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Civilian Defense Forces, Tribal Groups, and Counterinsurgency Outcomes

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M.A., Villanova University, 2006

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An abstract of a dissertation submitted to the faculty of the
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ABSTRACT

Civilian Defense Forces, Tribal Groups, and Counterinsurgency Outcomes

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How do states maintain their authority given that even weak non-state groups are now capable of challenging states by resorting to irregular warfare? In Part I of the dissertation, I propose that one of the ways in which states pursue internal security is by recruiting civilians into lightly armed self-defense units referred to as civilian defense forces (CDFs). In their role as government auxiliaries, these units assist the counterinsurgency (COIN) effort by counteracting insurgent guerrilla tactics. CDFs' relative affordability, local intelligence, and the propaganda value of coopting civilians, help offset insurgents' superior mobility, concealment, and covert civilian support. Empirical tests of the argument on two different crossnational data sets of all insurgencies completed between 1945 and 2006 reveal that incumbents who deploy CDFs are 53 percent more likely to be victorious. Given that CDF deployment is a more easily manipulable variable than many state attributes such as economic development or military power, CDFs appear to be an effective COIN policy deserving of further academic and policy attention.

The finding that this particular COIN policy is associated with incumbent victory raises an important theoretical puzzle. Namely, if CDFs really are as beneficial to COIN, why do all incumbents not deploy them? In Part II of the dissertation, I lay out a formal principal-agent model which posits incumbent fear of civilian defection to rebels as the main impediment to CDF formation. However, the model also reveals that this impediment should be more easily overcome in areas predominantly populated by tribal groups, where pre-existing intertribal blood feuds incentivize them to comply with the principal's wishes in order to maintain CDF membership and therefore an advantage relative to local rivals. Consistent with theoretical expectations, empirical analyses of a novel province-level data set (N=100) encompassing Turkey and the Philippines suggest that areas with substantial tribal populations tend to station twice as many CDF personnel as those with no tribal populations.

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Ovaj vrhunac svojeg akademskog postignuća posvećujem Mugiju, mojoj najdražoj i najboljoj mami na svetu.

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Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter 1

Introduction

In 1983, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a clandestine organization led by Abdulah Ocalan, initiated an armed uprising against the Turkish state ostensibly on behalf of the country's Kurdish ethnic minority. The stated objective of the group's uprising was the creation of an independent Kurdish state centered on the southeast of the country, where most of the Kurdish population resided. The PKK's secessionist aspirations were commonly attributed to grievances resulting from decades of alleged cultural, economic, and political discrimination by the Turkish state against ethnic Kurds and a perceived futility of attempting to effect meaningful change using non-violent means alone.

As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952, Turkey at this point in time represented a key bulwark against the eastward expansion of Soviet influence. As such, the Turkish government constituted the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid (after Israel and Egypt) and was able to field the second largest standing army within NATO (Uslu 2003, 256; Ron 1995, 28). Faced with overwhelmingly superior Turkish armed forces, the PKK had little choice but to adopt a Maoist insurgent strategy in its violent pursuit of an independent Kurdish homeland. In short, the first stage of the strategy prescribed the use of guerrilla tactics, relying

primarily on hit-and-run attacks on government forces and acts of sabotage targeting vulnerable state infrastructure. In order to achieve the mobility and concealment necessary to perform these tasks, PKK insurgents were lightly armed, organized into small-size units, and based in the inaccessible mountainous regions of the southeast. Were the secessionist movement to consolidate its military capacity and gain popular support, Mao's strategy would indicate the "liberation" of entire remote regions and a shift from guerrilla to conventional tactics (Jongerden 2007, 61).

For its part, the Turkish government opposed making any concessions to the rebels and sought to stamp them out with everything they could muster. Due to its focus on conventional military deterrence of a Soviet invasion, the Turkish army's organizational culture and capacity strongly favored static defense and large-scale search-and-destroy operations as its initial response. Having failed to suppress (or even contain) the PKK threat in this conventional fashion, the government implemented a clear-and-hold counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy of gradually expanding territorial control over the rural southeast. The new approach was complemented with the creation of small, highly mobile detachments capable of reacting quickly to reported guerrilla sightings. In addition, the Turkish forces instituted a policy of resettlement in which hundreds of thousands of Kurdish peasants were displaced from rebel-affected areas in an effort to deprive insurgents of critical resources such as food and shelter (Jongerden 2007, 67).

In addition, by the late 1980s the government had embarked on a plan to recruit ethnic Kurds into a self-defense militia called the village guards. As part of the village guard program, a number of Kurdish peasants in select villages were provided light weaponry and a modest stipend. In return, they were expected to perform static guard and patrol duty as well as report any knowledge of PKK operations in their respective local areas. By 1990, the ranks of village guards swelled to nearly 70,000 servicemen (Romano 2006, 83). Due to their affordability and local knowledge, the

village guards are thought to have freed up regular army personnel for offensive operations and provided the authorities with vital intelligence on the PKK. The Turkish CDFs are also believed to have misused their power to further their private agendas, often in the process generating human rights abuses against fellow citizens. Thus, there have been reports of village guards engaging in extortion, drugs trafficking, as well as homicide motivated by personal reasons — many committed under the guise of combatting insurgents. Having said this, village guards are widely thought to have been instrumental in aiding the government's COIN effort (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva 2010, 261; Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman 2007, 339; Martin 2001, 136). Thanks to its revised COIN strategy, the Turkish state managed to put an end to the insurgency by the late 1990s without having to concede virtually anything to the Kurdish nationalist cause. Following the capture and incarceration of Abdulah Ocalan in 1999, the PKK as an organization rapidly imploded, and as a result combatant casualties dropped dramatically thereafter (Metelits 2009, 148).

The PKK case described above is but one example of guerrilla insurgency — a global phenomenon that has existed since antiquity and is hardly confined to communist movements. As Joes (2004, 3) recalls, "[t]hroughout history, royalist, conservative, nationalist, and/or religious movements have engaged in guerrilla insurgency" in an attempt to defeat a numerically superior opponent. Guerrilla tactics serve to level the playing field by conferring on the insurgent tactical advantages in mobility, concealment, and popular support. By permitting rebel movements to survive (and possibly thrive) in spite of incumbents' superior conventional capabilities, guerrilla warfare has made it possible for insurgents to wrest concessions from or defeat even the most powerful of states (Arreguin-Toft 2005; Lyall and Wilson 2009; Merom 2003; Shultz and Dew 2006). This distinct technology of warfare played a direct role in the process of decolonization that followed World War II, as one territory after another

fought for and obtained independence from their respective metropoles. Ironically, many of the newly created states lacked the necessary capacity to maintain their authority and subsequently themselves fell prey to guerrilla insurgency. As a result, intrastate conflicts have occurred in more than a half of all nations and have taken over 16 million lives in the post-World War II period — five times as many as interstate wars (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003).

The proliferation of insurgency in recent decades poses an important question for political science. Namely, how does the modern state fulfill its most basic mandate as the guarantor of internal peace while protecting the prevailing political order? Arguably the best way a state could hope to achieve this is to enact measures designed to prevent civil conflict from occurring in the first place. However, since guerrilla warfare permits even very weak non-state groups to pursue their political aims using violence, conflict prevention may not always be an attainable objective. Instead, states may be compelled to exercise their guardianship of internal peace and order by defeating insurgents militarily while relinquishing as little political power as possible. The extent to which a state is successful in this regard is directly dependent on its ability to prosecute an effective COIN campaign, which is why a systematic study of the effectiveness COIN policies has a direct bearing on the overarching question of how states safeguard internal peace without compromising political authority.

1.1 Civilian Self-Defense and Internal Order

Any given counterinsurgency campaign is arguably a product of the government's intended COIN strategy and the unique historical circumstances of each case. Despite this uniqueness, in formulating their own responses, incumbents have sought to learn from the experience of past COIN campaigns. As a result of this learning process, similar policies have been implemented across many different COIN campaigns.

These historical similarities enable us to draw inferences about which policies are conducive to COIN success and which are not. Thus, in the case of the PKK insurgency discussed above, the village guards appear to have contributed to counterinsurgent victory. Referred to as a civilian defense force (CDF), paramilitary units of this kind have been deployed in many other instances of counterinsurgency, and in a substantial proportion of those cases, they were deemed similarly conducive to COIN success. From British-sponsored Malayan home guards and Peruvian *rondas campesinas* to Indonesian village security organizations and Greek rural security organizations, CDFs have been successfully used by incumbents of various capabilities and regime types. Moreover, their popularity does not appear to have diminished with time — most recently, the United States sponsored the establishment of Awakening Councils in Iraq, where they have been credited for much of the post-2007 reduction in violence, which erupted following the ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the subsequent occupation of the country by U.S. forces (Ricks 2009; Connable and Libicki 2010, 150; Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro 2012).

These and other such examples may be indicative of a more general pattern in which incumbents are sometimes able to profitably use civilian auxiliaries in support of their COIN aims. Extant literature would seem to suggest that indigenous civilian auxiliaries may indeed be advantageous to a counterinsurgent. In comparison with regular troops, they are thought to be more cost effective, superior in local knowledge, and better able to drive a wedge between rebels and the civilians whose support they require to thrive (Blaufarb and Tanham 1989; Cooper 1979; Horne 1987; Jones 1989; Kalyvas 2006; Linn 1989; McCuen 1966; Paget 1967; Race 1973; Richards 1996). Quantitative analysis of Russian military operations in Chechnya supports the notion that native recruits can suppress insurgent attacks even more effectively than regular troops (Lyall 2010*a*). However, the study is not specific to CDFs, and its external validity is limited by the subnational research design. In an exhaustive review of the

literature on COIN success, Connable and Libicki (2010) conclude that CDFs are generally an effective COIN method, especially when relying on part-time volunteer recruits. Although the study is informative inasmuch as it identifies a number of factors associated with COIN success, its assessment of CDF effectiveness is based on qualitative evidence alone. In the only quantitative study specific to CDFs, Felter (2008) presents statistical evidence that the Philippine Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGUs) have been effective at combating rebels. However, the study is largely descriptive rather than inferential and of limited external validity due to its subnational research design.

In consequence, we still do not know whether CDFs really are conducive to COIN victory and if so how states go about recruiting them. Attempting to answer these questions using rigorous social scientific methods and the best available data would certainly help elucidate the workings of one of the mechanisms modern states use routinely in an effort to preserve their political authority when faced with armed challenges by non-state groups. In addition, a systematic study of CDFs is also highly relevant to U.S. policy making in Iraq, where CDFs have been deployed and credited for much of the post-2007 reduction in sectarian violence, as well as in Afghanistan, where this same strategy is being replicated currently (Connable and Libicki 2010, 150). If effective, CDF deployment may represent a particularly appealing policy option for democratic governments more generally as well, since such regimes are likely politically constrained in their ability to pursue some of the more brutal COIN policies such as population resettlement, scorched earth tactics, and mass killing of civilians (Collier and Rohner 2008; Gleditsch, Hegre and Strand 2009; Hegre 2003; Lyall 2009; Rotberg 2003).

In Part I of this dissertation, I propose that one of the ways in which states pursue internal security in the context of an armed insurrection is by recruiting their own citizens into CDF units. In their role as government auxiliaries, CDF personnel

assist the COIN effort by counteracting insurgents' guerrilla tactics. Their relative affordability, better local intelligence, and the apparent political association of civilians with the state work to offset insurgents' superior mobility, concealment, and popular support in contested areas. In order to test the argument, I lay out a crossnational research design and assemble two data sets based on two different samples of insurgencies from 1945 to 2006. For any given observation in the two samples, I consulted encyclopedic sources and individual case histories to assess whether or not CDFs had been deployed at any point during the course of an insurgency. Empirical analysis of the assembled data provides the first crossnational quantitative evidence that CDF deployment is indeed an effective COIN policy which increases the likelihood of incumbent victory. Specifically, the evidence suggests that incumbents who deploy CDFs against insurgents are 53 percent more likely to be victorious. Incidentally, the data also appear to cast some doubt on a previous finding in the literature that greater force mechanization invariably hampers COIN effectiveness (Lyall 2010*b*; Lyall and Wilson 2009).

1.2 Civilian Rivalries and CDF Deployment

Given the sound theoretical mechanisms and robust quantitative evidence, the decision of the Turkish state to deploy ethnic Kurds as CDFs is perfectly reasonable. Nonetheless, this perfectly reasonable choice represents an exception rather than the norm — of the 86 insurgencies that started and ended between 1945 and 2006, CDFs were deployed in only 33 (38%) of them. Thus, the failure of many other incumbents to follow suit appears somewhat at odds with the notion that these auxiliary forces are advantageous to COIN. This raises an important theoretical question: provided CDFs really are as helpful as the evidence suggests, why are most incumbents not taking advantage of them to benefit their COIN effort? Framed differently, in the case

of the PKK insurgency, how is it that Turkish government was able to recruit Kurds themselves to fight against their own co-ethnics while so many others have not?

In order to account for this apparent puzzle, in Part II of the dissertation I formulate a principal-agent model of CDFs which posits the possibility of covert CDF defection to the rebel side as one of the main reasons why incumbents may be unwilling to deploy them. For instance, when contemplating the creation of native Arabic CDFs in Algeria, the main challenge for the French had been to "choose the correct moment when the population was sufficiently won over that [they] could distribute rifles without danger of having them passed to the rebels" (McCuen 1966, 228). Furthermore, even after CDFs are deployed, individual case histories suggest that defection among CDFs' rank-and-file is commonplace and that states go to great lengths to try to curb it. Thus, in the case of the Turkish-sponsored village guards, there is evidence that a sizeable number of them have consorted covertly with the PKK rebels, providing them with weapons and information, or even fighting along their side (Finn 2007, 783; Martin 2001, 136; Barkey and Fuller 1998, 148). Similarly, in the case of RENAMO insurgency in Mozambique, "many of the rifles going to [government-sponsored People's Militia] found their way into [rebel] hands through capture or barter" (Copson 1994, 97). Since most guerrilla groups are chronically deficient in military equipment — at least during the initial stages of insurgency — it is unsurprising that governments should be wary of issuing weapons to civilians when the risk is high that they will end up in rebel hands in one way or another.

Nevertheless, I argue that incumbents may sometimes be able to lessen this risk by preferentially recruiting members of traditional tribal groups into CDFs, since these groups often possess added incentives not to defect. Driven by the ancient institution of blood feud, tribal communities have been known to engage in intense local struggles amongst themselves, and as a result, joining a CDF system promises resources and legitimacy that these groups can profitably leverage in their private

disputes with local rivals. As far as Turkish village guards are concerned, ample evidence suggests that tribal servicemen used their weapons and newfound position of authority to pursue private vendettas against local rivals. In one of the most gruesome and well publicized examples of tribal enmity, the Celebi family from the village of Bilge in Mardin province had had a dispute with a rival clan over some nearby fishing farms. Over the years, their inability to arrive at a negotiated agreement resulted in a long-lasting blood feud between them. When the Turkish government began enrolling Kurdish civilians into its new self-defense program, both clans jumped at the opportunity to join. Nicholas Birch of the Irish Times aptly summarizes the logic of their decision to join as follows:

> [o]ne [clan] joined up eagerly, not so much out of a sense of loyalty as in the knowledge that guns, ammunition and state backing would give it the upper hand over its rivals. Much more unwilling to be in the front line of a conflict with [PKK] militants who had a history of massacring militia families, the other [clan] took up guns shortly afterwards, so as not to be left behind (Birch 2009).

In their official capacity as CDF personnel, the two rival groups cooperated in the government's COIN effort against the PKK as though they had been allies. However, following the Celebi chief's refusal to marry off his daughter to a suitor from the opposing clan, masked gunmen mounted a horrific attack in Bilge in which 44 people were killed, including 17 women and six children (Usta 2009*a*). In the aftermath of the event, the Turkish Interior Minister Besir Atalay conceded that the "[w]eapons used in the attack belonged to the Bilge village's guards, who are paid and armed by the state to fight alongside troops against rebels from the [PKK]" (Usta 2009*b*). This case is but one example of a more general dynamic in which long-standing enmities serve to motivate rival tribes to enter a CDF system so as to use their newfound privileges to settle private scores.

One may be tempted to think that governments would be even less inclined to supply weapons to groups that are likely to use them to kill off one another. As sensible as the idea is, this may not be the case for several reasons. First, most inter-tribal feuds are not nearly as deadly as the Bilge dispute has been, and therefore few incidents of inter-tribal conflict attract as much attention of state organs (Birch 2009). Second, casualties of CDF violence tend to be portrayed as insurgents or their sympathizers, especially when the targets themselves do not belong to the CDF system. And, most important, desperate times require desperate measures, and as a result incumbents embroiled in civil conflict are more than willing to sacrifice civilian lives if it means helping to defend their political authority from insurgent challengers. Moreover, the formal model of CDF delegation developed in Chapter 4 suggests precisely the opposite — namely, that tribal groups may actually be more trustworthy auxiliaries in the struggle against insurgents. All else being equal, because these groups place a greater premium on CDF membership than non-tribal ones, defection to the rebel side for them may not be worth the risk of raising suspicions and being kicked out of the CDF system, as this would place the offending tribe in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis its private archrivals. Thus, the model indicates that the existence of inter-tribal rivalries could help governments incentivize compliance by increasing the deterrent effect of threats to revoke CDF privileges in the event of suspected defection. If correct, the argument would imply that CDFs are more likely to be deployed in rebel-contested areas that are more heavily populated by tribal groups.

In order to put this prediction to a quantitative empirical test, I have collected subnational data on CDF deployment in Turkey and the Philippines (N=100). For each province in the two countries, I record the number of CDF personnel deployed by their respective governments to battle insurgent groups such as the Kurdistan's Workers Party (PKK), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the New People's Army (NPA). Consistent with theoretical expectations, statistical analyses of

the province-level data set suggest that, all else being equal, areas with a substantial tribal population station nearly twice as many CDF servicemen as those with no tribal populations. Importantly, the result is robust to a variety of model specifications and estimators such as fixed effects ordinary least squares and Poisson-based negative binomial regression. The pattern of preferential CDF deployment to tribal areas in Turkey and the Philippines provides evidence that inter-tribal enmities render these groups more trustworthy auxiliaries in COIN.

Advantageous though they may be to counterinsurgency, the model of CDF formation presented in this dissertation also highlights their potentially very disturbing "dark side" — a proclivity for human rights abuses. In essence, the model suggests that CDFs are more likely to get deployed when the government is able to strike a bargain with civilians on a quid pro quo basis. In return for helping to combat insurgents, the incumbent necessarily provides some resources such as weapons and salaries. However, a far more lucrative incentive appears to be the official legal sanction to act as local representatives of the state, which permits CDF personnel to pursue their private agendas under the guise of public interest. For tribal servicemen, this incentive is particularly salient due to the prevalence and intensity of inter-tribal hostilities. However, this is not to say that non-tribal CDFs are devoid of private agendas of their own. On the contrary, CDFs in general are quite capable of misusing the government's resources for private gain.

Thus, CDF personnel — whether tribal or non-tribal — have been known to engage in a variety of illicit activities, including extortion, rape, drug trafficking, and extrajudicial killing, to mention but a few (Sugden 2005, 10; Ron 1995, 55). For instance, in 1996 a country-wide scandal broke out after revelations of government involvement in the smuggling of several tons of heroin from Iran destined for the western European market. In this case, the village guard contingent belonging to the border town of Yuksekova is thought to have played a key role in transporting

the shipment from the border to the regional center of Diyarbakir (Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 2009, 288). Once again, the phenomenon is by no means confined to the Turkish CDFs. Prior to its disbandment in 1987, the Marcos-era Civilian Home Defense Force in the Philippines was widely seen as one of the most ill-disciplined and abusive (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1983, 26–31). Similarly, the British-sponsored Kikuyu home guards in Kenya have also been accused of extortion, torture, and extrajudicial killings (Branch 2009, 58–76; Anderson 2005, 239-43). Thus, given these units' propensity toward crime, it would seem that the establishment of CDFs paradoxically works to strengthen macro-level political order while simultaneously eroding micro-level societal order.

It goes without saying, then, that CDF deployment should not be undertaken lightly and without due consideration of the potential pitfalls of militarizing civil society in this manner. Fortunately, the fact that CDFs have been used in only 33 of the 86 insurgencies between 1945 and 2006 indicates that states are quite reluctant to undertake the drastic step of arming civilians. In line with this, preliminary analyses of the crossnational data suggest that civilian auxiliaries are likely to be deployed against more intractable cases of insurgency and after other COIN methods appear to have failed. Note, however, that the primary reason for this probably has more to do with incumbents' concerns about the possibility of CDF defection rather than with a desire to minimize human rights abuses. In addition, states have devised a variety of mechanisms to monitor CDFs and punish transgressors. For example, the Turkish government is reported to have sacked some 23,000 village guards (of the 70,000 in total) on various criminal charges by 1997 (Jongerden 2007, 65, 27n). Likewise, U.S. Marines in Vietnam developed the Combined Action Platoons program in which a marine squad was paired with a CDF platoon on a permanent basis in order to train, monitor, and provide security for the native recruits (Lewy 1980, 116). If implemented

in a good faith effort, these and other similar measures have the potential to keep in check CDFs' nefarious tendencies.

In addition, this study has important ramifications for policy makers across the world that might be facing intractable insurgencies. As far as U.S. foreign policy is concerned, my research suggests that the Sunni insurgency in Iraq which ensued following the American invasion in 2003 was indeed a good candidate for CDF deployment. First, the counterinsurgent commanded a woefully inadequate number of regular troops to be able to secure the country, while its personnel were relatively unfamiliar with the local terrain and culturally alien to the native inhabitants. Second, since the population of Iraq is rife with tribalism, Sunni tribes could be used to recruit the nucleus of a native Iraqi self-defense force (Stolzoff 2009). Last, the brutality of the Al Qaeda insurgents meant that CDF casualties could be used to turn around public opinion and help rally the population to oppose the insurgency. These factors help explain both why the Americans eventually decided to implement a CDF program as well as why it appears to have helped to reduce sectarian violence following the temporary U.S. troop surge in 2007. In a most rigorous study of the 2007 surge to date, Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro (2012) provide evidence in line with this explanation. Specifically, their analysis of recently declassified local-level data reveals a synergistic effect whereby the effectiveness of the surge in reducing insurgent attacks was greatly dependent on the concurrent deployment of a native Iraqi CDF. Furthermore, since some of the same basic conditions may be said to prevail in Afghanistan as well, CDF research is also relevant to current U.S. efforts to deploy a tribal-based self-defense force called the *arbakai*.

1.3 Layout of the Dissertation

The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I review some of the existing insights regarding insurgency and assemble a theory as to how CDFs might affect COIN outcomes. In Chapter 3, I present a crossnational research design along with two samples based on two different lists of insurgencies that started and ended between 1945 to 2006. Chapter 3 also details the results of statistical analyses of the assembled data, discusses the broader implications of the study, as well as points to some avenues for future research. In Chapter 4, I construct a formal model aiming to account for the apparent puzzle of why so few states have resorted to CDF deployment if indeed it is so useful to COIN effort. One of the model's main predictions is that incumbents should be more inclined to delegate auxiliary duty to civilians when the target population has demonstrable internal rivalries, which make the acquisition of government-provided weapons highly desirable. In this same chapter, the concept of tribalism is introduced as a reasonable proxy for civilian rivalries owing to tribal communities' proclivity to engage in longstanding internecine conflicts. In order to put the formal model to an empirical test, in Chapter 5 I outline a subnational research design as well as present the results of statistical analyses. The concluding chapter summarizes the main theoretical and empirical contributions of this study, discusses its implications for the broader political science literature on intrastate war, and outlines a possible future research agenda. Last, the appendices provide a complete documentation for the coding of CDFs and COIN outcomes as well as a tabular representation of both the cross- and subnational data set employed in this study.

Part I

CDFs and Counterinsurgency Outcomes

Chapter 2

Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Civilian Auxiliaries

2.1 Insurgency

British Major General C.E. Callwell was the first to conceptualize insurgency as a distinct form of warfare. According to him, insurgency comprises "rebellions and guerrilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field" (Callwell 1906, 21). His definition isolates guerrilla tactics as a critical feature of this form of warfare. In this dissertation — as in much of modern political science literature — the term *insurgency* denotes a sustained armed struggle between an incumbent (state) and an insurgent (non-state) actor, in which the latter resorts to violence in an attempt to achieve an overtly political aim such as secession, government takeover, or change in government policy.[1] Insurgencies are distinguishable from conventional civil wars inasmuch as the non-state actor pursues its goal by way of guerrilla tactics — "a strategy of armed resistance that [...] uses small, mobile groups to inflict punishment on the

[1]In the remainder of the text, I also refer to incumbent actors as governments.

incumbent through hit-and-run strikes while avoiding direct battle when possible" (Lyall and Wilson 2009, 70). The outcome of the incumbent's COIN effort refers to how favorable the final allocation of the disputed good is to the counterinsurgent.[2]

Many scholars have noted that insurgencies are often characterized by a marked power asymmetry between incumbents and insurgents (Cassidy 2006; Galula 2006; Kalyvas 2005; Merom 2003; Nagl, Petraeus, Amos and Sewall 2006). Given the lopsided nature of the contest, how can a rebel movement ever hope to achieve its aims? While innumerable theorists have expounded on how this is to be done, few works have been as influential as Mao Tse-tung's *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Mao's doctrine of revolutionary war envisions three distinct phases. In the first phase, the nascent movement is at its weakest, and hence its highest priority is to survive in the face of a superior incumbent foe. Accordingly, insurgent effort is largely clandestine and confined to building up the movement's organizational, economic, and political capacities, with only sporadic guerrilla action against the state. The second phase begins once the rebel group gathers sufficient strength to be able to challenge the incumbent's authority in remote pockets of the countryside as well as sustain its competing claim to sovereignty. A key insurgent objective here is to undermine the local population's trust in the government's ability to police the territory and protect the local agents of the state. However, since the revolutionary movement is still relatively weak, it continues to avoid pitched battles with incumbent forces and focuses instead on consolidating its military capacity. The third and final phase of the revolutionary war commences once the rebel movement grows so powerful as to be able to conduct conventional military operations. Provided the enemy does not give up its aims up until this point, the war culminates eventually in the overthrow of the incumbent or the annihilation of the insurgent organization (Mao Tse-tung 1961; Nagl 2002, 23).

[2]Following Lyall and Wilson (2009), outcomes are conceived of from the perspective of the incumbent.

As in Mao's doctrine of revolutionary war, for all major insurgency theorists guerrilla warfare performs a crucial and indispensable role in the most critical and protracted second phase of insurgency (See Võ Nguyên Giáp 1962; Guevara 1969; Debray 1980). As crossnational data in Chapter 3 show, the fact that rebels have defeated incumbents or received substantial concessions in 52 percent of insurgencies from 1945 to 2006 testifies to the efficacy of guerrilla tactics. By enabling insurgent survival in the face of a superior organized force, guerrilla tactics make rebel victory possible in one of two ways: either by (1) convincing the incumbent to give up his struggle because a decisive COIN victory is deemed increasingly unlikely or prohibitively costly, or by (2) allowing the insurgent movement to gather sufficient strength over time to defeat the incumbent militarily.

However, what exactly is it about guerrilla tactics that makes it so essential to insurgent survival? The literature points to three specific features of guerrilla warfare as critical to its effectiveness: mobility, concealment, and civilian support. By adopting hit-and-run tactics, small-size units, and light armament, guerrillas attain superior mobility which confers on them both offensive as well as defensive advantages (Thompson 2002, 11; Nagl et al. 2006, 5-18; Tanham 2006, 45). As far as offense is concerned, mobility plays an indispensable role in allowing insurgents to overcome strategic inferiority using tactical superiority. Although incumbents typically possess substantially superior military power, guerrillas may nevertheless score tactical victories by concentrating a number of smaller units into a larger fighting force capable of defeating the enemy at a critically weak spot (Joes 2004, 13).

In terms of defense, counterinsurgent forces often find that insurgents are able to evade their search-and-destroy parties and disperse easily into the adjoining territory. The ability to quickly assemble several guerrilla units operating in a territory also helps them break out of any encirclement by the counterinsurgent (Joes 2004, 243). Should government troops depart from a cleared area in pursuit of another objective,

the rebels may in turn quickly re-occupy their former stronghold (Kalyvas 2006, 140; Galula 2006, 53–4). As BBC journalist Ian Pannell notes of the ongoing (as of 2012) civil war in Syria, "[w]hen the [rebel army] is squeezed hard in one area, it simply moves to another and quickly moves back to reclaim unoccupied land as government forces move elsewhere" (Pannell 2012). Thus, as a guerrilla tactic, superior rebel mobility makes quick annihilation of the rebel threat difficult if not impossible to achieve for the counterinsurgent.

Second, concealment is likewise essential to rebel survival, since given accurate intelligence most incumbents could eliminate the rebel threat fairly easily (Merom 2003, 33–4; Berman, Shapiro and Felter 2008, 6–7). Therefore, in order to survive in the face of overwhelmingly superior government forces, an insurgent movement needs to prove adept at hiding its human and physical resources. Apart from facilitating survival, concealment confers important offensive advantages such as the ability to choose favorable timing and location for insurgent reprisals. Since the counterinsurgent cannot perfectly anticipate points of rebel attack, it is compelled to try and guard all potential targets simultaneously. In doing so, COIN forces are likely to be spread thin, thus making them more vulnerable to rebel attack at any single location (Hayden 1995, 161–2). In addition, concealment of undercover operatives permits the establishment of clandestine networks in government-held territory (Galula 2006, 57). These networks are then able to conduct subversive activities and supply tactical information about the incumbent's forces. The resultant informational asymmetry thus counterbalances the conventional military asymmetry and is the reason why accurate intelligence gathering is considered an indispensable intermediate objective in most COIN campaigns.

Given its importance, rebel organizations can be expected to make every effort to establish and maintain their concealment. In particular, concealment is often achieved by blending in with the civilian population or hiding in dense forest and impenetra-

ble mountains (U.S. Marine Corps 1940, 6-2; Osborne 1965, 5; Kitson 1971, 95). In addition to facilitating concealment, rugged terrain may also increase relative insurgent superiority in mobility by curtailing the mobility of government's heavy armor (Cederman, Buhaug and Rød 2009, 503). If so, the fact that some countries are more mountainous and forested than others would imply that they may be more prone to outbreaks of insurgency. As sensible as the notion is, the empirical record on the question remains mixed. Thus, while crossnational studies have found that rugged terrain increases the risk of civil war onset and possibly its duration as well (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gleditsch and Ward 2000), studies of conflict incidence at the subnational level have reported no statistically significant association with geographical attributes (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Buhaug and Lujala 2005; Do and Iyer 2010; Lange and Balian 2008; Raleigh 2010).

The apparent absence of spatial correlation between terrain variables and conflict episodes subnationally may actually be consistent with the idea that rugged geography is more valuable to rebels as a means of concealment rather than a mobility handicap for government forces. If the latter were the case, one would expect skirmishes to take place in mountains as insurgents attempt to draw in government forces to fight on terms favorable to the rebel side. However, if rugged terrain were important to insurgents for its concealment properties, we would expect skirmishes to occur in relatively accessible government-held territory owing to incumbents' inability to locate rebels' mountain hideouts. Another potential limitation of some these studies lies in their exclusive focus on African conflicts (e.g. Buhaug and Rød (2006)), which, although fought irregularly, may be symmetric rather than asymmetric — a distinction which could be relevant to insurgent need to seek out shelter in inaccessible terrain. Regardless of whether (and under what conditions) rugged geography

increases the incidence of civil conflict, it is relatively safe to say that it facilitates rebel concealment from superior government forces and therefore rebel survival.

Third, the incongruity of conventional military inferiority and ambitious political goals compels rebel movements to seek active civilian support in most cases (McCuen 1966, 54–64; Snow 1997, 65–6; Nagl 2002, 22). Although best known for his dictum "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," Mao's understanding of the relationship between political and military power was actually far more ambivalent (Cheek 2010, 294). Recognizing that the causal arrow between the two forms of power goes both ways, Mao writes:

> [w]eapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale. Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by people. If the great majority of the Chinese, of the Japanese and of the people of other countries are on the side of our War of Resistance Against Japan, how can Japan's military and economic power, wielded as it is by a small minority through coercion, count as superiority (Tse-Tung 2005, 211)?

In Mao's thinking, then, political and military power are fungible into one another. More specifically, the tactical impact of insurgent advantages in mobility and concealment are greatly dependent on manifest civilian support or at the very least civilian acquiescence (Chaliand 1982, 246). As far as concealment is concerned, non-combatants enjoy tremendous influence over the ability of guerrillas to remain hidden from COIN forces. The degree of civilian support is consequential to insurgents' ability to remain hidden when they attempt to do so by blending with the civilian population, since non-combatants can easily denounce to authorities all rebels living in their midst. Civilian support also matters to those insurgents pursuing concealment

in mountainous or densely forested areas, since their identities and precise locations can be divulged by their families, friends, or even accidental passersby.

Likewise, the impact of insurgent mobility on tactical outcomes is contingent on, among other things, accurate and timely intelligence about COIN forces, and intelligence is in turn substantially dependent on covert civilian cooperation. For instance, unless a guerrilla unit promptly learns of an impending COIN sweep operation in its area, the unit may be unable to escape despite any advantages in mobility. Furthermore, information plays an equally important role in offensive insurgent operations. Though guerrillas may be able to assemble quickly into a larger offensive force thanks to their mobility, they may not fully profit from this advantage unless they can quickly and accurately identify good opportunities for striking the counterinsurgent. Since the civilian population is known to be a major source of information for combatants engaged in civil conflict, the degree to which an insurgent movement enjoys the support of non-combatants modulates the tactical usefulness of guerrilla mobility.

In accordance with this, insurgents typically seek political power by "liberating" a remote area of the country and then attempting to elicit civilian support through ideological activism, the provision of basic social services, and if necessary, coercion (Nagl et al. 2006, 1-6; McCuen 1966, 34). Civilian support, whether voluntary or not, generates recruits, material assistance, and vital intelligence for the rebel movement while simultaneously withholding them from the incumbent. For this reason, irregular wars are often considered struggles in which belligerents leverage a variety of socioeconomic, political, and military instruments in an attempt to secure for themselves active civilian cooperation or at least their passive acquiescence.

2.2 Counterinsurgency

Following World War II, the apparent success of Maoist insurgent doctrine in China encouraged many revolutionary movements to embrace guerrilla warfare as a vehicle of social transformation. Thus, whether motivated by communism, nationalism, or religion, this particular technology of rebellion proliferated worldwide throughout the 1950s and 1960s, spawning well-known historical conflicts such as the 1952 Mau-Mau uprising in British Kenya, the 1954 nationalist resistance in French Algeria, and the 1966 leftist insurgency in Guatemala — to mention but a few. Serious scholarly work attempting to formulate a theory of COIN response began in earnest from within the confines of the CIA-funded Center for International Studies (CIS) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Blackmer 2002; Shafer 1988). The initial thrust of academic thinking on COIN centered on problems associated with economic modernization. Among other things, it was thought that rapid economic modernization eroded institutions of traditional society without supplanting them with modern ones. The resultant social instability made it possible for various movements to exploit the popular grievances in an effort to garner civilian support for their revolutionary agendas (Rostow 1959). The basic premise of this approach was that, in order for an insurgency to end, its root causes which generated it in the first place must be addressed. In light of the hypothesized driving force behind insurgency, these early COIN theorists maintained that an effective COIN would have to attempt to ameliorate the negative impact of economic modernization (Pye 1958).

Drawing on psychology and sociology, academics posited socioeconomic inequalities and the ensuing psychological frustrations as another negative repercussion of modernization (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011). Most notably, Ted Robert Gurr's relative deprivation theory advanced the notion that intrastate conflict could occur as an adverse consequence of economic modernization. Specifically, modernization was thought to increase expectations of economic welfare more quickly

than those expectations could be met in reality. The resulting unmet needs would then feed popular discontent with the incumbent and in doing so increase the likelihood of insurrection (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970; Muller and Weede 1994). Thus, according to this school of thought, an incumbent would have to target socioeconomic inequality in order to alleviate the conflict-causing grievances among the civilian population.

As far as practitioners at this time were concerned, while some of them viewed COIN as merely an extension of conventional warfare,[3] others embraced and expanded upon the population-centered approach of the early CIS theorists. Thus, for practitioners such as Constantine Melnik and David Galula in French Algeria or Sir Gerald Templer and Robert Thompson in British Malaya, addressing popular grievances became the *sine qua non* of effective COIN strategy (Galula 2006; Melnik 1964; Thompson 1966). Adopting the term "hearts and minds," (HAM) they put forth a population-centered theory of COIN with a broader emphasis on restoring public confidence in the governance capability and legitimacy of the state. Toward this end, proponents of the approach advocated a variety of reform programs designed to reduce corruption, improve access to basic goods and services, and encourage participation in local politics (Nagl et al. 2006, 5-20; Gompert, Kelly, Lawson, Parker and Colloton 2009). The idea was that, by improving local services and providing jobs, an incumbent could effectively steer civilian preferences away from supporting rebels and toward supporting the counterinsurgent. In particular, the expectation was that, in response to greater government legitimacy, civilians in contested areas would increasingly deny insurgents shelter as well as material resources needed to sustain their struggle (Long 2006; Melnik 1964).

Though the argument is certainly intuitively appealing, it is not without its limitations. Dissenting from the HAM theory early on, a number of scholars proposed an alternative approach known as the cost/benefit theory (CBT) (Long 2006, 25).

[3]A good example of this is U.S. General William Westmoreland's attritional strategy during the Vietnam War (Nagl 2010).

CBT theorists such as Leites and Charles Wolf (1970) see some major problems with the HAM view that perceptions of government legitimacy are important ideological determinants of manifest civilian support for or against the state. First, the task of alleviating popular grievances in developing countries in order to boost government legitimacy entails overcoming the numerous and enormous challenges associated with economic modernization. As a result, any such attempt is likely to be ineffective, unless the counterinsurgent is willing and able to commit vast amounts of resources to the effort. Second, even if HAM policies were to succeed in their proximate objective of redressing public grievances, Leites and Charles Wolf (1970) doubt whether this would help achieve the ultimate objective of convincing civilians to give up support for insurgents or denounce them to the authorities. In essence, while a particular individual may well be ideologically inclined to support the state, actually indulging this ideological preference could be prohibitively expensive if the rebel movement is sufficiently organized and capable of punishing such behavior.

Moreover, CBT scholars go on to point out that, under these conditions, successful HAM policies could actually prove counterproductive to the overall COIN effort. For instance, should a government manage to improve living standards in contested areas of the countryside as the HAM approach prescribes, a rational peasant may nonetheless find it in his or her best interest to share the windfall with rebels, thus overriding any ideological sympathies towards the state (Leites and Charles Wolf 1970; Popkin 1979; Long 2006, 25; Ives 2007, 76). Last, empirical support for relative deprivation as a motive for rebellion is quite mixed, with scholars arguing that grievances are far more prevalent and that the theory overpredicts civil violence (Aya 1979; Mason 2004). As a result, much of the civil war literature upholds the view that opportunities to rebel such as low state capacity and rugged terrain better predict outbreaks of intrastate conflict than grievances, implying that a COIN strategy primarily aimed

at addressing public discontent is unlikely to be effective (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; cf. Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011).

While both HAM- and CBT-based approaches agree that securing active civilian support for COIN should be a key intermediate objective, they disagree on how best to achieve it. Although civilian grivances may be difficult to alleviate and perceptions of government legitimacy resistant to change, CBT scholars contend that civilian cooperation could nevertheless be secured using coercion and selective rewards. Thus, Kalyvas (2006) takes the argument further and problematizes the notion that civilian ideological preferences are a key determinant of manifest popular support. Drawing on extensive fieldwork evidence, Kalyvas (2006) instead proposes that civilians are likely to supply critical information to whichever belligerent side is able to provide for a modicum of security. Wherever relative belligerent strength favors the state, incumbent violence against suspected rebel sympathizers is likely to be selective, thus allowing the counterinsurgent to consolidate its local control effectively. In his account, therefore, the ability to shield one's civilian collaborators from enemy reprisals affects expressed popular support more powerfully than do any underlying ideological disposition (Kilcullen 2010, 150–2).

At the core of the disagreement between the two major COIN approaches lie differing assumptions about how individual civilians make decisions regarding whom to support in a civil war. Whereas for HAM theorists individual decision-making is driven by a logic of appropriateness, for proponents of CBT, a logic of consequentiality reigns supreme (Gompert and Gordon 2008). Thus, to the extent that civilians follow the logic of appropriateness, they could be expected to support the legitimate government dutifully as prescribed by their identity as citizens of the state. In contrast, to the extent that civilians follow the logic of consequentiality, we may presume that civilians weigh carefully the expected utility of the available actions and choose the best one irrespective of what their duty mandates (March and Olsen 1989, 160).

Recognizing that individuals likely follow both cognitive models of decision-making, the theoretical approach to COIN presented below makes no strict assumptions in this respect. Instead, I proceed from the general premise that a COIN effort is likely to be successful to the extent that it manages to counteract guerrilla tactics, considering how indispensable they are to insurgent survival and growth. More specifically, COIN victory is more likely to occur if an incumbent can effectively (1) increase the mobility of his own forces or reduce the mobility of guerrillas; (2) reduce insurgents' concealment opportunities or improve state intelligence capability; and (3) weaken popular support for the rebels or gain civilian acquiescence (whether through CBT or HAM methods), which in turn may ultimately work to reduce rebel mobility as well as concealment. A COIN policy may then be considered effective to the extent that it helps an incumbent achieve these broad aims while minimizing any additional negative repercussions.

HAM and CBT are general approaches to counterinsurgency built on somewhat different theoretical fundamentals. Each approach suggests some specific policies as beneficial to COIN effort and isolates others as detrimental. When in agreement with respect to a COIN policy, the two approaches may posit different conditions in which the given policy can be expected to succeed. The following section of the chapter discusses some of the most widely employed counterinsurgency policies such as amnesty and cash-for-weapons programs, search-and-destroy operations, population displacement, and mass punishment of civilians. Whenever possible, HAM and CBT perspectives are used in this section to highlight the potential advantages and disadvantages of each specific policy.

2.2.1 COIN Policies

In their response to guerrilla warfare, counterinsurgents often implement policies which seek to exploit comparative rebel weaknesses in manpower, military equipment,

and resources. As far as manpower is concerned, insurgent cadres can sometimes be effectively reduced or even decimated with well-crafted amnesty programs. Ideally, a credible offer of amnesty should provide an attractive exit option for disillusioned rank-and-file guerrillas. In addition, apart from draining enemy manpower, successful programs can also yield invaluable intelligence from converts and thus further help seal the fate of a rebel movement (Joes 2004, 241). As an example, a successful amnesty program was implemented in the Philippines in the 1950s, helping to end the Huk rebellion (Joes 1992, 71–2). An important limitation of amnesty is that it is most likely to be successful in the waning stages of insurgency, when a substantial portion of rank-and-file members would prefer to quit the struggle but do not have viable means of doing so. An additional drawback is that public opinion may find the pardoning of outlaws morally questionable, and the resulting opposition may make implementation of amnesty difficult (Long 2006, 67).

Even when manpower is not a major issue for a rebel movement, military equipment is almost always a scarce good without which no insurgency can be sustained for obvious reasons. Indeed, in the initial phase when insurgent movements are most vulnerable, the bulk of rebel military equipment is comprised of civilian firearms and weapons stolen from police and army stocks. Since weapons constitute a major bottleneck in many insurgencies, conflict intensity often waxes and wanes with variations in access to armament. For instance, guerrilla operations by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) against Serbian targets reached significant proportions only after the 1997 overthrow of the Sali Berisha regime in neighboring Albania, after which the country's armories became accessible to KLA rebels (Sislin and Pearson 2001, 102–3). Given insurgent shortages in armament, an attractive course of action for incumbents is to attempt to restrict or eliminate possible sources of weapons supply. Policies that aim to do this include confiscation of civilian firearms, "no questions asked" cash payments, or prisoner release for every gun surrendered to the authorities (Joes 2004,

241–2). Cash-for-weapons schemes of this sort have been utilized successfully by the Americans during the 1899 nationalist insurgency in the Philippines and by the British during the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s (Joes 2010, 41–2; Arnold 2010, 170). As a drawback, payments issued in return for surrendered guns may end up in rebel hands, who can then use it to purchase even better armament. In addition, such policies may prove ineffective if insurgents are being supplied by an external power (e.g. the United States supporting UNITA rebels in Angola during the Cold War).

Informed in one way or another by the two grand theories of COIN, a wide variety of additional policies have been advanced, debated, and implemented in pursuit of the aforementioned aims. In an effort to counter superior rebel mobility, incumbents have attempted to hunt down guerrillas using both small- and large-scale offensive operations. Large-scale cordon-and-search maneuvers constitute a conventional military approach to neutralizing an elusive rebel group, and often represent a key element of an incumbent's initial COIN strategy. Designed by Major General C. H. Boucher, the initial British response in the 1948 Malayan Emergency relied heavily on large-scale sweep operations aimed at locating and trapping Communist insurgents. The British policy was deemed largely ineffective, because massive troop movements served to alert insurgents well in advance, who were then able to escape into adjoining territory unscathed. In addition, absent accurate local intelligence, the COIN forces tended to engage in the indiscriminate killing of civilians (Stubbs 2010*a*, 115). As a result, the counterinsurgent "not only failed to stamp out the [rebel] threat; it also alienated key sections of the population and [...] produced more recruits for the Communists' cause" (Stubbs 2010*a*, 128).

In contrast, search-and-destroy operations conducted using small, lightly armed, and highly mobile detachments result from the realization that conventional military methods are ill-suited to fighting irregular opponents and that the incumbent may benefit from adopting irregular tactics as well. Thus, the British COIN response to

the 1919 Irish nationalist insurrection eventually included both large-scale sweep operations as well as small, mobile search-and-destroy teams, reflecting the authorities' realization of "the need to adopt tactics mirroring those of the enemy: one- or two-platoon-strength foot columns able to move undetected for several days at a time" (Stubbs 2010*b*, 25).

Recognizing that insurgents are too elusive to be destroyed by way of offensive operations alone, counterinsurgents often transition to some form of the venerable clear-and-hold approach, which attempts to clear territory as well as hold it by deploying large numbers of static defense troops (Nagl et al. 2006, 5-19–20; Galula 2006, 80). The strategy follows directly from CBT thinking, which maintains that civilian support is as much a function of local state strength as it is a function of underlying ideological sympathies. By increasing the security of the locals and protecting them from potential rebel reprisals, the counterinsurgent hopes to generate civilian denunciations of insurgent operatives even in areas in which the population is relatively unsympathetic (Kalyvas 2006). In clear-hold-build variants of the approach informed by HAM precepts and adopted by the U.S. military, the deployed troops are tasked with a variety of civic programs designed to address local grievances and improve living standards (Nagl et al. 2006). Opinions diverge concerning the optimal number of troops that needs to be stationed in order for the policy to succeed. Among advocates of insurgent-centered approaches, a force ratio of 10 to 1 appears to be sufficient, whereas proponents of population-centered COIN suggest a ratio of 20 government soldiers per 1,000 population (Quinlivan 1995; Collins 2002, 188; Connable and Libicki 2010, 129; see also Dobbins 2003).

A major difficulty in implementing any clear-and-hold strategy is that very few incumbents possess the willingness and capability necessary to station troops throughout all contested areas for sufficiently long periods of time (U.S. Marine Corps 1940, 5-17; McCuen 1966, 35; Khalil 2007, 393). In the pithy words of Galula (2006), "sat-

uration can seldom be afforded" (54). In addition, the remote location and rugged terrain of affected territories give rise to major logistical difficulties and exposes resupply routes to rebel attack. Given these important limitations, incumbents are often compelled to rely on alternative modes of territorial and population control, including most notably resettlement programs and the mass punishment of civilians.

In order to increase rebel visibility, sever any links between insurgents and non-combatants, and control the population, counterinsurgents sometimes engage in the forced relocation of entire communities. If one accepts the Maoist understanding that "[civilians] may be likened to water and [guerrillas] to the fish who inhabit it," resettlement of civilians appears to be a logical attempt at separating the two (Mao Tse-tung 1961, 92) Thus, by concentrating the population into small, easily defensible locations, a counterinsurgent is able to provide security effectively to civilian informants with fewer boots on the ground and without jeopardizing supply lines. In addition, population resettlement serves to limit insurgents' concealment opportunities by denying them the ability to quickly "melt" with local civilians. Finally, the policy may also limit insurgents' supply of food and other resources previously obtained from civilians, especially when combined with scorched-earth tactics of destroying immobile civilian assets left behind. At the same time, however, forced relocation clearly risks antagonizing the civilian population, since "nobody likes to be uprooted" (Galula 2006, 81). Furthermore, in implementing it, COIN forces may employ violence against non-combatants reluctant to leave their homes and as a result further alienate the civilian population (Kalyvas 2006; Lichbach 1995; Popkin 1979; Tullock 1971).

Forced relocation programs have been implemented with varying degrees of success in many COIN campaigns. Prominent examples include the British emergency resettlement in Malaya, U.S. concentration areas in the Philippines, and French *regroupement* in Algeria (Joes 2010, 44; Stubbs 2010*a*, 119; Sutton 1977, 285). In the

case of the British Malaya, the authorities relocated some 423,000 civilians into 410 new resettlement centers, and an additional 650,000 were moved to existing wired-in villages (French 2012, 120). The policy was deemed to be effective insofar as it helped to sever insurgents' food supply, forcing them to spend more time finding alternative sources. However, forced uprooting, destruction of civilian property, and squalid living conditions served to generate widespread resentment toward the government. Overall, the program had mixed results, since sympathy for the communist cause was thought to have increased because of it, and rebel units were able to move in and out of the new villages almost at will (Stubbs 2010*a*, 119).

Antagonizing the civilian population may have major political repercussions if the relevant domestic and/or international audiences take a dim view of an incumbent's policies such as forced relocation. Especially in democracies, a withdrawal of public support can cripple or spell the end of a COIN effort. In fact, for guerrillas facing a vastly superior military force such as the United States, victory appears conceivable only if public opinion should turn against the counterinsurgent. Marred by conventional military thinking, U.S. strategy in Vietnam proved unable to adapt to the requirements of guerrilla warfare due to the organizational rigidity of the U.S. military (Nagl 2010). As a result of an excessive reliance on technology and conventional firepower, U.S. attrition strategy produced close to 60,000 American fatalities as well as some 2 million Vietnamese casualties, most of whom were civilian (Conteh-Morgan 2004, 37). Although no quantitative evidence exists to suggest that mass killings of Vietnamese civilians affected public opinion in the United Sttes, it nevertheless seems plausible to suppose that the apparent brutality of the U.S. strategy there had had a negative impact on international and domestic support for the war. As Schwab (2006) concludes, "[w]ith the mass media reporting daily on massive destruction of villages and towns, civilian casualties, and American war dead and wounded [...]

the war was lost in the most important arena of all, the psychological reality of the American public" (56).

Although autocracies are still vulnerable to international pressure — especially in recent decades when advances in information technology have made keeping secrets increasingly difficult — these regime types tend to be less constrained by public opinion in their COIN effort. As a result, autocracies may be more likely to take a heavy-handed approach to COIN using forced relocation and mass punishment of civilians (Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004). In the absence of accurate local intelligence and sufficient ground troops to provide for local security, autocratic regimes may attempt to undercut a rebel movement's civilian support simply by terrorizing the population into submission. Thus, should a village appear to be supporting the guerrillas, the counterinsurgent could proceed to destroy the entire village and imprison or murder its inhabitants. A brutal act such as this would be intended as a signal to other villages, ideally deterring them from collaboration with the guerrillas. More generally, even completely indiscriminate reprisals against non-combatants in response to guerrilla attacks may be perpetrated in the hopes of driving a wedge between rebels and civilians. Wiping out a village at random in these circumstances could plausibly motivate the population to turn against the insurgents in order to prevent any further indiscriminate reprisals.

The proposition that autocracies are more likely to use heavy-handed tactics in combating insurgents is borne out by anecdotal evidence, since historically some of the most brutal COIN campaigns have been waged by autocratic incumbents. While there is some evidence that Nazi repression effectively stifled resistance in Western Europe (Liberman 1998), Nazi occupation of the Baltic states and Belarus (collectively referred to as Ostland) illustrates well the potential pitfalls of a brutal COIN campaign. Soon after the commencement of Operation *Barbarossa* in June 1941, German forces had to deal with nascent partisan resistance in much of the vast occu-

pied territory. In their initial COIN strategy, the Germans employed both small- and large-scale sweep operations. Small-scale operations were conducted by special units called *Jagdkommandos* (hunting detachments) (Beckett 2001, 63). As Lieb (2010) explains, "[t]he basic idea was that the Jagdkommandos should themselves behave and act like partisans by setting traps and laying ambushes. They would make all their movements far away from villages and roads, to maximize the element of surprise" (79). Large-scale sweeps were conducted by regular troops from the front lines who would occasionally fall back in an attempt to encircle and hunt down the partisans using a cauldron maneuver (Beckett 2001, 64).

However, because the advancing German units were less maneuverable and short on manpower, the guerrillas were able to escape their cauldrons with relative ease (Lieb 2010, 79–81). Given the ineffectiveness of both small- and large-scale sweep operations, the Germans opted to supplement them with a harsh policy of depopulation. Seeking to separate the partisans from their sources of civilian support, Nazi authorities evacuated entire regions transforming them into "desert zones." In doing so, the German forces demonstrated complete disregard for non-combatants: "[v]illages were burned down [...] and all cattle and agricultural products were looted [...] [t]he units [...] sometimes did not waste time on the complicated evacuation process; instead they just shot the civilians on the spot" (Lieb 2010, 80).

The most serious problem with which the Germans had to contend was a major lack of ground troops with which to attempt to stabilize the vast hinterland occupied in just a few months (Beckett 2001, 61). The counterinsurgent's inability to provide for security meant that the local population would be reluctant to provide critical intelligence for fear of eventual partisan retribution. Combined with a genocidal racial ideology, the shortage of boots on the ground compelled Nazi authorities to resort to massive and indiscriminate violence against civilians as part of their COIN strategy. Thus, in response to partisan hit-and-run attacks, the Germans exacted vengeance

on the local non-combatant population under a policy of *Kollective Gewaltmassnahmen* (measures of collective reprisal). Under the policy, local officials were made responsible for subversive activities occurring in their district, so that following such an incident hostages would be taken and executed (Bartov 1992, 90–3). Moreover, the German high command issued directives authorizing the execution of 50 to 100 suspected communists or the shooting of ten randomly selected civilians for every soldier killed by partisans (Beckett 2001, 62).

Even though the COIN policies described above did manage to halt the spread of partisan activity, they never succeeded in eliminating it, thereby providing the Soviets and Allies with a relatively cheap way of stirring up trouble in the German rear (Lieb 2010, 83). Moreover, the indiscriminate violence perpetrated on a massive scale failed to drive a wedge between the partisans and civilians. Unable to affect guerrilla activity, many citizens preferred to take their chances with the partisan movement rather than becoming victims of indiscriminate German retribution. Some dissenting opinions notwithstanding, most historians today agree that the brutality of the Nazi COIN strategy contributed greatly to its failure and to the ultimate German defeat in World War Two (Kilcullen 2010, 6).

2.3 Civilian Defense Forces

Civilian defense forces (CDFs) are another such COIN policy designed to help states suppress guerrilla warfare (McCuen 1966, 107). CDF units are sometimes also referred to as self-defense militias or home guards. In the remainder of the text, I draw on Connable and Libicki (2010, 141) and adopt the term *civilian defense force*. A CDF is any government-sponsored auxiliary force that meets the following criteria: (1) it is armed; (2) its rank-and-file is populated mainly by civilians; (3a) its personnel is local to the region in which it is deployed for duty, and, in the case of ethnic conflicts,

(3b) has been drawn from the same ethnic group whose support rebels aspire to win; and (4) the group performs mostly static (i.e. defensive) tasks such as patrols and the protection of local civilians and infrastructure. Examples of CDFs include the Rural Security Units [*Monades Asfaleias Ypaithrou*] in the Greek Civil War, Civilian Defense Patrols [*Patrullas de Defensa Civil*] (PAC) in Guatemala, the Self-Defense Corps in Vietnam, and the Peruvian *Rondas Campesinas*. In the remainder of the chapter, I shall argue that the deployment of these paramilitary forces increases the likelihood of COIN success by offsetting the three pillars of guerrilla tactics: superior rebel mobility, concealment, and civilian support.

2.3.1 CDFs and Rebel Mobility

Due to CDFs' relative affordability, incumbents are able to deploy static forces around the countryside in greater numbers and in doing so counter superior insurgent mobility by denying them room within which to evade advancing COIN forces. Since rebellions tend to spring up in poverty-stricken areas of poor countries (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan 2004; Do and Iyer 2010), states typically do not experience much difficulty finding citizens willing to serve as auxiliaries in return for modest compensation. Furthermore, because "[CDF] troops need little training and can be given surplus and obsolete weapons," the recruitment of CDFs rather than regulars helps keep the cost of training, upkeep, and transportation to a minimum (Copson 1994, 96). For instance, Turkish Village Guards were armed with cheap Russian or Turkish-made automatic rifles and paid a salary of about a $100 per month — an attractive sum in the eyes of impoverished rural Kurds (Ron 1995, 54–5; Bloom 2007, 111).

CDFs' relative affordability thus allows for the deployment of greater numbers of static defense units which effectively restricts rebel maneuvering space and thereby helps offset their mobility advantage. The notion is exemplified in the Indonesian

military's use of *pagar betis* to combat the Darul Islam insurgency during the 1950s. *Pagar betis* represents a search-and-destroy tactic in which Indonesian government forces successfully encircled insurgent fighters residing in the hill areas of West Java. Crucial to this success was the incumbent's use of CDFs known as the Village Security Organization (VSO) to help cordon off designated areas and prevent guerrillas from escaping. During the operation, villagers in the VSO were required to establish a perimeter around the hills by linking up with recruits from neighboring villages. In doing so, pagar betis "used the whole population of the lowlands to encircle the hills, both controlling the local population and turning the Darul Islam strongholds into encircled death traps" (Kilcullen 2010, 92–3). In doing so, the Indonesian CDFs effectively restricted the rebel maneuvering space, making their neutralization by COIN forces that much more likely.

In addition, the assignment of static duties to CDF personnel increases the number of regular troops available for tracking down elusive guerrillas in offensive operations (Asia Watch Report 1990, 55; Asia Watch Report 1992, 11; Gompert et al. 2009, 96). In effect, the deployment of CDFs allows the counterinsurgent to enhance the mobility of its own forces by focusing its resources and regular personnel. For instance, in trying to track down communist guerrillas during the Malayan Emergency, the British-sponsored Home Guards are said to have allowed the British to concentrate their forces on more important offensive operations (Stubbs 1989, 158-9). Similarly, the Village Guards in Turkey released the Turkish army from "the impossible task of having to garrison every single settlement" (Jongerden 2007, 79). This enabled the Turkish government to utilize its regular troops more efficiently in pursuit of the fleeting PKK guerrillas. As Jongerden (2007, 68) explains, the army organized "special units of 'go-getters' who lived in the mountains for weeks, hunting the guerrilla," while the remaining regular troops patrolled the area. Once insurgents had been spotted, the regulars were instructed to surround them rather than engage them in

combat. The more mobile special units would then promptly be transported to the location by helicopter and commence pursuit. Thus, had the 70,000 CDFs not been deployed to release the regular forces from static duties, the Turkish army would have had fewer troops at its disposal with which to track down elusive PKK guerrillas.

2.3.2 CDFs and Rebel Concealment

CDF deployment may also help incumbents deal with rebel concealment insofar as they facilitate the influx of local intelligence regarding the identities and activities of insurgents and their sympathizers. There are at least three ways in which CDFs can do this. First, their linguistic skills, superior knowledge of local terrain, and access to informal social networks may well prove invaluable in assisting government forces in tracking down rebels and their sympathizers (McCuen 1966, 112; Badgley and Lewis 1974, 94; Connable and Libicki 2010, 148; Cassidy 2006, 138; Gwynn 1934; Galula 2006). CDFs are by definition native to the region in which they are deployed and belong to the same ethnic group as the insurgents. As a result, CDFs' local language skills are typically superior to those of regular military personnel. Because locals tend to be more forthcoming with native speakers than with foreigners, CDF recruits are able to communicate with the local populace more easily and extract vital intelligence. Furthermore, the fact that CDFs are native to the region in which they are deployed implies that their recruits are privy to local social networks and have extensive knowledge of the surrounding geography. Because they enjoy better access to informal social networks and have greater local knowledge, CDFs can obtain tactical intelligence from the local population more easily than regular army officers.

Not surprisingly, historically, CDFs' local knowledge and intelligence capabilities comprise some of their most frequently touted assets in COIN. For instance, the Philippine Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGUs) are said to have "functioned as the military's grassroots 'eyes and ears' in communities suspected of

harboring subversives" (Asia Watch Report 1992, 11). During the 1971 Dhofari insurgency in Oman, the British-sponsored *firqat* "'spoke the Dhofari language and knew the people,' and the fact that they had relatives and former comrades among the [rebels] enabled them to encourage defections and [...] helped government forces gain intelligence" (Hughes 2009, 292–3). Similarly, thanks to their superior knowledge of the local geography, the Turkish Village Guards are thought to have been able to assist the state in locating hidden rebel camps and intercepting arms shipments from across the Iraqi border (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 147; Balta 2004, 10; Khalil 2007, 392). More accurate local intelligence allows the counterinsurgent to employ violence against civilians more selectively. Thus, in the case of French-sponsored CDFs in Indochina, thanks to the native recruits' "knowledge of the local situation, they were even more effective than the indiscriminate slaughter practiced by [French] Foreign Legionnares" (Badgley and Lewis 1974, 94). All these anecdotal examples accord with the findings of a recent study of Russian COIN operations in Chechnya, which attributes the greater effectiveness of Chechen recruits to the natives' superior local skills (Lyall 2010*a*).

A second way in which CDFs can contribute to an incumbent's intelligence gathering is by establishing a more permanent footprint of the state and thereby encouraging civilian denunciation of rebels and their sympathizers. As mentioned previously, most governments lack the willingness and/or capability to station regular troops in adequate numbers across the contested territory of the state for sufficiently long periods of time. As a result of civilians' expectations of the counterinsurgent's eventual departure, extracting critical intelligence from the local population in cleared areas becomes substantially more difficult (Kitson 1971, 111; Nagl et al. 2006, 1-19; Galula 2006, 53; Kalyvas 2006; Tanham 2006, 54; Gompert et al. 2009, 2). As McCuen (1966, 33) points out, "[t]he people know that when the authorities leave [...] they are at the mercy of the terrorists and guerrillas." By virtue of their relative affordability,

CDFs help states create a more permanent local presence, which in turn works to allay potential informers' fears of eventual rebel retribution.

The relationship between CDFs, local security, and intelligence gathering is exemplified by the U.S.-sponsored COIN policy in Vietnam known as the Combined Action Platoons (CAPs). While the CAPs also included elements other than civilian self-defense, a CDF program was nevertheless at its heart (Krepinevich 1988). Created in 1965, the CAP program paired up a 14-man squad of U.S. Marines with a platoon of 38 locally recruited civilians. The Marines were permanently stationed in their assigned village, providing professional training services to the native recruits. By 1970, there were 114 CAPs headed by over 2,000 enlisted Marines, most of which were located in the hotly contested Military Region 1 adjacent to the North Vietnamese border (Joes 2004, 115). Among other duties, the CAPs were tasked with protecting the local population and infrastructure from insurgent attacks, establishing and maintaining local intelligence networks, and participating in civic action programs. As a result of improved security, the CAP's proximity to and extended contact with the locals yielded invaluable intelligence on the Vietcong (Cassidy 2006, 138). Despite U.S. withdrawal and South Vietnamese defeat in 1975, the program is considered to have been highly effective in combatting the Vietcong insurgency (Nagl 2010, 145; Joes 2004, 115–6).

Finally, CDFs may serve as a mechanism to distinguish compliant from non-compliant citizenry, allowing states to glean some information about citizens' underlying preferences and the extent of local rebel presence. For instance, if a Kurdish village in Turkey repeatedly declined to join the village guard system, the authorities were more inclined to conclude that the villagers are cooperating with the PKK rebels — whether voluntarily or not (Finn 2007, 783; Balta 2004, 16; Bird 2004, 320). Similarly, Guatemalan and Peruvian governments are believed to have used their auxiliaries partly in order to distinguish compliant from hostile peasantry (Benz 1996,

153; Ball, Kobrak and Spirer 1999, 100; Fumerton 2002, 16; see also Upreti 2008, 134–5). In effect, the degree of local resistance to CDF recruitment serves as a signal of local insurgent strength. Of course, the signal may be quite noisy to the extent that resistance to CDF recruitment is a function of factors other than local insurgent presence (e.g. the quality of weapons issued or an ideological commitment to neutrality). Signal quality is also degraded to the degree that CDFs are able to pledge loyalty to both belligerent sides at the same time. As far as it provides insight into local civilian preferences and the extent of local rebel influence, the deployment of CDFs helps states better target other COIN policies, minimizing the negative repercussions of dispensing punishment to compliant citizens and/or reward to non-compliant ones.

2.3.3 CDFs and Popular Support for Rebels

Finally, CDF deployment may help incumbents reduce civilian support for rebels by instigating conflict between insurgents and civilians. Since rebels typically perceive even pro forma government supporters as a grave threat to their political and military aims, CDFs often fall prey to vicious rebel attacks (Elkins 2005, 70; Kalyvas 2006, 109). Turning the civilian support problem on its head, such attacks have the potential to instigate conflict between insurgents and civilians and in doing so reduce a rebel movement's popular support (Gerlach 2010, 198). In accordance with this, Miranda and Ratliff (1993) describe the thinking of Nicaraguan government officials on this matter as follows:

> The Sandinistas often reported [CDF] losses [...] as civilian casualties from Contra attacks [...] At times, civilians were killed [...] and the fact is that [Minister of Defense] Humberto Ortega was pleased when this happened because of its enormous propaganda value. [...] Ortega realized that the killing of those civilians contributed more to the ultimate defeat

> of the Contras than [army] attacks on rebel fighters ever could (Miranda and Ratliff 1993, 93).

In another illustrative example, the British-sponsored CDFs in Kenya suffered a similar fate at the hands of Mau Mau rebels during the 1950s. On March 26, 1953, not long after the formation of first native Kikuyu home guard units, the Mau Mau organized a ferocious attack on the village of Lari. Due to sheer happenstance, much of its home guard had been dispatched to a patrol in a nearby forest, leaving the settlement vulnerable. When the insurgents attacked, they proceeded to set ablaze most of the huts in the village, trapping their residents inside and burning alive nearly 100 people — most of whom were women and children (Wieland 2000, 180). As observers noted, "many corpses were so completely hacked apart and scattered around that the count was questionable" (Alao 2006, 48). "The brutality and savagery of the attack on the loyalist Kikuyu guard post appalled whites and Africans alike" (Mumford 2005, 79), and the British used the event as a propaganda tool to rally public opinion and justify a crackdown of the rebels (Anderson 2005, 133).

These are certainly not isolated incidents, for the argument has been made in the case of other, well-known CDF deployments. Thus, Kurdish civilian casualties resulting from PKK attacks on Village Guards are thought to have undermined the insurgent organization's popular image (Brown 1995, 123; Cornell 2001; Marcus 2007, 115), and a similar dynamic is reported to have played out in the case of the Peruvian Rondas (Degregori 1998, 146–7). The argument is broadly consistent with the view that public preferences are dynamically determined in the course of a civil war (Kalyvas 2008). Assuming this is correct and violence indeed has a powerful effect on pre-existing cleavages (Branch 2009), CDF deployment may work to undermine civilian support for rebels.

2.3.4 Hypothesis

Provided the use of CDFs is in fact as advantageous to the counterinsurgent as the arguments developed in this chapter suggest, it follows that states which resort to them should have a higher probability of defeating insurgent challenges. Accordingly, in the subsequent chapter I test the following hypothesis.

$H_{2.1}$: *Insurgencies in which CDFs have been deployed are more likely to end in COIN victory.*

Ample anecdotal evidence exists in support of a general effectiveness of CDFs as a tool of COIN. Established in the 1980s to fight against Sendero Luminoso insurgents in Peru, *rondas campesinas* are considered a successful case of CDF deployment (Degregori 1999). Numbering some 300,000 personnel in more than 3,500 villages, "the rondas proved effective" and "played a crucial role in the defeat of Sendero Luminoso" (McClintock 2005, 72; García 2005, 45). Similarly, in a textbook COIN campaign against communist rebels in Malaya, the British utilized CDFs effectively to defeat the insurgency. As part of the Home Guard program designed by Sir General Gerald Templer, up to 300,000 Chinese and Malay peasants were recruited to defend their villages from insurgent reprisal, and the CDF program is thought to have "played the lead role in defeating the insurgents" (French 2012, 187; Corum 2007, 198).

But perhaps the most striking illustrations of CDF effectiveness come from some of the most difficult — and as a result ultimately unsuccessful — cases of COIN such as Nazi anti-partisan warfare during World War Two and the Vietnam War. Not long after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa in July 1941, pockets of partisan resistance to German occupation coalesced from remnants of battered Soviet units trapped behind enemy lines. After failing to suppress the

insurgency using some of the most brutal COIN methods in human history, the Nazis set out to create a self-defense force called *Wehrdörfer* in some 100 fortified villages in the occupied Belorussia (Nolte 2005, 266; Gerlach 2010, 190). Though it is difficult to claim effectiveness for the Wehrdörfer project in a disastrous case of COIN such as this, "it is revealing that post-1945 Communist historiography often described it as the most dangerous weapon of the 'fascists' in the 'people's war'" (Lieb 2010, 83).

In an equally unsuccessful case of COIN, the U.S. battled Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam while simultaneously waging war with the communist North. During the conflict, the United States established several civilian self-defense programs such as Popular Forces (PF), Regional Forces (RF), and the Marine-led Combined Action Platoons (CAP), ultimately numbering some three million native recruits (Moyar 2006, 70; Joes 2004, 114; Gerlach 2010, 197). Despite initial problems with poor armament, lack of professional training, and the ultimate counterinsurgent defeat, "[d]ollar for dollar, [the CDFs] were the most effective force for killing [insurgents] in the whole country; they absorbed only 2-4 percent of South Vietnam's war costs but accounted for 12-30 percent of all [insurgent] combat deaths" (Nagl 2010, 145; see also Nagl 2002, 121; Edwards 2001, 226–7).

2.3.5 Caveats and Concluding Remarks

As noted earlier, no silver bullet exists to solve the problem of insurgency. Useful though they may be, it is highly unlikely that the deployment of CDFs alone is a sufficient condition for victory. Furthermore, it is equally unlikely that CDFs are associated with no costs other than the cost of armament and remuneration. At least two types of drawbacks are likely to be present. First, as in hearts-and-minds approaches to COIN, one of the most significant drawbacks of arming civilians is the possibility that a portion of CDF provisions will end up in rebel hands through combat, defection, or sale for profit. The fact that civilian neutrality is often construed as

evidence of defection in civil wars incentivizes CDF recruits to try to collaborate with both warring parties simultaneously. As a result, evidence of duplicity is present to a variable degree in nearly all major cases of CDF deployment. Thus, in the case of the village guards in Turkey, some of its CDF units have allegedly collaborated with both the PKK rebels as well as the Turkish authorities (Finn 2007, 783; Barkey and Fuller 1998, 148). Or, in the case of the Guatemalan PAC, Americas Watch Committee reports that "[s]ome army officers [believed] that as much as twenty percent of the civil patrol [...] [collaborated] with the guerrillas" (Americas Watch 1986, 48).

Historical evidence suggests that states are well-aware of this danger and have attempted to reduce the risk through personnel screening, greater oversight by the military, the limiting of quantity and quality of armament, and the meticulous accounting of the supply and expenditure of ammunition (Copson 1994, 97). In Guatemala, the government attempted to minimize the likelihood of CDF collaboration with guerrillas by integrating its PAC into the military hierarchy. A degree of control was achieved by recruiting military commissioners from the local pool of retired army officers or informants who were then made responsible for overseeing the PAC unit in their community. Selected on the basis of their political allegiance, local heads of PAC units were often ultra-conservative party members without prior military experience. Weapons would be issued to PAC members daily at the start of their duty and collected at the end of it. The PAC heads were required to submit to the military commissioners daily reports of local activities and expended ammunition. PAC heads or patrollers themselves were made responsible for any unaccounted weaponry. The military commissioners in turn answered directly to the local army officer, usually a lieutenant or commander. In addition, there is also evidence that the army varied the quality and quantity of arms given to PAC units in response to their perceived trustworthiness. As a local priest observed, "[w]hen the army really trusts the patrol, they give them carbines; when they don't, they give them Mausers" (quoted in Americas

Watch 1986, 28). The majority of patrollers, however, carried machetes, slingshots, and sticks painted to resemble rifles (Americas Watch 1986). Though this particular case represents an extreme form of auxiliary control by a ruthless military dictatorship, it does illustrate a spectrum of measures that governments can implement to oversee their CDFs.

Since CDF personnel receive less training than regulars and enjoy a degree of autonomy, a concomitant rise in crime and human rights abuses is often another major drawback of CDF deployment (see Koonings and Kruijt 2004, 69; O'Neill 1990, 130). Especially in the case of CDFs that receive little to no formal payment, criminal activity may be the only means by which servicemen can secure remuneration (Gerlach 2010, 195). For example, many Turkish Village Guards are thought to have used their newfound position of authority for the purpose of theft, extortion, and drugs trafficking (Ron 1995, 55; Romano 2006, 95; Jongerden 2007, 270). In addition, the creation of some CDFs such as the Philippine CAFGUs may have led to the intensification of tribal rivalries as their members engaged in ancient blood feuds under the guise of combatting insurgents (Asia Watch Report 1990, 122; Berman 1990, 365; Asia Watch Report 1992, 10).

In conclusion, this chapter has developed a theoretical framework isolating rebel mobility, concealment, and civilian support as elements critical to the viability of a guerrilla insurgency. Accordingly, specific COIN policies may be judged more or less effective to the extent that they help reduce insurgent mobility, concealment opportunities, and civilian support. Drawing on this framework, I have argued that the deployment of civilian self-defense paramilitaries benefits COIN effort and as a result increases the likelihood of government victory. However, it is important to note that the militarization of civil society may entail some serious adverse side-effects that need to be considered carefully, including the possibility of defection, increased criminality, and personal score settling. Having said this, if anecdotal reports are any

indication, CDFs appear to be a costly though effective tool of counterinsurgency that states may be reluctant to deploy except under the most dire of circumstances. In order to test the notion that CDFs are conducive to COIN victory, in Chapter 3, I put forth a crossnational research design and present results of quantitative analyses of all insurgencies that occurred from 1945 to 2006.

Chapter 3

CDFs and COIN Victory: An Empirical Test

Chapter 2 laid out a theory of counterinsurgency which emphasizes three key factors: insurgent mobility, concealment, and civilian support. Using this framework, I have argued that CDFs help states defeat insurgencies by restricting rebel mobility, providing intelligence, and pitting the civilian population against insurgents. The argument thus predicted that incumbents which deploy such auxiliary forces ought to be more likely to emerge victorious from guerrilla conflicts. In order to test this proposition, in this chapter I advance a crossnational research design, comprising all instances of insurgency that started and ended between 1945 and 2006. After putting together two different samples based on two available lists of insurgencies, I conduct ordinal logistic analyses of the two samples. Consistent with the theoretical expectations from the previous chapter, the appearance of CDFs is associated with a 53 percent greater likelihood of incumbent victory and a concomitant 72 percent decline in the likelihood of defeat. The analysis also casts some doubt on an important finding in the extant literature regarding the adverse effects of mechanization on COIN outcomes.

3.1 Research Design

In the research design advanced in this chapter, the unit of observation is an insurgency. In line with a recent study of insurgencies, I consider a conflict to be an insurgency if: (1) it involved a politically motivated armed struggle between a state (incumbent) and non-state (insurgent) actors; (2) it produced at least 1,000 battle-related fatalities, with each side suffering a minimum of 100 casualties; and (3) the insurgent actor relied primarily on guerrilla warfare (Lyall and Wilson 2009, 70). Whereas for interstate and civil wars the Correlates of War Project provides a time-honored list of observations for quantitative analysis, there is no such standard list of insurgencies (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Instead, at least two different lists of insurgencies can be identified in the most recent political science literature, both of which fit the above specified definition. As a result, the analysis in this chapter is conducted on two different samples of insurgencies that started and ended between 1945 and 2006. Conflicts which started before 1945 or ended after 2006 are therefore excluded from empirical analysis. The first sample is based on the Lyall and Wilson (2009) data set, while the other is constructed on the basis of Kalyvas and Balcells's (2010) list of insurgencies. The empirical analysis in the next section is conducted on the post-World War Two sample of the Lyall and Wilson (2009) data set (N=133).[1]

The second data set is based on Kalyvas and Balcells's (2010) recent categorization of intrastate wars according to the predominant technology of warfare employed by the belligerents. The authors' sample of civil wars is drawn from Sambanis's (2001) data set. In it, a given event is coded as a civil war if: (1) the combatants include an internationally recognized state and an insurgent non-state actor capable of organizing an armed resistance to it; (2) the conflict is fought on the territory of that state; (3)

[1]Note also that I make two revisions to Lyall and Wilson's (2009) list: omitting France v. MDMR (1946-8) and Zimbabwe v. ZANU, ZAPU (1966-79), which appear to be duplicate observations of France v. Malagasy (1947-8) and Zimbabwe v. ZANU, ZAPU (1972-9).

it generated at least 1,000 battle-related fatalities during its entire course as well as in one or more years of the war; and (4) the conflict produced at least 200 fatalities in all other years (Sambanis 2001, 262).[2]

In Kalyvas and Balcells (2010), civil wars are classified as being one of three types: (1) conventional if both the government and the rebels fielded heavy weaponry during the first year of the conflict; (2) irregular if the rebels resorted to light weapons, while the state was able to deploy heavy armor; and (3) symmetric non-conventional (SNC) if the government was also incapable of deploying heavy weaponry (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010, 418). Well known cases of conventionally fought intrastate wars include the American Civil War (1861–5), the Spanish Civil War (1936–9), and the Bosnian conflict (1992-5). Examples of asymmetric and SNC wars include the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey (1984–99) and the civil conflict in Congo-Brazzaville (1993–7). Of the 147 civil wars identified by Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) in the post-World War Two period, 50 (34%) were conventional, 79 (54%) were asymmetric irregular, and 18 (12%) were SNC wars (423).

Until relatively recently, the assumption that conventional warfare is states' default technology of warfare has been largely unproblematic, since a great majority of state-rebel dyads had been characterized by an asymmetry of conventional capability. However, with the proliferation of weak and failed states in recent years, a growing number of state actors have resorted to irregular tactics (Kalyvas 2005). Because in SNC wars the incumbent also resorts to irregular tactics, warfare in these cases may differ considerably from typical asymmetric conflicts. A pooled, heterogeneous sample of wars runs the risk of not being able to control for all the differences and

[2]Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) exclude 8 cases of urban uprising such as the 1979 Iranian revolution, 2 cases of large-scale rioting, and combine the 1991 and 1997 episodes of the civil war in Sierra Leone. I accept these modifications as well. See the Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) online Appendix for more information. In addition, following Sambanis's (2004) suggestion, I drop three observations that most likely do not meet one or more of the civil war inclusion criteria: Burundi v. Hutus (1965-9), Uganda v. Buganda (1966), and Egypt v. Islamic Jihad (1994-7). See Sambanis's (2004) online coding notes for more information.

thus introducing inefficiency into the statistical analysis. As a result, distinguishing symmetric from asymmetric non-conventional wars appears just as important as distinguishing irregular from conventional ones.

Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) address this issue by further distinguishing SNC from asymmetric irregular wars. For this reason, I include in my sample only observations of asymmetric irregular civil war. Because the authors identify eight wars as ambiguous, I analyze the sample both with (N=86) and without (N=78) these cases. To this sample, I add 12 observations of extrasystemic conflicts that were both asymmetric irregular and generated 1000 or more battle-related deaths. Following Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand (2002, 619), I define extrasystemic wars as those which occur "between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory." The 12 cases were identified using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). They include: Netherlands v. Indonesia (1946-9), France v. Viet Minh (1946-54), France v. MDMR (1947), United Kingdom v. Malayan Communists (1950-60), United Kingdom v. Mau-Mau (1952-6), France v. Tunisia (1953-6), France v. Morocco (1953-6), France v. Algeria (1954-62), France v. Cameroon (1957-9), Portugal v. Angola (1961-75), Portugal v. Guinea Bissau (1962-74), and Portugal v. Mozambique (1964-74).

The theoretical arguments to be tested refer explicitly to asymmetric conflicts, and ideally, the sample needs to other categories of civil war. In conventional civil conflicts, the deployment of CDFs would serve little purpose, since mobility, intelligence gathering, and civilian support are far less important to war outcomes in cases where both actors resort to conventional warfare. Likewise, in cases where both belligerent actors resort to irregular warfare, the use of CDFs is not clearly indicated because superior mobility, concealment, and civilian support are intended to counterbalance a conventionally superior incumbent. Since Lyall and Wilson (2009) do not distinguish

SNC from asymmetric irregular wars, I conduct most of my empirical analyses using the Kalyvas and Balcells (2010)-based data set.

The Kalyvas and Balcells (2010)-based data set differs from that of Lyall and Wilson (2009) in two notable respects. First, whereas for Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) insurgency is defined as any war characterized by asymmetric fighting in the first year of conflict, Lyall and Wilson (2009) include as insurgencies only those conflicts in which the guerrilla phase lasted longer than the conventional phase. More importantly, unlike Lyall and Wilson (2009), Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) distinguish SNC from asymmetric irregular wars. Because the CDF argument presented above refers explicitly to asymmetric conflicts, I rely primarily on the Kalyvas and Balcells (2010)-based sample for present purposes and employ the Lyall and Wilson (2009) data as a test of robustness.

3.1.1 Dependent Variable

Given the hypothesis that CDF deployment increases the likelihood of COIN victory, COIN outcome is the dependent variable. Drawing on Stam (1996) and Lyall and Wilson (2009), the variable can take on three discrete values: win, draw, or lose. Operationally, insurgencies end either as a result of a military defeat or by way of a negotiated settlement. In the event of a military outcome, an incumbent is considered to have lost if its armed forces are destroyed or evicted from the capital. Likewise, an incumbent is considered victorious if the insurgent organization is destroyed or substantially weakened.

Whenever a decisive military outcome is not observed at an insurgency's end, either a compromise settlement has been negotiated or one of the participants has conceded all rival demands. An insurgency is considered to have ended in a draw if the warring parties reached a compromise agreement in which the government conceded some, though not all, insurgent demands. The second possibility is that an insurgent

gives up its armed struggle having received no government concessions or hostilities end because the incumbent concedes all or nearly all rebel demands. In such cases, the outcome is coded as a victory and defeat, respectively. In coding outcomes, I use a narrow definition of draws in that the insurgent movement must obtain either a power-sharing or autonomous arrangement. The possibility exists that a rebel organization's initial aim is limited to a power-sharing or autonomous arrangement, the subsequent achievement of which may strike some observers as a defeat for the incumbent rather than a draw. However, given that bargaining demands are endogenous to estimates of relative power and resolve, coding such cases as victories would get at a different conceptual definition—the accuracy of belligerents' estimates.

In coding the dependent variable, I rely primarily on the Correlates of War Project's (version 4.0) descriptions of each case (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). I subsequently substantiate each coding using a number of other reference materials, including Phillips and Axelrod's (2005) *Encyclopedia of Wars*, Clodfelter's (2002) *Warfare and Armed Conflicts*, Stearns's (2001) and Ackermann, Schoeder, Terry, Upshur and Whitters's (2008) encyclopedias of world history, Kohn's (2007) *Dictionary of Wars*, as well as a large number of individual case histories. A codebook documenting the coding decision for each observation is included in Appendix A.

As far as the Lyall and Wilson (2009) data set is concerned, a number of revisions is made to the authors' original COIN outcome variable. I make a total of 17 (out of 131) revisions. I revise only those cases in which the historical record unambiguously fails to accord with the authors' own coding of an outcome. A demonstrative example of this is the Bosnian civil war of 1992–5, which Lyall and Wilson (2009) code as a victory for the incumbent Muslims Bosniaks. This coding is problematic because it implies that no substantial concessions were made to the rebellious Bosnian Serbs — a notion not supported by the historical record. While the country did remain formally independent as the Muslim faction had desired, Bosnia became a confederacy with two

approximately equally sized units comprising Muslims and Croats on the one hand, and Serbs on the other. Furthermore, each unit became a de facto statelet with broad powers, enabling the Serbian-ruled Republika Srpska to maintain close ties with the neighboring Serb-dominated Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Innes 2006, 24; Burg and Shoup 2000, 215–6; Shewfelt 2007, 192). Because this confederate arrangement departs greatly from the incumbent Muslim ideal point of a unitary Bosnian state, the outcome of this conflict is best coded as a draw rather than a victory. All revisions made to this data set are also thoroughly documented in Appendix B.

3.1.2 Explanatory Variables

CDFs. The presence or absence of CDFs is the principal explanatory variable of interest. It is conceived of as a dichotomous variable (*CDFs*), coded 1 if an incumbent deployed CDFs at any point during a conflict, and 0 otherwise. For each observation in the sample, I rely on individual case histories to identify whether or not an auxiliary force was present that meets the criteria specified earlier: having been armed by the incumbent, its rank-and-file largely consisting of civilians native to the region in which they are deployed, and for the most part being tasked with defensive operations such as nightwatch and patrol duties. With this definition in mind, CDFs appear to have been deployed in 33 out of the 86 insurgencies that have started and concluded between 1945 to 2006. A simple bivariate analysis suggests that their deployment is rather weakly correlated with COIN outcomes (r=0.10).

Incumbent Strength. Since state power serves to defeat and deter insurgencies, its effect should be taken into account in any analysis of COIN outcomes (Fearon and Laitin 2003). This is all the more important because CDFs may also be more likely to emerge in wealthier countries with stronger militaries. More developed countries have greater resources at their disposal with which to induce civilian enrollment in

CDFs, while countries with stronger militaries have more weapons to distribute to their auxiliaries.

Lyall and Wilson (2009) use the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score, which reflects a country's power relative to other system members, as their main measure of incumbent strength. Since no theory predicts that COIN outcomes should be endogenous to an incumbent's standing relative to other system members, a different approach is adopted in this paper. Drawing from the COW Project's National Material Capabilities dataset (version 4), two measures of state strength are included — (1) logged pre-war number of military personnel per 100,000 population (*INCUMBENT MANPOWER*); and (2) logged pre-war energy consumption per 100,000 population (*INCUMBENT ENERGY*). The two measures are intended to proxy an incumbent's military and industrial capacity, respectively. The correlation between CDFs and the two measures of incumbent power equals 0.19 and 0.25, respectively.

Insurgent Strength. Furthermore, all insurgents are not created equal. Whereas some insurgencies are driven by determined mass-based rebel movements (e.g. the 40,000 Kurdish *peshmergas* in Iraq), others amount to little more than roving bandits (e.g. the 800 M-19 fighters in Colombia). A failure to control for insurgent power may introduce a number of biases. It may well be the case that states are more likely to establish CDFs when facing relatively weak insurgent movements. In such "easy" cases, governments may be able to protect their auxiliary personnel from rebel attack more easily, and in consequence citizens could be more willing (or less reluctant) to perform CDF service (Kalyvas 2008).

Having said this, it is also conceivable that precisely the opposite may be true — states may not feel the need to start arming civilians until a rebel challenge escalates beyond a certain point of severity. A third plausible scenario in this vein is that CDFs created during peacetime act to prevent insurgencies from erupting in the first place.

If despite the protective effects of a CDF a rebel movement emerges that is strong enough to make its way into the sample, such states may possess certain characteristics which make them prone to losing. To the extent that these characteristics are unobserved, this would bias the CDF coefficient estimate downward.

In the subsequent empirical analyses, I include two indicators of rebel strength. The first variable (*INSURGENT MANPOWER*) measures the number of armed insurgents per 100,000 population at the apex of insurgency. For the most part, I obtain this data from Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan's (2009) data set. In the few instances in which the data set does not provide an estimate, I consult individual case histories instead. The correlation between CDFs and insurgent manpower equals 0.23, suggesting that CDFs are more likely to be deployed when facing stronger rather than weaker rebel movements. Second, I include Lyall and Wilson's (2009) indicator of external support for rebels (*EXTERNAL SUPPORT*). It is a "scaled variable that measures whether insurgents received two critical types of assistance: material economic and military aid, and the ability to use a neighboring country as a sanctuary" (Lyall and Wilson 2009, 84). If a given rebel organization has received either one form of support, the variable equals 1, and if it has received both forms, it equals 2. The correlation between CDFs and external support for rebels is negligible at 0.02.

Occupation. Next, popular perceptions that a counterinsurgent represents a foreign occupier may undermine a state's COIN effort or provoke terrorist attacks (Cassidy 2006; Pape 2003; Peic and Reiter 2011). Importantly, perceptions of occupation may also make any involvement with CDF highly unpopular and thus stymie civilian recruitment. Drawing on Lyall and Wilson (2009), I control for this possibility by including on the right-hand side their dichotomous variable indicating whether the incumbent was perceived to be an external occupier (*OCCUPATION*). Contrary to these expectations, CDFs and occupation status do not seem to be associated at all

(r=-0.03)

Ethnolinguistic Diversity. I include a measure of ethnic heterogeneity on the right-hand side, since it may also influence COIN outcomes Lyall and Wilson (2009). I adopt Lyall and Wilson's (2009) approach and control for ethnic heterogeneity using Fearon's (2003) group data for each affected country (*DIVERSITY*).

Democracy. Regime type may also influence COIN outcomes. Scholars have long proposed that democracies tend to be less effective counterinsurgents. In this view, democratic publics are war-averse, and since insurgencies are typically protracted struggles, democratic leaders are constrained by their war-averse electorates in their ability to prosecute insurgents effectively (Horne 1987; Lyall 2010*b*; Mack 1975; Merom 2003). On the other hand, a democratic regime may enjoy greater popular support than its autocratic counterparts. As a result, such regimes may be more likely to win as well as more likely to arm civilians.

To account for this possibility, I follow the time-honored approach of measuring regime type using the Polity2 measure — a 21-point composite index ranging from autocracy (-10) to democracy (+10) — and include on the right-hand side of the estimated equation a dichotomous indicator (*DEMOCRACY*) of whether a country is a democracy (Polity2 ≥ 7) or not (Polity2 < 7) (Jaggers and Gurr 1995).

Mechanization. Lyall and Wilson (2009) and Lyall (2010*b*) find that an incumbent's level of mechanization has a negative impact on the likelihood of government victory. The authors' measure of this concept (*MECHANIZATION*) is a scaled fourfold ordinal variable indicating the country's military's prewar soldier-to-mechanized vehicle ratio Lyall and Wilson (2009, 83–4). Inasmuch as their sample differs from that of Kalyvas and Balcells (2010), the pre-war soldier-to-mechanized vehicle ratio is recoded from

Table 3.1. Crossnational CDF Deployment: Summary Statistics

Variable Name	*Median*	*St. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*	*Description*
Dependent Variable					
WDL	1	0.87	0	2	COIN Outcome: win (2), draw (1), or lose (0).
Explanatory Variable					
CDFs	0	0.48	0	1	Indicates whether CDFs have been deployed or not.
Controls					
INCUMBENT MANPOWER	749	896	14	5227	Pre-war number of military personnel per 100,000 population.
INCUMBENT ENERGY	99	162	0.03	851	Pre-war energy consumption per 100,000 population.
INSURGENT MANPOWER	147	340	0.54	2160	Maximum number of armed insurgents per 100,000 population.
EXTERNAL SUPPORT	1	0.85	0	2	External economic and/or military support for rebels.
OCCUPATION	0	0.43	0	1	Incumbent is perceived as an illegitimate occupier.
DIVERSITY	6.13	4.39	1	19	Number of major ethnolinguistic groups.
DEMOCRACY	0	0.42	0	1	Regime type: democracy (Polity2 $\geq$ 7) or not.
MECHANIZATION	3	1.12	1	4	incumbent's prewar soldier-to-mechanized vehicle ratio.

The Military Balance and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institutes *Arms Transfer Database* (IISS 2011; SIPRI 2009).

3.2 Statistical Analysis

In this section, I present the findings of statistical analyses of CDFs and COIN outcomes. Table 3.2 shows that incumbents with CDFs have suffered COIN defeat much more rarely (18.2%) than those without them (37.7%). Furthermore, insurgencies in which CDFs were used have been much more likely to end in draws (33.3% vs. 15.1%), while the rate of COIN victories among the two groups is nearly equal (47.2% vs. 48.5%). One might be tempted to conclude from these data that CDFs are not particularly effective COIN instruments. However, given the possibility that CDFs are more likely to be deployed in more difficult cases of insurgency, such simple bivariate analyses may be obscuring CDFs' true impact.

Table 3.2. CDFs and COIN Outcomes

	COIN OUTCOMES			
	Lose	Draw	Win	TOTAL
NO CDFs	20 (37.7%)	8 (15.1%)	25 (47.2%)	53
CDFs	6 (18.2%)	11 (33.3%)	16 (48.5%)	33
TOTAL	26	19	41	86

Pearson $\chi^2 = 5.73$; p=0.06.

Next, moving onto the multivariate analysis, Table 3.3 shows the results of six ordered logistic regressions of COIN outcomes on CDF presence. Models 1 through 4 are estimated on the Kalyvas and Balcells (2010)-based dataset, while 5 and 6 are estimated on the Lyall and Wilson (2009) dataset. In Model 1, a baseline specification is estimated. As expected, indicators of incumbent and insurgent power predict COIN outcomes at a highly statistically significant level (p=0.008 for *INCUMBENT MANPOWER* and p=0.001 for *INSURGENT MANPOWER*).[3] Furthermore, consistent with Lyall and Wilson (2009), I find that support for rebels (p=0.031) and perceptions of occupation (p=0.001) impact the likelihood of insurgent victory in the expected direction. However, whereas Lyall and Wilson (2009) find that a counterinsurgent's relative level of mechanization is inversely related to COIN success, the analysis performed here reveals the opposite—greater levels of mechanization appear to be associated with insurgent defeat (p=0.003).

In Model 2, the analysis is repeated with the addition of CDFs as a regressor. Consistent with theoretical expectations, deployment of CDFs is associated with an increased likelihood of state victory at a statistically significant level (p=0.007). Note also that with the inclusion of CDFs in the specification, incumbent per capita energy consumption appears to be correlated with insurgent victory (p=0.017) contrary to theoretical expectations. The robustness of these results is assessed in three ways. First, I assess the impact of outliers on coefficient estimates by re-estimating Model 2

[3]Note that all hypothesis tests are two-tailed.

Table 3.3. CDFs and COIN Outcomes: 1945–2006

	Kalyvas/Balcells				Lyall/Wilson	
	Full Sample		Restricted Sample			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
INCUMBENT MANPOWER†‡	0.531*	0.542*	0.609*	0.718*	0.495*	0.509*
	(0.199)	(0.201)	(0.212)	(0.254)	(0.191)	(0.197)
INCUMBENT ENERGY†‡	-0.254	-0.381*	-0.484*	-0.365*	0.0167	-0.0264
	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.106)	(0.104)
INSURGENT MANPOWER†‡	-0.604*	-0.774*	-1.048*	-0.746*	-0.175	-0.240
	(0.187)	(0.181)	(0.204)	(0.224)	(0.149)	(0.139)
EXTERNAL SUPPORT	-0.711*	-0.765*	-1.017*	-0.791*	-0.708*	-0.763*
	(0.330)	(0.318)	(0.291)	(0.353)	(0.235)	(0.240)
OCCUPATION	-2.258*	-2.127*	-2.747*	-2.560*	-2.182*	-2.048*
	(0.689)	(0.662)	(0.642)	(0.735)	(0.579)	(0.608)
DIVERSITY‡	-0.0924	0.0866	0.302	0.362	-0.0249	-0.0420
	(0.365)	(0.383)	(0.415)	(0.430)	(0.289)	(0.278)
DEMOCRACY	-0.0438	-0.302	-0.811	-0.0404	-0.293	-0.542
	(0.713)	(0.587)	(0.541)	(0.644)	(0.444)	(0.475)
MECHANIZATION	0.575*	0.656*	0.775*	0.589*	-0.280	-0.219
	(0.191)	(0.198)	(0.236)	(0.220)	(0.173)	(0.167)
CDFs		1.399*	1.666*	1.485*		0.912*
		(0.518)	(0.647)	(0.617)		(0.412)
Cutpoint 1	-0.997	-1.036	-1.952	0.607	-0.367	-0.435
	(1.341)	(1.280)	(1.262)	(1.481)	(1.406)	(1.439)
Cutpoint 2	0.334	0.395	-0.150	1.868	1.178	1.164
	(1.263)	(1.175)	(1.146)	(1.407)	(1.422)	(1.443)
Observations	86	86	82	78	131	131

NOTE: standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$; two-tailed test.
† per 100,000 population; ‡ natural log of.

on a sample from which the most egregious outliers have been omitted. Four outliers are identified by computing the expected outcome for each observation, subtracting this value from the actual outcome, and then isolating observations with residuals two standard deviations above or below the mean. When Model 2 is re-estimated with these four observations omitted from the sample, the coefficient estimates do not change appreciably (see Model 3 of Table 3.3). Next, I drop from the sample the

eight ambiguous observations of irregular war and replicate the analysis. As Model 4 in Table 3.3 shows, the results indicate that the ambiguous cases are not critically important to the estimates reported in Models 1 and 2.

Finally, I perform another test of robustness by replicating the analysis on the Lyall and Wilson (2009) data set. The results are reported in Models 5 and 6. Conducting the analysis using the authors' original outcome data suggests that CDFs are positively correlated with COIN success though not at a statistically significant level (p=0.150). However, when the analysis is performed with the 17 coding corrections, the results demonstrate that the statistical association of CDFs with COIN victory remains statistically significant (p=0.027) even in a sample substantially different from that of Kalyvas and Balcells (2010). In addition, the significance of most of the remaining predictors remains largely unchanged in the full specification. As for the *MECHANIZATION* variable, although non-significant at conventional alpha levels (p=0.106 and p=0.190, respectively), it remains negatively associated with COIN success as predicted by Lyall and Wilson (2009).

Some scholars have suggested that state power is sometimes perceived as intrusive and generates opposition among the civilian population (Lange and Balian 2008). For instance, it may be the case that the positive effect of incumbent manpower on COIN outcomes is significantly reduced when the incumbent is perceived to be an occupying force. To explore this possibility, I include on the right hand side of Model 2 an interaction term of incumbent manpower and occupation (estimates not shown). Contrary to these expectations, it turns out to be positively rather than negatively signed as well as nonsignificant (p=0.68). Note also that in none of the models are linguistic diversity and regime type associated with COIN outcomes at a statistically significant level.

Figure 3.1 displays graphically the substantive impact of the most important predictors of counterinsurgency outcomes. The baseline predicted values are indicated

Figure 3.1. Substantive Impact of CDFs on COIN Outcomes



by a solid point and are computed by setting covariates to their means, medians, and modes.[4] Figure 3.1 shows that in the absence of CDFs the baseline probability of incumbent success equals 54.3 percent. When CDFs are deployed, the probability of success jumps to 82.8 percent, representing a 52.5 percent increase over the baseline value. The diagram also suggests that, when CDFs are deployed, there is a concomitant and even more dramatic decrease in the risk of draw (-56.9%) and COIN defeat

[4]Specifically, *INCUMBENT MANPOWER*=mean, *INCUMBENT ENERGY*=mean, *INSURGENT MANPOWER*=mean, *EXTERNAL SUPPORT*=0, *OCCUPATION*=0, *DIVERSITY*=mean, *DEMOCRACY*=0, *MECHANIZATION*=2, *CDFs*=0.

(-71.8%). The substantive effect of CDFs on COIN outcomes is roughly comparable to a shift from the 16th (-1SD) to the 84th (+1SD) percentile on *INCUMBENT MANPOWER*. Note, however, that CDFs are a much more easily manipulable variable than structural factors such as state power.

3.3 Alternative Model Specifications

Ordinal logistic regression makes the critical assumption that the slope coefficients are identical across all outcome categories. Referred to as the parallel regression assumption, the condition is frequently violated in practice (Long and Freese 2001). Table 3.4 replicates Models 2 and 6 using the binary logit estimator for both outcome categories—(1) WDL>0 (i.e. 0="Lose" and 1="Draw" or "Win"); and (2) WDL>1 (i.e. 0="Lose" or "Draw" and 1="Win"). While the effect sizes on *CDFs* do vary, a Wald test (Brant 1990) fails to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in coefficients (p=0.143 and p=0.652 in the Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) and Lyall and Wilson (2009) samples, respectively).

Nevertheless, because a likelihood ratio (LR) test of the entire model rejects the null hypothesis of no difference in the Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) sample (p=0.047), I re-estimate both models in a multinomial logit framework as well. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3.5 below. Note that in both models the baseline category is *WDL*=0 (i.e. "Lose"). Except for the Lyall and Wilson (2009) sample, in which CDFs are predictive of COIN victories but borderline so in the case of draws (p=0.026 and p=0.102), CDFs retain their statistical significance (p=0.011 and p=0.003) in a non-ordered framework as well.

Table 3.4. Brant Parallel Regression Assumption Test

	Kalyvas/Balcells		Lyall/Wilson	
	WDL > 0	WDL > 1	WDL > 0	WDL > 1
INCUMBENT MANPOWER	0.754*	0.340	0.631*	0.354
	(0.259)	(0.280)	(0.228)	(0.242)
INCUMBENT ENERGY	-0.530*	-0.309*	-0.104	0.0534
	(0.213)	(0.152)	(0.124)	(0.114)
INSURGENT MANPOWER	-0.816*	-0.696*	-0.385*	-0.121
	(0.190)	(0.226)	(0.157)	(0.143)
EXTERNAL SUPPORT	-0.832*	-1.139*	-0.800*	-0.819*
	(0.384)	(0.471)	(0.281)	(0.283)
OCCUPATION	-1.349*	-3.053*	-1.583*	-2.338*
	(0.723)	(0.668)	(0.658)	(0.679)
DIVERSITY	0.133	0.141	0.143	-0.213
	(0.378)	(0.625)	(0.352)	(0.304)
DEMOCRACY	-0.288	-0.216	-0.883*	-0.319
	(0.562)	(0.618)	(0.534)	(0.678)
MECHANIZATION	0.749*	0.561*	-0.274	-0.226
	(0.276)	(0.314)	(0.232)	(0.214)
CDFs	1.080*	2.338*	0.961*	1.243*
	(0.621)	(0.812)	(0.559)	(0.582)
Constant	-1.245	2.270	-1.261	1.033
	(1.531)	(1.711)	(1.645)	(1.923)
Observations	86	86	131	131

NOTE: standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$; two-tailed test.

3.4 Endogeneity and Selection Effects

Since civil wars are highly dynamic and consist of intertwined processes, the problem of endogeneity must be given due consideration. A claim could be made that CDF presence is itself partly endogenous to COIN outcomes if for instance CDFs were more likely to emerge in successful counterinsurgencies as people bandwagoned to support a victorious incumbent. If this were correct, the estimated effect of CDFs on COIN outcomes would be biased upward.

Table 3.5. Multinomial Logit Analysis

	Kalyvas/Balcells		Lyall/Wilson	
	WDL = 1	WDL = 2	WDL = 1	WDL = 2
INCUMBENT MANPOWER	-0.251	0.661*	0.042	0.664*
	(0.342)	(0.305)	(0.269)	(0.280)
INCUMBENT ENERGY	0.083	-0.531*	0.137	-0.040
	(0.254)	(0.213)	(0.128)	(0.145)
INSURGENT MANPOWER	-0.025	-0.960*	0.107	-0.343*
	(0.277)	(0.255)	(0.156)	(0.170)
EXTERNAL SUPPORT	-0.956*	-1.319*	-0.549*	-1.104*
	(0.455)	(0.537)	(0.305)	(0.356)
OCCUPATION	-17.84*	-2.914*	-2.230*	-2.584*
	(1.238)	(0.704)	(0.807)	(0.769)
DIVERSITY	0.141	0.207	0.334	-0.050
	(0.270)	(0.626)	(0.321)	(0.383)
DEMOCRACY	0.755	-0.158	0.242	-0.793
	(1.016)	(0.631)	(0.872)	(0.635)
MECHANIZATION	0.049	0.828*	-0.103	-0.319
	(0.455)	(0.323)	(0.273)	(0.252)
CDFs	2.381*	2.585*	0.970	1.597*
	(0.938)	(0.885)	(0.593)	(0.717)
Constant	1.556	0.746	0.519	-0.193
	(2.377)	(1.794)	(2.138)	(2.068)
Observations	86	86	131	131

NOTE: WDL = 0 (i.e. "Lose") is the base category in all models; standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$; two-tailed test.

However, there are at least three reasons to reject this possibility. First, on theoretical grounds alone, it is equally plausible that winning incumbents have less need for CDF services. After all, why should an incumbent introduce CDFs and thereby risk also introducing any of the problems potentially associated with them if the insurgent is about to be defeated anyway? Theoretically, it also seems more plausible to suppose that civilians care about the local power distribution more so than macro-level outcomes. In that case, COIN success might extend the geographical distribution of CDF personnel but not trigger the establishment of CDFs in the first

place. Third, if the endogeneity hypothesis were correct, we would also expect to observe CDFs emerge when incumbent victory is most certain — i.e. at the close of an unsuccessful insurgency or during periods of insurgent weakness. Yet, a review of individual case histories as well as a preliminary quantitative analysis (see below) suggest precisely the opposite — CDFs often emerge closer to war starts or only after current COIN strategies have proven ineffective (and hence when it is not at all clear to civilian observers which belligerent party is going to be victorious).

Contrary to what one would expect if the emergence of CDFs were truly endogenous to COIN success, available evidence suggests that CDFs are *less* (not more) likely to emerge at the close of an insurgency. I was able to record information on the timing of CDF deployment in 16 of the 33 observations in which these units were deployed. In those 16 cases, the median duration of insurgency equals 88 months, while the mean time of introduction of CDFs is 48 months. Figure 3.2 displays the timing of CDF introduction for each of the 16 cases. In it, the overall bar length indicates a given insurgency's duration, with the darker gray portion representing the time during which CDFs were deployed. Figure 3.2 shows that only in one case (Indonesia v. Darul Islam (1956)) were CDFs deployed in the concluding period. Once again, the data indicate that CDFs are more likely to be established precisely when conditions are less favorable to incumbent victory.

For instance, the Turkish Village Guards were created in 1985, only two years after the start of the 16-year long PKK insurgency. Similarly, El Salvador's first Civil Defense units were formed in 1981, only two years after the start of FMLN's 13 year-long rebellion, while Guatemala's Civil Patrols were created 15 years prior to the end of the Guatemalan Civil War in 1996. Moreover, the ranks of the Turkish Village Guards swelled during the 1990s, precisely when the insurgency was at its apex, and the same could be said of the Peruvian *rondas campesinas*, which the Fujimori

Figure 3.2. The Timing of CDF Deployment



administration deployed in the early 1990s only after conventional COIN strategies had failed to stem the tide of the Sendero insurgency.

Table 3.6. CDFs and Selection Effects

	CDFs		
	Absent	Present	Overall
DURATION (months)	59	141	88
BATTLE DEATHS†	8,600	30,000	12,980
INSURGENT MANPOWER	7,500	12,500	10,000

NOTE: reported statistic is median value.

† Source: Lacina and Gleditsch (2005).

A possibility of omitted variable bias also exists if the incumbent decision to deploy CDFs is endogenous to some latent variable correlated with COIN outcomes (e.g., popular support). For example, if CDFs tended to be established in those insurgencies in which the incumbent enjoyed greater popular support — a concept that

cannot be captured entirely using proxy measures such as regime type and occupation status — this would certainly bias coefficient estimates upward. However, available evidence suggests that, if selection effects are present, in aggregate they are likely to make rejecting the null hypothesis *more*, not less, difficult. Table 3.6 shows that the median duration and casualty count in insurgencies in which CDFs have been deployed equal 141 months and 30,000 battle deaths as opposed to 59 months and 8,600 battle deaths for the remaining subsample, respectively. These data indicate that the incumbents more likely to deploy CDFs are precisely those that face more intractable insurgencies. To the extent that insurgency difficulty remains unobserved, such a tendency would imply that coefficient estimates of the effect of CDFs may actually be biased downward.

The notion that CDFs are more likely to be deployed against relatively intractable insurgencies has several implications testable in a multivariate framework using the available crossnational data. First, if the statement is indeed correct, measures indicative of conflict severity ought to predict the crossnational occurrence of CDFs. In order to test this proposition, I conduct a logistic regression analysis of CDF presence across the 86 insurgencies comprising the Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) data set. On the right-hand side of the equation, I include measures of conflict severity such as rebel manpower per 100,000 population (*INSURGENT MANPOWER*, logged), external support for the insurgent movement (*EXTERNAL SUPPORT*), total number of combatant deaths (*BATTLE DEATHS*, logged) (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005), as well as conflict duration (*DURATION*, logged). In addition, I control for a number of potentially confounding variables such as *INCUMBENT MANPOWER*, (*INCUMBENT ENERGY*), *OCCUPATION*, (*DIVERSITY*), and *REGIME TYPE* (Polity2 indicator derived from Jaggers and Gurr (1995)), which may be associated with both the dependent as well as the explanatory variables.

Table 3.7. CDF Selection Effects: A Multivariate Analysis

	Logit	Cox	Competing-Risks	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3 Failure = Win	Model 4 Failure = Lose
INCUMBENT MANPOWER†‡	0.139 (0.259)	0.122 (0.112)	0.355* (0.149)	-0.0530 (0.178)
INCUMBENT ENERGY†‡	0.417* (0.185)	0.0205 (0.0862)	-0.327* (0.137)	0.196* (0.112)
INSURGENT MANPOWER†‡	0.397* (0.229)	0.0987 (0.104)	-0.496* (0.186)	0.283* (0.130)
EXTERNAL SUPPORT	-0.402 (0.421)	-0.279* (0.169)	-0.724* (0.294)	0.660* (0.317)
OCCUPATION	-1.749* (0.601)	-0.140 (0.341)	-0.898 (0.570)	0.827* (0.466)
DIVERSITY‡	-0.510 (0.423)	-0.265 (0.222)	-0.353 (0.345)	-0.0773 (0.269)
DEMOCRACY	1.163* (0.672)	-0.129 (0.309)	-0.312 (0.464)	0.502 (0.364)
MECHANIZATION	-0.132 (0.287)	0.132 (0.122)	0.570* (0.205)	-0.309 (0.206)
BATTLE DEATHS‡	0.271 (0.251)	-0.207* (0.0797)	-0.237* (0.126)	0.251 (0.153)
DURATION‡	0.930* (0.329)			
CDFs		-0.646* (0.271)	0.518 (0.395)	-1.866* (0.542)
Constant	-9.283* (3.080)			
Observations	86	86	86	86

NOTE: standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$; one-tailed test.
† per 100,000 population; ‡ natural log of.
All models are run on the Kalyvas and Balcells (2010)-based data set.

In addition, if CDFs really do tend to emerge in the relatively more difficult cases, a multivariate survival analysis should reveal the association of CDF presence with longer COIN campaigns. In order to test this proposition, I conduct a Cox proportional hazards analysis of COIN campaign duration (in months), with CDF adoption (*CDFs*) as the chief explanatory variable. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 3.7. Model 1 employs logistic regression analysis to test the notion that CDF

adoption is more likely to take place in the more difficult cases of counterinsurgency. Consistent with this expectation, I find that CDFs are significantly more likely to be deployed in longer lasting COIN campaigns (p=0.002) and when the incumbent is facing a more populous insurgent movement (p=0.042). CDFs also seem to be more likely to appear in more intense conflicts, although this association does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p=0.140). In Model 2, I run a Cox proportional hazards regression to test the idea that CDFs tend to be deployed against more intractable and therefore longer-lasting insurgencies. In accordance with this hypothesis, the results of the analysis reveal that COIN campaigns with CDFs in general tend to be associated with protracted insurgencies (p=0.009).[5]

However, a possible alternative explanation might be that CDFs actually hurt COIN campaigns, causing them to last longer on average. Since COIN campaigns can "fail" (i.e. end) in three mutually exclusive ways (victory, draw, or defeat), this possibility can be evaluated within a competing risk framework of hazard analysis. Assuming CDFs are advantageous to incumbents as my theory claims, the theoretical expectation would be that CDF adoption in victorious COIN campaigns should hasten the end of insurgency, as the help of civilian auxiliaries allows states to defeat insurgents more quickly than they would otherwise. Conversely, CDF deployment in losing COIN campaigns ought to prolong them, as it takes rebels longer to depose incumbents when they are buttressed with civilian auxiliaries. If, however, CDFs were disadvantageous to COIN, our prediction would be exactly the opposite — losing incumbents would lose more quickly, whereas successful ones would take longer to triumph. Models 3 and 4 of Table 3.7 present the results of these empirical analyses.[6] Consistent with the theory that CDFs help states defeat insurgents, the analysis reported in Model 3 suggests that CDF adoption by successful incumbents tends to

[5]While the *INCUMBENT MANPOWER* variable fails the test of non-proportional hazards using Schoenfeld residuals, none of the remaining covariates exhibit non-proportionality.

[6]Note that coefficient estimates are reported here rather than hazard ratios.

be associated with shorter rather than longer COIN campaigns. Even though the effect is admittedly non-significant (p=0.095), this may be attributable to the aforementioned selection effects biasing the coefficient estimate downward. Moreover, the results reported in Model 4 provide further evidence in favor of the notion that CDFs are beneficial rather than harmful to a COIN effort, since the findings strongly suggest that losing incumbents who deploy a civilian auxiliary force tend to last longer before eventually suffering defeat (p=0.001). Overall, the results of these supplementary analyses lend support to the argument that CDFs are preferentially selected for deployment in more difficult cases of insurgency, while also yielding additional evidence for their beneficial effect.

Furthermore, individual case histories illustrate the idea that CDFs are often adopted as an option of last resort after all other COIN instruments have failed. For instance, in an attempt to suppress the partisan threat following German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, German authorities initially resorted to large-scale sweep operations and terrorization of the Jewish and Slavic populations (Lieb 2010, 76–7). However, since the partisans knew the local geography very well and were very mobile, they were often able to break out of German encirclements. Despite significant losses and contrary to Hitler's objectives, the partisans survived the winter of 1941 and continued to threaten the vulnerable German hinterland. From 1942 onward, the Nazis employed a variety of additional COIN policies, including small-scale mobile hunting detachments known as *Jagdkommandos*, ethnic German Selbstschutz militias, as well as the depopulation of large swathes of territory (Lieb 2010, 80; Lower 2005, 173; Beckett 2001, 63). Only after all of these methods failed to suppress the partisan threat did the Germans resort to arming the indigenous civilian population in a CDF program known as the *Wehrdörfer* project — arguably one of the few Nazi COIN policies that can conceivably be regarded as effective (Nolte 2005, 266; Gerlach 2010, 190). However, "[b]y the time the [CDF] project gained full pace in spring 1944, [...]

it was already too late," as the tide of war on the front lines had already turned around and the Soviet counteroffensive rapidly recovered territory lost in 1941 (Lieb 2010, 82).

Likewise, Peruvian government's embrace of CDFs in the 1990s appears to have resulted from a similar dynamic to the one described above in the case of Nazi Germany. In an effort to root out the incipient Sendero Luminoso threat during the early 1980s, the administration of President Fernando Belaúnde relied mostly on special counterterrorism police units (the *sinchis*). The *sinchis* were not only ineffective but brutal as well, resulting in a spate of disappearances and extrajudicial killings (García 2005, 42). Having realized that the insurgency is not merely a law enforcement problem, Peruvian authorities under President Alan Garcia dispatched the country's conventional military forces, declared emergency in the affected highlands, and suspended political and civil liberties. Being foreign to the region, regular military recruits proved unable to distinguish between ordinary Andean peasants and actual guerrilla subversives. The resultant indiscriminate killings and military repression continued until the election of President Alberto Fujimori in 1990 and "his administration's commitment to [CDFs] and an intelligence-focused strategy that ultimately led to the capture of [rebel leader] Guzmán and the disintegration of Sendero" (Paul, Clarke and Grill 2010, 14). "After 11 years of failure to combat Sendero Luminoso [...] by conventional means, the [Peruvian] government [embraced] the [CDFs] as 'the axis of [its] military strategy in the Ayacucho area'" (Bowen 1991, 7).

Although the Nazi German and Peruvian COIN campaigns were pursued by different regime types under different circumstances (interstate versus civil war), their comparison reveals a remarkably similar dynamic of CDF adoption. Namely, in both instances the incumbent decided to implement CDF-type programs only after more conventional COIN instruments had failed to produce desired results. To the extent that these cases are representative of COIN decision making in general, it is pos-

sible CDFs are more likely to be deployed in relatively intractable insurgencies, in which case the statistical findings reported above would be understating rather than inflating the impact of CDFs on COIN outcomes.

3.5 Maximizing CDF Effectiveness

Statistical analyses presented in this chapter indicate that CDFs are useful as a tool of COIN. While this may be true in general, historically, there have been many instances of incumbent defeat despite CDF deployment. For example, the United States was defeated in the Vietnam War despite its deployment of the Popular Forces and Combined Action Platoons in 1965. Similarly, Afghan mujahideen insurgents managed to drive out the Soviet Union and to eventually overthrow the Afghan government despite Soviet sponsorship of tribal-based *Operatifi*. In addition, some incarnations of CDFs have been perceived as relatively ineffective despite favorable COIN outcomes. As an example, the Philippine Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) is regarded as having been largely ineffective and corrupt despite government success in denying the secessionist Moros anything more than autonomy within an already decentralized state (O'Neill 1990, 130).

These and other such accounts may be indicative of an underlying variability in CDF effectiveness, thus raising important questions about why some CDFs would be more successful than others and what governments could possibly do to maximize their performance? While a theoretically and empirically rigorous examination of such questions is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the literature does outline some potential answers that can nevertheless serve to motivate and inform future systematic inquiry. In the remainder of this section, I identify and elaborate four factors which can conceivably influence the effectiveness of CDFs: (1) the ability of CDF personnel to defend themselves; (2) the ability of the counterinsurgent to

defend its auxiliaries from concerted insurgent attack; (3) the selectivity of rebel violence directed at CDFs; and (4) the prevalence of criminal behavior among CDF members.

First, we may intuitively suppose that the effectiveness of any fighting force is most directly dependent on its defensive and offensive capabilities. Thus, given their defensive character, CDFs' ability to defend themselves may be one of the most important determinants of their effectiveness. CDFs' defensive capabilities are in turn strongly affected by the quality and quantity of military equipment as well as by the amount of professional combat training provided to them by the state. As mentioned earlier, auxiliary forces of this kind are by definition tend to be deficient on all these dimensions. Thus, while the French in Algeria issued outdated weapons to its loyalist Harkis, the Peruvian government armed its rondas with shotguns at best and antiquated Mauser rifles at worst (Heggoy 1972, 205; Fumerton 2002, 17–8). Thanks to their low requirements with respect to training and equipment, the cost of fielding and maintaining CDFs is kept to a minimum. For instance, a CAFGU recruit cost the Philippine government six times less than a regular army soldier (Global IDP Database 2001, 15). Indeed, this affordability is a major reason why these forces are an appealing alternative to conventional military expansion in the first place. However, underarming one's CDF servicemen also impacts their performance in combat as one might intuitively expect. Speaking of French-sponsored Vietnamese CDFs in Indochina, McCuen (1966, 110–1) points out that "the French could not keep the militia effective," since "[t]he villagers' lack of training and equipment made them no match for the tough, battle-hardened guerrillas." It would appear then that when contemplating creation of CDFs incumbents must carefully weigh the tradeoffs between affordability and military effectiveness.

Having said that, states' frugality rarely constitutes a major constraint on CDFs' military capability. Rather, their ability to defend themselves is more often com-

promised by incumbents' decision to reduce the quality and quantity of armaments as a way of dealing with the inherent risk of CDF defection to the rebel side. For instance, in establishing their CDFs known as *Corpo Militar de Segunda Linha* (Second Line Forces) during the Angolan War of Independence, the Portuguese actually armed only about 1 in 10 native recruits. Furthermore, official documents "leave no doubt that the Portuguese had little intention of properly arming the African militia because they feared the Africans might defect to 'the enemy' with the weapons" (Bender 1978, 161). Even though it does not really improve the trustworthiness of auxiliaries as agents of the state, issuing fewer weapons of lower destructive capacity does render any potential act of defection less beneficial to insurgents and therefore less damaging to a COIN campaign. Thus, CDFs' military capacity appears to be constrained more by counterinsurgent effort to control rebel weapons supply than it by any desire to save money.

Although the aforementioned tradeoff cannot be entirely eliminated, incumbents may still be able to reduce its deleterious effect on CDF combat readiness by better managing the risk of weapons falling into rebel hands. Instead of reducing the negative impact of any potential defection by issuing small quantities of obsolete weapons, counterinsurgents may focus their effort on trying to minimize the willingness of CDF personnel to defect in the first place. In this regard, the literature points to screening and monitoring as the relevant instruments. Incumbents often try to control the type of recruits admitted into CDF service so as to prevent infiltration by insurgent sympathizers and activists. The screening process in a given locality may be more successful if the authorities can rely on the local knowledge of residents with an established record of loyalty such as army reservists or members of incumbent's political party. Moreover, reservists and fellow party members are good candidates for the leadership of a local CDF unit. By effectively controlling the trustworthiness of CDF members using such screening methods, an incumbent can hope to ameliorate the

risk of defection. In addition, the monitoring of CDFs' activities allows incumbents to identify and punish suspect personnel — however imperfectly — and in doing so helps deter further insubordination. Toward this end, states have employed a variety of mechanisms such as daily reporting procedures, detailed accounting of munitions spent in combat, and the planting of informants.

Second, however well its personnel may be armed, CDFs are never completely invulnerable to insurgent reprisal. Since superior guerrilla mobility permits them to overwhelm counterinsurgent's defenses at any single point of attack despite their general military inferiority, incumbents should be able to provide adequate protection should the need arise. Toward this end, states have worked on developing a rapid response capability consisting of highly mobile relief teams ready to be fielded at a moment's notice. Poor transportation infrastructure typical of most conflict scenarios and the threat of ambush represent major drawbacks of relief by ground. Provided the incumbent possesses capable aircraft in sufficient numbers, relief by air circumvents infrastructural limitations and reduces the threat of ambush or land mines. Nonetheless, if given access to affordable anti-aircraft weaponry, insurgents can and will challenge an incumbent's air superiority (Joes 2004, 239). For instance, following CIA's covert sale of portable heat-seeking ground-to-air Stinger missiles to Afghan Mujahideen in 1986, the latter were able to effectively endanger Soviet helicopters and thereby jeopardize Soviet relief sorties.

When a country's communication and transportation infrastructure are so underdeveloped as to render rapid counterinsurgent response impossible or prohibitively expensive, a viable alternative is to supplement CDFs with a program of population resettlement. The resettlement of civilians from remote areas into a number of predetermined defensible locations ought to make a self-defense program more viable by improving the incumbent's ability to provide rapid relief and resupply of CDF units. For example, during the Angolan War of Independence, the Portuguese reset-

tled some 20 percent of the native population into *dendandas* (strategic settlements), which complemented their CDF program (Beckett 2001, 137). Similarly, under the Briggs Plan the British deployed its home guard units during the Malayan Emergency to defend some 500,000 Chinese squatters that had been relocated to "New Villages" (Ooi 2004, 250; French 2012, 120).

A third potentially important determinant of CDF effectiveness is the selectivity with which insurgents attempt to punish civilian collaboration with the government. Recall that CDFs' usefulness in COIN stems in part from their ability to drive a wedge between rebels and the non-combatant population. One of the ways in CDFs can do this is by provoking brutal and indiscriminate insurgent reprisals, which serve to motivate civilians to seek protection from the state as well as provide valuable material in general anti-rebel propaganda to domestic and foreign audiences. The assumption that insurgent attacks actually conform to these expectations may not hold equally well across different cases of CDF deployment. If so, we may reasonably suppose that CDFs deployed to combat particularly gruesome and indiscriminate rebel movements should prove more effective in encouraging civilians to rise in self-defense and therefore in eroding insurgents' popular support. This proposition is borne out by cases of insurgency such as Sendero Luminoso in Peru, where government-supported rondas campesinas were pitted against Maoist insurgents, who demonstrated monstrous brutality and lack of discrimination when engaging the CDFs (Degregori 1998, 73). The scale of Sendero violence served to drive peasants to create their own CDF units in order to protect themselves and in doing so arguably helped the state eventually defeat the insurgency.

Finally, the prevalence of criminal behavior among CDF personnel may also affect their perceived usefulness in COIN. Historically, CDFs have been implicated in various illicit activities such as extortion, drugs trafficking, homicide, and the settling of private scores. Such actions serve to focus the public's attention on a government's

wrongdoings rather than those of the opposing rebel movement. In democratic polities, public backlash may lead to a withholding of funds required to finance a CDF program or its necessary expansions. More importantly, unless the government is able to put a stop to it, criminal behavior among CDFs may motivate affected non-combatants to seek protection from the insurgent movement, thereby undermining a major rationale behind their deployment—to help disentangle rebels and civilians. As a result, the effectiveness of CDFs may be "partly contingent on whether they constitute a disciplined force perceived to be a servant of the people [...] or are instead ill-disciplined units guilty of excesses against the people" (O'Neill 1990, 130–1).

Unlawful conduct amongst CDFs may again be dampened through more a careful selection of recruits, better monitoring, and consistent penalties. Opinions diverge somewhat on the question of whether CDF personnel should be volunteers or salaried servicemen. On the one hand, the extension of salaries to CDFs may serve to attract low-commitment, opportunistic recruits who are primarily interested in enhancing their personal welfare (Weinstein 2007). Having a greater proportion of rank-and-file individuals with propensities toward crime would then render a CDF more prone to illicit activities of the abovementioned kind. On the other hand, however, an argument could be made that unpaid servicemen should be more likely to engage in illegal conduct, as they try to secure for themselves some kind of compensation for their services using whatever means necessary.

However, while thorough criminal background checks should certainly be a standard part of the recruitment process, there may be some tradeoff between loyalty and lawfulness in that local CDF leaders may expect to receive license to settle private scores or pursue local power as they please in return for their allegiance to the state. Indeed, such tacit bargains between national and local powerholders are often said to be one of the main mechanisms which enable the deployment of auxiliaries in the first place — whether paid or unpaid. Thus, despite receiving a salary, the Kikuyu

home guards in Kenya were thought to have engaged in private score settling with the tacit approval of their British sponsors as an added incentive to resist the Mau Mau insurgents (Elkins 2005, 72). Or, as researchers of the Global IDP Project have noted of the Philippine CAFGUs, "what actually entices people to join [the CDF] is not the salary but the license to carry firearms and the sense of power that brings it [*sic*]" (Global IDP Database 2001, 15).

3.6 Concluding Remarks

The first crossnational test of CDF effectiveness reported in this chapter has yielded several notable findings and implications. First, consistent with theoretical expectations from Chapter 2, the establishment of civilian self-defense auxiliaries is indeed correlated with COIN outcomes favorable to the incumbent. Furthermore, theory, robustness checks, and analyses of insurgencies in which CDFs have been deployed all suggest that the finding is likely not driven by endogeneity, sample issues, or selection effects. On the contrary, the data seem to indicate that civilian auxiliaries tend to emerge in relatively intractable cases of insurgency — i.e., precisely those conflicts less likely to end in government victory — making the association of CDFs and COIN success that much more significant.

In addition, the data also cast some doubt on a recent finding linking military mechanization to poorer COIN outcomes (Lyall and Wilson 2009). Specifically, in the Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) data set, force mechanization appears to be positively (rather than negatively) associated with COIN outcomes favorable to the incumbent. Moreover, once a few issues in Lyall and Wilson's (2009) coding of the COIN outcome variable are addressed, the correlation with COIN defeat disappears in the authors' own data set as well. The link between mechanization and COIN success may indicate a variety of alternative underlying mechanisms. Thus, it may be the case that

mechanization is associated with mobility-enhancing equipment or advanced surveillance technologies which facilitate the acquisition of tactical intelligence. It may also be the case that regular troops are not particularly good at intelligence gathering in the first place. As a result, increasing the number of mechanized vehicles at their disposal might boost their capacity to provide local security without substantially hampering their intelligence gathering potential. In addition, the fact that mechanization and COIN success exhibit no relationship in the original data set of Lyall and Wilson (2009) is further evidence that distinguishing symmetric from asymmetric non-conventional conflicts is both theoretically and empirically relevant.

Finally, this chapter has offered some theoretical speculation attempting to account for the variability in CDF effectiveness across different cases of their deployment. This discussion provides a segue into the following chapter, which takes on the related question of why CDFs are used in some cases of insurgency but not others. Building on the notion that CDF effectiveness is variable, Chapter 4 explores the idea that CDFs may be formed only when incumbents can be reasonably certain that their auxiliaries will perform according to expectations as well as posits some conditions as to when this is more or less likely to be the case.

Part II

Tribal Groups and Civilian Defense Forces

Chapter 4

Intertribal Rivalry and CDF Formation

Consistent with theoretical expectations, results of the empirical analyses reported in Chapter 3 provide evidence that CDFs do indeed assist counterinsurgents in suppressing rebellions. In light of these findings, an important puzzle arises — why do all incumbents not resort to this tool of counterinsurgency if it is so helpful? In order to account for this apparent puzzle, in this chapter I frame the process of CDF formation in terms of a delegation problem wherein the state represents the principal while civilians constitute its agents. With this framework in mind, I go on to develop a formal model of government-village interactions which ultimately may or may not result in the delegation of CDF duty. Comparative statics analysis of the model yields predictions with respect to both crossnational as well as subnational variation in CDF deployment. Most importantly, it predict that CDFs ought to be deployed most frequently in areas characterized by a high prevalence of civilian rivalries.

4.1 CDF Formation as a Delegation Problem

In order to answer the question of why only some incumbents resort to CDFs, I start by considering a most straightforward possibility — namely, that CDFs can in principle hurt COIN just as much as they can facilitate it. If so, we may get to observe fewer instances of counterproductive CDFs if governments are able to anticipate their performance with some accuracy and choose not to form them in the first place. Medical treatment of a disease might provide a useful everyday analogy. If physicians are able to recognize patients in whom the treatment is contraindicated, its administration to those in whom it is not should produce consistently positive effects — assuming, of course, that the treatment is effective in the first place.

In theory, it is not difficult to conceive of ways in which CDF effectiveness may be undermined. When CDF personnel have ample reason to shirk on assigned duties or defect to the insurgent side, we may reasonably suppose that CDF deployment in such cases may prove to be at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive. Historically, anecdotal evidence suggests that CDFs may have ample reason to want to shirk in their duties or consort with the enemy (e.g. see McCuen 1966, 228; Copson 1994, 97). Since CDFs tend to have only rudimentary training and may be poorly armed, personnel may shirk to avoid armed confrontation with rebels in which they have no chance of winning. Furthermore, since civilian compliance is an important determinant of political outcomes in civil wars, insurgents want to punish harshly anyone who cooperates with the state. As a result, thanks to their visibility, CDFs are often subjected to brutal insurgent reprisals in which entire families are executed in order to deter further collaboration with the incumbent. Because the state is likely to harshly punish overt non-compliance as well, CDFs may have strong incentives to covertly defect to the rebel side while maintaining the pretense of compliance with assigned duties. At the same time, incumbents may find it difficult to detect such

defections in a timely manner due to CDFs' geographical remoteness and relative autonomy from central authorities.

Unsurprisingly, then, instances of CDF shirking, collaboration with insurgents, and outright defection are not hard to find. Thus, the U.S.-backed Self-Defense Corps in Vietnam often proved no match for the insurgent Viet Cong (VC) forces due to being lightly armed and poorly trained. In consequence, these units were less effective as well as counterproductive to COIN because the VC were often able to capture their weapons (e.g. see Nagl 2002, 121; Edwards 2001, 226–7). Further, allegations of covert CDF collaboration with the enemy have been reported during the leftist insurgency in Guatemala, whose ruling military junta estimated that up to 20 percent of its Civilian Defense Patrols may have been covert collaborators (Americas Watch 1986, 48). Even more strikingly, the Kurdish al-Fursan Forces of Iraq (derogatorily also known as the Jash) defected en masse once Saddam's external military escapades in Iran and Kuwait had left him in a vulnerable position. Though ultimately unsuccessful, the al-Fursan thus sided with insurgent *peshmerga* openly and fought for an independent Kurdistan on two separate occasions (Mackey 2003, 232).

As these examples illustrate, CDFs appear to be semi-autonomous actors with preferences that may or may not be in line with the incumbent's. This suggests that the latter's decision of whether to deploy them is perhaps best understood as a principal-agent (PA) problem. Viewed from a PA perspective, states as principals may be rightfully wary of handing out weapons to civilians, and unless the risks can be sufficiently attenuated, CDFs may never get to be deployed. In the PA literature, principals can resort to an array of control mechanisms to ensure agent compliance such as screening, monitoring, and incentivization by way of rewards and/or punishments (Miller 1992, Bendor, Glazer and Hammond 2001). In the case of delegation to CDFs, incumbents typically resort to monitoring and incentivization (McCuen 1966,

108). Imperfect monitoring is achieved by issuing specially designed weapons and meticulous accounting of the expenditure of ammunition, while incentivization often takes the form of salaries, impunity in local affairs, as well as violent coercion. Furthermore, given a greater risk of defection is anticipated, counterinsurgents may also ameliorate the threat by reducing the quantity and quality (i.e. destructive power) of the weapons issued to CDF personnel (Corum 2006, 13; Americas Watch 1986, 22–8; Fumerton 2002, 16–8). However, by doing so, states trade off the threat of defection for ineffectiveness, since less numerous and less well armed CDF personnel are less capable of assisting a COIN effort (McCuen 1966, 110–1).

Once the puzzle above is considered within a PA framework, explaining cross-national variation in the emergence of CDFs amounts to accounting for why some counterinsurgents fear defection from their auxiliaries less so than others. Building on existing scholarship that explores the ability of civilian actors to exploit a typical civil war environment for the purpose of furthering some local agenda (Kalyvas 2006, 385; Kreuzer 2005, ii–iii), I propose that CDF compliance can be incentivized more easily in those cases of counterinsurgency in which civilians find alliance with the state to be particularly useful to furthering their local agendas. More specifically, I argue that government leverage vis-a-vis a prospective auxiliary force is greater when rebel-contested areas are fraught with intense pre-existing civilian rivalries concerning local issues unrelated to the overarching conflict. In such cases, affiliation with the state can provide civilian groups with invaluable resources such as financial support, weapons, and legal approval. These groups can then leverage the government-provided resources in their private struggles for local power and prestige. In such circumstances, compliance with CDF duties may be elicited more easily, because a withdrawal of these perks in response to allegations of defection would leave the ostracized civilians at a substantial disadvantage relative to their local rivals.

By positing a link between a civilian attribute and the effectiveness of counterinsurgent efforts to ensure civilian compliance with assigned CDF tasks, the model developed in the rest of this chapter helps explain the puzzle of why we observe CDF emergence in some cases of COIN but not others. In addition to providing an explanation of crossnational CDF deployment, the model makes predictions with respect to their subnational deployment as well. Specifically, given a case in which the counterinsurgent does decide to set up CDFs, we should observe a greater number of personnel being deployed to areas of the country plagued by intense civilian rivalries. While a theory built on difficult-to-observe civilian rivalries does present some difficulties as far as empirical testing is concerned, the subsequent section identifies an observable proxy measure and justifies its use in testing the model's predictions.

4.2 Formal Model

4.2.1 Players and Moves

The model has the following players: an incumbent government (G), a village (V) located in an area of the country disputed by an insurgent movement, and a local village rival (V_R). At the outset of the game, the government makes two distinct decisions with respect to CDFs. It first chooses whether to create them (CDF) or not ($\sim$CDF). Then, having decided to create them, the government chooses the number of CDF personnel (n) village V should receive. For the sake of simplicity, its potential rival V_R is located outside of the contested territory and is therefore not considered for CDF deployment. Note that this is not a critical assumption inasmuch as a model in which both villages are subject to CDF deployment would exhibit the same key dynamics. In an equilibrium in which neither village defects, the government supports both villages, and as a result neither side is propped up in their private bargaining game. By defecting, a village risks losing government support and thereby giving the

opposing side a relative advantage in the private dispute. The addition of the private dispute thus renders the villages more trustworthy agents of the state.

In this model, the village may be rivalrous or non-rivalrous. Before the government can decide how many CDFs V should receive, nature (N_1) determines with probability p_1 whether the village is rivalrous (R). Conceptually, a village is considered rivalrous when it is engaged in a dispute with V_R concerning some local good or policy that has not been settled by invocation of commonly accepted law. Instead, the disputants attempt to reach an outcome by bargaining in which the threat of violent outside options exists. Formally, a rivalry is modeled as V engaging V_R in a bargaining game over some good X unrelated to the overarching conflict, where any division of it $x \in [0, 1]$.

The village may also have variable preferences with respect to the overarching state-vs.-insurgent conflict. Nature (N_2) determines V's bias (b), drawing randomly from a uniform distribution ($b \sim \text{unif}[0, 1]$). When N_2 draws a high value for b, the village receives a greater payoff from alignment with insurgents. Assuming the government does not choose to forego CDF deployment at its first move, the magnitude of village bias will impact V's performance of CDF duties. The government subsequently chooses CDF unit size for the village after N_1 determines whether it is rivalrous or not and before N_2 decides the magnitude of its bias.

As a result, G has perfect information as to whether V is rivalrous or not. The assumption of perfect information is justified, since in the real world private disputes often end in violence. In the case of tribal populations, such rivalries sometimes degenerate into longstanding blood feuds that are quite easily observable even to outsiders. Thus, for instance, the Turkish intelligence report *Asiretler Raporu* provides a detailed report of all Kurdish tribes in the country's southeast and in doing so characterizes their inter-tribal relations (Anonymous 1998). In contrast to its knowledge of salient rural rivalries, civilian loyalties remain partly hidden. Thus, I assume the in-

cumbent knows only the overall distribution of village biases but not their individual values.

After V's bias, rivalry, and CDF unit size have been determined, it selects how to implement the mandate entrusted to it by the incumbent. Specifically, it may choose to defect to the rebel side (D) or not (∼D). If it defects, it does so covertly, and the government observes (O) this with probability p_2. Whereas for the non-rivalrous villages the game ends at this point, their rivalrous counterparts bargain with V_R over good X. For the sake of parsimony, the bargaining process is modeled as an ultimatum game in which V proposes x and V_R chooses to accept (A) or reject (R). Figure 4.1 represents the game graphically.

4.2.2 Payoffs

In the event that the government chooses not to establish an auxiliary force, all players receive a status quo (SQ) payoff. Reflecting the potential risks of arming civilians with inscrutable loyalties, the decision to arm an n number of CDF personnel may potentially backfire should the village subsequently choose to defect without being detected. Should the village defect and the government fail to observe this, the government's negative payoff increases exponentially with CDF unit size and equals $-n^2$. When used to fulfill CDF duty, state-supplied resources are used mainly for defensive purposes. In contrast, when these resources fall into insurgent hands, they are more likely to be used for offensive purposes. The negative payoff in the event of undetected defection is conceived of as exponentially increasing, because with greater resources far more ambitious offensive tasks become feasible. If a village defection is observed, however, the government recalls the village's CDF unit and receives the status quo payoff.

However, if V elects to fulfill its duties as promised, the incumbent receives a reward equal to nR_v. These payoffs suggest that the incumbent can make the risk of

Figure 4.1. A Formal Model of CDF Formation



defection less threatening by reducing the number of CDF personnel armed. However, in doing so the government also reduces CDFs' ability to assist its COIN effort should the village choose not to defect. Note also that, given village rivalry with V_R, the government's utilities remain unaffected regardless of the outcome of their bargaining subgame. This reflects the notion that these private disputes are unrelated to the overarching conflict in the sense that the government's preferences are neutral with respect to any particular division of the good X.

As far as village preferences are concerned, a non-rivalrous village which opts not to defect receives a government reward R_g minus some cost of fighting the rebels

c_r. If it should choose to defect instead and remain undetected, the village receives some reward from the rebels (R_r), whose value is made dependent on the intensity of its bias b_i, in addition to the government's reward R_g. Because of its defection to the insurgents, the village does not suffer the cost of fighting them c_r. Should the government observe a defection, however, the village no longer receives government reward R_g and instead suffers a cost c_g for having antagonized the state.

Village payoffs in the case of rivalry with V_R are analogous to the payoffs without it. As mentioned earlier, the only difference is that a rivalrous V_i receives additional utility from bargaining with V_R. If V_R rejects an offer, the outcome is determined probabilistically such that V_i obtains the whole of the disputed good with probability p_3 and nothing with probability $1 - p_3$ while both villages suffer some cost c_v. Importantly, a village's prior interaction with the government may affect its subsequent bargaining with V_R. Specifically, should it decide not to defect or do so without raising any suspicions, its chances of winning all of X in the case of V_R's rejection will increase from p_3 to $p_3 + \pi$, where $\pi \in (0, 1]$. This reflects the notion that an alliance of local civilian actors with a central government may affect local politics in powerful ways. Should a village choose to defect on the government prior to bargaining with V_R and is caught in the act, its CDF privileges are suspended and therefore its probability of winning the entire good remains unchanged.

4.3 Formal Model Analysis

In this section, I solve for the model's subgame perfect equilibrium and derive comparative statics with respect to key variables.

4.3.1 Non-Rivalrous Village

At its last move, the non-rivalrous village V decides whether to defect or not. In the event of defection, the government observes the act probabilistically (p_2). The village compares the payoff received from fulfilling its duty and the weighted average received from defection.

$$EU_V(D|\sim R) = p_2(bR_r - c_g) + (1 - p_2)(bR_r + R_g)$$
$$\Leftrightarrow R_g - p_2R_g - p_2c_g + bR_r$$
$$EU_V(\sim D|\sim R) = R_g - c_r$$
$$EU_V(D|\sim R) \geq EU_V(\sim D|\sim R) \text{ if } bR_r - p_2R_g - p_2c_g \geq -c_r$$
$$\Rightarrow b_i \geq b^* \equiv \frac{p_2(R_g+c_g)-c_r}{R_r}$$

4.3.2 Rivalrous Village

Unlike its non-rivalrous counterpart, rivalrous V engages in a simple bargaining game with its rival V_R. At its last move, V makes the smallest possible offer that V_R would not refuse. Conditional on V not defecting or doing so undetected, V_R accepts all offers x such that $x \leq (p_3 + \pi) + c_V$. If V defects and is subsequently kicked out of the CDF system, V_R only accepts offers x such that $x \leq p_3 + c_V$.

$$\arg\max\ U_V(x|\sim D) = R_g - c_r + (p_3 + \pi) + c_V$$
$$\arg\max\ U_V(x|D, \sim O) = bR_r + R_g + (p_3 + \pi) + c_V$$
$$\arg\max\ U_V(x|D, O) = bR_r - c_g + p_3 + c_V$$

In the case of non-defection or undetected defection, the equilibrium of the subgame is V offers $x = (p_3 + \pi) + c_V$ and V_R accepts. In the case of observed defection, the equilibrium offer reduces to $x = p_3 + c_V$, which V_R likewise accepts. Given these outcomes in the bargaining subgame, the expected utilities of non-defection and de-

fection are as follows.

$$EU_V(\sim D|R) = R_g - c_r + (p_3 + \pi) + c_V$$
$$EU_V(D|R) = p_2[bR_r - c_g + p_3 + c_V] + (1 - p_2)[bR_r + R_g + (p_3 + \pi) + c_V]$$

$$EU_V(D|R) \geq EU_V(\sim D|R) \text{ if } bR_r - p_2R_g - p_2c_g \geq -c_r + p_2p_3R_g$$
$$\Rightarrow b \geq b^{**} \equiv b^* + \frac{p_2p_3R_g}{R_r}$$
$$\triangle\ b \equiv \frac{p_2p_3R_g}{R_r}$$
$$\triangle\ b \geq 0 \text{ by definition.}$$

4.3.3 Government

Given that N_1 makes V non-rivalrous, the government maximizes its payoff from deploying n number of CDF personnel there as follows.

Since $b \sim \text{unif}[0,1]$, $\Pr(b \leq b^*) = b^*$ and $\Pr(b > b^*) = 1 - b^*$

Therefore, $EU_g(n^*| \sim R) = b^*n^*R_v + (1 - b^*)(1 - p_2)(-n^{2*})$
$\frac{\partial EU_g(n^*|\sim R)}{\partial n^*} = b^*R_v - 2n^*(1 - b^*)(1 - p_2)$
$b^*R_v - 2n^*(1 - b^*)(1 - p_2) = 0 \Rightarrow n^* = \frac{b^*R_v}{2(1-b^*)(1-p_2)}$
Hence, $\arg\max EU_g(n| \sim R) = n^*$ and $\frac{\partial n^*}{\partial b^*} > 0$.

Therefore, $EU_g(n = n^*| \sim R) = \frac{b^{*2}R_v^2}{4(1-b^*)(1-p_2)}$.

Given V is rivalrous, the government maximizes its payoff in an almost identical manner. The only relevant difference is the difference between the two cutoffs, b_i^{**} and b_i^*. As a result, the government's expected utilities are obtained easily by sub-

stituting b_i^{**} for b_i^*.

$\arg\max \mathrm{EU_g(n|R)} = \frac{(b^*+\triangle b)R_v}{2(1-b^*)(1-p_2)} \equiv n^{**}$
$\mathrm{EU_g(n = n^{**}|R)} = \frac{(b^*+\triangle b)^2 R_v^2}{4(1-b^*)(1-p_2-\triangle b)}$.

Because N_1 is modeled as a Bernoulli trial which assigns rivalry to V with probability p_1, G's expected utility of deploying CDFs is a weighted average of the expected utility of arming n^* and n^{**} CDF personnel in non-rivalrous and rivalrous village, respectively.

$\mathrm{EU_g(\sim CDF) = SQ}$
$\mathrm{EU_g(CDF) = p_1 EU_g(n = n^{**}|R) + (1 - p_1) EU_g(n = n^*| \sim R)}$
$\mathrm{EU_g(CDF) \geq EU_g(\sim CDF)}$ if $\mathrm{p_1 EU_g(n = n^{**}|R) + (1 - p_1) EU_g(n = n^*| \sim R) \geq SQ}$
$\Rightarrow p_1 \geq p_1^* = \frac{EU_g(n=n^*|\sim R)}{EU_g(n=n^{**}|R) - EU_g(n=n^*|\sim R)}$

The above condition is always true if $\mathrm{SQ < EU_g(n = n^*| \sim R)}$

4.3.4 Equilibria

The model has two notable classes of subgame perfect equilibria.

Equilibrium 1: No CDFs

{(G plays $\sim$CDF, sets $n = n^*$ if $\sim$R and $n = n^{**}$ if R); (Given $\sim$R, V chooses D if $b \geq b^*$, $\sim$D otherwise; given R, V chooses D if $b \geq b^* + \triangle b$, $\sim$D otherwise; and offers $x = (p_3 + \pi) + c_V$ if $\sim$D $\vee D \wedge \sim O$, $x = p_3 + c_V$ if D $\wedge O$); ($Given \sim D \vee D \wedge \sim O$, V_R plays A $\forall x \leq (p_3 + \pi) + c_V$, R otherwise; given D $\wedge O$,V_R plays A $\forall x \leq p_3 + c_V$, R otherwise)} $\forall p_1 < p_1^* \wedge iff$ SQ¡$EU_g(n = n^*| \sim R)$

Equilibrium 2: CDFs

{(G plays CDF, sets $n = n^*$ if ∼R and $n = n^{**}$ if R); (Given ∼R, V chooses D if $b \geq b^*$, ∼D otherwise; given R, V chooses D if $b \geq b^* + \triangle b$, ∼D otherwise; and offers $x = (p_3 + \pi) + c_V$ if ∼D $\vee D \wedge \sim O$, $x = p_3 + c_V$ if D $\wedge O$); ($Given \sim D \vee D \wedge \sim O$, V_R plays A $\forall x \leq (p_3 + \pi) + c_V$, R otherwise; given D $\wedge O$,V_R plays A $\forall x \leq p_3 + c_V$, R otherwise)} $\forall p_1 \geq p_1^*$

4.3.5 Comparative Statics

PROPOSITION 1: CDFs are more likely to emerge in cases where a greater proportion of villages in rebel-contested areas is rivalrous.

Because $\frac{\partial EU_g(n)}{\partial b} > 0$ and $\triangle b \geq 0$, it must also be the case that

$$EU_g(n = n^{**}|R) \geq EU_g(n = n^*| \sim R). \tag{4.1}$$

$\frac{\partial EU_g(CDF)}{\partial p_1} = [EU_g(n = n^{**}|R) - EU_g(n = n^*| \sim R)]$

Furthermore, since $EU_g(n = n^{**}|R) \geq EU_g(n = n^*| \sim R)$, it follows that

$$\frac{\partial EU_g(CDF)}{\partial p_1} > 0. \tag{4.2}$$

PROPOSITION 2: Given the establishment of CDFs, units in rivalrous villages have a greater number of armed personnel than units in non-rivalrous villages.

Since $\frac{\partial n^*}{\partial b} > 0$ and $\triangle\ b \geq 0$, it must be the case that

$$n^{**} \geq n^*. \tag{4.3}$$

4.4 Implications

Analysis of the formal model yields several notable implications. First, comparative statics show that government utility from establishing CDFs increases in the probability with which nature generates a rivalrous village. Because alignment with the state is more useful to rivalrous villages than it is for non-rivalrous ones, governments can anticipate that such communities are less likely to defect on average. As long as the government gets to observe defections with some positive probability, fear of detection and subsequent expulsion from the CDF system helps keep these villages from switching sides surreptitiously. The model thus implies that, when a greater proportion of rebel-contested villages have rivalrous relationships, a government's threat of suspension of CDF privileges carries greater leverage in inducing CDFs compliance with assigned functions.

$H_{4.1}$: *CDFs are more likely to emerge in insurgencies in which a greater proportion of villages in rebel-contested areas have rivalrous relationships.*

Furthermore, given an equilibrium in which CDFs are formed, analysis of the formal model makes predictions with respect to their subnational deployment. As mentioned earlier, adjustments in the number and quality of weaponry issued to CDF personnel is one of the principal methods by which counterinsurgents attempt to attenuate the threat of defection. Because governments recognize their greater

leverage over rivalrous villages and perceive a smaller risk of defection there, counterinsurgents tend to deploy more numerous CDF units in them. The formal model thus suggests the following hypothesis.

$H_{4.2}$: *A positive association exists between the prevalence of rivalries in a given area and the number of CDF personnel stationed there.*

4.5 Tribal Society: A Proxy Measure of Rivalries

Analysis of the formal model developed above yields two notable predictions. First, the model predicts that CDFs are more likely to emerge when a greater proportion of villages in contested areas have intense rivalrous relationships with one another. It suggests that the existence of local rivalries places a premium on alliance with the state, enabling it to deter civilian defection from CDF duty more effectively. The model thus offers an explanation for the apparently puzzling crossnational emergence of CDFs. In addition, the model makes predictions with respect to CDFs' subnational deployment as well. Specifically, given a decision to establish them, governments deploy CDFs in greater numbers to areas of the country that are fraught with communal rivalries. Whereas empirical testing of Hypothesis 4.1 requires a crossnational research design, a subnational design is needed to put Hypothesis 4.2 to a test.

As a result of limited data availability, testing the model empirically is less than straightforward. The absence of accurate crossnational measurements of local rivalries in war-torn countries effectively precludes the testing of Hypothesis 4.1. Nevertheless, Hypothesis 4.2 is testable in the context of a subnational research design using a proxy measure that encapsulates the concept of rivalries. In the remainder of this

chapter, I contend that tribal groups represent a distinct subset of rural population that has a tendency to engage in intense and prolonged intertribal rivalries. Because such groups are associated with private feuding to a greater extent than non-tribal populations, they may serve as a reasonable proxy for civilian rivalries and enable empirical testing of the formal model. To make this case, I start by tackling the thorny issue of specifying the defining characteristics of tribal groups — features which collectively distinguish them from what can only be generically termed *non-tribal populations*. Subsequently, I offer some prevailing accounts in social science literature aiming to explain tribal feuding practices. In support of the notion that intense rivalries tend to be extraordinarily frequent among this population group, the chapter concludes with a presentation of whatever quantitative evidence sociologists and anthropologists have been able to gather to date.

4.5.1 Definition

Tribes are ancient units of social organization. These groups' connection to the past is evidenced in the welter of alternative designations used to describe them — including such adjectives as native, indigenous, aboriginal, non-state, primordial, or primitive. Their persistence nearly half a millennium after the advent of the modern state system testifies to their remarkable resilience. In anthropological research, definitions of tribal society usually have two salient dimensions: a cultural and a political one. Thus, tribes are seen as primordial social units possessing ethnolinguistic characteristics distinct from other groups while exercising political autonomy and control over a relatively fixed territory (Marx 1977; Morgan 1877). Expanding upon both these dimensions, this dissertation treats tribal society in terms of three key characteristics: (1) kinship ties; (2) political autonomy; and (3) rule of traditional law.

First, members of tribal society not only consider themselves distinct from members of other groups in terms of ethnicity and/or language, this ethnolinguistic identity is rooted in the perceived kinship ties which permeate society (Hall 1994, 447; Gluckman 1965). Tribal groups are often highly segmentary, consisting of a number of distinguishable subunits such as clans, villages, and hamlets — all of whom purport to trace their lineage to a single common ancestor to one extent or another (Bruinessen 1992, 51).[1] The alleged kinship cannot be taken at face value because many tribes do not keep precise records of their genealogies (Barth 1953, 36). In addition, group membership is quite fluid, since powerful tribes have been known to grant membership to outsiders at a hefty price (Bruinessen 1992, 57-8).

It is also worth noting that kinship ties and cultural homogeneity are typically strongest within the smallest unit (i.e. the hamlet and village level) and get progressively weaker as one moves further up the ladder of tribal social organization (Scott 1976, 608). In one of the rare quantitative studies of tribal affiliation, Chagnon (1988, 988) finds that, among the Yanomamö Indians of southern Venezuela, well over 80 percent of inhabitants of a typical Yanomamö village are related to 75 percent of their fellow villagers. Because kinship ties are so pervasive at this level, the term *village* may be considered synonymous with "kinship group" for all intents and purposes.

The second important characteristic of tribal society is political autonomy exercised internally as well as externally. Externally, a tribe exists in a state of political autonomy vis-a-vis the state whose territory it inhabits. While the expanding reach of the modern state has certainly eroded much of tribal authority in recent decades, these groups have persistently refused to abandon some of their most valued customs. As Kreuzer (2005) notes of Philippine tribes, "[t]he code of honour takes precedence over all other potentially competing patterns of order," and while "recourse to the state legal system is in fact possible, [...] it is in most cases de facto excluded, since

[1]Note that tribal group is used in the text to refer to a grouping of tribespeople at any one of these levels.

it violates the code of honour" (26). Geographic remoteness and relative government disinterest have aided the ability of these groups to exclude the state from meddling in their internal affairs. Internally, political authority in tribal societies is often decentralized along segmentary lines. Given the importance of kinship ties, tribal societies tend to be most politically cohesive at the clan, village, or even hamlet level, where authority is vested in a single individual (i.e. a tribal chieftain) or a handful of individuals (i.e. a tribal council).

The final important characteristic of tribal groups is their upholding of traditional rather than modern law. Traditional authority is rooted in informal norms and customs inherited from ancestors over many generations (Yalçın-Heckmann 1991, 103). According to Weber, "[t]he subjects are bound to the ruler by personal dependence and a tradition of loyalty, and their obedience to him is further reinforced by such cultural beliefs as the divine right of kings" (Blau 1963, 308; see also Barth 1953, 51–2). As a result, authority in such societies is profoundly personalistic in the sense that the tribal chieftain represents the very embodiment of the group's traditions.

Any discussion of the prevalence of rivalrous relationships in tribal societies implies comparison with groups in non-tribal society. The three criteria outlined above define tribal society as well as help delineate what exactly constitutes a non-tribal group. First, unlike their tribal counterparts, kinship ties do not permeate non-tribal groups. Thus, a typical resident of a non-tribal village is related to only a small fraction of his or her fellow villagers. Second, a non-tribal group usually does not enjoy as much political autonomy from the state as does its tribal counterpart. And, when a group does possess a degree of autonomy as in the case of federal or provincial administrative units, its self-rule is rooted in modern, codified laws and exercised by impersonal institutions such as mayoral offices or courts.

4.5.2 *Lex Talionis*: The Imperative of Blood Vengeance

Tribal groups' political autonomy and adherence to traditional law have important consequences for conflict management in these societies. Given the absence of state institutions and the decentralized nature of tribal authority, security provision in tribal societies must itself be decentralized. In anthropological literature, instances of tribal warfare are commonly attributed to the imperative of blood vengeance, and I do not depart from this scholarly consensus (Davie 2003; Otterbein 1970; Turney-High 1949; Wright 1965). Thus, in this section I contend that intense private rivalries occur more frequently among tribal groups largely due to their steadfast adherence to a traditional mechanism of decentralized security provision known as the blood vengeance. When inevitable conflicts of interest arise in tribal society, the application of blood vengeance tends to intensify and prolong them. As a result, private disputes escalate into full-blown intractable conflicts far more frequently in tribal than non-tribal societies. Arguably, the resultant association of tribal groups and intense private rivalries makes them a suitable proxy measure for the purpose of empirically testing the predictions of the above developed formal model.

I conceive of a dispute as any situation in which two or more actors have conflicting preferences over the distribution of some valuable good such as land, money, or social prestige. Often times, ostensibly trivial acts of insult or injury provide the necessary pretext to initiate bargaining over such valuables (Gluckman 1965, 114–5; Aase 2002, 92). Once disputants threaten violence as a costly outside option within the bargaining process, the dispute is thereby transformed into a rivalry. As Boehm (1984) notes of Montenegrin tribes, "any conflict situation involving land, women, or money could [lead] to angry words, insults, then homicide" (99). Or, as Turney-High observed, conflict in traditional societies occurs due to "a host of social-psychological purposes and desires, which [include] conquest, prestige, ego-expansion, glory, revenge, vengeance, and vendetta—motivations that could be remote in time and place

and to the Western observer could appear obscure, idiosyncratic" (Shultz and Dew 2006, 5–6; Turney-High 1949)

Having said this, a great majority of disputes do not escalate to the level of a rivalry. This is because most social conflicts can be resolved without resorting to threats of violence through the invocation of shared norms of behavior enforced at least in principle by an overarching authority. The modern state, with its formal legislation and sovereign enforcement, serves to regulate and dampen social conflicts of this kind (Durkheim 1893; Weber 1978). However, because of the decentralized nature of tribal authority, disputes occurring in tribal societies are more likely to escalate into rivalries. Since the disputants often do not share a common overarching authority, they may be compelled to engage in coercive bargaining in order to arrive at an outcome. For instance, suppose one clan contests another clan's grazing rights on a piece of adjoining territory. In the absence of a strong tribal authority encompassing both groups, the two clans may have no other option but to employ threats of violence in an attempt to settle their dispute.

Once violence occurs in the context of an extra-legal rivalry, blood vengeance regulates its proper use (Grutzpalk 2002, 120). An ancient institution present in nearly all societies throughout the world, blood revenge performs two critical functions. First, it prescribes a tit-for-tat strategy as the appropriate course of action in response to a given act of violence. And, second, it specifies who has the right and obligation to exact vengeance as well as who its legitimate targets are. Specifically, blood revenge stipulates that the target of a violent act as well as her kin have the right of revenge, and that the perpetrator and as well as his kin may be considered the legitimate targets. As ancient as tribal organization itself, the principle of blood revenge has been most prominently enshrined as *lex talionis* in the earliest written Roman laws as well as in the Old Testament exhortation "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" (Tiles 2000, 65–6).

Because tribal societies are decentralized as well as politically autonomous from the state, *lex talionis* represents a major mechanism of decentralized security provision centered on basic kinship units. As Aase (2002) argues, "the core meaning of the [blood] feud is found in the ability of a family to defend its interests" (92). In most societies not under effective bureaucratic control, "an assault on an individual [is] considered a stain on a family, and the whole family of the assailant [is] considered a partner in crime," which is why, "when there is revenge, various relatives of the family are targeted" (Turkish Daily News 2008). Because in tribal societies putative kinship ties permeate much larger groups, *lex talionis* often extends well beyond the family level and stipulates that the responsibility for violence and its punishment rests with all members of the community, whether village, clan, or even entire tribe (Grutzpalk 2002, 122; Davie 2003, 123–4; Çakir 2011).

Violence stemming from blood revenge thus tends to proliferate, and as a result, in tribal societies a greater number of actors are engaged in rivalrous relationships. Speaking of tribal Montenegrins in the nineteenth century, Wake (1878, 355) noted that their application of lex talionis had been universal, with "quarrels extending from families to villages, until whole districts were sometimes involved in hostilities with their neighbors." Similarly, commenting on a more recent display of Kurdish tribal conflict in Turkey, Sait Sanli, chairman of the country's Reconciliation Committee, states in an interview that "[b]ecause of the blood feud between the Mennan and Devan clans, 60 villages [were] under pressure; all the men in these villages [took] their guns and [guarded] their villages after dark" (Turkish Daily News 2008).

Sometimes, the institution of blood revenge is used to regulate violence only above the family and village level of traditional social organization. Wrongdoing occurring at or below the village level may be addressed using an entirely different dispute resolution mechanism — the moot. As Scott (1976, 610) explains, the moot is "an informal assembly called for the purpose of adjudicating a conflict, [which] provides

a forum for airing grievances and administering indemnification." A mediator agreed to by both parties heads the process of reconciliation in which grievances are aired freely and indemnities are levied on both sides, with the larger sum being paid by the offending party. Unlike that of blood revenge, the moot system of dispute resolution appears to increase group cohesion as well as reduce the social distance between disputants (Scott 1976).

Regardless of the unit level at which it takes place — village, clan, or tribe — blood feuds in tribal societies have a tendency to persist for a much longer period of time. In principle, most tribal societies do provide for means of ending feuds relatively quickly by way of punishment of the offender by members of his own group or via reparations in money, land, cattle, or women. However, in practice, divergent interests and interpretations of tribal custom regarding the appropriate punishment or amount of compensation may preclude agreement in the absence of a centralized overarching authority. Furthermore, even when agreed upon, indemnities for homicide tend to be so large as to require years before they can be paid in full, and in the meantime the aggrieved group has the right to claim vengeance (Scott 1976, 614). As a result, some tribal blood feuds may be "so far removed from their initial causes that tribesmen no longer recall them," yet violence continues unabated nonetheless (Akman 2002, 107). In a particularly illustrative case, Chagnon (1988, 986) describes the inner workings of blood revenge as follows:

> In January 1965 [...] the headman of one of the smaller villages (about 75 people) was killed by raiders in retaliation for an earlier killing. His ashes were carefully stored in several tiny gourds, small quantities being consumed by the women of the village on the eve of each revenge raid against the village that killed him. According to the Yanomamö, women alone drink the ashes of the slain to make raiders *hushuwo* and fill them with resolve [...] In 1975, 10 years after his death, several gourds of his

> ashes remained, and the villagers were still raiding the group that killed him, who by then lived nearly 4 days' walk away.

Because retribution in tribal societies takes place on such a large scale and tends to endure for long periods of time, it may be said to promote cooperation in a decentralized manner by threatening "an extremely high price for each act of violence," which results in "fear-based as well as advantage-based avoidance strategies" (Kreuzer 2005, 12). The logic of blood revenge, then, may be likened to a grim trigger strategy of self-enforcing cooperation in a decentralized society (Chagnon 1988, 986). In relation to this, an argument may be made that the anticipation of particularly severe punishment in these societies could have a greater deterrent effect on actors when deciding whether to initiate conflict or not (Boehm 1984, 98–9). If that were true, fewer disputes would rise to the level of a rivalry, although those that do cross the threshold would tend to proliferate and endure.

However, while the deterrent effect of blood revenge may indeed reduce the incidence of rivalry, the increase in their longevity may ultimately lead to a greater prevalence of rivalries. Moreover, even if blood vengeance is better than having no mechanism at all, the well known vulnerability of grim trigger strategies to noise suggests that superior alternative methods of decentralized security provision may exist (Axelrod 1984; Fearon and Laitin 1996). Finally, all decentralized means of security provision — especially blood vengeance — are almost certainly inferior to centralized security agencies operating in most modern states. A personal account in Chagnon (1988, 990) illustrates the suboptimality of blood vengeance when compared with the modern state:

> A particularly acute insight into the power of law to thwart killing for revenge was provided to me by a young Yanomamö man in 1987. He had been taught Spanish by missionaries and sent to the territorial capital for training in practical nursing. There he discovered police and laws. He

> excitedly told me that he had visited the town's largest *pata* (the territorial governor) and urged him to make law and police available to his people so that they would not have to engage any longer in their wars of revenge and have to live in constant fear.

4.5.3 Concluding Remarks

Consistent with the theoretical argument outlined above, observers have long noted the association of tribal groups with intense private rivalries, which take the form of long-standing disputes, feuds, or even open warfare. Like many tribal societies elsewhere in the world, Muslim Moros of the southern Philippines have a centuries-long tradition of "following a strict code of collecting blood debts" (Agence France Presse 2010*b*). According to studies conducted by the US Agency for International Development and the Asia Foundation, "[m]ore than 1,000 incidents related to family feuds have been recorded on [the southern Philippine island of] Mindanao in the past 75 years, leaving more than 3,000 people dead" (Agence France Presse 2005). Similarly, in the Kurdish southeast of Turkey, "[h]onor killings and blood feuds have claimed 1,190 lives in Turkey in the past six years despite tougher penalties for such crimes" (Turkish Daily News 2006).

Anecdotal evidence aside, it is very difficult to make quantitative assessments of tribal groups' proclivity for private conflict since adequate data about most of these groups is conspicuously absent. Nevertheless, what little quantitative evidence we do have paints a rather unambiguous picture. Thus, in one of the most extensive anthropological studies on this topic, Chagnon (1988) reports the results of his 23 year-long research of some 60 Yanomamö Indian villages in southern Venezuela. One of the most startling findings to come out his research is that "44 percent of [Yanomamö] males [...] 25 or older have participated in the killing of someone, that approximately 30 percent of adult male deaths are due to violence, and that nearly 70 percent of

all adults over [. . .] 40 years of age have lost a close genetic relative due to violence" (Chagnon 1988, 985).

Similar statistics have been reported in the few other studies of male mortality in other tribal societies as well. In Highland New Guinea, anthropologists have reported adult male mortality due to violence at 25 percent for the Mae Enga tribe, 19.5 percent for the Huh tribe, and 28.5 percent for the Dugum Dani tribe (Chagnon 1988; Heider 2006; Meggitt 1977). Even though these figures are quite telling on their own, corresponding statistics for non-tribal societies are missing from this picture. Toward this end, (Knauft 1987) reports data on adult male violent deaths per 100,000 people in non-tribal as well as some tribal societies. Sample rates from his study are: 0.5 for Great Britain in 1959, 58.2 for Detroit, Michigan in 1958, 165.9 for the Yanomamö in 1972–4, 330 for Murngin Australian aborigines in 1906–26, and 778 for the Hewa tribe of New Guinea in 1971 (Knauft 1987, quoted in Chagnon 1988, 991). As is readily apparent, adult male mortality due to violence is several orders of magnitude higher in tribal societies than in a modern urban environment such as Detroit, Michigan.

Although intriguing in its own right, the apparent association of tribal society with intense and enduring private rivalries is most important for present purposes because it makes possible the empirical testing of the model of CDF delegation presented earlier in this chapter. Accordingly, the following chapter outlines a research design in which tribal populations serve as a proxy for intense private rivalries, permitting us to estimate their effect on CDF deployment.

Chapter 5

CDFs in Turkey and the Philippines: An Empirical Test

5.1 Research Design

Due to a general lack of data on rural rivalries, Hypothesis 4.1 cannot be evaluated directly. Furthermore, a crossnational analysis of the determinants of CDFs appears infeasible due to aggregation problems and a general lack of data on tribal groups in most countries beset by insurgencies. Nevertheless, Hypothesis 4.2 can be tested on a subnational unit of analysis. This chapter details the sources and coding procedures used to generate a new subnational data set of CDFs in Turkey and the Philippines.

Since at present time only province-level CDF data are publicly available, the unit of analysis adopted in this chapter is an insurgency-affected province. In the Philippine case, nearly the entire territory of the country has been affected by two coincident rebellions, and as a result, all of its 78 provinces are included in the sample.[1] In the case of Turkey, the Kurdish insurgency was ethnically driven and therefore

[1]Note that Metro Manila is excluded from the sample. In addition, I merge the Zamboanga Sibugay province with Zamboanga del Sur, out of which it was created in 2001, because many of the variables used in this study utilize data collected in the preceding period.

confined to the southeast of the country. In this case, I identify an insurgency-affected province as any province with more than 10 percent ethnic Kurdish population as documented by Mutlu (2009, 526). Since 21 out of Turkey's 81 provinces meet this criterion, the total number of insurgency-affected provinces in the sample is 99.[2]

Figure 5.1. Administrative Map of Turkey

Since subnational data on CDF deployment is rarely publicly revealed, case selection in this study was principally motivated by the availability of the required data in Turkey and the Philippines. Nevertheless, external validity may not be much affected by this unfortunate circumstance, since the insurgencies fought in these countries appear to representative of the population as a whole on a number of important dimensions. Both countries experienced protracted rural insurgencies: the 1984 Kurdish

[2]As in the Philippine case, a number of newly created provinces need to be merged: (1) Ardahan and Igdir (created in 1993) are merged with Kars; (2) Batman (created in 1990) is merged with Siirt; (3) Kilis (created in 1994) is merged with Gaziantep; (4) Sirnak (created in 1990) is merged with Hakkari.

uprising in Turkey and the 1987 communist and Moro insurgencies in the Philippines. Furthermore, the two countries' population sizes and military strengths are within one standard deviation of the sample mean of the crossnational data set. The estimated rebel strength and battle death count in the two cases is likewise within one standard deviation of the sample mean.

Inasmuch as they differ, the Turkish and Philippine insurgencies provide valuable variation that benefits external validity. Most notably, whereas the Turkish case involves an ethnic insurgency, the Philippine case encompasses two conflicts — one ethnic separatist, and the other ideological. In addition, in light of the staggering ethnolinguistic diversity of the Philippine archipelago, Turkey by comparison appears to be a homogeneous country. Admittedly, in both cases the insurgencies are less representative of the general sample with respect to conflict duration. Whereas the sample mean equals 106 months, the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey lasted 174 months, while the two Philippine insurgencies lasted 240 and 311 months. Nevertheless, this is very much consistent with the empirical analyses in Chapter 3, where CDFs were found to be deployed disproportionately more often in difficult cases of insurgency. Thus, while conflict duration in the Turkish and Philippine cases is not representative of all insurgencies in general, it is very much representative of those cases where CDFs have been deployed.

5.1.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is number of CDF personnel deployed by the state in a given province (*CDFs*). In the case of Turkey, the government started forming CDF units called Village Guards in 1985, reaching their peak strength only by the mid-1990s (Ron 1995, 55). Province-level Village Guard deployment numbers for year 2003 have been released publicly by the Ministry of Interior (document BO50TIBOOOOO001, cited in Balta 2004, 22). In the case of the Philippines, its

Figure 5.2. Administrative Map of the Philippines

CDF units, referred to as Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGUs), were set up by President Aquino in 1987. The CAFGUs are a successor to an earlier Marcos-era CDF program dubbed the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) that

had been scrapped due to allegations of numerous human rights abuses. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have released province-level deployment numbers of CAFGUs in year 2008 (Romero 2008). No CDF units were reported in 13 out of the 99 sampled provinces. The median number of deployed CDF personnel is 630, with a standard deviation of about 1,900 (see Table 5.1 for complete summary statistics).

5.1.2 Explanatory Variable

Tribal Population. Hypothesis 4.2 suggests that provinces with a greater number of tribespeople should be positively associated with CDF presence. Given the definition of tribes developed earlier, a non-tribal person in Turkey's rebel-afflicted southeast is most likely a non-tribal Kurd or a Turk. Non-tribal Kurds are those whose families have over time dropped their tribal affiliations and who therefore no longer consider themselves bound by traditional law. Because the Kurdish population in Turkey comprises both tribal as well as non-tribal elements, estimates of provincial Kurdish population are an inaccurate measure of tribalism. For this reason, I rely on *Asiretler Raporu* — a report produced by the Turkish secret service and published anonymously in 1998 — to code the number of tribespeople in each conflict-affected province in Turkey (Anonymous 1998). The report catalogues all Kurdish tribes residing in the country in the mid-1990s, along with their size, location, and cultural characteristics.

In the Philippine case, assembling this information is made considerably harder by this country's staggering diversity. Moreover, because tribalism is a politically sensitive issue, no consensus has emerged regarding the definition — let alone measurement — of tribal Filipinos (Molintas 2004; Rovillos and Morales 2002). In addition, tribalism in the Philippines is often conflated with indigenousness, since the latter term is considered more politically correct and reflective of land entitlement issues that

are central to the debate.[3] I identify Filipino tribal population using the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples' (NCIP) official list of 110 major groups. The list was compiled on the basis of the definition of indigenous peoples given in the 1997 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). The definition corresponds very well to my own inasmuch as it identifies the same three elements of tribalism: territoriality, perceived kinship ties, and self-rule based on tradition (Molintas 2004). Since the country's 1990 census failed to identify many of these groups, NCIP's own survey-based estimates must be used instead (Tan, de Dios and Ducanes 2002).

The prevalence of tribal groups within a given province is operationalized as a percent of total provincial population that is affiliated with a tribal group. Because the resulting variable (*PERCENT TRIBAL*) is highly skewed to the right, I normalize it by taking the square root of it. Admittedly, these data are far from perfect. Nevertheless, to the extent that they are noisy and capture non-tribal as well as tribal populations, this should increase the standard error of the coefficient estimate and thus make rejecting the null hypothesis more not less difficult.

Figure 5.3 is a scatterplot showing the bivariate relationship between tribal groups (as percent of total population) and CDF deployment in each province.[4] As evidenced by the linear prediction, the apparent strength of this relationship is very weak. Indeed, the pairwise correlation between the two variables is just 0.04. However, since a number of other variables may be obscuring the picture, a multivariate approach is necessary to isolate the association between CDFs and tribal groups accurately.

[3]For this reason, organizations purporting to represent or work with tribal groups changed their title accordingly — e.g., the Episcopal Commission on Tribal Filipinos changing its name in 1995 to the Episcopal Commission on Indigenous Peoples.

[4]Note that the scatterplot does not display several outlying provinces with CDF deployments greater than 4,000 for the sake of readability.

Figure 5.3. Tribal Groups and CDFs: A Scatterplot



5.1.3 Controls

Insurgent Threat. In theory, CDF formation occurs as a direct response to insurgent threat. Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that a statistical association exists between the two phenomena if the theory is correct. In areas of low rebel activity, the benefits of CDF deployment may not exceed the costs. Given low or non-existent rebel threat, CDF units may not be of much help to the counterinsurgent simply because in such areas there is less intelligence to be acquired, fewer insurgent operations to disrupt, and less popular support to stem. If correct, this logic implies that counterinsurgents should be less likely to establish auxiliary units in areas of low rebel activity.

However, after the level of insurgent threat reaches a certain threshold, its effect on CDF deployment may decrease or even flip the other way. As insurgent threat rises, the costs as well as benefits of CDF deployment may rise also. In areas where rebels exercise nearly complete territorial control, such a policy would almost certainly be

doomed to failure, as CDF personnel there would either defect or be slaughtered in combat. If this were the case, the effect of insurgent threat on CDF deployment would be best characterized as a non-monotonic, inverse-U shape function. Nevertheless, such non-monotonicity may not be evident in this sample given the chosen unit of observation and selection of countries, since both counterinsurgents are likely sufficiently powerful to deny the respective rebel groups the opportunity to exercise near-complete control over an entire province.

Even though there is little a priori reason to believe that tribal groups as such are directly associated with insurgent threat, a relationship may nevertheless develop in time as CDFs are being created. For instance, provided that an incumbent establishes CDFs disproportionately in tribal areas as predicted by the formal model, the deployed personnel may become target of rebel reprisals and thus increase the number of local skirmishes. In response, the counterinsurgent could establish still more personnel in such areas to stem the increase in violence. If so, failing to control for the indirect effect of rebel threat on CDF deployment would serve to inflate the direct effect of tribal groups envisioned in the formal model. To avoid this possibility, I include on the right hand side a measure of insurgent threat.

The measure of insurgent threat employed here is the mean number of rebel-related skirmishes *INSURGENT THREAT* in a given province in the 10-year period following the start of insurgency. The variable is coded using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which records individual incidents arising from terrorism as well as insurgency worldwide. The GTD defines a skirmish as any incident which: (1) is intentional rather than accidental; (2) entails violence or the threat of violence; and (3) whose perpetrators are subnational actors. In addition, an incident must satisfy at least two of the following three criteria: (1) the act is "aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal"; (2) it is intended to convey information

to or coerce a larger audience; and (3) the act occurs outside the context of legal warfare permitted by international humanitarian law (GTD Codebook 2010, 5).

Importantly, the database contains information on both the location of a given incident (usually a village name, mountain, or some other toponym) as well as the reported number of combatant casualties. I code for each province the mean annual number of skirmishes that occurred in it and which resulted in at least one combatant fatality. First, unique values of the GTD location variable are recorded. Next, for each value, province information is determined using the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's Geographic Names Database (NGA 2010). When province information cannot be uniquely determined by GTD's location description (e.g. two or more places share the same toponym), additional information was sought in news reports using Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. Finally, I count for each province in the data set the mean number of skirmishes that occurred annually in the first ten years of the given insurgency. For the Philippine sample, the count is averaged over the period from 1987 through 1997, and in the case of Turkey from 1984 through 1994.

Population Size. Next, it is reasonable to suppose that population size helps predict CDF recruitment, as more populous areas require more numerous CDF deployments in order to self-police its residents. Population size also serves as a natural limit to how many auxiliaries can be raised in a given locality. In support of this notion, Karakasidou (1997) notes that, during the Greek Civil War "each local [CDF] unit was proportionate to the size of the local population." McCuen (1966, 108), too, argues that CDFs are "best organized on a territorial basis with squads, platoons, companies, regiments, etc., being established in each village, town, district, and province according to its size and population." In order to control for this effect, I include on the right hand side a measure of population size constructed using the 1990 General Population Census in Turkey and the 2000 Census of Population and Housing in the

Philippines (*POPULATION SIZE*).

Table 5.1. Provincial CDF Deployment: Summary Statistics

Variable Name	*Mean*	*St. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*	*Description*
Dependent Variable					
CDFs	1,211	1,914	0	14,478	Number of CDF personnel.
Explanatory Variable					
PERCENT TRIBAL	26	31	0	144	Tribes as percent of total population.
Controls					
INSURGENT THREAT	1.22	2.04	0	13.7	Mean number of skirmishes in the 10-year period after start of insurgency.
POPULATION SIZE	837,878	658,878	16,467	3,356,137	Total census population size.
DEVELOPMENT	613	473	241	2,702	Annual per capita income.
PERCENT RURAL	63	21	4.21	98.7	Percent of population living in rural settlements (20,000 inhabitants or less).
ROAD DENSITY	0.06	0.03	0.00	0.15	Ratio of total paved road length (km) and province area (km^2).
DISTANCE FROM CAPITAL	633	368	30	1,587	Distance to national capital (km).

Development. Because most governments provide their auxiliaries a modest compensation in one form or another, CDF delegation may also occur more frequently in impoverished areas. In such regions, local citizens may be more eager to seek recruitment due to high unemployment rates and greater need for supplemental income. The most straightforward operational measure of this concept is provincial per capita income (*DEVELOPMENT*). The data on annual per capita income are obtained from the Philippine National Statistics Office and the Turkish Statistical Institute. The Philippine data is given for year 2000 in pesos, while the Turkish data is given for year 1990 in US dollars. The Philippine data is converted to 1990 US dollars using FXHistory's Historical Exchange Rates and Robert Sahr's inflation conversion factors (FXHistory 2009; Sahr 2009). Since the variable is highly non-normal, I take the inverse of it.

Logistics. One of the major opportunity costs of CDF deployment is adoption of a COIN policy that pursues local security using more conventional methods. Therefore,

CDF deployment may partly be a function of the perceived utility of conventional means of territorial and population control. Theory suggests that the utility of conventional COIN approaches varies inversely with the degree logistical of difficulty expected to be encountered during implementation. In this study, I control for two factors which may affect the logistical viability of conventional COIN policy: degree of rurality and road coverage. In comparison with rural regions, urban environments are characterized by lower logistical demands and better knowledge of the local terrain and civilian population. Road density, in turn, determines the accessibility of rural locations to the motorized vehicles of modern conventional armies.

I use the Philippine and Turkish census data mentioned above to compute for each province the degree of rurality as the percent of total population which resides in settlements inhabited by fewer than 20,000 people (*PERCENT RURAL*). Since the variable is highly non-normal, I take the square root to normalize it. As for road density, the concept is operationalized as the ratio of the total length of paved roads (in km) in a given province and its area (in km^2) in year 1995 for Turkey and 1990 for the Philippines (*ROAD DENSITY*). The road length data were obtained from the Philippine Office of the Provincial Development Service and the Turkish Statistical Institute. Finally, I also include on the right hand side a measure of the distance (in km) between the national and provincial capitals (*DISTANCE FROM CAPITAL*).

5.1.4 Estimation

Given the nature of the dependent variable, choosing the most optimal estimator is far from straightforward. Since the dependent variable is strictly nonnegative and an integer variable, some may argue that an event count model such as negative binomial is most appropriate. At the same time, scholars have also resorted to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to model similar variables.[5]

[5]For example, both Valentino, Huth and Croco (2006) and Lacina (2006) use OLS to model casualty data.

As Valentino, Huth and Croco (2006, 364–5) note, event count models may not be appropriate estimators for data generating processes which do not closely approximate bernoulli trials. In a Bernoulli distribution, trials and observation periods are identical. In the case of CDFs, the individual units are almost certainly not created identical in size — as communities join a CDF, some are larger than others. This implies that event count models such as negative binomial (NB) are not entirely appropriate given present circumstances. However, the nonnegative and discrete character of the variable also implies that an OLS model would not be entirely appropriate either. In light of these methodological ambiguities, I conduct my statistical analyses using both OLS and negative binomial regressions.

In addition, in the case of OLS, I employ robust estimation, since the model appears to exhibit signs of heteroskedasticity upon visual examination with residual-versus-predictor plots for several variables. Moreover, a Breusch-Pagan test of heteroskedasticity (Breusch and Pagan 1979) suggests that the squared residuals may indeed be systematically related to regressor values (χ^2=3.03; p=0.08). Note finally that all subsequent hypothesis tests are one-tailed unless noted otherwise.

5.2 Empirical Analysis

Table 5.2 gives the results of four regression analyses of province-level CDF presence. Parameters are estimated using both fixed effects OLS (Models 1 and 2) as well as fixed effects NB (Models 3 and 4) estimators. In the fully specified Models 1 and 3, all variables except *DEVELOPMENT* and *DISTANCE FROM CAPITAL* are associated with CDF deployment at a statistically significant level. A Wald test fails to reject a joint null hypothesis of no effect (p=0.93) for these two regressors. When a restricted model is re-estimated without them (Models 2 and 4), all variables retain

their statistical significance. Thus specified, the model accounts for nearly a half of all the variation in CDF deployment in this sample (R^2=0.48).

Table 5.2. Regression Analysis of Subnational CDF Deployment

	FE OLS		FE Negative Binomial	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
ROAD DENSITY†	-0.608**	-0.625***	-0.361***	-0.376***
	(0.278)	(0.253)	(0.146)	(0.142)
POPULATION SIZE†	0.826***	0.836***	0.570***	0.567***
	(0.265)	(0.259)	(0.131)	(0.130)
PERCENT RURAL	0.0202*	0.0229**	0.0148**	0.0160***
	(0.0134)	(0.0112)	(0.00642)	(0.00607)
PERCENT TRIBAL§	0.112**	0.115**	0.0712***	0.0715***
	(0.0622)	(0.0580)	(0.0303)	(0.0277)
INSURGENT THREAT†	2.285***	2.342***	1.110***	1.143***
	(0.512)	(0.476)	(0.194)	(0.183)
DEVELOPMENT‡	99.05		62.61	
	(463.9)		(173.1)	
DISTANCE TO CAPITAL§	0.00470		0.00207	
	(0.0257)		(0.0139)	
Constant	-10.90***	-11.05***	-11.54***	-11.53***
	(3.529)	(3.399)	(1.901)	(1.887)
Observations	99	99	99	99

NOTE: standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; one-tailed tests.
† natural log; ‡ inverse; § square root.

Most notably, statistical analysis shows that tribal populations are positively associated with CDF deployment, and the effect is statistically significant using both the OLS and NB estimators (p=0.04 and 0.03, one-tailed test).[6] Consistent with the theoretical expectations of the formal model in Chapter 4, a province that has a larger percentage of tribal population can be expected to station greater numbers

[6]Note that the result remains unchanged when the equation is re-estimated without any transformation of the tribal percentage variable.

of CDF personnel. Moreover, the effect is substantively large. Thus, the expected number of CDF personnel in a province with no resident tribal population equals 313. In contrast, in a province whose population is 50% tribal, the expectation more than doubles to 636. Figure 5.4 presents the expected values of CDF personnel and the associated 95% confidence interval given a range of tribal populations.[7]

Figure 5.4. Substantive Impact of Tribal Groups on CDF Deployment



As far as the controls are concerned, all of the variables are associated with CDF deployment at a statistically significant level and in the predicted directions. In particular, regression results suggest that a given province's level of insurgent threat strongly determines the number of CDF personnel stationed there (p=0.001). Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is the largest of them all. Given a province in which

[7]The diagram was generated using the Zelig simulation package for R (Imai, King and Lau 2007).

the annual frequency of rebel skirmishes is one standard deviation below the sample mean, the predicted number of deployed CDF personnel is a meager 157. The number increases seven-fold when considering a province one standard deviation above the sample mean of rebel skirmishes (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.3. Substantive Effects of Key Variables

	-1 St. Dev.	*+1 St. Dev.*	
Variable Name	*Predicted CDF Personnel*		*Change*
PERCENT TRIBAL	380	701	+84%
INSURGENT THREAT	157	1,317	+739%
POPULATION SIZE	261	944	+262%
PERCENT RURAL	344	763	+122%
ROAD DENSITY	711	374	-47%

NOTE: Fitted values generated on Stata 12 using Model 2.

Consistent with theoretical expectations, total population size and degree of rurality are positively associated with CDF deployment (p=0.001 and p=0.027, respectively). All else being equal, counterinsurgents can be expected to deploy more than three times as many CDF personnel in provinces where population size is one standard deviation above the sample mean than in provinces one standard deviation below it. Likewise, more rural provinces can be expected to station twice as many personnel as their more urban counterparts. Finally, I find that the density of road coverage is negatively associated with number of deployed personnel (p=0.03). In provinces with more developed road networks, the utility of CDF deployment diminishes relative to more conventional COIN approaches. In consequence, the statistical model predicts that such provinces are likely to receive only half as many CDFs as those with less extensive road coverage (see Table 5.3).

5.3 Sensitivity Analysis

Outliers. I begin the sensitivity analysis by making sure that results do not change once a handful of observations are excluded from the sample. The DFITS statistic is computed for each observation, indicating the difference between the predicted values for a given observation when it is included and excluded from the estimation sample (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch 2004). All observations with DFITS $> 2\sqrt{\frac{k}{N}}$, where k is the number of regressors and N is sample size, are dropped from the sample. Re-estimation of the OLS model on this subsample (N=91) indicates that the statistical significance of the tribal effect is actually strengthened (p=0.007) in the absence of the outliers (see Model 5 in Table 5.4).

Other Measures of Insurgent Threat. As another check of robustness, I also re-estimate the restricted OLS model using the GTD's casualty data instead of rebel skirmish counts (Model 6). The measure reflects the mean annual combatant fatality rate resulting from the skirmishes recorded in the Global Terrorism Database and averaged over the same time periods. Once the model is re-estimated, the tribal effect is somewhat attenuated though still statistically significant at p=0.07. In addition, measured as annual combatant fatality rate, provincial level of insurgent threat remains the strongest predictor of CDF deployment.

Last, a third, alternative indicator is constructed using the following measures: (1) percent of barangays[8] within a given Philippine province which were affected by rebels in year 1988; and (2) the mean yearly terrorism index for the Turkish provinces during the 1984–2000 period. The Philippine data is obtained from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and published in United Nations' 2002 Human Development Report (Tan, de Dios and Ducanes 2002).

[8]A *barangay* is the smallest administrative unit of the Philippine state, roughly corresponding to counties in the U.S. or boroughs and townships in Europe.

Table 5.4. Sensitivity Analysis

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
ROAD DENSITY†	-0.640***	-0.395*	-0.121
	(0.208)	(0.247)	(0.284)
POPULATION SIZE†	0.988***	0.826***	1.439***
	(0.184)	(0.250)	(0.201)
PERCENT RURAL	0.0221***	0.0203**	0.0305***
	(0.00676)	(0.0107)	(0.0108)
PERCENT TRIBAL§	0.104***	0.0841*	0.194***
	(0.0410)	(0.0568)	(0.0550)
INSURGENT THREAT (SKIRMISHES)	1.456***		
	(0.323)		
INSURGENT THREAT (CASUALTIES)		1.284***	
		(0.251)	
INSURGENT THREAT (ALTERNATIVE)			0.768***
			(0.199)
Constant	-10.96***	-10.10***	-15.92***
	(2.531)	(3.331)	(2.976)
Observations	91	99	99

NOTE: standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; one-tailed tests.
† natural log; ‡ inverse; § square root.

The Turkish terrorism index is obtained from Ocal and Yildirim (2010), who in turn built it using the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) catalogue of incidents. The two sets of data are demeaned, standardized, and merged, creating a composite measure that encompasses the entire sample. The model is then once again re-estimated and the results given in Table 5.4 (Model 7). With the exception of road density becoming non-significant, the findings do not change appreciably. Most notably, the provincial prevalence of tribal groups remains positively associated with CDF deployment at a significant level (p=0.00).

5.4 Discussion

The empirical analysis presented in this chapter shows that areas of the countryside inhabited by tribal groups do tend to be associated with more numerous CDF deployments. In this sample, the effect is both statistically significant as well as substantively important, since the predicted number of deployed personnel is expected to double in provinces with large tribal populations. Consistent with the formal model developed earlier, the available evidence thus indicates that intertribal rivalries play an important role in CDF formation. More specifically, it suggests that incumbents are able to deploy CDFs in greater numbers by exploiting these rivalries and in doing so reducing the risk of agent defection.

The inability to integrate traditional groups into mainstream society is often seen as a manifestation of state weakness. While this may well be true in a broader sense, my research implies that the presence of such groups may also benefit important aspects of state strength such as the ability to maintain authority in the face of armed rebellion. Furthermore, if CDF compliance is indeed partly motivated by private rivalrous relationships as the findings appear to suggest, this may imply an increase in civilian casualties following CDF deployment as tribal groups begin slaughtering one another with their newly acquired weapons. The possibility certainly echoes the impressions of many observers and transnational organizations who have long associated militia groups of various kinds with human rights abuses (Asia Watch Report 1992; Butler, Carey and Mitchell 2012; Campbell and Brenner 2002; Francis 2005; Lefkow 2004).

Having said that, CDF deployment may in other ways also work to reduce collateral damage. One possibility hinted at in Chapter 2 is that CDF personnel assist the COIN effort by providing local intelligence to the incumbent. If so, CDF deployment may allow the counterinsurgent to employ violence more selectively, thus reducing civilian casualties associated with COIN operations. In addition, CDFs may also end

up reducing non-combatant casualties if their deployment leads to shorter COIN campaigns. However, the effect may be difficult to detect empirically, if incumbents have a tendency to resort to CDF deployment under more difficult circumstances which also tend to be associated with longer COIN campaigns.

The association of logistical factors such as road density and rurality with CDF deployment suggests that counterinsurgents are indeed generally reticent to delegate weapons to civilians unless absolutely necessary. CDFs are thus more likely to be established whenever traditional COIN approaches appear to be infeasible or prohibitively expensive. Due to the associated logistical difficulties, sparsely populated rural areas with poor transportation infrastructure render conventional deployment difficult to sustain in the long term. As a result, counterinsurgents are more likely to supplement their conventional forces with CDF auxiliaries in such areas.

5.4.1 Illustration: Tribal Rivalries and CDF Service

The evidence adduced thus far supports the contention that counterinsurgents delegate CDF duty in tribal areas more frequently due to the greater prevalence of civilian rivalries present there. The argument depends crucially on the assumption that CDF service is a particularly valuable asset for these actors in helping them deal with their tribal archnemesis. Therefore, if the assumption is valid, we should observe tribal actors leveraging their CDF membership in the context of their local struggles. In this section, I substantiate the claim by providing anecdotal evidence of such behavior. I contend that tribal groups derive two main benefits from association with the state via CDF service: (1) weaponry; and (2) legitimization.

Weaponry

In the case of the Turkish Village Guards, media reports allege that "[d]ozens of village guards have been implicated in [...] abusing their right to carry arms by us-

ing them to settle blood feuds or engage in drug-trafficking and abductions" (Agence France Presse 2010*a*). The CDF's impact on inter-tribal relations was apparent not long after the first wave of Kurdish villages joined it in the mid-1980s. Erdal Inonu, Chairman of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP), thus "called on the government to dissolve the village guard institution, which he said caused strife among tribes in the east, and kindled blood feuds" (Laber and Whitman 1988, 26). Kenan Nehrozoglu, a member of Parliament from Mardin, spoke of the Village Guards in similar terms: "with their guns, rifles and pistols, they use force against their enemies in the villages. Tribal loyalties continue to play a part in the region, and the arming of one side of a blood feud can only lead to trouble" (Laber and Whitman 1988, 26).

The phenomenon has not been unique to the Kurdish tribes and has been observed in many other parts of the world. Thus, for instance, a 2003 report indicated that state-sponsored auxiliaries in Pakistan "shot dead 14 people and wounded 24 others" in an attack that the police identified as being "part of a long running feud between the Bugti and Aisani tribesmen" (Tanveer 2003). Similarly, the Bougainvillean Prime Minister Theodore Miriung blamed state-sponsored auxiliaries of Papua New Guinea (PNG) for the death of eight men after a 1996 attack. Officially, the PNG Army pleaded ignorance but, unofficially, military sources "blamed inter-tribal tensions for the deaths," which O'Callaghan suggests "join a long list of strange or suspicious deaths on Bougainville, most of which will probably never be explained" (O'Callaghan 1996).

In the context of such inter-tribal vendettas, state-issued guns are certainly very useful. But, sometimes, the benefits are so great as to constitute the primary motivation for CDF service. Writing in the aftermath of a 2009 Kurdish inter-tribal massacre that killed 44 people in Turkey, Nicholas Birch explains the logic that drives these groups to join the state-sponsored Village Guard CDF: "[o]ne branch of the family joined up [the CDF] eagerly, not so much out of a sense of loyalty as in the knowledge

that guns, ammunition and state backing would give it the upper hand over its rivals. Much more unwilling to be in the front line of a conflict with [PKK] militants who had a history of massacring CDF families, the other branch took up guns shortly afterwards, so as not to be left behind" (Birch 2009).

Legitimization

While material supplies, principally in the form of weapons, represent the major benefit, CDF service has additional legal advantages as well. Most importantly, formal association with the state through CDF membership serves to legitimize one's goals and actions. Typically, we observe legitimation as local actors shroud their local disputes in the discursive language of the "master cleavage" (Kalyvas 2006, 385). In the case of tribal chieftains, we observe them pursuing their agendas by brandishing local rivals as rebels or rebel sympathizers as a pretext to dealing with them using violent means.

In the context of relatively strong states such as Turkey and the Philippines, where public institutions coexist and sometimes compete with traditional norms and practices, CDF service provides substantial legal benefits. Under normal circumstances, a particularly vicious tribal blood feud is likely to attract the attention of state organs such as the police, who are then likely to hold the perpetrators responsible for what they perceive to be their crimes. In other words, if a group is to satisfy the demands of its tribal code, it may also risk state penalties for doing so. In consequence, the ability to legitimate one's actions through the invocation of "master cleavages" places additional premium on CDF service. As Kreuzer (2005, ii–iii) aptly summarizes the logic as follows:

> [a]s agents of violence, clans and political families can use the civil war agents in many ways, thereby masking their political dealings as civil war violence. In the local political arena, it is vitally important to be

> able to characterise one's own forces as 'state' but those of rival clans as 'rebels' which can then be criminalised [...] The result is a large number of [...] private armies, which, legitimised through state uniforms, stand de facto in the service of a family (Kreuzer 2005, ii–iii).

As a result of this dynamic, we frequently observe tribal auxiliaries pursuing vendettas against their rivals with impunity by justifying their actions as part of the civil war struggle. Speaking in the context of the Philippine Moro insurgency, Kreuzer (2005, 21) notes that "[m]any of the skirmishes between the military or [the state-sponsored CDFs] and the guerrillas stem from the logic of the violent clan conflicts." He further adds that the tribal actors are incentivized to report the skirmishes as part of the overarching conflict because "it would be costly in political terms to report the truth," and because "in case of injuries or fatalities the state payments would be refused, if it concerned a private war" (Kreuzer 2005, 21).

The same dynamic has been observed in the case of the Turkish CDFs. As heads of Village Guard units, Kurdish tribal chiefs "have oppressed their opponents in a lawless and merciless fashion often naming the latter as PKK members," sometimes murdering villagers "against whom they had a vendetta and then [claiming] that they had been members of the PKK" (Cizre 2007). More generally, "traditional enmities and blood feuds among Kurdish tribal clans have often been revisited and redefined as being part of the broader 'anti-PKK struggle'" (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 147).

5.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has attempted to test empirically a prediction of the theory of CDF formation developed in Chapter 4 — namely, that incumbents ought to deploy CDFs more frequently in areas with salient civilian rivalries. Because of the operational difficulties associated with measuring civilian rivalries in conflict-torn countries, this

chapter only tests empirically the model's subnational predictions and only using a proxy measure of tribal population — groups known to harbor intense and long-standing civilian disputes. In line with the model's prediction, multivariate statistical analyses of CDF deployment across Turkish and Philippine provinces reveal that incumbents tend to establish nearly twice as many auxiliaries in provinces with substantial tribal populations. The finding suggests that exploiting local rivalries is a crucial mechanism by which incumbents attempt to ensure CDF loyalty. Not having this compliance-inducing mechanism at their disposal, incumbents facing rural populations without salient tribal divisions are less likely to employ auxiliaries and therefore less likely to reap their COIN benefits. In cases where CDFs do get deployed, compliance incentivization by way of civilian rivalries suggests that human rights abuses are doubly more likely in areas of the country inhabited by tribal populations — both because CDF personnel are more numerous there as well as because they have more scores to settle.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The research presented in this dissertation makes several notable contributions to the existing body of knowledge in political science. First and foremost, it provides a novel answer to a major theoretical issue in the study of armed conflict: how does the modern state maintain its authority and internal order in the face of armed non-state groups able and willing to wage guerrilla warfare in pursuit of their political goals? The question pertains to weak and powerful countries alike, since in recent decades even marginal non-state groups have proven capable of effectively challenging vastly superior incumbents using guerrilla tactics. Confronted with an ongoing insurgency, states may be deemed successful as guardians of internal order insofar as they are able to defeat insurgents militarily or convince them to give up their struggle without having to make major political concessions. Available evidence suggests that one of the ways in which incumbents achieve this aim is by recruiting their own citizens into a civilian defense force to combat insurgents as auxiliaries of the state. Locally recruited and relatively affordable, CDFs are thought to assist COIN effort by restricting rebel maneuvering space, providing valuable tactical intelligence, as well as by driving a wedge between insurgents and the civilian population. Consistent with these theoretical expectations, econometric analysis of the first crossnational data set

of CDF deployment reveals that insurgencies are substantially more likely to end in incumbent victory when civilian auxiliaries have been deployed.

The exploration of CDFs as a particular type of paramilitary group furthers recent efforts by political scientists to disaggregate the concept of militias, recognizing the possibility that different types of paramilitary groups are characterized by distinct causal patterns. Thus, distinguishing informal pro-government militias (PGMs) from semi-official ones, Butler, Carey and Mitchell (2012) find that informal PGMs are associated with substantially more human rights violations, strongly suggesting that paramilitary groups represent a highly heterogeneous conceptual category in need of disaggregation. In light of this possibility, the exclusive analytical focus on CDFs in this dissertation hopes to contribute to an ongoing development of a theoretically informed typology of militia groups. Furthermore, the theory in Chapter 2 explaining how CDFs exert their beneficial effect builds on two major insights that have emerged in recent literature on civil wars. First, the notion that local skills matter is very much consistent with Lyall's (2010*a*) finding that native Chechen auxiliaries possessing intimate local knowledge appear to have been more effective in conducting COIN operations than their regular Russian counterparts during the Second Chechen War. And, second, the idea that CDF deployment has the potential to undermine public support for rebellion by instigating conflict between civilians and insurgents accords with the view that political alignments of civilians are dynamically shaped during wartime and therefore malleable rather than predetermined by ideological preferences (Kalyvas 2006, 2008).

Nevertheless, despite CDFs' apparent usefulness, the data show that incumbents have been remarkably reluctant to deploy them. The fact of the matter is, in the period between 1945 and 2006, civilian auxiliaries have been used in only about a third of all cases of insurgencies. This raises an important question: why would only some incumbents resort to CDFs but not others? In order to address this puzzle, I propose

that the possibility of CDF defection constitutes a principal reason why states may be reluctant to avail themselves of this otherwise beneficial tool of COIN. In consequence, unless they anticipate a low enough rate of defection, counterinsurgents are likely to forego establishment of CDF auxiliaries in favor of other COIN approaches. In the first formal model of CDF formation, I contend that incumbents' fears of CDF defection may be alleviated when contested areas are inhabited by tribal groups. Unfettered by modern state institutions, the practice of blood revenge in remote regions works to set in motion enduring rivalries among tribal peoples, which in turn motivate said groups to enlist as CDFs in order to obtain weapons, money, and the license to pursue their local agendas in the hopes of gaining an upper hand over their local rivals. Should a group lose CDF privileges because the incumbent suspects it may be collaborating with the enemy, that group would suddenly find itself at a great disadvantage relative to its local rivals who are still part of the CDF system. Being aware of this dynamic, the government is able to condition tribal groups' access to the coveted resources on the continued loyalty of their CDF units in the COIN effort. Consistent with this notion, statistical analysis of CDF deployments in Turkey and the Philippines demonstrated that, even after the decision to create them had been made, counterinsurgents delegated CDF duty more frequently to villages in areas in which the threat of defection was less worrisome.

This research on CDF formation contributes to our understanding of the complex relationship between state strength and internal conflict. A conventional and most certainly intuitive view on the matter suggests that state weakness, however conceptualized, correlates with untoward phenomena such as corruption, authoritarianism, civil war onset, and indiscriminate violence, to name but a few (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Kalyvas 2006; Kilcullen 2009; Peic and Reiter 2011).[1] In contrast, the finding that states are more likely to delegate CDF duty in tribal areas reveals that a form

[1]Lyall and Wilson (2009) are a notable exception to this pattern inasmuch as they find that more mechanized counterinsurgents are less likely to prevail against insurgents.

of state weakness may actually help governments deal with internal challenges. The absence of state institutions that is ordinarily linked with grievances against central government and inability to control remote territories in the case of tribal groups also provides fertile ground for ancient social mores such as blood feuding which governments are able to exploit in their drive to suppress a rebel movement.

The study is also relevant to policy makers interested in learning about practical ways of defeating insurgencies and bolstering state authority. Admittedly, this research is expressly amoral in the sense that it does not have any bearing on fundamentally normative questions such as whether a particular incumbent's regime ought to be strengthened or not. As a result, it is conceivable that lessons learned from the study of CDFs could be used to prop up morally reprehensible tyrants just as easily as liberal democracies. Having said that, given an interest in defeating a particular insurgency, my study does help inform important policy questions such as whether CDFs should be deployed and under what circumstances. In the remainder of this section I repeatedly refer to the case of the ongoing Sunni insurgency in Iraq as one of the most publicized and hotly debated civil conflicts in the post-Cold War period. Following the U.S. invasion in 2003 to oust Saddam Hussein from office, American forces promptly disbanded the Iraqi army and transferred power from the Sunni minority to the Shi'a majority. Shortly thereafter, the country descended into bloody sectarian fighting as ousted Sunni groups, with Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) increasingly at the forefront, initiated an insurgency against the new government and its foreign patrons. It is against this backdrop that the United States decided in 2006 to establish a CDF called the Sons of Iraq (SoI) (also known as Awakening Councils or Concerned Local Citizens) — an instance of CDF deployment which illustrates the myriad considerations involved in answering such policy questions.

Whether CDFs ought to be utilized in any given case depends most obviously on whether there is reason to believe that their deployment is going to benefit the

incumbent's COIN effort or not. Part I of the dissertation bears directly on the latter question. Thus, the crossnational analysis of COIN outcomes in Chapter 3 demonstrated that insurgencies in which CDFs had been deployed were 44 percent more likely to end in COIN victory. In general, then, CDF deployment may be said to hold significant promise in helping to defeat insurgencies. Although the 2003 Iraqi civil war falls outside of the temporal scope of the present study, American experience with the SoI certainly appears to comport with the aforementioned findings. Thus, the Iraqi CDFs are widely credited for much of the sharp reduction in sectarian violence that occurred after 2007 (Connable and Libicki 2010, 150; Tucker 2010, 106; Ricks 2009; Herring 2009, 200). As a result, U.S. casualties declined from 904 in 2007, 314 in 2008, 149 in 2009, down to just 60 in 2010 (Doyle 2011). Moreover, there is anecdotal evidence in support of nearly all mechanisms outlined in Chapter 2 by which CDFs are thought to exert their beneficial effect. Numbering more than 100,000 native Sunnis by 2011, some of whom were former insurgents, the SoI are thought to have: (1) restricted insurgents' "operational space" (Gus 2011, 35); (2) provided valuable intelligence on the AQI to the Americans (Lansford 2011, 136; McCary 2009, 51–2); as well as (3) undermined public support for AQI as the latter engaged in "brutal [...] retaliatory attacks on [the SoI] and the tribal leaders who backed them" (Rosen 2011, 226).

However, this finding that CDF deployment is associated with COIN success should not be taken as evidence that CDFs would have a similar effect in any and all cases of insurgency. On the contrary, just as the effective treatment of a medical disease necessitates a careful assessment of the suitability of a treatment option given that patient's particular condition, so too does the judicious use of CDFs in suppressing an insurgency require a careful consideration of that country's conditions. As we saw in Chapter 4, a crucial selection process underscores an government's ability to employ CDFs profitably. During the selection process, the incumbent must assess

carefully the risk of CDF defection to the rebel side, and only if this risk is judged sufficiently low can CDF deployment be beneficial to COIN. In Iraq, reports suggest that the possibility of auxiliary defection ranked as a foremost concern in the eyes of the Baghdad government, as "Shi'ite political leaders were suspicious of the new practice of arming Sunni groups" (Cordesman and Davies 2008, 519). Thus, in deciding whether CDF deployment is appropriate in any given case, the most relevant factors that need to be considered are those which affect the likelihood of CDF defection.

In my dissertation, I have devoted most of my attention to one such factor — the prevalence of intertribal rivalries and the mechanism by which incumbents can exploit them to deter defection among CDF personnel. Consistent with the notion that tribal CDFs are less likely to defect, statistical analysis in Chapter 5 showed that governments do preferentially delegate auxiliary duty to civilians in tribal areas of the countryside. Thus, a most straightforward insight that emerges from it is that auxiliary deployment may be better suited to fighting insurgencies in those countries with sizeable tribal populations and salient intertribal divisions, since such conditions appear to give governments greater leverage with which to ensure CDF compliance. As far as Iraq is concerned, despite intersecting nationalist and sectarian loyalties that have received so much media coverage, tribal identity is deeply rooted in the psyche of most Iraqi citizens (Peters 2011, 107; Stolzoff 2009, 7). Furthermore, like in much of the rest of the world, tribalism in Iraq is characterized by a ceaseless intertribal competition for power and prestige, often times using the weak Iraqi state as its vehicle. In the words of Stolzoff (2009, 49), "[v]irtually every major event in Iraqi history can be interpreted and analyzed in the context of tribal competition for power and resources, as tribalism always plays a role in this on some level, even if the political players responsible for those events are doing so in repudiation or denial of their [...] status as tribal actors." In this regard, the Iraqi civil war certainly seems to have been a suitable candidate for CDF deployment. It is unsurprising that, in

accordance with my findings from Turkey and the Philippines, the Iraqi CDF also appears to have been organized around influential Sunni tribes such as the Abu Fahd tribe in Anbar province (Doyle 2011).

The decision of U.S. policy makers to create an Iraqi CDF also seems sensible considering that the number of deployed American troops had been wholly insufficient in order to successfully prosecute a clear-and-hold COIN strategy. In spite of numerous suggestions that stabilizing was going to require up to half a million regular U.S. troops on the ground, the administration of President George W. Bush stationed a force of about 140,000 personnel — a figure widely criticized as insufficient (Lansford 2011, 131; Belasco 2010, 38; Lewis 2007, 442). In response to U.S. General Eric Shineski's claim that hundreds of thousands of additional troops would be needed, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz replied that "it is hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself" (Shimko 2010, 200–1). Yet, precisely that turned out to be the case, as U.S. forces proved unable to stem the tide of the Sunni insurgency. In light of the counterinsurgent's manpower shortage and the political opposition to further costly increases in U.S. troop levels, the establishment of native auxiliaries represented an affordable alternative option. Thus, in comparison to the estimated cost of fielding one additional regular U.S. soldier of about $200,000, the $150 to $300 salary of a typical SoI serviceman appears positively minuscule (Serafino 2005, 26–7; Cordesman and Mausner 2009, 198).

Even though insufficient COIN troop levels provide sound rationale for the adoption of a CDF, grossly undermanned COIN is a recipe for CDF ineffectiveness and defection. As mentioned in Chapter 3, protecting CDF personnel from concerted guerrilla predation constitutes one of the major challenges of sustaining a static defense force. In the absence of such protection, CDF units are likely to either collaborate with the enemy in order to survive or be slaughtered at the hands of rebels and in

doing so deter others from serving as auxiliaries. Providing security to CDF units effectively tends to be easier when the country's terrain, infrastructure, and population dispersion are such that they favor rapid COIN response to insurgent attacks. When this is not the case, population resettlement and the use of helicopters may improve the defensibility of CDF units. Having said that, if an incumbent's regular manpower is so deficient as to make providing for auxiliary personnel's security infeasible even under favorable conditions, the deployment of CDFs would still be ill-advised. In Iraq, there is evidence that U.S. troop levels prior to 2007 had been insufficient for this purpose, since several attempts at coopting tribal Sunni allies ended up in their execution or defection to the insurgent side. Arguably, only following the infusion of 30,000 additional American troops in 2007 — commonly known as the "Surge" — did an effective CDF program become feasible. Furthermore, thanks to the country's decent transportation infrastructure and highly sophisticated U.S. military equipment, "[w]hen Awakening tribes were attacked, the Americans provided air and armor support and rescued them" (Rosen 2011, 226). Thus, it may be said that, while insufficient troop levels make CDF deployment justifiable, grossly insufficient troop levels make it imprudent.

Clearly, before proceeding with their deployment, the aforementioned benefits should be weighed against the potential risks, including CDF defection as well as increased human rights abuses. Indeed, in the model of CDF formation presented in Chapter 4, the ability to misuse government-issued weaponry represents a key incentive that motivates CDF mobilization. Although the claim has not been tested quantitatively, a preponderance of historical evidence suggests that CDF auxiliaries tend to be associated with human rights abuses. Due to the gravity of these risks, CDF deployment should be considered only as a measure of last resort after all other approaches appear to have been exhausted. Consistent with this notion, the analysis of the timing of CDF introduction in Chapter 3 shows that incumbents rarely resort

to them at the very outset of an insurgency. In fact, analysis of the available data indicated that the median CDF introduction occurred some 4 years after the onset of insurgency with median duration of nearly 8 years.

Furthermore, the U.S. government's deployment of the Sons of Iraq also conforms to the more general pattern in that the decision to do so was reached only after the situation in the country had become untenable and few policy alternatives seemed feasible. In essence, the situation in Iraq by 2007 had become characterized by the flourishing of insurgent groups in Iraq, mounting combatant and civilian casualties, as well as increasing domestic opposition in the United States. Thanks to many U.S. officials' expectations of a peaceful post-Saddam Iraq, underpowered American troops in the country proved incapable of containing (much less suppressing) the emerging insurgency following the ousting of the Baathist regime in 2003. The bombing of the Iraqi parliament in April of 2007 serves to show that the Sunni rebellion had grown so strong by that time as to be able to pose a constant threat to the security of even the most heavily fortified International Zone in downtown Baghdad (Katzman 2008, 83). Meanwhile, the mounting human costs of the spiraling conflict had come to include some 3,000 U.S. deaths, over 20,000 Iraqi combatant fatalities, as well as a staggering number of civilian casualties, with estimates ranging from 100,000 to over a million (Tucker 2010, 266–7). In addition, the total financial cost of the war had been estimated to some $3 trillion, most of which had been funded through borrowing, thus increasing the public debt burden to levels not seen since the end of World War Two (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008; Schumer 2007).

Finally, public opposition to the war had grown steadily, plunging President Bush's approval ratings to about 30% (one of the lowest recorded presidential approval ratings in U.S. history), and helping to bring about the Democratic takeover of the Congress and the presidency in 2006 and 2008, respectively (Harvey 2011, 182; Tucker 2010, 1330–3; Wilson III 2007, 4–5). Riding on this wave of opposition, the incoming Demo-

cratic President Barack Obama was keenly aware that the American public's patience had largely run out, and that he would have little option but to embrace unconventional approaches such as CDF deployment to try to bring the Sunni insurgency to a rapid close. Therefore, as in most other cases of CDF deployment, the American government's decision to arm tribal Sunnis came on the heels of an apparent COIN failure as an option of last resort. Although early CDF deployment may sometimes be justifiable, the general risks of defection and increased human rights abuses warrant a more conservative attitude toward their use in most cases of insurgency.

6.1 Unanswered Questions For Future Research

As mentioned earlier, one of the main contributions of the research presented here is that it advances our understanding of the effectiveness of CDF deployment. In doing so, it outlines a number of plausible mechanisms by which civilian auxiliaries are thought to exert their beneficial effect on COIN outcomes. However, one of the main limitations of my approach here is that the crossnational empirical test of the theory in Chapter 3 cannot discriminate among the aforementioned individual mechanisms. As a result, while the results coming out of this study do tells us a great deal about the effectiveness of CDFs in general, we still do not know which of the mechanisms are more important in helping to bring about COIN success and which are less so. A research agenda aiming to discriminate among these various mechanisms would go a long way toward improving our current understanding of the determinants of COIN outcomes as well as help inform policy making.

The policy relevance of such a research agenda can be illustrated by the fact that some CDF personnel are not recruited from the same ethnic group to which insurgents themselves belong. As an example, battling the Tamil insurgency in the Jaffna peninsula, the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government recruited its home guard

units almost exclusively from members of the Sinhalese migrant communities living in traditionally Tamil areas of the countryside. While there have been few such cases in the post-World War Two period, many CDF programs have incorporated members from different ethnic groups. Thus, for instance, attempting to suppress the Chinese-dominated communist insurgency in Malaya, the British-sponsored home guard program incorporated both members of the Chinese minority as well as members of the Malayan majority. Now, the question then becomes: are co-ethnic CDFs (e.g. the Chinese home guards) more effective than their non-ethnic counterparts (e.g. the Malayan home guards)? And, should co-optation of co-ethnics appear to be infeasible for whatever reason, is the deployment of non-ethnic CDFs (as in the case of Sri Lankan home guards) still beneficial to COIN? Answering these and other similar questions would not only serve to elucidate the relative importance of ethnolinguistic skills and the restriction of rebel mobility, it would also be of great interest to all policy makers contemplating the deployment of civilian auxiliaries to combat an ethnic insurgency.

A second major limitation of the present study pertains to its scope inasmuch as it examines only the effect of CDFs on COIN outcomes. In light of their effectiveness in this area, there is good reason for future research to look at the effect of auxiliary deployment on other conflict variables. One possibility left unexplored is that CDF deployment may affect conflict onset as well as conflict outcomes. Given that some CDFs persist even after war's end, it is entirely plausible that their presence may influence the likelihood of conflict recurrence. Thus, for instance, the Turkish-sponsored village guards continued to exist even after PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's capture in 1999 and the PKK's subsequent weakening. Despite achieving insurgent defeat, an incumbent may not want to disband the deployed self-defense forces, fearing that the insurgent organization may not have been completely destroyed and that a restart of guerrilla operations against the state at a future date remains a possibility. In

addition, given that CDF service often bestows significant benefits on its personnel, CDF units themselves may have reason to advocate against their disarmament. At any rate, the presence of civilian auxiliaries may serve to deter insurgent attacks from recurring or keep the number of casualties resulting from any renewed violence below the definitional threshold. A selection effect may operate here as well provided incumbents can assess the risk of renewed conflict relatively accurately, and therefore if warfare is more likely to recur in cases where CDFs have been retained. A research agenda aiming to elucidate any potential association of CDFs with insurgency onset may thus contribute to our existing understanding of factors affecting conflict recurrence.

In addition to their consequences for COIN outcomes, CDF deployment may conceivably also affect insurgency duration. This possibility seems particularly important in light of the earlier observation that these self-defense paramilitaries tend to be used in the more difficult cases of insurgencies. In such cases, CDF deployment may mean the difference between a COIN defeat and a draw or the difference between a COIN defeat and a victory, as this research suggests. However, given that belligerents embroiled in civil conflicts are often unable to commit credibly to negotiated settlements, COIN success may come at the price of prolonged warfare until the two sides are able to commit credibly to a war-ending agreement or until the insurgent movement is defeated militarily. The possibility that CDF deployment may be associated with prolonged internal conflicts would be relevant to policy makers as well as activists interested in managing the enormously deleterious impact of warfare on civil society.

Finally, as mentioned previously, the propensity of CDF personnel to engage in human rights abuses has been amply documented throughout the world. Given this welter of anecdotal evidence, the scholarly community may want to turn its attention to this issue in order to examine more systematically the possible association of CDF deployment and the incidence of human rights abuses. A welcome first step in

this direction has been taken by Butler, Carey and Mitchell (2012) in their as yet unpublished study of the impact of pro-government militias (PGMs) on the respect for human rights. Most relevant for the purpose of present discussion, Butler, Carey and Mitchell (2012) find that informal militias tend to be associated with violations of human rights to a much larger degree than semi-official PGMs. Furthermore, while semi-official PGMs are also found to be associated with abuses, their negative impact is not different from zero at a statistically significant level.

However, even though their research represents a laudable effort to study the propensity of militias for human rights violations, important problems remain to be addressed. Thus, while a significant overlap exists between semi-official PGMs and CDFs, the authors' definition of semi-official PGMs does not include the self-defense criterion used to identify CDFs in this dissertation. As a result, their finding of no relationship between semi-official PGMs and human rights violations sheds light only imperfectly on the potential association of CDFs and such breaches of humanitarian law. A second major reason to doubt the applicability of these findings to CDFs is that many CDF abuses may be occurring at a smaller scale, which allows them to be concealed deliberately as insurgent casualties. Data limitations notwithstanding, further research on this topic would no doubt serve to improve our understanding of the causes and consequences of CDFs as well as equip policy makers and activists to better manage any negative side effects arising from their use.

Appendix A

Documentation for COIN Outcome Codings

This section of the appendix provides supporting documentation for all coding decisions made with respect to the COIN outcome variable in the data set based on the Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) list of insurgencies.

1. **Greece vs. Communists (1944–1949)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"After three years of fighting, the civil war ended with the defeat of the rebel forces [...] made possible partly by American aid and partly by the closing of the Yugoslav frontier as a result of Tito's quarrel with the Cominform" (Stearns 2001). See also Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 236), Kohn (2007, 216).

2. **Russia vs. Latvia/LTSPA (1944–1949)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

3. **Russia vs. Lithuania/BDPS (1944–1949)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels

were defeated militarily.

4. **Russia vs. Estonia, Forest Brothers (1944–1949)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"Fierce fighting occurred primarily in Lithuania between the Soviet army and the Brethren for the first two and a half years after the end of the World War (May 7, 1945), and then continued at lower levels. By 1951 the Soviets had crushed the partisans, though suffering heavy losses themselves" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 408).

5. **Russia vs. Ukraine/UPA (1944–1949)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"The day after the end of World War II marks the start of this separate war, in which the UPA fought against the Soviet army [...] The UPA in the Ukraine at its height had 90,000 men who engaged in a guerilla war, causing the deaths of over 35,000 Soviet troops. Although most of the fighting ended in 1947, limited attacks continued until 1954" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 408).

6. **China vs. Taiwanese Nationalists (1947–1947)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"[The GMD nationalist government] had wiped out a major sector of the local elite in the repressions of 1947. Some 2 million GMD leaders, their families, and their supporters had flocked to Taiwan in 194849 and soon dominated politics completely" (Stearns 2001). "As soon as [government reinforcements] landed on March 8, the governor-general suspended negotiations, declared martial law, and staged a massive crackdown on the rebels. The KMT troops quickly seized control of major cities, encountering only minor resistance. On March 13, a more virulent campaign, called 'exterminating traitors and cleaning out villages,' was conducted to root out rebels

hiding in the countryside, to prevent future uprisings" (Ye 2007, 251–2). "[From] March 8 to May 15 [. . .] KMT troop reinforcements arrived in Taiwan and, together with provincial and military police, easily and ruthlessly suppressed the Uprising" (Lai, Myers and Wei 1991, 8). See also Clodfelter (2002, 697), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 409).

7. **Korea vs. Military (Yosu Rebellion) (1948–1949)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"Just two months after the founding of the ROK, a rebellion of communist guerrillas and peasants broke out in Cheju Island that challenged the authority of the new regime. The Rhee government's response was a severe crackdown in Cheju-do that resulted in thousands of deaths" (Sambanis 2001 Data Set Codebook, 127). "[T]he guerrillas never again posed any great menace to the ROK [. . .] because of a lack of support in the countryside, the absence of heavy vegetation to shield their movements [. . .] and the ruthlessness of the Rhee regime" (Sandler 1999, 219).

8. **Burma vs. Communists (1948-1988)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"All these factors can help explain the sudden implosion of the Communist insurgency in Burma. In March 1989, some Kokang Chinese CPB troops rebelled, and the mutiny quickly spread into all Communist areas in the northeast. The Wa units joined the mutiny in April, the CPB split into several ethnically based forces, and the party leadership fled into exile in China. When news of the events spread, the Myanmar government reacted quickly, making contact with the newly formed groups and offering them agreements whereby they would remain in autonomous control of their respective territories" (Lintner 1994). "Several groups quickly signed the cease-fire agreements, including the largest army formed from the remains of the CPB, the

United Wa State Army (UWSA). One of the provisions for the ceasefire with the 20,000 troops strong UWSA was that the organization would help the government defeat other rebels in their vicinity" (Kreutz 2007, 543–4).

9. **Burma vs. Karen (KNU) (1948–1951)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"The government launched counteroffensives in 1949 and 1950 that regained control of the country. For the most part the Communists had been suppressed, and the government entered into an agreement with the Karens in 1951" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 411). "By [1953] Burmese troops under the able General U Ne Win (19112002) had regained control of most parts of the country" (Kohn 2007, 85). "In 1950, U Ne Win launched a spring counteroffensive and began to push the Karens back. On March 19, Burmese forces retook [self-proclaimed Karen capital] Toungoo, and, on May 19, Prome (although Communist forces continued to operate from that area). The Karen revolt ended in 1951 when the Constituent Assembly voted to establish a Karen state at Kawthule" (Phillips and Axelrod 2005, 244).

10. **Philippines vs. Huks (1950–1952)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

By 1950, "the United States began sending large quantities of arms and other material to the Philippine government army, which made it more effective. With the election of Ramon Magsaysay (190757) to the presidency in 1953 and his subsequent reforms, popular support of the Huks waned. In 1954, the Huks leader surrendered, and the long rebellion ended" (Kohn 2007, 234). "Even more effective against the Huks than U.S. weapons was the presidency of Ramón Magsaysay (190757), whose bold political and economic reforms, beginning in 1953, quickly eroded popular support for the communist movement. The last leader of the Huks surrendered in 1954"

(Phillips and Axelrod 2005, 572).

11. **Bolivia vs. MNR (La Paz) (1952–1952)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. The counterinsurgent was defeated militarily.

The counterinsurgent was defeated militarily. "[T]he MNR, supported by armed workers, civilians, and peasants and the national police, overthrew the military junta" (Kohn 2007, 68). "A revolt in La Paz led by students, workers, and the national police, and bolstered by tin miners from the countryside, overthrew the junta of Gen. Ballivn after three days of bloody fighting" (Stearns 2001). See also Clodfelter (2002, 716).

12. **Indonesia vs. Darul Islam (1953–1953)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"Some of [the rebel] military leaders were co-opted by the Indonesian state, and its original political base in West Java was quickly intimidated into submission" (Glaudell 2007, 428). "By the end of November 1953, [the government] had driven the rebels into the hinterlands" (Reid 2006, 131). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 412–3).

13. **China vs. Tibet (1956–1959)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"The Dalai Lama [...] failed to reach a concessional agreement with Chinese authorities [...] China soon crushed the revolt, killing thousands in reprisals and repressive measures" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 210). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 413).

14. **Indonesia vs. Darul Islam, PRRI (1956–1960)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"The central government mainly responded to these challenges with the use of force. It conceded to some regionalist demands by the creation of some new provinces, such as Aceh and Central Kalimantan [. . .] It continued to contain the spread of the Darul Islam and crushed the PRRI rebellion" (Bertrand 2004, 36). "Sukarno's army was able to put down these revolts, even though the United States was secretely dropping arms to the rebels" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 414). "The ending of PRRI freed the army to concentrate upon [. . .] its old Darul Islam enemy in West Java [. . .] In June [rebel leader Kartosuwirjo] was captured and tried [. . .] He was executed in September. Security was restored to the countryside of West Java for the first time since the Revolution" (Ricklefs 2001, 326–7).

15. **Cuba vs. Castro (1958–1959)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. The counterinsurgent was defeated militarily.

In 1959, "Castro led the first of his motley columns into Havana, Cubas capital, where they were hailed enthusiastically by the people [. . .] A provisional government was quickly formed with Castro as premier" (Kohn 2007, 148). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 414–5).

16. **Iraq vs. Shammar (1959–1959)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"[A] garrison, which was allied with the local Shammar tribe, seized power in Mosul and declared a revolt against Kassem's regime. Government forces, aided by the local Kurdish tribes, launched a counterattack that quickly defeated the rebels" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 415). See also Hartzell and Hoddie (2007, 6).

17. **Laos vs. Pathet Lao (1960–1973)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands. However, after the 1973 agreement, the rebels ended up taking over control of the country. "These talks led to the formation of a provisional government that equally represented both parties. By 1975 the Pathet Lao had de facto control over the government and large numbers of right-wing supporters began to flee the country" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 176).

18. **Burma vs. Karen (KNU) (1960–1995)**. COIN Outcome: Win. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded no insurgent demands.

"[The government] destroyed the Karen rebel base in Manoplaw [. . .] in 1995" (Kohn 2007, 85). "In December 1994, a few hundred [Buddhist KNU] soldiers mutinied and declared the formation of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). Almost immediately, the DKBA announced a cease-fire with the government and helped guide Burma Army troops through the minefields and other obstacles into the KNU headquarters of Mannerplaw" (Kreutz 2007, 545). "The armed forces were able to break the back of the Karen insurgency by 1997, driving the remaining Karen rebels out of their bases in the eastern mountain ranges [. . .] The Karens have very clearly suffered a very serious setback but they have not been crushed [...] the KNU emphasized a political as opposed to a purely military approach to the Karen struggle" (Tan 2007, 47). While the KNU continues to launch guerrilla strikes against Burmese targets occassionally, the intensity of warfare has dropped below the inclusion criteria (*Uppsala Conflict Data Program* 2008).

19. **USA/S. Vietnam vs. NLF (Vietcong) (1960–1975)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded nearly all insurgent demands.

"The United States withdrew from Vietnam on January 27, 1973, though the war continued [] until the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 156).

20. **Iraq vs. Kurds (1961–1970)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"In June 1966 the Kurds and the Iraqi government agreed on a twelve-point plan aimed at improving conditions for Kurds [...] it was only after the Iraqi government reaffirmed the twelve-point plan in January 1970 that the negotiations leading to an armistice agreement made any progress. The armistice was signed on March 11, 1970" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 274). The counterinsurgent then made substantial concessions. "Hostilities temporarily ended after the negotiation (1970) of limited autonomy, the recognition of Kurdish as an official language, and political concessions such as the appointment of a Kurdish vice president" (Stearns 2001). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 421), Strakes (2007, 451).

21. **Algeria vs. CNDR (1962–1963)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"After [rebel leader] Ait Ahmed's arrest, [...] the [rebel movement] ceased to be a threat to the regime." In 1964, "[Algerian president] Ben Bella finally put [rebel leaders] and four of their accomplices on trial [...] the sentences were as expected: [they] were condemned to death" but were later commuted to life imprisonment (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970, 103–4).

22. **Kenya vs. Shifta (Somalis) (1963–1967)**. COIN Outcome: Win. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded no insurgent demands.

"The violence was halted in March 1964, when the Somali tribes declared their acceptance of Kenyan rule [...] Negotiations from 1967 led to an understanding in 1969, and relations between Somalia and Kenya were normalized" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 66).

23. **Sudan vs. Anya Nya (1963–1972)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"Finally, on March 27, 1972, the government of General Gaafar Nimeiry, negotiated a peace with the [rebel] Anya-Nya, one that maintained Sudanese unity but granted the black south a degree of local autonomy" (Clodfelter 2002, 611). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 419), Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 67), Kohn (2007, 529).

24. **Burundi vs. Hutus (1965–1969)**. COIN Outcome: None. Observation dropped.

25. **Chad vs. FROLINAT (1965–1979)**. COIN Outcome: Win. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded nearly all insurgent demands.

"[Rebel] successes in defeating government forces within the first two years led the French to intervene to support the government [and] by [June 1971] the government had suppressed the rebellion" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 423). However, once Libya intervened to support the rebel movement, they managed to seize "about 80 percent of the country by the end of 1978 [...] In 1979, [President] Malloum was deposed and fled to Nigeria; a provisional government was formed with Goukouni Oueddi (1944), a former FROLINAT leader, as president and Hissen Habr (1942) as defense minis-

ter" (Kohn 2007, 109). See also Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 81), Clodfelter (2002, 613).

26. **Guatemala vs. URNG (1966–1972)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"[President Arana] declared martial law and woved to eliminate all the guerrillas. The guerrillas retaliated, but they were crushed and rebel leader Marco Antonio Yon Sosa was killed" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 426). See also Ball, Kobrak and Spirer (1999).

27. **Thailand vs. Communists (1966–1982)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"The insurgency waned during the 1980s, until, by the end of the decade, it had been reduced to the level of banditry in the most isolated sections of the country" (Clodfelter 2002, 687). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 429).

28. **Uganda vs. Baganda Rebellion (1966–1966)**. COIN Outcome: None. Observation dropped.

29. **Cambodia vs. FUNK (1970–1975)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. The counterinsurgent was defeated militarily.

"Despite U.S. airlifts of material to Phnom Penh, the city fell to the Khmer Rouge on April 16, 1975; the government of Lon Nol (who had fled by air) capitulated" (Kohn 2007, 100). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 427).

30. **Oman vs. Dhofar (1971–1975)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

The rebels were defeated militarily. "By late 1974 the Dhofari [rebels] had largely been defeated" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 280). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 432), Clodfelter (2002, 635).

31. **Philippines vs. Moros (MNLF) (1971–1996)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"The negotiating position of the MNLF changed over time. Its original demand was an independent homeland of twenty-one provinces, but in the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the MNLF and the Philippine government, it accepted an autonomous Moro state within the Philippines that included only thirteen provinces" (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000). In 1989, the Philippine legislature approved the creation of an autonomous Moro entity but on the condition that it be subject to a popular referendum. At the referendum, only four of the 13 opted to become part of the new ARMM (Yegar 2002, 335). Even though the MNLF at first did not accept the arrangement, it did so eventually. "A peace agreement between the government and the MNLF in September 1996 created an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and ended twenty-four years of rebellion" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 182). "MNLFs leader, Nur Misuari [...] was made governor of the newly formed Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)" (Kohn 2007, 413). "In September 1996, President Fidel Ramos and Nur Misuari, the leader of the MNLF, signed a final peace accord ending the twenty-four-year-long insurgency. Under the terms of the accord, Misuari became governor of the four-province region of Muslim Mindanao and head of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development with jurisdiction over thirteen provinces" (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000). See also Manacsa and Tan (2007, 628–9), Clodfelter (2002, 690).

32. **Sri Lanka vs. JVP (1971–1971)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"A leftist insurrection led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, or People's Liberation Front) [. . .] was suppressed with considerable ruthlessness" (Stearns 2001). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 427).

33. **Philippines vs. NPA (1972–1992)**. COIN Outcome: Win. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded no insurgent demands.

"[The NPA] gradually declined in strength because of government military pressure and the worldwide decline of communism in the 1990s [. . .] Torn by internal strife, the NPAs strength fell to about 13,000 rebels (half what it had in 1987)" (Kohn 2007, 412). "In 1992 the National Unification Commission established a peace process, which ended the major fighting. Despite several attempts at negotiating a settlement, however, the peace process stalled, and clashes [. . .] continued at sub-war levels" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 430).

34. **Rhodesia vs. ZANU, ZAPU (1972–1979)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

"[E]ach year took a greater toll on both sides, and a pattern of raid and reprisal developed [. . .] This moved Prime Minister Smith to arrange a compromise by turning over leadership to a majority black government under a moderate black leader, Bishop Abel Muzorewa [. . .] Guerrilla leaders who were not included in the government, however, continued the war, claiming that Muzorewa was a white puppet" (Phillips and Axelrod 2005, 934). In 1979, "[t]he Lancaster House Conference, facilitated by Britain and the U.S., reached a negotiated settlement of the Zimbabwean War, leading to elections and independence" (Stearns 2001). "Elections early in 1980

brought [rebel leader] Robert Mugabe to power" (Clodfelter 2002, 625). See also Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 73).

35. **South Africa vs. Namibia (1973–1989)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

"A series of UN-sponsored mediations by U.S. negotiator Chester Crocker led to a settlement signed on December 22, 1988, providing for the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia. The withdrawal was completed by November 23, 1989, and UN-supervised elections were held in 1990. The elections brought SWAPOs guerrilla leader, Sam Nujoma, to power" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 72). See also Kohn (2007, 359), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 322–3), Clodfelter (2002, 623).

36. **Pakistan vs. Baluchistan (1973–1977)**. COIN Outcome: Win. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded no insurgent demands.

"The Baluchi make up one of the major ethnic groups in Pakistan [...] They generally favored the creation of their own state, and in 1973 they launched a rebellion against the Pakistani government" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 431). Pakistani and Iranian military cooperation finally crushed the rebellion in 1977, razing whole villages and leaving over 10,000 Baluch dead (Minahan 2002, 258). "By 1977, Baluch leaders were exiled and Pakistan was able to ensure its territorial integrity. Concessions to the Baluch were now unnecessary" (Nisan 2002, 81–2). The rebel movement was not completely defeated and continued to launch sporadic attacks from camps in Afghanistan (Ali and Rehman 2001, 73). The fighting continued intermittently until "General Zia released from 6,000 to 11,000 Baloch from jails [...] and declared amnesty for the guerrillas who had taken refuge in Afghanistan or Iran" (Baxter 2002,

221). See also Clodfelter (2002, 670), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 430–1).

37. **Bangladesh vs. Chittagong Hills/Shanti Bahini (1974–1997)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"In December 1997 a peace agreement with the Shanti Bahini rebels ended twenty-two years of insurgency and armed conflict. The agreement allowed for amnesty provisions, rebel disarmament, and greater control of the Hill Tracts by district councils. The Shanti Bahini rebels officially surrendered their arms at a ceremony in February 1998" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 216). See also Mohsin (2003, 45), Kohn (2007, 55–6).

38. **Ethiopia vs. Eritrean Insurgents (1974–1991)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. The counterinsurgent was defeated militarily.

"In the 1990s, under pressure from several devastating famines and a similar rebellion in the Tigre province, the Ethiopian government was unable to maintain effective control and fell in May 1991 after a concerted offensive by several rebel groups" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 70). "The EPLF then took control of Eritrea, which later gained full independence (May 3, 1993), leaving Ethiopia a landlocked country" (Kohn 2007, 179). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 442).

39. **Iraq vs. Kurdish Rebels (1974–1975)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"A March 1975 agreement resolved a territorial dispute between Iraq and Iran [...] Without Iranian support [...] Iraq quickly quelled the rebellion" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 283). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 432), Stearns (2001).

40. **Cambodia vs. Khmer Rouge Defectors, FUNCINPEC, KPNLF (1975–1991)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"In October 1991 the Cambodian government reached an accommodation with three rival armed movements that offered a path out of the 13-year civil war" (Clodfelter 2002, 690). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 452).

41. **Indonesia vs. East Timor (Fretilin) (1975–1999)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

"Indonesia recognized East Timors right to independence in October 1999, leaving it under UN administration en route to full independence" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 184). "On August 30, 1999, the East Timorese people voted overwhelmingly (78.5 percent) for independence" (Kohn 2007, 251). See also Clodfelter (2002, 691).

42. **Morocco/Western Sahara vs. Polisario (1975–1991)**. COIN Outcome: Win.

Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands. "Hostilities ceased in 1991, when Morocco and the Polisario agreed to hold a UN-supervised referendum on the future of Western Sahara" (Kohn 2007, 523). "The Polisario supported the referendum, but Morocco moved in settlers, who probably now outnumber the indigenous Sahrawis, to the territory it held. Morocco argued that the settlers, presumably all in favor of union, should be allowed to vote in the proposed referendum" (Ackermann et al. 2008, 460). "Public statements by Moroccan officials, including King Muhammad VI, stressing that Morocco will never surrender the Western Sahara, cast further doubts over the kingdoms intention to let a referendum determine the final status of the territory" (Bercovitch and Fretter

2004, 77). While Morocco did acknowledge the "futility of trying to defend all of the Western Sahara and decided to concentrate their efforts on securing the most important phosphate-rich region in the north" (Clodfelter 2002, 615), and Polisario continues to administer the remainder of Western Sahara as "liberated territory" (Ackermann et al. 2008, 460), the magnitude of government concession relative to Polisario's demands does not justify coding the outcome as a draw.

43. **Ethiopia vs. Ogaden (Somalis) (1976–1988)**. COIN Outcome: Win.

"This event refers to the rebellion staged by the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) for control of the southern Ethiopian province of Ogaden, which both the WSLF and Somalia wanted Somalia to annex. [. . .] An agreement to end hostilities was signed on April 3, 1988, under which both sides agreed to withdraw troops from the border, exchange prisoners, end hostile propaganda and acts of destabilization against each other and deal with the more difficult question of defining the border at a later date. With the agreement came an end to Somali support for the WSLF, hence by 1989 its demise as an effective guerilla organization" (Sambanis 2001 Data Set Codebook, 79–80). See also Kohn (2007, 180), Phillips and Axelrod (2005, 446), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 436).

44. **Indonesia vs. OPM (West Papua) (1976–1978)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"The [rebel] OPM was reduced to operating in two rival bands working from inside the territory of Papua New Guinea on Irian Jayas eastern frontier [. . .] One estimate had only 200 hardcore OPM warriors (Rabasa and Haseman 2002, 107). The government of Papua New Guinea was far more concerned with maintaining diplomatic ties with Indonesia than with promoting the welfare of its ethnic kin in Irian Jaya, so its support for OPM forces working from its remote western highlands has been limited"

(Glaudell 2007, 430). "There was no clear-cut conclusion to the war, though factional fighting within the OPN weakened its level of activity" after 1978 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 434). "Beginning in 1968, the rebels carried out guerrilla attacks on Indonesian forces and development projects and claimed to have killed 3,513 soldiers prior to April 1978. However in 1978, the rebel leader, Jacob Prai, was captured, and Papua New Guinea agreed to take measures to prevent its territory being used as a base by the rebels" (Rudolph 2003, 319).

45. **Mozambique vs. RENAMO (1976–1992)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"In 1990, FRELIMO abandoned the marxist system, accepted many MNR demands, and adopted a new constitution that granted civil liberties and free-market economy and provided for multiparty elections and three branches of government" (Kohn 2007, 350). Even though government reforms "included nearly everything Renamo had supposedly been fighting for," and RENAMO had been allowed to participate politically, FRELIMO retained control of most ministries in subsequent elections (Quinn 2007, 518–9; Stearns 2001; Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 80).

46. **Afghanistan vs. Mujahideen, PDPA (1978–1992)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

"In 1986 the United Nations began negotiating a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, which began in stages in 1988 and was completed in 1989" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 218). "The Najibullah government hung on for three years after the Soviet withdrawal" (Clodfelter 2002, 672). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 325–6), Sathasivam (2007, 96), Kohn (2007, 4).

47. **Colombia vs. FARC, ELN, Drug Cartels (1978–1991)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"The [government] military response was substantial, and the [rebel] M19 was on the retreat until the group signed a peace agreement and became a political party in 1990" (Kreutz 2007, 273). Following the promulgation of a new constitution in 1991, "[t]he [rebel] ELN disarmed, accepting political party status" (Stearns 2001). See also Kohn (2007, 131).

48. **Ethiopia vs. Tigreans (1978–1991)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. The counterinsurgent was defeated militarily.

"In the 1990s, under pressure from several devastating famines and a similar rebellion in the Tigre province, the Ethiopian government was unable to maintain effective control and fell in May 1991 after a concerted offensive by several rebel groups" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 70). "The EPLF then took control of Eritrea, which later gained full independence (May 3, 1993), leaving Ethiopia a landlocked country" (Kohn 2007, 179). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 442).

49. **Guatemala vs. Communists (1978–1994)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"The [peace] treaty, signed on December 29, provided for a one-third cut in the size of the army, the return of URNG fighters to civilian life, and the strengthening of the rights of the majority Indian population" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 128). See also Clodfelter (2002, 703), Kohn (2007, 218).

50. **Nicaragua vs. FSLN (1978–1979)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. The counterinsurgent was defeated militarily.

"Invading [rebel] Sandinistas from Costa Rica ignited a successful revolution on May 29, 1979, and, after about seven weeks of fighting against Somozas national guardsmen, forced Somoza to flee into exile in the United States on July 17, 1979. The Sandinistas, who broadcast over the government radio that a cease-fire was in place, installed a five-member junta" (Kohn 2007, 365). See also Clodfelter (2002, 709), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 438–9), Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 145), Phillips and Axelrod (2005, 817–8).

51. **Iran vs. KDPI (1979–1984)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"The [rebel] KDPI used the opportunity created by the Iranian revolution in 1979 to extend its de facto control over large areas of Iranian Kurdistan. An Iranian offensive sent by the Ayatolla Khomeini defeated and massacred the KDPI in 1983" [64–5]bartkus:1999. See also Clodfelter (2002, 649), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 439).

52. **El Salvador vs. FMLN (1979–1992)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"President Cristiani then engaged in UN-mediated negotiations for 21 months until a peace accord was reached on January 16, 1992, followed by a permanent cease-fire on February 1" (Kohn 2007, 477). "In exchange for the integration of the [rebel] FMLN into the national political structure and the purging of the worst elements of the national armed forces, guilty of death squad atrocities [...], the guerrillas agreed to disband their military structure" (Clodfelter 2002, 712). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 440–1), Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 143).

53. **Nigeria vs. Maitatsine Sect (Kano) (1980–1984)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"The 1984 Yola riots had all the characteristics of an armed struggle, including guerrilla warfare. The crisis breathed its last gasp on 26 April 1985 in Gombe" (Falola 1998, 137). See Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 441-2), Clodfelter (2002, 628).

54. **Peru vs. Sendero Luminoso (1980–1996)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"The last of the commanders of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), Oscar Ramirez Durand, was captured [on July 14, 1999] [. . .] Membership in the Peruvian Maoist guerrilla force reportedly dwindled to under 1,000 by the year 1999" (Stearns 2001). See also Cunningham (2007, 611), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 442–3), Clodfelter (2002, 720).

55. **Nicaragua vs. Contras (1981–1990)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"The Sandinista National Liberation Front and President Daniel Ortega Saavedra (1945), head of Nicaraguas ruling junta since 1979, were finally ousted in February 1990, when free elections were held; a 14-party anti-Sandinista coalition, led by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (1929), won legislative and presidential control. The new government signed a peace accord with the rebels, who then began demobilizing and registering with UN peacekeepers in MayJune 1990" Kohn (2007, 366). "After the election, Chamorro decided to retain Humberto Ortega (brother of Daniel) as head of the armed forces. This and other gestures helped the Sandinistas accept their electoral defeat and make the transition to an opposition political party and political movement. They remain a strong force in Nicaraguan politics" (Simon 2007, 558). See also Clodfelter (2002, 713), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 443), Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 145).

56. **Uganda vs. NRA (1981–1987)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. The counterinsurgent was defeated militarily.

"On July 27, 1985, [president] Obote was deposed in a coup led by Bazilio Okello, the commander of the armys northern region [...] On January 26, 1986, Kampala fell to the NRA, and on January 29 [rebel leader] Museveni was sworn in as president" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 86). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 441), Clodfelter (2002, 628), Kohn (2007, 565).

57. **Sri Lanka vs. Tamils (1983–2002)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"In a cease-fire signed in February 2002, the LTTE abandoned its armed struggle and, in the first round of peace talks in September, agreed to work toward autonomy rather than full independence. The Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM), with 50 international monitors led by Norway, was established to maintain peace" (Kohn 2007, 527). "The cease-fire left the LTTE as the de facto government in the areas it controlled, including most of the Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts in the North. The LTTE didnt agree to disarm but only to stop smuggling in additional military supplies to its forces" (Horowitz and Jayamaha 2007, 724).

58. **Sudan vs. SPLM (1983–2002)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"A January 2005 peace accord promised autonomy for the south, along with a referendum (after six years) on the possibility of the regions secession. A major step in implementing the deal was reached in July 2005, when SPLA leader John Garang (1945) became Sudans vice president alongside President Bashir" (Kohn 2007, 529). See also Thyne (2007, 745–6), Ackermann et al. (2008, 407), Sarkees and Wayman

(2010, 445).

59. **Zimbabwe vs. Ndebele Guerillas (1983–1987)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The counterinsurgent was defeated militarily.

"Dissident members of the ZAPU guerrilla army began a campaign against the Shona-dominated government in 1983. Matabeleland, the region occupied by the Ndebele, was brutally suppressed by Mugabes security forces. According to a report by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, at least 20,000 civilians were killed by the Fifth Brigade (trained by the North Koreans) from 1983 to 1988. Atrocities included burning people alive and torture. Since then, Zimbabwe has become a de facto one-party state, and no further separatist activity has been reported" (Rudolph 2003, 329–30). "By 1982 hostility between ZANU and ZAPU had developed into open violence, and for the next five years Zimbabwe was to suffer from what became known as the Dissidents War. [. . .] The negotiations, in real terms, were one-sided since Mugabe held all the trump cards; in effect he demanded the disbanding of ZAPU. An agreement was reached at the end of 1987, and ZAPU ceased to exist as a political party early in 1988 when Nkomo and other ZAPU leaders rejoined the government and Zimbabwe became a de facto one-party state. The disappearance of ZAPU as a political party represented the triumph of ZANU and the Shona people over their old enemies the Ndebele and their party, ZAPU" (Arnold 2008, 430).

60. **India vs. Sikhs (1984–1993)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"Demanding a separate Khalistan ("land of the pure"), Sikh radicals in the Indian state of Punjab began a campaign of terrorism against Hindus in September 1982" Clodfelter (2002, 673). In 1985, "[Indian prime minister] Rajiv Ghandi reached an agreement with the moderate Sikh leader Sant Harchand Singh Longowal and con-

ceded much of what the Akalis had all along been demanding" (Leonard 2006, 1409; see also Singh 2008, 46–7). However, the Rajiv-Longowal agreement unraveled by 1987 after the democratically elected Sikh leadership in Punjab was dismissed and direct presidential rule imposed (Chary 2009, 130). "Punjab remained under direct central rule via its governor until February 1992 [. . .] The Government of India eventually succeeded in crushing the Sikh militancy, but at a very heavy human cost" (Singh 2008, 51; see also Clodfelter 2002, 673). Although intermittent attacks persisted into the late 1990s and early 2000s, by 1994, "[n]ormalcy seems to have returned to Punjab State" (Art and Richardson 2007, 428–9). "In mid-1992, the security forces achieved an impressive breakthrough in which several leading figures of [Sikh] militant organisations were killed [. . .] Thus, most of the top-ranking militants had been eliminated and their organisations rapidly disintegrated" (Mitra 2006, 95).

61. **Turkey vs. PKK (1984–1999)**. COIN Outcome: Win. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded virtually no insurgent demands.

"Kurdish nationalism resurfaced [. . .] in the 1970s as Turkey degenerated into political anarchy. After the Turkish army took over the government in 1980, the military attempted to suppress the most active of the Kurdish radical movements — the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK) [. . .] The Kurd leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured and condemned to death in 1999, dealing a crippling blow to the Kurdish insurgency" (Clodfelter 2002, 655). "On August 2004 the [PKK] declared a unilateral cease-fire" (Ackermann et al. 2008, 253). Although Turkey did make some concessions after 1999, these were largely symbolic and inconsistently applied. "For instance, an article preventing the use of Kurdish names was amended and local officials were notified of the changes in September 2003, but this was not always applied in practice. Also, Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, which banned dissemination of separatist propaganda, was revoked, but there was little freedom of expression for

writers and publishers" (Kohn 2007, 295). In response, a severely weakened PKK relocated its base to Iraqi Kurdistan and renewed sporadic violence against the Turkish state (Jongerden and Casier 2010, 108; see also Finn 2007, 785). Nevertheless, "[t]he remaining PKK forces in northern Iraq do not represent a grave threat to Turkey [. . .] the PKK [remains] militarily weak" (Art and Richardson 2007, 368–9).

62. **Iraq vs. Kurds; Anfal (1985–1996)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"After Iraqs defeat in 1991 by coalition forces, the Kurds mounted a massive rebellion in the north, but, without allied support, it soon faltered. The fighting was brutal, forcing the coalition to establish 'safe havens' for the Kurds. A number of negotiations between Iraq and the Kurds at this time were largely unsuccessful. In mid-1992 the Kurds held elections, and by the end of that year Kurdistan had achieved a degree of autonomy" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 286). US-backed Operation Provide Comfort I and II were designed to enable the return of Kurdish refugees and "deter incursions by the Iraqi army into northern Iraq" (Kirişci and Winrow 1997, 160–1). "[The war] ended because the Saddam Hussein regime gradually abandoned its effort to forcibly assimilate Kurdistan into a unitary Iraqi polity, largely because of the constraints it faced from the UN and Allied restricted zones first imposed during the spring of 1991" (Strakes 2007, 451–2). See also Stearns (2001), Kohn (2007, 406). "The [KDP and PUK] began to struggle for control over the lucrative border trade, and the PUK drove the KDP out of Arbil in 1994. All attempts to resolve the differences between the two groups were futile, and the KDP entered into an alliance with Saddam Hussein. In August 1996, the KDP militia, backed by Iraqi troops and tanks, forced the PUK into the mountains" (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000, 133).

63. **Sri Lanka vs. JVP (1987–1989)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"In July 1987 India intervened to stop the conflict [between Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam]. [...] The militant Sinhalese of the JVP disagreed violently with the terms of the agreement" (Clodfelter 2002, 673). "The JVPs all-out assault was reciprocated by government security forces [...] Civilians were caught in a storm of violence, much of its indiscriminate, which subsided only with the killing or capture of most of the JVP leadership at the end of 1989" (Horowitz and Jayamaha 2007, 722). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 447–8), Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 220).

64. **Burundi vs. Hutus (1988–1988)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"In 1988 two communities in northern Burundi became the flashpoint for renewed ethnic violence [...] the gendarmerie was deployed to the region [Hutu] feared a recurrence of 1972 and organized self-defence groups, manned barriers, and destroyed bridges [...] which triggered a wave of violence leaving several hundred Tutsi dead. The army responded using helicopters and armoured cars to crush the uprising and killed an estimated 15,000 Hutu" (Bloxham and Moses 2010, 571). See also Cohen and Deng (1998, 25).

65. **Papua New Guinea vs. BRA (Bougainville) (1988–1998)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"In July 1997, New Zealand again hosted peace talks. On April 30, 1998amid much jubilationthe two opposing parties signed a permanent ceasefire; the government would withdraw its troops and assure freedom of movement on the island,

which would be patrolled by a multinational peace-keeping force" (Kohn 2007, 395). A peace agreement was signed in 2001, in which Bougainville received substantial autonomy and the right to hold a non-binding referendum; in return, the BRA rebels agreed to disarm (Weller, Metzger and Johnson 2008, 135–6). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 451–2), Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 192-3).

66. **Somalia vs. SSDF, SNM (Isaaqs) (1988–1991)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. The counterinsurgent was defeated militarily.

"In August 1990 the SNM joined a number of other guerrilla groups, and by the end of 1990 they controlled most of the countryside, while the government controlled only Mogadishu and its immediate surroundings. In December 1990 the United Somali Congress (USC) [...] also launched an assault on the Barre regime. By the end of January 1991 Barre had fled, Mogadishu had fallen, and the USC had installed an interim government [...] the SNM in the north set up a rival administration in April 1991; the north seceded in May. Calling itself Somaliland, the new entity essentially partitioned the country, but received no international recognition." (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 96). See also Wilson (2007*b*, 679), (Clodfelter 2002, 617-8), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 449), Ackermann et al. (2008, 393).

67. **Senegal vs. MFDC (Casamance) (1989–1999)**. COIN Outcome: Win. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded few insurgent demands.

"The Casamance region of southern Senegal is inhabited by the Diola (or Jola), who differ from the rest of the population with regard to language. Also unlike the majority of the Senegalese, the Diola are not Muslims. [...] Several movements for independence emerged in the early 1960s, but the first serious clashes between separatists and the Senegalese army occurred in 1982 in the town of Ziguinchor. Violence broke out again in 1987 and 1990, and over 1,000 people were killed" (Rudolph 2003,

61). In the early 2000s, the government offered rebels amnesty and initiated a regional Casamanca economic program. "Most, although not all of the leaders of the [rebel] MFDC backed away from open violence in the early to mid-2000s. [. . .] negotiations [. . .] produced a peace accord in December 2004" (Brinkerhoff 2007, 231).

68. **Indonesia vs. Aceh (1990–1991)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"By 1991, 6,000 troops sent by the government to Aceh were successful in capturing or killing most of GAMs leaders and ending the violence" (Sambanis 2001 Data Set Codebook, 111). "Indonesian security forces responded brutally, and by mid-1991 the rebellion was largely suppressed" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 451).

69. **Mali vs. Tuaregs (1990–1995)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"[T]he powerful Tuareg coalition force, the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad (MFUA), signed two agreements with the government (1993 and 1994) that allowed the incorporation of some 7,000 Tuareg rebels into the regular army and other government bodies [. . .] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Azawad and other Tuareg rebel groups agreed to disarm and demobilize, thus officially ending the war (March 27, 1996)" (Kohn 2007, 317). See also Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 102). The peace agreement was implemented "according to the provisions of the 1992 National Pact" (Velton 2009, 25). "The pact envisaged 1) a ceasefire [. . .] 2) an amnesty for the rebels; 3) enrolment of Tuareg guerrillas in the army of Mali, which was to reduce its presence in Tuareg regions considerably [. . .] 4) the creation of a commission to establish who was responsible for the atrocities [. . .] 5) [. . .] a fund to finance the repatriation of refugees; 6) [. . .] a fund for the development of Tuareg areas through investments" (Prasse 1995, 61).

70. **Tajikistan vs. UTO (1992–1997)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

Following the break-up of the USSR, "Tajikistan wanted to keep its ties with Russia, and it retained its Communist leadership. Opposition to the government soon developed among those who sought democratic reforms and those who favored the creation of an Islamic republic" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 459). "The civil war continued sporadically until the Peace and Reconciliation Accord was signed in June 1997, as part of the United Nations ongoing peace efforts" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 224). "The peace accord established a twenty-six-member National Reconciliation Commission [NRC], to be headed by an opposition representative but with seats split evenly between the government and the UTO [United Tajikistan Opposition]. The NRC would implement the peace agreement, repatriate and assist refugees, and introduce legislation for fair parliamentary elections, as well as integrating UTO members into 30 percent of ministerial and departmental posts" (Wilson 2007*a*, 764). Despite various diffculties, the agreement was implemented with Russian backing (Birgerson 2002, 153). "The power-sharing agreement was renewed in 1999 and then again, indefinitely, in 2002" (Ackermann et al. 2008, 85). See also Kohn (2007, 537–8).

71. **Egypt vs. Gamaat Islamiya; Islamic Jihad (1994–1997)**. COIN Outcome: None. Observation dropped.

72. **Congo-Zaire vs. AFDL (Kabila) (1996–1997)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

"With more support from Uganda, Burundi, and Angola, Kabilas troops marched across Zaire, arriving near the capital, Kinshasa, in May 1997. [. . .] [President] Mobutu returned to Kinshasa and was persuaded by his generals and South Africas President Nelson Mandela (1918) to relinquish power [. . .] A day later the rebel

forces entered the capital without any fighting. Kabilas peaceful entry and transition to power were engineered beforehand through negotiations among Mandela, Mobutu, Kabila, and U.S. representative to the United Nations Bill Richardson (1947)" (Kohn 2007, 619). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 465–6), Ackermann et al. (2008, 119).

73. **Yugoslavia vs. Kosovo (KLA) (1992–1997)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

"[O]n June 9, a military-technical agreement was signed following peace talks in Macedonia. Serbian troops were given 11 days (rather than the original seven) for a phased pullout, with NATO to cease bombings upon evidence of a peaceful withdrawal. The agreement established the terms for the deployment of international security forces to maintain the peace in Kosovo [...] Negotiations on Kosovos future (independence or statehood with Serbia) were postponed from 2005 to 2006, and after six years of international administration, Kosovo appeared ready to form a separate country" (Kohn 2007, 293). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 182), Clodfelter (2002, 605).

74. **Indonesia vs. Aceh (1999–2002)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"Finally, on August 15, GAM and the government signed an accord which would end the three-decade war. The government would pull out half of its 30,000 troops from Aceh, free 1,400 political prisoners, and grant amnesty to the several thousand rebels upon their disarming. Also, GAM agreed not to insist on independence but settled for participation in provincial elections" (Kohn 2007, 250).

75. **Burundi vs. Hutu Groups (1991–2005)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

"On November 16 [2003], the government and [rebel] FDD signed a peace agreement in Dar-es-Salaam, designating FDD as a political party and promising to assimilate the rebel Hutu forces into the Burundian army [...] In a February 2005 referendum, a power-sharing constitution to end the Hutu-Tutsi divide received overwhelming approval [...] In August, members of the assembly and senate endorsed a Hutu, Pierre Nkurunziza (1963), as the new president; the dominance of the Tutsis in government had ended" (Kohn 2007, 89). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 473), Brown (2007, 210).

76. **Algeria vs. MIA/FIS/AIS, GIA, GSPC (1992–2002)**. COIN Outcome: Win. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded virtually no insurgent demands.

"President Boutleflika, who took office in 1999, quickly extended an amnesty offer to insurgents, provided that they surrendered. The AIS received a full amnesty for its members on January 13, 2000, leading to what amounted to its surrender" (Schulhoferwohl 2007, 112). "Although the GIA vowed to prolong the conflict, fighting between the government and the rebels dropped below war level at this point" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 459). See also Arnold (2008, 28), Kohn (2007, 11–2).

77. **Nepal vs. CPN-M/UPF (Maoists) (1996–2006)**. COIN Outcome: Draw. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded some insurgent demands.

"[T]he war raged on until a truce was finally agreed to in April 2006, with the final peace agreement in November. The Maoists entered the political process and began

steps to limit the power of the king" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 477). "In April 2006, mass demonstrations around the country led to a peaceful transfer of power from the King to the democratic parties and the CPN (Maoist) [...] This agreement officially ended armed conflict in the country and re-integrated the CPN (Maoist) into the political arena" (Dayton and Kriesberg 2009, 172). See also DeRouen and Bellamy (2008, 518), Connable and Libicki (2010, 162).

78. **Netherlands vs. Indonesia (1946–1949)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

"[T]he Dutch were able to seize part of Indonesia, but much of the country remained under [rebel] control" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 311). This resulted in a compromise agreement 1946 with which neiter side was satisfied, and the conflict resumed. In the end, the Netherlands "transfered full sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia [...] headed by Achmed Sukarno" (Kohn 2007, 252). See also Ackermann et al. (2008, 409), Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 164), Clodfelter (2002, 675).

79. **France vs. Indochina (Viet Minh) (1946–1954)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

Even though Vietminh insurgents did not get their most preferred outcome (control over all Indochina), by withdrawing entirely from the region, France obtained its least preferred outcome (Stearns 2001; Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 312). See also Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 165), Kohn (2007, 196), Clodfelter (2002, 675–6).

80. **France vs. Madagascar (MDMR) (1947–1947)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"The French outlawed the MDRM, [. . .] and military courts ordered the execution of 20 military leaders of the revolt. Trials of others involved in the uprising resulted in 5,000 to 6,000 convictions and sentences of either imprisonment or death" (Ackermann et al. 2008, 317). "The French authorities responded with violent repression, and by December 1947, French troops had crushed the main rebel bands. Sporadic resistance continued after this date in the form of a guerrilla insurgency; the rebellion was declared officially over on December 1, 1948" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 60). See also Kohn (2007, 313).

81. **United Kingdom vs. Malaya (Communists) (1948–1957)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"The insurgency gradually lost its momentum and virtually disappeared by mid-1960" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 166). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 313–4), Kohn (2007, 317), Clodfelter (2002, 682).

82. **United Kingdom vs. Kenya (Mau Mau) (1952–1956)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

"The bulk of the Mau Mau forces were defeated by 1956" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 61). See also Kohn (2007, 324), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 316–7), Ackermann et al. (2008, 239), Clodfelter (2002, 619).

83. **France vs. Tunisia (1953–1956)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

"The French government granted complete internal independence to Tunisia. The terms of Tunisian sovereignty were spelled out in a French-Tunisian agreement (June 3, 1955)" (Stearns 2001). "[T]he violence continued until December 1954, when France conceded independence to the territory in principle [. . .] France retained large mili-

tary installations in Tunisia after independence" Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 61).

84. **France vs. Morocco (1953–1956)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

"On March 2, 1956, France terminated its protectorate, giving Morocco its independence and ending this war" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 318). "Faced with mounting violence and an ongoing war in Algeria, the French granted Morocco independence in 1956" (Ackermann et al. 2008, 293).

85. **France vs. Algeria (1954–1962)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

"The climate became more amenable to a political settlement [after] the French military had gained a greater degree of control over the country [] On April 8, 1962, a final referendum in France produced an overwhelming vote for independence" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 62). The counterinsurgent had conceded almost everything: "The French had failed to impose special legal and political protections for the Europeans resident in Algeria. They had also been unable to wrest the oil-rich Saharan provinces from Algerian control" (Stearns 2001). See also Kohn (2007, 12), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 318–9).

86. **France vs. Cameroon (1957–1959)**. COIN Outcome: Win. The rebels were defeated militarily.

The rebel organization was populated from members of two ethnic groups from two different areas of the country – Basaa and Bamileke. France managed to crush the Basaa organization by 1958, and plans were made (and implemented) to crush the Bamileke rebels immediately following the planned declaration of independence

in 1960 (Atangana 1997, 102). Even though France ended up granting independence to Cameroon, the insurgency is coded as a victory because the rebel organization was destroyed militarily. See Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 319–20).

87. **Portugal vs. Angola (1961–1974)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

"Neither side was able to get the upper hand, but Portuguese casualties were mounting and the costs becoming unbearably high," which led to a "military coup in Lisbon on April 25, 1974. The new military government implemented a unilateral cease-fire and offered independence to all the territories on July 27" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 65). "By 1972 the guerrillas had clearly suffered near-total defeat in Angola [. . .] The Portugese eventually lost their African colonies, but this was the consequence of domestic upheavals and not of any fundamental inadequacy within their counterinsurgency doctrine and practice" (Joes 2004, 229). See also Kohn (2007, 26), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 321).

88. **Portugal vs. Guinea Bissau (PAIGC) (1963–1973)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

"By 1973, the PAIGC had obtained control of two-thirds of Portuguese Guinea; it proclaimed independence and renamed the province the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. Portugal refused recognition, but a military coup in Lisbon (1974) installed a new national government that granted independence to Guinea-Bissau later that year" (Kohn 2007, 220). See also Clodfelter (2002, 620).

89. **Portugal vs. Mozambique (1964–1974)**. COIN Outcome: Lose. Neither side was defeated militarily. The counterinsurgent conceded all or nearly all insurgent demands.

"FRELIMO's control continued to expand, and by the end of the war it controlled half the country. In 1974, however, a military coup in Portugal overthrew dictator Marcello Caetano, which ultimately led to Portugal's decision to abandon its colonial empire" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 321). "The Portuguese attempted to negotiate a settlement with the rebels whereby Portugal would retain some rights, but FRELIMO refused. In 1974, a cease-fire was signed when Portugal agreed to grant Mozambique full independence" (Kohn 2007, 351). See also Clodfelter (2002, 620).

Appendix B

Revisions to the Lyall/Wilson Data

This section of the Appendix provides supporting documentation for the 17 observations in the Lyall and Wilson (2009) data set whose COIN outcome coding has been altered.

1. **China (1947-1949)**. Original: Lose; Revised: Win. The ruling KMT defeated the Taiwanese insurgents.

"[S]ince the Taiwanese see themselves as different from the mainland Chinese, they chafed under rule by the Chinese Guomindang (Kuomintang). The revolt began in Taipei on February 28, 1947, and spread to other areas of the island. Ultimately, 80,000 Guomindang troops faced the rebels, who were crushed within weeks" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 409). KMT troop reinforcements arrived in Taiwan and, together with provincial and military police, easily and ruthlessly suppressed the Uprising" (Lai, Myers and Wei 1991, 8). The KMT troops quickly seized control of major cities, encountering only minor resistance (Ye 2007, 251-2). "Poorly armed and without outside support, the Formosan rebels were quickly crushed" (Clodfelter 2002, 697).

2. **Yemen Arab Republic (1962-1969)**. Original: Lose; Revised: Draw. The incumbent republicans conceded some power to the insurgent royalists.

"[O]n September 25, 1962 [...] a republican uprising overthrew the government of Imam Mohammed al-Badr, who [...] fled to the sanctuary of the interior mountains where he rallied the tribes to the Royalist cause" (Clodfelter 2002, 634). "The republicans, now aided by the Soviets, Syrians, and South Yemenites, repulsed numerous attacks by the royalists [...] In May 1970, an agreement was reached between the two warring parties; the royalists were granted positions in the government of Yemen" (Kohn 2007, 614). "The Yemeni civil war [...] ended formally with the negotiation of the national reconciliation pact in May 1970. [...] The settlement terms [...] expanded the republican council and added a royalist, as well as allocating a minority of seats in an appointed consultative council to the former rebels" (Corstange 2007, 811). "Ahmad al-Shami was appointed to the Republican Council and four royalists took up cabinet portfolios. Perhaps more importantly, it was recognized that 'administration of areas under nominal control of the royalists was to be by royalist personnel'" (Gause 1990, 82).

3. **Rhodesia (1972-1979)**. Original: Draw; Revised: Lose. The incumbent's compromise offers were rejected by the rebels, who continued fighting until victory was achieved.

"Rhodesia's 240,000 whites ruled over its 4,000,000 blacks. [...] Guerrilla attacks by black forces began in 1967 but reached war levels only in 1972" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 430). "[E]ach year took a greater toll on both sides, and a pattern of raid and reprisal developed [...] This moved Prime Minister Smith to arrange a compromise by turning over leadership to a majority black government under a moderate black leader, Bishop Abel Muzorewa [...] Guerrilla leaders who were not included in the government, however, continued the war, claiming that Muzorewa was a white

puppet“ (Phillips and Axelrod 2005, 934). ”Elections early in 1980 brought [ZANU leader] Robert Mugabe to power“ (Clodfelter 2002, 625). See also Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 73).

4. **Philippines (1968-1987)**. Original: Win; Revised: Draw. A compromise agreement was hammered out in the late 1980s, wherein the incumbent conceded some insurgent demands for self-rule.

”The Moro had resented and frequently resisted rule by the regime in the northern capital of Manila, especially as Christian settlers moved in increasing numbers to the south. [...] Seven thousand guerrillas of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) were soon in the field“ (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 428). ”[MNLF's] original demand was an independent homeland of twenty-one provinces, but in the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the MNLF and the Philippine government, it accepted an autonomous Moro state within the Philippines that included only thirteen provinces“ (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000, 197). In 1989, the Philippine legislature approved the creation of an autonomous Moro entity (ARMM) but on the condition that it be subject to a popular referendum. At the referendum, four of the 13 provinces opted to become part of the ARMM (Yegar 2002, 335). ”In September 1996, President Fidel Ramos and [MNLF leader] Nur Misuari [...] signed a final peace accord ending the twenty-four-year-long insurgency. Under the terms of the accord, Misuari became governor of the four-province region of Muslim Mindanao and head of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development with jurisdiction over thirteen provinces“ (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000, 197). See also Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 182), Kohn (2007, 413), Clodfelter (2002, 690), Manacsa and Tan (2007, 628–9).

5. **Pakistan (1973-1977)**. Original: Draw; Revised: Win. Pakistan did not grant any concessions relating to Baluch self-determination.

"The Baluchi make up one of the major ethnic groups in Pakistan [...] They generally favored the creation of their own state, and in 1973 they launched a rebellion against the Pakistani government" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 431). Pakistani and Iranian military cooperation finally crushed the rebellion in 1977, razing whole villages and leaving over 10,000 Baluch dead (Minahan 2002, 258). "By 1977, Baluch leaders were exiled and Pakistan was able to ensure its territorial integrity. Concessions to the Baluch were now unnecessary" (Nisan 2002, 81–2). The rebel movement was not completely defeated and continued to launch sporadic attacks from camps in Afghanistan (Ali and Rehman 2001, 73). The fighting continued intermittently until "General Zia released from 6,000 to 11,000 Baloch from jails [...] and declared amnesty for the guerrillas who had taken refuge in Afghanistan or Iran" (Baxter 2002, 221). See also Clodfelter (2002, 670), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 430–1).

6. **Nicaragua (1978-1979)**. Original: Draw; Revised: Lose. The war ended in the overthrow of the ruling Somoza regime.

"The [Somoza] regime had become increasingly corrupt, leading to opposition from the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 439). "Invading Sandinistas from Costa Rica [...] forced [President] Somoza to flee into exile in the United States on July 17, 1979. The Sandinistas, who broadcast over the government radio that a cease-fire was in place, installed a five-member junta" (Kohn 2007, 365). See also Clodfelter (2002, 709), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 438–9), Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 145), Phillips and Axelrod (2005, 817–8).

7. **Iran (1979-2001)**. Original: Draw; Revised: Win. The conflict ended in insurgent disarmament with no major incumbent concessions.

"The fall of the shah's monarchy did not end the turmoil in Iran. Leftists of the Fedayeen Khalq, who wanted a secular Marxist state, fought the Mujahideen of the Islamic Republic" (Clodfelter 2002, 649). "Over the next 18 months, the government conducted extensive counterterrorist operations. The most notable victim was Musa Khaybani, leader of the Mujahidin-i Khalq [MEK], assassinated by Iranian security forces on Feb. 8, 1982" (Stearns 2001, 975). "By the end of 1982, most MEK operatives in Iran had been eradicated [...] By 1987, most MEK leaders and most of its activists had relocated in Iraq [...] Periodic attacks on Iranian targets continued until May 2003. The activities of the MEK ended abruptly during the American/British invasion of Iraq [...] the American State Department had designated the MEK as a terrorist organization in 1997 [...] in early May 2003, U.S. military commanders disarmed the MEK and transported its troops away from its military base camp" (Atkins 2004, 212). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 439).

8. **Iraq (1980-1988)**. Original: Draw; Revised: Win. Iraq suppressed the Kurdish insurgency through force and not concessions.

"In 1980 Iraq became involved in a long war with Iran [...] This situation prompted Iraq to reach an agreement with the Kurds in 1984, but when the agreement broke down, the Kurds launched a new offensive against Iraq in early 1985 with the help of Iran. The Kuds made significant gains in territory; however, immediately following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, [...] [t]he Kurds were defeated" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 446–7). "Immediately following the July 1988 cease-fire with Iran, Iraq went on a brutal offensive against the Kurds, often using poison gas in attacks on their villages" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 286). "The willingness of the regime to use poison gas attacks against internal opposition to its rule brought an unprecedented halt to a thirty-year insurgency, as Kurdish forces were unable to retaliate in

kind“ (Strakes 2007, 449–50). See also Clodfelter (2002, 652–3).

9. **Somalia (1981-1991)**. Original: Win; Revised: Lose. The ruling Barre regime collapsed in 1991, and the Republic of Somaliland was proclaimed.

”In May 1988 the Somali National Movement (SNM), based in the northern, Issa-dominated region, launched a rebellion against the despotic regime of President Muhammad Siad Barre, a former major general who became president in 1976“ (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 95). ”[In 1989], violence became universal within the capital, forcing Siyaad Barre to announce that he would hold multiparty elections. This did not satisfy the various rebel factions, which temporarily united to thwart the elections and then stage a coup against Siyaad Barre [...] The promise of free elections brought a brief intermission in the civil war, but rival clans, led by warlords, began the war anew. In January 1991, Siyaad Barre was at last dislodged from office [...] and was immediately replaced by [USC leader] Ali Mahdi“ (Phillips and Axelrod 2005, 1061). ”By the end of January 1991 Barre had fled, Mogadishu had fallen, and the USC had installed an interim government [...] the SNM in the north set up a rival administration in April 1991; the north seceded in May. Calling itself Somaliland, the new entity essentially partitioned the country, but received no international recognition“ (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 96). See also Clodfelter (2002, 618), Wilson (2007*b*, 679), Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 449).

10. **Turkey (1983-1999)**. Original: Draw; Revised: Win. The war ended in the decapitation of the insurgent leadership, with no concessions relating to Kurdish self-rule in Turkey.

”Kurdish nationalism resurfaced [...] in the 1970s as Turkey degenerated into political anarchy. After the Turkish army took over the government in 1980, the military attempted to suppress the most active of the Kurdish radical movements —

the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK) [...] The Kurd leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured and condemned to death in 1999, dealing a crippling blow to the Kurdish insurgency" (Clodfelter 2002, 655). "On August 2004 the [PKK] declared a unilateral cease-fire" (Ackermann et al. 2008, 253). Although Turkey did make some concessions after 1999, these were largely symbolic and inconsistently applied. "For instance, an article preventing the use of Kurdish names was amended and local officials were notified of the changes in September 2003, but this was not always applied in practice. Also, Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, which banned dissemination of separatist propaganda, was revoked, but there was little freedom of expression for writers and publishers" (Kohn 2007, 295). In response, a severely weakened PKK relocated its base to Iraqi Kurdistan and renewed sporadic violence against the Turkish state (Jongerden and Casier 2010, 108; see also Finn 2007, 785). Nevertheless, "[t]he remaining PKK forces in northern Iraq do not represent a grave threat to Turkey [...] the PKK [remains] militarily weak" (Art and Richardson 2007, 368–9).

11. **India (1984-1994)**. Original: Draw; Revised: Win. The insurgent organization was militarily defeated after the only serious attempt at a negotiated compromise, the Rajiv-Longowal agreement, unraveled in 1987.

"Demanding a separate Khalistan ("land of the pure"), Sikh radicals in the Indian state of Punjab began a campaign of terrorism against Hindus in September 1982" Clodfelter (2002, 673). In 1985, "[Indian prime minister] Rajiv Ghandi reached an agreement with the moderate Sikh leader Sant Harchand Singh Longowal and conceded much of what the Akalis had all along been demanding" (Leonard 2006, 1409; see also Singh 2008, 46–7). However, the Rajiv-Longowal agreement unraveled by 1987 after the democratically elected Sikh leadership in Punjab was dismissed and direct presidential rule imposed (Chary 2009, 130). "Punjab remained under direct central rule via its governor until February 1992 [...] The Government of India

eventually succeeded in crushing the Sikh militancy, but at a very heavy human cost“ (Singh 2008, 51; see also Clodfelter 2002, 673). Although intermittent attacks persisted into the late 1990s and early 2000s, by 1994, ”[n]ormalcy seems to have returned to Punjab State“ (Art and Richardson 2007, 428–9). ”In mid-1992, the security forces achieved an impressive breakthrough in which several leading figures of [Sikh] militant organisations were killed [...] Thus, most of the top-ranking militants had been eliminated and their organisations rapidly disintegrated“ (Mitra 2006, 95).

12. **Sri Lanka (1987-1989)**. Original: Draw; Revised: Win. The insurgency resulted in incumbent victory after the Sri Lankan government destroyed the rebel JVP.

”In July 1987 India intervened to stop the conflict [between Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam]. [...] The militant Sinhalese of the JVP disagreed violently with the terms of the agreement“ (Clodfelter 2002, 673). ”The JVPs all-out assault was reciprocated by government security forces [...] Civilians were caught in a storm of violence, much of its indiscriminate, which subsided only with the killing or capture of most of the JVP leadership at the end of 1989“ (Horowitz and Jayamaha 2007, 722). See also Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 447–8), Bercovitch and Fretter (2004, 220).

13. **Iraq (1991)**. Original: Draw; Revised: Win. The Iraqi government suppressed the Shi'ite uprising militarily.

”In the wake of Iraq's 1991 loss in the Gulf War [...], Shiites in the south [...] decided to take advantage of the situation and launch a rebellion in pursuit of greater autonomy“ (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 454). ”[W]hen Coalition troops did not come to their aid over the month following the end of the [1991 Gulf War], the Iraqis used both ground forces and helicopters to ruthlessly suppress a southern Shi-

ite uprising. Thousands of Shiite Muslim leaders were arrested, and hundreds were executed“ (Carlisle 2007, 39). ”The southern [no-fly] zone gave some protection to the Shi'ite population. Iraq was allowed to use helicopters, however, and it used these to suppress a Shi'ite uprising in 1991. In the north, the Kurds did better. The no-fly zone protected the Kurdish autonomous area set up after 1991, allowing the Kurds to establish a government of their own“ (King 2006, 30). ”Unlike the support shown to Kurds, international community showed little sympathy to the Shias“ (Pasha and Pasha 2003, 65). ”Due to the residual Iraqi troop deployment in the south [...] as well as the fact that the Shiite uprising was not as well organized as it northern counterpart, it was more easily contained by the Iraqi government“ (Fenton 2004, 38).

14. **Bosnia (1992-1995)**. Original: Win; Revised: Draw. The incumbent Muslims agreed to share power with the Croats, while the Bosnian Serbs were allowed to set up a quasi-independent entity, Republika Srpska.

Following the 1992 declaration of independence by Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic Serbs living in the former Yugoslav republic initiated an insurgency in the hopes of preventing secession from the Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. ”Fighting continued until the Dayton Peace Agreement, signed on December 14, 1995“ (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 460). Though the Serbs were unable to prevent Bosnian secession, a Serbian quasi-state with tight links to Yugoslavia was created in accordance with the 1995 agreement. ”During the negotiations, the Serbs continued to insist on ethnic division, while the Muslims demanded a unitary state. To appease each, U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke included both concepts in the accords — a militarily and politically autonomous Serb republic within a unitary Bosnian state“ (Innes 2006, 24; see also Burg and Shoup 2000, 215–6).

”The main power centers would be the two entities established under the accords: the RS [Republika Srpska] and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). The

RS would be a Bosnian Serb entity, whereas the FBiH would be [. . .] apportioned among Bosnian Croats and Muslims. The central government would be extremely weak, reliant on the entities for its funding and responsible only for matters related to foreign trade, foreign policy, customs, interentity communications, transportation, and international and interentity law enforcement" (Shewfelt 2007, 192).

15. **Tajikistan (1992-1997)**. Original: Win; Revised: Draw. The incumbent made significant concessions at the war's end.

Following the break-up of the USSR, "Tajikistan wanted to keep its ties with Russia, and it retained its Communist leadership. Opposition to the government soon developed among those who sought democratic reforms and those who favored the creation of an Islamic republic" (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, 459). "The civil war continued sporadically until the Peace and Reconciliation Accord was signed in June 1997, as part of the United Nations ongoing peace efforts" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2004, 224). "The peace accord established a twenty-six-member National Reconciliation Commission [NRC], to be headed by an opposition representative but with seats split evenly between the government and the UTO [United Tajikistan Opposition]. The NRC would implement the peace agreement, repatriate and assist refugees, and introduce legislation for fair parliamentary elections, as well as integrating UTO members into 30 percent of ministerial and departmental posts" (Wilson 2007*a*, 764). Despite various diffculties, the agreement was implemented with Russian backing (Birgerson 2002, 153). "The power-sharing agreement was renewed in 1999 and then again, indefinitely, in 2002" (Ackermann et al. 2008, 85). See also Kohn (2007, 537–8).

16. **Pakistan (1993-1999)**. Original: Draw; Revised: Win. With the rebel movement having been severely weakened by the war's end, the incumbent made no concessions.

In the early 1990s, "Conflict arose in Pakistans Sindh (Sind) province between the indigenous Sindhi peoples and the Mohajirs (Muhajireen), Urdu-speaking immigrants from India who settled mainly in the urban areas of Sindh after the partition between Pakistan and India in 1947" (Kohn 2007, 390). In 1997, "[t]he Mohajir leaders formed an alliance with [President] Nawaz Sharif [...] who promised to support the Mohajir position in Sind. The government eventually abrogated the agreement, and attacks on Mohajirs [...] resumed in 1998 [...] In 1999 the Sharif government was overthrown in a military coup. The new government, although led by an ethnic Mohajir, General Pervez Musharraf, clamped down on nationalist activities. Factionalism within the Mohajirs further limited their political power and made it impossible to secure a better position in local and federal governments" (Minahan 2002, 1279). As a result of government prosecution, the Mohajir rebels emerged beleaguered, divided, and with its leadership exiled. "The military takeover of 1999 seems to have thrown the [the Mohajir movement] into a state of indecisiveness and impotence" (Verkaaik 2004, 86–7; see also Kohn 2007, 391).

17. **Central African Republic (1994-1997)**. Original: Lose; Revised: Draw. Rebel factions were disarmed and their leaders incorporated into a coalition government.

In 1994, President Ange-Felix Patasse promulgated a new constitution which greatly augmented presidential powers. This act prompted revolts by members of the armed forces as well as various political factions. "A peace accord was signed in Bangui in January 1997. It called for creation of a government of national union and an amnesty, which covered the disarmament of the mutineers. [...] [A] new cabinet [was announced] in January 1999, including four members of the opposition and eight independents. It was in effect a coalition government in accord with the spirit of the peace agreements" (Rake 2001, 48–9). See also Villalon and VonDoepp (2005, 137),

Lumumba-Kasongo (2005, 137).

Appendix C

Documenting Civilian Defense Forces

This section of the Appendix documents the 33 cases of CDFs observed in the period between 1945 and 2006.

1. **Greece vs. Communists (1944–1949)**. CDF: Rural Security Units [*Monades Asfaleias Ypaithrou*].

"Shortly after the start of the Civil War, the government sponsored the organization and arming of local paramilitary troops to 'protect' villages from communists" (Karakasidou 1997, 106). "In October 1946 the government decided upon the formation of paramilitary units. These were called MAY (Monades Asfaleias Ypaithrou, Country Security Units) and MAD (Monades Asfaleias Dimosyntiritoi, Municipal Security Units) and incorporated the rightist bands. In September 1947, they were changed into Tagmata Ethnofrouras (the National Defense Corps) and operated in close connection with the army" (Voglis 2002, 71). "Most of the rightist bands on the mainland were gradually absorbed into the locally recruited and financed militias that were organized by the army and the government, known initially as MAY (Rural Security Units), a static type, and MAD (National Defense

Units), a more mobile type“ (Iatrídês and Wrigley 2004, 140). ”In 1949, of 232,500 armed forces in Greece, only 50,000 belong to the Ethnophroura (National Defense Corps)“ (Gerlach 2010, 197). Each militiaman carried a gun. ”[S]ome weapons were provided by the Greek army; others were privately owned“ (Karakasidou 1997, 106). ”The general staff [...] constituted self-defense units in towns and villages by simply providing rudimentary training in arms [...]“ (Gerolymatos 2004, 222).

2. **Burma vs. Communists (1948–1988)**. CDF: People's Militia [*Pyithu Sit*].

”In 1968, the Directorate of Military Training issued a directive for the training of people's militias [...] At the regional command level, the people's militias [...] were placed under the General Staff (G) Department. It included the formation, armament, and training of people's militias“ (Myoe 2009, 31). ”The [Burmese military's] 'Four Cuts' (pya ley pya) counterinsurgency strategy, used since 1963, best embodies the state's approach to suppressing ethnic minorities. A rebel group has been fully 'cut' if it no longer has access to new recruits, intelligence, food, or finances“ (Adams and Saunders 2005, 17). As part of this strategy, ”villagers were ordered to move into new 'strategic' villages under military control [...] Farmers and families forced into the new villages were mobilized as a 'people's militia' to fight for the government“ (Thawnghmung 2008, 55, 36n). The villagers were ”required to serve on day- and night-shifts as guards against rebel attack“ (Lang 2002, 39).

3. **Philippines vs. Huks (1950–1952)**. CDF: Civilian Guards.

”[F]ormed to protect the estates of [cooperating] landowners, [...] [b]y the time of the Huk Rebellion, civil guards were an instrumental part of the counterinsurgency strategy [...] landlords and the Military Police paid the civilian guards' wages“ (Asia Watch Report 1990, 40). The Civilian Guards are said to have been the progenitors

of the CHDFs and CAFGUs of the 1970s through 2000s (ibid).

4. **Indonesia vs. Darul Islam, PRRI, Permesta (1956–1960)**. CDF: Village Security Organization [*Organisasi Keamanan Desa, Organisasi Perlawanan Rakyat*]

"A prime source of ammunition seems to have been the government-equipped local self-defense forces, Organisasi Keamanan Desa (OKD). As villagers patrolling their own territory, the OKD usually reflected the political stance of individual villages toward the [Darul Islam] rebellion. In Dar'ul Islam villages the OKD [...] functioned as an intelligence and logistical network for the rebellion. In neutral villages they sought to provoke neither side [...] only in pro-government villages did the self-defense forces perform the anti-Dar'ul Islam function for which they were designed" (Jackson 1980, 16). "[I]t was natural for the [Indonesian] army to use local auxiliaries against Darul Islam, employing village militia for static security duties and intelligence work" (Kilcullen 2010, 94). "Pagar betis [technique] [...] used militias to secure villages. The Village Security Organization [...] secured each village or town. A small surveillance element provided overwatch, and [...] civilians from each village around the perimeter of a Darul Islam-controlled hill area [...] formed a cordon [...] Feeding the people in the cordon was the village's problem" (92). The army started employing the pagar betis technique in the early 1960s (Roosa 2006, 133). I was not able to find conclusive evidence with respect to the time of CDF creation. Kilcullen (2010, 93–4) suggests that the CDF proliferated from 1959 onward.

5. **Burma vs. Karen (KNU) (1960–1995)**. CDF: People's Militia [*Pyithu Sit*].

"In 1968, the Directorate of Military Training issued a directive for the training of people's militias [...] At the regional command level, the people's militias [...] were placed under the General Staff (G) Department. It included the formation, armament, and training of people's militias" (Myoe 2009, 31). "The [Burmese military's]

'Four Cuts' (pya ley pya) counterinsurgency strategy, used since 1963, best embodies the state's approach to suppressing ethnic minorities. A rebel group has been fully 'cut' if it no longer has access to new recruits, intelligence, food, or finances" (Adams and Saunders 2005, 17). As part of this strategy, "villagers were ordered to move into new 'strategic' villages under military control [...] Farmers and families forced into the new villages were mobilized as a 'people's militia' to fight for the government" (Thawnghmung 2008, 55, 36n). The villagers were "required to serve on day- and night-shifts as guards against rebel attack" (Lang 2002, 39).

6. **USA/S. Vietnam vs. NLF (Vietcong) (1960–1975)**. CDF: Self-Defense Corps (Popular Forces, Regional Forces); Combined Action Platoons.

"[President] Diem convinced the Americans to provide $12.3 million per year for his static village militia, which he dubbed the 'Self-Defense Corps' [which] supported [...] a total of 60,000 men nationwide [...] The Americans gave greater attention to the 50,000-man Civil Guard [a.k.a. Regional Forces], the mobile militia responsible for patrolling entire villages [...] [These units] could maintain a constant presence in the villages, and as locals they had excellent access to the information needed in both a guerrilla war and a conventional war" (Moyar 2006, 70). "Members of the Popular Forces were recruited and stationed in their home villages; Regional Forces could be used anywhere in their province (a typical southern province was twelve hundred square miles in area, equal to a circle with a radius of twenty miles)" (Joes 2004, 114). "In the People's Self-Defense Forces in South Vietnam, three million members shared 400,000 firearms" (Gerlach 2010, 197). The VC rebels managed to capture much of their weaponry, after which the Americans were much less willing to sponsor them, and as a result, the Self-Defense Corps and Civil Guard were "poorly trained and equipped, miserably led, and incapable of coping with insurgents" (Nagl 2002, 121; Edwards 2001, 226–7). The Vietnamese CDFs were set up in the mid-1960s (PF

and RF) and in 1965 (CAPs) (Joes 2004, 114–5).

7. **Iraq vs. Kurds (PUK) (1961–1970)**. CDF: Al-Fursan/Jash.

"To increase its chances of defeating the Kurds, the government made use of a newly-established contingent consisting of pro-government Kurds, called al-Fursan ('the Knights') or the Fursan forces (in most publications these forces are only referred to as Jahsh, meaning 'donkeys' or 'mokes', the name given to the forces by the Kurdish resistance)" (Zieck 1997, 177). "The system relied on local leaders recruiting or organizing their following" (McDowall 2007, 354). "The regime favored recruiting Kurds from influential tribes such as the Zibaris, Hirkins and Surjis which had the clout to compete with the PUK and the KDP" (Rabil 2002). "The first jash were recruited during the 1961 to 1963 Kurdish revolution, at which time they probably numbered about 10,000, but after 1983, their number grew exponentially, to reach as many as 150,000 by 1986 [...] As jash, the Kurds' duties were light — guarding checkpoints, keeping the local peace — and they could remain at home, farming, herding their animals, protecting their families, and earning a small salary" (Bird 2004, 81). "In return for weapons, money and privileges, Kurdish tribesmen played a part in containing the onslaught of the Peshmergas" (Chaliand 1993, 222).

8. **Thailand vs. Communists (1966–1982)**. CDF: National Defense Volunteers [*Or Sor*].

"In 1978, the ISOC [Internal Security Operations Command] set up the Thai National Defence Volunteers [the Or Sor] which trained and armed around 50,000 villagers to act as informants and vigilantes" (Baker and Phongpaichit 2005, 234–5). "Each village selected about ten 'volunteers' who received paramilitary training and weapons" (Bowie 1997, 341, 22n). Thailand's CDFs consist of "2,200 full-time village defense units (known as or sor) and 67,400 part-time village defense volunteers

(known as chor ror bor) [...] [The Or Sor] undergo a rudimentary program of defense and weapon instruction [...], are issued a government-supplied rifle, and receive a small monthly stipend [...] The [Chor Ror Bor] receive three days of training in shotgun handling and patrol practices [...] and are then organized into 30-person units that are equipped with a basic inventory of pistols and rifles" (Chalk 2009, 110). Thahan Phran, another paramilitary formation, was "[o]riginally established in 1978 to clear communist guerrillas from mountain strongholds in the northeast of Thailand [...] Operationally, [they] engage mainly in search-and-destroy missions, intelligence collection, and civic action programs" (Chalk 2009, 108–9). The Thahan Phran were "created in the late 1960s to carry out counter-attacks across the borders with Myanmar and Cambodia" (Peleggi 2007, 66). Because they are not a primarily self-defense force, I do not include the Thahan Phran as a CDF.

9. **Oman vs. Dhofar (1971-1975)**. CDF: Firqat.

"The home guard (*firqat*) units had been raised and trained for irregular counterinsurgency operations by [...] the British Army's Special Air Services. Armed with small arms, firqat units serve as tribal police and defense forces for the mountain people [...] in areas infiltrated by the Dhofari insurgents [...] after the insurgency, they remained as paramilitary tribal police, numbering about 3,500 in 1992" (of Congress 2004, 182). "Moving to a tribal basis, however, and making each firqat responsible for the selection of its own centres, increased reliability and [...] they became an effective territorial home guard" (Beckett 2001, 227–8). "[T]he Firqat could be troublesome: they refused to fight during Ramadan [and] were reluctant to leave their tribal area" (Mockaitis 1995, 93). Anti-rebel firqat were partly "made up of disenchanted guerrillas" (Ryan 2003, 87). "After a period of screening, the surrendered man would be re-armed and re-equipped and become a member of a tribal militia, the firqat. He would then, as a member of a firqat, return to the mountains of Dhofar, if

possible to his old tribal area, where he would act as part of an internal security and peace-keeping force“ (Townsend 1977, 102).

10. **Philippines vs. Moros (1971-1994)**. CDF: Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF).

”As part of the SWB [Special Warfare Brigade] the HDFG [Home Defense Forces Group] was tasked with training and administering village defence units such as the Civilian Home Defense Forces and Special Para-Military Forces in southern Philippines“ (Conboy 1991, 31). ”[. . .] the Civilian Home Defense Force became a civilian, reservist extension of the police under the Armed Forces of the Philippines“ (West 1997, 179). ”In the mid-1970s, existing paramilitary organizations were absorbed into the new Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force, or CHDF. In Mindanao, the CHDF was originally deployed together with Christian armed fanatic groups against an uprising of the Muslim population“ (Asia Watch Report 1992, 11). ”[T]he CHDF are local armed forces that serve as an inexpensive adjunct to the military in conducting counterinsurgency operations. CHDF reservists included prominent landowners, businessmen, and government officials. Their participation in the CHDF legitimized their possession of weapons. Private security guards associated with the CHDF were generally employees of those same businessmen and landowners“ (Riedinger 1995, 31). ”[T]he Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) were locally recruited, self-defense units under nominal Constabulary jurisdiction“ (McCoy 2009, 192). Philippine Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos ”believed that with increased supervision from the military, better recruitment and training procedures, and service restricted to the recruit's home area, the worst abuses of the CHDF could be avoided“ (Asia Watch Report 1990, 41–2). The statement of Chief of Staff Ramos suggests that some CHDF units may not have been locally recruited. In addition, I was not able to find evidence that CHDF recruits were indigenous — i.e. belonging to the Moro Muslim

ethnic group.

11. **Philippines vs. NPA (1972–1992)**. CDF: Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF).

"As part of the SWB [Special Warfare Brigade] the HDFG [Home Defense Forces Group] was tasked with training and administering village defence units such as the Civilian Home Defense Forces and Special Para-Military Forces in southern Philippines" (Conboy 1991, 31). "[T]he Civilian Home Defense Force became a civilian, reservist extension of the police under the Armed Forces of the Philippines" (West 1997, 179). "To fight the NPA insurgents, the government has long relied on the use of poorly trained paramilitary forces such as the [CHDF]" (Neistat and Seok 2009, 11). "[T]he CHDF are local armed forces that serve as an inexpensive adjunct to the military in conducting counterinsurgency operations. CHDF reservists included prominent landowners, businessmen, and government officials. Their participation in the CHDF legitimized their possession of weapons. Private security guards associated with the CHDF were generally employees of those same businessmen and landowners" (Riedinger 1995, 31). "[T]he Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) were locally recruited, self-defense units under nominal Constabulary jurisdiction" (McCoy 2009, 192). Philippine Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos "believed that with increased supervision from the military, better recruitment and training procedures, and service restricted to the recruit's home area, the worst abuses of the CHDF could be avoided" (Asia Watch Report 1990, 41–2). The statement of Chief of Staff Ramos suggests that some CHDF units may not have been locally recruited. In addition, I was not able to find evidence that CHDF recruits were not just local but indigenous as well – i.e. belonging to the Moro Muslim ethnic group. As a result, the CHDF are not included as a CDF in the case of the Philippines vs. Moros (1971–1994)

insurgency.

12. **Iraq vs. Kurdish Autonomy (1974–1975)**. CDF: Al-Fursan/Jash.

"To increase its chances of defeating the Kurds, the government made use of a newly-established contingent consisting of pro-government Kurds, called al-Fursan ('the Knights') or the Fursan forces (in most publications these forces are only referred to as Jahsh, meaning 'donkeys' or 'mokes', the name given to the forces by the Kurdish resistance)" (Zieck 1997, 177). "The system relied on local leaders recruiting or organizing their following" (McDowall 2007, 354). "The regime favored recruiting Kurds from influential tribes such as the Zibaris, Hirkins and Surjis which had the clout to compete with the PUK and the KDP" (Rabil 2002). "The first jash were recruited during the 1961 to 1963 Kurdish revolution, at which time they probably numbered about 10,000, but after 1983, their number grew exponentially, to reach as many as 150,000 by 1986 [...] As jash, the Kurds' duties were light — guarding checkpoints, keeping the local peace — and they could remain at home, farming, herding their animals, protecting their families, and earning a small salary" (Bird 2004, 81). "In return for weapons, money and privileges, Kurdish tribesmen played a part in containing the onslaught of the Peshmergas" (Chaliand 1993, 222).

13. **Cambodia vs. Khmer Rouge Defectors, FUNCINPEC, KPNLF (1975–1991)**. CDF: Village Militia.

"[T]he village militia [...] originated in the 1979 to 1980 period, when directives by the party and the newly proclaimed government mandated the raising of a militia in each village and subdistrict [...] In virtually all cases, militia members were ill- trained and ill-equipped, possessing only Soviet small arms from Vietnam, or hand-me-down United States weapons provided years before to the Khmer Republic" (Ross 1990). "[Village militiamen] receive one month's training, an old AK-47

rifle, and a fistful of bullets“ (Ismartono, Inter Press Service, October 6, 1989). ”Although the [People's Republic of Kampuchea] says it has 200,000 village militia and regular troops, even its Soviet allies in Phnom Penh acknowledge that the numbers are only approximate and that ammunition is woefully scarce“ (Magistad, The Globe and Mail, February 14, 1989). ”In some localities, former soldiers of the Khmer Republic who had escaped the purges of Democratic Kampuchea were able to dominate the militia. In others, local peasants without political antecedents were in the majority“ (Ross 1990). ”[T]he people have taken up arms and mobilized men as young as 15 years old to form village defense units“ (Ismartono, Inter Press Service, October 6, 1989). By the late 1980s, ”[t]he army of the Phnom Penh government, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces, had 50,000 regular soldiers and another 100,000 men and women serving in local militia forces“ (Ray and Robinson 2008, 36).

14. **Mozambique vs. RENAMO (1976–1992)**. CDF: People's Militia.

”The Mozambican regime [...] undertook a large-scale program to expand its People's Militia to counter RENAMO's widening influence [...] observers believe that many of the rifles going to the militia found their way into RENAMO hands through capture or barter“ (Copson 1994, 96–7; see also Rotberg and Mills 1998, 65). ”Everyone in government-held areas was required to undergo militia training and carry out patrols, including women and schoolchildren [...] militia duty was dangerous and poorly remunerated“ (Schafer 2007, 45–6). Angolan Minister Antonio said, PM personnel have ”a protective role. They protect the economy, ensure security and work with the residents of the wards“ (BBC, Aug 12, 1987).

15. **USSR/Afghanistan vs. Mujahideen, PDPA (1978–1992)**. CDF: Operatifi/Watanparast.

"[Afghan Interior Ministry] controlled the police (Sarandoy), which grew to include a heavily armed paramilitary militia; it also oversaw paramilitary groups often referred to by the Russian term operatifi" (Rubin 2002, 127). "Operatifi resembled the irregular forces that the Afghan state had largely relied upon to suppress the revolts in the days before Daoud built a modern army [...] These militia were responsible for keeping their areas clear of mujahidin and for keeping any major roads used by the government open" (Rubin 2002, 144). "The qawm-based [i.e. tribal] militias (watanparast, or operatifi) were also expanded and given new roles. Roy noted as early as 1984 that these militias were more combative and mobile than the regular army. At that time, however, they still operated in their areas of origin" (Rubin 2002, 158). "[T]he Soviets paid for and organised [...] the extended militia forces [...] [called] qawmi (tribal forces) that the regime referred to both as operatifi (operative) and watanparast (patriotic) forces. The tribal militias received training in handling arms and most importantly in monitoring Mujahideen movement in their areas. Their numbers were between 40,000 and 60,000 paid and registered men. [...] The Soviet aim when organising these militia forces was at first to keep the roads open. Soon they demanded that these militias stop resistance movement and any other such activity in their areas. The third aim was to airlift militias [...] to other parts of the country to fight the Mujahideen alongside [government] troops" (Misdaq 2006, 162). See citet[129–30]rasanayagam:2005 for more information about the Soviet use of tribal militias and their static as well as mobile roles. The Kabul regime maintained "25,000 tribal militia, composed of men from ethnic groups different from that of the local mujahideen. Highly paid, of questionable loyalty, only nominally under the control of Kabul, nevertheless in their own areas the militia usually kept the insurgents out and the roads open" (Joes 1992, 196).

16. **Colombia vs. FARC, ELN, Drug Cartels (1978–1991)**. CDF: United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia [*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*].

"In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a new form of insurgent group emerged in direct response to FARC and ELN: a right-wing paramilitary militia movement. Referred to as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC, an acronym for their Spanish name Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), the group numbers approximately 8,000, and is growing steadily. [...] By the 1980s, the Colombian government viewed these groups as a viable response to FARC and ELN and began supplying the vigilante groups with arms" (Gale 2006, 550). "The Colombian self-defense forces are local military forces that were created, armed and trained by the government army to fight guerrillas" (Xinhua General News Service, April 10, 1990). AUC self-defense groups were established "to enable people in rural Colombia to defend their lands from rebel attacks. But they soon moved beyond solely defensive actions and began killing leftist leaders and supporters, teachers and unionists" (Inter Press Service, June 20, 1989). The AUC has 1800 members (Livingstone 2004, 194). "Members attacked villages with roving columns of up to several hundred fighters; the AUCs forces lived in jungle camps but also maintained a presence in captured towns. As the AUC took over more villages, it gained control of coca-producing areas" (Kushner 2003, 385). "This local defense force quickly changed its posture from a defensive to an offensive one, attacking not armed guerrillas but unarmed civilians suspected of guerrilla activity" (Combs and Slann 2007, 347).

17. **Guatemala vs. Communists (1978–1994)**. CDF: Civil Defense Patrols [*Patrullas de Defensa Civil*].

"[T]he [Guatemalan] military institutionalized its control over the western highlands by forcing the local population to form civil defence patrols (Patrullas de Autodefensa — PAC) [...] At the height of the civil patrol system, in 1984, about

900,000, predominantly indigenous, men were active in the patrols“ (Koonings and Kruijt 2004, 54–5). ”[Civil Patrollers] were comprised of male campesinos (peasant farmers) primarily from rural Guatemala“ (Amnesty International, Sept 4, 2002). ”Virtually the entire highland — mainly Indian — population eligible for duty had been inducted into the civil patrols in just two years“ (Americas Watch 1986, 2). ”In general terms, civil patrol units are expected to protect the areas in and around the town perimeters [...] the men must also be available for [...] army-accompanied sweeps [...] into the surrounding mountainside or villages“ (ibid., 50-4). ” Civil patrollers were poorly armed, and, in the instances where there was an armed encounter with insurgent forces, civil patrollers would be the first to die“ (Sanford 2003, 116). ”Five to ten per cent of civil patrol members [were] armed [...] there were 50,000 weapons for 900,000 patrollers“ (Americas Watch 1986, 27).

18. **El Salvador vs. FMLN (1979–1992)**. CDF: Civil Defense.

”[O]rganized by El Salvador's armed forces under the supervision of the U.S. government, [the civil defense forces] assist the army's efforts to purge the area of rebel forces“ (Inter Press Service, March 4, 1987). The training of civil defense forces ”provides 16-week courses for Salvadoran non-commissioned officers, who then go out into the villages to recruit and train civilians in such skills as reconnaisance [sic] techniques, communications and weapons use“ (Ford, Inter Press Service, April 10, 1985). ”The main purpose of the new civil defense units was to serve as local self-defense militia and to repel guerrilla attacks on villages [...] [their membership] reportedly tended to overlap with that of Orden, [where] [r]ecruits came primarily from the army reserve system [...] By the late 1980s, the Salvadoran Army claimed to have organized 21,000 civil defense troops in 319 communities, with another 10,000 troops in training [...] Despite being lightly armed and poorly trained, the civil defense troops were an important supplement to the thinly stretched army“ (Haggerty 1990).

"Across El Salvador, about 15,000 civil defense troops attempt to guard the towns where they live" (Chavez, The New York Times, August 1, 1984).

19. **Peru vs. Sendero Luminoso (1980–1996)**. CDF: Rondas Campesinas (Ronderos).

"The official arming of the rondas campesinas started on a small scale under Peruvian President Garcia in 1990, before being enlarged and put on a legal basis under Fujimori in 1992" (Gerlach 2010, 197). Rondas Campesinas are a "civil defence militia formed to defend isolated villages from attack by Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrillas" (Chaudari, The Guardian, May 26, 1992). "After 11 years of failure to combat Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) by conventional means, the government is supporting the rondas as 'the axis of our military strategy in the Ayacucho area,' says a local Army source" (Bowen, Christian Science Monitor, June 7, 1991). "President Alberto Fujimori has announced that arming the rondas is official policy, an effort to involve civilians more closely in countersubversive activity" (ibid). "According to security some 12,000 to 14,000 weapons were distributed among the ronderos in the central and southern highlands" (Lama, Inter Press Service, August 6, 1996). "In Peru [...] the rondas campesinas described their function as the defence of communities from terrorists and support of the police and army" (Francis 2005, 253). "There are an estimated 12,000 'Ronderos' in the interior of the country, especially in the Apurimac River Valley, Ayacucho, and in the Mantaro Valley in the Central Andes" (Inter Press Service, July 29, 1992).

20. **Nicaragua vs. Contras (1981–1990)**. CDF: Sandinista People's Militia [*Milicia Popular Sandinista*].

"Following the example of Cuba, the Nicaraguan government established the Sandinista People's Militia (Milicia Popular Sandinista–MPS) to augment the regular

troops [...] Individual militias received weekend training in basic infantry weapons and were assigned as guards in sensitive installations or as neighborhood night watches [...] The principal weapons of the MPS were older-model rifles and machine guns and mortars [...] the main function of the mobilized militia became the protection of rural communities" (Merrill 1994). "Defense Minister Humberto Ortega announced Sunday the government distributed 200,000 rifles to civilian militia groups in anticipation of a feared U.S. invasion of the Central American country" (Bonilla, United Press International, July 14, 1985). "[T]he first standardized equipment received by the [Civil Defense units] were obsolete Czech BZ-52 ten-shot rifles [...] The militia were first issued modern AK-47 automatic rifles in 1983 [...] Nicaraguans of all ages and sexes joined the militia" (Walker 2003, 187, 193). The group is described as a "civilian self-defense militia" (Lauterpacht 1992, 59). "Nicaraguan militia and civil defense block committees [...] provide a vigilance service for the Sandinistas" (Chavez, The New York Times, November 18, 1983).

21. **India vs. Sikhs (1984–1993)**. CDF: Home Guards.

"In an attempt to contain the violence, the Punjab state governments run by Sikh moderates decided in April to set up village defense militias by providing guns to eight men in every hamlet" (Chellaney, The AP, June 3, 1986). "Village self-defense is the latest tactic being used in Punjab's war on terrorism. Civilians are being given weapons and training" (Singh, Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 1989). "The Home Guards are a voluntary force raised by state and territory governments under the guidance of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Home Guards undergo minimal training and receive pay only when called for duty [...] They assist the police in crime prevention and detection; undertake watch and patrol duties; and aid in disaster relief, crowd control, and the supervision of elections" (Heitzman and Worden 1996). "In addition to the existing 45,000-strong contingent of the Punjab police force, he

said, more than 700 companies of para-military forces have been deployed, besides 28,000 home guards and a large number of special police officers“ (Xinhua, February 17, 1992).

22. **Turkey vs. PKK (1984–1999)**. CDF: Village Guards.

”Following initial PKK attacks in 1984, the Turkish prime minister, Turgut Ozal, and his Motherland Party formed an institution of temporary 'village guards.' Select Kurds in particularly violent territories were trained as paramilitaries [...] [they] were typically lightly armed with Russian or Turkish-made automatic rifles [...] The village guard strategy was defensive in nature, however. It sought only to protect lives and property, and to inhibit PKK recruitment activities in the villages themselves“ (Finn 2007, 781). ”[...] the village guards as an institution – themselves invariably Kurds – also help divide the Kurdish community“ (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 147). ”In June 1995, Turkish government sources said there were 67,000 village guards. Initially, village guards were designed only to patrol their own villages; today, many take an active part in offensive military operations“ (Ron 1995, 55). The CDF program started implementation after 1987 (Jongerden 2007, 65).

23. **Iraq vs. Kurds (Anfal) (1985–1996)**. CDF: Al-Fursan/Jash.

”To increase its chances of defeating the Kurds, the government made use of a newly-established contingent consisting of pro-government Kurds, called al-Fursan ('the Knights') or the Fursan forces (in most publications these forces are only referred to as Jahsh, meaning 'donkeys' or 'mokes', the name given to the forces by the Kurdish resistance)“ (Zieck 1997, 177). ”The system relied on local leaders recruiting or organizing their following“ (McDowall 2007, 354). ”The regime favored recruiting Kurds from influential tribes such as the Zibaris, Hirkins and Surjis which had the clout to compete with the PUK and the KDP“ (Rabil 2002). ”The first jash were

recruited during the 1961 to 1963 Kurdish revolution, at which time they probably numbered about 10,000, but after 1983, their number grew exponentially, to reach as many as 150,000 by 1986 [...] As jash, the Kurds' duties were light — guarding checkpoints, keeping the local peace — and they could remain at home, farming, herding their animals, protecting their families, and earning a small salary" (Bird 2004, 81). "In return for weapons, money and privileges, Kurdish tribesmen played a part in containing the onslaught of the Peshmergas" (Chaliand 1993, 222).

24. **Sri Lanka vs. JVP (1987–1989)**. CDF: Home Guards.

"[...] the government authorized an expansion of local and private militias in the south. The signing of the [1987 Indo-Lankan] accord had unleashed a wave of violence among militant Sinhalese groups who opposed both the accommodation with the Tamil separatists and the presence of Indian troops on Sri Lankan soil" (Nyrop 1990). "All [Home Guard] trainees were recommended by the 143 members of parliament belonging to the ruling United National Party (UNP), each MP nominating 150 from their own electorate [...] these home guards are trained mainly to counter the threat from the Janath Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) (the People's Liberation Front) as every MP had asked for protection in their electorates" (Xinhua, Jan 26, 1988). "Home guards were trained and armed with rifles, which were made available to the local police" (Warnapala 1994, 184).

25. **Papua New Guinea vs. BRA (Bougainville) (1988–1998)**. CDF: Bougainville Resistance Force (BRA).

"To help neutralize the [rebel] BRA [Bougainville Resistance Army], Papua New Guinea created, funded, and armed the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF), ensuring its loyalty to the central government" (LaPierre 2007, 101). "Former BRA elements and other Bougainvilleans formed resistance forces that fought alongside

the army“ (Ghai 2000, 258). Mebers of the BRA and BRF ”are all, at the end of the day, Bougainvillians'“ (Murdoch, The Age, February 24, 1997). ”[W]ith their local knowledge and kinship connections, [the BRF] are seen as one of the most effective weapons the State has against the rebels“ (O'Callaghan, The Australian, July 31, 1996).

26. **Burundi vs. Hutus (1991–2005)**. CDF: Guardians of the Peace [*Gardiens de la paix*].

”With the [rebel] FDD advance into southern Burundi in 1997, military authorities began to organize armed paramilitary groups [...] Known at first also as abajeunes, they were renamed 'Guardians of the Peace' (gardiens de la paix) and, numbering more than three thousand, began to play a major role in fighting the rebels [...] some 30,000 Burundians had received military training as Guardians of the Peace [...] The vast majority of participants were Hutu [...] In Makamba province, where Tutsi and Hutu live together in displaced persons camps, a somewhat larger number of Tutsi serve in the guardians [...] In some areas guardians received new assault rifles [...] to replace the older Kalashnikovs [...] and played an increasingly important role as surrogate soldiers. [They] scouted with and for soldiers. They also guarded populated areas. Deployed in larger numbers than regular troops, and in advance of them, guardians sustained high casualties in combat [...] Rather than being used as a 'self-defense' force to protect their home regions, guardians were sent as surrogate soldiers on maneuvers miles away and for weeks at a time“ (McClintock 2001, 6–12).

27. **Algeria vs. MIA/FIS/AIS, GIA, GSPC (19921–2002)**. CDF: Legitimate Defense Groups [*Groupes de legitime defense*].

By 1994, the government established self-defense groups in Kabylia. ”[Its] militiamen were made responsible for checking people entering and leaving their villages, and

protecting them against the 'ghazias' of the Moudjahidin [...] The militias [...] were entrusted [...] with occupying the land so as to prey upon the Islamist guerrillas' supply networks [...] they remained stationed in the towns and villages where they were born" (Martínez 2000, 151–3). "[...] with the country's small army overstretched and mired in a guerrilla war for which it had not been trained, the authorities embarked on a policy of distributing weapons to trusted civilians" (The Economist, April 25, 1998). "The Algerian state armed civilians, encouraging them to create anti-Islamic militias to protect their communities [...] regarding the size of the militias, [...] estimates vary from between 100,000 and 300,000 [...] The two principal types of militia groups — the Groupes de legitime defense (GLD) and the Patriotes — were established to take responsibility for self-defense and resistance respectively. The GLD tend to be composed of villagers who carry out territorial surveillance [...] while the 'Patriots' are veterans of the Algerian war of liberation, organized into [...] combat units that work in conjunction with state security forces" (Collier and Sambanis 2005, 235).

28. **Nepal vs. CPN-M/UPF (Maoists) (1996–2006)**. CDF: Rural Volunteer Security Groups.

In late 2003, the government started organizing local villagers into Rural Volunteer Security Groups (ICG 2004). "By early 2004, so-called Rural Security Volunteer Groups and Peace Committees were created in communities across the country [...] these groups turned out to be local civilian militias [...] the civilians were hardly trained and uncontrolled but nevertheless armed" (Eurich 2010, 285). Rural Volunteer Security Groups and Peace Committees were constituted in 2003. The committees were supposed to mobilize the village people towards maintaining peace and security. The village people were expected to join these groups and those who did not join them they were viewed as supporters of the Maoist insurgents" (Upreti 2008, 134–5).

29. **France vs. Indochina (Viet Minh) (1946–1954)**. CDF: Suppletifs.

"[T]he number of Vietnamese serving for the French had increased to 54,000 regulars and 58,000 suppletifs, with another 15,000 Vietnamese in training" (Cassidy 2006, 145). "In the Red River Delta in the period 1945-54, the peasants came under intense pressure from both the Viet Minh guerrillas and the French to take sides. The response of numerous villages in the contested areas was to accept weapons supplied by the French and to establish self-defense militia forces" (Rambo 2005, 138). "[T]he French resettled the population of a number of scattered hamlets into one big agglomeration (regroupment des villages), which would then be defended by armed youths from the village, trained and led by French soldiers (organismes d'autodefense)" (Salemink 2003, 169). "The national troops included many supplementary and militia units which had been used only in static defense positions to relieve the French Expeditionary Corps" (Scigliano 1963, 162). See also Wiest (2006, 129). "After the war against the Viet Minh began in December 1946, the French did attempt to organize local militias. However, these self-defense forces were poorly trained and equipped – some members had nothing but cutlasses and iron spikes to defend themselves – and received little support from French troops. Not surprisingly, few villagers were willing to join these militias" (Rosenau 2005, 39).

30. **United Kingdom vs. Malaya (Communists) (1948–1957)**. CDF: Home Guard.

"Malay Kampung Guards (established in 1949 and armed only with shotguns) and the Auxiliary Police Force (made up of Malays) in Malaya were followed by the foundation of a Chinese Home Guard in September 1950, in 1951 all three being merged and brought to close to 300,000 men, one-third of them Chinese [...] equipped with 89,000 weapons" (Gerlach 2010, 197). "[T]he British had established in Malaya an indigenous armed force, the Home Guard. [...] The establishment of a local,

indigenous militia enabled regular troops to be freed from defensive positions and re-deployed more aggressively in the anti-guerrilla war" (Jongerden 2007, 73). "[T]he Home Guard was responsible for the defense of seventy-two New Villages" (Nagl 2002, 100). "The Home Guard had importance for static guard duties" (Osborne 1965, 18, 34n). "The New Villagers were allowed to form their own home guards to help the police protect and defend their areas" (Ooi 2004, 250).

31. **United Kingdom vs. Kenya (Mau Mau) (1952–1956)**. CDF: Home Guard.

"[Kikuyu] chiefs and headmen were granted an honorarium for leading a Home Guard unit [...] They would be issued with a shotgun, a welcome protection in these troubled times, and their recruits would be granted exemption from poll tax [...] By the end of [1952] units had formed in all the main towns throughout the White Highlands, and in the chieftaincies within the Kikuyu reserves [...] By March 1954 there were 25,600 Kikuyu Home Guards" (Anderson 2005, 241). See also Kantowicz (2000, 256). "Eventually, nearly the entire corps of Kikuyu Home Guard, numbering some fifteen thousand in early 1953, would be armed with precision weapons or spears" (Elkins 2005, 71). "To strengthen their authority, Kikuyu Home Guard units were confined within their own locations. Local knowledge was the key to their success, but it also gave vent to no small degree of private feuding and score-settling" (Anderson 2005, 243).

32. **France vs. Algeria (1954–1962)**. CDF: Harkis.

"In 1957, on General Challe's initiative, units of Harkis were developed, made up of Muslim Algerians who had chosen, out of conviction, self-interest or fear, the cause of French Algeria. Because of their social proximity to the ALN fighters, they succeeded in weakening their position in the maquis. The strength of the army 'auxiliaries' was

estimated at 160,000 men, divided into 'offensive Harkis' and village 'self-defence groups' (Moghazni)" (Martínez 2000, 153, 18n). "Among the auxiliaries in French Algeria were the Self-Defense Groups, the harki (supplemental combat troops; the term was also used in a generic sense for all auxiliaries in Algeria), Mobile Security Groups (police), the maghzen (armed auxiliaries of the militarized 'Special Administrative Sections'), and several smaller formations" (Gerlach 2010, 196). "The SAS helped form small village self-defense forces called 'harkis,' who were armed with a motley array of hunting rifles and shotguns, as well as some surplus military weapons. The only mission of the harkis was to patrol the areas around their villages and keep out the rebel FLN bands [...] the program was exceptionally successful from the start. By June 1960, more than 57,000 harkis had been enrolled in the Home Guard programs and another 27,500 enrolled as auxiliary police" (Corum 2007, 204).

33. **Portugal vs. Angola (1961–1974)**. CDF: Second Line Forces [*Corpo Militar de Segunda Linha*].

In 1961, Portugal maintained several civil militia formations: (1) Organizacao Provincial de Voluntdrios e Defesa Civil (the Provincial Organisation of Volunteers and Civil Defense), (2) the Corpo de Voluntdrios (Volunteer Corps), and (3) Corpo Militar de Segunda Linha (Second Line Forces). Of these, only the third one was staffed by mainly African recruits (Wheeler 1969, 432). "The Portugese also mobilised the native population [...] A Corpo Militar de Segunda Linha or Milicia was established. This was a local corps, organised in platoons with a police sergeant (usually white) [...] They were to be found in the cities and small towns, but their main role was a kind of Home Guard for the defence of aldeamentos [strategic settlements]" (Abbott, Botham, Rodrigues and Volstad 1988, 33). "The exact number of Africans now organized in militia units is unkown [sic], but estimates range between 35,000 and 40,000. About 10 percent have been issued weapons, but most rely on bows and

arrows and spears" (Bender 1972, 336). See also Beckett (2001, 137). "[N]o doubt [exists] that the Portuguese had little intention of properly arming the African militia because they feared the Africans might defect to 'the enemy' with the weapons. Instead, the militia's primary function was to compromise its members with the nationalists" (Bender 1978, 161).

Appendix D

The Data At A Glance

Table D.1 lists the CDF deployments and COIN outcomes in the Kalyvas and Balcells (2010)-based sample of irregular wars, while Table D.2 provides an overview of the subnational sample of Philippine and Turkish provinces used in Part II of the dissertation.

Table D.1. CDFs and COIN Outcomes, 1945–2006

ID	Incumbent	Insurgent	Start	End	CDF	WDL
1	Greece	Communists	1944	1949	1	2
2	Russia	Latvia/LTSPA	1944	1956	0	2
3	Russia	Lithuania/BDPS	1944	1956	0	2
4	Russia	Estonia, Forest Brothers	1944	1956	0	2
5	Russia	Ukraine/UPA	1944	1953	0	2
6	China	Taiwanese Nationalists	1947	1947	0	2
7	Korea	Military (Yosu Rebellion)	1948	1949	0	2
8	Burma	Communists	1948	1988	1	2
9	Burma	Karen (KNU)	1948	1951	0	1
10	Philippines	Huks	1950	1952	0	2
11	Bolivia	MNR (La Paz)	1952	1952	0	0
12	Indonesia	Darul Islam	1953	1953	0	2
13	China	Tibet	1956	1959	0	2

Table D.1. *continued*

14	Indonesia	Darul Islam, PRRI	1956	1960	1	2
15	Cuba	Castro	1958	1959	0	0
16	Iraq	Shammar	1959	1959	0	2
17	Laos	Pathet Lao	1960	1973	0	0
18	Burma	Karen (KNU)	1960	1995	1	2
19	USA/S. Vietnam	NLF (Vietcong)	1960	1975	1	0
20	Iraq	Kurds (PUK)	1961	1970	1	1
21	Algeria	CNDR	1962	1963	0	2
22	Kenya	Shifta (Somalis)	1963	1967	0	2
23	Sudan	Anya Nya	1963	1972	0	1
24	Burundi	Hutus	1965	1969	.	.
25	Chad	FROLINAT	1965	1979	0	0
26	Guatemala	URNG	1966	1972	0	2
27	Thailand	Communists	1966	1982	1	2
28	Uganda	Baganda Rebellion	1966	1966	.	.
29	Cambodia	FUNK	1970	1975	0	0
30	Oman	Dhofar	1971	1975	1	2
31	Philippines	Moros (MNLF)	1971	1996	0	1
32	Sri Lanka	JVP	1971	1971	0	2
33	Philippines	NPA	1972	1992	1	2
34	Rhodesia	ZANU, ZAPU	1972	1979	0	0
35	South Africa	Namibia	1973	1989	0	0
36	Pakistan	Baluchistan	1973	1977	0	2
37	Bangladesh	Shanti Bahini	1974	1997	0	1
38	Ethiopia	Eritrean Insurgents	1974	1991	0	0
39	Iraq	Kurdish Rebels	1974	1975	1	2
40	Cambodia	Khmer Rouge Defectors	1975	1991	1	1
41	Indonesia	East Timor	1975	1999	0	0
42	Morocco	Polisario	1975	1991	0	2
43	Ethiopia	Ogaden (Somalis)	1976	1988	0	2
44	Indonesia	OPM (West Papua)	1976	1978	0	2

Table D.1. *continued*

45	Mozambique	RENAMO	1976	1992	1	1
46	Afghanistan	Mujahideen, PDPA	1978	1992	1	0
47	Colombia	FARC, ELN	1978	1991	1	1
48	Ethiopia	Tigreans	1978	1991	0	0
49	Guatemala	Communists	1978	1994	1	1
50	Nicaragua	FSLN	1978	1979	0	0
51	Iran	KDPI	1979	1984	0	2
52	El Salvador	FMLN	1979	1992	1	1
53	Nigeria	Maitatsine Sect (Kano)	1980	1984	0	2
54	Peru	Sendero Luminoso	1980	1996	1	2
55	Nicaragua	Contras	1981	1990	1	1
56	Uganda	NRA	1981	1987	0	0
57	Sri Lanka	Tamils	1983	2002	0	1
58	Sudan	SPLM	1983	2002	0	1
59	Zimbabwe	Ndebele Guerillas	1983	1987	0	2
60	India	Sikhs	1984	1993	1	2
61	Turkey	PKK	1984	1999	1	2
62	Iraq	Kurds; Anfal	1985	1996	1	1
63	Sri Lanka	JVP	1987	1989	1	2
64	Burundi	Hutus	1988	1988	0	2
65	Papua New Guinea	BRA (Bougainville)	1988	1998	1	1
66	Somalia	SSDF, SNM (Isaaqs)	1988	1991	0	0
67	Senegal	MFDC (Casamance)	1989	1999	0	2
68	Indonesia	Aceh	1990	1991	0	2
69	Mali	Tuaregs	1990	1995	0	1
70	Tajikistan	UTO	1992	1997	0	1
71	Egypt	Gamaat Islamiya; Islamic Jihad	1994	1997	.	.
72	Congo-Zaire	AFDL (Kabila)	1996	1997	0	0
73	Yugoslavia	Kosovo (KLA)	1998	1999	0	0
74	Indonesia	Aceh	1999	2002	0	1
75	Burundi	Hutu Groups	1991	2005	1	0

Table D.1. *continued*

76	Algeria	MIA/FIS/AIS, GIA, GSPC	1992	2002	1	2
77	Nepal	CPN-M/UPF (Maoists)	1996	2006	1	1
78	Netherlands	Indonesia	1946	1949	0	0
79	France	Indochina (Viet Minh)	1946	1954	1	0
80	France	Madagascar (MDMR)	1947	1947	0	2
81	UKG	Malaya (Communists)	1948	1957	1	2
82	UKG	Kenya (Mau Mau)	1952	1956	1	2
83	France	Tunisia	1953	1956	0	0
84	France	Morocco	1953	1956	0	0
85	France	Algeria	1954	1962	1	0
86	France	Cameroon	1957	1959	0	2
87	Portugal	Angola	1961	1974	1	0
88	Portugal	Guinea Bissau (PAIGC)	1963	1973	0	0
89	Portugal	Mozambique	1964	1974	0	0

Table D.2. Province-Level CDF Distribution: Turkey and the Philippines

Country	**Province**	**CDF**	**Tribal Population**
Turkey	Adana	0	0
Turkey	Adiyaman	1510	111447
Turkey	Agri	1881	403462
Turkey	Bingol	2533	90300
Turkey	Bitlis	3796	18350
Turkey	Diyarbakir	5274	72195
Turkey	Elazig	2115	26052
Turkey	Erzincan	0	51285
Turkey	Erzurum	0	90641
Turkey	Gaziantep	599	69215
Turkey	Hakkari	14478	76300
Turkey	Maras	2267	87778
Turkey	Kars	1048	215946

Table D.2. *continued*

Turkey	Malatya	1392	3500
Turkey	Mardin	3360	280184
Turkey	Mus	1918	90879
Turkey	Sanliurfa	966	203362
Turkey	Siirt	7623	166850
Turkey	Sivas	0	39880
Turkey	Tunceli	386	101265
Turkey	Van	7365	113158
The Philippines	Abra	630	52352
The Philippines	Agusan del Norte	672	2046
The Philippines	Agusan del Sur	2016	49766
The Philippines	Aklan	226	127
The Philippines	Albay	848	1891
The Philippines	Antique	113	4772
The Philippines	Apayao	630	9496
The Philippines	Aurora	408	1709
The Philippines	Basilan	2400	115237
The Philippines	Bataan	204	1067
The Philippines	Batanes	0	5223
The Philippines	Batangas	936	2662
The Philippines	Benguet	105	224145
The Philippines	Biliran	0	0
The Philippines	Bohol	1017	489
The Philippines	Bukidnon	1232	186861
The Philippines	Bulacan	408	8763
The Philippines	Cagayan	630	235786
The Philippines	Camarines Norte	318	169
The Philippines	Camarines Sur	2014	9936
The Philippines	Camiguin	0	0
The Philippines	Capiz	565	5144
The Philippines	Catanduanes	318	0

Table D.2. *continued*

The Philippines	Cavite	117	6674
The Philippines	Cebu	339	1925
The Philippines	Compostella Valley	2142	0
The Philippines	Cotabato	3552	162214
The Philippines	Davao del Norte	1071	68782
The Philippines	Davao del Sur	1904	268313
The Philippines	Davao Oriental	833	133501
The Philippines	Eastern Samar	460	199
The Philippines	Guimaras	0	0
The Philippines	Ifugao	210	123163
The Philippines	Ilocos Norte	210	709
The Philippines	Ilocos Sur	315	18847
The Philippines	Iloilo	339	70906
The Philippines	Isabela	840	215597
The Philippines	Kalinga	945	93459
The Philippines	La Union	0	13534
The Philippines	Laguna	585	3320
The Philippines	Lanao del Norte	1510	579
The Philippines	Lanao del Sur	1041	4606
The Philippines	Leyte	575	711
The Philippines	Maguindanao	2220	599766
The Philippines	Marinduque	117	141
The Philippines	Masbate	212	0
The Philippines	Misamis Occidental	1161	0
The Philippines	Misamis Oriental	1456	2889
The Philippines	Mt. Province	630	48518
The Philippines	Negros Occidental	1808	2559
The Philippines	Negros Oriental	791	2885
The Philippines	Northern Samar	920	0
The Philippines	Nueva Ecija	510	2844
The Philippines	Nueva Vizcaya	105	54083

Table D.2. *continued*

The Philippines	Occidental Mindoro	351	31908
The Philippines	Oriental Mindoro	585	38163
The Philippines	Palawan	585	187619
The Philippines	Pampanga	510	2338
The Philippines	Pangasinan	510	4648
The Philippines	Quezon	1755	6323
The Philippines	Quirino	210	16488
The Philippines	Rizal	468	10832
The Philippines	Romblon	117	89044
The Philippines	Samar	920	222
The Philippines	Sarangani	833	0
The Philippines	Siquijor	0	0
The Philippines	Sorsogon	636	122
The Philippines	South Cotabato	952	200536
The Philippines	Southern Leyte	345	0
The Philippines	Sultan Kudarat	1443	109757
The Philippines	Sulu	0	45324
The Philippines	Surigao del Norte	448	474
The Philippines	Surigao del Sur	1120	8410
The Philippines	Tarlac	510	3488
The Philippines	Tawi-Tawi	0	133292
The Philippines	Zambales	0	121484
The Philippines	Zamboanga del Norte	2090	234691
The Philippines	Zamboanga del Sur	4413	298136

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