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*The Metaphysics of Temporality:
Heidegger's Later Concept of Time*

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Abstract

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By Christopher D. Merwin

Our experience of time is not the same as the chronological passage of time. In his landmark 1927 text *Being and Time*, Martin Heidegger poignantly described how humans project time through how we orient our own individual human cares and concerns. Heidegger's description of the experience of time springs from our everyday existence and had profound impact on the phenomenological interpretation of time. Heidegger's reflections on time did not end with the publication of *Being and Time*, however. In 1962, just over a decade before his death and 35 years after the publication of *Being and Time*, Heidegger gave a short lecture entitled "On Time and Being", his last treatment of the topic of time. In this lecture, Heidegger argues for a more radical interpretation of time. Time is ontologically relational. Our conceptions of "past", "present", and "future" are determined through the ontological presence and encounter with other beings. Over the course of 35 years, the locus of Heidegger's analysis had shifted from a concept of time framed around individual human experience to a deeply ontological and relational understanding. To show the radicality of Heidegger's concept of time in his later thought, I trace his thinking of time from across his entire career through his early, middle, and late periods. In the early period, around *Being and Time* (1927), time was understood as something we inter-subjectively create through our projects and in the living of our lives. In his middle period, in the unpublished treatises around the *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38), time is no longer thought from out of human Dasein but is instead thought in terms of the time-space of an event. Time in Heidegger's later period becomes something deeply relational because it is defined by the intersecting temporalities of discrete entities. This concept of time offers a provocative alternative to contemporary metaphysical conceptions of time. My dissertation thus traces the development of Heidegger's unusual concept of time across his entire career from *Being and Time* until just before his death in the 1970s and addresses the metaphysical questions which an individuated and inter-relational concept of time raises.

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τὸ φρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μέγιστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν
καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίοντας (τοῦ Λόγου).

- Ἡράκλειτος

Conventions

Citations

In referencing Heidegger's work, I cite using the standard convention of referring to the *Gesamtausgabe* volume number followed by the page number of the German edition, followed by the English translation, where available. In cases where no English translation exists, all translations are my own. Otherwise, existing English translations refer to their English language equivalents unless specified. For editions and translations used please refer to the bibliography.

References to the works of Aristotle are made using the title of the work, followed by the book and chapter number, followed by the Bekker numbers. In this way a reference to Aristotle's discussion of motion will look like: *Physics* III.1, 202a12-20.

Introduction

On October 1st, 1884 at the International Meridian Conference at the Department of State in Washington D.C. delegates from twenty different countries met “for the purpose of fixing upon a meridian proper to be employed as a common zero of longitude and standard of time-reckoning throughout the globe,” thus establishing the “universal day”.¹ The meridian the delegates chose was the so-called “prime meridian” which conceptually “passes through” Greenwich, England at the site of the Royal Observatory. The choice of this meridian established what is now referred to as “coordinated universal time”. A year earlier, at exactly noon local time in New York City on Sunday, November 18th, 1883, the Western Union Telegraph Company dispatched telegrams across the country announcing the new “standard time” (what had also been referred to as “railroad time”) in the United States, effectively abolishing local times and setting a standard by which everyone in the United States should coordinate their times.²

The standardization of time in the United States, and other Western countries, was not met favorably by everyone, however. The *Indiana Daily Sentinel* wrote in response: “[t]he sun is no longer to boss the job. People...must eat, sleep and work by...railroad time...People will have to marry by railroad time...Ministers will be required to preach by railroad time...Banks will open and close by railroad time.”³ Within a generation, however, the awareness of differences between local times to one another or to the new “standard” had all but disappeared. Americans, and others in the West, had become fully accustomed and habituated to reckoning their time via the institutionalization of

¹ International Meridian Conference, *International Conference Held at Washington for the Purpose of Fixing a Prime Meridian and a Universal Day*, October 1884: Protocols of the Proceedings (Washington: Gibson Bros., 1884).

² McCrossen, Alexis. *Marking Modern Times: A History of Clocks, Watches, and Other Timekeepers in American Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

³ Quoted in Ian R. Bartky's, *Selling the True Time, Nineteenth Century Timekeeping in America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000) 14.

the measure of “universal time” relative to Greenwich. Meetings, appointments, and events are no longer missed because of differences in reckoning time thanks to an agreed upon and imposed convention of coordinated universal time.

The statement by the *Indiana Daily Sentinel* and the ways in which we subordinate our own experiences of what we call “now”, “before”, and “then”, to an idea of time relative to Greenwich illustrate a deeply Heideggerian insight about our understanding of time. Humans have reckoned their local time for millennia by means of sundials measuring the relative position of the sun. And time’s perception, whether reckoned by means of clocks, the seasons, or the conduct of our daily affairs helps us understand the story of our lives. We have technologies which are supposed to act as “time saving” yet often our experience of using such technologies is that we have less and less time for the things which are truly meaningful for us. St. Augustine famously asked “What then *is* time? If no one asks me, I know. If I want to explain it to a questioner, I do not know”.⁴ Despite the perception of time’s ubiquitous presence in our lives, it is one of the least understood aspects of the human condition. From the earliest philosophical reflections by Aristotle up to contemporary psychology and neuroscience, anthropology and sociology, and quantum physics, the problem of time has been a perennial question about how humans experience the world.

The philosopher Martin Heidegger is one of the most well-known and influential philosophers of the 20th century. His landmark text *Being and Time* poignantly describes the way in which we as humans live in our world, the way in which our projects and relations with others both create and are created alongside others. This text had profound impact in not only philosophy, but also in literature, art history, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and the arts. Written relatively early in his career, Heidegger’s text remained unfinished, however, and the section on time was never completed.

⁴Augustine, *Confessions* XI.13.17

In 1962, just over a decade before his death and 35 years after the publication of *Being and Time*, Heidegger gave a short enigmatic lecture entitled “On Time and Being”, his last major treatment of the topic of time. In the lecture, Heidegger controversially argues for a non-chronological and non-measurable concept of time. Instead, Heidegger argues in this late essay, time is something deeply inter-relational, and each one of us constitute time through the multiplicity of these relations.

However, to understand how Heidegger arrives at this late understanding of time as our human Dasein’s relation with other beings, we must first understand the trajectory and evolution of Heidegger’s thoughts on time. Heidegger was as much a thinker of time, as he was of being. Only with the recent appearance of several unpublished volumes, including his private notebooks (the so-called “Black Notebooks”), has a fuller picture of the arc of Heidegger’s thought become possible. The project of this dissertation is to explain Heidegger’s late concept of time as he presents it in the 1962 essay “On Time and Being” and show the paths that Heidegger’s thinking on time took across his career to arrive at this inter-relational concept of time.

I. Heidegger’s Thinking on Time: Thematic Overview

Heidegger’s interest in the theme of time is career long. From his earliest review in 1913 of Nikolai Bubnoff’s book *Zeitlichkeit und Zeitlosigkeit* to his last seminar in Zähringen in 1973 just a few years before his death, Heidegger’s concern with time is one of the most enduring aspects of his thought. Heidegger’s 1927 *Being and Time* is generally acknowledged as the definitive early view of his thoughts on time and temporality, while his 1962 lecture “On Time and Being” is considered his last full treatment of the topic. Contemporary Heidegger scholarship is beginning to recognize a middle period of Heidegger’s thinking of time, due in large part to recent publication of several of Heidegger’s private monographs from the 1930s and 1940s. Heidegger’s thinking of time during each of these periods is distinct and the question remains as to why Heidegger’s thoughts on time

change throughout each of these phases and why he ultimately ends with the view of time expressed in “On Time and Being”.

Heidegger’s early concept of time culminates in his discussion of time and temporality in the second half of part one of *Being and Time*. In the introduction to *Being and Time* Heidegger describes the task of part one (the only portion of *Being and Time* which Heidegger completed) as: “the interpretation of Dasein on the basis of timeliness [*Zeitlichkeit*] and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being”.⁵ As we will see, the term ‘transcendental’ will become problematic for Heidegger and I discuss this in further detail both at the end of this introduction and throughout Chapter One. But for now, we know that it is through Dasein’s experience of time, here understood through the term ‘timeliness’, that we will be able to arrive at an understanding of time itself, what Heidegger will call temporality. I introduce the importance of each of these, timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) and temporality (*Temporalität*) terms in the next section.

Heidegger never completed his analysis of temporality in *Being and Time* and he became increasingly suspicious of trying to arrive at an understanding of both being and time that was predicated on Dasein’s own experience of timeliness. This suspicion led Heidegger to instead try and think being and time’s relation to Dasein in a different manner. This shift in thinking marks the transition to Heidegger’s middle-period.

During his middle period, thought roughly from the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s, Heidegger begins to think our relation to time as eventive, and it is in understanding the structure of the event that we can understand the happening of time as time-space (*Zeit-raum*). Heidegger first tentatively uses the term time-space in the context of the 1931 course on Augustine and time, although it is not until the following year, in the context of an analysis of Anaximander’s famous dictum as the earliest written philosophical fragment in a course dedicated to rereading the beginnings of Western

⁵ GA 2: 39/37

philosophy, that Heidegger begins to shape the conceptual contours of what would orient his thinking of time in his middle period. By 1935, through a rereading of Leibniz and Kant on world and the status of the thing, respectively the term had begun to achieve a technical status for Heidegger's lexicon. With the 1936 writing of Heidegger's first of six private monograph, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, Heidegger had conceived of a new way of articulating Dasein's relation to time, one explicitly distanced from the transcendental conditions of temporality in *Being and Time*.

Beginning in the *Contributions*, Heidegger articulates time-space as the structural "site" of Dasein's encounter with, captivation by, and articulation of the event. Heidegger's notion of event can be approached in a twofold way. On the one hand, the event is the way our encounter with the event is a confrontation and transformative rupture of our historical understandings of being (now thought as beyng) and on the other hand, simultaneously, a leap into and grounding of a new mode of understanding beyng. Like the event, time-space has a twofold structure. Time-space is both the structural "site" of this rupture and also the groundless "place" into which Dasein leaps. Time-space is thus structurally both a fissure, as the transformative opening, and also the site of Dasein's decision, the groundless "where" and "when" that Dasein decides to ground this other approach to beyng.

The thinking of time-space as the event of the grounding of historical being in the manuscripts of the 1930s leads Heidegger to explore the thinking of the event even more deeply. Beginning in the early 1940s, Heidegger wonders how it is that the event eventuates, what is its inception, and how does thinking of beyng and beings emerge and "twist free" from out of the event? And how, ultimately, how do beings depart from being? This leads Heidegger to think more intensely on the limits of the difference between being and beings in *On Inception* and *The Event*. In these late middle-period texts Heidegger thinks being as constancy of presence and time is

reconceived as an allotment of that presence and the way in which presence lingers (*verweilen*). Time is temporalized as the awhiling lingering of presence, and each being's presence is thought in terms of that whiling (*Erweilnis*). It is here that Heidegger once again rethinks Anaximander's famous dictum about the coming to be and passing away of entities in an undelivered lecture course on the fragment from the mid-1940s. Heidegger's ruminations on time as the awhiling presence of entities leads him to think of time (and being) as something that is given. The giving of time and being as the *Es gibt* ('it gives') marks the transition to Heidegger's later philosophy of time.

Heidegger's later philosophy of time is articulated most directly in the 1962 essay, "On Time and Being". Although a few reflections on time occur after "On Time and Being" up through the mid-1970s (and just a few years before Heidegger's death), for the most part these reflections can be interpreted within the framework articulated in "On Time and Being". It is in this essay that we see the culmination of Heidegger's career long thinking of time. For as much as Heidegger was a thinker of being, time always accompanied this thinking. Many of the familiar technical terms which Heidegger used to approach his ways of thinking of time through the decades are again brought to bear, although in slightly modified ways.

I introduce some of the key terms below, along with the chapter summaries, and show how we must think Heidegger's concept of time as developmental. For the later period, 'proper' or 'authentic' time (*eigentliche Zeit*) is a relational mediation between Dasein and the entities we encounter. Heidegger articulates this relational mediation through the expression, used throughout "On Time and Being", when he says "it gives time" and "it gives being" (*Es gibt Zeit, Es gibt Sein*). This reciprocal notion of giving, between Dasein and the entities we come into meaningful encounter with, is what allows Dasein to become aware of the relative nearness of presence of other entities. And it is in this way that Dasein comes to think of the 'present'. Similarly, the lack of nearness of presence can be thought in terms of its having-been present before me, what we name

the ‘past’, and the anticipation of a coming nearness, a coming presence, what we wait for now and call the ‘future’. This is a subtle but important shift Heidegger’s early thinking of time, where Dasein thinks of time in terms of its own projects. Here time is our awareness of the rich interrelational matrix of the multiplicity of presence, or lack of presence, of so many other entities in the world.

Heidegger’s later thinking of time illustrates a deep connection with and concern for how we relate to the multiplicity of beings around us – individually, and as humans. Heidegger’s later concept of time asks us to critically reexamine how we relate to others and our environment, precisely because this is what time is: our relations. Heidegger’s later concept of time has further implications for the way we think and practice history and for the ways in which we think of and practice science. Heidegger’s later concept of time rests alongside recent explorations in historiography that attempt to practice history (or *historiæ*) without chronology, or the contemporary movement in quantum mechanics, relational quantum mechanics, which tries to think variables as only taking values relative to their interactions with other systems. Similarly, by focusing on our relations to others and to place, Heidegger’s later concept of time sits comfortably alongside contemporary interpretations of native and indigenous experiences of time. Rather than being merely a contribution to Heidegger scholarship, my hope is that understanding Heidegger’s mature notions of time might also frame sites of other conversations about how we conceive of, create, and live each of our times.

II. Overview of Chapters 1 – 3

This dissertation is organized into three major chapter. The order of each of the chapters is developmental, moving through Heidegger’s early, middle, and later periods. The rationale for this order is that Heidegger’s later thinking of time can only be fully understood via the early and middle periods, both in contradistinction and as modifications of Heidegger’s earlier thought. As we shall

see, Heidegger makes use of many of the same terms in his later period that he developed in his early and middle periods, respectively, but in sometimes subtly, and other times dramatically, different ways. In outlining each chapter, I also briefly introduce the significant technical terms that Heidegger develops during each of period. I will leave the fuller story of how each term is arrived at and how and why it changes to be explained within each respective chapter.

1. Heidegger's Early Period: 1925 – 1932

Chapter One is centered on Heidegger's thinking of time within and immediately after *Being and Time*. During this period Heidegger's thinking is oriented around the development of what he understands as the science of fundamental ontology, or the understanding of the meaning of being. The key to developing this science, or so Heidegger thinks at least up until 1932, is the proper understanding and elucidation of temporality (*Temporalität*) from the phenomenological basis of Dasein's own timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*). By the end of the early period, Heidegger will abandon the project of fundamental ontology and with it, temporality as the means for understanding time. This abandonment signals the end of Heidegger's early period thinking on time and the transition to his middle period. Chapter One focuses on an analysis of Dasein's timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*), shows how timeliness is meant to explain temporality (*Temporalität*) as the ontological determination of time, and why, starting in about 1931, through a renewed analysis of Aristotle and Augustine on time, Heidegger ultimately abandons this approach.

a. Timeliness

For Heidegger, timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) is constitutive of who we are as human Dasein, and it is from Dasein's timeliness that we derive our everyday commonplace concept of time. This common (what Heidegger terms "vulgar") concept of time is the result of Dasein's own projective orientation towards the world. As humans we are engaged in projects which we take as meaningful and about

which we are concerned, say like the writing of a dissertation. My care for these projects reveals itself to me through a horizon of possibilities – how things and possibilities are presented to me in the ‘now’, what I can meaningfully anticipate from those possibilities (the ‘future’), and how other possibilities have made the horizon of my present possible – those possibilities that have been in order for me to understand the ‘now’, or what we standardly name the ‘the past’.

My understanding of how these different ontic modes of possibility are meaningful to my projects is what Heidegger calls *timeliness* (*Zeitlichkeit*). Right now, I can imagine the possibility of finishing this dissertation and I run ahead in anticipation, planning and carrying out its completion (the ‘future’) from the project that this whole study has been. Heidegger thinks that if we can properly work out the ontic features of what timeliness means and understand the way in which human Dasein orient the meaning of their being, then we can ontologically understand something about being, as such. And the way we can do this, in principle, is through an ontological understanding of time – temporality (*Temporalität*).

b. Temporality

Time, ontologically thought, is what Heidegger names temporality. Temporality was conceived by Heidegger, but never fully worked out, as the means by which we could ground the science of ontology – what Heidegger calls fundamental ontology. If timeliness is the horizon for understanding my own (ontic) projects and possibilities, that is, my *own* being, then temporality was meant to be the horizon by which we can ontologically understand being as such, the being of beings. All fundamental ontological understanding of other beings is mediated through an understanding of temporality. As Heidegger attempts to parce out what temporality looks like in the years immediately after *Being and Time*, we will say that it is the possibility of mediation, and the relation between becoming and occurrence (*Geschehen*).

The difficulty begins to arise for Heidegger in that this horizon of understanding being by means of temporality always seems to lie somewhere “outside” or “beyond” Dasein. It is for this reason that Heidegger initially conceives of fundamental ontology as a “transcendental” science because it is concerned with things beyond Dasein. I will discuss at the end of this introduction a little bit more about Heidegger’s idiosyncratic understanding of ‘transcendence’ and its importance to his thinking of time. But by the beginning of the 1930s, Heidegger becomes worried that if time (i.e. temporality) is transcendental, someone beyond us, then we can’t phenomenologically make sense of being. The reason for this is that there isn’t sufficient understanding between differentiate our horizontal representation of entities from their actual, ontological, difference. Heidegger takes a step back from the language of temporality, reexamines the two figures he considers to have most contributed to our philosophical understanding of time (Aristotle and Augustine), and begins to tentatively reconceive time not as a horizontal “beyond” or representation of the possibility for understanding, but as a structural “site” in which we are captivated by being. This marks the transition to Chapter Two.

2. Heidegger’s Middle Period: 1932 – 1946

Chapter Two deals with the period of Heidegger’s thinking that contemporary Heidegger scholarship has begun calling his middle-period, from around 1932 to 1946. Central to this period are the private book length monographs Heidegger wrote between 1936 and 1944, the so-called ‘poietic works’, which characterize Heidegger’s attempts to understand being as event (*Ereignis*). Heidegger primarily conceptualizes his understanding of time during this period first as ‘time-space’ (*Zeit-raum*) and then also as ‘whiling’ (*Weilen*). Chapter Two traces the developments in Heidegger’s thinking of time across this period from time understood as timeliness and temporality to time-space, and then from time-space to the way in which the idea of an entity’s whiling emerges.

The chapter begins with an examination of Heidegger's 1931 interpretation of Anaximander as the conceptual background to Heidegger's thinking of time-space in the poietic works before examining the first intimations of time-space as a technical term in Heidegger's 1935 courses on Leibniz and Kant. This lays the groundwork for a sustained interpretation of the role of time-space in the early poietic works that occupies the greater first half of the chapter.

The second half of Chapter Two is given to Heidegger's rethinking of the event and the role that time takes in poietic works of the mid-1940s in *On Inception* (GA 70) and *The Event* (GA 71). Throughout the period of the early and mid-1940's, Heidegger begins to think of time in terms of how being arises and emerges from out of the event in its presence and constancy. The chapter culminates with Heidegger's second major re-thinking of the Anaximander fragment in the undelivered lecture course *The Verdict of Anaximander* (Der Spruch des Anaximander) (GA 78). In re-thinking Anaximander, Heidegger defines the essence of time as: the whiling. The whiling is the name for the way in which beings emerge into their lingering presence. This lingering presence, as whiling, is both the name for the site where Da-sein encounters beings in their being, and also the how it is that beings disclose their abiding presence – through their own whiling. Heidegger's idiosyncratic and enigmatic interpretation of the Anaximander fragment, thought through all of the developments in Heidegger's poietic works, paves the way for understanding Heidegger's later concept of time, the subject of Chapter Three, as the 'It gives' (*Es gibt*).

a. Time-Space

As mentioned above, time-space is the site of Dasein's encounter with and appropriation by the event. Time-space as a "site" has a twofold structure. On the one side, time-space is the site of disruption from Dasein's understanding of being as it has been understood historically. As a site of disruption, time-space opens up a "fissure", a groundless abyss, which calls to and captivates Dasein. This site is neither a "where" or a "when" but is instead Dasein's realization that our past historical understandings of being are not all there is to being. It is where "the bottom falls out" on Dasein's previous understanding and the need for a new truth becomes necessary. But this new truth can only be grounded through Dasein's encounter with being in the event. This is the second "site" of time-space. Time-space is the Dasein's decision to leap into that groundless ground and claim another understanding of being. Dasein's decision and claim, Dasein's grounding of another truth, transforms the groundless abyss that had been opened up into a groundless *ground*, a ground that is Dasein itself.

Heidegger's thinking of time-space ranks among some of the most evocative, and difficult, material in his corpus. But it raises with it whole new sets of questions. Heidegger realizes that his thinking of the event in the 1930s is primarily oriented around Dasein's appropriation and captivation by the event as the truth of being. Heidegger begins anew to try think, or "speak", the occurrence of the event from out of the event itself. This leads Heidegger, to another approach to time: whiling.

b. Whiling

Whiling, for Heidegger in the mid-1940s, names the way in which we being presences only momentarily in beings. That being is only momentary means that presencing both arrives, or "comes-into-being", and departs. Time, as the whiling, is the manner in which presencing is uniquely momentary to each entity. Each being has its own allotted presencing, and beings come and go each

according to that allotment. Just as we might say in English, “to while the time away”, Heidegger’s notion of whiling is a specific active measure of presencing that belongs, in each case, to its respective entity. And it is in each entity’s whiling that we are able to see and understand their essence. Recognizing the whiling of an entity allows us to see that being presences as beings, and only for a while. And because entity’s only have their while, we can respect and esteem them for the constancy of their presence, for the being’s which they are.

Heidegger’s thinking of time as whiling is a result of his reengagement with the pre-Socratics, and Anaximander in particular, beginning in the early 1940s. Heidegger’s notion of whiling, with its aspects of respect and esteem, as developed out of Anaximander’s famous dictum, establishes a mutual relation between Dasein and other entities. Because the essence of time is an entity’s own whiling, this brings Dasein into a relational structure with beings in their presencing. This relational structure will then pave the way for Heidegger to think time in his later period as the giving of time, the *Es gibt*.

3. Heidegger’s Later Period: 1950s – 1970s

Heidegger’s later period thinking about time, and as I argue, a whole career of thinking time and being together, culminates in the 1962 essay “On Time and Being” and the articulation of time as the ‘It gives’ (*Es gibt*). Chapter Three is primarily dedicated to a close and careful analysis of that essay and each of the very subtle moves that Heidegger makes there. The chapter argues for an interrelational understanding of time, thought through the mediation of Dasein’s encounter with other entities. This encounter, as a modification of the time-space of the event from the 1930’s and 1940s, gives to Dasein the presence of other entities. With that giving of presence, Dasein thinks of giving of that entity’s presence in terms of a nearness or farness. When that presence is with me, before me, I think of it as ‘present’, or ‘now’. But the relative farness of presence lingers with me

either as a having-been present, which we name the ‘past’, or an anticipated arrival, called the ‘future’.

Seen in this way, for us to have ‘time’, requires the human. And it is this notion of requirement (*Brauch*), which Heidegger argues for a few years before his death in 1976 in the draft of an essay originally intended as part of a longer introduction to his *Gesamtausgabe*, the “complete edition” of his works entitled “The Argument against Necessity”. Chapter Three concludes with an examination of this essay and why it is that Heidegger argues that the human is required for us to think ‘time’. The human is required to think time because that is, following the “Time and Being” essay, the way that Da-sein articulates its own relation to the presence of other beings. Simply put, for Heidegger, humans are a special kind of entity that thinks time in its articulation of being. For us to try and think what time (or being) is without relation to human Da-sein would be to speculate on what its like to be a different kind of being than who we are.

III. The Question of the Transcendentality of Time

One final note needs to be added about the transcendental character of Heidegger’s thinking about time. Throughout his early period, up until around 1931, Heidegger conceives of his project of fundamental ontology as a transcendental one. In introducing the term *temporality* above, I mentioned that Heidegger that the ontological understanding of timeliness, thought in terms of temporality, was the means by which we can reach beyond our own individual thinking of timeliness, to a temporality which is the hallmark of being (*Sein*). Chapter One goes into further detail about how Heidegger casts this relation and what role temporality was meant to play in fundamental ontology.

That Heidegger thinks of his early project of fundamental ontology in transcendental terms is explicit. What is not altogether clear is exactly what Heidegger means by the term transcendental.

Heidegger gives an all too brief elaboration of fundamental ontology as transcendental science in the context of the 1927 lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, as well as passing references in some of the other courses of the late 1920s. Yet, by the mid-1930s, Heidegger becomes adamantly opposed to any and all forms of transcendentalism, saying that all such talk must disappear. He initially criticizes his own thought in *Being and Time* in the context of the *Contributions*, to only later criticize the transcendental language of the *Contributions* from the standpoint of *The Event*.

Chapter Two addresses these complaints from Heidegger and frames them in terms of how he re-approaches his thinking about time. Moving from a transcendental notion of temporality as ‘beyond’ in the ecstatic running ahead of the 1920s to the way in which Da-sein is captivated and brought into the time-space of the event in the 1930s in order to ground the truth of being. Heidegger reconfigures his thinking of time parallel to his concerns about transcendental thinking. Seen in this way, Heidegger’s shifts in thinking about time during his middle period are as much indications of his struggle with the presence (and pervasiveness) of the transcendental in his thinking.

By the late 1950s and into the early 1960s Heidegger had, for the most part, left behind his self-confrontation with transcendental thinking. Instead, Heidegger’s thought becomes increasingly oriented around Da-sein’s relationality and how that prompts us to think our encounter with beings and the structure of these encounters. Even Heidegger’s lengthy account of how ancient conceptions are translated by Kant into the “transcendental method” in *The Principle of Reason* is given in the service of orienting us back towards how we relate to beings as we encounter them.⁶ It is this relational structure, between Da-sein, encounter, and beings, I argue in Chapter Three, that forms the essential understanding of proper time in Heidegger’s later period. Proper time, in the later period and “Time and Being”, is the medium of encounter and Da-sein’s understanding. In the

⁶ GA 10: 133-141/78-82.

“Time and Being” essay, Heidegger carefully avoids the language of conditions of possibility, and even grounding, in favor of the sending and giving which is a result of the relational encounter of Da-sein with other beings in the event of encounter.

Unsurprisingly, the role and place of transcendentalism in Heidegger’s thinking has been consistently troubling for Heidegger scholars. Heidegger scholarship has for a long time debated whether we should understand Heidegger’s notion of the transcendental in Kantian or Husserlian terms, or instead think of it along the lines of ancient or medieval thinkers, or as some idiosyncratic blending and rejection of each. Similarly, do later essays like “Time and Being”, despite their avowed overcoming of transcendental thinking, nevertheless evince lingering traces of the transcendental? There is no clear consensus on these questions and I do not offer one here. Instead my task has been to focus on the genealogy and development of Heidegger’s thinking about time from *Being and Time* through to the end of his life. In so doing I have tended to take Heidegger at his word and left the problem, or resolution, of the lingering presence of transcendental thought out of my analysis and explication except in so far as it elucidates some aspect of his understanding of time. My focus has been to trace and get right Heidegger’s career long reflections on time and leave arguments about whether Heidegger is, or is not, in the end, a transcendental thinker, to others, or for another place.

I do think that the interpretation of Heidegger’s thinking, particularly regarding time, as relational has been both overlooked with regards to the question of lingering transcendental thinking. While this is not the place to defend such a view, it seems that much of the large body of scholarship which argues for or against Heidegger’s transcendentalism argues it from two standpoints. Either (1), Heidegger is either a good or bad interpreter of Kant, Husserl, the ancients, or the medievals, and so should or should not be read as adhering to their conception of the transcendental. I am not in a position to defend such a view and a great deal of scholarship already

exists staking one or another of these positions. Or (2), it is the structure of Heidegger's thinking that nevertheless continues to maintain some lingering form of (uniquely Heideggerian?) transcendental thinking.

I believe Chapter Three begins to respond to this position by first thinking through Heidegger's conception of proper time as relational. A relation between Da-sein, being, and beings, where the relation itself is the medium of understanding being and time. If Heidegger is guilty of anything in his later period (as perhaps in other earlier periods), it is the normative assertion that it is the constitution of human Da-sein to express being and time. Yet, as the late essay "The Argument against Necessity" argues, how could we speak otherwise? Heidegger's thinking has never been a view from nowhere, but is always and only situated from Da-sein's perspective. As the late essay argues, it may be that being and time are indeed grounded in other beings – but how could we, humans, ever know? To think that way, for Heidegger, would be to begin to think transcendently.

I leave it to other to decide whether my analysis of Heidegger on time sheds any light on that debate.

Chapter One

Heidegger's Early Concept of Time

How is the mode of the temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted?
 Is there a way leading from primordial *time* to the meaning of *being*?
 Does *time* itself reveal itself as the horizon of *being*?

—Martin Heidegger, last sentences of *Being and Time*⁷

On Thursday, January 19th, 1926, Simon Moser wrote in the course notes for his logic class: “If temporality is a—or *the*—basic determination of being itself, then probably care itself in its whole structure must have a temporal character” (GA 21: 234/195).⁸ The words were delivered as Heidegger was attempting to meet his April 1st deadline for a manuscript submission required to make full-professor (he had already been rejected twice) – *Being and Time*. Heidegger’s *Being and Time* was partially published in late April 1927, a week before the death of his mother, in volume 8 of the journal *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung*. The strength of its content would be enough to earn him full professorship and solidify his position as one of Germany’s leading philosophers⁹.

Heidegger’s early concept of time culminates in his discussion of time, timeliness, and temporality in the second half of *Being and Time* and in a number of texts that expand upon the ideas central to *Being and Time* up until 1931.¹⁰ Heidegger’s stated task for Part One of *Being and Time*, the

⁷GA 2: 577/415

⁸Simon Moser *Nachschrift*.

⁹Safranski, Rüdiger. *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*. Trans. Ewald Osers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1999. 143.

¹⁰The two German terms that Heidegger employs in his early period to refer to temporality, *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität*, are extremely difficult to translate. This is, in part, because in English we have only one term – temporality. The other major reason, as this chapter aims to clarify, is that Heidegger develops his own technical understanding of each term. The latinate *Temporalität* is more unusual to a native German speaker, although for most German speakers it is simply synonymous with *Zeitlichkeit*. I have chosen to use the English ‘temporality’ for *Temporalität*, although I usually

only portion of the text published, is the interpretation of Dasein in terms of its timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) and the explanation of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being (GA 2: 55/39).

Heidegger would only complete the first two divisions of the planned three of Part One of *Being and Time*, although scattered references in the published portion, archival evidence, and Heidegger's seminar and lectures courses, delivered in the years immediately after publication, give us some indication of how Part One Division III and Part Two might have looked. It is clear, however, that temporality is the keys to understanding the question of being for the early Heidegger. Temporality, says Heidegger, is where the concrete answer to the meaning of being is given and being is "in each instance comprehensible only in regard to time"¹¹ (GA 2: 26/18). Being, as Heidegger states in the Introduction to *Being and Time*, only becomes visible in its "timely" ("zeitlich") character.

Heidegger thinks that by learning something of the special character of the timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) of Dasein, we may learn something about the *temporality of being* (*Temporalität des Seins*) and thus being as such. I treat timeliness and temporality in detail throughout this chapter. However, a brief overview of the structure of *Being and Time*, as it relates to the concept of time, is helpful.

Division I of *Being and Time* provides an analysis of the fundamental structure of Dasein that culminates in the existential meaning of Dasein as *care* (*Sorge*) (GA 2: 55/39). Heidegger's analysis of the structural totality of the being of Dasein as care, itself the conclusion of Part One Division I,

provide the German to disambiguate it from *Zeitlichkeit*. I translate *Zeitlichkeit* as 'timeliness' to emphasize it as a structure of Dasein's own being.

¹¹Heidegger writes in his "black notebooks" from 1934-1935 that a "critically-historically configured reflection of" Part One Division III is contained in the 1927 summer semester course (GA 94: IV, 76/199-200). For archival references, see Kisiel, Theodore. "The Drafts of 'Time and Being'" in *Division III of Heidegger's Being and Time: The Unanswered Question of Being*, edited by Lee Braver, 149-173, MIT Press, 2015.

leads him to the interpretation, by way of introduction to Division II (§45), that care only becomes existentially intelligible in terms of *timeliness* (*Zeitlichkeit*) (GA 2: 311/224). Heidegger adds that with this discovery, we must go back to the ontological structures of Dasein already covered in Division I and now interpret them with regard to their temporal meaning. Heidegger thinks that in doing so the phenomenon of temporality will, itself, become more transparent.

Heidegger never offers an extended discussion regarding the role of temporality (*Temporalität*) as it relates to timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) in *Being and Time*.¹² It is only later during the summer semester course of 1927, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (GA 24), that Heidegger offers an articulation of the relation between *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität*. As Heidegger states in the 1927 course:

Temporalität is merely the translation of Zeitlichkeit. It means temporality insofar as temporality itself is made into a theme as the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being and of ontology as such. The term “Temporality” [*Temporalität*] is intended to indicate that *timeliness* [*zeitlichkeit*], in existential analytic, represents the horizon from which we understand being (GA 24: 324/229).

Unfortunately, given the constraints of the seminar and the approaching end of the semester, Heidegger’s analysis of the relation between timeliness (*zeitlichkeit*) and temporality (*Temporalität*) and the relation between temporality and being are relatively brief, although important.

Heidegger makes the important assertion that transcendence is rooted in temporality and thus in temporality, further claiming that “*time is the...transcendental horizon*” (GA 24: 460/322). He concludes the lecture course by quoting Part One of *Being and Time*, stating: “[t]he interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question about being” (GA 2:55/39) before going on to say “ontology is at bottom a temporal [*temporale*] science; therefore philosophy, understood in the proper sense and not taken straightaway

¹²Kisiel, Theodore J. 1993. *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 412.

in a Kantian sense, is transcendental philosophy” (GA 24: 461/324). The method, or so Heidegger believes in the closing minutes of the 1927 seminar, for conducting this temporal science (i.e. philosophy) is phenomenology, although, for Heidegger there is no *one* phenomenology (GA 24: 467/328).

We must understand in what way Heidegger conceives of temporality as a transcendental and why he feels he needs to. Heidegger’s particular use of the term transcendental is given at the end of the introduction of *Being and Time* when he writes:

Being and its structure transcend every being and every possible existent determination of a being. *Being is the transcendens pure and simple.* The transcendence of the being of Dasein is a distinctive one since in it lies the possibility and necessity of the most radical individuation. Every disclosure of being as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge. *Phenomenological truth (disclosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis*” (GA 2: 51/36).

It is clear that Heidegger understands his own elucidation of time as the condition of possibility for transcendental truth. Heidegger thinks his analysis of temporality, or so he believes until the mid-1930s, is the first to offer an accurate phenomenological interpretation of time that in turn can provide the only true understanding of the temporality of being as such. Heidegger believes that the philosophical tradition has occasionally come close in understanding time (in §81 and §82 he singles out Aristotle, Augustine, and Kant as having come closest), but it is only with Heidegger’s own existential and ontological description of temporality as the ground of Dasein’s being that we can interpret Dasein in its totality and thus move to an understanding of being.

My aim in this chapter is twofold. First, to analyze Heidegger’s understanding of time, timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*), and temporality (*Temporalität*), at least in so far as Heidegger uses these terms until the mid-1930s when we begin to see a shift in Heidegger’s thinking. Second, a principle aim of this chapter is to understand why Heidegger thinks that temporality, as the basis for the science of fundamental ontology, is transcendental.

This chapter is organized into three sections. Section I analyzes Heidegger's use of timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) and its various derivative terms, particularly as it is used from the period of *Being and Time* up through the mid-1930s. For Heidegger, timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) is a particular mode of time, ultimately derivative of temporality (*Temporalität*), that constitutes the structure of Dasein's being. This section analyses why Heidegger believes that Dasein is our best, and as we shall see, only, philosophical starting point if we are to have an ontological understanding of the concept of time.

Section II takes up the theme of Heidegger's analysis of ontological temporality (*Temporalität*). If, timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) is the timely character of the being that is Dasein, then temporality (*Temporalität*) is the understanding of the distinctive ontological determination as it relates to being (*Sein*) itself. Temporality (*Temporalität*) as the "temporality of being" was to be the stated topic of the unwritten Part Two of *Being and Time*, the basic features of which were to consist of a phenomenological destruction of "the history of ontology along the guideline of the problem of temporality [*Temporalität*]" (GA 2: 53/37).

It is worth noting that Heidegger's use of the expression "temporality of being" (*Temporalität des Seins*) is short lived. Heidegger uses the expression between 1926 and 1928, although his tarrying with the term *Temporalität* occurs up through the mid-1930s and beyond, even though his use of the term changes by 1931. Heidegger believes that his recognition of *Temporalität* is one of the unique insights of *Being and Time*, an insight which has neither been asked after, nor investigated until that text. Heidegger thinks in distinguishing *Temporalität* from *Zeitlichkeit*, he has made an important contribution to the history of the concept of time. A central aim of this chapter is to distinguish Heidegger's use and understanding of each term.

Section III returns to issues raised in Sections I and II regarding Heidegger's methodological need to conceive of time in *Being and Time* as transcendental and his move away from that need by 1932. Foremost is the distinction between being in general and individual beings and the

transcendental horizon which is supposed to mediate our ability to understand each. Section III traces Heidegger's use of the term transcendental during this period as it relates to time and engages the thinkers Heidegger acknowledges as having come closest to working out the structure and function of the "transcendental determination of time" – namely Aristotle and Augustine.

Heidegger's interpretation of these thinkers marks the end of his early period concept of time and a transition to his middle period thinking. In order to understand the stakes of Heidegger's transition away from fundamental ontology, we must first understand the role and importance of timeliness and temporality. I begin first with the analysis of timeliness.

I. THE TIMELINESS (*Zeitlichkeit*) OF DASEIN

Heidegger's philosophical interest in the theme of timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) extends back to his graduate years. One of Heidegger's earliest academic publications is a book review in *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland* in April 1913 of Nikolai von Bubnoff's 1911 habilitation *Temporality and Timelessness (*Zeitlichkeit und Zeitlosigkeit*)*.¹³ Heidegger starts using the term extensively in his own teaching as early as 1919, although he does not yet begin to articulate the idea of the timeliness of Dasein (*die Zeitlichkeit des Daseins*) as a full-fledged theme until the 1923 summer semester course *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity* where the interpretation of Dasein in its everydayness and its existential constitution is made central (GA 63: 84/65). One year later, on July 25th, 1924 Heidegger presents a paper to the Marburg Theological Society inquiring about the ontological interpretation of history and time. This paper, "The Concept of Time", is the earliest preliminary outline of *Being and Time*. By November, Heidegger drafts up four sections of a longer

¹³Heidegger's graduate years were spent, it seems, mostly writing book reviews. Between March 1910 and April 1913 Heidegger wrote no less than 11 book reviews. Kisiel, Theodore and Thomas Sheehan (eds). 2007. *Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1927*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. lxxviii. Heidegger's single page book review of von Bubnoff's book can be found in GA 1:46.

manuscript - *The Concept of Time* (GA 64). Heidegger would later cite each of these three sources as draft forms of what would become, three years later in 1927, *Being and Time*.¹⁴

Heidegger's oft-repeated task in *Being and Time* is the search for the answer to the question of the meaning of being. Division I of *Being and Time* presents a phenomenological analysis of Dasein as a being in the world and a being which is concerned with being as such (GA 2: 41-42/41). The being that is Dasein is always engaged in this world as an individual and understands itself through its projects and concerns. The introduction of *Being and Time* describes the task of Part One as: "[t]he interpretation of Dasein on the basis of *timeliness* [*zeitlichkeit*] and the explication of temporality as the transcendental horizon of the question of being" (GA 2: 39/37). The first division of *Being and Time* culminates in the assertion that this projective concern is not accidental to Dasein but is grounded in its timeliness.¹⁵ It is not, however, until Division Two that Heidegger offers the promised interpretation of Dasein on the basis of its timeliness.

The project of Division I was only partially successful, however. Although it offered the analytic of Dasein's existence, it confined itself to an analysis of Dasein's existence which was either inauthentic or indifferent. The starting point of Division II is to incorporate Dasein's proper or authentic potentiality-for-being. To accomplish this clarification of Dasein, however, we must have an analysis of the being of Dasein as a whole, what Heidegger calls a primordial interpretation of the ontology of Dasein. For Dasein the primordial ontological ground of its existence is timeliness (*zeitlichkeit*). Heidegger states at the end of the introduction to Division II:

If *timeliness* [*zeitlichkeit*] constitutes the primordial meaning of being of Dasein, and if this being [*Seienden*] is concerned *about its being* in its very being, then care must need

¹⁴

There is a great deal of extant literature both on Heidegger's pre-*Being and Time* conception of time and temporality as well as analyses of Part One of *Being and Time*. My task is to begin with Division II of Part One to see how Heidegger's concept of time develops after 1927. The story of the development of Heidegger's *Being and Time* is extensively documented in Kisiel, Theodore J. 1993. *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*. Berkeley: The University of California Press. 311.

¹⁵

Heidegger goes so far as to say that it is timeliness (*zeitlichkeit*) which makes the *being* of Dasein possible (GA 2: 491/354).

“time” and thus reckon with “time.” The timeliness of Dasein [*Zeitlichkeit des Daseins*] develops a “time calculation.” The “time” experienced in such calculation is the proximate phenomenal aspect of *timeliness* [*zeitlichkeit*]. From it originates the everyday, vulgar understanding of time. And that develops into the traditional concept of time (GA 2: 312/225 tm.).

Heidegger’s concept of timeliness (*zeitlichkeit*) in Division II of *Being and Time* is thus the key to understanding the being that is Dasein which will allow us to understand being itself. Heidegger tantalizingly says at the end of the introduction to Division II: “[w]ith this clarification the understanding prepares itself for a still more primordial temporalizing of timeliness. In it is based the understanding of being that is constitutive for the being of Dasein. The projection of a meaning of being in general can be accomplished in the horizon of time” (GA 2: 312/225)¹⁶.

I follow Heidegger’s analysis of the timely (*zeitlich*) structure of Dasein in two parts. First, (a) we must understand temporality as the ground of Dasein’s constitution. This includes both the understanding of Dasein’s resoluteness and temporality as the ontological meaning of care (*Sorge*). This helps us understand the being of Dasein in the way that its everydayness is disclosed to it. Second, (b) this allows us to understand how the existential structure of Dasein’s everydayness understood through timeliness allows us a more authentic understanding of Dasein’s historicity which will help us investigate our common, “vulgar”, concepts of time. Heidegger’s purpose in examining Dasein’s historicity and our average everyday notions of time is not merely to show that they are derivative of Dasein’s own timeliness (*zeitlichkeit*), but that we can learn something about the way in which other beings and being itself are determined by time.

¹⁶Heidegger later adds to the 7th edition of *Being and Time*, the official *Gesamtausgabe* version, from his personal “hut copy” (*Hüttenexemplar*), the following footnote: “Presencing (Arrival and Event)” [*Anwesenheit (Ankunft und Ereignis)*] (GA 2: 312/225). It is impossible to date when Heidegger may have written this but it is not present in the original 1927 manuscript. My claim, as Chapter Two aims to show, is that it is only with a transition in Heidegger’s thinking in his middle period that we can make sense of the transformation of time as the horizon for the meaning of being in general to time understood as presencing, arrival, and event.

A. *Temporality as the Ground Dasein's Constitution*

Heidegger's goal in Division II is to reexamine the now familiar structures of Dasein's being-there with special view towards the way in which timeliness (*zeitlichkeit*) emerges as the distinctive feature of Dasein's being, i.e. the ground of the constitution of Dasein. Put differently, the result of the investigation into the everyday existence of Dasein as that which is fundamentally disclosed to itself as timeliness, we may now reexamine each of these disclosive structures with a backwards glance as to what they elucidate about temporality. In Division II Heidegger takes up the four structural moments of understanding, attunement, entanglement, and discourse introduced in Division I, in order to now show how each point back to the single structure of timeliness (*zeitlichkeit*) as their unity. Particularly important for the establishment of fundamental ontology is the timeliness of understanding. The timely (*zeitliche*) form of understanding discloses my own potentiality for being, my own existential possibility. I understand the fact of something (say that it is raining outside) only because I can do something with this understanding and that it means something for my possibilities (namely since I don't like being wet, I shouldn't go outside). I project myself towards my possibilities based upon the way in which they present themselves in my life.

By examining the timeliness of understanding Heidegger attempts to move away from the ontic considerations of how I might explain or conceive of something generally and move instead to a thematization of what it means for us to ontologically understand something at all. This is the explicit shift from the phenomenological analysis of Division I to the transcendental analysis of Division II.¹⁷

¹⁷Stefan Käufer offers a persuasive analysis of how the structure of Heidegger's transcendental argument in Division II follows the threefold synthesis of Kant's A-deduction. See Käufer, Steffan. "Temporality as the Ontological Sense of Care" in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's Being and Time*. Ed. Mark A. Wrathall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2013. 338-359.

Heidegger names three ecstatic structures of timeliness¹⁸. The first is anticipation and is futural in its orientation. We will return momentarily to the importance of this ecstatic mode for understanding. The second temporal ecstasy of understanding is the moment (*Augenblick*) and corresponds to the present. The third is repetition (*Wiederholung*), understood as the taking up again of the returning sense of self that I projected in anticipation. Repetition corresponds to Dasein's having-been.

These structures unify in the following way. In anticipation I project myself futurally upon my possibilities. I circumspectfully examine my world, taking note of the things at hand, other Dasein, other non-Dasein, and the totality of things at hand. I then pursue a modification of these other innerworldly things by projecting possibilities. I anticipate a certain sense of my being in my interactions with these otherworldly things. I run ahead to a possible future in anticipation, I become enraptured in the first moment of encounter (*Augenblick*) of something or someone as at hand in my world. In remembrance I run back to myself from my future. I bring back and take up again for my own self those meaningful structures of my world and retain a sense of care for the things which have made me who I am and who I will become. My care for my world and my being illuminates the timely structures of running ahead, presence in the moment, and return to self.¹⁹ Care illustrates my existence as a temporal existence and as a being that is “there” in the world, alongside other beings.

In my understanding of my surrounding world, my circumspect taking care, I recognize at hand things “as” something. I interpret their presence “as” part of the timely unfolding of myself in the world. In understanding other beings “as” something I am also able to learn something about

¹⁸Because we are speaking here of the authentic temporal structure of Dasein I only discuss the three authentic modes. Heidegger provides the corresponding inauthentic temporal ecstasies and relates them back to their associated sections in Division I.

¹⁹Sheehan provides a nice illustration of this process in: Sheehan, Thomas. *Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015. 169-177. He is one of the few commentators to mark the importance of the notion of ‘movedness’ as it relates to Heidegger’s analysis of time from Aristotle, which I discuss in the next sections.

their being in the world. I develop ideas and concepts about how they are in the world. I thematize them and make them an object of investigation and interpretation. The aim of this thematization is the “freeing [of] beings encountered with the world in such a way that they can ‘project’ themselves back upon pure discovery, that is, they can become objects. Thematization objectifies” (GA 2: 362/345).

This realization of the innerworldly existence of other beings and the possibility for their transformation into objects of understanding reveals something surprising. Recall that other entities become objectified through the threefold ecstatic structure of Dasein’s timeliness. Dasein’s circumspect taking care of things discloses the world and other encountered entities to Dasein. But in thematizing those things encountered, Dasein necessarily “transcends” them, in Heidegger’s terminology. Dasein “steps beyond” other innerworldly entities in its projection by transforming the encounter with other things “as” an object for thematization. Heidegger puts this in the following way:

If the thematization of what is objectively present—the scientific project of nature—is to become possible, *Dasein must transcend* the beings thematized. Transcendence does not consist in objectivation, but is rather presupposed by it. But if the thematization of innerworldly beings objectively present is a change-over from taking care which circumspectly discovers, then a transcendence of Da-sein must already underlie “practical” being together with things at hand (GA 2: 481/346).

In thematizing entities Dasein understands its being in the world as a horizon of possibilities and projections. Timeliness thus discloses to Dasein both that it is “there” and through that disclosure that it exists in the world. When Dasein encounters other entities as horizons of possibility it thematizes their possibility into its own threefold temporal structure. This thematization is essential because it allows Dasein the possibility of attaining an understanding of being (*Sein*) through the disclosure of other innerworldly beings. This possibility of understanding being through other beings on the basis of Dasein’s timeliness is precisely the project of fundamental ontology.

B. *Timeliness, Historicity, and the Common Concept of Time*

Dasein is not timely because it is a being in history. Dasein has historicity because its being is fundamentally timely (GA 2: 498/359). In examining the vulgar, or common, conception of history we arrive at the determination that Dasein is always historical (whether inauthentically or authentically) and that its historicity is grounded upon care, itself determined through Dasein's timeliness.²⁰

Dasein's existence isn't the total of its experiences that occur one after another in succession, but is instead the way in which Dasein circumspectfully cares for its existence and articulates this care in the threefold structure of its timeliness. We can think of Dasein as *stretched out* (*Erstreckend*) or extended "between" the happening of Dasein's "birth" and its dying (GA 2: 494/357). Dasein's self-constancy, its persistence through time, is not due to time as a container nor to the movement of celestial objects but is grounded on Dasein's temporalizing of timeliness (*der Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit*) (GA 2: 497/358)²¹. Timeliness is not a theme of history ontologically, but vice versa. History (and "time") are possible only because Dasein's temporalizes its timeliness. Dasein is not an object "within" history, instead history is constituted by the way in which Dasein projects itself, its care, in its temporalizing:

The movement of existence is not the motion of something objectively present [*eines Vorhandenen*]. It is determined from the stretching along of Dasein. The specific movement of the *stretched out stretching itself along*, we call the *occurrence* [*Geschehen*] of Dasein. The question of the "connectedness" of Dasein is the ontological problem of its occurrence. To expose the *structure of occurrence* and the existential and temporal conditions of its possibility means to gain an *ontological* understanding of *historicity* [*Geschichtlichkeit*] (GA 2: 495/358).

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Because Heidegger is concerned in Division II with the authentic or primordial interpretation of Dasein and Dasein's authentic temporality, I do not spend much space in discussing inauthentic history except in so far as it elucidates some aspect of Dasein's temporality and time.

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I have chosen the less fortunate English translation "temporalizing of timeliness" for *der Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit* because there is no suitable equivalent for *zeitigung*. It should be kept in mind, however, that temporalizing used in this phrase does not relate to temporality (*Temporalität*).

The ontological key to understanding the way in which Dasein is stretched out and maintains its self-constancy is through understanding the way in which Dasein's timeliness hands over possibilities to itself. Recall that Dasein's primary mode of self-projection is a self-projection in anticipation of its possibilities (towards being a whole).²² These possibilities are given to Dasein in its initial encounter with other at hand entities in its being in the world. Like Dasein, these entities are ontologically already there. In encountering these entities Dasein takes them up as its own as a possibility for its own being. Dasein is also projected back to itself in its having-been. Its having-been discloses to Dasein an authentic repetition of its happening as a being.

Repetition is thus an authentic handing back to oneself one's own most possibility for being through the unity of the threefold horizon of ecstatic timeliness. Dasein's encounter with its having been (and with the presence of other at hand entities) determines for Dasein its "past". Just as its initial ontological encounter with other innerworldly entities produces an understanding of happenings as a "present" or a "now". Things only become "historical artifacts" because Dasein (and *only* Dasein) understands them through its own timeliness. Archeological or historical relics, monuments, or recordings are "*possible* 'material' for the concrete disclosure of *Da-sein* that has-been-there" (GA 2: 520/374 em.). The presence of other at hand materials or entities does not mean that there is a "past", merely that Dasein has understood their innerworldly presence through its own having-been. This understanding, however, allows such "past" objects to disclose something about the nature of timeliness and thus being.

From this idea of history as the historicity of Dasein and Dasein's interpretation of the presence of innerworldly entities, whether still living or not, as historical, Heidegger is finally in a

²²See also Heidegger's discussion of the way in which the three timely ecstases maintain the constancy (*Ständigkeit*) of the self in the moment (*Augenblick*) of its taking care (GA 2: 542/391).

position at the end of *Being and Time* to provide a provisional ontological analysis of timeliness as the source of our ordinary common (“vulgar”) conception of time.

The ontological analysis of the common concept of time by way of Dasein’s timeliness comprises the last chapter, and only the last five sections, of *Being and Time*. Heidegger begins and ends the chapter with a tantalizing cluster of questions: how or in what way does time have any sense of being (*Sein*), is there a way to move from primordial time (*ursprüngliche Zeit*) to the meaning of being, and does time reveal itself as the horizon of being (*Sein*)? Clearly Heidegger thinks that there is. It is the understanding of Dasein’s timeliness which is going to help us “make possible something like an understanding of being and addressing of beings” (GA 2: 536/386). Heidegger tells us that before we can discuss temporality (*Temporalität*) as the basis for understanding the time of being, we must conclude our analysis of Dasein’s timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) by understanding the way in which Dasein is “within time.” That is, how Dasein cares for its time and the way in which Dasein understands other non-Dasein to be within its time, out of which emerges our everyday common, or vulgar, concept of time.

Heidegger’s concept of time in his early period is, as far as Heidegger describes it, intentionally transcendental. I showed that Dasein temporalizes the encounter or happening of other entities (particularly at hand non-Dasein) on the basis of a transcendental horizon of possibilities. The point of the analysis of timeliness was to warrant the claim that Dasein is time and time is Dasein because of timeliness and that Dasein is not *within* “time” (GA 64: 118/14E).

We can ask, at this point, why Heidegger needs to justify the way other entities are within time at all? Heidegger could simply demonstrate that our common concept of time is derivative of our timeliness and close the analysis. This is, in large part, what *Being and Time* accomplishes.

Interpreting *Being and Time* this way misses Heidegger’s stated reason for providing a phenomenological means to arrive at a science of fundamental ontology. Heidegger must be able to

show that Dasein can analyze the timely existence of other non-Dasein. This is achieved through a) recognizing that Dasein understands the being of other beings through its own horizontal ecstatic timeliness and b) that there is a given horizon in which other entities are encountered²³. Heidegger provides an analysis of how other entities are within time for Dasein as a way to guarantee phenomenological access to them and not just our own particular being. Dasein's recognition that there are other innerworldly entities and that it projects these entities upon a timely horizon of possibilities is essential for establishing the project of fundamental ontology.

In interpreting encounters and occurrences with other entities, Dasein assigns the presence of these entities a relationality to its own timeliness²⁴. This relationality becomes understood as a kind of "public time" and designates the primordial way in which "beings [*Seiende*] unlike Dasein," exist, "*within-time*" (GA 2: 544/392). The interpretation of the encounter of other beings within the horizon of our timeliness allows us to designate these occurrences as "now", "then", and "on that former occasion". Critical for Heidegger's point is that these designations of "public time" do not name anything outside of Dasein and do not even name the beings encountered (GA 24: 366/259). These expressions name references to the structure of Dasein's own understanding of being-in-the-world on the basis of its timeliness (GA 2: 540-541/388-389). The public time of "now", "then",

²³Lee Braver thinks that the last chapter of Division II is merely a truncated version of the analysis of temporality (*Temporalität*) and that Division III would have provided us with an analysis of being itself. Braver's analysis of the Kantian import of talk of horizontality is excellent, but I disagree with him on this particular point. Division III, as Heidegger outlined it, was to be on why time understood via *Temporalität* is justified in giving us phenomenological access to being. Part Two of *Being and Time* was to be the analysis of being. See Braver, Lee. "Turning from a Given Horizon to the Givenness of Horizons" in *Division III of Heidegger's Being and Time: The Unanswered Question of Being*, edited by Lee Braver, MIT Press, 2015. 64.

²⁴In Heidegger's unpublished notes on temporality he says that timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) is the ground of relationality. Ostensibly because it is through the structure of its timeliness that Dasein makes sense of its encounter with other entities. Heidegger, Martin. "Aufzeichnungen zur Temporalität (Aus den Jahren 1925 bis 1927)," *Heidegger Studies*, 14 (1998): 21.

and even “during” or “span” reveals time as a *self*-interpretation for Dasein because such terms only make sense by reference to Dasein’s own timeliness (GA 2: 541/390).

In one of Heidegger’s few concrete examples in Division II, he provides a phenomenological interpretation of Dasein’s reckoning with its encounter with the sun. Dasein can see thanks to the sun’s brightness, through seeing Dasein can understand and interpret its immediate circumspect taking care, and in looking around and reckoning with at hand entities it can see because of its encounter with the sun. Yet, when the sun is not at hand Dasein becomes more limited in its possibilities because of its dependence on sight. Dasein learns to orient its circumspect taking care with regards to the availability of the sun and the capacity it provides Dasein to see and understand itself in terms of its “daily” work. Dasein names its encounter with the sun’s presence “day” and says that it is “*time for*” Dasein’s work (GA 2: 545/393). The sun’s absence it names “night” and awaits the sun’s arrival. Dasein temporalizes the presence and absence of the sun, just as it temporalizes the presence and absence of all entities because of the constitution of Dasein as timeliness. Day and night become means by which all Dasein can orient their taking care of things and interact with other Dasein and non-Dasein. Dasein’s awareness of its own existence as “stretched out” allows it to interpret something like a “span” or “duration” between its anticipation of the sun’s presence (the “future”) and the arrival of the sun in the interpretation of the “now.”

When other entities arrive Dasein observes the movement and position of these entities and other Dasein. This movement establishes a relationality not only of presence (or absence) but also of position with regards to nearness and farness from Dasein. Dasein understands the sun to be in a certain position because of its own timely (*zeitlich*) reckoning taking care, sees that it has moved, understands this new location as a division of its own timeliness. This is the essential insight which Heidegger takes from Aristotle’s account of time in the *Physics* and which I discuss in more detail below. Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of Aristotle shows that Dasein establishes “time”

based upon the reckoning, measurement, and calculation that it itself performs in temporalizing its encounters and interactions with other entities (GA 24: 369/261). This making public of its own timely (*zeitlich*) understanding positions the encounter with other entities within a framework of presence and absence.

The reckoning with these positions, the dividing up, measuring, and calculating of these relational encounters allows Dasein to establish something like a “clock”. A clock, for Dasein, is an at hand tool explicitly to aid with the reckoning, understanding, and making public of Dasein’s own innerworldly encounters in its circumspect taking care. Critically, the “time” that is “measured” by the clock is Dasein, it is: “a more primordial understanding of the fact that *time measured*—that is, at the same time the explicit making public of time take care of—is grounded *in the timeliness* of Dasein and indeed in a quite definite temporalizing of that timeliness” (GA 2: 548/395).

The clock is comprehensible as an at hand tool only because it expresses something about Dasein’s own self-understanding and interpretation of its being in the world, i.e. its timeliness. The clock allows Dasein to see what is important in taking care, situates events as “moments” (or positions) of significance, and provides a tool for Dasein’s self-understanding (GA 24: 374/265). The clock, however, also reveals a second essential aspect for Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology – the “now”.

The “now” is the name for Dasein’s self-interpretation of an event or occurrence of its encounter with other entities. The now therefore ontologically expresses the unity of the ecstatic horizon of the moment (*Augenblick*) and the presence of other innerworldly entities. When we say “now” we are expressing to other Dasein the happening of an event. In saying “now that we are together” I am making public my own temporalization of the moment of encounter with the presence of other Dasein. Other Dasein are also experiencing their own “now” with me. I am objectifying their presence and they are objectifying mine. The clock becomes a tool for the

objectification of presence and the being (*Sein*) of other innerworldly entities that each Dasein encounters and understands. The accessibility of the “now” as the expression of a happening makes “time” available to everyone, although as the happening of presence it does not “belong” to anyone. In this way, Heidegger thinks that the peculiar objectivity of time arises: “[t]here is time, time is given [*sie ist vorhanden*], it is extant, without our being able to say how or where it is” (GA 24: 373/264). However, objectification of “time” obscures the actual ontological encounter we understand as temporality (*Temporalität*).

II. THE TEMPORALITY (*Temporalität*) OF BEING

On Monday, January 11th, 1926, after returning from Christmas break, Heidegger introduces to the students of his “Logic: The Question of Truth” course a strange, by his own admission, term to characterize a phenomenon that is *essentially* characterized by time – *Temporalität*. His reason, he explains, is that the everyday term “timely” (*zeitlich*) means something that “runs its course, or happens, or takes place in time”, which is not what he means (GA 21: 199/169). Unlike timeliness, temporality (*Temporalität*) doesn’t describe a process or a movement, much less something which happens *in* time (the emphasis is Heidegger’s). Heidegger adds:

When we inquire into just how far certain phenomena are essentially characterized by time [*Zeit*], we take as our theme their temporal [*temporale*] structure—in a word, their temporality [*Temporalität*]. The project of investigating the temporality [*Temporalität*] of phenomena is one that relates the phenomena to these very time determinations [*Zeitbestimmungen*] and consequently (if it is a philosophical investigation) relates them to time as such [*die Zeit als solche*]. This fundamental philosophical examination that has time [*Zeit*] for its subject matter we call a chronology, indeed a *phenomenological chronology* (GA 21: 199/169 tm.).

These temporal (*temporale*) structures and temporality (*Temporalität*) are intended to tell us something about time *as such* and not merely Dasein’s experience of timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*). Put differently, Dasein’s own experience of its timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*), when understood phenomenologically, allows us to see that timeliness as an essential determination of Dasein, an entity whose essence is temporal

(*temporale*). Dasein is temporal because it is an entity essentially characterized by temporality. In understanding temporality (*Temporalität*) we gain insight into the character of being (*Sein*) rather than beings. Heidegger will say in 1935 that *Being and Time* is not “a ‘philosophy of time’ and even less a doctrine about the ‘timeliness’ [*Zeitlichkeit*] of humans,” but “, the truth of being itself and not of beings, not even of beings as beings” (GA 94: IV, 76/199-200). Temporality (*Temporalität*) provides us the phenomenological guideline into thinking about the temporality of being (*Temporalität des Seins*) and therefore, being as such.

The importance of a proper analysis of *Temporalität*, including what he would term in *Being and Time* as the “temporal interpretation” (*die temporale Interpretation*) and the “temporality of being” (*Temporalität des Seins*), occupies Heidegger increasingly between 1926 and 1928, despite the terms near absence from *Being and Time*. Heidegger’s only other reference before this time to the adjective *temporal* occurs roughly ten years earlier in his 1915 habilitation *The Doctrine of Categories and Signification in Duns Scotus* (GA 1: 563). It is only first in the context of the 1925-1926 lecture course on logic that Heidegger provides his own phenomenological interpretation of *Temporalität*.²⁵

A. Heidegger’s Logic Course & the Development of Temporality

²⁵

It is curious that despite teaching an entire lecture course the previous semester entitled “History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena” (GA 20), Heidegger does not introduce the term *Temporalität*. Similarly, even *Zeitlichkeit* as a term only appears less than half a dozen times, although it is mentioned with some emphasis as a particular way of our being with one another in the world in the final closing minutes of the course (GA 20: 442/320). This suggests that Heidegger may have developed the idea for the first use of the term sometime during the middle part of 1925. The only other analogue to the concept of *Temporalität* in Heidegger’s thought prior to the use in 1925-1926 logic course is Heidegger’s brief discussion of temporalness (*Zeitlichsein*) in his 1924 draft of *The Concept of Time*. Heidegger’s use of *Zeitlichsein* in that text however is inconsistent. In some uses it seems to possibly stand for something like *Temporalität*, that is, as the way in which the being that is Dasein is made temporal in its existence (GA 64: 86/73). In other cases it is obvious that it is merely conflated with *Zeitlichkeit* in *Being and Time* (see GA 64: 76/65 & 81/65). It is on this interpretation that I take larger issues with Peter Manchester’s reading of ecstatic temporality in Heidegger and his otherwise excellent reading of Heidegger and Augustine. See Manchester, Peter. *Temporality and the Trinity*. New York: Fordham University Press. 2015.

Heidegger's logic course concluded on February 25th, 1926 and Heidegger had promised the dean of the philosophy faculty at Marburg, Max Deutschbein, that a completed copy of *Being and Time* would be at the printer by April 1st, 1926.²⁶ Heidegger's discussion of temporality in *Being and Time* is extremely brief. For this reason we must look to other sources from the same time as Heidegger was writing *Being and Time* and just after. Analyses of temporality occur late in the 1925-1926 logic course, around the time Heidegger would have been writing Division II, as well as the 1927 summer semester course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, and a few notes written up to 1928.²⁷

In introducing his students to the second part of his 1925-1926 course on "Logic: The Question of Truth", Heidegger offers the thesis that "truth, being, and consequently falsehood, synthesis, and statement are, in some kind of (for the time being) obscure sense, connected with the phenomenon of time" and that their project will be to clarify time by reference to truth, falsehood, and synthesis (GA 21: 198-199/168). He then transitions by claiming that the characteristic that makes these phenomena (truth, falsehood, statement, etc.) temporal is what he terms temporality. Temporality is the temporal ontological determination which allows a statement, proposition, or being to be what it is. Temporality is the basic determination of being itself (GA 21: 195/168). He adds:

Now we must determine the temporality [*Temporalität*] of these phenomena as modes of the being of Dasein [*Seinsweisen des Daseins*] and thus as comportments that have the ontological character of care. If temporality [*Temporalität*] is a—or *the*—basic determination of being itself, then probably care itself in its whole structure must have a temporal [*temporalen*] character. And for their part, the comportments of the

²⁶Husserl, Edmund, and Martin Heidegger. *Psychological and transcendental phenomenology and the confrontation with Heidegger, 1927-1931*. Edited and translated by Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer. *Husserlania: Collected Works*. Vol. VI. Dordrecht: Springer, 1997. 19.

²⁷Of interest are Heidegger's own notes on temporality (*Temporalität*) from 1925 to 1927. The notes belong to the manuscript of the lecture course from the winter semester 1925-1926. These notes represent approximately 200 unnumbered pages from the Heidegger's archives. The pages are wrapped in a bundle labeled "I.3", ostensibly in reference to the unpublished Division III Part One of *Being and Time* (Kisiel, 2015). A selection of 30 of these pages has been published in Heidegger, Martin. "Aufzeichnungen zur Temporalität (Aus den Jahren 1925 bis 1927)" (Notes on Temporality [From the Years 1925 to 1927]), *Heidegger Studies* 14 (1998): 11–26.

whole will be temporal [*temporal*] insofar as they are comportments of Dasein, the phenomena of concern and care (GA 21: 234/195 trans. modified).

Heidegger's argument seems to go something like this: care is the determination of being for Dasein. But because determinations of being are temporal and care is a determination of being, then care too must have a temporal (in the ontological sense of *Temporalität*) structure too. Care is understood as not just something which Dasein is concerned for, namely itself, but *also* as an ontological structure of the particular kind of being (*Seiende*) which we call Dasein. Care is an essential ontological determination of the being of Dasein and not simply an ontic description of it. Although the logic course is provisionally a course on Kant and logic and the ontological characteristics of truth, falsehood, synthesis, etc. Heidegger does provide, in another context from the same year, a different but analogous description of what he means regarding something having both an ontological and an ontic determination.

Heidegger makes three enigmatic references to *Temporalität* a few months later in the 1926 summer semester lecture course "The Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy". In his lecture notes Heidegger glosses *Temporalität* with the Aristotelian terms χρόνος, κίνησις, ἐντελέχεια (GA 22: 170/143). It is not entirely clear what Heidegger means in invoking these terms, but the notes are with regard to motion (κίνησις) as a radical and fundamental state which is an essential determination of beings, to include the unmoved mover. In these notes, Heidegger links these terms with temporality as an ontological character of *all* beings (GA 22: 174/146). Heidegger makes a similarly provocative reference to temporality (*Temporalität*) in a supplement to the discussion of Aristotle's categories from the same course:

Categories = "ontological kinds," kinds of Being! And Being? The modalization of presence! Principle of modalization on the basis of the idea of Being itself.
 Temporality. Cf. Kant: schematism. How are the kinds to be acquired? Being – δύναμις παρουσίας. Presence of many things (plurality?), formal multiplicity, accessible in the "something as something". Categories are the (highest) concepts of

the modes of Being, and as such they are γένη. Modes of the togetherness of multiplicities as beings, presences (GA 22: 200/165).

Here Heidegger wants to link together the idea of beings and a modalization of being (*Sein*). It is *Temporalität* and not *Zeitlichkeit* which is the principle of that modalization. If categories are kinds of being, the question then becomes, how do they acquire the mode or category of being itself? The answer is temporality, as an ontological category which all beings have by virtue of being²⁸. This echoes the two-fold structure implied in §17 and §18 of the logic course and the announced (but undelivered) analysis from *Being and Time*.

What these reflections about temporality (*Temporalität*) make clear, and what, for various reasons *Being and Time* does not elaborate upon, is the ontological priority of the analysis of *Temporalität* to *Zeitlichkeit* and our average everyday understanding of “time”.²⁹ This material makes explicit that our average everyday understanding of time and the timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) of Dasein is helpful only because it serves to illuminate some of the hidden contours of the temporality of being (GA 21: 245/204). Because we can only arrive at temporality (*Temporalität*) by means of an analysis of Dasein and of our everyday understanding of the concept of time, temporality will always remain partially hidden and the ontological phenomenon of time itself indeterminate (GA 21: 237-238/198-199). *Being and Time*'s project was to provide an exhaustive analysis of Dasein's timeliness (*zeitlichkeit*) in Part One so that the Heidegger could arrive at the proper analysis of the phenomenon of time as

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Heidegger seems to emphasize the multiplicity or plurality of temporality as it relates to various beings in a single obscure usage of “temporalities” (*Temporalien*) during the logic course (GA 21: 243/202). The term is never used again in Heidegger's corpus. Jaran, Francois and Christophe Perrin (eds). 2013. *The Heidegger Concordance*. 3 volumes. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. Vol 2, 470.

²⁹

In addition to the pressures from his department and the Prussian Ministry of Education, Heidegger had already begun to sense issues with what he had already written in *Being and Time* by the time the galley proofs had gone to press. In part thanks to conversations with Jaspers in December 1926, Heidegger realized that the most important section (Part One, Division III) of what he had worked on so far, must remain unintelligible (*daß die bis dahin erreichte Ausarbeitung dieses wichtigsten Abschnittes (I,3) unverständlich bleiben müsse*). (GA 49: 39-40).

temporality (*Temporalität*) in Part Two. Unfortunately, the discussion of *Temporalität* never occurred in *Being and Time*, although announced, and it is not until the summer semester course of 1927, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, that we get a fuller glimpse of what Heidegger learned about temporality (*Temporalität*) through the analysis of Dasein as timely (*zeitlich*). Almost all of Heidegger's writings between 1926 and 1928 contain reflections, reformulations, and attempts at characterizing *Temporalität*.³⁰

B. Being and Time and the Project of a Fundamental Ontology

The announced structure of *Being and Time* sees Heidegger wanting to clearly articulate his concept of temporality (*Temporalität*), the “temporality of being” (*Temporalität des Seins*), and the “temporal interpretation” (*die temporale Interpretation*). All but one instance of Heidegger's usage of *temporal* and its cognates occurs in the two-chapter “Introduction” where he lays out his proposed structure for the entire two-part project of *Being and Time*. It is clear, however, from Heidegger's own comments that he believes that his conceptualization of temporality (*Temporalität*) and a temporal interpretation are a unique and original contribution to the history of philosophy.³¹

³⁰W.R. Boyce Gibson, the British phenomenologist who first translated Husserl's *Ideas I* into English, records in his diary from October 1928, during Heidegger's seminar on Aristotle's *Physics* IV.1-3, that: “[Heidegger] also told me it would be some little time before the 2nd half of his article [*Being and Time*] appeared. Not likely in the next *Jahrbuch*.” Gibson's diary entries provide an interesting and warm character portrait of Heidegger from this time. Gibson, W.R. Boyce. “From Husserl to Heidegger: Excerpts from a 1928 Freiburg Diary.” Edited Herbert Spiegelberg. *The Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology*. Vol. 2. 1971. 72.

³¹Heidegger had made this claim to the students of his 1926 *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy* course earlier that summer as part of an analysis of Parmenides, stating: “Being is *constant presence*. The now is the same in every now. Being is, in what it is, constantly without opposition or difference. This connection, namely that in the determination of Being there is also a determination of time, has never been heeded previously, or has only been noted superficially. Differences of Being with respect to time: temporal Being: the real; non-temporal Being: the ideal; super-temporal Being: the metaphysical. Why and whence this connection, with what justification? How does time come to serve as criterion to differentiate the various modes of Being?” (GA 22: 68/56). I will return to the theme of the relation of time to being as constant presence.

In the second chapter of the introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger lays out his program for the ontological analysis of Dasein because doing so will allow us to see previously hidden aspects about the meaning of being. He tells us that the meaning of being (*Sein*) of that particular being (*Seienden*) we call Dasein is timeliness (*zeitlichkeit*). But this does not provide us with a view to the meaning of being in general. Instead we need something else which acts as our horizon for understanding the meaning of being that is nevertheless related to our own meaning as *zeitlich*. That horizon will be time. Time, as Heidegger says, is “*the central problem of all ontology*” (GA 2: 25/18 tm).

Heidegger’s guiding thought in *Being and Time* is that if being (*Sein*) is conceived in terms of time then the various modes, characteristics, and determinations of being become exposed on the basis of an analysis of timeliness. The problem is that timeliness only exposes the ontological structure of particular beings and not being in general. But perhaps if we can understand the timely (*zeitlich*) way that beings are temporal, then we can understand time as such. And since all ontology is rooted in time, then analyzing ontological time will tell us something about the meaning of being in general. Because time is the central question of all ontology, that is, being is comprehensible only with regard to time, we will need to delineate this special branch of ontology which investigates the ontology of time as fundamental ontology:

Because the expression “timely” [*zeitlich*] belongs to both pre-philosophical and philosophical usage, and because that expression will be used in a different sense in the following investigations, we shall call the original determination of the meaning of being and its characters and modes which devolve from time its *temporal* [*temporale*] determination. The fundamental ontological task of the interpretation of being as such thus includes the elaboration of the temporality of being [*Temporalität des Seins*]. In the exposition of the problem of temporality [*Problematik der Temporalität*] the concrete answer to the question of the meaning of being [*Sinn des Seins*] is first given (GA 2: 26/18 tm).

Heidegger suggests that there is a temporal (ontological) interpretation of understanding.

Heidegger’s remark, although not specified as such, nevertheless fits in comfortably with his overall

task of using Dasein's existential structures (i.e. those very structures which become visible via Dasein's timeliness) to say something about the general meaning of being. The temporal interpretation indicates that timeliness represents the horizon from which we can understand being: "[w]hat we are inquiring into in existential analytic, existence [*die Existenz*], proves to be timeliness [*zeitlichkeit*], which on its part constitutes the horizon for the understanding of being that belongs essentially to the Dasein" (GA 24: 324/228). It is only with the 1927 summer semester course, however, that Heidegger lays out his fullest interpretation of time and temporality in the early period.

C. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology and beyond*

Heidegger's retrospectively inserted footnote in the first sentence of the for-publication version of the 1927 summer semester course reads: "[a] new elaboration of Division III of Part One of *Being and Time*" (GA 24: 1/1). That division was originally planned as "Time and being" [*Zeit und Sein*] and was, in fact, never elaborated. Heidegger only arrives at the discussion of time and being very late in the semester, although the centrality of the relation between timeliness and temporality is evident throughout. For Heidegger the possibility of fundamental ontology rests on a sufficiently clear differentiation between being (*Sein*) and beings and "accordingly with the possibility of negotiating a passage from the ontic consideration of beings to the ontological thematization of being [*Sein*]" (GA 24: 322/227). Heidegger terms this in course's introduction the "problem of the ontological difference" (GA 24: 22/17). The ontological difference is the name Heidegger gives to those differences already highlighted in the logic course and *Being and Time*, namely the difference between the meaning of beings in their being and the meaning of being itself. It is this difference and relation which is precisely what is aimed at in uncovering the structure of timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) of a being (*Seiende*) to the temporal (*temporale*) structure of being itself.

Heidegger's begins the 1927 summer semester course with the existential analytic of the common concept of time with the hope that like the analysis of timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) in *Being and Time*, it will unveil something essential about the temporal character of being. Heidegger sums up the orientation and goal of the course saying:

The main point is to see being in its Temporal determination and to unveil its problematics. But if being becomes phenomenologically visible in its Temporal determination, we thereby put ourselves in a position to grasp the distinction between being and beings more clearly as well, and to fix the ground of the ontological difference. (GA 24: 324/228-229).

Heidegger's emphasis is the making visible of temporal determinations so that they can illuminate something about being itself. Heidegger divides the course into the four categories: time and timeliness, timeliness and temporality, temporality and being, and being and beings (*Sein und Seiendes*). Unfortunately, Heidegger is only able to cover the promised sections on temporality and being, and being and beings in the last few hours of the course and even their treatment is extremely brief. The aim of this section then is to attempt to pull out the essential features of Heidegger's understanding of temporality and its relation to time and timeliness and why they are essential for fundamental ontology.

Because timeliness (*zeitlichkeit*) is for Dasein the horizon for the explicit understanding of its being it also provide Dasein the conditions for understanding being as such. When timeliness is used in this special sense, as a condition of possibility for the understanding of being (both pre-ontological and ontological) then this particular role of timeliness is understood as temporality (*Temporalität*) because it is the condition of possibility of understanding the temporality of being, and therefore time, itself (GA 24: 388/274). Heidegger sums this up saying: “[i]f Dasein harbors the understanding of being within itself, and if temporality makes possible the Dasein in its ontological constitution, then *temporality* must also be the *condition of the possibility* of the *understanding of being* and hence of the *projection of being upon time*. The question is whether time is indeed that upon which being

is itself projected-whether time is that by way of which we understand the like of being” (GA 24: 397/280).

For the project of fundamental ontology, a great deal rides upon Dasein’s ability to bridge the gap between the understanding of the constitution of its own being (as timeliness) and the understanding of being in general through the special mode of understanding revealed through temporality. It is for this reason that Heidegger can say, as he did in *Being and Time*, that the special problem of the temporality of being is *the* fundamental problem of ontology. Heidegger recognizes that in order to bridge the gap of the ontological difference, he must first determine what makes understanding ontologically, and not merely ontically, possible.

Heidegger’s analysis of how this might be possible is as follows. Dasein is in a sense attempting to reach “beyond” itself and other beings in understand being (GA 24: 405/286). This reaching “beyond” as an essential moment of understanding is projection (*Entwurf*). This projection of ourself into our world (our being-in-the-world) allows us to interact with other entities and things within the sphere of our world. In so doing we acknowledge that these other entities and things in the world are there for a purpose and we expect something of them (to respond, to not respond, to be available or unavailable). In projecting we have a future oriented expectation of these “handy” items because we project upon them our own possibilities. The future, present, and past, as structurally timely (*zeitlich*) moments are all essentially ecstatic in that they step outside of the now and into a transcendent “beyond”, Dasein’s being-in-the-world with other Dasein, entities, and things. This projection of a horizon operates both as the projection of possibilities (i.e. *how* I make use of other entities and things) and also from which the everyday ideas of past, present, and future are derived. This projection, however, has a much more important, temporal (*temporale*) role. It allows me to ontologically encounter, recognize, and possibly understand being itself through other

beings.³² This means though that my understanding of other beings is essentially achieved through timeliness. It is only the temporal “beyond” of other entities and things that makes this understanding ontologically possible.

What determines the horizon of this “beyond” is not Dasein’s cognizing or self-projection, but the actual presence of other intraworldly entities. It is only because of our projecting that other entities and things become intelligible. Our understanding is thus mediated by the presence, not the “present”, of other intraworldly entities. For this reason Heidegger distinguishes the present (*Gegenwart*) from the now (*Jetzt*), claiming that the now is important for temporality (*Temporalität*).³³ The assumption Heidegger seems to make is that all beings participate in the same being. In this way, for the early Heidegger, being (*Sein*) is to be understood transcendently, as a “stepping beyond”, although a form of transcendental which isn’t strictly Kantian, Aristotelian, or Scholastic.³⁴

Transcendence, for Heidegger, is founded upon the ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporality. This concept for Heidegger is shorthand for both (a) how we project possibilities on to a horizon of “past”, “present”, or “future” and (b) the projection of a horizon through which entities (and being

³²Heidegger is clear that we can always fail to understand both being and beings, although we always have a pre-conceptual, pre-ontological, sense of being. The task of fundamental ontology is to develop a science for the objectification of being and beings (GA 24: 398-399/281-282). This is discussed in more detail in this chapter in Section III.

³³In his notes on temporality as a main heading for Part One Division III, Heidegger gives “Gegenwart – reine Gegenwart – Jetzt” with a footnote on the last word: “Wichtig für Temporalität,” in Heidegger, Martin. “Aufzeichnungen zur Temporalität (Aus den Jahren 1925 bis 1927)” (Notes on Temporality [From the Years 1925 to 1927]), *Heidegger Studies* 14 (1998): 11.

³⁴Dahlstrom (2015) discusses this in several important footnotes in his “The End of Fundamental Ontology” in *Division III of Heidegger's Being and Time: The Unanswered Question of Being*, edited by Lee Braver, 83-103, MIT Press, 2015. Specifically, Dahlstrom’s claim is that Heidegger tries, and fails, to combine both the traditional medieval and modern (i.e. Scotist and Kantian) meanings of “transcendental” in fundamental ontology. For more on medieval conceptions of transcendental thought, including Heidegger’s reading of Scotus on the categories and *scientia transcendens*, see Aertsen, Jan. *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suarez*. Leiden: Brill, 2012. 647-648.

itself) are understood. It is because of this idea of transcendence that Heidegger feels he is can make the move from timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) to temporality (*Temporalität*).

Timeliness allows me to understand that I am in a world and that this world presents to me other Dasein, other beings, and other entities which I encounter ecstatically in my projection of a “past”, “present”, or “future”³⁵. This is sense (a) above. However, because I am also ontologically encountering other beings and through them establishing a horizon of intelligibility, I thus (b) understand them. The achievement of horizon in sense (a) is through my own timeliness. Sense (b) is my encounter with the timeliness of other beings through the horizon of my projection.

Heidegger can say that all beings are constituted by their timeliness. My understanding of the timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) of other entities is temporal (*temporale*) and is the basis for temporality (*Temporalität*) as such. My understanding of the being of these beings is thus always mediated through the temporal modality of *Temporalität*. This mediation is both the transcendental horizon, the “beyond”, of myself, and also the temporal constitution of the being of other beings.

Temporality is thus a kind of relation for the way in which beings relate to the being of each other.

In Heidegger’s 1927 Aristotle-Hegel summer seminar, taught at the same time as the summer semester course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger elides in his notes “becoming as the concept (authentic truth) of being and temporality [*Werden als Begriff (eigentliche Wahrheit) des Seins und Temporalität*]” (GA 86: 38). Adding further that temporality is the relation between becoming and occurrence (*Geschehen*) (GA 86: 39). Heidegger also suggests, referencing Aristotle’s concept of generation in coming-to-be and passing-away, saying:

Occurrence and temporality and becoming.

Coming-to-be and passing away:

a) a more primordial meaning of timeliness [*Zeitlichkeit*]

³⁵Heidegger truncates what I have described in the following way: “...on the basis of the *timeliness* [*zeitlichkeit*] that grounds the Dasein’s transcendence, the Dasein’s *Temporality* [*Temporalität*] makes possible the *understanding of being*. The most original temporalizing of temporality as such is Temporality [*Temporalität ist die ursprünglichste Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit also solcher*] (GA 24: 429/302).

b) even more radical than temporality [*Temporalität*]
 Temporality [*Temporalität*] the “*mediation*” and its Categories
 (Erdmann 13 §88 fn.)
 Possibility of mediation! Foundational for relation!
Relation as formal ontological category - *relationality* as formal apophantic category!
 Temporality of *what is thought* [*Gedachtheit*] and *truth*.
 (GA 86: 39. Trans. mine)

Important for Heidegger is that temporality acts as a kind relation between entities. This statement parallels a similar statement, possibly delivered around the same time, in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* where Heidegger analyzes Aristotle’s assertion that “[t]he thinking of indivisibles is found in those cases where falsehood is impossible: where the alternative of true or false applies, there we always find a sort of combining of objects of thought in a quasi-unity” (*De Anima*, III.6 430a26-430a28).³⁶ Heidegger thinks that Aristotle is also expressing the idea that temporality is the mediation and the conditions for the possibility for a being (*Seiende*) to understand being (*Sein*) through its relation with other beings.

Heidegger’s logic goes something like the following: understanding the handiness (*Zubandenheit*) of the handy equipment (*des zubandenen Zeugs*) as such is an understanding of the world, and world understanding, as the “beyond” of Dasein is grounded in Dasein’s constitution as ecstatic-horizonal temporality. Thus, our understanding of the handiness of the handy has already projected being on time, namely our own temporality. The recognition of this understanding allows us to say that we can understand handiness (*Zubandenheit*) on temporal (*temporale*) terms, and not simply Dasein’s own timely understanding. This understanding is based, at bottom, on the presence of the handy equipment, what Heidegger designates *praesens*.

³⁶Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές σύνθεσις τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ ἐν ὄντων. In his citation Heidegger truncates the citation to merely: σύνθεσις νοημάτων (GA 24: 258/182).

Heidegger wants to strongly distinguish the character of the *praesens* from any common relations with time. The reason for this is that all common time interpretations are based upon the timeliness of Dasein itself. We do not *ontologically* encounter handy equipment in the present or the now because both of those structures depend on the ecstatic nature of Dasein's own timeliness. Instead, when we encounter the handiness of the handy as *praesens* we encounter the being (*Sein*) of the being (*Seiende*) and project its presence upon a horizon of our understanding as present. The ontologically entity we are encountering is thus both "beyond" us as a presence and also experienced by Dasein as part of Dasein's own present. Heidegger is at pains to point out that in no way though is the ontological encounter with the entity as *praesens* to be thought through the now or present except in so far as it is the union of the horizon of Dasein's understanding with the *praesens* of the entity encountered. Heidegger puts this in the following way:

The ecstasis of the present is as such the condition of possibility of a specific "beyond itself," of transcendence, the projections upon *praesens*. As the condition of possibility of the "beyond itself," the ecstasis of the present has within itself a *schematic pre-designation* of the *where out there* this "beyond itself" is. That which lies beyond the ecstasis as such, due to the character of removal and as determined by that character, or, more precisely, that which determines the *whither of the "beyond itself"* as such in general, is *praesens as horizon*. The present projects itself within itself ecstatically upon *praesens*. *Praesens* is not identical with present, but, as *basic determination of the horizontal schema of this ecstasis*, it joins in constituting the complete time-structure of the present. (GA 24: 436/306).

Although we, as Dasein, understand the beings encountered, and thus being itself, from the horizontal schema of the ecstases of timeliness, the union of these ecstases cannot be detached from the ontological entity encountered in its presence (or corresponding absence). It is in this way that Heidegger can say that temporality is the basis of all understanding because transcendence as the horizon of the "beyond" makes the encounter with other beings understandable. Heidegger calls Dasein's ecstatic-horizontal unity the *ἐπέκεινα*, or "beyond", the mode of transcendence which is

constitutive of Dasein itself. Yet it is only because of temporality understood as the *praesens* of the being of the other that such a transcendental (ontological) understanding can occur.

A year and a half after the publication of *Being and Time* in the summer of 1928, Heidegger attempts to more radically define temporality. In his summer seminar on *Aristotle's Physics, Book III*, delivered at the same time as his lecture course on Leibniz and the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger begins to equate temporality with being itself and with what he terms in the seminar the ontological, or transcendental, understanding of movement. Heidegger finishes a section of notes stating: "Sharp distinction: Being is temporality [*Temporalität*](movedness), and: a being [*Seiendes*] is in motion. Being-in-Motion is itself a definite being and therefore must be as a movement (transcendental movement)" (GA 83: 19³⁷). Heidegger then annotates at the beginning of a section entitled "Aristotle's 'Ontology'" that "οὐσία (*Temporalität*)" (GA 83: 20). Heidegger is clearly identifying being with temporality and temporality with οὐσία.

The aim of fundamental ontology, and for Heidegger, philosophy itself, is to make use of temporal (*temporale*) analysis in order to explicitly provide a description of being. Heidegger summarizes this in his 1928 summer semester course, the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, in a section entitled "Describing the Idea and Function of a Fundamental Ontology":

Fundamental ontology is this whole of founding and developing ontology; the former is 1) the analysis of Dasein, and 2) the analysis of the temporality [*Temporalität*] of being. But the temporal analysis is at the same time the *turning-around* [*Kebrē*], where ontology itself expressly runs back into the metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly always remains. Through the movement of radicalizing and universalizing, the aim is to bring ontology to its latent overturning [*Umschlag*] (GA 26: 201/158 Trans. modified).

The aspect of turning-around as part of the temporal (*temporale*) analysis becomes increasingly central for Heidegger precisely because it is in the moment of the turning-around that we are supposed to get a glimpse of being and not simply of encountered beings. Heidegger's 1928 lecture course on

³⁷ All translations from GA 83 are my own.

Leibniz and the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* are a continuation and further explication of the project of fundamental ontology³⁸. Heidegger does not treat the theme of temporality in any great detail in that course but it is evident nevertheless that through temporal analysis and an awareness of the problem of temporality that we can achieve fundamental ontology as the science of philosophy.

Temporality as a term of art disappears from almost all of Heidegger's work after 1928 and it is not until four years later in 1932 that Heidegger highlights the theme of temporality again. This course, *The Beginning of Western Philosophy: Interpretation of Anaximander and Parmenides*, marks a decisive shift in Heidegger's thinking about the role of temporality and temporal analyses. Heidegger continues to think and lecture on the theme of timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) throughout this period, although curiously the 1932 lecture course on Anaximander and Parmenides does not treat the topic at all. Heidegger seems to begin to have reservations about the success of elucidating an understanding of being and begins on the basis of transcendental understanding and abandons what he terms "Kantian" talk of horizons and "conditions of possibility". By 1935, in the summer semester course *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger speaks of a transition from the transcendental "understanding of being" to the "happening of being."

To understand why Heidegger feels it necessary to abandon any appeal to talk of transcendence, or horizons, we must first understand why Heidegger felt it necessary to understand the project of fundamental ontology as a transcendental project and what it meant, at least until the mid-1930s, for Heidegger to conceive of a fundamental ontology.

III. THE ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE & TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE

³⁸ Heidegger will briefly conceive of this method of turning around, both as *Kebre* and *Umschlag*, under the methodology of a radicalized fundamental ontology called metontology, mentioned in the previous section. Like the project of fundamental ontology, Heidegger will abandon metontology by around 1935. See McNeill, William. "Metaphysics, Fundamental Ontology, Metontology 1925-1935" in *Heidegger Studies*, vol. 8. 1992.

Throughout the mid-1920's as Heidegger is working on *Being and Time* and up through until the mid-1930's he consistently refers to his project as a transcendental project and that fundamental ontology needs to attain the status of a transcendental science. Heidegger is quick to point out, however, that his view of transcendence and what constitutes a transcendental science is not identical with Kant's understanding, while enigmatically stating that it is perhaps closer and truer than even Kant (GA 24: 23/17). By 1936 Heidegger famously changes his position and dramatically states that "[t]he notion of 'transcendence' in *every* sense must *disappear*" (GA 65: 217/170).³⁹ The aim of this section is to examine the need for a transcendental temporal horizon for the understanding of being and why Heidegger ultimately abandons his project of fundamental ontology and moves away from transcendental talk.

This section is divided into two major parts. The first part of this section focuses on the theoretical reason why Heidegger believes he must conceive of his project as a transcendental one and what the role of transcendence is supposed to achieve. The second part of this section follows the theoretical trajectory established in the first part by looking at the two of the major thinkers Heidegger sees himself engaging with regard to timeliness and temporality, namely Aristotle and Augustine who ultimately cause him to move away from the notion of a transcendental horizon. Heidegger's courses on Aristotle and Augustine fill the missing narrative about why Heidegger ultimately abandons the view of time developed for fundamental ontology. No account of the transition and transformation (*Verwandlung*) of Heidegger's concept of time would be complete without them.

A. *Temporality and the Transcendence of Dasein*

³⁹See also GA 65: 322/255, 355/281; GA 70: 56. I discuss Heidegger's own criticism from his middle period standpoint in Chapter Two.

Less than six months after the publication of *Being and Time* Heidegger tells the students of his summer semester 1927 *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* lecture course that in order to understand how the whole of being-in-the-world is founded upon temporality, they must first understand the concept of transcendence and how it is that Dasein is *transcendent* (GA 24: 423/298). Heidegger had highlighted the importance of understanding the relation between timeliness, transcendence, and being earlier by remarking: “[t]his then leads to the question of the interrelations of the understanding of being, transcendence, and timeliness [*Zeitlichkeit*]. And from that point we shall attempt to portray timeliness [*Zeitlichkeit*] as the horizon of the understanding of being. That is, we shall attempt the definition of the concept of temporality [*Temporalität*]” (GA 24: 413-414/291-292). Heidegger prefaces his philosophical definition of transcendence by stating that the traditional (philosophical) usage of the term is both ambiguous and undefined, although if we understand Kant ontologically then we can approach it. Transcendence, he says, is best understood through its original literal meaning from the Latin *transcendere*: to step over, go through, or surpass (GA 24: 423/298).

It is important to recognize that Heidegger’s understanding of transcendence seems to have two senses. The first sense relates to Dasein’s ability to understand being (and beings). The second sense is related to Dasein’s own timeliness and thus to the ontological constitution of the being that is Dasein.⁴⁰ Heidegger reiterates this twofold understanding of transcendence in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* course by stating that transcendence is a) the *towards* which Dasein crosses over in its self-surpassing (and which thus makes possible the accessibility and attainment of understanding)

⁴⁰We can see in the preceding quote the two senses of transcendence that Malpas claims are going on in Heidegger. The first sense is the way in which beings can become objects for Dasein and the second as that which goes beyond world and is the source of Dasein’s understanding (Malpas, 127). I discussed Malpas’s first distinction in Section II and presented a version of his second distinction in Section III. In Chapter Three I will discuss how I believe there is a third version at work, one which is closer to the scholastic and Aristotelian notion of transcendence which, strictly speaking, does not fit either of Malpas’s two categories.

and b) also the activity or mode of being of the entity which crosses over, the relationality, and self as limit or “between” which is Dasein itself (GA 26: 203-204/159-160). Although Heidegger complicates this distinction by saying that there is an ontic transcendence and an ontological transcendence in this intentional relation.

If Dasein is that entity which oversteps in its being (following the discussion of ecstatic temporality in Section II), then it seems that transcendence as the activity, relation, and mode of being is what is named in the ontological understanding of transcendence (GA 24: 425/299). For Heidegger this form of transcendence as the activity and relation of Dasein overstepping itself is exactly why Dasein is not the immanent (GA 24: 425/299; GA 26: 205/160-161). Put differently, this form of transcendence is the way in which Dasein temporalizes entities and makes them a part of its world and brings entities “towards-itself” (GA 24: 426/300). For Heidegger, this form of transcendence is not the crossing towards entities that are beyond us, but it is bringing them into the sphere of our individual concern.⁴¹ It is the ecstatic character of time, Heidegger says, that makes transcendence possible (GA 24: 428/302).

The second understanding of transcendence is ontic and allows Dasein to have an epistemological understanding of entities. This form of transcendence is dependent on the first but makes a theory of knowledge possible for Dasein. In the ontological mode of stepping outside of itself (our first understanding of transcendence), Dasein is aware of itself in its circumspect taking care and its encounter and interactions with other beings as innerworldly. However, because Dasein crosses over and projects itself *towards* beings it is able to understand these entities as beings. In schematizing the horizon of understanding made visible by temporalization, Dasein encounters other entities, and thus being, as such. Importantly though, these beings are only intelligible on the

⁴¹Heidegger goes so far as to say: “Dasein is the transcendent being. Objects and things are never transcendent” and that this transcendence is what makes Dasein’s sense of selfhood possible (GA 24: 426/300).

basis of Dasein's concerned being-in-the-world, as discussed in Section II. This second form of transcendence is what makes understanding, and science, possible. If the project of fundamental ontology is to get off the ground, then Heidegger must be able to show how such understanding occurs.

It is worth noting that Heidegger seems to conceive of these two forms of transcendence as a single form. In Heidegger's 1929 contribution to Husserl's *Festschrift*, "On the Essence of Ground", he states that: "transcendence means surpassing. That which accomplishes such surpassing and dwells in this surpassing is transcendent (transcending)" (GA 9: 137/107).⁴² Although Heidegger does go on to outline the two ways in which this transcending occurs as I have described, he nevertheless thinks that it is Dasein who is transcendent, and that Dasein's transcendence is a fundamental constitution of the being (*Seiende*) of Dasein and even makes existence as such possible (GA 9: 137/108). In the essay Heidegger moves to a discussion of the form of transcendence which although belonging to Dasein as world (or being-in-the-world) as well as dwelling among other at hand entities but is nevertheless Dasein's own existence (GA 9: 140/109-110). What is important for Heidegger is that transcendence ontologically belongs to Dasein, on the basis of this transcendence Dasein temporalizes entities into a world, but this transcendence also makes possible for Dasein an ontic understanding of extant entities⁴³. And for the Heidegger of the early period, it is time,

⁴²"Transzendenz bedeutet Überstieg. Transzendent (transzendierend) ist, was den Überstieg vollzieht, im Übersteigen verweilt" (GA 9: 137).

⁴³Dahlstrom puts Heidegger's Janus-faced conception of transcendence during this period nicely when he writes: "The being in question is, to be sure, that of being-here and so the transcendental knowledge characteristic of fundamental ontology is precisely the disclosure of its transcendence, or more precisely, the transcendence that, coinciding with its understanding of being, makes up its manner of being," in Dahlstrom, Daniel. "Heidegger's Transcendentalism" *Research in Phenomenology* (2005) 35: 1. 29-54. Page 34. Dahlstrom's article is among the most complete attempts to trace the evidence and difficulties for Heidegger's transcendental thinking across his career. Chad Engelland has similarly traced some lingering aspects of transcendental thought in Heidegger's early middle-period, especially in the *Contributions*. See Engelland, Chad. *Heidegger's Shadow: Kant, Husserl, and the*

understood as timeliness, which makes Dasein's transcendence possible: "I maintain that the intrinsic possibility of transcendence is time, as primordial temporality" (GA 26: 252/195).

Heidegger's first form of transcendence is related to the medieval conception of ancient ontology and is evident in Heidegger's interpretations of the Scholastics, Aristotle, and the pre-Socratics.⁴⁴ The second form of transcendence, however, is related to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant and the schematism of understanding which so occupied Heidegger in the late 1920's until the mid-1930s. Heidegger's preoccupation with transcendence is thus twofold. On the one hand it is, following the first form of transcendence outlined above, the articulation of Dasein's ontology. However, recall from our previous discussion of timeliness and the provisional discussion of temporality (*Temporalität*), this is exactly what the project of *Being and Time* was meant to accomplish. The second division of *Being and Time* was explicitly meant as an ontological analysis of the constitution of Dasein on the basis of its timeliness. This corresponds to the first sense of transcendence mentioned above. The move to temporality (*Temporalität*) was designed to guarantee the theory of knowledge which would allow Dasein, through the understanding of time, to say something about the being (*Sein*) of beings (*Seiende*) and thus provide the basis for a fundamental ontology.

B. *Interpreting Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics*

In the late autumn of 1926 W. R. Boyce Gibson, a British phenomenologist visiting Freiburg to work with Husserl wrote in his diary: "Had my first glimpse of Heidegger. A dapper, alert figure, in knee-breeches, thin and wiry, with a very interesting head and face but looking as one might expect a

Transcendental Turn. New York, NY: Routledge, 2017 and "Disentangling Heidegger's Transcendental Questions." *Continental Philosophy Review* 45, no. 1 (2012): 77-100.

⁴⁴In an offhand comment in his 1928 Leibniz course about the need to understand judgement from an ontological standpoint Heidegger states: "[w]ere a confrontation necessary, then it would be one with Aristotle and Suarez on one side and with Kant on the other" (GA 26: 46/36).

long-distance champion cycle-rider or other energetic personality to look...Husserl is the Plato to Heidegger's Aristotle...Heidegger brought up on ancient philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus. He is steeped in these."⁴⁵ There is perhaps no other figure in the history of philosophy with whom Heidegger is more engaged with than Aristotle. In *Being and Time*'s longest footnote, a few pages before the end of the published text, Heidegger makes the claim that all essential understanding of time, with the exception of Kant and "time consciousness", are from Aristotle's *Physics* (GA 2: 570f14/420f30).⁴⁶

Late in the 1927 summer semester Heidegger finally provides a condensed analysis of Aristotle's concept of time with the caveat to his students that: "[w]e must deny ourselves a detailed interpretation here of Aristotle's treatise as well as Augustine's" (GA 24: 329/ 232). Heidegger would teach a seminar on Aristotle's *Physics* in the summer semester of 1928 (GA 83). This is significant because each analysis credits something different as ontologically essential in Aristotle's concept of time, although the analyses overlap. The 1927 course and *Being and Time* focus on time as the *vũv*, or "now", and the way that an interpretation of the "now" is connected with motion and our understanding of a sequence of "nows". The 1928 summer course focuses on what Heidegger calls the fundamental ontological formulation of the transcendental concept of motion. The analysis of time as *vũv* (now) associates the recognition of the now with Dasein's timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*), whereas the analysis of transcendental motion is explicitly associated with being (*Sein*) and temporality (*Temporalität*). I treat each, respectively.

1. Aristotle's 'now'

⁴⁵Gibson, W.R. Boyce. "From Husserl to Heidegger: Excerpts from a 1928 Freiburg Diary." Edited Herbert Spiegelberg. *The Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology*. Vol. 2. 1971. 72 & 74.

⁴⁶Heidegger would add Augustine to this list a few months later in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*.

Heidegger begins his analysis of Aristotle's concept of time in the summer 1927 course by citing Aristotle's definition of time at *Physics* IV.10: "For time is just this—number of motion in respect of 'before' and 'after' (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον)".⁴⁷ It is worth noting that in his own translation of the sentence Heidegger inserts the phrase "encountered in the horizon" of the before and after (GA 24: 337/238). This is significant in part because Heidegger is already signaling in his translation of Aristotle's statement an orientation towards Dasein as the entity which encounters the earlier and later. Heidegger makes use of an example of a moving rod on the blackboard to illustrate Aristotle's definition. Heidegger will elaborate a year later, it is not a moving *thing*, but motion as such which Aristotle points to in his definition of time. Central for Heidegger is that we follow the motion of the thing and it is Dasein that places the thing's movement on a horizon of before and after.

Heidegger continues Aristotle's analysis by emphasizing that time is: "[h]ence time is not movement, but only movement in so far as it admits of enumeration (οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις ὁ χρόνος ἀλλ' ἢ ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἢ κίνησις)".⁴⁸ Important for Heidegger here is the ἢ ἀριθμὸν ἔχει, that the movement is counted⁴⁹. The reason for this is that it is the counting that relates to the earlier and later. Heidegger emphasizes that πρότερον and ὕστερον, in addition to being translated as "before" and "after", can equally be translated as "earlier" and "later". Heidegger wants to be able to situate the "now" of νῦν as a relation which Dasein establishes through counting. It is Dasein who is counting the movement (and not the thing moved) in the νῦν and it is Dasein who establishes time's relation as either πρότερον or ὕστερον. Heidegger's use of the rod in

⁴⁷219b1. All English translations of Aristotle, unless otherwise specified, are from Aristotle. *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Volumes 1 & 2*. Jonathan Barnes, ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1984. All Greek references to Aristotle's *Physics* are from W.D. Ross, ed., *Aristotelis Physica*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1966.

⁴⁸219b3

⁴⁹Compare also Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, 1049b5.

the classroom is intended to show that Dasein interprets time on the basis of things encountered in the horizon of before and after, but it is in fact Dasein who establishes the relation of before and after on the basis of the thing's encountered as movement across a "temporal" horizon⁵⁰.

Heidegger believes that the two cited sentences from Aristotle's *Physics* demonstrate that Aristotle's definition of time contains both the common, "vulgar," concept of time as well as what Heidegger, following his own terminology, calls timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*). How? The task for Heidegger is to link what is counted not with time as an external container that Dasein is somehow within, but as an activity of Dasein. The key to this is, so Heidegger thinks, an ontological interpretation of motion. Before moving on to an interpretation of Heidegger's analysis of ontological motion, I will motivate why Heidegger thinks that this is the essential aspect in unlocking Aristotle's account of time and how that links up with his own sense of temporality.

First, our knowledge of movement comes from our experience of a thing in motion, "[t]his is what is most knowable; for motion is known because of that which is moved... (ὅτι τὴν κίνησιν γνωρίζομεν)".⁵¹ What we encounter in encountering motion is a particular 'this': "[f]or what is carried is a 'this', the movement is not (τόδε γάρ τι τὸ φερόμενον, ἢ δὲ κίνησις οὐ)",⁵² what Heidegger calls a this-here. This is the important ontological connection for Heidegger: "the moving thing is always a this-here, a definite entity," an Aristotelian τόδε τι, "while the motion itself does not have a specifically individualized character that would give its own special stamp. The moving thing is given for us in its individuation and thisness, but motion

⁵⁰Coope, in her authoritative analysis of Aristotle's concept of time, describes how πρότερον and ὕστερον for Aristotle group together the before and after of time, change, and place under one general type and, important for Heidegger's argument, that type is always relative to some origin point, namely Dasein. See Coope, Ursula. *Time for Aristotle: Physics IV.11-14*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2005. 61. Compare Heidegger's own comments on 219b23, although Heidegger's emphasis is on *thinking* time (GA 24: 344-345/242-243).

⁵¹219b17.

⁵²219b30.

as such is not given that way” (GA 24: 346/244). Seen in this way, Heidegger thinks that what we are counting when we count time is the number of motion, not the thing, although we are experiencing the thing and its transition to another place. For Heidegger, in following the motion of the thing we experience it: “in the horizon of a conjointly encountered series of locations on a singular path” (GA 24: 346/244).

The language of horizons is important here, particularly as it relates back to ὧ τὴν κίνησιν γνωρίζομεν. We are encountering and understanding, γνωρίζομεν, the thing in its own movement across a horizon of before and after, ontically, although we have not yet understood this movement ontologically. The observation of this movement occurs in the now, νῦν, and the changes of place are understood as the marks (στιγμῆ) of the counted movement (ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως) of a sequence of “nows” across both the horizon (σφαῖρα) and limit (ὄρος) of Dasein’s understanding (γνωρίζομεν).

Heidegger has provided a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle’s own summary of his definition of time at *Physics* IV.14 (222b30-223a15). Important here is the character of the σφαῖρα, or sphere, and what Heidegger is calling horizon. Heidegger is interpreting, although he does not say it, Aristotle’s opening remarks on time at *Physics* IV.10 where he says: “[t]hose who said that time is the sphere of the whole thought so, no doubt, on the ground that all things are in time and all things are in the sphere of the whole (218b6-218b9).⁵³ Sphere (σφαῖρα), however, as Heidegger’s translation of horizon, is interpreted on a Kantian framework of conditions for the possibility of understanding and not on an Aristotelian cosmological sense.⁵⁴

⁵³ ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὅλου σφαῖρα ἔδοξε μὲν τοῖς εἰποῦσιν εἶναι ὁ χρόνος, ὅτι ἐν τε τῷ χρόνῳ πάντα ἐστὶν καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ὅλου σφαίρᾳ.

⁵⁴ Francisco Gonzalez provides an otherwise compelling and sophisticated interpretation of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle which seems to agree with my own interpretation except on one critical point. Gonzalez sees Heidegger as saying something about the nature of time and not, as I do, about drawing a parallel between Aristotle’s concept of time and Heidegger’s account of

Heidegger's warrant for this is provided near the end of *Physics* IV.14. The counting of the movement across the sphere (horizon) is only achievable because the soul (ψυχή) has the capability to count. Heidegger reads Aristotle's question at 223a22 and following as a rhetorical statement:

Whether if soul did not exist time would exist or not, is a question that may fairly be asked; for if there cannot be some one to count there cannot be anything that can be counted either, so that evidently there cannot be number; for number is either what has been, or what can be, counted. But if nothing but soul, or in soul reason, is qualified to count, it is impossible for there to be time unless there is soul, but only that of which time is an attribute, i.e. if *movement* can exist without soul. The before and after are attributes of movement, and time is these *qua* countable.⁵⁵

Heidegger here reads Aristotle as confirming his own account for the way in which vulgar time is derived from the timeliness of Dasein and from Dasein's ontological encounter with other beings in the fusion of horizons in the moment, understood in Aristotle through an interpretation of time as a sequence of nows (νῦν).

Heidegger seems to think that Aristotle's definition of time as a sequence of nows counting motion with respect to the before and after is confirmation that he is, at least ontologically, headed in the right direction. Further, Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of σφαῖρα as a horizon

timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) as it relates to an ontological (and not ontic) interpretation of the movement of encountered entities. Heidegger reads Aristotle as fundamentally saying the same thing that he, Heidegger, is saying, time is only comprehensible on the basis of Dasein's ontological condition and the ontological understanding of beings. On my interpretation, unless I am misunderstanding Gonzalez's overarching concern, the majority of Gonzalez's disagreements with Heidegger would seem to disappear and Heidegger's interpretation would sit very comfortably alongside both Coope's and his own. Gonzalez specifically criticizes Heidegger's gloss on ἀκολουθεῖν saying that Heidegger fails to see the analogue of before and after as anything but ontic. However, Heidegger is explicit that ἀκολουθεῖν must be understood ontologically and as Dasein's relation to the being it encounters in the horizon. See Gonzalez, Francisco J. "Time in a Moment: The Temporality of Activity and Essence in Aristotle (with and against Heidegger)". *Dianoia*, 13: 7-46. 2008.

⁵⁵πότερον δὲ μὴ οὐσης ψυχῆς εἶη ἂν ὁ χρόνος ἢ οὐ, ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὄντος εἶναι τοῦ ἀριθμήσοντος ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀριθμητόν τι εἶναι, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ' ἀριθμός. ἀριθμός γὰρ ἢ τὸ ἠριθμημένον ἢ τὸ ἀριθμητόν. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο πέφυκεν ἀριθμεῖν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ ψυχῆς νοῦς, ἀδύνατον εἶναι χρόνον ψυχῆς μὴ οὐσης, ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦτο ὃ ποτε ὄν ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, οἷον εἰ ἐνδέχεται κίνησιν εἶναι ἄνευ ψυχῆς. τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν κινήσει ἐστίν· χρόνος δὲ τ αὐτ' ἐστίν ἢ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν.

of encounterability rests strongly on Heidegger's own conceptualization of the interplay between timeliness and temporality. For Heidegger though, as I outlined in the previous sections, this counting depends both on the ontological constitution of Dasein expressed in the threefold horizon of timeliness *and* the encounter with the another being (*Seiende*) also made temporal (*temporal*) its own manifestation of being (*Sein*). What Heidegger's summer semester 1927 course does not fully articulate is the way in which the temporality of the being (*Seiende*) encountered on the horizon of understandability is recognized ontologically. I turn to a brief analysis of Heidegger's ontological interpretation of motion from the summer semester 1928 seminar on Aristotle's *Physics* III.1-3.

2. *The ontological interpretation of motion*

For my argument two things are immediately evident in analyzing Heidegger's 1928 summer seminar on Aristotle's *Physics* III.1-3. First, Heidegger begins his analysis of *Physics* III.1-3 by highlighting the topic of the seminar, "Φύσις as the principle of motion" (ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. GA 83: 4 Trans. mine). This is significant because Heidegger's earlier interpretation of Aristotle on time began with the standard reading of Aristotle on time occurring at *Physics* IV.10-14. However, as I outlined above, it became apparent to Heidegger that in order to understand the temporal (*temporale*) character of the analysis, Heidegger needed an ontological interpretation of motion as such and this is exactly how Aristotle begins §1 of Book III of the *Physics* (200b12). In keeping with the overall project of fundamental ontology and the development of the problem of temporality as the means by which to understand how being itself becomes temporalized, Heidegger attempts a more radical, fundamental ontological, reading of Aristotle. This is the second immediately apparent aspect of the 1928 seminar, the further elaboration of his own concept of temporality.⁵⁶ The term temporality

⁵⁶It is tempting to read Heidegger's analysis of Aristotle's *Physics* in both GA 24 and GA 83 as the promised but never delivered Part Two, Division III of *Being and Time*. I think that this is unwarranted though. Just as we can read the 1925-1926 *Logic* lectures as just a sketch of Part One,

(*Temporalität*) does not appear once in Heidegger's analysis of *Physics* IV.10-14 from the previous summer, yet a year later it assumes a central position in the opening class sessions and is not only mentioned but foregrounded nearly a dozen times (GA 83: 5; 9; 11; 17; 18-19; 19; 20 passim).

My aim here is not to provide an account of Heidegger's interpretation of *Physics* III.1-3 but to show in what ways Heidegger is linking his interpretation of Aristotle with his own project of using timeliness and temporality to arrive at an understanding of being (*Sein*). Heidegger's reading of Aristotle on the principle of motion will illuminate a previously obscure aspect of Heidegger's own thinking, namely the role and character of temporality (see Section II). A few of Heidegger's remarks from the 1928 seminar should be sufficient to help us shed some light on what Heidegger clearly understands as part of his own unique contribution to the history of philosophy, temporality as a means of understanding being.

In interpreting *Physics* III.1-3, Heidegger makes a few curious and important glosses. First, he asserts straightforwardly that motion is temporality (*Bewegung – Temporalität*), although this motion must be understood as a primordial or originary (*ursprünglichen*) κίνησις or an absolute motion (einer *absoluten Bewegung!*)(GA 83: 257).⁵⁷ Heidegger elaborates this understanding of primordial κίνησις saying: “In Aristotle, being is understood as οὐσία. A more precise articulation of this is ἐνέργεια, a particular ἐνέργεια, κίνησις as a mode of being [*Seinart*], understood ontologically. This is distinguished from κίνησις in an ontic understanding, that is, the entity-moved in its movement [*das Bewegtseiende in seiner Bewegtheit*]. Our thesis is thus: our understanding not only of κίνησις, but also of ἐνέργεια and οὐσία is based in a *primordial κίνησις, an absolute movement!*” (GA 83: 267-258). We see

we must be careful not to overdetermine Heidegger's reading of the *Physics*. My aim here is to show that Heidegger is broadly seeking to articulate his project of fundamental ontology as *outlined* in the introduction to *Being and Time* and that an understanding of time, timeliness, temporality coupled with Heidegger's reading of Aristotle are indicators of Heidegger's early thought.

⁵⁷As noted in Hans Reiner's class notes dated July 16th, 1928.

here a twofold (διχῶς) understanding of movement. On the one hand there is the movement *of* a type of being, a particular entity, which is comprehensible on an ontic level, and which I maintain was the basis of Heidegger's analysis of *Physics* IV.10-14. On the other hand, we have movement *as* being.

It is usually the case that when Heidegger makes use of 'primordial' it is by reference to an ontological interpretation. The category of movement now becomes an indicator for being (*Sein*) itself. Heidegger's identification of motion with temporality becomes clearer (GA 83:5). The being (*Sein*) of a being (*Seiendes*) is demonstrated through motion and its motion is a characteristic of temporality (*Temporalität*) as an extant entity. Heidegger must, however, link this up with Dasein's ability to understand movement as time (as in the analysis of *Physics* IV.10-14) so that Dasein can distinguish being from the being of beings. Heidegger thinks he accomplishes this through Aristotle's analysis of being-moved.

Second, Heidegger associates timeliness (*Zeitichkeit*) and world (*Welt*) with 'being-moved' (*Bewegtheit*).⁵⁸ This is significant because it places in relief the analysis of motion given a year earlier. Although difficult to tell because of the lecture note quality of the material, it seems that Heidegger is associating the Aristotelian concept of being moved with Dasein and Dasein's own presence as timely and in-the-world. This would mean that ontological motion, or primordial κίνησις, has a

⁵⁸I have chosen the less awkward sounding 'being-moved' in place of the more directly translated 'movedness'. The phrase 'being moved' is less desirable in that it evokes being, because Heidegger seems to be designating *a* being (*Seiendes*), 'being-moved' has the benefit of sounding more natural in English and also corresponding with standard translations of Aristotle. It is likely, although difficult to tell from the notes, that Heidegger is making a reference to the nature of mutual contact between mover and moved at *Physics* III.2.202a3-202a11, and the similar reference from *On Generation and Corruption* I.1.323a25-33. Heidegger may have something in line here with what Victor Caston has proposed in his reading of *De Anima* III.5 and the relation between the so-called "Agent Intellect" and the "Divine Intellect" from the *Metaphysics*. That is, however, a thesis to be argued in a different place. See Caston, Victor. "Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal," *Phronesis*, Volume 44, Issue 3, 199 – 227. See also *Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption, Book I, Symposium Aristotelicum*. De Haas, Franz and Jaap Mansfeld (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2004.

more fundamental ontological role and is therefore linked with temporality. Credence for this is given in a passage entitled “Motion and its fundamental ontological functionalization. [The] transcendental concept of motion”⁵⁹ where Heidegger writes:

Now something remarkable becomes apparent when we radicalize this ontological approach, we also find *δυνάμει ὄν* and *ἐνέργεια* and their relation

1. in the various experiences dictated by rest, completion, *ἐντελής*, and the like.
2. in the all-encompassing and grounding ecstatic horizontal unity of timeliness [*Zeitlichkeit*], it is that which can be isolated by “transition” [»Übergang«] in the inner world. This *horizon* is taken from temporality [*Temporalität*].

Basic question: What is the temporal [*temporale*] functionalization of timeliness [*Zeitlichkeit*], i.e. to enable the specific ancient understanding of the understanding of being, manifests itself in Aristotle’s metaphysics- *ἐνέργεια*? (GA 83: 17 trans. mine).

I believe that there is much we can glean from this short citation and which can be linked back with my previous discussion of Heidegger’s reading of *Physics* IV.10-14 in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* course.⁶⁰ Heidegger interprets the entire passage along two lines. The first as the medieval (although taken from Aristotle) idea of production. That is, the way in which an entity comes to presence as present (*das Gegenwärtigende*) in reality.⁶¹ This entity provides ecstatic horizontal content and in so doing also acts as a source for understanding being as *ἐνέργεια* to other entities, namely Dasein. The entity as movable, the *δυνάμει ὄν* as being-moved, acts as an index for Dasein

⁵⁹*Bewegung und ihre fundamentalontologische Funktionalisierung. [Der] transzendente Begriff der Bewegung* (GA 83:16 trans. mine).

⁶⁰In the quoted section (§21) of GA 83, Heidegger makes explicit reference to his promised but uncompleted proof in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (GA 24: 148/105) of the ancient and medieval (via Suarez) discussion of the horizon for beings as production [here *Her-stellen*] and reciprocal causality between *essentia* and *existentia* (GA 83: 16). The discussion of *Her-stellen* in GA 31 follows along the same lines and also conceptually links it to *τέχνη* as the ‘*producing*’ in the broadest sense...it expresses the struggle around the *presence* of beings (GA 31: 50/72; 137/196; 281fn23. The footnote is not present in the English translation).

⁶¹I have intentionally rendered presence as a verb to highlight the distinction which Heidegger is drawing and which is evident in the German. For Heidegger ‘present’ is a structure of timeliness which is derivative of the presence of innerworldly entities. To highlight the distinction between these two, ‘present’ should always be interpreted as the linguistic temporal marker and presence refers to the immediate encounter with at hand entities. I will maintain this throughout unless otherwise specified.

of the reality of its inner world, i.e. the timeliness of its understanding of possibility for being a whole. This understanding in turn allows for the possibility of understanding being as such. What is curious is that here, and in keeping with both Aristotelian and medieval metaphysics, Heidegger says that the horizon is taken from temporality (*Temporalität*) and not timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*). Further, it is clear from the “basic question” in the cited passage, that Heidegger is attempting to articulate the way by which being manifests temporally *as* timeliness.⁶²

Recall from Section II that this is the primary motivation for an understanding of temporality (*Temporalität*), to provide a means by which we can understand the temporality of being (*Temporalität des Seins*). The way that being manifests as temporal. Heidegger reiterates the reciprocal character of the relationship between motion as such and being-moved a few pages later, saying: “Sharp distinction: Being is temporality (being-moved)[*Sein heißt Temporalität (Bewegtheit)*], and: a being [*Seiendes*] is in motion. Being-in-motion [*In-Bewegung-Sein*] is itself a definite being [*Sein*] and must therefore be understood as a motion (transcendental motion)”(GA 83: 19). Heidegger also refers to

⁶²Heidegger returns to an ontological examination of the relation between *δυνάμει ὄν* and *ἐνέργεια* almost two years later in the 1931 summer semester short lecture course *Aristotle’s Metaphysics* Θ 1-3: *On the Essence and Actuality of Force* (GA 33) and attempts to understand *δυνάμις* (force) and *ἐνέργεια* (actuality) as bound together each by *κίνησις* (*δυνάμις κατὰ κίνησις* and *ἐνέργεια κατὰ κίνησις*). What is curious about the entire lecture course is that none of the usual terms associated with Heidegger’s concept of time (*Zeitlichkeit*, *Temporalität*, etc.) are ever used. Heidegger makes a few passing remarks about *χρόνος*, but with one exception (see fn. 80, below) he offers no real analysis of the term. On my reading, this course carries over Heidegger’s articulation of motion as privation and transcendental motion from GA 83, but appeals to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Θ to accomplish that initial discovery. The 1931 lecture course should be read as following the same interpretive trajectory initiated in Heidegger’s analysis of *Metaphysics* Θ.10 in the 1930 lecture course *The Essence of Human Freedom* (GA 31). Discussed at length below. GA 33 offers a great deal of insight into how being becomes actual (*Wirklichsein*) from an Aristotelian standpoint without appeal to any transcendental language. Just as terms related to time are absent Heidegger’s analysis, so too are any references to transcendental or fundamental ontology. Understood in this way, Heidegger’s course on *Metaphysics* Θ.1-3 should be interpreted as part of the transition to his middle period.

transcendental motion as ontological privation *from* temporality, where temporality is glossed with οὐσία (GA 83: 18, 19).⁶³

Heidegger's interpretation of *Physics* III.1-3 in the summer seminar of 1928 is important for two reasons. First, as just discussed above, Heidegger is attempting to more radically interpret Aristotle to find confirmation for his own concept of temporality (*Temporalität*). Heidegger believes he is successful, in part. The connection between transcendental motion and being-moved is supposed to act as an index of being (*Sein*). In this way Heidegger believes he is bridging the gap between timeliness and temporality and moving toward an understanding of being. Second, the emphasis Heidegger places throughout the seminar on the way in which being itself presences marks a shift in Heidegger's approach to the *Seinsfrage*. Heidegger is, nevertheless, throughout the seminar committed to a transcendental understanding of being, even claiming at one point that the fundamental ontological notion of motion is the transcendental concept of presence (GA 83: 9). Heidegger is clearly still committed in the summer of 1928 to his project of fundamental ontology and the language and concepts of transcendental understanding to articulate that project.

C. Augustine's Concept of Time

Heidegger's reading of Augustine in 1930 is significant for two reasons. First, it is his last major engagement, nearly a line by line and word by word analysis, with one of the major figures in the tradition who Heidegger claims influenced his own concept of time during his early period. Heidegger's reading is a bookend to the development of the idea of temporality as it relates to timeliness and, ultimately, time. Second, Heidegger's reading of Augustine's *Confessions* XI in late 1930 and early 1931 even more strongly displays the shift in thinking about time I mentioned above.

⁶³In a somewhat offhanded comment during the 1931 lecture course on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Θ.1-3, Heidegger remarks that the essence of time "is grounded in movement, and movement in turn is grounded in extension in general. Whether in this way or that way, ἀκολουθεῖν is used in the sense of essential belongingness; cf. *Met* A 1, 981a24ff" (GA 33: 134/156).

Heidegger begins in the Augustine course to employ new terminology in his thinking about time that would eventually become central to his middle period. It is clear by the following year, in his lecture course on Plato's *Theaetetus* and the "Essence of Truth" (GA 34) that something has fundamentally shifted in Heidegger's approach to the concept of time.

Heidegger's interpretation of Augustine is not just an analysis that fits comfortably into the announced project of *Being and Time* but a transformation (*Verwandlung*) of the way in which Heidegger moves to interpret Dasein as being-historical. Heidegger's courses from 1930 can each be interpreted as the transition and transformation of Heidegger's questioning of being as fundamental ontology to a new questioning of the truth of being and the happening of historical Dasein. I turn now to a brief analysis of his 1930-1931 interpretation of Augustine's *Confessions* Book XI before concluding with some remarks on Heidegger's early concept of time as it transitions to his middle period understanding.

1. *The Augustine Seminar*

Ulrich von Loebl sitting in class in the autumn of 1930 wrote in his lecture notes: "Movement belongs to the essence of φύσις in a broad sense. Movement demands as conditions of its possibility place, void, and time, in which are the earlier and later, the before and after." It was the first day of class and Ulrich was listening to his professor's summary of the debt that Augustine's concept of time owed to Aristotle's *Physics*. He continued writing: "Time is *what is counted and movement*, which are limited by a succession of different nows. The fact that counting is an activity of the soul, shows that time cannot be without having a soul" (GA 83: 267). The professor, of course, was Heidegger. Heidegger would continue and suggest that the relation of the problem of time from Aristotle's treatise could be found in the title of Augustine's text: *Confessions*. The meaning of that title could be gleaned from the following words: "...affect therefore our openness to you, acknowledging to you

our miseries and your mercy upon us (*affectum ergo nostrum patefacimus in te, confitendo tibi miserias nostras et misericordias tuas super nos*),” from Book XI.1(1)(GA 83:267).⁶⁴ Heidegger would not, however, elaborate on this tantalizing clue until more than half-way through the semester. I will discuss the importance of this sentence, particularly the role of *patefacimus*,

Heidegger’s lecture notes give a dozen abbreviated citations from Aristotle’s *Physics* III and IV with no apparent emphasis on the way that motion and counting relates to time’s place in the soul. It is clear though from the student records of the seminar that Heidegger is conceptually linking his interpretation of Augustine with the analysis of Aristotle’s *Physics* III from the 1928 seminar. Heidegger begins the actual analysis of *Confessions* XI at chapter 14, saying:

As always: “fidenter tamen dico scire me⁶⁵”. *The investigation begins here.*

Chapters 14 and 15, rests upon:

1. Three fundamental experiences about time (only fleshed out further in the interpretation),
2. A self-evident representation of being.
3. Time as “*time-space*” [*Zeitraum*], “time-point” (measured time). C.f. p. 4 (GA 83:44).

The theme of time as a time-space becomes central to Heidegger’s middle period reflections about time. I will return to an analysis of how Heidegger develops this idea further in chapter two but it is important to flag its development over the course of the Augustine seminar.

Heidegger’s analysis of Augustine’s *Confessions* centers around an ontological interpretation of the Latin verb *distentio*, to stretch out. Heidegger’s concern throughout the seminar is with an understanding of what it means for time to be stretched out, the “While” (*das Während*) of time and

⁶⁴Trans. mine. *Confessions*, XI.1.1. All Latin citations of Augustine’s *Confessions* are from O’Donnell, James J. (ed.) *Augustine Confessions*. Volumes I-III. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2012. English translations unless otherwise noted are from Augustine. *The Confessions*. Maria Boulding, O.S.B. (Tr.). *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*. Part 1, Volume 1. 2nd edition. Hyde Park: New City Press. 1997. I have chosen my own translation here to emphasize what I think is essential for Heidegger in the sentence, the aspect of *affectum ergo nostrum patefacimus*, where what is sought after is greater openness. I discuss this in greater detail below.

⁶⁵“I can state with confidence, however, that this much I do know,” *Confessiones*, XI.14.17

the way in which Dasein experiences this stretching. Central to the Heidegger's entire analysis is his previous interpretation of transcendental movement in Aristotle from the year prior.

The familiar threefold structure of Dasein's ecstatic timeliness is mapped on to the Augustine's three fundamental experiences of time as retention, attention (as the making present involved in *Gegenwärtigen*), and expectation. Similarly, Heidegger very briefly casts both authentic and inauthentic forms for each of these. For example, an inauthentic expectation is understood as running-after, loosing oneself, forgetting (GA 83: 68). I think it important to note, however, that neither the term timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) nor temporality (*Temporalität*) are ever used by Heidegger or recorded by the students in the course. The reason for this, I believe, is that Heidegger is attempting to think time outside of the constraints of his concept as presented in *Being and Time* and is instead transitioning to the form of philosophizing initiated in the 1930 course *The Essence of Human Freedom*, discussed above. Many of the same themes addressed and new terms used in the 1930 course take on new prominence and Heidegger introduces several new terms of art which he will tarry with through to the 1940s.

The Augustine course is both a tentative attempt at new articulations as well as an ontological analysis of what it means for an at-hand-being or occurrence to be distended or stretched out through the encounter with time. Heidegger frames the question of the course in this way: "Is *measurement* and measuring [*Gemessenheit*] the *only* and even *decisive* way of meeting time [*Zeitbegegnung*] and thus the question of the being-at-hand [*Vorhandenseins*] and the whatness of time [*Wasseins der Zeit*], i.e. its presence [*Präsenz*] and the presence problem?" (GA 83: 47). My interpretation of Heidegger's 1930-1931 seminar on Augustine follows two lines. The first is the analysis of *distentio* as the ontological elucidation of the time-space of an occurrence. I take this to be the major phenomenological theme of the seminar and what marks this reading of Augustine from

Heidegger's previous, if brief, discussions of Augustine.⁶⁶ Second, I will briefly summarize the lecture that Heidegger gave at the archabbey of Beuron part way through the course.

Analyzing Heidegger's 1930-1931 seminar presents some interpretive challenges. First, the available material is both relatively short and Heidegger's own notes often only consist of short questions, fragments of citations, or points of reference in the text. Far more complete are the thirteen student records of the seminar. These, however, are undated and form a single block of text summarizing the entire seminar. Each student record is not more than a few pages long. What they do provide is a series of snapshots which when read alongside Heidegger's own notes are able to bring into relief some of the important themes of the seminar. One of these central themes is the analysis of *distention* and the cluster of terms Heidegger uses to discuss this concept. I turn first to the discussion of the role of *distentio* and the ontological analysis of the occurrence of a time-space.

2. "Tempus itself spatium"

As Augustine's grappling with the problem of time begins to reach fever pitch, Heidegger writes in his notes: "Ground, for the first time, in Chapter 22." It is, for Augustine at least, anything but solid ground. Augustine, mind aflame and begging for relief, writes at *Confessions* XI.22.1-2: "[m]y mind is on fire to solve this most intricate enigma. Do not slam the door in the face of my desire, nor forbid me entrance to that place where I may watch these things grow luminous as your mercy sheds its light upon them, Lord."⁶⁷ Heidegger, however, sees the possibility of Augustine's passage through

⁶⁶For a magisterial overview of Heidegger's readings of Augustine throughout his career, see Coyne, Ryan. *Heidegger's Confessions: The Remains of Saint Augustine in Being and Time and Beyond*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2015. Chapter five, "Temporality and Transformation, or Augustine through the Turn" is particularly helpful as it is one of the few interpretations of Heidegger's lecture on Augustine at the Beuron archabbey. 157-193.

⁶⁷"[e]xarsit animus meus nosse istuc implicatissimum aenigma. noli claudere, domine deus meus, bone pater, per Christum obsecro, noli claudere desiderio meo ista et usitata et abdita, quominus in ea penetret; et dilucescant, allucente misericordia tua, domine."

and realization of his desire. The breakthrough would not occur until the next chapter of the *Confessions* but for Heidegger the way is illuminated by reference to the term *distentio*.⁶⁸

Augustine's frustration in *Confessions* XI.22 is with understanding if multiple times exist and for how long. For Heidegger, the question is translated into the realization that the now is not just simply the present presence of an entity, but also the past and future presence of that entity (GA 83: 55). This leads Heidegger to conclude that the entity encountered is also a *spatium*, an interval of space or an extended length, a term which by extension also comes to mean a portion of time⁶⁹. Heidegger, following Augustine, becomes increasingly fixated on what it is that we are measuring when we measure time.

Recall that Heidegger had taken the position, via Aristotle's *Physics*, that time is a measurement of movement. In the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* course this had been Dasein's own narrativizing of its encounter with another being in the moment of the now. The measurement as past, present, or future was a result of Dasein's own running ahead and back to itself because of its constitutionality as timely. The goal of temporality, as the central problem of fundamental ontology, was to attain an understanding of the temporalization of being which was understandable by Dasein, but not dependent on Dasein's constitutionality as timely. Thus, the need for a twofold transcendental understanding which both leaps beyond Dasein but also recognizes that all beings participate in being.

However, Heidegger's analysis of transcendental movement in the 1928 lecture course on *Physics* III radicalized this encounter. It was movement as such which pointed the way for an

⁶⁸Heidegger writes in his notes for *Confessions* XI.22 that there is a reference to *distentio*. The term *distentio* does not actually occur until XI.23. The importance for Heidegger, regardless, is immediate.

⁶⁹The most frequent use of *spatium* is as a room, which may further provide background context for Heidegger's choice of the German *zeit-raum*. Etymologically it is also connected to the Greek *τείνω*, discussed below. See s.v. "spatium" in the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, ed. P. G. W. Glare. 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2012.

understanding of the being of beings and the way in which being is temporalized. The analysis *Metaphysics* Θ 10 from the year prior had revealed when beings are understood as constant presence, then by inquiring after them philosophically (ἀληθεύειν), they will disconceal the truth of being. Heidegger's conception of ἀλήθεια as the way in which beings and being are revealed in their truth from the *Essence of Human Freedom* course the year prior means that Dasein need no longer leap out transcending itself to attain understanding. Instead, philosophy understood as ἀλήθεια calls for beings to disconceal the truth of their being. Heidegger's analysis of Augustine's *Confessions* in the 1930-1931 seminar follows the same path as the 1930 course.

Heidegger is pushing his previous analyses of time and movement still further by asking after the *spatium* of an entity or an occurrence. He sees Augustine, as Dasein, wrestling with how to understand what is measured in the time. On the one hand the preset, past, and future of the Dasein who encounters the occurrence of an event or being is measured. Heidegger sees Augustine confessing this in the asking after the essence of time. For Heidegger Augustine's confession is in the form of his questioning. "Sine me, ... *amplius quaerere*," asks Augustine at XI.18.23, and it is this aspect of intensified questioning that Heidegger keys in on. Heidegger writes in his notes:

Quaerere: "ask", "seek" something, "solicit", "plead", "yearn" - solicit the unconcealment [*Unverborgenheit*], the truth.
 Is the contemplation of *time* in itself a plea? Asking-about-time the *possibility* of the *collected self-stretching-out* [*Sichbinausstreckens*] to the Unity, Eternal, that love itself is (*amor amoris tui*). Chapter 2, p. 241, Chapter 22, p. 256 - the decisive chapter.
Amo: Chapter 1: "*amore amoris tui facio istuc*". *Volo ut sis*: Letting the being be [*Seinlassen des Seienden*] gives me *that* being [*Seiende*], that is, *actually* is. (GA 83: 78).⁷⁰

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Coyne has translated a version of this passage which is also found in the Beuron lecture (the lecture course was unavailable to him). In Coyne's translation he emphasizes that Augustine is imploring God for the unconcealment of beings. However, what I think Heidegger wishes to emphasize is the act of questioning and the relation that questioning sets between the question asker and the being (*Seiende*) questioned (Coyne, 165). Coyne also highlights, which may be the case, that Heidegger's argumentative structure seems to closely follow Arendt's argument in her dissertation on *Love and Saint Augustine* [*Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin*] from the year prior (Coyne, 160).

This passage is the key for Heidegger for how we are to transition from our intense questioning to the knowledge and understanding of things. Heidegger is linking together several key terms in Augustine in order to illustrate how we might transition from our philosophical questioning towards an understanding of beings and time. The central exercise of the *Confessions* XI, for Heidegger, is not that it is an autobiography of Augustine but that it is a questioning enactment of ontological understanding. Heidegger draws our attention to the passage from XI.1, *amore amoris tui facio istuc*, because it is Augustine's love of loving God that makes him take up his inquiry⁷¹. For us to make sense of Heidegger's dense argument from the citation above, we need to first draw together the various terms he is referencing.

Recall that Heidegger's initial focus in *Confessions* XI.1 was with *patefacere*. The primary meaning of *pătěfăcĭo* is to open, or lay open, however, I believe that Heidegger is also emphasizing the secondary meaning: to expose, disclose, or bring to light. Understood in this way, *pătěfăcĭo* is analogous to ἀλήθεια as it was presented at the outset of the 1930 summer semester course on the *Essence of Human Freedom*. Like ἀλήθεια, *pătěfăcĭo* is intended as an openness to the disclosure of truth. Heidegger seems to confirm the importance of *patefacere* for interpreting the *Confessio* at the beginning of §53 (GA 83: 78). This openness to the possibility of the disclosure of truth is not immediate, however. We must first have two concomitant achievements. The *sine me, ... amplius quaerere* is the intensified *philosophical* seeking for the truth. In the 1930 course, the leading question of philosophy is the τί τὸ ὄν, the what it is? Augustine's *sine me, ... amplius quaerere* signals the asking after the what it is.

⁷¹Boulding's translation has: "it is out of love for loving you that I do this." O'Donnell has commented that the 'tui' must be an objective genitive, and on my reading should thus be translated as 'of you'. Linguistic speculation aside, the issue is important for Heidegger because the love is intended to form a connection between Augustine and the inquiry and not *for the sake of* what is being inquired.

Recall that in the summer 1930 course, the response to the $\tau\acute{\iota}$ τὸ ὄν was the truth of the being (*Seiende*) unconcealed, ἀληθής ὄν. I think it significant that in the *Confessions* XI.1.1 the complete phrase is *sine me, domine, amplius quaerere*. Heidegger fails to quote a single word: *domine*. There may be many reasons for this. One important reason is that in the above cited passage, just as in the ἀληθής ὄν, it is the being which is unconcealed, not God. Heidegger's emphasis of the "that being [*Seiende*], that is, *actually* is," corresponds to the unconcealing of the actual at hand ὄν. Heidegger sees Augustine in the above quoted passage as pleading with time itself. This plea takes the form of the *amore amoris tui facio istuc*, which translated directly says "from love of the beloved, [my inquiry] goes in the direction of you". Heidegger then reformulates the phrase as *volo ut sis*. The formulation is from Scotus's *De Primo Principio*, "*amo, volo ut sis*", "I love you, I want you to be."⁷² Heidegger concludes his analysis of the "*Quid est Tempus?*" lecture similarly in Beuron with almost exactly the same language stating: "*Amo – volo ut sis* – letting the being be, that it is" (GA 80.1: 448).

My claim above is that the structure of Augustine's confession as *quaerere – amare – patefacere* for Heidegger is analogous to the structure of $\tau\acute{\iota}$ τὸ ὄν, ἀληθεύειν, ἀληθής ὄν presented in the 1930 *Essence of Human Freedom*. This structure is intended to provide us a philosophical methodology for attaining an understanding of the truth. What has been absent in the preceding analysis and only obliquely referred to by Heidegger is the *quid* of the *quid amo*. Heidegger has seen in the structure of Augustine's confession a means of grappling with how to arrive at the truth, but not yet the what-it-

⁷²Heidegger used this same phrase, *Amo: volo ut sis*, four years earlier in a letter to Hannah Arendt. See Arendt, Hannah, and Martin Heidegger. *Letters, 1925-1975*. 1st U.S. ed. Orlando: Harcourt, 2004. 21. Heidegger uses the phrase again in 1938, describing philosophy as the love of wisdom, stating: "Then the word says: "*love*" is the will that wills the beloved *be*; the will that wills that the beloved finds its way unto its ownmost and sways therein" (GA 66: 63/52). Arendt takes up the expression "*Amo, volo ut sis*" in her later writings, most notably in *The Life of the Mind* (144). Arendt correctly cites Scotus as the source of the expression. See Duns Scotus, *The De Primo Principio of John Duns Scotus: a revised text and a translation*. Trans. John, and Evan Roche. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute. 1949.

is of time. Heidegger sums this up nicely in the summary to the Beuron lecture: “To discern the essence of time; the essence can only be discerned if we allow it to essentially become” (GA 80.1: 448⁷³). For this we must turn to what Heidegger calls the “decisive chapter” and understand the way in which “time as *distentio* is the essence of human existence” (GA 80.1: 445).

Heidegger’s analysis of the *confessio* has disclosed to us two essential aspects. The first is that Augustine measures his own time *and* that the movement of time itself is measured. Put differently, in the breakthrough offered by the *confessio* there is a pleading for the thing measured to reveal something about itself. Heidegger’s realization is that time is a twofold measurement, which on my account corresponds analogously although not directly to the early distinction of timeliness and temporality. Heidegger’s writes this excitedly in his notes: “Tempore metior *as confessio*: metior tempora. Take both perspectives of time measurement – time = what is measured and time = measurement - together in one! Problem!” (GA 83: 62). Heidegger’s problem is now the analysis of the *metior tempora* and to understand the structure of what is measured in time. What is revealed is that this thing, as constant presence, as occurrence, occupies a space of its movement. Heidegger terms this space as the measurement of time a time-space, or *spatium*. The realization that space is a *spatium* raises several new questions for Heidegger, however.

Heidegger devotes a significant portion of the seminar attempting to understand where we can draw the line between what measures, Dasein, and what is measured, the movement in space of an occurrence. Heidegger consistently returns to two examples provided in Augustine’s *Confessions*, the movement of the sun and the occurrence of a battle. From these analyses Heidegger focuses on several associated issues which become central to Heidegger’s thinking about time in the mid- to late-1930s. Although Heidegger’s analyses are within the context of the Augustine text, by 1936 what was revealed to Heidegger in these analyses becomes central for his own thought. I treat these in

⁷³ All translations from GA 80.1 are my own.

greater detail in chapter two, but it is important to introduce their context and problematic here to foreground the development and transition of Heidegger's thinking about time.

Heidegger's analysis of the sun's movement and the occurrence of a battle as the what is measured of time exposes three structural facets of the time-space of occurrences or measurements of movement within time: the inception or beginning of Dasein's measurement of the occurrence, the retention of the occurrence as a from – to structure, and the distention of the occurrence or measurement of the presence. The time-space, *spatium*, of a battle is interpreted based upon my determination of its inception (*Anfang*), the during as a meanwhile where Dasein fixes the *from* and *until* measurement of the occurrence (*Festmachen des Von-bis (das Während ein Während-dessen)*), and the movement as such as a stretched out abiding presence which stretches away from me. Heidegger quotes Augustine, offering his own ontological analysis of what is being measured in the interpretation of a battle, saying:

“per suum [quippe] spatium temporis, quod ei sufficeret, illa pugna gesta atque finita est”
(XI.23.30) “Through its time-space, which was sufficient for it, it was carried out and completed.” Because the battle, especially as occurrence [*nie überhaupt alles Geschehen*], is such, that it takes time. Therefore, the movement of the sun is not time. As occurrence it is such that it allocates [*verteilt*] past, present, and future and that it somehow extends, spreads apart and stretches (*distenditur*) (GA 83: 289).

Notice here a slight but important difference with the threefold horizontal structure of timeliness described in *Being and Time* and the *Basic Problems* course. It is Dasein's relation to the sun, not Dasein itself, which allocates the past, present, and future. Previously it had been understood as the way by which Dasein made sense to itself through the narrative structure of its own being present to itself. Here we see that it is the relational structure of Dasein with the thing at hand which allows Dasein to interpret this allocation as past, present, or future. It is the aspect of ‘taking time’, of the somehow mysterious extension and stretching (*distenditur*) which puzzles Heidegger. Why?

Previously the analysis of time was entirely based upon Dasein: “Dasein is time, time is Dasein,” Heidegger had written in the Marburg Theological Society lecture from July 1924 (GA 64:

123/20E).⁷⁴ In the 1930-1931 Augustine seminar time is co-constitutional, that is it takes both the perspective of Dasein as the measure and also what is measured to determine time. If we look at this through the conceptual lens established in *Being and Time* and the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* course this is the relation between timeliness and temporality. Dasein's is ontologically structured as timeliness, but temporality is what was intended to allow Dasein to understand the temporalization of other non-Dasein. This temporalization is understood as *distentio*, the way in which a being's presence is stretched out or extended in a time-space. However, the transition to interpreting time in this way raises two issues.

Recall that in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger told us that Dasein could attain understanding of other beings and being through its own radical transcendence, understood in part as an ecstatic stepping ahead or stepping out. Heidegger moves away from this conception by 1930, as I discussed in the last section, through the structure of τί τὸ ὄν, ἀληθεύειν, ἀληθής ὄν, reinterpreted in 1931 as *quaerere – amare – patefacere*. So how does Dasein arrive at a recognition of the extended presence of the being which is at hand? I wrote earlier of what Heidegger interpreted as Augustine's "breakthrough". How is it that Dasein is able to "breakthrough" its own self-measure of time as timeliness and understand something essential about the at-hand being?

In the late-1920s Heidegger understood this through Dasein's ecstatic projection towards the presence of the at-hand being. My claim in the last section was that ἀληθεύειν was interpreted as the philosophical calling out to the at-hand entity to reveal something about itself. I hinted above that in the Augustine seminar this was tied to the Scotist *amo: volo ut sis*, where the act of loving is also a restraint on the part of the lover to allow the being to be what it is. In describing the structure of the

⁷⁴From the lecture *Der Begriff der Zeit* (1924)(GA 64). Translated as *The Concept of Time* by William McNeill, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). Heidegger makes a similar comment in the 1925 summer semester course *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*: "Not 'time is' but 'Dasein qua time temporalizes its being'" (GA 20: 442/319).

distentio in his lecture notes Heidegger employs a new *technicus terminus* which will become a central part of his middle period interpretation about time: restraint (*Verhaltenheit*).

Recall that in the late 1920's the emphasis on the structure of transcendence as leaping ahead was oriented around Dasein's own self projection. What the Augustine analysis revealed was that Augustine was not able to understand the essence of time so long as he continued forcing his own understanding. Instead Augustine pleads with God to reveal for him the essence of time. Heidegger reads Augustine as simultaneously pleading or soliciting God, or the understanding of the essence of time for Heidegger, and also finally restraining his own self-projection on to what time *might* be in order to ask what time actually is. Augustine's act of restraint of his own self-projection finally reveals to him, or so Heidegger reads it, that the essence of time is being as out-stretched and the measurement of that stretching. Heidegger analyzes the *distentio* in his lecture notes:

33. Dis-tentio

Distentio: distendo, "stretching-away-from-one-another"

Held-apartness: Ground for the possibility of dispersion as well as collection. Each in this kind of nature and likewise in an indifference.

Held-apartness and restraint [*Verhaltenheit*].

Restraint and holding-back [*Verhaltenheit und Verhalten*].

"quis *tenet* ...?"⁷⁵

34. Distentio

Distended-out [*Aus-dehnung*] – Out-stretchedness [*Ausgestrecktheit*].

(GA 83: 68-69).

The way we can attain an ontological understanding of beings in their being is by exercising a form of loving restraint. Heidegger suggests, in the closing minutes of the course, that this loving restraint

⁷⁵"quis *tenet* ...?" Heidegger is probably intentionally misciting *Confessions* XI.11.13 "quis **tenebit** illud et figet illud", "Who can lay hold on the heart and give it fixity...?". Although Augustine seems to mean *tenebit* as the third person singular future indicative "who will hold", I suspect that Heidegger's use of the third person singular present may have another meaning. The Latin verb *tēnēo*, in addition to meaning hold, can also mean "remain" or "persist". It is also etymologically related to the Greek *τείνω*, which corresponds to the theme throughout the passage of stretching or spreading out.

is, in fact, the fundamental attunement for philosophizing: “[t]his fundamental attunement of philosophizing out of the essence of humans: letting-be [*Seinlassen*], *questioning Gelassenheit*, the gathered restraint of the heart...” (GA 83: 81). In many ways this sentence can be read as a link between the early Heidegger of *Being and Time* and Heidegger’s thinking in his middle period up through the mid-1940s. It is worth mentioning that the term *Gelassenheit* does not appear, so far as I can tell, in the Beuron lecture. This is, however, not surprising. Heidegger would not mention before an audience of Catholic priests, clerics, and novitiates a term strongly associated with the Catholic heretic Meister Eckhart. Heidegger’s philosophical interpretation of *Gelassenheit* would become central to his central period thinking and it is important to see it connected here with the analysis of Augustine’s *confessio* about time. I take up a more in-depth discussion of restraint (*Verhaltenheit*) and its relation to ἀλήθεια in the next chapter, but I want to first signal what Heidegger has discovered about time itself and a lingering problem which Heidegger sees in this new interpretation. I will do this through a very short interpretation of Heidegger’s October 1930 lecture at the Beuron archabbey on Augustine’s “What is Time?” which I turn to next before concluding.

3. *The Beuron Lecture*

Exactly one month after his 41st birthday, on October 26th, 1930, Heidegger gave a lecture entitled “Saint Augustine’s Meditation on Time: *Confessions* Book XI” to the monks, clerics, and novices at the Benedictine Archabbey of St. Martin at Beuron in Baden-Württemberg, Germany⁷⁶. Heidegger considered the monastery at Beuron, despite his misgivings about contemporary forms of Christianity, a personal spiritual retreat. Heidegger had already expressed in a letter to his former

⁷⁶The lecture Heidegger delivered at Beuron bears the title “Augustinus: Quid est tempus? (*Confessiones* lib. XI) (26. Oktober 1930)” in the *Gesamtausgabe* edition (GA 80.1), but the monastery copy of the typed lecture at the Beuron library carries the title “Des hl. Augustinus: Betrachtung über die Zeit. *Confessiones* lib. XI.”

student and lover Elizabeth Blochman a year on September 12, 1929, the same time as the *Essence of Human Freedom* lecture course, that: “and yet ‘Beuron’— to use the name as a kind of shorthand— will unfold as the seed of something essential”.⁷⁷

The Beuron lecture is important for two reasons. First, it presents in a single laid out discussion Heidegger’s analysis of Augustine’s *Confessions* Book XI. Although the lecture notes of the seminar give us insight into some of the deeper results of Heidegger’s analysis, the Beuron lecture places those notes together into a single argument. Second, differences between the Beuron lectures and the seminar illuminate some of the ways in which Heidegger is still transitioning in his own understanding of time. We should read the Aristotle and Augustine seminars not as previews of what is to come in Heidegger’s thinking about time, but rather as the book ends to the project of fundamental ontology and the seeds of a transition to a new way of thinking about time. The Beuron lecture read in this way stands as a last signpost in Heidegger’s path of thinking about time in his early period and there are a few notable observations that need to be made before we close out the interpretation of Heidegger’s early period on time. I will present both a very brief summary of the Beuron lecture along with some important ways in which the lecture departs from the Augustine seminar notes. My aim is to provide a single snapshot of Heidegger’s argument and why it is important for understanding the development of his concept of time.

In the middle of the lecture on October 26th, 1930 in a packed room of monks and novices, Heidegger provides the five fundamentally important results of Augustine’s contemplation on time before giving the monks the essence of time. First, he says, “*tempus* is *distentio – memoria, expectation, contuitus* (positive). The threefold self-stretching (retaining - expecting – making present), which forms – as viewable image – past - future - present” (GA 80.1). Heidegger’s positive interpretation

⁷⁷Martin Heidegger, Elisabeth Blochmann, *Briefwechsel, 1918 – 1969*, Joachim W. Storck (ed.). Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft. 1989.

of time places at the center the interpretation of time as *distentio*, the self-stretching. Heidegger has translated the authentic interpretation of timeliness from the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* into Augustinian language and made this authentic form primary. Heidegger continues on with the negative results, “time is not the merely one after another – one dimensional – successive now-points, not a mere series, that somehow flows. Also not the merely “enduring” [*dauern*], in the way *distentio* is often understood. *This is the “result” of the retained transition of the out-stretched*” (GA 81.1: 444).

Heidegger shifts his argument with the third result of Augustine’s time contemplation: “3. *Distentio* – being-stretched-out [*Erstrecktheit*] is the fundamental character of *vita actionis*, the *being* [*Sein*] of human comportment. *Vita distenditur* – the human *being as such* [*Sein als solches*] is the threefold dispersed self-stretching [*gestreutes Sicherstrecken*]. *Sive in tota vita*” (GA 80.1: 444). There are two unusual aspects about the definition of *distentio* that Heidegger gives here. First, Heidegger repeats and emphasizes the character of being as such in relation to *distentio*. This is not immediately surprising in the context of the Augustine seminar because the aim of the interpretation, of Augustine’s pleading with God and the soliciting of time itself, is to arrive at an ontological understanding. The second and more surprising part of Heidegger’s definition is the orientation toward human (*menschlichen*) being. This is surprising for two reasons. First, Heidegger makes only one reference in the entire Augustine seminar, at least from the notes we have, to the human. The sole reference, from Gertrud Philipson’s seminar notes, points out that reflecting on the human experience of time only further complicates the essential understanding of time (GA 83: 285). The reference to the human as *distentio* is further surprising because in Heidegger’s analysis of Book XI, Heidegger focuses on the interpretation of the sun’s movement and the whiling of a battle in order to arrive at the essence of time, not on the human. The sixth point in Heidegger’s Beuron argument complicates this picture even further.

Heidegger's concludes the six points of his argument about the fundamental importance of Augustine's contemplation on time by saying: "*Thus in the essence of time, the essence of the existence of the human. The human – timely essence. Not in the superficially common sense, that the human is ephemeral, and that human action is carried out in time, which is as much for a stone as for an animal. Rather, time as *distentio* is the essence of the existence of the human. The human essences as time*" (GA 80.1: 445). Heidegger reemphasizes the relation of time and the human, although in a different manner than presented in *Being and Time*. Recall that in *Being and Time* Dasein comes to an understanding of being through its encounter with at hand beings because timeliness is Dasein's ontological constitution. The phenomenology emphasis there was on Dasein and its constitution. Heidegger subtly shifts this emphasis in the Beuron lecture by saying that time is the essence of the existence of the human. The stretching out belongs to existence, to being as such, and essences in the human. The emphasis here is on the human as the site of the understanding of being and time. Dasein's appropriation of being in time as a site of time-space will become one of the leading problems for Heidegger's thought in the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s.

Curiously, the Beuron lecture contains only one direct mention of the key discovery of the Augustine seminar: time-space (*Zeitraum*). In translating Augustine's word *tempus* Heidegger renders it as time-space, although he provides no analysis of what he means by the term (GA 80.1 438).⁷⁸ Recall that the analysis of the sun's movement and of the battle, the breakthrough from Augustine's self-projection of time to the pleading for the essence of time revealed that time, in its essence is a time-space. Instead Heidegger has chosen to focus throughout the Beuron lecture on the essence of time as the *distentio* and to strongly connect the *distentio* with the essence of the existence of the

⁷⁸Heidegger is referencing *Confessions* XI.15: *longum fuit illud praesens tempus*, which Heidegger translates as "long was each time as present time-space" (GA 80.1: 438).

human. The closest that we get to a discussion of the phenomenological character of time-space is in Heidegger's recapitulation of Augustine's discovery. Heidegger writes:

Recapitulating: transforming the *dis* [of dis-tentio]: in the simplicity of its singular stretching [*Erstreckung*], which in its gatheredness [*Gesammeltheit*] is precisely out-stretched to what is *ante*.

“before” in the double sense:

the simply present - in the face of [*das schlechthin Anwesende – im Angesicht*]
and what is *before* all time - eternity - *praesentissimum* - constant presence [*ständige Anwesenheit*]- *the nunc stans* (GA 80.1: 445).

Heidegger's recapitulation is significant for several reasons. First, Heidegger's redeployment of the term constant presence as what is “before” time. Recall that Heidegger introduced the expression as a technical term within the context of the *Essence of Human Freedom* course but that it was not used within the Augustine seminar. Instead, the focus in the Augustine seminar lecture was the revelation of *distentio* as the stretching out within a time-space. In the Beuron lecture we have the same formulation with the added qualification that what is “before” (*ante*) the gathered stretching out is constant presence. Second, I take Heidegger here to mean that constant presence is not temporal or sequentially before as he has argued exactly against this interpretation in the preceding steps of the argument. As with the Augustine seminar, Heidegger is arguing that beings are “before” us in that their presence is in front of us (*im Angesicht*) and that as constant presence they are the basis for understanding time as a stretching out. The themes of the constant presence (*ständige Anwesenheit*) and the relation to time-space take center stage by the late-1930s and are central to understanding Heidegger's thinking in his middle-period. Their tentative use in the Beuron lecture signals a conceptual connection and transition from his early period thinking to the middle-period thinking.

Heidegger ends the lecture in an almost word for word conclusion from the seminar, stating: “As a lecture, it is only a rough guide to the real reading in which each silent restraint [*schweigende Verhaltenheit*] of the heart is expressed, in which the word in silent bearing [*Verschwiegenheit*] speaks to us (GA 80.1: 449)”. The silent restraint of the heart is reminiscent of the seminar's appeal to

Gelassenheit and the gathered restraint of the heart as the fundamental attunement of philosophizing. Like constant presence and time-space, the terms silent bearing (*Verschwiegenheit*) and restraint (*Verhaltenheit*) occupy central roles in Heidegger's technical vocabulary beginning in 1936 in Heidegger's private reflections in *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)* (GA 65). I discuss these terms and their relation to the fuller understanding of time-space presented in Heidegger's *Contributions* in greater detail in the next chapter. It is important to recognize their initial use here because it is through the analysis of Augustine's *Confessions* that Heidegger first tries these terms out.

Heidegger's analysis of Augustine's *Confessions* XI reveals that the time itself is a time-space (*zeitraum*), a *spatium* in the Augustinian language of the seminar. What time-space demonstrates for us is that the interpretation of time is now no longer exclusively determined by Dasein but is structurally linked with being itself. How? Time understood as time-spaces establishes a relationality between the being of Dasein and other at-hand beings. The measurement of time, at least within the Augustine seminar, requires that there is both a being which measures and also a being which is measured. The occurrence of beings then is essential one of a time space, not simply for Dasein, who measures other beings because of its timely (*zeitlich*) constitution, but because Dasein is itself a time-space. This, however, raises a question for Heidegger about the very essence of time, the being of time:

But this being of time still lacks *spatium*; it is the final version, which is no longer measurable, itself the measure. Or does it conceal itself in the comprehensive time of times, *spatium*, through which, what it makes possible? And once again raises the question: How – “in which time-space do we measure time as it passes by?” (XI.21.27) (GA 83: 279).

Heidegger's question here is whether the essence of time is itself a time-space, a comprehensive time of times. Heidegger does not pursue the question further in the context of the Augustine seminar, but we can perhaps reformulate the question in anticipation of the transition to Heidegger's middle-period concept of time. If time is essentially constituted as the co-relation of beings in their presence

and the way in which that presence is stretched out, in the way in which beings persist or remain and are comprehensible through their dispersion and collection (mentioned in the quote above), then is there a way in which we might understand the history of this dispersion and collection? Does time itself have a history?

At this point, at the end of the Augustine seminar in early 1931, the question is left unaddressed. Heidegger returns to the question a year later with a radical new interpretation in his 1932 summer semester lectures on Anaximander and Parmenides. Heidegger, writing in 1937-1938 identifies the spring of 1932 as a pivotal transition in his own thinking (GA 66: 424/374). My next chapter begins with an analysis of the 1932 lecture course *The Beginning of Western Philosophy: Interpretation of Anaximander and Parmenides* (GA35) as a prelude to Heidegger's middle period thinking about time.

IV. CONCLUSION: FROM TEMPORALITY TO TIME-SPACE

Almost 30 years after the close of the Augustine seminar, in 1953, Karl Löwith, one of Heidegger's earliest students, would comment about the transition in Heidegger's thought from *Being and Time* to the middle-period: "the transition from the analysis of *time* to the time of *history*, which is characteristic for Heidegger's analyses of temporality, is not to be found in Aristotle or Augustine."⁷⁹ Löwith had first met Heidegger in 1919 and had worked very closely with Heidegger during the conceptual development of *Being and Time*. By 1931, however, Löwith had secured his own permanent and distinguished teaching position and likely was not able to attend Heidegger's seminars on Kant, Aristotle, and Augustine from 1930 onwards.⁸⁰

⁷⁹Löwith, Karl. *Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism*, ed. Richard Wolin and trans. Gary Steiner. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. 94.

⁸⁰Löwith, Karl. *My Life in Germany before and after 1933: A Report*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1994. 69.

I have argued throughout this chapter against Löwith's view that Heidegger's transition from his early understanding of time as the central problem of fundamental ontology to time as the time-space wherein the history of being could not be found in either Aristotle or Augustine. Heidegger, reflecting on the path of his earlier conceptual development from the standpoint of 1937-1938, remarks that the "historical" lectures he gave before 1932 were varied attempts or approaches (*Anläufe*) which grew out of the path established in *Being and Time* and carried it forward. Heidegger remarks that in 1932 his thinking took on a new direction and project, one which would result in a "confrontation" with *Being and Time* (*»Auseinandersetzung« mit »Sein und Zeit«*) (GA 66 423/373).

My attempt in this chapter has been to outline one of the key problems of the project of fundamental ontology, time and temporality, and show how Heidegger's thinking transitioned from 1925 up to 1932. Heidegger's concept of temporality was intended to allow us to understand the way in which being itself became temporalized. Heidegger's thinking around the period just before and after *Being and Time* was that temporality could be arrived at through the ecstatic transcendental self-projection of Dasein upon the horizon of encounter with other at hand beings. The transcendental stepping over would enable Dasein to learn something in the encounter with other at hand beings about being itself. Because other beings are themselves temporalized, an understanding of how being comes to be timely was necessary so that we could move toward a science of being – fundamental ontology. If we were to understand the temporality of being, we needed to understand the timeliness of Dasein, how Dasein understands other encountered beings, and the ontological meaning of temporality.

Heidegger's various approaches to the ontological problem of time illuminated different possibilities. Heidegger's concept of truth shifted. The work of the late 1920s oriented itself around Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's schematism of the understanding and the transcendental imagination. The ego's self-projection onto the thing in itself coupled with the schematism of the

imagination was intended to provide a ground for understanding. By 1930 Heidegger had begun, tentatively, to move away from transcendental truth and towards a model of truth as unconcealing and revealing. Heidegger no longer emphasized the transcendental beyond as the source of the justification for the conditions of possibility of understanding time and being. Instead, beings give themselves up to our philosophical soliciting and pleading. Beings reveal themselves as the site of truth.

The role of time too changed between 1925 and 1931. From the standpoint of fundamental ontology, temporality was only understandable on the basis of Dasein's own authentic timeliness. Dasein is the center and locus of the understanding of time and temporality and it is through Dasein's own leaping forward that we can begin to understand time as such. But the ontological interpretation of movement and occurrences revealed to Heidegger another possibility. The ontological interpretation of time is not revealed to us through Dasein's own self-projection and running back to itself in understanding but in restraint. The *Essence of Human Freedom* and Augustine lectures present a model for the practice of philosophy as restraint. The 1930-1931 Augustine seminar and the Beuron lecture revealed the ontological understanding of time as time-space (*Zeitraum*).

Reflecting back on the project of fundamental ontology in 1937-1938, Heidegger describes time-space as: "as that unto which the primordial timeliness, that is, "temporality" advances and in turn is grounded in "the event" (GA 66: 424/275 Trans. modified).⁸¹ Heidegger would not develop his articulation of "the event" until the mid-1930s, but the lectures on Kant, Aristotle, and Augustine show the seeds of the transition from fundamental ontology to the thinking of the event of being. Central to this thinking is the idea of time-space first presented in the Augustine seminar

⁸¹"*Der Zeit-Raum* als das, worauf die ursprüngliche Zeitlichkeit »Temporalität« zugeht und was seinerseits im »Ereignis« gegründet ist."

and which reveals the ontological interpretation of time as the historical happening of being and not just the constitution of Dasein as timely (*zeitlich*).

From Heidegger's perspective, by the end of 1931, the project of fundamental ontology was no longer viable. Heidegger required a new project and a new orientation, which had already been signaled to him in the shifting of his thinking about time and truth in the Kant, Aristotle, and Augustine courses. We will end the story of Heidegger's early thinking of time here, in its inceptual twilight before the transition to a new way of thinking about time inaugurated, as Heidegger recalls, in his 1932 summer semester course, *The Beginning of Western Philosophy Interpretation of Anaximander and Parmenides* (GA 35).

CHAPTER TWO

THE TIME-SPACE OF THE EVENT

Being and Time is not a “philosophy of time” and even less a doctrine about the “timeliness” [“*Zeitlichkeit*”] of humans; on the contrary, it is clearly and surely one way toward the exposition of the ground of the truth of being—the truth of being itself and not of beings, not even of beings as beings. The guideline is a leap in advance into “temporality” [“*Temporalität*”], that in which originary time along with originary space essentially occur together as unfoldings of the essence of truth, unfoldings of the transporting-captivating clearing and concealment of truth. Martin Heidegger, *Ponderings IV*, 1934.⁸²

By 1934, seven years after the partial publication of *Being and Time*, Heidegger had abandoned (*abbrechen*) the project of fundamental ontology, and with it the centrality of the term temporality for grounding the science of philosophy. Instead, Heidegger increasingly begins to develop a new understanding of time and with it, a new term emerges as the initial center piece for his thinking of time in his middle-period – “time-space” (*Zeit-raum*). First tentatively deployed in the context of the 1931 seminar on Augustine’s concept of time (as we saw in chapter one), time-space would dominate Heidegger’s thinking about time for the next decade.⁸³ Beginning in 1936 with the composition of *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)* (GA 65), the first of six private unpublished texts that define his middle-period, time-space becomes the primary elaboration for Heidegger’s thinking of time until roughly the mid-1940s.⁸⁴ By the end of Heidegger’s middle-period, time-space

⁸² GA 94-IV: 272/199-200.

⁸³ Heidegger continues to use the term time-space until the early 1970s, albeit in a conceptually modified form from its original discussion in the mid-1930s and 40s. Even between the 1930s and 1940s there is a significant shift in its usage, but its role is nevertheless fundamental.

⁸⁴ Throughout this chapter, I follow Daniela Vallega-Neu’s (2018) use of the expression “poietic writings” as a term of convenience to refer to Heidegger’s six private monographs centered on the event and written between 1936 and 1944. The six poietic works are: GA 65 *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-38), translated as *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*; GA 66 *Besinnung* (1938-39), translated as *Mindfulness*; GA 69 *Die Geschichte des Seyns* (1938-1940), translated as *The History of Being*, GA 70 *Über den Anfang* (1941), translated as *On Inception*, GA 71 *Das Ereignis* (1941-42) translated as *The Event*; and GA 72 *Die Stege des Anfangs* (1944). The last volume, *Die Stege des Anfangs*,

takes on a more limited role and a new term, “the whiling” (*das Erweilnis*), emerges as the central term for Heidegger’s thinking of time moving into the 1950s and his later period. Our focus here is not on Da-sein as the ground for the grounding of time-space, or even the incredible detail with which Heidegger describes each step in the process of the event, but on time-space itself as the structural site for the sending and dispensation of beyng into being. Necessarily, this will mean limiting a great deal of what is both interesting and challenging about Heidegger’s poietic works.

Overall, we can understand Heidegger’s middle concept of time from two standpoints. First, the term time-space is Heidegger’s initial attempt starting in the *Contributions* to think of how time and space together structurally emerge through what Heidegger begins to call the event of being. Heidegger interprets this event as the essential site of a moment for grounding the truth of being in Da-sein.⁸⁵

Second, Heidegger begins to move away from the articulation of time-space thought in 1936 towards a subsequent attempt, five years later in *The Event* (GA 71), to describe a form of time that is similarly given out of the event but without surpassing the individual entity and treating either being or time as a transcendental structure that is somehow independent of its relation to specific entities (other than Da-sein).

In the context of the 1940s Heidegger articulates this second understanding of time primarily as “constancy” (*Beständigkeit*) and the while and “whiling” (*Weilen, verweilen*, etc.). I will unpack these terms over the course of this chapter.

has not yet been published. I discuss individual volumes in greater detail throughout this chapter. It is worth noting that von Hermann includes a seventh “great treatise” to the list, „*Die Überwindung der Metaphysik*”, collected as part of *Metaphysik und Nihilismus* (GA 67).

⁸⁵ Throughout his middle-period Heidegger plays with the orthography of the term Dasein, most notably by using a hyphen and italics to accentuate either the *Da-* of Dasein, or the *-sein*, depending on his emphasis. See, for example, GA 82: 25 for Heidegger’s own discussion of his shifts in usage. I follow Heidegger’s shifts in writing the term in order to maintain consistency and I will discuss why Heidegger changes the writing of the term when I do so. Otherwise I use the standard Da-sein throughout.

It is worth noting that a discussion of Heidegger's middle-period on time and the terms which Heidegger uses to articulate developments in his understanding are complicated by several factors. First, starting in the *Contributions* and all throughout the poietic works, Heidegger no longer relies heavily, or at all, on concepts which had been previously important in the early-period. For example, the term "timeliness" (*zeitlichkeit*), so central in *Being and Time*, appears only once in *The Event* and when it does, it is in scare quotes and in reference to *Being and Time*. A similar situation is the case for "temporality" (*Temporalität*). Further, even the word "time" (*Zeit*) itself is often in scare-quotes or used in an everyday way. This non-technical use highlights a further difficulty in analyzing Heidegger's middle-period work. Daniela Vallega-Neu has pointed out, Heidegger is not always as consistent or as rigorous in his middle-period with the use of his own terminology as he was in his early-period (Vallega-Neu 2018, 124).⁸⁶ The same is true of the vocabulary he develops around time.

Part of this is how Heidegger understands the purpose of the six monographs that comprise the poietic works. These texts, more so than either his personal notebooks (the so-called "black notebooks") or his lectures and seminars from the same period, Heidegger sees as attempts (in a similar vein to Montaigne's *Essais*) to think being. Properly speaking, they are not "works" in the traditional philosophical sense, nor are they "about" specific topics, but rather courses of thought which follow an attempt to think inceptively, from outside the framework of metaphysics and representation (GA 65: 4/5; 65: 60/48-49). The six poietic texts are, following Heidegger's motto for his collected works as a whole, "ways—not works".⁸⁷ We will follow Heidegger's thinking of time by charting the course of time's role throughout this period.

⁸⁶ Vallega-Neu, Daniela. *Heidegger's Poietic Writings: From Contributions to Philosophy to the Event*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2018.

⁸⁷ See Franz Josef Wetz, "Wege: Nicht Werke. Zur Gesamtausgabe Martin Heidegger," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, Bd. 41, H. 3 (Jul.- Sep., 1987), pp. 444-455.

This chapter provides a brief outline of Heidegger's middle-period thinking of time by focusing on (I) the conceptual development of the terms he uses, (II) the structural role that each assumes throughout Heidegger's poietic works, beginning with time-space. And (III), the transition from the thinking of time-space in the early-1930s to whiling [*das Erweilnis*] at the end of the middle-period in the 1940s. My analysis is primarily centered around the poietic works because this is where we see Heidegger's most creative attempts to think time out of the history of metaphysics. I also make reference to Heidegger's seminars and lectures from throughout this period as they provide valuable insight into how he develops the insights presented in the poietic texts. Finally, the intimacy and concreteness of Heidegger's private notebooks, the *Ponderings* and *Remarks* which comprise the "black notebooks" (GA 94-98), are often clearer and more lucid than the abstract and difficult passages from the poietic writings. Whenever possible I refer to passages from these texts for further clarification.

Heidegger's writings on time from his middle-period, to say nothing of the dizzying array of specific technical terms such as time-space, temporalizing, lingering, constancy, or whiling, represent some of Heidegger's most original, most creative, and most challenging material from his *oeuvre*. Unfortunately, a comprehensive analysis of Heidegger's middle-period writings on time would be a work entirely of its own. Further, Heidegger tends to experiment with new, or modify previous, terms since the poietic writings are themselves paths of thinking. The poietic works are intentionally written in a language which attempts to circumvent the standard metaphysical tradition of representing being. The sheer number of new technical expressions makes discussing each individually almost impossible. Instead, I ask patience in knowing that as new terms are introduced they will be discussed throughout these next sections and that not every term can be traced out exhaustively.

My primary concern here is on time and to provide an overview of such terms to show how they serve to bridge his thinking of time from his early-period to the writings on time in the 1950s and onwards in his late period. I begin first with a few words on how and when Heidegger begins using the term time-space, followed by the terms use in the mid to late 1930s (in the first four poietic volumes), and then how he shifts his understanding in the early and mid-1940s to the term whiling for his preferred understanding of time.

I. DEVELOPMENT: THE ESSENTIAL UNFOLDING OF TIME-SPACE

In an essay about the path of his thinking written around the time he was finishing the last section (VII. The Last God) of the *Contributions* and a few months before beginning the second of the poietic volumes, *Mindfulness* (GA 66), Heidegger comments: “Since the spring of 1932 the main thrusts of the plan are firmly established that obtains its first shaping in the projecting-opening called ‘the event’. Everything advances towards this projecting-opening, and *A Confrontation with ‘Being and Time’* (GA 82) also belongs to the domain of these deliberations” (GA 66: 424/374 tm). Bearing in mind that the poietic writings are not “about” anything, if there is a unifying thought which is followed across all six volumes, it is the thinking of being as event. The central thought of both the *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)* and *The Event*, the two poietic writings which bookend Heidegger’s middle-period, is Heidegger’s conception of the event (*das Ereignis*), although each text approaches this thought in sometimes radically different ways.

Following Heidegger’s above comment, and the general suggestions given from the aforementioned “A Look Back at the Path,” I would like to introduce our discussion of time-space in the middle-period with a brief look at Heidegger’s development of the term.

A. THE BEGINNING OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND THE TURN TO ANAXIMANDER

Heidegger's reference to the first inklings of the thinking of the event (*das Ereignis*) as occurring in the spring of 1932 is almost assuredly a reference to the two courses he taught that semester, a lecture course entitled *The Beginning of Western Philosophy: Interpretation of Anaximander and Parmenides* (GA 35) and a seminar on Plato's *Phaedrus* (GA 83). Of these, the course on Anaximander is significant with reference to time for two reasons. First, Heidegger's stated interest in Anaximander is to return to the oldest surviving philosophical statement in order to try and think outside of the dominance of the history of metaphysics: "[o]ur mission: the abandonment [*Abbruch*] of philosophizing? *That is, the end of metaphysics*; through an originary questioning concerning the 'meaning' (truth) of being [*ursprünglichem Fragen nach dem »Sinn« (Wahrheit) des Seyns*]. We want to seek out the *inception* [*Anfang*] of western philosophy" (GA 35: 1/1 tm.). For Heidegger, Anaximander represents the first great thinker to think the question of being and it is Anaximander who inaugurates the first beginning of philosophy (GA 65: 189/149; GA 66: 273/242). In going back to the source of this first beginning, Heidegger attempts to leap outside of the history of philosophy and rethink being from the beginning. Heidegger also returns again to Anaximander at the end of his middle-period in the mid-1940s, albeit with a significantly modified interpretation. In this way Heidegger's reading of Anaximander bookends his whole middle-period. Heidegger's 1932 interpretation of Anaximander's statement is brief, and his analysis of Anaximander's use of the Greek term for time, χρόνος, briefer still, but they provide valuable insight for the development of Heidegger's thinking of time over the next decade.

The standard translation of Anaximander's fragment runs: "From what things existing objects come to be, into them too does their destruction take place, according to what must be: for they give recompense and pay restitution to each other for their injustice according to the ordering

of time...⁸⁸ The statement is enigmatic, particularly without further context, and with a distance of over two and a half millennia, yet its interest is easily apparent to a thinker like Heidegger, concerned with articulating the meaning of the truth of being. Throughout the 1932 course, Heidegger walks his students word by word through his own interpretation of the statement arriving at: “But whence beings take their stepping-forth, thence also their receding ensues (happens) according to necessitation (compulsion); for they (the beings) give compliance—maintaining correspondence with one another, acquiescing to a correspondence with one another—(in consideration of) in return for the noncompliance according to the allocation of time” (GA 35: 21/17). Heidegger’s entire analysis of Anaximander’s fragment is significant, but what concerns us here is how he sees time at work, although as we shall see, we should not think time simply as the translation of the ancient Greek χρόνος, but also according to the “truth” of being in Anaximander’s dictum.

1. The Stepping Forth and Receding of beings (γένεσις and φθορά)

Heidegger begins by asking his students what it is that Anaximander is inquiring after: τὰ ὄντα, beings (*die Seienden*). The purpose of Anaximander’s inquiry is to determine something about being as a whole, the individual beings in their unity (GA 35: 3/3). However, to understand beings in their unity, we must understand how beings come to be and pass away, ἡ γένεσις ἢ φθορά, which Heidegger glosses as “*the stepping-forth, the receding*” (GA 35: 6/5 em.). Heidegger explains his use

⁸⁸ The translation I have provided here is from Graham’s *The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics, Part I*. I have provided the standard English translation for ease of reference. Heidegger initially relies on Diels’s translation in Hermann Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: 3 Bände. Griechisch und Deutsch*. (Ed.) Walther Kranz. Weidmann. 1903. The original Greek runs: ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς οὖσι καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. The statement is first attested in Simplicius’s *Commentary on the Physics*, 24.13-25 and is considered the oldest written philosophical statement.

of stepping-forth and receding by stating that his worry is to not introduce already a non-Greek way of thinking about ‘coming-to-be’, γένεσις, and ‘passing-away’, φθορά.

Within the narrow context of Heidegger wishing to teach his students Greek philosophy this is certainly understandable; however Heidegger’s own aim is to try and understand the particular historical situatedness of Anaximander’s statement without recourse to later metaphysical interpretations which import with them ideas of causation.⁸⁹ Important for Heidegger in translating γένεσις as ‘stepping-forth’ and φθορά as ‘receding’ is that the translations capture the Greek notions of arrival, emergence, and self-manifestation on the one hand, and disappearance, withdrawal, and departure on the other. Heidegger sums up both of these as appearance and disappearance, adding further that disappearance is merely a modification of appearance. Thus, what Anaximander is inquiring into is the question of where beings emerge from in their appearance (i.e. their being) and where they disappear to in their withdrawal.

However, to understand appearance, we must first understand how it is that emergence and withdrawal occur. Put differently, how is it that another being appears to me? How is it that being, as appearance, emerges and disappears? On Heidegger’s reading, Anaximander expresses the *how* of this understanding as occurring because of the reciprocal nature of appearance, precisely because beings are interrelated to each other (GA 35: 10-11/9). Heidegger expresses this interrelation in the following way: “[t]he one gives way reciprocally to the other, and this giving way is at once arrival and departure, i.e., appearance. *Appearance oscillates in such giving way before, and against, each other of the stepping-forth and receding*” (GA 35: 11/9). What is central here is the unity of beings, i.e. their being.

⁸⁹Beyond the immediate reference to Aristotle with γένεσις, Heidegger specifically calls out Kant, saying: “need to carefully set aside every relation to later meanings of the word as a technical term, even the relation to the Kantian concept, although Kant does, within certain limits, use ‘appearance’ genuinely and originarily. It is only because ‘appearance’ becomes the counter concept to ‘thing-in-itself’ that we cannot appeal here to Kant” (GA 35:7/6).

Beings appear to each other, in their being, according to Anaximander, through *δίκη* and *ἀδικία*, what Heidegger translates, respectively, as compliance and noncompliance.

2. Compliance and Noncompliance (*δίκη* and *ἀδικία*)

Heidegger is at pains to warn us against historically over determining the terms *δίκη* and *ἀδικία*, particularly, as they are often translated, in a moral or juridical sense. Standardly the terms are translated as retribution, justice, and injustice, but if we are to stay true to Anaximander's own use of the terms, Heidegger thinks, such moral and juridical connotations should be removed (GA 35: 11-13/10). Instead Heidegger makes an unusual appeal in the German by means of the words *Fug* and *Un-fug* for *δίκη* and *ἀδικία* respectively. In translating *ἀδικία*, Heidegger appeals to the early Greek expression (likely from Xenophon) of *ἄδικος ἵππος*, an unruly and noncompliant horse. The German word *Unfug* follows a similar meaning in implying mischievousness or disorderly conduct. Thus, in both Greek and German, the respective opposites of *δίκη* and *Fug* mean something like compliant, or in harmony with. Heidegger adds further that: “[c]ompliance: that which incorporates something, which provides the cadre for something and which has to accommodate this something” (GA 35: 11/14). Thus, beings in their appearance reciprocally offer to one another either noncompliance or compliance. In giving and receiving compliance then, beings incorporate the appearance, the being of the other being, in respective correspondence and measure (*τίσις*) of one another. Yet, this respective correspondence and measuring of the compliance or noncompliance of the appearance (being) of a being is performed through a very particular kind of measuring, *κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν*, “according to the measure of time” (GA 35: 15/13). It is here that we see the first reference to time and, as I argue next, what eventually becomes the general interpretive structure of Heidegger's notion of time-space as a structure for Da-sein's experience of being four years later in the 1936 private manuscript *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*.

3. The Allocation of Time (χρόνος)

Heidegger begins his discussion of Anaximander's understanding of time, χρόνος, by reminding his students that they should not think of time as a sequence of positions along a line which each follow the other, nor should they think of time in terms of a causation of before and after. Time is not, he says, Aristotle's conception of measuring and calculation (GA 35: 17-18/13-14). Instead Heidegger appeals to a passage from Sophocles' *Ajax* in order to ascertain this more originary understanding of time. Heidegger quotes *Ajax* 646-647, which standardly runs: "[s]trangely the long and countless drift of time brings all things forth from darkness into light, then covers them once more".⁹⁰ Heidegger's own translation is perhaps a bit more idiomatic and instead reads: "Powerful, incalculable time lets emerge *everything* not manifest and conceals everything standing in appearance" (GA 35: 18/15).

Central for Heidegger's interpretation of the Anaximander fragment is that time is what allows all beings to emerge into appearance and also which withdraws them back into concealment (GA 35: 18/15). Appearance, as Heidegger interprets the dictum here, is the characteristic of all beings, and is thus the first intimation of being. Time, χρόνος, is what brings to appearance the non-manifest, the being of beings. Further, drawing still from Sophocles, χρόνος makes it possible for beings to emerge (χρόνος φύει) from their hiddenness or concealment (κρύπτεσθαι). The essence of time, at least in the context of his 1932 interpretation of Anaximander's fragment, is: "[t]ime stands in relation to all beings and specifically to their being; the *office and essence* of time is to *let beings*

⁹⁰From Sophocles "Ajax," John Moore trans., *Sophocles II*, Mark Griffith, Glenn W. Most, David Grene, and Richard Lattimore (eds.), Chicago: Chicago University Press. 2013. From the Greek original: ἅπανθ' ὁ μακρὸς κἀναρίθμητος χρόνος φύει τ' ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται, in Sir Hugh Lloyd-Jones and N. G. Wilson (eds), *Oxford Classical Texts: Sophoclis: Fabulae*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. 27.

appear and disappear [Verschwinden]” (GA 35: 20/16). Thus, Heidegger says, it is time which allocates, τάξις, and measures out to beings their being, their appearing and disappearing.

Heidegger’s rationale in appealing to Sophocles to interpret Anaximander is that Sophocles is closer in terms of an understanding and use of χρόνος, precisely because Sophocles does not understand χρόνος as an endless counting or calculable measure, ἀναρίθμητος, the way that Aristotle does. Anaximander’s dictum is illuminating exactly because it names being as appearance and time as what allows this appearance to emerge. Heidegger concludes his interpretation of χρόνος by recapitulating a slightly modified version of his initial translation of the verdict of Anaximander: “[b]ut whence beings take their stepping-forth, thence also their receding ensues (happens) according to necessitation (compulsion); for they (the beings) give compliance–maintaining correspondence with one another, *acquiescing* to a correspondence with one another [*sich fügend*]–(in consideration of) in return for the noncompliance [*Unfüg*] according to the allocation of time” (GA 35: 21/17). While not named as such here, it is this aspect of time as the allocative power of being to beings that will form Heidegger’s understanding of the structure of time-space in the poetic works, particularly the first three volumes. And, as we will see at the end of this chapter, through a very different re-interpretation in the 1940s.

Before moving on, however, I want to merely highlight Heidegger’s translation of the fragment as a whole and in particular his unusual usage of the related German terms *Füg* and *sich fügend* which play an important conceptual role throughout this period. Heidegger is playing with a word cluster associated with *Füg*, a term associated with carpentry, and related to joints, joinings, or pieces that properly (“rightly”) fit together. We can hear echoes of the term in English through a fugue in music as a point and counterpoint which hang together. The German terms *fugend* and *Fügung* carry strong religious connotations of divine fate, dispensation, destiny, and foreordination, as the inalterable to which one must comply or be fitted to. Both terms are etymologically related

and have to do with binding and conjoining.⁹¹ In the *Contributions*, Heidegger will refer to the different sections of the book as *Fuge*, joints. Similarly, in *The Event*, Heidegger will develop a philosophical vocabulary around the terms ordaining, conjoining, and dispensation.

Further, as mentioned, Heidegger's initial analysis and translation of the Anaximander fragment offers a preliminary conceptual view of what he will eventually describe in terms of time-space in the early poietic volumes. I want to flag the importance, both of these terms, and also of the interpretation of Anaximander with regards to Heidegger's thinking about time in his middle-period. Before turning to a discussion of time-space in the early poietic writings, I want to briefly provide some background to the term's provenance.

B. THE UNITY OF TIME AND SPACE

Three years after his first Anaximander interpretation, in the Fall semester of 1935-36, roughly a year before writing the first of the poietic volumes, Heidegger would teach two courses, a lecture course on Kant (GA 41) and a seminar on Leibniz's concept of world (GA 84.1). Heidegger cites both as significant for the early development of his thinking of the event (GA 66: 419/370-317, 423/374). The Kant course, in particular, is important because it is here that Heidegger really begins to elaborate on the term 'time-space' as a *terminus technicus*. A few selections from this course will help, I think, set the stage and foreground the centrality of the term.

Recall from the end of chapter one that Heidegger's first use of time-space (*Zeit-raum*) occurred during the winter semester 1930-1931 course on Augustine's concept of time. Heidegger's use of the term occurred in the context of asking after what the time of a battle was, or the time of

⁹¹*Deutsches Wörterbuch* von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm. 16 Bde. in 32 Teilbänden. Leipzig 1854-1961. Quellenverzeichnis Leipzig 1971. *s.v.* „Fug“ and „Fügung“, Bd. 4., Sp. 372 and Sp. 402.

the sun's movement.⁹² In the context of the Augustine seminar (and also the Aristotle lecture of the following summer semester), Heidegger's interest was in the ontological status of movement. It is during that Augustine seminar that he first uses the term 'time-space' in a semi-technical although not yet fully developed way. It is clear from the notes of the seminar, as well as the shortened public lecture on Augustine's concept of time (delivered at Beuron Archabbey), that Heidegger believes he had stumbled upon a new way of thinking about time. The term he uses there, *Zeitraum*, is itself relatively standard German and in English means something analogous to time-span or time-frame, although Heidegger will emphasize each individual part of the word through the insertion of a hyphen in the German. However, it is in the context of the 1935-1936 lecture course on Kant and the status of the thing that Heidegger begins to tease out his own meaning from the standard German one. Heidegger's description of his choice of the term to his students is instructive:

In order to keep hold of these questions with the help of a title, we will call them the question of the time-space [*Zeitraum*]. By time-space we understand a certain span or frame of time and say, for instance, "in the timeframe of one hundred years." With this expression, we really mean only something temporal. Alongside this common linguistic usage, which is very instructive for reflection, we will give the composite word "time-space" a sense that points in the direction of the inner unity of time and space. In this way, we move toward the authentic question of the "and." That we name time first, and speak of time-space rather than space-time, should indicate that time plays a special role in this question. But this does not mean that space can be deduced from time or that space is something secondary (GA 41: 16/11).

The passage prefigures a few themes about time-space which become central for Heidegger's understanding in the context of the poetic writings. The "inner unity" of the "and" which Heidegger refers to will become significant for how Heidegger sees in the *Contributions*, time and space emerging together out of the event.⁹³ Here, however, he does not speak of event, but instead,

⁹²The connection between time and the sun, particularly through what is revealed and concealed in light and darkness, as they relate to an understanding of time-space, beings, and being is one that Heidegger returns to often throughout the middle-period (GA 35: 16/20; GA 65: 263/331; GA 66: 109/91; GA 71: 14/21).

⁹³Heidegger summarizes a more technical and extended discussion of the quoted passage from the 1935-36 Kant course again in the *Contributions* (GA 65: 377-378/297-298; §§240-242).

uses the term “encounter”, stating: “Reference and encounter [*Hinweisung und Begegnung*]*—*that means generally the domain in which we, as alleged “subjects,” also reside. If we want to apprehend this domain, we always meet up with space and time. We called it time-space, which makes possible reference and encounter, the domain that surrounds things and announces itself always in the necessary display of space and time” (GA 41: 30-31/21). Important here, and throughout the poetic writings, is that time-space is discernible as a “domain” (*Bereich*) only through reference and encounter with things and that it announces itself through such an encounter.⁹⁴ This encounter, in turn, demands of us a decision about the questioning of such an encounter, a decision which takes different forms among different peoples and in different historical times (GA 41: 40/27). It is, however, only through the double of encounter and questioning that time-space itself emerges: “*First*, with regard to *what* stands in question—the thing... This results in a twofold: first, the framework of the thing, time-space (*Zeit-Raum*), and the thing’s way of encountering, the “this,” and then the structure of the thing itself as the bearer of properties, entirely general and empty: to form one for a many” (GA 41: 51/35 tm.). The second aspect which emerges is that the posing of the question, the questioning of the thing, itself has a history, that is, to question is itself historical.

This description, as we shall see, of the interrelation between the individual posing the question, along a certain history, and the encounter with the thing which reveals time-space as a domain in which an encounter with being is possible, will form the basic framework for time-space in the poetic writings, starting in the *Contributions*. It is worth highlighting the contrast that the above description of encounter, and the announcement of the encounter, has from Heidegger’s earlier work, particularly in *Being and Time*. Throughout the middle-period works, it is the encounter with

⁹⁴ For more on how the term *Bereich* develops and transforms from the 1940s into the 1950s, see Andrew J. Mitchell’s “Rethinking Thinking: Heidegger in the 1950s.” *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 38, no. 1 (2017): 1-15. The notion of a discernible region or realm and the way it is both achieved and acts as a medium becomes important for Heidegger’s thinking of time in the 1960s.

being, made available through the thing and the questioning that Da-sein provides, which opens the domain of encounter. This is in marked contrast to the ecstatic running ahead of Dasein in its own timeliness attempting to understand the temporality of being. Heidegger is critically aware of the changes in his own thinking between the poetic writings of the middle-period and *Being and Time* as the culmination of his early-period. This criticism is perhaps best exemplified in the over three hundred pages of self-critique which Heidegger writes on *Being and Time*.

C. THE CONFRONTATION WITH *BEING AND TIME*

Between 1936 and 1943, the years which approximately bracket his middle-period, Heidegger would write no fewer than half a dozen different commentaries and confrontations with *Being and Time*, totaling over 350 pages of text, including a running commentary of Part One, Division I of *Being and Time* (GA 82). The first two major commentaries, the “Running Commentary on *Being and Time*” and the “Confrontation with *Being and Time*” [*Eine Auseinandersetzung mit »Sein und Zeit«*], were both written around 1936.⁹⁵ It is evident from the language that Heidegger uses throughout both of these commentaries that they were written either after the *Contributions* or at least around the same time, thus forming a retrospective interpretation of *Being and Time* from the standpoint of the writing of the *Contributions*. A detailed treatment of these commentaries isn’t possible here, but a few observations from Heidegger’s reflections on timeliness, temporality, and time should serve to show how Heidegger attempted to overcome the transcendental impasse of fundamental ontology and instead to think in terms of the time-space of the event of being.

In a remark entitled “§98 *The Historical Situation*—Being and Time,” from the “Confrontation with *Being and Time*,” Heidegger comments: “‘Time’ → the lack of a sense of plight as *authentic*

⁹⁵The fragmentary nature of the commentaries and their organization makes it difficult to give an exact dating to each fragment’s composition. Both texts are labeled “(1936)”, although occasionally some of the sections have alternative datings, as early as summer 1935 (GA 82: 190: §95) and based on references to the “Black Notebooks” at least up until the late 1930s.

[eigentliche] plight ...and...therefore the misunderstanding of *Being and Time*. The *inability* of the *real* overcoming. On the other hand, only talked about or ‘traced back’ to what is known” (GA 82: 191). The idea of plight (*Not*) and lack of plight (*Not-losigkeit*) is a central theme of the *Contributions* and like the alluded to reference with *Angst* from *Being and Time*, is a fundamental attunement which calls to Da-sein. The difference, as Heidegger says here and throughout the *Contributions*, is that this sense of plight, although experienced by Da-sein, is from being itself. This stands in contrast to the *Angst* of *Being and Time* which emerges as a fundamental attunement which calls Da-sein back to its own self to claim its own authenticity. Heidegger summarizes this in the following section, §99 of the “Confrontation” by saying:

2. Likewise to interpret *beyng itself originally* – not first and only the *at hand* [Vorhandene] and Reigning [Herrschende], as forgetfulness, to follow the powerful, interpretation of being on the conditions of *its possibility*, i.e. with timeliness beyond οὐσία in trinity; a *double* purpose:

Dismantling *and* | *new* beginning
on the condition (time) Time — fissure

3. Time, however, only the *next* horizon -
not only to cross this horizon, but to overcome the *horizon* in general – event.
(GA 82: 192).

The passage is not easy to parse, but I believe it signals a significant shift in his thinking about the role of time in the *Contributions* and beyond which nevertheless is linked to the thinking of time from his early-period. Many of these terms, particularly time as the fissure of being, are central to the understanding of time in the *Contributions* and beyond. I want to first highlight, though, the aspects of the above passage which demonstrate a transition from the thinking of time in *Being and Time* to the thinking of time-space in the poetic writings. First, we see Heidegger briefly summarize the role that timeliness and temporality were meant to play in his early-period as means of arriving at an interpretation of being from being itself. The trinity, or threefold structure, which Heidegger alludes to here is Da-sein’s ek-static timeliness of the having-been, the now, and running-ahead. Yet Heidegger has already signaled a shift by making use of *beyng*, unused in *Being and Time*, to highlight

that what is sought after is not merely the present at hand or metaphysical (the “reigning”) interpretation of being, but something which is beyond this immediate presence (οὐσία).

It is not entirely clear how we ought to read this line of the passage because of the way it is broken up. However, as I think will become apparent in the next section, I think we should read these movements of dismantling and new beginning as occurring together and that part of what is being dismantled is an interpretation of time as a horizon for the conditions of possibility, Heidegger’s primary thinking of time as we saw from chapter one. Time, here, must be thought in terms of a new beginning from the dominant interpretation of being, time is instead now a ‘fissure’ (*Zerklüftung*). The difficulty of moving from timeliness to temporality in the early-period necessitated that Da-sein understand temporality as the horizon for the projection of being. This, however, introduced for the project of fundamental ontology the notion of being as transcendent, or in the language of Heidegger’s early-period, beyond beings. Heidegger now sees a new direction, one which overcomes the transcendental horizon and instead interprets being itself as event and time as the fissure of being. Heidegger inaugurates the understanding of this new, or other, beginning in the first of the poetic writings, the *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*.⁹⁶

II. TIME-SPACE AS THE ABYSSAL GROUND

Heidegger’s *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)* is an unusual philosophical text. We are not, as already mentioned, supposed to consider the *Contributions* as a “work” of any kind, nor are the *Contributions* “about” anything. Yet, overall, and different from his private notebooks and reflections, the text is highly structured and presumes an audience, although also an unusual one. If

⁹⁶ For an excellent analysis of Heidegger’s conception of the event, particularly from the standpoint of the *Contributions*, see: Bahoh, James. *Heidegger’s Ontology of Events*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 2020. While Bahoh dedicates relatively little discussion to time-space, his overall analyses of truth, grounding, and the historical and ontological senses of event are indispensable.

the beginning of the text is any indication the text is “for the few [...] for the rare,” those future individuals who can creatively ground the truth of being because it is their destiny to prepare the time-space for the decision about being (GA 65: 13/13; 51-52/42). I hope to illuminate the overall features of time-space, but also recognize that Heidegger warns us against such representational and imagistic descriptions.

In a passage from his notebooks, probably written a year or so prior to the *Contributions*, Heidegger writes of such individuals that they are: “those who are self-certain, who arouse and pursue the most proximate and most easily graspable conditions of historical Da-sein, as if this were *the* task pure and simple; the questioning ones, who think far in advance and prepare the basic conditions of creativity whereby the space-time [*Zeit-Raum*] of Da-sein is first grounded for the entire people” (GA 94-IV: 288/211)⁹⁷.

Such creative individuals are so intertwined with being’s openness that: “[t]he proper grounding of this time-space is called *Da-sein*” (GA 65: 17/16). Further, Heidegger is clear that these Da-sein are humans, and human Da-sein whose basic disposition is to seek, preserve, and act as a steward of being:

To be *seeker, preserver, steward*—that is what is meant by *care* as the fundamental trait of Da-sein. These names for care gather together the destiny of humans as grasped in terms of their ground, i.e., in terms of Da-sein. Da-sein, in turning, is appropriated to the *event* as the essence of being, and only in virtue of this origin as the grounding of time-space (“temporality”[»*Temporalität*]) can Da-sein become steadfast in order to transform the plight of the abandonment by being into the necessity of creating as the restoring of beings (GA 65: 18/16; §5 *For the few —for the rare*).

Two things are clear for Heidegger here, at least in the context of the *Contributions*. First, it is human Da-sein, and only human Da-sein, who can become the grounding of the time-space. This is significant, and as other passages in the *Contributions* point out, plant, animal, and stone, etc. are not

⁹⁷Note that here space-time is *of* Dasein and *for* a people. I discuss the significance of this below.

Da-sein.⁹⁸ Second, the conceptual link which Heidegger draws between “temporality” and time-space. In this way there is a conceptual continuity between the thinking of time in his earlier work with the development of time as time-space. Time-space, however, is not Da-sein, but is grounded *in* Da-sein as truth. Time-space is the name Heidegger gives for the site of the event between Da-sein and beyng.

The idea of ground and grounding for Heidegger is important throughout all of the poietic writings, but particularly in the *Contributions* it serves to illustrate the fact that while time-space is grounded in Da-sein, Da-sein itself is not time-space, but prepares time-space. This is important because much of the *Contributions* (and to a lesser extent *Mindfulness*), illustrated in the passages just quoted, is to prepare those specifically dispositioned Da-sein to become the creative grounding of the time-space of the truth of being. Time-space thus serves a double function within the *Contributions* (1936-38) and the other poietic writings up until *On Inception* (1941) and *The Event* (1942).

Time-space is, on the one hand, the name for a specific structure of how being emerges as an event. On the other hand, it is also simultaneously part of the constitution of human Da-sein to become the “site” for the grounding of this truth. In the context of Heidegger’s poietic texts, this grounding of the truth of being in Da-sein brings with it a constellation of other essential features: history and knowledge, science and technology, poetry and literature, the gods and myth, “truth” and philosophy. Through the preparation of itself as ground, beyng grounds time-space in Da-sein as an event.

With the composition of Heidegger’s poietic works the question of being (*Seinsfrage*) of his early-period shifts into a meditation on the truth of beyng in its historicity (GA 65: 7/5; 8/6). In

⁹⁸“Da-sein—the mode of *being* that is distinctive of humans *in their possibility*; thus it is no longer at all necessary to add ‘human’ [to the term ‘Da-sein’]”(GA 65: 301/237).

the *Contributions*, Heidegger's primary concern is to think through the event in its grounding in historical Da-sein. Thus, inaugurating an interest in the way in which being itself is historically understood through beings by Da-sein. The second of the poetic writings, *Mindfulness*, reflects on many of the same themes from the *Contributions*, often more intensely, and sketches out individual key aspects of the event of being. Likewise, some of the meditations that *Mindfulness* enacts as a volume are also an increasing concern with the historical meditation on the sending of being in our own epoch.

Generally, at least up until the early 1940s with *On Inception* (GA 70) and *The Event* (GA 71), we can understand time-space as broadly fulfilling three overlapping roles: a) the abyssal ground which emerges from being, b) the temporalization (*zeitigung*) of being, and c) the site of the essential moment (*Augenblicksstätte*) of decision. These aspects constitute time-space and Heidegger's new understanding of "time" and "temporality," we will look at each before moving on to the way Heidegger starts to understand time in the later poetic works of the early and mid-1940s.

A. THE FISSURE OF BEYNG AND THE ABYSSAL GROUND

Being, as the historical happening of being, for Heidegger, essentially occurs as event. Being 'is' not, only beings 'are', although beings stand "in" being. This is one way in which we can make sense of what Heidegger means when he says that beings have been abandoned by being. But similarly, being is not an "abstract" idea or a representational thought (GA 65: 29-31/25-26). Some rare individuals can think, fully and inventively, the truth of being in our epoch and experience it as a sense of plight, a plight both that beings have been abandoned by being and that, for the many, there is no sense of plight or anxiety about this abandonment thanks to the power of machination and modern metaphysics to conceal being's refusal (GA 65: 21/23).

The recognition of this plight, of the abandonment of beings by being, and the refusal of being, exposes such individuals to the resonating of being as it essentially occurs (GA 65: 107-

108/85-86). Such Da-sein “hear” the resonating of beyng and are able to leap outside the history of being as machination and instead think inceptively, from an other beginning. This inceptive thinking which opens itself up to the resonating of beyng from the other beginning disposes Da-sein to the trembling reverberations of beyng as event (*Ereignis*). Beyng as event disposes Da-sein to the truth of being as a presentiment (*Abnung*) which: “does not at all concern merely the future, merely what is imminent, but instead traverses and measures up the whole of temporality: the temporal-spatial playing (*Zeit-spiel-raum*) field of the ‘there’ (GA 65: 22/19).⁹⁹ Da-sein’s presentiment, experienced from the resonating of beyng, “opens the expanse of the concealment of what is assigned and perhaps refused,” i.e. beyng in its refusal as the truth of being in beings. Da-sein’s exposure to this temporal-spatial-playing field through presentiment calls Da-sein to decide (in thought, words, or deeds) about being from out of this experience of beyng as event. Da-sein, as the site of the essential moment of the event of beyng, is a participant in beyng’s essential occurrence. And the “space” which emerges in Da-sein’s experience of presentiment is not merely the truth of the temporal-spatial-playing field of Da-sein’s own inceptive thinking, but is so precisely thanks to the “appearance” of time-space (GA 73.1: 79).¹⁰⁰

Beyng, as essential occurrence, calls forth to Da-sein as event. The event exposes Da-sein to the simultaneous way in which the refusal of beyng is both concealed and also revealed as the truth of being in beings. This concealing and revealing in the expanse of the event is understood as

⁹⁹It is worth noting that the German, *Abnung*, that the fundamental attunement of presentiment translates is colloquially used as “to have an idea” or “to have a clue” about something. The various other terms which Heidegger uses: shock, awe, diffidence, restraint, foreboding, etc. are all moments of this “clue” regarding the truth of beyng in its essential occurrence in beings.

¹⁰⁰ Heidegger uses the modified term temporal-spatial playing field (*Zeit-spiel-raum*) to refer to how Dasein’s sense of “time” and “space” enter into a realm of “play” (*Spiel*) in the strife of earth and world. In this way, we can think of the temporal-spatial playing field (*Zeit-spiel-raum*) on the part of Dasein, while the time-space (*Zeit-raum*) emerges from the event of beyng (GA 73.1: 176). Heidegger uses the term temporal-spatial playing field far less frequently than time-space and it is largely absent in the later poetic writings. The single reference to temporal-spatial playing field in *The Event* seems to be consistent with the earlier understanding that it is on the side of Dasein (GA 71: 307/266).

turning [*Kehre*] which clears a possible ground for Da-sein (in the history of being) through a confrontation and strife between world and earth, between the *Da* as ‘here’ of *Da-sein*, and the ‘being’ of *Da-sein* (GA 65: 188-189/148-149).

In this sense we can say that Da-sein is the ground of the truth of being in its decision, but it is beyng as event which grounds this truth in Da-sein. But, since beyng is itself not a being and only occurs essentially, neither the event, nor beyng, can be said to have a ground. By contrast, it is Da-sein who stands as the grounder of the ground of truth. As such we should think of the event as groundless, or as Heidegger will call it, the abyssal ground (*Ab-grund*). It is from “out” (*Ab-*) of this abyssal ground that Da-sein is able to “leap” into the expanse that emerges as the other beginning: “this open realm [*Bereich*] is the abyssal in-between amid the ‘no longer’ of the first beginning as well as of its history and the ‘not yet’ of the fulfillment of the other beginning” (GA 65: 23/20).¹⁰¹ The leap initiated in Da-sein’s thinking leaps “into” time-space, now thought of as the abyssal ground of beyng. *Time-space is thus: the structural site for both Da-sein’s leap into the groundless ground of the abyss, and also the “moment” of Da-sein’s decision to ground the truth of being* (GA 65: 386/305).

Throughout the poietic writings, and in particular the first three, Heidegger uses a number of terms which suggest a type of topography to the event. Terms like leap, region, abyss, ground, all help to illustrate the process that Heidegger sees at play in the recognition of event of beyng.¹⁰² Another term Heidegger introduces that is helpful in terms of thinking the structure of time-space, is “the fissure of beyng [*die Zerklüftung des Seyns*]” (GA 65: 32/27; 103/81; 235-237/186-187;

¹⁰¹Heidegger is clear that we should not think of the “space” (or region, expanse, etc.) or the “in-between” as any kind of place or location (GA 66: 94/78). Heidegger will also provocatively suggest that the in-between character of time-space was part of what was to be essentially elucidated in *Being and Time*’s I.3, “Time and Being” (GA 67: 131).

¹⁰²Recall, however, that Heidegger is insistent that what is experienced is a placeless “place”. Dasein is not leaping to some form of transcendental ‘beyond’. Moreover, while the language which Heidegger uses to describe the event is metaphorical (time-space *as* abyss, etc.), we should not interpret such statements as symbolic or representational.

279/220). This fissure of beyng can be thought of as the abyssal “bottom” of Heidegger’s topography. Heidegger provides relatively little discussion of the term (and it appears only in the early poetic works), yet its importance as what time-space emerges out of, is clear.¹⁰³ In what follows I would like to briefly put together what I have called the topography of time-space in order to give a metaphoric recapitulation of the structure of time-space.

Da-sein’s inceptual thinking out of the plight of our epoch and the abandonment of being by beings prepares Da-sein for a “leap” from “out” of the traditional history of being, the first beginning, and into another beginning which encounters the truth of being as (historical) event. Da-sein prepares for this leap by dwelling in the temporal-spatial playing field encountered in the confrontation and strife between earth and world. Time-space is Da-sein’s encounter with what erupts from out of the fissure of beyng and up into an abyss, a truth of beyng which has no ground but which is grounded in Da-sein. This truth occurs as a turning in the middle of the expanse of time-space which is co-determined as the clearing and concealing of beyng. Time-space thus juts out from the fissure of beyng and reveals itself as a groundless abyss. The jutting out of time-space as abyssal ground from the fissure of being occurs as the event of truth for Da-sein:

The abyssal ground [*Ab-grund*] is the originary essential occurrence of the ground [*Grund*]. The ground is the essence of truth. If time-space is thus grasped as abyssal ground, and, reciprocally, if the abyssal ground is grasped more determinately by way of time-space, then the turning relation and the belonging of time-space to the essence of truth are thereby opened up.

The abyss is the *originary unity* of space and time, that unifying unity which first allows them to diverge into their separateness.

¹⁰³The most detailed description in the *Contributions* of the half-dozen references to ‘fissure of beyng’ goes: “The fissure is the inner, incalculable splitting open of the ap-propriation, i.e., the splitting open of the essential occurrence of beyng as the center that is needed, that bestows belongingness, and that remains related to the passing by of the god and, at the same time, to the history of mankind” (GA 65: 279/220). It is not at all clear what Heidegger means by this passage, except to reiterate what the other references make clear, that this fissure or cleaving of beyng is out of which time-space emerges as abyssal ground. As far as I can tell, the term is only used in the *Contributions* and does not appear in any of the other poetic writings.

Yet the abyssal ground is also, and primarily, the originary essence of the ground, of its grounding, *of the essence of truth*.

What is the abyssal ground? What is *its* mode of grounding? The abyssal ground is the staying away of the ground.

And what is the ground? It is that which veils itself and also takes up, because it bears and does so as the protruding of what is to be grounded. Ground: self-concealing in a protruding that bears (GA 65: 379/299).

The above passage nicely sums up the way in which the abyssal ground wells up out of the fissure of being and, as time-space, both offers up what is to be measured while concealing being. The above passage is also important because we see Heidegger, without comment, stating that the protrusion of time-space is the originary unity of time and space. Again, however, we must keep in mind that while time and space will diverge into their own separate forms once time-space is grounded in Da-sein, this does not mean for Heidegger that time-space is either anything “temporal” or “spatial”, nor that they are somehow within Da-sein. Time and space emerge as a result of Da-sein’s decision and the grounding of the truth of being:

It is also prior to all dimensionalities, for these arise only out of the sheltering of truth, and thus of time-space, in beings and indeed primarily in objectively present and changing things.

Only where something objectively present is seized and determined does there arise the flow of “time” that flows by in it and the “space” that surrounds it.

The abyssal ground, as the first essential occurrence of the ground, grounds (allows the ground to occur essentially as ground) in the mode of temporalization and spatialization.

Yet here is the critical point for the correct conception of the abyssal ground. Temporalization and spatialization cannot be grasped on the basis of the usual representations of time and space; it is just the opposite: these representations must be determined according to their provenance out of the primessential temporalizing and spatializing (GA 65: 382/302).

The experience of this event appropriates Da-sein and calls it to both “measure” and make a decision about the oscillation between clearing and concealing which occurs as the truth of being. Following our topological metaphors, The event opens up to Da-sein as an “in between” (*Inzwischen*) region, time-space. In this in-between the event oscillates and calls Da-sein to be appropriated as a between, as a ‘there’ (*Da*-) for its self-opening and self-concealing. This between which hovers over

the abyss, like a net, is both Da-sein (and the between of its temporal-spatial playing field), and the in-between which emerges from out of the fissure of beyng as time-space (GA 67: 127). Da-sein is thus appropriated by the event, by beyng, to stand within this abyssal time-space and to shelter the truth of beyng as ground. Da-sein, as a sheltering of truth, becomes the site of a there for this in-between, which is the essence of time-space. Beyng occurs as event, as the in-between opened up by time-space, but needs Da-sein in order to shelter and become the site of the between of the truth of being. Da-sein thus becomes the site of the moment of the decision about the truth of being. We will return soon to Da-sein as the site of the moment and the differentiation of the between of Da-sein and the in-between of time-space will be important to keep in mind as we move into the next section.

Heidegger tells us that what Da-sein is measured in this junction between time-space and the site of truth as clearing-concealing is the temporalization of time and the spacing of space. And as the passage above points out, it is always through the seizing and determining of present things that time and space emerge separately from their unity as time-space. I turn next to a brief description of just what this temporalization of time-space means before ending the discussion of the early poetic works with an overview of time-space as the site of the moment.

B. THE TEMPORALIZATION OF TIME-SPACE

Recall that Da-sein, in acting as a between in the in-between of time-space as the abyssal ground is can now ground the ground of the truth of being. In turn, the abyssal ground grounds in the mode of temporalization and spatialization. Yet Heidegger warns us, again, that not only should we not think these as the usual representations of time and space, but that, in fact, space and time themselves arise as concepts precisely because of the way that time-space simultaneously temporalizes and spatializes as the grounding of the ground in Da-sein's intimation (*Wink*) about

being, i.e. the seizing and differentiation of the present thing from being. How so? To make sense of this we must tease out something of Da-sein's experience as the event of the between in the in-between of being and beings. Heidegger describes Da-sein's intimation of being through the following longer passage:

But this *intimation* comes to intimate only in the *resonating* of beyng out of the plight of the abandonment by being and merely says once again: it is neither from the call nor from a belonging, but only from the "between" in which both come to be in oscillation, that the event opens itself and that the projection of the origin of time-space, as originary unity, can be enacted out of the abyss of the ground (the net, cf. The leap, 142. *The essence of beyng*).

Space is the captivating and abyssal grounding of the embrace.

Time is the transporting and abyssal grounding of the gathering.

The captivation is the abyssal embrace of the gathering.

The transporting is the abyssal gathering into the embrace.

If transporting proves to be a gathering, and captivation an embrace, then in each case there is a countercurrent at work. For transporting seems at first to be a dispersing, and captivation an estrangement. This countercurrent is precisely the essential and points to the originary referentiality of both to each other on the basis of their separateness.

Time spatializes and is never captivating. Space temporalizes and is never transporting.

Even in their unity, space and time have nothing in common; instead, what unifies them, what allows them to emerge *in* that inseparable referentiality, is time-space, the abyssal grounding of the ground: the essential occurrence of truth. This emergence [*Ent-springen*], however, is not a tearing off; just the opposite: time-space is merely the unfolding of the essence of the essential occurrence of truth.

The abyssal grounding of the ground is not thereby exhausted in its essence; it is merely clarified as the grounding of the "there."

Time-space is the gathering embrace that captivates and transports at once; it is the abyssal ground which is structured in this way, which disposes accordingly, and whose essential occurrence becomes historical in the grounding of the "there" by Da-sein (by its essential paths of sheltering the truth) (GA 65: 385-386/304-305).

There is a great deal at work in this passage and I would like to tease out a few salient points about how time-space temporalizes as the transporting gathering into the event. We understand time as the temporalizing of time-space, but time as temporalization is experienced as the transporting (*Entriicking*) which is the opening up of the event of appropriation by beyng. The opening up of the event gives us a hint or intimation about the beingness of being through the double unity of constancy and presence which each manifest

the divergence of temporalization and spatialization from out of time-space. Presence (*Anwesenung*), as time, is the gathering together of what is in the beingness of a being. While constancy (*Beständigkeit*), as time, is the persistence of a being and beingness, such that it does not simply disappear (GA 65: 272/214).

It the first beginning it is through these aspects of the beingness of beings (*Seiendheit des Seienden*) that Da-sein differentiates between beyng and beings, and thus diverges the unity of time-space into time and space (GA 65: 260/205). It is only when we think inceptually in the other beginning that we experience the unity of time and space as time-space, that is, as that gathering embrace which is both captivating (*Berückung*) and transporting (*Entrückung*) into the in-between of the oscillation of the clearing and concealing of the event. Heidegger tells us, “time” when thought in its unity as time-space is what transports Da-sein into the truth of beyng and appropriates Da-sein to the event of appropriation (*Er-eignung*) through the threefold granting of consignment (*Übereignung*), bestowal (*Schenkung*), and assignment (*Zu-eignung*). This threefold structure of transporting, however, occurs only if Da-sein has sufficiently prepared itself to become the site of the moment in the time-space of the event. We will discuss the role of time-space as the site of the essential moment for Da-sein’s grounding of the truth of beyng next.

C. THE SITE OF THE ESSENTIAL MOMENT

Recall that early we had said that an aspect of the structure of time-space is its occurrence as the juncture between beyng and Da-sein, between being as Da-sein has known and understood it in the first beginning, and the possibility for Da-sein to experience and ground another beginning. As we have already discussed, it is the opening up of time-space from out of the abyssal ground which emerges up from the fissure of beyng that makes a “site” available for Da-sein. For this site to open

to Da-sein, Da-sein must prepare itself to not only think from another beginning, but also “leap” into the time-space of the event, to leap into another beginning. The event, if Da-sein is suitably prepared, through the fundamental dispositions of awe, shock, and restraint, then the event appropriates Da-sein and transports it to the placeless place which is the time-space of the event. Through the captivation and transport, which are the authentic unities of “time” and “space”, Da-sein is transported to the juncture between time-space and the abyssal ground which is the event. If Da-sein is appropriated in the event, then a clearing is opened such that Da-sein may leap into the abyssal “in-between” of time-space and be consigned, bestowed, and assigned the truth from the fissure of beyng and can now ground a new history of being for its people. However, for Da-sein to access and endure the experience of beyng, Da-sein must first join and transform the time-space opened by the abyss, and its own temporal-spatial-playing field, into the site of the moment¹⁰⁴.

The site of the moment is described by Heidegger as the event itself and in part this is because the site of the moment is where beyng call out to Da-sein and Da-sein makes a decision about beyng which becomes a new history of being. Heidegger will also refer to it as the site of decision, the site of the moment of decision, or occasionally the site of the incursion by the end of the 1930s (GA 94-V: 347/253; GA 95-IX: 240/185; 243/188). The site of the moment is, in many ways, the linchpin of the experience of the event, and where time-space (itself the site of the moment where the decision takes place) brings together beyng as abyssal ground and Da-sein for the decision. Heidegger describes it in the following way: “[t]he abyssal ground is thus the inherently temporalizing, spatializing, and oscillating site of the moment for the ‘between,’ and Da-sein must be grounded as this ‘between’” (GA 65: 387/306). The site of the moment brings together the in-between of time-space with Da-sein now become the “between” of this (new) historical being and

¹⁰⁴“Time-space as arising out of, and belonging to, the essence of truth and as the thereby grounded structure (joining) of the ‘there,’ a structure of transport-captivation” (GA 65: 371/293).

humans, its people.¹⁰⁵ The site of the moment is marked for Da-sein as both an experience of rapturous transport and also a site of conflict. As a site of conflict, it is the conflict which Heidegger refers to as the conflict between earth and world, and in order for Da-sein to ground the truth of beyng and enact a new historical being, Da-sein must clear the site of the moment, listen to the truth of beyng, and make a decision to become the “between” of this conflict.

Recall that for Heidegger the encounter with the intimation offered from the event of beyng occurred out of a sense of plight. A plight about the abandonment of beings by being, and in our own epoch, a plight about the overwhelming way in which machination dominates the world and all beings. For Da-sein: “[t]his plight must belong and listen to the call of the reigning of that intimation. What resonates and spreads out in such listening is first able to prepare for the strife of earth and world, i.e., for the truth of the ‘there’ and, through the ‘there,’ for the site of the moment of the decision and so for the playing out of the strife and thus for the sheltering in beings” (GA 65: 408/324). We must keep in mind that the ‘here’ which Heidegger has in mind in this and other passages is the *Da-* of Da-sein, that it is Da-sein itself which carries out both the listening to the intimation, prepares for the site of the moment of decision, and also carries out the strife so that it can be sheltered in others. It is clear that Da-sein is thus itself transformed at the site of decision by its encounter with beyng and that Heidegger thinks that part of the task of a Da-sein which has made the decision to shelter the truth of being must also spread this to others, ostensibly humans.

The strife of earth and world represents, for Heidegger, the way in which the history of beyng interacts with and is disseminated to other beings and the way in which beings have become alienated from beyng. Throughout the 1930s Heidegger uses the language of strife and battle,

¹⁰⁵In a passing comment in *Ponderings IV*, Heidegger refers to the site of the moment as: “site of the opening up and founding of being and thereby also of the ground of the creative affiliation,” ostensibly because Da-sein is creatively attuned to the strife of earth and world and in enacting this strife, founds a new historical being (GA 94-285/209).

between humans and beyng, beings and beyng, and between the world and the earth. Heidegger is relatively oblique in terms of what world and earth are, but we can venture that world is the world of historical Dasein, humans, and history, while the earth is the abiding place of all entities in the singularity of the existence. The site of the moment of decision is thus a response to the sense of plight which Da-sein experiences, a plight brought about because of the abandonment of beings by being, and a desire to return to the truth of being. The radical encounter of the event appropriates Da-Sein to beyng itself, and offers Da-sein another beginning, a means of responding to that plight by grounding truth. But because Da-sein's encounter with beyng yields the grounding of an other beginning, these encounters are precisely how we may understand history itself. In a longer passage from the *History of Beyng*, Heidegger writes:

History is temporal opening up of the space of sustainment [Geschichte ist Erzeitigung des Raumes des Austrags].
 'Time' and 'space' are here to be thought in terms of being as commencement [*anfänglich*], from *rapturous removal and clearing* and from the essence of truth, accommodating spacing as granting the jointures of de-cisions [*der Fugen der Entscheidungen*].

History as the history of beyng does not mean a sequence of occurrences to which beyng falls prey (not that which 'happens' to beyng), but rather that which beyng as such essentially opens for itself, insofar as it is the abyssal ground of 'truth'-of its essence and corrupted essence.

Only the history opened up in its essence by beyng, and indeed already in the manner of a first commencement, then becomes the history of beyng in the sense that it casts itself forth into moments of temporalization [*Zeitigungsaugenblicke*], singular and rare moments.

The essential prevailing of history opened up in its essence by beyng is the grounding of the truth of beyng.

That into which beyng (essentially) bestows itself is impoverishment into that poverty entrusted with its simplest wealth (GA 69: 116/98).

I would like to unpack this dense passage by reference to a few specific points. First, Heidegger wants to emphasize that history itself emerges as the temporalization of what emerges from Da-sein's appropriation in the event. What emerges is an incipient beingness (*anfänglich Seinshaft*) that clears away and grants time and space as jointures (*Fugen*). What, however, is being joined? Heidegger uses the hyphenated German term *Ent-scheidung* in order to play on the meaning of the

term decision, something (as in English) which is cut off and removed. In this case, Da-sein's decision about the truth of beyng, which enacts a grounding of the history of beyng, cuts off and makes incipient a new understanding of being. Yet, as we know, beings have been abandoned by being, and so while Da-sein has indeed acted as the agent of beyng in enacting a new history of beyng, beings must, nevertheless, still be cut off and abandoned. Further, it is clear, as in the above passage, that history is granted *by* beyng *through* the sheltering of truth in Da-sein, although "time" and "space" remain as joints or jointures which connect history to beyng.

I want to emphasize Da-sein's role, from the *Contributions* on up through the *History of Beyng* as the passive agent of this de-cision and in whom is sheltered the truth of being for other beings, thus Da-sein's status as a "between". The inventive, creative, Da-sein which endures and experiences the appropriation of the event is given a "piece" of beyng's essence which itself, now cut off from beyng, is an incipient beingness that Da-sein spreads in thought, word, and deed to other beings. Yet the joinings (*Fügen*) of "time" and "space" remain and can lead other futural Da-Sein back to the captivity and transport of the unity of time-space, and from there to the abyssal ground of beyng.

The issue of history for Heidegger is an important and interesting one, although it is outside the scope of my discussion here. My desire in highlighting the above passage regarding the history of beyng and being was to show something of the temporal structure of history as Heidegger sees it and the way that history emerges from time-space. It is not unsurprising that occasionally when Heidegger uses the term time-space, particularly in the notebooks and in the writings of the early 1940s, the term is occasionally synonymous with how we might understand an epoch. While strictly speaking, from the early poetic works, it is Da-sein who grounds a new "epoch," a new reign (*Herrschaft*) of beyng, from out of the time-space of the event of beyng and sheltering this other incipient beginning through their own words and deeds and given to "the human as historical

animal” (GA 66: 23-24/18). Yet Heidegger is very clear that it is being, and not a singular individual Da-sein, which thrusts this decision out and grants this other beginning.

D. DA-SEIN AND THE DECISION BETWEEN BEING AND BEINGS

I want to close our discussion of time from the first three volumes of the poetic writings by highlighting what I see as a lingering version of transcendence. Recall from the last chapter that the project of fundamental ontology was explicitly said by Heidegger to be a transcendental project. The reasons for this are varied, but the project of *Being and Time* conceives of the temporality of being as transcendent from Dasein’s own timeliness. It was temporality which was supposed to secure the epistemic foundation of fundamental ontology, and it was through temporality that we would get to knowledge about being: “[t]he transcendence of the being of Dasein is a distinctive one since in it lies the possibility and necessity of the most radical *individuation*. Every disclosure of being as the *transcendens* is *transcendental* knowledge. *Phenomenological truth (disclosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis*” (GA 2: 38/36). Dasein must in some sense go outside of itself, ecstatically, in order to attain an understanding of being, and not just its own existential constitution. This the way that beings are in the world ontically versus their ontological essence is the basis for the well-known ontological difference in Heidegger’s early thought. Heidegger is aware of this problem and discusses it at length in the *Contributions* (§110) and in *Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen* (GA 82). So strong is his vehemence against transcendence that he remarks: “Because Da-sein as *Da-sein* originally endures the open realm of concealment, we cannot in the strict sense speak of a transcendence of Da-sein; in the sphere of this determination, the representation of “transcendence” in *every* sense must *disappear*” (GA 65: 217/170).

Yet, despite Heidegger’s insistence, it is sometimes difficult to read occasional passages from the first three volumes of the poetic writings and not have the sense that the way that Heidegger

describes the decision of beyng and beings with Da-sein as a passive agent for the sending of beyng isn't in some sense still a lingering form of transcendence, even understood on Heidegger's own terms. Admittedly, Da-sein's experience of the event of appropriation occurs through the preparation of its own thinking and the jointure with time-space as it emerges from the abyssal ground. It would be unfair and I think incorrect to say that time-space, the abyssal ground, beyng, or even the larger project of the early poetic works are forms of immanence, if immanence is to be thought of as the opposition term to transcendence. Yet Heidegger's language in these volumes is nevertheless clear that beyng has an agency which is different from and specifically granted to human Da-sein. Moreover, Heidegger's description that beyng thrusts out of the abyss and severs itself in the decision that emerges (*Austrag*) from the event certainly suggests that beyng is separate and different from both Da-sein and other beings. There is, I think, a lingering ambivalence in Heidegger's thinking up through the 1930s as to the structure of the relation between beyng, Da-sein, and beings. I think Heidegger is aware of this. In a passage from *Mindfulness*, Heidegger states:

Beyng, however, "is" neither over us, nor within us, nor somewhere around us; rather, we are "in" it as the event. The intervening of beyng's arrival there in between.

And we are authentically (appropriated to the event of appropriation) "in" beyng only as those who steadfastly insist in Da-sein.

Being as the "wherein" is not "our," human "being," but the appropriative event of the in-between as the origin of time-space.

All appeal to existence, all "transcending" to "transcendence" (!) and all "acquaintance" with what is present at hand are through and through a relation to beings without knowing of beyng and without inquiring into the truth of beyng (GA 69: 55/49).

On the surface the passage seems relatively clear and straightforward. What is not clear is differentiation between beyng's arrival and Da-sein as the one called to dwell in the in-between as time-space. I believe that some of the developments in Heidegger's thinking starting in the 1940s are exactly meant to address this lingering ambivalence and problem of the role of Da-sein. And like timeliness and temporality in the early-period, and time-space and temporalization in the early

poietic works, I think the locus of this shift and the attempt to gain further distance from any form of transcendence occurs with Heidegger's thinking through of "time". Heidegger's thinking through of the problem of how being and beings emerge in the event of the other beginning takes center stage in *On Inception* and *The Event*, and with them a new and even more radical way of thinking what we call time.

III. DISPENSATION, CONJUNCTION, AND EMERGENCE

Heidegger's thinking of the event, including the role of time and time-space, begins to take a decisive turn beginning in the early 1940s. Starting with the fifth volume of the poietic works, *On Inception* (GA 70), Heidegger attempts to think the event from out of the inception (*Anfang*) of the other beginning and even more radically move away from the emphasis of the role of Da-sein's thinking and the history of being. This thinking culminates in the 1941-1942 volume, *The Event* (GA 71) from which Heidegger tries to think the event at its most extreme nonrepresentational limits. Heidegger's attempt to think the other beginning from out of the event itself, rather than from Da-sein's leap into the other beginning, makes these two texts some of his most difficult to interpret. They build upon material introduced in the *Contributions* and attempt to think it even more radically, while also modifying previous terms and introducing new ones. We can think of *On Inception* as a bridge linking Da-sein's inceptual thinking of the event as presented in the poietic writings of the 1930s to a thinking in the 1940s of the inception, the other beginning, from out of the event itself. Then, the subsequent volume, *The Event*, goes a step further still and attempts to let the event speak from out of itself and into another beginning.¹⁰⁶ A brief quote from *On Inception* will

¹⁰⁶ I am especially indebted to Daniela Vallega-Neu's masterful *Heidegger's Poietic Writings: from Contributions to The Event* for guidance in this section.

serve to highlight the shift in emphasis from the centrality of Da-sein's role of grounding time-space to how beyng and the event actively eventuate the event:

But the inceptively appropriative event has its full essence only in that, bearing-out the appropriating eventuation [*als Er-eignung austragend*], it clears the inceptive clearing, thus appropriatively eventuating the openness. Such appropriative eventuation is the inter-vening [*Dazwischenkunft*] of the clearing as time-space [*Zeit-Raum*]. This eventuation assigns the in-between (as in-the-midst-of and as meanwhile) to the nothing-less [*das Nichtslose*], until the time-span [*Frist*], essencing out of the appropriation, in which it then arises as a being (GA 70: 11/7).¹⁰⁷

There are two important shifts from the early poetic works that I want to highlight from this passage. First, it is the inceptive appropriating event which takes the role of active agent. The appropriating event clears the clearing and appropriates the openness and makes the time-space through its coming-in-between. This is in marked contrast to the emphasis that Heidegger had previously placed on Da-sein as preparing the site of the event by means of inceptive thinking and then leaping into and becoming the in-between such that it might transform time-space into the site of the moment of decision. The emphasis in the early poetic works was on the role of Da-sein, where here it is clearly from the standpoint of the appropriating event. Certainly, Heidegger nevertheless sees a reciprocal middle-voiced, simultaneously active and passive, giving and receiving, with respect to the way the event opens up for appropriation.

Likewise, I believe the last line is significant in naming that it is a being which arises out of the event. Recall the ambiguity I had highlighted in the last section regarding the role of Da-sein as the grounder of a new (inceptual) truth of being by means of beings and the role that beings themselves played. In the earlier works other beings served primarily as the gateway through which Da-sein was able to leap into the time-space of the decision of the truth of beyng. Here beings themselves seem to arise out of the appropriating event. As we shall see the language of arising and

¹⁰⁷ My sincere gratitude to Peter Hanly both for our discussions about Heidegger's *On Inception* and for his sharing of an early translation of that key text.

emerging out from beyng takes on a new and more central role in the poietic works of the 1940s. It is because of this arising and emerging from out of the beginning that time first come into play. My task throughout this section will be to try and clarify exactly how time relates to the way in which beings emerge from out of beyng.

I have attempted, as much as possible, to pull out the salient features of what we might think of as ‘time’ from these later poietic texts, with the full knowledge that doing so is to pull on Ariadne’s thread. This is due, firstly, to the difficulty of understanding the material itself. Heidegger’s writing, particularly in some passages from *The Event*, becomes very imaginative and very difficult to follow. The second difficulty is more conceptual. Recall that until now, in both the early-period and up through the poietic works of the 1930s, Heidegger’s thinking of time had always related beings to being, and to human Da-sein in particular. Temporality, timeliness, and time-space are all associated with Da-sein’s grounding of the truth of beyng as being. Here, in the writings of the 1940s, Heidegger is trying to let the event speak from out of itself (I will try and unpack what that means shortly). It is not entirely clear that we can now discuss time in any meaningful way without also speaking of the emergence of being from out of beyng. As Heidegger cryptically remarked, we must think the ‘and’ of being and time, that is, the way in which time emerges as part and parcel of being. The term which Heidegger will eventually give to this ‘and’ is first tentatively introduced in these two texts, the lingering (*das Verweilung*) and the whiling (*das Weilenden*), that marks the transition from his middle-period to his later period thinking about time. I endeavor as much as possible throughout this next section to discuss how beings emerge into their whiling from out of the event and as clearly as possible given the incredible complexity of the material.

A. THE RETURN TO ANAXIMANDER, HERACLITUS, AND PARMENIDES

Almost a decade after his breakthrough reading of Anaximander in the 1932 lecture course on *The Beginning of Western Philosophy*, Heidegger again returns to the pre-Socratic philosophers to rethink the idea of beginning and inception. This re-reading is significant on several levels, not least of which is because of the way that Heidegger uses the pre-Socratics, and particularly Anaximander, to begin *The Event* and its task of writing from out of the inceptive appropriating event itself. The importance of the Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides for Heidegger during this period cannot be overstated and it is from each of them that Heidegger will develop the primary vocabulary of the event at the end of his middle-period. Heidegger again retranslates the verdict of Anaximander, although now in 1942 with a slight modification and important difference in emphasis from his 1932 reading.

In this way, as I mentioned at the start of this chapter, Heidegger's two readings of Anaximander specifically, but the pre-Socratics more generally, serve to bookend Heidegger's entire middle-period thought. Heidegger's return to these three pre-Socratic thinkers after the intervening early poetic works also makes sense from Heidegger's perspective. Recall that in *Mindfulness* Heidegger had credited these three as inaugurating his path of thinking towards an understanding of the event. Yet, similarly, it is from these three figures that the history of Western philosophy, and thus an expression of the history of being, is also first inaugurated. Heidegger's working through of these two histories, the first and the other beginnings, results in a sense of plight at the abandonment of being by beings. Like his criticism of *Being and Time* in the *Contributions*, Heidegger will now, in the foreword to *The Event*, criticize the *Contributions* for having been too didactic and aimed at grasping the beginning (*Anfang*) as something carried out by thinkers. Further, he criticizes the dependence of the *Contributions* on human beings and that "the event still does not receive the purely inceptual essence of the abyss in which are prepared the arrival of beings" (GA 71: xxiv). The task of *The Event* is to transform everything that has been thought since the *Contributions* and instead, following the guidance of an interpretation of Sophocles's *Oedipus at Colonus* (vv.73-74), to have an eye for the

endurance and destiny of “being” from out of the truth of beings. Heidegger begins this by once again returning to what he sees as the oldest recorded encounters with being from beings, namely, the remaining fragments of Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides.

Like the *Contributions*, Heidegger sees a double movement at work in trying to radically enact a thinking of the beginning from out of the event. On the one hand, we must follow the path laid out from the history of metaphysics and the first beginning and in doing so we will meet and be appropriated by beyng in its emergence as inceptual knowledge. A great deal of *On Inception* and *The Event* is dedicated to the particular way that humans are appropriated, can facilitate this appropriation, and the consequences of the appropriation for both history and human experience. Heidegger articulates in detail the downgoing into the abyss of the event, the overcoming of metaphysics, and the way in which our encounters with the disconcealment and emergence of beyng in beings also articulates and sustains an interval of “time” in the history of beyng and grounds historical “epochs” (GA 71: 11/19; 167/143). However, in contrast to the *Contributions*, the description in *On Inception* and *The Event* is also in how beyng emerges into the event and rises up to appropriate Da-sein (now thought more inceptually in terms of Da-seyn). And now too Da-sein is differentiated from both beyng (and being) and the human. The human Da-sein is no longer the only recipient of beyng, as in the *Contributions*. Instead, human Da-sein have a special resonance that allows us to interrogate and perceive the essential occurrence of beyng (GA 71: 17-18/10). But beyng, and being, emerge already in other entities. In an important passage which highlights a significant change from the *Contributions*, Heidegger remarks:

In the difference and out of it, being never “comes to” beings as a “predicate,” nor is being in relation to beings something to which they are “entitled” and their state of affairs. On the contrary, in the difference beings rather “come to” being, i.e., they “approach” being in that they come forth—toward—being in the clearing. Beings *arise* from beyng.

Being, however, arises as the appropriating event. Being is not always. It itself brings time-space [*Zeit-Raum*] in the clearing and thus first grants the possibility of determination, explicitly on the basis of beings, according to the now and then

(GA 71: 124/106).

I want to mark this passage for two reasons. First because it highlights the way in which being and beyng are now made the locus of the appropriating event. And second because of the way in which it also illuminates the relation between beings and being and the way that beings arise from beyng, which is part of the narrative that must be told here if we want to understand Heidegger's thinking of time. I think it is important to point out that I do not think that Heidegger is offering us a straightforward ontogeny here, and I think it would be incorrect to interpret him in that way.¹⁰⁸ Yet, in focusing my discussion only on the way in which beings emerge "from" being, it may often sound like it is a Heideggerian account of coming-into-being. Heidegger himself, will at times, sound as if he is providing an ontogeny of both how beings come into their existence and how they are so understood.¹⁰⁹ Heidegger asks us, however, to understand the appropriating event as both the arising out of the event and simultaneously its appropriation. Because of our focus on the thinking of time, we'll necessarily be restricted to the way in which being and beings emerge, arise, together and are brought forth into their whiling.

Heidegger returns back to the inception of the first beginning in ancient pre-Socratic thought and names that first articulation of the truth of being as φύσις. Yet, he warns, φύσις names only the excess of what emerges as a being and highlights the differentiation between being and beings. What is needed, Heidegger thinks, if we are to think out of the other beginning, is to first follow through

¹⁰⁸I think it is safe to say, however, that by the time Heidegger writes *The Verdict of Anaximander* (GA 78), it seems clear that he is offering some form of explanation of ontogenesis. I think the status of ontogeny in *The Event* is ambiguous. In that text it is still not always clear whether Heidegger is describing how Da-sein *understands* coming-into-being or the process of coming-into-being itself.

¹⁰⁹In an extremely dense and technical passage from §71 of *The Event*, Heidegger could easily be confused for Hesiod. That section is immensely helpful in making sense of how Heidegger interprets the understanding of the event from out of the first beginning of Greek metaphysics. It does, however, read very much like an ontogeny, despite Heidegger's insistence that we understand the event in a middle-voiced manner (GA 71: 51-52/41).

the thinking of the truth of being as the ancient Greeks did so that we may continue further to think the beginning in its essence. The truth of being for the ancient Greeks, thought through the proem of Parmenides, is ἀλήθεια, or as Heidegger translates it, unconcealment. Heidegger follows the statement of Heraclitus that φύσις loves to hide (φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ, DK B123) and thinks that we must simultaneously think the first beginning as a double movement of both concealment and unconcealment of the “excess” of being which emerges as beings. For Heidegger, φύσις (thought along with ἀλήθεια) is both the name for the inception of the history of being in the first beginning, but also names something essential about the beginning itself and the way that beings emerge from being (GA 71: 13-15/7-9). And while it is especially through the thought of Heraclitus that Heidegger interprets φύσις as “being” in the first beginning, and via Parmenides that he thinks ἀλήθεια as the name for the essential relation of concealment and unconcealment as truth, it is from Anaximander that he takes special insight from the way in which beings emerge into the open realm of φύσις (GA 71: 22/14).

B. DISPENSATION, ORDAINING, INTEGRATION AND JUNCTION OF THE BEGINNING

Heidegger thinks that even though Anaximander does not use either the words ἀλήθεια or φύσις, that nevertheless the coming forth and passing away of entities is highlighted in the dictum of Anaximander in a way which captures each of those terms (GA 71: 39/30; 42/33). Anaximander thus becomes the thinker *par excellence* for understanding the incipience of the beginning. Heidegger once again translates the Anaximander fragment, although this time slightly modifying it from his 1932 lecture course and now emphasizing the way in which entities emerge, “fit” (*sich Fügen*), and twist-free (*Vervindung*) (GA 71: 39/30). Heidegger will take from Anaximander the notions of fitting and twisting-free as part of the vocabulary of emergence and dispensation which he develops throughout *The Event*. In a striking and somewhat challenging passage entitled “What does not yet

begin in the first beginning,” Heidegger offers the following reflection which will guide much of our reflection throughout this section:

Being as event

φύσις: emergence; the emergent striking of roots and thus the giving of a stance to what stands constant (as whiling [*Weilenden*], but *not* permanent) in standing out into the emergent open domain. Emergence therefore: presence and constancy.

Constancy— to what extent the distorted essence of presence?

φύσις : says then at the same time φύσει ὄν—beings of such a kind (GA 71: 58/46).

Heidegger’s use of whiling here is important and the first reference to the term in *The Event*. It will help us to think through the way that “time” is inceptually introduced here before we analyze it in fuller detail through his other writings of the 1940s. The passage can, in many ways, be thought of as Heidegger’s own rephrasing of the Anaximander fragment and thinking through each of its terms will allow us to see what Heidegger is describing.

A being of a specific kind (φύσει ὄν), a particular entity (τὸ ἔν), stands forth out into the emergent open domain (φύσις) in its whiling as simultaneously both presence and constancy. Read together with the Anaximander fragment, the constancy and presence which constitute whiling (as coming to be and passing away), must be understood in terms of their fitting and not-fitting (*Fug* and *Unfug*, δίκη and ἀδικία), what Heidegger had translated in 1932 as compliance and non-compliance, and their twisting free.

I will give a very quick sketch of how Heidegger understands the twisting free, dispensation, and emergence of beings with the understanding that necessarily many of the details, including how Da-seyn appropriates knowledge of the event, will need to be passed over in the interest of space. I will also try, as much as possible, to only highlight the terms Heidegger uses in reference to the beginning itself and how these then get named in the first beginning without getting us lost in the finer details of his points.

What we are essentially after is an understanding of how beings are differentiated from beyng, such that beings can twist free from beyng and emerge into the open domain of their constancy and presence, i.e. their whiling. We must always keep in mind that beyng cannot be thought of separately from beings and is not outside of beings in any way. What is at stake for Heidegger in this distinction is what he terms the differentiation (*Unterscheidung*). We must be able to simultaneously differentiate beyng from beings without positing beyng (and being) as a (transcendental) category. Describing this differentiation is in large part the both the task and Heidegger's own enactment of *The Event*. Heidegger is implicitly aware of both the possibility of slipping into a transcendental thinking of being, and also that this is exactly what happened in the thinking of temporality in *Being and Time*.¹¹⁰ Heidegger now tries to think all beyng as Da-seyn, with Da-sein as the essential occurrence of the human being capable of appropriating the “there” of the truth of being as clearing (GA 71: 140/120). It is the twisting free (*Ver-windung*) from beyng which marks the differentiation and inaugurates the movement towards emergence.

In the context of *The Event*, Heidegger's language for describing the carrying out of the differentiation and the twisting free from beyng into beings becomes very poetic. It is at times difficult to make out exactly what Heidegger means and how literally we should take him, or if the figurativeness of the language is an attempt to capture something that is, in itself, unsayable but nevertheless thinkable. Heidegger is adamant that we not think of this as a system and that we understand that the event only essentially occurs “in” Da-seyn (GA 71: 144/123). Heidegger

¹¹⁰It is perhaps worth at least signaling Heidegger's own articulation: “At first, what was available, simply out of metaphysics, was—to name only this—the schema of the transcendental, such that this itself was immediately conceived, according to the basic position of *Being and Time*, in its own truth (‘primordial temporality’ [*‘Temporalität’*]). Yet thereby also resulted by necessity the fatal delivery of the step to metaphysics; it seemed that everything was only a modification of Kant's laying of a foundation for metaphysics (cf. the Kant book {GA3} and the turning—already grasped there but not conceptualized—in speaking of the ‘metaphysics of Dasein,’ wherein it is thought that metaphysics itself exists by the grace of Dasein rather than Dasein being the “object” of metaphysics)” GA 71:141/120.

employs several terms having to do with turning, twisting, and winding to describe the twisting free of Da-seyn from beyng. The twisting free occurs as a twisting up into the counter-turning of the turning (*die Rückkehr der Kehre*) winding ring (he also calls it a wreath, *Kranz*, in the sense of a circle or corona) of the event. This double turning and counter-turning yields the twisting free, and as such, perhaps why he calls it the essence of the event, yields the overcoming (*Überwindung*) of the differentiation (*Unterscheidung*) (GA 71: 142-143/121-122).

Heidegger is clearly also playing with the language of differentiation and decision by means of the German root *scheiden*, to cut, also present in the English root of decision, but lacking in the English translation for differentiation. It is not simply that Da-seyn's twisting up and free from beyng is what marks it as different from beyng, but that the differentiation also cuts or shears Da-seyn off from beyng itself (and it is only through the event of appropriation that a Da-sein is able to return and bare witness to this event through inceptual thinking). Da-seyn is not, however, entirely severed from beyng, instead: "it becomes clear that the event is in itself the conjuncture of a concealed structure which itself essentially occurs in the integration into the junction of the beginning. The twisting free does not twist up into the event "something" that was previously lacking to it; on the contrary, the twisting free allows the clearing of the event to eventuate [*die Lichtung des Ereignisses sich Ereignen*]" (GA 71: 142/121). This eventuation itself is being, now understood as the truth of beyng in beings.¹¹¹ Another cluster of terms Heidegger introduces here articulates this relationship and serves to illustrate the emergence into the clearing. These terms, as

¹¹¹I recognize that I have skipped past an important step in Heidegger's understanding of differentiation, particularly in terms of the relation between difference and differentiation, being and beinglessness. See Part III, §§167-178, of *The Event*. I have done so primarily in the interest of space and to highlight the way in which presence and constancy emerge as whiling while downplaying how it is that we come to have an understanding of being. The distinction is crucial for Heidegger, although for our purposes here, seeing how it is that beings emerge and stand into their constancy is of greater priority for making sense of Heidegger's changing understanding of the role of "time".

we shall see, come entirely from Heidegger's thinking through of the Anaximander fragment and the way that beings comply or fit with being.

Heidegger refers to the result of the twisting free of the event as “the dispensation of the conjuncture of the event” (GA 71: 142/121). It is worth quoting Heidegger's description of this dispensation so that we can better make sense of the language at play: “[d]ispensation [*Fügung*] is an ordaining [*Fügen*] as event of the structure [*Gefüge*] of the time-space of the abyss, is integration [*Sich-fügen*] into the junction [*Fug*] of the beginning. The integrative ordaining essentially occurs in the junction” (GA 71: 142/121). Recall from the beginning of this chapter that Heidegger had translated the terms *δίκη* and *ἀδικία* from Anaximander's fragment in 1932 as compliance and non-compliance, now in 1941 thought in terms of fitting and non-fitting. Heidegger has taken the root German word *Fug* and through its cognates used it to describe the various ways in which being as *Da-seyn* remains connected. As I intimated in the first section on Anaximander, in its most basic etymological use, according to Grimm's *Etymological Dictionary of the German Language*, a text which Heidegger consulted frequently and was quite familiar with, the term *Fug* means ‘fitting connection’ (*passende Verbindung*) or ‘connecting connection’ (*anschließende Verbindung*) and which Rojcewicz has rendered as ‘junction’ in the sense of how two separate parts are joined together at a joint, hinge, or junction.

In a similar manner, the collective plural form *Gefüge* represents how multiple fittings fit together to form a framework or structure, which is how Heidegger names the event. Heidegger likewise plays with the shared etymology and homophony of the cluster *sich-fügen*, *fügen*, and *Fügung*. The verb *fügen* very standardly means ‘to fit together’ or ‘join together’, although its reflexive, *sich-fügen*, and nominalized *Fügung*, translated here as integration and dispensation, respectively, both have strongly religious and spiritual overtones in standard German and Heidegger seems to be playing off both their literal and cultural semantic meanings. The term *Fügung* is also understood as destiny or

providence, a reference Heidegger would have also intended for its signification. The German word for destiny, *Schicksal*, interpreted literally means ‘what is sent’, in this case, the clearing of the ‘there’ of Da-seyn. What Rojcewicz translates as integration, *sich-fügen*, means more standardly something like to comply oneself or submit oneself to something, in this case the sending of beyng as Da-seyn.

In using these word clusters Heidegger wants to highlight their intimate inter- and intraconnectedness. I have tried to highlight how in twisting free out of the event as the differentiation between beyng and Da-seyn, Da-seyn nevertheless retains an intimate connection with beyng. Beyng is, Heidegger says, always Da-seyn. Seeing how this intimate connection is at work is a necessary for our preliminary understanding of how Da-seyn transitions (*übergehen*) and emerges (*aufgehen*) as a being in its presencing and constancy. A presencing and constancy, you will recall from the beginning of this section, which is itself characteristic of the way beings linger (*Verweilen*) in their whiling (*Weilenden*). I turn next to a discussion of the transition, emergence, and allotment to presence which delimits the lingering of beings.

C. THE TRANSITION AND EMERGENCE OF A BEING

Heidegger makes sense of a being’s transition and emergence into presence once again by reference to Anaximander, who he interprets as the first person to have grounded the truth of being in the first beginning. We should understand both transition and emergence as part of the process which is at work in the beginning and the event. Heidegger will once again employ a set of terms with similar roots in order to describe the way in which a being finally transitions (*übergehen*) out of the twisting turning wreath of the event and finally emerges (*aufgehen*) into the unity of being and presence in the clearing of the ‘there’.

The root verb that Heidegger uses for both terms is *gehen*, as a movement of doing, leaving, or departure. What Rojcewicz translates as ‘transition’, *übergehen*, modifies this movement through

the prefix *über-*, as a change from one thing to another, or a passing over and into something else. Thus, the transition occurs as change from *beyng* to *Da-seyn*, although nevertheless conjoined in the unity of the joinings. While Heidegger does not want us to think any part of this process in a temporal or causal way, yet for illustration, if we were to think in terms of priority of occurrence of a being's presence, the transition happens after the twisting-free and the jointure, and on the way towards its emergence into the clearing. The emergence is the final movement or moment in the turning of the event as the being rises up into the open which has now been cleared through its there (*Da*).

Heidegger's use of *aufgehen*, translated as emergence, carries with it not only connotations of rising up or realizing, but also beginning and merging up into. Thought in this way, as *Da-seyn* emerges it rises up into the *Da* of its there and into an open realm and begins its presence and constancy. Heidegger describes the transition and emergence in the language of the first beginning, primarily through the terms of Anaximander, in the following longer passage:

γένεσις and φθορά and ἀλήθεια are characteristic of *what is present*, because this, as something present, is consigned to the essence (beings pertain to being, and what emerges in beings derives from being [*das Seiende gehört dem Sein, und was am Seienden aufgeht, das hat es aus dem Sein*]).

What is present comes to presence in a coming forth and a going away. Even φθορά is γίνεσθαι: coming forth, a kind of φύσις, *emergence—disappearance—going down*. The quintessence of γένεσις as φύσις is transition, the unity of coming forth and passing away, and the latter essentially occurs in the *same*, in ἀλήθεια, because ἀλήθεια is conjointly and essentially concealment—withdrawal into concealing. This transition is the presencing which, however, now remains precisely hidden in favor of the *presence* of that which is present, that which is beaten into limits and as such is then pursued and dispelled in change.

The *transition* will not be involved in the entrenchment of what comes to presence. The transition *preserves* the ἄπειρον. Presence is transitionally the gathered-gathering peak of φύσις, i.e., of unconcealedness (GA 71: 37/28).

I will move us through each part of the cited passage, although it will be helpful to keep in mind both Anaximander's fragment and Heidegger's varying translations of it. And while Heidegger makes use of the language of the first beginning (i.e. Anaximander's Greek), I believe it

nevertheless captures Heidegger's thinking of how the beginning occurs as such. It is also helpful to foreground a transition to thinking time as lingering and whiling from out of Heidegger's interpretation of Anaximander.

Because Heidegger here uses a kind of topological language of emerging, coming forth, and transitioning, it may be helpful, for the purpose of clarification if we also think of the process at work here also by means of topological descriptions. We can interpret the entire passage as depicting a double movement with transition and emergence as two central features which occur on either side of the site of emergence. Heidegger names this site φύσις, and it is the placeless place "where" beings come forth from out of the twisting-free and transition into their being as presence.

Recall from our previous discussion that the twisting-free is a twisting up of *Sein* and into the turning of the event of the beginning. From this twisting-up into the counter-turning of the wreath of the event, *Da-sein* overcomes the differentiation by transitioning and fitting into the junction of the beginning (recall our discussion of *Füg* and *sich fügen* above). *Da-sein* is dispensed, ordained, and integrated (*sich fügen*) in a gathering together as a singular unity in the structure (*Gefüge*) of the event. This is why Heidegger refers *Da-sein's* presencing as the transitionally gathered-gathering peak of φύσις from the passage quoted above.¹¹² Finally, this transition, as overcoming of the differentiation, becomes a coming-forth, an arising, and an emergence into presence as a being (*ein Seiende*). Thus φύσις is the site both of the transition from "out of" the differentiation on the one hand, and also the site of emergence of the unity of coming-forth (*γένεσις*) and passing-away (*φθορά*) which is the disclosed presence (*ἀλήθεια*), on the other. Once

¹¹²Heidegger further elucidates how this gathering allows for the constancy of the becoming of the singular being in an illuminating passage which I cannot quote here for space considerations but is nevertheless worth comparing alongside the above passage (GA 71: 23/15-16).

this being (*Seiende*) has emerged into the clearing of the ‘there’ in its emergence from out of the transition from the differentiation of Da-seyn from beyng, beyng recedes, as it were.¹¹³ Heidegger says that the transition preserves the ἄπειρον, the limitlessness of beyng and this is because of the emergence of a being, itself thought of as a limit (πέρας), and thus an end or goal, of beyng. Presence is thus a delimited expression of the emergence of beyng as event.

There is striking symmetry in Heidegger’s description of how beings transition and emerge into their presence.¹¹⁴ On the one side we have the relation between beyng, Da-seyn, and the joining into the transition. On the other side, we have the emergence of a being (*Seiendes*) into its presence and constancy. At the beginning of this section I cited Heidegger’s description of φύσις as “the emergent striking of roots and thus the giving of a stance to what stands constant” (GA 71: 58/46). Absent here is how presence and constancy are themselves “joined”, as it were, to the being that has emerged. However, it was in this same passage that Heidegger also linked together constancy with a non-permanent whiling (*Weilenden*). Heidegger does not discuss whiling in any detail in either *On Inception* or *The Event*. He does, however, offer an extended analysis of whiling and the way beings linger (*Verweilen*) in the context of a lecture course given in the winter semester of 1941, the same time as he was writing *The Event*. It is in the context of this lecture course that Heidegger gives not only an extended discussion of whiling, but further makes the connection that

¹¹³Heidegger describes the clearing as immediately transforming into presence and presence then “stepping back behind” the present thing, as it were. Likewise, emergence immediately becomes presence while also “going back into itself” (GA 71: 25/17). Thus, we can interpret a series of withdrawals or receding which happen “immediately” with a being’s coming into presence (GA 71: 25/18). It is worth noting that in this same passage, Heidegger also refers the reader to Aristotle’s discussion of how a being comes from being.

¹¹⁴There is a single passage in *The Event* that appears to support my claim that Heidegger understands this structure in a symmetrical manner (GA 71: 66/53). Unfortunately, the passage is a highly truncated list of Greek terms from Anaximander’s dictum without any commentary. The arrangement of these terms, especially when read alongside descriptions of the terms from GA 51, suggests the symmetry I have outlined. See, in particular, GA 51: 107-121/94-104.

this whiling is the allotment of presence to a being. This whiling, as the allotment of presence, Heidegger says, is ‘time’. I turn next to a brief discussion of the lecture course *Basic Concepts* as I believe it will both bring together the extended analyses in this section and also show how time is at work in Heidegger’s thought from the early 1940s.

D. LINGERING AS THE ALLOTMENT (*Zuweisung*) TO PRESENCING

In the closing sessions of the 1941 lecture course *Basic Concepts*, Heidegger finally arrives at the analysis of the ancient Greek term χρόνος in his painstakingly rigorous treatment of the Anaximander fragment. He had just finished discussing the notion of ‘transition’ (*Übergang*) with his class and saying that “transition is always presencing,” and the “pure emerging...[of] being itself” (GA 51: 120/103). Describing how presence presences, Heidegger once again invokes the language of jointure and fitting and stating, “what presences fits itself [*fügt sich*] in each case to *its own* presencing, and accommodates itself to this. In this way it fulfills the ‘when’ and ‘how long’ that are allotted to each respective being...what presences corresponds to the allotment of temporalizing by time [*der Zuweisung des Zeitigen durch die Zeit*]” (GA 51: 120/103). We see here that in transitioning from the beginning to presence, a being also fits itself into its own singular presencing and in so doing is also allotted its time. In terms of the verdict of Anaximander, this allotment is expressed via the ancient Greek τάξις, while time (still undiscussed) is in reference to χρόνος. Heidegger discusses the way that time is allotted to presence in the following way, in language now very familiar from *The Event*:

Τάξις never means a serial ordering of now-points one after the other, but the allotment-character that lies within time itself as what is always the proper [*schicklich*], sending [*schickenden*], granting, and ordaining [*fügenden*] time. We do not apprehend “time” when we say ‘Time is ...’ We are closer to apprehending it when we say “It is time [*Es ist Zeit*].” That always means it is time that this happens, this comes, this goes. What we thus address as time is in itself the kind of thing that directs and allots. Time is the allotment of presencing for what presences in each case [*seine jeweilige Anwesenung*]. Time is the expansion of the respectively enjoined abiding [*verfügten Weile*], according to which what presences is always something *momentary* [*jeweiliges*]. In

overcoming the unfit of itself, the momentarily presencing *αὐτὰ* corresponds to the enjoined abiding of transition. By giving what is fit to enjoinderment, and by each one mutually acknowledging the other, each respective presencing corresponds to the allotment of abiding. That beings are in the respective correspondence of their “being” to “time” means nothing other than: *Being itself is lingering* [Verweilung], *presencing*. (GA 51: 121/103-104).

This passage is significant for several reasons. First, as already mentioned, the term *χρόνος*, as with a discussion of time, is conspicuously absent from both *On Inception* and *The Event*. While Heidegger parses most of the Anaximander fragment across those volumes, there is only a single passing reference to *χρόνος*. Further, we see Heidegger begin to play with a cluster of words which have *-weile-* as their root. As we will see shortly, these terms will form the basis for Heidegger’s thinking of the way in which a being can be understood to be its own time. There are a few other observations I would like to make about the above passage, both with respect to what we have already seen from *The Event* as well as what we will discuss in the final section of this chapter and the chapter following on Heidegger’s later concept of time.

Notice that Heidegger not only makes use of the same language of ordaining, fitting, and joining which we also saw in his discussion of the way that *Da-seyn* twists-free from being, but that now he also explicitly connects this with the idea of proper or own (*schklich*) and sending (*schickenden*). This alludes, homophonously, to the shared etymology I had pointed out in the discussion from *The Event* between *fügen* and its nominal *Fügung* as integration and dispensation and the German term for destiny, *Schicksal*, as a sending. What is sent is being as presence and being is allotted according to time. I want to foreground here something which will become central in Chapter Three. Heidegger’s statement that we are better off thinking that “it is time” (*es ist Zeit*). While the expression “it is time” is common enough in English it is, idiomatically, not used in German. We will return to the significance of this in Chapter Three, but I want to highlight Heidegger’s usage of this phrase already in the early 1940s alongside his treatment of Anaximander.

However, in terms of Heidegger's thinking of time at the end of his middle-period, it is the linking of time to the notion of a lingering (*Verweilung*) and a site of joined abiding or awhiling (*verfügten Weile*). What I want to highlight here is that the allotment character of *τάξις* as it relates to the lingering aspect of time (*χρόνος*) is both given or sent to each (*jeweilige*) singular entity and that the reciprocal recognition of this lingering between entities is what constitutes the "space" of the abiding. Thought in this way time is not only the measure of the momentariness of a being, but also as the respective correspondence between beings, a recognition of each being's "being" and "time". Heidegger elaborates on the "space" of this lingering in the following passage, from the last few minutes of the *Basic Concepts* lecture course:

Abiding [*die Weile*] is a lingering [*Verweilen*] for its time, a lingering [*Verweilen*] that "only" allows itself a while. But this 'only' does not mean a restriction; rather, it says the purity of the inwardness of the essence of being: the elusive emergence as transition [*der entgängliche Aufgang als Übergang*]. Nevertheless, transition presences only such that the Same enjoins coming forth and passing away, which enjoiment is compelling need [*Verfügen nötigende Not*]. . . . The first sentence thinks the thus experienced essence in correspondence to its "inception," i.e., to enjoiment (*ἀρχή*), which, as the same, pervades the essential features of presencing (coming forth and passing away in their unity) in expanding for them their domain in which each being is momentary so far as it lingers for *its* while [*seine Weile verweilt*] (GA 51: 122-123/105 tm).

We see Heidegger bringing together here several of the elements we have discussed over the last several sections as well as giving us some more detail about the "space" of lingering, the abiding (*die Weile*). Heidegger illustrates again the way that transition gives over to emergence (*Aufgeben*). Transition, Heidegger tells us, belongs to the essence of being and reveals itself into experience as a self-gathered coming-forth (GA 51: 122/105). In its emergence, the being is enjoined (*Verfügen*) to being on the one side, and the unity of coming-forth (*Hervorgehen*) and passing away on the other. This unity is its presence and its lingering in the abiding. This conjoining happens according to a compelling need (*nötigende Not*), which is Heidegger's translation of *τό χρεών* in Anaximander's verdict. Heidegger does not go into any detail here on just how we ought to interpret this compelling

need (and the single substantive reference to τὸ χρεῶν in *The Event* is likewise enigmatic), although Heidegger will devote considerable space to interpreting the term beginning in the following year in his undelivered lecture course *The Verdict of Anaximander* (GA 78, Der Spruch des Anaximander). What I want to highlight from this passage, however, is that the domain (*Bereich*) and the lingering (*Verweilen*) of a being's presence is particular to that being (*Seiende*) itself. And while not explicitly stated here, as we saw from *The Event*, *mutatis mutandis*, so is being.

Heidegger is clear that abiding is always *an* abiding, and is the singular unity of the one and the same.¹¹⁵ Thus, we can interpret the transition, emergence, and coming-forth into the abiding as conjoining both being and time to an entity (*Seiende*). Being allots presence, it gives of itself according to necessity, to the being and assigns to it that being's lingering. We must again be careful here though to think this giving of being to a being in a middle-passive sense. As we saw from both *The Event* and now here in *Basic Concepts*, being, presence, and lingering all belong to the one and the same. Put differently, neither being nor time are thought outside or apart from the individual entity. The enjoinder between being and the coming forth of a being into its abiding are thus are the inceptive beginning of beings. In this way Heidegger will say that the whole fragment speaks of being and beings as enjoinder: “[*The fragment says the enjoinder of being and being as enjoinder. Enjoinder, however, is the inception. The fragment is the incipient saying of being*]” (GA 51: 123/105).

Heidegger somewhat abruptly ends the 1941 summer semester lecture course a couple of paragraphs later without further discussion of either the way that time should be understood as lingering in the abiding, or how it is that a being's whiling is allotted, sent, and given to it out of

¹¹⁵Heidegger uses the language of the one and the same (*das Eine und das Selbe*) in both the *Basic Concepts* course and to a lesser extent in *The Event*. Heidegger makes it clear in the context of *Basic Concepts* that the same is being (*das Sein*). I think we are not incorrect to hear echoes both of Parmenides and the one and the many as well as Schelling's later positive philosophy. See Mark Thomas's "The Meaning of the Copula as a Fundamental Structure in Schelling's Philosophy," in *Schelling Studien 2* (2014): 20-39.

compelling necessity (τό χρεών). Heidegger will, however, once again turn to Anaximander's fragment, the following year in the autumn of 1942 in his longest treatment of those now famous two lines.

IV. THE ESSENCE OF TIME: THE WHILING (*DAS ERWEILNIS*)

Around the same time as he was finishing *The Event*, and perhaps as a result of the groundwork he had already laid out in *Basic Concepts*, Heidegger began writing a trilogy of courses which centered on a reexamination of the three inceptual thinkers of Western philosophy — Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides. Heidegger would end up, however, only delivering a combined lecture course on two of these thinkers, Heraclitus and Parmenides (GA 54) during the winter semester of 1942-1943. The third course, dedicated entirely to Anaximander, remained undelivered. Yet, despite not teaching the course, Heidegger wrote more than three hundred pages exclusively examining the two lines of the *Verdict of Anaximander* (Der Spruch des Anaximander) (GA 78). Heidegger would rewrite the lecture course in 1946 as a standalone essay of the same name, although significantly condensed and without the important sections on time.

While the 1942 Anaximander material does not officially belong as one of the poetic writings of the event (there is some archival evidence to suggest that Heidegger may have intended it as such)¹¹⁶, it nevertheless bookends his middle-period thinking about time. It is difficult to overstate the importance of the text in providing the basis for Heidegger's thinking of time both as the end of his middle-period and as the transition into his later period. For reasons of space I cannot give a full analysis of the whole volume here and will instead focus particularly on the way in which Heidegger

¹¹⁶ Ingeborg Schübler, the editor of GA 78, mentions this in the her afterward, along with some of the difficulties in dating the text. It seems clear though that most of the volume was likely written between 1942 and 1946 and that the majority was probably composed in the winter semester of 1942-1943.

comes to understand the relation of compelling necessity (τὸ χρεών in Anaximander) to the whiling. Most importantly though, it is in the course of this volume that Heidegger makes his most direct statement about time as such. Throughout the poetic works Heidegger seemed to avoid, for the most part, using the word time (*Zeit*) while nevertheless (as I have tried to show throughout this chapter) providing a rich and detailed analysis of its relation to being and the event. Here, in the *Verdict of Anaximander*, Heidegger is clear: “time is that which brings forth the presencing of what is present each to its time, that is, as the bringing forth in their respective abiding-while. The actual essence of time: the *Whiling*” [“*Die Zeit als das Zeitigende des Anwesens des Anwesenden je zu seiner Zeit, d.i. als das Zeitigende der jeweiligen Weile. Das eigentliche Wesen der Zeit: das Erweilnis*” GA 78: 198). Much of the work of this chapter has been to unpack the meaning of the rest of the above sentence by showing how its component ideas were developed across Heidegger’s middle-period. In what remains of this chapter we will take up the theme of how a being arises and emerges into the open clearing of its there (*Da*) and is given its time while remaining conjoined by necessity to being.

Heidegger interprets the two lines of the Anaximander to be speaking about the ancient Greek understanding of being, and the experience of beings (τὰ ὄντα), respectively. Thus, Heidegger understands compelling necessity (τὸ χρεών) in the first line of the fragment as related to an understanding of being (*das Sein*), while the allotment of time (τοῦ χρόνου τάξις) relates essentially to the ancient Greek experience of beings (*Seienden*). While there is a great deal of interest in this volume, we’ll restrict our analysis mostly to how these terms function and in relation to each other. Following the outline of Heidegger’s translation and interpretation we’ll look first to understanding the role that compelling necessity, now understood as need or requirement (*Brauch*), plays in its relation to being. From there we will then look at the connection between need and the essence of time as whiling.

a. NEED AS THE ESSENCE OF PRESENCING

Heidegger had already signaled in the *Basic Concepts* course that the entire understanding of the first sentence of Anaximander's verdict could be heard in the phrase 'according to compelling necessity (*nötigenden Not*)', (κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν) (GA 51: 116-117/100-101). His description of the phrase in that course, however, was relatively brief and it is only in the context of the longer course on Anaximander that he begins to further flesh out the meaning of the expression.

With τὸ χρεῶν Heidegger believes that Anaximander is asking us to think both coming to be (γένεσις), the emergence (*Entstehen*) into the clearing of the 'there', and passing-away (φθορά), as the avoidance or evasion (*Entgehen*) from the clearing, as part of a unity which emerges from and escapes back into its sameness (GA 78: 130-131). It is τὸ χρεῶν which binds being to beings in their self-sameness: "τὸ χρεῶν is that which allows the emergence and evasion of its 'where from' and 'where to' as the same being, and in such a way joins and disposes [*fügt und verfügt*] of it together in advance. τὸ χρεῶν is the same itself, is the disposing itself [*Verfügende selber*]" (GA 78: 131). Heidegger begins to think the compelling necessity (*nötigenden Not*) of this enjoining disposal in stronger terms than mere necessity, and instead to see it as a kind of compulsion or coercion (*Zwang*).

Necessity, he tells us, strikes us as one-sided and does not have the reciprocal relationship implicated in coercion or compulsion. The force of this compulsion, however, is nonviolent and compels us without oppression (GA 78: 132). Instead Heidegger asks us to think the unity of emergence and evasion, coming-to-be and passing-away, and their relation to being along the lines of a compelling proof or demonstration. In following the force of a proof we see the way that the proof insists on us seeing how each part hangs together and compels us towards a conclusion that emerges from its unity (GA 78: 133). This is how Heidegger wants us to understand the way that emergence, coming-to-be, and evasion, passing-away hang together in their unity. A proof, however, is subtly different in that it requires a reasoning being to follow the proof. Unlike a proof, however, the unity which compulsion (τὸ χρεῶν) joins is that sameness that is the essence of presence.

“Compulsion,” Heidegger tells us, “thought in terms of τὸ χρεῶν, is presence as such” (GA 78: 134).

Heidegger now begins to think being as presence in the Anaximander verdict through the double unity of emerging evasion and evasive emergence, that is, in the way that both coming-to-be and passing-away must out of necessity be thought together as both an emerging from and receding back into the same. Heidegger clarifies the relation of the force of compulsion which is unified in emergence and evasion and the arising into presence as part of the withheld granting of being. In a dense and difficult passage, Heidegger describes this relation, and the new understanding of this compulsion, in the following way:

The compulsion itself, however, has the basic trait of not-ceasing. We ask: from doing what? The answer runs: from fulfilling the essencing of presence. And what is that? The emergence out of that into which it departs, in which departure emerges; that from out of that sameness, emergence is preserved, and in that sameness, departure is retained. This preserving retention, which joins together the unity of emergence and departure, and thus joins presentencing itself, is that sameness as an allowing which by itself does not cease: the incessancy in allowing: the pure compulsion, which alone joins over the essencing of presence. The joining of γένεσις and φθορά in the same of their ἐξ ὧν and εἰς ταῦτα ... We say: τὸ χρεῶν, “needs” presence. τὸ χρεῶν as this unceasing allowing claim, is “need.” This word we establish henceforth as the translation for τὸ χρεῶν (GA 78: 134).¹¹⁷

There is a good deal to unpack from this passage and I believe that if we keep in mind Heidegger’s comments from *The Event* regarding transition and emergence, we will see a continuity. If, following Heidegger, we think the first sentence of the Anaximander fragment as concerning being, then being is the provenance, the “from which” of the emergence and departure. Being is then the preserving retention (*gewährende Einbehalten*) that both preserves the being (*Seiende*) in its presence, but also withholds and retains itself. The granting of being thus joins together being and presence, ἐξ ὧν,

¹¹⁷Special thanks to Andrew J. Mitchell for his assistance with some of the trickier aspects of translating this passage.

“out of which” emerges and departs the same, the one, the singular entity (ἐξ ὧν → τὸ ὅν). The being of a particular being does not cease with its emergence, however (otherwise we could not say that an entity “is”). Being (*Sein*) allows beings (*Seienden*) to presence, and does not cease allowing, through the preserving retention of the joining. The allowing and not-ceasing of the restrained giving of being is the pure compulsion (*Zwingen*) because it is what allows being to “be” and being to emerge as beings. Recall though that Heidegger was unsatisfied with the idea that this compulsion was one-sided. Heidegger sees a reciprocal relation between the granting of being and the emergence as a being. This reciprocal need of the one for being, and being for the one (although we must keep in mind that they are, in fact, the same) is τὸ χρεῶν τὸ χρεῶν thus Anaximander’s articulation, according to Heidegger, of the way in which being, while unnamed in the fragment, comes to presence in beings as the purest need, each for the other. And what is joined in this unitary sameness by need, “according to necessity” (τὸ χρεῶν presence as emergence and departure, the coming-to-be (γένεσις) and passing-away (φθορά) of a particular being in its being (GA 78: 135-136).

It is here, for the first time in the context of the course, that Heidegger introduces the way in which a being whiles in its presencing through the joined requirement (*Brauch*) of τὸ χρεῶν.

Heidegger introduces the term in the following dense description:

But this is the pure claim of the allowing compulsion: the guarantee [*die Gewähr*] of emergence, whose retention is a guarantee of departure; emergence as the manner in which the to- and here- of presencing [*des An- und Her-Wesens*] is in particular a departure out of presence. Presencing is essentially a whiling; i.e. it is not only for a time, but rather the while itself, and therefore essentially each a whiling. The allowing of need lets presencing essence as this while [*als Weile*] and only as such (GA 78: 136).

Heidegger’s talk of guarantee (*die Gewähr*), or warrant, may seem unusual here, although Heidegger is once again playing with the German and also making reference back to the quote from Sophocles’s *Ajax* that had kicked off his reflections in *The Event*. While Heidegger has not elaborated in the context of the Anaximander course what this guarantee, or warrant, is, the term and its cognates are

important in his thinking in *The Event*. There Heidegger speaks of the bestowal (*Gewährung*) of the emergence and the permitting (*Zulassung*) to presence (GA 71: 124/106) and the way that being is grants (*gewährt*) itself. In a passage which I think links his thinking in the cited passage above from *The Verdict of Anaximander* with his reflections on the event and the differentiation between beings and being in *The Event*, Heidegger writes: “[b]eing, however, ises [*istet*] as the appropriating event. Being is not always. It itself brings time-space in the clearing and thus first grants the possibility of determination, explicitly on the basis of beings, according to the now and then” (GA 71: 124-125/106). Recall that in the *Verdict of Anaximander*, Heidegger is asking us to think the relation between being and beings in the joining need of their emergence and departure in a reciprocal (middle-voiced) manner. Heidegger’s language of guarantee captures both the sense of reciprocity between being and beings, but also the way in which being is, in a certain sense, “given back” in passing-away and departure.

The German gerund *Gewährung*, from the verb to ‘grant’, ‘bestow’, or ‘vouchsafe’ is used in an everyday sense of the granting of a license or permit, or a line of credit. As in English, this sense of granting carries with it the possibility of a return, or a disavowal. As with his description of coercion and compulsion, Heidegger does not wish us to think this relationship in negative or oppressive terms. Instead, it is that our presencing occurs, as it were, on borrowed time. Although this “time” is in each case our own and is in fact what constitutes our presencing as a whiling. As beings, our emergence from being and into presence, out of necessity, also guarantees our departure from presence. Being guarantees our presence, it joins us in a mutual and reciprocal need in our emergence, but this same joining also guarantees that we must depart from presence and into absence, in the same manner that being itself does, precisely because being “ises,” to use Heidegger’s neologism from *The Event* passage quoted above, on the basis of beings. Being “is” not always, but presences only *while* beings presence. This need is reciprocal in so far as both being and beings

“need” each other to fulfill their essence and emerge into presencing. Being presences in beings as a not-ceasing need, which is the essence of presencing. This need, however, guarantees that beings also must depart from their presencing. Heidegger’s term for the allowing of presence into the joined emergence and departure according to this need is whiling. In a nice summation from his 1946 essay on the Anaximander fragment, Heidegger summarizes this relation nicely in the following way:

What presences is what stays awhile. The while presences as the transitional arrival in departure. It presences between coming hither and going away. Between this twofold absence presences the presencing of all that stays. In this ‘between’ what stays awhile is jointed. This ‘between’ is the jointure according to which, from arrival here to going away from here, that which stays is jointed. The presencing of what stays obtrudes in the ‘here’ of ‘arrival here’ and in the ‘away’ of ‘going away.’ Presencing is, in both directions, enjoined toward absence. Presencing occurs in this jointure. What is present emerges in the coming forth and passes away in the going away; indeed, because it stays, it does both at the same time. The while happens in the jointure (GA 5: 354-355/267).

Although it is not stated here, or even in the 1946 essay itself, it is time which happens as the whiling. It is worth briefly noting, as we did earlier in the analysis of time-space from the *Contributions*, Heidegger’s use of ‘between’ here. While time-space is also unnamed in this passage, it is clear that the thinking of presence as the enjoined ‘between’ that is whiling is an echo back to the thinking of the structure of time-space inaugurated in the poetic writings. Yet, with the second line of the Anaximander fragment, Heidegger once again takes up a direct thinking through of time. As we will see next, it is time in the verdict of Anaximander that is the allocation of the whiling - *κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν*.

b. WHILING AS THE ESSENCE OF TIME

A striking feature of Heidegger’s *Verdict of Anaximander* course is that it is his first full treatment of the ancient Greek word *χρόνος*, time, in the fragment. Certainly, Heidegger’s previous analyses of

the Anaximander fragment referenced the term, but for the most part he simply left it translated as “time” without significant commentary. Likewise, even Heidegger’s later 1946 shortened essay on the Anaximander fragment contains no analysis of χρόνος nor of its connection to the while as the essence of “time”. Similarly, as already mentioned, the poetic writings of the middle-period make relatively little direct reference to time as a philosophical topic, with the important exception of time-space. By contrast, the *Verdict of Anaximander* course contains an extended analysis and reflection on time, our contemporary misunderstandings of time, and the way that modern technology and science, with talk of “quality”, “quantity”, and “category”, as well as “lived experience” have come to distance us from an essential understanding of time. In opening his remarks on the essence of time in Anaximander, Heidegger provides a long excursus on how “space” and “time” have been appropriated and thought and distorted from Aristotle to Nietzsche and Bergson (GA 78: 184-193).

Heidegger’s reflections here on time are strongly reminiscent of his reflections in *Being and Time* and the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* course from fifteen years prior with the important difference that it is not Aristotle (as we discussed in chapter one) who will give us a hint about the essence of time, but Anaximander. But why, Heidegger adds in an uncharacteristically fashion, bother with this dry detour through the “intellectual historical context” (*»geistesgeschichtliche Zusammenhänge«*)? Is it only to bring the verdict of Anaximander “closer to real life”? (GA 78: 193). Heidegger’s response to his own question belies the importance he sees for the role that an understanding of time plays with regard to both his own thought but also to the way in which we have become distanced from an authentic thinking of being in the modern age. Understanding the

essence of time and the ancient Greek conception of makes available for us the “first and only domain for the decision regarding the essence of being” (GA 78: 193).¹¹⁸

Recall that the key to unlocking the interpretation of Anaximander’s fragment, for Heidegger, is to understand the play of doubling that is at work in the two lines. The first line speaks of being’s relation to beings. In understanding the way that being gives itself to beings, Heidegger sees the double movement of γένεσις, the emergence, and passing-away, φθορά, bound together and the same, according to necessity, κατὰ τὸ χρεών. That is, the compelling guarantee and need which joins being and beings together in sameness. The second sentence, then, names the relation of a being’s (*Seiende*) relation to being (*das Sein*). Like the first sentence, there is also a double movement at work, the joining (*Fug*) and disjoining (*Unfug*) of beings to being, δίκη and ἀδικία, which happens according to the allotment or measure of time, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. Each line thus names “the twofold absence presences the presencing of all that stays” (GA 5: 354-355/267). Like the relation of emergence and departure to presence as requirement or need (*Brauch*), jointure and disjuncture, what Heidegger had previously thought in terms of compliance and noncompliance, also have a twofold relation to time. With the interpretation of time as the whiling of presence, the allotment or measure (τάξιν) is now thought as a description, of how time temporalizes and we must think the measure and time both together as part of the same - Ἡ τοῦ χρόνου τάξις (GA 78: 200). In

¹¹⁸Heidegger’s entire comment may be even stronger than I have translated it: “Mit diesem Unterschied hängt zusammen, ob das Wesen der »Zeit« fernerhin aus der selbst unerfahrenen Wahrheit des Seins wie als »Seiendes« begriffen wird, oder ob das Wesen der Zeit selbst uns einen Wink gibt, daß in ihm das Erscheinen der Wahrheit des Seins selbst sich vorbereitet und in diesem Erscheinen die Überwindung der Metaphysik als des ersten und einzigen Bereiches der Entscheidung des Wesens des Seins“. Heidegger also suggests in these sections, although perhaps not as strongly as in his earlier period, that time, while nevertheless bound up with space, is more essential for the thinking of being. This marks a return to his pre-poietic writings in interpreting the primacy of time for being.

the few pages that remain of this chapter I will briefly walk us through the salient parts of Heidegger's analysis of the second line of the fragment as they relate to time.

Time, when thought inceptually, Heidegger thinks, belongs to beings and temporalizes (*zeitigt*) in them. Put differently, the temporalizing of time allows each presencing being to presence, to while, as their own time. "Time," Heidegger writes, "temporalizes the whiling of each whiling presence. Time is the whiling of presencing of presenced beings. The whiling essences the being of beings [*Die Zeit zeitigt die Weile des jeweilig Anwesenden. Die Zeit erweilt die Weile des Anwesenden als des Jeweiligen. Die Zeit ist das Erweilnis des Anwesens des Anwesenden. Im Erweilnis west das Sein des Seienden*]" (GA 78: 198). It is time as temporalizing, the whiling of the while, which lets being essence as presence, and which forms the bond between the guarantee or need of being and presencing of beings. Recall though that the emergence and departure of the guarantee, the granting of being, are themselves joined together in such way that presence also guarantees absence. That is, the coming-to-being of being also necessitates its passing-away.

A similar structure holds in the second sentence with the temporalizing of time (the whiling of the while). Heidegger says that temporalization too also occurs in a joined movement of time (*Zeit*) and non-time (*Un-zeit*), temporalizing (*zeitigen*) and non-temporalizing (*Unzeitigen*). Thus, the time, the whiling, of a being follows a joined structure of temporalizing and non-temporalizing. For every being it has its time which is the measure of its temporalizing and its non-temporalizing, and the allotment of this measure, the whiling (*erweilnis*) that each individual being has follows the same structure that being follows in its coming-to-be and its passing-away, precisely because being presences as an individual being. Being is differentiated in the turning of being and emerges into the transition into a singular being. The emergence of being happens out of the granting of being as a need. This need manifests as presence, but as part of its presence it carries with it and is bound to its own absence, its departure from its whiling as a singular being. The presencing of being as a

singular being happens as its whiling (*erweilnis*) in the while (*Weile*). But in the same way that absence is joined to presence, non-whiling, non-temporalizing, is so too bound with whiling so that both the singular being and its presence as being retreat into absence in its passing-way, its departure from the open region where other beings abide and linger in their own whiling.

For Heidegger the verdict of Anaximander speaks from beings about being. Time, thought through the ancient Greek χρόνος of Anaximander's verdict, is the while (*Weile*) of being (*Sein*). The time, the while, of being happens in beings as temporalizing (*zeitigung*), as whiling presence. For Heidegger, time is the temporalizing presence of a presencing being, each to its time, each to their whiling while. Time is not a sequence of successive moments, nor is it an ordered line of points, one after the other. Rather, time is what a being is, as the temporalization of its being as presence. A being is in its presencing the emergence, transition, and whiling (GA 78: 201). What relates the two sentences, and what relates and affects time to temporalization, while and whiling, being to beings, is Η τάξις, the final word of the Anaximander verdict. Heidegger translates τάξις with a fairly unusual German term, *die Schätzung*, the esteeming, or giving value to. Whiling allows beings to give value to the presence of one another, and to recognize that they are present to each other in their while. For Heidegger τάξις is not an arrangement or ordering, just as time is not a serial succession, but is the recognition of relation and what makes relationality between beings and being possible.¹¹⁹ This relationality is accomplished because of time, understood as the constancy (*Beständigkeit*) of presence of each entity. It is this constancy of presence, first introduced in the *Contributions* and then further elaborated in *The Event*, which is the whiling itself, as the essence of time.

¹¹⁹In the 1946 essay Heidegger will translate the Greek τίσις, from the phrase, 'and with respect to each other,' καὶ τίσις ἀλλήλοις, as 'esteeming' (*Denn τίσις ist das Schätzen*)(GA 5: 358/270). In GA 78 the term *Schätzen* is reserved for τάξις, as discussed. I do not think this is an example of Heidegger changing his mind, but rather drawing another parallel 'doubling' between τίσις and τάξις to further emphasize the relation aspect apparent in jointure and time.

Heidegger's shorter 1946 essay on the Anaximander fragment (in GA 5) does not directly mention either time or the interpretation of χρόνος. The shorter essay, in fact, only analyses the first line of the fragment in any detail and only briefly looks at the first half of the second sentence. Heidegger's treatment of that material, however, is almost the same as the longer exposition from the undelivered *Verdict of Anaximander* course with a few notable exceptions, two of which I want to mention. Despite the absence of his translation of χρόνος (and the longer phrase we just examined: κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν) as the whiling in the while, Heidegger nevertheless refers to the constancy of an entity's presence as its whiling. Heidegger expresses it in the 1946 essay in the following way:

Thought from out of the jointure of the while, whiling as insistence is the uprising [*Aufstand*] into mere endurance. In presencing as such constancy asserts itself – presencing lets each thing that presences while in the region of unconcealment. Through this rising up of the while, that which stays awhile insists on mere constancy. The presencing presences [*Das Anwesende wesen*], therefore, without and against the jointure of the while. The saying does not say that everything that presences loses itself in the dis-jointure. It says, rather, that that which stays awhile with a view to dis-jointure, διδόναι δίκην, gives jointure (GA 5: 356/268 tm.).

While the passage does not directly name time, if we understand the essence of time as the whiling, and the while as the jointure of presence (being) with presencing (a being in its being), then the passage illustrates the reciprocal relation between being and time, time and beings. Beings manifest the constancy of presence through their own presencing. This constancy of presence is the joining of a being to being, and is what allows the being to be what it is. Similarly though, it allows being to be, to presence as the while. Being “ises” as the while, it joins a being to its own whiling. In the last line of the passage above, ‘what stays a while’ is both being and the singular being as they are both given in their junction and dis-junction of emerging into the region of unconcealment. In the line immediately following the above quotation, Heidegger asks: “[w]hat does ‘to give’ mean here? How

should that which stays awhile, presences in dis-jointure, give jointure? Can it give what it does not have?... Whither and how does that which presences awhile give jointure?" (GA 5: 356/268-269).

Heidegger is not merely reflecting on the translation of *διδόναι* as 'to give' but wondering about the way in which being gives itself for beings and reciprocally beings give themselves for being. The idea of 'it gives', that is, being and beings give to each other respectively in the whiling while, marks the transition from Heidegger's thinking of time across his middle-period and into his late-period. The hallmark of Heidegger's later thinking of time is captured in the everyday German expression: 'there is time' (*Es gibt Zeit*), more literally translated as 'it gives time'. We thus see the first seeds of this thinking developed in the undelivered *Verdict of Anaximander* lecture course through Heidegger's reflections on "it is time" (*Es ist Zeit*). The it is understood as the site of the reciprocal need between being and beings and the giving of being as time. It is the giving of being and time which takes us into the final chapter of Heidegger's thinking of time.

V. CONCLUSION: FROM TIME-SPACE TO IT IS TIME (*ES IST ZEIT*)

Across the roughly 15-years that comprise what I have been calling his middle-period thinking of time, we have seen both dramatic shifts and stayed consistency in Heidegger's thought. His thinking through the question of time's relation to being during this period was bookended by his two important readings of Anaximander. By tracing the path of Heidegger's thinking from one reading of the Anaximander fragment in 1932 to the longer re-interpretation of the fragment more than a decade later, we can chart the overall guideposts and development of his thinking about the role of time.

Central to Heidegger's middle-period thinking is how beings emerge into their being, thought through what Heidegger terms, the event. The first contours of his thinking through the event arrived with his 1932 analysis of Anaximander. Here Heidegger was interested in

understanding how appearance “steps forth” and “recedes” from concealment. It is time, he recognized, whose power allows everything to emerge and “conceals everything standing in appearance” (GA 35: 18/15). Already in the 1932 analysis of Anaximander’s fragment Heidegger had begun to develop a vocabulary for describing how being and beings emerge and depart and are reciprocally joined to each other.

Starting in the mid-1930s Heidegger begins to see time as a site or domain for the appearance of being in beings, and develops the vocabulary of time-space to describe this phenomena. Time-space becomes the site of our thinking of the truth of beings in their being from out of the event. With the early poetic writings, particularly the *Contributions*, Heidegger struggles to articulate how we can enact this kind of thinking, a thinking which leaps out of the history of metaphysics and the long tradition of thinking about being and instead into another beginning of being. We do so by opening ourselves to the thinking of being in the time-space of its appearance. Time-space is the thinking of the event of the truth of being which grounds the abyssal space which is the welling up of being from out of the fissure of being. Time-space captivates us and transports us in our thinking so that we (or at least the rare few) can bear witness to the emergence and departure from out of being and into being which marks a new inceptual beginning.

By the early 1940s, though, Heidegger saw that while his thinking of the event seemed to capture the basic features of the event, it was nevertheless too focused on showing didactically it is that Da-sein experiences this inceptual beginning. Heidegger begins to try and think the event of the other beginning from out of itself. Heidegger’s thinking in *On Inception* and *The Event* moves to describe how incipient beingness as jointure clears away and grants time and space in the unity of the transition from out of the turning and counterturning of being and the differentiation into da-seyn. It was in *The Event* that we saw Heidegger try and radically move away from Da-sein as the one that prepares time-space as the site of moment of decision, and instead Heidegger begins to think

the reciprocal relation between beyng and da-seyn, all beings in their beingness, and the way that beings transition and emerge into the constancy of their presence. Presence replaces his early thinking of appearance and it is describing how beyng presences as appropriating event that is the focus of the poetic works in the 1940s. It is no longer Da-sein which prepares time-space as the site of appropriation, but beyng. Beyng is thought there more in terms of how it is given to da-seyn as presence. Time, especially in the context of *The Event*, is thought of as the way that a being twists free from beyng and emerges to presence in its constancy.

This constancy of a being's presence, its joining with being, is finally thought at the end of Heidegger's middle-period as the whiling. The whiling, as Heidegger told us in the *Verdict of Anaximander*, is the essence of time, and is the reciprocal and singular relation of being and a being. The importance of this reciprocal need that being and beings have for each other becomes an essential feature of Heidegger's thinking moving from the end of his middle-period and into his late-period thinking about time. This shift in the locus of his thinking is encapsulated in the expression 'it is time,' where the 'it' is thought in terms of deixis, a pointing to the entity which is both being and time.

Across the 15 or so years that we can think of as his middle-period, Heidegger's thinking of time and the way that time is understood shifts considerably, not simply from the understanding of time and temporality in *Being and Time*, but even from the early articulation of time as time-space in the *Contributions* and the early poetic works. Heidegger's late-period thinking on time will bring together all of the elements of this thinking, including the thinking of Da-sein's timeliness from the early-period, and refine it further still. The hallmark of his late-period thinking on time is encapsulated in the expression: there is time (*es gibt Zeit*). The phrase takes a central place in his most important late-period work on time, the short radio lecture, presentation, and short seminar Heidegger gave in 1962 entitled: "On Time and Being" (GA 14). Heidegger will continue to think

the reciprocal relation between being and beings as a kind of requirement (*Brauch*) of each for the other and the way that being and beings presences as the giving of time. I will turn next to Heidegger's later-period, an analysis of "On Time and Being", and Heidegger's mature thinking about time in chapter three.

CHAPTER THREE

ON TIME AND BEING

Now and then I hear things about you. That you have been writing
the second volume of *Being and Time*, entitled “Time and Being.”
-Hannah Arendt to Martin Heidegger, October 19th, 1966¹²⁰

On January 29th, 1962 Heidegger recorded, before a live audience, for the radio station *Südwestfunk* (SWR), what would be his last most sustained lecture on the topic of time, “Time and Being” (»Zeit und Sein«).¹²¹ Two days later, on January 31st, he delivered the lecture again at the University of Freiburg’s *studium generale*, organized by his long-time colleague and friend, Eugen Fink. Heidegger would later offer a three-day seminar on the lecture that September to a group of twenty participants at his cabin in the small sub-Alpine hamlet of Todtnauberg.¹²² The lecture stands as Heidegger’s last major treatment on the topic and defines his late period thinking of time and temporality.

Time, in Heidegger’s later period, is fundamentally relational. Da-sein’s understanding of time and its own temporality are determined precisely through Da-sein’s relation to other beings.

¹²⁰ Arendt, Hannah, and Martin Heidegger. *Letters, 1925-1975*. Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt, 2004. 129.

¹²¹ Heidegger, Gertrud (ed.) *Martin Heidegger: Letters to His Wife 1915-1970*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2010. 283.

¹²² The recorded lecture and the finalized written version of “Time and Being” in volume 14 of Heidegger’s *Gesamtausgabe* occasionally differ significantly although not substantively. The audio recording is from: Martin Heidegger, “Zeit und Sein”, read by the author on *Von der Sache des Denkens: Vorträge, Reden und Gespräche aus den Jahren 1952 – 1969*. der Hörverlag 1656, 2009. 5 compact discs. Hereafter cited as ZS-CD. The notes from the participants’ seminar, as recorded by Dr. Alfredo Guzzoni and collected in GA 14, provide helpful commentary in attempting to understand the lecture as a whole, and not simply its individual arguments, and by further placing the lecture into the wider context of Heidegger’s thought generally. Heidegger warns his audiences in each of the lecture’s deliveries that it is best approached as following a movement of thought, and not simply a series of straightforward propositions. Guzzoni, in his notes, similarly emphasizes the unusual and experimental nature of the seminar, centered around trying to help the participants experience the movement of Heidegger’s thinking throughout the lecture and not focusing on any of the propositions put forward.

Heidegger calls this relation “proper” or “authentic time” (*die eigentliche Zeit*). Proper time is what *Da-sein* determines from out of the event (*das Ereignis*) of its encounter with other beings.

Heidegger’s lecture “Time and Being” is the culmination of his thought across a more than 40-year period on the thinking about time. Heidegger’s mature views on time are thus only really comprehensible when we consider, as I have outlined in the previous chapters, the whole movement of Heidegger’s thinking of time throughout his career. The lecture “Time and Being”, as the culmination of a career thinking about the interrelation between being and time, makes a dizzying array of references to technical terms which emerged especially during Heidegger’s so-called poetic works in the 1930s and 1940s, and a proper understanding of both the “Time and Being” lecture and the elucidation of Heidegger’s later concept of time would not be possible without first making sense of the development of Heidegger’s earlier thinking.

Beyond the mere culmination of a thinker’s career long thinking through of a philosophical problem, Heidegger’s late period thinking about time is important in its own right. Proper time, as Heidegger’s final articulation of his understanding of time, is a relational one, and is entirely contingent upon the way in which we, as humans, relate to the individual objects and entities around us. Heidegger’s concept of proper time, as presented in “Time and Being”, offers a novel and compelling interpretation of time which is outside the traditional metaphysics of time in the history of philosophy and for this alone is worth investigating.

Within the context of the “Time and Being” lecture, and up until his last writings in the mid-1970s, the guiding expression for Heidegger’s thinking of time and being is expressed through the phrase: *Es gibt, Es gibt Sein, Es gibt Zeit* – It gives, It gives being, It gives time.¹²³ From all of

¹²³ Stambaugh’s translation of “Zeit und Sein” alternates between translating *Es gibt* as either ‘there is’ or ‘It gives’, depending on context. For my part, I will leave the expression largely untranslated, or where necessary make use of the slightly more awkward English expression ‘It gives’, in order to preserve the reference to *geben* which is central for Heidegger’s elaboration. Kockelmans has translated the phrase as ‘It grants’. This has the benefit of capturing the conceptual idea of a

Heidegger's writings in his late period, the thinking through of this phrase, and with it proper time, occurs primarily in the 1962 lecture "Time and Being". For this reason, the majority of this chapter will be oriented around a very careful reading and analysis of this key text, unpacking the meaning of the phrase 'It gives being, It gives time', and Heidegger's elucidation of the character of proper time. I also briefly mention the few important references to time that occur after the 1962 lecture and before Heidegger's death in 1976.

In order for us to understand how proper time emerges from out of the givenness of the *Es gibt*, I analyze in section I Heidegger's discussion of the "It gives" as the primary articulation of the disclosure (*Entbergung*) of being and, with it, the co-determination of proper time. Understanding this will bring into relief the way in which being and time are, for Heidegger, both co-determined in their unity and also co-relational. Making sense of what co-determines being and time together will illuminate the question of time. From there, I discuss in section II the way that proper time emerges for Da-sein from out of this relational interaction with other entities.

I conclude in section III with a few remarks on Heidegger's last writings on time and the structure of the "It gives" in the mid-1970s, shortly before Heidegger's death, in an enigmatic essay entitled "The Argument against Requirement". It is here that I will also gesture to some of the broader implications of Heidegger's unique contribution to the thinking of time

I. THE GIVING OF TIME

Heidegger begins the "Time and Being" lecture by asking what prompts us to name being and time together. Being (*Sein*) has, since the beginning of Western-European philosophy, Heidegger thinks, been thought primarily in terms of presence (*Anwesen*). And from presence, we have tended to think

dispensation of being, but also brings with it a connotation of agency, which Heidegger adamantly rejects. Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Heidegger On Time and Being," *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Winter, 1970, 319-340.

that an entity's presencing (*Anwesenheit*) says something to us about the temporal present (*Gegenwart*).

Heidegger links the way we tend to equate presence with the present in the following way:

But we have so far omitted showing more clearly what the present [*Gegenwart*] in the sense of presence [*Anwesenheit*] means. Through this, unitary being is determined as presencing and allowing-to-presence, i.e., as disclosure [*Entbergung*]. What things are we thinking when we say presencing? To presence means to last [*Wesen heißt Währen*]. But we are too quickly content to conceive lasting [*währen*] as mere duration [*dauern*], and to conceive duration in terms of the customary representation of time as a span of time from one now to a subsequent now. To talk of presencing [*An-wesen*], however, requires that we examine the lasting as the lasting in the whiling and abiding [*daß wir im Währen als dem Anwähren das Weilen und Verweilen vernehmen*]. Presence [*Anwesen*] concerns us, the present [*Gegenwart*], that is: what, lasting [*entgegenweilen*], comes toward us, us human beings (GA 14: 16/12).

There are a few things to note from the passage. Heidegger articulates in the first and last lines how *Dasein* indexes presence as “the present” (*Gegenwart*). Importantly though, this sense of present does not have to do with any of our customary representations of time as either a span between two represented points or as a sequence of nows moving from one to the next. Instead, Heidegger wants us to understand the presence of an entity in terms of the way that it whiles and abides, terms we are already familiar with from Heidegger's treatment of the *Anaximander Verdict*. The last few words of the line give a general road map for how Heidegger understands this process. Importantly, Heidegger links here human beings with what comes towards us in its lasting (*entgegenweilen*). This last term, *entgegenweilen*, is key. While the term is used only once in the “Time and Being” essay, it was discussed extensively in the *Anaximander* course.

In the *Anaximander* course, *entgegenweilen* names the site of the jointure in the whiling and the recognition of the boundary or limit ($\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$) between beings (c.f. GA 78: 233-235). Recall that Heidegger's notion of whiling in the mid-1940s, served as the way to mark how being is “allocated” to beings. Beings remain in their while (*Weilen*). With the term *entgegenweilen*, Heidegger marks the relational character of the term through the two German prefixes *ent-* and *gegen-*. The German prefix

ent- typically serves to highlight a process (usually its beginning), while the affix *-gegen-*, establishes a relational structure. Heidegger is gesturing, through this very idiosyncratic term, to the way human beings come into relation with the presence of other entities as they arrive or come towards us (*entgegen*) and how their awhiling presence is what determines, for us, the present (*Gegenwart*).¹²⁴

What the above passage highlights for Heidegger is that we cannot point to being (*Sein*) any more than we can point to time. We may point to *a* singular being (*Seiendes*), like an animal, tree, or mountain as sites out of which we experience being (*Sein*), but we are not pointing to being itself. Likewise, when we point at a clock, a watch, or even the sun, as examples of time, we are not pointing at time itself, we are pointing at individual entities which are present to us in their presencing. But it is because of this presencing that we are able to speak of the present (*Gegenwart*) at all. To make sense of this, Heidegger thinks, we will need to approach the question of time and being as presence through a different modality.

For humans, proper time emerges in the encounter of humans with other entities. While it is not clear if Heidegger thinks that non-human entities also determine time, it is a central feature of what it means to be human that we are capable of recognizing both being and time (GA 14: 16/12 tm.). Being (*Sein*) and time are co-constitutive and emerge from the relational interaction between human Da-sein and other beings (*Seiende*), whether other human Da-sein, mountains, trees, animals, stars and any other so-called “natural thing”, or through our encounter with artifacts in the world (GA 14: 11/7 tm.).¹²⁵ Our encounter with other entities is our recognition of the way that entities presence (*Anwesen*) before us and from the experience of this presence emerges proper time.

¹²⁴ GA 73.2: 929

¹²⁵ Martin Heidegger, „Zeit und Sein“ in *Zur Sache des Denkens*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann (Vittorio Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main), 2007. Translated into English as *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 2002. Hereafter cited as GA 14.

The presencing of entities reveals to us being and, with it, time. But, as Heidegger is at pains to point out throughout the lecture and in the seminar, neither being nor time are, in themselves, things (GA 14: 8/4). Being and time do not exist, *per se*, and are not things in themselves but emerge co-determinately through Da-sein's encounter with the presence of other entities which are, themselves, entities (*Seiende*). Being and time are each, in their unity, what are given to us from out of this encounter.¹²⁶

Heidegger turns to an ordinary language notion to help us locate what we mean when we speak of either time or being.¹²⁷ Heidegger thinks we can make some progress through the very common German expression *Es gibt*. This everyday German expression, *Es gibt*, is colloquially translated into English as “there is” or “there are”, in the same way that we might say in English, “There is (still) time”. Heidegger thinks that we may make some progress in our understanding of both time and being by asking after the meaning of the two expressions, *Es gibt Sein*, there is being, and *Es gibt Zeit*, there is time. Translated word-for-word, however, the German expression *Es gibt* is “it gives”, so that we have the two expressions directly in English as “it gives being” and “it gives time”.

While it may seem like these expressions are abstractions, the process looks something like the following, the details of which will be filled in throughout the rest of the chapter. We bring ourselves into an encounter with other entities, responding to a call from their presence, and with the right comportment, this interaction may open-up a “space” for both the insight and expression of being.

¹²⁶ It may be tempting to think of time as Heidegger presents it here as something epiphenomenal. However, that would not seem to be the case because time is not knowledge *of* our encounters with entities, but rather is co-constitutive of the encounter itself. Likewise, time and temporality do not supervene on Da-sein's experience of the encounter, rather, the structure of time as Heidegger describes it is merely what it means for Da-sein to experience a relational interaction with another entity, *tout court*. While it is outside the scope of my argument here to defend this, it is clear that Heidegger thinks that the encounter of other beings as the co-relation of being and time is simply what it means to be human.

¹²⁷ C.f. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophische Untersuchungen = Philosophical Investigations*. Rev. 4th Ed. by P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. ed.; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. §109.

The other entity's giving of its presence calls to us (although it does not demand anything from us) to bring ourselves towards the possibility of transitioning to a different mode of thinking. But, this mode of thinking asks us to suspend our own representations and allow the entity to presence without our own willful projections (*wesen lassen*). This suspension of our willful projection brings us into relation with the presencing entity (as *Seiende*, or what Heidegger will often refer to as φύσει ὄν). The "space" of this relation becomes an open-expanse where we both bring the entity into relation and it gives of its presence. This interplay of bringing and giving between Da-sein and the presencing entity as the open (*das Offene*) in turn discloses to us the truth of its being from out of the event. In the familiar language of the event, a time-space is established from out of Dasein's relation to the presencing entity, and Dasein's transition to a way of thinking that allows the other entity to presence (*wesen lassen*), is how the event and the time-space opened up by the co-relation, gives the truth of being (*Sein*). This process can be thought of as how a being (*Seiendes*) gives being (*Es gibt Sein*), from out of the event.

But it is not only being (*Sein*) which is given. Time is also given (*Es gibt Zeit*). Time emerges as the way that Da-sein thinks its relation with the close presencing of the other entity. The closeness of this relation, the entity's presencing counter to us, is its nearness (*Nahheit*). Presencing nearness is the experience of proper (relational) time. But proper time, i.e. Dasein's relational nearness to the other being's presencing, is experienced by Dasein as a unity of three interrelated dimensions. Nearness is the unitary interplay of immediate presencing, lack or absence of presencing, and arriving presencing – a presencing to come. We call these three interrelated dimensions of nearness (presence, absence, and arrival) as 'present', 'past', and 'future', and their interplay as 'time'. The better part of the rest of this chapter will be spent unpacking what this all means.

A. THE GIVING OF BEING FROM PRESENCE

Heidegger plays extensively throughout the essay with the German root verb of the expression, *geben*, “to give”. Heidegger makes the somewhat unusual gesture to tell his audience that they should hear the *Es*, the “It”, in *Es gibt*, “It gives”, as capitalized. This is unusual because in German only nouns, and not pronouns, are capitalized. Yet, Heidegger warns us, the “It” in the phrase should only be understood as a grammatical placeholder and should not be thought of as a subject or causal agent. This raises two subsequent questions, however. If the “It” in the expression isn’t any person or thing, then what are we referring to in the expression? For Heidegger, as we shall soon see, the “It” is the event (*das Ereignis*). Likewise, what is given in the expression: “It gives”? The giving of “It gives” is both being and time together. Heidegger tells his audience: “In this giving [*im diesem Geben*] of time it becomes evident to how that giving of being [*jenes Geben*] is determined which as a relationship first holds the two together and produces” GA 14: 9/5 tm.). What remains is for us to understand how it is that presence, as the presence of another thing or entity, makes possible this giving of both being and time.

Because neither being nor time are things (*Seiende*), we cannot experience either the giving of being or the giving of time directly, on their own. Why not? Because neither being nor time *are*, ontically. So, while Da-sein may perceive the giving of both being and time, it is not receiving any *thing* in this giving. Likewise, the entity which Da-sein perceives, is also not what is given to Da-sein in this experience. Instead, we only experience the giving of both being and time through our meaningful encounter with other entities in their whiling presence before us (*entgegenweilen*), but we do not receive the thing or entity itself. Heidegger gives us a clue as to how this happens:

Being, by which all beings [*Seiende*] are marked as such, being means presence. Thought in regard to what presences [*das Anwesende*], presencing shows itself as letting-presence [*zeigt sich Anwesen als Anwesenlassen*]. But now it is important to think specifically of this letting-presence, in so far as presence is allowed [*zugelassen*]. Letting-presence [*Anwesenlassen*] shows what is proper to it in bringing it into unconcealing [*daß es ins Unverborgene bringt*]. Letting presence [*Anwesen lassen*] means:

disclosure, bringing into the open. A giving [*ein Geben*] plays in disclosure, namely, that in each *letting*-presence, presence, i.e. being, is given (GA 14: 9/5 tm.).¹²⁸

First, we must note that all beings (*Seiende*) are “marked” by being (*Sein*), but they are not themselves being. Being is no thing. Instead, Heidegger links for us in the above passage the connection between the presencing of an entity and the giving of being through the two modalities: letting-presence and disclosure. Each of these are technical terms for Heidegger and are related to his articulation of the event (*das Ereignis*), first elaborated almost thirty years prior in the poetic writings of his middle period, as I discussed in the previous chapter.

The seminar notes, as well as Heidegger’s own notes from *Zum Ereignis Denken*, make clear that Da-sein’s thinking of the encountered entity is a process. This process for Da-sein moves, in order, from presence, to letting-presence, to disclosure, to giving. The protocol notes further clarify the last sentence in the above passage by highlighting that in the movement from letting-presence up finally to giving, “in each case, thinking takes a step-back,” until the givenness of being is achieved (GA 14: 57/47; GA 73.2: 1276). It is in this way that beings are “marked” by being. Being (*Sein*), not beings, is what is disclosed to Da-sein in the giving of the “It gives” (GA 14:10/6).

Heidegger warns us again in this same passage that being *is* not, and we must be careful not to think of being as either the ground of beings or as some abstract category in which all beings somehow participate. Yet, without individual beings, Da-sein cannot let presence the disclosure which marks the giving of being. So how is it that we perceive being from out of our encounter with beings? Heidegger tells us instead that: “[w]e perceive presencing in every simple, sufficiently unprejudiced reflection on things of nature [*Vorhandenheit*] and artifacts [*Zubandenheit*]. Things of nature and artifacts are both modes of presencing” (GA 14: 11/7). This is

¹²⁸ Heidegger provides a similar, although more truncated, account of this process in *Zum Ereignis Denken* (GA 73.2). Interestingly he describes the process from “Zeit und Sein” as the “truth of being”, in contrast to *Sein und Zeit* as the “meaning of being” (GA 73.2: 418).

significant because it reinforces the notion that, for Heidegger, our perception of being and time is relationally contingent upon our encounter with other entities yet mediated through the giving of being and time. Fundamentally Da-sein can only think and determine time and being on the basis of its interaction with other entities (*Seiende*) which is mediated, when properly thought, through the event of the givenness of time and being.

The presence of the other entity makes possible for Da-sein the experience of the event of the giving of being in the “It gives”. In this way we can also think of this “giving of being” as a kind of sending. Heidegger puts this in the following way: “[a] giving that only gives its given [*das nur seine Gabe gibt*], though holding itself back and withdrawing, such a giving we call the sending. And thought in this sense of a giving is being, the It gives, what is sent. Each of its transitions remain sent in this way” (GA 14: 12/8 tm.). This passage is important because it highlights the co-relational structure between giving and sending in the perception of being as the It gives. How so?

The presence of the other entity does not give or send us being, but instead the experience of the “It gives”, which is only possible through our relation to the other entity. This giving establishes a relation between Da-sein and the encountered entity, such that the event may become possible. However, to experience this encounter with what is given in the sending from the “It gives”, Da-sein must first go through a process of questioning, thinking, and ultimately “stepping away from thinking”, that lets presence send what is given in the “It gives”. It is here that we can turn to a discussion of how being and time are co-determined from out of the experience of the “It gives”.

B. THE EVENT: BEING & TIME

Almost at the end of the lecture, Heidegger finally reveals the elusive way that being and time are determined together, finally “answering” the question he posed at the very opening: “[w]hat prompts us to think time and being together?” (GA 14: 6/2). What determines the co-relation of

time and being together is the event (*das Ereignis*). It is difficult to imagine what the audience members of the lecture at the *stadium generale*, much less those listening to Heidegger's radio address two days earlier, might have thought in hearing this articulation.

The importance of the role of the event, however, cannot be overstated in terms of Heidegger's late understanding of the concept of time. This was, in large part, the motivation for such a lengthy treatment in my previous chapter on Heidegger's development of the event and the role that time-space played there. Time-space continues to play a role in Heidegger's later thought, although in a slightly modified fashion. Heidegger does not describe the event in any great detail in the "Time and Being" lecture, certainly not in comparison to the six volumes on the event which date from the 1930s and 40s, except to describe how it is because of human's relation to the event that we are able to experience being and time from out of the presence of other entities. "Being and time", Heidegger tells us, "are there only in the event," and it is the character of human Da-sein that it is capable of being appropriated by the event (GA 14: 28/23). It is from out of the event that being and time are both given, and understood in this way, it is the event, the 'It', which gives in the phrase which has been guiding the entirety of Heidegger's time and being lecture. Although, the event *is* not a thing, nor a "happening", nor does it *give* anything in the sense of an active agent or subject (GA 14: 29/24). Likewise, the giving of being from out of the event gives no determinate ontic content. What is sent (*das Geschickte*) is being, not the entity encountered by Da-sein.

The event arises only when humans experience the presence of things of nature or artifacts, and only then with the right unprejudiced comportment towards them, allowing them to presence (*wesen lassen*). For the process of letting-presence, disclosure, and finally giving to take place (*sich ereignen*), Da-sein must exercise a form of releasement (*Gelassenheit*), through both a refusal (*Verweigerung*) and a

withholding (*Vorenthaltis*) from its normal projective thinking (GA 14: 19/14).¹²⁹ Da-sein experiences the event as a result of its releasement into the event. In Heidegger's language, Da-sein is appropriated by the event, and it is in this appropriation that the event gives the given (*die Gabe*). From out of the event is sent being, and we can think of this sending of being as a form of allotment (*das Geschick*)¹³⁰, as what is sent *as* being, so long as we remember that no thing (*Seiendes*) is actually sent or allotted, and the event is also neither a thing, or in any way a causal agent. Heidegger emphasizes the interplay between our human relation and the approaching presence in the following way:

The human: standing within the approach of presencing, but in such a way that he receives, as a giving [*als Gabe*], the presence that It gives [*das Es gibt*] by questioning what appears in letting-presence. If the human were not the constant recipient of the giving given by the "It gives presence," if that which is extended in the giving did not reach man, then not only would being [*Sein*] remain concealed in the absence of this gift, not only closed off, but humans would remain excluded from the reach of: It gives being. The human would not be human (GA 14: 16/12).

However, the recognition that there is a giving from out of the event, a receiving by Da-sein, and a sending from the presence of another entity does open Da-sein to a relation with the other entity in

¹²⁹ Heidegger's reference to releasement (*Gelassenheit*) occurs in a footnote to the *Gesamtausgabe* version of the lecture: "necessary in *releasement waiting* (not expecting) seclusion [*gebraucht in die Gelassenheit wartende (nicht hoffende) Abgeschlossenheit*]" (GA 14: 20 fn 6). The originally published version of the essay, from which Stambaugh was primarily working, does not contain any of the footnotes from the final *Gesamtausgabe* version. See Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag), 1969, 16. Heidegger's most sustained treatment of the topic of releasement [*Gelassenheit*] occurs in GA 77: 122-139/80-90, *Feldweg-Gespräche (1944/45)*, ed. Ingrid Schübler (Vittorio Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main), 1995. Translated into English as *Country Path Conversations*, trans. Bret W. Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 2010. For an important discussion of the role of seclusion (*Abgeschlossenheit*) as it relates to Da-sein's experience of beings, being and being, and time from the 1940s, c.f. "§3 Die Abgeschlossenheit des Anfangs" in Martin Heidegger, *Über den Anfang*, ed. Paola-Ludovika Coriando (Vittorio Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main), 2005, 14-16. Translated into English as *On Inception*, trans. Peter Hanly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), *forthcoming*.

¹³⁰ The German word, *das Geschick*, has strong connotations of fate and destiny in Germany, although it can also mean a living condition, or political situation. Heidegger is playing here with the root stem of the word as a 'sending' or 'dispatch'. See also my discussion in Chapter Two.

its presence, and even in its absence.¹³¹ To make sense of this, we will need to see how the giving of presencing also provides us with time, as what is extended from out of the event.

C. THE SENDING AND ALLOTMENT OF BEING

We saw that for Heidegger the relation of giving and sending from out of the event, in terms of the ‘It gives being/time’, can be thought of in terms of an allotment. Da-sein thinks the giving of being as something which is sent from out of the thinking of the event. Da-sein, in turn, thinks of this sending as a kind of extending out or opening up. And it is from this extending and opening up between Da-sein and the encountered entity (and the time-space of the event) that we see time finally emerge for Heidegger. He puts it in the following way:

Thus proper time appears as the “It” of which we speak when we say: It gives Being. The allotment [*Das Geschick*] in which being is given, consists in the extending of time. Does this reference show time to be the “It” that gives Being? By no means. For time itself remains the given of an “It gives” whose giving preserves the region in which presence is extended... This giving proved to be the sending of being, as time in the sense of an opening up which extends (GA 14: 22/17 tm).

Heidegger’s train of thought here is complicated, but we can follow this movement in terms of what I discussed previously regarding Da-sein’s relation to the giving and sending from the event. In order to clarify the above passage, I will try and summarize each step of the process as Heidegger has outlined it thus far, so that we can see how time and being both emerge from the approach and relational interaction of other entities. Thus far, the process looks something like the following.

Human Da-sein encounters the approaching presence of another entity. The encounter, at least for human Da-sein, is mediated through Da-sein’s experience of letting-presence

¹³¹ Heidegger cryptically tells his audience that even if presencing has to do with what comes towards us, that: “[n]ot every presencing is necessarily the present, a strange thing [*Nicht jedes Anwesen ist notwendig Gegenwart, eine seltsame Sache*](GA 14: 18/13 tm.) adding a few pages later: “[b]ut this we must keep in mind: The It, at least in the interpretation available to us for the moment, names a presence of absence” (GA 14: 23/18 tm).

(*wesen lassen*). Da-sein questions what appears in this letting-presence of the entity. This questioning takes the form of a refusal and a withholding (of Da-sein's own projective thinking) which allows the entity to presence through the relational structure of the event (*das Ereignis*). The event acts a relational mediation between withholding Da-sein and the giving granted by the other entity. From out of the event, Da-sein names the giving of presencing as 'being' (GA 72.3: 1276). Being here is no thing (*Seiendes*) but is articulated from out of the event on the basis of this co-relational encounter.

The event "gives" being to Da-sein as a sending, an allotment, although we must, as always, recall that neither the event nor being are "things", "subjects", or "agents", but are instead movements within Da-sein's relational experience of the present entity. The allotment, this sending of being, from out of the event establishes Da-sein's relation to the presence of the other entity. In this way, the allotment of being, can be understood as opening-up a relational "space" between Da-sein and the other entity, mediated by the event.

Put differently, we can think of both Da-sein and the presence of the other entity as "reaching out" and extending. This mutual "reaching out" establishes an opening up between each other such that Da-sein can perceive the entity as an allotment, or sending, of being (from out of the event)(GA 14: 24/19). And it is from out of this extending, and the allotment of being as a sending from out of the event, that Heidegger thinks that time emerges in this open-region for Da-sein. Heidegger introduces this idea in the following passage:

In the sending of the allotment of being, in the extending of time, there manifests an arrogation [*ein Zueignen*], a consignment [*Übereignen*], namely of being as presence and time as the open region of its own. What determines both, time and being, in their own, that is, in their belonging together, we shall call: *the event* [Ereignis]. What this word names can be thought now only in the light of what manifests in our pre-view [*Vor-sicht*] of being and of time as allotment and as extending, where time and being

belong. We have called both -being and time- things [*Sache*]. The “and” between them leaves their relation to each other indeterminate (GA 14: 24/19).

What is clear for Heidegger here is that being and time both emerge together, and both from out of Da-sein’s experience of the event. Each plays a different role, however, within the event itself. The terms arrogation (*Zueignen*) and consignment (*Übereignen*) appear nowhere else in the “Time and Being” essay, we can recall their importance, as discussed in the previous chapter, in terms of the threefold structure of transporting (*Entrückung*)¹³² and captivating (*Berückung*) that is the unity of time-space (c.f. chapter two, §II.B. “The temporalization of time-space). I will discuss in greater detail the role of time-space in the next section, but it is worth highlighting that much of the structure of what Heidegger is alluding to here is the same, or similar, to what Heidegger articulated first in the *Contributions* and later throughout his poetic works up to *The Event*, with an important modification. In the above cited passage from “Time and Being”, the arrogation and consignment occur from out of sending of being from the event as allotment and through the extending of time.

Similarly, here Da-sein experiences allotment, as arrogation and consignment, out of the unity of both being as presence and time as the extending of the open region, as shown from the above passage. This contrasts with the discussion of these terms in the *Contributions* in which Da-sein only experiences these out of its captivity and transportation into the time-space of the event of being. Within the context of Heidegger’s early poetic writings, it is the event, and Da-sein’s ability to act as the site of the ground of the truth of being, which takes the primary “active” role. I highlighted this as the ambiguity of a lingering thinking of transcendence which seems especially present in the *Contribution* and *Mindfulness* and, which I argued in the previous chapter, was in part what *On Inception* and *The Event* were meant to overcome.

¹³² I.e. consignment (*Übereignung*), bestowal (*Schenkung*), and assignment (*Zu-eignung*).

The shift, I think, is subtle but important. Because the discussion from “Time and Being” places the emphasis on the relation of human Da-sein to the presence of other entities *by means of* the mediating experience of the event, and not simply Da-sein’s captivation by the event. The relational emphasis in “Time and Being” is between Da-sein and other entities (*Seiende*) and the discussion of the event is intended to articulate how it is that both time and being emerge from out of this relational encounter, not because of it.¹³³ Time and being do not supervene as a result of Da-sein’s experience of the event; they are precisely how Da-sein experiences presence and makes sense of other entities.

Heidegger emphasizes this subtle shift towards the very end of the time and being lecture by saying: “[t]o the extent that being and time are only given through the event, what belongs to the event is the peculiarity that the event brings the human into its own as the one who hears being, while standing within authentic time (*indem er innsteht in der eigentlichen Zeit*). Thus appropriated, the human belongs to the event” (GA 14: 28/23 tm.). The passage provides a clearer indication of the way the event is both simply what it means to be a human Da-sein, to experience presence and the mediating role that the event plays between itself and its experience of the presence of other entities. It also serves to nicely bookend the summary I gave above about Heidegger’s discussion in “Time and Being” of the process by which Da-sein perceives the approaching presence of other entities. A presence that Da-sein characterizes both as being, but also as time. Time for Da-sein, as we have seen, is the extended opening-up in the open region, although we have not yet seen how. Da-sein accomplishes this extending through its relation to the allotment of being (from out of the event) and the approaching presence. It is from Da-sein’s relation to this approaching presence that we can

¹³³ Although not in any sense of the “conditions of possibility”, it is merely what happens when Da-sein experiences entities in this way.

experience proper time (*eigentliche Zeit*). I turn in my next section to the way in which this co-extending opening-up that establishes the open-region gives time to Da-sein.

II. THE GIVING OF PROPER TIME

Finally, we arrive at Heidegger's discussion of proper time (*eigentliche Zeit*). Like being, proper time is given from out of the event. The giving of both being and time are intrinsically intertwined and they arrive to Da-sein from out of the event together in a unity. Heidegger is careful, however, to warn that proper time is itself not the 'It', not the event, because neither the event nor time "are" in any ontic sense. And, likewise, there is nothing standardly temporal about either time or the event, as the 'It' that gives. Instead, we must think of both being and time in their unity as what are each given in the giving and sending of the event. Proper time is, instead, the mutual self-giving of presence and the "opening up" established in the extension between the relation of Da-sein to the encountered entity and the *Es gibt*. In order to make sense of what this means, we will need to see how Heidegger walks us through each part of the relation, the open region, and how time emerges as the extending.

In the previous section I introduced the way in which Heidegger links presence with the present (*Gegenwart*) through a thinking of the arriving whiling of an entity. What was important for Heidegger was that the arrival of an entity coming towards us allowed us to experience its presence as a form of whiling. But Da-sein's experience of the arrival of the other entity is not unilateral. As we saw in the previous section, there is the establishment of a co-relation of giving from out of the event, Da-sein's receiving this given, and the sending of presence.

Heidegger further explains that the giving of presence is also a "reaching out" from the presence approaching us and this reaching out, sending, giving, and receiving should all be thought of in terms of a unity, as a form of reciprocal offering and giving of presence.

Heidegger summarizes this relation in the following passage:

But what do they offer to one another? Nothing other than themselves and that means- that in them the presencing is given (*das in ihnen gereichte An-wesen*). With this presencing, there opens up what we call time-space. But with the word “time” we no longer mean the succession of a sequence of nows. Accordingly, time-space no longer means merely the distance between two now-points of calculated time, such as we have in mind when we note, for instance: this or that occurred within a time-span of fifty years. Time-space now is the name for the openness which opens up in the mutual self-extending of futural approach, past and present. This openness exclusively and primarily provides the space in which space as we usually know it can unfold. The self-extending, the opening up, of future, past and present is itself prespatial; only thus can it make room, that is, provide space (GA 14: 18/14 tm.).

There is a great deal to note in this dense passage. What is most significant is that this unity of offering and giving are in themselves what we think of when we think of the giving of presence. The relational unity of this reaching out and giving establishes what Heidegger now calls time-space. And it is from out of the openness established in time-space, that we also experience what Heidegger is calling the self-extending approach, an approach which gives us a unity of future, past, and present (GA 14: 19/14). It is for this reason that Heidegger says that proper time (*eigentliche Zeit*) is four dimensional. These four dimensions are the standard “past”, “present”, and “future” associated with Da-sein’s timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*) and another dimension which is the basis for, and unity of, the other three: nearness (*Nahheit*), or “the nearing nearness” (*die nähernde Nähe*).¹³⁴ I will discuss each of these and how they relate to the self-extended approach, the open-region, and the *Es gibt* in turn.

¹³⁴ In the footnotes added to the *Gesamtausgabe* version of the „*Zeit und Sein*“ Heidegger begins referring to the nearing nearness with the technical term, *die Nabnis*. In *Zum Ereignis Denken*, Heidegger also conceptually links *die Nähe* with *das Während* and *Gewährend* (GA 73.2: 935). Heidegger’s earliest technical usage of the term *die Nähe* seems to occur in the mid-1950s in his private notebooks where the term comes at the end of a long laundry list of interpretations of time (Time as...). The list ends with: “Time as the Nearness [*die Nähe*] – the proper dimension of time, the fourth as the first – the bearing of the fourfold [*die Tragende des Geviertes*] – Dimension: recognition as decisive appropriation. Event and nearness” (GA 100: 123). For more on the “bearing of the fourfold”, see Mitchell 2015, 74-78.

A. OPENNESS, APPROACH, AND THE NEARING NEARNESS

Heidegger thinks of “nearing nearness” as the fundamental characteristic which establishes proper time. To make sense of this I will show step by step what I think Heidegger means by this process. Because Heidegger thinks being and time together, with an emphasis on the “and”, as occurring from out of Da-sein’s relation to the event, we need to simultaneously keep in mind the way in which presence is understood as being. For now, our task is to think the other side of the statement *Es gibt*, with regards to how proper time is given from out of the event.

Da-sein’s encounter with the presence of other entities, whether artifacts or so-called “natural” entities, when properly thought brings Da-sein into relation with the event as the sending and giving of presence. This much was made clear in the previous section. Da-sein’s relation to the presence of the other entity opens up what Heidegger now calls time-space (GA 14: 18/14). Although we must be careful not to think of time-space as either points separated by a distance or punctuated between nows. For Heidegger, time-space is “pre-spatial” and is, in fact, what makes both space and time, as we ordinarily think of them, possible. What is essential for Heidegger is that Da-sein establishes a relation with the entity which is approaching it, and time-space is the name for the pre-spatial mutual self-giving relation established between Da-sein and the other entity (GA 14: 18-19/14). Although we must again be careful that not every encounter Da-sein has with other entities results in an experience of the “It gives”, the relation to the event, or the opening up of time-space. Da-sein only achieves the opening up of time-space from out of the event of presence when it takes on a comportment of releasement (*Gelassenheit*) towards the present entity. When Da-sein withholds and releases itself into this open-region established out of time-space, then Da-sein is able to experience the giving of being and the nearing nearness which establishes

proper time. However, for many, if not most, of our encounters with other entities, we are closed off to them.

When understood in this relational way, Heidegger thinks of nearing nearness as the foremost characteristic that determines proper time. Central to making sense of this is that we always keep in mind that it is the presence of the other entity and our meaningful relation to it, which constitutes time. Heidegger also thinks of this as a kind of mutual reaching out which establishes the open-region of interrelationality. Nearing nearness names the character or mode of this relation, although not in any spatial way, which is why Heidegger can say that the dimensionality of space (and time) as we know it, are determined on the basis of this encounter.

The nearing nearness, as Heidegger says, is “that giving that determines all” (GA 14: 20/15). How? This is precisely because Da-sein establishes the space for measurement and calculation, for thinking of time as either present, past, or future, from out of the recognition of the presence of other entities. As Heidegger states in the *Time and Being* lecture: “[t]here is no time without humans [*Zeit gibt es nicht ohne den Menschen*]” (GA 14: 20/16). Unfortunately, the lecture gives us precious little advice on how Da-sein first establishes time on the basis of nearing nearness. The seminar notes, thankfully, offer us some help in clarifying how Heidegger understands this:

The character of this thinking was often called the “step back.” At first this step back is understood as an “away from” and “toward.” Thus Heidegger’s thinking would be the movement away from the openness of beings (*Offenbarkeit des Seienden*) toward openness as such which remains concealed in manifest beings (*im offenbaren Seienden*). However, something else is thought in the phrase “step back.” The step steps back before, gains distance from that which is about to arrive. The gaining of distance is a removal of distance, the freeing of the approach of what is to be thought (GA 14: 38/30).

There are a few important points to highlight from the above quoted passage. First, what is being described is a movement of Da-sein's thought, from particular to abstract. This is the reason why in the passage the spatial terms like "step back", "away from", and "toward" are placed in scare-quotes because the ideas that such spatial dimensionality express are, in fact, attitudes of relation — between Da-sein and the manifest entities in their presence.

The "distance" that Da-sein gains here is not a spatial distance, per se, but in terms of how Da-sein thinks of its relation to other entities. We tend to think of our relations to things and others in general terms, the cup in front of me, the pencil over there. But these dimensional relations are available to me as ideas only because of my relation to the presence of the cup or the pencil (and as we will see soon, the absence of something also plays a role in my understanding). On first read, the last sentence of the cited passage seems somewhat paradoxical, unless we keep in mind that what is most essential here is the presence of entities (manifest beings), and not our determinations about how those entities presence. The "removal of distance" here is not a spatial distance, but a relational one which opens us up to the approaching presence of the entity, whether cup, pencil, or person.

It is this character of approach, as a mutual co-relation, which will help us understand the way that Heidegger sees both dimensionality and, more importantly, proper time as emerging from the approach of nearing nearness and the reaching out that characterizes this co-relation. Understanding how Heidegger links these will transition us to a discussion of the threefold timely structure of proper time. Heidegger puts it in the following way:

Accordingly, what we call dimension and dimensionality in a way easily misconstrued, belongs to proper time and to it alone. Dimensionality consists in a reaching out that opens up, in which futural approaching brings about what has been, what has been brings about futural approaching, and the reciprocal relation of both brings about the opening up of openness. Thought in terms of this threefold

giving, proper time proves to be three-dimensional. Dimension, we repeat, is here thought not only as the area of possible measurement, but rather as reaching throughout, as giving and opening up (GA 14: 19/14-15).

Remember from what we said before that proper time is, actually, four dimensional. But this fourth, most fundamental, dimension of proper time is the nearing nearness (*die nähernde Nähe*). Nearing nearness is the relation that, on the one hand, names Da-sein's co-relation to other beings in their presence and, on the other hand, also establishes for Da-sein's the threefold structure of "past", "present", and "future".

We can make sense of how this threefold structure (which is already unified in the nearing nearness) emerges for Da-sein in this way. The nearing nearness is the giving and opening up of the reciprocal relation which reaches out between Da-sein and the presencing of other entities that allows for: the dimension of future approaching (not-yet present), the what has been (no-longer present-absent), and present as presence. These three dimensions arrive bound together as a reciprocal relational unity to each other, but only in so far as all of them together are movements of the reaching out that is established in the open relation as "nearness". But how are we to understand nearness and its relation to time? By means of a preview I'll offer a short summation before going into greater detail.

Nearness (*die Nähe*), is the name for Dasein's *relation* to the presencing entity and how "time" first emerges.¹³⁵ So how does proper time and its three dimensions emerge from this relation? First, we must recall that these three dimensions are not distinct from the nearness, but movements within its relational interplay. And it is this interplay which helps us understand each of the three movements, as the three 'temporal' dimensions, and how they

¹³⁵ In his notes on *die Nähe*, Heidegger will almost always place "time" and the three "temporal" dimensions in scare-quotes. This further emphasizes the aspect that it is the relation of nearness which comprises the proper essence of time (GA 73.2: 1033; 1233).

comprise the unity of nearness. The immediate presencing of the entity in the open expanse counter to us names what we call the “present”. Heidegger will play on the German word ‘present’ (*Gegenwart*) by hyphenating the word *gegen-*, emphasizing how an entity presences counter (*gegen*) to us in the open-region (*die Gegend*). Heidegger describes the ‘present’ as presence, as presence-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*), and as the here-now (GA 73.2: 908). And it is from presence as ‘the present’ that we can experience actual “time” – as nearness and interplay of the three dimensions. While there is no particular priority, we can name ‘the present’ as the first dimension because it brings into relief the presence of the entity before us and marks its nearness to us. The second dimension we can name ‘the future’. The ‘future’ is the approaching, coming, presence. It is presence as arriving, but not yet ‘present’, presencing, or relating with us. Perhaps the most difficult interplay to understand is the ‘past’. The ‘past’ is the no-longer-presencing, or the lack of presencing of an entity or entities. Although we can and do experience a thin presence when we are thinking (*Denken*) or remembering (*An-denken*) the entity. We commemorate the presence of an entity by allowing it to presence with us in thought, even if it is no longer or not-yet counter to us. And this is also how we can see how the dimensions are at play with each other. I can thoughtfully recollect the presence of an entity as I mindfully attend its arrival. The dimensions of ‘past’ and ‘future’ are at play with each other even as they also relate to presence (‘the present’) by means of a lack. But each of these three dimensions are merely the three unified modes of nearness. Heidegger writes: nearness – the gathering of “times” (GA 73.2: 1233). And it is the nearness, and its three dimensions, which names for Heidegger *proper time*. I turn next to a more in depth discussion of exactly how past, present, and future emerge from the nearness as the fourfold extending of the open which is proper time.

B. PROPER TIME AS THE FOURFOLD EXTENDING OF THE OPEN

We must remember that for Heidegger, the essential core of time is established from what he calls the “nearing nearness”. And it is from within this experience of nearness, the relational nearness established between beings in their presenting, that the interplay of the three temporal dimensions – past, present, and future – emerges. How? First, Da-sein’s recognition of the presence of the other being sets Da-sein into a relation with that being. This co-relational space is characterized, first and foremost, by Da-sein’s nearness to the presence of the other entity. This nearness is the first and most essential of the four dimensions of time and it is also from out of which the other three dimensions emerge.

In this way nearness serves as both the unifying source of the other three dimensions of time and also “where” the interplay between each occurs. Heidegger writes: “the unity of time’s three dimensions consists in the interplay of each toward each. This interplay proves to be the true extending, playing in the very heart of time, the fourth dimension so to speak – not only so to speak, but in the nature of the matter (GA 14: 20/15). What’s important to keep in mind is that the temporal structure of each of the three timely dimensions of past, present, and future all are unified within the experience of the dimension of nearness.

Second, the three timely dimensions each achieve their determination from their interplay with each other. Another way to say this is that the past and future only make sense as they relate to the present, just as the present stands in contradistinction to how it relates to something either no longer present in the past, or something not yet present in what we name the future. Each of the three timely dimensions names once aspect of Da-sein’s own self-relation to the nearness of the encountered entity and are, in fact, dependent upon Da-sein’s recognition of the nearness of that being’s presence. We can understand this relation

of presence perhaps more helpfully when we focus on the correlational present and how the interplay of the three dimensions emerges from them.

When the entity presents with me, when we enter and establish a mutual relation of giving and sending of presence, from out of the experience of the event, then I say that the being is “present” to me. The presence of this other entity, and our mutual relation to each other, is how I first establish a recognition of our nearness to each other.

From this recognition and within this relational nearness, the timely dimension of the “present” is at play. I experience the presence of the other entity, name it as a being from out of the time-space of the event of being, and understand something about myself, being, and the other entity in this correlational structure. Yet, if the sending of the other entity’s presence is denied to me, if its presence is no longer present in its nearness to me, then the timely dimension of the “having-been” is at play. The presence of the other entity is marked as a lack of presence, a presence which is not available. The structure of the past, for Heidegger, is the denial of the giving presence and the recognition that my nearness to the other entity is not available. But I can only recognize this “having-been”, this denial of presence, on the basis of having experienced a correlational nearness with the other entity.

Likewise, the interplay of the “future”, when we think of it from the register of presence, is the self-withdrawn and not-yet arrived presence of our encounter with the event of the presence of the other. The extending presence of the other entity has not yet arrived, it is held back, and Da-sein experiences an anticipation at its coming. Like the past, the future is an absence of presence, but with an expectation of arrival.

Each of the three timely dimensions is a recognition for Da-sein of the presence or non-presence of the nearness of another being. This interplay of presence and absence constitutes the dimensions of past (having-been), present (as presence), and future (not yet

presencing). Understood this way, Heidegger's later concept preserves many of the essential features of his early *Being and Time* understanding of timeliness, but with one critical difference. In *Being and Time*, the ecstatic structure of timeliness was entirely centered on Da-sein, Da-sein's projects and self-understanding. The subtle shift that occurs 35 years later in "Time and Being" is the recognition that it is the correlational presence of the other being that allows for the threefold interplay of timeliness to emerge for Da-sein. Further, the nearing nearness only emerges as a result of the sending and giving of being which is given (the *Es gibt*) from out of the event.

Heidegger's struggle to articulate the contours of the event, of the ways that Da-sein is appropriated by the event, yet, nevertheless bears witness to the emergence of being, occupied the better part of his thinking throughout the mid-1930s and 1940s. As I have argued throughout, Heidegger's late thinking of time in the 1962 lecture "Time and Being", as part and parcel of his understanding of what is given in the *Es gibt*, would not be fully understandable without also understanding the ways in which Heidegger's thinking of time since *Being and Time* both shifted and deepened.

I set out at the beginning to argue that Heidegger's later concept of time presents a non-transcendental and non-subjective understanding of time. Heidegger's late thinking of time as the four-dimensional structure that emerges for Da-sein from out of the experience of the *Es gibt* is non-transcendental, at least the way that Heidegger understands it as non-transcendent, because time, for Da-sein, is not something external to it and neither does it appear if we somehow shoot past the entity we encounter. Proper time is not our determination or reflection on the possibility of experience but is a result of Da-sein's singular encounters with entities in their being. Proper time emerges as the event of Da-sein's relationality to other beings in their presence, and in their absence. Proper time is

neither outside of, nor “beyond”, Da-sein in any way, although it is likewise not something immanent to it. Similarly, Da-sein’s experience of time is not something that originates in Da-sein’s imagination or consciousness. Da-sein requires the presence (or absence) of actual entities in order to experience the interplay of timeliness which emerges out of the nearness of its encounters with beings in their being (from out of the event). As Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes in the “Time and Being” lecture, the experience of time is simply what it means for human Da-sein to be the being that it is in *relation* to other beings.

There is, however, a lingering worry about whether or not Heidegger’s late concept of time doesn’t, nevertheless, hide some vestige of either transcendentalism or subjectivism.¹³⁶ We’ve ascertained that time is not something which exists, ontologically, on its own. It is neither a container somehow beyond Da-sein, nor is it the condition of possibility of Da-sein’s experience of other entities. Instead, time is the structure of Da-sein’s co-relationality with other entities in their presence (and absence). Yet, the simple question could easily be posed: would there be time if there were no human Da-sein? Is it simply the case that human Da-sein, via Heidegger, simply normatively asserts what time is and that time is a structure of Da-sein’s encounters with other beings in their being? Aren’t there beings, like mountains, trees, and even some animals which are “older” than Da-sein, even older than all human Da-sein? Isn’t there some lingering transcendental subjectivity in Heidegger’s thought by insisting that it is humans, and only humans, who can experience time as past, present, and future even if it is grounded from out of the encounter with the being of another being? To respond to this criticism, I will turn to one of Heidegger’s last, if not his last, reflections on

¹³⁶ Heidegger himself worried about the lingering possibility of transcendentalism as it relates to time and we can see some of his working out of that worry from his notes in *Zum Ereignis Denken* (GA 73.2: 934-939).

the relation between time, the human, and the experience of other entities experienced in the *Es gibt*.

III. FOR EACH THEIR TIME

Sometime between 1973 and 1975, a few years before his death in 1976, Heidegger penned a draft of an essay entitled “The Argument against Requirement (for the being in itself of beings)” [*Das Argument gegen den Brauch (für das Ansichsein des Seienden)*] as part of the larger project of an extended introduction to his *Gesamtausgabe*, under the heading: “The Legacy of the Question of Being” [*Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage*].¹³⁷ The text is significant because it responds to and answers a lingering concern about transcendental subjectivity in Heidegger’s understanding of time – namely, whether time depends on humans. The essay provides the last word, as far as we know, of Heidegger’s thoughts on time and the importance of the *Es gibt*.

The essay takes its impetus from a correspondence between Heidegger’s longtime friend and collaborator, the Swiss psychoanalyst Medard Boss, and the geologist Rudolf Trümpy.¹³⁸ Trümpy expresses his worry about the human measure of time in the following way: “For us geologists there can be no doubt about the reality of a very long history of the Earth before humans. This reality may in the end exist only thanks to the retrospective activity of the human mind – but then one would be somewhat frightened by its likeness to God” (HGJ, 103). Trümpy’s letter articulates a lingering concern about Heidegger’s concept of time: whether time is something “objective” and apart from

¹³⁷ Martin Heidegger, “Das Argument gegen den Brauch (für das Ansichsein des Seienden),” *Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft Jahresgabe 2013/2014* (Stuttgart: Offizin Scheufele Druck und Medien), 75. Hereafter abbreviated HGJ. The essay is currently being translated by Tobias Keiling and Ian Alexander Moore and will appear in a forthcoming special issue of the *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* (Vol. 20, 2021). I am grateful to each of them for the opportunity to cite from their translation, as well for our insightful discussions of it.

¹³⁸ There is some doubt as to the whether the author of the letter is Heidegger, or what appears more likely, Boss, who then passed the letter on to Heidegger (HGJ, 78).

the human, or whether time is “subjective” and contingent upon human thinking. Heidegger’s response is both dense and complex, and a detailed analysis of the essay is unfortunately outside the scope of my discussion here. Instead, Heidegger’s “Argument against Requirement” moves by means of a series of dialectical arguments that center around the question of whether and how we know that the Earth, or even specific beings-in-themselves, like the Alps, are older than humans. What is at stake in Heidegger’s essay is whether being and time are independent from or dependent on humans. It is my contention that the essay satisfies, certainly for Heidegger, the worry of a lingering transcendental subjectivity hiding in his later thought. I will try to very briefly summarize the main points of Heidegger’s argument as a closing response to this chapter.

Throughout the essay Heidegger places the burden of his argument on the notion of requirement (*Brauch*).¹³⁹ Heidegger, in his customary fashion, seems to have given ontological weight to the term in order to articulate the special relation between humans and being. Understanding and articulating this special relation was a large part of the motivation for Heidegger’s poetic works from the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s, as I discussed in the last chapter. However, by the early 1970s, Heidegger’s thinking (beginning in part with the analysis of Anaximander as I showed at the end of chapter two), had shifted subtly and importantly. Now, in the “Argument against Requirement”, Heidegger sets up two possible, opposing, positions: (A) things in themselves are older than humans and therefore being and time cannot be contingent on the human, and (B) the thinking of being, even in the being of things in themselves, presupposes and requires humans (Heidegger’s own position). The essay the “Argument against Requirement” is not simply an articulation of Heidegger’s own position as outlined above. The essay also nicely summarizes his

¹³⁹ The noun *Brauch* is extremely difficult to translate into English in a single word. While it can certainly mean ‘requirement’, as the translators rendered it for the most part throughout the essay, it also carries a valence of ‘custom’, ‘convention’, ‘usage’, and the stronger sense of a ‘need’ or ‘necessity’.

poetic thinking across the 1940s and 1950s and shows some of the subtle shifts in his thought from that time. Instead of moving through the main features of the argument as Heidegger does, I will instead summarize Heidegger's own position, what he calls (B), in the essay, and focus on Heidegger's discussions of time and time-space as they enter his argument.

Before continuing, I want to make one important observation about Heidegger's usage of the term *Brauch* as a technical term in his thought. While there is a single passing usage of the term as early as the 1929 book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (GA 3: 88/62), Heidegger's use of the term there is non-technical and inline with the everyday German sense of the word as 'custom'.

Heidegger's first in-depth thematization of the ontological character of *Brauch* does not occur until the 1942-1946 *The Verdict of Anaximander*, as I discussed at length in the last chapter. Here Heidegger uses it as the German translation of the Greek τὸ χρεών and develops its importance for his thought across several large sections of that book (c.f. GA 78: §§13, 17, 19, 26). Heidegger then continues to develop the term throughout the 1950s and 1960s. While the original 1962 version of "Time and Being" does not make use of the term, Heidegger inserts several important marginal in his final *Gesamtausgabe* edition of that essay (c.f. GA 14:20, 21, 28, 50).¹⁴⁰ My summary of the term will of necessity be cursory so as to focus on how *Brauch* relates to time, but it is clearly an important term for understanding Heidegger's later thought since the *Verdict of Anaximander* and is very obviously an important link between Heidegger's understanding of the relation between being and time.¹⁴¹

Recall that what is at stake for Heidegger in the discussion of requirement (*Brauch*) is whether or not beings in themselves (and by extension being in itself) are independent from humans or whether being and beings in themselves, mountains, the Earth, nature, are not in some way

¹⁴⁰ These marginal notes were not available to Stambaugh and thus do not appear in the English translation of "Time and Being".

¹⁴¹ *Brauch* may even be how Heidegger understands the 'and' in "Time and Being", but that would have to be argued elsewhere.

dependent upon the essence of the human as that entity which articulates being. It is here that I would like to introduce, for convenience, two ways of thinking about the relation between requirement (*Branch*) and dependence and independence which is at stake here. The *ontic* argument (what Heidegger calls arguer A in the essay) runs: there are scientifically provable things which are older than and exist independently of humans. These beings in themselves are demonstrably independent of the human mind and our perceptions of them, even if we may epistemically make assumptions about them. Given the existence of beings in themselves, from them, we can speak of being in itself as something independent from the human. From Heidegger's standpoint this has been the customary way we have discussed being for most of human history and the way that science, specifically, understands the nature of being and beings in themselves (HGJ, 57-58).¹⁴²

Heidegger, somewhat surprisingly, in no way denies the correctness of this argument, and at several points in the essay emphatically maintains that it is just obvious and undeniable that beings would exist on an Earth without humans. Heidegger summarizes this position in the following way:

Beings in themselves, nature, the Earth, are not causally conditioned by whether or not beings of the sort 'human' appear. No one contests the independence of nature where depending means causal dependence on the human. But the question arises as to whether this non-dependence already makes up the being in itself of beings in themselves, whether such being in itself does not rather depend on the human being, whether this dependence does not remain the presupposition and condition for that causal independence in which, for example, the Earth can be a being without the human (HGJ, 67).

So far, it would seem as if Heidegger's own *ontological* position is not at odds with the customary scientific *ontic* position of (A). Beings (*Seiende*) do not require humans for their existence. For Heidegger, this is not the point. Instead, the *ontological* argument (his own position (B) in the essay), wants to ask the question of what being in itself means and whether any interpretation of being or being in itself can be independent of our human understanding of being. For Heidegger this is no

¹⁴² Heidegger's characterization of position (A) in this way sits very comfortably alongside contemporary (mostly Analytic) philosophical notions of scientific realism.

mere mental or categorical exercise. Heidegger thinks that human mental representation, and our very ability to categorize, is possible precisely because the essence of the human is our ability to articulate being from out of the experience of the open relation to the presencing of other beings in their presence. In a long passage which would seem scarcely comprehensible without understanding the terminological developments in Heidegger's thought, he writes:

Being in itself is dependent on the human being insofar as being always already shelters within itself the clearing of essencing, which clearing is safeguarded by the human essence, but this in such a way that this human essence itself belongs to the essence of **being**, from which that being in itself comes forth.

Presencing is in itself time-bound according to a still unclarified essence of time. Presencing forth [*An-wesen*] is an arrival [*An-kommen*] in unconcealment, for which reason essence is presumably the same as the time we mean now. Time and unconcealment prevail [*walten*] in the presence of being as such. Arrival from a to-come and unconcealment require in themselves an openness; the human is that essence which is required for the sheltering [*Wahrnis*] of openness. The human is authentically itself as the one so required.

Referring to this requirement does not humanize being, but rather directs the human into its essence and this essence into the belongingness to **being**.
(HGJ, 68 trans. mod.).¹⁴³

There is a great deal to unpack here, but I believe that this passage represents the most succinct description of Heidegger's own thought in the essay. First, it is immediately apparent from Heidegger's language here that he is referencing back to some of the technical terms developed from out of *The Event* and *The Verdict of Anaximander*. The structure of essencing forth (*An-wesen*), arrival (*An-kommen*), and the sheltering of openness (*Wahrnis der Offenheit*) were part of the central themes of those two texts. Second, I would like to focus on two aspects from the above citation that I think

¹⁴³ „Anwesen ist in sich zeithaft gemäß einem noch unaufgehellten Wesen von Zeit. An-wesen ist An-kommen in der Unverborgenheit, darum Wesen vermutlich das Selbe ist wie die jetzt gemeinte Zeit. Zeit und Unverborgenheit walten im Wesen des Seins als solchen. Ankunft aus einem Zu-kommen und Unverborgenheit brauchen in sich eine Offenheit; das zur Wahrnis der Offenheit gebrauchte Wesen ist der Mensch. Er ist eigentlich Mensch als dieser Gebrauchte.“

very nicely weave together the concept of time in those texts (as I discussed them in the last chapter) with the analysis of the “Time and Being” from this one.

I will analyze the two points together by looking at Heidegger’s enigmatic reference to time in the citation alongside unpacking Heidegger’s use of ~~being~~ in contrasted to ‘being’. Just as in “Time and Being”, unconcealment, being, and time emerge as relational structures between human Da-sein and the entity that arrives. Heidegger’s insertion of a dash on the prefix *An-* in both *An-kommen* (arrival) and *An-wesen* (essencing forth) emphasizes the movement and relational aspects of each term (the same can also be said for *Zu-kommen*). Moreover, Heidegger’s unusual declaration in the passage that “essence is presumably the same as the time we mean now [*darum Wesen vermutlich das Selbe ist wie die jetzt gemeinte Zeit*]”, just before stating that, “[t]ime and unconcealment prevail [*walten*] in the presence of being as such”, harken back to the point made in “Time and Being” that time only emerges or obtains from out of the experience of being in unconcealment.¹⁴⁴ Heidegger had not expressly articulated in “Time and Being” that the articulation of being (*Sein*) is what necessitates or requires the human, but it is evident in that essay that this is nevertheless the relation Heidegger had in mind.

What is different in the “Argument against Requirement” essay is the distinction between being and ~~being~~. Being, as we have seen, is the human articulation of the encounter with the presence of other entities. So what then is ~~being~~?¹⁴⁵ Heidegger’s placing of the term “being” under

¹⁴⁴ The verb Heidegger uses in the above passage for the relation of time and unconcealment is *walten*, “prevail”. The verb has a much stronger juridical sense, however, and can mean something like “to obtain”, “be in force”, “be customary”. Heidegger first analyzes the way that *walten* relates to emergence and time in *Der Spruch der Anaximander* (c.f. GA 78: 196, 221, 237). For a recent interpretation of the importance of this term for Heidegger, see Ziarek, Krzysztof. “The Nonviolent ‘Enjunction’ of Being: Heidegger on *Ge-walt*.” *CR: The New Centennial Review* 14, no. 2 (2014): 65-78.

¹⁴⁵ Heidegger first begins to cross out the word “being” in a 1955 essay, “On the Question of Being” [*Zur Seinsfrage*] (GA 9: 384-426/291-322) written in response to Ernst Jünger’s contribution to a *Festschrift* dedicated to Heidegger entitled “Across the Line” [*Über die Linie*]. An adequate discussion of Heidegger’s placing the word “being” under erasure is, however, vastly outside the scope of my project here. See also GA 73.2: 937.

erasure is intended to signify that *being* is not exhausted by our human representations of it, nor is it a thing in itself, standing off somewhere on its own (GA 9: 411/310). Instead, *being* is intended to mark the sites that call to us, the human, and the things among which we belong. Heidegger writes that the crossing-out of being using a chiasm (χ) points: “toward the four regions of the fourfold [earth, sky, divinities, mortals] and their gathering in the place of this crossing through” (GA 9: 410-411/310-311). And that point in which they pass through is the world, in its totality. As Andrew Mitchell has written: “*being* is pronounced ‘world’”.¹⁴⁶ Heidegger is wanting to recognize that when we humans bear witness to a moment of unconcealment, we name it being and in so doing temporalize it, we do not exhaust the source of that beingness of beings – the world in its totality of things (the earth, divinities, the sky, and we mortals). Being may be a representation, but only as a marker for the event. In a thought experiment designed to think through the problem of which came first, being in itself or the “oldest” beings in themselves, like the Earth, Heidegger writes:

How would we come to the oldest beings in themselves if something like being in itself did not already exist previously—previously, not only within the backward chronological order of the old, older, and oldest beings in themselves, but “*previously*” as before this chronological order as such? This latter “previously” [*zuvor*] belongs to the inception of earliness [*Frühe*], which we must learn to think of as time, *in* which the beings in themselves of the cosmos and the Earth exist, and first grants time-space to ordinary time. What grants this is the event itself. The turning of the human being into the event is the turning back into its essential provenance, in which humans have always already been, without as yet having expressly inhabited it (HGJ, 64 trans. mod.).

Heidegger’s point here is that our very temporal determinations as such, our ordinary sense of time, or the understanding of “old”, “older”, and “oldest”, are predicated upon the human experience of the event which is only possible through our human co-relation with other beings in themselves, the Earth, the Alps, and all the things of the fourfold. Heidegger asks us to think time here in its more

¹⁴⁶ Mitchell, Andrew J. *The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2015. 316.

four dimensional structure in which the beings in themselves of the cosmos and the Earth are by use of the archaic German *die Frühe*. The sense of this noun is difficult to directly capture in English, in part because we hear too much of the adjective in “the earliness”. Instead, *die Frühe* evokes a sense of the dawn, of an incipience, and *tempus antelucanum* as the origin of time.¹⁴⁷

Beings in themselves, for Heidegger, do not so much as live *in* time, rather it is beings in themselves, and our human encounter with them, which originate time for us. We should no longer think of “earlier” or “before” or “past”, “present”, or “future” as anything other than our human encounter and co-relation with all of the things of the world. Time, like being, is the articulation of the meaning we give our human experience of beings. As Heidegger himself recognized, this necessitates: “a departure from history in the sense it has had up to now; in no way does this amount to a denial of what [history] has transmitted [*Überlieferung*]; rather it signifies its transformation” (HGJ, 64).

In my Conclusion, I turn to some of the implications for what this transformation might look like, what it would mean to think of history as the passed on transmissions between humans about their many singular encounters with other beings; and also what Heidegger’s later thinking of time might mean for our human practices of science, particularly in its most abstract and “distant” forms like quantum mechanics; and finally how we might (in the words from the “Time and Being” seminar) “step-back” and re-evaluate how we think of nature and our relation to the Earth and all the beings on it.

¹⁴⁷ *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, ed. Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm. Volume 4. (Leipzig: 1854-1961, 1971). s.v. „Frühe, f.“

Conclusion

So come! That we may look at open spaces,
That we seek what is our own, 'though it be far.
One thing stands fast; it is noon, or nearly
Midnight, always there is a measure,
Common to all, yet to each his own is given,
All must come and go wherever he can.

Freidrich Hölderlin, *Bread and Wine*, 3 Strophe, v. 41-46

I. Heidegger's Paths through Time

If Heidegger is right that “[e]very thinker thinks only one thought,” then Heidegger’s singular thinking of being has always also been accompanied by a thinking of time (GA 8: 53/50). As Heidegger had stated to his students in 1926, time is *the* determination of being itself. Yet, just as Heidegger’s thinking of being went through modifications and transformations across his career, so too did his thinking of time. These *Holzwege*,¹⁴⁸ or forest paths, as Heidegger referred to them, nevertheless illuminate a deep and profound thinking about the structure and essence of time. In a note from his later period, Heidegger writes: “‘Time’ *Holzweg*. Albeit pre-conceived as ecstatic timeliness [*Zeitlichkeit*] and thus introduced with a view to the clearing of the there -although afterwards §44 *Ἀλήθεια* – the theme of time as time-space also remains confusing – it misses [*sie versagt*] the simpler path: Letting-be [*Lassen*]. Hence the reconsideration of time and being from being and time and a return back to the unthought.”(GA 73.2: 1278).

¹⁴⁸ While the term *Holzweg* straightforwardly translates as a forest or logging-path, idiomatically it means something more like ‘to be on the wrong track’ or ‘to bark up the wrong tree’. For Heidegger, these *Holzwege* may have been ‘wrong paths’, but they nevertheless illuminate something about the forest as such.

In many ways, Heidegger's statement is a summary of the paths that his thinking of time took across his career, from his early period thinking of time as Dasein's ecstatic timeliness (and temporality), to his middle-period articulations of time-space as both the structural site for Dasein's leap into the groundless ground of the abyss and also the "moment" of Dasein's decision about the truth of being. Heidegger's above comment about the simpler path of *Lassen* is a reference to his later period approach where he conceives of Dasein's coming to know the unity of being and time through the allowing to presence of other entities in their encounter. Heidegger's comment about a return back to the unthought illuminates the relative simplicity of the thought exercise at work in "Time and Being", especially when compared to the often-difficult material of Heidegger's middle-period.

Similarly, Heidegger's paths through time take on a different center from his early to his middle to his later period. In the early period of the 1920s, Heidegger's interpretation of timeliness is centered on Dasein. Dasein's concern for its own existence projects its timeliness in terms of a unitary horizon of its own finite possibilities. The primary orientation of time - as timeliness - is towards the 'future' that Dasein is running ahead towards (including the anticipation of its own death). And Dasein's existing alongside others and the recognition of present possibilities marks the 'present', while the 'past' is Dasein's relation to what is has-been.

Dasein relate these possibilities and their making present (*Gegenwärtigen*) to each other by reference to ready-to-hand things like the sun, moon, the seasons, or, in the most extreme, the clock. When I say that our meeting will be this afternoon, I relate myself in the 'present' by means of the sun's relative position to each of us in terms of our shared work world in such away that we can each orient ourselves towards making the possibility of our meeting present. Our shared orientation allows us to fuse the horizons of our possibility to make manifest a possibility. By appealing to a clock or other chronometer, I place myself in relative position to an endless succession of present

nows to measure where I, or some other, is relative to those successions. The clock, and all chronology, is entirely distanced from me in terms of meaning and possibility except as a means of measuring succession. The clock, and everyday life, has (for the most part) alienated me from myself, my experience of timeliness as my own possibilities, and the timeliness of other entities even though the clock and chronology are ultimately derivative of these. Yet, for the early Heidegger, the primacy of timeliness as Dasein's authentic experience of time also held the sought after key for unlocking time in general, the time of being itself: temporality.

Heidegger had difficulty maintaining the Dasein centered interpretation of timeliness with the way that temporality was meant to understand the projection of being upon time. Temporality was intended, under the auspice of fundamental ontology, to provide the means for understanding being. But for Dasein to understand temporality, it needed to move 'beyond' the structure of its own timeliness, in its relation to other entities. This precipitated a shift in Heidegger's thinking about the mediation between Dasein and being, and Heidegger began to recast how Dasein understands being in terms of a captivation and a decision about the event of being. Heidegger's thinking of the event of being and time-space as the captivation and 'moment' of decision marks the transition to Heidegger's middle-period and the need for a new conception of time, one which both locates the site of decision with how Dasein becomes captivated by being: time-space.

In Chapter Two I traced the many twisting formulations of time-space across Heidegger's so-called poetic works, the private monographs of the 1940s and early 1940s. Throughout these works Heidegger continues to struggle to articulate the ontological difference and the primary means by which time is thought to provide a means of understanding this difference. Time-space emerges as the non-spatial and non-temporal site of the truth of being that captivates and transports Dasein to an encounter with that truth. Time-space in this way becomes the groundless ground, or the abyssal ground, for Dasein's encounter with being. Yet, in leaping into this groundless abyss in order to

experience the truth of being, Dasein is caught in an “in between”, that is, in fact, time-space itself. This “in between” both reveals the truth of being while simultaneously concealing it, thus imposing a demand upon Dasein: to ground this new (historical) truth of being. Dasein’s decision to inaugurate another truth of being transforms time-space into the site of Dasein’s grounding.

Throughout Heidegger’s middle-period, the central focus is on Dasein and Dasein’s relation to being as event. Heidegger certainly does not disregard the way in which Dasein’s encounter with other entities acts as a medium for Dasein to make its leap into time-space, but the central focus is on the event itself and the way that Dasein interacts with time-space within the event. Other beings are, in a sense, left behind, only to serve as conduits for Dasein’s understanding of the ontological difference. By the mid-1940s and the last of the poetic works, particularly the eponymous *The Event*, Heidegger begins to reorient his view once again and try and think not merely “from” the event, but to think “out” of the event as an inception of how beings arise from and are ultimately abandoned by being. Heidegger goes back to three pre-Socratic thinkers, Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, to try and uncover how it is that they conceived the relation between being and beings from out of the (first) beginning of Western metaphysics.

And it is from Anaximander’s fragment that Heidegger now interprets time as a mode of lingering and whiling (*Weilen*) in the open expanse that is cleared by time-space. Heidegger’s language of how beings are differentiated from being (by means of the archaic term *beyng*) is evocative and highly challenging. Beings arise from out of the event through a counter-turning within the event. This counter-turning yields a twisting-free that is the event itself which overcomes ontological differentiation. Yet, the twisting-free from out of this counter-turning also is simultaneously a dispensation and ordaining to the jointure of being with its there (*Da*). This jointure marks the beings intimate connection with being, it’s coming-forth from out of being, and into the clearing of its there in the open. But beings are finite, and so too is their allotment to

presence in the open. The finitude of this connection is thought in terms of a being's whiling, and it is here that Heidegger thinks time in its most radical sense. Time is the allotment of presence as the site of its jointure with being (i.e. itself).

Around the same time as he was writing *The Event*, Heidegger wrote (but never delivered) an entire lecture course dedicated to interpreting Anaximander's fragment as means of thinking the unity of time and being outside the inception of Western metaphysics and instead thought out of another inception: the event. Time-space in these writings from the mid-1940s is no longer the site of Dasein's appropriation and decision by the event, but instead the site of being's determination as a being in the open clearing of its there. While time-space itself, as a technical term, remains central throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Heidegger's interpretation of how its relations operate in the event shifted. By the 1950s, and culminating in the 1962 essay "Time and Being", Heidegger saw a simpler way: allowing beings to be in the giving of time and being. This giving (*Es gibt*) marks the co-relation between Dasein and beings (*Seiende*) such that the unity of being and time can emerge.

Chapter Three focused on Heidegger's later period conception of time as the 'It gives' (*Es gibt*) and the process by which Dasein relates to this giving through letting-be or allowing to presence (*wesen lassen*). By letting being's presence as themselves, without the projection of our representations about them, we make it possible for beings to show what is proper or authentic to it. This disclosure allows the being to presence in the open as itself, and it is in this disclosure that being is given to Dasein. But to achieve this allowing to presence, Dasein must actively both refuse its own projective prejudgements about the being and hold itself open to the being's presence. We have a process of approach (between Dasein and another entity), Dasein's withholding and refusal of its own representations, the co-relation between Dasein and the encounter with the present being as event, and from out of this the giving of being as presence. The structure is, in many ways, a relational version of the two different ways Heidegger had approached time-space and the event from his

middle period. It is also here that we see the manifold ways that time emerges in Heidegger's later period. The notion of time-space continues to operate, but now time-space is what opens-up from the presencing that is given from the entity before us in an open expanse and what makes possible the event. With the giving of being from out of the event also emerges what Heidegger now refers to as proper time (*eigentliche Zeit*), and why he thinks being and time are to be thought together.

Dasein experiences the whiling presence of the entity before it as a 'nearness', what Heidegger thinks of as the most essential dimension of time and which determines three other dimensions. The three other modes correspond to each other as a unity, although each is itself a distinct mode of presencing. Dasein calls the immediate relational presence of the other entity 'the present'. The lack of that entity's presence becomes the 'having-been', which Dasein names as 'the past'. Finally, the approach and coming arrival of the entity's presence is, for Dasein, 'the future'. Each of these dimensions are understood both as relations to each other, but ultimately because of the presence of the other entity. We see echoes and modifications of Heidegger's early concept of timeliness, but now thought through in terms of the presence of another entity and not through Dasein's own projects.

Heidegger's later concept of time is thus deeply relational. Dasein experiences time as a result of its encounters and experiences with presence of other entities. Dasein relates to this presence in terms of a nearness, a nearness whose relational structure Dasein thinks in terms of encountered presence, lack of presence, and an arrival to come.

II. Implications

Relational time has profound implications for both our understanding of the structure of time and for the way that time is used and understood within different contexts and fields of knowledge. These implications can be thought in terms of what implications Heidegger's concept of proper

relational time makes positively available as well as how Heidegger's concept of time is different from our everyday (particularly modern) conceptions of time. For considerations of space, I only gesture towards these broader implications in a truncated manner before giving what I see as a few fruitful sites of exploration that are opened-up by Heidegger's later concept of time.

1. Positive Implications

To say that Heidegger's later concept of time is relational is to say that we, human Dasein, experience time from our interactions with other entities. Relational time is understood as our nearness to the presence of an entity. But to be near an entity means that I must first respond to its address, be open to it, and allow it to disclose its presence to me. These are each, for me as a human Dasein, different moments and each of them is a choice and a response to the presence of that other. The other entity does not demand of me and even though our responses are mutually available, there is always something of each of us, necessarily, withheld. Seen in this way, like so much of Heidegger's concept of truth, relational time carries with it both an ethical involvement and a limit. The present as presence only discloses to me so much, both because I must cultivate an attitude of openness and self-restraint, but also because there is a limit on how much I can experience, understand, and say about the entity presencing with me. The same may be said too of both the past and the future (as movements within the interplay of nearness). Some aspects of the past, as the no-longer presencing, may never be brought to memory again; their presence, and even the transmission of their presence, utterly and entirely gone. The future may never arrive, an expected presence to come may never presence before me (and so become a "past"). Yet each of these marks a more intimate experience of time, of the past, the future, and perhaps even our present.

Heidegger's relational time also calls for us - and it is up to us to answer - to realize our own presence with the world around us, to be more (self-) aware and circumspect in our interactions, because it is not just us as individuals, or even us as humans, but every being in the world that makes up the matrix of our relations. Heidegger's later concept of time, like much of his later thought, is an invitation. An invitation to listen to the past in its own words, from its own grounds. An invitation to intimately and meaningfully relate with those presences around us – each other, our environment, our world. And an invitation to attend to those that are still arriving – with an attitude of restraint and allowing. Heidegger's later concept of time as relational is ultimately about how other beings are understood to us as meaningful – 'now' in their presence with us, 'before' in their lack of presence, and in a presence still to come.

We are distanced, already, from thinking about time in this way. In the next section I show just how different Heidegger's later concept of relation time is different from how we have come to think about time in our everyday lives. I then end with just a few of the possible sites of encounter where we might use Heidegger's concept of time to rethink our understanding of time and more meaningfully relate to the world we live in.

2. Negative Implications

In many ways it is easier to make sense of some aspects of Heidegger's relational concept of time by what it is *not* because of its differences from our everyday (modern) conceptions that so dominate our experience of time. One of the most salient and far-reaching implications for Heidegger's concept of relational time is that time has no ontological status of its own. Time is how Dasein interprets its experience of encounters with other beings. As Heidegger consistently reminded his audience in "Time and Being", time *is* not. This already has certain deep implications, especially for how we typically think of time.

Because relational time is not ontologically independent of Dasein, this means that time is not a container that we are all somehow within, nor is it a 'flow' with a singular direction across which identity persists, and changes do not occur "in" time. Time is not a universal, and is neither sequential, nor chronological (for Heidegger these are arithmetic calculations, not time). This raises potentially profound implications for how we conceive of the practice of history, as well as those sciences (like physics) that depend on time as a measurable universal.

Similarly, Heidegger's relational concept of time is not some sub-species of temporal presentism, i.e. that there is only the 'now'. Presentism relies on the 'now' as an external category whose existence *is* independent of Dasein. Likewise, time and temporal indexicals like 'past', 'present', or 'future' (or 'now') do not supervene on to human experience. For Heidegger, relational time is merely what it means to be human. Individual Dasein (and by collective agreement) constitute time.

As the "The Argument against Requirement (for the Being in Itself of Beings)" essay is intended to show us, thinking time without human Dasein is nonsensical. Certainly, there is the lingering question whether animals, plants, or mountains experience time, something the "Requirement" essay takes up. From Heidegger's standpoint we are unable to respond to this question because we are human Dasein, and not mountains, and so the question of how temporal experience is experienced by non-human entities will always be answered through human terms.

3. Explorations

Heidegger's late thinking of time is a thinking of co-relation. Time, properly thought, emerges as part of the story of Dasein's encounter with other entities. Proper time is different from our modern chronological time because it is the shared multiplicity of our encounters with other entities, and not merely the abstracted "objective" retelling of such happenings. Heidegger's view of time invites us

both to rethink how we conceive of so many things for which our standard conceptions of time are at the center. In closing this project, I would like to gesture to what I see as a few possible sites for exploration which emerge from Heidegger's later thinking of time.

1. A Departure from History

In a somewhat offhanded comment half way through the essay "The Argument against Requirement (for the Being in Itself of Beings)", Heidegger remarks: "[p]resumably, this turning-in [*Einkehr*] necessitates a departure from history in the sense it has had up to now; in no way does this amount to a denial of what it has transmitted [*Überlieferung*]; rather it signifies its transformation."

At the heart of Heidegger's later concept of time is the idea that time emerges from Dasein's relations to other entities. Time is the presence, or lack of presence, of other entities in their relation to Dasein. Because of the relational aspect of time, these means that we cannot speak of a singular "universal" time but must instead think time in its multiplicities – that is, in the many varied interactions of different Dasein with each other and other beings. Heidegger's later concept of time is not only non-linear, it is also non-chronological, in the standard sense of the term. Historical time, as we typically learn it in school, relies on a standardized conception of time as a linear homogenous unity and whose relations consist of 'before' and 'after', but not presence or lack of presence. Heidegger's notion of history would not be a history of sequences of events but instead the delivery and transmission (*Überlieferung*) of the meaning of Dasein's encounters. These transmissions are necessarily composite. We do not bear witness to the presence of every encounter we have in our lives. If the 'past', for Heidegger, is the recognition that something that a presence we encountered is no longer in front of us except in our thinking of it, then only those descriptions of presence which we retain can be thought of as 'historical'. It would seem strange then to think of historical 'progress' or 'development' in a Heideggerian sense, because history is not what develops, it is us

and our relations. We each may carry with us many lingering presences, overlapping “temporalities” that while in our individual and cultural memories and which affect our mode of life and our encounters. For Heidegger, history is no longer a site of happenings or occurrences (*Geschehen*), but the localities of sites of encounter.

Certainly, in recent years a few historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists have become increasingly skeptical of the modern historicist conception of a chronological historical time as a model for speaking of cultural memory. Instead, in recent decades, the practice of history has turned to alternative genealogies and plural temporalities (whether Queer, Materialist, Marxist, Feminist, Black, Border, Decolonial or other temporalities) which aim to more accurately capture the varying ways that we relate to the ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’. As one recent historian put it: “[t]hinking with ‘temporalities’ has helped historians to understand that ‘time’ cannot be considered as an object separate from human configurations, perceptions and measurements, as well as to emphasize that ‘time’ is always and everywhere a condition of life in the world, and therefore an essential category of historical analysis. Temporalities are to time what materialities are to matter”.¹⁴⁹ This fits comfortably with much of Heidegger’s thinking of time and it is perhaps unsurprising that Heidegger’s work, or those immediately influenced by Heidegger (Arendt, Gadamer, Koselleck, Hartog), are cited as sources for this different approach to thinking the practice of history.

But Heidegger’s later concept of time, with its focus on the relation of individual entities and the complex forms of interaction that occur in making present carry this approach a step further. For

¹⁴⁹ Champion, Matthew S. “The History of Temporalities: An Introduction”, *Past & Present*, Volume 243, Issue 1, May 2019, 247. The “Viewpoints” portion of this volume is itself dedicated to the topic of “Temporalities” and contains a number of excellent articles from historians on the development and role of temporalities in the practice of history. For a more comprehensive overview, see Tamm, Marek, & Laurent Olivier. *Rethinking Historical Time: New approaches to presentism*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. 2019.

Heidegger, a thinking of history is a thinking of transmissions, both memorial and in terms of cultural artifacts. These transmissions are highly contextual, down even to the individual, and a Heideggerian inflected approach to history would be far less interested in temporalities as representational categories (Materialist, Marxist, etc.) which might be interpreted as somehow separate from the individuals who constitute such “temporalities”. We can see this, to some extent, as a practice in some of Heidegger’s own philosophical genealogies (his analyses of “Greece” and “Hellenism”, of in the appendices to “The Age of the World Picture”). Part of the shaping of memorial history are the very representations we give from out of our encounters. But also, part of these histories are our relations with the beings which resist and counter our human representations, trees, mountains, plants, and animals.

2. The Mountain there, as itself (*diesen Berg dort, ihn als ihn*)

Heidegger asks his imagined audience towards the end of his undelivered lecture course on *The Anaximander Verdict* (Der Spruch des Anaximander) to consider our encounter (*begegnen*) with: “the beings [*das Seiende*] in their being [*in seinem Sein*], for example that forest-covered mountain slope over there, i.e. it itself, as it is nestled over there, and raises into the blue sky” (GA 78: 252) . Heidegger’s invitation for us to reflect on the forest covered mountain slope is a reflection on how we encounter other entities, how they reveal, if we let them, both their particular being and also shelter and show being (*Sein*) itself and how we encounter each other. When we encounter the forest-covered mountain, in what way can we say that the mountain opposes us? In what way does our presence counter or encounter the presence of the mountain? What, if any, should our mode of comportment be in this encounter?

Heidegger’s later philosophy, with its emphasis on the relations between entities, is asking us to extend how we think of response to each being, sentient and non-sentient, that exists, whether

person or mountain. In this way Heidegger can also be seen along similar lines to those of contemporary response or care ethics. Heidegger is wary, however, of any construal of the mountain or other encountered entities as “nature” or “natural”. For Heidegger, by reducing the being of the encountered entity to mere “nature” or “human” is to position it as a resource to be worked, a being whose reality consists in its ability to be placed into a function or use or defined through a category.

Heidegger’s later philosophy, as we saw in both the discussions from *The Anaximander Verdict* and “On Time and Being”, asks us to encounter each entity as unique in its own presence and to restrain ourselves from our tendency to overdetermine who or what something might be for who or what they actually are. But to know this we must in turn be open to the possibility of encounter, to open ourselves up and reign in our mode of representational thinking which seeks to position someone or something in a constellation of other values and worth, and instead let others presence. This is not to merely esteem another, but to maintain an attitude of consideration, of open regard, and solicitude. Doing so allows us to meaningfully be alongside others, humans and non, in a nexus of co-relationality that seeks to acknowledge and pay respect to each distinct abiding of beings. Maintaining this comportment of mutual regard and solicitude may just save us from the thinking of all things in terms of their use-value in what Heidegger saw as “an age of devastation”.

In March 2017, the Whanganui river in New Zealand was granted the same legal rights as a person. Gerrard Albert, the lead legal negotiator for the Whanganui iwi (tribe) said: “we consider the river an ancestor and always have. We have fought to find an approximation in law so that all others can understand that from our perspective treating the river as a living entity is the correct way to approach it, as in indivisible whole, instead of the traditional model...of treating it from a perspective of ownership and management”.¹⁵⁰ Two months later, in December 2019, Mount

¹⁵⁰ Roy, Eleanor Ainge, “New Zealand river granted same legal rights as human being,” *The Guardian*. London, UK, Mar. 17, 2017.

Taranaki in New Zealand was similarly granted “environmental personhood”, with guardianship of the mountain’s ecosystem shared between 8 Māori tribes and the government of New Zealand. The issue of “environmental personhood” has been steadily increasing in the last few years thanks to a growing awareness of the interdependency of human populations with their “natural” surroundings.

Heidegger’s later philosophy, with his invitation in the *Verdict of Anaximander* for us to “think with the mountain” and his careful insistence in “On Time and Being”, “The Argument against Requirement” (and so many of his later works) to be wary of the imposition of human thinking on other entities, and the insistence to be open to the way that other (non-human) entities presence, bares importantly on debates within “deep ecology” and environmental ethics.

Certainly, Heidegger’s early thought has been used a great deal by environmental theorists and philosophers over the past forty years, but it is only with the relatively recent publication of a great deal of Heidegger’s later thought that we are able to see how Heidegger’s thought can be further helpful to debates in environmental philosophy. Among the largest contemporary debates in environmental ethics are a) what relationship and value should humans have towards non-human entities and b) how do we prevent imposing anthropocentric values on non-human entities?

As we saw from the discussions of both the *Verdict of Anaximander*, “Time and Being”, and the “Argument against Requirement”, Heidegger’s later philosophy provides us with an ethics of relationality. Heidegger’s later thought both implicitly sees the intrinsic value and worth of other (non-human) entities, while advocating for a mode of comportment which opens us up to allowing entities to presence on their own terms (*wesen lassen*). Alongside contemporary notions of the land ethic and environmental holism, Heidegger’s later thought asks us to view our relations in their multiplicity, while calling for a form of guardianship of life.¹⁵¹ Finally, as we saw in the “Argument

¹⁵¹ Heidegger’s thought experiment to think like a mountain is a nice echo of a sentiment later expressed by American environmental conservationist Aldo Leopold’s in the essay “Thinking Like a Mountain” in *A Sand County Almanac*, calling for us to take a holistic view of entities stand in an

against Requirement”, Heidegger’s later thought responds to worries about anthropocentrism by acknowledging the centeredness of human thinking, while also insisting that we try to minimize the degree to which we, as humans, impose our representations on other entities. Critics of deep ecology have claimed that its call to change our human attitudes about non-humans is too vague, Heidegger’s discussion of *wesen lassen*, and the entire process of co-relation from “Time and Being”, show just how just such a mindset shift is possible.

3. Physics without Time & Quantum Relationalism

Heidegger had more than a passing interest in theoretical physics and in quantum mechanics. Heidegger first met Nobel physicist Werner Heisenberg and his assistant, noted German nuclear physicist Baron Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker at Todnauberg in 1935.¹⁵² This meeting inaugurated a life-long association and correspondence between Heidegger and the two theoretical physicists. The association was more than a passing academic acquaintanceship, however and the esteem and admiration seemed to go in both directions. Von Weizsäcker considered Heidegger to not only be Germany’s foremost philosopher, but also the most important philosopher of the 20th century and would meet with Heidegger, according to his own testimony, at least every other year and they would discuss physics and philosophy on long walks. Similarly, Heidegger was the only non-scientist to whom Heisenberg would frequently send copies of his essays.¹⁵³ Almost 20 years later, in 1953, Heidegger would organize a week long lecture series in Munich oriented around Heisenberg’s (now

ecosystem. Leopold, Aldo, and Charles Walsh. Schwartz. *A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. Leopold’s philosophical heir, J. Baird Callicott, extends Leopold’s argument further in *Thinking Like a Planet: The Land Ethic and the Earth Ethic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013.

¹⁵² Carson, Cathryn. *Heisenberg in the Atomic Age: Science and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 90. See also, Schäfer, Wolf. “Der „utopische“ Nationalsozialismus- Ein gemeinsamer Fluchtpunkt im Denken von Martin Heidegger und Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker?“ *Acta historica Leopoldina*, 2014, Issue 63, pp.503-524.

¹⁵³ Carson, *ibid.*

famous) “The Representation of Nature in Contemporary Physics” and Heidegger’s own “The Question Concerning Technology” and in 1959 Heisenberg would contribute an essay to a *festschrift* for Heidegger’s 70th birthday.¹⁵⁴

Despite this long association, and Heidegger’s deep interest in the topic, relatively little attention has been given to the positive aspects of Heidegger’s relation to quantum theory, with a few notable exceptions.¹⁵⁵ And much of the scholarly work has tended to focus on the relationship between Heidegger and Heisenberg (or Heidegger and von Weizsäcker), rather than on Heidegger and quantum theory itself and almost all of it on the side of philosophers, rather than physicists.¹⁵⁶

In something of a surprising turn, however, some contemporary physicists have turned to Heidegger as a theoretical source for the ontology of quantum mechanics. Foremost among these is the work of Italian physicist Carlo Rovelli and his interpretation of quantum mechanics as relational. Relational quantum mechanics denies both the ontological existence of time except as a form of human measurement and the possibility of an observer-independent states in a physical system (both of which are already very unusual in physics). Instead, relational quantum mechanics interprets all

¹⁵⁴ Heisenberg, Werner, „Grundlegende Voraussetzungen in der Physik der Elementarteilchen,“ in *Martin Heidegger zum Siebzigsten Geburtstag. Festschrift*, ed. Günther Neske. Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske. 1959. 291–297. As testament to the length of their acquaintanceship, Heisenberg would also send a letter to Heidegger in recognition of his 80th birthday. See Heisenberg, Werner, „Brief an Martin Heidegger zum 80 Geburtstag,“ in *Dem Andenken Martin Heideggers. Zum 26. Mai 1976*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann. 44–45.

¹⁵⁵ Of particular interest are: Hempel, Hans-Peter. *Natur und Geschichte. Der Jahrhundertdialog zwischen Heidegger und Heisenberg*. Frankfurt: Hain. 1990 and Glazebrook, Trish. *Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science*. New York: Fordham University Press. 2000 and (ed.) *Heidegger on Science*. Albany: State University of New York Press. 2012.

¹⁵⁶ To be sure, much of the difficulty of establishing such a conversation is in bringing two very dense and challenging conceptual vocabularies into discussion with one another. A noted exemplar is the work of Patrick A. Heelan, S.J., who held doctorates in both philosophy and theoretical physics and studied with both Schrödinger and Heisenberg. He is one of the relative few to bring into view the philosophical implications of quantum theory with Heidegger’s philosophical thought. For a nice analysis of some of Heisenberg’s writing alongside Heidegger, see: Chevalley, Catherine. “Heidegger and the Physical Sciences,” in *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Vol. IV: Reverberations*. Ed. Christopher Macann. New York: Routledge. 1992. 342-364.

quantum variables as the relational interaction between two physical systems (which Rovelli argues was already at the heart of Heisenberg's interpretation).¹⁵⁷ For Rovelli and the interpretation of relational quantum mechanics (often referred to as RQM in the literature), humans can only explain the physical world on the basis of our relational interactions and these interactions are, in fact, how we measure changes in variables in interacting physical systems. Physicist Quentin Ruyant has described RQM as: "RQM can be primarily characterized as being committed to an ontology of 'observers', measurement interactions and relative events...".¹⁵⁸ In spite of the philosophical overlap with Heidegger's own thinking about time, Rovelli and other RQM theorists seem unfamiliar with Heidegger's later work (most references are to *Being and Time*), even though Heidegger's descriptions in "Time and Being" of how we relationally interact with other entities, and how time emerges as a result of this interaction, are so remarkably pertinent to the RQM interpretation of quantum mechanics. If there is a site of fruitful dialogue and exploration between Heidegger's later philosophy and contemporary physics (despite Heidegger's many criticisms of science and modern physics), the relational quantum mechanics interpretation seems the most promising and beneficial.

Each of these three areas of exploration are sites which seem to naturally emerge from Heidegger's conception of relational time. Certainly there is still much to be thought, within Heidegger's own works, about our representations of history, the environment, physics and the sciences, as well as the status of representation and imagination itself within Heidegger's later thought. But these three areas are ones which strike me as immediately sites of possible encounter, both outside Heidegger studies narrowly, and philosophy more broadly. Heidegger's later concept of

¹⁵⁷ Rovelli, Carlo. "Space Is Blue and Birds Fly through It?" *ArXiv.org* 376, No. 2123, 2018. Page 2. For Rovelli's major references to Heidegger, see Rovelli, Carlo. *The Order of Time*. Trans. Erica Segre and Simon Carnell. New York: Riverhead Books, 2018.

¹⁵⁸ Ruyant, Quentin. "Can We Make Sense of Relational Quantum Mechanics?". *Foundations of Physics* 48, 440–455 (2018).

proper relational time not only calls us to radically reinterpret the ways we collectively as humans reckon with the long shadow of the metaphysics of time, but also to each individually take ownership of what time actually is – our authentic encounters and relations with others.

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