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The Habit of Freedom: A Discussion of Identity and Being

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Abstract

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This thesis utilizes a phenomenological methodology to examine the relationship between the freedom inherent in being a subject and the structure of habit, as the implicit passing forth of one's identity. The work questions whether habits signify permanent constraints upon a subject's inherent freedom. This thesis is organized into four chapters. The first chapter focuses upon the radical differences in being exhibited by a subject and an object. The second chapter examines the phenomenon of bad faith as a position a subject may take towards his or her being, in the form of an evasion. The third chapter focuses upon the subject's first experience of his or her being, as well as how this experience may act as dispositional towards the adoption of bad faith. The fourth and final section gives an account of the subject as an embodied conscious and considers the relation between habit and freedom.

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The Habit of Freedom: A Discussion of Identity and Being

Introduction

Several experiences initiated my interest in writing this thesis. The first experience occurred at the end of my junior year at Emory College, when I embarrassingly misinterpreted Heidegger's concept of "schuldig-sein" as a self-conscious reflection on one's own action and a judgment that these actions did not meet a self-imposed standard. I became interested in how one's consciousness could recognize a distinction between one's actions and one's conception of oneself. This misinterpretation of Heidegger led me to consider how a subject's being was defined – for in examining guilt it appeared strange that one could confront oneself. Initially, I began talking with friends who at some time had experienced a great deal of guilt about one of their actions. Some of these friends who now identify themselves as gay described considerable guilt and self-denial prior to acting upon their sexual desires. These friends claimed to have introspectively come into conflict with themselves as gay, stating that their sexual desires initially conflicted with their conceptions of themselves. It was not their guilt prior to embracing their homosexuality that surprised me as much as the alteration that occurred after they did. All of these friends stated that after they embraced this aspect of themselves, the guilt vanished. I became intrigued as to how a subject's identity could sustain such an alteration.

Shortly thereafter I began working at a DUI and Drug treatment court in Canton, Georgia. Throughout my employment there I spoke with numerous individuals undergoing treatment. These individuals' ability to change was incredible; in some cases the individuals I spoke with were entirely different than they had been several years prior. The vast majority considered their drug and/or alcohol addictions to be a thing of the past. Yet I also witnessed several instances of relapse. In these instances of relapse, I noticed that the majority of those who relapsed found themselves in situations in which alcohol and/or drug use appeared to them as a possibility, and their past experiences with these substances influenced their use of them again. These two experiences served as the starting point for this thesis.

In this thesis I examine the relation between the subject's identity and his or her freedom, and I consider the role that habits play in this relation. In particular, I ask whether habits place permanent constraints upon the subject. In order to investigate this question more fully I have dedicated a considerable amount of time to Jean-Paul Sartre's description of the phenomenon of bad faith, the developmental stage of childhood as discussed by Simone De Beauvoir and John Russon and to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the body. I believe that the combination of these writers provides a very developed picture of the relation between a subject's freedom, his or her identity, and habit. For the investigation into these topics I have primarily utilized a phenomenological methodology. I have chosen to do so for two reasons. First, I believe the phenomenological tradition's conception of habit is rich and extremely relevant to the question of identity. Second, I think that the phenomenology provides access to these questions beyond

what other traditions can offer by seeking to overcome the traditional distinction between mind and body.

This thesis is arranged in four chapters. The first chapter "Being-as-Subject distinguished from Being-as-Object" focuses upon the radical differences in the being of a subject and the being of an object. The second chapter "The Phenomenon of Bad Faith" investigates a position that a subject may take towards his or her being, specifically a position of evasion. The third chapter "Childhood" focuses upon the subject's first experiences of his or her being, as well as how these experiences may dispose a subject towards the adoption of bad faith. The fourth and final chapter "Habit" focuses both upon the role of habit in the carrying forth one's identity and of habit's role in adopting the position of bad faith.

Chapter one begins by investigating an everyday experience in order to reveal that perception is an accomplishment of consciousness. We will determine that the being of a subject is radically different than that of an object inasmuch as the being of a subject is inherently free and lacks absolute definition. We will then discuss Sartre's account of anguish (Specifically his Precipice example) in order to discover an instance in which a subject's freedom becomes a problem for him or her. In this example we will see the subject's desire to be as an object is meant to insure him against the possibility of throwing himself over the precipice.

In chapter two will move on to Sartre's description of the phenomenon of bad faith in order to better understand this aversion to freedom, and how a subject may attempt to evade this freedom. In investigating the structures of bad faith, we will come to understand bad faith as akin to a lie to oneself. We will then examine the phenomenon of bad faith in terms of three questions: What is this lie about? Why do we lie to ourselves? How can one lie to oneself? We will discover that the lie of bad faith is that a subject's being is absolutely definite, that the subject's being is akin to that of an object's being. We will also discover that the impetus behind the lie to oneself is due to the discomfort that the freedom inherent in a subject's being may bring in relation to the subject's apprehension of him or herself in relation to the non-being of the future. We will discover that although bad faith appears as a solution to this discomfort, bad faith is always doomed to failure.

To better understand why a subject adopts a position of bad faith, we will move away from Sartre's description of adult experience and focus on the subject's experience of childhood in doing so we will learn that subjects first exist in a euphoric mode wherein their freedom is concealed from themselves. We will discover that due to this experience of one's freedom as concealed, that a subject may have a disposition towards the adoption of bad faith.

Finally we will focus on the structure of habit in order to understand how the lie to oneself of bad faith may be lived. In order to understand the structure of habit more adequately we will investigate a familiar example of habit: walking. Through our investigation of walking we will come to understand the implicit experience of our own bodies. We will discover that the subject does not exist in the form of a dichotomy of mind/body but rather exists as an embodied conscious. We will learn that the subject, as an embodied conscious, perceives his or her world

in terms of the “I can.” Delving deeper into the structure of the “I can” we will discover that a subject’s experience appears in terms of possibilities, which reflect both the freedom of the subject and the habituated condition of the subject insofar as the subject’s habits effect which possibilities appear to the subject as possibilities. We will then be able to discuss habit more fully, displaying that while habits exert a strong influence on the subject’s experience of a world, habits do not alter the condition of the subject as free

We will then discover that the lie of bad faith may be made implicit through habit and recognize that a subject’s freedom grants the possibility of bad faith as a possibility. We will conclude that in order to eradicate one’s bad faith, subjects must recognize their active role in the crafting of their habits. They must both recognize the effect that their habits have upon their perception of a world.

I hope you enjoy my thesis,

Chapter I: Investigation into the structures of being-as-object and being-as-subject

[1.1 Description of an Object]

In order to investigate the being of a subject, let us begin, as many other phenomenological essays begin, with a rigorous description of an everyday experience. From this description we will be able to recognize not only the structure of experience itself, but also the radical distinction between the existence of a subject and the existence of an object. For the sake of simplicity let us focus on the experience of a culturally familiar object, an aluminum can.

Imagine yourself sitting on a plush chair viewing an aluminum can of Coca-Cola set upright upon a wooden table. How does the can appear to you? First, the can will appear as having limits. These limits serve to distinguish, the can from the table it is set upon. Furthermore, the can appears differently than the table it is set upon. The can appears as a figure while the table appears as the ground. Yet is the table all the can is distinguished from? Does the can not also appear as distinguished from the other objects surrounding it? The can as figure relies upon a background, a background that synthesizes all other things so as to implicitly provide the foundation for the appearance of the figure.

This figure-background structure, phenomenologists argue, is a cornerstone of perception. As a structure, it exhibits flexibility insofar as the subject determines what specifically becomes figure while the rest becomes background (Merleau-Ponty, 4). For if one chooses to focus their attention upon the curvature of the first “C” in “Coca-Cola” then this “C” assumes the role of figure and the can joins the synthesis of other objects as background. The flexibility of this structure allows for any thing or feature, whether it is the “C”, the pull-tab

present atop the can, or even a grain of the wooden table, to assume the role of figure so long as the subject chooses to focus upon it. All objects and the features of these objects are capable of this interchange.

However, our perception of the can is not merely limited to the appearance of the can as figure; rather, the ground of one's experience extends beyond what is actually present. For our perception of the can does not occur as an independent moment, meaning that when we perceive the can we do not lose our sense of a world. The experience of the can does not limit itself to merely existing; rather it is experienced as a part of a larger world. This world is not limited merely to the experience of a present background; to describe it as a specific location would do it injustice; rather as the term "world" signifies what should be understood as an approximate sort of location – a "horizon." In his work Don Ihde described horizons in the following way: "Horizons belong to the boundaries of the experienced environmental field. Like the 'edges' of the visual field, they situate what is explicitly present, while the phenomena itself, horizons recede" (Ihde, 114).

Horizons essentially always point to other horizons. This pointing allows for a smooth transition between horizons. When inside of a classroom horizon, the classroom's horizon implicitly (in that it is not presently being perceived within perception) includes the hallway beyond. This continuity between horizons is an essential characteristic of perception. Without this continuity a subject would find him or herself continually surprised with every change of location or would not acknowledge the difference between locations. That a subject can be surprised is indicative that a subject has horizons that serve to aid in the transition from one location to another.

Delving deeper into the description of the can, one will notice that in perceiving the can one is not presented with the can in its entirety. Rather, one is presented a side of the can. No matter whether the subject chooses to change his or her point of view by moving around the can, the can's appearance will inherently remain sided. This sided nature of perception does not stop the subject from imagining or expecting the other sides of the object; instead, the sided nature of perception announces this potential beyond what is immediately seen. This sided nature inherent in the appearance of objects of perception contributes to the "multiplicity" of appearances in which the object appears as an object (Husserl, *Ideas*, 130-131). One's perception always presents these sides or "adumbrations" as contributing to this multiplicity through which one object appears; the adumbrations are implicitly synthesized and drawn into the multiplicity of the one object – serving the very basic purpose of identifying an object as an object. For something to appear in adumbrations is essentially the appearance announcing its object-ness.

While an object is certainly definite in the sense that it carries a particular set of qualities and attributes that it concretely carries with it so long as it remains that object, it remains that what is immediately seen (in this case the can) announces further potential. This potential is necessary in order for exploration; this is significant in that the structure of the perception of any actual object points to something potential (Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, 45). This potential to explore is "pre-delineated" in the structure of the object, meaning that the indefiniteness of the other sides has a definite structure; the subject may work to make the indefinite definite and these limits in essence call on the subject to explore them further (Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, 45). As this structure of what is presently definite pointing to what is presently indefinite, it seems inadequate to designate an object as simply "being-there," as the recognition of an object is always tied to the perception of the object by a subject.

In focusing our attention upon an everyday experience, we have found that in perceiving an object, we perceive the object as having limits that serve to distinguish that object. In distinguishing the object, we found that we were necessarily distinguishing the object from a background revealing that our perception of objects takes the structure of figure-ground. We came to understand that this structure of figure-ground is flexible insofar as we determine what appears as figure and what appears as background. In delving deeper into our investigation of an everyday experience we found that our experience actually extends beyond what is actually present. We found that our experience is always framed within horizons and that these horizons point to other horizons. We also noticed that our perception of the can is limited to sides, or adumbrations, and that these sides announce further potential sides. In investigating this sided nature of our perception, we found that these adumbrations contribute to a multiplicity of appearances in which the object appears as an object. Finally, we concluded that, as the recognition of the object is always tied to the perception of that object by a subject, an object cannot be considered to merely *be there*. That is, to exist independently of us. We usually think this conclusion might be surprising since we typically think that objects exist independently of us; however, our investigations thus far have indicated otherwise. As such, let us consider our traditional conception of perception more amply.

[1.2 Rejection of the Natural Attitude]

Our traditional conception of objects as existing independently of us is a natural assumption, designated by the phenomenological discipline as the "natural attitude." The natural attitude understands perception as a process of repeating already given objects to a subject (Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, 17-18). As such, this understanding of a subject's relation to the world takes a subject's perception as a consequence, or result, of an already existing world.

This understanding is dubbed "natural" because it seems intuitive or self-evident. However, this viewpoint merits criticism insofar as it relies upon a major assumption: that the world pre-exists and is independent of the subject. This assumption of the natural attitude is not tenable, as a subject's experience of the world cannot give access to a pre-existing world that is assumed to exist. Certainty of a world prior to one's perception of that world is impossible. While this assumption of the independence and pre-existence of the world appears to be inductively sound, this inductive reasoning itself merits criticism insofar as it pre-supposes what it seeks to establish. If all perception is an appearance, then strictly speaking, it is incorrect to assume that the world exists. More accurately, the world is always experienced as appearing to exist. In order to understand the phenomenon of our experience, one must abandon these natural assumptions, and must investigate experience of the physical world as it appears to a subject in consciousness.

Instead of the world serving as the cause of our perceptional experiences, it is our perceptional experiences that present a world. Through the example of a common everyday experience we notice that our consciousness is inextricable from the world. In focusing upon an object we inherently reveal something about the subject. What we have learned to be an object is always to appear as an object for a subject who actively chooses to designate the object as figure upon a synthesized whole that is a ground. This reveals that the appearance of the figure is not merely representational, as its designation as figure is reliant upon a subject. This means that a subject's perception is presentational, meaning that to perceive is always to perceive as. In terms of our example, to perceive the can is to perceive the can as an object. This understanding of perception as presentational conflicts with a long tradition of thought that holds the inverse, that perception (and the greater whole of subjective experience itself) is completely representational.

Our example of the aluminum can reveals, in the words of Husserl, the intentionality of consciousness; insofar as the subject assumes an active role in his or her perception – in the dictation of the figure/background structure – this perception of the aluminum can must be inherently intentional; it is guided by (or reflects) the particular subject. This focus on the can is an activity of consciousness. Consciousness is not, however, a passive medium from which a subject receives un-modified sense data. Consciousness is the appearing of the world. The world is an accomplishment of our consciousness.

[1.3 Understanding the Subject]

Recognizing the intentional structure of consciousness has drastic effects upon our understanding of the subject. It modifies our understanding of how the world appears to the subject, along with how the subject interacts within the world. In particular, we must recognize that the appearance of the world is shaped by the particular subject to whom the world appears and reflects the individual projects and goals of this subject.

For example, take note of Sartre's famous example of meeting a friend "Pierre" in a café. Sartre is 25 minutes late for his four o'clock meeting at the café with his punctual friend Pierre. In rushing over to the café, Sartre wonders whether his friend will have waited for him. Sartre acknowledges the possibility that Pierre is absent, but also acknowledges the possibility that Pierre is present. Sartre arrives and immediately begins to walk around the café in search of Pierre. In his search for Pierre, Pierre is designated as the figure, whereas the rest of the café – its patrons, tables, glassware, hallways, sounds, smells, etc. – become synthesized into a background. This synthesis is the product of the particular subject's (Sartre's) focus and reflects his active project (of detecting his friend, Pierre). The perception of the café itself is intentional insofar as it reflects this project. After searching the café for his friend, the possibility of Pierre's

absence is confirmed. Despite Pierre's absence, the perception of the café remains structured as background. This ability for the café to reflect the project of Sartre (to discover his friend, Pierre) is particularly relevant. If perception were as the natural attitude dictates, such a structure could not occur.

Sartre freely chose the project of finding his friend Pierre. In doing so, the world (as an accomplishment of his consciousness) appeared as structured around this project. Insofar as Pierre's non-presence effects upon Sartre's perception, it is evident that perception is not limited to mere representation of objects in the world, but rather that perception is utterly intentional as structured by the particular subject who perceives. As this intentionality of consciousness is structured around its particular subject it is free insofar as the subject freely determines the significance and meaning. The world we perceive, we perceive as meaningful. A subject's projects and aims are reflected in the structure of his or her perception. Subject and object do not exist separately from one another and then come into relation. Rather, they first exist in relation to one another. To exist as a subject is to have a world appear. The content of this appearance is always intentional as it reflects the projects of the particular subject. This construction is fundamentally free as is evident in the manner that the possibilities that appear to the subject are reflective of an individual's projects. If this were not the case then Sartre's perception of the café would be the same as any other patron's perception of the café.

[1.4 Freedom inherent in being-for-itself]

In focusing on an object we saw the necessity of discussing the subject insofar as the appearance of the object as an object is an accomplishment of the subject. In doing so, we notice that subjects exist differently than objects as they exert meaning and significance upon the appearance of the world in terms of figure/background. This freedom within perception is not the

limit of a subject's freedom. Instead, perception itself is indicative of a greater freedom that is essential to a subject's existence. Sartre makes this point and designates the term "being-for-itself" as the subject's manner of being. This term refers to the freedom inherent in a subject's being, specifically in reference to a subject's existence and identity as they are in every sense essentially free. Unlike objects, a subject's being lacks definition, meaning that a subject's being can never be fully defined. This lack of definite being is primarily due to consciousness, of which perception is a vital component. Sartre defines a subject as "a being, which by nature is conscious of the nothingness of its being" (Sartre, 86). This "nothingness," of which the being is conscious, is a reference to a subject's lack of definition. All the qualities that a subject possesses are subject to potential change due to the subject's active involvement in the world as it appears. Remembering that the subject imposes the meaning into his or her perception, we must acknowledge that a subject is free to impose meaning upon what he or she will, and is free to embrace this self-imposed meaning. The appearing of the world is comprised of the totality of involvements and meaningfulness (as imposed by the subject) of the subject. This meaning is changeable, insofar as the subject from whom it originates is changeable.

To exemplify how pervasive freedom is for a subject, let us refer to the example of the existential phenomenon of "anguish" as discussed by Sartre in his work *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre argues that anguish is distinct from the phenomenon of fear, insofar as fear is in regards to an external thing, whereas anguish refers to an internal facing of oneself (Sartre, 65). Of the examples of anguish that Sartre presents, the most relevant is his "Precipice" example (Sartre, 64). In the precipice example, a subject is faced with walking by a precipice. The anguish sets in when the subject realizes his potential to "throw himself over" thereby ending his life (Sartre, 64). The subject is distrustful of himself. He wishes for reassurance against this possibility but he

acknowledges precisely that this reassurance is impossible for nothing prevents him from realizing the possibility of throwing himself over. This inability displays that a subject is not an object with inherent qualities, purpose, or values. No prior experience, nor prior quality, acts as a definite aspect of his being that would definitely prevent him from reacting to the precipice by throwing himself off of it. The experience of anguish (in particular anguish of the future) is evidence of the subject's inherent freedom. If a subject could take refuge in his or her qualities, then anguish could not occur. For example: if the man confronted by the precipice could hold his quality of self-perseverance as a definite concrete component of his self, then his anguish (throwing himself off the precipice) would not appear nor be experienced.

If a subject's being were akin to an object's, then the closest the man could come to experiencing anguish would be to posit the external ledge as a threat. In that case, the phenomenon would be fear as opposed to genuine anguish. Aguish may take two forms. The precipice example refers to anguish of the future, meaning that the subject's being is in question in reference to the future. This is distinguished from anguish's other form, anguish of the past. In anguish of the past, one's past occurs as jeopardizing of one's future. In our discussion of the phenomenon of bad faith we will see an example of anguish of the past. Specifically, in Sartre's discussion of the gambler's anguish. In either example, anguish distinguishes itself from fear in that as opposed to fear, anguish is an inner-mode of being in which one's self is responsible for his or her own existential jeopardy.

Anguish is an inner-mode of being in which one stands in opposition to one's past or future. One is conscious of one's lack of concrete being in reference to an impending event, an inevitable (or at least appearing as inevitable) moment in his or her future. The two terms are similar, insofar as both refer to a phenomenon in which the subject's being appears to the subject

as being in jeopardy. As such, both are to a certain extent internal; both consist of an acknowledgment that one's existence is in jeopardy. However, fear is an internalized response to an external force[1] (Sartre, 66). As such, fear refers to something beyond oneself. In order to recognize how the phenomena of fear and anguish differ, we must also investigate the phenomenon of fear. For example, as an avid backpacker, I have a fear of bears. The appearance of a bear is experienced as fear due to the potential for a bear to end my existence. This fear is triggered by the appearance of the external object of which I am afraid (bears). This appearance may be genuine inasmuch as the external object is present. Likewise, it may not be, inasmuch as the "appearance" is merely the representation of the external object – the latter occurring in dreams, imagination, hallucinations, etc. Regardless, the presence of the external object is required for the fear to occur, in which case I fear for my existence due to something beyond myself. Both anguish and fear are a response to one's being appearing as in jeopardy. The two phenomena depart in what causes this response.

In anguish a subject encounters his or her freedom; anguish serves as a self-revelation of the freedom inherent in one's being-as-subject. The subject in anguish acknowledges his or her freedom and is disturbed by it. The example of anguish displays two important aspects of being-as-a-subject. Firstly, anguish serves to show a mode in which a subject recognizes his or her freedom; this reveals that this freedom is not merely an implicit mental construct of one's experience of a world, but rather is a component of this experience. Secondly, this example serves to show how one's awareness of his or her freedom may become an issue for its subject. Anguish is a phenomenon that results in the recognition of this freedom of being-for-itself. However, as will be shown, other phenomena exist for the sole purpose of evading this freedom.

[1] "Force" is used here as a means of referring to a gamut of possible external occurrences (objects, miss-perceptions

Our investigation of an everyday experience (the experience of perceiving an aluminum can) yielded that our experience extends beyond the perception of what is actually present (horizons). In doing so we discovered that perception rather than being a mere representation of the thing, is a presentational accomplishment of the subject (the can perceived as an object). As such, we acknowledged the intentionality of consciousness (consciousness is always consciousness of) and the effects such intentionality has upon our perception of a world (Pierre example). We delved deeper into our investigation of a subject's being by discussing the phenomenon of anguish. In doing so we recognized that the being of a subject is radically different than that of an object in that a subject lacks inherent qualities, purposes, or roles. As such, we recognized that a subject's being is inherently free. Our discussion of anguish also displayed how a subject may experience his or her freedom as problematic. We will now turn to the phenomenon of bad faith, in order to better understand this freedom as well as how a subject may react to this freedom.

Chapter II: The Phenomenon of Bad Faith

[2.1 Description of a Subject in Bad Faith]

In his work *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre discusses the phenomenon of bad faith as a means of discussing a potential stance that a subject may take in relation to his or her freedom. This stance towards one's freedom is one of evasion. In order to familiarize ourselves with what Sartre means by this, let us consider a subject who is in bad faith. To illustrate the phenomenon of bad faith, Sartre describes a waiter. As Sartre observes, the waiter appears to be imitating a waiter; his embodiment of this role is somewhat off. "His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise" and "He comes toward the patrons with a step too eagerly" (Sartre, 101). Further, Sartre describes the waiter as "trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-rope-walker by putting it in a perpetually unstable perpetually broken equilibrium which he perpetually re-establishes by a light movement of his arm and hand" (Sartre, 101). Sartre describes the occurrence as appearing to us as "a game" (Sartre, 101). The waiter's movements appear as such because, at least to a certain extent, he is playing a game. He is playing at being a waiter – with the intention of realizing his condition as a waiter.

Sartre employs the example of a waiter to show that bad faith often occurs within a subject's pursuit to embody a role, usually by adopting the qualities associated with that role. The waiter in this example is doing precisely this – attempting to be a waiter. However, the waiter's attempt to serve this role of a waiter to this degree is in vain – he cannot be a waiter in the same manner that a book is a book. The waiter may know what obligations or duties that this role requires, such as taking-orders, wiping down tables, entertaining guests, etc. Yet regardless

of one's attention to detail in attempting to be a role, this role in no way amply addresses the significance of the subject's being, nor does the waiter's attempt to embody the role, serve as a genuine alteration to the subject's freedom. The construct attempts to disregard the subject's indefinability in an attempt to hold particular qualities as definite. Any subject embodying an occupation nevertheless remains a subject. As evidence of the inevitable failure of the waiter's attempt to be a waiter, as an object is an object, consider the waiter's ability to disregard his assigned duties. For just as the waiter may choose to carry a salad to a guest, he has an equal opportunity to likewise throw the salad in a guest's face. The very fact that a waiter may leave his occupation is evident of this occupation's lack of definiteness with respect to the subject's being. Sartre writes that the waiter is in bad faith, and he writes that bad faith takes the form of a lie to oneself. In bad faith, one avoids acknowledging the freedom inherent in one's being-for-itself (Sartre, 87-88).

[2.2 Three Guiding Questions]

The idea of bad faith already raises several questions: what is this lie about? Why does the subject of bad faith lie to him or herself? How can one lie to oneself? In the sections that follow, I will focus on each of these questions in turn. Let us begin by considering the structure of bad faith more amply.

[2.3 What is the Lie?]

The subject attempts to accomplish an evasion of his or her freedom by positing qualities (of which they believe they have) as being definite, much like our aforementioned aluminum can's quality of holding a beverage. More simply put, a subject in bad faith is attempting to be an object. For the subject in bad faith emotions, duties, roles, etc. all become posited as definite qualities. The "lie" of bad faith is precisely that the subject's being is akin to that of an object's

being. The subject tries to just be as an object just is. In bad faith, as in anguish, a subject's freedom is recognized as problematic. This positing of one's freedom as a problem serves as the impetus behind the positing of one's qualities as definite (or object-like).

In more general terms, a subject posits the lie that he or she holds definite being, meaning that a particular subject's qualities such as bravery, reverence, charisma are understood as defining qualities of his or her being. Essentially, the lie is a result of the subject's recognition of his or her freedom, and the fear that such freedom presents. The purpose of bad faith is to escape or evade this individual freedom, by positing that one's being is definite. In our discussion of question two, we will see that as much as this freedom can be viewed as liberating, it can also be viewed as constrictive. Freedom does not grant the subject much certainty in terms of his or her qualities, as any such certainty is subject to change due to a subject's freedom. It is this elusiveness of one's identity that is inherent in being-as-a-subject that serves as the impetus for the adoption of bad faith. Under this illusion of determinacy, provided by bad faith, one is comforted by the idea that his or her identity will persevere through time. This reassurance is especially comforting when one encounters obstacles where such qualities are advantageous.

Let us return to Sartre's example of the waiter and more adequately analyze it. The example of the waiter, who attempts to be a waiter, is an exemplar of the intention of bad faith as "establishing that I am not what I am" (Sartre, 102). In recognizing this, we see that this attempt to establish definiteness is precisely the problem of bad faith, because in trying to make oneself an object, one inevitably declares that one is not an object. To attempt to possess the qualities of an object in the manner that an object possesses these qualities is an activity that can only be initiated by a subject who has the inherent freedom to initiate such an activity. A book does not choose to be a book. One may say that its component parts (the wood that becomes paper, etc.)

exert potential to become such; but this potential is neither understood nor acted upon by the component parts themselves. To attempt to exist bereft of the freedom inherent in being-as-subject requires that one be the sort of subject who has freedom in one's being that allows for the attempt. Therefore the project of bad faith is doomed to fail in accomplishing its end, because its initiation requires the very thing that it is attempting to evade.

The example of the waiter shows the prevalence of bad faith in numerous aspects of life. The example of the waiter associating his occupation as a definite aspect of his being is commonly expressed by individuals today with the question "what do you do?" (Often casually asked as a precursor to evaluating another individual). The response: "I am a student" or "I am a lawyer" understood as definite quality of a subject exemplifies bad faith. The structure of the response "I am ___" is to tie one's being-as-a-subject to one's occupation. However, this can never be the case. One cannot "be" one's occupation as a book can be a book, yet this is precisely the objective of bad faith to have the definite being of an object. To claim this sort of being is to reduce one's totality of being to brief moments. These moments do not amply address the totality of the subjects being.

Through Sartre's example of the waiter, we now understand that the lie of bad faith is that a subject's being is akin to that of an object's being. We also now understand that the phenomenon of bad faith is similar in construction to a lie that one tells oneself, with the impetus for this lie being an attempt to evade the freedom inherent in one's being-as-subject. However, in order to understand what this lie is about, let us return to the second of our questions: "why does the subject of bad faith lie to him or herself?" or perhaps more specifically "how may a subject view his or her freedom as problematic?"

[2.4 What is the Impetus behind the Lie?]

The subject's fear of his or her freedom is in essence a fear of temporality. In a sense, the subject is disturbed by what of awaits him or her in the future. In order to understand fully what this means, we must understand the structure of temporality as a nihilating structure. To understand this nihilating aspect of temporality let us consider the example of a reformed criminal.

For our example, let us imagine a criminal who genuinely regrets his actions. To a certain extent he is responsible for the crime; it is he who in the past committed it. Yet his regret signifies a change or alteration in his being. His genuine reform begs the question "is he the same man who committed the crime?" If his regret signifies a genuine change in will, then it would seem that the criminal who regrets, is significantly different than his past self, as presumably he (in the present) would not act in the same manner as he (of the past) acted. What separates this change? The easy answer is time. However, let us try to be more specific.

To begin with, let us consider time in a general sense. Time essentially consists of three component parts past, present, and future that flow together with the future becoming the present and the present becoming the past. The past is a present that has already happened, the present is the current moment, and the future is a moment that has yet to happen. Of these three parts only the present can be said to exist, because the past inherently no longer exists and the future has yet to come into existence. While we could come to consider the classic Augustinian question as to what constitutes the present, let us defer this question by considering the present as the immediate moment of perception. This allows us to focus our attention upon the question “what separates these three component parts of time from one another?”

To understand the answer to this question we must understand the subject’s role in temporality. A subject experiences temporality as a constant relation of one's self in the present

(moment of immediate perception) to one's past moments (past consciousness) as well as to expectations of being beyond the current present moment (future expectations of consciousness). According to Sartre these relations are separated by precisely nothing (Sartre, 64). However, this nothing is a self-imposed nothingness that allows the subject to distinguish his or her present consciousness from his or her former consciousness (Sartre, 64). Relating this account back to the subject's freedom we will find that the subject's freedom results in the future's indefiniteness. For as the future is precisely being that has yet to come into being, and as the subject's being is essentially free, the future signifies the subject's encountering of itself in the mode of non-being. The subject anticipates his or her future, yet he or she cannot know for certain what kind of subject he or she will be in the future. In apprehending him or herself in the mode of non-being, the subject acknowledges that his or her identity is subject to utter transformation and that precisely nothing may serve as a guarantee that in the future he or she will be the subject he or she was. This structure is precisely what causes the anguish that accompanies the presence of the precipice. For the potential to "throw himself over" only appears as a potential possibility, due to the subject's freedom in reference to the indefinite nature of the future.

In this way, time annihilates the past qualities of the criminal, allowing for this genuine change of the criminal's character. Yet this structure becomes problematic insofar as retribution for past actions committed is ethically merited. The he of the past is not the he of the present, and yet he is the same man. What separates this transition? What separates the man's past self as criminal from his consequential self of regret? Precisely nothing. It is the self-imposed nothingness that is required to distinguish moments within the flux of temporality. In anguish, we see the subject apprehending his future being in the mode of non-being. This apprehension is

precisely why the lie of bad faith presents itself as comforting. If a subject's being were definite then its apprehension with itself in the future would yield no uncertainty. It is the uncertainty of the future that causes a subject's freedom to appear as problematic.

Now that we understand that the impetus behind the adoption of bad faith is precisely the subject's apprehension of itself in the mode of non-being (as future), we may acknowledge that a subject's freedom may appear as problematic, insofar as the uncertainty of this apprehension may be experienced as disturbing. As such, we may now continue to the third, and final, question regarding bad faith: "How can one lie to oneself?" To investigate this question, let us examine Sartre's example of a gambler who is in bad faith.

[How can one Lie?]

Sartre employs the example of a reformed gambler to display the phenomenon of anguish of past (Sartre 69). The reformed gambler is in bad faith insofar as he posits his resolve to stop gambling as a definite quality of his being that prohibits his future possibility of gambling. When this reformed gambler is confronted by the opportunity to gamble (a gaming table) he is thrown into a state of anguish. For while he has sincerely resolved to never gamble again, the possibility of gambling remains tempting. When positing his possibilities, he recognizes "gambling" as a possibility. He has gambled before, and he is free to gamble again. Yet the positing of this action as a possibility runs against his self-imposed resolve (which he holds definite due to his bad faith) and this disturbs him. He turns inward, to himself, for assurance of his resolve; yet, all he receives is the certainty that he is uncertain of his actions in the future (Sartre, 69). He desires this resolve to become an essential definite component of his being in a similar fashion, just as a can is cylindrical. He fears that he will fall short of his resolve due to the temptation of gambling proving too strong, overcoming his resolve. This occurs because he recognizes, in his anguish,

that his resolve holds no power over his freedom as a subject. He cannot impose a limitation to his freedom, as this freedom is an inherent component of his existence. In this instance, the gambler is battling his freedom while simultaneously affirming it. The gambler posits that he is not the same man of his past, while also positing that he is the same man in the future.

In anguish of the past, one apprehends one's past self as problematic towards a present situation. One's freedom as a subject becomes a problem insofar as it prohibits one from knowing how they will fare in regards to this impending event. In this way, anguish of the past and anguish of the future share the similar apprehension of oneself in the mode of non-being (the future). One's freedom as a subject prohibits awareness of whether the subject will hold the qualities necessary to overcome the obstacle. A person in bad faith, who posits certain qualities as concrete components of his or her being, is not immune to this anguish. Instead, he or she is particularly disposed to encounter it. Through this confrontation of anguish the subject of bad faith is revealed the faulty nature of his or her project.

We must acknowledge that the positing of the limitation does not establish it as a real limitation. A subject's existence is always one of freedom. The willpower to act in accordance with this self-imposed limitation may allow an individual to follow through with a resolution, but it will not eliminate the possibility of failing to do so. In order to act in accordance with his resolve, the reformed gambler must re-find his resolve. In every case, in which the object he rejects as not being in accordance with his resolve confronts him, he must re-instill the resolve within himself in order to persuade himself that that particular possibility is not his possibility or to actualize another possibility (not gambling) as his possibility. Regardless of whether or not the reformed gambler re-instills his resolve within himself and believes that gambling is not his

possibility, the possibility of gambling cannot but be thought of as a potential living possibility: the possibility of gambling is as real as not gambling.

Through the example of the gambler it becomes clear that while the gambler posits the adoption of bad faith as a solution to his or her encounter with himself in the mode of non-being, bad faith yields no genuine solution to this apprehension. Necessarily, this "adoption" will always be doomed to fail because of its structure – specifically, as a "lie to oneself." The lie seeks to instill a mode of being in which a subject perceives him or herself as having definite being as an object has. Yet subjects lack the ability to have such being insofar as their being as a consciousness entails "being conscious of the nothingness that is its being" (Sartre, 86). This means that despite efforts to adopt bad faith, the subject always remains bereft of all definiteness, as a subject's being is ever subject to change.

As such, it is important to understand that it would be incorrect to define bad faith as a mode of being. Doing so would suggest that bad faith could be adopted sincerely as an alteration of one's being. More accurately, bad faith is akin to a pseudo-mode of being that an individual imposes or believes he or she imposes upon him or herself. Bad faith's project is to convince the subject that he or she exists like an object exists, that his or her being is already defined. As this project runs against the true nature of a subject, it will inevitably fail to achieve its purpose.

On a structural level, the idea of a lie to oneself is paradoxical, as the everyday phenomenon of a genuine lie suggests that a lie to oneself would be impossible. A lie has two component parts. Those are: a liar, and a one who is being lied to. By its definition the liar must know the truth in order to present the lie. Conversely, the one being lied to must not know the truth in order to think that the lie is the truth. If I lie to a professor about my health in order to get

out of an assignment, I (as the liar) know the truth; I am not sick. Yet in the case of bad faith, the liar and the one being lied to is the same individual.

As it is the individual in bad faith who imposes the lie of bad faith upon him or herself for the sake of elevating the discomfort associated with freedom, this structure is paradoxical so long as the individual who imposes the lie is aware of it as a lie. If one knows the truth one cannot be authentically deceived by the lie that one attempts to impose upon oneself. If I attempt to deceive myself that my eyes are green, in telling the lie to myself I am conscious of the truth; my eyes are blue, and thus my project will always fail. Regardless of whether or not the idea of having green eyes is more comforting to me, I am aware that the lie does not alter the truth.

The case of bad faith is similar in that the liar is hiding the disturbing truth from him or herself, or presenting a pleasing untruth. Regardless, this hiding has an original intention: to conceal the freedom of being of which is necessary for consciousness. But this bad faith is unstable. As mentioned before, the positing of this lie requires knowledge of the truth, which will inevitably reveal the lie as a lie. Even if the phenomena of bad faith were to be posited utterly implicitly (perhaps through repression, which we will discuss later when discussing habit) whereby the truth would be genuinely concealed to one's active conscious, several phenomena (such as anguish and guilt) would still act as indicators of bad faith's falsity. We have already discussed the phenomenon of anguish at the precipice, and the anguish of the gambler, as they relate to the recognition of one's freedom.

Bad faith is a doomed enterprise. Its intention, to evade the inherent freedom of subjectivity, will always result in failure. It seeks to establish what it lacks (definite being); yet it relies precisely upon this lack of definiteness for the potential to attempt its project. To be a

subject who has a world is to be this lack of definite being, and so, insofar as the subject remains a subject, the desire to fulfill this lack will always be left wanting.

In our investigation of the phenomenon of bad faith we have discovered that the phenomenon is akin to a lie to oneself with the "lie" of bad faith being that a subject's being is akin to the absolute definiteness of an object's being. We have also discovered that this lie is motivated by a subject's desire to evade the freedom inherent in being a subject in relation to the apprehension of his or her non-being of the future. We learned that while bad faith may appear as a solution to this apprehension, in reality it is doomed to failure as it runs against the true nature of the subject's being.

Our investigation into how the paradoxical lie to oneself may occur has been left somewhat wanting. Currently we cannot understand how its subject may genuinely posit a lie to him or herself so as to provide the illusion of definite being. In our discussion of habit we will find a manner in which this lie may become concealed to its subject. However, before we progress to our consideration of habit, we must re-focus our attention from the phenomenon as discussed by Sartre, in which the phenomenon is unilaterally discussed as it relates to adults, and instead shift to understanding the phenomenon in relation to a subject's experience in childhood, in order to better understand the subject's relation to the lie of bad faith. We will see that in childhood the subject exists in a way that hides his or her freedom. This concealment of one's freedom is similar to the definite-ness that the subject of bad faith desires. To do so, let us first begin by giving a rigorous description of childhood as it is experienced.

Chapter III: Childhood

[3.1 The Serious World of the Child]

In *The Ethics of Ambiguity* Simone de Beauvoir argues that the child finds him or herself thrown into a world in which every aspect of existence appears as definite and whose establishment he or she has not contributed to (Beauvoir, 35-36). From the perspective of the child, the world appears to be pre-determined by others; "in his (the child's) eyes, human inventions, words, customs, and values are given facts, as inevitable as the sky and the trees" (Beauvoir, 35). This means that the child considers all aspects of life to exhibit the absolute definiteness similar to that of an object. The world appears as a given, to which submission is the only possibility (Beauvoir, 35). As such, the child's perspective on the world's appearance is a "serious" perspective. That is, every aspect of existence appears as containing ready-made values. In order to understand the source of these ready-made values, let us consider the situation of the child as described by John Russon.

Like Simon de Beauvoir, John Russon also focuses on the experience of being a child. Russon argues that the child's first experience of the world, a world of both subjects and objects, takes place within the construct of the family. As such, the child's first reality is an interhuman reality, specifically the reality of the family, from which the child learns how to interact with various objects and subjects (siblings, parents, aunts uncles, grandparents, etc.) (Russon, *Bearing*, 53). From this interhuman reality, the child is granted access to meaning. It serves as the primary site of engagement for the child. This results in the child viewing adults as the establishers of meaning, and the child assumes a passive role of uncovering already established meaning through his or her interactions with his or her parents (Russon, *Bearing*, 53). Due to the

source of this meaning being singularly from the family, the child may experience only one possibility of meaning. The child doesn't see what exists as a possibility among others; rather, it just is. As such, the child cannot be said to truly recognize meaning as meaning, but rather considers meaning to be definite.

This prohibition of genuinely understanding meaning, in its fullest sense, results in the child adopting the "meanings" passed along by one's family – as opposed to establishing his or her own meaning. To the child, therefore, "men appear as Gods" (Beauvoir, 39). This viewing of adults as "Gods" reflects the child's position relative to his or her world. From the perspective of the child, he or she has no individual input pertaining to the world. The child assumes that the world in which she lives simply is the way that it is. He or she does not recognize the surrounding world as meaningful.

Despite the serious perspective held by the child, the child him or herself is not serious. As Beauvoir asserts: "(the child) is allowed to play, to expend his existence freely. In his child's circle he feels that he can passionately pursue and joyfully attain goals which he has set up for himself" (Beauvoir 35). This ability of the child to play is due to the child's inherited belief that he or she does not actually contribute to the world. The child believes this because the world appears to exhibit absolute definition, so regardless of his or her actions, the definite world will remain as such intact. Existence is not an issue for the child, as his or her actions have no perceived weight on the serious world. The child's only possible concern is for one's personal self. "Later on he (the child) will too become a big imposing statue," but for now the child is free to explore the various roles as he or she chooses: "a saint, a hero, a guttersnipe" (Beauvoir, 36). To the child, these serious occupations are associated with the sort of determination that he or she will one day, in adulthood, fulfill. Consequently the child chooses to play within these roles

and investigate the various idiosyncrasies of them. Yet the child always investigates these serious roles within the context of play. To the child they are distant possibilities that will potentially be assumed in his or her future.

Currently in our investigation of childhood we have discovered that the subject's first relation to his or her freedom is one of concealment. This concealment is due to the child's serious perspective on the world and subsequent adoption of meaning from his or her singular source of world insights: the family unit. As such, the child does not recognize the full intention of meaning. Due to the concealed nature of his or her freedom, Simon de Beauvoir considers the child to be "metaphysically privileged" (Beauvoir 36).

[3.2 Metaphysical Privilege and its Break]

In classifying the child as "metaphysically privileged," Beauvoir is signifying that the child is protected from any self-awareness that his or her actions impose meaning into his or her world. The child experiences meaning as a given and, as such, does not feel that he or she must rise to the challenge of developing or explicating upon this meaning. Instead, the child can only simply exist. The child's world does not appear in his or her eyes to be overwhelming – rather, it appears as utterly consistent and solid. Meaning exists independently of the child, pre-packaged in form and ready for discovery.

Even still, this metaphysical privilege does not last forever. As time progresses, this 'privilege' begins to wane as the child begins to notice other values (different from his or her own) that exist within the surrounding world. This development typically begins during adolescence, when inconsistencies inevitably begin to surface within the child's serious world, leaving the child to question the supplied serious values of his parents. At this point questions such as "Why this way? Why not this other way?" begin to arise. The child becomes increasingly

aware of these inconsistencies as he or she encounters new, unfamiliar forms of meaning established by other encountered subjects. Up to this point, the child's experience of meaning is singular in the sense that to any meaning held by him or her is not perceived as but one of many potential meanings. However, as the child eventually encounters others' differentiated, and often conflicting, viewpoints of meaning, the child's singular conception of meaning is directly challenged. The child will begin to recognize that the world itself is not singular, nor is it statically defined. For example, if the child has developed a view of the world as composed of a dichotomy of both good and bad actions (a value commonly pressed upon children by their parents for simplicity's sake), and then discovers a person who does not fit this conception, such as an individual who commits a "bad" action for an apparently altruistic reason (e.g., a father stealing food for his starving child), the child may be forced to re-assess the values he or she have previously held as absolute. Regardless of whether it is the first experience of such 'meaning,' inconsistencies or later paradoxical encounters that spur the child to re-assess their current belief system, the aging of the child will inevitably result in an enhanced awareness of humankind's expansive array of varied proposed meanings and perceptions. As a result, the child's world begins to break. His or her world, which at one time appeared to be so secure in its concrete values, becomes a strange place open for reinterpretation.

Following this aforementioned shift in how the child comes to begin to perceive meaning, familiar metaphysical privilege can, in many cases, begin to break. This leads, in turn, to the child being thrown against his or her freedom. The child is confronted with the realization that his or her actions are of equal importance as those of adults and consequently begins feeling compelled to contribute to this meaning as well. The child will realize that his or her prior

actions were not meaningless play, but rather were crucial to his development, as well as the development of others whom these actions affected.

The child must choose how to confront this freedom. This choice is vital insofar as it determines the stance the child later as an adult will adopt towards his or her freedom. The child's unfamiliarity with the liberation from metaphysical privilege will likely appear as risky, as it results in a radically new understanding of his or her existence. In this liberation, the child is in a state akin to the phenomenon of anguish as it is described by Sartre. The child is uncertain of him or herself and this uncertainty can be overwhelming. The child is aware of this uncertainty. Morality, meaning, and the future all appear as at risk – for just as the man at the precipice is distrustful of him or herself, the child is uncertain of his or her future and unknowing of the adult he or she will become. The child's familiarity with the serious world may potentially send him or her running from his freedom, instead choosing to adopt bad faith in a doomed attempt to evade the freedom inherent in his or her being.

[3.3 Childhood as dispositional of Bad Faith]

As the first condition of a subject is one in which he or she does not recognize meaning, his or her existence is bereft of this risk of freedom. The child's familiarity with the comfort of metaphysical privilege makes the prospect of bad faith utterly tempting, even if it does not cause it. If the child chooses to turn away from the risk, he initiates the lie – to become, in Beauvoir's terms: a "serious man" (Beauvoir, 49). The serious man is essentially a subject who is in bad faith. The serious man defers to the world of his youth and adopts the values given to him during that period. The serious man believes that his perception of the world is merely representational. He believes in an existing and separate world in which the values he holds simply are, just as an object is an object. The serious man also yearns for the metaphysical privilege of childhood; yet

while the child adopts the values given to him due to the concealed nature of his or her freedom, the serious man chooses to adopt these values. If challenged, the serious man must re-affirm his belief in the definite nature of the values of his childhood.

The serious man takes refuge in the values of his childhood, so much so that they become a sort of idol for him. This idol is necessary for him. It is his guarantee of his existence; bereft of it, his world losses all of its meaning. The serious man is thus vulnerable given this reality. His existence is centered on turning a blind eye to his freedom, always covering up the inconsistencies that arise, and to shunning or evading others who hold differing values. Since the serious man is a subject, he cannot escape his freedom. His project will inevitably result in failure. He will find himself confronted with his freedom - the truth he wishes to evade - and this confrontation will either result in the destruction of the values that hold his world together, or him necessarily reassuring himself of the lie, which he internally knows to be false.

The condition of the serious man is not akin to the condition of the child. The child does not yet recognize his or her freedom, whereas the serious man's recognition of his freedom serves as the impetus for his adoption of bad faith. As an adult is liberated from metaphysically protected world of pre-made value, the adult is distinguished from the situation of his childhood. In confrontation with one's freedom, subjects are faced with an essential choice of how to embrace this newly discovered freedom. This is a choice that will set-up the subject's relation to him or herself for the remainder of his or her life.

In our investigation of childhood, we have discovered that the condition of a child may serve as the impetus behind the adoption of bad faith, insofar as the subject may desire to exist in a state similar to that of the child; a state where one's freedom is concealed. This desire may cause the possibility of bad faith to appear as appealing. We also discovered that subject does not

recognize freedom in his or her first experiences of life. This failure to recognize this freedom (while it may serves an important role in the development of the subject) results in the subject's lifetime familiarity with the simple world of the serious, a familiarity that may disposition the subject to attempt to fall back into such a mode through the adoption of bad faith. As we now understand the subject's original relation to his or her freedom, we can now investigate how a subject may act upon this disposition through habituation. As such, let us now consider habit.

Chapter IV: Habit

[Embodied Consciousness]

In shifting our focus to habit, drawing particularly from Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological account of habit, it merits noting that the phenomenological understanding of habit radically departs from numerous philosophical traditions. It should also be recognized that much of Merleau-Ponty's work *The Phenomenology of Perception* is spent actively combating two of these traditions, most generally Empiricism and Intellectualism. Phenomenology naturally conflicts with these and other traditions; these traditions are often cited by phenomenological writers as "classical prejudices," as many of their accounts rely upon classical assumptions that phenomenology attempts to display as unmerited. For our purposes we will not dwell on combatting Empiricism or Intellectualism. However, the intellectualist tradition does provide a stark contrast in its understanding of habit. As such, we will utilize a general outline of this tradition's accounts of habit as a reference point for our discussion of habit. The primary issue with the intellectualist account is that it misconstrues the relationship between the mind and the body as one of pure mental control, with the mind explicitly determining every movement of the body – much like a person controlling a virtual character in a video game. This understanding of the relationship between the mind and the body serves as the foundation for this tradition's conceptions of habit insofar as habit relates to one's bodily actions.

For this tradition, a habit is reduced to a mental talent or, in certain cases (wherein the habit is viewed as detrimental to its subject) a flaw. For as this tradition posits the mind as explicitly directing every movement of the body, a habit, insofar as habit involves bodily movement, must take the form of a mental ability to explicitly move one's body and posit its position in relation to the outside world simultaneously. As such, for this tradition, mastery of a

skill comes from repetition of specific movements (as explicitly directed by the mind) until these specific movements become quicker and quicker, enabling greater speed and skill.

Already, several issues appear within this account. First, the account cannot explain the failure to accomplish a movement, nor can it account for pseudo-habit or a half-learned habit. By "pseudo-habit," I am referring to habits that are not fully developed. Usually such habits are experienced as awkward in their accomplishment. For example, when first learning to compose text messages on a touch-screen phone, many individuals experience difficulty in accomplishing the action in their first attempts but then, over time, manage to compose text messages with effortless efficiency. If the mind is in pure control of this movement, then in cases where the subject fails to accomplish the bodily movement, the failure is due to a subject's mental decision to fail, which appears counter-intuitive to the typical intention of the subject. In a similar manner, if the subject's mind is in pure control over his or her body, then one's development of a habit may not exhibit half-understanding as development may only really take the form of increased speed, as the mind directs the body and the movement is understood by its subject mentally.

Pointing out the flaws within this tradition is not the primary objective of this essay, nor is giving an extremely general description of this tradition's account. Rather, this discussion suggests how classical interpretations have failed to adequately consider the relationship between the mind and the body. The primary flaw of this tradition, which affect its understanding of habit, is their consideration of a subject's body as the same as any other object within the world. As a result of this conception of the body as an object, this tradition takes consciousness as a separate directional force upon a container-like body. As such, we must re-investigate this relationship and challenge our prejudices, in order to consider habit. In order that we may more amply understand this relationship, let us consider an example that is familiar to most of us: the

act of walking. This detailed example should exemplify the pitfalls of this previous conception regarding its consideration of the body as an object and the corresponding conception of relationship between a subject's mind and body.

If we are honest about our description of walking, we will notice that when walking we are rarely conscious of our actual walking. We may certainly shift our active focus to our gait, and play with our various bodily capabilities (perhaps by increasing the length of our walk or by aiming our foot in a particular manner in relation to the ground) yet such attention on the part of our consciousness is not necessary. Our active attention is not needed to accomplish the action; without such attention we continue to place one foot in front of the other, seamlessly shifting our weight from our back foot to our front foot as we balance ourselves in relation to the ground. Subjects do not posit the proximate size of their gait prior to walking. A subject does not think to him or herself, "Today I will walk with a gait of 3 feet." Rather the subject naturally assumes his or her gait without active determination. If this were not the case, we would be unable to concern ourselves with other things – such as daydreaming, conversations, reflection, manipulation of other objects, etc. For the most part, we do not concern ourselves with walking, for rarely is there need to. Even in instances in which such attention is seemingly needed, such as if we should trip over an unnoticed crack in the street, we still need only to readjust (a readjustment that takes the form of a reaction, a point I will return to later).

Furthermore, our walk is always directed towards an end, but this end is not necessarily posited actively. We are aware of our desired destination, but we do not need to hold our attention to it in order to arrive at it. Just as with our gait, we may choose to focus upon our destination, yet the actions that accomplish this arrival do not necessitate this focus. If we do focus upon our destination, this focus is often more directed at the expected impending

circumstances that the location potentially holds for us, rather than the destination's location in reference to our body. Certainly, we must initially determine our destination, but the steps taken to come to this destination are typically so natural that they no longer require our active attention. In a certain way, we allow ourselves to arrive at our destination, in that we assume a passive role in the physical activities necessary to do so. For us to accomplish movement (via walking) we need not posit a point upon a geometric map and track our movement towards this point. Neither do we need to place our focus upon every bend of the path in order to understand where we are going. Rather, we walk towards our destination and understand such distances in terms of our walking. For example, when I walk across the quadrangle to another class or meeting, I understand this movement in terms of my own gait (an understanding that draws from my past experiences). When I walk, I think "it will take me 5 minutes by foot" not "I am precisely 475 yards from my destination." My movement, if it is posited at all, is posited in terms of itself. When I think, "I have time" I am not referring to a relation between my body and some geographical point. Instead, I am speaking self-referentially – "Granted the current time, my body will allow me to arrive at my destination in time." This experience of our bodies occurs because our bodies are not like containers, which we actively command to move – rather our bodies exert their own sort of understanding.

This implicit experience of one's body is due to a subject's condition as an embodied consciousness. While a body inherently implies a degree of object-ness, insofar as it exhibits a definite presence within the world, one's own body (in experience) does not take on the form of an object. A subject does not primarily encounter his or her body as an object because in every instance his or her consciousness is rooted utterly within his or her body.

To recognize this relationship between one's body and one's consciousness is to recognize that the body is the subject's way of having a world. The body of a subject is not experienced (by its subject) as an object. Rather, one's body is experienced as a means of having objects - as the means to having a world. The body does not begin as an instrument of control for a self-conscious subject. Instead, it begins as the medium through which self-consciousness may arise in a subject (Russon, *Human*, 28). This implicit experience of the body is the subject's manner of having a world. That is, in order to utilize one's active attention upon other more complex phenomenon (such as inter-subjective relationships, i.e. love, community, etc.), one must be in a certain sense liberated from the need to actively manipulate one's body. This description should not seem radical for if I needed to posit every action, having to exert demands upon my body from my mind, I would be unable to conduct the sort of actions that allow for me to have a world beyond my body. I may walk across the quadrangle while daydreaming. Put more accurately, my body may walk across the quad whilst my mind directs its attention to a fantastical world. "It is the definiteness (of our body) that opens us to a multitude of as yet unimagined experiences of which our action is the actualization" (Russon, *Human*, 31). If we take, for example, one of the most basic distinctions that serves a necessary role in having a world: the distinction between subjects and objects, we may not deny that without one's body, this separation (meaning that one perceives an object as distinct from oneself and other subjects) could not occur.

We must, however, remember that speaking in such a manner is not to suggest utter independence as is often suggested by classical dichotomies of body and mind. In order to consider habit adequately, we must remember that the body and mind of a subject are not autonomous separate beings arranged in a hierarchical structure of mind controlling body.

Consciousness is in every instance attached to a body; it is through this body that a subject understands the world in terms of one's possibilities. The mind is not a prisoner within a body. The mind and the body exist together in the form of an embodied conscious, and the separation of the two into the classical designations of "body" and "mind" is accomplished only by focusing too singularly upon one aspect of the embodied consciousness while excluding the other. Embodied conscious takes the form of the "I can;" "with these hands I can grasp" "with these feet I can walk" (Russon, *Human*, 31). One's body does not merely serve to enable one's interactions with a world; rather the body itself effects one's perception of the world insofar as one's perception of the world is structured in terms of one's possible interactions with the world. If we refer back to our walking example, specifically the manner in which a destination is posited, this positing of a destination is a structuring of one's perception by one's embodied conscious wherein one designates a place as "destination" and perception is structured around this project. The appearance of a location as a "destination" is a self-created accomplishment of the subject. The destination is a project of subject; the positing of this project alters the manner in which the world appears. When we determine that we wish to move, our world appears in terms of this movement. The world appears as a place wherein our projects are being achieved or failed and such projects are facilitated by our "I can."

Husserl refers to this conception of one's body, as the medium through which one may engage a world of objects and other subjects, as "leib" or "lived body." The term "leib" refers specifically to one's recognition of the body's significance in experience. "My animate organism as uniquely singled out – namely as the only one of them that is not just a body but precisely an animate organism… I perceive 'with' my hands… I perceive also 'with' my eyes" (Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations,* 97). Leib serves as the foundation for the ever-present structures that

serves as the primary manner in which a consciousness engages the world. It is one's body as leib that allows one to perceive the world, and its contents, in terms of one's "I can." It is through one's "I can" (or bodily power) that one can view the world in terms of possibilities (Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations,* 97).

From one's body as leib, one may have a world. Yet in having a world, the subject's consideration of "I can" does not merely serve as a means to perceiving an object as able to be manipulated on one's part ("I can"), rather the world itself appears in terms of possibilities that are facilitated by the subject's "I can". This structure of the world as possibilities is essential to the subject's experience of a world as this possibility structure allows for the subject to forwardly project his or her project's and intentions. As previously mentioned, these projects and intentions alter the manner in which the world appears. However, the world of possibilities always refers to one's leib, meaning that the possibilities always appear in terms of one's own bodily power. This means that one's body shapes one's projects, and that these projects shape the manner in which the world appears to the subject. A subject is not merely limited to understanding his or her interactions with a world in terms of his or her bodily capabilities. Rather, the subject understands his or her interactions with the world in terms of possibilities.

Before progressing too far into the appearance of the world in terms of one's possibilities, we must first return to our discussion of horizons in order to better understand the effect of horizons upon the appearance of a subject's possibilities. It has been stated that a horizon includes one's current surroundings and also serves to establish continuity between transitions

from one location to another.[2] Yet this location also carries certain significance for the subject insofar as it determines a subject's possibilities in terms of the world.

To exemplify this nature of horizons, let us use the example of a church, as a means of understanding the potentially particular intentionality that a horizon may suggest. To describe a church merely in terms of its qualities (such as: pews, alters, stained glass windows) is to provide an inadequate description, as it misses the greater presence and intentionality that a church carries with it. The design of a church is primarily to facilitate worship. To be present within a church is to have this possibility (worship) called upon oneself in a manner similar to a suggestion. The possibility of worship is implied in the horizon of church, and is more vital to the church's essence than are its qualities. To be within a church is to have the possibility of worship appear. This particular horizon carries this particular significance and this significance alters the manner in which the setting is perceived.

This significance has a broader importance than just serving as a proponent of a particular possibility within reference to a horizon. For the world of the subject is comprised of the totality of all involvements and meaningfulness of the subject. This meaningfulness and involvements are always shaped according to the particular subject's "I can," as one's "I can" is linked to his or her particular bodily ability, and it is through one's body that one views his or her world. Thus one's body establishes involvements with the world. These involvements, and their meaningfulness, are a product of the subject who, in his or her active engagement (being-in-the-world), creates meaning with in the world. Through engagement with objects, one develops meaning. This meaning is subject to the influences of the subject as an embodied consciousness. The same steep cliff that appears to me as being inaccessible appears to the seasoned mountain

[2] Chapter I. (5)

climber as a means to arriving at the summit of the mountain. To him, a cliff appears almost in the manner a series of stairs appears to me: communicating a means of access to his bodily power. These radically different appearances arise from the same object. The appearances of that object are a reflection of one's own self – its structure is the accomplishment of the subject to whom it appears.

"The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and for living being, having a body means being united with a definite milieu (engagement with a significant environment), merging with certain projects, and being perpetually engaged therein" (Merleau-Ponty, 84). The world does not appear to a subject as bereft of meaning. Rather, the world appears as meaningful, and this meaning within the world originates from the subject, as well as the subject's adopted disposition towards the world. This construction is free as this freedom is reflected in the appearance of possibilities for a subject. This is because a subject's possibilities appear to the subject as possibilities due to the subject's choices. A subject's world appears to him or her in terms of possibilities. These possibilities are a product of a subject's thrown-ness or self-projection into the future and thus are shaped in their construction by the various projects of the subject. For example, when I need to be on campus several possibilities appear to me as possible realities, I may walk from my apartment, to the shuttle at Clairmont and be taken to Emory. Alternatively, I may drive my car and park illegally off of Oxford Road and continue on foot to Emory. Both of these possibilities are projections of my future possibilities. Prior to actualization neither is more real or less real than the other and both are an extension of my current condition as a subject.

However, in order to be posited as genuine possibilities, both are concrete or at least foreseeably concrete. In reference to this example, when I need to be on campus and I am

contemplating my possibilities, I do not posit taking a private helicopter as a genuine possibility, because I lack the foreseeable ability to make such a possibility my possibility. In fact, the possibility does not appear to me as a possibility. I may entertain such a possibility in a joking or fantastical manner, but it will not genuinely appear to me as a possibility, nor will I consider it my possibility. One's possibilities are always tied to one as a subject, and so are not utterly free in construct as they rely upon one's body. Finally, when I choose a possibility as my possibility, it has the character of being a lived possibility. The former possibilities cease to carry such an intention of possible-ness for me. As the other possibility was unrealized, the possibility can only be referenced in terms of past: "This morning, I had the opportunity to drive my car;" while the possible can reappear as a possible to me in the future: "I can drive my car to campus," it ceases to be such until a situation surrounds me in which it (more specifically, a possibility that appears akin to the unlived possibility) can reappear.

The appearance of these possibilities is shaped, in part, by my project to arrive on campus. For their appearance only occurs due to this project. Insofar as this is the case, the possibility is shaped by the subject's project. However, this is not to say that a possibility may not occur naturally. For example, regardless of the project, the possibility of smoking a cigarette will appear to a cigarette smoker. In this way the possibility alters the manner in which the world appears to the subject as horizons will appear as "places in which I may smoke."

There is an inherent freedom to this construction, for to make a possibility one's own relies upon the subject's assent. Even if the choice is implicitly determined, such as choosing one route over another solely upon one's familiarity with the particular route, the choice is open and therefore requires assent on the part of the subject insofar as it has the potential to be rejected or at very least appears to have the potential to be rejected. "I prefer to walk; yet I am running late,

therefore I will drive." In this case the preferred choice (walking) was superseded by other considerations (timing, specifically tardiness) of the project that necessitated its appearance (arriving on campus). Therefore, the preferred choice was rejected for the sake of another.

The structure of possibilities also implies the appearance of other associated possibilities. One possibility opening up into another. In reference to our example, if I choose to drive (for whatever reason), my driving implies the appearance of other possibilities – "since I drove, I may stop at a gas station and buy a coffee," or "I may smoke a cigarette on my ride over to campus," these possibilities appear, but are not necessitated. Any and all of them may be rejected or may not appear due to other considerations. For instance, if I drink a coffee prior to leaving my home the possibility of stopping at a gas station and buying a coffee may not appear.

However, this is not always the case. For example the lived possibility of driving implies the lived possibility of parking. In my decision to drive, I have implicitly decided to park leading me to question, "where will I park?" which leads to considerations of other possibilities such as "Should I attempt to avoid a ticket by parking in the 1 hour parking?" The lived possibility of driving has yielded effects upon my perception – now the overstuffed 1 hour sidewalk parking appears menacing, the appearance of a ticket upon another driver's windshield is experienced as relaxing as it results in me assuming that Decatur Police will not return twice in a day. Had I walked, however, neither of these examples would have taken on the same appearance. The overstuffed sidewalk parking would appear as an unintimidating typical messy arrangement of cars, and the ticket would have been experienced as melancholy as I would emphasize with the driver's situation.

These differences in perception are important. They emphasize how the choices a subject makes have effects upon how the world appears. While this appearance may be able to be

overcome through reflection, it remains an obstacle. For while looking for a place to park I may realize after the fact that the cars are not menacing, or that I should not take pleasure in the sight of a ticket that causes another pain – these affirmations require focus and willpower that may prove difficult due to other concerns. This indicates that the structure of possibilities always refers to a subject. The appearance of possibilities is not concretely uniform, but rather that it is subject to influences. This means that the projects and intention of the subject will influence which possibilities appear, as well as which possibilities appear as attractive. In my example of parking a car, my frustration in finding a parking spot resulted in dramatic perceptual changes. The appearance of objects within the world is not uniform. Instead, their appearance is subject to alteration due to the aggregate of subjective considerations – such as emotions, and individual projects of the subject.

We must also recognize that the appearance of possibilities also relies upon a certain freedom of the subject to posit them as such, to perceive them as possibilities. This perception is tied to both an inner-conception of oneself, as well as one's perception of their self in relation to the world. Let us consider a man who takes himself as a moral person. Such a man will perceive his possibilities against a background of morality. This inner-conception is flexible, for it is never concretely a quality of the subject. Yet possibilities that do not align with his morality such as "I could get a lap dance at a strip club" do not appear to this man, unless through focus upon them he initiates their appearance or if a horizon presents itself in which the possibility is suggested (ex. a strip club). The moral man's self-conception of being a moral individual may change. This change would radically alter the presentation of his possibilities as a subject, as it would essentially alter what he posits as possibilities for him.

My project of getting to school displays how my perception is shaped by my "I can" in the manner that various possibilities appear to me. These possibilities reflect my bodily capability. As I am the kind of subject to whom the operation of a vehicle is a possibility the possibility of operating a vehicle appears to me. Yet this possibility's appearance to me is not solely due to my body schema but also due to the fact that I own a car (a tool) and know how to drive it. As such let us more adequately consider the subject's, as an embodied consciousness, relation to tools.

In discussing a subject's relation to tools, it is important to make the distinction between a present-at-hand view of objects, and a ready-to-hand understanding of objects, with the latter being the subject's primary relation to objects in his or her everyday life (Heidegger, 99). This distinction must be made in order to fully understand the subject's relation to tools. As a result of having a set of qualities and attributes, an object may be viewed in a "present-at-hand manner," meaning the object may be viewed in terms of its component parts (Heidegger, 100). For example, from a present-at-hand viewpoint, a hammer is a piece of metal fastened to a piece of wood. This mode of viewing an object is prevalent in scientific fields, whose understanding of objects is primarily an account of the object's concrete properties and component parts as they operate in relation to one another. To be a hammer is to exhibit the ability to fasten other objects together. This utility is a definite quality of the hammer, meaning that so long as it remains a hammer it will carry this utility as a part of its being. While it is true that a hammer may be used for other purposes, such as a paperweight, the usage of the hammer for anything other than its established purpose is to use it in a deficient mode of its being (Heidegger, 115). Things that may be viewed in a present-at-hand manner, objects, have no world. Being-in-the-world distinguishes a conscious being from objects (Heidegger, 79).

Typically in everyday experience, one only approaches a piece of equipment in a "present-at-hand" manner when it is deficient or lacking. Take, for example, when a car is no longer drivable due to a flat tire. The tool's (in this case a car) failure necessitates a present-at-hand look at the car in order to diagnose the component that is an issue. Roughly, in the case of a flat tire, the subject will first view the cars in terms of its components, then realize that a tire is flat, remove and replace the component, and finally resume driving. However, this differs significantly from one's everyday experience of the car, as one does not typically have a conscious awareness of the components of the car when the car is working perfectly. In our everyday experience a present-at-hand viewpoint is primarily utilized as a means of overcoming a deficiency in the equipment itself. When driving a car, as with walking, the subject does not actively posit every movement necessary to operate the vehicle. The subject does not find him or herself commanding his or her body or the car. Rather, the subject's relationship to the car is similar to that of his or her body. When the subject places the key into the ignition, this movement is accomplished naturally, without positing the precise spatial locations of the key or the ignition, nor does the subject posit the various mechanistic components necessary for the functionality of the car. When driving, the subject understands the spatiality of the car as a part of him or herself. This relation is similar to that of a subject and his or her body in that active attention is not merited. If one's active attention were solely upon the car itself, then the subject would be unable to utilize the tool efficiently.

As one's world appears in terms of his or her possibilities, equipment necessarily serves to expand one's possibilities. For example, the natural human body that cannot move at 50mph, is enabled this possibility by equipment (for example; a car). In one's average everyday dealings with equipment, one does not have a theoretical "present-at-hand" grasp of the equipment itself

(Heidegger, 95). One does not have to process a deep understanding of the hammer itself to hammer. In fact, one interacts more intimately with the hammer when engaging in the act of hammering (Heidegger, 99). In the realm of the ready-to-hand, the subject's relation to the object is in no way theoretical. Instead, the object is encountered in the mode of its being, as is entailed in its utility.

In discussing a subject's relation to tools we have neglected discussing how the subject comes to develop this ready-to-hand relation. Just because a subject has the bodily capability, "I can," required for the usage of a tool or action does not mean that the subject may necessarily utilize his or her ability to do so. Rather, in order to accomplish actions and utilize tools implicitly one must develop his or her bodily understanding; the subject must develop a habit.

[4.2 Habit]

As our example of walking exemplifies, a subject's body is typically experienced implicitly, as focused attention is unnecessary to conduct the necessary actions of our everyday dealings. Due to this we concluded that this implicit nature of our everyday dealings is evident of a bodily development rather than a mental one with the mind only serving to first initiate the project of bodily development with the aim to accomplish movements without needing to exert explicit mental control over one's body. It is through habit that a subject may come to develop an explicit action (such as walking, writing, driving) into an implicitly experienced action. This development is not mental. Rather, it is only firstly initiated mentally by one's consciousness. Whether these developments are capable of recollection (such as learning to drive a car) or not (as is the case with bodily developments of infancy), every action that is employed by the subject is developed. The bodily "I can," that enables the appearance of the world, is not a given it is

developed. As development the embodied conscious takes the form of habit wherein explicit actions become experienced as implicit.

One might object to this description by citing an instance in which the subject is unfamiliar with the action he or she is completing (such as an initially awkward series of movements – "sprawling" in wrestling, driving a car, aiming a handgun, etc.) as evident that actions are not experienced implicitly, because these actions rather requires active attention on the part of the subject in order to be accomplished. It is true that these experiences initially do not adhere to this description; however, these experiences reveal a more flexible habit structure than other traditions suggest. As mentioned, the traditions of Intellectualism and Empiricism are unable to account for what I have designated as "pseudo-habits." These unfamiliar actions being cited as an objection are precisely such. Pseudo-habits are in the mode of being learned, whereby the subject's body develops a habit that allows for the flawless execution of such actions – as if they were as simple as walking.

In our example of walking, we came across an instance in which it seemed that one's active attention was merited (tripping). However, even such reactions become a sort of bodily development that is experienced implicitly. Reactions to an immediate event are in themselves a developed response to the event. In the example of driving a car, if one should get to close to the median or to another car, the individual will react in a manner that is similar to his or her past reactions. In this way one need not examine the precise distance necessary to correct, rather his or her action (as a reaction) is an immediate response. These actions represent a development on the part of the body. For these reactions to occur, a mind's active attention is not necessary. The body accomplishes these reactions.

All actions are developed, as we do not come out of our mother's womb with an understanding of our body. Rather than being given, each action was discovered, learned, and developed by its subject. Even the presumably simple example of walking displays this structure of development, it too is tied to habit insofar as these series of actions (walking) are not given at birth but rather developed in infancy. Since our active attention is not merited, the various component determinations that are a quality of the action (in the instance of walking: length of gait, speed of movement, placement of foot in relation to ground, etc.) must have been developed in order to be experienced implicitly by a subject. If such component actions were not developed, the subject accomplishing the action would have to place his or her active attention towards accomplishing these actions.

Habit always takes the form of a development, a development that is specifically bodily. This development is an alteration of one's body – serving as either an expansion or a constraint of one's bodily ability. One's perception is unique due to one's bodily developments; one's bodily developments grant his or her world meaning for at every moment a subject is engaged with his or her world and the nature of this engagement itself is radically determined by a subject's habituation. For example; as a shooting enthusiast with a particular interest in pistols, when a pistol is presented to me its appearance and my engagement with its appearance is different than that of another who lack my habituation to pistols. As I focus (in this case with my eyes or my hands) on the pistol I in a sense see more – features such as the angle or the width of its grip appear to me in terms of their utility in shooting. This appearance is always in reference to other pistols I have shot. Furthermore, particular technical aspects such as the lowering and flaring of an ejection port, a crowned barrel, an over travel screw's presence on a trigger, all appear to me whereas to others these aspects may not. At the same time, if a pistol is presented to

me that utilizes a unique action – this unique quality will grasp me, its uniqueness highlighted upon a background of familiar experience. This exemplifies how the same sense data that is presented to a particular subject may be more meaningful to him or her due to his or her habituation.

Beyond developing his or her own body through habit, the subject utilizes habit in conjunction with tools. As mentioned previously, one's world is presented to her in terms of her possibilities and the development of habit may serve to expand one's possibilities, this is especially the case in relation to tools. For one who has the ability to grasp, the choice of whether to grasp a pencil is available, and the pencil itself is seen as a something that may be grasped. Combined with the bodily capability of being able to grasp the object, the habit of writing allows for engagement with the pencil, enabling proper engagement with the pencil in the form of writing. It is clear that writing, in this sense, is not a possibility for one without hands, as they cannot have the habit of writing, for their body is incapable of engagement with the object necessary for the performing the habitual act.

Habit does more than merely allow a subject to develop further bodily powers. A subject's habits are essentially his or her past beginning implicitly carried into the future. We have already discussed the nihilating structure of temporality and concluded that temporality relies upon a self-imposed nothingness that acts to nihilate one's present into a past in order to bring one's future into the present.[3] We specifically discussed this nihilating structure of temporality in terms of one's being, and noted that one's being-for-itself forbids the object-like qualities that subjects of bad faith posit as definite structures of their being; however, we did not discuss how a subject carries forth any semblance of identity through this temporal structure.

[3] Chapter II. (19-21)

One's habits serve this role. It is through habit that subjects achieve this carrying forth of their identity. While habit is in no way binding, meaning that a developed habit does not serve as a permanent alteration to a subject's being, it is akin to a developed inclination or ability, habits may be so developed (such as addiction) that they appear as inescapable. Yet even in cases such as addiction habit does not serve as a definite aspect of a subject's being. At all points the subject's freedom remains intact. Structurally this must be the case, for the freedom of a subject's being allows for the flexibility necessary for developing a habit; it is this structure of being-for-itself that enables a subject to develop habits. So while habit (insofar as habit is the basis for identity) serves as the substance that those under the guise of bad faith posit as definite, it will always fail to serve this role insofar as habit itself relies upon this flexibility. As we now understand how habit serves to carry one's identity implicitly through temporality we may now consider habits relation to freedom.

[4.3 Habit and Freedom]

We have come to understand that habit alters one's perception of the world. For in developing habits one is essentially developing an inclination towards a particular possibility; as such, this possibility appears (often with more frequency) to the subject. One is able to change this structure through the development of new habits; however changing habit(s) poses particular difficulties. If we think back upon Sartre's example of the gambler, his strong habituated inclination to gambling is so strong that its eradication cannot be overcome simply through an affirmation of the will. To the gambler, the possibility of gambling is so enticing that it supersedes his mental ability to disregard it as a possibility. The possibility's appearance cannot be removed by his mind; his mind has no power over the appearance of this possibility. This is not the case only in addiction; rather because habit is so implicit recognizing the through which

an unpleasant possibility appears may be virtually impossible. In order to truly "overcome" a habit one must seemingly re-align oneself with a new habit that results in the appearance of a more attractive possibility so as to have the unpleasant possibility no longer appear. One cannot simply remove a particular bodily development via mental positing, rather one must resort to much more drastic and difficult measures in order to ensure he or she no longer utilizes the habit.

This difficulty does not suggest that the subject is unable to change; a particular habit is never a definite aspect of the subject. "Like all habituation it bears the marks of that finitude that is its condition, namely, the finitude of bodily form" (Russon, *Bearing,* 54). As one's "I can" enables one to develop habits, and as this "I can" is subject to change due to bodily changes, habit itself is finite. There is no habit so strong that it cannot be altered. For consideration let us take Merleau-Ponty's famous example of the phenomenon of the phantom limb as an example of a dramatic alteration of a subject's being-in-the-world.

The phenomenon of the phantom limb, medically known as "phantom limb syndrome," "is the perception of sensations, including pain, in a limb that has been loss (due to amputation, severing, etc.)" (NYU Medical Center). Often the subject experiences the limb as fully functional, yet obviously the limb no longer remains and thus is not functional. Merleau-Ponty uses this example to illustrate the power of the habit body, as well as the ability of a subject to refuse (through repression) the recognition of one's altered condition. The phenomenon occurs due to the subject's habituation to the limb's significance, and refusal to re-habituate him or herself in reference to his or her new body. The loss of the limb presents the subject with a decision to either re-habituate or to attempt to continue to engage the world as they always have. Obviously the latter is impossible. No matter how real the sensation of the severed arm the subject will always be confronted with instances that remind them of the loss of this appendage.

Alleviation of the phenomenon depends upon the subject's re-habituation to the world in terms of their altered bodily power. However, this is not to suggest that a subject may simply re-habituate him or herself easily; the loss of an appendage yields a significance obstacle for habit. Much of the subject's familiar former modes of engagement with the world must be in many cases utterly abandoned or modified. A subject who has lost a limb faces a radical alteration to their being-in-the-world, any past engagement that required the use of the lost limb must be modified or abandoned. Patients experiencing phantom limb syndrome fear such alterations, helplessly clasping to their old familiar being-in-the-world.

If this description sounds familiar, this is due to phantom limb syndrome sharing several similarities to the phenomenon of bad faith; both are doomed projects that posit a sort of lie in an attempt to evade a discomforting truth. Resolution of both of these phenomena requires a recognition. In the case of the phantom limb, a re-habituation must occur in relation to the subject's lost appendage. The subject must accept the loss so as to allow for the development of future engagements. In the case of bad faith, the subject must recognize and accept the freedom inherent in being-as-a-subject so as to allow for a greater engagement and understanding of him or herself as a subject.

As has been mentioned, this re-habituation is not solved by a simple affirmation of one's will. If we recall the possibility structure of the subject's "I Can," we must grant that the possibility of placing meaning in the world while simultaneously denying one's role in its placement (bad faith) remains a possibility for any subject. The unrestricted nature of the subject's freedom of being-for-itself allows necessarily for this possibility. In our discussion of

bad faith[4] we determined that the project of bad faith was doomed to failure from its initiation insofar as one's attempt to evade freedom requires the very freedom one is attempting to evade. As such, a major component of one's adoption of bad faith must be habit, for in order for the lie of bad faith to genuinely appear to its subject as a truth, the lie must become an implicit part of the subject. As habit signifies a making implicit of an explicit action, through habit a subject may hide the lie of bad faith from him or herself.

As the desire to evade freedom does not alter one's being in a manner by which they may accomplish this end, one remains free insofar as habituation is essentially the making implicit of an explicit action[5]; through habit the subject of bad faith may repress the appearance of bad faith's paradoxical nature as a lie to oneself - for through habitually re-affirming the lie of bad faith, the explicit affirmation will inevitably (granted it adheres to the structures of habit) become implicit. This means that bad faith's recognition as a lie would be (at least partially) hidden from oneself. Therefore while the phenomenon of bad faith is inevitably doomed to fail to achieve its end, it may exist in pursuit of its end if its lie is made implicit through habituation. In this manner, and only in this manner, may the lie to oneself be genuinely posited as enabling one to adopt bad faith. However, this adoption does not signify a genuine alteration of being, it only signifies the accomplishment of an illusion of a lack of freedom.

In this manner we may begin to establish the connection between bad faith and habit more fully. We acknowledge that bad faith must remain a possibility for subjects. As all subjects' first relation to their freedom was one of concealment (childhood), subjects are intimately familiar with comfort that bad faith provides. These considerations make bad faith's existence as a possibility for subjects problematic. A subject's experience of his or her

[4] Chapter II. (pg. 23)
[5] The term "action" is used here in its most general sense, without necessarily referring to physical action.

metaphysical privilege of childhood could dispose the subject towards the possibility of bad faith.

This does not suggest that all subjects hold the same disposition towards the adoption of bad faith; rather it implies that this disposition is present due to the subject's experience of childhood. However, a strong inclination towards this possibility appears to be possible. In our discussion of possibilities we discussed the manner that possibilities appear to a particular subject. In reference to the particular possibility of adopting bad faith – if one takes such comfort in the evasion of freedom or similarly if one is so disturbed by the confrontation of one's freedom, the possibility of bad faith is utterly tempting. This temptation could potentiality be so extreme as to be akin to addiction, wherein the possibility of adopting bad faith appears as a potential possibility in every horizon regardless of perceptual triggers[6] – similar to the manner in which an alcoholic sees the possibility of drinking regardless of the presence of alcohol.

Regardless of the magnitude of the temptation, a confrontation with one's freedom may motivate the appearance of the possibility of bad faith. It is in crossing by the precipice that a subject is inclined to evade his or her freedom by adopting the illusion of determinacy offered by bad faith. Insofar as confrontation with one's being-for-itself is a possibility, the appearance of the possibility of bad faith may arise. As this is the case, we must grant that the possibility of bad faith can never be utterly eliminated – just as the gambler cannot prohibit the appearance of the possibility of gambling, a subject cannot prohibit the appearance of the possibility of adopting bad faith.

[6] "Perceptual trigger" signifies an object/situation that suggests the appearance of a particular possibility. For example, the presence of alcohol suggests the possibility of drinking. Regardless of whether the possibility becomes a lived possibility the object itself may cause the appearance of the action as a possibility for the subject perceiving it. In Sartre's example of the gambler (21-23) it is the sight of gambling that initiates anguish within the gambler.

Through habit, one may make the lie of bad faith implicit, and thus hidden from oneself; however as has been discussed[7] habit cannot impose definite qualities upon its subject; rather it can only make a particular possibility more appealing. As such, it would be inadequate to equate habit's ability to make the lie of bad faith implicit to its subject as an establishment of genuine bad faith. Habit is never absolutely limiting insofar as habits may be reformed. Yet given that a subject's first relation to his or her freedom was one of concealment,[8] and as this first relation may dispose one towards the adoption of bad faith, we must reevaluate how one may break free of one's bad faith as well as what embracing one's being-for-itself entails.

In order for the eradication of one's bad faith, one must first recognize his or her responsibility in the crafting of his or her habits, as well as the corresponding alterations to one's being-in-the-world that result from such habits. One may object to the claim that the subject is responsible for his or her habits as the various habitual developments of infancy and childhood were seemingly beyond one's control. One might therefore argue, that one's habits are not entirely up to them insofar as their current condition has been affected by such developments. However, while the structure of habit is in play throughout a subject's life, its presence does not compromise the freedom of the subject: habit may only be considered limiting if the subject of the habit posits the habit as such. If we remember our discussion of the moral man[9] we may recall that the moral man's understanding of himself as moral effects the manner that the world appears to him. However, we must notice that this positing of himself as moral does not signify a genuine limit upon his being – for while the choice to violate his conception of morality may be

[7] Chapter IV. (51)
[8] Chapter III. (28)
[9] Chapter IV. (44)

unlikely or may appear as unappealing to him, it nevertheless remains a possibility due to his inherent freedom as a subject. The moral man is free to embody immorality.

The perspective of habit as a limit is false insofar as habit imposes no determinacy upon its subject. Habit may only be viewed as limiting if the subject imposes this perspective upon it in bad faith. While a habit is implicit, it must at one point have been explicit. The explicit origin of habit is evident of a subject's bad faith in treating the habit as a definite aspect of his or her being.

As habit serves as one's identity, and as habit itself is never definite, one's identity itself is free to change in relation to the non-being of the future. As such, the habits developed in childhood may not serve to compromise the ability for the subject to exert freedom of choice in his or her habits. Regardless of the manner that habit appeared to the infant or the child, the adoption of habits remained the responsibility of the subject. Unfortunately, one's childhood may make recognition of this responsibility, since as has been mentioned earlier, childhood can incline one towards the possibility of adopting bad faith.

Of course, the recognition of one's freedom does not necessitate a genuine change within the subject. Rather, it is with this recognition that the subject can begin to examine his or her habits. The work involved in making one's habits explicit so as to understand their effect upon one's being-in-the-world is difficult. Yet the work is rewarding insofar as it allows the subject to embrace his or her freedom by taking an active role of responsibility in the crafting of his or her being-in-the-world.

The habits that comprise a subject's identity and structure the appearance of his or her world are in every sense the responsibility of the subject. In no way are the various habits of a subject given, nor is any habit of the subject impervious to change. While this indicates that the

subject's being remains in essence inherently free, the subject's experience is structurally affected by his or her developed habits. As such, it is the responsibility of the subject to account for his or her habits and understand their affect upon his or her being-in-the-world. In this fashion a subject may embrace his or her freedom, developing a habituated condition of the subject's preference.

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