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Gottlob Christian Storr's Transfiguration of the Kantian Letter

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An abstract of  
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## Abstract

### Gottlob Christian Storr's Transfiguration of the Kantian Letter By Stiles Ajax Alexander

This study complicates one part of the scholarly legend that Gottlob Christian Storr infused the Kantian letter with an Orthodox spirit. In §§17-18 of his *DC*, Storr positions Immanuel Kant's physico-theological and moral arguments for rational belief in God within an argument for the divine authority of Scripture—on which he suggests the reliability of the book's dogmatic statements rest. By foregrounding some versions of Kant's arguments (while hiding others) and by illegitimately drawing biblical-theological conclusions from transcendental and limited-speculative premises, the scholarly story goes, Storr made it seem as if Lutheran Orthodoxy follows from Kant's arguments for rational belief in God. I argue rather that Storr put Kant's arguments in the mouth of reason—construed as a figure in a traditional Lutheran story of transformation. In this story—told from a post-transformation perspective—reason's awareness of God is both transformed by an encounter with Word and it is a placeholder that makes a comparison between 'pre' and 'post' transformation visible. In this encounter with Word, reason comes to trust that the God who is able to help is also willing to help, and to trust that the God who reveals his willingness to help is also the divine Author of Scripture. Because Kant's arguments—on Kant's own terms—concern only reason's rational belief in a God who is able to see the secrets of our hearts and are cognitive symbolic, Storr is able (while keeping within the bounds of the Lutheran dogmatics genre) to (re)present them as symbolic summaries of Scripture (i.e., as dogmatic statements) that harmonize neatly with reason's self-understanding. Storr does not cherry-pick the Kantian words that support his cause, but exploits the compatibility of Kant's heuristic language with the Lutheran heuristic. And he does not cast methodological rigor aside so much as he incorporates Kant's arguments into a Lutheran rule for hierarchically combining human-relative modes of argumentation and measures of reliability with divine or Scripture-relative modes and measures. While he owes much to sixteenth-century thinking, Storr answers a pressing question of the late eighteenth-century: how to reliably bring together multiple modes of argumentation and measures of reliability.

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## Abbreviations

### Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

*AA* *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*. Edited Königlich Preussische Akademie. 29 volumes. Berlin: Georg Reimer Verlag, 1910-. (Volumes IX, XIIIff have imprint: Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co.)

*CF* "Conflict of the Faculties" In *RRT*, pp. 239-327.

*CJ* *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Edited and translated Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

*Cor* *Correspondence*. Translated and edited Arnulf Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

*CPR* *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated and edited Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

*CPrR* *Critique of Practical Reason*. In *PrP*, pp. 133-271.

*O* "What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?" In *RRT*, pp. 7-18.

*PrP* *Practical Philosophy*. Translated and edited Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

*QeE* "An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?" In *PrP*, pp. 17-22.

*Rel* *Religion within the boundaries of mere reason*. In *RRT*, pp. 57-215.

*RRT* *Religion and Rational Theology*. Translated and edited Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

### Martin Luther (1483-1546)

*WA* *D. Martin Luthers Werke: kritische Gesamtausgabe*. Weimar: Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1906-1961.

*LW* *Luther's Works*. American Edition. Edited Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut Lehmann. 55 vols. St. Louis: Concordia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-1986.



## Philipp Melancthon (1497-1560)

*CR Corpus reformatorum.* Bretschneider, Karl Gottlieb, and Heinrich Ernst Bindseil, eds. 101 vols. Halle: C.A. Schwetschke, 1834.

## Gottlob Christian Storr (1746-1805)

*A Annotationes quædam theologice ad philosophicam Kantii de religione doctrinam.* Stuttgart: J. B. Mezleri, 1793.

*L Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmatik.* Stuttgart: Metzler, 1803.

*E An Elementary Course of Biblical Theology.* Translated and edited S. S. Schmucker. Second edition. Andover: Gould and Newman, 1836.

*SH Diss. hermeneut. de sensu historico.* Fues, 1778.

*HS An Essay on the Historical Sense of the New Testament.* Translated and edited J. W. Gibbs. Boston: Printed by Wells & Lilly, 1817.

## Dieter Henrich (1927-)

*GadI Grundlegung aus dem Ich: Untersuchungen zur Vorgeschichte des Idealismus, Tübingen-Jena (1790-1794).* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004.

*DPTS "Dominant Philosophical-Theological Problems in the Tübingen Stift During the Student Years of Hegel, Hölderlin, and Schelling." In The Course of Remembrance and Other Essays on Hölderlin.* Edited Eckart Förster. Translated Abraham Anderson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. pp. 31-54.

*Presuppositions "Some presuppositions of Hegel's System." In Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion.* Edited Darrel E. Christensen. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970. pp. 25-60.

## On Storr's Dogmatics

Printed at Stuttgart, Storr's biblical dogmatics (*Doctrinae christianae pars theoretica e scaris liters repetita, auditoribus suis scripsit*, hereafter *DC*) first publicly circulated in 1793. He penned the preface on the seventh of March of the same year. Kant's *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason* appeared that spring; Storr's remarks on it (*Annotationes quaedam theologicae ad philosophicam Kantii de religione doctrinam*, hereafter *A*) would appear (or at least appear to appear) before the year's end. While Schelling's quip that his teacher (Storr) had managed to fuse his own Orthodox spirit to the Kantian letter perhaps resonates with anyone who reads Storr's writings on Kant, scholars have been faster to echo Schelling's claim than to point to particular examples, and even less eager to point to an example that the Tübingen three might have found so compelling as to warrant changing the Kantian letter-not merely complicating Storr's read by pointing to other parts of Kant.

Adolf Harnack's observation in his 1906 essay "On Annotations in Books," "Doubtless many scholarly books that deserve cohesive studies, will not be read because they are so crammed full of notes," may be instructive on this point.<sup>1</sup> I will argue that §§17-18 of Storr's *DC* contain an example of the Kantian letter infused with an orthodox spirit, and that it is near impossible to point to something in Kant that would undermine the 'reading' Storr pursues there. While Storr's notes have been instructive, my investigation has been no easy undertaking, in no small part due to The Notes.

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<sup>1</sup> My very loose translation. Adolf Harnack, "Über Anmerkungen in Büchern," *Harnack, Adolf: Aus Wissenschaft und Leben. Erster Band: Wissenschaft, Schule und Bibliothek. Gießen: Töpelmann* (1911).

Notes in Storr's 1793 *DC* are the most straightforward and those with which my argument is directly concerned. There Storr annotates a series of brief dogmatic statements with parenthetical, in-text, usually biblical citations, and indirect endnotes. Even with only two citation-annotation systems, it can be difficult to maintain a sense of orientation within a train of thought.

The situation deteriorates in subsequent editions. Storr supervised and approved Flatt's 1803 translation of the *DC* into German and additional explanatory notes and citations. In this 1803 edition Storr's "Notes on Notes" first appear. The Latin edition of 1807 included additional notes from Storr's manuscripts. Flatt attempted in the 1813 edition to improve the notes and citations: he included Storr's additional notes as in the second Latin edition as well as some of his own. In his introduction to his 1825 English translation, Simon Schmucker explains his attempt at improving the book's readability: "The original is printed thus: first, the propositions or text; next, notes ; thirdly, notes upon these notes, by Storr; then notes upon all these notes, by Flatt; which occasionally creates much perplexity and confusion to the reader. All these the translator [Schmucker] has incorporated into one continuous and connected discussion, consisting simply of the text or propositions and the Illustrations or discussion of them."<sup>2</sup> Schmucker, of course, could hardly resist the critical impulse, and added his own notes.

All this leaves me with a few points to clarify. First, as a methodological guide, I have privileged Storr's 1793 Latin edition, comparing the German and English translations at every step. While I have not strictly limited myself to the 1793, I have made

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<sup>2</sup> *E*, vi-vii.

sparing use of later materials. For after Storr engaged at length with Kant's *Religion* toward the end of 1793, the tenor of his talk about Kant shifted, and—if it has any merit—this study may help us learn something more about that shift.

Second, while first pursuing any of these editions, one might expect that I could easily offer bibliographic citations by section and series. In the course of the book's "improvements," however, the alphabetical series used to mark Storr's indirect annotations of 1793 was sometimes changed to a numerical series; and their order was sometimes altered. This presents less a problem for sections with only a few endnotes than those with many ('d' is fourth, but 'j' is what letter of the alphabet?). As a rule, I cite a section number and note letter according to the edition of 1793, and explain in detail when I cite other editions. Storr's preface to the 1793 edition is a salient exception. I cite it as the Preface, but read it in Flatt's German translation (presented unchanged), and cross-checked it with Storr's Latin in the 1793.

Finally, as a rule, I quote from the Schmucker translation, and present or hide Storr's biblical citations and endnote markers as appropriate to my point. From the Preface, I occasionally present my own translations; as with the bibliographical citations, these are based on Flatt's German translation and informed by a comparison with Storr's Latin of 1793.

**Etc.**

All English Bible quotations are from the King James Version unless otherwise noted. I use Arabic numerals in text when referring to some chapter or verse (e.g., "Verse 14 makes clear the meaning of 12; 'Chapter 3' symbolizes universal condemnation."). I use

colons to separate chapter and verse (e.g., Romans 2:15). When a biblical citation appears in a direct quotation, I do not make it conform to my citation system.

# Introduction

This study complicates one part of the scholarly legend that Gottlob Christian Storr infused the Kantian letter with an Orthodox spirit. In §§17-18 of his *DC*, Storr positions Immanuel Kant's physico-theological and moral arguments for rational belief in God within an argument for the divine authority of Scripture—on which he suggests the reliability of the book's dogmatic statements rest. By foregrounding some versions of Kant's arguments (while hiding others) and by illegitimately drawing biblical-theological conclusions from transcendental and limited-speculative premises, the scholarly story goes, Storr made it seem as if Lutheran Orthodoxy follows from Kant's arguments for God.

I argue rather that Storr put Kant's arguments in the mouth of reason—construed as a figure in a traditional Lutheran story of transformation. In this story—told from a post-transformation perspective—reason's awareness of God is both transformed by an encounter with Word and it is a placeholder that makes a comparison between 'pre' and 'post' transformation visible.<sup>3</sup> In this encounter with Word, reason comes to trust that the God who is able to help is also willing to help, and to trust that the God who reveals his willingness to help is also the divine Author of Scripture.

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<sup>3</sup> By 'placeholder' I mean a steady point in a comparison. So if some notion of 'God who can help' becomes 'God who can and is willing to help,' 'God' and 'can help' are static points that make the before (unknown if willing to help) and after (willing to help) stand out as 'before' and 'after'. A change is visible against a backdrop—not wholly unlike like how some change is visible to an I-think that is somehow identical to itself before and after the change.

Because Kant's arguments—on Kant's own terms—concern only reason's rational belief in a God who is able to see the secrets of our hearts and are cognitive symbolic, Storr is able (while keeping within the bounds of the Lutheran dogmatics genre) to (re)present them as symbolic summaries of Scripture (i.e., as dogmatic statements) that harmonize neatly with reason's self-understanding.<sup>4</sup> Storr does not cherry-pick the Kantian words that support his cause, but exploits the compatibility of Kant's heuristic language with the Lutheran heuristic. And he does not cast methodological rigor aside so much as he incorporates Kant's arguments into a Lutheran rule for hierarchically combining human-relative modes of argumentation and measures of reliability with divine or Scripture-relative modes and measures. While he owes much to sixteenth-century thinking, Storr answers a pressing question of the late eighteenth-century: how to reliably bring together multiple modes of argumentation and measures of reliability.

## A Scholarly Commonplace

The great Kantians now everywhere to be seen have got **stuck on the letter**, and bless themselves on seeing still so much before them. I am definitely convinced that the old **superstition** of so-called **natural religion** as well as of **positive religion has** in the minds of most already once more **been combined with the Kantian letter**. It is fun to see how **quickly** they can get to the **moral proof**. Before you can turn around the *deus ex machina* springs forth, the **personal individual Being** who sits in Heaven above!<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See "A Note on Kant's Arguments for God," below.

<sup>5</sup> Emphasis mine. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler, eds., *Hegel, the Letters* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 29. Cf. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von

From Friedrich Schelling's January 1796 letter to G. F. W. Hegel sprung a lasting scholarly memory of their teacher at the Tübingen Stift: Gottlob Christian Storr infused a Lutheran spirit into the Kantian letter, and so transformed the Königsberger's postulates into the foundations of Orthodox dogma. He created from the building-materials of autonomy a cathedral of heteronomy.<sup>678</sup> Schelling's observations resonate with Storr's two engagements with Kant in 1793, *DC* and *A*. In the former, the reliability of Scripture and of Orthodox dogma appear to follow from Kant's arguments for rational belief in God; in the latter, it looks as if Kant's rationale for postulating God and immortality might be extended—on Kant's own terms—to many other tenets of Orthodox Christianity. Insofar as we maintain with Storr's Kantian students that Orthodox dogma simply does not follow from Kant's arguments for rational belief in God or from his

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Schelling, *Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe*, ed. W. Jacobs H.M. Baumgartner, J. Jantzen, H. Krings (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2001), Series III, Vol. 1, p. 16.

<sup>6</sup> "The theory of autonomy has become a means for defense of the theology of authority." *Presuppositions*, 37. "One observes with astonishment that the principle of the autonomy of reason begins to present itself in complete harmony with the authority of revelation and the church." *DPTS*, 47.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, F. Tomasoni, *Modernity and the Final Aim of History: The Debate over Judaism from Kant to the Young Hegelians* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub, 2003), 113; Peter Wake, *Tragedy in Hegel's Early Theological Writings* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 25; Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur, *A Companion to Hegel*, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 458-9; William Desmond, Ernst-Otto Onnasch, and Paul Cruysberghs, *Philosophy and Religion in German Idealism* (New York: Kluwer, 2006), xxiii; Stephen Crites, *Dialectic and Gospel in the Development of Hegel's Thinking* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 36; F. C. Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ Press, 1993), 211; Terry Pinkard, *Hegel: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 35; Thomas A. Lewis, *Religion, Modernity, and Politics in Hegel* (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2011), 24; Michael Baur and Daniel O. Dahlstrom, *The Emergence of German Idealism* (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 1999), 203-4.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Presuppositions*, 37; *DPTS*, 49.



rationale for the postulates, Storr's combinations of premises and conclusions strike us disharmonious. And yet Kant's words (both those Storr cites and those he does not) make it difficult to point out in what exactly what Storr's errors consist.

*Defensible, Compelling, and Yet Illegitimate*

In response to the gap Schelling pointed out between the Kantian letter and the Orthodox conclusions his teacher drew from it, scholars have attempted (1) to say why Storr's sleight of hand might appear compelling and (2) to maintain that Storr's use of Kant is nevertheless illegitimate. The two tasks can be construed as interdependent; they frequently form a narrative whole.

Contained in Schelling's spirit/letter language is a notion that Storr's 'read of Kant' appeared compelling because it employed the Kantian letter. Kant indubitably said much of what Storr claimed he said. But Storr gave Kant's words a new meaning.

According to one commonplace scholarly story, Storr mixed an Orthodox spirit with the Kantian letter by proof-texting. He removed selections of Kant's work from their initial contexts and re-presented them as parts of an Orthodox whole. To do this, Storr exploited the number and ambiguity of Kant's moral arguments.<sup>9</sup> In some places, Kant seems to suggest that moral awareness entails the use of an idea of God. In other places, Kant suggests that moral awareness makes denying God incoherent. Elsewhere rational faith is a product of reflection that comes after moral awareness.<sup>10</sup>

Storr selected from among Kant's treatments of the moral argument those in which a belief that one can act according to principle reads quite like a belief in biblical

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<sup>9</sup> *Presuppositions*, 27-31; 36-7. *DPTS*, 46-7.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Allen W. Wood, *Kant's Moral Religion* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 10.

miracles, or at least suggests that the belief that one can act according to principles is incompatible with denying biblical miracles.<sup>11</sup> Because of their number and ambiguity, Storr was able to select passages from Kant's moral arguments that supported his own ends. While Kant arguably presented these passages in conjunction with others that might undermine Storr's interpretations, Storr presented them in isolation from these others. Thus Storr poured an Orthodox spirit together with the Kantian letter by selecting portions of the Kantian letter that, if isolated, could be used as proof texts for his Orthodoxy.<sup>12</sup>

Though plausible, Storr's interpretation of the Kantian letter is wrong-headed because the alleged reliability of Kant's transcendental claims and Storr's dogmatic claims rest on different grounds. For an argument to cohere, its premises and conclusions must share a common ground. A biblical-theological dogmatic conclusion cannot follow from transcendental-philosophical premises. Thus Storr's biblical-theological dogmatic orthodox conclusions can no more legitimately follow from Kant's transcendental-philosophical investigations than from Storr's historical-critical investigations.

This second part of one commonplace story suggests that, although Storr's read of the Kantian letter is defensible (i.e., plausible, though perhaps not optimal), Kant's moral arguments cannot be understood to support Storr's Orthodox conclusions because they rest on fundamentally different grounds. Storr, the story goes, attempts to argue for the reliability of Scripture by pointing to historical evidence and to critical transcendental reasoning, but fails because he has not recognized that history, dogmatics, and critical

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<sup>11</sup> See Pinkard, 33-37.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *Presuppositions*, 37; *DPTS*, 46-7.

philosophy demand entirely different kinds of evidence and argumentation. Unlike his colleagues and heirs, Storr does not seem to understand that he cannot mix and match claims that have to be assessed according to different (perhaps incompatible) standards of reliability. Storr's amalgam of Orthodox dogma, rational-observational/historical claims, Scripture, and critical/transcendental propositions do not coherent argumentation make.<sup>13</sup><sup>14</sup> Though Storr did identify Kantian language that could be construed to support orthodoxy, his attempts to force the Kantian letter into the service of Lutheran orthodoxy were illegitimate because methodologically incoherent.

This story contains two distinct ways to explain what is wrong with Storr's interpretation. Storr's interpretation of the Kantian letter was at odds with the Kantian spirit because (1) it isolated some versions of Kant's arguments for rational belief in God from others (it is a methodologically suspect interpretation that presents simplicity instead of ambiguity) and (2) it assumes that biblical-theological dogmatic claims can follow from transcendental-philosophical ones (it assumes a common ground where there arguably is none).

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<sup>13</sup> *DPTS*, 48. "Storr's [...] dogmatics were full of Kantian insertions and were indeed dependent on them for the stability of their own construction." Storr's "amalgam of autonomy and authority" was one to which Storr's "contemporaries who were serious thinkers could not come to terms." "[C]aught in the Kantian current," Storr paid the price of what Henrich (citing Nietzsche) describes as the inability of "the most important dogmatics of every age [...] to keep its distance from the philosophy of the day." Later readers, he notes, thus "scarcely have any reason to cast the first stone."

<sup>14</sup> The notion that Storr attempted to prove the reliability of Scripture historically is widespread. See, for example, Magne Sæbø, *Hebrew Bible/Old Testament* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 34-5; Mark C. Taylor, *Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel & Kierkegaard* (New York: Fordham Univ Press, 2000), 34n; Clifford E. Nelson, *Lutherans in North America* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1975), 150.

## An Alternate Approach to the Commonplace

This story takes the reception of the Kantian philosophy at Tübingen as its starting point; in some sense it takes Storr's students' insight into their teacher as a given. It inquires into their insight's documentary sources and into their strategies for undoing what Storr had done. And it attempts to explain why the students pursued some strategies and not others. So Henrich says,

Schelling and Hegel could see only an inversion of the actual sense of Kant's doctrine in Storr's argumentation. But, although it contradicted completely its spirit, it could still rely on Kant's texts. Therefore it became necessary to protect Kant against the weaknesses of his own presentation. This could certainly have been effected by scrupulous interpretation. But it did not fit with Kant's role as an apostle of freedom to defend him with philological techniques.<sup>15</sup>

If Henrich shows that Schelling and Hegel might have protected Kant by pointing to Storr's methodological missteps, he also explains that they did not take this most obvious route because "it did not fit with Kant's role as an apostle of freedom."

While I, too, take Schelling's insight and the trio's sense that "philological techniques" were inadequate to be telling, in this essay I am less concerned, with how Storr's students understood their teacher's relationship to Kant than with how Storr and, to a lesser extent, Kant, may have understood one another.<sup>16</sup> It is possible that the

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<sup>15</sup> *Presuppositions*, 37.

<sup>16</sup> The clearest and most thorough contemporary account of the trio's responses to Storr's reading of Kant—including detailed descriptions of the intellectual, political, and social situations of Storr and his colleagues and students at the Stift—are in Dieter Henrich's *GadI* and in the first volume of Christoph Jamme and Frank Völkel, *Hölderlin Und Der Deutsche Idealismus : Dokumente Und Kommentare Zu Hölderlins Philosophischer Entwicklung Und Den Philosophisch-Kulturellen Kontexten Seiner Zeit* (Stuttgart:

students' insights were true in ways that they did not fully understand. Telling as the trio's assessments may be, their problems were the problems of a different generation, one in which Frederick William II governed Prussia, the French Revolution excited political hopes and fears, in which Kant's *Critiques* had been written and received, in which Reinhold and Fichte (among others) framed philosophical questions, in which higher criticism enjoyed a less-than-debatable place in biblical studies, in which chemistry could be taken seriously, and in which experiments with electricity were hardly new. They read with a whole host of contemporary concerns at the front of their minds.<sup>17</sup> But Storr's and Kant's primary trajectories were both more or less set several years before Hegel and Hölderlin arrived at the Stift in 1788. Their world was one in which, among the sextant, the self-winding clock, the steam engine, the submarine, and the guillotine, only the last was novel. But by comparison, these were all recent developments for Kant and Storr.

Although twenty-two years separated the two thinkers, by the 1790s they shared—in addition to the death of Christian Wolff (1754) and Lisbon earthquake (1755), when Storr was eight and nine—an adult's perspective on the previous thirty years. Formative events after Storr entered the Gymnasium at Stuttgart in 1763 and before the arrival of Hegel and Holderlin at Tübingen in 1788 include excitement at Voltaire's *Candide* and

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Frommann-Holzboog, 2003). Henrich's earlier essays on Diez and the Stift, *Presuppositions* and *DPTS*, are somewhat less daunting (someone vaguely interested in these topics or occupied with more pressing tasks could learn quite a bit from them in only a few minutes). Michael Franz, ed. "*--an Der Galeere Der Theologie*": *Hölderlins, Hegels Und Schellings Theologiestudium an Der Universität Tübingen* (Tübingen: Hölderlin-Gesellschaft, 2007); *TüBinger Platonismus : Die Gemeinsamen Philosophischen AnfangsgrüNde Von HöLderlin, Schelling Und Hegel* (Tübingen: Francke Verlag, 2012). are also especially valuable resources.

<sup>17</sup> Houlgate and Baur, 2. *Presuppositions*, *DPTS*, and *GadI* are a few of many, many examples.

the publication of Rousseau's *Emile*; hope for peace at the close of the Seven Years War and disappointment at the failure of the 1763 Peace of Hubertusburg and Treaty of Paris; the war's reception in Lessing's 1767 *Minna von Barnhelm*; the controversy surrounding Lavater's challenge to Mendelssohn to convert to Christianity in 1769; Lessing's publication of Reimarus' *Fragments* and his subsequent debates with the orthodox Johann Melchoir Goeze; ongoing partitions of Poland; substantial decline in university enrollments; tensions over the relation of the university faculties; and debates about oaths required of government employees.

These had formed the worlds within which Kant and Storr understood the publication of Goethe's *Sorrows of the Young Werther* and Jacobi's *Letters* in 1785; the deaths of Frederick the Great and of Mendelssohn a year later; the publication of Reinhold's metabolized version of the Spinoza controversy and of the Kantian philosophy in 1786-7; Semler's defense of Wöllner's Edict; and the deaths of Semler and Michaelis in 1791. For the elder pair, the Jacobi-Mendelssohn drama appeared in a much longer contiguous series than it did for Reinhold (a decade-younger Austrian and (recently ex-Catholic)) or for the Tübingen trio, who had received Kant, Reinhold's *Letters*, and the *Pantheismusstreit* as a bundle before any had reached the age of twenty-five. While the works of the late 1780s and 1790s framed subsequent interpretations of Kant and Storr, Kant's and Storr's lengthier works—and their responses to one another—were perhaps not dictated by these issues to so great an extent as they seem from the standpoint of an inquiry into the reception and development of the Kantian philosophy.

From the point of view of a forward-looking reception history of Kant's work, that Kant's most canonical writings on religion did not appear until after Reinhold had framed the value of the Kantian philosophy in religious terms, and after thinkers at Jena and Tübingen had formed more or less complete responses to Reinhold's Kant is critically important.<sup>18</sup> But just as the Tübingen three had some insight into Kant that they feared would fall outside Storr's readers' purview, Storr and Kant may have had insights into each other's work that did not—or could not—hold the interest of younger interpreters. And while the works of the late 1780s and 1790s framed subsequent interpretations of Kant and Storr, Kant's and Storr's lengthier works—and their responses to one another—were perhaps not dictated by these issues to so great an extent as they seem from the standpoint of an inquiry into the reception and development of the Kantian philosophy. This investigation abstracts (in a sense artificially) from forward-looking developmental-reception questions to focus on backward-looking ones. It asks what can be learned from the relation of Kant and Storr if we think about their interactions in the early 1790s as a story's closing chapter.

This approach allows me to raise questions and possibilities that do not so readily appear when the primary inquiry concerns the reception of Kant's philosophy by Storr's students. I can ask, for example, whether and to what extent Storr and Kant may have understood their spirits opposed. That they appear to disagree on many points may say more about the shared grounds on which we compare them than the grounds on which they understood one another. Permit me to explain.

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<sup>18</sup> See *Gaul*, particularly pages 9-14 for a short summary.

While Storr may have mixed an Orthodox spirit with the Kantian letter, and while it may be difficult to say what is wrong with Storr's reading, there is—on the usual telling—plenty of evidence to suggest that their spirits are incompatible. That Kant's moral argument is not an argument in support of the full-featured Lutheran theology Storr found in it does not exhaust what we remember about the differences between their spirits.

For example, scholars frequently contrast Storr's supernaturalism with Kant's limited, speculative supernaturalism or Kant's naturalism.<sup>19</sup> Although it can be understood to overlap in part with Kant's moral supernaturalism, Storr's supernaturalism commits him to claims about metaphysics and miracles that Kant's first Critique suggests are outside the bounds of knowledge.<sup>20</sup> Or again, Kant and Storr may both talk about Scripture's divine Author. But if Kant takes this to mean that Scripture must always be read in accord with morality, Storr maintains that Kant's is no form of exegesis, but one of eisegesis: to read the divine Author is to allow the divine Author to speak on his own terms.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> See, for example, *DPTS*, 40-1. As Mark Ogden notes, the less complicated versions can "encourage a rather unilluminating and cursory categorization which cannot give us a genuine sense of his position." Mark Ogden, *The Problem of Christ in the Work of Friedrich Hölderlin* (London: Modern Humanities Research Assoc, 1991), 13.

<sup>20</sup> See, for example, *Presuppositions*, 32-37; Pinkard, 35-6. Heinrich Hermelink, *Geschichte Der Evangelischen Kirche in Württemberg Von Der Reformation Bis Zur Gegenwart Das Reich Gottes in Wirtemberg* (Stuttgart: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1949), 300-10.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Flatt's note on the fifth note of §16.



But that they disagree does not mean that they are necessarily opposed. For, as Mark Ogden notes, Storr arguably envisioned the claims of biblical theology an altogether different sort of knowledge situated somewhere above the claims of reason.

Revelation, in which the otherwise acknowledged limits of human reason are for Storr, as a matter of actual (psychological) fact, transcended, possesses an authority which is qualitatively different from and therefore vastly to be preferred to, that of philosophy—the source of which is human and not divine. Thus Kant is answered by the appeal to a different kind of knowledge than the knowledge which was under examination in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. The fact that for Kant it would be nonsensical to make such a claim to divinely revealed knowledge (since if its channel of communication is inaccessible to ‘other’ people, even the purported recipients of the revelation will be unable to say anything at all about how or whence the so-called knowledge came) is for Storr a matter of indifference.<sup>22</sup>

This possibility just what is at stake in the thorny (but oft-cited) observation that Storr took Kant’s reason’s admission of “its inability to know anything of the supersensible,” to entail that “it has logically no right to protest against what has been made known to us concerning supersensible things by historical revelation.”<sup>23</sup> In some sense, Kant’s own terms leave open the possibility of divinely revealed truths that are higher than human reason. Or, put differently, they leave open the possibility that when we compare Kant’s and Storr’s positions on supernaturalism, miracles, articles of Orthodox dogma, or biblical interpretation, etc., we may be comparing them on grounds that Storr and Kant would not have recognized as common.

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<sup>22</sup> Ogden, 13-14.

<sup>23</sup> Otto Pflleiderer, *The Development of Theology in Germany since Kant: And Its Progress in Great Britain since 1825* (S. Sonnenschein & Company, 1890), 86.

Indeed, this possibility was arguably built into Storr's and Kant's self-conceptions as members of the theology and philosophy faculties. For while it was up for substantial reinterpretation in the second half of the eighteenth century, and despite shifts occasioned, for example, by the Peace of Augsburg, the Lutheran theological anthropology arguably remained the primary schema (at least for Kant and Storr) of the distinctions and relations between the theology and philosophy faculties.<sup>2425</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Though none put the matter in just this way, when read together the following works support my hypothesis that the Symbol can be understood to have governed the relations between the theology and philosophy faculties and to have been up for reinterpretation in the second half of the eighteenth century: Mordechai Feingold, *History of Universities*, vol. XXV/2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Ian Hunter, "Kant and the Prussian Religious Edict: Metaphysics within the Bounds of Political Reason Alone," (2003); "Kant's Religion and Prussian Religious Policy," *Modern Intellectual History* 2, no. 1 (2005); *The Secularisation of the Confessional State: The Political Thought of Christian Thomasius* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Karl Klüpfel, *Geschichte Und Beschreibung Der Universität Tübingen* (Tübingen: LF Fues, 1849); Charles E. McClelland, *State, Society, and University in Germany, 1700-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Denise Phillips, *Acolytes of Nature: Defining Natural Science in Germany, 1770-1850* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Roy Porter, *The Cambridge History of Science: Eighteenth-Century Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); R. Pozzo and M. Oberhausen, "The Place of Science in Kant's University," *History of Science* 40, no. 3 (2002); Thomas P. Saine, *The Problem of Being Modern, or, the German Pursuit of Enlightenment from Leibniz to the French Revolution* (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1997); Timothy M. Salo and Drew University, *An Orthodox Lutheran View of Ecclesiology: A Doctrinal and Practical Exchange between Valentin Ernst Loescher (1673-1749) and Joachim Lange (1670-1744)* (ProQuest, 2008); Debora Kuller Shuger, *The Renaissance Bible: Scholarship, Sacrifice, and Subjectivity* (University of California Press, 1998); Paul Spalding, *Seize the Book, Jail the Author: Johann Lorenz Schmidt and Censorship in Eighteenth-Century Germany* (Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1998); Jonathan I. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Jonathan Israel, *A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010); Jonathan I. Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670-1752* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Stephen Gaukroger, *The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1210-1685* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

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2006); Jonathan I. Israel, *Democratic Enlightenment : Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750-1790* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Philipp Melanchthon and Sachiko Kusukawa, *Melanchthon: Orations on Philosophy and Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Anthony Grafton, *Defenders of the Text : The Traditions of Scholarship in an Age of Science, 1450-1800* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities : Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Anthony Grafton and Suzanne L. Marchand, *Proof and Persuasion in History, History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1994); Anthony Grafton and Megan Hale Williams, *Christianity and the Transformation of the Book : Origen, Eusebius, and the Library of Caesarea* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006); Anthony Grafton, *The Footnote: A Curious History*, Revised edition ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997); Reinhard Brandt, *Universität Zwischen Selbst- Und Fremdbestimmung: Kants "Streit Der Fakultäten"* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003); Mordechai Feingold, *History of Universities*, vol. XVI/2 (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 2001); Volker Gerhardt, *Kant Im Streit Der Fakultäten* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005); Joon-Chul Park, "Philip Melanchthon's Reform of German Universities and Its Significance: A Study on the Relationship between Renaissance Humanism and the Reformation" (The Ohio State University, 1995); Michael J. Sauter, "The Enlightenment on Trial: State Service and Social Discipline in Eighteenth-Century Germany's Public Sphere," *Modern Intellectual History* 5, no. 2 (2008); Susan Schreiner, *Are You Alone Wise?: The Search for Certainty in the Early Modern Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Franz, "*-an Der Galeere Der Theologie*"; Walter Sparr, "Religöse Autorität Durch Historische Authentie? Die "Biblische" Dogmatik Von Gottlob Christian Storr (1793)," in "*-an Der Galeere Der Theologie*": Hölderlins, Hegels Und Schellings Theologiestudium an Der Universität Tübingen, ed. Michael Franz (Tübingen: Hölderlin-Gesellschaft, 2007); Sachiko Kusukawa, "Uses of Philosophy in Reformation Thought: Melanchthon, Schegk, and Crellius," in *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700*, ed. Russell L. Friedman and Lauge O. Nielsen, The New Synthese Historical Library (Springer Netherlands, 2003); Jonathan Sheehan, *The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Sachiko Kusukawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Melanchthon* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Jonathan Blake Fine, "Streitkultur: Polemic and the Problem of Public Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century Germany" (PhD Dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 2013); Michael C. Legaspi, *The Death of Scripture and the Rise of Biblical Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Johann David Michaelis, *Raisonnement Über Die Protestantischen Universitäten in Deutschland* (1776); Franz, *TüBinger Platonismus : Die Gemeinsamen Philosophischen Anfangsgründe Von HöLderlin, Schelling Und Hegel*.

The basic shape of this schema looks like this: the philosophy faculty treated ‘truths’ about all humans and that were (perhaps) recognizable by all (or at least some) humans, regardless of their confession, regardless of their encounter with verbal divine revelation in Word. The theology faculty, on the other hand, taught ‘truths’ about all humans, about God, etc., which were recognizable to those who had encountered verbal divine revelation in Word. Although some “truths of reason” were “confirmed” in and through Word, the two faculties perhaps (at least for Luther, Melanchthon, Storr, and Kant) did not have an identical criterion of reliability.

Though Kant perhaps (and perhaps not) conceived of his philosophy as posing challenges theologians would have to answer, he at least composed his work with careful attention to the limits of reason and what statuses it could (on the stories the state censors told about the faculties and that the philosophy and theology faculties told about themselves and one another) rightly confer on its claims.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, by keeping within the limits of reason as the university and state understood and prescribed them—Kant arguably secured for himself incredible freedom to publish his thoughts without undermining (by undermining the symbol) the power of the state to grant and protect this freedom. In an important sense, this meant keeping within the limits of what, on some interpretation of the schema, one could say from the philosophy faculty.

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<sup>25</sup> Distinctions and relations are inseparable. Things get a bit wordy when I repeat the formulation, so I will refrain as much as possible. It may prove helpful to remember that where you see one, there the other is also.

<sup>26</sup> Indeed, Kant sometimes follows Melanchthon (who both set out the basic organization of the faculties and was a member of the philosophy faculty) so closely that it is impossible to keep from wondering if it was part of a strategy to ensure that his work would not just pass state censors, but also (as was in most cases no longer necessary) censors from the theology faculty (i.e., to avoid even the appearance of insubordination).

From Storr's point of view in the theology faculty, on the other hand, the Kantian philosophy (at least in the first three *Critiques*) might look much less like a threat to Orthodox biblical theology than it seems to us in retrospect. That reason takes itself to be the source of its own insights, takes itself to be capable of some self-knowledge and of limited knowledge of God, takes itself to be capable of discovering and elucidating truths about the natural and moral worlds that hold for all human beings, etc., are all traditional affirmations of the Lutherans about reason. Scripture read through Scripture is, on the Lutheran telling, the source of this characterization of reason, and is, on Storr's as well as Luther's telling, the reading practice the biblical theologian takes to issue in reliable claims.

Framed this way, Storr's problem with the Kantian philosophy was perhaps not anything in the Kantian philosophy so far as it is understood to be a product of reason (i.e., on its own terms). Storr's problem might rather be construed thus: his seminary students and, increasingly, his colleagues in biblical theology did not merely use their training in the philosophy faculty to clear the way for theological readings, but more permanently adopted the perspective of the philosophy faculty (particularly Kant's reason, but also, for example, Semler's).

Put more simply: Storr's problem was perhaps that his students and colleagues read Kant on Kant's own terms from the theology faculty, a faculty from which reason's products must (on Storr's read) be read on biblical terms, from which reason's products must be evaluated under the Lutheran reliability criteria and according to Lutheran methods—from which Scripture alone is to be read on its own terms, and all else to be

read on Scripture's self-announcing, self-authenticating terms.<sup>27</sup> So the story I will pursue here is a far cry from some other narratives wherein Storr, threatened by much of late-eighteenth-century thinking, declares in defense that Scripture is the highest reliable and so attributes to his dogmas a kind of invincibility in the face of the Kantian philosophy.

But this approach has another important implication, for insofar as Storr and Kant conceived of their work according to the Lutheran symbol, they perhaps did not take themselves to share (and may not have actually shared) a standard of reliability, and so perhaps did not take their claims to have the statuses that would indicate their comparability, let alone their opposition *on* some shared ground. Kant may have understood himself to be talking past Storr, and Storr past Kant; neither biblical theology nor reason's self-investigations might be understood from the other faculty on its own terms and according to its own standards.

So long as we assume that Kant's and Storr's spirits are opposed and that Storr streamed an Orthodox spirit together with the Kantian letter, it is tempting to imagine Storr much like his students did—as a rival (brilliant but wrongheaded) interpreter of Kant. To ask what is wrong with Storr's appropriation of the Kantian letter perhaps to go looking for ways in which Storr's methodological standards fall short of our own. For in Western rational scholarly traditions, methodological missteps are inextricably linked to the visibility of error. The approach perhaps blinds us to the possibilities (1) that Storr's citations (quotations, paraphrases, and bibliographic references) may not (only) function

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<sup>27</sup> Those familiar with Storr's *A* may object, for there Storr more explicitly claims to address Kant's work on Kant's own terms. I will speak to the objection in chapter three; for now it should be enough to note that this essay concerns only the *DC*, which must be a work from the theology faculty.

as we suspect they do, and (2) that Storr's method for combining multiple materials and modes of argumentation may be internally coherent (or internally incoherent).

## A Concrete Example

I mentioned that Schelling's and Hegel's insight into Storr's spirit/letter switch resonates with both of the latter's 1793 public engagements with Kant. The following chapters concern only the first, Storr's *DC*. Again, in this book the reliability of Scripture and of Orthodox dogma appear to follow from Kant's arguments for rational belief in God: the Kantian letter seems to have a Storrish spirit.

In the *DC*, Storr presents paraphrases of Kant's moral (§17) and moral + physico-theological (§18) arguments for rational belief in God.<sup>28</sup> Kant's arguments, or better, Storr's paraphrases are premises in a larger argument for the divine authority of Scripture. Sections 17-18 (Kant's arguments) establish that there is a God. Elsewhere Storr establishes that that God is reliable; that God produced, influenced, or sanctioned the declarations of the Holy Scriptures, and so gives Scripture divine authority. Together, he

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<sup>28</sup> In §17, Storr claims that humans give themselves rules and compare these with their past actions, as if a judge. They are led by nature to respect an invisible judge who justly punishes and rewards. It would be difficult to deny that Storr's claim appears (if not \*is\*) compatible with Kant's notions of human autonomy (they give themselves the law and the capacity to fulfill it), of the inner tribunal (*AA* 3:Bxiii; *CPR*, 109), and of the postulates (*AA* 5:124-146; *CPR* 239-257). In § 18, the differences between Kant and Storr do not get any clearer. Although they cannot see it directly, humans discover the purposiveness of nature. They cannot prove that blind mechanism is impossible, but must assume an Author of creation on the pain of (presumably moral) contradiction. Given that they have to assume an Author of creation and a moral orderer, that they feel dependent upon both, and given that separating the two would introduce the possibility of mass (self-)deception, humans ought/must (it is unclear in Storr as it is in Kant) imagine them unified. As before, there is ample evidence that Storr's position is compatible with Kant's: see esp. Kant's third Critique (§§ 69-91, esp. the 70s and 80s) and the Orientation essay.

alleges, these warrant his conclusion that “we may receive [the Holy Scriptures] with perfect security.”<sup>29</sup>

But his paraphrases of Kant’s arguments are arguably also conclusions, support for which he demonstrates by citing their sources in Kant’s third *Critique*. At the same time, Storr’s paraphrases of Kant’s arguments are statements of official Lutheran dogma, and he demonstrates their biblical warrant by citing, among other things, Romans 1-2.<sup>30</sup> Now Romans 1-2 do not contain arguments for the existence of God; they perhaps demonstrate rather that Scripture attests to the possibility that humans may be aware of a God without divine verbal revelation by looking outward (to creation) and inward (to conscience). At least two premises that establish the existence of God in Storr’s argument for the divine authority Scripture, then, arguably depend on Kant’s reason’s rationale in the third *Critique*.

The Storrish spirit *seems* to emanate from the Kantian letter in *DC* §§17-18. But there are still other reasons to imagine Schelling concerned with this particular passage. First, Storr’s many references to Romans are references to the classical locus of the spirit/letter distinction. Though he may not have had it in mind, Schelling was certainly aware of the weighty link between the ‘spirit and the letter’ and the early sections of

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<sup>29</sup> *DC* §28

<sup>30</sup> The relative density of these citations and allusions is remarkable. In these two sections, Storr makes nineteen direct references to Romans 1 and 2, and thirteen direct references to Kant. Section 17 is Romans 1-2 heavy: thirteen of the book’s nineteen direct references are there. Of thirteen endnotes in §18, nine refer directly to Kant; all of the remaining four notes refer to responses to Kant authored by Jacob, Fichte, Flatt, and Brastberger. Of nineteen direct references to Kant in the whole *DC*, thirteen appear in §§17-18. The remaining six are scattered in §§21, 22 (2x), 24, 28, and 35—but basically limited to Book II (i.e., immediately after the passage in question).



Romans. For, as Randall Gleason put it, “[t]he interpretive history of Paul’s letter/spirit contrast (Rom. 2:25-29; 7:1-7; 2 Cor. 3:6) is virtually a history of biblical interpretation[...],” a topic with which Schelling was intimately familiar.<sup>31</sup> Augustine’s famous anti-Pelagian tract bore the title.<sup>32</sup> The figure is a central trope in Luther’s corpus.<sup>33</sup> Even if Schelling

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<sup>31</sup> Randall C Gleason, "'Letter' and 'Spirit' in Luther's Hermeneutics," *Bibliotheca Sacra* 157 (2000): 469. Gleason cites as further evidence Wai-Shing Chau, *The Letter and the Spirit: A History of Interpretation from Origen to Luther* (New York: Peter Lang Inc., International Academic Publishers, 1995).

<sup>32</sup> See *On the Spirit and the Letter*; there Augustine’s central thesis concerns the need of humans for divine help:

4. But we must fiercely and strongly oppose those who think that the power of the human will can by itself, without the help of God, either attain righteousness or make progress in tending toward it. When these people begin to be pressed as to how they presume to claim that this is possible without God's help, they hold themselves in check and do not dare to make this claim, because they see that it is godless and intolerable. Rather, they say that these things are not done without God's help, because God created human beings with free choice and, by giving the commandments, he teaches them how they should live. Moreover, they say that he certainly helps them, insofar as by his teaching he removes ignorance so that human beings know what they should avoid and what they should pursue in their actions. Thus, by following the path he pointed out to them, they may by the free choice implanted in their nature live chaste, righteous, and pious lives and merit to attain to the blessed and eternal life. 3, 5. We, on the other hand, say that the human will is helped to achieve righteousness in this way: Besides the fact that human beings are created with free choice of the will and besides the teaching by which they are commanded how they ought to live, they receive the Holy Spirit so that there arises in their minds a delight in and a love for that highest and immutable good that is God, even now while they walk by faith, not yet by vision.

Saint Augustine, "Works," (Charlottesville, Virginia and Hyde Park, New York: IntelLex Corp. New City Press, 2014).

had not encountered it in Augustine's or Luther's treatises on the topic, he would have known the figure from his study of Marcion, for neither Tertullian's nor Epiphanius' Marcion includes the second part ("in the spirit, and not in the letter; whose praise is not of men, but of God") of verse Romans 2:29.] There Paul contrasts the spirit and letter in Romans 2:29 (But he is a Jew, which is one inwardly; and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter; whose praise is not of men, but of God.) and 2 Corinthians 3:6 (Who also hath made us able ministers of the new testament; not of the letter, but of the spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.). When Schelling deployed the spirit/letter distinction, he brought Storr's reading of Kant into a web of thinking about interpretation in which Romans figures prominently. Romans features prominently, too, in *DC* §§17-18.

Second, Schelling mentions two topics Storr explicitly addresses in §§17-18: superstition and natural religion. If 'natural religion' tended to figure in modern theological conversational webs about of all of humanity,<sup>34</sup> 'superstition' tended to figure

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<sup>33</sup> See Gleason. Luther's preface to Romans. Etc.

<sup>34</sup> If a notion of 'religion' that divided into kinds (i.e., early-modern concept that permits and encourages comparisons and enables polemic) had its heyday in the confessional era, many thinkers of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries used 'natural religion' to talk about a phenomenon or history common to human beings.

While 16th-century thinkers invented new religions in Europe, explorers discovered new religions elsewhere. These drew on Paul's idolater-pagan and his social schema (Jew, Gentile/Pagan/Heathen, Christian—early moderns frequently updated this to include the Muslim) as they reinvented a concept of 'religion' within which an increasing number of humans, worldviews, and practice-sets could be classified (related, as in a functional taxonomy). (Jonathan Z. Smith's famous, "Religion, Religions, Religious," contains some documentary evidence for this. See esp. p. 275.) What these observations had in common counted as 'religion'; or what these had in common was an insight into the nature of human beings; or what these had in common was an historical

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or natural origin (e.g., a natural universal, transcendent religion (as in Cherbury's Common Notions) or a natural universal religious impulse (i.e., fear or awe - implanted or human). In other words, the notion of the human was tied up with the notion of natural religion.

'Natural religion' was tied to a notion of the human being, and it was traditionally contrasted with revealed religion. Though it hardly rings controversial to present-day ears, it was controversial in the eighteenth century partly because of this implicit opposition to revealed religion. Thomas had distinguished between natural and revealed theology, and associated 'natural theology' with what can be known by reason without revelation, ('natural reason', or according to the 'natural light.'). Out of this vocabulary grew 'natural religion', 'universal religion', etc. 'Natural religion' had been tied by early modern thinkers to both the cross-confessional sphere (the sphere of inter-confessional polemic and that polemic's 'common ground') and to the sphere of reason. In the universities that had been reformed by Lutherans in particular, 'natural religion' described the sphere of the philosophy faculty, while 'revealed religion' belonged to the theologians.

Natural religion had been tied to many efforts at destabilizing traditional theology and traditional power structures; for Schelling, this was likely a gesture to a wide range of controversies, including—but hardly limited to—those Lessing had stirred with the publication of Reimarus' *Fragments* and his *Anti-Goeze*. See, for example, Ronald Beiner, *Civil Religion: A Dialogue in the History of Political Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Christoph Bultmann and Friedrich Vollhardt, *Gotthold Ephraim Lessings Religionsphilosophie Im Kontext : Hamburger Fragmente Und Wolfenbütteler Axiomata* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011); Peter Byrne, *Natural Religion and the Nature of Religion: The Legacy of Deism* (New York: Routledge, 2013); Taliaferro Charles, *Evidence and Faith : Philosophy and Religion since the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); David Cressy and Lori Anne Ferrell, *Religion and Society in Early Modern England : A Sourcebook* (London: Routledge, 1996); Hermann Deuser, *Religionsphilosophie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009); Thomas Hibbs, *Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion: Metaphysics and Practice* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007); Richard G. Olson, *Science and Religion, 1450-1900: From Copernicus to Darwin* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); David S Pacini, *Through Narcissus' Glass Darkly: The Modern Religion of Conscience* (New York: Fordham Univ Press, 2008); Helen L. Parish and William G. Naphy, *Religion and Superstition in Reformation Europe* (Manchester: Manchester Univ Press, 2002); Jonathan Z. Smith, *Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity* (Psychology Press, 1990); Yasukata Toshimasa, *Lessing's Philosophy of Religion and the German Enlightenment : Lessing on Christianity and Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Hent de Vries, *Religion: Beyond a Concept* (New York: Fordham Univ Press, 2008); Peter Harrison, *'Religion' and the Religions in the English Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Jonathan Z Smith, "Religion, Religions, Religious," *Critical terms for religious studies* (1998); Denis O. Lamoureux, "Nature and Scripture in the Abrahamic Religion: Up to 1700 and Nature and Scripture

in modern theological conversational webs about particular parts of humanity.<sup>35</sup> On

Schelling's take, the two are one, and Storr has dared to mix them with positive religion

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in the Abrahamic Religion: 1700–Present," *Theology and Science* 8, no. 4 (2010); Jonathan Sheehan, "The Altars of the Idols: Religion, Sacrifice, and the Early Modern Polity," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67, no. 4 (2006); Peter Harrison, "'Science' and 'Religion': Constructing the Boundaries," *The Journal of Religion* 86, no. 1 (2006); *The Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Bernhard Pünjer, *History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion from the Reformation to Kant* (T. & T. Clark, 1887); Karlfried Gründer and Karl Heinrich Rengstorff, *Religionskritik Und Religiosität in Der Deutschen Aufklärung* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989); *Critical History of the Text of the New Testament: Wherein Is Established the Truth of the Acts on Which the Christian Religion Is Based* (Leiden: BRILL, 2013); Ritchie Robertson, "Religion and the Enlightenment: A Review Essay," *German History* 25 (2007); Jan Rohls, *Offenbarung, Vernunft Und Religion* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012); Charles Taliaferro, *Evidence and Faith : Philosophy and Religion since the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Toshimasa Yasukata, *Lessing's Philosophy of Religion and the German Enlightenment: Lessing on Christianity and Reason* (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Michael J. Sauter, *Visions of the Enlightenment: The Edict on Religion of 1788 and the Politics of the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century Prussia* (Leiden: Brill, 2009); Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion : A New Approach to the Religious Traditions of Mankind* (New York: Macmillan, 1963); Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Heike Bock, Jörg Feuchter, and Michi Knecht, *Religion and Its Other : Secular and Sacral Concepts and Practices in Interaction* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2008); Talal Asad, "Reading a Modern Classic: W. C. Smith's 'the Meaning and End of Religion'," *History of Religions* 40 (2001); Guy Stroumsa, "The Scholarly Discovery of Religion in Early Modern Times," in *The Cambridge History of the World*, ed. Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); R. Crocker, ed. *Religion, Reason and Nature in Early Modern Europe* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001); William T. Cavanaugh, "'A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House:' the Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State," *Modern Theology* 11, no. 4 (1995); Desmond, Onnasch, and Cruysberghs.

<sup>35</sup> The first extant examples of the noun *superstitio* refer to religious acts or practices that grew out of fears, displayed inappropriate emotion, and opposed accepted religious practices. ○ The term came to refer to popular anxieties about plague, weird events and supernatural harassment, and to alien religion. Eventually, forms of impiety, atheism, and malign magic that undermined the capacity of the flexible, polytheistic Roman cult to hold the empire together all took the name 'superstition'. Jews and Christians, whose

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religious practices were both foreign and opposed to Roman rule and cult, frequently bore the name. (Richard Gordon, “*Superstitio*, Superstition and Religious Repression in the Late Roman Republic and Principate (100 BCE – 300 CE),” in *The Religion of Fools? Superstition Past and Present* (Past and Present Supplement 3, 2008), edited S. A. Smith and Alan Knight, 72-98. )

While the Romans used political, social, and flexible theological categories to find right applications of ‘superstition’, Christians employed the category of truth. Non-Christian religions are superstitious because they neglect the one true God in favor of false gods. (Gordon, 98) When they came to power, Christians turned this conception on their opponents: in 425 Theodosius II outlawed pagan religions as superstitious, just as Domitian had outlawed Christianity as superstitious 300 years earlier.

In *On Christian Doctrine*, Augustine codified the one-true-God definition of superstition when he wrote that it pertains “to the worship of what is created or of some part of it as God, or to consultations and arrangements about signs and leagues with devils.” (§20) But after Caesarius of Arles condemned it in the Germanic tribes, Christians found little use for the term until the critical gaze of early reform movements turned to local and lay traditions. (S.A. Smith, “Introduction” in *The Religion of Fools?*, 14-15. ) After Lateran IV, papal inquisitors began to expose superstition (now roughly synonymous with heresy) in “local traditions” (including the cult of Guinefort the holy hound). With the rise of the universities, thinkers like William of Auvergne, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas showed a growing concern with superstition in their treatments of that topic and of related themes like natural magic, astrology, demonic magic, divination, etc. (Michael D. Bailey, “Concern over Superstition in Late Medieval Europe” in *The Religion of Fools? Superstition Past and Present* (Past and Present Supplement 3, 2008), edited S. A. Smith and Alan Knight, 120-1.)

Aquinas conceived of religion as a moral virtue, and of superstition as its vice of excess. But giving God too much of what God is due hardly seems vicious. In the *Summa Theologica*, Aquinas explains that superstition is excessive religion because it goes beyond the bounds of appropriate worship. For example, superstition gives divine worship to something other than the creator, or it worships the creator in an unfitting manner. (*ST* II-II.92.1-2. Aquinas also emphasizes the Augustinian business about making pacts with demons, upon which 15<sup>th</sup> century demonologies draw.)

By the beginning of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, ecclesial *and* academic authorities treated superstition as a practical problem. Numerous university faculty members including Nicholas of Jauer, Jean Gerson, Martin of Arles, Heinrich of Gorcum, Denis the Carthusian, and Johannes Hartlieb wrote on superstition; several included detailed demonologies and many specific examples of local superstitions. University faculties were often asked to try cases of superstition, which centered on deciding whether certain spells, charms, and other rituals involved explicit or implicit compacts with demons. Over the course of the century, concerns with witchcraft eclipsed those about superstition, but the concept regained popularity and substantial momentum during the reformation era. (Michael D. Bailey, “Concern over Superstition in Late Medieval

and the Kantian letter. Storr also implicitly addresses superstition and natural religion (in addition to laws of nature, the supernatural, natural law, and natural theology) when he cites Romans 1-2, a traditional locus of theological talk about these topics.<sup>36</sup>

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Europe” in *The Religion of Fools? Superstition Past and Present* (Past and Present Supplement 3, 2008), edited S. A. Smith and Alan Knight, 115-133.)

Protestant reformers revived interest in superstition when they found that, given a particular conception of grace, traditional church practices seemed to be idolatry or otherwise inappropriate or inefficacious forms of divine worship. If, for example, God gives grace directly and immediately, anxiety about saying particular words at particular times during Eucharist seems misplaced, and prayers to saints appear superfluous. Once rituals were rendered unnecessary and relics were drained of their power, many Roman practices were reduced to *excessive* (meaning superfluous) religiosity, and to superstition. Protestants thus appeared to turn Aquinas’ definition against the Roman church – but actually they turned from one meaning of ‘excessive’ (in an inappropriate manner) to another (superfluous). Catholic reformers shared many of the Protestant misgivings; when the Council of Trent outlined orthodox positions on Eucharist, images, saints, and relics, it both defended the church against charges of superstition and clarified for Catholics what counted as superstition and what did not.

By the seventeenth-century, both Catholics and Protestants condemned esoteric groups under the heading ‘superstition’. (Also Catholics had begun to return Protestant name-calling – Pascal calls Protestant protests of Roman superstition superstitious in *Pensees*, 255. ) These fraternities purportedly practiced alchemy, divination and worshipped false or evil gods. But esoteric thinkers denied that their practices were superstitious, claiming instead that things like magic, astronomy, and kabala are arts. (See, for example, Robert Fludd’s “Apology for the Integrity of the Society of the Rosy Cross” in William H. Huffman’s *Robert Fludd: Essential Readings* (Berkley: North Atlantic Books, 2001). )

<sup>36</sup> See Johann Hermann Benner and Georg Sebast Frid Schott, *De Revelatione Divina Naturali, Rom. 1, 19. 20* (Schroeder, 1757); William Lane Craig and James Porter Moreland, *The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); L. Daston and M. Stolleis, *Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral, and Natural Philosophy* (Brookfield: Ashgate Pub Co, 2006); John Dillenberger, *Protestant Thought and Natural Science: A Historical Interpretation* (Notre Dame: Univ of Notre Dame Press, 1989); K. Haakonssen, *Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 1996); T. J. Hochstrasser, *Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 2000); Robert C. Koons, "The Place of Natural Theology in Lutheran Thought."; Russell Re Manning, John Hedley Brooke, and Fraser Watts, *The Oxford Handbook of Natural Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Kretzmann Norman, *The Metaphysics of Theism : Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I*

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(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Phillips; Eugene F. Rogers, *Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural Knowledge of God* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999); Benson Saler, "Supernatural as a Western Category," *Ethos* 5, no. 1 (1977); Christian Wolff, *Theologia Naturalis: Methodo Scientifica Pertractata* (Officina libraria Rengeriana, 1737); Peter Harrison, *The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); "Reinterpreting Nature in Early Modern Europe: Natural Philosophy, Biblical Exegesis, and the Contemplative Life," (2007); *The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology* (London: Routledge); "Hermeneutics and Natural Knowledge in the Reformers," in *Nature and Scripture in the Abrahamic Religions* (2008); John T. McNeill, "Natural Law in the Thought of Luther," *Church History* 10, no. 3 (1941); Charles A. Corr, "The Existence of God, Natural Theology and Christian Wolff," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 4, no. 2 (1973); Johannes Bronisch, "Naturalismus Und Offenbarung Beim Späten Christian Wolff: Mit Der Edition Eines Briefes Von Wolff," *Aufklärung* 23 (2011); Kusakawa, *The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Melancthon*; Byrne; Thomas Aquinas, *The Treatise on Human Nature: Summa Theologiae* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002); James J. Bono, *Word of God & the Languages of Man: Interpreting Nature in Early Modern Science and Medicine Volume I, Ficino to Descartes* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995); Conal Condren, Stephen Gaukroger, and Ian Hunter, *The Philosopher in Early Modern Europe: The Nature of a Contested Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Lorraine Daston and Fernando Vidal, *The Moral Authority of Nature* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, *A Methodical System of Universal Law or, the Laws of Nature and Nations Deduced from Certain Principles, and Applied to Proper Cases. Written in Latin by the Celebrated Jo. Got. Heineccius, ... Translated, and Illustrated with Notes and Supplements, by George Turnbull, ... To Which Is Added, a Discourse Upon the Nature and Origin of Moral and Civil Laws* (London: printed for George Keith, 1763); Frederick Pollock, "History of the Law of Nature: A Preliminary Study, The," *Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation* 2 (1900); Gale Theophilus, *The Court of the Gentiles, or, a Discourse Touching the Original of Human Literature, Both Philologie and Philosophie, from the Scriptures & Jewish Church : In Order to a Demonstration of, I. The Perfection of Gods Word, and Church-Light. Ii. The Imperfection of Natures Light, and Mischief of Vain Philosophie. Iii. The Right Use of Human Learning, and Specially Found Philosophie / by Theophilus Gale*, 2nd ed., rev. and enl. ed. (Oxford: Printed by H Hall, for T Gilbert, 1672); Thomas Aquinas, *The Treatise on the Divine Nature: Summa Theologiae I, 1-13*, trans. Brian Shanley (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Company, 2006); Klaas van Berkel and Arie Johan Vanderjagt, *The Book of Nature in Early Modern and Modern History*, Groningen Studies in Cultural Change (Leuven: Peeters, 2006); Peter Harrison, "The Development of the Concept of Laws of Nature," *Creation: Law and Probability* (2008); Lamoureux; "The Creativity of Nature: The Genesis of Schelling's Naturphilosophie, 1775-1799" (PhD Dissertation, Rice University, 2009); Devin Zane Shaw, *Freedom and Nature in Schelling's Philosophy of Art* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010); Lorraine Daston

Third, Kant's moral proof appears in both §17 and §18; and in §19, there appears the miracle-working God of the Bible.<sup>37</sup>

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and Katharine Park, *Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750* (Cambridge, Mass.: Zone Books, 1998); Lorraine Daston and Gianna Pomata, *The Faces of Nature in Enlightenment Europe, Concepts & Symbols of the Eighteenth Century in Europe* (Berlin: BWV-Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2003); Crocker; Byrne.

<sup>37</sup> DC, §19.

The method above stated, for arriving at a conviction of the existence of God, is of such a nature, that it would not be strange, if God should, by other clear and striking proofs, facilitate<sup>(1)</sup> that evolution of our finer moral feelings which is presupposed in that method. Such proofs we actually have in the miracles<sup>(2)</sup> of Jesus and his apostles<sup>(3)</sup>, the truth and importance of which have already been established, §5, 8, 10 at the end. Those miracles were such effects as human agents could never have produced, by their own intelligence and power; and therefore necessarily presuppose an invisible cause. And this invisible cause must have been rational; for not only are we ourselves able to discover<sup>(4)</sup> certain objects for which they were wrought, but the history of them, and the express declarations of those who performed them, assign to them definite objects<sup>(5)</sup>. Now, according to the declaration of Jesus and his apostles, that rational Cause, whose superhuman power is proved from the very nature of these miracles<sup>(6)</sup>, was God, or the Creator and Lord of nature. (For, this is the description of the divine character which Jesus and his apostles give, deriving it from the Old Testament, the authority of which they acknowledged, see §20.) And we have no reason to look for any other cause of those miracles, different from that assigned by Jesus and his apostles; especially as the arguments which have been adduced (§ 18) for our belief in the existence of God, render their declarations credible. God has then, in the miracles of Jesus and his apostles, manifested his agency (Acts 14: 9— 11. comp. v. 15), and corroborated the other proofs of his existence (v. 17). This proof of the divine existence, taken in connexion with that above stated (§ 18), would not be wholly divested of force, even if we were to admit the unauthorized supposition, that



And in subsequent sections, Storr alludes to Kant, so that all kinds of Orthodox dogmas—far beyond the natural-theological or philosophical-theological topics that Kant had publicly addressed before Storr composed the *DC*—look to follow from the Kantian philosophy.

Compare with Schelling's letter:

The great Kantians now everywhere to be seen have got **stuck on the letter**, and bless themselves on seeing still so much before them. I am definitely convinced that the old **superstition** of so-called **natural religion** as well as of **positive religion has** in the minds of most already once more **been combined with the Kantian letter**. It is fun to see how **quickly** they can get to the **moral proof**. Before you can turn around the *deus ex machina* springs forth, the **personal individual Being** who sits in Heaven above!<sup>38</sup>

It is at least plausible that Schelling had somewhere in mind (even if at the back) §§17-18 of the *DC* when he wrote to Hegel. For in these sections we find talk about superstition and religion embedded in the Kantian letter (in the form of the moral proof); we find references to Romans, the traditional locus of conversations about spirit/letter, superstition, nature/natural, and religion.

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the miracles of Christ and his apostles were wrought by some other being. For, on this supposition, we should have to admit, that the other being, who must necessarily have been rational and superhuman, did himself ascribe the miracles and doctrines of Christ and his apostles (§ 8, 6) to the Creator and Lord of nature. In this case, then, a belief in the existence of God, would be supported by the testimony of at least one superhuman being, and would no longer be a weakness peculiar to man.

<sup>38</sup> Emphasis mine. Butler and Seiler, 29. Cf. Schelling, Series III, Vol. I, p. 16.

## **Spirit/Letter, Storr's Methodological Rigor, and the Place of Kant's Arguments in His Case for the Divine Authority of Scripture**

So far I have developed two interconnected sets of questions or lines of inquiry. The first concerns the sleight-of-hand by which Storr was able to infuse the Kantian letter with an Orthodox spirit; the second concerns a particular example in which the divine authority and reliability of Scripture (and of the dogma based on it) seem to follow from Kant's moral and physico-theological arguments. In this essay, I maintain that Storr steeps the Kantian letter in an Orthodox spirit in the *DC*, but I complicate the companion notions that Storr's case for the divine authority of Scripture rests (at least in part) on rational grounds and that this conclusion follows from his representations of Kant's arguments for rational belief in God. In so doing, I challenge commonplace notions that Storr's core methodology is incoherent—either because it rests on a circularity or because it illegitimately combines multiple grounds of argumentation.

Recall that Storr's paraphrases of Kant's arguments appear to be warranted by the third *Critique*, and that they are premises in his argument for the divine authority of Scripture. Though this is a perfectly defensible way to read the logic of Storr's case for the divine authority of Scripture and the place of Kant's arguments within Storr's *DC*, it does not readily comport with Storr's claim that he appeals to human reason in order to demonstrate the respectability of Scripture on reason's terms; nor does it easily mesh with the claims of Ian Cooper and Mark Ogden that Storr's case is ultimately—like many in the Lutheran traditions—circular (i.e., Scripture is the source of evidence for its own divine authority); nor does it adequately reckon with the absence of evidence (on rational

grounds) that the God of Kant's arguments is the same as the God who authored, influenced, or approved of Holy Writ. This essay advances the claim that there are other—perhaps equally defensible—ways to understand the logic of Storr's case for the divine authority of Scripture and the place of Kant's arguments within his *DC*.

With this in mind, I claim that the absence of evidence (on rational grounds) that the God of Kant's arguments is the same as the God who authored Holy Writ and Storr's insistence that Scripture's divine authority is a matter of immediate divine revelation together suggest that his case is neither circular nor dependent upon a rational (Kantian) mode of argumentation. Insofar as the success of Storr's book rests nevertheless on the power of his readers to see Lutheran dogma as reliable, his is an impossible task—for he cannot dispense this immediate divine revelation.

But it is possible to read Storr's paraphrases of Kant's arguments and his bibliographic Kant-citations less as evidence for the existence of God (and so support for that premise within his argument for the divine authority of Scripture), and more as part of Storr's attempt to teach his students what cannot be taught. Present-day scholars (as did many in Storr's day) tend to read citations like Storr's Kant-citations as presentations of evidence about which we are called to judge—as a decider of fact (e.g., the judge or jury in an American legal case). Though Storr used citations in this familiar-to-us way, I argue in chapter two, he perhaps also used them to set before his students (on to-them-familiar terms) a wide range of materials and modes of argumentation (i.e., parts) and to display how the Lutheran biblical-theologian divides, arranges, and orders those parts into a coherent whole. That is, Storr arguably used citations to draw his students into a new

way of seeing—a way of seeing in which the teachings of Scripture (backed by the divine author) and of reason might stand together in a characteristically Lutheran harmony. From this perspective, Storr’s representations of Kant’s arguments look more like invitations—they help him create the conditions under which he can hope—to a transformation in which his students may come to acknowledge the divine authority of Scripture, the relative reliability of doctrine, and a characteristically Lutheran harmony of Orthodoxy with (Kantian) reason.

Now from this challenge to the commonplace notions that Storr’s case for the divine authority of Scripture (and reliability of dogma) rests on an incoherent methodology arise alternative ways to explain what feature of the Kantian letter he exploited, why it is difficult to point to his error, and why Storr’s representations of Kant’s arguments are nevertheless illegitimate. Storr exploits the compatibility of Kant’s language with the vocabulary of Lutheran biblical theology—particularly the Lutheran transformation narrative or trope of history. And it is possible to show that Storr’s Lutheran trope of supersession is, despite Kant’s talk, not necessarily in accord with the trope under which Kant’s reason understood itself. In other words, I take my treatment of this particular example (questions about Storr’s case for the divine authority of Scripture) to expand or complicate what we might mean when we talk about Storr as one who infused the Kantian letter with an Orthodox spirit.

So I shift from the questions about a particular example (Storr’s case for the reliability of Scripture and dogma) to questions about the spirit and letter more broadly

construed.<sup>39</sup> If, in chapters one and two I suggest alternate ways of reading the logic of Storr's case for the divine authority of Scripture and the place of Kant's arguments within Storr's *DC* (i.e., that our usual ways of understanding Storr's citations and the grounds of his argument for the divine authority of Scripture may not be the whole story), in chapter three I argue that the compatibility of much of Kant's language with the Lutheran transformation narrative or Lutheran trope of history—not the number and variety of his arguments for rational belief in God—opened wide the door to Storr's implicit claim that the reliability of Scripture and of Lutheran Orthodox dogma somehow follows after (not from) (Kantian) reason's awareness of God from creation and conscience.

Combined, here is how the argument goes:

## **Defensible Methods, Compelling Evidence, and Yet Still**

### **Illegitimate**

I first argue that Storr's case for the divine authority of Scripture in the *DC* does not rest on Kant's arguments for rational belief in God; rather Storr positions Kant's arguments centrally within the case in order to display to his Kantian students on familiar terms the Lutheran Orthodox vision of the hierarchical harmony of human reason and divine revelation in Word (i.e., to teach his students to configure Scripture, dogma, and the products of human reason as the biblical theologian). For missing from Storr's argument for the divine authority of Scripture is a case on rational grounds that the God of Kant's arguments and the divine Author of Scripture are the same God. And, on his

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<sup>39</sup> I do not generalize out to other examples of Storr's sleight of hand, but I do offer a framework for re-reading them.

own terms, any case for the divine authority of Scripture ultimately depends upon an immediate divine revelation. Storr's task, then, is, on his own terms, impossible.

But he had at hand from the Lutheran and scholarly traditions methods, techniques, and guides for creating the conditions in which his students might discover the Lutheran way of configuring Scripture, dogma, and the products of human reason—and even of reliably configuring relationships between rational and biblical-theological grounds of argumentation. Storr exploited compatibility of Kant's arguments with the Lutheran story in which reason is aware of a God who is able to help humans do what they cannot; he exploited the compatibility of Kant's arguments with the Lutheran interpretation of Romans 1-2; he exploited Kant's claims that all human cognition of God is symbolic; and he exploited the Lutheran claim that dogmatic statements are symbolic summaries of Scripture in order to present Kant's arguments as dogma, and so to demonstrate the harmony of reason with Scripture. The feeling of discord that arises when, immediately on the heels of Kant's arguments, Storr talks about the historical reality of miracles, is perhaps not evidence of Storr's misrepresentation, but a rhetorical technique that makes visible to his Kantian students that their assumptions about the grounds and methods of Storr's arguments are misguided.

It was perhaps not the number and variety of Kant's arguments that allowed Storr to select and (re)present friendly formulations as support for his argument for the divine authority of Scripture, nor does Storr's case for the divine authority of Scripture illegitimately draw biblical-theological conclusions from rational-transcendental ones—his methodology is internally coherent. Rather Storr exploited the compatibility of Kant's

arguments (and talk more generally) with the Lutheran trope of history in order to display to his Kantian students on familiar terms the Lutheran Orthodox vision of the hierarchical harmony of human reason and divine revelation in Word. For evidence that Kant talks in ways compatible with the Lutheran trope of history abounds, and counter-evidence is sparse.

My argument suggests that Storr read reason's admission of its "inability to know anything of the supersensible" under the Lutheran trope of history and from the standpoint of a biblical theologian—a standpoint which reason allegedly could not occupy unless it had encountered Word. Although, from the perspective of biblical theology, all manners of Orthodoxy may follow "on Kant's own terms," (read in accord with the Lutheran trope of history) the same perhaps cannot be said from the perspective of Kant's reason on its own terms. For while Storr's exploitation of the notion that reason's recognition of its own limits opens the possibility of some higher divine revelation is genius, it assumes already a supersessionist history in which divine revelation already has revealed itself as higher. That Kant also employed the language of this trope is not necessarily—historically and linguistically speaking—evidence that he endorsed Lutheran supersessionism in just the way Storr did. For it is the language and standpoint that Kant learned from the catechisms and—perhaps more importantly—the language and standpoint to which the public work of the philosophy faculty was traditionally expected (if not forced) to conform.

## **An Unholy Amalgam?**

Insofar as I aim to establish that the connective tissues of Storr's perspective may hold together his Orthodox dogma and his representations of Kant's arguments as conclusion and premise, the essay can be situated within a scholarly conversation about Storr's argumentative methods and their coherence (or incoherence). In the *DC* and in his corpus more generally, Storr appears to draw Orthodox dogmatic conclusions from premises that he establishes on historical, philological, philosophical, biblical, and theological grounds. How and whether combines these Storr premises and conclusions according to recognizable rules that would issue in reliable results is debatable.

Although he recognized differences between many kinds of argumentation, in the *DC*, Storr's ultimate heuristic, I will argue, is the Lutheran divine/human distinction or the figure of the Lutheran theological anthropology. In the *DC*, Storr displays Kant's arguments in relation to Scripture, to history, to dogma, etc., according to the Lutheran story about the unity and distinction between the human and the divine. In other words, Storr brings together Kant's arguments for God—even though Kant's arguments are for the purpose of grounding rational *belief* (as premise) and orthodox dogma (as conclusion) according to Lutheran rules for argument-building; he brings them together under a Lutheran divine/human distinction, not under a distinction between, say, limited speculative transcendental reasoning and dogmatic assertion.

Our disagreements about Storr's grounds and forms of argumentation show up as tensions in our attempts to situate Storr in relation to his predecessors, his contemporaries, his heirs, and to Enlightenment or late-eighteenth-century themes more



broadly. We arguably tend to organize argumentative grounds and methods by particular disciplines or schools of thought (history, philology, rationalism, empiricism, etc.), or by alleged authoritative sources (empirically observed natural phenomena, interrogated documents, situated human artifacts, divine revelation, etc.), or even by alleged ultimate grounds (faith and reason; reason and revelation). My argument pertains only to the *DC*. But it perhaps adds to scholarly attempts to situate Storr historically an effort to imagine how Storr might have understood his argumentative method as internally coherent, and how we might imagine Storr's work as a serious, late-eighteenth-century (and characteristically Lutheran) engagement with one of his age's most important questions, namely how to reliably combine (or order) multiple measures of reliability.

### **Scripture and Reliability**

Permit me to expand this point. Scholars associate Storr closely with Scripture—he was, after all, a biblical theologian. Insofar as he was a biblical scholar, Scripture was what we might call Storr's object of study. Insofar as he was a biblical theologian, Scripture as what we might call the starting place or primary source of his theology. Storr understood Scripture to be his object of study and the primary source of his theology. Yet while there are some points of consensus, taken as a whole, scholarly accounts of Scripture's place in Storr's corpus are puzzling at best. Taken as a whole, perhaps just as curious are scholarly attempts to situate Storr's notions about Scripture in relation to his colleagues', predecessors', and heirs'.

For example, there is general consensus that Storr took Scripture to have divine authority.<sup>40</sup> And there is consensus that Storr took Scripture to be able to establish the reliability of Orthodox dogma. But whether his argument for its divine authority (and reliability) was circular (i.e., dependent upon Scripture's testimony);<sup>41</sup> historical<sup>42</sup>, Kantian<sup>43</sup>, or some unholy amalgam<sup>44</sup>, is hardly settled.

Another example: there is consensus that Storr rejected the sort of accommodationism in which Scripture is allegedly reduced to a human book that can be wholly understood historically—save, perhaps, its moral teachings, which comprise its divine part.<sup>45</sup> And yet, what we might call Storr's historical-critical and philological skill rarely goes unmentioned. Indeed, among historians of biblical scholarship, Storr is often remembered as the first to advance Markan priority. His solution to a set of questions and answers about the historical-linguistic relationships of the canonical Gospels to one another, which hypothesizes that Mark's Gospel was a source common to Matthew and Luke, would later become (and remains to the present day) the most widely held theory.

On the one hand, Storr is remembered as a throwback—the last of biblical scholars who would maintain something like the literal truth of a divinely inspired book.

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<sup>40</sup> *DPTS*, 40.

<sup>41</sup> Ian Cooper, *The near and Distant God: Poetry, Idealism and Religious Thought from Hölderlin to Eliot* (London: MHRA, 2008), 18; Ogden, 14.

<sup>42</sup> (Bloomsbury Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers, 756; See, for example, Magne Sæbø, *Hebrew Bible / Old Testament. Iii: From Modernism to Post-Modernism: Part 1: The Nineteenth Century - a Century of Modernism and Historicism* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 34-5; Mark C. Taylor, *Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel & Kierkegaard* (Fordham Univ Press, 2000), 34n; Clifford E. Nelson, *Lutherans in North America* (Fortress Press, 1975), 150.)

<sup>43</sup> (Beiser, *Cambridge Companion to Hegel*)

<sup>44</sup> cf. *DPTS*, 48; Pfeleiderer, x

<sup>45</sup> See, for example, Desmond, Onnasch, and Cruysberghs, xxii-xxiii.

On the other, he is understood as a pioneer in what would become an organizing question of historical-critical biblical scholarship. Storr's curious inclusion of Kant's arguments for God at the heart of his case for the reliability of Scripture and his deep engagement with the Kantian philosophy, meanwhile, only complicate the matter further.

Henrich chalks the difficulty of situating Storr up to his historical situation: he lived at the end of some kinds of thinking and the beginning of others. Storr's "amalgam of autonomy and authority" was one to which Storr's "contemporaries who were serious thinkers could not come to terms." "[C]aught in the Kantian current," Storr paid the price of what Henrich (citing Nietzsche) describes as the inability of "the most important dogmatics of every age [...] to keep its distance from the philosophy of the day." Storr's arguments are ultimately incoherent because they traverse so many incompatible grounds, but this is an accident of his situation. Later readers, Henrich notes, thus "scarcely have any reason to cast the first stone."<sup>46</sup>

As I mentioned, there is much to be said for Henrich's assessment, especially applied to Storr's corpus as a whole, though it perhaps points up our eagerness to understand Storr's work under present-day tropes of conflict. We arguably set historical-critical/philological investigation against appeals to divine authority; we oppose Kantian philosophy and its form of reflective criticism to appeals to the authority of Scripture. We find these oppositions meaningful—so meaningful that we use them to organize temporal metaphors: we can see in his relation to biblical interpretation that Storr is a throwback and the first of his kind.

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<sup>46</sup> *DPTS*, 48.

If Henrich positions Storr as ultimately strung up between the currents of his time, I want to suggest the possibility that the Storr of the *DC* reinterprets and combines various strands of Lutheran argumentative traditions to address questions about the relation of these forms/standards of argumentation (rational-observational/historical-philological, Kantian/critical, and dogmatic) to one another. More particularly, I will show that Storr sets a traditional Lutheran figure of a distinction/unity between the divine and human up as a guide for reliably imagining their relations to one another. Put differently: in the *DC*, Storr arguably takes a Lutheran theological anthropology as a rule for reliably ordering various measures of reliability.

### **Citation-Annotations**

Storr's "unholy amalgam" perhaps appears as such because of our over-familiarity with the role of citation-annotations in scholarly (esp. textual-evidentiary) reasoning. If present-day scholars tend to (rightly) assume that Storr's citation-annotations are, like ours, a means of pointing to evidence about which readers must make a judgment, we also perhaps tend to overlook the rhetoric and history of citation-annotations, their places within Lutheran theological thinking, and the many tasks eighteenth-century thinkers like Storr assigned them. In this essay I point up the possibility that that Storr paraphrases and cites Kant's arguments for God in the course of his case for the divine authority of Scripture does not necessarily indicate that those arguments are the source of or warrant for a premise in his case—or that his citations only indicate sources or warrants. Storr's citations may have additional functions; and, insofar as they indicate sources and warrants, they may assume other measures of reliability—ways of judging about a

relationship between document and claim that do not privilege rational-observation in any to-present-day-thinkers familiar way.

### **Thematic Tensions, Methodology, Standpoint**

One thematic question of this investigation is how the same words may come to have different meanings. At the highest level, the question is mine, and it concerns how Storr was able to fuse an Orthodox spirit to the Kantian letter. I argue that Storr changed the spirit of the Kantian letter by incorporating it into a uniquely Lutheran narrative harmony of pre-transformation reason with the post-transformation standpoint of the biblical theologian.

To convince the reader, I set Storr's representation of Kant's arguments, first, in the contexts of the history of Lutheran biblical theology and of Storr's arguments for the divine authority of Scripture in the *DC*. Here my primary conversation partners are scholars like Ogden and Cooper, who assert that Storr's arguments are circular; my secondary partners are historians of Lutheran theology. Second, I set Storr's representation of Kant's arguments in the contexts of scholarly and biblical citation-annotations and of scholarly and biblical-theological systems of annotation. Though my primary conversation partners are historians of scholarly citation and annotation practices—especially Robert J. Connors and Anthony Grafton, thinkers like Pfliegerer and Henrich who see Storr's "unholy amalgam" figure heavily in the background, as do historians of biblical studies and Lutheran dogmatics. Finally, I set Storr's representation of Kant's arguments in the contexts of Kant's critical philosophy, and of Kant's reception of the language of Lutheran biblical theology. Here I offer a way to interpret and expand

the work of Stephen Palmquist and Walther Sparn, each of whom have suggested that Kant's and Storr's common Lutheran theological language may offer some insight into their conversations with one another.

In short, I hope to change how the reader sees Storr's representation of Kant's arguments by changing the contexts in which the reader reads it. To accomplish this, I pepper a series of narratives with quotations and citation-annotations. I assert or display the connections between documents and my claims—as I see them. At the same time, I call the reader to judge whether the documents count as evidence that my claims are plausible. Different disciplines have different ways to assess this. While I make arguments about theological, rhetorical, and philosophical materials, the connections I posit should be visible to present-day historians of ideas—especially those familiar with the textual-evidentiary modes of reasoning and with modes of reasoning that take seriously what shows but may not be said (or may be said only obliquely).

But the question of how the same words may come to have new meaning, I will show, was also one with which Storr was deeply concerned—both as a teacher of biblical theology and as a Lutheran theologian. Storr's question has a pedagogical flavor insofar as he sought to teach his students to see as a biblical theologian does by way of language and by drawing analogies that they could grasp on their own terms. He organizes the *DC* in such a way that its words (and his assertions about their relations to one another) might mean one thing under the reason's rules of configuration, and might mean something else under the biblical theologian's. Storr's question has a theological or metaphysical flavor insofar as he understood a divine transformation of his students' rule

of configuration for reading Scripture as condition for their coming to see as a biblical theologian does—particularly, a condition for coming to see that the biblical theologian does not read the Creeds into Scripture, but rather understands the reliability of the Creeds as relative to the highest-reliable: Scripture. The words (and asserted relations between them) of Kant’s arguments, of Storr’s book, and of Scripture will all stay the same—but, if Storr’s rhetoric is successful and his doubting students encounter Word, they should all come to mean differently.

This is deeply related to a tension between the invisibility and visibility of (shifts in) rules of configuration. Storr uses citation-annotations to display or assert relationships between words, between parts of books, between different kinds of materials and modes of argumentation (to display a rule of configuration). He also employs citation-annotations to call his reader to judge about the hierarchical conceptual relations between words, materials, etc., in much the way an attorney calls a judge or jury to consider evidence in relation to some frame and to decide the facts of a case (i.e., in hopes that the reader will judge that the relation between claim and cited materials reaches out to reality).<sup>47</sup> (Present-day readers of histories are well familiar with this: when we read a curious claim, we look for a note, examine the cited materials, and judge whether the cited materials relate to the claim in a way that reaches out to reality. Storr, for example, cites Eusebius and Origen to show that as early as the third century, thinkers understood

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<sup>47</sup> In an important sense, these questions are familiar to an academic professional who asks how and whether an argument might convince, or finds herself attempting to teach what cannot be said (the connection of also un-stateable measures of reliability to methodological practices) of a given discipline to her students.

the Gospels to be the genuine work of their alleged authors.<sup>48</sup> These authors' works date to the early fourth and third centuries, respectively, and they both indicate that the Gospels were genuine. A reader compares the cited documents with Storr's claim and judges whether or not they support the conclusion Storr draws.)

Now a shift in a rule of configuration (or a measure of reliability) is only visible by comparison—to a static.<sup>49</sup> And at the same time, Storr talks about the power of a static (whether rhetorical, human-human or theological, divine-human) to reconfigure a reader's rule of configuration, and so to reconfigure itself. So it seems as if static words must be self-identical (to make transformation visible) and at the same time they must somehow not be self-identical (to explain the transformation of a self-reconfiguring rule of configuration).

This brings us to a second theme: the post-transformation standpoint of Storr as a teacher and as a biblical theologian. When Storr imagines the minds of his students in order to choose words and to display arrangements they might accept on their own terms, he must call (for human-human teaching) on an analogy to his own mind and (to create the conditions for divine-human 'teaching') he must call on some guide for thinking about those conditions. That is, he must imagine the standpoint of one who has not yet learned what he knows or seen as he sees—but this is always already to impose upon his students' minds (and on the authors he cites) assumptions that they may or may not embrace or

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<sup>48</sup> *DC*, §2.

<sup>49</sup> If, in the Lutheran transformation narrative (from the post-transformation perspective), 'God' and 'able to help' are statics against which a shift from 'unknown if God is willing to help' to 'trust that God is willing to help' stands out, here the words of Scripture are statics against which a change from one rule of configuration (x interprets y) to another (y interprets x) stands out.



ever come to recognize. Put differently, the second theme is that of supersession—both the ordinary pedagogical sort and an historical, metaphysical Lutheran biblical-theological sort.

My re-contextualizing of Storr's representation of Kant's arguments for rational belief in God, too, proceeds from a particular standpoint. While I employ historical methods to suggest a different way of understanding Storr's representation, and while I hope to convince the reader that they have some merit (i.e., to measure up to the reliability standards of historians), I do not take the historical methods and reliability measures I have assumed in order to write the essay to be themselves reliable, or to afford me some insight into "how things really are," or "how things really were." Put practically, I want to make clear to the reader that, despite my defense of the internal coherence of his argumentation, I do not take myself to have shown the present-day defensibility of his position; nor do I take myself to have shown, in my account of Kant's Lutheran borrowings, the present-day defensibility of a position akin to his. Rather I take myself to be presenting the results of an exercise in historical thinking—a kind of thinking whose dearest assumptions (especially about the 'human', 'human mindedness', and 'human communication') I do not—as a thinker—necessarily share. In short, I take the feeling of being compelled to believe the world is how I think it is to be just that—it does not offer me any legitimate standpoint as a thinker from which to compare or warrant organizing other configurations as "other," "past," "erroneous," etc. Even if—as a thinker—I must take my way of building a world as a point of comparison, nothing about this compels me to take my rule of configuration as equal to a by-all-humans-shared measure of reliability (i.e.,

I do not have to organize everything under more or less Melancthon-indebted-Kantian notions of objectivity and subjectivity).

### **Order of Argument**

My case divides into two parts. First, Storr's case for the reliability of Scripture and Orthodox dogma does not follow from Kant's arguments insofar as they are taken to be reliable on their own (reason's) terms, but only insofar as they are taken to be reliable according to the measure of Lutheran Orthodoxy. Storr's point, rather, —second— is that the reliability of Scripture, of Orthodox dogma, and of Kant's arguments might follow on the biblical theologian's terms after one accepted Kant's arguments on reason's terms (i.e., the rational belief in a God who is able to do what humans cannot precedes the divine revelation of the God who is able and willing to do what humans cannot. And it remains.). To this end, Storr displays two rules of configuration and measures of reliability under the Lutheran rule of configuration and measure of reliability (i.e., as the biblical theologian configures and measures).

Insofar as his argument for the reliability of Scripture is concerned, Storr positions Kant's arguments as dogmatic statements, which have relative reliability in light of their relation to Scripture. But 'Scripture', for Storr, means Scripture on Scripture, or what is the same, Scripture read according to an immediately and divinely revealed rule of configuration. Storr takes this rule of configuration, much as Luther did, as a measure for assessing divinity and reliability. Insofar as Kant's are arguments for rational belief in a God who is able to help humans do what they cannot, they conform to Scripture read under the Lutheran rule of configuration and resonate with the Lutheran reliability

measure. For the Lutheran story is that human reason is aware of a God who is able to help, but, unless it encounters Word, does not know whether that God is both able and willing to help. This Lutheran story is itself only available after an encounter with Word. The God of Kant's arguments may appear on Kant's reason's terms. But awareness of this God is, from the perspective of Orthodox Lutheran theology, a condition for the appearance of a new, highest-reliable rule of configuration (for reading Scripture) and measure of reliability. That from this perspective the products of reason might be understood to agree with and yet be subordinate to (i.e., confirmed by) divine revelation in Scripture is just the point the *DC*'s unique organization supports.

## **Order of Exposition**

### *Chapter 1*

By order of exposition, my case unfolds in reverse: in chapter 1, I argue that, Storr must—and yet, on his own terms—cannot teach his students either the rule of configuration or measure of reliability that they need as ambassadors of Lutheran biblical theology. Nor can he hope to convince them (as he must) that, under the Lutheran rule of configuration, the work of human reason may yet count as reliable on reason's terms. For the rule of configuration (the way to read Scripture for biblical theology) and conviction of the reliability of the rule as a measure of reliability (the conviction that Scripture, read aright, is the highest measure of reliability in matters of biblical theology) are given in the divine Author of Scripture's immediate self-revelation. In short, Storr must and cannot convince his students that Scripture's Author is divine, for the highest-

reliability of biblical theology and the relative reliability of the work of human reason both depend on what can—on his own terms—only be given immediately.

## Chapter 2

Storr had at hand, however, —from the Lutheran and scholarly traditions—a theory about how best to use words to create the conditions in which a reader’s rule of configuration and measure of reliability might be transformed. Language that readers can encounter on their own terms may have the power to reconfigure the terms on which readers understand it. Think, for example, of a joke or a poem: verbal expressions that we take in on our own terms, but that reconfigure the terms by which we understand them. And he has at hand—from the same traditions and in conjunction with print technologies—a way to display a new (Lutheran) rule of configuration on terms familiar to his students: citation-annotations.

What I am getting at, in plain English, is a feature of argumentation familiar to present-day scholars: while one can give an argument (reasons and evidence in support of some conclusion), and while a student, for example, may learn to identify reasons, evidence, and conclusion as such (she may see how the parts of an argument are configured), nothing can compel a reader to see that the argument’s parts are configured in a way that reaches out to reality. The best one can do, as Jan Zwicky puts it in *Lyric Philosophy*, is point and hope.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Jan Zwicky, *Alkibiades' Love: Essays in Philosophy* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015), §50. Of course we can and do correct student essays, for example, in hopes that they will learn rules of configuration that resonate with the reliability measure (often expressed indirectly as methodological requirements) of some particular discipline.

I argue in chapter 2 that Storr uses citation-annotations to display the Lutheran Orthodox rule of configuration (for reading Scripture aright), reason's rules of configuration (for reading human documents and experience aright), and the Lutheran Orthodox rule of configuration (for reading the relationship between these two rules of configuration aright). That is, I show how Storr uses the tools and theory at hand to create the conditions in which his readers might come to see that Scripture's Author is divine.

### *Chapter 3*

Now Kant's moral and physico-theological arguments for God together show that reason may (must, if it is to make practical judgments) have an awareness—perhaps only an implicit awareness—articulated as rational belief in a God who is able to help humans do what they cannot. From the standpoint of biblical theology, this awareness is both human reliable and highest-reliable. And it is also the pivot-point, a notion that reason may accept on its own terms and that, given an encounter with the divine Word, might reconfigure the terms on which it is accepted. After the divine Author's immediate self-revelation, in other words, one might be able to see (even if only indirectly) in the notion of a God who is able to help humans do what they cannot (the steady notion) the differences between the 'old' and 'new' rules of configuration and between the old and new measures of reliability.

Storr situates Kant's arguments for a rational belief in God in the midst of his case for the divinity and reliability of Scripture and Orthodox dogma follows shortly on the heels of Kant's arguments. But neither the divine authority of Scripture nor the reliability

of Orthodox dogma follow from Kant's arguments understood on reason's terms. Rather they follow after Kant's arguments. Indeed, they follow a presentation of Kant's arguments punctuated by biblical and extra-biblical citations. They follow after Storr has created the conditions (1) in which his readers might acknowledge their awareness of a God who is able to help; (2) in which they might encounter Word and the divine Author's immediate self-revelation; (3) in which his readers might come to see the divine authority and highest-reliability of Scripture; (4) in which they might come to see Orthodox dogma as reliable; and (5) in which they might come to see Kant's arguments as reliable on reason's terms and on those of biblical-theology. It is perhaps not the number and variety of Kant's arguments for God that make Storr's curious representation possible and difficult to counter, but their compatibility with the Lutheran transformation narrative. This is the case I make in chapter 3.

### *Conclusion*

Finally, I revisit my argument and suggest that the (striking) compatibility of Kant's arguments with the Lutheran transformation narrative or trope of history does not—by itself—suggest that he intentionally left open a path to unbridled metaphysical speculation of a Storrish sort. It may be possible to account for this striking compatibility by pointing to Kant's concerns about censorship. For the Lutheran transformation narrative had been used to set the limits of the philosophy and theology faculties.

Put just this way, we might (1) re-examine Storr's *A* with an eye on when and where he reads Kant as a member of the philosophy and biblical theology faculties, (2) with an eye on shifts in his strategy in light of Kant's attempt to bring a transformation

narrative into reason's sphere in the *Religion*. We might re-examine the first part of Kant's Conflict of the Faculties, which he penned in 1794, shortly after he acknowledged Storr's criticisms and reported his hope and attempts to answer them. And we might also re-examine the shifts in the second edition of the *Religion* with an eye for his responses to Storr's criticisms.

### A Note on Kant's Arguments for God

Storr paraphrases and cites the formulations of Kant's moral and physico-theological arguments for God that the latter presented in the third *Critique*. Though they are arguments, Kant does not take the moral argument (or the physico-theological, which "naturally precedes"—points the way to—,<sup>51</sup> but also depends on the moral argument) to "provide any objectively valid proof of the existence of God" or to "prove to the doubter that there is a God." The moral argument is rather a way of talking around "the assumption" of God that one needs to imagine one's "moral thinking" as "consistent," and the physico-theological argument depends on the conviction only this talking around (moral argument) can provide.<sup>52</sup> In other words, the God who exists in the conclusions

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<sup>51</sup> AA 5:436; CJ, 303.

<sup>52</sup> AA 5:450-1; CJ, 315.

\*This moral argument is not meant to provide any **objectively** valid proof of the existence of God, nor meant to prove to the doubter that there is a God; rather, it is meant to prove that if his moral thinking is to be consistent, he **must include** the assumption of this proposition among the maxims of his practical reason. – Thus it is also not meant to say that it is necessary to assume the happiness of all rational beings in the world in accordance with their morality **for** morals, but rather that it is

of Kant's arguments is no ordinary object, but the object of rational belief; "God exists" is no claim to have directly cognized God. And the insofar as the arguments "tend toward conviction," they do so because one must assume there is a God in order to think about "moral thinking" as rational. "There is a God" in the moral argument is merely symbolic cognition—it is not knowledge of God, but a way to represent to oneself indirectly the possibility of the conditions under which one might count moral thinking as rational.

Kant denies not just that the moral argument has the power to prove God's existence, but also that the traditional forms of argument for rational knowledge of God

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necessary **through** their morality. Hence it is a **subjective** argument, sufficient for moral beings.

<sup>53</sup> *AA* 5:477-8; *CJ*, 340-1.

That the physico-teleological proof is convincing, just as if it were at the same time a theological proof, thus does not rest on the employment<sup>c</sup> of the ideas of ends of nature, as so many empirical grounds of proof of a **highest** intelligence; rather, without noticing it, it mixes into the inference the moral ground of proof, which is present in and so deeply moving for every human being, in accordance with which we attribute to the being that reveals itself with such incomprehensible artistry in the ends<sup>a</sup> of nature a final end as well, and hence wisdom (although without being justified in so doing by the perception of the ends of nature), and thus arbitrarily make up the defect that still inheres in that argument. In fact, therefore, only the moral ground of proof carries conviction, and only in a moral respect, assent to which everyone feels most deeply; the physico-teleological argument, however, has only the merit of guiding the mind on the path of ends in the contemplation of the world, and thereby to an **intelligent** author of the world: where the moral relation to ends and the idea of such a moral legislator and author of the world, as a theological concept,<sup>b</sup> seems to develop on its own from that ground of proof, although it is a pure addition.



(which he divides, in the first *Critique*, into ontological, cosmological, and the physico-teleological) succeed. These take, Kant suggests, in one way or another, God to be an object that can be known like other objects. Even the transcendental argument on which the others ultimately depend, Kant shows, rests on a mistaken notion that existence is a predicate—not a modal category, or qualification of a subjective relation.<sup>54</sup> Reason's idea of God organizes thinking about the unity of whatever it organizes under its other ideas ('I' and 'world'), but its theoretical use is merely regulative. The moral argument for God, on the other hand, is meant to show that the belief requisite to count morality as rational is itself reasonable—or, as Kant might put it, not unreasonable.<sup>55</sup>

The moral argument is arguably a way of talking around a faith or trust that reason may give itself the law and the capacity to fulfill it—that we may act toward a building of the kingdom of ends. We may *use* a symbolic representation of an idea of the possibility of the highest good for orienting ourselves where theoretical reason comes up short.

If one may already call a mere kind of representation cognition (which is certainly permissible if it is a principle not of the theoretical determination of what an object is in itself, but of the practical determination of what the idea of it ought to be for us and for the purposive use of it), then all of our cognition of God is merely symbolic [...]<sup>56</sup>

This idea, rooted in the ground of thinking, can only have a symbolic representation precisely because it cannot be thought directly. Again, as a symbol, it can be *used* for

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<sup>54</sup> A 590/B618, *CPR*, 563, ff.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *AA* 5:469; *CJ*, 333, ff.

<sup>56</sup> *AA* 5:353; *CJ*, 227.

orientation in thinking about the supersensible.<sup>57</sup> In his moral case and even in his revivification (and modification) of his 1763 “Only possible argument” for God (based on the ground of possibility), Kant’s arguments for God are not arguments for knowledge of God as object. At most, they are ways of talking about how beings that think like us need to think (i.e., that we cannot deny the reality of the ground of thinking, even though we cannot encounter it as an object, and that we may not deny the conditions of the possibility of our building the kingdom of ends).

This essay suggests that, in one important sense, Storr does not give the God of Kant’s arguments what the latter might call objective reality, and so does not illicitly represent Kant’s arguments as if they were able to convince a doubter of God’s existence on pseudo-Kantian terms. Rather, Storr, not wholly unlike Kant, takes awareness of God to be indirect and symbolic—the “existence of God” must be trusted, and whatever it gestures toward is greater than what humans may know fully, greater than what they may hear or speak about directly.<sup>58</sup>

So, when I occasionally speak of self-knowledge and knowledge of God in Kant and Storr, I do not have in mind knowledge in the Kantian sense, so much as awareness within the Augustinian traditions. When I talk about Storr’s and Kant’s arguments for God, I do not mean proofs for the reality of some object of possible experience, but the ways in which they talk around faith (or trust) in what cannot be such an object. To be sure, the ‘object’ of Storr’s faith makes itself known on human terms, whereas reason

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<sup>57</sup> See “The God of Kant’s Arguments is a Symbolic Expression,” below.

<sup>58</sup> Not ‘symbolic’ in a wholly Kantian sense, for Storr arguably does not import Kant’s notions of subjectivity and objectivity into the ultimate standpoint of biblical theology.

makes its idea of God thinkable on its own terms. But Storr, I will suggest, no more pretends to direct knowledge of God than Kant to things in themselves.

# Chapter I: Storr's Case for the Divine Authority of Scripture in its Lutheran Theological Context

## Introduction

Although Storr situates Kant's cases for God at the heart of an argument for the divine authority of Scripture, his argument cannot rest on the rational grounds of Kant's cases, for he nowhere establishes on reason's terms that the God of Kant's arguments and the Author of Scripture are identical. On Storr's accounting, this premise is only available from the divine Author. While some have claimed that he is caught in a circular argument for the divine authority of Scripture, I show here that Storr makes clear that the divine authority of Scripture depends on an immediate divine revelation. Insofar as Storr's task is to teach future clerics to teach and defend Lutheran dogma—with all sincerity, and by learning the biblical warrant for dogma and how to make a case for its respectability on reason's terms—the success of his book turns on something outside his power: an immediate divine revelation.

## Storr's Dogmatics: Textbook and Task

Printed at Stuttgart, Storr's biblical dogmatics (*Doctrinae christianae pars theoretica e scaris liters repetita, auditoribus suis scripsit*) first publicly circulated in 1793; he penned the preface on the seventh of March of the same year. Storr lectured from the book, which would eventually replace Christoph Sartorius' 1777 *Compendium theologiae*

*dogmaticae* as the official theology textbook of Württemberg, a title it held from 1802 until 1841 in lectures, and until 1849 in Diocesan disputations.<sup>59</sup><sup>60</sup>

Storr named in the book's Preface its basic aim, which is to prepare future churchmen, first, to teach the doctrines of Jesus Christ and, second, to give an "adequate defense of the Christian religion" to any who challenged it.<sup>61</sup> Although Storr's students would memorize this dogma for examinations and were expected to teach it without deviation, he insisted that they understand why it was reliable and why detractors should take it seriously.

Reasons for affirming doctrine, Storr claimed, come from Scripture. So he presented alongside each doctrinal statement the biblical passages on which it depended. But those who would challenge Christian dogma, Storr noted, would not necessarily grant the divine authority of Scripture. So he also presented alongside each doctrinal statement reasons to trust that Scripture and the doctrine drawn from it were respectable nonetheless.<sup>62</sup> Storr deemed both sets of reasons for trust or respect valuable for his students to learn as the doctrine proper. And in one sense, Storr designed the *DC* to draw attention away from disagreements about the contents of doctrinal statements and toward the differences between the kinds of argumentation their defenders and challengers found acceptable.<sup>63</sup> 'Why' mattered as much as 'what'.

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<sup>59</sup> *L*, xiii. Sparrn, 71.

<sup>60</sup> In addition to Walter Sparrn's essay on the *DC*, see Ulrich Köpf, "Das Kompendium Des Christoph Friedrich Sartorius Als Grundlage Des Dogmatikstudiums," *ibid*.

<sup>61</sup> *DC*, Preface, viii; *L* viii-ix. Cf. §107.

<sup>62</sup> *L*, xii-xiii. This entangles Storr in the art of interpretation, a point to which I will return to repeatedly.

<sup>63</sup> *DC* vii-x; *L* x-xi.

Storr designed the book for lecturing and studying. To help keep the basic three elements straight in the course of lectures, repetitions, and individual study, Storr suggested, he presented a series of succinct dogmatic statements, each peppered with parenthetical, usually biblical citations and endnote markers, and each punctuated by a series of endnotes. Storr would be able to keep and mark his place as he followed various trains of thought within a lecture. And his students would learn the orthodox doctrine, the biblical warrant for it, and how to show the doctrine might be warranted even to those initially unmoved by biblical warrant grounded in divine authority.

### **Storr's Argument for the Divine Authority of Scripture**

Sartorius' *Compendium* had also offered students rationales for defending dogma to doubters. He began his book with natural theology, and so worked up from premises its opponents might accept to the tenets of Orthodoxy. Indeed, the *Compendium*, Griesbach's *Anleitung*, and Morus' *Epitome*—the three main models for Storr's book—all begin with a distinction between natural religion and theology (and with an exposition of Romans 1-2). Storr's book begins with the authority of Scripture. Storr, by contrast, structured his book around an argument for the divinity and reliability of Scripture.<sup>64</sup> He began by showing that God produced, influenced, or sanctioned the books of Scripture, and so have divine authority.<sup>65</sup> He then argues that there is a God who does not deceive

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<sup>64</sup> Cf. Sparrn 72.

<sup>65</sup> §§6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.

and concludes that Scripture is reliable.<sup>66</sup> Only after he has argued that Scripture is reliable does he begin to systematically draw out its teachings.<sup>67</sup>

It looks, then, as if Storr takes a defense of the divine authority of Scripture to be crucial to his defense of dogma. His efforts to show on doubter's terms that the teachings of Scripture are not necessarily irrational are efforts to shore up respect for Scripture, and so to keep open the possibility that they might respect his argument for the divine authority of Scripture. If the latter argument is successful, it would seem, doubters might come to accept the biblical-theological rationale—they might come to find the biblical warrant for dogma convincing.

Because Storr supports each of the premises in his argument for the divine authority of Scripture with a biblical-theological and a doubter-accessible rationale, some have claimed that Storr's argument rests on rational grounds and makes an illegitimate leap to biblical-theological ones, or perhaps suggests that the divine authority of Scripture is available on rational (even Kantian) grounds.<sup>68</sup> Others have claimed that Storr's argument, like Sartorius', rests on Scripture's testimony to its own divinity, and so is basically circular.<sup>69</sup> Though there is much to be said for these positions, they overlook Storr's admission in §16 that he cannot hope to give a proof that would convince his readers of the divine authority of Christian doctrine because it can only be given in an immediate, supernatural revelation. And they perhaps overlook how tightly, in §15, Storr

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<sup>66</sup> §§17-19, 26. Storr's paraphrases of Kant's moral and physico-theological arguments for God are in §§17-18.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. §27 and ff.

<sup>68</sup> I expand on this way of reading at length in chapter 2.

<sup>69</sup> Cooper, 18; Ogden, 14.

qualified his claim about the divine authority and reliability of Scripture: only the parts of Scripture that Scripture says are reliable are highest reliable. In the paragraphs that follow, I show that Storr's argument for the divinity and reliability of Scripture applies only to Scripture read in a particular way (in accord with a particular rule of configuration), and this rule of configuration can only be given in an immediate revelation.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> By 'rule of configuration' I mean an unstated (perhaps not directly articulable) rule for 'reading' particular parts of a verbal construction subordinate or superordinate to others. For example, I break my aunt's dish. When I confess, she says, "It's okay," and "I inherited the same sets of China from your great-grandmother and my husband's grandmother." If, in the hierarchical structure I must impose to understand anything, I privilege "It's okay," then "I inherited..." explains why it is okay that the dish is broken: it is replaceable. If, in the hierarchical structure, I privilege, "I inherited..." then "It's okay," means it is not okay, because the dish is valuable and irreplaceable. Nowhere does my aunt say (and perhaps she does not know) which statement should have interpretive priority over the other. But somehow I have a sense or a feeling that can neither be grounded in my patterns of assumption about her or me nor in her patterns of assumption about either of us (i.e., the subject/object question is completely irrelevant)—that "It's okay" has priority.

In the Lutheran/Storrish context, the rule of configuration is perhaps correlated with a sense of "knowing" the person of the author. For example, if I say "I know" my aunt, I might mean that I have a sense about which parts of her speech interpret the others. I would not be claiming to know anything about her mind or my mind as objects (there is no 'I meant to say' in that sense.). But were I to point to other things my aunt has said or done, or to my own habits to mind to support the claim, it might seem (falsely) as if I was talking about objects.

On the read I am proposing here, this is the sort of sense I suspect Luther attempted to articulate under *sola scriptura*, although he stood to benefit from conflating it with the polemical resistance to imposition and with the ancient and humanist (and almost nowhere challenged) principle of interpreting Homer by Homer (i.e., clarifying some passage in light of another by the same author). While this sense or feeling may be accompanied by utter certainty, the source of this certitude (in the Lutheran and Storrish senses) cannot be made known (to the certain person or anyone else) by pointing to documentary evidence. But a read may be defended or shown to be part of a coherent order in that way.



## Scripture on Scripture

In §15, Storr declares that only the parts of Scripture that Scripture says are reliable are highest reliable:

Thus, when the inspired writers state, that particular persons uttered certain expressions or entertained certain opinions; these expressions and opinions are not therefore to be regarded as infallibly true, unless the Scriptures express approbation of them.<sup>71</sup>

The guide to Scripture's self-relation—to reliable reads of Scripture and so to a reliable measure of reliability—is the divine Author's announcement of what is divine. This is arguably a corollary of Luther's story about natural human reason's partial but inadequate notion of God—a story to which Storr frequently alludes.

Every human,<sup>72</sup> Luther argued, understands that she is limited, that her needs extend beyond her capacity to meet them,<sup>73</sup> and that there is a God who is able to meet

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<sup>71</sup> *DC* §15.4

<sup>72</sup> “That to all people, especially to idolaters, clear knowledge of God was available, as he says here, so that they are without excuse and it can be proved that they had known the invisible things of God, His divinity, likewise His eternal being and power, becomes apparent from the following: All those who set up idols and worship them call them “gods,” or even “God,” believing that God is immortal, that is, eternal, powerful, and able to render help, clearly indicate that they have a knowledge of divinity in their hearts. For with what reason could they call an image or any other created thing God, or how could they believe that it resembled Him if they did not know at all what God is and what pertains to Him? How could they attribute such qualities to a rock, if they did not believe that these qualities were really suitable for Him? When they now hold that divinity is invisible (a quality to be sure, which they have assigned to many gods) and that he who possesses it is invisible, immortal, powerful, wise, just, and gracious to those who call upon him[...] it follows most surely that they had a knowledge or notion of divinity which undoubtedly came to them from God. This was their error, that they did not worship this divinity untouched but changed and adjusted it to their desires and needs. [...] This major premise of the “practical syllogism,” this theological “insight of the conscience,” is in all men and cannot be obscured.” (*LW* 25:157)

those needs.<sup>74</sup> Humans do not know whether God is willing to help, and cannot do anything to find out.<sup>75</sup> This destabilizes human reason.<sup>76</sup> In its attempts to stabilize itself,<sup>77</sup> reason imagines (Luther called this imagination a delusion) that God is “a being who is moved and satisfied by good works.”<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Reason recognizes its inability, for example, to be saved “from every misfortune,” and to bring about “all that is good and that makes for happiness.” (*LW*19, 54)

<sup>74</sup> “Here you find St. Paul’s statement in Rom. 1:19 concerning the universal knowledge of God among all the heathen, that is, that the whole world talks about the Godhead and natural reason is aware that this Godhead is something superior to all other things. [...] Although they do not have true faith in God, they at least hold that God is a being able to help on the sea and in every need. Such a light and such a perception is innate in the hearts of all men; and this light cannot be subdued or extinguished.” (*LW*19, 53)

But, although the “natural light of reason... must concede.... that God is able and competent to help and to bestow[...] reason does not know whether He is willing to do this also for us.” (*LW*19, 54)

<sup>75</sup> Though it can “call upon God,” acknowledge his ability to help, and “even believe that He may help others,” “free will cannot... believe that God is disposed to help.” (*LW*19, 54)

<sup>76</sup> “That renders the position of reason unstable. Reason believes in God’s might and is aware of it, but it is uncertain whether God is willing to employ this in our behalf, because in adversity it so often experiences the opposite to be true.” (*LW*, 19, 54)

<sup>77</sup> Until and unless reason is stabilized, all efforts to keep the law are efforts to please God, to self-stabilize. As Luther puts it, “It is impossible for nature to act or conduct itself contrary to what it feels. [Once] it feels God’s anger and punishment, it cannot view God otherwise than as an angry tyrant....[N]ature cannot but constantly insist on contributing something to the conciliation of God; however, it can find nothing. Nature does not know and does not believe that it suffices to call upon God.... All men are constituted thus.” (*LW* 19, 72-3)

Again, “Human nature, when it is free from temptation, becomes proud... But when it is in adversity, when it sees that it is done for, human nature submits to all things, even to some very low things..... They seek aid wherever they can... This is they way human reason is; it cannot act differently in trial. Similarly, when we were hard pressed in our consciences by sin, we ran to the monks or to this or that other person to find consolation.....Faith, on the other hand, as it rejects no one, also trusts no human being but depends on God alone, on whom it calls in need, etc.” (*LW*19, 12)

<sup>78</sup> *LW*, 19, 55.

Idolatry—reason’s attempts at self-stabilization—is the basic human condition.<sup>79</sup> It is a universal bad religion. To be an idolater (or a mere human) is to imagine oneself able to affect God by doing good, and so to imagine one able to meet one’s own needs by one’s own efforts. It is to make a god in one’s own image and, through self-deception, worship it as if it were the true God. It is to be unable to rightly distinguish between the merely human and the divine.

Idolatry, on Luther’s read, is a distortion in understanding how humans relate to God. Idolatry is the root-error, an error unlike all other errors, which introduces distortion into other judgments. More particularly, idolatry impedes one’s capacity to read Scripture aright. For it forces humans to imagine the author of Scripture as one who is able to help; it forces human reason (which must try to stabilize itself) to search in Scripture for ways to please God. It forces humans to read into Scripture their own notions of God.

The opposite of idolatry is faith,<sup>80</sup> the only condition under which a right reading of Scripture (the divine Author’s self-revelation)—is possible.<sup>81</sup> Faith is a gift of God: a

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<sup>79</sup> “St. Paul shows in these words: " When ye knew not God, ye did service, " &c., that is, when as yet ye knew not God or what God's will was towards you, ye served those who by nature were no gods; ye served the dreams and thoughts of your hearts, wherewith, against God's Word, ye feigned to yourselves a God that suffered himself to be conciliated with such works and worshippings as your devotion and good intention made choice of. For all idolatry in the world arises from this, that people by nature have had the common knowledge, that there is a God, without which idolatry would remain unpractised. With this knowledge engrafted in man kind, they have, without God's Word, fancied all manner of ungodly opinions of God, and held and esteemed these for divine truths, imagining a God otherwise than, by nature, he is.” (*Table Talk* CLXXVI)

<sup>80</sup> “The only completely true worship of God is for us in trouble to flee to Him as to a father in hope of receiving help. All our own works, desires, and efforts with which we

trust that God is willing to help accompanied by a conviction of one's inability to affect God.<sup>82</sup>

### **Figurative Rule for Scripture on Scripture Given Immediately and in Conjunction with Verbal Revelation**

Luther arguably experienced this difference between reading Scripture according to reason's natural notion of God and reading Scripture according to the divinely revealed notion in the course of coming to his transformative insight about passive righteousness. Luther framed the difference between these forms of reading as a difference in attention to context—a difference in which passages he understood to interpret (hierarchically) one another.

As he was reading, Luther reports, the relationships he previously imagined between the parts of Scripture gave way to new relationships, and with these new relationships the divine Author's notion of divinity and humanity and their relation came clear. As Luther came to understand that the "righteousness of God" was not a property of God and an unattainable ideal, but instead that it was a gift with which God clothed

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want to help ourselves are nothing. They can help is in no way. They ... are vain idols." (*LW*19, 20)

"There are innumerable types of idolatry; in fact, there are as many varieties as there are illusions and self-chosen concepts of pleasing God. All but faith in Christ come into this category." (*LW*19, 56)

<sup>81</sup> "That is why only unbelief is called sin by Christ, as he says in John, chapter 16, 'The Spirit will punish the world because of sin, because it does not believe in me.'" And elsewhere, "Things that are done from faith are right and pleasing in God's sight. On the other hand, Rom. 14:23: 'Whatever does not proceed from faith is sin.'" (*LW*19, 24)

<sup>82</sup> Though human reason can "call upon God," acknowledge God's ability to help, and "even believe that He may help others," "free will cannot... believe that God is disposed to help." (*LW*19, 54)

humans, he also found himself “in paradise,” no longer “disturbed.” At the pivot point, on Luther’s telling, was a movement in meditative attention to the “context of the words.”

Meanwhile, I had already during that year returned to interpret the Psalter anew. I had confidence in the fact that I was more skillful, after I had lectured in the university on St. Paul’s epistles to the Romans, to the Galatians, and the one to the Hebrews. I had indeed been captivated with an extraordinary ardor for understanding Paul in the Epistle to the Romans. But up till then it was not the cold blood about the heart, but a single word in Chapter 1, “In it the righteousness of God is revealed,” that had stood in my way. For I hated that word “righteousness of God,” which, according to the use and custom of all the teachers, I had been taught to understand philosophically regarding the formal or active righteousness, as they call it, with which God is righteous and punishes the unrighteous sinner.

Though I lived as a monk without reproach, I felt that I was a sinner before God with an extremely disturbed conscience. I could not believe that he was placated by my satisfaction. I did not love, yes, I hated the righteous God who punishes sinners, and secretly, if not blasphemously, certainly murmuring greatly, I was angry with God, and said, “As if, indeed, it is not enough, that miserable sinners, eternally lost through original sin, are crushed by every kind of calamity by the law of the Decalogue, without having God add pain to pain by the gospel and also by the gospel threatening us with his righteousness and wrath!” Thus I raged with a fierce and troubled conscience. Nevertheless, I beat importunately upon Paul at that place, most ardently desiring to know what St. Paul wanted.

At last, by the mercy of God, meditating day and night, I gave heed to the context of the words, namely, “In it the righteousness of God is revealed, as it is written, ‘He who through faith is righteous shall live.’” There I began to understand that the righteousness of God is that by which the righteous lives by a gift of God, namely by faith. And this is the meaning: the righteousness of God is revealed by the gospel, namely, the passive righteousness with which merciful God justifies us by faith, as it is written, “He who through faith is righteous shall live.” Here I felt that I was

altogether born again and had entered paradise itself through open gates. There a totally other face of the entire Scripture showed itself to me. Thereupon I ran through the Scripture from memory. I also found in other terms an analogy, as, the work of God, that is what God does in us, the power of God, with which he makes us wise, the strength of God, the salvation of God, the glory of God.

And I extolled my sweetest word with a love as great as the hatred with which I had before hated the word "righteousness of God." Thus that place in Paul was for me truly the gate to paradise. Later I read Augustine's *The Spirit and the Letter*, where contrary to hope I found that he, too, interpreted God's righteousness in a similar way, as the righteousness with which God clothes us when he justifies us. Although this was heretofore said imperfectly and he did not explain all things concerning imputation clearly, it nevertheless was pleasing that God's righteousness with which we are justified was taught.<sup>83</sup>

Luther's shift was a simultaneous shift in his notion about the hierarchical relation of the divine Author's thoughts ("the context of the words") and in his notion about the divine Author's self-conception. God did not see Godself (and so Luther) as Luther had seen God and himself, but rather as God described it in Romans and as Luther had now come to understand it. In other words, his notion about the shape of the divine Author's mind (how to read his words in relation to one another) changed along with his notion about what the divine Author meant about his divinity (and Luther's humanity and their relation).

On Luther's telling, his notion of the divine and human was given in verbal divine revelation (Romans, to be more precise). But the insight was given to him immediately—as he was reading. This new sense of the shape of the divine Author's mind changed what Luther saw in Scripture ("There a totally other face of the entire Scripture showed itself

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<sup>83</sup> *LW* 34, 336-7.

to me”) even as it became the key by which he understood it (“I also found in other terms an analogy, as, the work of God, that is what God does in us, the power of God, with which he makes us wise, the strength of God, the salvation of God, the glory of God.”)

Scripture under Luther’s “divine revelation about God” is Scripture on Scripture, or Scripture insofar as it has the shape of the divine Author’s mind that underwrote his conviction: the divine Author of Scripture is the God who announces his willingness to help alongside the futility of human efforts to rightly conceive of self and God and to please God in exchange for his help. Before his insight, he read Scripture according to merely human notions of the divine mind. But the words in Romans that Luther read were not apprehended as divine (and so not highest-reliable) until they were hierarchically arranged in a way that corresponded to the shape of the divine mind.

### **Divine Word Reconfigures Figurative Rule for Reading Scripture**

Storr inherited from Luther the notion that, although transformation was an act of God, it was nevertheless correlated with an encounter with Word. Human work (like reading Scripture) does not transform hearts, and no deed can cause God to gift humans with faith. And yet somehow transformation of mind (a reconfiguration of the rule for configuration) correlates with an encounter with Word.

#### *Augustinian Accommodation*

Although Luther pioneered the doctrine of passive righteousness, he was not the first to posit the correlation between a reconfiguration of the rule for configuration and reading Scripture. Augustine famously suggested the correlation in his *Confessions* and later developed a notion of divine accommodation that helped to explain it. Storr adapted

and adopted it, so that he could claim that the divine Word reconfigures the figurative rule for reading Scripture.

For Augustine, the divine Author's purpose is the transformation of Scripture's readers' minds. The divine Author knows how his readers read, how they ought to read, and how much he can hope his reader's minds to change at once. The Author weaves together a wide variety of what seem to the untransformed mind as incongruous styles, Augustine suggests, so that readers might "rise" from "things said in a gentler manner" and "better accommodated to souls creeping on the ground" through "human things into divine things, so that the studious mind might be profitably trained by questions and abundantly delighted by discoveries."<sup>84</sup>

Scripture's Author writes in ways that resonate with untransformed (and partially transformed) readers and yet simultaneously challenge their attunements, such that they find themselves newly attuned. As they read on with this new attunement, they again encounter resonant and challenging words, and find themselves newly attuned. The many seeming-incongruous styles that the divine Author brings together into an harmonious order, it turns out, are not evidence of his fragmentation but of the divine Author's attention to his reader's minds: his strategy of accommodation.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Brian Gronewoller, "Reading Homer, Reading God: Augustine's Rhetorical Theory of God's Authorship in *Mor.* 1.7.30 and 1.28.56," (2015), 4.

<sup>85</sup> In addition to Gronewoller, see Chad Wellmon, "Sacred Reading: From Augustine to the Digital Humanists," *The Hedgehog Review* 17, no. 3 (2015); Brian Stock, *Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of Interpretation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). In chapters three and four I suggest that Melancthon brought several of these elements into the Lutheran tradition.



Indeed, in Confessions, Augustine's transformation of mind (conversions to Christianity) arguably corresponds with a shift from seeing Scripture as a rhetorically weak hodge-podge to a well-ordered expression of the divine Author's love for its readers. As he learned to read Scripture, to see its value, he learned about the mind and 'intent' of its divine Author. To attend to the words of God was to come to know God, to be lead on by God was to feel the pull of the divine words.

Storr was not unfamiliar with this Augustinian notion or with its sources. As he put it in the *Historical Sense*, the divine messengers selected

[...] those arguments, which were best adapted to the men, whom they wished to convince, i.e. those **derived from truths, which the hearers themselves acknowledged** (Matt. Xii. 5.11 s. Luke xiii. 15 s. Jo. vii. 22 s). **Against** the Jews, therefore, or against Gentiles (Rom. Xi. 26 s. compared with 13) converted to Christianity, **who**, with the authority of the apostles, had also **admitted that of the ancient scriptures, they reasoned from the sacred books of the Jews. Against others, they reasoned from doctrines drawn from other sources** (Acts xvii. 24 ss xiv. 15ss).

They accommodated also their language to the genius of their hearers (Mk. iv. 33 s. Rom. vi. 19. Gal. iii. 15). The occasion of speaking (Acts xvii. 23), and **the images which they made use of, were usually derived from those things especially, which, at that time, were before the eyes of the readers** (1 Cor. v. 7 s), or hearers (Jo. iv. 10. 32. vii. 37 s. ix. 39. 41. etc), or were certainly often thus present (1 Cor. ix. 24 ss).

And, in short, they were indeed most learned teachers of truth, but also men of sense, and skilled in teaching, adapting themselves to the understanding of the learners; as a man, who walks very fast, if he were to set out on the same road with a child, would lend him his hand, and, relaxing his own pace, go no faster than the child could follow.\* Finally, the whole texture of their discourses and

epistles, is truly economical, i.e.,\*\* such as could not have been formed, unless from the circumstances then actually present.

\* Thus Quintillian (L. ii. De instit. orat. C. iii. p. 83. Argento, 1698) describes the good quality of a teacher, which the Greeks call *sugkatabasis*. [i.e., condescension] Comp. Origen apud Suicer, Thesaurus eccles. T. ii. Col. 1069.

\*\* See Quintillian, L. vii. C. x.<sup>86</sup>

Storr endorsed a form of accommodationism in which the divine Word was visible to human beings (made flesh) on human terms, but nonetheless resisted human preconceptions. Like a joke or a poetic figure, the divine Word stood at the intersection of already familiar possibilities and possibilities that grasp humans, that seem altogether new, and than even demand the reconfiguration of the world before the figure. Elsewhere in the *HS*, Storr summarizes his view on the humanity and divinity of Scripture:

[...T]he discourses and books of the sacred authors cannot be authentic, if they do not agree with the known history of the age, to which they are referred; but, also, that they cannot be the work of divine legates unless they depart much and often from the usual mode of thinking of the men, for whose instruction they were sent. The coming of our Lord, to use the language of Irenaeus, will appear superfluous and useless, if he came to permit and preserve every man's previous natural opinion concerning God.<sup>87</sup>

While the historicity and peculiarity of Scripture's human authors confirm its authenticity, its divinity opposes and resists the 'merely' human. If the book is not divine, it cannot contain the challenges to merely human "natural opinion[s] concerning God," and so renders impossible a human encounter with Word by, in, and through which the

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<sup>86</sup> *HS*, 9, emphasis mine.

<sup>87</sup> *HS*, 35.

human self-understanding, understanding of God, and capacity to read world and Scripture aright.

But the divinity of Scripture cannot, need not, must not, on Storr's account, preclude its humanity. Otherwise the tools and techniques by which biblical scholars are allegedly able to distinguish historical and theological accretions (and so to say which are authentic, oldest, and most reliable manuscripts)—to distinguish human impositions from the verbal divine revelation, and perhaps even to distinguish between biblical theology from ecclesial (state supporting, public-suitable) theology—would not be effective or reliable.

Storr accounts for the correlation of an encounter with Word and transformation of mind—particularly of human self-knowledge and knowledge of God—by appealing to the notion of Word implicit in an Augustinian notion of accommodation. The divine author understands the minds of those in his audience—both what will resonate with them, and which of their preconceptions can/ought be exposed and transformed. Thus, Storr argues, a responsible translator must not assume that philological investigation can fully determine the meaning of a biblical passage. For the cost of such an assumption is blindness to transformative figurations—particularly the turns of speech by which the divine Author upends human preconceptions.

(Augustine's accommodation and its reprisal in Storr's *HS* arguably depend upon a traditional Christian figurative rendering of Jesus Christ and Scripture: the divine Word is both divine and human. Word holds together Jesus Christ and Scripture. Jesus Christ and Scripture hold together two perhaps incompatible Christian claims about

God and human beings: on the one hand, God is so far beyond human understanding that no human words or images could describe him; on the other, “mine eyes have seen thy salvation.” An unimaginable God made himself known as God in the human Jesus Christ and in a human-readable book of Scripture. Word is where the divine and human meet, even though they perhaps cannot.<sup>88</sup>)

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<sup>88</sup> Christians traditionally claim (1) that humans are fundamentally different from God, and (2) that human readers and minds, interpretations and hearts, to varying degrees fall short of a (divine) idea(I). The first assumption is arguably a qualitative distinction, the second one of degree. The first suggests (ironically) that humans and God are not comparable, the second that they are at least as comparable as an idea(I) is to an actual. I say ‘idea(I)’ to draw attention to the descriptive and normative double-valence: on the one hand, Jesus Christ and Scripture reveal how things are, and on the other, how they ought to be.

Christians traditionally maintain both distinctions: they claim that that God is so far beyond human understanding that no human words or images could describe him, and that God made himself known as God in the human Jesus Christ and in a human-readable book of Scripture. When they maintain that they can and ought be transformed into the mind of Christ (the divine human), they arguably set the qualitative and degressed distinctions between the divine and human in tension with one another: the ideal is not visible and yet the invisible made visible is the ideal; the wholly other is not an ideal and yet the wholly other made visible is the ideal. The core Christian claim to have seen salvation in the divine Word (Jesus Christ and Scripture) holds these together: just as Jesus Christ transforms, so Scripture (as Word) transforms.

In quasi-Kantian terms, we might say that Word holds together claims that God sits outside the (human) series and that God sits inside it, as its first (linguistic) member. And we might add to that (in quasi-Kantian terms) that Word holds together the notions that all visible ideals are only images we have made to put the ideals to ourselves and that we nevertheless may understand all humans to share an unimaginable ideal. (Not to mention the notion that common sense goes hand in hand with the ideas and ideals we imagine.) Now Word (its status and reading practices) organizes Luther’s and Storr’s discussion of what we might provisionally call an antinomy.

But Kant’s distinctions between the subjective and objective and universal and particular arguably organize the discussion on his end. Put practically: the very least, readers should keep in mind that Kant’s notions of universality, subjectivity, and objectivity had not in 1793 been everywhere adopted. To talk about ‘reading in’ and ‘reading out’ was to invoke notions of reliability and communicability, but not necessarily subjectivity and objectivity as Kant gave and we inherited them.

Again, Storr echoes two key elements of Augustinian accommodationism into the late eighteenth century: the divine and human attentions to one another's minds (implicit rules of figuration) coalesce in and around Scripture, and at the same time, that Scripture itself is fully divine and fully human—the word of an invisible God made visible to human eyes. He writes in traditions that foreground a correlation between transformation of configuration rules and encounter with Word, and that maintain Word's full humanity and divinity.<sup>89</sup>

*Reliability and the Economy of Scripture*

Scripture on Scripture, then, is code for Scripture read according to its own rule of configuration. The divine Author reveals this rule of configuration immediately—but by, in, and through language that transforms a previously held rule of configuration. Only when Scripture is read according to the divine Author's rule of configuration does it count, in the Lutheran traditions, as a highest-reliable measure of reliability. As Storr put it,

[W]e are bound to receive as divine all the instructions and precepts, which are either given by the writers themselves, or communicated by them as the instructions and precepts of G o d ; ,and to receive all their statements, as indubitably and perfectly true. In short, the decisions which are contained in Scripture, as soon as they are satisfactorily

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<sup>89</sup> That the divine and human meet in Word is, in one sense, what Storr suggests his rationalist colleagues deny when they assume that philology definitively limits the range of possible senses of a biblical passage. But many of his rationalist colleagues publicly maintained that the divine and human meet in Word. Indeed, many claimed that the moral teachings in Scripture were divine truths or commands expressed in language human beings could understand. They arguably did not deny a correlation between a (moral) transformation or deny that Scripture was both divine and human. Yet Storr rejected their particular accommodationisms.

ascertained (§), must be received by us as the standard (norma) for the regulation of our judgments.<sup>90</sup>

But if Scripture's divine Author does not declare some doctrine divine (does not declare himself its author), it does not have highest reliability. So while Storr maintains the doctrine of the divine inspiration of Scripture, he does not understand every word (or every possible grammatical sense) to be highest reliable. As he put it in the *Historical Sense*:

the rule, that the case is different in divine writings, from what it is in human, and that, if a passage e.g. treats of doctrines, the meaning exegetically true, is also doctrinally true, would be false, if applied indifferently to all the propositions which the scriptures contain. But no one will be so blind, as not to see, that the old and common rule requires this appendage, which is no less ancient: *if there occurs the language of God, of Christ, or of others, through whom God speaks or teaches.*<sup>91</sup>

By attaching the reliability of Scripture to its divinity and its divinity to a divinely, immediately, and linguistically revealed rule of configuration, Storr effectively tied—much as had Luther—highest-reliability measure to Scripture's parts read in particular hierarchical relation to one another. Simpler: Scripture was divine and reliable and the highest measure of reliability only so long as certain passages were taken to be the context (subordinate or superior to) for understanding others. Storr's argument for the divine authority and reliability of Scripture is an argument for the divine authority and reliability of Scripture read according to a particular Lutheran rule of configuration.

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<sup>90</sup> *DC* §15

<sup>91</sup> *HS*, x

### **Rule of Configuration is Given Immediately**

In its reified form, Storr's Lutheran claim about the divinity of Scripture looks circular: Scripture is divine because its divine Author declares in Scripture that it is divine. Those who do not assume (or trust) that Scripture has a divine Author, then, do not find in it a divine author's declaration of its divinity. Those who do, do. This formulation forms the base of claims like those of Cooper and Ogden, who maintain that Storr took the reliability of his claims to rest in the divinity and concomitant reliability of his primary document, Scripture.<sup>92</sup> Insofar as Scripture alone ultimately attested to the divinity of its Author, Storr's commitment to its primacy involved him in a circular argument for his method's reliability.<sup>93,94</sup>

This might be unfair to Storr, who claimed in a later edition of the *DC*, that the divinely revealed notion of divinity (and corresponding measure of reliability) that underlay biblical theological dogmatics was revealed immediately. The source of this notion is not reason, but divine revelation.

For when, in the discussions of doctrinal theology, we examine the divine origin and authority of the doctrines of Christ, we are not inquiring concerning the truth of the particular doctrines which can be comprehended and

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<sup>92</sup> Cooper, 18; Ogden 14.

<sup>93</sup> As I have set it out here, the interpretive loop did not just beg the question, but protected the Lutheran theological anthropology and dogma more generally. Insofar as Scripture on Scripture, or Scripture as the divine reliable, meant Scripture under Romans as Luther understood it, the interpretive loop and methodological slogan together protected a peculiar set of hierarchical relations between parts of Scripture—a set in which Scripture as a whole formed the shape of the humiliated Christ, in which everything was informed by a Lutheran theological anthropology.

<sup>94</sup> This circularity had been a theme in conversations about Lutheran biblical interpretation since Flaccius pointed it out.

proved by human reason ; but we are inquiring concerning a special aid and influence of God, which it is contended that Jesus possessed above all other teachers ; an influence, of such a nature as to form a distinct ground of credibility, independent of the visible truth of the doctrines themselves. The question is not, shall we believe the doctrines of Jesus, under the same conditions that we believe the declarations of any other teacher, namely, provided our reason discovers them to be true ; but the question is, shall we believe the instructions of Jesus, under circumstances in which we would not credit any other teacher, who was not under the special influence of God; that is, when we cannot be convinced of the truth of the doctrines from visible marks of truth upon them, independently of the authority of the teacher.<sup>95</sup>

It is immediate.

It is not a mere mediate revelation, but an immediate and supernatural one, which is here the subject of inquiry; and the existence of such a revelation must be either asserted, or unconditionally denied. For, to retain the name of Revelation, and yet to believe only in such a mediate revelation as the naturalist will admit, is nothing else than a covert denial of all real revelation.<sup>96</sup>

And so Storr claims that, although a doubter's experience may resonate with Christian doctrine, and although he (Storr) cannot doubt it, he does not hope to be able to give an argument for their divinity.

For, the more he studies and follows in his practice the doctrines of Christianity, the more will he find by his own experience, that he is advancing in the knowledge of that truth which makes him happy, which gives peace to his mind, and meliorates his heart. And thus will his own experience satisfy him of the divinity of the doctrines of Christianity, John 7: 17 ; or of the truth of the account which its first teachers give of its origin. I should, indeed, hesitate

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<sup>95</sup> DC 16.3 (bb) – Added in the 1813 edition

<sup>96</sup> DC 16.3 (bb) – Added in the 1813 edition



to infer, merely from the salutary influence of the doctrines of Christianity on the mind, that they were promulgated by the extraordinary and direct agency of God(3); for I fear I should be unable to render this proof sufficiently evident to others(4).<sup>97</sup>

Storr's insistence on the divinity and humanity of Scripture's language allows him to maintain that the divine notion of divinity is immediately revealed alongside an encounter with divine verbal revelation. For if humans bring language in (read Scripture) on their own terms, and yet find their rules for configuring it immediately reconfigured—much like Luther reported about his new attention to contexts—one might say, as Storr did, that the language of Scripture has the power to do what humans cannot: namely challenge their ways of thinking (i.e., reconfigure their rules of configuration).

Insofar as this immediate revelation corresponds to a new, now divinely authenticated notion of the divinity of the divine Author, one needs only to posit that the divine Author authored all of the books of Scripture in order to discover, as Luther had, an entirely reconfigured way of thinking about the relation of Scripture's parts to one another.<sup>98</sup> In other words, the divinely revealed notion of divinity can become a figurative rule or schema of the order of the divine Author's mind. It may become the guide for reading Scripture in such a way that it is the highest-reliable measure of reliability.

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<sup>97</sup> *DC* §16.

<sup>98</sup>As I said above, "This new sense of the shape of the divine Author's mind changed what Luther saw in Scripture ("There a totally other face of the entire Scripture showed itself to me") even as it became the key by which he understood it ("I also found in other terms an analogy, as, the work of God, that is what God does in us, the power of God, with which he makes us wise, the strength of God, the salvation of God, the glory of God.")" Cf. Storr's case for the divine authorship, approval, etc. of particular books of Scripture.

But even if Storr is not caught in a circular verbal argument for Scripture's divinity, he effectively claims that the highest measure of reliability and so the power to read Scripture reliably are only available on the condition of having one's rule of configuration transformed by the words of the divine Author. On his own admission, Storr cannot give a proof for what can only be given immediately.

By itself, this only begins to point up the difficulty I promised to expose, namely that Storr must and yet cannot hope to convince his students of the divine authority and reliability of Scripture and so of the reliability of the dogma drawn from it. That Scripture, on Storr's account, is only highest reliable insofar as it is read in accord with an immediately, divinely revealed rule of configuration is only the first step. The second step takes Scripture read in accord with the rule of configuration as the highest-reliable measure of reliability—in light of which all other reads of Scripture are judged not-highest reliable. In other words, Storr's students needed an immediate revelation both to read Scripture aright and to be able to distinguish between Scripture read aright and Scripture read on 'merely human' terms.

This second power is particularly important, in part because it would function as a guide for understanding and evaluating Storr's assertions that particular parts of Scripture support particular dogmas. But it would also force his rationalist-leaning students and colleagues to shift from a narrative in which Storr's Orthodox biblical theology amounts to an exercise in reading the Creeds back into Scripture to a narrative in which rational-observational and moral reads of Scripture are exercises in reading human invention into Scripture.

But this power, too, depends on an immediate divine revelation. Even if Storr were able to convince his readers on rational-observational grounds that particular parts of Scripture look to support some claim (e.g., if the Lutheran rule of configuration and rational rules of configuration overlapped), they would need to construe the Lutheran rule of configuration as a measure of reliability in order to see that the relationship Storr presented was highest reliable (on the divine Author's terms).

### **Rule of Configuration as a Rule for Distinguishing Read In and Human from Read Out and Divine**

The Lutheran rule of configuration was a rule of putting together (in a hierarchy) the parts of Scripture in a way that conformed to what the divine Author immediately revealed about himself: given this immediate revelation, part x is the proper context for understanding part y. The rule of configuration allowed Storr, like it had Luther, to claim both that Scripture alone was the guide to reliability in matters of theology and that his particular reading of Scripture—because divinely self-authenticated—was the only highest-reliable reading. For the rule of configuration functioned as a rule for distinguishing between what was “read in” or “merely human” and what was properly “read out” or “divine.”

Storr's insistence on the divinity of Scripture, his “unswerving devotion” to the Creeds, and his rejection of some forms of accommodationism can be understood as evidence that he, like Luther, took the rule of configuration as a rule for distinguishing between what was “read in” or “merely human” and what was properly “read out” or “divine”—at least so far as biblical theology was concerned.

### The Analogy of Faith

How the widely respected biblical scholar could maintain both an “unswerving devotion” to the Creeds and publicly claim that their reliability rested on their relation to Scripture is among the more salient puzzles present-day scholarly reports about Storr pose. It seems preposterous that any scholar who was invited to join the faculty at Göttingen, the formation ground of Orthodoxy-disrupting biblical scholarship, could read Scripture in a way that supported the Creeds and (in good conscience) say that he was not reading the Creeds back into Scripture.<sup>99</sup>

What I have called the Lutheran rule of configuration is not wholly unlike what Storr perhaps knew as the analogy of faith or *regula fidei*, which, in Lutheran Orthodoxy, commands that particular parts of Scripture be understood in light of a presupposition of their harmony with the “whole of Scripture” and “heavenly doctrine.”<sup>100</sup> Even Lutheran biblical interpreters had cast it as methodological error for much of the eighteenth-century, and early Lutherans had explicitly prohibited reading the Creeds back into Scripture.<sup>101</sup> But what I call the Lutheran rule of configuration is not an articulate norm so much as an unstated pattern of ordering parts of Scripture.

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<sup>99</sup> See Sheehan, *The Enlightenment Bible*, Legaspi.

<sup>100</sup> cf. Gerhard Loci, I.xxv.53ff. Quenstedt, Calov, and Chemnitz have similar notions. Nearer Storr’s lifetime, Valentin Ernst Loescher had called on the analogy of faith in his polemic against Pietism (see **Timotheus Verinus**, esp ¶48).

<sup>101</sup> A summary Epitome of the Articles in Controversy among the Theologians of the Augsburg Confession, Explained and Reconciled in a Christian Manner under the Guidance of God’s Word in the Following Repetition

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Concerning the Binding Summary, Rule, and Guiding Principle, according to which all teaching is to be judged and the errors which have arisen are to be explained and decided in Christian fashion

We believe, teach, and confess that the only rule and guiding principle according to which all teachings and teachers are to be evaluated and judged are the prophetic and apostolic writings of the Old and New Testaments alone, as it is written, “Your word is a lamp to my feet and a light to my path,” and Saint Paul: “If ... an angel from heaven should proclaim to you something contrary,... let him be accursed!”

[On the Scriptures]

Other writings [...] shall [...] all [...] be subjected to it, and not be accepted in any other way, or with any further authority, than as witnesses of how and where the teaching of the prophets and apostles was preserved after the time of the apostles.

[On the symbola (Apostles’, Nicene, Athanasian, the first, unaltered Augsburg, Smalcald and the Large and Small Catechisms)]

All teachings should conform to these directives[; w]hatever is contrary to them should be rejected and condemned as opposed to the unanimous explanation of our faith.

In this way [...] Holy Scripture alone remains the only judge, rule, and guiding principle, according to which, as the only touchstone, all teachings should and must be recognized and judged, whether they are good or evil, correct or incorrect.

The other symbols, however, and other writings listed above are not judges, as is Holy Scripture, but they are only witnesses and explanations of the faith, which show how Holy Scripture has at various times been understood and interpreted in the church of God by those who lived at the time in regard to articles of faith under dispute and how teachings contrary to the Scripture were rejected and condemned. (Kolb, 486-7; See also Gritsch 83-105)

Eric W. Gritsch, *A History of Lutheranism* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010); Robert

Kolb, Timothy J. Wengert, and Charles P. Arand, *The Book of Concord: The*

*Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000).

It is not, first, an extension, as some say of Lutheran Orthodox analogy of faith, of the Lutheran doctrine of the perspicuity of Scripture in combination with ‘Homer by Homer’. Luther did say that what is clear in Scripture should guide the interpretation of what is unclear, and perhaps claimed that key doctrinal readings were perfectly clear. Indeed, he conceived of the book of Romans (the site of his transformation) as symbol of Gospel (a declaration that God is willing to do what humans need and cannot). Paul’s letter was “the most important piece in the New Testament,” and would be for Luther and his heirs the light under which “the entire Scripture” could be illumined. As he put it in his Preface to his lectures on the book:

This letter is truly the most important piece in the New Testament. It is purest Gospel. It is well worth a Christian's while not only to memorize it word for word but also to occupy himself with it daily, as though it were the daily bread of the soul. It is impossible to read or to meditate on this letter too much or too well. The more one deals with it, the more precious it becomes and the better it tastes. Therefore I want to carry out my service and, with this preface, provide an introduction to the letter, insofar as God gives me the ability, so that every one can gain the fullest possible understanding of it. Up to now it has been darkened by glosses and by many a useless comment, but it is in itself a bright light, almost bright enough to illumine the entire Scripture.<sup>102</sup>

Romans (as Luther read it) would be the “context” within which “the entire Scripture” had meaning: this new context would, in turn, transform the whole. As “purest Gospel,” Romans would serve as the standard by which readers could carry out Luther’s directive to distinguish in Scripture law from Gospel. James under Romans is reliable, Gospel; Romans under James is not. In an important sense, those who understand

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<sup>102</sup> Luther, Preface to Letter of Paul to Romans.

Luther's rule for interpretation to be an extension of Homer by Homer and the perspicuity of Scripture have a point.

But Luther also went to great lengths to link the gift of faith to what I have called the rule of configuration and to link idolatry to "alternate" interpretations. As Luther put it:

A Christian soon smells from afar which is God's and which is human teaching. He sees from afar that the schismatic spirits are speaking their own human mind and opinion. They cannot escape me, Dr. Luther. I can soon judge and say whether their doctrine is of God or of man; for I am doing the will of God, who sent Christ. I have given ear to none but God's Word, and I say: 'Dear Lord Christ, I want to be thy pupil, and I believe thy Word. I will close my eyes and surrender to thy Word.' Thus He makes me a free nobleman, yes, a fine doctor and teacher, who is captive to the Word of God, and is able to judge the errors and the faith offope, Turks, Jews and Sacramentarians. They must fall, and I tread them all underfoot. I have become a doctor and a judge who judges correctly.<sup>103</sup>

In Luther's case, the divine Author's immediate revelation provides a rule of configuration—for seeing which passages mean in light of which others. This rule of configuration then becomes a measure by which to judge whether a passage or interpretation is merely human or divine (highest reliable). Those who have not encountered the immediate revelation do not have the rule of configuration, and vice-versa. Those who do not read aright are self-deceived, idolaters; those who do are not. To read aright is to trust that God is willing to help; to read awry is not to trust (i.e., not to have the rule of configuration).

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<sup>103</sup> *LW* 23:230.

To be sure, Luther's use of the rule of configuration as a measure of humanity or divinity, reading in or reading out, protected his teachings. In their efforts at reform, Luther and Erasmus both developed a distinction between the divine and human they perhaps encountered in the rhetoric of Faber, a biblical scholar who had also been formed in the Brethren of the Common Life.<sup>104</sup> The two reformers contrasted the divine order,

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<sup>104</sup> Or the three may have had a common source, or something else. Here are a few examples from Fabre from Heiko A. Oberman and Paul L. Nyhus, *Forerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late Medieval Thought* (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2002).

“To those who do not have open eyes but nevertheless think they have, another letter takes its place, which, as the Apostle says, kills and opposes the Spirit. This letter is pursued today by the Jews [...] Their eyes are completely darkened so that they cannot see and their whole perspective is completely warped.” (298; viii) [...] “And so I came to believe that there is a twofold literal sense. The one is the distorted sense of those who have no open eyes and interpret divine things according to the flesh and in [passible] categories. The proper sense is grasped by those who can see and receive insight. The one is the invention of human understanding, the other is a gift of God's Spirit—the false sense depresses, the other bears it up on high. Hence there seems to be a good reason for the complaint of those monks that as often as they fell for 'literal' exposition they came away from it somber and upset. [...] For just as the healthy body is aware of what is harmful to it, so also the spirit is aware of what threatens it.” (298-99; viii-ix)

“O most wise Father [...], it is not hidden from you that when the farmer plows the field, however great his competence may be and whatever the extent of labor he invests, if plants grow and he brings in his rich harvest, the gift is God's. [...] If, therefore, the earth which is marked by the hoofs of cattle is made fruitful by divine favor, all the more is the rational earth of the human mind subject to divine inroads— the mind which is marked by the footsteps of the divine.” [...] “The fruits of minds deprived of divine favor are only brambles, thorns, and stones. And when these people take up the pen to write about either human or divine things, their works are full of such fruits. I except only those who proceed to their writing moved not by themselves but by God, and it is that movement which reaches up to the Highest and most Lucid.” “The human mind in itself is sterile; if it believes itself able to function by itself it is presumptuous; anything it brings forth will be sterile, ponderous, obscure, and detrimental to the mind [...]” (302)

Cf. *Quincuplex Psalterium: Gallicum, Romanum, Hebraicum, Vetus, Conciliatum* (Paris: Henricus Stephanus, 1509).



whose symbol they took to be the humiliated Christ, with the merely human order, symbolized by the exalted, impassive, kingly Christ.<sup>105</sup> They both argued that the symbol of the divine order was visible in Holy Writ, but that Rome had obscured it under the exalted Christ (a merely human invention).<sup>106</sup> On the one hand, it is possible to say that in

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The translator's note at '8' p. 305 reads, "The Latin text reads here *passibiliter*. To read Scripture "in human categories" means that the reader of the false literal sense makes Scripture the object (passive) of his reading, whereas the true sense is found when Scripture is the subject and the reader the object. The true reader of Scripture "does not act but is acted upon"; his own human insights give way to the influx of the Holy Spirit.

<sup>105</sup> See, for example, Donald Bernard Morrison Conroy, *The Ecumenical Theology of Erasmus of Rotterdam: A Study of the Ratio Verae Theologiae, Translated into English and Annotated, with a Brief Account of His Ecumenical Writings and Activities within His Lifetime* (Thesis--University of Pittsburgh.1974). On p. 341 is the book's exhortation, "make your heart itself into a library of Christ." The purpose of the book, which concerns the (interpretive) philosophy of Christ, is summed up on p. 133: "These comments, consequently, are made to keep us from vitiating the heavenly philosophy of Christ with either human laws or learning." The difference between the divine and human is summed up in pp. 134-6: "Human beings can fail; Christ can never make a mistake. Yet do not immediately reject what is taught by them, but consider who is teaching, whome he is taching, and at what time, on what occasion, and, lastsly, with what intention he is teaching. However, most of all consider whether what is taught agrees with the evangelical teachings, whether it is inspired by the life of Christ and corresponds to it. 'The spiritual man judges all things,' Paul says. 'He himself is to be judged by no one.' If then the teachings of Christ are twisted into human laws, I ask you, what hope still remains? And even much less, if the divine philosophy is bent to the desires of men, and according to the Greek proverb: 'The Lesbian rule becomes the standard for us.' The same thing, I believe, that has been said about the laws instituted by men must be taught concerning the writings of the ancient and the recent doctors; we should not be so dependent upon them that we would consider it a crime to be of different opinion in some matters. [...] And in any place they have quite obviously slipped up, rather than glossing it over, let us respectfully dissent from them while not deriding human failings with accusations but playing down and purifying what is possible. [...] We battle more bitterly to hold on to these innovations than to the doctrines of Christ." (Cf. pp. 343, 355, 362-6)

<sup>106</sup> Rome of course used the human/divine distinction in their response to Luther's theology. His work, not theirs, was merely human and full of error. He was self-deceived, only interested in his own glory and authority. In Exsurge Domine, Leo goes straight to Paul.

so doing, Luther and Erasmus expressed a widely shared sentiment that the church had fallen short of its own—divinely written—standards, and had papered over these with reachable ideals of its own fashioning.

On the other hand, the extent to which the ideal Luther and Erasmus took themselves to have uncovered through biblical study was actually recovered (as opposed to re/invented and imposed upon Scripture) was debatable. The controlling trope of Erasmus' paraphrases and Luther's translation of the Bible was not that of the Vulgate. If a kingly Christ held together the latter, a humiliated Christ bound and ordered the former.<sup>107</sup> With the rhetoric of "returning to the sources," and "reading Scripture without foreign imposition," Luther and Erasmus obscured the difference between what we might call an historical claim (in some past time, these words meant this and pointed to

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"Some, putting aside her true interpretation of Sacred Scripture, are blinded in mind by the father of lies. Wise in their own eyes, according to the ancient practice of heretics, they interpret these same Scriptures otherwise than the Holy Spirit demands, inspired only by their own sense of ambition, and for the sake of popular acclaim, as the Apostle declares. In fact, they twist and adulterate the Scriptures. As a result, according to Jerome, "It is no longer the Gospel of Christ, but a man's, or what is worse, the devil's."

And again,

"Other errors are either heretical, false, scandalous, or offensive to pious ears, as seductive of simple minds, originating with false exponents of the faith who in their proud curiosity yearn for the world's glory, and contrary to the Apostle's teaching, wish to be wiser than they should be. Their talkativeness, unsupported by the authority of the Scriptures, as Jerome says, would not win credence unless they appeared to support their perverse doctrine even with divine testimonies however badly interpreted. From their sight fear of God has now passed." *Exsurge Domine*.

<http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Leo10/110exdom.htm> /;

<http://books.google.com/books?id=ccFLAAAACAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Bulla+contra+errores+Martini+Lutheri+et+sequacium&hl=en&sa=X&ei=MHafVPz6Cqu1sQTItoCYDQ&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false>

<sup>107</sup> Pacini argues for this shift at length in manuscript drafts of *Jesus and the Philosophers*.

the ideal of the humiliated Christ) and a normative-descriptive claim (these words mean this and point to the ideal of the humiliated Christ).

It is perhaps not the case that the humiliated Christ had been in fact a primary ideal that Rome had endorsed or acknowledged. A secondary ideal, certainly. But perhaps not a primary ideal. And perhaps this secondary ideal did not have quite the same features Erasmus and Luther assigned it. In other words, it is not entirely clear in retrospect (because Luther and Erasmus did not make it clear) whether the ideal of which Erasmus and Luther claimed that Rome had fallen short was an ideal to which Rome subscribed or had once subscribed, or if it was rather an ideal to which Erasmus and Luther (and many others) subscribed, and against which Rome might be justly judged.

Luther and Erasmus kept the question from appearing (to themselves, perhaps, and others who more or less agreed with them) in part by linking the humiliated Christ firmly to the verbal divine revelation in Scripture. Through Scripture, they quietly aligned the humiliated Christ (the ideal against which Rome should/ought/would) be judged with the divine perspective: God, the Author of Scripture and of the ideal of the humiliated Christ, not Luther and Erasmus (mere messengers), would judge Rome against the ideal God endorsed and revealed in Scripture, namely the humiliated Christ. Indeed, God would not merely judge Rome against this ideal, but condemn Rome for having blotted out, having replaced God's ideal with one of Rome's own invention. Thus the thinkers subtly incorporated the reading practices they had used to "uncover" the divine ideal into the divine ideal that they claimed to have uncovered in the divine Author's book.

The result was that, on the one hand, those who agreed with the reformers' sentiments need not be bothered by the appearance of multiple, competing divine orders, for they had at hand a story (supported by biblical 'evidence', no less) about the divine source of the reforming ideal in which humans and human reason play no part at all (and so there is no possibility of human error). This story (and evidence) could be deployed to both understand the source of opposing claims (errors or illusions) and to de-legitimize them (merely human/tradition — any human intervention introduces the possibility of error).

And on the other hand, the ideal against which God would judge Rome aligned strikingly well (almost perfectly) with the political, social, economic, theological, philosophical, and interpretive interests of Luther, Erasmus, and their followers. A surprising coincidence! But insofar as they understood themselves to have removed themselves from the "discovery" process, reformers and their supporters could equate their positions with God's and their opponents' with the merely human, quite without puzzling about this happy coincidence.

While Erasmus was by comparison, far more circumspect in his deployment of the strategy, maintaining the notion that, in bible study, one (mutually) interacts with the divine mind and is gradually transformed into the mind of Christ, Luther removed himself from the discovery process by arguing that Word revealed itself or grasped him. That is, God or Word teaches the reader how it is to be read, Word reveals its meaning to its human pupil. If it makes known to the reader how to understand it according to its

own terms (and so acknowledges any human involvement), it also perfects the reader's ability to do so.

In case it is not already obvious, let me point out that the doctrine of passive righteousness Luther finds in Scripture is more or less at play in his doctrine about Scripture. He no more contributes to his reading of Scripture than his works contribute to his righteousness. And passive righteousness, accordingly, can hardly be a human invention. *Sola scriptura*, on this line of thinking, meant Scripture as Scripture reveals and interprets itself. Or, what was the same, Scripture in light of Scripture insofar as the hierarchical web conformed to Luther's notion about the shape of the divine mind, or, what is the same, to his doctrines of passive righteousness, Law and Gospel, etc.

At the same time, Luther correlated his self-elimination (his move to the passive position) with the absence of human imposition, or better, contrasted this method of reading with Rome's method of reading Scripture as "subordinate to merely human invention." Much of Roman doctrine and "philosophy", on the Lutheran take, was addition or imposition. Thus *sola scriptura* was a kind of code for readings of Scripture "in agreement with Luther's rule of configuration" and "unlike those of Luther's opponents." At the same time, it was shorthand for authentic readings of Scripture (readings by the divine Author, about the Author's work and made known by revelation to the human reader), to which, by definition, nothing human was added. The "divine"

corresponds to Luther's notion of the shape of the divine mind, which shape is visible in the invisible hierarchy of Scripture; the "human" is whatever deviates from it.<sup>108</sup>

Again: what I call the Lutheran rule of configuration, like the analogy of faith, undoubtedly ensures that proper reads of Scripture issue in Lutheran dogma and that reads that deviate from Lutheran dogma can be counted improper. But, on the read I am pursuing here, to claim that it is an extension of Homer by Homer and perspicuity is to miss the genius way in which Luther used sola scriptura to destabilize Roman measures of reliability and to enshrine a measure of reliability that resonated with Rome's critics. Had he simply insisted that Scripture be read in harmony with the clear parts of Scripture (and the doctrines he saw in them), Luther would not have been so readily able to defend himself against Roman accusations that he was reading his own inventions into Scripture.

Second, the analogy of faith and the rule of configuration are both basically about the resonant relationships among parts, part-groups, and wholes. The analogy of faith ultimately concerns the harmony of Scripture with dogma, while the rule of configuration is ultimately about the resonant relation of Scripture with itself.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Luther was not alone in the polemical use of the distinction. And, although it arguably functioned somewhat differently in systems that championed immediate, limited transformation of mind than those in which the transformation of mind was a gradual, life-long, rarely complete ante-mortem process, both drew on the notion that conformity to the divine order was correlated with the capacity to distinguish more clearly between the divine and human.

<sup>109</sup> The two were connected, however, by the book of Romans. For Luther explained that to read Scripture aright was to read it under Romans, and Melancthon conceived of dogmatic biblical theology as an extended commentary on Romans.

So the rule of configuration helps to explain how it was possible (and why it was perhaps unpopular) for Storr to maintain that the reliability of dogma came from its relationship to Scripture and that —despite all the shifts in biblical scholarship in 200+ years—the consistency of Lutheran readings did not indicate that anyone was reading dogma into Scripture: the basic shape of Storr’s rule of configuration simply had not changed.

Put differently, the rule—construed as a guide for determining divinity/highest-reliability and humanity/error—offers a way to imagine Storr able to answer, as he sets out to do in the Preface to the *DC*, those who would say that Scripture alone (i.e., if not read in light of state-endorsed dogma) could not possibly give reliability to the Creeds. It also offers a way to imagine Storr able to say, as he does, that interpretations of Scripture that deviate from the Creeds are not highest reliable, quite without claiming that the Creeds are the measure of reliability.

### **Accommodationism**

Storr’s rejection of some forms of accommodationism, too, perhaps suggests that he took the rule of configuration as a rule for distinguishing between what was “read in” or “merely human” and what was properly “read out” or “divine”.

Accommodationism in its broadest form is simply the position that Scripture’s divine author accommodated the work to the limits of human understanding: God made accessible the divine message to human beings. Storr embraced, as I showed in chapter x, a form of accommodationism in which the divine-human language of Scripture is available to humans on their own terms and yet has the power to alter human rule of

configuration, and so to alter their conceptions of self and God. While Storr's shows a distinctively eighteenth-century sensitivity to language and a distinctively Lutheran notion of definitive transformation, this form of accommodationism had been part and parcel of the Christian tradition since at least the fourth century.<sup>100</sup> It is difficult to

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<sup>100</sup> On language (and accommodation as a question for translators) in the eighteenth-century, see Bono; Ruth H Ohio, *German: Biography of a Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Priscilla A. Hayden-Roy, *A Foretaste of Heaven: Friedrich Hölderlin in the Context of Württemberg Pietism* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994); Avi Lifschitz, *Language and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012); Sheehan, *The Enlightenment Bible*; Michael N Forster, *Herder's Importance as a Philosopher* (na, 2010); Johann Gottfried Herder, *Herder: Philosophical Writings* (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Michael N Forster, *After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); "Herder's Philosophy of Language, Interpretation, and Translation: Three Fundamental Principles," *The Review of Metaphysics* 56, no. 2 (2002); Tom Jones, "Theories of Language in the Eighteenth Century," (2015); Hans W. Frei, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study of Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1974); Jones Tom, "Theories of Language in the Eighteenth Century," ('Oxford University Press', 2015); Anthony J. La Vopa, "Herder's Publikum: Language, Print, and Sociability in Eighteenth-Century Germany," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 29, no. 1 (1995).

<sup>101</sup> On the development of accommodationism, see Frederick Ludwig Herzog, "The Possibility of Theological Understanding: An Inquiry into the Presuppositions of Hermeneutics in Theology" (Th.D., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1953); Gottfried Hornig, *Die Anfänge Der Historisch-Kritischen Theologie: Johann Salomo Semlers Schriftverständnis Und Seine Stellung Zu Luther* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961); Hoon J. Lee, "Biblical Accommodation and Authority in Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century Germany: The Accommodation Debate of 1761-1835" (Ph.D., Trinity International University, 2014); Frei; Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "Political Theology with a Difference," *UC Irvine L. Rev.* 4 (2014); Stephen D Benin, "The 'Cunning of God' and Divine Accommodation," *Journal of the History of Ideas* (1984); Henri de Lubac, *Medieval Exegesis Vol 2: The Four Senses of Scripture* (London: A&C Black, 2000), 58-60; Jon Balsarak, *Divinity Compromised: A Study of Divine Accommodation in the Thought of John Calvin* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 13-19; Stephen D. Benin, *Footprints of God, The: Divine Accommodation in Jewish and Christian Thought* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2012); Amos Funkenstein, *Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 217-80; *Perceptions of Jewish History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 15, 94-160; Jill Harshaw, *God Beyond Words:*



maintain that Holy Scripture is divine and yet possible to understand, or that Scripture is somehow transformative without it.

The connection Luther formed between the divinity and reliability of Scripture on the one hand, and his insistence that to read Scripture aright was to be able to distinguish between the divine and human on the other arguably set the stage for what I will call the modern form of accommodationism. The modern form of accommodation rests on the assumptions that the divine is co-extensive with the reliable and that the divine/reliable is a guide for the proper interpretation of Scripture. Now if Luther's divine/reliable and his guide to what was read in or out was immediately announced by the divine Author resonated with Rome's critics (as itself reliable), the same could hardly be said of many of Luther's Protestant opponents and especially of natural philosophers in later generations. Yet Luther's basic strategy of linking a self-authenticating divine/reliable to a rule for right reading proved malleable and wildly effective. To read the works of the divine Author aright—whether the book of Nature or Scripture—was to read them with a resonant notion of the divine, or, what was the same, a resonant (as reliable) measure of reliability.

Some proponents of rational-observation, for example, suggested that the divine Author accommodated his words not to 'humans in general', but particularly to their first audiences. God knew, as the early modern natural philosophers did, that the earth

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*Christian Theology and the Spiritual Experiences of People with Profound Intellectual Disabilities* (Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2016), 95-110; James Samuel Preus, *From Shadow to Promise: Old Testament Interpretation from Augustine to the Young Luther* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 60, 187ff; Nathaniel Wolloch, *History and Nature in the Enlightenment: Praise of the Mastery of Nature in Eighteenth-Century Historical Literature* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).

revolves around the sun. But because his audience did not, and because his point was moral, God wrote in Joshua as if the sun stood still.

Galileo, for example, asserted that the language in which God wrote the world is mathematics. Nature, unlike Scripture, never obscures— or even “gives a whit” about who understands—her own laws and truths.<sup>112</sup> The book of nature is written in mathematics, and clear (albeit not fully understood) to those who can read it. The meaning of Scripture is not always perfectly clear, though this is not its aim. The purpose of Scripture is to give humans whatever knowledge is necessary for salvation that is too lofty for them to attain by reason, not to describe Nature with perfect accuracy.<sup>113</sup> Or, as Baronius famously put it, “The intention of the Holy Ghost is to teach us how one goes to heaven, not how heaven goes.”<sup>114</sup>

Because Scripture aims at teaching salvation, the scribes who recorded Scripture obscured certain truths in their efforts to make it accessible to everyone. After all, Galileo reasons, the uneducated would not believe Scripture if it asserted things not apparently true.<sup>115</sup> To communicate with everyone, Scripture includes metaphors that, if taken literally, are obviously false. For example, it attributes things like hands, feet, and rage to God. The truths behind Scripture are often unclear, covered over by metaphors that help the uneducated learn about salvation.

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<sup>112</sup> *LGDC*, 181.

<sup>113</sup> *LGDC*, 185-6. Galileo cites Augustine (*De Genesi ad literam ii*, 9) in support of the notion that Scripture is for teaching things about salvation, not the motion of the heavens.

<sup>114</sup> *LGDC*, 186.

<sup>115</sup> *LGDC*, 181, 199.

Since the books of Scripture and Nature have the same Author and can only express divine truth, Galileo reasoned, the church should consider comparing demonstrated truths about nature with the depictions of Scripture in order to discern which passages are literal and which are figurative. And this can be understood as keeping within church tradition.

Galileo reports that Augustine said that if the Bible contradicts astronomers, the church should believe the Bible; but if the astronomers can prove their points with “unquestionable arguments,” then it falls to the church to demonstrate that “what is meant in the Bible... is not contrary to their proofs.”<sup>116</sup> Where the astronomers assert one thing, but the Bible is unclear about whether or not this is true, then Augustine suggests that the church not “to believe anything inadvisedly on a dubious point, lest in favor of our error we conceive a prejudice against something that truth hereafter may reveal to be not contrary...to the sacred books...”<sup>117</sup> On Galileo’s read, the Fathers recommend that, for questions about nature (not matters of faith), the church should look first to see if there are demonstrations or evidence from sense-experience, and then use this knowledge (a “gift of God”) to find out what the “true senses” of Scripture are in “passages which superficially might seem to declare differently.”<sup>118</sup>

From this point of view, mandating a literal read of a few passages whose literal meaning contradicts demonstrated truths, the Rome commits herself to a falsehood that those who can read mathematics (i.e., those who find themselves constituted by the divine

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<sup>116</sup> *LGDC*, 198. This is Galileo’s paraphrase of Augustine.

<sup>117</sup> *LGDC*, 199. Here Galileo is quoting Augustine, again from *De Genesi ad litteram ii*, 9.

<sup>118</sup> *LGDC*, 199.

Author of nature) will see as a falsehood. This is just what Galileo hopes to help Rome avoid: “for an infidel to find a Christian so stupid as to argue these matters as if they were Christian doctrine, he will scarce be able to contain his laughter.... The worst of the matter is not that a person in error should be laughed at, but that our authors should be... censured and rejected as ignorant, to the great prejudice of those whose salvation we are seeking.”<sup>119</sup>

But when Rome rejected Galileo’s attempt to show how conformity to the of coherence of divine (geometrical) thought and conformity to reading practices might be linked to form a coherent picture of the divine order, she reacted as if Galileo offered a competing divine order (a la the Protestants), and in so doing, made it so. It is possible, however, to think of Galileo as offering exactly what he says: a way of thinking that the church should consider adopting so as to protect its claim that divine truth (and with it the divine order) is one. And it is possible to imagine that Galileo, like Luther, did and (more or less) could not conceive of himself as offering elements of a competing divine order (i.e., a competing rule of configuration).

If Storr’s version of accommodationism protects the distinction between God and humans and foregrounds human limitations, rational-observational versions like Galileo’s protect the veracity of Scripture and its divine Author for those who measure its veracity against ‘what humans know now’ or ‘the divine Author’s work in nature’. While Storr maintained that highest-reliability and divinity were coextensive, he ostensibly rejected the assumption of many of his colleagues that human notions of reliability and divinity

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<sup>119</sup> *LGDC*, 209.

(i.e., those that were not immediately revealed to humans by the divine Author of Scripture) were themselves highest-reliable.

Put differently, Storr rejected forms of accommodationism in which Scripture is read in light of a particular notion of truth in order to make clear what is reliable (and so genuinely divine) and what is an accommodation (a useful not-quite-truth). When his colleagues in biblical theology used a notion of accommodationism to argue that whatever in Scripture did not conform to a certain notion of observational rationality (e.g., miracles, particular notions of morality) could be understood as God's attempt to communicate what is most important to humans (e.g., morality) in language they understood, even if this involved God in falsehood about matters less important (e.g., geocentrism), he did not accept them.<sup>120121</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Semler, Lessing, Hamann, and Herder are among the more famous eighteenth-century proponents of this sort of accommodationism, but it was a rather hot topic; if ngram is trustworthy on the point, its popularity increased substantially between 1763 and 1800. Though artificial, I talk about Galileo as a symbol of a modern rational-observational form of accommodationism, about Spinoza as a symbol of the moral read of Scripture, and about Schmidt as a symbol of scholarly challenge to the Lutheran hierarchical web in order to foreground various aspects of Storr's Lutheran inheritance. In the German-speaking areas in the 1790s, though, Symbolic reading, morality, anthropology, and reading methods were thoroughly intertwined—conversations about accommodationism are but one example. Storr published on the topic—the *Historical Sense*—in 1778. In the three years leading up to the publication of the *DC* appeared three books on accommodation, and in the same year (1793), Friedrich August Carus published a history of the notion. For Carus, as it arguably was for Storr, accommodationism was as much a rhetorical and pedagogical notion as it was ecclesiastic, moral, epistemic, or doctrinal. In 1791, Herman Behn—like the position I have been describing—argued that morality was the divine Author's highest priority: God was interested in correcting moral error and willing to speak erroneously about other topics. Moral topics in Scripture, accordingly, ought not be considered accommodations.

The following year Wilhelm Krug and Carl Senff both claimed that the notion that Jesus' crucifixion atoned for human evils was an example of accommodation. In one sense, this can be understood as an extension of the Lutheran principle: if God cannot be appeased

We are now in a position to see that when Storr addressed those who did not admit the divine authority of Scripture, he did not have in mind that a nominal admission would allow them to see the biblical-theological rationale for Lutheran dogma. Rather included in ‘divine authority’ was a particular notion of the divine. Recall that Storr’s biblical citations were ostensibly part of an effort to show that he did not carelessly read Lutheran theology into Scripture, and that the Creeds’ reliability depended not on the state’s declaration but on the divine authority of their source.

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or pleased by human actions, the death of Jesus Christ seems not to qualify for exemption. The stories in which Jesus’ crucifixion appears attractive were written to attract folks (like the Jews qua Lutheran symbol of law-followers) who had not yet seen that God cares primarily about (moral) improvements of the heart.

It is well known that Storr rejected efforts like those of Krug and Senff to decentralize the obedience of Jesus “unto death.” (Cf. Storr’s conversation with Stäudlin, *DPTS* 38). But it is perhaps less well known (though perhaps implied in some discussions of Storr and Semler) that the matter (which reduces to a question about the moral goodness or power of God) was so closely connected to accommodationism. Senff, like Storr, connected accommodation to good teaching and compassionate communication.

See Lee; H. Fr Behn, *Ueber Die Lehrart Jesu Und Seiner Apostel, in Wie Fern Dieselben Sich Nach Den Damals Herrschenden Volksmeinungen Bequemt Haben* (C.G. Donatius, 1791); Friedrich August Carus and Wilhelm Weineck, *Historia Antiquior Sententiarum Ecclesiae Graecae De Accomodatione Christo Inprimis Et Apostolis Tributa: Dissertatio* (1793); Wilhelm Traugott Krug, *Principium Cui Religionis Christianae Auctor Doctrinam De Moribus Superstruxit Ad Tempora Eius Atque Consilia Aptissime Et Maxime Accomodate Coonstitutum: Dissertatio ... Francisco Volkmar Reinhard ... Sub Eius Auspiciis ... Auctor Guilielmus Traugott Krug* (Literis Car. Christ. Dürrii, 1792); Carl Friedrich Senff, *Versuch Über Die Herablassung Gottes in Der Christlichen Religion Zu Der Schwachheit* (Halle: Barth).

<sup>121</sup> But he was not as indiscriminate as some make him out to be. In *HS*, for example, he admits that “The divinely commissioned teachers have especially accommodated themselves to their hearers, and first readers; consequently to men of a certain age and country. [...] Those vices [...] and false opinions which were most common [among groups in particular times and places] were chiefly noticed [...] The more easy and most necessary truths were first taught, while others were deferred to another time. The divine messengers [...] were wont sometimes to omit an opportunity of confuting false opinions [...]” *HS* 8-9.

Storr's opponent, Semler, drew a distinction between Bible reading's contribution to "spiritual" or inner piety (i.e., moral improvement) and Biblical interpretation that encouraged conformity to the outward, public religion of the state.<sup>122</sup> Thus Semler could advocate for the divine Author's religion of inner morality, could offer readings of Scripture's many human authors that conformed to a more or less geometric notion of the shape of the divine mind (and so privilege philological and other historical investigations), and could endorse interpretations of Scripture that supported the interests of the state without thereby equating these interpretations with moral or critical interpretations. While the strategy freed Semler to pursue his humanist historical work (and yet preserve the notion of the divine Author), it firmly unlinked "divinely revealed truth" from the state-supported "outward" religion, undermined Orthodox ideas about the shape of the divine mind (i.e., the interpretive web that purportedly supported the orthodox anthropology), and more or less explicitly rejected the Lutheran anthropology and its complementary reading methods. It suggested that the state's concern for order is not necessarily based on divinely revealed truth; that the biblical theologian does not give divinely revealed truths to the state, but provides the biblical-theological justification for the state's notion of order (in other words, the state does not need the biblical revelation that these provide,

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<sup>122</sup> See Marianne Schröter, *Aufklärung Durch Historisierung: Johann Salomo Semlers Hermeneutik Des Christentums* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012); Hornig; Leopold Zscharnack, *Lessing Und Semler: Ein Beitrag Zur Entstehungsgeschichte Des Rationalismus Und Der Kritischen Theologie* (Alfred Töpelmann, 1905); Heinrich Hoffmann, *Die Theologie Semlers* (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1905); Axel Bühler and Luigi Cataldi Madonna, "Von Thomasius Bis Semler Entwicklungslinien Der Hermeneutik in Halle," *Aufklärung* 8, no. 2 (1994).

but needs to put its words in the mouth of the clergy in order to sway the people); and that cross-confessional pious morality is possible, to name only a few consequences.<sup>123</sup>

Now when Storr rejected Semler's accommodationism, he did not reject the letter of Semler's claim that Scripture was divine; rather he rejected Semler's implicit notion that Scripture was divine only insofar as it was moral. For Storr, to trust in the divine authority of Scripture is to trust in the divinely revealed notions of the divine and human, and so to trust the divine Author's self-revelation by, in, and through Scripture. Put differently, to trust in the divine authority of Scripture is to trust in the divine authority and highest-reliability of Scripture read according to the Lutheran rule of configuration.

### **Human Self-knowledge and Knowledge of God**

So far I have said that Storr needs to teach his students to read Scripture as Lutheran biblical theologians read it (in accord with a divinely revealed rule of configuration), and to think about Scripture as Lutheran biblical theologians do (as the highest measure of reliability). And I have suggested that, on Storr's own admission, these both depend on something Storr cannot hope to teach: an immediate divine revelation.

But I have been slowly and subtly making another point that can now come into view: the immediate divine revelation announces that God is willing to help humans do what they must and cannot and simultaneously announces that humans do not know

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<sup>123</sup> Thomasius had already argued that Westphalia-Augsburg had decided the question about whether the theology faculty provided divine truths to the state, insofar as it recognized multiple confessions. Stability, not metaphysical reliability, was the state's highest interest. Semler would pursue this line in his famous defense of Wöllner's Edict.



about God's willingness to help without divine revelation in Word. The God who reveals himself as willing to help humans do what they cannot simultaneously reveals himself as the divine Author of Word (who is willing to reveal to humans something about themselves and himself that they do not know). Simply put, the immediate divine revelation reconfigures both a rule of configuration for reading Scripture and a rule of configuration for what some might call self-knowledge and knowledge of God.

The point might come clearer if we reexamine the Lutheran transformation narrative. Comparison (here 'before' and 'after' against or in light of a static) makes a transformation visible as such. Humans are aware of a God who is able to help them do what they cannot. This holds static so that Storr can say "before humans do not know if God is willing; after they trust that God is willing." Similarly, the words on the page of Scripture remain the same so that Storr can say "before I had this rule of configuration; after I had this one."

Only after humans encounter Word do they learn that they needed an encounter with Word to discover the willingness of God to help. In other words, passive righteousness and sola scriptura are of a piece: before a divine revelation in Word, awareness that reason might encounter Word and trust the willingness of God to help is unavailable. Storr's transformation narrative concerns a shift in self-knowledge and knowledge of God and a concomitant shift in the rule of configuration of Scripture. But there is an implicit third shift to awareness that the God who is able and willing to help humans do what they cannot is also the Author of Scripture who there announces what human reason cannot believe, namely his willingness to help. Put simply, the God who

knows that humans cannot trust that God is willing to help unless the God who is able to help reveals it to them in language they can grasp and by which they may be grasped.

Trust that God is willing to help is simultaneously trust that the God who is able to help is also the Author of Scripture.

### **Storr's Missing Premise**

Now if we consider Storr's case for the divine authority of Scripture, we find it is missing a crucial premise, namely that the God of which reason is aware from creation and conscience is the same God who is the author of Scripture. Indeed, where we might expect to find a rational-observational case for the divine authorship of Scripture or that reason's God is the same as Scripture's, Storr defers to the testimony of the divine Author in Word. His missing premise depends for its visibility and reliability entirely upon the immediate divine revelation.

Storr sums up his argument for the reliability of Scripture in in §28:

If there be, (as has been proved § 17 — 19,) a God to whom veracity belongs (§ 26); then we may receive, with perfect security, the declarations of the Holy Scriptures; which were either produced by God, and under his influence (§ 6, 9, 10, 11, 13), or at least were sanctioned by him (§ 9, 12, 13); and therefore have divine authority (§ 11—13).<sup>124</sup>

With attention to the Latin and without the need to produce an elegant translation, we can present Storr's case in a slightly better light:

1. There is a God (§§17-19)
2. Veracity belongs to that God (§26)

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<sup>124</sup> DC §28

3. The declarations of the Holy Scriptures were either produced by God and under his influence or at least were sanctioned by him (§§9-13)

4. The declarations of the Holy Scriptures have divine authority (§§11-13)

Therefore,

5. We may receive the declarations of the Holy Scriptures with perfect security (§28)

Storr's case for divine unity explicitly privileges the divine Author's declaration over Kant's arguments and explicitly refers to God's knowledge that he is the only God as definitive.

We can discover no reason for believing in the existence of more than one God. For, when we contemplate (1) the works of nature, we find that, so far as our observation extends, they stand in such intimate connexion with each other, that their dependance on one Creator and Lord becomes highly probable (2); or if we reason from the idea of a moral government of the world, we cannot conceive how it can be divided among a multitude of regents; unless we admit that among these regents, so arbitrarily supposed, there is a perfect unity of purposes, and of manner of accomplishing them(3). **But in a matter of such importance, one which has so great an influence on our exclusive reverence and respect for God (Deut.6:5; Mark 12:30),we ought to regard the testimony of God himself as of the greater consequence; because thereby our belief (4) of the divine unity, is so confirmed(5), that we may now, with perfect certainty, affirm that there is but one God.** For, if the Creator and Lord of nature had been produced by another being on whom he is dependent, or if he formed and governed this world in conjunction with another being; he would certainly, as his knowledge is so extensive, know something of such a being. But he knows

of none who existed before him, or was his superior, or who cooperated with him in the work of creation (6).<sup>125</sup>

Storr's case that God authored, influenced, or at least sanctioned Scripture rests on the testimony of Jesus Christ:

It is therefore historically true,<sup>126</sup> that the Founder of Christianity, who (as Tacitus informs us, *Annal. L. XV. c. 44.*) was put to death by Pontius Pilate the Procurator, in the reign of Tiberius, did profess to be a divine messenger;(1) and that he neither derived his doctrines from other men, nor discovered them by the powers of his own mind,(2) but received them from God.(3)<sup>127</sup> According to his own declaration, his conscientious reverence for God (*John 5:30. 7:18. 8:29, 55.*), and most intimate union with him (*John 8: 16, 29. 14: 10. 10: 38. 16: 15.*), rendered it impossible for him to communicate any thing solely by himself, or without the cooperation of God. (4) It was in virtue of this his constant union with God, that he demanded that all his communications) should be received, not as the doctrines of the mere man Jesus, but as the declarations of God (6) himself; and that they should therefore be regarded as perfect truth. (7) **Hence he required, that in those things which transcend the limits of human knowledge, we should implicitly believe him upon his own authority; that we should receive his declarations as the testimony of one who had long been most intimately united with God,(8) and who had the most perfect acquaintance^ (Matt 11: 27. John 8: 55.) with things divine, and lying beyond the reach of our knowledge. Accordingly, he assured his hearers, that nothing but irreverence for God,( 10) which is itself criminal.(11) could**

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<sup>125</sup> §28, emphasis mine.

<sup>126</sup> 'Historically true' here, I will later show, means 'historically true under the divinely revealed trope of history.'

<sup>127</sup> This follows the form of the argument Paul makes for his apostleship, one perhaps not too far afield from the form of Luther's argument for the divinity of his rule of configuration. See Appendix 1, "Paul and the Argument for Universal Reach;" cf. my case about Luther's rule of configuration and his use of it as a measure of reliability.

prompt them to reject his doctrines ; and on the contrary,  
that every one who believed him, believed God himself.<sup>128</sup>  
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Jesus' knowledge of God, Storr insists, was not merely that of conscience, which is liable to error. And again it is paired with his notion of God who can do/know/reveal what humans cannot.

[John 7:15-16....] signifies more than merely this: my doctrine is derived from the will of God as discovered by reason; the voice of God in me (the voice of conscience) prompts me to teach; my doctrine flowed from reflexion on the will of God. For on this supposition, there a son and conscience referred to, would be the mere human reason and human conscience of Jesus. But conscience, if left to herself, is liable to error, even when the intention is sincere; so that the voice of conscience may be the voice of an erring conscience, and consequently merely the supposed voice of God.<sup>129</sup>

Storr's subsequent cases for the divinity of various books of Scripture rest on the declarations of Jesus Christ [who (§§7-8) is known to be divine because he does and declares what humans—according to the Lutheran story about human reason—cannot]. In §9, he argues from the words of Jesus Christ for the divine influence on the disciple-apostles, in §10 for the divine influence on Paul, in §11 for the divinity of the words of all the apostles, in §§12-13 for Mark and Luke and the “Old Testament” (derived from the testimony of the apostles).

Storr's arguments for the divine authority of Scripture reinforce (and do not undermine) the Lutheran narratives in which God reveals himself as willing to do what

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<sup>128</sup> DC §6. Emphasis mine. Cf. my case that the Lutheran rule of configuration is given immediately by the divine Author's revelation of himself as the God who will help humans do what they cannot.

<sup>129</sup> §6n2.

humans cannot and in which God reveals to human beings something about himself (his willingness to help) that human reason cannot trust unless it be revealed to them (that God is willing to help). His argument for the divine authority of Scripture rests on the testimony (i.e., immediate self-revelation) of the divine Author.

Storr cannot teach his students to read Scripture and dogma aright. For these depend upon an immediate announcement that the God who is able to help is also willing, and that the God who is willing to help is also the God who reveals that humans do not know God's willingness to help except they encounter him in Word. And yet, Storr must do so. For, on his own terms, the teacher of the doctrines of Christ must be able to swear an oath in all sincerity that he takes these doctrines to be true. And this requires the transformation of the cleric's measure of reliability. Indeed, if his theological textbook is successful, his students will not merely be able to repeat official dogma, but also understand the biblical ground of its reliability and be able to show—on reason's terms—Scripture and its teachings worthy of respect. But unless they encounter Word, they cannot rightly understand how Scripture could ground the reliability of dogma or even understand how to defend the respectability of Scripture on human reason's terms—for they neither understand Scripture and its divine Author (its divinely-authenticated rule of configuration), or how human beings stand in relation to the divine Author aright (i.e., as teachers of Lutheran biblical theology must).

## **Conclusion**

This essay advances the claim that Storr's case for the divine authority of Scripture in the *DC* does not rest on Kant's arguments for rational belief in God, but rather Storr

positions Kant's arguments centrally within the case in order to display to his Kantian students on familiar terms the Lutheran Orthodox vision of the hierarchical harmony of human reason and divine revelation in Word (i.e., to teach his students to configure Scripture, dogma, and the products of human reason as the biblical theologian). In this chapter, I have shown that, insofar as it is successful, Storr's case for the divine authority of Scripture cannot rest on rational grounds—for he nowhere establishes on those grounds that the God of Kant's arguments (§§17-18) is the Author of Scripture. I have suggested that—on his own terms—Storr's argument requires for its success an immediate divine revelation: the divine Author must reveal himself as both the God who is willing to help and who has revealed in Scripture what humans do not know. Insofar as this immediate divine revelation is necessary for coming to see that Scripture is respectable on reason's terms and that it is the source of Lutheran dogma, Storr's is an impossible task. But he has at hand, I will argue in chapter two, the resources to create the conditions in which his students might encounter Word and in which they might come to see as the biblical theologian does. Indeed, he uses these resources to make of Kant's arguments a way into the Lutheran point of view.

## Chapter 2

### Introduction

In the paragraphs that follow, I argue that Storr inherited from Quintillian and from Lutheran and scholarly book-making traditions theories, methods, techniques, and tools to display a wide range of materials and modes of argumentation as inter-related parts. Storr sets out to teach what cannot be taught by displaying a wide variety of materials and modes of argumentation in part-part and part-whole relations that his reticent-to-grant-the-divine-authority-of-Scripture students and colleagues may accept on their own terms, and that the biblical theologians may accept on their own terms.

More particularly, Storr situates Kant's arguments for rational belief in God and Romans 1 and 2 in relation to one another and at the pivot-point of his argument for the divine authority of Scripture. At the same time, he displays Kant's arguments as the pivot-point in the Lutheran transformation narrative —the awareness of God as able to help humans do what they cannot, which divine revelation confirms and reconfigures even as it announces that the God who is willing to help is the Author of Scripture. So Kant's arguments—read on reason's terms—function as a kind of entry point into Storr's Lutheran loop. In order to situate Kant's arguments and Romans 1-2 on the terms of reason and biblical theology, Storr exploits the double valence of citation-annotations, which may be used to display a rule of configuration (part-part relations, as in an aesthetic argument) and to present evidence that calls a reader to judge about the relation of the evidence to some claim (textual-evidentiary reasoning).



## Teaching What Cannot Be Taught

I argued in chapter 1 that Storr did and could not hope to convince anyone of the divine authority of Scripture (or the reliability of biblical theology) by way of argumentation, for it had, by his own admission, to be given immediately in divine revelation. But Storr needed to convince his students, for his task was to teach future clerics to teach and defend Christian doctrine. Storr set for himself a greater task than simply presenting the official dogma his students would memorize and repeat, for he insisted they learn why biblical theology was reliable and be able to explain to detractors why they should take it seriously. But unless they received this immediate divine revelation, they could hardly see the truth of the biblical theological claims or how/whether Scripture (read in accord with the Lutheran rule of configuration) lent them reliability. Nor could Storr expect his students see how his defenses on rational grounds for the respectability of biblical doctrine worked, for they assume what detractors cannot—namely that doctrine is respectable on both biblical-theological and rational grounds. Storr's was an attempt to teach what cannot be taught.

But he had at hand a theory about how words can alter rules of configuration. An author who attends to the mind of a reader might present materials on terms the reader can accept—but with a twist or a tweak that might alter the terms on which the reader reads. While Storr calls on the divinity and humanity of the divine Author's language to account for the power of Word to alter (and show to be highest reliable) human reason's notions of self, God, and their relation, he uses an analogy from human teaching and learning to explain the divine Author's strategy. More particularly, he draws on

Quintillian's account of the good teacher charged with teaching her pupils what cannot be taught: to read the particular parts set out before them in a life-situation so as to build a whole—much as a lifelong master does.

Recall that Storr was able to tie this immediate gift to an encounter with Word (Scripture or Jesus Christ) by way of a theory of language in which humans read (take in) words on their own terms (in accord with their own rules of configuration), but sometimes find themselves in the grip of words that reconfigure their rules of configuration. Storr's theory of language is of a piece with his insistence on the divinity and humanity of Scripture: it must be divine, because its language does what humans are unable to do for themselves—it challenges their notions of self and God as much as it secures new, highest-reliable notions. But it must be human, precisely because it must be familiar and particular enough that it could challenge (not obliterate or assault) their notions of self and God. Word transforms human beings; it does not eliminate the human and replace it with the divine anymore than it “permit[s] and preserve[s] every man's previous natural opinion concerning God.”<sup>130</sup>

The human authors of Scripture, like Augustine's divine Author, attended to the minds and language of their audiences, and introduced new ideas on terms they could understand. So Storr likens the authors of Scripture to good teachers:

And, in short, they were indeed most learned teachers of truth, but also men of sense, and skilled in teaching, adapting themselves to the understanding of the learners; as a man, who walks very fast, if he were to set out on the same road with a child, would lend him his hand, and,

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<sup>130</sup> *HS*, 35.

relaxing his own pace, go no faster than the child could follow.\*

\* Thus Quintillian (L. ii. De instit. orat. C. iii. p. 83, Argento, 1698) describes the good quality of a teacher, which the Greeks call *sugkatabasis*. [i.e., condescension] Comp. Origen apud Suicer, Thesaurus eccles. T. ii. Col. 1069.<sup>131</sup>

A good teacher learns from the mind of the student not only which words and ideas they might be able to hear, but even what sorts of arguments and common truths might best resonate.<sup>132</sup>

But sometimes a student needs to learn something that cannot be taught, something that one can only learn by doing or seeing for oneself—as one encounters all the parts held together in a whole. The teacher in these cases, where her job is not in her power, will set out the array of circumstances as a whole whose order or harmony shows.<sup>133</sup> As Quintillian put it:

10 There are, however, some things which depend not on the teacher, but on the learner. For example, a physician will teach what treatment should be adopted for different diseases, what the dangers are against which he must be on his guard, and what the symptoms by which they may be

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<sup>131</sup> *HS*, 9. Cf. Quintillian L. ii. De instit. orat. C. iii.: “Yes” it may be answered “but surely you do not deny that there is a type of eloquence that is too great to be comprehended by undeveloped boys?” Of course there is. But this eloquent teacher whom they fling in my face must be a sensible man with a good knowledge of teaching and must be prepared to stoop to his pupil’s level, just as a rapid walker, if walking with a small child, will give him his hand and lessen his own speed and avoid advancing at a pace beyond the powers of his little companion.”

<sup>132</sup> *HS*, 9. “[...] those arguments, which were best adapted to the men, whom they wished to convince, i.e. those **derived from truths, which the hearers themselves acknowledged**[.] Emphasis mine.

<sup>133</sup> *HS*, 9, “Finally, the whole texture of their discourses and epistles, is truly economical, i.e.,\*\* such as could not have been formed, unless from the circumstances then actually present. \*\* See Quintillian, L. vii. C. x.”

recognised. But he will not be able to communicate to his pupil the gift of feeling the pulse, or appreciating the variations of colour, breathing and temperature: this will depend on the talent of the individual. Therefore, in most instances, we must rely on ourselves, and must study cases with the utmost care, never forgetting that men discovered our art before ever they proceeded to teach it. 11 For the most effective, and what is justly styled most *economical* arrangement of a case as a whole, is that which cannot be determined except when we have the specific facts before us.<sup>134</sup>

Here the teacher's skill requires her to notice how she puts the parts before her together, and to display them in such a way that her student learns to see their economy—their home-order. So Quintillian explains that skillful teaching by displaying an economic arrangement

consists in the power to determine when the *exordium* is necessary and when it should be omitted; when we should make our statement of facts continuous, and when we should subdivide it; when we should begin at the very beginning, when, like Homer, start at the middle or the end; 12 when we should omit the statement of facts altogether; when we should begin by dealing with the arguments advanced by our opponents, and when with our own; when we should place the strongest proofs first and when the weakest; in what cases we should prefix *questions* to the *exordium*, and what preparation is necessary to pave the way for these questions; what arguments the judge will accept at once, and to what he requires to be led by degrees; whether we should refute our opponent's arguments as a whole or in detail; whether we should reserve emotional appeals for the peroration or distribute them throughout the whole speech; whether we should speak first of law or of equity; whether we should first advance (or refute) charges as to past offences or the charges connected with the actual trial; 13 or, again, if the case is complicated, what order we should adopt, what evidence or documents of any kind should be read out in

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<sup>134</sup> Quintillian, L. vii. *De instit orat.* C. 10-13.

the course of our speech, and what reserved for a later stage.<sup>135</sup>

To teach by display, the skilled teacher attends both to the economy she sees and to her pupil's words, affect, circumstance, etc., and decides which particulars to draw attention to, which arguments (and kinds of arguments) to make, which evidences to present, etc., and she decides how best to divide and arrange them, both by order of argument and of exposition.

While Storr's was an impossible task, he had in Quintillian a guide for creating the conditions in which his pupils might come to read the invisible home-order (i.e., to read biblical, dogmatic, and rational materials in accord with biblical-theological rules of configuration). And Quintillian was not Storr's only guide. He also inherited from the Lutheran and scholarly book-making traditions methods, techniques, and tools to display a wide range of materials and modes of argumentation as inter-related parts.

Foremost among these tools were citation-annotations. If citation-annotations assert that *y* is the context for reading *p*, and so display a relationship, in many traditions they also call a reader to judge whether *y* legitimates *p*. Present-day scholars might put the point thus: a citation-annotation in general expresses a relationship between *y* and *p* in order to display part-part relationships in a larger order; but if *p* is a claim in a rational-observational or textual-evidentiary argument, a citation-annotation (*y*) asserts a relationship governed by the particular conceptual hierarchy of the discipline's rules for argumentation. Put differently, there is a great difference between 'y and p' and 'judge whether y supports p', for the latter (for rational observational and textual-evidentiary

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<sup>135</sup> Quintillian, L. vii. *De instit orat.* C. 10-13.

arguments) concerns the reach of words toward reality, whereas the former merely expresses an arrangement.

Recall that Storr designed the book for lecturing and studying. To help keep the basic three elements straight in the course of lectures, repetitions, and individual study, Storr suggested, he presented a series of succinct dogmatic statements, each peppered with parenthetical, usually biblical citations and endnote markers, and each punctuated by a series of endnotes.<sup>136</sup><sup>137</sup>

Now insofar as Storr took, as I suggested in chapter one, the rule of configuration of Scripture to be also the highest measure of reliability, his biblical citations might display the rule of configuration and of reality—that is, they might not call the reader to judge, but simply assert that they do reach toward reality, even as they display the order of the mind of the divine Author. This way of reading Storr’s biblical citations, however, would be foreign to his detractor-students.

This is another way of saying that Storr’s contemporaries who would claim that he must have been reading the Creeds into Scripture in order to assert that Scripture

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<sup>136</sup> These reasons notwithstanding, endnotes were an unusual choice. Not only were they widely regarded as inferior to footnotes by Storr’s time, he preferred footnotes. (Re: inferiority of endnotes, see Connors’ “The Rhetoric of Citation Systems, I” and the delicious concrete example in Hume’s letter to Gibbon in Grafton’s *The Footnote*, 102-103.) Storr experimented with annotation systems (i.e., he did not always use the same annotation systems, or use similar systems in the same way). And yet *DC* is the only book I have found in which Storr uses endnotes. — Gibbon and Storr both visited the British Library in 1770; on whether their visits overlapped, I have not yet seen any evidence.

<sup>137</sup> His endnotes foreground the sense in which citation-annotations interrupt a train of thought: the book’s characteristic rhetorical affect is perhaps a tension between orientation, disorientation, re-orientation—all punctuated by page-flipping. His parenthetical biblical citations, on the other hand, perhaps do more to smooth the train of thought, insofar as they function as symbols that a biblically literate reader, at least, can interpret immediately.

supported the Creeds would perhaps have understood Storr's biblical citations as textual-evidentiary argumentation—not a display of the internal order of the highest-reliable. So Storr used the dual valence of citation-annotations to meet his Kantian students on their own terms and at the same time to display the part-part and part-whole relations that he hoped they would come to see.

## **Citations, Annotations, and Citation-Annotations**

### **Stipulations**

Storr uses citation-annotations to display a wide range of materials as inter-related parts. Citations assert a relation between one artifact (or other observable) and another; most often they assert a relation between a part of an artifact (or other observable) and another. Citations require there be a distinction between the related items. A citation is a quotation (verbatim or with variations from memory, marked as such or not) or a description (whether by an author's name, the name of a book, or any other proper noun, number, or symbol that creates an artificial whole) of the location (address) of some artifact, here frequently a verbal unit.

Citations are means of incorporation: with a citation, an author brings something outside (frequently from inside another body) into the body of his work. On the one hand, citations are usually masticated. They are parts: one author rarely quotes or points to the entirety of another work. At the same time, citations are metonymies or parts-turned-symbols-of-wholes brought from the outside in. For whether a quotation or an address, citations stand in for parts that belong to other wholes; they bring along with them their

relations within the outside source. Citations are made up of parts (e.g., names, titles, numbers), each of which may have their own symbolic value.

Storr displays many of his citations in annotations. An annotation is any note, number, symbol [i.e., typographical or editorial symbol (including, e.g., margin doodles but excluding a frontispiece)], distinguishable (usually by layout, typography, or some similar) from some “main” or “primary” artifact, regardless of the sequential, logical, or hierarchical relation of its contents. Even if a document’s primary message unfolds in its footnotes, for example, the footnotes are annotations. Annotations assert a relation between two things (e.g., between one verbal unit and another); they announce that *x* is a context for reading *y*. Annotations interrupt. They stand simultaneously inside and outside a primary body of work.

In short, citations put multiple artifacts in relation to one another; annotations put a main text in relation to a secondary (or tertiary) one. Annotations direct the meaning of a text; sometimes they contain citations, so that an outside artifact comes to direct the meaning of the one at hand.

Storr uses citation-annotations to display—in relation to his primary document—relationships between materials in a particular unit (here) and materials outside a particular unit (there). Annotations stand in relation to a primary document; citations assert a relation between documents; together, an annotation-citation displays a relationship between documents in relation to a primary document. In an important sense, citation-annotation is the print-era’s essential tool for displaying and controlling context.



## Storr's Citation-Annotations

In the *DC*, Storr uses citation-annotations to display relationships between Lutheran dogma and other materials.<sup>138</sup> He explicitly claims to use citation-annotations to organize his lecture materials (to foreground the relation between his main point and subordinate, secondary and tertiary points), and to show the biblical sources of dogma (to display the materials that both gave rise to and perhaps justified his dogmatic claims). He explained in the Preface that his citation-annotations made sense for this particular book because they mimic the form of (organize) his lectures and because they helped the reader see the biblical case for a particular point of doctrine.<sup>139</sup>

### Citation-Annotations Organize

Dogma was the subject of Storr's course and the primary text from which he lectured. It organized his presentation (aural and print) of the materials. If, in the course of a lecture, he expanded on a doctrine's biblical warrant or gave reasons for its acceptability on reason's terms, these points were subordinate to the dogma proper. As he and his students lost their places or returned the material between lectures, they could orient themselves in relation to the dogmatic statement. In print, Storr showed the structure of the lecture materials by incorporating biblical and rational-observational materials into the dogmatic statements through citation-annotations.

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<sup>138</sup> He also uses them to display relationships between particular sections of the *DC* and others.

<sup>139</sup> Preface, x

LIBER SECUNDUS  
DE DEO.

CAPUT PRIMUM

DE NOTIONE DEI EIUSQUE VERITATE.

§. 17.

Homo, natura duce, sibi ipse præscribit & imperat certam agendi rationem tanta auctoritate *a*), ut, relegens *b*) acta & ad iussa illa interna tanquam ad normam examinans, se, quamvis solum & ab hominum aliorum iudicio remotum *c*), incuset ipse aut purget (Rom. II. 14. 15), tanquam si causa dicenda esset ante iudicem (v. 16. *d*) I. 32). Ergo iudicem invisibilem, malo incommoda, bono commoda nescientem, revereri natura nobis infitum est. *e*).

*a*) Cum apostolus Rom. II. 13. docuisset, Iudaeos, quamvis legem divinam scriptam habeant, idcirco tamen Deo non illico probari, sed, nisi observent legem, ejusdem ipsius sententia condemnari (v. 12), jam v. 14. etiam prius enunciatum (v. 12), quod absque scripta lege divina peccare & poena teneri aliquis possit, hac ratione confirmat (v. 14. cf. Phil. III. 20. n). Col. III. 25. not. 61), quod ethnici, quamvis legem divinam *scriptam* non ha-

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beant,

## Citation-Annotations Display Sources and Justifications

Storr also liked the way Morus' layout made plain the biblical sources of particular claims. He named in the Preface Samuel Morus' 1789 *Epitome Theologiae Christianae* and Griesbach's 1789 *Anleitung zum Studium der populären Dogmatik* as his models, but the former is closer to his system of annotations.<sup>140</sup> Morus' annotations appear at the ends of smaller thought-units, and so can be quite a bit easier to follow than Storr's.




Figure 2 Morus' Annotations

Citation-annotations that displayed sources and justifications were perfectly familiar to Storr and his students, for between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, citation-annotation (especially, but not exclusively for documentation) became a hallmark

<sup>140</sup> Storr liked the way it made plain the biblical sources of particular claims. It helped to make clear which were claims of ecclesial theology and which were potentially part of a defense of biblical theology—without claiming that Scripture belonged solely to the keepers of the ecclesial-Symbol or to the historical-critical investigators. At the same time, Storr's critical and biblical annotations signaled his resistance to a subjectivism characteristic of some certain kinds of Pietist hermeneutics. See the Preface. *L* viii-ix

feature of scholarly writing.<sup>141</sup> Storr's citations are, as per the scholarly standards of the late eighteenth-century, complete and precise: he uses all the available markers to direct his reader to an outside passage.

Insofar as a citation documented a claim, this facilitated conversation and further research, and facilitated checks on scholars' proclivities to misremember or suppress counter-evidence.<sup>142</sup> This last was arguably a subtle but important feature, for it suggests that a document may 'resist' the read a scholar makes of it; it may show itself not to support a particular claim. A cited document itself, the assumption goes, may make clear that and what some scholar illegitimately "read into" it.

Many features of the scholarly practice—and the demand for documentation via complete, precise citation—began in the period of the quarrel between Luther and Rome. After Luther's demand that a book organize polemic, biblical citations took on new power. But biblical citations were only one expression of the larger practice of documentation whose rapid development corresponded with the rise of confessional polemics. Ecclesiastical historians gathered, authenticated, and cited documents to advance their own symbolic narratives and destabilize others'. Flacius' church history, for example, was an arrangement of many kinds of documents that corroborated the Lutheran story about past truths, their degradation into Roman idolatry, and the transforming encounter with Word that made visible Roman error and forgotten truths.

I am going about with a great plan, which, of course,  
outreaches my own powers, but which, if it is carried out,

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<sup>141</sup> See Connors, Grafton, etc.

<sup>142</sup> Grafton, 100ff.

could be extraordinarily useful for the church. First, I want to write a catalog of all the men that before Martin Luther of blessed memory fought the pope and his errors. Then I would wish that a church history would be written, in which in a certain order and in sequence it would be demonstrated how the true church and its religion gradually fell off the track from that original purity and simplicity in the apostolic time because of the negligence and ignorance of teachers, and also partly through the evil of the godless. Then it must be shown that at times the church was restored by a few really faithful men, and why the light of truth sometimes shone more clearly, and sometimes under the growing darkness of godless entity it was again more or less darkened - until, finally at our time, when the truth was almost totally destroyed, through God's unbounded benefice, the true religion in its purity was again restored.<sup>143</sup>

If Lutherans were to discover and read in Scripture the Symbolic narrative—and if they were to document (to cite Scripture) to make its self-organization show—they were to document history under the Symbol as well: to make visible the divine order, so to speak.

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<sup>143</sup> Flacius' letter to Hartmann Beyer, 1552. Quoted in Oliver K. Olson: *Matthias Flacius and the survival of Luther's reform*, 219.

minopolim, Hierichuntē, Zabulonem, Lydam, Iamneam, Azqtum, & alias. Fuisse in Tyro & Sydone Ecclesiā, indeliquet, quod utriusq; loci episcopos nominat Euseb. lib. 8, cap. 7 & 13. huius quidē Zenobium, illius autem Tyrannionē. Imò & Synodum apud Tyrum fuisse sub Constantino, Eusebius idem indicat lib. 4 de uita Constantini. Plures deniq; in eadē prouincia Ecclesiæ sedes recitat catalogus concilij Nicæni: ut Prole-<sup>10</sup> maida, Damalcū, Tripolim, Paneada, Emiffam, cuius in perſecutione episcopum fuisse Syluanum Eusebius testatur lib. 8, cap. 13. Sicut Beryti Phœnicia: episcopum nominat Apollinariū Socrates, lib. 2, cap. 4. 6. eiusdēq; Petrus Alexandrinus meminit in epistola sua apud Theodoretum lib. 4, cap. 22. Fuit & Gazæ ecclesiā Christi, nam & ibi episcopum Syluanum alium fuisse, Sozomenus refert lib. 5, cap. 3.

In Arabia fuisse ecclesias, perſecutio quam ibi Diocletianus exercuit, testatur. Euseb. lib. 8, cap. 12. Et recitat aliquot Ecclesiæ in ea sedes concilium Nicænum, & Athanasius in epistola ad episcopos Achæos. Boſtræ certē clara fuit ecclesia, cuius episcopum Titū prædicat Sozom. lib. 5, cap. 15.

Inter Syriacas ecclesias, quarum Eusebius lib. 3 de uita Constantini meminit, præcipua hoc adhuc tempore fuit Antiochena: quem<sup>30</sup> admodum ex ordine & ſucceſſione episcoporum, quam Eusebius & alij annotarunt, cōſtat. Et numerat aliquot illuſtres ecclesias in Syria concilium Nicænum: ut Seleuciam, ubi frequens fuit Synodus sub Constantio, & episcopum Neonas, de quo Socrat. lib. 2, cap. 42. Laodiceam, Apameā, Hierapolim, Samofata, Lariffam, & alias. Antaradi in Syria fuisse ecclesiam, ex eo clarum est, quod eius episcopum Carteriū celebrat Theodoretus lib. 2, cap. 15. & de Rhinea Syrorū, Sozomenus ait lib. 6, cap. 31, eā ab initio bonos ha-<sup>40</sup> buisse præceptores, & ad suam usq; ætatem nondum defecisse.

Ecclesiarum in Cæloſyria concilium Nicænum meminit: & fuisse ibi ecclesias non obscuras, testatur Sozom. lib. 6, cap. 34. Veniunt ex eadem episcopi ad cōcilium quoddam Romanum, ut Athanasius indicat Apolog. 2. Fuit in eadem prouincia ad Libanū<sup>50</sup> Heliopolis, ubi diaconum fuisse Cyrillum quendam, Theodoretus ostendit lib. 3, cap. 7. Ecclesiarum etiam per tres Syrias meminit Optatus lib. 2 contra Parmenianum.

Sequitur Meſopotamia, in qua ecclesias fuisse uel inde perſpicuum est, quod ibi perſecutio Diocletiani graſſata est, ut Eusebius indicat lib. 8, cap. 12. & 13. Ex ea uerò, Edeſſa mittit episcopum in Synodum Nicenam, quam urbem & Theodoretus lib. 3, cap. 26.<sup>60</sup> pietate ornatam appellat: eandemq; uniuer-

sam Christianam ab initio fuisse testatur Sozom. libro 6, cap. 1. & Niceph. lib. 10, cap. 34. Nominantur in concilio Nicæno etiam hæc Meſopotamia: loca, quasi in quibus ecclesia fuerit: ut Niſibis, Rheſinate, Macedonopolis. Etiam Carris fuisse ecclesiam, testatur Sozom. lib. 6, cap. 32. & Niceph. lib. 11, cap. 40.

In Asia minori Cilicia est, in qua fuisse aliquot Ecclesiæ hospitia cōſentaneum est. Episcoporum enim Cilicum Eusebius meminit in uita Constantini. Et Epiphania: Cilicia: episcopum Amphionem memorat Sozom. lib. 1, cap. 10. Nominat & Theodorū episcopum Mopſueſtia: Socrates lib. 6, cap. 3. Et ecclesiæ in Apſide Cilicia: meminit Ioan. Zonaras Tom. 3. in historia Iuliani. Meminit eiusdem loci & concilium Nicænum, ut & aliorum quorundā: nimirū Tarſi metropolis, cuius episcopum fuisse Syluanum, Socrat. re-<sup>20</sup> tulit lib. 2, cap. 39. Adanan, cuius episcopum fuisse Cyriacum, Sozom. scripsit lib. 7, cap. 10. Irenopolim, & alias.

In Pamphilia celebris fuit ecclesia Pergensis, cuius episcopum Iouinianum Theodoretus nominat lib. 4, cap. 15. Sed & nominatim ecclesiarum in Pamphilia Eusebius meminit in uita Constantini. Ac plures in eadē prouincia fuisse Ecclesiæ locos, Conciliū ostendit: uidelicet Tegmeſſam, Aſpendum, Seleuciam, & alias. Antiochia: in Piſidia patriarchatum obtinuisse Optimum, sub Valentiano & Theodoſio, Sozom. autor est libro 5, cap. 8. Ecclesias etiā in Cilicia & Pamphilia esse contendit Optatus Mileuitanus, lib. 2. contra Parmenianum.

Numerat idem aliquot etiam Piſidia: urbium episcopos: quemadmodum & Patara: prouincia: Lycia:, quæ et ipſa ecclesias habuit, quarum Sozom. meminit lib. 2, cap. 27. & Niceph. 8, cap. 42. apud Myram Lycia: episcopum fuisse Nicolaum indicat, sub Cō-<sup>40</sup> ſtantino. Olympi uerò ciuitatis Lycia: episcopū celebrat Methodiū Socrat. lib. 6, ca. 13.

Nec Lydia ecclesijs caruit: nam episcopos ex ea aliquos Socrates recēſet lib. 2, ca. 40. Mittuntur ex eadem episcopi in ſynodū Sardicenfem, ut Sozom. indicat lib. 2, cap. 8. Ac plura eius loca concilium Nicænum exprimit: ut Sardes, quarum ecclesiæ Sozom. meminit lib. 4, cap. 24. Philadelphiam, Tripolim, Peparam, Thyatiram, &c. Laodiceſium præterea Ecclesia celebris hoc ſeculo fuit episcopis clariffimis, Theodoro & Gregorio, ut Socrates ostendit lib. 2, cap. 45.

De Iconio Lycaonia:, antiqua Ecclesiæ ſede, libro ſuperiori diximus: & meminit eius hoc ſeculo Baſilius epiſt. 8, ſicut & ecclesiæ apud Niſan eiusdem, epiſtola 10. Fuit in eius metropoli Amphiloſchius episcopus, ut Theodoretus ostendit lib. 4, cap. 11.

Ephelina & Smyrna: ecclesiæ, ſicut iam olim

*clarorum virorum, p. 523. Operum a IO. ALB. FABRICIO editorum, STEPHAN. GAVSSENV in Dissertat. Theologicis p. 43. 44. 45. & HENR. VALESIVM in Dedicacione ad Clerum Gallicanum, EVSEBIO a se edito praefixa. Iam vero, inquit is inter alia eleganter, ad convincendos haereticos nihil, meo quidem iudicio, efficacius est atque potentius, quam hoc genus scriptio- nis. Quippe hominum animi disputationibus ac ratiocinando aegre se vinci patiuntur. Et quoties constrictos se vident, nec habent quod respondeant, non tam veritati id adscribunt, quam adversariorum in disputando subtilitati ac versutiae. Certe diuturno experimento comprobatum est, seu scriptis seu viva voce editis disputationibus accendi potius haereticorum animos, quam sanari. Historia vero rerum Ecclesiasticarum, cum se in animos legentium placidius insinuet, longe faciliorem de iis vi- sionem refert. Et quae sequuntur. Verissima sunt haec in se spectata, tamen non nimis bono afferantur a VALESIO consilio.*

(\*\*) Extant binae non inconcinnae virorum doctissimorum ora- tiones, quibus dedita opera fructus, quos affert ingenuis amato- ribus suis sanctior Historia, enumerarunt. Altera est IOH. AL- PHONSI TURRETINI, Theologi Genevensis celeberrimi, de *multiplici sacrarum antiquitatum usu ac praestantia*: altera IOH. CLERICI, de *praestantia & utilitate Historiae Ecclesia- sticae*. Vtramque ob elegantiam & orationis nitorem dignam iu- dicavit V. C. IO. ERHARDVS KAPPIVS, quam in *Clarissimo- rum virorum Orationibus selectis Lipsiae 1722. 8.* editis, repeti curaret, illam p. 88. hanc p. 334.

(\*\*\*) Secundum Theologos nullis Historiae Ecclesiasticae cognitio plus spondet utilitatis, quam Iureconsultis, praesertim illis, qui ius ecclesiasticum tradunt & interpretantur. Ostendit hoc in- primis rationibus vir summus, IVSTVS HENNINGIVS BOEHME- RVS in *Iure Ecclesiastico Protestantium Lib. I. Tit. IV. §. XXI. p. 214. f.* & singulari *Dissertatione de necessitate & utilitate stu- dii Historiae Ecclesiasticae in Iuris Ecclesiastici prudentia*, quam *selectis observationibus* suis in PETRI DE MARCA *Opus de con- cordia sacerdotii & imperii* praemisit: & ipsamet exemplo suo egregie comprobavit. Edidit & libellum Germanicum de hoc argumento IOH. ERNESTVS FLOERCKEN, *Icnae 1726. in 8.*

Figure 4 Complete, Precise Citations in Mosheim's Institutes of Ecclesiastical History, 1739

Though thinkers like Flacius did not understand documentation to give historical claims what we might call objectivity, they did take it to give these claims the power to command and sway judgment.<sup>144</sup> The legal term—judgment—is neither a Kantian

<sup>144</sup> Many present-day notions of objectivity are deeply indebted to Kant; many of our notions of documentary-historical objectivity are particularly indebted to Ranke. Lorraine Daston's work on the history of objectivity and Anthony Grafton's on the history of footnotes in historical thinking stand out as especially instructive. Lorraine Daston,

borrowing nor an accident: document trails, eyewitness accounts, and the like had long been standards in parts of canon and political law.<sup>145</sup> Documented historical claims were arguably, like legal arguments, well suited for polemics, intended to make visible a need to judge, and ultimately to convince or justify a particular judgment and outcome.<sup>146</sup>

The unstated assumption in the judgment imagery—that the documentation that demands judgment or gives a claim legitimacy is accessible to both the judge and adversary—is of no small importance, for the ecclesiastical historians “provided much of the substance and the model of learned research which the Enlightened historians fused with elegant narrative.”<sup>147</sup> The scholar constructed his claims as legal advocate, but was also to act as a decider of fact. His aim was both the pursuit of truth and the advancement or defense of a particular, rationally-observationally supported claim.

## **Citation-Annotations and Document Comparison**

Citation-annotations, in other words, encourage the reader to carefully compare parts presented as such, and to see (or judge) how they make a whole. Storr and his students were deeply familiar with this comparative feature of document connection, for it is the most basic activity of what would come to be called source criticism.

I mentioned the tendency of present-day thinkers to characterize Storr's theological project as a relic or throwback. In truth, the observation more accurately

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"Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective," *Social Studies of Science* 22, no. 4 (1992); Anthony Grafton, *The Footnote: A Curious History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 52, 60.

<sup>145</sup> Both kinds of law had long made use of citation-annotation systems to organize both the maze of statutes, precedent, and documentary evidence.

<sup>146</sup> See Grafton's *The Footnote*, esp. his bibliographic material on law and history.

<sup>147</sup> Grafton, *The Footnote*, 168.



describes a trend among thinkers who situate Storr against a philosophical-historical backdrop.<sup>148</sup> Those who situate him in histories of biblical studies and biblical theology, by contrast, tend to remember Storr a pioneer in source criticism—more particularly, the first (or at least among the first) to propose Marcan priority, an answer to the so-called Synoptic problem that is today the most widely accepted.<sup>149</sup>

Notoriously byzantine in its concrete manifestations, the synoptic puzzle is, at a distance, relatively simple: some materials in the first (by order of appearance) three canonical Gospels—Matthew, Mark, and Luke—appear strikingly similar, and these materials appear to be arranged in strikingly similar orders. The puzzle appears when thinkers additionally assume, first, a need to account for these similarities, and, second,

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<sup>148</sup> It is uncommon, but not unheard of, to see these brought together in biographical sketches—but how the two might go together is never quite clear.

<sup>149</sup> On the history of the Synoptic Problem, see David Laird Dungan, *A History of the Synoptic Problem: The Canon, the Text, the Composition, and the Interpretation of the Gospels* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Bernard Orchard and Thomas R. W. Longstaff, *J. J. Griesbach: Synoptic and Text - Critical Studies 1776-1976* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Henry Owen, *Observations on the Four Gospels;: Tending Chiefly, to Ascertain the Times of Their Publication; and to Illustrate the Form and Manner of Their Composition* (T. Payne, next the Mews-Gate, Castle-Street, St. Martin's., 1764); Gottlob Christian Storr, *De Fonte Evangeliorum Matthaei Et Lucae* (1794); David B Peabody, Allan James McNicol, and Lamar Cope, *One Gospel from Two: Mark's Use of Matthew and Luke* (London: A&C Black, 2002); William R. Farmer, *The Synoptic Problem* (Mercer University Press, 1981); Craig Robert Wilson, "The Synoptic Problem: A Case Study in the Control of Knowledge" (Ed.D., Columbia University Teachers College, 1990); Mark S. Goodacre, *The Synoptic Problem: A Way through the Maze*, *Understanding the Bible and Its World* (London: T & T Clark International, 2005); William Reuben Farmer, *The Synoptic Problem: A Critical Analysis* (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1976); Mark Goodacre to NT Pod, 2010; to NT Pod, 2010; to NT Pod, 2010; to NT Pod, 2010; John Peter Lange, *The Gospel According to Mark: An Exegetical and Doctrinal Commentary* (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2007).

that 'borrowing' explains these similarities. A successful solution to the puzzle is a coherent collection of compelling arguments about who is borrowing from whom.<sup>150</sup>

The whole synoptic puzzle depends upon the juxtaposition and comparison of documents, and the visibility of a particular (here linguistic) similarity between those documents.<sup>151</sup> For synoptic puzzlers, this similarity is meaningful; it warrants an explanation. Put as a question, synoptic puzzlers notice a similarity and ask who is citing whom. Or: they notice a similarity and ask which author is citing another and which author's work is merely being cited.

Insofar as they indicate a source, Storr's biblical citation-annotations call on his students to compare Scripture and dogma, to see some similarity, and to judge that Scripture is the source of the dogma. Insofar as they indicate a justification, they call on his students to compare, see a similarity, and judge that Scripture warrants its dogmatic expression. That Storr's biblical citation-annotations indicated sources and justifications was no small matter, for Orthodox biblical theologians like Storr had been accused for much of the eighteenth-century of either asserting (as the state demanded) the truth of dogma on no grounds, or of reading dogma back into Scripture. For, from the standpoint of Pietist and rationalist biblical interpreters, it was impossible to read Scripture aright and to claim that Scripture is the source of dogma. And, Scripture, read aright, does not provide warrant for Orthodox dogma. In some sense, Storr's biblical citation-annotations assert against many of his colleagues and students that Scripture is both the source of and

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<sup>150</sup> Mark Goodacre's podcasts were especially helpful on this point; New Testament scholars may be more interested in his book.

<sup>151</sup> This is no small point; I will return to it as a basic problem of citation-annotation shortly.

warrant for Orthodox dogma.<sup>152</sup> They declare that dogma is reliable—not merely a collection of non-sense that serves the order of the state. And they declare that dogma’s source is not state mandate, but the divine Author.

### **Three-Document Comparison**

Now in addition to biblical citation-annotations, Storr peppers his dogmatic statements with historical, philological, and philosophical citation-annotations. As with biblical citations, Storr’s reader is to compare these documents with the dogmatic statement. But with the historical and scholarly materials, Storr hopes his reader will judge that it is not irrational to respect Scripture and the teachings drawn from it.<sup>153</sup> Remember, Storr is teaching his students to teach and defend biblical dogma.

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<sup>152</sup> See chapter 3 for more on this point, especially as it figured in the controversies about oaths.

<sup>153</sup> See Preface. *L*, x.

90 *De notione Dei ejusque veritate.*

d) l. c. §. 75. 77. f. p. 329. fs. 349. fs. cf. locos, a Flattio laudatos (Briefe über den moral. Erkenntnisgrund der Relig. p. 106. f.).

e) v. *Kantii* Crit. der Urtheilskraft §. 75. f. p. 332. fs.

f) l. l. §. 86. 91. p. 411. f. 472.

g) Spem & formidinem, naturæ nostræ morali conjunctam, reclamante conscientia; pro vana aut incerta habere debemus, nisi reliquam naturam ad has minas & ad illa promissa dirigi credamus (cf. l. l. §. 87. f. p. 414. fs. 429. f. 433. f.). Vicissim naturæ consensus ad certos fines nullum ipse finem habere nobis certe videtur, nisi tandem ferviat scopo morali (l. l. §. 86. p. 405. fs.). Ergo naturæ nostræ consentaneum est, nos pariter cum reliqua naturâ subjectos credere morali imperio, quique propterea, quod causam mundi intelligentem & moralem non licet oculis cernere aut cogente argumentatione assequi, sed (cf. Ebr. XI. 1) credere oportet (cf. v. 6. & *Kantium* l. c. §. 88. 90. 91. p. 424. fs. 438. fs. maxime p. 452. fs.), eandem recusant admittere, ii certe repugnant contra moralem suam naturam (l. l. §. 88. 91. p. 428. fs. 465. fs. 472. f. cf. supra not. d), vereque sunt ἀπολογητοί (Rom. I. 20), quemadmodum culpa non vacat, qui malum, quod prospicere & accommodata periculo ratione agendi etiam avertere poterat, eo subit, quod periculum, quamvis probabile, nolisset credere, sed necessariam prius demonstrationem postulasset, fieri utique non posse, ut metus mali vanus sit.

h) cf. *Kant* §. 91. p. 457.

i) v

Figure 5 Endnotes on Penultimate Page of §18, Storr's DC, 1793

Now Storr uses two different kinds of citation-annotation systems—one primarily for biblical citations, and one primarily for scholarly citations. And this creates the

opportunity for a three-document comparison: a reader might compare scholarly materials, dogma, and Scripture.<sup>154</sup> The reader might puzzle about their similarities, and even ask about how and whether the documents might be related—both inside and outside the *DC*.

In other words, Storr uses citation-annotations to create an opportunity for the sort of three-document comparative thinking with which he is at home and his students are at least nominally familiar. For in the synoptic puzzle, similarities between Matthew, Mark, and Luke seem to demand an explanation. Their similarities and indeed, their other relationships, come clearest when parts of the three documents are juxtaposed.

For example, in 1776, Griesbach published his *Synopsis Evangeliorum Matthaei, Marci et Lucae*. Where most previous Gospel compositions brought elements of each into a single story or Gospel harmony, Griesbach's book displayed (juxtaposed) similar bits of the synoptic Gospels in three parallel columns. If Gospel harmonies created an order that no Gospel followed and displayed only one version of shared or 'repeated' material, Griesbach's *Synopsis* presented all the versions of shared material and all three orders (some were easier to follow than others, but Griesbach's book has extensive cross-reference system and even a critical apparatus).

The *Synopsis* made clear that Mark seems to be a hinge book. Matthew and Luke rarely agree with one another and disagree with Mark. Put differently: when Matthew or Luke (but not both) deviate from Mark—in content or order of exposition—the other usually does not. Griesbach's *Synopsis* allegedly made visible that the agreement of

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<sup>154</sup> I explain how Storr's two annotation systems create the opportunity in depth below.

Luke and Matthew against Mark (populated outer columns, but an empty middle column) was far more rare than the alternatives (one unpopulated outer column). If Mark is a hinge book like this data (and Griesbach's layout) suggests, Synoptic puzzlers might best defend the notion that Mark was composed from Matthew and Luke, or that

Matthew and Luke both knew Mark.

SECTIO LXXIII. <span style="float: right;">147-</span>		
MAT. XVI.	MAR. VIII.	LUC. IX.
<p>ἑρῳατὰς μαθητὰς αὐτῆ, λέγων· τίνα εἰ-  <u>μέ</u> λέγεσιν οἱ ἀν-            θρωποὶ εἶναι, τὸν            υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου;            34 Οἱ δὲ εἶπον· οἱ μὲν,            ἰωάννην τὸν βαπτί-            στήν· ἄλλοι δὲ, ἡλίαν·            ἄλλοι δὲ, ἰερεμίαν, ἢ            ἓνα τῶν προφητῶν.            35 Λέγει αὐτοῖς· ὑμεῖς            δὲ τίνα με λέγετε εἶ-            ναι; Ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ            36 αὐτοῖς· εἶπε· σὺ εἶ ὁ χριστός, ὁ            υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς            37 ζῶντος. Καὶ ἀπο-            κριθεὶς ὁ ἰησοῦς, εἶ-            πεν αὐτῷ· μακά-            ριος εἶ, σίμων βῆρ ἰωνᾶ, ὅτι σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα οὐκ ἀπεκάλυψε σοι,            38 ἀλλ' ὁ πατήρ μου, ὁ ἐν τοῖς ἑρανοῖς. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ δὲ σοι λέγω, ὅτι            σὺ εἶ πέτρος, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ οἰκοδομήσω μου τὴν ἐκ-            39 κλησίαν καὶ πύλαι ἄδης οὐ κατισχύουσιν αὐτῆς. Καὶ δώσω σοι            τὰς κλεῖς τῆς βασιλείας τῶν ἑρανοῦν· ἅμα ὃ ἐὰν δήσης ἐπὶ τῆς            γῆς, ἔσται δεδεμένον ἐν τοῖς ἑρανοῖς· καὶ ὃ ἐὰν λύσης ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς,            ἔσται</p>	<p>μας κοισαρείας" τῆς Φιλίππου. καὶ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ ἐπήρωτα τὰς μαθητὰς αὐ-            τῆ, λέγων αὐτοῖς· τίνα με λέγεσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι εἶναι;            28 Οἱ δὲ ἀπεκρίθησαν· ἰωάννην τὸν βαπτί-            στήν καὶ ἄλλοι, ἡλί-            αν· ἄλλοι δὲ, ἓνα τῶν προφητῶν.            29 Καὶ αὐτὸς λέγει αὐτοῖς· ὑμεῖς δὲ τίνα με λέγετε εἶ-            ναι; ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ ὁ πέτρος, λέγει αὐ-            τῷ· σὺ εἶ ὁ χριστός.</p>	<p>μόνας, συνῆσαν αὐ-            τῷ οἱ μαθηταί, καὶ            ἐπήρωτησεν αὐτὰς,            λέγων· τίνα με λέ-            γουσιν οἱ ὄχλοι εἶ-            ναι; Οἱ δὲ ἀποκρι-            θεύτες εἶπον· ἰωάν-            νην τὸν βαπτίστην·            ἄλλοι δὲ, ἡλίαν· ἄλ-            λοι δὲ, ὅτι προφή-            της τῶν ἀρχαίων·            ἀνέστη.            20 Εἶπε δὲ αὐταῖς· ὑ-            μεῖς δὲ τίνα με λέ-            γετε εἶναι; ἀποκρι-            θεὶς δὲ ὁ πέτρος,            εἶπε· τὸν χριστὸν τοῦ            θεοῦ.</p>
K 2		
MAT.	MAR.	LUC.
<p>(f) = Copt. Aeth. Arr. Sax. Vulg. colb. Mm. gat. Iren. mf. Sed pates latt. plerique agnoscunt, me.    C. et Orig. ponunt post λέγασθ. (g) σώζοντος D. cant.*    + qui in hunc mundum venisti. Op. imp. et Iuvenc. (h) = L. al. j. Syr. Copt. Vulg. It. Euf. Cyr. (i) super ista confessione Felix rom. 3. epist. 5. (k) σε Thomas hier. ap. Abucar. Ad πέτρος refert Epiph. et Orig. semel. (l) κλεῖδες L. Orig.</p>	<p>(c) ὅτι εἶς C*L. ὡς ἔστιν D. Vulg. It. (d) ἐπηρώτα αὐτὰς. CD*L. 53. Copt. verc. cant. corb. colb.</p>	<p>(q) + ἄλλοι (l. ἄλλοι) δὲ ἰερεμίαν. 1. 13. 69. 118. alius. Syr. p. cum aff. (r) magnus colb. (s) + υἱὸν D. Goth. Sax. brix.    τῷ θεῷ = verc.    σὺ εἶ χριστὸς θεοῦ. Copt.</p>

Figure 6 Griesbach's Synopsis, 1776

Augustine suggested in the fourth century that Matthew was the first Gospel, and, although his was more a literary-aesthetic argument than an historical-critical one, it

remained in Storr's day the (overwhelmingly) prevailing view. If Griesbach's *Synopsis* suggested that Mark was the hinge, it is probably safe to assume that scholars would have been more eager to defend the notion that Mark was composed from Matthew and Luke. Indeed, it was quite a while before Matthean priority finally fell out of favor.

But in 1782, Koppe argued that Mark was not an epitome of Matthew, and that Mark may not have read Matthew at all. (Koppe also hypothesized that the Gospels were all composed out of whatever fragments their authors had at hand.) Griesbach developed between 1783 (*Fontes*) and 1794 (2d, rev. ed. of 1789-90 *Commentatio*) an argument for Markan posteriority. Storr argued in his 1786 (2d ed 1810) *Über den Zweck* for Markan priority. If both thinkers took Mark to be the hinge, they disagreed about which way the door swings: Griesbach imagined—contra Koppe—Luke and Matthew set in front of Mark, who composed the Gospel by extraction; Storr imagined Mark's Gospel on the desks, so to speak, of Luke and Matthew, who took from Mark a general order of exposition and the materials that best fit their Gospels.<sup>155</sup>

Storr was deeply familiar with three-document comparison; it was the basic practice in one of his primary areas of scholarly inquiry. I promised to explain how Storr's two citation-annotation systems create the opportunity for three-document comparison, and I want now to present the explanation along with evidence that Storr wanted to draw attention to the relationships between all three documents.

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<sup>155</sup> Storr's case for Markan priority included a comparison of three Gospel documents; it included additional internal or literary evidence; and it included external historical-documentary evidence (e.g., the testimony of ancients about their composition, artifacts that established earliest and latest possible composition dates and places, etc.), all of which pointed to Mark as the hinge-piece.



In Storr's book, the dogmatic statements organize and order the other materials: they bring together, they are the stuff of the relation between biblical citations and rational defense materials. And Storr wants to show that dogma can be given a rational and biblical justification. Dogmatic statements are the rhetorical hinge piece. This is how Storr foregrounds the human, relative-reliable status of dogma, and how he teaches his students to read dogma as human symbol capable of both biblical and rational justification.

But he also says that his rational defense aims not at gaining respect for dogma, but for Scripture. This suggests that Storr was interested to display a relationship between Scripture and reason that was not necessarily or entirely mediated by dogma. Reason's relationship to Scripture mattered more than its relation to dogma. And Storr points up that relationship when he brings the two citation-annotation systems together in §17. Permit me to explain.

*Annotations and the Question of Scope*

An annotation is recognizable as such always and only in relation to a primary verbal unit: put grammatically, everything we call (according to common sense) an annotation can and must have at least one relation to something else, which relation is expressed by a preposition. In many cases, we choose prepositions that rely on spatial, temporal, or sequential metaphors.<sup>156</sup> This is another way of saying that annotations create and solve problems of document layout and design. In the print era (and even the

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<sup>156</sup> On whether and how this is related to the fact that the marks we see as words would be indistinguishable without negative space I can only speculate. But that is also true: all the annotations I am concerned with here can be distinguished by their positions in 2- and 3-dimensional space.

digital) annotations belong as much to the sphere of rhetoric as they depend upon particular, historically determined material conditions.

How do readers discern relationships between particular noted materials and their corresponding annotations? How do annotators facilitate such discernment? Sometimes spatial proximity does the trick: a copy editor, for example, indicates which word should be deleted by marking through it and which should take its place by positioning the suggestion close by the deleted word. Parentheses allow an author to include an annotation 'within' a sentence—it falls in would-be negative space along the same baseline as the primary unit; the curved lines as much as spatial proximity flag the relationship between note and noted. But in other cases spatial proximity does most of the work: we read ink in the margins and the leading (the vertical space between the baselines of lines of text) as more closely related to the words beside, below, or above it. Sometimes we ink out the connection: we use line and shape (e.g., carets and arrows) to trace a path between (and sometimes mark off) the note and noted. Other times we use symbols to mark off indirect spatial relationships between note and noted: a rarefied imaginary line connects the materials nearby each of, for example, a pair of daggers.

In an oblique sense, to ask how readers know whether these daggers connect materials immediately, say, to their right and not their left might bring us to the problem of scope. How do readers know (and annotators indicate) where the annotated material begins and ends? If, say, a dagger marks the end of an annotated unit, what marks the beginning? If a superscript nine falls at the end of a paragraph, and superscript eight falls within it, does the note at nine pair with the entire paragraph? With the materials that

appeared after superscript eight? If it pairs with the entire paragraph, what is the relation of note nine to note eight?

I call this the question of scope. While these ambiguities rarely pose recognizable, substantial, meaningful, and urgent interpretive difficulties, they are not rare. Many digital reading and writing platforms offer elegant solutions to the (potential) problems of annotative precision: Microsoft Word's highlight-to-comment feature is perhaps the most famous example.<sup>157</sup> Before the digital revolution, annotators who required such precision used cumbersome brackets/lines or simply began a note with a quotation that contained the first and last words of the annotated material (e.g., "I call this.... famous example": My colleague wrongly calls this the Mormon question, because he first wished for the feature when using BYU alum Bruce Bastion's famous program, WordPerfect.'). Luther did this in his bible (see figure x).

### **Problems with Scope and Hierarchy**

Until recently (and even now in work governed by print-culture like this one), it was relatively difficult or exceeding cumbersome (and so costly in both time and paper), especially in print-culture, to clearly delimit the verbal unit to which a particular annotation belongs. This is easiest with pen and paper: it is one reason why many still prefer to edit and comment on a hard copy. But paper has rarely been so plentiful or affordable as it is today. Scribes sometimes drew lines or brackets (sometimes in a contrast color like red) around an annotated unit, but more often used a range of

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<sup>157</sup> And, especially in print, it is horrifically inelegant... sometimes utterly useless (e.g., when the lines that connect comments to text overlap with one another). Medium's now-retired side-annotation system was not perfect, but was far more elegant.

somewhat less precise techniques that turn on spatial proximity (e.g., interlinear notes). In the print world, authors like Luther sometimes began a note with the first and last few words of the unit it concerned (commentaries on classics and Scripture include good contemporary examples). And with digital documents, we have many ways to visually mark the exact unit to which a note applies without obscuring or permanently overwhelming words on the page (e.g., highlighting and hypertext).

But in print culture solutions like Luther's were (and are) frequently too difficult, cumbersome, or expensive to be practical. The problem remains: a superscript or parenthetical might mark off one side of the unit to which the note belongs, but the other side is not made explicit. Again, this does not make too many public problems. But it does have some interesting results. For example, some contemporary citation systems allow an author to cite a source that figures in several sentences of a paragraph at the end of that paragraph. These do not prohibit sentence or multi-sentence specific annotations within the same paragraph. So in this example, a previous superscript may not set the first possible word (or even first possible sentence) in the annotated unit: my end of paragraph annotation-citation might apply to all sentences prior, even if they have their own annotation-citations.

Neither indirect (i.e., found in margin, footnotes, or endnotes by way of referens/referendum matching) nor direct citations (e.g., parentheticals, quotations, body sentences about a work) have, in most print works, terribly precise scopes. Readers must rely heavily on the content of the annotated material and its note, on other context clues like placement in relation to grammatical wholes, punctuation, and other citations, and

ultimately on imaginative speculation when they need to determine a citation-annotation's precise scope.

In the *DC*, Storr adds citations wherever he sees fit. This was not uncommon, especially in biblical scholarship, where small verbal units frequently organized research and reflection. Storr's practice can be helpful, especially when a note concerns the meaning of a few particular words, and it does not—by itself—pose any substantial difficulties.

But Storr uses two citation systems, and so sometimes obscures whether, for example, the unit to which a particular endnote belongs includes or excludes a parenthetical citation. Other times the content of an endnote makes it clear or makes clear its irrelevance. But my point here is not about particular cases so much as the interpretive possibilities his two citation systems open up. In figure x, for example, we might wonder whether the note at 'a)', which likely concerns "*Ex quo... luculentiora*," does so exclusive of '(Rom. I. 20)' or inclusive.

Eum, quamvis non cernamus oculis, animo tamen cernere (τα αορατα αυτη νοεμενα καθοραν) licet. Ex quo enim mundus creatus est, invisibilis auctor ejus suis certe operibus conspicuus est (Rom. I. 20), in quibus, quo longius progreditur studium investigandi, hoc plura & luculentiora a) nexorum inter se finium certique ordinis vestigia apparent b). Et fane, qui nobis hac via se ma-

Figure 7 Storr Cites Where Sees Fit, His Two Citation Systems Overlap

In §17, an anomaly points up a curious possibility of his two systems: a citation within a citation, an indirect citation within a direct, an endnote flag within a parenthetical.<sup>158</sup>

DE NOTIONE DEI EIUSQUE VERITATE.

§. 17.

Homo, natura duce, sibi ipse præscribit & imperat certam agendi rationem tanta auctoritate a), ut, relegens b) acta & ad iussa illa interna tanquam ad normam examinans, se, quamvis solum & ab hominum aliorum iudicio remotum c), incuset ipse aut purget (Rom. II. 14. 15), tanquam si causa dicenda esset ante iudicem (v. 16. d) I. 32). Ergo iudicem invisibilem, malo incommoda, bono commoda necessentem, revereri natura nobis infitum est. e).

Figure 8 (Indirect) Citation within a (Direct) Citation (1793)

Presumably the note at “d)” applies at most to “*incuset... v16,*” but not to “[Rom.] I. 32,” although “(v. 16. ... I.32)” applies at the very least to “*tanquam si... iudicem.*” So unless “d)” applies just to “v. 16” and not the verbal unit that “v. 16” qualifies, it seems as if “d)” must apply to “I. 32,” even though “d)” closes the annotated unit before “I. 32” appears.

<sup>158</sup> I call it an anomaly because I have not found another example. It is presumably not a mistake, for it appears just this way in the 1807 edition. Flatt omits the endnote marker (4) and moves all the parentheticals to the end of the sentence (“Romans II. 14-16. I. 32”). He leaves the irregularly sequential endnote markers (3 and 5) in place, and maintains the full endnote, there marked (4). Schmucker follows Flatt, putting “(Romans II. 14-16. I. 32)” at the end of the sentence, but inserts the endnote marker “(4)” before the closing punctuation. Though both translations further dampen or “fix” the anomaly they inherited, Flatt’s manages to preserve the spirit of Storr’s citation: something odd is going on. See figures x - x below.

quamvis solum & ab hominum aliorum iudicio remotum c), incuset ipse aut purget (Rom. II. 14. 15), tanquam si causa dicenda esset ante iudicem (v. 16. d) I. 32). Ergo iudicem invisibilem, malo incommoda, bono

Figure 9 Citation within Citation Retained in New Edition (1807)

dann, wenn er einsam und entfernt von allen sichtbaren Richtern seiner Thaten ist, 3) vor sich selbst anklagt und entschuldiget, gleich als ob sich er vor einem Richter zu verantworten hätte (Röm. 2, 14—16. I, 32.). Es liegt demnach schon in der natürlichen Einrichtung unseres Geistes, uns vor einem unsichtbaren Richter zu scheuen, der das Böse mit Unglück bestraft, das Gute mit Wohlseyn belohnt, 5)

Figure 10 Missing 4) in Flatt's Translation

he examines(2) his actions by them, although he is far removed from all visible judges of his conduct (3), he excuses or accuses himself, just as if he were arraigned before some visible tribunal (Rom. 2: 14—16. 1: 32) (4). The very constitution of the human soul, therefore, leads us to fear an invisible Judge, who punishes wickedness with misery, and dispenses happiness as the reward of virtue(5).

Figure 11 Return of (4) in Schmucker's Translation of Flatt

Storr's citation-annotation within a citation-annotation brings to the surface a question that might otherwise go unnoticed: are Storr's two citation-annotation

systems independent, self-contained or are they interrelated? Even if Storr had not given a citation-annotation within a citation-annotation, a reader might ask something like this: if a superscript 'a' falls at the end of a sentence that contains a parenthetical biblical citation, does the note at 'a' apply to the sentence sans parenthetical or to the biblical citation as well. Does the scope of one annotation system, in other words, include or exclude the other, and vice-versa. But Storr's citation-annotation within a citation-annotation introduces the even more curious possibility that an endnote might belong to a parenthetical note, or perhaps even to some small portion of a parenthetical note.

Storr's citation-annotation within a citation-annotation draws attention to the relationships between his cited materials. It draws attention to the three-document structure that his two citation-annotation systems display, particularly to the possibility that, while his biblical and rational materials both stand in relation to the dogmatic statements, they might be understood to have a relation that is not governed by the dogmatic statements.

In other words, If Storr's citation-annotation within a citation-annotation draws attention to the relationships between his cited materials, it also draws attention to the ambiguity of scope that his two citation-annotation systems introduce. It is frequently unclear whether the rational exposition in Storr's endnote is the context for reading a dogmatic statement alone or the dogmatic statement along with its parenthetical biblical citations. And it is frequently unclear whether his parenthetical biblical citations are the context for reading the dogmatic statement alone or the dogmatic statement along with its rational explanations in the endnotes.



Put differently, citation-annotations divide the primary part of a work into sequentially connected smaller parts. For they interrupt the train of thought and declare that something else is the context—the cited work and this particular part of the primary work are the contexts in which to interpret each other. With citation-annotations, Storr has the power to choose *when* in the course of exposition to display certain materials and modes of argumentation. He chooses when and where he wants to interrupt, to qualify, to make sure that his students understand the dogma aright (i.e., as he does).<sup>159</sup> Much like the reader chooses when and where he wants to stop following one train (to stop seeing the primary body as the whole in question) and start following another (to start seeing the primary body and the citation-annotation each as parts of a larger whole).

With a single citation-annotation system, the reader may (but need not) assume that the previous citation forms the bound of its largest possible scope. In other words, each citation (or citation-marker) makes the bounds of a part of the primary body material. But with two citation-annotation systems, the bounds of the parts of the primary body material are not so clearly defined. Storr's two citation-annotation systems, then, make it possible to think of his dogmatic statements as divided into parts by two different kinds of interruptions. But they also make it difficult to distinguish between these two orders of interruption, two ways of breaking dogma into parts, two ways of building dogma-citation-annotation wholes.

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<sup>159</sup> In Storr's day, citation-annotation practices were regulated, but not nearly so tightly as today. He could—and did—insert citations wherever he saw fit; he did not have to put them, for example, after any particular punctuation.

The practical point is just that Storr arguably displays a relation (suggests a comparison) between the primary source and guide of biblical theology (Scripture) and rational argumentation throughout his book—not just in this curious part of §17. And so the ambiguity of scope that Storr's two citation-annotation systems introduces coheres with Storr's claim that his expositions on reason's terms are designed to establish and protect respect for Scripture—not for biblical dogma.

Storr's dogmatic statements may not be the only possible hinge in his three-document display. It might organize his materials. But the vocabulary of biblical theology might not be the only way to think about the connection between Scripture and rational exposition. It might be, as I will argue in the next section, that Storr shows with his biblical citations that Scripture is the historical, linguistic source of dogma, and that the language common to Scripture and dogma is also the source of the language in his rational explanations. This coheres, I will argue, with his notion that the language of Scripture is both human and divine, and with his notion that dogma is a human symbolic expression or summary of Scripture.

For the most part, the material in Storr's rational explanations could only be historically and linguistically dependent on Scripture, dogma, or both—if they were dependent on it at all. It would seem odd if the vocabularies of eighteenth-century rationalities with which Storr might hope to make a case for the respectability of Scripture, in other words, were the historical-linguistic source of Scripture or of the dogma many of these rationalities rejected.

Nevertheless, Storr perhaps primed his students to consider the three documents' historical and linguistic relationships (source-critical thinking) when, in the Preface, he inserted Griesbach (the author of the Synopsis) into his remarks on the *DC*'s aim, technique, and organization.<sup>160</sup> Indeed, he perhaps cued his students to make the shift in §17, where he cites and discusses at length the work of Koppe—another major player in Storr's conversations about the synoptic puzzle.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> *DC*, v.

<sup>161</sup> Citations are symbols, and citations contain symbols. Citations frequently contain two grammatically curious proper names: book (essay, letter, etc.) titles and names of persons. As symbols, these both, I am asserting, hold together the “contents” or “core characteristics” of a work or person, perhaps most frequently for the sake of ease of communication. There is, in an important sense, no object, Kant's first *Critique* or Gottlob Storr; we dub what might otherwise be an unmanageable mess of direct descriptions, and, in an important sense, it does not matter for books or people whether a proper name has any relation to any of the valences it holds together. Indeed, books and people frequently have the same proper name as other, quite different, books and people, and there is no problem. Some names of books, of course, might be understood as part-whole symbols of their contents (e.g., *The World as I Found It* might be the most fitting title for Wittgenstein's articulables). Proper names already work because they are sticky (they can hold together all kinds of wildly different stuff) and context-sticky (“David Alexander” means my father at my father's house and my brother at my brother's house). Communities more or less prescribe ranges of possible meanings of these proper names: both in reference (e.g., *The World as I Found It* is in some communities Wittgenstein's hypothetical book in others, perhaps something quite different) and in number and kind of valence (e.g., Romans may hold together much more than the contents of the first epistle). When we read names or (inclusive) titles within citations, one or two valences may predominate in consciousness, but the others do not disappear. To state a perfectly obvious point: when we read Storr's citations, we might ask not just about the words or persons or books to which they refer, but also about their other valences. On to the more important point: citations are symbols. When I say they are symbols, I mean that they are images in which at least two valences are held together. As symbols, citations aid or minimally impede the flow of thought, for they communicate more than one thing at once without demanding intense attention (i.e., they work in a kind of “immediate” fashion). Here is an importantly disanalogous example: in everyday contemporary US American life, the meanings and rhetorical functions of a bumper sticker that reads “John 3:16” go far beyond the words to which it points (in the blink of an eye)—so much so that to call it a citation seems as wrongheaded as correct. But even (if

And in §§17-18, there appears the possibility that Scripture and dogma attest to the existence of God *after and because reason attests to it*. There reason's awareness of a God

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not especially) in scholarly contexts, I am saying, citations communicate more than one thing at once without demanding intense attention.

For example, citations are symbols of the content to which they point (a whole that stands in for a combination of those parts); symbols of community-sanctioned interpretations and valuations of that content, author, work as a whole; metonymic symbols of entire bodies of work, related by concepts, genre, method, etc., (no one cites all their 'intellectual debts'—we choose a few to stand in for the whole, especially when we want to be associated with some and distanced from others); symbols of community participation (I have read that book, too; all legit x scholars will cite m, k, b when they discuss q; I disagree with p about w); and symbols of conformity (or non-conformity) to community-sanctioned citation practices, to name only a few. Perhaps most important for this essay, citations can be construed as symbols of conformity to particular reading methods and to corresponding notions about the shape and possibilities of evidentiary reasoning. They can be understood to include, in other words, assumptions about the standards and limits of communicability and of inter-subjective accessibility, about what sorts of content ought be/ are best brought in relation to the body claim, etc. From a different angle: when a citation points to some expression that does not relate to the body claim as we expect it to, it could be an error, but it could also point up a difference between our assumptions about reading and evidentiary/text-relational reasoning and an author's assumptions. If we can detect patterns, we might be able to make out something of the shape of another sort of reading and reasoning.

We might provisionally say that Estienne's versification system added to a set of chapter-citation-symbols an entirely new set of chapter-verse-citation-symbols. And we might expect that the relations of the groups of words to which they refer do not exhaust the relation of these citation-symbols to one another. We now have at hand a way to talk about how the conflation of images across Scripture, so that the people in Romans 1 were the Gentiles in Galatians and First Corinthians, the idolaters in Acts, etc., survived the versification of Scripture by aligning with the citations it provided. Romans 2:15, for example, would come to hold together a particular sub-set of the valences that once belonged to Romans 2, including associative web-like links to other particular passages. Romans 1:1-3 and Acts 9:1-16 and 1 Cor 1:x and Galatians x:yy would form a symbolic web. But the indexification of Scripture is always also the creation of (perhaps more particular, or differently organized) symbol sets. A symbol set, instead of more vague/image similarities, might be based on the occurrence of a particular Greek word for apostle (e.g., the web a reader built as he followed a lexicon or concordance-path).

Cf. Henry G. Small, "Cited Documents as Concept Symbols," *Social Studies of Science* 8, no. 3 (1978); Robert J. Connors, "The Rhetoric of Citation Systems—Part II: Competing Epistemic Values in Citation," *Rhetoric Review* 17, no. 2.

who is able to do what humans must and cannot might be the three documents' common source. Storr cites Kant's moral and physico-theological arguments for rational belief in God, but even Kant claims that he has only given them the most recent articulation.

Indeed, Kant says this of the moral argument:

This moral proof is not any newly invented argument, but at most only a newly articulated one; for it lay in the human faculty of reason even before its earliest germination, and with the progressive cultivation of that faculty has merely become more developed. As soon as human beings began to reflect on right and wrong, at a time when they still indifferently overlooked the purposiveness of nature, taking advantage of it without thinking that to be anything more than the usual course of nature, the judgment must inevitably have occurred to them that it could not in the end make no difference if a person has conducted himself honestly or falsely, fairly or violently, even if to the end of his life he has found at least no visible reward for his virtues or punishment for his crimes. It is as if they heard an inner voice that things must come out differently; hence there must have lain hidden in them the representation, even if obscure, of something they felt themselves obligated to strive for which would not be compatible with such an outcome, or which, if they regarded the ordinary course of the world as the only order of things, they did not in turn know how to reconcile with that inner vocation of their mind.

And of the physico-theological proof he says this:

This proof always deserves to be named with respect. It is the oldest, clearest and the most appropriate to common human reason. It enlivens the study of nature, just as it gets its existence from this study and through it receives ever renewed force. It brings in ends and aims where extends our information about nature through the guiding thread of a particular unity whose principle" is outside nature. But this acquaintance also reacts upon its cause, namely the idea that occasioned it, and increases the belief in a highest

author to the point where it becomes an Irresistible conviction.<sup>162</sup>

Storr used annotation-citations, I have argued, to display and arrange his materials in ways that may make sense to his rationalist detractors. He employed them to point to evidence and to indicate the source of his claims. His citation-annotations foregrounded the biblical warrant for dogma and rationality of biblical doctrine. With citation annotations, Storr created opportunity for three-document comparison, and drew attention to the possibility that his biblical and rational-defense materials might have something in common aside from their place in dogmatic statements. Storr's citation-annotations cue his readers to consider the historical-linguistic relationships between his materials. And they suggest that reason's awareness of God might be the source of Scripture and dogma—that biblical theology might in some way depend upon the work of human reason. All of these uses would be familiar and appear appropriate to Storr's rationalist biblical scholars and students alike; they make sense given a rationalist rule of configuration.

In the next section, I show that Storr uses citation-annotations and the loci method to display the relationships between his dogmatic statements, Scripture, and rational explanations on terms that the Orthodox biblical theologian accepts.

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<sup>162</sup> A623/B651; *CPR*, 579-80.

## Biblical Citation-Annotations in the Lutheran Tradition

Among the smallest parts of Storr's *DC* are biblical citations. He inherited from the Lutheran tradition the practice of using them to display relationships between parts of Scripture according to the rule of configuration and to display relationships between parts of Scripture and Lutheran dogma.<sup>163</sup> Early Lutherans peppered their Bibles, Catechisms, Symbols, and theology textbooks with biblical citations, just as they famously did in polemics.

If the divinely revealed rule of configuration stood at the heart of Lutheran biblical interpretation, context was the soul of Lutheran biblical-theological argumentation, and annotation its quintessential technique. Lutheran biblical theology was grounded in a logic of context (a rule of configuration), and annotation was the print-era's essential tool for displaying and controlling it. At the same time, Scripture is the central document of Lutheran thinking—the highest measure of reliability and the battleground on which Luther forced his opponents to play: biblical citations permeate its positive and polemical corpus. Lutherans were quick to see the value of combining the powers of annotation (by which one could control context) and biblical citation (by which one could link to divine authority) into biblical citation-annotation.

Early Lutherans used biblical citation-annotations to teach readers the rule of configuration of Scripture (to associate some parts of Scripture with others) and to teach readers to associate some parts of Scripture with dogma. While they famously resisted the

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<sup>163</sup> I'm still looking for the citations, but there's a whole group of thinkers (I'm pretty sure Kolb is one) who talk about the Lutheran mode of argumentation as basically the modification and display of contexts.

“darkening” of the light of Scripture “by glosses and by many a useless comment,” Lutheran bibles are replete with glosses and biblical citation-annotations.<sup>164</sup> For example, Luther included in the 1534 Steyner edition (figure x) annotations of several sorts: commonplace navigational aids, including numbered chapter headings, and alphabetical section markers (the former within the body, the latter in the margins); biblical cross-references (in the margins); superscript alphabetical indirect reference markers (within the body); and finally, glosses. Each gloss begins with an indirect reference marker, and the glosses appear within the body at the end of each alphabetically delineated section.

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<sup>164</sup> *LW*, Preface to the Letter of St. Paul to the Romans by Martin Luther, 1483-1546 Translated by Bro. Andrew Thornton, OSB; "Vorrede auff die Epistel S. Paul: an die Romer" in *D. Martin Luther: Die gantze Heilige Schrift Deudsch 1545 aufs new zurericht*, ed. Hans Volz and Heinz Blanke. Munich: Roger & Bernhard. 1972, vol. 2, pp. 2254-2268.






Figure 12 Luther Bible, Steyner 1534

In the Lufft edition of 1550, Luther's cross-references move to the short margin and his glosses move to the wide margin. The body is reserved for Holy Writ. Negative space and spatial distance make clearer the distinction between these additions and the divine Word.




Figure 13 Luther Bible, Lufft 1550

Luther's annotations, like Rome's, were efforts to direct the meaning of Scripture. Put more generously, efforts to demonstrate proper reading practices—to make clear the normative associative structures within which Scripture meant. However vague, Luther's cross-references assert that some passage provides the context within which another passage's meaning can be made clear.

While they famously characterized Roman dogma as human invention, Lutherans exploited biblical citation-annotations to maintain *sola scriptura* even as they produced their own Symbols. In Lutheran bibles and in Catechisms, Creeds, and dogmatic

theologies, biblical citation-annotations display (teach) the Lutheran rule of configuration of Scripture. At the same time, they assert a relationship between the cited passages and the symbolic summary of them.

For example, in Figure X, we see Melancthon teaching a reader to associate parts of Acts, Hebrews, Colossians, 1 Timothy, etc. with one another and with the doctrine of creation.




Figure 14 Citation in Melancthon's Loci, 1541

Luther's Small Catechism contains another example of pedagogical citation-annotations. He twice follows the answer to a doctrinal question with "where is this written."

What does such baptizing with water signify?

-Answer.

It signifies that the old Adam in us should, by daily contrition and repentance, be drowned and die with all sins and evil lusts, and, again, a new man daily come forth and arise, who shall live before God in righteousness and purity forever.

Where is this written?

-Answer.

St. Paul says Romans, chapter 6: We are buried with Christ by Baptism into death, that, like as He was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life. [...]

*What is the Sacrament of the Altar?*

It is the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, under the bread and wine, for us Christians to eat and to drink, instituted by Christ Himself.

*Where is this written?*

The holy Evangelists, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and St. Paul, write thus:

*Our Lord Jesus Christ, the same night in which He was betrayed, took bread: and when He had given thanks, He brake it, and gave it to His disciples, and said, Take, eat; this is My body, which is given for you. This do in remembrance of Me.*

*After the same manner also He took the cup, when He had supped, gave thanks, and gave it to them, saying, Take, drink ye all of it. This cup is the new testament in My blood, which is shed for you for the remission of sins. This do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of Me.<sup>165</sup>*

Luther's questions teach his readers to ask where in Scripture some doctrine can be found, and so to imagine doctrine in relation to some particular part of Scripture. Put

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<sup>165</sup> Small Catechism, 1986 (<http://bookofconcord.org/smallcatechism.php>)

differently, his questions train his readers—largely children and non-theologians—to think on the terms of *sola scriptura*.



Figure 15 Citation as Answer to Catechetical Question, Luther's Small Catechism, 1557<sup>166</sup>

Luther's Small Catechism of 1557 is an especially fine example of the impulse to teach readers to connect images (symbolic expressions) with particular parts of Scripture.

Each of its illustrations (see figures x and x) is annotated with biblical citations. In these examples, as in more complicated Symbolic books, the reader comes to think of images in relation to some *group* of parts of Scripture. They learn both to group these passages and to connect the group to the image.

<sup>166</sup> Authored by Luther, 1529

The loci, then, taught readers to think about human creations or symbolic expressions in relation to divine words or particular parts (or groups of parts) of Scripture. They taught readers to think themselves in need of relatively-reliable images by which to grasp the divine message of Scripture.




Figure 16 Citations and Images in Luther's Small Catechism, 1557




Figure 17 Citations and Images in Luther's Small Catechism, 1557<sup>167</sup>

To recap: with the loci methods, early Lutherans made human summaries and symbols of parts of the divine book, and so made Scripture fit for human teaching and

<sup>167</sup> Figures x and x here are perhaps better understood as symbols of my point that the early Lutherans put biblical citations in relation to images (here literally, in the symbolic books, figuratively: taken to be human-built), particularly for teaching or otherwise making materials bite-sized. Luther used these images-citation combinations as early as the Luft 1529 *Enchiridion* (which included the Small Catechism). They appeared also in the prayer book (which included a Passional) as early as 1529. See Ruth B. Bottigheimer, "Bible Reading, "Bibles" and the Bible for Children in Early Modern Germany," *Past & Present*, no. 139 (1993); Lee Palmer Wandel, *Reading Catechisms, Teaching Religion* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 276ff.

learning. They insisted that these summaries (dogmas) not be read into Scripture and yet be understood as taken from Scripture. With biblical citations, they juxtaposed human images, summaries, and symbols with parts of the divine book. They taught readers to associate parts of Scripture with one another and groups of Scripture with particular dogmas. The method reinforced the notions that human minds are limited (by contrast with the divine mind), and that Lutheran dogma was based on Scripture alone (no human invention). Biblical citations had two basic pedagogical functions in the loci: on the one hand, they taught readers to associate particular parts of Scripture with one another and with dogma. On the other, they taught readers to organize the associated materials (Scripture and dogma) according to their divinity or humanity.

**Aside: Versification**

Storr's biblical citations bear the mark of Robert Estienne's division of Scripture into numbered parts. In the wake of Luther's quarrel with Rome, cross-confessional conversation was increasingly organized around and carried out with Scripture.<sup>168</sup> But biblical reference systems were not yet precise tools for defending and advancing particular claims. While the grammatical and rhetorical tools Luther and Melancthon used to pick out the smallest visible whole-parts of Word were relatively precise, the technologies they used to communicate about these were somewhat less precise, and

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<sup>168</sup> See esp. Robert J. Connors, "The Rhetoric of Citation Systems, Part I: The Development of Annotation Structures from the Renaissance to 1900," *Rhetoric Review* 17, no. 1 (1998).



certainly not so widely (spatially, geographically) shared as the basics elements of Greek and Hebrew grammar.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> They both, for example, referred to Greek and Hebrew grammar to discern complete thoughts or sentences. Erasmus and Melanchthon both drew on rhetorical traditions to distinguish units of thought that did not necessarily correspond to sentences or paragraphs. Melanchthon called these, following Cicero, schemata or hypotyposes. They make unities — Kant will later distinguish between schematic and symbolic hypotyposes. The former has to do with *a priori* intuitions taken up under concepts of the understanding (the formation of the schema for an *a priori* concept of an object of possible experience), the latter with *a priori* intuition that comes under an idea of reason, the imaging (presentation) of which sensibility can provide no guide. (This is not, strictly speaking, hypotyposis, Kant notes, but he uses the analogy.) Symbolic hypotyposes, thus, work by analogy. Though it is potentially misleading, it might be helpful to remember that at the end of his early essay on the Heavens, Kant explained that the speculative application of Newtonian mechanics to the distant heavens of which order we have no experience, depends upon an analogy. His claims about the heavens only hold, in other words, provided that the order we know is the same order or at least sufficiently similar to the order that we do not. For our capacity to make of the universe a unity—to make of nature a law governed whole that goes beyond our experience, out as far as we think we can ‘see’ (and, in the critical move, our incapacity to not make these wholes)—can easily trick us into thinking that no analogy is necessary. But to make disappear the analogy—and this is extremely important to Kant’s thinking throughout his career—is to assign to oneself an intuitive intellect, or the power to present and ‘create’ reality (ungrounded in experience). It should be obvious now that Kant’s distinction between things in themselves and representations is in an important sense a rhetorical reminder that, while we may give the law to nature, and have a right to claim knowledge of objects of possible experience (have a right to claim a connection to reality), and while we may rightly see nature as a law-governed whole, and while we may also claim a right to extend our law-giving to objects of possible experience as far as the eye can see (and so claim that careful, limited speculation by analogy is grounded in reality), we do not also have a right to pretend that the analogy is of no matter, or, what is the same, to claim that our ‘seeing’ that we give law to the whole of nature (as far as the eye can see, even beyond what we can experience-beyond a sum total) means that things must be just as we think they are. In fact, we neither know that nor have a vantage point from which to make the claim. When Jacobi goes after Kant on this point, he skips over, from my point of view at least, the thing in itself’s rhetorical value in relation to Kant’s comparison (more or less a throw away speculation for illustrative purposes) in the B deduction between the intuiting intellect and ours, which “can only think.” Kant is not claiming anything about God here, but stating an important assumption (or perfectly obvious to him statement) about human thinking: it does not make things or make things happen.

Many Christian Bibles in the first two-thirds of the sixteenth century shared a system of chapter divisions (artificial wholes).<sup>170</sup> Fewer shared a system of dividing chapters into several sections—usually marked by letters (e.g., a, b, c, d).<sup>172</sup> Luther and friends tended to use the more widely shared system, but sometimes used both. Cross-references, for example, suggest a connection between some part of Scripture physically near to the cross-reference and the materials in an entire chapter or, at best, quarter-chapter, in another place.

While earlier Lutherans could talk about the relation of the divine words, phrases, and thoughts to one another and to particular symbols—especially with those nearby, who shared a Greek or Hebrew edition or even a translation—it was much more difficult to communicate precisely (without further, clunky explanation) with others. Put differently, it was more difficult to pick out, point to, and to distinguish key nodes in the Lutheran web (e.g., the “law on hearts” and “impious/immoral idolatry”)—within their

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170 Jewish copyists used a numeric annotation system more than a millenium before English monks, inspired by Hebrew documents, implemented between 1180 and 1200 the modern New Testament chapter divisions to which we are heirs. For the riveting (at least for geeks) tales of twelfth- and thirteenth-century New Testament chapter divisions and their debts to Hebrew and Arabic scribes, see Peter Saenger's essay, "The Twelfth Century Reception of Oriental Languages and the Graphic Mise en Page of Latin Vulgate Bibles Copied in England," in *Form and Function of the Late Medieval Bible*, :Brill, 2013, pp. 31-66. Saenger's is a far better documented and interesting story than those it displaces, which credit the French Dominicans or Robert Langton with the modern chapter divisions. ('Modern' is Saenger's word. Elsewhere in this essay, it does not include the twelfth, thirteenth, or even fourteenth centuries. I add 'Christian' as a reminder that—considered rhetorically— even numbers are not neutral.)

171 Marginal biblical references by chapter number predated these modern chapter divisions. There were already many local systems for breaking down chapters. I know from secondaries that they also had a system of references, but I haven't seen myself an example yet.

<sup>172</sup> These divisions were more frequently imagined than printed in Bibles, although they are clearly marked in Eck's Bible—see figure x, above.

'original' contexts—when communicating with others than it would quickly become. And communication about these thoughts (and indirect communication about their relations) either was extremely precise (e.g., “law on hearts”) or relatively vague (e.g., Romans 1, Romans 2): the annotation-citational webbing was, compared to the post-versification webbing, thin (cumbersome) or thick (imprecise).

While this might pose communication problems for contemporary readers, much of the webbing assumed familiarity with the language of Scripture and worked by what we would call allusion (thematic, figural, or grammatical similarity). But not everyone—in cross-confessional and catechetical settings alike—shared a worldview within which a book and chapter citation was precise enough to communicate the connection between verbal units some annotator wanted to draw.

If some combination of the printing press, vernacular translations, humanism, and reforms had dethroned the shared European Bible (Jerome's Vulgate), while boosting the Bible's social, political, and cultural value, Estienne's verse numbering system (and the precise references that arrived with) met a need for a 'neutral' and universal (across Europe shared) means of connection, communication, collaboration, comparison, and battle—in and through and about Holy Scripture. The technology was adopted across Europe in a mere sixty years. William Weaver summarizes:

Estienne's verselets first appeared in his 1551, 4th edition of the Greek New Testament. Within the decade, they appeared in French (1552), Italian (1555), Dutch (1556), and English (1557) editions of the New Testament. The verse divisions were taken over (with some variations) by the Calvinist Theodore de Beze in his nine editions of the Greek New Testament that appeared between 1565 and

1604. Estienne first printed an entire Bible with verse divisions in his 1553 French edition. These were soon adopted in English Bibles, including the Geneva Bible in 1560 and the Bishops Bible in 1568. Rome adopted the verse divisions in its authorized Bibles, the 1590 "Sixtine" and the revised 1592 "Clementine" editions of the Vulgate. By the time the King James Version appeared in 1611, the presentation of Scripture divided into numbered verselets, a novelty only sixty years old, was a standard of Bible printing.<sup>173</sup>

Missing from Weaver's account (and several others') are the German translations, which appeared in a Heidelberg edition of Luther's Bible in 1568, and in a more widely circulated version of 1582.<sup>174</sup> Estienne's verse numbering system was hardly the first attempt at making Scripture easily navigable.<sup>175/76</sup> Nor was Estienne's the first essay in

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<sup>173</sup> William Weaver, "The Verse Divisions of the New Testament and the Literary Culture of the Reformation," *Reformation* 16, no. 1 (2011): 162.

<sup>174</sup> See Eberhard Nestle, "Die Erste Lutherbibel Mit Verzählung," *Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen* 20 (1903). Already in 1903, Nestle noted that the Anglophone authors seemed much more interested in the topic of versification—something I found salient in my (admittedly not exhaustive) research. While Nestle claims this is the first, I am afraid in the age of GoogleBooks to be so bold.

<sup>175</sup> Jewish copyists used a numeric annotation system more than a millenium before English monks, inspired by Hebrew documents, implemented between 1180 and 1200 the modern New Testament chapter divisions to which we are heirs.

For the riveting (at least for geeks) tales of twelfth- and thirteenth-century New Testament chapter divisions and their debts to Hebrew and Arabic scribes, see Peter Saenger's essay, "The Twelfth Century Reception of Oriental Languages and the Graphic *Mise en Page* of Latin Vulgate Bibles Copied in England," in *Form and Function of the Late Medieval Bible*, :Brill, 2013, pp. 31-66. Saenger's is a far better documented and interesting story than those it displaces, which credit the French Dominicans or Robert Langton with the modern chapter divisions.

'Modern' is Saenger's word. Elsewhere in this essay, it does not include the twelfth, thirteenth, or even fourteenth centuries. I add 'Christian' as a reminder that—considered rhetorically— even numbers are not neutral.

<sup>176</sup> Marginal biblical references by chapter number predated these modern chapter divisions. There were already many local systems for breaking down chapters. But there were no systematic ways of breaking down chapters that were so widely and so quickly adopted by so many different readers.

print, or the first with standardization or (relatively) wide use.<sup>177</sup> Rather it was the system that, as Weaver puts it, “hit a nerve.”

In 1551, Robert Estienne issued his fourth edition of the Greek New Testament and the first with the system of versification we more or less use today. Estienne had divided the document into what William Weaver aptly calls “units of discourse,” for, like the chapter divisions and subdivisions early Lutherans used, they do not cleanly map onto the grammatical thought-wholes with which later modern and contemporary readers were and are most comfortable: sentences and paragraphs. Estienne marked each of these bite-sized wholes with a superscript Arabic number, and so birthed what remains an altogether unique system of reference. The system’s uses were and remain legion. Estienne, for example, had in mind when he versified this New Testament to publish a companion concordance, thus perhaps boosting sales of both books.

The versification of Scripture supported the development of the notion that Scripture was a shared “object” while simultaneously helping to subtly frame biblical interpretation and biblical argumentation as an exercise in part-whole relations. If the relations between parts of Scripture and Scripture as a whole (as in translation and annotation) and between parts of Scripture and confessional summaries or topics were obscured in ‘interpretive warfare’, the citations Estienne’s versification system made possible obscured (by determining whole units of discourse) and enabled clearer communication about these relations on the one hand, and enabled, on the other, a kind

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177 Peter Saenger has painstakingly documented a wide range of medieval and early modern, manuscript and print efforts at the task.

of precision in exegetical argumentation best suited to an “objective completion” style of intellectual battle.

The sameness built *into* Bibles provided the illusion of a common ground for conflicts that sometimes had less to do with differences about interpretive technique or biblical authority than with the significance of Scripture in light of deeply held convictions about the shape of the divine order. The near ‘universal’ imposition of the series arguably made it seem, in other words, as if the comparisons the series made possible were made possible by a shared but never experienced common ‘object’ or ‘source’, and thus that the relations amongst verses within that common object or source were also (not merely could also be) shared via communication (invisibly revealed), but never experienced.

Estienne’s versification system made possible a ‘universally’ (Europe and colonies-wide) shared system of complete, precise citation, which would become the ideal and the model for academic citation more generally. This enabled further democratization of biblical document study (more participants in battle) and enabled a kind of precision in exegetical argumentation (which was frequently polemical) much better suited to modern intellectual battles in which documentation was the preferred weapon.

Estienne’s versification was adopted quickly and widely, so that by the mid-seventeenth century, ideas about the precise relationships between verses (the thoughts of God) could, in principle, be understood (or ‘seen’) and evaluated by thinkers across Europe (and territories)... and they could more readily be understood (or ‘seen’) and evaluated in relation to Greek and Hebrew documents, various confessional and non-confessional translations, etc. More simply, Estienne made it very easy to say and show

precisely which passages one understood to be the “context(s)” for reading another, and so much easier to destabilize other webs and easier to point out ‘evidence’ for the validity of one’s own. While allusion remained an important way to bring passages together through rhetorical figures, they could now be much more precisely cited, indexed; figural bleed could be obviated when necessary. In short, verses allowed more precision in the explication of the *hexis* (stable, but not static arrangement) of the mind of God and order of reality—and so more room to move in some places, and more reinforcements in others.

In the wake of its adoption, people could more easily object to particular manuscripts or translations on the one hand, and, in many cases, even in the absence of agreement about manuscripts or translations, go on comparing translations to one another and to (what many thinkers understood as) these translations’ sources. Authors could cite chapter and verse and assume (however falsely) that their readers could assess the claims or symbols the author took a citation to support, quite without referencing the same particular manuscript, edition, or translation as the author. Authors could more easily advance and defend results that depended upon hierarchical webs of the divine thoughts, for Scripture was already as they and their readers came to it divided into these thoughts.<sup>178</sup>

We might sum up the import of versification thus: the widely-shared biblical citation system supplied a widely-shared set of rules by which to determined units of

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<sup>178</sup> Another way to put this would be to say that the Lutheran method of reading was more or less the indexification of Scripture, and that Estienne’s division into verselets facilitated Lutheran indexification on the one hand, and many other Protestant, Roman, and natural philosophical indexifications on the other. See Luther’s comments after he stole Melanchthon’s Annotations on Romans and published them without his permission.

discourse and facilitated precise communication about part-whole relations, both of which pushed further to the background another feature of part-whole thinking, namely the tension between source and support and symbol and summary. Insofar as faith was understood as a firm conviction about the order of reality (and of Scripture, etc.), efforts at such destabilization could be construed as “attacks” on “faith,” their proponents as opponents, idolaters, etc.—albeit attacks unlikely to land so as to change convictions.

Compared to the Lutheran reformers’ who invented the loci tradition, Storr’s biblical citations were battle-ready. Storr’s biblical citations pick out a well-defined, bite-sized series of words that anyone with a Bible (and this was a much larger crowd for Storr than his predecessors) could find. Storr could easily communicate that and how he understood these bits of Scripture to relate to one another. He could assert a connection between a precise set of words in Scripture and a dogmatic statement, a philological or grammatical index, an archeological artifact. The cost of these powers, however, was that for Storr, all precise and widely communicable biblical citations would stand in relation (whether negative or positive) to Estienne’s rules of part-identification. The more argumentation made visible Luther’s hierarchical web, the more difficult it was to maintain on any grounds but faith. Or, put differently, the more biblical citations played in inter-subjective, documentary argumentation, the more difficult it was to see their part-whole valence—the more it looked as if Scripture perhaps was not the source and support of the Symbol.

Storr inherited a world in which biblical citations were complete and precise; in which Estienne set the basic division of Scripture into parts and gave authors the power



to cite with precision. The legacy of this world was one in which biblical citation annotations could be arranged to display relationships between parts of Scripture and between Scripture and dogma. This amounted to being a heir to a world in which biblical citations were war-weapons for theologians and natural philosophers alike. But he took seriously his inheritance from the Lutheran traditions: in the *DC*, he uses biblical citations to display—much as had Luther and Melanchthon—the Lutheran rule of configuration.

### **Storr's Groups of Biblical Citations**

While his groups of biblical citations may look like (and in an important sense, are) examples of inductive, textual, evidentiary reasoning,—or like blind appeals to whatever words he might remove from their context and assert are divine— they display the Lutheran rule of configuration of Scripture. Put differently, if we assume that Storr's groups of biblical citation-annotations display the Lutheran rule for configuration of Scripture, it is much easier to see the rhetorical function of the relationship he asserts between particular passages and dogmatic claims. Permit me an extended example.

Recall that in his argument for the divine authority of Scripture, Storr claims in §§17-19 that there is a God. He presents paraphrases of Kant's moral and physico-theological arguments in §§17-18, respectively. In support of Kant's moral argument, Storr cites Romans 2:14-16 and 1:32.

For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and *their* thoughts the mean while accusing or

else excusing one another;) In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my gospel.

Who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them.

Compare:

Man is led, by the spontaneous impulse of his nature, to prescribe to himself certain rules for the regulation of his conduct. And such is the influence of these prescriptions on him (1), that when he examines (2) his actions by them, although he is far removed from all visible judges of his conduct (3), he excuses or accuses himself, just as if he were arraigned before some visible tribunal (Rom. 2:14-16. 1:32) (4). The very constitution of the human soul, therefore, leads us to fear an invisible Judge, who punishes wickedness with misery and dispenses happiness as the reward of virtue (5).<sup>179</sup>

In support of Kant's physico-theological argument, Storr cites Romans 1:20 (x2).

For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, *even* his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse:

Compare:

Although we cannot behold God with our bodily eyes, yet to the eye of the mind he is by no means invisible, ta aorata autou nooumena xathoratai the invisible things of him, being understood, are seen; for since the creation of the world, the invisible Creator stands revealed by his works, Rom. 1:20. And the farther we advance in our investigations of nature, the more numerous and striking are the marks (1)

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<sup>179</sup> DC 17.

which we discover, of system and of adaptation to an end (2). And there is in fact no excuse, in the sight of him to has revealed himself to us in the works of nature, for the stubborn skepticism which can doubt whether this system and adaptation were produced by the agency of a rational and intelligent Being, or were the result of a blind mechanism, Rom. 1:20, eis to einai autous anapologatous, comp. 2 Thess. 1:8. For, although we cannot fully demonstrate the impossibility of a blind mechanism (3); still we, who are rational beings, and whose superiority over other creatures consists chiefly in our reason and our ability to adapt our conduct to particular ends, cannot possibly admit, that the cause which produced the world and gave us our reason, should have no semblance of rationality, but should be an irrational something. Indeed such an admission would be utterly inconsistent with our conscious feeling of the dignity of our own natures, Acts 17:28 &c. Ps. 94:8-10.<sup>180</sup>

As we would expect, Storr's references to Romans 1 and 2 fit with and reinforce the Lutheran story about human awareness of God without an encounter with Word.

Here is the story as I put it in Chapter 1:

Every human,<sup>181</sup> Luther argues, understands that she is limited, that her needs extend beyond her capacity to meet

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<sup>180</sup> *DC* §18.

<sup>181</sup> "That to all people, especially to idolaters, clear knowledge of God was available, as he says here, so that they are without excuse and it can be proved that they had known the invisible things of God, His divinity, likewise His eternal being and power, becomes apparent from the following: All those who set up idols and worship them call them "gods," or even "God," believing that God is immortal, that is, eternal, powerful, and able to render help, clearly indicate that they have a knowledge of divinity in their hearts. For with what reason could they call an image or any other created thing God, or how could they believe that it resembled Him if they did not know at all what God is and what pertains to Him? How could they attribute such qualities to a rock, if they did not believe that these qualities were really suitable for Him? When they now hold that divinity is invisible (a quality to be sure, which they have assigned to many gods) and that he who possesses it is invisible, immortal, powerful, wise, just, and gracious to those who call upon him[...] it follows most surely that they had a knowledge or notion of divinity which undoubtedly came to them from God. This was their error, that they did not worship this divinity untouched but changed and adjusted it to their desires and needs. [...] This

them,<sup>182</sup> and that there is a God who is able to meet those needs.<sup>183</sup> Humans do not know whether God is willing to help, and cannot do anything to find out.<sup>184</sup> This destabilizes human reason.<sup>185</sup> In its attempts to stabilize itself,<sup>186</sup> reason imagines (Luther calls this imagination a delusion) that God is “a being who is moved and satisfied by good works.”<sup>187</sup>

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major premise of the “practical syllogism,” this theological “insight of the conscience,” is in all men and cannot be obscured.” (LW 25:157)

<sup>182</sup> Reason recognizes its inability, for example, to be saved “from every misfortune,” and to bring about “all that is good and that makes for happiness.” (LW 19, 54)

<sup>183</sup> “Here you find St. Paul’s statement in Rom. 1:19 concerning the universal knowledge of God among all the heathen, that is, that the whole world talks about the Godhead and natural reason is aware that this Godhead is something superior to all other things. [...] Although they do not have true faith in God, they at least hold that God is a being able to help on the sea and in every need. Such a light and such a perception is innate in the hearts of all men; and this light cannot be subdued or extinguished.” (LW 19, 53)

But, although the “natural light of reason... must concede.... that God is able and competent to help and to bestow[,...] reason does not know whether He is willing to do this also for us.” (LW 19, 54)

<sup>184</sup> Though it can “call upon God,” acknowledge his ability to help, and “even believe that He may help others,” “free will cannot... believe that God is disposed to help.” (LW 19, 54)

<sup>185</sup> “That renders the position of reason unstable. Reason believes in God’s might and is aware of it, but it is uncertain whether God is willing to employ this in our behalf, because in adversity it so often experiences the opposite to be true.” (LW, 19, 54)

<sup>186</sup> Until and unless reason is stabilized, all efforts to keep the law are efforts to please God, to self-stabilize. As Luther puts it, “It is impossible for nature to act or conduct itself contrary to what it feels. [Once] it feels God’s anger and punishment, it cannot view God otherwise than as an angry tyrant....[N]ature cannot but constantly insist on contributing something to the conciliation of God; however, it can find nothing. Nature does not know and does not believe that it suffices to call upon God.... All men are constituted thus.” (LW 19, 72-3)

Again, “Human nature, when it is free from temptation, becomes proud... But when it is in adversity, when it sees that it is done for, human nature submits to all things, even to some very low things..... They seek aid wherever they can... This is they way human reason is; it cannot act differently in trial. Similarly, when we were hard pressed in our consciences by sin, we ran to the monks or to this or that other person to find consolation.....Faith, on the other hand, as it rejects no one, also trusts no human being but depends on God alone, on whom it calls in need, etc.” (LW 19, 12)

<sup>187</sup> (LW, 19, 55).

Idolatry—reason’s attempts at self-stabilization—is the basic human condition.<sup>188,189</sup>

Storr’s references to Romans support the Lutheran (and now Storrish-Kantian) story in which all human beings have a natural awareness of God who is able to help them do what they must but cannot. This God displays his creatorship of the world and conscience announces him as a judge. But to read Romans as support for these claims is less to read Paul’s book as a scholar or non-Lutheran theologian than it is to read according to the Lutheran rule of configuration.

For example, based on the Greek alone, it is difficult to tell how Romans 1 and 2 are related. Paul describes in Romans 1 (1 the revelation of invisible things of God in creation, (2 a group of people who, though they have the capacity to see the revealed invisible things of God, exchange these for a God of their own making, and (3 the immorality of these people. He does not name this group, although the rhetoric in (2 and (3 would be familiar both to those with connections to Greek philosophical/rhetorical traditions, to those familiar with debates about the Jewishness of Hellenized Jews, and to those familiar with the Jewish Decalogue (many members of Paul’s audience were

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<sup>188</sup> “St. Paul shows in these words: " When ye knew not God, ye did service," &c., that is, when as yet ye knew not God or what God's will was towards you, ye served those who by nature were no gods; ye served the dreams and thoughts of your hearts, wherewith, against God's Word, ye feigned to yourselves a God that suffered himself to be conciliated with such works and worshippings as your devotion and good intention made choice of. For all idolatry in the world arises from this, that people by nature have had the common knowledge, that there is a God, without which idolatry would remain unpractised. With this knowledge engrafted in man kind, they have, without God's Word, fancied all manner of ungodly opinions of God, and held and esteemed these for divine truths, imagining a God otherwise than, by nature, he is.” (Table Talk CLXXVI)

<sup>189</sup> Chapter I, pp. x x

perhaps familiar with all three).<sup>190</sup> In light of other Pauline materials, the group might arguably be named “Gentiles” and “idolaters,” but—again—there are no words to which anyone can point to settle the matter.

In Romans 2, Paul calls the group of people who have a “law on hearts” *‘ta ethne’*. But Paul famously uses the word in a wide variety of ways; its meaning is perfectly ambiguous, and so undecidable. Paul uses it, for example, in conjunction with the present tense to describe Christian God-fearers at Rome (you are ‘ethne’) and in conjunction with the past for the Christian God-fearers at Corinth (you were ‘ethne’).<sup>191</sup> Paul sometimes uses ‘ethne’ to designate groups of people with transformed (to Christ) minds, and, at other times, groups whose minds are not so (or not yet) transformed. Those with the “law

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<sup>190</sup> To Hellenized Jews, the anti-idolatry and homo-sex vice-list would sound like home (Wisdom 11-12; Jubilees 5-7); the Decalogue-violations would ring true to the less-Hellenized Jews; and the general vice-list would be perfectly familiar to the Gentiles. See Aune, David Edward. *The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and Rhetoric*. Westminster John Knox Press, 2003. Collins, John Joseph. *Seers, Sibyls, and Sages in Hellenistic-Roman Judaism*. BRILL, 2001. Huttunen, Niko. *Paul and Epictetus on Law: A Comparison*. Continuum, 2009. Malherbe, Abraham J. *Moral exhortation: a Greco-Roman sourcebook*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986. Martens, John W. “Romans 2.14-16: A Stoic Reading.” *New Testament Studies* 40, no. 01 (1994): 55-67. Pearson, Brook W. R. *Corresponding Sense: Paul, Dialectic, and Gadamer*. BRILL, 2001. Reed, Annette Yoshiko. “From Judaism and Hellenism to Christianity and Paganism: Cultural Identities and Religious Polemics in the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies” [pre-print]. Accessed October 17, 2013. [http://www.academia.edu/269748/\\_From\\_Judaism\\_and\\_Hellenism\\_to\\_Christianity\\_and\\_Paganism\\_Cultural\\_Identities\\_and\\_Religious\\_Polemics\\_in\\_the\\_Pseudo-Clementine\\_Homilies\\_pre-print\\_](http://www.academia.edu/269748/_From_Judaism_and_Hellenism_to_Christianity_and_Paganism_Cultural_Identities_and_Religious_Polemics_in_the_Pseudo-Clementine_Homilies_pre-print_). Thompson, James W. *Moral Formation According to Paul: The Context and Coherence of Pauline Ethics*. Baker Books, 2011. Wasserman, Emma. *The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Sin, Death, and the Law in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology*. Mohr Siebeck, 2008.

<sup>191</sup> Ishay Rosen-Zvi and Adi Ophir, “Paul and the Invention of the Gentiles,” *Jewish Quarterly Review* 105, no. 1 (2015). The article, which appeared after I had written much of this material, is among the best treatments of the topic I have found—well worth reading in full.

on hearts” are somehow different or perhaps substantially different enough to be other, but in comparison to whom remains unclear. For there are represented in Paul’s audience (and even in Paul, within his letter to Rome) many group-identity standpoints, and so several possible ranges of possible meanings.<sup>192</sup>

From a grammatical standpoint, how and whether the bounds of either group Paul describes overlap with ‘Gentiles’, ‘idolaters’, ‘immoral’ persons, those with and

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<sup>192</sup> Thus, for example, Augustine could, simply by foregrounding different “contexts”, offer strong cases both for his claim in one place that those with “law on hearts” had transformed minds, and in another that they did not. Origen’s Gentiles’ hearts told them not to murder, lie, etc., and to believe in one God, but nothing about Jesus Christ; the Gentiles’ law and Jewish law are different but equally ineffective. Augustine’s Gentiles have a law on hearts only if they believe the gospel; his Jewish Christians also have a law on hearts. See Origen’s commentary on Romans, III-IV; Augustine’s *On the Spirit and the Letter*, 43-50. Runar Thorsteinsson’s summary in *Paul’s Interlocutor in Romans 2*, (pp. 1-2) details more recent displays of flexibility:

As ‘one of the most puzzling pieces of Pauline writing,’ Romans 2 has long stood up to scholarly efforts to explain both its meaning and presence in Paul’s letter. Because it does not easily ‘fit the system’ this ‘stumbling block for the Lutheran interpretation of Paul’ and ‘Achilles heel of schemes on Paul and the Law’ has repeatedly been set aside in Pauline studies. In his survey of the history of interpretation of the chapter, Klyne R. Snodgrass remarks that ‘even where this text has been discussed, more time has been spent explaining the text away than explaining it.’ This is the case, for example, in E. P. Sanders’ influential work, *Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People* in which he treats Romans 2 separately in an appendix, viewing it as a non-Pauline synagogue sermon incompatible with the rest of Paul’s thought. ‘[W]hy is the chapter in Romans at all?’ he wonders. Many a commentator pays no more than obligatory attention to its second chapter which, as Snodgrass complains, “has often been lost in the shuffle as people move quickly from the description of human sin in 1.18f. to the proclamation of the righteousness of God in 3.21 f.’ Or, as Stanley K. Stowers puts it, ‘[c]ommentators are so clear about their destination at 3:9 (‘all sinners are in need of Christ’) that they tend to fly over chapter 2 quickly and at a high altitude, seeing only the message of 3:9 being worked out.’ No wonder N. T. Wright calls Romans 2 ‘the joker in the pack.’

Runar Thorsteinsson, *Paul’s Interlocutor in Romans 2: Function and Identity in the Context of Ancient Epistolography* (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2015), 1-2.

without clear or unclear knowledge of God, etc., is difficult, if not impossible, to definitively determine. And—and this is the more important point—so also impossible to determine definitely what the relations are between the two groups (whether identical, overlapping in some ways but not others, wholly distinct, etc.).

While theological reads need not be grammatical, when Luther collapsed the distinctions between Paul's groups, he broke with many bible interpreters. Lutheran and Melanchthon grouped together the "immoral idolaters" of Romans 1 with those with law on hearts in Romans 2, and so offered a way to cut through the great morass of possible groups and relations between them that had accumulated in more than a millennium of scholarly investigations. But despite its elegance, grammatical and philological support for the reading is tenuous; its scholarly foundations unstable.

While this might be said of many attempts at reconciling or dissolving some apparent conflict between the two passages (for, at least on one read, the non-transformed minds of the folks in Romans 1 are equated with immorality, while the *ethne* in Romans 2 behave morally despite lacking the Decalogue) the Lutheran interpretation represented a significant departure from the range of traditional Roman reads. Thinkers like Origen, Augustine, Thomas, and Erasmus saw in both the "law on hearts" and the visible/invisible divine self-revelation in nature a way to make sense of the relative 'rightness' and 'truth' of actions and claims of particularly attentive non-Christians, despite their non-conformity to Christian standards of self-knowledge and knowledge of God.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> Thomas P Scheck, ed. *Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Books 1-5*, The Fathers of the Church (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press., 2001); Mark Reasoner, *Romans in Full Circle: A History of Interpretation* (Louisville:



In the Lutheran read, these exceptional non-Christians disappear from view. The law on hearts and visible/invisible divine self-revelation in nature are instead part and parcel of the exchange of the truth of God for self-deceptions—images of God—of human fashioning. This ‘idolatry’—whether in what we would call a moral, what Luther might call its pious face or in its (from some perspective) more obviously impious face—is, on the Lutheran view, the basic human condition. It is the sin of which all are, without exception, guilty.

What I am getting at is that when Storr read Romans 1-2 as a scholar, he knew perfectly well that Paul may or may not have been describing a universal human awareness of God and a universal natural human idolatry. And he knew perfectly well—again, as a scholar—that Romans 2:16ff may not interpret Romans 1:17ff. In other words, it might not be the case that the vicious idolaters have the law on hearts. And indeed, Storr supplies explicit evidence for their connection when he cites Romans 1:32: the vicious idolaters know the judgment of God.<sup>194</sup>

Romans 1-2 need not be read as support for the Lutheran notion of a natural immoral morality of human reason that is the result of human awareness of God’s ability to help and inability to know about of God’s willingness to help. But Storr does it—he moves from grammar to Scripture on Scripture—and so preserves the first half of the

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Westminster John Knox Press, 2005). Although I can stand by the sentence, the situation is a good deal more complicated than it suggests. Augustine, for example, famously argued also in *The City of God* that those Gentiles with laws on hearts had transformed minds (were “Christian”).

<sup>194</sup> Whether that is the judgment of the conscience-God, who knows. My point is that Storr seems to be aware that he has to connect the two groups and passages if he wants to claim (“with Kant”) that the God of conscience and the God of the order of nature are the same.

Lutheran story about the announcement in Word of God's willingness to help. Read grammatically, Storr's biblical citations in §§17-18 may or may not support his dogma. Read according to the Lutheran rule of configuration (in which the groups in 1 and 2 are collapsed), they do. When Storr displays relations between parts of Scripture by putting biblical citations in relation to one another, he displays the Lutheran rule of configuration.

## The Loci Method

I mentioned that early Lutherans used biblical citations to teach others to see relationships between groups of parts of Scripture and dogma. Recall that the latter is a feature of the loci method, which early Lutherans designed to educate children and clerics, and to ensure that their Creeds did not deviate from *sola scriptura*.<sup>195</sup> Recall also that the Lutheran rule of configuration connects Scripture to dogma, and both to divine authority or highest-reliability. To teach these three together, early Lutherans followed the loci method to produce Creeds, Catechisms, and Loci, which would become dogmatics. The method moves from part to whole—from Scripture to Symbol—and it prohibits movement from whole to part (e.g., reading the Creeds into Scripture).

Scripture, after being clarified by human reason, would be read in light of Scripture, and

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<sup>195</sup> Although he tended to use direct biblical citations (not margin notes) in these documents, Melancthon—in many ways the pioneer of the loci method and dogmatic genre—was familiar with Quintilian's method of instruction by display. For example, he talked about annotation as a means of teaching in the *Institutiones Rhetorica*. By pointing out and explaining just a few figures of speech in the margins, readers would learn to “judge even without the precept.” In other words, students can be taught to attend to (to see) figures of speech indirectly (part to whole, not schema to determinate part)—simply by reading through and with the web of connections in a more practiced scholar's mind, said in and shown through marginal annotations. By showing a reader a few examples, an author can train a reader to look for and make certain kinds of connections. Quoted in, translated by Weaver, 173.

then the message would be articulated in a form suitable to the work of the particular document.<sup>196</sup> Storr displays the loci method in the *DC*, and the book is an example of dogmatics as a genre.

### **From Grammar to Scripture on Scripture**

The movement from clarification according to human reason to an interpretation in light of Scripture characteristic of the loci is the procedure Storr follows. He begins by clarifying the sense of a passage by the rules of grammar—of human reason.

Whenever the reading of a particular passage is unquestionable, and a legitimate exegesis proves a certain sentiment to be contained in it; then, and then only, is it satisfactorily shown that the passage contains that sentiment. Hence, in order to confer the greatest possible degree of certainty on this course of christian doctrines, passages of which there are various readings, are never adduced in this work, except when the canons of criticism show the reading adduced, to have preponderating evidence in its favour; and even then they are accompanied with other passages.<sup>197</sup>

Even if the sense of a passage is clear by these standards, Storr groups it together with other passages. While this grouping-together with other passages is good inductive method—for an inductive argument is stronger where there is more evidence—it is also

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<sup>196</sup> See Robert Kolb, "Melanchthonian Method as a Guide to Reading Confessions of Faith: The Index of the Book of Concord and Late Reformation Learning," *Church History: Studies in Christianity and Culture* 72, no. 3 (2003); Charles P. Arand, Robert Kolb, and James Arne Nestingen, *The Lutheran Confessions History and Theology of the Book of Concord*, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012), Online resource from Project Muse <http://pid.emory.edu/fgc3z>; Robert Kolb, "Teaching the Text Commonplace Method in Sixteenth Century Lutheran Biblical Commentary," *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance* 49, no. 3 (1987); Kolb, Wengert, and Arand; Neal Ward Gilbert, *Renaissance Concepts of Method* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 108ff.

<sup>197</sup> *DC* 15n.5 (e)

an assertion of a relation between those passages: it displays something of Scripture on Scripture or the rule of configuration. More directly: Storr's biblical citation-annotations look familiar—like standard scholarly, rational-observational-textual-reasoning fare.<sup>198</sup> And Storr explains that they are there to help organize lectures and show biblical warrant. But, read in the Lutheran tradition of biblical citation-annotation, they arguably display and carry with them something of the Lutheran rule of configuration—even as they operate much like any citation-annotation in a scholarly textual argument. I argued in the previous section that Storr's grouped biblical citations display the rule of configuration.

### **From Scripture on Scripture to Dogma**

In relation to one another, Storr's biblical citations display the Lutheran rule of configuration for Scripture. Again, he moved up, as per the loci method, from the grammatical sense of Scripture to Scripture on Scripture. He used biblical citations to display the relation of parts of Scripture to one another according to the Lutheran rule of configuration. The next step of the loci method is from Scripture on Scripture to

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<sup>198</sup> Biblical citation-annotations are a great-grandmother to the scholarly citation-annotation traditions Storr inherited... in part because of the double valence of Scripture in the Lutheran thinking. In other words, because biblical citation-annotations in the Creeds could be and were received by Luther's opponents as materials with which to disagree (because Scripture's teachings are plain for all to see), they had the flavor of evidence in a textual argument. (Where point-to-able is nearer the measure of reliability than an immediately given rule of configuration.) But insofar as they displayed the immediately revealed rule of configuration of Scripture, they had the flavor of Quintillian's impossible teaching: they demonstrated the part-part to part-whole movement. In one sense, biblical citation-annotations already had these two valences in the sixteenth century. In another sense, citation-annotations were not characteristic features of the scholarly enterprise until at least the end of the seventeenth-century. But even then, scholars like Bayle learned, adapted, and popularized citation-annotation practices they had learned in biblical inquiry.

symbolic expressions or summaries of Scripture (on Scripture). It is here that Storr's Lutheran strategy of taking the rule of configuration of Scripture as the highest measure of reliability (the rule for discerning what is divine and human, what is highest-reliable and reliable relative to human reason) makes it appear that he takes Orthodox Lutheran dogma—not Scripture, as he claims—as the measure for assessing the reliability of biblical theology. And it is here that Storr's biblical citation-annotations give the appearance that he takes the reliability of dogma to rest on the divinity and highest reliability of Scripture.

But the loci method is not a way to establish the reliability of Lutheran dogma by way of textual evidentiary reasoning: biblical citations do not establish the reliability of dogma as evidence for a claim. For the divinity and reliability rule of configuration of Scripture is divinely self-authenticating. Rather, in the loci method, the biblical theologian works—like Storr—up from 'parts', to 'part-part' relations, and finally (artificially) to topics.<sup>199200</sup> The loci method made groups of parts easy to work with and easy arrange in relation to other such groups, so that the relation, e.g., of 'sin' to 'grace' could be articulated – albeit provisionally.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> Cf. Storr's description of the part-whole and particular-general movement in *HS* pp. 13-17; his description of 'aesthetic' reading continues in pp. 18-19.

<sup>200</sup> Melancthon, for example, builds up toward highest loci (God, trinity, and incarnation), but they stay at the limit, almost completely outside his investigations; as he might put it, he reserves these mysteries for adoration instead of inquiry.

<sup>201</sup> Breen and others situate Melancthon's notions of *topoi*, *loci communes*, *loci theologici*, and *hypotyposes* within ancient philosophical, rhetorical, and humanist traditions. Students of Kant's *Darstellung*, schematism, and of his discussion of hypotyposis in *CJ* §59 may find Melancthon's uses of these materials especially interesting. See Quirinus Breen, "The Terms 'Loci Communes' and 'Loci' in Melancthon," *Church History: Studies in Christianity and Culture* 16, no. 04 (1947).

Atop this movement from particular to general or part to symbolic whole, early Lutherans imposed a divine-human distinction. The results of the procedure, Luther and Melancthon both claimed, were never to be taken to be more than provisional; Scripture was never to be read through (to be made to conform to) these instruments. These symbols and topoi were not to be imposed upon Scripture from outside, for Scripture alone was considered the ground and measure of reality. They were human expressions of the divine order, not divine expressions. Much as Kant would proscribe reading symbols built by analogy back into the analogized-from (e.g., from human mind to divine mind, then back down to make conclusions about the relation of divine and human minds; from near-observables to the whole of the Milky Way, and back down to near observables), so the early Lutherans were quick to say that topics, summaries, catechisms, and creeds must not be read back into Scripture.

So the symbolic expressions were considered human as opposed to the divine parts of Scripture; they were accompanied by prohibitions on making Scripture conform to the symbols and summaries.<sup>202</sup> For symbolic expressions could contain human error, where Scripture—whose rule of configuration was also the measure of truth and error—could not. Although they were only relatively reliable, the symbolic expressions, were nevertheless for early Lutherans considered useful for teaching, thinking, meditating, and for community order-building—in its positive (our world has this shape) and negative (their worlds do not have this shape) uses.

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<sup>202</sup> See Summary of Epitome, below.

Framed in just this way, biblical citations in the loci display the particular passages (parts) that a locus purports to hold together. As stalks (in relation to one another) form a sheaf (a whole), biblical citations can be understood to shape the topics, and the topics to inform the relations of citations to one another, but (allegedly) without changing the meaning of the cited passages considered under the topic. In other words, the topics image a relation of parts of Scripture to one another (a whole built of parts), but these wholes allegedly do not, in turn, shape the relation of the parts to one another. Biblical citations and dogmatic statements together display an order or a pattern of relationships between words— an order characteristic of a Lutheran point of view, of a Lutheran way of reading Scripture and a Lutheran way of symbol building.

The relationship between the divine and human is schematic insofar as Word is understood to be highest-reliable by virtue of its divinity and dogmatic statements are understood to be reliable only relative to Word. This relationship between the divine and human, the highest-reliable and relatively reliable, is displayed through the juxtaposition of symbolic expressions and biblical citations.<sup>203</sup>

The loci method, then, begins and ends with human reason: the biblical theologian first reads Scripture grammatically, then reads it according to the divinely given rule of configuration. He combines several part-part relationships into a symbolic whole, and continually works upward from the parts of Scripture (read in relation to one

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<sup>203</sup> The relationship between the divine and human is also schematic insofar as it reinscribes the Lutheran story that the difference between a divine Author's mind that can hold all at once and a limited human mind that needs to form symbols (wholes) from groups of parts (the divine Author's words) in order to imagine divine truths. Biblical citations display the relative reliability of the dogmatic statements and point up the limitations of human thinking at once.

another) to symbolic, human-scale wholes. When he juxtaposes biblical citations and dogma, he situates the divine Word and the merely human in tension with one another: the divine Word, because self-authenticating as highest reliable, shows the mere relative reliability of dogma. And the relative reliability of dogma points up the highest reliability of Scripture.

### **Human-Built Wholes May Have Rational Justifications**

The Lutheran loci method produces human-built, relatively reliable wholes. And it is possible to make a case on human terms for the rationality of human-built wholes. It must be possible to make such a case, for example, on the grounds of rational, grammatical biblical interpretation. For even if the message of Scripture on Scripture ruled out a grammatical possibility or reconfigured a grammatical probability, something of its message must be available on human, grammatical terms. And it must be possible to make such a case on the grounds of philosophical reasoning—at least when it comes to the awareness of a God who is able to help humans do what they cannot. For the divine Author announces in Scripture (on Scripture) that humans have an awareness of this God from nature and from conscience, just as the divine Author announces by and in and through Scripture the divinity and humanity of his words.

What I am getting at is that the divine Author of Scripture announces in Scripture how he talks to human beings on reason's terms: how he reveals himself (albeit inadequately) outside of Scripture. Which is to say that the divine Author might be understood to teach Storr how to talk to reason on its own terms about something it cannot understand on its own terms.



This possibility is just what Storr displays in his *DC*. For, in addition to his citation-annotations of passages of Scripture that a dogma summarizes—whose internal relations announce their own highest-reliability—Storr annotates each dogmatic statement so as to show its viability on the grounds of rational biblical scholarship or, in the case of §§17-18, on philosophical grounds. These are not arguments, he says, for the reliability of dogma on rational grounds so much as they are arguments for the respectability of Scripture. They are designed to show that it is not irrational to trust in the reliability of Scripture. In an important sense, the conclusion follows from Storr's Augustinian notion of accommodationism. For if God speaks in Scripture on human terms, and if one's rule of configuration (and self-knowledge, knowledge of God are) is not obliterated and replaced, but simply reconfigured by the divine Word—if the reconfiguration always stands in relation to a mere configuration—it must not be wholly unavailable to human reason. It is, after all, a new rule of configuration—not a rule of chaos.

*Example: Kant's Arguments as Dogmatic Statements*

This means that Storr may present, for example, Kant's arguments as dogmatic statements—as human-built symbols of Scripture. And in *DC* §§17-18, he presents paraphrases of Kant's physico-theological and moral arguments for rational belief in God just so. In §17, Storr paraphrases Kant's story about how conscience leads us to the notion of an invisible Judge.

Man is led, by the spontaneous impulse of his nature, to prescribe to himself certain rules for the regulation of his conduct. And such is the influence of these prescriptions on

him (1), that when he examines (2) his actions by them, although he is far removed from all visible judges of his conduct (3), he excuses or accuses himself, just as if he were arraigned before some visible tribunal (Rom. 2:14-16. 1:32) (4). The very constitution of the human soul, therefore, leads us to fear an invisible Judge, who punishes wickedness with misery and dispenses happiness as the reward of virtue (5).<sup>204</sup>

On Kant's telling, we have to assume a being who can do what we cannot—namely punish wickedness and reward virtue with happiness—in order to maintain that the moral actions we propose to ourselves are rational.<sup>205</sup> Storr's story here follows this line of thinking: humans have conscience and conscience leads us to a notion of an invisible Judge who makes right what we cannot.

In §18, Storr paraphrases Kant's combination physico-theological and moral argument. Humans see purposiveness in nature and all of nature as purposive. Even though we cannot rule out the possibility that it is not, we have to think about it as having some rational order—indeed, a rational orderer or Author. But because of conscience, we also have this notion of an invisible Judge on whom the rationality of our practical judgments (which we must make) depends. We have to imagine, then, that the Judge and the rational Author of nature are the same: otherwise, we would have to admit the possibility that the rational order of nature rules out the possibility of a rational moral order.

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<sup>204</sup> *DC 17*.

<sup>205</sup> “When Kant claimed that “the critique of pure reason is the true tribunal for all controversies of pure reason,” without which “reason is, as it were in the state of nature” and “cannot make its assertions and claims valid or secure them except through **war**,” he was not merely speaking theoretically.” Pacini, *TNGD*, 53 ; cf I. Kant, *AA 3:B779*; *CPR*, 649.

Although we cannot behold God with our bodily eyes, yet to the eye of the mind he is by no means invisible, ta aorata autou nooumena xathoratai the invisible things of him, being understood, are seen; for since the creation of the world, the invisible Creator stands revealed by his works, Rom. 1:20. And the farther we advance in our investigations of nature, the more numerous and striking are the marks (1) which we discover, of system and of adaptation to an end (2). And there is in fact no excuse, in the sight of him to has revealed himself to us in the works of nature, for the stubborn skepticism which can doubt whether this system and adaptation were produced by the agency of a rational and intelligent Being, or were the result of a blind mechanism, Rom. 1:20, eis to einai autous anapologatous, comp. 2 Thess. 1:8. For, although we cannot fully demonstrate the impossibility of a blind mechanism (3); still we, who are rational beings, and whose superiority over other creatures consists chiefly in our reason and our ability to adapt our conduct to particular ends, cannot possibly admit, that the cause which produced the world and gave us our reason, should have no semblance of rationality, but should be an irrational something. Indeed such an admission would be utterly inconsistent with our conscious feeling of the dignity of our own natures, Acts 17:28 &c. Ps. 94:8-10. Moreover, to admit the existence of a rational Author of the world of which we are a part, is the more consistent with our nature, because we feel within us a natural dread of an invisible Judge of our actions and motives; whom we must of course believe to be a rational Being, unless we are willing, in defiance of our own consciences, to pronounce that inward feeling which leads us to dread such a Judge, a delusion. Now, as this feeling of accountability *unavoidably leads us to the idea that we are dependent on a rational Being*, it would manifestly be in itself inexcusable, and would militate against our own inward feelings, if we should give way to that obstinate unbelief, which, instead of acknowledging a rational Being as the great first cause of all things, looks upon the wise and intelligent constitution of nature as the result of a mere blind mechanism. Reason, in her attempts to account for the system and adaptation of nature, is compelled to admit the existence of a rational Author of creation (4); and conscience compels us to believe, that we who are a part of this creation are dependent on a superhuman rational

Being. How then can we, notwithstanding all these proofs, and in violation of the constitution of our own minds (5), resist the belief of a rational Author of creation, to whom alone we can refer (6) those feelings of gratitude which arise within us while enjoying the bounties of nature, and from whom alone we can expect those righteous retributions for our good and bad actions which our consciences lead us so confidently to anticipate? (7) Heb. 11:6. Rom. 2:6-10. It is also evident, that the Judge and Lord of our moral nature, is one and the same Being with the Lord of the rest of creation; (which, as is evinced by its peculiar and wise adaptation to such an end, must have been formed for the use of rational and moral beings) (8); for otherwise we must suppose it possible, that the arrangements in the external world, might prevent our moral Judge (who on this supposition would be distinct from the author of nature) from fulfilling those promises and executing those threatenings (9) which he has made known to us through the instrumentality of our consciences. Moreover, while our nature strongly leads us to desire happiness, our reason as strongly enjoins obedience to the law, and teaches, that obedience and happiness are most intimately connected (§17); but it is impossible to conceive, how obedience can be united with happiness in the performance of duties which require self denial (10), unless we admit that the whole creation, as well as ourselves, is under the control of a moral Governor (11). Therefore, unless we would be at variance with ourselves (12); unless we would have the inextinguishable desire of our nature for happiness (13), frequently to be at variance (1 Cor. 15:32) with that law, whose sanctity and authority we can never deny, except in the blind rage of passion; we are compelled to admit that supposition, which best accounts for our inward feelings of reverence for a Judge of our thoughts and actions, and for the order and adaptation visible in the material world; in other words, we must admit the existence of a moral Author and Governor of the universe (14). And it would indeed be a great departure from wisdom, if we should be so obstinate in our unbelief as to take refuge in the groundless and absurd hypothesis, “that we are perhaps deceived by our nature and by the objects around us” (15), thus rejecting the only supposition which accords with our

nature, and with the nature of the objects that surround us.<sup>206</sup>

Storr paraphrases Kant's arguments in the dogmatic statements of §§17-18.

While it may seem odd to think of Storr offering paraphrases of Kant's arguments as points of Orthodox dogma, the Lutheran tradition he inherited hardly prohibited it. If Storr presented Kant's arguments as dogmatic statements, and so as human creations and symbolic expressions, as I have suggested, one would expect that he also presented them as summaries of Scripture. One would expect that he presented them as human in relation to the divine Word. And this is arguably just what Storr did when he peppered his paraphrases of Kant's arguments with biblical citations. He situates Romans 1:32 and 2:14-16 in the midst of §17 (Kant's moral argument); and Romans 1:20; 2:6-10, among others in the midst of §18. Romans 1-2 is the classical locus for so-called 'natural knowledge of God'.<sup>207</sup> In chapter two, Paul gestures to the law on hearts, conscience, and divine Judge.

For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and *their* thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another;) In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my gospel.

Even without the Decalogue, humans have a law on hearts that beckons them to do right in anticipation of a future judgment. Both Storr's summary and Kant's argument

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<sup>206</sup> DC §18.

<sup>207</sup> In some strains of Orthodox Lutheran theology, 'natural' yet indicated divine revelation—but not verbal revelation or revelation in Word.

from conscience can be construed as compatible with Paul's description. Something similar could be said about Paul's words in chapter one:

For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness; Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath shewed *it* unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, *even* his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse:

In chapter one, the creator of the universe reveals himself in creation such that those who do not have any other knowledge of God yet have knowledge sufficient that they are accountable for their words and deeds. In chapter two, the law on hearts points those without any other knowledge of God to the notion of a future judgment.

On the read I am pursuing here, when he cites these passages, Storr asserts that his paraphrases of Kant's arguments—as dogmatic statements—are somehow summaries of Scripture. He asserts that the moral and combination physico-theological arguments can be understood as human, symbolic representations of the divine book of Scripture. And so he asserts that Kant's arguments (qua human creation) stand in relation to Scripture (a book with what Storr takes to be a divine Author).

Odd as it may seem to us, this divine/human organization is perfectly in keeping with the traditional requirements of a Lutheran dogmatic. Storr's paraphrases of Kant's arguments are human creations (summaries of Scripture) whose reliability is merely relative. And they can be construed as a movement from part up to whole: from bits of Scripture, which, situated in relation to one another, Storr (human) symbolized or made

an articulable, by-human-minds-handleable image. The loci method and dogmatics genre allowed Storr to present Kant's arguments as Lutheran dogma.

To recap: In this section I argued that Storr uses citation-annotations and the loci method to display the relationships between his dogmatic statements, Scripture, and rational explanations on terms that the Orthodox biblical theologian accepts. Storr uses citation-annotations to show that dogmatic statements are summaries of Scripture that admit of rational defense because they are linguistic and human-built. In the previous section I argued that Storr uses citation-annotations to display relationships between these materials on terms that his rationalist colleagues and students might expect and accept.

The next step is, of course, to show that Storr arranges materials in the *DC* so as to display a relationship between these two ways of configuring the relationships between dogma, Scripture, and rational defense. I first demonstrate that Storr had precedent from the scholarly and theological traditions to use citation-annotations to display different kinds of materials and modes of argumentation in such a way that they—on a larger level—systematically posed questions about the relation of different modes of argumentation and measures of reliability to one another. Then I turn to show how Storr meets his students on their own terms and leads them to the pivot points between configuration rules in order to create the conditions in which they might come to trust in the divine authority of Scripture and the Orthodox rule for configuring the relationship of human reason and biblical theology.

## **Relationships between Multiple Modes of Argumentation**

### **Citation-Annotations in Bayle's Dictionary**

In his famous Dictionary—the whole of knowledge in a single book—Pierre Bayle wove a traced an order of reality whose nodes included (among other things) parts of Scripture, rational-observations of nature (including, for example, philology), and rational reflection. He reported and connected his reports to other verbal materials: his reports were symbols and summaries; his citations were sources and supports. Insofar as he made plain the connections he drew, a reader could evaluate or assess the extent to which his methods (reading practices) were reliable. What showed, in other words, was Bayle's conformity or, more often, non-conformity to a particular idea about the order of reality. This self-organizing order was not only (and perhaps only barely) revealed in Scripture, but in nature and rational reflection; it could be seen in the hierarchical relations of books both divine and human, in verbal units 'revealed' and 'human' expressions of rational observations.

At the same time—and this is how we have come to remember Bayle and his dictionary—the self-organizing order that underlay his dictionary hid its particular shape and substance. Instead of entering the fray, so to speak, his point of view was one that occasioned reflection on it, as if from a spectator's point of view. Bayle's annotations more overtly destabilize a wide range of conceptions of self-organizing orders by situating them adjacent to one another. This draws the reader's attention away from the point of view on which various positions might be understood to conflict (i.e., from self-awareness and from the conditions of comparison—Bayle's positive case) and toward Bayle's



anthropological conclusion: human beings and human reason are far more limited than his readers are perhaps wont to admit.




Figure 18 Bayle's Dictionary

As Storr received them, citation annotations could be used to support a particular notion about the order of Scripture, the divine mind, the order of reason, etc., as we see in the confessional Bibles. They could be used for education, in hopes of occasioning a transformation of mind, for community formation and delimitation, to show a relationship (whether source and support or parts of a self-organizing whole) between an important 'experience' and a symbolic or summary expression of it. They could also be used in more direct argumentation to tear down, for example, a confessional or natural

philosophical worldview: to point to 'evidence' that an opponent had the shape of an order wrong. They could be used to communicate with precision about the particular relationships between thoughts an author wanted to show, which lent credence to the idea that any reader (not just any reader who kind of 'understood' already the shape of a particular worldview or divine order) could understand and evaluate some claim. Storr also received a tradition (of which Bayle is one symbol) of using citation annotations to destabilize many distinct notions about the divine or rational order at once.

And he received in Friedrich Haug's Berleburg Bible a combination of all three of these uses.

## Das I. Capitel.

Von der Fleischwerdung des Wortes, und dem Vorläufer Johannes.

**Im** Anfang war das Wort, und das Wort war bei Gott, und Gott war das Wort.

2. Dieses war im Anfang bei Gott.

Die fünf ersten Verse dieses Kapitels soll Plato ganz, obwohl mit etwas verdeckten Worten, ausgesprochen haben, wie Augustinus bezeugt. Daher ein gewisser Platonischer Philosoph, als er den Anfang des Evangeliums Johannes gelesen, gemeint, er hätte solche Dinge aus dem Plato genommen: da dieser vielmehr Dieses aus Moses und von den Hebräern aufschätzte.

v. 1. **Im** Anfang) der Natur und Creatur schon, welches nämlich ein Auge hat auf die Worte Moses von der Schöpfung.

**War)** und warb nicht erst, sondern ist da auch bereits gewesen.

**Das Wort)** Da setzt nun Johannes voraus, als etwas, das bei den alten Juden ganz bekannt und ausgemacht war, daß das ein Zunamen des Messias sey, welches unter denselben Niemand geküget.

**Das Wort war bei Gott)** als die Reizeit, die sein Vorgesicht ist, wie sie sich selber beschreibt, Sprüch. 8, 27. 30. 31., die dem Vater jugelächelt hat.

Das erste, das in Gott von aller Ewigkeit her gesehen, ist die ewige Geburt seines Sohns oder die Aussprechung seines Wortes in sich selbst, ohne welches Gott nicht seyn kann.

Können wir aber nicht sogleich begreifen, wie das Wort als Wort bei Gott sey und warum es so heiße, so wird GOTT Geburt mit uns haben: aber man wird doch immer gern hinschauen nach Gott und nach dieser Erkenntnis hungern.

Und aus diesem folgt nun das dritte:

**Gott war das Wort)** oder vielmehr, **das Wort war Gott** selbst mit Gott, indem es eine göttliche, behändige Wesenheit, ein Einfluß des ganzen göttlichen Wesens in sich selbst und also nichts anders als Gott seyn kann. Es ist nicht zufällig bei Gott. Bei Gott kann nichts Ungleiches seyn.

v. 2. ist der erste Vers kürzer zusammen gezogen.

**Dieses) Wort,** welches hernach Fleisch geworden, **War)** auch schon ehe es Fleisch geworden: welches gegen die läghaftesten Grundsätze der Socinianer zu merken. Durch dasselbe sind

**Im** Anfang) der Schöpfung alle Dinge ausgesprochen, und also war es da schon

**Bei** Gott) notwendig, unzertrennlich, gleich ewig, als der Wortmeister, als der Anfang der Creatur Gottes, Offenb. 3, 15. und der Erstgeborne vor allen Creaturen, Col. 1, 15., den Gott zum Mittler gebraucht, um sich der Creatur mitzuthellen. Und eben daher wird er **das Wort** genannt. Wie wir mit einander umgehen und Gemeinschaft haben durch die Rede: also ist uns auch durch Christum die Gemeinschaft mit Gott wieder eröffnet. Wie Gott zu seinem Sohn sprach: Du bist mein Sohn, also redet er auch

3. Alle Dinge sind durch dasselbige geworden, und ohne dasselbe ist auch nicht ein einziges Ding geworden, das da geworden ist.

4. In ihm war das Leben und das Leben war das Licht der Menschen.

durch seinen Sohn zu uns und theilt sich uns mit und Alles, was er hat, durch diesen seinen Sohn.

Hier ist das Wort beschrieben innerhalb dem Schooß des Vaters; nun wird es beschrieben, wie es sich geoffenbart in der Schöpfung.

Die Aussprüche sind allgemein, da auch nicht eines ausgenommen ist.

v. 3. **Alle Dinge)** die ein Wesen haben, wovon nichts ausgenommen ist als die Sünde, die wie das Unkraut von sich selbst herorgekommen,

**Sind durch dasselbige geworden)** haben ihm ihr Wesen zu danken, und ihr Werden durch dasselbe bekommen; nicht als durch ein bloßes Instrument: denn das **Durch** wird auch vom Vater selbst gebraucht, den Niemand für ein bloßes Instrument halten wird. 1. Cor. 1, 9. Gal. 1, 1. 3. Col. 1, 16. So wird es nun auch hier zur Erhöhung des Wortes gebraucht, nicht zu dessen Heruntersetzung. Denn es sirt und heißt sogleich:

**Ohne dasselbe ist nicht ein einziges Ding)** unter den sichtbaren und unsichtbaren, irdischen und himmlischen Geschöpfen entstanden, durch einen andern Weg oder von sich selbst.

Darum geschieht auch nichts in einem Menschen inebellendere als durchs Wort. Daher liegt Alles daran, daß man diesem Geist des Wortes Raum lasse, in uns wirken zu können.

O Wesen aller Wesen! von dem alle Wesen bestehen: **Alles ist durch dich gemacht,** und du bist der Arm des Allerhöchsten. O Wort aller Wörter, wer kann dich mit Worten ausdrücken! Von dir sind so viele hohe Dinge zu sagen, daß man nicht sagen kann! da denn die Unwissenheit dem Herzen, das dich liebt, lauter Freude verursacht, weil ihm dieses eine gewisse Versicherung ist dessen, was du bist.

Derselbe, der Fleisch werden sollte zum Heil der Menschen, mußte als der Mittler nothwendig von Gott kommen. Nun fragt sich: Was war er denn vorher bei Gott? Antw.: Das selbstständige Wort, Licht, Leben, u.

v. 4. **In ihm war das Leben)** und die Quelle dessen, als in seinem Centrum und Behältniß, in seiner rechten Reifezeit, daß man nun auch sagen kann: **Im** Anfang war das Leben. Darum wird dies Wort, oder die Weisheit, Sprüch. 3, 18–20., genannt **der Baum des Lebens.** Hier hat die ganze Lebendigmachung ihren Grund.

Und **das Leben war das Licht der Menschen)** Da neigt sich nun zum Menschen. Durch die Lebendigmachung erleuchtet es und im Erleuchten macht es

Figure 19 Berleberg Bibel, Stuttgart, 1859

### Citation-Annotations and Haug's Mysticism

Haug, like Luther had some two hundred years prior, used translation and annotation together to produce a Bible that reflected the self-organizing shape of reality, or of the mind of God. While his translation reflected immediately the shape of that order (a radical Pietist form), Haug's notes signaled his sense that the order of reality was not to

be found in the order of verbal revelation in Scripture, or in the hierarchical order of various parts of Scripture, nature, and results of rational observation. It was not rational observation of more Orthodox or natural philosophical stripes, but mystical union with God in which the self-organizing divine order came clear.

Some annotations in Haug's Bible, as they had in Bayle's Dictionary, destabilized 'human' pretensions to knowledge. Others connected Scripture to particular mystical traditions. For Haug, the destabilization pointed a keen reader to a kind of mystical unity; for Bayle, at least on the usual read, simply to a kind of skepticism. Though it could be construed as a confirmation of Haug's sense of being constituted in an order of reality that is divine, more Orthodox Lutherans might more readily construe Haug's notes and translation as foreign imposition or as an expression of unfaith, insofar as they equated 'faith' with trust in a stable (albeit not fixed) order of the divine mind and of reality—one that was revealed by, in, and through Word (a book, a verbal expression, an incarnate God, etc., not a mystical experience).<sup>208</sup> So one core conflict, as some have put it, between Haug and the Orthodox, concerned a question about whether Scripture has more than one meaning, or, as we might put it in light of the reading I am advancing, the question about whether apparently conflicting points of view (e.g., the rational observational and

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<sup>208</sup> Douglas H. Shantz relates an excellent example in his 2013 *Introduction to German Pietism: Protestant Renewal at the Dawn of Modern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press): "This [contradictory annotations that leave "the reader unsure of what the commentary intended"] is illustrated by the comments on Exodus 32:15, where Moses descends the mountain with two tablets containing the Ten Commandments. On the question of how the commandments were distributed on the two tablets, the commentary notes that Philo and Josephus argued for five on each tablet; others, such as Augustine, argued for three and seven; Athanasius and Ambrose argued for four and six. In the end, Haug dismissed the discussion as unimportant compared with obeying the commandments, however they were inscribed." (ebook, no page numbers)

moral as in the tablets illustration) might be mystically held together in the divine order in just the hierarchical order Haug suspects they are. In other words, the implicit hierarchy of the variously shaped divine orders (their stability), in addition to their instability (for, presented next to one another, they call one another and any clear hierarchy between them into question) together creates the tensional 'stability' that supports Haug's radical Pietism. Haug's translation does some of this work, but the bulk of it is accomplished with his annotations.

Annotation-citations as Storr received them, could be used to advance, support, source, defend, destroy, replace, destabilize, and teach both particular propositions, symbols of rules of configuration (of any document(s) or object(s), and rules of configuration (again, of any document(s) or objects). Their content and/or the assumption sets within which that content appears might be subordinate, superior, or tensionally balanced with the verbal units they annotate. Their content and/or the assumption sets within which that content appears might be subordinate, superior, or tensionally balanced with the content and assumption sets of other annotations. Or both.

Storr used citation-annotations to display the relationships between dogma, Scripture, and reason's products in ways that detractors (those who did not admit the divine authority and highest-reliability of Scripture) could read on their own terms and—simultaneously—in ways that those who did admit the highest-reliability of Scripture (and Lutheran dogma) could read on their terms. Indeed, he presented ways that his detractors and fellow biblical theologians could understand on their own terms how those relationships might be configured from an outside perspective (e.g., one in which

reason's trope of history dominated and one in which the Lutheran trope dominated). In other words, he presented ways of configuring the materials on reason's terms and from the perspective of the Lutheran biblical theologian.

## **Kant's Arguments at/as the Hinge Between Reason and Biblical Theology**

It would, of course, be difficult to imagine Kant and Storr's Kantian students conceiving of his arguments for rational belief in God as summaries of the divine Author's revelation in Scripture. And it would be equally difficult to imagine that Kant and Storr's Kantian students conceived of his arguments for rational belief in God as reliable relative to human reason, where human reason and its limits can be understood as if from the outside. But this is just Storr's task.

Storr organizes the *DC* so as to lead his doubting students on their own terms to the pivot points between configuration rules. This creates the conditions in which they might come to trust in the divine authority of Scripture (on Scripture) and the Orthodox rule for configuring the relationship of human reason and biblical theology. The pivot point to which Storr leads his students is the pivot point in the Lutheran transformation narrative.

Again: If Storr's book is successful, his students will see its part-part and part-whole relationships on their own terms, and come to see these relationships under a rule of configuration appropriate to a Lutheran cleric. That is, they will come to see Storr's book as an example of the loci method. Storr's words will be static; they will permit his students to compare one way of reading with another. To see as believing Lutheran

clerics, Storr's students will need to see Scripture's part-part and part-whole relations on their own terms, and come to see these on the terms (and as the Words) of the divine Author. The correlated Lutheran divine-human distinction will permit them to see how the DC groups different modes of reasoning under the divine and human and displays their harmony. The words of Scripture will stay the same and show the difference between two rules of configuration. Again, to see as Lutheran clerics of faith, Storr's students will need to see God as both able and willing to help them do what they cannot. Their sense that God is able to help them do what they cannot will hold static and show the difference between life without trust in God's willingness and life with trust in God's willingness.

Now in the Lutheran transformation narrative—the source of which, from the biblical theologian's point of view, is Scripture—the primary pivot point is awareness of a God who is able to do what humans must but cannot. Storr's students presumably admit Kant's arguments for rational belief in God. And presumably they admit the possibility that these arguments are the source of similar expressions in Scripture and dogma. But how could they come to see them as symbolic expressions and summaries of Scripture?

Kant may lead them there. For Kant says that they are symbolic expressions. And that they concern only the ability of God to help. And that hope and religion are the sphere of trust in God's willingness to help. In other words, Storr's students might read Kant's arguments on his reason's own terms and be able to see that they are similar to the teachings of Scripture (perhaps a book they might respect) and that they are symbolic expressions of what human reason cannot represent to itself.

## The God of Kant's Arguments is Able to Do What Humans Cannot

In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant claims that his postulate and arguments for rational belief in God concern only a notion of God who is able to do what humans cannot do on their own.

Christian morals, because it frames its precept so purely and inflexibly (as must be done), deprives the human being of confidence that he can be fully adequate to it, at least in this life, but again sets it up by enabling us to hope that if we act as well as is within our *power*, then what is not within our power will come to our aid from another source, whether or not we know in what way.<sup>209</sup>

The moral law commands me to make the highest possible good in a world the final object of all my conduct. But I cannot hope to produce this except by the harmony of my will with that of a holy and beneficent author of the world.<sup>210</sup>

The postulates concern the possibility of the highest good, and so “how we are to become *worthy* of happiness[,] but [o]nly if religion is added to it does there also enter the hope of some day participating in happiness to the degree that we have been intent upon not being unworthy of it.”<sup>211</sup>

Storr paraphrases and cites the particular articulations that appear in Kant's third *Critique*. Kant is famous for talking about his arguments in a variety of (sometimes

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<sup>209</sup> AA 5:127n; *CPrR*, 243. Kant is not yet talking about religion, but about the, “Christian principle of morals itself[, which] is not theological (and so heteronomy); it is instead autonomy of pure practical reason by itself, since it does not make cognition of God and his will the basis of these laws but only of the attainment of the highest good subject to the condition of observing these laws, and since it places even the proper incentive to observing them not in the results wished for but in the representation of duty alone, faithful observance of which alone constitutes worthiness to acquire the latter.”

<sup>210</sup> AA 5:129; *CPrR*, 244.

<sup>211</sup> AA 5:130; *CPrR*, 244.



conflicting) ways. So permit me to show why Kant claims that the underlying case concerns only the possibility of divine aid. In §85 of that book Kant describes the moral and physico-theologies thus:

**Physicotheology** is the attempt of reason to infer from the **ends** of nature (which can be cognized only empirically) to the supreme cause of nature and its properties. A **moral theology** (ethico-theology) would be the attempt to infer from the moral ends of rational beings in nature (which can be cognized *a priori*) to that cause and its properties.

The former naturally precedes the latter. For if we would infer **teleologically** from the things in the world to a world-cause, ends of nature must first be given, for which we have subsequently to seek a final end and then for this the principle of the causality of this supreme cause.<sup>212</sup>

Both kinds of arguments, we learn in Kant's essay on Orientation, depend upon the capacity of rational beings who think like us to distinguish between the actual and the possible. Moral awareness includes a kind of recognition that things could be other than they are (i.e., what appears does not exhaust the full range of possibilities). More robust: freedom's self-revelation includes a sense of an unconditional command to bring about the highest good (since ought implies can, it must be possible to bring about the correlation of highest morality with greatest happiness; in what appears to us, these two are not correlated, so awareness of freedom involves awareness of a distinction between the actual and possible). Already entailed in awareness of freedom's self-revelation is a capacity to distinguish between the necessary (the command is unconditional), the possible, and the contingency "*of the existence of things in the world.*" That we read

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<sup>212</sup> AA 5:436-7; CJ 303.

purposiveness in nature, too, requires recognition that things could be other than they are, for how would we wonder that things are as they are, save by comparison.<sup>213</sup>

*How are we able to distinguish between the necessary and the possible?*

In the first *Critique*, Kant argued that necessity, possibility, and existence are categories of the understanding. Unlike some of the other categories, these modal categories do not determine objects. Rather they qualify how an object is related to a faculty of cognition.<sup>214</sup> Simply put, ‘possibility’ is not a property of objects, but rather a way we organize objects in relation to our cognitive faculties. When, for example, I combine sensibility and understanding and so represent the bird in front of me, I say the bird exists. It is actual for me. I experience it, I *understand* it. When represent a bird in front of me that is not in front of me, I say it is possible. I do not experience it. I do not know it. I do not make it exist. Even if it is the most perfect bird I can imagine.

Kant distinguished between logical and real possibility. A bearded critter with a flying sleigh that twists time and space in order to deliver presents is logically possible: there is nothing contradictory about it. But it is not really possible because it does not conform to my concept of an object of possible experience: if there were such a thing, I would not experience it on those terms, because I cannot experience “twisted” space and time. But the bird that is not in front of me is really possible because it I could experience it. Again, loosely speaking, existence is not a predicate, but a qualification of how something is for me—it is free of contradiction, sensible, understandable, *actual*.

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<sup>213</sup> To be clear, this is entirely about us and our wondering in a way that, on Kant’s terms, the moral argument is not.

<sup>214</sup> A219/B266; *CPR*, 322.

But there is nothing sensible, for example, about the moral law or about freedom's self-revelation. So how could we tell that the moral law commanded unconditionally? Or whether the highest good that we ought to bring about is merely logically possible, merely a wish? When I act morally, Kant suggests, I have to *assume* that it is really possible to bring about the highest good. The highest good is not my incentive, for I act solely out of respect for the moral law, but it is a condition of the coherence of my action. Because we have to act—to judge in practical matters—, Kant says, we must have a way to orient ourselves in thinking about the supersensible.

If we orient ourselves objectively (in relation to experience) in the sensible, we orient ourselves subjectively in the supersensible.

Reason, Kant says, is always reaching out for more, but at the same time, it feels a need to close things off. Reason reaches out endlessly, but it feels a need to make for itself an artificial end. This felt need orients reason. For artificially ending the endless means positing an unconditioned in relation to the conditioned.

For not only does our reason already feel a need to take the *concept* of the unlimited as the ground of the concepts of all limited beings - hence of all other things\* - , but this need even goes as far as the presupposition of its *existence*, without which one can provide no satisfactory ground at all for the contingency of the existence of things in the world, let alone for the purposiveness and order which is encountered everywhere in such a wondrous degree (in the small, because it is close to us, even more than in the large).

Let us return briefly to the sensible world. When I experience the bird, for example, I experience it as *in the world*. By 'in the world' I mean that the bird is not inside me, looking through my eyes, so to speak, and that the bird is not connecting me to it.

Because I experience the bird as in the world, reason must have already distinguished between 'I' and 'world' and 'God' (the idea we use to organize the combination of I and world). But 'world' could be endless—it does not correspond to anything sensible. So reason must have already posited an unconditioned; otherwise 'world' would not organize anything for me. Reason feels a need, Kant says in the first *Critique*, to posit this unconditioned—to draw 'world' to a close—in order to organize experience. But how does it distinguish between the conditioned and the unconditioned?

Reason, Kant says, "presuppose[s] reality as given for the possibility of all things." In other words, reason takes the reality of any and all possibility whatsoever as given. That does not mean that reason assumes that all possibilities are real. Reason's assumption is more like a transcendental starting place: when I think, a possibility appears. That any possibility appears at all means (according to reason) that the reality of possibility is given. Reason does not assume that the appearance of a possibility means that there is some other possibility that made the appearance of that possibility possible, and so on, ad infinitum. Instead, reason takes the reality of the possibility of all things as given. When I think (i.e., when a possibility appears to me), I \*actually\* think.

So we have a subjective ground for orienting ourselves in the supersensible, because when we think anything at all, the conditions of the possibility of that thought—an unconditioned—are actually met. Even if we tried to deny it, we would always confirm it. For to deny is to relate, and to relate is to think.

When we have any thought at all, we can already compare, in other words, the actual and the possible, the ground and the thought. We can use this ground, in

combination with sensibility and a concept of an object of experience to draw a close to world, and so to organize our experience *if* we want to judge about the contingency of the world in relation to an original being. As Kant puts it, reason understands itself "necessitated to take one single possibility, namely of an unlimited being, to consider it as original and all others as derived."<sup>215</sup> All this is to say that when I experience the bird in the world, it *exists*, and it is not the condition of my having any thought at all (i.e., it exists, it is logically and really possible, and it is not necessary).

Kant puts the point this way:

But one can regard the need of reason as twofold: *first* in its *theoretical*, second in its *practical* use. The first need I have just mentioned; but one sees very well that it is only conditioned, i.e. we must assume the existence of God *if* we *want to judge* about the first causes of everything contingent, chiefly in the order of ends which is actually present in the world.

But how does reason use this subjective ground for practical purposes? In combination with freedom's self-announcement. Because I can only affirm the objective reality of the concept of the highest good (i.e., the real possibility of the highest good)—and I have to, for it is the condition of the coherence of moral action)—if I assume a being *independent* of the order of the world (experience) and the order of the moral world (which freedom announces), who can bring them together. In other words, I can use the distinction between the actual (the ground of thought) and the possible (any thought) to orient myself in thinking about the supersensible—for practical purposes. The God I

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<sup>215</sup> AA 8:139; O, 12.

postulate, in more familiar language, is a being capable of ensuring that ought implies can.

So, Kant says,

Far more important is the need of reason in its practical use, because it is unconditioned, and we are necessitated to presuppose the existence of God not only if we *want* to judge, but because we *have to judge*. For the pure practical use of reason consists in the precepts of moral laws. They all lead, however, to the idea of the *highest good* possible in the world insofar as it is possible only through *freedom: morality*; from the other side, these precepts lead to what depends not merely on human freedom but also on *nature*, which is the greatest *happiness*, insofar as it is apportioned according to the first. Now reason *needs* to assume, for the sake of such a *dependent* highest good, a supreme intelligence as the highest *independent* good; not, of course, to derive from this assumption the binding authority of moral precepts or the incentives to observe them (for they would have no moral worth if their motive were derived from anything but the law alone, which is of itself apodictically certain), but rather only in order to give objective reality to the concept of the highest good, i.e. to prevent it, along with morality, from being taken merely as a mere ideal, as it would be if that whose idea inseparably accompanies morality' should not exist anywhere.<sup>216</sup>

The capacity of reason to orient itself in the supersensible on subjective grounds lies behind the argument Kant gives in the third *Critique*—to which Storr refers. In §87, Kant's logic unfolds thus:

The moral laws, however, have the unique property that they prescribe something to reason as an end without a condition, thus do exactly what the concept of a final end requires; and the existence of such a reason, which in the relation to ends can be the supreme law for itself, in other words, the existence of rational beings under moral laws,

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<sup>216</sup> AA 8:139; O, 12.

can alone be conceived of as the final end of the existence of a world. If, on the contrary, this is not the case, then there is either no end at all for the existence of a world in its cause, or it is grounded in an end without a final end.

The moral law, as the formal rational condition of the use of our freedom, obligates us by itself alone, without depending on any sort of end as a material condition; yet it also determines for us, and indeed does so *a priori*, a final end, to strive after which it makes obligatory for us, and this is the **highest good in the world** possible through freedom.

The subjective condition under which the human being (and, according to our concepts, every rational finite being as well) can set a final end for itself under the above law is happiness. Hence the highest physical good that is possible in the world and which can be promoted, as far as it is up to us, as a final end, is **happiness** – under the objective condition of the concordance of humans with the law of **morality**, as the worthiness to be happy.

However, given all of the capacities of our reason, it is impossible for us to represent these two requirements of the final end that is set for us by the moral law as both **connected** by merely natural causes and adequate to the idea of the final end as so conceived. Thus the concept of the **practical necessity** of such an end, by means of the application of our own powers, is not congruent with the theoretical concept of the **physical possibility** of producing it if we do not connect our freedom with any other causality (as a means) than that of nature.

Consequently, we must assume a moral cause of the world (an author of the world) in order to set before ourselves a final end, in accordance with the moral law; and insofar as that final end is necessary, to that extent (i.e., in the same degree and for the same reason) is it also necessary to assume the former, namely, that there is a God.\* <sup>217</sup>

Kant's footnote confirms that, on his terms, the argument has only subjective validity and is not designed to convince doubters.

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<sup>217</sup> AA 5:450; CJ 315.

\*This moral argument is not meant to provide any **objectively** valid proof of the existence of God, nor meant to prove to the doubter that there is a God; rather, it is meant to prove that if his moral thinking is to be consistent, he **must include** the assumption of this proposition among the maxims of his practical reason. – Thus it is also not meant to say that it is necessary to assume the happiness of all rational beings in the world in accordance with their morality **for** morals, but rather that it is necessary **through** their morality. Hence it is a **subjective** argument, sufficient for moral beings.<sup>218</sup>

The physico-theological argument depends on the moral argument. As Kant puts it in *CJ* §88, “we have a moral ground for also conceiving of a final end of creation for a world.”<sup>219</sup> While the moral and the physico-theological arguments, then, can be drawn out from the objective reality of the concept of the highest good (without which we could not affirm the real possibility of the highest good), they do not tell us anything about the existence of God qua object. “The reality of a highest morally legislative author,” Kant says, “is thus adequately established merely **for the practical use** of our reason, without determining anything in regard to its existence theoretically.”<sup>220</sup> On Kant’s terms, neither his moral nor physico-theological arguments concern God conceived as an object; neither of them convince someone who doubts (i.e., who lacks rational faith). The objective reality of the concept of the highest good does not ‘undo’ the subjective ground of orientation on which they rest.<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> *AA* 5:450-1; *CJ* 315.

<sup>219</sup> *AA* 5:455; *CJ* 320.

<sup>220</sup> *AA* 5:456; *CJ*, 320.

<sup>221</sup> This is why, for example, Kant says that whatever we think about the unthinkable ‘necessary’ being, we think on analogy to ourselves.



## The God of Kant's Arguments is a Symbolic Expression

All this is to say that the God of Kant's moral and physico-theological arguments—the necessity of possibility—is an absolute. It is not something human beings can represent to themselves in any way, save symbolically. Kant explains in the *Critique of Judgment*:

But if one demands that the objective reality of the concepts of reason, i.e., of the ideas, be demonstrated, and moreover for the sake of theoretical cognition of them, then one desires something impossible, since no intuition adequate to them can be given at all.

All **hypotyposis** (presentation, *subjecto sub adspectum*), as making something sensible, is of one of two kinds: either **schematic**, where to a concept grasped by the understanding the corresponding intuition is given *a priori*; or **symbolic**, where to a concept which only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, an intuition is attributed with which the power of judgment proceeds in a way merely analogous to that which it observes in schematization, i.e., it is merely the rule of this procedure, not of the intuition itself, and thus merely the form of the reflection, not the content, which corresponds to the concept.<sup>222</sup>

When we go to think about the necessity of possibility (God) (i.e., to display the ground of relation in relation)—and for practical use, we must—we build for ourselves a symbol. So, Kant says, all of our cognition of God is symbolic:

If one may already call a mere kind of representation cognition (which is certainly permissible if it is a principle not of the theoretical determination of what an object is in itself, but of the practical determination of what the idea of

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<sup>222</sup> AA 5:351; CJ, 225.

it ought to be for us and for the purposive use of it), then all of our cognition of God is merely symbolic [...]<sup>223</sup>

On Kant's terms, reason's arguments for rational belief in God are arguments for a God who is able to help and they are symbols of something that humans must think but cannot think directly. Which is to say that reason's arguments are similar to those set out in the Lutheran read of Scripture and that they have the status of a human symbol. At this point, Storr can only hope for the miracle of faith. But he has perhaps led his students to the point where they might recognize the rationality of Scripture's teachings. He has exposed them to the words of Scripture, which perhaps have their own power—one correlated with an announcement of the willingness of the divine Author to help and to announce that willingness. Given a reconfigured self-knowledge/knowledge of God, they might come to see the loci method (which turns on a divine/human distinction) at work in the *DC*, and so to see that the work of reason is (at least in some cases) not opposed to that of biblical theology. But instead, there are two measures of reliability—a divine and highest-reliable and a human and relatively-reliable—that stand on either side of a transformation story *as told post-transformation*. That is, they might come to see Kant's reason's arguments not simply as the hinge in an argument for Scripture, but also a turning point in their own ways of imagining the relation of dogma, Scripture, and reason.

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<sup>223</sup> *AA* 5:353; *CJ*, 227.

## Conclusion

Storr arranges materials in the *DC* in an effort to teach what cannot be taught: the divine authority of Scripture. And the power to divide modes of argumentation into human and divine, and to imagine them related sequential-hierarchically in accord with the Lutheran transformation narrative. That is, the power to imagine them not as competing ways to discover and justify truth, but as distinctive, sometimes overlapping ways assessing reliability. And to imagine one (reason) as a narrative condition of the other (divine revelation on terms humans may grasp and be grasped by; biblical theology). To imagine reason superseded by divine revelation in Word, but not obliterated by it. And to recognize the products of reason as reliable relative only to humans, but not highest-reliable, relative to the divine Word. Storr situates Kant's arguments in relation to other materials such that his students might come to see Kant's reason's arguments not simply as the hinge in an argument for Scripture, but also a turning point in their own ways of imagining the relation of dogma, Scripture, and reason. In the next chapter I show that the compatibility of Kant's language (even his descriptions of the arguments for rational belief in God) with the language of Lutheran theology may be the loophole Storr exploited and may also contain a way to show that the Storrish and Kantians spirits are at odds nevertheless.

## Chapter 3

In this chapter I argue that the divine authority of Scripture and Orthodox dogma do not follow from Kant's arguments, but 'after' them—Storr reads Kant's arguments under and into the Lutheran transformation narrative or trope of history. That is, Storr's biblical theology supersedes—but does not destroy—reason. Because Kant uses the language of the Lutheran trope of history, it is difficult to point to evidence that Storr's read of Kant's arguments under that trope is illegitimate, and easy to point to evidence that it is consistent with what Kant says. So this chapter attempts to show just how genius was Storr's sleight of hand and why his is perhaps an illegitimate read of Kant nonetheless.

### Introduction

In Storr's *DC*, the divine authority of Scripture and Orthodox dogma do not follow from Kant's arguments so much as they follow *after* Kant's arguments. In other words, to read Kant's arguments under the Lutheran rule of configuration is to read them under the Lutheran trope of history (the transformation narrative) or, what is the same, as products of pre-transformed human reason that are also the human-built materials one might expect the divine Author to use to introduce a new rule of configuration. Put differently, the divine authority of Scripture and Orthodox dogma supersede Kant's arguments in much the way Paul's Christianity and Luther's Christianity superseded Greek and Jerusalem Judaism and Roman Christianity, respectively. At the same time, the Lutheran trope of history supersedes that of rational-historical biblical interpretation. So when, immediately on the heels of Kant's arguments, Storr introduces talk about the

historical reality of miracles, he is perhaps not leaning on an unnuanced doctrine of the literal divine inspiration of Scripture or ignoring the power and human-relative reliability of rational historical biblical interpretation so much as he is reading Scripture from the standpoint of the Lutheran biblical theologian—whose trope of history is the Lutheran transformation narrative. For if the divine Word interprets itself, it interprets itself under the trope of history in which the divine Author announces himself as such on human terms.

Now if the divine authority of Scripture and reliability of dogma follow after Kant's arguments, it seems as if Storr's sleight of hand—how he (mis)represented Kant—should be relatively easy to detect and demonstrate. Storr claims in the Preface, for example, that Kant's reason's awareness of its own incompetence in the field of divine revelation leaves open the possibility that there is some still-higher truth; on his own terms, Kant must (and in some sense does) admit this. But what is extraordinarily well hidden here, I will argue, is that Storr is situating Kant's reason in the Lutheran trope of history. That is, Storr is looking 'back' at Kant's reason from the point of view of the post-transformation biblical theologian. Kant's reason, by contrast, is arguably not. But—and this is why I say it is extraordinarily well hidden—the overwhelming majority of what Kant's reason declares fits with (sometimes follows ridiculously closely) the Lutheran trope of history. In other words, it is difficult to find evidence that Kant's reason rejects the possibility of the reliability of that trope, and evidence that Kant's reason accepts it (or at least talks that way) is plentiful.

Recall that Schelling remarked about Storr's reading of Kant's arguments,

The great Kantians now everywhere to be seen have got **stuck on the letter**, and bless themselves on seeing still so much before them. I am definitely convinced that the old **superstition** of so-called **natural religion** as well as of **positive religion** has in the minds of most already once more **been combined with the Kantian letter**. It is fun to see how **quickly** they can get to the **moral proof**. Before you can turn around the *deus ex machina* springs forth, the **personal individual Being** who sits in Heaven above!<sup>224</sup>

And on the heels of Kant's arguments Storr presents §19—an exposition in which the God of §§17-18 is transformed into the personal, miracle working God of Lutheran dogma.

The method above stated, for arriving at a conviction of the existence of God, is of such a nature, that it would not be strange, if God should, by other clear and striking proofs, facilitate(1) that evolution of our finer moral feelings which is presupposed in that method. Such proofs we actually have in the miracles(2) of Jesus and his apostles (3), the truth and importance of which have already been established, §5, 8, 10 at the end. Those miracles were such effects as human agents could never have produced, by their own intelligence and power ; and therefore necessarily presuppose an invisible cause. And this invisible cause must have been rational; for not only are we ourselves able to discover(4) certain objects for which they were wrought, but the history of them, and the express declarations of those who performed them, assign to them definite objects (5). Now, according to the declaration of Jesus and his apostles, that rational Cause, whose superhuman power is proved from the very nature of these miracles (6), was God, or the Creator and Lord of nature. (For, this is the description of the divine character which Jesus and his apostles give, deriving it from the Old Testament, the authority of which they acknowledged, see §20.) And we have no reason to look for any other cause of those miracles, different from that assigned by Jesus and his apostles ; especially as the

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<sup>224</sup> Butler and Seiler.

arguments which have been adduced (§ 18) for our belief in the existence of God, render their declarations credible. God has then, in the miracles of Jesus and his apostles, manifested his agency (Acts 14: 9— 11. comp. v. 15), and corroborated the other proofs of his existence(v.17). This proof of the divine existence, taken in connexion with that above stated (§ 18), would not be wholly divested of force, even if we were to admit the unauthorized supposition, that the miracles of Christ and his apostles were wrought by some other being. For, on this supposition, we should have to admit, that the other being, who must necessarily have been rational and superhuman, did himself ascribe the miracles and doctrines of Christ and his apostles (§ 8, 6) to the Creator and Lord of nature. In this case, then, a belief in the existence of God, would be supported by the testimony of at least one superhuman being, and would no longer be a weakness peculiar to man.<sup>225</sup>

In the next few paragraphs I will suggest that Storr's talk about Scripture corroborating reason's "proofs" for God and his talk about miracles is evidence that he has adopted the Lutheran trope of history.

### **The Lutheran Trope of History**

I suggested in chapter one that Storr resisted the adoption of rationalist biblical interpretation by biblical theologians in part because it was not founded in a divinely-revealed distinction between the human and divine. So-called rationalist interpretations did not necessarily privilege the Lutheran rule of configuration or the Lutheran narrative in which Scripture can only be read aright with an Orthodox Lutheran presupposition about how parts of Scripture related to one another in the mind of the divine Author.<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> *DC* §19.

<sup>226</sup> I do not mean that there was something 'rationalist biblical interpretation', but use the phrase to refer to an extended family of interpretive methods that tend to (1) privilege what we would call nascent forms of historical, philological, and source criticism or to

I suggested in chapter one that, read in accord with the Lutheran rule of configuration, Lutheran dogma can be construed as a summary of Scripture. And I suggested in chapter two that Storr did not reject rationalist biblical interpretation outright, but instead embraced it as a propaedeutic to biblical theology. Among the great differences between rationalist and biblical-theological theological readings of Scripture, the denial and affirmation of miracles was especially salient point of attention in the eighteenth-century.

Here I want to suggest that the Lutheran rule of configuration includes a Lutheran trope of history—one that stood in contrast to the tropes of history typically employed by rationalist biblical interpreters. Scripture read on Scripture is Scripture read in light of the divine Author's trope of history. To make the point clear, let us drop back to the Wertheimer Controversy of the 1740s.

With his Bible translation, Johann Lorenz Schmidt brought together to the fore questions about whether a translation ought reflect the Lutheran rule of configuration (e.g., if Genesis 3 must be translated such that its subordination to the New Testament story about Jesus Christ and Satan is clear, or if it need only reflect, say, its subordination to evidence-supported speculation about what its author might have recognized) and questions about whether a translation ought reflect the Lutheran rule of configuration as

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read Scripture as one reads nature, and so to call confessional interpretations into question, (2) base their methods and reliability measures in a metaphysic or theological anthropology that may be at odds with confessional metaphysics or theological anthropologies (3) give Scripture (sometimes in an effort to defend the unity of truth) a shape akin to philosophical rationalist metaphysics (e.g., a Cartesian read or a Wolffian read), (4) deny sorts of divine intervention that do not cohere with the new physics, or (5) take the truth of Scripture to lie primarily in its moral teachings.



a measure of reliability— (e.g., whether the translation of Genesis 1-2 should reflect its subordination to the conclusions natural philosophers—who perhaps took themselves to be constituted by/in/through a divinely Authored natural world—supported with rational-observation, or to the Confessions—to the official summary of Scripture read through Scripture). Both questions concern the shape of the divine mind, particularly the relation of that shape to the realities within which various thinkers (and human beings) found themselves constituted.<sup>227</sup>

Many accounts of the Wertheim controversy suggest that Orthodox thinkers resisted Schmidt's rationalization of Scripture—particularly Schmidt's efforts to impose upon Scripture the Wolffian philosophy.<sup>228</sup> Although this perfectly well describes the gist of the controversy, it makes it seem as if Orthodox thinkers' opposition to Schmidt's translation can be reduced to their opposition to the Wolffian philosophy. But the Wolffian philosophy challenged the Lutheran anthropology and trope of history, while its challenges to the Lutheran hierarchical web of Scripture were—for the most part—indirect. However much it embraced a Wolffian perspective, Schmidt's translation more fundamentally challenged the Lutheran rule of configuration.

Put differently, the extent to which the Wolffian challenges mattered for the task of the Lutheran biblical theologian was debatable. But Schmidt's Bible also raised a

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<sup>227</sup> Cf. Spalding; Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670-1752*, 188-94; Ursula Goldenbaum, "The Public Discourse of Hermann Samuel Reimarus and Johann Lorenz Schmidt in the *Hamburgische Berichte Von Gelehrten Sachen* in 1736," in *Between Philology and Radical Enlightenment: Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768)*, ed. Martin Mulsow (Leiden: Brill, 2011); Sheehan, *The Enlightenment Bible*, 121ff.

<sup>228</sup> Here is a representative example: Pünjer, 543-44.

question from which biblical theologians could not afford to turn away or relegate to the philosophy faculty: should translations reflect the Lutheran rule of configuration, or is it merely important for biblical theologians to have and read Scripture under the divinely-given rule of configuration? Does Scripture have to be translated through the Symbol, or merely read through it? On the one hand, this was a question about power and public order. On the other, though, it is about confronting the possibility that efforts to expose and eradicate external impositions, and to ensure the integrity of biblically-supported claims, might be at odds with the Lutheran hierarchical web on which the biblical theologians' core claims "actually" rested. This was important for biblical theologians particularly in light of the early admonition that, although it is a summary of Scripture read in light of itself, the Symbol ought never be imposed upon Scripture or used as a guide for reading, for it brings to the fore the relation of history to the rule of configuration.<sup>229</sup> Permit me to explain.

Attention to anachronism is perhaps the hallmark of modern historical thinking; let us assume this for the sake of argument. Historical thinkers talk about anachronism as a form of illicit reading-in. Deciding what counts as anachronism is no simple matter. If we confuse a simple series (e.g., 1, 2, 3) with a linear temporal one (1931, 1932), then correlate the linear temporal series with events, temporary objects (e.g., organisms), etc., we do not then make a rule that no 'later' events or objects can appear 'before'. Otherwise an historian would be nothing but an obsessive actor or re-enactor. Rather we come up with some ideas about which 'changes' we would like to foreground and which we would

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<sup>229</sup> Cf. Concord

not, we reflect on whether an earlier author might have recognized some truth in the words we wish to say about her, etc., and these provide limits within which something might count as anachronism. So our notions of anachronism have as much to do with our notions of mind, our assumptions about human beings, about how to visualize time, and about the topic of conversation as they do with the “insight” that what can appear only after x cannot appear before it. The x is important, because anachronism is always defined in relation to some artificial point. This is another way of saying that the historical past and present need not map cleanly onto the grammatical or transcendent temporal past and present, nor need they map cleanly onto the conditional relationships we associate with them.

Now Schmidt’s translation might be understood to express a conviction that Christ in Genesis was anachronistic. And, if Scripture on Scripture did not mean, as it did for Luther, Scripture read in light of Luther’s reading of Romans, in light of the Lutheran theological anthropology, but rather meant, as Avi Lifschitz suggests, that one “should accept as God’s word only what was explicitly mentioned in Scripture,” (and so reject the traditional Christian typology) Scripture on Scripture perhaps carried with it different rules for what counts as anachronism.<sup>230</sup> The rules for ana/chronism might be figural, whether positively or negatively. The historical order and the hierarchical web of Scripture might be understood to contain or not-contain one another.<sup>231</sup>

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<sup>230</sup> Lifschitz.

<sup>231</sup> For more on characteristic Lutheran configurations of ‘before’ in the Book of Concord, see the detailed discussion of “‘prius’ and other indications of necessity” in Jayson Scott Galler, “Logic and Argumentation in *the Book of Concord*” (PhD Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 2007), 318-35. Galler calls ‘prius’ “more than chronological.”

Put this way, we might say that Schmidt's translation rejected the notion that Scripture on Scripture—as Lutherans traditionally understood it—contains the rule for anachronism, and accepted, instead, a more Spinozistic rule. Spinoza's Scripture had human authors who lived in particular times and places, and so who used particular words. If an author used a particular kind of language that belonged to a particular time and place, a reader does not have warrant to claim that the author lived elsewhere or in another time. Moses, Spinoza argued, could not have written Deuteronomy.<sup>232</sup> In the *TTP*, Spinoza sets “what the human author may have had in mind” as the guide to interpretation. On the one hand, this guide is the product of philology: one establishes a range of words and a range of ways of using words that an author might have had in mind by examining both the author's words and those of his contemporaries. But beneath this lies a deeper point, namely that “historical accounts [...] are based on conceptions of self in time,” and so ultimately on an individual's conatus.<sup>233</sup> In other words, an interpreter may find that a biblical author understands himself to have been transformed or given special knowledge by divine intervention; but the interpreter must contrast that with his own self-understanding. And for Spinoza, that ought to be an understanding of oneself in time and as one who may act in the world—but not as one who may be acted upon and transformed by divine intervention. A biblical author may report miracles, and the interpreter may say “this author reported this miracle,” but the interpreter may not say “there was some miracle.”

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<sup>232</sup> *TTP*, viii.

<sup>233</sup> Michael A. Rosenthal, “Spinoza and the philosophy of history,” in Heunman, *Interpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays*, III.

While the Lutheran and Spinozistic rules for anachronism might be taken to be correlated with an idealized transformation of mind, Spinoza's transformation and so Spinoza's rule for 'history' was decidedly not universal, and decidedly not passive. The philosopher, who has all the necessary means for close reading (of nature, Scripture, the body politic, etc.) and few of the pressing needs of the common people, may come to love God, may come to master the passions, etc. Spinoza's state does not hope to gain or stand to lose power through a shared transformation of mind: its citizens need not become Spinozists to be obedient. Obedience may govern their relation to God and love their relation to others; they need no shift from these ideals to unite themselves.

This, I suspect, is just the 'determinism' some of Spinoza's opponents found so threatening.<sup>234</sup> Spinoza's figural rule of history is, in a sense, one of distance from figures: the imaginative language of Scripture stirs the passions; investigation of that language tames them. And it is here a contrast between Schmidt and Spinoza becomes instructive: if Spinoza let the prophets have their reveries, Schmidt's translation domesticated their figures.<sup>235</sup>

Now we can perhaps begin to see the significance of the relation of history to the Lutheran rule of configuration and to questions of reading out and reading in, to reality and reliability. While Scripture in the Lutheran world had a history (e.g., its meaning was covered over in the course of time and could be immediately recovered in encounter with

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<sup>234</sup> My point comes clearer if I compare Schmidt with Spinoza instead of the more obvious historical influence, Wolff.

<sup>235</sup> Lange would hack at Schmidt on the issue. Michaelis and Storr will both link the figural to the otherness and dynamism of the divine Word. For more on the general reception of Leibniz, Wolff, and Pufendorf in light of aesthetics and language in Halle, Göttingen, and Berlin, see 318-35.

Word or mediately recovered through grammar and philology), its immediately recovered content provided the frame for all reliable histories. The history of Scripture was the divinely revealed history of human error and human encounter with God: Scripture contained the frame or trope of its own history. Alternate histories of Scripture were not divinely self-authenticated. Nor were alternate frames or tropes of history—for example, those in which some humans may come to love God and others—equally human, if perhaps not equally blessed—are never transformed of mind, but simply hope to better love neighbor and obey God and state. The moral Bible, the mysterious ‘remains’ after the historian-philosopher had showed its problems, leaves no room for (or does not require) the meta-morality, the mass transformation of mind in which the moral ideals and the image of the relationship of God and humans are transfigured, and (most important) in which these are understood to be universal and common. The common people need not share the basic assumptions necessary for a history, need not share any robust idea of error, of reading-in, of anachronism. They can love neighbor and obey God and may understand this as genuine love of neighbor and obedience to God quite without transformations and rules for reading. In practice, this looks, of course, strangely like the Bible in the Lutheran cross-confessional sphere (as read in the philosophy faculty). But the dissonance lies in the differences about universal transformation, about the frame of history and its relation to reliability and to reality. What one takes to be anachronistic, the other takes to be perfectly chronistic. For in history, a linear, perfectly formal, seeming universal, temporal series is never the only posited static. Though this seems to be—or even is—a necessary condition for anachronism, it is not a sufficient one.

If Schmidt's frame of history situated him as an outlier in the 1730s, by the 1790s that Scripture on Scripture provided the trope of its own reliable history was—from one perspective—completely outmoded.<sup>236</sup> We could put the point a little differently, though, and say that by the late 1700s that Scripture on Scripture provided the trope of its own reliable history had been thoroughly associated with the practice of illicitly reading the Symbol into Scripture. Storr held onto the creeds and to the notion that Scripture on Scripture provided the trope of its own reliable history.

Storr's Lutheran trope of history is among the reasons Storr looks like a throwback. And it is remarkably clear when he affirms miracles. For in the Lutheran trope of history, reason's measure of reliability is not highest-reliable. Which is to say that human self-knowledge on its own terms is open to self-deception that can only be checked by divine revelation in Word. Or: to read Scripture according to merely human tropes of history is to read it illicitly. The divine Author announces how history has unfolded, and, in biblical theology, that trope is the highest-reliable.

### **Lutheran Trope of History is Trope of Supersession**

At its heart, the Lutheran trope of history is a trope of supersession. Its model, I have suggested, was the first few chapters of Paul's letter to the Romans. There Paul argues that all are condemned, whether Jew or Gentile, and that all may be redeemed in Jesus Christ. The God Gentiles knew through creation and conscience and the God the Israelites knew through the divinely revealed law were the same God—and this God was also the God of the Christians. Supersession, in other words, is not a story of obliteration

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<sup>236</sup> *DPTS*, 48.

and replacement, but rather of the transformation of some parts of a worldview that subsequently reinterpret parts that remained—as parts that remained. Put differently, Paul's read of Gentiles and Jews was a read from the point of view of the religion about Jesus—even though it doubtless resonated with the self-understanding of Jews and Gentile God-fearers in his audience.

Similarly, the Lutheran trope of history is not a story of obliteration and replacement, but of the transformation of some parts of a worldview that subsequently reinterpret parts that remained—as parts that were there all along and remained. And the trope unfolds from the point of view of Lutheran Christianity—even though it perhaps resonated in Luther's day with the self-understanding of protesting Roman Christians and in Storr's day with the self-understanding of his rationalist and Kantian students. Again, in this trope, human reason has some awareness of a God who is able to help it do what it cannot; upon encounter with Word (given an immediate divine revelation), it comes to trust that the God who can help is willing, and indeed willing to announce what it could not trust on terms familiar to it. Human reason retains its conviction about a God who is able to help, but comes to see it in a new light—comes to see it as a turning point. On the other side of the turn is a new way of configuring Scripture and a higher way of discerning what is reliable. The old way and its reliables do not disappear, so much as they now always appear in relation to a new way and to new, higher-reliables. The two ways are not at odds, but coordinated in a narrative harmony—in which the 'new' or 'after' is also the 'highest'.



## Kant's Arguments in the Lutheran Trope of History

Now when Storr claims in §19 that Scripture corroborates reason's awareness of a God who is able to help, he reads Kant's arguments in accord with the Lutheran trope of history. He has explicit precedent from Melanchthon who taught that Scripture confirms and strengthens what reason teaches.

Here it is indeed most useful to think of the distinction: Certain things are handed down by the voice of God which are known naturally, such as the commandments of the Decalogue. But God wanted his voice to come down to show that those natural awarenesses themselves were implanted by him in human minds, and established the law in his covenant. But the confirmation of truth is welcome to a good mind when it understands that the divine voice comes through natural awareness. Reason recognizes that the earth stands immobile and the sun is moved. But when we hear it divinely told to us, we agree more firmly.<sup>237</sup>

Reason's insights are confirmed, strengthened, when it hears them from another source, especially one conceived as the voice of God. Compare with Storr in §19:

And as soon as the idea of a God has been communicated to a person from without, all the declarations of his own conscience and the instructions of nature around him, become, even without any new external proofs of the divine existence, much more comprehensible and efficient.<sup>238</sup>

But this is just the trope Kant draws on when he talks about the Gospel:

I, therefore, seek in the Gospel not the ground of my faith but its fortification; and in the moral spirit of the Gospels I find the report of how that faith was disseminated, and of the means of its introduction into the world - in brief, of

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<sup>237</sup> *MR*, 267. This is in Melanchthon's commentary on Aristotle's *de Anima*, written from the philosophy faculty.

<sup>238</sup> *DC* §19, note c (3).

what is incumbent upon me -clearly distinguished from what God does for me.<sup>239</sup>

Recall that Kant's arguments for rational belief in God also fit the Lutheran trope of history—both in its story about reason's self-conception (as aware of a God who is able to help, but unaware of the willingness of God to help) and about Luther Christianity's self-conception (as aware of the willingness of God to help):

Christian morals, because it frames its precept so purely and inflexibly (as must be done), deprives the human being of confidence that he can be fully adequate to it, at least in this life, but again sets it up by enabling us to hope that if we act as well as is within our *power*, then what is not within our power will come to our aid from another source, whether or not we know in what way.<sup>240</sup>

The moral law commands me to make the highest possible good in a world the final object of all my conduct. But I cannot hope to produce this except by the harmony of my will with that of a holy and beneficent author of the world.<sup>241</sup>

It is possible to construe, as Storr did, Kant's reason's admission of its own limits under the Lutheran trope of history. When, for example, Kant's reason claims to be blind to miracles—but unable to rule out their possibility—, Kant's reason can be understood to

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<sup>239</sup> *AA* 10:179-80. Cf. also the letter of April 28, 1775 at *AA* 10:176-9. Kant did not publish these.

<sup>240</sup> *AA* 5:127n; *CPrR*, 243. Kant is not yet talking about religion, but about the, "Christian principle of morals itself[, which] is not theological (and so heteronomy); it is instead autonomy of pure practical reason by itself, since it does not make cognition of God and his will the basis of these laws but only of the attainment of the highest good subject to the condition of observing these laws, and since it places even the proper incentive to observing them not in the results wished for but in the representation of duty alone, faithful observance of which alone constitutes worthiness to acquire the latter."

<sup>241</sup> *AA* 5:129; *CPrR*, 244.

conform to the Lutheran story about untransformed humanity. Indeed, Kant's corpus is replete with talk that conforms to the Lutheran trope of history.<sup>242</sup>

Storr's trope of history and Kant's reason's (at least nominal) conformity to it, then, allow him to mingle the Lutheran Orthodox spirit (in which miracles are historical) and Kantian letter (in which miracles are not part of human experience)—in such a way that it is difficult to find counter-evidence (and easy to find supporting evidence) in the Kantian corpus. But the feeling of discord his students might articulate as “Kant does not take miracles to be historical, Storr does,” is palpable. And, if the reading I have pursued thus far has merit, this feeling of discord might be just what Storr hopes will send his doubting students on an errand to discover the grounds Storr assumed and the methods Storr used to be able to present Kant's arguments in just the way he did. For the feeling of discord may indicate that reason is not the ground of his arguments for the divine authority of Scripture, but rather that this can only be a gift of divine revelation. It may indicate that Storr's position is that of the biblical theologian—not that of the rationalist biblical interpreter. For, read under the Lutheran trope of history, Kant's reason's arguments may be both the historical-linguistic source of Scripture and its teachings—but they might be reliable relative to both the highest-reliable and to human measures of reliability. That is, Storr's students may come to see the divine Author of Scripture as the God whose self-revelation in nature and conscience is the source of Kant's arguments.<sup>243</sup>

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<sup>242</sup> I give other examples below.

<sup>243</sup> This is just the traditional Lutheran Orthodox teaching. Divine revelation came in two basic kinds: the “declarations of conscience” and “order of nature” and verbal divine revelation in Word. While divine truth was one, of the two kinds of divine revelation, verbal divine revelation in Word was superior. Thus Word could confirm reason's

## Luther is the Historical-Linguistic Source of the Lutheran Trope of History

Were Storr's students, however, to inquire into the historical-linguistic sources of Kant's eighteenth-century articulation of reason's arguments and of Kant's talk that conforms to the Lutheran trope of history, and into the historical-linguistic sources of Storr's summary of Romans 1-2, they might come to see a rather different picture.

For, as I have shown, the notion that reason's rational belief in a God who is able to help might be the pivot-point of a transformation—might be the law against which Gospel shines—is, historically and linguistically speaking, Luther's. That the basic human problem is an immoral morality that stems from inadequate self-knowledge and knowledge of God is Luther's notion, as is the notion that this is correlated with the power to read Scripture aright. The notion that God reveals himself to humans in Word is Luther's. Luther summarized these ideas in the Catechisms, in which both Kant and Storr were schooled.<sup>244</sup>

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insights into the "declarations of conscience" and "order of nature," but reason could not "strengthen" those of Word. Similarly, Word could stultify reason's insights, but reason's could not preempt Word's. — Here is where the insight of Pannenberg and others—that if Kant said, "no morality, no religion," Storr answered with "no religion, no morality," begins to make sense. But the difference perhaps amounts merely to a difference between the pre- and post-transformation perspectives. See Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Theologie Und Philosophie: Ihr VerhältniS Im Lichte Ihrer Gemeinsamen Geschichte*, Uni-TaschenbüCher (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), 205.

<sup>244</sup> AA 8:323. "[...]in childhood we knew it by heart to the last detail and believed we understood it, but the older and more reflective we become, the less we understand of it, and hence we would deserve to be sent back to school, if only we could find someone there (other than ourselves) who understood it any better."

The notion that human reason may encounter Word and be transformed is Luther's. And the standpoint from which Luther made all these claims was the post-transformation standpoint. In other words, his story about what remained the same (e.g., the words of Scripture, the awareness that God is able to help humans do what they cannot) was told after his rule of configuration had been changed. Put differently, Luther construed himself in the past and Rome as "old man" and the idolaters and the immoral morality only after something had changed. Luther was able to talk about Word corroborating reason only after he had encountered Word. The Lutheran trope of history, in other words, proceeds from the post-transformation standpoint.

### **Lutheran Trope of History and the University Faculties**

And the Lutheran trope of history—its story about reason, its transformation, its supersession by Scripture on Scripture—had been Melancthon's guide to university reform—more particularly, to delineate the work of the philosophy and theology faculties. As he set it out, the philosophy faculty would treat the "natural causes and effects" in both the world and the human mind. Though it would not treat divine revelation in Word, and though its sphere would be cross-confessional (for all humans), it would not be an unregulated mish-mash of mere opinions or merely human illusions. Though it would not directly inquire into divinely revealed truths of Word, it would treat demonstrable truths.

That philosophy is the law of God can also be understood from the fact that it is the knowledge of natural causes and effects, and since these are things arranged by God, it follows that philosophy is the law of God, which is the teaching of that divine order.

Just as astronomy is the knowledge of the heavenly motions, which are arranged by God, so moral philosophy is the knowledge of the works, that is, of the causes and effects that God has arranged in the mind of man.

Thus we call philosophy not all the beliefs of everyone, but only that teaching which has demonstrations.

There is only one truth, as the philosophers say, therefore only one philosophy is true, that is, the one that strays least from demonstrations.<sup>245</sup>

Among these demonstrable truths were civic morals. Melanchthon's work, I mentioned before, was not a free standing reformation of the structure of the universities, but part of a larger effort to ensure that the state could benefit from an alliance with the Lutheran confession without giving up its right to apply instruments of conformity to those in its jurisdiction, regardless of confession. The Catechisms and non-university educational programs helped make compliant Lutheran ruled. And because the philosophy faculty—tasked with questions of the cross-confessional sphere of reason—would declare that the “law on hearts” included the command to obey the ruler, local rulers would maintain their right to rule non-Lutherans.

Just as the hands of Jacob resemble the hands of Esau, so the Gospel certainly teaches nothing else regarding civic life than what philosophy and the laws themselves teach.

Pomponius Atticus and the Apostle Paul differ, because they disagree about God. The one doubts whether God cares about human affairs, and lives without God, the other declares that God truly punishes; similarly, that He forgives for the sake of Christ, and that He has regard for and hears us. They do not disagree in what regards civic morals.<sup>246</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> Melanchthon and Kusukawa, 24.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid., 23-24.

The demonstrable truths of civic morality hold of all humans; about them, Word and reason wholly agree. Agreement, however, goes only one-way: from reason to Word.

Paul is speaking of the kind of abuse that is most harmful in the Church, namely when Scripture is received as though it taught nothing other than a knowledge of human reason. For it is easy for cunning men to transform the Gospel, by skillful explanation, into philosophy, that is, the teaching of human reason.<sup>247</sup>

Where reason and Word overlap, they overlap on Word's terms—not reason's. Just as it was illegal to read the summaries and symbols back into Scripture, it was illegal to read divine (Word) agreement back into the results of human reason, as if the status of reason's claims had divine force on their own terms (apart from their verification in Word). This was arguably for the Lutherans just what Rome had done to obscure the Gospel.

This did not mean that the theology faculty would be the sole reader of Scripture, but that the philosophy faculty (which would teach languages, grammar, philology, etc.) would clear the way for reads of Scripture on Scripture, Scripture as Word. The philosophy faculty's products regarding Scripture would have, on the one hand, similar standards as any human knowledge sans Word, but on the other, these would not be free-standing (as say, work on astrology, which could be confirmed by Word only in the most abstract sense), but considered propaedeutic to Word—awaiting treatment by the theology faculty. Strictly speaking, the philosophy faculty did not treat Scripture as the Word of God, but provided the tools for reading it theologically (i.e., it taught biblical exegesis).

By now it should be clear that Melanchthon's notion that Word confirms and

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<sup>247</sup> Ibid., 23. Cf. Kant's two prefaces to the *Religion* essay, AA 6:3-14; *Rel*, 57-65.

strengthens some of reason's propositions was perhaps not on his own terms a teaching he could make from within the limits of the philosophy faculty, or, insofar as it was a teaching he could make on that footing, it must have been a point of collusion with the theology faculty. For on the model I have just sketched, only the theology faculty should have the power to discern whether Word confirms, stultifies, or is indifferent to the teachings of the philosophy faculty. Because it cannot give a highest-reliable read of Word, the philosophy faculty can only discern whether its teachings have been sufficiently demonstrated, or whether they "stray" too far from demonstrations.

All of this is to say that in the two faculties, there were arguably two distinct but sometimes overlapping reliability criteria: demonstration and Scripture on Scripture: conformity to reason's "self-given" rules for reading/to the divinely revealed orders of nature and conscience; and conformity to the Lutheran theological anthropology and hierarchical web. The latter was higher than the former, for it could confirm, deny, or call indifferent the proposed truths of reason, while the truths of reason could not confirm, deny, or call indifferent the proposed Word-truths. Put differently—and this is my key point—the theology faculty was (early on) understood to hold the measure of highest, divine, 'absolute' reliability, while the philosophy faculty held a measure of lower, human, relative reliability. At their best, philosophy faculty's results might hold for all humans. But they could not be understood to hold for all humans with the force of a Word-truth; only the theology faculty could establish agreement or disagreement with the mind of God, with the divine-Word truths. In other words, the results of the philosophy faculty were, however well demonstrated, subject to human self-deception unless confirmed by



the theology faculty through Word.

On the quasi-Melanchthonian model I have outlined here, while the philosophy faculty—on a political, social level—shared the Word-vetted theological anthropology in their collusion with the theology faculty and the needs of the state, its conclusions were still understood to lack the reliability of the theology faculty. Put differently, the self-understanding of the philosophy faculty, on this model, looks more like what we would expect of a member of the theology faculty or a faithful Lutheran who was committing himself to playing the role the theology faculty had assigned the philosophy faculty. It reflects already a Lutheran understanding of reason, its limits, and its subordination to faith/Word—the very self-understanding that reason allegedly does not and cannot have. This is just what we would expect, of course, from a university reform engineered by Melanchthon and ordered by Luther. But Melanchthon's situation—inside the philosophy faculty, outside the all the faculties, and authorized by a member of the theology faculty—looks, in retrospect, like a formula for trouble.

### **The Resulting Paradox**

The trouble, simply stated, is that the message of reason (the philosophy faculty) must conform (for practical, political reasons) to the Lutheran teaching about reason: reason can only be aware of the God who is able to do what humans must and cannot. But reason (the philosophy faculty), by definition, has not encountered the divine Word. And so it does not know that it can only be aware of the God who is able to do what humans must and cannot—for that is only available after it encounters Word. So either the philosophy faculty cannot know the message to which it must conform (i.e., can only

be censored by the theology faculty) or (if it self-censors) it declares that it can know quite without having encountered Word. The paradox is the result of a deeply socially and politically and academically engrained Lutheran trope of history in which ‘human reason’ was a symbol of the ‘before’ or ‘subordinate’ position; its limits had been defined by the Lutheran trope of history, much as the ‘Gentiles’ had been defined by the Pauline-Christian trope.

All this is to say that the conformity of the Kantian letter to the Lutheran trope of history was perhaps no accident. It may be evidence that Kant had spied the possibility that his reason could make a strong claim about its inability to know (on its own terms) about God’s willingness to help that might both pass and stultify the theological censors. It could be that Kant’s advocacy for reason’s self-censorship included a carefully constructed way to quietly (at least prior to the *Religion*) demonstrate the paradox and the possibility that the philosophy faculty might not need to be subject to the censorship of theology faculty in order to preserve social and political stability. And it could be that Storr discerned Kant’s strategy and attempted to stultify it—either in the *DC* or the *A*, or both.

For if Storr had in mind that Kant’s reason had declared what it could not (unless it encounter Word), namely that—on its own terms, reason cannot be aware of or trust God’s willingness to help—then the historical-linguistic source-critical relationships between Scripture, Kant’s articulation of reason’s arguments, and Lutheran dogma that Storr displayed might look like an announcement that Kant’s reason had overstepped its limits. And if Storr situated the criticism in a state-approved work of biblical theology,

Kant and any member of the philosophy faculty would have no authority to raise public disagreement.

I do not mean, of course, to suggest that Storr and Kant were living in the sixteenth century, but rather with conflicts in some sense created by the remnants of Melancthon's paradox. With the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and Peace of Westphalia (1648), the state re-asserted its cross-confessional character. While the notion that the state was a cross-confessional sphere (a human entity) was compatible with Lutheranism, it was now only one of several approved confessions. The truth of Lutheran trope of history (or theological anthropology) was arguably no longer the ground of the state's cross-confessional authority. Nor could that truth ground a model for the relations between the higher and lower faculties, and between these faculties and the state.

The power of the state to make and maintain peace—not the truth of the Lutheran theological narrative—made the cross-confessional sphere. If, in the first half of the seventeenth century, theologians used theological language (particularly the “singularity of truth” in the books of nature and Scripture) to push for the unity of metaphysics in the philosophy and theology faculties (so that philosophical metaphysics served theological), by the second half of the seventeenth-century, this shift in the grounds of peace in the cross-confessional sphere began to provide a rationale for the rearrangement of university structures.<sup>248</sup> Thomasius, for example, argued that, by a covert alliance, the philosophy and theology faculties asserted a ruling power that

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<sup>248</sup> Ian Hunter, *Rival Enlightenments Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Kindle 678-9; Walter Sparr, *Wiederkehr Der Metaphysik: Die Ontologische Frage in Der Lutherischen Theologie Des Fruhen 17. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1976).

belonged properly only to the state. For private faith in morals and metaphysics—whether from the philosophy or theology faculties—had no legitimate place in matters of civil order. Insofar as they made claims to truth that could not be squared with one another and yet exercised civil power (e.g., by bringing charges of heresy), they undermined the stability of the state by calling its relation to truth into question.<sup>249</sup>

By the mid-eighteenth, the push for agreement across the faculties in metaphysics had backfired. In the interest of order, warring confessions and the “theological faculties traditionally associated with reinforcing them were [in some places] deliberately suppressed.”<sup>250</sup> For example, the founders [of the university at Göttingen (founded in 1737 by George II)] “stripped the theological faculty of its traditional powers and preeminence and thrust theology into the lowest position that the discipline, to that point, had ever occupied at a European university.”<sup>251</sup> There, relationships between the faculties were organized to minimize sparring about morals and metaphysics. And so were the modes of biblical scholarship, which Lutherans, Anglicans, Reformed, and Catholics all found sufficient. While they had a theology faculty, perhaps their most famous biblical scholar in Kant’s and Storr’s day was Michaelis, a member of the philosophy faculty.

Beginning in 1768, Michaelis published anonymously a multi-volume essay, *Reasoning on the Protestant Universities in Germany*, in which he argued that “it was no longer reasonable to assume that a university’s primary value consisted in its ability to advance the Christian faith.” Nor was its value the production of knowledge, but rather in

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<sup>249</sup> See Hunter, *Rival Enlightenments Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany*.

<sup>250</sup> Legaspi, 33.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid.

advancing the social and economic good of the state.<sup>252</sup> He sums up the sentiment, combined with resistance to confessional sparring thus:

If theology is beset by barbarism and ignorance, then one can only expect religious frauds to deceive the citizens and even the leaders: they will not spread reasonable and useful morality but, instead of these, traffic in many useless, incomprehensible, or erroneous propositions; and if several zealous teachers of such a religion rise up and others oppose them enthusiastically, then useless quarrels would arise over nothing, which would nevertheless be capable of unsettling the state. But the state avoids this danger if theology is drawn from the Bible with sufficient linguistic competence and if it is enlightened by philosophy: and even if, owing to the greatness of human corruption, it produces only a few Christians, the reasonable morality of the pulpit will nevertheless attract many good citizens. It will train still more effectively the obedient citizen who, because of his duties, treats it as a law. Because of its ongoing connection to philosophy, ancient languages, and history—in short, to many sciences related to biblical research—theology will cultivate scholarship and therefore help improve and promote the taste and knowledge of the people . . . I am actually of the opinion that whoever wants to cultivate a people has much to gain from a learned theology with a partly philosophical and partly philological flavor. Such a theology would have all forms of knowledge as its by-product and ultimately spread among the masses that serve the church and, as they fan out in all cities and villages throughout the entire land, give rise to new research and knowledge.<sup>253</sup>

In short, Kant and Storr were heirs to a world in which the structures that governed relations between the philosophy and theology faculties and between these faculties and the state were up for grabs. Questions about the proper way to construe relationships between the state, its university faculties, and truth hovered over the public

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<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>253</sup> Michaelis, *Raisonnement*, vol. 1, 72–73, quoted in *ibid.*, 35–6.

controversy about the oaths required of clerics—into which Kant and Storr both entered. Both of the thinkers were deeply interested in the sincerity of the clerics who took the oaths.<sup>254</sup> But if Storr created the conditions in which a cleric might come to believe in the veracity of the Symbol (i.e., to adopt a measure of reliability to which the Symbol measured up), Kant criticized the oath requirement on grounds that it discouraged the very sort of morality on which rational faith depends.

In his introduction to the Cambridge edition of Kant's writings on Religion and Rational Theology, Giovanni summarizes the catalyst occasion:

[...A]t the end of 1790, Wöllner and Hermes used the Immediate Commission to put into practice a new system of testing for theological students. All theology candidates were subjected to a rigorous examination designed to ensure the orthodoxy of their opinions, supplemented by a solemn oath, whose violation in any particular would be grounds for immediate dismissal.<sup>255</sup>

In the “Concluding Remark,” of the Miscarriage essay, Kant comments on sincerity. Having just argued that a faith like Job's is only possible in a person who bases faith on morality—not morality on faith—Kant claims that a sincere theodicy (one that admits the limitations of human knowledge and speaks “from the heart”) is far preferable to the sort that cannot be resolved and whose attempt demands insincere confessions.<sup>256</sup> Kant grants that human beings cannot guarantee that everything they say is true, but maintains nevertheless that they can “and must” stand “by the truthfulness” of their claims.

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<sup>254</sup> Storr's Württemberg was not under Prussian control. But the oath requirement was famous, required in Württemberg, and the possibility of Prussian takeover was on-radar.

<sup>255</sup> *Rel*, xix-xx.

<sup>256</sup> In slogan-like summary, Kant's point is that people aren't moral because they believe, but believe because they are moral.

We can stand by them because we have “direct consciousness” of whether or not we take something to be true, just as we have a direct sense about whether we are conscious of something. If we claim we believe something true without being conscious of it, we lie because we must be conscious of something to believe it true. So Kant holds out as a standard for formal conscientiousness both consciousness of material conscientiousness (awareness of having hesitated to affirm what might be false) and “care in becoming conscious” of one’s beliefs and unbeliefs (first), and (second) refusing to pretend otherwise.<sup>257</sup> This sort of sincerity, Kant notes, is not especially common, for human beings tend to deceive others, and *more importantly*, they tend to deceive themselves by “distort[ing] inner declarations before [their] own conscience.”<sup>258</sup>

In a footnote to this comment on sincerity, Kant explains that the human penchant for deception and the state’s need for order in some sense justify the oath’s use.

The means for extorting truthfulness in external declarations, *the oath (tortura spiritualis)*,<sup>w</sup> is held by any human court as not only permissible but as indispensable - a sad proof of the little respect of human beings for the truth even in the temple of public justice, where the mere idea of it should by itself instill the greatest respect. Human beings, however, also feign conviction - which is at least not of the kind, or in the degree, as they pretend - even in their inner profession; and since this dishonesty can also have external harmful consequences (for it gradually forges actual persuasion), this means for extorting truthfulness - the oath (which is, to be sure, only an internal means of extortion, i.e. the trial whether holding something as true can withstand the test of an internal hearing of the profession *under oath*) - can likewise very well be used, if

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<sup>257</sup> AA 8:268; *Rel*, 34-5.

<sup>258</sup> AA 8:267-70; *Rel*, 34-35.

not to put a stop to the impudence of bold and in the end also externally violent assertions, at least to make it suspect.

But it is not optimal. Not only because humans ought already to respect “public justice,” but also because the oath does little to guarantee the honesty of its taker.

Nothing more is expected by the human court from the conscience of one taking an oath than the admission that, *if there is* a future judge of the world (hence a God and a future life), the taker of the oath wills to answer to him for the truth of his external profession; there is no necessity for the court to require him to profess *that there is such a judge of the world*, because, if the first declaration cannot prevent a lie, a second false profession would cause even fewer scruples.

And ultimately because, while a cleric oath-taker can perhaps say whether he believes, he cannot affirm the truth of what can only be believed.

By any such inner sworn statement one would be asking himself: Do you now, by everything which is dear and holy to you, venture to guarantee the truth of that important proposition of faith or of some other equally so held? At such an unreasonable demand conscience would be startled, because of the danger to which one is exposed of pretending more than one can assert with certainty - where holding something as true involves an object which is not attainable by way of knowledge (theoretical insight), though its assumption, while still always free, is commendable above all things because it alone makes possible the union into one system of the highest principles of practical reason with those of theoretical cognition of nature (hence reason's agreement with itself).<sup>259</sup>

Insofar as the oath, in other words, demands that one claim to know what cannot be known, it discourages the very sincerity (morality) that leads to faith.

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<sup>259</sup> AA 8:269n; *Rel*, 35.



Storr, meanwhile, asked that his students be able to sincerely affirm their oaths—something his arch-Kantian student Diez famously thought himself unable to do. While he took faith to be a condition of the appearance of the reliability of the Symbol, he also took an encounter with Word to introduce a measure of reliability to which the Symbol measured up. In other words, faith is not knowledge, but biblical faith of the Storrish sort is grounded in language that resonates with faith or does not. Kant and Storr both affirm that the Symbol is a collection of symbolic expressions of what humans do not know. But if Kant might say that the Symbol has no theoretical content (nothing about which we can make reliable judgments about truth or falsity), Storr might say that it has linguistic content, and that this linguistic content may appear to measure up to its source (Scripture, conceived as the highest-reliable and as highest measure of reliability) or not.<sup>260</sup>

While it might be tempting to say that they are flatly opposed, Kant and Storr take their positions on oaths from the philosophy and theology faculties, respectively. They may or may not have understood their positions comparable enough to call them opposed. But, construed on the common ground of a political controversy, it might look as if the two thinkers hope to maintain or advance the power of their position (what they take to be the highest measure of reliability) in matters of state policy. In other words, it is at least possible that Kant and Storr took themselves not to be opposed on matters of

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<sup>260</sup> If Storr attempts to maintain and defend the highest-reliability of the Symbol, and so to enable his students to take their oaths with all sincerity, Kant accepts the demand for the oath as an instrument of political and social order, but is wary of its consequences on moral grounds, for it encourages mendacity. So long as the cleric is allowed to publish in the public sphere, however, the demand is not necessarily wholly at odds with autonomy—the command to subordinate everything to freedom. Cf. *QeE*.

metaphysics (at least as concerns awareness of a God who is able to help), but on how and which metaphysical truths translated into public policy.

I can perhaps sharpen the point by contrasting Storr's support for the oath and Kant's ambivalence about it with the targets of Wöllner's edict and with Semler's defense of it. Earlier I mentioned rationalist biblical interpretation. Those who championed these forms of interpretation, whose metaphysics and tropes of history did not always align with those of confessional interpretations, in order to undermine the truth of the Symbol were among Wöllner's targets.<sup>261</sup> His difficulty was a practical one: the state kept order by permitting several confessions and simultaneously demanding that they keep the peace between one another. If the confessions were rendered dubious (for example, by privileging historical and philological investigations of Scripture) and the state continued to demand conformity, it effectively undermined state power.

As I mentioned, the biblical scholars at universities like Göttingen worked with materials and methods that appealed across confessional boundaries. Which is to say they developed ways of reading Scripture that were reliable and yet did not issue in hyper-confessional results. Now clerics who first studied these historical and philological forms of interpretation and did not (fully) accept confessional forms of reading had begun to teach their parishoners Scripture in ways that undermined the confessional creeds. This effectively (at least from one perspective) amounted to the introduction of competing, not-

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<sup>261</sup> "Wöllner's intent," di Giovanni writes, "was to reassert and protect from attacks the truth of ecclesiastical dogma. Di Giovanni, translator's introduction to *RRT*; *Rel*, 22. Cf. Hunter

approved confessions, to churches within the state's purview.<sup>262</sup> Wöllner introduces the oath in an effort to bring this to a halt.

If Wöllner's oath aimed at maintaining the post-Westphalia arrangement of state and confession (a state blind to metaphysical truth, especially the theological sort), Storr and Kant both hoped to balance the state's need for order with a human need for sincerity or at least some resonance with the official teachings of a state or church. Put differently, Storr and Kant both hoped to have some say about how that balance might be achieved. Again, Storr looks to faith and a conviction of the heart—and to a faith-ful measure of reliability. He cites Scripture next to official dogma in order to show his students that there is some reason to treat the dogma as reliable (its relation to Scripture) that does not reduce to the state's endorsement of particular Symbolic books. Kant, meanwhile, argues that the state might be more stable and might even contribute to the moral improvement of its people if it at least permitted the cleric to publish his thoughts on the Symbol freely in the public sphere. That is, if the state created and maintained a place in which the cleric could say what he thinks (teach with heartfelt sincerity) about the Symbol without thereby introducing an unapproved confession.

I have suggested that Kant and Storr endorse different metaphysical truths, but, insofar as they make their claims from the philosophy and theology faculties, they may not

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<sup>262</sup> These rogue teachers were especially threatening, for the same time, public scholars like Lessing published (without university censorship and for wider audiences) interpretations of Scripture (and rules for its interpretation) that lent them credence. For example, Lessing's 1777 "Proof of the Spirit and of Power" argued that dubious historical truths cannot count as evidence for metaphysical truths. In other words, the claims of Scripture (read as an historical book) about which we are uncertain cannot guarantee the reliability of the Symbolic teachings about God, immortality, etc.

imagine them to be opposed. We might, however, begin to see a wisp of their opposition to one another on common grounds in their responses to particular political controversies—especially those in which the question about how the faculties, state, and truth out be related.

## **Two Measures of Reliability, Two Claims to Universality**

To account for the similarity between Kant's arguments and Romans 1-2 by saying that God corroborated in Word that of which reason was already aware—the ability of God to do what human beings must and cannot—is to take a post-transformation standpoint or to assume the Lutheran trope of history. To say, as Storr did, that a defense of the respectability of Scripture on reason's terms, might open the door to a transformation of mind was to call on the Lutheran trope of history. And to position Kant's arguments as pivot-points was to ask Scripture about what reason might be able to grant and what God might reconfigure. It was not to ask about reason's self-conception independent of the Lutheran trope of history. Nor could Kant have hoped to deviate far from this trope of reason's self-knowledge without encountering the censor. Again, to see that God corroborated in Word that of which reason was already aware—the ability of God to do what human beings must and cannot—is to take a post-transformation standpoint. And it is to take the Lutheran transformation narrative—in which God announces his willingness to help immediately and through Word—as the controlling trope of history. For it is to take Scripture (on Scripture) as the highest measure of reliability and to see that merely human measures of reliability are open (but not necessarily) to human self-deception. And it is to be unable to deny that trust in God's

declaration of his willingness to help was itself a miracle: something that humans could not trust on their own powers.

In this light, we might see a great difference between Kant's and Storr's claims that Gospel confirms and strengthens some insights of reason: Kant's comes from the philosophy faculty, and Storr's from the theology faculty. On the one hand, we might see here evidence that Kant colludes, if not with the theology faculty proper, with the state through the symbol of the Lutheran theological anthropology. On the other, we might see Kant quietly overstepping the bounds of the philosophy faculty (according to the quasi-Melanchthonian model) and claiming for reason the power to see that Gospel confirms and strengthens reason's insights. Either way, Kant has in Melanchthon evidence of a precedent of making this sort of claim about reason and Gospel from the philosophy faculty. Storr's claims, in turn, could be grounded in Lutheran tradition (e.g., appeal to Melanchthon) or, more likely, in appeal to Scripture on Scripture (e.g., Romans 1-3, wherein Word allegedly confirms to those with faith that "natural knowledge of God" is possible, though not wholly reliable).

We might also begin to compare Kant's and Storr's notions of universality and reliability. Kant carefully and repeatedly limits his generalization in the three *Critiques* to "rational beings who think like us," and to "human reason." Whether in reason's aesthetic, theoretical, or practical modes, its products are reliable (or have the force of reliability), according to Kant's account, only for all other human beings. In an important sense, the reliability of these products of reason is always only ever relative to us. Put another way, Kant denied that humans have intellectual intuition, and so doing ruled out an account

that would legitimate attributing to reason's products absolute reliability.

However, Kant's supersensible ground or necessity of possibility, on the other hand, would have to "have" intellectual intuition. Without it, it would not make sense to hope for the realization of the highest good; without it, we might deny that the moral world could have any relation to reality. Insofar as reliability can be understood to correspond to reality only on the terms this supersensible ground, Kant might be taken to have claimed that the reliability of reason's products is not always only ever relative to the I-think, but to the supersensible ground. Insofar as the supersensible ground is an absolute, Kant might be understood to have claimed that the reliability of reason's products is not always only ever relative to us, but always also to the supersensible ground. Given this read of Kant, and the difficulty of meaningfully distinguishing in non-transcendental modes between the I-think and an absolute, it might begin to look as if Kant has claimed that reason confirms not just the reliability of reason's products, but also their connection to reality, wholly without reference to an other: that reality and reliability are features of some of human reason's other-free self-relations.

For Storr, on the other hand, universality and provisional reliability go together under the Lutheran account of the "merely human," the untransformed mind, the work of reason and of the philosophy faculty. Here universality means "for all humans (with untransformed minds)." Universality and highest-reliability only go together in the Lutheran account of the divine Word or transformed mind; in the work of faith and of biblical theology. Here, universality means "for all humans, as declared by Word from

outside,” or “for all humans, as declared by their Author and Creator.”<sup>263</sup> The highest reliable, for Storr, is not relative, but absolute, because it is through divine revelation in Word given to humans by God (as if shared between humans and God). Storr maintains, in other words, a verbal-ontological link between human beings and the divine order, a link Kant denied.

### “Kant’s Own Terms”

The trouble with Storr’s read is perhaps less his read than his claim that the warrant and mandate for it is not ‘faith’ or his understanding of the Symbol or the work of the biblical theologian, but “Kant’s own terms.” Storr is ever eager to remind his readers that the critical philosophy—“on its own terms”—can neither confirm nor deny whatever is outside reason’s limits.<sup>264</sup> In scholarly memory, Storr’s appeal to “Kant’s own terms” to warrant Storr’s Symbolic read of Kant’s postulates stands among the more salient themes. For example, here is Adickes’ summary of Storr’s argument in *A*:

When Kant denies the possibility of an immediate influence of God upon the world, the resurrection, and the trinity in unity, he is going against his own principles; according to which we cannot determine anything as regards not-sensuous objects [things-in—themselves].<sup>265</sup>

And Otto Pflieger’s summary—not limited to *A*— is among the more famous accounts of what is wrongheaded about Storr.

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<sup>263</sup> Cf. “[T]hat for Kant it would be nonsensical to make such a claim to divinely revealed knowledge (since if its channel of communication is inaccessible to ‘other’ people, even the purported recipients of the revelation will be unable to say anything at all about how or whence the so-called knowledge came) is for Storr a matter of indifference.” Ogden.

<sup>264</sup> *DC* Preface, xii.

<sup>265</sup> Erich Adickes, “Bibliography of Writings by and on Kant Which Have Appeared in Germany up to the End of 1887,” *The Philosophical Review* 3 (1894): 447.

[Storr and his colleagues] maintained their biblical system against all the objections and doubts of the *Aufklärung* by an appeal to the Kantian philosophy; since [...] reason itself admits its inability to know anything of the supersensible, it has logically no right to protest against what has been made known to us concerning supersensible things by historical revelation; with regard to practical reason, Kant himself allows that it demands a requiting Deity for the satisfaction of our desire for happiness, and is therefore in its own interest called upon to receive upon authority the historical revelation concerning God and his government of the world. Hence the truth of the biblical doctrines stands higher than the critique of the speculative reason which confesses its own incompetence, and accords with the demands of the practical reason; it has therefore nothing to fear and nothing to expect from philosophy, but rests entirely upon the positive authority of a supernatural revelation, which has only to be first historically proved and then reduced to a system. Storr did this by putting together a dogmatic system, in the fashion of a mosaic, from detached Biblical texts, without caring for any other proof of his propositions [...].<sup>266</sup>

As I have shown, Kant does talk—endlessly—about reason’s “inability to know the supersensible.” He even talks about the possibility that “revelation” might confirm or strengthen or even bolster rational faith, and that it might be a vehicle of rational faith. But it does not follow from Kant’s language that he endorses the heuristic resonance of the Symbol as a matter of faith. Rather, in *What is Enlightenment*, Kant declares that it is a “criminal offense against human nature” for an age to “bind itself [...] to a certain unchanging Symbol.”<sup>267</sup> For while the Lutheran Symbol, historically considered, is certainly among the linguistic sources of Kant’s claims about the limits of reason and possibilities of revelation, it does not follow that Kant took the Lutheran faith or the

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<sup>266</sup> Pflleiderer, 86.

<sup>267</sup> QEE, AA 8:38-39, CPrR, 19-20; and the Pacini translation.



Symbol to be the source of their reliability.

This tension between Kant's Symbol-conforming language and his rejection of its heuristic-truth is perhaps nowhere more pronounced than in his April 28, 1775 letter to Lavater. He writes

A man who believes that, in the final moment, only the purest candor concerning our most hidden inner convictions can stand the test and who, like Job, takes it to be a crime to flatter God and make inner confessions, perhaps forced out by fear, that fail to agree with what we freely believe. I distinguish the *teachings* of Christ from the *report* we have of those teachings. In order that the former may be seen in their purity, I seek above all to separate out the moral teachings from all the dogmas of the New Testament. These moral teachings are certainly the fundamental doctrine of the Gospels, and the remainder can only serve as an auxiliary to them. Dogmas tell us only what God has done to help us see our frailty in seeking justification before Him, whereas the moral law tells us what we must do to make ourselves worthy of justification.

Suppose we were totally ignorant of what God does and suppose we were convinced only of this: that, because of the holiness of His law and the insuperable evil of our hearts, God must have hidden some supplement to our deficiencies somewhere in the depth of His decrees, something we could humbly rely on, if only we should do what is in our power, so as not to be unworthy of His law. If that were so, we should have all the guidance we need, whatever the manner of communication between the divine goodness and ourselves might be. Our trust in God is unconditional, that is, it is not accompanied by any inquisitive desire to know how His purpose will be achieved or, still less, by any presumptuous confidence that the soul's salvation will follow from our acceptance of certain Gospel disclosures.

Kant's moral religion conforms to the Symbolic story about the necessity of rational faith in God's willingness to help, even as he rejects the "auxiliary" dogmas. He grants that these appendages—put on human terms—may have met human (rhetorical) needs.

That is the meaning of the moral faith that I find in the Gospels, when I seek out the pure, fundamental teachings that underlie the mixture of facts and revelations there. Perhaps, in view of the opposition of Judaism, miracles and revelations were needed, in those days, to promulgate and disseminate a pure religion, one that would do away with all the world's dogmas. And perhaps it was necessary to have many arguments *xa:t' a:v-&ponov,*<sup>1</sup> which would have great force in those times.

But once the purified core of the Lutheran story (the religion of conscience) has been disseminated, the appendages can be cast off.

But once the doctrine of the purity of conscience in faith and of the good transformation of our lives has been sufficiently propagated as the only true religion for man's salvation (the faith that God, in a manner we need not at all understand, will provide what our frail natures lack, without our seeking His aid by means of the so-called worship that religious fanaticism always demands) - when this true religious structure has been built up so that it can maintain itself in the world - then the scaffolding must be taken down.<sup>268</sup>

It is perfectly possible, then, that Kant understood his commitment to freedom in thinking to warrant advocating for gradual changes to the interpretation of the Symbol that had been the model governing the relations between the theology and philosophy faculties and the state.<sup>269</sup> It is possible that Kant took the Lutheran Symbol to be a historically determined heuristic (a way of orienting oneself subjectively, even a way of

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<sup>268</sup> *AA* 10: 175-77; *Cor*, 152-3.

<sup>269</sup> Cf. *QEE*, where Kant says that the cleric "is bound to 8:38 deliver his discourse to the pupils in his catechism class and to his congregation in accordance with the creed of the church he serves, for he was employed by it on that condition. But as a scholar he has complete freedom and is even called upon to communicate to the public all his carefully examined and well-intentioned thoughts about what is erroneous in that creed and his suggestions for a better arrangement of the religious and ecclesiastical body." *AA* 8:38; *CPrR*, 19.

communicating the kernel of the moral religion), not a divinely revealed in Word subjective/objective confusion (i.e., possible that Kant might have not understood the Symbol to be best suited or most appropriate for undergirding reason's claims about reason's limits).

But, insofar as it issues from the philosophy faculty, there is little in Kant's work that we could point to as definitive evidence that he understood things in a way that would stultify Storr, for it was subject to censorship, and so was judged to contain nothing "outside of reason's limits," as they were construed socially, legally, theologically, politically. Everything Kant published (especially before 1792-93) could be tucked into its place within the Lutheran Symbol—by design of the author, and by design of the powerful.<sup>270</sup> The state-endorsed censorial power of the theology faculty—the power to determine reason's limits from outside—was no small matter.

Storr's claims about reason's lack of right to protest whatever the theologian may make of it could just as well have been political claims. We may hear in them the voice of a well-respected scholar who had witnessed the state's shifts in alignments from Orthodoxy to Pietism and finally to the more irenic rational-observational biblical theology, and who wanted to reclaim (and teach others to claim) the position the biblical theologian perhaps once occupied in relation to the state (e.g., before Westphalia, or at least before Thomasius brought the super-confessional reality to light) and the philosophy faculty (e.g., as final interpreter of the limits of reason). This would fit with Storr's decline of the

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<sup>270</sup> Kant's "Conflict of the Faculties" may, in one sense, be understood to constitute an exception, but not one in play in 1793-94. It is a use of reason in the public sphere, one in which Kant often positions himself in imagination outside the faculties as their arbiter.

invitation to Göttingen, where the theology faculty had diminished censorial powers and the philosophy faculty housed many rational-observational biblical scholars (e.g., Michaelis).<sup>271</sup> And it would fit with Storr's insistence that the Symbol hold steady and that the clerics be required not just an oath, but one taken with sincerity of heart.

Or: that Kant advocated reason's respect for its own limits and acknowledged that revelation may bolster or even add to the religion of reason did not give Storr the right to claim that the reliability of Scripture or any Symbolic doctrine follows from Kant's postulates on Kant's own terms; Storr's office perhaps did.<sup>272</sup>

## Conclusion

One version of usual story of the disagreement between the two thinkers (wherein they are taken to share a common ground, their claims are taken to have comparable statuses), then, might go something like this: for Kant, freedom is this highest and what matters most is that practical judgments really can be understood to be universal and to entail an assumption about the real possibility of the highest good (the 'largest order, the widest and highest dome of heaven'). For Storr, Symbol or Scripture on Scripture—divine revelation in Word—is the highest and what matters most is that humans orient themselves and evaluate/build their claims in relation to that Symbol, for it is a divinely-created widest and highest dome of heaven.

From one standpoint, Storr and Kant disagree (in spirit) about which dome of heaven is the highest and widest. And, insofar as Kant's reason and his 'notion' of

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<sup>271</sup> See Legaspi, 42.

<sup>272</sup> Indeed, it would be odd if Storr took reason's self-assessment from the philosophy faculty to give him that right.

freedom leave open the possibility of a higher, wider dome about which reason can say nothing, Kant cannot (on his own terms) shut down Storr's claim about the wider-higher dome. Now if we add to the disagreement about the highest-widest dome the assumption that there can only be one highest-widest, which would necessarily include as distinguishable/evaluable (if not fully determinate) all other domes, then it might appear that Storr and Kant were in a contest about whose dome was really the widest and highest. We might say that, in this contest—from the Kantian side—the relation of universality to communicability (and the two in relation to reliability), and—from the Storrish side—the capacity of human self-knowledge to stabilize 'universal' claims were at stake. Though a bit crude, we might even reduce it to a contest between autonomy and heteronomy, or between the denial of genuine otherness/surprise and an insistence on the necessity of a gift of genuine otherness/surprise.<sup>273</sup> But if one thinker has to appear on the other's terms in order for the disagreement to appear, there is perhaps no genuine disagreement; present-day thinkers are, in this case, free to create whatever common ground best suits their own interests.

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<sup>273</sup> "Although it certainly sounds questionable, it is in no way reprehensible to say that every human being makes a God for himself, indeed, he must make one according to moral concepts (attended by the infinitely great properties that belong to the faculty of exhibiting an object in the world commensurate to these concepts) in order to honor in him the one who made him. For in whatever manner a being has been made known to him by somebody else, and described as God, indeed, even if such a being might appear to him in person (if this is possible), a human being must yet confront this representation with his ideal first, in order to judge whether he is authorized to hold and revere this being as Divinity. Hence, on the basis of revelation alone, without that concept being previously laid down in its purity at its foundation as touchstone, there can be no religion, and all reverence for God would be idolatry." (AA6:169n; *Rel* 189)

It is possible that the common ground on which some present-day scholars find Kant's and Storr's spirits opposed is that of a supersession narrative. If, to the story in which their two highest-widest domes must be at odds, one were to add the notion that victory was supersession... If, as some claim, Kant was the author of a trope of history in which reason (rational religion) supersedes confessionism (revealed religion), and Storr maintained the opposite, the two thinkers' trajectories appear to be deeply at odds. Indeed, the disjunct (both cannot be highest and widest) spreads out through the tropes of history and there appears a (false?) dichotomy: where reason's dome is highest-widest, it supersedes revealed religion's; where revealed religion's dome is highest-widest it supersedes reason's.

This (perhaps commonplace) heuristic is borne out (or reinforced) in present day histories of history. For example, Hartung and Pluder explain that

The question, "what is history and how should it be written?" was posed anew in the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and its answers contrasted with preceding notions of history which had ranged from chronicle to narrative. What is characteristic of this new form of historiography, as Enlightenment historiography, is an understanding of history as linear and causally linked or through its showing the grounds for history's course and development in time. This latter is itself understood as universal-historical progress towards a secular end of history.<sup>274</sup>

Enlightenment tropes of history, they claim, are universal, progressive, and move toward a post-confessional world. In his recent essay, Ian Hunter explicitly links this

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<sup>274</sup> Hartung, Gerald and Valentin Pluder, *From Hegel to Windelband: Historiography of Philosophy in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century*, 1.

enlightenment trope of history to Kant—particularly insofar as his reason casts off the trappings of revealed religion.

although Kant himself did not use the term secularisation in either its Latin-based (*Säkularisierung*) or German form (*Verweltlichung*), he developed a metaphysical anthropology and theology that would give rise to a distinctive philosophical-historical conception of secularisation. In deploying a metaphysical conception of man as a double-sided intellectual (noumenal) and sensible (phenomenal) being, who was capable of governing himself through pure thinking once he had overcome his ‘sensuous inclinations’, Kant launched a doctrine of individual moral self-governance that in effect rendered the salvational role of the Christian churches redundant. In his rational theology and ecclesiology, Kant thus developed a philosophical history in which biblical Christianity and the confessional churches amounted only to external training-wheels for the inner capacity of moral self-governance, to be discarded once ‘history’ had brought that capacity to maturity in a ‘pure religion of reason’. This process of maturation, in which confessional religion was displaced by a rational philosophy that maintained religion’s transcendental ideals, was typically called ‘enlightenment’ but would later also be called ‘secularisation’.<sup>275</sup>

While Hunter’s Kant’s philosophical history is universal, progressive, and directed toward a post-confessional world, his metaphors (like Kant’s) are perhaps not that of Lutheran-Pauline supersession: Kant’s doctrine “rendered the salvational role of the Christian churches redundant;” his philosophical history pictured biblical Christianity and confessional churches as “external training wheels [...] to be discarded;” “rational philosophy” displaces confessional religion in the course of reason’s maturation.<sup>276</sup> Like Lutheran-Pauline supersession stories, traditional confessional religion is displaced as

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<sup>275</sup> Hunter, “Secularisation,” 9.

<sup>276</sup> Cf. Kant’s metaphors

rational religion appears; revealed religion is, in an important sense, left to the past; in another sense it is incorporated into a new world view. But the ‘super’ element of the Lutheran-Pauline supersession, insofar as it entails a change of perspective made possible by an ontological link between the divine and human is nowhere to be found. That the training wheels may come off hardly indicates that a young one’s bicycle prowess is superior to all other cyclists. The cycle remains the cycle. And its rider may mature in place, so to speak, without gaining super-powers. Change, before and after, and maturation, in other words, may not necessarily entail superiority.

We can say something similar about Habermas’s Kant. His Kant’s alleged supersession story is not one of revolution, but slow incorporation.

Kant refused to let the categorical "ought" be absorbed by the whirlpool of enlightened self-interest. He enlarged subjective freedom [ *Willkür*] to autonomy (or free will), thus giving the first great example—after metaphysics—of a secularizing, but at the same time salvaging, deconstruction of religious truths. With Kant, the authority of divine commands is unmistakably echoed in the unconditional validity of moral duties. With his concept of autonomy, to be sure, he destroys the traditional image of men as children of God. But he preempts the trivial consequences of such a deflation by a critical *assimilation* of religious contents.<sup>277</sup>

On the one hand, Habermas’s Kant incorporates traditional “religious contents” into reason; on the other, he clips the ontological link between the divine and human spheres. Taken together, Kant’s is a purified moral religion to which traditional religion is subordinate—but perhaps in a way that did not require Kant to imagine reason in a position superior to confessionism. Without the ontological link between the divine and

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<sup>277</sup> Habermas, *Faith and Knowledge*, 333



human, the fetters of revealed religion may both appear as fetters and be left off without pretending to a position higher than the human, more holy than the moral.

The history of German philosophy since Kant can be perceived in terms of a trial on this disputed heritage. By the end of the Middle Ages, the Hellenization of Christianity had resulted in a symbiosis of religion and metaphysics. This symbiosis was broken up again by Kant. He draws a sharp line between the moral belief of rational religion and the positive belief in revealed truths. From this perspective faith had certainly contributed to the "bettering of the soul" [*Seelenbesserung*], but "with its appendages of statutes and observances . . . bit by bit . . . became a fetter."<sup>278</sup>

What I am getting at is that present-day readings of Kant's secularization narrative may have features of Pauline-Lutheran supersession stories, but responsible ones do not attribute to Kant a robust ontological link between the divine and human that elevates reason above revealed religion. These reads of Kant as the progenitor of a secularization (i.e., slow letting go of heteronomous confessionalisms) narrative are perfectly defensible. In the *Religion*, for example, Kant both incorporates the language of Lutheran dogma into reason's self-investigation and talks about a time in which the trappings of revealed religion are no longer necessary.

If a moral religion (to be cast not in dogmas and observances but in the heart's disposition to observe all human duties as divine commands) must be established, **eventually all the *miracles* which history connects with its inception must themselves render faith in miracles in general dispensable.** For we betray a culpable degree of moral unbelief if we do not grant sufficient authority to duty's precepts, as originally inscribed in the heart by reason, unless they are in addition

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<sup>278</sup> Habermas, *Faith and Knowledge*, 334.

authenticated through miracles: "Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe." Yet, **when a religion of mere cult and observances has run its course and one based on the spirit and the truth (on moral disposition) is to be introduced in its place, it is entirely conformable to the ordinary human way of thinking, though not required by the [new] religion, if the historical introduction of the latter be accompanied and as it were adorned by miracles, to announce the end of the previous one which without miracles would not have had any authority at all:** indeed, even in such a way that, to win over the adherents of the earlier religion to the recent revolution, the older religion is interpreted as the ancient prefiguration, now come to fulfillment, of the final end of providence in the new. **And it would not pay under these circumstances to contest those narratives or interpretations, now that the true religion, which in its time needed introduction through such aids, is finally here and from now on is able to hold its own on rational grounds.** For we would then have to accept that the mere faith in things incomprehensible and their repetition (of which anyone is capable without being for that reason a better human being, or ever becoming one thereby) is a way, indeed the only way, of pleasing God - a claim that we must dispute with all our might.

Again, we see themes of replacement, before/after, old/new, and letting go the trappings of confessionalism, but no claim to super-super humanity or a revealed in Word divine endorsement of the purified religion of reason.

Now Storr argued in *A* (§5) that those Kantians who would deny the possibility of divine revelation on human terms take a wildly incoherent position. For without the "immediate influence of God," even the Kantians have no way to account for the moral transformation of a human being that figures centrally in the *Religion*, and peripherally in

the second *Critique*.<sup>279</sup> Recall that in §19, Storr defined a miracle as something God does for human beings that they cannot do for themselves, and that Kant repeatedly says that the possibility of divine help is requisite for hope of becoming well pleasing to God (and so perhaps oversteps what Lutheran reason may affirm). It follows from Storr's definition that Kant's hope depends upon the possibility of a miracle. Kant also repeatedly says that we have no way of knowing how that help might be given, but Storr's point is worth considering.

From what standpoint is Kant's reason able to distinguish aright between pure rational religion and its scaffolding? Criticism is a process that 'begins' with spontaneous reflection. Beings who think like us find themselves implicitly aware of a given and of efforts to bring those givens into harmony. As Pacini puts it, criticism is a dynamic correlation of awareness and investigation. It is a process in which reason discovers its characteristic features as they show through its past activities. Criticism looks back. But it does not look back to construct an empirical history; it looks back in order to discover what it "puts in." In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant's reason examines by order of exposition—first the conditions of possible experience, and second, the historical products of reason. By order of genesis of insight, reason takes as a problem the riddle of metaphysics: why, in its historical manifestations, does reason appear to be in endless wars with itself? What can we learn from its products about what we put in? In the second part of the *Critique*, Kant takes up reason's talk about I, world, and God, and shows that it sometimes illegitimately reads these ideas—which help reason to organize

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<sup>279</sup> *A*, §§2-5.

possible experience—as if they were objects of possible experience. While we can think of them on analogy to experience (symbolically), we cannot think of them directly. When we take ourselves to be thinking of them directly and attempt to make sense of them thus, we wind up in endless contradiction. So criticism entails coming to see I, God, and world as ideas of reason—not as objects of knowledge. And so it entails the adoption of ‘new’, self-given norms: reason ought restrict its knowledge claims to objects of possible experience.

Beside theoretical judgments, however, are practical judgments. If we can hope to suspend judgment on theoretical matters beyond reason’s limits, we must make practical judgments because we have to act. And when we make practical judgments we never have at hand everything that we would need or want. Like a judge, we hear opposing arguments and rule—we do not declare to know with perfect certainty, but rather decide among any number of competing goods. Reason’s theoretical and practical activities are always in relation to one another: to suspend judgment on matters beyond reason’s limits is a moral activity, and to make practical judgments aright is to recognize that they are ever uncertain. And in this dynamic relation—a description of the self-ruling subject—lies Kant’s rule for distinguishing between rational religion from the trappings of revealed religion. A rational religion has always in view a duty to respect reason’s limits in knowledge claims and a duty to recognize the uncertain but necessary character of practical judgments: a rational religion maintains and guards the results of critical reason’s self-investigations. The scaffolding of revealed religion, which reason may let go, by contrast, aids and abets reason’s efforts to overstep its bounds in theoretical judgment and to take its practical judgments to be perfectly steadied.

Though reason may hope for divine aid (a miracle), an attempt to account for moral transformation by appeal to God or to experience or reports of experience would require reason to overstep its bounds. Reason can see no miracles, even though it may, for practical purposes, hope for one. (It may hope for one because the necessity of possibility ensures that it is impossible to rule out the possibility of divine help.) Insofar as they are comparable, the critical philosophy stultifies tropes of history in which divine-human interaction account for moral transformation. But there is no claim to superiority—no claim that reason has come to occupy a standpoint higher than that of confessional religion. There is merely a claim that reason has a guide for distinguishing between what it may do and say and what it may not—for this is the same line with which reason arguably distinguishes between rational religion and not-rational-religion.

What I am getting at is that Storr's criticism about miracles makes sense from a perspective in which Kant's reason's self-determination and insistence on its autonomy are understood to render a metaphysical account of the transformation it requires impossible on its own terms. Rational faith is a trust in reason and its power of criticism. Storr's criticism assumes already that moral transformation requires some immediate encounter with an other—namely God—with whom humans have an ontological connection. It assumes a faith in the inability of reason to see its own limits without a self-announcing and confirming divine transformation, without a divinely revealed announcement of its direction.

As I see it, the criticism perhaps expresses a desire for awareness of moral transformation—for its visibility, so to speak—not merely its symbolic thinkability

(possibility), but its historical reality. Especially as it translates into the power to read (Scripture) aright. Or, put differently, it expresses his need to defend his right to a post-transformation standpoint—his sense that the Kantian philosophy somehow threatens the ground on which his sense of connection to reality (reliability) stands.

Storr cited in his criticism of the internal coherence of Kant's insistence that reason knows no miracles but cannot rule out their possibility Kant's claim in the *Religion* that churches first form in efforts to please God not by morality but by speculative actions. That is, historically speaking, rational religion is not first pure, then covered with accretions, but begins with what later comes to be called dross, and only when purified is it made visible. The religion of conscience appears historically only after revealed religion. Storr cites the passage in an effort to argue that—on Kant's own terms—moral religion depends upon revealed religion. What is likely Kant's response to Storr's criticism in a footnote of the second edition of the *Religion* is telling: "morally speaking, it ought to be the other way around."<sup>280,281</sup> In other words, reason's trope of history is not one in which the appearance of pure religion depends (temporally, empirically) upon the appearance of revealed religion (with its speculative attempts to please God by action) in churches. Its trope of history rather protects its self-understanding and its self-given command to assert and protect its autonomy.<sup>282</sup>

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<sup>280</sup> Palmquist makes the suggestion that this is a response to Storr. Stephen R. Palmquist, *Comprehensive Commentary on Kant's Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 280n35.

<sup>281</sup> *AA* 6:105-106; *RRT*, 138-9.

<sup>282</sup> If one regards Kant's moral trope of history as a trope that aims at the purification of revealed religion and at the kingdom of ends, and if one also regards it as the highest trope not just for reason and from the philosophy faculty, but also for biblical theology,

Kant's talk in the *Religion* about the moral interpretation of Scripture bears out reason's trope. A church, Kant argues from the philosophy faculty, must give up its claim to universality (the highest-widest dome) when it bases itself "upon a faith of revelation which, as historical faith, (even if more widely spread and more firmly secured for the remotest posterity through scripture) is incapable of a transmission that commands conviction universally." But because "of the natural need of all human beings to demand for even the highest concepts and grounds of reason something that *the senses can hold on to*, some confirmation from experience or the like, (a need which must also be seriously taken into account when the intention is *to introduce* a faith universally), some historical ecclesiastical faith or other, usually already at hand, must be used." Kant construes Scripture as meeting the human need to represent the ideas of reason to themselves symbolically. Insofar as symbols are historically determinate, they do not have the universal reach that the ideas of reason they symbolize, on Kant's account, might.

Insofar as it symbolizes reason's ideas—particularly about God, immortality, and freedom—and insofar as it is understood to be the work of the God who is a symbol of the ground of thought—Scripture must ultimately be read under reason's (moral) trope of history.

Now to unite the foundation of a moral faith (be this faith an end or merely an auxiliary means) with such an empirical faith which, to all appearances, chance has dealt to us, we require an interpretation of the revelation we happen to

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then one might say that Kant's trope is supersessionist and 'secularizing' (albeit slowly). But until Kant steps outside the philosophy faculty and outside the character of reason (outside the critical project *per se*) to pen the *CF*, we arguably do not have a clear picture about how he hopes the state, the faculties, and the truth might relate.

have, i.e. a thoroughgoing understanding of it in a sense that harmonizes with the universal practical rules of a pure religion of reason. For the theoretical element of ecclesiastical faith cannot be of moral interest to us, if it does not work toward the fulfillment of all human duties as divine commands (which constitutes the essential of every religion). This interpretation may often appear to us as forced, in view of the text (of the revelation), and be often forced in fact; yet, if the text can at all bear it, it must be preferred to a literal interpretation that either contains absolutely nothing for morality, or even works counter to its incentives.<sup>283</sup>

While Kant allows (especially for the biblical theologian, whose materials are historical, revealed religion) other tropes of history, other modes of interpretation, these must be subordinate to the moral reading. Although this hierarchy is fitting for a work that issues from the philosophy faculty, it can be understood to be compatible with Lutheran biblical theology. For insofar as the Lutheran theology proclaims that the God who reason knows as able to help is also the God who is willing—that the God of conscience is also the God of hope—it hardly has room to deny that the author of Scripture and of the moral law are the same.

Now the crux of the matter: Storr's brand of Lutheran theology makes room by positing the possibility of the erring conscience; somehow reason is right about the God, but not about what that God commands. In other words, Storr's ontological transformation promises to clear up the errors of merely human conscience. (Cf. *DC* §6) From a Storrish perspective, however, Kant's insistence that the message of Scripture be subordinate to reason's notion of the divine author would perhaps appear tantamount to the assertion of human autonomy or the denial of human reason's dependence on divine

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<sup>283</sup> *AA* 6:110; *Rel*, 142.



revelation in Word for reliable self-knowledge. Storr at least reacts as if this were the Kantian challenge when he dismisses his “philosophical interpretation” as unprincipled eisegesis unchecked by historical reality.<sup>284</sup> While Storr’s trope of history, I have argued, is not one many of his colleagues shared, and while it was allegedly revealed by the divine Author, it does not abstract—at least not in the way Kant’s perhaps does—from human experience and artifact (from the face value of language) in order to preserve a conception of human autonomy.

The non-turning point in Kant’s moral trope of history is rational belief: a kind of trusting resistance to the project of becoming superhuman. Reason’s trope of its own history does not have the status of divine truth. Its universality comes from the way beings who think like us have to think about the moral law if we are to think about morality as our own (as rational and autonomous). It does not come from some metaphysical being who ensures that everything will come out in the end in a moral order, but from our need to think symbolically the ground of possibility. In this sense, it is no competitor with the Storrish trope.

For to remain human, to stick with reason, and not to imagine oneself super-human or super-rational, then, is arguably the challenge and promise of criticism. This is different than imagining critical human reason as super-super-human or super-super-rational. Autonomy and its correlate, radical evil, bring competition for the highest position to a close.

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<sup>284</sup> *B*, 80-81.

Reason does not encounter in itself some law higher than its own. Rather reason gives itself the law and the capacity to fulfill it; reason is self-directed, self-regulated—it may turn itself toward a moral end, albeit one that could never be realized. It could not be realized, Pacini claims, because of the “impossibility of eradicating radical evil.” This is an extension of Kant’s notion of practical judgment. Practical judgments are inevitably judgments we must make without sufficient grounds for full confidence, for knowledge. Moral judgments are choices between competing goods; the right order of these goods is unknowable for us. The human situation is one in which we have no hope of being able to know that we have made a moral choice, or that we have become more like a divine moral ideal.

If Kant has a supersession story, it is hardly the inverse of Storr’s, insofar as Storr’s depends upon a robust theological ontology and a notion of the possibility of the visibility of transformation as conformity to a divinely-revealed ideal that Kant does not share. It may be, as Hunter has suggested, a competing story. But it would be difficult, I have suggested, to say in what the competition consisted. That its result is the possibility of “leaving behind” the scaffolding of revealed religion—of ‘maturing’—is hardly similar to the Storrish requirement that reason obliterate the possibility of the reliability of self-understanding on its own terms (i.e., that humans become super-human and only rightly assess reason from that standpoint). In other words, Kant’s moral metaphysics is arguably not connected to a trope of history in which reason supersedes itself by becoming super-human. Kant’s trope of history is for and about the conditions of human hope in a world

without an ontological link to the divine (without the prospect of becoming super-human).

Now reason's end may include the purification of religion (the recognition of symbolic language as such); but it may not aim at the obliteration of Others' self-understandings on Augustinian terms (it may not be a competing Christian God)... for it cannot picture to itself on non-symbolic/non-human terms its own ideal or end. If, by Kant's secularization narrative, one meant an attempt to envision the close of competing self-understandings in an ontological relation to God, it coheres with his work.

There is a before and after, for example, in Kant's story about dogmatism, skepticism, and criticism. The appearance of dogmatism as such is a condition of taking the skeptical position; the appearance of skeptical method as such is a condition of taking the critical position. But there is nothing about having taken the position of criticism that precludes a return to dogmatism—and certainly there is no ontological transformation into conformity to a new ideal. There is only the recognition of freedom to give oneself the law and the capacity to fulfill it (i.e., a power to see or not see any ideal as one's own creation. ... useful for practical judgment). Its job is to prompt one to become a better human being—quite without knowing what that means or how it is possible. Not to prompt one to declare for others that to be fully human is to imagine oneself in an ontological relationship with a divinity who transforms one (by revelation in Word) into its own image, above or beyond the merely human.

Insofar as Kant's rational religion is not the supersession of revealed religion, but resistance to the assumptions that would make any such supersession narrative useful

inside an empirical history, we might say that there is another standpoint from which to imagine the spirits of Kant and Storr opposed. I have tried to sketch something of this standpoint, although it may be uncomfortable to those who prefer (or have long practiced) the highest-widest supersessionist trope of Enlightenment-era conflicts between religious and philosophical thinkers. From this standpoint, it is difficult to say whether and to what extent Storr and Kant may have understood themselves to be in a highest-widest contest. For from this standpoint, Kant and Storr both take the Symbol (perhaps as an instrument of the state and the 'divine will', respectively) to govern the status and scope of the claims Kant's reason can make from the philosophy faculty and those Storr's biblical dogmatics can make from the theology faculty. Storr may understand it to be eternally true and Kant may understand it as an historical but useful for self-governance symbol. The highest-widest dome from Kant's standpoint must be that of a universal moral religion (and may be that of the subordination of everything to freedom). The highest-widest dome, from Storr's standpoint, must be higher and wider than that of reason/a universal moral religion (and may yet maintain the relative reliability of shorter-thinner domes). The 'must' in these sentences is a practical, political must, and the extent to which it was for Kant more than that is—at least in materials published before 1798—perhaps not available for us to assess.

But, so long as it is situated within the Lutheran narrative, Storr can affirm with Kant that the “concept of God and even the conviction of his existence can be met with only in reason, and cannot first come to us through inspiration or through tidings

communicated to us, however great the authority behind them.”<sup>285</sup> And even that “thinking for oneself means seeking the supreme touchstone of truth in oneself (i.e., in one’s own reason).”<sup>286</sup> For reason’s self-knowledge, “knowledge of God”, and awareness of a higher (widest) measure of reliability are formed without an encounter with Word. Or, as Kant put it in his letter to Wöllner about the *Religion*,

But when reason speaks, in these matters, as if it were sufficient to itself and as if revealed teachings were therefore superfluous (an assertion which, were it to be taken objectively, would have to be considered a real disparagement of Christianity), it is merely expressing its appraisal of itself - not in terms of its [theoretical] ability [but] in terms of what it prescribes us to *do*<sup>a</sup> insofar as it alone is the source of the *universality*, *unity*, and *necessity* in the tenets of faith that are the essence of any religion as such, which consists in the morally practical (in what we *ought* to do). On the other hand, what we have cause to believe on historical grounds (where “*ought*” does not hold at all) - that is, revelation as contingent tenets of faith - it regards as nonessential. But this does not mean that reason considers it idle and superfluous; for revelation is useful in making up the *theoretical* deficiency which our pure rational belief admits it has (in the questions, for example, of the origin of evil, the conversion from evil to good, the human being's assurance that he has become good, etc.) and helps - more or less, depending on the times and the person concerned - to satisfy a rational need.<sup>287</sup>

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<sup>285</sup> AA 8:142; O, 14.

<sup>286</sup> AA 8:146; O, 18.

<sup>287</sup> AA 7:9; CF, 241-2.



# Conclusion

## Restatement of the Argument

In chapter one I showed that in §§17-18 of his *DC*, Gottlob Christian Storr positions Immanuel Kant's physico-theological and moral arguments for rational belief in God at the heart of an argument for the divine authority of Scripture. And Storr insists that its relationship to Holy Writ shows the reliability of dogma. So some scholars have claimed that Storr's is an attempt to ground the reliability of dogma and of Scripture in human reason—particularly Kant's arguments for rational belief in God. But Storr's argument for the divine authority of Scripture is missing a crucial premise. For he nowhere establishes on rational grounds that the God of Kant's arguments and the divine Author of Scripture are the same God.<sup>288</sup> Nor does he establish, as other scholars have claimed, that premise by appealing to Holy Writ.<sup>289</sup> Indeed, Storr claims that the premise can only be given in an immediate divine revelation. It is a matter of faith. Insofar as Storr aims in the *DC* to teach future clerics how dogma can be understood as reliable (i.e., that its source is Scripture) and how it can be understood as worthy of respect on reason's terms—both of which depend on this immediate divine revelation—his task is both an impossible and necessary one.

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<sup>288</sup> Kant, of course, makes the move from God to the 'divine Author' of Scripture such that the book must be interpreted—even where it requires reading against the obvious meaning—with a moral message (a message worthy of the divine Author). Storr, by contrast, moves from an immediate divine revelation (a transformative encounter with Word) in and through which one comes to trust that the God who is able to help is also willing—and the divine Author of Scripture. So Storr ultimately rejects the Kantian move from the moral God to Scripture and the Kantian claim that Scripture must ultimately have a moral message.

<sup>289</sup> Cooper, 18; Ogden 14.

Now Storr had a guide, I argued in chapter two, from the Augustinian and Lutheran traditions for creating the conditions in which this immediate divine revelation might be given. In these traditions, an immediate encounter with Word was strongly correlated with reading Scripture. Storr also had at hand a theory, technique, and tools for teaching what cannot be taught. And he had a theory of language and learning by which something might be presented on a pupil's terms, but could, in turn, reconfigure those terms. And he used citation-annotations—tools and techniques with which his readers were familiar—in order to set out a wide range of materials (Scripture among them) and modes of argumentation, and to display part-part and part-whole relationships between them.

On the one hand, Storr used citation-annotations to show that his dogmatic statements both had biblical warrant and were worthy of respect on reason's terms. That is, Storr exploited the Lutheran notion that dogmatic statements were human, symbolic summaries of Scripture, and so could bring together biblical-theological and rational modes of argumentation. Because they were human and symbolic, and because they conformed to the Lutheran reading of Romans 1-2, Storr was able to present paraphrases of Kant's arguments for rational belief in God as dogmatic statements. And so he was able to suggest (by way of citation-annotations) that they had a demonstrable relationship to the highest measure of reliability (Scripture) and to human measures of reliability. But this, too, was perhaps only visible given trust in his particular notion of the divine authority of Scripture.



Storr claimed in the Preface to use two annotation-systems in order to organize his lectures. As he lectured on the dogmatic statements, he would expound on their biblical warrant, on related matters of grammatical, rational biblical interpretation, and on their respectability on reason's terms. In print, Storr tended to display their biblical warrant in parenthetical annotations; in endnotes, he tended to display scholarly, rational exposition.

If Storr's citation-annotations generally show that dogmatic statements could bring these two measures of reliability together in a divine/human harmony, in §§17-18 they can also be understood to pose questions about how one might configure relationships between dogma (here paraphrases of Kant's arguments), Scripture, and rational defense. In other words, Storr uses citation-annotations to raise the question to which he hopes his doubting students will see an answer—and he poses the question on their own terms. For read on reason's terms, Storr's citation annotations in §§17-18 might be construed as evidence for the historical-linguistic dependence of Scripture and dogma on reason. Storr might be claiming that the words of Scripture and dogma depend on reason—that they follow historically and linguistically, if not also logically and conceptual-hierarchically, from Kant's reason's arguments for rational belief in God.

But if he raises the possibility in §§17-18, he perhaps creates a feeling of discord when he asserts in §19 the reality of miracles. To see how and whether the claim follows, Storr's students might ask not if the historical reality of miracles follows from Kant's arguments, but how Storr's argument works—particularly, how Storr understood the relationships he asserted between dogma, Scripture, and rational defense.

Which is to say, as I suggested in chapter three, that the feeling of discord might point up to his students that Storr's citation-annotations might not (or not only) indicate the historical-linguistic or conceptual-hierarchical relationships between the materials. They might not (only) display—as they perhaps thought—relationships visible on reason's terms. It might rather be that Storr has already adopted the standpoint of the biblical theologian, and that Kant's arguments are—as Kant describes them—cognitive symbolic expressions of reason's awareness of a God who is able to help. That is, it may be that they discover that, from the standpoint of biblical theology and from the standpoint of human reason, Kant's arguments can be construed as reliable on reason's terms and as human summaries of Holy Writ. Now miracles—as Kant suggests—may not be historical reality from the standpoint of human reason, yet may be from the standpoint of biblical theology. Even though they may share some results, human reason's tropes of history and those of biblical theology are distinct. And this is just the point Storr sets out to make—nay, to display in the *DC*. If the read I pursue here has some merit, it is perhaps not the number and variety of Kant's arguments for rational belief in God that leave open the possibility of Storr's curious (mis)representation, but rather the conformity of much of Kant's talk to the supsessionist Lutheran trope of history, which is told from a post-transformation standpoint, and in which reason's awareness of the God who is able to help is the pivot-point and the static against which the transformation (and so 'before' and 'after' or 'highest-reliable' and 'reliable relative to human reason') can be made visible.

## Connections: Conversation and Further Development

I have argued that §§17-18 of Storr's *DC* are an example of the Kantian letter infused with a Storrish spirit, and that here Storr subtly changes the significance of the Kantian letter simply by incorporating it into a Lutheran Orthodox world—by reading it under the Lutheran rule of configuration. Storr's reading gives internal coherence to what appears to be patchwork argumentation (an unholy amalgam), and so can be understood to address a thoroughly eighteenth-century question, namely how best to reliably distinguish, combine, and assess the reliability of multiple ways humans connect their claims to materials they can point to (rationally-observe, communicate).

I can put the point differently and suggest that Henrich's read of Storr's appropriation of Kant's arguments in the *DC* perhaps overlooks both the aesthetic character of the form of Storr's case for the divine authority and reliability of Scripture and (more important) the way in which Storr exploited Kant's insistence that all cognition of God is symbolic. Because Storr paradoxically affirmed both the impossibility of direct human awareness of God and the visibility to humans of (condescending) divine self-expressions in Word, he, like Kant, took awareness of God to be a matter of faith. And, like Kant, he took rational arguments for the existence of God (and arguments that depended upon these arguments as premises) to be unable to convince doubters. But insofar as Storr understood the power to distinguish between the divine and human (to read aright) to be a divine gift, he could do for a biblical theological point of view what Kant could not do (or, from alternative perspective, could do only on the assumption of an initial reflective activity) for critical reason's: account for the "categories" by which it

produces reliable “judgments”. Only given this alternative perspective can one coherently contrast Kant’s interest in autonomy with Storr’s heteronomy, for only if reason builds its own categories is it not open to the charge of covert heteronomy.

Put simply, Kant’s arguments for rational belief in God and Storr’s appropriation of them both turn on heuristic symbolic strategies; Storr exploits this similarity. But the rationalities behind the strategies differ: if Kant’s is anchored in the cognitive, Storr’s is anchored in revelation. The thinkers can be understood as involved in a dispute about which of these symbolic, heuristic rationalities and their anchorings would prevail in intellectual, academic, and political life.

All taken together, we might say that Storr and Kant shared a world populated by a wide an array of metaphysics and measures of reliability—each allied and entangled with one another and an equally wide array of social, political, economic, and intellectual projects; and that they both saw among the headiest sorts a pressing need for some means of orientation. For as each project claimed some form of universality—as each claimed a bigger dome of heaven, so to speak—one might find oneself not progressing toward truth or goodness, but merely being tossed about on the waves of emancipation... ever destabilized and restabilized, only to be destabilized again. If metaphysics (ecclesial, theological, or philosophical) had an endless appetite for stabilizing, metaphysics (and historians) perhaps seemed able to relativize and destabilize everything the other built up. Intellectual integrity could no longer be construed as blind devotion to a single largest dome of heaven; it would have to consist in a principled way of hierarchically combining several domes that, from within, perhaps appeared to be the largest.

If the ready replicability of Luther's emancipatory strategy contributed to the state of disorientation, Storr found in the Lutheran Symbol—construed variously as a trope of history, a measure of reliability, a rule for reading—both a pole star and a rule for hierarchically combining historical-critical, critical-transcendental, and dogmatic methods and measures. Kant looked rather to rational faith (in many ways an equally Lutheran move)—to the conviction that the invisible point where the starry heavens meet the moral law was, despite its invisibility, a point in relation to which all human beings can be understood to stand. The most perfect hierarchical combination in any particular situation is not something we can calculate or articulate, not something we can read off of our images as if they were ideals. But it entails the subordination of everything to freedom... especially freedom in thinking.

In one sense, this essay has been an attempt to resist tropes of history in which Enlightenment-era religious and philosophical thinkers are understood to be in a battle for largest dome of heaven—tropes of history through which the historian subtly asserts her own dome large enough to contain them both, if not also her capacity as both an advocate and a decider of fact. More particularly, it has been an attempt to expose—if not loosen—the grip of the notion that Kant's secularization narrative is supersessionist such that it is the reverse of Storr's Lutheran supersession. Rational religion does not overtake revealed religion *in the mind of God*, nor does its heuristic assume the actuality of divine intervention in this life (as far as human reason is concerned).

Thus framed, one might imagine next detailing the extent to which Storr and Kant really were in a battle—for the ear of the state as it heuristically reinterpreted the

Symbol that governed the theology and philosophy faculties in relation to one another and the public order. This might entail, for example, developing the suggestions of Sparr and Palmquist that the first section of Kant's "Conflict of the Faculties" was originally his answer to Storr's *A* he had planned but did not, in January of 1794, "venture to promise ... because of the difficulties that old age poses especially in the way of working with abstract ideas."<sup>290</sup><sup>291</sup> This path is particularly promising, because Kant occupies there a standpoint outside the philosophy faculty as he envisions how the faculties and state (and their notions of truth and whether it has any bearing in some matter).

Or it might entail, as Palmquist has begun, reading the second edition of the *Religion* with an eye on Kant's responses to Storr. One might also imagine Kant's assertion in the *Religion* of the possibility of rational faith (in which Kant claims a place for reason's own transformation narrative) a catalyst for the shift in tone and strategy evident in Storr's *A*. Or re-examining the *A* with an eye on the standpoint Storr occupies.

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<sup>290</sup> AA 6:13; Rel 65. "In this second edition I have not been not able to take cognizance, as I would have wished to do, of the judgments passed upon this text by worthy men, named and unnamed, since (as with all foreign literature) these arrive in our regions very late. [I say this] especially with reference to the Annotationes quaedam theologicae etc. of the renowned Hr. Dr. Storr of Tübingen, who has examined the text with his accustomed sagacity and with a diligence and fairness deserving the greatest thanks; I plan a reply to him, but do not venture to promise it because of the difficulties that old age poses especially in the way of working with abstract ideas."

<sup>291</sup>Cf. Sparr, "Religöse Autorität Durch Historische Authentie? Die "Biblische" Dogmatik Von Gottlob Christian Storr (1793)," 103; Palmquist, 390; Sæbø, 34-5. (Jan Rohls links them implicitly in "Chapter Two. Historical, Cultural and Philosophical Aspects of the Nineteenth Century with Special Regard to Biblical Interpretation.")

# Appendix I: Paul and the Argument for Universal Reach<sup>292</sup>

## Paul

Once Saul of Tarsus, the legendary persecutor of Christians,<sup>293</sup> Paul, apostle to the Gentiles<sup>294</sup> had a penchant for reinvention. Even before he was the author of Christian misogyny<sup>295</sup> and heteronormativity,<sup>296</sup> he has been remembered as the progenitor of a religion about Jesus<sup>297</sup> and of his own apostleship.<sup>298</sup>

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<sup>292</sup> I include the appendix as matter for reflection on the shape of argumentation for a self (or divine-self)-authenticating, and on the ways in which some supersession narratives remove from view the self-conceptions of others... while offering new ways to construe their past self-understandings.

<sup>293</sup> v. Acts 7:58-8:3; Galatians 1:13-14; Philippians 3:6. Gunther Bornkamm ( *Paul*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995.) would almost certainly object to my indiscriminate amalgam of Acts and epistles; I would agree. I will later draw on a dubious assumption that this same Paul was the author of Colossians. I will talk about 'Christians', and use other potentially anachronistic terms. My story here is about Paul, the literary-cultural figure. It is a plausible story, given one set of critical assumptions (given another set, perhaps less). In other words, this story is defensible to an intelligent, well-educated audience. Though my standpoint is critical and historical, my problems are not those of biblical scholars. The propositions on which this essay's conclusions depend neither stand nor fall on the micro-historical plausibility of my claims about Paul.

<sup>294</sup> v. Romans 1:5, 11:13; Galatians 1, 2:8.

<sup>295</sup> Reuther, Rosemary Radford. "St. Paul, Friend or Enemy of Women?"

Informational. *Beliefnet*,

2004. <http://www.beliefnet.com/Faiths/Christianity/2004/03/St-Paul-Friend-Or-Enemy-Of-Women.aspx>. "Traditional Christianity believed that the statements attributed to St. Paul in I Timothy 2--that women were created second, sinned first, and should keep silence--were the universal consensus of the early Church and its founder, Jesus. Women, traditionalists believed, should simply accept these teachings as true. In the last three decades, however, a Christian feminist movement began to criticize these passages in the New Testament. They drew a picture of St. Paul as an unmitigated misogynist. In their view Christianity started with an egalitarian view of gender relations taught by Jesus. But this was destroyed by Paul, who imposed a patriarchal interpretation of Christianity that taught that women are inferior, primarily culpable for sin and the fall of humanity, and excluded from ordained ministry."

Whatever his realities and delusions, and however real or fanciful our memories may be, when he wrote to Christians at Rome, he wrote as an apostle who wanted to be recognized as such.<sup>299</sup> He had not (or not recently) been to visit, though the group had certainly heard of him.<sup>300</sup>

Saul's anti-Christian zeal had been well-known in Israel-Palestine.<sup>301</sup> The author of Acts, for example, pictured him looking on at the martyr Stephen's death, stone-thrower's

296 v. Hays, Richard B. "Relations Natural and Unnatural: A Response to John Boswell's Exegesis of Romans 1." *The Journal of Religious Ethics* (1986): 184-215. Malick, David E. "The Condemnation of Homosexuality in Romans 1: 26-27." *Bibliotheca Sacra* 150, no. 599 (1993): 327-40. Martin, Dale B. "Heterosexism and the Interpretation of Romans 1: 18-32." *Biblical Interpretation: A Journal of Contemporary Approaches* 3, no. 3 (1995): 332-355.

297 Traditions of quests for an historical Jesus make much of a distinguish between the religion of Christ and the religion about Christ. Along with the other apostles, Paul is taken to be an inventor of the religion about Christ. A complete bibliography is unnecessary here, but Reimarus' fragments are a good place to start. v. Reimarus, Hermann Samuel, and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. *Fragmente des Wolfenbüttelschen Ungenannten. Ein Anhang zu dem Fragment vom Zweck Jesu und seiner Jünger*. Bey A. Wever, 1784; Reimarus, Hermann Samuel, and Charles H Talbert. *Reimarus, Fragments*. Eugene, OR.: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2009.

298 v. Baur, Ferdinand Christian. *Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ: His Life and Work, His Epistles and His Doctrine. A Contribution to the Critical History of Primitive Christianity*. Williams and Norgate, 1876. p. 110. v. Deissmann, Adolf. *St. Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History*. Hodder and Stoughton, 1912.

299 v. Rom 1:1-16.

300 This is plausible assuming Fitzmeyer is right that Roman Christians were in "continual contact" with those at Jerusalem. v. Fitzmyer, Joseph A. *Romans: a new translation with introduction and commentary*. New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2008., p. 33. "Roman Christians seem to have been in continual contact with the Christians of Jerusalem, and Christianity there seems to have been shaped by that of Jerusalem, as Brown has maintained (Antioch, 110). It seems to have been influenced especially by those associated with Peter and James of Jerusalem, in other words, by Christians who retained some Jewish observances and remained faithful to the Jewish legal and cultic heritage without insisting on circumcision for Gentile converts."

301 v. note 1, above, esp. Acts 9:13-ff.



jackets draped over his arm.<sup>302</sup> When he came to Jerusalem to join the disciples, only Barnabas the Brave came out of hiding to hear this tale: Walking to Damascus, a bright light blinded him. The voice of Jesus, “Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me,” begins a revelation about Christ. He recovered (and his sight), and came to Jerusalem as one of the Christ-followers.<sup>303</sup> Barnabas negotiated for him a hearing with the apostles, and he went off preaching.<sup>304</sup>

Now the Christ-followers had only after Christ’s death—as Kant’s translators put it—“hit upon the idea” that the failed messiah would extend the Jewish God’s covenant to the Gentiles.<sup>305</sup><sup>306</sup> The disciples hastily adopted this reconfiguration, as did the Gentiles. As their numbers grew, so did the impetus to govern them. And so there was a conference at Jerusalem to decide whether Gentiles would need to be circumcised (and so materially Jewish, materially covenanted) before they could become Christians. Paul argued ‘no’, and won.<sup>307</sup><sup>308</sup><sup>309</sup><sup>310</sup>

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302 v. Acts 7:54 - 8:3.

303 cf. Acts 9, 22, 26; Gal 1; I Cor 9, 15.

304 v. Acts 9:26-31.

305 CoF, 285, n. I drawing here on an assumption set like that of Reimarus and of the historical Jesus movements. I am intentionally not citing these, for it is an historical approach that makes things appear this way. That a biblical scholar or historian also saw it that way tells us nothing about its truth. Kant points to Pentecost. In that vein, I will cite the book of Acts. By the time of its composition in the mid-60s, its author, at least, was convinced that the apostles and disciples believed that the covenant of Christ was for Jews and Gentiles.

306 Whether this is an extension or an altogether new covenant is not entirely clear. Certainly the messiah was part of an older Jewish covenant. And what was regarded a ‘new covenant’ by early thinkers included, among other things, the promise of God about the messiah.

307 cf. Acts 14:27 - 15:29 and Gal 1-2. The following section of Gal 2 is especially useful. In vv. 7-10, Paul is a vetted apostle.

7 But contrariwise, when they saw that the gospel of the uncircumcision was committed unto me, as [the gospel] of the circumcision [was] unto Peter; 8 (For he that wrought effectually in Peter to the apostleship of the circumcision, the same was mighty in me toward the Gentiles:) 9 And when James, Cephas, and John, who seemed to be pillars, perceived the grace that was given unto me, they gave to me and Barnabas the right hands of fellowship; that we [should go] unto the heathen, and they unto the circumcision. 10 Only [they would] that we should remember the poor; the same which I also was forward to do.

In vv. 11-16, Paul's authority is enough to trump even Peter's.

11 But when Peter was come to Antioch, I withstood him to the face, because he was to be blamed. 12 For before that certain came from James, he did eat with the Gentiles: but when they were come, he withdrew and separated himself, fearing them which were of the circumcision. 13 And the other Jews dissembled likewise with him; insomuch that Barnabas also was carried away with their dissimulation. 14 But when I saw that they walked not uprightly according to the truth of the gospel, I said unto Peter before [them] all, If thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of Gentiles, and not as do the Jews, why compellest thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews? 15 We [who are] Jews by nature, and not sinners of the Gentiles, 16 Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law: for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.

308 The terms of the settlement were these: Gentiles did not need to be circumcised, but would need to follow the rules for God-fearers. The rules for God-fearers have roots in the covenants of God with all humans recorded Genesis, first with Adam and Eve (ch. 2-3), then with Noah and his family (ch. 9). Early Christ-followers would have bound these with traditions and practices about Gentiles among them, drawn in part from the rules for resident alien or *ger toshav* in Dt. 29-30. Aside from local practices and traditions, those who dealt with written documents would, in the first century CE, be quite familiar with the Noachic covenant—surrounded by anti-Gentile polemic—in Jubilees 6 and 7. The famous rainbow-sealed covenant prohibits murder, eating blood, idolatry, sexual indiscretion; it enjoins, like materials in and around the Decalogue, the worship of God, love of God and neighbor, honoring mother and father.

It is worth noting that the story of Noah (and this is even more explicit in Jubilees 5ff than Genesis) begins and ends with universal judgment and condemnation. God judged all humans, save Noah and his family, wholly corrupt, and executed a death sentence on all through the great flood. But by saving Noah, God made the way for righteousness, “salvation” from sin. Jub 5:11-13: And He destroyed all from their places, and there was not left one of them whom He judged not according to all their wickedness. And he made for all his works a new and righteous nature, so that they should not sin in their whole nature for ever, but should be all righteous each in his kind alway.

In his argument (and the decision) at Jerusalem about the material signs of the messianic, Gentile inclusive covenant, Paul drew on the precedent of the universal Noachic covenant. He would draw from this source again, we will see shortly, when he spelled out

Jews and Gentiles at Rome had heard of Paul. And Paul had heard about them: the two groups had been quarreling.<sup>311</sup> Evidently he imagined himself a qualified mediator despite his former vocation, his sudden change of heart, his quick rise to power, and his public role in a controversial decision about Jews and Gentiles. The letter would be a challenge for even the best of rhetoricians.

His apostleship might improve his chances at success.<sup>312</sup> The form of Paul's argument for his apostleship is a simple, repeatable one. No one need believe his tale

the details and implications of the 'new' (or newly configured, extended) messianic covenant, which included Gentiles and Jews.

309 Though it was clear that the covenant would be extended to the Gentiles (or that the new covenant included the Gentiles) and that Gentiles need only adopt the law of the Noachic covenant (not be circumcised) to be counted Christians, it was yet unclear (as far as we can tell from documentary evidence) exactly what the new terms of the covenant (or the terms of the new covenant) were.

310 Note: the first apostles weren't in agreement with Paul on this, before (and probably (unofficially) after the council. The with authenticating-power teachings apparently didn't include Paul's teachings on Jews/Gentile relations, but now do.

311 This is up for—or at least in the center of a—debate, which concerns the purpose of Paul's letter. Some argue that Paul's primary aim is securing the funds and geographical resources; others claim that he has first in mind to calm a conflict between Jews and Gentiles there. Both positions are plausible, and, as Luke Johnson suggests in *Reading Romans*, there is little reason to think of these as mutually exclusive. Paul's primary purpose does not matter for my reading. If, instead of a quarrel, Paul wrote for money for a Gentile mission, the letter would present similar rhetorical challenges to those I have described. For an overview of the debate about Paul's primary purpose, see Karl P. Donfried, *The Romans Debate*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011 (first issued in 1979). For a rundown of the issues at play in their historical context, see Philip Esler's *Conflict and Identity in Romans: The Social Setting of Paul's Letter*. Fortress Press, 2003. And Richard Longenecker's *Introducing Romans: Critical Issues in Paul's Most Famous Letter*. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2011.

312 Though I have connected the paragraphs rhetorically, my claim about Paul's argument is not drawn exclusively (or even primarily) from the book of Romans, but from Galatians. Paul's authorship of this book, like Romans, is not disputed. And it is dated to the same decade as Romans - between 50 and 60 CE. (I am most convinced by arguments that put Romans between 56 and 58, and Galatians a bit earlier. But in this context, my opinion is adiaphora.) Paul uses his apostleship in Galatians to argue against

about the bright lights and voices. Anyone can see that the truths about Christ must have been revealed to him, since he did not know them before he set out for Damascus, he did know them after, and he did not receive these teachings from any (hu)man before he presented them (as authenticators) to the apostles.<sup>33</sup> In short, that the message he received conformed with the Christian one, combined with his not having any human source for it, was evidence that he had received it from the Christian God, from Christ.<sup>34</sup>

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heresy. Because Paul's Gospel, like his apostleship, is from heaven and authentic, it provides a standard for discerning 'heresy'.

313 Gal 1: 11 But I certify you, brethren, that the gospel which was preached of me is not after man. 12 For I neither received it of man, neither was I taught [it], but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. 13 For ye have heard of my conversation in time past in the Jews' religion, how that beyond measure I persecuted the church of God, and wasted it: 14 And profited in the Jews' religion above many my equals in mine own nation, being more exceedingly zealous of the traditions of my fathers. 15 But when it pleased God, who separated me from my mother's womb, and called [me] by his grace, 16 To reveal his Son in me, that I might preach him among the heathen; immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood: 17 Neither went I up to Jerusalem to them which were apostles before me; but I went into Arabia, and returned again unto Damascus. 18 Then after three years I went up to Jerusalem to see Peter, and abode with him fifteen days. 19 But other of the apostles saw I none, save James the Lord's brother. How he picked out people for persecution without something like this gospel is unclear to me. It seems that a "Pharisee of Pharisees" would have clear criteria for something like that.

314 Though I am not aware of any scholarly precedents for this particular claim, the influence of Paul's conversion on his theology has been much discussed. See James Dunn's *Theology of Paul the Apostle*. Continuum, 2003; Alan Segal's *Paul the Convert: The Apostolate and Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee*. Yale University Press, 1990; Becker, Jürgen. *Paul: Apostle to the Gentiles*. Westminster John Knox Press, 1993. Gager, J. G. "Some Notes on Paul's Conversion." *New Testament Studies* 27, no. 05 (1981): 697-704. Hedrick, Charles W. "Paul's Conversion/Call: A Comparative Analysis of the Three Reports in Acts." *Journal of Biblical Literature* 100, no. 3 (September 1981): 415. Lategan, Bernard. "Is Paul Defending His Apostleship in Galatians?" *New Testament Studies* 34, no. 03 (1988): 411-430. McLean, Bradley H. "Galatians 2. 7-9 and the Recognition of Paul's Apostolic Status at the Jerusalem Conference: a Critique of G. Luedemann's Solution." *New Testament Studies* 37, no. 01 (1991): 67-76. Menoud, Philippe H. "Revelation and Tradition The Influence of Paul's Conversion on His Theology." *Interpretation* 7, no. 2 (April 1, 1953): 131-141. Räisänen, Heikki. "Paul's Conversion and

Some revelation of Christ is authentic, genuine, true, not heresy, whenever it conforms to apostolic teachings and is not from human beings.<sup>315</sup><sup>316</sup>

When Tacitus picks up his pen,<sup>317</sup> Paul greets the Christians at Rome with an announcement of this apostleship, a repetition of the convictions they share, and no small hint that he has in mind to emancipate them from their Jew/Gentile divisions.<sup>318</sup> He

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the Development of His View of the Law.” *New Testament Studies* 33, no. 03 (1987): 404–419.

315 It will turn out that it need not always agree with the 'other' apostles, and that he is -perhaps already- calling on this apostolic authority to authenticate itself. For the other apostles, of course, did not (at least at first) believe that he wasn't dangerous, let alone one of them. In other words, his claim to be an apostle is self-authenticating. It doesn't need to match with the first apostles' teachings. The evidence (my teachings match with theirs) for his case is up for grabs - external authentication.

316 Paul will repeat the form in his letter to the church at Rome, this time within an argument for universal condemnation, where he brought Jewish ideal of the “law written on hearts” to the Gentiles, and both of them under a super-human Christ. Since we cannot be sure whether Paul wrote Romans or Galatians first, this is a rhetorical use of 'repeat'. I mean 'you will see it again in the exposition of the Romans letter'.

317 Tacitus is Paul's amanuensis. This is a figure; or, if you prefer, a known anachronism.

318 See n. 18, above. 1: 1 Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, called [to be] an apostle, separated unto the gospel of God, 2 (Which he had promised afore by his prophets in the holy scriptures,) 3 Concerning his Son Jesus Christ our Lord, which was made of the seed of David according to the flesh; 4 And declared [to be] the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead: 5 By whom we have received grace and apostleship, for obedience to the faith among all nations, for his name: 6 Among whom are ye also the called of Jesus Christ: 7 To all that be in Rome, beloved of God, called [to be] saints: Grace to you and peace from God our Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ. 8 First, I thank my God through Jesus Christ for you all, that your faith is spoken of throughout the whole world. 9 For God is my witness, whom I serve with my spirit in the gospel of his Son, that without ceasing I make mention of you always in my prayers; 10 Making request, if by any means now at length I might have a prosperous journey by the will of God to come unto you. 11 For I long to see you, that I may impart unto you some spiritual gift, to the end ye may be established; 12 That is, that I may be comforted together with you by the mutual faith both of you and me. 13 Now I would not have you ignorant, brethren, that oftentimes I purposed to come unto you, (but was let hitherto,) that I might have some fruit among you also, even as among other Gentiles. 14 I am debtor both to the Greeks, and to the Barbarians; both to the wise,

begins his argument with a topic about which they can all agree—the immorality of their Gentile neighbors:

18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness; 19 Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath shewed [it] unto them. 20 For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, [even] his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse: 21 Because that, when they knew God, they glorified [him] not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. 22 Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, 23 And changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things. 24 Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves: 25 Who changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever. Amen. 26 For this cause God gave them up unto vile affections: for even their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature: 27 And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompence of their error which was meet. 28 And even as they did not like to retain God in [their] knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient; 29 Being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers, 30 Backbiters, haters of God, spiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, 31 Without understanding,

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and to the unwise. 15 So, as much as in me is, I am ready to preach the gospel to you that are at Rome also. 16 For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ: for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; to the Jew first, and also to the Greek. 17 For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith: as it is written, The just shall live by faith.

covenantbreakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful: 32 Who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them.<sup>319</sup>

But then Paul turns: no one—whether they can see and reject immorality in others or not—can say that they see and reject the immorality in themselves.<sup>320</sup>

1 Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art that judgest: for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself; for thou that judgest doest the same things. 2 But we are sure that the judgment of God is according to truth against them which commit such things. 3 And thinkest thou this, O man, that judgest them which

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319 If the Gentiles at Rome had any leverage against the Jews, Paul has ruled it out. Nevertheless, Paul's announcement of God's wrath against heathen immoral idolaters would ring familiar to Hellenized Jews, less-than Hellenized Jews, and God-fearing non-Jews. Everyone is united against them; Paul looks less a scoundrel. The Gentiles in the church at Rome were already functionally God-fearers; they had separated themselves from idolatry, eating blood, etc., and aligned themselves with the Jewish covenants. To Hellenized Jews, the anti-idolatry and homo-sex vice-list would sound like home (Wisdom 11-12; Jubilees 5-7); the Decalogue-violations would ring true to the less-Hellenized; and the general vice-list would be perfectly familiar to the Gentiles. See Aune, David Edward. *The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and Rhetoric*. Westminster John Knox Press, 2003. Collins, John Joseph. *Seers, Sibyls, and Sages in Hellenistic-Roman Judaism*. BRILL, 2001. Huttunen, Niko. *Paul and Epictetus on Law: A Comparison*. Continuum, 2009. Malherbe, Abraham J. *Moral exhortation: a Greco-Roman sourcebook*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986. Martens, John W. "Romans 2.14-16: A Stoic Reading." *New Testament Studies* 40, no. 01 (1994): 55-67. Pearson, Brook W. R. *Corresponding Sense: Paul, Dialectic, and Gadamer*. BRILL, 2001. Reed, Annette Yoshiko. "From Judaism and Hellenism to Christianity and Paganism: Cultural Identities and Religious Polemics in the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies" [pre-print]. Accessed October 17, 2013. [http://www.academia.edu/269748/\\_From\\_Judaism\\_and\\_Hellenism\\_to\\_Christianity\\_and\\_Paganism\\_Cultural\\_Identities\\_and\\_Religious\\_Polemics\\_in\\_the\\_Pseudo-Clementine\\_Homilies\\_pre-print\\_](http://www.academia.edu/269748/_From_Judaism_and_Hellenism_to_Christianity_and_Paganism_Cultural_Identities_and_Religious_Polemics_in_the_Pseudo-Clementine_Homilies_pre-print_). Thompson, James W. *Moral Formation According to Paul: The Context and Coherence of Pauline Ethics*. Baker Books, 2011. Wasserman, Emma. *The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Sin, Death, and the Law in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology*. Mohr Siebeck, 2008.

Note the theme of judgement, cf. n. 16, above.

320 2:13 And thinkest thou this, O man, that judgest them which do such things, and doest the same, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God?

do such things, and doest the same, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God? 4 Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and longsuffering; not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? 5 But after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God; 6 Who will render to every man according to his deeds: 7 To them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life: 8 But unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, 9 Tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil, of the Jew first, and also of the Gentile; 10 But glory, honour, and peace, to every man that worketh good, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile: 11 For there is no respect of persons with God.

All sin. All will be judged alike, and according to their deeds—not their knowledge or possession of the law. This destroys any leverage the Jews at Rome might have had in their quarrels with the Gentiles. Sin, in Paul's efforts to quell the quarrels, is a great equalizer: neither Jews nor Gentiles can sincerely claim to be righteous. God's righteousness is revealed in Christ, who justifies Jew and Gentile alike.

21 But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets; 22 Even the righteousness of God [which is] by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe: for there is no difference: 23 For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God; 24 Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: 25 Whom God hath set forth [to be] a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; 26 To declare, [I say], at this time his righteousness: that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.



Paul's solution to the conflict of Jews and Gentiles at Rome seems simple, straightforward: all sin, all will be judged accordingly, but all have been made right through Jesus Christ.

But Paul has been quietly clarifying the terms of the new (or newly expanded) messianic covenant; he has been patching together the lines along which future (if not then-current) conflicts between Jewish and Gentile Christians might erupt. Christians like Paul perhaps shared a basic conviction that the messiah who would save Jews *from* Gentiles turned out to be a messiah who would save Gentiles as well as Jews *from* sin. But so long as what that conviction means about the relation of God to the Jews and Gentiles remained unclear, so did the basic ordering of their relations to one another.

To defend his claim that the 'new' messianic covenant is universal (inclusive of all humans, which divide into Jew and Gentile), Paul shows that a covenant-relation might be invisible or unknown to the Gentiles. There are two steps here: first, he argues that God may have a relation to the Gentiles, quite without their realizing it. "For the invisible things of God have been revealed..." Second, Paul claims, this relationship is of a moral-legal sort that the Jews would recognize as covenanted. There is precedent for a covenant with Gentiles in the Noachic covenant already at play in the minds of Paul's audience, since the Gentiles at hand are likely God-fearers and since it had a central role in the controversial decision at Jerusalem. And sometimes Gentiles, Paul asserts, show evidence that the law is at work, even written in their hearts.

14 For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: 15 Which shew the work of

the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and [their] thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another;) 16 In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my gospel.

The law for the Jews could not be reduced to the legal-political or moral. It was always both, and always a sign of a covenant, the terms of their unique relationship with God. Though the Gentiles may not have (had) a visible, static covenant, written on tablets, they may (and, Paul will argue, are) in a covenanted relationship to God. While some may provide evidence of having forgotten or preferred their own laws to God's, others show by the agreement of their actions with a law on hearts, *which matches the law on tablets* that they are in a covenant already with God.

Here the form of Paul's argument for apostleship appears again: Gentiles are in a covenant with God because (1 there is a law (symbol of covenant, relation to God) on their hearts that could not be of their own human invention, since only the Jews, who have the law on tablets, would be able to see it as such,<sup>321</sup> and (2 this law on their hearts agrees with the law on tablets.<sup>322</sup> That covenant (again in keeping with the Jewish — and

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321 This is important because Paul's case needs to be digestable to and defensible in front of the less Hellenized Jews like those at Jerusalem, who are suspicious of things (and have a habit of looking for things) that sound Jewish, but are not: Greek inventions.

322 This provides the possibility of "external authentication" (though there is lots of room here).

If approached from the outside, the Jews and quasi-Jewish God-fearers (who have access to their law) seem to get the upper hand here: because the covenant of Gentiles with God is invisible to those without the law on tablets, they are the only ones for whom Paul's argument could work. This is Paul's audience - the ones for whom the law on the hearts of Gentiles is visible. Given that standpoint, his case works. Given another standpoint, say, that of a Gentile, it looks as if the Jews who have the law on tablets are superior to the Gentiles who do not have it, since those with tablets can see what the Gentiles cannot.

particularly Hellenistic Jewish— traditions) entitles God to judge them accordingly.

Only Jews are in a position to compare Gentile actions with the Jewish law, and to declare that the Gentiles are in a covenant with God (but when they do, it is so - there is no available challenge or check).

This line of thinking allows Paul to include Gentiles in a messianic covenant without undermining the uniqueness of God's covenant with the Jews. And, since there was already precedent for the judgment of the Gentiles (this was an important thread in Hellenized Jewish writings),<sup>323</sup> as well as a long Jewish tradition of God's judgment against the Jews, Paul had at hand a way to talk about the bad news in common to which the good news of the righteousness of God in Christ was a common solution.<sup>324</sup>

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If we assume for the sake of argument what I otherwise take to be a false proposition, that all humans (even first century non-Jews) feel conscience, or even one I take to be true, that many humans (and so it cannot be constitutive of human-being) feel conscience, we might see another way in which Paul's argument is sly, for it would be difficult to deny that we have a feeling of having broken a law (and equally difficult, though we have no evidence in the first place, and for different reasons, that many others have the feeling), though somewhat less difficult to differ with Paul's interpretation (that this is evidence of a law on hearts). For those willing to entertain the rest of Paul's story, though, it would provide a way for Gentiles to think of themselves as having been in covenant with God all along— but not having recognized it as such.

323 See note 26, above.

324 Read this way (and only this far), Paul's argument hardly meets the criteria for 'Christian supersessionism', for it is unclear whether there is a 'new covenant' at all. The Jews need not give up theirs, but merely modify what is understood by the Messiah and his work; the Gentiles do not give up, but, with the help of the Jews, come to recognize their covenant with God. What unites the two groups (on this read) is not a third, altogether different and superior covenant, but their common God, their common failure, and their common acceptance of the revelation of that God's righteousness and their redemption through Jesus Christ. Within Paul's frame (as with any Jewish or Hellenized Jewish frame), to be human and to break covenant, to sin, are co-extensive. To be in need of God's righteousness or saved from that sin are human, uniting features. If anything is 'superior', and imposed here, it is not Christianity as a third 'religion' or identity, a new covenant, but Paul's Hellenized Jewish Christ-following frame, within

## Am I Not an Apostle?

Paul's argument for his apostleship has two basic steps. Whatever teachings he received on the road to Damascus were (1. not of human origin, but (2. matched the apostles' teachings. It should be perfectly obvious that, unless these teachings include "Paul is an apostle," neither premise directly supports the claim.

Rather the second point (if accompanied with evidence) might support a conclusion like, "Paul's teachings are not opposed to the apostles'." It would be difficult to give evidence for the first (Paul only asserts it), and so difficult for it to do a certain kind of work in an argument. I suspect that it does a kind of rhetorical work: Paul agrees with or perhaps even goes beyond his audience's conviction and uses his experience to confirm that the apostles' teachings have a divine origin.

Here is how convoluted the path might be to Paul's conclusion, "I am an apostle." I have teachings that match the apostles'. I got the teachings from their (divine) source.<sup>325</sup> An apostle has apostle-matching teachings from a divine source, therefore I am an apostle.

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which (and this is not new, but allegedly 'superior') a covenant with the Jewish God is imposed upon the Gentiles and a modification of the messianic covenant is imposed on the Jews.

But if rather Christianity is a new, third covenant that Jews and Gentiles ought abandon theirs for, or if Christianity is taken to be a new religion in which distinctions between Jews and Gentiles (in eyes of God and in relation to other Christians, other humans) should cease (if, for example, the world should divide into Christians and Jews), or if one takes Paul to be in one of these camps, then it would be difficult to maintain the conclusion. In these cases, Christianity supersedes the others, Christ conquers all. And Christians—now neither Jew nor Gentile, but beyond or above both, and so of the whole of humanity (from a Jewish or God-fearer standpoint)— like Christ, and in Christ, supersede or transcend not just human divisions, but the whole human family.

<sup>325</sup> If one assumes "there is only one God," the source is the same. There might be a shared-source argument here, too.

The first apostles had to be convinced that Paul was an apostle. So Paul's assertion about his apostleship did not always meet the "matches the apostles" criterion. Unless one assumes already Paul's apostleship. In that case, his teaching (that he is an apostle) matches with at least one apostle. And in that case, his argument, from a formal perspective, begs the question, or, from another, the claim "Paul is an apostle" is — apparently— self-authenticating.

Paul's premises might support an important (for him) conclusion: Paul is no longer a threat to the Christ-followers. They do not support "Paul is an apostle."

Argument or none, the apostles did not put up a fight (or win when they did), and he came to be (at least as the story goes) an apostle (i.e., to behave as the other apostles did). "I am an apostle because I am one and say so"—this might seem to gesture to the matches-with criterion, but it actually bypasses it. After he won apostleship from the apostles, it is of no matter. The supports can all evenesce.

The conclusion is, paradoxically and anachronistically, self-evident. Yet the argument was also received as an argument with a legitimate (if not yet divinely inspired) form. "Not from a human, but from a divine source," and "conforms to x teachings," became standards among Christians for establishing and defending truths.

## **Universal Reach**

The logics in Paul's argument for universal reach (Gentiles are not righteous. Jews are not righteous. Those in Christ are righteous.) are a bit more slippery than in the argument for apostleship.

Paul assumes, as did his audience, that Jews and Gentiles comprise the whole of humanity. This division has its origins in Jewish thinking, though the form is hardly unique to Jews.<sup>326</sup> The Romans, for example, used 'barbarian' to talk about themselves in relation to all others. Its logical form is simple: all y are x or non-x.

Paul's first two steps say that Gentiles have not fulfilled the law and Jews have not fulfilled the Law. Paul assumes, as likely does his audience, that the Gentiles have a law on hearts and are accountable to the Jewish God for following it. This assumption is grounded on Jewish teachings about the Noachic covenant, and Paul supplements it with the argument that the law on hearts can be verified by its conformity to the law God gave to Moses. That the Jews have not fulfilled the law God gave Moses sets the stage for Paul's third and fourth claims and conclusion: no one has fulfilled the law, save Christ, who saves all.

'The law' is an odd way to talk about what, in Paul's premises, were two sets of laws, the Noachic and Mosaic. Paul leaves unclear whether the Noachic law and Mosaic law are combined simply because of their shared source (the Jewish God), because the Noachic law on hearts is validated by (subordinate to, minimally overlaps with) the Mosaic law, or some combination.

Put differently, the Gentiles are not required to conform to the Mosaic law to have a relation to Jesus Christ. But Christ's fulfillment of the law is his power to save. So either there is a third, universal law that Christ has fulfilled, the Noachic law is contained in the

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<sup>326</sup> The division (and most divisions like it, for self-identification of groups within wholes) is not exclusive to Jews, either. A Roman, for example, might identify as a Gentile when interacting with Jewish cultures, Phoenecian might identify as a barbarian in Roman cultures, etc.

Moasic law, or the Noachic law is somehow subordinate to the Mosaic law. One can imagine it in Paul's best interest to not trouble about this ambiguity, but simply to stress (as he did) that that divisions between Jew and Gentile disappear in the ordering of Christ.

On Paul's telling, differences between the Noachic and Mosaic laws disappear in the image of Christ as the fulfillment of the law. Paul's gospel pictures Jew and Gentile united in Christ. In it, he plays up the shared assumptions of his bickering audience, that sin and other orderings are universal problems for which Christ is a universal solution. Paul helps his audience understand themselves as united by their common convictions. But this picture of the whole of humanity united in Christ, the Pauline ideal, is a picture of the obliteration of all other forms of self-understanding, first for the Greek, then for the Jew.

The logic of the argument for universal reach unites God-fearers and Jewish Christians under the banner of the obliteration of Gentile self-understanding. Gentiles must come to see themselves as the God-fearers and Jewish Christians did: as disobedient subjects of the Jewish God (whose law and ordering is revealed to them in invisible things and is written on their hearts), in need of salvation provided by Jesus Christ. In this transformation of mind (of self-knowledge and knowledge of God) the aim of Christianity is fulfilled.

Paul's gospel's dark underside is the gospel of the universal-reality of the presuppositions shared by Christian God-fearers and Jewish Christians: that all humans sin and fall short of the glory of the Jewish God, and that all humans may be transformed

in Christ by the renewing of their minds. Only when all humans have embraced this self-understanding (and so made a claim about all humans into a claim espoused by all humans) is the work of the Christian mission complete.

Paul's is a religion of conformity to a divine ordering, in which one's self-understanding is transformed in relation to the symbol of the divine ordering manifest as the image of humanity. Though it may sound harmless rendered in such abstraction, and though some may even today be convinced of its viability or value, it aimed at the obliteration of self-understandings of the Greek (these must see themselves in relation to the Jewish God and to Jesus Christ) and Jew (these must see themselves in relation to Jesus Christ), and called the construction of new self-understandings in their place "salvation."

Paul's missionary efforts were wildly successful. To be and to understand oneself fully human, Paul's heirs would argue, is impossible if not in relation to Jesus Christ. But to understand oneself in relation to Jesus Christ is to understand oneself as Jew or Gentile—in relation to what may be a foreign God. Along with this understanding, which united western Europe, later thinkers inherited Paul's argumentative strategies, which freed many people from oppressive images of Jesus Christ (and of their own humanity), even as they enslaved them. In one sense, this essay has been a story about early modern thinkers (especially two eighteenth century thinkers) and their valiant but failed efforts to reshape elements of Paul's religion and argumentative strategies for what they perhaps took to be an ultimate and human-common good.





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