Nicomedia should endeavor to be first in essence rather than in name. Dio remarks, “some one really is first,

⁹² See Louis Robert, “La Titulature de Nicée et de Nicomédie: La Gloire et La Haine,” *HSCP* 81 (1977): 1–39, as cited in Jones, *Roman World of Dio Chrysostom*, 84.

⁹³ *Or.* 38.21: “The prize for which this evil is endured is a mere nothing and the supposed issues are both small and trifling and it is not fitting even for private persons to squabble over them, much less cities or such importance.” See also 38.37–40.

⁹⁴ Feuding cities may imagine that their dispute over titles and primacy is necessary to advance the political ladder, but Dio tells the Tarsians that “whether it is a question of Aegeans quarrelling with you, or Apameans with men of Antioch, or to go farther afield, Smyrnaeans with Ephesians, it is an ass’s shadow ... over which they squabble; for the right to lead and to wield authority belongs to others [i.e., Rome]” (34.48).

and no matter if another wears the title, first he is. For titles are not guarantees of facts, but facts of titles” (38.40). As in the *Kingship Orations*, Dio stresses the importance of character, albeit not that of an individual but of an entire citizenry, vis-à-vis external titles.⁹⁵

Dio calls Nicomedia to reconciliation with Nicaea, underlining the many elements that both cities share in common and that should lead to concord. There is interchange of produce, intermarriage, close family ties, and warm personal friendships that unite the two cities. They worship the same gods, conduct festivals in the same manner, cherish the same customs, and conduct the same religious rites.⁹⁶ Moreover, they are both Hellenes. Dio bases his call for unity on the premise of a common Greek identity, arguing that they should not “fight [among themselves] like Greeks against barbarians” (38.46). Apart from appeals to things that both groups have in common, Dio also appeals to the advantages and benefits of reconciliation. Instead of constantly soliciting support from smaller cities in their bid to gain legitimacy regarding their primacy, the unified cities of Nicomedia and Nicaea will be able to exercise greater influence over other cities. Provincial governors will also not be able to exploit tensions between them (38.36–37).⁹⁷

⁹⁵ *Or.* 38.30–31: “Men of Nicomedia, what do you want? To be first in very truth, or to be called first when you are not? ... For names have not the force of facts; whereas things that are in very truth of a given nature must also of necessity be so named. Try, therefore, to hold first place among our cities primarily on the strength of your solicitude for them—for since you are a metropolis, such indeed is your special function—and then too by showing yourselves fair and moderate toward all, and by not being grasping in any matter or trying to gain your end by force.”

⁹⁶ *Or.* 38.22: “We have everything in common—ancestors, gods, customs, festivals, and, in the case of most of us, personal ties of blood and friendship”; 38.46: “You worship the same gods as they do, and in most cases you conduct your festivals as they do.”

⁹⁷ The provincial assembly (*koinon*) mediated between the cities and the Roman governor, and had the authority to press charges against bad governors. Dio’s point here is that if cities continue feuding, the governor, by the issuance of titles, is able to ally himself with the Nicaean or the Nicomedian

Moreover, there will be a doubling of resources available to each city. Manpower is doubled, honors are doubled, and services are doubled as the rich in one city will also be able to pay for the public expenses in the other.⁹⁸ Furthermore, the restoration of judicial relationships between the two cities will only raise the moral standards of its citizens since miscreants from one city cannot hope to obtain refuge in the other. “Once concord is achieved, persons must be men of honor and justice or else get out of Bithynia” (38.42).

Dio offers a further inducement, noting that concord between both cities can be permanently maintained once reconciliation is achieved. He remarks that the greatest guarantee for concord’s permanence is its expediency (38.49). If the Nicomedians have been persuaded by Dio’s reasons, they will be all the more inclined to maintain concord when these very reasons are supported by actual experiences. The inculcation of habits conducive toward concord will also make it difficult for them to stray from the path on which they have begun. Moreover, Dio is confident that the prime concern of the gods is the preservation of concord. He therefore ends the oration with a prayer that the Nicomedians will heed his words (38.51).

While Nicomedia and Nicaea were major cities in Bithynia, Prusa and Apameia were relatively insignificant. Dio held citizenships in both cities,⁹⁹ and *Or.* 40–41 demonstrate how one man with ties to both cities could be called to function as a

party in the provincial assembly, thereby escaping any punishment. Dio ironically remarks that “despite the wrongs [the governor] commits, he is protected by those who believe they alone are loved by him” (38.36–37).

⁹⁸ *Or.* 38.42: “When all resources have been united—crops, money, official dignities for men, and military forces—the resources of both cities are doubled.”

⁹⁹ Dio also held citizenship in Rome, Nicomedia (38.1), and other cities (41.2). He was honored in Nicaea (39.1), but it is not clear if this honor included citizenship.

mediator. The nature of the dispute between the two cities is not clear, but it probably involved land and territorial boundaries (40.30). In *On Concord with the Apameians* (Or. 40) delivered in his native city, Dio first attempts to obtain the goodwill of his audience, disarming criticism regarding his public construction projects (40.5–12) and the perceived lack of success in securing favors from Trajan (40.13–15). He then moves into the main thrust of his oration, appealing for concord and noting the common bonds and close relationships between the two cities. Prusa and Apameia share the same borders and the same constitutions.¹⁰⁰ Their citizens intermingle freely, share ties of marriage, and some like Dio even hold honorary citizenships in both cities (40.22, 27). Moreover, Dio argues that it is much better when meeting for joint festivals, spectacles, and religious sacrifices that participants of both cities can come together in unison with prayers, sacrifices, and acclamations rather than with abuses and curses.¹⁰¹ Dio is no doubt aware that large gatherings such as religious festivals, chariot races, or gladiatorial shows can suddenly turn violent.¹⁰² Although Dio does not go so far as Plutarch in recommending the ban of all “free exhibitions which excite and nourish the murderous

¹⁰⁰ Both Prusa and Apameia ultimately share the same founder in Prusias 1 of Bithynia. See A. H. M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), 151.

¹⁰¹ Or. 40.28: “And how much better it is for those who are entertained away from home to be received without distrust, and how much better and more sensible it is at the common religious gatherings and festivals, and spectacles to mingle together, joining with one another in common sacrifice and prayer, rather than the opposite, cursing and abusing one another. And how different are the shouts of the partisans of each of two cities in the stadium and the theatre, when uttered in praise and generous acclamation, from the cries which are uttered in hatred and abuse!”

¹⁰² See especially Or. 32 where Dio attacks the Alexandrians for their frivolity and uncontrollable passion for races and music. For example, 32.31: “But of the people of Alexandria what can one say, a folk to whom you need only throw plenty of bread and a ticket to the hippodrome, since they have no interest in anything else?”; 32.59: “But at present, if you merely hear the twang of the harp-string, as if you had heard the call of a bugle, you can no longer keep the peace.”

and brutal or the scurrilous and licentious spirit,”¹⁰³ his appeal for reconciliation mitigates the possibility of violent riots. Dio continues his call for concord and reminds his audience of the economic benefits of such a friendship. The geography of Prusa and Apameia necessitates such a partnership. Prusa needs the port of Apameia for its imports and exports, while Apameia turns to Prusa for its lumber (40.30). A breakdown in relations will only stunt economic growth.

Dio presses his case for concord by appeal to examples of harmonious relationships found in nature. Humans should learn from the birds, ants, bees, goats, sheep, cattle, and horses that are able to work together quietly. Apart from the animal kingdom, Dio also points to the cosmos (40.40–41). The heavens and the planets possess an “order (τάξις) and concord (ὁμόνοια) and self-control (σωφροσύνη) which is eternal” (40.35); the elements—air, earth, fire, and water—preserve not only themselves but the entire universe through their reasonableness and moderation; the sun and the moon make way for each other; the planets in their course above do not get in each other’s way (40.38); and the earth, the atmosphere, and the ether are all content in their respective locations to one another (40.39). Dio uses numerous Stoic cosmological terms (στοιχεῖον, ἁρμονία, συμπαθής, ἐπικράτησις αἰθέρος, ἀήρ, πῦρ θεῖον),¹⁰⁴ applying Stoic metaphysical theory to make the case that “earthly Homonoia is grounded in that heavenly concord which is both its inspiration and goal.”¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, Dio appears to argue that earthly

¹⁰³ Plutarch, *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 30 (*Mor.* 822C).

¹⁰⁴ Harris, “Moral and Political Ideas of Dio Chrysostom,” 174n. 5. See also Stanton, “Sophists and Philosophers,” 360.

¹⁰⁵ Harris, “Moral and Political Ideas of Dio Chrysostom,” 175. See *Or.* 40.39: “Now if these beings, strong and great as they are, submit to their partnership with one another and continue free from

and heavenly concords may impinge upon one another in the cosmic realm. Earthly greed and strife as a manifestation of the violation of the law of reason “contains the utmost risk of ruin, [but it is] a ruin destined never to engulf the entire universe for the reason that complete peace and righteousness are present in it and all things everywhere serve and attend upon the law of reason, obeying and yielding to it” (40.37). The inevitability of concord in the greater processes of the natural universe renders any dispute between Prusa and Apameia pointless.¹⁰⁶ It is also perhaps this confidence in the ultimate certainty of peace and concord that gives Dio the perseverance and stamina to continue his divine mission of urging reconciliation.

The short address of *Or.* 41 is the sequel to *Or.* 40. Here, Dio speaks before the Council of Apameia as a member of the Prusan delegation sent to finalize the terms of reconciliation between the two cities. This oration shares many of the same characteristics as the previous orations. For example, it contains as in *Or.* 40 an *exordium* where Dio disarms his critics and establishes goodwill with his audience, averring his love, gratitude and loyalty to Apameia. But there are two significant aspects in this oration. First, Dio urges concord by appealing to the foundational story of the city. Although it is difficult to eliminate strife that has nurtured for a long time, Dio expresses faith in the impeccable pedigree of the Apameians. He states, “I have confidence in the character of your city, believing it to be, not rough and boorish, but in very truth the genuine character of those distinguished men and that blessed city (Rome) by which you

hostility, cannot such puny, petty towns (πολίχνια) of ordinary mortals, such feeble tribes (ἔθνη) dwelling in a mere fraction of the earth, maintain peace and quiet and be neighbors to one another without uproar and disturbance?”

were sent here” (41.9).¹⁰⁷ As a planted colony of Rome,¹⁰⁸ Apameia shares the same genetic material as the great city that is “superior in fairness and benevolence” and that safeguards “justice for all alike” (41.9). Nevertheless, Dio exhorts the Apameians to continue to emulate the excellence of Rome and show themselves to be “gentle and magnanimous” in extending reconciliation (41.10). Furthermore, Dio reminds his audience of the foundational purpose of their city: they were “sent here [by Rome] as friends indeed to dwell with friends [i.e., the Prusans]” (41.9). The development and prolongation of inter-city strife not only nullifies the original mission of their city but may also invite unnecessary attention from the Roman authorities.

Second, Dio’s stress on the common bond between Prusa and Apameia shares many similar motifs of the other orations such as common borders, festivals, and gods. Nevertheless, *Or.* 41 contains one of the most succinct and developed statements, not least of which is its repeated emphasis on “one.” He writes,

You should show yourselves gentle and magnanimous toward men who are so close to you, virtually housemates, and not harsh and arrogant neighbors, since they are men with whom you have common ties of wedlock, offspring, civic institutions, sacrifices to the gods, festive assemblies, and spectacles; moreover, you are educated together with them individually, you feast with them, you entertain each other, you spend the greater portion of your time together, you are almost one community (εἷς δῆμος), one city (μία πόλις) only slightly divided. (41.10)

¹⁰⁶ Swain, *Hellenism and Empire*, 203.

¹⁰⁷ Dio adjusts his message to suit his rhetorical function. He can criticize Rome (for example, *Or.* 36.17), and he can sing her praise before Greeks. As John Moles, “Dio Chrysostom, Greece, and Rome,” in *Ethics and Rhetoric: Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday* (ed. D. Innes et al; Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 192, remarks, “It is a matter of practical moralism, not inconsistency.” See also Swain, *Hellenism and Empire*, 206–25.

¹⁰⁸ Apameia became a Roman colony in the Roman Triumviral period with the name Colonia Julia Concordia Apameia. See David Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor: To the End of the Third Century After Christ* (2 vols.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 2:1268n. 34; Jones, *Roman World of Dio Chrysostom*, 91.

Concord within a city

Or. 39 was delivered in Nicaea and celebrates the cessation of civil strife. The text provides no specific clue as to the nature of the disturbance. Dio's illustrations of domestic discord as disputes between a ship's skipper and his crew, or a chariot's driver and his horses, however, suggest that there was disagreement between the Council (βουλή) and the Assembly (δῆμος). Such disagreements occurred in other cities of Asia Minor, and reflected disputes between different socio-economic classes since the rich typically controlled the Council while the poor had access only to the Assembly.¹⁰⁹

Dio first congratulates the citizens for the restoration of civic order, rejoicing to find them “wearing the same costume (ἐν σχῆμα), speaking the same language (μίαν φωνήν), and desiring the same things” (39.3). Such congratulatory remarks serve the dual purpose of eliciting goodwill between speaker and audience, and providing positive reinforcement toward the desired behavior. Appealing to the foundational myth of Nicaea that claimed Dionysius as its progenitor and Heracles as its founder, Dio further notes,

¹⁰⁹ In the *Second Tarsic Discourse* (*Or.* 34), there were divisions between the Assembly, Council, and the Elders, with each group seeking their own advantage. Moreover, there were riots led by the marginalized group of linen workers. For this and other similarly excluded groups, see Ramsay MacMullen, *Roman Social Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 59–60. A common cause of civil unrest in various cities is hunger and the shortage of bread. In *Or.* 46, the mob in Prusa attacked the properties of Dio out of a general dislike for the rich, accusing him of manipulating the grain market and not doing enough to alleviate the situation.

It is fitting that those whose city was founded by gods should maintain peace and concord and friendship toward one another.... For founders, kinsmen, and progenitors who are gods desire their own people to possess nothing—neither beauty of country nor abundance of crops nor multitude of inhabitants—so much as sobriety, virtue, orderly government (πολιτείαν νόμιμον), honor for the good citizens and dishonor for the base. (39.2)

Since concord has its genesis in the divine, and since perfect peace and friendship exists between the gods, it is expected that such excellence should be the defining character of a city founded by the gods. Indeed, Dio remarks that such a city should consider the typical advantages of economic wealth and fortune as nothing compared to orderliness and virtue.

Dio then stresses the importance of continued peace for Nicaea, proceeding with a total of eleven rhetorical questions that demonstrate the benefits of domestic concord. A concordant city is wiser and more enchanting; it functions more smoothly, and is less likely to fail; its blessings are sweeter, afflictions lighter, and difficulties more rare; it is dearer to its people, more honored by strangers, and more formidable to its foes; its judgment is considered more noble and right, its praise more trustworthy, and its censure more truthful; it wins the admiration of rulers, and it gains the ear of the gods (39.3–4). Dio moreover states that domestic concord provides a stronger defense than any edifice or structure. Using the metaphor of a body, Dio argues that when a city has concord, as many citizens as there are, so many are the ears with which to hear, the eyes with which to see, the tongues with which to advice, and the minds with which to be

concerned about the common good of the city (39.5).¹¹⁰ Furthermore, concord enhances the strengths of a city—abundance of riches, size of the population, honors, fame, and power. If concord is lacking, such blessings are detrimental to a city, and “the more abundant they are, so much the greater and more grievous the loss” (39.5–6). For example, any ship with discord between a skipper and his crew will find it difficult to reach port safely. A ship that has more sails, however, will face a much greater risk of danger due to the increased speed. Finally, Dio ends with a prayer to the gods that they may “implant in this city a yearning for itself, a passionate love, a singleness of purpose, a unity of wish and thought; and on the other hand, that they may cast out strife and contentiousness and jealousy, so that this city may be numbered among the most prosperous and the noblest for all time to come” (39.8).

The occasion for *Or.* 48 is the visit of the newly appointed proconsul of Bithynia, Varenus Rufus. The people of Prusa intended to use their recently regained right of public assembly to present complaints against certain fellow townsmen. These charges appear to involve the upper strata of Prusa’s society (“the Council, ... the leaders of the government, [and] the duly elected officials” [48.9]) who were accused of embezzling state funds (48.9) or procrastinating the payment of pledges for building projects (48.11). Dio addresses the assembly and pleads with them not to use the proconsul’s visit as an opportunity to air their grievances. Instead of appearing as a fractious and riotous city, they are to “show [themselves] temperate and well-behaved in assembly, and first and

¹¹⁰ See also *Or.* 34.45: “For to vie with the whole world in behalf of justice and virtue, and to take the initiative in friendship and harmony, and in these respects to surpass and prevail over all others, is the noblest of all victories and the safest too.”

foremost, ... to adorn [themselves] with mutual friendship and concord” (48.2). The city must show itself to be “of one mind, on terms of friendship with itself and one in feeling, united in conferring both censure and praise” (48.6).

Dio’s call for domestic concord is no doubt driven in part by his concern for his native city. Internal strife weakens the honor and status of the city and its citizens, presenting opportunities for their adversaries to ridicule them (48.5). Internal strife is also likened to discordant noise produced by bad musical instruments that “[emit] two kinds of notes and sounds as a result of twofold and varied natures” (48.7); in such dissonance is “found not only contempt and misfortune but also utter impotence both among themselves [i.e., between Council and Assembly] and in their dealings with the proconsuls” (48.7). Internally, domestic strife destroys the political status quo such that the city is no longer able to function as a cohesive unit; externally, domestic strife draws the ire and unnecessary attention of the Roman authorities. Moderate civil dissent may harm the prospects of obtaining favors from the Emperor; extreme riotous behavior, however, may lead to the personal intervention of the Roman proconsul or Emperor and the loss of freedom to gather in public assembly.¹¹¹

Although Dio’s call for domestic concord functions to maintain the honor, autonomy, and integrity of the city, it nevertheless can also be read as a political ploy to guarantee the continued power of the nobles and the upper class. The preservation of cordial relationships with the Roman government is generally beneficial to all, but

¹¹¹ For another example of Dio’s fear of Roman intervention, see *Or.* 46.14: “Just as relatives denounce to the teachers the children who are too disorderly at home, so also the misdeeds of the

clearly more important to the elite. The poor in dire straits do not have much to lose if they ravage properties belonging to the nobles and attract the attention of the Roman authorities with their riotous behavior. The upper class, on the other hand, risks its entire social and economic well-being if the Roman proconsuls personally intervene in the internal affairs of the city. Dio therefore urges the Assembly not to destroy the proconsul's perception regarding the peaceful character of their city (48.2). Those who criticize their fellow townsmen are no better than outsiders and foreigners who revile the citizens as rapacious and untrustworthy (48.4–5). Even if the nobles are tardy in providing funds for the public projects, Dio reminds the people that what makes a city truly beautiful are not markets, theaters, or gymnasiums, but ultimately moral character such as self-control, friendship, and mutual trust (48.9). Finally, Dio warns that domestic discord will lead to a loss of independence and the imposition of stability from outsiders. He cites the example of the Athenians at the close of the Peloponnesian War who “reached the point of not being satisfied with their own leaders, but, just as in the case of incurable diseases, require physicians from abroad. Then comes what happens with intractable horses—when the bit fails to hold them in check, a curb is put upon them from without” (48.13). The “physicians from abroad” was the Spartan Lysander and the “curb” his occupying garrisons.¹¹²

communities are reported to the proconsuls.” See also MacMullen, *Enemies of the Roman Order*, 163–91, for a general discussion of urban unrest and intervention by Roman authorities.

¹¹² See Donald Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

The rationale for concord

In his speeches to the cities, Dio appeals for domestic concord by emphasizing its worth and the various social, political, and economic benefits it provides. We, however, also suggested above that such appeals can be interpreted as political maneuvers to maintain the status quo of the socio-economic strata within a city, protecting the power bases of the nobility while fostering a compliant mindset among the poor. A. R. R. Sheppard writes that “concord and conformism have become inescapable conditions of civic life in the Antonine age.”¹¹³ He also remarks that in Dio’s speeches, “good order is presented in terms of obedience to established leaders and conformity to moral and cultural norms handed down by that leadership.”¹¹⁴

While Dio’s appeal for concord exhibits advantages for the elite, it cannot be read *solely* as exploitative propaganda to maintain control over the poor. Like Plutarch, Dio realizes that Roman intervention may also result from the “greed and contentiousness of the foremost citizens,”¹¹⁵ and he is quite willing to attack the aristocracy that are intent only in fulfilling their own ambitions and self-interests (34.28–37).¹¹⁶ Moreover, Dio advocates the exercise of reason (48.17) and flexibility in the resolution of disputes between the leadership and the poor. Both sides must compromise and adopt a give and take approach.¹¹⁷ Dio’s handling of the “linen workers’ riot” in the *Second Tarsic Oration* (*Or.*

¹¹³ A. R. R. Sheppard, “HOMONOIA in the Greek Cities of the Roman Empire,” *Ancient Society* 15–17 (1984–86): 251.

¹¹⁴ Sheppard, “HOMONOIA in the Greek Cities of the Roman Empire,” 251.

¹¹⁵ Plutarch, *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 19 (*Mor.* 815A).

¹¹⁶ See also *Or.* 34.29 where Dio attacks civic leaders who are elected not on the basis of their leadership abilities but on their wealth and family connections.

¹¹⁷ Plutarch, *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 19 (*Mor.* 815A–B) also calls for compromise: “The statesman should soothe the ordinary citizens by granting them equality and the powerful by concessions in return, thus

34) is illustrative. Although most of the linen workers (λινουργοί) were born in Tarsus and were even second or third generation Tarsians, they were excluded from citizenship as a class even if they were able to pay the 500 drachmas necessary to become full citizens. The group as a whole was ostracized and reviled, ranked lower than other artisans such as dyers, cobblers, or carpenters (34.23). Dio's bold advice to the assembly in this explosive conflict is to grant full citizenship to the guild,¹¹⁸ arguing that one's occupation should not be cause for reproach (34.21–23).¹¹⁹ Dio's advocacy on behalf of the disenfranchised should, however, not make us imagine that he always presents himself as the champion of the poor.¹²⁰ When the occasion necessitates, Dio does what is politically expedient and denies favoring the poor. Speaking before the council (and not before the populace), Dio justifies himself and remarks, "If I did pity the commons at the time when they were subjects for pity, and if I tried my best to ease their burdens, this is no sign that I am on more friendly terms with them than with you [i.e., the nobles]" (*Or.* 50.3).¹²¹

Domestic discord can arise either from aristocratic rivalries or popular disquiet, and Dio addresses both groups as the need arises. Dio railed against aristocratic indulgences, and he also called the populace to obedience. But note that the call to

keeping them within the bounds of the local government and solving their difficulties as if they were diseases, making for them, as it were, a sort of political medicine."

¹¹⁸ The guild probably only included the shopkeepers and not the workmen. See Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, 1:178–79.

¹¹⁹ See also *Or.* 43.7 where Dio claims to have spoken for the poor.

¹²⁰ Karin Blomqvist, *Myth and Moral Message in Dio Chrysostom: A Study in Dio's Moral Thought, with a Particular Focus on his Attitudes towards Women* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1989), 228, suggests that there is a change in Dio's portrayal of the poor. The earlier discourses, such as *Or.* 11, display a certain contempt for the poor; the later discourses, such as *Or.* 1, 7, and 61, contrast the noble poor vis-à-vis the evil rich.

¹²¹ See also *Or.* 50.4: "Again, if I have said that the commons were subjects for pity, let no one assume that I mean they have been treated unfairly and illegally."

obedience is specifically couched as “obedience to your men of character” (44.10). What was fundamental to Dio’s program of civic concord is the quality of its leaders. In a speech delivered before the Council of Prusa, Dio states that “man is most hostile of all toward a bad ruler, though most kindly of all toward one who is good” (49.2). Concord can best be established by one who possesses moral excellence and character, and knows the art of ruling: the philosopher king.¹²² The ideal city statesman is here assimilated to the ideal king in Dio’s *Kingship Orations*. Whether one rules over all mankind or just over a city, moral excellence and character is the necessary requisite.

Dio’s appeal for domestic and inter-city concord is grounded in a complex of reasons: the preservation of social order and cultural norms, the gain of economic benefits, and the doubling of resources and manpower. But apart from these political benefits applicable only to individual cities, Dio has a larger vision of cultivating Greek honor, unity, and autonomy under the hegemony of Roman rule.¹²³ Dio is acutely aware of the failure of Athens and Sparta, alluding to this negative historical example multiple times in his speeches to the cities. He also expresses shame and humiliation that the Romans consider discord and strife to be a particular “Greek failing” (Ἑλληνικὰ

¹²² Or. 49.3: “But he who is really a philosopher will be found to be devoting himself to no other task than that of learning how he will be able to rule well, whether it be ruling himself or a household or the greatest state or, in short, all mankind.”

¹²³ Contra Salmeri, “Dio, Rome, and the Civic Life of Asia Minor,” 77, who dismisses its importance. He writes, “Although, of course, it was also a matter of safeguarding Greek honor, it was in the first place more specifically political considerations that led Dio in his appeals for *homonoia*, which he saw as a guarantee for the continued power of the notables, his peers, and for that degree of the autonomy the *poleis* might still enjoy under the Empire.”

ἀμαρτήματα).¹²⁴ In contrast to this negative view, Dio argues that concord and its corresponding virtues should actually be the heart of true Hellenism. For example, he urges the citizens of Prusa to make “[their] city truly Hellenic, free from turmoil, and stable, and in devoting [their] native shrewdness and courage and intelligence to greater and finer things, while refraining from discord and confusion and conflict with one another so far as possible” (44.10). Moreover, Dio’s appeal for inter-city concord generally centers on various common elements shared by the two cities: common borders, interchange of produce, personal ties of friendship. But a central element that Dio constantly draws upon is the common Greek identity shared by the different Hellenic cities. These include the same customs, the same religious rites, the same gods, and the same history.¹²⁵ Furthermore, while many of Dio’s concord speeches are delivered in Bithynia, Dio envisions a Greek unity that involves more than the Bithynian province. The scale of Dio’s dream is reflected in his argument for a grander vision of Hellenic unity than just concord between Nicomedia and Nicaea. Speaking before the Nicomedians, Dio waxes eloquently: “Oh that it were possible for you to make even the Ephesians your brothers! Oh that the edifices of Smyrna too might have been shared by you!” (38.47). Dio’s dream of Hellenic unity encompasses the whole of Asia Minor!¹²⁶

¹²⁴ *Or.* 38.38: “In truth such marks of distinction [i.e., discord and strife], on which you plume yourselves, not only are objects of utter contempt in the eyes of all persons of discernment, but especially in Rome they excite laughter and, what is still more humiliating, are called ‘Greek failings!’”

¹²⁵ Instances where Dio clearly alludes to the Greek identity of his audience include *Or.* 31.18, 157–9; 32.65; 33.1; 38.22, 46; 39.1, 8 (where Dio appeals only to Greek gods); 43.3; 44.9; 48.8; 50.2.

¹²⁶ Dio’s vision echoes Isocrates’ Panhellenism, a Hellenism that went beyond the borders of Athens and Greece. See Isocrates, *De pace* 16.

Dio's desire for Greek vitality bumps against the geopolitical reality of the first century CE. He is no doubt acutely aware that the Greek cities are firmly in Roman rule, and he employs a threefold strategy in his civic speeches to salvage some semblance of Greek honor and freedom.

1. Apart from external factors such as the provision of a favorable Roman imperial policy as indicated in the *Kingship Orations*, Dio recognizes that individual Greek cities have their own part to play. They must maintain concord and civic order so as to mitigate the possibility of Roman intervention.¹²⁷ In *Or.* 32, Dio chides the Alexandrians for their reckless disorder that led to the loss of freedom and the presence of Roman soldiers within the city. Speaking to the people of Alexandria, Dio ironically thanks the gods for providing the Romans as corrective instruments:

However, god is indulgent ... and he treats lightly the folly of the masses [i.e., the Alexandrians]. Accordingly to you as his children has he given as guardians and guides those who are more prudent than you Alexandrians, and by their companionship not only at the theater but elsewhere too, your conduct is improved. For otherwise how could you keep your hands off one another? (32.51)

In contrast to the Alexandrian excesses, the Rhodian's moderation and self-respect earned them "freedom and complete independence of action" (32.52). Not only does concord minimize the probability of Roman interference, it also increases the likelihood that Greek cities may one day gain actual independence and have some measure of freedom so that they can manage their own affairs with dignity. In calling for concord with the Roman authorities, Dio again pursues the *via media* between

passive submissiveness on the one hand and irresponsible attacks on the other. “To submit to any and every thing and allow those in authority to treat them simply as they please, no matter to what lengths of insolence and greed they may proceed ... is the conduct of slaves” (34.38–39). Such servility is to be strictly avoided. On the other hand, to “[make] complaints now and then without good reason” will only cause them to “lose the right of free speech altogether” (34.39). Dio argues that Greek cities must tolerate Roman rule but also not be like the Ionians who make no prosecution at all. The city must use prudence and reason in determining the severity of the hardship. If the burden is highly oppressive and cannot be endured any further, they should cast it off immediately; but if they are only moderately inconvenienced, they should exercise restraint (34.41).

2. Not all Greek cities are fortunate enough to obtain freedom and independence.¹²⁸ Dio, for example, failed to obtain it for Prusa. In such situations, Dio reinterprets freedom in behavioral and moral categories in which concord plays a central part. He writes,

For rest assured that what is called independence, that nominal possession which comes into being at the pleasure of those who have control and authority, is sometimes impossible to acquire, but the true independence (τὴν ἀληθῆ ἐλευθερίαν), the kind which men actually achieve, both the individual and the state obtain, each from its own self, if they administer their own affairs in a high-minded (μεγαλοφρόνως) and not in a servile and easy-going manner. (44.12)

¹²⁷ Plutarch, *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 19 (*Mor.* 815B) also counsels Greek cities to curb their riotous behavior or to hide it at least from the Romans, “so that [they] may have as little need as possible of physicians and medicine drawn from outside.”

¹²⁸ The most important privilege of freedom is the ability “to resist the authority of a proconsul or his legate who wished to interfere in [local] affairs” (Jones, *Roman World of Dio Chrysostom*, 5).

Instead of an external freedom that can be given or taken away, Dio speaks of an internal freedom that is solely dependent upon the individual's own ability to manage his or her own affairs in a high-minded manner (μεγαλοφρόνως). The word μεγαλοφρόνως and its cognates occur 16 times in Dio's works, a third of which occurs in the *Kingship Orations* and describes the character and divine education of the ideal king. The use of μεγαλοφρόνως in the civic speeches then suggests that within their respective circle of influence, ordinary men and civic leaders can wield the same independence and power that a king possesses if they govern their own affairs rightly; namely, if they maintain civil order.¹²⁹ The importance placed on concord is further suggested by the preceding context of Dio's redefinition of true independence. In *Or.* 44.10, Dio effusively praises the Prusans for manifesting the Hellenic virtues of peace, concord, and stability.¹³⁰ He then cites the example of *ancient* Athens and Sparta who "through orderly behavior in civic matters" made their cities great despite their "very small and weak beginnings" (44.11). Dio claims that such transformations are still possible today if Greek cities follow the practices that he advocates. It is true that Greek

¹²⁹ Dio believes that true freedom is conferred only by virtue and wisdom. Although citizens can be "free" through virtue and concord, kings can be "slaves" through failure to demonstrate the necessary virtues. Thus, great kings are not necessarily "free" to do as they wish. Dio remarks, "We are forced to define freedom as the knowledge of what is allowable and what is forbidden, and slavery as ignorance of what is allowed and what is not. According to this definition there is nothing to prevent the Great King, while wearing a very tall tiara upon his head, from being a slave and not being allowed to do anything that he does" (*Or.* 14.18).

¹³⁰ *Or.* 44.10: "You possess [the blessings] being superior to the other self-governed communities in their orderly behavior, in respect for others, in obedience to your men of character, ... in making your city truly Hellenic, free from turmoil, and stable, and in devoting your native shrewdness and courage and intelligence to greater and finer things, while refraining from discord and confusion and conflict with one another so far as possible."

cities are under Roman control; nevertheless, Dio argues that they can recapture their former glory and attain true independence through the practice of concord.

3. Dio expands the concept of being “Hellenic” in response to the new socio-political order where Romans and barbarians are fellow-citizens of the Greeks. Dio relates in the *Borystheniticus Discourse* a myth “sung in secret rites by the Magi” (36.39), who learned it from Zoroaster. But despite Dio’s claims for its Iranian origin, its essence is clearly Greek, derived from Plato’s *Phaedrus* and other Stoic contexts.¹³¹ Moreover, although Dio contrasts the theory (λόγος) of the Greek philosophers against this “myth” (μῦθος; 36.38–39), he blurs this distinction at the end of the oration when he *twice* calls the Magi story not a μῦθος but a λόγος (36.61). This suggests that despite Dio’s apologies for the “barbarian” quality (36.43) of the myth, he fundamentally approves of its substance *after* it has been molded to suit his purpose.¹³² The hybrid nature of the myth in the larger context of *Or.* 36 that focuses on issues of Hellenic identity implies that the audience’s understanding of what it means to be Greek needs to be moderated and widened. Furthermore, the prior discussion of a cosmic city comprising god and men who possess a share in “reason and intellect” (36.38), instead of cultural or ethnic identity, suggests that there is a place for Greek and barbarian wisdom to coexist together. It is tantalizing to speculate that Dio’s account of the Magi myth then serves to provide the audience with a higher vision of what Greekness (or “Hellenism”) means.

¹³¹ Russell, *Dio Chrysostom Orations VII, XII, and XXXVI*, 22; M. Trapp, “Plato’s *Phaedrus* in Second-Century Greek Literature,” in *Antonine Literature* (ed. Donald A. Russell; Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 148–55.

¹³² Dio compares the philosopher to a craftsman (κοροπλάθης; lit., modeler of small figures) who shapes and moulds myths (μῦθος) so that it would be “beneficial and suited to philosophy” (*Or.* 60.9). See

“Greekness ... cannot be an exclusive thing, for Greeks may benefit from barbarian wisdom and we are all children of God (cf. *Euboicus* 138). This vision is at once what ought to be and what, ultimately, is, and the right way to handle problems of racial identity and conflict lies in emulation of the cosmic harmony.”¹³³ Dio possesses a deep concern for Greek cultural identity, but it is a concern that is tempered by a willingness to accept barbarian wisdom, and founded on kinship between all humans and between humans and gods.¹³⁴

Synthesis and Overview

This chapter attempts to explore Dio’s vision of peace. I provided a brief biographical sketch of Dio’s life, followed with an examination of the Kingship and concord orations. In this concluding section, I synthesize the above data under three categories that facilitate comparison with Ephesians in a later chapter. They are (1) Dio’s political persona; (2) Dio’s understanding of the nature of concord; and (3) Elements in Dio’s vision of peace.

Political persona

Although I suggested that there is some merit in Synesius’s account of Dio’s “conversion” to a moral philosopher, we should not forget that Dio is a politician engaged in the rough and tumble of local politics. Dio uses his rhetorical skills deftly, projecting a political and public persona that buttresses his credibility and advances his vision of peace.

Suzanne Saïd, “Dio’s Use of Mythology,” in *Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy* (ed. Simon Swain; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 161–86.

¹³³ Moles, “Dio Chrysostom, Greece, and Rome,” 191.

In the civic speeches on concord, Dio freely refers to his trials and discomfort during his years in exile. He elicits sympathy by referencing the deleterious effects the exile has on his present health (39.8; 40.2; 48.8); yet, he exudes a confidence and authority that derives from his having not only been a victim but also a vocal critic of the tyrant Domitian (40.2, 12).¹³⁵ Through his frankness (παρρησία) in openly challenging Domitian (45.1–2), Dio no doubt compares himself to the Cynic hero Diogenes (6.57). Dio’s exile therefore becomes not a source of shame but a badge of honor. It is precisely because he survived his exile through philosophy that Dio considers himself a true philosopher and counselor,¹³⁶ capable of offering genuine advice on the interests of the city and providing safety through policies (38.1–2).

Dio maintains that his motivation for giving political advice arises out of a sincere love for the city. Unlike the sophists who charge money for their lectures, Dio denies any desire for seats of honor, public proclamations, or statues, being content only with the city’s goodwill and friendship (44.2).¹³⁷ His primary concern is not for personal gain or advantage but for the welfare of the city (38.9; 40.19). To this end, he willingly bears hardships for the common good (40.7), he prays for the city as a benevolent father would

¹³⁴ Moles, “Dio Chrysostom, Greece, and Rome,” 192.

¹³⁵ Swain, *Hellenism and Empire*, 189, 212. There is much prestige in portraying oneself as an exile. Dio himself admits this when he writes, “If I narrate in Prusa the course of my exile, men will say, not that I am lamenting, but far rather that I am boasting” (45.2). See also Lucian’s *Peregrinus* who engineers his own exile in order to join the company of Musonius, Dio, and Epictetus (Lucian, *Peregr.* 18).

¹³⁶ See his criticism of false philosophers in *Or.* 32.8, 20. For Dio’s understanding on the role of a philosopher, see *Or.* 34.3, 52; 48.14; 49.1–13.

¹³⁷ See also *Or.* 32.11; 34.4: “I am here because there is nothing which I myself require of you, while on the contrary I have been much concerned to be of service to you. If, then, you refuse to bear with me, clearly it will be your loss and not my own.”

for his children (39.8; 48.12), and he administers the painful but necessary cautery as a caring physician (39.7).

Even though Dio modestly states that he does not personally hanker after honors, he is quite willing to list those that have been bestowed on his family in order to establish some respectability for himself and for his message of peace.¹³⁸ More significant, Dio emphasizes his own importance as the personal link between the city and the combined powers of the universe: the Roman Emperor and Zeus. Dio punctuates his speeches with references to his friendship or to the concessions that he obtained from Trajan (40.5, 13–14; 41.7; 47.13–14), the net effect of which is to remind his audience and enemies that Roman goodwill to a Greek city is funneled through him alone.¹³⁹ In other situations such as in *Or.* 44.12, Dio ends his call for concord by reading his “correspondence with the emperor ... as if to imprint on his words the seal of the supreme power.”¹⁴⁰ Apart from the earthly king, Dio also underscores his connection to the divine king. His role as an advocate for concord is not by his own volition but by the will of the deities; he is divinely appointed. Moreover, the message of reconciliation that he proclaims has its inspiration not in human but in godly wisdom. Of all divine revelations, the gods deem his message so important that it is delivered not in a few words like oracles and dreams

¹³⁸ *Or.* 44.2–4: “Indeed, you may rest assured that I find all my honors ... contained in your goodwill and friendship, and I need naught else.... *But* if I really must have some such honors also, I have here at Prusa many other honors already” (italics mine). Dio then goes on to list the honors bestowed on his father, mother, ancestors, brothers, and other kinsmen. The quest for honor (φιλοτιμία) is a common feature of the sophists. See Whitmarsh, *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire*, 6, 215–16; Thomas Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht: Zur sozialen und politischen Funktion der zweiten Sophistik in der griechischen Welt der Kaiserzeit* (Zetemata 97; München: C. H. Beck, 1997), 97–135.

¹³⁹ One may also include his repeat performances to the cities of his *Kingship Orations*, “words [he spoke] in the presence of the Emperor” (57.11).

¹⁴⁰ Salmeri, “Dio, Rome, and the Civic Life of Asia Minor,” 66.

that are subject to misinterpretation, but in “strong, full utterance and in clear terms” (32.13). To ignore such a lucid message only invites peril, disaster, and divine displeasure.

Dio further strengthens his message by casting the opponents of concord in a negative light. Citizens and civic leaders who foment strife and disorder are men of no reputation (38.50) who delight in evil (38.14), who possess a perverted sense of pleasure, and who seek their own advantage (34.16–23, 34.19). They lack φιλανθρωπία; they treat human beings as “wild beasts and take pleasure in the conflict waged with those of our own kind” (38.17). They do not act according to the divine law of reason, the “only sure and indissoluble foundation for fellowship and justice” (36.31). Moreover, they are impious, ignoring the signs and omens that the gods send to promote peace (38.18). Finally, Dio labels citizens who bring grievances against one another to be unpatriotic; they are not true citizens but outsiders who revile the city (48.4–5).

The persona that Dio constructs for himself stands in opposition to that of his enemies. He is a man that is influential yet not self-serving, authoritative yet concerned about the welfare of the city and its citizens. As one who has been tried in the crucible of exile and who survived through philosophy, he is competent to give judicious advice that will save the city. As one who is divinely appointed by Zeus, his message of peace cannot be ignored. There may be debate as to whether this persona is a façade or an accurate depiction of the real Dio, but such discussion is not particularly critical to my investigation since they deal with Dio’s motivation rather than the formal structure or substance of his vision of peace. What we cannot ignore, however, is that Dio’s self-presentation facilitates the delivery of his vision of peace.

The nature of concord

Dio links concord with peace (εἰρήνη), benevolence (φιλανθρωπία), self-control (σωφροσύνη), friendship (φιλία), health (ὑγεία), discipline (πράοτης), civic order (εὐταξία), reconciliation (καταλλαγή), and kinship (συγγένεια).¹⁴¹ It consists of “sharing in things which are good (κοινωνίαν ἀγαθῶν), unity of heart and mind (ὁμοφροσύνη), rejoicing of both peoples in the same things” (38.43); and it stands in opposition to enmity (ἔχρθα; 38.6), strife (στάσις; 38.8), disease (νόσημα; 38.12, 14; 41.9), and war (πόλεμος; 38.19–20). The collocation of concord and strife with some of these adjectives shows that Dio links the political idea of concord with the moral sphere; indeed, he even goes so far as to call the struggle for concord a struggle (μάχη) between good (ἀγαθός) and evil (κακός).¹⁴²

In line with other Greco-Roman writers, Dio considers concord a “fine word and a fine thing” (38.6). It is lauded by all men; the benefit and advantage that it confers on a city is never disputed, not even by sophists—rhetoricians who frequently make paradoxical statements or adopt two sides of any issue for argument’s sake (*Or.* 38.9–10). Although concord is always praised, enmity and strife are constantly condemned.¹⁴³ The

¹⁴¹ *Or.* 38.14; 39.2; 32.27; 38.9, 11, 48; 40.35.

¹⁴² *Or.* 38.14: “But though the conflict between the evil things [i.e., wars, factions, diseases] and the good [i.e., concord] is so manifest, yet there are some among us—or rather a good many—who delight in things which are admittedly evil.”

¹⁴³ Dio’s view toward war follows common Greco-Roman thought. Although Dio acknowledges the destructive power of war, he nevertheless admits that external, not internal, conflict can raise the moral integrity of the citizens under siege. For example, Borysthenes was under constant threat of barbarian raids such that its inhabitants listened to Dio’s speech bearing their arms for fear of a surprise attack (*Or.* 36.16). The result of such a state of affairs was “a modest tenor of life in Borysthenes, but one free of corruption and contentiousness, and as such a possible model for the inhabitants of the many Greek cities afflicted with internal strife” (Salmeri, “Dio, Rome, and the Civic Life of Asia Minor,” 85–86. See also *ibid.*, 86n. 162).

“fruit [of concord] is most palatable and profitable,” but the “fruit of enmity is most bitter and most stinging” (40.34). Enmity is “a vexatious thing and unpleasant for both state and private citizen, no matter how they may be situated” (40.20). It exposes and humiliates the weak; and although it may not critically impair the strong, it nevertheless proves to be a most bothersome hindrance. Thus, it is “never profitable even for the greatest city to indulge in hostility and strife with the humblest village” (40.22).

As the greatest of all human blessings, concord has its origin (γένεσις) not in the sublunar but in the divine (38.11), in Zeus himself. As the God of Friendship, and the God of Comradeship, Zeus wills that all men come together as friends and not as enemies (12.76), dispatching ambassadors of peace to accomplish his purposes. Dio sees his task in line with this mission. Wandering and preaching throughout the various cities of Asia Minor, Dio portrays himself as a herald of Zeus who proclaims the divine message of peace and concord.

Dio understands concord and peace operating at multiple levels in the universe. It is operative in the molecular level, holding the elements of air, earth, fire, and water together; it is witnessed in the animal kingdom among the birds, the bees, the ants, and the goats and cattle; it is seen in the human sphere, within the family, the circle of friends, the clan, the city, the province, and the kingdom; it is present in the geographical sphere as seen in the harmony between the earth, the atmosphere, and the ether; finally, it is resident in the heavenly sphere, modeled in the cooperation between the various planets and the friendship among the gods. Concord is such a fundamental and important glue in the elemental structure of the universe that

were this partnership [of concord] to be dissolved and to be followed by sedition, [the nature of the elements] is not so indestructible or incorruptible as to escape being thrown into confusion and being subjected to what is termed the inconceivable and incredible destruction, from existence to non-existence. (40.36)

This possibility of a cosmic collapse, however, remains only a theoretical possibility. All the natural elements in the universe obey and yield to the law of reason such that greed and strife will never engulf the entire universe (40.37).

Of the above multiple levels of concord, Dio remarks that only the human sphere needs correction. All other spheres, but especially the heavenly, are in the state of concord, and they function as models of imitation for correcting human failure. The direction of the vector of influence is unidirectional, pointing downwards from heaven to earth as cosmic concord forms the inspiration and goal of human concord.¹⁴⁴

Elements in Dio's vision of peace

Dio's vision of peace focuses on human concord within a city, within a province, and within the Empire. Although Dio holds to the Stoic theory of an eternal sequence of cosmic cycles in which the cosmos perishes in a conflagration and then regenerates back into existence, better than before (*Or.* 36.42–60),¹⁴⁵ he does not specifically locate his

¹⁴⁴ In *Or.* 38.11, Dio moves from the physical theory of the cosmos, to the community of the gods, and finally to the city of men. Similarly, in *Or.* 40.35–41, Dio begins with the concord of the elements, sustained by the power of Zeus. He then moves to the harmonious movements of the planets, to the animal kingdom, and then to concord within the family at which point the oration breaks off.

¹⁴⁵ For references to Stoic sources, see David E. Hahm, *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), 185–99. John M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 175–76, however, cautions that not all Stoics held to this theory.

general vision of human concord within this metanarrative.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, Dio does not extensively discuss how Zeus harmonizes the universe or regulates and governs the elements, nor does he explicitly indicate how divine concord dynamically and materially impacts human concord. It therefore appears that the relationship between heavenly concord and human concord is not one of cause and effect but of imitation.¹⁴⁷ Although concord possesses a divine character, Zeus does not directly create human concord. Rather, humans are to create it just as Zeus creates divine concord. The gods do play a supplemental role in this creative process since Dio prays for their help, but the primary participants and agents of human concord are humans themselves.

Given the central role that humans play in his vision of peace, Dio crafts an elaborate set of appeals for concord that is particularly suited for his target audience. In the *Kingship Orations*, Dio holds up the portraits of the true king and the tyrant, underscoring the importance of moral character. The ideal king adopts virtues that promote true royalty while shunning vices that lead to tyranny; he possesses the four cardinal virtues, and exhibits φιλανθρωπία and other-benefiting virtues. The tyrant, on the other hand, is self-centered, profligate, unscrupulous, and a lover of pleasure. Central to the formation of right character is the necessity of proper education. This includes the study of philosophy and the pursuit of the divine education comprising imitation of the kingship and virtues of Zeus. Dio promotes the ideal king vis-à-vis the tyrant by appeals

¹⁴⁶ We can, nevertheless, say that Dio's use of the "picture of the world's renewal after destruction is an appropriate figure of the felicity of the new order that Nerva and Trajan inaugurated" (Russell, *Dio Chrysostom Orations VII, XII, and XXXVI*, 23).

to the consequent results of their respective rule. The true king receives praise and may even be accepted as a divine spirit; the tyrant king risks the forfeiture of his own life. Dio also warns the Emperor that he cannot act with impunity since there is a principle and power that is greater than the Roman Empire at work. Finally, Dio advocates the choice of the ideal king by appeal to stock heroes and villains.

In the civic orations, Dio advocates concord via appeals to the common elements shared between the feuding cities. Such elements include having the same geographical borders, same Hellenic identity, same gods, same festivals, same religious rites, and intimate personal ties of friendship between the citizens of the two cities. Dio also argues that strife is futile since concord in the greater processes of the universe is inevitable. Disputes over primacy, moreover, are pointless since the strings of power are firmly held by the Romans. Dio further appeals to the advantages of reconciliation, arguing that concord not only enhances the blessings enjoyed by a city, but also makes it difficult for provincial governors to play one city off another. As if the benefits of concord are insufficient inducement, Dio also warns his audience that discord will invite Roman intervention and result in the loss of freedom. Other appeals that Dio employs include appeals to examples of concord in nature and the cosmos, to the body metaphor, to the city's foundational myth, and to the historical example of Athens and Sparta.

Although addressed to different parties, the appeals in the kingship and the civic orations share common elements that are essential to Dio's program. First, Dio strongly

¹⁴⁷ See *Or.* 40.36 where Dio acknowledges that there may be an apparent remoteness between the cosmos and human affairs, noting that "the doctrine [of cosmic concord] will seem to some an airy fancy and one possessing no affinity (συμπαθής) at all with yourselves."

emphasizes the importance of internal virtue and character vis-à-vis external trappings. Kings must embrace true courage and true glory while cities must pursue true independence and true primacy. Speaking the truth is more courageous than standing one's ground in the face of physical danger; mastering one's self is more noble than overthrowing empires; administering one's affairs in a high-minded manner is more liberating than political independence; and showing concern for others brings more honor than titles. Excellence of character is essential because it is the prerequisite and basis of human concord,¹⁴⁸ a fact underscored if we are right that Dio considers humans as its primary agents. If human moral excellences are foundational for human concord, then human moral flaws such as greed and self-centeredness are impediments. This observation is valid since Dio nowhere suggests that human discord results from attacks by spiritual or cosmic entities.

Second, Dio argues that there is an analogous relationship between the king and the civic leader. The true civic leader is the philosopher king, and the true city is “an organization that is governed by the sanest and noblest form of kingship, to one that is actually under royal governance in accordance with law, in complete friendship and concord” (36.31–32). This analogous relationship between the king and the civic leader parallels that between Zeus and the ideal king. Dio therefore suggests the same political hierarchy of imitation that is common in Greco-Roman literature: Zeus ⇔ King ⇔ Civic leaders/citizens.

¹⁴⁸ *Or.* 34.19: “For only by getting rid of the vices that excite and disturb men, the vices of envy, greed, contentiousness, the striving in each case to promote one's own welfare at the expense of both

Third, the *Kingship Orations* and the civic speeches work together in promoting communal flourishing and Greek vitality under Roman rule. The ideal and benevolent king provides the framework for individual communities to succeed and thrive; the wise civic leader seizes this opportunity, managing the affairs of the city in an orderly manner with minimal Roman supervision or interference. Dio is aware of the power and control that Rome has over the Greek cities. As a mediator between the Roman Emperor and the cities, he seeks a compromise between servile submission and dangerous revolts on the part of the cities. His vision of peace therefore attempts to establish Hellenic pride, unity, and autonomy under foreign rule.

Dio Chrysostom is a complex figure: a moral philosopher, a sophist, and a politician all rolled into one. Although he modifies his message to suit his intended audience, he nevertheless speaks with conviction concerning his vision of peace. Seeing the wider implications of petty internecine disputes and the destructive rule of tyrannical emperors, Dio attempts to broker a vision of peace between the ruler and the ruled. He therefore appeals for reason, moderation, virtue, and order so as to establish communal flourishing and Greek vitality under Roman rule.

one's native land and the common weal—only so, I repeat, is it ever possible to breathe the breath of harmony in full strength and vigor and to unite upon a common policy.”

CHAPTER 5

THE VISION OF PEACE IN THE CONFUCIAN *FOUR BOOKS*

In chapter one, I noted that Ephesians can be compared with the *Four Books* (*Sishu* 四书) since both texts envision a cosmic vision of peace, and demonstrate a complex relationship between ethics, politics, cosmic forces, and spiritual or cosmic beings. There are other aspects that make such a comparison exciting. Both compositions describe a vision of peace that has widening concentric circles of focus: the individual, the family, the community, and the cosmos; both call for humanity to imitate God or some heavenly principle in order to bring about or maintain peace; both possess distinct views of human nature and cosmology as it relates to their vision of peace; and both speak about peace using religious or quasi-religious categories.¹ Bringing the *Sishu* into conversation can enrich our theological appreciation and understanding concerning the motif of peace in Ephesians, through comparison with literature written in a dramatically different context.

¹ There is still debate whether Confucianism should be considered as a religious tradition. Recent works which appreciate the religious dimension of Confucianism include Xinzhong Yao, *An Introduction to Confucianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 38–47; Julia Ching, *The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Rodney Leon Taylor, *The Religious Dimensions of Confucianism* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990); Hans Küng and Julia Ching, *Christianity and Chinese Religions* (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 59–128; John Berthrong, “Trends in Interpretation of Confucian Religiosity,” in *Confucian-Christian Encounters in Historical and Contemporary Perspective* (ed. Peter K. H. Lee; Religions in Dialogue 5; Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1991).

Although the authorship of the various texts of the *Sishu* is uncertain, tradition attributes them to Confucius (his traditional dates are 551–479 B.C.E.) and his school.² Confucius and his disciples lived during the Eastern Zhou period (770–256 B.C.E.),³ a period of political upheaval and moral crisis as China transitioned from a feudal to a multi-state system before culminating in the unified empire of the Qin Dynasty (221–206 B.C.E.). The dissolution of the old feudal structures led to constant political struggles, wars, and massacres as former vassal states took matters into their own hands and vied for military, economic, and territorial power. Ambitious rulers searching for ways to survive and thrive were more than willing to hire advisors and strategists, of which Confucius was one of the earliest important figures.⁴

The tumultuous Eastern Zhou period proved to be fertile for the development of political thought as various ideas were developed concerning how states should be governed and how one should live and survive through the chaos and anarchy. Daoism advocated the abolition of all social conventions and institutions, a withdrawal from the world, and a return to nature with its primitive lifestyle; Confucianism argued against political disengagement, calling for the restoration of traditional values and stressing the importance of virtue in maintaining social order; Moism proposed universal equality and

² Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200 C.E.), for example, made such claims. See Daniel K. Gardner, “Transmitting the Way: Chu Hsi and His Program of Learning,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 49 (1989): 164–66.

³ The Eastern Zhou roughly corresponds to two periods: the Spring and Autumn period (770–481 B.C.E.) and the Warring States period (481–221 B.C.E.).

⁴ Confucius served as a political advisor to the Duke of Lu for three months before resigning due to the duke’s indulgence in the very vices that Confucius spoke out against. He spent the next fourteen years traveling among the various states looking for a political appointment. Finding none, he returned to his native state of Lu and spent his remaining years with his disciples in literary endeavors.

a utilitarian ethic that emphasized frugality, condemning rituals and music as wasteful and useless; and the School of Law or Legalism championed the need for clearly defined laws and a harsh criminal code to maintain social order.

During the Qin Dynasty, Confucianism declined as the administration favored Legalism and purportedly destroyed many “heretical books” including some Confucian texts. With the advent of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E. – 220 C.E.), Confucianism enjoyed a resurgence; the Confucian classics became the state orthodoxy and the worship of Confucius formed the state cult. Confucian scholars, meanwhile, attempted to reconstruct and stabilize the text of the Confucian classics. The earliest known collection of the Confucian classics is the *Six Classics* (*Liujing* 六经),⁵ comprising the *Music*, the *Odes*, the *Documents*, the *Rites*, the *Changes*, and the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. As the *Music* was lost during the Qin Dynasty, the orthodox Confucian canon became the *Five Classics* (*Wujing* 五经).⁶ To this core component were added other texts over time, forming the *Seven Classics* (*Qijing* 七经) of the Eastern (Later) Han Dynasty (25–220 C.E.), the *Nine Classics* (*Jiujing* 九经) of the Tang Dynasty (618–907 C.E.), the *Twelve Classics* (*Shier jing* 十二经) of the mid-ninth century, and the *Thirteen Classics* (*Shisan jing* 十三经) of the Song Dynasty (960–1279 C.E.).

⁵ It is also known as the *Six Arts* (*Liuyi* 六艺) or the *Six Forms of Learning* (*Liuxue* 六学).

⁶ For an excellent introduction to the *Five Classics*, see Michael Nylan, *The Five “Confucian” Classics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

In 1190 Zhu Xi (朱熹; 1130–1200 C.E.), one of the leading Confucian scholars of the Song Dynasty,⁷ selected four texts to be published as the *Four Masters* (Sizi 四子), or what later came to be known since the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368 C.E.) as the *Four Books* (Sishu): the *Great Learning* (Daxue 大学), the *Analects* (Lunyu 论语), the *Book of Mencius* (Mengzi 孟子), and the *Practice of the Mean* (Zhongyong 中庸). According to Zhu, these texts embody the essence of the Confucian Way and provide a coherent statement of Confucian doctrine. Apart from selecting these texts, Zhu also edited and commented on them. The impact of Zhu's recension and commentary as presented in his *Collected Commentaries on the Four Books* (Sishu jizhu 四书集注) cannot be overemphasized.⁸ It became the focus of Confucian thought after his death, eclipsing the previously authoritative status of the *Five Classics* (Wu jing 五经).⁹ Moreover, it formed the basic texts for civil service examinations of the Chinese empire from the early fourteenth until its abolition in the twentieth century (1313–1905 C.E.).¹⁰ Furthermore, Zhu's recension continues to be the

⁷ Yu-Lan Fung, *A History of Chinese Philosophy* (trans. D. Bodde; 2 vols.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 2:533, remarks, "Zhu Xi is probably the greatest synthesizer in the history of Chinese thought." He synthesized the ideas of all his predecessors into one system and created a form of Confucianism that remained orthodox until the twentieth century. For a summary of Zhu's accomplishments, see Wing-tsit Chan, *Chu Hsi: Life and Thought* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1987).

⁸ Daniel K. Gardner, *The Four Books: Confucian Teaching in Late Imperial China* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007), xv, remarks, "No texts had greater presence or power in later imperial China than the Four Books. Just as knowledge of the Bible among literate people was assumed in Europe in medieval and early modern times, so was knowledge of the Four Books assumed in China."

⁹ For an overview of the shift in emphasis from the *Five Classics* to the *Four Books*, see Daniel K. Gardner, *Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsueh: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian Canon* (Harvard East Asian Monograph 118; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 5–16; Chan, *Chu Hsi: Life and Thought*, 130–38.

¹⁰ Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 85n. 5. The Yuan government in 1313 C.E. made the *Four Books* and Zhu Xi's commentary on them the basis for the civil service examination. See *History of the Yuan Dynasty* (Yuan shi 元史), 81.2019. For an overview of civil examinations in late imperial China, see Benjamin Elman, *A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

source text for the majority of modern Chinese translations and practically all foreign translations. I consequently use Zhu's text and commentary in this study.¹¹

This chapter focuses on the Confucian vision of peace as described in two books of the *Sishu*: the *Daxue* and the *Zhongyong*. The rationale for this selection is as follows. First, these two texts embody the social, political, and ethical ideal of Confucian thought. Second, the two books share a common textual history. Prior to their selection in the *Sishu*, these two texts were originally chapters in the *Book of Rites* (*Liji* 礼记),¹² and were also traditionally located in the same subdivision of the *Book of Rites*: “comprehensive discourses on ritual, rites, and learning” (*tonglun liyi he xueshu* 通论礼仪和学术).¹³ Third, these texts display varying aspects of political and cosmological significance that enable us to obtain a fuller portrait of the Confucian vision of peace. Finally, Zhu focuses on two modes of moral cultivation: knowledge-study and action-practice. Although a generalization, one can say that the *Daxue* emphasizes the former, and the *Zhongyong* the latter. In this chapter, I examine each of these two texts, providing a brief introduction

¹¹ The English translation that I primarily use and cite is Gardner, *Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsueh*. Other translations that I consult include Gardner, *Four Books*; Andrew Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung* (London: Penguin, 2003); William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, eds., *Sources of Chinese Tradition* (2 vols.; 2d ed.; Introduction to Asian Civilizations; New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); James Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (5 vols.; Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960); Chan, *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*.

¹² The *Liji* together with the *Ceremonials* (*Yi li* 仪礼) and the *Zhou Rites* (*Zhou li* 周礼) form the *Rites classics* (or the *Three Rites Canons*; *San li* 三礼) within the Confucian *Five Classics*. Other translated names for the *Liji* are the *Rites Records* or *Record of Rites*.

¹³ Zheng Xuan (127–200 C.E.) of the Eastern Han Dynasty divided the 49 chapters of the *Book of Rites* into 11 categories in the *Contents of the Three Rites* (*San li mulu* 三礼目录). See the table in Jeffrey K. Riegel, “The Four ‘Tzu Ssu’ Chapters of the *Li Chi*: An Analysis and Translation of the *Fang Chi*, *Chung Yung*, *Piao Chi*, and *Tzu I*” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1978), 35. More recently, Yao, *Introduction to Confucianism*, 62, suggests 5 categories: “(1) comprehensive discourses on ritual, rites, and learning ... (2) interpretations on ancient rites recorded in the *Yi Li* ... (3) recordings of the sayings and affairs attributed to Confucius and his disciples (4) ancient rituals or ceremonies, and (5) ancient proverbs, maxims, and aphorisms.”

and overview of their central argument, followed by an exposition of key themes pertinent to my overall project. I conclude with a synthesis and overview of the Confucian vision of peace they suggest.

The *Daxue*

The authorship of the *Daxue* is debated. Tradition variously attributes the work to Confucius's grandson Zengzi (ca. 505–432 B.C.E.), to Confucius's disciple Zisi (ca. 483–402 B.C.E), or to one of Zisi's disciples.¹⁴ Nevertheless, modern scholarship dates it much later to the period between the Qin Dynasty and the reign of Emperor Han Wudi (140–87 B.C.E.).¹⁵

When Zhu selected the *Daxue* to be included in the *Sishu*, he also modified the *Daxue* text as it was originally collected and transmitted in the *Liji* by Dai De and Dai Sheng in the first century B.C.E. The changes are twofold. First, Zhu divided the text into two main portions: a classic section of 205 characters attributed to Confucius, and a commentary section comprising ten chapters attributed to Zengzi. Second, he rearranged the text of the commentary section, added a preface and a supplementary chapter, and annotated many portions of the text.

The *Daxue* encapsulates the educational, moral, and political ideals of the Confucian system. Its central theme is the substance, practice, and implications of self-cultivation, ultimately culminating in the establishment of universal peace. The classic section or canonic core (*jing* 经) contains the principal argument of the text, and the

¹⁴ De Bary and Bloom, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, 1:330.

commentary section (*zhuan* 传) elucidates each of the points in the initial argument via a set of aphorisms or proof texts. The argument in the canonic core can be further divided into two parts: the Three Guiding Principles (*san gangling* 三纲领) and the Eight Particular Steps (*ba tiaomu* 八条目). Chapters one to four in the commentary discuss the Three Guiding Principles, and the other six discuss the effort required in the Eight Particular Steps. In my exposition of the themes of the *Daxue*, I first locate the text within Zhu's pedagogical system. I then examine the Three Guiding Principles and the Eight Particular Steps.

The *Daxue* and the Role of Confucian Education

Learning has always been a fundamental part of the Confucian tradition,¹⁶ beginning from the time of Confucius himself.¹⁷ According to Zhu, the sages undertook learning with the aim “to understand moral principle clearly in order that they might cultivate their persons, thereafter extending [their perfection] to others.”¹⁸ In contrast to these ancients who studied to obtain moral progress, Zhu berates the scholars of his day for devoting themselves entirely to the composition of ornate verses and the blind memorization of the classics so as to succeed in the imperial exams.¹⁹ Zhu's criticism is

¹⁵ Gardner, *Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsueh*, 17.

¹⁶ Kung-chuan Hsiao, *A History of Chinese Political Thought* (trans. Frederick W. Mote; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 111, remarks, “Transformation through teaching is not merely one of the techniques of governing, but is in fact the central element in Confucius' political policy.”

¹⁷ *Lunyu*, 2.4: “The Master said, ‘At fifteen I set my heart on learning (*xue* 学)’” (D. C. Lau, trans., *Analects* [London: Penguin, 1979], 63).

¹⁸ Daniel K. Gardner, *Learning to be Sage: Selections from the Conversations of Master Chu, Arranged Topically* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 13.

¹⁹ Zhu is probably drawing on *Lunyu*, 14.24: “The Master said, ‘Men of antiquity studied to improve themselves (*xuezhe weiji* 学者为己); men today study to impress others (*xuezhe weiren* 学者为

not directed at the examination system; he regards it as a reasonable process for recruiting talented and moral men into civil service, arguing that students can legitimately study for these examinations.²⁰ It is, rather, directed against the prevailing pedagogical practice that led students to devote their entire attention to the examinations, thereby forsaking the fundamental purpose of learning: to perfect one's moral character and to extend one's moral influence to others. Implicit in Zhu's criticism is the belief that one cannot be an effective civil administrator unless one first develops one's moral character.

Zhu attempts to rectify the prevailing situation, developing his own pedagogical system with its emphasis on the *Sishu*. According to him, the *Sishu* transmits the Way of the former sage kings Yao and Shun. These former kings carried the work of Heaven (*ji tian* 继天)²¹ and set up the perfect model (*li ji* 立极) to transform the people and establish

人)” (Lau, *Analects*, 128). See also *Conversations of Master Zhu Arranged Topically (Zhuzi yulei 朱子语类)*, 8.139.4 (ET Gardner, *Learning to Be a Sage*, 110). For a series of essays on “learning” and “self,” see William Theodore De Bary, *Learning for One's Self: Essays on the Individual in Neo-Confucian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

²⁰ Zhu argued that students could legitimately study for these examinations if it did not take away their determination for true learning. *Zhuzi yulei*, 13.246: “Someone asked whether preparing for exams interferes with one's efforts at true learning. Chu said: ‘Master Ch'eng has said that one shouldn't fear that it will interfere with one's efforts at true learning but only that it will rob one of one's determination to learn. If one spends ten days of every month preparing for the exams, one still has twenty days to cultivate true learning. But if one's determination to learn is shaken by the preparation for the exams then indeed there is no cure’” (Daniel K. Gardner, “Principle and Pedagogy: Chu Hsi and The Four Books,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 44 [1984]: 62).

²¹ Although commonly translated as “Heaven,” there is no singular meaning for the Chinese character *tian* 天. Fung, *History of Chinese Philosophy*, 1:31, suggests five different meanings. More recently, Yao, *Introduction to Confucianism*, 142, suggests three categories: (1) In its metaphysical context, Heaven in conjunction with Earth (*di* 地) refers to the “universe, the cosmos, the material world, or simply, Nature.” (2) In its spiritual context, Heaven signifies “an anthropomorphic Lord or a Supreme Being who presides in Heaven, and rules over or governs directly the spiritual and material world.” (3) In its moral context, Heaven is “the source of ethical principles and the supreme sanction of human behavior.” These categories are not absolute, and there is probably a fusion of categories in particular usages of the word. Ching, *Religious Thought of Chu Hsi*, 55, remarks that Zhu is also familiar with these three categories

peace and tranquility.²² They set up schools throughout the empire that promulgated the instruction of the Way, dividing the educational program into *lesser* (*xiaoxue* 小学) and *greater learning* (*daxue* 大学).²³ At the age of eight, all male children from the sons of kings to the sons of commoners enter the school of *lesser learning*, receiving instruction in “the chores of cleaning and sweeping, in the formalities of polite conversation and good manners, and in the refinements of ritual, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, and mathematics.”²⁴ At the age of fifteen, the imperial sons and the gifted sons of the commoners enter the school of *greater learning*, and are “instructed in the Way of probing principle, setting the mind in the right, cultivating oneself, and governing others.”²⁵ This also includes learning and understanding the reasons (*suoyi* 所以) for the formalities and

(physical/metaphysical; spiritual/religious; moral/philosophical). Although influenced by the Cheng brothers (Cheng Yi [1033–1107 C.E.] and Cheng Hao [1032–1085 C.E.]) who elevated principle (*li* 理; for further discussion on principle see page 274) above Heaven, Zhu at times also considers Heaven to occupy a transcendental position as the creator and organizer of the natural and human world such that it is even the source of principle (*li*) and material force (*qi* 气). Yu Yamanoi, “The Great Ultimate and Heaven in Chu Hsi’s Philosophy,” in *Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism* (ed. Wing-tsit Chan; Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), 88, suggests that Zhu’s transcendental understanding of Heaven arose out of his reading of the multiple passages in the *Sishu* where Heaven assumes a suggestive anthropomorphic identity as the one that “gives rise to,” “creates,” or “commands.” Zhu understands Heaven in the *Daxue* as the Ultimate Reality which sets and commands the moral direction of humans and to which humans are accountable. This idea is brought out in Zhu’s commentary to *Daxue zhangju*, “Commentary” 1.3 where he considers the luminous mandate of Heaven (*tian zhi mingming* 天之明命) to be equivalent to the luminous virtue given by Heaven (*tian zhi mingde* 天之明德). Zhu therefore equates luminous mandate (*mingming* 明命) with luminous virtue (*mingde* 明德); the only difference between the two is that of perspective. In *Zhuzi yulei*, 16.315, he remarks, “From the perspective of humans, it is called luminous virtue (*mingde*); from the perspective of Heaven, it is called luminous mandate (*mingming*)” (translation mine).

²² *Preface to the Chapter and Verse Commentary on the Great Learning (Daxue zhangju xu* 大学章句序) (ET Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 78–79).

²³ Zhu suspected that there was an entire text called *Lesser Learning* that became fragmented with the passage of time. He compiled an anthology of passages under the title *Xiaoxue* in 1187. See Gardner, *Learning to Be a Sage*, 94n. 17. For a collection of Zhu’s comments on *Lesser Learning*, see idem, *Learning to Be a Sage*, 88–95.

²⁴ *Daxue zhangju xu* (Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 79–80).

²⁵ *Daxue zhangju xu* (Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 80–81).

ritual prescriptions taught in *lesser learning*. The fall of the Zhou Dynasty led to the decline and deterioration of the ancient school system. The program of instruction used in *greater learning*, however, survives in the *Daxue*.

In support of this narrative, Zhu interprets the title *Daxue* to mean “learning for adults” (*daren zhi xue* 大人之学).²⁶ Such a move underscores his commitment to the popularization of education since prior commentators had understood the title to refer to that “extensive learning which was available for the administration of government.”²⁷ Zhu believes that the *Daxue* cannot be read only as a political handbook for the ruler. All men possess the capacity for learning; all men have the responsibility to refine themselves morally; and all men have the potential for cultivating the self, manifesting humaneness, ordering society, and serving others: in effect, of becoming a sage. The text of the *Daxue* also supports such a reading when it notes: “From the Son of Heaven on down to the commoners, *all without exception* should regard self-cultivation as the root” (*italics mine*).²⁸

In his educational curriculum, Zhu recommends that the *Daxue* should be read first before any other text in adult education since it is the most accessible.²⁹ It is

²⁶ Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 4, translates *daxue* 大学 as “the highest order of cultivation.” He adopts this rendering to allow for interpretations that range “from the more advanced levels of instruction, in the narrowest sense of the expression, to the broader spheres of personal fulfillment, and, ultimately, the highest levels of Confucian attainment.”

²⁷ See Legge’s notes under “Title of the Work” (*Chinese Classics*, 1:355).

²⁸ *Chapter and Verse Commentary on the Great Learning (Daxue zhangju* 大学章句), “Classic” 6 (Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 94). Besides Zhu, other late imperial Neo-Confucian scholars such as Cheng Yi and Wang Yangming (1472–1529 C.E.) were also “profoundly committed to the text of the *Great Learning* in large part because it argues for the applicability of the Confucian self-cultivation process to all people” (Gardner, *Four Books*, 6–7).

²⁹ See the numerous references in Gardner, “Principle and Pedagogy,” 69–81. The order in which the *Four Books* are to be read is the *Daxue*, the *Lunyu*, the *Mengzi*, and the *Zhongyong* (69). The *Daxue* offers a

concrete, prescriptive, and coherent. More important, it neatly encapsulates the broad aim of the Confucian system: cultivating oneself and serving others.³⁰ There are two dimensions in the Confucian pedagogical system: an inner dimension of self-cultivation, and an outer dimension of ordering society. The two are inextricably connected and cannot be separated.³¹ This dual emphasis is clearly brought out in Zhu's preface to the *Daxue*. He first notes that the greater learning of the ancients included instruction in the "Way of probing principle, setting the mind in the right, cultivating oneself, and governing others."³² He then writes that in the former days,

All in that age advanced in learning, and, in their advancement, they all came to know the primal constitution of their natures, and at the same time, the duties that were demanded of each of them. Each was diligent and put forth his utmost effort. This is why in the heyday of antiquity good government flourished above and excellent customs prevailed below—it was a period never equaled by later generations. (*Daxue zhangju xu* [Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 81–82])

Finally, he states in the last line of the preface that the *Daxue* is of great benefit in helping the student "cultivate himself and govern others (*xiuji zhiren* 修己治人)."³³

Note that Zhu highlights the inner and outer dimensions in each of the above three frames of pedagogy, suggesting that a proper reading of the *Daxue* must do justice to these two dimensions. Zhu's reading finds support in the text of the *Daxue*. The

pattern, the *Lunyu* the foundation, the *Menzi* the elaboration of Confucian principles, and the *Zhongyong* contains subtlety and profundity (*Zhuzi yulei*, 14.249). After finishing the *Four Books*, one can then proceed to the *Five Classics* and the histories.

³⁰ *Lunyu*, 6:30: "Desiring to take his stand, one who is Good helps others to take their stand; wanting to realize himself, he helps others to realize themselves"; 14.42: "[The superior man] cultivates himself in order to bring peace to all people" (Edward Slingerland, trans., *Confucius Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries* [Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003], 63, 171).

³¹ See Benjamin Schwartz, "Some Polarities in Confucian Thought," in *Confucianism in Action* (ed. David Nivison and Arthur Wright; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), 52–54.

³² *Daxue zhangju xu* (Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 80–81).

argument in the canonic core as seen in the Three Guiding Principles and the Eight Particular Steps makes a similar emphasis on the importance of the inner and outer dimensions. We now turn to the Three Guiding Principles.

Three Guiding Principles

The classic portion of the *Daxue* begins with the statement of the Three Guiding Principles: “The way of greater learning (*daxue zhi dao* 大学之道) lies in (1) causing the light of one’s moral force and virtue to shine forth (*ming mingde* 明明德), in (2) renewing the people (*xinmin* 新民), and in (3) coming to rest in perfect goodness (*zhi yu zhi shan* 止於至善).”³⁴ The first element concerns the inner dimension of the individual, the second element the outer dimension toward others, and the third element encompasses both inner and outer dimensions.

The first principle consists of causing the light of one’s moral force to shine forth (*ming mingde* 明明德). In the phrase *ming mingde* 明明德, the first *ming* 明 is a transitive verb (“to shine, to illumine”), but the second *ming* 明 is an adjective (“luminous, bright”) modifying *de* 德 (“virtue”).³⁵ According to Zhu, the phrase then means to “recover and reclaim the luminosity of one’s moral virtue.”³⁶ Heaven (*tian* 天) endows all people with a

³³ *Daxue zhangju xu* (Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 86).

³⁴ *Daxue zhangju*, “Classic” 1 (Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 88–90).

³⁵ The word *de* 德 connotes both “power” and “virtue.” See Dainian Zhang, *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy* (trans. and ed. Edmund Ryden; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 337–44.

³⁶ Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 89, translates *ming mingde* as “keeping one’s luminous virtue unobscured.” In a more recent work, Gardner translates the phrase as “letting one’s inborn luminous virtue shine forth” (idem, *Four Books*, 3). It should be noted that Zhu differs from Mencius in their models of self-cultivation and the development of humaneness (*ren* 仁). Mencius advocates a developmental model of virtue where *ren* needs to be patiently cultivated, nurtured, and actualized. Lee H. Yearley, *Mencius and*

luminous virtue *mingde*. *Mingde* is pure and unsullied. It embodies the principle or pattern of order (*li* 理) that governs the universe and rightly responds to all things (*ying wanshi* 应万事),³⁷ and it can be identified with one's inborn nature (*xing* 性) which is fundamentally good.³⁸ The goal of all humanity is to express this inner virtue in all areas of their lives.³⁹ Such a move requires considerable effort since one's inner virtue may be concealed (*bi* 蔽) by one's human desires (*renyu* 人欲) and restrained (*ju* 拘) by one's endowment of material force (*qi* 气). Although all humans have one and the same luminous virtue, not everyone has the same endowment of *qi*. Some are clear and refined, allowing full expression of the individual's virtue and heavenly principle; others are turbid and imbalanced, increasing the propensity for creaturely desires and restraining free expression of one's virtue.⁴⁰ The critical point for Zhu is that the luminosity of one's

Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 60, remarks, "Mencius's model is developmental because capacities produce proper dispositions and actions only if they are nurtured and uninjured. If improperly developed, capacities either attain only a truncated form or become so weak that animating them becomes virtually impossible." Zhu, on the other hand, employs a discovery model, arguing that one's essential nature has already been given to human beings. The role of self-cultivation then is to return, recover, or reclaim this original luminous nature. See Irene Bloom, "Three Visions of *Jen*," in *Meeting of Minds* (ed. Irene Bloom and Joshua Fogel; New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 25–33.

³⁷ The term *li* 理 originally meant the lines or patterns in a piece of jade. See Zhang, *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy*, 26.

³⁸ See also *Zhuzi yulei*, 16.318: "What heaven confers upon me is luminous mandate (*mingming*); what I obtain as my nature (*xing* 性) is luminous virtue (*mingde*)" (translation mine).

³⁹ In line with his popularization of learning, Zhu's reading of *ming mingde* differs from pre-Song interpretations that interpret it as an activity addressed primarily to the ruler (who was to teach morality by manifesting his illustrious virtue to his subjects). See Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 52. Legge, *Chinese Classics* 1:356, following the pre-Song Kong Yingda's (574–648 C.E.) interpretation, translates the phrase as "illustrate illustrious virtue."

⁴⁰ In Zhu's metaphysical thought, principle (*li* 理) and material force (*qi* 气) are inseparable for material force provides the medium in which principle exists and manifests itself. Nevertheless, in order to manifest fully one's inborn nature or heavenly principle, one needs to have clear material force. *Zhuzi yulei*, 4.73 states: "Once there is such-and-such a manifestation of *li* there is such-and-such a manifestation of *qi*. Once there is such-and-such a *qi* there is necessarily such-and-such a manifestation

virtue *never ceases* (*wei chang xi* 未尝息); it is at times only obscured (*youshi er hun* 有时而昏) by human desires and *qi*. The way of greater learning then is to constantly and scrupulously chisel and polish (*tiaoti kaimo* 挑剔揩磨) away the encrustations of human desires,⁴¹ using the light of our virtue to bring clarity and balance to our *qi* so that we might in turn restore our virtue to its original heavenly brilliance (*fu qi chu* 复其初) and allow heavenly principle (*tian li* 天理) to infuse every aspect of our lives.⁴²

The second principle of greater learning consists of renewing the people (*xinmin* 新民).⁴³ Zhu comments that “to renew” (*xin*) means “to remove the old” (*ge qi jiu* 革其旧).⁴⁴ When one’s luminous virtue is able to shine forth, one has the responsibility of reaching out to others, enabling them to remove their “old stained impurities” (*jiu ran zhi wu* 旧染之污) so that they in turn may cause their own luminous virtue to shine. In this

of *li*. It’s just that he who receives clear *qi* is a sage or worthy—he is like a precious pearl lying in crystal clear water. And he who receives turbid *qi* is an idiot or a degenerate—he is like a pearl lying in turbid water. What is called ‘keeping the inborn luminous virtue unobscured (*ming mingde*)’ is the process of reaching into the turbid water and wiping clean this pearl” (Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 72.n 28).

⁴¹ *Zhuzi yulei*, 14.271.

⁴² Zhu’s commentary to *Daxue zhangju*, “Classic” 1 (ET Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 52; idem, *Four Books*, 3–4). See also *Zhuzi yulei*, 31.796: “Only when selfish desires are removed will heavenly principle flow and infuse all of one’s life activities” (translation mine).

In other texts, Zhu also describes the process of self-cultivation in terms of the two natures in man: the original human nature (*benran zhi xing* 本然之性) and physical nature (*qizhi zhi xing* 气质之性). Original nature is pure principle (*li*) while physical nature is an admixture of principle (*li*) and material force (*qi*). While original nature is unchanging, physical nature is particular to an individual and changes due to the quality of its *qi*. While original nature is always good, physical nature has the propensity for both good and evil depending on one’s *qi*. These two natures are, nevertheless, interfused. The original nature is the substance (*ti* 体) of nature, and the physical nature is the function, usage, implementation, or expression (*yong* 用) of the original nature. The task of cultivation is to correct the evil obfuscations in our physical nature and restore the goodness of our original nature. See Chan, *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 590.

⁴³ The original text reads “loving the people” or “treating the people as one’s relatives” (*qin min* 亲民). Zhu, following the Cheng brothers, emends the text to “renewing the people” (*xin min* 新民). He

schema, there is a logical and sequential progression from the individual toward others, from the internal to the external. The importance of sequence is clearly outlined in the text: “Things have their roots (*ben* 本) and branches (*mo* 末); affairs have a beginning and an end. One comes near the Way in knowing what to put first and what to put last.”⁴⁵ Zhu emphasizes the priority of internal focus, noting that *mingde* is the root, but *xin min* is the branch. Before one is able to renew others, one must renew oneself.⁴⁶

The third principle consists of resting in perfect goodness (*zhi yu zhi shan* 止於至善). Although the verb *zhi* 止 literally means “to stop,” it also connotes a state of constancy or “a point of dynamic equilibrium.”⁴⁷ Humanity is called to abide constantly in the highest excellence. Although resting in perfect goodness is listed as one of the three guiding principles of greater learning, Zhu does not consider it to be a separate endeavor. Rather, it is a descriptive statement of how the first two principles are to be accomplished; it indicates “a perseverance in the two others, till they are perfectly accomplished.”⁴⁸ At the same time, it is also the recognition that the first two principles, when perfectly maintained, leads to “perfect goodness,” the highest sphere of Confucian

gives no philological justification for this change other than the comment that *qin* makes little sense in the context. See Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 90.

⁴⁴ Zhu’s commentary to *Daxue zhangju*, “Classic” 1.

⁴⁵ *Daxue zhangju*, “Classic” 3.

⁴⁶ See *Zhuzi yulei*, 16.319. At the same time, it should be remembered that self-cultivation can ultimately be perfected only in a social setting. John H. Berthrong and E. Nagai-Berthrong, *Confucianism: A Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2000), 31, remarks, “The vision [of self-cultivation] was predicated on the assumption that the task of becoming fully and authentically human could only be accomplished within a social setting.”

⁴⁷ Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 62n. 3. Zhu’s commentary on this verse interprets *zhi* as the point to which one must strive (*bi zhi* 必至) and from which one cannot deviate (*bu qian* 不迁).

⁴⁸ Notes in Legge, *Chinese Classics*, 1.356. See also *Zhuzi yulei*, 14.270: “‘Resting in perfect goodness’ encompasses ‘*ming mingde*’ and ‘*xin min*’. The [cultivated] individual must rest in perfect goodness; the people must rest in perfect goodness” (translation mine).

moral cultivation that embodies the principle by which things and affairs are necessarily so (*dangran zhi ji* 当然之极).⁴⁹

In the political frame of *Daxue*, when the kings came to “rest in perfect goodness,” the people also attained to their proper places (*de qi suo* 得其所),⁵⁰ dynamically resting (*zhi* 止), neither falling short nor overshooting,⁵¹ in the moral obligations (*dang ran* 当然) and virtues that are in accord with their respective role within society. Thus, the commentary text for this verse reads,

“King Wen ... came to rest [in perfect goodness].”⁵² He who fulfils the role of a ruler came to rest in humaneness (*ren* 仁); he who fulfils the role of a minister came to rest in reverence (*jing* 敬). He who fulfils the role of a son came to rest in filial piety (*xiao* 孝); he who fulfils the role of a father came to rest in affection (*ci* 慈). He who has dealings with his countrymen came to rest in trustworthiness (*xin* 信). (*Daxue zhangju*, “Commentary” 3.3; translation mine)

From the late Warring States period onwards, there are five human relationships (*wu lun* 五伦) that are determinative in Confucian ethics: ruler–minister, father–son, husband–wife, elder–younger, friend–friend.⁵³ Dainian Zhang notes that “the identification of these relationships is prescriptive rather than descriptive. To say that someone is my ruler or

⁴⁹ Zhu’s commentary to *Daxue zhangju*, “Classic” 1.

⁵⁰ Zhu’s commentary to *Daxue zhangju*, “Commentary” 3.5: “In renewing the people, the former kings came to rest in perfect goodness, enabling every single creature then in the realm, as well as those in later generation, to attain to their proper places” (Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 103).

⁵¹ See *Zhuzi yulei*, 14.271. See also *Lunyu*, 11.16.

⁵² The gloss “came to rest [in perfect goodness]” is implied from Zhu’s commentary to *Daxue zhangju*, “Commentary” 3.3. See Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 98–99.

⁵³ The five human relations are seen in *Mengzi*, 3A.4: “This gave the sage King further cause for concern, and so he appointed Hsieh (*Xie* 契) as the Minister of Education whose duty was to teach the people human relationships (*ren lun* 人伦): love between father and son, duty between ruler and subject, distinction between husband and wife, precedence of the old over the young, and faith between friends” (D. C. Lau, trans., *Mencius* [London: Penguin, 1970], 102).

father implies a certain attitude I am to have toward him and he toward me.”⁵⁴ Each social relation possesses a natural order and norm (*suoyi ran* 所以然) that conforms to the principle or pattern (*li* 理) dictated by Heaven,⁵⁵ and this natural order ultimately demands a corresponding moral imperative and obligation (*dang ran* 当然).⁵⁶ In other words, each social relation possesses a certain *is-ness* that demands a corresponding *ought-ness*.⁵⁷ Since each relationship entails two moral norms that are to be displayed by either member, there are altogether ten moral norms (*shi yi* 十义) that are determinative for the five human relationships.⁵⁸ The *Daxue* text lists three sets of relationships with their concomitant virtues: ruler–minister, father–son, fellow members of the state. Two

⁵⁴ Zhang, *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy*, 321.

⁵⁵ *Zhuzi yulei*, 17.383: “The reason whereby something is so (*suoyi ran* 所以然) is given by that which is above it. The reason whereby a ruler should be benevolent is that the ruler is the leading brain and the people and land are all entrusted to his care. He must use [humaneness] and favor. Suppose one considers what will happen if he is not benevolent and loving, then things would certainly not get done! It is not that this is said of the ruler: that he cannot not use [humaneness] and favor. *It is rather that this is to conform to principle.* Suppose one discusses one household. The head of the household uses love towards the people of the household and cherishes the things of the household. *This is because this is to conform to principle, as if Heaven had commissioned it to be so....* Other important discussions are all alike. In all cases the heavenly principle has commissioned it to be so” (italics mine; Zhang, *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy*, 279–80). For further discussion on *li*, see page 274.

⁵⁶ *Zhuzi yulei*, 18.414: “He was asked, ‘Some Questions said that things have the standard by which they ought to be (*dang ran* 当然) and also the reason for which they are what they are (*suoyi ran* 所以然). What does this mean?’ He replied, ‘In serving one’s parents one ought (*dang* 当) to have filial piety, in serving one’s older siblings one ought (*dang*) to have the respect of the younger siblings; this is the standard of what ought to be (*dang ran*). Now how does one know that one ought to show filial piety in serving one’s parents? How does one know that one ought to show the respect of a younger sibling when dealing with an older sibling? This is the reason for which things are so (*suoyi ran*)’” (Zhang, *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy*, 36).

⁵⁷ See Siu-chi Huang, *Essentials of Neo-Confucianism: Eight Major Philosophers of the Song and Ming Periods* (Westport: Greenwood, 1999), 151.

⁵⁸ The *Evolution of the Rites* (*Liyun* 礼运), 2.19, lists the ten moral norms as follows: “What are the human norms (*ren yi* 人义)? The father is to be compassionate, the son filial; the elder brother kind and the younger brother respectful; the husband just and the wife submissive; the old person gracious and the young deferent; the ruler benevolent and the minister loyal. These ten are called the human norms” (translation mine). Note that this passage makes no mention of the relationship between friends. Mencius, however, notes that the proper attitude between friends should be trustworthiness (*xin* 信).

observations can be made here. First, the presence of these moral norms linked by the key word “rest” (*zhi*) suggests that “resting in perfect goodness” entails the exercise of the virtues within the five human relationships. Second, the text cites the relationship between fellow members of the state rather than between friends. It, however, characterizes this relationship with the same moral norm as that between friends: trustworthiness (*xin*). This suggests that the text considers fellow civic members to interact as friends, thereby expanding the scope of friendship to a political level.

Resting in perfect goodness, with its dual emphasis on self-renewal and renewal of the people, is also fundamental to attaining political legitimacy—the mandate of heaven (*tian ming* 天命).⁵⁹ The idea of *tian ming* presents a heavenly or transcendental sanction for legitimate human rule, asserting Heaven as the final judge in establishing or deposing kings. The bestowal of this mandate is conditioned upon knowing Heaven, serving Heaven, and following its decrees and mandates (*ming* 命), all of which are ultimately predicated on self-cultivation.⁶⁰ The bestowal of the mandate is not constant, and it can be withdrawn when an enthroned recipient proves himself unworthy of the charge.

Eight Particular Steps

The main section of the canonic core comprises the Eight Particular Steps in chiasmic structure. The sequence of the text can be laid out as follows:

⁵⁹ Zhu’s commentary to *Daxue zhangju*, “Commentary” 2.3, states that King Wen received the mandate of heaven because he was able to renew himself and the people. See also *Zhuzi yulei*, 16.319.

- (8) Those of antiquity who wished to cause the light of their luminous virtue to shine forth before the entire world (*ming mingde yu tianxia* 明明德於天下) put governing their kingdoms well first;
 (7) wishing to govern their kingdoms well (*zhi guo* 治国), they first established order in their households;
 (6) wishing to establish order in their households (*qi jia* 齐家), they first cultivated their own 'person';
 (5) wishing to cultivate their own 'person' (*xiu sheng* 修身), they first set their minds in the right;
 (4) wishing to set their minds in the right (*zheng xin* 正心), they first made their thoughts true;
 (3) wishing to make their thoughts true (*cheng yi* 诚意), they first extended their knowledge to the utmost;
 (2) the extension of knowledge (*zhi zhi* 致知) lies in
 (1) fully apprehending the principle in things (*ge wu* 格物).
- (1') Only after the principle in things is fully apprehended (*wu ge* 物格) does
 (2') knowledge become complete (*zhi zhi* 知至);
 (3') knowledge being complete, thoughts may become true (*yi cheng* 意诚);
 (4') thoughts being true, minds may be set in the right (*xin zheng* 心正);
 (5') the mind being so set, the person becomes cultivated (*sheng xiu* 身修);
 (6') the person being cultivated, order is established in the household (*jia qi* 家齐);
 (7') household order being established, the kingdom becomes well-governed (*guo zhi* 国治);
 (8') the kingdom being well-governed, the entire world enjoys enduring peace (*tianxia ping* 天下平).

From this sequence, the Eight Particular Steps are:

- 1) apprehending the principle in things (*ge wu* 格物)
- 2) extending knowledge (*zhi zhi* 致知)
- 3) making the thoughts true (*cheng yi* 诚意)
- 4) setting the mind in the right (*zheng xin* 正心)
- 5) cultivating the person (*xiu sheng* 修身)
- 6) establishing order in the household (*qi jia* 齐家)
- 7) governing the kingdom well (*zhi guo* 治国)
- 8) bringing enduring peace to the world (*ping tianxia* 平天下)

The Eight Particular Steps outline the necessary sequence for establishing world peace, starting from personal cultivation, the establishment of household order, the

⁶⁰ *Mengzi*, 7A.1: "For a man to give full realization to his heart is for him to understand his own nature, and a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven. By retaining his heart and nurturing his

proper governance of the state, and then ultimately the manifestation of universal peace. Zhu connects the Eight Particular Steps with the Three Guiding Principles, remarking that these steps are the means for bringing the Three Guiding Principles into fruition. He reminds us that the initial reason given at the top of the sequence (*ming mingde yu tianxia*) comprises the first (causing the light of one's virtue to shine forth; *ming mingde*) and second guiding principle (renewing the people; *xin min*).⁶¹ Moreover, he groups steps 1–5 with *ming mingde* and steps 6–8 with *xin min*.⁶² A slightly different way of configuring the eight steps is to consider step 5 (cultivation of the person; *xiu shen*) as the root.⁶³ Steps 1–4 then become the means for obtaining this cultivation, while steps 6–8 are its goals and purposes. But in either approach, the Eight Particular Steps maintain the dual Confucian concerns for the individual (*xiu ji* 修己) and society (*zhi ren* 治人).

Two observations should be noted about the sequence of the Eight Particular Steps. First, the eight steps should not be construed as a strict logical sorites where each sequential progression is like the rung of a ladder. The completion of one step in the argument does not automatically entail the attainment of the next. For example, Zhu remarks that the “completion of knowledge” only *enables* (*ke de* 可得) “the making of

nature he is serving Heaven” (Lau, *Mencius*, 182).

⁶¹ *Zhuzi yulei*, 14.267.

⁶² Zhu's commentary to *Daxue zhangju*, “Classic” 5: “*xiu shen* and above are the affairs of *mingde*, *qi jia* on down are the affairs of *xin min*” (translation mine).

⁶³ *Daxue zhangju*, “Classic” 6: “From the Son of Heaven on down to the commoners, all without exception should regard cultivation of the person as root” (Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 94). See also Li Xiusheng 李修生 and Zhu Anqun 朱安群, eds., *Sishu Wujing Cidian* 四书五经辞典 (Beijing: ZhongGuo WenLian, 1998), 105.

thoughts sincere.”⁶⁴ Disciplined effort must be constantly employed; otherwise, the progress that one has already made will be lost.⁶⁵ In other cases, the completion of one step is simultaneous with the completion of the next. For example, Zhu explains that the use of *zai* 在 (“lies in”) in *zhizhi zai gewu* 致知在格物 shows the extremely tight connection between “apprehending the principle in things (*gewu* 格物)” and the “extension of knowledge (*zhizhi* 致知).” The two elements happen at the same time; there is no time or sequential lapse.⁶⁶ Fundamentally, the Eight Particular Steps must be understood broadly as a guide of how one is to approach the Way of Greater Learning. Sequence is important; it is forcefully argued by the text’s analogy of the root and branch, and the example of the proper order of chiseling and polishing.⁶⁷ At the same time, the Eight Particular Steps cannot be reduced into a rigid and ironclad schema.⁶⁸

Second, the text appears to mark out a progression where outer realization is predicated on inner cultivation. This is represented by a series of outwardly radiating concentric circles of focus: individual (steps 1–5) ⇒ household (step 6) ⇒ kingdom (step 7) ⇒ entire world (step 8). But the commentary chapters are quick to remark that the directional flow is not linear or unidirectional, but almost cyclic. For example, *inner*

⁶⁴ See Zhu’s commentary to *Daxue zhangju*, “Classic” 5: “Knowledge being complete, the thoughts *can* then successfully be made true. The thoughts being true, the mind *can* then successfully be set in the right” (italics mine; Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 93).

⁶⁵ See Zhu’s commentary at the end of *Daxue zhangju*, “Commentary” 6.

⁶⁶ See *Zhuzi yulei*, 15.309–310.

⁶⁷ *Daxue zhangju*, “Commentary” 3.4.

⁶⁸ *Zhuzi yulei*, 15.310 writes: “The *Daxue* speaks of ‘only after the principle in things is fully apprehended does knowledge become complete’ on down through ‘the entire world enjoys peace’. The Sage spoke broadly; he did not [specifically] say, if one is able to do this, one is then able to do that; nor did he say that, if one is able to do this, one can then study that. He just stated it broadly, as is. Later,

cultivation entails an investigation of the principle that is in the *external* world and cosmos.⁶⁹ Knowledge of our individual principle and nature is aided by our understanding of the principle in the things and affairs of the universe. Moreover, the ruler's role as a moral exemplar can be accomplished only by paying attention to his own luminous virtue *and* by measuring the minds of his people through reciprocity.⁷⁰ There is thus a recurrent theme of "finding within one's own innermost self a reflection of the abiding patterns of meaning inherent in the outside world, on the basis of which one can then attain a solid ground for moral judgment and for effective interaction with others in all the varying spheres of human relations."⁷¹

Self-cultivation

Self-cultivation at its core begins with *gewu* 格物.⁷² The meaning of the phrase is highly disputed, and the issue is further compounded by a lacuna in the pertinent section of the original text. Zhu inserted his interpretation into the text, arguing that *gewu* is the process of apprehending and probing the underlying principle (*li* 理) in everything that we encounter.⁷³ According to Zhu, there is one supreme principle that underlies all

chapter by chapter, paragraph after paragraph, further explanation is given. It is simply that men must come to an understanding of the passage on their own" (Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 93).

⁶⁹ I am here following Cheng Yi's and Zhu Xi's approach, the Learning of Principle (*li xue* 理学). Cheng Hao and Wang Yangming, on the other hand, emphasize the Learning of the Mind (*xin xue* 心学), arguing that principle is inherent in the mind, and that it is through knowledge of the mind that one comes to know Heaven.

⁷⁰ See page 280.

⁷¹ Andrew Plaks, "Daxue (大学)," *RoutledgeCurzon Encyclopedia of Confucianism* (ed. Xinzhong Yao; London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) 1:183–84.

⁷² Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 6, translates the phrase as "[the perception of] all things in the objective world through the correct conceptual grid."

⁷³ See *Daxue zhangju*, "Commentary" 5. See also *Daxue zhangju xu* where Zhu remarks that *greater learning* consist of "probing principle (*qiong li* 穷理)." In fact, Zhu goes so far as to say that apprehending

things in the universe and that connects “the natural and social worlds, the foundation for unity between Heaven and humanity (*tian ren he yi* 天人合一).”⁷⁴ Every living thing and affair in the universe has its specific principle (*li* 理), the norm for both the natural order and the moral order, the rule for “why things are so” (*suoyi ran* 所以然) and “that things ought to be so” (*dang ran* 当然).⁷⁵ But each of these specific principles is only a manifestation of the one supreme principle.⁷⁶ The presence of this one supreme principle both in humanity and the cosmos provides every person with the capacity for knowing

principle differentiates *greater learning* from *lesser learning*. See *Zhuzi yulei* 7.124.12; 7.125.1 (ET Gardner, *Learning to Be a Sage*, 90, 93).

The dispute in the term *gewu* turns primarily on the meaning of *ge*, a word which can mean “to correct,” “to arrive,” or “to oppose” (A. C. Graham, *Two Chinese Philosophers: Ch’êng Ming-tao and Ch’êng Yi-ch’uan* [London: Lund Humphries, 1958], 74). Zhu’s interpretation of *gewu* appears to follow Cheng Yi who says: “*Ge* 格 is like *qiong* 穷 (to exhaust); *wu* 物 is like *li* 理 (principle). *Gewu* is like saying ‘to exhaust their principles’” (*Henan Chengshi Yishu* 河南程氏遗书, 25:1a as cited in Philip J. Ivanhoe, *Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The Thought of Mencius and Wang Yang-ming* [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990], 81). For an article in support of Zhu’s reading, see D. C. Lau, “A Note on *Ke Wu* 格物,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 30 (1967): 353–57. In contrast to Zhu’s reading, Wang Yangming, explains *ge* as “to rectify” and *wu* as “the presence of an idea.” According to him, *gewu* then means to rectify one’s mind. See *Instructions for Practical Living* (*Zhuanxi lu* 传习录), 1.6–7 (ET Wing-tsit Chan, trans., *Instructions for Practical Living and other Neo-confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1963], 14–15). See also Zhang, *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy*, 455. In essence, the dispute concerning *gewu* ultimately centers on whether the fullest realization of one’s potential is a matter of objective study of the external world or of intuitive knowledge formed by an introspective investigation of the self. See Andrew Plaks, “*Gewu zhizhi* (格物致知),” *RoutledgeCurzon Encyclopedia of Confucianism* 1:226–27.

⁷⁴ Thomas Selover, “*Li* (理),” *RoutledgeCurzon Encyclopedia of Confucianism* 1:354–55.

⁷⁵ Zhang, *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy*, 36–37. Adherents of the “School of the Way” (*dao xue* 道学) use the twin ideas of *is-ness* and *ought-ness* to explain *li* 理. Graham, *Two Chinese Philosophers*, 8, cites Xu Heng (1209–1281): “If we exhaust the principles in the things of the world, it will be found that a thing must have a reason why it is as it is (*suoyi ran zhi gu* 所以然之故) and a rule to which it should conform (*suo dang ran zhi ze* 所当然之则), which is what is meant by ‘principle.’” See also idem, *Two Chinese Philosophers*, 8–22; Willard J. Peterson, “Another Look at *Li*,” *Bulletin of Song-Yüan Studies* 18 (1986): 13–31.

⁷⁶ *Zhuzi yulei*, 6.99.11: “Someone asked: The myriad things are splendid; still are they the same or not? Chu replied: Principle alone is one. Moral principle thus is the same, but its manifestations are not. Underlying the relationship between a sovereign and a minister is the principle for the relationship between a sovereign and a minister; underlying the relationship between a father and a son is the principle for the relationship between a father and a son” (Gardner, *Learning to Be a Sage*, 91). For a collection of Zhu’s sayings on principle, see Gardner, *Learning to Be a Sage*, 90–92.

the Way via observation of the world. By studying this principle in every affair and everything that we encounter in our daily lives, we extend our knowledge (*zhi zhi* 致知). With practice and by constantly building upon our understanding of principle, we will be able to penetrate the underlying quality and nature of all things, both that which is manifest and hidden, and ultimately illumine the substance and application of our minds (*xin* 心).⁷⁷ Knowledge of the principle in the myriad things of heaven then becomes the means by which we apprehend our own principle and nature.⁷⁸

With a perceptive knowledge of the cosmos and of ourselves, we can become true in our thoughts (*cheng yi* 诚意) and true to our nature, manifesting integrity in our entire being.⁷⁹ There will be no self-deception (*ziqu* 自欺): our hearts, our minds, our thoughts, our motives, and our actions will constantly be one, regardless of whether we are in the presence of others or alone.⁸⁰ Moreover, we will be in a position to rectify our minds

⁷⁷ In Zhu's thought, the word *xin* 心 is the locus of the will, intellect, emotion, and desire of a person. It is usually translated as the mind, heart, or mind/heart. A. C. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China* (La Salle: Open Court, 1989) 61, lists three psychological classes to which the term applies: knowledge, passions, and purpose.

⁷⁸ Gardner, *Learning to Be a Sage*, 66.

⁷⁹ The word *cheng* 诚 has been traditionally translated as "sincerity" or "to be sincere." Gardner, *Four Books*, 123, however considers "sincerity" to be inadequate. He writes, "To be sincere implies a feeling or emotion of genuineness projected outwardly, toward something, that is, to be sincere toward others. To these readers, only secondarily—if at all—does it convey the sense of first being genuine to ourselves. For Zhu and the later Chinese, *cheng* is foremost the process and capacity of being true to ourselves, of being true to the human nature endowed in us." Consequently, he prefers the phrase "true" or "to make oneself true." Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 11, translates *cheng* as "integral wholeness." In this chapter, I translate *cheng* 诚 as "true."

⁸⁰ *Daxue zhangju*, "Commentary" 6.1: "Becoming true in one's thoughts is allowing no self-deception—as one hates the hateful smell, as one loves the lovely color" (Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 105). The concept of *cheng* in *Daxue* operates in the ethical realm. Such an understanding is also present in *Mengzi*, 4A.12 (ET Lau, *Mencius*, 123) where *cheng* is the source of faithfulness (*xin* 信), and the content of goodness and the four virtues (humaneness, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom). See Yanming An, "The Idea of Cheng (Integrity): Its Formation in the History of Chinese Philosophy" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1997), 52–56.

(*zheng xin* 正心), keeping close watch over our rage (*fen zhi* 忿懣), fears (*kong ju* 恐惧), delights (*hao le* 好乐), and anxieties (*you huan* 忧患) so that we do not indulge our desires (*yu* 欲) and allow our emotions (*qing* 情) to prevail.⁸¹ If the mind is rectified, we will then be able to know and nourish the goodness of our human nature, recovering the full potential of the four cardinal virtues of humaneness (*ren* 仁),⁸² righteousness (*yi* 义), propriety (*li* 礼), and wisdom (*zhi* 智).⁸³ It is through this entire process that we cultivate ourselves.

Governing others

Self-cultivation must issue forth in moral action and behavior. Having understood the principle of all things, we then know “how to comport ourselves as required by the nature of everything that we encounter. In all of life’s situation we behave as we should

⁸¹ See Zhu’s commentary to *Daxue zhangju*, “Commentary” 7.1: “It would seem that these four things [i.e., rage, terror, doting, and misery], being operations of the mind, are familiar to everyone. But, if once under their influence a person is unable to keep close watch over them, desires will be aroused and the emotions will prevail” (Gardner, *Ta-hsueh*, 108).

⁸² *Ren* 仁 is frequently translated as *humaneness, humanity, true goodness, or benevolence*. The *Chapter and Verse Commentary on the Practice of the Mean (Zhongyong zhangju 中庸章句)*, 20.5 (Gardner, *Four Books*, 119), remarks: “*Ren* 仁 is what it means to be human (*ren* 人),” emphasizing that *ren* 仁 is the essential feature of human beings, the virtue that defines what humanity is. Moreover, according to folk etymology, the character for *ren* 仁 is formed from “human” (*ren* 人) and “two” (*er* 二), suggesting that *ren* 仁 stresses the social aspect of human beings. As a virtue, *ren* 仁 is used in a particular and general sense. In the particular sense, *ren* relates to the heart of sympathy and love alone, and is one of the four cardinal virtues. In the general sense, *ren* generates and encompasses the four cardinal virtues of mankind: humaneness (*ren* 仁), righteousness (*yi* 义), propriety (*li* 礼), and wisdom (*zhi* 智). The understanding of *ren* is complex and changes with different writers. For a study outlining the similarities and differences in Confucius’s, Mencius’s, and Zhu’s understanding of *ren*, see Bloom, “Three Visions of *Jen*,” 8–42. See also Wing-tsit Chan, “The Evolution of the Confucian Concept *Jên*,” *Philosophy East and West* 4 (1955): 295–319; idem, “Chinese and Western Interpretations of *Jen* (Humanity),” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 2 (1975): 107–29.

⁸³ See *Prefatory Remarks to the Collected Commentaries of the Works of Mencius (Mengzi jizhu xuyan 孟子集注序言)* (ET Gardner, “Transmitting the Way,” 169).

interrelationally,”⁸⁴ bringing order to the household, proper governance to the kingdom, and peace to the entire world.

Self-cultivation allows one to bring balance and order to the household. When confronted by the vicissitudes of life, we will not be mastered and led astray by the swirl of raw emotions (kinship and affection [*qin ai* 亲爱], derision [*jian wu* 贱恶], awe [*wei jing* 畏敬], pity [*ai guan* 哀矜], scorn [*ao duo* 敖惰]) such as excessive love for one’s children or greed for wealth.⁸⁵ On the contrary, we forego our natural biases (*pian* 偏), critically examining and doing what is right in our family. The text goes on to state that if we are able to bring order to our household, we will be able to govern (*zhi* 治) the kingdom well; if we are able to teach our household, we will be able to teach the kingdom. This household-kingdom relationship is based on the premise that familial relations exemplify and effect proper social and political relations. “Filial respect provides the basis for serving one’s sovereign; brotherly devotion provides the basis for serving one’s superiors; and parental love provides the basis for commanding all of one’s subordinates.”⁸⁶ Moreover, the power of moral example suggests that the behavior of a single family or individual can influence an entire kingdom.⁸⁷ Thus, the superior man (*junzi* 君子) is able to accomplish the moral instruction of the whole empire without ever leaving his

⁸⁴ Gardner, *Four Books*, 8.

⁸⁵ Zhu’s commentary to *Daxue zhangju*, “Commentary” 8.2.

⁸⁶ *Daxue zhangju*, “Commentary” 9.1 (Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 13).

⁸⁷ *Daxue zhangju*, “Commentary” 9.3: “When a single family evinces the ideal of human kindness, then human kindness will be promoted in the entire realm; when a single family evinces a deferential spirit, then a spirit of deference will be promoted in the entire realm. And conversely, should the members of a single family be greedy and recalcitrant, this will give rise to a state of anarchy throughout the entire kingdom” (Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 13–14).

house.⁸⁸ Finally, the household-kingdom relationship is tied to the notion that the kingdom models a household with its necessary moral obligations. As the father and mother, the ruler must show parental kindness (*ci* 慈) to the populace;⁸⁹ as the children, the people must demonstrate obedience to their sovereign.

Although the ninth chapter of *Daxue* commentary suggests that any household or any superior man can bring about proper governance of the kingdom, the tenth chapter shifts the emphasis toward the ruler and his household.⁹⁰ The ruler's household becomes a microcosm of the entire kingdom,⁹¹ and his interactions with different household members become the paradigm for social relations within the empire.⁹² Although the development of this paradigmatic household etiquette of the ruler is predicated on prior links within the Eight Particular Steps (such as observing principle and letting his luminous virtue shine), the text breaks the “outwardly radiating” sequence and argues that the ruler must also measure the minds of his people (*xie ju* 絜矩), exercising

⁸⁸ The term *junzi* literally means “son of a lord.” In earlier texts such as the *Book of Documents* and the *Book of Odes*, it refers to a social position (a member of the aristocracy) and not to the individual's moral character. In later texts such as the *Lunyu*, its uses include exclusive reference to social status, exclusive reference to character, and reference to status and character simultaneously. Hsiao, *History of Chinese Political Thought*, 120, remarks that “Confucius' ideal superior man was ... a man complete in virtue and elevated in status.” Through this use, Confucius hoped to reconstitute a ruling class similar to that present in the old feudal world. The opposite of a *junzi* is a *xiaoren* 小人 (“petty man”).

⁸⁹ *Daxue zhangju*, “Commentary” 9.2; 10.3.

⁹⁰ Commentators are aware of this shift and remark that the “one individual” and the “one household” of the ninth chapter of the commentary refer to the ruler and his household. See Legge, *Chinese Classics* 1.371; *Liji zhushu* 礼记注疏, 60.986: “The one household and the one individual is the ruler” (translation mine).

⁹¹ While it is common to portray society as a magnified family, it is also possible to expand the categories and portray the universe as a family. In the *Western Inscription*, Zhang Zai (1020–1077 C.E.) states, “Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother.... All people are my brothers and sisters.... The great ruler (the emperor) is the eldest son of my parents (Heaven and Earth).... In life I follow and serve [Heaven and Earth]” (Chan, *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 497–98).

⁹² *Daxue zhangju*, “Commentary” 10.1.

consideration, reciprocity, and empathy (*shu* 恕).⁹³ He takes the concerns of the people as his own, treating them as he himself would want to be treated. In this way, he gains the confidence of the people, brings order to the kingdom, and ultimately establishes peace in the entire world.

The *Zhongyong*

The authorship of the *Zhongyong* is traditionally attributed to Zisi.⁹⁴ As with the *Daxue*, the *Zhongyong* was originally a chapter in the *Liji*. When Zhu incorporated it into the *Four Books*, he divided the text into thirty three chapters without altering its order, and wrote a detailed commentary on it.⁹⁵ Zhu considered the *Zhongyong* to be highly abstract and difficult to understand, containing the subtle mysteries of the ancients.⁹⁶ He therefore recommended that it should be read last after the *Daxue*, *Lunyu*, and *Mengzi*, remarking

⁹³ *Daxue zhangju*, “Commentary” 9.4; 10.2–3. Technically, *xie ju* 絮矩 means to “measure with the carpenter’s square (*ju* 矩).” *Zhuzi yulei*, 16.361, however, understands *ju* to refer to one’s mind (*xin*). Explaining the principle of *xie ju*, the text further states that the superior man sees the minds of others as similar to his own. Thus, he always uses his own mind to measure the minds of others in order to achieve peace, not doing unto others what he does not want done unto himself. *Zhuzi yulei*, 16.364, clarifies this point, stating that “*shu* 恕 (reciprocity) is also the meaning of *xie ju*” (translation mine). The importance of *shu* is clear, not least in *Lunyu*, 4.15, where in explaining the one thread that runs through the Master’s Way, Zengzi remarks, “The way of the Master consists in doing one’s best (*zhong* 忠) and in using oneself as a measure to gauge the likes and dislikes of others (*shu* 恕). That is all” (Lau, *Analects* [Bilingual ed.], 33).

⁹⁴ See the *Records of the Historians* (*Shi ji* 史记), 47.1946.

⁹⁵ For an account of the *Zhongyong* prior to Zhu, see Tu Wei-ming, *Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Chung-yung* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976), 12–17.

⁹⁶ *Zhuzi yulei*, 62.1479: “The *Zhongyong* speaks often of the abstract; for example, it speaks loftily of ‘spiritual beings’ and ‘forming a trinity with heaven and earth.’ Few are the passages that speak of learning on the lower level; numerous are those that speak of penetration on the higher level” (Gardner, “Principle and Pedagogy,” 72). Modern authors also attest to the difficulty of understanding the *Zhongyong*. For example, Chan, *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 96, remarks that the *Zhongyong* is “perhaps the most philosophical in the whole body of ancient Confucian literature.”

that “having read these three books, you will already understand half of what is in the *Zhongyong*.”⁹⁷

The central message of the *Zhongyong* is to “encourage the ongoing productive confluence of the ‘Way of Heaven’ (*tian dao* 天道) and the ‘Way of Man’ (*ren dao* 人道) through human virtuosity” and moral education.⁹⁸ The opening chapter presents a programmatic overview of this message, beginning with three aphoristic statements: “By the term ‘nature’ (*xing* 性) we speak of that which is imparted by the [mandate] of Heaven; by ‘the Way’ (*dao* 道) we mean that path which is in conformance with the intrinsic nature of man and things; and by ‘moral instruction’ (*jiao* 教) we refer to the process of cultivating man’s proper way (*dao* 道) in the world.”⁹⁹ Through these statements, the text posits a tight relationship between Heaven and man; between the ontological Way (the Way of Heaven) and the ethical Way (the Way of Man).¹⁰⁰ Subsequent chapters of the *Zhongyong* then describe this relationship in further detail, laying out the full range of possibilities for such a union: from the impossibility of its attainment (chapters 2–11), to the concrete expressions of partial fulfillment (chapters

⁹⁷ Zhuzi yulei, 62.1479 (Gardner, “Principle and Pedagogy,” 72).

⁹⁸ Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall, *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 27.

⁹⁹ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 1.1 (Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 25). Although not specifically described as the Way of Man, the second occurrence of *dao* with its attention to cultivation refers to the “correct Confucian way of ordering the self and world” (Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 80n. 3).

¹⁰⁰ The text’s emphasis on the Way of Heaven and the Way of Man is underscored by Zhu’s annotations (“this chapter concerns *tian dao* 天道” or “this chapter concerns *ren dao* 人道”) after various chapter headings in the *Zhongyong zhangju*. According to him, chapters 22, 24, 26, 30, 31, and 32 discourse primarily on the Way of Heaven, and chapters 23, 25, 27, 28, and 29 the Way of Man.

12–20), and finally to the lofty human and cosmic implications of its perfect realization (chapters 20–33).

The word Way (*dao* 道) is perhaps the most important concept in Chinese philosophy. In its literal uses, it means “path,” “road,” or “to speak”; in its metaphorical use, it denotes the path of thought, governance, or ethical behavior.¹⁰¹ Thus, the Way of Heaven refers to the natural order, norm, and rule of the universe; the Way of Man refers to the moral life that governs humanity. In the next two sections, we examine the elements of the Way of Heaven and the Way of Man as described in the *Zhongyong*, paying particular attention to how the Way of Man can approach the Way of Heaven.

Elements of the Way of Heaven

The *Zhongyong* does not explicitly define the Way of Heaven, but elusively describes it in multiple ways. For example, the text states, “The Way of Heaven and Earth ... produce things in an unfathomable way. The Way of Heaven and Earth is extensive, deep, high, brilliant, infinite, and lasting.”¹⁰² The *Zhongyong*, nevertheless, focuses on two important elements that embody the character of the Way of Heaven: *zhongyong* 中庸 and *cheng* 诚.

The word *zhong* 中 means “middle” or “mean”; by extension, it means “perfect balance,” never leaning to one side or the other, never falling short or overshooting. It

¹⁰¹ For a slightly expanded understanding, see Bryan W. Van Norden, “Introduction,” in *Confucius and the Analects* (ed. Bryan W. Van Norden; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 24. He explains: “This word (*dao*) has several related senses. (1) The original sense may have been ‘way,’ in the sense of ‘path’ or ‘road.’ It came to mean (2) ‘way,’ in the sense of ‘a way to do something,’ or ‘the right way to do something,’ or ‘the order that comes from doing things in the right way,’ (3) a ‘linguistic account’ of a way to do something or a verb, that means ‘to give a linguistic account,’ (4) a metaphysical entity responsible for the way things act.”

¹⁰² *Zhongyong zhangju*, 26 (Chan, *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 109).

does not connote simply doing things in moderation; but rather “[weighing] circumstances and [finding] the perfect balance, behaving precisely as demanded by the particular circumstances.”¹⁰³ The word *yong* 庸 has a wider range of meaning. Zheng Xuan defined it as “practice” (*yong* 用) and “constant” (*chang* 常);¹⁰⁴ Cheng Yi as “unchanging” (*bu yi* 不易); and Cheng Yi’s disciple Guo Zhongxiao (郭忠孝; ?–1127 C.E.) as the “comprehensive penetration of that which is absolutely transforming the world.”¹⁰⁵ Zhu, however, glosses it as “ordinary, normal or constant” (*ping chang* 平常), suggesting that the principle of *zhong* should be applied in each and every situation of life. Zhu further endorses Cheng Yi’s remark that *zhong* connotes the correct Way of the universe (*tianxia zhi zheng dao* 天下之正道) and *yong* the steadfast principle of the universe (*tianxia zhi ding li* 天下之定理).¹⁰⁶ Thus, a loose paraphrase of *zhongyong* according to Zhu may be “maintaining perfect balance in each and every set of circumstances and thus keeping to [the correct Way and the] steadfast principle at all times.”¹⁰⁷ The term *zhongyong* is the ideal standard to which humanity is to aspire in order to attain the Way of Heaven.

Despite the importance of *zhongyong*, not least in its use as the title, the term almost disappears after chapter seven, a quarter of the way into the text. In its place

¹⁰³ Gardner, *Four Books*, 108.

¹⁰⁴ *Liji zhushu*, 52.879–880. Following Zheng Xuan’s understanding of *yong* 庸 as *yong* 用, Riegel, “The Four ‘Tzu Ssu’ Chapters of the *Li Chi*,” 88, argues that the phrase “to apply the inner” (*yong qi zhong* 用其中), found within the text itself (*Zhongyong zhangju*, 6), should be the proper gloss for *zhongyong* 中庸.

¹⁰⁵ Tu, *Centrality and Commonality*, 20.

¹⁰⁶ Introductory remarks in the *Zhongyong zhangju* (ET Gardner, *Four Books*, 107).

appears “truthfulness” or “integrity” (*cheng* 誠). The terms *zhongyong* and *cheng*, however, do not embody two distinct concepts; rather, they represent two different ways of looking at the same ideals of the Way of Heaven.¹⁰⁸ As in the *Daxue*, the *Zhongyong*’s use of *cheng* also carries an ethical dimension, the completion of the self (*zi cheng* 自成) and the realization of one’s moral nature.¹⁰⁹ The *Zhongyong*, however, expands the categories of *cheng*. First, the *Zhongyong* describes *cheng* in supernatural categories of foreknowledge. The text reads,

It is characteristic of absolute *cheng* to be able to foreknow. When a [state] or family is about to flourish, there are sure to be lucky omens. When a [state] or family is about to perish, there are sure to be unlucky omens. These omens are revealed in divination and in the movements of the four limbs [of the sacrificial victims].¹¹⁰ When calamity or blessing is about to come, it can surely know beforehand if it is good, and it can also surely know beforehand if it is evil. Therefore he who has absolute *cheng* is like a spirit (*shen* 神). (*Zhongyong zhangju*, 24 [Chan, *Source Book of Chinese Philosophy*, 108])

¹⁰⁷ Gardner, *Four Books*, 109, with some modifications. A similar reading is given by Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 23–24, who understands the term as putting into common practice (*yong* 庸) the ideal of perfect equilibrium (*zhong* 中).

¹⁰⁸ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 20.18, highlights the interrelationship between the two terms, stating, “He who is *cheng* maintains *zhong* (“perfect balance”) without effort” (translation mine).

¹⁰⁹ The relationship between “making oneself true” (*cheng* 誠) and self-“formation or completion” (*cheng* 成) is etymological. See *Zhongyong zhangju*, 25.1. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao*, 133, remarks that making oneself true (*cheng* 誠) “derives from *ch’eng* 成 ‘become whole,’ used (in contrast with *sheng* 生 ‘be born’) of the maturation of a specific thing. Graphically it is distinguished by the ‘speech’ radical 言, marking it as the wholeness or completeness of the person displayed in the authenticity of his words.”

¹¹⁰ Divination, for example, was carried out by poking a heated iron into the surfaces of tortoise shells and “reading” the resulting cracks. See Victor H. Mair, Nancy Shatzman Steinhardt, and Paul Rakita Goldin, eds., *Hawai’i Reader in Traditional Chinese Culture* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 8–9; Victor H. Mair, ed., *The Columbia Anthology of Traditional Chinese Literature* (Translations from the Asian classics; New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 3–4; Sarah Allan, *The Shape of the Turtle: Myth, Art, and Cosmos in Early China* (SUNY series in Chinese philosophy and culture; Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 112–23.

The ability of foreknowledge results from perfect *cheng*. According to Zhu, the man with perfect *cheng* maintains a “psychological state of ‘emptiness and brightness’ (*xu ming* 虛明) that may be compared to an extremely clean mirror. It is able to reflect certain signs that are invisible for ordinary people.”¹¹¹

Second, the *Zhongyong* elevates *cheng* to a cosmological category. The text reads,

Only he who is most perfectly *cheng* is able to give full realization to his human nature; able to give full realization to his human nature, he is then able to give full realization to the human nature of others; able to give full realization to the human nature of others, he is then able to give full realization to the nature of other creatures; able to give full realization to the nature of other creatures, he can then assist in the transformative and nourishing process of heaven and earth. If he can assist [or participate; *zan* 贊] in the transformative and nourishing processes of heaven and earth,¹¹² he can then form a trinity with heaven and earth (*yu tiandi san* 与天地参).¹¹³

Cheng is able to effect cosmic transformation since it entails not only the completion of the self but the completion of all things.¹¹⁴ The one who possesses perfect *cheng* fully realizes his original nature and manifests the virtues that are in accord with his essential humaneness (*ren* 仁). Through the power of his moral example, he is then able to realize fully the nature of other people through a ripple-like effect.¹¹⁵ This outwardly radiating movement, beginning with the internal truthfulness of the individual, is similar to steps

¹¹¹ An, “The Idea of Cheng (Integrity),” 77.

¹¹² The meaning of *zan* 贊 is debated. It can mean “know,” “assist,” or “participate.” See An, “The Idea of Cheng (Integrity),” 69–71.

¹¹³ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 22 (Gardner, *Four Books*, 124).

¹¹⁴ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 25.3; 26.1–8 (ET Gardner, *Four Books*, 126–27).

¹¹⁵ This statement assumes that all humanity shares the same good nature. *Mengzi*, 4A.7 (Lau, *Mencius*, 164), writes: “Now things of the same kind are all alike. Why should we have doubts when it comes to man? The sage and I are of the same kind.” Since all humanity possesses the same nature that is fundamentally good, they are able to admire and follow the perfect example set by the sage. The sage is therefore able to effect the external transformation of human society.

3–8 (making the thoughts true [*cheng yi* 诚意] ... bringing enduring peace to the entire world [*ping tianxia* 平天下]) in the Eight Particular Steps of the *Daxue*. The *Zhongyong*, however, ratchets up the influence of the one with absolute *cheng* so that he effects not only the full realization of other human beings but also of the ten thousand creatures of the cosmos. This possibility turns on the concept of principle (*li*). A “person, who is born, is born of heaven as well as his parents since heaven imparts principle in him. Another way of saying this is that heaven endows the mind with principle and once endowed it becomes nature by virtue of being the ‘humanized’ aspect of heaven.”¹¹⁶ The nature of man is connected to the nature of heaven (and all things) via principle;¹¹⁷ the nature of man is the concrete embodiment of the Way of Heaven. The man who is perfectly sincere and true to his nature thus shares in the very nature of heaven and earth. He is then able to participate (*zan*) in the nourishing of all creatures and in the regeneration, stability, and peace of the cosmos.¹¹⁸

This cosmological aspect of *cheng* is further described in the text:

¹¹⁶ Allen Wittenborn, trans., *Further Reflections on Things at Hand: A Reader by Chu Hsi* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1991), 33.

¹¹⁷ Zhu remarks, “Heaven is principle, endowment is nature, and nature is principle” (Chan, *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 612).

¹¹⁸ An, “The Idea of Cheng (Integrity),” 71–72, understands *zan* in the more passive sense of non-interference whereby the man with absolute *cheng* allows all things to develop their own natures. In this interpretation, the sage “cannot add anything to the movements of heaven and earth. However, he can ensure that no movements will be violated by artificial efforts” (72).

Absolute *cheng* is ceaseless (*wu xi* 无息). Being ceaseless, it is lasting. Being lasting, it is evident. Being evident, it is infinite. Being infinite, it is extensive and deep. Being extensive and deep, it is high and brilliant. It is because it is high and brilliant that it overshadows all things. It is because it is infinite and lasting that it can complete all things.... The Way of Heaven and Earth may be completely described in one sentence: They are without any doubleness (*bu er* 不二). (*Zhongyong zhangju*, 26 [Chan, *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 109])

The state of perfect *cheng* is ceaseless (*wu xi*), possessing an inextinguishable constancy such that there is a definite consistency and regularity in its movements. Heaven and Earth manifest this perfect state of constancy since they lack choice. The sun will continue to be the sun, and the moon will continue to be the moon. There is therefore no “doubleness” in its nature; it is constantly one. Humans, on the other hand, possess choice as they react to a multitude of events. There is therefore the danger that a person will lose touch with his human nature, moving from consistency to inconsistency. The *Zhongyong*’s use of *cheng* then encourages people to imitate the constancy of the Way of Heaven, and maintain the consistent manifestation of their human nature, thereby participating in the completion of all things.¹¹⁹

The *Zhongyong* presents the Way of Heaven as the fundamental cosmic processes of the universe, the natural order by which all things are done and to which all things follow. At the same time, the text also presents the Way of Heaven as the ethical dictates that people are to follow in order to fulfill and realize their human nature. By conjoining the ethical and the cosmic dimensions, the *Zhongyong* illustrates the means by which

¹¹⁹ An, “The Idea of Cheng (Integrity),” 72–75.

humanity can join Heaven and Earth in the generative and transformative processes of cosmic harmony.

Confluence of the Way of Man and the Way of Heaven

The Confucian understanding of the Way precludes any sharp division between the Way of Heaven and the Way of Man, between the transcendent Way and the moral human life. The elements that occur in the realm of Heaven such as principle and nature are also predicated of humanity. Thus, the two Ways are closely related. The *Zhongyong* begins with the statement that the Way of Heaven demands a life that perfectly conforms to our human nature (*xing*). As that which is decreed by Heaven, our original nature is unalterable and good. Moreover, this nature is a manifestation of the same principle that is in Heaven. As humanity's original nature is the concrete embodiment of the Way, a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven, and a man who lives a life in full conformity to his original nature fulfills the Way of Heaven.

Despite the interconnectedness of the Way of Man and the Way of Heaven, the *Zhongyong* warns us that perfect manifestation of the Way of Heaven in humanity is extremely difficult, and lays out three possible levels of attainment: the Way of the Sage (*shengren zhi dao* 圣人之道), the Way of the Superior Man (*junzi zhi dao* 君子之道), and the Way of the Petty Man (*xiaoren zhi dao* 小人之道). The Way of the Sage manifests the idealized attainment of the Way of Heaven in humanity; the Way of the Superior Man manifests a genuine desire, pursuit, and gradual attainment of the Way of Heaven; and the Way of the Petty Man, lacking any moral aversions or inhibitions, exhibits a blatant

disregard of *zhongyong*.¹²⁰ Among these three levels of the Way of Man, the *Zhongyong* focuses on the Way of the Superior Man, the term occurring seven times in the text; the other two terms occur only once each.

The difficulty of attaining the Way of Heaven stems from the near impossibility of achieving and maintaining absolute embodiment of *cheng* and *zhong*. Although one can demonstrate some incipient manifestations of the Way in bringing stability to the family, state, and the entire world, few people possess the capacity to uphold *zhong* and manifest perfect *cheng* constantly.¹²¹ Only the sage (*shengren* 圣人), possessing the highest intellectual perfection (wisdom; *zhi* 智) and the highest human perfection (humaneness; *ren* 仁),¹²² is capable of doing so.¹²³ He is one in every respect with the heavenly principle; he maintains perfect balance without effort, apprehends without thinking, and possesses no further need of *becoming* true since he *is* in the state of being true. As the epitome of human cultivation, the sage who embodies absolute *cheng* possesses almost supernatural power that transcends human capacity. He is like a spirit (*shen* 神), possessing foreknowledge and the ability to read signs and omens.¹²⁴ More important, the sage by virtue of his capacity participates in the dynamic structure of the cosmos, assisting in its

¹²⁰ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 2.

¹²¹ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 3, 9, 22 (Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 26, 28, 44).

¹²² Ulrich Unger, *Grundbegriffe der altchinesischen Philosophie: Ein Wörterbuch für die Klassische Periode* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000), 104. See also *Mengzi*, 2A.2.

¹²³ The ease or possibility of becoming a sage is debated in the Confucian tradition. Confucius did not claim to be a sage (*Lunyu*, 7.34 [Lau, *Analects*, 90]; *Mengzi*, 2A.2 [Lau, *Mencius*, 79]). He also remarked that he had never met a sage (*Lunyu*, 7.26 [Lau, *Analects*, 89]), nor was he capable of fulfilling even one of the four aspects of the Way of the Superior Man (*Zhongyong*, 13.4 [Gardner, *Four Books*, 117]). Nevertheless, later Confucian thinkers consider Confucius to be a sage, and emphasize the possibility of sagehood. Mencius remarked that “all men are capable of becoming a Yao or a Shun [ancient sage kings]” (*Mengzi*, 6B.2 [Lau, *Mencius*, 172]). Zhu described a path to sagehood through education and practice.

transformative and nourishing processes and forming a trinity with Heaven and Earth (*yu tiandi san* 与天地参).¹²⁵ The Way of the Sage then is the highest level of cultivation in the Way of Man, a level that truly reflects the Way of Heaven. As the *Zhongyong* remarks, “Great indeed is the Way of the Sage! Overflowing,¹²⁶ it produces and nourishes the ten thousand things; in its greatness it extends all the way to heaven.”¹²⁷

Apart from discussing the two extreme endpoints of man’s ability in attaining the Way of Heaven, its impossibility and its actual attainment in the Way of the Sage, the *Zhongyong* focuses on the Way of the Superior Man, the way by which one can progressively move toward the goal of perfect attainment. The difference between the Way of the Sage and the Way of the Superior Man using the concept of *cheng* is described as follows:

To *be* true (*cheng*) is the Way of Heaven. To *make oneself* true (*cheng*) is the Way of [the Superior] Man. He who *is* true (*cheng*) maintains perfect balance without effort and apprehends without thinking; he is centered naturally and comfortably in the Way [of Heaven]. Such is the sage! He who *makes* himself true (*cheng*) chooses the good and holds to it firmly. (italics mine; *Zhongyong zhangju*, 20.18 [Gardner, *Four Books*, 121])

¹²⁴ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 24 (Chan, *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 108).

¹²⁵ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 22 (Gardner, *Four Books*, 124), uses the numeral three (*san* 参) as an intransitive verb meaning (“to join as a third term”). See Plaks, *Ta Hsieh and Chung Yung*, 97n. 3.

¹²⁶ The influence of the sage cannot be contained. Just as the sun shines its rays on all of creation, so will the sage influence all of humanity and creation.

¹²⁷ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 27.1–2 (Gardner, *Four Books*, 127). See also *Zhongyong zhangju*, 32.1–2 (Gardner, *Four Books*, 129): “Only he who is most perfectly *cheng* [i.e., the sage] is able to put in order the world’s great invariable human relations, to establish the world’s great foundation, and to know the transformative and nourishing processes of heaven and earth.... Earnest and sincere, he is true goodness! Quiet and deep, he is the fountainhead! Vast and great, he is heaven!” In addition to these texts that extol the greatness of the sage, one must also hold in tension passages that speak of the absolute transcendence of the Way such that it is outside the reach of the sage. *Zhongyong zhangju*, 12: “The Way of the superior man functions everywhere and yet is hidden. Men and women of simple intelligence can share its knowledge; and yet in its utmost reaches, there is something which even the sage does not know. Men and women of simple intelligence can put it into practice; and yet in its utmost reaches there is something which even the sage is not able to put into practice” (Chan, *Sources in Chinese Philosophy*, 100).

The Way of Heaven is the ideal. The Way of the Sage is the actual realization of that ideal; the Way of the Superior Man is the gradual realization of that ideal. The Way of Heaven and the Way of the Sage are static and constant, depicting the state of *being* true; the Way of the Superior Man is dynamic, depicting the action of *becoming* true. In other words, the Way of Heaven and the Way of the Sage is *cheng* from beginning to end without any discontinuity; it is complete *cheng*. The Way of the Superior Man exhibits intermittent *cheng*.¹²⁸

A central argument of the *Zhongyong* is to encourage the superior man to pursue the Way constantly, ultimately becoming a sage and participating in the nourishing processes of the cosmos. I highlight two approaches that the text suggests and that are pertinent to my overall project: the role of the mind (*xin* 心), and the role of rites (*li* 礼).

The role of the mind in cultivating the Way

The opening chapter of the *Zhongyong* lays out the imperative for constantly pursuing the Way. It reads:

¹²⁸ *Zhuzi yulei*, 64.1578, demonstrates this difference between the sage (Confucius), who displays *cheng* throughout his life, and Yan Yuan, who displays *cheng* only for a limited time. It states, “*Cheng* lasts from a thing’s beginning to its end, without any discontinuation... For instance, the sage is in perfect *cheng*. It means that he is completely in *cheng* from his birth until death. In Yan Yuan, there would be nothing contrary to humaneness for three months. It means that, in him, the starting point of the three months is the beginning of *cheng*, and the final point of the three months is the end of *cheng*. After the three months, there may be some discontinuity in regard to his *cheng*” (An, “The Idea of Cheng [Integrity],” 145).

The Way: it must not be abandoned for even a moment. What can be abandoned is not the Way. Consequently, the superior man treats with extreme care that not visible to him; and treats with apprehension even that beyond the reach of his hearing. Nothing is more manifest than the hidden, nothing more obvious than the subtle. Thus the superior man, even in solitude, is watchful over himself. Before pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy have arisen (*wei fa* 未发)—this we call perfect balance (*zhong* 中). After they have arisen and attained due proportion—this we call harmony (*he* 和). Perfect balance is the great foundation of the universe; harmony is the Way that unfolds throughout the universe. Let perfect balance and harmony be realized and heaven and earth will find their proper places therein; and, the ten thousand creatures will be nourished therein. (*Zhongyong zhangju*, 1.2–4 [Gardner, *Four Books*, 110–11])

Just as the sage manifests perfect balance and absolute truthfulness at all times in all circumstances, the *Zhongyong* urges the superior man to pursue the Way relentlessly without ceasing from his efforts in mid-course (*ban tu er fei* 半途而废).¹²⁹ Similarly, the text admonishes him to maintain perfect balance at all times (*shi zhong* 时中).¹³⁰ The *Zhongyong* goes on to detail the means for achieving this constancy, explicitly and implicitly touching upon several key concepts including mind (*xin* 心), nature (*xing* 性), and feelings (*qing* 情).

In order to understand the above text, it may be helpful to lay out the relationship between nature, feelings, and the mind.¹³¹ Building on Mencius's Four Beginnings or Four Germs (*si duan* 四端),¹³² adherents of the "School of the Way" (*dao xue*

¹²⁹ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 11.2 (ET Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 29).

¹³⁰ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 2.2 (ET Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 26).

¹³¹ See Huang, *Essentials of Neo-Confucianism*, 137–38, 149–60; Wittenborn, *Further Reflections on Things at Hand*, 31–41; Shu-hsien Liu, "The Function of the Mind in Chu Hsi's Philosophy," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 5 (1978): 195–208.

¹³² *Mengzi*, 2A.6: "The heart of compassion is the germ of [humaneness]; the heart of shame, of dutifulness; the heart of courtesy and modesty, of observance of the rites; the heart of right and wrong, of wisdom. Man has these four germs (*si duan* 四端) just as he has four limbs" (Lau, *Mencius*, 83).

道学) such as Zhu argue that human nature consists of the four cardinal virtues. When these four natures are stimulated, they express themselves respectively in the four feelings of commiseration (*cinyin* 恻隐), shame and dislike (*xiuwu* 羞恶), modesty and deference (*cirang* 辞让), and right and wrong (*shifei* 是非).¹³³ Nature is the substance (*ti* 体) of feelings, and feelings are the concrete manifestation and function (*yong* 用) of nature; nature is passive, but feelings are active.¹³⁴ Since nature is endowed from heaven and is in fact principle, it is fundamentally good. Feelings, however, can be good or bad depending upon the quality of one's *qi* 气. With this understanding of nature and feelings, Zhu adds the category of the mind (*xin* 心), asserting that mind encompasses both nature and feelings. In this tripartite division, Zhu understands nature as the principle of the mind, feelings as the mind in action; nature as the substance of the mind, and feelings as the function of the mind. Although nature is passive and feelings are active, the mind is both active and passive as it links (*tong* 统) nature and feelings together and controls them as

¹³³ *Zhuzi yulei*, 5.92: "According to Mencius, the feeling of commiseration of the mind is the beginning of [humaneness]. It therefore becomes clear that commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and deference, right and wrong are feelings. [Humaneness], righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are the essence of the nature, but it is expressed in the feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and deference, right and wrong" (Huang, *Essentials of Neo-Confucianism*, 152). Note that Mencius's and Zhu's list of four feelings differ from earlier texts which list seven. For example, *Liyun*, 2.19: "What are the feelings of men? They are joy (*xi* 喜), anger (*nu* 怒), sadness (*ai* 哀), fear (*ju* 惧), love (*ai* 爱), disliking (*wu* 恶), and liking (*yu* 欲)" (*Li Ki* [trans. James Legge; vols 27 and 28 of *The Sacred Books of the East*; ed. F. Max Müller; Oxford: Clarendon, 1885], 27:379). Note also that Zhu inverts Mencius's understanding of the Four Germs or Four Beginnings. Under Mencius, the Four Beginnings bloom into virtues; thus the virtue of humaneness (*ren*) develops or blooms from the feelings of pity and compassion. Under Zhu, feelings of pity and compassion arise from the endowed nature of humaneness (*ren*); feelings are the function or manifestation of the substance of nature. See Bloom, "Three Visions of *Jen*," 28.

¹³⁴ For a discussion of Zhu's understanding of substance and function, see Wing-tsit Chan, "Patterns of Neo-Confucianism: Why Chu Hsi Differed from Ch'eng I," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 5 (1978): 111-20.

the ruler (*zhu zai* 主宰).¹³⁵ The mind therefore has the will or capacity to determine its goal (*li zhi* 立志), thereby possessing the ability to direct one's *qi* and feelings.¹³⁶

Zhu further expounds that there are two basic phases of the operation of the mind: imminent and accomplished issuance.¹³⁷ Imminent issuance (*wei fa* 未发) is the phase where nature dominates and feelings lie dormant; accomplished issuance (*yi fa* 已发) is the phase where nature is stimulated such that feelings dominate.¹³⁸ The former phase is identified as man's original nature and is the "ontological or moral mind" (*dao xin* 道心); the latter phase with its manifestations of feelings is the "material mind" (*ren xin* 人心).¹³⁹ Feelings when released give rise to desires, and desires in themselves can be either good or bad depending upon the ability of the mind to regulate them.¹⁴⁰ When

¹³⁵ *Further Reflections on Things at Hand* (*Xu jinsilu* 续近思录), 1.46 (ET Wittenborn, *Further Reflections on Things at Hand*, 66).

¹³⁶ *Mengzi*, 2A.2: "The will (*zhi* 志) is the commander over the *qi*" (Lau, *Mencius*, 77).

¹³⁷ The terms imminent and accomplished issuance are from Wittenborn, *Further Reflections on Things at Hand*, 35–38. He argues that there are four phases of the mind in its movement from consciousness to thought. They are total stillness (*jing* 静), imminent issuance (*wei fa* 未发), incipient issuance (*qi* 起), and accomplished issuance (*yi fa* 已发).

¹³⁸ *Zhuzi yulei*, 5.90, remarks, "Imminent issuance is the substance of the mind; accomplished issuance is the function of the mind" (translation mine).

¹³⁹ The two basic phases of the human mind are *dao xin* and *ren xin*. The *dao xin*, literally the "mind of the Way," refers to the mind that is centered on the Way. On the other hand, the *ren xin*, literally the "mind of man," refers to the mind that is governed by one's impure and unbalanced *qi*, the mind that needs to be corrected and refined. See *Preface to the Chapter and Verse Commentary on the Practice of the Mean* (*Zhongyong zhangju xu* 中庸章句序) (ET Gardner, "Transmitting The Way," 170).

¹⁴⁰ The difference between mind, nature, feeling, and desire is described by Zhu as follows: "Nature is the state before activity begins, the feelings are the state when activity has started, and the mind includes both of these states. For nature is the mind before it is aroused, while feelings are the mind after it is aroused, as it is expressed in [Chang Tsai's] saying, 'The mind commands man's nature and feelings'. Desire emanates from feelings. The mind is comparable to water, nature is comparable to the tranquility of still water, feeling is comparable to the flow of water, and desire is comparable to its waves. Just as there are good and bad waves, so there are good desires, such as when 'I want [humaneness]', and bad desires which rush out like wild and violent waves. When bad desires are substantial, they will destroy the Principle of Heaven, as water bursts a dam and damages everything" (Chan, *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 631).

feelings arise, it is the function of the mind to control and direct them in accordance with principle so that they do not burst forth unrestrained and degenerate into evil and selfish desires (*si yu* 私欲).¹⁴¹

This description of the moral psychological processes of the mind lays the background for understanding our text. In order for the superior man to constantly pursue the Way, he must be vigilant and examine himself at all times even when he is alone. He must maintain continual “seriousness or concentration” (*jing* 敬),¹⁴² directing his mind constantly to search his hidden thoughts and feelings, and regulate them, thereby preventing evil selfish desires and thoughts from germinating and disturbing his moral tranquility.¹⁴³ The result of this constant introspection is that the mind becomes as clear as a mirror, reflecting the ontological mind with its highest ideal of perfect balance (*zhong* 中) where man’s original nature dominates and feelings lay dormant (*wei fa*). Even if feelings are aroused (*yi fa*), the material mind obeys the ontological mind, existing in a state of harmony (*he* 和) where feelings are in dynamic equilibrium and perfect measure,

¹⁴¹ It is important to iterate that feelings are not in themselves bad if they appear in the right time and in the right degree. For example, even sages and Heaven show anger. Zhu remarks, “When Heaven is angry, thunder is also aroused. When sage-emperor Shun executed the four cruel criminals, he must have been angry at that time. When one becomes angry at the right time, he will be acting in the proper degree. When the matter is over, anger disappears and none of it will be retained” (Chan, *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 632).

¹⁴² Although *jing* 敬 is commonly rendered as “awe, respect, or reverence,” Zhu typically uses the word in its other sense which denotes a state of concentration. Graham, *Two Chinese Philosophers*, 68–69, explains the two semantic aspects as follows, “*Jing* as it is used in the *Analects* of Confucius, for example, is the attitude one assumes towards parents, ruler, spirits; it includes both the emotion of reverence and a state of self-possession, attentiveness, concentration. It is generally translated ‘respect’ or ‘reverence,’ but it is the other aspect which is the more prominent even in some passages of the *Analects*.... The two aspects of *jing* are interdependent; to collect oneself, be attentive to a person or thing implies that one respects him or takes it seriously; and to be respectful implies that one is collected and attentive.”

¹⁴³ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 1.2–3 (ET Gardner, *Four Books*, 110–111).

without imbalance and excess.¹⁴⁴ When the superior man is able to cultivate his mind such that the material mind is constantly attuned to the ontological mind, he realizes the human nature that is mandated of him by Heaven.¹⁴⁵ When the superior man is able to cultivate his mind such that it reflects both perfect balance and harmony, he in essence attains the Way of Heaven and becomes a sage. As the *Zhongyong* remarks, “Let perfect balance and harmony be realized and heaven and earth will find their proper places therein; and, the ten thousand creatures will be nourished therein.”¹⁴⁶

The role of rites in cultivating the Way

The *Zhongyong* outlines several roles that rites (*li* 禮) play in the cultivation of the Way within the individual and within the state. Nevertheless, it does not address fundamental issues regarding the nature and workings of rites. For example, what is the origin of rites? What is their relationship to principle (*li* 理)? What specific role do rites play in the cultivation of an individual? Do rites produce humaneness or does humaneness manifest itself in the rites? Moreover, what is the relationship of rites to feelings and desires?¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ *Chronological Biography of Master Zhu* (*Zhuzi nianpu* 朱子年譜), 1.2: “If in daily life, one cultivates one’s mind and the spirit of earnestness, and refuses to allow selfish desire to disturb his moral tranquility, then his mind will be as clear as a mirror and still before manifestation, and at the time of manifesting itself will always be attuned to the *Dao*” (Huang, *Essentials of Neo-Confucianism*, 156).

¹⁴⁵ *Zhongyong zhangju xu*: “The text speaks of ‘heaven mandates’ (*tian ming* 天命) and ‘following nature’ (*shuai xing* 率性)—This concerns the ontological mind (*dao xin* 道心)” (translation mine).

¹⁴⁶ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 1.5 (Gardner, *Four Books*, 111).

¹⁴⁷ For readings on ritual studies in general, see Catherine M. Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); idem, *Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); William G. Doty, *Mythography: The Study Of Myths And Rituals* (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1986); Jonathan Z. Smith, *To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Robert A. Segal, ed., *The Myth And Ritual Theory: An Anthology* (Malden: Blackwell, 1998); Caroline Humphrey and J. A. Laidlaw, *The Archetypal Actions of Ritual: A Theory of Ritual* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994). For readings on ritual studies from a Confucian perspective, see Herbert Fingarette, *Confucius: The Secular as Sacred* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Benjamin I. Schwartz, *The World of*

Although not addressed in the *Zhongyong*, these fundamental issues are discussed in other texts with which the *Zhongyong* was canonized. In the *Liji*, such texts include the *Evolution of the Rites* (*Liyun* 礼运);¹⁴⁸ in the *Four Books*, it is the *Lunyu*. In my examination of the role of rites in the *Zhongyong*, I therefore also refer to the *Liyun* and Zhu's commentary on the *Lunyu*.¹⁴⁹ I begin with a brief introduction to the rites.

The *Liyun* provides a mythic narrative of the rites, tracing their origins to the earliest primitive men who lived in caves, ate raw flesh and drank blood, and clothed themselves with feathers and skins. Despite their rudimentary sensibilities, they were able to offer sacrifices that adequately expressed their reverence for spiritual beings.¹⁵⁰ In due course sage rulers arose. Forming a trinity with Heaven and Earth and standing alongside spiritual beings, they perceived the will of Heaven. With a fundamental understanding of the divine principles, they developed and refined the earliest practices of primitive men into a system that served to nourish the spirits and rectify all facets of

Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 67–75; Stephen Wilson, “Conformity, Individuality, and the Nature of Virtue,” *Journal of Religious Ethics* 23 (Fall 1995): 263–289.

¹⁴⁸ The *Liyun* is also translated as the *Cycle of the Rites*. The authenticity of *Liyun* has been debated since the Sung dynasty. Huang Chen of the Sung dynasty regarded the ideas present in it to reflect that of Lao Tzu. Yao Chi-heng of the Ching dynasty argued that the work was composed by the disciples of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu. See Kung-chuan Hsiao, *A History of Chinese Political Thought* (trans. F. W. Mote; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 126. Hsiao remarks that “it has virtually become a final conclusion that one must regard the ‘Li Yün’ with suspicion and [one] cannot take it as representing Confucian theory.” However, Michael Nylan, “*Li Yun* 礼运 (The Evolution of Rites),” *RoutledgeCurzon Encyclopedia of Confucianism* 1:369, remarks that the *Liyun* should not be misconstrued as a Daoist interpolation. Rather, it expands upon three major passages in the *Analects*. I include a discussion of *Liyun* in my present work since it is within the traditionally accepted Confucian canon and lies within the trajectory of Confucian thought.

¹⁴⁹ It will also be helpful to examine briefly the *Book of Xunzi* (*Xunzi* 荀子). Not only did Xunzi (313?–238? B.C.E.) write extensively on rites, his views on the role of rites have points of contact with Zhu's despite their disagreement over fundamental issues, not least of which is the condition of human nature. For Xunzi's understanding of rites and morality, see chapter 5 “*Li* 禮 and Morality” in Janghee Lee, *Xunzi and Early Chinese Naturalism* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005); Kurtis Hagen, “Xunzi and the Nature of Confucian Ritual,” *JAAR* 71 (2003): 371–403.

social relations (ruler–minister; father–son; husband–wife; elder–younger brother; the high-the low), thus securing the blessings of Heaven.¹⁵¹ Rites “were constituted in imitation of perceptible cosmic rhythms as a means of strengthening the coordination of the human being and his natural and spiritual environment.”¹⁵² At the same time, there was a shift in the focus of the rites, from the vertical dimension to the horizontal, from humanity’s relationship with the supernatural to that among members of human society. Consequently, “the *li* (rites) themselves came to be regarded less as modes of hieratic action than as paradigms of human relations.”¹⁵³ Moreover, *li* came also to be understood as “a virtue and/or the collective name of all rules, principles, laws, forms, customs, and rites.”¹⁵⁴ As a virtue, *li* (propriety) is the attitude that leads people to treat others with respect and deference. The Confucian *li* then is a complex concept whose scope includes religious rites and norms of acceptable behavior, as well as dispositions and attitudes that

¹⁵⁰ *Liyun*, 1.5–10 (ET Legge, *Li Ki*, 27:367–71).

¹⁵¹ *Liyun*, 2.12–13; 1.10 (ET Legge, *Li Ki*, 27:376–78, 370–71). The cosmic effect and marvelous powers of rites are also seen in *Xunzi*, 19: “Through rites Heaven and earth join in harmony, the sun and moon shine, the four seasons proceed in order, the stars and constellations march, the rivers flow and all things flourish” (Burton Watson, trans., *Xunzi: Basic Writings* [New York: Columbia University Press, 2003], 98). Note that *Xunzi*’s concept of Heaven leans toward the naturalistic dimension, and has been translated by some authors as nature (see Fung, *History of Chinese Philosophy*, 1.31). For a brief discussion on the magical efficacy of rites, see also Arthur Waley, *The Analects of Confucius* (New York: Vintage Books, 1938), 64–68.

¹⁵² David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Thinking Through Confucius* (SUNY Series in Systematic Philosophy; Albany: SUNY Press, 1987), 86.

¹⁵³ Robert M. Gimello, “Civil Status of *Li* in Classical Confucianism,” *Philosophy East and West* 22 (1972): 204. Kwong-loi Shun, “*Ren* 仁 and *Li* 礼 in the *Analects*,” in *Confucius and the Analects* (ed. Bryan W. Van Norden; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 53–54, also remarks that *li* 礼 originally referred to sacrificial rites and was distinguished from *yi* 义, norms governing polite behavior. In due course, even in the time of Confucius, *li* acquired a broader meaning and included social norms and customs. Shun also notes that *Xunzi* at times used *li* 礼 interchangeably with *li yi* 礼义, denoting “social distinctions and norms that govern conduct appropriate to people by virtue of their social positions” (54).

¹⁵⁴ Xiusheng Liu, *Mencius, Hume, and the Foundations of Ethics* (Ashgate World Philosophies Series; Burlington: Ashgate, 2003), 52.

fostered such behavioral traits.¹⁵⁵ Modern categories that distinguish the religious from the secular or the individual from the communal are not applicable. The Confucian understanding of *li* encompasses all aspects of human life: from liturgies necessary in various ceremonies such as capping, weddings, funerals, and sacrifices; to norms regulating all forms of social interactions; and to rules of conduct in the minute details of everyday life such as sweeping the floor or walking.¹⁵⁶

The *Zhongyong* remarks that there are “three hundred general rules of ceremonies and three thousand lesser rules of conduct.”¹⁵⁷ The practice of these rites allows the Superior Man to regulate the state in an orderly manner, thereby manifesting the Way of Heaven.¹⁵⁸ Within the framework of the state, the efficacy of the rites in cultivating the Way lies in their fundamental rootedness to the very foundation of Heaven. Rites are practices developed by the ancient sage kings who sought to represent the Way of Heaven in all the affairs of human life. They are the measured display of the heavenly

¹⁵⁵ The concept of *li* covers a wide span of implications such that it is almost impossible to find a single corresponding word in English. The long list of translations that Peter Boodberg, “The Semasiology of Some Primary Confucian Concepts,” *Philosophy East and West* 2 (1953): 326, provides includes “propriety, ritual (religious and social), cult and culture, worship, ceremony and ceremonial, etiquette, decorum, decency and refinement, urbanity, courtesy, rules of proper social usage or conduct, customary rules of living, polite traditional deportment, good manners, social order, *convenance*, *bienséance*, *Sittlichkeit*, formality, good form.”

¹⁵⁶ For an example of the detailed prescriptions regarding *li* within the context of a family, see Zhu Xi, *Jia li* 家礼 (Patricia B. Ebrey, trans., *Family Rituals: A Twelfth-Century Chinese Manual for the Performance of Cappings, Weddings, Funerals, and Ancestral Rites* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991]).

¹⁵⁷ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 27.3 (Gardner, *Four Books*, 127).

¹⁵⁸ While one may suppose an orderly government to be a full manifestation of the Way of Heaven, the *Zhongyong* suggests otherwise, remarking that it is only a partial fulfillment. *Zhongyong zhangju*, 9: “Empire, state and family can be well governed.... But as for maintaining perfect balance and holding to the constant, it cannot be done” (Gardner, *Four Books*, 115). Through the use of such language, the *Zhongyong* presents the Way of Heaven as an elusive entity, something toward which one should strive, but yet something that is practically just out of one’s reach.

principle (*tian li* 天理),¹⁵⁹ the outline of *is*-ness and *ought*-ness, the embodiment of what is right (*yi* 义),¹⁶⁰ and, along with music, the manifest expression of ideal order and harmony. Since all things and events possess a natural order and harmony, all facets of social and political life can be nurtured and regulated by ritual and music.¹⁶¹

Rites promote social stability by providing commonly accepted norms, protocols, and etiquettes for structuring communal interaction and behavior. They are the means to regulate all social interactions from the Emperor down to the common man, to cultivate the ten virtues of the five human relations (*wu lun* 五伦), to promote truthful speech and maintain harmony, to demonstrate consideration for others, to eliminate quarreling and plundering, to regulate the seven feelings of humanity,¹⁶² to nurture and

¹⁵⁹ Zhu comments in *Collected Commentaries on the Analects (Lunyu jizhu 论语集注)*, 12.1: “*Li* (ritual) is heavenly principle (*tian li* 天理) in measured display” (Daniel K. Gardner, *Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects* [New York: Columbia University Press, 2003], 80)

¹⁶⁰ *Liyun*, 4.9: “[Rites] (*li* 礼) are the embodied expression of what is right (*yi* 义)” (Legge, *Li Ki*, 27:390).

¹⁶¹ Zhu comments in *Lunyu jizhu*, 17.9: “Ritual is nothing but order; music is nothing but harmony.... Under heaven, there is nothing that is not ritual and music. Suppose, for instance, you arrange these two chairs. If one of them is not upright, there will be no order, and if there is no order, there will be irregularity, and if there is irregularity, there will be no harmony. Take, too, the case of bandits: they do the most unprincipled things—but they still have ritual and music. It is essential that they have a leader and subordinates who obey; only then they are capable of banditry. If such is not the case, there will be uncontrolled rebellion, and they will be incapable of uniting together in banditry even for a day. There is no place that ritual and music do not reach” (Gardner, *Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects*, 94–95). Rites and music serve complementary functions. Rites “separate” society by establishing hierarchies, but music “unites” by arousing feelings of commonality. The *Records of Music (Yueji 乐记)*, 1.15, states: “Similarity and union are the aim of music; difference and distinction, that of [rites]. From union comes mutual affection; from difference, mutual respect. Where music prevails, we find a weak coalescence; where [rites prevail], a tendency to separation. It is the business of the two to blend people’s feelings and give elegance to their outward manifestations” (Legge, *Li Ki*, 28:98). Also, *Yueji*, 1.29, remarks: “Harmony is the thing principally sought in music:—it therein follows heaven, and manifests the spirit-like expansive influence characteristic of it. Normal distinction is the thing aimed at in [rites]:—they therein follow earth, and exhibit the spirit-like retractive influence characteristic of it. Hence the sages made music in response to heaven, and framed [rites] in correspondence with earth” (Legge, *Li Ki*, 28:103).

¹⁶² *Liyun*, 2.19: “Hence, when a sage (ruler) would regulate the seven feelings of men, cultivate the ten virtues that are right [i.e., the virtues of the five human relations]; promote truthfulness of

correct human desires,¹⁶³ and to illumine the interior thoughts of men including their likes and dislikes.¹⁶⁴ Rites, moreover, play an important role in developing and ordering the Nine Cardinal Principles necessary for maintaining order in the world.¹⁶⁵ These include

cultivating the self, honoring the worthy, showing affection toward relatives, reverencing the great ministers, empathizing with the body of officials, treating the common people with parental love, giving encouragement to the hundred artisans, dealing gently with travelers from afar, and embracing the lords of all the states. (*Zhongyong zhangju*, 20.12 [Gardner, *Four Books*, 121])

Rites, furthermore, provide the proper avenues for serving the spirits of one's departed ancestors, thereby fulfilling one's filial obligations and ensuring the continual blessings of Heaven.¹⁶⁶ Consequently, the rites have spiritual, material, social, and legal

speech, and the maintenance of harmony; show his value for kindly consideration and complaisant courtesy; and put away quarrelling and plundering, if he neglects the [rites *li*], how shall he succeed?" (Legge, *Li Ki*, 27:380).

¹⁶³ Xunzi considers the primary function and purpose of *li* to be the regulation of human desires. *Xunzi*, 19, states: "What is the origin of ritual? I reply: man is born with desires. If his desires are not satisfied for him, he cannot but seek some means to satisfy them himself. If there are no limits and degrees to his seeking, then he will inevitably fall to wrangling with other men. From wrangling comes disorder and from disorder comes exhaustion. The ancient kings hated such disorder, and therefore they established ritual principles in order to curb it, to train men's desires and to provide for their satisfaction. They saw to it that desires did not overextend the means for their satisfaction, and material goods did not fall short of what was desired. Thus both desires and goods were looked after and satisfied. This is the origin of rites" (Watson, *Xunzi*, 93).

¹⁶⁴ *Liyun*, 2.20: "Liking [or desires; *yu* 欲] and disliking (*wu* 惡) are the great elements in men's minds. But men keep them hidden in their minds, where they cannot be fathomed or measured. The good and the bad of them being in their minds, and no outward manifestation of them being visible, if it be wished to determine these qualities in one uniform way, how can it be done without the use of rites (*li* 禮)?" (Legge, *Li Ki*, 27:380).

¹⁶⁵ The importance of rites in establishing harmony within the world is also noted in *Lunyu*, 1.12: "Yu Tzu said, 'Of the things brought by the rites, harmony (*he* 和) is the most valuable.... To aim always at harmony without regulating it by rites simply because one knows only about harmony will not, in fact, work'" (Lau, *Analects*, 61).

¹⁶⁶ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 19.5: "In all of these ancestral rites, one stands in the place of one's forebears, one conducts their ceremonial observances, one performs their music, one pays respect to those whom they honored, and one extends affection to those whom they treated as kin. To serve the dead as one serves the living, to serve the departed just as one serves those still in this world: this is the perfect fulfillment of one's filial obligations" (Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 36–37).

implications for the orderly rule of the state,¹⁶⁷ and their use within the state allows sage rulers to bring all under heaven into one family (*tianxia wei yi jia* 天下为一家) and to transform the middle states into one man (*zhongguo wei yi ren* 中国为一人).¹⁶⁸

Apart from its sphere of influence within the state, the *Zhongyong* teaches that rites play an important role in cultivating the Way within the individual, enabling the Superior Man to emulate the Way of the Sage. For example, the text twice remarks that the particular strengths of the former sage kings lie in their status as paragons of supreme filiality.¹⁶⁹ The text then details extensively how proper expression of filiality is to be found in the rites, suggesting that practice of the rites allows one to imitate the Sage. More important, the *Zhongyong* teaches that rites assist the Superior Man to cultivate the Way by means of molding and shaping his individual character. The relationship between rites and moral cultivation rites runs through a list of dependencies as follows: “the cultivation of the individual proceeds on the basis of the Way; the cultivation of the Way proceeds on the basis of humaneness (*ren* 仁)... The greatest expression of humaneness is in the proper expression of affection for one’s relatives.... The proper expression of affection for one’s relatives ... gives rise to the rites (*li*).”¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 19.6: “For one who is well versed in the [rites] of the outer Precincts and the Altar of the Soil, as well as the meaning of the dynastic Ti and Ch’ang sacrifices, the secret of ruling a kingdom is as plain as if displayed like a finger in the palm of one’s hand” (Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 37).

¹⁶⁸ *Liyun*, 2.18 (ET Legge, *Li Ki*, 27:379).

¹⁶⁹ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 17.1; 19.1.

¹⁷⁰ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 20.3–4 (translation mine). See also *Zhongyong zhangju*, 20.7, which draws the relationship between self-cultivation and serving one’s parents; and *Zhongyong zhangju*, 20.14: “By undergoing fasting and purification and donning splendid garments, making no move that is not in accord with ritual propriety: that is the means whereby one achieves the cultivation of the individual character” (Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 40).

Within the Confucian tradition, the exact relationship between *li* 礼 (rites, propriety) and the ultimate virtue *ren* 仁 (humaneness) is debatable.¹⁷¹ Nevertheless, the instrumental role of *li* in cultivating the Way, or more specifically, in cultivating *ren* appears to be twofold, emphasizing either the internal or external dimension of *li*.

First, in an individual who has approximated the *ren* (humaneness) ideal, *li* (propriety) is the accompanying virtue that truly (*cheng* 诚) expresses the emotional dispositions and attitudes that constitute that ideal.¹⁷² Even though *ren* has priority since it is the generative and unifying virtue, *ren* and *li* coexist simultaneously; there can be no *ren* without *li*, and there can be no *li* without *ren*. *Li* then is not so much an external code of conduct as it is an inner disposition and one of the four cardinal virtues of human nature (*xing*). As a virtue, *li* subsequently manifests itself in the perfect performance of the rites. The form of the rites then are the pattern and configuration that enables the principled control of one's material force (*qi* 气) and optimal expression of one's feelings (*qing* 情), "fitting human experiences and actions productively into the patterns and dispositions of the enviroing world."¹⁷³ In this relationship, the rites can never be fully employed without the requisite human goodness. A man who does not possess true

¹⁷¹ See the discussions in Chenyang Li, "Li as Cultural Grammar: On the Relation between Li and Ren in Confucius' Analects," *Philosophy East and West* 57 (2007): 311–29; Shun, "Ren 仁 and Li 礼 in the Analects," 53–72; Wei-Ming Tu, "The Creative Tension between Jên and Li," *Philosophy East and West* 18 (1968): 29–39; idem, "Li as Process of Humanization," *Philosophy East and West* 22 (1972): 187–201.

¹⁷² Zhu emphasizes this internal aspect of *li*, defining it along with the other three cardinal virtues in terms of the uniting virtue of *ren*. *Zhuzi yulei*, 6.109, states: "Humaneness (*ren* 仁) is the fundamental structure of humaneness (*ren* 仁); propriety (*li* 礼) is the graded pattern of humaneness (*ren* 仁); righteousness (*yi* 义) is the judgment of humaneness (*ren* 仁); knowledge (*zhi* 知) is the discernment of humaneness (*ren* 仁)" (translation mine).

humaneness (*ren*) does not realize the principle that is his human nature; consequently, he is also unable to realize fully the measured display of principle in rites.

Second, in an individual who has not approximated the *ren* ideal, *li* (rites) is the external means and form necessary for cultivating the appropriate emotional dispositions and attitudes.¹⁷⁴ Practice of the rites teaches us how to channel and contain our material force (*qi* 气) to productive expressions that are quintessentially humane (*ren*).¹⁷⁵ Moreover, rites are the measure of what is right and wrong, what is selfless and selfish. Practice of the rites therefore assists in the subjugation and elimination of our

¹⁷³ James Behuniak, *Mencius on Becoming Human* (SUNY Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture; Albany: SUNY Press, 2005), 115.

¹⁷⁴ Xunzi emphasizes this aspect of *li*. He considers human nature to be evil and *li* to be the means by which human desires are curbed, disciplined, and channeled to productive ends. He writes in *Xunzi*, 23: “The nature of man is evil; his goodness is the result of his activity. Now, man’s inborn nature is to seek for gain. If this tendency is followed, strife and rapacity result and deference and compliance disappear.... Therefore to follow man’s nature and his feelings will inevitably result in strife and rapacity, combine with rebellion and disorder, and end in violence. Therefore there must be the civilizing influence of teachers and laws and the guidance of propriety and righteousness, and then it will result in deference and compliance, combine with pattern and order, and end in discipline” (Chan, *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 128). It should be noted that even though Zhu’s view of human nature differs from Xunzi, Zhu also acknowledges the role that *li* plays in preserving and recovering *ren*.

¹⁷⁵ The shaping function of *li* is suggested by its original meaning of “to practice.” Early lexicons frequently render *li* 禮 with its homophone *li* 履 (“to tread or follow a path”), emphasizing the necessity of embodying the essence captured in the ritual action. See Zang Kehe 臧克和 and Wang Ping 王平, eds., *Shuowenjiezi xinding* 说文解字新订 (Originally compiled by Xu Shen 许慎; Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2002), 4. More important, the molding function of “rite” (*li* 禮) is underscored by the word’s cognate relationship to “body, embodiment, to embody, or form” (*ti* 體). “Rite” and “body” are the only two common words that share the “ritual vase” phonetic *li* 豊; both can be understood as “shapes” that configure material force. See Boodberg, “The Semasiology of Some Primary Confucian Concepts,” 326–27; Behuniak, *Mencius on Becoming Human*, 116.

selfish desires, leading to the recovery of true humaneness (*ren*).¹⁷⁶ Through the external actions of the rites, we learn to preserve our innate goodness.¹⁷⁷

Practically, the above twofold functional relationships between *li* and *ren* can be viewed as a circular loop: the performance of rites assists in the preservation of *ren*; the attainment of *ren* expresses itself in the virtue of propriety that ultimately manifests itself in the perfect performance of the rites with the measured display of emotions such as deference and compliance. There is a movement from the exterior to the interior, and from the interior back to the exterior. The external practice of *li* (rites) aids in the recovery of the internal virtue of *ren*, and the internal virtue of *ren* manifests itself in the perfect external performance of *li* (rites). The text of the *Zhongyong* also illustrates this circularity. It stresses the role of rites in the recovery of the internal virtue of *ren*. The practice of the rites is the method or procedure by which the Superior Man develops his moral character and controls his feelings and desires. If he is able to persist in *li* steadfastly, he will ultimately be able to achieve the cultivation of his character, establishing and manifesting the Way of the Sage in his life.¹⁷⁸ Nevertheless, the *Zhongyong* also remarks, “Only with the right person [the sage] can [all the rites] be

¹⁷⁶ Zhu comments in *Lunyu jizhu*, 12.1: “Master Cheng said, ‘What is contrary to ritual is a matter of selfish intention; being selfish in intention, how can one become truly good (*ren* 仁)? It is necessary to subdue entirely one’s own selfishness and, in everything, return to ritual. Only then can one begin to be truly good (*ren* 仁)’” (Gardner, *Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects*, 80).

¹⁷⁷ Zhu’s comments in *Lunyu jizhu*, 12.1: “Master Cheng said, ‘Master Yan asks for the details of subduing the self and returning to ritual. The Master says, ‘If contrary to ritual, do not look; if contrary to ritual, do not list; if contrary to ritual, do not speak; if contrary to ritual, do not act.’ These four are the operations of one’s person, arising from within in response to the external. Regulating the external is the means of nurturing what is within” (Gardner, *Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects*, 81).

¹⁷⁸ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 20.13 (Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 39): “When one achieves the cultivation of one’s individual character, then one’s Way stands firm.”

followed.”¹⁷⁹ *Li* then becomes not so much a means to develop one’s moral character but an expression of true humaneness (*ren*).¹⁸⁰

Synthesis and Overview

This chapter attempts to explore the Confucian vision of peace as contained in the *Daxue* and the *Zhongyong*. I provided a brief account of the period in which Confucius and his disciples lived, followed with an examination of key themes and motifs in the two texts. In this concluding section, I first compare the *Daxue* and the *Zhongyong*. I then synthesize this chapter’s findings and present an overview of the Confucian vision of peace under two categories to facilitate comparison with Ephesians and Dio Chrysostom’s vision of peace: (1) The Confucian understanding of the nature of peace; and (2) Elements in the Confucian vision of peace.

Brief comparison of the *Daxue* and the *Zhongyong*

The *Daxue* and *Zhongyong* are different in many ways, not least of which is their different orientation of peace: the *Daxue* emphasizes the horizontal dimension, but the *Zhongyong* the vertical. Specifically, the *Daxue* focuses on the social and political dimensions of human experience, moving from individual moral cultivation to peace in the external world; the *Zhongyong*, on the other hand, focuses on unity and harmony between

¹⁷⁹ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 27.3–4 (Gardner, *Four Books*, 127).

¹⁸⁰ This approach is also present in *Xunzi*. Although he initially considers *li* to be the means for developing one’s character, he also notes that the one who constantly practices *li* and has a deep love for it is ultimately a sage. *Xunzi*, 19, states: “Rites (*li*) are the highest achievement of the Way (*dao*) of man. Therefore, those who do not follow and find satisfaction in rites may be called people without direction, but those who do follow and find satisfaction in them are called men of direction. He who dwells in ritual and does not change his ways may be said to be steadfast. He who knows how to think and to be steadfast, and in addition has a true love for ritual—he is a sage” (Watson, *Xunzi*, 99).

humanity and Heaven. The two texts also differ in their positions regarding the possibility of attaining their respective orientation of peace. The *Daxue* implicitly assumes the possibility of realizing enduring peace within the world. The *Zhongyong*, on the other hand, lays out different levels of attaining the Way of Heaven, from its impossibility, to partial fulfillment in the concrete expression of social order and stable government, to the lofty cosmic implications of its perfect realization. There are also differences in tone. The *Daxue* is generally rational, stressing concrete social and political programs, but the *Zhongyong* is allusive and mystical, discoursing on psychology and metaphysics.¹⁸¹

Despite the differences, the two texts share basic similarities. Both texts, for example, share a common structure. Each begins with an opening section that sets forth the central tenets of the book in several terse statements, followed by several chapters that expand and comment on the opening text. Moreover, the different goals of horizontal and vertical peace espoused by the two texts are approached and cultivated in a similar manner, centering on the necessity of self-cultivation. Furthermore, despite its mystical and cosmic framework, the *Zhongyong* does not abandon the Confucian preoccupation with practical affairs. For example, both texts share a common desire for sound government. While the *Daxue* advocates the Eight Particular Steps, the *Zhongyong* espouses the Nine Cardinal Principles necessary for maintaining order in the world and in the various political states. The differences and similarities between the *Daxue* and the

¹⁸¹ See Chan, *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 95.

Zhongyong enable me to obtain a fuller picture of the Confucian vision of peace. I now summarize the Confucian understanding of the nature of peace.

Confucian understanding of the nature of peace

The semantic range of the focal concept of peace covers several verbal and nominal ideas.

In the Eight Particular Steps of the *Daxue*, we see that *cheng* 诚 (making true), *zheng* 正 (rectification), *xiu* 修 (cultivation), *qi* 齐 (establishing order) and *zhi* 治 (governing well) are the progressive steps that lead to peace (*ping* 平) in the world. In the *Zhongyong*, the lexical stress falls on *zhong* 中 (perfect balance) and *he* 和 (harmony). Lexicons such as the early Han *Shuowen Jiezi* understand harmony *he* as the “mutual interplay (of sounds),”¹⁸² and later writers use it to denote reconciliation and concord between diverse parties or groups. Harmony is not static uniformity or identity; rather, it is the dynamic unity and tensive balance that forms when one pole constantly adapts and changes in response to the push and pull of other poles.¹⁸³ The concept of balance and harmony does not stand alone but forms an integral part of the Confucian vision of peace. In the *Zhongyong*, the term *ping* 平 occurs only once at the end of the book. The text states, “The [superior man] behaves with integrity and respect, and all the world is at peace (平),”¹⁸⁴ suggesting that the prior emphasis on balance and harmony informs our understanding

¹⁸² Zang Kehe and Wang Ping, *Shuowen Jiezi Xinding*, 78.

¹⁸³ See Zhang, *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy*, 270–76; Chenyang Li, “The Confucian Ideal of Harmony,” *Philosophy East and West* 56 (2006): 583–603.

¹⁸⁴ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 33.5 (Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 55).

of what peace is.¹⁸⁵ Moreover, numerous other early texts collocate *he* 和 (harmony) and *ping* 平 (peace) to form the binome *heping* 和平, which functions as a hendiadys indicating peace and harmony, or a peace that is characterized by harmony.¹⁸⁶ Given the importance of harmony within the Confucian texts, not least in the *Zhongyong*, we may perhaps note that harmony is the defining aspect of the Confucian vision of peace.

Various texts attribute the origin of this peace and harmony to Heaven, the anthropomorphic Supreme Being or Ultimate Reality. For example, the concept of *tian ming* 天命 (the mandate of Heaven) presents Heaven as the final arbiter or judge in establishing legitimate political authority. In this regard, the Confucian Heaven functions similarly as Dio Chrysostom's Zeus who sets up and deposes kings. But apart from Heaven, Zhu emphasizes the importance of principle (*li*) such that peace and chaos are predicated on how close individuals or governments align themselves with *li*. Peace then is not so much described negatively (or apophatically) as the absence of conflict, but positively (or kataphatically) as the presence of certain virtues and attributes, and the implementation of the ceaseless Way. Given the indestructibility of *li* and the Way, the possibility of peace is ever present, and the means of attaining peace will always be the same from beginning to end: follow the Way.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁵ Zhu's commentary on this verse emphasizes this point, arguing that the attainment of peace by the superior man is the highest outcome of maintaining perfect balance and harmony (*zhongyong*).

¹⁸⁶ The binome *heping* occurs 41 times within the *Thirteen Classics*. See for example the *Classics of Filial Piety* (*Xiaojing* 孝经), 8 (*Xiao zhi zhang* 孝治章); the *Book of Changes* (*Yijing* 易经), 31 (*Xian* 咸); the *Book of Odes*, 165 (*Famu* 伐木).

¹⁸⁷ Fung, *History of Chinese Philosophy*, 2:563, commenting on Zhu's understanding of political philosophy, remarks, "The [Dao] or Way for governing the state and bringing peace to the world has always been as it is since earliest antiquity, and will always remain such, even though its external actualization in the physical world depends wholly upon whether men follow it or not. All men,

The *Daxue* and the *Zhongyong* envision peace in multiple concentric circles of focus: the individual, the household, the kingdom, and the cosmos. In the individual sphere, peace and harmony are primarily understood as the full realization and recovery of one's inborn good nature such that all actions and emotions are fully in accord with principle. Peace and harmony consist of manifesting *cheng*, being true to one's nature and exhibiting integral wholeness in one's entire being such that there is no doubleness (*bu er* 不貳), but unity in feelings, thought, will, and action. Moreover, peace and harmony require maintaining perfect balance in every circumstance of life (*zhongyong* 中庸). When confronted with external events, people should stay in a state of harmony (*he* 和) where their feelings remain in dynamic equilibrium and perfect measure. At its superlative level, individual peace and harmony can also be understood in transcendental relational categories. Those who manifest absolute *cheng* become sages who share a unity with Heaven (*tian ren he yi* 天人合一),¹⁸⁸ participating in the transformative and generative processes of the cosmos.

In the social sphere of the household and the kingdom, peace and harmony consist of fulfilling the moral norms that correspond to the principle (*li*) inherent in the five human relationships: ruler–minister, father–son, husband–wife, elder–younger, friend–friend. Thus, a good person displays fatherly compassion to his children; and in

therefore, who make any kind of achievement in government or society, do so only because their conduct conforms to this [*Dao*].”

¹⁸⁸ See Paul Y. M. Jian, “Ethics in Cosmology: Variations on the Theme of ‘Unity of Heaven and Man’ in Neo-Confucianism,” in *Harmony and Strife* (ed. Shu-hsien Liu and Robert E. Allinson: Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1988), 271–90; Wei-Ming Tu, “The Neo-Confucian Concept of Man,” *Philosophy East and West* 21 (1971): 79–87.

the next moment, he expresses deference to his aged next door neighbor. Moreover, Confucians regard the state as a hierarchy of the ruling and the ruled, perceiving the state not as the embodiment of class antagonism, but as an expression of social harmony between the morally superior and the inferior. This social hierarchy is not an artificial social construction but a reflection of the natural order,¹⁸⁹ and social peace is the acceptance of one's preordained social station in life. Fortune and status are not within the control of men; they are given by Heaven. Thus, while the petty man tries to gain undeserved wealth and prestige through risky and foolish endeavors, the superior man accepts his fate in life with equanimity.¹⁹⁰

In the cosmic and natural sphere, peace and harmony consist of every creature and process realizing their innate principle. Heaven and Earth generate all things and endow them with their respective principle or nature (*xing*). Cosmic order ensues when all things proceed according to their nature and the Way of Heaven such that "all things are nurtured in concert, free of all mutual inquiry, and all things proceed in their parallel courses, free of any conflict among them."¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ The commentaries on the *Book of Changes* state: "Heaven is high, the earth is low, and thus *ch'ien* (Heaven) and *k'un* (Earth) are fixed. As high and low are thus made clear, the honorable and the humble have their places accordingly. As activity and tranquility have their constancy, the strong and the weak are thus differentiated. Ways come together according to their kind, and things are divided according to their classes" (Chan, *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 265).

¹⁹⁰ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 14.1-3: "The superior man does what is proper to the station in which he finds himself. He has no desire to go beyond. In a position of wealth and high status he does what is proper to a position of wealth and high status; in a position of poverty and low status he does what is proper to a position of poverty and low status.... The superior man lives at ease awaiting his fate. The small [i.e., petty] man takes dangerous paths seeking undeserved fortunes" (Gardner, *Four Books*, 118).

¹⁹¹ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 30 (Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 51-52).

Elements in the Confucian vision of peace

Framed within the chaos and anarchy of the Eastern Zhou, the Confucian vision of peace is a conservative reaction that seeks to recover the stability of the glorious past.¹⁹²

Although Confucius was interested in the practices of all of the Three Dynasties of antiquity,¹⁹³ he drew primarily from the Zhou, reinstating its rites, regulations, and institutions.¹⁹⁴ Later thinkers added to and modified the original vision of Confucius, making it difficult to separate the different layers of tradition. Nevertheless, the overall vision of peace encompasses several common elements.

1. The Confucian vision of peace focuses on the interior rather than the exterior, regarding the internal instability and disunity of a state as far more pernicious than external aggression.¹⁹⁵ Internal disintegration and decadence not only undermines the foundation of the state, but also invites attacks from the outside. The state must

¹⁹² Lin Mousheng, *Men and Ideas: An Informal History of Chinese Political Thought* (New York: John Day, 1942), 37. Discussing the relationship of Confucianism to other political thought current during the Eastern Zhou, Hsiao, *History of Chinese Political Thought*, 21, remarks, “Confucians and the Mohists supported the already collapsing feudal world, the Legalists anticipated the practices of the forthcoming imperial unification, and the Taoists denied the validity of all the institutions in history.” With the advent of imperial rule, Confucianism dropped its support of the past feudal order and supported the reigning imperial political system.

¹⁹³ The Three Dynasties comprise the Xia (2205?–1600? B.C.E.), Shang (1600?–1100? B.C.E.), and Western Zhou (1100?–771 B.C.E.).

¹⁹⁴ *Lunyu*, 3.14: “The [Zhou] is resplendent in culture, having before it the example of the two previous dynasties. I am for the [Zhou]” (Lau, *Analects*, 69); *Zhongyong zhangju*, 28: “Confucius said, ‘I have talked about the ceremonies of the [Xia] dynasty, but what remains in the present state of Ch’i [descendant of Xia] does not provide sufficient evidence. I have studied the ceremonies of the Shang dynasty. They are still preserved in the present state of Sung (descendant of Shang). I have studied the ceremonies of the [Western Zhou dynasty]. They are in use today. I follow the [Zhou]’” (Chan, *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 111). See also *Zhongyong zhangju*, 20.2. Hsiao, *History of Chinese Political Thought*, 98, asserts that Confucius attributed the disorder and chaos of his day to the abandonment of Zhou institutions. Thus, “the words and deeds of his entire life were directed toward bringing about the veneration of the [Zhou] royal house and reverence for the ruler, toward limiting the excesses and encroachments of the nobility, and toward curbing the usurpations and illicit appropriations of authority committed by ministers and subordinates.”

¹⁹⁵ Leonard Shih-lien Hsü, *The Political Philosophy of Confucianism* (London: Routledge, 1932), 73.

therefore secure internal order before it can extend its influence beyond its borders.¹⁹⁶ This emphasis on the internal dimension is clearly seen in the Eight Particular Steps of the *Daxue*. Moreover, the Nine Cardinal Principles of the *Zhongyong* also stress the importance of managing the internal affairs of the state before embarking on diplomatic missions to bring the rulers of all the other states under one's influence.

2. The Confucian vision rests fundamentally on ethics not only as inseparable from politics but as the root of politics. While Confucians do not eschew the use of penal laws, they generally consider ethics to be a better means for social order.¹⁹⁷ There are three aspects of governance by ethics. (A) There is the necessity of setting up a definite standard of ethical values through the correct use of names (*zheng ming* 正名).¹⁹⁸ Names are not mere labels for things; rather, they signify the essence of things and their relationship to other things. To rectify names is therefore to establish common standards of truth, goodness, and rightness.¹⁹⁹ (B) The quality of the government depends upon the moral quality of its human leaders. A morally superior ruler results in a strong government.²⁰⁰ (C) Governance by ethics requires the ethical transformation or renewal

¹⁹⁶ See *Lunyu*, 16.1 (ET Lau, *Analects*, 139).

¹⁹⁷ See Roger T. Ames, *The Art of Rulership: A Study in Ancient Chinese Political Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 115–25.

¹⁹⁸ *Lunyu*, 13.3: “When names are not correct, what is said will not sound reasonable; when what is said does not sound reasonable, affairs will not culminate in success; when affairs do not culminate in success, rites and music will not flourish; when rites and music do not flourish, punishments will not fit the crimes; when punishments do not fit the crimes, the common people will not know where to put hand and foot” (Lau, *Analects*, 118).

¹⁹⁹ Cheng Chung-ying, *New Dimensions of Confucian and Neo-Confucian Philosophy* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 221–32.

²⁰⁰ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 20.2–4: “Insofar as the requisite human capacity is present, one's rule will be successful; lacking this, one's rule will quickly fade away.... From this we conclude that the proper conduct of government rests upon human capacity; the ground for selecting human capacity lies in the ruler's own individual character” (Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 37). This emphasis on moral character

of the people (*xin min* 新民) through the provision of exemplars and education.²⁰¹ Rulers effect the cultivation of the common people through the power of their moral example; when the common people see their king acting virtuously, they will invariably follow suit.²⁰² Moreover, rulers can influence the ethical development of the people through the education system since Confucian instruction has its primary objective in ethical formation rather than the acquisition of specialized skills.²⁰³

3. The means of attaining peace rest foundationally on the moral cultivation of individuals. Only those who have fully developed their nature are able to develop fully the nature of others, thereby bringing harmony to the household, order to the kingdom, and enduring peace in the entire world. The moral influence of cultivated individuals does not stop at the human social world; it also encompasses the natural and cosmic world as they fully realize the nature of all existing things. In this manner, cultivated individuals or sages form a trinity with Heaven and Earth, partaking in their

leads some to consider Confucianism as a “government by men” (*ren zhi* 人治) in contrast to a “government by laws,” a government whose stability is dependent upon clearly articulated laws, strict regulations, harsh punishments, and severe fines. This polarity is artificial. Hsiao, *History of Chinese Political Thought*, 124, remarks that Confucius did not intend “to substitute a government by men for government by laws, but rather to implant the concept of government by men within a system of government by law.”

²⁰¹ See also *Lunyu*, 12.7: “Confucius answered, ‘To govern (*zheng* 政) is to correct (*zheng* 正)’” (Lau, *Analects*, 115). Wei-ming Tu, *Way, Learning, and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectual* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993), 6, notes that the word “correct” (*zheng* 正) has a “distinctive moral overtone.”

²⁰² *Zhongyong zhangju*, 29.5: “The [superior man], with his every movement, sets the path for the world for generations to come; with his every action he sets the patterns of behavior for the whole world for generations to come; and with his every word he sets the standards of judgment for the whole world for coming generations” (Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 50–51). See also *Lunyu*, 12.19: “Confucius answered, ‘In administering your government, what need is there for you to kill [those who do not follow the Way]? Just desire the good yourself and the common people will be good. The virtue of the [superior man] is like wind; the virtue of the small man is like grass. Let the wind blow over the grass and it is sure to bend’” (Lau, *Analects*, 115–16).

transformative and generative processes. This progression of moral influence emanating from the individual can be understood as outwardly radiating concentric circles: individual → household → kingdom → world → cosmos. It should also be noted that this progression must be taken as a whole. The inner dimension of self cultivation cannot be separated from the outer dimension of ordering the world. A sage is one who not only attains moral perfection, but also succeeds in serving the people and transforming the cosmos.²⁰⁴

4. The Confucian vision of social order emphasizes introspection and reflection. If the superior man experiences a rupture in social harmony, he is encouraged to determine whether the fault lies within him, asking “Have I practiced the rites fully? Have I discharged my filial responsibilities? Have I displayed the requisite virtues?” As the *Zhongyong* remarks, “The archer in some ways is similar to the superior man. Upon missing the target they turn their gaze inward and seek the cause within themselves.”²⁰⁵ The emphasis on introspection thus seeks to resolve conflict not through a change in the external environment, but through a change in the mindset and practice of the individual. From a psychological perspective, this emphasis has certain benefits. Attempts to change the external environment may result in frustration since external factors may be outside of one’s control, but attempts to cultivate oneself are technically within the prerogative and control of the individual. Thus, the “[superior man] corrects

²⁰³ The role of the government in teaching is already seen in “The Great Declaration” (1.7) of the *Book of Documents*: “Heaven, for the help of the inferior people, made for them rulers, and made for them instructors” (Legge, *Chinese Classics*, 3.286).

²⁰⁴ Gardner, *Learning to Be a Sage*, 58.

²⁰⁵ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 14.4 (Gardner, *Four Books*, 119).

himself and demands nothing from others and thus feels no ill will. Above he feels no ill will toward heaven; below he bears no grudge against men.”²⁰⁶ He is content, at ease.

From a political perspective, this emphasis on introspection reduces the possibility of social revolt. Since one’s attention and energies are focused on rectifying oneself, one is less inclined to seek redress through violent political acts against the social order.

5. Since rites (*li*) are the manifestation of what is right and just, politics and rites are intimately intertwined. Rites are “the cement of the entire normative sociopolitical order,”²⁰⁷ and “all government can be reduced to [rites].”²⁰⁸ According to the *Zhongyong*, rites enable the ruler to govern well.²⁰⁹ As rulers wear the right ceremonial caps, ride in the proper carriages, and follow the correct calendars, they exude their moral influence and potency over the entire populace with magical efficacy. At a more pragmatic level and employing a hermeneutics of suspicion, rites can be understood as the means that enable a ruler to exercise total and uniform control over his people. Since the rites encompass a wide range of activities from sacrifices to sweeping the floor or walking, rites have the potential to regulate all facets of the people’s lives. Moreover, the power to institute and change the form and type of rites rests solely on the supreme ruler, the Son of Heaven.²¹⁰ The Son of Heaven can therefore use rites to influence directly the cultivation of his people, determining right and wrong, illumining their interior thoughts,

²⁰⁶ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 14.2 (Gardner, *Four Books*, 118).

²⁰⁷ Schwartz, *World of Thought in Ancient China*, 67.

²⁰⁸ Graham, *Disputers of the Tao*, 13.

²⁰⁹ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 19.

²¹⁰ *Lunyu*, 16.2: “When the Way prevails in the Empire, the rites and music and punitive expeditions are initiated by the Emperor. When the Way does not prevail in the Empire, they are

and regulating their emotions. Through the rites, the Son of Heaven also maintains a uniform set of practices within the entire state such that “all carriages run on wheels of uniform gauge, all official documents use uniform script, and all customary practices follow uniform ethical standards.”²¹¹

6. The Confucian vision of peace is guardedly optimistic, with a blend of idealistic and pragmatic elements. The vision presents full cosmic realization and sagehood as the ideals to which humanity should strive, extolling the hyperbolic Way of the Sage. Nevertheless, there are indications that the possibility of attaining these ideals is difficult, if not impossible. The vision therefore allows for realistic partial fulfillment, emphasizing the concrete modes of expression found in the Way of the Superior Man and providing illustrations of such fulfillment in the areas of benevolent rulership, social order, and political processes.

7. The household is the fundamental social structure within the Confucian vision of peace. There is a fundamental relationship between the state and the household. The state is the family writ large; social relations are based on family affections;²¹² the family is the locus where virtues are instilled through education and the practice of the rites; and any attempt to change the world must begin with the household.²¹³ Moreover, the concept of the household is expanded from one’s immediate family to the entire state

initiated by the feudal lords” (Lau, *Analects*, 139). *Zhongyong zhangju*, 28, however, insists that it is only the virtuous Son of Heaven that has the prerogative to institute new systems of rites and music.

²¹¹ *Zhongyong zhangju*, 28 (Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 49).

²¹² For example, filial obedience toward one’s parents and respect toward one’s elder brothers serve as the basis of a subject’s conduct. *Lunyu*, 1.2: “It is rare for a man whose character is such that he is good as a son and obedient as a young man to have the inclination to transgress against his superiors; it is unheard of for one who has no such inclination to be inclined to start a rebellion” (Lau, *Analects*, 59).

such that there is no longer any individual household, only a collective- or world-household. Each person is to demonstrate a genuine love for *all* people to the extent that everyone regards other parents as their own parents and other children as their own children.²¹⁴ Furthermore, while the government is to provide social protection to those who are unable to contribute to society, each person is to treat the disenfranchised and the handicapped as their own siblings.²¹⁵

8. The Confucian vision is rhetorically deliberative, promoting peace through moral cultivation. Although there are encomiastic elements that speak effusively about the Way of Heaven or the ancient sage kings, the overall rhetoric is nevertheless deliberative. The use of encomium regarding Yao, Shun, and Confucius only strengthens the deliberative appeal, elevating these individuals as paradigmatic examples worthy of emulation. Other implicit or explicit appeals that these texts employ in support of their vision of peace include the appeal to other Confucian scriptural traditions such as the *Book of Poetry*, the appeal to the vision of a world household with the emphasis on the public good, the appeal to adopt virtues that promote the Way, the appeal to shun vices and selfish desires, the appeal to imitate the natural rhythm of Heaven and Earth,²¹⁶ the

²¹³ See Hsü, *Political Philosophy of Confucianism*, 33–37.

²¹⁴ *Mengzi*, 1A.7: “Treat the aged of your own family in a manner befitting their venerable age and extend this treatment to the aged of other families; treat your own young in a manner befitting their tender age and extend this to the young of other families, and you can roll the Empire on your palm” (Lau, *Mencius*, 56).

²¹⁵ See *Xu jinsilu*, 10.18: “Master Chu said: All those who are weary, disabled, crippled, and infirm, who are orphans, childless, widowers, and widows, are my brothers who totter and falter with no one to turn to. When the [superior man] rules the government he must support such people” (Wittenborn, *Further Reflections on Things at Hand*, 144).

²¹⁶ As the embodiment of the Way of Heaven, the “regulating precepts of the seasonal cycles in the heavens above,... the patterns of the land formation and the watercourses in the world below, ... the overlapping procession of the four seasons, to the alternating brightness of the sun and moon”

appeal to common shared practices as found in the rites, the appeal to a common foundational narrative in the legendary sage kings and the golden past.

(*Zhongyong zhangju*, 30 [Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung*, 51]) function as paradigmatic examples of following our innate principle and proceeding along the Way of Heaven.

CHAPTER 6

COMPARING VISIONS OF PEACE

The earlier chapters of this study cover considerable ground. Chapter one lays out the task of this project, providing a brief history of prior interpretations and stating the assumptions and guidelines of my project. Chapter two compares Ephesians vis-à-vis Colossians, argues that the motif of peace is prominent in Ephesians, and provides an initial investigation into the character of its vision of peace. Chapter three further examines this vision of peace. It investigates the character of Ephesians as a tractate περὶ εἰρήνης, arguing that the letter can be read politically as it shows similarity in subject matter, themes, and terms with Greek and Roman political thought. Chapter four examines the vision of peace in Dio Chrysostom's orations, chapter five the Confucian classics. In this concluding chapter, I compare the three visions of peace, then highlight the implications of my study.

Three Visions of Peace

Comparison of the three visions of peace must be selective. I emphasize those elements that are pertinent to the reading of Ephesians. Consequently, I do not discuss the similarities and differences of the Dionic and Confucian visions of peace if they do not

contribute to an improved understanding of Ephesians. I consider first the nature of peace, and second the various elements in the three visions of peace.

Nature of peace

I began this project with a working definition of peace derived from contemporary English usage. I then subsequently adjusted and developed this semantic field as I interrogated each set of texts. I can now summarize and compare the concepts of peace in the three sets of texts, paying attention to their respective metanarratives, multiple frames of reference, bases for peace, impediments against peace, and the relationships between heavenly and human peace.

Nature of Dionic peace

Dio's vision of peace is located within the framework of the Second Sophistic, a period in which sophists and philosophers wrestled with issues concerning Greek identity under Roman imperial power. Through the *Kingship* and the *Bithynian Orations*, Dio portrays himself as an emissary of peace sent by Zeus, and seeks to craft a vision of peace that promotes communal flourishing and Greek vitality. Although Dio holds to the Stoic theory of eternal cycles of cosmic conflagration and regeneration, he does not locate his vision of peace within this metanarrative.

Dio sees peace operative at multiple levels. At the molecular level, peace holds the elements together; in the animal kingdom, peace exists among the ants, birds, and the bees; in the human sphere, peace pervades the city, province, and kingdom; in the geographical and atmospheric sphere, peace exists between the earth and the ether; and

finally in the heavenly sphere, peace is expressed as friendship among the gods. Of all these contexts, Dio considers only the human sphere to be in need of correction.

Dio focuses on three frames of reference: relationships within a city, relationships between cities, and relationships within the kingdom. The primary failing in these three reference frames is discord (στάσις). Discord within a city arises from enmity, distrust, and jealousy between different socio-economic classes, between the ruling elite and the poor. Discord between cities arises from the desire for primacy, the love for titles, and quarrels over territorial boundaries. Discord and instability within the empire result from the moral failings of tyrannical rulers. In contrast to discord, Dio envisions a state of peace that is characterized by concord (ὁμόνοια). Concord is the elimination of enmity, hostility, strife, and war. Concord is friendship between members of a city and reconciliation between disputing cities. More important, concord is civic order, the maintenance of the prevailing social and political hierarchy, and the imposition of beneficent rule by an ideal king characterized by φιλανθρωπία. Given the centrality of concord within Dio's oration, we may conclude that concord is the defining character of Dio's vision of peace.

Zeus is the source of concord, but human concord is accomplished not by divine intervention but by human accomplishment. The gods may assist, but the primary onus lies on human effort, or more precisely, on the development of moral character in humanity. The ideal king or good civic leader who possesses the four cardinal virtues, who labors diligently on behalf of his people, who looks after them as a father and savior, and who is flexible and able to adopt a give-and-take approach will provide the necessary

conditions for concord to flourish both within a kingdom and a city. At the same time, the citizens of a city must seize this opportunity for concord by being temperate, prudent, moderate, and well-behaved, adorning themselves with mutual trust, friendship, and integrity. Heavenly concord serves as the model and inspiration for human concord, but the creation of human concord has no subsequent influence on heavenly concord; the relationship is unidirectional, flowing from the heavenly to the human sphere (heavenly concord \Rightarrow human concord).

Nature of Confucian peace

The Confucian vision of peace sees the early Zhou period as the high-water mark of Chinese history that subsequently degenerated into the political anarchy and social instability of the Eastern Zhou period. The vision therefore seeks to recover the stability of the golden past, not through a rigid and blind appropriation of the past but via the application and contextualization of inherited knowledge to the present prevailing circumstances. In so doing, the Confucian vision believes that “culture—the social refinements developed primarily to encourage and articulate proper moral feelings—is cumulative and generally progressive.”¹

The *Daxue* and the *Zhongyong* envision peace at several interconnected levels. In the individual sphere, peace is the full realization of one’s moral nature, the maintenance of perfect balance, and the uniting of feelings, thought, will, and action. In the communal sphere, peace is the formation of social harmony brought about by the acceptance and

¹ Roger T. Ames, *The Art of Rulership: A Study in Ancient Chinese Political Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 5.

fulfillment of one's obligations within the social and political hierarchy. In the cosmic and natural sphere, peace not only ensues when all things follow their respective principle and proceed along the Way of Heaven, but also occurs when humans realize their potential and aspire to become sages, ultimately forming a trinity with Heaven and Earth.² Together, this trinity (Humanity-Heaven-Earth) forges the transformative and generative processes of the entire cosmos, maintaining the dynamic harmony and balance of the universe.

Similar to the way concord (ὁμόνοια) defines Dionic peace, the Confucian vision of peace is dominated by the concept of harmony (*he* 和). There are several similarities between the concepts of concord and harmony.³ Both emphasize civic order within their respective social and political hierarchies. Both can be used to describe relational spheres outside of the human arena such as that of nature and the cosmos. Both allow for unity within diversity.⁴ Both trace their origin to some divine transcendent source, Zeus in the Dionic and Heaven in the Confucian system.⁵ Both can be illustrated by music, where the

² See *Chapter and Verse Commentary on the Practice of the Mean* (*Zhongyong zhangju* 中庸章句), 22 (ET Daniel K. Gardner, *The Four Books: Confucian Teaching in Late Imperial China* [Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007], 124).

³ For another comparison of the concept of harmony in ancient Chinese and Greek thought, see Chenyang Li, "The Ideal of Harmony in Ancient Chinese and Greek Philosophy," *Dao* 道 7 (2008): 81–98.

⁴ The *Shaogong*.20 昭公二十年 in the *Commentary of Zuo on the Spring and Autumn Annals* (*Zuo zhuan* 左传) illustrates the necessity of diversity for harmony. It states, "Harmony (*he* 和) may be illustrated by soup. You have the water and fire, vinegar, pickle, salt, and plums, with which to cook fish. It is made to boil by the firewood, and then the cook mixes the ingredients, harmoniously equalizing the several flavors, so as to supply whatever is deficient and carry off whatever is in excess. Then the master eats it, and his mind is [at peace (*ping* 平)]" (James Legge, *Chinese Classics*, 5.684).

⁵ It should be noted that the divine and spiritual element in Confucian thought is less overt than in Dio. For example, although Confucius acknowledges the existence of ghosts and spirits, he does not place a heavy emphasis on them. The *Lunyu*, 11.12, states, "Chi-lu asked how the spirits of the dead and the gods should be served. The Master said, 'You are not able even to serve man. How can you serve the spirits?'" (Lau, *Analects*, 107). One can, nevertheless, argue that religious elements in Confucian thought

interplay of sounds mutually support, complement, and stabilize one another. There are nevertheless substantial differences. Dionic concord focuses on interpersonal relations, but Confucian harmony is used for both interpersonal and intrapersonal realms; unlike Dionic concord, Confucian harmony is closely tied to the rites and is fundamentally based on a metaphysical principle (*li* 理),⁶ and unlike Dionic concord, which is frequently contrasted with discord (στάσις), Confucian harmony is seldom described negatively.⁷

As in Dio, the Confucian tradition sees the human sphere as the one needing correction. Impediments toward peace include human failings such as partiality, moral defects, failure to follow the rites, and uncontrolled emotions that degenerate into passions and selfish desires. Progress in the development of peace within this sphere comes through apprehending the principle (*li* 理) in everything that we encounter, the practice of the rites, and the study of the classics, all of which are essential for the development of virtue and the formation of proper ethical behavior.⁸ In contrast to Dio,

became more palpable from the Song Dynasty onwards due to the influence of Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi. For a study on the religious elements in Zhu's writings, see Julia Ching, *The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

⁶ This emphasis on *li* only became prominent from the Song Dynasty onwards.

⁷ Although the *Daxue* and the *Zhongyong* do not describe harmony negatively, the *Spring and Autumn Annals* (*Chunqiu* 春秋) provides many examples of states in various stages of disorder.

⁸ There are similarities and differences between the Greco-Roman and Confucian understanding of virtue. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine this subject in detail, here are some initial observations. In order to have a common focal concept that permits cross-cultural investigation, scholars such as Lee Yearley define virtue generically as “a disposition to act, desire, and feel that involves the exercise of judgment and leads to a recognizable human excellence or instance of human flourishing” (Lee H. Yearley, *Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage* [Albany: SUNY Press, 1990], 13). Using this initial focal concept to interrogate the two traditions, scholars note that both Greco-Roman and Confucian thought mention lists of virtues and both promote an overarching virtue that is outwardly focused toward other people. The overarching virtue, nevertheless, is different: justice (δικαιοσύνη) in Greco-Roman thought (see my discussion of δικαιοσύνη in chapter 3), and humaneness (*ren* 仁) in Confucian thought. For some recent studies on this growing and important field, see Jiyuan Yu, *The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue* (New York: Routledge, 2007); May Sim, *Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Wan Junren,

however, the Confucian vision also emphasizes the constant need for peace and harmony within the natural, the cosmic, and the transcendental arenas—in essence, *all* the multiple spheres of peace need constant correction and maintenance, not just the human, and *all* are ultimately dependent on human cultivation. Thus, even though peace within the natural and cosmic processes serves as an initial paradigm for the human sphere, the Confucian vision nevertheless emphasizes the transitory nature of this peace: harmony can be impaired, order is not static. The vision therefore calls for the development of individuals into sages so that they can ultimately participate in the dynamic and continual maintenance and renegotiation of natural and cosmic peace. In contrast to Dio’s unidirectional flow, the Confucian vision sees the relationship between heavenly peace and human peace as bidirectional and circular: on one hand, heavenly harmony is the paradigm that humanity imitates in order to foster self-cultivation and proceed along the Way of Heaven; on the other hand, the cultivated individual subsequently participates in the dynamic maintenance of cosmic harmony (heavenly harmony \Leftrightarrow human peace).

“Contrasting Confucian Virtue Ethics and MacIntyre’s Aristotelian Virtue Theory,” in *Chinese Philosophy in an Era of Globalization* (ed. Robin Wang; Albany: SUNY Press, 2004), 123–49; various articles published in *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 29 (2002) such as Jiyuan Yu, “The Aristotelian Mean and Confucian Mean”; Eric Hutton, “Moral Reasoning in Aristotle and Xunzi”; and Kenneth Dorter, “The Concept of the Mean in Confucius and Plato”; Jiyuan Yu, “Virtue: Confucius and Aristotle,” in *Philosophy East and West* 48 (1998): 323–47; Xinzhong Yao, *Confucianism and Christianity—A Comparative Study of Jen and Agape* (Brighton: Sussex Academic, 1996).

Nature of Ephesian peace

Ephesians is a circular letter written to various Christian communities within Asia Minor in the first century C.E. Despite being written to a predominantly Gentile audience,⁹ its multiple OT references suggest some familiarity with the Jewish Scriptures, not least the creation account in Genesis (Eph 3:9). The Ephesian vision of peace therefore is located within a metanarrative of creation and chaos in which the original unity and harmony of the cosmos suffered a rupture requiring a reconciliation, recreation, or new creation in Christ. The Ephesian metanarrative is different from Dio's: it proclaims the complete victory of Christ (1:10, 21–22) without any indication of a continual cycle of order and chaos. The Ephesian metanarrative also differs from Confucian thought: it does not seek to recover a glorious past but to institute a new cosmic order.¹⁰ Thus, even though Ephesians uses κτίζω language (2:10, 15; 3:9; 4:24) that recalls God's original creation of the heavens, the earth, and humanity,¹¹ its vision of peace nevertheless calls for a *new* creation (ἵνα τοὺς δύο κτίση ἐν αὐτῷ εἰς ἓνα καινὸν ἄνθρωπον; 2:15). The description of the vision as a μυστήριον that was hidden in ages past further attests to its newness. At the same time, Ephesians intimates that its vision of peace is a culmination or fulfillment of events in the past. Believers have been chosen before the foundation of the world (1:4), the ἀνα- prefix in ἀνακεφαλαιόω suggests a renewal of something in the past, the Spirit

⁹ Peter T. O'Brien, *The Letter to the Ephesians* (The Pillar New Testament Commentary; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 24; Andrew T. Lincoln, *Ephesians* (WBC 42; Dallas: Word, 1990), lxxvi, lxxxiv.

¹⁰ It should be noted that the Confucian metanarrative of "recovering the Zhou" provides the context or background for understanding and locating the Confucian vision of peace. The Confucian vision of peace *in itself*, as seen in the *Daxue* and the *Zhongyong* and as developed by Zhu, is primarily conceptual and provides no complex historical narrative comparable to that in the Ephesian vision of peace.

¹¹ See Gen 14:19, 22; Deut 4:32; 32:6; Psa 32:9; 88:48; Amos 4:13; Mal 2:10; Isa 45:8 (LXX).

with which believers are sealed is the same Spirit promised in the OT Scriptures (1:13),¹² and the access to God that Jews and Gentiles have in Christ is the fulfillment of OT prophecy that sees the temple as the place where all nations come and worship God (Isa 2:1–4; 66:18–20; Mic 4:1–5).

In contrast to Dio's emphasis on concord (ὁμόνοια) or the Confucian tradition's stress on harmony (*he* 和), the Ephesian understanding of peace is communicated by a cluster of terms including εἰρήνη, ἀποκαταλλάσσω, ὑποτάσσω, ἀνακεφαλαίω, ἐνότης, εἶς, ἐν Χριστῷ, and συν-prefixed words. As in Dionian and Confucian thought, the Ephesian peace operates in multiple spheres.

In the spiritual sphere, Ephesians understands peace to be the reconciliation of believers to God and their incorporation into the body of Christ. Both Dio and the Confucian tradition also address human-divine participation. Dio remarks that true kings are friends of Zeus and likeminded (ὁμονοέω) with him,¹³ and suggests the possibility of apotheosis as a *reward* and incentive for kings to be good and just. The Confucian tradition sees the union of humanity with Heaven (*tian ren he yi* 天人合一) as ultimate spiritual realization and the *goal* of human cultivation. In Dio and the Confucian tradition, participation with the divine is obtained by strenuous human effort and is not readily available to everybody; in Ephesians, it is a gracious gift of God that is available to all who

¹² G. Henry Waterman, "The Greek 'Verbal Genitive,'" in *Current Issues in Biblical and Patristic Interpretation* (ed. Gerald F. Hawthorne; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 291–92, remarks that the phrase τῷ πνεύματι τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τῷ ἁγίῳ (Eph 1:13) should be rendered as "with the Holy Spirit promised by (God)." The genitive τῆς ἐπαγγελίας should be understood as a "verbal genitive," a genitive which functions as a "verb indicating the action or state of the noun on which it depends" (292).

¹³ Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 4.43.

have faith (1:13, 19; 2:8). Ephesians sees access to God, union in Christ, and the seal of the Holy Spirit as the *basis* for moral development.

In the human sphere, peace in Ephesians can be understood in various sub-domains. In the ethnic sub-domain, the Ephesian vision is much more radical than the Dionic. Dio expresses openness toward barbarian wisdom while steadfastly holding on to the superiority of his Greek cultural heritage. Ephesians, on the other hand, argues that ethnic peace results from the reconciliation (*ἀποκαταλλάσσω*) of Jews and Gentiles: the elimination of ethnic enmity, the destruction of the dividing wall, the abolition of the law of commandments, and the creational transformation of two mutually antagonistic groups into one new humanity and one body. In the ecclesial sub-domain, peace means the use of individual gifts for the building up of the body, the formation of a common ethos, and the unification of the body against the onslaughts of the evil cosmic powers. In the familial sub-domain, peace means the maintenance of the household codes within a framework that presents Christ as the true *pater familias*. Ephesians, Dio, and Confucian thought agree most in their common concern for social order within the household and the communal sub-domains, emphasizing conformity to social hierarchical structures while allowing for diversity amidst the pursuit of the common good.

In the cosmic and divine spheres, Ephesians's understanding of the oneness and unity of the Trinity (Father-Son-Spirit) is a much stronger form of divine concord than Dionic friendship among the various gods. Moreover, Ephesians's cosmic peace is not akin to Confucian cosmic harmony, the mutual ebb and flow of cosmic processes that ensue when all things proceed along the Way of Heaven; rather, it consists of the

headship of Christ, and the subjugation (ὑποτάσσω) of all rule, authority, power, and dominion under his feet when God raised him from the dead (1:20–22). The current reign of Christ is no doubt contested by the cosmic powers; nevertheless, Ephesians points toward an inevitable future (τὸ πλήρωμα τῶν καιρῶν; 1:10)¹⁴ when Christ will *completely* sum up and bring all things into unity (ἀνακεφαλαίω),¹⁵ thereby restoring perfect peace to the universe. Furthermore, cosmic peace in Ephesians is not dynamic and fragile, nor is it brought about by the cooperative participation of Heaven, Earth, and the sage; it transcends the ages (οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι; 1:21), and it is a decisive fact brought about by the sole and final action of God (1:20).

The relationship between heavenly and human concord in Ephesians is also different from the other two visions. Like the Dionic and Confucian visions, cosmic and divine peace in Ephesians impacts human concord. The unity of the Trinity forms the basis for the unity of the church (4:4–6), and the triadic references to the Father, Son, and Spirit working together to effect salvation serve as a paradigm for how the church is to work together. Unlike Dio, but similar to the Confucian tradition, human concord in Ephesians influences heavenly concord. The *Zhongyong* remarks that the sage in some way “assists” or “participates” (*zan* 贊) in the transformative and generative processes of

¹⁴ Contra Andreas Lindemann, *Die Aufhebung der Zeit* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Mohn, 1975), 96–99, the aorist tense of ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι cannot be used to argue for a past event, nor can it be used to construct an “aorist eschatology” that is radically completed. The “fullness of the times” may have begun with the Christ event, but that does not mean that the cosmic “summing up” has been completed.

¹⁵ Unlike Ephesians, Colossians speaks of God “reconciling” (ἀποκαταλλάσσω) all things through Christ. The verb ἀποκαταλλάσσω in Col 1:20 also carries the sense of “pacification” (the imposition of peace by force) since this verse must be understood in light of Christ’s triumph over the cosmic powers (Col 2:15). See F. F. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids:

heavenly concord. In Ephesians, the influence on heavenly concord is less direct. The church does not create ultimate cosmic peace or unity; it is inaugurated by Christ's death and consummated in his eventual summing up of all things. Nevertheless, the church does participate in bringing about cosmic peace in several ways. The church as a unified body is the means or channel (διὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας) through which God discloses (γνωρίζω) the manifold wisdom of his plan of reconciliation (3:10).¹⁶ The very existence of a *united* church manifests the ultimate victory of Christ and the inevitable defeat of the evil powers. Likewise, the existence of a *discordant* church throws the reality of a future cosmic harmony into question. If the church is to be a credible witness, it must stand firm against the attacks of the evil powers that attempt to destroy and divide the church. Similarly, the church's prayer for the saints and her proclamation of the gospel (6:18–20) testifies to the reality of Christ's cosmic unity, weakening and restraining by the power of God the influence of the devil. The relationship between heavenly and human concord in Ephesians is not unidirectional (Dionic) or circular (Confucian); it is U-shaped and can be diagrammed as follows: Cosmic and divine peace (Unity of the Trinity & Supremacy of Christ) ⇒ Human peace (Unity of the Church) ⇒ Cosmic peace (Testimony to the Cosmic Powers).

The Confucian understanding of individual harmony is not present in Ephesians since, like Dio, Ephesians understands peace in interpersonal rather than intrapersonal

Eerdmans, 1984), 76. Nevertheless, Ephesians's use of ἀνακεφαλαιόω rather than ἀποκαταλλάσσω presents a clearer image of Christ's headship and rule over the universe.

¹⁶ I understand γνωρισθῆναι to be a divine passive, suggesting that God himself is the ultimate agent of the revelation.

terms.¹⁷ Moreover, the attitude toward emotions in the realm of ethics is different between the Confucian and Ephesian visions. Instead of advocating a state whereby one's emotions are in dynamic equilibrium and perfect measure, without imbalance and excess, Ephesians explicitly calls believers to put away the various passions that were associated with their former lifestyle (4:19, 22, 31; 5:3–4, 18).

Ephesians sees a major need for correction within the human sphere. The impediments to peace in these areas include human moral failings such as the failure to imitate the virtues of God, the failure to adopt the communal ethos and identity, the failure to hold fast to the central teachings of the ἐκκλησία, the failure to relinquish former ethnic particularities and hatred, and the failure of the church to protect itself against the attacks of the evil powers. Ephesians's focus on the human sphere falls in line with the Dionic and Confucian tradition. The difference lies not least in the primary frames of reference for applying their respective visions of peace: the πόλις and βασιλεία for Dio, the state for the Confucian tradition, and the ἐκκλησία for Ephesians.

Elements in the three visions of peace

Having examined how the three sets of texts understand peace, I now explore various elements that they use to structure their vision of peace. These include the appeals for

¹⁷ The Ephesian vision of peace, despite its strong ecclesiological focus, allows for an individual dimension. The phrase ἐξελέξατο ἡμᾶς (1:4), contra Ernest Best, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Ephesians* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 119–20, should be understood in both corporate *and* individual dimensions. But regardless of either dimension, election and salvation must be understood in interpersonal categories as it is ultimately reconciliation between humanity and God. In Confucian thought, individual fulfillment or realization is found not so much in relationship to a person but to a principle, a principle which, nevertheless, is finally expressed in correct behavior toward others.

peace within a specific frame of reference, the sequence for implementing the vision, the central operative principle guiding the vision, and the vision's attempt at balancing and reimagining hierarchy.

Appeals for peace and their frame of reference

In addressing the emperor within the *Kingship Orations*, Dio appeals to sacred texts such as the writings of Homer to underscore the qualities of the ideal king. He gives examples of stock heroes and villains, stressing the need of emulating Heracles and Zeus while avoiding the excesses of Alexander and Sardanapallus. He further draws out the stark ramifications of his program: on one hand, the good king will be proclaimed the savior of the human race and may even be deified after his death; on the other hand, the tyrant king will suffer ignominy, like Phaethon, or be deposed and killed. More important, Dio warns that there is a principle and power superior to the Roman emperor. Zeus is the final judge who sets up and deposes kings; aspiring kings will do well to accept his divine education and emulate his character.

In addressing the common populace and the local assembly within the *Bithynian Orations*, Dio urges the people not to follow the negative example of Athens and Sparta: both went to war over primacy, both lost it. They are, instead, to learn from the harmonious working relationships of the birds, ants, bees, and goats. Dio also advocates concord by appealing to the common elements shared between the disputing communities. These include close personal relationships, a common Greek identity, the same festivals, and the same gods. Dio also appeals to the social, economic, military, political, and judicial benefits of reconciliation. United cities wield great influence,

maximize their resources and manpower, and present fewer weaknesses that provincial governors can exploit. Referring to the foundational narrative of Nicaea, Dio further admonishes its citizens to imitate the heroic qualities of its progenitor, Dionysius, and founder, Heracles. Finally, Dio warns the people that unless they curtail their riotous behavior, Rome will intervene and remove their freedom to gather in public assembly.

An appreciation of the frame of reference in which Dio's orations are addressed helps us to understand his appeals for peace. In the *Kingship Orations*, the frame of reference is the Roman Empire. The benefits to which Dio appeals are crafted for the Emperor: social stability within the Empire, the possibility of deification, and paradigmatic examples drawn from the realm of gods and kings. The warning is also apropos: there is a greater power to which the Emperor must place himself under. In the *Bithynian Orations*, the frame of reference is the city and the province. Dio therefore appeals to benefits and warnings that are pertinent to a city within the Roman Empire: the reward of greater economic prosperity and political status vis-à-vis the threat of Roman intervention. At the same time, since neighboring cities are frequently tied by bonds of natural kinship through intermarriage, Dio appeals to these personal relationships in his call for inter-city concord. Finally, Dio appeals to their common Greek heritage, reminding them of the past failures of Athens and Sparta while looking forward to a renewed vision of Hellenic unity and identity.

The primary frame of reference for understanding the appeals within the Confucian vision of peace is the state (*guo* 国). Certain elements, such as conversations of

dukes asking Confucius about government policy,¹⁸ suggest that the intended audience probably included the intellectual elite, political advisors, and rulers. Broad similarities in the audiences and frames of reference within the Confucian and Dionic texts (*Kingship Orations*) suggest the possibility that similar types of appeals may be at work in both traditions. For example, both appeal to an authority that is superior to the ruler. In the Confucian tradition, the higher authority is Heaven rather than Zeus, and the benefits and warnings concern the Mandate of Heaven. As the *Daxue* remarks, “The Mandate of Heaven is not fixed or unchangeable. The good ruler gets it and the bad ruler loses it.”¹⁹ As another example, both traditions appeal to exemplary kings as models of imitation: Heracles in Dio and the sage kings Yao and Shun in the Confucian tradition. Although political frames of reference are helpful in understanding one aspect of the Dionic and Confucian appeals, we must also note that other factors come into play, not least is their respective political history and metanarrative. For example, the Confucian tradition argues that rites are more effective than punishment in correcting the ethical behavior of the population.²⁰ But part of the rationale for appealing to rites is because rites form the substructure of the government in the early Zhou period, the high point of unity, peace, and justice.²¹ As Confucians strive to recover the practices of the golden past, they

¹⁸ See for example *Zhongyong zhangju*, 20 (ET Andrew Plaks, *Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung* [London: Penguin, 2003], 37).

¹⁹ *Daxue Zhangju*, 10 (Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963], 93).

²⁰ *Lunyu*, 2.3, states, “The Master said, ‘Guide them by edicts, keep them in line with punishments, and the common people will stay out of trouble but will have no sense of shame. Guide them by virtue, keep them in line with the rites, and they will, besides having a sense of shame, reform themselves’” (D. C. Lau, trans., *Analects* [London: Penguin, 1979], 63).

²¹ Tao Jiang, “Intimate Authority: The Rule of Ritual in Classical Confucian Political Discourse,” in *Confucian Cultures of Authority* (ed. Peter D. Hershock and Roger T. Ames; Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), 25.

invariably appeal to rites as the normative system that undergirds all aspects of human life.

The intended audience and primary frame of reference in Ephesians is different from the Dionic and Confucian traditions. The intended audience is not the ruling elite but the members of the community. The primary frame of reference for understanding the appeals for peace is now the ἐκκλησία, an intentional community or voluntary association that meets primarily in a household setting. The organization of the ἐκκλησία as an intentional community influences the strategy and appeals that Ephesians employs in its call for communal peace and unity.

1. An intentional community faces the constant challenge of transforming unrelated members with different backgrounds, worldviews, and ideologies into a unified body politic. Education (cf. Eph 4:11, 20–21) plays a major role in this process, and Ephesians seeks to forge a common pool of values and ideals, contending for one body, one Spirit, one hope, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, and one God and Father (4:4–6). Ephesians also gives its members a common communal history or foundational narrative, a narrative that recounts their election before the foundation of the world (1:4) and their formation through the death of Christ on the cross (2:16). Moreover, since members of an intentional community are not tied together by bonds of natural kinship, Ephesians encourages its readers to consider themselves members of a reconstituted family. They are now no longer strangers and aliens (2:19); rather, they are God's adopted children (1:5; 5:1), brothers and sisters in the household of God (2:19) with God presiding as the father (1:2, 3, 17; 2:18; 3:14; 4:6; 5:20; 6:23), members of one new humanity (2:15), members of

one body (1:23; 2:16; 3:6; 4:4, 12, 16), members of one another (4:25), and members that are characterized by a deep love for one another (1:15; 3:14–19; 4:2, 15, 16; 5:2, 25, 28, 33).

The household setting in which the early church gathered together no doubt provided greater opportunities for intimacy and the forging of personal relationships.

Furthermore, Ephesians contrasts their former manner of life with their present new identity,²² encouraging them not only to make a decisive break with their past (οὐκέτι, μηκέτι; 2:19; 4:14, 17, 28) so as to embrace the ethos of the new community, but also to refrain from associating with the outsiders among whom they live.²³ Finally, Ephesians encourages its members to share their material resources (4:28) so as to minimize any tension brought about by their different socio-economic backgrounds.

2. An intentional community may also experience conflict from the dominant culture that perceives it to be deviant. In the face of outside hostility, intentional communities such as the ἐκκλησία typically characterize themselves as virtuous while that of outsiders as evil (4:17, 24; 5:8, 15). But this is counterbalanced with exhortations not to create unnecessary antagonism with their neighbors. Ephesians therefore advocates household codes that are socially conservative, and reminds its members that their true battle is not against flesh and blood but against the evil spiritual forces (6:12). Apart from possible conflicts, members of an intentional community also face the temptation to return to the stability offered by the dominant culture. Intentional communities try to stem this loss by providing an enlarged sense of purpose and identity

²² Note the contrasts between ποτέ, (2:2, 3, 11, 13, 5:8), πρότερος (4:22), and παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος (4:22) vis-à-vis νῦν, νυνί (2:13; 5:8) and καινὸς ἄνθρωπος (4:24).

²³ “Do not associate with [outsiders]” (5:7); “expose [their] unfruitful works of darkness” (5:11).

with aspirations of universal fraternity and significance. In a similar vein, Paul in Ephesians prays for his readers that the eyes of their heart will be enlightened so that they may know what is the hope of God's calling and what are the riches of God's glorious inheritance in the saints (1:18). Paul asserts that the ἐκκλησία has "supra-national and supra-temporal significance, [being] ... the visible manifestation of a universal and eternal commonwealth in which men could become citizens."²⁴ Although its members may be despised in the dominant culture, they are in reality adopted children of God (1:5), seated with Christ at God's right hand,²⁵ and engaged in a battle of cosmic proportions (6:10–20).

3. Warnings and punishment against deviant behavior in intentional communities are similar, but take a different form from that found in cities or empires. For example, warnings generically may consist of a possible loss of reward. Within the framework of a city interested in material wealth, Dio appropriately warns the citizens of Prusa and Apameia that strife will lead to the loss of economic prosperity. Within the framework of a community that is focused on a spiritual reality, Ephesians warns its readers that a failure to renounce their former pagan ways will lead to the loss of their inheritance in the Kingdom of God (5:5). As another example, warnings typically appeal to a higher

²⁴ Robert Banks, *Paul's Idea of Community: The Early House Churches in their Historical Setting* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), 49.

²⁵ Ephesians's portrayal of the ἐκκλησία as a heavenly assembly gathered around the throne of Christ resonates with the idealized cosmic city of Stoic thought such as that found in Dio's *Or.* 36. Both portray a community of humanity and gods; nevertheless, there are differences. In Stoic thought, true citizenship in the cosmic city is awarded only to the wise and good; in Ephesians, entry into the community is first granted to those who are σεσωσμένοι διὰ πίστεως (Eph 2:8), only then are they called to walk not as ἄσοφοι but as σοφοί (5:15). The similarity between Ephesians's ἐκκλησία and Stoicism's cosmic city will be perceived positively by those who are familiar with Stoic thought, possibly serving as further inducement to join the intentional community of believers.

authority. Dio highlights Roman intervention while Ephesians appeals to the wrath of God (2:3; 5:6). In the area of punishment, Ephesians differs from other intentional communities in that it does not mention or employ shaming, shunning or excommunication. There is also no mention of any form of discipline that the community is to inflict on deviant members. On the contrary, Ephesians stresses internal motivation rather than external correction, advocating character formation through the positive development of right praxis over against negative dissuasion through threats. Like the Confucian vision of peace, which advocates the positive practice of rites rather than criminal penalty, Ephesians also stresses the positive practice of imitating Christ rather than punishment.

Sequence for implementing the vision of peace

The *Daxue* and the *Zhongyong* explicitly outline a sequence for implementing the Confucian vision of peace. It progresses through a series of outwardly radiating concentric circles, beginning with personal cultivation, the establishment of household harmony, the proper governance of the state, the manifestation of world peace, and culminating in the dynamic generation of cosmic harmony: Individual (King) → Household → Kingdom → World → Cosmos. The entire vision rests on the moral cultivation of individuals and on the power of their moral influence to effect peace in other spheres. This strong sequence in the Confucian tradition raises the question whether a similar sequence or strategy is present in Dio and Ephesians.

The Dionian texts do not explicitly highlight a sequence for implementing its vision of peace. The reason for this lack probably stems from the nature of the texts itself,

being primarily orations delivered before an audience rather than programmatic essays or systematic treatises. One can, nevertheless, suggest two strands of thought. On one hand, the *Kingship Orations* present a top-down approach. The moral excellence and wise rule of the individual king provide the conditions necessary for concord to flourish within the empire. Moreover, as subordinate governors imitate the practices and ethos of the ideal king, they will not interfere in local politics for their own ends, but provide some measure of freedom so that individual cities can manage their own affairs with dignity. The sequence can be laid out as follows: Individual (King) → Empire → Province → City. On the other hand, the *Bithynian Orations* present a bottom-up approach. Dio does not begin with the moral formation of individuals but of communities. Friendship, concord, and unity between the different socio-economic communities lead to intra-city concord, inter-city concord, concord between cities in Bithynia, and ultimately in all of Asia Minor: Communal ethical formation → Intra-city concord → Inter-city concord → Bithynian province → Asia Minor.

The vision of peace in *Ephesians* also contains a sequence, but one substantially different from the other two visions. The sequence and causative progression in the Dionic and Confucian traditions contain three presuppositions: (1) the vision of peace has not been realized, or the vision of peace has been realized but needs to be sustained; (2) humanity has a definitive role to bring about the vision of peace; and (3) humanity can independently fulfill the vision of peace through the cultivation of human excellences. These presuppositions are modified or overturned in *Ephesians*. In contrast to the other

two traditions, Ephesians considers the basis for attaining the vision of peace to rest not on human effort but on the prior work of Christ.

Ephesians affirms that ethnic peace between Jews and Gentiles is already made possible because of the death of Christ (spiritual reconciliation to God → ethnic peace), unity among believers in the heavenly ἐκκλησία is already produced in Christ by the Spirit (spiritual reconciliation in Christ → peace within the ἐκκλησία), and the decisive victory over the cosmic powers is already won by God in Christ (Christ's subjugation of cosmic powers → cosmic peace). The eschatological perspective of Ephesians, however, stands in the tension between the "already" and "not yet." The vision of peace has been decisively inaugurated, and there is a clear emphasis on a realized eschatological perspective. There is nevertheless a future expectation of a coming age (1:21; 2:7) where this vision of peace will be fully consummated such that Christ completely sums up and unifies the universe. Standing in the overlap between this age and the age to come, the church must demonstrate unity in order to function as a proleptic symbol of the future consummated harmony in Christ. Nevertheless, it faces hostilities from evil powers. The church must therefore embrace the reality of ethnic peace between Jewish and Gentile believers and keep the unity of the Spirit, "[providing] the angelic powers with a tangible reminder that their authority has been decisively broken and that all things are to be subject to Christ."²⁶

²⁶ Andrew T. Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 155.

This “already and not yet” eschatological perspective, absent in Dio and the Confucian tradition, assists the readers of Ephesians to participate fully in the vision of peace. The “not yet” perspective reminds the church that they have the responsibility of working out their new ethics within the community, growing into the unity that truly reflects Christ’s cosmic unity. At the same time, the “already” perspective strengthens believers, assuring them that they need not fear since they have been resurrected and exalted with Christ to a position far superior to that of the evil powers.²⁷ Moreover, it encourages believers, reminding them that they have at their disposal every spiritual blessing (1:3) needed to fulfill their calling until the day of redemption (4:30).

The sequence in Ephesians also differs from the Dionic and Confucian traditions in that human concord or cosmic harmony is not the ultimate goal. In contrast to their anthropocentric focus, the theocentric interest of Ephesians asserts that God’s glory is the *summum bonum*. Paul places the mystery of Christ’s ἀνακεφαλαίωσις (“summing up”) as the “pivotal statement” of the *berakah* in 1:3–14,²⁸ a *berakah* that begins with a blessing pronouncement on God the father (1:3) followed by the three fold refrain “to the praise of his glory” (1:6, 12, 14). This structure emphasizes the doxological character of the Ephesian vision of peace. God is the origin and source of this vision (1:9), and its completion will redound to his glory. Similarly, Paul ends his prayer for the unity of the church with the doxology: “To him be glory in the church and in Christ Jesus to all

²⁷ Clinton E. Arnold, *Ephesians: Power and Magic: The Concept of Power in Ephesians in Light of its Historical Setting* (ed. G. N. Stanton; SNTSMS 63; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 147–49.

²⁸ Thorsten Moritz, “‘Summing Up All Things’: Religious Pluralism and Universalism in Ephesians,” in *One God, One Lord in a World of Religious Pluralism* (ed. Andrew D. Clarke and Bruce W. Winter; Cambridge: Tyndale House, 1991), 96.

generation, for ever and ever” (3:21). God’s glory is seen in the church because her unity is a testimony to God’s manifold wisdom; God’s glory is seen in Christ Jesus because he mediates and accomplishes God’s plan of reconciliation. According to Paul, the eternal glory of God is the teleological goal of cosmic peace.

Central operative principle

Adherents of the Confucian “School of the Way” such as the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi postulate that every living thing and affair possesses a specific pattern or principle (*li* 理). This specific principle is a manifestation of the one supreme principle that underlies all things in the universe, and is the norm for both the natural order (“why things are so”) and the moral order (“that things ought to be so”).²⁹ Peace and chaos is then predicated on how well individuals and governments follow their innate principle *li*. For example, peace in the individual human sphere is being true to one’s *li* and inborn nature (*xing*); peace in the social sphere consists of fulfilling the moral norms that correspond to the *li* inherent in the five human relationships; peace in the cosmic and natural sphere occurs when every process and thing realizes its innate principle. In this way, principle or *li* functions as the rubric for understanding the Confucian vision of peace.

Can we also speak of a central operative principle or idea that guides the formulation of the Dionic and Ephesian visions of peace? Dio does not explicitly specify a

²⁹ The natural order-moral order relationship in Confucian thought is similar to the indicative-imperative relationship in Ephesians. Both systems call for humans to understand their true nature, and both call for humans to fulfill the ethical obligations mandated by their true identity. There are nevertheless differences. In Confucian thought, the natural order-moral order relationship is applicable to all things in the universe, and the moral obligations are heavily dependent upon one’s social location.

central unifying principle that determines his vision of peace. I suggest, however, two impulses that shape his understanding of concord: pragmatism and a concern for Greek vitality. Although Dio was a moral philosopher, his involvement in local politics leads him to craft his ethical injunctions and to shape his vision for peace with common sense pragmatism. Thus, in the *Kingship Orations*, Dio warns the emperor that he cannot act with impunity otherwise he will be deposed by Zeus and follow the tragic path of Domitian. Moreover, appeals for civic concord are based on practical economic concerns, and warnings against riotous behavior or inter-city disputes over primacy are established on the stark reality that the strings of power are firmly held in Roman hands. Dio's vision of peace is also driven by his concern for Greek vitality. He notes that Greek παιδεία is fundamental for developing the qualities of an ideal king. Moreover, in the interactions between the Greek cities and Roman imperial power, Dio seeks a compromise between servile submission and dangerous revolts. He therefore attempts to establish Hellenic communal flourishing under foreign rule.

The Ephesian vision of peace is not controlled by an abstract conceptual principle but by a person. Specifically, peace is personified in Jesus Christ and grounded in the historical narrative of his death on the cross. Christ not only brings peace and reconciliation, he himself is this peace (2:14).³⁰ In the context of 2:11–22, Christ is the locus and basis of *ethnic peace* between Jewish and Gentile believers. The phrase αὐτός γάρ ἐστιν ἡ εἰρήνη ἡμῶν is clarified by three participial phrases (ὁ ποιήσας ... λύσας ...

In Ephesians, the indicative-imperative relationship is applicable only to believers, and the moral obligations are dependent upon one's spiritual location in the family of God.

³⁰ Note the intensive αὐτός in 2:14.

καταργήσας): he *made* both Jews and Gentiles into one, he *destroyed* the barrier, and he *abolished* the enmity between them. Ephesians, however, extends the significance of Christ to other spheres of peace:

1. *Spiritual peace.* Christ is the locus and basis of spiritual reconciliation with God. Believers have been made alive with and in Christ (2:5). They have been raised up and seated with him in the heavenly places (2:6), and they have access in one Spirit to the Father through him (2:18). The believers' union ἐν Χριστῷ is the basis of their fellowship with God.

2. *Ecclesial peace.* Christ's sacrificial death on the cross functions as the paradigm for ethical behavior within the ἐκκλησία. Believers are to forgive one another *just as* (καθὼς καὶ) God in Christ *also* forgave them (4:32); believers are to walk in love *just as* (καθὼς καὶ) Christ *also* loved them (5:2); and believers are to experience the cruciform love of Christ so that they can be filled up to the fullness of God (3:19), extending Christ's love toward other believers and building up the body of Christ.

3. *Household peace.* The headship of Christ radically transforms *all* the relationships within the household code. Thus, wives are to submit ὡς τῷ κυρίῳ; children are to obey ἐν κυρίῳ; slaves are to obey ὡς τῷ Χριστῷ; husbands are to love just as Χριστός loved the church; fathers are to bring up their children in the discipline and instruction κυρίου; and masters are to remember that they have same κύριος in heaven. Furthermore, the most intimate human relationship, that between a husband and wife, prefigures the

mystery of the Christ-church union (5:32), or more broadly, the cosmic headship and unity in Christ.³¹

4. *Cosmic peace.* Christ's supremacy over all rule, authority, power, dominion, and name, and the subjugation of all things under his feet establishes cosmic peace. Moreover, as the church stands against the attacks of the evil cosmic powers, they are to do so from a position of strength that comes from their union with Christ. Believers are to be strong in the Lord Jesus and in the strength of his might (6:10), and they must remind themselves that they too have been seated with Christ above all evil powers (2:6).

5. *Eschatological peace.* Ephesians affirms that the eschatological fulfillment of God's plan of salvation and reconciliation has its focal point in the mystery, the content of which is the summing up and uniting of all things in Christ, things in heaven and things on earth (1:9–10). In the fullness of the times (1:9), at the climax of history,³² God sets forth Christ not only as the means or instrument but the sphere in which to sum up the cosmos, to effect cosmic unity, and to bring about peace and harmony. Ephesians 1:9–10 then functions as the programmatic statement for the Ephesian vision of peace. To be sure, the mystery concerning Christ (τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ Χριστοῦ) has strong implications for the church (3:4–6; 5:32). The accent, nevertheless, still falls on Christ such that the unity of the church is a subsidiary theme under the leitmotif of the unity and cosmic summing up of all things in Christ. There is no doubt that major portions of Ephesians advocate peace within the ἐκκλησία, but this peace within the ἐκκλησία is supported,

³¹ Max Turner, "Mission and Meaning in Terms of 'Unity' in Ephesians," in *Mission and Meaning: Essays Presented to Peter Cotterell* (ed. A. Billington, T. Lane, and M. Turner; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1995), 156–57.

nourished, informed, and interpreted through the peace of Christ. If we are correct that Ephesians configures its vision of peace through the lens of Christ, then it may be more appropriate to affirm that the letter draws out the implications of Christology for ecclesiology rather than to say with Käsemann that “Christology is almost exclusively interpreted from the standpoint of ecclesiology.”³³ Ephesians’s vision of peace is first christological, then ecclesiological.³⁴

Balancing and reimagining hierarchy

Both the Dionic and the Confucian visions of peace call for the maintenance of some form of social and political hierarchy. But despite the necessity of maintaining such hierarchy, both visions also allow for the coexistence of mitigating elements of equality or a reimagining of the hierarchy to promote communal flourishing. For example, the Confucian system stresses the importance of rites in maintaining the social hierarchy of the five human relationships. But the call to maintain the rites is balanced by the acknowledgment of a common humanity or universal fraternity. One Confucian text reads: “The gentleman is reverent and does nothing amiss, is respectful towards others and observant of the *rites*, and *all within the Four Seas are his brothers*” (italics mine).³⁵ Moreover, Confucian thought teaches that rites must be balanced with music. Rites

³² Lincoln, *Ephesians*, 32.

³³ Käsemann, “Das Interpretationsproblem des Eph,” *TLZ* 86 (1961): 3, as cited in Werner Georg Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament* (trans. Howard Clark Kee; rev. ed.; Nashville: Abingdon, 1973), 360.

³⁴ Similarly, George H. van Kooten, *Cosmic Christology in Paul and the Pauline School: Colossians and Ephesians in the Context of Graeco-Roman Cosmology, with a New Synopsis of the Greek Texts* (WUNT 2.171; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 178–79, remarks, “It is wrong to summarise the difference between *Eph* and *Col*, as is commonly done, by saying that *Col* is more concerned with cosmology whereas *Eph* focuses on ecclesiology. In fact, the ecclesiology of *Eph* is merely a function of its cosmic Christology.”

divide society by establishing hierarchies, music unites by arousing sentiments of commonality;³⁶ rites are based on respect, music on love.³⁷ The Confucian vision of peace therefore calls for the harmonious interaction of music and rites such that there is balance, without excess either in the area of stratification or unification.

In his orations, Dio is clearly aware that Greek cities are under the ultimate authority of the Roman Emperor. Even though some cities such as Prusa are not fortunate enough to obtain freedom and independence from Roman oversight, Dio nevertheless insists that they can still be free since *true* freedom is conferred on the virtuous and the wise. Moreover, even though the citizens do not have the physical power and influence of the King, they can still manage “their own affairs in a high-minded (μεγαλοφρόνως) and not in a servile and easy-going manner.”³⁸ They can be a king in character, though not in power. Through the reinterpretation of freedom, independence, and kingly excellence in moral categories, Dio holds two poles in tension: social stability via the maintenance of hierarchy and communal flourishing via the reimagining of this hierarchy.

Like Dio and Confucian thought, Ephesians also promotes a reconceptualized hierarchy, albeit driven by different concerns. Dio’s reimagining stems from his pragmatic considerations to establish Greek communal flourishing under Roman rule, and the Confucian balancing is dominated by a concern for harmony. Ephesians, on the other hand, reinterprets the household codes through the lens of the supremacy of

³⁵ Lunyu, 12.5 (Lau, *Analects*, 113).

³⁶ Yueji, 1.15 (ET Legge, *Li Ki*, 28:98).

³⁷ Yueji, 1.20 (ET Legge, *Li Ki*, 28:99–100).

Christ. Ephesians does not blur the roles that different members of the household are to play; there is no mutual or reciprocal submission.³⁹ The phrase “be subject to one another” (5:21) should be read as “be subject to the appropriate authority that is over you,” the specifics and examples of which are laid out in the following detailed instructions regarding relationships between wives and husbands, children and fathers, and slaves and masters. But at the same time, Ephesians recasts these relationships such that the one who submits and the one to whom submission is given are now *both* equally under the headship of Christ. The Ephesians household code therefore balances two ideas, the continual maintenance of a hierarchy amidst the new reality of spiritual equality in Christ.

Implications of this Study

This study has argued that the *topos* of peace is prominent in Ephesians, and that this vision of peace contains political elements such as *topoi* concerning moral education, household management, communal stability, a universal humanity, and war. Comparison with other political writings sharpened my understanding of Ephesians’s vision of peace, establishing its controlling idea to be the unity and cosmic summing up of all things in

³⁸ Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 44.12.

³⁹ Confucian thought also lacks this direct reciprocity of hierarchical relationships. Martha C. Nussbaum, “Golden Rule Arguments: A Missing Thought?” in *The Moral Circle and the Self: Chinese and Western Approaches* (ed. Kim-chong Chong, Sor-hoon Tan, and C. L. Ten; Chicago: Open Court, 2003), 6, argues that the Confucian concepts of loyalty (*zhong* 忠) and reciprocity (*shu* 恕) do not allow for mutual or reciprocal submission. She writes, “In *zhong* one reasons that what A should do toward B, when B is a superior, is what A would expect an inferior to do for him. In *shu*, one reasons that what A should do to B, where B is an inferior, is what A would find it acceptable for a superior to do to him.... The Chinese texts presuppose a fixed structure of familial and social relationships. Distinctions of precedence and authority are taken for granted.... The Chinese [hierarchical] forms do not say, ‘Treat another as you would have

Christ, and its dominant deliberative function to be the advocacy of peace within the ἐκκλησία. This conclusion has several implications.

1. Chapter three highlighted the political character of Ephesians in five major sections: the reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles (2:11–22), the call to unity (4:1–16), the ethical injunctions (4:17–5:20), the household codes (5:21–6:9), and the call to spiritual warfare (6:10–20). My comparative work suggests that the investigation can be fruitfully extended to other portions of Ephesians as follows: (A) We can assess the entire letter to determine its narrative substructure so as to compare it with the metanarratives of other political documents. For example, the election of believers before the foundation of the world (Eph 1) and the story of Christ in forming the community (Eph 2) can be construed as elements of a foundational narrative for the ἐκκλησία. This Ephesian foundational narrative can then be compared with similar narratives or charter myths from other communities, real or imagined, to determine how they function to foster ideological unity and construct a common historical identity.⁴⁰ (B) Within the context of Eph 1–3, Paul’s prayer for his readers to be strengthened with love for one another (3:14–21) is fundamentally a prayer that they would also be able to work out the unity that God has created within the church. This prayer can be compared with other prayers for concord.

that other treat you,’ but ‘Treat another as you would have anyone else related to you as you are to that other treat you.’”

⁴⁰ Apart from the Nicæan foundational myth in Dio’s *Or.* 39.2, one other example is Plato’s “noble lie” in *Resp.* 414B–415D. In his discussions concerning the founding of an ideal city, Socrates suggests the need to invent a “fiction” (414C) which emphasizes the natural brotherhood of all its citizens. The principal idea of such a myth is that all citizens were molded and fostered within the earth; they are “brothers and children of the self-same [mother] earth” (414D) and should therefore be more inclined “to care for the state and one another” (415D). For discussion on Plato’s “noble lie,” see Malcolm Schofield, *Plato: Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 284–309. For the foundation

One such example is Dio's prayer in *Or.* 39.⁴¹ After his deliberative discourse urging concord in Nicaea, Dio prays that the gods may "implant in this city a yearning for itself, a passionate love, a singleness of purpose, a unity of wish and thought; and on the other hand, that they may cast out strife and contentiousness and jealousy" (39.8). A central element in both prayers is the importance of love. (C) Various portions of Ephesians provide a self-description of Paul's calling, ministry, identity, and activities (1:1–2, 15–23; 3:1–21; 4:1, 17; 6:18–24), allowing us to compose a political persona of Paul. This profile can then be compared with political figures such as Dio Chrysostom. Both Paul and Dio are moral philosophers; both claim to be divinely appointed ambassadors of God; both proclaim a message of peace; and both pray for eloquence in announcing the divine message of reconciliation. Such a comparison of Paul and Dio may provide deeper insights regarding Paul's role, strategy, and self-understanding as the apostle to the Gentiles.

2. It has become popular to consider Paul's political language as a polemic against Caesar or the Roman Empire. Applying this reading to Ephesians, Paul presents Christ's rule as the counterpart to Roman rule.⁴² Instead of the *pax Romana*, we have the peace of Christ (2:14); instead of the emperor who enforces peace among the nations within his imperial body, it is Christ who produces peace between Jews and Gentiles within the body of his church (2:11–22); instead of Caesar as the divine savior and benefactor of the world,

myths of Ephesus datable to the early-second century C.E., see Guy MacLean Rogers, *The Sacred Identity of Ephesos: Foundation Myths of a Roman City* (London: Routledge, 1991).

⁴¹ See also *1 Clem.* 59:1–61:3.

Christ is now the savior (5:23); instead of the gospel of Augustus, we have the gospel of Christ (1:13; 3:6, 7; 6:15, 19); instead of Caesar as the Son of God,⁴³ Jesus is the true Son of God (4:13). Moreover, the cosmic powers represent concrete political rulers and authorities. Christ's subjugation of these powers (1:21–22) symbolizes the ultimate defeat of the Roman order, and the command for the church to engage in spiritual warfare is a coded message urging resistance and rebellion against the imperial cult and the Roman authorities. This reading therefore sees Paul's political language as an assault on Roman rule.

Although a first-century person may have read Ephesians this way, I do not believe it is the best reading for the following reasons: (A) There is no explicit mention of Caesar or Rome, and any indication of the imperial machinery can only be obtained via inference. (B) The Ephesian household codes are remarkably similar to Greco-Roman political codes, indicating that the letter does not appear to be physically subverting the prevailing Roman social order. (C) The rulers, authorities, and powers in Ephesians are said to reside in the heavenly places (3:10; 6:12), thereby depicting primarily spiritual rather than physical entities. (D) Ephesians explicitly states that our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against the rulers and spiritual forces *in the heavenly places* (ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις; 6:12). Malevolent spiritual forces can work through earthly structures; nevertheless, Ephesians reminds us that the *ultimate* enemies are the cosmic forces.

⁴² See also Eberhard Faust, *Pax Christi et Pax Caesaris: Religionsgeschichtliche, traditionsgeschichtliche und sozialgeschichtliche Studien zum Epheserbrief* (NTOA 24; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 280–314, 431–70.

Ephesians's presentation of Christ as the ultimate sovereign over all things is not an explicit polemic against Roman imperial rule. To be sure, Christ's cosmic rule has implications for how believers are to relate to their respective earthly government. If we can extrapolate from the Ephesian household codes toward the larger political hierarchical structures, we would expect Christ's rule to relativize all earthly political rule just as it relativized all relationships within the household codes. Ephesians will thus probably advocate submission to the political rulers but only ὡς τῷ Χριστῷ and ἐν Χριστῷ.

3. Instead of functioning as a direct anti-Roman polemic, Ephesians constructs an alternate social reality that indirectly challenges and relativizes the current political paradigm. The political language, motifs, and concerns for peace and stability within the community suggest that Ephesians can be read as a πολιτεία (*politeia*) for the church. The term πολιτεία can mean a formal constitution, a set of written laws similar to Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution*. At the same time, it can also be broadly understood as the social customs, habits, and history that define the manner of life, identity, and soul of a city.⁴⁴ This broadened understanding of πολιτεία is seen in the fragments of other constitutions collected by Aristotle and collated by Heraclides Lembus.⁴⁵ These fragments do not

⁴³ The title θεοῦ υἱός is a translation of the Latin *divi filius*. For examples of the use of this Greek title in various inscriptions, see S. R. F. Price, "Gods and Emperors: The Greek Language of the Roman Imperial Cult," *JHS* 104 (1984): 79-95.

⁴⁴ See Aristotle, *Pol.* 4.9.3 (1295A.40-1295B.1); Isocrates, *Areop.* 14; *Panath.* 138; 2 Macc 4:11; 8:17; 4 Macc 8:7; 17:9. Schofield, *Plato: Political Philosophy*, 32-33, also calls for this broadened understanding of *politeia*. He writes, "Education, upbringing, rules governing marriage, the role of women in society: these are the subjects a contemporary reader [of Plato] would have expected to find discussed in a work entitled *Politeia*.... The core meaning of *politeia* is 'citizenship,' 'the condition of being a citizen.'"

⁴⁵ See Heraclides Lembus, *Excerpta Politarum* (ed. and trans. Mervin R. Dilts; Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Monographs 5; Durham: Duke University Press, 1971).

describe legal procedures or protocols but the history, character, and life of the city. For example, one fragment from the *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* reads:

Women in Lacedaemon are not allowed to wear ornaments, to let their hair grow long, or to wear gold. They bring up their children on empty stomachs to train them to be able to endure hunger. They also train them to steal, and they beat whoever is caught in order that from this treatment they can endure toil and be alert among the enemy. They practice speaking briefly from childhood, and later they practice with wit both jesting and being objects of jest. (Heraclides Lembus, *Excerpta Politarum*, 19)

Ephesians functions in a similar manner to such a broadened understanding of a πολιτεία. Nevertheless, as a politico-religious document, Ephesians presents a πολιτεία within the framework of Christ's supreme rule.⁴⁶ It lays out the foundational narrative of the community as a divine election—you were predestined before the foundation of the world, you were created into one new humanity through the work of Christ on the cross. It also sets the ethical standards of the community according to the dictates of God—walk worthy of the calling to which God has called you. It frames the present lives of believers as a grand battle with powerful and malevolent forces—for our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic powers of this present darkness, against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places. In all of these tasks, Ephesians functions as a manifesto for the church. As a πολιτεία, Ephesians describes the essence and soul of the church: who it is, how it came about, how

⁴⁶ This interplay of religious and political textures in Ephesians can be profitably compared with other theologico-political documents. One example is Plato's *Laws* which present the life or πολιτεία of a Platonic city within a theocratic framework. The first word of the entire treatise is θεός (624A); and God, not man, is the measure of all things, including political order (716C). This strong religious substructure leads Schofield, *Plato: Political Philosophy*, 315, to remark that the *Laws* "constitutes a systematic exploration of the way religion should perform its ideological role unparalleled until Augustine's *City of God*."

it is to conduct itself, and what its mission is within the larger framework of the cosmic rule of Christ.

4. The primary frame of reference for understanding the political aspects of peace in Ephesians is the ἐκκλησία or the church. One can appreciate the importance of peace, unity, and reconciliation within the local church; nevertheless, Ephesians casts a much larger vision, implicitly calling for the same transformation in relationships among churches. This is accomplished through several means: (A) If we are correct in reading Ephesians as a circular letter, we see Paul hoping to establish a unified vision and purpose among multiple churches in Asia Minor. The ethos and faith that these churches share then serve as a common framework from which to build upon and develop bonds of unity. (B) Although ἐκκλησία in the Pauline corpus typically refers to local communities of believers, all nine occurrences of ἐκκλησία in Ephesians refer to a larger assembly and reality to which all believers belong. By reminding its readers that they are fellow citizens and fellow members of the larger household of God (2:19), Ephesians suggests the need for strengthened inter-ecclesial relationships. (C) Ephesians stresses the need for inter-ecclesial unity and love with the refrain πάντες οἱ ἅγιοι. While commending its readers regarding their love for “all the saints” (1:15), Ephesians also exhorts them to comprehend with “all the saints” the great love of Christ (3:18–19), suggesting that true understanding of Christ’s love occurs in a communal context that extends beyond the boundaries of the local church. Moreover, Paul ends the letter with an urgent appeal for intercession on behalf of “all the saints” (6:18), emphasizing the need for collaborative partnership among churches as they battle against a common spiritual enemy. If the

focus of attacks by the evil cosmic forces is the peace and unity of the ἐκκλησία in both its narrow and wider sense, the need for inter-ecclesial unity is no less important than the need for intra-ecclesial unity.⁴⁷

5. The vision of peace in Ephesians teaches that the church does not exist for itself, but that it has a revelatory role to play on both a cosmic and global scale in God's plan of peace and reconciliation. Ephesians 3:10 remarks, "Through the church the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places." In the context of Eph 3, the wisdom of God refers to the various ways in which God works in uniting a multiethnic and multicultural community as fellow members of the body of Christ. This united church is to be a proleptic foretaste of God's reconciled universe, a universe in which all things—things in the heavens and things in the earth—are summed up and united under the headship of Christ (1:10). The existence of a united church then is a reminder to the cosmic powers that their power over humanity has been decisively broken and that their final defeat is imminent. At the same time, the existence of a united church demonstrates to the world the reality of reconciliation. When the world sees the possibility of a community that is not divided by enmity, hatred, and boasting, but that truly reflects God's gift of reconciliation, they will be drawn into the community of peace.⁴⁸ The extent to which the church is a credible witness to God's plan of reconciliation in the above two contexts depends on how well

⁴⁷ While the call for intra- and inter-ecclesial unity mirrors Dio's concern for intra- and inter-city concord, there are nevertheless substantive differences. Unlike the *Bithynian Orations*, Ephesians issues a general call for inter-ecclesial unity and does not mediate between *specific* communities. Moreover, Ephesians evinces no discord (στάσις) among local churches.

the church first appropriates and implements God’s vision of peace for itself. The more united the church becomes, the more credible will its witness be. There is therefore a necessary sequence in the church’s revelatory role that moves from the internal to the external, a sequence that resonates with the outwardly radiating concentric circles within the Confucian vision of peace.

6. The results of my study impinge upon the relationship between Ephesians and Colossians. If Ephesians can be profitably read as a political letter, the question naturally arises whether Colossians can be read in a similar vein given the two letters’ close structural and thematic similarities. Colossians does, indeed, contain political elements. It portrays a cosmic peace (1:20); it uses power language (1:13, 16, 17, 18, 29; 2:10); it presents Christ’s conquest over the rulers and authorities as a Roman triumph (θριαμβεύω; 2:15); it promotes the concept of one new humanity (3:11); and it discusses ethics and household codes.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the political timbre or density is not nearly as great as in Ephesians. Colossians lacks specific political language such as πολιτεία or συμπολίτης, and it lacks *extended* discussions on political motifs such as ethnic reconciliation and cosmic warfare.

It is also common to contrast the Christology of Colossians with the Ecclesiology of Ephesians, and the vertical reconciliation of Colossians with the horizontal dimension of Ephesians. For example, Stig Hanson notes that “unity in Eph aims at the unity of the

⁴⁸ This perspective of missions via attraction or inward pull is generally called centripetal missions.

⁴⁹ For studies examining the political character of Colossians, see Brian J. Walsh and Sylvia C. Keesmaat, *Colossians Remixed: Subverting the Empire* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2004); Harry O. Maier, “A Sly Civility: Colossians and Empire,” *JSNT* 27 (2005): 323–49.

Church whereas that of Cl (Colossians) chiefly refers to (Christ's reconciliation of the) cosmos."⁵⁰ Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate that the vision of peace in both Colossians and Ephesians are foundationally similar. Christ is the basis and central operative principle inherent in both visions of peace, and the overarching framework of both visions is the reconciliation of the cosmos in Christ. There are no doubt different emphases within this overall cosmic plan of reconciliation. Colossians emphasizes the role of Christ in unifying the cosmos and reconciling humanity to God; Ephesians emphasizes the role of Christ in reconciling members of the church with one another.

The different emphases of Ephesians and Colossians stem from their different objectives. In response to the "Colossian heresy" with its emphasis on the worship of angels (2:18) and the traditions of men (2:8),⁵¹ Colossians reminds the believers in Colossae of the tradition of Christ (παρελάβετε τὸν Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν; 2:6): he is the cosmic Lord over all creation (1:15–20), and he is the one in whom the fullness of deity dwells bodily (1:19; 2:9). Ephesians, however, addresses neither a specific problem nor a specific community. As a circular letter, Ephesians functions as a πολιτεία for the churches in Asia Minor, reminding them of their identity and mission within God's overall cosmic plan of reconciliation in Christ. Ephesians is therefore replete with political language,

⁵⁰ Stig Hanson, *The Unity of the Church in the New Testament: Colossians and Ephesians* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1946), 107.

⁵¹ For discussions on the "Colossian heresy," see R. McL. Wilson, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Colossians and Philemon* (ICC; London: T&T Clark, 2005), 35–58; Troy W. Martin, *By Philosophy and Empty Deceit: Colossians as Response to a Cynic Critique* (JSNTSup 118; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1997); Clinton E. Arnold, *The Colossian Syncretism* (WUNT 2.77; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995); Richard E. DeMaris, *The Colossian Controversy: Wisdom in Dispute at Colossae* (JSNTSup 96; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994); Fred O. Francis and Wayne A. Meeks, eds., *Conflict at Colossae: A Problem in the Interpretation of Early Christianity, Illustrated by Selected Modern Studies* (SBLBS 4; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1975).

stressing peace and unity within the ἐκκλησία so that she may truly be a testimony to God's redemptive work.

7. This study affirms the benefits of comparative analysis in the study of religious texts as it provides different frames of reference or perspectives with which to probe a text. More important, this study highlights the advantages of intra-cultural and cross-cultural comparisons. On the one hand, comparing texts within the same cultural milieu allows for close lexical, linguistic, and structural comparisons. For example, I contrasted Ephesians's use of εἰρήνη vis-à-vis ὁμόνοια (a term that characterizes Dio's vision of peace), suggesting several reasons for this preference. I also compared the Ephesian household codes against those found in Hellenistic *τοιοὶ περὶ οἰκονομίας*, noting structural similarities while affirming the reconfiguration of specific relationships under the headship of Christ.

On the other hand, comparison of texts outside the same cultural location encourages the interpreter to ask broader conceptual questions. For example, my examination of the programmatic Confucian texts led me to inquire whether the Ephesian vision of peace similarly possesses a central operative principle or describes a sequence for attaining its goal. By comparing Ephesians with texts both *within* and *without* its cultural milieu, we obtain a more accurate understanding and portrayal of the Ephesian vision of peace.⁵²

⁵² Although not pursued in this study, an intra-cultural and cross-cultural comparison of texts advocating peace can produce normative conclusions regarding elements that are essential for

Ephesians locates the church within a grand vision of peace that not only reaches back to the beginning of time but also encompasses the cosmic reaches of the heavenlies, a vision that has its nexus in Christ who unites all things. Using political language, Ephesians reminds the church of her identity and mission, urging her toward peace so that she may be a testimony to the reality of Christ's reconciling work. In a time where the church still remains strongly divided according to geographic, ethnic, and socio-economic demographics, the message of Ephesians remains just as urgent as it was two thousand years ago.

establishing peace within any community. Such elements may include a common identity, a common set of ethical norms, and a common vision.

APPENDIX

Appendix table 1. “In Christ” Phrases in Ephesians

#	Formula	Verse	Text	Category
1	έν Χριστῶ	1:3	ό εύλογήσας ήμᾶς έν πάση εύλογία πνευματικῆ έν τοῖς έπουρανίοις έν Χριστῶ	Basis of fellowship with God
2	έν Χριστῶ	4:32	ό θεός έν Χριστῶ έχαρίσατο ύμῖν	Basis of fellowship with God
3	έν Χριστῶ Ἰησοῦ	1:1	Παῦλος άπόστολος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ ... πιστοῖς έν Χριστῶ Ἰησοῦ	Membership of Christ
4	έν Χριστῶ Ἰησοῦ	2:6	συνεκάθισεν έν τοῖς έπουρανίοις έν Χριστῶ Ἰησοῦ	Basis of fellowship with God
5	έν Χριστῶ Ἰησοῦ	2:7	τό ύπερβάλλον πλοῦτος τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ έν χρηστότητι έφ' ήμᾶς έν Χριστῶ Ἰησοῦ	Basis of fellowship with God
6	έν Χριστῶ Ἰησοῦ	2:10	αὐτοῦ γάρ έσμεν ποίημα, κτισθέντες έν Χριστῶ Ἰησοῦ	Basis of fellowship with God
7	έν Χριστῶ Ἰησοῦ	2:13	νυνὶ δὲ έν Χριστῶ Ἰησοῦ ύμεῖς οἱ ποτε ὄντες μακράν έγενήθητε έγγύς	Basis of fellowship with one another
8	έν Χριστῶ Ἰησοῦ	3:6	συμμέτοχα τῆς έπαγγελίας έν Χριστῶ Ἰησοῦ	Basis of fellowship with one another
9	έν Χριστῶ Ἰησοῦ	3:21	αὐτῶ ή δόξα έν τῆ έκκλησίᾳ και έν Χριστῶ Ἰησοῦ	Activity or state as a Christian
10	έν τῶ Χριστῶ	1:10	άνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα έν τῶ Χριστῶ	Gather cosmos into one
11	έν τῶ Χριστῶ	1:12	τοὺς προηλπικότας έν τῶ Χριστῶ	Basis of fellowship with God
12	έν τῶ Χριστῶ	1:20	ένήργησεν έν τῶ Χριστῶ	Basis of fellowship with God

13	ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ	3:11	κατὰ πρόθεσιν τῶν αἰώνων ἦν ἐποίησεν ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ	Gather cosmos into one
14	ἐν τῷ κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ	1:15	Διὰ τοῦτο καγὼ ἀκούσας τὴν καθ' ὑμᾶς πίστιν ἐν τῷ κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ	Activity or state as a Christian
15	ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ	4:21	καθὼς ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ	Quality present in Christ
16	ἐν αὐτῷ	1:4	ἐξελέξατο ἡμᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου	Basis of fellowship with God
17	ἐν αὐτῷ	1:9	κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν αὐτοῦ ἦν προέθετο ἐν αὐτῷ	Gather cosmos into one
18	ἐν αὐτῷ	1:10	ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι ... τὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐν αὐτῷ	Gather cosmos into one
19	ἐν αὐτῷ	2:15	ἵνα τοὺς δύο κτίση ἐν αὐτῷ εἰς ἓνα καινὸν ἄνθρωπον ποιῶν εἰρήνην	Basis of fellowship with one another
20	ἐν αὐτῷ	2:16	ἀποκτείνας τὴν ἔχθραν ἐν αὐτῷ	Basis of fellowship with one another
21	ἐν αὐτῷ	4:21	εἴ γε αὐτὸν ἠκούσατε καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐδιδάχθητε	Activity or state as a Christian
22	ἐν ᾧ	1:7	Ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν	Basis of fellowship with God
23	ἐν ᾧ	1:11	Ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἐκληρώθημεν	Basis of fellowship with God
24	ἐν ᾧ	1:13	Ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀκούσαντες τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας	Basis of fellowship with God
25	ἐν ᾧ	1:13	ἐν ᾧ καὶ πιστεύσαντες ἐσφραγίσθητε τῷ πνεύματι τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τῷ ἁγίῳ	Basis of fellowship with God
26	ἐν ᾧ	2:21	ἐν ᾧ πᾶσα οἰκοδομὴ συναρμολογουμένη αὕξει εἰς ναὸν ἅγιον ἐν κυρίῳ	Basis of fellowship with one another
27	ἐν ᾧ	2:22	ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑμεῖς συνοικοδομεῖσθε εἰς κατοικητήριον τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν πνεύματι	Basis of fellowship with one another
28	ἐν ᾧ	3:12	ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ προσαγωγὴν	Basis of fellowship with God
29	ἐν ᾧ	4:30	μὴ λυπεῖτε τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἐσφραγίσθητε	Basis of fellowship with God
30	ἐν κυρίῳ	2:21	ἐν ᾧ πᾶσα οἰκοδομὴ συναρμολογουμένη αὕξει εἰς ναὸν ἅγιον ἐν κυρίῳ	Basis of fellowship with one another
31	ἐν κυρίῳ	4:1	Παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ ὁ δέσμιος ἐν κυρίῳ	Membership of Christ

32	ἐν κυρίῳ	4:17	Τοῦτο οὖν λέγω καὶ μαρτύρομαι ἐν κυρίῳ	Activity or state as a Christian
33	ἐν κυρίῳ	5:8	ἦτε γάρ ποτε σκότος, νῦν δὲ φῶς ἐν κυρίῳ	Activity or state as a Christian
34	ἐν κυρίῳ	6:1	Τὰ τέκνα, ὑπακούετε τοῖς γονεῦσιν ὑμῶν [ἐν κυρίῳ]	Activity or state as a Christian
35	ἐν κυρίῳ	6:10	Τοῦ λοιποῦ, ἐνδυναμοῦσθε ἐν κυρίῳ	Activity or state as a Christian
36	ἐν κυρίῳ	6:21	Τύχικος ὁ ἀγαπητὸς ἀδελφὸς καὶ πιστὸς διάκονος ἐν κυρίῳ	Membership of Christ
37	ἐν τῷ ἠγαπημένῳ	1:6	τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ ἧς ἐχαρίτωσεν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ ἠγαπημένῳ	Basis of fellowship with God

Appendix table 2. Statistics of “In Christ” Phrases in Ephesians

<i>Category</i>	<i># of Occurrences</i>	<i>%</i>
Basis of fellowship with God	15	40.5%
Membership of Christ	3	8.1%
Activity or state as a Christian	7	18.9%
Basis of fellowship with one another	7	18.9%
Gather cosmos into one	4	10.8%
Quality present in Christ	1	2.7%
Total	37	100.0%

Appendix table 3. “In Christ” Phrases in Colossians

#	Formula	Verse	Text	Category
1	ἐν Χριστῷ	1:2	τοῖς ἐν Κολοσσαῖς ἀγίοις καὶ πιστοῖς ἀδελφοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ.	Membership of Christ
2	ἐν Χριστῷ	1:28	ἵνα παραστήσωμεν πάντα ἄνθρωπον τέλειον ἐν Χριστῷ	Activity or state as a Christian
3	ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ	1:4	ἀκούσαντες τὴν πίστιν ὑμῶν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ	Activity or state as a Christian
4	ἐν αὐτῷ	1:16	ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς	Gathering of cosmos into one
5	ἐν αὐτῷ	1:17	καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν	Gathering of cosmos into one
6	ἐν αὐτῷ	1:19	ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ εὐδόκησεν πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα κατοικῆσαι	Description of Christ
7	ἐν αὐτῷ	2:6	Ὡς οὖν παρελάβετε τὸν Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν τὸν κύριον, ἐν αὐτῷ περιπατεῖτε	Activity or state as a Christian
8	ἐν αὐτῷ	2:7	ἐρριζωμένοι καὶ ἐποικοδομούμενοι ἐν αὐτῷ	Basis of fellowship with God
9	ἐν αὐτῷ	2:9	ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς	Description of Christ
10	ἐν αὐτῷ	2:10	καὶ ἐστὲ ἐν αὐτῷ πεπληρωμένοι	Activity or state as a Christian
11	ἐν αὐτῷ	2:15	ἀπεκδυσάμενος τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἐξουσίας ἐδειγμάτισεν ἐν παρρησίᾳ, θριαμβεύσας αὐτοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ	Gathering of cosmos into one
12	ἐν ᾧ	1:14	ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν, τὴν ἄφεσιν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν	Basis of fellowship with God
13	ἐν ᾧ	2:3	ἐν ᾧ εἰσιν πάντες οἱ θησαυροὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως ἀπόκρυφοι.	Description of Christ
14	ἐν ᾧ	2:11	Ἐν ᾧ καὶ περιετμήθητε περιτομῇ ἀχειροποιήτῳ	Basis of fellowship with God
15	ἐν ᾧ	2:12	ἐν ᾧ καὶ συνηγέρθητε	Basis of fellowship with God
16	ἐν κυρίῳ	3:18	Αἱ γυναῖκες, ὑποτάσσεσθε τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ὡς ἀνήκεν ἐν κυρίῳ.	Activity or state as a Christian
17	ἐν κυρίῳ	3:20	Τὰ τέκνα, ὑπακούετε τοῖς γονεῦσιν κατὰ πάντα, τοῦτο γὰρ εὐάρεστον ἐστὶν ἐν κυρίῳ.	Activity or state as a Christian
18	ἐν κυρίῳ	4:7	Τύχικος ὁ ἀγαπητὸς ἀδελφὸς καὶ πιστὸς διάκονος καὶ σύνδουλος ἐν κυρίῳ.	Membership of Christ
19	ἐν κυρίῳ	4:17	καὶ εἶπατε Ἀρχίππῳ· Βλέπε τὴν διακονίαν ἣν παρέλαβες ἐν κυρίῳ.	Activity or state as a Christian

Appendix table 4. Statistics of “In Christ” Phrases in Colossians

<i>Category</i>	<i># of Occurrences</i>	<i>%</i>
Basis of fellowship with God	4	21.1%
Membership of Christ	2	10.5%
Activity or state as a Christian	7	36.8%
Basis of fellowship with one another	0	0.0%
Gathering of cosmos into one	3	15.8%
Description of Christ	3	15.8%
Total	19	100.0%

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