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Robin Walker April 09, 2014

Political Culture: State Responses to Social Welfare

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Abstract
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This paper seeks to explore whether state political culture influences social welfare outcomes via state policy designs. Drawing on previous theory and literature, I compare three measures of political culture and I hypothesize that the influence of political culture determines the progressiveness of state policy designs, which in turn affects outcomes in social welfare problems. To test these hypotheses, I utilize a cross sectional design to examine how political culture effects social welfare outcomes, in particular poverty rates and uninsured rates, in the policy arenas of welfare and health respectively. My analysis results in mixed findings; the relationship between state policy designs and political culture was mixed, showing significance for only a few variables. Further, there proved to be little to no relationship between state policy designs and outcomes in poverty rates and the uninsured rate. Overall, my findings do not confirm my hypotheses. However, my findings suggest several avenues for further research.

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Political Culture: State Responses to Social Welfare Problems

Chapter 1: Introduction

Social welfare policy in the United States attempts to provide assistance and support to citizens, especially the disadvantaged, through programs by which wellbeing may be promoted. Before the implementation of each program, the federal government formulates a policy design to serve as a blueprint for how it will go about addressing an issue or achieving particular goals by outlining "who does what, when, with whom, with what resources, for what reasons, and with what kinds of motivating devices" (Schneider and Ingram 1997, 2). During this process, the federal government strategically chooses policies that are most likely to result in desired outcomes.

For most social welfare programs however, the federal government yields great discretionary authority to the states, making them responsible for a variety of important decisions about social policy and its implementation. Given the discretion to make and choose policies, states differ in their policy designs or their mechanisms for adopting particular policy portfolios and subsequent programs. Differences in state policy designs however are most compelling as the social welfare problems they attempt to address, broadly defined to include aspects of education, health, and welfare, also vary across states.

According to Miller (2004), several political scientists have investigated political factors such as "political party control, interparty competition" and state and citizen ideology and socio-economic characteristics including "population size and composition and state fiscal capacity" among several others in attempts to explain state variation in public policies (35). One factor in particular, American political culture, has proven "fundamental to understanding federalism in the United States" as it influences "public policies, government institutions and political

processes" (Lieske 2010, 538; see Elazar 1972, Elazar 1984; Dye 1997; Hero 1998, 2007). Since the mid-20th century, many scholars have utilized the concept to explain "differences in the political processes, institutional structures, political behavior, and policies and programs of state and local government" (qtd. in Lieske 1993, 539; see also Elazar 1966, 1970, 1994; Sharkansky 1969). No previous scholar, however, has provided a more significant contribution to this literature than Daniel Elazar (1966, 1970, 1994).

Daniel Elazar's concept of political culture has been "one of the most utilized, as well as criticized, by scholars for its ability to explain policy differences among the states" (French and Stanley N.D., 2). Elazar's concept classified states and local regions as one or a combination of three political subcultures[1]—individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic—based on sociocultural differences found among various groups in early American migration patterns (Elazar 1994, 237). These subcultural differences, he argued, would help to explain, "what state and local governments do, how they are organized, what political rules they observe, and who participates in the political process" (Lieske 1993, 888).

Debates surrounding the utility of Elazar's political culture to explain political phenomena at the state-level are ongoing. The three main arguments against Elazar's theory are that it is not appropriate for empirical measures, too crude, and circular in form (Schiltz and Rainey 1978; Lowery and Sigelman 1982; Nardulli 1990; Lieske 2010, 2011). Most scholars find Elazar's typology difficult to replicate because it is not "based on rigorous statistical analysis" and "does not account for cultural changes over time" (Lieske 1993, 888). Furthermore, some tend to think the lack of empirical precision in Elazar's state classification scheme and "228 separate subcultural designations [interspersed throughout] the country" is rather crude and largely impressionistic (Sharkansky 1969, 71; Kincaid and Lieske 1991; Lieske

[1]Political subculture and political culture are used interchangeably.

1993). Lastly, several scholars argue that the circularity of his typology, in which Elazar posits that the political cultures are circular although several attributes of his political cultures tend to fall on a linear continuum, "complicates the task of testing its validity" (Sharkansky 1969; Kincaid and Lieske 1991; Lieske 1993). Some researchers have offered improvements to Elazar's conceptualization, the first being Ira Sharkansky, who created a unidimensional measure to correct the circularity problem. Others, most notably Joel Lieske, purport a better measure of political culture that addresses all these criticisms (Sharkansky 1969; Kincaid and Lieske 1991, 1993, 2011).

Albeit the inherent issues with Elazar's theory, others argue that there is still support for his typology (Johnson 1976; Dran, Albritton, and Wyckoff 1991; Kincaid 1980a; Savage 1981; Joslyn1980; Hanson 1980; Fitzpatrick and Hero 1988; Koven and Mausolff 2002; Carman and Barker 2005). The most recent support for Elazar's theory has been research concerning social welfare (Mead 2004a; Mead 2004b; Camp-Landis 2008) in which state governments tend to respond to welfare reform, with regard to the policies they enact and their overall implementation of the program, in accord to their respective subcultural classifications[2].

This recent research on political culture influencing state responses to welfare reform raises the question of whether state variation in social welfare problems can be traced back to state political culture through state policy designs. Thus, this thesis offers a contribution to the literature in two important respects. First, no previous research to my knowledge has researched whether outcomes in social welfare problems are the result of state political culture's effect on state policy design[3]. Moreover, most research that has investigated the influence of political

[2] The way in which states respond to welfare reform according their respective subcultural classifications will be elaborated in the literature review.
[3] Some studies may have touched upon this link using case studies (i.e. Camp-Landis 2008, Mead 2004b), however; I have not found any research that explicitly conducted a study to determine this relationship.

culture on social welfare has focused on welfare reform with little investigation into other social policy arenas. The purpose of this research project therefore is to use the policy domain of social welfare programs in welfare and health[4] to determine whether the concept of political culture is a valid explanation for variation in state policy outcomes. These particular arenas were chosen because federal and state governments jointly support them, yet states have great discretionary power--administratively and financially. Discretionary power enables states to "choose the means by which they meet federally prescribed ends" (Soss et al. 2001, 380). In other words, states make decisions about what to do and how to go about resolving or reducing an issue, including the level of financial support that will be directed towards these social problems. Further, it is important to observe the strength of political culture as an explanatory variable across these policy arenas because other political and socioeconomic factors, to be discussed in the literature review, could sway state policy designs. Lastly, these arenas include major programs that receive large federal and state expenditures that could positively affect the well-being of many individuals, especially the disadvantaged.

Second, given the debate encircling Elazar's measure, including improvements to his concept and a purported new measure of political culture offered by Lieske, this thesis compares the political culture measures of Elazar, Sharkansky and Lieske to determine whether political culture has a significant impact on state policy designs and if so, whose measure provides the most explanatory power.

[4] My initial research project included the education policy arena as well (Title 1 program and variation in high school dropout rates) but due to insufficient Title 1 data, I unfortunately had to exclude it from my analysis.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Policy Design

Before delving into the literature concerning the concept of political culture, it is important to get a grasp of exactly what policy design refers to and how states craft their policy designs to respond to social welfare problems. It is also important to recognize the potential influence state policy designs could have on social welfare outcomes, in addition to the wide variety of other plausible explanations for variations in both.

First, policy design refers to the "efforts made by governments to alter aspects of their own or social behaviour in order to carry out some end or purpose and are comprised of complex arrangements of policy goals and policy means" (Capano 2013). Simply stated, governments that desire a particular outcome(s), design a policy that will most likely have the desired effect(s). To create an effective policy design, policymakers must understand what Thomas Birkland refers to as the causal theory. The causal theory is a "theory about what causes the problems and what intervention--that is, policy response to the problem--would alleviate the problem" (Birkland, 2001, 161). Establishing causation usually occurs when governments believe they can "identify the purposes or motives of a person or group and link those purposes to their actions" (qtd in Birkland 2001, 161; refer to Stone 1989, 189). How causation is perceived therefore, is important because it "directs government action and influences the types of policy tools" used to respond to the problem (Birkland 2001, 161).

The way states create their policy designs to respond to social welfare problems depend on the levels of specificity and discretion provided by the federal government. For some social welfare programs, like Medicare, the federal government leaves little ambiguity or discretion to the imagination of the states. It is a program for which the "causal theory is implicit in

legislation" and the policy design for the program is centrally based (Birkland 200, 161). For other social welfare programs that the federal government jointly administers with states, such as Medicaid and TANF, the causal theory in legislation may be "sufficiently vague enough for each state to establish its own causal theory", subsequent policy design and the policy tools to carry it out (Birkland 2001, 56).

It is important to note however, that the formulation of policy designs for these programs originates at the federal level. Policy design authority is simply devolved to the state level. Thus, the federal government may put forth specific requirements or limitations of state action within the policy designs. For example, federal law for TANF mandated that states "promote work, reduce welfare usage, and change poor people's behaviors" or a more specific example, that states meet a strict quota for the "percentage of adult recipients who must participate in work-related activities and defined these activities in a narrow manner that left the states with little room to maneuver" (Soss et al 2001, 378). Thus, the causal theory is provided in the TANF legislation (Birkland 2001); the perception of dependency among recipients on welfare would be counteracted by the promotion of work-related activities and the enforcement of a time limit (among other policy tools) that would achieve the goals of a reduced caseload and increased self-sufficiency. For Medicaid, the federal government requires states to "cover a specified set of eligibility groups and benefits, provide enrollees with mandatory benefits and certain cost sharing protections in order to participate in the program" (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2011, 4-6). The causal theory for this program is also evident in the legislation; the disparity of health coverage due to low income or disability would be narrowed by providing health assistance to low-income and high-need individuals (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2011; Birkland 2001).

Due to federal limitations, states primarily operate by the policy tools embedded in the policy design. Policy tools refers to the "the elements of a policy design that cause agents[5] or targets to do something they would not otherwise do with the intention of modifying behavior to solve public problems or attain policy goals" (Schneider and Ingram 1997, 93). However, discretion over policy tools still enables "states [to] enjoy significant latitude in the design" of their respective Medicaid and TANF programs (Ewalt and Jennings 2004, 452). Under both programs, "states have access to the same policy tools and options", yet vary in regard to their policy choices and ultimate programs (Ewalt and Jennings 2004, 452).

Finally, the question moves to whether state policy designs actually result in the desired outcomes. As Ewalt and Jennings stress, the extensive literature and debates surrounding the types of policies that would help states achieve desired outcomes in welfare reform "illustrated the centrality of policy design to the achievement of program outcomes" (2004, 452). They found that for TANF in particular, policy design does affect policy outcomes. Their hypothesis that more restrictive TANF policies reduced caseload was found to be supported in their findings. McKernon and Ratcliffe investigated whether TANF policy tools (sanctions, time limits, maximum benefit levels, and family caps, etc.) influenced poverty levels among ever single mothers and children and found that "more lenient eligibility requirements and more generous financial incentives to work generally reduce deep poverty, as hypothesized" (2006, 23). These two studies provide only a glimpse of the numerous studies concerning outcomes of TANF policies. The significance of welfare reform—states having greater discretion to uniquely design their programs and influence policy outcomes--provided greater in-depth research into the effects of state policy designs on outcomes. However, few other policy arenas have garnered

[5] According to Schneider and Ingram 1997, agents refer to the agencies or organizations that will go about implementing the policy design, and targets refer to "the recipients of policy benefits or burdens" (2).

similar research to that degree.

In addition, not all scholars agree that state policy designs alone affect outcomes. In fact, the existing literature suggests that both state policy designs and outcomes in social welfare problems could be influenced by other factors. Economic differences among states may reasonably account for varying state policy designs, as state funding is an important aspect of such programs. State economies vary notably in size and strength based on characteristics such as the presence of natural resources, the size of the private sector, jobs availability and revenue sources which could enable wealthier states to be more generous to social welfare programs. According to several scholars, state measures such as per capita income and unemployment rates have been shown to influence state policy choices (Soss et. al, 2001; Hero 1998; Fellowes and Rowe 2004) as well as the poverty rate and uninsured rate (Holahan and Garret 2009; McDonald and Hertz n.d.). Further, some scholars argue that caseload reduction in TANF was the result of an economic boom in the late 1990s (Ziliak et. al. 2000, Klerman and Haider 2003; Moffitt 1999). There is also evidence that wealthier states provide more funds to social programs and more specifically welfare and health (Winston 2002; Tweedie 1994). For example, Tweedie (1994) found that states that have greater revenue with which to distribute tend to provide more generous AFDC benefits than states with less revenue (664).

Research also suggests that partisanship can have an influence on social welfare policy. Partisan control is generally understood to be the extent to which Democrats or Republicans control the legislature and executive branches. The general consensus is that state Democratic control leads to more liberal policies whereas Republican control leads to more restrictive policies. Fellowes and Rowe (2004) found that Democrats tend to pass more generous welfare policies than Republicans and that the greater percentage of legislative seats occupied by

Democrats is positively associated with less restrictive eligibility rules and more flexible work requirements[6] (367-369). Further, Soss et al (2001) found that "strict [TANF] sanction policies were significantly more likely in states with conservative governments" (386). In addition, numerous studies have provided evidence that citizen ideology affects state public policy. The literature suggests that liberals tend to support more generous welfare policies (Erikson, Wright, and Mclver 1993; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Plotnick and Winters 1990; Volden 2002).

Other plausible explanations to variations in policy design and social welfare outcomes are demographic characteristics. There is a general consensus among scholars that the "proportion of a state's population that is racial minorities and its generosity in welfare policy" are negative correlated (Johnson 2013, 27; refer to Hero 1998; Howard 1999; Orr 1976; Wright 1976, Soss et al. 2001). This implies that states with a greater proportion of minorities are more likely to enact policies that are more stringent whereas states with a smaller proportion of minorities are more likely to choose policies that are more generous. For example, Soss et al. (2001) found that family caps and strict time limits were significantly more likely to exist in states with a "higher percentage of African Americans in their AFDC caseloads and those with higher percentages of Latinos in their AFDC caseloads" *ceteris paribus* (386). In addition, research finds that the minorities are more likely to be uninsured and/or poor (McDonald and Hertz n.d.; Holahan and Garett 2009; Davis and Rowland 1983).

Due to the social, political and economic factors that may influence variation in both state policy designs and social welfare outcomes, these factors will be taken into account in the analysis.

[6] Refer to Fellows and Rowe Table 3, page 369.

Political Culture

Daniel Elazar, in his book *American Federalism: A View from the States*, attempted to expand the knowledge of state political systems and the legislation they promote by theorizing that a state's political culture shaped state political behavior and policy outcomes (1972, 83). Using historical settlement patterns[7], Elazar argued that the "habits, concerns and attitudes" of the groups of people who settled in the U.S. "influenced the political life of the various states" which in turn determined the dominant or dominant-subordinate[8] political cultures in each of the fifty states (1972, 85).

Elazar (1972) defined political culture as "the particular pattern of orientation to political action in which each political system is imbedded" (85). State political cultures can be categorized[9] as moralistic, individualistic, traditionalistic or a combination. Though the political culture of a state is not geographically bound, "states located in the far North, Northeast and on the Pacific Coast are usually dominated by the moralistic culture" (Elazar 1972, 119). States in the South are generally dominated by the traditionalistic culture and states across the Midwest are generally dominated by the individualistic culture (Elazar, 1972, 119).

Each political culture differs in its approach to the purposes and norms of important aspects of a political system. The three political cultures emphasize different purposes for government. In moralistic states, government is "devoted to the advancement of the public

[7] Elazar (1972) explains that Puritans/Scandinavians who settled in New England established the moralistic culture because of their religious ambitions that influenced their perception of a commonwealth. The individualistic culture resulted from the settlement patterns of groups of people from non-Puritan England and Germanic states, who "sought communal as well as individualistic goals such as individual freedom to pursue private goals" (103). Similarly, the groups of people who settled in the south sought individual opportunity but by agrarian pursuits, which hinged on the means of slavery. The "elitism of the landed gentry", Elazar argued, led to the establishment of the traditionalistic culture (1972, 103-113).

[8] Not all of Elazar's state political cultures consist of one dominant political culture. In fact, 32 of his state political cultures involve a combination of political cultures or a dominant-subordinate classification. Dominant-subordinate political culture is a paired method of political cultures in which the first letter denotes the most prevalent political culture and the subordinate letter designates the second most prevalent political culture present within a state.

[9] Elazar categorizes and creates an eight-point scale of his political cultures. The scale is as follows: **M MI IM I IT TI T TM** (Elazar 1972, 117).

interest" and is not opposed to intervening for the "public good" because the "commonwealth conception [forms] the basis for democratic government" (Elazar 1972, 93). In individualistic states, the "marketplace" and individual initiative is emphasized with little "community intervention—whether government or nongovernmental—into private activities" (Elazar 1972, 94). In traditionalistic states, because democratic order "is rooted in an ambivalent attitude toward the marketplace coupled with a paternalistic and elitist conception of the commonwealth", government seeks to maintain the social hierarchical order in place (Elazar 1972, 99). The differing role of government for each culture consequently reflects states' approach to programmatic innovation. In moralistic states, public officials "initiate new government activities" to address certain problems before the majority even perceives the issue (Elazar 1972, 98). In individualistic states, public officials are "not willing to initiate new programs or government activities" unless there is an "overwhelming public demand" (Elazar 1972, 96). In traditionalistic states, public officials will seek to maintain the status quo and not initiate new programs unless "pressed strongly from the outside" (Elazar 1972, 98).

How each culture views the role of government also influences the expectations of the bureaucracies, political parties, politicians, and citizen participation. Moralistic states view bureaucracies positively as they bring about "desirable political neutrality" (Elazar 1972, 98). As such, bureaucracies tend to be strong and efficient. Political parties are considered useful to "attain goals believed to be in the public interest" (Elazar 1972, 98). However regular party ties are not fixed as politicians can "shift from one party to another without contest if the shift is believed to be helpful in gaining larger political goals" (Elazar 1972, 98). Political actors are placed under "moral obligation" to serve the public; economic gains and political loyalty are subordinate to serving the community (Elazar 1972, 98). Lastly, citizens are encouraged to

participate as politics is considered a "matter of concern for all citizens, not just those who are professionally committed to political careers" (Elazar 1972, 97).

In individualistic states, bureaucracies are relatively strong and efficient as they increase the efficiency and opportunity for individuals to "master the market" (Elazar 1972, 96). Political parties are important as they provide the "means for coordinating individual enterprise in the political arena" (Elazar 1972, 95). Political loyalty is important and political parties are competitive in the "pursuit to hold office" not for achieving policy agendas (Elazar 1972, 95). Where "standards are high, such that people are expected to provide high-quality government services for the general public in the best possible manner in return for the status and economic rewards considered their due" motivations for political actors vary in one of two ways (Elazar 1972, 94-95). Some commit themselves to fulfilling this expectation while others are purely self-interested only seeking to help themselves and their supporters (Elazar 1972, 94-95). Citizens are usually not expected to be concerned with politics as both "politicians and citizens view political activity as a specialized one, essentially only for professionals" (Elazar 1972, 95).

In the traditionalistic states, bureaucracies are weak as they disrupt the "fine web of informal interpersonal relationships" of the governing elite who hold the majority of political control (Elazar 1972, 102). Political parties are of "minimal importance because they encourage a degree of openness that goes against the elite-oriented" control of the government (Elazar 1972, 99). Political competition usually occurs from factions within a dominant party (Elazar 1972, 99). Those "active in politics are expected to personally benefit though not necessarily" through monetary gains (Elazar 1972, 99). Lastly, citizens are not expected to be active in politics because "those who do not have a definite role to play in politics are not expected to be even minimally active as citizens" (Elazar 1972, 99).

Several researchers criticize Elazar's typography on conceptual and empirical grounds. The difficulty in measuring political culture remains one of the most frequent criticisms. The lack of rigorous statistical analysis and empirical evidence beyond that of "historical migratory patterns, personal field observations, interviews, and scholarly studies of America's regions, sections and ethnoreligious groups" has made is difficult for other researchers to duplicate his method (Lieske 1993, 889). Lieske (1993) notes that several scholars argue that by designating subcultures at the state level "without empirical precision", Elazar's typology is too crude and rather impressionistic, for it fails to take into account cultural distinctions of smaller political entities such as the "county level" (889). Further, Elazar's classification scheme does "not adjust for cultural changes" or future migratory patterns and "remains the same as it was" over 50 years ago, which leads many to criticize his concept as outdated (Lieske 1993, 889; Kincaid and Lieske 1991). Lastly, Elazar's description of several differences in attributes between his political subcultures tends to follow a "linear continuum from Moralistic to Individualistic to Traditionalistic yet he confuses his readers by describing it as a continuum that is circular" (Sharkansky 1969, 70; refer to Elazar 1984, 110). Sharkansky notes that Elazar "perceives a Traditional-Moralist culture (especially in Arizona and New Mexico) that bridges the two extremes of his scale" (Sharkansky 1969, 70). This is problematic because Elazar's scale lists "TM higher than T, although the T component would appear to be moderated (i.e. pulled toward the other end of the scale) by the influence of M" (Sharkansky 1969, 70).

In light of the criticisms against Elazar's cultural classification scheme, some researchers have offered improvements to his measure while others have sought to pursue better measures for the concept. Ira Sharkansky (1969) was the first scholar to pursue the former. He corrected the circularity problem inherent in Elazar's typology by reordering the subcultures on a linear

scale from moralistic to traditionalistic[10]. To do this, Sharkansky[11] assigned numerical values to each state based on his calculation of Elazar's "228 separate designations of culture that prevail in various areas across the country" instead of relying on Elazar's map which designated the dominant culture for each state[12] (71). He then tested several of Elazar's hypotheses that appear to form a linear continuum, namely his hypotheses about the bureaucracy, political participation and government programs[13], by conducting a comparative state analysis using twenty-three different dependent variables. The dependent variables were indicators of the size and prerequisites of the bureaucracy, participation and the scope, magnitude, cost, and innovative character of government programs respectively. Sharkansky found that about two-thirds of the dependent variables actually showed the expected relationship[14], which drew him to conclude that with his modifications, Elazar's theory was "empirically useful" to the study of state politics (Sharkansky 1969, 66).

Another scholar, Joel Lieske, has contributed extensively to providing more empirically based measures of political culture. Since 1993, Lieske has worked on developing a new measure of regional subculture that is "derived from an explicit and replicable set of mathematical and statistical algorithms, is based on the latest available census and religious survey data, and distinguishes subcultural differences down to the sub-state level" (2010, 539). Lieske argues that his most recent attempt has been successful, providing a novel approach to determining state political culture and explaining state variation in social and political behavior (2010, 2011).

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[10] Sharkansky worked under the assumption that Moralistic and Traditionalistic cultures "were best perceived as opposites" (1969, 70).

[11] Sharkansky based his scale of Elazar's typology on generous assumptions that it was "interval and therefore appropriate for statistical analyses" or that the distance and order between the political cultures actually mattered (1969, 74).

[12] Sharkansky did this because their analysis of both measures determined that the former carried more strength in relationships among other variables. (1969, 71)

[13] Refer back to the description of Elazar's political cultures.

[14] The indicators for political participation presented the strongest findings while the indicators for bureaucracies and governmental programs find some support (Sharkansky 1969, 70).

Using data from the "2000 census and the Glenmary survey of American church bodies for 3141 counties", Lieske determined eleven different regional subcultures throughout the country, which were classified as Global, Blackbelt, Rurban, Nordic, Germanic, Latino, Border, Anglo-French, Heartland, Mormon, and Native American (2010, 541).

The Global subculture represents a number of diverse ethnic groups that "are concentrated in the largest and most urbanized metropolitan areas around the country" (Lieske 2010, 541). A high density of black residents represents the Blackbelt and Rurban is characterized by "rural- urban habitats with high levels of education, working women, residential mobility, and younger populations generally found west of the Mississippi" (Lieske 2010, 542). The Nordic subculture is classified by its "high concentration of Scandinavian and German descent and high affiliation in Lutheran Church bodies" (Lieske 2010, 542); Germanic subcultures are indicated by the high numbers of people of German descent and people who are "affiliated with the Missouri-Synod Lutheran Church and the United Church of Christ" (Lieske 2010, 542). The Latino subculture is represented by large percentages of Americans who consider themselves Latino; Border includes "strong indicators of religiosity and membership to conservative church denominations, the Southern Baptist Convention and the Churches of Christ and includes sizeable numbers of people who do not claim another ethnic ancestry other than American" (Lieske 2010, 542). Anglo-French is primarily indicated by "French ancestry and membership in the Catholic Church" (Lieske 2010, 542); Heartland is represented by "high numbers of heartland religions (i.e. the American Baptist Church, the United Methodist Church, the Christian Church and the Christian Churches and Churches of Christ)" (Lieske 2010, 542). Native American subcultures are known for their "high loadings of Native Americans" and relative separation from other cultures (Lieske 2010, 542). Lastly, its "high numbers of

membership with the Mormon Church" represents the Mormon subculture (Lieske 2010, 542).

To measure states by their culture, Lieske (2010) formulated an eleven dimensional vector measure, which reflects the "aggregated respective proportions of the total statewide population that are under the influence of each regional subculture" (543). However, he also created unidimensional measures[15], similar to Sharkansky's unidimensional measure. For each reduced typology, Lieske classifies states by their dominant or dominant-subordinate subculture. In his five-fold measure, Lieske classifies states as having moralistic, individualistic, pluralistic, bifurcated and separatist "identities, values and ways of life", which are categories based on the extant literature by subcultural scholars[16] (2011, 4). Figure 1 [in Appendix A] depicts Lieske's typologies, which show that all eleven of his categories can be reduced to an updated and empirically based version of Elazar's eight-point scale. In addition to his classification, he argues that these categories can be "grouped and ordered on a continuum that ranges from those subcultures that tend to be more culturally homogeneous, communalist, assimilationist, and nationalist to those that tend to be more culturally heterogeneous, individualist, multicultural, and separatist" (2011, 4).

At one end of the continuum, Lieske argues, the moralistic category captures the "Nordic, Mormon and Anglo-French subcultures due in large part to their Puritan influence" (2011, 4). The individualist category includes the Germanic and Heartland subcultures that represent "geographic extensions of German and Dutch settlers who migrated to America in large numbers between 1614 and 1880, and a core North Midland stream" (2011, 4). His

[15] Lieske created a five fold, four fold and a three fold measure of state culture. For the four fold reduced typology, the bifurcated and separatist subcultures combine to form a traditionalistic category. Finally, for the three- fold typology, the pluralistic category is absorbed into the individualistic category because "there is no dominant racial or ethnic minority such as African Americans, Native Americans or Latinos and its derivative subcultures were largely established by ethnic groups who came to America more for economic opportunity than religious and political freedom" (2011, 6).

[16] These scholars include Elazar 1966, 1970, 1994; Sharkansky 1969; Gastil 1975, Garreau 1981; Fischer 1989; Lieske 1993, 2007; Hero 1998; Huntington 2004; Reshon 2005; and Marger 2006.

pluralistic category includes Rurban and Global, which represent the migrations of culturally diverse "white ethnic [groups] from eastern and southern Europe" (Lieske 2011, 4). Lieske's bifurcated category groups the Border and Blackbelt subcultures together due to their representation of "the geographic extensions of the Border and Cavalier streams of the British wave and the importation of African slaves in the Lowland South and their subsequent migration to the upland south" (2011, 5). Lastly, Lieske's separatist category includes two other bifurcated groups, Native American and Latino, due to the safeguard of their "native language and cultural traditions and resistance to conforming to American values and traditions" (2011, 5).

It is clear that Lieske favors his new measures of state culture more than that of Elazar's due to the empirical evidence on which it is founded. However, empirical evidence for Elazar's subcultural designations is apparent in a number of political issues. Joslyn (1980) illuminated the relationship between a state's political culture, as defined by Elazar, and the content in political campaign advertising. He discovered that for issue and candidate-oriented content, "moralistic ads are more likely to stress issue concerns and positions while individualistic ads are more likely to emphasize the personal attributes of candidates even after controlling for numerous other variables thought to be related to ad content" (Joslyn 1980, 54-55). Russell Hanson's (1980) conclusive research on the relationship between state political culture and political efficacy and interparty competition offered support to Elazar's proposition that political culture influences turnout through its effect on both factors. With regard to Elazar's purported role of government in creating new policies and programs, Fitzpatrick and Hero (1988) found that "moralistic states demonstrate greater policy innovation and greater economic equality among its citizens, [which] are consistent with the implicit political goals of that culture" (151). In addition, Johnson (1976) found that moralistic and individualistic states were more innovative in policies.

Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) found that traditionalistic states were more likely to choose and implement conservative policies. The relationship between political culture and state spending patterns has also been investigated with traditionalistic states having the lowest expenditures compared to moralistic states (Koven and Mausaff 2002, 74). Johnson (1976) found that moralistic and individualistic states spent more per capita for social programs than traditionalistic states.

Research on welfare reform also provides evidence in support of Elazar's theory and its ability to explain social welfare policymaking. Mead (2004a) investigated the relationship between state political culture and welfare reform performance across 24 states. He sought to determine the ability of states to reform welfare successfully based on their political performance, or how well state governments chose policies to address welfare reform (*policymaking*), agreed on policies (*consensus*) and adequately funded the policies (*resources*) (Mead 2004a, 278). In addition, Mead also investigated states' administrative performance[17] or how committed administrators were to implement reform policies (*commitment*), how well they worked together to implement policies (*coordination*), and whether they had the "expertise" necessary for reform (*capability*) (Mead 2004a, 278). Mead found that moralistic states were most successful at reforming welfare, even after controlling for ideology, personal income per capita, the percent of state population that was Black or Hispanic and government capacity. Mead (2004a) concludes that moralistic states were most successful due to their concern for the general welfare of their citizens, which motivated them to generously support the program, and

[17] Mead assumes that all the dimensions of political and administrative performance are independent of one another, meaning that a state can meet one criterion without meeting them all. Also, the three dimensions of political performance and the three dimensions for administrative performance tend to run parallel to one another. "Policymaking and commitment express the political direction of reform, the goals that policymakers or administrators choose. Consensus and coordination express the degree of unity that officials succeed in building around their decisions, either in the political arena or during the administrative process. Resources and capability express at two levels whether a state "has the horses" to get the job done" (Mead 2004a, 279).

their "problem-solving approach to legislation and especially their strong public administration" which enabled them to meet the goal to "raise the work activity" of recipients (276).

Camp-Landis (2008) sought to determine the factors that influence state TANF policy choices and their implementation by focusing on the role of state political culture and other political and socioeconomic factors including social capital, social diversity, racial context, economic context, citizen ideology and party control and competition. In his quantitative analysis, Camp-Landis found that the "effect of political culture on TANF policy" fit the "expected direction based on Elazar's description of core values in each of the three state political cultures" (Camp-Landis 2008, 359). Camp-Landis (2008) discovered that moralistic states were most likely to choose and implement TANF policies that had the most redistributive policy due to their perceived view of government as a commonwealth. Individualistic states also implemented policies that had a redistributive impact but the government usually did not implement stringent work requirements as it "interfered into private matters" (Camp-Landis 2008, 44). Lastly, he found traditionalistic states to be least redistributive due to their "narrow eligibility rules [along with] low benefits" (Camp-Landis 2008, 394).

In addition to studies examining the effect of political culture on welfare reform however, few researchers have utilized political culture as an explanatory variable for other social policy arenas. It is thus the objective of this thesis to utilize and compare all three measures of political culture as an explanatory variable across the policy arenas of health and welfare to determine the effect it has on state policy designs and subsequent outcomes in social welfare problems.

Research Questions

My primary research question is as follows: is political culture a viable explanatory

variable for variation in social welfare problems through state policy designs? Supporting questions include:

1) What are the indirect effects of political culture on outcomes in social welfare problems?

2) Is there a better measure of political culture than Elazar's measure?

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

The theoretical and empirical literature on political culture suggest that states differ systematically in their approach to choosing social welfare policies due to their political culture. Diverging from previous research, this thesis seeks to use the frameworks of Elazar, Sharkansky and Lieske to determine whether political culture influences state response to social welfare across policy domains, in particular health and welfare, and whether state policy designs influence social welfare outcomes. This thesis assumes that Lieske's five-fold measure of state culture, which falls on a continuum from homogeneous to heterogeneous subcultures, coincides with Elazar's political subcultures and his descriptions of each. Lieske's "culturally homogenous, communalistic, assimilationist, and nationalist" subcultures reflect Elazar's moralistic subculture and his "more culturally heterogeneous, individualist, multiculturalist, and separatist" subcultures tend to parallel Elazar's traditionalistic subculture[18] (2011, 4). This assumption is made due to Lieske's reduction of his own eleven dimensional vector measure into categories that follow Elazar's typology. As such, the hypotheses that proceed reflect the descriptions of Elazar's typology.

Hypotheses

Within the theoretical framework of Elazar, Sharkansky, and Lieske, my thesis focuses on two hypotheses stemming from the definitions of the individualistic, moralistic and

[18] Elazar's individualistic subculture falls in the middle of Lieske's continuum.

traditionalistic political cultures and previous research. Lieske's measure differs only slightly, incorporating only Elazar's moralistic and individualistic cultures and moving towards moralism instead of away from it on his scale.

Hypothesis #1**: Political Culture→Policy Design**

Elazar: Based on a state's political culture, the smaller the role government has to promote equality, the less progressive a state's policy design will be.

A. In moralistic states, policy designs will be most progressive.
B. In individualistic states, policy designs will be less progressive.
C. In traditionalistic states, policy designs will be least progressive.

Sharkansky: The closer a state's political culture is to Traditionalism, the lower it will score on measures of the progressiveness a state's policy design.

Lieske: The closer a state's political culture is to Moralism, the higher it will score on measures of progressiveness in regards to a state's policy design.

The term progressive refers to policies that promote redistribution or equality through broad access to benefits and generosity. For example, a moralistic state would have a most progressive policy design as its focus on the common good for all citizens in a society enables governments to choose generous benefits and broaden eligibility rules. On the other hand, traditionalistic state governments uphold the social order and are least progressive in their policy designs as they choose and implement policies that decrease access to benefits and have low benefit levels. Under the assumption that Lieske's continuum moves from more traditionalistic subcultural tendencies to those of more moralistic subcultural inclinations, as one moves up the scale, progressiveness in state policies should increase.

Hypothesis #2: **Policy Design→Social Welfare Outcomes**

As the progressiveness of state policy designs decrease, poverty rates and uninsured rates should be greater.

A. Where policy designs are most progressive, poverty rates and uninsured rates should be lowest.
B. Where policy designs are less progressive, poverty rates and uninsured rates should be higher.
C. Where policy designs are least progressive, poverty rates and uninsured rates should be highest.

This hypothesis is based on the primary purpose of state policy designs, which is to achieve desired outcomes, and the evidence provided from the literature on TANF that specific policies states choose to implement and the leniency/restrictiveness of those policies affect outcomes in social welfare problems.

Chapter 4: Data and Methods

The following sections describe this study's methodology for evaluating the above-listed hypotheses. The two programs I will focus on are Medicaid and TANF[19] and the social welfare problems are the percent of the population without health insurance (uninsured rate) and the poverty rate respectively. The poverty rates and uninsured rates will be observed by their rate of increase or decrease. To test the indirect effect of political culture on social welfare outcomes via state policy designs I utilize ordinal least squares (OLS)[20] cross section regressions,[21] due to the limited years in which the data for my TANF and Medicaid policy design variables are available. For the cross section regression analysis, the time component will be the year 2004 for Medicaid and the year 2000 for TANF. As such, testing the relationship between state policy designs and

[19] Refer to Chapter 1: Introduction (5) for motives behind choosing these particular programs.
[20] This type of regression assumes that both my dependent variables are continuous.
[21] I used the random effects in my analysis since my political culture measures do not vary over time.

social welfare outcomes will also be limited to these particular years, respectively.

Because Elazar, Sharkansky and Lieske measure each state by its subculture, I focus on the U.S. states as my unit of analysis to test my hypotheses. In addition, I decided to use all 50 states[22] in my study, as it would allow me to compare the most cases. Furthermore, the relationship between political culture and policy design, and subsequently between policy design and social welfare outcomes, is most relevant within the states.

To determine causality, three criteria must be met. First, I need to observe whether there is a significantly strong association between political culture and policy designs/social welfare outcomes. Second, the observation of my independent variable(s) must occur before the dependent variable. To meet this criteria, there will be a one year time lag between the TANF and Medicaid policy design variables and the respective poverty rates and uninsured rates. It is assumed that political culture is present before policy design as it is based on early settlement patterns. Third, to rule out other plausible explanations, I will control for factors that have been found to have an impact on both my dependent variables.

Dependent Variable(s)

Policy Outcomes

1) Poverty Rate. The official U.S. government's poverty measure, which most researchers use to analyze poverty in the United States, has received considerable criticism over the years. Such criticisms include not "reflecting the effects of key government policies that alter the resources available to families and, hence, their poverty status" and not "adjusting for geographic differences in the cost-of-living across the nation" (Short 2012, 1). In recent years however, there has been research on experimental poverty measures, one in particular being the supplemental

[22] Nebraska was omitted from the analysis due to it having a unicameral legislature. Nebraska would have been accounted for in my analysis had I realized this omission early enough to change it.

poverty measure (SPM) that includes in-kind benefits and adjustments for geographic differences.

In this study, I only use the official poverty measure because despite the shortcomings of the U.S. poverty measure, Meyer and Sullivan (2012) note, "few economic indicators are more closely watched or more important for policy than the official poverty rate. The poverty rate is often cited by policymakers, researchers, and advocates who are evaluating social programs that account for more than half a trillion dollars in government spending" (111). I obtained data for the poverty rate by state from the United States Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplements Historical Data Tables: Table 21. https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html

2) Uninsured Rate. The uninsured population is measured by the percentage of people under the age of 65 that are not covered by private or public health insurance. Thus, I will focus on data for the health uninsured for 64 and younger since individuals above 65 are eligible for Medicare. Therefore, I obtained data from the U.S. Census Bureau Health Insurance Historical Tables-HIB Series HIB 6: Health Insurance Coverage Status and Type of Coverage by State--Persons Under 65: 1999 to 2012 (http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/data/historical/HIB_tables.html).

Independent Variables

Political Culture

The primary independent variable in this study is political culture and I will analyze its affect using three different measures. For Elazar's measure, states will be measured by their predominant political culture since Elazar did not consider one political culture better than another and several researchers have chosen to use Elazar's typology nominally (Mead 2004a;

Camp-Landis 2008). One of Elazar's measures will be omitted[23] to avoid the dummy variable trap. The Sharkansky index will be measured using an interval scale that ranges from 1 to 9. The Lieske measure for political culture will be scaled 1 to 25 and is an interval scale. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide the scales for Sharkansky and Lieske's political culture measures.

Table 4.1

Table 4.2

Intervening Variable

Policy Design

As aforementioned, the policy tools embedded within states policy designs are the primary method in which they operate to meet desired outcomes. The policy tools available to states differ between TANF and Medicaid. For TANF, states have discretion in the benefit levels, eligibility rules, time limits, income disregards and other features of the program. For Medicaid, states make choices about eligibility, the scope of optional services they provide and provider reimbursement. As such, the policy design measures for both programs will capture variables of these specific policy tools and how states utilize them.

Policy design will be measured by its progressiveness in the policy tools utilized by states. As such, the underlying dimensions on which the policy tools will be categorized are generosity level and access to benefits. The policy tools that will be categorized under access to benefits for TANF are eligibility rules, sanctions, work activities requirements and time limits. The maximum benefit level for a family of three will be categorized under generosity level. For Medicaid, the eligibility variable will be categorized under access to benefits and the scope of services will be classified as the generosity level, because it captures the comprehensiveness of

[23] I left out the predominantly traditionalistic dummy variable. The traditionalistic states can be predicted from the others.

the services provided by each state.

The data for the TANF policy tools were acquired from the Welfare Dimensions Summary Score (WDSS) database. In "Measuring State Welfare Policy Variations and Change After Reform", De Jong et al (2006) developed a methodology and scores to describe state welfare policies adopted after PRWORA. De Jong et al. scaled TANF policies on a lenient to stringent continuum[24]. The data includes seven variables, which are time limits (*time*), sanction policies (*comply*), eligibility rules (*preg*, *eligresp,* and *twopar)*, income disregards (*inc*) and activities requirements (*actreq*). The data is from 1996-2003, however the data does not appear to change much over the years, therefore the time component will be the year 2000[25] for this policy design. I also obtained the TANF maximum benefit levels for a family of three with no income from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research. As for Medicaid, I gathered data from the *Unsettling Scores: A Ranking of State Medicaid Programs* project by Ramírez de Arellano and Wolfe (2007). This report gathered, scored and ranked data for state Medicaid programs between the years 2000 and 2006, on Medicaid eligibility, Medicaid scope of optional services provided by the state, Medicaid reimbursement and quality of services provided. For the purposes of my research project, I will only use the eligibility (*medelig*), scope of services (*medservice*) measures.[26]

Measuring progressiveness is slightly different for the two programs. For TANF, since the data I obtained already provides the variables on a lenient to stringent continuum, its relative leniency in policies under access to benefits and the overall maximum cash benefits level for

[24] Based on the lenient to stringent continuum, the scores "range from negative (the lowest indicating greatest leniency) to positive (the highest indicating greatest stringency) values" (De Jong et al. 2005, 9).
[25] There is no motivating reason as to why I choose to use the year 2000 over any of the other years, as the majority of the scores for each of the years remained relatively the same.
[26] These two variables in particular will be used as they fall under the dimensions of my progressiveness measure for policy design.

generosity will measure progressiveness. For Medicaid, since states are scored by how broad or narrow their eligibility and scope of services are, states' score will measure their progressiveness.

Control Variables

In light of the factors mentioned in the literature review that may have a profound influence on state policy design and social welfare outcomes, I will control for state economic context, partisan control and racial/ethnic composition of states' population, and citizen ideology.

Economic Factors. Indicators I will use to control for economic differences include *per capita income*, and *unemployment rates* as they are commonly used variables in social welfare studies (Mead 2004a; Camp-Landis 2008; Johnson 2013). I gathered data for *per capita income* from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://bber.unm.edu/econ/us-pci.htm. Data for unemployment rates were acquired from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program. http://www.bls.gov/lau/#tables.

Political Factors. Indicators for partisan control are important to control for since research suggests that state Democratic control leads to policies that are more liberal whereas Republican control leads to policies that are more restrictive. As several researchers have followed the recommendations of Smith (1997), I measure partisan control as the *percentage of major party legislators who are Democrats* and *Democratic governors*. I obtained data for the number of Democrats and Republicans in each legislature from Carl Klarner's State Partisan Balance from 1934 to 2011 dataset http://www.indstate.edu/polisci/klarnerpolitics.htm. For the racial/ethnic composition of states' population, I obtained estimates for the African American

and Hispanic populations by state from the U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin from April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2010. From this, I measured the *percent of state population that is African American* and the *percent of state population that is Hispanic* (Soss et al 2001, Mead 2004a 2004).

Citizen Ideology. Lastly, research suggests that citizen ideology may influence state policy designs (with liberals supporting policies that are more generous) and policy outcomes (Erikson, Wright, and Mclver 1993; Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Plotnick and Winters 1990; Volden 2002). As such, I will control for citizen ideology using the measure offered by Berry et al (1998).[27]

Chapter 5: Results and Discussion

My findings would appear to disconfirm my overall hypothesis that political culture indirectly affects social welfare outcomes through state policy designs. The relationship between state policy designs and political culture was mixed, showing significance for only a few variables. Further, there proved to be little to no relationship between state policy designs and outcomes in poverty rates and the uninsured rate. In the paragraphs that follow, I first address the issue of collinearity between my political culture measures and a control variable--the percent of state black population. Following this, I detail the significant controls and my mixed findings for the influence of political culture on state policy design, first discussing the results with regard to the TANF variables and then with the Medicaid variables. Subsequently, I explicate my insignificant findings for state policy designs on social welfare outcomes and the significant controls. I conclude with a summary and the implications of my findings.

State Political Culture and Policy Design

[27] I gathered this data from Richard Fording's website, Updated Citizen and Government Ideology Data, 1960-2010. http://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/ .

I encountered the issue of collinearity between my political culture measures and the percent black population during my initial test of the relationship between state political culture and state policy designs. For both Medicaid and TANF policy designs, the *percent black population* exhibited statistically significant relationships for several variables even while controlling for other factors. However, once any of the political culture measures were introduced into the regression equation, the *percent black population* responded in one of two ways. It either rendered no significance at all or displayed profound significance while the political culture measures were of no significance. I then proceeded to test the correlation between *percent black population* and each of my political culture measures. The relationship for both Elazar's political culture measures and Lieske's fivefold measure rendered relatively low correlations[28] however, the correlation between Sharkansky's index and the *percent black population* resulted in a .72 correlation. Due to the high correlation between the two measures, I opted to drop the Sharkansky index[29] from my analysis and to focus on Elazar's measures as well as Lieske's fivefold measure of state culture for the remainder of the analysis.

TANF

The overall results for political culture's effect on TANF policy design are mixed. Of the eight TANF variables, Elazar's moralistic culture only displayed a significant relationship for two, the TANF benefits for a family of three with no income and pregnancy eligibility. Elazar's individualistic culture exhibited no statistically significant relationship with any of the TANF variables. Lieske's fivefold measure exhibited statistically significant relationships with three of the eight variables, TANF benefits for a family of three with no income (MaxBenefit,

[28] The correlations for Elazar's moralistic culture and Lieske's five-fold state culture measure were .35 and .58 respectively.

[29] In my best efforts to examine all three measures of political culture, I tried to combines the percent black population with the percent Hispanic population, however the correlation between the Sharkansky index and the combined minority population still rendered a high correlation.

compliance rules (comply), and eligibility responsibilities (elig.respons). For both Elazar and Lieske's measures however, the statistically significant relationship actually follow the expected direction; Elazar's moralistic states are rather generous in their cash benefits and lenient (or broad) in their access to benefits. For Lieske's measure, moving up the continuum (towards the moralistic category) the generosity in TANF cash benefits increases and access to benefits increases. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 display the coefficients and standard errors of my analysis of Elazar and Lieske's measures respectively. The rows include the political culture measures along with the control variables included in the regression. The columns represent the dependent TANF variables. The findings from the tests, as presented in the tables, show that state political culture fail to be significant overall.

Table 5.1

Table 5.2

Based on the data presented here, there not only appears to be a weak relationship between state political culture and states TANF policy designs, but also between state policy designs and the control variables. In fact, for several tests of the TANF variables, the Prob>F was greater than .05 leading me to fail to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between the factors and the dependent variables. This may be the result of several circumstances. The small number of observations I have for each test, which reduces the chances of finding a significant relationship or less comprehensive data that does not capture the encompassing effect of TANF policies may account for this issue. Alternatively, this may suggest that the control variables and political culture have little influence on state policy design. My deduction is that it is due to the small number of observations and insufficient data.

Before moving on to explain my findings for Medicaid, it is important to compare the

relative explanatory power of the political culture measures. Both measures are statistically significant with regard to generosity (MaxBenefit). This relationship falls in line with my hypothesis that moralistic states will be more generous. Lieske's measure appears to exhibit more statistically significant relationships among the TANF variables and in the expected direction, but by no means does it explain TANF variation across the board. My findings suggest that state political culture does not influence the progressiveness of state policy design.

Medicaid

In my analysis of the relationship between political culture and the Medicaid policy design variables, I find that Elazar's political cultures provide no significant relationships. Only when the *percent black population* is taken out of the equation does Elazar's moralistic culture exhibit any significant relationship to the Medicaid scope of services *(medservice*) variable. I find that Lieske's measure does not display any significance either. The coefficients and standard errors for both of the Medicaid variables as well as the number of observations are presented in Table 5.2 and 5.3. Table 5.2 represents the results of Elazar's political culture measure and Table 5.3 indicates the regression results of Lieske's measure. Each of the rows represents the measures of political culture and the control variables; the columns represent the dependent variables.

Table 5.3

Table 5.4

For Medicaid eligibility, legislative control, citizen ideology and per capita income exhibit positive and significant relationships. In line with the literature, it appears that a greater proportion of Democrats in the legislature lead to less restrictive eligibility policies (Soss et al.

2001). As well, the positive significance between citizen ideology and Medicaid scope of services implies that liberal citizens not only support broader eligibility and services provided but also actually influence such policies. With regard to the relative strength of the political culture measures, neither Elazar nor Lieske's measure explain the state policy design progressiveness.

Policy Design and Social Welfare Outcomes

Poverty Rates

None of the eight variables tested to determine whether there was a relationship between the TANF policy design and the poverty rate provided any statistically significant relationship. I gauged the impact of the policy design variables separately and included all of the common control variables. Throughout the analysis of each variable, the unemployment rate, Democratic governor, legislative control, percent black population and percent Hispanic population all exhibited significant relationships to the poverty rate. Below Table 5.5 displays the coefficients and standard errors for the influence of the TANF variables on the poverty rate.

Table 5.5

Most of the significant controls appear to be in line with the literature. Democratic governor has a negatively significant relationship with the poverty rate implying that the poverty rate fares better with a Democrat in office. The legislative control however displays the inverse effect; showing a positively significant relationship to the poverty rate. The unemployment rate, as expected carries a significantly positive relationship to the poverty rate. Also as expected, the minority population exhibits significantly positive relationships with the poverty rate, which further supports the literature that minorities are more likely to be poor (Holahan and Garrett

2009).

Uninsured Rate

With regard to the Medicaid policy design variables, there appears to be mixed findings. Only one variable, the Medicaid scope of services (*medservice*) provides a significant negative relationship with the uninsured rate. The other variable, Medicaid eligibility (*medelig*) shows no significant relationship at all. Ultimately, the percent Hispanic and percent black populations were more strongly and significantly related to the uninsured rate, indicating that the greater the minority population in a state the more likely they are to be uninsured. This finding agrees with the literature that more Hispanics and blacks are uninsured (McDonald and Hertz n.d.). Per capita income also exhibited a significant negative relationship with the uninsured rate, suggesting that an increase in per capita reduced the uninsured rate. Below Table 5.6 provides the coefficients and standard errors for each of the Medicaid variables along with the number of observations. Each of the rows represent the Medicaid variables and controls, while the columns represent the models used to separately test the relationship between each Medicaid variable and the uninsured rate, *ceteris paribus*.

Table 5.6

The significant and negative relationship between Medicaid scope of services *(medservice*) and the uninsured rate suggests that an increase in the scope of the services a state provides helps to decrease the uninsured rate by .04 percent. This implies that state Medicaid programs that are more progressive in terms of the generosity or comprehensiveness of services provided would lower the uninsured rate for that state.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

In this thesis, I sought to explore whether state political culture influences social welfare outcomes through state policy designs. Drawing on previous theory and literature, I compared Elazar and Lieske's measures of political culture and I hypothesized that the influence of political culture determines the progressiveness of state policy designs, which in turn affected outcomes in social welfare problems. Overall, my findings did not confirm my hypotheses. The relationship between state policy designs and political culture was mixed, showing significance for only a few variables. Further, there proved to be little to no relationship between state policy designs and outcomes in the poverty rate and the uninsured rate.

In the paragraphs that follow, I acknowledge the limitations of my study, which may have played a significant role in my findings. Subsequently, I explore possible areas for further research. I conclude with a summary of the importance of my thesis, both for the scholarly world and for the real world.

Limitations of Study

It should be noted that my findings were weakened by the limited amount of TANF and Medicaid data. The data that I used to measure TANF policy design provided a parsimonious way to capture several of the major policy tools states use and to measure progressiveness. However, the data came with its weaknesses. First, although it covered the years 1996-2003, there was little variation between the years for the majority of states, which resulted in the analysis of a single year and a relatively small number of observations. Similarly, the Medicaid policy design variables could only be analyzed for a single year due to the bulk of the policies representing the year 2004 and no variation over time. Second, the TANF data were not as thorough as I would have hoped. The TANF policy tools states utilize are rather diverse,

complex and extensive and to get a better representation of the relationship between state TANF policy designs and outcomes, one must incorporate more policies in the analyses. Both limitations may have definitely influenced my results as more comprehensive data across time provides more observations in which the opportunity to observe significant relationships increases.

Another limitation of my project is my focus on only two state policy outcomes-- poverty and uninsured rates--which does not aptly address all other possible outcomes of state policy designs. As noted in the literature review, states may have several varying goals for which their policy design is meant to influence. Incorporating more social welfare outcomes such as self-sufficiency (moving recipients into the job market), child poverty, and caseload reduction for TANF state policy designs and quality of care, mortality, and other indicators of health outcomes for Medicaid state policy designs in the study may have revealed interesting differences in the state policy design effects.

Strengths of Study

Although there are limitations to my study, one must also consider the strengths of my research. Other than Lieske himself, no other scholar to date has compared his five-fold measure[30] to Elazar's typology. In this case, no other scholar has compared both measures to determine the effect, if any, political culture has on state policy designs. In my comparison of Elazar's typology to Lieske's new measure of state culture, I find that Lieske's fivefold typology does a better job at explaining variation in state policy designs for TANF, though neither Elazar nor Lieske's measure provided a holistically strong relationship to either policy designs. Comparatively speaking, Lieske's measure appears to fare better than Elazar's measure because

[30] To my knowledge, no other scholar has compared Lieske's eleven-dimensional vector measure to Elazar's typology as well.

of the empirical precision by which he acknowledges and classifies eleven distinct subcultures throughout the country. Lieske argues that Elazar's "assumption that state culture could be conceived as dominant and subordinate blends of just three core cultures" was wrong due to the fact that "state cultures and their associated political cultures are not distributed uniformly across the American states" (2010, 17). By aggregating the regional subcultures present in each state, Lieske's measure arguable captures an accurate and "more precise measure of state culture" (2010, 18).

Implications

Some of the previous research on state policy designs for TANF suggests policy designs do in fact affect outcomes (McKernon and Ratcliffe 2006; Ewalt and Jennings 2004). My findings run counter to this literature. My results as mentioned in the limitations of this study however, may not be as clearly representative of the true impact that states policy designs have on outcomes. From the Medicaid policy design, it appears that the scope of services provided by state Medicaid programs do in fact have a significant impact on the uninsured rate. This finding suggests that expanding state Medicaid programs to include a more comprehensive set of services and covering more than the medically needy[31] may in fact reduce the uninsured rate. Thus, my findings have real world implications. The relationship between the scope of services and the uninsured rates (even though the number of observations for my study is relatively small) suggests that researchers and policymakers should take a closer look at the potential impact that the scope and duration of services provide especially concerning the Healthcare Reform Act that is underway today. As states choose to expand or not to expand their Medicaid programs, the

[31] States received more points in terms of the scoring and ranking based on their scope of services if they expanded coverage to the medically needy (Arellano de Ramirez and Wolfe 2007). Medically needy refers to "populations whose income is above the eligibility standards but who had very high medical bills" (Moffitt, 2003).

uninsured rate may undoubtedly be affected.

With regard to the effect of political culture on state policy design, it would appear that political culture does not have any overall significant impact. However, the limitations of this study still may influence this relationship.

Further Research

In light of my findings, there are several avenues to pursue further research. Due to the limitations of my data, one avenue of research would be to gather more data that are comprehensive across time for the fifty states for TANF and Medicaid policy designs to observe whether there is a significant difference in the effects for both my independent variable and the common control variables. In addition, updated data between the years of 2000 and 2013 may provide a better depiction of whether culture still has an impact on today's issues. As with welfare reform, and the extensive research that has occurred to determine the relationship between state policy designs and outcomes, the Healthcare Reform may provide a basis by which to examine the relationship between political culture and state policy designs. It would be an interesting study to examine the differences between state Medicaid programs prior to and after the implementation of the Affordable Care Act with regard to culture.

Second, culture lays the foundation for every society, setting the norms and rules, conditioning the way in which people behave and interact with one another, and shaping the perspectives of political action by citizens and political officials (Lieske 2010, 1; Elazar 1972, 1994). As such, political culture can arguably affect state policy designs and quite possibly policy outcomes through a couple of pathways. The way in which Elazar describes the appropriate norms for political parties suggests that political culture can condition the effect of party control on state policy designs. For example, since political parties of moralistic states

generally pursue office to address "issues and public concerns" whereas political parties of individualistic states are more focused on "controlling the distribution of favors and rewards of government" while in office, social welfare outcomes may fare better in the former (Elazar 1972, 95-99). In addition, Elazar's description of the appropriate norms for citizens implies that political culture can condition the relationship between citizen ideology and state policy designs. In moralistic states, because citizens are very involved in politics and perceive it as a method of addressing "issues and public concerns of civil society", they may be more likely to support liberal policies than citizens of traditionalistic states who are not expected to participate in politics (Elazar 1972, 97). Conducting case studies of a state from each political culture may shed light on the causal mechanism by which this conditioning effect occurs.

Third, Hero (1998) argues that Elazar's conceptualization of political culture[32] is "associated with, masks, and may even be a surrogate for social diversity and other factors" (9). Searching for more scholarly research into the matter, I discovered that Hero and Tolbert (1996) used Sharkansky's index against a number of state performance indicators to show that it largely reflected differences in racial diversity. Thus, the issue of collinearity I encountered during my analysis may be the result of political culture actually capturing racial/ethnic differences, especially in the case of the black populations. However, many subcultural scholars, (Elazar 1966, 1972; Lieske 2010, 2011) argue that political culture has an independent effect on state political behavior. In light of this debate between the influence of racial/ethnic differences and/or political culture, and my results[33], which tend to show that political culture may mask the effect of racial diversity on the outcome in question, I believe that this would undoubtedly be an

[32] This argument would also stand for Sharkansky's index and Lieske's fivefold measure due to their foundation being that of Elazar's framework.
[33] The results I am referring to include the correlation coefficients for Sharkansky's index and my regressions for some TANF variables.

interesting avenue for further research.

My analysis also suggests that there is a convergence between political culture, racial composition and ideology. Citizen ideology and racial differences appear to have a significant impact on state policy designs and social welfare outcomes, yet the effect of political culture is mixed even though both ideology and race are essential aspects of political culture. Further, removing one from my regression model(s) increases the explanatory power in another. The argument could be made that the concept of political culture does not accurately capture the encompassing effect on state policy designs and/or social welfare outcomes better than its separate elements. Conducting case studies may illuminate the true manifestations of political culture on citizen ideology and race relations.

It is safe to say that my research is just a snippet of the research that can become of it. Though my overall findings did not support my hypothesis, they did provide real world implications for social welfare in the U.S. (Medicaid in particular) which may influence the uninsured rate (and wellbeing of numerous individuals) in the following years. It also shed light on the ambiguities between political culture and racial diversity, which may spur further research in determining which factor carries more importance in the analysis of state social and political behavior.

TABLE 4.1 Sharkansky Political Culture Scale and State Scores									
	M	MT	MI	IM	I	IT	TI	TM	T
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Each State's Score on the Political Culture Scale*									
ALABAMA	8.57				**NEBRASKA**				3.66
ARIZONA	5.66				**NEVADA**				5.00
ARKANSAS	9.00				**NEW HAMPSHIRE**				2.33
CALIFORNIA	3.55				**NEW JERSEY**				4.00
COLORADO	1.80				**NEW MEXICO**				7.00
CONNECTICUT	3.00				**NEW YORK**				3.62
DELAWARE	7.00				**NORTH CAROLINA**				8.50
FLORIDA	7.80				**NORTH DAKOTA**				2.00
GEORGIA	8.80				**OHIO**				5.16
IDAHO	2.50				**OKLAHOMA**				8.25
ILLINOIS	4.72				**OREGON**				2.00
INDIANA	6.33				**PENNSYLVANIA**				4.28
IOWA	2.00				**RHODE ISLAND**				3.00
KANSAS	3.66				**SOUTH CAROLINA**				8.75
KENTUCKY	7.40				**SOUTH DAKOTA**				3.00
LOUISIANA	8.oo				**TENNESSEE**				8.50
MAINE	2.33				**TEXAS**				7.11
MARYLAND	7.00				**UTAH**				2.00
MASSACHUSETTS	3.66				**VERMONT**				2.33
MICHIGAN	2.00				**VIRGINIA**				7.86
MINNESOTA	1.00				**WASHINGTON**				1.66
MISSISSIPPI	9.00				**WEST VIRGINIA**				7.33
MISSOURI	7.66				**WISCONSIN**				2.00
MONTANA	3.00				**WYOMING**				4.00

* A depiction of Sharkansky's calculation of each state's political culture score based on Elazar's map of 228 subcultural designations found throughout the country.
Ira Sharkansky, The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture: A Research Note, 1969, Palgrave MacMillan Journals, reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan.

Table 4.2 Lieske's five-fold measure of political culture (MIPBS[34]):

(1) S	(10) BM	(19) I
(2) SB	(11) PS	(20) IM
(3) SP	(12) PB	(21) MS
(4) SI	(13) P	(22) MB
(5) SM	(14) PI	(23) MP
(6) BS	(15) PM	(24) MI
(7) B	(16) IS	(25) M
(8) BP	(17) IB	
(9) BI	(18) IP	

[34] This is Lieske's five-fold coding. "MIPBS where ''M'' represents ''moralistic,'' 'I'' represents ''individualistic,'' ''P'' represents ''pluralistic,'' ''B'' represents ''bifurcated,'' and ''S'' represents ''separatist.'' (Lieske, 2011, 221).

Table 5.1 State Political Culture Influence on State Policy Design TANF year 2000								
Time Component 2000	Max Benefit	Preg Elig	Elig. Respons.	Two Parent Elig	Income Disregards	Sanctions	Time Limits	Activities Req.
Elazar moralistic	**117.51 (58.41) P=.05***	**-1.49 (.46) P=.00****	.03 (.58) P=.94	.01 (.45) P=.97	-.17 (.56) P=.75	-.63 (.55) P=.26	-.22 (.46) P=.63	-.70 (.52) .18
Elazar individualistic	44.30 (58.92) P=.45	-.87 (.47) P=.07	-.06 (.59) P=.91	-.07 (.46) P=.87	-.52 (.56) P=.36	-.55 (.56) P=.33	.15 (.46) P=.73	-.01 (.53) .97)
Democratic Governor	34.66 (33.27) P=.30	**.75 (.26) P=.00****	.07 (.33) P=.82	.09 (.26) P=.70	.05 (.32) P=.86	-.35 (.31) P=.27	-.29 (.26) P=.26	.28 (.30) P=.34
Legislative Control	23.55 (22.69) P=.30	-.07 (.18) P=.68	-.23 (.22) P=.31	.21 (.17) P=.24	-.08 (.21) P=.70	-.35 (.21) P=.10	-.10 (.17) P=.56	-.00 (.20) P=.97
Citizen Ideology	.8867 (1.40) P=.53	-.01 (.01) P=.28	.01 (.01) P=.23	-.01 (.01) P=.20	-.02 (.01) P=.14	.01 (.01) P=.14	-.01 (.01) P=.18	-.00 (.01) P=.67
Unemployment	**42.36 (18.70) P=.02***	-19 (.15) P=.20	.00 (.18) P=.95	-.08 (.14) P=.55	.13 (.18) P=.44	.09 (.17) P=.61	.07 (.14) P=.62	-.31 (.16) P=.06
Per Capita Income	**.0189 (.0059) P=.00****	-.00 (.00) P=.68	-.00 (.00) P=.26	-.00 (.00) P=.64	.00 (.00) P=0.93	.00 (.00) P=.62	-.00 (.00) P=.75	-6.2 (.00) P=.90
Percent State Pop. Black	**-6.716 (2.19) P=.00****	-.02 (.017) P=.28	.03 (.02) P=.17	-.01 (.01) P=.45	.017 (.02) P=.40	.03 (.02) P=.07	.01 (.01) P=.28	-.03 (.01) P=.07
Percent State Pop. Hispanic	-1.90 (2.06) P=.36	-.01 (.01) P=.34	.00 (.02) P=.70	-.00 (.01) P=.54	-.03 (.01) P=.06	-.00 (.01) P=.72	-.00 (.01) P=.96	.00 (.01) P=.78
N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
Prob>F	.00	.00	.82	.62	.27	.15	.29	.51
R-sq/Adj. R-sq.	.64/.56	.44/.31	11/-.09	.15/-.03	22/.05	.26/.09	.22-.04	.17/-.01

Note: Each cell contains the coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, and p value. * p > .05; ** p > .01. Also, negative coefficients for all the variables except TANFBen3 means more lenient. Key: Max Benefit is the Maximum TANF benefit for a family of three with no income; Preg Elig-whether pregnant women are eligible in state; Elig. Respons.- basic eligibility responsibilities; Two Parent Elig.- whether two parent households are eligible for benefits; Income Disregards; Sanctions; Time Limits; and Activities Req.- work requirements set forth by states.

Table 5.2 State Political Culture Influence on State Policy Design TANF year 2000								
Time Component 2000	Max Benefit	Preg Elig.	Elig Resp.	Two Parent Elig	Income Disregard	Sanction	Time Limits	Activities Req.
Lieske Fivefold	**9.7**	-.02	**-.09**	.05	.06	**-.13**	-.00	.07
	(4.76)	(.04)	**(.04)**	(.03)	(.04)	**(.04)**	(.03)	(.04)
	P=.04*	P=.60	**P=.04***	P=.14	P=.14	**P=.00****	P=.83	P=.10
Democratic Governor	**67.85**	.56	-.13	.21	.18	**-.71**	-.33	.37
	(34.37)	(.30)	(.32)	(.26)	(.32)	**(.29)**	(.27)	(.31)
	P=.05*	P=.07	P=.68	P=.40	P=.56	**P=.02***	P=.22	P=.23
Legislative Control	16.55	.11	-.31	.25	.00	**-.38**	-.08	.13
	(21.50)	(.19)	(.20)	(.16)	(.20)	**(.18)**	(.17)	(.19)
	P=.44	P=.56	P=.12	P=.12	P=.96	**P=.04***	P=.61	P=.45
Citizen Ideology	-.11	-.01	**.02**	-.02	-.03	**.03**	-.01	-.01
	(1.48)	(.01)	**(.01)**	(.11)	(.01)	**(.01)**	(.01)	(.01)
	P=.93	P=.26	**P=.04***	P=.06	P=.02	**P=.01****	P=.27	P=.27
Unemployment	**52.05**	-.17	-.18	-.00	.21	-.15	.10	-.09
	(19.76	(.17)	(.18)	(.15)	(.18)	(.16)	(.15)	(.17)
	P=.01**	P=.33	P=.34	P=.99	P=.26	P=.36	P=.49	P=.58
Per Capita Income	**.01**	-.00	-.00	-.00	.00	2.93	-4.93	2.65
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
	P=.00**	P=.21	P=.13	P=.46	P=.16	P=.94	P=.99	P=.95
Percent State Pop. Black	**-6.65**	.00	.00	.00	.03	.01	.02	.00
	(2.21)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
	P=.00**	P=.66	P=.91	P=.91	P=.06	P=.44	P=.21	P=.95
Percent State Pop. Hispanic	-.39	-.00	-.01	.00	-.01	-.03	-.00	.02
	(2.2)	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)
	P=.86	P=.74	P=.48	P=.81	P=.44	P=.10	P=.85	P=.20
N	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49
Prob>F	.00	.05	.29	.30	.14	.00	.29	.49
R-sq/Adj. R-sq.	.64/.56	.30/.16	.20/.04	.19/.03	.24/.09	.40/.28	.20/.04	.15/-.00

Note: Each cell contains the coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, and p value. * p > .05; ** p > .01. Also, negative coefficients for all the variables except TANFBen3 means more lenient. Key: Max Benefit is the Maximum TANF benefit for a family of three with no income; Preg Elig-whether pregnant women are eligible in state; Elig. Respons.- basic eligibility responsibilities; Two Parent Elig.- whether two parent households are eligible for benefits; Income Disregards; Sanctions; Time Limits; and Activities Req.- work requirements set forth by states.

Table 5.3 State Political Culture Effect on State Policy Design Medicaid		
Time Component 2004	Medicaid Eligibility (medelig)	Medicaid Scope of Services (medservice)
Elazar Moralistic	25.6 (21.17) P=.23	17.85 (10) P=.08
Elazar Individualistic	-18.13 (21.04) P=.39	1.34 (9.94) P=.89
Unemployment	11.18 (6.12) P=.07	4.43 (2.89) P=.13
Democratic Governor	-11.21 (11.91) P=.35	2.73 (5.62) P=.63
Legislative Control	**20.17** **(8.46)** **P=.02***	-.99 (3.99) P=.80
Citizen Ideology	**1.50** **(.54)** **P=.00****	**.86** **(.25)** **P=.00****
Per Capita Income	**.00** **(.00)** **P=.02***	.00 (.00) P=.68
Percent State Pop. Black	-.43 (.85) P=.61	-.46 (.40) P=.26
Percent State Pop. Hispanic	-.96 (.70) P=.18	.05 (.33) P=.15
N	49	49
Prob>F	.00	.00
R-sq./Adj.R-sq	.57/.47	.52/.41

Note: Each cell contains the coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, and p value. * p > .05; ** p > .01

Table 5.4 State Political Culture Effect on State Policy Design Medicaid		
Time Component 2004	Medicaid Eligibility (medelig)	Medicaid Scope of Services (medservice)
Lieske Fivefold	1.43 (1.78) P=.42	1.27 (.80) P=.12
Unemployment	12.61 (6.60) P=.06	5.56 (2.99) P=.07
Democratic Governor	-9.59 (13.08) P=.46	4.3 (5.93) P=.46
Legislative Control	**19.05** **(9.05)** **P=.04***	-1.25 (4.10) P=.76
Citizen Ideology	**1.25** **(.61)** **P=.05***	**.70** **(.28)** **P=.01****
Per Capita Income	.00 (.00) P=.08	.00 (.00) P=.82
Percent State Pop. Black	-.81 (.87) P=.35	-.59 (.39) P=.14
Percent State Pop. Hispanic	-.80 (.83) P=.33	.18 (.37) P=.62
N	49	49
Prob>F	.00	.00
R-sq./Adj.R-sq	.50/.40	.48/.38

Note: Each cell contains the coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, and p value. * p > .05; ** p > .01

Table 5.5 Effect of State Policy Design on Social Welfare Outcomes	
Time Component 2001	Poverty Rate
TANFBen3	-.00 (.00) P=.60
Time	.133 (.35) P=.71
Eligresp	.42 (.26) P=.11
Comply	-.22 (.27) P=.43
Inc	-.24 (.28) P=.38
Twopar	.54 (.34) P=.12
Actreg	.27 (30) P=.36
Preg	.32 (.31) P=.31
N	49

Note: Each cell contains the coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, and p value. * p > .05; ** p > .01
Key: Max Benefit is the Maximum TANF benefit for a family of three with no income; Preg Elig-whether pregnant women are eligible in state; Elig. Respons.- basic eligibility responsibilities; Two Parent Elig.- whether two parent households are eligible for benefits; Income Disregards; Sanctions; Time Limits; and Activities Req.- work requirements set forth by states.

Table 5.6 Effect of State Policy Design on Social Welfare Outcomes-Medicaid (uninsured rate)		
Time Component 2005	Model 1	Model 2
Medicaid Eligibility	-.01 (.00) P=.09	
Medicaid Scope of Services		**-.04** **(.01)** **P=.01****
Per Capita Income	**-.00** **(.00)** **P=.00****	**-.00** **(.00)** **P=.00****
Unemployment Rate	.26 (.37) P=.48	.35 (.36) P=.33
Percent of State Pop Black	**.11** **(.03)** **P=.00****	**.07** **(.03)** **P=.04***
Percent of State Pop. Hispanic	**.27** **(.04)** **P=.00****	**.28** **(.03)** **P=.00****
N	49	49
Prob>F	.00	.00
R-sq./Adj.R-sq.	.66/.62	.68/.65

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Appendix A

Figure 1 Lieske's Reduced Typologies



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