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How Generational Differences in Socialization and Identity Shaped America's Partisan-Ideological Landscape By

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Abstract

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Over the past 60 years the United States experienced dynamic changes in the shape of public opinion. Americans have become more ideological, and are participating in new and exciting ways. But what explains the changes that we see in the electorate? What might explain these changes? This dissertations examines the partisan-ideological development of the United States since the 1950s. Using national survey data, it finds three important causes for the development of partisanship and ideology in the United States. In the first part, I show how Americans have become more ideological within the two major parties, a phenomenon which can be described as sorting and polarization. I also explain this development as a consequence of growing education and political sophistication in the electorate. As Americans have become more educated and politically sophisticated, the major parties in the electorate have diverged to a greater extent. In part two, I track the growth of political sophistication among American women. American women have polarized as a much faster rate than men, and I explain this change by looking at how generational differences in gender norms explain explosive growth in the political sophistication of women. This sophistication, in turn, helps to explain partisan polarization among women. Thus, changes in gender identity are tied to partisan-ideological development. Finally, part three explores how changing racial identity for American blacks has led to segmentation in black public opinion. As black Americans have become incorporated into American public life, their political identity with respect to race has changed as well. These changes have led to the development of a growing subset of conservative blacks, and a more heterogenous black voting bloc overall. Thus, generational differences in political sophistication as mediated by education and political identity are shown to have shaped the American partisan-ideological landscape.

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Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

What's Going on in American Public Opinion?

Since the 1960s, American public opinion has undergone a variety of changes. Not only are Americans more politically polarized than in the post-War era, but Americans are also participating in new ways and shapes. Additionally, there has been tremendous change in the demographics of the United States, and these changes can be expected to influence the partisan-ideological landscape. How have these changes influenced the partisan-ideological landscape in American public opinion?

Although popular accounts of the shape and development of public opinion in the United States may vary, there has been little scholarly research holistically examining demographic changes in the context of partisan-ideological change. This project seeks to fill that gap by examining the scope and shape of partisan-ideological change in the United States and then exploring how changes in education, gender identity, and racial identity influence ideological development over time. The analysis is broken down into three major parts, each of which can be read in isolation.

The first part of this project describes the development of ideology in the United States by examining national survey data from the 1950s to the 2000s. Using a novel measure of ideology that allows for the scaling of policy preferences across surveys, the first part shows how Americans have sorted themselves ideologically into each of the major two parties, with liberals becoming Democrats, and conservatives becoming Republicans. Additionally, it shows how that, within these parties, Americans are becoming more polarized, with the degree of overlap between the two parties

shrinking by half since the 1950s. Finally, this part introduces a novel theory for the growing partisan-ideological polarization in the United States: education. As Americans have become more educated, they have also become more politically sophisticated; as Americans grow more sophisticated, they also become much more ideological. In this way, increasing education is shown to be a key contributor to growing partisan-ideological polarization in the American electorate.

Beyond this general explanation for polarization, the second part of this project explores how the political incorporation of women has also shaped the American electorate. Since women gained suffrage rights in the 1920s, there has been a slow incorporation of women into American politics. As gender norms about political participation changed across generations, younger, more politically sophisticated women began to replace their mothers within the electorate. As political sophistication changed across different generations of women, there has been a gradual increase in the overall political sophistication of the electorate. As was found in part, political sophistication is closely tied to ideological thinking about politics. Thus, changing gender norms coupled with generational replacement have contributed to political polarization in the electorate. This part again uses national survey data, and shows how women are polarizing at a faster rate than men, and that this ideological development is directly tied to beliefs about gender norms and political sophistication.

In addition to the political incorporation of women, black Americans have undergone significant incorporation into American political life. Following the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960s, black Americans began to experience increasing political and economic incorporation. Part three of this project examines how this incorporation has changed black political identity across different generations and how changing black political identity has led to the segmentation of black public opinion from a uniformly liberal voting bloc to a liberal and conservative voting

bloc. Using national survey data, this part first links economic incorporation and identity to racial identity, and then links racial identity to ideology and policy preferences. This linkage suggests that a growing polarization in black ideology is tied to changes in the racial identity of blacks.

Together, these three parts have important implications for political science research and American politics as a whole. The project casts light on important demographic differences across generations, and then demonstrates how generational change is shaping the overall American electorate. Also, this projects gives a comprehensive look at the shape and development of American public opinion across time and key subgroups. Finally, this project calls attention to the need for segmented research on partisan-ideological development, as group identity is key to understanding how individuals develop the policy preferences they have.

Part 1

Partisan-Ideological Change in American Public Opinion

Introduction

One of the more dynamic changes in the American electorate since World War II has been the increase in partisan-ideological polarization and partisan sorting. Liberals have moved to the Democratic party, and conservatives have moved to the Republican party (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2005, 2008). Furthermore, within the parties, Democrats have adopted more extreme liberal positions, and Republicans have adopted more extreme conservative positions (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz 2010; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004). The combined effect of these changes has been the creation of two cohesive voting blocs with diametrically opposed viewpoints on government. While some of the consequences of these changes have been positive, e.g. increased turnout and higher rates of political efficacy (Hetherington 2008), other consequences, such as the decrease in political civility (Dionne 2004), are not so benign. Given the varied and important effects of the ideological shifts in the parties, it is important to understand what led to these changes.

Most theories explaining partisan-ideological change in the American electorate

postulate that partisan-ideological shifts in the public are due to major shifts in party elites. These theories posit such significant events as the passage of civil rights legislation in the mid-1960s (Black and Black 2003), the adoption of new presidential nominating systems (Layman et al. 2010), and changes in news broadcasting (Levendusky 2009*a*; Prior 2007) as responsible for changing the partisan-ideological character of the electorate. As a whole, these theories suggest that ideology and party began to align in the electorate in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, is it possible that partisan-ideological change began before the 1970s?

Testing for partisan-ideological change prior to the 1970s has historically proven difficult due to data limitations. The standard 7-point ideological self-identification question first appeared on the American National Election Studies (ANES) survey in 1972, and, thus, much of the research on the relationship between party and ideology focuses on the time period from 1972 onward. I seek to understand better the origin of partisan-ideological change in America by expanding my measurement of ideology into the period prior to 1972. While measures of ideological self-placement are not available prior to 1972, there are a number of other measures of policy preferences available. With these policy preference questions, I estimate a measure of latent ideology that is comparable from the 1950s onward. Using my measure of estimated ideology, I show changes in the relationship between party and ideology within the mass public began well before the 1970s. This suggests that elite-driven, top-down partisan-ideological change may not be the only possible explanation for changes within the electorate in the post-WWII era. Furthermore, this measurement strategy allows for exploring additional questions in the ideological development of the United States, including questions about the changing influence of media, increasing political sophistication, and the relationship between ideology and participation.

In the following, I provide an overview of the broad partisan-ideological change in the mass public before moving to a discussion of prior measurement strategies for

exploring this phenomenon. Next, I introduce my alternative measurement strategy, which uses Bayesian Item Response Theory to measure latent ideology from a variety of policy preference questions. Using data from the ANES, I implement this strategy to get comparable measures of ideology for a time period covering 1952-2008. I next use these estimates to show how the relationship between party and ideology has been growing since at least the 1950s. Additionally, I show how a mass-level change, increasing education, is a plausible explanation for the growing relationship between party and ideology. Finally, I discuss some extensions and further applications for my measurement strategy.

Partisan-Ideological Change in the American Electorate

One of the most important phenomena in American politics in the post-WWII era has been the growing relationship between party preference and personal ideology. In the 1940s, the party system in America was not closely related to ideology. Both parties represented similar positions on many issues, and on issues on which they disagreed, the difference was not large.[1] However, beginning with racial issues in the 1950s and 1960s and continuing with the emergence of "moral" issues in the 1970s, the two major parties began to express clearly different platforms (Carmines and Stimson 1986, 1989). Party differences on these issues have expanded, and new issues have extended conflict beyond the original cleavages of the 1960s (Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 2006; Layman et al. 2010). Consequently, the major parties today represent two distinct and diametrically opposed bundles of policy positions.

These distinct policy bundles are frequently conceptualized as representing ideology. Democrats, who generally support government involvement in economic issues as well as limited government intrusion into social matters, are said to represent a

[1] Obvious exceptions to this characterization are racial issues, across which the major parties had not sorted yet.

"liberal" ideology.[2] Republicans, on the other hand, are said to represent a "conservative" ideology, which is characterized by limited government intrusion into economic matters but substantial government control with respect to social matters.

The shift of the two major parties towards a more homogeneous ideological platform has been linked to partisan-ideological change within the electorate as well (see e.g. Levendusky 2009*a*). Over the past 40 years, there has been an increasing correlation between party identification and ideological self-identification. In general, voters who identify as conservative are increasingly likely to identify as Republican, and voters who identify as liberal are increasingly likely to identify as Democrat (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz 2010; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008). This shift has manifested itself in two major ways: partisan sorting and partisan polarization.

Partisan Sorting

The first manifestation of partisan-ideological change in the electorate has been partisan sorting. Partisan sorting refers to the process by which conservatives leave the Democratic Party for the Republican Party, and liberals leave the Republican Party for the Democratic Party. With partisan sorting, the overall distribution of voters does not necessarily change. Liberals and conservatives occupy the same ideological space as they did before sorting and have changed their partisan identification to "match" their ideology. In other words, sorting is a result of voters changing their partisan identification, but not their policy preferences (Adams 1997; Levendusky 2009*a*).

This shift in the party identification of different ideologues has been tied to dramatic partisan realignment of white, Southern Democrats following the passage of the civil rights legislation (Black and Black 2003). With the passage of the

[2]The terms "liberal" and "conservative" as applied in the American context represent substantially different ideologies than those terms as applied in a European context.

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by members of the Democratic Party, white Southerners who held conservative views on racial issues gradually abandoned their longstanding affiliation with the Democratic party. As a consequence, social conservatives in the South joined with economic conservatives in the Republican Party creating a uniformly conservative and uniformly liberal party (Black and Black 2003; Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2005).

At the mass level, the growing homogeneity of parties has influenced how voters process political cues at the individual level. Most evidence suggests that voters rely heavily on elites for voting cues (see e.g. Zaller 1992). When there was not a clear distinction between the two parties, voters likely chose party affiliations based on imperfect information. However, as the parties distinguished themselves, voters were able to make much more informed judgments about the ideological tenor of the two parties. Consequently, voters were also able to identify parties with which they were most ideologically compatible. As a result, the increasing clarity of elite cues over time led to better sorting of voters into each of the two major parties (Levendusky 2009*a*,*b*).

Partisan Polarization

While evidence suggests that partisan sorting has dramatically reshaped the American electorate, a more controversial proposition supposes that members of the electorate have adopted more extreme ideological positions as well. Thus, while the members of the electorate have sorted themselves in to parties based on ideology, they also have adopted more extreme policy preferences within those parties. This process, by which members of the Democratic Party adopt more extreme liberal positions and members of the Republican Party adopt more conservative positions, is known as partisan polarization.

Evidence for polarization suggests that members of the electorate today, and es-

pecially those members most active in the electorate, are much more likely to adopt extreme policy preferences than members of the electorate in the 1950s (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998, 2008; Abramowitz 2010; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004). Across a broad spectrum of policy issues, Democrats today are more likely to adopt extreme liberal positions, and Republicans are more likely to adopt extreme conservative positions. This distinction is most prominent among the most engaged members of the electorate, i.e. those who participate in campaign activities and vote.

There are a number of purported causes for partisan polarization, and, like partisan sorting, they focus on the growing polarization of party elites. Within each house of Congress, members of Congress have been adopting more extreme and more adversarial positions (see, amongst others, Poole and Rosenthal 2000). Furthermore, party activists, who have considerable influence over nominations and campaigns, have become more extreme over time (Layman et al. 2010). As elites pass down more extreme cues to voters, then voters will follow by adopting more extreme ideological positions (Abramowitz 2013; Layman and Carsey 2002). This would explain why those most attentive to politics, i.e. those receiving the most cues, would exhibit higher polarization than other members of the public.

Two Sides of the Same Coin?

Although there is considerable debate as to the prevalence of each phenomenon within the electorate, both partisan sorting and partisan polarization represent similar changes within the electorate. Indeed, some have noted that sorting and polarization are a difference of "degree rather than of kind" (Levendusky 2009*a*, p. 6). In both cases, shifts in the makeup of the national parties led members of the mass public to adopt different ideological positions.[3] Also, in both cases, elite cues are

[3]There is some ambiguity as to if members of the public are adopting new partisan identities (see Adams 1997), adopting new positions on the basis of elite cues (see Zaller 1992), or older members of the electorate are being replaced by younger members who adopt issue positions according to the party environment in which they grow up (see Carmines and Stimson 1981). The

the key mechanism by which elites influence public opinion. Finally, in both cases, the parties in the electorate become more distinct ideologically.

While partisan sorting and partisan polarization have much in common, I conceptualize them as distinct but interrelated phenomena. Despite sharing similar causal mechanisms, it is not necessary to have partisan sorting and partisan polarization occur at the same time or to the same degree. Partisan sorting can occur without any change in the overall ideological distribution of voters; partisan polarization can occur without anyone switching parties (see Figure 1.1). In this way, partisan sorting and partisan polarization are conceptually distinct. Empirically, however, both phenomenon appear to occur simultaneously. This is likely due to a reinforcing process by which more ideologically homogeneous parties allow for the selection of more extreme party elites who then, in turn, push members with inconsistent ideologies out of the party. I use the term "partisan-ideological change" to refer the broad, simultaneous processes of partisan sorting and partisan polarization that have characterized the American electorate in the post-WWII era.

When Did Partisan-Ideological Change Start?

In examining the theories behind elite-driven partisan-ideological change, it appears as though change began in the late 1960s or early 1970s. The civil rights legislation that drove white Southerners out of the Democratic Party was passed in the mid-1960s, and, in 1972, changes occurred in the presidential nominating system that gave party elites more influence than rank-and-file members. At the elite level, the combination of these factors led to ideological realignment between the parties as well as increasing ideological extremity within the parties. The public, lagging behind these developments, began to change shortly thereafter in the mid-1970s.

To test these theories, one would ideally have long-term measurements of ideol-

net effect of any of these processes is that the public appears to be adopting new policy positions according to elite cues.

ogy for both the public and for political elites. While DW-NOMINATE scores are available for measuring the ideology of party elites (Poole and Rosenthal 2000), and ideology scores exist for party activists (Layman et al. 2010), the measurement of ideology in the electorate generally depends on responses to questions about ideological self-placement. While asked consistently since it was first asked in 1972, this measurement strategy is problematic for measuring ideology prior to 1972.[4] Furthermore, there exist no consistent battery of policy questions asked over a consistent period of time with which to measure policy-based ideology. Consequently, the current measurement strategy used to gauge when partisan-ideological change began is silent about the period prior to 1972. This is particularly problematic in evaluating change that is hypothesized to begin in the 1970s.

In light of the concerns about ideological self-placement as a measure of mass ideology, I propose a new measure of aggregate ideology based on individual issue positions. This measure utilizes Bayesian Item Response Theory (IRT) to provide a summary ideological position based on individual issue positions. While this measurement strategy has been used to describe historic trends in elite ideology (see e.g. Clinton, Jackman and Rivers 2004; Martin and Quinn 2002) as well as cross-sectional analysis of mass ideology (see e.g. Jessee 2012), this approach can also be used to compare mass ideology across time. This method overcomes many of the limitations of the ideological self-placement measurement as well as missing data problems caused when using policy preference questions.

Measuring Mass Ideology

When measuring mass ideology, one would ideally like a complete battery of policy preference questions asked consistently over time. However, practical constraints in producing national surveys mean that only a selection of questions are asked from

[4]See Wood and Oliver (2012) for a more comprehensive list of problems with the ideological self-placement measure of ideology.

year to year, and that this selection will vary greatly over long periods of time. For example, abortion did not really become a national issue before the 1970s, and, thus, there exists a paucity of data on mass preferences about abortions for the era preceding the 1970s. Likewise, questions about many of the racial policies of the 1960s disappeared as racial issues were eclipsed by other social issues. Bayesian Item Response Theory provides a valuable measurement strategy in this context because it allows for estimation of a latent ideology without needing a complete or consistent battery of policy questions.

Modeling Mass Ideology

Using the Bayesian IRT framework, I model ideology as a function of 45 issue position questions from the Cumulative American National Election Studies. These questions cover a wide variety of important issues in American politics, including questions about economic, social, racial, and foreign policy issues. Using policy questions improves upon the ideological self-placement measurement by measuring an individual's ideology as a function of many different policy positions and not group affect (Conover and Feldman 1981).

Specifically, I model ideology using a graded response model (GRM) (Samejima 1970).[5] This model allows for the estimation of ideology from polytomous ordered response questions. With the GRM, responses are modeled as being a function of a latent trait, θ, which represents ideology in my case.

For the GRM, the probability of a response, x_{ij}, for a respondent i on item j, in response category m given some latent ideology θ_i is modeled as a function of the probability of responding in that category or higher compared to responded in a lower category. This allows each response to modeled as a normal olgive function

[5]I chose the GRM over the other major model for polytomous item response theory, the Partial Credit Model, because the PCM models all responses as having a baseline "guess-rate," which makes sense in an educational application but not with regards to measuring ideology.

where:

$$P^*_{m_j}(\theta_i) = \frac{e^{a_j(\theta_i - b_{m_j})}}{1 + e^{a_j(\theta_i - b_{m_j})}} \tag{1.1}$$

and $a\&b$ represent the discrimination and difficulty parameters of the IRT model. Since the cumulative probability of all responses is 1, the probability of any single response can modeled by:

$$P(x_{ij} = m_j|\theta_i) = P^*_{m_j}(\theta_i) - P^*_{m_j+1}(\theta_i) \tag{1.2}$$

Thus, responses are modeled as the probability of selecting one response category to the exclusion of other response categories as a function of increasing θ_i. As will be discussed later, I model θ_i as measure of "conservative-ness," i.e. higher levels of θ_i represent strong preferences for conservative policies.

While inferring ideology from specific issues has been common strategy in the past, few studies use several surveys in an attempt to understand how ideology varies over time. Using policy preferences to model ideology in this way can be problematic if the questions used to measure policy preferences mean different things at different times and in different places. I attempt to mitigate this problem, which is a variation on the problem of differential item functioning, by pooling surveys on policy questions that scale with definite endpoints.

For example, one ANES question about abortion policy asks respondents to place themselves on a scale where one end represents banning all abortions, and the other end represents abortion always being allowed. These end points "fix" the scale, in that these options represent both extremes of the policy space, and these end points are fairly unambiguous at different times or in different places. Compare this question with one asking about federal defense spending, where the endpoints represent policy preferences of "more spending" or "less spending." A respondent would likely view these endpoints differently as a function of how much spending

is going on when the question is asked or of how much spending is needed to meet a national need. In other words, a policy preference for more or less spending varies by temporal context. In my data set, I pool on questions like the abortion question, where responses time and space invariant, while keeping context-dependent questions, like preferences for spending, as different questions for each year in the survey.

As mentioned earlier, one important problem when measuring ideology through time is a lack of a consistent or complete battery of questions measuring policy preference. This problem is similar to those in the education and psychology literatures addressing test equation, where the objective is to measure students or subjects taking different tests on the same scale. In these contexts, IRT offers a solution to problems of test equation through the use of "anchor" questions. Anchor questions are identical questions asked on two different tests; these questions can be used to measure test-takers of the different tests on the same scale (Vale 1986). Furthermore, as few as one anchor question can be sufficient to equate two different tests (García-Pérez, Alcalá-Quintana and García-Cueto 2010).

If one views different surveys as different "tests," then anchor questions can be used to compare ideology across a much greater time frame than would be otherwise possible using a consistent and complete battery of questions. In other words, with each survey, respondents do not need to be asked the same questions in order to be scaled with respect to policy ideology. This not only allows for the use of more surveys in measuring ideology, but it also allows for the inclusion of a greater number of policy questions. Questions do not need to be dropped because they are not asked in every iteration of the survey, and this added information can be used to estimate ideology with greater precision. In the ANES, nearly every survey[6] has at least one policy preference question that links it to a subsequent or preceding survey;

[6]The Time Series ANES from 1948 lacks any policy questions that link it surveys in the 1950s.

frequently, there are more than one. When pooled together, these linking questions allow for a measurement of ideology on a consistent scale going back to the 1950s. Since the 7-point self-identification question is only asked from 1972, a Bayesian IRT approach increases my time-horizon for understanding dynamics of ideology by two decades.

Organizing responses in this way allows for comparable estimates of ideology across time. Since respondents are only linked on questions with fairly unambiguous response categories, I have confidence that the latent dimension I am measuring is consistent in time and space. Furthermore, the Bayesian modeling framework allows for the incorporation of more information, in the form of inter-survey variation in the battery of questions asked, without influencing the latent dimension from which response patterns manifest.

Data and Methods

To estimate ideology over time, I pool together a multitude of issue position questions from the ANES Time Series surveys from 1952-2008.[7] All available policy questions were used and were selected on two major criteria. First, questions must have "fixed" endpoints in that they represent the maximum endpoints in a policy space. The canonical example of this type of question addresses abortion, and the endpoints are "abortion should never be allowed" and "abortion should always be allowed." Second, the policy question cannot make reference to the status quo. This restriction excludes spending questions from the data because preferences for increases or decreases in spending are dependent somewhat on the status quo. Using these criteria, I select 44 different policy questions from the ANES. The average respondent answered 11 questions, the modal respondent answered 10, the most questions answered was 27, and the fewest 3. Dropping respondents with no data leaves 46,028 respondents over 26 different surveys. Questions are recoded such

[7] 1954, 2002, and 2006 are excluded from the analysis due to data sparseness in those years.

that lower-value responses represent "liberal" responses and higher-value responses represent "conservative" responses. Thus, in the graded response model, increasing values of θ_i represents increasing conservatism.

Given the large size of this data set, I estimate ideology by simulating the posterior distribution of the graded response model by Markov Chain Monte Carlo. My mean posterior estimates are based on 10,000 iterations (thinned by 10 with a 5000 iteration burn in period) implemented in JAGS (Curtis 2010). For identification, the location and scale are established by normalizing the mean to zero and the variance to one. The discrimination parameters are restricted to be positive, which, when coupled with liberal-conservative coding above, means that the scale of estimated ideology runs from negative "liberal" ideologies to positive "conservative" ideologies. Trace plots for the parameters suggest that the model converges quickly, and this finding is supported by estimates of the Gelman-Rubin statistic (Gelman and Rubin 1992).

Estimates and Validity Checks

Using the posterior means from my measurement model, I are able to describe ideological character of the American electorate between 1952 and 2008. By my measure, the electorate has a mean ideology of 0.00, and a standard deviation of 0.60. Neither of these measures is surprising given my priors on the distribution, although the standard deviation is somewhat tighter, suggesting that Americans, in general, are fairly clustered around the mean. While the average American appears to be the picture of moderation, this has not always been the case.

In looking at the mean of estimated ideology over time, the country has, overall, gotten more liberal over time (Figure 1.2). Especially in comparison to the 1960s, Americans in the 2000s are much more liberal. As a validity check, I plot the mean of my measure of ideology against one of the few time series measures of

ideology going back into the 1950s, the Stimson Mood Index.[8] In some respects the measurements are very alike, but in some they are significantly different. For example, both time series pick up a liberal shift from the 1970s onward, and the measures correlate during this period at 0.64. The big difference in the two measures occurs in the period before 1970, in which my measure picks up a conservative shift in the electorate and the Stimson Mood Index measures an increase in liberalism.

What might explain this significant deviation? One possible candidate is differences in the number and types of survey questions used. The Stimson Mood Index uses numerous surveys on a variety of issues to gauge ideology at the macro-level. My measure, on the other hand, uses comparably fewer measures on a narrower range of topics. This is especially true of the 1950s and 1960s, when the range of topics asked about is smaller compared to later years.[9] In an effort to explore this possibility, I compare the time trend for mean ideology using birth cohort rather than survey year as the grouping variable. This allows me to smooth over different surveys while still examining the time trend. For example, roughly 20% of the 1952 survey was made up of respondents born in the 1920s; in 1992, 40 years later, this percentage is 12%. Thus, by looking at cohort, I can "average" respondents across surveys, which in turn gives leverage on the degree to which the structure of the survey is driving my estimates.[10]

In looking at the trend in ideology across birth cohorts, the overall pattern looks

[8]My measure has been rescaled in a linear fashion such that the center and end points of my scales match.

[9]For example, not many questions were asked in the 1958 study (3), when compared to the 1994 study (16). However, the 1964 study has 11 questions, which isn't that much different than the 1994 study, and yet still displays deviation from the Stimson measure. This suggests that the number of questions is not at the root of the difference.

[10]Grouping respondents by cohort effectively addresses the question of survey question selection because, while the questions asked in an individual year may not be asked at random, the questions asked to any given cohort are essentially random. Accordingly, I also estimated my same model as a hierarchical IRT model, which models ideology partly as a function of birth cohort. The results from this model do not differ substantially from the model presented here, and correlate at $r = 0.977$.

very much like that estimated across years (Figure 1.3). Birth cohorts in the early 1900s appear to be very conservative when compared to those born in the 1970s and 1980s. This matches my general intuition that the country has become more liberal over time as more socially and economically progressive cohorts replace more traditional cohorts. Since this matches very closely my across-years pattern, this suggests that my measure is not particularly sensitive to the number and type of questions asked. What, then, might explain the difference with the Stimson Mood Index? A likely explanation could be differences in aggregation methodology. The Stimson index relies on publicly available survey data, which is available at the macro and not micro level. On the other hand, my data is aggregated directly from the micro-level. Furthermore, my measure models ideology with a fixed scale, i.e. θ_i represents the same thing in 1952 and 2008. These two factors may explain why, in my model, 1960 America looks more conservative than 2008 America, whereas in the Stimson Mood Index 1960 America looks more liberal than 2008 America.

Another benefit of modeling ideology at the micro rather than macro level is the ability to compare ideology within groups. For example, black Americans are generally thought to be more liberal than white Americans, and I can test to see if my measure picks up these group differences (Table 1.1). In comparing the estimated ideology of black Americans to white Americans, black Americans do appear significantly more liberal than white Americans. On average, black Americans appear to .727 points more liberal than white Americans, which is more than a standard-deviation's difference between the two group means. As a validity check, I also compared my performance to the self-reported ideology measure traditionally used within the literature.[11] While both measures pick up traditional group differences between blacks/whites, Southerners/Non-Southerners, and Men/Women, my

[11] I rescale the self-reported ideology score with a linear shift that places the mean "moderate" response at zero.

measure does better at actually placing group means in their intuitive ideological categories.[12] For example, while women are informally viewed as a liberal group and men as conservative, only my measure actually classifies them as such. My measure places women at -.042, a liberal score, and men at .054, a conservative score; the self-reported ideology score places both on the conservative side of the spectrum. This pattern is mimicked when comparing differences between the South and the rest of the country. My measure places the South as conservative and rest of the country as liberal, while self-reported ideology places the whole country right of center. This difference is likely due to social stigma associated with the word "liberal," which may lead liberal survey respondents to self-identify more moderately than their actual policy positions would suggest.

As a final validity check, consider the degree to which my measure is related to the standard ideological self-placement measure (Figure 1.4).[13] In general, my measure tends to correlate well with self-reported ideology, with a Spearman correlation of .478. Furthermore, for each self-identification category, the means of my measure are ordered appropriately along a Liberal-Conservative spectrum. This suggests that my measure is capturing some of what people think about themselves when considering labels of "liberal" or "conservative." Additionally, the self-identification category with the largest variance is that of moderates, which is to be expected given ambiguity about the definition of self-identification labels and the propensity for cross-pressured individuals and low-information respondents to identify as

[12] "South" identifies the 11 secession states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

[13] A similar analysis comparing my ideology measure to self-reported partisanship confirms my findings in Figure 1.4 (See Appendix, Figures 1.9 and 1.10). my measure corresponds with expected partisanship, even when controlling for ideological differences between the parties in and out of the South.

"moderate."[14]

When did Partisan-Ideological Change Start?

With these estimates, I now have a time-comparable measure of ideology which I can use to gain a better understanding of when partisan-ideological change began within the electorate. Consider first the distributional changes in ideology over time (Figure 1.5).[15] In the 1950s, both parties looked very similar, and both clustered around the moderate area of the measure. By 1972, both parties saw expansion towards the edges of the scale, and both party means pulled away from the center of the scale. This give us some indication that partisan-ideological change had already started before 1972. By 1992, there is a clear difference in the means of each party, with Democrats having a liberal (negative) mean, and Republicans having a conservative (positive) mean. Additionally, by 1992, the overlap between the two parties has shrunk significantly. In 2008, the parties have very distinct means around which party members have clustered, and there is only a moderate degree of overlap between the two parties.

These changes in the location and concentration of ideology within the parties represent the broad partisan-ideological change in the electorate since the end of WWII. To some degree, these changes represent both party sorting and polarization. Party sorting can be seen in the decrease in overlap between the two parties, and this comports with the general perception of sorting. However, the graphs also show how, over time, the dispersion of ideologies in the electorate has been growing.

[14]One might also care to know how my measure does at predicting something like vote choice. My measure correlates with Republican presidential vote at a moderate 0.37, which is statistically significant ($p \leq 0.001$). Comparable relationships can be found when looking at ideology in and out of the South. Furthermore, regression analysis (See Appendix, Table 1.4) predicting Republican presidential vote while controlling for traditional predictors supports my measure as being positively and strongly associated with presidential vote choice.

[15]For a continuous representation of party distributions over time, consider Appendix, Figure 1.11. Additionally, breaking this graph down into South and Non-South groups does not substantially alter the patterns in the data; it does, however, shift the graphs into more conservative and liberal directions, respectively.

Additionally, partisans, who once occupied the same ideological space as independents, seem to now occupy more extreme ideological positions. This suggests that polarization has been growing at the same time as Americans sorted themselves into parties.[16] Thus, growth over time can be characterized as polarization and sorting. I will next use the measures to evaluate when each of these changes began in the electorate.

One indicator of partisan-ideological sorting is the degree of correlation between partisan identification and ideology (Figure 1.6). Traditional explanations for ideological change in the electorate, e.g. partisan realignment due to the Civil Rights Movement, would predict that partisan-ideological change occurred beginning in the 1970s. Looking at the correlation between self-reported ideology and partisanship[17] shows a marked increase since the 1970s, moving from around 0.4 to 0.7. my measure also shows a similar growth in magnitude with the correlation growing from around 0.3 to 0.6. However, using my new measure to look prior to 1972, there appears to be a significant increase from 1952 to 1972. This suggests that partisan-ideological sorting began prior to partisan realignment in the 1970s. Although the rate of sorting appears to be slower between 1952 and 1972 than after, the correlation between party identification and ideology more than doubled during this period, from around 0.1 to 0.2.

With regards to polarization, one common measure of polarization is the standard deviation of ideology in the public. If the public is becoming increasingly polarized, then there should be increasing numbers of voters on the ends of the ideology scale. Thus, looking at standard deviation should give an indication of the

[16]It is worth noting that the overall distribution of preferences in the electorate is still unimodal. That is, aggregating opinion without respect to party yields a unimodal distribution of preferences. Only by isolating analysis to partisans yields a bimodal distribution. This suggests that most of the polarization in the electorate is confined to partisans and not independents.

[17]Partisanship here and elsewhere is measured in three categories: Republican, Democrat, and Independent. Leaners are grouped with the party towards which they lean.

degree of polarization in the electorate (Figure 1.7). Looking only at the traditional self-reported ideology measure, the public has gradually become more polarized since 1972. My measure of polarization not only picks up this trend, but also suggests that polarization began back in the 1950s. Indeed, my measure suggests that much of the shift in ideology from the center to the edge of the distribution occurred in the period prior to 1972. This suggests that polarization began as early as the 1950s.[18]

One final measure of partisan-ideological change that captures aspects of sorting and polarization is the degree of overlap between distributions of Republicans and Democrats (Figure 1.8). If the two parties are becoming more distinguished and moving apart, as seen in Figure 1.5, then the overlap between the distributions of the two parties should also be decreasing. The measure used in this case, overlapping coefficient, is calculated as the area of overlap between the two distributions, $\int min(f(x), g(x))dx$, where $f(x)$ & $g(x)$ represent the two distributions. Theoretically, this ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 representing perfect overlap.

In calculating this overlap, I find that there has indeed been a consistent decrease in overlap between the two parties. Beginning in the 1952, the overlap between the two parties decreased from 0.95, which represents near-perfect overlap, to around 0.47; this decrease covers around half the total scale for the overlapping coefficient. It is also important to note that this decrease occurred more or less linearly since 1952. This suggests that partisan-ideological change has indeed been going on since the 1950s.

[18] An additional measure of partisan polarization, difference between party means, supports this general conclusion that polarization is on the rise (see Appendix Figure 1.12). Since 1952, the difference in party means for the two major parties has increased by a little over one standard deviation of the ideology measure. While the difference in party means could be increasing due to party sorting alone, the difference between the parties has also grown with respect to the modal ideology in each party (Appendix, Figure 1.13). This suggests the parties are indeed polarizing and not just sorting.

Causes

Given this substantial increase in polarization and party sorting over time, what might be driving these changes? Traditional explanations, inasmuch as they posit changes based on institutional changes in the 1970s, are incomplete in describing change in the 1950s. As such, I posit a simple, new theory for the increasingly strong relationship between partisanship and ideology. I suggest that the partisan-ideological change in the American electorate is a consequence, in part, of the increasing educational attainment of the American electorate.

How might educational attainment lead to partisan-ideological change in the electorate? Higher education is, in general, associated with higher levels of political sophistication, where political sophistication refers to the degree to which an individual has a large set of ideologically consistent and constraining beliefs about politics (Luskin 1987, 1990). Also, a higher degree of political sophistication is associated with more extreme policy preferences that are in line with one's party allegiance (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004). Thus, increasing educational attainment will lead to partisan-ideological change by increasing political sophistication within the electorate.

Increasing educational attainment is an attractive explanation for partisan-ideological change for a number reasons. First, levels of education in the United States have been increasing since at least the 1950s. According to the Census, the percent of adults over 25 with a high-school diploma increased from 25% to 87% between 1940 and 2009; the percent with a bachelor's degree or higher increase from 5% to 30%. Second, this increase in education has been consistent over time, which matches the trends in party sorting and polarization. Finally, educational attainment would influence members of both parties, which is important since both parties seem to be moving apart. Other proposed causes only explain one party is moving one way,

e.g. the emergence of women's rights issues pushing the Democratic party in a more liberal direction.

In order to evaluate the role that increasing education has played in the partisan-ideological changes in the American electorate, I perform a micro-level analysis in two stages. First, I estimate the effect of education on political sophistication. Second, I estimate the effect of political sophistication on party sorting and polarization. If education is driving partisan-ideological change as I suspect, then higher levels of education should be associated with higher levels of political sophistication, and higher levels of political sophistication should be associated with ideologically-aligned party identification and a more extreme ideological position.

Analysis

Before conducting the first stage of my analysis, I need a measure of political sophistication at the individual level. In the common conceptualization, individuals with high levels of political sophistication have political beliefs about a wide range of issues. To tap this characteristic of political sophistication I calculate the mean number of survey questions to which an individual responds "don't know" or "haven't thought about it." I then take 1 minus this quantity to get an estimate for the percentage of questions on which an individual did have an opinion.[19] For individuals with high levels of political sophistication, this percentage will be very close to one. Over time this variable has grown from around 85% in the 1950s and 1960s to 95% in the 2000s. On average, Americans have responses to around 90% of the questions, but some answered as few as 4% of questions asked.[20]

In the first stage of my analysis, I predict the percent of questions answered as a function of education and a number of other demographic controls (Table 1.2).[21]

[19]This measurement most closely matches the basic concept of political sophistication (Luskin 1987).

[20]Summary statistics for all variables used in this analysis can be found in the Appendix, Table 1.5.

[21]While the coding on the demographic controls should be straightforward, one may require

Overall, education levels, obtaining a high school diploma and/or college degree specifically, perform well when predicting the percentage of survey questions a respondent will actually answer. Together, a high school diploma and college degree will increase the percentage of questions answered by around 8%. While this effect appears substantively small, recall that the average Americans without these degrees would be predicted to answer 90% of these questions, which suggests that education explains much of the difference between knowing and not knowing one's own opinions. Furthermore, education seems to have much larger effect than any of the traditional demographic variables associated with political sophistication. This suggests that education plays an important part in explaining political sophistication.

The second stage in my analysis links political sophistication to both party sorting and ideological extremity. In order to perform this analysis, I present two logit models of ideological change: one predicts "correct" party sorting and the other predicts extreme ideology. "Correct" party sorting in my case is classified as a respondent having an estimated ideology that matches the ideological tenor of the party with which they identify. In the case of my estimated ideology variable, this means that Democrats have negatively signed ideologies and Republicans have positively signed ideologies. To measure ideological extremism, I code respondents who have ideologies over 1 standard deviation larger than the mean as having "extreme" ideologies.[22] This measure essentially classifies respondents with ideologies in the most extreme third of the distribution as having extreme ideologies.

I estimate these dependent variables from a number of independent variables. The key independent variable in my analysis my measure of political sophistication,

additional explanation. Strength of party affiliation is an ordinal measure ranging from 1, which indicates Independent identification, to 4, indicating "strong" identification with either party.

[22]I choose this over alternative specifications, such as prediciting absolute distance from the mean, because specifications using the exact ideology estimate misrepresent the level of precision in my data.

the percent of questions about which each respondent had an opinion. I also include a number of other independent variables as controls in my model. Outside of normal set of demographic controls, I also include a measure of religiosity, coded as 1 if the respondent attended more than 1 religious service a month and 0 otherwise, and evangelical identification, coded as 1 if the respondent identifies as an evangelical protestant and 0 otherwise.[23]

In general, my models support the hypothesis that changes in political sophistication are strongly linked to party sorting and polarization in the electorate (Table 1.3). In both models, the percentage of questions about which a respondent has an opinion is positively and significantly associated with being sorted into the correct party and with having a more extreme ideology. In both models, increasing the level of political sophistication from its minimum to its maximum increases the probability of party sorting or extreme ideology increases by just over 20 percentage points.[24] This effect is larger than many traditional demographic predictors, and comparable to the difference between blacks and whites, which is quite large due to the ideological homogeneity of blacks in the Democratic party. The strongest effect in either model appears to be the effect of strength of party affiliation on party sorting. This makes sense inasmuch as I would expect the strongest partisans to be most likely to have ideologies in line with their affiliated party. In total, my models support my general hypotheses that increasing political sophistication is driving partisan-ideological change, and that these changes in political sophistication can be linked to changes in education.

[23]Including a measure of evangelicism decreases my sample size by around 20,000, and my results are robust to its exclusion.

[24]With each variable at its median, the baseline probability of being correctly sorted is around 57% and of having an extreme ideology is around 27%.

Conclusion

Using a novel application of Bayesian IRT, I provide evidence of party sorting and polarization at the individual level. My evidence suggests that party sorting and polarization both began prior to the 1970s. Many theories explaining the partisan-ideological changes posit causes in the 1970s, and my evidence highlights how these theories may be incomplete. I find novel evidence that increasing educational attainment may be driving partisan-ideological by increasing levels of political sophistication in the electorate.

My measure of ideology could also inform a number of topics of interest outside of partisan-ideological change. As a time-comparable measure of policy ideology, it might be used to explore how the relationship between policy ideology and affective ideology, as measured by the self-reported ideology scale, has changed over time. Also, research examining the degree of spatial-voting in the electorate is usually confined to one election, and my measure allows for generalizing to more than one. Finally, the time-consistent nature of my measure may be leveraged to describe how state-level opinion has been changing over time.

Finally, beyond applying my measure in different contexts, future research might also further explore the connections between education, political sophistication, and party sorting and polarization. While I provide preliminary evidence here, education may not be the only thing driving rising political sophistication. For example, I remain rather agnostic to the mechanism by which education leads to higher levels of political sophistication. Education might increase political awareness, provide additional resources for obtaining political information, and/or reduce the costs of gaining political knowledge. All of these pathways would increase political sophistication. Additional explanations for rising political sophistication outside the scope of this paper include changing media environments and increasing elite polarization.

While traditional explorations of these topics begin only in the 1970s, my research suggests extending analysis back in to the 1950s.

Tables and Figures

Table 1.1: Comparing Estimated and Self-Reported Ideology by Group

Groups	Mean Estimated Ideology	Mean Self-Reported Ideology
South	0.056	0.380
Non-South	−0.023	0.195
Difference	0.079***	0.185***
Black	−0.623	−0.236
White	0.104	0.319
Difference	0.727***	0.555***
Women	−0.042	0.184
Men	0.054	0.317
Difference	0.096***	0.133***

Note:$^{***} \rightarrow p \leq 0.001$

Table 1.1: *Differences in Mean Self-Reported and Estimated Ideology by Group* In looking at the mean estimated ideology and self-reported ideology, as measured by a shifted 7-point self-identification scale, the model picks up the traditional ideological splits between different groups in America. The South is more liberal than the non-South. Furthermore, the model estimates Southerners as conservative and non-Southerners as liberal, unlike the self-reported measurement which places both groups as right of center. The model is also good at placing women as more liberal than men, and placing women as left of center, unlike self-reported ideology which places them right of center.

Table 1.2: Predicting the Percentage of Questions with an Opinion

Variable	Coefficient
High School Diploma	0.032***
	(0.002)
College Degree	0.051***
	(0.002)
Age	0.001***
	(0.0001)
Birth Cohort	0.013***
	(0.0004)
Woman	−0.024***
	(0.001)
Black	0.003
	(0.002)
Strength of Party Affiliation	0.009***
	(0.001)
Voted	0.024***
	(0.001)
Constant	0.754***
	(0.005)
Observations	39,206
R^2	0.091
Adjusted R^2	0.091
Residual Std. Error	0.120
F Statistic	490.73
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 1.2: *Predicting the Percentage of Questions with an Opinion* This table presents the linear regression results predicting the percentage of questions with a opinion, i.e. those in which the respondent does not respond "don't know" or "haven't thought about it." Standard errors represent robust standard errors. The results suggest that education plays an important role in political sophistication. Getting a high school diploma increases the percent of questions answered by around 3%, and a college degree beyond that increases the percent of questions answered by around 5%. Given that the average American answers 90% of questions to begin with, education seems to play an important factor in explaining "don't know" style responses.



Figure 1.1: *Hypothetical Distribution of Voters* Each graph represents a possible distribution of two groups of voters along a liberal-conservative axis. One group is shaded light gray and one a darker gray, and their overlap is some level in between. With sorting, there is distinction between the two groups, and with polarization, the groups are distributed bimodally. With sorting and polarization, the groups are distributed bimodally and are distinct along the ideological axis.



Figure 1.2: *Comparing Estimated Ideology Over Time* The solid line represents the mean ideology of the country using my estimated ideology. The moving dashed line represents the policy mood of the country as measured by the Stimson Mood Index (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). The horizontal line represents the most moderate value on the scale, 50, with 0 being the most conservative and 100 being the most liberal. In general, both measures move very much in tandem with each other, and pick up a growing liberalism in the public. However, there is strong deviation between the measures in the 1960s and 1970s.



Figure 1.3: *Comparing Estimated Ideology By Generation* The solid line represents the mean ideology of each birth cohort using my estimated ideology. The horizontal line represents the most moderate value on the scale, 50, with 0 being the most conservative and 100 being the most liberal. Averaging by cohort smooths over survey differences in the types and number of questions asked. Since the trend in ideology by birth cohort matches my by-year estimates, this suggests that my measure is not dependent on the selection of specific question types or the number of questions asked.



Figure 1.4: *Relationship between Estimated Ideology and Self-Reported Ideology* Each category represents a response on the 7-point ideology self-placement scale. My measure correlates very will with the ideological self-placement scale, and my estimated means for each group follow the expected pattern. The group with the most variation is self-identified "moderates," which is to be expected given the ambiguity about the definition of that response category.



Figure 1.5: *Density Plots of Voter Ideology, 1952, 1972, 1992, and 2008* Each graph here represents the distribution of voters who identify as Democrat or Republican. Beginning in the 1950s, the distributions look very similar with a significant degree of overlap. However, in 1972 there is divergence between the partisan distributions, and this increase continues for 1992 and 2008. Furthermore, in 1972 voters begin to expand outward from the center of the scale without respect to party. This suggests that voters are adopting more extreme ideological positions. Additionally, while there is significant overlap between the parties in 1952, by 2008 there is substantially less.



Figure 1.6: *Polyarchic Correlation of Ideology and Partisan Identification* The dashed line represents a lowess smooth of the correlation between my estimated ideology and party identification over time. The solid line represents a lowess smooth of the relationship between self-reported ideology and party identification. Party identification is measured in three categories, Republican, Democrat, and Independent, and leaners are grouped with the party towards which they lean. Over time, there has been a marked increase in the correlation between party identification and ideology, and this increase began well before the 1970s.



Figure 1.7: *Standard Deviation of Ideology over Time, 1952-2008* Each line represents the standard deviation of ideology based on each measure of ideology. My measure of ideology is scaled to match the range of self-reported ideology. The solid line, which is a loess smooth of the data, shows the increase in the standard deviation of self-reported ideology since the 1970s. My measure, represented by a dashed-line loess smooth, shows that the increase in standard deviation of ideology began in the 1950s, and that a significant portion of growth occurred during this time. This suggests that polarization began prior to the 1970s.



Figure 1.8: *Coefficient of Overlap between Distributions of Republicans and Democrats* Each dot represents the overlapping coefficient, which is a function of the degree of overlap between Democratic and Republican voters. The black line represents a loess smooth of the data. Overall, this overlap has decreased over time, going from almost perfect overlap, to half that. Furthermore, note that this decrease has been going on consistently since the 1950s.

Appendix

Table 1.4: Predicting Repblican Presidential Vote Choice

Variable	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Estimated Ideology	$0.782 * **$	+16%
	(0.037)	
Woman	0.007	-
	(0.042)	
Black	$-1.727 * **$	-35%
	(0.106)	
South	$0.207 * **$	+4%
	(0.051)	
Education	0.023	+1%
	(0.013)	
Protestant	$0.352 * **$	+4%
	(0.046)	
Republican	$2.861 * **$	+59%
	(0.046)	
Intercept	$-1.376 * **$	-
	(0.064)	
N	16692	
log-likelihood	−7229.676	
χ^2	8677.110	

Note: $* * * \rightarrow p \leq 0.001$

Table 1.4: *Predicting Vote Choice for Republican Presidential Candidate* This table estimates a logit model of vote choice with a respondent voting for the Republican presidential candidate being the non-reference category. The marginal effect represents the increase in percentage points of the probability of voting Republican holding other variables at their medians. When using a series of traditional predictors for Republican presidential vote choice, my estimated ideology measure performs very well. Increasing estimated ideology by 1, which is akin to becoming more conservative by a little over 1 standard deviation, increases the probability of voting Republican by 16% over a baseline 29%. This effect is larger than those predicted by being Protestant or by being in the South.



Figure 1.9: *Boxplot of Estimated Ideology by Self-Reported Partisanship* This graph shows boxplots for estimated ideology broken down by self-reported partisanship. Independent leaners are grouped with the party towards which they lean. The mean ideology for each party aligns with expectations about the ideological tenor of the parties; Democrats are on average liberal, and Republicans are on average conservative.



Figure 1.10: *Boxplot of Estimated Ideology by Self-Reported Partisanship, South vs Non-South* This graph shows boxplots for estimated ideology broken down by self-reported partisanship, and separated by respondents in and out of the South. Independent leaners are grouped with the party towards which they lean. The mean ideology for each party still aligns with expectations about the ideological tenor of the parties; Democrats are on average liberal, and Republicans are on average conservative. Also, the South, as expected, appears more conservative than the rest of the country, and the variation in estimated ideology for Southern Democrats is greater than other groups, which is expected due to Civil War-era allegiances that persisted in the South well into the 1980s.



Figure 1.11: *Distribution for Democrat and Republican Voters* The shaded areas represent the distributions for Democrat and Republican Voters from 1952-2008. The dots represent the mean of each group for year, and the lines represent a linear fit of the trend in means. While there is much overlap between the groups in the 1952, the area of overlap has shrunk significantly by 2008. Furthermore, the party means for each group have been diverging over time.



Figure 1.12: *Difference in Party Means for Democratic and Republican Voters* This graph represents the absolute difference between means for Democratic and Republican voters in the electorate. The solid line represents a loess smooth of the data. The graph highlights a general positive trend in the difference between the two parties. From 1952 to 2008, there is around a .8 increase in the difference between party means, which equals around 1 standard deviation of my estimated ideology measure. This suggests consistent and substantial growth in the difference between the parties at the mass level.



Figure 1.13: *Difference in Party Modes for Democratic and Republican Voters* This graph represents the absolute difference between modes for Democratic and Republican voters in the electorate. The solid line represents a loess smooth of the data. The graph highlights a general positive trend in the difference between the two parties. This corroborates evidence about the increasing distance in means between parties. Overall, this supports the conclusion that they two parties are polarizing and not just sorting.

Table 1.3: Predicting Ideological Change

	Dependent Variable			
	Party Sorted		Ideologically Extreme	
	Coefficient	Max Effect	Coefficient	Max Effect
Pct. of Questions w/ Opinion	1.077***	+22%	1.749***	+21%
	(0.119)		(0.126)	
Age	0.008***	+15%	−0.013***	-20%
	(0.002)		(0.002)	
Birth Cohort	0.138***	+26%	−0.161***	-25%
	(0.016)		(0.016)	
Woman	0.027	-	−0.036	-
	(0.029)		(0.029)	
Black	1.134***	+23%	0.924***	+21%
	(0.051)		(0.044)	
Strength of Party Affiliation	0.655***	+45%	0.095***	+5%
	(0.016)		(0.015)	
Voted	0.201***	+5%	0.094***	+2%
	(0.032)		(0.033)	
South	−0.381***	-9%	0.371***	+8%
	(0.033)		(0.032)	
Attend >1 Relig. Service/Month	−0.064**	-1%	−0.167***	-3%
	(0.029)		(0.030)	
Evangelical	0.056	-	0.039	-
	(0.063)		(0.062)	
Income	0.094***	+9%	−0.014	-
	(0.014)		(0.014)	
Constant	−4.155***	-	−1.311***	-
	(0.184)		(0.187)	
Observations	23,508		23,508	
Log Likelihood	-14,647.490		-14,342.350	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	29,318.990		28,708.710	

Note: Coefficients are for logit models; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 1.3: *Predicting Ideological Change* This table represents logit models predicting party sorting and ideological extremity. Party sorting is coded 1 if a respondent's estimated ideology matched the tenor of their party, and zero otherwise. Ideological extremity was coded 1 if a respondent's ideology was over 1 std. deviation outside the mean ideology and 0 otherwise. The marginal effects were calculated moving each independent variable from its respective minimum to maximum, while holding other variables at their medians. This results in this table suggest that political sophistication, as measured by percent of questions on which a respondent has an opinion, is a significant predictor of both party sorting and ideological extremity.

Table 1.5: Summary Statistics of Variables Used

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Absolute Value of Estimated Ideology	46028	0.519	0.407	0	2.642
Percent Questions with Opinion	49760	0.904	0.133	0.033	1
Education	45646	3.550	1.704	1	6
College Degree	45646	0.174	0.379	0	1
High School Diploma	45646	0.529	0.499	0	1
Age	45746	45.660	17.164	17	99
Birth Cohort	46028	5.063	2.249	1	10
South	46028	0.294	0.455	0	1
Woman	45985	0.556	0.497	0	1
Black	42588	0.127	0.333	0	1
Strength of Partisanship	45710	2.841	0.997	1	4
Voted	42940	0.673	0.469	0	1
Party Sorted	49760	0.489	0.499	0	1
Ideologically Extreme	49760	0.351	0.477	0	1
Attend $>$ 1 Relig. Service/Month	45338	0.533	0.499	0	1
Evangelical	28968	0.076	0.265	0	1
Income	42575	2.878	1.152	1	5

Part 2

Gender Identity and Partisan-Ideological Change

Introduction

One of the well-known facts about the modern American polity is the presence of strong partisan-ideological polarization.[1] This increase in polarization had been associated with a number of political outcomes, both good and bad. For example, some research has shown that increased political polarization has led to increased mobilization amongst the electorate (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Hetherington 2001, 2008, 2009; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004). Others have argued that increasing partisanship has clarified party positions and given voters a clear choice of candidates (Bartels 2000; Burden 2004; Garner and Palmer 2011; Jacobson 2005; Levendusky 2010). However, others have argued that polarization has decreased interest in politics, especially amongst moderates (Dionne 2004). Another negative outcome might be a decrease in the civility of rhetoric, which has important implications for things like trust in government (Mutz and Reeves 2005; Galston and Nivola 2006). Given these varied but important consequences of polarization, it is critical to understand its causes both for proposing remedies and understanding how long these effects might persist.

What, then, might explain the growing partisan-ideological polarization within

[1] Although there remains some disagreement about the substantive size of this polarization, even those arguing against widespread polarization concede that the ideological difference between Democrats and Republicans has grown over time (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2005).

the electorate? Many theories have been offered to explain the rise in polarization over the last 60 years. These theories offer many different agents of change including both elites (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Layman and Carsey 2002; Layman et al. 2010) and the general public (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz 2010; Stoker and Jennings 2008). One common assumption between many of these theories is that the composition of the electorate itself changes very little, and can be implicitly assumed to be constant in many cases. However, such assumptions may mask hidden dynamics of polarization based in more gradual generational changes.

One gradual change in the American polity that has potential implications for growing polarization is the shrinking gender gap in political sophistication. In the past, American women voters tended to lag behind voting men in political interest, information, and efficacy (Conway, Steuernagel and Ahern 1997; Verba, Burns and Schlozman 1997; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001).[2] However, this gap in political behavior has diminished to a point where women voters tend to look very much like men. This significant convergence in political behavior is likely ignored because the demographics of gender have not changed; men and women still constitute roughly one half of the population each. However, this fundamental shift in American politics has important implications for understanding the growth of political polarization over time.

In light of recent changes in the American electorate, I present a theory of mass polarization that incorporates important generational differences in the electorate. Through the mechanism of political socialization, younger generations of women are now more politically polarized than older generations in a way systematically different from their male counterparts. Furthermore, through the process of gen-

[2]Specifically, when one measures these variables in traditionally "masculine" ways, such as through voting and questions about leading political actors. Burns, Schlozman and Verba (2001) demonstrate that in many political arenas, such as participation in local political organizations, women can participate and be knowledgeable as much if not more than men.

erational replacement, these younger, more polarized generations now constitute a much larger portion of the electorate. Thus, the current levels of political polarization can be attributed, in part, to the increasing partisan-ideological polarization of women in the electorate.

In order to test this theory, I use survey data from the 1948-2008 Cumulative American National Election Studies (ANES) data set. By comparing differences between the political attitudes of men and women both within their own birth cohorts and among other birth cohorts, I show that women became polarized at a much faster rate than men. Furthermore, I link these changes in ideology to changes in socialization experiences, such as those fostered by parents and education. In total, this evidence provides insight into how social-historical changes in the electorate have led to changes in the political character of the electorate. These results expand our understanding of mass polarization by offering a mechanism for polarization independent of elite behavior, by calling attention to important changes in the electorate over time, by considering different polarization stories for different subgroups in the electorate, and by placing polarization within the greater historical context of American politics.

Polarization in the Electorate

While some have argued that the partisan-ideological polarization of Americans is constrained mostly to the realm of political elites (e.g. Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2005, 2008; Fiorina and Abrams 2008), a growing body of evidence suggests that partisan ideological polarization has occurred at the mass level as well (Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Garner and Palmer 2011; Jacobson 2006; Ura and Ellis 2012). Given the potential implications for this polarization, it is important to understand what polarization looks like and why it has happened.

From the early 1970s to the early 2000s the moderate share of the electorate

dropped, and respondents identifying as either liberal or conservative increased (Figure 2.1).[3] The percent of respondents identifying as "moderate" has decreased from around 35% in early 1970s to around 25% in the early 2000s. Furthermore, the share of respondents identifying as "somewhat liberal" and "liberal" has increased from around 20% to 25%. On the conservative side, the corresponding categories have grown from around 30% to 35%. Even within the non-moderate respondents, "somewhat liberal (conservative)" was the modal category in the early 1970s, but has now been surpassed by the more extreme "liberal (conservative)" category.

Another way of seeing polarization is to look at the ideology of a particularly salient subset of the population: voters. Since voters play a pivotal role in American politics, understanding the ideological distribution of voters is paramount to understanding polarization in American politics writ large. Prior literature has used the spread of voter ideology as a measure of such a concept (Abramowitz 2010; DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson 1996; Levendusky 2009*a*). If the spread of voters on an ideological scale has increased over time, this suggests that voters are moving away from moderate positions into more extreme positions. In considering the distribution of voters on the 7-point ideological self-placement scale over time, voters[4] are moving away from the center of the scale and towards the edges. Since 1972, the standard deviation of the ideological self-placement question has increased from 1.3 to 1.6, which is a 24% increase in the spread of voters along the scale.[5] This suggests

[3]Scale values are 1="Very Liberal", 2="Liberal", 3="Somewhat Liberal", 4="Moderate", 5="Somewhat Conservative", 6="Conservative", & 7="Very Conservative".

[4]Both this and the following analyses of "voters" relies on respondent self-reported voting. While it is well known that survey respondents over-report voting, this would only hinder my analysis in that self-reported voters who do not actually vote are *less* likely to be politically active and partisan when compared to their veracious counterparts (Belli, Traugott and Beckmann 2001). Since political activity and partisanship correlate with more extreme ideological beliefs, this sample of "voters" likely contains an an over-representative amount of moderates; thus, any analysis here is likely to err on the conservative side when estimating polarization (Saunders and Abramowitz 2004).

[5]While, in general, ordinal measures are not interpreted through means or standard deviations, I include the analysis here because it is common practice within this literature. Nevertheless, looking at changes in the interquartile range leads to a similar conclusion; there is an increasing

polarization among voters.

In addition to the general spread of voters, one might also consider comparing how ideology varies by party (Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). In the two party American system, divergent ideologies between the means of party supporters suggests polarization in the electorate. Over time, voters identifying with each party have become increasingly divergent in their ideologies (Figure 2.2). The mean ideology for Republican identifiers has increased from around 4.7 to 5.4, which indicates a marked increase in the concentration of self-identified conservatives in the party. The mean ideology for Democratic identifiers has decreased from 3.7 to around 3.3, which signifies an increase in the concentration of liberals in the Democratic party. Together, this divergence between the ideology of parties indicates a growing polarization in the electorate. The average ideological self-placement of Republicans identifiers has increased (become more conservative) by 0.7, and the ideological self-placement of Democratic identifiers has decreased (become more liberal) by about 0.4. The total divergence mirrors nearly a category's increase in the difference between Democrat and Republican self-placement over the past 30 years.

Causes of Mass Polarization

Given that polarization has grown, what might be causing this growth? In general, theories of mass polarization can be classified by the main agent of polarization, which is to say who is responsible for pushing liberals and conservatives apart. One explanation for polarization ascribes this agency to political elites, whose political behavior induces extreme preferences in the electorate. A second class of explanation entails members of electorate responding to exogenous, non-political factors, such as education, and adopting more political views as a consequence.[6]

Perhaps the earliest expression of the elite-driven argument is that of Carmines

spread in the ideological distribution of voters over time.

[6]For a comprehensive review of the literature on polarization at the mass and elite levels see either Layman, Carsey and Horowitz (2006) or Hetherington (2009)

and Stimson (1981, 1986, 1989). In their theory of issue evolution, Carmines and Stimson explain how parties adopt divergent positions on new issues, and mass identifiers will then adopt the positions of the parties. In an updated application of this idea, Layman and Carsey (2002), in their theory of conflict extension, theorize the adaption of party platforms to new policy issues increases in the polarization of elites, and that the public, especially partisan identifiers, reacts accordingly. Indeed, in looking at party activists, Layman et al. (2010) find that elites have become very polarized over time. Given previous research about mass public reaction to elite public opinion (e.g. Zaller 1992), it is a small step to conclude that such polarization in elites will lead to polarization in the mass public (Levendusky 2009*a*). Within this vein of thinking rests explanations wherein the manipulation of hot-button social and economic issues, such as abortion, homosexual rights, or redistributive taxes, by the parties has led to an increasing partisan divide (Bartels 2006, 2008; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006).

A second class of explanations for mass polarization looks to changes in the mass electorate itself for sources of increasing partisan-ideological divergence. A simple example of this type of argument involves how education influences partisanship and participation. Citizens with higher levels of education have long demonstrated higher propensities for partisan identification and participation (Campbell et al. 1960; Verba and Nie 1972). Over the past half-century, Americans have achieved higher and higher levels of education. Consequently, the electorate may be becoming more polarized as a function of increasing education and political engagement in the electorate (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Abramowitz 2010). Likewise, there is some evidence that increased media choices have led Americans to forgo moderate, information-based news media sources in favor of more ideological, opinion-based media sources (Mutz 2006; Prior 2007). As a result of receiving more polarized information, Americans are adopting more polarized ideological positions.

In truth, it is possible and likely that all of these factors are working in concert to generate the polarization that we see in the electorate. While each of these theories make important contributions to our understanding of polarization, there is a common, implicit assumption in these theories that ought to be examined. Specifically, these theories assume constant effects across the electorate throughout time without considering how various subgroups or generations within the electorate might respond differently to similar stimuli. For example, many top-down theories of polarization assume that elite actions can substantially shift mass public opinion. However, scholars have consistently shown that a person's ideology is relatively stable later in life, and rarely shifts dramatically (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1969; Jennings and Markus 1984; Stoker and Jennings 2008). This suggests that macro-level changes in ideology are likely not due to many Americans changing their ideology at once, but rather by changes in the mixture in the electorate of Americans with certain ideologies.

Changes Through Generational Replacement

If small shifts in individual behavior are not responsible for changes in the ideology of the electorate,[7] what other kind of processes could result in changes over time? One potential source of change in an electorate might be the gradual entrance to and exit from the electorate of different age cohorts, commonly known as generational replacement. If older cohorts that exit the electorate are systematically different from younger cohorts, then the character of the electorate will gradually shift in accordance with those differences. In the past, generational replacement has been used to explain shifts in partisanship, such as in the case of secular realignment or the evolution of issue agendas (Andersen 1979; Carmines and Stimson 1986; Campbell 2002).

[7]For a unique argument on how micro-level changes may provide a substantial building block for mass polarization, see Levendusky (2009*a*).

Generational replacement can be seen in the different birth cohorts that constitute the electorate in this different election years (Figure 2.3). For example, in the 1952 election, the modal generation of voters was born prior to 1900, and there are no voters born in the 1950s. However, in the 1980 election, voters born in the 1950s, the baby-boomers, constitute the modal category of voters. Inasmuch as the character of public opinion for baby-boomers differs from voters born in the 19th century, the character of the 1980 electorate should be different from the 1952 electorate. Comparing the 1980 and 2008 election, the modal category is still voters born in the 1950s, but the overall distribution of voters has shifted from voters born before 1950 towards those born after 1950. Again, these variations in the generational constitution of the electorate can be used to explain changes in the character of the electorate.

In looking to generational change as a significant mechanism for change in the electorate over time, the next important question to ask is how do generations differ? While there are numerous sources for variation in the public opinion of different generations, one understudied change with respect to polarization is that of change in the difference between the ideology of men and women.[8] Several past studies have shown that existing gender differences in participatory behavior and education have been shrinking over time (see e.g. Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998). Given that higher levels of engagement and education generally translate to greater political sophistication and stronger ideological beliefs, it stands to reason that decreases in those gender gaps could translate into higher partisan-ideological polarization in women (Conover 1988). Furthermore, since much of the shrinkage in the gender gap has been women becoming more like

[8]I'm referring here to a very specific component of gender differences in ideology. There have been numerous studies in the past addressing gender differences in the realms of partisanship (Sanbonmatsu 2002; Wolbrecht 2000), voting behavior (Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998), and participation (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Verba, Burns and Schlozman 1997).

men with respect to political engagement, employment, and education, this suggests that polarization among women is a contributing to mass polarization to a degree significantly different than polarization among men.

Gender Differences in Ideology

How then does partisan-ideological polarization differ between men and women? A simple first cut at understanding these differences would be to look at how the distribution of ideology for men and women has changed over time.

Consider first the differences in the growth of ideological identification between genders over time (Table 2.1, Part I). Again looking at the standard deviation of ideological self placement as a measurement of polarization, both men and women have become more polarized over time. Between 1972 and 2008, the standard deviation of self-reported ideology for men grew from 1.289 to 1.472, and it grew for women from 1.274 to 1.594. As these numbers suggest, polarization grew for both men and women but to a greater degree for women. Comparing the ratio of growth for women to that of men (1.746), women polarized almost twice as much as men over the same period.

Another way to measure polarization is to compare the difference in party means of ideological self-identification (Table 2.1, Part II). The difference in ideological self-placement between Republican and Democratic men grew from 0.908 to 1.707 between 1972 and 2008. The same difference for women grew from 0.832 to 1.753. Again, the growth for women is higher than that of men. Specifically, the difference between Republican and Democratic women grew around 1.15 times that of men.[9] This evidence suggests that women are polarizing at a rate greater than of men.

[9]Graphs of these relationships can be found in an online appendix. Using bivariate linear regression to model both standard deviation and difference in party means as a function of time returns results comparable to those presented here.

What Explains Gender Differences in Polarization?

Given that there are differences in the rates of polarization between the two genders, what might explain these differences? Historically, there has been significant variation in the political socialization of men and women, but this variation has decreased over time. These changing trends in political socialization may explain why there are differences in polarization between genders.

Gender Roles & Political Socialization

Political socialization describes the individual's "learning of social patterns corresponding to his societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society" (Hyman 1959; Sapiro 2004). This education generally involves learning about how a citizen is expected to act as a member of the polity, and is tied to the formation of partisan affiliation and ideology (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009). Considering that gender, too, can be conceptualized as a learned behavior, differences in the political socialization of genders are a potentially fruitful source of differential ideological development (West and Zimmerman 1987).

Through the earliest parts of American history, the American political sphere was divided along gender and other cleavages. Women were not guaranteed the right to vote until the 20th century, and prior to 1840, married women did not even have the right to own property. In general, women were considered as legally bound to their husbands (Sapiro 1983). This dependence on men for legal rights highlights a longstanding division in sex roles; men are assumed to be responsible for the public welfare vis-a-vis their families, and women are assumed to be responsible for the private welfare of their families (Baker 1984).[10] Thus, for much of the history of

[10]This is not to say that women were not involved in politics absent the right to vote. Without a doubt, the suffrage movement could not have succeeded without the very public activity of women, and women were very involved in the temperance and progressive movements. However, these cases highlight how, even when they participated in politics, women were cast as moral reformers, which connects much closer to their roles as defenders of virtue than of public crusaders. These

the United States, the majority of political behavior demonstrated by women did not involve public expressions of politics such as voting or campaigning, but rather around private persuasion and local community organizing (Sapiro 1983). These distinct gender roles in politics form the foundation for differences in changes in the political behavior of men and women.

This sexual division of politics along a public-private dimension shifted as changes in the legal environment in the 20th century began to recast gender roles. With the passage of the 19th Amendment, women were Constitutionally guaranteed the right to vote.[11] Although women's participation initially lagged behind that of men's rates of participation,[12] women's voting patterns began to match those of males by the middle of the 20th Century. This suggests a shift in norms away from distinct political gender roles, or a least a blurring of the boundary between "masculine" and "feminine" roles. However, even by the end of the century, women were less likely than men to engage in many "masculine" forms of participation, such as engaging in debate or donating to campaigns (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001).

Thus, while gender norms were changing during the 20th century, they did not change overnight; rather, gender norms were gradually changing. Prior to the 1920s, there had been a distinct boundary between men's and women's roles in the public realm, and "in order to alter that boundary women had not only to learn new habits, but to unlearn old assumptions about acceptable behavior" (Andersen 1996, pp. 68-69). This learning process could not take place overnight, and, thus, women were

difference still persist today, inasmuch as women are more likely to be engaged with community organizing and school board participation than their male counterparts, who are more likely to vote or participate in national campaigns than participate at the community level (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Hardy-Fanta 1993). Furthermore, many so-called "women's rights" issues today, e.g. abortion, concern the reproductive labor of women and role of women as mothers.

[11]Some states granted women the right to vote in national elections prior to the passage of the 19th Amendment, but these were mostly low-population, western states and territories.

[12]This characterization varies greatly by region, class, and ethnicity depending on data availability. There is some evidence that, even in the 1920s, women's participation mirrored closely that of men's participation (Corder and Wolbrecht 2006).

integrated gradually through the changing of gender norms rather than immediately through the creation of legal rights (Sapiro 1983). It is this gradual integration of women into the public political sphere that, I argue, is responsible for differences in the rates of change in the political ideologies of men and women. The shifting of norms and political behavior linked to these norms can thus be seen as a consequence of integration.

Gender Roles & Ideology

Shifts in gender roles following the passage of the 19th Amendment also led to shifts in the political behavior of new women voters. New political opportunities opened new participatory experiences to women, which, in turn, distinguished younger women voters from older ones. Furthermore, changes in the messages transmitted through political socialization altered beliefs about the role of women in politics. Finally, increases educational and job opportunities led to a more political adulthood socialization for women. These forces, in concert, led younger generations of women to have more extreme ideologies than women of older generations.

One important difference between younger and older generations is a difference in the types of information passed through parental socialization. Children generally learn how to behave in society from their parents; this learning process includes the transfer of partisan identification between generations (Campbell et al. 1960).[13] Furthermore, parental interest in politics has been shown to lead to higher levels of political sophistication and more extreme ideologies (Luskin 1990). With the passage of the 19th Amendment, women in the 1920s became the first generation of mothers to be able to act as political role models for their daughters. As the participation rates for women increased with each successive generation, younger

[13]Despite this finding, there is a concern that such "recall" questions, i.e. questions based on the respondent's memory, are subject to bias and error. Respondents may recall their parents' politics as their own, regardless of the reality of the situation. With regards to such concerns, Jennings and Niemi (1975) present evidence supporting the validity of these measures.

generations of women received stronger and stronger political cues from their mothers. Each successive generation of women was raised by more political mothers, and this shift in political socialization led to significant differences in political ideology among different generations of women.

Another important difference between younger and older generations of women is a difference in the types of socialization received in adulthood. For example, education has been shown to be an important source of political sophistication, inasmuch as it pertains to having a consistent, coherent set of political beliefs (Luskin 1990). Furthermore, with particular reference to women, higher education has been shown to be an important influence on beliefs about political gender norms, with women who receive higher education shown to be more likely to believe that they ought to participate in politics (Sapiro 1983). In the period following the passage of the 19th Amendment, changing gender roles led to a convergence in the educational experience of men and women. Thus, while older generations of women lagged behind their male counterparts with regard to education, younger generations of women did not. This convergence in educational attainment, and its concomitant effects on political sophistication and political gender norms, suggest that education is an important source of generational differences in the political ideology of women.

Finally, younger and older generations of women differed in the type of work in which they participated. The workplace has been shown to be an important source of political socialization, in that it tends to provide the resources, e.g. political information, necessary for participating in politics (Almond and Verba 1965). Furthermore, in the case of women, homemaking has been shown to suppress beliefs about gender equality in politics, which are linked to increased participation (Sapiro 1983). While for many women of older generations, homemaking was a primary career[14], changing gender norms following World War II led many women to seek

[14]This characterization fits white women to a much greater degree than women of other races.

careers outside the home. As women sought employment outside the home, they were able to marshal civic resources unavailable to them inside the home. Inasmuch as these civic resources translated into increased political sophistication, younger generations of women who left the home workplace became more ideological than women of older generations.

A Theory of Gender Socialization and Polarization

These relationships between changing gender roles, political socialization, and increasing political sophistication among women outlines the contours of my theory of gender socialization and polarization. In general terms, the theory holds that changing gender norms following the passage of the 19th Amendment led to a shift in the political socialization of women. Women have increasingly been socialized to see politics less as a masculine endeavor and more as inclusive of both men and women. These changing beliefs among women about women's role in politics have translated to higher levels of political sophistication in the female electorate, which have manifested as women having increasingly stronger ideological beliefs over time. Thus, changes in gender socialization have contributed to the partisan-ideological polarization we see in the electorate today.

The effect of gender differences in political socialization on ideological development begins with the passage of the 19th Amendment. While partial to full suffrage existed for women in a number of states, the ratification of the 19th Amendment introduced into the electorate a number of women who, prior to the 1920s, had no institutional incentive to participate in politics, and who were in fact socialized to not participate public politics. Importantly, previous scholars have demonstrated that people with little interest in politics or knowledge of politics tend to be ideological moderates with inconsistent policy positions and weak partisan ties (Converse 1964; Jennings 1992; Miller and Shanks 1996; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004; Stimson

1975). Thus, the passage of the 19th Amendment likely doubled the electorate by adding millions of political moderates, and, consequently, the American electorate of the 1920s should look much more moderate than that of the 1890s or earlier generations.

Following the passage of the 19th Amendment, political gender norms began to change such that women could participate to a greater extent in public politics, such as voting and campaigning. However, norms and attitudes, once learned, do not change very much. Thus, traditional gender norms and moderate ideological identification in women likely persisted beyond the immediate, legal incorporation of women into the electorate in 1920.

As social gender norms began to change, women became increasingly likely to get a college education and work outside the home. These changes allowed for an alternative adult socialization that began to blur traditional distinctions in political gender roles. Thus, in terms of political beliefs, younger generations of women began to look more like men of their generation and less like women of older generations. Importantly, changes in education, work opportunities, and childhood socialization should lead to women of younger generations having stronger partisan affiliations and greater ideological consistency than women of older generations.

As older, moderate cohorts, who were socialized under traditional norms exited the voter pool, younger, more ideological cohorts made up an increasing share of the electorate. The overall effect of this generational replacement was increasing partisan-ideological polarization. It is through this logic that I argue changes in gender political socialization have contributed to a more polarized electorate.

Empirical Implications

The preceding analysis has several testable implications for polarization. First, younger generations of women should demonstrate stronger ideologies and higher

levels of political sophistication than women of older generations. This prediction follows from the overall effect of changes in political socialization for women.

H1: Women of younger generations should be more likely to demonstrate higher levels of political sophistication and stronger ideologies than women of older generations.

Within the theory, differences in ideology are linked to differences in political socialization and the beliefs of women about political gender norms. Thus, there should be generational differences in political socialization, and these differences should translate to different beliefs about gender norms.

H2: Women of younger generations should experience a different political socialization (e.g. higher education, more political mothers, etc.) than women of older generations.

H3: Women of younger generations should be more likely to hold progressive political gender norms than women of older generations due to different political socialization experiences.

Finally, my theory speaks to how these changing political gender norms relate to the ideological development of women in the electorate. According to my theory, belief in more egalitarian political norms should be associated with stronger ideological beliefs in women. This is the final linkage between differences in political socialization and polarization.

H4: Women with more egalitarian beliefs about political gender norms should be more likely to have stronger ideological beliefs than women with more traditional beliefs about political gender norms.

Analysis

To test the implications of my argument, we would ideally look for changes in the electorate over time. Specifically, if older birth cohorts of women differ, as theorized, from men of their same birth cohort and women of younger birth cohorts, then generational replacement provides a viable explanation for differences in polarization over time. Looking at national surveys, such as the ANES allows for such a comparison.

Data

My main source of data is the Cumulative American National Elections Studies data set, which pools ANES surveys from between 1948 and 2008. As such, my unit of analysis is the individual. I pool the studies together, which is appropriate in this case because the operative comparison in the data is between voters of different generations and not different elections. Thus, in all the following analysis, respondents are grouped by birth year or birth cohort. This allows me to make the comparisons across generations needed to support my theory.

Difference in Socialization

An important linkage within my theory of political gender socialization and polarization concerns changes in beliefs about political gender norms. Changes in political socialization should lead to changes in beliefs about political gender roles and the extent to which women feel as though they belong in public life. With respect to childhood socialization, I expect to see changes in the political character of parents. Specifically, I expect to see each subsequent generation to have more politically involved mothers than the last generation. We can examine this trend by looking at the proportion of respondents within a birth cohort who identified their parents as being politically active (Figure 2.6). This measure defines parents as politically

active if they identify with one of the major parties and were considered by their children to be politically active. Respondents born in later cohorts are much more likely to have a politically active mother than those born in earlier cohorts. Furthermore, there appears to be little growth in the level of political activity of fathers.[15] The proportion of respondents with political fathers has stayed constant across generations at around 75%, but the proportion with political mothers has greatly increased from around 40% to nearly 60%. This suggests that successive generations of respondents were getting stronger signals about political engagement from their mothers when compared to older generations. Additionally, these differences between mothers and fathers suggest that any differences in political socialization between generations would be conditioned on differences in the political activity of mothers and not fathers. This supports the argument that, if women are socialized more by their mothers than their fathers (as suggested in, e.g., Rinehart (1992)), differences in gender socialization could explain differential ideological polarization between the genders.

In addition to the childhood socialization process, adult socialization has also occurred outside the home at work and at school. Decreasing differences between the genders in work force participation and education would indicate that adult socialization process is becoming more uniform across the genders. One venue for adult socialization is the workplace, and we can look for differences in the difference in the proportion of female and male respondents answering that they work outside the home to measure differences in workplace environments (Figure 2.7). In general the trend shows a marked decrease in the difference between the genders beginning with the age cohort born in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Consequently, this is the same cohort that would be entering the workforce in the late 1950s and early

[15]The rate of growth in mothers is roughly 24 times that of fathers, and this difference is significant at the $\alpha \leq 0.05$ level.

1960s, which supports the earlier argument that opportunities for women for political socialization outside the home really began in the 1960s. Also, this graph supports prior research that the gender differences in employment are decreasing over time.

Another process of adult socialization occurs during adult education experiences, such as college. Looking at generational differences in college education[16] between the two genders could provide insight into gender differences in partisan-ideological polarization (Figure 2.8). Cohorts born before 1910 appear to have very similar, low levels of college education. However, beginning with respondents born in the 1910s, a greater proportion of men receive a college education when compared to women. At the widest point in the gap, that of the 1940s cohort, men were 83% more likely to have a college degree than women. The education gap then begins to shrink in successive generations until in the 1970s cohort, when women again match their male counterparts in levels of education.[17] Inasmuch as college socializes citizens politically, these differences in education suggest a differing level of socialization that has grown and then shrunk for successive generations. This evidence, along with that concerning political parentage and workplace differences provide support for hypothesis H2, that women of younger generations are receiving different political socialization experiences than their mothers.

As a first multivariate cut at examining this relationship, consider a model[18] of the relationship between generational change and beliefs about women's role in society (Table 2.2).[19] Here the dependent variable measures, on a 7-point scale,

[16]College education here refers respondents to having answered as having a BA level degree or higher when asked about education.

[17]The difference in education for men and women is statistically significant at the $\alpha \leq 0.05$ level for the 1910s, 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s cohorts.

[18]Models are estimated via Bayesian MCMC using the MCMCglmm package for the R statistical software. Coefficients for effects are modeled to be distributed normally, and priors are set to be uninformative. All models were run over 15000 iterations, with all reaching convergence. Gelman-Rubin statistics and trace plots evidencing convergence are available on request.

[19]One of the key components of my theory is that generational differences represent the manifestation of change in public opinion. Testing for cohort effects, i.e. generational effects, is difficult in an analytical setting due to the fact that many different influences can occur concurrently with

the extent to which the respondent believes women should have an equal role in running society.[20] An alternative measure of beliefs in political gender norms asks respondents to agree or disagree with the statement "Women should stay out of politics." Supporters of progressive gender norms would likely disagree with this statement, and, thus, it offers another measure of beliefs in political gender norms.

Models 1 and 2 indicates that, among both men and women, beliefs about women's role in society have become more egalitarian over time. This comports with general knowledge about the progress women have made in breaking down traditional gender divisions. Model 1 increases our understanding of this development by including information about how changing political socialization has influenced this development. Including variables about the political nature of mothers and fathers indicates that some of the growth in support of progressive gender norms can be tied to the growth in numbers of political mothers depicted in Figure 2.6. Women with political mothers are around 30% more likely to believe in equal gender roles than women with non-political mothers, and around 50% less likely to believe that women's place is in the home (Figures 2.9 and 2.10). Furthermore, in looking

generational effects. More problematically, for any given survey, age, year, and cohort effects are a linear expression of each other. For example, in the 1984 ANES, a person who is 34 may exhibit the life-cycle effects of being 34, year effects of being surveyed in 1984, or cohort effects of being born in 1950. Historically, separating these effects using regression modeling has been difficult, as estimated effects for all three leads to a perfect linear dependency and excluding one presents possible omitted variable bias. To combat this problem, I draw from recent research suggesting the use of hierarchical linear modeling to estimate age, year, and cohort effects (Yang and Land 2006, 2008). This process conceptualizing cross-section survey respondents as being nested in years and birth cohorts. As such, effects are estimated with a random-effects model, and year and cohort are considered random. This overcomes the linear dependency in a regular regression framework and allows for the estimation of year and cohort effects. Furthermore, if the model estimates null year and cohort effects, this can be interpreted as the other independent variables in the model accounting for any temporal differences across time or cohorts (Neundorf and Niemi 2014). Thus, this modeling approach is well-suited for testing my theory about the causes behind generational differences. Figures of the year and cohort effects can be found in the appendix.

[20]Higher values indicate less egalitarian beliefs. The text of the question reads "Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. Others feel that a women's place is in the home. And of course, some people have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this?"

at Model 1, these results seem to hold even including other socialization factors used to explain this growth, such as education and work outside the home. Finally, while a college education can increase progressive beliefs for both men and women, having political mothers and working outside the home appears to only affect the gender norm beliefs of women. This suggests that women have been greater influenced by the shrinking of the political gender gap than men, which would be expected given the different starting places for both genders.[21] These models lend support to hypotheses H2 & H3, in that differences in political socialization seem to have led to differences in beliefs about political gender roles.

Differences in Sophistication

Before returning to polarization, these differences in beliefs about political gender roles should translate to stronger ideological beliefs among women. As described in my theory, women who have adopted more egalitarian political gender norms as a consequence of changes in political socialization should be more likely to demonstrate higher levels of political sophistication than older generations of women socialized into traditional gender norms. One measure political sophistication is the correlation between between partisan and ideological identification. To see how this relationship has changed over time, I examine the Spearman correlation between 7-point partisan self-identification[22] and 7-point ideological self-placement grouped by birth cohort (Figure 2.4b). Women from earlier cohorts tend to have a lower correlation between partisan identification and ideology than both women of later generations and men of their same generation. This suggests that women of that generation exhibited lower partisan-ideological consistency than women of later generations and men of their same generation. Furthermore, this gender gap appears to be shrinking over

[21] Differences between the number of observations in each model are due to missingness in the data.

[22] Scale values are 1="Strong Democrat", 2="Democrat", 3="Independent Leaning Democrat", 4="Independent", 5="Independent Leaning Republican", 6="Republican", & 7="Strong Republican"

time.[23] The correlation for successive generations of men as grown about 23%, and the correlation for the same generations of women has grown around 48%. This, again, suggests that the more rapid growth of polarization in women contributes disproportionately to the growth of polarization in the electorate.

Another measure of political sophistication is the proportion of respondents not able to place themselves on a 7-point ideology scale. In looking at this proportion over time, early generations of women were not able or willing to place themselves ideologically (Figure 2.5). Upwards of 60% of females born before 1900 could not place themselves ideologically compared to roughly 25% of women born in the 1960s. Consider also the comparison between the genders. For the generation born before 1900, there is a 19-point gap between the genders. Contrast this with the generation born in the 1960s, where the gap is around 5 points.[24] Finally, the decreasing difference between men and women demonstrates how the gender gap in political sophistication is shrinking over time. This evidence supports H1, that younger generations of women exhibit higher political sophistication and stronger ideologies than women of older generations.

Beyond simple group difference, multivariate analysis also supports the conclusion that gender differences in political sophistication can be tied difference in gender role socialization (Table 2.3). Models 3-5 present similar analysis across three different measures of political sophistication: placing ones' self ideologically, placing the parties by ideological label, and understanding the underlying policy foundation for each of the parties. Across all three models, the usual predictors of political sophistication behave in the expected ways. For example, a college education greatly increases sophistication as does a strong partisan identity. On the other

[23]Comparing the slopes on the lines of best fit indicates that the rate of correspondence for women is growing 1.55 times as fast as the same rate for men. This difference is significant at the $\alpha \leq 0.05$ level

[24]All of these differences are statistically significant at the $\alpha \leq 0.05$ level.

hand, espousing an Evangelical Protestant worldview or living in the South reduces the probability of demonstrating political sophistication.

Interestingly, gender roles play an important role in the development of political sophistication as predicted in hypothesis H1. Across all three measures, having progressive views on gender roles increases the probability of demonstrating ideological thinking (Figures 2.11 to 2.13). Furthermore, these relationships appear only for women; changing views on gender roles do not affect men. This effect is so great that women who believe in progressive gender roles are able to completely close the gender gap in sophistication demonstrated among respondents who espouse traditional views.

Generational Differences in Polarization

If my theory of gender socialization and polarization holds, then I should show gender and generational differences in polarization. In looking at the relationship between birth cohort and ideological extremity, successive birth cohorts of both men and women seem to be more ideologically extreme than older birth cohorts. Moreover, the relationship between birth cohort and ideological extremity is nearly twice as strong for women as it is for men. This comports with the evidence presented in Table 2.1 that polarization is happening faster for women than it is for men. Substantively speaking, a woman is around 35% less likely to self-identify as a moderate than a woman born twenty years earlier, and around 52% more likely to identify as extremely ideological. Compare this men, who are only 27% more likely to identify as extremely ideology and 20% less likely to identify as moderates.

Another way of understanding partisan-ideological polarization is to look at the consistency between a respondent's ideology and their party affiliation. A "consistent" ideology is one in which a liberal respondent would identify with a liberal party, and a conservative respondent would identify with a conservative party. Having a

consistent ideological-partisan identification is an indicator of ideological sophistication, and has been used as a measure of polarization in the past (Abramowitz 2010).

If there are gender differences in polarization, then we should see gender differences in the proportion of respondents with a consistent[25] ideology over time (Figure 2.4a). While the proportion of men that have consistent partisan-ideological identifications has increased with each successive cohort, this growth has flattened out following the cohort born in the 1940s. Women, on the other hand, have continued to grow in consistency such that the 1970s cohort of women matches the 1970s cohort of men. Furthermore, the proportion has grown at a faster rate for women than men.[26] Cohorts of men born in the 1940s and later demonstrate fairly stable levels of partisan ideological consistency; conversely, women of the same cohorts continue to exhibit growth in partisan ideological consistency, which suggests a disproportionate effect on polarization.

Finally, having shown that changes in gender role socialization have led to political sophistication, a final link in the theory is to show that political sophistication is tied to stronger ideological beliefs (Table 2.4). Models 6 & 7 use the traditional ideological self-identification scale as a dependent variable, and I have folded the scale to estimate how extreme a respondent's ideology is in either direction, liberal or conservative. In looking across two different measures of political sophistication, identifying the conservative party and matching one's policy preferences to the appropriate party, higher sophistication is linked with more extreme ideological identification (Figures 2.14 and 2.15). Importantly, sophistication does not move respondents one category at a time, but appear to move respondents from the most

[25]Having a consistent partisan-ideological identification consists of being a liberal and identifying as a Democrat, being a conservative and identifying as a Republican, or being moderate and identifying as a independent. Note that only respondents after 1972 are included.

[26]The difference between men and women respondents is statistically significant at the $\alpha \leq 0.05$ level for the 1920s through 1960s cohorts. By the 1970s, this difference is null.

moderate category to the most extreme. Also, the size of the effect is similar to other demographics characteristics like gender and education.

The relationship found in Models 6 and 7 also extends to measures of the policy preferences of Americans. Models 8 and 9 use policy position questions on 44 different issues to estimate a latent dimension of ideology.[27] For both models, sophistication predicts more extreme ideologies. Moreover this effect is similar to other demographic characteristics which corroborates the findings in Models 8 and 9.

Putting all the evidence together, I have shown, link-by-link how incorporation and changing socialization has led to ideological divergence. First, and starting historically with suffrage, successive generations of women began to be incorporated into political activities at increasing rates. This increase led to changes in socialization such that younger generations of women were more likely to believe that politics was as much a woman's arena as a mans. As beliefs about gender norms changed, successive generations of women became increasingly sophisticated, so much so that the gender gap in the youngest generation of voters is marginal. Finally, as women began using ideological tools and partisanship to organize their thoughts about politics, this led to the adoption of increasingly extreme policy positions. As such, the incorporation of women can be seen as partially fulfilled in the current polarized electorate.

[27]More specifically, I estimate ordinal responses on policy preference questions as a function of latent ideology following the Graded Response Model developed by Samejima (1970). This model assumes that a respondent i's response X on question j is a function of their ideology Θ and cut-points x such that:

$$P(X_{ij} = x_{ij}|\Theta_i) = P^*_{x_{ij}}(\Theta_i) - P^*_{x_{ij}+1}(\Theta_i) \text{ where: } P^*_{x_{ij}}(\Theta_i) = P(X_{ij} \geq x_{ij}|\Theta_i)$$

This model allows different policy questions to influence ideology to different degrees, and, as such, overcomes concerns about missing data and the relative weight of different policy questions.Ideologies range from -3 (liberal) to +3 (positive), with 0 representing the ideal moderate position.

Conclusion

Mass polarization is an important phenomenon in American politics, with important implications for the functioning of American democracy. I have argued that the increasing political incorporation of women in the electorate following a shift in political gender norms has led to the increasing political sophistication of women. As more politically sophisticated women replace less sophisticated women through generational replacement, the electorate as a whole becomes more polarized. Thus, the political integration of women has contributed to the mass polarization we now see in the electorate.

In fitting these findings with the current polarization debate, this paper has offered a novel argument for the growing partisan-ideological polarization in the American electorate. It presents a strong case for revaluation of assumptions about the stability of gender differences over time. Furthermore, it highlights the need for more cohort-based analysis in understanding change over time. This original research should contribute significantly to the current polarization conversation, and provide several interesting avenues for future research.

One interesting implication of this paper is that polarization seems here to stay. While other mechanisms may allow parties to manipulate polarization for electoral reasons, the argument of this paper hinges on one structural change that can never happen again. While the vote may be extended to other members of population, such as felons, in time, the electorate will never effectively double again as it did in the 1920s. As such, this paper has strong implications for the prospects of moderation in the near future.

While there is strong evidence that the shrinking gender gap has led to increased polarization, this paper is not arguing that this is the only mechanism for growing polarization. As was in the case in several graphs, men appear to be becoming

more polarized as well; the paper just argues that the rate is much faster for women than men. Consequently, this argument leaves room for other explanations as to the growing polarization among men and women. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the gender differences here apply only certain subsets of the population. For example, partisan-ideological consistency has not increased over time for blacks of either gender, and the gender differences in ideological self-identification abilities persist for lower-income Americans. This potential for intersectional differences in integrations provides an interesting avenue for future research.

Tables

Table 2.1: Difference in Polarization by Gender

Gender Differences in Polarization, 1972-2008				
I. *Standard Deviation of Ideological Self-Identification*				
	1972	2008	Growth	Ratio
Men	1.289	1.472	0.183	-
Women	1.274	1.594	0.320	1.746
II. *Difference in Party Means of Ideological Self-Identification*				
	1972	2008	Growth	Ratio
Men	0.908	1.707	0.799	-
Women	0.832	1.753	0.921	1.152

Table 2.2: Predicting Gender Socialization

	Models	
	(1)	(2)
	Dependent Variable	
	Woman's Place in Society	Woman's Role in Politics
	Egaltarian → Traditional	
Age	0.009	0.001
	(0.013)	(0.025)
Woman	−0.010	0.048
	(0.046)	(0.058)
Political Mom	0.029	−0.054
	(0.197)	(0.529)
Political Dad	−0.093	−0.457
	(0.213)	(0.556)
College	−0.582∗	−2.658∗
	(0.143)	(0.779)
Homemaker	0.550∗	0.060
	(0.099)	(0.276)
Strength of Party ID	0.033	0.057
	(0.042)	(0.111)
Evangelical	0.383∗	1.002∗
	(0.084)	(0.212)
Woman * Political Mom	−0.434∗	−1.047
	(0.251)	(0.674)
Woman * Political Dad	−0.264	0.667
	(0.253)	(0.667)
Woman * College	−0.065	−0.937
	(0.191)	(1.492)
N	1664	1032
DIC	5488	826

Note: * indicates that 0 is not an element of the 90% high density interval.

Table 2.2: *Predicting Gender Socialization* This table presents hierarchical models predicting the effect of different political socialization factors for men and women. For both measures of gender socialization, education and religion play similar but opposite effects on social gender identities. Obtaining a college degree tends to predict more egalitarian views and identifying as Evangelical predicts more traditional gender socialization. In looking at beliefs about a woman's role in society, the political behavior of a respondents mother plays a role as well, but only if the respondent is a woman as well. Having a political mother tends to predict a more active role in public life for a woman than having another political parent.

Table 2.3: Predicting Political Sophistication

	Models		
	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Dependent Variable		
	Does R know own Ideological ID? (Yes = 0, No = 1)	Does R know more conservative party? (Yes = 0, No = 1)	Does R which party favors strong gov't? (Yes = 0, No = 1)
Woman's Place in Society	0.040∗	0.054∗	−0.060∗
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Age	0.002	−0.007	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Woman	0.112∗	0.046	0.137∗
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.046)
College	−1.915∗	−1.912∗	−0.837∗
	(0.091)	(0.098)	(0.077)
Homemaker	0.099	0.068	0.089
	(0.066)	(0.093)	(0.080)
Strength of Party ID	−0.274∗	−0.312∗	−0.057∗
	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.030)
Evangelical	0.442∗	0.099	0.062
	(0.055)	(0.075)	(0.067)
South	0.410∗	0.419∗	0.106
	(0.084)	(0.079)	(0.067)
Woman's Place * Woman	0.101∗	0.121∗	0.200∗
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.022)
N	14559	6216	10635
DIC	14415	7523	9986

Note: * indicates that 0 is not an element of the 90% high density interval.

Table 2.3: *Predicting Sophistication through Gender Socialization* This table presents hierarchical models predicting the effect of different political socialization for women on different measures of political sophistication. Across all three measures, the effect of gender socialization is different for men and women. For women, more egaltarian beliefs about gender roles are predictive of higher levels of political sophistication. Additionally, a college education and stronger party affiliation predicts a higher level of sophistication, while being in the South or identifying as Evangelical predict lower levels of sophistication.

Table 2.4: Predicting Ideological Extremity

	Models			
	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Dependent Variable			
	Self-Reported Ideology (Absolute Value) (Moderate = 0, Extreme = 4)		Estimated Ideology (Absolute Value) (Moderate = 0, Extreme = 2.4)	
Correctly ID's Conservative Party	0.448∗	–	0.063∗	–
	(0.051)		(0.027)	
Policy Preferences Match Party	–	0.514∗	–	0.069∗
		(0.063)		(0.036)
Age	−0.003	0.003	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Woman	−0.092∗	−0.126∗	0.002	−0.008
	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.021)
College	0.314∗	0.343∗	0.088∗	0.077∗
	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Homemaker	−0.048	−0.049	−0.032	−0.024
	(0.068)	(0.051)	(0.037)	(0.032)
Strength of Party ID	0.215∗	0.296∗	0.031∗	0.048∗
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Evangelical	0.211∗	0.140∗	0.062∗	0.063∗
	(0.055)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.026)
South	0.046	0.040	0.076∗	0.025∗
	(0.057)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.025)
N	4677	11015	6195	9067
DIC	10663	19330	12532	18351

Note: * indicates that 0 is not an element of the 90% high density interval.

Table 2.4: *Predicting Ideological Extremity through Political Sophistication* This table presents hierarchical models predicting the effect of different levels of political sophistication on ideological extremity. Across all measures, political sophistication is postively associated with ideological extremity. Furthermore, the magnitude of its effect is similar to that of holding Evangelical beliefs, obtaining a college degree, or having strong party affiliation.

Figures



Figure 2.1: *Histogram of ANES 7-point Respondent Ideology, for 1972 & 1974 and 2002 & 2004.* The categories represented here range from "very liberal" to "very conservative," with "moderates" representing the middle category. Respondents answering "Don't Know" or "Haven't Thought About it Much" are excluded from this analysis.



Figure 2.2: *Mean Ideology of Party Identifiers over Time.* Each line represents the mean ideology for respondents who identified with either major party and who responded as voting in the last election. Respondents answering as "leaning" toward either party are included as identifying with that party.



Figure 2.3: *Frequency of Voters for Presidential Elections in 1952, 1980, & 2000, Organized by Birth Cohort.* Each bar plot represents the number of respondents in each ANES survey reporting voting in that year's presidential election. Each bar in each plot represents a categorization of voters by the decade in which they were born. Only the x-axis is constant between all three bar plots.



(a) *Proportion of Respondents with Consistent Partisan-Ideological Identification, Organized by Birth Cohort.* Each dot represents the proportion of respondents with a self-reported ideology that matches the ideology of the party with which they identify.



(b) *Correlation Between Partisan Self-Identification and Ideological Self-Placement, Organized by Birth Cohort.* Each dot represents the Spearman correlation between partisan and ideological self-identification. Lines indicate lines of best fit.

Figure 2.4: Each of these figures show two different measures of partisan-ideological sophistication. The left figure shows the proportion of respondents with consistent partisan and ideological identifications. The right panel shows the growth of the correlation between party and ideology over time.



Figure 2.5: *Proportion of Respondents Unable to Place Themselves on a 7-Point Ideology Scale, Organized by Birth Cohort.* Each point represents the proportion of respondents able to place themselves on a 7-point ideological self-identification scale.



Figure 2.6: *Proportion of Respondents with Politically Active Parents, broken down by parent and birth year.* Each dot represents the proportion of respondents with political mothers or fathers in each birth year.



Figure 2.7: *Difference in the Proportion of Women and Men Employed Outside the Home, Organized by Birth Year.* Each point represents the difference between males and females in the proportion of respondents answering that they work outside the home. The solid line represents a loess smooth of the data, and the dashed lines represent a 95 % confidence interval around that smoothed line.



Figure 2.8: *Proportion of Respondents with a College Education, by Gender and Birth Cohort* Each dot represents the proportion of respondents identifying as having received a college education or higher.



Figure 2.9: *Substantive Effects for Model 1* Each dot represents the posterior probability of expressing egaltarian views on gender roles. Parental influence are shown to be important, especially for women. This suggests that political gender identity is passed down from parents of the same gender.



Figure 2.10: *Substantive Effects for Model 2* Each dot represents the posterior probability of expressing egaltarian views on gender roles. As was the case with Model 1, having a political mother decreases the probability of holding traditional views about gender roles for daughters but not sons.



Figure 2.11: *Interaction Effects for Model 3* Each line represents the interactive effect between beliefs about gender roles and the probability of lacking any ideological self-identification, a measure of political sophistication. Political sophistication for women seems to be suppressed by holding more traditional beliefs about gender roles, but women who hold egalitarian beliefs about gender roles have similar political sophistication as men.



Figure 2.12: *Interaction Effects for Model 4* Each line represents the interactive effect between beliefs about gender roles and the probability of being able to correctly identify the more conservative party, a measure of political sophistication. Political sophistication for women seems to be suppressed by holding more traditional beliefs about gender roles, but women who hold egalitarian beliefs about gender roles have similar political sophistication as men.



Figure 2.13: *Interaction Effects for Model 5* Each line represents the interactive effect between beliefs about gender roles and the probability of being able to which party favors a stronger government, a measure of political sophistication. Political sophistication for women seems to be suppressed by holding more traditional beliefs about gender roles, but women who hold egalitarian beliefs about gender roles have similar political sophistication as men.



Figure 2.14: *Posterior Probabilities for Model 6* Each dot represents the posterior probability of identifying with one of the stated ideological categories. Respondents who have higher levels of political sophistication as measured as the ability to identify the more conservative party are less likely to identify as moderate and more likely to identify as extremely liberal or conservative.



Figure 2.15: *Posterior Probabilities for Model 7* Each dot represents the posterior probability of identifying with one of the stated ideological categories. Respondents who have higher levels of political sophistication as measured as the ability to correctly label one's policy preferences are less likely to identify as moderate and more likely to identify as extremely liberal or conservative.

Appendix



Figure 2.16: *Histogram of ANES 7-point Respondent Ideology, for 1972 & 1974 and 2002 & 2004 ANES Surveys, separated by gender.* The categories represented here range from "very liberal" to "very conservative," with "moderates" representing the middle category. Respondents answering "Don't Know" or "Haven't Thought About it Much" are excluded from this analysis.



Figure 2.17: *Standard Deviation of Ideology for Voters over Time, Broken Down by Gender.* Each dot represents the standard deviation of ideological self-placement for men and women. Lines of best fit are included to aid interpretation. Respondents identifying as "Don't Know" or "Haven't Thought About It" are excluded from this graph.



Figure 2.18: *Proportion of Respondents Correctly Identifying Republicans as the Conservative Party, Organized by Birth Cohort.* Each point represents the proportion of respondents able to correctly identify Republicans as the conservative party.



Figure 2.19: *Correlation between Strength of Parent's Partisanship and Strength of Respondent's Partisanship, Organized by Birth Cohort, Parent, and Gender.* Each point represents the average correlation within each birth cohort between the strength of a parent's partisanship and the strength of a respondent's partisanship. The circles represent the average correlation with a mother's partisanship, and the triangles represent the average correlation with a father's partisanship.



(a) *Mean Ideology of Democrats, By Gender and Birth Cohort*



(b) *Mean Ideology of Republicans, By Gender and Birth Cohort*

Figure 2.20: These figures present the mean ideology for Democrat and Republican voters broken down by birth cohort and gender. Birth cohorts pooled by half decade. Lines represent lines of best fit.



(a) *Standard Deviation of Ideology for Democrats, By Gender and Birth Cohort*



(b) *Standard Deviation of Ideology for Republicans, By Gender and Birth Cohort*

Figure 2.21: These figures present the standard deviation of ideology for Democrat and Republican voters broken down by birth cohort and gender. Birth cohorts pooled by half decade. Lines represent lines of best fit.



Figure 2.22: *Coefficients on Year Effects* Each plot shows the estimated coefficients for year effects in Models 1 - 9.



Figure 2.23: *Coefficients on Cohort Effects* Each plot shows the estimated coefficients cohort effects in Models 1- 9.

Part 3

Incorporation, Identity, and Change in Black Public Opinion

Introduction

Black public opinion in America has undergone a unique change over the past several decades. While once homogeneously liberal, a subset of blacks in America have begun to adopt more conservative positions on social and economic issues, and this has moved black public opinion towards the center of the ideological spectrum (see e.g. Tate 2010). Given the role that race consciousness plays in maintaining a liberal identity (see e.g. Dawson 1994; Tate 1993), one simple explanation for this centering of black public opinion might be decreasing race consciousness in the black community. However, why would race consciousness only decrease for a particular subset of blacks?

In this paper, I argue that economic incorporation has led to a fundamental change in black public opinion. Following political incorporation in the 1960s, blacks were offered more economic opportunities, which, in turn, led to the development of a black middle and upper class. These changes in class consciousness for this subset of blacks is then linked to a decrease in racial consciousness. Thus, economic incorporation led to a shift in political identity that manifests as support for more conservative policies.

This shift in black public opinion has important consequences for the future

of American politics. In this paper, I show how decreasing racial consciousness is linked to decreasing Democratic identification and support for liberal policies among blacks. Additionally, I show how this link manifests across generational. To the extent the Democratic Party relies on blacks as important component of its electoral coalition, this suggests that in the future the Democratic Party must change in order to appeal to younger generations. Also, my findings hint that potential class cleavages in American politics may supplant racial cleavages as dividing lines in the future.

This paper proceeds as follows. I begin with broad discussion of recent developments in black public opinion. Next, I describe how differences in political and economic incorporation coupled with generational replacement instigated these changes. This leads to a presentation of the theory, which links incorporation to increasing polarization in black ideology. Using data from a number of public opinion surveys, I next provide evidence supporting my theory before concluding with a discussion of the results.

Recent Changes in Black Public Opinion

Over the past 50 years, black public opinion has shifted from monolithic support of Democrats and a liberal policy agenda following the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960s to a much more heterogeneous group of preferences. Tate (2010) shows that blacks have moderated from liberal positions on a number of different dimensions, including both social and economic issues. Likewise, Gay (2014) demonstrates how developing tensions between racial identification with the Democratic Party and more conservative policy preferences has led to some defections among politically knowledgeable blacks. These changes highlight a novel trend in black public opinion.

For context on the nature of these changes, consider also important ideological

changes in white public opinion.[1] From the early 1970s to the early 2000s the moderate share of the electorate dropped, and respondents identifying as either liberal or conservative increased (Figure 3.1).[2] For whites, the percent of respondents identifying as "moderate" has decreased from around 35% in early 1970s to around 25% in the early 2000s. Furthermore, the share of respondents identifying as "somewhat liberal" and "liberal" has increased from just under 20% to around 25%. On the conservative side, the corresponding categories have grown from around 30% to 35%. Even within the non-moderate respondents, "somewhat liberal (conservative)" was the modal category in the early 1970s, but has now been surpassed by the more extreme "liberal (conservative)" category.

For blacks, there is a somewhat different, but equally interesting, pattern. In 1972, the modal identification for blacks was "liberal," and this was still the case 30 years later. However, there was a great deal of change on the moderate-conservative side of the scale. Between 1972 and 2004, there was a substantial decrease in the percentage of blacks identifying as "moderate" and a substantial increase in the percentage of blacks identifying as "conservative." On a much smaller scale, there was a substantial decrease in blacks identifying as either "slightly liberal" or "slightly conservative," and a large increase in the percentage identifying as "extremely conservative." These trends highlight important differences between blacks and whites when it comes to ideological change since 1972. For whites, the trend has been away from moderate identification towards the ideological extremes, but for blacks the shift has been in only one direction: towards conservatism.

Another way to understand heterogeneity in public opinion is to compare the

[1]For the following analysis, the Cumulative ANES is used to describe trends in white ideology. For most years, the ANES samples an insufficient number of blacks to draw valid inferences. Thus, to supplement the ANES, the following analyses pool the National Black Election Study, which surveyed an oversampling of blacks in 1984, 1988, and 1996, the 1993 National Black Politics Survey, the 2004 National Politics Study, and the 2012 Outlook on Life Survey.

[2]Scale values are 1="Very Liberal", 2="Liberal", 3="Somewhat Liberal", 4="Moderate", 5="Somewhat Conservative", 6="Conservative", & 7="Very Conservative".

standard deviation of the ideology scale (see e.g. Abramowitz 2010). In looking at the standard deviation of the ideology scale over time, there appears to be an increase in the levels of polarization for both blacks and whites (Figure 3.2). While the standard deviation for blacks is higher than whites for all time periods surveyed, the overall growth for whites is around 3 times that of blacks, and twice as large over the period for which black ideology is measured. This may be a function of the strong ideological homogeneity within the black community or of the right-skewness in the distribution of black ideology.

Beyond just ideological identification, the overall issue positions of blacks have also become more conservative (Figure 3.3). Figure 3.3 presents the average latent ideology in a given year as estimated from a number of different survey questions about policy preferences.[3] Beginning in the 1970s, black public opinion moves from a strong liberal position to a much more moderate position by 2012. This moderation, as suggested by Figure 3.1, is due to a sizeable contingent of blacks adopting more conservative issue positions over time. However, it is still the case that black public opinion is more liberal than the average ideological position in the electorate.[4]

Changes Through Generational Replacement

This conservative shift in black public opinion raises the question of what might cause these changes. One simple explanation would posit that blacks are adopting more conservative positions in response to changes in the political environment. For example, Tate (2010) argues that, as black political elites have moderated in response to increasing political influence, ordinary blacks have moderated as well. However, scholars have consistently shown that a person's ideology is relatively after

[3]Although detailed to a greater extent in another paper, this methodology involves using Bayesian Item Response Theory to measure a latent ideological dimension from manifested policy preferences. The estimates presented here were generated from the Graded Response Model, which measures a latent dimension from ordinal data. Over 44 questions were used for these estimates, and anchor questions were used to link respondents on different surveys. Negative values represent a liberal ideology and positive values represent a conservative latent ideology.

[4]The average ideology is scaled in estimation to be 0.

young-adulthood, and rarely shifts dramatically (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1969; Jennings and Markus 1984; Stoker and Jennings 2008). This suggests that, at least at the mass level, individual-level changes over time are unlikely to explain macro-level changes.

If small shifts in individual behavior are not responsible for changes in the ideology of the electorate,[5] what other kind of processes could result in changes over time? One potential source of change in an electorate might be the gradual entrance to and exit from the electorate of different age cohorts, commonly known as generational replacement. If older cohorts that exit the electorate are systematically different from younger cohorts, then the character of the electorate will gradually shift in accordance with those differences. In the past, generational replacement has been used to explain shifts in partisanship, such as in the case of secular realignment or the evolution of issue agendas (Andersen 1979; Carmines and Stimson 1986; Campbell 2002).

In looking to generational change as a significant mechanism for change in the electorate over time, the next important question to ask is how do generations differ? Specifically, how are younger cohorts of black Americans ideologically different than older cohorts? One recently researched trend in black public opinion is the increasing conservatism of younger generations of blacks (Spence 2012; Tate 2010). In comparison to older generations of blacks, younger generations are much less likely to express liberal ideological self-identification (Figure 3.4). For the earliest birth cohorts, around 50% of blacks self-identified as "liberal;" however, younger cohorts, such as those born in the 1970s, identify as "liberal" only 37% of the time. Furthermore, this is coupled with a decreasing identification with Democratic Party (Figure 3.5). For example, blacks born in the 1920s and 1930s identified with the

[5]For a unique argument on how enough small, micro-level changes may provide a substantial building block for macro-level change, see Levendusky (2009*a*).

Democratic Party at a rate of around 90%.[6] It is noteworthy that generations were also those that were young adults during the Civil Rights era. However, blacks born in the 1970s, i.e. those born after the Civil Rights movement, identify at a rate around 75%. While blacks are still overwhelmingly Democrats, there is a negative trend in Democratic identification, and this highlights an important generational difference in black partisanship.

Coupling these changes in ideology with these changes in partisanship highlights the key partisan-ideological difference between generations of blacks (Figure 3.6). Across generations, the average ideology of Democratic blacks has not changed. However, younger generations of blacks are increasingly likely not to identify as Democrats, and, moreover, more likely to identify as conservative. For earlier generations of blacks, what few Republican there were tended to have very similar ideologies to black Democrats. However, later generations of Republicans have distinctly conservative ideological identification. These trends in identification are also matched by changes in policy preferences (Figure 3.7). Older generations of blacks had similar, slightly liberal policy preferences regardless of their party identification. However, successive cohorts of Republicans became more and more conservative while Democratic blacks retained a similar ideological character. Importantly, this demonstrates how the overall moderation in black public opinion is driven by younger cohorts who are more likely to not identify as Democrats and more likely to espouse conservative policy positions. It is this asymmetric shift in ideology that defines the overall partisan-ideological change in black public opinion: younger blacks are less Democratic and more conservative than older generations.

[6]Independent "leaners" are classified as identifying with the party towards which they lean.

Why Are Younger Generations of Blacks More Conservative?

Two trends related to black public opinion stand out as possible explanations for generational differences in black ideology. The first major trend has been the development of a black middle class following the gradual economic integration of blacks. Increasing white-collar opportunities to blacks have been tied to a decreasing salience of many important racial issues to middle-class blacks (Dawson 1994; Kilson 1981, 1983). Second, there has been an increasing political incorporation of blacks. This trend marks a shift from protest politics of a legally excluded minority towards the more white, mainstream politics characterized by voting and giving money to candidates (Tate 1993, 2010). Both of these trends help explain the formation of conservative black opinion over the past 30 years.

Both of these trends represent specific instances of a broader process of incorporation of blacks into mainstream or white America. While women were probably the largest group to experience incorporation into politics in the 20th century, they were not the only group. Blacks, who constituted America's largest minority throughout the 20th century, were disenfranchised throughout the South for much of that time. Restrictive voting laws, such as poll taxes and literacy tests, and intimidation tactics suppressed black participation throughout the South. Furthermore, legal segregation reinforced black separation and exclusion from white politics in the South.

Following the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960s, many of the structural barriers to participation, both political and economic, weakened or disappeared. Consequently, younger generations of blacks were raised with more opportunities than older generations. In other words, younger generations of blacks received different political socialization than their parents or grandparents. Political socialization, which describes the individual's "learning of social patterns corresponding

to his societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society," differed for blacks of younger generations because legal changes shifted the societal positions of many blacks (Hyman 1959; Sapiro 2004).

Incorporation and Black Political Subculture

When the levels of political and social constraints on blacks were at their highest, black political socialization took place in a black political subculture (Marvick 1965). This black political subculture differs in significant ways from the traditional white politics in America. With regards to ideology, black political subculture is substantially distinct from the liberal-conservative scale that characterizes white politics (Dawson 2001; Gilliam, Jr. 1975). Labels that better fit black ideology at the time were "black nationalism," "black feminism," and others. What is important to note is that black ideology prior to incorporation often concerned issues of incorporation, such as desegregation.

Another important difference between white and black political culture is blacks have historically communicated lower levels of internal political efficacy than whites (Lyons 1970). These lower levels of feelings of efficacy are evident even in childhood, and are influenced by family context (Clarke 1973; Orum and Cohen 1973), which suggest they are linked to childhood socialization. Additionally, black political subculture involves a much greater emphasis on local political leaders, especially religious leaders, than traditional white politics that focus on national elections (Marvick 1965; Harris 2001; Tate 1993, 2010). This, too, is likely a consequence of being excluded from national politics.

Finally, a critical component of black political subculture is a common conception of "linked fate," which is the idea that blacks share a common political destiny (Dawson 1994). This idea taps to some extent the belief that one's own fortunes are defined by being black, and that being black is being a member of a subordinated

group in American politics. As such, linked fate and its associated measures address the extent to which one believes he or she is not incorporated into mainstream America.

It is important to note that the development of black political subculture is dependent on the legal and social restrictions placed on blacks in the pre-Civil Rights Era. When controlling for socioeconomic status, many studies have found differences between blacks and whites to disappear (see e.g. Clarke 1973; Lyons 1970). Furthermore, other studies have shown elements of a black political subculture to be unique to blacks in the South, where suppression of black political and economic advancement was strongest (Marvick 1965). This suggests that beliefs about "linked fate" and the extent to which blacks are subordinate are the consequence of political socialization; indeed, one's societal position seems predictive of one's beliefs about the one's degree of incorporation.

Shifts in Incorporation

While black political subculture is likely a consequence of the institutional and social restraints placed on blacks for much of American history, the relaxation of these restraints has led to several significant shifts in black political beliefs and behavior. For example, in the wake of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the registration of black voters in the South doubled, growing from around 30% of the black voting age population in 1960 to 60% in 1970 (Campbell and Feagin 1975). Also, feelings of political efficacy among blacks began to rise in the 1970s (Pierce and Carey, Jr. 1971). By the mid-1980s, differences in white and black turnout diminished greatly; controlling for socioeconomic status, black participation looks very much like white participation (Tate 1993). Together, these shifts in black political behavior suggests a movement away from local, community politics towards an emphasis on national politics.

Changes in ideological identification mimic changes in political participation. Whereas, prior to incorporation, many blacks could not identify where their political position was on a mainstream, liberal-conservative spectrum, the proportion of blacks who can identify with the scale has increased significantly over time (Figure 3.8). For the earliest generations of blacks, between 40-60% of blacks would not place themselves on a liberal conservative scale; this corresponding figure for whites is around 24%. For later generations of blacks, this percentage is much lower, around 25%, while for whites of later generations the percentage is around 15. This suggests that earlier generations of blacks were much less likely to think of their political ideologies in terms of "liberal" or "conservative" than younger generations.

Concomitant with the growth of political incorporation for American blacks is the growth of economic power for blacks. Although blacks still tend to be less affluent than whites, a significant black middle class emerged in the 1980s, and has been growing ever since (Wilson 2012). This new economic cleavage has led to a divergence in black public opinion, which did not exist prior to the 1960s. The emergence of a black middle and upper class has led to a growing moderate to conservative wing of black public opinion on many issues on which blacks used to agree (Tate 2010). At the micro-level, a decreasing affinity with the lower class has been associated with decreasing support for welfare and spending policies, which used to receive widespread support in the black community (Dawson 1994). Thus, economic integration as well as political integration have led to significant changes in black public opinion.

The transition of black politics from the protests of a marginalized, united group to the "business-as-usual" politics of an apparently integrated minority group is also apparent in the political attitudes of children. Gimpel, Lay and Schuknecht (2003) show that black youth in the 2000s were less likely to identify systematic oppression as commonplace than older generations. These beliefs are indicative of an overall

shift away from the exclusion of the 1960s and before towards incorporation.

The key linkage between legal shifts in incorporation and changing economic and political identities is the shift in political socialization, specifically with regards to "linked fate." As barriers to participation were removed, shifts in societal positioning changed the degree to which incorporated blacks saw themselves as members of an excluded black majority. Comparing across generations, the prevalence of feelings of "linked fate" peaked at around 75% for the birth cohort born in the 1940s (Figure 3.9). It is likely no coincidence that this is also the generation that were impressionable young adults during the civil rights era. However, younger generations are less likely to express the same feelings; only around 50% of the cohort born in the 1980s share the feelings of their grandparents. This decline, in turn, allowed for the adoption of ideological identities outside of the black political subculture, i.e. conservative identities. Furthermore, this growing disassociation with black political subculture allowed middle and upper class blacks to shift party affiliations to the Republican party.

Incorporation and Asymmetric Ideological Divergence

How have generational differences in incorporation led to changes in black public opinion? As younger, more incorporated generations of blacks replace older generations of blacks, the overall tenor of the electorate changes. Inasmuch as younger generations are more likely to be Republican and conservative due to changes in political socialization, then the ideological character of the parties will change as well. A growing Republican Party will become more conservative as new, conservative members join; the Democratic Party will become more liberal as conservative members realign with the Republican Party. As a consequence, the black community will become increasingly divergent ideologically and more moderate overall; this is the key characterization of black public opinion since the 1980s. This polarization

between the parties, in turn, will have profound effects on American politics as a whole.[7]

A Theory of Incorporation and Black Public Opinion

Thus, the key transition driving change in black public opinion over the past 50 years has been a shift from political exclusion to incorporation, and the concomitant shifts in behavior (Figure 3.10). Prior to the 1960s, blacks were systematically excluded from politics and society at large, especially in the South. Politics for this generation of blacks involved engagement in local politics and the church. Importantly, these generations of blacks were socialized to see themselves as members of distinct subculture from white, mainstream society.

However, with the passage of the civil rights legislation and the success of the civil rights movement, blacks started to become integrated into mainstream society. Immediately following the passage of civil rights legislation, blacks strongly identified with the Democratic party due to its position on racial issues. However, as younger generations grew up in a more racially progressive America, race likely became less dominant an issue for them. As these younger generations became affluent in a way denied to older generations, they likely began to adopt more conservative policy positions when compared to older generations of blacks. As younger generations became more Republican and more conservative, the Democratic Party became more homogeneous and, therefore, more liberal. This divergence between the ideologies of Democratic and Republicans helps explain the growing moderation in black public opinion and the ideological schism created within the black community.

[7]While, generally speaking, blacks do not make up a numerically large proportion of the electorate, they do exert political power through party caucuses, particularly in the Democratic Party. In as much as black public opinion influences these caucuses, increasing ideological polarization could have a substantial impact on the national party system. Also, Democratic electoral strategy depends on turning out black voters and winning over 85% of those voters. If a growing ideological split in the black community either decreases turnout or Democratic support, this could have a large impact on the national two-party system.

This theory of changing incorporation, socialization, and polarization across generations leads to several testable predictions. The first prediction to be tested derives from the first link in describing change in black public opinion: changing socialization. If this theory is true, then changes in the political and economic incorporation of blacks should lead to changes in socialization. Specifically, incorporated blacks should be less likely to identify with black political subculture. We operationalize the extent to which an individual feels affinity to black political subculture as the individual's sense of "linked fate."

Hypothesis 1: AS an individual becomes more incorporated into mainstream society economically and politically, they should be less likely to express feelings of "linked fate" than individuals who are not incorporated.

The second important step in explaining how incorporation leads to changes in political ideology is to link socialization to ideological identity and issue positions. Specifically, incorporated individuals, i.e. those expressing low beliefs in "linked fate," should be more likely to express a conservative political identity and support conservative policy positions. This is in strong contrast to individuals who express strong feelings of "linked fate" and who possess a more liberal character both in terms of identity and policy positions.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals who express weak feelings of "linked fate" should be more likely to express a "conservative" ideological identity and conservative policy preferences than individuals with strong feelings of "linked fate."

Hypothesis 3: If an individual possesses weak feelings of "linked fate," they should support more conservative policy positions than individuals with strong feelings of "linked fate."

Finally, these differences in ideology should manifest as political polarization between the two major parties. Specifically, the difference in policy positions of Democrats and Republicans should be greater in younger generations than in older generations. Differences in polarization across generations would then imply polarization across time, as younger cohorts replace older cohorts in the composition of

the electorate.

Hypothesis 4: Younger generations of Democrats and Republicans should express more divergent policy preferences than Democrats and Republicans of older generations.

Data and Analysis

Using these hypotheses, I evaluate the degree to which my theory explains partisan-ideological change in the black community. In order to test my predictions, I need individual level measures of socialization, incorporation, and ideology. To get these measures I draw on a number of national public opinion surveys, which I pool to aid inference.

Data

One of the recurrent problems when evaluating minority public opinion is the dearth of surveys that sample a sufficient number of individuals to draw reliable inferences. Such sample size problems exclude the possibility of just using many popular national surveys such as the ANES or GSS. Rather, I pool together several national surveys. My subsequent analyses pool the National Black Election Study, which surveyed an oversampling of blacks in 1984, 1988, and 1996, the 1993 National Black Politics Survey, and the 2004 National Politics Study, and the 2012 Outlook on Life Survey with the ANES. Together, these surveys give me 11,359 observations with which to work.

Measures

In order to measure my key conceptualization of socialization, "linked fate," I use a dichotomous measure coded from the question "Do you think what happens generally to black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life? Will it affect you a lot, some or not very much?" Respondents who say that what happens to other blacks will affect their lives some or a lot are coded as

having a strong sense of linked fate, and those who say no or it will have little effect are coded as not having a strong sense of linked fate. In my analysis this operates as both dependent and independent variable.

When my measure of linked fate is a key dependent variable, my theory says that incorporation will predict feelings of linked fate. To measure economic incorporation, I use class identification. Prior research suggests that class identification, i.e. does a respondent see himself or herself as a member of the working class, middle class, etc., is a good measure of the degree to which a respondent identifies with being a member of an economically subordinate group (Dawson 1994). My measure is a five point scale, measuring identification with the poor, working, middle, upper-middle, and upper classes. According to my theory, I would expect individuals with higher class identification to have a weaker sense of linked fate.

I also use linked fate as an independent variable to measure the extent to which socialization predicts both conservative ideological identification and conservative policy positions. Ideological self-identification is measured along a 7-point scale, where 1 signifies identification as "extremely liberal" and 7 indicates identification as "extremely conservative." As per my theory, I expect individuals with weaker senses of linked fate to be more likely to identify with a conservative ideology.

While increasing conservative identification is one measure of the increasing conservatism of blacks, I also measure how their policy preferences have changed. To calculate how policy preferences change, I use two similar measures: one is an index of issue positions on 8 different issue positions included across all the surveys[8] and the other is a scaling of policy preferences within the broader ideological context in the United States. For the first measure, I rescale all 8 questions to a 0-1 scale and then average the responses; a value of 1 represents the most "conserva-

[8]This number, though unfortunately limited, covers the universe of policy questions asked in surveys where questions about linked fate are also asked. A full listing of questions is included in the Appendix.

tive" responses on all answered policy questions, and 0 represents the most "liberal" responses across all answered policy preferences.

While this method is simple, it assumes that all questions are equally representative of ideology, and it does not account for potential answers when the data is missing. To overcome these shortcomings, I estimate a latent measure of ideology from the policy preference questions using Bayesian Item Response Theory to create the measure. This method assumes that each response to a question is a manifest measure of an underlying ideology.[9] Additionally, when estimating ideology with this method I can score respondents who have been asked different questions on the same scale. Accordingly, I scale not only the black respondents to the surveys mentioned above but also white respondents to the ANES. This methodology allows me to create a consistent ideology scaling for blacks and whites in the United States and gives me a useful tool for comparing individuals' ideologies across different surveys within a common context.[10] According to my theory, I would expect individuals with a weaker sense of linked fate to score higher on this scale.

My theory also speaks to the way in which these variables vary across generations. As my measure of generation, I create an ordinal measure, ranging from 1 to 9, measuring the decade in which the respondent was born. The measure begins in the 1900s and continues to the 1980s. Collapsing birth year into birth decade is necessary in order to get enough observations in each generation from which to draw inferences.

[9]More specifically, I estimate ordinal responses on policy preference questions as a function of latent ideology following the Graded Response Model developed by Samejima (1970). This model assumes that a respondent i's response X on question j is a function of their ideology Θ and cut-points x such that:

$$P(X_{ij} = x_{ij}|\Theta_i) = P^*_{x_{ij}}(\Theta_i) - P^*_{x_{ij}+1}(\Theta_i) \text{ where: } P^*_{x_{ij}}(\Theta_i) = P(X_{ij} \geq x_{ij}|\Theta_i)$$

This model allows different policy questions to influence ideology to different degrees, and, as such, overcomes concerns about missing data and the relative weight of different policy questions.

[10]As would be expected, blacks are more liberal than whites on average. See Table 3.5 for more details and other group comparisons.

In addition to these key theoretical variables, I also include a number of control variables that might be related to my variables of interest. One such control variable, education, has been shown in other research to predict positively feelings of linked fate as well as feelings of efficacy, and has been negatively associated with conservative identity and policy positions (see e.g. Dawson 1994). I include two dichotomous variables measuring the attainment of a high school diploma or college degree, to capture the influence of education. I also include a dummy variable for Republican Party identification and an ordinal measure of income when predicting ideological dispositions, as both have been shown to be related to linked fate and ideology.[11]

Understanding Age, Period, and Cohort Effects

One of the key components of my theory is that generational differences represent the manifestation of change in black public opinion. Testing for cohort effects, i.e. generational effects, is difficult in an analytical setting due to the fact that many different influences can occur concurrently with generational effects. More problematically, for any given survey, age, year, and cohort effects are a linear expression of each other. For example, in the 1984 NBES, a person who is 34 may exhibit the life-cycle effects of being 34, year effects of being surveyed in 1984, or cohort effects of being born in 1950. Historically, separating these effects using regression modeling has been difficult, as estimated effects for all three leads to a perfect linear dependency and excluding one presents possible omitted variable bias. To combat this problem, I draw from recent research suggesting the use of hierarchical linear modeling to estimate age, year, and cohort effects (Yang and Land 2006, 2008). This process conceptualizing cross-section survey respondents as being nested in years and birth cohorts. As such, effects are estimated with a random-effects model, and year and cohort are considered random. This overcomes the linear

[11]Summary statistics of all variables included in the analysis can be found in the Appendix.

dependency in a regular regression framework and allows for the estimation of year and cohort effects. Furthermore, if the model estimates null year and cohort effects, this can be interpreted as the other independent variables in the model accounting for any temporal differences across time or cohorts (Neundorf and Niemi 2014). Thus, this modeling approach is well-suited for testing my theory about the causes behind generational differences.

Analysis

The first step in my analysis explores the degree to which incorporation is associated with decreasing feelings of linked fate. If my theory is correct, then changes in incorporation, as measured in class identification, should lead to decreasing feelings of linked fate. To evaluate this relationship, I estimate[12] a random-effects logit model predicting feelings of linked fate (Model I, Table 3.1).[13] In general, my model supports Hypothesis 1 in that incorporation seems associated weaker feelings of linked fate. Individuals who are more likely to identify with the middle and upper class, i.e. those who experience some degree of economic incorporation, are less likely to express feelings of linked fate.[14] Moving from a lower to a higher class, e.g. moving from working to middle class decreases the odds of expressing feelings of linked fate by around 10 percentage points. The model predicts individuals who identify as rich to be 40% less likely to have feelings of linked fate as individuals who identify as poor (Figure 3.11). This effect is larger than any other gender, educational, or religious differences between respondents. Overall, these findings support Hypothesis 1, in that increasing economic incorporation as measured by

[12]Models are estimated via Bayesian MCMC using the MCMCglmm package for the R statistical software. Coefficients for effects are modeled to be distributed normally, and priors are set to be uninformative. All models were run over 45000 iterations, with all reaching convergence. Gelman-Rubin statistics and trace plots evidencing convergence are available on request.

[13]While estimated, the year and cohort effects are not presented in Table 3.1 because no effect passed the 95% threshold of statistical significance. If interested, the effects can be found in Table 3.4.

[14]There is some concern that class identification may be a function of feeling of linked fate, which raises concern for endogeneity. An instrumental variable analysis will be presented later.

class identity explains decreasing racial identity across generations.[15]

Interestingly, income is positively associated with feelings of linked fate when class identification is held constant. Overall, individuals who have incomes in highest category are 20 percentage points more likely to convey feelings of linked fate. This positive association is novel and interesting because it suggests that the relationship between class identity and racial identity is not necessarily based on material wealth but on social identities. This further lends credence to looking for changes in socialization and incorporation for causes of change.

As for other key differences in the model, education is positively associated with higher feelings of linked fate. Specifically, the model predicts that individuals with a college degree will be roughly 11 percentage points more likely to express feelings of linked fate. This confirms earlier analysis that education is positively associated with linked fate (Dawson 1994). Also, the model predicts that women will be less likely to express feelings of linked fate than men holding all other variables constant. Holding all else constant, men are around 10 percentage points more likely convey feelings of linked fate than women. These gender differences suggest that gender identity is likely a separate but nevertheless important influence on racial identity.

Having identified key predictors for feelings of linked fate, Hypotheses 2 and 3 predict that feelings of linked fate will be correlated with conservative ideological self-identification as well as conservative policy preferences. In order to test these hypothesis, I regress feelings of linked fate on measures of policy ideology as well as self-reported ideology (Models II - IV, Table 3.1). Model II uses my aforementioned measure of estimated ideology as its dependent variable, and Model III uses a simpler, more crude measure of policy preference. In both cases, linked fate is negatively associated with a more conservative ideology. This supports Hypothesis

[15]The lack of statistically significant effects for year and cohort measures can be interpreted as the individual-level independent variables in the model being sufficient to explain temporal differences across generations.

3 in that individuals with a strong racial consciousness are much more likely to express liberal policy preferences than individuals without the same consciousness. For my estimated measure of ideology, individuals with feelings of linked fate are around 0.15 points more liberal than individuals without feelings of linked fate; this represents around a 7% of the ideology scale. Similarly, the effect for Model III is around .03, which represents around 3% of the issue scale. However, this coefficient is not statistically significant; thus, only Model II supports Hypothesis 3.

Much like Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 2 also finds support in the model. Feelings of linked fate are negatively associated with conservative ideological identification. In other words, having feelings of shared life outcomes with other blacks decreases the probability of identifying with a more conservative ideology. Additionally, income, education and church attendance are also negatively associated with conservative ideological identification. This is opposite the direction as would be expected for whites in the United States. Given the role that income, education, and religion play for reinforcing racial consciousness among blacks, it may be the case that these variables actually increase liberal identification by way of increasing the strength of racial identity. Finally, being affiliated with Republican party is the strong predictor of conservative ideology, which is unsurprising given the strong relationship between the two.

Endogeneity Concerns and Causal Inference

This strong relationship between Republican Party identification and conservative ideological identification call attention to an important problem when interpreting the models presented in Table 3.1. For each of the models presented above, there is a potential endogeneity problem with key independent and dependent variables. For example, in Model I, while class identity is a potential influence on racial identity, it is also reasonable to speculate that racial identity may influence class identity.

Likewise, in Models II-IV, policy preferences, ideological identification, and party identification all likely cause each other to a certain degree. In each of these cases, endogeneity could potential bias the results presented and complicate any causal inference they provide.

In order to evaluate any potential endogeneity problems, I re-estimate each of models above using instrumental variables regression. Instrumental variable regression, which in this case will be Two State Least Squares and instrumental variables probit, uses variables related to potentially endogeneous independent variables but unrelated to the dependent variable to isolate the local average treatment effect of those independent variables. For instrumenting class identity, I use a policy question about the role of government in guaranteeing a standard of living for its citizens; answers to this questions are related to class identity but not racial identity. For questions involving ideology, I use a measure of voting, did the respondent vote, to instrument Republican Party identification, a measure of church attendance, does the respondent attend church at least monthly, to instrument ideological identification, and a measure of home ownership, does the respondent own their home, as an instrument for estimated policy ideology.[16] Results for these models are included in Table 3.2.

Generally speaking, instrumental variable regression confirm the findings from Models I and II. Class is predictive of linked fate at around the same magnitude estimated in Model I; likewise, the effect of linked fate on estimated ideology is negative and of the a same magnitude presented in Model II. Unlike Model III, Model VII suggests finds support for Hypothesis 3 in that linked fate is a positive predictor of a liberal ideology and negatively associated with a conservative ideology. However, Model VIII does not find a predictive link between racial identity and ideological

[16]Both the F- and t-statistics for the first stage regressions using these measures are significant at the 95% confidence level, suggesting that they are reasonable instruments.

identification. This suggests the support found for Hypothesis 2 in Table 3.1 was an artifact of the endogenity and not the direct consequence of linked fate predicting conservative ideological identification. On the other hand, factors influencing feelings linked fate, such as education and church attendance, still affect ideological identity, and perhaps racial identity may be a mediating force between them and ideological identification.

Pulling these individual-level relationships in to the aggregate, there should be generational differences in ideology within the black community, as predicted in Hypothesis 4. Consider again Figures 3.6 and 3.7. Across generations, there is significant ideological divergence within the black community. Furthermore, these difference are asymmetric; liberal blacks espouse the same liberal ideology over time, but conservative blacks grow increasingly conservative. From the models presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, this divergence can be attributed to economic incorporation and declining racial identity for incorporated blacks.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have shown how generational differences in the socialization of blacks resulting from changes in economicincorporation have led to an increasing ideological divergence in the black community. I linked differences in class identification to changes in expression of racial consciousness, and I linked differences in racial identity to growing conservatism in black public opinion. This, coupled with the growing Republican party identification of blacks, highlights a growing partisan polarization in the black community.

My explanation advances my understanding of polarization in the electorate by offering a mechanism by which members of the mass public can polarize independently of elite influence. Expanding this theory to other incorporated groups, including women and immigrants, may provide a plausible explanation for the growing

partisan polarization within those groups as well. Furthermore, I have contributed evidence of growing conservatism in black public opinion with regards to both identification and policy preferences. Finally, my results highlight the need for considering generational differences when looking for changes in the mass electorate.

While my results expand my understanding of polarization, they are not without their caveats. First, blacks make up only a small fraction, around 12% of the American electorate at any given time, and, thus, the effects of this divergence may be minimal at a national level. The bigger story may be how the incorporation leads to changes in public opinion. To the extent that other, larger political minorities, such as women and immigrants, experience incorporation, there may be large changes in national public opinion. Second, the overall number of non-Democrats in the black community, while increasing, is still very small. However, to the extent that the Democratic electoral strategy depends on turning out black voters and gaining over 85% of their vote, the changes detailed above may have important impacts for electoral politics in the United States

Figures



Figure 3.1: *Histograms of 7-Point Ideological Self-Identification for 1972-1974 & 2002-2004* The categories represented here range from "very liberal" to "very conservative," with "moderates" representing the middle category. Respondents answering "Don't Know" or "Haven't Thought About it Much" are excluded from this analysis. This histograms show very different patterns of polarization for whites and blacks. Whereas for whites, there is a shift away from the moderate category towards both ideological extremes, blacks see an almost uniform shift from moderation to conservatism, while the proportion of liberals stays relatively unchanged.



Figure 3.2: *Standard Deviation of Ideology from 1972-2008* Each line represents the trend in standard deviation over time. Due to the small number of blacks sampled in certain survey years, only the years 1984, 1993, 1996, and 2004 are included for blacks. For both blacks and white, there appears to be an upward trend in the standard deviation, which suggests that polarization is increasing for both groups.



Figure 3.3: *Average Estimated Ideology Over Time* Each dot represented the average estimated ideology for a given year. 0 represents the most moderate position, positive numbers represent conservative preferences, and negative numbers represent liberal preferences. Over time, black public opinion has on average become more moderate.



Figure 3.4: *Proportion of Liberal Self-Identification By Cohort* Each dot represents the average proportion of blacks identifying as "liberal" for each successive birth cohort. Whereas around 50% of older generations of black self-identified as "liberal," only around 37% of younger generations of blacks identify in the same way.



Figure 3.5: *Proportion of Democratic Identification By Cohort* Each dot represents the average proportion of blacks identifying as Democrat for each successive birth cohort. At the peak level of Democratic support, around 89% of blacks identified with the Democratic Party. However, support among younger generations has dropped to around 75%. Note also how the peak generations for Democratic support were also those generations who were young adults during the Civil Rights era.



Figure 3.6: *Mean of Self-Identified Ideology for Democrat and Non-Democrat Blacks* Each line represents the trend in mean ideology across different generations. For Democratic identifiers, their mean ideology has stayed around the same liberal mean across generations. However, for Republicans, the mean of self-identified ideology has shifted from slightly right-of-center to increasingly conservative. Given that the number of Republicans is also increasing over time, this highlights important generational differences in black public opinion.



Figure 3.7: *Estimated Ideology by Cohort and Party* Each line represents the trend in mean ideology estimated from policy preferences across different generations. For Democratic identifiers, their mean ideology has stayed around the same liberal mean across generations. However, for Republicans, the mean of estimated ideology has shifted from slightly left-of-center to increasingly conservative. Given that the number of Republicans is also increasing over time (see Figure 3.5), this highlights important generational differences in black public opinion.



Figure 3.8: *Proportion of Respondents Unwilling to Place Self on Liberal-Conservative Self-Placement Scale* This graph represents the proportion of respondents who would not place themselves on the 7-point liberal-conservative scale aggregated by birth cohort. The graph shows how large portions of earlier generations of blacks could not or would not place themselves on a liberal-conservative scale. However, younger cohorts place themselves at a rate almost twice that of earlier generations.



Figure 3.9: *Proportion of Respondents Expressing Feelings of Linked Fate by Cohort* This graph represents the proportion of respondents in different birth cohorts who expressed feeling of "linked fate." Across generations, feelings of linked fate grew, peaking with the 1940s birth cohort at around 75%. Note that this is the cohort that were young adults during the civil rights era. However, after this cohort, the proportion of respondents declined with around 50% of the 1980s birth cohort expressing feelings of linked fate.



Figure 3.10: *Stylized Theory Map* This figure represents a stylized visualization of the theory presented. Briefly, older generations were socialized as members of an excluded group, and this manifest itself in many ways associated with black political subculture. However, changes in the political and economic opportunities for blacks led to changes in socialization; younger generations are now more likely to be socialized as a member of mainstream society, and this manifests in more mainstream behaviors.



Figure 3.11: *Posterior Probabilities of Expressing Feelings of Linked Fate* This figure presents the marginal change in the posterior probability of expressing a feeling of linked fate for one unit changes in each of the statistically significant variables. Marginal differences are calculated holding other variables at their median. The variable that demonstrates the largest effect on feelings of linked fate is class identification, my measure of economic incorporation. Holding all other variables constant, identifying as rich decreases the posterior probability of expressing feelings of linked fate by around 40 percentage points.

Tables

Table 3.1: Predicting Feelings of Linked Fate and Ideology

	Models			
	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)
	Dependent Variable			
	Does R express feelings of Linked Fate? (1 = Yes, 0 = No)	Estimated Ideology (- = Liberal, + = Cons.)	Aggregated Issue Scale (0 = Liberal, 1 = Cons.)	Ideological Self-Identification (1 = Liberal 7 = Cons.)
Indep. Variable	Coefficient			
Linked Fate	–	−0.145∗	−0.032	−0.151∗
	–	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.063)
Class	−0.444∗	0.032	0.007	0.091
	(0.066)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.039)
Income	0.085∗	0.024	0.007	−0.030∗
	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)
High School	0.212	0.062	0.007	0.055
	(0.159)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.109)
College	0.597∗	−0.082	−0.019	−0.337∗
	(0.137)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.078)
Age	−0.005	0.002	0.001	0.006
	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Woman	−0.505∗	−0.067	−0.016	−0.050
	(0.113)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.065)
Attend Church	−0.085	0.006	0.001	−0.130∗
	(0.052)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.031)
Republican	–	0.275∗	0.092	1.065∗
	–	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.146)
Self-Reported Ideology	–	0.042∗	0.013	–
	–	(0.013)	(0.013)	–
Intercept	1.440	−0.534	0.172	1.594
	(1.207)	(0.434)	(0.433)	(0.476)
N	2491	1862	1862	2179
DIC	3147	4205	3517	7827

Note: * indicates that 0 is not an element of the 95 % high density interval.

Table 3.1: *Relationship between Class, Linked Fate, and Ideology* Each model represents a Bayesian random effects model of a different dependent variable. Posterior means are given for each independent variable as well as standard deviations on the posterior distribution. Model I shows how class is a significant predictor of feelings of linked fate. Models I-III show how feelings of linked fate influence ideological dispositions.

Appendix

Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of Key Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Estimated Ideology	-0.321	0.663	-1.652	2.122	9350
Issue Scale	0.325	0.237	0	1	9672
Does R express feeling of Linked Fate?	0.629	0.483	0	1	5039
With which Class does R identify?	2.356	0.714	1	5	7185
Income Range	5.165	3.201	1	11	5152
High School	0.722	0.448	0	1	11359
College	0.172	0.378	0	1	11220
Age	43.612	16.527	17	99	11018
Woman	0.619	0.486	0	1	11359
Year	1990.268	15.34	1948	2012	11359
Cohort	5.203	2.036	1	9	10920
Ideological Self-Identification	3.753	1.802	1	7	6882
R Identifies as Republican	0.079	0.27	0	1	10441
Does R attend religious services?	1.94	1.026	1	4	9520
Did R Vote in last election?	0.700	0.458	0	1	9542

Questions used in composition of issue position scale:

1. Should the government provide aid to minorities?
2. Should the government guarantee jobs and standard of living?
3. Spending on food stamps: increased, decreased or kept the same?
4. Spending on crime: increased, decreased or kept the same?
5. Spending on Medicare: increased, decreased or kept the same?
6. Spending on public schools: increased, decreased or kept the same?
7. Spending on government jobs: increased, decreased or kept the same?
8. Spending on the military: increased, decreased or kept the same?

Table 3.2: Instrumental Variables Regression

	Models			
	(V)	(VI)	(VII)	(VIII)
	Dependent Variable			
	Does R express feelings of Linked Fate? (1 = Yes, 0 = No)	Estimated Ideology (- = Liberal, + = Cons.)	Aggregated Issue Scale (0 = Liberal, 1 = Cons.)	Ideological Self-Identification (1 = Liberal 7 = Cons.)
Indep. Variable	Coefficient			
Linked Fate	–	−0.208 * **	−0.045 * **	−0.441
		(0.046)	(0.012)	(0.493)
Republican	–	−1.171	−0.217	3.997
		(0.736)	(0.189)	(3.212)
Reported Ideo.	–	−0.007	0.012	–
		(0.103)	(0.027)	–
Estimated Ide.	–	–	–	2.433
	–	–	–	(2.184)
Class	−1.087 * **	0.046	0.008	0.031
	(0.146)	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.196)
Income	0.128 * **	0.020*	0.007 * *	−0.092
	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.052)
High School	0.163	−0.004	−0.007	0.060
	(0.093)	(0.065)	(0.017)	(0.357)
College	0.312 * **	−0.061	−0.011	−0.575*
	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.018)	(0.292)
Age	−0.004	0.004	0.000	−0.012
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.036)
Woman	−0.189 * *	−0.127 * *	−0.029 * *	0.194
	(0.063)	(0.043)	(0.011)	(0.310)
Attend Church	−0.076 * *	–	–	−0.200 * **
	(0.028)			(0.086)
N	1778	1858	1858	2174
Instrumented	Class	Republican ID Reported Ideo.	Republican ID Reported Ideo.	Republican ID Estimated Ideo.
Instrument	Gov't Should Guarantee Jobs	Voted Attend Church	Voted Attend Church	Voted Home Ownership

*Note:*Instrumented variables are those endogenous with the main independent variables, and the variables used to instrument them are listed below in the table. Each of the instruments is statistically significant in the first stage regressions. Additional random effects coefficients for survey year and birth cohort are included in the model but not shown in the table. (*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01)

Table 3.2: *Relationship between Class, Linked Fate, and Ideology* Each model represents a instrumental variables model for each of the dependent variables. Models I-III mirror the relationships seen in Table 3.1, but there is no causal relationship between self-reported ideology and feelings of linked fate expressed in Model IV.

Table 3.4: Random Effects Coefficients for Table 3.1

	Models			
Random Effects	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)
Year				
1984		(Excluded)		
1996	−0.083	−0.058	0.069	0.137
	(0.234)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.121)
2012	−0.864	−0.177	0.130	0.038
	(0.450)	(0.170)	(0.171)	(0.202)
Cohort				
1900s		(Excluded)		
1910s	−0.050	−0.124	−0.025	0.07
	(0.570)	(0.246)	(0.249)	(0.333)
1920s	0.470	−0.124	−0.024	−0.368
	(0.599)	(0.232)	(0.235)	(0.303)
1930s	0.390	−0.031	−0.023	−0.219
	(0.652)	(0.236)	(0.239)	(0.284)
1940s	1.117	−0.059	−0.024	−0.186
	(0.737)	(0.254)	(0.256)	(0.286)
1950s	0.534	−0.063	−0.007	0.042
	(0.849)	(0.284)	(0.287)	(0.312)
1960s	0.622	−0.054	−0.008	0.263
	(0.959)	(0.321)	(0.324)	(0.351)
1970s	0.631	0.001	0.009	0.094
	(1.097)	(0.364)	(0.369)	(0.399)
1980s	0.374	0.100	0.042	0.158
	(1.259)	(0.433)	(0.425)	(0.459)
N	2491	1862	1862	2179
DIC	3147	4205	3517	7827

Table 3.4: *Random Effects Coefficients* Each column represents the random effects coefficients for each of the models presented in Table 3.1. The lack of significant coefficients indicates that any year or cohort effects are likely explained by individual-level characteristics included in each model.

Table 3.5: Comparing Estimated and Self-Reported Ideology by Group

Groups	Mean Estimated Ideology	Mean Self-Reported Ideology
South	0.056	0.380
Non-South	−0.023	0.195
Difference	$0.079 * **$	$0.185 * **$
Black	−0.623	−0.236
White	0.104	0.319
Difference	$0.727 * **$	$0.555 * **$
Women	−0.042	0.184
Men	0.054	0.317
Difference	$0.096 * **$	$0.133 * **$

Note: $* * * \rightarrow p \leq 0.001$

Table 3.5: *Group Comparisons using the Estimated Ideology Scale* Presented here are the mean estimated ideology from the IRT model used as well as the mean (rescaled) self-reported ideology for different groups in the electorate. As would be expected, blacks are estimated to be more liberal than whites and women are more liberal than men. This suggests that my estimated ideology measure is picking up valid differences in the American electorate.

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