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Urban Sprawl and State Growth Management Programs:

Why Certain States Have Adopted Policy

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Abstract

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While many previous studies have examined the effectiveness of state growth management policies, few have focused on the reasons for the adoption of such legislation. This study investigates why certain states have adopted growth management legislation using comparative data analysis and case studies. The empirical results show that population growth rate, competing interest groups, and strong governors make a state more likely to adopt smart growth policy. The case studies of Florida, a state with a growth management program, and Texas, a state without one, illustrate that political circumstance specific to each state at a certain time play a role, as well. The combination of the comparative data analysis and case studies show that certain political or demographic factors alone cannot always accurately predict a state's adoption of smart growth policy, and idiosyncratic forces often trump a state's statistical proclivity to adopt growth management legislation.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures

Introduction

Over the past few decades, urban sprawl is an issue that continues to play an important role in influencing policy, public opinion, and civic activism. The roots of urban sprawl are numerous yet widely debated – from historical and sociological factors to the rise of the automobile industry to racial and economic inequity. Sprawl has typically been defined based on a multitude of factors, including low levels of density, concentration, clustering, and mixed uses, among others (Galster et al 2001). Lopez and Hynes (2003) measure urban sprawl on the metropolitan level as the proportion of the population that lives in high- versus low-density census tracts. Despite the numerous factors believed to characterize sprawl, the general consensus is that sprawl has mostly negative consequences for the quality of life of a city or state.

Lopez and Hynes (2003) find that "sprawl is increasing in…metropolitan areas even as they add population because new growth is much less dense than older portions of…metropolitan areas." In the face of increasing metropolitan sprawl, state governments in the United States have enacted various growth management policies to attempt to limit the negative side effects of sprawl. This study attempts to determine which characteristics of a state increase the chances that smart growth legislation will be enacted. Do the politics, culture, and citizen makeup of a state influence the likelihood that growth management legislation can pass? It is my hope to examine the various determinants of the adoption of state smart growth policies to better understand why certain states have succeeded in passing legislation while others have not.

This paper examines several factors, including population growth rate, gubernatorial power, and the role of interest groups, which state politics scholars have generally found to be the most important determinants of state policy outcomes. The 14 states that currently have some form of smart growth policy are the focus of this analysis. A brief background on the legislative history of the adoption of smart growth policy in each state is combined with a comparative case analysis of the 14 adopting states. In addition, this honors thesis delves deeper into a pair of states – Florida, who passed one of the most comprehensive growth management programs in 1985; and Texas, who has tried and failed to pass growth management legislation, but possesses many of the statistical qualities of a state which needs such policy. Lastly, I will develop a recipe for action for growth management supporters by summarizing the factors that most likely may be influenced or changed to increase the likelihood that a state will adopt smart growth policy in the future.

Literature Review

The causes of urban sprawl have been argued for years, but a few of the more common sources are land-use regulations promoting low-density development, tax and land incentives for construction outside of the city core, and the desire of some citizens to move out of the city center to have more personal space. All of these factors, as well as others, lead to the negative consequences associated with urban sprawl – increased traffic congestion and travel times, increased citizen political apathy, environmental harms,

decreased population and business activity in the city center, social and racial inequality, and inefficient use of energy and utilities (Ramirez de la Cruz 2009).

As of 2007, fifteen states have adopted state growth management programs (SGMPs), which encompass various objectives but all, in some form or another, address the need to curb urban sprawl (Yin & Sun 2007).[1] Growth management programs can be referred to by many different names. In recent years, the term "smart growth" has become increasingly popular. Regardless of the term used, smart growth has become an idea representing an answer to a litany of environmental, social, and political problems. While smart growth specifics vary state by state, the ills for which policy is designed to cure are similar in nature. The concern raised in this paper is not the differences between states' smart growth policies, but rather how or why states were able to bring the issue of smart growth to the forefront of the policy agenda in order to get legislation passed.

Hawaii in 1961 was the first state to adopt a SGMP and in a lot of respects had very pressing needs for one, especially as it relates to protecting the natural environment and preventing chaotic and sprawling development in a state with a small land area (Hawaii is a truly unique case, though, and for the purposes of this study, will not be included in the data analysis). California was next in 1965, followed by Vermont and Oregon in 1970 and 1973, respectively. A group of states adopted smart growth legislation in the mid-to-late 1980s and early 1990s, as well as several in the late 1990s (see Figure 1)

[1] While 15 states have adopted growth management legislation, only 14 will be considered in the data analysis in this paper. Hawaii is not included because it is a truly unique case and data is less readily accessible for it.

Figure 1: Map of State Adoptions



Much of the previous literature related to the topic of growth management policy has focused on the issue at a local or metropolitan level. My research focuses on the state level, however, for a number of reasons. Anthony (2008) discusses possible research design problems in studying the effectiveness of state growth management programs, but recommends using "the state as the level of analysis and explaining why some states have adopted state growth regulations while the rest have not" in order to avoid many of the common research design pitfalls that arise in cross-sectional studies of cities.[2]

[2] Anthony (2008) notes that previous studies which focused on cities encounter the problem that some cities do not have a choice whether to adopt growth management policy or not – it may or may not be required by state law. Therefore, examining demographic and population-based determinants for cities would not be ideal because one could not definitively say that those variables, not state mandates, were necessarily accounting for policy adoption.

Additionally, in studying the determinants of growth management policy adoption, using the state level of analysis provides an easy and sensible mechanism for comparison. Using data on various characteristics of the states, like political ideology or educational attainment, allows for more straightforward comparisons and will lead to clearer conclusions as to why certain states have adopted smart growth legislation.

Beyond the convenience of the state level of analysis, state growth management programs have many advantages over local programs and are therefore more important to examine in the fight against urban sprawl. For one, states can issue mandates to local governments to ensure local land use policies promote smart growth. Second, and perhaps more important, state legislation can preempt local legislation. Also, local governments receive considerable amounts of financial assistance from their state governments, which may provide incentives for local governments to adopt smart growth practices (Fisher 1994). In addition, local governments generally receive their taxing authority from the state, so efforts to use taxes and fees to promote smart growth typically require some type of state approval before local governments can use taxes as a policy tool.

Healy and Rosenberg (1979) provide other reasons for focusing on the state. First, sprawl issues may cross the boundaries of individual jurisdictions. Second, local interests often diverge from the interests of the general public; thus, growth management policy developed on the local level would encounter many more obstacles in the form of smaller but seemingly more pressing local issues.

My research on growth management programs also differs from previous research because I am not primarily concerned whether or not the programs reach their intended results. Previous literature has shown mixed results of the success of growth management policies. Anthony (2004) finds that growth-managed states generally experienced less population density decline than states with no growth management program. His statistical analysis did not show a significant effect, however, of growth management programs helping to check urban sprawl. Healy and Rosenberg (1979) concluded that Hawaii's SGMP has been "relatively, but not completely, effective in stopping the urbanization of agricultural lands." They go on to explain that the program definitely made an impact on the pattern of the state's growth, saying that urban expansion was much more compact and organized than if the program had not been in place.

While the research on the successfulness of SGMPs has been mixed, the existing literature on why states develop growth management policies is limited. Case in point, Anthony (2008) summarizes the factors generally thought to influence the adoption of growth regulation policies – population-based, organizational, cultural, environmental, and technology-based factors – but does not provide a state by state analysis. My research focuses on many of these factors, specifically gubernatorial power, citizen ideology, socioeconomic factors, the degree of sprawl of a state's urban areas, and population growth.

Ramirez de la Cruz (2009) focuses on compact development and examines several statistical models to explain why land-use policy is adopted in certain localities

and not others. While his research is focused on city and local governments, many of his background theories can be extended to the state level (for purposes of clarity in this paper, I will reference Ramirez de la Cruz's models at the state level). The property rights model assumes a state offers a certain amount of public good in a competitive supply/demand marketplace. When a state experiences deterioration in that public good because of sprawl, the state will adopt need-based regulations to curb sprawl in order to save the public good and the economic competitiveness of the marketplace.

The second model posits that smart growth regulations are more likely to be adopted when there is substantial support from strong interest groups. States with high civic involvement from politically strong groups are better able to fight pro-growth interests like developers and building/construction groups. The political institutions, specifically the governor and state legislature, are also important in determining whether a state will adopt smart growth legislation, according to Ramirez de la Cruz. If a state has a strong governor, political institutions invest more faith and power in the position, and the governor has greater influence in policy decisions.

A factor that could feasibly impact the likelihood of a state adopting anti-sprawl policy is inter-jurisdictional fragmentation. Buzbee (2003), in a look at theories of overregulation, finds this factor to be one of the main reasons why such a complex issue like urban sprawl is so difficult to address, let alone solve. While Miller (2002) and Lewis (1996) have developed political fragmentation indices for certain metropolitan areas, the lack of a clear and consensus statewide measure of governmental fragmentation precludes this variable from being included in this study.

Brody et al (2006) examines the adoption of sprawl-reduction planning policies in local jurisdictions in southern Florida and finds clear socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that influence the adoption rate of these programs. The study finds that wealthier individuals are less likely to support local sprawl-reduction policies, but more educated individuals are more likely to support them. This work leads me to examine wealth and educational attainment on a state level. Wassmer and Lascher (2006) have done extensive studying of survey data of California citizens to determine how influential citizens may be in the adoption of state growth management strategies. They find that women and residents of higher per capita income counties in California were more likely to believe that sprawl was a pressing issue, and one can then infer that they would be more likely to support growth management policy. In other words, states with higher average per capita incomes may be more likely to adopt growth management policy, contrary to the findings of Brody et al (2006).

Examining race, Gainsborough (2002) found blacks were less concerned about urban sprawl and unchecked growth than other races in analysis of public opinion data from New York and Los Angeles. Both Connerly and Frank (1986) and Chapin and Connerly (2004) found that women in Florida were more likely to support limits on growth than men. The former also found level of education related to an individual's likelihood to support growth management programs. The work of these scholars beckons me to examine demographic data on the state level of analysis, because the previous literature shows mixed results when it comes to the demographic factors like income and education.

Wassmer and Lascher's model looks at political ideology, as well. "Conservatives may be more inclined to accept growth as the outcome of natural market forces that are best left alone," in tune with the popular conservative notion of the importance of free markets. Wassmer and Lascher also argue that liberals tend to be more accepting of government intervention and would therefore be more likely to support growth management policy to curb sprawl's negative consequences. Gainsborough's (2002) research in this topic, however, returned mixed results, finding that "liberals in the Los Angeles area were significantly more likely to see growth and congestion as important problems, but ideology was not related to support for slowing growth in New York City suburbs."

Using event history analysis, Howell-Moroney (2008) finds the importance of civic engagement, strong gubernatorial powers, citizen liberalism, and growth pressures in the adoption of state growth management programs. Howell-Moroney also does a case study on the smart growth policies in Maryland, inspiration for my comparative case studies of Florida and Texas. He finds that legislative incrementalism and incentives were important factors in Maryland's successful adoption of smart growth policies.

Dillingham (2008) suggests the likelihood that a state will adopt growth management policy depends primarily on the severity of the problem itself in relation to the competition from other states. In other words, states try to remain competitive with one another by adopting similar policies dealing with similar problems. In this regard, one would think that the adoption of SGMPs would experience a domino effect across the 50 states, because when one state deems it necessary to adopt policy, another state with

similar or worse problems will then follow suit. Walker (1969) would also argue that the likelihood of a state adopting a program is higher if other states have already adopted the policy. He adds that "the likelihood becomes higher still if the innovation has been adopted by a state viewed by key decision makers as a point of legitimate comparison." Considering there have only been 15 states to enact SGMPs since 1961, this diffusion process may be occurring, but at a slow rate. Additionally, all 50 states may not deem sprawl as a pressing issue, so certain states may not be even interested in passing smart growth legislation, or perhaps the political norms in some states promote deference to local control as opposed to state.

Kingdon (2003) cites the importance of policy entrepreneurs and policy windows in the agenda-setting process. A policy entrepreneur is most often a persistent, well-connected, leader of an interest or advocacy group. In Kingdon's research, policy entrepreneurs were deemed important in helping pass legislation in 65 percent of case studies, while they were deemed unimportant in only 13 percent. Policy entrepreneurs must always be ready to capitalize on a policy window, or time when the right forces combine to allow for an entrepreneur to make his or her push for legislation. This window can come after a crisis relevant to the policy topic, which thrusts that subject matter onto the agenda. It could also come during certain legislative cycles, which Kingdon shows are prone to let more legislation through than other times. Randomness is also a factor – "Government does not come to conclusions. It stumbles into paradoxical situations that force it to move one way or another. There are social forces that you can identify, but what comes out of them is just accident" (Kingdon 2003). The

main idea to take from Kingdon's work is that policy can be made a variety of ways, both predictable and unpredictable, yet the presence of key policy entrepreneurs can aid in the process and if the political situation is right, legislation can be passed.

In summary, the majority of the previous literature focused on the *effects* of state smart growth policies or the reasons behind the adoption of *local* growth management plans, but little conclusive work has been done on the determinants of *state* adoptions of those policies. Additionally, a comprehensive comparative analysis of the states with smart growth legislation is rare in the literature on sprawl.

A key objective of this thesis is to examine whether certain states have adopted growth management policy for largely idiosyncratic reasons or whether there are certain commonalities that characterize the adoption of state growth management policies. Sprawl is evident in most places, albeit to varying degrees, and smart growth legislation is not only about combating sprawl, but promoting the idea of a sustainable and efficient future. Governments play an active role in providing incentives and disincentives for growth, as well as incentives for smart growth. Therefore, understanding the determinants of smart growth policies is important not only for this policy area but also for increasing our understanding of the linkages (or lack thereof) among citizen preferences, the design and role of state political institutions, and the adoption of state public policies. My research examines the major determinants of state adoption of smart growth legislation and summarizes the key lessons learned for future research and analysis.

Determinants of the Adoption of State Growth Management Policy: Indicators and Hypotheses

As urban sprawl has become a more pressing issue over the past few decades, the number of state governments to enact growth management legislation has increased. Before 1985, only four states (Hawaii, California, Vermont, and Oregon) had state growth management programs. From 1985 to 2000, eleven more states followed suit. The negative consequences of sprawl are forcing more states to consider growth management policy. But what are the reasons why the 15 states which enacted legislation up to 2000 did so? What are the characteristics of these states that made them more likely to enact legislation to promote smart growth? This section contains a discussion of the key determinants and their operationalization in this study, as well as the key hypotheses and predictions of the influence of the relevant factors on smart growth policy adoption.

Population-Based Factors

Most fundamentally, the rate of population growth would seem to be an important predictor of increased urban sprawl. If the population increases, sprawl is usually more likely to occur. However, Yin and Sun (2007) find that "high population growth is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for a state to adopt a SGMP." They looked at the population growth rates of the 15 states (they included Hawaii) that have adopted smart growth policy up to 2000 from the two decades before that state's adoption of the program. Their results were mixed, finding population growth rates which were higher

than the national average in the decades preceding the adoption of the SGMP in 10 of the 15 states. For example, Florida adopted its legislation in 1985. From 1960 to 1980, Florida's population growth rate was well above the national average, which may help explain why the policy was enacted. However, population growth rates in New Jersey were well below national averages in the decades preceding its policy adoption in 1985. Thus, population growth rate may contribute to some states' policy adoptions, but perhaps not all. In this study, urban population growth rate is examined as opposed to total population growth rate to emphasize that sprawl's negative effects tend to be more evident in and around urban and metropolitan areas.

Additionally, the sheer population of a state is unlikely to be a good predictor of policy adoption. The states with SGMPs range widely in population size. The list is comprised of populous states like California, Florida, and New Jersey, but is also comprised of very small states like Rhode Island, Vermont, and Maine. Thus, the wide variation in population sizes among the states with SGMPs makes it unlikely that it is an important factor in affecting policy adoption.

Keep in mind, however, that population growth is not always a determinant of increased urban sprawl. The decentralization of cities in the 1960s and 1970s due to a variety of reasons led to increased development away from the city center, but was not necessarily accompanied by population growth, but rather population decentralization. This study recognizes this and merely uses population growth rate as a possible determinant of growth management policy adoption. States with less population growth may have high levels of sprawl, which is why other determinants, including population

density index (discussed below), are included in the study to account for any potential faults in the population growth rate statistic.

For the purposes of this study, the degree of sprawl associated with a state is examined using a state's urban areas. One measure is the urban and rural population percentages. Population density is also used to determine the percentage of each state's urban population that lives in urban areas with higher than the average statewide density. This measure, which will be referred to as the population density index, will provide a sense of the degree of sprawl of a state's more populated urban areas – the higher the index, the greater the percentage of a state's population which lives in high density urban areas. In other words, states with a lower score may be more likely to be sprawled because a lower percentage of the population lives in high density urban areas.

Hypothesis 1: States with higher rates of population growth are more likely to adopt growth management policies.

Hypothesis 2: States with a higher degree of sprawl are more likely to adopt growth management policies.

Political Factors

In addition to population-based factors, political factors are critical in the adoption of growth management policy. This study examines the institutional power of the state governor, as well as his or her relative influence with the state legislature. Using Gray's (1999) research, the institutional power of a governor is determined by the constitutional structures of each state. Included in the index are veto power, tenure potential, budgetary

power, and party control, among others. Howell-Moroney (2008) finds gubernatorial power to be significant in the adoption of SGMPs, and which leads to the following hypotheses my analysis will test:

> **Hypothesis 3:** States with more powerful governors are more likely to adopt growth management policies than states where the governor's powers are weaker.
>
> **Hypothesis 4:** States with more liberal or progressive governors are more likely to adopt growth management policies than states with more conservative governors.

Also important, I believe, are the political characteristics of the citizens of the states. I believe the ideology of a state's citizens, as well as the consistent political leanings of the state in presidential elections, greatly affects the state's likelihood of adopting policy. Wassmer and Lascher (2006) argue for the notion that liberals are more likely to believe urban sprawl is a pressing issue, and thus be more likely to support policy combating sprawl.

> **Hypothesis 5:** States with a higher percentage of citizens that identify themselves as liberals are more likely to adopt growth management policies.

Interest Groups

Several scholars (Ramirez de la Cruz 2009, O'Connell 2008) have identified the importance of interest groups in affecting the legislation process. More specifically, the battle between pro-growth builder/developer/contractor interests and pro-growth-

management environmental interests has drawn much attention. Using survey data, Ramirez de la Cruz and O'Connell observe a significant impact of the level of activism of environmental groups on growth management policy in cities. Concrete quantitative data on interest groups on a state level is difficult to find. However, using vast research done by Thomas and Hrebenar (1998), a simple measure of the presence and relative influence of certain types of interest groups was developed. A list of influential interest groups for each state was scoured to determine whether or not there was a strong presence of the competing interests relevant to this study – environmentalists and builders/developers/contractors.

As Ramirez de la Cruz (2009) posits, "Environmental groups are openly associated with the protection of open space, farmland, and environmentally sensitive land. In addition, environmentalists promote the adoption of regulations that facilitate compact development because they champion the efficient use of energy for activities such as transportation." There are many pro-growth interests, as well. Builders, contractors, and developers are usually opposed to most anti-sprawl policies because of the restrictions levied on them. In most cases, a state will see influence from both sides, but the policy adoption will most be affected by the side that lobbies the most effectively and has the most influence.

> **Hypothesis 6:** States with a higher presence of environmental interest groups as opposed to builder/developer/contractor groups will be more likely to adopt growth management policies.

Demographic Factors

In addition, demographic variables such as per capita income and educational attainment are very important in order to determine the makeup of the citizens in the states. The population-based factors described earlier focus on population growth and geographical characteristics, while the demographic factors focus more on characteristics of the citizens themselves.

> **Hypothesis 7:** States where citizens have higher per capita incomes and educational attainment levels are more likely to adopt growth management policies.

Unfortunately, not all the factors associated with greater urban sprawl can be reliably measured and analyzed in a study of this nature due to excessive costs and limited availability of data. Additionally, historical and cultural factors that are difficult to conceptualize, let alone operationalize, may play a large role in determining the adoption of smart growth policy. Another issue is the fact that policy may have been enacted for reasons other than for combating urban sprawl. While all the SGMPs explicitly state that controlling sprawl is a main purpose of the legislation, one cannot discount the secondary reasons behind political decisions. For example, the passing of growth management legislation in a state may be indicative of a political ploy done near election time to curry favor for a certain candidate rather than an actual move towards combating sprawl and controlling growth. Dye (2008) mentions the notion of "nondecision making," when political actors intentionally suppress a policy issue because

they know it will disturb the political norm. This would be an example of a politically selfish motive to avoid pursuing smart growth policy. Accordingly, the Florida and Texas case studies provide an opportunity to examine the all the potential factors behind adoption (or lack of adoption in Texas) more closely.

Overall, the current gap in the literature about a consensus of factors contributing to SGMP adoption makes this study both extremely relevant and important in the overall research on urban sprawl and growth management legislation.

States' Smart Growth Legislation Summaries

While the legislation varies state by state, Howell-Moroney (2008) notes that "most scholars agree that the distinguishing features that identify growth management states are a mandate for local planning and some sort of review for consistency of local plans with state goals." Smart growth policies usually include provisions to protect natural resources, promote mixed-use development, and reduce traffic congestion. According to Bolen et al (2001), some other common goals of smart growth policy include:

1) Eliminate state subsidies that promote sprawl
2) Promote infill development (i.e. encourage compact development in areas where the adequate infrastructure is already in place)
3) Preserve farmland, open space, and areas of environmental and recreational value

4) Support local planning through incentives and technical assistance and encourage regional planning

Many of the 14 growth-managed states address these issues in their respective policies. Below is a brief summary of each state's growth management policies, highlighting some of the differences and peculiarities which exist among them.

First Wave

California (Adopted in 1965)

California first made a splash on the growth management scene in the mid-1960s. The state plan makes it mandatory for local governments to create comprehensive plans. California is also one of the few states that require consistency between individual elements of local and state plans. The California plan places review authority on the local level, however, and a large majority of the legislation is concerned with protecting the environment and agricultural land (Bolen et al 2001).

California's adoption of growth management legislation in 1965 came at a time of massive population growth and was coupled with a concern for protecting agricultural and open space. Along with Hawaii, which enacted policy in 1961, California was a pioneer in the growth management movement, and continues to place a high importance on such issues today.

Vermont (Adopted in 1970)

Vermont's Land Use and Development Act (Act 250) does not require local planning, but does require permits for certain types of development activity in order to control growth and foster good land use practices. The State Environmental Review Board is the state's primary planning authority on land use issues. Act 250 criteria focus on protecting the environment (especially as it relates to water), decongesting the highways, and preserving the aesthetic beauty of natural habitats (Bolen et al 2001).

After Act 250, Vermont has continued to keep land use and growth management as a key issue. In 1988, Vermont passed the Growth Management Act, which ensured that state plans were coordinated with regional and local plans. Vermont is an interesting state to examine, as in the decade prior to the adoption of Act 250, the urban population actually declined. Vermont also has very strong representation from environmentalist groups which promote smart growth initiatives.

Oregon (Adopted in 1973)

According to DeGrove (2005), Oregon's Land Use Planning Act is "the premier example of a comprehensive growth management plan to protect natural systems and confine urban development." The state requires comprehensive local plans, which must address numerous land use elements and must be consistent with other local land use ordinances and regulations.

Oregon's smart growth effort is focused on "quality development," including mixed-use and energy-efficient development, better transportation alternatives, and

development compatible with natural resource constraints. Oregon also has instituted urban growth boundaries, which promote compact development around existing population centers in an effort to reduce sprawl.

The city of Portland is perhaps the country's best example of a city committed to the ideals of smart growth and responsible development. The Portland metropolitan area is the country's only elected regional governance system (called Metro), and its Region 2040 planning process is a strong vision for the future. As Mike Burton, former executive officer of Metro, noted, "We chose to grow 'up' rather than 'out', preserve open space and natural areas, redevelop urban areas when and wherever possible, create new development that is less auto-dependent and is oriented along transit corridors, and plan for affordable housing (DeGrove 2005)." While there have been some challenges to Oregon's growth management program, it remains one of the most organized and comprehensive plans in the country.

Second Wave

Florida (Adopted in 1985)

Florida's Growth Management Act of 1985 rivals Oregon's as the most aggressive and far-reaching growth management program in the nation. Enacted during the so-called "second wave" of smart growth legislation during the 1980s, Florida's adoption led to similar legislation being passed in Georgia and Washington over the next several years.

By law, every local government in Florida must undertake a comprehensive planning process. Florida is also one of the few states which give the state government a strong role in reviewing and commenting on local governments' plans. A strong emphasis is placed on consistency, requiring inter-jurisdictional dialogue and cooperation (Bolen et al 2001).

One of the main reasons behind Florida's adoption of growth management policy was its massive population growth that was having detrimental effects not only on the state's infrastructure, but on the water systems and on other aspects of the environment.

New Jersey (Adopted in 1986)

New Jersey's State Planning Act created the State Planning Commission (SPC) and the Office of State Planning (OSP). The SPC is tasked with creating an assessment on the long-term infrastructure needs and facilitating cooperation between state and local governments to accomplish land use planning goals (Bolen et al 2001). The goals can seem challenging – the SPC must protect natural resources, for example, while still promoting development and identifying areas for growth, agriculture, and open space conservation.

The SPC gives local jurisdictions, not the state, more control over development and planning. However, the state encourages open communication between levels of government to foster cooperation and achieve consistency. The state can also provide financial and technical assistance to local governments to help them adopt various planning measures (Bolen et al 2001).

New Jersey's program is not as far-reaching as Oregon's or Florida's, but it is still significant. In fact, the American Planning Association recognized New Jersey in a 1999 report, calling its program among the five most comprehensive approaches to managing growth through the regulatory framework (Bolen et al 2001). New Jersey has a history of supporting smart growth initiatives; the key is finding the necessary funding to see those ideas through.

Maine (Adopted in 1988)

As DeGrove (2005) mentions, Maine is a good example of a state with modest population growth that still has adopted growth management legislation. Until the mid-1980s, Maine was comprised of two distinct entities. The south was fast-growing and burgeoning for economic development. On the other hand, the north was struggling to attract people and business. In the end, localities were becoming overwhelmed with a crumbling infrastructure and Maine's vulnerable natural resources and open spaces required attention and preservation.

The Growth Management Act originally required local governments to prepare comprehensive plans. However, soon after adoption, the Maine Legislature changed the language due to fiscal concerns. The state retains most of the power in Maine; essentially, localities can prepare a plan, ask for financial and technical assistance, and design implementation procedures, but the state has the final say on reviewing local planning.

Rhode Island (Adopted in 1988)

In terms of growth management, Rhode Island is a very unique state to examine because it has the smallest land area of any state in the country. But it is also very densely populated and has extensive shoreline access which became vulnerable in the mid-1980s during a population and building boom. Rhode Island's growth management program gives the state much power. There is a comprehensive state plan and mandatory local planning and consistency and cooperation is required on all levels of government.

Providence, the capital of Rhode Island, has seen many smart growth elements take hold in the last decade or so. The former industrial city has transformed into a model of mixed-use development, downtown revitalization, and protection of parks and open spaces (DeGrove 2005). Rhode Island is similar in many ways to the other Northeastern states of Vermont and Maine in that they have not experienced massive population growth, but due to environmental, economic, and development factors, have chosen to adopt growth management policy to responsibly grow and develop in the future.

Georgia (Adopted in 1989)

Georgia is somewhat different than most of the states previously discussed. It gives less power to the state and instead follows more of a "bottom-up" approach to growth management. Nevertheless, Georgia has a history of fairly progressive leadership (Georgia had a Democratic governor every year from 1872 to 2003), which through a series of incentives led to 99% of Georgia localities having prepared comprehensive

plans by 1997 (Bolen et al 2001). While implementation has seemingly lagged behind, this statistic is impressive for a state with no requirement for local governments to have a comprehensive plan.

Georgia is also unique because it has experienced one of the greater population booms of any state in recent years. This population growth combined with fairly progressive leadership (especially for a Southern state) and strong public and private resources led to strong support for smart growth initiatives. Citizens in the Atlanta area, for example, crave better designed roads and better transportation alternatives to help alleviate traffic congestion. While smart growth initiatives seemed to pick up steam during the 1990s, the new millennium has brought uncertainty and a lack of funding to such reform.

Washington (Adopted in 1990)

The state of Washington saw many negative impacts of unplanned growth throughout population increases in the 1970s and 1980s. Sprawl patterns began to show up, including congested roads and water and air pollution. The state had no way of coordinating any type of land use planning agenda. The growth management legislation in Washington was helped along by a strong civic mandate and strong governors.

A unique aspect of Washington's smart growth policy is that only counties that are experiencing a certain level of rapid population growth are required to prepare a comprehensive plan (Howell-Moroney 2008). Other localities have the option to do so. Additionally, Washington's planning policy is modeled very closely after Florida's. In

that sense, it is fairly far-reaching and comprehensive. Today, Washington's smart growth system still sees much support, although with the economic downturn many legislators are hesitant to support any massive smart growth reform.

Maryland (Adopted in 1992)

Maryland has very extensive smart growth measures in place, and as Howell-Moroney (2008) noted, "The Maryland case illustrates how growth management can evolve in an incremental fashion, even in a state where there are significant pro-development interests." Maryland's governor from 1995 to 2003 was Democrat Parris Glendening, who many recognize as one of the most important figures in the smart growth movement across the country. Even though the first monumental growth management legislation was adopted before his tenure began, Glendening was a champion of smart growth and helped Maryland achieve further legislation during his governorship.

Maryland's smart growth program has several goals – to protect natural resources, to target and support existing communities where a proper infrastructure is already in place, and to save money by not building an infrastructure which worsens sprawl (Bolen et al 2001). Howell-Moroney (2008) believes the legislation was able to pass because it offered incentives and citizens became involved and passionate about the cause. There were many groups that fought for smart growth legislation, and it turned Maryland into a poster child for the smart growth movement.

Third Wave

Arizona (Adopted in 1998)

Arizona passed the Growing Smarter Act in 1998, which included various provisions: reform community planning and rezoning processes to make them more growth-conscious, provide greater opportunities for citizens to comment on development plans, and provide money for the acquisition of state lands for open space (Bolen et al 2001). Unique here is the importance placed on the role of the citizen in the development process. Arizona encourages citizens to play an active role in determining the best community plans.

Arizona's growth management laws encourage comprehensive planning on both the state and local levels, but it is only mandatory for local governments. Also, inter-jurisdictional consistency is not required. At the gubernatorial level, growth management is seen as a quality of life issue. Emphasis is placed on preserving green space and eliminating contaminated sites, while transportation issues have not been at the forefront in Arizona.

Tennessee (Adopted in 1998)

The state of Tennessee has one of the fastest rates of land development in the country, in addition to having consistent population growth over the past several decades. Tennessee's Growth Policy Act requires county governments to create 20-year growth plans. Tennessee did not mandate a single, statewide solution, but instead provides technical assistance to local governments in their creation of growth plans. The Act also

specifically mentions minimizing urban sprawl as a goal. In fact, the state has created urban growth boundaries for municipalities in an effort to manage growth. The Act also created Planned Growth Areas, which are areas not located in urban growth boundaries but are expected to experience considerable growth over the next 20 years (Bolen et al 2001).

This state is unique because the Act tries to merge two often competing goals – containing urban sprawl while maximizing economic development. Tennessee encourages economic development, but also realizes the importance of managing potentially unchecked growth.

Colorado (Adopted in 2000)

Colorado's Land Use Act gives local governments broad control over planning, but requires plans to be consistent with state guidelines. Local governments can identify areas of concern, which the state can then protect from unchecked development. Governments in critical need of growth management can even receive funds from the State Planning Aid Fund (Bolen et al 2001).

Governor Bill Owens (Republican, 1999-2007) was a strong proponent of smart growth initiatives. The state promotes protecting open space and offers technical and financial assistance to local governments in preparing their growth plans. Transportation reform is also emphasized, mostly regarding highway improvements, although there is support of light rail where financially feasible. The state also promotes economic prosperity through tax credits for affordable housing. Colorado has increased public

awareness of growth management issues through a series of reports, which educate and inform citizens on the importance of land use planning.

Wisconsin (Adopted in 2000)

Wisconsin's planning law is unique because it provides incentives for local governments to implement smart growth strategies and elements in their land use decisions. Localities can receive up to $1.5 million in "smart growth grants" and up to $2 million in "transportation element planning grants." In order to be eligible to receive benefits, however, local governments' plans must address several elements, among them housing, transportation, utilities, economic development, intergovernmental cooperation, and land use. For example, Dane County, in which Madison lies, received $1.3 million in planning grants between 1999 and 2006. This led to $167 million in smart growth-related public and private investment (Dierwechter 2008).

Local governments' plans must be consistent with other county or regional plans. Wisconsin also places heavy emphasis on trying to foster better ways to get the public involved in the smart growth planning process.

Judging by the facets of growth management policy discussed above, most states have very similar goals. Even though some states may give more power to the state review board or allow for more local freedom in preparing a plan, they all have the majority of the requirements necessary to help curb urban sprawl and grow more responsibly. A quick summary of the specific elements per Bolen et al (2001) which

each state's growth management policies contain (consider only 13 states because California is not included in Bolen's study): eight eliminate state subsidies that promote sprawl; twelve promote infill development; ten preserve farmland and open space; and nine provide incentives and technical assistance. Only Vermont does not specifically address at least two of these issues. Among those without a statewide plan, Massachusetts promotes all four goals, while Connecticut, New Hampshire, Ohio, Illinois, South Carolina, and Texas promote three.

Data and Discussion

We now turn to the quantitative data collected on each state in this study. The data is meant to provide an overall sense of each state's population-based, political, and demographical factors. The following tables will be analyzed to highlight what are deemed the most influential factors in a state's quest for growth management policy adoption. A few summary statistics of the 14 growth-managed states in this study (Texas is also included in the tables, but will be examined more closely later in this paper): Four reside in the Northeast, four in the South, five in the West, and only one in the Midwest. Twelve voted for Barack Obama in the last presidential election. Nine would be considered blue states today, three red, and two are generally thought of as swing states. Of course, the data below takes into account the situation preceding and at the time of adoption, though, and not today.

Table 1: Population Factors

	Date of Adoption	Total State Pop. (1,000)	Urban %	Decade 1 Urban Pop. (1,000)	Decade 2 Urban Pop. (1,000)	Urban Pop. Growth Rate %	Avg. Pop. Density	Pop. Density Index
First Wave								
California	1965	15,717	86	8,539	13,573	58.9	3374	86.6
Vermont	1970	444	32	149	142	-4.7	1704	100.0
Oregon	1973	2,091	67	1,100	1,402	27.5	2423	87.5
Second Wave								
Florida	1985	9,746	84	5,544	8,212	48.1	1770	80.0
New Jersey	1986	7,365	89	6,373	6,557	2.9	2163	94.9
Maine	1988	1,125	48	504	534	5.9	1537	16.1
Rhode Island	1988	947	87	824	824	-0.1	1827	99.9
Georgia	1989	5,462	62	2,768	3,409	23.2	1480	87.7
Washington	1990	4,866	76	3,037	3,717	22.4	2039	84.6
Maryland	1992	4,781	81	3,386	3,888	14.8	1857	87.9
Third Wave								
Arizona	1998	3,665	88	2,278	3,206	40.7	2395	95.2
Tennessee	1998	4,877	61	2,773	2,969	7.1	1419	64.7
Colorado	2000	3,294	82	2,329	2,715	16.6	2679	70.5
Wisconsin	2000	4,891	66	3,020	3,211	6.3	2314	79.4
Yet to Adopt								
Texas	n/a	16,986	80	11,333	13,634	20.3	2347	85.4

NOTE: The years Decade 1 and 2 populations vary by state based on the state's date of adoption to account for population growth rate leading up to the legislation passing. For example, California's adoption date was 1965; Decade 1 is 1950, Decade 2 is 1960. Total state population is also from the nearest decade to adoption. See Appendix for more information.
SOURCES: Yin and Sun (2007), Howell-Moroney (2008), Census data

Table 1 covers a wide range of population variables for each state, including overall state population, growth rate, and the created measure – population density index. The state populations, not anticipated to play a role as a characteristic why a state would adopt growth management policy, varied considerably. Of the 14 growth-managed states, populations ranged from 444,000 in Vermont to 15.7 million in California (Note: populations are as of the nearest decade to date of adoption). Some states are large, some

states are small. In other words, as expected, there is no clear trend that would seem to illustrate that more populous states are more likely to adopt growth management policy.

Turning to urban population growth rate, it seemed to play a role in some states, but not in others. For instance, from 1950 to 1960, California's urban population grew a whopping 59 percent from 8.5 to 13.5 million. The urban populations in Florida and Arizona grew similarly in the decade preceding their policy adoptions. On the other hand, Vermont and Rhode Island actually had negative urban population growth rates, and several other states showed minimal growth. In all, 8 of the 14 growth-managed states had double-digit urban population growth rates in the decade prior to adoption. Of the other six states, four are in the Northeast, the slowest growing region in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2004). So, while not all the states have very high population growth rates, a majority do. And some previous studies have considered growth rate as a good predictor of policy adoption (Howell-Moroney 2008).

The population density index measures the percentage of people that live in urban areas with population densities greater than the state average. The lower the percentage, the more people live in less dense areas, indicating a higher degree of sprawl. From the data, the large majority of states have indices above 80 percent. Maine is somewhat of an outlier, as it lacks a very large city and has one of the lowest average population densities of any state in this study. While the population density index may not show any overwhelming trends or surprises, the consistency of the numbers suggest that most of the growth-managed states have fairly high-density urban areas where the majority of the state's population lives.

In sum, the population factors, taken in and of themselves, do not show any overwhelming trends. Some of the factors may be influential in some cases, but it is clear that there is not a population factor that directly influences a state to adopt growth management policy consistently, at least as measured at the state level.

Table 2: Political Factors

	Date of Adoption	Liberal %	Party of Gov.	Gov's Party % in Senate	Gov's Party % in House	Gov's Institutional Powers Score	Pres. Election Results
First Wave							
California	1965	30.7	D	64.1	61.3	3.3	r
Vermont	1970	29.7	R	73.3	66.2	2.9	r
Oregon	1973	32.4	R	40.0	45.0	3.1	d
Second Wave							
Florida	1985	19.7	D	80.0	64.2	3.4	r
New Jersey	1986	24.8	R	42.5	62.5	3.9	R
Maine	1988	26.2	R	42.9	43.0	3.6	R
Rhode Island	1988	27.8	R	24.0	25.0	2.8	d
Georgia	1989	18.7	D	80.4	80.0	3.1	r
Washington	1990	24.9	D	49.0	64.3	3.1	r
Maryland	1992	25.4	D	80.9	82.3	4.3	r
Third Wave							
Arizona	1998	18.2	R	60.0	63.3	3.3	r
Tennessee	1998	17.4	R	45.5	38.4	3.6	d
Colorado	2000	22.9	R	57.1	63.1	3.8	r
Wisconsin	2000	19.7	R	48.5	52.6	3.5	D
Yet to Adopt							
Texas	n/a	16.7	R	61.3	51.3	3.4	R

NOTE: Governor's Party Percentage in the Senate and House refer to the representation of the Governor's party, Democrat or Republican, in each chamber. This is one of the factors used to determine the Governor's Institutional Powers Score. Presidential Election results refer to the three elections prior to policy adoption. D is having voted all three times Democratic; d is twice Democratic, etc. See Appendix for more information.

SOURCES: Yin and Sun (2007); Howell-Moroney (2008); CBS/New York Times national ideology and party identification polls; *Book of the States*, various years; Gray (1999)

Table 2 presents selected political factors for the 14 states that have adopted state growth management policy. The first measure is the percentage of citizens in each state that identify themselves as liberals. In the literature, some previous research has shown this measure to be significant. In this study, the data portrays a wide range of percentages. Oregon has the highest percentage at 32.4, while Tennessee has the lowest at 17.4. The First Wave states were significantly more liberal than the states which adopted later. When divided into regions, the numbers become clearer still. Eight of the highest nine percentages belong to states in the Northeast or West. Only one state in the South and Midwest has a liberal percentage above 20. It is clear from the numbers that the liberal percentage is based very much on regional preferences. The Northeast and West, especially the Pacific Coast, are historically much more liberal than the South and the Midwest. Nevertheless, the simple fact that there are several Southern and Midwestern states with growth management policy suggests that adopting such policy does not have a regional or ideological bias. In other words, just because the Northeast is generally more liberal than the South, it is clear that ideology is not the main factor at play, as both the Northeast and the South contain four growth-managed states.

The political party of the governor at the time the smart growth legislation passed is a very interesting measure. Again going against my hypothesis that more liberal politicians would be more likely to adopt growth management policy, there were actually more Republican governors than Democrats among the 14 states. In fact, only five Democratic governors oversaw the adoption of their state's growth management legislation. That doesn't mean that Republican governors were pushing through

legislation with huge Republican majorities in the legislature, however. Many of the states with Republican governors at the time of adoption also had Democratic majorities in one or both houses in the legislature. This would lend itself to an explanation that growth management legislation may be a bipartisan issue. In other words, smart growth is not a Democratic or Republican notion; rather, it is an issue related to a set of circumstances unique to each state. New Jersey and Maryland are good examples of this phenomenon. New Jersey had a Republican governor with a Democratic majority in the Senate and a Republican majority in the House. Its governor also possessed a fairly strong institutional powers score. New Jersey is a case where the political factors proved to be an inconsistent predictor of policy adoption. A split legislature with a fairly strong Republican governor but a high percentage of liberal citizens does not lend itself to a clear political trend. Maryland, on the other hand, has several key political indicators that paint a much clearer picture of the adoption process. Maryland had overwhelming Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, as well as a Democratic governor with very strong institutional powers. With this combination of political factors, it is not surprising that Maryland has one of the most comprehensive growth management policies of any state. The contrasting political contexts of Maryland and New Jersey illustrate, however, how political factors alone cannot predict smart growth policy adoption.

Table 3: Interest Groups

	Date of Adoption	Environmental Interest Group	Builder/Developer Interest Group	Interest Group Impact
First Wave				
California	1965	Yes	No	4
Vermont	1970	Yes	Yes	2
Oregon	1973	Yes	No	4
Second Wave				
Florida	1985	Yes	Yes	5
New Jersey	1986	Yes	Yes	3
Maine	1988	Yes	No	3
Rhode Island	1988	Yes	Yes	2
Georgia	1989	Yes	Yes	4
Washington	1990	No	Yes	4
Maryland	1992	Yes	Yes	4
Third Wave				
Arizona	1998	Yes	Yes	4
Tennessee	1998	No	Yes	4
Colorado	2000	No	No	3
Wisconsin	2000	Yes	No	3
Yet to Adopt				
Texas	n/a	No	No	4

NOTE: Interest Group Impact is a rating used by Gray (1999) to determine the relative influence of interest groups as a whole in each state. Ratings are on a scale of 1-5, 1 being the least influential and 5 being the most influential. See Appendix for more information.
SOURCES: Yin and Sun (2007), Howell-Moroney (2008), Thomas (1998); Gray (1999)

Table 4: Interest Groups Comparison between Growth- and Non-Growth-Managed States

	Growth-Managed States (14)	Non-Growth-Managed States (35)
Overall Influence of Interest Groups		
High (4 or 5)	57%	63%
Medium (3)	29%	31%
Low (1 or 2)	14%	6%
Presence of an Environmental Interest Group	79%	40%
Presence of a Builder/Developer Interest Group	64%	26%

NOTE: Hawaii is not included. Interest Group Influence is a rating used by Gray (1999) to determine the relative influence of interest groups as a whole in each state. Ratings are on a scale of 1-5, 1 being the least influential and 5 being the most influential. See Appendix for more information.
SOURCES: Yin and Sun (2007), Howell-Moroney (2008), Thomas (1998); Gray (1999)

Tables 3 and 4 highlight the role of interest groups in the legislative process. Thomas and Hrebenar have done extensive research on the role of interest groups but unfortunately, no proper quantitative measure exists to compare the influence of specific types of interest groups across states. Instead, they have done an extensive register of simply which interest groups are present and influential in certain states. Among growth-managed states, almost every one has the presence of an environmental interest group, with the exception of Washington, Tennessee, and Colorado. And 9 of 14 states have the presence of a builder/developer/contractor interest group. It is interesting to note that the more recent adoptions have had somewhat less interest group influence, with Arizona being the only state among the Third Wave group with the presence of both sides.

From Table 4, there is no significant difference in the overall impact of interest groups between growth-managed states and non-growth-managed states. In each group,

interest groups are highly influential in roughly 60 percent of the states, moderately influential in roughly 30 percent, and minimally influential in about 10 percent. The two groups show glaring differences, however, in the presence of environmental and builder/developer/contractor interest groups. Growth-managed states are almost twice as likely (79 to 40 percent) to have an active environmental lobby and two-and-a-half times as likely (64 to 26 percent) to have an active builder/developer/contractor lobby. These statistics suggest that the mere presence of active competing interest groups equates into a higher likelihood of a state having growth management policy. Based on Kingdon's (2003) work, interest groups could be considered policy entrepreneurs. In growth-managed states, it is much more likely that these entrepreneurs exist for smart growth policy, and when the policy window opens, they leap at the opportunity.

Table 5: Demographic Factors

	Date of Adoption	Per Capita Income $	U.S. Average $	Difference from U.S. Average %	Educational Attainment %	U.S. Average %	Difference from U.S. Average %
First Wave							
California	1965	14,079	12,151	15.9	13.4	10.7	25.2
Vermont	1970	10,799	12,151	-11.1	11.5	10.7	7.5
Oregon	1973	12,264	12,151	0.9	11.8	10.7	10.3
Second Wave							
Florida	1985	19,076	18,715	1.9	18.3	20.3	-9.9
New Jersey	1986	24,288	18,715	29.8	24.9	20.3	22.7
Maine	1988	16,816	18,715	-10.1	18.8	20.3	-7.4
Rhode Island	1988	19,443	18,715	3.9	21.3	20.3	4.9
Georgia	1989	17,691	18,715	-5.5	19.3	20.3	-4.9
Washington	1990	19,368	18,715	3.5	22.9	20.3	12.8
Maryland	1992	23,011	18,715	23.0	26.5	20.3	30.5
Third Wave							
Arizona	1998	20,275	21,587	-6.1	23.5	24.4	-3.7
Tennessee	1998	19,393	21,587	-10.2	19.6	24.4	-19.7
Colorado	2000	24,049	21,587	11.4	32.7	24.4	34.0
Wisconsin	2000	21,271	21,587	-1.5	22.4	24.4	-8.2
Yet to Adopt							
Texas	n/a	19,617	21,587	-9.1	23.2	24.4	-4.9

NOTE: Per Capita Income is normalized to 1999 dollars. Educational attainment is defined as the percent of the total population 25 years and over with a bachelor's degree or higher. The data used for the U.S. averages vary by each group of states. See Appendix for more information.
SOURCES: Yin and Sun (2007), Howell-Moroney (2008), Census data

Table 5 covers some basic demographic data on the states. It was expected that per capita income and educational attainment may be higher in states that have adopted growth management policy, but the data shows little to support this. Some states, like New Jersey and Maryland, have significantly higher per capita incomes than the national averages during the time of adoption. Yet other states, like Vermont and Tennessee, have

per capita incomes well below the national averages. Educational attainment yields similar results. While California, Maryland, and Colorado boast excellent educational attainment rates, Florida, Tennessee, and Wisconsin fall below the national averages. Among these states, the numbers vary widely and cannot reasonably be thought of as a good predictor for growth management policy adoption.

Overall, the quantitative data, when taken at face value, some interesting cases arise, but no clear trends exist. There are no clear characteristics or factors that are evident in every single state. Most of the states have decent population growth rates and most have competing interest groups that were able to compromise and pass legislation, but wide variations in the representations of state legislatures and demographic data lead the author to believe that most of the states have adopted growth management policy for largely idiosyncratic reasons. In other words, there are definitely some determinants of policy adoption, but they do not occur in every case. Rather, they may contribute some to adoption, but other determinants specific to each state come into play to augment some of the influential statistics covered in this study. Accordingly, case studies are needed to really determine some of the other factors behind policy adoption.

Case Studies

Case studies are important because they provide a different method of analysis from the quantitative section above. The following case studies allow for a more in-depth look into the legislative history and specific circumstances of a state around the

time of its smart growth policy adoption. Florida was selected because it is a state with a rich history of growth management debate and legislation. It is also a state which supports many of the conclusions drawn from the previous quantitative analysis. Texas was selected because it is a state that has tried and failed to adopt growth management policy. Additionally, it has experienced high rates of population growth, which would make it a likely candidate for necessary land use planning and responsible development. The comparison of two seemingly similar states, one without a statewide growth management plan and one with, is a useful and insightful addition to this study.

Florida

Introduction

The state of Florida is truly a unique and interesting case to look at for a variety of reasons. For one, it possesses many of the characteristics of a state thought to necessitate some type of growth management policy. Additionally, its policy is considered to be one of the most comprehensive and far-reaching of any state. It was even used as a model for the growth management legislation in Georgia and Washington. In the previous statistical tables, Florida showed hints of trends that may have influenced their adoption, but this case study will enable us to identify the key determinants related to Florida's adoption of smart growth policy.

Florida was not the first state to enact growth management legislation, but it was a pioneering state in many regards. As Chapin, Connerly, and Higgins (2007) claim, "The 1985 Growth Management Act (GMA) represents a near perfect version of the planning

profession's 'comprehensive planning' model." Every local government is required to prepare a comprehensive development plan. These plans must comply with local regulations and must reflect a long-term vision of development. Lastly, the local plans must be revised every few years to reflect any major updates or changes. These plans are used to determine how to build new roads, schools, and urban residential and commercial development while keeping natural habitats unharmed, traffic congestion to a minimum, and decreasing wasteful land-use practices; in other words, smart and responsible management of growth and development. As Chapin et al (2007) note, "the local comprehensive plan was established as *the* guiding document for local land use regulations, local infrastructure planning, and government capital project expenditures." The courts in Florida have held up this legislation as necessary and proper in shaping developmental patterns across the state (Chapin et al 2007).

The state government plays a very large role in Florida's GMA. The state agency responsible for reviewing and providing commentary on the local plans is the Department of Community Affairs (DCA). It also promotes inter-jurisdictional dialogue and cooperation to develop the best and most consistent plans possible. Another unique aspect of Florida's GMA is that a local government's budget can be shaped by its comprehensive plan. This harkens back to Fisher (1994), who believed a statewide growth management policy was better than various local policies because of the massive financial influence the state can yield on local governments. In fact, when the GMA passed in 1985, the state was to extend the sales tax to the services sector and increase motor fuels taxes to help pay for the estimated $53 billion in implementation costs

(mostly for roads and infrastructure changes). The state has the power to do this, while local governments are often constitutionally more limited in this regard. In all, the state was to provide for two-thirds of the costs of implementation, leaving local governments to pay for the other one-third. Hence, not only does the state have a controlling stake in the review and preparation of local plans concerning growth management, but the state is responsible for paying a majority of the infrastructure costs.

Legislative History

Even though Florida's comprehensive growth management policy wasn't enacted until 1985, the issue had been on the agenda for several decades prior. Governor Reubin Askew (Democrat, 1971-1979) created the Task Force on Resource Management in 1971. This body led to the Florida Legislature enacting the State Comprehensive Planning Act in 1972, which set the framework for which a local government could prepare a comprehensive plan for future development. This Act, however, was more of an interim piece of legislation and did not address specific implementation procedures, but it did lay the groundwork for the GMA of 1985. A very important committee, the Environmental Land Management Study (ELMS) Committee, was created in 1972, and made recommendations for implementing plans in critical areas. In 1975, the Legislature adopted the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act (LGCPA). This Act also lacked the proper implementation mechanisms, however, and gave the state very little enforcement power. Thus, the LGCPA also ultimately failed (Chapin et al 2007).

The 1970s saw several growth management reforms passed, but ultimately none were very effective or comprehensive. This decade was when Florida began to see the need for growth management policy for a number of reasons. Most importantly was the state's massive population growth. From 1970 to 1980, Florida's total population grew from 6.8 to 9.7 million. Its urban population increased by a whopping 48 percent. This growth put an enormous strain on the environment and on developmental planning and organization. The concern over the environment and natural resources in the state, especially its sensitive water systems, necessitated further legislative action (DeGrove 2005). New Governor Bob Graham (Democrat, 1979-1987) was as committed to growth management policy as Governor Askew was. After a second ELMS Committee was formed, more comprehensive and far-reaching requirements were put in place for legislation in 1985, including regional plans that addressed issue like land use, water resources, transportation, and infrastructure (Chapin et al 2007), and the Growth Management Act was born.

The GMA of 1985 included three central implementation policies – consistency, concurrency, and compact development. Consistency refers to coordination among local, regional, and state level agencies. Plans on all three levels must be consistent with one another to be able to implement the policy effectively. In the end, the state has the ultimate authority in land use decisions. Concurrency refers to the idea of controlling growth while simultaneously not inhibiting economic development. Lastly, compact development is fairly self-explanatory. It aims to keep development from growing too

much to where it harms the environment and natural resources. It encourages mixed-use and high density development (Chapin et al 2007).

Analysis

We turn now to examining more closely the reasons why Florida adopted their growth management policy, examining citizens' attitudes, governmental leadership and popularity, and other factors which could not be placed in the quantitative section.

Based on a survey of Florida residents from the *Florida Annual Policy Survey* in 1985, 72 percent of Floridians perceived a need for growth controls in the state. College grads favored growth controls over people who hadn't gone to college by a margin of 75 to 70 percent. Interestingly, both Democrats and Republicans favored growth controls equally at 72 percent. There were some differences by household income, with low and high income households at a 70 percent clip while 77 percent of medium income households favored growth controls (Chapin et al 2007).

The second question this survey asked was related to support for a government role in managing growth in Florida, a slightly-worded but significant variation from the previous question, which did not address the government's role in growth management. In response to this question, 76 percent of Floridians supported a government role in managing growth. 81 percent of college grads favored a government role, compared with 75 percent of non-college grads. In political parties, 78 percent of Democrats supported while only 74 percent of Republicans supported. Support shown by various household

incomes was much more even than the previous question, with all three levels of income in the 75 to 77 percent range (Chapin et al 2007).

The point of mentioning the survey results is this – across the board, in 1985 a majority of Floridians showed not only a perceived need for growth controls, but also support for an increased government role in managing that growth. This is a key reason why Florida was able to pass the GMA in 1985 – the public strongly supported it.

Another key reason why Florida passed the GMA is because of the vulnerability of its natural ecosystems, especially its water systems. Initially, Florida's rapid population growth was seen as a boost to the economy, but by the mid-1960s, wetlands, beaches, and dune systems became increasingly threatened by unchecked growth. Additionally, the threat of saltwater creeping into Floridians' drinking water caused them to really attack the issue head-on (DeGrove 2005). The destruction of Florida's water systems combined with the fact that an environmental movement was sweeping the nation throughout the 1960s and 1970s increased public awareness on the issue even more (Liou and Dicker 1994).

Based on careful analysis, this study has come to the conclusion that a combination of a huge population boom and a threat to the state's natural resources increased public awareness on the growth management issue and facilitated the passage of legislation. There were strong political factors at play, as well. The role of the governor in Florida cannot be understated. From 1950, arguably when Florida's population really began booming, to 1998 at the time of the death of Governor Lawton Chiles, Republicans held the governorship only eight years. The two most prominent

Democrats during the time of the growth management discussion were Governors Reubin Askew and Bob Graham. Both fervent supporters of growth management, their power and popularity allowed them to push through such legislation when other states could not. In fact, Governor Graham's approval ratings from 1983 to 1985 rose as high as 85 and no lower than 60 percent (Beyle 2009). This is significant because no other Florida governor since then has enjoyed that type of sustained support and popularity.

In addition to having strong Democratic governors, Florida had large Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate during the mid-1980s, as shown in Table 2. This facilitated the passage of legislation, even though only 20 percent of Florida's citizens were considered liberal.

The competing interest groups in Florida can now be viewed under more scrutiny. In data from the late 1980s, the representation of environmentalists compared to builders/developers/contractors is amazingly similar. Environmentalists had 72 registered interest groups, developers had 73. Environmentalists comprised 2.5 percent of the total group representation in Florida, while developers had 2.6 percent. In addition, Thomas and Hrebenar (1992) list environmentalists as one of the most influential groups in Florida politics, along with business, labor, education, and governmental groups. Nonprofits like 1000 Friends of Florida also played a key role in increasing public awareness on the issue and fighting for continued growth policies.

Evolution of the GMA

The section is meant to give a brief overview of how the GMA has been implemented and evolved over time. It is presented only to give background information, supplemental details to give the reader a clearer idea of the big picture in Florida. Since its adoption in 1985, the effectiveness of Florida's GMA has been mixed. As discussed earlier, Florida's growth management policy is unique in that it gives the state a lot of policing power. Previous reports have concluded that "state control over land use planning, followed by high level of local compliance, has been much greater in Florida than in other growth states" (Chapin et al 2007). Yet since the GMA was passed in 1985, many growth problems have worsened. Frankly, the infrastructure could not keep up with the continuous massive population growth in the state. Sprawl has increased and traffic congestion is still a problem for most Florida drivers. According to the Sierra Club, Florida has five of the top 30 most sprawled metropolitan areas in the country (Chapin et al 2007). The population growth did lead to some improvements in compact development, however. Density per square mile went from 239 in 1990 to 303 in 2001 (Chapin et al 2007). As some had feared, the economy did not in fact collapse with the adoption of the GMA. During the 1980s, Florida added 1.6 million new jobs, which was 9 percent of the entire nation's growth in employment. In the 1990s, Florida also added 1.6 million new jobs, good for 8 percent of the nation's job growth. Even when employment growth rates dipped in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to a recession, Florida never dropped below the national average (Chapin et al 2007).

Some of the successes and failures of the first round of growth management legislation have led to changes in the legislation. The GMA is constantly evolving – the Florida Legislature amends it almost every year, but has failed to address the most severe problems with the state plan. The late-1990s saw new Republican leadership in the Governor's office and in the Legislature. Governor Jeb Bush (Republican, 1999-2007) "seemed ready to turn almost all decisions on growth back to local governments, with no state or regional oversight and coordination" (DeGrove 2005). Besides the restrictions made on the regional authority's power to organize and coordinate with local plans, there are other problems. State executive agencies are no longer required to prepare plans that are consistent with the state plan, oversight of local plan amendments has declined, and the state has not provided adequate funding for infrastructure improvements (Chapin et al 2007).

In addition, various economic and political pressures have led to a change in the inter-governmental relationship from one of prescriptive power to more discretionary. By the late 1980s, developers had become upset with the state's strict approach to planning and feared losing development opportunities (Chapin et al 2007). Governor Bush's administration transferred most oversight responsibilities from the state to the local governments, and coordination among localities has become extremely difficult because developers and businesses can exert much more influence over local issues than on the state level.

Today, the GMA is not the same policy that was enacted 25 years ago. While the original enactment was a considerable achievement because of its comprehensiveness and

proposed cooperativeness between different levels of government, it is now a compromised product that in many ways has failed to provide adequate and specific guidance for implementing the growth management process. Updates to the state plan have failed to address Florida's most pressing issue – how to balance increasing economic development while preserving the state's vital yet vulnerable natural habitats and resources. Oversight has diminished and the state has failed to provide the necessary funding to properly implement the GMA. Decisions about the locations of state-owned buildings are often made with complete disregard for the land use statutes of the local or state plans. No decisions or actions made by the Governor or Legislature are based on the growth management policy and the budget is not linked to the GMA in any way (Chapin et al 2007). In short, the growth management process in Florida does not currently function in the way originally envisioned due to budgetary issues, lack of implementation, and the decline of the state's scope in reviewing and monitoring local plans.

Conclusion

In sum, Florida's growth management process is a great example of a state experiencing a phenomenon and taking the necessary steps to try and combat it with the support of politicians and citizens alike. Even though no overwhelming statistical trends appeared in Tables 1 through 5, taking a closer look at Florida showed that there were indeed several reasons why growth management legislation was passed. Massive population growth led to the destruction of environmental systems, which caught the

state's and nation's attention, leading to broad public support and a mandate for the governor and Legislature to push through growth management legislation. It must be noted, however, that just because legislation is passed, the problem of urban sprawl is not necessarily solved. As evidenced by the Florida case, developer interests can win out and political and public support for an issue can waver. Unfortunately, urban sprawl is still a big issue in Florida, but the simple fact that growth management and responsible development are on the radar screen in the state puts it well ahead of the majority of America.

Texas

I wanted to include a state in this study that has not adopted growth management legislation for several reasons; most importantly, to serve as a means of comparison. Are there certain characteristics, *ceteris paribus*, which exhibit why Texas has yet to adopt such policy? Based on the comparative analysis of state adoption of growth management policies (Tables 1 through 5), Texas has many of the characteristics thought to be influential in the Florida case, including substantial population growth and a similar urban percentage of the population. From 1980 to 1990, the urban population of Texas increased 20 percent and it continues to increase at a similar rate today. In addition, 80 percent of Texans live in urban areas, more than Oregon, Georgia, Washington, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, all which have growth management programs.

In 2009, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 2169 out of both the House and Senate. SB 2169 would have established a smart growth policy work group to develop a

smart growth policy for the state. The bill was meant to deal with Texas' increasing population growth and would have developed plans and strategies to help communities maintain high qualities of life in the face of urban sprawl.

SB 2169 passed unanimously out of the Texas State Senate and passed 99-48 in the House with bipartisan support. The bill was vetoed by Governor Rick Perry, however. He cited the concern over having a statewide one-size-fits-all approach to growth planning because communities have different problems and require different solutions. "Decisions about the growth of communities should be made by local governments closest to the people living and working in these areas," Perry said (Crossley 2009). This reason is interesting, though, considering the Senate Urban Affairs Committee issued a report saying that "this bill does not expressly grant any additional rulemaking authority to a state officer, department, agency, or institution." In addition, the Legislative Budget Board said that "local governments may benefit from policies developed by the smart growth policy work group, but any benefits will depend on what future policies recommend and the operating environment of each local government" (Crossley 2009). Governor Perry was concerned about giving the state too much power, but in essence, the bill does no such thing.

The bill's supporters were extremely disappointed with Governor Perry's veto. According to the bill's sponsor, Senator Rodney Ellis, the smart growth work group would have worked proactively to try and mitigate sprawl and traffic congestion, citing Governor Perry's inadequate and unpopular transportation proposals. Another sponsor, Representative Carol Alvarado, said that this bill would have provided a much needed

plan to ensure that future growth is done in a responsible manner. "I want the relationship between businesses and neighborhoods to remain a positive one, free of clashes on issues like pollution or traffic congestion. SB 2169 isn't more government, it's strategic government cooperation necessary to move our state forward (Crossley 2009)."

Not all of Texas seems to be against growth management, however. The capital city of Austin actually launched a Smart Growth Initiative in 1998 in an effort to guide future land use decisions. The Initiative's goals are to develop mixed-use and transit-based neighborhood development patterns, improve the quality of life, and to enhance the tax base (Bolen et al 2001). It is not surprising that Austin is the leader of the smart growth movement in Texas as it is often considered a center for liberal politics in a generally conservative state.

In the end, the differences between Texas and Florida are mostly political. Both states have experienced population growth, but Texas does not have the same pressing environmental concerns today that Florida did in the 1970s and 1980s, and the political climate of Florida during the 1970s and 1980s was radically different than the current political climate in Texas. Unlike Florida, which has influential representation from both environmentalists and developers, Thomas and Hrebenar do not list either side as influential in Texas. Howell-Moroney (2008) suggests that "having pro-growth interests at the table may not be all bad…Policies that integrate their concerns evidently have some staying power." Perhaps the fact that Texas lacks competing interest groups, and

thus policy entrepreneurs, is a cause why not much smart growth legislation has been brought forward in the state, excluding the most recent case.

Additionally, besides having a Republican governor, Texas has Republican majorities in the House and Senate. But, as the passage of SB 2169 illustrates, having Republican majorities in the Legislature does not even matter. So, in the Texas case, it boils down to Governor Rick Perry. His veto power and strong opposition to smart growth have denied Texas a statewide growth management program. He represents the traditional conservative ideal that the governing body, in this case the state, should have as little power as possible over local governments. Until the political climate shifts in Texas, the passage of an expansive statewide smart growth policy seems unlikely.

Conclusion

At the outset of this paper, I posed the question as to why only a handful of states had adopted statewide growth management policies. Are there some underlying characteristics common to all 14 states in this study? Or does each state adopt such policy based on a set of completely unique circumstances? The comparative data analysis yielded no dominating factor that stood out among the rest, yet it provided a good sense of each state's demographic, political, and population situation at the time of policy adoption. The analysis was not futile – it showed a majority of states had major population growth, liberal citizens, high-density urban areas, and competing interest groups. The case studies of Florida and Texas highlighted certain specific characteristics in ways that the quantitative data could not. In the case of Florida, it was found that an

environmental crisis spurred by massive population growth, concurrent with a growing national environmental movement, led to public awareness and support for growth management policy. It also helped that Florida's governor and Legislature were extremely supportive of the policy.

Then we turn to the Texas case, where massive population growth and sprawled cities like Houston and Dallas have led to legislation being offered, but failing. It seems the conservative political culture in Texas is too strong to allow a smart growth bill to succeed. While Florida's progressive governors of the 1970s and 1980s played an integral role in seeing Florida's Growth Management Act pass, Texas Governor Rick Perry exercised his veto power to kill Texas' bill.

The debate continues – which theory of adoption is correct? Are states' adoptions largely based on idiosyncratic reasons or are there common determinants among them all? I've come to the conclusion that both theories have merit. Based on the quantitative data, certain characteristics seem important in a majority of cases and would lead to states being more likely to adopt smart growth legislation. However, for the most part, states have adopted such policy for different reasons based on circumstances that have occurred in those states for an extended period of time. That leads me to believe that the reason why these 14 states have adopted growth management policy is based on a combination of certain factors and having the right governmental players at the right time, as Gray (1973) suggests. She concludes that in making policy decisions, explanations are usually politically- and economically- based and "issue-and time-specific." Mintrom (1997) and Kingdon (2003) highlight the importance of policy entrepreneurs, who are the initiators

and champions of innovative ideas and get them onto the political agendas. Who knows whether Florida would have had as much success passing the GMA if the governor had not championed the issue so much? And what if Texas had a Democratic governor? The important policy entrepreneurs in this study are governors and interest groups. Governor Glendening of Maryland was a powerful and outspoken advocate of smart growth. In growth-managed states, leaders of interest groups fighting for smart growth policy were able to find a policy window to push legislation through. In Florida, entrepreneurs capitalized on the environmental damage to the water systems and the public's overwhelming support of growth management policy to push legislation through when a window opened. In Texas, no such window has opened. It is this author's opinion that an environmental crisis or stronger advocacy by policy entrepreneurs on behalf of smart growth initiatives are the only ways to get around the gubernatorial powers of Texas. While population growth, liberal citizens, and competing interest groups are important in the majority of cases, each state has special circumstances and only through influential leadership and persistence will growth management policy come to be.

While predicting which states may be next to adopt growth management policy is a difficult task, supporters of the smart growth movement should keep their eyes on fast growing states with progressive leadership and an environmentally-conscious citizenry. States in the West and the South, America's fastest growing regions, are more likely to look into growth management policy, as well as Northeast states where higher percentages of people have liberal ideologies. States with a strong presence of competing environmental and builder/developer/contractor interest groups are more likely to adopt

because the issue is more likely to be heard and acted on by politicians if more policy entrepreneurs are ready to push their proposals. And lastly, states with strong, outspoken governors are more likely to adopt smart growth policy because every issue needs a champion, and if a governor has the mandate and the popularity, a policy window is likely to open. Governors have many motivations to seize political opportunity, showing that they can accomplish policy goals in office while trying to cement their place in history (Dye 2008), and passing smart growth legislation may be their way to do so.

Some lessons learned from this study can be applied to states currently without smart growth policies. Some factors are more difficult to change than others – a governor's institutional powers, for example. But smart growth supporters should form interest groups and lobby their representatives in the legislature if they want to get their point across. When the right political circumstance arises, leaders of the smart growth movement need to be ready to push legislation through. Additionally, the public needs to be made aware of the problem. Smart growth advocates should try and garner support from the public by emphasizing the importance and necessity of responsible development and the benefits of preserved open spaces and decreased traffic congestion. Through a concerted effort and with political leadership willing to listen to the needs of the public, changes can be made.

The most exciting prospect about researching smart growth is that it is a constantly evolving and adapting movement. Future research on this topic has the opportunity to study new phenomena and policies, as well as it may take into account all 50 states in a panel study analysis. I wanted to include as many potentially relevant

factors as possible, but that led to many of them not being suitable for proper statistical analysis. With more time and resources, an in-depth examination of all 50 states and their relevant cultural and historical factors would also be helpful, as a lack of detailed information on non-growth-managed states limited the ability to more appropriately compare states with smart growth policy against those without. As shown with the Florida and Texas cases, there can be many underlying factors that do not necessarily show up in the data analysis, such as a national environmental movement or the importance of a progressive governor.

This study has shown that growth management policy is not a simple thing. Adoption of such policy can be influenced by a multitude of factors and is not completely predictable, yet certainly some characteristics play a larger role than others. The process is slow, but through the right political and demographic circumstances, growth management policy can succeed and be viewed as an imperative and progressive movement for responsible development and the reduction of problems associated with urban sprawl.

Appendix

This appendix gives an explanation of all the factors examined in this study, as well as if any calculations went in to arriving at certain measures.

Total State Population

Census: Urban and Rural Population, 1900 to 1990

Data was collected from year nearest to but also prior to year of adoption. For example, California adopted in 1965, so the total population data is from 1960.

Decade 1 and Decade 2 Urban Population

Census: List of Urbanized Areas with population, population density, and land area

Data was collected from year nearest to but also prior to year of adoption. For example, California adopted in 1965, so Decade 1 is 1950 and Decade 2 is 1960.

Population Growth Rate

Census: Urban and Rural Population, 1900 to 1990

Data was calculated using the urban populations from the two decades nearest to but also prior to date of adoption.

Average Population Density

Census: List of Urbanized Areas with population, population density, and land area

The average of each state's Urban Area population densities was calculated.

Population Density Index

Census: List of Urbanized Areas with population, population density, and land area

Data was calculated by taking the total population of a state's Urban Areas with greater than the state average population density, divided by the total population of all Urban Areas in a state.

Liberal Percentage

CBS/New York Times national polls on ideology and party identification, 1976-2003

Party Composition in House and Senate

Book of the States, various years

Majority percentages were calculated based on the party of the governor.

Governor's Institutional Powers Score

Gray (1999)

The following are the factors that went into the Institutional Powers Score (all factors were placed on a 1 to 5 scale):

- Separately elected executive branch officials
- Tenure potential of governors

- Governor's appointment powers in 1) corrections, 2) K-12 education, 3) health, 4) highways/transportation, 5) public utilities regulation, and 6) welfare
- Governor's budgetary power
- Governor's veto power
- Gubernatorial party control (adjusted for year of adoption)

The sum of the factors was divided by 6 to give an overall score.

Presidential Election Results

The election results were determined for the previous three presidential elections prior to year of adoption. The key is as follows:

- D: voted Democratic all three times
- d: voted Democratic twice, Republican once
- r: voted Republican twice, Democratic once
- R: voted Republican all three times

Interest Group Representation

Thomas (1998)

The source listed types of major interest groups for each state. A dummy was used for whether or not a state had an environmental group listed and likewise for a builder/developer/contractor group.

Interest Group Impact

Gray (1999), compiled by the 1998 update to the Thomas-Hrebenar study

Ratings are as follows:

- 5: dominant
- 4: dominant/complementary
- 3: complementary
- 2: complementary/subordinate
- 1: subordinate

Per Capita Income

Census: Per Capita Income by State, 1959, 1969, 1979, 1989, 1999

The figures closest to date of adoption were used, adjusted to 1999 dollars. Data from 1969 was used for First Wave states; data from 1989 was used for Second Wave states; and data from 1999 was used for Third Wave states. The U.S. averages vary per the average of the closest year to the date of adoption.

Educational Attainment

Census: Percent of the Total Population 25 Years and Over with a Bachelor's Degree or Higher, 1940 to 2000

The figures closest to date of adoption were used for each state. Data from 1970 was used for First Wave states; data from 1990 was used for Second Wave states; and data

from 2000 was used for Third Wave states. The U.S. averages vary per the average of the closest year to the date of adoption.

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