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Michael Rubin 4/14/2010

Beyond Ethnic Mobilization: Group Characteristics and Conflict Intensification

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Abstract

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This study aims to build on the research linking ethnicity to armed conflict behavior within the relatively new area of inquiry examining the relationship between ethnic identity and conflict intensification. It seeks to answer the question: What characteristics of groups in conflict increase the likelihood of escalation to war? The author argues that there are factors associated with ethnic politics beyond ethnic mobilization of rebel groups that raise the risk for war. Namely, group size and exclusion from political power together create conditions that encourage intensification of conflict. In addition, the presence of ethnic kindred across international boundaries bordering the group's regional base will increase the likelihood of conflict escalation in large groups. These propositions are tested by adapting Eck's (2009) strategy, using a Cox model on all intrastate armed conflicts from 1946-2004; ethnic conflicts are divided according to the groups participating in conflict so as to insert group characteristics into the analysis.

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BEYOND ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: GROUP CHARACTERISTICS AND CONFLICT INTENSIFICATION

During the Cold War era, the dominant paradigm in academic debate argued that ideologies (i.e. capitalism vs. communism) were the most salient characteristics contributing to armed conflicts. The growth of violent intrastate conflict accompanying the end of the Cold War has provided convincing anecdotal evidence against this orthodoxy. Conflicts that have erupted over the last two decades lend credence to the argument that ethnically motivated conflicts may be inherently more violent and intractable than others. The bloodshed breaking out time and again since the end of the Cold War has supported the legitimacy of such a worldview. From ethnic cleansing campaigns in the former Yugoslavia to the state-orchestrated genocides in Rwanda and Sudan, intrastate ethnic clashes have exhibited shocking levels of violence throughout the contemporary era. Furthermore, scholars as well as observers of history offer compelling arguments as to why ethnic conflicts may be more violent.

However, only very recently have scholars attempted to empirically verify the claim that ethnic conflict is more violent and thus it remains imprecisely supported by scientific research. The post-Cold War wave of conflict led to a surge in scholarship focused on explaining intrastate and civil war while locating the causal role of ethnicity. This attention has encouraged the treatment of ethnic conflict as a distinct political phenomenon and an important subject of study within the peace and conflict field. In its infancy, this body of literature has met many credible challenges. Kalyvas (2001), for example, cites examples of non-ethnic civil wars such as those in Spain and Russia as equally compelling examples of intense violence. Furthermore, the recent prevailing

trend in the scientific literature has largely discounted the relevance of ethnicity to explaining violent conflict. Fearon and Laitin's (2003) Insurgency model is widely accepted as convincing evidence against the salience of identity and in support of more realist and conditional factors in determining conflict behavior. This scholarly debate generates critical questions regarding whether and how ethnic differences affect conflict.

Regardless of the particular position one takes in the debate, the importance of understanding the causes of violence is unquestioned. It is important to understand which factors or characteristics are associated with higher levels of violence. Since World War II the world has witnessed significant growth in the frequency and intensity of intrastate civil wars. The proportion of all armed conflicts that are intrastate in this time frame has grown rapidly: Intrastate civil wars represented 45% of all wars (conflicts with over 1,000 battle deaths per year) in the period following the Versailles Peace Treaty and have increased to 75% of all wars at the end of the 20th Century (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009). Intrastate conflicts have emerged as critical threats to international peace and security, in part because they often become "internationalized". Thus, intrastate conflicts have surpassed interstate war both in the danger they present to the international community and the number of casualties they create (Figures 1 and 2). This trend is especially concerning as the emergence of ethnic identities as foundations for political organization may increase the intractable nature of these conflicts, complicating efforts to mitigate violence and to resolve disputes.

The present study builds from two prominent and related questions from the conflict literature: 1) Are ethnically heterogeneous societies more likely than others to experience conflict? 2) Is the intensity of conflict greater in ethnically heterogeneous

FIGURE 1[1]



FIGURE 2[2]



[1] Center for Systemic Peace. "Measuring Systemic Peace". http://www.systemicpeace.org/conflict.htm. Accessed April 1, 2010

[2] Center for Systemic Peace. "Measuring Systemic Peace". http://www.systemicpeace.org/conflict.htm. Accessed April 1, 2010

than in homogenous societies? The extent of research concerning the susceptibility of intrastate conflict to intensify to war is relatively limited, but its relation to the conflict onset literature provides a theoretical foundation. What follows draws upon the applicable and established theories addressing the first question to inform a new examination of the latter question in attempt to demonstrate how causal factors differ between onset and escalation. In particular, I address the following questions: Are ethnically mobilized conflicts more likely than non-ethnic conflicts to intensify in violence? What characteristics beyond the ethnically defined parameters for recruitment and mobilization make conflicts more likely to escalate?

Eck (2009) was the first scholar to compare the escalation of violence within ethnically mobilized conflicts to their non-ethnic counterparts. She found scientific evidence supporting the assertion that ethnic conflicts tend to be at greater risk for escalation into high levels of violence, and that this acceleration in violence occurs in most cases within the first few years after the outbreak of armed conflict. This is a significant discovery with critical research and policy implications.

While Eck (2009) has found ethnic conflict more likely to escalate, it is important to know why this empirical pattern exists. Though the relationship between ethnicity and conflict onset is essential to understanding the dynamics of conflict intensification, the causal factors of importance may vary, as there are different barriers and initial conditions to launching conflict than to escalating violence. This study aims to build on the foundation that Eck (2009) has created to identify the causal mechanisms that raise the likelihood of intensification to war within intrastate conflict, and to determine if ethnic conflicts, or their associated characteristics, are more at risk than other categories

of conflict. The complex relationship between ethnic politics and conflict is most likely not limited to the strategies of recruitment and mobilization, reflected in Eck's (2009) ethnic mobilization model. This study acknowledges the crucial role that ethnic mobilization plays in conflict intensification and inquires about additional factors related to ethnicity that contribute to the salience of ethnicity in increasing the risk for war. What particular characteristics of societies in conflict make escalation to war more likely? By what mechanisms may ethnic divides lead minor armed conflicts to escalate into full-scale war?

The paper proceeds as follows: I first review the existing literature that lays out the theoretical landscape regarding the relationship between ethnic politics and armed conflict. I then draw upon that body of research to develop a theoretical model and specific hypotheses to be tested in this study. The next section describes the research design and data collection procedure, leading to a clarification of the data, variables, and statistical tests to be used. I then interpret the results, explaining what the empirics say about the hypotheses and the relationship between ethnicity and conflict. Finally I conclude with a succinct summary of the findings and their overall contribution to the literature, the relevant policy implications, and opportunities left for future research.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

The rich body of scholarship exhibits competing claims regarding the relationship between state ethnic composition, ethnic mobilization, and the outbreak and nature of intrastate conflict. The literature includes thorough examinations from varying sets of assumptions and a diversity of methodological approaches. To date, there have been few

investigations into the explanatory factors influencing the likelihood of intrastate conflict intensification specifically, but the existing literature does provide relevant studies relating ethnic politics to conflict onset. In this section I draw upon the logic of these empirical studies to inform and adapt an investigation of the explanatory factors related to intensification, as the arguments place the dynamics of conflict in the appropriate context and many of the independent variables may logically impact conflict escalation as well as onset.

The literature is divided over the influence of ethnicity on conflict. The broadest form of the debate involves the question of whether ethnically diverse societies display different patterns of behavior. Some foundational works (Gurr 2000; Horowitz 1985; Kaufman 1996) argue that the existence of ethnic discrimination or political/economic exclusion within societies foster conditions suitable for ethnically mobilized violence, thus advancing a causal relationship between ethnic or identity politics and conflict in the context of repression. Others (Mueller 2000) reject the existence of any meaningful distinction between cases of ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts. Some (Kalyvas 2001; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007) support this assertion with research emphasizing the equally violent nature of non-ethnic wars.

The prevailing trend in the literature has largely discounted the effect of ethnic politics on conflict outcomes. Examining the link between ethnic identity and the onset of armed conflict, Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that societies with greater degrees of ethnic diversity are not associated with greater risk for violent episodes and that there is little evidence that political grievances couched in ethnic terms or societal divisions along ethnic lines are useful predictors of civil war. Instead, they posit an Insurgency model,

finding that “financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more feasible and attractive” (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The best predictors of conflict onset are conditions that favor insurgency; including weak central government, large population, lower per capita income, relative infancy of the state, and rough terrain because they are associated with advantages for rebel groups to hide from government forces. Until the wave of scholarship associated with Cederman and his co-authors, most research in the field has been focused on refining while largely affirming Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) work.

There is broad acceptance of the idea that the presence of multiple ethnic groups does not have an independent effect on conflict outbreak, but variation emerges in the scholarship involving the salience of the ethnic character of conflict within these conflict-prone conditions. Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2009) contradict some of Fearon and Laitin’s key findings. While they find ethnically diverse societies are not inherently more conflict prone (just as Fearon and Laitin claim), ethnic politics do have an important effect on the onset of conflict. Their Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset covers all conflicts from 1946 until 2005 and collects data on all “politically relevant” groups and their access to state power. Their unit of analysis is at the group level rather than the state level, which more accurately reflects the observations to be measured because “the nation-state itself relies on ethno-national principles of political legitimacy” (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009). Because the nation-state is founded upon myths of identity, governments must craft their mission to represent their “people” and thus have incentives to organize politically along ethnic divisions, making the state neither an ethnically neutral actor nor a passive arena. Rather, the state is “both the prize over which

contending political actors struggle and a power instrument for those who control it" (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009). Leaders will favor co-ethnics at the expense of ethnic others, which raises the stakes for group ownership over, and access to, the political center. These divisions are not the product of inherent group-level differences or grievances (the "diversity-breeds-conflict" school), but of the state structure itself, which artificially imposes incentives to divide and exclude along ethno-political lines. Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009) find that greater levels of ethnically based exclusion in the government increase the likelihood of armed conflict. Such conflicts are more likely to be secessionist when the state government is relatively new, thus lacking historical legitimacy. Building off these principles, Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) find that ethnic conflict is more likely to occur when politically relevant groups are excluded to a greater degree from state power (especially if they have only recently been ousted from a share of government power), they have greater mobilizational capacity, and they have a history of conflict in their past.

There are additional factors relevant to the relationship between ethnicity and conflict, and central to the present study, that remain largely absent from the debate described above. Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch (2009) test the effect of ethnic kin groups given conditions favoring insurgency. They find that while group population, distance from the capital, and roughness of terrain in the settlement area have significant independent effects on the likelihood of conflict onset, their triadic model of conflict-torn societies provides scientific evidence that the presence of transnational ethnic ties interacting with a group's demographic weight in society yield important effects heightening the risk of conflict outbreak. This interactive effect is important to

emphasize because supporting rebel movements in neighboring states carries significant political, financial, and resource costs and these considerations largely outweigh identity politics (Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009; Saideman and Jenne 2009). Potential kin supporters will only be willing to incur the risks if intervening will serve their national interest (Saideman and Ayres 2008). Accordingly, Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch (2009) find empirical evidence that the ethnic kin-effect is an important factor in proportion to the excluded group's demographic weight (related to their share of the overall population) in the primary conflict dyad. Kin groups will only violate international norms protective of state sovereignty to support violent opposition groups abroad if the group possesses sufficient power and resources to project realistic prospects for victory and if the grievances are perceived as especially legitimate. Both conditions are strengthened with greater demographic size of the group population.

An interesting debate regarding the specifics of the ethnic kin-effect is divided over the differing effects of the distinct types of kin relationships. Some[3] claim that diaspora communities residing in wealthy liberal democracies harbor more extremist nationalistic sentiments and the ability to influence their government's policies towards the conflict of interest and thus facilitate conflict escalation while others (Petersen 2004) assert that geographically adjacent kin groups foster conflict. Neighboring kin may encourage conflict because they can easily smuggle weapons and other valuable resources while providing a safe haven for rebel groups (Saideman and Jenne 2009). Furthermore, supporters of the Diaspora kin-effect claim that kin in neighboring states are constrained by greater and immediate security costs for violating the state sovereignty

[3] There are a number of studies that collectively contribute to this conclusion; the scholarly contributions are outlined in Saideman and Jenne (2009)

paradigm associated with supporting rebel campaigns, because their proximity makes them vulnerable to retaliation (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989; Zacher 2001). Even if this is true, some scholars (Carment and Rowlands 1998; Carment, James and Taydas 2006) find that ethnic ties matter for determining which sides of a conflict an external third party will align with if they find it in their best interest to intervene. Additionally, many kin-bordering communities are refugee spillovers with few resources and lacking mobilization capacity. As this study includes measures for both the diaspora effect (*kin*) and the kin-bordering effect (*Kinbord*), it allows a comparison between the competing theories of the overall effect of kin across international borders on intrastate civil conflict escalation.

The issue at the heart of this scholarly debate is the conceptualization of ethnicity as it relates to conflict. Aforementioned research has focused on measures of "ethnolinguistic fractionalization" (ELF) (Fearon and Laitin 2003), the N* index (Cederman and Girardin 2007), or the newly developed Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009) to assess whether ethnic diversity or demographic composition within state borders influence a society's likelihood of descending into civil war. ELF is a crude measure of ethnic composition as it relates to conflict; it measures the probability that two citizens in a society chosen at random speak a different language. Not only does this ignore some very significant ethnic divisions associated with recent trends in intrastate conflict, such as religious and racial cleavages, but it also emphasizes diversity in itself at the expense of more important determinants like power balances, levels of exclusion, and other factors independent of population percentages that instigate ethnic grievances. ELF measures also treat the state as an

ethnically neutral actor and treat all ethnic groups within society similarly despite the reality that not all groups are politically relevant. This bias in the analysis skews the effect of ethnic politics on conflict outbreak (Wimmer Cederman and Min 2009), ignoring the true causal mechanisms of collective action at work (Cederman and Girardin 2007). Fearon and Laitin's (2003) country-level analysis, therefore, does not examine the essential group level characteristics that may be important to relating ethnic politics to conflict.

Cederman and his co-authors improve on this shortcoming by adopting a group-level analysis to onset outcomes. Cederman and Girardin's (2007) N* index introduces a geo-mapping strategy to measure ethno-nationalist exclusion and to plot ethnic configurations onto political violence. Their model postulates the composition of conflict-ridden societies consisting of ethnic groups in power (EGIP) at the center surrounded by marginalized groups (MEP) and assesses the opportunity for conflict outbreak, expecting societies with demographically significant ethnic groups excluded from power to be at greater risk. The N* Index calibrates theses conditions to assess the predicted outcome compared to what is observed. Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) employ the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) project to develop a dataset examining group level characteristics contributing to conflict onset. However, these measurements based strictly on ethnic composition and demographics do not adequately reflect the concept of the ethnic character of conflict, which is more interesting and accurate determinant in the connection between ethnicity and conflict. Simply observing the level of diversity should not explain conflict outbreak, but rather the onset of conflict should be associated with conditions that lead the different ethnic groups within society to develop incompatible

claims or goals while affording them the resources necessary to carry out rebel campaigns.

This study is not concerned with the relationship between ethnic diversity and conflict onset or resolution, recognizing that conflicts erupt and sustain for a variety of reasons and that most ethnically diverse societies exist in peace (Fearon and Laitin 1996). While knowledge about whether or not ethnically diverse societies are more prone to internal violence offers important empirical information, the independent effect of diversity in and of itself is not expected to yield any effect. I examine existing conflicts to expose the causal mechanisms that explain why relatively minor conflicts escalate into wars.

Eck (2009) has examined the surprisingly overlooked aspect of the debate regarding the relationship between ethnic politics and conflict escalation, which speaks more closely to the relationship between ethnic identity and intrastate conflict. Shifting focus away from the questions of whether ethnically diverse societies are more likely to erupt into violence, where the units of analysis are cases with the potential for conflict, Eck (2009) addresses the question: given the existence of armed conflict, are ethnically mobilized conflicts more likely to intensify into war? She uses a measure of "ethnic mobilization", a more accurate proxy than diversity measures of the role ethnicity plays in conflict, which codes for whether the armed factions within a specified conflict are at least partially mobilized according to ethnic criteria. Ethnic mobilization occurs when "the rebel side mobilizes partially or entirely along ethnic lines" (Eck 2009). Using ethnic mobilization as an independent variable is a more logical approximation of why ethnicity may be associated with conflict outcomes, correcting the deficiencies associated

with ethnic fractionalization and other strictly demographic measures. The analysis reveals that conflicts involving parties mobilized along ethnic lines are much more likely to escalate beyond the accepted war threshold than those that are characterized by other divisions.

This study builds upon Eck's (2009) work on the determinants of conflict intensification, in which she finds that ethnically mobilized conflicts are more susceptible to escalation to war. I intend to examine the additional factors that might lead intrastate ethnic conflicts to intensify into full-scale wars, specifically how they influence patterns of escalation. This examination is important to the study of conflict in that over 40% of intrastate conflicts between 1946 and 2004 escalated from minor conflict to full-scale war. Eck's (2009) sample of conflict-years identifies 76 "failures", or escalations, out of 185 total conflicts (about 41.1%) in this time frame. That such a huge portion of intrastate conflicts escalate to war affirms that these conflicts are not only increasing in relative frequency but they are also highly susceptible to dramatic increases in violence.

The "ethnic mobilization" measure is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a given conflict is mobilized at least partially along ethnic lines. Particularly, if one or more armed factions within the conflict employ ethnic criteria to some extent to recruit and mobilize supporters, it is coded as "1", while if ethnicity plays no role in mobilization the conflict is coded as "0". This measure captures the effect of how recruitment strategies influence behavior in conflict. Because not all ethnically mobilized conflicts escalate to surpass the war threshold, seeking knowledge about other factors that play a role in the relationship between ethnicity and conflict is essential to filling the gaps left in the existing body of research. What are the particular causal mechanisms that,

when present, encourage the parties to a conflict to intensify their violent campaigns? What factors beyond mobilization intervene to make escalation more likely? Identifying the specific characteristics that explain why ethnic conflicts escalate to war will advance knowledge about the true nature of the causal relationship between ethnic politics and armed conflict.

HYPOTHESES

In this framework, I seek to examine the roles of specific group characteristics in explaining the risk of conflict intensification: relative group size, access to power, and the ethnic kin-effect. Derived from the onset literature, the theoretical underpinnings of these suspected explanatory variables appear to logically apply to the conditions of escalation to war. These group factors differ from Eck's (2009) measure of ethnic mobilization in that they inquire about the potential effects of non-strategic factors. Recruitment strategies may be a product of the agenda of particular leaders and organizations conducting rebel campaigns, which may be difficult for policymakers to ascertain at the time of conflict. The demographic make-up of the conflict dyad (particularly the power balance between the government and rebel groups) and the regime characteristics (whether the political center is open or closed to marginalized groups) are more translucent. In addition, the existence and proximity of ethnic kindred related to the rebelling ethnic group is an identifiable condition outside of strategic control (though all of these factors are certainly utilized in strategic calculation). If any of these factors can be identified as exercising a critical influence on conflict behavior, it may offer important insight into the nature of conflict intensification generally, and warning signals about the

risk of escalation in specific conflicts. I hypothesize that conflicts are more likely to intensify to war if the rebel groups involved represent a larger share of society's population, are excluded from access to the power center, and enjoy external support from ethnic kindred abroad.

The expectation relating group size to conflict behavior derives from the idea advanced in the onset literature that relative demographic weight is a central component to launching and sustaining violent campaigns. Accordingly, groups require a sufficiently large pool of potential recruits to strengthen its fighting force. Large relative population size also lends credibility to a group's grievances, because the greater number of people that are marginalized by, or opposed to, a certain government makes those grievances more legitimate.

> H_1: Rebel groups that draw from a sub-state population representing a larger proportion of the society will be more likely to escalate conflict to war.

I also expect a group's access to power to exercise a significant impact on its conflict behavior. Groups that are excluded from power (i.e. MEGs identified in Cederman and Grardin's 2007 model) will be more likely to resort to violence, as they do not have the ability to influence the policies of the ruling coalition. Groups sharing a space in the central government (EGIPs) will either have the power to make acceptable changes and compromises to relevant policies through peaceful political means or find it too costly and threatening to their access to power and government distributed benefits to disturb the status quo with violent protests. Consequently, whether or not a group is excluded from political representation should affect their behavior in conflict.

> H_2: Rebel groups that draw from a sub-state population that is excluded from access to political power will be more likely to escalate conflict to war.

It is possible that neither of the factors, group size or exclusion from political power, will be enough to independently cause intensified violence within conflict in and of themselves. Larger groups may intimidate the government sufficiently to force concessions before costly fighting occurs. They may also have greater success voicing legitimate challenges accepted and supported by the international community. In addition, smaller excluded groups may be able to produce minor resistance efforts, but lack the capacity to escalate to war. As such, it may be that the interaction between these two characteristics is necessary to induce conflict escalation.

> H_3: Rebel groups that draw from a large excluded sub-state population will be more likely to escalate conflict to war.

As Eck (2009) contends, ethnic criteria are more easily distinguishable than ideological or other criteria and "this ascriptive nature of ethnicity affects the recruitment environment such that ethnically mobilized rebel groups can grow numerically stronger and make more effective use of their resources" (Eck 2009), explaining why and how ethnic rebel groups develop stronger fighting forces and sustain more casualties while recruiting replacements at a quick enough rate to prolong violent uprisings. I expect this consequence to apply to the ethnic kin-effect. The nature of ethnic identity empowers ethnically mobilized rebel groups an easy and successful medium of drawing attention and support to their struggle, finding sympathetic kin abroad to mobilize on their behalf.

I do not expect that the ethnic kin-effect will increase the likelihood of intensification independently, but rather it should matter only in context of more concrete factors that encourage escalation. This line of reasoning advanced in the onset literature should apply simultaneously to the conflict escalation scenario. The very fact that the authors find that ethnic kin will offer support to rebel movements dependant on their relative power substantiates the logic that this effect would more appropriately apply to the escalation phenomena within conflict; groups already in conflict signal their fighting capacity to potential supporters and clearly possess the foundational structure and resources, however meager, to sustain violent campaigns.

Weinstein (2007) asserts that overcoming these initial barriers to launching violent rebel campaigns is a significant determinant in and of itself, finding that whether and how groups will employ violence is influenced by the initial conditions that leaders face; namely the availability of the necessary natural (geographic factors) and material or financial (ethnic kin-support factors) resources independent of consent from the population. I expect that ethnically mobilized rebel groups that can project their struggle to secure diplomatic, resource, and military support from ethnic kindred abroad will strengthen these necessary preconditions to an exponentially greater extent. Because rebel groups are inherently at a power disadvantage relative to the organized and resource-rich government forces, groups that can rely on external support and find a safe haven abroad will be much more effective at sustaining violence against their opponents. By receiving and using more recruits, weapons, and resources, these groups will generate more opposition casualties while tolerating greater death tolls before conceding. Rebel groups that identify closely with ethnic kindred abroad are more likely to find a highly

motivated population, not restricted by the perilous conditions of the conflict, to empathize with their plight and grievances. If their home countries are at peace they will enjoy the stable environment and access to resources necessary to aid their brethren in their struggle. Because of the enormous costs associated with intervention across sovereign borders, this effect will depend on the demographic weight of the rebelling group.

Furthermore, I expect the ethnic kin-effect will have greater impact when ethnic kindred are found within close geographic proximity, though this expectation is also contested in the literature. Proximity ensures that rebelling groups will seek safe refuge and attain access to imported resources from neighboring kin. In addition, bordering state governments may feel threatened by the potential for spillover effects if an unsuccessful rebellion leads to massive expulsion and migration across international boundaries. Whether or not ethnic kin across the border want to take the aforementioned risks to provide substantive aid to their oppressed kin, rebel fighters will take advantage of the adjoining friendly territory to import weapons and conduct operations out of reach from their government adversary. Cumulatively, these logical assumptions lead to the following hypothesis:

> H_4: The existence of ethnic kin abroad tied to the rebel group in a conflict dyad will increase the likelihood of escalation in proportion to that group's demographic weight in the society.

Here, I apply the explanatory variables used by Cederman and his co-authors to their appropriate conflict-intensification dependant variable and use Eck (2009) and EPR (2009) data to extend the analysis to all conflicts in the world from 1946-2004.

The explanatory factors of interest in this study represent specific characteristics beyond ethnic mobilization that are expected to increase the likelihood of conflict escalation. Additionally, they reflect the potential crucial conditions that differentiate low-risk from high-risk armed ethnic conflicts. If it can be empirically demonstrated that ethnic conflicts in which rebel groups enjoy support from ethnic kindred abroad are more likely than those without such support valves to erupt into war, then it may be true that ethnic mobilization itself is insufficient to explain why ethnic conflicts are more likely to escalate. Further, the results may provide scientific information concerning which specific category of conflict is actually more likely to escalate. To test the effects of the aforementioned explanatory variables on the outcome of conflict intensification, I employ data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), using Eck's (2009) coding of ethnic mobilization and additional control variables from her model while adding variables from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) and Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data in order to extend her analysis to incorporate the ethnic kindred concept into the model.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA

The design used in this study borrows from Eck (2009), supplementing her model with variables from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project and the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Project which code the specific group characteristics of interest; namely, the

existence of ethnic kindred in neighboring states and the insurgency-related factors of group demographic weight. For Eck (2009), the primary independent variable was *ethnic mobilization*, a dummy variable for whether the armed factions mobilized at least partially along ethnic lines; coded using the Fearon and Laitin (2003) ethnic war variable and Kreutz (2006) which expanded the Fearon and Laitin dataset to include conflicts according to the lower threshold used in the Armed Conflict Dataset. While this concept improves upon previous measurement techniques, I remove it from primary consideration and test it only in Models 1, 6, and 7 to determine whether the effect of ethnic mobilization is significant along with other primary variables. I suspect that ethnic mobilization variable is too crude of a tool to capture all of the variance associated with the effects of ethnic politics. I generate the principle explanatory variables from the MAR variables for *Transnational Dispersion-Kindred Groups* and the demographic weight variables from the EPR population ratios. In Models 2-15, I replace these variables respectively for the ethnic mobilization measure to determine their effect on conflict intensification.

The sample remains the time-series data on all intrastate armed conflicts, defined as a "contested incompatibility concerning government or territory between the government of a state and a non-governmental party that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year" (Eck 2009) from 1946-2004 as coded in the Uppsala-PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD).

I make one especially important modification to Eck's (2009) risk set. Because Eck (2009) was interested in coding only the existence of ethnic mobilization, partially or entirely, she did not distinguish between, or identify, the specific groups participating in

each conflict, thus precluding the insertion of group-specific characteristics in the models. Each conflict-year could potentially involve multiple ethnic groups. This study is interested in unearthing additional ethnic-related factors associated with individual groups in conflict. Therefore, I code the ethnic composition of the rebel groups involved in each conflict-year and separate any conflict-years that involve two different groups fighting the same war into separate and parallel *group conflict-years*[4]. Because multiple ethnic groups can mobilize opposition against each other or the government, it is possible to have multiple group-conflicts within a single conflict in a given year. For example, Eck (2009) codes conflict in Angola from 1975-2002 as one conflict (over multiple conflict-years). This conflict involved a number of rebel groups, some mobilized within the Ovimbunu ethnic group and others within the Bakongo. Therefore, I separate this one conflict from Eck's (2009) analysis into two different group conflicts occupying the same years. This strategy permits the insertion of group-specific characteristics expected to encourage those rebel groups to escalate violence and allows a distinction between groups that do and do not exhibit those characteristics even within the same conflicts.

While this strategy may inflate the relative weight allocated to those conflicts involving multiple ethnic groups in a way that biases the results, it remains the only method at this point to incorporate group characteristics into an analysis of the risk of conflict intensification. Moreover, this inflation may not be theoretically inconsistent or biasing, given that as more ethnic groups are mobilized in conflict, there are more potential cross-border kin ties available to intervene in the conflict. Hypothesis 4 is concerned with the effect of cross-border kin ties, and thus every opportunity for such an

[4] I would like to thank Dr. Erika Forsberg (Uppsala University) for providing valuable information used to code the ethnic composition of a number of rebel groups.

intervention must be considered on an individual basis, regardless of whether the relevant group is fighting by itself, in an anti-government multi-ethnic coalition, or separately but simultaneously against the government. Because the analysis incorporates the measure of the group's size in the interaction term representing the independent variables, the effect of each observation is weighted by group size, thus mitigating this inflation issue.

The Dependent Variable: Conflict Intensification

The ACD allows an investigation of conflict intensification because it differentiates between "minor" conflicts (25-999 battle-deaths in a year) and "war" (1000 or more battle deaths in a year). A conflict is coded as "minor" and determined "at risk" for escalation whenever it is "active" (crosses the 25 battle deaths threshold in a given year while remaining below the 1,000 deaths figure representing war). The dependent variable in the analysis is the occurrence of a "failure", defined as the shift from armed conflict (25-999 battle deaths in a year) to war (1000+ battle deaths in a year). Therefore, failure, indicating the escalation outcome, occurs whenever the *war* dummy variable is coded as 1 in any group conflict-year. Escalation does not occur whenever a conflict drops from the risk set without ever recording a failure. A conflict terminates without escalating to war if it is inactive for more than ten years.

All minor conflicts are deemed at risk for escalation, and exit the risk set only when it either exceeds the war threshold (failure) or remains dormant for ten years. Because some conflicts hover around the 25 battle-deaths threshold, conflicts in which there is a lull in the number of deaths for less than ten years in between minor conflicts are still coded as at risk for escalation. Eck (2009) employs this strategy because

conflict-years separated by only a few years of lower death-tolls are probably not, in reality, different episodes of conflict but rather may be characterized by lulls in killing that maintain the potential to, and at times eventually do, erupt back into violence, meaning that the conflict was still at risk during the intervening years. Conflicts that linger close to the 25-deaths threshold, perhaps for warring parties to negotiate terms to end the fighting, are still at risk of resumption of violence. If a conflict is at peace for longer than ten years, then a new outbreak in armed conflict is considered removed enough from context of the previous episode that it must be essentially understood within a new set of circumstances as a separate instance of conflict. To protect against the weighted effects of conflicts under this ten-year criterion with multiple escalations to war, the analysis allows only one failure (escalation beyond the war threshold) per group-conflict in a given state.

Hypotheses 1-3: Group Size and Access to Power

The intervening variables measuring demographic weight and access to power are derived from EPR. *Group Size* is simply the proportion that the ethnic group represents relative to the total population of the state. *Stat* is a descriptive variable representing the group's power status within the society. *EGIP (Ethnic Group in Power)* and *Excluded* are dummy variables demonstrating whether the group is part of the ruling coalition or excluded from political access, respectively. I generated the variables *Total Population of Ethnic Groups in Power* by adding the group sizes for all groups in the state coded "1" for *EGIP* to represent the total proportion of the population that comprises the ruling coalition and *Group Size/EGIP* by dividing the group's size by the state's *Total*

Population of Ethnic Groups in Power value to represent the group's size as a proportion to the size of the ruling coalition. *Group Size* and *Group Size/EGIP* are used as proxy measures for the concept of demographic weight. *Group Size* is intended to capture the idea that the absolute size of the recruitment pool of the rebelling ethnic group within society may capture most of the variance associated with demographic weight while *Group Size/EGIP* emphasizes the centrality of the conflict dyad by comparing the rebel group population to the total population of all groups with access to, and thus having a stake in defending, the ruling coalition. I run two sets of analysis to compare the effects of these distinct concepts of demographic weight.

Hypothesis 4: The Ethnic Kin-Effect

The independent variables of interest for the ethnic kin-effect hypothesis are designed to represent a variety of potential sources of the proposed relationship. *Groupbord*, *Kin*, and *Kinbord* are variables generated from MAR. *Groupbord* measures whether the ethnic group is concentrated in a regional settlement that borders an international boundary. This condition may provide information about the group's access to a safe-haven across borders, ease of access to external resources and relative separation from the central government based in the capital (making control over the group more difficult). *Kin* is a dummy variable measuring whether the group possesses kin-group ties outside of the state boundaries. *Kinbord* is a dummy variable measuring more specifically whether the group possesses kin-group ties across state borders attached regionally to their regional base.

Control Variables

Because the present study seeks to expand upon Eck's (2009) research, I use the control variables present in Eck's Model 1 in modified models to test the explanatory variables of interest. *Ethnic pluralism* is a measure of the largest ethnic group's share of the entire population, used to represent the ethnic composition of the society in conflict, which some previous research has causally linked to conflict onset. The *incompatibility* variable differentiates between the different classes of intrastate conflict based on their aims, because groups competing for territorial control may meet less resistance from the state military than attempts to seize control over the existing government. The government may find it too costly and insignificant to maintain control over regions geographically distant from the capital with separatist populations, whereas it will likely employ all force at its disposal to protect its legitimacy and control of power from a hostile rebel force seeking its overthrow.

Because regime type may have an important effect on the likelihood of conflict escalation, I include Eck's dummy variables for *Democracy* and *Autocracy*. Because Democracies allow citizens greater access to the political center and the power to affect policy, they are likely to be associated with less risk for war. Autocracies often frustrate populations excluded from the ruling coalition and are expected to fuel grievances and mobilization. Additionally, a *population* variable, logarithmically transformed to adjust for the exponential nature of the data (Eck 2009), is included to control for the effects of country size. *Per Capita Income*, measured in constant 1996 U.S. Dollars controls for the wealth of the state in conflict. Democracy, Autocracy, population, and per capita income

are all lagged by one year. The *Cold War* variable is a dummy indicating whether the conflict broke out before or after the Soviet Union dissolved at the end of the Cold War.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

To replicate Eck's (2009) analysis, I employ the same Cox proportional hazards model examining transitions from minor armed conflict to war with the additional variables mentioned above. The Cox model distinguishes between failure and censoring in the data; protecting against the potential bias in the data given that conflicts deemed "at risk" through 2004 have not yet reached the war threshold nor terminated, leaving the potential for future conflict failures to remain unobserved. The Hazard Ratio measures the risk created by each corresponding variable within the model for the likelihood of conflict intensification as measured by the failure outcome. I cluster the data on country to control for correlation across ethnic groups within the same country, which addresses the aforementioned problem associated with inflating the multi-group conflicts. The standard errors reported are Huber-White (Robust) standard errors, which control for heteroskedasticity across the sample.

When comparing Eck's results to the replication of her Model 1 using the modified dataset with group conflict-years, which includes more conflicts in the sample, the effect of ethnic mobilization is greater, demonstrating that ethnically mobilized conflicts are 95% more likely than non-ethnic conflicts to escalate to war, whereas in her study Eck found them to be 92% more likely. Moreover, this effect is significant closer to the .01 level (.011); her results produced a z-score of 2.43 while this sample produces

2.55 for ethnic mobilization (Model 1). This strengthens Eck's findings that ethnic mobilization is an important determinant of conflict escalation. Even given a larger sample of conflicts, ethnic mobilization has a powerful, statistically significant effect on the risk for intensification to war.

In Table 1, I compare the ethnic mobilization effect to the variables representing demographic weight, borrowed and generated from EPR. Models 2 and 3 indicate with two different measures of group size (size as a proportion of the overall population and size as a proportion to the population of all "ethnic groups in power", respectively) that demographic weight in and of itself does not have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of conflict escalation. Model 4 offers weak support for the independent effect of exclusion from political access on the risk of escalation. This relationship, with a Hazard Ratio of 1.59, is a weaker magnitude of effect than ethnic mobilization and is only significant at the .1 level, which limits confidence in the results. The results reject Hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding the independent effect of demographic weight and exclusion from access to political power. Most likely it will require a more complete data set than the one available and a greater sample of conflicts to determine the exact nature of the relationship between exclusion and conflict intensification independently.

Models 5 and 6 in Table 1 include interaction terms between exclusion and demographic size (using size relative to the total population and size relative to the ruling coalition respectively) to test Hypothesis 3 and find that the combination of these two effects does, in fact, yield significant results. Model 5 indicates that an excluded population representing a larger portion of the state's total population is substantially more at risk for escalation (Hazard Ratio=22.32), significant at the .1 level. While the

TABLE 1						
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Ethnic Mobilization	1.95 (2.55)**				7.46 (4.20)***	4.03 (2.66)***
Ethnic Pluralism	2.09 (1.77)*	1.36 (0.52)	1.41 (0.58)	1.68 (0.93)	3.15 (2.26)**	1.68 (0.85)
Per Capita Income	0.99 (-0.20)	1.00 (-0.01)	0.99 (-0.09)	1.00 (-0.05)	1.01 (0.11)	1.02 (0.36)
Population	0.98 (-0.20)	0.94 (-0.58)	0.93 (-0.67)	0.92 (-0.84)	0.93 (-0.75)	0.93 (-0.71)
Democracy	0.48 (-2.11)**	0.58 (-1.43)	0.56 (-1.47)	0.57 (-1.47)	0.59 (-1.40)	0.56 (-1.46)
Autocracy	0.86 (-0.57)	1.04 (0.13)	1.00 (0.01)	1.01 (0.03	1.21 (0.68)	1.17 (0.63)
Incompatibility	0.43 (-3.00)***	0.71 (-1.29)	0.73 (-1.19)	0.54 (-2.00)**	0.37 (-2.57)**	0.34 (-2.75)***
Cold War	1.22 (0.71)	1.56 (1.60)	1.54 (1.54)	1.54 (1.63)	1.77 (2.11)**	1.79 (2.19)**
Group Size		2.10 (1.07)			0.05 (-2.33)**	
Group Size/EGIP			1.08 (0.70)			0.37 (-2.19)**
Excluded				1.59 (1.80)*	0.35 (-2.76)***	0.80 (-0.57)
Excluded*Size					22.32 (1.95)*	
Excluded*Group Size/EGIP						3.10 (2.11)**
Observations	978	825	823	825	825	826
Subjects	205	175	174	175	175	177
Failures	94	73	73	73	73	73
Log pseudolikelihood	-419.42	-318.15	-318.34	-317.43	-311.62	-318.29
Significance: *(.1); **(.05); ***(.01)						

lower level of significance reflects less confidence in the relationship, the magnitude of the effect is difficult to ignore and may offer insight into future research. Model 6 substitutes the Group Size measure for the Group Size/EGIP, testing the interaction between the group's size in proportion to the population of the ruling coalition and exclusion. The Hazard Ratio of 3.10 reveals that as the size of the ethnic group in conflict approaches or exceeds that of the ruling coalition the conflict is at much greater risk of escalation to war, statistically significant at the .05 level. This finding strongly supports Hypothesis 3. To discover more about the influence of group demographic weight, I use both measures of group size in the analysis examining the effects of the interaction between kin-effects and group demographic weight on the risk of conflict intensification.

The focus of this study concerns the relationship between ethnic kin-effects and escalation of armed conflicts to war. I run separate models replacing each of the explanatory kin-effect variables respectively for Eck's ethnic mobilization variable in her Model 1. Consistent with the expectations, neither of the variables (*Kin* or *Kinbord*) have a statistically significant effect on the intensification outcome independently, indicated in Models 7 and 8 in Table 2. As mentioned above, this reflects the tremendous costs associated with supporting rebel campaigns and the consequent barriers to ethnic kin support.

The effect of an ethnic group's regional concentration bordering another state does, in fact, possess statistical significance independently. If an ethnic group in conflict is located in a home base on the outskirts of the state, bordering another state, the conflict is 72% more likely in escalate to war, significant at the .05 level. These results indicate

TABLE 2

VARIABLES	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Ethnic Mobilization			
Ethnic Pluralism	1.79 (1.13)	1.66 (0.88)	1.91 (1.17)
Per Capita Income	1.00 (-0.04)	0.99 (-0.18)	0.99 (-0.17)
Population	0.97 (-0.38)	0.96 (-0.49)	0.95 (-0.62)
Democracy	0.55 (-1.69)	0.56 (-1.67)*	0.58 (-1.58)
Autocracy	1.13 (0.44)	1.10 (0.33)	1.11 (0.35)
Incompatibility	0.57 (-1.79)*	0.63 (-1.56)	0.51 (-2.23)**
Cold War	1.31 (1.03)	1.27 (0.91)	1.27 (0.91)
Kin	1.63 (1.73)*		
Kinbord		1.30 (1.22)	
Groupbord			1.72 (2.43)**
Observations	859	859	859
Subjects	174	174	174
Failures	76	76	76
Log pseudolikelihood	-330.52	-331.7	-330.59

Significance: *(.1); **(.05); ***(.01)

the expectation that groups residing far away from the political center, where it is difficult for the government to oversee group activity, maintain control over access to weapons and resources, and prevent border crossings to safe havens in neighboring states, have insurgent advantages. These conditions allow rebel groups to regroup and operate outside of the reach of government suppression, thus aiding their organizational and military rebel efforts.

When the interaction term representing the effect of the group bordering a neighboring state relative to that group's proportion of the population (Group Size*Groupbord) is included in Model 12 (Table 3), this effect is strengthened. The group-bordering effect by size produces a Hazard ration of 11.09, indicating an enormous effect on the likelihood of escalation, significant at the .05 level. Larger groups in conflict that reside in regionally concentrated settlement areas near the border with another state are at considerably greater risk for escalation to war.

Models 10-14 (Table 3) test the particular kin-effects relevant to Hypothesis 4. Model 10 uses the broader kin definition which includes kin-ties found anywhere in the world, including Diaspora communities separated by vast geographic distances and the measure of group size as a proportion of the total population as a proxy for the concept of demographic weight. The interaction term representing the effect of broadly defined kin ties proportional to the group's demographic weight, when compared to the term representing the absence of any kin ties proportional to demographic weight, is not significant at any level. However, the same test for the effects of group-bordering kin ties in Model 11 yields extremely significant results. Model 11 includes the interaction term representing the presence of kin groups across state borders and adjoined to the

TABLE 3						
VARIABLES	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Ethnic Pluralism	1.34 (0.43)	1.52 (0.62)	1.59 (0.69)	1.20 (0.26)	1.51 (0.62)	1.26 (0.33)
Per Capita Income	1.01 (0.09)	1.00 (0.04)	1.00 (0.02)	1.01 (0.14)	1.00 (0.04)	1.00 (0.07)
Population	0.93 (-0.78)	0.95 (-0.55)	0.93 (-0.73)	0.93 (-0.76)	0.93 (-0.67)	.092 (-0.84)
Democracy	0.68 (-1.07)	0.69 (-0.99)	0.71 (-0.95)	0.65 (-1.13)	0.68 (-1.00)	0.66 (-1.11)
Autocracy	1.21 (0.64)	1.30 (0.85)	1.26 (0.79)	1.17 (0.51)	1.24 (0.68)	1.18 (0.54)
Incompatibility	0.74 (-1.05)	0.69 (-1.33)	0.69 (-1.38)	0.75 (-1.00)	0.72 (-1.18)	0.77 (-0.94)
Cold War	1.50 (1.41)	1.45 (1.28)	1.47 (1.31)	1.52 (1.44)	1.49 (1.38)	1.49 (1.38)
Group Size*Kin	2.29 (1.16)					
Group Size*No Kin	5.72 (0.52)					
Group Size*Kinbord		22.35 (2.94)***				
Group Size*No Kinbord		1.25 (0.39)				
Group Size*Groupbord			11.34 (2.49)**			
Group Size*No Groupbord			1.25 (0.40)			
Group Size/EGIP*Kin				1.24 (2.36)**		
Group Size/EGIP*NoKin				0.79 (-0.41)		
Group Size/EGIP*Kinbord					3.40 (2.05)**	
Group Size/EGIP*NoKinbord					1.16 (1.31)	
Group Size/EGIP*Groupbord						1.04 (0.11)
Group Size/EGIP*NoGroupbord						1.22 (2.18)**
Observations	774	774	774	772	772	772
Subjects	162	162	162	161	161	161
Failures	68	68	68	68	68	68
Log pseudolikelihood	-292.13	-290.69	-291.25	-291.89	-291.45	-292.11
Significance: *(.1); **(.05); ***(.01)						

group's regional base relative to its demographic weight measured by size relative to total population; it produces a Hazard Ratio of 22.35 significant at the .01 level. The magnitude of this effect and its significance at such a low level of significance lends a great deal of support to Hypothesis 4.

However, the measurement of group size as a proportion of the total state population may in some cases overlap with the measure of ethnic pluralism. Ethnic pluralism measures the size of largest ethnic group within society, so if and when the rebelling ethnic group is actually the largest in the country these two measures will measure the same variance and create a multicollinearity bias. Accordingly, I run the same analysis using the measure of group size as a proportion of the population represented in the ruling coalition (EGIP) as the proxy for demographic weight in Models 13 and 14 (Table 3). Substituting the relative demographic power balance between the rebelling ethnic group and the population comprising the ruling coalition (EGIP) gives an unbiased, more accurate approximation of the demographic weight. It also may be a more accurate representation of the power balance relevant to conflict behavior; other excluded groups not involved in fighting may not have any important effect on the conflict because they would not gain from supporting either side.

This analysis tells a similar story. Interestingly, Model 13 demonstrates a slight effect of the broadly defined kin-effect, significant at the .05 level. The Hazard Ratio for the interaction term representing the kin-effect proportional to the group's size as a proportion to the ruling coalition, when tested against the absence of kin, is 1.24. Model 14 tests the effect of the interaction between the kin-bordering effect and demographic weight measured by the ratio of the group's population to the population of the ruling

coalition. The results indicate that larger groups in conflict with kin ties across interstate lines adjacent to their regional base are far more likely than those without these conditions to escalate conflict to war. The Hazard Ratio, 3.40, demonstrates a huge and statistically significant effect, providing further support for Hypothesis 4.

Turning to the control variables the model, there is very mixed results, reflective of the diversity of findings in the previous literature. Eck's (2009) measure of ethnic pluralism is insignificant at the .05 level in all models except Model 5, in which it is included with the measure of group size, the exclusion dummy variable, and an interaction term between the two. It is unclear whether this is a telling finding given that it is included with the size variable, which may introduce a multicollinearity problem. Ultimately, this study cannot provide any confident verification of any theories involving the relationship between a society's ethnic composition and conflict escalation.

The per-capita income and population measures are not significant in any of the models, suggesting that these are not as important in explaining conflict behavior as some realists claim. The dummy variables for regime-type demonstrated Hazard ratios consistent with expectations in almost every model, Democracy makes societies less likely to experience conflict intensification and autocracies increase the risk, but are almost never statistically significant. Democracy is only statistically significant at the .05 level in the replication of Eck's analysis (Model 1) and Autocracy is never significant. Furthermore the effect present in the Hazard Ratios for Autocracy is very marginal compared to other variables.

Incompatibility is significant in only a few models, including at the .01 level in Model 1, and supports the expectation that conflicts regarding control over the central

government are more at risk for conflict intensification than territorial conflicts because the ruling coalition will be willing to incur much higher costs to defend their safety and position in power than to hold onto geographically distant territories populated primarily by ethnic others. The Cold War dummy variable is significant only in Models 5 and 6, and the Hazard Ratios throughout indicate that those conflicts beginning after the end of the Cold War are more likely to escalate to war.

CONCLUSION

The findings here are quite interesting given Eck's (2009) theory and the debate over kin-effects in the literature. Particularly, the independent effect of exclusion from the political center based on group demographic weight demonstrates an extremely substantial effect on the likelihood of conflict escalation which may capture some of the variance left unexplained by ethnic mobilization. Measuring demographic weight by the ethnic group's size in proportion to the population of all groups with political access to the ruling coalition *and* in proportion to the size of the ruling coalition, this study demonstrates that the interaction between demographic size and exclusion from power is a powerful determinant of the likelihood of conflict escalation. This finding follows logically from the contention in the onset literature that groups with greater demographic weight are more capable to sustain violent campaigns and thus to recruit support from external parties to escalate violence. It is also consistent with the idea that excluded groups will be more motivated to organize rebellion to challenge the status quo. Accordingly, there must be greater attention given to conflicts characterized by rebel

groups representing ethnic groups closer to or larger than the size of the ruling coalition that are excluded from political representation.

Whereas Eck has pinpointed the primary determining factor contributing to conflict escalation in the strategies employed for recruitment and mobilization, the results here using her same model structure with an expanded sample and additional variables reveal other group-level characteristics that have great impact on the risk of war which may affect conflict behavior alongside ethnic mobilization. There is overwhelming evidence that the kin-bordering effects by demographic weight in society have considerable and far-reaching impact on conflict escalation. The findings support Hypothesis 4 in that larger groups with the kin-bordering effect are far more likely to escalate to war.

There are more mixed results for the kin-effect by demographic weight. Specifically, the relationship is only positive and significant at the .05 level when using the measure of demographic weight corresponding to the ratio of the group's size to the size of the ruling coalition. This effect is quite small, producing a Hazard Ratio of only 1.24.

When comparing the kin-bordering effect and the kin-effect, this study demonstrates that it is primarily bordering kin that raise the risk for conflict intensification. This finding refutes earlier work that emphasizes the diaspora (kin)-effect. In fact, distant diaspora communities, though they may be politically mobilized and aim to impact the conflict through access to their powerful governments, do not contribute to the conditions that foster intensified violence. They may, for example,

encourage political and diplomatic solutions by supporting negotiation efforts, but this is a subject for other research endeavors.

The policy implications of this finding are quite important for efforts to protect international security. For governments controlling fragile, ethnically fractured states, the empirical evidence presented here should be absorbed into policy decisions regarding treatment of marginalized groups. While excluding small, demographically weak groups from power may not raise significant costs, governments should refrain from restricting access to the political process for larger groups even if they appear to lack any form of organized resistance. Demographically powerful groups are more equipped and likely to mobilize support from within and to attract the support of ethnic kin abroad. Powerful nations and international organization seeking to protect international peace should focus attention primarily on instances of ethnic-based exclusion of numerically larger groups.

Additionally, governments ruling ethnically fractionalized states in which larger aggrieved groups identify with ethnic kindred across an international border adjacent to their regional base should be wary about their policies towards such groups. The international community must be ready to identify and respond to instances of such exclusion, as they pose a particular threat to international security. Furthermore, conflict dyads in which powerful diaspora distant from the conflict exercise their political weight to raise awareness and pressure their governments on specific policies are not as risky as those in which kindred are close by. This identifies an attention imbalance that skews the treatment of conflict in a critical way. While wealthy diaspora communities in powerful nations, such as the United States, may be able to push conflicts relevant to their kindred to the forefront of the foreign policy agenda, this may come at the cost of overlooking

more volatile conflicts that are more likely to intensify into war and threaten international security.

For example, the United States and the international community neglected mounting evidence that violence would inevitably escalate in Rwanda in the early 1990's. The oppressive and exclusionary policies that the Hutu government imposed on the Tutsi minority encouraged Tutsi mobilization that made violent conflict between rebel groups and the government practically inevitable. Tutsi populations in both Tanzania and Uganda, augmented by the refugee flows from Rwanda, exacerbated the risk of war by creating safe bases of operation from which to develop and launch rebel campaigns. The examples of geographically proximal ethnic kindred across state boundaries intensifying conflict are far too numerous to recount here, but the empirical evidence suggests that improving border integrity between weak and fractionalized states is of particular importance to preventing the escalation of conflict.

Transnational kin adjacent to a group in conflict's regional base provide access to the necessary resources and safe base of operation outside enemy government controlled territory that contribute to the ability to sustain violent campaigns. Despite legitimate arguments pointing out that neighboring groups are at greater risk for backlash given their proximity and that they are often made up of refugee populations without sufficient means to mobilize rebel campaigns, this study demonstrates the considerable effect bordering kin have on conflict escalation. Because the effect demonstrated depends on the demographic weight of the group in conflict, it follows that the barriers to supporting rebel campaigns are overcome primarily through the power balance within the conflict. While ethnic groups that are much smaller than the ruling coalition in society may find it

difficult to recruit meaningful support from neighboring kin, larger groups may attract their support because their relative size lends legitimacy to their claims of gross oppression and their power to mobilize effective rebellion. Transnational kin may find it worthwhile to support a rebel campaign because it offers the opportunity to weaken a regional rival or to grab part of its land and resources through victory. It may be that the politically motivated neighboring kin sympathetic to the grievances of their oppressed counterparts outweigh the aforementioned barriers. Or, the intentions of transnational kin groups may not matter as much as the opportunity their existence presents to rebels who can manage to operate, recruit, and attain weapons and resources in a friendly environment even if the majority find it too costly to support the campaign directly.

Though there is little one can do about the presence of ethnic diversity within a society, and the existence of heterogeneity is too widespread to offer insight into which specific conflicts are at greatest risk of escalation, policymakers can focus on these specific causal mechanisms by which ethnic differences may manifest themselves into hazardous conflict.

This study affords additional opportunities for future research related to discovering the causal factors associated with conflict intensification. I propose above a number of explanations for why the kin-bordering effect is more powerful than that of diaspora, but future studies to examine the reasons for this pattern will help to contribute to an understanding of the particular causal relationship. In addition, I focus specifically on the effect of transnational kin ties in combination with group demographic weight, but there may be additional group-level factors that make conflict escalation more likely. For example, it would be interesting to know the effects of the type of political parties and

armed factions representing ethnic groups in conflict. One might expect that more militant groups vying for support from the group population during conflict might encourage radicalization and encourage an increase in violence. There is also additional verification needed for the demographic weight factors and kin-effects. The data available to this study include some missing values. This is especially problematic when data for the explanatory group-level variables are missing for especially long and violent conflicts that have significant relevance to the empirical pattern.

The literature addressing intrastate conflict and civil war is a rich and diverse forum of debate, with yet tremendous space for further theory-development and refinement. As such conflicts become more frequent and violent, it is essential to pinpoint and understand the factors that contribute to their intensification from minor episodes of violence into bouts of war. Escalated conflicts create the global problems of transnational intervention and cross-border spillover effects that threaten the international community's maintenance of peace and security. Identifying and responding to conditions that contribute to the outbreak of war will mitigate these international threats to make the world a safer, less violent community.

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