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Paige Thielke April 9, 2024

“Freedom at War with Fear”: An Evaluation of Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform Aid’s Impact on Human Rights during the War on Terror

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Abstract

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Foreign aid for the promotion of rule of law and security sector reform was a central tenet of the War on Terror. This thesis analyzes the effect of American Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance aid between 2002 and 2012 on human rights outcomes in recipient countries, evaluating changes over time in respect for various rights and the rationale of security sector reform more broadly. This theory, which has over time been increasingly adopted by the US government, posits that the development of security and rule of law capacity improves security and human rights outcomes, leading to further citizen buy-in and creating a self-reinforcing cycle of positive change. To evaluate this theory, I drew on American aid data and two human rights datasets, and further analyzed outcomes by level of relative aid, whether or not they were a partner country in the War on Terror, and their development status. Using a cross-sectional panel regression analysis, I find very few significant results, and very little evidence of positive changes among aid-recipient countries throughout this decade. Partner countries had the most significant results, showing significant decreases in the respect for rights among their governments as a result of American aid, supported by two robustness tests. Contrary to the theory and the hypotheses, the findings suggest that security sector reform theory cannot be assumed to work across all contexts, and that the nature of American interests within recipient countries was a far more important factor influencing the change in respect for rights during this period. The findings also support the contention that in order for aid to be successful, its distribution and implementation must be tailored to the unique context of each country. Further research should focus on individual countries through case studies and process-tracing, and dive deeper into various factors within recipient countries that affected how aid was implemented.

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Introduction

For the past 75 years, foreign aid has been a major component of American foreign policy. Doling out money, training and other forms of help has been one of the main ways the US has advanced their goals abroad, and trillions of dollars of taxpayer money has been distributed to countries around the world. However, due to the massive amount of resources devoted to the problem globally, a lack of reliable measurement tools, and variation in outcomes coming from entirely unrelated elements, it can be exceedingly difficult to understand how effective this aid is at achieving its goals. This is particularly true for programs focused on less tangible concepts and ideals like respect for human rights and safety, which do not have clear conceptualizations and measurements, especially when compared to other forms of development such as economic growth or health outcomes.

The question I seek to answer is: "What factors influence the effectiveness of foreign assistance for Rule of Law development and Security Sector Reform programs in increasing human rights?" I will be looking specifically at US government initiatives carried out during the War on Terror that, as part of a broader foreign policy strategy, aimed to increase rule of law and security outcomes through Security Sector Reform. Rule of law refers to the principle that in states with a strong rule of law, both governments and citizens are accountable to their laws, and Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a set of policies and activities a government undertakes to improve its security and justice. These programs were undertaken in order to increase the quality of justice and security to countries worldwide, as there is a large amount of evidence that improvements in these realms leads to long-term stability and peace, but there are serious criticisms to the aid regime and evidence that aid may be ineffective or actively detrimental to the development of democracy and human rights in recipient countries. This paper will look at

the effects of US aid distributed by the three major American aid distribution agencies – USAID, DOD, and the State Department – between 2002 and 2012 on human rights outcomes across three categories.

Answering the question of what aid does is very important in two dimensions: whether or not aid makes any difference in the first place, and whether or not that difference is positive or negative. The purpose of aid is to make a positive difference, so if it is ineffective or detrimental to its recipients, it is crucial to identify why. This is important given the scale of the US aid regime – trillions of dollars have been given out, and there is empirical evidence indicating that the US acts in many ways as a global agenda setter for aid. Knowing whether or not these types of aid are at all effective, or if there are any factors conditioning when they make a difference, is crucial in order to properly allocate aid and finite government resources. My contribution to the literature will be an evaluation of this specific time period in aid at the global scale. The War on Terror's beginning marked a significant shift in the principles and goals that underlie American foreign policy, of which aid is a component. Increasing human rights was not the central objective of this policy, but was one objective that was normatively aligned with the US's broader goals. Testing whether these improvements were realized during this time period will be important to know going forward, especially since increasing the rule of law and security around the world are at the core of USAID values. Furthermore, I am using a wider scope of analysis than the majority of other studies I have seen thus far, and using cross-national data to try to identify broader trends that indicate patterns in specific outcomes.

Literature Review

History of US Foreign Aid

In its modern iteration, American foreign aid can be traced back to the end of World War II. The Marshall Plan was conceived with the central goal of fighting communism, which would be realized through the rebuilding of Europe's economy and the re-establishment of economic ties in a way favorable to American interests (Lancaster 2009, 799; Morgenstern and Brown 2022, 3; Tarnoff and Nowels 2005, 3). The major law governing America's aid regime is the Foreign Assistance Act, originally passed in 1961 and providing the basic framework for how aid is implemented. The law established a normative case for why aid is important, arguing that it is in the best interest of Americans for the international community to respect various rights and use resources in a responsible way, and declares that supporting development is "a principal objective of the foreign policy of the United States" (*Foreign Assistance Act* 1961, Part I, Sec. 101a). National security concerns, broadly conceptualized as the prevention of anything that could hurt Americans (thereby including narcotics and pandemics), has been the most significant and lasting theme within aid allocation over the decades. American economic interests and humanitarian interests have also been central rationales, with the latter holding the highest level of support among both the American public and politicians (Morgenstern and Brown 2022, 3).

For the first few decades of the modern American aid regime, while the Cold War was always at the center of policy considerations, distributed aid was much more focused on economic development than it was security and governance. If a country experienced a security crisis, like a civil war, aid was suspended and the focus shifted to humanitarian assistance and crisis response (Morgenstern and Brown 2022, 12; Swiss 2011, 371). Economic aid was used as a way to display America's wealth and economic power, and as a tool to incentivize countries to

align themselves with the US. Nearly $500 billion was doled out during the Cold War to recipient countries, in order to bolster America's claim to be the superior and sole hegemon in the world (Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998, 299). The aid regime came to be focused on long-term, stable growth that would welcome and integrate a country into the global community and economy (Findley 2018, 362). It was during this time that the global governance system came to fruition with the development of the IMF, World Bank, and other international monetary institutions, as well as aid programs established by other industrialized countries (Lancaster 2009, 799). This does not mean that security concerns were not a consideration; empirical evidence from the 1980s indicates that a country's strategic importance and ties to the US were key determinants of who received aid (Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998, 319).

The end of the Cold War significantly changed the logic behind how aid was distributed. As the conflict that had defined US foreign policy for decades suddenly vanished, there was speculation that the defeat of communism would lead to a slow-down in the amount of aid given out in the 1990s. This hypothesis was bolstered by the fact that the American public during the 1990s was not enthusiastic about sending money abroad, and instead preferred to focus on domestic issues. However, worldwide aid remained more or less constant (Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998, 294), signaling that high levels of aid may have become a central component of US foreign policy outside of the Cold War context. Aid also started to directly address issues related to conflict prevention, mediation and security, as the US got involved in foreign interventions to liberate Kuwait, stop war in the Balkans, and provide aid to Somalia (Swiss 2011, 371). While this was in part due to a shift in US policy and priorities, there is also evidence that conflict within developing countries increased during the 1990s, which led to considerations about how development and conflict related to each other within developing societies (Swiss 2011,

373-374). Also during this time period, aid agreements began including clauses and conditions that specifically made democratization a condition for continued payments (Wright 2009, 554-555), further evidence for the idea that security and governance began to play a more central role within the development and aid framework than they had during the Cold War.

While the seeds of security aid were planted in the 1990s, 9/11 significantly changed American involvement abroad, including how it gave out aid. Despite being critical of foreign aid prior to the attacks (Hasnat 2010, 79), the Bush administration made global development a foundational pillar of its global strategy in the aftermath of 9/11, along with defense and diplomacy (Tarnoff and Nowels 2005, 2). It was here that development became a tool in the War on Terror, and became more explicitly tied to national security interests than it had been before. This new role for aid is reflected in the way that Congress allocated funds during the early 2000s – military assistance and democracy promotion aid jumped significantly between 2002 and 2005, with assistance overall going to 150 countries (Tarnoff and Nowels 2005, 12); adjusted for inflation, the War on Terror marked the highest levels of aid since the Marshall Plan, doubling between 2000 and 2004 and hitting $29 billion in 2007 (Hasnat 2010, 84; Morgenstern and Brown 2022). In particular, countries deemed important to the War on Terror were flooded with aid; one review found that countries where terrorist groups were based or had previously attacked received the largest increases of total aid (Hasnat 2010, 85). As an example, Kenya, where the US had already established a security presence in the late 1990s following the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi, demonstrated its willingness to work with the US after 9/11 and subsequently received massive amounts of security aid and training (Aronson 2011, 121). Similarly, stretching back to the Cold War, Israel and Egypt have received enormous

proportions of US aid, particularly around security and governance (Morgenstern and Brown 2022, intro).

Foreign Aid Distribution:

In the US, foreign aid is appropriated by Congress as a part of the larger government budget. It makes up a relatively small percentage of the government spending; in fiscal year 2004, for example, foreign aid accounted for roughly 1% of the federal budget (Tarnoff and Nowels 2005, 20). The majority of this aid, approximately 70%, is bilateral, meaning it is given directly to another country. The other 30% is multilateral aid, where more than one country is involved as a part of the approach; this usually means going through international organizations such as the World Bank, which pools together money from many donors and distributes it as one package as opposed to the same money being doled out by each individual country. Empirical evidence finds that bilateral aid is more likely to go to countries with whom the donor country has existing ties to, such as through trade or a former colony, and multilateral aid is more focused on countries with encouraging and reliable outcomes (Wright 2009, 568). Multilateral aid has been an important part of US foreign policy for the past 75 years and is generally thought to be more efficient than bilateral aid. However, it has the potential for principal-agent problems and necessitates ceding control to another actor, and is less popular with the American public, which may explain why it makes up a much smaller proportion of the US aid budget than bilateral aid (Milner and Tingley 2013).

Differences in aid appropriations between different administrations can be somewhat attributed to domestic politics; the president cannot unilaterally set aid policy, meaning members of congress must vote to approve the budgets. Research into support for economic aid finds that

representatives are more likely to vote for aid when it supports the material interests of people in their district. Party affiliation also plays a role depending on the purpose of the aid: representatives of democratic districts are more likely to support economic aid than republican representatives, but the opposite is true when it comes to military aid (Milner and Tingley 2010). Public opinion polls from the 1970s further support this finding, with the results showing that conservatives wanted foreign policy to focus on security, while liberals wanted to increase the global living standard (Milner and Tingley 2013); since aid is often conceptualized as a foreign policy tool, this is in line with previous findings. It also may help to explain why a Republican administration, especially one as aid-averse as George W. Bush at the start of his first term, made aid a central pillar of its foreign policy, given its connections to national security as opposed to purely humanitarian aid.

Aid focused on rule of law and security is generally administered by one of three agencies: the Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department, and the Department of Defense (United States Agency for International Development, Department of Defense and Department of State 2009 (hereafter USAID; DoD; and State)). Each has specific roles and general focuses for the overall aid strategy, with a significant amount of overlap between them (Tarnoff and Nowles 2005, 24; USAID 2023); agencies often implement aid that is not allocated to or planned by them (Morgenstern and Brown 2022, 11). Generally, USAID is focused on program implementation of rule of law, conflict resolution and other governance related programs, the State Department lends support to USAID and coordinates aid with other aspects of US foreign policy, and DoD provides support and training in the defense sector (USAID 2021, 2-3). An important aspect of the US aid regime is just how closely these agencies work together, and who makes decisions between them. Since 2006, the State Department has

been home to the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, which manages and coordinates aid programs, making them the central hub for America's aid regime (Morgenstern and Brown 2022, 13). While they are not the most directly responsible for implementation, the State Department and DoD have an immense amount of influence over the actions of USAID, meaning that the central aid agency is very likely to be heavily influenced by US foreign policy goals as opposed to a more independent humanitarian approach (Swiss 2011, 386).

These three agencies implement several key programs and funds providing rule of law and security aid. The State Department and DoD run the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which provides foreign countries with military education and training. Started during the Cold War, the program had the goal of improving relations between countries while propagating American ideals about democracy and the value of American culture, and has had more than 100 participant countries (Mujkic, Asencio and Byrne 2019, 271-272). Another important aid account is the Economic Support Fund (ESF), which is managed by the State Department and USAID, provides funding to US allies; for the past few decades, the majority has gone to partners in the Middle East, especially as the War on Terror kicked off and the US sought to prop up regimes that it supported (Morgenstern and Brown 2022, 8). This program is one of the clearest examples of aid being directly aligned with US security interests. The State Department is also responsible for the Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA), the government's largest global counterterrorism training program. The budget for the program exploded after 9/11, going from $38 million in 2001 to $175 million in 2007, and more than 70 countries participated as of 2007 (United States Office for Government Accountability (hereafter GAO) 2008).

It is also important to note that the US often delegates its aid duties and funding to third parties for implementation. This may be for a variety of reasons, but often comes down to issues of efficiency and efficacy, with donors choosing to delegate when the agent has a better understanding of a specific context than they would (Milner and Tingley 2013, 317). In the US system, one of the biggest actors is the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a quasi-government yet independent agency that is responsible for roughly one-third of the government's funding that is directed to NGOs. This makes them an extremely visible and influential actor within the global aid community, and funds both American and foreign NGOs in order to promote "civil society", which has its own category in the "Democracy, Human Rights and Governance" sector in the US aid datasets (Bush 2016, 362-364).

It is worth reiterating that other countries are major actors, all with different intentions and strategic interests guiding their aid allotments. These intentions may be shaped by their history; for example, France has long been involved in security in West Africa as a result of their previous colonial holdings and continued connection to the rest of the world (Tankel 2018, 262). However, America has acted as a strong influence on the overall global aid regime in the modern era. The American approach has been replicated by multiple countries: Japan, the UK and Denmark have all adopted a more security-centric approach to development aid in the past 20 years (Aning 2010, 16-18).

Does Aid Work?:

The literature on foreign aid is generally split between two major questions: why countries give aid and what affects those decisions, and what aid does to the countries that receive it (Alesina and Dollar 2000, 34). This paper is more focused on the second question, but

it is important to acknowledge that there is a tremendous amount of research and debate regarding the first issue, as it likely affects how effective aid is when it gets to its recipient countries. To broadly summarize the findings that are relevant for this paper, scholars find that aid is distributed in line with broader foreign policy goals, that existing relationships between countries and larger goals are much more predictive of who gets aid than humanitarian necessity (except for a select few – mostly Nordic – countries that focus on the latter), and that support for foreign aid among congressional representatives tends to align with the perceived benefits and ideological preferences of a rep's constituency (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Milner and Tingley 2010; Milner and Tingley 2013; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998; Tingley 2010).

In terms of aid's effect, findings vary widely based on every possible variable, such as the type of aid being distributed, the relationships between the donor and recipient countries, whether or not a recipient country is experiencing instability or violence, and so on. Two main schools of thought take opposing views on whether or not aid is beneficial, with the 'resource fundamentalists' taking the position that aid ultimately leads to further development, while 'market fundamentalists' view aid as something that interferes with the nature of the market (this argument is most applicable to economic aid and development, but the same principles and tensions are echoed throughout the literature on security and human rights aid) (Lancaster 2009, 800). However, it has broadly been accepted that countries allocate aid based on their strategic interests (Findley 2018, 371), which falls in line with a realist assessment of the aid regime (Scharder, Hook and Taylor 1998, 297). These interests vary a great deal from country to country, or even agency to agency (Schrader, Hook and Taylor 1998, 319; USAID 2010, 5), which can create friction as competing goals and policies are enacted at the same time. There is also debate regarding the ways in which aid interacts with other types of foreign policy and

involvement from donor states, with scholars arguing in all directions (Findley 2018, 364; Wright 2009, 553). Determining the effects of aid focused on government and politics is especially hard to measure; while there is clear and convincing evidence that aid has led to better health, agricultural and education outcomes (Lancaster 2009, 801-802), there are not clear measures of what improvements in governance would look like, making it a tricky topic to evaluate empirically.

Rule of Law:

While the concept is multifaceted and highly contextual, Rule of Law (ROL) is centered around the principle that in a state with a strong rule of law, the government and the people are accountable to their laws, through both compliance and implementation. In practice, this means having strong institutions that are able to enforce laws in a fair and equal way. It also involves a culture within a country that is committed to these same sets of laws, and buy-in to them as a means of resolving conflict (Erbeznik 2011, 876-877). Within American aid guiding documents, ROL is also defined as being one of five essential components of democracy (USAID 2010, 1). The UN's definition specifically mentions certain aspects of government such as separation of powers, transparency in the legal process, and participation in decisions making (USAID 2023, 8), suggesting that ROL has certain normative qualities that cannot be found in a dictatorship or autocracy, where the law may be opaque and applied unequally.

Over time, ROL promotion has become a central goal to US foreign policy. The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act lays out the principle that proper rule of law is necessary in order for long-term stable economic growth (*Foreign Assistance Act* 1961, Part I, Sec. 102b), thereby embedding its long-term importance to American aid and defining its relation to other

development goals. More recently, the 2010 USAID *Rule of Law Strategic Framework* laid out the five pillars: order and security, legitimacy, checks and balances, fairness, and effective application of the law (USAID 2010, 1-2). The framework emphasizes that implementing rule of law cannot be a one-size-fits-all program, it must be tailored to each individual country, taking into account both the local context and the existing state of the security sector (USAID 2010, 14). In particular, however, it highlights the role of the judiciary, stating that without a functional court system, "it is highly unlikely that rule of law will prevail" due to their involvement in all five ROL elements (USAID 2010, 17).

While this framework was used throughout the 21st century, in 2023 USAID laid out an official Rule of Law Policy for the first time, with "people-centered justice" at its center (USAID 2023, 4). The Policy shifts the focus from institutions to the individual, arguing that the people affected should be the prime consideration going forward, as opposed to a broader approach that seemingly instigated reforms at a more institutional level. The policy also formally adopts the UN definition of rule of law, and goes a step further with the normative implications by explicitly arguing that democracy is the best way to promote the rule of law (USAID 2023, 9). In terms of programs, interviews with participants in IMET reveal that the program strongly emphasizes a connection between the rule of law and democracy (Mujkic, Asencio and Byrne 2019, 280), which is an important normative goal that the US seeks to disseminate through the program.

A substantial body of research links government compliance with the law with higher levels of peace and stability. Research on political violence has found that terrorist attacks, for example, are more likely in societies where there is a lack of opportunity for political participation, where governments are not responsive to the ills of their citizens, and where groups

feel unfairly discriminated against (Crenshaw 1981, 383). Having a stronger rule of law should, in theory, help to alleviate many of these grievances against the government and thus in the long run create a safer society. Democracies in particular have been found to have lower rates of domestic terrorism, with the opportunity for political participation and legal systems that are effective at resolving grievances as explanations (Choi 2010, 953). Having limits on the executive, for example, may decrease security threats as citizens' trust in their government increases; conversely, an unchecked executive may erode the publics' trust and sense of buy-in, making reactive violence more likely (Dragu and Polborn 2014, 513). This evidence provides support for the emphasis on democracy promotion specifically within American aid programs as a viable tool for improving long-term security and rule of law. In terms of historical precedent, there is not a clear causal relationship between good governance and democracy, which somewhat weakens the American dogma that the two are inextricably linked. However, in the long-term there is a strong relationship between democracy and good governance, while the short- and medium-terms are more of a mixed bag (Lancaster 2009, 804).

Security Sector Reform:

The idea of Security Sector Reform (SSR) was first introduced publicly in the late 1990s in the UK, and has since become a common and deeply influential principle for development (Wulf 2004, 1-2). The US government defines SSR as being 'the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice' (USAID 2021, 5). Other definitions highlight its normative connections to democracy and good governance, and are based in many of the same principles and end-goals as ROL as defined by Western actors (Wulf 2004, 3-4). The logic behind this kind of reform aligns with

theories about the role of counterinsurgency aid, specifically that of a hearts and minds approach. An insurgent group's power generally comes from the support of the civilian population; by targeting the hearts and minds of the people, a government can cut off an important source of power for an insurgent group (Findley 2018, 368). In order to do so, the government needs to convince the people that they are the best possible option in terms of governance, and will often accomplish this by providing basic services and increasing security, safety, and the rule of law in an area. If a government cannot provide safety and security based on the laws of a country in a fair and equitable way, then it loses legitimacy in the eyes of the people (USAID 2010, 9). However, if the people feel like they can trust their government to protect them and to respect their rights, this in turn leads to increased buy-in from the population, which leads to a self-reinforcing cycle that long-term should create lasting peace and stability.

The security sector is a broad and inclusive set of actors and agencies, encompassing security institutions like the military and police, oversight bodies, and the justice system, as well as non-state actors like guerrilla armies and private companies (USAID 2021, 3; Wulf 2004, 5). Very generally, if an actor has a part to play in the safety and security of a country, and can be brought into this framework, then they are a part of the security sector. It is also important to note that this group of actors is present at all levels of government and society: implementing SSR cannot happen without everyone from local police, regional courts, and the national government getting involved and fully buying into the process, as well as having the capacity to do so (USAID 2021). In practice, SSR may look like training actors within the security sector, disarming and demobilizing combatants, and working to increase mechanisms for accountability and oversight over the military and police (Swiss 2011, 374).

SSR and ROL have a significant amount of overlap as concepts. The key difference is generally in their scopes; while SSR is a set of policies with the explicit goal of creating more effective institutions, Rule of Law is an end goal more normatively shaped by the ideals of accountability and equality (USAID 2010, 23; USAID 2021, 5). Both are concerned with providing justice and fostering a more secure and equal environment; ROL goals are driving ideals for SSR, and SSR is an important framework through which to increase ROL. The USAID 2023 Policy argues that safety is one of the central goals and benefits of a strong rule of law, because it increases the enforcement capacity of security and justice actors (USAID 2023, 17). While not explicitly stating it, the 2023 Policy adopts an SSR-like framework in its broader goals of preventing conflict and violence through the rule of law, and through linking the two realms of rule of law and peacebuilding (USAID 2023, 28).

Criticisms:

Despite a great deal of ideological and empirical support for the idea of ROL and SSR, there is significant criticism of these ideas and practices. ROL and SSR reforms are notoriously difficult to actually implement successfully, and have often backfired and only led to more repression.

One major criticism is the Western-centric nature of ROL and SSR aid. Despite USAID's claims that ROL is not just a Western or American concept (USAID 2010, 6), these aid programs are often designed to teach governments how to implement Western-style judiciaries, based in Western legal codes that are influenced by Western values. This often leads to a tremendous mismatch between the donor and recipient countries, as some countries have very different conceptions of the legal system and the rules and ideals governing society (Erbeznik 2011, 893),

leading to a decreased belief in the system and low compliance with the reforms, rendering them basically ineffective. This suggests that traditions are important, and that countries are much less likely to buy-in to systems that do not align with their values or ideals of governance, which only further decreases citizens' trust and buy-in to the entire system (Erbeznik 2011, 878-879). Evidence from post-war countries suggests that aid is only effective when the recipient countries are fully invested in the development goals of the donors (Findley 2018, 371), further supporting this criticism. The 2023 Policy itself, while discussing the move away from an institutional approach, alludes to disappointments or failures in the previous policies (USAID 2023, 14). This issue is particularly pressing considering how much of the world's aid is given by Western or Western-aligned countries: in 2000, 70% of aid came from the US, Japan, France and Germany (Alesina and Dollar 2000, 35). While those proportions have changed over the past two decades, it highlights the amount of power that the West holds in these spheres.

Similarly, differences between aid donors and recipients play into how principal-agent problems factor into ROL and SSR reforms. In a country where the values of the donor and recipient are not aligned, agents in charge of carrying out the reforms (in this case, members of a recipient government) have few incentives to do so, and may in fact be actively disincentivized (Erbeznik 2011, 892). NGOs receive funding from the government and are tasked with carrying out their vision for the aid, but as the number of people involved in the chain of delegation grows, the higher the likelihood that there is "agency slippage" between the various groups (Bush 2016, 364). Similarly to the game "telephone," as a directive passes through more and more people, it tends to become more and more warped until it differs in a substantial way from the original intent. Delegating to NGOs adds links, making these changes more likely. A model put forth by Nielson and Tierney of international organizations (IOs) that had multiple

"principles" (multiple donor countries that had their own ideas and goals for their aid money) proposed that this increased number of priorities and links in the delegation chain made principal-agent problems more acute (Nielson and Tierney 2003). While this model used the World Bank as an example (which, to be clear, does carry out aid programs), the same principles can also be applied to NGOs operating in foreign countries in order to enact US programs and trainings. NGOs may also have their own goals and desires, and are constantly competing for more money in order to carry out their programs, which may further skew their goals and incentives for certain actions within their countries of operations. The fact that countries with higher security importance to the US receive more aid from US-based NGOs, which the operating agencies have higher levels of control over compared to NGOs centered in the recipient country, signals that aid agencies are aware of these problems (Bush 2016, 376). These problems indicate that aid may not be carried out in the way intended, which decreases its overall efficacy as a foreign policy tool.

Another major criticism has to do with the flow of aid into a country, and how it can incentivize bad actors. Foreign aid is often sent to multiple different areas of a society, and different forms of aid can have different consequences for the same sector. It has been found that aid more generally actually decreases the rule of law in a country because it creates a pile of cash that can be won, and can end up propping up elites with no incentive to change the current system. This finding plays into Rentier State Theory, which argues that states who are largely dependent on taxes are much more responsive to their citizens than states whose wealth comes from exterior 'rents', which includes aid (Erbeznik 2011, 882-885, 888).This can be especially problematic in emerging democracies, where corruption and elite control can deeply undermine the legitimacy of the new government (USAID 2010, 9). Receiving aid may also signal a

government's strength, which may dissuade potential rebels or opposition activity (Findley 2018, 366); while this may mean a more peaceful situation, it could also mean that oppressive regimes stay in power longer, which is counterintuitive to the normative goals of American aid. On the flip side, aid can also exacerbate pre-existing social divisions and inequalities that can precipitate violent rebellion (Findley 2018, 367).

Finally, there is evidence to suggest that countries receive aid based on how important they are relative to American security interests (Aning 2010, 8). While aid is generally understood to be shaped by the strategic interests of a donor country, this is a deeply rooted aspect of the American aid regime, stretching back to the Cold War when the aid a country received was strongly conditioned on its willingness to participate in and adopt anti-Soviet programs and policies (Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998, 299). This trend is especially true during the early 2000s and the start of the War on Terror. Even though aid may have increased aid more generally, the targets often were heavy on security initiatives and not general aid, and were often given to countries who had signed on to participate in the War on Terror or were oil rich (Aning 2010, 13-14). As previously mentioned, Kenya was a major benefactor due to its cooperation with the US on counterterrorism (Aronson 2011, 121). This is further supported by the existence of the ESF, which doles out aid based on American political interest, as opposed to more humanitarian grounds that most aid is generally seen to stem from (Morgenstern and Brown 2022, 8). While this is not illegal or inherently detrimental, it does propagate the idea that the true intention of aid is not a genuine desire to improve the world, but rather to strengthen the American position abroad through the continued reign of US allies. It is worth noting, for example, that for the last two decades of the twentieth century, over 85% of ESF funds went to Israel, Egypt, the West Bank, and Jordan (Morgenstern and Brown 2022, 8), all of which have

been the sight of reported, and in some cases systemic, human rights abuses. Furthermore, the US was aware of the corruption of Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze, and yet continued to support him in the 2000s because of his support for the War on Terror (Bush 2016, 365). This willingness to turn a blind eye in favor of American security interests may weaken American credibility in recipient countries, and make citizens and governments less willing to buy into American ideals of rule of law and human rights.

The withholding of aid has also been used as a leveraging technique for the US to achieve its foreign policy goals – for example, IMET funds were decreased to several countries in Africa that refused to sign onto Article 98 of the American Service Members Protection Act, which would prevent them from handing over an American citizen to the ICC for prosecution (Aning 2010, 14). The IMET program has also over the years come under criticism for the actions and motivations of its participants: rich countries in the Gulf have participated not because of a lack of educational capacity, but rather due to American security interests, and IMET academies were responsible for training military officers of South American dictators during the Cold War, with some evidence suggesting that methods learned from IMET were used to commit human rights abuses back home (Mujkic, Asencio and Byrne 2019, 277). This tactic has also been used in high profile settings like the UN: in 1991, Yemen voted to not authorize the use of force against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War and subsequently the amount of aid it received from the US decreased dramatically (Kuziemko and Werker 2006, 910). Similarly, Jordan's economic support was withheld after it opposed the 1991 Gulf War, and only reinstated after it caved to American demands to sign a peace treaty with Israel (Hinnebusch and Quilliam 2006, 519).

It is also worth briefly mentioning the outsize role that the US continues to play over the global aid regime and international organizations. The US continues to exert its power and

influence over several global institutions that play a large role in aid distribution. For example, the US government holds a tremendous amount of influence over the US bank: the headquarters are in Washington D.C., and the US government traditionally appoints the bank president and holds the largest voting bloc of the bank's board (Nielsen and Tierney 2003, 204). Given that the World Bank is one of the largest international groups that distributes multilateral aid, this gives the US another in-road to exert control over how aid is distributed around the world, without necessarily bearing the US label. There is also evidence that the US has used aid as a way to influence the rotating members of the UN Security Council. Non-permanent members received a 59% increase in total aid during the years that they served on the council, which dropped back down to normal rates almost immediately after the country's 2-year tenure expired. Those countries also received an 8% increase in total aid from the UN, mostly from agencies like UNICEF that the US has significant sway over (Kuziemko and Werker 2006, 907).

Theory and Hypothesis

Model of Implementation:

Before delving into the theory, it is important to describe the model this paper uses for how aid impacts human rights. In this model, there are three actors: the donor state, the recipient state, and the recipient population. The "donor country" is the state that is giving out aid, and refers to any government agencies or affiliated actors working on behalf of that government. While this could be any number of countries, for the purposes of this paper the donor country will always be the US. The "recipient country" is the state receiving aid, and refers to any actors working on behalf of the state in terms of implementation. This includes militaries, police, judiciaries, members of the executive or local governments. The "recipient population"" are the citizens of a country where SSR and ROL reforms are being implemented, and are defined as any non-state members of a country who have no role in implementation.

In this model, the donor country first decides to give aid to a donor government, considering both the amount and purpose of the money. As previously noted, a donor country will largely give aid based on its strategic desires; this can vary based on what each country deems as important, and does vary significantly between countries (Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998, 300-301). That aid then gets delivered to the recipient country, which can have different motivations for accepting it (for the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that all countries who were offered aid accepted it). Recipient governments may be genuinely committed to increasing the rule of law and security in order to increase the quality of life of their citizens; they also may want to increase their security capacity without any consideration for human rights, or may want to use the money in order to solidify the regime currently in power. From there, the recipient government implements the reforms, which the recipient population reacts to, both towards their

own government and towards the donor country, and the fact that these two governments are collaborating on this set of reforms (this assumes that the recipient population is aware of the aid that has been given from the donor country). In this model, the agency that recipient citizens have is limited to reacting to and receiving aid, which can in turn affect the amount of aid that will be implemented the next year.

SSR Theory:

The main theory that this paper seeks to analyze is Security Sector Reform itself. Given the centrality of this idea to the American aid regime during the War on Terror, and the level of centrality it currently occupies, it is important to know if there is empirical evidence to support its continued usage. For the purposes of this theory, the definition of SSR will be borrowed from the US government: "the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice." This theory largely argues that donor countries give aid and training to recipient governments, increasing the capacity and the quality of the security sector, which includes improving ROL. Under this theory, the recipient governments' implementation is positive, as they implement reforms and complete trainings that increase positive security, justice and civil and political outcomes. Recipient governments are better able to respond to the security needs of their citizens, which increases citizen trust and buy-in, thereby creating a positive and self-reinforcing cycle that leads to better human rights outcomes in the short-term and increased stability and peace in the long-term.

In the context of the model this paper uses, SSR and ROL aid is offered by donor governments to recipient governments with the intention of increasing both the security and rule of law of a country. Recipient governments would accept the aid because their interests are

aligned with that of the donor country. Recipient governments would then implement the reforms and produce the desired outcomes, leading to not only increased human rights and security outcomes, but also a greater level of buy-in from the citizenry, and ultimately more long-term stability and increased quality of governance. It should also theoretically increase positive feelings from the recipient citizens towards the donor government, thereby providing a strategic incentive for donor governments to continue to provide aid.

Several assumptions underpin this model and SRR theory more generally. First, it is assumed that the more resources devoted to a recipient country, then the more successful the aid or training will be, because they are able to do more. Another important consideration here is the relative importance of a recipient country to the donor country. If the security of a recipient country is considered especially important to the donor country, then they will devote more resources to that country, which should increase the likelihood of successful outcomes. This is also important when it comes to decisions in a donor country about continuing support – if a recipient country is not producing the desired outcomes, then a donor country is more likely to continue providing aid because it is more invested in the outcomes of a relatively more important country than a relatively less important one. It should be noted that each country is given a different allocation of funds and programming based on perceived needs, which will change from year to year based on factors that are not a part of this model, so this theory cannot be said to account for all the variation in outcomes and subsequent aid.

Outcomes and Measurement:

Under this model, the main outcomes of interest are human rights, at the level of an individual's experience. A key component of ROL is not just that there are laws on the books

that protect citizens, but that those laws are respected. Therefore, human rights will be measured as outcomes and not the amount of legislation adopted by a country. Human rights is a broad field, and therefore will be split into three major categories: "security", "justice", and "civil and political" outcomes. "Security outcomes" generally refers to physical integrity rights and the physical safety of an individual from violence or abuse, and can be conceptualized as safety from murder, torture, or other types of violence at the hands of the state. "Justice outcomes" refers to the level of fairness and equal treatment under the law that a citizen experiences going through the justice system, and can be conceptualized through things like access to the judiciary and fair treatment from state actors. Finally, the "civil and political outcomes" refers to a citizen's civil rights granted by the state and their ability to participate in the political process; this variable is of interest due to the importance of democracy and a more Western-conception of human rights within the implementation of SSR and ROL as conceptualized by the US government (this definition is adopted because the paper is using American aid as a case study; if this research was duplicated using aid from a different government, the conceptions of rule of law and human rights should be adopted to the ideals of that government).

One important component of this theory is that security outcomes will likely take a shorter amount of time to show results, in either a positive or negative direction. The capacity of actors involved in security outcomes, like the military and police, can be improved relatively quickly through trainings and supplies. It is possible that these reforms could be short-lived and impermanent, since aid could be used for buying new supplies that are all eventually finite and needing to be replaced. However, training should lead to long-term increases in capacity and the types of operations that a government can carry out in order to increase security, so for the purposes of this paper it is assumed that security outcomes are more permanent than just the

increase that would come with new supplies. On the other hand, reforming judiciaries or other institutions involved in the other outcomes are likely to take longer to show any demonstrable results, given it involves having to train employees and professionals in legal skills, which should theoretically take longer than basic security training (as an imperfect but fairly illustrative example, law school in the US normally takes three years, while basic training for the US Army is 10 weeks). Therefore, there is expected to be a difference in the time frame through which these outcomes should be evaluated.

H1: Recipient countries of SSR aid and training saw significant positive changes in the overall respect for human rights within their countries.

H2: Recipient countries that received higher amounts of SSR aid and training saw larger short-term improvements in security outcomes than recipient countries that received lower amounts of SSR aid and training.

H3: Recipient countries that received higher amounts of SSR aid and training saw larger long-term improvements in justice and civil and political outcomes than recipient countries that received lower amounts of SSR aid and training.

While SSR theory is the main focus of the analysis, it is also important to realize that there may be other important factors determining how aid is assigned. As mentioned in the theory section, one of these is a country's security importance, which is particularly important given the goals of the War on Terror. The model and theory predict that a recipient country with a higher relative importance to the donor country will receive more aid; in the context of the War

on Terror, this is conceptualized as countries that were partners in the fight against terrorism. We would therefore expect, in this context, that partner countries saw greater improvements than non-partner countries as the US government would be more invested in their outcomes than in countries that were less important to the War on Terror.

H4: Recipient countries with higher levels of security importance to the donor country saw larger overall improvement in all three outcomes than recipient countries with lower levels of security importance to the donor country.

Finally, while SSR theory is an important idea within the US aid regime, it is part of a broader commitment to aid that generally seeks to give to the most needy countries. We would therefore expect that aid in general is given at higher rates to developing countries, who may have lower capacity for governance and would therefore benefit more from SSR training and aid, leading to a greater increase in outcomes than aid to countries with a higher capacity for governance.

H5: Developing recipient countries saw larger overall improvements in human rights outcomes than non-developing recipient countries.

Research Design

Scope Conditions:

This paper is a cross-sectional and cross-temporal analysis, and the unit of analysis is country-year. While initiatives may have been implemented at a sub-state or local level, the allocation of aid is done at a national level, which makes it ideal to measure outcomes at that same level. Reliable aid data from the US government and human rights data from various indexes and datasets both report at the country level, which further increases the feasibility of doing research at this scale using country level data, as opposed to a sub-national analysis where there may be varying amounts of data (also of varying quality) between countries. While it is possible, and in fact overwhelmingly likely, that there is variation within countries regarding the implementation of aid and human rights outcomes, doing a sub-national analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. For similar reasoning, the project is a year-by-year comparison, as it is unlikely that there would be any appreciable difference between shorter time intervals.

The time period under consideration is 2002-2012, the first decade after 9/11 is the main timespan of analysis. Because of how fiscal years (which is how the aid being used for this analysis is categorized) are measured, this time period begins in October 2001, only a couple weeks following 9/11. This decade was the height of the War on Terror, and marked a significant change in how aid was given out. While the period from 2012-2015 is not under consideration in terms of aid allotment, human rights outcomes from this three-year period will be analyzed in order to account for the lagged effects of aid disbursed in the early 2010s. There is expected to be a delay in results for many of the outcomes, and as such the last year of aid implementation is placed at 2012, which is based on a few considerations. Firstly, there is no clear end date for when the War on Terror ended; rather than being a war in the traditional sense, beginning with a

formal declaration from Congress and ending with a peace treaty, the War on Terror was more of a series of policies and foreign interventions. As such, the end date is flexible. 2011 marked a turning point in two significant respects: the US mostly completed its withdrawal of troops from Iraq in December 2011, and the Arab Spring movement kicked into high gear throughout the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, which resulted in several monumental changes, as some countries became more democratic, while others saw massive upticks in violence. There is some lag between when aid is allotted and when aid is disbursed, so placing the end year at 2012 should account for some of the lag.

Case Selection:

A total of 141 countries are included in the dataset. In order to be included, countries have to be member-states in the UN, and must have received disbursements from the US between 2002 and 2012, in the US Government Sectors of "Peace and Security" and "Democracy, Human Rights and Governance." States had to receive aid in both sectors due to the intersectional nature of the theories; furthermore, the majority of states that were excluded for receiving one but not the other are high income countries that received Peace and Security aid but not Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, suggesting that the purpose of the aid was not in order to promote better governance and rule of law but to serve more security and counter-terrorism oriented purposes. For this reason, those states were excluded. Finally, states that joined the OECD before 2012 are excluded, due to their presumably high levels of development and possible problems as they would be considered under this model both donor and recipient states. While it is certainly possible that some of the states in the sample also gave

aid, their lack of involvement with the OECD suggests that they were not major enough donors to be able to exert the same level of influence that an OECD country would.

Working Definitions:

It is necessary to provide working definitions for some of the key terms outlined in the research question, literature review and theories. Firstly, "effectiveness" in this case refers to how effectively the goals of US foreign aid were accomplished. The central goals for US foreign aid have varied over time, but in the context of the War on Terror, these are understood to be the defeat of global terrorism, as well as more general goals such as "strengthening the performance and accountability of government institutions, combating corruption, and addressing the causes and consequences of conflict" (Tarnoff and Nowels 2005, 12). In simple terms, the goals are to increase human rights and security. Due to the nature of US aid, which seeks to increase these outcomes for US citizens through improving the lives of foreign citizens. While the promotion of human rights are just one of the goals of foreign aid and foreign policy, they are a significant normative justification for aid. Therefore, "effectiveness" for the purposes of this paper can be understood to mean the effectiveness of aid in increasing security and human rights outcomes.

Secondly, "rule of law" is conceptualized using the US definition, as this paper is mostly concerned with measuring success of US programs. As such, the working definition for this paper is "a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards" (USAID 2023). As stated above, the definition for SSR will be the definition used by the US government, which is "'the set of policies, plans, programs, and

activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice'" (USAID 2021, 5).

Research Design:

I use a panel regression analysis in order to analyze how aid disbursements affected human rights outcomes over multiple years and countries. The analysis is between years, as studies using similar formers of analysis have pointed out that simply measuring the change between the start year and end year (in this case, 2002 and 2012) erases many of the changes that could happen during this time period and be overly sensitive to changes in the start and end years (Wright 2009, 553). Due to the fact that there was no random-assignment in the allocation of aid, a diff-in-diff is not used in the analysis. Beyond the primary regression models measuring the changes in the different types of human rights outcomes (three, one for each of the human rights categories), separate regressions are run in order to measure three different subgroups within the data.

For all of the analyses, I included control variables for GDP per capita, population size, dummy variables measuring whether a country was involved in a civil or interstate war, and its government type (measured using the Polity Score). These should help to account for some of the variation between countries that could affect the human rights outcomes: human rights outcomes tend to go down in countries that are experiencing conflict, larger states will likely receive larger amounts of aid, countries with higher levels of GDP are more likely to have higher human rights and state capacity to carry out reforms, and a state's existing government structure will be highly correlated and indicative of the existing state of human rights in that country (for

example, a dictatorship will score very poorly on a measure of the quality of elections irrespective of US aid if they aren't happening in the first place) (Findley 2018).

Data and Variables

Aid Data:

Data for the aid is taken from the U.S. Foreign Assistance website, which has datasets available. This paper specifically utilizes data from the *USG Sector Summary* report, which has both obligations and disbursements per USG sector for every year from 2001 onwards. For this paper, I will be using disbursements, as they reflect the money that went into each recipient country in a fiscal year, which measures October of the year prior through October of that year (for example, fiscal year 2023 spanned October 2022-September 2023). While money may be obligated in a certain year, that does not mean that it was distributed in that same year (USAID and State 2024).

This paper specifically focuses on one sector for the analysis: Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DHRG). The Peace and Security (PS) sector was also recorded, along with the total aid allotment to each country in a year; however, neither of these categories are used in the analysis. This is because DHRG aid most directly affects the outcomes of interest for this study. Furthermore, while reforms to the military and security institutions are integral components of security sector reform, they are likely to take a longer time frame to show up than DHRG aid. Therefore, DHRG aid is the only aid under full analysis in this paper, although PS aid is used as a point of comparison, and is included as a component of the case selection in order to ensure that all of these countries received both aspects of SSR aid, and not just one or the other.

Human Rights Data:

This paper employs two different human rights datasets in order to run the analysis. The first dataset used is the V-13 version of the Varieties of Democracy Dataset (VDEM), which was

released in March 2023. This dataset comes from the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg, and has several hundred compiled measures of human rights and governance coded by a series of experts (Terrell et al 2022). The second dataset used is the most recent version of the CIRIGHTS, which is created by Political Scientists and draws most of its data from US State Department Human Rights reports (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay 2014; Mark, Cingranelli, Filippov and Richards 2023). It is important to note that the scores do not measure exactly the same things. The scope of rights measured in the VDEM dataset is greater than the CIRIGHTS dataset, and their conceptions of the their common measures (which are gone into more detail in Appendix I) vary, meaning some of the variations also come from different elements being present in some analyses and not in others. However, the concepts being measured in this paper are broad, and are intentionally defined that way by the US government and many of the practitioners who carry out aid. Given the subjective nature of human rights measures, having two different sets of scores that use different measurement strategies should hopefully provide a more multiperspective look at the data, and somewhat account for any (intentional or unintentional) bias that may have arisen in the creation of both datasets.

Time Frames of the Analysis:

Three different time frames and conceptualizations of the aid data are considered which measure the changes in human rights between years. Changes in human rights scores are being considered in order to try to account for the effect of aid itself over time. The first measure takes the difference between the current year and the past year, which should help to determine the immediate impact of aid in the year that it is given out. If a score is positive, then it signals an improvement of the human rights in question, and if negative, a worsening of those human

rights. This will help to establish the change from year to year in human rights, which should be a more useful metric in determining how aid actually impacts human rights from year to year. The second change measure looks at the impact of aid from a year prior; this is important to measure because there is plenty of evidence in the literature, and it is an important component of the theory and hypotheses, that aid may take time to show significant effects on human rights outcomes. For the purposes of this paper, this can be conceptualized as a short-term impact of aid. The final change measure looks at the impact of aid from three years prior; the logic behind the measure is the same as the one-year impact, but just on a longer time frame. This measure will be used to conceptualize a long-term impact of aid.

Aid Level:

One of the main contentions in the hypotheses is that there is a difference in the human rights outcomes of countries that received higher amounts of aid versus countries who received lower amounts. A dichotomous variable was created coding whether or not the amount of DHRG aid a country received per citizen was above or below the median amount between 2002 and 2012; based on the distribution of the data, this number was set at 0.1920646 (meaning that the median country received just over $0.19 per citizen in DHRG aid in a given year).

Between the two sets of countries, there are several key disparities that exist. Firstly, in terms of aid received between 2002 and 2012, lower-receiving countries on average received $143.75M per year in total aid, $325,553 of which went towards DHRG aid, while higher-receiving countries got $290M in all, $25.8M of which went towards DHRG aid. However, it should be noted that the amount received in PS aid was much, much closer to being even – $110M per year for lower-receiving countries and $150M per year for higher-receiving

countries. The GDP of lower-receiving countries during the decade of analysis was more than 2.5x larger than higher-receiving countries, which together suggests that lower-receiving countries in the dataset tended to be wealthier countries receiving aid with a more explicit focus on security rather than rights. It is also worth noting that on the Polity scale, which measures the spectrum of regime authority on a scale of -10 to 10, higher-receiving countries were on average more than a point higher than lower-receiving countries, meaning that higher-receiving countries were more democratic than lower-receiving countries. Finally, looking at the number of terror attacks in each country, there were on average 5 more attacks in higher-receiving countries per year than in lower receiving-countries.

Partner Countries:

The measure of War on Terror partner attempts to capture whether a country was a major partner of the US government during this period, cooperating on security and counterterrorism operations. The vast majority of countries cooperated with the US to some extent, although the level of cooperation varied significantly (Tankel 2018). There is no one set list or measure that could be used to classify states; furthermore, the member countries of certain agreements are not publicly available. For example, while the member states of the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership are known, the full list of countries that participated each year in the ATA is not public, with certain countries out of the total number (which is made public) are highlighted in State Department materials (State 2019).

For the purpose of this paper, a country is classified as being a War on Terror partner if they have been a part of a regional counterterrorism partnership founded during this era– the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East

Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) – or if they are known to have partnered with the US in a major way based on existing research and public documents. It is also assumed that countries that are part of a partnership were partners during this entire time period; while the partnerships began at different points during the WOT (the TSCTP officially began in 2005, although it was based on a partnership that began years prior, and PREACT was officially started in 2009), it is extremely unlikely that a country would have joined one of these partnerships had they not already had an existing security relationship with the US. For example, Kenya had a long standing security relationship with the US stretching back to al-Qaeda's 1998 bombing of the American embassy in Nairobi (Aronson 2011), and Jordan has been an American security partner for decades (Lang, Wechsler and Awadallah, 2017). It is also impossible to know when exactly a country began partnering with the US following the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, this paper is more interested in the implications of being involved with the US on an official level vs. not having been officially a partner at some point during the War on Terror. Therefore, all of these countries are coded as being partners for all of the years in question.

The countries that are coded as war on terror partners are: Algeria, Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, India, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger, Pakistan, the Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

Before 9/11, there was already a disparity between partner and non-partner countries in the amount of aid received. In 2001, partner countries received an average of $319M per year in total, with $48M of that going towards DHRG aid. In contrast, non-partner countries received just $54M per year, with $6.8M going towards DHRG. As with the higher-receiving countries, a

massive amount was devoted towards PS & DHRG aid. The US had existing security partnerships with many of the countries on the list, such as Israel, so it is not surprising that such a high level was already devoted to these countries before the War on Terror began. However, the disparity jumps during the War on Terror decade: while in 2001 total aid to partner countries was 5.9x greater than total aid to non-partner countries, during the War on Terror total aid to partner countries was 9.8x bigger. The difference in DHRG remained more or less the same, as in both time frames partner countries received roughly 8x the amount of DHRG aid as non-partner countries, but the disparity in PS aid skyrocketed between 2001 and 2002-2012. Beyond the differences in aid, the average GDP scores of non-partner countries was slightly higher than partner-countries, although there was greater variation among partner countries. The Polity scores in non-partner countries, however, were already on average 3 points higher than partner countries in 2001, a difference that shrunk slightly during the War on Terror.

Terror attacks were also far more likely to happen in partner-countries than in non-partner countries: while the average non-partner country experienced an average of 4.9 terror attacks per year, partner countries had 70.1 attacks per year, signaling a significant difference in the prevalence of terrorism between the two categories during the War on Terror (while this divide in the likelihood of terror attacks was still true in the 1990s through 2001, partner countries on average experienced far less attacks than during the War on Terror, while partner countries experienced roughly the same). Breaking it down further, the prevalence of attacks carried out by groups designated as terrorist organizations by the State Department was far greater in partner-countries than in non-partner countries: while non-partner countries experienced 0.44 terror attacks per year by one of these groups, 11 of the attacks in partner-countries were carried out or suspected to be carried out by a designated terror group. This suggests that terrorism was

not only higher in partner-countries, but that the prevalence of terrorism from groups on the radar of the US government was higher than in non-partner countries.

Developing Countries:

Finally, there is evidence within the literature that the stage of a country's development may have significant impacts on both the type of aid it is likely to receive, and its human rights in general. In order to determine if there was a significant difference between these countries, a dichomotous variable was created that designated a country as either non-developing or developing.

As may be expected, there was a stark difference between the aid that each set of countries received during this time. Between 2002 and 2012, developing countries received an average of $330M per year in total aid, $30M of which was devoted to DHRG aid. Non-developing countries received $180M in total, $8M of which was devoted to DHRG. It should be noted that the average amount of PS aid given to non-developing countries was only about $30M less than going to developing countries, despite the much higher total amount going to developing countries. This seems to suggest that one of the main drivers behind aid to non-developing countries was security. Interestingly, in 2001 non-developing countries received higher total aid and higher DHRG aid than developing countries ($171M versus $99.5M, $3.79M versus $885,000 respectively). This is likely due to the pre-9/11 Bush administration's reluctance towards the use of foreign aid, as well as the fact that this is a single year being measured. However, it does provide an important look at how much the aid regime changed following 9/11, and the extent to which aid allotment exploded.

In line with expectations, the GDP of non-developing countries was more than 6x larger than developing countries, and the Polity score for non-developing countries was nearly 2 points higher than for developing countries in 2001. In terms of terror attacks, non-developing countries experienced on average 20 less attacks than developing countries, which may be reflective of the security capacity of developing countries.

Results

Overall Trends in Aid and Human Rights:

A basic analysis of the total aid disbursed supports the overall findings of the literature that aid dramatically jumped as a result of 9/11. In 2001, the average amount of total aid disbursed to the dataset countries was about $123M, with around $17.7M going to DHRG aid and $68.5M going towards PS & DHRG aid overall. While data on aid disbursement before 2001 is not publicly available, an analysis of the total obligations between 1992 and 2000 reveals that the amount of aid disbursed in 2001 was nearly identical to the average amount disbursed during the previous decade, which supports the idea that the aid regime did not substantially change immediately before 9/11. Between 2002 and 2012, however, the average total aid amount more than doubled to $260 million, with $142 going to PS & DHRG aid (although DHRG aid only increased slightly to $20.4M per year).

Between 1992 and 2012, results from the two datasets show that respect for human rights across the board largely stayed the same. Comparing the averaged human rights scores from 1992/1993, 2002 and 2012, there was very little variation in the scores over the decades. The V-Dem indexes show very slight increases (the increases averaged out at a 0.3586 point increase, equating to a roughly 6.4% increase over two decades) while the CIRIGHTS indexes show either stagnation or slight decrease (security rights remained constant, civil and political rights rose by 0.5 points in 2002 but reverted back to the original score in 2012, and justice rights dropped by a point in 2002 and stayed there in 2012). Together, these two indicate that over the two decades in question, there were not worldwide dramatic increases or decreases in the state of human rights; however, this does not mean that there was not wide variation between countries.

Analysis Results

Figure 1: Changes in Security Rights Scores - VDEM



Figure 2: Changes in Security Rights Scores - CIRIGHTS



Figure 3: Changes in Justice Rights Scores - VDEM



Figure 4: Changes in Justice Rights Scores - CIRIGHTS



Figure 5: Changes in Public Civil and Political Rights - VDEM



Figure 6: Changes in Private Civil and Political Rights - VDEM



Figure 7: Changes in Civil and Political Rights Scores - CIRIGHTS



Figure 8: Changes in Lower-Receiving Rights Scores - VDEM



Figure 9: Changes in Lower-Receiving Rights Scores - CIRIGHTS



The graphs, which are coefficient plot graphs, show the effect on the change of human rights scores as the result of each additional dollar per capita of DHRG aid that a recipient country received per year. The dot for each measure represents the coefficient of the regression, with the axis at the bottom of each graph showing the scale of the coefficients, while the lines on either side are the confidence intervals. A finding is significant if neither of the ends of the confidence interval cross the dashed line in the center of each of the columns.

When comparing results between the two datasets, it is important to keep in mind that the two work on different scales: the V-Dem indexes are on a continuous scale of 0-10, where it is possible to make changes between decimal points, while the CIRIGHTS indexes are on scales of either 0-8 (security and justice) or 0-6, where a score must be a whole number. Therefore, it is not surprising that the coefficients for the CIRIGHTS indexes are higher, given that any changes between years in the CIRIGHTS scores are almost certain to be higher than any changes between years in the V-Dem scores.

The coefficients of the effects for lower-receiving countries were much, much larger than any other measure. This is likely due to the extremely small amount of aid per capita that was given to lower-receiving countries, as the median amount used as the cutoff between the two groups was $0.194683 per person. Given the fact that the model is showing the results for each additional dollar, an amount nearly 5x bigger than the absolute maximum that one of these countries could receive, the effects were much, much bigger than any of the other groups, and skewed the graphs to an extent making it impossible to see any of the other results. In order to solve this, these results were put into different graphs.

H1: Recipient countries of SSR aid and training saw significant positive changes in the overall respect for human rights within their countries.

Evaluating this hypothesis requires addressing its two components: whether or not aid had a significant effect at all, and whether or not that effect was positive. The vast majority of all models did not yield significant results, suggesting that DHRG aid did not have a significant effect on respect for human rights. Of the few cases where it was significant, the effect was far more likely to be negative than positive; out of 17 total significant findings from the models that measured changes between years as the result of aid, only 3 had a positive slope.

While there were certain differences among the various subgroups, this hypothesis deals with the full set of data, which overall had only one significant result with a negative coefficient. Based on these findings, there is evidence that directly contradicts both parts of the hypothesis, suggesting that overall, recipient countries of DHRG aid did not see significant positive impacts on respect for human rights.

H2: Recipient countries that received higher amounts of SSR aid and training saw larger short-term improvements in security outcomes than recipient countries that received lower amounts of SSR aid and training.

H3: Recipient countries that received higher amounts of SSR aid and training saw larger long-term improvements in justice and civil and political outcomes than recipient countries that received lower amounts of SSR aid and training.

An examination of aid's effects between higher- and lower-receiving countries reveals that there was very little significant difference. While some measures came close, there were no significant results in higher-receiving countries, across any time frame or between either index. Between the two datasets, outcomes measured by the VDEM dataset had coefficients that tended to be around zero, while the CIRIGHTS outcomes tended to have a greater magnitude, especially in the CIRIGHTS civil and political index (Figure 7), although none reached the level of significance. For lower-receiving countries, there were significant results measured by the VDEM indexes, specifically those measuring the impact of aid on security rights and public civil and political rights in the current year. Because the magnitude of these scores are so much bigger, these results indicate that there would be a rather large immediate increase in respect for these two rights as the result of aid, but those gains decrease by the next year to statistically insignificant levels. These significant results for lower-receiving countries are also not present in the CIRIGHTS indexes, which had no significant results and some disagreement on the directionality of the outcomes.

Put together, these results do not indicate that there were significant differences between high-receiving and lower-receiving countries. While there were some measured improvements among lower-receiving countries, they were functionally erased in the years to come and did not appear in both datasets. It is also important to note that while the coefficients for the lower-recipient countries are much higher, when accounting for the amount of money that a lower-recipient country would have actually received, the size of the effect goes down considerably. Taken together, these results suggest that the relative amount of aid that a country received had very little bearing on respect for human rights.

H4: Recipient countries with higher levels of security importance to the donor country saw larger overall improvement in all three outcomes than recipient countries with lower levels of security importance to the donor country.

Between non-partner and partner countries, which is how this paper conceptualizes security importance, there are stark differences in the outcomes measured. Non-partner countries overall had no significant outcomes in any category, across either index or any time frame, although some scores came close to significance in the CIRIGHTS civil and political index (Figure 7). However, partner countries experienced high levels of significance – both security rights indexes showed negative results (across differing time intervals), and the CIRIGHTS justice index (Figure 4) showed significant negative short-term impacts (the long-term impact was close to significant, but with a smaller magnitude coefficient). All three civil and political indexes had significant results, although the two datasets showed the changes pointing in different directions. Both of the VDEM indexes (Figures 5 and 6) showed significant decreases in the respect for rights after one and three years, with the magnitude increasing from the first to the second. While the CIRIGHTS index (Figure 7) showed significant decreases in respect for civil and political rights as an immediate result of aid, the effect in the short-term and long-term moved in the positive direction, with the long-term effect having statistical significance.

These results suggest that DHRG aid had a far greater impact on human rights outcomes in partner countries than non-partner countries, which supports the hypothesis. However, the hypothesis predicts that partner countries saw larger overall improvements, which is not suggested by the findings. While there were some positive impacts as measured by the CIRIGHTS civil and political index, those findings are not in agreement with both of the VDEM measures, suggesting that there may be mixed results. Furthermore, all of the significant impacts

among partner countries were negative, and only one out of the statistically insignificant results was positive. This implies that partner countries experienced overall negative impacts as the result of aid, as opposed to the much less significant (or perhaps more overall mixed) results in non-partner countries. These findings indicate that while the hypothesis was correct in that there was a difference in outcomes depending on a recipient country's security importance, the directionality predicted by the hypothesis was wrong.

H5: Developing recipient countries saw larger overall improvements in human rights outcomes than non-developing recipient countries.

Finally, there are some significant differences between developing and non-developing countries, but not as many as between non-partner and partner countries. In non-developing countries, aid had a fairly small yet statistically significant negative impact on security rights in both the short- and long-term as measured by the CIRIGHTS index, although the VDEM security index (Figure 1) found no impact at any time frame; very small yet statistically significant positive impacts on justice rights after one year in the VDEM dataset and a nearly significant positive finding in the CIRI justice index (Figure 4) after three years; and a slightly negative significant impact on civil and political rights after one year as measured by the CIRIGHTS civil and political index, with no impact measured by either VDEM dataset. These results suggest that while there were some significant changes within non-developing countries, the majority had a very small coefficient and were not particularly dramatic. It is also worth noting that while the justice rights indexes showed some improvements, the coefficients were much smaller than those in the security rights index that showed decreases in a respect for rights.

For developing countries, there were no significant results in either security index or any of the civil and political indexes, although multiple of these were close to significant and had fairly high coefficients; all but one of these regressions was negative in slope. Developing countries did have one significant result in the justice rights index, showing negative short-term impacts as measured by the CIRIGHTS index, as well as a nearly significant long-term impact.

Put together, the results suggest similar trajectories as when dividing based on higher-receiving versus lower-receiving countries: the results were not very significant, although the confidence intervals were fairly large and there were a number of nearly significant results, and most impacts seemed to have a short-term effect that diluted over time. Although there are certainly more observable differences between the outcomes for developing and non-developing countries than between higher- and lower-receiving countries, these findings do not provide very strong support for the hypothesis. While the coefficients for developing countries tended to be more negative than non-developing countries across all of the categories, the lack of significant results suggests that there are not large differences between the two groups of countries.

Further Tests: Robustness Test One

The examination of the hypotheses indicates that aid was by far the most impactful on partner countries as opposed to any of the other subgroups. In order to try to understand why that may be, I performed two additional tests that look further into partner countries.

The first of these tests deals with the possible effect that the combination of security importance and level of development have on the efficacy of aid. One of the underlying assumptions and arguments made both within the literature and US government SSR reform materials is that developing countries in general have weaker institutions and state capacity than non-developing countries. It therefore may be the case that the significant results for partner

countries, which have a larger proportion of developing countries than non-partner countries, are being driven by development status and not partnership. Among the 36 partner countries, only seven were non-developing: Algeria, Colombia, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia. With the exception of Colombia, all of these countries are in the broader MENA region, where the central focus of the War on Terror was directed (Colombia, the literature suggests, has been a longtime partner with regards to counter narcotic operations, which became roped into the larger WOT framework under the Bush administration's doctrine (Milani 2021)). Given the difference in proportions of aid allotted to these countries compared to other partner countries, it is logical to think that these countries had different rationals governing the purposes for aid's distribution, and that there may be divergent outcomes between developing and non-developing partner countries.

It may be useful to first compare how aid was allocated depending on a country's status in either category. When looking at the total proportion of aid in a given year that was devoted to DHRG aid and PS and DHRG aid during the War on Terror decade, there are stark differences between the four categories. Of the four, developing partner countries had the lowest proportion of total aid devoted to DHRG, at just 5.63% of the total budget, while non-developing non-partner countries had the highest proportion, at 16.7%. Both non-developing partner countries and developing non-partner countries had roughly 11% of their budget devoted to DHRG. However, when looking at the total proportion devoted to PS and DHRG aid, a stark divide emerges between developing and non-developing countries. While both partner and non-partner developing countries had roughly a quarter of their total aid devoted to these two sectors (25.6% and 24.7%, respectively), for non-developing non-partner countries that more than doubled to 54%, and for non-developing partner countries, the proportion tripled to 75.5%.

These results, while falling in line with a general expectation that developing countries would receive higher levels of economic aid, also indicates something larger about why non-developing countries were given aid during this period.

An analysis of the differences between developing and non-developing partner countries (result charts can be found in Appendix II) finds very little difference between them, especially for security and justice scores. The vast majority of scores agreed with the directionality and general magnitude of the full partner score, although there was some variation in which subgroup had a greater magnitude coefficient. In general, results for non-developing partner countries were not significant due to massive confidence intervals, reflecting the fact that only seven countries were included in that group. However, the coefficient scores were largely the same as the full dataset and similar to their developing counterparts, with all of the differences in coefficients being within 0.2 units; for the VDEM justice index, the differences were all less than 0.01. Together, these results suggest that while there was some individual variation among partner countries, overall there were not significant differences between partner and non-partner countries, especially when looking at respect for security and justice rights.

Interestingly, there were greater differences between developing and non-developing countries for non-partner countries. Security outcomes showed greater differences over time and more variation in directionality between developing and non-developing non-partner countries, and civil and political outcomes showed basically no difference in the VDEM indexes and larger variation in magnitudes in the CIRIGHTS index. The differences were most pronounced for justice rights, where both indexes saw an increasing gap between developing and non-developing countries over time. Both indexes showed that non-developing non-partner countries had increasingly positive outcomes in terms of justice rights as the time after aid's distribution

increased, indicating that aid worked as a tool for increasing the respect of justice rights in those countries. On the other hand, both indexes showed respect for justice rights in developing non-partner countries decreasing, although the datasets somewhat disagree in terms of magnitude and directionality at the current year interval.

Put together, these results suggest that the outcomes for partner countries were more homogenous than the results for non-partner countries when separating based on development status. In terms of why these results ended up this way, partner countries had specific common traits that led them into security cooperation with the United States, suggesting a pre-existing level of similarity that cannot be assumed for non-partner countries. As a result, there is likely more pre-existing variation between non-partner countries that yielded greater differences in results; one of those differences is visible within the dataset, as non-partner countries were already more balanced between developing and non-developing countries than partner countries.

However, the differences presented in the level of variation seems to suggest that being a partner country was a rather influential factor when it comes to human rights outcomes. While there were pre-existing conditions that may have affected the outcomes, it is also true that the nature of American involvement changed following 9/11 and the start of the War on Terror, even for countries that had pre-existing security relationships with the US, which would explain why these countries experienced significant change during this time period.

Further Tests: Robustness Test Two

Because this paper is looking specifically at the War on Terror, and the ways that aid affected human rights, it would be irresponsible to ignore the two major conflicts that defined this era: the US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These two countries are the highest recipients of aid between 2002 and 2012, and there is good reason to think that the

implementation of this aid was significantly different from any other country in this dataset. While other countries may have received significant training, and American officials may have been close collaborators and highly influential, the US was responsible for the ousting of the two incumbent political systems ruling the countries – the Taliban in 2001 and Saddam Hussein's Baath Party in 2003 – and largely took responsibility for the reestablishment and rebuilding of Iraq and Afghanistan's governments. This is not the same thing as providing aid, and does not exactly fit within the model of the study, where the recipient government is an independent actor from the donor government (while new governments were established in both Iraq and Afghanistan, they were set up under the direct supervision and approval of the American government). In order to test whether or not these two countries did have significantly different results and how they may have affected the overall results, I removed them from the dataset for partner countries and re-ran the analysis, then compared the results between the Iraq and Afghanistan (IA) inclusive and exclusive results.

The results (available in Appendix II) suggest that Iraq and Afghanistan had a fairly significant effect on the results for partner countries, although there were very few cases where the directionality changed between the IA-inclusive and -exclusive results (the only three cases where there were directionality shifts were statistically insignificant, and had low coefficients to begin with). Rather, it seems that Iraq and Afghanistan amplified or (more often) dampened the magnitude of aid's effects when they were included, which varies between the two datasets fairly significantly. The VDEM dataset overall found far smaller differences between IA-inclusive and IA-exclusive outcomes than the CIRIGHTS dataset, and the two differed somewhat in the directionality of the changes. For security rights, the VDEM dataset found that the negative changes were higher in the IA-inclusive scores than the IA-exclusive scores, while the

CIRIGHTS security index found the opposite. The VDEM justice rights index found no significance for either of the scores over any time frame, while the CIRIGHTS justice index found much wider variation between the IA-inclusive and IA-exclusive scores, especially when looking between the immediate and short-term effect of aid where the directionality of the IA-exclusive scores changed in a significant way. Finally, the VDEM civil and political indexes both indicate that IA-inclusive scores were more positive than IA-exclusive scores, although whether the scores were negative or positive differed between the datasets.

This comparison seems to indicate that Iraq and Afghanistan were not unique in how the respect for rights changed over time as the result of aid: there were no widespread changes in directionality once the two countries were taken out, and in the majority of cases, the IA-inclusive and -exclusive scores had the same directionality in to begin with. However, the differences between the outcomes can be read as an indication of how respect for rights in Iraq and Afghanistan changed over time; while these results are not particularly conclusive, given the variations between the datasets, they seem to suggest that Iraq and Afghanistan had small improvements in all three scores compared to other partner countries, especially when looking at the impact of aid over longer-periods of time. There are some notable exceptions – the security results from the VDEM dataset indicate that Iraq and Afghanistan had worse outcomes than other partner countries, for example – but across the board these were the general trends. IA-exclusive scores also had lower rates of significance; while 10 out of the 21 regressions run for IA-inclusive partner countries yielded significant results, only 5 of the findings of IA-exclusive partner countries were significant (a fair amount of this may be a result of larger confidence intervals, which the majority of IA-exclusive scores had when compared to their IA-inclusive counterparts).

These results seem to support the idea that Iraq and Afghanistan saw more improvements over time than other partner countries, which makes sense when considering the history of what happened in those two countries between 2002 and 2012, and how the scores from the datasets were coded. The governments that the US established were democracies replacing non-democratic and repressive regimes; Afghanistan held its first presidential elections in 2004, with the pro-US candidate Hamid Kharzai winning (United Nations Security Council 2004), and despite Saddam Hussein holding rigged elections as late as 2002 and claiming 100% victories (Chandrasekaran 2002), Iraq also held its first major elections in 2005 with extensive US support (GAO 2005). This obviously marked major improvements in those specific human rights, which is reflected in the data; it is also true that both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein's regimes had appalling human rights records, so despite extensive criticisms of American actions in those countries regarding human rights (Amnesty International 2013; Human Rights Watch 2004), those likely would still be seen as improvements from the previous government.

Discussion

Broader Trends in Findings:

Within the broader dataset, there are some broader trends and findings that I would like to highlight. First and foremost, the vast majority of DHRG aid had no significant impact in either direction on respect for human rights in recipient countries. This fits within the larger findings of research about aid and its impacts, which has found very mixed results on whether aid is beneficial or detrimental towards human rights in countries that receive it. The fact that there are so few significant findings does not mean, however, that DHRG aid didn't have significant effects; it almost certainly means that there was wide variation in its effects between countries over the course of this decade in question, shaped by the local context of the places it was doled out. This contention is supported by the greater significant or near-significant findings of the subgroups as opposed to the overall data; of the 17 significant findings within the analysis, only one came from a model measuring the effects of aid on the full dataset. Even among partner countries, which had by far the highest rates of significant results out of any subset, there were only 10 significant findings out of 21 total tests, and when excluding those driven by Iraq and Afghanistan, that number shrinks to 5.

For the results that were significant, the coefficients tended to be very small, meaning that the changes themselves from year to year (or longer) were not very large. This is likely due to both the nature of the scores themselves, which depending on the dataset are aggregated between a panel of experts or subject to standards that may erase more incremental changes between years, and to the fact that changes in human rights are generally the result of wide, institutional changes, which intentionally or unintentionally may have a long implementation time. As such, we would not expect there to be large coefficients, but the fact that most

coefficients were less than 0.1 (excluding those from lower-receiving countries) on 10-point scales indicates that even significant results were fairly subtle.

One important trend that was observed was that the findings between the VDEM and CIRIGHTS datasets did not always agree with each other. There were multiple instances where the measured outcomes varied in terms of significance or directionality. This is almost certainly due to the differences in how each was put together, and how the human rights scores were created. This highlights the subjectivity when it comes to how human rights are measured, as there is not one perfect way to capture the current state of a country that is both objective and accurate. However, when the two datasets did agree, it provides stronger evidence for an effect being present, as it was captured through two different data collection methods.

Finally, while there were not particularly meaningful differences in the levels of significance between the different human rights categories, there were some fairly considerable differences in the differences between the measured time frames. Within the main dataset (not taking into account either robustness test), short-term impacts saw the most significant results at nine, followed by long-term impacts at six and finishing with four significant immediate impacts. This provides some support for the idea that aid takes a little bit of time to show results; it is unrealistic to expect that DHRG aid will show meaningful results in the week after it arrives. However, these results also support the idea that aid's gains are not long-lasting, as the overall rate of significance wanes over time, which goes against the contention of SSR theory that human rights are continuously improved in a self-reinforcing cycle.

Implications for SSR Theory:

The main theory this paper analyzes is SSR theory, specifically the factors that make it more or less effective. For this paper, I chose to focus on three broad factors affecting recipient countries – the level of aid a country received, its security importance, and whether or not the country was developing – as a way to begin to dig into this question. Looking at all three of the subgroups, many of the findings seem to contradict the model of improvements that aid would cause.

Firstly, the data shows no convincing evidence that the relative level of aid makes a significant impact on the changes in respect for human rights in recipient countries. This is surprising given the sheer difference in the average amount of aid given to each group – higher-receiving countries on average got 78.5x more aid per person than lower-receiving countries. However, this finding aligns with several criticisms of aid within the literature, namely the argument that throwing money at a problem is not equivalent to implementing positive solutions. If the money is not applied in productive ways, then it doesn't much matter what the amount is. This conflicts with the model put forward by SSR theory, and shows that the amount of money devoted to a problem cannot be read as a predictor of its future success in solving it. The model does not argue simply that more money leads to greater improvements in human rights; however, it does predict that the more resources are devoted to improving security and human rights, the greater the capacity of the state becomes, which should then lead to greater long-term improvements. In this area, the findings of this paper do not provide evidence supporting this area of the theory.

Secondly, the data shows that aid was far more impactful in countries of high security importance to the US versus those with lower security importance. While this greater impact fits

within the theory, due to the extra aid and attention devoted to partner countries, the on-balance negative effects of DHRG aid goes against the general thesis of SSR theory. These results may be explained by a couple of factors. Firstly, as already established, more aid does not mean an automatic improvement in human rights. Secondly, partner countries were already less democratic and had less respect for civil and political rights than non-partner countries in 2001. Much of the literature suggests that the existing conditions of a country greatly impact what kind of effect aid has, and that aid generally works to support existing power structures. This supports the contention that as the US began pumping money into partner countries, the existing systems would only double down on the practices they had already established. This is compounded by the US's security priorities, which seems to have outweighed any desire for true democracy promotion: if an existing government was willing to cooperate with the US on counterterrorism, and those conditions and cooperation may change if a new government was to be installed, why risk rocking the boat? This explanation is further supported by the lack of difference in outcomes when dividing between non-developing and developing partner countries, particularly when compared to the difference that existed between non-partner countries. The War on Terror seems to have shaped how DHRG aid was doled out, leading to more homogenous results among partner countries than non-partner countries.

However, the US presence and increased attention may have also prevented certain countries from using the influx of aid to crackdown even further. US operations within partner countries may have created unofficial means of oversight and monitoring of partner countries, reigning in the potential abuses of power that could have been carried out. It is also true that counterterrorism trainings run during this era highlighted methods that emphasized a respect for human rights, which could have also had an effect on the personnel that received it. While these

trainings may not have reshaped the recipient state's overall strategy or doctrine regarding human rights respect, this does not mean that they were completely discounted.

For non-partner countries, the lack of significant human rights impacts as a result of DHRG aid may be attributable to many of the same factors that explain the impact on partner countries. Firstly, while aid is not a cure-all, it can't be discounted as an impactful force. Non-partner countries simply received far less DHRG aid than partner countries, which at a certain level means that there was less funding for trainings and increased capacity-building, although it may have had a positive effect in that it decreased the amount of aid that powerful actors within the recipient country could fight over. It is also true that non-partner countries were more democratic in the first place, which may have affected the levels of improvements in respect for rights that could be made, especially when it comes to civil and political rights where they had higher scores at the start of the War on Terror. Because one of the main considerations for how aid is allocated are the perceived needs of each country, then states that already have an "acceptable" level of respect for human rights or capacity may not be seen as a priority by American lawmakers, especially if they are not perceived as being important to American security strategy. Put together, the divergent results of non-partner countries from partner countries in some ways support SSR theory, demonstrating that relative security importance is an important factor at the allocation stage, but reiterates the idea that higher allocation does not equate to higher outcomes.

Finally, the results show that while there were more differences between the outcomes for developing and non-developing countries than for the different aid levels, there were not wildly different outcomes depending on the level of development. In some respects, this finding falls in line with the broader conclusion that money is not indicative of results, given the difference in

the amount of aid that was doled out in total based on development level. The findings also provide some insight into one of SSR's major assumptions, that increasing state capacity would increase good governance and a respect for human rights. If this was to be true, then there should be a starker difference between developing and non-developing countries, especially considering that non-developing countries were already more democratic than developing countries (leaving perhaps less room for improvement). However, the lack of significant development in the respect for rights in developing countries, especially compared to the more significant changes for non-developing countries, suggests that these theorized improvements did not materialize during this decade as SSR theory would predict, meaning either that state capacity did not increase as a result of SSR aid and or that increased state capacity has a very little impact on rights. Although the second explanation is certainly possible, this paper is measuring only a decade's worth of aid effects, which lends more support to the idea that state capacity simply did not improve to a degree which affected human rights outcomes within the decade.

It is also worth briefly mentioning trends in total terror attacks over the course of the WOT decade, given SSR's focus on not only improving human rights, but doing so through an increased government capacity to fight crime and terrorism, which should lead to increased trust and buy-in from the recipient country's population. Between 2001 and 2012, the average number of terror attacks per country rose from 9.34 to 47.4. Among developing countries, the increase was from 8.34 to 13.15, and in partner countries, that number increased from 25.96 to 159.19. When the time frame is expanded to 2015, there are even further spikes – 81.94 terror attacks per year in all recipient countries, 128.96 in developing countries, and 249.11 in partner countries. While this is likely a result of the rise of jihadist groups like ISIL in the mid-2010s, it does speak to how SSR reform during this time period did not result in permanent increases in government

capability to fight terrorist groups. The fact that the amount of terror attacks increased during the War on Terror suggests that US actions abroad and the greater global focus on fighting terrorist groups may have had an inflammatory effect. This contention is supported by the fact that terrorist incidents were on average decreasing throughout the 1990s, down from 23.38 in 1992 to averages below 10 a year by the late 1990s and early 2000s. The increase in terror attacks started in 2005, and continued to increase throughout the rest of the 2000s and early 2010s (see Appendix III for a graph of terror attacks over time).

The steep rise in terror attacks after the amount of aid distributed increased dramatically seems to counter a key contention of SSR theory, that as countries become better at fighting terrorists, human rights improve due to better safety enforcement from the government and a greater level of trust. These results seem to imply that the opposite happened, and that more aid led to greater unhappiness with the government and a greater level of reaction. This suggests that aid for SSR did little to build trust among the citizens of a country, and instead may have actively inflamed tensions that led to further radicalization and violence, leading to further government crackdowns and abuses. This may be one of the key reasons that human rights during this decade did not improve. These results are not only important given the implications for the model and theory, but for measuring the War on Terror at large and considering the applicability of findings from this period to other situations and contexts.

What this data does show is that the factors that made aid more impactful had to do with the overall level of involvement of the US, especially as it pertains to the War on Terror. While the most direct evidence of this are the findings relating to Iraq and Afghanistan in the second robustness test, there are other considerations regarding SSR theory that may help to explain this trend, particularly in the assumptions that the theory makes.

One of the often unspoken rationales behind SSR aid, particularly in materials published by the US government, is that the interests of the donor country and recipient government are aligned with each other; however, this is not always the case. One useful example of this dynamic can be seen in how SSR aid was distributed in Mali throughout the 2000s. The Malian government had long been a major recipient of aid from not only the US, but from the world at large. This has been linked to their establishment of multi-party democracy following a coup that overthrew a military dictatorship in 1991, making them the poster-child for democratization in West Africa (Tankel 2018, 240). Mali is situated in the Sahel, the region of West Africa just below the Sahara desert, with a territory roughly the size of California and Texas combined. The government had long struggled to govern the sparsely inhabited north of the country, which is underdeveloped, and shares weak borders with countries like Algeria where jihadist groups already had a presence. When the War on Terror started, US officials became concerned that this area would become a safe haven for on-the-run jihadists, much as Afghanistan had in the 1990s (Pringle 2006; Tankel 2018).

The US began training the Malian military for counterterrorism operations in the early 2000s, but it became clear that each party had very different conceptions of who the major security threat was. While the US was concerned about jihadist groups gaining a foothold, the Malian government was indifferent to those concerns and instead was concentrated on the threat posed by the Tuareg, an ethnic group in northern Mali that has had a long and contentious relationship with the central government (Lecocq and Klute 2013). The training provided by the US government was limited and inconsistent, and failed to address capacity for anything besides counterrorism, while doing nothing to address systemic corruption within the Malian military and Mali's government more broadly (Tankel 2018). Consequently, the time and aid invested in

these trainings yielded very few improvements in the security capacity of Mali's military, which only became more apparent when jihadist groups did increase their presence and control in northern Mali in the early 2010s. The military's inability to combat these groups' increased operations and growth in the country resulted in a coup in 2012 that only made the situation worse (Baldaro and Diall 2020; Lecocq and Klute 2013; Tankel 2018). The difference in priorities between the US and Mali largely doomed the trainings from the start, as both had very different conceptions of what this increased capacity and trainings were to be used for. This misalignment is one aspect of real-life application that SSR theory doesn't really account for, highlighting a major flaw in its assumptions and something that definitely needs to be taken into account if SSR theory is to be applied in the future.

An additional unspoken assumption that is not necessarily rooted in reality is that the main interests of the US government and the recipient country are conducive to human rights, when in reality there is substantial evidence proving that security concerns take precedence over respect for human rights. Beyond the infamous examples from the War on Terror such as the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib in Iraq, other examples are less overt but nonetheless show a concerning pattern. Returning briefly to Mali, it has been observed that US officials had little genuine interest in increasing human rights or governance within the country, instead continuing to funnel money into a government which is notoriously corrupt. The political ruling class in Mali – known as *la classe politique* – showed little interest in actually increasing governmental capacity or decreasing Mali's reliance on foreign aid, but had become de facto allies of the US government against the church and military (Wing 2023, 81).

Jordan provides another illustrative example of how security concerns overrode the desire to improve human rights, particularly in the period leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Jordan has had to balance a number of security crises throughout the decades, and while there has never been a formal security agreement the US has long been an ally and has provided a tremendous amount of aid (Congressional Research Service 2016). In 2000, King Abdullah, who had taken the throne the year before following the death of his father, was facing a number of domestic crises: the economy was (as it had been from the country's establishment) heavily dependent on aid and growth was stagnant, and the second Intifada led to mass demonstrations within the country in support of Palestinians and inflamed existing angers over Jordan's normalization of relations with Israel in 1994 (Greenwood 2003; Hinnebusch and Quilliam 2006; Warrick 2016). After 9/11, King Abdullah saw an opportunity to increase the inflow of US aid in order to help with debt relief costs, and publicly positioned his kingdom as a willing and competent ally to the US in order to court further American favor (Greenwood 2003).

The government also simultaneously announced an economic and civil revitalization plan called "Jordan First," along with some reforms giving women more political rights, in October 2001. This move was not only designed to encourage Jordanians to become more involved in domestic politics and to work to improve their country, but to ensure that the focus of domestic politics and the 2003 parliamentary elections was on this plan, and not on the impending US invasion (Greenwood 2003, 101). While the government publicly denounced American involvement in the region following 9/11, a move all the more necessary given Jordanian's high levels of disapproval towards a US presence in the region and the war in Iraq more generally (Braizat 2006; Hinnebusch and Quilliam 2006), behind the scenes they were working closely with the US government on counterterrorism and the logistics behind the invasion of Iraq, even allowing American forces to be secretly stationed in Jordan prior to the attack (Hinnebusch and Quilliam 2006, 519). It was absolutely essential for Jordan's economic future and the stability of

the regime that the country continued to receive American support, and as a result the Jordanian government cracked down hard on dissidence and press criticism immediately before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Greenwood 2003, 92; Hinnebusch and Quilliam 2006, 520). In this case, increasing US support was more important than preserving the commitment to democracy promised by their new king, and the US did nothing to stop it because it directly aided their security interests. Jordan is one of the many cases where security concerns were placed above human rights.

Conclusions

The findings presented in this paper ultimately show that DHRG aid during the War on Terror had very little impact on the human rights outcomes of the countries that received it, and the effects that were significant were overall negative. These findings are not particularly encouraging, from both a normative and monetary perspective – we spent a lot of taxpayer money on largely ineffective and sometimes detrimental aid during the War on Terror. The results also show that taking a more universal approach to an analysis of something as contextual as aid is not likely to yield overall significant results, as well as demonstrating that there are virtually no universal factors that affect what impact aid will make in a recipient country. This finding should be applied with respect to how aid is allocated going forwards, as creating a one-size-fits-all approach will not yield effective results. SSR theory overall posits that aid is an effective tool for increasing security, governance, and respect for human rights. While the findings of this paper do not disprove this contention, they do demonstrate that this principle cannot be assumed to be universally valid and applicable in every case.

These conclusions, and the findings of this paper more generally, must be presented with some caveats. Firstly, this data yielded for the most part insignificant results. While it is entirely possible that the majority of aid did not have a significant effect on human rights in the countries that received it during the War on Terror, there may be other reasons to help explain that lack of significant results. Firstly, this analysis was restricted to 2002-2012, which is only a 10 year time period. While this was to measure the changes over a specific decade when there is evidence of a change in the US aid strategy, that short of a time span makes it difficult to find strong evidence of larger trends; if the analysis were run for another decade or two, there may be more significant results.

Secondly, the aid data being used here measures a very specific amount of money that flowed into a country in a given year; it certainly does not represent all of the money that came in. Other actors were also giving money during this time period, with their own specific visions for what that aid should be used for. At times, this almost certainly clashed with the American vision for what rule of law and security should look like, forcing countries to try to appease all of their donors and in the process likely diverging from the US ideal. It is also true that there are other factors within countries that affect human rights that are not at all related to aid. Therefore, the significance of results found in this analysis should be read as one part of a larger picture of the things that affect human rights.

Furthermore, this study uses the amount of aid that flows into a country as the independent variable; it does not account for differences in how aid was implemented within these countries. It is entirely possible and almost certainly the case that the variations in outcomes were not just the result of the amount of money allotted to each country, but to how that aid was implemented on the ground. Analyzing that is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is important to note that equal quality of implementation should not be assumed across all recipient countries.

Finally, measuring the human rights of a country in a perfectly scientific and unbiased way is not possible, because human rights are heavily influenced by context and knowing the full scope of what is going on in a country would not be possible, even for the governments who are in charge. These scores reflect the opinions of the experts who monitor these countries, and while there are certainly ways that these databases make their measurements more standardized (such as having numerical thresholds for certain actions or practices), they are at the end of the day affected by the opinions of the people who put them together. These indexes also capture a very

small subset of everything that their category entails, and cannot be read as definitive in measuring how well the human rights in a certain country are respected. This may also help to explain why there were so many divergent findings between the two datasets, as they were put together by a different team of researchers using different methods. While this can cause a lot of headache, it also demonstrates the necessity of looking at multiple resources when seeking to measure something as subjective as human rights.

While there are limitations to this data, it still provides overall evidence regarding the effect of aid at a macro-level during this time period. The lack of widespread significant findings does not mean that this topic is not worth exploring, especially given the continued role that aid plays as a tool for US foreign policy and as a global force for shaping the lives of billions of people around the world. Case studies and process tracing for individual countries may be a useful next step in order to understand the mechanisms of aid distribution and its interactions with domestic actors who have differing preferences. Doing so may uncover patterns in how aid functioned on a smaller scale, which would likely be much more indicative of the success of aid rather than a large-scale analysis. Another point for further research could be the exploration of aid obligations rather than aid disbursements. While this paper chose to work with aid disbursements, aid obligations would be a more useful unit for assessing the intentions behind aid, and if there were factors or changes over time that affected how those decisions were made. It may also be worthwhile to dig more deeply into the different subcategories of DHRG aid that were given out, as well as looking more broadly at the effects of all the different aid sectors. Finally, extensions of this study could do further analysis of the period after the “official” War on Terror to examine the long-term impacts of aid during the 2010s and 2020s.

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Appendix I: Coding Rules

Aid Categories:

Within Peace and Security (P&S), the categories are: Counter-Terrorism; Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction; Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform; Counter-Narcotics; Transnational Crime; Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation; and Peace and Security - General. Within Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DHRG), the categories are: Rule of Law and Human Rights; Good Governance; Political Competition and Consensus-Building; Civil Society; and Democracy, Human Rights and Governance - General.

Aid Coding:

V-Dem indexes in the dataset followed the basic pattern *hrindex_NAME_v2OPT*, where the name was the short code for the human rights category, while the option at the end was used to differentiate between public and private rights in the civil and political measures. CIRIGHTS measures were coded as *cirisum_NAME*. The change scores were created as separate variables, and are denoted by attached endings that denote the type of change being measured. "_d" meant the current-year impact, "_ld1" meant the one-year impact, and "_ld3" meant the three-year impact.

Security Rights:

In order to analyze "security rights," which examines physical integrity rights, two human rights scores were used to create indexes. The first is an average of various scores from the V-Dem dataset: *v2caviol*, which measures the level of political violence; *v2clkill*, which measures freedom from political killings specifically; and *v2cltort*, which measures freedom from torture. In the dataset, this aggregate score is denoted as *hrindex_sec_v2*. This measure runs on a scale of 0-10, with 5 being the middle. It is important to note that these scores are drawn

from the V-Dem dataset, which converts the raw scores to a standard distribution-like scale, although the V-Dem codebook notes that it does not follow standard distribution. In the dataset, this variable is named *hrindex_sec_v2*.

The second is a pre-made score in the CIRIGHTS dataset, called *ciri_physint*, which combines: *ciri_disap*, which measures the occurrences of disappearance that are likely perpetrated by the state for political reasons; *ciri_kill*, which measures extrajudicial killings by the state; *ciri_polpris*, which measures political imprisonment; and *ciri_tort*, which measure torture by the government. This measure is a sum of all the individual scores, which are all measured by ordinal numbers between 0 and 2, and so the scale of this measure is 0-8. It is important to note that scores have to be whole numbers.

There are slight differences between the datasets that may result in some differentiations in results. While both are concerned with the frequency of usage of these practices by government authorities, only the CIRIGHTS measures disappearances and political imprisonment, and only the V-Dem data has the level of political violence, as opposed to torture and political killings by state authorities which are measured by both datasets.

Justice Rights:

For "justice rights," which looks at equal and fair treatment from the justice system, I again derived two indexes, one from each of the datasets. The first, from the V-Dem dataset, combines two scores: *v2cltrnslw*, which measures the transparency of laws and the predictability of enforcement; and *v2xcl_acjst*, which measures access to the judiciary (it is important to note that this score has been doubled, as it is an average of two scores that measure access to the judiciary by gender). As with the V-Dem security index, this index runs on a 0-10 scale, and is

drawn from scores that had been converted to the V-Dem measurement model. In the dataset, this variable is named *hrindex_just_v2*.

The second index is the sum of different CIRIGHTS measures: *ciri_injud*, which measures the independence of the judiciary; *ciri_trial_l*, which measures the extent a person's legal rights in the criminal justice system are protected under the national laws or constitution; and *ciri_trial_p*, which measures the extent to which these rights are protected in practice. This score is the sum of these three scores, with a total range of ordinal numbers between 0-8 (each of the *ciri_trial* scores run from 0-3, while *ciri_injud* runs from 0-2). In the dataset, this variable is named *cirisum_just*.

There is more variation between what is measured in these two scores. The V-Dem index deals more with the legal and justice system as a whole and the access that citizens have; the CIRIGHTS data is more concerned with the judiciary and the rights afforded to people going through a trial specifically. This may lead to some disagreements between the data, as they measure the same subset of human rights from slightly different angles that may vary from country to country.

Civil and Political Rights:

The final human rights category addresses "civil and political rights," which addresses the rights afforded to citizens by the state and their ability to participate in the political process. Three different indexes were created, two using V-Dem data and one using CIRIGHTS data. The two V-Dem indexes were split into "public" and "private" rights. Firstly, the public rights index is the *v2x_clpol* index multiplied by 10, in order to create a range from 0-10 instead of 0-1. The index is an averaged score of: *v2mecenefm*, which measures government censorship of media; *v2meharjrn*, which measures harassment of journalists; *v2meslfcn*, which measures media

self-censorship; *v2cldiscm* and *v2cldiscw*, which measure freedom of discussion for men and women respectively; *v2clacfree*, which measures freedom of academic and cultural expression; *v2psparban* and *v2psbars*, which measures bans and barriers to parties; *v2psoppaut*, which measures opposition party autonomy; and *v2csecorgs* and *v2csreprss*, which measures the freedoms of CSOs. These are officially called "political rights" within the V-Dem dataset; for the purposes of this paper, I am more broadly terming them as "public" rights, as in the civil and political rights that citizens exercise while undertaking actions in public.

The second V-Dem index is the "private" rights index, which again is an adaptation of an existing V-Dem index (multiplied by 10). This index uses the *v2x_clpriv* index, utilizing the following measures: *v2clprptym* and *v2clprptyw*, which measure the property rights for men and women; *v2clslavem* and *v2clslavef*, which measure freedom from forced labor; *v2clrelig*, which measures freedom of religion; *v2csrlgrep*, which measures repression of religious organizations; *v2clfmove*, which measures freedom of foreign movement; and *v2cldmovem* and *v2cldmovew*, which measure freedom of domestic movement. These "private" rights examine the individual rights granted to a citizen by the state, as opposed to the rights related to public and political participation that the other measures. The two indexes are separated given the breadth of the category, as well as the high number of relevant variables available. It is also useful to separate them given the focus that American aid gave to running elections and promoting democracy; it is entirely possible that public rights could improve while private rights do not as a result of increased election focus.

The final civil and political index utilizes the CIRIGHTS dataset to sum various measures: *ciri_assn*, which measures association and assembly rights; *ciri_relfre*, which measures religious freedoms, and *ciri_speech*, which measures freedom of speech and press.

This score is the sum of these three scores, with a total range of ordinal numbers between 0-6 (each runs from 0-2). In the dataset, this variable is named *cirisum_civpol*.

These three scores cover much of the same ground, although the CIRIGHTS score is much simpler. However, it gets to the core of civil and political rights, especially as imagined under the American conception, and may be a useful comparison point to the V-Dem indexes, which have other variables not included in the CIRIGHTS dataset.

Aid Level:

Countries that were above the median in a given year are coded as "1" in the dataset, and are henceforth referred to as "higher-receiving" countries. Countries that were below the median in a given year are coded as "0" in the dataset, and are henceforth referred to as "lower-countries." The aid level line is determined by analyzing the distribution of the DHRG aid per capita, and taking the median value between 2002 and 2012, as the value for the entire dataset skewed it much smaller and leading to a very unbalanced distribution within the time frame. The cutoff amount was set at 0.1920646.

Partner Countries:

The major sources cited for this subset of the list was a 2002-2007 GAO report that listed the 10 countries that received the majority of US ATA aid during this period (and are assumed to have remained partners for the entirety of the time period in question), and the Stephen Tankel's book *With Us and Against Us: How America's Partners Help and Hinder the War on Terror* (2018), which cites specific and in-depth examples of partnerships between various countries.

The countries listed in the paper above are considered to be "partner" countries, and are coded as 1 in the dataset. All other countries are considered to be "non-partner" countries, and are coded as 0 in the dataset.

Developing Countries:

A country's designation as developing came from a 2012 USAID list, which termed "developing" as being either low-income or lower middle income.[1] A country is assumed to remain on this list for the entire period in question, and no differentiation is made between low or lower-middle income countries. A country not on that list is considered to be "non-developing," and is coded as a 0 in the dataset. A country that is on that list is considered to be "developing," and is coded as a 1 in that dataset.

Miscellaneous Notes:

A cursory analysis of the PS per capita aid revealed extremely insignificant results when analyzing its effects on changes in human rights.

The V-Dem dataset did not have valid scores for 1992, so 1993 is used as the first comparison year. Comparing the change between years across the whole dataset, there is little reason to think that there was a dramatic change in scores between 1992 and 1993. However, the CIRIGHTS data does use 1992 as the first comparison year.

For the second robustness test, I only ran an analysis of partner countries due to the high level of significance that these initial results had, as well as the results of the first robustness test that indicate that being a partner country was a far more important factor in the effect of DHRG

[1] When cross referencing this with the US Aid Greenbook in order to see if countries on this list were also low income or lower-middle income in 2001, since 2012 is near the end of the time period of interest, several countries within the dataset were listed as being upper-middle income for the entirety of the time period in question and yet are listed on the developing countries list: Armenia, Belize, Fiji, Georgia, Guatemala, Guyana, Iraq, Marshall Islands, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, and Turkmenistan. This poses a potential program; for the purposes of this paper, I am going to assume that the USAID team has other unlisted criteria for making a country "developing" that these countries fall under. Therefore, these countries will continue to be considered "developing".

aid than being a developing country. While it is possible that the results would change significantly, an analysis of the results that had already been done did not make me think that it would be further significant findings.

Appendix II: Results for Robustness Tests

Figure 10: Comparative Changes in Security Scores - VDEM



Figure 11: Comparative Changes in Security Scores - CIRIGHTS



Figure 12: Comparative Changes in Justice Scores - VDEM



Figure 13: Comparative Changes in Justice Scores - CIRIGHTS



Figure 14: Comparative Changes in Public Civil and Political Rights - VDEM



Figure 15: Comparative Changes in Private Civil and Political Scores - VDEM



Figure 16: Comparative Changes in Civil and Political Scores - CIRIGHTS



Figure 17: Comparison of All Partner Countries vs. No Iraq and Afghanistan - VDEM



Figure 18: Comparison of All Partner Countries vs. No Iraq and Afghanistan - CIRIGHTS


Comparison of All Partner Countries vs. No Iraq or Afghanistan - CIRIGHTS
Effect of Aid on Current Year
Effect of Aid after One Year
Three-Year Changes
Total DHRG Aid (per capita)
-.4
-.2
0
.2
Security (All)
Security (No I or A)
Justice (All)
Justice (No I or A)
Civ Pol (All)
Civ Pol (No I or A)

Appendix III: Terror Attacks Chart

Figure 19: Terror Attacks Over Time