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An Experiment Using Race and Religion to Determine Whether the Effects of Cross-Cutting Identities are Additive or Interactive

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An abstract of

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the

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Abstract

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By Tyler Wiegert

Political science has operated until now without an explicit theory of identity, with researchers restricting their inquiries to one identity at a time often relying on the common assumption that conflict arises out of differences in identity. When cross-cutting or overlapping identities are relevant, researchers employ an additive model wherein shared identities increase peace and differing identities increase conflict. This has left the discipline unable to explain situations where conflict arises out of overlapping identities, and the salience of one dimension of identity versus another appears important. Tajfel (1974) and Turner's (1975) social identity theory suggests an interactive model of identity that can explain these occurrences. To examine whether an additive or interactive model is more accurate, and to improve understanding of the relationship between overlapping identities and conflict, this thesis uses an original survey experiment to determine how religious and racial identities affect whether an individual supports hostility against a foreign government. In accordance with social identity theory, respondents who matched one of the leaders' identities were significantly more hostile than respondents who matched neither identity. In addition, race and religion were found to have an interactive effect on hostility, and independent effects were found for several demographic factors.

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Introduction

An individual's identity – how he or she perceives him or herself – and how that individual *interacts* with other people of a *similar* or *different* identity is fundamental to political interactions. Yet, the field of political science that seeks to understand political interactions has operated without an explicit theory of identity. Most frequently, political scientists rely on the basic assumption that differences in identity *increase* conflict, and similarities in identity *reduce* conflict. Scholars of international relations and comparative politics that ask how identity relates to international and civil wars draw from the cross-cutting identity literature – by assuming that two groups will fight less when they have more in common. Further, these scholars maintain that this assumption holds even in the face of *cross-cutting identities*: when two groups or individuals differ on one dimension, such as ethnicity, but not another, such as religion. In that case, scholars expect that a shared religion will reduce conflict -- moderating any discord that arises from ethnic differences.

There are reasons to believe that this simplified, direct, and linear relationship between identity and conflict propensity is incorrect. As conventional wisdom states, conflicts often occur because people are "too similar," or the reverse, that "opposites attract." The conflict in Sudan, for example, emerged along religious lines despite a shared ethnicity. In fact, as Kaufman (2006) describes, this conflict arose not merely *despite* a shared ethnicity, but *because* of it**. When cross-cutting identities are important, the sharing of one identity and not the other, can**

heighten the salience of differences. If this is true, then had the Sudanese differed along religious lines *and* ethnicity, then perhaps conflict *would not* have occurred. Contrary to the political science assumption, this means that ***greater differences may lead to less conflict***.

How can we improve our understanding of identity? Social identity theory, developed in the field of social psychology, gives reason to believe that *similarities can cause conflict, because context, similarities, and differences affect the salience of specific identity dimensions* (Tajfel 1974; Turner 1975). This suggests that the relationship between identity and conflict is not necessarily additive, but better captured by an interaction between layers of an individual's identity, where matching and non-matching identities interact with an individual's salience hierarchy for their identities to create greater conflict.

To improve our understanding of the relationship between identity and conflict within political science, this thesis provides an overview of social identity theory and tests the merits of an additive versus an interactive model of two cross-cutting identities, race and religion. To test these, I use the literature from social identity and political science to show why ethnic and religious identities are the most useful identities with which to test social identity theory's premises about identity interactions and contrast these with the standard political science assumption. I designed and conducted an original survey experiment to test whether the standard cross-cutting identity literature in political science or social identity theory has a more accurate conception of identity interactions. This experiment explores how feelings of hostility form across multiple identity layers. I

introduce a new measure of religious identification, which can easily be applied to ethnic identification, to facilitate salience comparisons. I then use the results to ask three questions.

First, which identity configurations, or what level of similarity between two groups, fosters the most hostility? Second, what are the direct and interactive effects of religion and race on hostility? Third, once race and religion are accounted for, how do additional demographic factors affect hostility?

Literature Review

Political Science Conception of Cross-Cutting Identities

Cross-cutting identities exist when two groups or individuals that differ on one dimension, such as ethnicity, share a different identity, such as religion. Within political science, cross-cutting identities prevent tension from building along one cleavage by allowing individuals to focus on dimensions on which they are similar. Cross-cutting identities are credited with keeping democracies stable by ensuring that electoral alignments do not build on one dimension (Chandra 2005; Lipset 1959). Dahl (1956) and Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue that the moderation of the political salience of ethnicity in certain countries derives from the presence of cross-cutting cleavages. Mali serves as an example, where the historical informal institution of "cousinage," in which families formed alliances on the basis of surname, limits the political salience of ethnicity -- despite the fact that ethnicity is highly socially salient (Dunning and Harrison 2010). As a result, Mali is able to support relatively stable levels of democracy. In a study of over 100 countries,

Gubler and Selway (2012) show that civil war onset is nearly twelve times less likely in societies where ethnicity is crosscut by class, region, and religion.

Melson and Wolpe (1970) also contend that cross-cutting linkages reduce conflict in their discussion of the effects of modernity on communal groups. They argue that modernity deepens social divisions along communal lines by pairing individual socio-economic classes with specific ethnic communities, which reduce cross-cutting linkages. With more cross-cutting linkages, confrontations become less "naked" and there is a lower likelihood of secessionist conflict. Heilmen and Kaiser (2002) argue that Tanzania would be a perfect example of Huntington's (1997) clash of civilizations. The overlap of animist religions, Christianity, and Islam that pervades society makes political mobilization along religious lines a losing strategy. It even causes the majority of citizens to perceive inter-religious relations as positive, even in the presence of occasional violence.

While the political science literature on identity appears to conclude that cross-cutting identities mitigate conflict and promote stability, cases suggest that this may not accurate. Kaufman (2006) shows that the conflict between northern and southern Sudan indicates that cross-cutting identities did not mitigate the conflict, but actually served as a cause. Southern Sudan is ethnically African and its primary religions are combinations of Christianity and animism. Kaufman describes how the North perceives itself as Arab, but the Arabs of North Africa rejected the North Sudanese and argued that North Sudan was much closer to ``African''. This was made more conflictual by the reality that the North Sudanese were actually of African descent. North Sudan then engaged in conflict with the South to reinforce

the belief that they were different from the South – different from Africans -- and to impose Islam, because they conceived of Sudan as an Islamic state. In this case, the North and South shared a nationality (they were both Sudanese) and shared an ethnicity (they were both of African descent). They differed on their religious identities (the North was Muslim and the South was Christian-animist) and their self-perceived ethnicity (the North perceived itself as Arab and not African). It is not clear that this conflict would have occurred if the two groups did not share a nationality and technical ethnicity. Indeed, it appears that the shared nationality actually made any difference in religion *more* salient, and shared ethnicity heightened the tension over the difference in self-perceived ethnicity. In the case of Sudan, one can make a reasonable case that cross-cutting identities heightened conflict by making between-group differences more salient – directly opposing political science's conventional wisdom.

An important point is that previous scholarship has not examined multiple identities at once. Nor has it examined the importance of an individual's ranking of those identities by salience, where salience means the importance of one dimension of identity (Stryker 1980). Nor has anyone examined the probability of one dimension of an identity being activated or becoming more relevant to a given contextually-defined situation (Stryker and Serpe 1982). Kaufman's evidence suggests that cross-cutting identities might not always mitigate conflict. In this next subsection, I explore social identity theory's premises about how multiple ordered identities interact to expand our hypothesis about the effects of cross-cutting identities.

Social Identity- The Social-Psychological Foundations

Tajfel (1974) is regularly credited as the foundational work on social identity theory. He defines social identity as the part of an individual's self concept that is derived from membership in a social group and the emotional significance attached to that membership. Social identities only exist in the presence of other groups and perceived differences in values between them (Tajfel 1974). Social identity theory can be succinctly put as saying that society is a multifaceted entity, and the self is a reflection of society. Despite the endogeneity problem with that statement, identity is thus multifaceted, and the salience of any given identity depends on the social context in which one currently is located (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995). In this conception, social identity is multi-dimensional, but the weight given to any particular social identity in a decision-making process is heavily dependent on the context in which one is. Individuals will wear different hats, or behave very differently in their office compared to happy hour with their college friends or at their children's soccer game.

Turner (1975) augments social identity theory with self-categorization theory, which specifies how individuals adopt social identities. This theory states that when people examine the groups of which they are members, they abstract prototypical traits based on the physical and social characteristics of the other members. They then alter their own social behavior and perception of the world to match the traits they have abstracted. Importantly, prototypes are developed to maximize similarities within the group and maximize differences with those outside the group (Hogg and Terry 2000). People adopt these prototypes to reduce

uncertainty (provide security) by providing a lens through which to interpret the world, which then prescribes responses to what is observed (Chafetz, Spirtas, and Frankel 1998; Hogg and Terry 2000). For example, when a dad suddenly finds himself the parent of a soccer player, he will look to the behavior of other soccer parents to see what is the "right" way to cheer on the team, what snacks he should bring, and whether he should stand, bring a lawn chair, or sit on a blanket.

In political science, this type of behavior emerges when individuals take policy cues from their political elites. Most people are uncertain about the challenges facing their country and how to handle them. This leads them to feel insecure, and in some contexts (e.g. discussions about gun control or going to war), it can even be a physical insecurity. To feel safe, in control, and certain about the world, people look to their party leaders for a lens through which to understand the world. They do not need all the details of every policy issues. They just need some prototypical guiding principals to help them understand the challenges, and how they may be handled.

Chafetz, Spirtas, and Frankel (1998) clarify the notion of salience. They define identification as the importance of an identity. The base salience of an identity is determined by the number of identities an individual possesses (a person who is only a part of one group will value that group membership more than somebody who travels in dozens of social circles) and the degree to which that identity is psychologically rewarding (which is based in part upon the idiosyncratic preferences of the individual). Situational salience reflects both the base salience of an identity and the context one is in, or the role one is currently occupying (Chafetz,

Spirtas, Frankel 1998). When researchers prime a respondent's ethnic, religious, party, or class identity, they are effectively altering the number of identities a person has by elevating the relative salience of one to a point where no other identities matter. Because each individual's internal ordering of their identities is idiosyncratic, there is no way of knowing ex ante which hats a respondent will wear when faced with a situation presented by the researcher. Identity priming, then, is an attempt to highlight the impact of one identity on an issue, despite the possibility (and even likelihood) that the issue is actually multi-dimensional, or relevant to multiple identities.

How Identities Interact From Each Perspective

While reducing a respondent's number of identities to one can help in understanding the effect of one identity on preference ordering in various contexts, it does little to suggest how individuals, who generally possess multiple identities, naturally form preferences. It also leaves unclear the nature of identity interactions. Does the most salient identity dominate? Can less salient identities bandwagon (can their effects add together) and cause a decision contrary to the one arrived at by the most salient identity? If a person is a gun owner, a hunter, a Democrat, and the relative of someone who has been shot, where does he or she stand on gun control? This is an important question for both the political scientist and the social identity theorist. The political science literature has thus far only explored one identity at a time, leaving these questions unanswered.

Political Science Conception of Identity Interactions

When thinking about how identities interact, the standard cross-cutting identity literature used in political science suggests that identities are additive. Contextually relevant identities prescribe varying behaviors. Those behaviors are considered with the weight of their corresponding identity, and some behavior is chosen in the middle. An individual's ethnic identity pulls him or her toward conflict with another ethnic group in a tense situation, but his or her socio-economic or religious identity, which is shared with members of the other ethnic group, suggests searching for a non-violent solution to the tension. This situation produces mild conflict between groups.

Social Identity Theory Conception of Identity Interactions

Social identity theory suggests something different. Identities are constantly interacting to form perceptual lenses. Context weights identities, but all identities form the individual's worldview. As will be discussed more below, the ordering of identities matters; the hierarchy of salience interacts with the similarities and differences between groups to produce a non-additive behavioral outcome (when two groups differ on an identity dimension, it matters how important that identity is to each group). For example, if an American Evangelical Christian and an American atheist are in conflict, I would not expect it to be a mild conflict (which the political science literature would predict, because the shared American identity pulls in one direction and the differing religion pulls in another). I expect a non-additive, antagonistic outcome that arises from the interaction of the identity match and mismatch. To the Evangelical Christian, Christianity is a part of what it means to be

an American. The atheist challenges that conception by simultaneously being an American and an atheist. Salience is important, because the identities in question must matter enough to the individuals or groups to warrant hostility, or to be viewed as challenging a fundamental identity. It is unlikely the political science literature is simply wrong about identity interactions, so there must be some low level of salience at which identity mismatches no longer challenge fundamental identities and warrant increased hostility. The purpose of this study is to test the interaction of multiple identities on the development of hostility between groups. I begin this new branch of study by using just two identities: religion and ethnicity.

Foundations of Group Formation and Group Behavior

I will now turn to a more focused discussion of groups and intergroup behavior. To my knowledge, the story I tell has not been explicitly told in any one place. I construct it out of the dense literature on social identity and group behavior, although Tajfel (1974), Turner (1975) and Turner (1978) serve as the core. It is open for review by scholars far more experienced with the social-psychology literature than I am. In any case, it provides one reason why the study of cross-cutting identities is so important, but is by no means the only reason.

The psychological needs for belonging and for security explain why people form groups. The desire for self-esteem is also the force that turns groups into in-groups and out-groups (an in-group being the group of individuals who share an identity on the presently-salient identity dimension, such as religion, and an out-group being the group(s) of individuals who share a different identity on the presently-salient dimension). An individual's need for self-esteem will not only

drive them into a group, but it will also drive them to form favorable opinions of their group (Branscombe and Wann 1994; Stets and Burke 2000). The preference one develops for one's own groups can be seen in the Cross Race Effect, where an individual is more able to recognize faces that have been presented to them of individuals of their own race than of individuals of other races. Bernstein, Young, and Hugenberg (2007) shows that this effect holds even when an individual is simply told that they belong to a group that consists of certain faces, while holding all other factors, such as race, constant. Because this preference exists even at this most basic level of grouping, I should not observe naturally mild or self-apathetic groups with higher level, or more-salient identities, which becomes important below.

Social identity theory explains this phenomenon. When group members select prototypical traits to separate their group from other groups, they will attribute positive traits to themselves. To maximize the differences between themselves and others, groups may attribute generally negative traits to other groups. If a group actively perceives the inferiority of other groups as a corollary of its own superiority, that group may become hostile to out-groups. Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) find that groups with high self-esteem show unrealistically positive views of the self, illusions of control, and unrealistic optimism for the future. By the mechanism of trait abstraction, those individual experiences then are drawn into the group experience in a cycle of self-esteem building. Luhtanen and Crocker also find that groups whose members view the group and their membership in the group highly are more likely to engage in competition with out-groups, which becomes

increasingly likely the more each group believes and vocalizes that it is "good" and other groups are "bad," or at least "better" and "lesser." This is presumably one reason for Adida, Laitin, and Valfort's (2010) finding of anti-Muslim discrimination in the French labor market or the American settlers' need to Christianize the Native Americans.

When a group continually elevates itself over an out-group, and the out-group is experiencing the same internal esteem building, disagreements must necessarily arise about the nature of each group's identity. These disagreements can be interpreted by each side as an attack on the group's identity, which, by extension, is an attack on the individual's identity. For example, a statement that the Democratic Party is naïve and wasteful for wanting to extend the duration of certain welfare programs can be interpreted by the individuals that take their policy cues from that party as a statement that they are also naïve and wasteful. This dynamic of continual elevation and derogation, and the propensity of individuals to interpret attacks on the group's identity as attacks on their own identity, lead to a number of important outcomes. First, threats to one's group increase the probability of derogation in return (Branscombe and Wann, 1994). Threats also increase the probability of relative power misperception (a group will think it is stronger relative to another group than it actually is), as well as the formation of double standards of behavior. The double standard is closely related to the return of out-group derogation, because the group will view attacks against itself as unwarranted, but will view its own retaliatory attacks as perfectly deserved (Druckman 1994). This double standard can be seen in the belief of Muslims in Ukraine and Azerbaijan that

acts of terror perpetrated by Christians would be less justified than acts of terror perpetrated by Muslims (Fischer, Gretemeyer, and Kastenmuller 2007, pg 379). (It should be noted, however, that that finding was based on a sample of 60 individuals.)

The intense preference for in-group members generated by this cycle of self-esteem building causes a particularly strong preference for "achieved" groups even over ascribed groups (Ellemers, Kortekaas, and Ouwerkerk 1999; Stets and Burke 2000). The individuals must justify to themselves the effort they made to achieve membership, so they elevate the status of the group in their hierarchy of psychological reward (which, in turn, affects the hierarchy of salience). They must also justify their membership to the group, so they elevate the status of the group outwardly, more strongly than do the old members of the group, if they can. This becomes relevant again later in the discussion of why religious identity may be generally more salient than ethnic identity.

On the one hand, it logically follows from the discussion so far that greater alignment of identities (identities that reinforce each other by providing similar perceptual lenses) will lead to greater self-esteem. The more clear those lenses are in their identification of the relevant out-group, and the more clearly they identify the differences between the in-group and the out-group, the more optimistic the group will feel about entering a conflict. For example, Germany's strong sense of nationalism in the generations following unification, combined with its historical antipathy toward the French, led it to believe it was capable of waging World Wars I and II.

Schafer (1999) actually finds that more violence comes from less-defined identities, or those that are less clear about who is in the group (and for what reason they are in the group) and who is outside the group. That is to say, unclear group boundaries stimulate more violence. Turner suggested something very similar to this in his seminal work on self-categorization theory (a subset of social identity theory).

> The significant other may also be a group that threatens to blur the distinctiveness of the ingroup. Thus, it may be a group that is culturally related to the nation and therefore puts in question the authenticity of its identity. Indeed, according to social-psychological research on group behavior, the strongest competition between two groups may be expected to occur where in reality there is the least reason to distinguish one group from the other. – Turner (1975) (quoted from Triandafyllidou 1998)

An initial example of this might be the particularly vitriolic hostility between Jesus and the Pharisees in the Gospel of Matthew, which essentially painted Jesus as a Pharisaic teacher of the law, just with a different interpretation of the law. This phenomenon might also explain North Sudanese aggression against the South Sudanese. To reiterate, Kaufman (2006) observes the extreme identification of the North Sudanese with Arab culture and Islam and their strong derogation of the South Sudanese who they view as pagan Africans. Kaufman also notes how Arab cultures have denied that the North Sudanese are Arab, and have viewed them as Africans. The North Sudanese, then, according to Turner (1975) and Turner (1978), would naturally become hostile to the South Sudanese in an attempt to separate themselves from a group from whom their preferred in-group does not believe them

to be different. The South Sudanese, without even trying, threatened the North Sudanese identity as Arabs and the North Sudanese conception of Sudan as an Islamic state, and engendered their hostility.

Having outlined the political science conception of identity and social identity theory, and having hopefully stressed the need to find a better understanding of identity interactions, and the value that might come from examining social identity theory, I will now turn to a discussion of ethnic and religious identities. I focus on these two identities because the literature clearly shows that they are often the most salient identities held by an individual, which makes them particularly useful for the study of the effect of holding multiple identities on out-group formation.

Ethnic and Religious Identification

Ethnic Identification

In much of the literature focused on ethnic identity, the discussion is focused on the origins of ethnicity. Ethnicity is assumed to be a salient identity; what is important is defining it. In this study, I am less concerned with the definition of ethnicity. Individuals are assumed to have an ethnic or racial group, and they are assumed to know what it is. What exactly forms that identity is less important than the existence of that identity and its salience. Because of that, I will skip the dense literature on primordialism and instrumentalism[1], and I will avoid discussing the large number of definitions of ethnicity that have been presented. For the purposes

[1] For a good introduction to this literature and the debate between those schools of thought, I suggest to the reader Bentley (1987), Eriksen (2001), and Brubaker (1998). These works outline the arguments of each school and assess their strengths and weaknesses in a way understandable to those unacquainted with the literature.

of this study, the most appropriate definitions may come from Bentley (1987) and Calhoun (1993). Bentley defines ethnicity as common memories and a shared "rhythm of living." Calhoun expresses a similar idea by stating ethnicity is not based on the antiquity of the tradition, but on the immediacy and unquestionability of its nature. Essentially, ethnicity is what it is felt to be.

It is important to look at reasons why ethnic identity may be salient. Calhoun suggests a somewhat tautological answer: ethnicity is salient because we define it by what is salient. It is present in the social structure of a community. It defines and *is* social interaction, institutions, and regularized behavior.

Kazal (1995) argues that ethnic salience (though not racial salience) declined in the Great Depression, because ethnic networks were no longer able to protect an individual. They were replaced by broader class networks, which were able to generate greater social power. So, ethnicity may be salient because ethnic networks are facilitators of collective action to protect members, although there is a clear endogeneity problem with that explanation.

Kaufman (2006) takes a more top-down approach to the collective action value of ethnicity. In his presentation of symbolist theory, hostile myth-symbol complexes are used by elites to mobilize their populations to war. Myth-symbol complexes get their power from the emotion-laden interpretation of history shared by all the members of the community. Ethnicity is salient because it is perceived to be a long-historical, and possibly ancient connective identity, and it is reinforced by political elites because of its inherent collective action potential.

Religious and Ethnic Identification

I group the discussion of ethnic and religious identity into the same broad section, because much of the literature about religious identity is focused on the high salience of religious identity, and though the literature's opinion about the relationship between religion and ethnicity is mixed, when religion is treated as an independent identity, that discussion often includes a listing of the reasons why religious identity is more salient than ethnic identity. Through these discussions, we can identify traits of salient identities that might explain why ethnic identity itself might be inherently more salient than most other identities.

The literature on religious identity is far less vast than that on ethnicity, in part because religion was for a long time viewed as a component of ethnicity (Marty 1997). There have been a number of works on the relationship between religious and ethnic identity, and just as many interpretations of that relationship. Hamf (1994) takes an instrumentalist approach and treats religion as if it is a tool for mobilization toward economic or political goals in the same way as ethnicity. Bruce (1996) examines the conflict in Northern Ireland and argues that religion forms the basis of ethnicity, sets groups apart and legitimizes their goals, but that ethnicity is still the dominant identity. Sells (2003) gives religion more credit than any of the others by treating it as a submerged primordial identity that is activated in the name of ethnicity, but then takes on a power of its own.

Hammond and Warner (1993) argue that ethnic and religious identity are declining in social importance and inheritability, and that religious loyalties are declining more quickly because of Protestant norms of self-choice and a general

belief that ethnicity is a matter of blood rather than choice. They describe three relationships between the two identities. First, religion can serve as the foundation of ethnicity, as it does with Jews. Second, religion can be one of many foundations of ethnicity, as with Greek and Russian Orthodox. Third, what they call religious ethnicity is when many ethnic groups associate with one religion. In this case, the two are the most uncoupled and religion has the greatest potential to take on a force of its own. This third category is the most important to this study, as religion and ethnicity must be completely separated in order to measure the interaction of two independent identities.

Seul (1999) provides one of the best discussions of how the nature of religious identity sets it apart. Seul argues that religion satisfies individuals' need for psychological stability and belonging more than other identity groups, because commitment to members can be thought of as commitment to God, so group bonds are much tighter. Also, exit-permeability of the group is low; even people who do not feel a spiritual connection to their religion must overcome large social obstacles to leave the group. While primordialists claim that ethnic groups have eternal communal memories, they really can only mean as long as humans have existed. Religious groups have truly eternal memories, extending into the precreation mind of God, or whatever deity or deities the group worships or reveres. Seul's work suggests that identities become salient when they provide psychological stability. They do this by forming group bonds, which are tighter when commitment to the group is equated with commitment to something larger than the group. The perception of ancient connection adds to this idea of the group as something larger.

There is another point from the earlier discussion of identity that is not explored in Seul. If salience arises out of a combination of idiosyncratic preferences and context, then an identity would become more salient, or provide greater psychological stability, the more contexts it covered (related to Stryker's (1982) statement that salience arises out of the probability of activation). Jacobson (1997) interviewed a sample of second-generation Pakistanis in Britain about the interaction between their ethnic and religious identities. For her respondents, Islam was a greater source of identity than ethnicity. Being Pakistani was tied to a place and customs, but being a Muslim was everywhere and was defined by loyalty to absolute truths. They felt that ethnicity was less concrete, based on where one was born and where they lived. They were unwilling to call themselves entirely Pakistani or entirely British. For them, religion, however, was binding (Jacobson 1997). Ethnicity is contextual, albeit sticky. When religion is separated from ethnicity, it becomes a source of absolute truths that covers every context, including not only every aspect of life, but also death.

Numerous works deal with the same factors put forth by Seul. Reynal-Querol (2002) rephrases the exit-permeability point by saying that religion is more important than interests or ethno-lingual divisions because it more sharply excludes, and goes even further than Seul by calling religious identity fixed and non-negotiable. Mitchell (2006) calls religious boundaries absolute and adds that religion also acts as a perceptual filter on the world and history. Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman (2010) state religion is uniquely powerful because it blends social identity with a non-falsifiable belief system. Smith (2004) and Hutchinson (2004)

have posited that ethnicity might be salient because it allows one to escape oblivion through the memory of posterity, but religious identity may be even more salient because it will actually preserve you yourself from oblivion.

Grzymala-Busse (2012) provides probably the most extensive list since Seul's of the factors that make religion the most salient identity. She cites the high costs involved in changing religious identity, the unique way religion orders one's life, the eternal dimensions of the history and the constant immediacy of its message, and the supermassive transnational nature of religion, connecting an individual intimately to an extremely large community. The important of the transnational community has some basis in the study of abstract group identities. Druckman (1994) finds that dividing people into groups and not allowing preferential treatment of in-group members actually lowers self-esteem, possibly because of the associated loss of the larger inclusive group. So, the larger the inclusive group provided by an identity, the higher the associated self-esteem.

For a long time, ethnicity was assumed to always be salient, and religion was assumed to be part of ethnicity. Because of this, there has been little work done examining how variations in the saliencies of either ethnic or religious identities affect policy preferences. When the saliences of the two have been separately assessed, it has mostly been related to conflict situations. Kaufman (2006) assumes a high level of potential for ethno-religious salience, and then looks at how the priming of North Sudanese ethno-religious identity led to conflict with South Sudan. Seul finds that religion does not cause conflict, but is the most salient social fault line, so conflict often occurs along religious divisions (Seul 1999).

In this work, I introduce a conceptualization of identification that allows for the independent measuring of ethnic and religious saliencies, and the quantitative comparison between them. Posner (2004) is relatively unique among scholars of ethnicity in that he actually measures ethnic saliency, using a series of questions related to willingness to intermarry with or vote for a member of the salient "other." In contrast, there is an abundance of work that has sought to measure religious saliency. Unfortunately, most of the conceptualizations and their accompanying measures have been described as "crude." I will cover some of the history of the conceptualization of religiosity before I introduce my own in the Research Design section of this work.

In the following section, I will describe the survey and the main experiment. In the construction of the survey, I attempted to incorporate the various, and at times, opposing predictions of the political science literature and social identity theory and allow for the testing of each. I sought to separate ethnic and religious identity, and leave it to the respondent to decide relatively how salient each identity was. I prime those identities to overcome the problem of context-dependent salience. I will also introduce my new conceptualization of identification, which was designed to facilitate cross-identity saliency comparisons, which becomes important for determining a hierarchy of salience, and construct a smoothly continuous continuum between low and extreme identification.

Research Design

In this section, I describe an original survey experiment. The experiment is designed to test the premises of the political science conception of identity and social identity theory about identity interactions, specifically, whether identities are additive or interactive, and to allow for additional determinations about the statistical effects of other demographic characteristics on hostility. With the experiment, I answer the following three questions. One, which identity configurations, or what level of similarity between two groups, encourages the greatest hostility? Two, what are the direct and interactive effects of religion and race on hostility? Three, are there other demographic factors that have independent effects on demonstrated hostility?

The hypotheses are stated explicitly and in an expanded form below. Succinctly, the cross-cutting identity literature predicts that more differences lead to more conflict, while social identity theory predicts that semi-similar groups will fight more than completely dissimilar groups.

The independent variables, described in greater detail below, are the respondents' racial identity, religious identity, and identity hierarchy, or the ordering of which identity is more important. The dependent variable is support for hostility, where hostility is constructed using categories of hostility as coded in the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset. The MID dataset, which is compiled by the Correlates of War Project, codes all interstate conflicts 1816-2010 as one state threatening, displaying, or using force against another state. A checklist is used to show which of 15 potential actions were taken by a state, such as "Threaten to

Sanction" or "Begin a Comprehensive Bombing Campaign", and then the checklist helps to categorize whether a state has displayed more or less hostility on a scale from 1 to 3 (those labeled 2 to 4 below). I repurpose this checklist to ask respondents which specific policies they would support against foreign leaders of another country, and retain the classifications of "threaten force," (scored 2) "display force," (3) "use force," (4) while adding a "do nothing" (1) category to categorize the hostility level supported by an individual.

As will be explained in greater depth below, each respondent was randomly sorted to read one out of four scenarios. Each scenario describes a situation in which another country is experiencing a civil conflict, and the leaders of that country are described as having a particular racial and religious identity. Four treatment groups were formed based on whether the respondents' identities matched both, one, or neither of the leaders' racial and religious identities. The primary goal is to assess whether respondents whose identities cross-cut those of the leaders favor higher or lower levels of conflict than respondents who have no cross-cutting identities.

Identity priming is crucial to this experiment for two reasons. First, both theories of identity agree that identity is context-dependent. Second, one large issue in race relations is that dominant racial groups often do not think about their racial identity on a day-to-day basis. As discussed above, identity salience is in part driven by the number of identities one holds. To raise the salience of religious and racial identities, I take several steps to make all other identities irrelevant to consideration in the experiment. These steps will be discussed below.

The complete survey can be found in Appendix A.

Survey Recruitment

Approximately 1500 survey respondents were recruited using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (mTurk) service, with a dropout rate of 8%. Mechanical Turk is an online platform where researchers and employers can post projects (HITs) and compensation levels. For this survey, mTurk respondents were offered between $0.35 and $0.70 for completion of the survey, depending on the wave in which they responded. Following the example of numerous mTurk researchers, I limited participation in the study to mTurk workers located in the United States whose HIT approval rate was greater than 95%. I also re-fielded the survey every one or two days in order to generate several waves.

I use race as a proxy for ethnicity, because race can be conveyed visually, where ethnicity sometimes cannot. I make the assumption that race in the United States shares many of the traits that make ethnicity salient to an individual. Race is highly salient in the US, more so than ethnicity. Relative to racial out-groups, racial groups, despite having varying ethnicities within the group, share similar appearance, similar cultural background, and similar treatment by racial out-groups. This assumption would be much weaker in a society with fewer racial groups and/or greater ethnic salience.

Christians and atheists constitute the large majority of respondents, not just for convenience, but also to facilitate accurate measuring of identity interactions. They have a relationship with ethnicity that Hammond and Warner (1993) describe as "religious ethnicity," where many ethnic groups are associated with one religion.

This selection of religious groups based on their ability to be stand-alone identities is necessary to best capture how people form preferences, or how out-groups form, across multiple identities. As will be discussed more below, race and religion were chosen in part because of their high inherent salience, not because of the specific content of religious or racial identities. They are tools, not the object of focus. The results are meant to generalize to other pairings of salient identities, not necessarily to other specific pairings of religious and ethnic identities. For this reason, it is not important that Jewish respondents were not surveyed, or Greek or Russian Orthodox respondents, where ethnicity is strongly intertwined with a particular religion.

Independent Variables

The independent variables in this experiment are the respondent's racial identity, their religious identity, and the identity they name most important, or the hierarchy of saliencies. This section will discuss the measurement of the respondent's racial and religious identity.

Before the scenarios, each respondent was asked to identify his or her religious belief system. There were nine choices: Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodox, Islam, Judaism, Atheism/ Agnosticism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Other. Respondents who answered "Catholicism," "Protestantism," or "Orthodox" were then asked three questions related to typically Evangelical beliefs (the imminent return of Jesus Christ, born-again status, and the presence of angels and demons on earth) to establish whether they should be classified as Evangelical. I take the position of Jelen (1994) that it is incorrect to define the group "Evangelicals" as only

white Protestants who hold Evangelical beliefs. Catholics are also capable of holding Evangelical beliefs, and holding these beliefs can cause Catholics to respond to prompts differently than Catholics who do not hold Evangelical beliefs. Catholic opinions, however, are affected differently by Evangelical beliefs than are Protestant opinions (Jelen, 1994). Evangelicals were separated because they are recognized to have beliefs and opinions that distinguish them from the mainline practitioners of Christianity.

Respondents were asked to identify their racial or ethnic identity. Acknowledging that individuals are capable of, and, in America, possibly even prone to dual racial and/or ethnic identities, individuals were asked to identify the racial or ethnic identity with which they most strongly identify.

Next, respondents were asked to rank on two scales of one to ten the importance of their religious and ethnic identities (see Appendix A for complete wording). It is understood that one respondent's "seven" is not equivalent to the "seven" of another respondent, so these scales are collapsed into the categories "religious identity is more important" and "ethnic identity is more important." How these categories are arrived at will be discussed more fully in the Methodology section. The purpose of this initial index question was to prime the respondent to think in terms of these identities. In the past, thermometer scales measuring a respondent's feelings about various racial groups have been used as a way to measure the salience of race to the respondent. I employ a more introspective measure, because the goal of this question was to prime the respondent's racial identity in a vacuum. By using this tool, I avoid explicitly priming any favorable or

unfavorable emotions the respondent may hold toward another group. I understand that it may be objectionable to simply take a respondent's self-identification on such a question at face value. For this reason, respondents were asked several religious and ethnic identification questions after the main experiment, which incorporate more-objective measures of religious and ethnic salience, and are used in the construction of an alternative classification. These will be discussed after the scenarios.

In the following section, I will outline the experimental manipulation, which is highly dependent on respondents not only being able to rank their racial and religious identities, but also on the salience of those two identities to decision-making. There is a legitimate concern that identity is context-dependent, that individuals wear different hats in different situations. I have taken a number of steps to address that concern by attempting to reduce the respondent's collection of identities down to just these two, as far as decision-making in this experiment is concerned. I have selected these two identities because the literature clearly shows that these two identities have a relatively high degree of base salience; there is something inherently important about these two identities for most people. The religious and racial identification questions and the identity-ranking question are presented before the main experiment in order to further prime those two identities. And lastly, the scenarios themselves, as you will see, have very little information that is not relevant to these two identities.

Main Experiment

The main experiment has a between subjects design with two-by-two factorial vignettes. In the experiment, respondents were faced with one of four scenarios regarding a humanitarian crisis in a foreign country and various policy responses the United States was considering. The foreign country was engaged in a civil conflict, and various intelligence agencies reported that the leaders of the country were likely targeting civilians, committing human rights violations, and possibly beginning genocide.

The four scenarios were created out of variations in the religious and racial identities of the leaders. The leaders were described as "devout [Christians][Muslims]" who stressed "the importance of keeping the values of [Christianity][Islam] in government." One of two pictures, depicting four white male leaders *or* four black male leaders, was then presented. The scenario template is presented here:

The leaders are all devout [Christians][Muslims], and stress the importance of keeping the values of [Christianity][Islam] in government.
They are shown here:

[] []

Respondents were asked after reading their scenario to select from a list of 20 policy responses, categorized into four groups labeled “Do Nothing,” “Threaten,” “Display of Force,” and “Use Force.” These policies were taken from the MID data set.

For the reader’s convenience, Table 1 visually represents the four treatment groups. This will hopefully make the discussion of the hypotheses easier to follow, although it will require periodically referring back to the table. Respondents have a primary and secondary identity, based on the salience of their racial and religious identities. Respondents were faced with leaders of a foreign country such that both of their identities matched (I), both identities did not match (II), their primary identity matches but their secondary did not (III), or their primary identity did not match and their secondary identity did (IV).

Table 1: Classification of Treatment Groups

	Primary Identity Match	Primary Identity Non-Match
Secondary Identity Match	I	IV
Secondary Identity Non-Match	III	II

Hypotheses

Any hypothesis about the hostility level exhibited by a group must necessarily be comparative. I will discuss each treatment group and where the political science literature and social identity theory predict it to be in the ordering of hostility. Table 2 will display the hypotheses according to the political science conception of identity interactions and social identity theory at the end of the discussion.

Treatment Group I

Consistent with both the political science literature and social identity theory, I expect respondents in Treatment Group I, where both identities match, to select policies that involve low levels of hostility against the leaders. If the identity priming was effective, and the respondents view the scenario entirely from the perspectives of their religious and racial identities, then the leaders of the foreign country are firmly in the respondents' in-group, and hostility should be low.

Treatment Group II

The two conceptions of identity interaction diverge in Treatment Groups II-IV. The political science conception predicts that respondents in Treatment Group II will exhibit the highest level of hostility, relative to the other groups. This is because there are no overlapping identities to mitigate the conflict by suggesting non-violent solutions to the respondent.

Social identity theory, on the other hand, predicts that respondents in Group II should exhibit higher levels of hostility than respondents in Group I, but not as high as respondents in Group IV, and possibly not as high as respondents in Group III (that ambiguity will be discussed within that group's section). This comes from the Turner (1975) quote in Triandafyllidou (1998) that states that blurred group boundaries may generate greater uncertainty and conflict, and from Schafer (1999), which also finds that blurred group identities lead to greater conflict. In Group II, the respondent is faced with leaders who share neither of their identities. The leaders are very clearly out-group members compared to the respondent, but they do not challenge the respondent's conception of their own identity. For this reason,

Treatment Group II is predicted to be above Treatment Group I, but below Treatment Group IV.

Treatment Groups III and IV

In Treatment Group III, the respondent is faced with leaders who match their primary identity, but do not match their secondary identity. The placement of this treatment group is ambiguous. The political science literature would predict respondents in this treatment group to exhibit hostility greater than Treatment Group I, because there is a non-matching identity, but less than Treatment Group II, because there is also a matching identity pulling the respondent toward a non-violent solution. If the political scientist were concerned with salience, he or she may even predict lower hostility than Treatment Group IV, because the primary identity is the matching one. The same reasoning applies to Treatment Group IV's placement between Groups I and II, with the possibility of being above Group III.

Social identity theory is ambiguous about what to predict for these groups. It predicts that intermediate levels of overlapping identity will generate hostility, but it does not describe how. There are two ways to think about how Treatment Group III (primary match, secondary non-match) compares to Treatment Group IV (primary non-match, secondary match). One, as was stated before, the political science literature on cross-cutting identities is likely not wrong, it is just too narrow. There must be some nth level identity at which a non-match results in mitigated conflict rather than exacerbated conflict. Because I cannot know if that nth level is the secondary identity, it is unclear if a non-matching secondary identity results in more conflict than Treatment Group II (exacerbated conflict) or less (mitigated

conflict). Group III should be somewhere between Treatment Groups I and IV, however, as Group I has no cause for any level of conflict, and Group IV is the most likely case for exacerbated conflict (groups do not share their primary identity, but share their secondary identity). In the table below, this line of thought will be labeled "Route 1."

Two, it might be that as long as the primary identity does not match, there is no blurring of boundaries between groups. It may be that non-matching on a still-salient, but not primary identity is what causes the lines to be blurred between two groups that match on the primary identity. Returning to the example of the American Evangelical Christian and the American atheist, if being an American is the Christian's primary identity, then the atheist's religion challenges what it is to be an American. If the Christian's primary identity is their Christianity, and being an American is secondary, then the shared American-ness probably does not challenge what it is to be a Christian, and may even lessen the hostility between the Christian and the atheist. It is not clear that with this hierarchy, the Christian still feels that his or her conception of America is being challenged. In this alternative line of thought, where only lower-order mismatches can challenge a higher-order identity, Treatment Group III (primary match, secondary non-match) would be expected to be more hostile than Treatment Group IV (primary non-match, secondary match). Treatment Group IV, then, would be the one that may or may not be higher than Treatment Group II. In the table below, this line of thought will be labeled "Route 2."

Table 2: Hypothesized Ordering of Treatment Groups by Hostility and Theory

	Political Science	Social Identity Theory	
		Route 1	Route 2
Hostility		Treatment Groups	
Most Hostile	II	IV	III
Hostile	IV	II or III	II or IV
Less Hostile	III	II or III	II or IV
Least Hostile	I	I	I

Religious Control Questions

The questions used to measure religious and ethnic identification more objectively than simple self-identification (used before the scenarios) represent a larger set of dimensions than has previously been used in the measurement of those concepts. Before describing the measurement tools I use, I will discuss the past conceptualizations of religiosity, and explain why I employed the questions that I did.

How the Literature Measures Religiosity

There has been a slowly increasing, but also faltering movement to look to the long example of the sociologists and begin to incorporate religion and religiosity into the study of individual and group political behaviors, perhaps best illustrated in Wald and Wilcox's (2006) statement of the need to "rediscover" the "faith factor." The systematization of religiosity, though, has more often than not been too crude to capture the full impact of religious beliefs and adherence (Smidt 2005), and massive

surveys like the GSS and the Baylor Religion Survey are great for research interested in macro public opinion, but do little for those interested in responses to specific policies or scenarios excluded from those surveys.

It has been a repeated error in the literature to equate Evangelical Christianity with fundamentalism and to equate the two with high religiosity (Mayer 2004; Jelen 1994). While it is clear that Evangelical Christians have a high degree of religiosity, Evangelical Christianity, as treated in the literature, is also characterized by hostility toward ethnic and religious out-groups (McDaniel et al 2010) and is often defined as only being composed of white Protestants (Smidt 2005; Guth et al 2006; Baumgartner et al 2008). It is flawed to say that black Protestants, Catholics, or even mainline white Protestants are unable to derive a significant portion of their worldview from their religious identity just because they are not white or do not experience extreme hostility toward out-groups. Welch and Leege (1988) is far ahead of its time in that it includes in its conceptualization a dimension for an individual's conceptualization of God as a Father, Judge, Companion, etc., allowing respondents to express both a high degree of religiosity and a means of explaining how that might not be channeled into out-group hostility. Distinguishing between religiosity and religiously based hostility toward out-groups is crucial for a good conceptualization, and thus measurement, of religiosity.

It would be unfair to claim that the field as a whole has failed in this area. A large portion of the literature defines religiosity the way I do: *the level to which one's worldview is shaped by one's religious identity* (Welch and Leege 1988; Layman 1997; Kunovich and Hodson 1999; Steensland et al 2000; Greenberg 2001; Bader et

al 2007; Peek 2005; Smidt 2005; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007; Tan and Vogel 2008; Guth 2009; McDaniel et al 2010; Grzymala-Busse 2012). Defining religiosity in this way overcomes the issue of defining a religious denomination or stream as being inherently more religious, and it also avoids the issue of defining religiosity in such a way that it can only apply to Christianity. For mass public opinion surveys, it may be only feasible based on sample demographics to differentiate Christians by religious identification, but it would be more useful to have a conceptualization of religiosity that can apply to any religion. While much of the literature cited above does focus exclusively on Christianity, it is important to note that the definition they use does not exclude their conceptualizations from being employed across religions.

Numerous dimensions of religiosity have been put forth. They can nearly all be categorized as different ways in which religious identity is expressed. I will briefly describe the content of each. I use several of them in my later conceptualization. I sometimes describe measures of dimensions, rather than measures of indicators of dimensions, because this body of literature is almost exclusively based on survey research, and the indicators are synonymous with the measures. It simply saves space to refer to them as measures rather than measures and indicators.

The most basic dimension of religiosity is religious affiliation. In its crudest form, this is simply a question of whether one is a Protestant, a Catholic, or non-religious. Often this is extended to ask whether one would consider oneself an Evangelical (Jelen 1994; Guth et al 2006; Baumgartner et al 2008; McDaniel et al 2010) or a fundamentalist (Mayer 2004). As was discussed extensively above, it is

not useful to have only this dimension. When this is the only dimension, a researcher is left with a dichotomous structure in which a respondent is either religious/ Evangelical/ fundamentalist or not.

Acknowledging that two individuals who identify as "Protestant" may not be in every way religiously the same, many conceptualizations add a dimension of religious participation or religious commitment. While this dimension sometimes includes indicators like frequency of service within the church (Greensberg 2001) or frequency of monetary contributions (Tan and Vogel 2008), this dimension is most often measured by frequency of church attendance. Some conceptualizations stop here (Greenberg 2001; McDaniel 2010; Welch and Leege 1988), content to have a source of religious identity (religious participation) and an expression of it (self-identified affiliation). Depending on the number of levels of church attendance offered to the respondent, this can provide a researcher with a roughly continuous measure of religiosity.

Many conceptualizations of religiosity have included a dimension for orthodoxy of beliefs, perhaps in the belief that self-identified religious affiliation does not provide enough levels of religious expression. This dimension is usually measured in part by beliefs about Biblical inerrancy. Many if not most of the conceptualizations of religiosity include only these three dimensions (Jelen 1994; Layman 1997; Kunovich and Hodson 1999; Steensland et al 2000; Daniels and von der Ruhr 2005; Grzymala-Busse 2012).

Some of the literature includes a measure of religious intensity or the salience of religion in everyday life. This more direct attempt to capture religiosity is

usually comprised of the indicators “frequency of prayer” and/or “salience” (Greenberg 2001; Smidt 2005).

Religious experientialism, typically measured by the frequency of the experience of visions, callings, religious ecstasy, or speaking in tongues, is sometimes included in a conceptualization (Bader et al 2007; Tan and Vogel 2008). I would argue this dimension is little more than an indicator of denominational affiliation. Without assuming the objective reality of visions and callings from God, it is difficult to attribute the experience of these things to anything other than group dynamics.

Peek (2005) and Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) go a step beyond simply asking for beliefs and ask for adherence to the tenets of faith, creating a religious obedience dimension. Assuming that a researcher can reliably account for an individual’s overestimation of their obedience, a researcher is still faced with the task of identifying universally agreed upon tenets of faith about which to ask. These two works are focused on Muslim identity, and so are able to ask about the Five Pillars of Islam. While this dimension may not be transferable to other religions, it is certainly an appropriate one about which to ask when tenets can be identified and when there is a strict boundary between observance and non-observance.

Lastly, Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) and Guth (2009) add a dimension for politicized or civil religion. Verkuyten and Yildiz approach this dimension by asking Muslims how important it is that Muslims are politically organized. Guth has two indicators of this dimension: the perceived importance of having a President with a strong faith and the perceived appropriateness of the involvement of religious

organizations in politics. Where many in America believe in the separation of church and state, it may be apropos to approach a question of religious worldview by measuring how much a person will defy a societal norm to strengthen the socio-political position of their religion.

This study introduces a new way of measuring religiosity, a concept that has previously been often crudely defined (Smidt 2005). It combines dimensions of religiosity from across the literature and a measure of religious traditionalism drawn from Guth (2014), which primarily addresses how religiosity is channeled into positive or negative feelings about out-groups.

How I Measure Religiosity

Religiosity, which I define as *the extent to which, or amount of, one's worldview that is shaped by their religious identity*, was measured along six dimensions, each with a single indicator. Most of the dimensions and indicators come from prior literature, but some are new. This is a significant increase in the number of dimensions relative to the previous literature, because it is trying to capture all of the avenues in which religious identity could be expressed, to best measure how much of a person's worldview or lifestyle is informed by their religious identity. The reader is directed to Appendix A for the exact wording of each question and answer.

First, before the scenarios, respondents were asked with which religious belief system they affiliate. In order to avoid over-priming a respondent to their religious identity relative to their racial identity, the rest of the religiosity questions were asked after the scenarios. The second dimension is Public Participation,

measured by the frequency of attendance at religious services. A dimension for the amount of Guidance Received by one's religious identity was measured by the frequency one reads the religion's most sacred text. Civic Religion was measured by the importance one places on the President sharing one's religious faith. Social Faith was measured by asking a respondent to think of five close friends, and then identify their religious beliefs. Respondents were instructed to not put anything down if they could not identify a friend's beliefs, and to not substitute friends. This question has the dual effect of measuring the salience of religion in forming social groups (though this is more a question of religious traditionalism), measured by how many friends match the respondent's religion, and the salience of religion to the respondent, measured by how many they can identify. Lastly, Active Identification was measured by how often a respondent thinks about religion and their relationship to the divine outside of the contexts of religious services, prayer, and the reading of religious texts. This dimension seeks to measure how much a respondent actually thinks about religion, while all the other dimensions could possibly be measuring activities that have become ritualized for the respondent or simply part of their environment.

Religious traditionalism was measured along two dimensions: orthodoxy of beliefs and the level of inward focus the religion was perceived to have, where inward focus, or a focus on self-improvement, is associated with greater separation from or hostility to religious out-groups. To measure orthodoxy of beliefs, respondents were asked how literally their faith's most sacred text should be read. Inward focus was measured by asking respondents if they believed the central goal

of their faith was personal improvement through obedience to God's will or developing a community of faith focused on helping the poor, whether the poor share the respondent's faith or not.

Ethnic Control Questions

Before the scenarios, respondents were asked to identify their most prominent racial identity. After the scenarios, Public Participation was measured by the frequency with which one attends meetings of local, state, or national organizations that are primarily concerned with race or ethnicity. Guidance Received was measured by the frequency with which the respondent consults members of their racial ethnic group for answers to questions or guidance in life. I specified that I was only interested in instances in which the respondent sought guidance from an individual **because** the individual was a member of the respondent's racial or ethnic group. This specification may cause respondents to respond with a lower-than-accurate count, because they may not have been actively aware that this was why they sought guidance. This may need to be corrected for later. Civic Ethnicity was measured by asking how important it is to the respondent that the President shares their racial identity. Social Ethnicity was measured by how many of a respondent's five close friends share the respondent's race. Because race is a generally more outwardly visible identity than religion, I do not ask the respondent how many friends' race they can identify, only how many match their own.

Active Identification with ethnicity was measured in two ways. The first was the same as with religion: how often does as individual think about ethnicity or race

outside of the context of ethnic-organization meetings, reading about ethnicity, or seeing ethnicity mentioned on the news. This is a highly subjective question, so I also asked how many generations it has been since an individuals family tree has arrived in America, based on the most recent direct ancestor to arrive. It seems reasonable to assume that more-recent arrivals would stress their ethnic identity and ethnic community to maintain security in a new environment. This question was not asked for religious identification, because there is no corresponding measure. The whole concept of ethnic identification is itself a subjective concept, however, so it is not clear that the family tree measure is better than the self-measure. For this reason, I included both questions.

Last, a concept corresponding to religious traditionalism was asked to establish how inwardly focused the respondent's racial/ethnic identity is. Respondents were asked if the primary goal of their ethnic/racial group should be winning more rights for their group, even if other groups get left behind, or working with other groups to win rights, even if their group moves forward more slowly.

Control Variables

As standard controls, I asked about the respondent's gender, political ideology, which was on a scale from extremely conservative to extremely liberal; income, in the intervals $0-$35,000, $35,001-$65,000, $65,001-$100,000, $100,001-$150,000, $150,001 or more, and prefer not to say; and level of education, ranging from "did not graduate from high school" to "Masters degree or higher."

Respondents were asked three questions regarding their preferences about foreign policy to establish their beliefs about the effectiveness of using force abroad,

the general trustworthiness of other countries, and their preference for isolationism versus internationalism. Again, the reader is referred to Appendix A for the wording of the questions and answers.

Dependent Variable

As stated above, the dependent variable was constructed out of the MID dataset. Respondents were asked, "The US government is considering various policy options. Which of the following policies do you support? (Check **all** that apply. You may selected policies from multiple groups.)" They were then presented with the policy grouping from the MID dataset.

The construction of the dependent variable score is described in greater detail below, but each grouping of policy responses, such as "Display Force," was assigned a score 1-4. Two variations on the dependent variable were created using these scores. MaxHostility took on the value of the most hostile response selected by a respondent. AvgHostility took on the value of the average score of all the policies selected by a respondent.

Methodology and Results

There are multiple components to the results analysis, so I combine the Methodology and Results sections together, so that for any particular component, the reader is able to obtain a complete understanding of what has happened. The section is broken down into Survey Recruitment and Treatment Group Assignment; Dependent Variable Scoring and Treatment Group Comparison, which includes the results for the primary question; Results for the Secondary Question; and Results for the Tertiary Question. In the first two components, the methodology will be

described, and then the results. The other sections follow generally the same pattern, but the methodology is much shorter and is not given a separate heading.

Survey Recruitment and Treatment Group Assignment

Methodology

When calculating how many respondents would be required for the experiment, I assumed 95% confidence, 3% error, and an average treatment effect of .2. The .2 reflects a belief that moving from the control group (Group II) to the treatment group of interest (Group IV) would result in an escalation of hostility to the next highest category of policy responses (the next grouping of five policies, based on the MID dataset, counting complete non-selection as the bottom group). Assuming those numbers, I would have needed 164 respondents per group. This sample size of 756 would have provided us with a standard error of .055.

To organize respondents into treatment groups, I first had to establish whether their primary identity was religious or racial. To do this, I asked the respondents to rank their religious and racial identities near the beginning of the survey. I then used the battery religious and racial questions to assign respondents who ranked their religious and racial identities equally to one group or the other. There were a number of related steps before this could be accomplished, however.

First, the Social Ethnicity variable needed to be inverted, so that having more friends who shared your ethnicity resulted in a lower score. This was because the other religious and racial battery questions were already ordered so that greater identification would yield a lower score.

Second, a total religious score, AggRel, was calculated based on the variables ParticipationChristian, GuidanceChristian, CivicChristian, and ActiveChristian (for a possible total score of 18), and a total ethnic score, AggEthnic, was calculated based on the variables ParticipationEthnic, GuidanceEthnic, CivicEthnic, FamilyEthnic, ActiveEthnic, and SocialEthnicity (for a possible total score of 28).

Third, respondents were marked missing if they failed to answer any of the relevant battery questions for religion *and* failed to answer any of the relevant battery questions for ethnicity.

Fourth, respondents received a rescaled religious and ethnicity score, calculated by dividing AggRel by 18 and AggEthnic by 28. If the rescaled religious score was less than the rescaled ethnic score, the respondent was classified primarily religious, given that they had previously equally identified and that AggRel>0 (because only Christians received the religious battery questions, not specifying this creates a danger that all non-Christian equal-identifiers would be categorized as primarily religious).

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four scenarios, differing based on the racial and religious identities of the leaders. Respondents were then categorized into treatment groups based on their religious identity, their racial identity, the religious and racial identities of the leaders, and the respondent's primary identity.

Results

There were unforeseen complications with attaining an adequate sample size within each treatment group. Due to the limitations of mTurk and Qualtrics, I was not able to categorize respondents based on their religious and ethnic identities and then randomly sort into treatment groups within blocks. Because respondents were randomly assigned to scenarios, regardless of their own identities, it happened that some treatment groups had a much larger number of respondents than others. When there were 899 respondents (after removing dropouts, which amounted to about 8% of all respondents in the end), Treatment Group I, where both identities matched, had only 49 respondents. Treatment Group II, both non-match, had 433 respondents. Group III, primary match and secondary non-match, had 266. Group IV, primary non-match and secondary match, had 151.

Additional responses were collected to try to bolster Treatment Groups I and IV. Seeing that most respondents were White and either Christian or Atheist, this second group of respondents was only presented with one of *three* of the scenarios: White Christian, White Muslim, and Black Christian. I did not need more respondents in Group II, so the scenario most likely to generate those types of respondents, Black Muslim, was not presented. There were 485 new respondents after this re-launch. Treatment Group I now had 184 respondents, II had 524 respondents, III had 413 respondents, and IV had 263 respondents.

The distribution of those who are primarily ethnic and primarily religious among the treatment groups will be important for interpreting the results of the primary and secondary questions separately. It will become more clear below, but

the results could be conflated if all respondents identified as primarily religious. In reality, Treatment Group I had 104 respondents who were primarily ethnic and 80 who were primarily religious. Treatment Group II had 394 primarily ethnic respondents and 130 primarily religious. Treatment Group III had 299 primarily ethnic respondents and 114 primarily religious. Treatment Group IV had 148 primarily ethnic respondents and 115 primarily religious. These add to a total breakdown of 945 primarily ethnic respondents compared to 439 primarily religious respondents.

Dependent Variable Scoring and Treatment Group Comparison

Methodology

The first step of scoring the dependent variable arises out of a feature of Qualtrics. When respondents were sorted into different scenarios, Qualtrics generated a separate variable for each policy response in each scenario. For example, there were four variable related to the declaration of war. To fix this, a new variable was generated for each policy response, and the variable took on a value of 1 if the respondent selected that policy option for any of the scenarios.

Second, each policy option was given a score based on the MID category in which it fell. The policy categories were scored 1-4, and those scores replaced the "1" that denoted a policy was selected. Two scoring methods were devised for a total hostility score. The first was MaxHostility, which took on the value of the most hostile policy selected by the respondent. The second was AvgHostility, which was the average score of all the policies selected. Difference-in-means tests were run to compare each treatment group within each DV type.

Results of the Primary Question: Which Theory Better Describes Identity Interactions

The results for AvgHostility were unexpected in that Treatment Group I was significantly the most supportive of hostility, when all theories predicted that it would be the least hostile. The t-test tables involving Treatment Group I will be placed in Appendix B, and a possible theoretical explanation for this deviation will be provided in the Discussion section. This section will deal with the other three Treatment Groups, whose ordering corresponds most closely to the ordering hypothesized by Social Identity Theory Route 1.

Table 3.1: Comparing AvgHostility Between Treatment Groups II and III

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
AvgD~2T2 |     524    1.331107    .0407376    .9325257    1.251077    1.411136
AvgD~3T2 |     413    1.430993    .0451771    .9181071    1.342186    1.519799
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     937    1.375133    .0302849    .9270338    1.315699    1.434568
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.0998859    .0609444               -.2194895    .0197178
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(AvgDVTreat2T2) - mean(AvgDVTreat3T2)              t =  -1.6390
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      935

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0508         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1016          Pr(T > t) = 0.9492
```

Table 3.2: Comparing AvgHostility Between Treatment Groups II and IV

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
AvgD~2T2 |     524    1.331107    .0407376    .9325257    1.251077    1.411136
AvgD~4T2 |     263    1.562738    .0554957     .899989    1.453463    1.672012
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     787    1.408513     .033068    .9276725    1.343601    1.473425
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.2316308    .0696591               -.3683709   -.0948907
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(AvgDVTreat2T2) - mean(AvgDVTreat4T2)              t =  -3.3252
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      785

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0005         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0009          Pr(T > t) = 0.9995
```

Table 3.3: Comparing AvgHostility Between Treatment Groups III and IV

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
AvgD~3T2 |     413    1.430993    .0451771    .9181071    1.342186    1.519799
AvgD~4T2 |     263    1.562738    .0554957     .899989    1.453463    1.672012
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     676    1.482249    .0351038    .9126981    1.413323    1.551174
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.1317449     .071877               -.2728746    .0093848
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(AvgDVTreat3T2) - mean(AvgDVTreat4T2)              t =  -1.8329
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      674

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0336         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0673          Pr(T > t) = 0.9664
```

Table 3.4: AvgHostility Results Compared to Route 1 Hypothesis

Route 1	Results			
Treatment Groups	Treatment Groups	Means	95% CI Lower Bound	95% CI Upper Bound
IV	I	1.598	1.467	1.727
II or III	IV	1.563	1.453	1.672
II or III	III	1.431	1.342	1.520
I	II	1.331	1.251	1.411

Treatment Groups are listed from most hostile on top to least hostile on bottom.



Figure 3.5: AvgHostility CI Plot

The MaxHostility results also correspond most closely to the ordering hypothesized by Social Identity Theory Route 1. The difference between Treatment Groups II and III is no longer significant, which fits fine with Social Identity Theory's ambiguity about which group would be more supportive of hostility. Also, Group IV now is greater than Group III at the .01 level.

Table 4.1: Comparing MaxHostility Between Treatment Groups II and III

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
MaxD~2T2 |     524    2.931298    .0435399    .9966739    2.845763    3.016832
MaxD~3T2 |     413     2.98063    .0484755    .9851384    2.885339     3.07592
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     937    2.953042     .032387    .9913805    2.889482    3.016601
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.0493318    .0652483               -.1773818    .0787182
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(MaxDVTreat2T2) - mean(MaxDVTreat3T2)              t =  -0.7561
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      935

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2249         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4498          Pr(T > t) = 0.7751
```

Table 4.2: Comparing MaxHostility Between Treatment Groups II and IV

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
MaxD~2T2 |     524    2.931298    .0435399    .9966739    2.845763    3.016832
MaxD~4T2 |     263    3.163498     .057012    .9245787    3.051238    3.275758
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     787    3.008895    .0348884    .9787421    2.940409     3.07738
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.2322004    .0735442               -.376567   -.0878338
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(MaxDVTreat2T2) - mean(MaxDVTreat4T2)              t =  -3.1573
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      785

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0008         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0017          Pr(T > t) = 0.9992
```

Table 4.3: Comparing MaxHostility Between Treatment Groups III and IV

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
MaxD~3T2 |     413     2.98063    .0484755    .9851384    2.885339     3.07592
MaxD~4T2 |     263    3.163498     .057012    .9245787    3.051238    3.275758
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     676    3.051775    .0371334    .9654689    2.978864    3.124686
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.1828686    .0758959               -.3318894   -.0338477
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(MaxDVTreat3T2) - mean(MaxDVTreat4T2)              t =  -2.4095
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      674

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0081         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0162          Pr(T > t) = 0.9919
```

Table 4.4: MaxHostility Results Compared to Route 1 Hypothesis

Route 1	Results			
Treatment Groups	Treatment Groups	Means	95% CI Lower Bound	95% CI Upper Bound
IV	I	3.163	3.026	3.300
II or III	IV	3.163	3.051	3.276
II or III	III	2.981	2.885	3.076
I	II	2.931	2.846	3.017

Treatment Groups are listed from most hostile on top to least hostile on bottom.



Figure 4.5: MaxHostility CI Plot

For both DV types, the results most closely match the hierarchy predicted by Route 1 of Social Identity theory, with some deviations. All three theoretical bases (the political science conception of identity, and Route 1 and Route2 of social identity theory) predicted that Treatment Group I would display the least hostility, but for both MaxHostility and AvgHostility, Treatment Group I displayed at least as much, or more hostility than Group IV, the next most hostile. Beyond that, the ordering, from greatest to least hostility, was Group IV, Group III, Group II, as predicted. The ambiguity over whether II or III would be greater was even reflected in that III's lead over II was only statistically significant in AvgHostility, while the two were almost even in MaxHostility.

Results for the Secondary Question: Direct and Interactive Effects of Race and Religion

Direct Effects of Matching the Scenario's Race and Religion

There was another question as to whether it mattered if a respondent matched on religion versus race, whether one caused a greater shift in hostility than another. To do this, MatchRace and MatchReligion variables were created that took on a value of 1 if the respondent's race and religion, respectively, matched that of the scenario prompt. Subgroups were then created, such as MatchRelAvg, which took on the values of AvgHostility if MatchReligion was equal to 1. The same was done for non-matching religion, matching race, non-matching race, matching religion and non-matching race, matching race and non-matching religion, matching both, and non-matching both. This was then repeated for all of the groups using MaxHostility. These groups were created for both AvgHostility and MaxHostility so that the direct effects of Matching on Race and Religion would be measured using both methods of scoring hostility.

To isolate the direct effects of race and religion, t-tests were conducted comparing the AvgHostility and MaxHostility levels between the Non-Match Religion, Non-Match Race group (NMRelNMRace-) and each the Match Religion, Non-Match Race group (MRelNMRace-) and the Non-Match Religion, Match Race group (NMRelMRace-). The tables for those results can be found in Appendix B, but all comparisons were statistically significant at the .05 level. For AvgHostility, the direct effect of matching the scenario's Religion, calculated by subtracting the mean AvgHostility of the NMRelNMRace from the MRelNMRace group, was .414, or about

35.2%. The direct effect of Race on AvgHostility was .251, or about 21.3%. For MaxHostility, the direct effect of Religion was .583, about 22.5%. The direct effect of Race was .388, about 15.0%.

Interactive Effects of Matching the Scenario's Race and Religion

In order to identify an interactive effect, the mean hostility for the group that matched both the scenario's Race and Religion (MRelMRace-) was compared to the mean hostility for the MRelNMRace and the NMRelMRace groups. The t-test tables and confidence intervals will be presented here. The AvgHostility tables will be presented first.

Table 5.1: Comparing AvgHostility Between NMRelMRace and MRelMRace

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
NMRelM~g |     415    1.426506    .0440915    .8982114    1.339835    1.513177
MRelMR~g |     183    1.592896    .0656213    .8877084     1.46342    1.722373
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     598    1.477425    .0367037    .8975541    1.405341    1.549509
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.1663902    .0794205               -.3223681   -.0104122
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(NMRelMRaceAvg) - mean(MRelMRaceAvg)               t =  -2.0951
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      596

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0183         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0366          Pr(T > t) = 0.9817
```

Table 5.2: Comparing AvgHostility Between MRelNMRace and MRelMRace

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
MRelNM~g |     257    1.589494    .0579498    .9290066    1.475375    1.703613
MRelMR~g |     183    1.592896    .0656213    .8877084     1.46342    1.722373
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     440    1.590909    .0434319    .9110354    1.505549    1.676269
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |            -.003402    .0882194               -.1767879    .1699839
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(MRelNMRaceAvg) - mean(MRelMRaceAvg)               t =  -0.0386
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      438

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4846         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9693          Pr(T > t) = 0.5154
```



Figure 5.3: CI Plot of the AvgHostility Scores of the Various Identity-Matching Configurations
LevelOfMatching=1: Non-Match both Religion and Race
LevelOfMatching=2: Non-Match Religion, Match Race
LevelOfMatching=3: Match Religion, Non-Match Race
Level of Matching=4: Match both Race and Religion

Table 6.1 shows that there is a statistically significant difference at the .05 level between the NMRelMRace and the MRelMRace groups. This means that there is some interactive effect between Race and Religion that is not captured purely by examining Race. Table 6.2 shows no statistically significant difference between the MRelNMRace and the MRelMRace groups, so taking the direct effect of Religion is sufficient. The results are the same for MaxHostility.

Table 6.1: Comparing MaxHostility Between NMRelMRace and MRelMRace

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
NMRelM~x |     415    2.980723    .0475122    .9678975    2.887328    3.074118
MRelMR~x |     183     3.15847    .0698293    .9446331    3.020691    3.296249
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     598    3.035117    .0394022    .9635419    2.957733    3.112501
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.1777471    .0852625               -.3451985   -.0102956
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(NMRelMRaceMax) - mean(MRelMRaceMax)               t =  -2.0847
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      596

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0188         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0375          Pr(T > t) = 0.9812
```

Table 6.2: Comparing MaxHostility Between MRelNMRace and MRelMRace

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
MRelNM~x |     257    3.175097    .0595256     .954268    3.057875    3.292319
MRelMR~x |     183     3.15847    .0698293    .9446331    3.020691    3.296249
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     440    3.168182    .0452527    .9492289    3.079243    3.257121
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |            .0166273    .0919145               -.164021    .1972757
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(MRelNMRaceMax) - mean(MRelMRaceMax)               t =   0.1809
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      438

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.5717         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8565          Pr(T > t) = 0.4283
```



Figure 6.3: CI Plot of the MaxHostility Scores of the Various Identity-Matching Configurations
LevelOfMatching=1: Non-Match both Religion and Race
LevelOfMatching=2: Non-Match Religion, Match Race
LevelOfMatching=3: Match Religion, Non-Match Race
Level of Matching=4: Match both Race and Religion

Hostility Toward Christians vs. Muslims

There was concern that the events of the last 15 years would cause respondents to exhibit systematically different levels of hostility toward Christians and Muslims. It was unclear in which direction this would be. Respondents might have been more hostile toward Muslims, because Muslims are a salient out-group in American media coverage and in overseas conflicts. Respondents might also have exhibited a lesser degree of hostility, because the mTurk community typically tends

to be more liberal and respondents may have consciously corrected for any bias they see as unwarranted.

To assess this, subsets were created for those that received a Christian prompt and those that received a Muslim prompt. Within each treatment group, the Max and Average Hostility scores for those with Christian prompts were compared to those with Muslim prompts. Within Treatment Group 1, only 1 respondent received a Muslim prompt, so a difference in means test could not be conducted. Treatment Groups II, III, and IV exhibited no statistical difference in means between the two prompts. The tables for those tests are located in Appendix B.

Results for the Tertiary Question: Independent Effects of Demographic Factors

Demographic Factors

Lastly, regressions were run within each treatment group for each dependent variable type (MaxHostility and AvgHostility) to capture the effects of specific races and religions, gender, political ideology, income, education, preference for the use of force, belief in the general trustworthiness of other countries, preference for isolationism vs multilateralism in US foreign policy, and a measure of how inclusive one's particular Christian faith is.

The religion variables included denoted whether the respondent was Protestant or Catholic (no other theoretically relevant religious groups were large enough to test specifically; the lack of Muslim respondents will be discussed in the Limitations subsection of the Discussion section). The race variables denoted whether the respondent was white or black. Political ideology was self-identified on a scale from "extremely conservative" to extremely liberal." Income was self-

identified as being in one of several ranges: $0-35,000; $35,001-$65,000; $65,001-$100,000; $100,001-$150,000; $150,001 or more; or prefer not to say. Education ranged from "did not graduate high school" to "Masters Degree or higher."

Preference for the use of force was measured by asking how preferable the use of force is in international relations, where the options can be briefly described as "most effective," "sometimes necessary," "never necessary," and "don't know." Beliefs about the trustworthiness of other countries were assessed by asking if the respondent felt that other countries were more generally trustworthy or self-interested. Preferences for isolationism versus internationalism were measured by asking if the United States should develop alliances in the world, only be active enough to direct its interests, or avoid interactions with the rest of the world.

Religious Inclusivity is measured through a combination of two questions. The first, intended to assess religious orthodoxy, asks how literally the respondent believes the Bible should be read. The second, intended to assess how inwardly focused the respondent thought faith should be, asked whether the central goal of Christianity is personal improvement or developing a community that aids the poor. The scores on the two questions were added together to get a Religious Inclusivity index, where a higher score means greater inclusivity.

Model I regresses all of the factors except White and Black on AvgHostility. Model II regresses all of the factors except Protestant, Catholic, and ChristInclusion on AvgHostility. Model III regresses all factors on AvgHostility. Models IV, V, and VI regress these same groupings on MaxHostility. Results in all tables are broken down by Treatment Group. I present the results for AvgHostility first.

AvgHostility

Table 7.1: Demographic Effects on AvgHostility Excluding Race

	Model I			
Variables	Treatment Group I	Treatment Group II	Treatment Group III	Treatment Group IV
Protestant	-.495	.210	-.176	-.657
	(.324)	(.666)	(.663)	(.529)
Catholic	-.256	.471	-.082	-.618
	(.334)	(.666)	(.673)	(.531)
White				
Black				
Gender	-.136	-.164	-.101	-.330**
	(.141)	(.179)	(.151)	(.126)
Ideology	-.030	-.063	.123*	-.105
	(.067)	(.084)	(.075)	(.068)
Income	.090	.034	.115*	-.005
	(.063)	(.081)	(.065)	(.062)
Education	-.125	-.142	-.137	.030
	(.081)	(.108)	(.084)	(.075)
PreferenceForce	-.026	.129	-.206*	.068
	(.107)	(.131)	(.123)	(.103)
Trustworthiness	.020	.105	-.106	-.328**
	(.136)	(.173)	(.159)	(.133)
PreferenceForPolicy	-.188**	-.161	-.201**	-.098
	(.090)	(.118)	(.098)	(.087)
ChristInclusion	-.099	-.180**	-.055	-.221**
	(.068)	(.089)	(.084)	(.072)
Constant	3.176**	2.488**	2.909**	4.308**
	(.593)	(.851)	(.936)	(.762)
N	181	126	164	200
R^2	.090	.133	.106	.135

Standard Errors are in parentheses
*p-value<.1
**p-value<.05

Table 7.2: Demographic Effects on AvgHostility Excluding Religion

	Model II			
Variables	Treatment Group I	Treatment Group II	Treatment Group III	Treatment Group IV
Protestant				
Catholic				
White	omitted	-.070	-.025	-.017
		(.093)	(.178)	(.157)
Black	.046	.037	.295	.365
	(.199)	(.177)	(.224)	(.245)
Gender	-.192	-.001	.017	-.106
	(.136)	(.081)	(.089)	(.110)
Ideology	-.048	-.046	.043	-.131**
	(.064)	(.040)	(.042)	(.054)
Income	.091	.086**	.066*	.002
	(.063)	(.035)	(.040)	(.052)
Education	-.162**	-.077	-.171**	-.009
	(.081)	(.047)	(.052)	(.062)
PreferenceForce	-.007	-.159**	-.346**	.042
	(.108)	(.064)	(.076)	(.092)
Trustworthiness	-.007	.009	-.017	-.310**
	(.137)	(.084)	(.091)	(.115)
PreferenceForPolicy	-.174*	-.266**	-.236**	-.040
	(.090)	(.051)	(.056)	(.076)
ChristInclusion				
Constant	2.696**	2.465**	2.947**	2.618**
	(.525)	(.319)	(.379)	(.469)
N	182	520	411	262
R^2	.056	.085	.121	.065

Standard Errors are in parentheses
*p-value<.1
**p-value<.05

Table 7.3: Demographic Effects on AvgHostility

	Model III			
Variables	Treatment Group I	Treatment Group II	Treatment Group III	Treatment Group IV
Protestant	-.495	.245	-.109	-.670
	(.327)	(.669)	(.666)	(.530)
Catholic	-.256	.493	.033	-.614
	(.343)	(.671)	(.679)	(.534)
White	-.002	.008	.078	.045
	(.218)	(.220)	(.221)	(.175)
Black	omitted	-.423	.361	.327
		(.396)	(.304)	(.261)
Gender	-.136	-.145	-.120	-.329**
	(.147)	(.180)	(.152)	(.127)
Ideology	-.030	-.041	.113	-.107
	(.069)	(.087)	(.075)	(.068)
Income	.090	.038	.123*	.005
	(.063)	(.082)	(.065)	(.062)
Education	-.124	-.147	-.151*	.033
	(.081)	(.108)	(.085)	(.075)
PreferenceForce	-.026	.125	-.227*	.061
	(.108)	(.131)	(.124)	(.103)
Trustworthiness	.020	.110	-.110	-.323**
	(.137)	(.174)	(.160)	(.133)
PreferenceForPolicy	-.188**	-.168	-.208**	-.095
	(.091)	(.119)	(.010)	(.087)
ChristInclusion	-.098	-.197**	-.042	-.207**
	(.070)	(.091)	(.084)	(.073)
Constant	3.177**	2.466**	2.832**	4.174**
	(.597)	(.882)	(.948)	(.798)
N	181	126	164	200
R^2	.090	.144	.116	.143

Standard Errors are in parentheses
*p-value<.1
**p-value<.05

There were no statistically significant results for race or religion in the AvgHostility regressions, but religious inclusion was substantively significant at the .05 level in Models I and III, Treatment Groups II and IV. That is, in both of the models that included religious variables, ChristInclusion had its greatest impact when the respondent's scenario either did not match either of their identities (II), or did not match their primary identity while matching their secondary (IV). This means that beyond the effect of matching the race or religion of the prompt, specific races and religions did not have an effect on the willingness to support hostility. Among Christians, however, the lessening of religious orthodoxy and an outwardly focused religion had a substantively negative effect on the willingness to support hostility when the respondent's primary identity did not match the prompt.

The results directly concerning foreign policy were predictable. The more respondents trust other countries, the less they support hostility against other countries. The less they prefer force as a solution to international issues, the less they support hostility. The more isolationist they are, the less they support hostility.

Gender was only significant in Treatment Group IV (primary non-match, secondary) in Models I and III (includes religious variables, and includes all variables), but when it was significant, it was substantively significant and in the predicted direction; women are less prone to support hostility.

Ideology had an unclear effect. In Model II (includes race variables but not religious), Treatment Group IV (primary non-match, secondary match), the effect was negative (liberals are less hostile), but it was positive (conservatives are less hostile) in Model I (includes religious variables, but not race), Treatment Group III

(primary match, secondary non-match). The effect was marginally larger and more significant in Model II.

Income was significant in Treatment Group III (primary match, secondary non-match) in all models at the .1 level, and in Model II (includes race but not religion), Treatment Group II (both non-match) at the .05 level. Its effect was consistently positive, that is, greater income is correlated with greater support for hostility.

Education was significant at the .05 level in Model II (includes race but not religion), Treatment Groups I (both match) and III (primary match, secondary non-match), and at the .1 level in Model III (includes all variables), Treatment Group III. The effect was consistently negative; higher levels of education are correlated with lower levels of support for hostility.

The MaxHostility results were different enough to warrant inclusion in the Results section rather than an Appendix. As a reminder, AvgHostility took on the value of the average score of every policy option the respondent supported against the foreign country's leaders, while MaxHostility took on the value of the most hostile policy selected. There were moderate differences in the significances of the standard battery control variables between the two, and Protestant and Black achieved significance at least once in the MaxHostility regressions.

MaxHostility

Table 8.1: Demographic Effects on MaxHostility Excluding Race

	Model IV			
Variables	Treatment Group I	Treatment Group II	Treatment Group III	Treatment Group IV
Protestant	-.671*	.021	.098	-.401
	(.343)	(.676)	(.677)	(.542)
Catholic	-.439	.309	.164	-.445
	(.353)	(.676)	(.687)	(.544)
White				
Black				
Gender	-.203	-.133	-.062	-.199
	(.149)	(.182)	(.154)	(.130)
Ideology	-.099	-.109	.093	-.130*
	(.071)	(.086)	(.076)	(.069)
Income	.054	.067	.126*	.036
	(.066)	(.082)	(.066)	(.063)
Education	-.023	-.120	-.148*	-.062
	(.085)	(.109)	(.085)	(.076)
PreferenceForce	-.062	.089	-.288**	.008
	(.113)	(.133)	(.125)	(.106)
Trustworthiness	-.018	.189	-.075	-.372**
	(.144)	(.176)	(.162)	(.136)
PreferenceForPolicy	-.242**	-.260**	-.235**	-.083
	(.095)	(.119)	(.101)	(.089)
ChristInclusion	-.110	-.184**	-.052	-.165**
	(.072)	(.091)	(.085)	(.073)
Constant	5.226*	4.308**	4.462**	5.795**
	(.626)	(.863)	(.956)	(.780)
N	181	126	164	200
R^2	.112	.168	.123	.122

Standard Errors are in parentheses
*p-value<.1
**p-value<.05

Table 8.2: Demographic Effects on MaxHostility Excluding Religion

	Model V			
Variables	Treatment Group I	Treatment Group II	Treatment Group III	Treatment Group IV
Protestant				
Catholic				
White	omitted	-.002	-.098	.005
		(.096)	(.188)	(.160)
Black	.124	.149	.229	.495**
	(.211)	(.184)	(.236)	(.248)
Gender	-.246*	-.019	.033	-.019
	(.144)	(.084)	(.094)	(.112)
Ideology	-.124*	-.056	.058	-.139**
	(.068)	(.041)	(.045)	(.055)
Income	.055	.104**	.097**	.064
	(.067)	(.036)	(.042)	(.053)
Education	-.065	-.067	-.186**	-.053
	(.086)	(.049)	(.055)	(.063)
PreferenceForce	-.037	-.267**	-.433**	-.012
	(.115)	(.066)	(.082)	(.094)
Trustworthiness	-.046	.084	-.001	-.334**
	(.145)	(.087)	(.096)	(.116)
PreferenceForPolicy	-.225**	-.339**	-.264**	-.059
	(.095)	(.053)	(.060)	(.077)
ChristInclusion				
Constant	4.531**	4.270**	4.708**	4.301**
	(.557)	(.331)	(.400)	(.476)
N	182	520	411	262
R^2	.071	.134	.149	.088

Standard Errors are in parentheses
*p-value<.1
**p-value<.05

Table 8.3: Demographic Effects on MaxHostility

	Model VI			
Variables	Treatment Group I	Treatment Group II	Treatment Group III	Treatment Group IV
Protestant	-.664*	.080	.143	-.421
	(.345)	(.676)	(.682)	(.541)
Catholic	-.420	.374	.250	-.451
	(.363)	(.679)	(.695)	(.545)
White	-.054	.147	.119	.025
	(.231)	(.222)	(.226)	(.178)
Black	omitted	-.364	.309	.421
		(.400)	(.311)	(.266)
Gender	-.193	-.107	-.076	-.197
	(.156)	(.182)	(.155)	(.129)
Ideology	-.103	-.090	.086	-.135*
	(.073)	(087)	(.077)	(.070)
Income	.055	.069	.132**	.050
	(.067)	(.082)	(.067)	(.064)
Education	-.022	-.123	-.162*	-.060
	(.086)	(.109)	(.087)	(.077)
PreferenceForce	-.059	.087	-.301**	-.003
	(.114)	(.133)	(.127)	(.106)
Trustworthiness	-.017	.202	-.076	-.366**
	(.144)	(.176)	(.163)	(.136)
PreferenceForPolicy	-.243**	-.278**	-.244**	-.079
	(.096)	(.120)	(.102)	(.089)
ChristInclusion	-.107	-.201**	-.044	-.145*
	(.074)	(.092)	(.086)	(.074)
Constant	5.238**	4.141**	4.367**	5.659**
	(.631)	(.892)	(.970)	(.814)
N	181	126	164	200
R^2	.112	.185	.129	.137

Standard Errors are in parentheses
*p-value<.1
**p-value<.05

The religion and race variables have the most interesting results. Though the race and religion variables were rarely significant, when they were, they had substantively significant effects. Protestant was significant at the .1 level in Model IV (includes religious variables but not race) and Model VI (includes all variables), and had a negative effect greater than .66, well over a 10% reduction in support for hostility compared to other religious groups. Similarly in Model V (included race but not religious variables), Treatment Group IV (primary non-match, secondary match), Black had a positive impact of .495, significant at the .05 level. This, too, is a greater than 10% increase in hostility. The ChristInclusion variable, was significant and negatively related to hostility in Treatment Groups II (both non-match) and IV in both Models VI and VI.

The results concerning foreign policy variables are standard. The more one prefers diplomacy, the more one trusts other countries, and the more one prefers isolationism, the less hostile one is toward the other country. Foreign policy preferences were significant for Treatment Groups I-III in every model, while Trustworthiness became significant in Treatment Group IV in every model. There are reasons to doubt the reliability of the results for Treatment Group I, which will be discussed later. If Treatment Group I is excluded from the analysis, Treatment Group IV is becomes the most willing to support hostility, which is its theoretically correct placement. For this Treatment Group, it would make sense for the trustworthiness of the out-group to take precedence over general foreign policy preferences in decision-making.

The results for Gender, Ideology, Income, and Education were significant more often. Gender was only significant at the .1 level in Model V (includes race but not religion), Treatment Group I (both match), but being female predictably had a negative relationship to support for hostility. Income was significant in Treatment Group III (primary match, secondary non-match) in every model, and also in Treatment Group II (both non-match) in Model V, and it had a positive relationship to support for hostility. Ideology was significant in Treatment Group IV (primary non-match, secondary match) in every model, and also in Treatment Group I in Model V. Liberalism had a negative relationship with support for hostility. Education was significant in Treatment Group III in every model, and had a negative relationship to support for hostility.

Discussion

There are two levels on which the results of this study may be interpreted. The larger theoretical point is that social identity theory has the more correct understanding of identity interactions than the standard cross-cutting identities theory used in political science. Identity interactions are more complicated than the political science literature has largely treated them; there are clearly interactive effects with cross-cutting identities, and this has real implications for how political scientists need to structure their examination of identity going forward, both when it is the primary focus and when it is just a control (as is often the case with ethnicity). To that point, I will discuss a growing body of literature on intersectionality, which is not directly related to the foreign policy context present in this study, but which has been developing a conception of identity interactions as

relates to disadvantaged groups in society. I will also talk about ethnic fragmentation, a concept frequently used in the discussion of development and civil war onset, and how it can be improved with identity saliency considerations.

On a more specific level, the results of this study support the idea that those interactive effects of cross-cutting identities result in greater out-group hostility than more "simple" out-groups, where an individual shares no identities with another individual. This is somewhat relevant for the discussion on ethnic fragmentation, but it is relevant primarily through the discussion of political framing effects that comes after it. I will close the discussion of the primary results with a section on the results of Treatment Group I.

I will then proceed to a discussion of the regression results and connect those to larger bodies of literature. I will close with a discussion of the limitations of this work, which primarily stem from incomplete control over the recruitment and randomization processes.

Result 1: Intermediate Levels of Shared Identity Create Support for Hostility

Intersectionality

In this study, I have demonstrated that there are interactive effects among identities in a foreign policy context. The building of in-groups and out-groups is not as simple as saying, "You are different from me, so I don't like you." Depending on how an individual ranks their identities, sharing an identity with another individual may only exacerbate tensions around an identity that they do not share.

One body of literature that has been exploring the question of interactive identity effects for some time is the literature on intersectionality. Coming out of a

cross-over of political science and sociology, intersectionality is a framework that helps to better understand the structural disadvantages of black women. The primary argument is that the experience of black women cannot be as easily understood as saying that it is the sum of the disadvantages experienced by women and those experienced by the African-American community as a whole (Crenshaw 1991; Glenn 1992; King 1988).

King (1988) provides a few examples. In the context of slavery, black women were subject to all of the same physical abuses as black men, but were also subjected to sexual abuse because of their womanhood. They were also separated from the experience of oppressed white women, because of a system of complete domination, which included the coopting of their reproductive capabilities for the enhancement of slave capital. The second example concerns the suffrage movement. The women's suffrage and black suffrage movement had the same goal in principle, but when opponents reframed the issue as being that only women or only blacks could get the vote, the two groups turned on each other. This left black women completely out of the suffrage movement, because if women won the right to vote, black women would be excluded on the basis of race, and if African-Americans won the right to vote, black women would be excluded on the basis of gender.

Crenshaw (1991) explains how legislation must be framed in terms of helping "all women," or "all the poor" in order to receive support from the dominant white political class, when the reality is that the particular situation of black women, suffering from both sexism and racism, needs a remedy focused on that intersection, not just on one dimension.

Hancock (2007) describes how this special type of exclusion continues today, where identity-political movements seek to build power for one group by suppressing differences among other identities; for example, race is empowered by suppressing class and gender.

In the following discussion of ethnic fragmentation, I will make clear how the frames used by anti-suffragists to split the suffragist movement and those used by identity politicians to build coalitions are transferrable to political entrepreneurs in ethnically fragmented countries. The discussion of the primary result will close with a discussion of this study's uses for domestic politicians in the framing of foreign policy initiatives.

Ethnic Fragmentation

It was stated early on that identity priming can be useful for identifying the effects of one identity in a vacuum, but that it had little use in identifying the true effects of identities, which exist in a multi-identity/dimensional space. The primary result of this study reinforces that this is the case. To view groups and individuals as being comprised of one identity is to abstract too far from reality and miss certain insights. In this section, I discuss how measures of ethnic fragmentation have largely been limited by their focus on just one identity. I also discuss how political entrepreneurs might benefit from a multi-dimensional understanding of identity in ethnically fragmented societies, particularly those with unstable or insurgent ethnic politics.

Ethnic fragmentation refers to the amount of ethnic diversity present in a given geographical area, typically a state. It is typically measured using the Ethnic

Fractionalization Index, calculated by subtracting the Herfindahl index of ethinc groups (the sum of squared ethnic shares of the population) from one. It represents the probability that any two random people drawn from the population will be from a different group (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999).

Numerous studies have connected ethnic fractionalization to public goods provision and economic outcomes. Luttmer (1997) finds that support for welfare increases if a larger fraction of welfare recipients belongs to the individual's racial group. In a similar vein, representatives are theorized to only value public goods that accrue to their group and discount benefits that accrue to other groups not only because different groups have different preferences, but because a group's utility level for a good is diminished when another group also uses it. Out of this comes the conclusion that ethnic fragmentation leads to fewer pooled resources for public goods (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). Alesina et al (1999) does actually find that the amount of taxes collected is inversely related to ethnic fractionalization, leading to higher deficits and more intergovernmental transfers.

Alesina et al (2003) connect ethnic fractionalization to political instability, bad economic policy, and poor economic performance. They also find that democracy is inversely related to ethnic fractionalization, presumably because conflicts are less intense in homogeneous societies. Ellingsen (2000) finds the multiethnicity significantly increases the probability of small-scale domestic violence, and Blimes (2006) finds that increasing levels of ethnic fractionalization cause factors that have a direct effect on civil war onset to "stick." Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) also connect ethnic divisions to the frequency of civil war. And

although Garcia Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) use ethnic polarization instead of ethnic fractionalization as their measure (polarization measures the social distance between groups) they also find that ethnic diversity leads to higher probabilities of conflict, higher levels of corruption, and greater difficulties for the diffusion of technology.

The results are not universally negative for ethnic fragmentation, however. A number of studies identify a U-shape for the effect of ethnic fragmentation on certain outcomes. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) find that highly fractionalized states are about as likely to see conflict as homogeneous states. It is the middle range that experiences the most conflict.

The middle range also has benefits. Cerqueti, Coppier, and Piga (2012) theorize that corruption is lowest in the middle-range, because ethnic groups are large enough to effectively monitor each other. At small levels of fragmentation, the dominant group will get away with corruption, because it will not police itself. At high levels, each group does not have the resources to monitor all of the other groups. So there are benefits to some increase in fragmentation levels.

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) seem to find a negative relationship between fragmentation and conflict. They argue that newly formed rebel armies are in particular need of social cohesion, and are therefore likely to limit recruitment to one ethnic or religious group. Because of this, high levels of fragmentation can limit the recruitment pool and diminish the likelihood of conflict. Conversely, having a majority ethnic group nearly doubles the risk of conflict.

Despite its results, ethnic fractionalization (ELF) is not a perfect measure of fragmentation for a number of reasons. One, ethnic classifications are filled with ambiguity, because ethnicity itself is not clearly conceptualized along precise and universally agreed-upon dimensions. Divisions such as language may be a good differentiator in some contexts but not others (Alesina et al 2003). Laitin and Posner (2001) argue that a single index is underequipped to handle the multidimensional nature of ethnicity.

Two, ELF is based on 40-year-old data with numerous problems, the most significant of which may be its use of umbrella groups that are often created out of ethnographically distinct groups, including the Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda being classified as "Burundi" (Posner 2004). Somali clans are referred to as separate ethnic groups, although they are not culturally different (Fearon 2003).

Three, the ethnic compositions of states change. Campos and Kuzeyev (2007) show that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, transition economies became significantly more homogeneous in a relatively short time period (about 20 years).

Lastly, ELF does not provide any reason to assume that the ethnic groups it measures are in any way organized (Cedarman and Girardin 2007). This last point has served as the basis of a number of critiques of the disconnect between the theory of ethnic fractionalization and the economic outcomes it purports to explain. Posner (2004) makes the strongest attack by claiming that it is illogical to construct a measure of ethnic fragmentation that includes politically inactive groups and try to use it to explain economic outcomes through a mechanism of political activity. He creates a new measure, Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG), which is

essentially an ethnic fragmentation measure that updates the ethnic classifications used for ELF, and then only counts political active groups. This new measure confirms ELF's results for the world sample, and then also finds those results in the African subsample, which ELF could not.

Posner's correction to ELF makes sense, and clearly provides some improved results. This current study suggests another change to existing fragmentation indices. There must be some incorporation of multiple identity layers. Campos and Kuzeyev (2007) created individual indices for linguistic and religious diversity and tested those on economic outcomes. Alesina et al (2003) also created similar indices. To the best of my knowledge, only Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have actually created a social fractionalization index, formed by the product of ethnic and religious fractionalization indices, reflecting their belief that the effects of cross-cutting identities are multiplicative. They find independent effects for ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, and social fractionalization, implying that there is some interactive effect not captured by the two identities independently. The results of this current study indicate that they were correct in including a multiplicative index. It seems like some blending of social fractionalization and PREG, or the creation of some social polarization measure would be the next step in creating a more useful social fragmentation measure.

In addition to the implications of this study for research measuring tools, there are also practical implications for political entrepreneurs in the environments of interest. The U-shape relationship between ethnic fractionalization and economic outcomes suggests that some countries would benefit by splitting up ethnic

coalitions, and others would benefit by creating them. This study suggests at least one method of splitting up ethnic coalitions: stressing differences on other identity levels *in conjunction with* stressing shared ethnic identity, trying to create multidimensional "social" groups instead of unidimensional "ethnic" groups. The literature on intersectionality shows that black women are torn between allying themselves with the feminist movement and with racial-empowerment movements. Highlighting multiple identities and pointing out how they are being suppressed by ethnic identity may encourage some factions to break off, or at least encourage groups within the ethnic coalition to question how many benefits they will actually receive if the ethnic coalition gains political power. Dividing unidimensional groups into social groups could fragment a society into the "safe zone," where civil war onset is less likely.

For societies that need to create coalitions to move into a safe-zone of fragmentation, this study can offer no new insight about how to do that. If anything, it just underscores the importance of suppressing non-ethnic identities. If other identities are allowed to become relevant, ethnic bonds may start to crack, and groups will begin to experience a loosening of social cohesion.

Political Framing

Earlier, I said that the more specific way the primary result of this study could be interpreted was that sharing some identities generates greater support for hostility than not sharing any at all. This result, once strengthened by confirmation in other studies, could provide political leaders with a new political frame with which to promote an agenda of conflict abroad, and possibly domestically.

The word "framing" has taken on a number of meanings across the political science and psychology literature. There are two definitions that most closely represent what I mean when I use the term here.

> Frames focus attention on specific dimensions (explanations) for understanding issues… frames highlight connections between issues and particular considerations, increasing the likelihood that these considerations will be retrieved when thinking about an issue.
> - Feldman (1995) (Quoted from Mitz and Redd 2003)

> [A frame provides] a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frames suggest what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue.
> - Gamson and Modigliani (1987) (Quoted from Druckman 2001)

Frames are a way for political elites to draw attention to certain aspects of an event or series of events, so that the target audience bases its opinion on only those aspects. It is like a conditional consideration. For example, Nelson and Oxley (1999) created a lab experiment where respondents were presented with factually identical news stories about a new development project. One group was presented with an article that focused on the jobs the project would create, while the other was presented with an article focused on the wildlife the project would destroy. Without the frames, respondents would receive the facts and make a judgment. With the frames, respondents are cued to view something as important, so they form their judgment based on facts, conditional on economic or environmental facts being more important.

Political leaders typically have a more difficult time convincing the public to engage in hostile action toward a group of people similar to the domestic public. This has been cited as one possible reason for the Democratic Peace (Mintz and Redd 2003). Gadarian (2010) shows that fear-inducing cues and threat-frames are associated with a greater propensity for overseas involvement. The results of this current study indicate that political elites may be able to frame conflicts with similar groups as an existential battle for the nation's identity. Political leaders are typically capable of emphasizing differences enough such that domestic audiences think of the other group as an out-group, but this study shows that they may not have to, and it may in fact be more effective to emphasize some fundamental similarity between the nation and the potential adversary.

Of course, without further research, I would not advocate this as a public relations strategy. Lacking further evidence, there are two significant areas in which this strategy has the potential for failure. The first is that this strategy of stressing some similarity between the nation and an adversary has a clear potential for becoming what Mintz and Redd (2003) call a "counterproductive frame." A counterproductive frame is one that brings about the opposite effect to the one desired. It is highly possible that a domestic audience may not be attuned enough to understand the threat posed to their identity as a nation by a similar group doing something reprehensible (like genocide, as in the scenarios in this study). The nation may instead just see a similar group and experience basic in-group preference. It likely depends on the ability of the political elite to frame the issue sufficiently well.

The second potential pitfall is closely related, and it also depends on the framing abilities of political elites. With such a frame, there is a high likelihood of opposing elites to employ the opposite frame, namely the in-group frame. It would be easy for a group of elites that do not prefer conflict to frame the potential adversary as an in-group in need of correction, rather than as a mortal out-group threatening the nation's identity with its actions. In their pursuit of a synthesized theory of the relationship between the mass media and public opinion, Baum and Potter (2008) theorize that the media is most able to have an independent effect on public opinion when frames can be interpreted in many different ways and when elites are divided. On the issue of foreign intervention, it is easy for elites to become divided, and the two sides' frames are not very different from each other, leaving the situation open to confusion. To overcome these two potential pitfalls, more research needs to be done on the interactive effects of identities, to determine if this is a consistent and strong enough effect to warrant a riskier public relations strategy.

Treatment Group I

Treatment Group I defied all theoretical expectations by being the most supportive of hostility in the AvgHostility tests, and equally as hostile as Treatment Group IV in the MaxHostility tests. This group, where the respondent matched both of the identities in the scenario, was supposed to be a clear in-group and elicit the softest response from the respondent.

I suggest that Treatment Group I may have actually been in line with Social Identity Theory, and that it is just drawing attention to the impact of describing the leaders in the scenarios as "foreign." The leaders were described this way so that the

scenario, which involved human rights atrocities, including possible genocide, would seem more realistic to the respondent. The scenario could not have had the same impact on the respondent if I attempted to pass it off as something that was happening without their knowledge in the United States. When articulating the hypotheses, though, it did not occur to me that respondents might react to the foreignness of the leaders themselves, that this might become a salient difference between respondents and the leaders in the scenario. If this did happen, it would mean that respondents were considering three identities: nationality, race, and religion. The respondent might then identify the leaders as an out-group on the basis of nationality and then feel like their identity, as a white Christian for example, was extremely threatened by the similarities between the genocidal foreign leaders and themselves. Treatment Group I was not significantly greater than Treatment Group IV in the MaxHostility tests, however, so it is unclear how many identities a respondent can react to at one time.

If Treatment Group I is in its proper place as the most supportive of hostility, it is possible that the results may initially be seen as not supporting an interactive model of identity interactions, but rather a subtractive model, where the effect of cross-cutting identities is monotonically negative; the more you have in common, the more you will fight. If this were the case, though, I would expect to see Treatment Group III, where the respondent's primary identity matched the prompt, consistently more hostile than Treatment Group IV, where only the secondary identity matched. In reality, Treatment Group IV is greater than Treatment Group III at the .05 level in AvgHostility, and at the .01 level in MaxHostility. There still seems

to be some interactive effect between shared identities and the saliences of those identities.

Result 2: The Interaction Between Religion and Race

As demonstrated above, the direct effect of race did not account for its full impact on either measure of hostility. There is some interactive effect that requires a concurrent examination of religion. This may speak to the need to develop a more multi-dimensional measure of social fragmentation, as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) do. Conversely, in this context, religion's effect on hostility was contained within its direct effect.

Result 3: The Effects of Demographic Variables

Religion

The fact that Protestantism and Catholicism had almost no significant effect on hostility is somewhat surprising, given the literature on religion's effect on foreign policy preferences. Granted, most studies interested in religion's effect on foreign policy are focused on Middle East policy, which inherently carries with it Judeo-Christian-specific connotations. Even in these studies, though, mainline, white Protestants are the only Christian group likely to support intervention. Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris (2008) show that Black Protestants, Catholics, and the National Council of Churches (some Lutherans, Methodists, and Episcopalians) were more likely to oppose the Iraq War even before military action began. Cavari (2013) also finds that Protestants and Jews are the most likely religious groups to support Israel, followed by Catholics and all other religious groups.

Martin (1999) describes the (at the time) rising influence of the Christian Right in the foreign policy sphere, in part how various groups in the movement took an active role in not only praising, but also funding anticommunist military forces in South America. It is surprising, then, that neither Protestantism or Catholicism had any positive effect on hostility in the regressions, and Protestantism even had a negative effect on MaxHostility in Treatment Group I (both match) in both the models in which it was included (IV and VI). Matching on religion resulted in a greater increase in hostility than just matching on race, however, so it may be that once religious identity is threatened, the response is greater.

It could also be that the effect of religion is not in the identification, but in the level of religious inclusion. Religious inclusion was significant for Treatment Groups II (both match) and IV (primary non-match, secondary match) in every model in which it was included (I, III, IV, and VI), amounting to half of the regressions in which it was included. When significant, ChristInclusion's negative effect was in line with the literature. Layman (1997) finds that the doctrinally conservative were more likely to be hawkish than the doctrinally liberal. Guth (2014) also finds that religious traditionalism has an effect beyond religious identification. It is unclear why ChristInclusion would not be significant in all Treatment Groups, but the results of this current study further indicate the need for greater nuance in the study of religious effects on policy preferences.

Race

The effect of race on foreign policy preferences has typically been that non-whites, particularly blacks, have been less prone to support the use of force than whites. Burris (2008) tracks public opinion on the use of force from Vietnam to Iraq and finds that non-whites were only more supportive of the use of force than whites in a few conflicts, with the most clear difference being Haiti, where US efforts were focused on the restoration of a democratically elected black leader to power. Holsti (1996) also finds that blacks may be more willing to support intervention in support of causes specifically involving countries with black populations.

Nincic and Nincic (2002) examined five conflicts from Korea to the Gulf War and also find that blacks are more dovish than whites, particularly in Korea and Vietnam, and that they were more likely to support immediate pull-outs from conflicts and encourage a search for a peaceful solution. These results are supported for Korea and Vietnam by Mueller (1973) and for the Gulf War by Mueller (1994). Looking more recently to the Iraq War, Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris (2008) find that black Protestants were more likely to oppose the war than white Protestants.

In their study of the psychological effects of threat perception and anxiety following 9/11, Huddy et al (2005) find an opposite result. They find that blacks experienced a greater perception of threat than whites, which was related to a greater desire for retribution. In this current study, White and Black were not significant in any model for any Treatment Group, except Black in Model V (MaxHostility, race variables included, but not religion) Treatment Group IV

(primary non-match, secondary match), the Treatment Group that experienced the highest threat to their identity. The large positive effect of being black on hostility in that group matches the result of Huddy et al, that blacks experience threat more strongly than whites, and it led to a similar desire for retribution. It is odd, though, that being white never had a significant effect on hostility, given the large body of literature that finds that whites are typically more hostile.

Gender

Gender has been described as one of the "best predictors" of foreign policy preferences, both for the size and consistency of its effect (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Numerous studies have found that women generally prefer the use of force less than men do (Huddy et al 2005; Nincic and Nincic 2002; Fite, Genest, and Wilcox 1990; Caprioli 2000; Eichenberg 2003; and Burris 2008). The results from Burris (2008) are also not conditional on social traditionalism, typically associated with conservatism.

The strength and breadth of the literature on this topic begs the question of why the results in this study are so weak with regard to gender. Women are only significantly less hostile than men in a few Treatment Group-Models. This may be due to the humanitarian nature of the intervention in the scenarios. While not explicitly stated as humanitarian, the United States is considering action against a country that is starving its own people and possibly beginning genocide, which can easily be interpreted as a humanitarian mission by a respondent. Eichenberg (2003) finds that women demonstrate a much greater increase in support of the use of force for humanitarian purposes than men do. A humanitarian reading of the

scenarios could have closed much of the typically large gender gap. This may have been beneficial to the study, because of the inability to create blocks and randomize men and women into treatment groups separately. This humanitarian reading may have removed any significant differences between the two genders (with only a few exceptions), and thus removed the need for blocking on this dimension.

Ideology/ Partisanship

The literature on the effects of ideology and partisanship on foreign policy preferences is not as conclusive as one might assume, or, at least, the conclusion is not what one might immediately expect. Several studies find that Republicans and conservatives are more hawkish than Democrats and Liberals. Huddy et al (2005) find that Republicans experienced less anxiety than Democrats following 9/11, translating into less risk aversion in the realm of foreign policy and significantly greater support for military action. Koch and Sullivan (2010) find that right-parties in the US, Britain, and France are more focused on national security than left-parties, and are more likely to continue conflicts in the facing of dropping approval ratings. Gadarian (2010); Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris (2008); and Cavari (2013) all find that Republicans are more hawkish than Democrats on the issues of 9/11 and Israel. In fact, Republicans seem to have been more prone to military intervention ever since Vietnam, when one examines votes on antiballistic missiles (Bernstein and Anthony 1974), the Panama Canal Treatiest (McCormick and Black 1983), nuclear freezes (McCormick 1985), strategic arms (Wayman 1985), and B-1 bombers (Fleisher 1985). McCormick and Wittkopf (1990) even find that this gap existed in the pre-Vietnam era when bipartisanship was high.

When ideology had a statistically significant effect, it was in the direction predicted by the aforementioned literature, except for one occurrence in Model I (AvgHostility, religion variables included but not race), Treatment Group III (primary match, secondary non-match). The literature is not conclusive about the Republican/Democrat split; there is also a large body that says support for war depends on whether the President advocating war is from your party (Mueller 1973; Mueller 1994; Holsti 1996). Hildebrandt, Hillebrecht, Holm, and Pevehouse (2013) actually find that conservatives are less likely than liberals to support intervention, and that partisanship and ideology are the strongest predictors of support. Their study is restricted to the Bill Clinton presidency.

The effects of ideology in this current study may even be a more accurate estimation than those given in the other research listed, because this study neither mentions the party of the President or his/her preferred policy. Even if the respondent imported the current political situation and assumed President Obama was the President in the scenario, they would not know his policy preference.

Income

The effect of income on foreign policy preferences has been consistently erratic over time. Burris (2008) tracks income's effect on support for military action from Vietnam to Iraq. At the beginning of the Vietnam conflict, the more affluent were more supportive of the war (Converse and Schuman 1970; Hamilton 1968; Patchen 1970; Wright 1972; Hahn 1970). In the post-Vietnam era, high income has been a better predictor of support than education, but has been erratic across conflicts. Mueller (1973) and Mueller (1994) also find that higher socio-economic

status leads to greater support for military intervention, but Nincic and Nincic (2002) also find that this effect is erratic across conflicts. Martin (1999) provides tangential support at best that high income leads to hawkishness in that he finds that Evangelicals who identified with the Religious Right tended to be better paid than other Evangelicals and the American public.

While income was one of the most frequently statistically significant variables in this study, that still only happened in about half the treatment group-models, and the effects were consistently marginal. The only contribution this study makes to the literature on this point is further evidence that income is positively related to support for the use of force, but inconsistently so.

Education

The effect of education is much less clear than the effect of income, with numerous studies indicating positive and negative relationships between education and support for the use of force. As mentioned above, Martin (1999) finds that Evangelicals associated with the Religious Right tend to be better educated and better paid than other Evangelicals and the American public. But this is just tangential support for a connection between education and hawkishness. Huddy et al (2005) finds that less educated people are more likely to experience anxious responses to violence, leading them to risk-averse behavior. Conversely, more educated people will feel less anxious, and a greater willingness to retaliate to violence.

Nincic and Nincic (2002) find that education is positively related to internationalism, and some research suggests that education is also positively

related to support for intervention (Russett and Nincic 1976). Holsti (1996) finds mixed results, though, and Nincic and Nincic (2002) finds that the effect of education is erratic across conflicts. Converse and Schuman (1970), Hamilton (1968), Patchen (1970), Wright (1972), and Hahn (1970) all find that the more educated showed greater support for the Vietnam War at its outset. Burris (2008) finds that education has been a highly erratic, but overall positive predictor of support for military conflict in the post-Vietnam era. In the Iraq War, which was turned into a banner issue by the Republican Party, neither income or education had any effect on support within that party, but within the Democratic party, education was negatively correlated with support for the war.

This current study only infrequently finds an effect for education, mostly restricted to Treatment Group III (primary match, secondary non-match), but when it does exist, it is negative. It would be interesting to see in future research whether responsiveness to identity frames is at all dependent on education level.

Limitations

Recruitment Method

Given both time and financial constraints, the most practical method to recruit survey subjects was through mTurk. This survey service allowed for the rapid and relatively inexpensive recruitment of nearly 1500 respondents that approximates the demographic breakdown of the US. Unfortunately, Muslims are only about 2% of the US population, and I was only able to recruit fewer than 20 into my sample using mTurk, which is better for connecting interested workers to employers than it is for connecting employers to the workers they wish to hire.

I elected to use Muslim leaders in the scenarios because I believed Islam was the most relevant alternative to Christianity, given current events. If I could show that Christians were more hostile toward in-group Christian leaders, even when the out-group was Muslim leaders, that would provide strong support for my theory (and I was able to do that). I anticipate some push-back because I was not able to draw in Muslim respondents, because that means that everyone who matched on religion (except for the 13 Muslims) had to be a Christian. So all of the primarily religious individuals in Treatment Groups I and III were Christians, and all of the primarily ethnic individuals in Treatment Group IV were Christians.

I only mention this because I anticipate some push-back on the point. There is no theoretical reason to believe that Christians and Muslims would behave systematically differently in this study. Still, the results would be stronger with a larger Muslim sample, and future research on this topic should pursue such a sample if it is feasible.

Assignment Method

As was mentioned in the Methodology and Results section, the limitations of Qualtrics and mTurk affected the treatment assignment. Ideally, respondents would have been blocked based on their religion, race, and ordering of those identities, and then randomly assigned to scenarios within each block. This would have ensured an even distribution of respondents between treatment groups, useful both financially and for limiting the variance of hostility estimates. Because blocking is not possible with those firms, respondents were randomly assigned to scenarios out of the total sample, rather than within groups of similar individuals. This meant a lack of control

over the distribution of respondents into treatment groups, and resulted in a large number of respondents being placed into Treatment Groups II and III, and a relatively small number being placed into Treatment Group I. Although this was financially infeasible for us, future research on this topic would benefit from finding a way to sort respondents into blocks before treatment assignment.

Survey Formatting

The first error is the difference in wording between the questions that ask for an identification of religious and race. From my own life experience, I held the improper belief that these religious belief systems were mutually exclusive, and a respondent could not hold more than one of them simultaneously. This belief informed the question wording. Even if that belief were true, the question still should have asked the respondent to identify which system was the closest to how they identify their religious beliefs, both for the sake of consistency within the survey and to account for those who were raised with or have experienced multiple religious belief systems and have constructed a personal system of religious beliefs out of parts of many different systems.

More substantial, the Evangelical identification questions should not have been placed before the scenarios. These three questions were presented to those who identified themselves as Christians immediately after the religious identification question. The effect of this was likely that religious identity was more primed for Christians than both racial identity for Christians and religious identity for other religious groups. It is difficult to say what the true effect of this question ordering was, but it is possible that it accounts for the greater hostility exhibited by

those who matched the scenarios on religion than those that only matched on race. Future work on this subject should be more careful to avoid priming one identity over another, and should possibly even randomize whether respondents are asked for their religious or racial identity first.

Scope Limitations

Although this was stated at the beginning of the Research Design section, it is important to reiterate the limitations of the generalizability of these results. Race and religion were intentionally primed independently, and the races used in the scenarios were chosen because they were not tied to any particular religion, and vice versa. For these results to be applied to other sets of identities, those identities need to be independent of each other. It would be interesting, though, to see if the results hold when one of the identities being measured is a joint identity (such as ethno-religion).

The scenarios used in this study also involved the enemy perpetrating genocide. It is possible that nothing less than genocide will activate an individual's sense of threat to their identity, leaving the results of this study only applicable to instances of genocide, in which political leaders have typically demonstrated a desire to not get involved. Further research should be done to determine if the interactive effects of identity hold at lesser outrages.

Conclusion

For over 40 years, political science has been operating with an ill-defined theory of identity interactions that has resulted in the majority of identity-related research employing an additive model of identity interactions. This theory provided no answer to why I sometimes observed conflict that not only was not mitigated by cross-cutting identities, but seemed to be caused by them. Social psychology offered an explanation with Tajfel and Turner's social identity theory, which describes an interactive effect for multiple identities, where shared identities can exacerbate the hostility arising out of non-shared identities.

From Turner's (1975) statement that the greatest levels of hostility might exist between groups that have similarities, I constructed an experiment designed to test how out-group hostility is generated across multiple identity layers. With this experiment, I sought to answer three questions. One, which identity configurations, or what level of similarity between two groups, encourages the greatest hostility? Two, what are the direct and indirect effects of religion and race (the two identities used in this experiment) on hostility? Three, are there other demographic factors that have independent effects on demonstrated hostility?

The results of this two-identity study clearly indicate that groups that share one identity will be more hostile to each other than groups that do not share any identities. This conflicts with the basic cross-cutting identity theory used in political science. This study suggests that the discipline needs to look for a better defined and more complex theory of identity interactions, and recommends social identity theory.

This result has implications for a number of areas. First, the broad theory of identity interactions that has been postulated in the intersectionality literature is applicable outside of the contexts of political suppression and social disadvantage. Second, the next stage in the development of a good social fragmentation index must include a multiplicative component. Third, placing an emphasis on multidimensional social groups rather than on unidimensional ethnic groups may help fractionalize states out of the civil war "danger zone," and may prevent deep cleavages from forming along ethno-political lines, even within a party system. Fourth and lastly, political leaders in high-functioning democracies may have a new political frame to employ, namely the ability to argue that semi-similar groups are a greater existential threat to the nation's identity than entirely-different groups are (as has been the case with radical Muslims in recent American elections).

Future research on this topic should focus first on garnering a larger sample size and, perhaps alternatively, using a different survey distribution firm that would allow a blocked design. Future research may also benefit from the use of less extreme scenarios than "probably genocide," in an attempt to discover the point at which the similarities between a respondent and a proposed out-group begin to threaten the identity of the respondent.

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Appendix A: Survey

Survey

1. Do you consider yourself a member or practitioner of one of the following belief systems? (Check the one that **best** describes you.)

_____ Catholic-Christianity

_____ Protestant-Christianity

_____ Orthodox-Christianity (Eastern, Greek, Russian)

_____ Islam

_____ Judaism

_____ Atheism/Agnosticism

_____ Hinduism

_____ Buddhism

_____ Other _____

2A (for Christians only). Do you believe in the imminent return of Jesus Christ, that is, do you believe Jesus Christ could return at any time *and* that it will be soon?

_____ Yes _____ No

2B (for Christians only). Would you consider yourself to be born-again and to have had a personal salvation experience with Jesus Christ?

_____ Yes _____ No

2C (for Christians only). Do you believe in angels and demons, and that they are fighting on earth for human souls?

_____ Yes _____ No

2. Of the following, which is closest to how you would describe your race? (Check the one that **best** applies to you.)

_____ White

_____ Black

_____ Asian

_____ Jewish

_____ Hispanic

_____ Arab

_____ Other _____

PAGE BREAK

3. On the following scales, please move the arrows to show how much you relate to or connect with your religious and ethnic or racial identities. For example, the more you view yourself in terms of your race, the closer to 10 you should move the arrow corresponding to race, and the same for your religious identity.

Relative importance of your religious identity; _____
Relative importance of your racial identity; _____

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4. Please select your gender.

_____ Male

_____ Female

5. Which of the following best describes your political ideology?

_____ Extremely Conservative (Typically Republican)

_____ Conservative

_____ Moderate

_____ Liberal

_____ Extremely Liberal (Typically Democrat)

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EXPERIMENT

Several intelligence agencies, the US State Department, and the United Nations have been receiving reports about a civil conflict in another country.

The reports indicate that the foreign government's forces are likely committing human rights violations, targeting civilians, and cutting off food supplies to certain parts of

the country, creating a danger of mass hunger or starvation. The reports also indicate that the conflict may be in the early stages of genocide.

The leaders are all devout [Christians][Muslims], and stress the importance of keeping the values of [Christianity][Islam] in government.
They are shown here:

[] []

The US government is considering various policy options. Which of the following policies do you support? (Check **all** that apply. You may select policies from multiple groups.)

Do Nothing
No Militarized Action
No Threats
No Use of Force
Wait for Further Intelligence
Engage Diplomatically With Allies

Threaten
Threaten to Use Force
Threaten to Sanction
Threaten to Blockade or Establish No-Fly Zones
Threaten to Send Troops
Threaten to Use Air Strikes

Display of Force
Move Navy or Air Force to Nearby Bases
Impose Sanctions
Establish a Blockade or No-Fly Zone
Send Troops to the Region
Launch Limited Air Strikes

Use Force
Send Troops (Marines, Army, Navy) to Attack
Occupy and Secure Territory
Attack and Possibly Depose the Country's Government
Begin a Comprehensive Bombing Campaign
Declare War

Post Experiment Demographic Questions

CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS (for Christians only)

7. How often do you attend religious services? (Select the one that **best** applies)

_____ More than once weekly

_____ Once weekly

_____ Once or twice a month

_____ A few times per year

_____ Never

8. How often do you read the Bible?

_____ A few times per day

_____ Daily

_____ A few times per week

_____ A few times per month

_____ A few times per year

_____ Never or almost never

9. Do you agree with the following statement?

It is important that my elected political leaders share my religious faith.

_____ Yes

_____ No

10. Think of 5 of your close friends. If you are able, list their religious beliefs. If you are not sure of a particular friend's beliefs, do NOT put anything down for them. **Don't worry about filling in all the lines. Just answer as best you can for the first five friends you think of.**

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

11. How often, outside of the contexts of religious services, prayer, and the reading of the Bible do you find yourself thinking about religion and your relationship with God and your religious community? (Select the one that **best** applies)

_____ Several times per day

_____ Daily

_____ A couple times per week

_____ A couple times per month

_____ Almost never or never

12. Which of the following best reflects your beliefs about the Bible?

_____ The Bible is the Word of God and should be taken literally

_____ The Bible is the Word of God, but not everything in it should be taken literally

_____ The Bible is a book written by men and should not be taken literally

13. Which of the following do you believe is more central to Christianity?

_____ Personal improvement through a combination of God's grace and always trying to practice obedience to God's will

_____ Developing a community of faith that is focused on helping the poor, whether they are Christians or not

MUSLIM RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS (For Muslims only)

7. How often do you attend religious services? (Select the one that **best** applies)

_____ More than once weekly

_____ Once weekly

_____ Once or twice a month

_____ A few times per year

_____ Never

8. How often do you read the Quran?

_____ A few times per day

_____ Daily

_____ A few times per week

_____ A few times per month

_____ A few times per year

_____ Never or almost never

9. Do you agree with the following statement?

It is important that my elected political leaders share my religious faith.

_____ Yes

_____ No

10. Think of 5 of your close friends. If you are able, list their religious beliefs. If you are not sure of a particular friend's beliefs, do NOT put anything down for them. **Don't worry about filling in all the lines. Just answer as best you can for the first five friends you think of.**

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

11. How often, outside of the contexts of religious services, prayer, and the reading of the Quran do you find yourself thinking about religion and your relationship with God and your religious community? (Select the one that **best** applies)

_____ Several times per day

_____ Daily

_____ A couple times per week

_____ A couple times per month

_____ Almost never or never

12. Which of the following best reflects your beliefs about the Quran?

_____ The Quran is the Word of God and should be taken literally

_____ The Quran is the Word of God, but not everything in it should be taken literally

_____ The Quran is a book written by men and should not be taken literally

13. Which of the following do you believe is more central to Islam?

_____ Personal improvement through a combination of God's grace and always trying to practice obedience to God's will

_____ Developing a community of faith that is focused on helping the poor, whether they are Christians or not

Ethnic Demographic Questions

14. How often do you attend meetings of local, state, or national organizations that are primarily concerned with ethnicity or race? (Select the one that **best** applies.)

_____ More than once weekly

_____ Once weekly

_____ Once or twice a month

_____ A few times per year

_____ Never

15. How often do you consult members of your ethnic or racial group for guidance in life or answers to questions? (Note, we are interested in times when you consulted an individual **because** they were a member of your ethnic or racial group.)

_____ A few times per day

_____ Daily

_____ A few times per week

_____ A few times per month

_____ A few times per year

_____ Never or almost never

16. Do you agree with the following statement?

It is important that my elected political leaders share my ethnic or racial

identity.

_____ Yes

_____ No

17. When you think of five of your close friends, how many would you say share your ethnic or racial identity?

_____ 0

_____ 1

_____ 2

_____ 3

_____ 4

_____ 5

18. How many generations has it been since your family tree arrived in America? (**Answer based on the most recent direct ancestor to arrive.)**

_____ 1 (I am a first-generation immigrant)

_____ 2 (My parents were first generation immigrants, but I was born in America)

_____ 3

_____ 4 or more

19. Outside of the context of meetings with ethnically or racially oriented organizations, or times when you read about ethnicity or race, or see ethnicity or race mentioned on the news, how often do you find yourself thinking about race or ethnicity and your relationship to a racial or ethnic community? (Select the one that **best** applies)

_____ Several times per day

_____ Daily

_____ A few times per week

_____ A few times per month

____ Almost never or never

20. Which of the following do you believe should be the primary goal of your ethnic/racial group?

_____ Winning more rights and protections for our group, even if it means some other racial/ethnic groups get left behind

_____ Working together with other racial/ethnic groups to win rights and protections, even if it means our groups moves forward more slowly

Additional Demographic Questions

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19. Which of the following ranges best reflects your household's annual income?

_____ $0-$35,000

_____ $35,001-$65,000

_____ $65,001-$100,000

_____ $100,001-$150,000

_____ $150,001 or more

_____ Prefer not to say

21. Which of the following best describes your level of education?

_____ Did not graduate high school

_____ High school diploma

_____ Some college

_____ Bachelors Degree

_____ Masters Degree or higher

PAGE BREAK

22. Which of the following best reflects your beliefs about the use of force in international relations?

_____ Military force is always the most effective solution to international disagreements

_____ Military force is sometimes necessary to solve international disagreements

_____ There are always non-violent solutions to international disagreements, whether they be negotiations, economic sanctions, or some other diplomatic action

_____ Don't Know

23. Generally speaking, would you agree with A or B more?

_____ A. Most countries are generally trustworthy, and lasting international agreements help move the world forward.

_____ B. Every country is looking out for its own best interest, and countries should be careful.

24. Which of the following best reflects your beliefs about the United States and its foreign policy?

_____ The United States should be active in the world and pursue lasting relationships, expanding it alliances.

_____ The United States should be active in the world, but only active enough to direct its interests.

_____ The United States should focus on its internal problems and avoid interactions with the rest of the world.

Appendix B: Additional Tables

Treatment Group I T-Tests

Table 9.1: Comparing AvgHostility Between Treatment Groups I and II

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
AvgD~1T2 |     184    1.597826    .0654496    .8878018    1.468693    1.726959
AvgD~2T2 |     524    1.331107    .0407376    .9325257    1.251077    1.411136
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     708    1.400424    .0348727     .927903    1.331957     1.46889
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |            .2667192    .0789348                .1117442    .4216942
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(AvgDVTreat1T2) - mean(AvgDVTreat2T2)              t =   3.3790
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      706

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9996         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0008          Pr(T > t) = 0.0004
```

Table 9.2: Comparing AvgHostility Between Treatment Groups I and III

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
AvgD~1T2 |     184    1.597826    .0654496    .8878018    1.468693    1.726959
AvgD~3T2 |     413    1.430993    .0451771    .9181071    1.342186    1.519799
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     597    1.482412     .037301    .9113981    1.409155     1.55567
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |            .1668334    .0805594                .0086179    .3250488
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(AvgDVTreat1T2) - mean(AvgDVTreat3T2)              t =   2.0709
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      595

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9806         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0388          Pr(T > t) = 0.0194
```

Table 9.3: Comparing AvgHostility Between Treatment Groups I and IV

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
AvgD~1T2 |     184    1.597826    .0654496    .8878018    1.468693    1.726959
AvgD~4T2 |     263    1.562738    .0554957     .899989    1.453463    1.672012
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     447    1.577181    .0422923    .8941605    1.494064    1.660298
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |            .0350884    .0860179               -.1339633    .2041402
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(AvgDVTreat1T2) - mean(AvgDVTreat4T2)              t =   0.4079
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      445

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.6582         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.6835          Pr(T > t) = 0.3418
```

Table 10.1: Comparing MaxHostility Between Treatment Groups I and II

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
MaxD~1T2 |     184    3.163043    .0695992    .9440892    3.025723    3.300363
MaxD~2T2 |     524    2.931298    .0435399    .9966739    2.845763    3.016832
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     708    2.991525    .0371263    .9878678    2.918634    3.064417
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |            .2317458    .0842625                .0663108    .3971808
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(MaxDVTreat1T2) - mean(MaxDVTreat2T2)              t =   2.7503
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      706

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9969         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0061          Pr(T > t) = 0.0031
```

Table 10.2: Comparing MaxHostility Between Treatment Groups I and III

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
MaxD~1T2 |     184    3.163043    .0695992    .9440892    3.025723    3.300363
MaxD~3T2 |     413     2.98063    .0484755    .9851384    2.885339     3.07592
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     597    3.036851    .0399258    .9755306    2.958439    3.115263
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |            .1824139    .0862147                .0130919     .351736
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(MaxDVTreat1T2) - mean(MaxDVTreat3T2)              t =   2.1158
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      595

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9826         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0348          Pr(T > t) = 0.0174
```

Table 10.3: Comparing MaxHostility Between Treatment Groups I and IV

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
MaxD~1T2 |     184    3.163043    .0695992    .9440892    3.025723    3.300363
MaxD~4T2 |     263    3.163498     .057012    .9245787    3.051238    3.275758
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     447    3.163311    .0440634    .9316054    3.076713    3.249909
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.0004546    .0896368               -.1766187    .1757094
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(MaxDVTreat1T2) - mean(MaxDVTreat4T2)              t =  -0.0051
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      445

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4980         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9960          Pr(T > t) = 0.5020
```

Hostility Toward Christians vs. Muslims

Table 11.1: AvgHostility Toward Christians vs. Muslims- Treatment Group I

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Avg~1T2C |     183    1.592896    .0656213    .8877084     1.46342    1.722373
Avg~1T2M |       1         2.5           .           .           .           .
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     184    1.597826           .           .           .           .
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.9071038           .                       .           .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(AvgDVTreat1T2C) - mean(AvgDVTreat1T2M)            t =        .
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      182

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) =      .         Pr(|T| > |t|) =      .          Pr(T > t) =      .
```

Table 11.2: AvgHostility Toward Christians vs. Muslims- Treatment Group II

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Avg~2T2C |     240    1.304167    .0589447    .9131669    1.188049    1.420284
Avg~2T2M |     284    1.353873    .0563477    .9495875     1.24296    1.464787
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     524    1.331107    .0407376    .9325257    1.251077    1.411136
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.0497066    .0818133               -.2104303    .1110171
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(AvgDVTreat2T2C) - mean(AvgDVTreat2T2M)            t =  -0.6076
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      522

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2719         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5437          Pr(T > t) = 0.7281
```

Table 11.3: AvgHostility Toward Christians vs. Muslims- Treatment Group III

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Avg~3T2C |     256    1.464844    .0576133    .9218132    1.351385    1.578302
Avg~3T2M |     157    1.375796    .0728068    .9122669    1.231982    1.519611
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     413    1.430993    .0451771    .9181071    1.342186    1.519799
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |            .0890476    .0930772               -.0939191    .2720143
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(AvgDVTreat3T2C) - mean(AvgDVTreat3T2M)            t =   0.9567
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      411

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8304         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3393          Pr(T > t) = 0.1696
```

Table 11.4: AvgHostility Toward Christians vs. Muslims- Treatment Group IV

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Avg~4T2C |     190    1.573684    .0645159    .8892908     1.44642    1.700948
Avg~4T2M |      73    1.534247      .10919    .9329194     1.31658    1.751913
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     263    1.562738    .0554957     .899989    1.453463    1.672012
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |            .0394376    .1241433               -.2050123    .2838876
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(AvgDVTreat4T2C) - mean(AvgDVTreat4T2M)            t =   0.3177
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      261

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.6245         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7510          Pr(T > t) = 0.3755
```

Table 12.1: MaxHostility Toward Christians vs. Muslims- Treatment Group I

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Max~1T2C |     183     3.15847    .0698293    .9446331    3.020691    3.296249
Max~1T2M |       1           4           .           .           .           .
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     184    3.163043           .           .           .           .
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.8415301           .                       .           .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(MaxDVTreat1T2C) - mean(MaxDVTreat1T2M)            t =        .
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      182

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) =      .         Pr(|T| > |t|) =      .          Pr(T > t) =      .
```

Table 12.2: MaxHostility Toward Christians vs. Muslims- Treatment Group II

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Max~2T2C |     240    2.933333    .0628991     .974429    2.809426    3.057241
Max~2T2M |     284    2.929577    .0603363    1.016805    2.810813    3.048342
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     524    2.931298    .0435399    .9966739    2.845763    3.016832
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |            .0037559    .0874719               -.1680844    .1755962
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(MaxDVTreat2T2C) - mean(MaxDVTreat2T2M)            t =   0.0429
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      522

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.5171         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9658          Pr(T > t) = 0.4829
```

Table 12.3: MaxHostility Toward Christians vs. Muslims- Treatment Group III

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Max~3T2C |     256    3.023438    .0608683    .9738933    2.903569    3.143306
Max~3T2M |     157    2.910828    .0800007    1.002406    2.752804    3.068852
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     413     2.98063    .0484755    .9851384    2.885339     3.07592
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |            .1126095    .0998295               -.0836306    .3088496
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(MaxDVTreat3T2C) - mean(MaxDVTreat3T2M)            t =   1.1280
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      411

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8700         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2600          Pr(T > t) = 0.1300
```

Table 12.4: MaxHostility Toward Christians vs. Muslims- Treatment Group IV

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Max~4T2C |     190    3.163158    .0658983    .9083449    3.033167    3.293148
Max~4T2M |      73    3.164384    .1137665    .9720211    2.937594    3.391173
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     263    3.163498     .057012    .9245787    3.051238    3.275758
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.0012257    .1275598               -.252403    .2499517
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(MaxDVTreat4T2C) - mean(MaxDVTreat4T2M)            t =  -0.0096
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      261

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4962         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9923          Pr(T > t) = 0.5038
```

Direct Effects of Religion and Race on Hostility

Table 13.1: Direct Effect of Religion on AvgHostility

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
NMRelN~g |     601    1.175541     .039766    .9748764    1.097443    1.253638
MRelNM~g |     257    1.589494    .0579498    .9290066    1.475375    1.703613
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     858    1.299534    .0334354    .9793789    1.233909    1.365159
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.4139534    .0716537               -.5545909   -.2733159
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(NMRelNMRaceAvg) - mean(MRelNMRaceAvg)             t =  -5.7771
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      856

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
```

Table 13.2: Direct Effect of Race on AvgHostility

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
NMRelN~g |     601    1.175541     .039766    .9748764    1.097443    1.253638
NMRelM~g |     415    1.426506    .0440915    .8982114    1.339835    1.513177
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |   1,016    1.278051    .0298637    .9518975     1.21945    1.336653
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.2509653     .060271               -.3692354   -.1326952
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(NMRelNMRaceAvg) - mean(NMRelMRaceAvg)             t =  -4.1639
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     1014

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
```

Table 14.1: Direct Effect of Religion on MaxHostility

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
NMRelN~x |     601    2.592346     .054144    1.327356    2.486011    2.698681
MRelNM~x |     257    3.175097    .0595256     .954268    3.057875    3.292319
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |     858      2.7669    .0428701    1.255736    2.682757    2.851042
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.5827512    .0915038               -.7623493   -.4031531
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(NMRelNMRaceMax) - mean(MRelNMRaceMax)             t =  -6.3686
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      856

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
```

Table 14.2: Direct Effect of Race on MaxHostility

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
NMRelN~x |     601    2.592346     .054144    1.327356    2.486011    2.698681
NMRelM~x |     415    2.980723    .0475122    .9678975    2.887328    3.074118
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
combined |   1,016    2.750984    .0379092    1.208345    2.676595    2.825374
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff |           -.3883768    .0761897               -.5378843   -.2388693
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(NMRelNMRaceMax) - mean(NMRelMRaceMax)             t =  -5.0975
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =     1014

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
```