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The Conditional Efficacy of Non-State Intervention on Conflict Intensity: A Bargaining Model
Perspective

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Abstract

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International civil society has increasingly strong influence on states' treatment of their
citizens through improved information sharing and a post-Cold War global emphasis on human
rights. The tools available to the international community in encouraging good governance are
varied, and produce inconsistent results in changing the target state's behavior. I engage with a
bargaining model analysis to determine which non-state intervention methods are successful at
increasing the costs of war and should, therefore, result in a change in the target state's
behavior. I suspect that the efficacy of four common intervention methods, naming and
shaming, peace workshops, non-armed intervention, and armed intervention, is conditioned on
the ratio of battle deaths, which also affects the state's perceived costs of war. To test this, I
conduct an ordered logistic regression of the interaction of those intervention methods with
the ratio of battle deaths on conflict intensity. I find a negative and significant interaction of
battle deaths with unarmed peacekeeping, which ceases to be significant at the highest points
of conflict intensity. This indicates that once intensity reaches a certain point, states are no
longer responsive to third-party pressures, which has important implications for interventionist
strategy. I conclude by suggesting some ways in which this model could be further developed,
namely through the inclusion of temporal factors and formal modeling.

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Table of Contents

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, international civil society has accepted increased responsibility in maintaining peace and standards of living. This movement has manifested in forms ranging from interventionist foreign policies to international non-governmental cooperation. The ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1945 (United Nations) serves as a foundation for international civil society to begin normalizing and enforcing the humane treatment of citizens by their government. However noble these attempts may be, the twenty first century has witnessed a persistence of genocides and politicides (Krain 2014, 1) suggesting that our methods of promoting peace are either ineffective or underutilized. This paper investigates the efficacy of particular categorical attempts to promote peace, within the context of conflict circumstances, to determine the best way to reduce violence.

Conflict circumstances at time of intervention are under investigated in the literature, but could drastically impact the reception of a particular method of intervention. An important measure of a conflict is the number of deaths in a calendar year, as this determines both the intensity of conflict and in some cases a specific descriptor of the conflict, as in genocide or civil war (Uppsala, 2013). War, for example, is defined as having 1,000 battlefield deaths in a calendar year (Correlates of War, 2016). Assuming there are two sides to an intrastate conflict, the state side and the side of those opposed, the distribution of battle deaths across these lines can have further implications. If the rebels inflict fewer than 200 battle deaths on the state side, while suffering at least 800, this conflict can be described as a genocide. If, in an intra-state conflict, each side inflicts at least 500 battle deaths, the conflict can be described as a civil war. These are the types of conditions I expect will impact the efficacy of intervention methods, which are currently studied as a blanket strategy.

The present project considers a range of non-state third-party intervention signals, ranging from least to most costly, and when those signals are effective in influencing state behavior. Basic game theory would suggest that the costlier the signal, the more likely it is to affect an actors cost analysis (Reiter 2003, 29). However, some other factor must explain the varied efficacy of even the costliest third-party intervention in the real world. I suspect this factor may be the conflict circumstances, specifically, the distribution of battle deaths. This particular factor is significant, because if the deaths favor the state, the effects of intervention are concentrated on the state. If the distribution of battle deaths is more even, it may give the state more opportunity to deflect the pressure of intervention.

While the most direct and costly intervention may be effective in reducing violence in general, I assume that the international community seeks the greatest efficacy for the smallest cost, and so the least costly method that is able to produce a significant reduction in the intensity of violence is therefore the winning strategy. Other studies have demonstrated the blanket efficacy of UN intervention (Dorussen and Gizelis, 2013; Peksen, 2012) so the question the literature has lead it is not whether or not UN intervention can be effective, but when it is necessary. Physical intervention is costlier than naming and shaming in terms of moral, political and economic prices (Valentino 2011, 60) so while it certainly saves lives, one must ask when the effect can be achieved through a less costly measure.

Literature Review

Political violence occurs when states and citizens have opposed preferences over some policy or good and discursive methods, or typical state-citizen interactions like voting or running for office, fail to reconcile these differences (Ritter 2013, 45). Fearon (1995, 386) describes this as a positive expected utility problem, where two parties each estimate that war will produce

benefits that outweigh the costs. According to the Bargaining Model of War, there should be deals that both sides prefer to violence based on these anticipated costs. However, since wars exist, bargaining is not always successful, and states fail to secure rational agreements based on disagreements over the likely outcome of violence (Reiter 2003, 30). Development of the theory indicates that there are three main sources of bargaining failure. First, information problems can arise out of disagreements about relative power, a miscalculation about an opponent's willingness to fight, or other capacity information. Perfect information is unlikely since actors have an incentive to misrepresent various aspects of their capacity, or relative strength, in order to maximize bargaining power. Thus, inaccurate information in this regard often distorts an actor's utility analysis (Reiter 2003, 390-400). Second, commitment problems arise from distrust of an opponent. One or both states has an incentive to renege on a peaceful agreement, which if it was enforceable, would be preferable to violence. Assumption of this possibility, plus a capacity for violence, leads the sides to attack each other (Reiter 2003, 401-408). Finally, issue indivisibility occurs when the division of the good in question is either impossible or becomes devoid of value with division (Reiter 2003, 30).

In intrastate violence, the central conflict typically surrounds the division or allocation of political power (Reiter 2003, 28). Assuming the state's interest lies in preserving power, it will use whatever tools are in its cache to maintain control, as long as the expected consequences for their implementation do not outweigh the expected benefits of fighting (Fearon 1995, 386; Ritter 2013, 146). Logically, then, increasing the costs of using repressive tools should reduce their utility, and encourage a decrease in conflict intensity. Often, this cost adjustment must come from a third party outside of the conflict to mediate the aforementioned sources of bargaining failure (Reiter 2003, 37). Though the world is anarchic, peer states, intergovernmental

organizations, and non-governmental organizations serve as critical enforcement bodies. The literature has found that foreign direct military intervention either has limited effects (Meernik, Poe, and Shaikh, 2006; Murdie and Davis 2012), or actually worsens conditions for oppressed groups (Peksen, 2012). Therefore, non-governmental and inter-state actors have the greatest likelihood of improving conditions (McFarlane 2011, 5). Non-state actors can pressure states to change their behavior with methods ranging from economic to physical; a lack of international legitimacy could lead to intervention and dissolution of the regime. States must weigh the potential for these consequences when deciding on repressive strategy. Non-state actors can impact this utility analysis by signaling the degree of their willingness to impose costs on the oppressor state.

Third parties convey their intentions through costly signaling, or 'compellent threats,' (Chamberlain 2016, 19) that indicate the intervening party's willingness to take on costs of their own in order to make oppression costlier for the offending state. In keeping with this decision-making perspective, to coerce an actor to stop abusing its citizens, the target actor must believe it to be more advantageous to change their behavior than to continue to reap the benefits of oppression. In order for this to happen, the oppressor must also believe that threats made by third parties are legitimate, and the intervening party takes on costs to signal their commitment to changing the oppressor's behavior. Costs for the intervening party come in two different forms, *material* and *political*. First, the physical material costs of the effort include wages, troops, equipment, and sustaining programs like food or healthcare (Chamberlain 2016, 19; Valentino 2011, 61). Political costs include the potential for failure and subsequent accusations of ineffectuality as demonstrated by the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, the unbalancing of political

allies of the regime, as well as the moral costs of potentially defending those who engage in "unsavory behavior" (Valentino 2011, 63-65).

Dissent among citizens has been defined as the coordination of non-state actors, outside of state organized methods of discourse, in an attempt to influence political outcomes (Ritter 2013, 145). This dissent drives the state leader's decision on how intensely to repress, and a dissenting group will only succeed against high levels of repression if they dissent as severely as possible. State actors, as a result of a capacity imbalance in their favor, are the typical drivers of repression (Peksen, 2012), and if repression and dissent are causally related (Ritter 2013), it logically follows that intensity is also dependent on state behavior. Often, regimes quickly turn to repression tactics in an attempt to maintain a grip on political power, assuming power preservation is the goal. The government, while in power, has greater control of resources, especially in terms of weaponry, infrastructure, and funding. It has the ability to deny rebel groups access to government provided goods, which can further weaken the rebels' standing. Moreover, the regime has the crucial benefit of support from international community, at least at first, where a rebel group must earn that backing (Reiter 2003). These imbalances can be abused by the state to increase its advantage and attempt to quell an oppositional movement as quickly as possible. When these advantages on their own no longer appear sufficient to quiet an uprising, the government may turn to extreme methods if it believes the benefits of those methods would outweigh the risks of implementation.

'Naming and shaming' is the terminology used in the literature to refer to the non-state actor tactic that attempts to change state behavior, or the way it interacts with its citizens, by publicizing its wrongdoings. Keck and Sikkink (1999) described this process of reputation-based threats. Since non-state actors themselves have very little power, their ability to effect change

lies in their ability to leverage more powerful institutions. The two main types of leverage are moral and material, and naming and shaming links them both. Material leverage typically consists of actions like sanctions or conditional trade deals, that force a state to improve human rights in order to maintain its economic well-being. Moral leverage is where the "mobilization of shame" comes in, as non-state actors expose state behavior "under the bright light of international scrutiny" (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 97). The information then becomes fair game for other states and organizations to use in leverage politics, as mentioned, by threatening or coercing the state to change its behavior. Again, this could be economic in nature, but could range all the way to the most extreme coercion, like military intervention (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 97).

If repression carries such a high risk of delegitimizing the regime in the eyes of the international community, why then do states commit them? The key assumptions are that actors pursue self-interested goals and will consistently choose the alternative with the highest expected utility (Monroe and Maher, 1995; Reiter, 2003). When the expected utility of a certain behavior decreases below the value of victory, we should see change in state behavior. It is also important to note that actors are unitary in this decision-making model, so for present purposes the state and the leader of the state are the same unitary actor.

While Dorussen and Gizelis (2013, 691) found that repressor states can be responsive to armed UN peacekeeping missions, a signal this costly is rarely efficient in terms of time and funding. It is therefore necessary to determine the least costly measure that is sufficient to produce the same change in state behavior. The literature on non-state intervention thus far has focused on the net efficacy of particular interventionist tactics. That is to say, when x intervention method is employed is there an improvement in y intensity. This neglects to

consider conditions on the ground that may impact the efficacy of particular tactics. I, then, pose the question *what non-state intervention tactics are effective in reducing conflict intensity and do conflict circumstances condition this relationship?*

Theoretical Development

This paper answers the question by creating a scale of intervention, or costly signals, and evaluating their ability to change state behavior in varied conflict conditions. Four of the most common intervention methods are naming and shaming, the facilitation of peace workshops, the presence of unarmed UN peacekeepers, and full-scale armed UN intervention. Since conflict intensity is driven by the state, changes in state behavior will be measured by changes in conflict intensity. Before exploring this utility analysis further, one must accept a series of assumptions. First, actors are rational and unitary (Fearon 1995, 34). Second, that leaders want to stay in power, and will respond to the strength of their opponent (Ritter 2013, 147). Finally, that states have a range of options available to them strategically, which include capitulation, negotiation, and fighting.

Naming and shaming, sometimes referred to as shaming and blaming (Murdie and Davis 2012, 2), is a common, low cost tactic of intervention. Naming and shaming seeks to publicize a regime's treatment of its citizens in an effort to shame it into improving the named behavior. This is a dominant tactic of human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who compile reports and distribute them to IOs, third party states, and news media. Typically, this work is facilitated by Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) which aid in the collection and dissemination of the data (Murdie and Davis 2012, 3). As the information spreads, more actors are able to use it as a credible source to justify putting pressure on the host government to effect policy change and prevent further violations. While non-

democratic governments may be able to ignore or suppress the demands of their people, international pressure is more difficult to ignore. If the state's legitimacy is lost internationally, it could suffer economic sanctions or reduced trade, receive less aid, or face military intervention and regime overthrow. Thus, states are more responsive when the international community becomes aware of internal conflict (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). As Murdie and Davis (2012) found in their quantitative study on HRO efficacy, there is evidence of responsivity, and states do change their behavior after naming and shaming takes place. However, the action of naming and shaming itself is not sufficient. Instead, it facilitates pressure from third party states. The role of HROs is indirect, but a necessary preceding factor.

Beyond naming and shaming, non-state actors are found to be more effective than states and other international organizations in other variations of monitoring as well, since they are able to engage in more "on-the-ground," or direct, monitoring (McFarlane, 2011). In the Northern Ireland case, NGOs were able to host workshops ranging from prejudice reduction to border negotiations. Considering the international prowess of its foe, the Republican Irish were reluctant to engage with third-party states, assuming the threat of English retaliation for poor behavior was enough to influence the objectivity of any such mediator. Moreover, agreeing to requests from an NGO is less demoralizing and seemingly oppressive than capitulating to a state organization (McFarlane, 2011). The state side should be more willing as well, since unlike other states, non-state actors have no military to summon, and so they pose little threat to the physical stability of the regime. The perceived legitimacy and objectivity of a non-state actor lends itself to achieving violence reduction goals, because both state actors and community level actors should be more willing to work with an impartial outsider (Curle, 1971; Dorussen and Gizelis, 2013).

Valentino (2011) conducted an analysis of the efficacy of unarmed intervention and argued that non-physical intervention is both less costly and potentially saves more lives than physical intervention. Granted, this study takes the state-to-state perspective, rather than a non-state actor, so the political costs would likely be more concentrated than if they were distributed across members of a group. However, the logic follows here as well. He notes that "aiding defenseless citizens usually means empowering armed factions claiming to represent them" and "even if the ends of such actions could be unambiguously humanitarian, the means never are" (Valentino 2011, 63-65). These monetary costs are not guaranteed to produce any improvement for the oppressed, and the support raises significant moral questions about encouraging greater violence. Although, he does acknowledge that many data tests have demonstrated that "humanitarian intervention undoubtedly saves lives" (Valentino 2011, 62), "military intervention becomes almost extravagant" (Valentino 2011, 65) in many cases.

Armed UN intervention has garnered varying results over years of study. To some, it appears that UN peacekeeping missions can be effective in facilitating cooperation and negotiation between state and rebels (Dorussen and Gizelis, 2013), though they may also have no effect at all on human rights (Peksen, 2012). Greig and Deihl (2005) found that the long-term presence of UN peacekeepers may actually inhibit the establishment of lasting peace by discouraging diplomatic efforts. Clearly, there is much discord in the academic community on whether or not UN Peacekeepers can reduce the violence. Problematically, such studies rarely take into account the conditions under which the UN intervenes.

These intervention methods, (naming and shaming, peace workshops, unarmed intervention, and armed intervention) are ordered by cost in this model. Naming and shaming, for example, has lower material costs than purchasing weapons and arming a military force, as

well as lower political costs than largescale action from an organization with fixed political capital like the United Nations.

Arranging the scale by cost makes it possible to consider the additive property of the scale. While each point on the scale is an action in itself, some of the value in the lower end of the scale lies in the implicit threat of subsequent action (Krain 2012, 28) in the form of intervention on the higher end of the scale. Thus, each point is both an action and a threat. This is important, since Chamberlain's (2016, 21) examination of U.S. coercion attempts discovered that in order for a threat to be compelling it must be both *immediately* and *ultimately credible.* To be immediately credible is for the target to believe that the threat making party will execute its immediate threat, and to be ultimately credible the target must believe the threat making party will continue to take subsequent action until the desired behavior change occurs. The scale is therefore additive, in that it is unlikely the UN would conduct a full scale armed intervention without first attempting peaceful resolution, and actions on the lower end may occur before costlier tactics are adopted.

Hypotheses

I suspect that intervention efficacy is not determined by the interventionist's tactic or organizational structure. Instead, efficacy is a function of the environment into which interventionists enter. This project identifies which intervention mechanisms are most effective *under which conditions* as determined by the ratio of battle deaths. I suspect that the present theory, stating that naming and shaming can change state behavior, is only effective when there is a clear aggressor. As genocide moves towards civil war (when the ratio of deaths moves from 1:999 to 200:999) naming and shaming will fail, as the autocrat can point to the regime's own suffering and the violence of the rebels to justify its own actions.

H1: Less costly tactics will be effective in reducing the intensity of conflicts where the ratio of battlefield deaths moves away from 1

With the ratio of battle deaths as *Side A:Side B*, the distribution of battle deaths will determine where the conflict falls in terms of genocide or civil war. In intrastate war, if there are 1,000 battle deaths in a year, and at least 100 are on each side, the conflict qualifies as civil war. If there are 1,000 battle deaths in a year and less than 200 on one side, that conflict is genocide (Fearon, 1995). Since there is a clear aggressor in these cases, the full weight of the intervention method will be concentrated on the regime. Justifying such continued action to the international community is prohibitively difficult. The shaming and resulting threat of subsequent action should reduce the utility of oppression, and the regime should back off the level of violence.

H2: Less costly tactics will be ineffective in reducing the intensity of conflicts as the ratio of battle deaths moves towards 1

As conflicts become balanced, as in civil war, less costly tactics will be increasingly ineffective. Since naming and shaming relies on calling into question the practices, and thereby legitimacy, of a regime in power, a battle death ratio closer to 1 will give the regime the ability to deflect judgement by referencing the rebels' actions. When states are able to deflect responsibility for violence, changing their behavior with the indirect potential for decreased legitimacy will not be effective. Instead, direct intervention will alter the utility of oppression. Maintaining power through oppression may become less significant in the face of physical harm and international threats. Moreover, it is typically up to delegates of the regime to actually carry out the human rights violations on behalf of the regime. The physical intervention of UN peacekeepers applies pressure to said delegates and incentivize defection from the regime.

Methodology

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for this project is country-year with the sample censored to states experiencing civil conflicts. The data must include a lag in order to establish clear causality and avoid endogeneity problems, so I will also include the year immediately following the end of that instance of state-sponsored violence. (Krain, 2012) (Ritter, 2013).

Dependent Variable: Magnitude of Violence

The Center for Systemic Peace produces a dataset titled Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions 1945-2015. This includes all episodes of political violence with sustained use of lethal violence by organized groups with at least 500 deaths in a calendar year. Each year is given a "magnitude of impact" score on an 11-point scale from 0-10. MEPV's CIVTOT variable compiles magnitude scores of all civil and ethnic conflicts (CIVWAR, CIVVIOL, ETHWAR, ETHVIOL variable scores) and serves as the dependent variable of intensity for this study.

Independent Variables

The four major independent variables are 1) naming and shaming, 2) peace workshops, 3) unarmed peacekeeping, and 4) armed peacekeeping. In terms of measuring naming and shaming, two organizations in particular, Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) are deeply embedded in human rights TANS. AI and HRW are the most commonly cited organizations in the literature, and their well-known status makes them the most effective in their policy goals. For this reason, these two organizations serve as the focus of the naming and shaming variable. The AI and HRW data comes from reports created by their staff specialists. Matthew Krain's 2012 data neatly complies this information and will be used for this project.

When the [ainr] variable is above average, the dummy will be a 1, and when it is below average, the dummy will be a 0.

The data for peace workshops, unarmed peacekeeping, and armed peacekeeping all comes from the University of Central Arkansas Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) dataset. Variable 35, MEDIATE1, is a dummy response to the question "did one or more third parties attempt to facilitate or mediate negotiations between parties?" with a 1 signaling yes and a 0 signaling no.

Variable 10, PURPOSE1, denotes the primary purpose of the peacekeeping mission and ranges from 1 to 8. My unarmed peacekeeping variable is derived from PURPOSE1 at either a 3 (monitoring/verifying disarmament, demobilization, or disengagement of combatants) or 4, (protecting/delivering humanitarian assistance). When PURPOSE1 is a 1 (maintaining law and order/protecting civilians with military troops or civilian police) or a 2 (military observation) it serves as my armed peacekeeping variable. Since I am examining the effects of non-point state intervention, I also filtered the cases by DADM variable 7, TPTYPE. I only included results when TPTYPE is a 1 (United Nations) or a 2 (regional or inter-governmental organization), excluding 3 (state or ad-hoc group of states).

Two other variables of significance are the scale and ratio of battlefield deaths. The scale variable is created by adding the four independent variables (naming and shaming + peace workshops + unarmed peacekeeping + armed peacekeeping) and allows for the crucial consideration of the additive properties of intervention. Since part of the costly signaling by third parties is being immediately and ultimately credible (Chamberlain, 2016) it is necessary to incorporate the shadow of the future in this model.

The battlefield death data comes from the Uppsala Conflict Database Georeferenced Event Dataset which separates deaths dyadically. The ratio variable is created with deaths of side a divided by the sum of battle deaths from both sides. I have excluded deaths marked as civilian or unknown, since the theory here primarily focuses on the relationship between state and rebels.

Control Variables

Conforming to standard practice in the literature (Krain, 2012) I have included controls for former colonial status, whether or not the conflict is ethnically driven, regime type, as well as World Development Indicators for trade, land area, population, and GDP. These are all factors which may affect the potential for high intensity by way of either facilitating violence intensity or duration. This data comes from the Quality of Government (QoG) Institute at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. In order control for the effects of the previous period, I also lag the dependent variable by one year. By including the previous Magnitude of Severity Score, I am able to account for the finding that previous levels affect current or future levels of atrocities (Krain, 2012).

Results of Statistical Analysis

Here I present the results of ordered logit models of factors affecting the MEPV magnitude scores of political violence in 133 cases from 1946 to 2016. The model demonstrates that naming and shaming has a negative and significant effect on magnitude score, which aligns with the Murdie Davis (2012) results. The interaction variable (y_var) with the ratio of battlefield deaths did not have a significant impact on intensity, so the efficacy of naming and shaming is not conditioned by conflict conditions like civil war or genocide. Peace workshops did not produce any significant results. The interaction with the ratio of battle deaths (x_var) was

also not significant. This confirms Sousa's (2012) finding that mediation, successful or unsuccessful, has no effect on conflict intensity.

TABLE 1 HERE

The model also demonstrated that unarmed peacekeeping has a positive and significant effect on intensity, but the interaction with battlefield deaths (w_var) produces a significant negative effect on intensity, which can be observed in the following graph. This indicates that if the ratio of battlefield deaths favors the state, they are responsive to intervention, which supports the theory that a state engaging in one-sided intrastate violence is more susceptible to cost manipulation by unarmed peacekeepers. This result is likely explained by the effects of any pressure being concentrated on the regime with little opportunity for deflection. As the ratio of battle deaths approaches 1, the effects of cost manipulation are diluted by the actions of the rebels, and unarmed intervention becomes less effective.

GRAPH 1 HERE

The effect of the interaction of the ratio of battlefield deaths for everything below a 9 or 10 Magnitude of Severity Score shows a negative effect larger than zero, but once the score reaches nine the result becomes positive and significant. This result indicates that, at a certain point, the state actor ceases to be responsive to outside pressure and views the bargaining range as non-existent. The utility of victory at high intensity outweighs imposed costs, and this is likely where winning the conflict becomes synonymous with survival to the state.

Armed peacekeeping also did not produce significant results with or without the interaction of battlefield deaths. This is likely a temporal issue, since some studies have found that armed third-party intervention may increase intensity in the short term, but also reduce the duration of conflict. Moreover, from a decision-making perspective, if armed intervention is

impending, the state actor has a great incentive to attempt to shift the status quo in their favor as drastically as possible, since it has also been found that third-party intervention is likely to enforce the status quo (Sousa, 2012).

I also tested the interaction between the scale of costly intervention and battlefield deaths. Without a lagged dependent variable, this produced a small negative and significant result, showing a 1 unit increase in z_var leading to a significant decrease in intensity. However, the introduction of the lag led to no significant results for this interaction.

Conclusion

This paper's findings for unarmed peacekeeping efficacy are the most meaningful. States are responsive to the presence of unarmed peacekeepers when they are driving the majority of the violence. The state's utility function is not impacted the same way when the rebel group is inflicting a more comparable number of casualties. Moreover, this paper was able to indicate that there is a point where states are completely unresponsive costly signaling, which has significant policy implications moving forward.

These findings raise some significant questions to be further developed in subsequent research. If victory over rebels and survival become synonymous once intensity reaches a certain point, does victory lose value with the introduction of post-war consequences? This paper has undertaken an examination of the utility of violence, but if the utility of victory is changed by the introduction of post-war consequences, so too should the utility of violence.

Further study on unarmed monitoring is additionally required. It is possible that the knowledge of being watched is itself enough to change political behavior in terms of voting practices, it would be interesting to see if this also applies to wartime models. Moreover, all

unarmed intervention is not alike, and it would be worthwhile to investigate how different methods of unarmed monitoring impact the findings of this paper.

       Finally, the study of intervention efficacy can be further developed by formally modeling the state's utility function, including the presently discussed impact of conflict conditions and intervention. This should also include an investigation of temporal factors, to investigate whether or not states are more receptive to influence at certain points in a conflict.

Figures

Graph 1: Marginal Effect of Unarmed Intervention on Intensity as the Ratio of Battle Deaths Changes

Table 1- Ordered Logistic Regression Results: Effects of Intervention on Intensity as the Ratio of Battlefield Deaths Changes

	Change in Intensity (civtot 1946 – 2016)				
Z_var	-0.601 (-1.11)				
Y_var		-0.403 (-0.12)			
X_var			0.962 (0.95)		
W_var				-2.143** (-2.83)	
V_var					0.907 (0.96)
Scale	0.694* (2.07)				
Shame		-5.908** (-2.79)			
Mediation			0.262 (0.39)		
Unarmed PK				1.135* (2.42)	
Armed PK					0.365 (0.67)
BFD	1.204 (0.83)	3.82e-14 (0.00)	-0.968 (-1.13)	0.184 (0.37)	-0.761 (-1.13)
Colonial History	0.118 (1.44)	0.0948 (1.16)	0.150 (1.79)	0.0976 (1.16)	0.0933 (1.16)
Polity Score	-0.422** (-3.17)	-0.500*** (-3.72)	-0.438** (-3.22)	-0.476*** (-3.30)	-0.355* (-2.47)
WDI Trade	0.0122 (1.76)	0.00941 (1.42)	0.0125 (1.85)	0.00980 (1.45)	0.0108 (1.64)
WDI Land Area	0.00000123*** (3.57)	0.00000120*** (3.56)	0.00000116*** (3.40)	0.00000111** (3.27)	0.00000115*** (3.32)
WDI Population	2.84e-09 (0.38)	6.08e-09 (0.83)	-6.17e-10 (-0.08)	1.11e-08 (1.46)	4.58e-09 (0.62)
WDI exp. military	0.0154 (0.96)	0.0137 (0.86)	0.0218 (1.34)	0.0145 (0.90)	0.00728 (0.45)
UNNA GDP	3.29e-12 (0.53)	3.70e-12 (0.60)	8.09e-12 (1.26)	-2.67e-12 (-0.41)	1.10e-12 (0.17)
Ethnic	-4.058*** (-3.58)	-4.899*** (-4.44)	-3.909*** (-3.50)	-4.584*** (-4.14)	-3.486** (-2.97)
Third Party Type	-0.139 (-0.56)	-0.0171 (-0.07)	-0.0679 (-0.28)	-0.117 (-0.46)	0.00749 (0.03)
Prob > Chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	133	133	133	133	133

t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 2- Summary Statistics

Var	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Z_var	208	1.255741	1.014425	0	4
Y_var	3173	.4087143	.36527	0	1
X_var	208	.3751997	.3655889	0	1
W_var	3,173	.0090611	.1178229	0	2
V_var	3,173	.0184443	.1146241	0	1
Scale	559	2.670841	.7470788	1	4
Shame	19,714	.9810287	.136427	0	1
Mediate	559	.7960644	.4032825	0	2
Unarmed PK	19,714	.0088262	.1325723	0	2
Armed Pk	19,714	.0170437	.1294376	0	1
BFD	7,981	98.49285	135.0239	0	1
Ht Colonial	14,653	3.342797	2.644605	0	10
Fh ipolity 2	11,278	5.441802	3.281086	0	10
trade	10,982	68.24605	44.68583	.0209992	531.7374
Land area	12,511	870891.8	1627159	2	1.64e+07
population	12,685	8.15e+07	2.38e+08	7959	1.36e+09
Expmil	11,984	64.56906	11.69079	22.394	86.61
Unna gp	11,247	1.89e+11	7.20e+11	6706647	1.45e+13
Ethnic	14,048	.4818291	.2627543	0	.930175
tytype	559	1.273703	.7562445	0	2

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