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The Art of being an Imperial Broker:

The Qing Conquest of Taiwan and Maritime Society (1624-1788)

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Abstract

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By Cheng-Heng Lu

Whether Taiwan is part of China remains a crucial question. In the Chinese nationalistic description, the Qing Empire's (1644–1911) conquest of Taiwan was a process of unification of the Chinese nation-state. This interpretation is influenced by a nationalistic perspective. In this dissertation I use the lens of imperial and global perspective to review this subjugation as an imperial expansion rather than a national unification. Instead of focusing on either the aspect of empire or the aspect of society, I explore the history by analyzing the acts of four families: the Zheng lineage of Zheng Chenggong, the Shi lineage of Shi Lang, the Huang lineage of Huang Wu, and the Lan lineage of Lan Li. These four families were *kaituoxunchen*, who had naval skills and maritime knowledge that were unfamiliar for the Qing ruling class. They became the Qing Empire's cultural and military brokers in the maritime borderland and helped the Qing conquer Taiwan and gain knowledge of the maritime world. These families earned benefits by being brokers in the local society. The maritime society needed to negotiate with these newly rising influential brokers and to recognize their status to guarantee local people's benefits. Meanwhile, each side encountered dilemmas. To ensure the brokers' loyalty, the empire enrolled them in the Eight Banners system and the Mongolian prince system, which were Inner Asian systems to build subjects with a close relationship to the Manchu rulers. This created unintentional impacts on these four families that they had gradually engaged with Inner Asian cultures and phenomena instead of the maritime world. Although the four families had successfully conquered Taiwan in 1683 and 1721, they failed to conquer it in 1787. Their roles were superseded by Manchu generals in 1788. Therefore, the brokers and the brokerage system they had built with their empire declined, and the Manchu took the dominant roles. I explore the Qing's conquest and expedition and the relative impacts on maritime societies in 1661, 1683, 1721, and 1788 from the perspectives of global, imperial, and social history and argues that the Qing Empire began its direct rule in Taiwan after 1788.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The Taiwan issue hinges on if Taiwan should remain the territory of the Republic of China or if Taiwan should be part of the People's Republic of China. This issue is one of the most significant geopolitical issues across the world. The PRC claims that Taiwan is China's "sovereign and fated territory" because since 1683, "national heroes," such as Shi Lang and Lan Tingzhen, have contributed to the integration of Taiwan into China—or, in its account, "the unification of the Chinese nation-state." However, in what kind of polity did these "national heroes" help incorporate Taiwan? The polity was the Qing. Recent scholars have been clearer in identifying it as the Qing Empire because Qing history has been placed within the structure of imperial history. Imperial historians, embracing a significantly different perspective from nationalistic supporters, interpret the integration of Taiwan as part of imperial expansionism. When the integration of Taiwan was seen as part of Qing expansionism, the historical figures Lang and Tingzhen were no longer appropriately described as national heroes. Then, the questions remain what they were, how we reinterpreted their roles against the topic of the integration of Taiwan, and whether this new interpretation could tell us a new story. I argue that, instead of studying only Lang and Tingzhen, we examine their followers, colleagues, and descendants—some of them were probably seen as national traitors—within the same context of imperial history. I find and consider them to have been the empire's brokers who expanded the empire toward the maritime world.

In this dissertation, I study Taiwanese history and maritime history under the framework of the New Qing History, which is a new historiography by which to study Qing history within the context of Inner Asian, imperial, and global history; this historiographical approach has never before touched Taiwanese and maritime history, until now. I argue that Taiwan was integrated into the Qing Empire only gradually under the control and help of the Qing's brokers and was brought fully under the Qing's central control only after 1788. In the sense of relying on brokers for an indirect rule, the integration of Taiwan was parallel to the integration of Ezochi into Japan and Mesoamerica into the Spanish Empire during the seventeenth century. The Qing Empire required brokers to function as nodes of communication between the borderlands and central empire. Aside from acting as cultural brokers, these people also possessed special military skills and unique knowledge about the borderland. Instead of using a general and universal system to rule the regions under the empire's expansionism, the Qing recruited these brokers to control these cross-cultural and cross-ethnic areas they sought to conquer. In 1683, the Qing ordered brokers to conquer and rule Taiwan, and these brokers enhanced their influence in their lineage and local society, while they were given privileges on the island. The brokers' interactions with the empire and society formed the Qing's maritime brokerage.

This brokerage originated with the model of Zheng Chenggong's father, Zheng Zhilong, in the 1640s; the model was formed to handle the issues between the Ming Dynasty of China and other maritime powers in Taiwan and was also used by the Qing Empire to recruit Zheng Zhilong's three followers—the Shi family of Xunhai, Lan family of Zhangpu, and Huang family of Pinghe—as brokers during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These brokers of Qing also did as Zheng Zhilong did when he became the Ming's broker—rebuilt a lineage, participated in social affairs, and gained recognition for their status. In this dissertation I argue that their skills in naval warfare and knowledge of the maritime world contributed to Chinese expansionism toward Taiwan. On the one hand, these four families—Zheng's and his three followers' families—handled pressures from both the empire and society, and, on the other hand, made efforts to seek out considerable benefits for themselves. I examine the interactions and relationships among the empire, society, and four families to better understand the imperial structure, brokerage system, and society during the process of Taiwan's integration into Qing China.

Hiring and supporting influential brokers undoubtedly had its risks that threatened the empire's ruling in the borderland. The core of ensuring the success of this strategy and maintaining the close relationship between the empire and brokers was ensuring and maintaining the loyalty of the brokers. The Qing Empire devised a way to guarantee recently professed loyalties—by enrolling them into the Inner Asian institutions. The Qing's Inner Asian institutions would help create a close connection between brokers and the Inner Asian culture, laws, politics, and rulers. However, although this approach might have been useful for a short time, it became a double-edged sword in the long run. The longer the brokers stayed within the Inner Asian institutions, the more Inner Asian, precisely, Manchurized, they became. When a man was Manchurized, he was not obliged to spend his time honing his naval skills but rather his archery and cavalry skills. A Manchurized man was also expected to recognize Manchu culture as his first priority instead of his knowledge about the maritime world and naval skills. By the mid-eighteenth century, these brokers had gradually lost their functionality and failed to quell a rebellion in Taiwan—the Lin Shuangwen Rebellion in 1788—so the Qianlong Emperor sent a more conventional Manchu commander, rather than another broker, to regain control of Taiwan.

In past scholarship, three primary perspectives of the four families and their relationship with the integration of Taiwan were noted: the nationalistic perspective, the Taiwanese history perspective, and the global perspective. The nationalistic perspective views certain people, such as Shi Lang, as patriotic, national heroes because they helped unify the Chinese nation-state. In contrast, the Taiwanese history perspective focuses only on these families' construction of Taiwanese society, and as for the global perspective, it focuses on certain families' overseas activities. Each perspective has its significant weaknesses. The nationalistic perspective simplifies its narration of history under national discourse by enlarging and overemphasizing generals' achievements. The Taiwanese history perspective ignores the complicated interaction between Taiwan and China because of its emphasis only on Taiwan, and the global history perspective overlooks the impact of Inner Asia but emphasizes maritime activities before 1683, when Shi Lang integrated Taiwan into Qing China. In other words, advocates of each perspective only pay attention to the region in which they are interested. Moreover, each perspective focuses on only specific people or families, such as the nationalistic perspective's Zheng Chenggong and Shi Lang, the Taiwanese history perspective's Shi and Lan family, and the global perspective's Zheng family. Finally, each perspective's scholars give accounts of this history through their respective structures—the nationalistic perspective under nationalism, the Taiwanese history perspective under the Taiwan-centered approach, and the global perspective under maritime interaction. Indeed, each perspective is sound and worthwhile, but obvious gaps, exist so that none of them can provide a full picture. These gaps mean that the history between the Qing Empire and the maritime world has only been partially revealed.

Although many researchers have explored the issue of China's integration of Taiwan through multiple concepts, in this dissertation I am influenced by new historiographies and thus use new sources to propose a continuous perspective for reviewing past points of view. I aim to use comparative imperial history's emphasis on the empire's agency. In the study of late imperial

China, two historiographies focus respectively on empire and society: the New Qing History and the School of South China Studies. While New Qing History places material emphasis on Manchu-language sources, the School of South China Studies emphasizes social materials. By highlighting people’s actions between the empire and society, I synthesize sources and concepts of these two historiographies to offer a continuous perspective for understanding the role of these historical characters in the history of the integration of Taiwan into China. In other words, by focusing on the empire–broker–society structure to understand the history of integration of Taiwan within a broader picture and avoid any stereotype or bias, I place these historical characters and their overlooked descendants and followers where they should be and offer a holistic story regarding their role as the empire’s brokers.

I argue that, although the Chinese Empire had ruled Southern Fujian for centuries, it required brokers to assist in handling the new maritime situation of incorporating Taiwan into maritime East Asia in the seventeenth century when Western, Japanese, and Chinese traders had established prosperous condition. People from the peripheral area of Southern Fujian were the pioneers of connecting with the maritime powers because they had struggled to make a living in the peripheral area owing to the prominent lineages’ exploration, the government’s encroachment, and ecological crises since the sixteenth century, and thus, the Chinese Empire employed them as brokers, making use of their experiences and professional skills in the maritime world. The first broker was the Zheng family, employed by the Ming Dynasty to negotiate with and fight against the maritime powers in Taiwan, such as the VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, the Dutch East India Company) and Japanese smugglers. After the Ming–Qing transition, the Qing Empire had to deal with the new situation of Zheng Chenggong’s conquest of Taiwan in 1662. The Qing Empire directed its Inner Asian institutions to revise Zheng's model and employed Shi, Lan, and Huang, who had been subordinates of the Zheng family and were from peripheral areas, as the empire's new brokers to conquer and rule Taiwan. The brokers' families not only provided military service but also increased their influence in the local society of Southern Fujian and Taiwan—until 1787 when they failed to restore the Qing's authority in a rebellion.

In examining the process whereby Taiwan was integrated into the Chinese Empire via the assistance of the brokers, I help elucidate how a formerly peripheral island came to be regarded as an integral part of China's "sovereign and fated territory." In this study, I view Taiwan–China relations as a product of a particular history—that of Qing expansionism led by brokers—rather than as a matter of nation-state building. By illuminating the nature of the historical relationship, I seek to add to our understanding of current political events in this complicated region.

1.2 Historiography

In this dissertation I focus on the four families' roles in the process by which Taiwan was integrated into the Chinese Empire. Past scholars have explored this topic and offered a wide range of perspectives. Based on this foundation and with the benefit of new historiography, I plan to consider the four families in a holistic context. I see these four families as a group that played the role of middlemen between the empire and society. In this way I suggest that these four families linked Taiwan, the overseas world, Southern Fujian, and Beijing together as a unified group to initiate the integration of Taiwan. I propose that these four families, in different periods, played the same role of the empire's brokers instead of perpetuating the conservative chronological divisions. Therefore, in this historiographical section, I analyze the studies of the four families and their relationship with the integration of Taiwan.

I argue that the past studies about the four families had obvious insufficiencies and biases, which stemmed from a lack of suitable sources. By adding newfound materials, this dissertation is an attempt to bring these four families and the integration of Taiwan within the context of imperial history. Because the Qing Empire, which ruled China in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, has widely been seen as the Inner Asian Empire in recent studies, I argue that, although Taiwan is not part of Central Eurasia and the four families were not Inner Asians, the nature of the Qing Empire still had dramatic impacts on this island beyond the seas (*haiwai* in Chinese). Instead of studying Taiwan and these four families from an Inner Asian perspective, however, I take the social perspective of Southeast China to not only create a complement to the Inner Asian perspective but also show the interaction between these imperial brokers and societies. In other words, based on the rich studies of this topic, my dissertation is aimed at providing a holistic approach to synthesizing studies to provide a more comprehensive overview of the integration of Taiwan into China from the perspectives of empire, society, and the brokers in between.

Before the nineteenth century, the four families had not been "academic subjects." They were generally considered as either a political taboo, such as the Zheng family, or a living and powerful family, such as the Shi family.[1] Since the nineteenth century, increasing numbers of scholars have explored the history of Zheng Chenggong, specifically the Zheng family's military achievements during the Ming–Qing transition. Although scholars support the Qing dynasty, they also compliment Zheng Chenggong's loyalty to the Ming power; in fact, the Zheng family was considered a symbol of loyalty, and as such, the main purpose of researchers has been to highlight Zheng's loyalty to the Confucian doctrine.[2]

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[1] The study of Zheng Chenggong became a taboo during the Qing period because of his attempt of overturning the Qing power. Even though people deified Zheng Chenggong as a local deity in Taiwan, people could not use his name but renamed the deity as "the moral king of opening mountain." See Gao Zhihua, "Guguo yimin yu minjian zaoshen: Zheng Chenggong xinyang de chengxing yu fazhan", Mingshi yanjiu xuehui, ed, *Qianquihuaxia Mingshi yanjiu zhi xin shiye lunwen ju* (Taipei: Soochow University History Department, 2008), vol. 2, no page.

In 1842, the Qing China entered a new stage brought by the Opium War. After the war, the threat of imperialism inspired the Chinese to contemplate a way to counterattack. An effective approach was nationalism. The Chinese looked for historical characters to build a genealogy of national heroes to underline their legacy of creating and consolidating the Chinese nation-state. In this process, Zheng Chenggong, who defeated the Dutch, became a suitable icon who propagated the idea that the Chinese could defeat Western powers.[3] Aside from this, the Qing official government also made an effort to underscore the nationalistic image of Zheng when Japan invaded Southern Taiwan in 1874. The Qing government officially worshiped Zheng as a deity and endorsed his loyalty. Simultaneously, the invading Japanese soldiers also worshiped Zheng because he had been an essential part of Japanese imperialism, colonialism, and nationalism to claim Japan's legitimacy of invading, colonizing, and ruling Taiwan.[4] In other words, in the nineteenth century, the image of Zheng shifted from that of a loyal commander to a national hero in both China and Japan.

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[2] For instance, Shen Yu, *Taiwan Zhengshi shimo* (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1958).

[3] Regarding Zheng Chenggong as Chinese national heroes, there are some landmarks in the modern scholarship of nationalism. See Ralph C. Croizier, *Koxinga and Chinese Nationalism: History, Myth, and the Hero* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Shen Song-Chiao (Shen Songjiao), "Zhenda Han zhi Tiansheng – minzu yingxiong xipu yu wan Qing de guozu xiangxiang," *Zhongyangyanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan*, no. 33 (2000), pp.77-158.

[4] This nationalistic perspective not only occurred in China but also in Japan and Chinese overseas communities. Although there are tons of studies regarding this issue, most of them are associated to anti-Japanese concept in recent China. For instance, Cheng-Heng Lu, "One Family, Four Worlds: Koxinga's descendants and nationalism across the modern East Asia," *Berliner China-Hefte: Chinese History and Society*, no. 51 (2020), pp. 5-22. Wang Xiangyuan, Jianghushidai riben minjian wenren xuezhe de qinhuamimeng — yi jinsongmenzuoweimen, zuoteng Xinyuan, jitian songyin wei li," *Zhongqing daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban)* 14, no. 4 (2008), pp. 120-124. There are some studies which placed this issue within a relatively fair statys. See Jiang Renjie, *Jiegou Zheng Chenggong—Yingxiong, shenhua yu xingxiang de lishi* (Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 2017), pp.44-63; Chang Wen-Hsun (Zhang Wenxun), "Lishi xiaoshuo yu zaidihuarentong—"guoxingye" gushi xipu zhong de Xichuan Man *Chikanji*," *Taiwan wenxue yanjiu xuebao*, no. 14 (2012), pp. 105-131.

After the First Sino-Japan War, the Japanese colonial government utilized the image and legacy of Zheng to legitimate its colonial rule in Taiwan. Meanwhile, in mainland China, the revolutionary party boosted the image of Zheng again, not because of his loyalty and nationalistic qualities, but rather because he had made efforts to overturn the Manchu rulers. Through newspapers and many other media, the image of Zheng, as a symbol of the revolutionary movement, became increasingly clear and important.[5] This image lasted until the successful 1911 Revolution—Zheng, as a great man against the Manchu's alien rule, became rooted in the Chinese mindset.[6] Scholars began noticing historical characters around the Zheng family, such as Shi Lang, during the twentieth century, but these characters' roles were to accentuate Zheng's pure morality.[7] Zheng's image was rooted not only in people's daily lives but also in academia. For instance, in 1920, Academia Sinica published *Ping Ding Hai Kou Fang Lue*, a strategic book compiled by the Qing government to document the war between the Qing and the Zheng Regime. The editors hated the title of this book because it translated as *The Strategic Book of Quelling Pirates*, so they renamed it *The Qing Official Book Recording the*

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[5] Yu Danchu, "Ershi shiji chunian Zhongguo de aiguozhuyi shixue sichao" in Yu Danchu ed, *Aiguozhuyi yu Zhongguo jindai shixue* (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1996), pp. 121-125; Xing Hang, "The Contradictions of Legacy: Reimagining the Zheng Family in the People's Republic of China," *Late Imperial China* 34. 2 (2013): 1-27; Chen Zhongchun, "Jindai guoren dui Zheng Chenggong xingxiang de suzao yu jingshen de chuancheng—yi baokan wenxian Zhong de Zheng Chenggong chuanji wei zhongxin," *Taiwan yanjiu jikan*, no. 5 (2013), pp.69-77.

[6] Shen Sung-Chiao analyzed Chinese nationalism during the twentieth century based on their daily life. See Shen Song-Chiao (Shen Songjiao), "Zhongguo de yiri. yiri de Zhongguo—1930 niandai de richang shenghuo xushi yu guozu xiangxiang," *Xin Shi Xue* 20, no. 1 (2009), pp. 1-59.

[7] In 1912, the Fujian government proposed to change the name of Xiamen as Siming, literally referring to memorializing the Ming dynasty, to propagate Zheng Chenggong's loyal merit when the republic government just overturned the Manchu ruler and built a "Chinese nation-state." People also required to remove a statue that Shi Lang mounting on horseback looked down at Zheng Chenggong who is kneeling for surrender. Chinese and Chinese overseas saw this a humiliation, so asked to remove this statue because Chinese nation restored the state from "alien Manchu." Noteworthily, these Chinese considered Shi Lang a "Chinese traitor." Chinese then further required to build a statue and a tower of Zheng Chenggong in the religious center of Xiamen, Nanputuo Temple, to announce Minnanese' contribution on restore a Chinese nation-state to adore a national hero. *Taiwan riri xinbao*, 1913-01-19, page, 5, Japanese version. *Shen bao*, 1912-04-25, no. 14071, page, 6. *Shen bao*, 1912-05-23, no. 14099, page, 6.

Event of the Collapse of the Zheng. These critical scholars changed the title to indicate that Zheng endeavored to fight the “Manchu barbarians.”[8] In the 1910s, the Chinese saw Zheng as a nationalistic symbol because of his morality and attempts against the Manchus. However, during the Republican Era of China, no studies linked him with the integration of Taiwan.

After World War II and the Chinese Civil War, the nationalistic image of Zheng Chenggong was necessary for the Republic of China (ROC) and People’s Republic of China (PRC) governments for political usage. The ROC government promoted Zheng’s plan of recapturing mainland China because this was what the Chiang Kai-shek government hoped to do. In contrast, the PRC government promoted Zheng Chenggong because he was the first to subjugate Taiwan from an imperial power. This nationalistic perspective became embedded in Chinese life on the mainland and Taiwan for decades. Furthermore, the PRC government transformed the image of Shi Lang from that of a traitor to a hero because he was the second Chinese man to conquer Taiwan and unify the Chinese nation-state.[9] Because the PRC shifted Shi’s image, this perspective required a new foil to accentuate the greatness of nationalistic heroes such as Zheng and Shi. Zheng Zhilong, Zheng’s father—who did not follow Zheng’s suggestions—and Huang Wu—who betrayed Zheng in 1656, never contributed to the nation-state, and betrayed the “heroes”—became the ideal choices. Scholars criticized their disloyalty and immorality against all Chinese.[10] Even today, countless studies perpetuate this criticism.[11] Therefore, after the 1940s, Zheng Chenggong and Shi Lang were considered of a similar status in the historical narratives of the two Chinese governments, and historians initiated the connection between these historical characters and the integration of Taiwan. In their opinion, the integration of Taiwan, contributed by Zheng Chenggong and Shi Lang, was a crucial step in the formation of the modern Chinese nation-state.[12]

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[8] *Qingdai guanshu ji Mingzheng Taiwan Zhengshi wangshi* (Nantou: Taiwan Historica, 1995).

[9] Xing Hang, “The Contradictions of Legacy: Reimagining the Zheng Family in the People’s Republic of China,” *Late Imperial China* 34. 2 (2013): 1-27; Ronald Po, “Hero or Villain? The Evolving Legacy of Shi Lang in China and Taiwan,” *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 53, Issue 4 (2019), pp. 1-30.

However, during the 1960s, in Western scholarship, a revised idea arose of examining not only Eurocentrism but also national history. Scholars such as William McNeil endeavored to study human history under a single framework and from a broader point of view. This idea, in the field of Chinese study, challenged two classical and significant areas: "the rise of the West" and the stagnation of China that emerged around the 1980s.[13] After the 1980s, the Zheng family as a topic was not absent from this global perspective. Scholars noticed the importance of the family; during this time, they shifted their attention from Zheng Chenggong to his father, Zheng Zhilong. They explored the family's unique role in the global maritime period around the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thanks to sources of varying languages—including Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, English, and Japanese materials—scholars were able to discover the Zheng family's maritime activities and interaction with foreign powers in East Asia.[14] Today, many studies about the Zheng family continue to appear. Therefore, influenced by the development of world history/global history, the scholarship has acknowledged the Zheng family as an essential part of human history.

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[10] In many studies, scholars believe that Zheng Zhilong was a traitor because he did not accept/follow Zheng Chenggong's suggestion/advice which is that Zheng Zhilong should not surrender to the Qing. Scholars consider Zheng Chenggong the icon who followed the Confucian standard as a loyal official to the Chinese government. The fact that he did not obey the loyal official makes Zheng Zhilong a betrayer of his/the Chinese ruler. See Xu Xiaowang, "Qingjun rumin yu Zheng Zhilong xiangqing shikao," *Fujian luntan (renwen shehui kexue ban)*, no. 7 (2007), pp. 70-77. Chen Zaizheng, "Zheng Zhilong zai Qingzheng hetan zhong shu bangyian de jiaoshe," *Xiamen daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui ban)*, no. 3 (1988), pp. 117-124. Huang Wu is also treated the same by the modern scholars. See Zhang Yan 張菼, "Zheng Chenggong de wushang," *Taiwan wenxian* 36, no. 2 (1985), pp. 15-33. For instance, many studies have built such comparison between Zheng Chenggong and Zheng Zhilong. See Deng Kongzhao, "Hueyu zanbang de Zheng Zhilong," in Deng Kongzhao ed, *Zheng Chenggong yu Mingzheng Taiwanshi yanjiu* (Beijing: Taihai chubanshe, 2000), pp. 185-190; Wu Zhenglong, *Zheng Chenggong yu Qing zhengfu jian de tanpan* (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe, 2000).

[11] Wong Young-tsu, *China's Conquest of Taiwan in the Seventeenth Century: Victory at Full Moon* (Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2017).

[12] In fact, this is not a special case. Before 2001, Ezochi had been considered as a frontier of Japan, and the Japan's incorporation of Ezochi as Hokkaido is a process of the building of modern nation-state. See Brett L. Walker, *The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590-1800* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 6. Christopher P. Hanscom and Dennis Washburn, "Introduction: Representations of Race in East Asian Empire," in Christopher P. Hanscom and Dennis Washburn edit, *The Affect of Difference: Representations of Race in East Asian Empire* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2016), pp. 1.

[13] Many studies are important, and one of the most effective See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: the World System A.D. 1250-1350* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Andre Gunder Frank, *ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills edit, *The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

When world history developed in the 1960s, scholars of Chinese studies in North America initiated a revision of the Eurocentric perspective on Chinese history. Scholars looked to regional studies to argue that China might share similarities with Europe in many aspects. This idea became part of the mainstream from the 1970s to the 1980s.[15] In 1984, Paul Cohen criticized Fairbank's Eurocentric idea on modern Chinese history during the 1950s and 1960s. Instead,

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[14] C. R. Boxer, "The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan(Cheng Chi-lung 鄭芝龍)," *T'ien-hsia Monthly*, vol.11, no.5(1941), pp. 401-439. Leonard Blussé, "Minnen-Jen or Cosmopolitan? The Rise of Cheng Chih-Lung Alias Nicolas Iquan," E. B. Vermeer, *Development and decline of Fukien province in the 17th and 18th centuries*(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), pp.245-264; Nagatsumi Yoko, "Te Shiryu chichitoko to nihon no sakoku," in Nagatsumi Yoko ed, Sakoku wo minooshi (Tokyo: Yamakawa Press, 1999), pp. 56-72; Li Yuchung (Li Yuzhong), "Mingzheng yu Xibanya diguo: Zhengshi jiazu yu Feilubin guanxi chutan," *Hanxue yanjiu* 16, no. 2 (1998), pp. 29-60; Jing Guoping and Wu Zhiliang, " Zheng Zhilong yu Aomen: jiantan Zhengshi jiazu de Aomen heiren," *Haijiashi yanjiu*, no. 2 (2002), pp. 48-59; Gu Weimin, "Mingzheng sidai yu tianzhujiahui de guangxi," *Wenhua zaizhi*, no. 50 (2004), pp. 69-80; Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, *The World that trade created: Society, culture, and the world economy, 1400-the present* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

[15] A lot of important scholars conducted their studies under this Chinese-centered approach. See Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); William Rowe, *Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984); Madeleine Zelin, *The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-century Ch'ing China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Philip C.C. Huang, *The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); and David Faure, *The Structure of Chinese Rural Society: Lineage and Village in the Eastern New Territories, Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1986).

Cohen proposed, based on the fruitful results of regional studies, a Chinese-centered approach to reevaluating Chinese history. Cohen suggested studying Chinese history, primarily regional history, from Chinese standards via multidisciplinary methods.[16]

The Chinese-centered approach became increasingly important, but a similar concept appeared in Taiwan almost at the same time, which could be called the "Taiwan-centered approach." This approach benefited from the democratic movement in Taiwan, which opposed the KMT government's autocracy in the 1980s. In 1986, Academia Sinica established an independent institution for Taiwan history, which symbolized a milestone in the study of this field.[17] After this period, the academia in Taiwan entered a critical transition that saw a growth in studies under this framework of Taiwanese history. Scholars were looking for unique features of Taiwan to argue that it differentiated from China. Within this context, studies on the four families and the integration of Taiwan offered a distinctive focus as well as arguments from those on which the nationalistic perspective had been concentrated.

Unlike the nationalistic studies, which emphasized Taiwan as a homogeneous part of the Chinese nation-state and global interaction of the Zheng families, Taiwanese history turned its focus to Taiwan alone. By conducting field research and using social materials, proponents of this perspective were able to explore families other than the Zheng and Shi—particularly the Lan family. These scholars argued that the four families created unique social structures in Taiwan.

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[16] Cohen suggested that Fairbank's interpretation of tributary system made three errors because of his nation-centered or west-centered approaches. First, Fairbank and others used "impact-response model (emphasizing the western impact on China and its response)." Second, they used "tradition-modernity model" (the western society as norm, and Chinese traditional system would be advanced toward "norm" when the western impact appeared). Third, they had "Imperialism model" (imperialism resulted in the transition and change in China). See Paul A. Cohen, *Discovering history in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

[17] This is the institution of Taiwan history. See http://www.ith.sinica.edu.tw/about.php?l=c&no=15. In China, institution about Taiwan history is usually under the main historical institution and is a sub-field of Chinese history.

Li Wenliang, Li Zuji, Shi Weiqing, Huang Fusan, Cai Zhizhan, and Chen Qioqun used such documents to illustrate how the Shi family reestablished the social structure while colonizing Taiwan after the 1683 conquest.[18] John Shepherd and Ka Chih-ming used social materials to explore the shifts of Taiwanese Aboriginal landownership among Aborigines, Chinese, and the government.[19] Lin Yuju (Lin Yuru) utilized social materials to argue that, aside from the impacts created by colonization, these families also established the primitive commercial organization, *jiao*, as the most essential and fundamental unit in Taiwanese society during the Qing period.[20] Therefore, by using social materials, these scholars comprehensively illustrated these families' reformation of the social structure by analyzing their agricultural and commercial activities and thus argued that these families individually influenced society in Qing Taiwan.

Additionally, advocates of the Taiwanese history perspective have argued that Taiwan was culturally different, and experienced a distinctive history, from China. This perspective encourages the study of Taiwan by itself rather than within the context of Chinese history. In this sense, this perspective is also a nationalistic perspective but of a different nation—Taiwan. Proponents of the nationalistic perspective have emphasized that Zheng Chenggong and Shi Lang's conquest resulted in Chinese culture becoming ingrained in Taiwan. That is, these scholars have interpreted that Taiwan is culturally a part of the Chinese nation-state. However, supporters of the Taiwanese history perspective have opposed this idea and suggested that Chinese arrivals had the experience of being in an exotic location. Many scholars have explored Chinese travel writings about Taiwan, and their studies have all been concentrated on members of the four families because they were the pioneers of narrating Taiwan. Scholars have argued that the knowledge of Taiwan made the island appear somewhat familiar, and the Chinese, particularly these families, gradually came to understand it after the 1683 conquest.[21] Based on this fact, Ang Kaim and Tsai Wei-chieh further noted that Taiwan was a culturally different entity under Chinese rule because the officials and people treated Taiwan and items from it as exotic in nature. The use of the phrase "Eastern Barbarian region," referring to Taiwan in the same manner as Tibet's "Western Barbarian" region, and the Chinese government deemed Taiwan an exotic place after it had established its ruling for decades.[22] Therefore, these scholars revised the nationalistic perspective and argued that Taiwan was culturally different from China, so the Chinese sought to experience and understand this exotic area when they were in Taiwan.

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[18] There are many studies focus on Shi Lang's illegal occupation of lands. See Shi Weiqing, *Shi Lang zai Taiwan xunyedi yan jiu* (Beijing: Shehui wenxian chubanshe, 2015); Li Wenliang, "Mintian yu qingken zhidu: Qingchu Taiwan tianyuan de jieshou yu guanli, in Chan Sujuan ed, *Zuqun, lishi yu diyu shehui: Shi Tianfu jiaoshou rongtui lunwenji*, pp. 27-56; Li Zuji, "Lun Shi Lang Taiwan qiliu libishu de beijing yu dongji －jiantan Qingchu Taiwan de guanzhuang ji wuzhi zhanken wenti," in Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan Taiwanshi yanjiu zhongxin ed, *Qingdai Taiwanshi yanjiu de xinjinzhan: jinian Kangxi tongyi Taiwan 330 zhounian guoji xueshu taolunhui lunwenji* (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2015), pp. 84–102. Huang Fu-san suggests to study family history because he believes family history is a crucial approach to understand families' roles in Taiwan history. This is also a representative field of Taiwan history. Huang Fusan, *Taiwan shuitianhua xianqu: Shi Shibang jiazushi* (Nantou: Taiwan Historica, 2006); Li Wenliang, "Fanzu tiandi yu guanshi －Kangxi Xiadanshuishe wenshu suojian de Taiwan xiangcun shehui," *Hanxue yanjiu* 27, no. 4 (2009), pp. 229-260; Li Zuji, "Shi Lang yu Qingchu de dalu yimin 施琅與清初的大陸移民," *Lishi yuekan*, no. 153 (2000), pp. 53-58; Cai Zhizhan, "Qingchu Banxian kenshou Shi Shibang shiji tanwei," *Shehuike jjiaoyu yanjiu*, no. 2 (1997), pp. 73-117; Mao Shaozhou, "Zhenshi yu xiangxiang de kongjian jiaocuo: yi Tainan datianhougong de jianzhu xingzhi ji gongneng weili," *Taiwanshi yanjiu* 21, no. 2 (2014) , pp. 1-32; Chen Qiukun, "Diguo bianqu de kezhuang juluo: yi Qingdai Pingdong pingyuan wei zhongxin (1700-1890)," *Taiwanshi yanji* 16, no. 1 (2009), pp. 1-28.

[19] See John Robert Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). To be sure, Shepherd's analyses is magnificent. However, as Paul R. Katz points out, Shepherd overlooks the role and intervention of diverse local elites because Shepherd defines the local elites as the people who passed the national examinations. In other words, he ignores other type of elites in Taiwan as a immigration society. Kang Bao (Paul Katz), "Tuijianxu," in John Shepherd, Lin Weishen trans., *Taiwan bianjiang de zhili yu zhengzhi jingji* (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2016), p. vi

[20] Lin Yuju (Lin Yuju), "Zhengzhi, zuqun yu maoyi: shiba shiji haishang tuanti jiao zai Taiwan de chuxian," *Guoshiguan guankan*, no. 62 (2019), pp. 1-51.

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[21] Zhuang Yazhong, "Bihai jiyou─paihui yu yiji yu ziwo zhijian,," *Xin Shixue*, vol. 4, no. 3 (1993), pp. 59-79; Zhuang Shengquan, "Qing Kangxi chao Taiwan yinxiang de zhuanbian─yi siwei qinlizhe de guancha weili," *Taiwan Fengwu* 56, no. 3 (2006), pp. 27-60; Huang Meiling, "Qingchu Taiwan danpian shanshui youji zhi tantao—yi Chen Menglin Lan Dingyuan weili," *Taibei shili jiaoyu daxue xuebao* 42, no. 1 (2011), pp. 25-48; Zhuang Shengquan, *Wanwen yaoji haiyifang: Qing diguo dui Taiwan de shuxie yu renshi* (New Taipei City: Daoxian chubanshe, 2013); Emma Jinhua Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-1895* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004).

[22] Ang Kaim (Weng Jiayin), "Qianshou khan-chhiu laikan Taiwan shijieshi: cong Taiwan lishi guanyongyu lun dafulao wenhuaquan gainian" *Taiwanshi yanjiu* 13, no. 2 (2006), pp. 1-31; Tsai Wei-chieh (Cai Weijie), "zhimin dangan yu diguo xinggou: lun Qingchao manwen zouzhe zhong dui Taiwan shufan de biaoshu," *Taiwanshi yanjiu* 15, no. 3 (2007), p. 48.

Last but not least, those advocating for the Taiwanese history perspective have argued that the Qing formulated different institutions in Taiwan even though the Qing placed Taiwan under the Chinese bureaucracy and system. They have further argued that Taiwan was institutionally different from other regions of China. For instance, Xu Xueji explored the military institution concerning the soldier in the rotation system, and Li Qilin examined the position of Fujian naval marshal. These two scholars successfully showed that the Qing utilized a unique military system to control Taiwan.[23] In this sense, Ka and Shepherd also pointed out the uniqueness of the Qing's rule in Taiwan.[24] Their studies suggested that the Chinese government enacted different systems and policies in Taiwan because of its special status even though they admitted that the Chinese government ruled Taiwan under Chinese bureaucracy. However, the Taiwanese history perspective has been taken about as far as it can go in the recent scholarship. Researchers have begun to examine trifles—such as the date when Zheng Chenggong really landed in Taiwan and which foot he placed on the land first.[25] Such unimportant studies that have contributed nothing to the academia have become popular.

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[23] Xu Xueji, *Qingdai Taiwan de luying* (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1987), p. 286; Li Qilin, Jianfeng zhuanduo: Qingdai qianqi yanhai de shuishi yu zhanchuan (Taipei: Wunan chubanshe, 2014).

[24] However, because of the recent scholarship of maritime history and imperial history, Taiwan and Southern Fujian should be properly seen under the same sub-macro-region. This trans-strait region had a close connection militarily, culturally, economically, and even environmentally. Skinner concludes China proper should not be considered as a monolithic whole. Instead, China proper can be divided into nine macro-regions based on the drainage basins of the major rivers, geography, market, and distance. In the southeast, there are five sub-regions, and Zhang-Quan and Taiwan are two of them. This dissertation adopts Skinner's proposal to include Taiwan within the Southeast macro-region; Evelyn Rawski and Susan Naquin have revised Skinner's category, but their discussions do not change the core. By contrast, as Perdue once argues, China is surrounded by Manchuria, Mongolia, Qinghai, and Tibet which each held different cultures, institutions, ethnicities, and economies from China proper. Adopting Perdue's argument, Taiwan should be seen as part of the culturally, economically, ethnically, and institutionally different frontier within the context. G. William Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957); G. William Skinner, *Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand* (Ithaca: Published for the Association for Asian Studies by Cornell University Press, 1958). Although the market was a significant and dominant force within each macro-region, Prasenjit Duara argues that culture might have played a more influential role in a given region. The theory of cultural nexus of power interprets rural societies through agents, such as elite, family, and temple organization, cooperated with the state to display religious, social, economic, and political power in local societies. See Prasenjit Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China 1900-1942* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

Since 2000, global history has dominated the studies of the four families and the integration of Taiwan. Xing Hang's landmark study explored the Zheng family's regime in Taiwan.[26] Tonio Andrade investigated the procedure of integrating Taiwan into China in his two books. He suggested that the Chinese had developed a powerful foundation in Taiwan, and thus the VOC had to cooperate with Chinese traders to maintain an efficient rule. These Chinese influences eventually took shape as the pillar for Zheng Chenggong's conquest in 1662, which was a result of the competition for usage of the Western military revolution between the Zheng and the VOC.[27] Cheng Weichung further discussed the conquest of 1683 and suggested that the VOC's rejection of Shi Lang's proposal for returning Taiwan was the final step in stimulating the integration of Taiwan into China. In this sense, global history rather implies that 1683 marks the end of Taiwan as a crucial case in global history because it had become a consolidated territory of the Chinese Empire.[28] Nevertheless, I suggest that scholars must continue treating Taiwan as a player distinct from the Chinese Empire in the course of global history—although it was undoubtedly a part of the Chinese Empire.

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[25] Shi Wansou, "Zheng Chenggong denlu Taiwan riqi xintan," *Taiwan wenxian* 28, no. 4 (1977); Shi Wansou, "Zheng Chenggong denlu Taiwan riqi xintan busu, *Taiwan fengwu*, vol. 32, no. 4 (1982); Shi Wansou, "Zheng Chenggong denlu Taiwan riqi xintan lunzheng pingyi," *Taiwan fengwu* 38, no. 4 (1988).

[26] Xing Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in maritime East Asia: the Zheng family and the shaping of the modern world, c. 1620-1720* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[27] Tonio Andrade, "The Company's Chinese Pirates: How the Dutch East India Company Tried to Lead a Coalition of Pirates to War against China, 1621-1662," *Journal of world history*, vol. 15, no. 4(2004), pp.415-444. Tonio Andrade, *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Tonio Andrade, *Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China's First Great Victory over the West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

[28] John E. Wills Jr., "Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang Themes in Peripheral History", edit. by Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills Jr., *From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, Region, and Cotinuity in Seventeenth Century China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 217-219. Weichung Cheng, "Admiral Shih Lang's secret proposal of returning Taiwan to the VOC", Tonio Andrade and Xing Hang edit, *Sea Rovers, Silver and Samurai: Maritime East Asia in Global History 1550-1700* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i, 2016), pp. 290-311; Leonard Blussé, "No Boat to China. The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690," p.67.

Since the nineteenth century, the academia in this area has been concentrated on Zheng Chenggong. However, previous studies of this individual never positioned him as part of the discussion on the integration of Taiwan until the Chinese Civil War took place. After the 1960s, the Zheng family was recognized in global history, and many scholars focused on it during the 1980s and 1990s. After the 1980s, those pursuing the Taiwan-centered approach studied families beyond the Zheng family and pinpointed their impact on the formation of Taiwanese society. After the 2000s, global history brought the integration of Taiwan within its context. Overall, these studies coexist today, and their authors focus on individuals such as Zheng Chenggong and Shi, but do not further explore history after 1683. A goal of this dissertation, then, is to extend the historical focus from the Zheng family's period to the late eighteenth century. This approach will illustrate that these four families played continuous significant roles in this historical period even though scholars overlooked their significance during this period—this is a fact affected by nationalistic perspectives, both Chinese and Taiwanese.

Because New Qing History interprets the nature of the Qing as an Inner Asian empire rather than a Sinicized dynasty, its appearance in the 2000s has posed a new question for Chinese studies as well as Taiwanese history—the question of how to reframe history from the point of view of the New Qing History. Mark C. Elliott defines the New Qing History as an approach to emphasizing the Qing's nature as an Inner Asian empire rather than a Sinicized dynasty within the context of global, Inner Asian, and imperial history via the use of non-Han Chinese sources, such as Mongolian-, Manchu-, and Tibetan-language materials.[29] Similar to Elliott's definition,

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[29] Mark C. Elliott, "Book Reviews: Pei HUANG, Reorienting the Manchus: A Study of Sinicization, 1583-1795,"

Michael G. Chang suggests that the New Qing History has benefited significantly from the "Altaic" (as opposed to the Sinicization) school of Qing history; this approach could be seen as a Qing-centered history.[30] Within these structures, I will apply the New Qing History approach and perspective to study the integration of Taiwan into the Qing Empire because the maritime borderland has remained unstudied under the framework of the New Qing History. Even though the New Qing History has recently moved to study more peripheral areas, these moves are likely "Inner Asian turn." The New Qing History has not been thought to matter to Taiwan history and has kept its focus away from Taiwan.

The New Qing History has created a few important questions for the topic of integration of Taiwan and the four families. First, how should we reevaluate the integration of Taiwan into an "Inner Asian universal empire" rather than a Chinese dynasty, and was the integration a "unification," a "cocolonization," or a "conquest"? In other words, the difference between the Inner Asian nature of the Qing Empire and a Sinicized state might reshape our understanding of the procedure of integration and the roles of the families. Second, scholarship has been aware that the Zheng and Shi families were in the Qing's most essential Inner Asian system, the Eight

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JESHO, *vol.* 54, Issue 4 (2011), pp. 584-588; many scholars believe that the debate between Ping-ti Ho and Evelyn S. Rawski generates the New Qing History. However, this debate is one of the process toward making the New Qing History. There are three articles that shape this debate. In 1967, Ping-ti Ho's "The Significance of the Ch'ing Period in Chinese History." In 1996, Rawski publishes an article about the Qing had not been sinicized but maintained its Inner Asian nature in her article, "Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History." Finally, in 1998, Ho responded Rawski's article, "In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski's 'Reenvisioning the Qing.'参見 Ping-ti Ho, "The Significance of the Ch'ing Period in Chinese History." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 26, no. 2 (1967), pp. 189-195; Evelyn S. Rawski, "Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 55, no. 4 (1996), pp. 829-850; Ping-ti Ho, "In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski's 'Reenvisioning the Qing'" *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 57, no. 1 (1998), pp. 123-155。In fact, scholars in the early period, such as Jonathan Spencer, has been aware of the Qing China's nature of Inner Asian empire.

[30] Michael G. Chang, *A Court on Horseback: Imperial Touring and the Construction of Qing Rule, 1680-1785* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007), pp. 9.

Banners system.[31] According to Mark Elliott, people under this system were ethnically, culturally, socially, and politically separate from the Chinese. How should the scholarship reanalyze these bannermen's accomplishments of conquering Taiwan? It is insufficient to understand their conquests within the context of the Chinese's effort of unifying a nation-state; instead, their bannermen and Hokkien background could offer a more complicated picture. Third, how can the Manchu-language sources enable the scholarship to reappraise these families and Taiwan? Although these sources might offer rich contributions, no researchers have ever utilized them to study these families and the integration of Taiwan.

Thus far in the 2000s, many scholars have offered plentiful studies, using multiple approaches to examine the families and their relationship with the integration of Taiwan, but their studies have raised many questions with regard to the following: how to interpret that the four families monopolized the position of the Fujian naval admiral over half of High Qing, which was about the time of reign of the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong Emperors; how to interpret the fact that the members of these four families were the largest local landowners as well as policymakers; how to interpret the conquests of Taiwan achieved by these four families in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and how to interpret that these four families were not only Hokkienese but also bannermen. These questions cannot be found in any single study, but rather they arise when all studies are juxtaposed. Moreover, the New Qing History forces the scholarship to rethink Qing history because the central government during the Qing was, in essence, different from the previous government because the Qing was an Inner Asian Empire. How should we gain the key to synthesize the facts produced by these studies and give an explanation for the relationship between the four families and the integration of Taiwan into an inner Asian empire, instead of a Chinese dynasty? In other words, how do we bring Taiwanese history and maritime history during the early modern period, led by these families, within the context of the New Qing History to re-explore the history of the integration of Taiwan into China and the four families from the nationalistic perspective on imperial history, which sees the integration as part of the Qing expansionism rather than a nation-unification?

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[31] Scholars have shown that the Zheng family and Shi Lang had tie connection with the Qing Empire's Inner Asian institutions, although such studies are very few because of the shortage of sources. Yoshio Hosoya, "Qingchao zhongqi baqi hanjun de zai bianzu," inIshibashi Hideo ed, Yang Ningyi and Chen Tao trans, *Qingdai Zhongguo de ruogan wenti* (Jinan: Shangdong Huabao chubanshe, 2011), pp. 68-90. To examine the relationship between the Chinese and their bannermen kinship is not a popular topic in the scholarship. See Pamela Crossley, "The Tong in Two Worlds: Cultural Identities in Liaodong and Nurgan during the 13th-17th Centuries," *Ch'ing-shih Wen-t'i*, 4(1983), pp. 21-46.

In this dissertation I propose a way to answer these questions, inspired by scholarship on the phenomenon of imperial brokerage. Patterson Giersch introduced a promising solution. Instead of focusing on the empire or society, Giersch devoted most of his attention to local actors. These actors were not Confucian elites who had passed the national examinations. Instead, they were the people who were familiar with a place that the empire's authority could not fully control—a connecting zone between the Qing Empire and other empires. In Giersch's discussion, these actors were local chiefs, *tusi*. Their power was not gained from passing the civil examinations but was directly granted by the central government because the government relied on them to stabilize its sovereignty within the boundary.[32] Moreover, Kwangmin Kim focused on the Qing's rule in Xinjiang. He argued that the local Qing administration required the Turkic *begs* to develop resources and raise military revenue when the *begs* seized silver from access to the Chinese market. Kim suggested that this economic relationship was the real reason that the Muslim *begs*, who were powerful in Muslim local society, were willing to submit their loyalty to the alien authority of the Qing Empire. This system was built on the collaboration between the Qing's capitalism and imperialism and local *begs*' economic demands based on the profitable international trade.[33] These scholars explicitly explained the cooperation between the empire and local powerful groups. In this dissertation I aim to use this approach, which has not yet been used in Taiwanese historiography.

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[32] Charles Patterson Giersch, *Asian borderlands: the transformation of Qing China's Yunnan frontier* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Jodi L. Weinstein, *Empire and Identity in Guizhou: Local Resistance to Qing Expansion* (Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 2014).

A subfield of imperial history—comparative imperial history—benefited the two studies' point of view. Comparative imperial history appeared in 1997 and was a product of the combination of the imperial turn in the 1990s and global history, the latter of which highlighted two methods—connectedness and comparativeness.[34] After 2001, 9/11 and the US invasion of the Middle East led scholars to think about the nature of America and how to study empires in different periods to better understand the imperial structures. Brokerage became a topic in the field of imperial studies.[35] In 2010, Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper proposed to focus on the people between the frontier and the central government.[36] Since then, increasing numbers of imperial studies have been centered on the intermediary system, brokerage, and agency.[37]

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[33] Kwangmin Kim, *Borderland Capitalism: Turkestan Produce, Qing Silver, and the Birth of an Eastern Market* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).

[34] Ann Stoler Laura and Frederick Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony," in Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler edit, *Tension of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 1-56.

[35] Durba Ghosh, "Another Set of Imperial Turns," *AHR*, (2012), p. 779; Peter C. Perdue, "Reflections on the Transnational and Comparative Imperial History of Asia: Its Promises, Perils, and Prospects," *Thesis Eleven* vol. 139, no. 1 (2017), pp. 129-144.

[36] Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 11, 13-14. There are other terms to describe these people to help the empire's rule, such as middleman, agent, and broker.

[37] In Karen Barkey's discussion, she points out that brokerage is a crucial way to understand imperial structure. She indicates that an empire is a flexible and lasting political organization to control economic and political network to maintain its ruling for a long time. An empire must have strategies and approaches, which were beyond a single law and ideology, to rule multiple ethnicities. An empire could utilize tolerance, assimilation, and exclusion to maintain differences within empire. These approaches and strategies must rely on privileged local elites. An empire negotiated with ruled to have their military or financial obedience. The central government shared authorizes and power with local powerful groups. In this sense, an empire could be understood as a political relationship of the power distribution between the central government and local elites.

Although Peter Perdue explored the West, Evelyn Rawski the Northeast, and Giersch the Southwest have placed the Qing within the context of comparative imperial history, only Giersch has focused on cultural brokers.[38] Thus far, no authors have applied the concept of brokerage to the research of Southeast China and Taiwan because of the belief that Taiwan is a part of the Chinese nation-state. However, the past scholarship has laid a concrete foundation for using this the concept of brokerage to explore the history of this region in late imperial China. The New Qing History and the comparative imperial history's broker-based focus will provide an opportunity to answer the questions raised earlier and place the integration of Taiwan into the Qing within a broader context.

Therefore, in this dissertation I aim to consider the four families as the empire's brokers because they helped the Qing conquer Taiwan, proposed policies to rule Taiwan, gained benefits from ruling Taiwan, dominated local society, were monitored by the empire, provided knowledge about the maritime world, and became the representatives who dealt with Taiwanese issues. From many perspectives, these four families were the Qing's brokers, so their conquests of Taiwan were an integral part of the Qing's expansionism toward the overseas world.

Brokerage is an important part of an empire. These brokers had intercultural, interlinguistic, inter-religious, and inter-economic ability to contribute to the exchange between the empire and borderland. In other words, a broker is a critical figure to understand the exchange of source and other items between two "societies" under a structure. See Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 9-21; K. Ekholm and J. Friedman, "”Capital" Imperialism and Exploitation in Ancient World System," in Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills edit, *The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 63; Yanna Yannakakis, *The Art of Being In-between: Native Brokers, Indian Identity, and Local Rule in Colonial Oaxaca* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), pp. 4. Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 2-3. Victor Lieberman, *Strange Parallel: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830, Volume 1: Integration on the Mainland*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 33.

[38] Evelyn S. Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp.97-101; Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).

1.3 Thesis and Chapter structure

In this dissertation, I argue that the four families, originally from peripheral areas, became the Qing's brokers because of their naval skills and knowledge of the overseas world. After they became brokers and helped the Qing handle issues in Taiwan, these brokers would simultaneously turn their focus from imperial tasks to their personal gains, including dominating their lineage and local society and building economic enterprises in Taiwan. The brokerage was not established in a one-way process from the top down but rather in a two-way cooperation and negotiation among the empire, brokers, and society. For over a century, these four families conquered Taiwan and stabilized the Qing's authority there in exchange for political and economic privileges given by the empire while they negotiated with the empire and society in the meantime.[39] By combining the Manchu-language sources and social materials collected from field research, I frame the integration of Taiwan into the Qing Empire's expansionism, which was achieved by the four families, under a broader perspective instead of the previous three primary perspectives. I aim to understand the Qing's imperial structure by analyzing its brokerage in the maritime borderland.

During the sixteenth century, the Chinese in Southern Fujian encountered ecological crises. Particular groups of people from the deltas of Southern Fujian could move to the peripheral areas to exploit more resources, including lands and woods, mainly because they belonged to lineages, especially certain prominent and long lineages. Belonging to a lineage usually symbolized that they were taxpayers protected by the Ming government. In contrast, people in the peripheral areas were suffering because they had to struggle with the ecological crises, lineages' exploitation, and the government's encroachment. Under such difficult circumstances, these people sometimes became agitators who threatened the social order. Coincidentally, at the same time, Western powers and Japanese pirates were seeking opportunities along the coast of China, so many of the people from the peripheral areas—the mountains as well as the coastal periphery—were lured by flourishing maritime activities, including piracy and trade. By the sixteenth century, these people from the periphery had unwittingly become the Chinese pioneers of the new maritime world.

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[39] The Qing Empire utilized these brokers as a means of contending with the variability and ambiguity of sovereignty by compiling cartography and descriptions. This matches Lauren Benton's arguement that the early modern empires relied on brokers to prove imperial legitimacy in its different geographic regions, such as oceans, islands, enclaves, and mountains. In Benton's mind, imperial sovereignty was territorially uneven and irregular across many European empires—which is also adepted for the case of the Qing's four broker families in Taiwan, and the intermediary figures helped to secure sovereignty, and that the geography of different regions determined the mode in which they were incorporated into imperial spheres of control. I think the four brokers could provide a suitable case to bring Qing Empire's sovereighty in Taiwan and seas under his context. See Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900* (Cambridge, 2010).

The growing maritime connection among powers in the 1620s met in Taiwan, which had not yet been occupied by any power. The Japanese, Chinese, Spanish, and Dutch all built their power, claimed parts of Taiwan, and collaborated with, or fought, each other. From Taiwan, these maritime powers usually turned out to be pirates who harassed the coast of Fujian. The Ming Dynasty viewed these multiple powers in Taiwan as similar to the situation on its northern frontier, where there were many barbarian and nomadic tribes which looked for opportunities to pay tributaries and trade with China. The Ming Dynasty, therefore, employed Zheng Zhilong, one of the peripheral people, as a broker in charge of handling the issue of Taiwan because he was the most experienced pirate and understood the maritime powers and Taiwan well. Zheng created a structure to, on the one hand, satisfy the Ming court, such as defeating the maritime powers, and, on the other hand, reap enormous benefits from the wars. After he satisfied the court, he participated in the social affairs of Southern Fujian, which was rare for a person from peripheral areas, and organized his family's lineage for many useful reasons, such as the right of taking examinations and being protected by the state laws. In other words, because of his professional skills in the maritime world, Zheng became the Ming's broker to operate a brokerage, which wielded influences on the state, society, and the family itself.

In this dissertation, brokerage is an informal institution operated and formed by the acts of the empire and brokers. This structure included many institutions, positions, and informal systems as a structure linking the empire and brokers together. In other words, maritime brokerage is a two-ways cooperation between the empire and brokers to aim to deal with the complex issues in Southeast China between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Zheng Zhilong's model of brokerage was replicable and adjustable. During the Ming–Qing transition, the Qing Empire adopted this brokerage but adjusted time after time. In the context of my study, I use the term brokerage to refer to Zheng Zhilong and all other brokers' acts of brokering rather than some formal institution called a brokerage. The Qing employed Huang Wu in 1656 and Shi Lang in 1662 as the brokers to handle the dynamic situation of maritime East Asia. The Qing Empire embedded its Inner Asian institutions into the brokers' model. The brokers enjoyed the privileges of the Inner Asian institutions, but they still practiced the Chinese social structure in the same way as Zheng Zhilong. In other words, after 1656, the Qing Empire and the brokers collaborated to create a brokerage, which mixed the Inner Asian institutions and Chinese social structure in Southern Fujian, to assist the Qing's ruling in Taiwan. This brokerage allowed these peripheral people to become influential and powerful brokers, ensured the Qing's rule in the maritime borderland, and generated impacts in many areas, including the ideologies, economy, and social organizations in local societies. This system endured until 1788, when the brokers no longer functioned well because they failed to overturn a rebellion led by their own subordinates and the Qing sent a Manchu army to quell the rebellion and terminate the brokerage.

The pervading idea of this dissertation stems from the concepts of brokerage and broker. I define brokerage as a structural position occupied by brokers who were cultural and military brokers simultaneously. This structural position was similar to an informal institution that is a production of the cooperation among brokers, empire, and societies. However, it was not necessary for the interests of broker, society, empire, and local communities to coincide, but they did sometimes conflict. In agreement with Daniel Richter's argument, a cultural broker is an individual among multiple connected powers that are connected to the network of political influence communities.[40] Yanna Yannakakis further suggested that the Indian intermediaries in the early modern Mesoamerican frontier were peripheral actors who served as cultural, economic, and legal brokers—because of their linguistic talent, cross-cultural sensibility, and sensitivity to the more subtle aspects of human communication—so that they could hold the colonial order in balance. The intermediaries of Mesoamerica, who learned to speak and write in Latin and Spanish and successfully petitioned the Crown to wear Spanish silks, carry a sword, and ride a horse, had to answer not only to their Spanish overlords but also to the people who legitimated their authority in the native society. However, these brokers' cross-cultural competence made their cultural and political loyalties suspect, and, in Yannakakis' words, "when situations went sour, they met closed doors, recrimination, legal sanction, or worse."[41] The four families that are the focus of this dissertation played more than the basic roles of cultural brokers. In fact, many cultural brokers also served as military brokers in an expanding empire toward the borderland. When the empire expanded, cultural interaction also occurred. These military brokers were recognized as terrible powers, but local communities still cooperated with them if their interests did not conflict.[42] As Karen Barkey suggested, a brokerage was where groups and institutions negotiated with state power. She further defined brokerage as a structural position in which an actor (broker) makes transactions and resource flows possible between two other social setting. Imperial state–periphery relationships were not direct relationships between state and individual subjects, but rather intermediate bodies, networks, and elites mediated the relationships.[43] This was the key to the success of the empire-building process. She argued that to maintain the dominance and durability of a brokerage, an empire needed to maintain legitimacy, diversity, and various resources through a stable relationship with brokers who could maintain compliance, resources, tributes, and military cooperation and ensure political coherence and stability.

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[40] Daniel K. Richter. "Cultural Brokers and Intercultural Politics: New York-Iroquois Relations, 1664-1701." *The Journal of American History* 75, no. 1 (1988): 40-67.

[41] Yanna Yannakakis, *The Art of Being In-between: Native Intermediaries, Indian Identity, and Local Rule in Colonial Oaxaca* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), pp. xiv, 2-7. Prasemjit Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 5.

In other words, the Qing's maritime brokerage was a structural position that brokers occupied, and this brokerage was produced by their acts and negotiated with the empire to help it control the area conquered under the empire's expansionism. These brokers were cross-cultural, legal, and linguistic groups. The Qing expanded through the use of many of the existing ideological and organizational tools, but with one added element—a brokerage of networks used as a tool that was lacking among other similarly emerging political formations.[44] The Qing's innovative manner was that the Inner Asian institution was used as a tool of brokerage, connecting networks rather than bringing closure and establishing boundaries.[45] The four families' major services included providing knowledge about the maritime world and lending their naval skills to conquer and maintain social order in Taiwan, which was integrated into the empire because of these families' efforts. Of course, they shared certain similarities with cultural brokers, such as possessing mastery of both languages. However, this was not their primary task. They were recruited from the territory under the control of the Qing Empire—Southern Fujian—and were asked to conquer a known but unconquered borderland—Taiwan. They were not only selected by the empire but also actively used the existing lineage system to cooperate with the empire on creating the model. This was not a top-down or one-way system because these families had to have held basic power before they were recruited. After they were selected, they had to turn their focus to society to attain acceptance. Although the process was slightly different, it is my belief that the maritime brokerage was a production of the interactions among the empire, society, and these families.

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[42] Lawrence Bragge, Ulrike Claas, and Paul Roscoe, "On the Edge of Empire: Military Brokers in the Sepik "Tribal Zone." American Ethnologist 33, no. 1(2006): 100-113.

[43] Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 1, 8-13.

[44] Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 25.

In Chapter 2, I analyze the scene. I argue that because of the Ming's policies and the geographical features that characterized Southern Fujian—a core, mountainous periphery to the west and a coastal periphery to the east—the people who became the future brokers moved to the peripheral areas because they encountered threats from the core. The threats included the ecological crisis. As opposed to the threats, growing maritime activities in the overseas world, including piracy and trade, were attractive forces, luring these people into sailing on the seas.

The new situation created the requirement for a brokerage to deal with Taiwan, which had been a globally and imperially connected zone. In the following chapters, I examine the individual brokers: the third and fourth chapters for the Zheng family; the fifth, sixth, and seventh for the Shi family; the seventh for the Lan family; and the eighth and ninth for the Huang family. In Chapter 3, I discuss the first broker, Zheng Zhilong, who was also the founder of this brokerage. I argue that Zheng established the standard of brokerage in the maritime borderland and thus laid the foundation for future brokers. Even after the Ming Dynasty collapsed, the Qing Empire still sought Zheng's service as a broker because he could help the Qing control and rule the unfamiliar region.

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[45] Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 25.

In Chapters 4 and 5, I concentrate on the period of the Ming–Qing transition and discuss the competitions among different commanders for the control of the brokerage left by Zheng Zhilong. Although Zheng Chenggong had gained control of the brokerage and accepted by the Qing, his disloyalty made the Qing Empire recruit its brokers. After Zheng Chenggong's conquest of Taiwan in 1662, the Qing needed naval commanders as new brokers. Even though they were knowledgeable about the overseas world, the naval commanders were bellicose and uncontrollable. Therefore, the Qing ministers decided to established the Zheng Regime in Taiwan as a tributary state, so the Qing abandoned the brokerage in Southern Fujian because the Zheng Regime might serve the finctions to replace the brokerage.

In Chapter 6, I introduce Shi Lang's brokerage. Shi Lang's conquest of Taiwan in 1683 created a new situation. As a broker, Shi colonized and dominated Taiwan by proposing policies and controlling militarily. He established his private plantations and held power in local societies, including Taiwan and Southern Fujian. In Taiwan, elites and traders acknowledged Shi's dominant role. Shi created a unique brokerage that was a combination of the Eight Banners system and lineage organization. This brokerage allowed the Qing court to guarantee the brokers' loyalty and functions as well as helping the Qing rule and understand Taiwan, the island "beyond the seas."

In Chapter 7, I focus on the conquest in 1721 and argue that the second generation had succeeded Shi's brokerage. I argue that the second generation of Shi and his generals inherited their achievement and quelled a rebellion to recover the Qing's authority in 1721. They followed Shi's pattern to continue their role and special status in Taiwan. The empire and the emperor also employed them as brokers to deal with Taiwan and the overseas world.

In Chapter 8, I examine Qianlong's bureaucratization and reactivation of the brokerage and argue that the Qianlong Emperor refused to follow his father and grandfather's strategy and planned to end the brokerage, instead trying to bureaucratize brokerage. However, his assigned admirals could not handle this region because they lacked skills, knowledge, and reputations. The Qianlong Emperor decided to reactivate the brokerage, but he only had two families to choose from because the others who satisfied the requirements had been Manchurized, which was one of the emperor's great achievements because Manchurization indicated a man who was closer to Inner Asian culture and skills rather than those of the maritime world. Huang Shijian from the Huang family ultimately became the new brokers and functioned well by following the pattern of previous pattern.

In Chapter 9, I focus on the Manchu's conquest of Taiwan in 1788 and argue that the brokers' brokerage had ended. I also argue that the brokers failed to quell the rebellion in 1788 because the brokers' followers were the ones who led this rebellion. The Qing sent brave Manchu commanders and armies to Taiwan, and they successfully defeated the rebellion. This event proved that the Qing did not need a brokerage and brokers because the most loyal Manchu army could replace them and function in their roles. The empire-building projects highlighted the Manchus' greatness and belittled the brokers' achievements. After 1788, the brokers disappeared into the maritime borderland.

2 The Setting: Southern Fujian and Taiwan

2.1 Introduction

The Chinese government had established authority over part of Southern Fujian by about the eighth century; however, by the seventeenth century, the Chinese Empire needed brokers to handle the new situation that had developed, and this continued into the eighteenth century. The Chinese Empire encountered a dramatic transition in Southern Fujian that suddenly required brokers. In this chapter, I argue that the sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century transition in maritime East Asia resulted in the residents of the peripheral areas of Southern Fujian meeting maritime powers such as Japan and the VOC. These encounters brought Taiwan into maritime East Asia, resulting in the Ming Dynasty’s demand for brokers to solve the potential challenges that gathered in Taiwan. The people living in the peripheral areas, who had been struggling to live in their hometowns, became the pioneers of the maritime world and masters of naval warfare, the ideal candidates for the Chinese Empire to use to cope with this new phenomenon in Southern Fujian.

The Ming government required brokers because the partnership between the people from the peripheral areas of Southern Fujian and the maritime powers caused Taiwan to play a more active part in the economic, political, and social life of the region as a whole. The Ming Dynasty had controlled Southern Fujian since 1367, but its control did not extend across the entire province. Its authority was limited to the Jinjiang and Jiulongjiang deltas, scarcely reaching into the mountainous periphery and withdrawing from the coastal periphery. The people who lived on the delta and government officials recognized the people in the peripheral areas as troublemakers, uncivilized, and even non-Chinese. The peripheral people not only were stigmatized by such labels but also suffered from ecological crises in the early sixteenth century, when the population outgrew its resources. The growing population and the ecological crises resulted in the intrusion of prominent lineages that targeted the peripheral areas, and the Ming government simultaneously expanded its authority over the mountainous and coastal peripheries by establishing new administrative districts.

In response to the lineages' exploitation, government encroachment, and ecological crises, many people in the peripheral areas answered the increasingly attractive call of the sea. The Ming government considered them pirates. The peripheral people's engagement with the maritime world, especially Taiwan, inspired the idea of forming a maritime brokerage. The need for brokers resulted from the lineages' exploitation, the encroachment of the government, and the ecological crises in the peripheral areas of Southern Fujian.

2.2 The Sandwiched Structure: Core-periphery in Southern Fujian

The Chinese Empire demanded a maritime brokerage in the seventeenth century because the peripheral people from Southern Fujian collaborated with foreign powers to bring Taiwan into maritime East Asia. The crucial question was why the peripheries appeared in Southern Fujian and what created them. I argue that the peripheral areas of Southern Fujian were a product of the Ming Chinese rule and the isolated geography of Southern Fujian. After the fourteenth century, the Ming government had abandoned its rule in the coastal areas and reduced its control of the mountainous areas because these geographic features created barriers against the access of the official authorities. The core periphery not only had institutional and geographic distinctions but also generated cultural and economic differences between them.

During the Ming period, geography and some Ming policies created a sandwiched structure in Southern Fujian. The deltas and populous cities near the Jiulong River of Zhangzhou and the Jin River of Quanzhou formed the core of Southern Fujian. Its two sides were the coastal and mountainous peripheries, in which the Ming did not establish firm authority. The enormous crescent-shaped mountains surrounded the west, and many islands and peninsulas bordered the east (see Figure 2-1). The mountains and seas created a natural barrier that limited people, especially Chinese, from going in and out. However, many reasons, including wars and disasters, encouraged increasingly more Chinese to cross the mountains to initiate large-scale colonization in the deltas. Even though increasing numbers of Chinese had settled in this region since at least the eighth century, the isolated geography resulted in significant cultural differences, including social structure, mores, and language, from other regions of China proper.[46] The geographic features thus shaped Southern Fujian into a relatively independent region.

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[46] *Qing Shizong shilu*, vol. 72, p. 1074; G*ongzhongdang Qianlongchao zouzhe* 宮中檔乾隆朝奏摺, Vol 5, p. 163. Chen Wenzhu 陳文燭, *Si'eryouyuan shiji, xuji*, vol. 13, p.7; *Tong'an xianzhi*, vol. 12, p. 23.

Figure 2-1. The sandwiched core-periphery structure of Southern Fujian. The red spots show the walled city and garrisoned forts under the Quanzhou prefecture. The green spots show the walled cities and garrisoned forts under the Zhangzhou prefecture. The blue spots are the hometowns of the four families. The red dotted lines represent the three different areas.


Ningyang
Dehua
Zhangping
Yongchun
Anxi
Hui'an
Longyan
Nan'an
Quanzhou
Chongwu
Tong'an
Changtai
Shijing
Xunhai
Gaopu
Nanjing
Fuquan
Zhangzhou
Xiamen
Pubian
Jinmen
Haicheng
Xiaoling
Pinghe
Zhangpu
Changxi
Zhenhai
Yunxiao
Liu'ao
Zhao'an
Tongshan
Xuanzhong
Nan'ao

In this dissertation I focus not on the core of Southern Fujian but on the peripheral areas because the four families, who became the future brokers between the Qing and the maritime world, were from these peripheral areas in the mountain or near the coast, although they moved to urban cities after they became the empire's brokers. The Huang and Lan families settled in the mountainous area of Zhangzhou, one of the two prefectures in Southern Fujian during late imperial China. The Zheng and Shi families resided in the infertile coastal area of Quanzhou, which was another prefecture. The mountainous and coastal peripheries, compared with the prosperous delta region in Southern Fujian, were relatively undeveloped and ungoverned. Although these four families were marginal during this period, their marginal status gave them a chance to establish contacts with the maritime world and helped them become the Chinese Empire's brokers. In addition, their ancestors' and families' experiences in the peripheral areas created demand. Therefore, the mountainous and coastal peripheries are my primary focus because the situation in the peripheral areas eventually brought the four families to prominence.

The deltas and the two cities, Zhangzhou and Quanzhou, were the most populous areas. However, the Ming rulers (1368–1644) abandoned their control of the coastal areas and did not expand their authority to the mountainous areas until the early sixteenth century, thus turning the mountainous and coastal areas of Southern Fujian, including the two populous cities, into peripheries. The first reason for this was the Ming policies regarding maritime trade and the Ming coastal defense system. Before the fourteenth century, the primary industry in this region was maritime trade. For centuries, Zhangzhou and Quanzhou were two of the most important international ports in the world. These two cities were also the largest settlements in this region and had been surrounded and protected by walls as early as the thirteenth century. However, the flourishing maritime trade was terminated after the fourteenth century by the new dynasty—the Ming. Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming Dynasty, had a vision of an ideal utopia, and maritime trade was not in his plan. He therefore banned maritime trade and prohibited any private ships from traveling overseas. In his mind, trade suggested massive mobility, and trade with the overseas world would result in uncertainties. Mobility and uncertainty could threaten his realm. Zhu Yuanzhang's policies regarding maritime activities were unchangeable laws in the Ming code. In other words, maritime activities were illegal during the Ming period, and Ming law conflicted with the ways inhabitants of these coastal areas lived.

Although the ban on traveling the seas had a major impact on the coast, the Ming system of coastal defense was the direct cause of the creation of the coastal periphery. To monitor people who intended to go overseas and to defend against harassment by foreign powers, the Ming established five maritime forts and a series of *weisou* castles as a line from northern Fujian to Southern Fujian. At the very beginning, many of the forts or castles were located on islands and the coastline. However, the Ming government soon moved the forts, castles, and other coastal defense strongholds from the islands and coastlines to the hinterland. This action reflects how the Ming withdrew their control, step by step, from the sea to the shore—and eventually to the hinterland.[47]

Additionally, although the Chinese had settled in these small, barren islands since at least the thirteenth century, the Ming government emptied the islands, retrieved their officials, and drove the Chinese out. In addition to the military strongholds, the government moved people, armies, and all facilities back to the hinterland of Southern Fujian.[48] The Zheng family's hometown, Shijing, was a good example. During the Mongol Yuan period, a force had regularly garrisoned Shijing as a township because it was a famous coastal town and could defend the hinterland, especially main cities such as Nan'an and Quanzhou. However, after the Ming government launched its ban on the seas, the Ming moved the garrisoned force to Tong'an, which was located farther from the coast than Shijing's location.[49] These two significant policies created a narrow area along the coastline that was not under the Mings' authority. The absence of authority does not indicate that there were no inhabitants left; many people still lived there, but they were sometimes identified as the "ungoverned" and "pirates." Therefore, before the sixteenth century, the Ming's authority was limited by an invisible boundary, and the region beyond this boundary became the coastal periphery, including some coastal regions and islands.

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[47] Huang Zhongqing, *Mingdai haifang de shuizhai yu youbing—Zhe Min Yue yanhai daoyu fangwei de jianzhi yu jieti* (Yilan: Xueshu jiangzhu jijin, 2001).

[48] He Mengxing, "Xidao jinghai: lun Mingchu Fujian de "xudi ximin" cuo shi," *Xingda lishi xuebao*, no. 22 (2010), pp. 9、13–14、17–18. *Ming Taizhong shilu*, vol. 27, p. 498; *DaMing luli, binglu*, vol. 15, pp. 6–11; Wang Rigen, "Mingdai haifang jianshe yu wokou, haizei de chisheng," *Zhongguo haiyang daxue xuebao (she hui ke xue ban)*, no. 4 (2004), pp. 13–18; He Mengxing, *Wuyu shuizhai: yige Mingdai Minhai shuishi zhongzhen de guancha* (Taipei: Lantai chubanshe, 2006), pp. 11–12.

The coastal area was a periphery because governmental authority was absent. The mountainous area could be considered another periphery in Southern Fujian because the Ming government did not actively rule the mountainous areas of that area in the early period. During the Ming period, although the mountainous areas were theoretically under the Ming's counties and two prefectures, the Ming did not establish any governmental facilities in the mountainous areas before the fourteenth century. Instead, the distance between these mountainous areas and the locations of the counties might be more than 50 miles—in very inconvenient rugged mountain terrain. This inaccessible feature was perhaps the primary reason Ming authority rarely entered this region.[50] Thus, rather than seeking the government's protection and helping with specific issues, the inhabitants of the mountainous areas usually relied on self-protection. They settled in intermountain basins; people did not live in clustered villages but rather were spread over the mountains.[51] Without an active governmental power and with relatively undeveloped transportation, people in this area had to defend themselves from dangers, including bandits.[52]

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[49] *BaMin tongzhi*, vol. 80, p. 12.

[50] Tang Lizong, Zai daoqu yu zhengqu zhijian: Mingdai Min Yue Gan Xiang jiaojie de zhixu biandong yu difang xingzheng yanhua (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 2002).

[51] *Ningyang xianzhi*, vol. 1, p. 2.

[52] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 14.

Social disorder was the most critical issue in this area. After the late fifteenth century, the Ming state had gradually begun to expand its influence into the mountainous periphery by building walled cities and new administrative districts to address the increased social disorder that threatened the Ming's authority in Southern Fujian.[53] For example, the hometown of the Huang family, Pinghe (平和), which literally means "peace and harmony," was assigned by the Ming to be the military colony (*Juntun*, 軍屯) of Zhangpu, and people in military households were in charge of cultivating and producing food for the soldiers.[54] However, farmers rarely produced food in this area, which was not adequately controlled by the Ming authority, so many rebellions occurred. In 1518, Wang Shouren (王守仁), also known as Wang Yangming (王陽明), whose neo-Confucian ideology had been popular during the middle Ming period, quelled local military revolts.[55] After he quelled this rebellion, he established Pinghe as a new county. When Pinghe became a county, specific lineages, such as the Zeng (曾), collaborated with the state authority to select the location of the governmental facilities. These facilities eventually were set in Jiofeng, which was the hometown of the Zeng and other lineages.

What is noteworthy is that the establishment of Pinghe did not indicate that the Ming government controlled the periphery. Instead, many mountainous areas of Southern Fujian remained outside Ming authority. For instance, the Huang family's hometown, which was far from the walled city of Pinghe, was still an ungoverned area overflowing with social disorder. Moreover, during the mid-sixteenth century, because of the deep valleys and dense forests in the mountainous areas, bandits frequently looted and hid in the area; as a result, officials from Pinghe had to regularly lead a troop to this area to confront the bandits. Officials suggested building a new county in this area, Ningyang (寧洋).[56] Thus, the Ming kept expanding their authority to the mountainous areas, or the periphery.

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[53] For instance, because of the invasion of Japanese pirates in Dehua (德化), a walled city was built in this region. In the mid-fifteenth century, inhabitants proposed building a new county in Longyan (龍巖) because it was so far from where they lived to the administrative center. The government approved and established Zhangping (漳平) county in 1470. See *Quanzhou fuzhi*, vol. 4, p. 11; *Zhangping xianzhi*, vol. 1, p. 4.

[54] According to the gazetteer, there were 1704 households, and 480 of them were military households. See *Pinghe xianji*, vol. 6, pp. 1–2.

[55] Because Pinghe was established by Wang Yangming, a representative of neo-Confucianism, neo-Confucianism under Wang Yangming became the most crucial doctrine in Pinghe. In the city temple of Pinghe, Wang Yangming was deified as a local god. Neo-Confucianism's perspective challenged the court and increased "localist turn" to some degree. Peter Kees Pol, "'The 'Localist Turn' and 'Local Identity' in Late Imperial China," *Late Imperial China*, vol. 24, no. 2 (2003), p. 4.

In sixteenth-century China, ecological crises were a nationwide issue. According to gazetteers, in addition to the presence of tigers in human settlements, there were other disasters in Southern Fujian after the fifteenth century (see Figure 2-2).[57] During this period human activities might have caused more severe crises. Figure 2-2 indicates the positive correlation between floods and the presence of tigers, not only in the mountainous areas but also on islands, including Taiwan. According to studies, the presence of tigers in human settlements usually results from human activities and deforestation that destroy the tiger habitats, so tigers have no choice but to enter human areas to look for food.[58] The Lan family's story illustrates such a relationship between human activities and ecological crises. The Lan family settled in the mountainous periphery of Zhangzhou in a remote forested village in the mountains. Around the fifteenth century, tigers frequently appeared in the Lan family’s settlements. “Tiger” became a critical element in the Lan family’s familial legend because the tiger reflected the crisis faced by the Lan family after the middle Ming period. In one story a Lan family member had killed a tiger that ruined a temple in his village and shared the tiger meat with others. Thus, as the ecological crisis became more severe, more land was cultivated by human beings, more tigers appeared in human settlements, and more accounts of the tensions between tigers and humans were recorded in social materials.

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[56] *Ningyang xianzhi*, vol. 1, p. 2.

[57] Many types of disasters occurred in Southern Fujian and Taiwan. Snowstorms frequently occurred in Southern Fujian; other disasters included famine, drought, and disease. Between 1602 and 1603, when a Ming commander landed in Taiwan to eliminate pirates, it was snowing in tropical Taiwan. Guo Yuanchung (郭元春) recounted that when the Ming troops arrived in Taiwan, "it was winter, and it was frigid. General Shen looked around and saw the giant wave[s] and snow everywhere." See Shen Yourong, *Minhai zenyan*, p. 23.

[58] Robert Marks suggested that tigers required a large forested territory to survive, and the growing population deforested to cultivate on the mountainous and hilly areas in Southern Fujian. In this sense, the many records regarding the appearance of tigers in the settlements suggest that human activities had intruded into the habitat of tigers. See Robert Marks, *Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Lan Dingyuan, *Luzhou chuji*, vol. 7, pp. 31–32, "xing xu," p. 2; *Zhangpu xianji*, Vol 22, pp. 48–49. This situation occurred not only in Southern Fujian but also in Taiwan because the Chinese commander never went to the hills or mountains in Taiwan; the Ming soldiers observed many tigers. *Liuqiu yu Jilongshan*, p. 91

Figure 2-2 The record of a snowstorm in Fujian and Taiwan and the correlation between floods and tiger appearances



When people from the core and periphery encountered ecological crises, the botanical colonization into which the landscape was transformed began. During the sixteenth century, the growing population in China and ecological crises occurred almost simultaneously. For centuries, Southern Fujian relied strongly on grain imports from other regions because of the shortage of land.[59] However, the prominent lineages in the deltas needed resources to solve the issues they faced, so they sought to acquire the resources of the peripheral areas. For instance, they funded and operated new irrigation systems to transform unusable lands in the coastal areas into arable land and deforested the mountains to obtain resources.[60]

The ecological crises were the result of the botanical colonization and landscape changes, which featured Scott's discussion about the interaction between being stateless, the expansionary state, and issues of identity. The best example still lies in the Lan family, who were labeled the *She* people by the delta Chinese. Han Chinese in the core areas usually perceived people in the peripheral areas as ethnic minorities or uncivilized. An essential reason the Chinese would create such a label was how rarely people from the peripheral areas, especially the mountainous periphery, took the examinations, which were a standard used to determine someone's degree of civilization. Unfortunately, the Lan members did not have the right to take the examinations because they were ungoverned. To take the examinations, members had to register their households in other villages and families.

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[59] According to a statistic, each individual in Fujian had only 0.3 acres of land in 1766, compared with Jiangsu's 0.5 and Guangdong's 0.8. Philip Kuhn*, Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Time* (New York: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2009). "Zhangzhou and Quanzhou of the Fujian province lean on mountains, surrounded by sea, lacked plains, and filled with the population." Another record says, "Fujian did not have enough fields for cultivation, so people squashed lands between the mountain and ocean to cultivate. However, it still relies on the supply from other provinces even though it harvested." See Ding Yuejian, *ZhiTai bigao lu* (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1958), vol. 2, pp. 171–172; Dong Yingju, *Chongxiang ji*, vol. 19, pp. 40–41.

[60] For instance, a gazetteer recorded that the dominant lineages irrigated and cultivated lands on the coastal periphery and deforested the upper rivers on the mountainous periphery. See *Quanzhou fuzhi*, vol. 3, pp. 1–2; Gu Menggui, *Youzhui lu*, vol. 5, p. 15.

Such a distinctive identity also grew out of the ecological crises in the mountainous periphery. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the growing population in the mountainous areas resulted in deforestation in the upper river area, which might have directly caused flooding in the lower river area. The earth in the mountainous periphery, the so-called mountainous fields, was also fertile in Southern Fujian, but the limited arable land could not feed a growing population.[61] Deforestation could help create more arable land. In these deforested areas, the grain produced was called the rice of *She* (畬稻) by the delta Chinese because the grain was grown by the *She* people, who were identified as the "others" in the mountainous periphery; the Lan family is considered this ethnicity to this day.[62] This ethnicity is categorized by the government as ungoverned people in the mountainous periphery who migrated to this region during the thirteenth century. In the late Ming period, many ethnographical writings emphasized that these people (no matter whether their ethnic origin was Han Chinese) shared special and unique culture and tradition with Han Chinese as descendants of Pan Hu (槃瓠); thus, the category of *She* shifted from a ruling category during the thirteenth century to an ethnic category during the late Ming.[63] They might have spoken the Hakka dialogue, and during the sixteenth century, many of them might have gone overseas, perhaps to Manila, to become laborers.[64] In this situation, the Lan family may have been perceived as *She* people and may have experienced overseas activities during the sixteenth century.

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[61] *Quanzhou fuzhi*, vol. 5, p. 6.

[62] *Quanzhou fuzhi*, vol. 3, p. 19. According to the *minzu* (nationality, 民族) category in the People's Republic of China, the *She* people (畬) are the nineteenth most populous nationality. The population of the *She* people is about 710,000 and exists mainly in Fujian, Guangdong, and Zhejiang.

[63] See Li Renyuan, "She ming zhijian: diguo wanqi Zhongguo dongnan shanqu de guojia zhili yu zuqun fenglei," *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan* 91, no. 1 (2020), pp. 81–137; Zhuang Jifa, *Xie Sui zhigongtu Manwen tushuo jiaozhu* (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1989), pp. 186–189. In certain places, these *She* communities were authorized to manage themselves and paid tribute. See Qu Dajun, *Guangdong xinyu*, vol. 7, pp. 243–244. There are other features: in 1984, an investigation showed that members of the Lan lineage would hang up a figure of a dog as they worshiped their ancestors. Additionally, when the Lan lineage worshipped their ancestors, they would use their fingers to press a symbol of dog feet into their food. The Lan lineage did not use paper money when they worshipped their ancestors. They worshipped and respected dogs and dressed in white for weddings. Moreover, they did not worship Chen Yuanguang, because Chen was the representative who led the Han Chinese to cultivate Zhangzhou and eliminate ethnic minorities who were the *She* people's ancestors. See Lan Rongqin, *Zhangpu Lanshi Zhongyutang yuan yu liu* (Zhangpu: Zhangpuxian Lanshi zumiao Shiyi Zhongyutang guanli weiyuanhui, 2009), pp. 165–166.

Indeed, the Lan family was the only one among the four families identified as another ethnic group. However, ultimately, the distinctive identity was tied to geography. That is, the people in the delta during the Ming period identified the people in the mountainous and coastal areas as uncivilized and social troublemakers. Gazetteers suggested that officials and elites warned that miasma filled the mountainous areas that could cause malaria, especially during the summer. This stereotype had a major effect. For example, officials in the peripheral areas observed that people liked to pray instead of asking for help from physicians when they had malaria or other diseases. For the Ming officials in the mountainous areas, this was a sign of the uncivilized characteristics of the people of the mountainous areas.[65] One Ming account described the mountainous and coastal peripheries as uncontrollable.[66] Moreover, accounts indicated that bandits were everywhere in the coastal periphery of Southern Fujian.[67] If we believe that people in the deltas saw the peripheral people as uncivilized and social troublemakers, such as bandits and pirates, then the four families all shared such distinctive identity. The Huang, Shi, and Zheng families all lived in areas outside the Ming authority and participated in businesses that created social disorder, such as trading overseas; they also lived in peripheral areas and gathered in private castles.

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[64] Chen Zonlin (Chen Zongren), “Chinese origins of the Boxer Code: The Xaque illustration and Fujianese knowledge,” *Journal of Monsoon Asia Studies*, no. 3 (2016), pp. 33–65.

[65] A record divided Quanzhou into two parts. This record described prominent lineages and civilized ideologies that dominated Nan’an, Hui’an, Quanzhou, and Tong’an. By contrast, An’xi, Yongchun, and Dehua were immersed in miasma and located between mountains. See *Quanzhou fuzhi*, vol. 3, pp. 55–59. Officials in these areas observed that people would like to pray instead of asking for help from physicians when they had malaria or other diseases. See *Ningyang xianzhi*, vol. 2, p. 19.

[66] Chen Wenzhu, *Si’eryouyuan shiji xu ji*, vol. 13, p. 7.

[67] *Tong’an xianzhi*, vol. 12, p. 23.

There are links between the distinctive identities of those who lived in the peripheries and those who lived in the core areas. Even though many people from the peripheral areas were not involved in violent businesses, they were still stereotyped as "uncivilized" bandits or *She* people. Many examples mentioned have illustrated this, such as the Lan's uncivilized status and the rice of *She*. Indeed, it is likely that the deltas and cities were usually considered the centers of human civilization, where the governmental facilities, agricultural development, cultural center, and commercial core were situated. In fact, the two most populous cities, Zhangzhou and Quanzhou, were not the centers of Confucian culture for the Chinese settlements in Southern Fujian; instead, Confucian culture germinated in the peripheral areas in Fujian. Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130–1200), the most important neo-Confucian scholar after the twelfth century, taught his doctrines in the mountainous and coastal areas rather than in cities.[68] This is consistent with Fernand Braudel's argument about the Mediterranean world: the mountains and hills do not necessarily have to be peripheral and barbarian, but they could have been the birthplace of culture. In other words, it is not fair to assume that the "Chinese culture" was diffusing from the delta to the mountains, coasts, and islands; although it is perhaps true that the cities might be more urbanized and populous, the mountains and coast were not undeveloped. Their distinctive identity was a way for the people in the deltas to label the people in the geographical periphery.[69]

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[68] Zhu Xi taught in the mountainous area of Fujian rather than in Southern Fujian, but he had taught in Jinmen, a small island in Southern Fujian. See Wing-tsit Chan, *Chu Hsi: Life and Thought* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1987).

[69] Unfortunately, until now, I have not found any sources written by the Lan family that describe their self-identity during the Ming period. Thus, descriptions of their distinctive identity in this dissertation rely on others' views of the Lan family.

I want to highlight James Scott's study: his argument could apply to the relationship between the core and periphery in Southern Fujian during the Ming Dynasty. Scott described the encounter between expansionary states that tried to bring self-governing people under their routine administration in Zomia, which includes Southeast Asia and the southwest Chinese highlands. Scott argued that the expansion into stateless areas in Zomia usually involved botanical colonization, in which the landscape was transformed—by deforestation, drainage, and irrigation—to accommodate crops, settlement patterns, and systems of administration familiar to the state and the colonists.[70] This situation might describe the sandwiched structure. In the delta area, Chinese people from the deltas often formed lineages. These lineages exploited resources in the periphery because of ecological crises and growing populations. The distinctive identity, deforestation, and encroachments from the core of Southern Fujian were fitting into Scott's argument in certain degree. In Southern Fujian, the government and prominent lineages in the delta were the core, and the residents in the mountains and coastal areas were the stateless area. People categorized the ethnic and cultural differences between the core and peripheral people.

Therefore, the geography of Southern Fujian and Ming policies created two tracks that circumscribed authority. During the Ming period, the deltas were filled with walled cities, taxpayers, governed inhabitants, official soldiers, agricultural industry, and governmental facilities. By contrast, in the coastal area, the Ming had abandoned islands and certain coastal areas and tried to render them uninhabited, but many people still settled there. Of course, they violated the Ming policies, so the inhabitants were regarded as pirates and social creators of disorder. Similarly, the hills and mountains beside the plains were geographically difficult to access, so the Ming had loose or no governmental facilities and military forces there. In this area, similar to the coastal area, people were ungoverned and were perceived as socially disorderly. Thus, Ming policies and the isolated geography created a mountainous periphery and a coastal periphery in Southern Fujian. This sandwiched structure was critical because the Ming government had begun to reclaim its authority and increase its influence in the peripheries. This action had a huge impact on the inhabitants in the peripheral areas, which will be discussed in the next section.

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[70] James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upload Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 3–12.

2.3 Where Should They Go after the Lineage and State Encroachment? "Pirates" Assemble.

It was a blessing in disguise for the people in the peripheral areas, who might or might not have been suffering from the lineages' encroachment and ecological crises, to decide to join the growing maritime activities in East Asia. Their participation gave them two unexpected yet significant advantages to prepare them for their future role as brokers. They had experienced multicultural interactions and honed their skills in naval warfare. These advantages, which resulted from their being a gear in the maritime engine, gave them an edge over others in Southern Fujian. In this section, I argue that regardless of the crises that came with living in the peripheral areas during the fifteenth century, the growing maritime activities, including smuggling and piracy, enticed enormous numbers of people to sail the seas and gave them experience in dealing with the sea.

Certainly not everyone in the peripheral areas suffered from the same situation and reacted the same way after the middle Ming. However, the ecological crises, lineage encroachments, and the Ming's administrative expansion occurred alongside growing social disorder. Some were suffering. For instance, in Shijing, where the Ming had withdrawn their military force in the early years, the Zheng family had lived for centuries. In the sixteenth century, this township was facing harassment from piracy and was once occupied by pirates.[71] During this period, according to their family stories, when the pirates harassed and occupied this township, the Zheng family did not leave their hometown, but participated in maritime trade.[72] Although the Zheng family would not describe the details of what their ancestors did in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they must have been smugglers and pirates because, as mentioned, maritime trade was illegal according to the Ming code.

Beginning in the sixteenth century, piracy was one of the two most significant issues for the Ming.[73] Chinese piracy was small in scale in the sixteenth century, so most Chinese pirates joined Japanese pirates. These pirates grew to harass coastal China on a large scale. In 1513 the Portuguese arrived on the coast of Guangdong, but in 1521 the Ming defeated the Portuguese there. The battle drove the Portuguese northward to the coast of Zhejiang province. After 1523 Japanese pirates harassed the southeast coast, and this period became the Jiajing wokou period.[74] European arrivals and Japanese piracy resulted in a booming period of piracy. Around the 1540s the Portuguese cooperated with Chinese traders and Japanese pirates to build Shuangyu island in Zhejiang into an international trade port. Shuangyu had been abandoned by the government during the early Ming period. Although the original purpose of Shuangyu was trade, these smugglers eventually became pirates and harassed coastal villages. The Ming government had to eliminate the illegal forces on this island. Thus, in 1548 the Ming captured and destroyed this smuggler stronghold. In 1557 the Portuguese rented Macau from the Ming government to be used as a trading post. Local Ming officials accepted the Portuguese proposal but hid the truth: officials told the central government that the Portuguese were temporarily settling in Macau and would pay tribute. The Ming government must have known about the officials' lie because the government was aware of the potentially profitable trade that could eliminate the growing fiscal deficit. Therefore, the Ming soon established a Macau-Guangzhou system to deal with maritime trade. This system allowed foreign ships to enter Macau, and traders, including Chinese and foreigners, participated in the commercial fair in Guangzhou every year.[75]

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[71] Frequently piracy and social disorder caused schools to be abandoned and collapse. *Jinjiang xianzhi*, vol. 4, pp. 15–16; *BaMin tongzhi*, vol. 44, p. 23; *Minsu*, vol. 9, p. 29.

[72] Li Gunagchao, "Lun Shijing Zhengshi jiazu yu Zheng Zhilong zaoqi haiyang huodong tanxi," conference paper presented in "Zheng Zhilong International Conference 2019," Tamkang University, April 26–27, 2019.

[73] Although the European definition of piracy is illegitimate armed robbery at sea within an imperial context, the idea of piracy was different in the historical Chinese context, especially during the period of late imperial China. Reid implied that people who participated in maritime activities were "barbarians" or "bandits," and the people staying home were civilized. Piracy could be referred to as a maximalist category, potentially including almost all the international maritime commerce of the world and its sons outside China. Pirates in Chinese sources could be mariners, rebels at sea, barbarian people from the seas, and Chinese overseas. See Anthony Reid, "Violence at Sea: Unpacking 'Piracy' in the Claims of States over Asian Seas," in *Elusive Pirates Pervasive Smugglers: Violence and Clandestine Trade in the Greater China Seas*, edited by Robert J. Anthony (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University, 2010), pp. 15–27.

[74] Wu Daxin, "Ming Jiajing wokou yanjiu de huigu," *Mingdai yanjiu tongxun*, no. 2 (1999), pp. 91–106.

Although the Ming successfully defeated the pirates in Zhejiang and built a commercial system for the Portuguese, the piracy did not end. Chinese pirates became dominant, and Japanese and European pirates became subordinated. These Chinese pirates usually nested in the coastal periphery where the Ming authority did not exist, such as Yuegang, Penghu, Taiwan, and other coastal islands.[76] From Zhejiang province to the boundary of Guangdong and Fujian, the Chinese collaborated with or pretended to be Japanese pirates because of the Chinese fear of the brutal Japanese pirates.[77] Instead of plundering the periphery, Chinese pirates cooperated with the bandits in the mountainous areas to invade the hinterland, including the hometowns of the

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[75] Zheng Yongchang, *Laizi haiyang de tiaozhan: Mingdai haimao zhengce yanbian yanjiu* (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 2008), pp. 174–183, 185–186; Zhang Bincun, "Shiliu shiji zhou shan qun dao de zou si mao yi," in Zhongguo haiyang fazhan shilun wenji bianji weiyuanhui ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji* 1 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1984), pp. 71–95.

[76] This is what scholars called the tendency of nesting externally because Chinese pirates usually established their nests in places outside China's authority. They went back to China only for piracy and smuggling. See Zhang Zengxin, "Mingji dongnan haikou yu chaowai fengqi 1567–1644," in Zhang Yanxian, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji* 3 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1988), pp. 313–344.

[77] For instance, according to a Ming account, seven of ten "Japanese pirates" were actually pretended by Chinese imposters. *Ming Shizhong shilu*, vol. 403, p. 7062.

Huang and Lan families.[78] To address the piracy in Fujian, especially Southern Fujian, the Ming government built walled cities in the core of Southern Fujian, such as in Hui'an, and in the mountainous periphery, such as in Yongchun and Dehua. In addition, the Ming revised their coastal defense system. In the 1560s the Ming government pushed the maritime forts toward the sea to defend the deep-sea areas instead of the hinterland and established new coastal defense systems to garrison and cruise the offshore areas.[79] The most representative action was the establishment of Haicheng in 1567, which had once been the base of twenty-four smugglers and pirates.[80] The Ming government built a new system to allow the Chinese to legally trade overseas from this port.

As mentioned, the distinctive identity, botanical colonization, and ecological crises all affected the society of the peripheral areas. People in the peripheral areas could either be governed and register their households under Ming rule or they could fight against the newcomers and threats. The latter choice always came with massive social disorder. To handle this situation, the Ming began to expand their authority to the difficult-to-access mountainous periphery and the abandoned coastal periphery. After the fifteenth century, the increasing uprisings and unstable social order forced the Ming to respond, so the government decided to expand its influence into the peripheral areas, which had been either ignored or abandoned in the early Ming Dynasty. The Ming's expansion toward the peripheral areas functioned in two ways: building walled cities and establishing new administrative divisions. First, before the sixteenth century, walled cities only existed in the Southern Fujian delta and military and maritime strongholds. During the fifteenth century, the Ming built walled cities in the mountainous periphery, such as Yongchun, and the coastal periphery, such as Hui'an.[81] From the late fifteenth century to the late sixteenth century, the Ming government expanded toward the coastal and mountainous peripheries simultaneously because of social disorder in those areas. In the coastal areas, the Ming established a new county in Yuegang (moon port, 月港) because this port had been the base for smugglers and pirates. The new administrative division was called Haicheng, which refers to cleaning the ocean.[82] Thus, the Mings' expansion not only occurred in the mountainous periphery but also in the coastal periphery, and the expansion toward the abandoned coastal periphery was strongly associated with the prosperous maritime activities after the sixteenth century, which will be covered in the next section. The cases of the Lan and Huang families were the most prominent. Compared with the prominent lineages that exploited resources from the periphery, the economic structure in the peripheries was relatively fragile, so they had to find a new approach to survival: violence. People in the peripheries became bandits and pirates. Therefore, around the 1560s, the Ming extended their authority and defenses toward the sea by adjusting the policies established in the fourteenth century through administrative expansion. Meanwhile, the people in peripheral areas joined the growing maritime activities.

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[78] For instance, Xu Chaoguang, Wu Ping, invited Japanese pirates to Chaozhou and the mountainous areas. The mountainous bandits also invited Japanese pirates to harass the mountainous periphery. See *Zhangzhou fuzhi*, vol. 47, pp. 25–26; *Jiaying zhouzhi*, vol. 31, p. 16.

[79] *Ming Shizhong shilu*, vol. 526, pp. 8571–8575; Huang Zhongqing, *Mingdai haifang de shuizhai yu youbing—Zhe Min Yue yanhai daoyu fangwei de jianzhi yu jieti* (Yilan: Xueshu jiangzhu jijin, 2001).

[80] *Minsu*, vol. 30, pp. 1–2; In fact, Zhu Wan had suggested building a new administrative district in Yuegang and rearranged Anhai under the control of Nan'an. The government of Nan'an was moved to Anhai to control the coastal area. See *Ming Shizhong shilu*, vol. 347, pp. 6285–6289.

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[81] *Hui'an xianzhi xubu*, attached volume, no page; *Quanzhou fuzhi, vol.* 4, p. 10.

[82] The Ming government built a new system to allow Chinese to legally trade overseas from this port. See Li Jinming, "Mingchao zhongye Zhangzhou Yuegang de xingqi yu Fujian de haiwai yimin," in Tang Xiyong, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji* 10 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2008), pp. 65–100; Chen Zonlin (Chen Zongren), "Wanming 'Yuegang kaijin' de xushi yu shiji: jianlun tongbo, zhengshangshui yu Fujian junqing zhi zhuanbian," in Tang Xiyong ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji* 10, pp. 101–142; He Qiaoyuan, *Min su*, vol. 30, pp. 1–2; In fact, Zhu Wan had suggested building a new administrative district in Yuegang and rearranged Anhai so that it was under the control of Nan'an. The government of Nan'an was moved to Anhai to control the coastal area. See *Ming Shizhong shilu*, vol. 347, pp. 6285–6289.

By participating in maritime activities, people from the peripheral areas, including the Shi and Zheng families, developed their understanding of the maritime world. They learned foreign languages, including Japanese, European, Southeast Asian, and Austronesian languages.[83] Additionally, they began to accumulate knowledge about sailing and navigation to different regions, such as Ryukyu, Southeast Asia, Japan, and Taiwan.[84] For instance, members of the Zheng and Shi families had lived overseas, including in Manila, Japan, Macau, and Taiwan. They had married non-Chinese people, and these intercultural marriages were not exceptional or surprising in these families.[85] As mentioned, the Lan family had also participated in maritime activities. These family members maintained close connections with their hometowns, even though they had settled overseas.[86] Therefore, intercultural marriage, knowledge of navigation, linguistic ability, and the peripheral people's "maritime turn" were all advantages they brought to their role as the Chinese Empire's future brokers.[87]

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[83] Ang Kaim (Weng Jiayin), "Qianshou "khan-chhiu" laikan Taiwan shijieshi: cong Taiwan lishi guanyongyu lun dafulao wenhuaquan gainian," *Taiwanshi yanjiu* 13, no. 2 (2006), pp. 1–31; Ang Kaim (Weng Jiayin), "Shiqi shiji de Fulao haishang," Tang Xiyong ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji*, vol. 7 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1999), pp. 59–92.

[84] See Zhou Wanyao, "Shan zai yaobo bilang zhong─Zonglun Mingren de Taiwan renshi," *Taida lishi xuebao*, no. 40 (2007), pp. 93–148.; Chen Zonlin (Chen Zongren), "Qianwang dongxiyang: 'Yunei xingshi tu' jiexi ji qidi yuanzheng zhi xiangxiang," *Taiwanshi yanjiu* 19, no. 3 (2012), pp. 1–46; Chen Zonlin (Chen Zongren), "Mingchao wanqi 'Fujian haifang tu' de huizhi ji qi shidai beijing," *Taiwanshi yanjiu*, 23, no. 3 (2016), pp. 1–42; Shen Yourong, *Minhai zenyan*, pp. 29–30.

[85] Take the Zheng lineage as an example. Zheng Zhilong was the eleventh generation of this lineage. Although he married a Japanese, his wife in this genealogy was described as a Chinese. It is therefore possible that some of the members married non-Chinese, but the intercultural marriages did not show up in the genealogy. However, there are still cases in which the genealogy clearly states, "This man married a woman from another state (外邦)." It is also noteworthy that the genealogy did not use any term meaning "barbarian" in describing these women. See *Zheng Chenggong zupu sizong*, pp. 33, 53, 69, 78, 117, 128.

[86] See *Xunhai Shishi dazong zupu*, pp. 549 and 1135. The Public Union of the Sy family, who traveled in the Philippines, *Return to celebrate the completion of General Sy Lang's memorial hall and grand ancestral hall* (Manila, the Philippines: The Public Union of Sy family who traveled in the Philippines, 1986), 63–65. Philip A. Kuhn, *Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Times* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 87–97.

[87] In recent works, Chen Zongren argued that "these people should not be regarded as Chinese, but they should be identified in a maritime context as 'tn̂g-lâng' (Tang people in Hokkien pronunciation, 唐人)." This idea would adequately describe the peripheral people, who were the majority of tn̂g- lâng and who shared experiences and languages in maritime East Asia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See Chen Zonlin (Chen

Although no one wants to take risks, many still became pirates and developed naval skills. As pirates, they came into conflict against local militias and Ming navy. They not only knew how to fight on the seas but also how to build siege weapons and tools to capture walled cities.[88] Moreover, they learned to operate Western artillery. They became the first group to master artillery in China and invented the creative moving cannon carrier.[89] The Huang, Lan, Zheng, and Shi families all handed down legends that their ancestors participated in the war against pirates as well as the Japanese and amassed experiences and skills fighting on the seas. Therefore, these peripheral people not only increased their naval warfare skills during this period of fighting against pirates but also became the first group to master advanced Western weaponry.

Therefore, if the ecological crises and other situations were the push factor, the growing interpolitical maritime activities, including trade, cultural exchange, and piracy, were the pull factor to lure peripheral people to leave their hometowns and head out to sea. This movement gave them two crucial and distinctive skills: the experience of the maritime world during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and naval warfare skills. These two abilities became unique advantages that helped the Chinese Empire when the most crucial transition occurred in the 1620s—the integration of Taiwan into maritime East Asia—and this transition was why the Ming government had to recruit brokers to deal with the new political situation.

Zongren), "Tangren yu shiqi shijichu de Selden Map: yi Riben qundao de diming fenxi ji qi zhishi laiyuan weili," conference paper presenting in Mingqing yanjiu guoji xueshu yantaohui, 2017.

[88] *Lianjiang xianzhi*, vol. 3, p. 44; vol. 31, p. 1; vol. 24, p. 47; *Wenzhou fuzhi*, vol. 30, p. 14.

[89] Huang Yilong (Huang Yinong), "Mingqing zhiji hongyi dapao zai dongnan yanhai de liubu ji qi yingxiang," *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan*, vol. 81, no. 4 (2010), pp. 769–832; Huang Yilong (Huang Yinong), "Ouzhou chenchuan yu Mingmo chuan Hua de Xiyang dapao," *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan*, vol. 75, no. 3 (2004), pp. 573–634.

2.4 Imperially Connected Zone: The *Middle Ground* of Taiwan

The maritime powers and peripheral people eventually met in Taiwan in the 1620s, and all powers developed multicultural approaches to negotiate with each other; there was no a political hegemony in Taiwan, but these powers created potential threatens to the Ming China. The coming of peripheral people and maritime powers in the 1620s formed Taiwan into a *middle ground*.[90] I argue that Taiwan, within the context of middle ground, is in the middle of China, the VOC, the Spanish Empire, and all smuggler traders from all states. While Taiwan is a middle ground, this produces a new situation that threatened the Ming's social order in Southern Fujian. Meanwhile, Zheng Zhilong was one of the participants in the middle ground. The middle ground was important because although the Ming did not plan to control and terminate Taiwan as a middle ground, the Qing Empire, like the British Empire in the Great Lakes region, terminated the middle ground of Taiwan after 1683. In this chapter, I discuss how the Chinese Empire suddenly demanded brokers in Southern Fujian because it confronted a new situation in the 1620s. In this section, I argue that the peripheral people and multiple maritime powers met in Taiwan and their interactions developed Taiwan as a middle ground—Taiwan's being near Southern Fujian was the reason the Ming government required a broker.

Since 1991, when the theory was initially discussed, the theory of middle ground challenged historiographical paradigms of Indian and Western American history. Rather than focusing on warfare and conflicts, pioneers such as Richard White, Daniel Usner, and Jay Gitlin suggested paying attention to all sides of the ethnic, cultural, and racial collisions among whites, Hispanics,

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[90] The idea of middle ground is raised by Richard White. This thesis later becomes one of the significant ideas in the New Western History for American history. This thesis focuses on the non-violated relationship, including trade and marriage, and argue that different groups interacted with other ethnic groups to come up with a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic approach to establish a relationship in this region where none political power could dominate with. See Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empire, and Republics in the Great Lates Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Blacks, and Indians. The new studies under this concept also noted that alien cultures and peoples inventively attempted to find a common cultural, linguistic, and symbolic ground upon which to interact; these sides produced a new world that was not wholly European or Indian. In Richard White's milestone research, he examined the middle ground as both a place (in his case, the Great Lakes region between 1650 and 1815) and a process of mutual accommodation among Algonquian-speaking Indians, French, British, and Americans. After the Seven Years War and the British victory in 1760, the middle ground of the Great Lakes region saw the decline of the middle ground as the British favored force over accommodation. The British, particularly under Jeffrey Amherst (1717–1797), tried to institute more direct rule, but Britain's inability to govern showed the effectiveness of the middle ground that the French had successfully developed. During the Revolutionary War, however, the middle ground collapsed. Since this idea was first theorized, scholars have utilized it in different places, such as Hokkaido, Southwest China, Ryukyu, the Inner Asian steppe, and other regions.[91]

Adapting the definition and ideas of a middle ground, we can say that Taiwan fits the definition, shaped by the Dutch VOC, Chinese smugglers, and pirates who were mainly peripheral people, as well as the Spanish Empire, Japanese traders, and Taiwanese aborigines during the seventeenth century. The establishment of the middle ground inspired the Ming recruitment of a broker, who was one of the participants in the middle ground, to handle this new situation, and this middle ground endured until 1683 with the integration of Taiwan into China. The middle ground of Taiwan was thus a useful approach to understanding the early stages of the history of the brokerage. After the 1620s, the Spanish Empire occupied northern Taiwan, traded with Chinese smugglers, and interacted with Taiwanese aborigines; in southern Taiwan, the Dutch VOC established colonial rule by collaborating with Chinese smugglers and Japanese traders, building a complicated relationship, which included gift-giving and conflict fights, with Taiwanese aborigines. Taiwanese aborigines, Japanese, and Chinese all accommodated the Westerners; more importantly, none of them was dominant in Taiwan during this period. Similar to Richard White's argument regarding the Great Lakes region, each side, mainly Dutch and Chinese, built a dynamic relationship with the other, although the VOC violently ejected Spain from Taiwan. During the seventeenth century, although Spain and the Netherlands built their colonial outposts in Taiwan, they had to accommodate other powers. This middle ground, like the Great Lakes, partially ended after Zheng Chenggong's conquest in 1662 and entirely collapsed in 1683 when the Qing, notably Shi Lang, established rigid rule in Taiwan.

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[91] There have been many studies that use such perspectives and theory to explore different regions.. For instance, Charles Patterson Giersch, *Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunana Frontier* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); John E. Herman, *Amid the Clouds and Mist* (2007); James A. Anderson and John K. Whitmore, "Introduction: The Fiery Frontier and the Dong World," in James A. Anderson and John K. Whitmore edit, *China's Encounters on the South and Southwest* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), p. 9; Bin Yang, *Between Winds and Clouds* (2009); Brett L. Walker, *The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590–1800* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); David L. Howell, *Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Michal Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002). Based on these studies, this idea has been adapted to different regional studies across the world.

It may be said that the Ming reached a balance with other maritime powers in the late sixteenth century. Between the 1570s and 1610s, there were almost no records of piracy in gazetteers and official documents; scholars suggest that pirates became traders in the commercial legal system rather than take the risk of being deemed illegal pirates. The Portuguese in Macau, the Spanish in Manila, and the Japanese from Kyushu all benefited from legal trade with the Chinese, which was deemed one of the most important engines of global trade in the world. However, increasingly more pirates appeared around the 1600s and 1610s. The third piracy period occurred after the 1620s when the VOC participated in the maritime activities of East Asia and many pirates harassed coastal areas; many of them were supported by the VOC based in Taiwan. These two issues encountered by the Ming government co-occurred simultaneously.

Taiwan had begun to integrate into maritime East Asia after the late sixteenth century, when many pirates nested in Taiwan because no authority had never conquered it.[92] Many of the Zheng family members died on their international trade routes; Penghu was one area in which many members died during the early seventeenth century. According to the sailing route, these members' terminal point may have been Taiwan instead of Penghu because during the seventeenth century, the known route from the mainland to Taiwan included a required stop at Penghu first. Many studies have also noted that during the seventeenth century, although it was a non-Chinese territory with rich exotic features, Taiwan was becoming a crucial trade post for Chinese pirates and certain colonialists.[93] One myth, which might not be wholly true but could accurately reflect the situation, tells how Yan Siqi (1586–1625), a young man from the Zheng family in Shijing, recruited men who suffered the difficulties of the peripheral areas, including Zheng Zhilong, to colonize middle Taiwan.[94] In the 1620s, the Chinese settled in Taiwan for purposes of colonization as well as trade; the Spanish Empire established two posts in northern Taiwan and traded with Chinese and aborigines. In southern Taiwan, the VOC built a colonial government and traded with Chinese and Japanese who had been there for a long time. These powers met in Taiwan, but none of them achieved actual political and military dominance, so the

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[92] An unknown person asked a similar question at the same time: "General Shen did not get a certificate or permission to insist on crossing the sea from Jinmen to Dong Fang, [which] was not a territory of our great state." Shen's consultant replied, "Pirates occupied this area (Dong Fang), which was indeed not part of our state, but it nested in this area to loot the coastal areas. Were these areas part of our state?" This consultant also said, "General Shen recruited fishermen to Dong Fan and mapped this area, so he was able to know that this area located at the east of Penghu, north to Wangang, and south to Jiali (加哩). There were many islands along the coast for anchoring. See Shen Yourong, *Minhai zenYan*, pp. 29–30; *Chongxiu Taiwan xianzhi*, vol. 15, p. 548; Tan Zangun, *Taiyang jianwen lu*, p. 108; Lin Shengwe, *Haibin da shiji* 海濱大事記, p. 73.

[93] Zhuang Yazhong, "Bihai jiyou─paihui yu yiji yu ziwo zhijian," *Xin shixue* 4, no. 3 (1993), pp. 59–79.

[94] Qian Yiji, *Beizuan xuanji*, vol. 2, p. 244.

Ming summoned brokers in the seventeenth century because many maritime powers considered Taiwan to be a middle ground.

The integration of Taiwan into maritime East Asia, which resulted from growing maritime activities, was the new situation confronted by Ming China that required brokers to help resolve the issues with which the empire might not be familiar. A crucial question is why, when the Ming had encountered "new situations" with Japanese piracy and European arrivals in the sixteenth century, the Ming did not summon any maritime brokers when it first encountered a new situation. I argue that in the 1620s, the integration of Taiwan into maritime East Asia was considered a new situation because of the meeting between peripheral people and non-Chinese maritime powers. This situation was not unfamiliar in Ming history. Scholars such as Tsao Yonghe argued that there were three active piracy periods during sixteenth- and seventeenth-century China. The first period was around the 1550s, the second was around the 1570s, and the final one was around the 1620s.[95] I argue that each of the three periods was the product of interactions between foreign powers and Chinese smugglers.[96] However, further study is required to provide a more in-depth analysis of how the three periods affected Ming China. Interestingly, placing dots of each record of piracy in gazetteers on a map to show the pattern which could lead to further analysis of the three periods. In the first period, around the 1550s to

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[95] In his article Ts'ao Yonghe noted that the periods could be generally divided into three piracy tendencies after the sixteenth century in China. The first was the period of Japanese piracy derived from the wokou harassment during the Jiajing period and the Portuguese arrivals. The second was a consequence of Spanish arrivals, including Lin Daoqian (林道乾) and Li Feng (林鳳), known as Limahong, after the middle of the sixteenth century. The final period was caused by the conflict between the VOC and the Ming government during the early seventeenth century. Tsao argued that the appearance of Chinese pirates resulted from the change in Japanese-Sino trade and European arrivals in the East Asian maritime world. See Tsao Yonghe (Cao Yonghe), "Huan Zhongguo haiyushi shang de Taiwan han Riben 環中國海域史上的臺灣和日本," in Tsao Yonghe (Cao Yonghe), *Taiwan zaoqi lishi yanjiu xuji* (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshe, 2000), pp. 25–26.

[96] Lu Cheng-heng (Lu Zhengheng), "Jingyan yu chuancheng: Mingdai sanci haidao xingshengqi de yuan yin, neirong, yu yingxiang," in Li Hsiaoti (Li Xiaoti), ed., *Haike yingzhou: chuantong Zhongguo yanhai chengshi yu jindai Dongya haishang shijie* (Shanghai: Shanghai Kuji chubanshe, 2017), pp. 199–221.

1560s, pirates mainly assembled in Zhejiang. In the second period, around the 1570s and 1580s, pirates primarily gathered on the Guangdong coast, especially near the Chaozhou region. In the third period, the pirates were centered in Southern Fujian, including Taiwan (see Figure 2-3).

Figure 2-3. The records of piracy between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. I used text-mining, a digital humanities approach, to analyze the three pirate periods and the terms about pirates in Chinese, such as haikou 海寇, haizei 海賊, haidao 海盜, to pick up data from Zhong Guo Fang Zhi Ku 中國方志庫, which is a database containing many gazetteers. I put these data on the maps chronologically and find this tendency significant.


1. (the 1550s-1560s
N
2. (the 1570s-1580s
N
3. (the 1610s-1630s
N

Figure 2-3 could explain why the Ming needed a broker from the 1610s to the 1630s to handle the complicated situations arising from increasing piracy in Taiwan that had not previously appeared. This piracy was the result of the VOC arrival. However, why did the Ming not use the strategy of hiring someone as a broker during the first and second pirate periods? In this section, I argue that the existence of Taiwan as a middle ground was a significant reason the Ming demanded a broker. It is necessary to understand how the Ming Dynasty dealt with the first and second pirate periods and examine the similarities and differences in the Mings' reactions during the three periods. Across the three periods, the Ming shared one strategy: using the military. In the first period, the Ming routed the smugglers' bases in Zhejiang; in the second period, the Ming fought against pirates for almost two decades; in the third period, the Ming never ceased the conflict with the VOC and their pirate allies. In all three periods, the Ming also tried to recruit and disarm pirates, turning them into commoners or traders. To end the first and second periods, the Ming adopted commercial and institutional approaches, or the Macau and Haicheng systems, as mentioned.

However, a significant difference among the three periods was the relationship among the Ming, the Chinese, and foreign powers. In the first period, the Ming built the Macau system to move the Portuguese to Guangdong and legitimize the trade between the Chinese and Portuguese. In the second period, the Haicheng system eventually ended the piracy and legitimized trade between Spanish Manila and Fujian. Although the Spaniards in Manila had proposed conquering China several times, the Spaniards never actually mounted a military expedition. By contrast, in the third period, the VOC in Taiwan still harassed the coastal areas. The VOC was not the only problem for the Ming; the Japanese, Spanish, and Chinese pirates in

Taiwan all worried the Ming. For the Ming, the relationship between Taiwan and China was more like the relationship between the Ming and Inner Asian tribes on the northern frontier. Therefore, the critical reason the Ming required a broker in the third period rather than in the first two periods was because of potential threats from Taiwan—a middle ground.

Although the Huang and Lan families participated in the maritime activities much later, the Shi and Zheng families had participated in the growing maritime commerce. They were not only traders between China and the overseas world but also the practitioners of cultural change. Many of the southern members married non-Chinese and eventually settled in foreign states. They were the first group to understand Western technologies and gain maritime skills such as learning foreign languages. Among them, the most important character was Zheng Zhilong when multiple powers gathered in Taiwan and created a new political phenomenon for Ming China after 1624.

Therefore, maritime activities brought Taiwan from a middle ground into maritime East Asia. The concept of the middle ground is useful for this study because Taiwan's becoming a middle ground among multiple maritime powers created a complicated and novel situation, so the Ming needed a broker to handle the situation, especially to negotiate with these powers. The middle ground ended after 1683 when Shi Lang, who will be discussed later, conquered Taiwan and integrated Taiwan into the Qing Empire. This situation created a new political phenomenon that included the middle ground of Taiwan and the piracy on the Fujian coast. This phenomenon illustrates why the Ming government needed brokers to assist in ruling and handling this region. For the Ming government, the most qualified and effective brokers were the people who came from the peripheral areas and were labeled as *other*s by the prominent lineages.

2.5 Conclusion

Evelyn S. Rawski once suggested that scholars may benefit by looking at Chinese history from the periphery rather than the core, which, in her account, was the project of de-centering China. I agree with Rawski and even extend her theories in this chapter: this dissertation "de-centers Fujian" and deconstructs Southern Fujian as a core-periphery structure as well: the four families were not from the core of Southern Fujian but from its periphery. This idea has been important in this dissertation because I argue that the periphery of Southern Fujian later regarded Taiwan as its periphery. In other words, this dissertation is about Taiwan, which is the periphery of the coastal and mountainous periphery of Southern Fujian, which is, in turn, the periphery of Fujian, which is further a periphery of the Chinese Empire. Taiwan is also the frontier of multiple maritime powers, the Spanish Empire, Japan, and China. Thus, this dissertation focuses on Taiwan, a periphery of the Chinese Empire and a frontier of maritime states.[97]This chapter utilizes two significant historiographical theories to interpret the transition between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This transition generated a new situation for the Ming and explained why they suddenly required a broker. This chapter also interprets why the future brokers all came from the peripheral areas. These people had relatively rich knowledge of and experiences with the overseas world, where they explored and faced challenges after their difficult experiences living in their hometowns due to the ecological crises, the encroachment of government, and the pull factor of the attractive maritime activities.

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[97] Evelyn S. Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 1. This approach was inspired by Karen Wigen's work in 1995 focusing on the Japanese Alps and discussing a relatively isolated geographic region as Japan's periphery during the early modern period. See Karen Wigen, *The Making of Japanese Periphery, 1750–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 69.

In this chapter, I presented my argument in four steps. The first was the construction of the peripheral areas of Southern Fujian following the early Ming period. Second, I focused on the push factor that caused the people in the peripheral areas to struggle with ecological crises, their distinctive identity, lineages' encroachments, and the state's administrative expansion after the fifteenth century. Third, I concentrated on the pull factor that lured the people from the peripheral areas to join the growing maritime activities and gave them chances to develop knowledge and skills. My final point was that these peripheral people collaborated with maritime powers to transform Taiwan from a pirate's nest into an imperially connected zone and a middle ground, which created a political situation that was more like the situation on the Mings' northern frontier. These facts explain why the Ming suddenly required the existence of the maritime brokers in Southern Fujian: to cope with the new situation overseas.

3 The First Maritime Broker, Zheng Zhilong, and His Model

3.1 Introduction

In 1628, Zheng Zhilong, a leader of a pirate alliance, surrendered to the Ming dynasty. To atone for his crimes, he was tasked with defeating the pirates who had been his partners. Independently, Zheng Zhilong and these pirates attempted to increase their power by gaining the VOC's military and economic support. In 1630, Zheng Zhilong was named to fill the position of *fu yi guan* (the officer of pacifying barbarians, 撫夷官) because of his singular knowledge about Taiwan and the powers on the island. This position allowed him to officially negotiate, launch wars, and connect with foreign powers in maritime East Asia under the Ming Dynasty's sea ban. Between 1630 and 1640, Zheng Zhilong defeated pirates, the VOC, and Japanese smugglers to ensure peace in the Taiwan Strait. Subsequently, Zheng Zhilong earned a legitimate status to contract with the VOC. By 1640, Zheng Zhilong had monopolized the profitable commercial network, built a military organization to defend the Southeast China coast, and established his influential status in local society.

In this chapter I argue that Zheng Zhilong's actions created a virtual brokerage to increase his power in the maritime world, Southern Fujian society, and his own lineage. As mentioned in the previous chapter, after 1622, the Mings encountered a new political situation: the incorporation of Taiwan into the maritime world. Zheng Zhilong was employed as the broker to handle the situation. He satisfied the Ming court because he negotiated and defeated the VOC and Japanese smugglers, stopping their harassment of the coastal area and stabilizing the social order. He also earned massive profits from the war and trade. By 1640, he had successfully monopolized commercial trade in maritime East Asia, so he turned his attention to social activities, including organizing his lineage and funding social projects. His achievements made local elites recognize his status as a broker, although they would not use such a term to describe someone who handled the threat from Taiwan.

Fu yi guan is an official position that shaped a crucial component of the Zheng Zhilong's model of brokerage, and it had existed in the Ming's bureaucracy, regarding the northern frontier. The Mings adopted this position from the north of China to the maritime frontier and assigned it to Zheng Zhilong. Zheng Zhilong modified the position according to his own needs, creating the maritime brokerage model that other people and families would mimic over the next hundred and fifty years. The maritime brokerage model is a structure that included the responsibilities of being a broker; the broker could increase his family's and his own influence in local society. It was a structure that allowed qualified peripheral people to assist the Chinese government in handling overseas issues, particularly those in Taiwan, and earn practical benefits and social capital while doing so. In this sense, Zheng Zhilong simultaneously satisfied the Ming court and accomplished his private purposes. After Zheng Zhilong's tenure, this basic model would be used again and again, with different people filling the role of broker.

3.2 A Northern-frontier System in Maritime Borderland: *Fu yi guan*

In this chapter I argue that Zheng Zhilong was the first broker and created a maritime brokerage structure. The most important question, however, lies in why he was chosen. What made him a broker, and what did he do as a broker? His experiences in and understanding of Taiwan were his advantages over other *fu yi guan* candidates.

The best place to start is to introduce the Zheng family and recap Zheng Zhilong's early life. The previous chapter briefly touched on the Zheng family. The family lived in Shijing, a township from which the Ming dynasty withdrew official force during the early Ming period. Rather than depending on agriculture, the family had a long tradition of trading overseas, especially during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They were able to recognize and seize commercial opportunities, so the members of the Zheng family pursued commerce in the most profitable places: Macau, Manila, Japan, and Taiwan.[98] Zheng Zhilong was among those in pursuit. After he grew up, he went to Macau. In Macau, he converted to Catholicism and learned the languages used in maritime East Asia.[99] He eventually went to Hirado, Japan, and became an employee of the wealthiest Chinese trader, Li Dan, in 1623. His striking linguistic ability inspired Li Dan to send him to Penghu in 1624 as a translator for the VOC in negotiations among Li Dan, Ming commanders, and the VOC. In 1624, Zheng Zhilong traveled to Taiwan with the VOC and served as a translator before leaving and becoming a privateer, meaning that he tormented the coast of China, and traded the loot with the VOC.[100]

The question remains as to what happened during the period when Zheng Zhilong worked as a translator and became a pirate. We only know he led a pirate group in 1625—a group that possibly settled on middle Taiwan for its headquarters. In recent works, scholars have shown that Chinese, especially those from Southern Fujian, gathered in middle Taiwan when the VOC colonized Southern Taiwan. In middle Taiwan, Chinese built temporary trading posts and settled with Taiwanese aboriginal tribes. This region had been well known in the contemporary maritime world, so many maps described the area.[101] Although the Chinese there were mainly smugglers, they sometimes became pirates as well. Zheng Zhilong possibly went to middle Taiwan from the VOC's colony and joined these Chinese; records from the seventeenth century have indicated he settled in middle Taiwan with pirates, and materials have noted his main base was located in middle Taiwan.[102] Instead of seeing these records as fake, a way to interpret them is to infer that Zheng Zhilong had joined the Chinese smuggler nest in middle Taiwan. This interpretation also indicates that multiple powers coexisted in Taiwan. It is clear he had experience being in Taiwan and must have met, *inter alia*, the VOC and Japanese traders.

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[98] This has been mentioned in the previous chapter. Although the Zheng genealogy describes the members of the Zheng family had traded in different ports, Li Guangchao is the scholar who has ever conducted a detailed study about the Zheng family.

[99] This has been explored in the most classic and important article about Zheng Zhilong in non-Chinese sources. See C. R. Boxer, "The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan (Cheng Chi-lung 鄭芝龍)," *T'ien-hsia Monthly*, vol. 11, no.5(1941), pp. 401-439.

[100] By using Dutch sources, there are many scholars who had ever mentioned this fact. The earliest one is Leonard Blussé. See Leonard Blussé, "Minnen-Jen or Cosmopolitan? The Rise of Cheng Chih-Lung Alias Nicolas Iquan," E. B. Vermeer, *Development and decline of Fukien province in the 17th and 18th centuries* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), pp.245-264.

Around 1626, Zheng Zhilong had become a powerful pirate leader and began to fight against the Ming commander and the commander's pirate followers. He harassed the people of the Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Fujian coasts for years. In 1628, helped by his naval talents and deadly weapons, he occupied Xiamen and besieged Quanzhou.[103] His siege aimed to force the Chinese elites in Quanzhou to recruit him as an official general. The Ming's regularly recruited pirates after the sixteenth century, and the primary purpose of recruitment was to transform pirates into unofficial generals with elemental naval powers to help stabilize social disorder and reduce the government's obligations. In many cases, local elites acted as mediators between the government and pirates.[104] Therefore, Zheng Zhilong did exactly what his predecessors had done to garner Ming recruitment.

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[101] This idea has been mentioned by Tonio Andrade. Andrade explores Chinese's colonial settlements in aboriginal tribes in middle Taiwan via the analyses of maps and languages. See Tonio Andrade, *How Taiwan Became Chinese*.

[102] Indeed, scholars doubt whether Zheng Zhilong had ever been being in Taiwan. This legend was especially crucial because the myth of Yan Siqi's colonialism in middle Taiwan has been one of the important components for Chinese's legitimate colonialism in Taiwan. Recent studies suggest that, no matter whether Yan Siqi was a real character, and no matter whether Zheng Zhilong had ever settled in Taiwan, Zheng Zhilong at least had ever temporarily been in Taiwan as a base as well as a temporary settlement. See Huang A'you, "Yan Siqi Zheng Zhilong ruken Taiwan yanjiu," *Taiwan wenxian* 54, no. 4 (2003), pp. 93–122

[103] The battle of Zheng Zhilong's capture of Xiamen was complicated. The Ming commander had provided thousand cannons to Zheng Zhilong's partners as gifts to ask them attack Zheng Zhilong. However, Zheng Zhilong also got supports, including boats and Western artillery, from his friend, who was the Ming general in Penghu, to defeat the Ming official navy. The most significant was that Zheng Zhilong had a better naval skills and strategies than the Ming, so he could defeat the massive Ming navy. See *Zhongguo Mingchao dang'an zonghui*, vol. 3, pp. 374–405, vol. 4, pp. 44-49.

In 1628, Ming leadership agreed to recruit Zheng Zhilong; however, he was one of many leaders in his pirate alliance. Other leaders, such as Li Kuiqi (李魁奇, ?–?) disagreed with the conditions, so they refused the recruitment offer; instead, they took the majority of pirates from Xiamen and kept their piracy along the coast to look for better recruitment conditions.[105] Their movement weakened Zheng Zhilong's force, so he conscripted fishers and gunners from the peripheral areas as his primary power against his past partners.[106] In 1629, Li Kuiqi, who had become the head of the pirate organization, harassed the coast and tried to collaborate with the VOC. The Ming government, de facto, recruited Li Kuiqi and invited him to garrison in Xiamen.[107] Although Li Kuiqi had been recruited, he did not stop his attack on Zheng Zhilong, and Zheng Zhilong responded in kind. They each tried to eliminate the other's power and monopolize the profitable commercial network centered on Xiamen. Li Kuiqi had the apparent superiority—a powerful force and support from most of the Quanzhou elites. But by the end of

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[104] In Ming history, many elites had served as agents. In the case of Zheng Zhilong, Su Yan (蘇琰) was the agent. Although Su Yan was a minister, he came from Shijing, the hometown of Zheng Zhilong. He insisted on recruiting Zheng Zhilong and gave him three years to atone. See *Guangdong tongzhi*, vol. 283, pp. 10–11; *Zhongguo Mingchao dang'an zonghui*, vol. 4, pp. 453–454; vol. 5, pp. 29–33; 112–118; Cao Lutai, *Jinghai jilue*, vol. 1, p. 15; Chen Renxi, *Chentaishi wumengyuan chuji*, "Man ji," 2, p. 70; *Chongzhen changbian*, vol. 10, p. 588.

[105] In the ninth month of 1628, Li Kuiqi left Xiamen. See Cao Lutai, *Jinghai jilue*, vol. 1, pp. 17; and 44–45, vol. 2, p. 28.

[106] One of the important officials, Cao Luitai, pointed out that the most picked soldiers at this time were the 500 fishers recruited by Zheng Zhilong in Liuwudian. See Cao Lutai, *Jinghai jilue*, vol. 2, pp. 28–29 and 34.

[107] In the Ming plan, Li Kuiqi would garrison in Xiamen and manage the coastal affairs of the South, which meant Zhangzhou, basically. The Mings actually had planned to move the trade system from Haicheng to Xiamen. These plans were proposed and supported by elites and ministers because Li Kuiqi had a better relationship with them than Zheng Zhilong. On the contrary, Zheng Zhilong, at this time, met the VOC in Weitou, a port in the north of Xiamen. This was also the port where the Mings planned to ask Zheng Zhilong to garrison, which means the Quanzhou area. In other words, in Ming's plan, Li Kuiqi would control the trade with Manila and settled in Xiamen but Zheng Zhilong should handle the affairs with Taiwan and Japan in Weitou. See He Qiaoyuan, *Jingshan quanji*, attachment, p. 5–8; *Chongzhen changbian*, vol. 30, p. 1689; *Zhangzhou fuzhi*, vol. 5, p. 14; *Fujian tongzhi*, vol. 19, p. 13; *Quanzhou fuzhi*, vol. 12, p. 45.

1629, Zheng Zhilong gained his most important advantage, an advantage that eventually made him the Ming's overseas broker: the Ming government deemed Zheng Zhilong *fu yi guan* (the official of pacifying barbarians, 撫夷官).[108]

Fu yi guan is a title given to a commander of a given area, and this title must be appointed via the governor of a province. This rule indicates the highest official in the province had the right to name the most qualified person as the agent to deal with such complicated "international affairs," although this position would represent the central government. In the Ming dynasty, this position first appeared in 1465 when a commander went to Guangdong and Guangxi to quell barbarian bandits.[109] In *Da Ming huidian* (大明會典), *fu yi guan* was widely established in the northern frontier (such as Liaodong, Datong, and Gansu), where generals had regular contact with "barbarians." The duties of *fu yi guan* were to certify and monitor foreigners who planned to pay tributes, claim war against foreigners, inspect whether foreigners carried weapons when they planned to enter China, retain foreigners who surrendered to the Mings, supervise foreigners outside the Ming's authority, and understand foreigners' affairs and the relationships between different foreign powers.[110] More important, the standard for selecting a general as *fu yi guan* was determined by whether the general sufficiently understood foreigners as well as whether foreigners sufficiently trusted the general.[111] *Fu yi guan* had the right to launch a war against foreign powers, determine whether a foreign power could enter China to pay tribute, and negotiate with foreign powers as the Ming's representative. The Ming had adopted this position in the Northern frontier for centuries, but the position was never used in the Fujian because the

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[108] Although there is no exact date for this appointment, Zheng Zhilong might have this title in the end of 1629. See *Chongzhen changbian*, vol. 31, pp. 1791–1792.

[109] *Ming Xianzong shilu*, vol. 14, p. 317.

[110] *Da Ming huidian*, vol. 130, pp. 667–671.

[111] *Ming Xizong shilu*, vol. 12, p. 600.

Ming did not need such a role. Therefore, when Zheng Zhilong became the first *fu yi guan* in the region, he was given special status. Essentially, being *fu yi guan* was like being the Secretary of State in Ming China.

Why was Zheng Zhilong chosen? He was more qualified than others (such as Li Kuiqi) because of his experience in and understanding of the maritime world, especially Taiwan as a middle ground, and he had a closer contact with the VOC than others. Li Kuiqi had support from the most influential elite in Southern Fujian.[112] Militarily, Li Kuiqi was more powerful than Zheng Zhilong.[113] From this perspective, recruiting and promoting Li Kuiqi might have been more useful for the Ming. However, the Ming did not need the most powerful recruited pirate—it needed an agent to cope with the threats from Taiwan. Under the circumstances, the Ming needed someone who had enough practical knowledge about Taiwan and the VOC. Among all the candidates, Zheng Zhilong had the advantage because *fu yi guan*'s main task was to negotiate with non-Chinese powers. His experience and linguistic ability gave him an upper hand. For example, in 1629, the VOC went to Xiamen and received gifts from Li Kuiqi when he announced his appointment as an official. A few days later, however, Li Kuiqi did not send any messengers to speak with the VOC further despite his promise of doing so. The VOC eventually decided to collaborate with Zheng Zhilong, who was in Weitou port.[114] In essence, Li Kuiqi did not have the authority, but Zheng Zhilong did.

How did the position of *fu yi guan* function and shape Zheng Zhilong as a broker? Zheng Zhilong used powers granted by this position to force the VOC to cooperate with him instead of

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[112] This elite was He Qiaoyuan. He was not only an elite from a prominent lineage in Quanzhou but also the teacher and mentor of many ministers at that time. See He Qiaoyuan, *Jingshan quanji*, vol. 64, pp. 27–29.

[113] Li Kuiqi had more than hundred ships and over ten thousand soldiers at any won, but Zheng Zhilong shamed neither so many men nor supports from the Ming government. See *MingQing shiliao*, vol. Yi, no. 7, p. 618.

[114] See Chen Shaogang, *Helanren zai Fu'ermosha* (1624–1662), pp. 107–109.

Li Kuiqi or other pirates, to claim war against the VOC later, and to ultimately negotiate with the VOC as the Ming's representative. First, he acted what a *fu yi guan* should do when Li Kuiqi and other pirates tried to cooperate with the VOC against him in the 1630s. Although the VOC had many reasons not to work with these other pirates, its primary reason was that the only legitimate approach to trade with Ming China was through Zheng Zhilong.[115] After Li Kuiqi failed to control the seas and Zheng Zhilong controlled the coast, Zheng Zhilong began to monopolize the trade after 1633. The VOC could not tolerate Zheng Zhilong's abuse and control of trade between Southern Fujian and Taiwan, so it collaborated with Liu Xiang. The VOC and Liu Xiang partnership once destroyed Zheng Zhilong's vessels in Xiamen. However, Zheng Zhilong claimed war against the VOC and defeated it in Jinmen a few months later; this was not an act of personal revenge but part of his duty as a *fu yi guan*. After this period, Zheng Zhilong could trade officially and overtly with the overseas world, including Japan, Manila, and Taiwan. Therefore, Zheng Zhilong satisfied the Ming's requirements: calming the VOC's invasion, stabilizing the order in the maritime world, and shifting the proper polities to establish a "tributary trade."

After 1640, Zheng Zhilong controlled the trade between Southern Fujian and Taiwan and dominated the coastal defense system. Being a *fu yi guan* was Zheng Zhilong's first step in building his model. He was a competent *fu yi guan* because he suppressed the VOC's ambition to control trade in the region. Under Zheng Zhilong's control, the VOC had nearly no choice but to collaborate and adapt his commercial structure. Zheng Zhilong established his commercial hegemony and system in maritime East Asia.[116] While setting up his commercial rule, Zheng Zhilong had already gained personal benefits from his position. His new residence in Anhai, another township beside Shijing, was the center of his commercial network. All ships sailing from Southern Fujian had to receive his approval; otherwise, they would be considered “pirates.” Once they were regarded as pirates, Zheng Zhilong’s army could arrest them. In addition to being *fu yi guan*, Zheng Zhilong and his generals were the commanders of all coastal strongholds: not only Southern Fujian but also the rest of Fujian and Chaozhou of Guangdong. They controlled the Ming’s official naval power, so they dominated the coastal defense system. His organization and generals were deemed the Zheng Ministry, and this organization in fact was reincarnated during the Qing period in 1662 when the Qings established the position of the Fujian naval admiral.[117]

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[115] See *Zeelandia Dairly*, vol. 1, pp. 3–10.

[116] Weichung Cheng, *War, Trade and Piracy in the China Seas (1622–1683)*, (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2013).

No one could deny that Zheng Zhilong was lucky; he was neither the most powerful pirate when the Ming planned to recruit his pirate organization nor the one supported by the most elite. However, he was the one embracing the rich knowledge about the maritime world. The appointment as *fu yi guan* was a windfall for Zheng Zhilong because the Mings allowed the position to be established in Southern Fujian. Moreover, the VOC’s aggressive actions made his *fu yi guan* position more valuable. However, Zheng Zhilong was the only one who could ultimately build the brokerage because of his family’s tradition of trade in international trade ports and his experience with maritime enterprise. While fighting against other pirates, he simultaneously benefited from the privileges of being a *fu yi guan*. His personality, abilities, and ambition all contributed to his establishment, but his connection with Taiwan was the most important factor in his becoming a broker and helping the Mings handle the maritime arena.

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[117] Lu Cheng-Heng (Lu Zhengheng), “Between Bureaucrats and Bandits: The Rise of Zheng Zhilong and His Organization, the Zheng Ministry (Zheng Bu, 鄭部),” Tonio Andrade and Xing Hang edit., *Sea Rovers, Silver, and Samurai: Maritime East Asia in World History, 1500–1700* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2016), pp. 132–155.

3.3 From the External World to Internal Society

Zheng Zhilong was a man from the coastal periphery, and he was not considered a "cultured" man in most of the Chinese people's minds; for example, He Qiaoyuan said of Zheng Zhilong, "You enjoyed the title of the great king of seas . . . led poor men, uncultured men, and criminals, so you like being the leader of such a group;" He Qiaoyuan also indicated that Zheng Zhilong intentionally hated cultured elites.[118] Zheng Zhilong tried to elevate his reputation and status in local society after he grew powerful. As an up-and-coming trader and commander, he had to work to make sure the elites appreciated his achievements. This raises the question of how he could reverse the idea of his being a marginal man and what society deemed him? Zheng Zhilong constructed the Zheng lineage and required his relatives to undergo schooling and examinations. He aggressively engaged in social affairs, not only in the peripheral areas but also in the core of society; Chinese elites eventually recognized these actions and his achievements as a broker. Therefore, Zheng Zhilong turned his efforts from the external world to internal society, which became one of the signature features of his model and subsequent success.

The year 1640 was significant for Zheng Zhilong. He had defeated all his opponents and suppressed the VOC, and he had monopolized the trade in maritime East Asia. After accomplishing the task involved in being a broker, he turned his attention to internal society; that is, he had to strengthen his status and role not only in his family but also in the Southern Fujian society. He began to organize a lineage; he compiled a genealogy and built a great ancestral hall. He participated in social affairs, including funding to build new temples, buildings, and other public works. The outcome of these efforts garnered positive feedback—both commoners and elites saw Zheng Zhilong as a competent and powerful figure.

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[118] For instance, He Qiaoyuan had written a letter to Zheng Zhilong. In this letter, he implied that Zheng Zhilong was someone outside the civilized circle, so he did not understand elites' thoughts. He was just "someone from the shoreline." See He Qiaoyuan, *Jingshan quanji*, vol. 34, pp. 6–7.

In 1640 alone, Zheng Zhilong constructed two prominent symbols for building a lineage. First, he built a great ancestral hall. He compiled a genealogy. These were among the processes for selecting particular families for the lineage; Zheng Zhilong made a clear argument that the whole family, who were not recorded in his genealogy, was not composed of their relatives but should instead be seen as "the others." Zheng Zhilong and Zheng Zhiluan (鄭芝鸞, ?-?), his cousin, each wrote a preface for this genealogy. In Zheng Zhilong's preface, he claimed the Zheng families had genealogies and an ancestral hall before, but they were ruined during a war.[119] He openly discussed the experience of traveling among non-Chinese states with pirates (including himself) roaming the seas.[120] An account in his preface says, "Although we [the Zhengs] had a safe homeland, we allowed people to travel to other places, so it is hard to know everyone within the families."[121]

Zheng Zhilong had several aims in constructing his lineage. After 1640, members of the Zheng lineage began to go to schools and take national examinations. Among all, Zheng Zhilong's lineal families achieved the most. His brother, Zheng Hongkui, obtained the highest educational degree; his son, Zheng Chenggong, earned a fundamental educational degree, *xiucai*. Zheng Zhiluan was also a pioneer in the Zheng lineage in earning an educational degree. Besides these three men, more family members were taking the examinations and becoming "educated."

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[119] This story was also narrated in the early Qing that Zheng Zhilong had not completed the work of building a great ancestral hall because the original hall was burned out. Kenneth Dean and Zheng Zhenman edited, *Epigraphical Materials on the History of Religion in Fujian: Quzhou Region II* (Fuzhou, Fujian: Fujian People's Publishing House, 2003), pp. 646–647.

[120] *Zheng Chenggong zupu shizhong*, pp. 161–162.

[121] Ibid., pp. 162–164.

After this, Chinese elites gradually identified Zheng family members as “civilized men” rather than “pirates”; for example, Zheng Zhilong’s brother Zheng Hongkui was seen as one of the generals with a pure Confucian nature.[122] Zheng Zhilong and Zheng Zhiluan’s prefaces openly suggested that the Zheng lineage, located at the coastal periphery, had massive connections with the East Asian states other than China. Ultimately, Zheng Zhilong wanted to detach his lineage from the “uncultured” label.

To further elevate his family and himself, Zheng Zhilong participated in social affairs; these were usually the sorts of privileges granted only to particularly prominent and prosperous lineages. Zheng Zhilong’s social participation plan can be categorized as threefold. First, he repaired and built infrastructure in pursuit of his strategic and economic goals. In 1640, as the vice commander of Nan’ao, he rebuilt and enlarged the major road from Meiling (梅嶺) to Zhangzhou.[123] Meiling (located at the border of Zhangzhou, Fujian, and Chaozhou, Guangdong) was an important and strategic peninsula and an artery for traffic from Guangdong, especially Nan’ao and Chaozhou, to Fujian. Locals from the region, both commoners and soldiers (military households), contributed to erect a stele to commemorate Zheng Zhilong’s accomplishment. Nan’ao, which had been a pirates’ nest for almost a century, was one of Zheng Zhilong’s main bases because it was on the maritime route from Southeast Asia and Macau to Fujian and Penghu. He controlled the island for over a decade, so he had to secure transportation between it and Southern Fujian.

Second, Zheng Zhilong helped repair temples in religious and social centers. In Quanzhou in 1637, when Zheng Zhilong had defeated the giant pirate Liu Xiang and pacified other pirates, he led the renovation of Kaiyuan Temple (開元寺). He not only repaired the main hall but also donated to cast a bell, and he designated Shi Fu (施福, 1612–?), one of his most trusted generals, the supervisor of this project.[124] At the time, Shi Fu was the most influential member of the Shi family (discussed in this dissertation). Another historical figure, similar to the case of Shi Fu, that could be used to explain the model is Zheng Cai's (鄭彩, 1605–1659) case. Zheng Cai was from a military household, but he did not become an official soldier. He joined Zheng Zhilong's troop at the very beginning, and this was not a unique case because many people from military households would make this decision after the middle Ming period.[125] Zheng Zhilong ordered Zheng Cai to lead the construction repairs at Chaozhou in 1642, when Zheng Cai was the commander of Chaozhou. Along with numerous local elites and military generals, Zheng Cai gathered funding to repair the most important temple there, *San Shan Guo Wang Zu Miao* (ancestral temple of the lords of the three mountains, 三山國王祖廟).[126] This temple was the religious and social center in Chaozhou, and it was an important place for Hakka people, who had long been regarded as ungoverned groups in the mountainous area of Fujian and

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[122] Zheng Hongkui, *Jichuntang ji* 及春堂集, Su’s preface, p. 32.

[123] This place is located at Nanzhao, Zhao’an, Fujian. I visited it on August 23, 2018.

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[124] *Xunhai Shishi dazong zupu*, p. 568. This bell still exists in the temple today. When Shi Fu's relative stole a wood, which was a component of a ship from the Zheng organization, Shi Fu intervened to release his kinship even though Zheng Zhilong tried to kill them. See *Xunhai Shishi dazong zupu*, p. 976.

[125] He came from Gaopu, locating at the coastal periphery, and he belonged to a military household. According to an oral interview in Gaopu, local people believe that Zheng Cai's name was not in the genealogy because local commoners erased him during the Qing period to avoid potential problems. See He Bingzhong and Wu Heli, *Xiamen muzhiming huicue* (Xiamen: Xiamen University Press, 2011), pp. 129–130. *Hepu zhengshi zupu* (unpublished; copied in Gaopu in 2011 and collected by the Zheng family there). Although some scholars believe that Zheng Cai was Zheng Zhilong's cousin, it is possible that just shared the surname and had no kinship. See He Bingzhong, "Nan Ming renwu Zheng Cai zaonian shishi kao," *Taiwan yuanliu*, no. 31 (2005), pp. 36–4. However, there is another perspective indicating that Zheng Cai came from Nan'an, just like Zheng Zhilong, because his descendants were still there. Before Zheng Zhilong occupied Xiamen in 1627, he had landed in Gaopu. Zheng Zhilong might have been aware that the military households were the Chen and Zheng families in Gaopu. Meanwhile, another source indicated that Yu Zhigao planned to garrison in Gaopu but was rejected by the angry multitude of people in Gaopu. See Cao Lutai, *Jinghai jilue*, vol. 1, pp. 11, 14–15, 18.

[126] This stele is "Chongjian zumiao wanyuan bei" located in Chaozhou today.

Guangdong.[127] These three examples suggest that Zheng Zhilong had at least connected with prominent lineages and social elites from the core of Southern Fujian and also Chaozhou, Guangdong; the latter could guarantee transportation between Chaozhou and Southern Fujian because Nao'ao and Chaozhou could provide his organization logistics, offer military support, and ensure the safety of sea routes from Southeast Asia to Penghu and Taiwan. In other words, Zheng Zhilong gradually built connections with elites for his personal purposes.

Third, Zheng Zhilong also ensured connections with traders who were likely less critical in Chinese bureaucracy but equally influential because of their wealth. In 1638, Zheng Zhilong led an initiative to repair a bridge and the pavilion on it; this was Anping Bridge, which linked his hometown (Shijing) and his new residence (Anping). Rebuilding the bridge not only contributed to commercial purposes because it linked the port (Anhai) and the urban market (Quanzhou) but also showed that Zheng Zhilong had unified and controlled traders from various families in

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[127] Although, in Taiwan history, scholars usually consider the belief of the Kingdoms of the Three Mountains Hakka people's belief, this was not true in mainland China. As Wolfgang Franke pointed out, this belief held by ethnic minorities in South China, especially the Chaozhou area. This belief was standardized and absorbed other minor beliefs into it. See Wolfgang Franke, "The Sovereigns of the Kingdoms of the Three Mountains, San Shan Guowang, at Hepo and in Southeast Asia—a Preliminary Investigation" in the Collected Papers, *International Conference on Chinese Studies* (Kuala Lumpur, 1994), pp. 377–385; Chen Chunsheng and Chen Wenhui, "Sheshen chongbai yu shequ diyu guanxi—zhanglin sanshan guowang de yanjiu," in Bei Wenxi and Yang Fangshen ed., *Sanshanguowang chongtan*, pp. 81–96; Zhou Jiangxin, "Yuedong diqu Sanshanguowang xinyang de qiyuan tezheng ji qi zuqun yixiang," *Guangxi minzu yanjiu*, no. 83 (2006), p. 56; Chen Chunsheng, "Minjian xinyang yu Song Yuan yilai Hanjiang zhongxiayou difang shehui de bianqian," *Dongwu lishi xuebao*, no. 14 (2005), pp 52–58; Chen Chunsheng, "Zhengtongxing difanghua yu wenhua de chuangzhi—Chaozhou minjianshen xinyang de xiangzheng yu lishi yiyi," *Shixue yuekang*, no. 1 (2001), pp. 123–133; Du Liwei, "Taiwan Sanshanguowang xinyang yanjiu shuping," *Taiwan wenxian* 59, no. 3 (2008), pp. 129–174. Moreover, the topic of Hakka people had a complicated historiography. Hakka people in Taiwan history and in mainland China are different. In Taiwanese history, Hakka people were more likely an ethnicity with particular identity based on social chaos. There are many great studies, but it is necessary to note that Hakka people in Taiwan were not as same as the Hakka people in other places, including mainland China and Southeast Asia. See Lin Zhenghui, "Cong kejia zuqun zhi xingsu kan Qingdai Taiwan shizhi Zhong zhi ke—ke zhi shuxie yu kejia guanxi chutan," *Guoshiguan xueshu jikan*, no. 10 (2006), pp. 1–61; Lin Zhenghui, "Huanan kejia xingsu licheng zhi tanjiu," *Quanqiu kejia yanjiu*, no. 1 (2013), pp. 57–122; Lin Zhenghui, "Min Yue? Fu Ke? Qingdai Taiwan Hanren zuqun guanxi xintan—yi Pingdong pingyuan wei qidian," *Guoshiguan xueshu jikan*, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1–60; Chen Lihua, "Tanfan Taiwan kejia renting: 1860–1980 niandai Taiwan kejia zuqun de suzao," *Taida lishi xuebao*, no. 48 (2011), pp. 1–49; Huang Rongluo, "Sanshanguowangmiao yu kejiaren qianTai," in Huang Rongluo, *Taiwan kejia minsu wenji* (Zhubei: Hsinchu County government, 2000), pp. 29–30.

Quanzhou, including many prominent lineages. Multiple families and their companies endorsed this on a stele and acknowledged that the influential Zheng Zhilong led and announced.[128] The stele recording Zheng Zhilong's achievement also proved he had monopolized the trader communities.

His hard work paid off. Although he might not have been regarded as an elite in local society, the three examples suggest Chinese elites had at least accepted his hard-won status. First, Chinese elites from Guangdong and Fujian built a memorial archway to commemorate his accomplishments. This archway was erected in Fenshuiguan, located at the border between Fujian and Guangdong and one of the settlements of the Lan family, one of the main foci in this dissertation. However, Zheng Zhilong might have never been here although this place was under this command. This official archway was a memorial building both to celebrate Zheng Zhilong's contribution and to claim local society's view of him as a prominent man. There were two descriptions on this archway. The first was "Achievement in Guangdong and Fujian," and the other was "Reputation over the Chinese and barbarian world." The endorsement was from "elites and commoners from Fujian and Guangdong."[129] It is a general approach for commoners, especially ungoverned groups, to claim an official's achievement to build their legal status in the peripheral area.[130] More important, people in this peripheral areas had known Zheng Zhilong's achievement in the maritime world, although Zheng Zhilong's most significant achievement for these people was supposed to be the war against bandits in the mountainous periphery. But these people brought the victory in maritime world as an equally important event. In other words, Zheng Zhilong's achievement on the coastline became a symbol for peripheral areas, including the mountainous periphery, to announce the connection between ungoverned people and official authority (See Figure 3-1).

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[128] This stele is in Anhai today. This bridge was on the sea across the bay.

[129] This archway is in Fengshuiguan today.

[130] For instance, Li Wenliang, "Li da Qingqi feng wansuipai: Zhu Yigui shijian shi de huangshang wansui shengzhi pai yu difang shehui," *Taiwanshi yanjiu* 19, no. 2, pp. 1–29.

Figure 3-1. The memorial archway of Zheng Zhilong.



Second, Chinese elites saw Zheng Zhilong as a symbol of success and of the possibility for reforming the military system in the future. Huang Xianchen (黃獻臣, ? –?) published a book, *Wu jing kai zhong* (武經開宗) in 1636; the book was an instruction on how to reform the Mings' military system and enhance military power. An essential part of the book was the introduction of Ming military generals who had restructured the official power; for example, Qi Jiguang (戚繼光) was listed among them because he invented a square matrix by mixing Japanese and Portuguese weapons. Among all biographies of many Ming generals, the only living character introduced by Huang Xianchen was Zheng Zhilong. Huang Xianchen highly admired Zheng Zhilong's achievement and saw him as the future of Ming naval warfare, especially with his skills and strategies.[131] This book was published not by Huang Xianchen or a small local publisher but by the central government, and it spread widely to the entirety of China proper and foreign states. Later, the book became one of the most popular books in Japan on military art.[132] Zheng Zhilong's legacy saw mainstream acceptance and was known by a massive audience.

Finally, a significant connection between Zheng Zhilong and prominent lineage was marriage. Zheng Zhilong came from a peripheral township, and none of his relative had ever earned an educational degree. Marriage for members of the Zheng family could not go far beyond a particular region and was possibly limited to a particular region.[133] After 1640, however, more and more Zheng family members intermarried with prominent lineages, such as the Huang and Hong families; these two families were perhaps the largest and the most influential lineages in Quanzhou because many members were ministers in the central government.[134] Such marriages implied that the prominent lineages were at least willing to build close connections with the Zheng family, which had been a peripheral one before the 1630s.

Therefore, during the 1640s, Zheng Zhilong built a brokerage. He could not control Southern Fujian society because he was still from a peripheral area. Because he was part of the Ming bureaucracy, however, he was a representative of the Mings to the overseas world. After his control and dominance of maritime East Asia, he began to make efforts to strengthen his status in his lineage and in Southern Fujian society. The lineage and local society admitted his efforts and acknowledged his achievement as an empire's broker to the maritime world.

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[131] Three libraries have this book: in Japan, in Harvard, and in China. See Huang Xianchen, *Wujing kaizhong*, and see https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100057649.

[132] This book had been republished several times in Japan during the eighteenth century.

[133] The marriage market is discussed by G. William Skinner and Prasemjit Duara. Duara has used the case of North China to focus on the market region. See Prasemjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900–1942 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 17–20.

[134] See Xia Lin, *Minhai jiyao, vol.* Shan, p. 2; *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an bianyi*, vol. 1, p. 1; *Nan'an xianzhi*, vol. 25, p. 6; *Donghua lu*, Shunzhi 20, p. 28; *Qing Shizu shilu*, vol. 75, p. 591.

3.4 Conclusion

The model and the features that Zheng Zhilong created were crucial because his successors followed this pattern until the end of the eighteenth century. Zheng Zhilong was not an elite—he was still a peripheral man. However, his elemental naval power, which was conscripted from peripheral areas; his understanding of the maritime world, which was informed by his family tradition and early professional life; his naval ability, which was gained from pirate life; and his leadership all contributed to his appointment as *fu yi guan*. This position gave him the authority to legally and directly handle issues proposed by Taiwan as a middle ground. Zheng Zhilong gained much from being this position, which aimed toward the overseas world rather than China proper.

Zheng Zhilong's extraordinary reputation and special status became well known in Southern Fujian and Guangdong after his achievements, especially his victory over the barbarians—the VOC and Japanese. He participated in social affairs not only for his reputation but also for practical purposes—being an active participants of social affairs which had not been expected for the Zheng families before because they were marginal and had no power and money. His efforts, usually significant monetary funding, eventually achieved his goals. Local elites saw him as a representative of military reformists and as a successful commander. His family began to marry prominent elites, and these marriages ultimately gave him considerable results after 1644 when the Mings collapsed; the Qing came to China because many of Zheng Zhilong's relatives-in-law served as ministers in the Qing court.

Past studies believe that the rise of Zheng Zhilong is because of his transnational commercial network and his comprehensively social connections. However, scholars never carefully analyze Zheng Zhilong's official duties and see what his official positions provided him and how he benefited from these positions. My contribution to historiography on Zheng Zhilong is that I explore the importance of *Fu yi guan* and argue that Zheng Zhilong could establish the commercial network and built well-relationship in local society because he had served this special and privileged position.

The eight features of Zheng Zhilong's model are as follows:: (1) being originally peripheral in local society, (2) holding basic power before the state's recruitment, (3) having specialized knowledge regarding the maritime world, (4) becoming a member of the bureaucracy, (5) having the right to initiate a war, (6) obtaining benefits from and after the war, (7) dominating local society and making a social transformation, and (8) continuing to future generations. This model forms the base and foundation of the Chinese Empire's model of brokerage in the next 150 years, which were adopted by the Qing Empire, although some of them might be changed a little. In this chapter I argue that Zheng Zhilong fitted these eight criteria to feature a colonial broker at the maritime borderland and created the model of colonial mediation, which lasted for about 150 years after he created it.

4 Replicable Brokerage: The Competition for Brokerage and Qing's Broker—Huang Wu

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I argue that during the Ming–Qing transition (following Zheng Zhilong's surrender to Beijing), Zheng Zhilong's son Zheng Chenggong seized the brokerage's control after defeating other competitors. Both the Qing and Southern Ming intended to cooperate with Zheng Chenggong who played a second game to enlarge his benefits. However, this disloyalty was no longer tolerated by the Qing. In 1656, the Qing and Huang Wu followed Zheng Zhilong's model, building the Qing's new brokerage version. This version adopted the Inner Asian institution—Mongolian princes—to ensure the connection between the broker and the empire. Loyalty and cooperation were guaranteed by holding family members hostage and recruited the children as imperial guardians, so that the emperor could supervise them closely.

Scholars argue that Southern Fujian's history between 1644 and 1661 is the story of a political wrestling match between Zheng Chenggong and the Qing; all other characters were reduced to supporting roles. In the narrative advanced by these scholars, Zheng Chenggong, who was loyal to the Ming, opposed his father, Zheng Zhilong, who was a fence-sitter, having fought the Qing Empire during the Ming–Qing transition. Zheng Chenggong came into conflict with his uncles and negotiated with the Qing between 1650 and 1656 because he planned to expand his power. The Qing could not tolerate Zheng Zhilong and his two-faced behavior, so they attacked and arrested him. In this historiographical description, Huang Wu's surrender in 1656 was merely a minor episode in the adventure. However, instead of telling this story by highlighting Zheng Chenggong's morality and Zheng Zhilong's evil nature, I focus on brokerage competition during the Ming–Qing transition through the competitors' perspectives and the Qing Empire. I argue that the competition for brokerage between many qualified challengers shows that Zheng Zhilong's model was replicable.

I examine two phases of this competition. Phase 1, from 1646 to 1653, includes Zheng Zhilong's surrender, leaving his brokerage enterprise exposed in Southern Fujian. His subordinates began to compete for control of the brokerage; Zheng Cai was the first to succeed. In 1650, Zheng Hongkui and Zheng Chenggong wrested control of the brokerage from Zheng Cai; in 1651, Zheng Chenggong defeated his uncles and monopolized the brokerage. Afterward, the Qing aimed to collaborate with Zheng Chenggong, the brokerage controller, but Zheng's disloyalty exhausted the Qing's patience.

The second phase of the competition began in 1656 when the Qing replicated the brokerage system with a new family—the Huang Family—because Zheng Chenggong and Zheng Zhilong had been disloyal. To modify the brokerage to ensure the broker's loyalty, the Qing added its Inner Asian institution as an element to the brokerage to strengthen the empire's control. In other words, the Qing maintained most of the criteria from Zheng Zhilong's model and added new criteria to it.

The Qing ennobled Huang Wu as if he were a Mongolian prince, enjoying the privileges of this position and complying with the emperor's rules and regulations, which included leaving his family in Beijing and marrying with bannermen. Huang Wu's recruitment successfully destroyed the Zheng family's brokerage monopoly and diminished Zheng Chenggong's power. Ultimately, that loss of power forced Zheng Chenggong to invade Taiwan.

Although the Qing reformed its brokerage, it did not want to break the link between brokers and local society. Therefore, Huang Wu established his lineage and required elites and commoners in Zhangzhou to submit to his command, shaping his status as a dominant and meritorious achiever in local society—just as Zheng Zhilong and the elites had done in the 1640s. In other words, in 1656, Huang Wu and the Qing Empire reformed the brokerage by combining the Qing's Inner Asian system with Zheng Zhilong's model.

4.2 The Competition for Brokerage

During the Ming–Qing transition, Zheng Zhilong's subordinates competed for control of the maritime brokerage after 1646, when Zheng Zhilong was recruited by the Qing and moved to Beijing. Who would take brokerage? Previous scholars approached this question from a linear perspective. In their mind, Zheng Chenggong was Zheng Zhilong's eldest son, meaning he was the legitimate successor.[135] Their thoughts were understandable but unreasonable. In this section, I reverse this biased idea, arguing that anyone who was qualified could compete for brokerage, which had been left open by Zheng Zhilong; therefore, the model was not Zheng Zhilong's exclusive formula, but replicable for everyone with qualifying attributes—like Zheng Cai and Zheng Chenggong.

A brief historical background is necessary for further analysis. This section argues that the Ming–Qing transition did not end Zheng Zhilong's role as a broker. In 1644, starving bandits captured Beijing, and the Chongzheng emperor committed suicide. Li Zhichen (李自成, 1606–1645), the head of the bandits, established the Shun dynasty. Li Zhichen required the Ming's commanders and generals to submit to him. In May of 1644, Wu Sangui (吳三桂, 1608–1678),

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[135] This is a continental and Confucian/Chinese idea. However, notably, the Zheng family was not simply a Chinese/Confucian/continental family but more like a maritime family. This idea has not been published as an article or a book, but Liu Zhiwei has revealed this idea in many open speeches. See https://wemp.app/posts/b03edb44-efa1-40de-b153-1c15c558dc39.

an experienced commander in Shanhai Pass, co-worked with the Qing's regent, Dorgon (多爾袞, 1612–1650).[136] The Qing and Wu Sangui defeated Li Zhichen's massive army, approached Beijing, and ultimately captured it.

Dorgon moved the five-year-old Shunzhi emperor (1638–1661) from Mukden to Beijing, officially establishing the Qing's sovereignty in China.[137] After the Qing captured Beijing, it endeavored to eliminate potential foes, including Ming's commanders and warlords. Meanwhile, the Ming ministers and warlords endorsed a Ming member to take the throne in Nanjing—the Hongguang Emperor (弘光, 1644–1645).

The Hongguang court was the first regime of the Southern Ming. However, uncontrollable warlords and factionalism weakened the Hongguang court. In 1645, the Qing troops captured Nanjing and headed to southern China. After the Hongguang court's fall, Zheng Hongkui (鄭鴻逵, 1613–1657), Zheng Zhilong's brother, along with certain ministers, brought another Ming royal member, the Longwu Emperor to Fujian. They established the second court of the Southern Ming—the Longwu court.

The Longwu Emperor (隆武, 1602–1646) is believed to have been one of the most energetic and hardworking emperors during this period. Although he longed to restore the Ming's power, he could not ease the conflict among his primary ministers, Huang Daozhou (黃

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[136] At this time, the Qing Empire just "completed" a "Chinese military revolution," and held the most picked and fatal legions mixed artillerists, cavalry, archers, and infantries. This argument made by Huang Yilong. Although other scholars have different opinions regarding the term of "military revolution," it is undoubted that the Qing Empire was not an empire with cold weapon and traditional Inner Asian light cavalry. See Huang Yilong (Huang Yinong), "Hongyi dapao yu Huang Taiji chuangli de baqi hanjun," *Lishi yanjiu*, no. 4 (2004), pp. 74–105.

[137] The most important and detailed research regarding this period is Frederic E. Wakeman's landmark. See Frederic E. Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise: the Manchu reconstruction of the imperial order in seventeenth-century China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

道周, 1585–1646), and military supporter, Zheng Zhilong. In other words, the Longwu court's establishment resulted in transforming Zheng Zhilong from a broker to a minister in the central government.

Zheng Zhilong did not give up his role as a broker but continued to discharge his duties, interacting with the overseas world. For instance, during the Longwu period, Zheng Zhilong sent messengers to Japan, Macau, Vietnam, and Taiwan to request military and financial support.[138] In 1645, Zheng Zhilong asked for 3,000 troops from Nagasaki to capture Nanjing, but the Tokugawa government refused. The messenger headed to Satsuma and petitioned the *daimyo*, who had a close relationship with the Zheng family, at the end of 1645, and requested military support for the Zheng's expedition plan to Nanjing.[139] Before Zheng Zhilong's surrender in 1646, he had sent an envoy to enlist soldiers from the Tokugawa government again. Simultaneously, Zheng Zhilong requested soldiers from Japan, and his commercial network in maritime East Asia continued in full force. He still traded with the VOC, Japan, and other states. In other words, while Zheng Zhilong was a minister in the central court of Fuzhou, he continued his tasks as a maritime broker.

Regardless of whether Zheng Zhilong had any success in earning the maritime powers' support, he served as a broker to negotiate with the overseas world. The Southern Ming undoubtedly knew the importance of Zheng Zhilong to the maritime world. In contrast, the Qing Empire did not know Zheng's importance; the Qing knew little about the coastal area. Understandably, a newly established empire originating in inner Asia could hardly know much about southeast China's coastal area and its dynamic maritime world. Indeed, there were many ministers in the Qing court from Southern Fujian—some of them were Zheng Zhilong's relatives. Their information, however, might not have provided the Qing with accurate facts.[140] For example, when the Qing approached Southern Fujian in 1645, its investigation determined that Zheng Zhilong was a warlord in Fujian like the warlords the Qing had encountered (and recruited) in other regions.[141] The Qing may have mistaken Zheng Zhilong as a warlord rather than a broker, so it recruited him alone rather than with his whole brokerage structure.

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[138] Although there are many works about the Southern Ming, such as Gu Chen, Nan Bingwen, and so on, the best work about this period in English is still Lynn A. Struve's book. See Lynn A. Struve, The Southern Ming, 1644–1662 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

[139] Japanese had certain letters from Zheng Zhilong, Zheng Cai, and Zheng Chenggong. See "Cui Zhi qing yuanbing 崔芝請援兵" and "Xushan linguo baoji 續善隣國寶記" in *Kaientai* 華夷變態, vol. Shan, no page.

The brokers and warlords were treated differently by the Qing. The formers were sent to particular areas to discharge their duties, and the latter were taken hostage in Beijing under supervision; for example, Zou Menggeng was a surrendered bandit who had led his army as a warlord in northern China.[142] It was reasonable to consider Zheng Zhilong a warlord. This dissertation does not propose that the Qing's kidnapping of Zheng Zhilong was myopic. However, it is essential to understand the Qing's logic behind brokers' and warlords' treatment during this period. The Qing had to appreciate the nuance between a broker and a warlord because the Qing had a long history of recruiting brokers—especially those who had military skills. For example, in the early stages of the empire, Nurgaci (1559–1626), the founder, had recruited Ming commanders, such as Tong Yangxing (佟養性, ?–1632) and Li Yongfang (李永芳, ?–1634), via intermarriage because they had Chinese military skills.[143] During Hong Taiji's reign (1592–1643), the Qing ennobled and recruited Kong Youde (孔有德, ?–1652) and two other feudatories because they were masters of Western-trained artillerists.[144] In other words, the Qing had a strategy to recruit men as brokers who had particular military advantages—therein lay the Qing's weakness.

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[140] The Qing had taken efforts in 1647 to investigate the coastal area of Zhangzhou and Quanzhou, but it only had a rough idea, "there are many islands occupied by pirates." However, until 1656, the Qing court still had no idea how far between Jinmen and mainland, how big it is, and where it is. See *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Ding, no. 1, p. 5; *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, pp. 280–284.

[141] *Qing Shizu shilu*, vol. 34, p. 279.

[142] *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Ding, no. 1, p. 89; Institute of Taiwan History, Xiamen University, China First Archive ed., *Zheng Chenggong Manwen dang'an shiliao xuanyi*, p. 9.

[143] Pamela Crossley, "The Tong in Two Worlds: Cultural Identities in Liaodong and Nurgan during the 13th–17th Centuries," *Ch'ing-shih Wen-t'i*, 4(1983), pp. 21–46.

The Qing's bringing Zheng Zhilong to Beijing represented that the Qing saw him a warlord (moving them to Beijing and requiring their subordinates to fight for the Qing) rather than a broker. If the Qing (who had no official navy) wanted to recruit Zheng Zhilong (who had the most powerful navy in China at the time) as a broker, the Qing would need him to function in the maritime borderland instead of Beijing.[145] In other words, although the Qing had many ministers from Southern Fujian, all of whom had close relationships with Zheng Zhilong, the Qing Empire had not fully understood Zheng Zhilong's unique role as a broker in mediating the overseas world.

In 1646, the empire sent a messenger, Zheng Zhilong's son-in-law, to convince Zheng Zhilong to surrender.[146] A few months later, soon after the Longwu court collapsed, Zheng Zhilong decided to surrender to the Qing. In 1647, the Qing claimed the consolidation of Fujian.[147] Although the Qing promised to give him the same status and title, he was moved, kidnapped, or arrested after he met the Manchu commander in Fuzhou in 1646 and was returned to Beijing (kidnapping was the Qing's standard approach to handling the warlords during this period).[148]

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[144] See Huang Yilong (Huang Yinong), "Wuqiao bingbian: Ming Qing dingge de yitiao zhongyao daohuoxian," *Qinghua xuebao* 42, no. 1 (2012), pp. 79–133.

[145] For instance, the Qing required Zheng Zhilong to order his subordinates, including Zheng Cai and Shi Fu, to assault the Southern Ming. In 1647, Zheng Zhilong asked Shi Fu and many generals to convince local powers in Guangdong and Fujian to surrender; otherwise, they attacked and captured their castles. See Ling Xue, *Nantian heng*, vol. 2, p. 39; Wongzhou laoming, *Haidong yishi*, vol. 12, p. 1; Wang Guangfu, *Hanghai yiwen*, in Chenhu yishi, *Jingtuo yishi*, pp. 3-4; Chen Yanyi, *Shiwen daji*, vol. 5, p. 2; Meichun yeshi, *Luqiao jiwen*, vol. Xia, pp. 104–105; Xu Nai, *Xiadian jinian*, vol. 14, p. 658; Huang Daozhou, *Huang Zhangpu ji*, Voil. 5, pp. 22–23, vol. 6, pp. 18–20; *Mingshi*, vol. 276, pp. 7080–7081.

[146] Replying to the messenger, Zheng Zhilong promised to surrender after he controlled Guangdong. See *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, p. 1; *Qing Shizu shilu*, vol. 17, p. 156.

[147] The empire implied several points in an official announcement. For instance, it indicated that the lineages and influential people collected tax themselves. Fujian was located between mountains and ocean, so many lineages and powerful elites dominated local societies. Also, because Fujian was close to the overseas states, many

After Zheng Zhilong departed from Southern Fujian, Zheng Cai collaborated with the Southern Ming to replicate the brokerage left by Zheng Zhilong, considered a trophy and hotly contested by those militarily qualified (Zheng Cai and Zheng Chenggong). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Zheng Cai joined Zheng Zhilong's troops immediately after the latter conscripted in Kaopu in 1628. During the late Ming period, Zheng Cai was one of Zheng Zhilong's trusted generals—but they were not related. During the Ming–Qing transition, the Southern Ming court appointed Zheng Cai as a naval commander, making him one of the most powerful commanders.

Before the Longwu court's fall in 1646, Zheng Cai had foreseen its collapse; therefore, he went to Zhejiang and Northern Fujian to support Prince Lu's court. In 1646, when Zheng Zhilong in Beijing asked Zheng Cai to capture Prince Lu, Zheng Cai rejected the order and instead became a prime minister in the Prince Lu campaign, which located in the coastal islands of Zhejiang and Fujian. Zheng Cai's powerful navy and his experience of the maritime world were valuable for Prince Lu's court, so the ministers welcomed his participation.

During this period, Zheng Cai fought against the Qing from the islands; his targets included the essential ports, such as Haicheng, because these were the commercial network's

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people migrated overseas. Lastly, the Qing welcomed some states which had a close relationship with Fujian, such as Japan, Siam, Vietnam, and Ryukyu, to "pay the fee (納款)," instead of pay tribute, and the empire would treat them as same as Korea. See *Qing Shizu shilu*, vol. 30, pp. 249–251.

[148] For instance, Zou Menggeng (左夢庚) was a powerful warlord in North China, and he was moved to Beijing as well. See *Qing Shizu shilu*, vol. 40, p. 323.

trading posts.[149] In 1647, Zheng Cai controlled the two most important naval bases—Xiamen and Jinmen. In addition to being a military supporter, Zheng Cai's primary task for Prince Lu's court was to communicate with foreign powers—much like Zheng Zhilong did in the late Ming and Longwu court.

Between 1648 and 1649, Zheng Cai sent an envoy to Japan demanding military support. Furthermore, he demanded that the Ryukyu Kingdom provide sulfur for their weaponry. Simultaneously, he continued to trade with the VOC in Taiwan because he controlled Xiamen and Jinmen's commercial centers.[150] In other words, mediating between a Chinese power and foreign powers and holding the most powerful navy in China at that time, Zheng Cai replicated Zheng Zhilong's model, satisfying the Southern Ming's demands and purposes.

Zheng Zhilong's lineage ultimately recaptured the brokerage in 1650. Between 1644 and 1656, the Qing and Southern Ming continued the brokerage because no one created a new model until 1656, when the Qing and Huang's cooperation produced one based on Zheng Zhilong's model (through the retention of Huang Wu). When Zheng Cai controlled the brokerage, Zheng Zhilong's subordinates and relatives likely had no choice but to work with him; for instance, Zheng Chenggong was garrisoned in Gulangyu (鼓浪嶼) and joined Zheng Cai's expedition to Haicheng.[151] Because Zheng Cai, an outsider to the Zheng lineage, could control brokerage, the Zheng lineage attempted to seize it back. During this period, Zheng lineage members worked together, including Zheng Zhilong, Zheng Hongkui, and Zheng Chenggong, to challenge Zheng

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[149] Cha Jizou, *Zuiwei lu*, Ji 18, p. 18; Ji Liuqi, *Mingji nan lue* 明季南略, vol. 2, p. 44; Ling Xue, *Nantian heng*, vol. 2, p. 16; Wen Ruilin and Li Yao, *Nanjiang yishi*, vol. 3, p. 36.

[150] Kawaguchi Choju, *Taiwan geju zhi*, pp. 31–32; Huang Zongxi, *Xingchao lu*, p. 7; Shao Tingcai, *Dongnan jishi*, vol. 11, p. 4. About this history, the best study so far is still Ishihara Michihiro, *Meisue chinhachi nihon koisi no kenkyu* (Tokyo: Fujiya, 1945).

[151] Xia Lin, *Haiji jiyao*, vol. 1, pp. 4–5.

Cai's power. In Beijing, Zheng Zhilong delivered important information, which was secretly passed from the central court to the south.[152]

Zheng Zhibao (鄭芝豹, ?–?), one of Zheng Zhilong's brothers, was in charge of communication between north and south. In the south, Zheng Hongkui, Zheng Chenggong, and others endeavored to enhance their power to assault and besiege cities, such as Quanzhou, Haicheng, Tong'an, Tongshan, and Zhangpu—without Zheng Cai's support.[153] In other words, between 1647 and 1650, the Zheng family organized a concrete network among its members, including information providers, information deliverers, and war practitioners.

It appears that the control of Zheng Zhilong's brokerage had passed back into the Zheng lineage—but who would dominate it? In this section, I argue that Zheng Chenggong, who had not automatically become Zheng Zhilong's legitimate successor, competed against his uncles and ultimately replicated the brokerage. Among the war practitioners, Zheng Hongkui and Zheng Chenggong were the two most crucial leaders. However, Zheng Chenggong had a natural advantage over Zheng Hongkui; as mentioned in the previous chapter, Zheng Hongkui was an outstanding naval commander and the first member to earn an educational degree. In the Southern Ming court, Zheng Hongkui had a stellar reputation and was in charge of the essential task of commanding the navy. However, no sources indicate that Zheng Hongkui had a better understanding of the world overseas.

On the contrary, Zheng Chenggong grew up in Japan and had shown his aptitude for naval warfare in 1647, when he defeated the Qing navy and occupied many cities along the coast. In 1648, like Zheng Zhilong and Zheng Cai, Zheng Chenggong wrote a letter to Nagasaki requesting military support. The reason Zheng Chenggong only wrote to Nagasaki when Zheng Zhilong and Zheng Cai wrote to both Nagasaki and Satsuma was that Zheng Chenggong's brother and his mother's family were living in Nagasaki and Hirado at that time; therefore, he may have had a better relationship with Nagasaki than his father and Zheng Cai.[154] In other words, Zheng Chenggong had shown his ability to mediate with the overseas world (and his naval skills) from 1647 to 1650, while Zheng Hongkui was just an ordinary commander. Zheng Chenggong did not get military support from other states—just financial support.

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[152] Zheng Zhilong had an unbelievably well-organized spy network, and every one had their duties but did not knew each other. See *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, pp. 151–154, 190–193, 271–275, 298–301.

[153] Shao Tingchao, *Dongnan jishi*, pp. 157–158. Xia Lin, *Haiji jiyao*, vol. 1, pp. 4–6. Kawaguchi Choju, *Taiwan geju zhi*, p. 32; *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, p. 123.

In 1650, the Zheng lineage, led by Zheng Hongkui and Zheng Chenggong, suddenly attacked Xiamen, capturing both it and Jinmen. They killed Zheng Cai's brother and placed Zheng Cai under house arrest. After the battle, Zheng Chenggong claimed, "The two islands were originally my lands but occupied by Zheng Cai brother. I could not tolerate this."[155] From this account, it seems that Zheng Chenggong tried to legitimize his role as his father's successor even though Zheng Zhilong was still alive and had not yet nominated anyone. Thus, the Zheng lineage controlled the brokerage again. Defeating Zheng Cai was not, of course, accomplished by a single man; therefore, a new crisis arose: Who was the head of the brokerage? Zheng Zhilong? Zheng Hongkui? Or Zheng Chenggong?

Infighting within the Zheng lineage resulted in Zheng Chenggong's eventual monopoly. After 1650, Zheng Chenggong and Zheng Hongkui were two of the most influential generals in the maritime borderland. Although the former did have particular advantages over the latter, he was still a young man with a lesser reputation. Zheng Chenggong had to find an excellent chance to seize the brokerage and monopolize it. In 1651, after Zheng Chenggong had headed to Guangdong and asked his uncle, Zheng Zhiwan (鄭芝莞, ?–?), to defend Xiamen, Ma Degong (馬得功, ?–?), a Qing general, attacked Xiamen with the help of Zheng Zhibao's ships, plundering Zheng Chenggong's properties.[156] When the Qing army approached Xiamen, Zheng Zhiwan sailed out to sea instead of defending Xiamen.[157]

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[154] Kawaguchi Choju, *Taiwan geju zhi*, p. 31; Huang Zongxi, *Riben qishi ji*, in Peng Sunyi, *Jinghai zhi*, p. 104–107.

[155] Kawaguchi Choju, *Taiwan geju zhi*, pp. 32-33; Chen Yan, *Taiwan tongji*, pp. 30–31. Xia Lin, *Haiji jiyao*, vol. 1, pp. 7; Cha Jizou, *Zuewei lu*, Biography 9, p. 49.

Meanwhile, Zheng Hongkui did not fight back against the Qing. Instead, he went to a coastal village, Baisha, built a castle, and settled there until his death.[158] After Zheng Chenggong received this news, he soon withdrew from Guangdong to Xiamen. However, the Qing and Zheng's uncles had seized his properties and destroyed his bases. This event gave Zheng Chenggong a reasonable excuse to punish his influential uncles. He executed Zheng Zhiwan; Zheng Hongkui fled to his base, and Zheng Zhibao also returned to his hometown with other family members.[159] After this event, Zheng Chenggong monopolized and controlled the Zheng lineage's military and commercial power in Southern Fujian. Arguably, Zheng Chenggong had finally become the most viable broker and successor to his father's role.

How did the Qing react to the brokerage competition? In this section, I argue that the Qing acknowledged the importance of the brokerage in the maritime borderland and decided to recruit Zheng Chenggong as the empire's broker. After 1651, Zheng Chenggong appears to have been the only choice if the Qing hoped to recruit a broker; it seems that eventually, they saw the need for such an appointment. The Qing were from Inner Asia and had little understanding of the coastal area. For instance, in Beijing, the Qing court did not know Jinmen was an island—nor did they know each coastal stronghold's distance.[160] This knowledge shortfall constrained the Qing's consolidation in Fujian. Zheng Chenggong knew that naval warfare and the coast were two critical factors for his bargaining with the Qing. Therefore, in 1652, Zheng Chenggong captured Haicheng and marched to its mountainous periphery; at the end of 1652, Zheng Chenggong besieged Zhangzhou. This siege resulted in a bloody famine in which the populace resorted to cannibalism to survive; over 700,000 people died.

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[156] Lu Ruoteng, *Dao yi shi*, p. 36.

[157] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, p. 49.

[158] Kawaguchi Choju, *Taiwan geju zhi*, p. 33-35; Xia Lin, *Haiji jiyao*, vol. 1, p. 8; *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, p. 7.

[159] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, pp. 11–13.

Zheng Chenggong soon retreated to Haicheng while the Qing's army approached Zhangzhou. Zheng Chenggong avoided confronting the Qing's huge army while securing his occupation because Zheng Zhilong continued to leak military secrets to him from Beijing.[161] After this battle, the Qing court decided to recruit Zheng Chenggong and ask him to garrison in Southern Fujian like a feudatory, rather than going to Beijing if he wished to surrender, like Zheng Zhilong.[162]

Ultimately, in 1653, the Qing could not endure the war of attrition, so although Zheng Chenggong still clashed with the Qing in Southern Fujian, the Qing court ennobled Zheng Chenggong, Zheng Zhilong, Zheng Honkui, and Zheng Zhibao. Among them, Zheng Chenggong was the only one allowed to garrison in Southern Fujian.[163] In other words, the Qing had privileged Zheng Chenggong as its broker with the maritime world.

Zheng Zhilong's model was replicable under a qualified candidate—Zeng Cai and Zheng Chenggong's successes proved it could be done. The brokerage was not a unique enterprise instated by Zheng Zhilong; nevertheless, Zheng Zhilong and his lineage eventually dominated the brokerage because of the cooperation between Southern Fujian and Beijing. Unexpectedly for Zheng Zhilong, the one who eventually controlled the model was not his trusted and experienced brother, Zheng Hongkui, but his young and ambitious half-Chinese son, Zheng Chenggong. Nevertheless, Zheng Zhilong's leaked information and Zheng Chenggong's unceasing wars were destined to exhaust the Qing's patience.

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[160] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, pp. 280–284.

[161] For instance, Zheng Zhilong in 1656 had sent messengers to warn Zheng Chenggong, "the Qing's great army will go to Fujian soon." See *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Ji, no. 3, pp. 292–293.

[162] Kawaguchi Choju, *Taiwan geju zhi*, pp. 35–36.

[163] Kawaguchi Choju, *Taiwan geju zhi*, pp. 36-37; *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Ding, no. 1, p. 85.

4.3 The Qing's "Man Friday": Huang Wu

The previous section suggests that Zheng Chenggong eventually controlled the brokerage left by his father. Zheng Zhilong worked with Zheng Chenggong by leaking top-secret information from the central court to give the latter a head start in negotiations and military actions. By using this information, Zheng Chenggong successfully expanded his influence and control in Southern Fujian. Zheng Zhilong and Zheng Chenggong's disloyalty frustrated the Qing: what would they do? In this section, I argue that Zheng Zhilong's brokerage was replicable; therefore, the Qing founded its brokerage against Zheng Chenggong's based not only on Zheng Zhilong's model but also on its long tradition of employing brokers. This broker was Huang Wu (黃梧, 1618–1674). He followed Zheng Zhilong's pattern in maritime and social affairs, but this time, the Manchu Qing Empire poured its Inner Asian institutions into its brokerage.

Although Huang Wu still followed Zheng Zhilong's model, guaranteeing his power in local society, the Qing's brokerage had changed in its nature—the broker was no longer a mediator between the Qing and the overseas world, but a naval commander and powerful local actor in the fight against Zheng Chenggong, the Southern Ming's broker whose primary duty was negotiations between the Southern Ming and the overseas world.

Zheng Zhilong and Zheng Chenggong's disloyalty to the Qing led directly to the Qing's brokerage innovations based on the Zheng model. To begin with, Zheng Chenggong was a two-faced operator during this period. Between 1652 and 1656, he played a duplicitous game between the Southern Ming and Qing.

On the one hand, he negotiated with the two authorities to obtain the most substantial benefits. For instance, Zheng Chenggong not only requested multiple prefectures as his fiefs but had once requested independent statehood in Southern Fujian—much like Joseon (Korea).[164] To rope Zheng Chenggong into the Southern Ming campaign, the Yongli court—the last Southern Ming court—appointed Zheng Chenggong as the Prince of Chao, the highest noble rank in the Ming hierarchy. They requested he join the Southern Ming's expedition to Guangdong. Zheng Chenggong agreed to join the expedition, although he never approached Guangzhou when the Southern Ming army besieged it. Instead, he endeavored to loot and collect resources, such as grain and weapons, to enhance his power on Guangdong and Fujian's border.[165]

Simultaneously, in Beijing in 1656, many ministers accused Zheng Zhilong of disloyal behaviors, such as sending messengers to Fujian and sending secrets to his brothers and son. Eventually, one of Zheng Zhilong's servants became a witness, confirming all these accusations.[166] Zheng Zhilong and his family were arrested and put into jail in advance of exile.[167] Did the Qing learn a lesson from Zheng's disloyalty? The lesson was that it would be even worse when a powerful broker was on the frontier, but the Qing court could not ensure his loyalty. Fortunately, the Qing had ample experience guaranteeing the brokers' loyalty: using institutional methods to ensure the connection between the central court and brokers and holding family in Beijing as hostages.

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[164] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, pp. 82–86, 369–376.

[165] Yang Ying, *Congzheng shilu*, p. 86.

[166] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian* vol. 1, pp. 348–352.

[167] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian* vol. 1, pp. 452–455, 382–384, 404–407; *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 2, pp. 199–200.

The case of the Zhengs' disloyalty stimulated the Qing Empire to innovate a hybrid structure, replicating Zheng Zhilong's model but also adding its experience in recruiting brokers with Inner Asian elements. Between 1646 and 1656, the Qing had already acknowledged that it lacked a powerful navy in the region to eliminate opponents—especially those sheltering on islands—efficiently. The Qing had encountered this kind of crisis in the 1620s when the Ming hired Portuguese artillerists to train Chinese troops to use Western artillery. The deadly artillerists became a huge obstacle to the Qing's invasion; therefore, it sought opportunities to summon the Chinese artillerists to force its enemies' capitulation. Eventually, the Ming's poor logistics forced the Chinese artillerists to rebel and surrender to the Qing in 1631. The surrender provided the Qing with skills, techniques, and artillery knowledge, remedying its weakness on the battlefield.

Similarly, in the 1650s, the Qing lacked naval power against its opponents in the coastal areas. It needed a navy to help it in the same way it needed the artillerists. In 1656, relations between the Qing and Zheng Chenggong became incendiary; war was inevitable. The accusation that Zheng Zhilong leaked information to Zheng Chenggong, Zheng Chenggong's expansion in Southern Fujian, and the Southern Ming's expedition led to demands for a new broker. To prepare for the possible war, the Qing needed someone to replace Zheng Chenggong; therefore, the Qing recruited Huang Wu as its broker against Zheng Chenggong's maritime power. This recruitment also suggests that the brokerage was replicable. In 1656, Huang Wu, Zheng

Chenggong's garrisoned commander in Zhangzhou surrendered to the Qing. Huang Wu was from Pinghe (平和), a newly established county in the mountainous periphery. His family, while claiming their ancestors were from a military household, was ungoverned. Huang Wu's family was located in the rural mountains and gathered in a *tu lou*.[168] They tried to shape a lineage in the late Ming period; therefore, they invited Huang Daozhou to Pinghe.

On the one hand, Huang Daozhou could be a tutor for children. On the other hand, Huang Daozhou could serve as a mediator to combine the Huang family in Pinghe and Huang Daozhou's lineage in Tongshan. Although Huang Wu had one of the most outstanding Confucian scholars as his teacher, having no interest in studying, Huang Wu joined Zheng Chenggong's army during the Ming–Qing transition. He soon became Zheng Chenggong's most reliable general and garrisoned at Zhangzhou and Haicheng during the 1650s. In 1656, Huang Wu brought control over the important cities of Zhangzhou and Haicheng (and over 300 Western cannons) for his new overlords because Zheng Chenggong had tried to execute him.[169]

Huang Wu's surrender was crucial because the Qing had an experienced naval commander with a rich understanding of the maritime world. Huang Wu had been a trusted advisor of Zheng Chenggong, so he brought top-secret intelligence and a deep understanding of the workings of the Zheng's military and economic structures. For instance, he knew Zheng Zhilong's spy network's details and connections with Zheng Chenggong and his commercial organization. He understood how these organizations worked—including where they went to trade.[170] Also, Huang Wu knew the best naval generals, recommending them to the Qing campaign—for example, Shi Lang (施琅, 1621–1696), the next chapter's subject.[171]

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[168] The Huang families lived in this area and belonged to a military household. According to the familial legend, during the Yongle reign period, several Huang families migrated to Xialing (霄嶺). According to the genealogy, the ancestor who migrated to Pinghe was Yingyuan, and he was born in 1407. Therefore, he might have migrated to Pinghe during the Yongle or Xuande reign periods. Jiangxia Xialing Huang Shi Yuanyuan Yanjiuhui ed., *Pinghe Xialing Huangshi zupu* (Zhangzhou: Jiangxia Xialing Huang Shi Yuanyuan Yanjiuhui, 2006), p. 93.

[169] He was Huang Daozhou's student during the late Ming—a coincidental fact is that when Huang Wu surrendered to the Qing, it was at the time that many Qing ministers who were Huang Daozhou's students accused Zheng Zhilong of disloyalty in the court. He also brought about 1,700 soldiers to surrender. See *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Ding, no. 2, p. 159. After he surrendered, the Qing Empire allowed Huang Wu to retain his 5,000 soldiers and incorporate the surrendered soldiers and men under his command. For instance, in 1664, a general surrendered to the Qing Empire with 2,600 soldiers, and his request was approved that he and his men would be arranged under Huang Wu's command. In 1664, Huang Wu had 5,000 soldiers in five battalions. *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 11, p. 177, vol. 13, p. 199; *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp.72–73.

Moreover, as a broker whose primary task was to cope with the Zheng's maritime power, Huang Wu proposed the so-called *ping hai wu ce* (five strategies of pacifying the sea, 平海五策) to terminate Zheng Chenggong's financial support, emphasize Zheng's military weakness, and initiate the defeat of the Zheng.[172]

Finally, the most significant policy suggested by Huang Wu was *qian jie ling* (coastal exclusion policy, 遷界令) (see Figure 4.1). This policy, similar to the policy of *xu di xi min* during the Ming period, moved people from the coastal areas to the hinterland and ruined buildings and fields in the coastal areas. This policy's core was to terminate the possible support and smuggling between the coastal areas and Zheng Chenggong. Although the Qing eventually agreed to carry out this policy after Zheng Chenggong headed to Taiwan, this policy had an equal impact on the Qing's coastal regions' local society. Huang Wu's functions and contributions were what the Qing needed when Zheng Chenggong was no longer the Qing's agent in this region.

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[170] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, pp. 343, 348–352; Zhang Yan, "Zheng Chenggong de wushan," *Taiwan wenxian*, vol. 36, no. 2 (1985), pp. 15–33.

[171] Because of Huang Wu's reputation in the Zheng camp and distinctive position in the Qing, Huang Wu was a crucial broker for Zheng's associates, who planned to surrender to the Qing. For instance, Wan Yi (萬儀) and Wan Lu (萬祿) surrendered to Huang Wu. With the Wan brother's assistance, Huang Wu captured many generals, soldiers, and families and ruined the walled city and houses in Tongshan. Besides those surrendered commanders, the court rewarded Huang Wu significantly. See *Qing shengzu shilu*, vol. 4, pp. 80–81. Moreover, Huang Wu recommended many naval commanders, such as Shi Lang, because he was young and understood how to build ships and flags and dispatch armies. Shi Lang had surrendered in 1651 but did not be utilized by the Qing. Xia Lin, *Haiji jiyao*, vol. 1, p. 9.

[172] See Xia Lin, *Haiji jiyao*, vol. 1, p. 17.

Figure 4-1: The Boundary of the Coastal Exclusion Policy



However, one of Huang Wu's recruitment's most intriguing aspects was that the Qing brought its Inner Asian institutions into the maritime brokerage. The Zheng lineage's disloyalty was the central issue that the Qing needed to address to construct a new brokerage and ensure brokers' service in the borderland. In this section, I argue that the most critical factor was that the Qing employed Huang Wu as a broker and poured inner Asian characteristics into this brokerage—treating him the same as the Mongolian princes.[173]

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[173] The Qing had ever planned to establish another equal position as Haicheng gong in Quanzhou, called Tongan hou (同安侯). See Ni Zaitian, *Xu Ming jishi benmo*, Voil. 7, p. 182. Also, a genealogy states, "according to the example of Mongolian prince, members of the family should go to Beijing and meet the emperor." See *Huangshi Shilingfang zupu*, no page. *Qing shengzu shilu*, vol. 67, p. 859.

According to the Qing code, a Mongolian prince acted like a royal member of the Qing imperial clan in rites, privileges, and all behaviors.[174] After 1656, Huang Wu obeyed the rules, enjoying certain privileges intended only for Mongolian princes. For instance, as with most princes, Huang Wu's family was required to settle in Beijing, and his heirs would become imperial guardians. These two facts guaranteed the brokers' loyalty and discipline because their families were effectively held hostage in Beijing.[175] Moreover, under Qing laws, the court prohibited intermarriage between Chinese and bannermen. However, even though the Huang family was legally and ethnically Chinese, the Qing emperors allowed them to marry banner females.[176]

Indeed, it seems special permission was extended from the emperors to the Huang family. However, it is not surprising that the Qing treated the Huang family under the rule of "Mongolian prince" because the prince's design was not just used for Qing's noble Mongolian allies; this strategy was one of the Qing's standard approaches. During the Qing period, Mongolian collaboration was a vital component of the Qing Empire's rule and legitimacy. To cooperate with Mongolian princes, the Qing used intermarriage as an approach for maintaining the connection.[177] Finally, Huang Wu and his heirs were given many gifts by emperors, mostly representing Inner Asian symbols or that were only given to non-Chinese, such as Mongolian princes and the Dalai Lama. The emperor gave Huang Wu many fine bows, arrows, and saddles representing the Manchu and Mongolian military tradition.[178] Therefore, in many aspects, Huang

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[174] See *DaQing huidian*, vol. 41, pp. 9–12.

[175] Besides Huang Wu, all the heirs of Haicheng gong had served as imperial guardians in the palace.

[176] *Huangshi Shilingfang zupu*, no page.

[177] About the intermarriage between Manchu and Mongolians, Du Jiaji's book is perhaps the most comprehensive in academia. See Du Jiaji, *Qingchao Man Meng lianyin yanjiu* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2003).

[178] These gifts were python skin, jade belt, exquisite quiver, an arrow with the carved feather, formal robe with five-claw python figure, and emperor's robe with golden silk and python skin. Moreover, the gifts from the emperor to Haicheng gong were noteworthy because they might suggest how the empire and emperor regarded

Wu and his family enjoyed unique treatment from the Qing court. For the empire, the principal purpose of this treatment was to ensure the maritime brokers' loyalty after failing to control Zheng Chenggong. For the Huang family, this noble title and institutions unintentionally brought impacts on the family—which would be discussed further in latter chapter.

Zheng Zhilong's model turned his focus to local society once his power became stable, constructing his lineage and participating in social affairs to ensure his status. Huang Wu followed suit. In this section, I argue that Huang Wu built the Huang lineage and made social elites and commoners accept his status as a broker from Southern Fujian's peripheral area. First, Huang Wu came from Pinghe, where his family tried to found a lineage. However, before its formal development, the Ming–Qing transition threw Southern Fujian into chaos.

The Ming government established its rule, officially incorporating the region under Ming authority in 1518. Although the governmental facilities were located in another division (because

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this emerging broker. In 1665, Huang Wu received gifts, including python skin (大蟒), mink coat (貂裘), and saddle (鞍轡) because of his success conquering Jinmen and Xiamen. *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 16, p. 240. In the record of a genealogy compiled in 1910, the compilers narrated that Huang Wu had been rewarded the coat of python skin (蟒袍), jade belt (玉帶), mink coat (貂裘), saddle (鞍馬), and carved bow (雕弓). *Huangshi Shilingfang zupu*, no page. In the official record, the Qing emperor gave Huang Fangshi (黃芳世), who succeeded his cousin's title as a duke because his cousin's family was eliminated at Zhangzhou in 1675, some items, including formal cloth made by python skin, saddle, bow, and arrow (蟒緞朝服。鞍馬弓矢). In the genealogy of 1910, the family described that Huang Fangshi received several items, such as a golden helmet (金盔), golden armor (金甲), gem (寶石), exquisite quiver (玲瓏撒袋), carved bow (雕弓), golden head of arrow (金鏃), arrow with carved feather (雕翎箭), golden sword (鍍金刀), yellow seating saddle (黃坐褥鞍韂), formal robe with five-claw python figure (五爪蟒袍), official robe (掛朝衣), mink fur hat (貂帽), boots with silk sock (內緞韡襪), an emperor's robe with golden silk, and python skin (御穿織金蟒袍). *Huangshi Shilingfang zupu*; *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 67, p. 859. These gifts were 大蟒 玉帶 玲瓏撒袋 雕翎箭 五爪蟒袍 內緞韡襪 織金蟒袍 黃坐褥鞍韂. Exploring *Qing Shi Lu*, each item was only given to certain characters. For instance, besides Huang Wu, 大蟒 had been a gift for only the Dutch king, Sun Kewan (孫可望), and the Vietnamese king. See *Qing Shizu shilu*, vol. 103, p. 803–804; vol. 119, p. 922; *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 2, p. 58. Before the Kangxi period, 玉帶 was the gift for Mongolian princes, feudatories, Dalai Lama, and Manchu generals only. See *Qing Taizhong shilu*, vol. 11, p. 154; vol. 25, p. 322; vol. 45, p. 593, vol. 54, p. 725, vol. 60, p. 824; vol. 64, p. 888; *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 4, p. 55; vol. 18, p. 165; vol. 20, p. 175; vol. 38, p. 310; vol. 44, p. 352; 玲瓏撒袋 only was a gift for Korean king, feudatories, Mongolian princes, and Manchu princes. See *Qing Taizu shilu*, vol. 51, pp. 683; *Qing Shizu shilu*, vol. 4, p. 55; *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 69, p. 883; 雕翎箭 was never given to others. 五爪蟒袍 and 織金蟒袍 were used only by cin wang. See *DaQing huidian*, vol. 48, p. 2.

the Ming relied on other lineages), the Huang lineage sought governance in the late Ming period. The Huang attempted to do so via the household system, so the family constructed its lineage in 1637. To this end, it invited Huang Daozhou to Pinghe to help, because Huang Daozhou's reputation and connection with the Huang family in the core of Southern Fujian could legitimate the Huang family in Pinghe, making his family part of the Huang lineage, which was likely the largest lineage in Southern Fujian.[179] However, this coalescence was not finalized, and the Ming–Qing transition came to cause social disorder in Pinghe.

After Huang Wu became the broker in 1656, he returned his focus to his lineage again. In 1657, one year after he was ennobled, Huang Wu and his relatives in Pinghe compiled a document recording their genealogy. This genealogical document (which will be called "genealogy" in this dissertation) claimed that the Huang family lost a separate genealogical document during the Ming–Qing transition. Regardless of whether this was true, the story of the lost genealogy gave Huang Wu a chance to rewrite the family history in the shape that he intended for his future descendants. Huang Wu and his relatives claimed that the compilation of the genealogy and the great ancestral hall building benefited from the emperor's support.[180] In the genealogy and the stele in the vast ancestral hall, Huang Wu repeatedly underlined his achievements—constructing his lineage and direct support from the Qing Emperor.

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[179] *Pinghe Xialing Huangshi zupu*, pp. 2–3. Huang Daozhou was from a military household in Tongshan, which was located at the coastal periphery. Huang Daozhou was perhaps the most influential Confucian scholar, philosopher, and educator in Southern Fujian during the late Ming period. Moreover, he was also an upright minister in the central government. Because of his stubbornness, he was forcibly fired and returned to Southern Fujian. When he returned to Fujian, he was invited to Pinghe to become a tutor. One of his major tasks was to teach the children of Huang families. Huang Wu was one of them receiving Huang Daozhou's philosophy. Besides teaching, Huang Daozhou's philosophy influenced the shape of the Huang lineage. Huang Daozhou was the representative of Neo-Confucianism in the late Ming, and people believed that he was one of the successors of Wang Yangming. He was a Confucian and moral exemplar. His primary philosophical idea was profoundly affected by the cultural and political movement, and his primary ethic principles were loyalty and filial piety (*zhongxiao*, 忠孝). In 1637 when he was in Pinghe, Huang Daozhou wrote a preface for all Huang lineages in the Zhangzhou area, and he emphasized that all Huang lineages shared their origin. As a result, the Huangs in Pinghe gathered together as a section in *Jiangxia Yuanyuan.* To complete the process of organizing a lineage, the Huang families in Pinghe compiled genealogy and followed Huang Daozhou's statement. This genealogy included a preface of Jiangxia Huang (江夏黃氏) written by Huang Fang (黃芳) in the Jin Dynasty. This preface emphasizes that the importance of the "five ethic (Wurun, 五倫)," and restated that descendants had to be loyal to the emperor. *Pinghe Xialing Huangshi zupu*, pp. 2–3.

After Huang Wu was ennobled, he and some family members migrated to Zhangzhou, which was, in theory, his fief. They settled in the largest residence, which had initially belonged to one of the most prominent elite's lineages located at the city center. Thereafter, Huang Wu's family was known as *Gongfu Fang* (the branch of duke residence, 公府房) in genealogy.[181] This family grew rapidly; around 1659, it had more than 200 members, including servants and men.[182] Within this family, Huang Wu established a clear hierarchy. The patriarch (家主) of this family was also the leader of the entire lineage, who would be in charge of all familial affairs.[183]

Finally, although there is no written record, elders in Zhangzhou today still tell of a tradition during the Chinese New Year, saying "since Huang Wu occupied the residence, people in Zhangzhou have celebrated Chinese New Year in front of the residence." In the elders' legend, this celebration began immediately after Huang Wu settled in Zhangzhou. He needed to establish his authority over the commoners, so he required they parade and celebrate in front of the dukes' residence to declare their allegiance. Later, this parade became one of the largest temple fairs and markets ("sėh kang iâ kue [踅公爺街]" in the local dialect). This term means "take a walk to the street of the Duke."[184] Today, although "showing allegiance to Huang Wu" exists only in oral legend, this tradition is still an essential part of Zhangzhou society. Therefore, much like Zheng Zhilong memorial archway (mentioned in the previous chapter), Huang Wu also received allegiance from the elites and people of Southern Fujian's core.

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[180] *Pinghe Xialing Huangshi zupu*, pp. 4–6. This castle is *Fang Yuan Lou* (藩垣樓).

[181] Unknown, *Gongfu Fang Genealogy*, (manuscript, read in May 31, 2016).

[182] Although Huang Wu only had 30 taels as his salary during this period, *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Jia, no. 5, p. 490.

[183] For example, in 1742, a follower of the Huang Duke family went to Beijing to deliver a message that called Huang Shijian to be the young patriarch. See *Neige Daku Dang*, Number: 194843-001.

[184] This tradition is also known as "shang gong ye jie (上公爺街)." See http://www.hxvos.com/783/2012-09/03/cms698273article.shtml and oral investigation in Zhangzhou on June 3, 2016.

Great importance was attached to the recruitment of Huang Wu. The central Asian honors are an index, I believe, of the importance the court ascribed to Huang Wu and his organization. The Qing recruited Huang Wu to replace Zheng Chenggong because of Zheng's disloyalty. The Qing used the strategy of recruiting Huang Wu by offering him the privileges of a Mongolian prince in the maritime borderland. The Qing treated Huang Wu well mainly because the Qing adopted its Inner Asian institution—the Mongolian princeship—to recruit him and fight against the Zheng power. This strategy made Huang Wu distinctive because he was the first broker to be assigned to the maritime borderland while also being treated as an Inner Asian feudatory.

Huang Wu was one of the most distinguished generals in the Zheng campaign; he knew the Zheng organization and maritime world well. His understanding could contribute to policymaking, such as *qian jie ling*, and dismissing the spy network and commercial organizations to weaken Zheng Chenggong's power. While the court treated Huang Wu like an inner Asian feudatory, he still acted as a Chinese man in society, building his lineage organization. Huang Wu rebuilt the Huang lineage by compiling his genealogy and constructing the great ancestral hall in Pinghe, his hometown.

4.4 Conclusion

During the Ming–Qing transition, the main purpose of the brokerage changed phase by phase. During the first phase (1644–1646), Zheng Zhilong was still a broker playing as a middleman and representative between the Ming and overseas powers. In the second phase

(1646–1650), the Zheng lineage competed against Zheng Cai to control the brokerage. Hence, each side showed its ability to be a broker between China and the overseas world.

In the third phase, competition within the Zheng lineage existed. Zheng Chenggong eventually won, so Zheng Zhilong, who did not prefer any side within the family—neither his son nor his brothers—decided to cooperate with the competition's final winner—as did the Qing. During this phase, the Qing still expected the broker—Zheng Chenggong—to play his role between the Qing and the overseas world. However, in the final phase, the brokerage changed in its nature: Zheng's disloyalty had exhausted the Qing's tolerance, so the Qing's new version of the brokerage aimed to deal with the issue; not between the Qing and overseas world, but with local actors fighting against Zheng Chenggong, who had been the Southern Ming's maritime broker at this point. Therefore, the brokerages changed their nature during the Ming–Qing transition (1644–1661); moreover, there was no longer only one brokerage but multiple brokerages. Zheng Chenggong's brokerage still aimed to play a role between the Southern Ming and the overseas world.

The empire's perspective required Zheng Cai, Zheng Chenggong, and Huang Wu as brokers because they could connect with maritime powers and fight against them. From the brokers' perspective, they could still gain benefits; for example, they could have the legitimate right to collect taxes from local society, rebuild their lineage, dominate their lineages, and play active roles in local society—something their ancestors could not achieve because their ancestors were marginalized within Southern Fujian society. From a societal perspective, they were simply the "incarnation" of Zheng Zhilong in the late Ming period.

Zheng Zhilong's model was replicable; after 1646, Zheng Cai managed to recreate it. In 1650, the Zheng lineage regained control of the brokerage. In 1653, Zheng Chenggong dominated it, and the Qing accepted his role, but the Zheng lineage's disloyalty made the Qing decide to create its brokerage with Huang Wu. Differing from Zheng Zhilong's model, the Qing utilized its Inner Asian elements to ensure the broker's loyalty and function. Disloyalty had become the most significant weakness for the Zheng model, giving Huang Wu Inner Asian gifts, providing him privileges, allowing him to act like a Mongolian prince, and keeping his family members in Beijing.

After years of fighting against the Qing, in 1659, Zheng Chenggong decided to attack Nanjing because he did not want to initiate war in Fujian;[185] however, his attempt failed. According to Tonio Andrade's research, after 1659, Zheng Chenggong failed to capture Nanjing because rather than attack the city, he instead besieged it until the Qing reinforcements arrived. After an epic loss in Nanjing, Zheng Chenggong returned to Southern Fujian. During this period, one of his commercial partners in Taiwan, He Bin (何斌), visited him and convinced him to capture Taiwan as a new base. Zheng Chenggong decided to head to Taiwan in 1661; his army passed a narrow strait, Lu'ermen (鹿耳門), and captured Taiwan. Then, he spent months besieging Zeelandia, eventually forcing the VOC to surrender.[186]

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[185] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 2, pp. 200–202.

[186] See Tonio Andrade, *Lost Colony*.

5 Another Side (1661–1683)

5.1 Introduction

This chapter argues that the Qing policy favored engagement with the maritime borderland, but the Qing terminated the brokerage between 1668 and 1680 because it did not need it. The Qing court had no interest in integrating Taiwan but expected to make the Zheng Regime a tributary state. In 1662, Zheng Chenggong forced the VOC to surrender after a one-year siege, moving his primary base from the coast of China to Taiwan. This conquest dramatically changed the situation in the Taiwan Strait and the nature of the brokerage. The Qing court sought to adjust its brokerage structures, looking for new brokers to handle the new situation—the enemy beyond the seas.

The Qing court's first gambit was to revamp its brokerage structure, creating a new position—Fujian Naval Admiral—and naming new brokers to fill that position: most notably, the famous Shi Lang. Its second bid was to recruit surrendered generals: the obscure Zhou Quanbin (周全斌, ?–1670) and Zheng Mingjun (鄭鳴駿, 1621–1666). However, the new brokers did not achieve what the Qing court expected; therefore, the Qing halted brokerage in 1668 and withdrew its brokers to Beijing, enrolling them under the Eight Banner System. After this, the court could negotiate with the Zheng Regime without obstruction from the bellicose brokers. Brokerage, therefore, did not exist between 1668 and 1680.

In this chapter, I argue that the brokerage was not necessary between 1668 and 1680 because the Manchu court did not need the brokers' services due to the empire's new plan concerning the Zheng in Taiwan. During this period, most Manchu officials embraced the continental perspective rather than expanding to the maritime world. The brokers were eager to recover the profitable commercial network in maritime East Asia; the key to restoring it was to capture Taiwan and bring it under the VOC's control. Although the Manchu officials in Fujian enjoyed the profits from the international trade based in Xiamen and Jinmen, they disagreed about capturing Taiwan—their idea was to leave the Zheng Regime in Taiwan alone.

The Manchu ministers in Beijing also shared similar ideas, but the Manchu court planned to build a territorial empire rather than directly conquer Taiwan. Thus, during this period, there were three opinions: the brokers' (Huang Wu, Shi Lang, Zhou Quanbin, and Zheng Zuanxu) idea of capturing Taiwan and returning it to the VOC to restore the commercial network, the Fujian Manchu officials' suggestion to leave Taiwan alone, and Bejing's Manchu ministers' desire to make the Zheng Regime a tributary state. The brokers' failed to convince the Manchu ministers—particularly when they were the central court's true power holders. Thus, when the brokerage was no longer necessary for the Manchu court, the empire terminated it.

Manchu officials in Fujian and the center of the empire all agreed to leave the Zheng Regime alone—including the Manchu ministers in the central court—except for the young and ambitious Kangxi Emperor. He did not hold power in the central court because his regent ministers were the power-holders. They decided to treat the Zheng Regime as a tributary state. The court called the brokers to Beijing after the debate; they became ordinary bannermen who could not contribute their professional knowledge and strength to the maritime borderland.

5.2 The New-rising Maritime Brokers

Although the Qing named Shi Lang to fill the Fujian naval admiral's new position dealing with maritime affairs and the Zheng in Taiwan, Shi Lang was incapable of crossing the Taiwan Strait until naval commanders from the Zheng side surrendered to the Qing. However, Shi Lang and those surrendered commanders' plans to conquer Taiwan conflicted with the Manchu officials' plans—they were satisfied with Jinmen and Xiamen's occupation and the international trade from the two islands. The Manchu officials agreed with the brokers' expedition plan, but they did not actively support their expeditions. Their outlook, and brokers' incapability, resulted in failed expeditions.

In 1661, the Qing Empire faced a new complication when Zheng Chenggong moved his primary base to Taiwan; the Qing needed naval generals to defend the Zheng Regime's coast. The Qing's recruitment of Huang Wu as a broker successfully reduced Zheng Chenggong's power on the Fujian coast. In 1659, Zheng Chenggong led the navy to the Yangzi River; his target was Nanjing. Zheng Chenggong believed that Nanjing's capture would inspire the Ming supporters to join his campaign while also symbolizing the restoration of Ming sovereignty. He explained that he launched an expedition to Nanjing because he no longer sought to destroy his homeland of Fujian. However, Zheng Chenggong's power had been weakened by Huang Wu's policymaking—especially the destruction of Zheng's commercial network. Zheng Chenggong headed to the Yangzi River because he had to find a place for supplies; interestingly, this expedition may well have been the plan made by Zheng Zhilong in 1646 when he sent messengers to Japan. Nevertheless, after a year-long war, Zheng Chenggong eventually withdrew to Fujian in 1660.

After Zheng Chenggong returned to Southern Fujian, his primary bases were Xiamen and Jinmen. Although he lost most of his soldiers and resources in the Nanjing battle, his powerful navy was still superior to the Qing's; he could still defeat the latter led by a Manchu commander. However, the shortage of resources eventually left Zheng Chenggong with no choice but to take He Bin's (何斌, ?–?) offer to seize Taiwan. In 1661, Zheng Chenggong began his journey to the island. Although his army was once stranded in Penghu by winds, Zheng Chenggong again took the risk—successfully passing the narrow waterway and landing in Taiwan. He soon captured the city and fought the VOC. Afterward, he besieged Zeelandia Castle.[187] In 1662, Zheng Chenggong finally captured Zeelandia and established his authority in Taiwan under the Ming Dynasty's name.

The Qing, also in 1661, had high expectations of its navy and naval specialists when Zheng Chenggong led his army to Taiwan. The Qing believed that this expedition would succeed, according to information collected by the coastal officials. Following Zheng Chenggong's departure to Taiwan, officials on Fujian and Guangdong's coast sent spies to investigate Taiwan and Zheng Chenggong's army. They all delivered the same message: Zheng Chenggong would soon defeat the VOC and occupy Taiwan as a new base.

In 1662, because Zheng Chenggong had settled in Taiwan, the Qing requested the use of the navy against Zheng's power, establishing the Fujian naval admiral (福建水師提督) position to respond. The admiral was responsible for the navy in Fujian and overseas affairs; in this sense, this position was similar to the Zheng Zhilong's position of *fu yi guan* under the Ming.[188] The first question for the Qing court: who should be the admiral? As the broker and feudatory of Zhangzhou, Huang Wu was perhaps one of the most qualified candidates; however, he knew that his naval skills were not as refined as those of Shi Lang, whom he had recommended as his deputy in charge of naval warfare in 1656. As a result, Huang Wu recommended Shi Lang to the Qing court to become the first Fujian naval admiral.[189] Huang Wu's recommendation was sound, so the court agreed to appoint Shi Lang as the admiral and asked him to garrison in Haicheng to be responsible for naval affairs.[190]

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[187] See Tonio Andrade, *Lost Colony*.

[188] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 6, p. 115, vol. 7, p. 130.

[189] Jiang Risheng, *Taiwan waiji*, vol. 4, p. 154; *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 2, pp. 503–505.

After Shi Lang became admiral, he recruited a navy to replace the Qing's official navy. Shi Lang had indicated that although the empire had founded a navy, this imperial navy was unsuitable—the mariners did not understand naval warfare because of poor training and could not acclimate to Fujian.[191] Therefore, Shi Lang personally financed and built 160 ships, hired over 3,000 seafarers, trained these recruits as mariners, and purchased armor and weapons. His experience as Zheng's general gave him the necessary experience preparing equipment, ships, and uniforms.[192]

Indeed, Shi Lang was likely the most experienced naval commander in the Qing campaign. Before 1664, however, his military action focused on Jinmen and Xiamen because he could not lead his vessels from Southern Fujian to Taiwan. After 1664, Shi Lang suddenly launched two expeditions within half a year, but all failed because of unexpected winds. What happened in 1664 to cause Shi Lang to sail beyond Jinmen and Xiamen? Two more experienced naval commanders—Zhou Quanbin and Zheng Mingjun—switched sidesfrom the Zheng campaign to the Qing; their understanding of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait gave Shi Lang faith. Zheng Mingjun surrendered in 1663 and supplied the Qing with a well-trained navy with handpicked weapons and ships, precisely what the Qing needed.[193] His brother, Zheng Tai (鄭泰, 1612–1663), one of Zheng Jing's chief supporters in 1662's infighting, had proposed surrendering to the Qing and dominating the trade based in Xiamen and Jinmen.

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[190] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 6, p. 118.

[191] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 2, pp.503-505。

[192] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 2, pp.446-448; Kawaguchi Choju, *Taiwan geju zhi*, p. 34. Besides Shi Lang, other naval commanders during this period all gathered their men, ships, and weapons; wearing their uniforms, receiving their training, and flagging their banners. The only stipulation from the empire was that a supervisor would monitor these commanders. See *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 2, pp. 472–495。During this period, Zheng Mingjun's son, Zheng Zanxu (鄭纘緒, ?-?), funded 9,600 taels and Lin Shun (林順, ?–?) funded 1,054 taels to prepare ships and weapons, and Shi Lang and Huang Wu funded 8,250 taels to build 165 ships. See *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp. 205–208.

After Zheng Chenggong died in 1662, the Zheng Regime was divided into two campaigns because Zheng Chenggong did not officially appoint an heir. Zheng Chenggong's brother, Zheng Xi (鄭襲, ?–?), occupied Taiwan; Zheng Chenggong's son, Zheng Jing, controlled the island along the coast, including Jinmen and Xiamen. During this infighting, the Zheng's financial manager (Zheng Tai) in Jinmen and the most experienced commander (Zhou Quanbin) in Xiamen supported Zheng Jing. On the one hand, Zheng Jing (in 1662) proposed to surrender to the Qing and act like Joseon in maritime East Asia (based on Zheng Tai's suggestion); on the other hand, he prepared to head to Taiwan.

In 1663, Zheng Jing crossed the strait and defeated Zheng Xi in Taiwan. After Zheng Jing controlled Taiwan, Zheng Tai secretly negotiated a surrender with Sotai (李率泰, ?–1666)[194]and Geng Jimao; Zheng Tai said he would surrender if the Qing allowed him to dominate the maritime trade, garrison in Jinmen and Xiamen, and the right to trade overseas. Why did Xiamen and Jinmen matter? These two islands were the most important ports in China within East Asia's maritime commercial network and the starting point of one known route from mainland China to Taiwan.[195] In other words, the Manchu officials and the brokers were all influenced by their understanding of routes and commercial networks all around the maritime world, explaining why the Manchu officials and brokers all made efforts to capture these two islands. In other words, Zheng Tai embraced the idea that a peaceful relationship between the Zheng and Qing was possible if the latter allowed him to act like Zheng Zhilong. Zheng Tai's idea could also explain why Zheng Tai had once convinced Zheng Jing to stand peacefully with the Qing Empire before Zheng Jing launched the battle against his uncle.

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[193] According to one report, Zheng Mingjun brought 137 ships, 431 officers and generals, 5,300 soldiers, 10,130 women and children, 2,000 armors, 300 big cannons, and 403 small cannons. Zheng Mingjun also sent 48 ships with 2,000 soldiers to Taiwan and other islands to recruit men to surrender. See *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp. 38–43.

[194] Although most of Qing records uses "Li Shuai-tai" to refer his name, his really name should be Sotai. Sotai is a Manchu-style name, which was given by Sotai's father, Li Yongfang. In other words, his true name should not be Sotai in Manchu language. Nevertheless, people usually gave his family name in most of the records. In this dissertation, I prefer to use his true name, Sotai, instead of Li Shuaitai.

[195] This is the analysis presented by Cheng Weichung based on Dutch sailing data. See Cheng Weichung (Zheng

When Zheng Tai proposed surrender in exchange for trade privilege, a different attitude between the central court and Fujian disrupted Zheng Tai's plan. Although Geng Jimao and Sotai agreed with Zheng Tai's proposal, the central court asked Zheng Tai to move his force from the islands to the mainland and abandon the islands; that is, the central court still embraced the continental idea—emphasizing on the familiar lands rather than the unfamiliar seas. Zheng Tai was confused, so he tried to present his requests again; unfortunately, the secret negotiation was noticed by Zheng Jing, who arrested Zheng Tai. After that, his brother, Zheng Mingjun, led his families—including the failed Zheng Xi and armies—to surrender to Quanzhou. Geng Jimao went from Fuzhou to Quanzhou to accept Zheng Mingjun's capitulation.[196] According to

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Weizhong), "Helan Dongyindu gongsi renyuan zai Taihai liang'an jian de shuiwen tance huodong (1622–1636)," Liu Xufeng ed, *Yazhou haiyu jian de xinxi chuandi yu xianghu renshi* (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2018), pp. 385–440.

[196] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 6, pp. 115–116; *Jinghai zhi*, vol. 3, p. 61; *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 2, pp. 395–398, 434–437, 459–460. Another account regarding Qing's idea toward the island on the coast could answer Zheng Tai's question. The court indicated, "(南澳地處海疆，原屬未得之地，不同於駐地山湖有賊)." *Qing chu zheng cheng gong jia zu man wen dang an yi bian* 清初鄭成功家族滿文檔案譯編, vol. 2, pp. 472–495. Zheng Tai insisted on staying in Xiamen and surrendering rather than abandoning these islands. He claimed that the Qing had approved his proposal that he would be allowed garrisoning in Xiamen. *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 2, p. 522. This letter from Zheng Tai to Geng Jimao was translated into Manchu-language and delivered to Beijing. See *Neige daku dang'an*, Number: 153266-001; *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 2, pp. 496–500. When Zheng Mingjun surrendered, the Qing provided 660 houses for him and his troops. At the same time, Zheng Jing led army to harass the coast. Then, Geng Jingzhong and Lo Sotai went to Quanzhou. Under their supervision, all men cut their hair in the Manchu style. The Qing also gave Zheng Mingjun "arrow, bow, horse, and Manchu-style clothing. See *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp. 38–43; *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 10, p. 162.

ministers' reports, Zheng Mingjun's surrender mattered to the Qing because he was the first Zheng member to surrender with well-trained mariners and ships.[197]

The Manchu officials, such as Geng Jimao and Sotai, and the brokers, such as Huang Wu and Shi Lang, made attempts to monopolize the war against Zheng because their shared target was to control the coastal islands, Jinmen and Xiamen, and reinitiate trade as Zheng Tai had planned to do. After Zheng Chenggong captured Taiwan in 1662, the VOC commander, Balthasar Bort, arrived at Fuzhou and proposed to ally with the Qing to take Taiwan back. However, as mentioned, Zheng Jing merely held out an olive branch to the Qing, while Zheng Tai suggested cooperating with the Qing to reach a peaceful agreement. Zheng Jing indicated that his father had established a kingdom, and based on Zheng Tai's suggestion, Zheng Jing proposed to establish a relationship with the Qing like Joseon because Taiwan was located at the "corner of the maritime world" and overseas, which previously had no connection with China proper. This idea was not unfamiliar because Zheng Chenggong had proposed the same thing in the 1650s.[198] Geng Jimao and Sotai did not respond to Bort's plan because they were waiting for the central court's decision on Zheng Jing's requirement. Bort returned to Batavia in the spring of 1663. After the VOC left, in 1663, Huang Wu and Shi Lang proposed attacking Xiamen because they believed that Zheng Tai was still under arrest.

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[197] A comparison between the Qing's recruitment of Zheng Mingjun rather than Zheng Xi could prove the Qing also applied for Zheng Zhilong's model to hire a broker in the maritime borderland. When Zheng Mingjun surrendered, he brought Zheng Xi to Quanzhou. However, because Zheng Xi did not have any soldiers as his elemental power, Geng Jimao suggested that the court should move Zheng Xi to Beijing and live with Zheng Zhibao and Zhibao's mother under the Eight Banners system with close supervision. Geng Jimao did not think that the court should treat Zheng Xi as same as Zheng Mingjun and Zheng Zuanxu, who carried soldiers and ships to surrender. This proposal also implies that one of the most critical functions of enrolling these surrendered men under the Eight Banners system is to monitor them. See *Jinmen zhi*, vol. 16，p. *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, pp. 11–13, 65–66.

[198] Xia Ling, *Minhai jiyao*, vol. Shan, pp. 31–32.

Interestingly, Shi Lang suggested that he would attack Xiamen alone rather than work with other commanders.[199] Shi Lang's proposal implied that he wanted to be in the control position of the war and its aftermath. Soon, he led the army to control part of Xiamen island without the empire's permission.[200] Zheng Jing withdrew from Xiamen to Jinmen.[201] After investigation, Shi Lang insisted that he would attack Jinmen without approval from the central government if the time were right. The Ministry of Army required Shi Lang to wait and collaborate with commanders and officials in Fujian.[202] Shi Lang ignored the central court's order and continued to fight against Zheng because he wanted to capture Xiamen and Jinmen—however, he was unsuccessful. Shi Lang failed to capture Jinmen and Xiamen, so Geng Jimao and Sotai decided to collaborate with the VOC, who had just arrived from Batavia.

At the end of 1663, Bort came to Quanzhou and met Geng Jimao and Sotai again. This time, Zheng Jing had harassed the Qing after Zheng Mingjun's surrender, and the Qing had attacked Jinmen and Xiamen on several occasions. Thus, Geng Jimao and Sotai agreed to ally with the VOC, but they did not agree to capture Taiwan. Notably, this agreement was not known to the Qing central court.

In November, the VOC conflicted with the Zheng in Jinmen because the Zheng had over 5,000 soldiers in Xiamen but only hundreds in Jinmen. However, the VOC withdrew after a small altercation because the Qing's support did not arrive. Here, the Qing side demonstrated its selfishness again. After the VOC had reduced Zheng's power and retreated, Geng Jimao and Sotai from Tong'an, Ma Degong from Quanzhou, and Huang Wu and Shi Lang from Haicheng headed to Jinmen; Zheng Mingjun also attended this battle. The VOC army joined the battle when they noticed the Qing's attack. In this brutal battle, the Zheng navy commander was Zhou Quanbin, who killed Ma Degong and defeated the allied army. However, Zhou Quanbin did not want to fight against the VOC because he knew the VOC's navy was far more powerful than the Qing's. The next day, although the Zheng had almost destroyed the Qing navy, Zhou Quanbin decided to withdraw to Tongshan. The Qing, therefore, occupied Jinmen and Xiamen.[203]

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[199] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 2, pp. 506–508, 510.

[200] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 519–521.

[201] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 527–529.

[202] Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 3–4.

After the Qing captured Jinmen and Xiamen, the Manchu officials and brokers achieved their primary goal: capturing Jinmen and Xiamen to reinitiate trade. However, the VOC's target was to recapture Taiwan; the VOC and the Qing had different goals. Although the VOC repeatedly urged Geng Jimao, Li Sotai, and other brokers to attack Taiwan, Geng Jimao disagreed and insisted on attacking Tongshan because Zhou Quanbin still controlled Tongshan and Nan'ao.

During this time, Huang Wu, Shi Lang, and the Manchu officials (since 1664) had been keen on trading with Japan, enjoying a rich profit.[204] After the victory in Jinmen and Xiamen, Geng Jimao, Li Sotai, and Huang Wu went to seize Tongshan to eliminate "pirate nests" on the islands along the coast.[205] After the Qing's capture of Tongshan in 1664, Zhou Quanbin negotiated with Geng Jimao and soon surrendered.[206] In other words, in 1664, the Qing obtained one of the experienced—perhaps the *most* experienced—naval commanders, Zhou Quanbin, who had been the primary commander of the Zheng Regime.

After 1664, Zheng Mingjun and Zhou Quanbin's surrender gave Shi Lang the faith and capacity to launch an expedition to Taiwan. Nevertheless, Shi Lang dare not, or could not, cross the Taiwan Strait due to the incapability. Although Zheng Mingjun and Zhou Quanbin were experienced, Shi Lang still insisted on his own thoughts and approaches to cross the strait even though he was incapable to do so and had a bad plan. Shi Lang was confident that he could capture Taiwan with Zhou Quanbin and others, so he discussed with the central government in advance whether he should dismantle the castles in Taiwan after conquering them—suggesting that he had an elevated view of himself.[207] He could not even achieve a successful port departure. The result of his insistence was that he failed even to approach Taiwan within half a year. After the Qing successfully controlled Xiamen, Jinmen, Tongshan, and Nan'ao, the empire cleared Shi Lang, Zhou Quanbin, and other commanders to lead the navy to conquer Taiwan.[208]

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[203] Yang Yanjie, *Heju shidai Taiwanshi*, pp. 298-299; Xia Lin, *Haiji jiyao*, pp. 34–35.

[204] Cheng Weichung (Zheng Weizhong). *War, Trade and Piracy in the China Seas (1622–1683)*

[205] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 12, p. 181.

[206] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 10, pp. 163–164, vol. 11, p. 179, vol. 12, p. 184; Xia Lin, *Minhai jiyao*, vol. Shan, pp. 34–35; Peng Sunyi, *Jinghai zhi*, vol. 3, pp. 64–66, 68; *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp. 69–70.

Geng Jimao supported Shi Lang's first expedition in 1664 with the deputy of Zhou Quanbin.[209] In the tenth month of 1664, Shi Lang sailed for Penghu from the Jinmen and Xiamen area and prepared to control Taiwan. Although Shi Lang was the most experienced naval commander in the Qing campaign, his vessels encountered a fierce northerly wind, so he returned to the mainland. Surprisingly, Shi Lang could not find his way to the mainland.[210] In the spring of 1665, he failed again because of calm wind and sudden southerly wind in the third month.[211] Shi Lang offered a report regarding his failure; he admitted that he did not fully realize the wind problems encountered when crossing the strait. He defended himself, saying that it was tough to cross and recognize Penghu on the vast ocean.[212]

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[207] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, p.194.

[208] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 12, pp. 193–194.

[209] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp. 90–91.

[210] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp. 210–213. In fact, some of the Qing commander had known a better route to Penghu from Nan'ao. In 1661, one of the Qing's naval commander pretended as trade ships to Nan'ao and later sailed to Penghu from Nan'ao to obtain more information regarding the campaign in Taiwan and captured Koxinga's ships. *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 2, pp. 195-198。

[211] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp. 210–213.

[212] "Given that Taiwan was an isolated island locating among the far ocean, the crazy wind and evil wave were

The VOC complained that Shi Lang had approached Penghu, but he dared not go further and was required to go back because of the dangerous wind and sea currents. In the Manchu materials, Shi Lang defended a report that Xiamen and Jinmen could not leave.[213] Thus, his failure made his Manchu sponsors doubt his capability. This doubt resulted in the first debate between Manchu officials and brokers.

5.3 The Debate between Manchus and Brokers

What happened after the brokers' failures? The onlookers—the Manchu officials in Fujian—determined they would not support the brokers' plans; in response, the brokers defended their ideas. This section focuses on a debate between Manchu officials and brokers after Shi Lang's double failure. I argue that although the brokers convinced Manchu officials to support their plan, their plan failed anyway, and the Manchu officials joined the other side.

I believe the brokers' participation in the debate provided plentiful knowledge for the Qing Empire. However, their efforts could not persuade the officials because their plan could not bear the test—a successful expedition. Their knowledge and experiences were not sufficient to convince the Manchu ministers' court. Manchu officials no longer believed that the brokers—not only Shi Lang but also Zhou Quanbin—could launch a successful expedition to Taiwan; they were satisfied with Xiamen and Jinmen's control. As such, they proposed to end the plans for an expedition. How did the brokers respond to the Manchu officials' suggestion? How did they defend themselves? How did they convince the central court to continue the plan for an

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unpredictable in four seasons. It is hard to measure ocean phenomenon. Compare to the coastal area, it was particularly different and distinctive. Penghu is the transportation and strategic point on the way to Taiwan. It must capture Penghu in order to conquer Taiwan. However, although there are mountains in Penghu, these mountains are small and flat, so they are difficult to distinguish." See *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp. 215–230.

[213] Yang Yanjie, *Heju shidai Taiwanshi*, p. 308.

expedition? In the following section, I argue that the brokers proposed a plan sufficient to persuade the central court to endorse.

While the Manchu officials collaborated with brokers to capture Xiamen and Jinmen because they shared the same target (restoring the commercial network, such as trade with Japan and the Dutch), they secretly planned to strengthen their power over the other side. For instance, during 1663 and 1664, the Manchu officials and brokers endeavored to strengthen their power by recruiting naval commanders from the Zheng campaign. When the Qing controlled Jinmen and Xiamen, the Zheng campaign's most experienced commander was Zhou Quanbin. Sotai had written a letter to Zhou Quanbin, inducing him to surrender. Simultaneously, Huang Wu wrote letters to convince two other commanders to surrender because he could claim their armies according to his rights given by the empire to keep the armies he recruited.[214]

Meanwhile, the brokers secretly traded with the Zheng in the coastal areas, such as Nan'ao and Xiamen, to obtain foreign merchandise.[215] Moreover, in 1662, Huang Wu suggested attacking Xiamen to conquer Taiwan. He also proposed to move logistic resources to Zhangzhou, which was his "fief."[216] Therefore, the brokers and the Manchu officials both endeavored to increase their power during this period.

Shi Lang's two failures proved that the brokers could not achieve their target of conquering Taiwan. These failures entrenched the Manchu officials' standpoint. Although they had once supported the brokers, the Manchu officials had no shown they had no interest in Taiwan. For instance, after the Jinmen and Xiamen battle, Sotai wrote a letter to convince Zheng Jing to abandon Taiwan and return to the mainland because abandoning Taiwan was the imperial officials' idea.[217] Although the Manchu officials had typically been glad to see the Zheng defeated in Taiwan, the brokers' failures exhausted their patience.

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[214] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 2, pp. 527-529.

[215] Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 50–63.

[216] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 506–508.

First, the Manchu officials suggested limiting the brokers' power. For instance, in 1665, Geng Jimao suggested dismissing the brokers' private soldiers to reduce the number of soldiers from 29,000 to 8,000.[218] In other words, each side, although they worked together, planned to decrease the other's power and monopolize the trade.

The brokers' failure led to the Manchu officials' complaints; the imperial officials suggested leaving Taiwan alone rather than conquering it. Two days after Shi Lang's report was reviewed by the ministers and the emperor in Beijing, on the eighth day of the fifth month of 1665, two of the most representative and involved officials—Li Sotai and Geng Jimao—worked together to provide their argument. They pointed out that the empire had erased the criminals' primary leader (Zheng Chenggong) and cleaned their nests on the coastal area (Jinmen, Xiamen, Tongshan, and Nan'ao). There were only a few fragmented pirates who had fled far to Taiwan. Li and Geng noted:

> In our humble opinions, Taiwan has been occupied by the Red-hair barbarians for a long time. This island is an alien area. It would take risks on the ocean to conduct the expedition . . . Zhangzhou and Quanzhou encountered a severe drought, so the commoners were suffering. It has been a long time that these areas are under the war without a single day of quiet. An ancient saying goes, 'the army for expedition should not cross the water, and the army should not chase the defeated bandits.' Therefore, how could we take the risk of unpredictable and horrible wind and wave to go on a punitive expedition to the barren land?

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[217] Ni Zaitian, *Xu Ming jishi benmo*, vol. 7, p. 183; Afterward, Shi Lang and Zhou Quanbin marched to Taiwan but failed because of unexpected wind. Ruan Minxi, *Haishan jianwen lu*, vol. 2, pp. 43–44.

[218] In fact, their ships and weapons were destroyed due to an unexpected flood. See *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp. 90–91, 178–180.

These imperial officials advised that the empire should garrison the present frontier, dispatch officials to these areas, and no longer match and attack Taiwan.[219] Therefore, after Shi Lang's two failures in 1664 and 1665, the imperial officials suggested garrisoning the present territory.

What was the brokers' reflection on the imperial officials' suggestion? After Shi Lang's reply, and Sotai and Geng Jimao's reports in 1665, the court debated. The Kangxi Emperor, who was young and had no true power, consulted with Zhou Quanbin because he was a broker and the highest-ranking primary commander of the Zheng Regime before its surrender. Zhou Quanbin replied in 1666, providing three points. First, although it was large, Taiwan was barren—there was little but bamboo in the mountains. Taiwan required daily support and products from the mainland to maintain survival conditions. Second, nine out of ten soldiers were single because the native women were unwilling to marry them. Because of this fact, Zhou Quanbin predicted that the number of soldiers would decrease year after year because they would eventually return to the mainland. Third—and most important—although Zhou Quanbin acknowledged and agreed with the imperial officials' point of view on Taiwan's natural and humanitarian crises, he believed and insisted that the Qing should actively attack and conquer the island by connecting and allying with the VOC garrisoned in Keelung. Finally, Zhou Quanbin believed that the Qing should ally with the VOC because they had a superior navy. He also suggested that the empire should not necessarily incorporate Taiwan; instead, he proposed to return Taiwan to the VOC and rewarded them with the right to trade with the empire after the conquest.[220] Therefore, Zhou Quanbin acknowledged the imperial officials' insightful opinions, but he defended Shi Lang's proposal and insisted on conquering Taiwan; however, he disagreed with incorporating Taiwan, as per Shi Lang's proposal, and returned it to the VOC, restoring trade between the Qing Empire and the VOC Taiwan. This proposal was undoubtedly for the brokers' profits.

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[219] See *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp. 231–232.

[220] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp. 261-265.

To convince the Kangxi Emperor and the ministers in Beijing, Zhou Quanbin mapped and planned an expedition. This map was *Taiwan Lue Tu* (the sketch map of Taiwan, 臺灣略圖) (see Figure 5-1).[221] This map was not drawn precisely; instead, the main point was to indicate who the garrisoned generals were, where the ships could anchor, and where the native tribes were located. The map includes the northern end of Taiwan, Tamsui during this period; and the southern end of Taiwan, the Taiwanese aboriginal territory in modern-day Pingdong. The center of Taiwan island was the capital of Taiwan—Anping—which is modern-day Tainan. Xiamen and Jinmen appear as two framed but blank shapes without further description because these two islands had been placed under the Qing's control in 1664 when Zhou Quanbin surrendered.

Moreover, this map emphasizes the location of where ships and vessels could anchor. It especially foregrounds the lagoon of Tainan, which was the so-called inland sea of the Taiwan River. The Penghu islands were drawn roughly in as seven islands on this map. These islands were not randomly selected; instead, they were the markers when the army sailed from Tongshan and Nan'ao to Penghu. Therefore, this map provides details about the Zheng's military colonies in Taiwan and the garrisoned generals and suggests an attack on Taiwan from the southern route instead of Xiamen and Jinmen's route, which Shi Lang used when he failed.

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[221] A significant event occurred in the twenty-third day of the ninth month in 1665 when Zhu Yin (朱瑛) surrendered in Zhejiang from Taiwan. He had comprehensive knowledge regarding the arrangement of the location of the garrisoned and military colony in Taiwan. He therefore drew a map for the Kangxi Emperor. Lin Shixuan argues that this map was *Taiwan Lue Tu* (the Sketch map of Taiwan, 臺灣略圖). Emma Teng studies this map but focusing on the cartography and the image behind this sketch map functioning as a strategic purpose rather than the historical background of this map. Emma Teng suggests that the *Sketch Map of Taiwan* (Taiwan luetu, 臺灣略圖) was a pre-conquest map for strategic purpose, and this map provides the basis for the following map project in gazetteers. See *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp.234–236; Lin Shixuan, "Renjiao jubo nanqingfan, tianxian shengcheng lu'ermen ─yuancang Man, Hanwen Taiwan luetu jianjie," *Gugong wenwu yuiekan*, no. 349, pp. 40–48; Emma Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography*, pp. 51–52.

Figure 5-1. The Chinese version of *Taiwan Lue Tu*



Shi Lang also defended his standpoint in 1667. Shi Lang's proposal was associated with the debate and inspired by the Qing's unsuccessful diplomacy. In 1667, the Qing sent Kung Yuanzhang (孔元章, ?–?) to Taiwan to negotiate with Zheng Jing. The Qing expected to convince Zheng Jing to make Taiwan a tributary state, which was also Zheng Jing's idea. This idea intended to recruit the Zheng Regime in Taiwan to replace the role of brokerage. The Qing had approved trading with the Zheng in the coastal area (in fact, trading had been conducted in

Haicheng for a short time) if the Zheng Regime paid tribute and sent one of its princes to Beijing as a hostage. However, they did not reach an agreement due to certain detailed conditions for an unknown reason.[222] Shi Lang's next step hints at a possible reason: he and his partners still anticipated conquering Taiwan during this negotiation period.

After the negotiation in 1667 failed, Shi Lang suggested that the emperor obliterate the Zheng Regime in Taiwan and capture Taiwan. He mentioned that he had heard rumors from Kung Yuanzhang's subordinates that Zheng Jing would never surrender and serve as a tributary state. This rumor gave Shi Lang a great excuse to propose the brokers' expedition plan again. Shi Lang insisted that the Zheng Regime did not intend to have a peaceful relationship with the Qing Empire. Although he did not provide a map as Zhou Quanbin did, Shi Lang described Taiwan as large and with abundant agricultural production and easily accessible to Japan, Manila, and Southeast Asia—ensuring the Zheng Regime would have a plentiful supply of gunpowder and weapons. Shi Lang implied that Taiwan was located in an important strategic position with abundant resources in this account, which was different from what Zhou Quanbin once suggested—obviously, Shi Lang even lied in order to convince the court. Shi Lang suggested capturing Taiwan because the ships were still usable even after failing in 1664 and 1665; he worried that the ships would be unusable after a few years. He suggested leading about 20,000 men, including 12,000 soldiers for the land battle and 8,000 seafarers for naval warfare, with 170 ships under Huang Wu and his command sent to Taiwan. Shi Lang defended his previous two failures as an accident, and he had already had a comprehensive plan to capture Penghu. Shi Lang admitted that crossing the Taiwan Strait to capture an overseas island would be difficult, but he had already had experience. He would wait for suitable conditions to launch the expedition. He suggested that once he had conquered Taiwan, the empire could reduce the number of soldiers in Fujian because the boundary would be safe.[223]

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[222] Xia Lin, *Minhai jiyao*, vol. Shan, p. 37.

In the meantime, Shi Lang offered another proposal. This second proposal suggests that brokers had planned the details of the landing and occupation. He proposed to capture Taiwan to eliminate the danger instead of carrying out the *qian jie ling* policy, implying that Shi Lang and the brokers expected to reopen the coastline to trade freely with foreign powers. To persuade the central court, Shi Lang again described the brokers' plan for the expedition; he suggested landing in the Bay of Taiwan. After that, he would dispatch troops to the south to Dagou (打狗) and the north to Wengang (蚊港) and Haiwongku (海翁窟) to eliminate the Zheng force as well as pacifying native tribes. Finally, in his plan, Shi Lang would recruit the surrendered Zheng soldiers and seafarers to serve in the Fujian navy because they were familiar with Taiwan. He concluded that after the conquest of Taiwan, the Qing could enjoy a peaceful borderland.[224]

Therefore, either Zhou Quanbin or Shi Lang defended himself when the Manchu officials suggested not supporting the expedition to Taiwan. In their proposal, with rich supporting materials, including a map, the brokers planned to head from Tongshan and Nan'ao to Penghu with the VOC's support and then land in the Bay of Taiwan. After the landing, the brokers would divide their army (around 12,000 men) to the north and south to eliminate Zheng's force and pacify the natives. After eradicating the Zheng authority and power, they would return Taiwan to the VOC to restore the profitable commercial network. Shi Lang and Zhou Quanbin's plan emphasized that they had already devised a comprehensive military plan to launch the expedition from the right place under the proper climate because the failure to cross Taiwan Strait was a critical point in the debate by the Manchu officials, who insisted that the brokers were not capable.

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[223] Shi Lang, *Jinghai jishi*, vol. Shan, pp. 1–4.
[224] Shi Lang, *Jinghai jishi*, vol. Shan, pp. 4–8.

Nevertheless, although Shi Lang and Zhou Quanbin had tried their best to convince the central government, the Qing Empire had already decided—it would stop attacking Taiwan and end the functions of Shi Lang and his colleagues but maintain Huang Wu in Southern Fujian.[225] After 1661, although the naval brokers, including Huang Wu, Shi Lang, and even Zhou Quanbin, likely achieved what the Qing Empire expected them to do (such as capturing the coastal islands), they were still not satisfied and sought more benefits. Their primary purpose was to rebuild Zheng Zhilong's profitable commercial network with the VOC. However, it is apparent that these naval brokers still lacked fortune and knowledge because they sailed from Jinmen and Xiamen to Penghu in an inappropriate season. Shi Lang defended his failures in 1664 and 1665 by blaming the environmental difficulties rather than his ability. These two failures resulted in the imperial officials' proposal to isolate Taiwan rather than sending another expedition. These reports stimulated debate in the central court. Among brokers, Zhou Quanbin was perhaps the most experienced commander and the most knowledgeable Taiwan expert, so the Kangxi Emperor consulted with him when the imperial officials chose another side to argue against these commanders' expedition plans. Zhou Quanbin showed his extensive knowledge regarding Taiwan, offered a map to show detailed information on the island, and proposed an accessible route for the expedition.

On the one hand, these brokers enhanced their power; on the other hand, they sought the most substantial profit possible through dealing with Taiwan. Therefore, the failures of Shi Lang and Zhou Quanbin in 1666 were the turning point. The Manchu officials disagreed with the expedition plan. The Qing Empire had a solid idea for excluding Taiwan within the Qing's formal empire-building project. Even though Shi Lang and Zhou Quanbin wished to convince the central government, the empire had different ideas. The empire called Shi Lang to the capital asked other commanders to replace him, and soon dismissed the Fujian naval admiral's position. The Qing, therefore, stopped attacking Taiwan, and the people of the island could finally take a breath.[226]

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[225] Ni Zaitian, Xu Ming jishi benmo, vol. 7, p. 183.

5.4 The Pause of Brokerage

Although Shi Lang and Zhou Quanbin strove to convince the central court to approve their expedition plan, the Qing court, dominated by certain Manchu regent ministers—such as Oboi—finally decided to terminate brokerage because the brokers' aggressive ambition would disturb their broader project: negotiating with the Zheng Regime and recruiting it as a tributary state. The central court called the brokers to Beijing and enrolled them under the Eight Banners system to monitor them directly, indicating that all brokerage was halted until Shi Lang was renamed the Fujian naval admiral in 1680.

When the Kangxi Emperor took the throne in 1661, the ministers controlled the central court as regents. They were Sonin (1601–1667), Ebilun (?–1673), Suksaha (?–1667), and Oboi (1610–1669). In 1667, Sonin died, and Oboi killed Suksaha. Oboi dominated the central court. Although Oboi might have known Zheng Zhilong and had a close friendship with Zheng Zhilong's friends, he and Suksaha, who were political opponents and disagreed with each other, consistently argued against recruiting Zheng Chenggong and agreed to execute Zheng Zhilong in 1661.[227] Therefore, in 1661, after the Kangxi Emperor took the throne, Zheng Zhilong was brought back to Beijing from his exile in Northeast China, and he and his sons were executed in Beijing.

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[226] Xia Lin, *Minhai jiyao*, vol. Shan, p. 37; Ruan Minxi, *Haishan jianwen lu*, vol. 2, p. 44.

[227] Oboi had a connection with Zheng Zhilong in the 1650s and had a close relationship with Liu Zhiyuan (劉之

Although Oboi and other ministers likely had no interest in the maritime world, the young emperor was probably curious about Taiwan. In 1666, the Kangxi Emperor, rather than Oboi or other ministers, consulted with Zhou Quanbin, who provided the map; it was sent to the council. The ministers requested the translation of the Chinese notes into the Manchu language in 1666. This map became a key resource for the central court to understand Taiwan and the unfamiliar maritime environment rather than a strategic map for military purposes (see Figure 3-4). This Manchu-language version of the map is likely the empire's first cartographical project about the maritime world ever.[228] Therefore, although the Kangxi Emperor might have been

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源, ?–1669) and his family, who had a great friendship with Zheng Zhilong and his family. Liu Zhiyuan was the chief of Han Chinese Border Yellow Banner and the boss of Zheng Zhilong as well as his families, such as Zheng Zhibao and other surrendered Zheng families. *Qingshi gao*, vol. 251; *Qing Shizu shilu*, vol. 66.

[228] Although Laura Hostetler, Pamela Kyle Crossley, and Yuji Lai's studies regarding Zhi Gong Tu (職貢圖) of 1751 show different perspectives and interpretations, they all agree this work shows the nature of the Qing as a universal empire to distinguish the others. Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 276–277, 327–336; Laura Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 1–3, 47–49; Lai Yuzhi, "Tuxiang diguo: Qianlongchao Zhigongtu de zhizuo yu didou chengxian," *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jingdaishi yanjiusuo jikan*, no. 75 (2012), pp. 1–76. In 1652, when a Fujian governor planned to cross the sea to Jinmen and Xiamen, he saw the wave and wind and felt afraid, so he decided to return. See Ruan Minxi, *Haishan jianwen lu*, vol. 1, p. 10. Although it is unknown who the translators were, translators were in the capital when Zhou Quanbin was still in Fujian. The translators could not consult with Zhou Quanbin regarding the words on the map. To avoid mistranslating, the translators did not add their new ideas for specific terms. This might suggest that the Qing did not want to add overinterpret it for further meanings. For instance, the term of (只一大厝) was translated as *jy i da ts'u* in Manchus. (大厝) was translated as *da ts'u*; (武衛) and (虎衛) were translated as *u wei* and *hū wei*; (六察) was translated as lu ca; (先鋒) was translated as siyan fung; and (大溪) was translated as *da si*. The most typical case is the word of (淡水). Because this word was written on the location of the Tamsui River or area, it could be at least three meanings in Chinese: Tamsui River, drinkable water, or the place of Tamsui. To avoid misunderstanding, the Manchu translators used *dan šui*. A critical fact is that the Qing Empire used *fan i niyalma* (番的人), which refers to the barbarian people, to refer to Taiwanese natives. Comparing to the empire-building projects after-conquest in 1683, the Qing had used the term *fandz* (番子) during the 1710s, *urehe fandz*, (cooked aborigines, 熟番), *eshun fandz* (raw aborigines, 生番), and *dahaha eshun fandz* (naturalized raw aborigines, 歸化生番) as tax-category during the 1720s and *fan i irgen* (barbarian citizens, 番的民) during the 1750s to refer Taiwanese natives. In contrast, this map is the earliest source ever to understand how the Qing Empire saw Taiwan natives before it conquered Taiwan. Tsai Wei-chieh (Cai Weijie), "Zhimin dang'an yu diguo xinggou: lun Qingchao Manwen zouzhe zhong dui Taiwan shufan de biaoshu," *Taiwanshi yanjiu*, vol. 15, no. 3 (2008), pp. 25–55. The recent scholarship pays attention to how the empire utilized the Manchu terms to describe Taiwanese natives after the

interested in Taiwan, his primary interest was defeating Zheng. Instead of occupying Taiwan, the Qing Empire, especially the Manchu officials in Fujian and Beijing, did not have interest in the expedition to Taiwan or its capture; thus, beginning in 1666, many officials suggested moving to weaken these powerful brokers' armies and transferring these soldiers to regions of China other than the coastal areas.[229]

Qing controlled Taiwan in 1683 within the context of the five cultural blocs proposed by James Millward. James A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and the Empire in Qing Central Asia 1759–1864* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 197–203；this theory has been used by Jodi Weinstein. See Jodi L. Weinstein, *Empire and Identity in Guizhou: Local Resistance to Qing Expansion* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014), pp. 120.

[229] *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. pp. 308–310. The central government also tended to limit these naval commanders' force. For instance, in 1668, the government rearranged the 1,000 soldiers garrisoned in Tong'an from Huang Wu's command to the governor's control. *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 25, p. 356. In 1664, Zheng Mingjun was sick and passed away soon. His soldiers were reassigned to three divisions. Three thousand soldiers were assigned to Tian Xun (田雄, ?–1664), 2,000 were assigned to Zheng Zuanxu, and 5,000 would be assigned to the heir. However, because Zheng Mingjun's sons were too young to manage the private troop, these 5,000 soldiers were entrusted to Zheng Zuanxu. See *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp. 84–85.

Figure 5-2. The Manchu-language version of *Taiwan Lue Tu*



In 1668, the central court decided to terminate brokerage and called the brokers to Beijing because their belligerent and uncontrolled behaviors interfered with the negotiations between the Qing and Zheng. The Qing Empire intentionally relocated them to Beijing under the Eight Banners system to be closely monitored. As per Manchu officials' suggestions, the empire removed the truculent generals such as Shi Lang, Zhou Quanbin, and Zheng Mingjun and their families from the coastal areas.[230] This enrollment into the banners system unintentionally yielded a massive impact on brokerage, society, imperial ruling, and Taiwan in the future, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

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[230] Shi Lang belonged to the Bordered Yellow Banner of *ujen cooha*; Zhou Quanbin belonged to the Plain Yellow Banner of *ujen cooha*; Zheng Zuanxu (鄭纘緒, ?–?), who was the patriarch after Zheng Mingjun died in 1665, and his families were in the Plain White Banner of *ujen cooha*. See *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 31, p. 423. Also see Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 39–132; Shi Weiqing 施偉青, *Shi Lang jiangjun zhuang*, pp. 13–24.

Immediately after the brokers were in Beijing in 1668, the Qing Empire sent its highest-ranking officials to negotiate with Zheng Jing in 1669. The Qing Empire required Mingju (明珠, 1635–1708) and Cai Yurong (蔡毓榮, ?–1699) to go to Fujian to be in charge of the negotiation. They sent Mu Tianyan (慕天顏, ?–?) to Taiwan, leaving Beijing in the spring and arriving in Southern Fujian in the seventh month.[231] Zheng Jing proposed that they would not queue their hair, wear the Ming-style cloth, become the Qing's ministers, land on the mainland, nor have equal status with Joseon and Ryukyu. Zheng also dispatched two messengers in Han Chinese-style clothing to Quanzhou to meet the Qing ministers and insisted on maintaining their status equal to Joseon.[232] Zheng Jing wrote to Sotai that the Zheng Regime had established a kingdom in Taiwan (the title of this kingdom was Dongning) and did not want conflict with the Qing. Zheng Jing wrote to Geng Jimao that he would not land on the mainland. During this negotiation, the Zheng and Qing began to trade in Guangdong.[233] However, in the ninth month, the Kangxi Emperor did not accept the negotiation between Zheng Jing and Mingju. It does not make sense that Mingju, as one of the most powerful prime ministers in the central court, did not recognize the bottom line of the Qing Empire.

Why did the Kangxi Emperor suddenly intervene in the negotiation and refuse the Mingju and Zheng Jing's deal? The critical event was the arrest of Oboi a few months after Mingju departed from Beijing. In other words, when Mingju headed to Southern Fujian, the court must have authorized him and given him guidelines for the negotiation—undoubtedly including the bottom line. Mingju's negotiation suggested that the compromise must at least achieve the goal the central court had discussed; Oboi must have been one of the ministers participating in discussions in Beijing before the Kangxi Emperor arrested him. Therefore, the Kangxi Emperor overturned Mingju's proposal because his bottom line was different from these ministers. The emperor did not care whether the Zheng would abandon Taiwan or garrison in Taiwan but insisted that Zheng Jing himself, being Chinese, must wear the queue.[234]

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[231] Xia Lin, *Minhai jiyao*, vol. Shan, p. 37; Ruan Minxi, *Haishan jianwen lu*, vol. 2, p. 44.

[232] Similar to the order of Manchu queue for hairstyle, the Zheng had its dressing symbol, which was (圓領衣). *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 2, pp. 246, 248–249.

[233] Ni Zaitian, *Xu Ming jishi benmo*, vol. 7, p. 183; *Taiwan shichao*, vol. 17, pp. 323–337.

The emperor allowed Zheng Jing and his followers to stay in Taiwan as an independent kingdom, and the Qing and Zheng could share the peace. In other words, the critical point for the Kangxi Emperor was not whether the Zheng Regime was independent, dependent, or a feudatory, but whether Zheng Jing and his followers would change their hairstyle to the Manchu style.[235] Therefore, thinking of the Kangxi Emperor's consultation with Zhou Quanbin in 1665, Kangxi's attitude was apparent: he planned aggressive action with the Zheng, either by recruiting Zheng Jing back to the mainland or militarily defeating the Zheng Regime in Taiwan. However, even though Kangxi was an ambitious young emperor and had eliminated the influential regents to dominate the court, he could not reactivate brokerage because he faced a far more critical problem than the Zheng Regime in Taiwan: the three feudatories.

After 1669, the Qing and the Zheng Regime did not make further progress on the negotiation because the Qing court had to deal with the essential challenges from its feudatories.

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[234] Queue was one of the clothing styles demanded by the Qing rulers right after the Qing built its sovereignty in China proper. This dress code was a symbol for a great many commoners and all elites and scholar-officials that they had been Manchufied in their attire. See Edward J.M. Rhoads, *Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), p. 61.

[235] In the emperor's edict, he announced that Zheng Jing could stay in Taiwan if he did not want to abandon Taiwan, which had been developed since his father's generation, but the emperor insisted that Zheng Jing must change his hair style. See *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Ding, no. 3, p. 272.

The Kangxi Emperor and the Qing court had to solve the feudatories' issues and had also been aware that the Zheng Regime in Taiwan still had ambitions for the mainland. In 1673, Wu Sangui rebelled in southwest China (the three feudatories). Afterward, the commanders or feudatories in northwest China, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Mongolia rebelled against the Qing Empire. These rebel leaders invited in Zheng Jing, who led his armies to Southern Fujian.

In 1677, the Qing decided to allow Zheng Jing's proposal in 1669 to establish a tributary state relationship because the rebellion posed a significant challenge to the Qing Empire.[236] At the end of 1677, the new Fujian governor, Yao Qishen (姚啟聖, 1623–1683), proposed the same compromise to Zheng Jing again. One of the proposals was that the Qing Empire would see the Zheng Regime in Taiwan as an "island barbarian," which implied treating the Zheng in Taiwan the same as the Portuguese in Macau.[237]

In 1679, when the Qing and Zheng clashed in Southern Fujian, the prince dispatched a messenger to Zheng Jing again. At this time, the Qing suggested that the Zheng Regime could trade in Haicheng. The Qing would consider the Zheng Regime a complex between the Spanish in Manila or the Portuguese in Macau and the tributary states such as Korea and Ryukyu. This negotiation lasted for one year and was broadly successful, but Yao Qishen ultimately disagreed with this proposal.[238] The idea of the Zheng Taiwan was as an independent state that would continue until Shi Lang's conquest of Taiwan in 1683. One of the brokers, Zheng Zuanzu, who also participated in the war, wrote prose for Shi Lang's villa in Xiamen. He described the Zheng

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[236] Xia Lin, *Minhai jiyao*, vol. Xia, p. 54.

[237] Shen Yun, *Taiwan Zhengshi shimo*, vol. 6, p. 68.

[238] Xia Lin, *Minhai jiyao*, vol. Xia, pp. 61–62; Ni Zaitian, *Xu Ming jishi benmo*, vol. 7, p. 194.

Regime as a “sea kingdom,”[239] symbolizing how these brokers acknowledged and regarded the Zheng Regime in Taiwan as a state with a great link to the maritime world.

During the rebellion, the brokers did not participate in the war because they were still in Beijing. What happened after 1668 when the brokers went to Beijing during the period of the Qing–Zheng negotiation? They were enrolled into the Eight Banners system—impacting brokers and their families.

After 1668, Zhou Quanbin, Shi Lang, and Zheng Zuanxu (Zheng Mingjun’s nephew and the Zheng family’s patriarch at the time Zheng Mingjun had passed away) settled in Beijing. They were enrolled into the Eight Banners system and became bannermen. One of the Eight Banners system’s critical principles was to culturally, legally, socially, and economically separate bannermen from other subjects.[240] Under this principle, they could not connect with their families in Southern Fujian. For instance, although the court gave Zhou Quanbin a large residence in Beijing, he could not contribute anything to his lineage in Jinmen, so his family eventually waned.[241]

When these brokers were under the Eight Banners system, they were under Manchu’s cultural rules. They had to understand the Manchu language;[242] also, in a departure from the general situation within Chinese lineage, the legal wife’s son would succeed instead of following the patriarchal line due to the need for immunization against smallpox. Official records recorded whether a man ever had smallpox; this record was important because it could determine whether a man could be a candidate to succeed in becoming the patriarch. These rules held not only for regular bannermen but also for the imperial clan—it is believed that the Kangxi Emperor took the throne because he was the Shunzhi Emperor's only child who was immune to smallpox (his sibling died due to smallpox).[243]

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[239] *Xiamen zhi*, vol. 9, p. 38.

[240] Lai Huimin, *Danwen qimin: Qingdai de falu yu shehui* (Taipei: Wunan chubanshe, 2007), p. 1.

[241] According to the oral interview, the Zhou lineage in Pubian built the great ancestral hall during the nineteenth century because a member of the Zhou family became prosperous due to overseas trade. Even though the Zhou lineage knew one of their ancestors was the famous commander Zhou Quanbin, a familial story told that Zhou Quanbin barely contributed to this lineage because he eventually moved to and settled down in Beijing permanently with a tough life. Zhou Quanbin and his descendants never returned to Jinmen so that they could not have any influence on the Zhou lineage. This oral interview could combine with two facts. First of all, Zhou Quanbin died two years later in 1670 after he moved to Beijing. However, unlike the house arrest narratives, his residence located near the drum tower and bell tower of Beijing, and he had many servants. See *Neige daku dang’an*, number: 065909-001; *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Ji, no. 7, p. 606.

[242] Shi Lang had required his sons, such as Shi Shiliu (施世騮), to learn Manchu language, and many of them soon mastered this language. See *Xunhai Shishi dazong zupu*, p. 573.

These three families had gradually been acculturated as Manchu people in a slow process.[244] They became bannermen, so they were moved to settle in Beijing. Although they were not racially Manchu, they adopted the banner laws nonetheless. Bannermen and the Chinese adopted different institutions, laws, and social structures in theory.[245] For instance, the bannermen's lands were not under the same Chinese category because the government taxed them at different rates.[246] During the Kangxi period, all bannermen, except the soldiers garrisoned in the provinces' capital, were required to live, settle, and register their households in Beijing.

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[243] These brokers were under the Qing Empire's direct control. Take Zheng Mingjun's case as an example: after Zheng Mingjun passed away, the empire decided that Zheng Mingjun's concubine's son, Zheng Zuancheng (鄭纘成, ?–?), who was only six years old, was favored by Zheng Minjun's wife, Mrs. Huang, and Zheng Zuanxu. Moreover, Zheng Mingjun's son by his legal wife, Zheng Zuanshi (鄭纘世, ?–?), was three years old and had not yet had chickenpox. Therefore, the empire decided to select this young and non-legal wife's son as the heir. See *Qingchu Zheng Chenggong jiazu Manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 3, pp. 170–171.

[244] According to an official record about Zhou Quanbin's noble title, the so-called *jue wei ce* (volume of the noble title, 爵位冊). This official volume usually includes two major parts. The first part narrated why this noble existed and the story of the heirs and the titleholders. The second part of this volume is a family tree. Sometimes, the family tree is comprehensive in recording details, including all male members of this family, their ages, official positions, and diseases. Sometimes, as the case of Zhou Quanbin's, it is very rough only to record the one who succeeded in the title. The first part of this volume records that Zhou Quanbin received this noble title because he surrendered. However, according to the family tree, it is apparent that Zhou's title could be inherited for at least seven times until the eighteenth century, and Zhou Quanbin's fifth generational descendant had used the Manchu-style name rather than Han Chinese style, which includes the surname.

[245] It is not surprising that there were many cases to show the exception. In fact, this dissertation will show that these four families were also exceptions. A recent study about the exception comes from Huang Lijun. See Huang Lijun, "Qianlong Huangdi de minrenpin," *Xin shixue*, 31, no. 3 (2020): 71–127.

[246] *Qingbai leichao*, p. 74, 737.

Once the families moved to Beijing, they had to legally separate from their lineage. For instance, in Jinmen, the Zhou lineage shared that Zhou Quanbin's branch declined because Zhou Quanbin left Jinmen and could not return. Even though they gradually become bannermen, they still missed their hometowns and the maritime world during this period. For instance, Zheng Zuanzu wrote many poems demonstrating his nostalgia when he had a chance to return to Quanzhou. In one poem, Zheng Zuanzu memorialized his past life and the magnificent view of the ocean and maritime world in Southern Fujian.[247]

The only chance to return to Southern Fujian was that the empire would approve their return to their hometowns with particular tasks. For example, Zheng Zuanzu's son, Zheng Xiumin (鄭修敏, ?–?), had long been in Quanzhou because of an unknown task when his mother and family were in Beijing.[248] A theory for why they might have returned to Quanzhou is that the empire needed them to return to either play a broker's role, such as fighting against enemies or intervene in lineage affairs. The cases of Zheng Zuanzu and Zheng Xiomin cannot confirm this theory because of the lack of sources. However, this dissertation provides many examples to illustrate why this hypothesis might be correct.

Accordingly, between 1661 and 1668, the Qing hired new brokers because Zheng Chenggong moved his power from the coastal islands to Taiwan. Shi Lang, Zheng Mingjun, and Zhou Quanbin became the emerging brokers. The Qing established the Fujian naval admiral's position to allow Shi Lang to manage Fujian's navy; this position became the most significant criterion for being the Qing's broker in the maritime borderland. As a broker, Shi Lang was able to reconstruct his lineage and make it the dominant one for reshaping his ruined hometown's social structure due to the *qian jie ling* policy. However, after the Qing decided to negotiate with the Zheng, these bellicose generals had to be removed from Southern Fujian. They were enrolled into the Eight Banners system because the court had to monitor them closely. The Qing Empire might not have imagined that this strategy would eventually have a critical impact on its brokerage in the maritime borderland afterward. In 1668, these brokers temporarily disappeared in the maritime borderland.

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[247] See *Xiamen zhi*, vol. 9, p. 38-39.
[248] *Quanzhou fuzhi*, vol. 55, p. 5.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I explored how the Qing Empire sought an ideal broker to replace Zheng's dominant power in the maritime borderland. I argued that, although the Qing Empire, the imperial officials (Sotai and Geng Jimao), and the brokers (Shi Lang, Zhou Quanbin, and Zheng Tai) shared the desire not to incorporate Taiwan within the empire, they had very different ideas for achieving this target. The Qing eventually called these troublemakers—Shi Lang and Zhou Quanbin—to Beijing and enrolled them under the Eight Banners system to avoid intervening within the informal empire-building negotiation with the Zheng Regime.

This chapter showed that the Qing Empire fostered Zheng's followers as the primary brokers because they were familiar with the environment. In contrast, the Qing Empire had limited knowledge about the area. The brokers were the masters of naval warfare and knew the maritime world well. They became advisors, fighters, and policymakers, and as a result, they became necessary and vital go-betweens in this borderland.

Simultaneously, these ascendant brokers served the empire and strived to gain their own benefits, organizing their lineages and moving their families to the urban center. However, these families were soon moved to the empire's capital after 1668 because they were enrolled in the Eight Banners system and treated as Mongolian princes. They also recruited soldiers as their troops. Rather than peaceful negotiations, these naval commanders insisted on conquering Taiwan because they planned to return it to the VOC in exchange for the right of trade. Shi Lang, Huang Wu, Zhou Quanbin, and Zheng Tai all proposed achieving the right of trade with the overseas world because they all understood what Zheng Zhilong had done and how much benefit he had gained in the 1630s and 1640s in terms of massive profits.

The turning point was the second failure of Shi Lang. On the one hand, Zhou Quanbin and Shi Lang proposed a more comprehensive expedition plan to the central government to convince the center to support their conquest plan. However, the dispatched officials resisted, stating that the Qing should not carry out any further expeditions. To convince the empire, Zhou Quanbin even provided a map to illustrate their plan, and this map was translated into the Manchu language to build its global understanding. However, in 1668, the Qing Empire, having had its new project to make the Zheng Regime a tributary state and a replacement of the function of brokerage, recalled them to Beijing because the brokers and their troops were belligerent and would jeopardize the negotiation. The empire planned to build an informal relationship with the Zheng Regime rather than conquering them. However, the Zheng Regime would become neither Joseon nor Spain or Portugal, but instead, somewhere in between.

Meanwhile, the brokers challenged the Zheng family's hegemony controlled by Zheng Chenggong; they were the consultants and the policymakers. In 1661, Zheng Chenggong's conquest of Taiwan resulted in the change of these brokers to conquest-pursuers. Between 1661 and 1683, they were the warlike brokers, trying to convince the empire to dispatch Manchu officials to conquer Taiwan. However, the Qing Empire, at this time, did not have ambitions in maritime East Asia. They were called to Beijing and became bannermen under the direct supervision of the empire until 1680. This enrollment significantly impacted the Qing's brokerage in the maritime borderland after Shi Lang’s conquest of Taiwan in 1683. However, this entire situation changed in 1683, with the brokerage’s reactivation approved by the Kangxi Emperor to launch the expedition to Taiwan.

6 Shi Lang’s Conquest of 1683 and His Maritime Brokerage

6.1 Introduction

In 1680, the Kangxi Emperor reactivated brokerage and reappointed Shi Lang as the Fujian naval admiral. In 1683, Shi Lang successfully conquered Taiwan, following Zhou Quanbin’s plan of 1666. This chapter argues that, during the conquest, brokers combined service to the state with the goal of personal enrichment and initiated some major transformations of Taiwanese society, as well as their own lineages. This was a part of Zheng Zhilong’s model: to obtain benefits claimed by the brokers through conquest.

After the conquest, Shi Lang served as a policymaker and economic controller, and he was celebrated as the military conqueror of Taiwan. Shi Lang suggested incorporating Taiwan into the Qing Empire because the VOC refused to take Taiwan back. Between the conquest and the Qing’s official arrival, Shi Lang occupied extensive tracts of land for his colonial plantations. He also erased any trace of the Zheng and Ming influences and replaced them with many new structures that highlighted his conquests and achievements. In 1684, Shi Lang began to be called *kai tuo xun chen*—“the meritorious commander of cultivating Taiwan,” to convey the recognition of his role as a conqueror of Taiwan. To guarantee his dominant position, Shi Lang proposed policies for ruling Taiwan as the Fujian naval admiral, which would make Taiwan administratively different from other regions of China proper and more like an intermediary colony.

Shi Lang’s conquest generated a special structure that allowed brokers who were bannermen to control Taiwan, and they also dominated and reorganized their Chinese lineage. At this point, the nature of brokerage changed: Zheng Zhilong’s mediation between the Chinese government and overseas powers and Huang Wu's mediation with the Zheng regime were replaced by Shi Lang's mediation between the Qing Empire and the intermediary colony of Taiwan, which established the empire's sovereignty over the newly conquered territory.[249] In 1696, Shi Lang reached an agreement with the Kangxi Emperor to adjust brokerage, which allowed bannermen to fill the position of the Fujian naval admiral. This adjustment served to control the brokers' Chinese lineage (although, as mentioned, the Qing code did not allow any connection between bannermen and the Chinese) and allowed them to settle in Beijing while receiving much revenue from Taiwan. Because brokers needed naval and maritime expertise, the Shi family was the most suitable bannerman family. I argue that Shi Lang's conquest generated a new model of brokerage that dramatically affected the empire, society, and lineage, especially by authorizing interaction between bannermen and the Qing government in the maritime borderland.

The emperor would authorize one of the bannermen—either the Fujian naval admiral or another family member—to return to Southern Fujian to oversee family affairs and participate in social affairs. In other words, members of the bannerman family could simultaneously serve as Fujian naval admirals, members of the social elite in Southern Fujian, and lineage controllers. The Shi family was under the bannermen's control until the end of the eighteenth century. The bannermen controlled properties, the right of worship, and family affairs, and the Shi family did not challenge the bannermen because the latter were sent by the emperor and enjoyed special privileges, from which the Shi family could garner enormous benefits.

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[249] The idea comes from Benton's argument that brokers/intermediaries helped European empires to establish and claim their sovereignty and laws in its uneven and different geographies. See Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900* (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 3-12.

6.2 Shi Lang's Conquest of Taiwan in 1683

In 1681, the Kangxi Emperor appointed Shi Lang as the Fujian naval admiral to aim to eliminate the Zheng in Taiwan. Although the new governor of Taiwan, Yao Qisheng, was also hostile toward the Zheng regime, he was less experienced than Shi Lang, so the court ultimately approved Shi Lang to head the expedition. Following the 1666 plan mentioned in the previous chapter, Shi Lang successfully defeated the Zheng navy and forced the Zheng regime to surrender in 1683. After the VOC refused to take Taiwan back, the Qing integrated Taiwan into the empire, an act that marked the end of Taiwan as a middle ground and its beginning as a Qing overseas colony. This overseas triumph gave the Kangxi Emperor an opportunity to proclaim the empire's and the Manchu's greatness to his Inner Asian subjects.

Although the Kangxi Emperor had appointed many Fujian naval admirals between 1673 and 1680, their primary task had been fighting against the Three Feudatories Rebellion, instead of dealing with the overseas world. This revolt began in 1673 when Wu Sangui collaborated with warlords across the empire to attack the Qing government. The rebels invited Zheng Jing to join them, and the Qing ordered the Joseon court to dispatch the navy to fight Zheng Jing in 1674.[250] In 1675, Zheng Jing invited Joseon and Japan to join the rebellion.[251] Although the Three Feudatories Rebellion posed a serious challenge to Qing sovereignty in China, the Qing gradually prevailed by capitalizing on internal discord among the rebels and by virtue of its outstanding military commanders. In Fujian, the Kangxi Emperor's cousin Giyešu (1646–97) defeated the feudatory Geng Jingzhong in 1676, and he proceeded to fight the Zheng there until 1680, when he gained control of the Fujian coast.

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[250] *Joseon Wangjo Hyeonjong Sillok*, vol. 022, p. 19.
[251] *Joseon Wangjo Hyeonjong Sillok*, vol. 4, pp. 16-–17, vol. 5, p. 25.

In 1681, the Kangxi Emperor reactivated the position of broker and appointed Shi Lang because he was the most experienced naval commander and the only experienced broker still living. Shi Lang was also recommended by Yao Qisheng, an experienced maritime official, and Li Guangdi (李光地, 1642–1718), a Qing prime minister.[252] The appointment was approved when the Kangxi Emperor prohibited negotiation between Yao Qisheng and the new king of the Zheng regime in 1681. Shi Lang was thus able to return to Southern Fujian and become the naval admiral. In 1682, the Kangxi Emperor decided to send an expedition to Taiwan to eliminate the Zheng regime.[253]

Although Yao Qisheng recommended Shi Lang for the naval admiral position because they both wanted to attack Taiwan, they did not work closely with each other. Shi Lang eventually prevailed over Yao Qisheng and took over the expedition due to his prowess in naval warfare. For instance, when the Kangxi Emperor approved the expedition in 1682, Yao Qisheng and Shi Lang were ready for their first expedition in the same year. However, Yao Qisheng insisted on going to Penghu during the winter, as he had planned to do since 1679. Yao Qisheng did not heed the suggestion of Chen Ang (陳昂), a consultant from Tong'an with rich experience in maritime trade, that going to Penghu would be more appropriate during the summer when the south wind prevailed. In fact, Yao Qisheng's plan repeated Shi Lang's failure to cross the sea in the winter of 1664. Unlike Yao Qisheng, Shi Lang recruited Chen Ang as his primary consultant because they agreed about using Zhou Quanbin's 1665 plan instead.[254] In 1681, Shi Lang and Yao Qisheng were ready for their expedition, but each of them had their own expedition plan. Shi Lang led the navy to Tongshan and awaited the south wind. However, Yao Qisheng insisted that the navy sail to Penghu until the north wind began; apparently, the north wind rarely arose during summer, so Shi Lang did not successfully depart from Tongshan.[255] After this failure to cross the strait, Shi Lang wrote to the Kangxi Emperor to request full responsibility for the expedition and that Yao Qisheng be garrisoned in Xiamen to manage equipment preparation because his plan had failed. Eventually, Shi Lang convinced the emperor and court that he should be in charge of the expedition, and Yao Qisheng had no choice but to stay in Fujian to manage the logistics.[256] Shi Lang, as the oldest broker and most experienced naval commander, had a well-prepared plan to conquer Taiwan, which he devised in 1665 with the other brokers.

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[252] In 1678, Giyešu recommended an experienced maritime trader and official, Yao Qishen, to be the governor-general. Yao Qishen was born in a coastal city of Zhejiang, but became a bannerman because he attached him under one of his bannermen relative in 1659. When he was an official in Xianshan (香山) county, where he was in charge of monitoring and controlling Portuguese Macau, he obtained rich experiences at maritime commerce. However, the court fired him in 1669 because he violated the ban on maritime trade. After 1669, he returned to Beijing and began his commercial enterprise between 1669 and 1676. Undoubtedly, Yao Qishen earned a vast amount of money because he offered what he earned in Beijing and sold his ancestral properties in Zhejiang to donate weapons, horses, and equipment and recruit soldiers for the empire's usage, totally over 150,000 taels. *Qingshi gao*, vol. 260, pp. 9857-9861; Xu Ke, *Qingbai leichao*, p. 3377; In fact, the best reason of this recommendation is that these three men had relationship by marriage Yao Qishen's sister was Huang Xigung's wide, and Huang Xigung's sister was Shi Lang's wife. His grandson was Li Gunagdi's son-in-law.

[253] *Qingshi gao*, vol. pp. 9864-9869.

In 1683, Shi Lang led his navy toward Penghu. However, because Liu Guoxuan (劉國軒, 1629–93) had established short walls and placed low cannons surrounding the main island for twenty *li*, Shi Lang anchored at Bazhao (八罩). After Shi Lang's army encamped in Bazhao, his general, Lan Li (藍理, 1647–1719), led his navy against the Zheng navy. Afterward, because the ocean current and winds were favorable for Shi Lang, his troops managed to capture Hujin (虎井) and Tongpanyu (桶盤嶼). Shi Lang then divided his troops into three sections: one section attacked Jilongshan (雞籠山) in the east, one pretended to attack Niuxinwan (牛心灣) in the west, and the main force concentrated in the middle to attack Liu's fortifications (see Figure 6-1). Eventually, Shi Lang defeated the Zheng navy, killing over 14,000, and captured Penghu. Many accounts indicate that Shi Lang won this battle because he was born in the coastal area and was familiar with the maritime world.[257]

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[254] *Quanzhou fuzhi*, vol. 56, p. 37.
[255] Xu Ke, *Qingbai leichao*, p. 776.
[256] Shi Lang, *Jinghai jishi*, Vol Shan, p. 11.

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[257] *Beizhuan xuanji*, pp. 266–68

Figure 6-1. The route from Tongshan to Penghu. (The X marks refer to the locations with the most frequent shipwrecks during the Qing period.)


Magong (媽宮)
Jilongshan (雞籠山)
Hujing (虎井)
Luer'men(鹿耳門)
Cikan
Anping
Nioxingwan (牛心灣)
Tongpanyu (桶盤嶼)
Bazhao (八罩)
Tongshan

Shi Lang's defeat of Zheng resulted in the end of Taiwan as a middle ground and inaugurated its beginning as a Qing Empire's overseas colony, which created a new challenge to their rule. The failure in Penghu shocked the Zheng ruling class in Taiwan. Although Zheng Keshuang (鄭克塽, 1670–1707), the young king of the Zheng regime, had originally planned an expedition to Manila, he and the ruling class were eventually convinced by Liu Guoxuan to surrender to the Qing. The Zheng regime surrendered to the Qing Empire, specifically to Shi Lang, in 1683.

When Zheng Keshuang surrendered in 1683, Qing officials debated whether the empire should incorporate or exclude Taiwan. At this time, Shi Lang tried to persuade the VOC to take Taiwan back and rebuild its commercial network, as Zheng Zhilong had done before.[258] However, the VOC refused Shi Lang's proposal because it could no longer profit from colonizing Taiwan. The VOC decided to focus on its commercial network in Southeast Asia and Japan, rather than occupying Taiwan.[259] In other words, the middle-ground theory assumes that no single hegemonic power should dominate the middle ground. This assumption had applied before 1683, when the Zheng could not fully control Taiwan but had to compete against the VOC in the north and the aboriginal tribes in the center. However, Shi Lang's conquest brought Taiwan fully under Qing control, just as the Great Lakes region falling under British control had terminated its status as a middle ground. The question therefore arose of how to rule the new colony.

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[258] Cheng Weichung (Zheng Weizhong), "Admiral Shi Lang's Secret Proposal to Return Taiwan to the VOC," in Tonio Andrade and Xing Hang eds, *Sea Rovers, Silver, and Samurai: Maritime East Asia in Global History, 1550-1700* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2016): 290-311.

[259] Leonard Blussé, "No Boat to China: The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690," *Modern Asian Studies* 30: 1(1996): 51-76.

This massive victory of an Inner Asian empire in a maritime theater was proclaimed to all subjects under the Qing's rule. The Kangxi Emperor had to inform his subjects because the Qing court had encountered two significant and growing challenges: the Zunghar and Russia,[260] but he deliberately made slight changes to emphasize the Manchu contributions. To achieve this goal, he compiled a book, *Pingding haikuo fanglue*.[261] This book was published in both Chinese and the Manchu language, and the two versions are strikingly different.[262] The Manchu version describes an imperial expansion into Taiwan and emphasizes the Manchu commanders' efforts; the Chinese version does not. Thus, the Qing Empire took different approaches to rule by telling different stories to different subjects.

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[260] In 1684, Zasagt khan was chaotic. In 1687, Zhunghar cooperated with the rival force of Zasagt khan. Zunghar planned to incorporate the Khalkha region. In 1688, Zunghar invaded into Khalkha. In 1682, Russians built their force once again in the area of Albazino. In 1685, the Qing besieged this city, but Russians recaptured this city after the Qing retreated. In 1686, the Qing besieged the Russian city again. Russia and the Qing Empire signed a treaty in 1689. These challenges could see Peter Perdue's landmark work. Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West*.

[261] *Fang Lue* is a particular form to chronologically record historical events based on the official archive. Yao Jirong, "Fanglue shiyi," *Anhui jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao* 20, no. 2 (2002), p. 28; Peter C. Perdue, "The Qing Empire in Eursasian Time and Space: Lessons from the Galdan Campaigns", in edited by Lynn A. Struve, *The Qing Formation in World-Historical Time* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004), pp. 74-76; Yao Jirong, "Qingdai fanglueguan yu guanxiu fanglue," *Qinghai shifan daxue xuebao*, no. 1 (2002), p. 68, 80. In order to come up with a final version of *Fanglue*, there are at least five versions: draft, manuscript, version to offices, version to emperors, and version for the exhibition to the general audience for claiming the empire's greatness. Before Cheng-heng Lu discovered the Manchu-language version in 2011, scholars believed that the Chinese draft is the only existed version. Like Wu Fengpei suggests that this book is worthy of being explored the history of conquering Taiwan from the empire's Inner Asian perspectives. In 1993, Wu Fengpei disagreed with Fu and Zhu's point of view regarding this *Fang Lue*. He suggests to re-understand this *Fang Lue* from the point of view from Inner Asia and Manchu. See Wu Fengpei, *Qingcu xijiang fanglue sizhong huebian* (Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian suowei fuzhi zhongxin, 1993), p. 468.

[262] As Mark C. Elliott states, the Manchu-language version is not a translation copy of the Chinese version. Mark C. Elliott, Li Renyuan trans., "Manwen dang'an yu xinqingshi," *Gugong xueshu jikan* 24, no. 2 (2006), pp. 1-18; As Peter C. Perdue indicates, Manchu-language version provides a further point of view that the Chinese discourses do not show to the audience. For example, in page 204 and 504, Perdue cite Okada's work and Wei Yuan's account about Galden's death. He might be able to directly use the Manchu language sources to find the fact of Galden's death. He actually conducts great studies by using non-Han Chinese language sources, see Peter C. Perdue, "Tea, Cloth, Gold, and Religion: Manchu Sources on Trade Missions from Mongolia to Tibet," *Late Imperial China*, vol. 36, no. 2 (2015), pp. 1-22. For instance, when the Zunghar Empire raised and challenged Qing's sovereignty in East Turkestan, Kangxi decided to lead an expedition himself. Kangxi's expedition destroyed the khanate of the Zunghar Empire, Galden. When the Qing force approached Galden's camp, Galden suddenly died. His death provided a source to the Qing mythmakers to link Galden's death and Qing's greatness although the main reason for his death had been unknown. Perdue particularly points out that this Qing myth-make is not recorded in the Manchu-language edition of the *Qing Shilu*. Perdue believes that the Qing created the myth of committing a suicide because Galden's personality and beliefs forbade him to do so. However, in *Qinzheng pingding shuomo fanglue* (親征平定朔漠方略), both Manchu-language and Chinese edition narrates myth and fact. As Perdue states, "Yet the reports contained in the *Qinzheng Pingding shuomo fanglue*, and Kangxi's original letters to his son, preserve the recalcitrant facts that contradict the imperial mythmakers." According to *Qin Zheng Ping Ding Shuo Mo Fang Lue*, Galden was died because of an unknown illness.[262] By contrast, the myth of Galden's death is also recorded in the *Qin Zheng Ping Ding Shuo Mo Fang Lue*. In 1697,

First, the Kangxi Emperor wanted to demonstrate to Manchu readers his "conquest" of a distant "foreign borderland" (M: *tai wan i be tulergi gurun i goroki hecen de bifi*) that had been temporarily settled by Zheng Chenggong. This was a milestone: an imperial expansion rather than an act of Chinese unification. The Qing had originally described Shi Lang's suppression of the Zheng as *wame mukuyebure*: "eliminated and destroyed." The emperor modified these terms to *dailame wara*: "conquered and killed." To describe the armies marching toward the islands, the Manchu version uses *afambi* (conquer) instead of the original *gaimbi* (occupy). To describe Zheng Chenggong's plan to attack Taiwan, the Manchu version uses *ejelefi*, which means "occupying illegally," to replace the original term of *tenefi*, which means "settle down" or "colonize."

Second, the book intended to show Inner Asian readers that the conquest of Taiwan was a preplanned imperial strategy under the insightful leadership of the Kangxi Emperor, enacting a transition from the traditional tribal council to an autocratic empire with a universal emperor. For example, the Kangxi Emperor added *hese wasimbufi* (imperial edict) and *dergici hesei* (edicts from on high) in the Manchu text and removed the terms *yi zheng wang* and *hebei wang* (regent) when describing the decisions and policies. These changes emphasize that decisions were

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"Galden committed suicide by swallowing a pill because the Kangxi Emperor organized a comprehensive plan to defend Galden." Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West*, p. 203. *Qinzheng pingding shuomo fanglue*, vol. 44, p. 7. For instance, in 1767, the government compiled *Manchu Fang Lue*, the editor used khan in Chinese but used the king in Manchu-language to describe a Mongol khan. This word choice resulted in punishment for not only the editor but also all ministers and officials. *Neige daku dang'an*, Number: 181915-001。For instance, in 1786, the government compiled *Kaikou fanglue*, but a Manchu editor Silabu wrote *dame* (help) as *wardame* (dig out). The proofreader did not discover this error, so both were punished. See *Neige daku dang'an*, Number: 217448-001.

coming directly from the emperor rather than the council.

Third, the Manchu version hides the errors of Manchu commanders and exaggerates their contributions to the war against the Zheng. For example, in describing the battles against Zheng Chenggong in 1654 and 1659, it lists three more Manchu commanders than the Chinese version. It credits the Manchu governor Wu Xinzuo (吳興祚, 1632–97) for winning a battle in 1680 instead of the Chinese admiral Wan Zhengse (萬正色, 1637–91), who gets the credit in the Chinese version.[263] It also omits a description of a 1647 battle because a Manchu general was defeated by Zheng Chenggong.[264] Thanks to the emperor's farsighted strategy and the Manchu generals' bravery and talent, the "great" empire had incorporated this borderland. Such a victory might have given the emperor's Inner Asian subjects the confidence to face new incoming threats; by contrast, the Chinese version did not emphasize the Manchu role but described the Qing's greatness and the war against the Zheng in relatively neutral terms. In sum, the New Qing History aimed to recontextualize Qing history as a Manchu-led imperial history. It highlights the Qing's expansion under Manchu leadership into a barbarian and alien land beyond the seas.

Both the Chinese and Manchu versions acknowledge Shi Lang's achievement. However, Shi Lang was not the dominant figure in the expedition in the beginning, when the emperor reactivated brokerage. Shi Lang had to compete against Yao Qisheng, who understood the significance of trading with foreign powers and whose actions betrayed his hope of dominating the expedition and taking the spoils. However, Yao Qisheng's failure in 1682 enabled Shi Lang to convince the court and emperor to transfer control to him, and Yao Qisheng was permitted only to stay in Southern Fujian. The next section illustrates why this was important, because Shi Lang dominated Taiwan after his victory. Shi Lang proved his skill at naval warfare and his knowledge of Taiwan and the maritime world, which was mainly based on the 1665 plan and which made him the most qualified broker in the maritime borderland. The Chinese version matches Ma Yazhen's argument that the Kangxi Emperor planned to underscore the empire's achievement rather than the greatness of the emperor himself. However, the Manchu version shows that the emperor intended to associate the conquest with his individual greatness.[265]

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[263] Ruan Minxi, *Haishan jiangwen lu*, vol. 2, p. 58.

[264] Peng Sunyi, *Jinghai zhi*, vol. 1, pp. 17-18; *Tong'an xianzhi*, vol. 3, p. 3; vol. 25, p. 35; *Quanzhou fuzhi*, vol. 73, p. 32.

6.3 *Kai tuo xun chen*'s Social Transformation, Policymaking, and Colonial Enterprises

After conquering Taiwan, Shi Lang instigated a number of structural reforms that transformed Taiwanese society. First, he sought to remove all traces of Zheng rule, which would obscure his status as a conqueror. Second, he established colonial enterprises to enlarge his personal profits. Third, to ensure his status and profits, he proposed policies for ruling Taiwan that were approved by the Kangxi Emperor. Taiwan thus became Shi Lang's colony. He was called *kai tuo xun chen* and seen as its conqueror.

While the Qing court debated whether the empire should include or exclude Taiwan, Shi Lang oversaw its military occupation. Determined to erase the influence of the Ming and Zheng, he set about reconstructing one of the Zheng's representative buildings: the Ming prince's residence, a symbol of Ming legitimacy in Zheng Taiwan. According to an investigation in 1650 by Dutch, a popular belief along the coast of China in the sea goddess Mazu (媽祖) was unpopular in Taiwan.[266] Shi Lang, however, credited Mazu for his conquest and rebuilt the Ming prince's residence as a Mazu temple. His second task was to link his image to this new symbol of colonialism. He therefore seized an adjacent residence, which believers had to pass by on their way to the temple.[267] This site was later called Shicuoya (施厝衙), meaning Shi Lang's yamen or residence.[268] Meanwhile, to the south of the Mazu temple in Xianzailin (檨仔林), Shi Lang built another residence that served as his ancestral hall in Taiwan.[269] He also occupied one of the canal entrances to the Mazu temple because another Shi ancestral hall was located beside the canal, and many Shi had settled there after the conquest (see Figure 4-2). These were the urban projects carried out by Shi Lang instead of the Qing court, which were meant to enhance his status in Taiwanese society.

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[265] Ma Yazhen, "Manzhou shanwu wenhua zai jianshi—yi Kangxichao chuanfa fanglue weili," *Xin shixue*, vol. 30, no. 4 (2019), pp. 55-122.

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[266] Ang Kaim (Weng Jiayin), Huang Yan, *Jiema Taiwan shi*, pp. 250-251

[267] Mao Shaozhou, "Zhenshi yu xiangxiang de kongjian jiaocuo: yi Tainan daTianhougong de jianzhu xingzhi ji gongneng weili," *Taiwanshi yanjiu* 21, no. 2 (2014), pp. 1-32. Xu Xiaowang, "Qingchu cifeng Mazu tianhou wenti xintan," *Fujian shifan daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban)*, no. 2 (2007), pp. 28-35.

[268] This is Wanfu'an (萬福庵).

[269] This residence is a temple today, called Chaoxing Gong. According to gazetteer, Shi Lang built this place as his residence as well as a Mazu temple for local people. See *Chongxiu Fujian Taiwan fuzhi*, vol. 9, p. 308.

Figure 6-2. The Taiwan county in the early Qing period.


城池圖
Shi Lang's residence
Shi Lang's residence in Xianzailin
Shi family's port
Mazu temple
Shi ancestral hall

Another example of Shi Lang utilizing and promoting the Mazu cult to enhance his status and gain acceptance among the local population is the revised version of the text, *Tianfei xianshen lu* (天妃顯聖錄), which was first compiled in the late Ming period by the Lin family in Putian, where the Mazu cult had originated. The author of the revised version added three chapters explaining how Mazu had assisted Shi Lang in navigating to Penghu, finding water sources in the islands, and defeating the Zheng regime.[270] The author also added illustrations (see Figure 6-3).

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[270] Lin Yaoyu, *Tianfei xiansheng lu*, pp. 43-45.

Figure 6-3. The pictures about Mazu’s protection on Shi Lang’s victory. The left-hand drawing accompanies two chapters of *Tianfei xianshen lu*: “lai shen gong peng hu po zei” (賴神功澎湖破賊) and “ping peng hu yin hui shen jiang” (平澎湖陰麾神將). The right-hand painting is in the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam. Both illustrations depict the same battle, but one intends to show the reality, whereas the other offers a religious perspective.



Shi Lang’s construction of the Mazu temple and occupation of the adjacent residence indicate that, like Zheng Zhilong, he wanted to establish a presence in the local society.[271] In 1685, he placed the inscription “ping tai ji lue bei” (平臺記略碑) in the Mazu temple, declaring that he had officially incorporated Taiwan, an island on the frontier of the maritime world and not previously recorded in the Chinese world.[272] The Kangxi Emperor also built a living shrine for Shi Lang in Penghu, where Shi Lang placed a stele reading “shi jiang jun miao bei ji” (the inscription of the temple of general Shi Lang, 施將軍廟碑記) to commemorate his conquest of

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[271] Shi Lang not only rebuilt the human landscape but also shaped that people identified him as a conqueror. In the past scholarship, John R. Shepherd points out that Shi Lang was a conqueror. John Robert Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier 1600-1800* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 105.

[272] Xu Ke, *Qingbei leichao*, p. 102.

Taiwan, which had ended Penghu's isolation by reducing the distance and effort of traveling to it.[273]

How did Taiwanese society react to Shi Lang's efforts? Two cases provide an answer to this question: First, in 1685, Jiang Yuying (蔣毓英) became the first magistrate of Taiwan and had no special relationship with Shi Lang. Despite this, when he compiled a gazetteer, *Tai wan fu zhi* (the gazetteer of Taiwan prefecture, 臺灣府志), he listed those who had contributed to conquering Taiwan in separate categories. The first category was *kai tuo xun chen* (military generals of merit who cultivate the land, 開拓勳臣), and Shi Lang was the first name listed.[274] Second, in 1693, elites and traders placed a stele in the Mazu temple with the inscription *"jing hai jiang jun shi hou gong de bei"* (the marquis of jing hai general Shi Lang's achievement, 靖海將軍施侯功德碑) to announce that civilization had never reached Taiwan before the Shi Lang's conquest. The Taiwanese therefore welcomed Shi Lang's conquest. In the inscription, the elites and traders announced that although the empire had once suggested excluding Taiwan, which caused social disorder in Taiwan, Shi Lang insisted on including Taiwan, resulting in increased support for the Taiwanese. Shi Lang left two of his subordinates to manage the military and administration after he returned to the mainland. As representatives of the Taiwanese, the aforementioned elites and traders thanked Shi Lang for conquering Taiwan.[275] The location of this stele suggests that the Taiwanese recognized and accepted Shi Lang as a conqueror—similar to the memorial archway for Zheng Zhilong built by elites and commoners in Southern Fujian.

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[273] *Penghu tingzhi*, p. 425.

[274] *Taiwan fuzhi*, vol. 9, pp. 209-213.

[275] These two steles are still in the Mazu temple of Tainan today. I copied the inscriptions in July 23, 2015.

Jing hai hou, meaning the marquis who subdued the sea, was Shi Lang's noble title after he conquered Taiwan. The three inscriptions and the gazetteer described above all referred to Shi Lang's noble title of *jing hai*. Besides mentioning Shi Lang, this title also had special meaning for ordinary people in Taiwan and Southern Fujian as a symbol of his achievement, dominant role, and status as conqueror.[276] On Shi Lang's plantations, for example, when tenants signed contracts with the managers or owners, they would see the seal of *jing hai hou* authorizing their rights (see Figure 6-4).

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[276] For instance, in 1709, Shi Lang's fifth son, Shi Shilai, published Shi Lang's writings as a book. Shi Shilai, as an elite in Quanzhou, said, "my father, the honorable Xianzhuang, was in charge of *jing hai*." The term of *jing hai* was indeed the term Shi Lang's noble title, but, in Shi Shilai's account, this term includes a broader idea as a verb and a norm to describe Shi Lang's achievement of conquest. See Shi Lang, *Jinghai jishi*, p. F34.

Figure 6-4. The seal of *jing hai* on contracts.



Shi Lang's plantations were important not only because of the *jing hai* seal—which was also a noble bannermen title—but also because of their vast scale, which attracted many migrants to Taiwan to become the Shi family's tenants. Shi Lang and his subordinates appropriated vast tracts of land and transformed them into private and highly profitable plantations. Shi Lang's subordinates had large plantations as well, but, naturally enough, his colleagues had much smaller plantations than his. Many studies have focused on these agricultural enterprises, the so-called *xun ye di* (noble land, 勳業地), during Shi Lang's fifteen-month military occupation of Taiwan in 1683–84.[277] The rent collected from these noble lands are called *shi hou zu* (施侯租)

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[277] Li Wenliang, "Mintian yu qingken zhidu: Qingchu Taiwan tianyuan de jieshou yu guanli," in Zhan Sujuan ed., *Zuqun lishi yu diyu shehui: Shi Tianfu jiaoshou rongtui lunwenji*, pp. 27-56; Shi Weiqing 施偉青, *Shi Lang zai Taiwan xunyeidi yanjiu* (Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe, 2015), pp. 59-107.

in Taiwan. Shi Lang established at least ten rent-collecting centers overseen by professional managers, each of whom collected at least 6,000 *dan* and 2,000 taels every year. In 1685, the Taiwan government collected about 92,000 *dan* and 24,000 taels in taxes, and Shi Lang appears to have netted about 6 percent of the total *dan* and 8 percent of the total taels collected. Some scholars believe that the Shi family might have collected far more than this: it is noteworthy that the estimated net income is based on fragmentary records.[278]

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[278] Shi Lang and his descendants dispatched managers to Taiwan in charge of management. These lands could offer. This report indicated that Shi Lang's descendant came to Taiwan to sell six rental halls and associated rights during the Daoguang period. During the early of Japanese colonial period, the Shi family remained four rental halls in Fengshan and Jiayi county, and the Shi family still received 1,600 taels which were delivered to Beijing every year. She Yingsan, *Tainan ge yamen guanzu qiyuan yange kuanlei jiuguan diaocha quance* (unpublished, completed in 1903 and collected in the Library of Taiwan); *Taiwan fuzhi*, Vol 7, p. 145-147; Gao Gongqian, *Taiwan fuzhi*, vol. 5, p. 141; To increase production, Shi Lang also built an irrigation system. This irrigation is called Jiang jun po. See *Taiwanfu yutu zuanyao*, pp. 144-145.

Figure 6-5. The locations of brokers' plantations (the green dots are Shi Lang's plantations; purple dots are Shi Shikui's plantations; pink dots are Shi Shibang's plantations).



Besides himself, Shi Lang asked his cousin Shi Qibing (施啟秉) and nephew Shi Shibang (施世榜), who was probably half-Japanese (as was Zheng Chenggong), to serve in southern Taiwan as managers between 1686 and 1690.[279] Shi Qibing and Shi Shibang both managed Shi

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[279] The best study about this family is Huang Fusan's work. See Huang Fusan, *Taiwan shuitianhua xianqu: Shi Shibang jiazu shi*.

Lang's plantations and developed their own enterprises. They exploited the well-developed sugar industry in southern Taiwan and used the port of Anping to export sugar to Japan during this period, when sugar was produced amply but rice was lacking in Taiwan. This foundation in the sugar industry provided a chance to invest in rice production in central Taiwan.[280] Therefore, after Shi Lang's conquest in 1683, he and his relatives controlled the sugar trade between Taiwan and Southern Fujian. The sugar produced in Taiwan was sent to Xiamen for international trade, and the Shi family's massive colonial plantations generated enormous profits.

However, to ensure that his status as conqueror and his profitable colonial enterprises would endure, Shi Lang sought to dominate Taiwanese policymaking in the Qing government. Because he was the leading expert on Taiwan, government officials always consulted with him before proposing policies regarding taxation and the benefits of sugar and deer skins. Instead of giving advice on these policies, Shi Lang usually provided his own suggestions for decreasing taxation in Taiwan, for exporting sugar from Southern Fujian rather than from Taiwan, and for allowing only authorized traders to trade overseas. Shi Lang declared a tax holiday for the following three years: all taxes and labor services were forgiven, and the rents on government-owned farms were reduced by 40 percent.[281] With respect to maritime trade to overseas world, he insisted on trade from Xiamen, where the Fujian naval admiral was based, instead of from Taiwan; in other words, in his plan, Taiwan became a place for production rather than a trading post, and the only trading post would be Xiamen where was fully controlled by him. Moreover, all sugar trading ships had to sail directly from Anping, which was controlled by Shi Lang, to Xiamen.[282] In other words, trade between Taiwan and Southern Fujian was centered in Xiamen, which was controlled by the Fujian naval admiral. Hence, whoever could control the Fujian naval admiral would control trade between Taiwan and Southern Fujian as well as between Southern Fujian and East Asia.

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[280] Cai Zhizhan, "Qingchu Banxian kenshou Shi Shibang shiji tanwei," *Shehuike jiaoyu yanjiu*, no. 2 (1997), p. 77

[281] Shi Lang, *Jinghai jishi*, vol. Xia, pp. 66-72。John Robert Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier 1600-1800* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 215.

[282] Shi Lang, *Jinghai jishi*, vol. Xia, pp. 69-72。

Besides the control of trade, Shi Lang had to maintain firm control of Taiwan and the surrounding sea as the Fujian naval admiral. Shi Lang advanced several policies for the military control of Taiwan from Southern Fujian. He ordered a stationing of a commander in Taiwan with 8,000 soldiers and a naval commander in Penghu with 2,000 soldiers. These 10,000 soldiers were transferred from the mainland every three years.[283] This policy became known as the "soldier rotation system" (*ban bing zhi du*, 班兵制度). The Qing government initiated a system from around 1685 to 1687 in which 13,376 to 14,661 soldiers in Fujian had to garrison in Taiwan every three years for four reasons: distrust of the Taiwanese people, economic security, familiarizing the Hokkienese with Taiwan in case it needed to be defended or reconquered in the future, and protecting Taiwan from Dutch and Japanese ambitions.[284]

Furthermore, Shi Lang increased his own power by installing a commander in Taiwan under his control as Fujian naval admiral. The Fujian naval admiral was stationed in Xiamen and controlled the navy in Fujian as well as the army commanders of Taiwan, Haitan, and Nan'ao.[285] This control of the Fujian coast had been established by Zheng Zhilong through his Zheng

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[283] Shi Lang, *Jinghai jishi*, vol. Xia, pp. 61。

[284] Shi Lang, *Jinghai jishi*, vol. Xia, pp. 61; *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 127, p. 358。Xu Xueji, *Qingdai Taiwan de luying*, pp. 260-262、264、286. Yu Guanghong uses the approach of historical anthropology, via the perspective of history from below, to explore the influence of current and monsoon on soldier rotation system in Penghu. Yu explores the topic of immigrants and populous form in Penghu. Yu Guanghong, *Qingdai de banbing yu yimin: Penghu de ge'an yanjiu* 清代的班兵與移民：澎湖的個案研究 (Taipei: Daoxian chubanshe, 1998); *Chongzuan Fujian tongzhi*, vol. 84, pp. 2-3; Yao Ying, *Dongcha jilue*, vol. 4, p. 93.

[285] *Qingchao tongdian*, vol. 38, p. 2223.

Ministry, but the Qing reenacted it through their own bureaucracy; however, the admiral was directly appointed by the court rather than selected from random candidates. The establishment of the Fujian naval admiral in 1662 lasted until 1863, and Shi Lang and his son Shi Shibiao occupied the position for thirty-three years. Besides the Shi family, Huang Wu's family and Lan Li's family later occupied the same position for another thirty-two years before the death of Qianlong in 1799. Thus, during the so-called High Qing period (1662–1799), these three families controlled the Fujian naval marshal over half of the time. Interestingly, they were all colonial brokers sharing similarities with Shi Lang and following his brokerage model: to conquer Taiwan and hold plantations in Taiwan.[286]

In sum, Shi Lang and his subordinates transformed Taiwanese society in many ways after the 1683 conquest. They had better knowledge of Taiwan than Yao Qisheng's forces, which also had experienced frontier officials along the coast, and they conquered Taiwan to fortify the empire's maritime borderland, integrating Southern Fujian and Taiwan. The conquest resulted in Shi Lang and his subordinates being raised from colonial brokers in Fujian to conquerors in Taiwan. Shi Lang created policies on taxation, maritime trade, and military control to his own profit, especially from the plantations. His urban project transferred the symbol of Ming legitimacy to the Mazu temple near his residence, and the Mazu temple also became a place to secure his legacy as a conqueror of Taiwan, which had been ingrained in people's minds. I offer an interpretation to frame Shi Lang and his subordinates' plantations in Taiwan within the social context and political context to argue that Shi Lang's acts and policies were all related to his personal benefits in Taiwan.

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[286] Li Qilin, *Jianfeng zhuanduo: Qingdai qianqi yanhai de shuishi yu zhanchuan*, pp. 152-156.

6.4 Brokerage in 1696: Lineage Organization and Eight Banners System

This section argues that the Qing's use of the Eight Banners system to enroll brokers unintentionally affected the brokers' lineage structure. In 1696, when Shi Lang was ill, he wrote a letter to the Kangxi Emperor proposing that one of his sons should inherit his noble title and stay in Beijing while the other return to Quanzhou and manage the lineage, as he had arranged in 1665. The Kangxi Emperor agreed. This agreement produced a unique structure allowing the bannermen to interfere with their Chinese lineage affairs. Shi Lang's brokerage was based on Zheng Zhilong's model and the Qing's Inner Asian institutions, such as the Qing's replication of Zheng Zhilong's model and employment of Huang Wu as a Mongolian prince; however, here, the institution was not the Huang family's Mongolian prince institution but the Eight Banners system. The Qing court used the Eight Banners system to ensure the loyalty of brokers; at the same time, this structure exerted great influence in the maritime borderland society.

Because the law required separating bannermen, who operated under the Eight Banners system, from the Chinese, who usually organized lineages to interact with government institutions, previous studies have presumed that the Eight Banners system had no impact on lineage organization. However, the brokerage proved that the Qing court intentionally used the Eight Banners system to exert influence and control the lineage organization at the maritime borderland.

Many researchers have emphasized the distinctiveness of the Qing's Eight Banners system and its effects on Qing history.[287] The Eight Banners system is one of the Qing's foundations.

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[287] Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). Qiu Yuanyuan, *Zhaoxun jingjiao qiren shehui: koushu yu wenxian shuangzhong shijiao xia de chengshi bianyuan qunti* (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe,

This system created the ruling class, the military, and a separate community from the Chinese. In other words, it was a hybrid institution combining a range of military, social, economic, and political functions.[288] The Eight Banners system included three ethnic groups: the Manchu, Mongolians, and Chinese. People under this system were the so-called bannermen (qi ren, 旗人), which was distinct from the Chinese (min ren, 民人) legal category. Bannermen were subject to a different legal system from the rest of subjects and had a quota for the national examination; in fact, most bannermen did not need to take the exam to become officials because they could sidestep it to serve in the bureaucracy. Because bannermen were the empire's soldiers, they were unable to hold other careers but received subsidies to serve as soldiers and in related careers. The Qing court had to maintain the bannermen as a force to stabilize its authority, especially when it conquered China, because Chinese culture might have stained the purity and bravery of the bannermen/Manchu.[289]

Just as the Eight Banners system was the fundamental system of the Manchu society, the Chinese society was based on lineage organization. This organization was like a company rather than a purely hereditary organization; it was a corporation based on regional ties and alliances between lineages because of economic, political, and social factors. Lineages were characterized

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2014). Lai Huimin, *Qingdai de huangquan yu shijia* (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2010).

[288] Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 40.

[289] The term Liao-ese has been used since the late Ming period, and this term specifically refers to people who garrisoned or lived in Liaodong area. See Huang Yilong (Huang Yinong), "Wuqiao binbian: Ming Qing dingge de yitiao zhongyiao daohuoxian," *Qinghua xuebao*, New vol. 42, no. 1 (2012), 79-133. Frederic E. Wakeman Jr., *The Great Enterprises: the Manchu Reconstruction of the Imperial Order in Seventeenth-century China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Jonathan D. Spence, *Ts'ao Yin and the K'ang-hsi Emperor; bondservant and master* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Mark C. Elliott, "Ethnicity in the Qing Eight Banners," Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton edit, *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), pp. 27-57. Lai Huimin, *Danwen qimin: Qingdai de falui yu shehui* (Taipei, Taiwan: Wunan Press, 2007).

by their trust holdings. The distribution of privilege within lineages would have been uneven.[290] The two crucial tools for establishing lineage were the establishment of an ancestral hall based on an official standard to certify its members' literati status. Lineages served as legitimizing labels for claims to settlement rights and territorial control, and for excluding outsiders from villages to maintain the lineage. The lineage was a product of borrowing from the larger society (e.g., borrowing ideas or explaining some of the religious rites) because it began as a norm suited to groups that needed or wanted connections with officialdom.[291] Influenced by Freedman's documentation of lineage as the studied unit in communities and understanding the history of villages in South China, David Faure placed Freedman's studies in a practical, historical context. Once official ideology entered the village, the lineage as an institution could protect its members.[292] Because worshipping ancestors was the core of this institution, descendants' worship was part of the "contract."[293] Because lineages were the most fundamental social unit in Fujian and Taiwan, the lineage organizations in this region used the same strategies to divide property, practice religion, address taxation, and resolve social problems.[294] The ancestral hall was therefore the center of the lineages as an urban institute.[295]

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[290] Freedman argues that lineage was the fundamental unit in local society, and family is the smallest unit in a lineage. Several families become a compound. Several compounds become a branch. Several branches become a sub-lineage. Several sub-lineages become a lineage. Each one has its own leader and ancestral hall._Sib, clan, and lineage means that a local community with male members, female unmarried members, and males' wives. About the organization and structure of lineage, see Maurice Freedman, *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China* (London: Athlone Press, 1958).

[291] David Faure, *The Structure of Chinese Rural Society: Lineage and Village in the Eastern New Territories, Hong Kong* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 4, 12-13;. Helen F. Siu and David Faure, "Introduction," in David Faure and Helen F. Siu edit, *Down to Earth: The Territorial Bond in South China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 211. Before Freedman, Chinese historians based their studies of the lineage primarily on written records. Accepting the view from the written genealogies that the lineage must necessarily be a segment within a wider lineage, they came to regard what they referred to as the clan as the sum total of all the offspring descended from an ancestor. However, following the tradition of British anthropologists who had conducted field-work in Africa, Freedman distinguished between the lineage as a corporate group holding defined rights and the "dispersed division of society" that claimed a common ancestry, to which he applied the word "clan." To Freedman, these corporate groups had to be actively formed and maintained through alliances between individuals and smaller groups. They were established to defend particular rights, and by no means, all descendants were included. Faure further argues that ancestral hall, temples, and religion were overlooked by Freedman to analyze lineages. David Faure, *The Structure of Chinese Rural Society: Lineage and Village in the Eastern New Territories, Hong Kong* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 5, 8-11.

[292] Local elites can benefit from using the government's discourses and system to show their legitimacy. If we named this process in local society, this institution is lineage. It is necessary to understand "estate/land" to entirely realize the cultural background of lineage's establishment in the 15th and 16th centuries. Faure's study in Fushan suggests that this town was never controlled by the government but lineages. Whether people had right to reside depends on whether they had right to share public resources, such as building houses, fueling woods, and so on. Therefore, in Fushan, people used their ancestor to decide whether an outsider could reside in

Shi Lang, residing in Xiamen as the Fujian naval admiral, was a bannerman who had established and dominated the lineage. He became a bannerman residing in his Hokkien hometown and controlling the lineage. For instance, Shi Lang could decide who had the right of worship and selected members to study at school.[296] In Qing law, bannermen and Chinese would be tried by different systems: Manchu garrisoned generals had the right to try bannermen, whereas Chinese administrative officials would try Chinese.[297] Moreover, the Qing government also had a clear property law that prevented the bannermen and Chinese from selling to each other (*qi min bu jiao chan*, 旗民不交產).[298] Thus, because a bannerman was under the authority of a Manchu garrisoned general and could not conduct economic exchanges with the Chinese, Shi Lang's acts on behalf of his own Chinese lineage, such as purchasing properties, were illegal.

Fushan. However, Faure admits that a commercial town, such as Fushan, and an agrarian village, such as New Territory, are distinct because of the fundamental difference in their original purpose.

[293] Zheng Zhenman, Michael Szonyi translates, *Family Lineage Organization and Social Change in Ming and Qing Fujian* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001). He Xi 賀喜, *Yishen yizu: Yuexinan xinyang goujian de shehuishi* (Beijing: Shanlian shuju, 2011). Ivy Maria Lim, *Lineage Society on the Southeastern Coast of China: The Impact of Japanese Piracy in the 16th century* (New York: Cambria Press, 2010). David Faure, *Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp 1-14; Maurice Freedman, *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China* (London: The Athlone Press, 1958), pp. 34-36. David Faure, *The Structure of Chinese Rural Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 65-66. Maurice Freedman, *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung* (London: Athlone Press, 1966).

[294] Zheng Zhenman, *Xiangcun yu guojia: duoyuan shiye zhong de Min Tai chuantong shehui* (Beijing: Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian shudian, 2009).

[295] Hugh Baker focuses on kinship. The City in Late Imperial China by G. William Skinner (1977)

[296] *Xunhai Shishi zupu*, p. 671, 922.

[297] *DaQing huidian shili*, vol. 23, p. 2.

[298] Zhao Zhongfu, "Qingdai dongsansheng beibu de kaifa yu haihua," *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiushuo jikan*, no. 15 (1986), pp. 1-16.

Nevertheless, these transactions were approved (see the discussion below).

Although the Qing inherited the Ming system, especially its civic administrations, a rift still existed between the two dynasties. Some scholars have argued that, in general, society did not experience significant change because lineages used similar civic administrations during the Qing Dynasty. In this section, I argue that the lineages under the Qing functioned the same as under the Ming period, but the case of the colonial brokers' lineage was embedded into a new element of the Eight Banners system. Shi Lang not only had frequent connections with his non-bannermen kin but was also involved in their affairs in Quanzhou—with the Kangxi Emperor's approval.

From 1683 to 1696, Shi Lang garrisoned men in Xiamen. Although his legal status had been ignored, he was a bannerman. While serving as the Fujian naval admiral, Shi Lang fully dominated the Shi lineage, which he himself had organized in 1665. He rebuilt the great ancestral hall and compiled a new genealogy in which he had the power to determine who would be incorporated and who excluded. In Shi Lang's instructions, Shi Tao (施韜) participated in social affairs.[299] Shi Tao funded repairs and built eleven bridges for commercial purposes over major rivers near Quanzhou (see Figure 6-6).[300] Additionally, Shi Tao funded the repair of the Longshan Temple at Anhai, the hometown of the Zheng family.[301] Shi Lang asked Shi Tao's son, Shi Shijin (施士晉), to manage a property. This land could offer rent in grain worth over 10,000 *jin*.[302] Under Shi Lang's permission, Shi Tao's grandson Shi Yifen (施奕奮) had the right to manage the ancestral residence in the hometown and nearby lands, offering an annual rent of over 12,000 *jin*, two salt fields, five stores, and the responsibilities of worshipping ancestors.[303] These two cases might be related to the question of whether bannermen could have Chinese properties. Much evidence suggests that Shi Lang was the most significant figure in the lineage and dominated all familial affairs during this period.

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[299] Shi Tao was the only non-bannermen in the Shi lineage had a noble title as *baitalbure hafan*. Shi Tao is Shi Lang's brother's son. He not only got Shi Lang's particular favor but also the only Han Chinese who could hold a noble title. According to the Manchu-language record, Shi Tao's son Shi Shilong (ši ši lung, 施士隆) inherited this title later. According to a record memorized by Jingjiang county in 1753, Shi Tao had the noble title because he assisted to capture Zhangzhou and Quanzhou in 1677, defeated the Zheng troop in 1678, recovered nineteen castles in 1680, and contributed to conquering Taiwan in 1683. This noble title is able to be succeeded for three times. In 1720, Shi Tao passed away, but his son Shi Shilong inherited this title in 1726. Shi Shilong was assigned to the Fujian naval marshal to learn naval warfare to prepare as a naval commander. Although the genealogy did not record that Shi Tao had a son whose name was Shi Shilong, it is clear that someone whose name was this inherited Shi Tao's noble title and lived in Quanzhou. Although the genealogy did not record that Shi Tao had a son whose name was Shi Shilong, it is clear that someone whose name was this inherited Shi Tao's noble title and lived in Quanzhou. See *Qingdai pudie dang'an*, B collection, microfile 002, Huang ce 009, microfile 003, Huang ce 019. *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Wu, no. 1, p. 94. Shi Tao's nine sons are Shijen 士楨, Shiyue 士嶽, Shifong 士峯, Shijin 士晉, Shichen 士岑, Shiwei, 士蔚, Shijing 士景, Shidun 士敦, Shitan 士曇, Shiyan 士巖, Shihui 士徽, and Shichen 士晟. See S, *Xunhai Shishi dazong zupu*, pp. 668-669.

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[300] Among these bridges, three bridges locate at Luo River, three locate at Jin River, and four are the bridge crossing bays. See Fang Ding 方鼎 and Zhu Shenyuan 朱升元, *Jin jiang xian zhi* 晉江縣志, vol. 2, pp. 33-35. These bridges might associate with commercial purposes. In fact, in a preface of an unpublished genealogy, the Shi lineage encourage members to conduct commercial activities. See *Xunhai Shishi zupu*, p. 56。

[301] *Jinjiang xianzhi*, vol. 15, p. 18.

[302] This is a property of the tomb of his babysitter, Mrs. Chen, located in Fuquan (福全). Se *Xunhai Shishi dazong zupu*, pp. 671-673。

[303] *Xunhai Shishi dazong zupu*, pp. 673-674。

Figure 6-6. The locations of the bridges built or rebuilt by Shi Tao. The black circles refer to the bridges built by Shi Tao; the white circles indicate Anhai, the Zheng Chinese lineage's hometown, and Xunhai, the Shi Chinese lineage's hometown.


Longtan Bridge (Kangxi period)
Majia Bridge (Kangxi period)
Lou River
Haoshi Bridge (Kangxi period)
Puli Bridge (1717)
Jing River
Quanzhou
Dongshan Bridge (Kangxi period)
Hankou Bridge (Kangxi period)
Jiezhuan Fuli Bridge (Kangxi period)
Dongyang Bridge(1712)
Anping Bridge(1712)
Anhai
Youjiang Bridge (1704)
Xunhai
Huihu Bridge (1704)

However, the close interaction between Shi Lang and his relatives in Quanzhou apparently violated the Qing law of "no property exchange between bannermen and Chinese." Besides the important question of whether these properties belonged to Shi Lang and other bannermen, another important question is why Shi Lang made the purchase. He could not guarantee that his and his descendants' control of the lineage would last forever. In a 1696 letter, Shi Lang proposed that his sons, at least, could still control the lineage. Before his death in 1696, he requested that the Kangxi Emperor appoint one of his sons to inherit his role in the lineage. This was an unusual request because the Qing did not approve the connection between the Eight Banners system and the Chinese.[304] Shi Lang ordered his fifth son, Shi Shilai (施世騋), to return to Quanzhou to manage ancestral worship as well as his properties. In the genealogy, Shi Shilai is described as "returning to manage the worship according to the emperor's edict."[305] Shi Shilai was not the only bannerman approved by the Qing emperors to manage the lineage. During the Qing period, emperors approved Shi Shilai's return to Quanzhou in 1696, Shi Shibiao's return in 1715, Shi Liangpu's (施良璞) return in 1741,[306] Baoju's (保住) return in 1749,[307] and Shi Delin's return in 1844.[308] Among these five returns, Shi Shilai and Shi Liangpu ultimately settled permanently in Quanzhou because of the emperors' approvals, and Baoju and Shi Delin were called back to Beijing. These five members were all bannermen, but they could still return to worship their Chinese ancestors with the emperor's permission and settle within the lineage; however, I do not have enough sources to demonstrate whether these bannermen inherited the properties purchased by Shi Lang—that is, whether the bannermen violated the law to own Chinese properties. As David Faure has pointed out, once the ancestral hall and worshiping practice existed, the lineage could continue.[309] In other words, even though these members had been placed under the Inner Asian system, the ancestral hall and worship practice were part of their tradition, and the lineage continued as a combination of two different communities during the Qing period. The case of the Shi family was quite unusual and almost the only case of its kind during the Qing era because the Qing did not enroll many Chinese into the Eight Banners system after 1644. An exception was made for the people from Liaodong and Southern Fujian (such as Shi Lang), who were the largest group from the same region in the system. The people from Liaodong had a less developed lineage organization, but the lineage organization was crucial in Southern Fujian and among these brokers' families. Therefore, the case of the Shi family was unusual and important because no study has ever noted that the Eight Banners system influenced the lineage organization in Southern Fujian, and these cases created a new interpretation of an important idea, namely that the separation between bannermen and Chinese could be flexible if the empire needed it to be.

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[304] Chi Yunfei, "Qingmo zuihou shinian de ping Man Han zhenyu wenti," *Jindaishi yanjiu*, no. 5 (2001), pp. 21-44.

[305] Shi Tao was Shi Lang's nephew. He was one of the naval generals recommended by Shi Lang in 1696. There is a Manchu-language version of this letter. See *Gongzhongdang Kangxichao zouzhe* (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1976), vol. 8, p. 593. The Chinese version of this letter is collected in Shi Lang's work. See Shi Lang, *Jinghai jishi*, vol. Xia, pp. 60-63.

[306] Shi Shibiao (施世驃)'s second son, Shi Tingzhuan (施廷專), who inherited Shi Shibiao's noble title, requested Qianlong Emperor to approve his nephew, Shi Liangpu (施良璞), a born bannerman, with Liangpu's mother, Mrs. Bai, and his grandmother, Mrs. Zheng, who was from the Zheng family to return Quanzhou and manage the worship and lineage in 1741. Qianlong Emperor approved this reques Shi Tingzhuan's mother and from Zheng Chenggong's family. See *Neige daku dang'an*, Number: 223630-001.

[307] In 1749, Shi Tingjing (施廷敬)'s son Baoju had been settling in Quanzhou for a while. He was only seven years old, but he being a bannerman, should not stay outside Beijing for a long time so that Baozhu was requested to be moved to Beijing. However, Jinjiang county counter-argued that Baozhu was too young to survive in Beijing, so the county suggested that Baozhu should be grown by his uncle Shi Tingzhi (施廷諮) in Quanzhou until he was old enough. The Jingjiang county used the example of Shi Liangpu to convince the court. To remain Baoju in Quanzhou, the officials of the county also showed the certification and guarantee from the Shi lineage. The court approved this request in 1750. However, apparently, until 1762, although the court had seen Baozhu a citizen who had departed from the banners system, he was still asked to move to Beijing and waited for the judgment. See *Neige quanzong*, Number: 03-18-009-000030-0003, 03-0175-1569-004。

[308] In 1844, Shi Delin (施德霖) who was the *jing hai hou* returned to Quanzhou with the emperor's approval to repair the great ancestral hall, worship ancestors, and tomb in Quanzhou. He asked to go to Taiwan because he "heard" that Shi Lang had a great ancestral hall in Taiwan as well. He, therefore, asked to repair the hall in Xianzailin (羨仔林) in Taiwan. See *Neige daku dang'an*, Number: 216497-001。

In 1696, Shi Shilai succeeded Shi Lang and played an important role in not only the lineage but also the local society. With respect to genealogy, Shi Shilai utilized Confucian doctrines to manage the lineage.[310] He also rebuilt the Chengtian Temple (承天寺) and purchased nearby lands and stores, adding them to the lineage's enterprises.[311] In 1713, Shi Shilai funded the repair of the prefecture school, which was located in the same area as the Shrine of Moral Officials (賢

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[309] David Faure, *Emperor and Ancestor*.

[310] *Xunha Shishi zupu*, pp. 119-124.

[311] *Jinjiang xianzhi*, vol. 15, p. 14; Wu Zhiju, Zhou Xueceng, and You Xungong ed, *Jinjiang xianzhi*, vol. 14, p. 71.

良祠) of Shi Lang.[312] Shi Shilai participated in social affairs and cultivated a high reputation. In 1811, local elites and gentries built a great memorial hall for Shi Shilai's morality and contribution in society.[313] Therefore, Shi Shilai achieved what Shi Lang expected, enhanced the Shi lineage's influence on local society, and strengthened Shi Lang's control of the lineage. It has to be remembered that this was a bannerman family.

Thus, in Southern Fujian, the Eight Banners system was influenced by Chinese lineage. In fact, to maintain brokerage, the Qing court allowed an unusual interaction between the Eight Banners system and the Chinese lineage organization in Southern Fujian. This interaction did not suddenly appear or disappear; instead, the structure lasted until at least the nineteenth century. The reason for the existence of this structure was because the Shi family served as the Qing's broker.

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that Shi Lang's conquest affected the maritime borderland society, himself, and the empire. Shi Lang defeated the Zheng navy at Penghu in 1683 due to his deep knowledge of naval warfare and the maritime world. After he conquered Taiwan, he transformed Taiwanese society by setting new policies, rebuilding the cities, establishing his unique status among the Taiwanese, and organizing plantations. The new military, administrative, and financial policies not only stabilized the empire's governance but also provided Shi Lang with a stable colony and profitable colonial enterprise. Shi Lang's urban projects included transforming the Ming's symbol of legitimacy—the Ming prince's residence—into a Mazu temple, building multiple residences, and appropriating central locations as his private property. Shi Lang placed steles emphasizing his and his subordinates' achievements at the new center of Taiwan. The results indicate that Taiwanese society identified Shi Lang and his subordinates as conquerors of Taiwan, as he himself did. His actions provided a foundation for profitable colonial enterprises.

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[312] *Jinjiang xianzhi* vol. 4, pp. 3-4.

[313] *Jinjiang Xianzhi,* vol. 5, p. 13.

Shi Lang's conquest also gave him a special role in the maritime borderland. Previous studies have not recognized Shi Lang's bannerman status and its importance and impacts on his heritages. No study has yet appreciated the influence of Shi Lang's bannerman status on his conquest of Taiwan. Shi Lang reached an agreement with the Kangxi Emperor in 1696 that enabled a unique interaction between the Eight Banners system, which was the fundamental system of this Inner Asian empire, and the Chinese lineage organization, which was the basic social unit of southern China. The Qing emperors used this new arrangement to indirectly dominate Shi Lang and his descendants as the brokers and *kai tuo xun chen* in Quanzhou society and to monitor their behavior. The brokers dominated the lineage by exploiting their outsized economic power and elite legal status. This structure could only function because of Shi Lang's conquest of Taiwan.

Finally, Shi Lang's conquest led the central empire to initiate a formal process of empire-building according to the analyses of *Pingding haikou fanglue*. The Manchu version of this book emphasized the achievements of Manchu generals, underscored the Kangxi Emperor's insights, and proclaimed the empire's spirit of kindness. Unlike the Chinese version, the Manchu version took a biased view of the victory in the maritime borderland, which included Taiwan and Southern Fujian. Thus, Shi Lang's conquest of Taiwan contributed to the empire-building. I accept Ma Yazhen's argument and further explain it. Shi Lang's efforts to emphasize his military contribution were part of a tradition of highlighting military culture in Southern Fujian to make commoners and social elites recognize the generals' status; *fang lue* has a similar function. Thus, the Southern Fujian military culture and Manchu military culture met each other in the conquest of Taiwan.[314]

Shi Lang's 1683 conquest led to the Qing's maritime brokerage. This brokerage featured Zheng Zhilong's model, which included an official position (Fujian naval admiral), participation in social activities by brokers and their families, and the influence of Inner Asian institutions, although it was the Eight Banners system rather than the Mongolian prince in Shi Lang's model. Most importantly, Shi Lang's brokerage set the new precedent of a broker controlling extensive lands and building colonial enterprises in Taiwan. This model continued into the next generation and expanded in 1721 after the brokers conquered Taiwan again by defeating a massive rebellion.

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[314] See Ma Yazhen, "Manzhou shanwu wenhua zai jianshi—yi Kangxichao chuanfa fanglue weili," *Xin shixue* 30, no. 4 (2019), pp. 55-122; also see Joanna Waley-Cohen, *The Culture of War in China: Empire and the Military under the Qing Dynasty* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006)

7 The Second Conquest, a Debate, and Growing Power Brokerage

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will demonstrate that the broker role was inherited and continued to pay dividends for the next generation of brokers. In 1721, Zhu Yigui (朱一貴, 1690–1722) led a massive rebellion and seized Taiwan, quickly removing most structures of the Qing rule. The Qing court, needing a way to quell the rebellion, turned to familiar names: Shi and Lan. Members of these two families were vital in quelling this second conquest of Taiwan, much as their ancestors had been vital in overthrowing the first conquest. How did they do it? Why were they chosen? What happened after their successful military actions? I argue in this chapter that the second generation of *kai tuo xun chen* inherited their ancestors' role of assisting the Qing in reconquering Taiwan. Because of this inheritance, they reaped great rewards from the war but were also responsible for managing the resulting debate between the anticolonization and procolonization factions.

After Shi Lang died in 1696, control over the Fujian naval admiral position ultimately went to his son, Shi Shibiao (施世驃, 1667–1721), even though the Qing had already appointed his subordinate to this role. In 1721, Zhu Yigui led a rebellion in Taiwan, which was quelled by Shi Shibiao, who reconquered Taiwan with the assistance of his deputy, Lan Tingzhen (藍廷珍, 1664–1730), whose uncle, Lan Li (藍理, 1647–1719), had been a bannerman and Shi Lang's deputy in 1683. Shi Shibiao died in Taiwan after suppressing the rebellion, and Lan Tingzhen became the Fujian naval admiral in charge of brokering.

Lan Tingzhen's first task was to defend Taiwan on behalf of the brokers, because the rebellion resulted in a debate between the Manchu officials and the brokers. The Manchu officials, namely Gioro Mamboo (1673–1725), proposed anticolonial policies and even suggested abandoning Taiwan. However, Lan Dingyuan (藍鼎元, 1680–1733), Lan Tingzhen's cousin and consultant, convinced almost all of the Manchu officials, including Gioro Mamboo, to adopt more lenient colonial policies to more efficiently civilize Taiwan.

The central court eventually approved of the brokers and most of their policies. These policies allowed the Shi and Lan families to expand their plantations into aboriginal territory and other areas not already under Qing control. Meanwhile, although the Lan family had long dominated the brokerage business, the Yongzheng Emperor tried to keep brokerage under the bannermen's control. Given that he still greatly trusted the Shi family, the emperor then fostered and trained Shi Shibiao's son, Shi Tingzhuan (施廷專, ?–?), as a qualified naval admiral ready to assume his father's and grandfather's role in the future,[315] rather than allow the brokerage business to remain under the control of the Lan family.

Thus, Shi Lang's brokerage continued, and the second generation of *kai tuo xun chen* even expanded their colonial enterprises after their triumph in Taiwan. The Lan family was undoubtedly qualified to support the Qing's rule, and they enlarged the brokers' colonial enterprises and acquired greater profits.

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[315] Certain bannermen, especially the Shi family, had closer relationships with emperors because of two critical facts. First, the Shi family had a marriage relationship with the imperial clan, the emperor instead of other members. Second, many of the Shi family served as imperial guardians beside the emperor, which was one of the reasons why Manchu emperors needed these guardians because the emperors could supervise and know these potential candidates for the future usage. See Chen Wenshi, "Qingdai de shiwei," *Shihuo yuekan* 7, no. 6 (1977): 249-261; Huang Yuanqing, "Qingdai Man Han guanzhi: yi shiwei de shengqian wei zhongxin," In *Manxue lunching*, edited by Zhao Zhiqian 1 (Shenyang: Liaoning, 2011): 111-112; Chen Zhang, "Qingdai shiwei dengji xintan," *Zhongguo wenhua yanjiushuo xuebao*, no. 63 (2016): 123-148.

7.2 The Second Generation of *kai tuo xun chen*: Shi Shibiao

In 1696, Shi Lang died, and the Kangxi Emperor continued to name other *kai tuo xun chen* as Fujian naval admirals. In 1712, the last *kai tuo xun chen* died, and the emperor named Shi Shibiao as the Fujian naval admiral. After Shi Shibiao took the position, he began his term as a broker, strengthening his status in his lineage, as well as in the local society of the maritime borderland, helping the Qing in their maritime affairs and with Taiwan.

The emperor continued employing *kai tuo xun chen*, who helped conquer Taiwan in 1683, and Shi Lang's heirs continued to be Fujian naval admirals because of their experience and skills. Immediately before Shi Lang died in 1696, he recommended Zhang Wang (張旺, 1649–1722), one of his most reliable generals, as the next Fujian naval admiral because, according to Shi Lang, Zhang Wang was an expert in the affairs of the Fujian coast and Taiwan.[316] However, he only served in this position for two years. Although the Kangxi Emperor accepted Shi Lang's recommendation, he noted the decreasing number of appropriate candidates and decided to select a general to fill the position from the pool of *kai tuo xun chen*.[317] In 1698, Wu Ying (吳英, ?–1712), a *kai tuo xun chen*, became the next Fujian naval admiral and served until his death. Wu Ying's naval skills and knowledge of the maritime world, especially concerning pirates, assured the emperor that he was the best choice.[318] Except for Shi Lang, Wu Ying was the only general for whom people built a living shrine in Xiamen and Taiwan during this period, an indication that the local society admired his special role in both locations.[319] Thus, between 1698 and 1712, Wu Ying, as the last living *kai tuo xun chen*, was a broker.

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[316] Shi Lang, *Jinghai jishi*, vol. 2, pp. 74-75

[317] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, Vol 154, p. 705-706; vol. 188, p. 1002–1003; vol. 213, p. 164; vol. 225, p. 263; vol. 227, p. 272-273; vol. 229, p. 295-296; vol. 229, p. 298.

[318] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 174, p. 883, vol. 188, p. 1003, vol. 251, p. 249.

After 1712, the second generation of *kai tuo xun chen* inherited their ancestors' positions as brokers for the Qing Empire. The first member of the second generation to inherit was Shi Shibiao. He had served beside the Kangxi Emperor in his early career and took part in the Zunghar War. Before 1696, Shi Shibiao was trained as an army commander rather than as a coastal general. Shi Lang wished that Shi Shibiao could receive a better position in the future.[320] The Kangxi Emperor appointed Shi Shibiao to the coast of China, from Shangdong and Zhejiang to Guangdong. In 1712, Shi Shibiao was named the Fujian naval admiral to fill the vacancy created by Wu Ying's death.[321] Shi Shibiao then returned to Quanzhou and served as the Fujian naval admiral until 1721.

Shi Shibiao's primary task was to maintain the Qing's authority in Taiwan and keep social order there. This task aligned with Shi Shibiao's personal goals because he wanted the brokerage business to dominate Taiwan to maintain his lineage's profit from the island. As mentioned, the Fujian naval admiral had full control of Taiwan, and the Shi lineage had established massive colonial enterprises that benefited from Shi Lang's policymaking. However, the new Fujian governor presented new challenges.

In 1715, Chen Bin (陳璸, 1656–1718), the new governor of Fujian, had to deal with pirates in the Taiwan Strait attacking boats that were transporting goods between Taiwan and Xiamen. He also suspected that the boats frequently went to foreign states to trade. To solve these issues, he ordered every boat to register the name of the captain and the amount of cargo; every boat to be guaranteed by a third party before setting sail; and every boat to leave only in a large group with twenty to thirty other boats, to ensure they were protected and supervised by the navy. Chen Bin also ordered the Taiwanese navy to patrol east of the strait and the Xiamen navy to patrol the western part.[322]

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[319] In Xiamen, this place is as known as jiangjunchi, literally referring to the shrine of general (將軍祠), and in Tainan, this place locates at Dongan fang (東安坊).

[320] Shi Lang, *Jinghai jishi,* vol. 2, pp. 74-75

[321] *Qing shengzu shilu, vol.* 251, p. 484.

Chen Bin's orders undoubtedly had a major impact on the brokers' enterprises in Taiwan, with the added possibility of terminating the smuggling controlled by the Shi family. Chen Bin's policy would make it impossible to smuggle goods to Japan, where the Shi family's ships would often go, although they claimed their destination was Taiwan. Moreover, the policy giving the Taiwan naval commander the right to control the eastern Taiwan Strait meant that the Fujian naval admiral was no longer the highest admiral of the navy in Fujian. To oppose Chen Bin's policymaking, Shi Shibiao admitted that, although the new policies could help solve some issues, they were too complicated to enact. Instead, Shi Shibiao proposed that the navies from Xiamen and Taiwan should individually patrol the entire strait as a shared jurisdiction; he also disagreed with Chen Bin's regulation of trade boats.[323] The court eventually sided with Shi Shibiao. His proposal can be summarized by saying that both navies—who were under his command, although the Fujian navy of Xiamen was closer to him—had the right to control the strait, which was the most important area for the smuggling trade from Fujian to Japan.

After Chen Bin's proposal, a strong challenge to the brokers' privileges came from Gioro Mamboo, the Fujian governor-general and the most experienced Manchu official in the maritime borderland—with over fifteen years of service. Unlike Sotai, who was from a Chinese banner family, Gioro Mamboo was a royal member of the Qing imperial clan, and unlike some bannermen, he had taken the civil examination and earned a degree in 1694. He was selected as an imperial scholar in the National Academy. In 1711, he became the governor of Fujian and the Fujian-Zhejiang governor-general in 1715 until his death in 1725. Gioro Mamboo had a strong continental perspective. For instance, he saw Taiwan as an exotic territory, so he made an effort to "civilize" it and rule over the Taiwanese aborigines, provide exotic goods, such as mango and watermelon, to the Kangxi Emperor, and send some aborigines to Beijing so that the emperor could better understand these "others."[324] Moreover, he emphasized the importance of the mainland over Taiwan and suggested the most outstanding officials should be assigned to Fujian because this province was located beside the sea. In 1715, he built 127 coastal forts with 1,178 cannons to defend the maritime borders. Moreover, he proposed enhancing the naval defenses in Lu'ermen, Penghu, Danshui, and Anping to ensure the safety of Taiwan by protecting the southeast coast.[325] In 1717, he proposed that ships commuting between Taiwan and Fujian should register in Xiamen, as Chen Bin once ordered, and banned immigration to Taiwan.[326]

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[322] *Qing chixian leizhen xuanbian*, vol. 7, pp. 658-660; *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 270, p. 648.

[323] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 271, p. 660.

In his most significant proposal, approved by the Kangxi Emperor, Gioro Mamboo disagreed with private trade overseas and suggested a ban on maritime trade in 1717.[327] In 1717, the Qing court restricted maritime trade, which only banned ships to Spanish Manila and the VOC Batavia. The court still permitted trade to Japan. The Qing Empire required that Chinese living overseas must return to the mainland, or they would be considered pirates. Shi Shibiao disagreed with this policy, but he could not reverse it. The only thing he could do was to postpone it and require that the court give Chinese living overseas time to be notified and return years later. He pointed out that many Chinese had departed before the new laws were implemented. He suggested that the Qing should hire prominent and rich traders to announce this regulation to Chinese people living overseas in other countries. Eventually, the court approved Shi Shibiao's suggestion to give overseas Chinese time to either return to China or settle overseas forever.[328] Therefore, in the early eighteenth century, although the two groups had different opinions, there was no significant debate between the continental and maritime groups. However, Chen Bin and Gioro Mamboo shared the idea that going overseas should be banned, which undermined the brokers' benefits.

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[324] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 268, p. 635. Tsai Wei-chieh (Cai Weijie), "Zhiming dnag'an yu diguo xinggou: lun Qingchao Manwen zouzhe zhong due Taiwan shufan de biaosu," pp. 25-55。

[325] *Qingshi gao*, vol. 284, pp. 10187–10189.

[326] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 277, p. 715-716

[327] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 271, p. 658.

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[328] *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Ding, no. 8, p. 790

Figure 7-1. The route map of the Eastern and Southern Oceans (*dong yang nan yang hai dao tu*, 東洋南洋海道圖). This map can be found in the First Archive of China and is believed to be the map completed by Shi Shibiao.



Zheng Zhilong, Huang Wu, and Shi Lang shared two important beliefs. First, they established, or reorganized, their lineage and expanded their status therein. Shi Shibiao followed suit and compiled a genealogy in 1715 after Shi Shilai died in 1714. This new genealogy was based on Shi Shilai's version, and Shi Shibiao wrote a preface announcing that "our lineage begins when Shi Lang opened a territory overseas and contributed to the empire." In this narrative, Shi Shibiao linked the formation of the Shi lineage to Shi Lang's conquest. After this announcement, he proclaimed that he wished he could inherit his father's achievement for both the empire and his lineage. At the end of this preface, Shi Shibiao invited forty-one members, including Shi Shibang (施世榜, 1671–1743) of Taiwan, from different branches of the Shi lineage to endorse this genealogy and his status in the lineage.[329] Because Shi Shilai died in 1714, Shi Shibiao successfully assumed his role and continued the bannermen's domination of this Chinese lineage.

Shi Shibiao's second strategy, similar to his predecessors, was to enhance his status as a broker and to be acknowledged by local society. Shi Shibiao took the opportunity to claim his status in Taiwan in 1719 and 1720, when officials in Taiwan began their compilation of gazetteers. Shi Shibiao claimed that he was Shi Lang's legitimate successor. Gazetteers in the peripheral regions were important for local actors, such as chieftains in Southwest China, to document their lineages and demonstrate their legitimacy to the central government, thereby laying a foundation for their continued rule.[330] This is precisely what Shi Shibiao did. He wrote prefaces for the 1719 Gazetteer of Fengshan and the 1720 Gazetteer of Taiwan to claim his status. He also thoroughly read these gazetteers to obtain firsthand information regarding Taiwan. He emphasized Shi Lang's conquest of the "unconquered place" in the empire and announced that he would inherit his father's will, duty, and position as a conqueror of Taiwan. He wrote in the preface, "Taiwan was located far away in a 'non-civilized area'. My father conquered the maritime universe to include this island and make it important for the defense of the southeast area." He believed that the compilation of the gazetteers would be one way to glorify the emperor's greatness and memorialize his father. At the end of his preface, he said, "I inherited the spirit and goal of my ancestors."[331]

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[329] *Xunhai Shishi zupu*, pp. 90-95; *Jinjiang Xunhai Shishi zupu*; *Xunhai Shishi dazong zupu*, "tijie," p. 2.

[330] Joseph Dennis, "Projecting Legitimacy in Ming Native Domains," in James A. Anderson and John K. Whitmore edit, *China's Encounters on the South and Southwest* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), pp. 259-70.

In other words, Shi Shibiao's achievement as a Fujian naval admiral was undoubtedly also an achievement as a broker. His background as a bannerman and descendant of *kai tuo xun chen* made his appointment meaningful because he supported the idea that only *kai tuo xun chen* were qualified to serve in the maritime borderlands and handle those complicated situations. However, he had to earn people's acceptance, not only as a broker but also as Shi Lang's legitimate successor.[332]

7.3 Zhu Yigui's Rebellion and the Second Conquest

Shi Shibiao's most important achievement as a broker was neither his policymaking in international trade, nor his proposal concerning the Fujian naval patrol, but rather his reconquering of Taiwan in 1721. Zhu Yigui (朱一貴, 1690–1722) led a massive rebellion to overtake most of the strongholds of the Qing rule. Shi Shibiao, with his deputy Lan Tingzhen, successfully defeated the rebellion and reinstated Qing authority.

Environmental crises may have been a primary catalyst for the rebellion. In the peripheral areas of Southern Fujian, people were still suffering from natural disasters, and many people illegally migrated to Taiwan, including Zhu Yigui. From 1719–1721, floods, earthquakes, torrential rain, snow, and wind battered Taiwan. Such conditions ruined fields and crops and caused shortages in the harvests. People struggled to survive in Taiwan because of this prolonged period of hardship, which greatly impacted the local economy.[333]

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[331] *Taiwan xianzhi*, Shi's preface, pp. 1-2. *Fengshan xianzhi*, Shi's preface, p. 1-2.

[332] For instance, Shi Shibiao and Shi Lang both were worshipped in a shrine for famous and important officials locating at Fengshan. See *Chongxiu Fengshan xianzhi*, vol. 6, p. 174. In Xiamen, people established a memorial archway for Shi Lang, and another memorial archway for Shi Lang and Shi Shibiao. See *Xiamen zhi*, vol. 2, pp. 68-69.

The immigrants devised strategies to resolve the situation, such as to cultivate new lands and exploit resources outside the Qing authority. During the 1710s, increasing numbers of immigrants illegally deforested the aboriginal territories and claimed lands there. However, in the 1710s, the magistrate of Taiwan was Wang Zhen (王珍, ?–1721), a significant figure in the anticolonialization faction, but his attitude toward ruling Taiwan has been ignored in the literature because scholars only focused on his corrupt behaviors, which were believed to be the main cause of the rebellion.[334] Many studies have indicated that Wang Zhen was the main culprit because his and his son’s illegal collection of taxes eventually sparked the rebellion. Zhu Yigui directly blamed Wang Zhen and his son for illegally collecting numerous taxes; for arresting assembled people who had invited a troupe to pray for safety because of a tsunami caused by an earthquake or a flood in 1721; and for allowing people to deforest land in aboriginal places.[335] Although this appears reasonable, these accusations might be overlooking some of Wang Zhen’s policies.

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[333] During this period, the severe weather resulted in the arduous living conditions in Southern Fujian. As many environmental historians and institutes have noted, the average temperature of the globe reached the lowest during the 1450s and gradually increased until the 1770s to reach the peak; research indicates that the abnormal temperature change had a positive correlation with deforestation and increasing population. These scientific studies fit into Mark Elvin's statement regarding the Great Deforestation. Mark Elvin, *The Retreat of the Elephants: An environmental history of China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 19-85. This is what Kenneth Pomeranz illustrates that increasing population cultivated toward border during the late imperial China period. Kenneth Pomeranz, "The Transformation of China's Environment, 1500-2000," in Edmund Burke and Kenneth Pomeranz edit, *The Environment and World History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), pp. 122–123. These environmental historians' observations are what happened in the maritime borderland as well. For instance, just like the conquest of 1661 and 1683, frozen climate caused to famines. According to the weather records, before Zheng Chenggong attacked Taiwan, it was snowing in Fujian. In 1662, famine occurred in Quanzhou. These facts might directly result in Zheng Chenggong's expedition. See *Fujian tongzhi*, vol. 65, p. 67. In 1683, after Zheng Keshuang surrendered, it was snowing dramatically in Taiwan. A gazetteer describes that it never showed in Taiwan before and it was extreme hot in Taiwan, the snowing in Taiwan was because the Qing's conquest of Taiwan caused to the unification of the air between north and south. See *Fujian tong zhi*, vol. 65, p. 80. When an extraordinarily frozen weather in winter was usually followed by an unusual climate during the spring, summer, and fall time. Such an unusual climate created strict impacts on harvest and agriculture. For example, before the cold winter of 1683, a famine stroke Taiwan. Xia Lin, *Haiji jiyao*, pp. 75-78。Similarly, in 1721, a frozen and snowstorm attacked the maritime borderland. *Fujian tongzhi*, vol. 65, p. 51. Maybe someone asks whether the frozen weather was a regional situation? In fact, perhaps not. As known, the temperature and weather of maritime borderland would highly affect by the weather in northeast China and Mongolia during the winter. During the 1720s, the severe and frozen weather had caused disasters in Mongolia. For instance, in 1723, the Qing officials reported several-year frozen weather and snowstorm in Mongolia. *Qing Shizong shilu*, vol. 18, p. 298. He had been a runner in yamen and became a duck-farmer later. His charismatic personality attracted many followers. See Lan Dingyuan, *PingTai jilue*, p. 1; *Fujian tongzhi*, vol. 65; *Chongxiu Taiwan fuzhi*, vol. 19.

[334] Anticolonization in this context is that officials disagreed with an open policy to colonize Taiwan. They disagree with any form of colonization, including free migration, free cultivation in all lands of Taiwan, and other tax relief.

Wang Zhen was an experienced official who likely held an anticolonization stance. For instance, he required separation between Chinese colonists and aborigines and banned deforestation in the aboriginal areas. Moreover, to decrease the possibility of an uprising, he built infrastructure to educate people and actively deal with the social conflicts caused by competition for water resources.[336] Therefore, the objections raised by Zhu Yigui stress two facts. First, the environmental crises, including floods, snow, and earthquakes, resulted in hard times, as well as fiscal deficits. To survive, Zhu Yigui and the people of Taiwan deforested the aboriginal areas and assembled to pray for safety. However, these two activities apparently violated Wang Zhen’s policies designed to ensure a stable colonial society, so he arrested these people. Wang Zhen's actions ultimately contributed to the rise of the rebellion.

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[335] *Chongxiu Taiwan xianzhi*, vol. 15, pp. 554; See Lan Dingyuan, *Ping Tai jilue*, p. 1; *Qingshi jianyi xuanlu*, p. 58.

[336] Wang Zheng was on the waiting list of first-degree scholars (舉人) in 1681. In 1716, the government assigned him as the prefecture of Taiwan. Wang Zhen was an experienced and ambitious official. See *Xuxiu Taiwan xianzhi*, vol. 2, p. 129; *Zhuluo xianzhi*, vol. contributors , p. 11; *Fengshan xianzhi*, Wang’s preface, p. 7-8, contributor, p. 13; *Taiwan xianzhi*, Wang’s preface, pp. 5-6, contributors, p. 13; Wang Zhen repaired and built a new facility in the official school to make it spectacular in 1718. See *Xuxiu Tanwan fuzhi*, vol. 8, pp. 339. In 1720, Wang Zhen and the local elite worked together to rebuild the Anlan bridge (安瀾橋) as a solid one. This bridge connected the port and land to allow officials to enter the city of Taiwan. *Chongxiu Taiwan xianzhi*, vol. 3, pp. 98; *Chongxiu Taiwan fuzhi*, vol. 2, pp. 78. In 1719, elites and ordinaries build a memorial arch, named “Enlightening learning and fostering elites (興學造士)” for Wang Zhen. *Taiwan xianzhi*, vol. 2, pp. 87. In 1718, Wang Zhen resolved a dispute regarding water sources. After a survey and investigation, Wang Zhen placed a stone and delimitated how to distribute the water source from a lake. *Xuxiu Taiwan xianzhi*, vol. 1, pp. 26. In 1717, because of a famine in the winter, Wang Zhen required to reduce the tax to seventy percent of usual. *Taiwan xianzhi*, vol. 9, pp. 219. In Wang Zhen’s account, he took six things seriously. They were the emphasis of learning at school, of military defense, coaxing aborigines, monitoring non-registered people, reducing tax, and cultivating forest and lake areas. *Fengshan xian zhi*, Wang’s preface, p. 7-8.

In 1721, the rebellion soon removed the Qing authority from the island. In the beginning, Du Junying (杜君英, 1667–1721) was the leader of the uprising, not Zhu Yigui. Du Junying was a Hakka man who collected rent on the colonial plantation of the Shi family. However, Du Junying was wanted by the government for deforesting the mountains.[337] Convinced by others, Du Junying led a rebel troop to attack the Qing's stronghold. Afterward, Zhu Yigui also revolted. Many men joined the rebellion, including sugar traders, rice store owners, farmers, cotton workers, sugarcane farmers, laborers, ferrymen, fish sellers, students, yamen runners, cloth store owners, and even some officials.[338] Zhu Yigui and Du Junying individually defeated the Qing government and then joined forces. Two months after they rebelled and captured the city of Taiwan, the Qing officials, including Wang Zhen, fled to Penghu. The rebels believed that Zhu Yigui was a royal member of the Ming Dynasty because of his surname.[339] As a result, he took the throne in the Mazu Temple as the successor of the Ming Dynasty. He then prepared for the rebel forces coming from the mainland and reopened Fort Provintia—closed for over three decades—making it a stronghold.[340]

When Shi Shibiao was notified of the rebellion, he immediately headed to Penghu to prepare for the coming war.[341] Gioro Mamboo and Lan Tingzhen decided to join Shi Shibiao in

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[337] *Ming Qing shiliao*, Vol Ding, no. 8, p. 797.

[338] *Ming Qing shiliao*, Vol Ding, no. 8, pp. 792-796.

[339] When the rebels captured the city, a myth told that a jade belt floated on the surface of the sea, and this was a symbol for rebels to claim their legitimacy through the Ming Dynasty. See Shi Shije, *Housukan heji*, pp. 147–148.

[340] Lan Dingyuan, *Ping Tai jilue*, p. 6. Another source indicated that Zhu Yigui took his throne in Wanshou temple. See Lian Heng, *Yaotang wenji*, p. 207.

[341] Lan Dingyuan, *Ping Tai jilue*, p. 9.

Penghu. They encountered a typhoon soon after they departed; however, as an experienced seaman and naval commander, Lan Tingzhen himself steered his vessel to safely anchor in Tongshan and then sailed to Penghu again.[342] In Penghu, Lan Tingzhen suggested landing simultaneously in three different places in Taiwan to fight back. However, based on his rich knowledge of Taiwan through reading gazetteers and experiencing life there in 1683, Shi Shibiao had a map with marks, and he insisted on directly landing in Lu'ermen as Zheng Chenggong had in 1661 because the wind would direct them there.[343] Afterward, Shi Shibiao and Lan Tingzhen approached the coast of Taiwan and destroyed the coastal fort at Lu'ermen, which Zhu Yigui's army defended with cannons. Shi Shibiao soon passed through the narrow passage when the tide rose to an unusual height. Although it is not clear whether Shi Shibiao consciously took this route, his landing exactly mirrored that of Zheng Chenggong's conquest in 1661.[344] Shi Shibiao and Lan Tingzhen soon captured Anping, located on a sandbar, and fought Zhu Yigui's army in a massive cannon battle on the Taiwanese mainland. Zhu Yigui's troops moved forward, protected with shields and many bullock carts, to a sandbar while the Qing took a field position and shot cannons behind them. Facing such formidable rebel troops, Lan Tingzhen established a gun encampment to fire on the Qing's great cannons, ordered the navy to the back of the rebel troops, and fired cannons from ships to pin the rebels to the middle of the sandbar.[345] After Lan Tingzhen defeated the rebels in this battle and in nearby areas, Shi Shibiao went to the garrison in the city of Taiwan.[346] Shi Shibiao ordered Lan Tingzhen to quell the rebels. Seven days after they landed in Taiwan, the second generation of *kai tuo xun chen* had reconquered Taiwan. Zhu Yigui's regime only lasted one month. The Qing eventually captured Zhu Yigui and sent him to trial.[347]

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[342] Lan Dingyuan, *Ping Tai jilue*, p. 11.

[343] Ibid., p. 13.

[344] See Tonio Andrade, *Lost Colony*.

[345] Lan Dingyuan, *Ping Tai jilue*, p. 13–14. Two campaigns used massive artilleries to fight against each other in not only the city of Taiwan but also in other battles. See Xu Ke, *Qingbai leichao xuanlu*, pp. 16–18. On the area where the two sides fought against by cannons, Taiwanese called the cannon fires as a landmark. See Lian Heng, *Yatang wenji*, pp. 225-226.

[346] Lan Dingyuan, *Ping Tai jilue*, p. 16.

In 1723, the Yongzheng Emperor ennobled Shi Shibiao with a new title and asked his second son, Shi Tingzhuan (施廷專, 1690–?), to succeed him instead of his eldest son. Shi Tingzhuan had served as an imperial guardian of the Qianqing Gate alongside the emperor from 1709–1727, and this service allowed him to develop a close relationship with the Kangxi Emperor and imperial clan, including the Yongzheng Emperor.[348] After 1727, Shi Tingzhuan was assigned as commander to the coastal areas of Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Jiangnan. The emperor did this because he wanted to give Shi Tingzhuan more experience in maritime affairs—though Shi Tingzhuan was likely a corrupt commander because he was impeached a number of times.[349] The Yongzheng Emperor, known as the most rigorous emperor in Qing history, tolerated Shi Tingzhuan's illegal behaviors and made an effort to promote him as a qualified naval commander for his future use. The Yongzheng Emperor insisted that Shi Tingzhuan had to serve at least as a commander in the coastal area. An official indicated that the Yongzheng Emperor intended to train and take care of the "descendant of an achieved commander (*xun yi*, 勳裔)."[350] Therefore, the emperor's special treatment of Shi Tingzhuan indicated how the empire would pass the role of colonial broker to the next qualified descendant.

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[347] When the Qing brought Zhu Yigui to the trail, the Qing required to investigate Zhu Yigui's relatives in great detail because he claimed himself the descendant of the Ming royal family. See *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Ding, no. 8, p. 797.

[348] *Xunhai Shishi dazong zupu*, pp. 9–10、653; *Jinshen xinshu, Qianlong shiliu nian chun*, p. 162; *Chiongzhou fuzhi*, vol. 25, p. 21.

[349] *Qing Shizong shilu*, vol. 60, p. 921; *Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi*, vol. 27, p. 38, vol. 102, pp. 2, 16-22 vol. 73, p. 24. *Neige daku dang'an*, Number 290992-066.

[350] *Ming Qing dang'an*, vol. 44, p. 29, vol. 57, p. 48; *Shizong Xianhuangdi zhupi yuzhi*, vol. 223, p. 42, vol. 174, pp. 15–16, 29-33.

Thus, Shi Shibiao becoming the next Fujian naval admiral represents how the second generation of *kai tuo xun chen* assumed the broker position. Shi Shibiao endeavored to strengthen his status in the lineage while making an effort to legitimize his status in Taiwanese society. He was an expert in the maritime world and tried to retain his lineage's benefits. In 1721, after the second conquest, Shi Shibiao successfully defeated the rebellion and recaptured Taiwan; however, three months later, Shi Shibiao died from an unexpected illness.[351] Although the Kangxi Emperor did not take any further actions, the Yongzheng Emperor particularly mentored Shi Shibiao's son, who had a close relationship with the imperial clan, grooming him to be a broker in the future.

7.4 The Debate between Manchu and *Kai tuo xun chen*

In 1721, Shi Shibiao and Lan Tingzhen, two second-generation *kai tuo xun chen*, restored the Qing rule in Taiwan. A debate then arose between Qing officials as they discussed the incorporation of Taiwan. Just as in the debates of 1665 and 1683, these officials used relatively neutral actions to express their ideas, such as Chen Bin's policymaking, Wang Zhen's restrictions on colonialization, and Gioro Mamboo's ban on sea trade. However, the Zhu Yigui Rebellion provoked the officials' more aggressive opposition in Taiwan. Similar to Shi Lang's role in the previous two debates, the brokers defended their position and insisted on retaining control of Taiwan. This time, the representative of the broker's side was the Lan family, who eventually convinced the court and won the debate.

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[351] See Lan Dingyuan, *Ping Tai jilue*, p. 21-23.

A short introduction of the Lan family, who played a significant role during this period, is important here. In 1721, Lan Tingzhen was the controller of Taiwan after Shi Shibiao's death. However, 1721 was not the starting point of his family's connection to Taiwan. Lan Tingzhen's uncle was Lan Li, a deputy of Shi Lang. In the battle of Penghu in 1683, Lan Li was famous for his brave fighting.[352] After the battle, Lan Li seized and developed massive lands in Taiwan, as did Shi Lang. Lan Li was labeled one of the *kai tuo xun chen*. He and his brothers, Lan Zhu (藍珠, ?–?) and Lan Yuan (藍瑗, ? –?), all served as important naval commanders on the coast of Fujian because they were experts in naval warfare.[353] After they served as naval commanders, they planned to rebuild their lineage and enhance their influence because their family was not part of the existing Lan lineage and had been ungoverned in the mountainous periphery before the seventeenth century. During the Ming period, certain families of Lans had organized a lineage because they were registered as military households. However, Lan Li's family was not incorporated and was still ungoverned. After Lan Li and his brothers became powerful, they seized control of the Lan lineage.[354] Thereafter, they began to organize a new lineage to strengthen their status within the Lan lineage.[355] In other words, from 1696–1702, Lan Li and his brothers successfully established their legitimacy and replaced the primary status of a branch of the old Lan lineage and formed a new Lan lineage dominated by their branch.[356]

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[352] His intestines came out because of an injury, but he still fought against his enemies bravely. After the war, Shi Lang sent Dutch medicine and doctor to cue Lan Li. Kangxi and the empress dowager highly praised Lan Li when they saw the wound on his belly.

[353] Except Lan Yao, Lan Yuan serving as Jinmen Commander, Lan Zhu (藍珠) was a general in a coastal area, and Lan Li finally became the Fujian army admiral in 1706 Lan Dingyuan, *Luzhou chuji*, vol. 7, pp. 43. *Jinmen Lanshi zupu*, unpublished, pp. 79. Interestingly, after the battle, Shi Lang asked a Dutch doctor to remedy Lan Li. See Lan Dingyuan, *Luzhou chuji*, vol. 7, pp. 34-44. Lan Guoji (藍國機) and his father, Lan Zhu (藍珠) who was Lan Li's fifth-youngest brother, He Bingzhong and Wu Heli, *Xiamen muzhiming huicui* (Xiamen: Xiamen University Press, 2011), pp. 192–194.

[354] Lan Yuan could directly affect Zhenhai and the Shide Hall because Zhenhai was an area under the Jinmen commander's control. In 1699, Lan Yuan repaired the Shide Hall and offered worshipping manors (*ji tian*, 祭田). *Lanshi zupu*, unpublished, pp. 13; In 1702, Lan Yuan purchased lands in order to build a new ancestral hall, Liangjin Hall (兩金堂) in Neicuo (內厝), Zhangpu, and this ancestral hall was for worshipping his direct ancestor. *Jinmen Zongyutang zupu*, unpublished, pp. 16; Around the same time, Lan Yuan also built another ancestral hall, the Dasu Hall (大樹堂), which was also for worshiping another direct ancestor. *Jinmen Zongyutang zupu*, unpublished, pp. 14–15

[355] They organized a lineage to replace the role of Shide Hall. This replacement ascribed to their influential naval

Although Lan Li achieved huge success in his familial affairs, he did not fare as well in his career. In 1712, Gioro Mamboo impeached Lan Li because he and his family bullied people, occupied others' lands forcibly, and reduced prices on merchandise to increase his potential profits. The Kangxi Emperor was disappointed when he heard of Gioro Mamboo's impeachment of Lan Li. Kangxi wrote a word, *akacun*, which means "grieved" in Manchu, to reflect his views on the situation.[357] The court confiscated Lan Li's property, which was about 80,000 taels, and enrolled Lan Li and his family into the Eight Banners System.[358] Lan Li and his family were forced to live far away from their lineage and hometown.[359] In 1719, Lan Li died in Beijing. Although Kangxi later asked Lan Li's family, in 1721, to depart from the Eight Banners System and register their household in Zhangpu, most members still remained in Beijing.[360] Lan Li's family departed at the same time that Lan Tingzhen inherited the status from his uncle and conquered Taiwan with Shi Shibiao.

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positions as well as a new policy, *liang hu gui zong* (taxes returning from household to lineage, 糧戶歸宗). In 1687, the Qing government reformed the tax system in Fujian. This policy of *liang hu gui zong* combined taxes and the *bao jia* system (保甲) together to encourage unregistered communities to register their households under the empire's authority. This policy not only reformed the tax system but also ensured that lineages in Fujian would self-manage so as to stabilize social order. Liu Yonghua and Zheng Rong, "Qingchu Zhongguo dongnan diqu de lianghuguizong gaige— lai zi Minnan de lizheng," *Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu*, no. 4 (2008), pp. 81-87. Recently, I found that there is an outstanding master thesis in Taiwan providing a similar idea. See Lin Rong-Sheng, "Marginal People and New Regime: The Making of Fujian Lan Li Family during Early Qing Dynasty" (Taipei: National Taiwan University Master Thesis, 2016). In 1699, Lan Yuan, who had served as the Jinmen commander since 1696, purchased sixteen plantations in Jinmen as property for the Lan lineage. *Jinmen Zongyutang zupu*, unpublished, pp. 45-46

[356] *Jinmen Lanshi zupu*, unpublished and collected in the Lan family in Taipei, pp. 36-37

[357] *Gongzhongdang Kangxichao zouzhe*, vol. 9, p. 205.

[358] His family became bannermen and enjoyed the privileges and followed the law. Lan Li's sons, Lan Guozhu (藍國柱) and Lan Guogui (藍國桂) served as imperial guardians. Lan Dingyuan, *Luzhou chuji*, vol. 7, pp. 42.

[359] Lan Dingyuan, *Luzhou chuji*, vol. 7, pp. 44.

[360] Lan Dingyuan, *Luzhou chuji*, vol. 7, pp. 42-44.

After Shi Shibiao passed away, Lan Tingzhen became a broker, and he served as a possible intermediary between Shi Shibiao and Shi Tingzhuan in the Yongzheng Emperor's plan. Similar to Wu Ying's service in 1698 and 1712, Lan Tingzhen served as a full broker, rather than merely an intermediate one, before the Shi regained the Fujian naval admiral position. The Yongzheng Emperor is believed to have been a most rigid emperor. However, he was willing to turn a blind eye to the brokers' illegal behaviors because he needed them so much. The emperor had praised Tingzhen as a loyal and brave man and hoped he would be a general of flawless virtue.[361] However, Tingzhen was likely corrupt.[362] The emperor indicated that naval officials in Fujian were usually served by the Fujianese, so these Fujianese military officials were always partial to their lineages. Hence, the emperor noted that Tingzhen was a qualified general, but his ethics needed to be improved.[363] The emperor expected that Lan Tingzhen could be a "No. 1 good admiral."[364] Thus, it is clear that the Yongzheng Emperor still had faith in Lan Tingzhen.

Another important figure from the Lan lineage during this period was Lan Dingyuan (藍鼎元, 1680–1733), who came from the same branch as Lan Tingzhen. Benefiting from Lan Li's construction of the Lan lineage, Lan Dingyuan's father was able to study at an official school and earned a high status.[365] Different from his brother's service under Lan Tingzhen's command as a general, Lan Dingyuan had traveled to many places in Fujian, especially Xiamen, and knew much about the maritime world.[366] In 1721, before Lan Tingzhen headed to Taiwan, Lan

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[361] *Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao zouzhe*, vol. 2, pp. 501.

[362] Yongzheng warned Lan Tingzhen, "People who ruin their prestige only because of a tiny benefit are all stupid." Although Yongzheng told Tingzhen, "Don't disappoint me," Tingzhen did not perform well. *Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao zouzhe*, vol. 2, pp. 657, vol. 3, pp. 21, vol. 4, pp. 333. vol. 3, pp. 123.

[363] In 1729, Yongzheng replied to Tingzhen, "your reputation has become better recently, but it is rumored you are still partial to your lineage Please notice it." *Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao zouzhe*, vol. 13, pp. 395, vol. 3, pp. 123.

[364] *Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao zouzhe*, vol. 11, p. 50.

[365] Lan Dingyuan, *Luzhou chuji*, Xing Xu, pp. 1-2.

[366] Lan Dingyuan, *Luzhou chuji*, Shen Xu, pp. 1-2, vol. 20, pp. 9, vol. 3, p. 42, Zhang Xu, p. 4, Xing Xu, p. 3, Vol

Dingyuan was his primary consultant.[367] Lan Dingyuan was important because he was the most aggressive debate participant after 1721 and was the one who convinced the court to approve his suggestions, which eventually enhanced the brokers' colonial enterprises in Taiwan.

The debate began immediately after the second conquest in 1721, when Shi Shibiao's sudden death was another unexpected blow for the Qing court. The court named Guangdong admiral Yao Tang (姚堂, ?–1723) as the Fujian naval admiral because the court demanded that someone take this position.[368] In 1722, Lü Youlong (呂猶龍, ?–?) and Yao Tang created a proposal to move the commander of Taiwan to Penghu and reduce the official force in Taiwan. This proposal was extremely similar to the discussion to abandon Taiwan and garrison in Penghu.[369]

Lan Dingyuan, on behalf of the brokers, disagreed with this proposal and wrote a letter to Gioro Mamboo, saying that the ministers in the central court did not understand overseas geography and overemphasized the significance of Penghu over Taiwan. Lan Dingyuan convinced Gioro Mamboo to stand with the colonial brokers on military policies.[370] Gioro Mamboo emphasized defending the coastal mainland. Convinced by Lan Dingyuan, he disagreed with Lü Youlong and Yao Tang's suggestion. Gioro Mamboo believed that the corrupt rotation system proposed by Shi Lang weakened Taiwan's defensive capabilities. Gioro Mamboo stood with the colonial brokers to reform the military system in Taiwan and suggested increasing the

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18, p. 2-3. Besides being a traveler, Lan Dingyuan, like most of the Chinese students preparing for the national examination, was a Neo-Confucianism supporter and scholar and promoted Huang Daozhou's doctrines in his hometown

[367] Although Shi Shibiao, as mentioned, had held affluent knowledge about the maritime borderland and Lan Tingzhen had outstanding naval skills, they, as Shi Lang, still needed consultants to assist them. Most of the consultants were actually from their own lineages. There are many Shi families serving as consultants, for instance, Shi Shiyue (施士嶽) and Shi Shiba (施世黻). See *Quanzhou fuzhi*, vol. 53

[368] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 295, p. 864,

[369] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 297, p. 879.

[370] Lan Dingyuan, *Dongzheng ji*, pp. 46-47.

number of soldiers in Taiwan. However, the court was satisfied with Shi Shibiao and Lan Tingzhen's seven-day quelling of the rebels, so it rejected this suggestion.[371]

In 1724, to respond to the court's disagreement over increasing power in Taiwan, and based on his knowledge regarding Taiwan, Lan Tingzhen, who had been the Fujian naval admiral,[372] suggested increasing the garrisoned army in Taiwan, which had to defend the aborigines and protect all of Fujian; this huge army had to defend "overseas challenges and threats," which indicated that Taiwan would be a Great Wall of the Qing, protecting its maritime border. Lan Tingzhen suggested moving the generals and army from Bengang (笨港) to Taiwan and stationing new troops in Lugang because the huge ships from the mainland could only anchor in these two ports. Then Lan Tingzhen suggested establishing a cavalry in Taiwan to deliver news more efficiently. The Yongzheng Emperor, who took the throne in 1723, rejected almost all these proposals because he did not think the court should spend too much on a military force in Taiwan.[373] In fact, these policies concerned both the military rearrangement and how to enhance the brokers' control of Taiwan.

Although, regarding the military arrangements, Gioro Mamboo was convinced by Lan Dingyuan to support the brokers, he had markedly different and negative ideas about colonial policies. He limited immigration to Taiwan and banned not only maritime trade with foreign states but also trade between Taiwan and Fujian. Moreover, as Wang Zheng emphasized, Gioro Mamboo proposed delimiting the line between aborigines and Chinese colonists, and he even once suggested building a wall in Taiwan to separate the two because this would force the Chinese to stay out of the aboriginal areas. He also planned to move Chinese colonists who were beyond the line to inside the line. Moreover, he disagreed with the policy of unlimited migration to Taiwan. He did not allow immigrants into Taiwan with their families, and he even banned all civilian travel to the island. Therefore, Gioro Mamboo had a retrenched policy on immigration to Taiwan.[374]

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[371] John Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Froniter, 1600-1800*, pp. 239-256.

[372] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 295, pp. 867; *Qingi Shizong shilu*, vol. 10, p. 189, vol. 11, p. 208

[373] In the end of this report, Lan Tingzhen said that the Kangxi's conquest of Taiwan was as same as Yongzheng's victory in West Ocean (收服西海). Lan Tingzhen suggested paying attention to Taiwan because it was the gate of southeast provinces. He also emphasized that he could make these proposals because of his experiences in Taiwan for years. *Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao zuozhe*, vol. 3, p. 121.

In contrast, the brokers championed procolonization. Lan Dingyuan rejected Gioro Mamboo's policy on immigrants because he thought such policies would cause social disorder. From 1724, Lan Dingyuan supported what Shepherd called procolonization against Gioro Mamboo's ban. In a letter on behalf of Lan Tingzhen, Lan Dingyuan listed the possible dangers of the policy.[375] In 1724, Lan Dingyuan indicated that lone Hakka immigrants to Taiwan would cause social disorder.[376] Lan Dingyuan argued for colonization, feeling that the court should free the immigrants to be with their families and allow them to cultivate land in Taiwan.

Lan Dingyuan's suggestion gained Gao Qizhuo's (高其倬, 1676–1738) support. Gao Qizhuo was a Hanjun bannerman under the same banner as the Shi family. In 1727, Gao Qizhuo replaced Gioro Mamboo as the Fujian-Zhejiang Governor-General, buttressing Lan Dingyuan's procolonization ideas. He proposed allowing immigrants to come to Taiwan with their families. Both of them actively supported their immigrant policy and convinced the court to terminate the ban on trade. Their efforts succeeded in 1727 because the rice from Taiwan saved southeast China from famine when the court allowed the rice trade to occur between Taiwan and Fujian. Lan Dingyuan once again proposed freely allowing immigration to Taiwan, but the court rejected this proposal again.[377] In 1732, Guangdong's Governor-General Omida (鄂彌達, 1685–1761) invited Lan Dingyuan to be his consultant. Omida was influenced by Lan Dingyuan and perhaps wanted to solve the issues caused by the growing population in Guangdong. He again suggested allowing people to migrate to Taiwan with their families. This proposal was supported by Grand Council Member Ortai (鄂爾泰, 1677–1745).[378] As a result, the Yongzheng Emperor approved the immigration policy to Taiwan in 1732.

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[374] John Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800*, pp. 137-146.

[375] Ibid., pp. 178-191

[376] Ibid., pp. 148-154.

After 1721, the Lan family became the most important broker family, although this family differed somewhat from the Shi family. The Lan family conquered Taiwan and dominated the Fujian naval admiral position. This family, especially Lan Dingyuan, participated in the colonization debate and interceded on behalf of the brokers. Lan Dingyuan insisted on maintaining Taiwan under the empire's rule and increasing the government's power. The policies suggested by Lan Dingyuan and Lan Tingzhen were designed not for imperial rule, but for their colonial enterprises.

7.5 How Colonial Enterprises Benefited from Policymaking

After the conquest of 1683, Shi Lang asked his cousin Shi Bing (施秉, ?–?) to manage Shi Lang's sugar trade between Taiwan and Japan because Shi Bing had married a Japanese woman, and their son, Shi Shibang (施世榜, 1671–1743), was Shi Bing's successor. The sugar trade experience in Taiwan resulted in Shi Bing's investment in rice production in Taiwan because of the shortage of rice on the mainland due to environmental crises. In 1709, Shi Shibang built two irrigation systems in central Taiwan to increase production, though he spent most of his time in Quanzhou. He had rebuilt a bridge in Anhai, which had also been rebuilt by Zheng Zhilong.[379] In 1715, when Shi Shibiao compiled the genealogy to take, or inherit, Shi Shilai's role and dominate the lineage, his effort had to be supported or recognized by all branches within the lineage. He invited people from different branches to endorse him in his preface; Shi Shibiao was one of them.[380] In 1721, Shi Shibang joined Shi Shibiao's troops as a consultant. After the rebellion, Shi Shibang and his family settled in and dominated Lugang (鹿港), where Lan Tingzhen had insisted on increasing the power of the garrison. This city was close to their huge plantations near the irrigation systems in the middle of Taiwan in 1725 and was featured as an urban overseas Chinese community.[381] Shi Shibang's family held over 6,000 *jia* and collected 45,000 *dan* every year.[382] Shi Shibang eventually created Shichangling (施長齡) as a colonial corporation to cultivate central Taiwan and hired laborers to build fish farms, which was one of the most capital-intensive industries in Taiwan.[383]

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[377] Ibid., pp. 148-154.

[378] Ortai was one of the four trusted subordinates of Yongzheng Emperor and promoted by Yongzheng Emperor from the low-class bannermen community, and he was also the main promoter of the policy of *gaitu guiliu.*

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[379] "Chongxiu Anping qiao ji." [重修安平橋記, Inscription of Rebuilding Anping Bridge]. 1727. Inscription in Anhai. "Chongxiu Anping xiqiao beiji." [重修安平西橋碑記, Inscription of Rebuilding Anping West Bridge]. 1727. Inscription in Anhai.

[380] Shi Shibiao, in 1715, dominated the lineage, like his father; for instance, he had the right to decide whether a family could attach on the Shi lineage. See *Xunhai Shishi zupu*, pp. 90, 95, 141

[381] Scholar argues that, although Lugang was located within the empire, it had features like the urban overseas Chinese communities. That is, the social and public affairs are relied on and dominated by lineages and elites who were merchants. This kind of city is usually seen in Southeast Asia. See Donald R. Deglopper, "Social Structure in a Nineteenth-Century Taiwanese Port City," in G. William Skinner edit, *The City in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), pp. 633-650.

[382] In 1709, Shi Shiban succeeded his father's business to build two important irrigation system, Shicuozhen (施厝圳) of 1719 from Zhuoshui River in Zhanghua and Fumazhen (福馬圳) from Dadu River (大肚溪) in Zhanghua. These made his family owned at least 6000 jia lands in Zhanghua. In 1721, Huang Shiqing built another system, Shiwuzhuangzhen (十五庄圳) in the similar area. After Zhu Yigui rebellion, Shi Shiban gained a military title. According to his study, because of the lack of human force after Taiwan was conquered by the Qing, agricultural production decreased after 1701 when the population gradually increased. The author suggests that Shi Shiban was from Anhai (安海). Until the Zhu Yigui Rebellion, the sugar trade between Taiwan and Japan terminated. Based on Shi Shiban's title as a 貢生, he might arrive at Taiwan between 1686–1690. After Shi Shiban died, this was divided to his sons. After Qianlong period, these rental halls had gradually broken and some of them were sold. Cai Zhizhan, "Qingchu Banxian kenshou Shi Shibang shiji tanwei," *Shehui jiayu yanjiu*, no. 2 (1997), pp. 73–117

After the rebellion, Shi Shibang also expanded his colonial enterprise toward the stateless area in Southern Taiwan. Indeed, around 1707, Shi Shibang had illegally cultivated a huge area in southern Taiwan that provided him with about 14,000 *dan* annually from the Taiwanese aboriginal terrain—illegal because the court did not allow Chinese colonization of said terrain.[384] However, in southern Taiwan, after the conquest, Shi Shibang was approved to hire over 2,000 Hakka tenants to cultivate over 1,400 *jia* in the area of the Taiwanese aborigines, centered in Wanluan (萬巒), because Lan Dingyuan, working on behalf of the brokers, successfully convinced the court to approve such a policy.[385]

Besides Shi Shibang and his family's new colonial plantations in Wanluan (萬巒), worked by Hakka people, Lan Dingyuan's family built a plantation and a city centered at Ligang (里港). Ligang was located between the stateless area and Fengshan and was the frontier of the Qing's authority in Taiwan. After he passed away, his eldest son, Lan Yunjin (藍雲錦), built plantations in Ligang. One of the most important products produced in Ligang was sugar. People in Ligang farmed sugarcane, produced sugar in village workshops, and sold it to Anping and to the mainland. To manage their sugar industry and business, the Lan lineage established a corporation, which was Lanruimei (藍瑞美).[386]

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[383] Huang Fusan, *Taiwan shuitianhua yundong xianqu: Shi Shibang jiazushi*, pp. 7–106; *Qingdai Taiwan dazu diaochasu* (Nantou: The Historical Research Commission of Taiwan Province，1994), p. 4.

[384] This area locates at east of Lili tribe (力力社) and south of Donggang River (東港溪) until Kuelei tribe(傀儡). In this area, the Shi family could gain the great rent (大租額) about 14000 dan (石), and the tax was 1100 dan (石). The Shi only needed to pay tax to Lili tribe 136 dan as the tribal tax (社課). See Wen-Liang Li, "Fanzu tiandi yu guanshi－Kangxi Xiadanshuishe wenshu suojian de Taiwan xiangcun shehui," *Hanxue yanjiu*, 27(4), 2009, pp. 239-240. The detailed sources is in "A'houting Gangdong Shangli dazu fenzheng diaoshu," in *Taiwan zongdufu jiqi fushu jigou gongwen leizuan* (archive collected in the Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica), archival number: 04411–13.

[385] Hakka became the tenants and organized their own semi-military societies to defend themselves from the attack of Taiwanese aborigines and the conflict between Hakka and Fujianese. In the 1750s, the Shi descendants divided their ancestral property to sell these plantations to the Chen family. In 1772, these lands were sold to the other families again. In 1819, these lands were sold to the tenants. In Wanran, the Zhong family transferred their status from tenants to landowners in 1800. Chen Qiukun, "Diguo bianqu de kezhuang juluo: yi Qingdai Pingdong pingyuan wei zhongxin (1700–1890)," *Taiwanshi yanjiu*, vol. 16, no. 1 (2009), pp. 5-20.

In 1724, Lan Tingzhen applied for approval to cultivate the middle of Taiwan. This area was north of the Shi lineage's plantation in Zhanghua, on lands purchased from the Anli tribe (岸裡社). This plantation was called Lanxing (藍興), referring to the flourishing Lan. Lan Tingzhen and his successors cultivated this plantation of over 5,104 *jia* and negotiated with aboriginal headmen to acquire more lands.[387] The Lan lineage's agents also migrated to the hinterland of Taiwan, where they settled in a stateless area of Zhangpuliao (漳浦寮), built a bamboo-walled village to protect themselves, and traded with the aborigines and exploited resources.[388]

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[386] There are five steles in Shuang Ci Gong (雙慈宮), which is a Mazu temple in Ligang. I transcribed the content through my field research in Ligang on December 14 to 24, 2016. There is one stele in Bi Yun Si (碧雲寺), which is a Mazu temple in Ligang. I transcribed the content through my field research in Ligang on December 14 to 24, 2016.

[387] Data also come for Ka Chih-ming, *Fan toujia*, p. 78. *Daicyuku sigai toti tokorobun ni kan suru syorui* unpublished archive and collected in Taiwan Historica 國史館臺灣文獻館.

[388] This part comes from field research as well as the archive. See *Gongzhongdang zouzhe buyi*, pp. 249.

Figure 7-2 Map of Taiwan including the new plantations of the Shi and Lan families and the settlements after the rebellion. The thick black line shows the boundary between the empire and the Taiwanese aborigines. The thin black line is the boundary between each administrative county. The red dots mark the locations of the official hall for each city and the year when the given county was established. The pink dots indicate the location of the Shi lineage's plantations. The blue dots show the Lan lineage's plantations.


Damshui (1731)
Zhanghua (1723)
Lanxing
Lugang
Zhangpuliao
Shicuo irrigation
Zhulou (1684)
Taiwan (1684)
Ligang
Fengshan (1684)
Wanluan

The brokers' policies were designed to increase their colonial benefits in Taiwan. Lan Dingyuan's policy rejected Gioro Mamboo's suggestions and proposed instead that the Qing increase military power in Taiwan, rather than shifting the base from Taiwan back to Penghu, which implied cutting Taiwan off from the empire. Thinking of the Lan's colonial enterprises in Taiwan, Lan Dingyuan did not want to see his ancestors' efforts obliterated. He suggested allowing massive family migration to Taiwan to reduce social disorder. Considering the Shi and Lan's plantations in southern Taiwan, this policy helped the two lineages gain plentiful and rich human resources for cultivating their newly developed plantations. These were mainly Hakka people, and they organized their societies in southern Taiwan.

One of Lan Dingyuan's most influential ideas was that the empire should encourage people to cultivate all lands, regardless of whether they were aborigine or not. Given the Shi's plantations in southern Taiwan and Lan's plantations in central and southern Taiwan, this policy allowed the maritime brokers to expand their colonial enterprises toward the stateless areas. For instance, Lan Tingzhen claimed that he had the right to cultivate lands in central Taiwan because he paid the tax for the aborigines; however, he collected over 1,000 taels every year and paid the aborigines only 240 taels.[389] That is, as we saw in 1683, the maritime brokers' cultivation of lands as colonial plantations meant they benefited from Shi Lang's policies, such as living tax-free. The 1721 maritime brokers used their policy suggestions to cultivate undeveloped and stateless lands as a part of their plantations, resulting in growth for themselves and for the empire toward the frontier and expanding the frontier into the stateless areas.

An interesting coincidence is that the apparent commercial network between Taiwan and Southern Fujian was run by the Lan lineage. Besides the sugar fields and rice plantations, settlements near aboriginal tribes, and sugar corporations, the Lan lineage had built canals from Haicheng to Putou, a river port outside Zhangzhou City. In 1706, Lan Li built this port and the canals, and he renewed the tariff system to assist trade from Xiamen and Jinmen to Haicheng to Putou.[390] In Putou, people believed that Lan Li and his family were the most important personages for this port, so they deified him in all the temples along the canal (see Figure 7-3).[391] Based on these facts, it seems the Lan lineage built a commercial network from upstream to downstream, growing economic crops, producing sugar, transporting it to the mainland, and directing it to the urban market. This enterprise was the result of the Lan lineage's efforts since Lan Li's time.

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[389] John Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800*, pp. 256-267.

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[390] Lan Dingyuan, *Luzhou chuji*, vol. 7, pp. 41. When Lan Li served as a general in Fujian in 1677, he had repaired Chongfu Temple (崇福宮) in Putou. Lan Li claimed that he had slept in this temple when he was young and poor and had been called by the deity, so he rebuilt this temple. However, this legend was associated with a practical purpose: commerce. Putou is a perfect location to control commercial profits because this port was the end of the canal from Haicheng, the major port of Zhangzhou, to Zhangzhou urban city. *Jinmen Zhongyutang zupu*, pp.60; *Zhangzhou fuzhi*, vol. 49, p. 27.

[391] because Lan Li was worshipped as the founder of Congfu Temple (檀樾主), Putou, in 1740 *Jinmen Zhongyutang zupu*, pp. 60; Moreover, according to my field research, around 6 kilometers east of Putou, people in Lantian (藍田) told me that this town was originally offered by Kangxi to Lan Li because of Lan Li's contribution to the empire.

Figure 7-3. A possible commercial network built by the Lan lineage. The blue dots show the main settlements of the Lan lineage; the red dots are the main cities; and the green lines outline the route of products between Taiwan and the mainland.


Putou(浦頭)
Zhangzhou(漳州)
Jinmen(金門)
Changxi(萇溪)
Zhangpu(漳浦)
Lugang (鹿港)
Lanxing (藍興)
Zhangpuliao (漳浦寮)
Ligang (里港)

Similar to Shi Lang's construction of the Mazu temple in Taiwan, the Lan family built Mazu temples at the core of their plantations. According to legend, Lan Li brought a statue of *Mazu* (媽祖) from Putian, the hometown of Mazu, and placed it in the Lugang Mazu Temple (鹿港天后宮).[392] After the 1721 conquest, the Shi and Lan families both settled in Lugang, where Lan Tingzhen suggested establishing a garrison because this would become the most significant port in middle Taiwan; both families had huge plantations in the area. In his plantation, Lan Tingzhen built a private Mazu Temple, Lanxing Gong (藍興宮), for his family members. According to oral history, this temple was once used to collect rent from tenants.[393] Similarly, the Lan Dingyuan family in Ligang built Shuangci Temple (雙慈宮) in Ligang to worship Mazu. This temple became the center of this region and a place for people to discuss social affairs. As a result, the Mazu belief, promoted by Shi Lang after 1683 when he turned the Ming prince's residence into a Mazu temple, was widely employed by the Lan lineage to create a social center and was perhaps the symbol of these maritime brokers' colonization in Taiwan.[394]

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[392] Cheng Zhiping, "Min Tai diqu Huizu, Shezu de Mazu xinyang," *Putian xueyuan xuebao*, vol. 21, no. 6 (2014), pp. 1-8

The Lan family's colonial enterprise benefited from Lan Dingyuan and Lan Tingzhen's policymaking. In fact, the colonial enterprises could be expanded toward the area where they originally had not been allowed; cultivation was resumed under the brokers' policies. The Lan family, after 1721, played a crucial role in the brokers' influence on local society.

7.6 Conclusion

Before Gioro Mamboo arrived at Xiamen to talk with Lan Tingzhen, Shi Shibiao identified himself as the successor of Shi Lang and moved to Penghu to protect his father's colonial enterprises. Shi Shibiao and Lan Tingzhen took only seven days to quell Zhu Yigui in massive artillery battles. After the conquest in 1721, Shi Shibiao and Lan Tingzhen seized vast lands in Taiwan. This was different from Shi Lang and his followers occupying lands in the developed areas during the Zheng. Shi Shibiao, Lan Tingzhen, and their consultants expanded their colonial plantations toward stateless areas that were dominated by Taiwanese aborigines.

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[393] Although this temple was eventually designed as a public temple, Wanchun Gong (萬春宮), people still called the this temple Lanxing Mazu today. Chen Yanbin, *Taizhong Mazu yin Taiwan* (Taichung: Taichung Cultural Affairs Bureau, 2015), pp. 50-69.

[394] Luo Fenmei, Bei wujie de Taiwan shi: 1553-1860 zhishishi weibi shi shi shi (Taibei: Shibao, 2013): 162-181.

To obtain the rights to cultivate and establish their plantations in these lands, maritime brokers represented by Lan Dingyuan established a series of policies. He insisted on remaining as the commander in Taiwan, suggested allowing free migration for families to Taiwan, and cultivated Taiwanese aboriginal lands. Over the course of a decade, Lan Dingyuan and his cohorts achieved their goals. Their plantations in middle and southern Taiwan benefited from the imperial policies implemented on the island.

Therefore, in 1684, after Shi Lang's effort, a gazetteer labeled Shi Lang and Lan Li as *kai tuo xun chen*. The Kangxi Emperor gave Shi Lang the title of "jing hai" and gave Lan Li the honorable term, "copper pillar of the maritime borderland (銅柱海疆)." In 1721, when the Zhu Yigui Rebellion claimed Ming legitimacy and eliminated the Qing authority from Taiwan, the descendants of *kai tuo xun chen* conquered Taiwan within days. Shi Shibiao had announced his role as the legitimate successor of Shi Lang, and Lan Tingzhen was lauded by the Yongzheng Emperor as "the great general of ruling Taiwan (治台名將)." Both Shi Shibiao and Lan Tingzhen were called "the generals who conquered Taiwan (平台名將)." These two *kai tuo xun chen* descendants, although not the heirs of their ancestors, had naval warfare skills and an understanding of Taiwan and the maritime borders. They thus became qualified colonial brokers after the rebellion in 1721.

8 Bureaucratization and Reactivation of Brokerage

8.1 Introduction

This chapter explores how the Qianlong Emperor bureaucratized and reactivated the brokerage. They did not recruit the Shi family, the most reliable brokers, which had been Manchurized. Instead, They recruited the Huang family, the eldest broker family, which had not been Manchurized during the ethnicity-building period. Since the early eighteenth century, the Qing court noticed that brokers such as the Shi and Lan families, and even the previous brokers (the Zheng family), were becoming too economically and politically influential in the maritime borderland.[395] In 1735, the young and energetic Qianlong Emperor aimed to erase these brokers' power by bureaucratizing the Fujian naval admiral (1735–1750) and ending the brokerage. However, the men the emperor selected to fill their place proved ineffective because these admirals lacked the skills, knowledge, and reputation to solve the issues faced in the maritime borderland. Thus, the Fujian navy became powerless, and indiscipline and uprisings increased in Taiwan.

In 1750, the emperor planned to reactivate brokerage by reemploying brokers' families. However, he realized he did not have many options. In his first decade of rule, the emperor established the Manchu ethnicity. He declared that all bannermen were part of it—forcing bannermen from different racial backgrounds share the same ethnic identity. The emperor could not select members from the Manchurized broker families because the more Manchu they were, the fewer functions they could perform as brokers. The Manchu lost their maritime skills and knowledge due to their different status, which required that they learn cavalry, archery, and Inner Asian culture and skills instead of naval warfare.

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[395] The emperors in fact knew the economic influence of the brokers, but each emperor coped with the different families. For instance, the Kangxi Emperor allowed the Shi's privileges in Taiwan but took the Zheng family's fishery industry in Chaozhou and Southern Fujian that could provide a lot of profits for the Zheng bannermen family in Beijing. See *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Ding, no. 3, p. 300. The Yongzheng Emperor coped with the Lan family, as mentioned in preceding chapters, and allowed the Shi family's privileges. During the Qianlong period, the emperor began to decrease the brokers' economic influence. Besides the Lan family's plantations in Taiwan, the emperor took the Shi family's authorized privileges in Penghu that the Shi family could collect taxes in all fishery activities. Also, the Kangxi Emperor confiscated the Zheng family's fishery enterprise in Chaozhou and Southern Fujian in 1709. In other words, in the early eighteenth century, the emperors had gradually decreased the brokers' economic sources and benefits in maritime borderland. See *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Wu, no. 1, p. 42; vol. Ding, no. 3, 300.

As a result, instead of seeking a broker from the Manchurized bannermen families such as the Zhou, Shi, and Zheng, the emperor selected the oldest broker family, the Huang, who possessed the emperor's required criteria: naval skills, loyalty to the court, an Inner Asian connection (Eight Banners system or the Mongolian prince system), and an established reputation in the maritime borderland. The families featuring Inner Asian elements did not qualify because they were too Manchu; therefore, the only option was the Huang, whose patriarch was treated as a Mongolian prince and whose members were loyal martyrs and skillful naval experts with esteemed reputations built over a century. The Qianlong Emperor began to train Huang Shijian as a broker in 1750. Between 1750–1787, Huang Shijian pacified several uprisings in Taiwan successfully and transformed the Fujian navy into a skilled force. Huang Shijian was so successful that the emperor planned to train Huang Shijian's son as the next broker—just as the Yongzheng Emperor had done for Shi Tingzhuan.

8.2 Bureaucratized Fujian Naval Admiral

In 1735, the Yongzheng Emperor died, and the new Qianlong Emperor had a different brokerage strategy from his forebearers. The Qianlong Emperor attempted to bureaucratize the Fujian naval admiral rather than employ the broker families again. The emperor named generals who were either non-southern Fujian or non-naval specialists. Although the emperor successfully weakened the brokers' power, these bureaucratized admirals could not satisfy the court, and there occurred increasing uprisings, piracy, and ineffective navy.

In 1744, the Qianlong Emperor required brokers and generals' colonial plantations in Taiwan to be investigated—they planned to confiscate lands and reassign them to aborigines and tenants.[396] Moreover, the Qianlong Emperor also investigated the Shi Lang family's fishery enterprise and fishing tax in Penghu to confiscate it as income for the government,[397] suggesting that the emperor intended to decrease the brokers' influence in the borderland financially.

The best way to reduce the brokers' power was to take the source of their power—the Fujian naval admiral position—away from them. The emperor, therefore, decided to bureaucratize the Fujian naval admiral. After Lan Tingzhen passed away in 1730, the Yongzheng Emperor assigned two of Lan Tingzhen's generals as the Fujian naval admirals. One of them was also a second generation *kai tuo xun chen*, yet the emperor still expected Shi Tingzhuan to become a qualified coastal commander. In 1736, the Qianlong Emperor stopped fostering Shi Tingzhuan and assigned him to be commander in the hinterland rather than the coastal areas.[398]

After 1736, nine generals served as Fujian naval admirals until the Qianlong Emperor appointed Huang Shijian as the Fujian naval admiral in 1763. Table 8-1 suggests that the Qianlong Emperor preferred to employ three types: non-Southern Fujian people, generals without naval backgrounds, and generals who passed the military examination. Although most of them shared experience as the commanders of Taiwan or Fujian army admirals, these generals did not have enough experience and knowledge regarding the maritime borderland to be successful.[399]

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[396] Li Zuji, "lun Shi Lang Taiwan qiliu libi shu de beijing yu dongji: jiantan Qingchu Taiwan de guanzhuang ji wuzhi zhanken wenti," pp. 84-102.

[397] *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Wu, vol. 1, p. 42

[398] *Neige daku dang'an*, Number: 055487.

Table 8-2. Fujian naval admirals between 1682 and 1788[400]

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[399] An example is that Qianlong Emperor did not really care about whether the candidate was fully familiar with the naval affairs. For instance, in 1751, although Li Youyong (李有用, ?-?) was “a general knowing army (陸路出身),” Qianlong wished him to become a naval commander because he was familiar with military affairs. Although Qianlong Emperor once appointed Hu Gui (胡貴, ?-?) as the Fujian naval admiral because he was a master of naval warfare, but he had not arrived at Fujian but transferred to Zhejiang in 1757. The new admiral after Hu Gui was Ma Dayong (馬大用, ?-?). However, a case suggests that these naval admirals did not have basic knowledge regarding the maritime world. For instance, a Spanish ship arrived at Xiamen from Manila following the regular system, but Ma Dayong did not know this regular system. The court had to give him an edict to allow the Spanish ship to trade in Xiamen. Comparing to this poor knowledgeable admiral, Shi Tingzhuan, even though he was in Wenzhou, had well-known how to deal with the Spanish ships and how to find interpreters to translate in 1754. *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 366, pp. 1042; vol. 279, pp. 645, vol. 553, pp. 1065

[400] *Tong’an xianzhi*, vol. 13，p. 19-

Year	Name	Previous position	Other	From
1682	Shi Lang 施琅	--	Kai tou xun chen	晉江
1696	Zhang Wang 張旺	Admiral of Jiangnan (江南提督)	Shi Lang’s subordinate	山西
1698	Wu Ying 吳英	Army admiral of Fujian (福建陸路提督)	Kai tou xun chen	晉江
1712	Shi Shibiao 施世驃	Admiral of Guangdong (廣東提督)	Shi Lang’s son	晉江
1721	Yao Tang 姚堂	Admiral of Guangdong (廣東提督)	--	漳浦
1723	Lan Tingzhen 藍廷珍	Commander of Taiwan (臺灣總兵)	Lan Li’s nephew	漳浦
1730	Xu Liangbin 許良彬	Commander of Nan’ao (南澳總兵)	Kai tuo xun chen’s nephew	海澄
1733	Wang Jun 王郡	Army admiral of Fujian (福建陸路提督)		陝西
1746	Zhang Tianjun 張天駿	Commander of Taiwan (臺灣總兵)		錢塘
1751	Lin Junshen 林君升	Admiral of Guangdong (廣東提督)		同安
1751	Li Youyong 李有用	Commander of Taiwan (臺灣總兵)		陝西
1757	Hu Gui 胡貴	Admiral of Guangdong (廣東提督)		同安
1757	Ma Dayong 馬大用	Commander of Chaozhou (潮州總兵)	Military jinshi (武進士) 臺灣總兵(QL18-21)	江南
1759	Ma Rongtu 馬龍圖	Commander of Taiwan (臺灣總兵)		晉江
1761	Gan Guobao 甘國寶	Commander of Taiwan (臺灣總兵)	Military jinshi (武進士)	福州
1764	Huang Shijian 黃仕簡	Admiral of Guangdong (廣東提督)	Huang Wu’s descendant	漳州

1764	Wu Bida 吳必達	Admiral of Guangdong (廣東提督)	Military jinshi (武進士)	同安
1769	Ye Xiangde 葉相德	Commander of Taiwan (臺灣總兵)		浙江
1769	Wu Bida 吳必達	--		同安
1769	Huang Shijian 黃仕簡	Army admiral of Fujian (福建陸路提督)	Huang Wu's great-grandson	漳州
1787	Lan Yuanmei 藍元枚	Army admiral of Fujian (福建陸路提督)	Lan Tingzhen's grandson	漳浦
1787	Cai Daji 柴大紀	Army admiral of Fujian (福建陸路提督)		浙江
1788	Cai Panlong 蔡攀龍	Army admiral of Fujian (福建陸路提督)		同安
1788	Hadangga 哈當阿	Admiral of Guyuan (陝西固原提督)		蒙古正黃旗

Between 1736 and 1764, the emperor's bureaucratization resulted in an undisciplined Fujian navy and an increasing number of uprisings in Taiwan (among many other issues). First, the Fujian navy had lost its skills, as Kargišan disappointedly informed the Qianlong Emperor in 1748 after viewing their training. The Qianlong Emperor was angry and required Zhang Tianjun to retrain the navy within one year. However, Zhang Tianjun could not retrain the navy well enough in that timeframe.[401]

Second, pirates had appeared in Fujian (1740s–1750s).[402] In 1752, the censors required the Fujian naval admiral to capture the pirates to mitigate their damage to Taiwan. However, in

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[401] *Qing Gaozong shulu*, vol. 307, pp. 16. vol. 338, pp. 667-668

[402] Ibid., vol. 313, pp. 139.

1753, the pirates attacked Xiamen.[403] The Qianlong Emperor was disappointed in Li Youyong, who did not report the event, proving unable to overcome the pirates' threat.[404]

Third, in 1748, Fujian naval admirals could not effectively control the market and grain price; commoners were so angry and hungry that they robbed the Fujian naval admiral's official hall.[405] Finally, increasing conflicts and revolts occurred in Taiwan during this period. For instance, in 1751, Chinese colonists invaded Taiwanese aborigines' territory in Kataunan and battled fiercely.[406] In 1753, commoners in Taiwan captured and besieged officials and forced them to release criminals. In 1753, there were at least six considerable conflicts in Taiwan, and Li Youyong admitted he did not investigate these events in great detail.[407]

To defend himself, Li Youyong indicated that increasing uprisings in Taiwan and Fujian resulted from the Fujian people's savage nature.[408] Although Li Youyong had served as the Fujian naval admiral for seven years, Qianlong disliked him because of his bad reputation, corrupt followers, and inadequate training.[409]

Thus, in 1758, the Qianlong Emperor admitted that the Fujian naval admiral position should be assigned to the Hokkienese, who had mastered naval warfare. According to Qianlong's account, "for years, the government employed native Hokkienese to fill the naval positions because naval skills are very different from army skills. The suitable candidates for the naval positions must be the people understanding the wind and wave of the seas." The Qianlong Emperor was aware that having native Hokkienese serve as Fujian naval admirals might enhance the brokers' influence. However, Qianlong believed that they would serve the empire with loyalty; therefore, he decided that the risk in appointing a native Hokkienese as the Fujian naval admiral was worth it.[410] Then, in 1758, the Qianlong Emperor had a qualified, loyal candidate for naval admiral in his mind—a man from Southern Fujian who understood naval warfare. Arguably, the Qianlong Emperor had been fostering Huang Shijian since 1750.

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[403] Ibid., vol. 447, pp. 825-826
[404] Ibid., vol. 424, pp. 550-551
[405] Ibid., vol. 315, pp. 166. vol. 319, pp. 244-245
[406] Ibid., vol. 387, pp. 90; vol. 391, pp. 144-145; vol. 410, pp. 375-376; vol. 414, pp. 421
[407] Ibid., vol. 441, pp. 742-743; vol. 447, pp. 825-826 vol. 438, pp. 706
[408] Ibid., vol. 442, pp. 754
[409] Ibid., vol. 531, pp. 697

8.3 Manchu Identity Crisis and Manchurized Brokers

Why was it challenging to find a qualified admiral? Why did the emperor not look for someone from the original broker group, as his father and grandfather had done? The fact is that he wanted to, but he could not because the descendants of *kai tuo xun chen* had been put under the Eight Banners system—one that was a double-edged sword concerning maintaining the brokerage. On the one hand, the system ensured their loyalty; on the other hand, after establishing the Manchu ethnicity, these brokers' descendants became culturally and physically remote from the maritime borderland. This system decreased its functionality because they did not stay in Southern Fujian to maintain maritime knowledge and practice naval skills. Thus, the more Manchurized they were, the less able they were to serve as the Fujian naval admirals. The emperor could not find brokers from the Shi, Zheng, and Zhou families because they had been too Manchurized at the time.

Mark Elliott, Evelyn Rawski, and Pamela Crossley have discussed the topic of Manchu identity. Contrary to Elliott's argument, Crossley asserts that the Manchu people gradually formed ethnic identity in the late Qing because of two significant impacts: the Taiping Rebellion's massacre of the Manchu and the Chinese Revolution's influence on unifying the

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[410] Ibid., vol. 540, pp. 828-829

Manchu.[411] However, the brokers' cases in this dissertation might support Elliott and Rawski's argument that the Manchu identity was idealized and shaped in the eighteenth century after the Qianlong Emperor's efforts to reform the Eight Banners system.

Elliott argues that Chinese, Manchu, and Mongol bannermen had gradually lost their identity since the seventeenth century. For example, bannermen enjoyed luxurious living conditions, causing them to lose their martial abilities—and even their ability to speak the Manchu language.[412] Before the 1740s, the institutional and fiscal identity crises resulted in the emperor and central court defining the "Manchu Way": a standard for the emperor to determine who qualified as Manchu.[413]

In Elliott's discussion, during the Qing era, particularly Qianlong's reign, the "Manchu Way" refers to Manchu customs and practices, including archery, mounted archery, horse riding, fluency in the Manchu language, and frugality.[414] This way was the standard for everyone in the Eight Banners system and eventually shaped how Manchus shared the same status with bannermen from different racial backgrounds under the term *Manchu*.[415] To form this Manchu ethnicity, Elliott argues that the Eight Banners system played a significant role; therefore, Manchu identity was also institutional. Others in the banners came to be known as "banner people" in distinction to "commoners or Chinese" during the eighteenth century.[416]

Many sources indicated that the Shi bannermen had been acculturated into the Manchu communities, matching the Manchu Way criteria. For instance, Shi Lang was also a part of the Eight Banners system. He asked his sons, including Shi Shiliu (施世騮), to learn the Manchu language.[417] Later, many of the Shi family members would also master the Manchu language. Additionally, the Qianlong Emperor commented that Shi Tinghan, who was Shi Tingzhuan's cousin, was not like a Chinese bannermen because he did not have the same unpleasant characteristics that Chinese bannermen often had: "he was not luxurious like a Chinese bannerman but sober like a Manchu bannerman, so he had a future."[418] Therefore, as part of the Chinese bannermen, the Shi family during the Manchu identity crisis period was acknowledged by the emperor as "Manchu" because, in Elliott's argument, the bannermen had shifted from a ruling category to an ethnicity.

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[411] Pamela Kyle Crossley, *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 5.

[412] Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 276-299.

[413] Ibid., pp. 276, 305.

[414] Ibid., pp. 8. Evelyn S. Rawski, *The Last Emperor: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 43.

[415] Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, pp. 9, 14

[416] Ibid., pp. 41, 133.

The principal elements of the Manchu Way included features such as naming practices and clothing.[419] According to a "hereditary reason volume (爵位緣由冊)," an official document that recorded the familial situation of the Shi Banners family,[420] there were 54 male members in the Shi Banners family. Of these 54, 17 names did not include a surname, using a Manchu-style first name instead. Notably, some members' names were very Manchu; Qishiba (七十八), which means "seventy-eight," Bashisi (八十四), "eighty-four," and Baisui (百歲), "a hundred years old."[421] As Elliott points out, the names are likely an appropriate way to understand people's identities.[422] Their names, therefore, implied the transformation of their ethnic and cultural identity from Han Chinese to bannermen. Moreover, the Shi family was not a unique case. Another example is Zhou Quanbin's case. Around the eighteenth century, Zhou Quanbin's fifth-generational descendant used a Manchu-style name rather than the Han Chinese-style, including the surname (see Figure 8-1).

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[417] *Xunhai Shishi dazong zupu*, p. 573.

[418] Qin Guojing, Qingdai guanyuan luli dang'an quanbian (Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 1997) vol. 2, p. 6.

[419] Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way,* pp. 276.

[420] According to the code, the two copies of the volume should be edited every decade. One copy was sent to the Court and another was sent to the Banners officer. At the end of every year, if the volume should be edited or have any new information added to it, people should go to the officer to edit, but the newest one should be edited every decade and sent to the Court. See *DaQing Huidian zheli*, vol. 32, pp. 2-3; vol. 175, pp. 85-86.

[421] Using number name children is common in East Asian society. Although this custom is also appeared in Han Chinese culture, this denomination represents the typical Manchu style, Inner Asian style as well, because increasing Manchu men did not name their children in this way due to its barbarian means. See Zhuang Jifa,

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" Tan Manzuren yi shumu mingming de xisu," *Manzu wenhua* 滿族文化, vol. 2 (1982).

[422] Mark C. Elliott, "Ethnicity in the Qing Eight Banners," in Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), pp. 27-29

Figure 8-1. The noble title volume of Zhou Quanbin



The final example showing the Shi family's Manchu identity was in how they identified themselves. Shi Tingzhuan (施廷專), whose grandfather was Shi Lang, exemplifies the bannermen's identity perfectly. His name followed the Han Chinese custom by using "Ting" as his first name's first character. Furthermore, he was a military general who could connect directly with the emperor. Therefore, analyzing how he referred to himself helps us comprehend his identity and how the emperor regarded him.

Between 1727 and 1729, Shi Tingzhuan, who was Congzhou (瓊州) Commander, sent a greeting to the Yongzheng Emperor. In the letter, he identified himself as a "servant," written in Chinese as *nucai* (奴才) and *aha* in Manchu. However, Yongzheng advised, "You can just claim yourself as a *chen* (臣)" (minister). In the Qing period, the terms *aha* or *nucai* were only claimed by Manchus, especially in greeting letters; Han Chinese officials also primarily used chen.[423] According to the Yongzheng Emperor's response, he did not allow Tingzhuan to regard himself as a Manchu. According to the 53 official documents from Tingzuan, he never called himself a servant after the emperor corrected him. During the Qianlong period, Tingzuan called himself a minister instead of a servant before 1749; afterward, Tingzuan used a servant and minister mix. In other words, it was acceptable for him to call himself a servant because the Qianlong Emperor did not correct him. Perhaps the Qianlong Emperor had admitted Tingzuan as a Manchu servant and a bannerman.

However, Elliott ignores one possible case: if the court enrolled bannermen for a particular purpose, could they still depart from the system? The answer is no—as the Shi family's brokerage proved. For example, after the Qianlong reformation, some Chinese bannermen departed from the banners system, saving government's fiscal deficit caused by the system and purified the Manchu ethnic identity from taking "impurities" out.[424] Others could not depart from the Eight Banners system—for example, the Shi family. The empire bound this family closely into the banner system. For instance, in 1743, Shi Tinggao (施廷皋) required three of his sons, including Shi Chungkai (施純愷), the heir of the marquis, to register their households as Chinese citizens rather than bannermen while the other two sons remained in the banner system.[425] This structure was what Shi Lang had proposed in 1696. Although the ministers agreed to approve the request because it was necessary at the time, the Qianlong Emperor did not permit him to do so. After this event, the Qianlong Emperor offered an edict that bannermen who had noble titles could not depart from the system.[426] The best interpretation of the emperor's decision was that the Qing emperors valued the Manchu Way and highlighted the Manchu tradition because they needed the bannermen to remain loyal to the emperors.[427] To ensure the loyalty of the brokers, it was necessary to keep them in the system.

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[423] In 1773, the Qianlong Emperor legitimized that not only Manchu men but also Han Chinese should call themselves as *Chen* (minister) when they reported an official document instead of a greeting letter. Before 1773, the rule was that Manchus men claimed themselves as *Nucai* (servant), but Han Chinese claimed themselves as *Chen*. In other words, *Nucai* was still used by only Manchus men, especially the private letter to emperor, but *Chen* could be used by both Manchus and Han Chinese when they reported official businesses. See *DaQing huidian shili*, vol. 114, p. 467.

[424] Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way,* pp. 306.

The Manchu identity was a double-edged sword for the maritime brokerage because the court had to keep these brokers' families in the system. Initially, the court recruited them because of their experience with the maritime coast, understanding of the maritime world, and naval skills. However, Elliott, Rawski, and Crossley note that a significant feature of the Manchu identity was their warfare and military skills, including bow and arrow, lance, musket, and light cannon.[428] In Elliott's words, "training concentrated above all on archery in the promotion of the ethnic ideal of the Manchu Way."[429] Elliott also points out that the Manchu's environment—a semi-agricultural, semi-steppe, forested region—was crucial to studying their identity.[430] In other words, while the Shi family and the Zhou and Zheng families were gradually becoming Manchu, they had closer connections with the non-maritime environment, where their military practice did not include naval skills.

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[425] *Nei ge quan zong* (archive collected in Chinese first archive), Number: 03-0336-021.
[426] *Baqi tongzhi*, vol. 31, p. 34-41.
[427] Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, pp. 171.
[428] Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, pp. 177.
[429] Ibid., pp. 179.
[430] Ibid., pp. 90.

Why do I argue that the more Manchu they were, the less functionality they had? It is important to note that the Manchus had to practice archery and cavalry as essential features of their ethnic identity. Naval warfare was not part of it—especially in the Qianlong Emperor's mind during the Manchu ethnic building. The Qing emperors had pointed out several times that Manchus did not understand complicated naval warfare, which was a gift for the Southern Fujian people, who usually did not understand land warfare.[431] During the Qing period, the Manchu had to practice archery and cavalry as their "Manchu profession."[432] Because the Manchu spent their time on their traditional military skills, when the Qing planned to establish the Manchu navy in Tianjin, Hangzhou, Jiangnan, and Fuzhou, the Qing recruited people from Southern Fujian to support them and asked Southern Fujian naval commanders, such as Lan Li and Lan Tingzhen, to train the navies.[433] However, during the Qianlong period, this Manchu navy in the garrisoned naval strongholds practiced on land, not the seas—thus losing their naval skills. In other words, how is it possible that people did not practice naval skills, touch seas, and obtain maritime knowledge when they were forced to stay in Beijing and practiced Inner Asian skills?

The Qianlong Emperor also announced that even in these Manchu-garrisoned naval strongholds, the Manchu need not know naval skills because they were not the traditional skills of a Manchu.[434] He even punished an official who wrote, "Manchu and Han Chinese practiced a naval array together" in a memorial. The Qianlong Emperor was angry because, in his mind, there was no such thing as a "Manchu naval array"—he did not think a Manchu man should waste their time practicing these skills).[435] Therefore, Lai Huimin's (賴惠敏) observation could be a proper conclusion for this section: the lineages needed a connection to imperial authority because that gave them the resources to enhance their economic and social influence.[436] However, the more Manchu they were, the less functionality they had to serve as brokers in the maritime borderland.

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[431] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 112, p. 149; *Qing Shizong shilu*, vol. 62. p. 954vol. 88 p. 185; Qingshi gao, vol. 244, p. 9616-9617.

[432] *Qing Shengzu shilu*, vol. 243, p. 415;

[433] *Qing shizong shilu*, vol. 35, p. 530; vol. 39, p. 566; vol. 53, pp. 798-799.

[434] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 195, p. 512; vol. 460, p. 981.

8.4 Reactivating Brokerage: Huang Shijian

Around the 1750s, when the Qianlong Emperor became aware of the brokerage's importance and useful function (because his plan of bureaucratizing the Fujian naval admiral resulted in many problems), he did not have many choices available to him because of his ethnic-building efforts in the 1740s. This section argues that the Qianlong Emperor thus began to foster Huang Shijian and Lan Yuanmei, rather than the Shi, Zheng, and Zhou families. Huang Shijian was not as Manchu as the other three families, but he still had Inner Asian connections—particularly the Mongolian prince institution. I argue that the Qianlong Emperor reemployed the descendants of *kai tuo xun chen* because they would still be the most useful naval commanders for the maritime borderland. He named Huang Shijian in 1764 when he was ready.

The best place to start is with the Huang family. In 1673, the Three Feudatories Rebellion occurred. The next year, Huang Wu died. His son, Huang Fangdu (黃芳度, ?–1675), joined the rebellion and still oscillated between it and the Qing. In 1675, Zheng Jin besieged Zhangzhou.[437]After a half-year siege, Zheng Jing captured Zhangzhou and killed all Huang family members in Zhangzhou, destroying and defiling Huang Wu's body and tomb.[438] The Huang family members were considered martyrs and became symbolic of loyalty. Huang Fangdu himself was rewarded as the only Han Chinese *doroi giyūn wang* in Qing history and was given the honorable title of *zhongyong* (loyal and brave, 忠勇).[439] In 1675, Huang Fangshi (黄芳世, ?–1678), a first-class imperial guardian in Beijing, inherited the noble title.

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[435] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 822, p.1169; vol. 826, p.6.

[436] See Lai Huimin, *Qingdai de huangquan yu shijia* (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2010).

[437] Xia Lin, *Minhai jiyao*, vol. Xia, p. 47; *Taiwan guanxi wenxian ji ling*, pp. 38-40.

After he died in 1678, his brother, Huang Fangtai (黄芳泰, ?–?), inherited the title. In the same year, Huang Fangtai and his family were required to settle in Beijing until they approved their return in 1679. The empire explained that while Huang Fangtai was a descendant of great generals, he was too young to command troops. As a result, the empire could not let him stay in the local region because he could not contribute.[440] Nevertheless, Huang Fangtai was brave and a martial expert—including in cavalry and archery—this is likely why the Kangxi Emperor allowed Huang Fangtai to inherit the title, rather than Fangshi's two young sons.

In Beijing, Huang Fangdu met the Kangxi Emperor at a banquet at the palace in 1679, and soon his family was forced to settle in Beijing. He complained that he was brought to Beijing not because he was a good commander, but because Yao Qishen wanted him away from Southern Fujian because Yao wanted to recruit some Zheng generals responsible for the massacre of the Huang family in Zhangzhou. He asked to return to the "maritime borderland" to fight against the enemies instead of enjoying Beijing's luxurious life.

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[438] Xia Lin, *Minhai jiyao*, vol. Xia, p.48.

[439] *Qingshi gao*, vol. 168, p. 5372. This is the loyal shrine. The court placed five primary loyal martyrs. They are Nikan (尼堪), Yangguli (揚古利), Kong Youde (孔有德) , Huang Fangdu (黄芳度), Barkan (巴爾堪). Among them, Huang Fangdu was the only Han Chinese. See *Qingshi gao*, vol. 87, pp. 2595-2597.

[440] *Pingding sanni fanglue*, vol. 40, p. 317.

At this banquet meeting, Huang Fangtai displayed his rich knowledge of the maritime world and naval warfare. He proposed many suggestions and policies to defeat the Zheng Regime; therefore, the Kangxi Emperor retained him and his family in Beijing until 1683, when Shi Lang conquered Taiwan. He and his family were then allowed to register their household from Beijing to Zhangzhou.[441] In other words, the Qing Empire did not need the Huang family as a broker after 1683 because it already had Shi Lang.

Although the Huang family never served in the bureaucracy after Huang Fangtai, the Huang family was extremely influential in Zhangzhou society, especially using the legacy—a seal—of the Inner Asian institution. Huang Fangtai's return did not mean that this family was no longer special; indeed, the court still treated it the same. In 1690, the Qing court required that Huang Yingzhuan (黃應纘, 1677–1740) be Huang Fangdu's adopted son to inherit the noble title.[442] Like a Mongolian prince who would send familial members to Beijing as a hostage, Huang Yingzhuan had lived in Beijing between 1703 and 1709.[443] Even though Huang Yingzhuan did not serve as an official, his family was wealthy and was exempt from taxes.[444] The family had a duke's seal that was significant for the Huang family to claim their authority in Zhangzhou as "Mongolian princes."[445] Huang Yingzhuan used the seal on documents for his relatives to benefit in lawsuits at yamens and claim the right to read documents in Fujian's official archives. By exploiting local sources with the seal, the Huang family acquired enormous profits until 1729, when the Yongzheng Emperor forced Huang Yingzhuan to retire and return the duke's seal. As mentioned above, a similar abuse of the seal occurred with the Shi family's *jing hai* seal on all contracts in Taiwan—this was how brokers used Inner Asian practices to their personal benefit.[446]

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[441] He killed many enemies alone when Zhangzhou was besieged. When he was dispatched to Guangdong after 1675, he was one of the most successful and experienced commanders. See *Guochao qixian leizhen chubian*, vol. 270.

[442] *Huangshi Shilingfang zupu*, no page.

[443] *Gongzhongdang Kangxichao zouzhe*, vol. 2, p. 370.

[444] The Qing government allowed that Pinghe 25 chin (頃), about 417 acre. See Du Zhen, *Yue Min xunshi jilue*, vol. 4, p. 8. The salary for the Huang family every year came from the annual budget of Fujian. According to the budget report, the government gave the Huang family 1,667 taels which is higher than the combination of the salary in total of the governor-general, Manchu garrisoned general which is only 1,216 taels. See *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Wu, no. 9, pp. 821-822; This family owned treasures, such as white parrot and huge crystals. See Wei Xian, *Baimingjia shixuan*, vol. 29; Ji Yun, *Yuewei caotang biji*, vol. 15; For instance, Huang Yinzhuan built a irrigation and dam in Zhangzhou. See *Longxi xianzhi*, vol. 6.

[445] *Qing Shizu shilu*, vol. 103, pp. 800.

After Huang Yingzhuan was forced to resign, the court selected one child from another branch to be adopted by Huang Yingzhuan in 1730, one year after the seal was taken back: Huang Shijian (黃仕簡, 1722–1789).[447] In 1732, the Yongzheng Emperor permitted Huang Shijian to officially receive the noble title and be adopted by Huang Yingzhuan.[448] He was called a "young patriarch (幼家主)" of the Huang lineage.[449] In other words, the adoption happened when Huang Shijian obtained permission from the empire to become the heir.

When Huang Shijian became the heir in 1732, he was only ten years old. He met the Qianlong Emperor in 1744, who gave him many gifts and identified him as a "descendant of [a] loyal servant." The Qianlong Emperor asked the twenty-two-year-old duke to return to

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[446] Officials and ministers required Yongzheng Emperor to retrieve the seal. However, Yongzheng Emperor disagreed with this request, and he clarified that the seal was a symbol of loyalty instead authority; the emperor also indicated that this seal was also a symbol of Haicheng gong as a "Monoglian prince" in Zhangzhou. The officials' accusation and Yongzheng Emperor's answer reflected what previous chapter discussed about his contradiction of balancing the empire statecraft and colonial brokers' power. This abuse is sued by the censors dispatched by the Yongzheng Emperor in 1723. Yongzheng Emperor might struggle with this until Huang Yingzhuan was forced to retire in 1727 because he bribed local officials so as to select his heir. Although Yongzheng Emperor indicated, "the successor was the familial affairs within the Huang, so it was not local officials' businesses" and punished the local officials rather than Huang Yingzhuan, see *Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao zouzhe*, vol. 8, p. 154; vol. 3, p. 519, vol. 14, p. 906; *Qingqi leizhen xuanbian*, vol. 10, pp. 1116-1133; *Yongzheng zhupi zouzhe xuanji*, pp. 226-227; *Rengue zanda ji*, vol. 1.

[447] *Qingqi leizhen xuanbian*, vol. 10, pp. 1116-1133; *Yongzheng zhupi zouzhze xuanji*, pp. 226-227.

[448] *Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao zouzhe*, vol. 20, p. 255.

[449] *Neige daku dang'an*, Number: 194843-001.

Zhangzhou. He commuted to Fuzhou frequently to learn how to become an official from Governor Kargišan (喀爾吉善, ?–1757).

In 1751, when Huang Shijian met the Qianlong Emperor in Suzhou, the Qianlong Emperor indicated that the court would appoint Huang Shijian as either a commander or an admiral when he was ready. In 1753, the Qianlong Emperor allowed the Huang family to inherit the noble title of *Haicheng gong* forever, which was the first and only time the court allowed a Chinese noble title to remain in a family forever. This order is perhaps a sign of reactivating brokerage by employing the broker's descendants.

The next year, the court appointed Huang Shijian as the naval commander in Quzhou, enabling him to practice basic knowledge of the maritime world; coincidently, in the same year, the naval commander in Wenzhou was Shi Tingzhuan, who was criticized by the Qianlong Emperor, saying "Shi Tingzhuan has no talents and specialties."[450] Since Shi Tingzhuan was identified as a proper Manchu man, the emperor expected him to be the next broker. The Qianlong Emperor criticized this—again, a sign of the emperor's preoccupation with the idea that the more Manchu a person was, the less functionality they had to act as a broker.

The Huang family had a number of advantages: it had connections with the Inner Asian institutions but had not been acculturated as Manchus like the other families. The Huang family was synonymous with loyalty. When the Qianlong Emperor met Huang Shijian in Beijing, the emperor talked about Huang Wu's and Huang Fangdu's martyrdoms to emphasize their loyalty and the Huang family's generational service. However, he also discussed—or tested—Huang Shijian's knowledge of maritime affairs.[451] The emperor's emphasis on loyalty is significant because it was one of the most critical broker criteria. The Huang family was a loyal icon not only in the empire but also in the local society.[452]

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[450] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 460, pp. 974, vol.389, pp. 102-103; *Ming Qing shiliao*, vol. Wu, no. 1, p. 92.

[451] *Gongzhongdang Qianglongchao zouzhe*, vol. 10, 745.

Another criterion was the close relationship between the Huang family and the Manchu. Besides the Mongolian prince's status, the Huang family had intermarriages with the Shi family and many local elites. The most important connection was that the Huang family still had relationships with one of the most crucial bannermen families—the Li family.[453] However, these two connections with the Inner Asian institutions would not lose their potential to serve as maritime brokers. Thus, the Huang family became the proper candidates for being brokers after its reactivation.

During the 1760s, the emperor was ready to reactivate brokerage after the Southern Fujian and Taiwan situations exhausted his patience. In 1760, Huang Shijian became Guangdong naval admiral—the most significant position in terms of managing the maritime borderland, in Qianlong's mind.[454] One crucial policy from the Qianlong Emperor was that people from Southern Fujian could serve as Fujian naval admirals after 1760. He never restricted the

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[452] In the level of local society, the Huang family were regarded as martyrs to the Qing. Afterward, 19 out of 22 martyrs were belonged to the Huang family and were worshiped in the *Zhongyi Xiaoti Hall* (忠義孝悌祠) as idols in Zhangzhou and mentioned in gazetteers. *Zhangzhou fuzhi*, vol. 8, pp. 14-15, 29-30 vol. 14, p. 9.

[453] Li Shiyao (李侍堯, ?-1788) was the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi. Li Shiyao was Sutai's descendant and a bannerman. When he knew the appointment of Huang Shijian, he memorized to Qianlong Emperor that Huang Shijian and his family were kinship in law because Huang Fangdu married with the Li family. Qianlong Emperor said that they did not need to avoid. *Gongzhongdang Qianglongchao zouzhe*, vol. 23, p. 86. Li Shiyao's great-grandfather was Sijaboo (釋迦保), grandfather was Citianboo (祈天保), and his father was Yungliang (元亮), who had been the minister of the Broad of Household. When he was in Guangdong, he proposed five rules regarding the overseas trade. In Qianlong 34th, he was ordered to send edict to Siam to capture the Burman's chieftains, but Shiyao rejected because the order had been delivered. It is not necessary to send the physical and real edict to Siam. In 1787, he became governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang. He garrisoned in Qu River (蛆江). He also asked to call soldiers from Zhejiang to help. He was placed after Fuk'anggan and Hailanca. According to the official genealogy of niru, Li Shiyao was Li Yongfang's sixth son, Bayan (巴顏)'s descendant. *Zuangao*, *Li Shiyao leizuan* (collected in National Palace Museum), Number: 701007067-1, pp. 1-12; *Qingdai pudie dang'an*, B collection, Microfilm 37, Shi zhi 112.

[454] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 620, pp. 973.

Fujianese from serving as Fujian naval admirals between 1730 and 1760.[455] This reformation was designed for Huang Shijian because he would be appointed as the Fujian naval admiral soon.

In 1763, Huang Shijian became the Fujian naval admiral, perhaps because the Qianlong Emperor had just reviewed the Fujian navy's inspection in Hangzhou in 1762. He was probably disappointed because of their lax training due to Qianlong's failure to bureaucratize the Fujian naval admiral.[456] Therefore, the Qianlong Emperor consciously decided to foster Huang Shijian as his broker, step by step, by underscoring his family's loyalty and arranging for him to learn with experienced maritime frontier officials—eventually assigning him a high-ranking post as commander in a coastal area.

The Qianlong Emperor did not forget the Lan family because not only were they not Manchu, they also suited all his other criteria. However, the Lan family lacked the Inner Asian connections, which might have caused it to be the second choice—although still qualified. Like the Huang family, the Lan family had a high reputation in local society, which the bureaucratized admirals lacked after 1736.

In 1773, the ministers offered two candidates who were experts at naval warfare to become Taiwan commanders. The Qianlong Emperor picked Lan Yuanmei (藍元枚, ?–1783), a naval commander and successor of his family's land ownership in Taiwan even though some suggested that Lan Yuanmei was from Southern Fujian. Although ministers did not think it is not appropriate to appoint a Hokkienese to serve in Taiwan because Hokkienese were the majority of residents in Taiwan, the Qianlong Emperor insisted that Lan Yuanmei was an expert at naval warfare and, similar to Huang Shijian, would not be selfish but would act reasonably and without favoritism. The Qianlong Emperor also told Fujian and Zhejiang's general-governor, Zhong Yin (鐘音, ?–?), to report Lan Yuanmei's behaviors in Taiwan, hoping that Lan Yuanmei would be fair and show no favoritism to people from his hometown.[457]

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[455] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 606, p.800.

[456] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 656, pp. 34, vol. 697, pp. 806-807.

Not only did the Qianlong Emperor foster Huang Shijian, but he also planned to pass on the role to his descendants. For instance, the Qianlong Emperor appointed Huang Shijian's eldest son, Huang Bingchun (黃秉淳, ?–?), as an imperial guardian at the palace to observe him.[458] After 1773, the Qianlong Emperor arranged for Bingchun to serve in every province in sequence. He asked local ministers to report back to him on Bingchun's personality, performance, and experiences.[459]

In 1773, Huang Bingchun began his naval career as a naval general in Jingnan. In 1783, the Qianlong Emperor secretly asked some governors and officials to investigate Huang Bingchun's capacity. Although reports suggested that Huang Bingchun was sickly, and his archery and cavalry skills were weak, the Qianlong Emperor argued that being a qualified commander was not determined by personal abilities in archery or cavalry, but by his capacity to lead and manage. Perhaps officials understood the emperor's implication that Huang Bingchun was outstanding at leading and management, suggesting that he could become a commander in the future. The next year, he became a commander.[460]

In 1785, the Qianlong Emperor asked Huang Shijian to order Huang Bingchun to learn naval warfare. The emperor had Huang Shijian send his experts and experienced naval generals to serve beside Huang Bingchun. The Qianlong Emperor wanted Huang Bingchun to become an essential naval commander for the empire in the future.[461] This case indicates that the Qianlong Emperor intentionally promoted Huang Shijian's heir step by step as the next qualified broker.

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[457] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 945, p. 800-80; *Gongzhongdang Qianglongchao zou zhe*, Number: 403029284.

[458] *Neige daku dang'an*, Number: 152156-001.

[459] *Gongzhongdang Qianlongchao zouzhe*, vol. 35, p. 183.

[460] *Qingqi xian leizhen xuanbian*, vol. 10, pp. 1116-1133.

As with other brokers, when Huang Shijian was named the Fujian naval admiral in 1764, he compiled a genealogy to reconstruct his family's importance in the Huang lineage.[462] Although the Huang family already held influence in local society, Huang Shijian became even more influential—occupying lands with tax exemptions.[463] He participated in the building and transformation of social infrastructure. However, the most significant examples relate to his kindness and respect for women. For example, he donated fields and houses to the wet nurse hall (育嬰堂) to provide salaries and ultimately finance the charity location.[464] Huang Shijian's wife was a famous poet;[465] his aunt was also well known in literary circles,[466] and his sister was featured as a great woman of Neo-Confucian standards.[467] Huang Shijian also actively supported government policy,[468] and he donated to and participated in many social affairs.[469] Thus, when Huang Shijian became a broker, he still held influence in local society.

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[461] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1241, p. 690-691; Unfortunately, in 1786, Huang Bingchun passed away. Qianlong Emperor allowed Huang Shijian to pick up his heir himself. *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1264, p. 1026

[462] *Pinghe Xialing Huangshi zupu*, p. 4.

[463] Huang Shijian had a legal case with others in Zhao'an. Over hundred farmers sued Huang Shijian and gathered in front of his residence in Zhangzhou to protest their rights. Huang Shijian arrested the leaders of this protest and asked the government to put them in the jail. See *Linxi xianzhi*, vol. 10, p. 3

[464] *Zhangzhou fuzhi*, vol. 6, p. 27.

[465] Liang Zhangju, *Minchuan guexiu shihua*, vol. 1, p. 1.

[466] *Zhangzhou fuzhi*, vol. 36, p. 7

[467] *Nanjing xianzhi*, vol. 6, p. 11.

Huang Shijian intervened in the maritime world in his career as a Fujian naval admiral. First, he wished to reform the corrupt custom and maritime trade in Xiamen in 1764. He had to challenge the vast, complicated, and corrupt system that included almost all Fujian officials. Nevertheless, the Qianlong Emperor assigned Huang Shijian to Guangdong to compromise with the corrupt officials and protect Huang Shijian.[470] In 1769, Huang Shijian became the Fujian naval marshal again, and he had two significant tasks. First, he had to reform the Fujian navy after its poor performance in the Sino-Burma war.[471] The Fujian navy had been weak for decades, so the Qianlong Emperor gave a secret edict to Huang Shijian to strengthen and reform it.[472] In 1772, Huang Shijian completed the reforms, including dismissing unqualified generals and promoting qualified ones, enhancing soldiers' archery, gunnery, and shield skills, and rebuilding ships and weapons.[473] In 1776, the Qianlong Emperor applauded Huang Shijian as his best admiral among all his regions.[474]

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[468] For instance, in 1748, a report indicated that Huang Shijian provided 2,000 dan grain on the market because it was usually that elites' families would store grains during spring and summer until the price of grain increased. This situation always resulted in high-price grain and uprisings, and these was particularly severe in Quanzhuo and Zhangzhou because of the savage folkway.[468] It is necessary to recap that this was one of the issues the Qing encountered when the bureaucracy dominated the Fujian naval admiral during the three decades. Huang Shijian successfully dealt with this issue from his pocket. Additionally, in 1753, a potential uprising in Pinghe was overturned by Kargišan. The leader of uprising Cai Rongzu (蔡榮祖) sued that he would rebel because the Huang family over-collected grains and taels from tenants. However, Qianlong Emperor said that Huang Shijian was a law-abiding person. Moreover, it was common that Huang Shijian's family to collect grains. Qianlong Emperor thought that this was an excuse from the rebels. Qianlong ordered Kargišan not to investigate this case because this might excite tenants who did not pay rent or grain to rebel in the future. See *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 431, pp. 629-630.

[469] Regarding social affairs, Huang Wu and Huang Shijian had donated funding for repairing Shanping Temple (三平寺). Because of their contributions, they were the thirteen people of virtue of this temple. Lu Zhenghai, *Shanping sizhi* (Pinghe: The Landscape Administrative Committee of Shanping in Pinghe, Fujian). The income of the Pinghe official school was donated by the Huang lineage. *Zhangzhou fuzhi*, vol. 7, p. 39.

[470] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 706, pp. 884-885, vol. 709, pp. 924-925. In a later report, Yang did ask traders to purchase yan wo and western cloth (the other report indicated that Yang also purchase jisheng, coral, and pearl). However, during this process, Yang's officials loaned to pay. This was his guilty, so he was asked to return Beijing. *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 711, pp. 937-938, vol. 714, 963-96, vol. 710, pp. 927-928, vol. 717, p. 996, vol. 719, p. 1024, vol. 714, pp. 964-965, vol. 707, pp. 899, vol. 709, pp. .923; In 1767, Huang Shijian returned to Fujian as the army admiral and quell many uprisings in the mountainous periphery. *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 795, p. 739;, vol. 808, p. 915, vol. 832, p. 98

[471] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 847, pp. 337-338, vol. 849, p. 373. Huang Jiao rebelled in 1768. However, the officials could not arrest Huang Jiao at the first moment when he stole a bull. Huang Jiao therefore rebelled and killed many officials. The officials in Taiwan did not report immediately, so Qianlong Emperor was angry and dispatched Wu Bida to Taiwan in the end of 1768. Huang Jiao escaped to the stateless area of the mountains. However, after several months, Wu Bida could not arrest Huang Jiao. Qianlong Emperor was extremely angry. Qianlong Emperor therefore fired Wu Bida and required the commander of Taiwan, Ye Xiande (葉相德) to take the position of Fujian naval marshal. Finally, Wu Bida arrested Huang Jiao in 1769. In 1770, Qianlong Emperor informed Huang Shijian that, during the Sino-Burmese War, the Fujian navy to Yunnan were not trained and

Second, Huang Shijian had to cope with an increasing number of uprisings in Taiwan to stabilize the Qing authority in Taiwan by crossing the strait himself. In 1782, Huang Shijian quelled a conflict because he was worried that the conflict would turn into a rebellion.[475] Huang Shijian stayed in Taiwan to deal with numerous conflicts and uprisings until 1783.[476] Then, in 1786, even though Huang Shijian was sick, he still went to Taiwan to deal with a case where Taiwanese aborigines had killed an official—an event that led to another uprising.[477]

Thus, the Qianlong Emperor selected and fostered Huang Shijian as a future broker because of his family's reliable reputation and symbolism. This decision sprang from the Qianlong

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performed badly, so he asked Huang Shijian to train navy well. Ironically, how Qianlong knew the rotten performance of the Fujian navy in Yunnan was from the Manchu imperial guardians when they returned to Beijing. These guardians told the emperor that the Fujian navy was timid. They were so cowardly that they were trembling or diving under water when they heard guns and artillery. The Fujian navy became joke within the imperial guardian community. Qianlong Emperor was angry because he had thought that the Fujian navy was supposed to be slightly useful, but the navy was so loose. The emperor required Huang Shijian to reform the Fujian navy and train it as a powerful force. See *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 852, p. 410; vol. 855, p. 447-448, vol. 851, p. 403, vol. 820, p. 113; vol. 823, p. 117; vol. 832, p. 92, vol. 833, pp.112-114

[472] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 859, p. 499

[473] Ibid., vol. 909, p. 178-179; vol. 911, p. 204

[474] Ibid., vol. 1002, p. 421-422

[475] Ibid., vol. 1167, p. 649-650; *Tai'an huelu*, Ji collection, vol. 6, pp. 256-259. At this period, Qianlong Emperor had indicated the difference between Taiwan as an overseas area and the coastal area of China proper. *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1169, p. 683-684; A significant point was about the term of "wang ye." The belief of wang ye (literally means "king") was an important popular belief in Taiwan as an immigrant society to worship people who died but not buried by their families. However, Qianlong Emperor misunderstood that people in this uprising claimed themselves as "king." *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1171, p. 704-705

[476] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1174, p. 742, vol. 1175, p. 753-754, vol. 1193, p. 951, vol. 1196, p. 8

[477] Ibid., vol. 1248, p. 766-767; vol. 1248, p. 771-772; vol. 1248, p. 774-775; vol. 1249, p. 782; vol. 1249, p. 791-792; vol. 1251, p. 814-815

Emperor's prior failure to bureaucratize the Fujian naval admiral because the commanders could not handle the increasingly chaotic maritime borderland. Huang Shijian was significant because he showed that he was a good choice by reforming the navy as a picked troop, dismantling the corrupt customs system, and quelling the uprisings in Taiwan. His outstanding service compelled the emperor to foster his son to be the next broker. The emperor trusted Huang Shijian's profession deeply. For instance, in 1763, a new naval commander began his service in Guangdong, aggressively proposing his ideas about maritime policies and relative systems. He requested a meeting with the emperor and illustrated his proposals. However, the emperor indifferently replied to him, "you just follow all [the] rules and systems made by Huang Shijian. They are all good enough."[478] In other words, he performed pretty well—at least between the 1760s–1780s.

8.5 Conclusion

In the 1730s, the Qianlong Emperor decided to bureaucratize the Fujian naval admiral to weaken the brokers' power structure. In the 1740s, he initiated a reform of the Eight Banners system and focused on building the Manchu ethnicity. These two matters were related to each other. In the 1750s, the Qianlong Emperor regretted his decision to bureaucratize, but he could not select the Manchurized brokers for positions because they were no longer qualified. The Qianlong Emperor, therefore, interviewed Huang Shijian, who matched all his criteria: Inner Asian elements, maritime knowledge, naval skills, loyalty, and a strong reputation in the maritime borderland.

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[478] *Gongzhongdang Qianglongchao zouzhe*, vol. 19, 123.

The reactivation of brokerage was significant for the Huang family in both reputation and public memory. For example, in 1806, when the Huang family was no longer the broker, the Zhejiang governor asked Huang Bingzhe (黃秉哲) to serve in Zhejiang because he was Shijiang's son—and the heir of the Huang family could frighten Fujianese pirates.[479] Just as the Shi family memorialized their ancestors through the term, *jing hai*, even though the descendants of the Huang family had been serving in the hinterland rather than the coastal area, they still identified themselves as "men from the ocean." For instance, Huang Jiamo (黃嘉謨, ?–?), Huang Bingchun's son, proclaimed in 1808 that the Huang family was a "coastal servant from generation to generation" (海疆世僕), which was a mixed term of maritime borderland and Manchu servant from generation to generation (滿洲世僕).[480]

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[479] This account says, "Huang Bingzhe had been in Zhejiang for over a decade and was familiar with the maritime situation. Especially, he was son of Huang Shijian, and his family had a high reputation. The Hokkienese pirates respected this family. So, today, the navy is seeking Cai Cian, so it is wise to keep Huang Bingzhe in Zhejiang to serve." See *Neige daku dang'an*, Number: 193087-001.

[480] *Gongzhongdang Jiaqingchao zouzhe*, vol. 18, p. 399.

9 The Manchu Conquest of Taiwan and the End of Brokerage

9.1 Introduction

The Manchurized descendants of kai tuo xun chen lost their functionality to serve as brokers at the maritime borderland, so the Qianlong Emperor picked the non-Manchurized Huang Shijian and Lan Yuanmei instead when the court reactivated the brokerage. However, these two brokers could not quell a massive rebellion in 1787. This failure resulted in a transition from indirect rule to direct rule. This move underscores the fact that the Qianlong Emperor had chosen the Manchu, rather than Manchurized brokers, for leadership—this suggested that, despite being bannermen, these brokers were still not considered “Inner Asians” and so were unfit for this role because, even though they had identified as Manchu, they were still different in origin.[481]

In 1787, Lin Shuangwen (林爽文, ?–1788) led a massive rebellion that almost unseated the Qing’s rule in Taiwan. Huang Shijian headed to Taiwan and contained the rebels in central Taiwan. However, after a containment of roughly one year and several small-scale conflicts, Huang Shijian could not quell the rebellion. As a result, he was replaced by Lan Yuanmei (藍元枚, ?–1787), the grandson of Lan Tingzhen, the former broker. However, Lan Yuanmei died before he could launch any effective action. The two brokers' failures exhausted the Qianlong Emperor's patience, so he dispatched Fuk'anggan (1754–1796), his most reliable commander, to direct the course of the war in Taiwan. In 1788, Fuk'anggan's Manchu army quashed the rebellion and reinforced the Qing's rule in Taiwan. After this rebellion, no member of the four families discussed in this dissertation ever served as a broker again.

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[481] This is not a surprising case. In fact, even though the Qianlong Emperor made his efforts to build Manchu ethnicity based on bannermen group, the emperors of the Qing still distinguished Chinese bannermen, Mongolian bannermen, and other non-Manchu bannermen from the Manchu race. Even though the Qianlong Emperor tried to treat every bannerman equally, he still intentionally separated Chinese and Manchu bannermen who were from different racial origins. For instance, the Manchu naming taboo was only applied for Manchu people rather than Chinese bannermen because, in the Qianlong Emperor’s mind, these Chinese bannermen’s names were transliteration from Chinese to Manchu instead of naming their children in purely Manchu words. This creates a significant difference, so the Qianlong Emperor had ever required that Chinese bannermen should follow naming taboo rule based on Chinese characters instead of Manchu-language words. In other words, the emperor still believed that Chinese bannermen were racially different from Manchu, and the Manchu were still the closest group to the Manchu emperor and Manchu nature. See Lu Cheng-heng (Lu Zhengheng), “Qingdai Manwen bihue: Jianlun Qianlongchao bihue yunyong shili.” *Qinghua xuebao* 48, no. 3: 489–524.

In this chapter, I argue that the failures of Huang Shijian and Lan Yuanmei in the Lin Shuangwen rebellion led to the end of brokerage. For over a century, brokerage had played an essential role in the empire, structuring imperial rule, local society, and lineage organization. The families' failure in the rebellion resulted in the end of brokerage and effected crucial changes in these three aspects. After the rebellion, the Qianlong Emperor was eager to proclaim his Manchu army's outstanding military performance in the maritime borderland, with which the Manchu, originally from the Inner Asian Steppe, were not familiar. He ascribed the Manchu's success to his efforts to build an empire and a Manchu ethnic identity, highlighting the people's bravery and military tradition. By contrast, the emperor intentionally belittled and ignored the brokers' achievements over the previous century. His intent was to demean the brokers and to glorify the Manchu through a series of empire-building projects. After the rebellion, Manchu men were named to Fujian naval admiral positions; no one from the *kai tuo xun chen* families had ever assumed this role, and none had served as a naval general. These changes ushered in a new era in the Qing Empire's rule in the maritime borderland, in the practice of local society, and in the development of the four families' lineages.

9.2 Lin Shuangwen Rebellion and the Brokers' Failure

In the 1770s and 1780s, Huang Shijian successfully quelled several uprisings and conflicts in Taiwan, earning the emperor's trust. However, at the end of 1786, Lin Shuangwen in central Taiwan and Zhuang Datian in southern Taiwan led a massive rebellion and almost ended the Qing's rule over the territory. Huang Shijian (and later, Lan Yuanmei) could not defeat the rebels. Although the emperor had faith in them and gave them all his support, they could not satisfy the court to quell the rebellion as what their ancestors successfully did, and the war reached an impasse, leading the emperor to send the Manchu army to replace them in Taiwan.

Huang Shijian could not defeat the rebellion, perhaps because of his close relationship with the rebels. Lin Shuangwen, who was believed to be the leader of a secret society, lived in Daliyi (大里杙), a village headed by the Lin family. He migrated to this village from Pinghe, Huang Shijian's hometown, with which his family had a kinship; Huang Shijian might have been aware of this fact because he compiled a genealogy in 1764 and visited Daliyi in 1783 to handle a murder case. Before Huang Shijian headed to Taiwan, the Qianlong Emperor warned him that he should not side with the Lin family.[482] Huang Shijian resolved this issue appropriately by arresting criminals who had kidnapped and killed an official; however, he could not predict that this village would become the center of the rebellion three years later.

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[482] When Huang Shijian went to Taiwan deal with one of the conflicts which a man whose name was Li Shen (林審), a low-rank military official and from Daliyi, was killed by another Quanzhou village. This was one of the conflicts between Quanzhou and Zhangzhou, and this was also why Qianlong Emperor required Huang Shijian to investigate and arrest Zhangzhou village first instead of Quanzhou village. See Bank of Taiwan, *Tai'an huilu*, Ji Collection, vol. 6, pp. 259–262. The emperor also required Huang Shijian not partial to the men sharing same hometown with him. He was required to arrest people from Zhangzhou first to show his unselfish and fair. See *Gongzhongdang Qianlongchao zouzhe*, vol. 54, p. 453; vol. 55, p. 259.

Why did Lin Shuangwen raise the rebellion? During the 1780s, Taiwan suffered through severe disasters. From 1786 to 1788, severe famine, drought, and an unusually cold winter assaulted Fujian and Taiwan.[483] In such a situation, the secret society became an attractive group for many people, attracting poor tenants as well as some rich men, including brokers' relatives and plantation managers.[484] The tougher life became for people, the more they sought salvation from social organizations such as religious groups, brotherhoods, and secret societies. Thus, Lin Shuangwen gained power because more and more people joined his society. Because he had amassed a great amount of power, the government began to worry about his society becoming a potential rebel group. Meanwhile, Zhuang Datian (莊大田, 1734–88) also revolted in Ligang. Zhuang Datian was also from Pinghe, and many members of his family were married to members of the Huang family there. He migrated to Ligang from Zhanghua and became a tenant of the Lan lineage.[485] Therefore, two of the society's leaders, Lin Shuangwen and Zhuang Datian, who were from Pinghe and had a kinship in law with the Huang lineage there, settled in the Lan family's plantation in Taiwan. In 1786, the magistrate of Taiwan himself went to Daliyi and arrested Lin Shuangwen's uncles. Following this arrest, Lin Shuangwen led his followers in revolt.

At the end of November 1786, Lin Shuangwen attacked the village of Dadun (大墩), where the Lan plantation was located, and soon after captured Zhanghua. Zhuang Datian rebelled in the south, captured Fengshan, and planned to attack the city of Taiwan from the sea.[486] Over the next two months, Lin Shuangwen, backed by an army wielding powerful cannons, captured all of the Taiwanese cities, except Taiwan, Zhulou, and Lugang.[487]

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[483] See Xie Guoxing, *Guanbi minfan: Qingdai Taiwan sanda minbian* (Taipei: Independence Evening Post, 1993). About the extreme climate, see *Daishui tingzhi*, vol. 14, p. 348.

[484] *Ming Qing gongcang Taiwan dang'an huibian* (Beijing: Jiuzhou Press, 2009), vol. 53, p. 107.

[485] Unlike poor tenants, Zhuang Datian owned lands in Taidoukeng, Zhulou, which were managed by his cousin, Huang Tianyan (黃天養, ?–?), who shared a surname with Huang Shijiang and was from Pinghe as well, although there is no evidence to prove whether Huang Tianyan was a relative of Huang Shijian. See *Tai'an huilu*, Geng Collection, vol. 5, pp. 791-793.

The Qianlong Emperor thought Lin Shuangwen was weak and believed that Huang Shijian could handle this uprising. Huang Shijian gathered a huge army and immediately headed to Lu'ermen.[488] Meanwhile, Fujian Governor-General Cangcing (常青, ?–?) garrisoned in Quanzhou with Fujian Army Admiral Ren Cheng'en (任承恩, ?–?). After Huang Shijian fought Lin Shuangwen, Ren Cheng'en also went to Taiwan. The Qianlong Emperor criticized Ren Cheng'en because the emperor thought that the duty of the Fujian army admiral was to maintain social order in Fujian rather than in Taiwan, which was under the control of the Fujian naval admiral. Furthermore, the emperor noted that sending two Fujian admirals to Taiwan was unwise, and he believed that Huang Shijian could handle this issue himself, as he had before.[489] The emperor believed that Huang Shijian could defeat the rebellion and be as successful as Shi Shibiao, who quelled a rebellion in one month in 1721.[490]

Although the emperor had faith in Huang Shijian, even though he never admitted it, he might have underestimated the scale of the rebellion. The emperor blamed Ren Cheng'en rather than Huang Shijian when he discovered that the two admirals could not defeat the rebellion. In

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[486] The Qing government worried about whether Lin Shuangwen would organize people in Zhangzhou to launch a larger rebellion across the Taiwan Strait. The Qing court, therefore, required officials in Guangdong to monitor the situation in Zhangzhou. See *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1272, p. 2-4; vol. 1272, p. 11-12

[487] When Lin Shuangwen had almost eliminated the Qing authority, Lin Shuangwen's rebels cut their hair queues as a symbol of being outside of Qing authority. See *Tai'an huilu*, Geng Collection, vol. 4, pp. 622-627; *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1272, p. 4-5

[488] *Qingding pingding Taiwan jilue*, vol. 4, p. 141

[489] Also, this was Huang Shijian's responsibility because Taiwan was under his control as the Fujian naval admiral. See *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1271, p. 1143-1144

[490] Ibid., vol. 1271, p. 1144-1145

1787, the Qianlong Emperor named Lan Yuanmei as the new Fujian army admiral to replace Ren Cheng'en. Lan Yuanmei was chosen because he came from a prominent lineage with a great reputation in naval warfare.[491] The emperor believed that, compared to Ren Cheng'en, Lan Yuanmei was a more suitable choice because he expected that he could act as his great-great-uncle, Lan Li, did in the 1683 conquest and as his grandfather, Lan Tingzhen, did in the Zhu Yigui Rebellion—as a deputy beside the prime commander. In early 1787, the emperor named Huang Shijian the highest commander in Taiwan.[492]

Even though the war remained at a stalemate the emperor still had faith in Huang Shijian. The Qianlong Emperor selected Li Shiyao, Huang Shijian's brother-in-law and an experienced governor, to replace Cangcing as the governor-general so that he could send Cangcing to Taiwan to work with Huang Shijian. The emperor also required Lan Yuanmei to officially take over Ren Cheng'en's position in Fujian.[493] In other words, even though Huang Shijian never made any progress in quashing the rebellion, the emperor replaced the generals around him—but not Shijan himself—and offered him better political, military, and logistic experts as supporters with whom he had a close relationship and had always worked.[494]

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[491] Ibid., vol. 1272, p. 2-4

[492] Ibid., vol. 1272, p. 7-8; vol. 1272, p. 9-10; In the second month of 1787, Huang Shijian made a plan to beat the rebellion back with Huang Shijian, Ren Cheng'en, and other generals marching on Lin Shuangwen's base in central Taiwan from Taiwan, Lugang, and Danshui. However, this audacious plan was unsuccessful because of an unknown reason. Although there are no records to tell us why this plan was not successful, my guess would be that Huang Shijian did not plan to overturn the rebellion like Shi Shibiao did with the Zhu Yigui Rebellion but rather in the way he had done for the conflicts in the previous decade. In other words, rather than launching a massive war, Huang Shijian wanted to make this small scale—a conflict instead of a rebellion—probably because he had been aware that many of these rebels were his relatives. See Ibid., vol. 1274, p. 37.

[493] So in early 1787, the emperor asked Li Shiyao, who was Huang Shijian's brother-in-law, to be in Fuzhou; he also asked Lan Yuanmei, who had been Huang Shijian's subordinate and was from a broker family, to replace Ren Cheng'en to garrison in Quanzhou for the backup; Cangqing, the former governor-general, went to Taiwan and replaced Ren Cheng'en's position in Taiwan under Huang Shijian's commend; and Huang Shijian became the prime commander in charge of the war. Ibid., vol. 1272, p. 16-17; vol. 1273, p. 33-34; vol. 1274, p. 38-39.

[494] By supporting Li Shiyao the Qianlong Emperor had assigned some of the most experienced officials who had ever served in Taiwan to Fujian as Li Shiyao's consultants. This was done in case Li Shiyao did not have enough understanding of Taiwan. See Ibid., vol. 1274, p. 46-47.

After the emperor gave Huang Shijian his best team, Huang Shijian did not make any progress. The emperor began to make excuses for him: The emperor convinced himself that Huang Shijian had not physically or psychically recovered from his illness and from the death of his son, so he indicated that Huang Shijian could return to Xiamen if he still felt unwell.[495] This suggestion was apparently meant to give Shijian an out. The Qianlong Emperor was aware that Huang Shijian, in fact, stayed in Taiwan city while other generals garrisoned in different cities; none of them had marched to Lin Shuangwen's bases in central Taiwan.[496]

The deadlock eventually forced the emperor to turn to his second choice—Lan Yuanmei. Although Lan Yuanmei was originally meant to replace Ren Cheng'en rather than Huang Shijian, he was sufficiently qualified and was ordered to head to Lugang from Quanzhou to pacify the maritime borderland. Although the emperor tried to offer Huang Shijian a chance to step down gracefully, this opportunity dissolved as the rebellion continued. The Qianlong Emperor fired Huang Shijian and Ren Cheng'en, arrested them, and delivered them to Fujian to wait to be taken to Beijing.[497] The Qianlong Emperor required Huang Shijian to retire and stay in Zhangzhou until further notice, and his noble title would be given to his grandson, Huang Jiamou. After the war, the Huang family had to pay for all military expenses related to the war.[498]

Meanwhile, the Qianlong Emperor demanded to know more about the island. To this end, the emperor read Lan Dingyuan's *Dongzhen ji* (the collection of memorials about the Eastern expedition, 東征集), which was compiled after the 1721 conquest. This book collected Lan Dingyuan's memorials, observations, and proposals about how to rule Taiwan and defeat the rebellion. The emperor was impressed by Lan Dingyuan's ideas about how to rule Taiwan and eliminate rebels. In fact, he was so impressed that he required Li Shiyao and all officials located along the maritime borderland to read this book.[499] The emperor also read another book by Lan Dingyuan, *PingTai jilue* (*The Strategic Records about Conquering Taiwan*, 平臺紀略). Compared to *Dong zhen ji*, which concentrated on policies and war, *PingTai jilue* chronologically narrated the process of quelling the Zhu Yigui rebellion; in fact, this book could be seen as a private *fanglue* compiled by the brokers to claim their success. After the Qianlong Emperor read these two books, he offered his thoughts on correcting the course of the war in Taiwan.[500]

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[495] Ibid., vol. 1274, p. 50-52; vol. 1277, p. 107-108; vol. 1278, p. 113-114.

[496] As a result, Lin Shuangwen was able to prepare a comprehensive plan and build better defense fortifications in Daliyi with cannons, thick walls, and a deep moat. The Qianlong Emperor repeatedly emphasized that the deadlock was caused by Ren Cheng'en. The emperor criticized Ren Cheng'en by complaining that he was an army general and knew nothing about the navy. Therefore, he should not have been in Taiwan; by being there, he was holding Huang Shijian back. Ibid., vol. 1274, p. 52-53

[497] Ibid., vol. 1275, p. 64-66; vol. 1276, p. 91

[498] Ibid., vol. 1277, p. 103-104

The emperor had high expectations for Lan Yuanmei and claimed that he was a suitable war commander and capable of inheriting his grandfather's mantle.[501] After Lan Yuanmei arrived in Lugang, he drew a map to illustrate the situation in Taiwan.[502] In Lugang, Lan Yuanmei met his relatives from Lugang and Zhangpuliao (漳浦寮), who offered him rich information regarding Lin Shuangwen and his rebellion.[503] Although Lan Yuanmei had prepared well, he could not capture Lin Shuangwen's fortified base. Disappointed by the result, the Qianlong Emperor accused Lan Yuanmei of being timid just like Huang Shijian.[504] The emperor reminded Lan

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[499] Ibid., vol. 1281, p. 172-173

[500] Ibid., vol. 1282, p. 177-178; In 1788, when Lin Shuangwen was arrested, one thing remained in Qianlong's mind that Lan Dingyuan described that Zhu Yigui claimed himself an emperor when he was arrested and presented in front of Lan Tingzhen, so Qianlong Emperor required Fuk'anggan to memorize and describe what Lin Shuangwen did when he was in front of Fuk'anngan. Ibid., vol. 1298, p. 452

[501] Ibid., vol. 1283, p. 197-198

[502] Ibid., vol. 1283, p. 192

[503] *Gongzhongdang zouzhe buyi*, pp. 249.

[504] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1286, p. 250

Yuanmei that Lan Tingzhen had defeated rebels in seven days, and he pushed Lan Yuanmei to eliminate the rebels quickly to inherit and propagate his family's reputation.[505] Unfortunately, immediately after the emperor's edict arrived in Taiwan, Lan Yuanmei passed away from a sickness that the emperor and others attributed to the humid climate, most likely malaria.[506] Following the failure of Huang Shijian and the unexpected death of Lan Yuanmei, the emperor sent the Manchu to Taiwan to defeat the rebels.

9.3 The Manchu Conquest of Taiwan and Empire-building

In 1787, the Qianlong Emperor gradually lost faith in the brokers after he fired and arrested Huang Shijian. For instance, when he sent Lan Yuanmei to Taiwan, he also instructed the Manchu soldiers in Fuzhou to prepare for potential deployment to Taiwan.[507] Immediately before Lan Yuanmei died in the eighth month of 1787, in the seventh month of that year, the Qianlong Emperor called upon his most reliable frontier official,Fuk'anggan,[508] and consulted with him and planned (although it was not decided) to send him to Taiwan to resolve the rebellion.[509] After Lan Yuanmei died, the emperor made a comparison in his speech, letter, and edicts between the brokers and the Manchus to express his disappointment in the former and his faith in the latter. In an edict, the emperor indicated that Lan Yuanmei and his troops were not as strong and capable as Fuk'anggan, Hailanca, or the Manchu *baturu* (*brave ones* in the Manchu language). Because Lan Yuanmei had died, the emperor decided to deploy Fuk'anggan, the deputy of this Manchu expedition, and his Manchu army, including many *baturu* and imperial guardians, who landed in Taiwan and began their task.[510]

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[505] Ibid., vol. 1288, p. 271

[506] Ibid., vol. 1288, p. 271-275, vol. 1288,

[507] Ibid., vol. 1278, p. 1114-118; vol. 1278, p. 123-124; vol. 1277, p. 101-102; vol. 1282, p. 178

[508] Fuk'anggan came from a prominent Manchu lineage, and he was the empress's nephew. His father was also the emperor's most reliable minister and commander. Since 1767, Fuk'anggan had participated in all significant wars between Qing and other powers on all Chinese frontiers—Xinjiang, Tibet, and Guangdong, among others. He could be seen as one of the most important commanders for the Qianlong's empire-building enterprise. See *Qingshi gao*, vol. 330.

[509] Ibid., vol. 1285, p. 226-227; vol. 1295, p. 229; vol. 1296, pp. 238-240.

The emperor met Fuk'anggan in the Confucian temple of Chengde, the Qing's capital for its Inner Asia territory and subjects, and instructed him on strategy, which he possibly based on Lan Dingyuan's books. The emperor also gave Fuk'anggan a conch, which was a tribute from the sixth Panchen Erdeni in 1780 (see Figure 9-1). This conch was a Tibetan Buddhist relic used to pray for the safe crossing of a river or an ocean, so the emperor expected that it could help Fuk'anggan smoothly cross the Taiwan Strait during the winter.[511]

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[510] The emperor exaggerated to say that a Manchu baturu or imperial guardians could fight alone against thousand rebels. *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1288, p. 274

[511] Aisin Gioro Hongli, *Yuzhi shiwen shi quanji*, vol. 50, p. 18. This conch was a tributary gift from Erdeni Bancan in 1780. In the box of this conch, there are four languages, Manchu, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Chinese, text, "this is the great luck and fortunate white conch with right spiral marks, this holy conch has incrediable power to make cross river and seas safely." This conch is collected in Palace Museum, Beijing, today. See https://www.dpm.org.cn/collection/religion/234448.html.

Figure 9-1. The white conch[512]


大利益吉祥右旋白螺乾隆五
十二年八月
賜福康安帶赴臺灣剿平逆賊林爽
文莊大田等往來渡海平安五
十三年七月凱旋後繳回供奉
永資護佑普被吉祥
國立故宮博物院
NATIONAL PALACE MUSEUM

The emperor ordered Fuk'anggan to replace Cangcing, who was the prime commander after Huang Shijian was arrested and Lan Yuanmei died, in Taiwan and lead the war effort.[513] Two months later, Fuk'anggan arrived at Fujian, ready to cross the strait.[514] However, unexpected strong winds stranded Fuk'anggan in Xiamen, despite the conch. This delay proved a blessing in disguise. During the two months during which Fuk'anggan waited for the right wind, Fuk'anggan gathered about 6,000 and 7,000 soldiers from Quanzhou and Zhangzhou, respectively; troops from other provinces also assembled in Xiamen. Meanwhile, Fuk'anggan asked fishermen about the wind and about the best time to cross the strait because the soldiers wanted to sail from Chunwu to Lugang.[515] Fuk'anggan and his legion soon rescued the besieged Jiayi, originally named Zhulou. After this battle, Fuk'anggan devised a plan for the emperor's approval (see Figure 9-2). This became the first map of Taiwan drawn by Manchu commanders.[516]

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[512] This picture is from an open access source: http://catalog.digitalarchives.tw/item/00/1c/c4/dd.html

[513] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1286, p. 240-241

[514] Ibid., vol. 1288, p. 271-272

Figure 9-2. *Qing jun wei bu lin shuang wen tu* (清軍圍捕林爽文圖).



Indeed, Fuk'anggan and his Manchu commanders dominated the war against the rebellion. However, these Manchu commanders still relied on the brokers' subordinates, especially their unique knowledge that was useful in the fight against Lin Shuangwen. For instance, Huang Jiaxun (黃嘉訓), a grandnephew of Huang Shijian, was the official in North Taiwan, so

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[515] *Qianlong jian Fukang'an fengming wangjiao Taiwan zhiluan shangyu huichao canben*, pp. 61-64.

[516] This was a map compiled in the end of 1787. This map has two functions. First, it records the significant battles in which Fuk'anggan defeated rebels in the major cities; second, it also shows the plan that Fuk'anggan began to search and arrest Lin Shuangwen. This map was an attachment of a document to the emperor. *Qing jun wei bu lin shuang wen tu* (清軍圍捕林爽文圖), National Palace Museum collection, Archival number: 409000141. There is a basic study about this map, see Lin Jiafeng, "Tushi huzheng: yuancang *qingjun weibu Lin Shuangwen tu* yu Fukang'an jiaobu Lin Shuangwen zhiyi," *Gugong xueshu jikan* 26, no. 3 (2009), pp. 105-132.

Fuk'anggan relied on his talents and professional knowledge to negotiate with Aborigines and hire them as soldiers.[517] Moreover, Lan Qineng (藍啟能), Lan Yuanmei's nephew who lived in mid-Taiwan, was hired by Fuk'anggan to serve as a consultant and to guide the army toward the mountains.[518] Thus, although the rebellion was mainly led by the brokers' subordinates, the Manchu commanders were also aided by subordinates.

The Manchu army worked with the local militia and Taiwanese Aborigines to fight the rebels. Fuk'anggan destroyed the rebels in their fortified bases. After taking the bases, Fuk'anggan led armies to find Lin Shuangwen and his family. Eventually, the Qing arrested Lin Shuangwen in a mountainous village. In southern Taiwan, Zhuang Datian fled to a coastal village. A Manchu-commander-led navy blocked the rebels and eventually eliminated them. In 1788, two months after Fuk'anggan's Manchu army landed in Taiwan, the Lin Shuangwen rebellion was quelled. This was the first—and last—time the Manchu conquered Taiwan without the brokers' assistance. In 1788, just after Fuk'anggan arrested Lin Shuangwen, the Qianlong Emperor established living shrines for Fuk'anggan, Hailanca, and other Manchu generals in Taiwan and Jiayi; none of the men who were worshiped at these shrines were Chinese. The Qing court had done the same for Shi Lang and Wu Ying after their 1683 conquest. The primary purpose for these shrines was to claim their achievement and to inscribe them in Taiwanese memory forever.[519]

In 1788, after the Lin Shuangwen revolt in Taiwan was suppressed, the Qianlong Emperor asked Huang Shijian to pay for the expenses incurred during the expedition, which amounted to about 200,000 taels.[520] A report indicated that Huang Shijian actually had to pay 300,000 taels. A few months after the rebellion ended, ministers reported that Huang Shijian had not disbursed the money, so the Qianlong Emperor launched an urgent investigation into his property to ensure he could pay. Because Huang Shijian still had not paid, the court doubled the penalty to 400,000 taels. However, a few days later, the Qianlong Emperor said that he disagreed with this punishment because he believed that Huang Shijian could not easily sell his property, so he asked the Fujian minister not to force Huang Shijian to reimburse the empire immediately. Afterward, the Qianlong Emperor decided to allow Huang Shijian to only pay 200,000 taels and said he could keep enough property to ensure his family's survival.[521] Later, the emperor compromised with the ministers on the double penalty, but he reduced it by only 100,000 taels. However, in the sixth month of 1789, the emperor allowed the Huang family to pay 100,000 taels rather than the entire amount.[522] So eventually, Huang Shijian only had to pay 100,000 taels, still a huge amount. Huang Shijian only took one year to reimburse the government for the military expenditure, and he did so by selling part of his properties in Zhangzhou.[523]

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[517] *Tai'an huelu*, Yi collection, p. 179; vol. Geng collection, pp. 613-615; *Qingding pingding Taiwan jilue*, vol. 20, pp. 339-352, vol. 23, pp. 377-392; vol. 41, pp. 647-660.

[518] *Tai'an huelu*, Geng collection, vol. 4, pp. 507-510; vol. 5, pp. 666-670

[519] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 766-769.

Requiring Huang Shijian to pay the fee was only part of Fuk'anggan's plan to cope with the aftermath of the war. His first reform was that the Fujian naval admiral could no longer select garrisoned soldiers to send to Taiwan himself; instead, the Fujian army admiral would participate in the review of the training, skills, and abilities of those soldiers who would be mobilized. Second, Fuk'anggan decided to increase the naval presence in Taiwan to patrol its seas; this strategy was previously proposed by Chen Bin but rejected by Shi Shibiao in the early eighteenth century. Third, he decided to name a prominent Manchu—Kuilin, Fuk'anggan's cousin—as Fujian naval admiral instead of a general bannerman. Notably, Fuk'anggan still suggested that Taiwan remain under the full command of the Fujian naval admiral, but this position would no longer be occupied by bannermen brokers but by prominent Manchus in his blueprint. Finally, although Taiwan was still under the command of the Fujian naval admiral, the Qing decided that every year one of the Fujian governors, Fujian-Zhejiang governor-generals, Fujian army admirals, Fujian naval admirals, and Fujian-Manchu garrison generals must take a one-year rotation on Taiwan to monitor it, which was isolated beyond the seas.[524] Therefore, although Fuk'anggan's 29-Article Ordinance for the More Effective Governing of Tibet in 1793 is his best and most well-known contribution after his victory during the Gurkha's invasion, his first governing ordinance was issued to deal with Taiwan.[525] On the one hand, his proposals decreased the Fujian naval admiral's control of Taiwan, and on the other hand, he suggested that a Manchu man, instead of bannermen, should occupy this position. His efforts were clearly meant to build close control of Taiwan by the Manchu to the maritime borderland.

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[520] The Qing Empire disbursed a lot on quelling this revolt. Because the shortage of funding, the Qing government allowed that traders donated money. For example, salt traders offered 500,000 taels. Moreover, the Qianlong Emperor also confiscated criminal general's property, such as Cai Daiji (柴大紀). *Ming Qing gongcang Taiwan dang'an huibian*, vol. 80, pp. 260-265, 393-403, vol. 81, pp. 85-86.

[521] Ibid., vol. 83, pp, 365-366.

[522] Ibid., vol. 84, pp, 234-236. *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1333, p. 1042

[523] *Ming Qing gongcang Taiwan dang'an huibian*, vol. 83, pp. 165-168, 353-355.

The Qianlong Emperor had devised a fundamental plan regarding how to utilize the Lin Shuangwen rebellion to propagate his empire-building when Huang Shijian revealed that he could not defeat Lin Shuangwen. During this period, the emperor compared the brave Manchu and the useless brokers, which turned out to be one of his core ideas after the rebellion ended. The Qianlong Emperor criticized and singled out Huang Shijian from the other Chinese generals and said his family had received special treatment from him because he was the Mongolian prince, but despite this, he failed to defeat Lin Shuangwen and to meet the emperor's expectations. The emperor compared Huang Shijian to Pugiboo (普吉保, ?–?) and said the latter was a Manchu and had worked hard to fight the Taiwanese rebels in the maritime borderland, and he eventually served as a naval commander, even though he was not familiar with naval warfare. According to the emperor's criticism, Huang Shijian was worse than Pugiboo, even though the latter was unfamiliar with the environment and with naval warfare in Taiwan.[526] Furthermore, the Qianlong Emperor also noted that Taiwan was different from the hinterland because it was an overseas island.[527] These two ideas shaped the emperor's later empire-building after the rebellion.

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[524] *Qingding pingding Taiwan jilue*, vol. 63, pp. 1003-1016; vol. 64, p. 1022; vol. 62, p. 1000; vol. 56, p. 890-891.

[525] Fuk'anggan's plan eventually ensured the system of Golden Uru in which the empire could determine who would be the incarnation of Dalai lama. Two recent studies about this war and Fuk'anggan's plan about Tibet. See Max Oidtmann, *Forging the Golden Urn: The Qing Empire and the Politics of Reincarnation in Tibet* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018). Lin Lei, "The Limits of Empire: The Qing-Gurkha War, China's Borderlands and the Trans-Himalayan Paradigm, 1788-1850." PhD dissertation. Harvard University. 2020.

In 1789, the Qianlong Emperor ordered his prime ministers to compile a book, *Qingding pingding Taiwan jilue* (欽定平定臺灣紀略). Unlike Kangxi's Chinese *Fang lue*, the Qianlong Emperor wanted to show his preeminence and individualism by creating a link between himself and the conquest.[528] In its front matter, this book claimed four significant events: Zheng Zhilong's colonization of Taiwan, Zheng Chenggong's conquest of Taiwan, Shi Lang's capturing of Taiwan, and Shi Shibiao's defeat of Zhu Yigui. This book especially underscored the Qianlong Emperor's insightful instruction to pacify the Lin Shuangwen rebellion and make the island an important part of the empire.[529] This text acknowledged the conquests led by these brokers in the past: first, the Zheng family, who had conquered this "maritime corner" as a base against the empire, even though Taiwan did not become part of China until Shi Lang's conquest, the empire's second; third, Shi Shibiao and Lan Tingzhen's 1721 conquest; and, most significantly, Fuk'aggan's fourth conquest that quashed the Lin Shuangwen Rebellion and showed that the brokers were no longer useful.[530]

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[526] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1275, p. 73-75

[527] *Qing Gaozong shilu*, vol. 1275, p. 75-77

[528] Ma Yazhen, "Manzhou shangwu wenhua zai jianshi—yi Kangxichao chuangfa fanglue weili," *Xin shixue* 30, no. 4 (2019), pp. 55-122.

[529] *Qingding pingding Taiwan jilue*, preface.

During the war against the rebellion, the Qianlong Emperor had already instructed Fuk'anggan to hire painters to create replications of the battle, a common component of the emperor's empire-building efforts. After the conquest in 1788, Fuk'anggan submitted sixteen paintings of battles; interestingly, he did not attend most of these battles, but the painters placed him at the center of each one. Fuk'anggan asked the Qianlong Emperor to reproduce certain paintings as part of the empire-building project.[531] Eventually, the emperor picked ten of Fuk'anggan's paintings from the original sixteen; added two new paintings, *Triumph of Returning* and *Triumph Banquet*; and revised *The Capture of Zhuang Datian*. These three moves served as the base for a series of etchings that would highlight the victories in the maritime borderland. In these three paintings, the most significant aspects were the "maritime elements" that the Manchu had operated. In fact, according to the painting of *Triumph Banquet*, the emperor even placed a Southern Fujian ship as a decoration at the banquet. The Qianlong Emperor thus emphasized the empire's victories in the maritime borderland and focused on the significance of the sea in the art he commissioned, especially such elements as ships, naval warfare, and the dangerous ocean. For instance, Qianlong's poem, *The Capture of Zhuang Datian*, indicated that the navy defended the coastline from Lu'ermen to Chaicheng.[532] The poem *Triumph of Returning* indicated that deities protected the Manchu soldiers as they made the dangerous crossing to return to the mainland.[533] *Triumph Banquet*, the longest of the poems, announced the Qing's claim to greatness in the maritime borderland, and the real banquet itself took place in "western territory" to celebrate the victory in Taiwan (See Figure 9-3).[534] The emperor emphasized maritime elements in these paintings and poems because he wished to express that the Manchus could also prosper in the maritime world and even fare much better than the people from that world—that is, the brokers. As Ma Yazhen pointed out in her landmark study on the Qing's battle paintings, the Qianlong Emperor commissioned paintings to highlight his magnificence and his military strategy to tie himself to his empire-building.[535]

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[530] *Qingding pingding Taiwan jilue*, vol. 1, pp. 101-102.

[531] *Qingdai Taiwan dang'an shiliao quanbian*, vol. 8, p. 1706; *Qinggong yuzhidang Taiwan shiliao*, pp. 1279-1281. The sixteen paintings are now collected in Yenching library, Harvard University. No scholars have ever studied these paintings and made a comparison with the final version.

[532] *Qingding pingding Taiwan jilue*, p. F11.

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[533] In this poem, the emperor paid his attentions on whether his Manchu baturu had successfully and safely returned to mainland. See *Qingding pingding Taiwan jilue*, p. F13.

[534] *Qingding pingding Taiwan jilue* , p. F14.

[535] Ma Yazhen, "War and Empire: Images of Battle during the Qianlong Reign,' in Petra Chu and Ding Ning eds., *Qing Encounters: Artistic Exchanges between China and the West*, Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2015, pp. 158-172. Also see Ma Yazhen*, Kehua zhanxun: Qingchao diguo wugong de wenhua jianggou* (Beijing: Social Science Press, 2016).

Figure 9-3. The three added paintings in *Pingding Taiwan deshengtu*



The belittling of the brokers and the glorification of the Manchus' achievement were disseminated to be known not only to officials but also to all subjects, especially in the maritime world and Inner Asia. The aforementioned paintings and books were destined for ministers and governors as gifts. However, the audiences for these two empire-building projects were limited to high-class bureaucrats. The emperor therefore carried out this third empire-building project to disseminate his views. He wrote ten texts and turned them into inscriptions, and the court placed these inscriptions in three locations: Taiwan, Xiamen, and Chengde. The emperor placed nine inscriptions in Taiwan, including four Manchu-language and five Chinese-language inscriptions, at Fuk'anggan's living shrine at the main port entrance in Taiwan. The inscriptions and living shrines highlighted the role of the conquerors in Taiwan.[536] They were intentionally positioned to ensure that people who arrived at the port would see them. In Xiamen, eight inscriptions were placed outside the most significant temple, which had been built by brokers using their frequent donations. In Chengde, the emperor placed two inscriptions in Manchu and Chinese at the Confucian temple, where he met Fuk'anggan and instructed him on strategy. These inscriptions, in addition to proclaiming the empire's greatness, emphasized Huang Shijian's failure and timidity and the Manchu's bravery and success. The emperor compared the groups in these inscriptions again: He compared Fuk'anggan and other Manchu generals' achievements with Shi Shibiao and Lan Tingzhen's seven-day conquest in 1721 and declared that the Manchus had performed more successfully than the brokers. Additionally, the inscription criticized Huang Shijian and Lan Yuanmei for going to Taiwan but doing nothing for two months so that the rebels could assemble and Ren Cheng-en for doing nothing and dying, which postponed the end of the war.[537] In other words, although the ordinary subjects might not have had the opportunity to see the paintings and read the books, they may have been in a position to read the inscriptions, especially those in Xiamen and Taiwan. Although they may not have understood the Manchu-language text, they may have understood the Chinese inscriptions, and they would have picked up on the implication that Taiwan would be part of the great empire because of the Manchu's achievement rather than that of the people from the maritime borderland.[538]

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[536] *Taiwan nanbu beiwen jicheng*, pp. 130-132, 143-144.

[537] *Taiwan nanbu beiwen jicheng*, pp. 138-143, 132-136.

The ordinary subjects in the maritime borderland, under the emperor's empire-building project, encountered a new era. For them, the Manchu conquest was no different than the brokers' conquest, especially in terms of its impact on local society. The only difference was that the conqueror had changed from the brokers to the Manchu commanders. Fuk'anggan, to a certain extent, followed the pattern laid out by Zheng Zhilong and Shi Lang to replace the brokers. In terms of policymaking, Fuk'anggan's new policies in Taiwan made it indistinguishable from other regions of China proper. For instance, the Qing government allowed the construction of walled cities in Taiwan; the Qing court decreed that Taiwanese Aborigines could maintain ownership of their lands.[539] Meanwhile, because many militia joined the Qing army against Lin Shuangwen, Fuk'anggan gave them the title of *yi ming*, or "loyal ordinary." Most of the *yi ming* were Hakka people from the peripheral areas. The majority gathered in militarized villages to defend themselves, and Fuk'anggan's arrival offered them the chance to pledge loyalty to the empire in exchange for the right of being registered and governed subjects.

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[538] Gan Dexing argued that these inscriptions were in Chinese, so they represented that the Qianlong Emperor was a Sinicized emperor to show his achievement of unification of China, like all other Chinese emperors. However, I believe that, no matter in Chinese or in Manchu-language, the emperor was likely expressing an idea that the empire and Manchus achieved to conquer Taiwan, a maritime island, and this was resulted by the Manchu's military tradition across the world. This was more likely the idea of a universal-empire building rather than an unification. I believe that Gan misunderstood the point and the nuances between "unification" and "universal empire." See Gan Dexing, "Manzhou huangdi de hanhua yu dayitong Zhongguoguan: Qianlong wushisan nian yuzhi Taiwan Man Hanwen bei de beishi xing yanjiu," *Zhongguo bianzheng*, no. 221 (2020), pp. 85-132.

[539] See Zheng Yingy, "Wangchao tizhi yu shufan shenfen: Qingdai Taiwan de fanren fenlei yu difang shehui," National Cheng Chi University, Insitution of Taiwan History, Ph.D. Dissertation, 2017.

One way to do so was to join the Qing army.[540] These pledges of loyalty to the emperor occurred across Taiwan, in Liudui, Zhuqian, and Zhanghua, among other places.[541] The status of *yi ming* had a significant impact on Taiwan society as well as on its governmental structure.

Although many *yi ming* tried to legitimate their status, one group wanted to link their legitimate status to Fuk'anggan's conquest. Fuk'anggan garrisoned in Chaicheng (柴城), located at the periphery of southern Taiwan, to plot against Zhuang Datian. After the rebellion, the Qing placed this village under the empire's control and made it the southern endpoint of the Qing's authority in Taiwan. Locally, the previously ungoverned people who pursued the title of *yi ming* erected an inscription to announce their close connection with Fuk'anggan and other Manchu commanders. They placed the inscription in front of a temple to proclaim that the *yi ming* in this village would become its leaders. Even though the locals claimed that Fuk'anggan ordered this inscription to please the court, Fuk'anggan and his generals perhaps never knew of its existence. In other words, the people in Chaicheng did exactly what the elites and other citizens in the city of Taiwan did to announce their acceptance of Shi Lang's role as conqueror.[542]

Just as Shi Lang erased the Ming and Zheng's rule, Fuk'anggan also endeavored to remove the brokers' influence in local society. During the Lin Shuangwen rebellion, Taiwan and Lugang remained under Qing control. After Fuk'anggan suppressed the Lin Shuangwen rebellion, he built Mazu temples in Taiwan and Lugang, such as the one in Taiwan (Tainan) located at the main entrance of the port. Fuk'anggan also built a temple in Lugang beside the old Mazu temple that had been built by the Shi lineage. These two Mazu temples became the official iterations: The government privileged them and held official events in these temples rather than in the ordinary people's religious centers.[543]

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[540] See Chen Qiukun, "Diguo bianqu de kezhuang juluo: yi Qingdai Pingdong pingyuan wei zhongxin (1700-1890)," *Taiwanshi yanjiu* 16, no. 1 (2009), pp. 1-28.

[541] See Cai Caixio, "yishun chengyi: lun kejia zuqun zai Qingdai Taiwan chengwei yimin de lishi guocheng," *Taiwanshi yanjiu* 11, no. 1 (2004), pp. 1-41.

[542] Guo Guoliu, "Lin Shuangwen shijian de judian—jianjie Pingdong Checheng Fu'angong de Fugongbei," *Lishu yuekan*, no. 247, pp. 30-34.

If Shi Lang's urban project was an effort to consolidate his status in Taiwan, Fuk'anggan's urban project not only attempted to cement the empire's influence and achievement for local people but also erased Shi Lang and the brokers' marks. It is believed that Fuk'anggan built the Hai'an temple beside his own living shrine at the official school in the port's main entrance. Fuk'anggan built stone walls around Taiwan city, but this wall excluded Wutiao port, the Shi family's main area, outside the urban sector. In other words, the wall clearly distinguished people and locales into two categories: insider and outsider (see Figure 9-4); the Shi family's bases and people became the city's outsiders.[544]

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[543] Field research in Tainan and Lugang in 2019.

[544] See Li Wenliang, "Qing Jiaqing nianjian Cai Cian shijian yu Taiwan fucheng shehue de bianhua 清," *Taida wenshi zhexue bao*, no. 86 (2017), pp. 127-157; Wu Pingsheng, "Qingling shiqi Tainan chengshi kongjian jiegou fuyuan zhi yanjiu (1875-1895)—yi shuweihua zhi 1920 niandai "Tainanshi dijitu" wei jiangou jichu," *Jiangzhu xuebao*, no. 85 (2013) , pp. 1-15.

Figure 9-4. Fuk'anggan's urban project. The green areas include Fuk'anggan's contributions and the yellow were Shi Lang's. Compared to Figure 6-2, Shi Lang's residence no longer belonged to the Shi family. The Shi family's port was also excluded outside the walled area.


城池圖
Fuk'anggan's living shrine
Shi family's ancestral hall
Hai'an temple
Mazu temple

Although Fuk'anggan did not stay in Taiwan for very long, he used the belief of Mazu, an important part of "maritime culture," to reconstruct Taiwanese society and brought this belief to Beijing.[545] After he returned to Beijing, he constructed a Mazu temple in a corner of his residence. This became the official Mazu temple for the empire at Beijing. Afterward, when the empire needed to worship Mazu, the Qing emperor would ask ministers or princes to pray in this temple on his behalf.[546] It is necessary to clarify that the emperor had been familiar with the Mazu belief system for a long time.[547] But after the rebellion, Fuk'anggan introduced the Mazu belief system to Beijing, and its goddess played a significant role in the Manchu court after the nineteenth century when the Jiaqing emperor took the throne, who was the first Qing emperor ever worshipped Mazu himself.[548] In 1805, the emperor proclaimed that the naval ships and traders relied on Mazu's protection, so the emperor asked the missionary ambassador to go to Ryukyu to pray in Fujian, where was the Qing's missionary departing port, on his behalf.[549] For most adherents, and especially for the Manchus in the hinterland, Mazu's importance is not that of a mere patron goddess for "sailing on the seas" but as a deity of water. For instance, in 1812, the Jiaqing emperor built a Mazu shrine in the imperial garden and ordered a Manchu governor, who had been in Fujian for a long time, to contribute a portrait of Mazu as the focal point for the shrine. This shrine, located in Beijing, was not used to pray for safe passage on the seas but for control of the waters in the north of China.[550] In other words, the Qing emperor never denied Mazu's role as a goddess of the sea and actually considered her as the water goddess who blessed dredging and embankment projects.

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[545] Chang Hsun (Zhang Xun), "Hai bu yang po: Mazu yu qi xinyang zai Taiwan zhi chuanbo," *Guojia hanghai*, no. 9 (2014), pp. 117-129; Chang Hsun (Zhang Xun), "Haiyang Taiwan de minsu xinyang yu chuantong: yi Mazu yu wnagye weili," *Taibei chengshi keji daxue tongshi xuebao*, no. 4 (2015), pp. 1-10.

Undoubtedly, I do not claim that the court comprehensively reversed Mazu's role from a goddess of the seas to a goddess of water. Instead, the seafarers, Chinese, and people from overseas still believed in Mazu as a goddess of the seas, but most Manchus and central officials turned to Tibetan Buddhism to protect them during their sea crossings, as evident in their sanctification of two critical items: the conch and incense. First, for protection during sea crossings and oceanic transportation, the Qing, especially the Manchus, believed more in the Tibetan instrument—a white conch with right helical veins.[551] In 1800, the governor of Fujian, Yude, told the mission to Ryukyu that the Qianlong Emperor had given this conch to Fuk'anggan for safe crossing. After the rebellion, this conch was placed in the governor's hall for future usage, especially by Manchu officials. The conch remained in Fuzhou until 1903. Between 1788 and 1903, it was placed and worshiped on the fifth floor of the governor's office at Fuzhou. Every Manchu who needed to cross the sea, Taiwan or Ryukyu—could request to bring it aboard their vessel so they could pray for a safe trip. Another essential item used to pray for a safe crossing was Tibetan incense. In 1800, when the mission arrived at Fuzhou, the weather was not suitable for crossing the sea to Ryukyu. The missionary ambassadors prayed and buried Tibetan incense in front of the Mazu temple at Fuzhou.[552] Tibetan incense was a tributary item during the Qing period. The incense was collected in the palace only, and the emperor would distribute it for necessary usage, especially for prayers over dredging and embankment projects; when the court made such prayers, Mazu was one of the deities to whom they paid tribute with the incense. Fuk'anggan, then, likely played an initial role of cultural exchange agent between Inner Asia and the maritime world—in other words, he became a cultural broker.

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[546] See Li Dingyuan, *Shi Liuqiu ji*, p. 168-169; *Qing Renzong shilu*, vol. 156, pp. 3-4。In July 17th, 2019, when I conducted field research in Beijing, a woman told me that there was a "goddess temple" when she was a child. However, her families and friends do not know the identity of this goddess. This temple has been deconstructed and the location became part of the area center. This place locates at no. 19 Yuqun hutong.

[547] The best discussion about Mazu in English work is James Watson. See James Watson, "Standardizing the Gods: The Promotion of Tien Hou along the South China Coast, 960-1960," in David Johnson edit, *Popular Culture in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 292-324.

[548] *Qing Renzong shilu*, vol. 150, p. 1055-1057.

[549] *DaQing huidian shili*, Jiaqing version, vol. 362, pp. 8-16.

[550] *Qing Renzong shilu*, vol. 258, p. 486, vol. 354, p. 678

The conch, Tibetan incense, belief in Mazu, and the belief for safe sea passagelead to another significant historiographical point in Qing history: the Qianlong–Jiaqing transition. Most New Qing historians focus on the High Qing. In the 2010s, William Rowe, even though he is never identified as a New Qing historian, suggested that researchers concentrate on the early nineteenth century, the so-called Qianlong–Jiaqing transition. Rowe, Daniel McMahon, Matthew Mosca, Seunghyun Han, and Wensheng Wang, focused on the Jiaqing emperor's efforts to reform and rescue the empire from multiple crises after the High Qing. However, scholars agree that the Jiaqing emperor successfully resuscitated the empire and continued its rule for another century.[553] Seunghyun Han argued that, based on an analysis of local elites' social and political participation in Suzhou, the empire retreated from active intervention and designated certain powers to local elites. That is, local elites took over social roles that the empire had originally occupied.[554] The idea of the Qianlong–Jiaqing transition or Jiaqing restoration argued by McMahon has attracted Anglophone scholars' attention, but no works about Taiwan history have touched on this historiographical awareness.

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[551] Li Dingyuan, *Shi Liuqiu ji*, pp. 181, 206

[552] Li Dingyuan, *Shi Liuqiu ji*, p. 207

The end of the maritime brokerage could fit into the context of the Qianlong–Jiaqing transition, and even though the idea of said transition had been introduced over a decade prior, it had not been incorporated into Taiwanese history. However, the end of brokers' historical importance in 1787 was a clear sign for Taiwanese history because the empire implemented new policies and found new brokers to rule Taiwan. In fact, the historians have pointed out certain changes between the Qianlong and Jiaqing periods. For instance, Hung Li-wan's analyses of the cooked Aborigines' land rights, Wu Ling-qing's analysis of *tai yun* (rice delivery from Taiwan to Fujian), and other scholars' works have implied that the appearance of new policies or social structures in Taiwanese society signal a shift to a new stage.[555] However, they pointed out that this shift was a result of new policies in Taiwan’s frontier rather than a broader imperial restoration. However, in their examinations of Taiwanese history, scholars are fully aware that many local elites who compiled books, contributed to local infrastructures, and gained status as elites suddenly appeared after the end of the Qianlong period. Moreover, the cooked Taiwanese Aborigines—referring to the Aborigines settled in the western plain who were registered under the Qing household system and were relatively civilized by Chinese standards—became local elites during this period. Scholars tend to ignore the question of why this is so.

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[553] William Rowe, "Introduction: The Siginificance of the Qianlong-Jiaqing Transition in Qing History," *Late Imperial China*, vol. 32, no. 2(2011), pp. 74–88.

[554] See Seunghyun Han, *After the Prosperous Age: State and Elites in Early Nineteenth-Century Suzhou* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2016)

[555] Wu Lingqing, "Taiwan mijia biandong yu Taiyun bianqian zhi guanlian (1783–1850)," *Taiwanshi yanjiu* 17, no.1 (2010), pp. 71-124; Hong Liwan, "Qingdai Nanzaixianxi Laonongxi zhongyou zhi sheng shufan zuchun

I thus propose to explore this question by examining the situation before the Jiaqing period. I argue that the disappearance of the brokers, who mainly saw Taiwan as a colonial enterprise, resulted in the emergence of local elites in Taiwanese society. In other words, the brokers’ knowledge of Taiwan benefited them, as it did in terms of publishing books, but their ideas were still focused on how to colonize Taiwan as a private enterprise.[556] In contrast, after these brokers lost their function, local elites in Taiwan, who regarded the island as part of China proper rather than a colony, were able to play a role in the empire. Therefore, the Qianlong–Jiaqing transition can be understood in Taiwan by examining the disappearance of the brokers, who had identified themselves differently in Beijing and in Southern Fujian, during this period; after these brokers withdrew from the maritime borderland, new elites, including new privileged elites and those who held degrees, in Taiwan rose and became the empire’s new agents who implemented the empire’s tasks, such as building walls for cities, compiling gazetteers, dominating the economy, establishing schools, and negotiating with and fighting against Taiwanese Aborigines. In other words, the new elites in Taiwan, rather than those from Southern

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guanxi (1760-1888): yi fu fang zu wei Zhong xin,” *Taiwanshi yanjiu* 14, no. 3 (2007), pp. 1-71.

[556] Lan Dingyuan would be an idea example about this.

Fujian, were supported by the empire and rose up and replaced the brokers as agents of the empire in Taiwan. They also took on the role of the empire in Taiwan during the Jiaqing reign, which was the key during the Qianlong–Jiaqing transition.

The Manchu's conquest of Taiwan gave the emperor a chance to proclaim his rule over the maritime world to the empire's subjects, especially those living in Inner Asia; maritime subjects; those in the brokers' colony (Taiwan); and those in brokers' primary base (Xiamen). This propagation had multiple meanings. The emperor could belittle the brokers' contribution in the past but also highlight the achievement of the Manchu; most importantly, this empire-building eventually had a major impact on the citizens in the maritime borderland. After his victory in 1788, Fuk'anggan played a role similar to the one the brokers had; the society also reacted similarly when brokers conquered Taiwan. The Qianlong Emperor's empire-building project broadcast the difference between Huang Shijian and Fuk'anggan and between brokers and Manchus. The most significant fact is that the Qianlong Emperor emphasized that this victory happened in the maritime borderland and was led by Manchus. After this conquest, the brokers deserted their functions in the maritime borderland: They were no longer the brokers or colonial brokers.

9.4 The End of Brokerage

Before 1787, the four broker families dominated the position of Fujian naval admiral for over a century. The foundation of their services in the maritime borderland since 1683 had been to handle Taiwan and overseas world, especially social disorder in this region of the empire. The Lin Shuangwen rebellion created a huge transition for brokerage, which had already affected society, families, and imperial rule for over a century. What happened after these brokers' failure? In this section I argue that after the rebellion, the brokerage ended because the original structure had been eliminated.

The Shi family disappeared from the imperial broker stage after the Qianlong Emperor's ethnicity-building efforts. The Huang and Lan families were then poised to become future brokers. However, their failure in the rebellion showed the court that they no longer deserved the role; in fact, the Manchu could fulfill their role. After the rebellion, the Huang and Lan families never served in any naval positions. After 1787—although, as Huang Jiamo once said in 1808, the Huang family was a "coastal servant, generation by generation"—they never served in Fujian. In 1799, a minister suggested Huang Jiamo for a position as a Wenzhou commander, which was a navy marshal position along the Zhejiang coast, but the emperor did not permit it. The emperor and the Zhejiang governor thought Huang Jiamo still needed more experience before he could take on that role.[557] But less than one year later, in 1800, Huang Jiamo was appointed as commander in Chuzhou (處州), an inland area of Zhejiang.[558] The Qing court and the local governor determined that Huang Jiamo was qualified to become a commander in Zhejiang but not in a coastal area because he might not have had sufficient skill to serve as an effective navy commander. In 1808, Huang Jiamo was fired as a commander in Zhili and asked to become an imperial guard in Beijing.[559] In 1859, Huang Maochen (黃懋澄), then a young patriarch, lived in Beijing with his two brothers and their mother, when his mother asked to change their household's registration from Zhangzhou to Beijing because they had known nothing about the former; he might never have returned to Zhangzhou.[560]

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[557] *Ming Qing dang'an*, vol. A293, p. 77.

[558] *Neige daku dang*, Number: 105665-001.

[559] *Neige daku dang*, Number: 187549-001.

[560] *Qing Wenzong shilu*, vol. 290, pp. 250. According to two genealogies, among three brothers, Maoyin, Maozhen, and Maochen, only Maochen migrated to Beijing, and the other two settled in Zhangzho. See *Pinghe Xialing*

Figure 9-5. The military position of each patriarch in the Huang family' *Gongfu fang*


Huang Wu
Huang Fangdu
Huang Fangshi
Huang Fangtai
Huang Shijian
Huang Bingchun
Huang Jiamo
Huang Qingchun
Huang Maochen

The dots in Figure 9-5 present each duke's career as a military general. This figure suggests that the first six patriarchs—except Huang Yinzhuan, who lived in Zhangzhou for his entire life but never served as an official—served as coastal military generals. The first five patriarchs all served in the coastal area for most of their lives. Of the other four patriarchs, three never served as coastal generals. (Huang Bingchun became a general in the coastal area of Jiangnan but was

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Huangshi zupu, p. 208; *Junjichu zhejian* (Taipei: National Palace Museum, unpublished archive), Number: Guji 123396 ◦ *Gongzhongdang Guangxuchao zouzhe*, vol. 19, p. 65.

soon assigned to another region.) Coincidentally, they all became imperial guards in Beijing and spent most of their lives in that city. The last three patriarchs possibly never stayed in Zhangzhou. After the Lin Shuangwen rebellion, the Huang family men spent most of their careers as infantry commanders in the hinterland instead of in coastal areas.

Other than naval service, another feature of brokerage was that the empire could send bannermen back to Southern Fujian to dominate the lineage and society. The control was not carried out by the broker family itself because the central court needed to approve it. For instance, in 1709, Shi Shifang had asked for an annual visit to Quanzhou, but this request was denied.[561] After 1787, the Shi family was allowed to return once in 1844. Shi Delin (施德霖), the noble title holder, was allowed to travel to Quanzhou to repair the great ancestral hall and familial tombs. That year, he headed south from Beijing but contracted a fever in Zhejiang, delaying his journey by several months. He asked the Daguang emperor for more vacation time to complete his task. After he completed his worship and repairs in Quanzhou, he requested to visit Taiwan because, he claimed, when he was in Quanzhou, he became aware that Shi Lang had built an ancestral hall in Taiwan.[562] Shi Delin was scheduled to repair this hall, but he did not return to Beijing on time, so the emperor asked the governor to search for him and escort him back to Beijing immediately. What did Shi Delin do in Taiwan? It is possible that he was selling his properties on the island.[563] In other words, the Shi family had gradually severed the connection between Taiwan and their new homeland of Beijing.

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[561] *Xunhai Shishi dazong zupu*, pp. 81-85.

[562] It is unreasonable that Delin knew about the ancestral hall in Taiwan at this time because the Shi Banners family had considerable estate and property in the same place in Taiwan. The Shi Banners family held considerable estates and manors in Taiwan when Shi Lang occupied Taiwan, and the rent or revenue had to be sent back to Quanzhou for delivery to Beijing. See Shi Weiqing, *Shi Lang zai Taiwan xunyeidi yanjiu* (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2015).

[563] She Yingsan, *Tainan ge yamen guanzu qiyuan yange kuanlei jiuguan diaocha quance*, no page.

Undoubtedly, the Shi lineage was influenced by the bannermen branch during the Shi Lang, Shi Shilai, Shi Shibiao, and Shi Tingzuan periods. When brokerage declined after the rebellion, the Eight Banners System, one of the pillars of the brokerage structure, was no longer effective in the bannermen's domination of the lineage. Before the rebellion, the Shi lineage rarely participated in social affairs, but after the rebellion, gazetteers reported that the Shi in Quanzhou began to participate in social affairs and reconstructed their lineage because they had enough economic power to be independent from brokerage and the bannermen's control. For example, Tongfo Temple and Huiren Temple were rebuilt by members of the Shi lineage after the Shi bannermen family could no longer dominate the lineage through controlling properties and familial affairs.[564]

The Shi lineage had sufficient economic capacity to free itself from brokerage, giving it the capacity to be independent. One can see a clear shift in the content of inscriptions from highlighting the bannermen's achievement to emphasizing non-bannermen members' accomplishments in a project to repair the great ancestral hall in 1825. In fact, not a single inscription mentions Shi Lang. The Shi lineage's sufficient financial resources can be deduced from its ability to repair the hall without assistance from the bannermen. In 1751, the Shi lineage organized the rebuilding of the hall. An inscription records this repair, articulating that the hall had been established seventy years prior at Shi Lang's request in 1665, so the Shi members intended to belittle Shi Lang's monopoly on Shi Lang's contribution. In other words, the Shi lineage did not want to give all the credit to Shi Lang. Instead, they sought to emphasize that Shi Lang was only one of the contributors and that the Shi lineage had existed in local society since the Ming period.[565] In 1793, the great ancestral hall was repaired again, and in 1825, the Shi lineage enacted another repair. The most notable description is another inscription recording the 1825 repair that does not mention Shi Lang at all.[566] Perhaps because the Shi bannermen family had declined during this period, the Shi Chinese lineage omitted Shi Lang and his sons' contributions. Thereafter, the hall was under repair from 1842 to 1861 and again in 1863. Based on the extensive amount of funding, the 1863 repair was perhaps the greatest repair during the Qing period. Although the inscription recording this repair mentions Shi Lang's contribution to the hall's establishment, it does not contain a single word about Shi Delin's visit in 1844. Instead, the description narrates the Shi lineage's success in Quanzhou. For example, instead of mentioning how numerous members in Beijing passed the national exam or were students in the national school, this description explained that two family members from the lineage had entered the local academy[567]—another choice to emphasize the successes of the Shi lineage over the bannermen's contributions. An examination of these inscriptions makes it apparent that the contributions of Shi Lang and the Shi bannermen were gradually omitted.

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[564] *Jinjiang xianzhi*, vol. 15, p. 17

Accordingly, the Lin Shuangwen rebellion was a transition that terminated the Qing's brokerage, which had existed since 1630 when Zheng Zhilong created it. For over a century, Zheng Zhilong, his subordinates, and their descendants oversaw this system to control the maritime borderland for the Chinese Empire. During the Qing period, the court brought Inner Asian elements into this brokerage and made the system more efficient. However, the rebellion and the Manchu's conquest of Taiwan in 1788 eventually effected the separation of the bannermen from their Chinese lineage, which was originally under brokerage, and none of the family members were qualified or fostered as brokers from then on because the Qing did not require their service.

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[565] Kenneth Dean and Zheng Zhenman edited, *Epigrphical Materials on the Historu of Religion in Fujian: Quzhou Region I* (Fuzhou, Fujian: Fujian People's Publishing House, 2003), pp. 273-274.

[566] Ibid., pp. 337-338.

[567] Ibid., pp. 387-388.

9.5 Conclusion

In 1786, Lin Shuangwen rebelled. The Qianlong Emperor believed that Lin Shuangwen's uprising was no different from the others, but he was wrong because the close relationship between Huang Shijian and the rebels likely led the former to try to use other ways to quell the rebellion instead of by force. Huang Shijian failed to suppress the Lin Shuangwen rebellion despite the Qianlong Emperor's faith in him. After months of stagnation, Qianlong no longer believed in Huang Shijian and turned to Lan Yuanmei. However, Lan Yuanmei could not defeat the rebellion either. At this point, the Qianlong Emperor came to believe that the brokers were of no use, and the Manchu generals became his new choice. His faith in the Manchu was well placed because Fuk'anggan successfully defeated the Lin Shuangwen rebellion and conquered Taiwan.

After Fuk'anggan conquered Taiwan, he took over the role of broker and transformed the social structure. Meanwhile, the empire-building emphasized the success of the Manchus in the maritime borderland rather than in Inner Asia. The transformation of Taiwan's landscape and structure came with Fuk'anggan's conquest and the Qianlong Emperor's empire-building, and it reduced the role of brokers along the maritime borderland.

The Manchu commanders were nominated to fill the position of the Fujian naval admiral after 1788. And because the brokers lost their functions, the Qing court had to find new agents in the local society. After the rebellion, Taiwan shifted from an overseas colony to a formal administrative region. The Qing implemented new policies and allowed the Taiwanese to take national examinations. Rich traders and people who earned degrees became the new elites in Taiwan. After 1796, these new elites earned the right to decide what the empire could and should do in the Qianlong period. They built cities and participated in compiling cultural and literary works. The social elites became the dominating force of Taiwan's society, and the Taiwanese began to serve in important naval positions along the coast. Although many of the Fujian naval admirals and commanders of Taiwan were Manchu, these newly ascendant social elites became increasingly powerful. Therefore, the end of brokerage created a new situation in Taiwan, and this new situation fit into the significant historiography of the Qianlong–Jiaqing transition.

10 Epilogue and Conclusion

In 2015, when I was conducting my field research in Yakou, Quanzhou, the hometown of Shi Lang, I visited the main square, which has four buildings: Shi Lang's residence that is now the Shi Lang Memorial Hall; the Shi lineage's great ancestral hall; a new branch shrine that has been rebuilt by Shi members; and a branch shrine that has almost collapsed as a result of its members fighting. As I looked at these buildings, I realized they represent an important part of my dissertation—the Eight Banners System, Chinese lineage, and the brokers who contributed to the integration of Taiwan into China.

In 2019, I conducted field research in Lugang, the Shi family's hometown in Taiwan. In the official Mazu temple in Lugang, which was built by Fuk'anggan after the 1787 Rebellion, there is a couplet written on the two main pillars that states, "The mandate of heaven is responsibility, and the holy sign is held by Shi Lang. The grace of the goddess is love, and the miracle has assisted Fuk'anggan." This couplet symbolizes Taiwan's shift from an intermediary colony to a territory of the Manchu Empire in Yakou and Lugang undergirds this dissertation's attempt to build a dialogue between two historiographical approaches: the New Qing History and the School of the South China Studies.

In this dissertation, I have provided a new understanding of four families from the context of an imperial perspective. I argue throughout that these families acted as the Qing Empire's brokers in the maritime borderland to help it rule Taiwan until 1788. The Qing had similar frontier systems, although they were never formalized or institutionalized. Furthermore, brokerage was composed of many elements, and one of them constituted an official position. In the case of maritime brokerage, the Fujian admiral aimed to conquer and control Taiwan through naval power. The Qing Empire carefully selected naval commanders, but brokers attempted to reorganize and control their lineages and become influential ones in local societies. To ensure their loyalty, the Qing adopted Inner Asian institutions to bring the naval commanders and their families closer to the Inner Asian court and emperors and to bring their families as hostages to Beijing. This approach shaped the relationship between the two cultures. However, the naval commanders' primary task was—not to act as cultural brokers—but to act as military brokers and expand the empire. Between 1661 and 1787, these brokers had conquered Taiwan for four times, maintained social stability, and attempted to make local societies recognize their authority. In other words, maritime brokerage represented a new official position, an intermediary colony, a lineage, a local society, and an Inner Asian institution.

This brokerage system was not completely new but was, rather, a different version of the brokerage system the Qing had applied elsewhere. For instance, in Southwest China, the Qing used the *tusi* system to control chiefdoms; in Xinjiang, they used the *beg* system to indirectly rule Muslims; in Mongolia, they used the prince system to assert control; and in Tibet, they used the lama system to rule. An understanding of how the Qing controlled these regions reveals the different situations they encountered in Southeast China and Taiwan, which had been closely connected to the Southern Fujian since the late-Ming period. In that period, Zheng Zhilong was the broker who handled Taiwan, which was a *middle ground* in the seventeenth century. During the Ming-Qing transition, the Qing could adopt Zheng Zhilong's efficient model, which was a brokerage system that allowed negotiations between the central empire and local societies. Ultimately, brokerage became an informal official institution and a way to maintain structural positions in frontier areas.

My thesis is that the Qing Empire employed brokers who acted as intermediaries between the empire and maritime borderland. This system was important because of Taiwan's naval capacity and understanding of the maritime world. Brokers allowed the Qing to indirectly rule Taiwan, and the empire relied on policymaking efforts to maintain social order. In exchange for their services, the Qing provided brokers with privileges, so they were able to establish colonial enterprises in Taiwan even though they were bannermen. To strengthen their power in local societies and within their lineages, they also reorganized and controlled their lineages, and to become important figures in local societies.

The Inner Asian institutions also impacted the brokers and the institution of brokerage. When the Qing adopted the Eight Banners system and the Mongolian prince system began to recruit brokers, the empire's principal purpose was to hold and monitor hostages. However, these two institutions had an unintentional impact. Brokers moved between cultural and linguistic groups, and they used their Inner Asian status to accrue benefits, such as the Huang family's duke seal and Shi family's seal for contracts in Taiwan, in the maritime borderland. Further, these brokers became members of Inner Asian society, and they embraced the Manchu ethnicity because of the Qianlong Emperor's ethnicity-building efforts. This change in ethnic identity broke the connection between them and their lineages in the maritime borderland and attenuated their naval skills and knowledge of the maritime world. Therefore, the Inner Asian institutions are an important part of this history because they had a significant effect on the brokers and their families, although these impacts were not the Qing's original intention.

In this dissertation, I demonstrate my argument by analyzing these historical characters, trying to understand how their families acted in the maritime borderland and using Manchu-language social materials. I explore brokers' actions, such as their conquest of Taiwan, policymaking, control of their lineages, and privileges, such as their colonial enterprises, control of trade, and status in local societies. Furthermore, I explore the empire's perspectives and attitudes about the brokers. I explain how the empire used Manchu-language sources such as cartography, colonial paintings, and ethnography to understand how the Qing Empire told stories to its Inner Asian subjects. Understanding the brokers' Inner Asian features is an important goal of this dissertation, and I consider Taiwanese and maritime history as part of the New Qing History. I also position my topic in the context of the New Qing History and School of South China Studies because these historiographical approaches allow scholars to understand perspectives on the empire, the local societies, and the people in between as well as the relationships among these elements.

I also explain the Qing's imperial structure and consider the complex process of Taiwan's integration into China. I argue the Qing Empire conquered and ruled the maritime borderland by adopting a strategy that the empire regularly used in Inner Asia and Southwest China. The Qing's strategy and ruling methods were different than what it used in other regions. Brokers, in particular, played an important role. When considering the imperial perspective, these brokers allowed the Qing Empire to understand the frontier, have locals adopt their policy suggestions, and maintain powerful navies that upheld social order in the maritime borderland. When considering local societies and family lineages, the brokers' role was to be utilized and recognized by local societies because of their influential power supported by the empire. Although the brokers obtained benefits from the empire and local societies, they faced a dilemma because they had to satisfy both groups. Thus, these three perspectives provide a comprehensive narrative about the mainland empire's integration of an island.

In past studies, New Qing history focused on Central Eurasia before shifting its focus to Southwest China. Scholars believed the Qing ruled regions that were different from China by using non-Chinese administrations and systems. This is an accurate observation. However, a nationalist perspective suggests that Taiwan should be part of China proper. Under the Qing, Taiwan became a significant part of the administrative apparatus of *haijiang*, the maritime borderland, and I argue we should consider Taiwanese and maritime history in the context of the New Qing History. I also suggest that the Qing's treatment of the maritime world was similar to how it treated other areas. Regions with unique cultures, environments, and subjects were incorporated into the Qing Empire during periods of expansion. After the empire integrated new areas, it recruited brokers to rule these territories. Therefore, I argue that Taiwan, which represented a maritime borderland, should be considered an object of Qing expansionism. Putting maritime and Taiwanese history under the rubric of New Qing History suggests the hybrid field I propose: New Qing Maritime history.

The goal of New Qing maritime history is to understand the various aspects of the Inner Asian empire's maritime activities and to consider cultural interactions between Inner Asia and maritime worlds. Ronald Po first posited the idea of a New Qing maritime history, and he suggests that scholars should view Qing history as part of maritime history rather than as part of the Inner Asian perspective.[568] However, Po's method is not significantly different than what maritime Taiwanese and Chinese historians, such as Tsao Yong-he, have done for decades. I am not arguing that Po's contribution is not important, but his study was part of an imperial history project that investigates the Qing's maritime world and policies. Po has made significant contributions to the literature, and this dissertation builds on his work to offer an alternative vision of the New Qing maritime history. One of the crucial insights of the New Qing History is that Qing history should be considered in the context of Inner Asian history. In this dissertation, I reinterpret and redefine the New Qing maritime history to include the Manchus' Inner Asian perspectives on the maritime world and to approach maritime history in a way that reduces gaps in New Qing historiography, such as a focus on social history. My new definition proposes that over a century the Manchu Qing Empire began to understand the policies and rules of the maritime borderland and they developed a system of brokerage as the result of this process. I believe this approach will lead to new research about maritime history that considers it in the context of New Qing History.

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[568] Ronald C. Po, *The Blue Frontier: Maritime Vision and Power in the Qing Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

I now want to consider the Qing Empire in relation to my previous discussion. Because comparative imperial history explored the Qing Empire's frontiers, Taiwan can be compared to the Qing's other frontiers, but it can also be compared to other empires. In other words, can this dissertation compare different parts of the empire? David Bello's work explores the Qing's strategies, institutions, policies, and identities at the steppe frontiers in the northwest, the mountains in the southwest, and the forest in the northeast by using environmental and New Qing History.[569] Bello suggests that the differences within the Qing Empire were based on environmental and ecological differences, which resulted in the Qing's different institutions and policies.[570] However, his study overlooked the fourth environment of the Qing Empire: the maritime environment in southeast China, which I have focused on in this dissertation. I argue that the Qing Empire had different strategies for controlling Southern Fujian and Taiwan, which formed their administrative category in the maritime borderland. The Qing Empire also used different policies, systems, and institutions at the maritime borderland than they used in the steppes, mountains, and forests. Like Bello, I recognize the importance of unique geographical and environmental factors. For instance, the Qing's use of brokers at the maritime borderland is different from the systems it employed in other areas—such as using the Eight Banners system and Mongolian princes system in the steppes and forest or their use of local chieftains in the Southwest. Thus, the maritime borderland represents an in-between zone.

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[569] David Bello, *Across Forest, Steppe, and Mountain: Environment, Identity, and Empire in Qing China's Borderlands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

[570] See Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 11, 13–14;. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 11, 13–14.

I have demonstrated that Zheng Zhilong's brokerage model includes at least eight criteria. After my analysis, I can now provide detailed examples that illustrate them. First, brokers were peripheral members of local societies. For instance, the Zheng, Huang, Lan, and Shi families were originally marginal members of Southern Fujian society. Second, brokers held a certain level of power before the state recruited them. For instance, the Qing recruited Zheng Zhilong because he was considered a powerful warlord in Southern Ming; they recruited Zheng Chenggong because he defeated other competitors to control the brokerage system; they recruited Huang Wu because he understood the Zheng; and they recruited Shi Lang because he had a private navy and he was a skillful naval commander. Third, brokers had specialized knowledge about the maritime world. For example, Huang Wu and Shi Lang were knowledgeable about the Zheng and Taiwan. Fourth, brokers became members of the Qing bureaucracy. For instance, Zheng Zhilong was named as *fu yi guan*, and the Qing made brokers Fujian naval admirals; and the purposes of these two positions were the same—handling the overseas affairs. Fifth, brokers had the right to initiate wars. Zheng Zhilong's fought against pirates and the VOC, Shi Lang, Shi Shibiao, and Huang Shijian launched expeditions before the court approved their military actions. Sixth, brokers obtained benefits from fighting wars. For example, Shi Lang controlled the economy in Taiwan, and the Lan family and Shi Shibiao expanded their colonial enterprises in Taiwan after their successful expeditions. Seventh, brokers dominated local societies and socially transformed them. Huang Wu, Shi Lang, Shi Shibiao, Lan Tingzhen conducted social transformation, and Fuk'anggan eventually did the same. Eighth, brokers' power was passed on to future generations: Zheng Zhilong to Zheng Chenggon, Shi Lang to Shi Shibiao, Lan Tingzhen to Lan Yuanmei, and Huang Wu to Huang Shijian; all used the brokerage system to establish family enterprises. Although the brokerage system changed over time, its basic features remained stable, and it became the foundation of the Qing Empire's model of maritime brokerage from 1661 until 1787.

Moreover, I also compare the Qing's integration of Taiwan to other contemporary empires—which represents my novel contribution to comparative imperial history. In considering the historiographical dimensions of this work, I ask how this dissertation informs other historical disciplines. In other words, why does this dissertation, which focuses on the Chinese conquest of Taiwan in one century, matter for historians of other regions? This dissertation not only examines a case study within the strange parallel framework from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but also provides a way to reconsider the imperial structure. In considering world history that focuses on Southeast Asia, Victor B. Lieberman argues that economic, political, and cultural expansions were absorbed into peripheral political units, so the number of states decreased, and they fragmented and merged from 800–1800 in Southeast Asia. Lieberman further argues that the situation in Southeast Asia was similar to the situation on the Eurasian continent. This political phenomenon was caused by cultural spread, disease, climate change, nomadic invasion, gunpowder weapons, institutional innovation, technical revolutions, and economic developments.[571]

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[571] See: Victor B. Lieberman, *Strange Parallel: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830: Volume 1: Integration on the Mainland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)與;Victor B. Lieberman, *Strange Parallel: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830: Volume 2: Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China,*

In this sense, the incorporation of Taiwan into China during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was part of larger global change. Taiwan was a conquered territory, and it was associated with the Qing's imperial structure. Lieberman and Barkey have also posited the hub-and-spoke model, or the so-called solar polities model to recognize the relationship between metropolitan areas and their peripheries. In these imperial models, a powerful centralized government collaborates with influential local chiefs or elites to expand the empire's rule over the peripheries.[572] In this dissertation, I suggest that the Qing Empire created a similar model. However, the Qing's distinctive approach to the imperial model is their use of the Eight Banners System and an organization of lineage that established an efficient but unsupervised structure to employ brokers. This structure allowed the Qing empire to control its periphery with the help of brokers while also limiting their power. This approach successfully managed risks by using a system of checks and balances. Therefore, in this dissertation, I demonstrate how the Qing's imperial structure went beyond the hub-and-spoke model that connected the Inner Asian empire and brokers.

If the Qing's conquest of Taiwan is placed within the *strange parallel* framework, can this dissertation establish a comparison between the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century worlds? I argue that an empire conquering a known but unconquered area was common during the early modern period. I will examine one particular case in which other empires used colonial brokers. I will consider the Spanish Empire's conquest of the Mesoamerican periphery, and I will use the example of Mesoamerica to support my argument and provide a comparison. As John F. Chuchiak IV argues, it would have been impossible for the Spanish Empire to conquer

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South Asia, and the Islands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3–4.

[572] Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: the Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*, 67–68, 110, 264, 295; Victor Lieberman, *Strange Parallel: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830, Volume 1: Integration on the Mainland*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 33.

Mesoamerica without the help of Indian brokers.[573] The Spanish Empire often collaborated with local people to colonize and conquer a region.[574] Because of their pattern of collaborating with local elites to conquest and to colonize, the Spanish Empire had Spaniards migrate to and settle in Mesoamerica. Further, it had natives registered under the household system and had native settlements transferred to Spanish colonial centers. On the one hand, these tactics provided the empire a solid rule in Mesoamerica; on the other hand, they allowed Europeans and natives to create a new social structure.[575] Mesoamerican natives used new knowledge and institutions to find "the past," and these new approaches helped them survive. Therefore, they used Spanish colonial practices for their own benefit.[576] Shi Lang and the Qing's maritime brokers I discuss likewise appropriated and benefited from certain colonial practices.

Also, Mesoamerican natives who became partners with the Spanish Empire were often lesser or aspiring members of the nobility in their native societies. However, they learned Spanish, European writing, and colonial law because they wanted to become part of the colonial hierarchy through local institutions, and they wanted to become the empire's brokers to collect taxes and distribute labor.[577] These conquistadors, like the brokers, used iconic scripts to record and narrate the power, privileges, legitimacy, and myths of their ancestors in Spanish.[578] When the Spanish Empire stabilized its rule in the Mesoamerican center, it turned its attention to the periphery. The Spanish Empire shared the interests of the Mexica, who were the previous indigenous sovereigns, to occupy the periphery, which produced profitable goods such as cocoa and feathers. The Tlaxcalans—who were enemies of the Mexica—and other indigenous groups were recognized by the Spanish as Indian conquistadors as a reward for their help in conquering and invading the peripheral regions such as Guatemala. After these Indian conquistadors subjugated these areas, they established the center as the brokers' hometown. Because of Spanish colonization, Indian conquistadors and their descendants constructed their identities as conquerors, and they eventually formed an ethnic group known as *Mexicanos*.[579] The conquistadors' legacy contributed to the maintenance of the privileges that the Spanish Empire awarded to native peoples even if it forgot its commitments.[580] Indian conquistadors had two major roles: they quelled uprisings and mapped conquered regions to enhance the empire's authority.[581] Thus, the Qing's maritime brokers employed similar tactics as Indian conquistadors because they pursued their interests, pacified uprisings, maintained their identities, and embraced the empire's ideology by helping their colonization efforts by mapping the conquered regions, claiming the empire's authority, and becoming brokers in local societies. However, unlike the

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[573] John F. Chuchiak IV, "Forgotten Allies: The Origins and Roles of Native Mesoamerican Auxiliaries and Indios Conquistadores in the Conquest of Yucatan, 1526-1550," in Laura E. Matthew and Michel R. Oudijk *Indian Conquistadors: Indigenous Allies in the Conquest of Mesoamerica* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007), 213–214.

[574] See: J. H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 16–17.

[575] J. H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 39; William F. Connell, *After Moctezuma: Indigenous Politics and Self-Government in Mexico City, 1524-1730* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 3; Steve Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), xv.

[576] Gabriela Ramos and Yannan Yannakakis, "Introduction." Gabriela Ramos and Yannan Yannakakis ed., *Indigenous Intellectuals: Knowledge, Power, and Colonial Culture in Mexico and the Andes* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 2–3.

[577] Mayr G. Hodge, "Political Organization of the Central Provinces," Frances F. Berdan et al., Aztec Imperial Strategies (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 1996), 23; James Lockhart, *The Nahuas After the Conquest: A Social and Cultural History of the Indians of Central Mexico, Sixteenth Through Eighteenth Centuries* (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 1992), 14.

[578] Eduardo De J. Douglas, *In the Palace of Nezahualcoyotl: Painting Manuscripts, Writing the Pre-Hispanic Past in Early Colonial Period Tetzcoco,* Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 6.

[579] Laura E. Matthew, *Memories of Conquest: Becoming Mexicano in Colonial Guatemala* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 2–11, 39–41, 131–133, 179, 269.

[580] Laura E. Matthew, "Whose Conquest? Nahua, Zapoteca, and Mixteca Allies in the Conquest of Central America," in Laura E. Matthew and Michel R. Oudijk editors, *Indian Conquistadors: Indigenous Allies in the Conquest of Mesoamerica* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007), 102–126.

[581] Yanna Yannakakis, "The Indios Conquistadores of Oaxaca's Sierra Norte: From Indian Conquerors to Local Indians," in Laura E. Matthew and Michel R. Oudijk editors, *Indian Conquistadors: Indigenous Allies in the Conquest of Mesoamerica* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007), 227–253. Laura E. Matthew and Michel R. Oudijk editors, *Indian Conquistadors: Indigenous Allies in the Conquest of Mesoamerica* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007), 232.

Indian brokers who settled in their conquered areas, the maritime brokers lived in the center of the empire while keeping ties to native areas.

Peter C. Perdue's landmark study explains how the Russian Empire's expansion into Siberia caused the rise of the Zunghar Empire in central Eurasia and the expansion of the Qing Empire to the west.[582] Perdue sought to uncover the inter-imperial connection among these three empires, and he studied the Qing conquest of Central Eurasia.[583] The goal of imperial history is to create comparisons and to understand the structures of imperial control.[584] One of the primary goals of comparative imperial history is to consider historical events in the context of global history. Two of the most significant aspects of global history are comparativeness and connectiveness.[585] Perdue's study is a representative study that uses the framework of comparative imperial history. Evelyn Rawski, who studies Northeast Asia, has also identified a relationship between the Qing, Russia, Korea, and Japan that occurred in the northeast part of the Qing Empire.[586] Similarly, C. Patterson Giersch explores the Yunan by considering the inter-imperial relationship among chieftains, the Qing, and Southeast Asian states.[587] Since the western, southwestern, and northeastern frontiers of the Qing Empire can be understood through comparative imperial history, the southeastern frontier should be understood in the same way.

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[582] See Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: the Qing conquest of central Eurasia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

[583] Kwangmin Kim, *Borderland Capitalism: Turkestan Produce, Qing Silver, and the Birth of an Eastern Market* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016); David Bello, *Across Forest, Steppe, and Mountain: Environment, Identity, and Empire in Qing China's Borderlands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

[584] Peter C. Perdue, "Comparing Empires: Manchu Colonialism," *The International History Review* 20, no. 2 (1998): 255–256; Peter C. Perdue, "Reflections on the Transnational and Comparative Imperial History of Asia: Its Promises, Perils, and Prospects," *Thesis Eleven* 139, no. 1 (2017): 129-144; Huri Islamoglu and Peter C. Perdue, *Shared Histories of Modernity: China, India, and the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

[585] Richard Drayton and David Motadel, "Discussion: the future of global history," *Journal of Global History* 13 (2018), 1–21.

[586] Evelyn S. Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-border perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[587] C. Patterson Giersch, *Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunan Frontier* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

The Qing's conquest of Taiwan involved inter-imperial relationships among the Japanese, the VOC, the Qing, and Taiwanese aborigines. Hence, my discussion of the Qing's conquest of Taiwan again suggests that Qing history should be considered part of comparative imperial history.

Next, I will return to historiography and the global history of China and Taiwan. I want to understand whether this dissertation matters to researchers who are not historians. Does this dissertation relate to current events in contemporary East Asia? This dissertation aims to understand the origin of East Asia in relation to contemporary geopolitical issues. Currently, the issue of Taiwanese sovereignty is a significant geopolitical issue. The People's Republic of China claims sovereignty over Taiwan because "Taiwan is China's holy and unseparated part." The relationship of Taiwan to China is similar to the relationship of Hokkaido to Japan. The Japanese regarded the conquest of Ezochi as a crucial part of their establishment of a Japanese nation-state.[588] However, as many Chinese understand, Taiwan did not become part of China until 1683. If researchers want to understand the origins of the conflict between Taiwan and contemporary East Asia, they must understand the history of the Chinese conquest of Taiwan that occurred from 1661–1787. To improve how we understand Taiwan today, this dissertation, which focuses on the system of brokerage, offers a detailed study of the complicated history of the making of modern and contemporary East Asia.

Some may argue that brokers were historical figures who are no longer important. Although the brokerage system collapsed in 1787 and brokers likely disappeared from the maritime borderland, they remained influential in and important to the region's politics and religion at state and social levels. Their role at the level of the state was crucial to the construction of the nation-state. Moreover, brokers became local deities who are still worshipped today. In fact, it is a common religious practice in contemporary Taiwan to worship Zheng Chenggong, who is no longer a symbol of nationalism in Taiwan but remains a significant figure for local societies.[589] In Zheng Chenggong's hometown, the Zheng members, who are not the lineal descendants of Zheng Chenggong, have transformed Zheng Chenggong into a deity, and they conduct yearly pilgrimages to the ancestral hall. Moreover, almost all of the figures I have discussed in this dissertation were deified in Taiwan. Over the past three decades, Shi Lang has been deified as a land-god in two temples located in Tainan and Taipei. In Zhangzhou, Lan Li is regarded as the founder of many temples. In Taiwan, Lan Li is a significant figure for the Mazu belief in Lugang and one of the founders of the Mazu temple, so Lan Li is deified. Furthermore, in modern Taiwan, the brokers' legacies are apparent nearly everywhere. In southern Taiwan, Zhou Quanbin is deified as Zhen Hai Er Yuan Shuai (the second marshal of the pacifying sea, 鎮海二元帥), although he is unknown in his hometown of Jinmen. In Lugang, the Shi are one of the most prominent families, and their claimed ancestor, Shi Lang, is deified as a samgharama deity (jia lan zun wang, 伽藍尊王) in Lugang. The Lan family also remains an important family in Pingdong.

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[588] Brett L. Walker, *The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590-1800* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 6.

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[589] Chen Yating, "Pingdong diqu zhusi Zheng Chenggong miao zhi bianlian yanjiu─yi Linluo xiang Zheng Chenggong miao wei li," *Wenxue*, no. 20 (2016): 291–311; A belief in Koxinga is one of the most popular folk beliefs in Taiwan. According to research from 1999, there were at least 114 temples where the major deity was Koxinga. Among them, five temples had worshipers whose surname was Zheng. Research from 2012 indicates that the amount of Koxinga temples in Taiwan increased to 165. See: Fu Chaoqing, "Taiwan jisi Zheng Chenggong miaoyu de diaocha yanjiu," *Taiwan Wenxian* 50, no. 3 (1999): 262–266; Chang Boyu, "Taiwan Zheng Chenggong miaoci qunji zhi diyu tese yu jianli yuanqi leixing guina," *Haiyang wenhua xuekan*, no. 13 (2012): 47–74.

A legend explains how Huang Shijian created the couplet that can be found in the city temple of Tainan after he successfully crossed the strait. The names of villages, institutes, streets, and schools became memorial sites for them. Although it may seem that the brokers' behaviors, activities, and contributions were fragmented and inconsistent, I argue in this dissertation that these men should be considered as a group because they served similar functions for the empire during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. When we view the brokers as a group, we can better understand the Qing Empire's nature and the conquest of Taiwan that occurred from 1661–1787. Once we understand these facts, we can better comprehend the making of modern East Asia.

Taiwan's history suggests that any attempt to incorporate it into the mainland's political system must occur with caution and an awareness of local conditions. In this process, brokers became information-providers and military pioneers. The central government compromised with them to earn their support and offered them privileges and rewards in exchange for their services. The history of the brokers that this dissertation describes also suggests that the central government encountered a dilemma about how to simultaneously balance their roles and loyalty.

The relationship between an island and the mainland is a reoccurring feature of East Asian history, which has been defined by Taiwan's and Hong Kong's relationship to mainland China, Okinawa's relationship to Japan, and Jeju Island's relationship to Korea. The mainland polities, such as China, Japan, and Korea, relied on brokers to rule the island, such as Okinawa, Taiwan, and Jeji, abandoned them, raised new agents, and made the island a permanent territory of the mainland's nation-state. Eventually, the Taiwanese started a democratic movement that questioned its integration into the mainland polity. My dissertation explores the first stage of the history of the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China, and now we are watching the final stage. What will happen next? We should keep our eyes on Hong Kong and Taiwan.

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