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Sahar Al-Gazzali April 1, 2023

From Division to Decision: Exploring the Role of Language and the Interplay between Arab and Berber Collective Identity in Post-Colonial Morocco

by

Sahar Al-Gazzali

Sam Cherribi
Adviser

Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies

Sam Cherribi

Adviser

Geoffrey Levin

Committee Member

Nahomi Ichino

Committee Member

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Abstract

From Division to Decision: Exploring the Role of Language and the Interplay between Arab and Berber Collective Identity in Post-Colonial Morocco
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Using historical and quantitative research, this study will discuss how French language acquisition in modern Morocco has impacted the concept of collective identity through language, social mobilization, and political ideology within Arab and Berber ethnic communities. This research predominantly compares colonial Morocco to post-colonial Morocco, focusing on various historical events that impacted the nation, leading to the majority of data and study focused between 1956 to 2011. Furthermore, this study will focus on Arab and Berber nationalism against Francophone culture and political identity. This will begin with an overlook and understanding of French colonialism within Morocco since France held control between 1907 to 1934 during a conquest period and from 1912 to 1956 as an official Protectorate. A historical overview of education within Morocco from the 20th century till now is also imperative to study how French became a language that Moroccans used as a door to the outside. Next, a linguistic study of French will be discussed as it gained more traction within various spheres of Moroccan society, such as education, politics, and even social class structures. Many scholars argue that linguistic unity equates to national unity. This leads to an analysis of how the role of the French language and culture paved the way for anticolonialist and pro-nationalist sentiments throughout Morocco after the end of the Protectorate period. The latter half of this paper will investigate how Morocco's postcolonial self is still denigrated in Western society and divided based on class, political, and ethnic identity within Arab and Berber populations.

Survey data will be a primary source to establish causal links between collective identity and the relationships between Morocco's social groups as the colonial period affected factors such as anticolonial resistance, ethnopluralism, urbanization, and economy. While these various social factors intermingle, political connections are a model for understanding the defining effects of nationalism and social strata. Concluding with nationalism instead of the Arab Spring protests throughout MENA, this study will end with a focus on combined nationalism of Arabs and Berbers against the Moroccan government.

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Table of Contents

Note on Transliteration

Throughout this thesis, standards from the I*nternational Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* guided transliteration of Arabic titles and terms. For transliteration of personal names, I used the same guide but defaulted to those used by individuals in their publications, websites, social media platforms, or business cards. For places, I have deferred to generally accepted spellings to enhance clarity. I used the French spelling for place names in Morocco, guided by standards of the glossary within Troin, Jean-François et. al, *Maroc: régions, pays, territoires* [*Morocco: regions, countries, territories*]. Exceptions to both the Arabic and French rules are locations that are commonly found in English: Marrakesh, Tetuan, Tangier, Fez.

Chronology[1]

- March 30, 1912 - Treaty of Fez, French Protectorate begins
- November 27, 1912 - French-Spanish treaty institutes Spanish control in the north
- November 18, 1927 - Sultan Muhammad V crowned
- December 10, 1943 - Creation of the Istiqlal Party
- August 20, 1953 - Sultan Muhammad V deposed and exiled to Madagascar
- November 16, 1955 - Sultan Muhammad V returns to Morocco
- March 2, 1956 - French-Moroccan declaration of independence
- September 6, 1959 - Istiqlal splinters; left-wing forms UNFP
- March 3, 1961 - Hassan II crowned King
- December 7, 1962 - First Moroccan Constitution adopted
- January 2, 1963 - The Istiqlal leaves the government and joins the opposition
- May 13, 1963 - First legislative elections
- January 24, 1973 - Arabization of the Faculty of Letters, Rabat
- March 3, 1973 - King Hassan II announces the program of "Morrocanization"
- May 10, 1973, Founding of Polisario
- May 20, 1976 - SARD is declared (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic)
- September 6, 1991 - Cease-fire in the Western Saharan War
- August 21, 1992 - New Constitution presented for referendum
- July 30, 1999 - Muhammad VI crowned King
- September 27, 2002 - Parliamentary elections, PJD emerges as main opposition party
- June 2007 - Muhammad VI and Polisario meet at the UN but fail to reach an agreement

[1] Susan Gilson Miller, *History of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), xv-xxi.

- February 20, 2011 - Mass rallies for political reform and a new constitution
- July 1, 2011 - New Constitution approved in a referendum, winning 98% of the vote

Introduction

Topic Background

My thesis will discuss how the acquisition of the French language in Morocco from the Protectorate period to the present day has impacted the concept of collective identity through language, social mobilization, and political ideology within Arab and Berber ethnic communities. Studying the effects of colonialism on Moroccan identity is essential because it helps scholars understand the historical and cultural context of the country and its people. The colonial and protectorate periods significantly shaped Moroccan society, politics, and economy. It also influenced the formation of Moroccan national identity and the country's relationship with the rest of the world, primarily Europe. Understanding these effects can provide insight into Morocco's current issues and challenges, such as the question of Western Sahara. Further, it can inform policies and actions aimed at addressing them. Finally, it can also give a better comprehension of the complexity and diversity of Morocco, its culture, and its people.

My travels to Morocco in 2019 inspired this study when I studied Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and the colloquial Moroccan dialect, Darija, through the State Department's National Security Language Initiative for Youth (NSLI-Y) program. During my three months, primarily in Marrakesh, I noticed that the use of French or Arabic changed depending on one's social standing and ethnic background. This observation grew as it became evident through conversations with Moroccans from various socioeconomic circumstances that one's use of French or Arabic could provide insight into their beliefs regarding nationalism, education, and societal identity. This is further complicated by the indigenous Berber community, which uses its Moroccan dialectal language, Tamazight. Furthermore, my experience led me to hypothesize that the higher one's socioeconomic status is, the less Arabic will be used in relaxed/informal settings

in favor of French. This study evolved from my findings into a query about how nationalism and political identity can also be significant factors in the strength of French culture in Moroccan individuals. I believe this study is essential in understanding the lasting effect of French colonialism, starting in the French Protectorate period, and understanding how modern-day Moroccans identify in a post-colonial world.

Structure

This study will also tackle the decades-long issue of French fluency and culture becoming a door to the Western world, leading to better schooling, higher-paying jobs, and a distance from Arab or Berber roots. The impact of French colonialism will be shown as a tool by the Western world to control and disseminate conflicting religious, cultural, or linguistic differences that could potentially harm the political and socioeconomic structures created by the Francophone world. This study will begin with a historical overview of the early French Protectorate rule and chronologically trace developments related to the use of the French language through Moroccan independence and Morocco today. This first chapter will emphasize the colonial and post-colonial historical background. Next, we will look at how the French language was utilized strategically in Moroccan education to separate Berber and Arab culture and language and contain Islam's threat. This chapter will focus on how the enforced teaching of MSA, French, and Tamazight have led to the blurring of community and identity through culture. The third chapter will examine the effect of French culture and language on modern-day Moroccan society, specifically on collective class identity and structures. This chapter will include Berber's ethnic identity and language and the generational difference in the usage of French in the home. The fourth chapter will discuss the effect of French in the political sphere of Morocco and how and why ethnic voting happens. Using recent survey and electoral data, we

will inspect the differences between Arab, Berber, and other ethnic groups voting patterns in Morocco.

Furthermore, we will look at legislation and legal documents prevalent in separating Arab and Berber communities. The final chapter will discuss the rise of anticolonialism and nationalism in post-colonial Morocco. This chapter will examine the Arab Spring movement and scholars who have rebelled against European rule and pushed for Arabization. This study will open conversation and discourse on the multi-linguistic issues that affect Moroccans beginning in their early education, leading to the blurring notion of identity and the question of what defines being a Moroccan.

Literature Review

This study's primary sources include polling survey data from the Afrobarometer and the Arab Barometer. Other primary sources consist of historical sources such as treaties, speeches, autobiographical recollections, declarations by Moroccan leaders and European leaders, and also economic and political data. Secondary sources will be the main form of sources, and these will range from both Moroccan and Western historians and scholars. Several chapters will use and display tables and charts condensing survey data using the online analysis tools from the Afrobarometer for the years 2019 and 2021, from the Arab Barometer from 2018 to 2019 and from October 2021 to July 2022. The decision to use aggregate data and surveys regarding public opinion on social life in Morocco is inspired by my primary major within the Political Science department. The data provide concrete backing to the other secondary sources used in this study.

The Afrobarometer is a non-profit that, since 1999, has committed to pan-African, nonpartisan survey research that conducts and uses public attitude surveys on democracy

governance, economy, and society.[2] Along with their independent goals, the Afrobarometer surveyed Morocco in French and Arabic in 2013, 2015, 2018, and 2021. The Arab Barometer is another "nonpartisan research network that provides insight into the social, political, and economic attitudes and values of ordinary citizens across the Arab world."[3] Since 2006, the organization has surveyed Morocco using probability samples for citizens aged 18, relying on maps and population estimates to gather their data.[4] The Arab Barometer has also conducted several country reports and topic reports for Morocco on issues such as corruption, COVID-19, education, and political institutions.

Scholars from all backgrounds agree that French colonialism has profoundly impacted Moroccan identity in various ways and remains prevalent in the modern world. Beginning in the Protectorate period, we have evidence from historical decrees and laws of an early separation of Muslim Moroccans and non-Muslim Moroccans. Many scholars have studied the link and impact of language and ideology in Morocco and Algeria with the influx of several languages in the education system and how this relates to ideological and political beliefs. With the onset of Arab Spring in 2011, there has been a focus on the importance of the post-colonial self and varying conceptions of what defines the modern-day Moroccan. This has led to a major push from Maghrebi intellectuals and political leaders to urge Moroccans to rethink national identity outside of the Occidental perspective. Our sources also discuss the monarchy's ability to hold onto power in a divided Morocco with various ethnic backgrounds and political ideologies, shaped by years under French authority and then Moroccan authoritarianism.

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[2] "About," *Afrobarometer*, https://www.afrobarometer.org/about/.

[3] "About Arab Barometer," *Arab Barometer*, https://www.arabbarometer.org/about/.

[4] "Methodology," *Arab Barometer*, https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/methodology/.

The French could impose their values and cultures on Moroccan society by suppressing traditional Moroccan practices and institutions. With the division of the urban (mainly Muslim Moroccans) and rural (primarily Berber) populations, the French found another foothold to expand already uneasy sentiments between the two dominant factions in the country (more on this in chapter five). Urban areas such as Casablanca, Rabat, and Marrakesh became established settlements with European styles. This developed into a new era of a privileged class with the "best" Western education and culture bred into them. As time passed, this clear educational division led to the dilapidation of rural areas and their feeling of marginalization and exclusion from Moroccan society. National identity and language identity are carefully intermixed, and the introduction of European identity and assimilation created generations of confusion. Alternatively, some scholars and proponents of European involvement in the Maghreb believe that colonialism was the best thing to happen to Morocco. France gave Morocco infrastructure, technology, a flourishing economy, an education system, and the development of transportation and communication. With the aid of France, specifically in the urbanized centers, Moroccans' resources and opportunities were greatly strengthened. For example, the nation now has large-scale agricultural projects and mining operations that allow the country to house a strong export industry, leading to new jobs and a heightened standard of living. And while French colonialism has led to the dissemination of Moroccan culture and values, it has also preserved certain aspects of Moroccan heritage by establishing museums and institutes (for instance, Dar Batha and Dar Jamai Museum).

While there is an extensive range of scholarship, specifically on Moroccan politics, there are still significant limitations to current scholarship and even the research and conclusions made in this study. Any important sources regarding other facets of life in Morocco, such as education,

urbanization, and economy, are outshone by Algeria and the profound changes that have occurred in that nation since the Arab Spring movement. The perspective of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and the Berber population has been largely untouched in Moroccan education and political analysis. With a Muslim majority, the voices of the minority parties require more research to accurately assess the effect of modern-day Francophonie culture on all individuals within Morocco.

My study focuses on my belief that French colonialism heavily impacted social, cultural/ethnic and political identity in Morocco and that the French language became a tool of division and hierarchy in Moroccan society. However, the French language has been vital to the push for Arabization, Berber rights, and overall political nationalism. By looking at the societal markers of education, political ideology, and language rather than solely focusing on language, the predominant feature used in scholarship, we can further the scope of research using religion and history as a backdrop for how the nation first became divided. Furthermore, when looking at political ideology, this study seeks to determine why ethnic voting and ethnic grouping occur and what truly creates those divisions.

Identity is a complicated topic, even in a nation without various ethnic groups, languages, and nationalist ties. I hope to offer answers and to push scholars and those in Moroccan politics and education to reconsider the implications of forcing French on specific groups of people and certain subjects in school and look to the Berber community and their ability to weave their own indigenous culture into an Arab-dominant society.

Important Individuals[5]

Mahjoubi Aherdane: (1921/24-2020) Berber military chief, leader of the 1957 Rif Uprising, founder of the Popular Movement

'Abd al-'Aziz: (r. 1894-1908) Deposed by his brother, 'Abd al-Hafiz

'Allal al-Fasi: (1910-1974) Founder and chief architect of PI, co-authored Plan of Reforms, favored a constitutional monarchy

'Abd al-Hafiz: (r. 1908-1912) Signed the Treaty of Fez in 1912 which enacted the French Protectorate Period, deposed his brother and previous Sultan, 'Abd al-'Aziz

Abdelkrim al-Khatib: (1921-2008) Co-founder of Popular Movement

'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi: (1882/1883-1963) Berber chief, journalist, head of Rifian Republic 1922-1926, hero of anti-colonialist resistance

Mohammed Hassan al-Ouezzani: (1910-1978) Founder of PDI, rival of 'Allal al-Fassi

Ahmed Balafrej: (1908-1990) Founder of PI, Secretary-General of PI (1944), Prime Minister (1958), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1963)

Mehdi Ben Barka: (1920-1965) Founder of the National Union of Popular Forces

Abderrahim Bouabid: (1922-1992) Founder and leader of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces

Maati Bouabid: (1927-1996) Founder of the Constitutional Union

Fouad Ali El Himma: (1962-now) Founder of the Authenticity and Modernity Party, close advisor to Mohammed VI

Hassan II: (r. 1961-1999) Chief of *Forces armées royales* (FAR)[6] as Crown Prince, authoritarian leader, father of Mohammed VI

[5] Miller, xxiii-xxvii.

[6] Translates to Royal Armed Forces.

Abdallah Ibrahim: (1918-2005) Head of opposition government 1958-1960, a founder of the National Union of Popular Forces

Mohammed V: (r. 1956-1961) Revered as a liberator of Morocco from colonial rule, father of Hassan II

Mohammed VI: (r. 1999-now) Current ruling monarch, known for his liberal and democratic reforms, transformed the *makhzen* from an authoritarian to hybrid regime, signed the 2011 Constitution which made Tamazight an official language in Morocco

El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed: Sahraoui nationalist, co-founder and second Secretary-General of the Polisario Front

Ali Yata: (1920-1997) A founder of the Moroccan Communist Party in 1943 and later its head, founded the Party of Progress and Socialism in in 1974

Abderrahmane Youssoufi: (1924-2020) Founding member of the National Union of Popular Forces, Leader of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces after split from the National Union of Popular Forces, Prime Minister of the government of Alternance (1998-2002)

Key Terms and Phrases[7]

Arab: the predominant ethnic group in Morocco and throughout MENA

Berber/Amazigh: ethnic group indigenous to North Africa

Bled: Arabic for countryside, rural area

Dahir: Arabic for royal decree

Darija: the Moroccan Arabic dialect

Habous: Arabic for religious endowment in perpetuity

Makhzen: Arabic for warehouse, refers to the Moroccan government and monarchy

[7] Miller, 239-240.

Motswana: For the Afrobarometer it is used under ethnicity as national identity only or for individuals identifying as not falling into the categories of Arab, Amazigh, or Sahraoui

Sahraoui/Sahrawi: a nomadic ethnic group from the western part of the Sahara, mainly from Mauritania and are of Berber, sub-Saharan African, and Arab descent

Siba: Arabic for territory not under *makhzen* control

Tamazight: the main dialect of Berber in Morocco

Tourag/Tuareg: a nomadic Berber ethnic-subset living in the Sahara and is different from the Sahraoui ethnic group

'Urf: Arabic for customary law

Chapter One: A Historical Overview of French Colonialism

France has a long and complex history of influence and colonialism within Morocco. Their relationship, for this study, will begin in the late nineteenth century. During this time, France began to establish a presence in Morocco as part of its colonial expansion. Its expansion and interest in the Maghrebi[8] region stemmed from an Orientalist desire, among others, to colonize, gain influence, and additional information and context to the unfamiliar and complex orient, specifically in Asia and Africa. The rest of this chapter will discuss the period of colonization and conquests by the French, which led to Morocco becoming a protectorate in 1912. Ending with the new independence era, an analysis of King Hassan II is vital to understanding the push toward Moroccanization and Arabization. The importance of this chapter is to set the stage for understanding the ideological and political goals of the French and the way their systems were heavily imposed on the Moroccan people, leading to a shift in identity and social mobilization. By the end of this chapter, the strength of French influence in Morocco will be substantiated.

Orientalism and Morocco (1896-1907)

We must first explain and define Orientalism to understand colonialism within Morocco and the Maghreb. Edward Said, who published groundbreaking work in postcolonial studies in 1978, is credited with popularizing the term. He defines Orientalism as "a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in European Western experience"[9] and that "the Orient has helped define Europe (or the West)."[10] He contends that

[8] Maghreb(i) is a transliterated Arabic term for the Arab and Berber people living in North Africa, including Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, and Tunisia.

[9] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Books, 1978), 1.

[10] Ibid.

Western imperialism is to blame for the discriminatory and erroneous way the West portrays the East, particularly the Islamic world. According to Said, the West had cultivated a stereotype of the East since antiquity as "a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories, and landscapes, [and] remarkable experiences."[11] These archaic and illogical notions were used by the French to support its colonial rule over the area. Said further contends that many cultural expressions, such as literature, the arts, and academic studies, have continued to use this representation across the Western world. His book challenges the notion of an eternal, unchanging "Orient" and contends that the Western narrative of the East is created and ideologically motivated. The ideas and theories of this practice will emerge throughout this chapter and the rest of the study.

With the topic of Orientalism in mind, France set their sights on Morocco and utilized the distress of the 'Alawi dynasty[12] due to "insufficient revenues, tribal revolts"[13] and in 1896, "unbridled spending."[14] As the twentieth century neared, France could encroach further into Morocco's borders, as the monarchical authority and economic security fell away. By 1900, 'Abd al-'Aziz (r. 1894-1908) ruled Morocco with less and less control and with open access to the inner workings of court life for the French. As described by French diplomat Eugène Aubin, "He has shown no disposition to become like his ancestors, either a religious or warrior sultan."[15] Out

[11] Said, 125.

[12] The reigning dynasty in Morocco since 1631. This dynasty claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad through his grandson, Hasan ibn Ali.

[13] Susan Gilson Miller, *History of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 57.

[14] Ibid., 57.

[15] Eugène Aubin, *Morocco of Today*, vi-vii.

of touch with the Moroccan people and with no experience politically, the sultan symbolized the fall of the *makhzen*.[16]

To control the 40 million francs and counting debt,[17] the sultan reinstated the *tartib*, "a universal capital tax imposed on everyone, including Europeans, protégés, tribesmen, urban dwellers, and even the religious nobility, to be paid in cash and without exception."[18] All heavily opposed this tax, leading to the sultan trying various fiscal fixes over the next few years, mainly through foreign loans from the British, Belgians, and French.

To make matters worse, insurgencies and rebellions continued to worsen through 1907. During this time, political, religious, and intellectual rebels argued for "selfhood and national identity"[19] and rivaled the *makhzen*. This chaos culminated in 1907 when Émile Mauchamp, a French doctor, was assassinated in Marrakesh, leading to his martyrdom and to French troops taking over the Moroccan city of Oujda.[20] While it is believed that Mauchamp's murder was planned by Moroccan anti-colonialists, it was the catalyst for more European murders and French takeovers of Moroccan cities such as Casablanca.[21]

Colonization and Conquest Period (1908-1934)

The French conquest of Morocco, which lasted from 1908 to 1934, imposed a protectorate on the Maghrebi state. A protectorate as defined by France intervened to protect

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[16] See "Key Terms and Phrases."

[17] L. Arnaud, *Au temps des "mehallas" ou le Maroc de 1860 à 1912* [*At the time of the "mehallas" or Morocco from 1860 to 1912*] (Casablanca: Éditions Atlantides, 1952), 71, 129, 132.

[18] Miller, 61.

[19] Farid Laroussi, "Orientalism and Postcolonial Studies," *Postcolonial Counterpoint: Orientalism, France, and the Maghreb*, (2016): 58, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/j.ctv1005crh.6.

[20] Miller, 75.

[21] Ibid., 75.

colonial interests in Morocco, led now by Sultan ‘Abd al-Hafiz, and resist the burgeoning influence of Germany and other European countries. The Algeciras Conference agreement, which recognized France's guardianship over Morocco, was signed by the French and the Spanish in 1908. Over the following several years, French troops took control of important towns and crucial areas, including Casablanca, Fez, and Marrakesh. In Fes in 1911, the French seized the city while “the tribes of the Middle Atlas besieged Fez and the sultan found himself a prisoner of the palace.”[22] This is just another example of the French relying on the crumbling of the *makhzen* to take control.

Locals rebelled against French rule and the displacement of Moroccan officers, causing turmoil. Despite resistance, the French continued to take over more and more of the state, enacting numerous political, social, and economic reforms. These included advancing French culture and language, updating the legal system, and improving the infrastructure (more on this in later chapters). The imposition of such changes ties back to Said’s perspective on Orientalism and how “Orientalism, then, is not an airy European fantasy about the Orient, but a created body of theory and practice in which, for many generations, there has been considerable material investment.”[23] The long-played investment of the French military, economists, and political thinkers worked and led to the long Protectorate period in Morocco.

However, the Moroccan people did not readily accept colonial rule. Several uprisings and rebellions occurred during this time, including the Rif War (1921–1926), which the Berber people of northern Morocco waged against the French and Spanish. Figure one illustrates the division of Morocco by the French and the Spanish, excluding the Tangier zone. The charismatic

[22] Miller, 78.

[23] Said, 20.

resistance leader Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi (‘Abd al-Karim) led the Berbers in their fight against the French and Spanish, who wanted to increase their hold over the area. ‘Abd al-Karim used Islamic revival tenants to garner support and form *al-jumhuriyya al-rifiyya* (the Rifian Republic)[24] and an army, and France by 1924 had dealt with Arab and Berber opposition in several regions while protecting “the railroad line between Fez and Oujda,”[25] allowing them control over territory “between Moroccan and western Algeria.”[26]

Figure 1. The French Protectorate, Spanish Protectorate, and Tangier International Zone in Morocco began in 1912. (University of Arkansas)

Numerous significant engagements took place throughout the period, including the Battle of Anoual in 1920, which gave the Berbers a resounding victory, and the Battle of Annual in 1921, which gave the French and Spanish forces the upper hand. Berber resistance persisted

[24] Miller, 107.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

despite the setback, and the battle eventually developed into a full-fledged war in which the French used modern weaponry that was not available in Morocco during the time, including "aerial bombardment, poison gas, and armored tanks and cars."[27] The Berber armies were routed at the end of the Rif War in 1926, and a French Protectorate was established over the Rif region. The conflict had enormous repercussions for Morocco since it signaled the start of a new age of foreign dominance and added to the population's mounting unhappiness.

Protectorate Period and Treaties (1912-1956)

The French Protectorate period officially began with the signing of the Treaty of Fez on March 30, 1912, between France and Morocco which was signed by the current ruler of Morocco, Sultan Abd al-Hafiz and French diplomat Eugène Ragnault. By formally designating Morocco as a Protectorate of France, it preserved the Moroccan monarchy while granting France command over the country's foreign policy and armed forces. The agreement ended the Moroccan Crisis of 1911 and established French rule over Morocco, which lasted until its independence in 1956. This treaty is important, as it establishes the end of Morocco's independence and highlights the control over all Moroccan facets of government, with the Sultan remaining as a puppet of indirect rule. Article I of the Treaty of Fez reads:

> The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty the Sultan have agreed to establish in Morocco a new régime admitting of the administrative, juridical, educational, economic, financial and military reforms which the French Government may deem useful to be introduced within the Moroccan territory. This régime shall safeguard the religious status, the respect and traditional prestige of the Sultan, the exercise of the Mohammedan religion and of the religious institutions and in particular those of the *habous*.[28] It shall admit of the organization of a reformed Shereefian makhzen. The Government of the

[27] Miller, 109.

[28] See "Key Terms and Phrases."

> republic will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government regarding the interests which this government has in virtue of its geographical position and territorial possessions on the Moroccan coast. In like manner, the City of Tangier shall retain the distinctive characteristic for which it has been known and which will determine its municipal organization.[29]

As seen from the first article, the Treaty of Fez highlights the role of the French and the Spanish in the northern and southernmost portions of the country, illustrated in figure one. While maintaining French military presence, the Protectorate period would also create lasting transformative political, religious, social, educational, and economic changes to Morocco and, subsequently, the Moroccan people. The French began this colonial period by first distinguishing what Berber identity should be and how this needed to be separated from Islamic and Arab influence to facilitate control of all Moroccans. This ethnic framing, "*politique berbère* (Berber policy) and later its *politique indigène* (native policy)... was principally concerned with identifying and codifying the political, linguistic, and legal practices particular to different tribes and tribal sections"[30] within the framework of indirect rule. To control a vast range of territories and ethnic backgrounds, the French knew that they quickly had to create a system through which they could classify every individual into various categories.

This leads us to the second component: choice of language. As the French found it easier and more practical to speak Moroccan vernacular Arabic (Darija) over the Moroccan Berber language (Tamazight), French, Darija, and the Modern Standard Arabic (Fusha) quickly became the three dominant languages in the colonial period, remaining even now.[31] This breakdown of

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[29] "Protectorate Treaty between France and Morocco," *American Journal of International Law* 6, no. S3 (1912): 207, https://doi.org/10.2307/2212598.

[30] Katherine E Hoffman, "Purity and Contamination: Language Ideologies in French Colonial Native Policy in Morocco," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50, no. 3 (2008): 725, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27563696.

[31] J. Bourilly, *Elèments de l'enthnographie marocaine*, [*Elements of Moroccan ethnography*] (Paris: Librairie Coloniale et Orientaliste, 1932), 39.

language led to a division of collective identity, specifically among the Tamazight-speaking Berbers who used an oral literary tradition.[32] The implementation of French was also used to create national unity, which can be seen in other French protectorates and former colonies such as Algeria, Ghana, Cameroon, and Senegal. Hoffman discusses how "Some wishful-thinking Protectorate officials and French scholars imagined that Berbers would eventually assimilate to French civilization, or at least to French law, rather than Arab civilization and Islamic law"[33] due to the strict idea they had about collective identity in the colonial period. However, as this study will continue to discuss, identity is far more complex than an either-or-situation. For many Moroccans, identity does not simply hinge on only ethnicity or language.

The final component used by the French was the separation of law for native policies for Arabs and Berbers with divisions such as "*bled makhzen* (central government-controlled land)--*bled siba* (dissident land); *shari'a* (Islamic law)--*'urf* (customary law)."[34] The French saw the *bled makhzen* as Islamized, requiring the application of *shari'a*, and the *bled siba*, was the central and eastern Berbers, requiring *'urf*. Schieffelin and Woolard theorize that "Language ideologies naturalize linkages between language, law, and belief systems, among other aspects of culture and society."[35] This topic will be further discussed in the next chapter regarding education.

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[32] Jonathan Wyrtzen, "Colonial State-Building and the Negotiation of Arab and Berber Identity in Protectorate Morocco," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43, no. 2 (2011): 245, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23017396.

[33] Hoffman, 727-728.

[34] Ibid., 728.

[35] Bambi B. Schieffelin and Katheryn A. Woolard, "Language Ideology," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 23 (1994): 55, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2156006.

The other two treaties to note during this period were the Franco-Spanish Treaty (1927) and the Franco-Moroccan Joint Declaration (1956). On October 4, 1927, France and Spain signed the Franco-Spanish Treaty intended to settle the matter of their respective regions of influence in Morocco. To ensure that France and Spain would coordinate their policies and avoid any conflicts of interest, the treaty established a system for joint consultation between the two nations on subjects about Morocco.

The Franco-Moroccan Joint Declaration, signed on March 2 1956, by France and Morocco, signaled the end of the Protectorate over Morocco and the start of its independence. Following the agreements, France acknowledged Morocco's independence and consented to give the new administration control of the country's military and administrative facilities. In return, Morocco pledged to protect the rights and interests of French nationals and companies doing business there. With Spain's agreement to hand over the authority of its southern provinces to the new Moroccan government, the status of Spain's Protectorate over Morocco was also resolved by the Madrid Accords. The signing of the Madrid Accords brought an end to French and Spanish colonial control in Morocco and ushered in its independence.

New Independence Period (1956-1975)

Morocco's separation from France was finally secured on March 2, 1956, following decades of protracted fights by nationalist movements and riots led my pivotal moments such as the Berber Rif War,[36] the exile of Sultan Mohammed V (r. 1956-1961), and riots in Oujda. Morocco had been a part of the French Protectorate for more than 40 years. While this new period of freedom brought great hope to Moroccans, "the principal dilemma facing the new

[36] War lasted from 1921-1926 and was led by 'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi. The movement was later suppressed by French and Spanish troops.

regime was how to restart the engine of the state and overcome the blockages of arrested, political and social development."[37] Returning to Moroccan soil only a year prior to independence, the formerly exiled Mohammed V started to work first on the modernization of the nation and the economy, consolidating state institutions and organizing the society and political parties. The Sultan faced many insurgencies at the start of his reign but tried to establish unity again between the Arabs and Berbers, a link that the French had worked tirelessly to destroy for the last 44 years. While re-establishing the constitutional monarchy, Mohammed V symbolized Moroccan nationalism and independence. His legacy paved the way for his son, Hassan II (r. 1961-1999) to rule after his death in 1961.

King Hassan II,[38] at only 32, was now in charge of Morocco and took a more radical, authoritarian approach to rule. Educated by the French and Moroccans, he was "a lover of tradition and the prerogatives of power,"[39] while representing a new era of Moroccans who experienced both Western and native influence from the Protectorate period. His early reign focused on consolidating power and ushering in an ideology of Moroccaniation and Arabization. While trying to strengthen the nation's economy and infrastructure further, Hassan II focused on suppressing political opposition, mainly from leftist and nationalist groups, and controlling the political parties (more on this in chapter four). Although his government was criticized for violations of human rights and the repression of political dissent, Hassan II's reign was characterized by political stability. Nevertheless, he continues to play a key role in Moroccan history and will always be remembered for his work to advance and build the nation.

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[37] Miller, 154.

[38] The term Sultan as a title for Moroccan monarchs ended in 1957 when Mohammed V changed the title to *malik*, King.

[39] Miller, 162.

Conclusion

This chapter highlighted the downfall of direct rule and power by the ‘Alawi dynasty and the colonial world within Morocco through the lens of Edward Said’s book, *Orientalism*. French colonialism significantly shaped Morocco's history since the late 19th century. The French involvement led to orientalist and uneducated attitudes and assumptions towards the Middle East. Morocco became France's Protectorate due to the French intervention, which took place between 1912 and 1956. The French attempted to impose their political, economic, and cultural dominance throughout this time, which sparked opposition, civil wars, and rebellions from both Berbers and Arabs. Despite the resistance, the French rebuilt Morocco's infrastructure, economy, and *makhzen* while increasing their influence over the country. Important treaties such as the Algeciras Conference (1906), the Treaty of Fez (1912), the Franco-Spanish Treaty (1927), and the Franco-Moroccan Joint Declaration (1956) all shaped the political and cultural landscape in Morocco. With the reign of Hassan II and his period of Moroccanization and Arabization, Morocco was still finding its footing in the post-colonial world. French power and hierarchy were still denigrated within Moroccan society, and this study will continue to look at how this prolonged power has affected various strata of life for Moroccans.

The next chapter will discuss the effects of the French language and education system on Arab and Berber children, and how this changed education reform affected social identity and the revival of Islamic teachings.

Chapter Two: French Education in Morocco

French education is widely accessible and regarded in Morocco as a mark of sophistication and modernity. The term Francophonie, first used by Onésime Reclus, "referred to the countries under French rule in which the French language was widely used."[40] French language and culture were cemented in the early 20th century and played an essential role in private and public educational systems. The curricula and pedagogical methods used today in Moroccan schools are also influenced by the French educational system, particularly in science and mathematics. However, the Protectorate period began the divide between Islamic and Westernized (specifically French) education, further dividing Berber and Arab individuals and forced assimilation using the French language in combination with Modern Standard Arabic.

In this chapter we argue that French education significantly shaped Moroccan society during the French Protectorate period from 1912-1956. French education was intended to modernize Morocco and advance the French language and culture, and it was implemented to educate a small elite of Moroccans who would later act as liaisons between the colonial authorities and the larger "populace." We then will discuss French education's two main objectives during the Protectorate period: the creation of French-speaking educational institutions and the curbing of Islamic teachings to Muslim Arab and Berber students. Next, we will discuss the development of the Moroccan education system since independence in 1956, with a focus on the country's multilingualism and the role of language in shaping ethnic identity. Moroccan policymakers faced challenges in shifting from a French-language education system to an Arabic-language one and the impact this shift had on the country's Amazigh population. The chapter ends with a discussion of how political expression and ideology affect the usage of

[40] Ali Alalou, "Language and Ideology in the Maghreb: Francophonie and Other Languages," *The French Review* 80, no. 2 (2006): 408, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25480661.

French, a topic which is vital to understanding the rest of this study, as in chapter four, political ideology will be examined through the lens of ethnic voting and ethnic grouping.

Education in the Protectorate Period (1912-1956)

In chapter one, we discussed that the French Protectorate period in Morocco lasted from 1912 until 1956. To modernize the nation and advance French language and culture, the French government made considerable reforms to Morocco's educational system during this time. One of the main objectives was the creation of French-speaking educational institutions, which were intended to educate a small, chosen[41] group of Moroccans who would later act as liaisons between the colonial authorities and the larger populace. These schools had French professors who focused heavily on the French perspective when instructing students in areas like math, science, history, and French language and culture. The reasoning behind transforming Morocco into a Francophonie colony was that linguistic unification "could bring about national unity among colonized populations."[42] This ideology about the role of language in spurring unity fueled French policymakers to discourage Arabic and Tamazight, especially in rural areas.

In the beginning, French education was very much for the elite, and, after 1916, only five schools "were created to educate boys from elite families" but for Muslim students, their education was focused on vocational education or religious studies.[43] This separation was purposeful, intended to create "strict divisions between urbanites and rural peasants, Arabs and Berbers, and Muslims and Europeans."[44] 1930 marked the date from which Moroccan students

[41] Chosen here refers to students who were more willing to receive French education and from urban areas and not students gaining an Islamic education from Quranic schools or living in a rural location.

[42] Hoffman, 726.

[43] Miller, 100.

[44] Corrie, Decker, History of Education Quarterly 50, no. 4 (2010): 574, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25799366.

could study in France for higher education, furthering the assimilation of Morocco into a Westernized educational system. For Berber students, the French focused even more on French policy and language in rural areas at institutions such as Azrou in the Middle Atlas,[45] and it was believed at the time that forming an "Arab-Berber distinction that effectively erased Arabic-Berber bilingualism"[46] was the best way to force unity among the various tribal regions in Morocco.

The second main objective during the French occupation was to curb Islamic teachings to Muslim Arab and Berber students. Quranic schools were not under the jurisdiction of the French and had traditionally been the only education available before European colonization. The structure of Muslim education began with children learning "simple passages (*suras*) of the Quran," and then at seven, children would officially begin Quranic school.[47] After completing mastery of the Quran and MSA reading and writing, students could continue to further their education in literature, law, and theology in larger towns or religious centers (*zawias*), such as Fes, Marrakech, and Taroudant.[48]

At the same time, French colonial authority was founding contemporary schools, preparing native instructors, and creating fresh curricula,changes that were introduced in Quranic schools as well. With these changes, the French hoped to develop a more Westernized educational system that would encourage deeper political and cultural ties to France. Moroccan

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[45] Miller, 100.

[46] Hoffman, 731.

[47] Daniel A. Wagner, and Abdelhamid Lotfi, "Traditional Islamic Education in Morocco: Sociohistorical and Psychological Perspectives," *Comparative Education Review* 24, no. 2 (1980): 239, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1187234.

[48] Ibid., 240.

intellectuals wanting to widen the access to education for all created free schools with a goal of "educating children in Arabic language, literature, and Islamic history."[49] Different from Quranic schools, these free schools acted as a midway point for students desiring an education outside of the Islamic tradition. The rise of educated Moroccans proved a threat to French rule, and, rather than linguistic unity bringing the nation together, it was a desire for freedom and education that pushed Moroccan intellectuals to nationalize and fight for independence. As we will show below, the French failed at adapting a unified and seamless adaptation of French to Moroccan society.

Languages in the Post-Colonial Moroccan Education System

Since independence in 1956, Morocco has developed a multilingual education system that has sought to reflect the country's diverse cultural heritage and linguistic traditions. The Moroccan education system is generally divided into three primary categories: Arabic-language schools, Quranic schools, and French-language schools. To understand the role of a multilingual system in Morocco, we must first understand the shift of language from a French Protectorate to an independent Morocco.

The Moroccan government has worked to upgrade and align the educational system with international norms in the post-colonial era, but "the chaos within the educational system in the 1960s slowed the changeover from French to Arabic."[50] While Arabic in the 20th century was the official language of Morocco, French was, and still is to many, a second language, as it was the language of instruction implemented even after the French ended the Protectorate period. And with the implementation of four major objectives set by the Moroccan Ministry of National

[49] Miller, 122.

[50] Ibid., 189.

Education: “Arabization, Moroccanization, Unification, and Generalization,” bilingualism in the education system was being phased out.[51] From the 1960s to the 1990s, educated subjects who had previously been taught only in French (history, geography, philosophy) were switched to Arabic instruction (mathematics, biology, physics, and chemistry switched later).[52]

Some educators doubted the effectiveness of dropping French suddenly, a language that had been used in education for over four decades by the time of independence. Mohammed El Ayadi, a Moroccan educator summarizes the fears of the Arabization policy as follows: “This policy of Arabization, in addition to its demagogic character for conjunctural political ends, is in fact accompanied by a serious deterioration in the level of education in this country (joining the low level of education in the 'Arab East often quotes as an example of the success of the Arabization policy).”[53] The push for Arabization also acted as a further divide between Moroccan Arabs and Moroccan Berbers. The idea of Morocco as only an Arab nation is problematic as it erases the identities of minority ethnic groups such as Berbers and Sahraoui peoples, shown in table one.

Category	Frequence	%/Total	%/(Total-No answer)
MA: Arab	816	68.0%	68.0%
MA: Amazigh (Rifi, Soussi, Chalh)	308	25.6%	25.6%
MA: Sahraoui	43	3.6%	3.6%
National identity	29	2.4%	2.4%

[51] Erin Twohig, *Contesting the Classroom: Reimagining Education in Moroccan and Algerian Literatures*, Liverpool University Press, 2019, 92, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvs32t59.

[52] Ali Alalou, “Francophonie in the Maghreb: A Study of Language Attitudes among Moroccan Teachers of French,” *The French Review* 82, no. 3 (2009): 559, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25481621.

[53] Translated from French. Mohammed El Ayadi, "Langue- culture- pensée," [“Language-culture-thought”], Enseignement et système scolaire, *Bulletin Economique et Social du Maroc*, 149-50 (1983): 16.

(Motswana) only, or "doesn't think of self in those terms"			
Other	4	0.3%	0.3%
(N)	*(1,200)*	*(100%)*	*1,200 (100%)*

Table 1. Survey Response to "What is your ethnic community, cultural group, or tribe?" (Afrobarometer R8 2019/2021, Morocco)

Table one shows the percentage breakdown of the ethnic groups listed on a particular survey given by the Afrobarometer, with the four ethnic groups, Arab, Amazigh (Berber), Sahraoui, and Motswana and "other" listed.[54] Berbers/Amazigh consist of just over ¼ of the population, and yet until 2011, their language of Tamazight was not readily taught, and overall, the Berber identity has been hidden due to the Arabization period. This push for Arabization, added to the "flawed conception of multilingualism in Morocco" and the "reduced function of Standard Arabic while favoring foreign languages and promoting dialects."[55] French was regarded as a symbol of oppression, while Arabic was exalted as the "language of faith and spiritual life, and the expression of 'identity'."[56]

The switch from French to Arabic led to the revival of Arabic and Quranic schools. With independence, as stated in chapter one, Arabization and the reemergence of Islam took full force in both politics and education and is reflected in Morocco's motto: Allah, watan, malik (God, Motherland, King).[57] This new post-independence regime, led mainly by Sultan Hassan II (r. 1961-1999) focused on several reforms aimed at modernizing the country's education system.

[54] See "Key Terms and Phrases."

[55] Abelkader Fassi Fehri, *Langue et écologie*, (Rabat: Editions Az-Zaman, 2003), 33.

[56] Alalou, Language and Ideology, 411.

[57] Miller, 188.

One key reform implemented by Sultan Hassan II was the introduction of a new national education system, which aimed to standardize education across the country and make it more accessible to all citizens, especially those in rural areas. This system emphasized the teaching of modern subjects, such as science, mathematics, and technology, and aimed to provide students with the skills and knowledge needed to participate in the modern workforce.

However, similar to Algeria, Moroccan policymakers had the daunting task of switching a Francophonie society into an Arabized one. With many Moroccans considering French a language of exclusion and social stratification, the first thing that was prioritized in funding and planning was Arabic and Quranic schools. The pupils who attended Arabic and Quranic schools, particularly those from rural and lower-income households, received an education in religious and cultural subjects (see fig. 1). These schools are regarded as traditional, religious institutions that have existed in Morocco for generations.



Figure 1. Survey Response to "What is your highest level of education?" crossed with Urban/Rural location. (Arab Barometer, AB Wave VII, Oct. 2021-July 2022, Morocco)

But Arabic and Quranic schools have mainly not changed since before independence and continue to offer instruction based on conventional Islamic teaching techniques, including memorization of the Quran. These schools have recently dealt with a number of issues, such as a lack of competent teachers, unequal balance of education in rural and urban public schools, and insufficient funding. Another main issue has been that, even with a focus on Arabic-language literature and teaching MSA as the official language of education, "the realities of Arabic diglossia, furthermore, ensure the persistence of a visible gap between the 'language of the school' and the 'language of the home,' compounding the sense that the school teaches an elite language not accessible to all."[58]

Despite these difficulties, many Moroccan families still value traditional schools for maintaining their religious and cultural legacy, and many kids continue to attend them in addition to more contemporary institutions. By including formal education components like math and science in its curricula, the *makhzen* has been working to integrate Arabic and Quranic schools into the contemporary educational system in recent years. The goal of this integration is to give students a more comprehensive education that equips them for the modern workforce. While Moroccan education has made positive changes since independence, the reality of the lasting strength of French in education as "the language of the elite"[59] is still undeniable and plays a role in identity for Berber and Arab students, shaping their social standing and political views.

[58] Twohig, 103.

[59] Alalou, Language and Ideology, 419.

The Role of Language on Ethnic Identity

The advent of an independent Morocco left policymakers with a choice about how to categorize the people in their nation. The French language played a complex and multi-faceted role in shaping both Arab and Berber identities. As this section will argue, the acquisition of French has left a permanent impact on education, and therefore, privilege. While the introduction of French to Moroccans at a young age has created opportunities for social and economic advancement, many Arab and Berber individuals feel that the language is a tool of assimilation and colonial domination. Specifically for the Berbers, who were forced to abandon Tamazight for decades along with their culture, this policy led to a disconnection with their own heritage. Sultan Hassan II focused on Arabizing the nation after independence but, "Since the late 1960s, a revival movement has been striving for official recognition of Berber."[60]

Language is one of the strongest indications of identity and ethnicity for Berbers, and is defined through the ability to speak Tamazight. The Berber revival movement exists as an extension and desire for separate identity within the role of Islam, and a distinction from the Arab identity. However, Aissati notes that Arabic "does not pose a direct threat to any of the national languages of [the Arab World]" but that "Arabic continues to gain more territory in the countries of the Maghreb at the expense of Amazigh, namely in Algeria and Morocco."[61] The ideological strength of Arabization and Moroccanization after independence harmed ethnic minorities such as Berbers, but unlike French, Arabization and Moroccanization were overtly promoted by nationalists.[62]

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[60] Abderrahman El Aissati, "Ethnic Identity, Language Shift, and the Amazigh Voice in Morocco and Algeria,: Race, Gender & Class 8, no. 3 (2001): 57, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41674983.

[61] Ibid., 62.

[62] Attilio Gaudio, *Allal el-Fassi* (Paris: Editions Alain Moreau, 1972), 155.

Early modern textbooks after independence show ideological problems in both French and Arabic; as Ibaaquil notes, "Between the negating gaze of textbooks in French and the deeply backward-looking and nostalgic gaze of textbooks in Arabic, the students will find it difficult to find a balance, and the way, in any case, is open to alienation."[63] Today, language issues have grown, as there are many dialects and languages in use: English, French, MSA, Darija, and Tamazight. This accumulation of languages has not only confused identity but has led to a fragmentation of collective identity and the cohesion of Morocco's social components that Arabic is only useful within the confines of the nation and that languages such as French and English should take priority as a door to the West.[64] Figure 2 shows the current public opinion about satisfaction with the current state of education in Morocco. As we can see, 47% of Morocccans are dissatisfied, and 27% are completely dissatisfied.

[63] Translated from French. Abdelâli Bentahila, *Language Attitudes Among Arabic-French Bilinguals in Morocco* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 1983), 29.

[64] Bouali, 8.



Figure 2. Survey response to "How satisfied are you with the educational system in our country?" (Arab Barometer AB Wave VII, Oct. 2021-July 2022, Morocco)

This dissatisfaction with the current state of education in Morocco has no simple solution, but a linguistic system has been built that reflects the colonial power that France had in the past. Education reforms since independence have sought to counteract the effects of colonialism and promote a more diverse and inclusive Moroccan society that values and celebrates the various cultural and linguistic traditions within it. While the official recognition of Tamazight has been a win for Berbers, it also leads to a road with many options ending in further dilapidation in education and fragmentation of national identity. French still holds a firm grasp on Morocco, and, as Alalou notes, "The image of French has thus changed from the language of the colonial power which used to be seen as the enemy of authenticity, to the language of the elite that is opposed to the traditionalized society."[65] Figure 3 ends this chapter by illustrating the education

[65] Alalou, Language and Ideology, 419.

levels of various ethnic groups in Morocco. The chart shows three dominant ethnic groups, Arabs, Amazigh/Berber, and Tourag.[66]



Figure 3. Survey Response to "What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?" crossed with "What is your highest level of education?" (Afrobarometer R8 2019/2021, Morocco)

The ethnicity data survey is crossed with education levels spanning from no formal education to post-graduate degrees. These results show that, even in 2019/2021 education was still highly unequal between non-Arab Moroccans, with most Arabs at 75.8% completing some university, Berbers at 43.4% have no formal schooling, Sahraoui at 7.9% completed secondary school (high school), and national identity under Motswana at 6.2% completed post-secondary qualifications, other than university. The difference between Arabs' highest level of education and Berbers is astounding and shows a still-evident and outdated bias of Arabization school policies created in the 1960s.

[66] See "Key Terms and Phrases."

Overall, the different languages spoken in Morocco are closely tied to ethnic identity, and language can be a powerful marker of cultural heritage and identity. While there is overlap between different ethnic groups in terms of language use, the various languages spoken in Morocco reflect the country's rich diversity and contribute to its unique cultural landscape. While many Berbers and Arabs continue to speak French and value its cultural and economic benefits, there is also a growing movement to promote and preserve Islamic and Berber identity through the revival of Arabic and Quranic schools, and the Tamazight language.

Conclusion

The post-colonial Moroccan education system reflects the country's complex linguistic and cultural heritage, with MSA, Darija, French, Amazigh, and English all playing important roles in the educational landscape. The promotion of these languages has contributed to the development of a diverse and multicultural society in Morocco, allowing citizens to communicate and interact across linguistic and cultural boundaries. The problem lies in the effect of language of Arab and Berber identity and how this translates to other spheres of life. With the call for Arabization after independence, we see a visible shift through education in the treatment and importance of minorities and their languages and ethnic background.

There are two main points from this chapter. Firstly, the French education system in Morocco was designed to promote assimilation and create a French-speaking elite class. This led to a divide between those who had access to French education (urban located secular Arabs and Berbers) and those who did not (rural located religious Arab and Berbers). The elite class was predominantly made up of Moroccans of French or Arab descent, which increased tensions between them and the Arab majority.

Secondly, the implementation of the French language as the official language of Morocco during the French Protectorate had a significant impact on the country's ethnic relations. While it allowed for greater communication and understanding between different ethnic groups, it also created a linguistic barrier for those who did not speak French. This further marginalized the Arab majority and reinforced the power dynamic between different ethnic groups.

Ultimately, French education and the implementation of the French language in Morocco had a complex impact on ethnic relations. While it allowed for greater communication and understanding between different groups, it also reinforced existing power dynamics and created a divide between those who had access to French education and those who did not. It is important to continue to examine the historical and social implications of these policies in order to better understand the current state of ethnic relations in Morocco.

This leads us to the next chapter which discusses how French has affected collective class identity and social structures with an emphasis on the differences in economic, linguistic, and societal status in Arab and Berber populations. By understanding how Arabs and Berbers are treated within a social framework, we are seeking to divulge how the usage of the French language plays its part.

Chapter Three: Ethnicity and Class Structures in Moroccan Society

This chapter will discuss Morocco's unique social hierarchy, influenced by location, economics, and linguistics. We will discuss the differences in social identification theories by scholars, such as Ernest Gellner, which we will connect to the multi-ethnic backdrop of Morocco. We will also identify existing colonial remnants of social division within modern-day Morocco while also looking at the usage of various languages such as MSA, Darija, Tamazight, English, and French and how this correlates with social standing and ethnic identification. Finally, we will end the chapter by analyzing economics in urban versus rural Moroccan locations and how this relates to linguistic and ethnic disparities.

Class Structure and Collective Identity

In Morocco, ideas of religion, language, and ethnicity are frequently connected to communal identity. Collective class identity, "a social aggregate within the polity, defined by its common role, function, and status within the socioeconomic setting,"[67] is an essential part of social mobilization. This search for identity can be complicated for Moroccans in a post-colonialist society.

Beginning with ethnicity, religion, and language, this stratum of identification is a significant part of the collective identity of Moroccans. Young explains, "Unlike ethnicity, class categories are analytical constructs in the first instance, though they may acquire social meaning and become powerful foci of solidarity."[68] Despite the country's predominantly Arab and Sunni Muslim religious majority, there are sizable Berber and Sub-Saharan African minorities as well

[67] Crawford Young, "Patterns of Social Conflict: State, Class, and Ethnicity," *Daedalus* 111, no. 2 (1982): 73, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024786.

[68] Ibid., 73.

as religious minorities, and these ethnic groups contribute to the nation's total cultural diversity (see table 1).

During the Protectorate era, "colonial studies produced 'topography' of the Moroccan society through the lens of 'human geography,' 'demography,' and 'political economy,' all important for colonial domination."[69] The French separated Berbers and Arabs through Islam and land disputes "falling under the realm of the shari'a and the sultan, with the Berbers escaping both and following their own *'urf*[70]."[71] As the French Protectorate period continued into the 1940s, social stratification and the birth of wealth and prestige (mainly in cities) grew. Scholars during this period began looking for a "core Moroccan personality," which proved difficult as Western and Maghrebi ideals were clashing.[72] Paul Marty, a school inspector, commented on the divide between Berbers and Arabs where he "contrasted the lazy, fatalistic, fanatic, lacking in foresight, and polygamous Arab" against the "monogamous and farsighted Berber."[73]

With colonial divisions and education further dividing social classes and ethnic groups, it is no wonder that after independence, many Moroccans still felt this division in every social sphere. After the Protectorate period, the chasm between the various ethnic groups and urban and rural populations grew with the "major social and economic transformation" of Moroccan cities, worsened by "the nexus of modernization, industrialization, and education."[74] As this paper will

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[69] Mekki Bentahar and Et-Tibari Bouasla, "La sociologie coloniale et la société marocaine (1830–1960)," in *La sociologie marocaine contemporaine* (Rabat: Publications de la Faculté des lettres et des Sciences Humaines, 1988), 15.

[70] See "Key Terms and Phrases."

[71] Zakia Salime and Noor Al Malki Al Jehani, "Morocco," In *Arab Family Studies: Critical Reviews*, ed. Suad Joseph (Syracuse University Press, 2018), 75, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1pk860c.12.

[72] Bentahar and Bouasla, 39.

[73] Ibid., 39-40.

[74] Salime and Al Jehani, 79.

continue to reiterate, social identity is not a homogenous or static identifier. Placing Moroccans into two categories is a relic of colonization[75] and Western ideas on nationhood linked to ethnolinguistic commonalities. Later, this chapter will return to the importance and connection between economy, inequality, and class structures.

The Moroccan social hierarchy starts with Europeans at the top: "foreign estate included colonial officialdom, those associated with colonial mercantile capitalism, missionaries, and… permanent, settled white populace that seized much of the best land and dominated the economy."[76] Next, comes a small Moroccan elite, which includes politicians, affluent businesspeople, and royal family members. They have numerous economic and social advantages, including access to top-notch housing, healthcare, and education. Then, Morocco's diverse middle class comprises professionals, government employees, and small business owners. The middle class, however, has a high unemployment rate and little economic mobility. In addition, those who reside in rural areas usually have higher poverty rates and lower prospects for upward mobility. Finally, the impoverished, who account for a sizable fraction of the population of Morocco, are at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Poverty is most widespread in rural locations with inadequate access to healthcare, education, and other requirements. In addition, numerous low-paid positions in the fisheries, agriculture, or unorganized sectors are held by poor Moroccans and frequently come with unstable employment.

However, colonization, racial and ethnic division, and economic inequality continue to shape Morocco's social structure and conception of identity. Said's book points to the West's construction of the Maghreb's collective identity and how this manufactured generalization

[75] Divide and rule colonization is seen in other North African and Middle Eastern nations such as Syria, Lebanon, and Algeria.

[76] Young, 76.

perpetuates cultural stereotypes and reinforces power imbalances. He argues that the Maghreb, like all regions of the world, has a complex and diverse cultural identity that cannot be reduced to simplistic stereotypes and continues to explain that cultural representations have real-world consequences and that the West's construction of the Maghreb has contributed to injustices we still see today, such as in Morocco. Discussing the complexity of identity, Said states, "Imperialism consolidated the mixture of cultures and identities on a global scale. But its worst and most paradoxical gift was to allow people to believe that they were only, mainly, exclusively, white, or Black, or Western, or Oriental. Yet just as human beings make their own history, they also make their cultures and ethnic identities."[77]

The idea of segmentation theory comes from British-Czech anthropologist Ernest Gellner who proposes that there needs to be "an interplay between blood (kinship) and soil (territory)"[78] and "an interplay between family (conceived as unilaterally tracked kin members)."[79] According to this theory, kinship is vital and attached to one's tribe. In the context of Morocco (and argued by many Moroccan scholars), society is divided into various segmented groups based on factors such as geography, religion, ethnicity, and occupation. This is further broken down into rural, urban, and tribal categories. We argue that dyadic organization is too simplistic and has been perpetuated by "France's politique berbère (Berber policy) and later its politique indigène (native policy)—a less explicitly ethnic framing" that categorized Moroccans into two groups.[80] As a result, segmented patterns of organization are more visible within Moroccan society and explain the power of kinship in voting, lifestyle, language choices, education, and even the selection of

[77] Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 336.

[78] Radim Tobolka, "Gellner and Geertz in Morocco: A Segmentary Debate," *Social Evolution and History* 2 (2): 89.

[79] Bentahar and Bouasla, 330.

[80] Hoffman, 725.

urban or rural living. This dynamic connects to Pascon's idea of composite society, "the co-existence of diverse social, cultural, and economic forms over time, with each retaining a measure of internal coherence"[81] and the claim that Morocco "is a composition of a segmented stratification, and stratified segmentation."[82]

The rest of this chapter will focus on how diglossia and economics intertwine as factors that shape the country's landscape. With a mix of ethnic identities, including Arab, Berber, and Sub-Saharan African, among others, we hope to better understand the correlation between ethnicity, language, and privilege in Morocco through the lens of segmented organization.

Diglossia and Linguistic Inequality

Language-related idiosyncrasies are typical in many societies, including Morocco, and as this paper argues, one of the leading causes of dissonance in class and ethnic identity. One of the strongest arguments for this dissonance is diglossia, a term (from French, *diglossie*) coined by French linguist William Marçais to describe the "condition where two varieties of a language exist side by side throughout the community, with each having a definite role to play."[83] For Moroccans, this is Moroccan Arabic (Darija) and Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), which are used in different contexts by codeswitching (CS). Furthermore, scholars such as Albirini and Ferguson denote a high code, "issues of importance, complexity, and seriousness" (MSA), and a low code, issues that are "less important, less serious, and accessible topics" (Darija).[84]

[81] Paul Pascon, *Le Houz de Marrakech*, trans. C. Edwin Vaughan and Veronique Ingman (Rabat: Publications du Centre de la recherché scientifique, 1977), 20.

[82] Paul Pascon, "Segmentation and stratification dans la société marocaine," in Actes de Durham (Rabat: Société Marocaine des Editeurs Réunis, 1978), 116.

[83] Charles A. Ferguson, "Diglossia," *Word 15*, (1959): 325, https://doi.org/10.1080/00437956.1959.11659702.

[84] Abdulkafi, Albirini. "The Sociolinguistic Functions of Codeswitching between Standard Arabic and Dialectal Arabic," *Language in Society* 40, no. 5 (2011): 537, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41329672.

The beauty and danger of diglossia are the division of purpose given to the languages. MSA is one of the official languages of Morocco, and as such, is employed in official contexts, including the media, government, and educational institutions. Religious writings and literature also use it as "Classical Arabic has been the instrument by which the Arab Islamic culture was spread and recorded and has been preserved."[85] On the other hand, the majority of Moroccans speak Darija. The everyday language mixes French and colloquialisms full of "foreign idioms and of modern expressions,"[86] and varies depending on the locality; it is spoken in informal settings. It is the language of the street, the market, and the home. Several media platforms, including radio and television, also employ it. The employment of both dialects of Arabic in Morocco creates a linguistic barrier between the educated and uneducated and between official and casual language use.

Although MSA is linked to greater social standing and education and a language of unification, this split may also represent social and economic disparities. This issue is further complicated by the addition of the other official language of Morocco, Tamazight, along with the prolonged use of French and the recent addition of English in schools and work. Alberini summarizes this issue as "the local-foreign dichotomy dictates specific social functions for CS based on the social, political, economic, and ideological relationship between the two languages. In most cases, a foreign language accruing power and prestige from a previous asymmetric, often colonial, relationship is superimposed on a local and low-prestige language."[87]

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[85] Muhammad Raji, Zughoul, "Diglossia in Arabic: Investigating Solutions," *Anthropological Linguistics* 22, no. 5 (1980): 203, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30027777.

[86] Mahmoud Teynmour, The Battle Between the Arab Languages in Modern Egyptian Literature, *The Asian Review 28*, (1932): 635.

[87] Albirini 537-538.

The acquisition of the French language has persisted in Morocco and affects social relationships and hierarchies within its society. For Moroccans, particularly regarding education and social mobility, diglossia can lead to linguistic and cultural difficulties, as discussed in chapter two. Furthermore, due to their unfamiliarity with the language and its culture, students from underprivileged backgrounds may find it challenging to succeed when learning MSA or French in school, resulting in a significant disparity between pupils who speak MSA well and those who do not believe in terms of educational and employment chances. In regard to the Arab world, Sotiropoulos states the main issue in society:

> If diglossia, objectively, is an ingenious device of necessity, nonetheless from the point of view of educational efficiency of telecommunications and mass media, diglossia is definitely a hindrance. In addition, in view of the fact that the function of the language is not strictly communicative, and the face that language serves other emotional, cognitive, and psychological needs, of the individuals and society, the presence of diglossia in a speech community has limiting and even crippling effects on its expressive capacity.[88]

These comments on society and individuals will tie into this chapter's following section, which will look at collective identity and class structures in Morocco. Language plays a significant role in collective identity, but where do economics and social mobilization factor as either fueling or undermining a shared Moroccan identity?

The cohabitation of Darija and MSA resulted in a linguistic gap between formal and informal language use, making diglossia a common phenomenon in Morocco. The act of code-switching shows the social and economic differences between these two varieties of Arabic and how it might hinder social mobility and widen this linguistic gap. For example, a Moroccan individual might switch from MSA to Darija in situations where the dialectal form is more

[88] Dimitri, Sotiropoulos, Diglossia and the National Language Question in Modern Greece, *Linguistics 197*, (1977): 7, https://doi.org/10.1515/ling.1977.15.197.5.

appropriate, as the alternative "may expose the speaker to ridicule from his/her listeners."[89] Furthermore, Al-Kahtany discusses that "Ideologically, MSA has been more or less regarded as the status form because of its association with the language of the Holy Qur'an."[90] The duality of Arabic, ignoring imperial languages, shows that thought, even subconsciously, does play a role in what language a Moroccan will use in conversation. The code-switch can happen when speaking to someone of a different class, a particular profession, or a specific topic in conversation. This plays a role in the more extensive discussion of division in Moroccan identity and social mobilization.

Our last look at diglossia pertains to the usage of French in Morocco as a language of social mobility. This opinion differs from that of Alan S. Kaye, who does not consider diglossia to be connected to social dialects.[91] This paper argues that French acts similarly, just as the difference in usage of MSA and Darija can be as simple as the formality or the complexity of speaking to someone of a different social class. As French is taught in both public and private schools, there are likely occasions when French is used out of necessity, but using what we know from Ferguson and other linguists such as Albirini, French also can act as a language of choice for social mobility or to emphasize a divide in class in a conversation. There is no right or wrong answer as to when to use French. However, there can (depending on the context) be a greater hidden meaning to the particular usage of one language or dialect over another to convey status, wealth, profession, and ethnic collective identity. With the usage of Tamazight as an official

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[89] Abdallah Hady, Al-Kahtany, "The 'Problem' of Diglossia in the Arab World: An Attitudinal Study of Modern Standard Arabic and the Arabic Dialects," *Al-'Arabiyya* 30 (1997): 3, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43192773.

[90] Ibid., 3.

[91] Alan S. Kaye, "Formal vs. Informal in Arabic: Diglossia, Triglossia, Tetraglossia, Etc., Polyglossia — Multiglossia Viewed as a Continuum," *Zeitschrift Für Arabische Linguistik*, no. 27 (1994): 58, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43525622.

language in Morocco, we also know that this language acts as the preferred language of choice for Berbers as a connection to their roots prior to Arabs arriving in the Maghreb. If the usage of MSA as a “high code" and Dairja as a “low code” falls under different categories of construct, along with code-switching showing a speaker’s “pan-Arab or Muslim identity,” the usage of French should prove similar factors in social mobilization as well.[92]

Economics and Ethnic Inequality

In Morocco, as in the majority of other nations, economic inequality due to an unequal distribution of economic opportunities relates to ethnic or cultural disparity. Morocco is a developing nation with a mixed economy that is highly dependent on mining, agriculture, and tourism. Over the past few decades, the country has made significant strides toward reducing poverty, lowering the unemployment rate (as of October 2022, 11.1%)[93], and raising living standards, but wealth and income disparity continue to be significant obstacles. The unequal distribution of money and income is one of the major causes of inequality in Morocco. In Morocco as of 2021, the top 10% of households control 63.9% of the nation's wealth, while the lowest 50% control only 3.8%.[94] Furthermore, the average national income in Morocco is €8,048 per adult.[95] The fact that many workers in the informal sector have low-wage jobs with no social protection, which results in a lack of economic security and social mobility, widens this disparity even further (see fig. 4).

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[92] Albirini, 557.

[93] “Morocco and the IMF,” International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/MAR.

[94] “Morocco - WID - World Inequality,” World Inequality Database, https://wid.world/country/morocco/.

[95] Ibid.



Figure 4. "To what extent do you believe that the age gap between the rich and the poor is a problem in your country?" (Arab Barometer AB Wave VII, Oct. 2021-July 2022, Morocco)

The unequal distribution of economic opportunities across regions and industries is another issue. For example, while rural areas frequently have limited access to education and training, resulting in lower-paying jobs and lower economic mobility, urban areas frequently provide more chances for higher-paying jobs (see fig. 5). According to Griffin, "During the last 11 years the disparity between levels of consumption in the urban and rural areas has risen from 70 percent to 120 percent… the share of the rich in total consumption has increased from 25 to 37 percent while that of the poor has fallen from 3.3 to 1.24 percent."[96] The discrepancy between wealth in rural and urban areas is astronomical and reflects the perspectives of Moroccans based on their location (see fig. 5).

[96] Griffin, 319.



Figure 5. "Which of these statements comes closest to describing your net household income?" crossed with Urban/Rural. (Arab Barometer AB Wave VII, Oct. 2021-July 2022, Morocco)

We know from chapter two that this rural-urban divide is present in the country's educational structure, with a smaller variety and opportunity provided in rural schools which house primarily Berber students. With the majority of students in rural areas having no formal education and the majority of students in urban areas having completed secondary school at a minimum (see fig. 1), there are large regional differences in the quality of education provided. This causes a skills gap that reduces their opportunities to land better-paying employment, continuing an inequality cycle.

The last point of economic inequality that we will focus on is in relation to ethnic identity. There are four main reasons that one might rely on ethnic identification in society: cultural preservation, social cohesion, political representation (more on this in chapter four), and economic development. Cultural preservation is important as it allows ethnic groups to rely on

kinship and segmented organization to connect to particular roots and beliefs. Social cohesion is at its peak, particularly with ethnic inequality, as it creates a sense of comradery and togetherness. Economic development, as we have seen from figures 4, 5, and the World Inequality Database, relies on the promotion of economic growth that can be aided by ethnic identity, especially in regions with abundant natural or cultural resources. Ethnic communities can contribute to economic growth and employment creation by utilizing these resources, such as by promoting cultural tourism.

Certain ethnic groups within Morocco are more likely than others to experience poverty and economic marginalization. This has been proven by the discrepancy of resources provided to individuals of urban versus rural areas along with public opinion of other ethnic groups. Figure 6 shows that Arabs (42%), Amazigh/Berber (36%), and Sahraoui (29.7%) people all believe that Moroccans are "often" treated unequally due to ethnic background. Figure 6 is interesting, as it is mainly Arabs and Berbers who comment on ethnic inequality in Morocco while "other" ethnic groups and "Motswana"[97] comment that people are "rarely" treated unequally in Morocco. This could be due to decades of French influence pitting the two groups against one another, as well as the vast educational and economic differences.

[97] See "Key Terms and Phrases."



Figure 6. "How often people treated unequally?" crossed with "What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?" (Afrobarometer R8 2019/2021 and R9 2022, Morocco)

As Gordon suggests, "As in comparisons among ethnic groups, intragroup differences in ethnicity may be directed to a number of dimensions such as levels of acculturation, structural assimilation, out-marriage, perceptions of discrimination and ethnic conflict, and support for ethnic politics."[98] This is important, as it aids Ayalon, Ben-Rafael, and Sharot's hypothesis that the "Costs and benefits of ethnic affiliation may take various forms such as economic resources, status, and political influence."[99] Differences in ethnic prestige, distribution of ethnic groups in socio-economic hierarchies, and the openness or closure of social participation are all important factors in ethnic identification and inequality and can influence whether a particular group will align itself more with their culture, or against. This could be the reason that "members from ethnic groups with low prestige and a low socio-economic distribution who have risen in the

[98] Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1964).

[99] Hannah Ayalon, Eliezer Ben-Rafael, and Stephen Sharot, "The Costs and Benefits of Ethnic Identification," *The British Journal of Sociology* 37, no. 4 (1986): 551, https://doi.org/10.2307/590716.

socio-economic order may be socially accepted by ‘others’ in their equivalent socio-economic stratum.”[100] In the case of Morocco, this could be why Arabs of a lower socio-economic status prefer to use Darija over French, perpetuated by public education, and why Berbers align more with the Amazigh movement and have pushed so hard for Tamazight to be an official language.

Conclusion

Disparities and discrimination based on ethnicity and class still exist despite Morocco's attempts to advance equality and social justice. The Protectorate period has had a lasting effect on Arab and Berber relations and the level of equality that these two groups face in society. In this chapter, we have learned how the role of diglossia and linguistic disparity affects possible ethnic and hierarchical structures in Morocco, tying back to chapter two and the chasm of education received in the nation. We then looked at how socio-economics and ethnic background are connected, along with ethnic prestige, and why we might find intragroup differences that manifest in views of politics, education, and society in general. We argue that segmentation of organization and the divisive use of breaking kinship have affected socio-economic hierarchies in Morocco and correlate with specific usage of particular languages or dialects over others. For instance, the Amazigh population has traditionally experienced marginalization and the erasure of their cultural identity, and the binary between Arabs and Berbers continues to be divisive. Similarly, there are differences in access to healthcare, job opportunities, and education, with the rural poor and urban slum dwellers suffering the most from the inequality.

The structural and cultural causes of racial and class-based discrimination and marginalization must be addressed as part of this endeavor. Although Morocco exists in the

[100] Ibid., 552.

post-colonial world, it still harbors colonized behaviors through its class and ethnic division, creating new ideas of what collective identity should and can be.

Chapter Four: Moroccan Politics and Ethnopluralism

In this chapter, we will first go over the history of the *makhzen* and the formation of the first political parties in the newly independent Morocco. After analyzing the political ideologies and relationships between the parties and the *makhzen,* we will discuss the goals of King Hassan II during his reign and the emphasis on empowering non-religious parties. We will then look at Moroccan politics today under King Mohammed VI and the switch in political party alignments with the *makhzen*. This will culminate with voting patterns and party alignments of Arabs, Berbers, and Sahraoui people in Moroccan elections. This chapter aims to establish another factor of collective identity and its larger implications within Moroccan society for Arabs and non-Arabs. By understanding the role of ethnopluralism, we hope to discern the goals and desires of the various ethnic groups within Morocco.

Historical and Political Context

Morocco's independence from France in 1956 marked the beginning of a new era in Moroccan politics. Gone were the colonial order and perfection of a "parallel, secular, and unfamiliar Protectorate authority," and the nation was faced with the job of creating a new Morocco, with political parties that reflected the needs and desires of the people.[101] Morocco's first modern political party was the Istiqlal Party (PI), formerly the National Party, which was in power during Morocco's early years of independence and was instrumental as "a nationalist resistance movement led by Allal al-Fassi, who sought complete autonomy and independence from French colonial rule."[102] The party had originally received considerable support from the

[101] Miller, 121.

[102] Mohamed Daadaoui, "Rituals of Power and Political Parties in Morocco: Limited Elections as Positional Strategies," *Middle Eastern Studies* 46, no. 2 (2010): 197, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20720658.

general public, but it soon became mired in internal power struggles and came under fire for failing to address the social and economic problems facing the nation. Split in 1959 from the Istiqlal party was the leftist Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP), which reunited with the PI in the 1970s "to protest against a new constitutional amendment that sought a further centralization of power in the hands of the monarchy."[103] The constitutional amendment led to major social and political unrest in the 1960s and 1970s, with protests and demonstrations demanding more social justice and democracy. Many opposition leaders and activists were imprisoned or driven into exile as a result of the government's response, which included repression and violence.

With the PI and UNFP (later known as the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires, USFP) forming the majority of opposition to the monarchy, Crown Prince Hassan II, and King Muhammad V, faced backlash against political and economic reforms which aimed to modernizing the country and improving living conditions for Moroccans. Other parties formed throughout the this period (1961-1970), coined by Daadaoui as the first phase "in the development of [Morocco's] multi-party system,"[104] which was designated by the reality of the "new left"[105] and the iron fist of the King. As this new Leftist movement grew, the then Crown Prince was left in charge of the *Forces armées royales*[106] (FAR) and garnered the support of many Berbers living in rural regions, who "professed loyalty to the throne rather than to the

[103] Ibid., 197.

[104] Ibid., 197.

[105] Mohamed Darif, *Al-Ahzab As-Siyasiya Al-Maghribiya: min Siyaq Al-Muwajaha ila Siyaq At-tawafuq* [*The Maghrebi Assisiyya Parties: From the Context of Confrontation to the Context of Convergence*] (Casablanca: Ennajah al-jadida, 2001), 104-105.

[106] See "Important Individuals."

nationalists" who were mainly Arab Moroccans.[107] The separation of nationalism and ethnic identity will be discussed further in chapter five.

The early years of Moroccan independence marked the monarchy's use of "modern institutions to preserve medieval political authority" through "repression, corruption and cooptation."[108] Close allies and corroborators received "high administrative and government positions, immense state-subsidized benefits and services and hundreds of farms and companies recovered from the French in the early 1970s."[109] This arrangement leads to the second phase, according to Daadaoui, which lasted from 1970-1990 and was a period of immense pressure on the monarchy to democratize the political system and address issues such as corruption and human rights abuses. This period showed the deep cracks in Morocco's political system, as Miller summarizes:

> Instead of a constitutional democracy, there was no constitution; instead of economic liberalism, the state took charge; instead of a nation free of the colonizer, the fingerprints of France were still found everywhere; instead of a mosaic-like and vibrant multiethnic and multipolar social organization, people were being forced into a stifling, centralizing, and homogeneous mold in the educational system, in the workplace, in the shaping of the political field.[110]

This second period was characterized by most parties acknowledging monarchical privilege and continued opposition with a reformist approach. The USFP and the Partie du Progrès et du Socialisme[111] (PPS) "abandoned any direct confrontation with the regime; instead

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[107] Miller, 157.

[108] Abdeslam Maghraoui, "Political Authority in Crisis: Mohammed VI's Morocco," *Middle East Report*, no. 218 (2001): 13, https://doi.org/10.2307/1559304.

[109] Will Swearingen, *Moroccan Mirages: Agrarian Dreams and Deceptions*, *1912-1986* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

[110] Miller, 160.

[111] Translates to the Party of Progress and Socialism.

they sought to challenge the state from within the political system and to lobby for more democratic reforms."[112] King Hassan found a solution to these pressures by creating a coalition of pro-monarchy parties like the Rassemblement National des Indépendants[113] (RNI), the Union Constitutionnelle[114] (UC), and the Mouvement Populaire[115] (MP).[116] This confirmation of multiparty participation in elections beginning in the 1980s was further developed by the reemergence of Islam in the political sphere.

The Islamist movement's revival hinged on "the crises of the secular opposition together with the general worsening of economic and social conditions" during the 1970s.[117] The Leftist movement had failed to consider the importance of ideology and religion in their political ethos, allowing the emphasis on ideology and cultural unity to be played to the benefit of the monarchy. Benomar explains that "In Morocco, Islam as the preserve of the monarch, has been used actively by the state, both to immobilise the opposition and as a means of consolidating its control."[118] This fusion of religion and politics is visible in the motto of the nation: "God Nation, and King (*Allah, al-watan, al-malik*)" and in the King's Arabic title as *amir al-muminin*.[119]

The global Islamist revival that was occurring in the 1970s in the Muslim world had an impact on the Islamist movement in Morocco as well. Islamist organizations demanded the

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[112] Daadaoui, 198.

[113] Translates to the National Rally of Independents.

[114] Translates to the Constitutional Union.

[115] Translates to the Popular Movement.

[116] Daadaoui, 198.

[117] Jamal Benomar, "The Monarchy, the Islamist Movement and Religious Discourse in Morocco," *Third World Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (1988): 540, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992656.

[118] Ibid., 541.

[119] Miller, 188.

creation of an Islamic-based, more just and equitable society in response to the monarchy's perceived corruption and tyranny. The Islamist movement grew in power and influence throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in spite of government attempts to suppress it. Many Moroccans, especially those who were marginalized or excluded from positions of political and economic power, found the movement's ideals and rhetoric to be compelling.

By the 1990s, the end of this second phase of post-independence political authority, religion and politics were in tandem with the monarch as *amir al-muminīn* (Commander of the Faithful,[120] the multiparty system and the coalition of pro-monarchical parties, democratic reforms and referendums to the constitution, and a stable system of corruption and cooptation. Since then, Morocco has experienced a number of changes in dominant political trends, with political groups with various ideologies holding the reins of power. In addition, the Islamist movement in Morocco underwent a major transformation in the 1990s, and some organizations, like the Justice and Charity Movement, changed their political stance to one that was more moderate and practical. Islamist parties now play a significant role in Moroccan politics, with the Justice and Development Party (PJD) presently controlling the majority of parliamentary seats.

However, the monarchy continues to hold supreme power, and detractors contend that its democratic structures are still underdeveloped. Morocco has advanced significantly in the twenty-first century, despite these obstacles, and its political and economic reforms have been praised by foreign observers.

Moroccan Politics and Structure Today

[120] Benomar, 551.

Morocco has a multi-party political structure and is a constitutional monarchy (see table 2). The political ideologies of the various political organizations and groups in Morocco are diverse. The constitution in theory supports the separation of powers and the rule of law while ensuring freedom of speech, association, and peaceful gathering. However, the reality is that, while Morocco does have elections, many of the parties were created with pro-monarchy sentiments as a way for the state to hold power still, allowing authoritarianism to remain.[121]

English Party Name	Political Purpose/Affiliation	Political Ideology	Majority Ethnic Demographic	Year Founded
Istiqlal Party (PI)	To offset colonialism and push for Pro-Arab ideals	Anti-monarchy; conservative	Non-Arab: Sahraoui	1956
Popular Movement (MP)	To weaken the Istiqlal Party and to support the monarchy and Berber community	Pro-monarchy; administration parties	Non-Arab: Sahraoui	1957
Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS)	Originally created as a communist party	Liberal; formerly communist and currently socialist	Non-Arab: Motswana	1974
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)	Openly critical of the monarchy and pushes for constitutional reforms	Anti-monarchy; progressive democratic socialism	Non-Arab: Amazigh (Rifi, Soussi, Chalh)	1975
National Rally of Independents (RNI)	To weaken the Istiqlal Party and to support the monarchy	Pro-monarchy; administration parties	Non-Arab: Motswana	1978
Constitutional Union (UC)	To weaken the Istiqlal Party and to support the monarchy	Pro-monarchy; administration parties	Non-Arab: Motswana	1983
Democratic and Social Movement	Created from the MP and for the	Pro-monarchy; socialist democracy	Non-Arab: Amazigh (Rifi, Soussi, Chalh)	1996

[121] James N. Sater, "Parliamentary Elections and Authoritarian Rule in Morocco," *Middle East Journal* 63, no. 3 (2009): 382, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20622927.

(MDS)				
Justice and Development Party (PJD)	Main Islamic party focusing on economic and legal reform	Pro-monarchy; moderate Islamist group	Non-Arab: Sahraoui	1998
Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM)	Created in opposition of the Justice and Development Party	Pro-monarchy; liberalism	Arab	2007

Table 2. The Political Parties Represented in the First House of the Moroccan Parliament. Helmut Reifeld. "Government Formation by Consensus?: Monarchy, Democracy and Political Islam in Morocco," ed. Gerhard Wahlers, *Borders*, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10101.10.

Morocco's government is organized through a parliamentary constitutional monarchy "with the executive branch consisting of the current King Mohammed VI" and the 15th prime minister (up until 2011 for this study), Abdelilah Benkirane who has a five year term.[122] The government also consists of a bicameral legislature with the Assembly of Representatives (*majilis al-nuwwab*) of Morocco and the Assembly of Councillors (*majilis al-mustasharin*). The lower chamber of parliament, the House of Representatives, has 395 members who are chosen by the general public to serve terms of five years. Legislation and the government's funding are approved by the House of Representatives. With 120 members appointed for six-year terms, the House of Councillors is the upper chamber of parliament. The primary duty of the House of Councillors, which has few legislative powers, is to review and amend legislation approved by the House of Representatives. In figure 7, we see that the last election up until 2011 was won by the PJD who "obtained 107 seats in parliament (out of 395), saw its secretary-general, Abdelilah Benkirane, appointed as prime minister, and took control of major ministerial positions."[123]

[122] Sahar Al-Gazzali, "Morocco: An Analysis of Identity and Beliefs," (essay, Emory University, 2022), 7.

[123] Abouzzohour, "Justice and Development Party."

The major political parties in Morocco are the secular center-right UC, the centrist RNI, the leftist USFP, the conservative Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), and the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) (see fig. 7). The PJD has been in control since 2011 and is the largest party in the legislature. The party has worked out to implement political and economic changes in the nation and is an advocate of an Islamic democracy. The PJD has strong links to Islamist organizations in the region and is a member of the global Muslim Brotherhood movement. Founded in 2008, the right-leaning political organization PAM promotes a freer and more open economy while defending the monarchy. The party has drawn a sizable portion of urban electors and is thought to be pro-business and pro-reform. Since its founding in 1975, the communist organization USFP has promoted social justice and fiscal equality while defending secularism. The party has advocated for more extensive democratic reforms and has criticized the monarchy. The RNI is a centrist group that backs free-market principles and economic liberalization. Business executives, technocrats, and liberal intellectuals make up the party, which has had success winning over metropolitan voters. The UC is a liberal political organization that supports democracy, human rights, and individual liberties. It is in favor of a market-based economy and has opposed government economic interference. In terms of electoral support, the party has fared worse than the other main parties.



Figure 7. Vote Share of Leading Parties in Morocco's Parliament in Election Years. Yasmina Abouzzohour, "The Persistent Rural Failure of Morocco's Justice and Development Party," *Project on Middle East Political Science*, https://pomeps.org/the-persistent-rural-failure-of-moroccos-justice-and-development-party.

With the context of the current government structure, we jump back to Daadaoui's third phase of political authority which lasted from 1991 to the present. This period has been focused on "state control over the political system and to guarantee a process of governmental power transfer, known in Morocco's political parlance as 'alternance'."[124] Alternance describes the orderly handover of power between political organizations or groups in the wake of a free and fair election. This first took place in 1998 between the USFP and the PI. This system allowed "the Koutla (democratic bloc)" to present "the monarch with a list of political demands for more democratic reforms."[125]

[124] Daadaoui, 198.

[125] Ibid., 199.

In 1997, the first multiparty parliamentary elections were conducted, and the USFP won the most seats, 57 of the 319 seats in the Assembly of Representatives. A coalition government led by the USFP and smaller parties was established, but it disintegrated quickly due to internal conflicts and corruption scandals. Abderrahmane El-Youssoufi, a USFP member, was named prime minister by King Hassan II in 1998, and he was given the responsibility of forming a new administration with its Koutla allies.[126] The El-Youssoufi government cleared the way for future alternations and marked the first peaceful transfer of power in Moroccan history with the introduction of democratic reforms including socio-economic issues. Since then, Morocco has experienced a number of alternations, with political groups with various ideologies holding the reins of power. The idea of alternance has grown in significance in Moroccan politics, and numerous political parties and civil society organizations support a more robust democracy system that would encourage peaceful changes in power. However, many scholars and citizens believe that the King still wields considerable authority and that the nation's democratic structures are still insufficient. This "Cynicism towards the government grew even greater" with following elections, such as the 2002 polls, "which saw the new King Moham[m]ed VI break with democratic practices and appoint Driss Jettou, a technocrat who was not affiliated with any political party."[127]

The arguments about continual corruption in Moroccan politics are not unfounded. Johnston defines corruption as "the abuse of public roles and resources for private benefit. 'Abuse' in this sense, can be initiated by people who hold public positions or by those who seek to influence them."[128] Muhammad VI's dramatic democratic reforms created the illusion of a

[126] Ibid., 200.

[127] Ibid., 200.

[128] Michael Johnston, "The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment," *Comparative Politics* 18, no. 4 (1986): 460, https://doi.org/10.2307/421694.

progressive Morocco that was no longer linked to its colonial past but the blatant powers of the monarchy: "the appointment of ministers, including the prime minister, the right to dissolve parliament and legislate in its absence, the ability to declare a state of emergency and to revise the constitution by national referendum" all prove the authoritarianism of the monarchy (more on this in chapter five.)[129] Figure 8 shows the current civilian opinion on corruption within the *makhzen*.



Figure 8. Survey Response to "Handling Fighting Corruption." (Afrobarometer R8 2019/2021, Afrobarometer R9 2022, Morocco)

We see that 44% of Moroccans believe that corruption is being handled "fairly badly," and 21.6% believe it to be being handled "very badly". With a total of 65.6% negatively viewing

[129] Miller, 228.

the *makhzen's* ability to handle fighting corruption, it is clear that even with democratic reforms and alternance, the monarchy has work to do.

As Waterbury explains,

> It is illusory to think that we can actually measure the costs and benefits of corruption. Either one is dealing with a country in which some level of corruption is apparent or with a country in which, at least for the sake of argument, no corruption is apparent. On the one hand, a discussion of the benefits of corruption would oblige the observer to make a purely hypothetical guess as to how the system would function without corruption, and on the other, how a noncorrupt system would function with corruption. One can convincingly and legitimately analyze only what actually is going on and what the costs and benefits seem to be. It is very difficult to suggest what the costs and benefits of some hypothetical process might be.[130]

Though some might argue that corruption has allowed the monarchy to persist, it nonetheless affects the structure and compromisation of its political institutions.

Ethnicity and Party Alignment

One of King Mohammed VI's most important reforms was the 2011 adoption of a new constitution, which gave the legislature and the courts more authority and strengthened protections for human rights. Along with Arabic, the Amazigh language was officially recognized as a language in Morocco, marking a watershed victory of the Berber Movement and push for Amazigh in the government and in schools. Furthermore, the influence of ethnic groups such as the Berbers has recently played a larger role in political party strength than it has in the past (see fig. 9.)

[130] John Waterbury, "Endemic and Planned Corruption," *World Politics* 25, no. 4 (1973): 543, doi: doi:10.2307/2009951.



Figure 9. Survey Response to "Which Party" crossed with "What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?" (Afrobarometer R8 2019/2021, Morocco)

In this figure, we see that pluralities of Arabs (30.3%) voted for PAM, Berbers (21.7%) PJD, Sahraoui (29.7%) PJD, and Motswana (24.9%) equally for PAM and PPS. PAM, a liberal party that supports the monarchy, was the only party with a plurality of Arab voters (see table 2). We infer that this plurality vote for PAM in the Arab community is tied to nationalism and the parties' focus on democratic reforms. Meanwhile, the PJD garnered considerable support from the smaller ethnic groups of Berbers and Sahraouis. This could be due to the party's stance "as largely uncorrupted," a factor that wins over minority ethnic groups who experience more amounts of corruption and socio-economic bias in their day-to-day life.[131] The Motswana group is not an ethnic division but instead a depiction of national alignment so their analysis is unneeded in this context. In summary, the Berber and Sahraoui groups voted for mainly moderate, and Islamist, parties with lower levels of corruption and the Arab group has mostly

[131] Reifeld, 92.

voted in favor of secular, liberal, and pro-reformist policies that benefit the monarchy and nationalist endeavors.

So what is the link between ethnicity and voting, and is there a probable correlation in politics? Ichino argues that in various sub-Saharan nations, "a person's ethnicity is generally a strong predictor of how they'll vote" and that this can be due to either expressive voting, the "psychological benefit from affirming identity through the vote" or instrumental voting, the calculation "that you'll benefit more (materially) from voting for a co-ethnic" through public and private goods.[132] She further argues that more segregation (rural vs urban) can create a larger incentive to vote for your own group or a group that benefits your interests. This argument holds merit in the case of Morocco as some parties tend to be more popular in certain regions or among certain ethnic groups.

For instance, the PI, one of the major opposition groups under King Hassan II, has historically gained considerable support from rural communities in northern Morocco, where the group was established and is predominantly inhabited by Berber peoples. As we know from chapters two and three, the rural regions receive less government aid and education, and this ties into ethnic pluralism and party alignment (see fig. 1 and fig. 5). A significant portion of the moderate and religiously inclined voters who support the PJD, which is currently the biggest party in parliament, are also able to win over young people, urban dwellers, and members of the middle class. Osaghae explains that ethnicity "arises from and is used as an instrument of competition for power and resources among people, typically the elites, from different ethnic

[132] Nahomi Ichino, "Responsiveness" (presentation, Atlanta, GA, November 15, 2022).

groups" which is used to then make "claims on (cf. local political autonomy, right to self-determination) and seeking redress from the political system."[133]

It is possible that a sizable portion of Moroccan voters are unaware of political issues or party platforms. In the absence of knowledge regarding political platforms, they may rely on racial or tribal ties to cast their votes. In the past, Moroccan political parties benefited from racial strife by frequently choosing candidates from particular tribes or ethnic groups to appeal to people who voted along ethnic or tribal lines. Then, to garner support, these contenders typically focus most of their campaigning on their hometowns. Ethnic identity may lead to marginalized groups having more political influence. In this way, such groups can help deal with the issue of underrepresentation and make sure that all Moroccans' opinions are addressed during the political process. In Morocco, tribalism and kinship ties have a long past and are deeply ingrained in the culture of the nation. Consequently, strong ethnic attachments and identities have developed, frequently taking precedence over political allegiances. Many Moroccans have a propensity to vote primarily on the basis of their clan or ethnicity. This ethnopluralism is a delicate balance in Morocco where "On the one hand, the state, as an agent of distributive justice, is expected to provide a level playing field with guaranteed access and participation for all competitors. On the other hand, it is also expected to manage ethnic demands and conflicts to forestall their possible escalation into deadly conflicts."[134]

We see ethnopluralism most clearly in the coexistence of several ethnic and linguistic groups, such as the Berber population. This group experienced decades of discrimination and marginalization, particularly under the policies of previous Moroccan governments that sought to

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[133] Eghosa E. Osaghae, "Political Transitions and Ethnic Conflict in Africa," *Journal of Third World Studies* 21, no. 1 (2004): 227-228, http://www.jstor.org/stable/45198370.

[134] Ibid., 228.

promote Arab identity and suppress Berber culture and languages. With Berber activism in Morocco reaching to 40-45% of the population,[135] the monarchy worked to absorb Berber identity and culture into the larger "Arabo-Islamic identity reified by nationalist rhetoric."[136] In Morocco alone, the Berber-speaking population sits at around 15 million with three main groups: "Tashelhit, spoken in the south; Tamazight, in central Morocco; and Tarifit, in the north."[137] While the *makhzen* since independence has worked hard to push Berbers to adopt Islam and Arabic (see chapter two), Arabization has not fully worked in these communities with many rejecting "Assimilation amid rising group consciousness and subsequent demands to promote Berber identity."[138]

In the sphere of politics, the Berber movement has created several parties and organizations, such as the Movement for the self-determination of Kabylie (MAK), an organization created in 2001 that advocates for greater autonomy of the Kabylie people.[139] Another group is the Amazigh Democratic Party (PAD), founded in 2005. Since the 2011 official recognition of Berbers in Morocco, "The King's address also affirmed 'the constitutional enshrinement of the pluralist character of the unified Moroccan identity, which is rich due to the wealth of its sources, and in their heart, Amazighism, as a credit for all Moroccans without exception."[140] With language symbolizing political independence and expression, the 2011

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[135] Miller, 194.

[136] Ibid., 195.

[137] Moha Ennaji, "Recognizing the Berber Language in Morocco: A Step for Democratization," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 15, no. 2 (2014): 93–94, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43773631.

[138] Ibid., 94.

[139] A Berber ethnic group originating mainly in northern Algeria but exists throughout the Maghreb.

[140] Mohammad VI, "The March 9, 2011 speech," *al-Alam* Newspaper, April 19, 2011.

constitution signifies a great step forward for Berbers and attention to their political desires of equality and cultural permeance.

Conclusion

The idea of ethnopluralism is crucial to Moroccan politics and culture because it reflects the nation's rich and varied cultural heritage. The acceptance and acknowledgment of ethnopluralism is essential in fostering a more inclusive and tolerant Moroccan society, as the country's population is made up of a variety of ethnic and cultural groups, including Berbers, Arabs, Sahraouis, and others. Although the Berber people have historically faced marginalization and discrimination, the Berber movement in Morocco has worked to increase their recognition and representation, and in recent years, substantial progress has been made in this direction. In the end, the promotion of peaceful coexistence, mutual regard, and understanding among all of the country's diverse communities depends on the recognition and approval of ethnopluralism in Moroccan politics. This chapter also sought to find the correlation between ethnic identity and political alignments and ideologies within Morocco with the context of corruption and pro-monarchy backed parties that act as pawns for the monarchy’s whims. Using the Afrobarometer (see fig. 8 and fig. 9), we see that there is both a high obvious belief of corruption with the *makhzen* and a correlation between ethnic background and culture and political party. From the data we infer that Arabs vote with nationalistic tendencies with a focus on democratic and economic reforms that continue to benefit their group. Meanwhile, the Berber and Sahraoui groups tend to vote for moderate parties with key voters coming from rural or lower socio-economic backgrounds. While ethnopluralism alone is not a definitive marker of political ideology (there are many other factors such as age, education level, primary language), it

provides insight into the political ideologies of the Moroccan people and gives a voice for more marginalized groups.

Chapter Five: Expression of Anticolonialism and Nationalism in Post-Colonial Morocco

This chapter will discuss the shift in Arab nationalism from the colonial period to the Arab Spring and the various factors that affected mobilization. We will also discuss the importance of anticolonialist groups, including Islamic nationalism, and the background of other greater movements in the MENA region, such as Pan-Arabism. We will then discuss the Moroccan Arab Spring both from the perspective of Berbers, such as the Sahrouis in Western Sahara and urban centers. This will be compared to the larger February 20th movement in 2011 that saw a massive mobilization of Arabs and Berbers together protesting the *makhzen* and urging for political, social, and economic reforms. We will end the chapter by highlighting the new Morocco after the signing of the 2011 constitution and the various changes enacted by Mohammed VI. Finally, a greater analysis will be drawn on the current state of collective identity for Arabs and Berbers and how this changed from the early colonial period of anticolonialist and nationalist rhetoric.

Rise of Anticolonialism and Arab Nationalism

Arab nationalism is not a new phenomenon of the 21st century, and the Arab Spring was not a movement that suddenly formed in the 2010s. On the contrary, this ideology in Morocco was first formed during the Protectorate period, along with the idea of "Arabisants" and the rejection of Francophonie culture. Khalidi summarizes this fact by stating:

> Arab Nationalism, like most other Middle Eastern nationalisms, was a child of the intellectual atmosphere of the nineteenth century and one of many responses to the process of incorporation of the world into a single system with Europe at its center which that century witnessed. (...) Arab Nationalism in its fully developed form represented an expression of identity and of group solidarity within the projected new format of the nation-state by an amalgam of old elites and new social forces at once desirous of seeing

> their society resist control by outside forces and and deeply influenced by the example and challenge of the West.[141]

We will use the definition of Arabism by Manduchi, who states, "(*'urūbah*, being Arab) in the sense of belonging to the same world, in a single context."[142] As Morocco achieved independence, the push for further Arabization, specifically in education, grew with "the first Prime Minister, Mohamed El Fassi, [attempting] to Arabize the first grade."[143] French was, and still is, seen as an expression of modernity, a tool to access technological and scientific knowledge, or a symbol of domination that has contributed to an identity crisis and acculturation.[144] This battle between modernity and tradition continued with the rise of Pan-Arabism in Arab nations. Pan-Arabism, "(*qawmiyyah 'arabiyyah*) developed in the interwar period, but especially after the Second World War," with the former President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, famously influencing the ideology.[145] Finally, the idea of nationalism solidified Morocco's independence from France, as Moroccans were at that time acknowledging their identity through the "aims to create political unity" and to project "cultural and spiritual hegemony."[146] Arab leaders and civilians joined during these early years of independence to protest against imperialism and Westernization. Intending to strengthen their presence within

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[141] Rashid Khalidi, "Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Literature," *The American Historical Review* 96, no. 5 (1991): 1364-1365, https://doi.org/10.2307/2165275.

[142] Patrizia Manduchi, "Arab Nationalism(s): Rise and Decline of an Ideology," *Oriente Moderno* 97, no. 1 (2017): 4, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48572289.

[143] Alalou, "Language and Ideology," 410.

[144] Ibid., 409.

[145] Manduchi, 4.

[146] Ibid., 5.

their nation, the Arab nationalism of the 20th century always had different goals than that of the 21st century.

With this historical context in mind, Morocco achieved a second wave of Arab nationalism during the autocratic reign of Hassan II (r.1961-1999), during which, in chapter five, corruption, division, and repression produced a variety of political and cultural ramifications. Furthermore, as in many other Arab nations during the later half of the 20th century, Hassan II used Arabism "to legitimize autocratic rule" and "delegitimize potential rivals and adversaries."[147] The current monarch's reign, Mohammed VI (r. 1999-present), has been very different from that of his father through an effort to enact democratic and political reforms. However, there have still been significant issues of political representation in the nation, leading to the rise of protests and the eventual Arab Spring. Biagi states that "Fundamental rights were significantly limited between 1999 and 2011 also in other areas: freedom of association, assembly, expression, and religion were in fact permitted only within certain bounds, and violence against women continued to be very frequent."[148] The four main issues that led to more protests and ethnic mobilization were political, economic, social, and regional.

As in chapter four, political issues culminated around the government's slow progress on political reforms, such as transparency and accountability and the citizens' desires for greater political openness, right to free expression, and an end to corruption. Economically, protests centered on high unemployment, poverty, inflation, and high economic gaps between urban and rural regions. This economic inequality worsened over the decades, further stigmatized by ethnicity and educational background. Socially, like in chapter three, the Moroccan people and

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[147] P.R. Kumaraswamy, "The Arab Spring," *India International Centre Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (2011): 53, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44733617.

[148] Justin O. Frosini and Francesco Biagi, *Political and Constitutional Transitions in North Africa: Actors and Factors* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 53.

external groups such as Human Rights Watch have cited high numbers of human rights abuses, limited healthcare, and discrepancies in the level and quality of education offered to students. Finally, regional issues, such as the Western Sahara annexation and similar worsening government structures in other North African nations like Egypt and Tunisia, stoked the desire for change in Morocco.

The rise of Arab nationalism has thus affected the notion of ethnic collective identity, as well as relationships with other minority ethnic groups in Morocco, such as the various Berber tribes existing in and near Morocco. One of the critical drivers of Arab nationalism has also resulted from a desire for a distinct identity in the face of a nation that juggles so many backgrounds, languages, and cultures due to Western cultural and political influence. The issue with this drive for one identifying force in Morocco is the position of non-Arab ethnic groups in Moroccan society.

Although Berber, Jewish, and other communities have long coexisted in Morocco alongside the Arab majority, focus on these other identities has diminished since the rise of Arab nationalism. Some ethnic groups' perceptions that their identities are being marginalized in favor of an Arab-centric view of the nation have led to tensions between various ethnic groups in Morocco. Others contend, however, that regardless of their ancestry, Moroccans now feel a sense of unity and shared identity due to the rise of Arab nationalism. Overall, the growth of Arab nationalism in Morocco has significantly impacted ethnic collective identity. As a result, the position of non-Arab ethnic groups in Moroccan society has come under scrutiny, even though it has led to a renewed respect for Arab cultural heritage and identity. Finding ways to honor the nation's diversity while fostering a sense of shared national identity will be crucial as the nation continues to manage these tensions.

The Moroccan Arab Spring

Rising sentiments of Arab nationalism, smaller ethnic group protests, and grievances played a role in the eventual Arab Spring in Morocco. However, Morocco differs from other Arab nations: "the regime weathered mass demonstrations with no external intervention, minimal violence, limited financial resources, and no political concessions."[149] Many theories have been made in the aftermath as to why Morocco and other monarchies, such as Jordan, remained intact. However, Biagi cites three reasons: "the Moroccan sovereign, as a member of the Alaoui dynasty claims direct descent from the Prophet Mohammed, and this gives him a very strong legitimacy;" "Morocco had initiated an important process of democratic reform in 1999;" and finally, "the idea according to which without the king and his 'unifying role' the country would be ungovernable."[150]

While the Arab Spring in Morocco was relatively calm and resulted in a more democratic process within the *makhzen*, it nonetheless significantly impacted the collective identity of ethnic groups in the nation. Wilson believes that in Morocco, the Arab Spring truly began with the Sahraoui people in annexed Western Sahara "from October to November 2010, a few weeks before the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia on 17 December 2010," an act considered the catalyst of the Arab Spring.[151] The Western Sahara has been a disputed territory since 1975, when Spain withdrew from the area, leading to claims over it from both Morocco and Mauritania. The Sahraoui, who speak in the Hassaniya dialect, have historically resided in

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[149] Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, and Hicham Alaoui, "From Authoritarian Pluralism to Centralized Autocracy in Morocco," in *The Lure of Authoritarianism: The Maghreb after the Arab Spring*, ed. Abdeslam M. Maghraoui and Stephen J. King, 271, (Indiana University Press, 2019), https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvfc54tb.14.

[150] Frosini and Biagi, 55.

[151] Alice Wilson, "On the Margins of the Arab Spring." *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice* 57, no. 2 (2013): 81, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42705146.

this zone, and in 1973, fought for their territory as the Polisario Front. The conflict led to "war and later, as of the 1991 ceasefire, UN negotiations and other diplomatic forums."[152] Wilson cites that the region has failed to implement decolonization. This led the Sahraoui to take matters into their own hands by fighting for the independence of the annexed territory and forming the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)[153] on February 27, 1976. The SADR live in exile and only control a small fraction of the territory, with Morocco controlling the remainder.

This annexation and exile are just one example of the disparity between ethnic minorities living in and near Morocco. The Sahraoui began the demonstrations against Moroccan rule and should be considered an integral part of the Arab Spring in Morocco. Early Berber mobilization led to Moroccan forces attacking Sahraoui refugee camps in Algeria. The UN Security Council states, "Moroccan auxiliary forces and police officers forcefully dispersed the protesters and destroyed the camp using tear gas, water cannons, batons and loudspeakers mounted on vehicles and helicopters."[154] The Sahraoui people and their supporters have opposed Morocco's annexation of Western Sahara and continue to demand freedom and self-determination as they are "marginalized from Morocco's claims to have brought prosperity to Western Sahara"[155] and cite negligence of their people through a lack of education and job opportunities, and lack of housing.[156]

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[152] Ibid., 84.

[153] Interchangeable with Sahraoui and will only be used in relation to Wilson and the SADR.

[154] UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara* (New York: UN Security Council, 2011), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/724626.

[155] Wilson, 87.

[156] Ibid., 86.

Many scholars consider the beginning of the Moroccan Arab Spring after February 20, 2011, when the name "*Mouvement du 20 Février*" took root. This movement was "largely comprised of young people, [who] denounced in particular the systematic and endemic corruption, the high cost of basic products, low wages and increasing poverty; it also called for greater social justice, free access to healthcare, greater employment opportunities and the right to housing."[157] Many of these issues differ from those protested by the Sahraoui in Western Sahara. However, we believe that due to their location in the annexed region, the monarchy could hide their protests more easily than the sizable multi-ethnic gathering of the February movement, which took a greater political and social toll on the *makhzen*.

The February 20 movement was held "in fifty-three cities and towns," and based on three main estimates, there were either 37,000, 300,000, or 120,000[158] protestors and relying on an estimate of these numbers, "Morocco would have drawn proportionally larger crowds than the initial protests in Tunisia[159], Libya[160], and Yemen[161] combined."[162] The protests began to bring together people from different regions, classes, and ethnicities who shared a common goal of political, social, and economic change. The protesters emphasized their Moroccan identity and rejected any attempt to divide them along ethnic or regional lines. The Amazigh, who had long been marginalized and discriminated against, played a prominent role in the protests and demanded recognition of their language and culture. This demand was answered with the new

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[157] Frosini and Biagi, 54.

[158] Mamfakinch, Bilan Statistique #Feb 20, https://www.mamfakinch.com/.

[159] "Tunisia Struggles to End Protests," Al Jazeera, December 2010, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/20101229122733122341.

[160] Al Arabiya, "Clash Breaks Out as Libya Braces for Day of Danger," 2011.

[161] Lina Sinjab, "Yemen Conflict: Protests Continue across the Country," BBC, May 30, 2011, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-middle-east-13595745/yemen-conflict-protests-continue-across-the-country.

[162] Maghraoui and Alaoui, 272.

2011 constitution. The Arab Spring in Morocco thus led to a renewed sense of collective identity among the country's diverse ethnic groups.

Morocco and the early Arab nationalist movement have evolved from a Protectorate region without any strong sense of nation or leadership and full of ethnic and cultural division to a combined ethnic and cultural endeavor of the Moroccan people, demanding change for everyone. Berbers, Arabs, and Sub-Saharan people were united in their response to the country's long history of political repression, economic inequality, and social injustice. Beyond uniting the nation under one common goal, the Arab Spring also led a renewed sense of collective identity among the country's diverse ethnic groups.

A New Era of Identity

The Arab Spring led to the adoption of Morocco's new constitution in 2011. This followed quickly behind the King's March 9, 2011 speech, an event during which Mohammed VI never mentioned the February 20 movement but instead stated seven elements of reforms:

> 1) a guarantee of the pluralist nature of Moroccan identity, including the Amazigh component; 2) consolidation of the rule of law, the promotion and expansion of the scope of fundamental rights and guarantee of their exercise; 3) guarantee of the independence of the judiciary and reinforcement of the powers of the Constitutional Council; 4) consolidation of the principle of the separation of powers through the transfer of new powers to parliament and the appointment as prime minister of a member of the party obtaining the largest number of votes in elections, and the reinforcement of the prime minister's status as the head of the executive branch; 5) consolidation of the role of political parties within a pluralist system, reinforcement of the role of the parliamentary opposition and civil society; 6) bolstering of mechanisms intended to guarantee moral integrity within public life and to favor responsible conduct within public office; and 7) guarantee of the institutions addressing the issues of good government, human rights and protection of freedoms.[163]

[163] Mohammed VI, "March speech."

The 2011 constitution gained approval "by 98 percent of the population" and was promulgated by Mohammed VI on July 29, 2011.[164] Not only did this new constitution update address significant issues such as gender inequality, corruption, and balance of power between the legislative and executive. It also finally acknowledged and gave rights to the Berbers, such as Article 5, which states, "Arabic is the official language of the State…Likewise, Tamazight [Berber/amazighe] constitutes an official language of the State, being common patrimony of all Moroccans without exception…The State works for the preservation of Hassani, as an integral component of the Moroccan cultural unity, as well as the speakers [of it]...".[165] At least on paper, this was a massive victory for the Berber movement and even for acknowledgment of the Sahraoui people and their struggles in Western Sahara.

Another critical article in the constitution is Article 26, states, "The public powers lend, by appropriate measures, their support to the development of cultural and artistic creation…"[166] This was another important article, considering the previous restrictions on Berber and other minority cultural expressions. However, it is in the Preamble where we see the most unambiguous indication of cultural and ethnic unity: "A sovereign Muslim State, attached to its national unity and to its territorial integrity…Its unity, is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Berber [amazighe] and Saharan-Hassanic [saharo-hassanie] components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean influences [affluents]."[167]

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[164] Frosini and Biagi, 58.

[165] Morocco Const. art. V.

[166] Ibid., art. XXVI.

[167] Ibid., pmbl.

The Arab Spring and the 2011 Constitution have profoundly impacted the Moroccan people and their sense of identity. Morocco was a region of colonialism where Islam and traditional culture were treated as second-rate to European teachings and political structures. As Bouzzit says, "Colonists in Morocco were agents of destruction of both the land and culture, and their imperialism was to begin at the end of their mission."[168] As a result, for most of the 19th and 20th centuries, the Moroccan people were scattered, divided, and placed in a hierarchy based on ethnicity, language, and religion. Even after independence, Morocco achieved a camouflaged defeat where Moroccans continued the colonial ideology into their new nation. Laroui summarizes this by saying, "This was the very essence of the colonial process to destroy indigenous society and then accept individuals one by one into a new society organized by and for foreigners. In other words, the foreigners, after destroying most of the society's functions, were kind enough to let it die in peace."[169]

The Arab Spring catalyzed Moroccans to gain greater social awareness and a renewed sense of national identity after decades of colonial and Orientalist priority. Arabs and non-Arabs protested in tandem and fought together for a better future that included unity and solidarity. As a result, Morocco's people and nation have changed significantly due to the Arab Spring and the 2011 Constitution. These occasions contributed to developing a new sense of Moroccan collective identity characterized by greater social awareness, national pride, and a commitment to constructive change. These events have done this by promoting democracy, human rights, and greater political engagement.

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[168] Bouzzit, 11.

[169] Abdallah Laroui, *The History of The Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 340.

Conclusion

This thesis sought to uncover how the acquisition of the French language in modern Morocco impacted class identity, social mobilization, and political ideology within Arab and Berber communities. Furthermore, we looked at the overall shift in Berber and Arab relations and placement in society from the Protectorate period to 2011 after the Arab Spring in Morocco. The past five chapters have looked at important identity and standing societal factors such as language, religion, politics, and economics. These factors all play a role in the experiences and status of Arab and Berber individuals throughout the 20th and 21st centuries and the competing vision about cultural capital and what characterizes "Moroccaness," "Arabism," and "Berberism."

Understanding the relationship and treatment of Arabs and Berbers also requires the historical lens of various pivotal events such as decolonization, the rise of the modern monarchy, the death of King Hassan II, the official coronation of King Muhammad VI, and the Arab Spring. Following a historical background of the Protectorate period and the independence period in Morocco, the core of our thesis begins with the implementation of French in Moroccan education. Next, scholars such as Ali Alalou and Katherine Hoffman dive into the historical background of colonial education in Morocco and the role of Islamic education during this period. Chapter two focuses on how education during the Protectorate period affected the process of language learning and diglossia at home and school in Arab and Berber communities. Chapter three emphasizes modern class structures within Morocco, factoring economics and linguistics as a stratum for collective identity. This is where scholars such as Crawford Young and Albirini Abdulkafi argue the value of diglossia in multi-linguistic societies such as Morocco and how the segmentation theory by Ernest Gellner plays a role in class structures and identity within

Moroccan society. Chapter four adds another dimension to collective identity in the form of political ideology and ethnopluralism. Here the relationship between the *makhzen* and the people is more visible with an overview of several prominent political parties, the role of corruption, and finally, the true power of the monarchy. Chapter five ties in all the previous chapters to culminate in the Arab Spring in late 2010/early 2011. This final chapter pushes our thesis toward our goal of understanding Arab and Berber relations in the backdrop of identity, culture, and tribe.

However, this thesis concludes that the largest transformation in identity has resulted from Morocco switching from a colonialist rule to a true hybrid regime under King Mohammed VI. During the Protectorate period, Arab and Berber communities were divided by French colonial practices, such as separate laws, regions of living, and standards of education and job opportunities. These discriminatory practices resulted in social and political separation, as well as ethnic conflict. Even after achieving independence in 1956, Berber and Arab communities faced division due to King Hassan II's Arabization and Moroccanization policies which pushed for a focus on Arabic and Arab culture to eradicate the decades of French colonial rule. This tendency reversed after the Arab Spring, and these communities' collective identities shifted to oneness and Moroccan nationalism. Inspired by a shared goal of better political, social, and economic policies, Moroccans (including the Sahraoui in Western Sahara) protested against the current *makhzen*, calling for political reform, social justice, more accountability for human rights violations, and remedies for regional inequality (specifically regarding Western Sahara).

With the Arab Spring in full motion throughout MENA in 2011, the movement in Morocco gave people a forum to express their ideas and worries and gave rise to a new sense of unity and nationalism. Following the Arab Spring, the Moroccan government made several

changes, including adopting a new constitution, to allay public concerns. The Arab and Berber communities felt included and integrated due to these changes. The government also promoted the use of Amazigh in public affairs and recognized it as an official language. As a result, following the Arab Spring, the collective identity of the Arab and Berber populations has changed from ethnic division and segregation under the French Protectorate to unification and Moroccan nationalism. This transformation has been greatly influenced by the Moroccan government's initiatives to resolve populist concerns and advance inclusivity. To guarantee that the collective identity of all communities in Morocco is fully incorporated and recognized, however, much work still needs to be done. As a result of the Arab Spring, the Arab and Berber communities in Morocco experienced a major change in their shared identity. The ethnic division and separation during the French Protectorate period have been replaced by a sense of unity, and Moroccan nationalism developed due to the protests and rallies. The Moroccan government's promotion of inclusivity and integration has been instrumental in this change. But it is crucial to keep pushing for the complete acceptance and integration of the collective identities of all Moroccan communities. We will now list the four important dimensions of this paper in understanding the link between language, identity, ethnicity, and society.

The first dimension of this thesis involved separating the idea of collective identity and cultural attachments from the colonial and post-colonial periods. In chapter one, we discussed that, due to the influence of the European powers during the colonial period, the concept and separation of Berber and Arab identities underwent significant changes. For instance, the Berber and Arab groups closest to the Algerian border to the east were greatly impacted by French colonialism and later nationalist movements in Algeria. The Berbers and Arabs in Morocco and Algeria were forced to adopt the French language and culture, which caused a gradual decline in

their traditional ways of living via tribal, Islamic, and Bedouin. Many Berbers and Arabs started to resist and reclaim their identities due to this cultural oppression. The "Berber Spring," a campaign for preserving and advancing Berber culture, language, and identity, first appeared in the 1980s.

Similarly, after the end of the colonial era in the late 1950s, Arab nationalists in North Africa and across the Middle East started to establish their own identities. The changes in Berber and Arab cultures persisted after colonialism ended. The post-colonial era was frequently characterized by a revival of traditional cultural customs, Islam, and a reassertion of ethnic identities. This was not always the case, though, and the effects of colonialism on Berber and Arab cultures persist today, even after the Arab Spring.

The second dimension of this thesis focuses on the role of religion, specifically Islamism, and the change in its importance during the reign of Hassan II and the reign of the current monarch, Mohammed VI. This dimension was discussed in each chapter, and we emphasized that, in Morocco, the role of Islamism in politics has undergone significant changes over the years. Islamism was not regarded as a major political force in Morocco during the reign of King Hassan II. But under Muhammad VI, Islamism has become more well-known and has been accepted by political groups. From 1961 to 1999, King Hassan II kept a tight grip on power and quashed all political opposition. *Al-Adl Wa Al-Ihsane*[170] and other Islamic groups were prohibited from participating in politics during his rule.

Additionally, the monarch swiftly put an end to any attempts to overthrow his rule because he saw Islamist groups as a danger to the nation's security. After Hassan II passed in 1999, Muhammad VI succeeded him and started a series of political reforms intended to democratize the nation. Islamist organizations were given permission to take part in politics as a

[170] Translates from Arabic to Justice and Spirituality. This organization is currently illegal in Morocco.

result, and several Islamic parties were established. The PJD, which has won several elections and is presently in power in Morocco, is the best known and most politically successful of these parties. Muhammad VI's choice to normalize Islamism through political parties has significantly impacted Morocco's politics. However, the growth of Islamism during Muhammad VI's reign has also raised concerns from both Moroccan and Western scholars about the country's potential for becoming more conservative and deteriorating secularism, which has become entrenched socially and politically.

The third dimension of this thesis comes in chapters four and five, where we look at how the Moroccan monarchy and government have been criticized for their policies of keeping separation between Arabs and Berbers. The Berbers, also referred to as the Amazigh, are native people of North Africa, which includes Morocco. They vary from the Arab population in terms of language, culture, and tradition. Despite this diversity, the monarchy and government of Morocco have implemented measures to keep the Berber and Arab communities apart. The monarchy and government of Morocco have put policies that give preference to Arab customs and culture over Berber ones such as the late recognition in 2011 of Tamazight as an official language in Morocco, where Arabic has been the official language since independence. Furthermore, Tamazight and other Berber language usage decreased over time due to the Moroccan educational system's preference for teaching Arabic over Berber, specifically during the reign of King Hassan II.

This division of the Arab and Berber people resulted in a dispersed country that is easier to govern. The *makhzen* have preserved a centralized power structure by marginalizing all citizens. The Berbers have little access to resources and services and are not given equitable representation in the government. Likewise, Berbers, including the Sahraoui, have discussed the

inequality in jobs, homes, and education compared to Arabs. This particular dimension of Moroccan society shows how the *makhzen's* policies of maintaining ethnic segregation between Arabs and Berbers have harmed the country's development and unity.

The fourth, final, and most important dimension of this thesis is language and how it acts as a gate to different opportunities, depending on the language used and who is using it. During the colonial and post-colonial periods in Morocco, language choice significantly affected identity and class structure. The official language was changed from Arabic to French during the Protectorate, and it was also pushed as the main language of administration, education, and politics. This language change in Moroccan culture significantly impacted the country's intellectual and political elite. According to Western scholars and French administrators, Arabic was connected to traditionalism and backwardness, while the French represented modernity, sophistication, and advancement. The class system in Morocco was also significantly impacted by the push towards more French in everyday life. Those fluent in French enjoyed a higher social status and had more job possibilities, which became a sign of social distinction and economic benefit. As a result, Moroccans began to speak different languages, with the elite speaking French, creating a distinct class from the general population who spoke Arabic.

The French-speaking elite controlled the highest levels of Moroccan society due to this linguistic division, which reinforced pre-existing social hierarchies. The Moroccan government made Arabic its formal language in the post-colonial era, which caused the linguistic hierarchy to be reversed. While the French language lost its position of privilege, Arabic rose to become a symbol of national identity and cultural legacy. However, the effects of colonialism still influence Moroccan linguistic beliefs and behaviors today. French has continued to be the language of the elite and the learned, and proficiency in it has remained a sign of social

distinction. The complex interactions between language, power, and social inequality are highlighted by the effects of language choice on identification and class structure in Morocco.

Language is not just a tool for communication; it is also a political and social tool that can be employed to uphold or undermine established power systems. The example of Morocco shows how a country's linguistic policies can have a lasting impact on society, influencing not only linguistic behaviors but also social identity and class structure.

We will end with the current state of scholarship on the relationship between language, identity, and social mobilization. According to existing scholarship, there is a complex and nuanced connection between communal identity in Arab and Berber communities and the significance of the French language. However, Algeria consistently appears more frequently in research concerning Arab and Berber ethnic identity over Morocco. French in education is another facet that has been widely researched by scholars but for our research, we would like to see more recent studies and surveys on Moroccan perceptions and opinions of French usage in education and the home. Finally, we would like to see further scholarship on direct correlations between Arab and Berber relations in the colonial and post-colonial period and what factors played a role in eroding the stark division instilled by the Protectorate period. We hope that this topic may be researched further to include other religious backgrounds, such as Morocco's Jewish population, to get a firmer grasp on the intricacies of collective identity and ethnic culture.

We hope that this thesis achieved its goal of shedding light on the importance and lasting impact of Western involvement and Francophone culture on Morocco's diverse, multilingual people. Passing from ruler to ruler, nationalist movement to religious revivals, the Arab and Berber Moroccans have transformed overtime through the way that they mobilize, view the

makhzen, relate to French, and ultimately, are treated by society. Collective identity is a complicated topic, and the multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic backdrop of Morocco only makes it harder to discern. But we argue that the French Protectorate left their culture as a way to instill control and power and this political move has continued under Morocco's monarchs since independence. Although France still holds a firm grasp on Moroccans, Arab and Berbers have found ways to fight for their traditions, languages, and cultures to form their own unique identity separate from the West. Together, Arab and Berber nationalism has paved a way for inclusion and understanding between two groups that for decades were pitted against one another.

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