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The Politics of Soundscapes: Between Phenomenology and Poststructuralism

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An abstract of
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Abstract

The Politics of Soundscapes: Between Phenomenology and Poststructuralism

By

Molly Kelly

This dissertation argues that R. Murray Schafer's notion of the "soundscape" provides philosophers with rich resources for thinking about place, power, and the politics of sound. Specifically, I question how Schafer's concept can be taken up and re-deployed in interesting, complex ways that depart from its intended purposes and productively complicate (and exceed) Schafer's original vision. Bringing philosophy to bear on Schafer's work, the project explores two central questions. First, what does a phenomenological reconstruction of the soundscape render salient? Second, what does a poststructuralist reconstruction of the soundscape render salient? The dissertation thus includes an implicit argument about methodology; to adequately think soundscapes –how they operate and the possibilities they afford and preclude– one needs to destabilize some of the presumed dichotomies between poststructuralism and phenomenology, gesturing instead towards their various resonances. In this way, the project fosters a sort of reciprocal exchange, insofar as sound studies can help us retune our approaches to phenomenology and poststructuralism, and phenomenology and poststructuralism can help us better understand sonic phenomena and our experiences of being-in-sonic-worlds. I conclude by demonstrating how my critical reinterpretation of the soundscape provides philosophers with powerful conceptual tools for thinking about the fate of place and human agency in sonic registers.

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Introduction

This project begins with two key questions: how are sounds shaped by place and power, and how are place and power negotiated/reconstituted in and through sound? From Aristotle's *Physics* to Luce Irigaray's *Speculum of the Other Woman*, philosophers have long approached "place" as a relational, embodied phenomenon distinct from the empty ubiquity of "space." From a phenomenological standpoint, "place" is not merely "the Being-present-at-hand-together of Things that occur" (Heidegger 2008, 81). Rather, it describes a process of determinate signification within specific place-worlds. Whereas an object in space may be located through a set of geographical coordinates, an object's place "brings with it the very elements sheared off in the planiformity of site: identity, character, nuance, history" (Casey 1998, xiii). In this way, place not only concerns the locatedness of specific entities (human, celestial, textual, etc.) but also how they are *implaced* through complex histories and relations of power.

In further distinguishing "place" from "space," philosophers have often relied on ocularcentric metaphors. For example, in *Science and the Modern World* (1967) Alfred North Whitehead argues that place is established through our perceptions of the world. He explains: "you are in a certain place perceiving things. Your perception *takes place where you are*, and is entirely dependent on how your body is functioning" (1967, 92; emphasis added). In other words, our place in the world is defined in and through our perceptions, e.g., our view of the tree beside us, of the road in front of us, etc. Similarly, in *Phenomenology of Perception* (2012) Maurice Merleau-Ponty uses "the gaze" to describe the total immersion of body and world within the phenomenal field, an immersion that negates any understanding of "place" as an a priori form of intuition.

Starting in the mid-twentieth century, however, others turned away from ocularcentric metaphysics towards philosophies of orality and listening. As Adrienne Janus (2011) explains, the "anti-ocular turn" in continental philosophy was primarily characterized by a return to aural and acoustic metaphors to escape vision's dominion over Western thought (183). Following Martin Heidegger and Jean Luc Nancy, Janus traces how continental philosophers came to reject models of subjectivity "built around the rational, self-identical subject of reflexive consciousness, a subject whose mastery and dominance over self and world involves a 'vision' that objectifies all it identifies" (Janus 2011, 183-184). In centering the rational, *visual* subject, scholars like Heidegger and Nancy accuse ocularcentric philosophy of perpetuating a subject-object dialectic that cannot adequately grasp being in place-worlds. To counter this, Nancy develops a theory of *resonance* to describe a subject who "is not a phenomenological subject … not a philosophical subject, and … is perhaps no subject at all" (2007, 21-22). Unlike the ocularcentric subject, Nancy's "resonant subject" is not a "proper self," but a "form, structure, and movement of an infinite referral [*renvoi*], since it refers to something (itself) that is nothing outside of the referral" (Nancy 2007, 9). Returning to our focus on place and power, Nancy's theory of resonance subsequently characterizes implacement as a process of *sounding*, both as a literal giving-forth of sound and as an attunement to the sounds of others.

While the anti-ocular turn in continental philosophy has provided scholars with novel insights on subjectivity, relationality, and embodiment, philosophers' turn to sound has also brought with it its own set of limitations. For example, in *Remapping Sound Studies* (2019) Gavin Steingo and Jim Sykes detail the ways in which anti-ocular philosophy has perpetuated essentialist tropes about the primitiveness of sound and oral/aural cultures. Citing Jean-Jacques Rousseau's association of sound with "South," Steingo and Sykes write "sound and South are, importantly,

relational figures: they function only in relation to what they are not. Whether the relationship is dialectical, supplementary, or hybrid, sound and the South are the Others of the visual and the North" (2019, 2). Through this sort of framing, sound subsequently comes to stand for all the things that vision is not: sound is smooth while vision is striated; sound is affective while vision is intellectual; sound is immersive while vision is objectifying. In *The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction*, Jonathan Sterne aptly calls this series of oppositions "the audio-visual litany," a litany which "idealizes hearing (and, by extension, speech) as manifesting a pure interiority" (2003, 15).[1] Such idealization has important consequences; in attempting to differentiate sound and sight, philosophers ultimately run the risk of 1) inverting the hegemony of ocularcentrism, 2) of re-imparting a self-world dialectic through sound, and 3) of treating history "as something that happens *between* the senses" (2003, 16).

During this time, a new movement was also developing within the fields of musicology and acoustic ecology. Like the continental philosophers, musicologists in the twentieth century were increasingly interested in the spatiality of sound vis-à-vis musical composition. For example, Austrian composer Arnold Schoenberg describes musical space as "the two-or-more dimensional space in which musical ideas are presented … all that happens at any point of this musical space has more than a local effect. It functions not only in its own plane, but also in all other directions and planes, and is not without influence even at remote points" (1950, 109). Similarly, in *Orientations* (1986) Pierre Boulez argues that compositions are made of both "smooth" and "striated" parts "… capable of reciprocal interaction" (87). Deconstructing the contradiction between the horizontal-melodic and the vertical-harmonic in tonal music, Boulez seeks "a new

[1] Interestingly, Sterne connects this litany to the dominion of Christian spiritualism. For example, we might compare sound theorists' emphasis on sound to Christianity's emphasis on the "word" or spirit in comparison to the visual letter (Sterne 2003, 16).

dimension, which we might label diagonal, a sort of distribution of points … no longer on the flat space, but in the sound-space" (1968, 383). Like Heidegger and Nancy, Boulez and Schoenberg are thus concerned with the dimensions of "sound-space" that escape or exceed the planiformity of written composition. In doing so, both Schoenberg and Boulez disrupt Euclidean approaches to sound and reveal music's status as a dynamic part of place-worlds.

While the works of Boulez and Schoenberg inarguably inspired a new generation of composers and musicians, other theorists sought to explore "sound-space" beyond the bounds of tonality. In the fields of anthropology and media studies, scholars like Edmund Carpenter and Marshall McLuhan question how sounds destabilize pictorial depictions of space. Like Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, both Carpenter and McLuhan reject characterizations of auditory space as an empty container waiting to be "filled." As Carpenter explains:

> Auditory space has no favoured focus. It's a sphere without fixed boundaries, space made by the thing itself, not space containing the thing. It is not pictorial space, boxed-in, but dynamic, always in flux, creating its own dimensions moment by moment. It has no fixed boundaries; it is indifferent to background. (1973, 35-37)

In describing auditory space as being "without fixed boundaries" and "always in flux," Carpenter echoes Merleau-Ponty's characterization of perception as a process of immersive *implacement*. Like Whitehead, Carpenter approaches auditory space as a "taking place" of sound that cannot exist without it. As a space made "by the thing itself," then, Carpenter's auditory space can be better characterized as an auditory *place*.

In emphasizing the fluidity and dynamism of sound, however, Carpenter ultimately falls prey to the audio-visual litany. For example, in his text *Eskimo Realities*, Carpenter fetishizes Indigenous approaches to sound and reifies the *subjectivity* of auditory space over and against the alleged *objectivity* of visual space. Comparing vision and hearing, he writes "the eye focuses, pinpoints, abstracts, locating each object in physical space, against a background; the ear, however,

favours sound from any direction" (1973, 37). By contrasting the objectifying force of the eye with the immersive reception of the ear, Carpenter fails to grasp the ways in which listening also involves processes of abstraction and objectification, processes which are inevitably informed by relations of power. More specifically, Carpenter's approach cannot account for the ways in which sounds operate as culturally policed sites, sites where some sounds are silenced whilst others are amplified. For example, in *The Sonic Color Line: Race and the Cultural Politics of Listening*, Jennifer Lynn Stoever defines listening as "an interpretive, socially constructed practice conditioned by historically contingent and culturally specific value systems" (2016, 14). In other words, the "ear" that Carpenter describes cannot be divorced from the cultural and social systems that condition it, suggesting that the ear can (and does) favor certain sounds over others. A similar problem arises in McLuhan's work "Visual and Acoustic Space," wherein he writes that "the human eye appears to be the father of linear logic" whereas listening "is both discontinuous and nonhomogeneous" (2006, 70-71).

For both traditions, then, sound is not understood as being separable from (or supplementary to) analyses of place and power. Rather, by reading the anti-ocular turn in continental philosophy together with the emergence of sound studies in musicology and acoustic ecology, I argue that the philosophy of sound provides us with rich insights on the "taking place" of power. In other words, just as philosophers question how "place" disrupts the uniformity and planiformity of space, so, too, does a robust account of sonic *place* reveal both the anarchic *and* the ordered natures of sounds, as well as the juridical and non-juridical forms of power that shape and are shaped by them.

In order to construct such an account, I question how R. Murray Schafer's concept of the "soundscape" provides philosophers with rich resources for thinking about place, power, and the

politics of sound. A Canadian composer who took classes with McLuhan at the University of Toronto, Schafer positions the soundscape as being "simultaneously a physical environment and a way of perceiving that environment; it is both a world and a culture constructed to make sense of that world" (Thompson 2002, 1). As a "physical environment," Schafer's concept echoes the dynamic spatial accounts developed by Schoenberg, Boulez, McLuhan, and Carpenter. As a mode of perception, however, the soundscape also lends itself to phenomenological investigations of place and embodiment. Additionally, the theoretical ambivalence of the term (i.e., soundscape as both a place and a way of making sense of that place) lends itself to nuanced analyses of power. Against philosophers who seek to define sound in strictly juridical or non-juridical terms, I suggest that the soundscape reveals how sonic place operates as "a multiple and mobile field of force relations" (Foucault 1990, 102). While each of these areas have been studied independently, this project brings these traditions together in order to show how relations of power "that cannot be literally articulated take place in nonliteral places like sound" (Bradley 2014). In doing so, I conclude that the soundscape provides philosophers with powerful conceptual tools for thinking about the fate of place and human agency in sonic registers.

The remaining part of this introduction will be structured as follows. Part one ("Soundscape: A Brief History of the Concept") offers a brief history of the term "soundscape" and its development by Schafer and the World Soundscape Project (WSP). Here, I question how the ambivalence of the term highlights sound's ability to juxtapose several scenes of interaction in a single place (Foucault 1984). Part two ("Soundscape's Proliferation") explores the proliferation of soundscape studies through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in a number of diverse fields. While some scholars (Kelman 2010) hold that Schafer's original definition need be maintained, others make use of the concept in new, creative ways to describe sonic phenomena

and the politics of sound more broadly. Part three ("Methodology and Chapter Outlines") concludes with a description of my methodological approach and provides an outline for the project's proceeding chapters.

1. *Soundscape: A Brief History of the Concept*

As Sterne muses in the opening to "Soundscape, Landscape, Escape," "no concept has proven to be more fertile or ubiquitous in the academic study of sound" than the notion of the *soundscape* (2013, 181). A neologism offering a sonic counterpart to the visual "landscape," "soundscape" was widely popularized by Schafer and the WSP[2] throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. While some scholars incorrectly credit Schafer with its creation, the term predates his use by about 60 years, appearing in a 1907 article from *Harper's Weekly* (Picker 2019, 148). As Jonathan Picker explains, the article's setting in Long Island Sound "suggests that the use of 'Soundscape' here is meant to characterize a painting of a *geographic*, not an acoustic, sound" (2019, 148; emphasis in original). In referencing *geographic* sounds, early uses of "soundscape" subsequently relied on topographical interpretations of space. As a sort of *place*, however, "soundscapes" also bring with them specific social and political contexts. In the *Harper's Weekly* article, for instance, Picker holds that the term "[had] less to do with the auditory realm, and more to do with the natural and cultural environment of late Gilded Age leisure and luxury" (2019, 148). In other words, early depictions of the soundscape were inextricably steeped in bourgeois notions of class and identity.

[2] As defined by the WSP official website: "The World Soundscape Project (WSP) was established as an educational and research group by R. Murray Schafer at Simon Fraser University during the late 1960s and early 1970s. It grew out of Schafer's initial attempt to draw attention to the sonic environment through a course in noise pollution, as well as from his personal distaste for the more raucous aspects of Vancouver's rapidly changing soundscape. This work resulted in two small educational booklets, *The New Soundscape* and *The Book of Noise*, plus a compendium of Canadian noise bylaws. However, the negative approach that noise pollution inevitably fosters suggested that a more positive approach had to be found, the first attempt being an extended essay by Schafer (in 1973) called 'The Music of the Environment,' in which he describes examples of acoustic design, good and bad, drawing largely on examples from literature."

Even as the term broadened to include the acoustic elements of geographic sounds, its connections to identity, history, and politics remained.

Moving into the mid-twentieth century, "soundscape" increasingly became used in an environmental sense, deployed by scholars like Buckminster Fuller and Michael Southworth to describe the auditory makeup of cities and the growing problem of noise pollution. In his 1967 master's thesis "The Sonic Environment of Cities," Southworth uses "soundscape" as a guiding analytic to describe "the quality and type of sounds and their arrangements in space and time" (2). Through field analyses and perceptual experiments, Southworth investigates the soundscapes of various Boston neighborhoods in order to uncover which areas allow for the greatest level "sonic interaction" viz. preferred frequency and intensity ranges (1967, 6). As with earlier uses of "soundscape," Southworth's project is acutely concerned with the auditory dimensions of *place*. Describing the sonic blight of traffic and planes, Southworth argues that "the concern has been with the identity of settings relative to one another over a relatively limited time. If the same settings are compared over a longer period of time, and at many times of day and week under different weather conditions, one finds few continuities but many contrasts" (1967, 27-28). In other words, of the areas studied (Washington Street, the U.S. Customs Tower area, etc.) few offered auditory signatures that could be readily identified, and fewer still could be distinguished from one another when observed over periods of time. Warning against this sonic homogenization, Southworth concludes by offering a number of suggestions for future sound design projects, from increasing "the diversity and informativeness of the soundscape" to widening the contrast of sound intensities (1967, 71).

Thinking critically about the social and political climate in which Southworth was writing, his work reveals an underlying cultural anxiety surrounding the state of "place" throughout the twentieth century. As Edward Casey muses:

> Certain devastating phenomena of this century bring with them, by aftershock as it were, a revitalized sensitivity to place. Precisely in its capacity to eliminate all perceptible places from a given region, the prospect of nuclear annihilation heightens awareness of the unreplaceability of these places. Much the same is true for any disruptive event that disturbs the placidity of cities and neighborhoods… the encroachment of an indifferent sameness-of-place on a global scale–to the point where at times you cannot be sure which city you are in … makes the human subject long for a diversity of places, that is, difference-of-place, that has been lost in a worldwide monoculture based on Western (and, more specifically, American) economic and political paradigms. (1998, xiii)

While Casey primarily focuses on the threats of nuclear warfare and Western economic and political hegemony, Southworth's preoccupation with noise may also be interpreted as a fear of "the encroachment of a [sonic – MK] sameness-of-place." For Southworth, the trouble with noise pollution lies, in part, in its ability to destroy sonic identity, or to overpower the "difference-of-place" and unique sonic signals that define a soundscape. In doing so, noise pollution threatens listeners' experience of *place* and their ability to orient themselves within sonic place-worlds.

For a soundscape to be identifiable, then, Southworth holds that it must 1) provide a sense of sonic continuity over time, and 2) provide unique and/or informative sonic signals. For example, in *Village Bells: Sound and Meaning in the 19th-Century French Countryside* Alain Corbin explores the centrality of the bell to the "auditory landscape" of nineteenth-century France (1998, xi). Through close historical readings, Corbin argues that the sound of the bell "helped create a territorial identity for individuals living always in range of its sound" (2004, 184). Like Southworth, Corbin emphasizes both the uniqueness and constancy of the bell, arguing that its ringing "provided a sort of auditory certification, transmitted information about major events of private life, and solemnized rites of passage" (1998, x). The bell thus proved fundamental to

villagers' experience of place, delimiting a distinct auditory community and providing that community with a sense of identity and rhythm.

Writing at the same time as Southworth and Corbin, Schafer was clearly inspired by the works of his sound-minded contemporaries. Regarding their terminological similarities, Schafer himself acknowledges "it has been suggested that I borrowed the term soundscape from the geographer Michael Southworth … this is entirely possible, I read the article" (2012, 120). However, Schafer nonetheless maintains "it was the research I was beginning to develop that defined the term and brought it to international attention" (2012, 120). Schafer is not wrong; with the publications of *The Book of Noise*, *The Soundscape*, and *Voices of Tyranny: Temples of Silence* his work garnered global recognition and helped to define the emergent field of acoustic ecology.

Like Southworth, Schafer's work is environmentally and politically motivated. Responding to increasing levels of noise pollution in Vancouver, Canada, Schafer questions how careful attention to the soundscape might serve as a "*positive* study program" as opposed to (or perhaps, in conjunction with) negative approaches like noise abatement (1977, 4; emphasis in original). Unlike Southworth, however, Schafer employs the concept in a slightly different sense. For Southworth, "soundscape" is deployed geographically; throughout his thesis, Southworth uses "soundscape" interchangeably with "sonic environment" to describe the quality, intensity, and duration of sounds within a given geographic space. This allows Southworth to "map" the soundscape and notate its positionality. Such a definition would be closer to what Schafer calls "acoustic space," or the "expression of the profile of a sound over the landscape" (1977, 115). For Schafer, "soundscape" is also used to describe a broader field of interactions, a field where "sounds affect and change one another (and us)" (1977, 131). In doing so, Schafer criticizes what he calls "clinical approaches" to soundscape studies that attempt to separate sounds from their contexts

and associated meanings (1977, 131). Here, I take Schafer to be making a distinction between the "place" of the soundscape and the "space" of sonic environments. As a place, the soundscape necessarily involves elements of identity, character, and history that cannot be grasped through the universalizing force of space. Additionally, while Southworth focuses exclusively on the soundscapes of cities and neighborhoods, Schafer holds that a soundscape can be *any* acoustic field of study, from musical compositions to public parks (1977, 7). Schafer's work subsequently expands the definition of the soundscape to include a wider range of sonic phenomena and foregrounds *being* in sonic worlds.

This is not to say that Schafer is unconcerned with the spatiality of the soundscape, however. As Paul Rodaway notes, "there is a tension within Schafer's use of the term. On the one hand, and more often, he uses soundscape to refer to a geographical space of particular sonic characteristics" (1994, 86). This is particularly evident in Schafer's critiques of sonic imperialism. In *The Book of Noise*, Schafer condemns the sonic excess of the West and the destruction of native soundscapes. He writes

> It is we of Europe and America who have produced these problems, it is we who have produced the technology of outrageous sound … territorial expansion has always been one of our aims, just as we refuse to leave a space of our environment uncultivated, unmastered, so too have we refused to leave an acoustic space quiet, unpunctured by sound … The huge noises of our civilization are a crude manifestation of this same imperialistic ambition. (1970, 13)

Drawing a parallel between territorial expansion and acoustic domination, Schafer astutely highlights the complex intersections between place, power, and weaponized sound. In doing so, he demonstrates that colonialism is not only a physical and psychical process, but a *sonic* one as well. Such a claim coincides with recent literature in political and decolonial theory. For example, in *Necropolitics* (2019) Achille Mbembe writes that "colonial occupation itself consisted in seizing, delimiting, and asserting control over a geographical area – of writing a new set of social

and spatial relations on the ground" (79). As a sort of geographical space, the soundscape likewise proves vulnerable to colonial occupation and exploitation, from Adolf Hitler's loudspeaker campaign (Birdsall 2012) to the Israeli Air Force's use of sonic booms in the Gaza Strip (Goodman 2012, xiii).

Reading Schafer and Mbembe together, the "sonic imperialism" that Schafer describes may be productively reinterpreted as the "seizing, delimiting, and asserting control over" a geographical *soundscape*. Such control manifests in a variety of ways; as Mbembe notes, "the writing of new spatial relations (territorialization) ultimately amounted to the production of boundaries and hierarchies, zones and enclaves" (2019, 79). Schafer writes similarly, detailing the ways in which soundscapes have been secured by the forcible expansion of industrial and post-industrial sound, and by the installation of "walls, fences and vegetation" (1977, 214). With this thought, Schafer productively departs from McLuhan and Carpenter, characterizing the soundscape as an acoustic space capable of being manipulated, divided, and objectified. Schafer therefore avoids perpetuating the audio-visual litany by recognizing soundscapes' potential territorialization.

While Schafer's work is undoubtedly spatial in these regards, his use of "soundscape" also extends beyond a strictly geographic interpretation. Lamenting the loss of acoustic communities (or communities defined in relation to specific soundscapes, e.g., parishes) Schafer muses "the problem of redefining the acoustic community may involve the establishment of zoning regulations; but to limit it to this, as is common today, is to *mistake the trajectories of the soundscape for the property lines of the landscape*" (1977, 216; emphasis added). Schafer's claim proves problematic here; while it may be true that the soundscape does not follow property lines, it is wrong to suggest that landscapes do. Indeed, the concept of a landscape relies on the vantage point of a perceiving subject, not geographic delineations. So while Schafer misstates the

fundamental character of landscapes in this quote, his interpretation of soundscapes' spatiality nevertheless holds true. In other words, while the soundscape is indeed spatial, it cannot be wholly reduced to positional coordinates. Schafer therefore uses "soundscape" in a second sense: to describe the auditory *experience* of place. As Rodaway notes, "the soundscape moves with the sentients as they move through the environment and it continually changes with our behavioural interactions. In this sense, one cannot 'map' a neighbourhood soundscape – to do so is to suggest a kind of soundscape as object" (1994, 87).

Approaching Schafer through a phenomenological lens, I suggest that this distinction largely parallels Merleau-Ponty's theorization of bodily space. In *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty describes the dynamism of the body schema, writing that "my body's spatiality is not, like the spatiality of external objects or of 'spatial sensations,' a *positional spatiality*; rather, it is a *situational spatiality*" (2012, 102; emphasis in original). In other words, the position of my body in the world is not the same as the position of a cup on top of a table. Rather, the cup's very position "on top of" the table *depends* on my ability to situate myself in and through the world, such that the world is taken up in relation to my body. While Merleau-Ponty primarily uses visual and tactile examples to describe the body schema, Schafer's soundscape productively demonstrates how sonic place-worlds are also taken up with and through the (re)sounding body. Indeed, in describing the experience of listening to low-frequency sounds, Schafer writes "instead of facing the sound source the listener seems *immersed* in it" (1977, 116; emphasis added). The soundscape therefore describes a process of implacement in sonic worlds, a process that "upsets any a priori assumption that [sonic – MK] space is homogenous, ever-the-same everywhere, *homou ēn panta* [all things alike]" (Casey 1998, 237).

Through this careful attunement to sonic place, Schafer's "soundscape" subsequently offers listeners *both* a positional understanding of sonic spatiality (i.e., soundscape as a geographical place) *and* a situational understanding (i.e., soundscape as a way of making sense of that place). While some scholars (Rodaway 1994) have criticized Schafer for this conceptual ambiguity, I suggest that this tension is ultimately what gives the concept its theoretical force– a claim I will elaborate further in chapter one. What's more, Schafer's notion of the soundscape also lends itself to nuanced theorizations of power. Throughout his body of work, Schafer primarily approaches sonic power in a juridical sense, outlining "a general system of domination exerted by one group over another" (Foucault 1990, 92). For example, in describing the imposing nature of sound, Schafer asserts that "a man with a loudspeaker is more imperialistic than one without because he can dominate more acoustic space. A man with a shovel is not imperialistic, but a man with a jackhammer is because he has the power to interrupt and dominate other acoustic activities in the vicinity" (1977, 77). In this example, sonic power is characterized as something that one person *has* and exerts over those who do not. Such a model is useful in describing the politics of certain soundscapes, like the U.S. military's use of sound torture in U.S. detention camps and black sites.[3] In chapter four, I discuss this model further to explain how sounds have been weaponized throughout history to alter experiences of place and to overpower listeners.

However, as a dynamic process that is "always in flux" and "creat[es] its own dimensions moment by moment" (Carpenter 1973, 35), juridical notions of the soundscape cannot adequately account for all the ways in which sounds and (re)sounding bodies interact. For example, in *Voices of Tyranny: Temples of Silence* (1993) Schafer writes: "sound may transpierce space, animate

[3] A "black site" is a secret military facility used as a prison or interrogation center. The existence of these sites is typically denied by participating governments, and they usually operate outside of the country's legal jurisdiction. In these sites, prisoners can be held indefinitely without being charged with a crime and without any legal protections like due process.

space, or transcend space but never to the exclusion of contradictory transients. Defining space *by* sound is very different from dominating space *with* sound" (42). Here, I take Schafer to be making a point similar to Michel Foucault in *The History of Sexuality: Volume I*. There, Foucault explains that power

> Must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate; it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable. The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because *it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another*. (1990, 93; emphasis added)

In "creating its own dimensions moment by moment," the soundscape mirrors Foucault's characterization of power as being "produced from one moment to the next, at every point." As a multiplicitous field wherein sounds are constantly changing and changed in turn, I argue that the soundscape likewise operates through a "moving substrate of [sonic – MK] force relations." By working with the ambiguity of Schafer's concept, then, we are better able to speak to both the juridical nature of sound and its non-juridical components. In doing so, this project ultimately reveals how sound "transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile, and makes it possible to thwart it" (Foucault 1990, 101).

2. *Soundscape's Proliferation*

Since its publication in 1977, *The Soundscape* has served as a foundational text for scholars interested in the burgeoning field of sound studies. In *The Soundscape of Modernity: Architectural Acoustics and the Culture of Listening in America* (2002), Emily Thompson utilizes Schafer's concept to construct "a history of aural culture in early twentieth-century America" (1). There, Thompson argues that twentieth-century developments in architectural acoustics played a significant role in the history of modernity. Similarly, in *Listening to Nineteenth-Century America*

(2015) Mark Smith explores how sounds were differentially heard and navigated by white supremacists and enslaved peoples through the Antebellum South. In both of these texts, "soundscape" maintains its ambivalent character as both an acoustic environment and as a process of orienting oneself within that environment. For Thompson and Smith, soundscape studies thus serve as fecund sites for sociohistorical inquiry insofar as they uncover how sounds create and reflect specific interests, ideologies, and histories.

With the proliferation of soundscape studies through the twenty-first century also came a proliferation of the uses of the term. As Ari Kelman muses:

> In its near-ubiquity, the term has come to refer to almost any experience of sound in almost any context. Despite the term's general popularity, Schafer's original definition captures something far more specific … his soundscape is lined with ideological and ecological messages about which sounds 'matter' and which do not; it is suffused with instructions about how people ought to listen; and, it traces a long dystopian history that descends from harmonious sounds of nature to the cacophonies of modern life. (2010, 214)

In tracing the history of the soundscape, Kelman is right to point out the unique ideological, ecological, and pedagogical aims of Schafer's project. As previously discussed, Schafer's concept was originally developed in direct response to growing levels of noise pollution in Canada and to the loss of native soundscapes. Additionally, Schafer's project was largely meant to be pedagogical in function; in founding the WSP with Barry Truax, Hildegard Westerkamp, Peter Huse, Howard Broomfield, and Bruce Davis, Schafer sought to encourage people to observe, record, and analyze the soundscapes of their lives. To protect these aims, Kelman subsequently challenges sound theorists to "honor the specific legacy of Schafer's 'soundscape' while resisting the impulse to apply it ubiquitously to all studies of the social life of sound" (2010, 214). Here, I take Kelman to be embarking on a conversative project to "preserve" the soundscape and its associated meanings. For Kelman, "the soundscape" remains a rich conceptual tool for sound scholarship only so long as it attends to Schafer's original intentions.

Against Kelman's recuperative efforts, other scholars suggest that it is time to abandon the notion of the soundscape in favor of new terminologies. For example, in "Against Soundscape" Tim Ingold holds that Schafer's concept "has now outlived its usefulness" (2007, 10). Responding to the "near-ubiquity" of the term, Ingold holds that the soundscape's popularity "carries the risk that we might lose touch with sound" as a complex phenomenon of experience (2007, 10).

This leads Ingold to propose two new terms for describing being in sonic worlds: "*enwinded*" in place of "embodied," and "*ensounded*" in place of "emplacement" (2007, 12). Contra Ingold, however, I worry that too quickly dismissing the soundscape in favor of new terms may amount to what Sara Ahmed calls a "founding gesture" that reduces the complexity and heterogeneity of its uses (2008, 28). Describing the rise of new materialism in feminist philosophy, Ahmed warns that "when we consider how it is that we arrive at the grounds we inhabit, we need to appreciate the feminist work that comes before us … we should avoid establishing a new terrain by clearing the ground of what has come before us. And we might not be so willing to deposit our hope in the category of the 'new'" (2008, 36). Bringing Ahmed's concept to bear on sound studies, I subsequently suggest that scholars must likewise appreciate works already done on the embodiment of sound and the politics of the soundscape. From Mala Muñoz and Diosa Femme's "The Sonic Landscapes of Unwelcome: Women of Color, Sonic Harassment, and Public Space" (2017) to Katie Hemsworth's work on the affective range of carceral soundscapes (2016), many soundscape projects continue to do good work in situating material-cultural contexts that they, in part, constitute. Much like the "lifeworld" does for social action, "soundscape" forces us to approach every sound and listener as a node in a larger network of interaction. Following Ahmed's warning to avoid "deposit[ing] our hope in the category of the 'new,'" I likewise suggest that Ingold's pursuit of new language risks repeating the "founding gesture" made by anti-ocular

philosophers in the mid-twentieth century. By looking to sound as the "new" ground for metaphysics, continental philosophers unwittingly inverted the audio-visual litany and the theological, political, and ontological baggage it brings with it.

In refusing Kelman's call to recuperate the soundscape and Ingold's call to progress past it, this project will work "on, with and against" the soundscape and its possible applications (Muñoz 1999, 12). Riffing off Schafer's concept, this dissertation: 1) investigates soundscapes' potential to underwrite "a historical knowledge of [sonic – MK] struggles" (Foucault 1980, 83); and 2) reveals sound studies' ability to provide scholars with "tools, concepts, and practices … to engage with history and power in its specificity" (Guenther 2021, 5). In approaching the soundscape as an important site of philosophical inquiry, then, my project ultimately explores how given soundscapes both nurture and impede different agentic possibilities (Labelle 2018, 2) and its ability to "allow for another form of thinking" (Günzel 2014, 33-34) about place, power, and the politics of sound.

3. *Methodology and Chapter Outlines*

In keeping with what I see as the multiplicity of sonic phenomena, my methodological approach is best described as an *assemblage* which leads me to combine modes of analysis often kept distinct in surveys of philosophical movements.[4] In brief, in order to adequately grasp how soundscapes occur (and how lives are lived and sonically operative within them), I have benefited from drawing upon three kinds of analysis. In order to describe the complexities of sonic *being* within soundscapes, I draw heavily from the phenomenologies of Edmund Husserl, Sara Ahmed, and

[4] Here, I am also motivated by Lisa Guenther's description of critical phenomenology as a "hybrid method" which requires "tools, concepts, and practices beyond classical phenomenology to engage with history and power in its specificity, whether these methods come from postcolonial theory, feminism, critical race theory, Marxism, the Frankfurt school" etc. (2021, 5).

Martin Nitsche. To grasp how soundscapes (and the resonant bodies therein) are discursively situated, I turn to Foucauldian accounts of juridical and non-juridical power and feminist, poststructuralist critiques of phenomenology. To problematize readings of the soundscape as a single-layered soniferous space (Hosokawa 2012), I attend to prominent critiques of Schafer's work (Akiyama 2010; Arkette 2004; Ingold 2007) as well as projects that productively emphasize the social, political, and historical particularities of specific sonic contexts (Collins 2018; Crawley 2017; Kassabian 2013; Stoever 2016; Radano and Olaniyan 2016; Rangan 2019; Weheliye 2005).

The dissertation will proceed in five chapters. The first two will establish the theoretical foundations of the project through a critically phenomenological reinterpretation of the soundscape. Chapter one provides a brief exegesis of the concept as well as two of its popular critiques ("The Subject Critique" and "The Euclidean Critique"). Responding to these criticisms, I reconceptualize the soundscape as a phenomenological *topology*. Situating my account within the literature, chapter two questions how the disciplinary divide drawn between sound studies and auditory culture studies largely mirrors the philosophical debates between phenomenology and poststructuralism. Continuing my phenomenological-topological approach, I explore how the soundscape remains a philosophically fruitful concept insofar as it addresses *both* the lived experience of sound *and* the contingent, discursive practices that shape (sonic) subjectivity.

Having secured a basic orientation with these concepts, chapters three, four, and five will consider specific ways of being in sonic worlds. Each will focus on a specific modality of inhabiting the soundscape: sounding, listening, and silence.[5] In chapter three, I explore how keening (a traditional Irish mourning ritual) provides philosophers with rich resources for thinking

[5] In discussing these modalities in separate chapters, I do not mean to suggest that they are extricable from one another. Rather, as Don Ihde explains "a 'pure' auditory experience in phenomenology is impossible, but as a focal dimension of global experience, a concentrated concern with listening is possible. Auditory experience can be thematized relatively, in relation to its contextual appearance within global experience" (2007, 44).

through a phenomenology of the soundscape. Specifically, I argue that Schafer's notion of the "soundmark" can be productively reinterpreted as a community *orientation*, or an orienting device that guides community members ontologically, epistemically, and practically. Chapter four explores the popular theoretical divide drawn between "listening" and "hearing" in the sound studies literature. Looking specifically at Jean-Luc Nancy's short text, *Listening* (2007), I explore popular characterizations of hearing as expressive and logical, and listening as embodied, primordial, and pre-signifying. While Nancy suggests that phenomenology proves incapable of listening, I demonstrate how Nancy fundamentally misunderstands phenomenological analyses of listening and hearing through a deconstruction of the conceptualist vs. nonconceptualist debate. Finally, chapter five investigates the politics of silence in soundscapes. Against Western philosophy's many metaphysical dichotomies (sound vs. silence, absence vs. presence, etc.), I describe soundscapes of silence as always already *soundful*, and ask what sort of ethics might arise from attending to this presumed "nothingness" (Crawley 2017, 203).

While I continue to use the soundscape as a guiding analytic for these later chapters, I do not offer it as an eidetic structure. Rather, I use it as a brick, as Brian Massumi suggests: "a concept is a brick. It can be used to build the courthouse of reason. Or it can be thrown through the window" (2018, xii). Chapters three, four, and five will thus experiment with the concepts developed in earlier chapters to see what they render salient, while also recognizing that the phenomena they engage will necessarily exceed them and so call for their revision.

Chapter 1

Rethinking the Soundscape: A Phenomenological-Topological Approach

This chapter explores resonances between Schafer's soundscape and phenomenological notions of being-in-sonic-worlds. While some scholars (Born 2019; Hosokawa 1984; Sterne 2015) suggest that these elements weaken Schafer's overall concept, I argue that his hidden phenomenological commitments actually strengthen his work. Responding to characterizations of the soundscape as both "a physical environment and a way of perceiving that environment" (Thompson 2002, 1), I offer an alternative reading of the soundscape as a phenomenological *topology*. In doing so, I demonstrate how a phenomenological-topological approach to the soundscape proves capable of responding to a number of popular criticisms, two of which ("The Euclidean Critique" and "The Subject Critique") I will discuss at length. To conclude, I argue that such an approach reveals the ontological and topological *anarchy* of the soundscape, one which opens up possibilities for nuanced conversations regarding the place, power, and politics of sound.

1. *Soundscape Phenomenology*

In *The Soundscape: Our Sonic Environment and the Tuning of the World* (1977) Schafer describes the soundscape as "any acoustic field of study. We may speak of a musical composition as a soundscape, or a radio program as a soundscape or an acoustic environment as a soundscape" (7). Here, Schafer's work departs from that of his predecessors in an important way; while previous thinkers often sought to define acoustic space in terms of geographic environments (Carpenter 1973; Carpenter and McLuhan 1960) *or* in terms of musical compositions (Boulez, Mendelssohn,

Schoenberg, etc.), Schafer's concept is meant to encompass any and all areas of acoustic inquiry. For example, in *Voices of Tyranny: Temples of Silence* (1993), he further emphasizes this conceptual breadth, defining "soundscape" as a word meant "to imply all or any acoustical environments – all the sounds heard in a shopping mall for instance, or on a farm, or in an airport, or on a radio station – any environment that one might temporarily frame for study" (104). As a "frame for study," "soundscape" thus describes both a medium *and* a method. As Emily Thompson (2002) and Paul Rodaway (1994) note, a soundscape is not simply an environment but also a way of perceiving and analyzing that environment as well. This is particularly evident in Schafer's breakdown of three key variables of aural perception: keynote sounds, signals, and soundmarks (1977, 9). Building from the works of Gestalt psychologists, Schafer begins by defining "keynote sounds"[6] as the *ground* of a soundscape, or as the sonic background against which other sounds are able to appear. These sounds are often created by the physical geography or climate of an environment, i.e., the sounds of water features, winds, forests, insects, etc. (1977, 10). While walking my dog in the morning, for example, the sounds of birds in the winter or cicadas in the summer often constitute the keynote sounds of my neighborhood soundscape. And while Schafer holds that keynote sounds are not listened to consciously, "the fact that they are ubiquitously there suggests the possibility of a deep and pervasive influence on our behavior and moods" (Schafer 1977, 9). In other words, while I may not actively listen to the bird calls on our morning walks, their ubiquitous presence nonetheless proves fundamental to my experience of the soundscape, so much so that their sudden absence would fundamentally change my experience of the neighborhood.

[6] Schafer also notes the compositional origins of the term, writing "Keynote is a musical term; it is the note that identifies the key or tonality of a particular composition. It is the anchor or fundamental tone and although the material may modulate around it, often obscuring its importance, it is in reference to this point that everything else takes on its special meaning" (1977, 9).

Riffing off Dugal McKinnon (2013), I subsequently interpret keynotes as those sounds that are *overheard* within a given soundscape. Describing the compositional function of John Cage's famed *4'33"*, McKinnon characterizes Cagean works as "giv[ing] attention to what is already there to be heard–all sound–and which is often ignored, or, in a long obsolete sense of the word, overheard (as in overlooked), by attention to what is supposed to be heard (music and speech)" (2013, 71). Following McKinnon's use of the term, I suggest that keynote sounds are likewise "overheard" insofar as they are ignored or "overlooked" in favor of what is supposed to be heard, i.e., the "figures" of a soundscape. Beyond McKinnon's use, however, keynote sounds are also overheard in a *second* sense, as they are still heard even without conscious intent or knowledge. This is why Schafer argues that these sounds "cannot be overlooked, for keynote sounds become listening habits in spite of themselves" (1977, 9). In other words, despite keynote sounds' "overheard" quality, we anticipate them, thereby informing a protentional horizon of aural perception.

In contrast to the "overheard" quality of keynote sounds, Schafer defines "signals" as "foreground sounds that are listened to consciously" (1977, 10). Whereas keynote sounds constitute the *ground* of aural perception, signals serve as the sonic *figures* that listeners actively attend to. Popular examples of signals include "acoustic warning devices" such as sirens, bells, and horns– devices specifically designed to grab listeners' attention (Schafer 1977, 10). While Schafer spends an appreciable amount of time focusing on these sounds in *The Soundscape* (e.g., on the evolution of fire alarms through the twentieth century), he nonetheless maintains that "any sound can be listened to consciously, and any sound can become a figure or signal" (1977, 10). In claiming that "any sound can become a signal," Schafer productively troubles the boundaries between the different features of the soundscape. For example, if I were to turn my attention toward

a bird singing on my morning walk, this sound would cease to be a keynote and would instead become a sonic *signal*. If, however, my attention is redirected to the sound of my dog barking, the bird song would cease to be a signal and would become a keynote sound once more. Signals are thus signals by virtue of the attention that is directed towards them, whether that be the attention of an individual or of an entire community (Schafer 1977, 10).

Because of the porosity between these two terms, the difference between keynote sounds and signals is not primarily ontological but *phenomenological*. In other words, keynote sounds and signals should not be understood as distinct "types" or "species" of sounds within the soundscape, but as different valences within a perceptual horizon. We can deepen this thought if we turn to the work of Edmund Husserl, particularly because as a "frame for study," Schafer's soundscape is decidedly phenomenological. In "framing" a specific field of acoustic inquiry, the soundscape employs a sort of phenomenological *epoché*, or a "bracketing" of prior judgements and theses in order to reflect on sonic phenomena as they unfold through lived experience. Such a reading largely coincides with Schafer's own description of the soundscape, particularly in his later works. In *Voices of Tyranny* (1993), for example, Schafer writes: "what I urging [sic] is a phenomenological approach to broadcasting to replace the humanistic … let the phenomena of the world *speak for themselves*, in their own voices, in their own time" (142; emphasis added). Doubtlessly inspired by Cage's work,[7] Schafer uses this text to call for a return to sounds-as-sounds, or for a return to sonic events as they occur in concrete places and situations. In his keynote address "I Have Never Seen a Sound" delivered at the 12th International Congress of Sound and

[7] Schafer regularly cites Cage as a major source of inspiration throughout his works. In *The Soundscape*, for example, he ties his conception of the world as a "macrocosmic musical composition" to "the opening-out of the time-an-space container we call compositions and concert halls [that] allow the introduction of a whole new world of sounds outside of them (in Cage's *4'33" Silence* we hear only the sounds external to the composition itself, which is merely one protracted caesura)" (1977, 5).

Vibration (2006), he continues this call, asking audience members: "what would be the benefits of a more phenomenological approach to acoustics– that is, an approach that uses the naked ear as a guide rather than instruments and visual projections?" (13). The ultimate goal of soundscape studies, then, is a pedagogical one; by letting the sonic phenomena of the world speak for themselves, Schafer aspires to get people to critically engage with the sounds around them.

Beyond this direct invocation of phenomenological language, I argue that Schafer's concept may be further elaborated through a direct engagement with Husserl's work. Mathematician-turned-philosopher, Husserl began developing phenomenology in response to the rise of psychologism in twentieth-century Europe. Critical of psychologists' tendency to "[dismiss] the tension in understanding truth one-sidedly in favor of subjectively situated achievements" (Held 2003, 11), Husserl nonetheless recognized the need for a rigorous critique of reason, as he believed that reason had –in the realms of logic and formal analytic procedures– become alienated from the life-world. In other words, Husserl sought to create a rigorous, normative science capable of maintaining a relation to "subject-relative, originary manners of givenness" (Held 2003, 12). Caught between "the Scylla and Charybdis of logicizing structuralism and psychologist geneticism" (Derrida 2002, 198), Husserl held that the task of the philosopher was "to somehow retain our intuitive insight into experience without sacrificing the power of formal apophansis" (Liberman 2007, 9).

To accomplish this difficult goal, Husserl offers phenomenology as a presuppositionless "science of 'phenomena'" (2014, 3), or as a method capable of analyzing phenomena as they appear to us as intuitions. Such a method requires three primary operations: the phenomenological epoché, the phenomenological reduction, and the eidetic reduction. To begin, the phenomenological "epoché" requires "that we *completely withhold judgment regarding the*

doctrinal content of all previous philosophy and carry out all our demonstrations within the framework of withholding such judgment" (Husserl 2014, 33; emphasis in original). In other words, the phenomenological epoché tasks us with suspending prior theses and judgments about the world in order to "[orient] oneself to the *things themselves* [*Sachen selbst*]" (Husserl 2014, 34-35; emphasis in original), or to orient oneself to the phenomena of the world as they appear "in the subjective processes of achievements of intuitive self-givenness" (Held 2003, 13). At its most fundamental level, phenomenology thus strives to show how lived experience can serve as legitimate sources of knowledge, and that each of these intuitions "is to be taken simply as what it affords itself as" (Husserl 2014, 43). Therefore, Schafer's charge to let sounds "speak for themselves" largely echoes Husserl's own *Sachen selbst*, insofar as both ask us to attend to (sonic) phenomena as they appear in and through lived experience.

Reading Husserl and Schafer together, Schafer's work provides a call to a return to *the sounds themselves* (*Klänge selbst)*, or for a return to sonic phenomena as they unfold through intentional processes of aural intuition.[8] Here, "intentional processes" refers to Husserl's notion of "intentionality." In *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, Husserl characterizes consciousness as always being *intentional*, or as having "the fundamental character of being a consciousness of something, an 'intentional lived experience'" (2001a, 19). In other words, "intentionality" describes the "aboutness" of consciousness, or how consciousness is always directed or oriented. Within the context of sound studies, Schafer likewise characterizes the soundscape as "consist[ing] of events *heard*" (1977, 8; emphasis in original), events that direct our attention in specific ways. For example, Schafer's description of signals largely parallels Husserl's

[8] Schafer's writings on soundscape "tourism" also apply well here. In *The Soundscape*, for example, Schafer suggests that entering a new soundscape challenges us to "bracket" our prior theses and judgments and "enables a person to become detached from the functioning environment in order to perceive it as an object of curiosity and aesthetic enjoyment" (1977, 212).

work on act-intentionality. Signals are, by definition, sounds we find ourselves oriented towards (Schafer 1977, 10). Therefore, we may re-interpret signals as the *intentional objects* of aural perception, for they act as the "consciousness *of* something" within the soundscape. This is not to reduce signals to sonic "objects," nor is it to characterize the "aboutness" of consciousness as being solely object-driven. Rather, in describing signals as the "intentional objects" of aural perception, I argue that they operate as a specific mode of intentional *awareness*, i.e., a mode of orienting ourselves within sonic worlds. This is further supported by Schafer's claim that "any sound can become a figure or signal" (1977, 10), as different valences of the perceptual horizon (e.g., keynotes, signals, etc.) shift through different modes of perceptual engagement.

In describing signals as the intentional objects of aural perception, however, I do not mean to reduce the soundscape to a realm of intentional acts. So, too, do I resist the popular misconception that phenomenology concerns only what is accessible through conscious awareness. In *Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation* (1999), Dan Zahavi marks a distinction between surface phenomenology and depth phenomenology, writing that "the moment phenomenology moves beyond an investigation of object-manifestation and act-intentionality, it enters a realm that has traditionally been called the unconscious" (207). While Zahavi perhaps downplays phenomenologists' failure to respond adequately to psychoanalytic critique,[9] he nonetheless demonstrates that Husserl was interested in a notion of the sub- or pre-conscious in his development of active and passive syntheses. To begin, "active synthesis" refers to the ego's explicit involvement in the constitution of perceptual objects; in active synthesis, I

[9] It is arguable whether the model Husserl provides can really be considered "unconscious" in any rigorous, Freudian sense. As Talia Welsh explains, "the Freudian rebuttal would be that phenomenologists misunderstand an essential distinction: unconscious versus pre-conscious. The unconscious that phenomenology investigates in 'depth phenomenology' is the pre-conscious of psychoanalysis" (Welsh 2002, 166). This is due in part to the radically unknowable nature of the Freudian unconscious that phenomenology cannot account for.

approach the world through "an active, objectivating orientation" (Husserl 1973, 71). Returning to our focus on the soundscape, we can think of sonic signals as operating within this mode, for we attune to signals through an "active, objectivating" grasp. Our sphere of aural perception, however, is not limited to this active mode of engagement. Instead, Husserl holds that it also requires "an original passivity not only of sensuous givens, of 'sense data,' but also of feeling" (1973, 71). "Passive synthesis," then, refers to "a uniting or combining [through association] that takes place without the active involvement of the ego" (Moran and Cohen 2012, 236). Unlike active synthesis, passive synthesis does *not* require an individual's conscious awareness, and while active synthesis is central to our intentional grasping of objects, it is through passivity (and, more specifically, through primary and secondary passivity)[10] that a unified experience of consciousness becomes possible.

Approaching Schafer's soundscape through Husserlian depth phenomenology, it seems that keynote sounds operate within the realm of passive synthesis. Like the "sense data" of original passivity, keynote sounds are not grasped through an active, objectivating orientation. Rather, keynote sounds are notable insofar as they are "overheard," i.e., are heard without the express intent of a listener. As with passive synthesis, then, keynote sounds prove to be an unintentional[11] yet fundamental valence of the soundscape, as they ultimately constitute "the ground over which the figure of signals becomes conspicuous" (Schafer 1977, 60). This is not to say that keynotes nor sense data provide a "neutral background" against which other things appear, however. Rather, as Husserl explains:

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[10] As Moran and Cohen clarify: "primary passivity refers to the unification of the flow of my own life experiences; secondary passivity refers to the experiences of the intersubjective socially constituted world as already pregiven and formed" (2012, 236). Already, then, Husserl's notion of intentionality is inherently intersubjective and concerned with the socio-historical life world.

[11] Here, I mean "unintentional" in a colloquial sense, not the phenomenological sense.

> Something can be noticed in a primary fashion; if this is the case, then the ego is attentive <in> a distinctive sense, the ego has turned toward it in a primary sense; but something can also be noticed in a secondary fashion; a single thing or several things in the unity of a single grasping can be called to our attention in a primary fashion or can be noticed in a secondary fashion … The affections proceed to the ego from out of the passivity of the background. (2001a, 276)

In writing that some things are noticed in a "primary fashion," Husserl is most likely referring to active modes of intentional awareness. By contrast, things noticed in a "secondary fashion" are not actively grasped, but nevertheless shape what is likely to appear as well as *how* it appears in the primary fashion. Returning to Schafer's soundscape, we can therefore say that keynotes (like sense data) serve as fundamental orientations within the soundscape, albeit ones distinct from (but necessarily tied up with) the active, objectivating orientation of signals.

What's more, keynote sounds can be seen as operating within the realm of passive synthesis insofar as they share a certain affective force. Just as Husserl describes passive synthesis as involving an original passivity of sense data and *feeling*, so, too, does Schafer characterize keynote sounds as "influenc[ing] the behavior of the people or set[ting] up rhythms that are carried over into other aspects of life" (1977, 48). Indeed, part of what makes keynote sounds so powerful is their ability to shape the affective character of a soundscape, a character which "underpin[s] other more fugitive or novel sound events" (Schafer 1977, 48). This directly connects with Husserl's notions of affection and allure. Comparing affection to more active modes of intentional awareness, Husserl writes: "the constituted object exercises an affection, exercises an allure of gradually varying intensity … the ego is aroused in a special way here, although it does not yet orient itself actively" (2001a, 280). In other words, just as Schafer characterizes the keynote sound as having a sort of affective *pull* around which other sounds are modulated (1977, 9) so, too, does

Husserl describe affection as a "tendency" of the perceptual horizon that influences the ego "to turn toward and to pass over into active objectivation" (2001a, 280).[12]

In adopting a phenomenological approach to the soundscape, however, a number of possible criticisms arise. Though I have argued that the phenomenological aspects of Schafer's soundscape (i.e., soundscape as "bracketing," keynote sounds, signals, etc.) strengthen his overall concept, other scholars (Born 2019; Hosokawa 1984; Sterne 2015) suggest that these elements weaken his work. As such, I will now focus on two possible critiques of my account: 1) the Subject Critique; and 2) the Euclidean Critique. While each critique focuses on different elements of Schafer's work, both pose important challenges for a phenomenological reinterpretation of the soundscape, challenges that require careful consideration.

2.1 *The Subject Critique*

As discussed in section one, Schafer often describes the soundscape as a "frame for study," or as a *method* for engaging with acoustic environments. If the soundscape is a method, however, what role does the *subject* (i.e., the listener who "frames" the acoustic field) play in the soundscape's description/creation? Or, put differently: does the soundscape begin and end with the human subject (Rodaway 1994, 8)? For many scholars, "soundscape" is used in two, related senses: 1) to describe a sonic environment, and 2) to describe how a sonic environment is perceived. In *Sensuous Geographies: Body, Sense, and Place* (1994) Rodaway writes:

> There is a tension within Schafer's use of the term. On the one hand, and more often, he uses 'soundscape' to refer to a geographical space of particular sonic characteristics … This suggests soundscape as an aesthetic object, not unlike painting or musical composition (the latter being one of Schafer's own analogies). (86)

[12] Interestingly, Husserl uses a sonic metaphor in explaining the relationship between affective awakening and active, egoic intentionality. He writes: "in its transition to pianissimo, the beginning loud tone carries the tone in affective force to the softest piano that would otherwise remain unnoticeable" (2001a, 200).

As "an aesthetic object," Rodaway approaches Schafer's soundscape through a subject-object dialectic. In other words, Rodaway takes Schafer to be describing the soundscape as a sonic "object" that is then grasped by an autonomous, listening subject. In doing so, Rodaway reads Schafer's work in a manner similar to that of French composer Pierre Schaeffer. Rising to fame during the mid-twentieth century, Schaeffer was best known for his development of *musique concrète,* or an aesthetic method which takes recorded, everyday sounds as the "raw material" of musical composition. Citing Husserlian phenomenology, Schaeffer argues that musique concrète is best achieved through processes of "reduced listening," or acousmatic practices wherein one separates listeners from the sources of a sound so as to arrive at a sound object, or *l'objet sonore* (Chow 2019, 7). Much like Pythagoras' veil,[13] Schaeffer utilizes phenomenology as a tool to bracket or suspend a sound's (visual) source in order to ultimately hear "the 'in-itself-ness' of sound" (Dack 2019, 49).

While the soundscape does not require the same sort of acousmatic listening, Rodaway's interpretation of the soundscape (i.e., soundscape as an object of aesthetic contemplation) suggests that Schafer is similarly concerned with the objectivity of sound. In addition to this interpretation, however, Rodaway describes a *second* sense in which Schafer uses the term: soundscape as a form of auditory experience (1994, 87). As an auditory experience, Rodaway explains that the soundscape "is less an object for contemplation and more a process of engagement with the environment … the soundscape moves with sentients through the environment and it continually changes with our behavioural interactions" (1994, 87). In other words, soundscape-as-auditory-

[13] As Michel Chion summarizes in *The Voice in Cinema*, acousmatic "was apparently the name assigned to a Pythagorean sect whose followers would listen to the master speak *behind a curtain* as the story goes, so that the sight of the speaker wouldn't distract from the message" (1999, 19). However, as Brian Kane notes in *Sound Unseen: Acousmatic Sound in Theory and Practice*, this story is only a partial account of a broader myth, one which traditions like Schaeffer's have since established a "mythic identification" with (Kane 2014, 45).

experience cannot be understood in terms of a discrete object, for the soundscape moves with (and ultimately, depends on) the experiences of a listening, feeling subject. Indeed, in "The Stereophonic Spaces of Soundscape" (2015) Sterne echoes this view while also troubling Rodaway's first interpretation. Sterne writes: "I challenge the widely accepted notion that soundscape is both a physical space and its representation … soundscape is a media concept, and it is a concept that demands its listener experience the broader phenomena of sonic mediations from a stable and surprisingly delicate position" (2015, 67). By "media concept," Sterne means that the term "soundscape" belongs to a specific intellectual-historical milieu, one that it inevitably participates in while also attempting to historicize/critique (67). Because of this, Sterne concludes:

> Schafer proposes a notion of sonic space that is effectively created through the act of comprehension, and a single comprehending subject–or comprehending subjects, one at a time. We might call the audioposition created by this particular composition a situated omniscience, one that extends a particular kind of Enlightenment subject into the listening space. As with other Enlightenment subjects … it stretches toward a subjectivity that is at once somewhere and everywhere. (2015, 73)

As with popular critiques of phenomenology, Sterne's primary critique of Schafer's soundscape concerns its reliance on a particular notion of the "subject," a notion inextricably steeped in Enlightenment notions of autonomy, containment, and enclosure (Crawley 2017, 44).[14] More specifically, Sterne holds that the "soundscape" ultimately depends on "the aspirational tendency for and desiring of an enclosed, bordered, coherent, stable subject position, place in space and time" (Crawley 2017, 119). For example, in recycling terms often used in ocularcentric discourse

[14] Here, Sterne echoes arguments made by Ashon Crawley in his groundbreaking work, *Blackpentacostal Breath: The Aesthetics of Possibility* (2017). There, Crawley explores how Western philosophy and theology often rely on liberal logics of subjectivity. He explains: "Enlightenment thought constructed its conception of the subject through a desire for reducing openness and vulnerability, Enlightenment's subject was one created by the shoring up against movement, created a subject through containment and enclosure" (2017, 44). In other words, Enlightenment's subject depends on a sort of exclusion: in delimiting *who* or *what* is included in (inter)subjective experience, subjectivity becomes intelligible only in relation to that which it externalizes. In doing so, Enlightenment's subject privileges certain experiences whilst marginalizing others, thereby harming those peoples (Black folks, Indigenous folks, etc.) for whom subjectivity has been repeatedly denied.

("earwitness," "clairaudience," "ear cleaning," etc.) Sterne warns that the soundscape risks ontologizing a particular synthesis through the comprehending acts of an all-knowing, all-grasping subject. In doing so, he argues that Schafer fails to consider how the concept may overhear other experiences and histories, thereby privileging certain ways of listening and sounding. Sterne therefore concludes that Schafer is unable to offer a dynamic depiction of the soundscape, one wherein the concept "is simultaneously a set of sonic-spatial practices, the metadiscourses that describe them and the conditions of possibility for experiencing that space" (Sterne 2015, 79-80).

Following Sterne, I therefore argue that the "Subject Critique" of the soundscape is twofold: first, it suggests that the soundscape is irrevocably steeped in Enlightenment notions of subjectivity; and second, because of the soundscape's focus on the "audioposition" of the listener, the concept risks *overhearing* the materiality of sound itself, a thought elaborated in "On Nonhuman Sound– Sound as Relation" by Georgina Born. There, Born criticizes overly subjectivist approaches to sound studies, calling instead for a relational model of both human *and* nonhuman sound (2019, 187). For Born, it is not enough to talk about how listening subjects create and modulate sound; rather, she emphasizes sound's ability to act on and influence listening subjects. Here, Born's argument largely parallels James J. Gibson's work on *affordances*, a term used to describe what an environment offers that is neither wholly physical nor phenomenal (Gibson 1986, 143).[15] Motivated by Gestalt psychologists' discussion of "valences," Gibson explains that "the perceiving of an affordance is not a process of perceiving a value-free physical object to which meaning is somehow added … it is a process of perceiving a value-rich ecological object" (1986, 140). Bringing Gibson's concept to bear on sound studies, Born likewise questions

[15] A similar argument is also made in John Dewey's "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," wherein Dewey criticizes psychologists' reliance on a reflex arc idea which posits sensory stimuli and motor responses as distinct psychical entities (Dewey 1896, 360).

how nonhuman sounds destabilize attempts to neatly divide the sonic world into subjects and objects, causes and effects, etc. (Born 2019, 197). Situating her account within the literature, she writes:

> Nonhuman sound, in the guise of environmental sound or noise, has of course, featured in a number of ways in the development of the fields now coalescing as sound studies. Most obviously, it features in the tradition of acoustic ecology initiated in the 1970s by R. Murray Schafer, who coined the concept of the soundscape and ushered in scholarship and activism based on location recordings, as well as encouraging the work of field recording-based sound art and environmental sound artists. (Born 2019, 190)

As a scholar deeply invested in the study and preservation of nonhuman sound, Schafer is inarguably aware of the role affordances play within the soundscape. For example, in describing keynote sounds as being capable of shaping a society's behaviors and moods, Schafer approaches sounds as necessarily value- and affect-laden/producing. Like Heidegger's motorcycle,[16] Schafer's concept shows that what we encounter in the soundscape are not simply sounds, but *hearkenings* that both invite and discourage different ways of being in sonic worlds (Heidegger 2008, 207).

While Born thus praises Schafer for his attempts to center environmental sound, she nonetheless maintains that his work perpetuates a sort of anthropocentrism. She explains: "in the couplet 'human subject-nonhuman sound,' it is the first term that is privileged [within the soundscape] … nonhuman sound provid[es] a kind of object, ground, context, or wild on the basis of which the active figure of the human subject, or culture, does its perceptual, creative, or civilizing work" (Born 2019, 190). Such a move is particularly evident in Schafer's description of the soundscape as a *pedagogical* concept. For example, in *Voices of Tyranny* he maintains that the

[16] In *Being and Time*, Heidegger offers "hearkening" as a phenomenal potentiality distinct from psychological understandings of hearing. Important in this concept is an emphasis on the alongside-ness of what is ready-to-hand; as Heidegger argues, "what we 'first' hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking waggon, the motor-cycle … the fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells *alongside* what is ready-to-hand within-the-world" (2008, 207).

goal of soundscape studies "is to get whole populations to listen more carefully and critically, as I believe they once did, and to learn the extent to which they can control their own acoustic environments and resist undesirable manipulations" (1993, 113). Beyond the troublingly nativist and anti-modernist implications of such a claim,[17] Schafer's desire to "control" the sonic environment and "resist" undesirable manipulations belie the ways in which sounds inevitably resist and/or evade such control. As Born notes: "because of its materiality/immateriality, sound invites relational analysis, and this is stronger when it takes account of the hybrid multiplicity of the sonic assemblage as a temporalized relay of nonhuman and human mediations" (2019, 196). In other words, if a phenomenology of the soundscape is to escape the pitfalls of subjectivist and anthropocentric logics, it must account for the complex ways in which sounds mediate (and are mediated by) human bodies and address how these mediations can never be fully captured or contained through acts of aural perception.

2.2 *The Euclidean Critique*

The Euclidean Critique concerns the soundscape's understanding of *space*. As previously discussed, Sterne argues that Schafer's concept requires that listeners experience the soundscape from a "surprisingly stable" sonic location, or an *audioposition* "carried by coding foregrounds and backgrounds" (Verma 2012, 35). For example, in comparing rural towns to cities, Schafer makes a distinction between "hi-fi" and "lo-fi" soundscapes, where "hi-fi" describes soundscapes with low ambient noise levels and clear sonic signals (i.e., clear distinctions between "background"

[17] Schafer's sonic nativism has been well criticized throughout the literature. For example, in "Sounds Like City" artist Sophie Arkette criticizes the nativism of Schafer's rural/urban dichotomy, arguing that "to say that the urban supervenes upon the natural soundscape, and that urban sounds can be cleaned up to resemble natural sounds is to misread the dynamics of city spaces" (2004, 162). In other words, Arkette problematizes Schafer's prioritizing of "pure" or "natural" sounds over and against "artificial" ones, suggesting that such a division is not so easily maintained (Arkette 2004, 162).

and "foreground") and "lo-fi" describes soundscapes that "are obscured in an overdense population of sounds" (1977, 43).[18] "Lo-fi" soundscapes are thus "lo-fi" (or "low-fidelity") by virtue of the listener's inability to clearly differentiate figure from ground. By approaching the soundscape in this way, Schafer's concept therefore relies on a very specific notion of sonic *space*. As Sterne contends:

> [The soundscape's] essence is a stable audioposition, one from which the entire world is available to be heard. Recall that Schafer considered sonic space something empty, except for the sounds moving through it. It is, in a sense, classic Euclidean space–a set of intersecting flat planes with no contours, curves, or densities; a container for action, but nothing more. (2015, 79)

In claiming that Schafer "considered sonic space something empty," Sterne is likely referencing his early writings on the spatiality of music. For example, in *Ear Cleaning: Notes for an Experimental Music Course* (1967) Schafer writes: "there is a difference in talking about space and attempting to fill that space with objects. The space to which we refer is empty save for the sounds cutting through it" (13). Here, Schafer appears to describe sonic space as a homogenous plane through which sounds travel. In doing so, he assumes a sort of Euclidean and Cartesian approach, one where the soundscape (as a "container for action") is thought to be empty until filled by atomistic sound events.

Preceding Sterne's critique by about thirty years, Shuhei Hosokawa likewise questions the spatial logic of Schafer's work in his groundbreaking article, "The Walkman Effect" (1984). There, Hosokawa claims that what the soundscape ultimately lacks is "the concept of plurality … [w]e do not live, as Schafer implicitly assumes, in a one-layered 'sonoferous' reality, in which one factor can exercise its influence on total reality homogeneously" (174-175). As with Sterne's recognition of sound's contours and densities, Hosokawa likewise emphasizes the aspects of sound

[18]Arkette swiftly dismisses this attempted distinction, suggesting that *both* hi-fi and lo-fi soundscapes contain "acoustic profiles and soundmarkers [that] are in constant transition" (2004, 162).

that cannot be grasped by planar thinking. Building from the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, he argues for a reconceptualization of sonic space as "a multi-layered structure, in which one layer, even if identifiable as such, shifts away from another and no definite causality is found" (1984, 175). Here, I read Hosokawa's "multi-layered structure" together with Deleuze and Guattari's concept of smooth and striated space. In *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (2018), Deleuze and Guattari begin by describing "striated space" as being fundamentally Euclidean, i.e., as being homogenous and divisible. As a single-layered space "in which one factor can exercise its influence on total reality homogeneously," Hosokawa therefore aligns Schafer's soundscape with Deleuze and Guattari's concept of striation. In contrast to striated space, Deleuze and Guattari define "smooth space" as "a space of contact, of small tactile or manual actions of contact, rather than a visual space like Euclid's striated space" (2018, 371). Whereas striated space is understood as being objective, numerable, and occupiable, smooth space "is wedded to a very particular type of multiplicity: nonmetric, accentered, rhizomatic multiplicities" (Deleuze and Guattari 2018, 371). As with Hosokawa's walkman listener, within smooth space "one 'distributes' oneself in an open space, according to frequencies and in the course of one's crossings" (Deleuze and Guattari 2018, 481). Smooth space is thus understood as heterogeneous yet indivisible; it is not a container within which objective identities are juxtaposed, but "a quality in which everything is composed of everything else" (Wambacq 2017, 133).

Returning to the discussion at hand, the Euclidean Critique therefore poses a significant challenge for a phenomenological reinterpretation of the soundscape. Just as Hosokawa criticizes Schafer for his Euclidean leanings, philosophers like Deleuze critique phenomenology for its inability to think of space in accentered, nonmetric ways. In *Foucault* (1988) Deleuze recounts phenomenologists' struggle to work past Husserlian intentionality. Describing the topological shift

present in both Merleau-Ponty's notion of the "flesh" and Martin Heidegger's *Dasein*, he explains: "intentionality is still generated in a Euclidean space that prevents it from understandings itself, and must be surpassed by another, 'topological', space which establishes contact between the Outside and Inside, the most distant, the most deep" (Deleuze 1988, 110). In other words, in distinguishing between an "inside" (i.e., subject, figure, etc.) and an "outside" (object, ground, etc.), phenomenology perpetuates the same sort of Euclidean logic present in ocularcentric thinking. As with the Subject Critique, then, the Euclidean Critique ultimately suggests that Husserlian intentionality (and, by extension, Schafer's intentional aurality) are inevitably wedded to a subject/object dialectic that cannot accurately grasp the strange ontology and topology of sound.

3. *Response: Soundscape as Phenomenological Topology*

In responding to these criticisms, my (re)turn to phenomenology may at first seem moot: as previously discussed, phenomenology is often critiqued on the same grounds as Schafer's work, both for its Euclidean leanings and for its inability to think beyond the subject. While tracing Deleuze's critique of phenomenology in *The Logic of Sense*, for example, Nicolas de Warren writes: "what remains unthinkable in Husserl is an impersonal transcendental field and transcendental genesis … presupposing nothing of what it engenders" (2014, 10-11). In other words, Deleuze's critique of phenomenology largely parallels sound theorists' critique of the soundscape; by grounding their methodologies in the intentional acts of a perceiving subject, both Husserl and Schafer are accused of perpetuating Enlightenment notions of subjectivity. What's more, while Husserl directly engages with the works of Bernhard Riemann in his development of manifolds, some scholars nonetheless hold that his work misses the importance of non-Euclidean thought. For example, in *Foucault* (1988) Deleuze writes:

> It was Riemann in the field of physics and mathematics who dreamed up the notion of 'multiplicity' and different kinds of multiplicities. The philosophical importance of this notion then appeared in Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, and in Bergson's *Essay on the Immediate Given of Awareness* … but the notion died in these two areas, either because it became obscured by a newly restored simple dualism arising from a distinction made between genres, or because it tended to assume the status of an axiomatic system. (13)

In arguing that phenomenology obscures Riemannian multiplicity by restoring a "simple dualism," Deleuze means that Husserl ultimately collapses multiplicity into a one-many opposition when the core of Riemann's work "is the constitution of a substantive in which 'multiple' ceases to be a predicate opposed to the One, or attributed to a subject identified as one" (Deleuze 1988, 13-14). In the context of the soundscape, Husserl's account thus seems unable to address the multiplicitous ways in which sounds mediate and are mediated by (re)sounding bodies, such that a dualism like "listening subject/sounding object" becomes intractable. How, then, can a phenomenological approach to the soundscape possibly advance our understandings of place and sound?

3.1 *Soundscape as Ontologically Anarchical*

Moving forward, I argue that it is actually *because* of these shared criticisms that phenomenology proves to be such a powerful resource for Schafer's soundscape. More specifically, in critiquing the soundscape on phenomenological grounds, I argue that scholars like Sterne and Hosokawa ultimately miss the radical potential of Schafer's concept. Let us begin with the Subject Critique. In section 2.1, I discussed Rodaway's first characterization of the soundscape as "an [aesthetic] object for contemplation" (1994, 87). I compared Rodaway's interpretation of the soundscape to the works of Pierre Schaeffer, who utilizes Husserlian phenomenology in his development of *l'objet sonore*. Reading these scholars together, one might conclude that Schafer's effort to return to "sounds themselves" (and with it, Husserl's "to the things themselves") echo Pierre Schaeffer's

desire to arrive at sonic objecthood. Such interpretations, however, fundamentally miss the point. Stephen Boos explains:

> By 'the things themselves,' Husserl does not mean sensible things, the things of the senses, phenomenology is not a call for a return to empiricism, as is sometimes mistakenly thought, but a call for a return to the world of phenomena – the world as it appears to us in and through 'lived' experiences. (2008, 6)[19]

As discussed in section 1, Husserl developed phenomenology at a time when psychologism was on the rise in European academic circles. In calling for a return "to the things themselves," however, Husserl does not offer an anti-subjective rallying cry as some philosophers have suggested.[20] Rather, "to the things themselves" marks an attempt to reject the trappings of *both* psychologism and scientific empiricism. Indeed, Husserl's entire project can be read as a response to Franz Brentano's inner-outer distinction, a distinction which Husserl believed "missed the factual permeation of the subjective and the objective" (Nitsche 2018, 20). Such "factual permeation" is particularly evident in his characterization of the *noema*, or "the-object-in-the-How-of-its-giveness" (Held 2003, 8). As with Boos' reading of "the things themselves," Husserl does not interpret the noema as being relegable to a wholly subjective or objective realm. Rather, the noema operates through a sort of paradox; as Jacques Derrida explains in *Writing and Difference*, "[the noema] is neither of the world nor of consciousness, but it is the world or something of the world for consciousness … this real nonappurtenance to any region at all, even to the archi-region, this *anarchy of the noema* is the root and very possibility of objectivity and meaning" (2002, 204, emphasis mine). In other words, just as Husserl believes that the

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[19] This is made all the more apparent in the original German, where *Dinge* describes "objects/things" and *Sachen* (as in Husser's "Sachen selbst") describes matters or phenomena.

[20] As Klaus Held recounts: "Husserl later had to defend himself against a one-sided objectivist interpretation of his early critique of psychologism. In addition to dealing with this later interpretation of his *Prolegomena,* Husserl also had to take a position against a development within the very movement which he himself had launched … they [i.e., some of his followers] understood phenomenology to be a '*turning toward the object*,' and they made his maxim '*to the things themselves*' into their battle cry" (2003, 12).

phenomenological sphere cannot be neatly aligned with "inner" or "psychical" experience, so too might we approach the phenomena of lived experience as being ontologically *anarchical*. To be clear, Husserl himself would not use this language; however, I justify my use of "ontological anarchy" vis. Steven Crowell's examination of ontology in Husserlian phenomenology. Looking specifically at Husserl's concept of immanence, Crowell questions how Husserl maintains both an anti-Cartesian motivation and a commitment to "the methodological priority of the first-person perspective" (2013, 105). This leads Crowell to argue "that the phenomenological concept of immanence yields a *non*-ontological, *quasi*-inferential concept of representation" (2013, 105). By non-ontological, Crowell (with reference to John Drummond) means that the noema is not ontologically distinguished from the intended object; rather, following the East Coast interpretation,[21] the noema is not "an instrumental entity distinct from the intended object, an avenue of access" (Drummond 1990, 136). Rather, "the intended objectivity is contained within the noema just as it is intended" (Drummond 1990, 136).

Bringing Husserl's philosophy to bear on Schafer's, then, allows me to suggest that the anarchical qualities of the *noema* can also be found in Schafer's characterization of the *soundscape*. As a place and a way of making sense of that place, it cannot be said (pace Rodaway) that Schafer approaches the soundscape as an "aesthetic object." To be sure, throughout his writings Schafer goes to great lengths to distinguish his concept from Schaeffer's *l'objet sonore*. For example, in *The Soundscape* (1977) he writes: "when we focus on individual sounds in order to consider their associative meanings as signals, symbols, keynotes or soundmarks, I propose to

[21] Here, I am referencing the East Coast vs. West Coast debate about the noema. For West Coast thinkers like D. W. Smith and Ronald McIntyre, the noema is approached through a mediator theory, i.e., it is understood as an ideal meaning entity that mediates between consciousness and the object, or that entity "'through' which an object is intended" (Crowell 2013, 112). For East Coast thinkers like Drummond, however, the perceived object is a moment within the noema, creating a sort of object theory rather than a mediator theory.

call them *sound events*, to avoid confusion with sound objects, which are laboratory specimens … in other words, *a context is implied*" (131; emphasis added). Contrary to Schaeffer, then, Schafer does not approach the soundscape as an object for contemplation. Instead, he defines it as "a field of interactions, even when particularized into its component sound events … sounds affect and change one another (and us)" (1977, 131). By emphasizing how sounds change each other and us, Schafer thus echoes Husserl's description of the "factual permeation" of subjective and objective, such that the soundscape shares in the nonappertunance of the noema. Riffing off Derrida, then, Schafer's concept productively highlights what I will call the ontological *anarchy of the soundscape*, insofar as it underscores the complex mediated/mediating nature of sounds and their irreducibility to a subject-object dialectic.

In describing the soundscape as "a field of interactions" or a field of "events," however, Schafer's project inevitably enters into popular debates surrounding the ontology of sound. Within analytic philosophy, scholars typically approach sound ontology through one of three theories: the Property View, the Wave View, or the Event View. Popular within the philosophical tradition (e.g., Locke 1689; Pasnau 1999), the Property View defines sound as a *property* of sounding objects, i.e., tastes, smells, colors, etc. As Casey O'Callaghan explains in *Sounds: A Philosophical Theory*, the Property View "impl[ies] that sounds are dispositions to cause auditory experiences in suitably equipped perceivers … physical properties, manifest primitive, or simple properties, or mere projections of qualities of experiences" (2007, 15). Here, we might think of Schaeffer's *l'objet sonore*. In attempting to bracket the "source" of a sound through acousmatic listening, Schaeffer approaches sound as a property of sounding objects, a property that can be identified and isolated as a perceptual content. As O'Callaghan notes, however, the Property View faces several well-founded criticisms. For example, characterizing sounds as properties or qualities

misses the fact that sounds themselves contain different qualities, e.g., pitch, timbre, loudness, etc. (2007, 17). What's more, the Property View fails to grasp the multiplicitous nature of sound, such that a single "sounding object" can produce a number of discrete, overlapping sounds. At a concert, for example, audience members may hear both the static and crackle of the amp, as well as the voice of the singer amplified by it. While these sounds represent two distinct "audible particulars" (O'Callaghan 2007, 20), they nonetheless pertain to the same "sounding object." In this way, the Property View proves unable to speak to the wholeness and particularity of different sonic phenomena, ultimately offering us an ontologically limited understanding of sound.

While the Property View remains popular in certain branches of philosophy, the Wave View has gained a broader audience within the field of sound studies. Following the development of wave theory in physics, the Wave View suggests that sounds "are longitudinal pressure waves that travel from a source to our ears and that these waves are proximal causes of auditory experience" (O'Callaghan 2007, 24). In other words, the Wave View thinks of sounds as waves moving through a *medium*. At first, such a description may seem "surprisingly object-like" (O'Callaghan 2007, 25); indeed, from a Property View perspective, one might argue that the Wave View simply moves the "source" of a sound from object to medium. Against this view, however, O'Callaghan argues that an important feature of the Wave View is that the wave "happens to" or occurs within the medium (2007, 26). In other words, sound waves relate to a medium in a manner that is more event-like than object-like, for they involve dynamic processes of change over time. In this way, the Wave View more closely approximates the "factual permeation" of subjective and objective that Husserl describes, while also recognizing the complex materiality of sound as always occurring within and through *something* (e.g., air, water, etc.) rather than within a Euclidean field of "empty" space.

While it is thus "a strength of the wave view that it counts sounds as event-like particulars that persist through time" (O'Callaghan 2007, 28), the theory nevertheless has its own set of limitations. From a phenomenological standpoint, the Wave View struggles to explain the locatability and spatiality of sound. For example, while the loudness or softness of sounds is often correlated with a sound wave's amplitude, the Wave View cannot speak to the role that *location* plays in that correlation, i.e., how a loud sound heard as being far away is experienced differently than a close, soft sound. As O'Callaghan clarifies: "audible qualities of sounds thus are medium dependent. The medium is not the sole subject of sounds; neither is the object. To locate sounds we must locate the place where the objects interact with the medium" (2007, 56). Therefore, he offers a third possible theory of sound: the Event View.[22] According to O'Callaghan, the Event View proposes that sounds "are happenings that take place in one's environment … [they] *occur*, *take place*, and *last*" (2007, 57; emphasis in original). To clarify his use of "event," he suggests that philosophers "operate with an intuitive conception of events as potentially time-taking particulars– as happenings that may or may not essentially involve change. Events as I wish to understand them are immanent or concrete individuals located in space and time" (2007, 58). Distinct from the Wave View and the Property View, then, the Event View necessarily concerns the spatiality and temporality of sounds. As "happenings," sounds occur in specific places and unfold over time, speaking to their embeddedness within ever-changing sonic worlds.

[22] Such a view is not an altogether novel one. As O'Callaghan himself writes: "The view that sounds are events of objects or interacting bodies disturbing a surrounding medium in wavelike fashion is not without historical precedent. The common interpretation of Aristotle is that he held a version of the received view according to which sounds are waves (see Pasnau 1999, 2000). *De Anima* says that 'sound is a particular movement of air' (II, 8, 420b10). This hints at a wave conception of sounds. Aristotle, however, understands 'movement' as active, which yields a view that differs in important respects from the view that the sound is the motion of the air" (2007, 60).

While O'Callaghan's Event View thus highlights the situatedness of individual sounds, his account fails to adequately consider the *phenomenology* of auditory experience. As Born notes:

> What O'Callaghan offers … is an object- and event-centered theory of sound that resists anthropocentric and anthropomorphic assumptions and, importantly, that is relational within its physicalist remit. In his account, sound is a physical process initiated by a sound event … but he stops short of including in his relational account the contributions of hearing subjects. (2019, 192)

In arguing that O'Callaghan "stops short of including the contributions of hearing subjects," Born reveals how his account ultimately brackets the role of the listener in favor of material processes. It is here I argue that a phenomenological reading of the soundscape proves so valuable. At first glance, Schafer's concept might appear to align with O'Callaghan's Event View, particularly in his characterization of the soundscape as a "field of interactions."

What's more, in "Sound Ontology and the Brentano-Husserl Analysis of the Consciousness of Time" (2020), Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez suggests that Husserlian phenomenology supports a Property View (1) of sound, whereby sound is not a property of the sounding object, but a property of the perceiving mind (2020, 188). From these two readings, a phenomenological re-interpretation of the soundscape may appear deeply fraught: how can we possibly reconcile two seemingly incongruous theories of sound ontology?

By playing *with* rather than *against* this incongruity, however, a phenomenological approach to the soundscape is not only possible, but beneficial insofar as it productively troubles popular philosophical theories of sound. For example, whereas Méndez-Martínez suggests that Husserl's distinction between the experience of sound and sound itself supports a Property View, the anarchical nature of Husserl's *noema* actually disrupts any such efforts to neatly categorize sound ontologically. So, too, does the anarchy of Schafer's soundscape refuse to clarify "what ontological kind sounds belong to" (O'Callaghan 2007, 28). For example, while O'Callaghan's

Event View does not include the contributions of listening subjects, Schafer directly recognizes listeners' influence on the soundscape and the soundscape's influence on listeners in turn (e.g., the affective force of keynotes, the effects of noise pollution on signal clarity, etc.) Just as the nonappertunance of Husserl's noema "disrupts ontology itself" (de Warren 2014, 6) by adding a layer of complexity, so too does Schafer's soundscape productively disrupt *sonic* ontologies. Reading Schafer's concept through a phenomenological lens thus proves fruitful to both disciplines; not only does phenomenology help to clarify the novelty of Schafer's concept within the field of sound studies, but Schafer's concept also complicates and clarifies philosophical discourses on the ontology of sound.

3.2 *Soundscape as Topologically Anarchical*

Thus far, I have argued that a phenomenological approach to the soundscape proves capable of responding to the first part of the Subject Critique, i.e., interpretations of the soundscape as an aesthetic object. However, the second part of the Subject Critique (and with it, the Euclidean Critique) remain unanswered. In other words, does the soundscape begin and end with the listening subject, and if so, what does this mean for the soundscape's spatiality? While the last section investigated the anarchical nature of the soundscape's *ontology*, this section will explore the anarchical elements of the soundscape's *topology* through an engagement with the scopic-topological approaches of Martin Nitsche and Sara Ahmed.

As discussed in section 2.1, the second part of the Subject Critique concerns the soundscape's reliance on the intentional acts of a listening subject. For example, in "The Stereophonic Spaces of Soundscape," Sterne accuses Schafer of furthering a notion of sonic space created "through the act of comprehension, and a single comprehending subject" (Sterne 2015, 73). Because of this, Sterne argues that the soundscape "stretches toward a subjectivity that is at

once somewhere and everywhere," or a subjectivity founded upon a sort of "situated omniscience" (2015, 73). While Sterne does not directly engage with phenomenology in this chapter, his critiques of Schafer largely parallel criticisms made of phenomenological intentionality. For example, in "Feminism and Phenomenology: A Reply to Silvia Stoller" (2000) Shannon Sullivan builds upon her earlier work (see "Domination and Dialogue in Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*") to explore the limitations of Merleau-Ponty's "projective intentionality." Questioning the social and ethical implications of this concept, she explains:

> The problem with projective intentionality as a description of human experience … is that it tends to construe one's being-in-the-world as an activity of projecting one's intentions, values, and meanings onto objects and others in one's world. Projective intentionality is too unidirectional, as it were, not allowing sufficiently for a 'two-way, co-constitutive back-and-forth between my world and me. (Sullivan 2000, 184)

In arguing that projective intentionality is "too unidirectional," Sullivan echoes the concerns raised by Sterne in his critique of Schafer's soundscape. Just as Sterne criticizes the soundscape's reliance on a "single comprehending subject" that *overhears* the materiality and dynamism of sound, so too does Sullivan argue that projective intentionality is an inescapably solipsistic concept, one that cannot speak to the co-constitutive, fluid nature of being-in-the-world. And while Sullivan focuses primarily on Merleau-Ponty in this article, her critiques likewise apply to Husserlian phenomenology. For example, while Sullivan acknowledges Merleau-Ponty's efforts to describe the world as being intersubjectively constituted, she nonetheless concludes that "because of its problematic inheritance of Husserl's notion of intentionality Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology still retains the notion of a solitary life (now in the form of the body, rather than the transcendental ego) whose own projection is its primary preoccupation" (2000, 185). In other words, Sullivan connects the limitations of Merleau-Ponty's concept back to the solipsism of Husserl's transcendental ego,

which she believes to be incapable of grasping how meaning-making occurs interpersonally and interactively.

Responding to these criticisms, I suggest that another, more nuanced understanding of intentionality is possible, and with it, another understanding of the soundscape's subjectivity. To begin, Sullivan's account does not address the role passivity[23] plays in intentional processes, e.g., the role passive synthesis plays in our interactions with phenomena like Schafer's keynotes. What's more, in *Methodical Precedence of Intertwining: An Introduction to a Transitive-Topological Phenomenology* (2018), philosopher Martin Nitsche uncovers the scopic-topological elements of Husserlian thought, elements which he believes productively complicate popular understandings of intentionality and the transcendental ego. Beginning with Husserl's *Logical Investigations,* Nitsche argues that Husserlian intentionality is best understood as a form of *interpretation,* or as a passive-active process whereby phenomena are experienced as meaningful. Against Sullivan's reading of intentionality as a sort of active directedness (i.e., as "an arrow always starting with me and arching itself outward into the world" [Sullivan 2000, 184]), Nitsche describes "interpretation" as a process of *re-localization*, whereby phenomena are re-localized within ever-changing fields of meaning. In this view, Husserlian intentionality is not simply "projective" in a unidirectional, dominating sense. Rather, it approaches all modes of anticipation as worldly emergences. Here, I take Nitsche's point to be closer to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the *refrain*. For example, in their chapter titled "Of the Refrain," Deleuze and Guattari open with a vignette about the refrain of a lost child. They write: "a child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under his breath … he takes shelter, or orients himself with his little song as best he can. The song is like a rough sketch of a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable,

[23] We might also question the role spirituality or spirit [*Geist*] plays in Husserlian intentionality, further destabilizing Sullivan's reading.

center in the heart of chaos" (2018, 311). The child's song (or *refrain*) thus operates as a form of sonorous orientation that grounds the child in the face of chaos and fear. The refrain does not mark a permanent, territorial separation of sonic space; rather, the child's refrain is a momentary organization, a porous re-localization that de- and re-territorializes over time. Like the refrain, then, intentionality re-localizes (emphasis on "*re*-")[24] phenomena within an always-already transitive field, creating a sort of "place-space" that resists the fixity and enclosure of Sullivan's account.

In describing intentionality as a sort of "place-space," Nitsche goes on to suggest that interpretation likewise complicates our understanding of the phenomenological subject. Because interpretation suggests an ongoing process of re-localization, Nitsche argues that it "does not constitute appearing by providing a solid grounding for appearances" (Nitsche 2018, 23). In other words, the "subject" of interpretation does not bind or ground experience through interpretative acts, as Sullivan might suggest. Rather, just as the subject re-localizes phenomena within a transitional area, so, too, is the subject (re-)localized through an experiential unity. What's more, rather than characterizing this unity as being formed by the ego, Nitsche describes how the ego is formed *by* experiencing, or *Erleben* (2018, 43). He explains:

> Even when Husserl speaks about the subject, he does not understand it as a relational center, but performatively … the main difference must be seen between the subject as the relational center and the 'subject of a pure experience of the type cogito.' The latter, i.e. the ego methodically acquired in the carrying out of evidence, can never become a relational center, because it is, simply put, too weak to become the subject that ontologically binds and grounds experiences. (Nitsche 2018, 72)

[24] By describing intentionality as a process of *re*-localization, I suggest that Nitsche carefully avoids debates on sonic "origins" popular in the philosophy of sound (Cavarero 2005) and inadvertently echoes Ronald Radano's analysis of "resonance." For example, in *Lying up a Nation: Race and Black Music* Radano muses that "resonance is a useful concept … not simply because it is a musical term but one that specifies repetition. Its origin or 'sonance' is revealed from the beginning as something essentially reiterative" (2003, 53). So, too, might we question how the re-localization of intentionality operates iteratively, or in a trace-like manner.

In other words, whereas Sullivan interprets intentionality as a unidirectional grasping that begins with the solipsistic subject, Nitsche's reading of Husserl suggests that the phenomenological subject is instead always already situated, such that it "must be understood in terms of perspective, as a point-of-view" (Nitsche 2018, 72). In this way, the subject no longer denotes an anonymous, universal position, but a specific location or *place* within the transitive field of interpretation. By emphasizing the scopic-topological elements of Husserlian phenomenology, Nitsche does not do away with the subject entirely. Rather, he demonstrates how the phenomenological subject may be more fluid and dynamic than originally thought, giving us different tools for thinking about "transactional or interactive way[s] of building meaning in and for my world that [are] contingent upon others" (Sullivan 1997, 2).

If we bring Nitsche's topological-phenomenological approach to bear on the concept of the soundscape, it need not rely on the "comprehending acts" of a "single comprehending subject," as Sterne would suggest. Rather, it indicates a sort of place-space, or an area wherein (re)sounding subjects re-localize (and in turn, are re-localized by) ever-changing sonic phenomena.[25] This is perhaps most evident in Schafer's discussion of *soundmarks*. Like signals and keynotes, Schafer defines the "soundmark" as a key feature of the soundscape; he explains that the term "refers to a community sound which is unique or possesses qualities which make it specially regarded or noticed by the people in that community" (1977, 10). In *Voices of Tyranny*, he goes further, writing that soundmarks "define [a soundscape's] essential character, rendering it unique … soundmarks *are sensory anchors helping one to feel at home*" (Schafer 1993, 108; emphasis added). Schafer's description of soundmarks as "sensory anchors" connects with Nitsche's characterization of intentionality as re-localization and with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the refrain. Soundmarks

[25] Here, we might also think of Heidegger's Zeit-Spiel-Raum.

can thus function as community *orientations*. In *Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others*, Sara Ahmed offers us a clear definition of phenomenological orientation: "if we know where we are when we turn this way or that way, then we are oriented. We have our bearings. We know what to do when we get to this place or to that place" (Ahmed 2006, 1). Orientations in the soundscape thus operate similarly, allowing us to navigate through and anchor ourselves within dynamic sonic worlds. By attuning to soundmarks in this way, we are better able to understand not only how listening subjects navigate diverse soundscapes, but also how soundscapes constitute (and are constituted by) rhizomatic processes of orientation.

As a space fundamentally established through "sounding" (both in terms of a literal giving-forth of sound and through processes of orientation/re-localization), then, I argue that the soundscape likewise complicates ocularcentric, Euclidean notions of space. In describing interpretation as a "place-space," Nitsche holds that the phenomenal field "cannot be described simply as a space, because it is not a pre-given dimension which offers locations available for re-location" (Nitsche 2018, 75). Instead, he clarifies that "transitive places are not fixed by any co-ordinates, but localized by transition (i.e., re-localized)" (2018, 33-34). In other words, the "places" of intentionality cannot be graphed on a Euclidean plane, for they are fundamentally transitive and anarchical in nature. So, too, do I suggest that the "place-space" of the soundscape resists the empty dimensions of Euclid's geometry. While Sterne is right to point out the Euclidean logic of Schafer's early writings (1967), he fails to consider how Schafer's thought changed dramatically over the course of his career. For example, in *Voices of Tyranny* Schafer argues that sound "inhabits space rather erratically and enigmatically," so much so that "whenever one writes about sound or tries to graph it, one departs from its essential reality, often in absurd ways" (1993, 3). Additionally, Schafer openly acknowledges the dynamic spatiality of sound in this text, writing

that music "moves us quite beyond ourselves and the ordinary, Euclidean geometry of streets and highrises, walls and maps" (1993, 39). Like Nitsche, then, Schafer approaches the soundscape as a space "established by re-localization … as a space, it is founded by places" (Nitsche 2018, 75). By reading Schafer in this way, we are also able to respond to Hosokawa's critique. In developing his Deleuzian account of Walkman listening, Hosokawa repeatedly states that the soundscape lacks a concept of *plurality*. Against Hosokawa, however, I argue that what the soundscape ultimately requires is a concept of *multiplicity,* a concept which phenomenology proves capable of providing. Such a terminological distinction is not a trivial one; as Mariana Ortega explains: "the term 'plurality' suggests multiple selves, while the term 'multiplicity' suggests a complexity associated with one self … a singular self occupying multiple social locations and a condition of in-betweenness" (2016, 64-65). By using the language of "plurality," I suggest that Hosokawa inadvertently falls prey to the Euclidean and Cartesian logics he sought to avoid despite his turn to Deleuzian poststructuralism. What's more, because a phenomenological-topological approach the soundscape is not "fixed by any coordinates" and is fundamentally characterized by transition, I suggest that Schafer's concept actually lends itself to the multiplicitous reflections that Ortega calls for. As a space de- and re-established through re-localization, soundscape as phenomenological topology is heterogeneous yet indivisible, thus answering popular poststructuralist critiques whilst also maintaining its phenomenological core.[26]

[26] While not discussed explicitly here, my topological reading of the soundscape is also necessarily *temporal*. In writing about the spatiality of soundscapes, we might think of Jeff Malpas' claim that spatiality (as a matter of orientation) is always temporal, such that it is impossible to think about apart from temporal orientation (2006, 107). As Malpas explains: "The idea that is at issue here can be summarized as the claim that spatial orientation is impossible without temporal orientation… the structure of space and place necessarily implicates time through consideration, in the simplest and most basic sense, of the character of the dimensionality that belongs to space as itself opened up *as dimensional* through movement" (2008, 107). So, too, does Schafer acknowledge the inescapably temporal elements of sonic space, writing: "in the past, critics have spoken of the 'spatial' as opposed to the 'temporal' arts. But recent developments in the arts have tended to dissolve these distinctions for, as Minkowski and Einstein discovered at the beginning of the century, neither space nor time can preserve an independent existence; both exist simultaneously in an ever-present fourth-dimensional continuum" (1967, 3).

4. *Conclusion*

To conclude, I have argued for a phenomenological-topological approach to the soundscape, one that provides both an ontologically and topologically anarchical conception of sonic space. In calling the soundscape a "topology," I have used the term in a distinctly *phenomenological* sense, i.e., in a different sense than the mathematical study of surfaces. Describing the role of "place" in Heidegger's phenomenology, for example, Jeff Malpas notes the Greek roots of topology (*topos* and *logos*), suggesting that Heidegger "takes it in the sense of a 'saying of place' (*Ort-reden*)" (2008, 33). Just as Heidegger regards *Topologie* as a "saying of place," so, too, does my account approach the soundscape as a "sounding" of place, one wherein "place" is established by and through sound. In the following chapter, I will explore how my topological-phenomenological interpretation of the soundscape lends itself to nuanced analyses of politics and power, analyses that help us reveal the "liminality, ambiguity, and contradiction" of sonic ways of being and knowing (Ortega 2016, 189).

***Spectrostitches* – After Louisa Bufardeci**



Inauguration Protest Soundscape, Washington, D.C., January 2017

Landon Wilson's Speech at the Reuter Foundation, New York, N.Y., September 2018

Chapter 2

Sonic Normativity: Auditory Cultural Studies, Sound Studies, and a (Critical) Soundscape Phenomenology

In the preceding chapter, I called for a phenomenological reinterpretation of the soundscape. Responding to two popular critiques of the concept (the Subject Critique and the Euclidean Critique), I characterized the soundscape as being ontologically and topologically *anarchical*, or as disproving popular assumptions about the ontology and topology of sound. In so doing, however, a further question emerges: if the soundscape is ontologically anarchical, what does this mean for the *meaning* of sound, i.e., questions about sonic normativity?

In this chapter, I continue my (critically) phenomenological investigation of the soundscape. Responding to Brian Kane's "Sound Studies Without Auditory Culture: A Critique of the Ontological Turn" (2015), I explore the disciplinary divide drawn between sound studies and auditory cultural studies. Whereas sound studies primarily investigates the *ontology* of sound (e.g., pre-cognitive sonic affect, sonic materialism, onto-aesthetics, etc.), auditory cultural studies emphasizes sonic *normativity* (e.g., the history of sonic discourses and orders). While these approaches are often thought to be dichotomous, I argue that both traditions ultimately advance rival third-person perspectives that elide first- and second-person accounts of sonic experience. Returning to my retooled concept of the soundscape, I offer a situated agential analysis of sound capable of addressing lived sonic experiences and the normativity that are inherently part of them.

1. *Auditory Culture and the Ontological Turn: A Theoretical Divide*

Thus far, I have used the term "sound studies" to refer to the broad swath of literature dealing with the philosophy, history, and anthropology of sound. For many scholars, however, the term carries a more specific, theoretically circumscribed meaning. As Kane explains:

> 'Sound studies' and 'auditory culture' are terms often used synonymously to designate a broad, heterogeneous, interdisciplinary field of inquiry. Yet a potential disjunction between these terms remains. Some scholars within sound studies, by turning to the ontology of sound and to the material-affective processes that lie 'beneath representation and signification', reject auditory cultural studies. (2015, 2)

In arguing that some scholars working in sonic ontology "reject auditory culture studies," Kane identifies a troubling tendency of sound theorists to *overhear* the social, cultural, and economic dimensions of sound in favor of "the ontological commitments and beliefs of particular subjects or communities" (Kane 2015, 2). To better explain this trend, Kane offers Steve Goodman's *Sonic Warfare: Sound, Affect, and the Ecology of Fear* (2010) as emblematic of "the ontological turn." In *Sonic Warfare*, Goodman seeks to develop "an ontology of vibrational force" (2010, 81) capable of describing the affective power of sonic vibration. Following popular neuroscientific studies on emotion/feeling, Goodman investigates how the "production, transmission, and mutation of affective tonality" (2010, xv) makes possible the "colonization of the inaudible" (2010, 187), or the cultivation of affective dread and fear through inaudible (yet viscerally felt) sound. This colonization occurs *before* cognition and overt sounding, making it a particularly insidious form of violence and control. Through an engagement with Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*, Goodman articulates a concept of sonic warfare that "[…] is an undercurrent that attains a cosmic transversality, cutting across all strata, human or nonhuman, with local outbreaks in every milieu, as abstract turbulence" (Goodman 2010, 33). In other words, by turning to a vibrational

ontology of affect, Goodman aims to uncover relations of power and violence not yet grasped by juridical notions of politics and war.

While Kane recognizes Goodman's attempts to confront questions of culture and violence, he nevertheless holds that Goodman's work privileges a sort of disembodied, pre-cognitive affect that reifies "a rigid and untenable" stimulus/response dichotomy (2015, 7). Echoing Dewey,[27] Kane identifies a sort of reflex arc operative in Goodman's account, one wherein sensory stimuli (i.e., vibrational forces) are ontologically and psychically distinct from acts of hearing.[28] Despite Goodman's stated interest in challenging dualisms (2010, 100-101), then, Kane concludes that his efforts are "betrayed by his rigid temporal and theoretical separation of affective from cognitive realms" (Kane 2015, 8).[29] He continues:

> There is a crucial dialectic missing in Goodman's account. The capacities of the body are cultivated at the same time that cultures become embodied. By focusing on training and acquisition of skills, where bodies are pressed into action in order to produce and maintain modes of listening, studies in auditory culture articulate the interaction of mind and body in more nuanced ways than the sharp dichotomy presented in Goodman's theory. (Kane 2015, 8)

In other words, while Goodman emphasizes the affective force of sonic weaponry, he does not consider how this force can be cultivated and resisted at the ontological level. It is not enough to

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[27] Here, I am referencing Dewey's "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" (1896). For more on this concept and its implications for sound studies, see chapter one, footnote 18.

[28] To demonstrate this, Kane turns to Franz Kafka's unfinished story, "The Burrow." In it, a small, rodent-like creature hears a series of noises that it believes to be caused by an unknown beast. To protect itself, the creature creates an elaborate maze of underground passages called the "Castle Keep." Despite these vigilant efforts, however, the creature remains consumed by anxiety, haunted by the unknown noise. Reading the creature's anxiety through Goodman's affective ontology, Kane muses: "imagine a situation where Kafka finished the story and … the burrower discovers the source of the sound, finding it benign … while the sound would remain unchanged – for its fixed at a constant volume on the same thin note – the burrower's affect would be drastically altered. And yet, there appears no simple way that Goodman's 'ontology of vibrational force' can account for this change in affect. Since the ontological situation has not changed, the only way to account for the change in affect would be an appeal to something other than ontology" (Kane 2016, 6-7).

[29] It is not altogether clear that Goodman's account is as rigidly dichotomizing as Kane claims. Indeed, the belief that affect proceeds discursive judgment is widely held in both philosophy and psychology, and does not necessarily suggest that affect is uninformed by historical sedimentation. Because this section aims to articulate the theoretical sound studies divide as Kane outlines it, however, I will not explore this point at further length here.

describe how sonic warfare creates ecologies of fear through affectively felt vibrations. Rather, Kane's critique of Goodman's work highlights the need to consider how affective and material processes shape and are shaped by cultural practices, such that affect cannot exist wholly prior to (or disconnected from) sociohistorical discourse.

To further clarify how scholars in sound studies typically approach sound, Kane also references Christoph Cox's sonic materialism. In "Beyond Representation and Signification: Toward a Sonic Materialism" (2011), Cox offers a materialist account of sound "able to grasp the nature of sound and to enable analysis of the sonic arts" (146). More specifically, Cox voices suspicion about the linguistic turn in cultural theory, holding that theories of textuality and discursivity "implicitly support a separation between culture (the domain of signification, representation, and meaning) and nature (the domain of inert, dumb matter)" (2011, 147). In these accounts, Cox holds that sonic matter is treated as something in-significant, something to be set aside as mere social construction. Against this impulse, Cox turns to Deleuze's work on the "virtual" and the "actual" to articulate a materialist account of sound as constantly in flux, differential, and thoroughly immanent (2011, 157). For Cox, sound is not the "inert, dumb matter" that the linguistic turn makes it out to be. Rather, sonic matter "precedes and exceeds individual listeners" and is "actualised, but not exhausted by, speech, music, and significant sound of all sorts" (2011, 155; 2009, 22). Cox concludes that this actualization is most clearly evident in sound art, particularly in the works of experimental artists like Alvin Lucier and Cage. In other words, whereas music transforms sound into forms and participates in the symbolic and imaginary orders, sound art discloses sound's unique ontological condition and alerts listeners to the virtuality of sound itself.

Responding to this sonic materialism, Kane questions the distinction that Cox draws between music and sound art. Aligning Cox with previous theorists like Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried, Kane calls Cox's position an *onto-aesthetics*, or "the principle that a work of art can disclose its ontology" (Kane 2015, 11). In suggesting that sound art discloses its ontological condition, however, Kane argues that Cox commits a category mistake. According to Kane, onto-aesthetics "confuses *embodiment* with *exemplification*" (2015, 11; emphasis in original). In other words, by suggesting that sound art better reveals the ontology of sound than music, Cox's materialism deals in exemplification, i.e., it suggests that there are different degrees of ontological disclosure. *Embodiment*, however, deals with kinds: it cannot come in degrees (Kane 2015, 12). And because ontology is *embodied* (i.e., concerns embodiment), it cannot be exemplified. Put simply: "no object … or no mode of being … better exemplifies its ontology than any other object or being. Rather, it *is* its ontology, it *embodies* it, it *lives* it" (Kane 2015, 12; emphasis in original). If Cox's argument is actually that sound art better *exemplifies* sound than music, then, he does not actually get "beyond" representation and signification as he so claims. This leads Kane to conclude that Cox's "supposedly culture-free ontology presupposes a cultural ground," as exemplification is referential and therefore relies on existing symbolic systems (2015, 15).

Contra Cox and Goodman, Kane uses Sterne's *The Audible Past* (2003) as a fecund example of how discursive sonic practices "become tools for investigating, knowing, and interacting with the surrounding world" (Kane 2015, 8). Like Kane, Sterne is deeply suspicious of the ontological turn in sound studies and situates his work within the realm of auditory culture. Adopting a genealogical approach, Sterne investigates the history of sound technologies and the historical milieu in which they developed. More specifically, Sterne is interested in "examin[ing] the social and cultural conditions that gave rise to sound reproduction and, in turn, how those

technologies crystallized and combined larger cultural currents" (2003, 2). As with other studies in auditory culture, Sterne is not interested in uncovering universal maxims about the ontology or metaphysics of sound. Rather, his account explores how sound-reproduction technologies influenced practices of listening and sounding, and how cultural forces like capitalism, rationalism, and colonialism shaped the development and dissemination of these technologies in turn.

Thinking further about the sound studies vs. auditory cultural studies divide, Sterne likewise questions how ontological theories of sound incorporate *and* obfuscate the cultural and political discourses from which they arise. In developing a "history" of sound-reproduction technologies, Sterne contrasts his work with another possible field of inquiry: studies on "the *nature* of sound and hearing" like Goodman's or Cox's (2003, 10). Problematic in this line of investigation, he argues, is a reliance on a certain transhistorical notion of "nature." He warns: "generally, when writers invoke a binary coupling between culture and nature, it is with the idea that culture is that which changes over time and that nature is that which is permanent, timeless, and unchanging" (2003, 11). Against this, Sterne demonstrates how the senses themselves can be understood as historical products, and how definitions of hearing and sound have changed drastically over time in tandem with changing cultural beliefs about the body, science, and technology (2003, 11). In other words, attempts to describe the "nature" of sound and hearing falter insofar as they cannot account for their own historicity. Separating his work from these transcendental theories of sound, Sterne maintains that his work in auditory cultural studies "turns away from attempts to recover and describe people's interior experience of listening — an auditory past — toward the social and cultural grounds of sonic experience" (2003, 13).

Returning to this project's focus on the soundscape, Sterne's text situates Schafer's work on the "sound studies" side of the sound studies/auditory culture debate. As with Kane's critique

of Goodman and Cox, Sterne criticizes Schafer for his hidden ontological presuppositions. He argues that Schafer's anti-urbanism is steeped in specific notions of the Enlightenment subject and communicative ideals. In *The Soundscape*, for example, Schafer muses: "in his model Republic, Plato quite explicitly limits the size of the ideal community to 5,040, the number that can be addressed by a single orator" (1977, 215). Here, Schafer seems to suggest that the ideal sonic environment is one built around the range of the human voice, as opposed to the "[sonic] slop and spawn of the megalopolis" we live in today (1977, 216). Responding to this suggestion, Sterne outlines two primary problems with Schafer's argument. First, in offering Plato's Republic as a sort of transhistorical ideal that we might return to, Schafer fails to consider how this suggestion "requires that one identify with the elites of that former society" (Sterne 2003, 343).[30] In other words, Schafer does not consider how the voices of enslaved peoples, women, and children were structurally excluded from the Greek polis. Second, in privileging the voice of the one over the cacophonic voices of the many, Sterne accuses Schafer of relying on a very specific notion of communication borne of mid-twentieth century, Habermasian models of deliberation (Sterne 2003, 344).[31] He explains:

> Communication is a collective endeavor, not reducible to a model of two people talking. One could cast Schafer's and others' preference for the few over the many as a form of nostalgic elitism … It follows that one of the criticisms of Habermas (and others who privilege face-to-face speech as the basis of communication theory) has been that he occludes labor and social stratification in his idealized communication contexts. (Sterne 2003, 343-44)

[30] This is not an altogether accurate critique, which I will address further in the following section.

[31] Here, Sterne is referencing Jürgen Habermas' communicative model of deliberative politics. In *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, for example, Habermas develops a concept of "communicative action" wherein "participants coordinate their plans of action consensually, with the agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims" (1991, 58). An important element of communicative action is its dependence on reciprocal trust between participants. Habermas argues that "the fact that a speaker can rationally motivate a hearer to accept [a claim] is due not to the validity of what he says but to the speaker's guarantee that he will, if necessary, make efforts to redeem the claim that the hearer has accepted" (1991, 58). Communicative action therefore relies on specific liberal frameworks of discourse and epistemic exchange.

Likely inspired by thinkers like Chantal Mouffe (1993) and Iris Marion Young (1996),[32] Sterne reveals how Schafer's desire to return to a transhistorical, "natural" sort of sonic environment built around the human voice belies the "labor and social stratification" such an environment inevitably requires. By following the ontological turn in his theorization of speech and of "lofi/hifi environments," Schafer's concept "as much reflects a set of dominant ways of organizing sonic space –drawn from mid-century, bourgeois, Anglophone settler cultures– as it critiques them" (Sterne 2015, 67). And while Sterne recognizes the continued usefulness of "soundscape" for many scholars, he nevertheless holds that the ontological hang-ups of the term fail to convey how "sound is not the result of transhistorical interior states of the body or the subject" (2003, 343).

2. *"Sound Studies" vs. "Auditory Cultural Studies": Rethinking the Sound Theory Divide Perspectivally*

While Kane thus offers a binarist reading of these two traditions, I will now offer an alternate approach: namely, that the "sound studies" vs. "auditory cultural studies" divide is not so much a dichotomy, but a tension between rival third-person accounts. In other words, both sound studies and auditory cultural studies emphasize third-person perspectives over and against first- and second-person perspectives on sound, albeit in different ways. For onto-aestheticians like Goodman and Cox, this happens through a return to pre-cognitive affect and materiality. For

[32] For example, in "Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy," Young describes how Habermas' deliberative ideal tends to presuppose unity in the ways individuals understand and experience the world. Young suggests that Habermas "sometimes writes as though reaching understanding through discourse about norms depends on restoring a disrupted consensus" (1996, 125). For Young, Habermas' communicative action takes unity to be an a priori condition of community, a condition that is not established, but *re-established* through deliberation. Young notes that this assumption may hinder deliberation as a guiding democratic ideal, as it removes the need for "self-transcendence" as an integral part of democracy (Young 1996, 125).

Sterne, this happens through an analysis of the social and cultural externalities that inevitably shape sound.[33] For example, in *The Audible Past*, he writes:

> This book turns away from attempts to recover and describe people's interior experience of listening–an auditory past–toward the social and cultural grounds of sonic experience. The "exteriority" of sound is this book's primary object of study. If sound in itself is a variable rather than a constant, then the history of sound is of necessity an externalist and contextualist endeavor. (Sterne 2003, 13)

Here, Sterne makes a curious distinction between experience and culture. While the experience of listening is characterized as being "interior," the "social and cultural grounds of sonic experience" are "of necessity … externalist and contextualist." This leads Sterne to conclude: "before we can talk about the so-called inherent interiority of sound and being in the world, we must consider the constitution of sound as a thing … sound in itself is always shaped by and through its exteriors, even as it acts on and within them" (2003, 343). Thus, the crux of Sterne's critique concerns exteriority and sonic *normativity*. Put otherwise, Sterne's argument demonstrates how the ontological turn (in talking about the inherent 'interiority' of sound) situates listening and sounding as transhistorical, "natural" phenomena that cannot account for their own sociohistorical formations.

While distinct in their methodologies and conclusions, then, both sound studies and auditory cultural studies are interested in the *meaning(s)* of sound. For Goodman and Cox, sound's meaning is to be found in affective processes or in the materiality of sound itself. For Sterne, it is to be found in the social and cultural milieus in which the senses are shaped and produced. Because of this emphasis, sonic *experience* is largely ignored in both accounts. For example, while listening and/or speech may help disclose the virtuality of sound in Cox's work, sound's meaning is neither

[33] This is particularly evident in Sterne's earlier works, but not so much his recent work. I say "earlier works" to note the shift that has occurred in Sterne's more recent writings, particularly in his latest book where he assumes a phenomenological approach to vocal impairment. I will discuss this book and Sterne's phenomenological shift at greater length in my fifth chapter.

created nor exhausted by these practices. So, too, does Sterne attempt to escape subjective experience. In his conclusion to *The Audible Past*, for example, he reiterates his desire to "move the speaking subject away from the center of sound theory as a means of countering this aesthetics and politics of the singular" (2003, 343). One such way in which Sterne decenters the subject is through his conceptualization of "audile techniques." In response to theories that suggest sound-reproduction technologies posited new ways of listening, he counters: "over the course of the nineteenth century, audile technique was constructed as a set of related practices. In turn, it was crucial in the construction of sound reproduction as a practice. Thus, my genealogy re-places sound reproduction within the larger flow of history" (2003, 95-96). By turning away from a transcendental theory of sound toward a genealogy of audile techniques, Sterne positions listening not as a universal capacity, but as an historically contingent, discursive *practice*. Like Foucault, Sterne does not situate knowledge and power through the framework of a universal, listening subject. Rather, his work reveals how "bodily experience is a product of the particular conditions of life, not something that is given prior to it" (Sterne 2003, 12).

In arguing that sonic experience is a product of socio-political discourse and not something "given prior to it," Sterne appears to take an *externalist* approach to sonic meaning. By "externalist," I am referencing the internalism/externalism debate in semantics.[34] As Steven Crowell explains:

> Contemporary semantics divides on the question of how to think about meaning. Internalists hold that it is something like a mental representation or concept, part of the psychological make-up of the speaker. Externalists deny this … [they] need not deny that there is some sort of psychological representation – or "narrow content" – but they argue that relying on its descriptive features to determine reference encounters insuperable

[34] Such a connection may at first seem strange: how does a debate about sound theory relate to semantics? However, the sound studies vs. auditory cultural studies debate is itself often characterized in linguistic terms. For example, Kane describes "the 'ontological turn' in sound studies [as] setting itself against the 'linguistic turn' in the humanities" (2015, 3). Just as Kane aligns sound studies with the "ontological turn" in philosophy, then, so, too, can we align auditory cultural studies with the "linguistic" or poststructuralist turn of the humanities.

> difficulties. For instance, everyone agrees that we can be wrong about the properties we think something has. But this is possible only if we can refer to that thing even while being wrong about its properties. (2013, 102)

Put simply, then, semantic internalism approaches meaning as a product of the mind, whereas semantic externalism suggests that there is some sort of causal or social relation to objects and others that determines the "wider content" of meaning that internalism leaves out. To better understand this divide, let us return to Cox's and Goodman's works. In *Sonic Warfare*, Goodman holds that the vibrational ontology of fear precedes cognition, operating at some prior level of affect. In this way, Goodman's account is externalist: sonic dread is not a mental representation or concept produced by the subject, but an affective state that precedes and/or exceeds the listener. So, too, does Cox provide an externalist account of sound. In attempting to go "beyond" representation and signification in his analysis of sound art, Cox rejects a representationalist approach to sonic meaning. Instead, he offers a "realist conception of sound as an asignifying material flux" that ultimately "enjoins us to abandon the idealist and humanist language of representation and signification" (2011, 157).

While Sterne thus positions his account in opposition to these ontological projects, he, too, approaches sonic meaning through externalism. For Sterne, sonic meaning is not a product or function of the listening subject, nor is it an ideal or abstract (eidetic) entity. Rather, it is something that exists outside the subject via social, cultural, and political forces. This is not to say that Sterne rejects the "narrow content" of the internalist. Indeed, in acknowledging that "sound in itself is always shaped by and through its exteriors, even as it acts on and within them" (2003, 343), he acknowledges the subject's responsivity to and within sonic orders. Nevertheless, he maintains: "there is no 'mere' or innocent description of interior auditory experience. The attempt to describe

sound or the act of hearing in itself–as if the sonic dimension of human life inhabited a space prior to or outside history–strives for a false transcendence" (2003, 19).

In taking this externalist mantle, however, there is a theoretical danger to Sterne's position. By turning away from "attempts to recover and describe people's interior experience of listening" (2003, 13), Sterne appears to align first-person accounts of sound with internalism, such that first-person perspectives remain hopelessly solipsistic and cannot speak to normativity. Such a view leads Sterne to exclude first- and second-personal perspectives from his analyses, an exclusion that carries with it social and political risks. Namely, Sterne's focus on the historicity of sound and listening 1) risks overhearing lived experiences of sound, and 2) risks perpetuating masculinist perspectives on the limitations of experiential-based knowledge. Sterne himself recognizes these risks, writing: "my emphasis on the very early moments of technologies and practices at times leads me to concentrate on a relatively small, elite (white, male, European or American, middle-class, able-bodied, etc.) group of people" (2003, 28). Despite this, he maintains: "I have not been very concerned with recovering the experiences of my historical subjects … the history of sound must move beyond recovering experience to interrogating the conditions under which that experience became possible in the first place" (Sterne 2003, 26). Contra Sterne, the following section of this chapter will question whether first- and second-person perspectives are inherently internalist, and will demonstrate the value of experiential-based (soundscape) knowledge to studies of sonic normativity.

3. *Response: A (Critical) Phenomenology of the Soundscape and Situated Sonic Agency*

Responding to Sterne's, Cox's, and Goodman's third-person accounts, my reply will be threefold. First, by offering a *phenomenological* reading of the soundscape, I argue that my concept is inherently normative. Indeed, even in its most traditional forms, phenomenology is a *normative*

science, such that experience cannot be excised from normativity. Second, I demonstrate how my reading of the soundscape usefully intervenes on the sound studies vs. auditory cultural studies debate, insofar as it eschews the internalism/externalism divide that Cox, Goodman, *and* Sterne ultimately fall prey to. Third, and finally, I explain how a critically phenomenological reading of the soundscape successfully incorporates third, second, and first-personal perspectives so as to emphasize the role of the lived, sounding body and "its responsiveness to [sonic] norms that define our capacity to act" (Crowell 2013, 141).

3.1 *Phenomenology, Experience, and Normativity*

In his introduction to *The Audible Past*, Sterne expresses skepticism over phenomenological accounts of sound that treat listening as an ahistorical, transcendental practice. However, he acknowledges this needn't be the case; despite warning that "an appeal to 'phenomenological' truth about sounds sets up experience as somehow outside the purview of historical analysis," he admits: "this need not be so–phenomenology and the study of experience are not by definition opposed to historicism" (2003, 14). To underscore this point, he makes brief reference to Merleau-Ponty, commending his attention to the historical dimensions of experience (2003, 14). Nevertheless, Sterne remains skeptical of traditional phenomenology's political import, noting that "founding one's analysis on the supposed transhistorical phenomenological characteristics of hearing is an incredibly powerful move in constructing a cultural theory of sound" (2003, 14).

Against Sterne, I suggest that even traditional phenomenology does not necessarily view experience as being outside "the purview of historical analysis." As discussed in chapter one, traditional phenomenology is best described as a philosophical *method*. Concerned with the veridicality of knowledge, thinkers like Husserl offered phenomenology as a way to arrive at logical truths through originary intuition. In other words, phenomenology holds that knowledge

cannot exist wholly separate from lived experience; rather, "logical concepts, as valid thought-unities, must have their origin in intuition" (Husserl 2001b, 168). At the same time, however, phenomenology does not relinquish its status as a *normative* science, i.e., as a method capable of establishing general propositions through which other sciences can be carried out and evaluated. As Klaus Held clarifies:

> It is not enough for phenomenology to make general statements about the universal *a priori* of correlation between objects and their manners of givenness. If such statements are not to remain distant from the matter at hand because of their generality, then they themselves must rest upon concrete investigation, investigation of the specific manners of appearance of different types of objects. The philosopher must, as Husserl said on occasion, be prepared to exchange the big bills of his universal themes into the small change of detailed analyses that are close to the issue. In this way, philosophy as phenomenological method becomes 'working philosophy' – this, too, is a phrase coined by Husserl. (2003, 10)

In arguing that phenomenology requires an investigation into "originary manners of givenness" to arrive at eidetic claims, Held highlights phenomenology's emphasis on *evidence* (or *Evidenz*). Distinct from the "evidence" sought by the natural sciences, however, the evidence of the phenomenologist arises only through the rigorous examination of first-person experience. In other words, in order to "know" something, we must be able to trace that knowledge back "to some evident experiences that ground it fully" (Moran and Cohen 2012, 114). Firsthand accounts of lived experience are not simply important to phenomenological analyses, then, but are *foundational* to the pursuit of knowledge itself.

To better explain *how* experience grounds conceptual knowledge in phenomenology, let us turn to Husserl's work on *sensings*. In *The Political Logic of Experience: On Expression in Phenomenology* (2022), Neal DeRoo explores how Husserlian "sensings" (or *Emfindnisse*) highlight the complex phenomenality of experience and its relation to logic. Distinct from colloquial understandings of "sense" as being exclusively of the bodily, DeRoo clarifies that, for Husserl, sense "operates potentially as the epistemic content of an experience … and as the

ontological and practical means of experiencing" (2022, 8). Take Husserl's famed hand-touching-hand example in *Ideas II*. There, he writes:

> Touching my left hand, I have touch-appearances, that is to say, I do not just sense, but I perceive and have appearances of a soft, smooth hand, with such a form. The indicational sensations of movement and the representational sensations of touch, which are Objectified as features of the thing, "left hand," belong in fact to my right hand. But when I touch the left hand I also find in it, too, series of touch-sensations, which are "localized" in it, though these are not constituitive of properties. (Husserl 1989, 152).

In describing how the touched hand is experienced as an object *and* experiences sensations that "are not constitutive of properties," Husserl reveals how the representational contents of touch (i.e., the epistemological, objectifiable elements) are inextricably bound up with the experience of being *touched*. Returning to our broader focus on the veridicality of knowledge obtained through experience, Husserl's *Empfindnisse* thus demonstrates how sensuous experiences (i.e., perceptions in and of the world) "are equally determinative of 'subject' and 'world,'" such that conceptual meaning "is both drawn from, and constitutive of, its incarnate activities" (DeRoo 2022, 22).

If the veridicality of knowledge is inextricably tied to first-person experience, then, what does this mean for questions of normativity? As Steven Crowell explains in *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegge*r (2013), the veridical nature of mental acts suggests that they are inherently normative. He clarifies that for Husserl, "cognitive acts (thinking, judging, perceiving, etc.) [are understood] not as mental items but as possible truth-bearers, that is, in light of the norm of truth" (2013, 36). In other words, intentionality is not a process of representation or signification, but "a normatively oriented claim to validity" (Crowell 2013, 36). Take, for example, Husserl's work on anticipation and fulfillment. In unifying our various senses of an object, Husserl suggests that we come to form an overarching "sense-content" (2001a, 37). For example, in

experiencing a statue, we may walk around and observe it from various angles. We may touch it or lean against it. All of these different perceptions (or adumbrations, as Husserl calls them) are then connected and synthesized to form a unified perception of the statue as intended. These adumbrations are necessarily temporal, as well, for we can only see one side of an object at a time. In looking at one side of the statue, however, we do not only perceive the side we are currently viewing: we also visualize the sides we cannot genuinely see (Husserl 2001a, 39). This is because perception is a mixture of genuinely viewing an object as existing and as "an empty indicating that refers to possible new perceptions" (Husserl 2001a, 41). In attempting to create a single, unified experience of the statue, then, we engage in a process of anticipation and fulfillment. We anticipate the other sides of the statue, and these anticipations are fulfilled if we move and perceive the other sides as expected.

In this process of anticipation and fulfillment, however, Husserl notes another possibility: disappointment. Sometimes in perceiving an object, our intentional prefigurings of it are disappointed or "negated." Husserl famously uses the example of a ball to explain this phenomenon. In this example, Husserl asks us to imagine a red ball, and then to imagine discovering that the other side of the ball is green and misshapen (Husserl 2001a, 65). He writes: "prior to the ensuing perception of the back sides, perception in its living flow was intentionally prefigured toward red and ball shaped … the intentional prefigurings and referential indicators became disappointed" (Husserl 2001a, 65). Before perceiving the other side of the ball, our understanding of the ball was established through syntheses of perception and expectation fulfillment. After seeing the other side, our

anticipated perception of the ball is negated; the new perception of the ball and its shape/color alters the previously unified perceptions of the object as intended. Returning to our focus on phenomenology and normativity, we may use this example to better understand intentionality as "a normatively oriented claim to validity" (Crowell 2013, 36). In the case of the red ball, our intentional prefigurings and referential indicators are normative; they can be fulfilled or disappointed depending on whether we "got it right" (Loidolt 2019, 9), i.e., whether we anticipated *correctly*. This leads scholars like Sophie Loidolt to conclude that "this movement of intending and fulfilling, and thus of a certain normativity in intentionality itself, permeates the whole of intentional life" (2019, 9).

In addition to the normative elements of traditional phenomenology, we might also look to critical and feminist projects to further understand how phenomenology operates within the purview of historical analysis. In *Feminist Experiences: Foucauldian and Phenomenological Investigations* (2016), Johanna Oksala offers "postphenomenology" as a modification of traditional phenomenological methods. Receptive to Foucauldian emphases on the social production of knowledge, postphenomenology "understand[s] *epoche* not as total, universal, and complete, but as an endless, circular, and always partial task" (Oksala 2016, 105). Within a postphenomenological framework, first-person accounts of lived experience are not treated as "the exclusive and indispensable point" of phenomenological inquiry (2016, 105). Rather, postphenomenology encourages philosophers to engage with an array of cultural products (medical reports, sociological investigations, studies in anthropology, etc.) in order to think beyond one's own limited experience and to critically question the discursive formations through which we think.

In comparison to Oksala's call for a post-phenomenological method (a call which suggests moving "beyond" or "past" phenomenology), other scholars maintain that phenomenology already provides us with the tools necessary to engage in critical, feminist analyses of power and knowledge. Writing at the same time as Sterne, Linda Fisher persuasively describes phenomenology not as an abstract, totalizing philosophy, but as an attempt to articulate general experience without negating or overlooking particularity. Comparing the phenomenological tension between the particular and the general to the feminist need for solidarity across differences, she writes:

> Phenomenology displays the same sort of dialectic, although in phenomenological terms it is not necessarily represented as a particularly problematic tension, but rather as the particular complexity and contingency of a philosophy of subjectivity … such a general account need not be equivalent to the absolutist sense of generic, but is understandable rather as the thread of invariance; not one model fits all, but structural invariance within variance, that which gives shape and coherence to the variance. (Fisher 2000, 29)

In using the language of a "dialectic," Fisher does not offer phenomenology as a reifying, homogenizing discourse. Rather, phenomenology becomes "the attempt to articulate the tension of general and specific" (Fisher 2000, 29), or the attempt to speak about individual, lived experience within broader social and historical contexts. In so doing, the fundamental "aim" of phenomenology shifts; rather than arriving at a universal, a priori truth, phenomenology becomes a *praxis* of relating to others in full view of experiential variance.

If phenomenology need not be seen as operating "outside the purview of historical analysis" (Sterne 2003, 14), then, what can a phenomenological reading of the soundscape teach us about sonic knowledge, experience, and power? Let us return to Schafer's works.

While primarily interested in the exploration of sonic experience,[35] Schafer's concept also lends itself to historical analyses of sound. In *The Soundscape*, for example, Schafer connects changes in noise legislation to changing attitudes about class, private property, and public space. Looking specifically at the disappearance of street music and street criers in early twentieth-century Europe, he writes: "the study of noise legislation is interesting, not because anything is ever really accomplished by it, rather because it provides us with a concrete register of acoustic phobias and nuisances" (1977, 67). Through an historical analysis of noise abatement laws, Schafer does not treat sounding and listening as transhistorical/transcultural phenomena. Rather, by utilizing historical records to uncover how "changes in legislation give us clues to changing social attitudes and perceptions" (Schafer 1977, 67), Schafer's work accomplishes two things. First, it dispenses with the idea that phenomenology must treat lived experience as "the exclusive and indispensable starting point" of sonic analysis (Oksala 2016, 105). Second, it underscores how our *perceptions* of sound are inevitably shaped by larger social, cultural, and economic currents. *Pace* Sterne, then, Schafer's work does not require that we identify with the elites of former societies; rather, in chronicling the history of noise abatement, Schafer reveals how certain sounds (like street crying) became "the object not only of a collective intolerance but of a judicial action" (Foucault 1990, 31).[36]

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[35] This is made obvious by many of Schafer's terminological choices, including "soundwalks," earwitnessing," etc.

[36] Michael Bull also recognizes the historicity of Schafer's method in "Listening to the Sirens." There, he writes: "Schafer situates his brief account of the bell and siren within an analysis of the power of technology to transform the soundscape and subordinate the subject within a dominating sonic matric of 'industry, transportation, and war, power over nature and power over other men' … [Schafer] focuses on the power of the sonic in the transformation of culture, practices, assumptions, and formations in a way that is useful" (2019, 233).

In addition to documenting the historicity of different sonic practices, Schafer also utilizes the "soundscape" as a tool to *critique* dominant discursive formations. Take, for example, Schafer's many critiques of sonic imperialism. As discussed in the introduction, Schafer argues that "it is Europe and North America which have, in recent centuries, masterminded various schemes designed to dominate other peoples and value systems, and subjugation by Noise has played no small part in these schemes" (1977, 77). Here, Schafer highlights the "noisiness" of colonization, emphasizing Western countries' weaponization of sound in pursuit of colonial power.[37] Additionally, Schafer explores *silence* as a form of power and/or oppression depending on the context of its deployment. For example, in *Voices of Tyranny* he writes:

> 'Noise equals power' used to be the slogan. Now it could read 'Noise equals safety,' as one listens to the stretto of car alarms, house alarms and now personal alarms, popping off around the rich and vulnerable. 'Silence equals power' is an equally valid proverb. Actually the closer one gets to individuals with enormous personal power or influence, the more one is struck by the quiet. (1993, 109)

In arguing that both noise and silence equal power, Schafer highlights the different political valances that sound (or its absence) can assume. In other words, neither sound nor silence can be understood as operating monolithically. Here, then, sound is not some sort of transhistorical constant. Returning to the gestalt elements of his concept, Schafer maintains: "whether a sound is a figure or ground has partly to do with acculturation

[37] Against claims that Schafer fails to consider the colonial violence of locomotive noise (Bull 2020, 1), Schafer directly cites trains (as well as planes, tanks, battleships, and radios) as being integral to colonial expansion and the erasure of Indigenous peoples and ways of sounding (1977, 77). Speaking specifically about the aviation industry, he writes: "Western Man leaves his calling cards all over the world in the form of Western-made or Western-inspired machinery. As the factories and the airports of the world multiply, local culture is pulverized into the background" (Schafer 1977, 77). Here, I take Schafer to be directly addressing Bull's concern with "cultural silencing," albeit with markedly nativist commitments.

(trained habits), partly with the individual's state of mind (mood, interest) and partly with the individual's relation to the field (native, outsider)" (1977, 152). Even in thinking about the shift from keynote to signal modes of awareness, then, Schafer acknowledges both the discursivity of sound (e.g., acculturation, relation to the field) as well as subjective states like affect and attention. Rather than suggesting that only the former concern normativity, though, a phenomenological reading of the soundscape reveals that all these elements (acculturation, emotional/mental states, relationships, etc.) are necessarily normatively laden.

3.2 *Soundscape Phenomenology and the Internalism/Externalism Debate*

In distinguishing his approach from the onto-aestheticians, part of Sterne's argument is that traditional, transcendental phenomenology is too preoccupied with interior experiences of listening. Here, he seems to suggest that transcendental phenomenology offers an *internalist* account of sonic meaning, i.e., that phenomenology treats sound as a subjective mental representation or concept. Sterne is not first to suggest this; in comparing his work to that of his predecessor's, Heidegger also accuses Husserlian phenomenology of adopting an internalist concept of intentionality that fails to break with Cartesianism. More recently, Taylor Carman has echoed this point, holding that Husserl's "appeal to ideal or abstract meanings" to explain the "aboutness" of consciousness commits him to "Platonism, mentalism, and methodological solipsism" (Carman 2003, 68, 56). Similar to Sterne, then, Carman maintains that transcendental phenomenology wrongfully understands semantics "in abstraction from social practice and communicative discourse" (2003, 56).

Responding to these claims, I argue that characterizing phenomenology as an internalist project fundamentally misunderstands the critical intervention it provides into the internalism/externalism debate. In chapter one, I described the soundscape as being ontologically *anarchical*. Here, I riffed off Derrida's characterization of the noema as being "neither of the world nor of consciousness" (2002, 204). In other words, in Husserlian phenomenology, the intentional object permeates both the subjective and objective, such that it cannot be neatly aligned with inner or "psychical" experience. In "Husserl's Noema and the Internalism-Externalism Debate" (2004), Dan Zahavi furthers this argument, writing: "in my view, the phenomenological analyses of intentionality (be it Husserl's, Heidegger's, or Merleau-Ponty's) all entail such a fundamental rethinking of the very relation between subjectivity and world that it no longer makes much sense to designate them as either internalist or externalist" (53). This is because the intentional object, as neither mental representation nor external object, refuses the inner-outer logic that this debate necessarily depends on.

Returning to this project's focus on the soundscape, what, then, does this mean for a phenomenological (re)interpretation of sonic environments? Recall that Sterne aligns Schafer with other theorists who regard sound as being "the result of transhistorical interior states of the body or the subject" (Sterne 2003, 342). Here, Sterne takes a quasi-Dreyfusian approach, insofar as "Dreyfus argues that Husserl, in his search for an indubitable foundation, wished to investigate consciousness from a strictly internal perspective and that he consequently found it necessary to effectuate a procedure of purification, which would remove all external or transcendental components from consciousness" (Zahavi

2004, 45). So, too, does Sterne suggest that Schafer's work, in treating the speaking subject as the "indubitable foundation" of the soundscape, excludes the external (or in his words, "exterior") components of sound. If we accept that phenomenology necessarily rejects this internalism/externalism divide, however, so, too, will a phenomenological account of the soundscape "[reject] the picture of inner and outer that governs that debate and the ontological conception of representation that divides the two camps – substituting for it a concept of meaning that is norm-governed, holistic, and quasi-inferential" (Crowell 2013, 109).

3.3 *Return of the First- and Second-Personal: Soundscape Phenomenologies and Lived Experiences of Sound(ing)*

Thus far, I have positioned my notion of the soundscape as a normative concept that productively eschews the internalism/externalism debate. If the soundscape is neither of consciousness nor of the world, however, what role do first- and second-personal accounts of sound play in its analysis? Recall that for Cox, Goodman, and Sterne, sound is understood through third-person, externalist perspectives. Sterne justifies this approach by calling his method *genealogical*, likely referencing Foucault's works. For example, in "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress," Foucault provides a tripartite description of his project:

> Three domains of genealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, a historical

> ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents. (1984, 351)

In focusing on audible techniques and the production of listening as a sociohistorical capacity, Sterne offers "a historical ontology" of sonic experience. In his later "prismatic" (Flynn 2005) works, however, Foucault goes on to characterize experience as "emerg[ing] from the interplay of distinct elements: domains of knowledge (objectivation), practices of power (coercion), and reflexive relations to oneself (subjectivization)" (Oksala 2016, 56). While Sterne undoubtedly addresses domains of sonic knowledge and practices of sonic power, absent in his account is the final piece of Foucault's prism: the role of self-reflection, or first-person analyses. Such an omission has serious consequences: as Linda Martín Alcoff argues in "Phenomenology, Post-structuralism, and Feminist Theory on the Concept of Experience," "the project of 'making experience visible' *has* sometimes had the effect of disrupting dominant discursive formations" (2000, 46; emphasis in original). Using the example of sexual violence in the United States, Alcoff demonstrates how survivors' accounts (or second-person analyses) have helped to foster political change, including recognition of rape within marriage and more recent legislation on date rape (2000, 46).[38] In the context of sound, we might also think about how experiential accounts have been used to disrupt *sonic* discursive formations, e.g., how testimonies from survivors

[38] Alcoff also offers a powerful response to Foucault's "farmhand case" in this text. She writes: "Foucault's objective in discussing this case is to suggest that it marked a discursive turning point in the construction of sexual experiences between adults and children … it hardly needs to be said that Foucault lacked sufficient evidence to warrant his claims about the girls' participation in or feelings about the event … his quickness to assume such knowledge manifests unfortunately typical male and adult patterns of epistemic arrogance" (2000, 53-54).

of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp helped outlaw the use of sound torture as an "enhanced interrogation technique," albeit with limited enforcement.[39]

For these reasons, Sterne's emphasis on the discursivity of sound, while valuable, ultimately leaves readers to question what the relationship between discourse, meaning, and the lived experience of sound is, and how self-reflection matters for analyses of power and knowledge. As Crowell muses:

> To the extent that the circumstances of practical life can be seen as phenomenological conditions of the meaningful structures of what we encounter in the first-person experience, they cannot be constructed naturalistically as third-person data; they must already belong to the reflectively accessible terrain of normatively integrated phenomena– to a kind of immanence (2013, 108-109).

In other words, by maintaining the methodological importance of the first-personal, phenomenology offers us a kind of immanence that "recover[s] the meaningful structure of lived experience" without bifurcating mind and world (Crowell 2013, 102). So, too, does Sophie Loidolt defend the first-personal nature of phenomenological analyses and their normative implications. In "Phenomenology, Law, and the Political: A Methodological Reflection on First-Person Inquiry, Normative Orders, and Action" (2017), she explains: "as soon as phenomenology speaks about experience and meaning, it does so by defending the intentional, subjective, first-personal, and correlational features of both, instead of conceptualizing them from the viewpoint of a third-person perspective" (153). As a

[39] On his second day in office, former president Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13491 which barred the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" (i.e., interrogation practices which utilize "cruel, inhuman, or degrading" punishments) or interrogation techniques not explicitly authorized by the Army Field Manual of Intelligence Interrogation. This order was later codified with the McCain-Feinstein amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act in 2016. Despite this, reports of sound torture being utilized at CIA blacksites persists, raising serious questions about the law's effectiveness.

normative concept that utilizes first, second, and third-personal accounts of sound, my phenomenological reading of the soundscape thus remains committed to the experiential-based knowledge that Alcoff calls for whilst also remaining "open to intersubjective criticism and verification" (Loidolt 2017, 159). In so doing, my concept avoids the masculinist perspective that Sterne's genealogy inadvertently takes while also avoiding the hegemony of the linguistic turn that Cox and Goodman critique through a return to sounds themselves. In the study of sound, normativity and experience needn't be oppositional. Rather, I will use the following chapters to demonstrate "how the constitution and categorization/typing of [sonic] experience through orders on the one hand and the analysis of lived experience of orders on the other hand, can go together" (Loidolt 2017, 162).

4. Concluding Thoughts: Sounding Critique

In conclusion, by offering a (critical) phenomenology of the soundscape, I do not seek to uncover the transhistorical or transcultural dimensions of sounding and listening. Neither do I mean to reify an ontology of sound that abandons historical analyses. Rather, in furthering a phenomenological approach, my account seeks to reposition the soundscape as a critical tool through which philosophers may speak about lived experiences of sound while also recognizing their social, political, and historical variance.[40] In *Voices of Tyranny*, Schafer states that the soundscape's ultimate aim "is to get whole populations to

[40] Despite some of Sterne's earlier critiques of phenomenology, his most recent book, *Diminished Faculties: A Political Phenomenology of Impairment* (2022), does just this. By engaging with a range of thinkers in critical and political phenomenology, Sterne develops a phenomenology of impairment inspired, in part, by his own experiences with cancer and voice changes. I take this as continued evidence of critical phenomenology's importance, and of the continued importance of first- and second-personal accounts as I have argued in this chapter.

listen more carefully and critically" (1993, 113). Speaking specifically about musical soundscapes, he muses: "the history of music, with its cultural variants, provides a repertoire from which deductions can be made about what different eras were expected to hear, and equally what they missed, for in the study of any soundscape what is missed is just as important as what is listened to, perhaps moreso" (1993, 118). Adopting a critical, feminist approach to Schafer's work, I therefore read the soundscape through Judith Butler and Lisa Guenther's definitions of *critique*. For Butler, the purpose of critique "is to be able to call foundations into question, denaturalize social and political hierarchy, and even establish perspectives by which a certain distance on the naturalized world can be had" (Butler 2002, 212). So, too, does Guenther characterize critique in this manner. In her recent work "Six Senses of Critique for Critical Phenomenology," she offers a six-fold account of critique, including an emphasis on "quasi-transcendental, historically-grounded stud[ies] of particular lifeworlds" and "(situated and interested) analys[e]s of power" (2021, 5). Building on traditional phenomenology's suspension of the natural attitude, Guenther holds that critical phenomenology must be self-reflective and praxis-driven, tasking philosophers with not just describing the conditions of possibility through which meaningful experience arises, but also with "chang[ing] the conditions under which horizons of possibility for meaning, action, and relationship are wrongfully limited or foreclosed" (2021, 5).

Playing Butler and Guenther's work together with Schafer's, I therefore suggest that a phenomenological reading of the soundscape can likewise be interpreted as a form of critique. In other words, just as critique "calls foundations into question" and provides us

with “(situated and interested)” analyses of power, so, too, does the soundscape aim to lay bare the sonic epistemes through which we listen and (re)sound. As Guenther concludes: “what might a critical phenomenology of experience, improvisation, and experimentation become if we affirmed a methodological hybridity rather than policing the boundaries of what counts as phenomenology?” (2021, 20). This, I argue, is precisely what a (critical phenomenology of the soundscape is able to provide: an analysis of normative sonic orders in which (re)sounding bodies form and transform, as well as an account of a situated sonic agency capable of creatively responding to (and resisting) these orders.

“Sam Hall,” The Corby’s (2000)

Chapter 3

Sounding: Soundscapes of Grief and a Critical Phenomenology of Keening

In this chapter, I argue that Schafer's notion of the "soundmark" can be productively reinterpreted as a community *orientation*, or as a sort of sonic *sensing* that helps shape community members ontologically, epistemically, and practically. The chapter is divided into four parts. First, I offer a brief exegesis of Schafer's "soundmark" and its use in contemporary literature. Reading Schafer's work together with Ahmed's and DeRoo's, section two calls for a reinterpretation of soundmarks as general *orientations*, or as processes of meaning-making and navigation within given social and spiritual worlds. I then demonstrate this retooled reading through an engagement with the traditional Irish custom of *keening*. Section three addresses possible limitations of this account, specifically focusing on the plane of immanence and the generativity of soundmarks themselves. Here, I turn to Deleuze's work on sense to show how our tripartite reading of the soundmark remains possible without relying on a (re)sounding, intentional subject. Fourth, and finally, I describe a critical re/territorialization of keening in the music of fairy metal artist, Banshee, to underscore soundmark's continued usefulness for music and media studies.

1. *Schafer and Soundmarks*

In *The Soundscape*, Schafer explicates "soundscape" through three key features: keynote sounds, signals, and soundmarks (1977, 9). Drawing upon Gestalt psychologists, he defines signals as the "figures" of an auditory field and "keynote sounds" as its ground. For example, an ambulance's siren may be heard as a signal while driving, whereas the constant hum of a car's motor serves as

the sonic "ground" during a drive.[41] In addition to keynote sounds and signals, he terms signals that carry social and cultural significance for particular communities *soundmarks*. Distinct from signals, Schafer defines a "soundmark" as a "community sound which is unique or possesses qualities which make it specially regarded or noticed by people in the community" (1977, 10). In *Voices of Tyranny* (1993) he clarifies this further, describing soundmarks as "sensory anchors helping one to feel at home in a situation" (1993, 108).

It is not simply that communities *can* have soundmarks; rather, Schafer argues that soundmarks are an inevitable part of community-building and group identity. In his words: "every community will have its own soundmarks" (1977, 239). To demonstrate this, Schafer often utilizes examples of religious soundmarks, including the widespread use of church bells in Europe. Recounting a trip to Austria, he recalls: "In Salzburg, from a small ancient hotel room, I listened to the innumerable bells ring slowly … [t]he bell was an acoustic calendar, announcing festivals, births, deaths, marriages, fires and revolts" (1977, 55). As a sort of "acoustic calendar," Schafer argues that the ringing bell "[helped define] the community, for the parish is an acoustic space, circumscribed by the range of the church bell" (1977, 53-54). Unlike passing signals, therefore, the bell served an important social, cultural, and spiritual function, orienting listeners to the events of the community (marriages, funerals, etc.) while also acoustically delimiting the community's (sonic) boundaries.

Following Schafer's work, contemporary scholars continue to use "soundmark" to describe vital aspects of sonic cultural heritage. For example, in "To Ring or Not to Ring: What COVID-19 Taught Us about Religious Heritage Soundscapes in the Community," Dirk H. R. Spennemann

[41] This example is also fruitful insofar as it shows the porosity of these two terms. A mechanic may attune to the hum of a car motor as a signal in order to diagnose a problem, and someone living in a dense, city apartment may grow accustomed to the sounds of blazing sirens. As stated in chapter one, then, keynote sounds and signals are *not* stable, immutable categories.

and Murray Parker explore the role bell ringing played for religious communities during the COVID-19 pandemic. Looking at communities in Australia during the initial 2020 lockdown, they examine how changes in bell ringing greatly impacted local soundscapes and the communities that comprise them. In Sydney, for example, the Catholic Archdiocese "directed that the bells be rung five times each day at specific points in time" to create unified moments of prayer (2022, 1681). This schedule included: morning bell ringing for those currently infected, midday ringing for healthcare professionals and those caring for the sick, and evening ringing for those who had passed from COVID-19 (Spennemann and Parker 2022, 1681). By sounding out in this manner, the bells served an important orienting function during a period of great social upheaval. Indeed, as the archbishop noted: "the ringing of the bells will remind the faithful of the importance of pausing and uniting wherever they are in prayer for those suffering due to the coronavirus" (quoted in Spennemann and Parker 2022). In other words, while other forms of community life were interrupted by lockdown mandates and social distancing, the continued use of church bell-as-soundmark provided the Catholic community with a sense of mooring during an otherwise deeply unmooring event.

In contrast to Sydney, Spennemann and Parker also note the temporary *loss* of religious soundmarks in Australia during the pandemic. In churches such as Albury and Leeton, for example, bell ringing was halted entirely, causing surrounding communities to note how "quiet and unusual" their soundscapes became (Spennemann and Parker 2022, 1681). As Spennemann and Parker muse: "For the communities that lost their bells, it was not the loss of the material object of a bell that was mourned, but the loss of what the bell provided: the familiar soundscape of community life" (Spennemann and Parker 2022, 1683). Here, Spennemann and Parker make an important distinction between an empirical and a phenomenological interpretation of soundmarks. Following my phenomenological reinterpretation of the soundscape in chapter one, it is not a

discrete sound "object" that these communities missed; rather, the loss of the bells during COVID-19 highlights soundmarks' status as orienting phenomena that situate people in a place, time, even cosmically in cases where soundmark refers to a spiritual order. To further clarify this distinction, I will now offer a phenomenological reading of soundmarks via Husserl's concept of *Empfindnisse* or "sensings."

2. *Soundmarks as Orientations: Husserl and Empfindnisse*

In chapter one, I called for a phenomenological-topological reinterpretation of the soundscape. I reinterpreted soundmarks as community *orientations,* or as sounds which help us navigate dynamic sonic worlds. However, more can be said of soundmarks as distinctly phenomenological events, and, more specifically, as forms of phenomenological *sensings*. To reiterate, Schafer defines soundmarks as culturally significant "sensory anchors" that orient listeners within given social and spiritual worlds. From this, I argued that we can productively reinterpret soundmarks as community *orientations*. In *Queer Phenomenology,* Ahmed describes the role orientations play within phenomenology.

> What does it mean to be orientated? … If we know where we are when we turn this way or that way, then we are orientated. We have our bearings … To be orientated is also to be turned toward certain objects, those that help us find our way. These are the objects we recognize, so that when we face them we know which way we are facing. They might be landmarks or other familiar signs that give us our anchoring points. They gather on the ground, and they create a ground upon which we can gather. (2006, 1)

There are several parallels between Schafer's and Ahmed's work. Like Ahmed, Schafer approaches soundmarks as sensory guideposts; a neologism combining "sound" and "landmark," a soundmark provides listeners with "anchoring points" to situate themselves within dynamic sonic worlds. Return to the example of the church bell. In *The Soundscape*, Schafer notes that "wherever the missionaries took Christianity, the church bell was soon to follow, acoustically demarking the

civilization of the parish from the wilderness beyond its earshot" (1977, 55). By demarking the sonic space of the parish, the church bell thus served an important orienting function; just as Ahmed characterizes orientations as creating the grounds upon which we gather, so, too, did the church bell (as soundmark) create a colonial ground upon which parishioners convened.[42]

In addition to this orienting function, however, Schafer adds that soundmarks are unique insofar as they are socially and culturally *significant*. Because of this, a second definition of orientation is required, one that Ahmed also provides. In her later work "Orientations Matter" (2010), Ahmed argues that orientations "matter" in two distinct senses. Following her focus on the philosopher's table in *Queer Phenomenology*, she first suggests that orientations matter insofar as they "are about how matter surfaces by being directed in one way or another" (2010, 235). In the context of the soundscape, for example, we might think of how soundmarks direct (re)sounding, fleshy bodies in repeated ways, e.g., the Muslim call to prayer (*adhan*) or Catholic kneeling during Eucharistic prayer. Just as Ahmed writes of emotions in *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, these soundmarks help "shape the very surfaces of bodies, which take shape through the repetition of actions over time, as well as through orientations towards and away from others" (Ahmed 2015, 4). Just as emotions can shape what bodies do and how they do it, so, too, can sounds help shape the lived "matter" of our (resounding) flesh.

Additionally, Ahmed describes a second sense in which orientations matter. Playing with the polysemy of "matter," she writes: "orientations matter in the simple sense that orientations are significant and important. To be oriented in a certain way is how certain things come to be significant, come to be *for me*" (2010, 235; emphasis in original). Such a claim is likewise supported by DeRoo in *The Political Logic of Experience*. As discussed in chapter two, DeRoo

[42] It also operates in tandem with a physical landmark (the physical church), gesturing toward the interplay and overlap of various sensory modalities.

examines how Husserl's notion of *Empfindnisse*, or "sensings" complicates any sort of mind/body or subject/object dichotomy. "In *Ideas II*, Husserl coins the term *Empfindnisse* (a portmanteau of *Empfindung*, sensation, and *Erlebnisse*, lived experiences) … to articulate this situation of a subject that is always already in contact with the surrounding world" (2022, 57). In other words, *Empfindnisse* emphasizes the primordial contact of body and world, wherein contact and the living-through of that contact are unified. Looking specifically at the sensuous-spiritual entity as something more than the sum of two elements (the spirit and the body), he explains:

> We encounter things as spiritual products (Hua 6, 270), that is, as things carrying a "spiritual meaning" as an inherent part of their own being … their meaningfulness, then, is not primarily a matter of theoretical or objective knowledge … we "feel" or are affected by things before we objectify them. (DeRoo 2022, 131-132)[43]

In writing that spiritual meaning is a matter of neither theoretical nor objective knowledge, DeRoo means that spiritual products share the primordial character of *Empfindnisse*. In other words, the meaning of spiritual products cannot be understood separate from the *experiencing* of them. Rather, spiritual meaning (as a form of *Empfindnisse*) precedes the division of body and hyletic data, entailing a phenomenal condition "that is simultaneously a contact with the world and a subjective living through of that contact" (DeRoo 2022, 57).

Like Ahmed, then, DeRoo's work demonstrates how the two elements of orientation – significance and bearing– are inextricably intertwined. In fact, DeRoo goes on to argue as much

[43] Interestingly, while one might assume that sound as a quasi-tactile sense would operate similarly (cf. Goodman's vibrational ontology, 2012), Husserl holds that hearing cannot provide this same double sensation/double apprehension. Although he relents that the ear is undoubtedly involved in acts of listening, he nevertheless maintains that "the sensed tone is not localized in the ear … they are in the ear just as tones of a violin are outside in space, but, for all that, they do not yet have the proper character of sensings and the localization proper to them" (1989, 157). In a supplement to this section of *Ideas II*, however, Husserl goes on to suggest that for the localization of sounds, "… we have to attend to a phenomenon of *orientation* … corresponding to 'my' approach or withdrawal (in the free 'I move') a visual Object changes its orientation, and likewise so does an acoustic Object" (1989, 324). Here, Husserl characterizes sounds as being orientating in the first sense of the word, i.e., as directing our bodies this way and that. However, while Husserl may be correct in suggesting that sounds are not localized in the ear as touch sensations are in or on my hand, his description of the body as the zero-point (or *Nullpunkt*) of sonic orientation suggests that sounds are still localized in the Here of my body (Husserl 1989, 325).

in his reading of Merleau-Ponty's notion of the *flesh*. Following the double-sensation of sense/sensing, he writes: "such a sense/sensing, therefore, is both 'meaning' and 'orientation' – a point captured in the French sense of *sens.* And this dual connotation implies an intertwining, not just of meaning and being but of meaning, being, and doing" (DeRoo 2022, 78). In other words, just as Ahmed argues that orientations "matter" in a twofold manner (e.g., in gathering on the ground and in creating the ground upon which we gather), DeRoo likewise suggests that sense involves a similar sort of knotting. Beyond Ahmed, though, DeRoo's emphasis on the tripartite nature of sense ("meaning, being, and doing") offers a *third* element for our understanding of orientations. Reading Ahmed and DeRoo together, I therefore suggest that orientations "matter" insofar as they: 1) are significant (i.e., they are meaningful, they "matter"); 2) shape our bodies (i.e., shape the "matter" of our being), and; 3) enable us to *act* with a certain end in view (i.e., serve an indicative function).[44]

In sum, soundmarks, as community orientations, direct or guide the fleshy "matter" of (re)sounding bodies within a given soundscape and carry special social and cultural meanings. Additionally, soundmarks entail a practical element; they call upon community members to act in specific ways, to "take matters" into their hands. This is perhaps why Schafer so often utilizes religious sounds to explain soundmarks; these sounds not only orient listeners in a literal, spatiotemporal sense (i.e., the church bell) but in meaningful and practical ways as well. To better explain this threefold account, I now turn to an analysis of keening.

[44] Such a reading also resonates with Heidegger's treatment of sense. As Janus explains in discussing Nancy's work: "the three 'senses' of the word 'sense' recalls and revises Heidegger's triumvirate: listening to sense as meaning, listening to sense as sensual or perceptual sense, and listening to sense as movement, sense of direction, and impulse" (Janus 2011, 183).

3.1 *Keening: The Irish Lament for the Dead*

A "Pagan carryover" (Conrad 2008, 42) dating back to at least 7th century Ireland,[45] keening (or *caoineadh*) was a pre-Christian mourning ritual consisting of both prepared and extemporized lamentations and wailing (Collins 2018, 60). Led by the *bean chaointe* (or keening woman), the practice served two primary functions: first, to guide the deceased's soul into the underworld, and second, to guide community members in the collective resonance of grief. As Narelle McCoy summarizes: "the keening woman was an essential presence at funerary rites to ensure that the deceased departed to the Otherworld, and that the journey was as smooth as possible … However, the pivotal role that the keener fulfilled was to lead the community in the public expression of sorrow and grief and to carry the group along with her" (2008, 121). Through her cries, the keening woman thus performed an important social *and* spiritual function, traversing the boundaries between worlds and "allow[ing] life to resume its normal rhythm after the mourning period" (McCoy 2008, 123).

Performed only after the death and following a period of observed silence,[46] the keen traditionally comprised three parts: the salutation, the dirge/lament, and the cry or *gol*. As Michelle Collins summarizes:

> The *salutation* can be defined as a fond address or call to the dead person. The *dirge/lament* or verse consisted of impromptu poetry from a body of stock poetry, partly extempore, partly prepared … The third part, the *keen/gol* is a choral cry led by the *bean chaointe* at the end of each verse. (2018, 63; emphasis in original)

[45] While keening continued well into the age of audio recording, few (if any) recordings of the practice actually exist. As Breandán Ó Madagáin explains, the keen was not a matter of entertainment; rather, it was an integral part of wake rituals that was treated with deference if not superstition if performed outside of its appropriate context (1981, 311).

[46] The timing of the keen was of grave importance for practitioners and was never to be performed while someone was still in the process of dying. Summarizing the research of Séan O Súilleabháin, McCoy explains: "If the keen broke out too early, the devil's dogs were alerted and the soul could lose its way" (2008, 121).

While each part of the keen involved aspects of ritualized sound, the third part –the cry or *gol*– is of particular interest for philosophers exploring sound. Created through drawn-out vocables, voiced inhalations, falling inflections, and glottal stops (McCoy 2008, 121) the cry operated as a sort of affective call and response; while the first two portions of the keen (the salutation and the lament) were performed exclusively by the keening woman, the cry was unique insofar as it called upon others to participate in the sounding-out of grief. Patricia Lysaght explains: "At the close of each stanza [the keening woman] led a choral cry (gol) in which the female relatives of the deceased and other mourners usually joined, repeating throughout the exclamation *Och-Ochón!* Or some such words, by way of a burden to the verses" (1997, 71). To describe the exclamation "och-ochón" as a *word* is not wholly correct, however. Breandán Ó Madagáin argues that the phrase "och-ochón" is closer to a *vocable*, roughly meaning "alas" or "woe," and was used together with other vocables to "g[i]ve poignant expression to [mourners'] emotion in purely musical terms, using their voices as a musical instrument" (Ó Madagáin 2005, 84). The *gol* was thus unique in a second way, highlighting language's expressive materiality and including non-lexical sounds meant to better capture the raw, explosive feelings of grief.

In addition to its vital role as a wake custom, keening was used during periods of change and loss in Ireland. Historical records show that keening was performed during the Famine years and during the departure of those emigrating to distant shores (including the United States). As Ó Madagáin recounts in *Caointe Agus Seancheolta Eile, or Keening and Other Irish Musics*:

> In the Memoirs of folklorist Jeremiah Curtin he records the following: "The migration of 1892 had begun … At a station near Limerick we witnessed a most pathetic scene. A woman, not less than eighty years old, was clinging to her grandchildren, perhaps they were great-grandchildren, a young man and woman, and was wailing as at a funeral. She realized that she was seeing them for the last time" [Curtin 1947, 457]. Most likely she was keening. (2005, 88)

Here, Ó Madagáin's interpretation of the woman's cries demonstrates the saliency of the practice and its proliferation to other facets of community life. Such an example also demonstrates the spatializing aspects of the practice; as form of embodied (re)sounding, keening co-created a sonic space (or perhaps, *place*) for members of the community, one that "allowed for unconventional sounds to be expressed by the community … [and] to release their grief communally" (Collins 2018, 63-64).[47]

3.2 *A Phenomenology of Keening: Soundmarks as Orienting Sensings*

Read in a Schaferian manner, keening is a traditional Irish *soundmark*. As a sequence of sounds "specially regarded or noticed" by Irish communities (Schafer 1977, 10), keening served as a "sensory anchor" that moored listeners during periods of intense social and spiritual upheaval. As evidenced in Ó Madagáin's account, keening also helped the significance of the mourning ritual migrate to other sites of mourning and grief, including emigration. Just as Schafer characterizes soundmarks as "helping one to feel at home in a situation" (1977, 108), so, too, did keening guide community members "through [an] ambiguous time of transition and re-assimilation into a new way of living, a newly formed community" (Collins 2018, 62).

Beyond Schafer's original definition, however, keening also might be considered a soundmark as an *orientation*. More specifically, we can reinterpret keening as operating through an orienting function. Recall Ahmed's claim that orientations "gather on the ground, and they create ground upon which we can gather" (2006, 1). So, too, does keening "gather on the ground" (i.e., gathers listeners through "the collective outpouring of grief" [McCoy 2009, 212]) and *creates*

[47] Stated this way, one might suggest that keening as a soundmark loses the plane of immanence and broader scenes of interaction. I will address this limitation and offer a more extensive reading of the practice in section four.

the ground upon which mourners can gather (i.e., establishes a liminal time and space for the intense grieving of the dead [Lysaght 1997, 76]).

In addition to Ahmed's ground/grounding distinction, however, we might also explore how keening "matters" in the threefold sense outlined in section two: ontologically, epistemologically, and practically. As an embodied practice, keening undoubtedly shapes the "matter" of (re)sounding bodies. During the *gol* or cry, listeners are called upon to join in the sounding-out of loss, directing grieving flesh through group cries and glottal breaks. Here, sound is irrevocably tied to the *matter* of the body: the throat, the diaphragm, the soft palate. Take, for example, Collins' firsthand account of the keening experience. Following her participation in a modern-day keening ceremony, she recalls:

> Higher open pitches, almost church like [sic] develop, with the group complementing each other. This is followed by a disharmony and I begin to feel very sick. I cough loudly and gag. The feeling is very strong. The facilitator brings me a basin and towel and I cough into the bowl as I feel I am about to get sick. The sounds are dissonant and I am coughing, coughing, coughing … my feelings of sickness begin to subside and the group returns to closed sounds with the lead keener humming. (2014, 53)[48]

Here, Collins' physical reaction to the mourners' cries (coughing, gagging, etc.) highlights the deeply embodied, physical quality of the keen.[49] As a material practice, keening is not simply a sonic "object" existing out there, in the world. Rather, keening highlights the immediate, primordial quality of sense, wherein sound is viscerally *felt* and *lived through* before becoming objectified and/or abstracted.

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[48] Collins' experience occurred as part of a Celtic Shamanic practice wherein keening is used as a way to process individual grief in a collective forum. As Collins explains: "The contemporary keen now presents itself in the context of Keening ceremonies, outside of the traditional funeral setting. Keening ceremonies are infrequent events where groups come together and keen. Unlike keening at funerals, at such ceremonies participants are not keening any one individual's death – every person keens their own personal grief. This grief is not always the loss of the passing of someone. Sometimes people keen in order to release grief surrounding a tragic event that happened in their life such as rape, inability to have children, abuse etc." (2018, 66).

[49] This need not be the experience of others during the ritual. Indeed, other participants may respond very differently to the same sounds.

Additionally, keening often included other forms of bodily gestures. As J. M. Synge's account of the Aran Islands demonstrates, the keening woman "seemed possessed for the moment with a profound ecstasy of grief, swaying to and fro, and bending her forehead to the stone before her, while she called out to the dead with a perpetually recurring chant of sobs" (1999, 36-37). Like Ahmed's orientations, then, keening necessarily concerns physical or corporeal substance; keening "shape[s] the corporeal substance" of grieving bodies through communal lamentations and repetitive movement.[50] Keening thus served as a sort of bodily guidepost, directing both the fleshy matter of living toward the spiritual matter of the dead.

Turning to the second definition of the term, keening also "matters" insofar as it is *significant,* i.e., it is a process of spiritual importance and meaning making. As Angela Bourke explains in "The Irish Traditional Lament and the Grieving Process": "the period of mourning – after the body has been laid out and before it is covered with earth in the cemetery– is a time of disruption of the social order" (1988, 289). In other words, death is a profoundly destabilizing force; it poses a significant break in our understandings of time, place, and relationality. For many, death may be described as sense*less,* or lacking sense. Through the orienting sounds of keening, however, mourners are able to "make sense" of their loss and give significance to the death with others in their community. Additionally, keening helps offer mourners with an outlet to express seemingly inexpressible affect.[51] As Collins explains: "the loose form of semiotic sound allowed for heightened ability to personally express both individual and collective grief. This ambiguous

[50] Other accounts include additional physical gestures that were incorporated into the keen. As Collins summarizes: "Some reports present the women as tearing their hair out and throwing it on the coffin, exposing themselves, wringing and clapping their hands or chewing on themselves while howling, shrieking, and unleashing 'barbarous outcries' as they beat their breasts" (2018, 62-63).

[51] Just as keynote sounds, signals, and soundmarks are not absolute, immutable categories, so too must we say that keening may not be successful in this offering. Indeed, listening bodies may refuse to participate, may fail to resonate with it, etc.

aural space allowed for unconventional sounds to be expressed by the community" (2018, 64). Through these "unconventional sounds," keening thus provides participants with the opportunity to meaningfully voice their feelings.

Reading Ahmed's twofold account of orientation together with DeRoo's tripartite analysis of expressivity, we may also say that orientations "matter" in the third sense of the term, i.e., they involve a *practical* element, a being, a knowing, and a *doing*. In *The Political Logic of Experience*, DeRoo explores the equiprimordial unity of expressivity as expression, expressed, and expressing. While phenomenologists aptly emphasize the first two components, DeRoo argues that thinkers like Husserl fail to adequately mark the distinction between expression and *expressing* (2022, 21). In other words, scholars like Husserl fail to grasp the generative dimensions of experience, wherein "an expression is simply the being, knowing, and doing of one and the same phenomenal unity" (DeRoo 2022, 40). Such a distinction is important, DeRoo claims, because these three elements constitute the core of phenomenality itself; to lose the practical, "doing" element of phenomenality is to miss how experience is necessarily "a participation in the sense development of an intersubjective structure that is in the process of generation as we describe it and as we bring it about" (Steinbock 1995, 14-15).

Just as DeRoo emphasizes the practical element at the heart of experience itself, so, too, might me explore how keening comprises a being, knowing, *and* a doing. Describing the generative aspect of orientations, Ahmed writes: "we can think, in other words, of the background not simply in terms of what is around what we face, as the 'dimly perceived,' but as produced by acts of relegation: some things are relegated to the background in order *to sustain* a certain direction" (Ahmed 2006, 31; emphasis in original). Keening (as orientation) likewise requires action on behalf of its participants; as a soundmark, it brings certain sounds to the fore whilst relegating others to sustain its directionality.

In framing soundmarks as forms of phenomenological *sensings*, however, several potential issues arise. First, if we interpret soundmarks as sonic sensings or orientations, are these phenomena wholly subsumed by the activity of an intentional subject? Such a concern relates back to the "Subject Critique" developed in chapter one and requires an account of *immanence*, or soundmarks' participation in (and constitution through) constantly shifting substrates of sonic relations (Foucault 1990, 93). Second, can the language of "soundmark" (as a neologism of "sound" and "landmark") accurately grasp the ephemeral or fugitive quality of many community sounds? Take the practice of keening during non-traditional contexts; during emigration, for example, keening functioned almost like a sonic *metaphor*, taking a sonic source domain into a target domain. This concern relates back to the "Euclidean Critique" in chapter one and orientations' relation to space/place. To address these concerns, I now turn to the philosophy of Deleuze to develop my own concept of sonic orientations as re/territorializing *soundings*.

4.1 *Deleuze, Sense, and Subjectivity*

In section three, I offered a threefold interpretation of soundmarks as sonic *sensings*. In so doing, I highlighted the ontological, epistemological, and practical elements of (sonic) sense via DeRoo's reading of Husserl's *Empfindnisse*. If we interpret soundmarks as kinds of community orientations, however, how do we account for the immanent generativity of sound itself? Put otherwise, how are we to address the ontological, epistemological, and practical elements of orientations without recourse to a transcendental subject? Take, for example, Ahmed's discussion of orientations. In order to sustain an orientation, Ahmed writes that a background is produced through "acts of relegation" (Ahmed 2006, 31). In using the language of "relegation," however, Ahmed risks placing too much emphasis on the intentional acts of a perceiving subject. To paraphrase Rodaway, does sense necessarily begin and end with the human subject (1994, 8)?

Interestingly, Husserl's work on sense and expressivity was a significant (and contentious) point of inquiry for Deleuze. In *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1990), Deleuze largely follows the tripartite structure of expressivity outlined by DeRoo in *The Political Logic of Experience*. He writes: "we must distinguish what expresses itself, the expression itself and what is expressed" (Deleuze 1990, 333). In other words, Deleuze's early approach to expressivity aligns with DeRoo's triadic reading: expressivity involves a doing, a knowing, and a being. In his later work, however, Deleuze appears to abandon this triadic structure in favor of a twofold interpretation of expression. For example, in *Difference and Repetition*, he writes: "By 'expression' we mean, as always, the relation which involves a torsion between an expressor and expressed" (Deleuze 1994, 260). This twofold relation also appears in *The Logic of Sense*, wherein Deleuze writes:

> Sense is both the expressible or the expressed of the proposition, and the attribute of the state of affairs. It turns one side toward things and one side toward propositions. But it does not merge with the proposition which expresses it any more than with the state of affairs or the quality which the proposition denotes. It is exactly the boundary between propositions and things. (1990, 22)

In arguing that sense "does not merge" with the proposition nor with the state of affairs that the proposition expresses, Deleuze offers an *event-view* of sense. In other words, sense is an event insofar as the expressed "is becoming-itself in and through its expression" but is not reducible to it (DeRoo 2022, 37).[52] Expression and expressed, therefore, are immanently related, being ontologically inseparable but non-identical.

In describing this asymmetrical relationship between the expressed and the expression, however, Deleuze makes an important departure from Husserl's work. Whereas Husserlian

[52] Here, Deleuze gestures back toward the radical potential of Husserl's noema, insofar as the noema likewise is neither physical object nor mental representations of it (Deleuze 1990, 20). Returning to chapter one, Deleuze thus echoes Derrida's interest in the nonappurtenance of the noema as sense.

phenomenology locates the relationship between expressed and expression in the conscious acts of an intentional subject (i.e., in *expressing*), Deleuze is interested in the generative force of the event itself. As DeRoo summarizes, for Deleuze: "Expressivity … requires an act or force (expressing) that co-constitutes both expressed and expression as relata. This force is not primarily an action performed by a subject but is an innately generative process" (DeRoo 2022, 22). In arguing that expressivity (constituted in and through sense) is innately generative, Deleuze foregrounds the immanence of sense. In other words, Deleuze proposes a sort of *epochē* to a level of immanence without relating that epochē "back to a subject who apprehends that immanence" (Reynolds and Roffe 2006, 236).

In doing this, however, Deleuze does *not* abandon sense's triadic structure. Rather, he develops an immanent philosophy of sense that does not rely on the unifying acts of consciousness conceived of either transcendentally or historically. Returning to our discussion of orientations-as-sensings, we do not need to abandon our triadic interpretation of orientations to avoid losing the plane of immanence. Rather, following Sean Bowden, I argue that soundmarks (as sensings) can still involve ontological, epistemological, and practical elements without subsuming them into the intentional acts of a coherent, stable subject. In "The Intensive Expression of the Virtual: Revisiting the Relation of Expression in *Difference and Repetition*," Bowden explores Deleuze's enduring (yet transformative) treatment of expression as a triadic relation (2017, 219). The triadic relation that Bowden identifies in Deleuze maintains our focus on the ontology, epistemology, and activity of sense, but through different conceptual framings. Bowden clarifies these elements through three central theses:

> The first thesis is a claim about *ontological* inseparability. It holds that some internal or immanent cause is expressed in an expression with which it is not identical, but apart from which it does not have actual existence. The second thesis is an *epistemological* one. It maintains that what the expression expresses is something like the 'sense' of its internal or

> immanent cause. We might say that, insofar as the expression is the existence of its immanent cause, the characteristic features or sense of this immanent cause, while not reducible to its expression, can nevertheless only be grasped with reference to it. The third thesis has to do with *activity* or production. What is claimed here, finally, is that the expression not only expresses the *sense* of its immanent cause, the expression also dynamically *constitutes* or *accomplishes* its immanent cause, in particular through the way in which what the expression expresses is 'comprehended'. (2017, 225-26; emphasis in original)

Let us clarify these three theses within the context of the soundscape and, more specifically, within the context of the soundmark. Whereas our original ontological argument focused on how soundmarks (as orientations) shape the matter or being of (re)sounding bodies, a Deleuzian interpretation focuses on the ontology or being of soundmarks *themselves*. The first thesis does this by stressing the ontological inseparability and non-identicality of an expression and an expressed. Take keening, for example. As a kind of orientation/soundmark, we can say that keening is a sonic expression of grief, anger, loss, etc. Participants' grief is made existent through (and expressed by) keening. In other words, it is the sounding-out of grief that actualizes it. But keening is not ontologically identical to that grief. Put simply, what is expressed (grief, loss, etc.) is not separable from its expression (the *gol*, crying, screaming, etc.) but these two elements remain non-identical. The expressed is not fully realized by its expression, nor can it ever be. As Deleuze himself concludes: "The foundation can never resemble what it founds. It does not suffice to say of the foundation that it is another matter– it is also another geography, without being another world" (1990, 99). Through this focus on the ontological inseparability of the expression and expressed, Deleuze offers us a way to conceptualize the being of sonic sense while also avoiding the Subject Critique.

The second part of the first thesis leads into the epistemological point made in the second thesis. Specifically, the second thesis argues that an expressive "saying" (or in our context, *sounding*) not only concerns the relationship between the expressed and the expression, but

between the expressed-expression relationship and "something that, as it were, understands or comprehends what the expression expresses" (Bowden 2017, 223). Bringing this to bear on our discussion of soundmarks, I argue that the *sense* of what soundmarks say likewise "refers to an understanding that grasps this sense" (Bowden 2017, 223). As sounds that are culturally *significant* or meaningful to specific communities, soundmarks contain a "sense" that is grasped or understood. At first, such a claim may not seem all that different from our original, Husserlian point: to recap, I argued that orientations matter epistemologically insofar as they bear specific cultural meanings. By engaging with Deleuze, however, we can better explain how the "sense" of a soundmark/orientation "can be understood in a variety of ways" (Bowden 2017, 223). Take, for example, experiences of sonic *dis*orientation. In *Queer Phenomenology*, Ahmed argues that orientations are not simply given. Rather, she characterizes them as the effects of alignment processes. Riffing off Merleau-Ponty, she explains:

> The normative can be considered an effect of the repetition of bodily actions over time, which produces what we can call the bodily horizon, a space for action, *which puts some objects and not others in reach* … it is shaped by the repetition of bodily and social actions over time. (Ahmed 2006, 66; emphasis in original)

In putting "some objects and not others in reach," the normative thus orients us in and through the world. It shapes how we extend into space(s) and what we can extend toward. In addition to these processes of "proper" or "correct" orientation, Ahmed also emphasizes *queer* experiences, or experiences of disorientation. An example of this might include Merleau-Ponty's exploration of cases "where the world no longer appears 'the right way up'" (Ahmed 2006, 66). In situations where subjects cannot see straight (e.g., when wearing vision-distorting glasses) experience becomes disorientating or strange, leading to the "experience of disorder" (Ahmed 2006, 4).

Connecting Ahmed's work to Deleuze's, I argue that Deleuze's emphasis on the epistemological valence of sense likewise complicates assumptions about "correct" or universally

shared orientations. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze describes the derivative nature of sense. Returning to its ontological aspects, Deleuze writes that sense is paradoxical or contradictory insofar as it is "impassible" in relation to states of affairs and "neutral" in relation to propositions (1990, 96). To clarify this further, Deleuze explicates sense through Husserl's noema:

> We recall that Husserl had uncovered sense as the noema of an act or as that which a proposition expresses … Moreover, the noema possessed a nucleus quite independent of the modalities of consciousness and the thetic characteristics of the proposition, and also quite distinct from the physical qualities of the object posited as real. (96)

Deleuze argues that such a conceptualization of the noema (as being independent of propositions *and* states of affairs) is fruitful insofar as it aptly grasps the dynamic generativity of sense. In other words, noematic sense "is nothing other than the relation between sense itself and the object in its reality" (Deleuze 1990, 96-97).

While Husserl thus appears to acknowledge the paradoxical core at the heart of sense, Deleuze argues that he ultimately abandons its radical nonappurtenance through his turn to *urdoxa*, or common sense (1990, 97). Specifically, Deleuze argues that Husserl takes a Kantian turn by presupposing "an originary faculty of *common sense*, responsible for accounting for the identity of an object in general, and even on the basis of a faculty of *good sense*, responsible for accounting for the process of identification of every object in general and ad infinitum" (1990, 97). Returning to our focus on the epistemological elements of sense, such an assumption has important consequences for thinking about orientations. As Jack Reynolds and Jon Roffe explain: "On Deleuze's analysis … phenomenology is comprised to its core by a presupposed commitment to an orderly, intrinsic and natural meaningfulness. As a result, phenomenology must be criticized for excluding in an unjustifiably a priori manner many decisive subjective experiences, notably those of the mad and those connected to the unconscious" (2006, 231). In other words, by failing to think about the genesis of sense as being necessarily paradoxical (and therefore, intimately tied

to non-sense), Husserlian phenomenology cannot account for the variety of ways in which the sense of what something "says" can be differentially experienced.

Let us return to keening. While keening functioned as an important soundmark in rural Irish soundscapes throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the practice was met with sustained hostility and censorship by the Catholic Church.[53] For many church officials, this soundmark was experienced as a form of *non*-sense, or as a form of madness and incivility. Suspicious of its pagan origins and alleged "glorification of earthly life," the Catholic Church held that keening was inconsistent with Catholic notions of piety and salvation (Lysaght 1997, 67).[54] For example, in a regulation written in 1748, the Diocese of Leighlin announced that in response to

> the heathenish customs of loud cries and howlings at wakes and burials … all Parish Priests and religious laymen of this Diocese are hereby strictly charged and commanded, in virtue of holy obedience, to use all possible means to banish from Christian burials such anti-Christian practices, by imposing arbitrary punishment … on as many men and women as will loudly cry and howl at burials. (Ó Súilleabháin 1971, 139)

Here, we may interpret the Church's response as one of *disorientation*. In other words, the Church's response demonstrates how the *sense* of what keening "said" was differentially felt and negotiated by different (re)sounding bodies. In attempting to ground a Catholic epistemology, the Church presupposed an *urdoxa* (namely, that sense/meaningfulness is to be found in the principles of God) that necessarily excluded the experiences of keening women. This disorientation led

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[53] To be clear, the Church's censorship of keening is not the only reason for its demise. As Narelle McCoy explains: "Another influence on the demise of keening was the rise of a conservative middle class Catholic laity modelling itself on Protestant values. These two factors saw the ritual almost die out, while other characteristics were absorbed and appropriated " (McCoy 2008, 122).

[54] As McCoy writes: "the wake lament was not only a pagan remnant of the past but it was a woman's ritual. It was not appropriate to have women as the conduit between earth and the afterlife, this being the sole province of the priest. Women keeners were whipped in public by priests at graveyards as they tried to keen the dead, as late as the beginning of the twentieth century" (2009, 215). Additionally, keening was considered dangerous because it made no reference to an afterlife. McCoy continues: "one of the main concerns of the Church was the lack of reference to an afterlife in the keening ritual" (McCoy 2008, 122).

church officials to target the (re)sounding bodies of keeners through the implementation of curfews, regulations on corpse removal, and corporal punishment. To the church, what keening sounded out was nonsense, lacking the epistemological significance it carried for the communities who practiced it. As Bourke recounts, church officials heard keening as the "'barbarous outcries' and 'hideous howlings' of the peasantry" (Bourke 1988, 288). In so doing, the Church denied keening women their subjectivity. As DeRoo warns: "I cannot intend some sound as meaningful unless I take whatever is producing the sound as the kind of thing capable of understanding and communicating sense" (2022, 51). By approaching keening through a Deleuzian lens, then, we are able to understand how soundmarks (as orientations/sensings) do not contain pregiven, originary meanings. Rather, soundmarks reveal how meaning (and understanding) is produced. In other words, if sense "refers to an understanding that grasps this sense" (Bowden 2017, 223), I argue that this understanding is likewise produced *through* the sounding out of sense. As Stephan Günzel notes: "When Sartre says the ego is an object of consciousness, Deleuze reads this as follows: Consciousness is a field in which the me merely appears- the me is never the foundation of this field" (2014, 39). Through a Deleuzian re-reading of the soundmark, then, I argue that the soundscape is a field in which resonant bodies appear; resonant bodies are not the foundation of this field. Such a claim directly resonates with my phenomenological-topological reading of the soundscape developed in chapter one, particularly with Nitsche's argument that that the subject is re-localized through intentionality just as it re-localizes phenomena within a dynamic field of meanings (Nitsche 2018, 23).

Finally, Bowden's third thesis on Deleuzian sense concerns practice or *activity*. In many ways, Bowden's point is a performative one; he argues that through expressing the expressed, the expression *accomplishes* something, and this accomplishment is in part tied to its reception or

comprehension (2017, 226). In writing this chapter, for example, I am not simply transcribing concepts or meanings that exist elsewhere onto the page. Rather, the concepts and ideas expressed here are accomplished *through* the act of writing. In the context of keening, we may say that the sense of the ritual is accomplished through its sounding out. As a sort of orientation, the "sense" of keening does not exist prior to its expression. Rather, we may say that soundmarks are accomplished through their orienting function. In Bowden's terms, "the expressed is not something already fully formed that needs only to be presented in an appropriate way. The expression is rather the dynamic *accomplishing* … of what is expressed" (Bowden 2017, 221; emphasis in original). In emphasizing its performativity, a Deleuzian account of sense productively nuances our understanding of the practical elements of sensings. Previously, I described the "doing" of orientations through a subjective lens; riffing on Ahmed, I described how orientations are "produced by acts of relegation: some things are relegated to the background in order *to sustain* a certain direction" (Ahmed 2006, 31; emphasis in original). However, such a view risks placing too much emphasis on the intentional acts of a (re)sounding subject. By turning our attention to the dynamic accomplishing of soundmarks as sensings, we are better able to describe the generativity of these phenomena within the plane of immanence.

4.2 *Fugitive Soundmarks: Sensings as Re/Territorializing Soundings*

A second question about my re-interpretation of soundmarks-as-sensings concerns soundmarks' relationship with *space*. Put otherwise, does the language of the soundmark (as a sort of sonic landmark) lend itself to a Euclidean interpretation of sonic space? What's more, does the language of "orientations" presuppose a sort of open, stable plane through which orientations cut? Schafer's original writings do not fully answer these questions. In describing various soundmarks, Schafer often chooses sounds tied to specific geographical locations, such as church bells or waterfalls. In

The Soundscape, for example, he describes the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 79 AD as an important soundmark of Roman history (1977, 25). Additionally, he describes soundmarks such as the boiling sulfuric pools in Rotorua, New Zealand, or the famous voice announcements in the London Underground (1977, 26; 240). In all these examples, soundmarks are tied to specific, physical *landmarks*, potentially eliding the transitive and ephemeral qualities of sound. Indeed, Schafer does not address many vocalic soundmarks like keening, nor more complicated phenomena like soundmarks in *cyberspace*.[55] How, then, should we talk about soundmarks-as-sensings without abandoning the topological account developed in chapter one?

Already, phenomenology provides us with some initial answers to these questions. Recall that for Ahmed, orientations "gather on the ground, and they create a ground upon which we can gather" (2006, 1). In writing that orientations both "gather on the ground" and "create a ground," Ahmed gestures toward the spatializing aspect of orientations. Engaging with Merleau-Ponty, she goes on to describe how space is negotiated by and through orienting/oriented bodies. Looking specifically at moments of re-orientation, she writes:

> Merleau-Ponty considers how subjects "straighten" any queer effects and he asks what this tendency to "see straight" suggests about the relationship between bodies and space. He answers this question not with a model of space as determined by objective coordinates (such that "up" and "down" exist independently of one's bodily orientation), but as being shaped by the purposefulness of the body; the body does things, and space thus takes shape as a field of action. (2006, 65)

[55] While Schafer was deeply involved in the recording and archival preservation of soundscapes, his work also reveals a sort of luddism and aversion to modern technology. Take, for example, his development of *schizophonia*. First described in *The New Soundscape* (1969), Schafer uses schizophonia to describe "the splitting of sounds from their original contexts" (1977, 88). Combining the Greek prefix *schizo* (split, separated) with *phōnē* (voice, sound), Schafer largely uses the term to describe recorded sounds and broadcasting. Schafer mourned the spread of schizophonic sounds throughout the twentieth century, writing: "Originally all sounds were originals. They occurred at one time in one place only. Sounds were then indissolubly tied to the mechanisms that produced them" (1977, 90). In suggesting that originally "all sounds were originals," Schafer buys into a certain metaphysics of presence and follows a long line of thinkers critical of acousmatic sound.

In taking a Merleau-Pontian approach to orientation, Ahmed likewise rejects a Euclidean account of space, i.e., a notion of geometric space with discrete, objective coordinates. Instead, Ahmed proposes a concept of space that is "dynamic and lived," a space that "acquires 'direction' through how bodies inhabit it" (12). In so doing, Ahmed foregrounds the dynamic generativity of orientations as sensings.[56]

Additionally, Nitsche's work (discussed at length in chapter one) likewise provides us with a non-Euclidean approach to orientation. In describing intentionality as an active/passive process of re-localization, Nitsche maintains that the phenomenal field is not simply pre-given, nor are the "transitive places" of intentionality fixed by coordinates (2018, 33-34). Rather, he argues: "The transitional area [of intentional orientation] cannot be described simply as a space, because it is not a pre-given dimension which offers locations available for re-localization. In fact, this area is established by re-localization; as a space, it is founded by places" (2018, 75). In suggesting that the phenomenal field is established by re-localization, Nitsche's work suggests that orientations *create* places. Like the practical component of Deleuze's sense, then, I interpret soundmarks (as orientations/sensings) as accomplishments of *place situated* interactions. Such a claim also coincides with research on keening. In "Corporeal Interventions and the Contemporary Sounds of Keening," Collins describes keening as a process of *re-spatialization*, or as a practice of "traversing the space inbetween" (2018, 65). This traversal involves a number of non-Euclidean spaces: the spaces of the living and of the dead; of semiotic and symbolic space; of spaces of sense and nonsense. As Collins notes:

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[56] Ahmed would likely support my reading of orientations of sensings, particularly in her citation of Henry Lefebvre in this section. Specifically, she cites a line from Lefebvre's *The Production of Space*: "I speak of an orientation advisedly. We are concerned with nothing more and nothing less than that. We are concerned with what might be called a 'sense': an organ that perceives, a direction that may be conceived, and a directly lived movement progressing towards the horizon" (1991, 423).

> In ritual, individuals are taken outside normal space and time to a liminal state. In the constructed space for the Keening ceremony, separate from ordinary daily living, participants are invited into a sacred place… Here the flow of ordinary conversation stalls. In Keening ceremonies participants are separated from ordinary life and ordinary sound-making. (2018, 70)

In describing how participants are removed from ordinary life, Collins' work highlights how keening orients listeners to "new" or different places. As a soundmark, keening is an accomplishing of "place" wherein (re)sounding bodies temporarily meet. This place is not fixed by coordinates but is created *through* the sounding out of grief.

While Collins' characterization of keening as a process of re-spatialization productively aligns with our interpretation of orientations as processes of re-localization, a potential problem remains. Namely, Collins writes: "The keener allowed and constructed the space for intense grieving to occur" (2018, 65). In suggesting that the keener "constructs" the place of grief, Collins risks running into the Subject Critique as outlined in chapter one and in the previous section of this chapter. How, then, can we talk about the liminal "place" that soundmarks create without suggesting that this place is the construction of a (re)sounding subject?

One way to address this is through the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari. In chapter one, I compared Nitsche's transitive-topological phenomenology to Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of smooth and striated space. More specifically, I argued that Nitsche's characterization of intentionality as a process of re-localization resonates with their notion of the *refrain*. To recap, Deleuze and Guattari define the refrain as "any aggregate of matters of expression that draws a territory and develops into territorial motifs and landscapes… we speak of a refrain when an assemblage is sonorous or 'dominated' by sound" (2018, 323). In chapter 11 of *A Thousand Plateaus*, they demonstrate this through the refrain of a lost child. They write: "A child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under his breath. He walks and halts to his song.

Lost, he takes shelter, or orients himself with his little song as best he can. The song is like a rough sketch of a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos" (2018, 311). The child's song (or refrain) thus operates as a form of sonic *orientation*; it is not permanent separation of sonic space but a momentary organization or territorialization. A second vignette describes the refrains of home:

> Now we are at home. But home does not preexist: it was necessary to draw a circle around that uncertain and fragile center, to organize a limited space… sonorous or vocal components are very important: a wall of sound, or at least a wall within some sonic bricks in it. A child hums to summon the strength for the schoolwork she has to hand in. A housewife sings to herself, or listens to the radio, as she marshals the antichaos forces of her work. (2018, 311)

Acting as a circle through which "the forces of chaos are kept outside," the sounds of home (singing, records playing, a dishwasher humming) provide a stable center just like the child's song (2018, 311). What's more, in writing that home "does not preexist" these sounds, Deleuze and Guattari echo Nitsche's and Ahmed's claims that orientations are dependent emergences. As a sort of orientation, home does not preexist its enactment; rather, home is created *through* orienting acts. Such a reading also coincides with Deleuze and Guattari's assertion that refrains "seek, mark, [and] assemble a territory" (2018, 327).

In "assembling" a territory, however, the refrain does not orient (re)sounding bodies along geographical lines. In other words, while refrains serve as de- and re-territorializing forces, they cannot always be neatly mapped out onto physical territories. Distinct from a Kantian geographic approach,[57] Deleuze and Guattari approach refrains not as discrete spaces, but as *milieus* that achieve some level of consistency. As Brent Adkins explains: "milieus are not territories; they are

[57] Referring to the child's song, Adkins explains: "The child does not orient himself with regard to a pre-existing set of boundaries, as in the Kantian schema" (2015, 174). He continues: "[I]n both 'The Conflict of the Faculties' and *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* the issue of geographical and political territory are front and center" (174).

sub-territorial. That is, milieus when territorialized become components of a territory" (2015, 173). Here, we can think of soundmarks once more. Soundmarks are not territories in a geographical sense. Rather, soundmarks may become part of a territory through community orientations. For example, keening is not tied to a specific physical location. While we may say that keening is connected to the (re)sounding bodies of its participants, its sounding out cannot be localized geographically. Instead, keening functions as a sort of territorial sonic milieu.

Just as the soundmark is not territorial in a strictly geographical sense, it is not isolated, either; rather, "all territories are laid out on a plane of consistency… territories are open to one another not closed off from one another" (Adkins 2015, 177). During its sounding out, the soundmark of keening may overlap with a number of other soundmarks, including church bells, water features, community infrastructural sounds, etc. This overlap has important consequences for understanding the political valence of soundmarks as well. As a scene of interaction always already immersed in other scenes of interaction, keening exemplifies how soundmarks "constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable" (Foucault 1990, 93).[58]

What's more, the refrain is marked by fugitivity; it is not an enduring sounding-out, but a momentary organization. As Adkins explains: "there's no sense that the territory marked by the refrain is either permanent or needs to be permanent" (2015, 177). Such an emphasis on the impermanence of the refrain speaks to Collins' emphasis on the unique temporality of keening. Unlike Schafer's examples of church bells or train announcements, keening was not a continuous

[58] Here, for example, we might think of the various states of power that contributed to keening's demise. Beyond the Catholic Church's direct efforts to silence the practice, broader, more diffuse social pressures were also at play. As Lysaght explains: "Another factor which greatly assisted the church in its efforts to root out wake practices and thereby to hasten the decline of the traditional death-lament was the emergency, in the decades after the Great Famine (1845-50), of a newly-prosperous and conservative Catholic middle-class laity, consciously modelling itself on a Protestant elite with strong Victorian values, for whom traditional funerary rituals involving lively wakes and lamentation for the dead were an embarrassment" (1997, 68).

soundmark in the rural Irish soundscape. Rather, it appeared only during certain moments of overwhelming grief. While the soundmark may have been expected at rural wakes, death itself cannot always be predicted. As a sort of refrain, then, keening provided a momentary orientation, offering a stable center in the chaos of loss.

4.3 *Keening as Sounding: Banshee, "Death of a Predator," and TikTok Laments*

By pairing my discussion of soundmarks-as-sensings together with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the refrain, I am better able to demonstrate the transmissibility and transmutability of soundmarks. Collins herself notes this kind of transformative quality in her discussion of keening's de-ritualization. Describing keening's reemergence in modern contexts, she documents its appearance in the music of Susan McKeown, the public art performances of Ceara Conway, and in the 1984 film *Raic* (Collins 2014, 41-42). In all these instances, Collins explores how "[T]he keen continues to inspire, evolve, become recontextualised and used by artists today, with no relation to ritual" (42). Here, I relate Collins' emphasis on the de-ritualization of keening to Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of the re/territorialization of the refrain. After describing the refrains of home, for example, they muse: "One ventures from home on the thread of a tune. Along sonorous, gestural, motor lines that mark the customary path of a child and graft themselves onto or begin to bud 'lines of drift' with different loops, knots, speeds, movements, gestures, and sonorities" (2018, 311-12). In other words, in venturing out, we take the refrains of home with us. These refrains do not remain unchanged, however. Rather, they are transformed in concert with other scenes of interaction. As Adkins explains: "Children grow up; they leave home. They take with them some of the sounds of home, but these sounds combine with new sounds" (2015, 175). In riffing off previous refrains, then, we create new sonic milieus. In taking the refrain of keening and combining it with new sounds or using it in new contexts, therefore, the artists that Collins

describes created new iterations of keening. Keening (as a soundmark) thus remains open to being re/territorialized and is always open to new localizations and new interpretations.

In describing the de-ritualization and re-contextualization of keening, however, Collins mainly focuses on the deliberate territorializing acts of (re)sounding subjects. For example, she writes: "Although recontextualised and de-ritualised the artists with whom I spoke had a clear reverence for the tradition… This affected the artists' decisions in relation to how to form the keens they sang or how they used elements of the keen, attempting to respect the traditional form" (2014, 42). In the instances of re-contextualization that Collins studied, the creation of new sonic milieus was intentional; the artists were deliberate in how they preserved and altered the keening soundmark. Given our emphasis on immanence and the generativity of soundmarks, however, how might we speak of these transformations and alterations as occurring within a moving substrate of sonic force relations (Foucault 1990, 93)? To address this, I now turn to the potential reemergence of keening on TikTok and an exploration of soundmarks in cyberspace. More specifically, this section will explore keening's re/territorialization in the viral music of fairy metal artist, Banshee.

A heavy metal artist based in Los Angeles, Rachel Knight (otherwise known as "Banshee") became interested in music at a young age. Much of this was through her religious heritage; having grown up in Judaism, she recounts the sounds of Purim and the minor harmonic scales of Judaic melodies. During early adolescence, Knight's music interests turned to heavy metal. While performing in a metal band, however, Knight was assaulted by a fellow band member. When Knight attempted to speak up about the assault, she was shamed and shunned by the metal community. In an interview conducted on April 13, 2023, she recounts: "I was in this band with my abuser… I was out of the local metal scene, and everyone sided with him… and that was basically the end of metal for me for ten years" (Knight, Zoom call with author).

Following this ten-year hiatus, Knight began recording music once more, returning to metal albeit with a feminist/trap bent. When it came time to choose a stage name, Knight found inspiration in Irish mythology. She recalls:

> I remember when I was five seeing a program about different monsters, and banshees were one of them. I remember learning about banshees and thinking, "That's terrifying! That's scarier than any of these other monsters." Maybe because it is just a woman screaming, it's just pure emotion. There is something about that… that really freaked me out as a kid. When I was searching for my artist name it just sort of made sense … I feel like I have been bringing myself back from the dead, finding my power in that. (Knight, Zoom call with author, April 13, 2023)

Knight's choice of "Banshee" for her artist name is of particular interest given the term's mythological background. In Irish folklore, banshees are female spirits that foretell a family member's death. According to the legends, to hear a banshee's cries is to be warned that a loved one will die soon. However, the "cry" of the banshee is not simply screaming; rather, it is *keening*. The keen of the banshee is thus a soundmark of Irish mythology and directly connected to keening's function as a sounding-out of grief and as a community orienting device. Like the soundmark, the banshee's cries hold specific meaning for those who hear it, orienting listeners to grief yet to come.

While these may not have been intentional connections on Knight's part, these threads gesture toward the enduring generativity of soundmarks-as-sensings. While Knight's vocal stylings are not a direct inheritance of the practice,[59] her art carries the "thread of a [keening] tune" in two ways: first, in its mythological inheritance described above, and second, in its thematic and affective orientations. To explain the latter point, let us explore Knight's viral success on TikTok.

[59] Like keening, Knight's vocal stylings feature cry breaks as well as falsetto vowels. The stylistic similarities largely end there, however, particularly with the absence of glottal stops in Knight's singing. While Banshee's music is not a direct inheritance of the practice, however, her art carries remnants of keening in its thematic content "where subjects normally considered taboo can be examined without censure" (McCoy 2008, 122).

In November 2022, Knight released an album, "Fairy Phonk," that featured a song titled "Death of a Predator." The song is a quasi-lament for her late abuser, recounting both her assault and the circumstances surrounding her abuser's death. The lyrics include lines like: "I heard you bit the dust / wish the rest would follow suit / Least I don't gotta worry about you now / I don't gotta worry 'bout you" (Banshee 2022). Later in 2022, Knight posted a video of herself singing the song on the social media app, TikTok. In the video, Knight smiles and dances as the chorus wails: "I'm not saying he deserved it / Just kidding, I'm absolutely saying he deserved it." The clip quickly went viral, with 4,542 other videos using her original sound. Most of these videos feature women and femmes ventriloquizing Knight's screams, detailing their own abuse, and expressing joy or relief over the deaths of their abusers. Bringing my work to bear on Knight's, I subsequently argue that Knight's song served as a *soundmark* for sexual assault survivors. In her sounding-out, Knight offered a sort of orientation for survivors, one that thousands of people resonated with. Like a soundmark, her angry lament carried specific meanings for sexual assault survivors. And just as soundmarks provide sensory anchors to orient and moor (re)sounding bodies within the soundscape, so, too, does Knight's music provide survivors with a sonic anchor to orient and moor themselves within cyberspace. As Knight herself notes: "When a Banshee fan meets another Banshee fan, they have this sort of knowing, or they know they've been through something similar or have similar beliefs… they are either a survivor or an ally to survivors, and it immediately creates a sense of safety, they feel safe with each other" (Knight, Zoom call with author, April 13, 2023). Returning to our tripartite understanding of soundmarks-as-sensings, then, we may say that Banshee fans share certain epistemological, ontological, and practical commitments.

In calling Knight's viral song a soundmark, however, some readers might question whether the song can be interpreted accurately as a re/territorialization of keening. Indeed, while Knight's

vocal stylizations share some similarities with the funerary practice, the similarities may seem tenuous at best. What's more, I have thus far described keening as a sounding-out of *grief,* an affect that Knight certainly does not express in her song. Despite this, I argue that Knight's "Death of a Predator" represents a re/territorialization of keening because of its angry, indignant lamentations and creation of a "place" to express emotions and thoughts often considered taboo in ordinary society.

While keening traditionally was meant to re-orient listeners after the disorientating effects of death, Irish women also used the practice to unsettle or momentarily break free from normative social conventions. As Collins explains: "keening was a situation afforded to women where they could use their voice and be heard without constraint" (2018, 63). In other words, keening afforded a momentary rupture in conventional gender roles, providing women with a liminal place of power. As such, women would use the aural space of the keen to voice social and political critiques. As Kathryn Conrad summarizes:

> [The keening woman] had, at least during the time between death and burial, license not only to grieve unreservedly but also to express criticism … in the keen, she could articulate the wrongs perpetuated against herself, her community, and/or the dead whom she keened, focusing criticisms on anyone who deserved censure, from other keening women to the dead being mourned to the colonial power structure of the clergy. (2008, 40)

An example of this can also be found in Angela Bourke's work. In her article, "The Irish Traditional Lament and the Grieving Process," Bourke recounts one such keen from a woman who had lost her husband: "He often beat be / With the stoutest stick / But thanks be to God / I am done with his company" (1988, 289). Here, I locate direct resonances with Knight's work. Just as keening was occasionally used as a fleeting feminist re/territorialization of sonic space, so, too, does Knight's refrain create a liminal *place* for survivors to grieve and share their stories. As Knight recounts: "There is too much emphasis on respecting the dead even if they were bad-

forgive and forget, don't speak ill of the dead… You do not get a pass just because you are dead" (Knight, Zoom call with author, April 13, 2023). Like the women that Conrad and Bourke describe, Knight sees her music as providing a transitive place where taboo emotions and thoughts can be expressed. She continues: "I get a lot of messages and comments from people saying they've never been able to talk about this stuff before or have never been able to accept their feelings about it before." From this, I suggest that Knight's work (as a soundmark) provides survivors with new expressive possibilities.

In choosing a viral TikTok sound, however, I also mean to gesture towards the generativity and fugitivity of soundmarks-as-sensings. Virality on TikTok cannot be neatly attributed to the intentional efforts of a sounding subject. Unlike the artists that Collins describes, Knight did not view her work as an iteration of keening. Indeed, while talking to Knight, she expressed surprise at the similarities. After explaining to her how keening was not just a lament but was also used to voice social and political critique, she commented: "I love the idea of a banshee scream *celebrating* the death of someone" (Knight, Zoom call with author, April 13, 2023). What's more, how a sound is received on TikTok is rarely under the artist's control. Artists cannot always predict what will resonate with audiences, nor can they predict how a sound will transform and germinate within the strange space of social media. For these reasons, the success of "Death of a Predator" as a sonic orientation speaks to soundmarks' generative, affective pull that transcends the intentional acts of (re)sounding subjects.

5. *Concluding Thoughts*

I have reinterpreted soundmarks as sonic sensings, or as sounds that help shape listeners ontologically, epistemologically, and practically. To avoid an overly subjectivist account, I have explored the tripartite structure of sense in Deleuze's work, as well as orientations' resonances

with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the refrain. Whereas Schafer's original interpretation of the term requires geographical proximity to physical landmarks, I demonstrated how my retooled notion of the concept proves capable of addressing the immanence and generativity of soundmarks, including soundmarks like keening and Knight's viral TikTok sound. As sensory anchors, soundmarks provide (re)sounding bodies with specific meanings and motivations. However, as DeRoo warns: "Expressing necessarily produces an expression and another and another" (2022, 22). So, too, do soundmarks –as re/territorializing soundings– remain open to continuous transformation, transmutation, and transmission.

Listening to Beethoven's Symphony No 8, R. Murray Schafer[60]



[60] From Schafer's *The New Soundscape*, p. 11. New York: Associated Music Publishers Inc.

Chapter 4

Listening: Nancy, Active and Passive Syntheses, and Hostile Soundscapes

While the previous chapter explored experiences of *sounding* within the soundscape, this chapter will explore "listening" as another activity within soundscapes by focusing on the theoretical divide drawn between "listening" and "hearing" in the sound studies literature. First, I begin with a vignette of listening in *hostile* soundscapes, or soundscapes of unwelcome/torture. Here, I question how listening functions in such scenes and ask what philosophy can teach us about such experiences. Looking specifically at Jean-Luc Nancy's short text, *Listening* (2007), I then explore popular characterizations of "hearing" as signifying and logical, and "listening" as embodied, primordial, and pre-signifying. While Nancy holds that phenomenology (and the phenomenological subject) prove incapable of listening, I argue that Nancy fundamentally misunderstands phenomenological analyses of auditory experience. Reading Husserl's work on active and passive syntheses together with Schafer's soundscape writings, I argue that my account of listening proves fruitful for three primary reasons: first, it escapes the essentialism and ahistoricism present in Nancy's work; second, it escapes the historicism of auditory cultural studies and maintains the value of first-person perspectives; and third, it destabilizes the boundary drawn between "hearing" and "listening" to show how these phenomena are more porous than originally thought. To conclude, I return to soundscapes of unwelcome (or, more specifically, soundscapes of *torture*) to demonstrate the utility of such an account. Put simply, I argue that by recognizing the inescapable dynamism of the sensible and the intelligible, we are better able to account for the unique forms of harm that sound torture poses, insofar as it operates conceptually (i.e., by

interrupting our ability to make meaning) and non-conceptually (i.e., by weaponizing the innate resonance of listening bodies). This critical reading thus continues to work between phenomenological and post-structuralist thought.

1. *Listening and Hostile Soundscapes*

In the previous chapter, I described keening as a critical soundmark of rural Irish soundscapes. In doing so, I focused on the "sounding out" of the keen, or the giving-forth of sound through grieving, keening bodies. Inevitably co-present with these soundings, however, are experiences of *listening*. Indeed, it is impossible to speak of soundmarks without also speaking about the (re)sounding bodies capable of hearing them. In his groundbreaking work *Listening and Voice: Phenomenologies of Sound* (2007), Don Ihde notes the inseparability of different sensuous capacities. Commenting on phenomenology's ocularcentrism and his subsequent turn to aurality, he explains:

> The move to separate the senses into discrete faculties and to divide categorically among them is an empirical notion, not a phenomenological one. In fact, to the contrary, through concentrating on auditory experience, a reevaluation of all the "senses" is implied. For the first gain of phenomenology in regard to sensory experience is a recovery and reappreciation of the fullness and richness and of the global character of experience. (2007, 21)

While Ihde is specifically focusing on the attempted separation of vision from hearing in this passage, so, too, may we conclude that sounding and (re)sounding are not isolated experiences, but areas of selected focus.[61] As such, my focus on listening in this chapter is not meant to suggest that listening is a discrete soundscape phenomenon. Rather, following Schafer, I will use this focus

[61] Such a claim is supported by Casey O'Callaghan's work on the phenomenology of multisensory perception. O'Callaghan demonstrates how "sensory systems interact extensively," particularly in information-gathering and the deployment of perceptual capacities (2019, 154, 156).

as a temporary "frame for study" to better understand the different facets or modes of inhabiting soundscapes.

In the example of keening, both sounding and listening appear as forms of *orientation*. Community members heard the *bean chaointe's* cries and used the sounds to orient themselves within dynamic spiritual and social worlds. So, too, did I briefly describe listening as a form of potential *dis*orientation vis-à-vis the Catholic Church's experience of keening. For church officials, the keening woman's cries did not serve as a sensory guidepost; rather, the sounds were experienced as sense-less, or as lacking meaning and direction. Returning to Bourke's work, so, too, did some English travelers experience keening as the "'barbarous outcries' and 'hideous howlings' of the peasantry" (1988, 288). Here, we may question how these differences in experience arise, and if these differences might be explained through a distinction between "hearing" and "listening."

Building on these questions about sonic disorientation, we also might explore the more extreme example of *hostile* soundscapes. By "hostile soundscapes," I do not mean to describe soundscapes that are simply disorienting. Rather, riffing on the concept of hostile architecture, I use the term "hostile soundscapes" to describe sonic environments meant to prescribe and restrict and the activities of (re)sounding bodies. In her article, "'You are in a Place that is Out of the World…': Music in the Detention Camps of the 'Global War on Terror,'" historian and musicologist Suzanne G. Cusick details the creation of some such soundscapes. Specifically, Cusick explores the use of music torture in various CIA black sites around the world. In the examples that Cusick provides, prisoners were exposed to hours (if not days) of unending music, often in rooms or structures designed to amplify sound and limit other sensuous capacities. In designing these rooms, interrogators were not interested in simply re-orienting their prisoners;

rather, the function of these soundscapes was to destroy orientation itself. Through their unbounded duration and extreme volume, soundscapes of music torture work by destroying listeners' ability to make *sense* of their surroundings, both in terms of meaning and direction.

2. *Nancy, Schaeffer, and the Hearing/Listening Divide*

Thinking specifically about hostile soundscapes, a number of questions arise: how are we to understand these scenes, and what is the function of "listening" within them? Additionally, what can phenomenology and poststructuralism reveal to us about these experiences? In his short text, *Listening* (2007), Nancy develops an originary account of listening, focusing on the innate resonance of the listening human body. In so doing, he also offers a sustained critique of phenomenological approaches to listening and subjectivity. He begins with a question: "Is listening something of which philosophy is capable?" (2007, 1). To clarify this question, he continues: "hasn't philosophy superimposed upon listening, something else that might be more on the order of *understanding*?" (2007, 1; emphasis in original). In questioning philosophy's ability to listen, Nancy thus draws a distinction between two forms of sonic engagement. Whereas "hearing" (*entendre*) describes a desire to understand or ascertain meaning, "listening" (*écouter*) describes something more primordial, a mode of sonic experience that goes beyond comprehension and/or signification. As Adrienne Janus explains, Nancy's turn toward listening "is to attend to resonances of perception and meaning yet to emerge and always passing away" (2011, 189). In other words, Nancy's "listening" seeks to describe a mode of sonic engagement that does not end in signifying sense.

Against philosophy's superimposition of *hearing* upon listening, then, Nancy seeks to develop a notion of the *listening* subject, one that "is not a phenomenological subject … not a philosophical subject, and … is perhaps no subject at all, except as the place of resonance, of its

infinite tension and rebound" (2007, 21-22). As a place of *resonance*, Nancy's subject is not the intentional subject of Husserlian phenomenology. Rather, the listening subject is constituted by and through a sort of *referral*, a self-made entirely through resonant relationships with the self. Through this concept of resonant subjectivity, Nancy's project can be understood as "an intervention aimed at thematizing ways in which the question of the subject can be posed anew, outside of the horizon of the phenomenological subject" (Kane 2012, 446). What's more, Nancy's project serves as a *positive* intervention in sound studies. Beyond merely critiquing the ocularcentrism of Western metaphysics, Nancy "offer[s] a positive model for a philosophy that explores the ontological and epistemological possibilities of listening as a mode of thinking and as a way of being in the world" (Janus 2011, 184).

On Nancy's account, human existence engages the world through *listening*, whereas a phenomenological subject (as philosophical subject) engages the world solely through *hearing*. To demonstrate this, Nancy analyzes Schaeffer's use of Husserlian phenomenology in his development of reduced listening. As discussed in chapter one, Schaeffer offers reduced listening as a sonic extension of the phenomenological reduction; through reduced listening, the natural attitude is suspended, and a sound is taken "in itself" in order to arrive at *l'objet sonore*, or the sound object. As Kane notes: "Schaeffer emphasizes *entendre*, which is etymologically related to word *intentionality* [sic], as the privileged mode of listening to the sound object, an intentional object, whose sense is grounded on the closed reference back to the listening subject" (Kane 2012, 439; emphasis in original). In other words, whereas Schaeffer characterizes listening (*écouter*) as the unreflective mode of sonic engagement operative in the natural attitude, Nancy suggests this characterization traps sound within the intentional acts of a hearing subject. This leads Nancy to conclude that Schaeffer (and by extension, Husserl) "preserves and prolongs the structure of a

Cartesian epistemology" (Kane 2012, 443). By this, Nancy means that a Husserlian account of hearing proves problematic insofar as it: 1) cannot account for the phenomenality of sound outside of act intentionality; 2) perpetuates a belief in a solipsistic, Cartesian subject; and 3) reduces "sense" to meaning and signification. Critiquing Husserl's use of melody in his development of internal time consciousness, for example, Nancy writes: "Husserl persists in 'seeing' the melody instead of listening to it … listening is listening to something other than sense in its signifying sense" (2007, 21, 32). To "hear" a melody is thus to *intend* it, according to Nancy, which ultimately reifies "signification as the final perspective" (Janus 2011, 189).

I find two main problems with Nancy's account. In attempting to articulate a resonant subject that listens "beyond" signification, Nancy perpetuates many of the tropes popular in other ontological sound works. Second, in critiquing Schaeffer and Husserl, Nancy misunderstands phenomenological accounts of sonic experience and the conceptualist vs. non-conceptualist debate within phenomenology. The following sections will elaborate on these two points before returning to an analysis of listening within hostile soundscapes.

2.2 *Nancy's "Listening Subject" and the Ontological Turn*

As discussed in chapter two, the ontological turn in sound studies attempts to move "beyond" sonic signification or representation toward the materiality of sound itself. Additionally, many works in the ontological turn "[attempt] to re-think the concept of 'sense' as something more than meaning as sign" (Janus 2011, 189). Like Cox's sonic materialism, then, Nancy's "listening subject" attempts to uncover the ways in which sound is "actualised, but not exhausted by, speech, music, and significant sound of all sorts" (Cox 2009, 22). As Nancy explains: "to be listening is always to be on the edge of meaning, or in an edgy meaning of extremity, and as if the sound were

precisely nothing else than this edge" (2007, 7). To listen is thus to move *beyond* sense, to resonate beyond sound as signification.

In attempting to move "beyond" sonic signification, however, Nancy falls prey to the same critiques leveled at other proponents of the ontological turn. In his article "On Sonotropism," for example, Martin Scherzinger argues that many works in the philosophy of music/sound tend toward *sonotropism*, or regard music as "a metaphysical valence in excess of the usual mediators of language, culture, and history" (Scherzinger 2012, 350). Like the ontological turn, then, sonotropism in philosophy suggests that music and sound can provide some sort of access to sonic ontology free from the trappings of signification or representation. Nancy would likely resist such an accusation, particularly given his emphasis on *re*sonance. As Sarah Hickmott explains: "While it may appear that the *renvoi* reinstates a kind of fundamental ground or essence towards which we can turn, the emphasis on the 're' negates any claims of foundationalism; any sounding is always already a *re*sounding, with no recourse to an originary or 'pure' sounding" (2015, 483). However, while Nancy's *renvoi* attempts to avoid recourse to an *origin* (a recourse made by the Western metaphysical accounts he criticizes), he nevertheless posits a notion of resonance that exists prior to culture, appealing to the same sort of "excessive" metaphysical valence that Scherzinger describes.

One of the ways in which Nancy tries to do this is by playing with the polysemy of *sense*. As Janus summarizes:

> One of the ways that Nancy makes 'sense' resound, makes it resonate past the limitations of signifying sense or as *logos*, is by playing upon the word's multiple resonances: (1) 'sense' as intelligible, signifying sense, or meaning; (2) 'sense' as perceptual, sensate or sensual sense, and affect; and (3) 'sense' as sense of direction, impulse, and movement. (2011, 190)

While Nancy attempts to use these multiple resonances to demonstrate the superiority of his account of listening, I am struck by how all these resonances already can be found within phenomenology. As discussed in chapter three, the polysemy of sense has been explored extensively by phenomenologists, including by Merleau-Ponty and Husserl. Additionally, Deleuze's poststructuralist account of sense (an account that Nancy would likely be sympathetic to) was developed, partially, as a response to phenomenological conceptions of sense. Because of this, it is incorrect to suggest that Nancy's tripartite reading of sense is novel or that it somehow moves beyond what phenomenological accounts can already provide.

Beyond these limitations, the politics that emerge from Nancy's project also proves worrisome. In her article, "*(En) Corps Sonore*: Jean-Luc Nancy's Sonotropism," Hickmott questions how Nancy's metaphorical/morphological reliance on the maternal-feminine womb de-materializes the lived body and de-historicizes listening (Hickmott 2015, 488-490).[62] For example, in the "Coda" of *Listening*, Nancy provides a lengthy analysis of Titian's *Venus and Musician*. In the painting, Venus lies naked on a bed before a sprawling, manicured villa. While she stares intently at Cupid (stretched over her left shoulder), an organist playing at the foot of her bed gazes longingly at her nude form. Venus does not seem to notice the organist, nor the collection of animals populating the landscape. The pipes of the organ stretch into the background, blending with the tree line at the top-left corner of the painting.

Using this painting to develop his notion of the *corps sonore* (or the resonant body), Nancy writes: "Evidently –it is clearly shown– the musician is gazing sensually at the woman. But isn't this belly that he is gazing at the very place where his music comes to resound?" (2007, 45). In

[62] Continuing with Hickmott's critique, we might question whether Nancy's account can speak to Jennifer Lynn Stoever's characterization of listening as "an interpretive, socially constructed practice conditioned by historically contingent and culturally specific value systems riven with power relations" (Stoever 2016, 14).

other words, Nancy takes Venus' fleshy form (and more specifically, her womb) to be emblematic of the *corps sonore*. In gazing at Venus' belly, Nancy takes the organist to be engaging in "a mode of listening that is different to that of Schopenhauer, Wagner, and the early Nietzsche, indeed different to the whole Western (Helleno-Christian) tradition of musico-theological listening since Plato" (Janus 2013, 80). He continues: "The ear opens onto the belly, or the ear even opens up the belly, and the eye resounds here" (Nancy 2007, 45). The maternal-feminine womb thus becomes a metaphor for Nancy, de-materialized and de-historicized to represent resonant subjectivity at its most pure.

Against Nancy's reading of *Venus and Musician*, Hickmott argues that Nancy's engagement with Titian's work ultimately perpetuates gender essentialisms and a desire for (false) transcendence that are part and parcel of Western metaphysics.[63] Hickmott explains:

> Although Nancy is happy to acknowledge that the organist is certainly gazing sensually at the naked Venus, he contends that the gaze is directed towards her belly (presumably in order to make his argument that the musician's gaze merely directs us to the belly-womb matrix on, in, or with which the *corps sonore* is able to make itself resound, and thus folds the visual aspect into a more essential relationship to sonority), it seems evident that the organist's gaze is actually directed towards Venus' crotch. (2015, 491)

Here, Hickmott highlights how, in turning to a *painting* to describe listening, Nancy renders the resonant body as mute, material, and feminine, ultimately relying upon a metaphysics of gendered oppositions. In other words, while Nancy's resonant body attempts to avoid the classic dialectics of Western metaphysics (subject/object, interior/exterior, etc.) "this move [e.g., turning to the maternal-feminine womb to ground his notion of the *corps sonore*] necessarily resorts to an

[63] Here, Hickmott is also echoing Butler's critique of Kristeva "The Body Politics of Julia Kristeva." There, Butler argues: "Kristeva's theory of the semiotic dimension of language at first appears to engage Lacanian premises only to expose their limits and to offer a specifically feminine locus of subversion of the paternal law within language… it is unclear whether the primary relationship to the maternal body which both Kristeva and Lacan appear to accept is a viable construct and whether it is even a knowable experience according to either of their linguistic theories" (1989, 104-105).

essentializing of sound and listening as somehow subsisting outside of time or culture and … [and yet] still relies on the very traditional realm of the (erotic) male gaze directed towards the naked female body for its final exposition" (Hickmott 2015, 493). So, too, does Robin James note this limitation in her article, "Affective Resonance: On the Uses and Abuses of Music In and For Philosophy." In feminizing resonance through his reading of *Venus and Musician*, James holds that "[Nancy's] theory of affect turns on the appropriation, by a white masculine listener, of traits, attitudes, and comportments stereotypically associated with white femininity" (2012, 68). In other words, despite his desire to de-historicize listening and to characterize it as a natural phenomenon, Nancy ultimately resorts to a problematic (and socio-culturally contingent) essentialism that aligns femininity with nature and fails to understand "the inheritance of our ears as always already cultural" (Hickmott 2015, 490).

2.3 *Hearing, Listening, and Conceptualist vs. Non-Conceptualist Interpretations of Husserlian Phenomenology*

Nancy's reading of Husserl also proves fraught. In developing his listening subject, Nancy seeks to overcome "conceptual thought based in vision" and to "move past sense-making (or meaning) as the final perspective" (Janus 2011, 189). In so doing, I argue that Nancy assumes a *non-conceptualist* approach to auditory experience.[64] By non-conceptualist, I am referring to Kantian

[64] Such a reading will likely be met with criticism from other sound scholars. For example, in *Sound Unseen: Acousmatic Sound in Theory and Practice*, Kane warns that Nancy's message may be lost in translation between the French and English editions. He writes: "As the French makes explicit, the struggle between sense and truth is a struggle between *écouter* and *entendre*. The ear is the common thread upon which the tension travels … Perhaps the English translation is doomed to sever the thread that ties the listening ear to the hearing ear … by unloosing sensation from understanding and encouraging the reader to falsely cast the difference in terms of faculty psychology– sensibility vs. understanding– rather than an oscillation of difference within the same" (2014, 127). However, given Nancy's specific critiques of Husserlian phenomenology, my framing of the debate in terms of conceptualism vs. non-conceptualism does not cast the difference "in terms of faculty psychology." What's more, my reading of Mooney and the nuance of Husserlian phenomenology in the following section will demonstrate how this "oscillation of difference" also appears within Husserl's work.

theories of conceptualism vs. non-conceptualism. As a non-conceptualist, Nancy supports the thesis that the listening body (re)sounds in ways that are not wholly determined by discursivity or conceptual representation. In contrast, Nancy would suggest that Schaeffer and Husserl provide *conceptualist* interpretations of hearing. In other words, Nancy's line of argument suggests that phenomenology –by reifying signification/meaning as the final perspective– cannot account for auditory experiences apart from higher-level processes of conceptual understanding. Nancy is therefore juxtaposing his view to one that locks listening within understanding. In a conceptualist view, there can be no listening apart from understanding. Rather, listening (or, in Nancy's terms, *hearing*) is always already bound up in discursive, propositional knowledge.

While Nancy does not directly use the language of conceptualism vs. non-conceptualism, his critique of Husserl's internal time consciousness resonates with non-conceptualist critiques of conceptualism. In developing his theory of temporality, Husserl uses the example of listening to a melody. While listening to a song, for example, we do not simply experience a series of distinct "now" points or notes, but rather a threefold process of retention, direct experience, and protention. In other words, we pre-reflectively retain the notes just passed and anticipate the notes yet to come.[65] The melody is thus experienced as a phenomenal *unity* for the listener, or as a continuous temporal object as opposed to a discrete series of sonic instances.

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[65] By "primary memory," Husserl distinguishes retention from colloquial understandings of memory as re-presentation. How retentions (as primary memories) become secondary memories, however, is an issue that Derrida points out in Husserl's work. As Boos explains: "Husserl's account of temporality is of interest to Derrida because it appears to introduce non-presence into the constitution of the present and thus sows the seeds of deconstruction in the West's privileging of the present as the moment of truth and being" (2008, 7). In describing lived temporality, Husserl maintains his threefold structure of retention (primary memory), lived experience, and protention. While direct experience is the "now-point" or the direct impression of perception, Husserl notes that it is always taken together with retention and protention. In describing what is given in one perception, he thus includes "that which is not now spatially present but which does exist; [and] that which is simultaneous with what is perceived, although not perceived itself" (Husserl 1991, 182). Derrida therefore suggests that Husserl acknowledges the existence of non-presence in the present, for retentions are no longer present. Returning to the melody example discussed in *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time,* a melody becomes "the unity of the present and nonpresent" (Boos 2008, 8). And while Husserl later tries to maintain a distinction between retentions (as primary memory) and memories (as secondary memory), "Derrida argues that there must be a continuity between retention and secondary

Responding to this, Nancy takes issue with the potential subject/object dialectic this theory maintains. As Kane explains: "The question is this: how can a series of temporally extended sensations be grasped as a unity (as a single melody) by a subject whose consciousness of that melody is also temporal?" (2012, 444). This leads Nancy to conclude that the melody is turned into an intentional *object* through the intentional acts of the hearing subject. As Nancy clarifies:

> Husserl, according to Granel, perpetuates the "forgetting of being" in the Heideggerian sense, and this occurs to the very extent that he does not concentrate his ear on musical resonance but rather converts it ahead of time into the object of an intention that configures it. Sound (and/or sense) is what is not at first intended. It is not first "intentioned": on the contrary, sound is what places its subject, which has not preceded it with an aim, in tension, or under tension. (2007, 20)

Returning to our focus on conceptualist vs. non-conceptualist interpretations of listening, then, Nancy suggests that Husserlian intentionality is necessarily a conceptualist enterprise and misses experiences of (re)sounding *before* conceptualization, or "what is not at first intended."

But Husserl's position is more nuanced than Nancy allows. My argument will be twofold. First, Husserl's work has undergone *both* conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations given Husserl's vague (and sometimes, contradictory) writings on the matter. Second, following Timothy Mooney, I argue that Husserlian phenomenology productively destabilizes popular dichotomies (conceptualist vs. non-conceptualist, sensing vs. understanding, passive vs. active, etc.) such that Nancy's hearing vs. listening distinction does not actually hold. Indeed, as Mooney notes: "it is scarcely wrong-headed to affirm that [Husserl] does not conclude with a pre-expressive innocence of simple seeing any more than he commences with an operative net of concepts going all the way down" (2010, 47).

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memory such that it is impossible to claim that there is a *radical discontinuity* or a *radical difference* between retention and re-presentation" (Lawlor 2011, xxi). In the very act of listening to oneself speak, then, signs can be (and are) operable, for the self-presence that expression requires is always already contaminated by non-presence.

In “Understanding and Simple Seeing in Husserl,” Mooney reviews popular conceptualist vs. non-conceptualist interpretations of visual perception within Husserl studies. More specifically, he compares the works of Richard Cobb-Stevens to that of Kevin Mulligan. Whereas Cobb-Stevens suggests that Husserl extends understanding into the realm of sensuous intuition, Mulligan holds that “Husserl distinguishes nominal and propositional seeing from simple or straightforward–and yet interpretative–seeing of particulars” (Mooney 2010, 20). Interestingly, both thinkers defend their interpretations with the same sources: Husserl’s writings on categorial vs. sensuous intuition and on passive vs. active syntheses.

Beginning with the conceptualist view, Cobb-Stevens would likely support Nancy’s claim that phenomenology proves incapable of listening, but for a slightly different reason. As Mooney explains: “It is Cobb-Stevens’ contention that sensuous intuitions are always already caught up in categorial acts, to the extent that they are interdependent with the latter” (Mooney 2010, 25). In other words, sensuous intuitions (or simple acts of un-mediated perception, sense data etc.) are always already caught up in categorial intuitions (the perception of states of affairs or of relations, syntheses, etc.). This is not to say that sensuous intuitions are taken up and understood through some secondary process of reasoning. Rather, as Dermot Moran and Joseph Cohen clarify: “these categorical [sic] intuitions are given directly in intuition rather than apprehending through reason or inference” (Moran and Cohen 2012, 59). The perceiving subject does not simply take up raw sense data and turn it into an object of knowledge. Rather, the conceptualist view maintains that “our acts of simple or straightforward perception already fuse subordinate perspectival views presenting different profiles or aspects into the continuous presentation of a unitary object … such a unity of perception is an immediate fusion of part-intentions, without the addition of new act intentions founded on them” (Mooney 2010, 25). Take, for example, the perception of a ball. In

perceiving the ball, we may walk around and observe it from various angles. We may touch it or push it. We do not then fuse all these various points of view together through a secondary act of reasoning. Rather, the part-intentions of the ball (or its various adumbrations, including those not currently perceived) are "immediately fused."

While conceptualists often talk about vision in making this argument, the same can be said of auditory experience. Through a conceptualist interpretation of sound, intention and sonic intuition are coincident; in hearing a dog barking, for example, part-intentions of the bark are immediately experienced together as a unified sonic experience (as with Husserl's time consciousness). In this way, Nancy's claim that phenomenology cannot "simply listen" proves true, for the conceptualist would hold that it is impossible to simply listen, or to fully separate sonic intellection from sonic intuition.

Alternatively, non-conceptualists might support Nancy's hearing vs. listening distinction while also refuting Nancy's claim that phenomenology cannot listen. Rather, the non-conceptualist would suggest that phenomenology both hears *and* listens, for they believe that sensuous intuitions *can* be separated from categorial judgments. Responding to conceptualists like Cobb-Stevens, non-conceptualists agree that perception always involves syntheses of part-intentions. However, these non-conceptualists do not believe that these syntheses necessarily involve meanings or concepts. Paraphrasing Mulligan, Mooney explains:

> Simply seeing, states Mulligan, is the straightforward perception of particulars, but it is not just the seeing of bare things; it is the experience of things with moments and determinations … To simply or straightforwardly see particulars, therefore, is already to have interpreted one's sensations. All that Mulligan disputes is the claim that the apprehending sense of perception fusing part-intentions has to involve meanings or concepts. (2010, 31)

In other words, whereas Cobb-Stevens would suggest that the synthesis of part-intentions necessarily involves conceptual components, Mulligan separates intentional associations from

meaningful or signifying relations. Mulligan thus supports the belief that we can see in a simple, straight-forward way without exercising individual meanings or concepts (Mooney 2010, 31). Indeed, as Mooney explains: "there is an essential difference between interpretation that is sensuous and interpretation that is cogiative" (2010, 31). In terms of auditory experience, then, non-conceptualist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology would suggest that 'simple listening' is indeed possible, for "to [listen] simply is not to exercise an individual meaning or a general concept" (Mooney 2010, 20).

3. *Mooney, Active Synthesis, and Passive Synthesis*

Responding to the conceptualist vs. non-conceptualist interpretations of perception, Mooney suggests a third, more nuanced approach is possible. Responding to both Mulligan and Cobb-Stevens, Mooney suggests that a strictly conceptualist or non-conceptualist reading of Husserl is not entirely possible. Leaning more toward Cobb-Stevens' account, Mooney writes: "The problem we are faced with is that there is no clear-cut account that merely awaits its distillation from the pages of *Logical Investigations*. We find certain remarks that are hostile to the conceptualist interpretation of perception, and others that go in its favour, and there are no citations that can decide Husserl's view" (Mooney 2010, 34). Given this ambiguity, Mooney instead chooses to explore how Husserl *integrates* conceptualist and non-conceptualist descriptions of experience throughout his work, productively blurring the lines between these two terms.

Looking specifically at Husserl's genetic phenomenology, Mooney contends: "the sensible level is not composed of raw sensation data. It is always already organised or structured by receptive consciousness, and the relevant organization is a pre-condition of the intentional experience of an object" (2010, 36). Here, Mooney is referring to Husserl's distinction between passive and active syntheses. As discussed in chapter one, active synthesis refers to the ego's

explicit involvement in the constitution of objects, whereas passive synthesis describes "an original passivity not only of sensuous givens, of 'sense data,' but also of feeling" (Husserl 1973, 71). As Mooney clarifies: "through passive syntheses of heterogeneity and homogeneity, the field of vision that is encountered by egoic awareness has already been organised pre-egoically into elementary configurations or patterns" (2010, 37). Without this pre-egoic patterning, perception would consist solely of undifferentiated multiplicities with no points of prominence. Mooney continues: "this is because prominence in the perceptual field is not the achievement of attentive thematisation. This is arrived at through the pre-constituted configurations exercising affectivity in their turn" (2010, 37-38). By "exercising affectivity," Mooney means that these sense data have certain levels of affective pull, or perhaps contain affective "valences" in Gibson's terms.[66] This affection is what then gives rise to prominence and motivates the pre-egoic configurations that structure the perceptual field. As Tony Steinbock summarizes in his translator's introduction to *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis*: "passivity is the realm in which, through fundamental laws of association, affective forces spur an egoic attentiveness to objects, enabling acts of remembering and expectation to constitute objects as such, i.e., as in-themselves-for-us" (2001a, xxxviii).[67] Passive synthesis, then, refers to a sort of meaning-connecting that takes place without the express intent of the individual (Welsh 2002, 168). While active synthesis is crucial in our intentional grasping of objects, it is through passive synthesis that a unified experience of consciousness ultimately becomes possible.

[66] As a refresher on Gibson's notion of valences, see chapter one's discussion of Georgina Born and the "Subject Critique."

[67] A similar argument is made by David Hume in his work on the association of ideas. For more, see Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* and *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*.

While one might assume that this distinction between active and passive syntheses supports the non-conceptualist distinction between intellection and intuition, Mooney argues that these operations cannot be separated from one another. As Husserl explains:

> That receptivity [vis. passive syntheses] precedes predicative spontaneity does not mean that the former is something independent, as if it was always necessary first to run through a chain of repetitive experiences before there could be any awakening of genuine cognitive interest. On the contrary, from the first we can already thematise a pre-given object in the interest of cognition … predicative forming and cognising go immediately hand in hand with receptive apprehension, and what is distinguished from a genetic point of view as belonging to different levels is in fact inseparably entwined in the concretion of consciousness … each step of the predication presupposes a step of receptive experience and explication, for only that can be originally predicated which has been originally given in an intuition, apprehended, and explicated. (1973, 203-204)

In other words, because pre-egoic patternings allow for associations to be awakened to our active attention, we cannot say that receptivity (or sensibility) is wholly independent from "cognitive interest" (or intellection). Nor does the affective pull exercised during passive syntheses simply disappear once egoic interest is awakened. As Mooney clarifies: "non-conceptual affectivity is not cast off like the spent stages of a rocket when active synthesis occurs. It goes toward keeping me interested, and as I get nearer to the recognised thing, new details may emerge that motivate further objectivations" (2010, 43).

However, this is not to say that all pre-given objects come to be actively thematized, as a multitude of affective forces passively compete for egoic attention.[68] This leads Mooney to conclude that neither active synthesis nor passive synthesis are wholly self-sufficient. He concludes: "Through they are notionally separable, pre-conceptual syntheses at the passive and noematic level are inevitably interwoven with conceptual and categorial articulations in a

[68] As Steinbock explains: "In a field of affective tendencies that rival one another for attention, some will be more or less significant than others, and these rivalries can occur within the same sense field or across sense fields. Even though there is an affective force, it is not necessary that it draw my attention to it; it may only be 'perceived' in a passive attention as it knocks at the antechamber of the ego; it may not yet or ever achieve an active attention, cognitive or otherwise" (2001, xlix).

developed consciousness" (Mooney 2010, 19). This is not to say that Husserlian phenomenology is rigidly conceptualist and "commences with an operative net of concepts going all the way down" (Mooney 2010, 47). Indeed, in his work on constitution, Husserl is interested in the non-conceptual components of early life, as in infancy. As Mooney explains:

> For Husserl, the primordial level of trust or belief or *doxa* that is founded on straightforward perceptual evidence is not a domain of lesser rank than the *epistēmē*, of judicative knowledge and its sedimentations. What is finally inseparable from conceptual cognition is neither reducible to it, nor inferior to it. (2010, 47; emphasis in original)

In this way, Husserl's genetic phenomenology troubles the very idea of independent, hierarchical levels of consciousness. Husserl's elaboration on active and passive syntheses does not support the intellection vs. intuition divide; rather, "Husserl's analyses of '*passive* synthesis' challenges this schism between the sensibility and the understanding by describing intentionality as the interplay of intention and fulfillment as they both pertain to the perceptual and the cognitive spheres of experience" (Steinbock 2001, xl). In other words, truth (epistēmē) is not alien to sensibility, and conceptual meaning can be (and is) found in the realm of passivity.

3.1 *Deconstructing Nancy's Hearing vs. Listening Divide*

Returning to Nancy's work and given our recovery of rich ambiguities in Husserl's work, I would suggest that Nancy's distinction between hearing and listening (as yet another iteration of intellection vs. intuition, conceptual vs. non-conceptual divide) fails to grasp the ways in which hearing and listening are always already inseparably intertwined. In many ways, Nancy's hearing vs. listening split mirrors surface-level understandings of passive vs. active syntheses. Whereas hearing (as *active synthesis*) is egoic, intentional, and meaning-oriented, listening (as *passive synthesis*) is receptive, pre-egoic, and affective. In attempting to separate these processes and focus on the passive realm of listening, however, Nancy's account fails to address Husserl's refusal to

treat these operations as separable, distinct "levels" of consciousness. Take, for example, Nancy's discussion of the birthing cry: "Thus resounds, beyond a saying, a 'meaning' [*vouloir-dire*, 'meaning to say'] to which one must first give not the value of a will but the inchoate value of an articulatory or profferatory release that is still without intention and without vision of signification" (2007, 28). This notion of a "profferatory release … without vision of signification" aligns with the affective, instinctual call of Husserl's passive syntheses. However, as Mooney clearly articulates, this release does not cease to exist once active syntheses begin. Rather, Husserlian phenomenology would suggest that this "profferatory release" exists alongside and together with active syntheses and "visions of signification." In other words, Nancy's *corps sonore* cannot account for the ways in which conceptual contents are available (and operable) even at the passive, "resonant" level of auditory experience, and the ways in which resonant, profferatory releases are operable at the level of active, signifying auditory experience. Just as it would be wrong to say that we can have "purely categorical givens divorced from simple, straightforward perceptions" (Mooney 2010, 25), so, too, would it be wrong to suggest that we can have purely naïve, sensuous givens wholly divorced from categorial intuition.

What's more, despite Nancy's aversion to theory and signification as the final perspective of philosophy, I argue that his desire to articulate a mode of listening distinct from hearing is possible only through an act of *abstraction*, therefore making his "listening subject" a product of theory. Let us begin with categorial intuition. As Mooney writes: "in 'categorial intuition,' I am given ideal and universal objects intellectually, as the fulfilling correlates of the general concepts that refer to them as species" (2010, 24). Here, "abstraction" has a very specific meaning. As the "fulfilling correlates of the general concepts," categorial intuitions are not abstractions in terms of separation. Rather, abstraction in this sense refers to a type of species "which has a special kind of

identity distinct from that of an individual" (Moran and Cohen 2012, 25). Take, for example, the perception of color. When we think of the color "blue," we are not thinking of a specific shade in a particular moment. Rather, "blue" describes a more general species. However, these references to general species do not occur consciously in the colloquial sense. In the natural attitude, categorial intuition happens alongside sensuous intuition without our conscious knowledge. As Mooney clarifies: "I employ and grasp categorial forms in my ordinary perceptual life, but without having to know that I am doing so. The thematisation of categorial form *as such* is the function of a subsequent act of reflective abstraction" (2010, 24). In other words, categorial intuition is not consciously performed in ordinary life. In perceiving something as "blue," we do not knowingly take ourselves to be referring to a general species. Rather, we understand categorial intuition only through a secondary act of reflection– another form of abstraction.

In addition to categorial intuition, however, Mooney argues that the thematization of *sensuous* intuition is likewise an abstraction. To do so, he looks specifically at Husserl's writings on perception in infancy. In infancy, it may be possible to describe the sort of "simple" or "innocent" perceiving that the non-conceptualists attend to. Before conceptual knowledge, an infant experiences something like pre-conceptual sensibility or sensuous intuition devoid of intellect. As Mooney explains:

> When a child seeks to apprehend something and to discriminate more sensuous details by changing orientation, he or she can be prompted by aesthetic delight and curiosity rather than by a prefiguration of danger or the satisfaction of a physical need … the later Husserl agrees that the infant perceives in this pre-conceptual manner, having an intentional background that lets him or her predelineate the behaviour of certain objects. There are certainly expectations that certain appearances will accompany or follow on other ones … but not the articulated appreciations of states of affairs. (2010, 38)

Shifting our focus from vision to sound, we may likewise question whether young children may hear in a non-conceptual manner, responding to affective forces and *resonating* with sounds in

ways that do not require "articulated appreciations of states of affairs." As with Mulligan's reading of Husserl, this account suggests that associations and the fusion of part-intentions still occur, but they do not mean that infants are dealing in meanings and concepts.[69]

While it is true that Husserl identifies a pre-conceptual form of perception operative in infancy, he does not believe this sort of simple perception continues throughout our development. As Mooney explains: "Though Husserl can allow for simple or straightforward infant perception prior to the expressive (nominal, categorial and shareable) stage, he does not suppose that these come to adventitiously mark a simple seeing that would otherwise carry on regardless … once it has been reached, moreover, there is no stage at the active level that becomes inert or a *ne plus ultra*" (2010, 42; emphasis in original). This claim is supported by Husserl's own writing in *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis*. There, Husserl contends:

> An object that exercises an affection from the background, but that does not yet bear any traits that stem from active accomplishments, is actually a limit-concept for us, an abstraction, but a necessary one, since we see necessarily that whatever exercises an affection must already be a unity of constitutive manifolds, and that where a unity is constituted in this blind way, many kinds of occurrences of disruptive inhibition, and hence preliminary stages of modalization, must already occur as well. (2001a, 288)

In arguing that affections "not bearing traits of active accomplishments" are an abstraction, Husserl means that our grasping of these things only occurs through some secondary act of reflection. Following the conceptualist argument discussed in section 1.3, Husserl is saying that if something exercises affection on us, it has already undergone syntheses of part-intentions and pre-egoic patternings. To try to think of an object that does not bear any traits from active accomplishments, then, is to abstract away these processes. In other words, just as it is only through some secondary act of reflective abstraction that allows us to see categorial intuitions as such, so, too, would the

[69] I do not mean to get into a more difficult conversation about infant cognition here. Indeed, young children may very well have cognitive architecture that informs "passive syntheses" such that they are not really passive. Rather, I mean to emphasize potential modes of perception that precede nominal and categorial thinking.

grasping of passive syntheses free of active accomplishments be an act of abstraction. Returning to Nancy, then, I suggest that Nancy's development of the "listening subject" is an act of abstraction, one that engages in theory just as much as the accounts he aims to critique. To separate listening from hearing is to already engage in a reflective process that involves higher order, conceptual processes.

4. *Nancy, Schafer, and Listening in/with Hostile Soundscapes*

Let us return to this chapter's opening example of hostile soundscapes. What can Nancy's account of hearing vs. listening tell us about experiences of music torture? In emphasizing the innate resonance of the listening body, Nancy's work aptly highlights the corporeal violence of music torture; the music works by exploiting the "infinite tension and rebound" (Nancy 2007, 21-22) of the resonant body, and turns this self made through resonant relationships into a weapon. In attempting to separate hearing from listening, however, Nancy's account misses the ways in which pre-conceptual sonic syntheses are always already intertwined with conceptual articulations. Take, for example, the experience of navy veteran Donald Vance. As Cusick recounts, Vance was investigating an illegal arms operation with an FBI agent from Chicago when he was arrested and transported to a detention center at Baghdad International Airport (2008, 20). While there, Vance was subjected to music torture for days on end. Not only was the music intolerable on a material level (i.e., in terms of its volume and duration) but on a conceptual level as well. As Cusick describes in a conversation with Vance: "sometimes he couldn't help responding to familiar music, singing along when 'they played an artist I enjoyed. But that just… began destroying me. Listening to songs that I would play at home… within that place, drove me into tears'" (2008, 22). Cusick thus concludes: "whereas stress positions and the like are intended to make the vulnerabilities of a human being's own body betray him and cause him pain, both 'futility music' and 'gender

coercion' target the practices by which a human being's cultural beliefs are embodied, performed, and made real as ethical practice" (2008, 17). Such conceptual violence is not a separate function of the music torture. Rather, it underscores the fundamental instability of Nancy's hearing/listening divide and highlights the equiprimordiality of culture and resonance.

Given this dissertation's focus on Schafer's notion of the soundscape, can Schafer's writings help us further clarify these experiences? While Schafer's distinction between the different soundscape components helps explain some of the machinations of hostile soundscapes, it does not take us far enough. To begin, Schafer does not take up Nancy's aural dichotomy. Though he makes some distinctions between specific modes of auditory experience (i.e., "focused listening" vs. "peripheral hearing," etc.) he uses the terms "hearing" and "listening" interchangeably. Even when using terms like "focused listening," however, Schafer is not describing the sort of signifying, meaning-oriented intentionality that Nancy associates with hearing. In other words, the intentionality and focus that soundscape hearing calls for is *not* the kind of intentional hearing that Nancy criticizes. For example, in *The New Soundscape: A Handbook for the Modern Music Teacher*, Schafer writes: "Anything in our world that moves vibrates air. If it moves in such a way that it oscillates at more than about 16 times a second this movement is heard as sound. The world, then, is full of sounds. Listen. Openly attentive to whatever is vibrating, listen. Sit quietly for a moment and receive" (1969, 5). Here, Schafer's call to "sit quietly and receive" echoes Nancy's *corps sonore*, insofar as Schafer regularly talks about listening and hearing as forms of full-body attunement. When describing his teaching practices in *Voices of Tyranny*, he adds: "By focusing on specific sounds I was encouraging the students to listen to all sounds … [t]he whole body must become an ear to register with seismographic delicacy

all sound sensations, the large and the small, the near and far" (Schafer 1993, 105).[70] By suggesting that the whole body must become an "ear" to register various sounds, the subject of Schafer's soundscape resonates with Nancy's *corps sonore* as a (re)sounding body. Indeed, Schafer takes this bodily resonance quite literally: in *The New Soundscape*, he muses: "Scientific tests … reveal that changes in the circulation of the blood and in the action of the heart take place when a person is exposed to a certain intensity of noise" (1969, 19).[71] Like Nancy, then, Schafer does not position signification as the final perspective in soundscape studies. Rather, his goal is to "open ears" (1967, 1) and encourage people to be more receptive to the multitude of sounds happening around (and even, within)[72] them. Paraphrasing Nancy, we may conclude that Schafer likewise approaches

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[70] A metaphysics of presence is clearly operative in Schafer's original works. Take, for example, Schafer's development of "schizophonia." First described in *The New Soundscape* (1969), Schafer uses schizophonia to describe "the splitting of sounds from their original contexts" (1977, 88). Combining the Greek prefix *schizo* (split, separated) with *phōnē* (voice, sound), Schafer largely uses the term to describe recorded sounds and broadcasting. A sonic luddite, Schafer mourned the spread of schizophonic sounds throughout the twentieth century, writing: "Originally all sounds were originals. They occurred at one time in one place only. Sounds were then indissolubly tied to the mechanisms that produced them" (1977, 90). In suggesting that originally "all sounds were originals," Schafer buys into the notion of sonic originarity that Nancy resists. As with the metaphysical accounts that Derrida deconstructs, Schafer's aligns listening with presence, being, and truth. In splitting sounds from their sources, schizophonic listening contaminates this presence, a contamination that Schafer believes to be potentially *dangerous*. As Sterne explains: "If interpersonal interaction is the presumptively primary or 'authentic' mode of communication, then sound reproduction is doomed to denigration as inauthentic, disorienting, and possibly even dangerous by virtue of its 'decontextualizing' sound from its 'proper' interpersonal context" (Sterne 21). Reading Schafer through a deconstructive lens, however, I argue that the distinction he makes between 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' (or *schizophonic*) listening does not actually hold. Like Derrida's Husserl, Schafer's conception of schizophonia relies on the presumption of pure presence in experiences of authentic listening. While Schafer would likely disagree with Husserl's claim that expressions (as experiential unities) occur only in solitary mental life, he nevertheless privileges direct interaction as the most authentic or truthful form of auditory experience. Take, for example, listening to a cat meow. Schafer would maintain that listening to the cat in person would be more 'real' or 'authentic' than listening to a recording of the cat. This is because, for Schafer, the recorded meow lacks the connection to its sounding origin. Schafer thus maintains a self-presence of sound and sounding source.

[71] In this section of *The New Soundscape*, Schafer is speaking specifically about the dangers of sonic imperialism via sonic military technologies. Describing an example of military testing, he writes: "In one of the large laboratory rooms, two physicists and a biologist stand about a heavy metal table. They wear thick ear pads. On the table is a dial-covered device about the size and shape of a television set, with a trumpet-like horn protruding from its face. The device is a kind of siren, designed to produce high-frequency sound of outrageous intensity. The scientists are studying the effects of this sound on materials, animals and men. They are wondering if sound can be used as a weapon" (1969, 19).

[72] Here, we might think of Cage's anecdote about hearing his own bodily processes in an anechoic chamber or the more common experience of hearing one's stomach rumble. As Schafer himself continues: "I have always tried to induce students to notice sounds they have never really listened to before, listen like mad to the sounds of their own environment and the sounds they themselves inject into their environment" (1967, 1).

listening as an inclination "toward the opening of meaning" rather than meaning solidification (Nancy 2007, 41).

Thinking specifically about this chapter's focus on hostile soundscapes, Schafer was likewise keenly interested in the ways in which soundscapes can be transformed into tools of violence. In *The Soundscape*, for example, he muses: "The loudspeaker was … invented by an imperialist, for it responded to the desire to dominate others with one's own sound" (1977, 91). Speaking specifically about the loudspeaker's role in Hitler's regime, he continues: "the Nazis were the first to use the radio in the interests of totalitarianism, but they have not been the last; little by little, in both East and West, radio has been employed more ruthlessly in culture-molding" (1977, 92). By "culture-molding," Schafer gestures towards sound's ability to shape our sociocultural realities, or in Guenther's terms, how sounds "shape our experience, not just empirically or in a piecemeal fashion, but in what we might call a quasi-transcendental way" (2020, 12). What's more, Schafer's breakdown of the soundscape's different conceptual components provides us with a preliminary framework to explain hostile soundscapes' impact. For example, let us return to the three key features of the soundscape: keynote sounds, signals, and soundmarks. In chapter one, I argued that keynote sounds and signals are not *ontologically* distinct, but *phenomenologically* distinct. In other words, they describe different modes of aural awareness and engagement, rather than different "types" or "species" of sound. Emphasizing the "critical" aspect of critical phenomenology, I also held that these differences between sonic "background" and "figure" are inevitably shaped by relations of power. In other words, the "quasi-transcendental" social, political, and economic structures that phenomenologists study shape what "figures" within the soundscape, and what is relegated to the background.

In the context of our everyday soundscapes, music often serves as a sort of keynote in public settings. Here, we might think of the ubiquitous presence of music and muzak in shopping malls, grocery stores, restaurants, and even doctor's offices. When we intentionally listen to music, however, it functions as a sonic signal. In these cases, we may have some control over the music by controlling its duration, volume, and/or content (i.e., when listening to our phones or other personal music devices) or in our ability to navigate soundscapes where music is present (i.e., walking out of a grocery store or office, putting headphones on, etc.). In the context of hostile soundscapes (and, more specifically, soundscapes of torture), I argue that the music functions by attempting to destroy the listener's perceptual field, or by collapsing distinctions between keynote sounds and signals. Recall that I interpreted signals as the intentional objects of aural perception. In other words, signals constitute the "consciousness of" within the soundscape, directing our awareness this way or that. In saying that the music operates by collapsing the keynote/signal distinction for the prisoners exposed to it, I do not mean to suggest that these listeners willfully attend to the music. Rather, part of the violence of prolonged sound exposure concerns sound's ability to shape our perceptual field. It is not that the prisoners *choose* to attend to these sounds; though they may.[73] Rather, the music's volume and unbounded duration attempts to force attention, shaping the aural "ground" such that other sounds cannot appear. In other words, music torture attempts to obliterate both the listener's perceptual horizon and their ability to navigate the soundscape through 1) the inability to distinguish figure/ground; 2) the absence of a foreseeable horizonal silence; and 3) the music's relentless duration.

Such sonic control has serious consequences; for example, some of the people Cusick interviewed recall that the constant music made it near impossible to hear and organize their own

[73] For example, Cusick recounts how Donald Vance sometimes sang along to the music being played during his detainment (2008, 22).

thoughts. Comparing sensory deprivation to the sensory overload of music torture, Cusick explains: "loud or frightening sound was understood to enhance the effect of systematic sleep deprivation, and to mask–that is, drown out–the inner thoughts of a detainee" (2008, 5). Returning to my discussion of sonic place and Deleuze and Guattari in chapter one, I subsequently argue that music torture striates sonic space in specific ways so as to foreclose other modes of sonic being. In short, the spatiality of sound torture "[…] literally doesn't let you leave, even in your own head" (Friedson 2019, 14).

Here, a Schaferian reading of music torture largely parallels other works on confinement and violence within critical phenomenology. Describing the connections between delirium and spatial structures, phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes that "what brings about the hallucination and the myth is the contraction of lived space, the rooting of things in our body, the overwhelming proximity of the object" (2012, 304).[74] Beyond Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the overwhelming proximity of the *object*, I instead emphasize sound's ability to weaponize the innate *resonance* of listening bodies, and the inescapably haptic and multimodal nature of sound.[75] As Elaine Scarry writes in *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking the World*, "the torture room is not just the setting in which the torture occurs … it is itself literally converted into another weapon, into an agent of pain" (1985, 40).

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[74] Merleau-Ponty seems to avoid describing lived space as "living space" in this section, perhaps to avoid any overlap with the German notion of *Lebensraum*. Lebensraum functioned as an important tenet in settler colonialism and Nazi ideology, holding that the survival of the German people depended on the extermination of Indigenous peoples in occupied lands. We may thus question how this concept arises in the weapons of colonialism and colonizers' efforts to destroy the lived space of others.

[75] In focusing on the haptic nature of resounding bodies, I also aim to trouble popular assumptions about sound torture as a form of "no-touch torture." As Feld writes in "Waterfalls of Song," "sound, hearing, and voice mark a special nexus for sensation and emotion because of their coordination of brain, nervous system, head, ear, chest, muscles, respiration, and breathing" (1996, 97). Similarly, in *Sonic Warfare: Sound, Affect, and the Ecology of Fear* Goodman describes how "in the onset of the event, the body-environment acts as one" (2012, 76).

Additionally, in *Solitary Confinement: Social Death and Its Afterlives* (2013), Guenther explores the profound impacts sensory deprivation has on an individual's sense of being-in-the-world. There, she writes: "solitary confinement works by turning prisoners' constitutive relationality against themselves, turning their own capacities to feel, perceive, and relate to others in a meaningful world into instruments of their undoing" (xiii). Riffing on Guenther, we may likewise say that music torture functions by turning listeners' constitutive *resonance* against themselves. As Guenther concludes: "The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that prolonged solitary confinement undermines prisoners' capacities to make meaning and sustain meaning" (2013, 35). Such an inability to orient oneself (both in terms of meaning *and* direction, as discussed in chapter three) leads to a deterioration of subjectivity, resulting in anxiety, depression, and hallucinations.

In focusing on the perceptual field of the listening subject, however, a Schaferian or classically phenomenological approach to sound torture risks over-emphasizing the role of the (re)sounding subject. In other words, such accounts risk overhearing the resonant aspects of listening in favor of a conceptualist interpretation of music torture's violence. So, too, is Nancy's account limited in its explanatory power. To summarize, Nancy's listening/hearing distinction abstracts itself from the event of listening and, ironically, loses the soundscape as a differing, transforming field of resonances. How, then, should we think of listening within that field? What's more, how are we to account for the specific harms present in listening to/with hostile soundscapes?

This, I argue, is why my account of listening is so important. Recall that in chapter one, I developed a generative account of sonic subjectivity. Responding to what I called the "Subject Critique" (or the belief that the soundscape is irrevocably steeped in Enlightenment notions of

subjectivity and that the concept overhears the materiality of sound itself), I instead emphasized the complex mediated/mediating nature of sounds and their irreducibility to a subject-object dialectic. Turning to Nitsche's work on scopic-topological phenomenology, I suggested that the "subject" of the soundscape is not the subject of Enlightenment philosophy. Rather, I argued that the soundscape is a sort of place-space, wherein (re)sounding subjects re-localize (and are re-localized by) ever-changing sonic phenomena. Bringing this reading to bear on the present chapter's focus on listening, I subsequently suggest that the "listening subject" be understood as a process of re-localization. In this way, we can say that the listening subject re-localizes phenomena vis-à-vis the processes described by Schafer and Guenther while also recognizing that the listener is simultaneously re-localized by sound, thereby also addressing Nancy's concern.

So, too, does my discussion of the conceptualist vs. non-conceptualist debate within this chapter offer some potentially critical insights. Put simply, the ambiguity of Husserl's work productively destabilizes dichotomies like listening/hearing and sensing/understanding to reveal how these dichotomies focus too much on the (re)sounding subject and not enough on the world. For example, Mooney's article aptly highlights how sense data "exercis[e] affectivity" on the perceiving subject (2010, 38), or how sense data themselves contain affective valances or levels of affective "pull." By emphasizing the porosity between these terms, we are better able to account for the dynamic interplay of soundscapes and listening bodies, and how this interplay can be weaponized. Such a reading is also supported by Steven M. Friedson's work. In his article, "The Unbearable Weight of Music: The Intermezzo" (2019), Friedson investigates the profound psychic, temporal, and intersubjective harms music torture have on its listeners. Assuming a quasi-Gibsonian approach, he muses: "the affordances of musical experience, its capacity to become our mode of being-in-the-world, its fantastic power, can be turned against us into an aversive sonic

attack over which we have no control, bending our social arch into an unbounded intermezzo, a liminality without end" (2019, 12). In emphasizing the unique affordances that musical experience provides, I argue that Friedson underscores the inescapably cultural and conceptual components of music. It is not simply that music torture (as unbounded sound) destabilizes our ability to orient ourselves within the soundscape, as Schafer's account might suggest. Neither is it solely a weaponization of the innate resonance of our fleshy, material bodies. Rather, part of music torture's violence involves its social, historical, and affective valences, valences that operate vis-à-vis histories of power.

4.1 *Hostile Soundscapes and Listening (as) Resistance*

This is not to suggest that the power of music ever is wholly totalizing, although cases of extreme sonic torture might be exceptions. For example, in "On Music, Torture, and Detention: Reflections on Issues of Research and Discipline," Anna Papaeti recounts the experiences of Maria, a political prisoner subject to sound torture during the Greek military junta of 1967. Imprisoned on an island in the middle of the Aegean Sea, Maria recalls that "a regular song played to them was *Famous Macedonia Country of Alexander*," a song that she had once loved (Papaeti 2020, 8). While the song initially made her physically ill, Papaeti describes how Maria "was eventually able to shift the meaning of music imposed from above. By associating some of the songs with the man she was in love with at the time, she managed to withstand this inescapable listening" (2020, 9).

In "shifting the meaning of music imposed from above," I suggest that Maria survived by engaging in a *counter-acoustemology*. By "counter-acoustemology," I riff off Steven Feld, Emma K. Russell, and Bree Carlton. For Feld, "acoustemology" describes "the potential of acoustic knowing, of sounding as a condition of and for knowing, [and] of sonic presence and awareness as potent shaping forces in how people make sense of experiences" (1996, 97). Connecting Feld's

work to carceral studies, Russell and Cartlon subsequently define counter-carceral acoustemologies as "alternative 'soundtracks' of resistance that both reveal and momentarily displace carceral-spatial control, re-patterning the aural environment of the prison" (2020, 296). Bringing Russell and Carlton's concept to bear on soundscapes of torture, I argue that counter-acoustemologies may momentarily disrupt the striating forces of music torture.[76] Returning to Muñoz' notion of disidentification, however, I do not approach counter-acoustemology as a sort of counter-identification or utopianism. Rather, as Foucault muses in "Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from Outside": "anyone who attempts to oppose the law in order to found a new order … will only encounter the silent and infinitely accommodating welcome of the law" (1990, 38). Thinking specifically about soundscapes of un/welcome, then, I approach counter-acoustemology as a form of *transgression* that "seeks to undermine or at least weaken any given set of limits" and ultimately "attenuate their violence" (Pickett 1996, 450-451).

5. *Conclusion*

In this chapter, I explored a range of ways in which soundscapes and listening bodies interact, from rural Irish soundscapes to soundscapes of torture that impact listeners differentially. In doing so, I highlighted how bodily resonance can be exploited so as to alter an individual's experience of sonic place. Approaching listening as both a site of vulnerability *and* resistance, I questioned how listening bodies may engage in counter-acoustemological practices capable of (momentarily) disrupting sonic-spatial control (Russell and Carlton 2020, 296). Such an account productively

[76] Another, less extreme example might involve appropriations of ultrasonic devices. Responding to uses of the Mosquito in the U.K., Akiyama notes "shortly after the Mosquito was introduced, young people seemingly found a way to reclaim ultrasound. Using a high-pictured sound similar to that of the Mosquito as a cellphone ringtone, kids discovered that they could surreptitiously text each other without the knowledge of older authority figures" (2010, 466). In this way, teenagers were successfully able to re-territorialize ultrasound and simultaneously *de-territorialize* the sonic space of the classroom.

destabilizes the listening vs. hearing divide popular within sound studies and the conceptualist vs. non-conceptualist divide within philosophy. Echoing the topological account I developed in chapter one, I end this chapter by suggesting that listening necessarily involves presence and non-presence, intellection and intuition, experience and discourse. In the following chapter, I will explore experiences of listening to *silence* in order to uncover how these experiences further complicate the sound studies/auditory cultural studies divide, and, in so doing, to expose how soundscapes both foreclose and foster different listening practices.

The Last Call



Chapter 5

Silence: I Am Sitting in a[n Emergency] Room

The first sign that something was wrong with my father –that something was seriously wrong– was *sound*. Seemingly overnight, my father's voice changed. It became hoarse, strangled, strange. After much persuasion, he went for a check-up at the VA medical center in West Haven, Connecticut. At first, the doctors released him, scheduling a future appointment with an ENT specialist. But after collapsing in the parking lot on his way out, he was brought back in for further testing. It was then that the doctors discovered the cause of both his voice change and fatigue: squamous cell carcinoma, stage four, with a large mass encapsulating his trachea and larynx. He was immediately rushed into surgery where doctors performed an emergency tracheotomy to preserve his airway. When he awoke, my father could no longer speak.

For the next few months, I spent most of my time in the VA's intensive care unit (ICU). Since my father couldn't talk, he communicated by writing, scrawling his personal brand of shorthand on a notepad while I responded out loud. During these conversations, I became acutely aware of what my own voice sounded like, listening to it rise and fall in the otherwise silent room. The ICU itself was often quiet, primarily serving incredibly ill (and often, incredibly old) veterans with the occasional bout of excitement. In the absence of my father's voice, other sounds came into focus: the clicks and beeps of the many machines he was connected to; the distant whirring of delivery robots passing down the halls; the footsteps of nurses making rounds.

Years after my father's death, I was introduced to Alvin Lucier's *I Am Sitting in a Room* (1969). A composer and experimental musician, Lucier created the art piece by playing back his

own narrated recording within a room, recording it and re-recording it until only the resonant frequencies of the room were audible. In the original narration, Lucier explains his process:

> I am recording the sound of my speaking voice and I am going to play it back into the room again and again until the resonant frequencies of the room reinforce themselves so that any semblance of my speech, with perhaps the exception of rhythm is destroyed. What you will hear, then, are the *natural* resonant frequencies of the room articulated by speech. (Lucier 1969; emphasis added)

Largely inspired by Cagean aesthetic practices, Lucier sought to turn listeners' attention from the sound signal toward the background, or the resonant room itself. As Brian Hulse and Nick Nesbitt explain, Lucier "forcefully shifts listening from sonorous object, or identity, to sonic event, or noise, as if recording the sound of the room's timbre without a note rather than an abstract musical ghost" (2010, 72). Much like Cage's famed *4'33"*, Lucier's work uncovers the sonority of presumed silence, revealing "the resonance of nothingness, making audible how that which is deemed nothing has material vibratory force" (Crawley 2017, 203).

Thinking about Lucier's work in the context of intensive care rooms, important questions arise: what is required to adequately describe the resonant frequencies of these rooms? How do the histories of these rooms (and the sounding bodies that inhabited them) shape their resounding? And to riff on Ashon Crawley's question in *Blackpentacostal Breath: The Aesthetics of Possibility,* what are the political and ethical valences of this resonance, this presumed *silence* that nevertheless contains its own vibratory power (2017, 203)?

Take, for example, sound artist Jacob Kirkegaard's 2006 response to Lucier's *I am Sitting in a Room*. Like Lucier, Kirkegaard created an original recording (about ten minutes long) and played this recording over and over in four rooms, re-recording the sound until only the resonant

frequencies of the rooms remained.[77] Unlike Lucier, Kirkegaard is deeply interested in the *histories* of these resonant environments. Specifically, Kirkegaard's work offers "a sonic portrait of four abandoned rooms inside the 'Zone of Exclusion' in Chernobyl, Ukraine" (Kirkegaard 2006). As Cox explains in "Sound Art and the Sonic Unconscious": "Lucier's piece moves from personal, human and domestic speech to pure anonymous sound; Kirkegaard's project begins where Lucier's leaves off and aims, in a sense, to reverse the process" (2009, 24-25). Whereas Lucier's piece does not consider the material history of the room he is recording, Kirkegaard's work asks listeners to confront how these rooms were made silent. As Cox concludes:

> The depopulated rooms recorded by Kirkegaard are profoundly overdetermined by the nuclear disaster that, twenty years earlier, forced their sudden evacuation. Thus, the drones that emerge from these rooms are, presumably, inflected by the radioactive particles and electromagnetic waves that still invisibly move within them. They are also haunted by the human beings that once inhabited them. (2009, 25)

Returning to my discussion of keening in chapter three, Kirkegaard's work thus questions how the resonant frequencies of rooms are socially and historically contingent. This is not to say that these rooms are always already "overdetermined," as Cox suggests of Kirkegaard's work. Rather, Kirkegaard's *Four Rooms* questions how these resonances (and our orientations with/in them) are not simply *there*, but "take shape through social action, through 'the activity of a whole succession of generations,' which is forgotten when the object is apprehended as simply given" (Ahmed 2010, 241).

Following Kirkegaard, this chapter will explore soundscapes of silence as nuanced sites of negotiation and contestation. Specifically, I explore Schafer's efforts to recover a *positive* silence and compare his project to Cage's, Ihde's, and poststructuralist writings on silence and (presumed)

[77] Unlike Lucier, Kirkegaard's original recording does not contain speech. As the CD description notes: "no human voice is being projected into the rooms: during the recordings [Kirkegaard] left the four spaces, to wait for whatever might evolve from these seemingly silent spaces themselves" (Kirkegaard 2006).

absence. Riffing on Schafer and Cage, I define silence as a relative phenomenon, or as a question of intensity and attention within differential sonic fields. The chapter will proceed in four parts. First, I explore how silence is discussed in Schafer's works, specifically in *The Soundscape* and *Voices of Tyranny*. Here, I note the resonances between Schafer and Derrida, particularly in their shared rejection of various Western metaphysical dichotomies, including silence/sound and absence/presence. Next, I compare Schafer's notion of "positive silence" to Cage's work. Following a brief exegesis of Cage's writings, I argue that both Cage and Schafer offer quasi-phenomenological accounts of silence. Third, I note the political limitations of both Cage's and Schafer's works on silence. While Schafer does include political analyses in other aspects of his work (e.g., in his analysis of the history of noise abatement laws), I argue that his recovery of "positive silence" fails to consider the histories of resonant environments and how they can be sounded-forth through silent practices. Fourth, and finally, I return to my opening example to explore how a critical reading of soundscapes of silence can provide us with novel insights on the resonance of "nothingness" and the ethical demands of silence.

1.1 *Schafer, Silence, and the Metaphysics of Presence*

Throughout his work, Schafer largely regards silence as *aspirational*. Inspired by Taoism[78] and horrified by the rising volume of the world, he muses: "In Western society, silence is a negative, a vacuum. Silence for Western Man equals communication hang up. If one has nothing to say, the other will speak; hence the garrulity of modern life which is extended by all kinds of jabberware"

[78] As Schafer argues: "No philosophy or religion catches the positive felicity of stillness better than Taoism. It is a philosophy that would make all noise abatement legislation unnecessary. This is also the message of Jalal-ud-din Rumi, who advised his disciples to 'Keep silence like the points of the compass, for the king has erased thy name from the book of speech.' Rumi sought to discover that world where 'speaking is without letters or sounds'" (1977, 258-9).

(1977, 256). In suggesting that Western society views silence as a negative term, Schafer gestures toward the metaphysics of presence inherent in Western interpretations of sound and voice. In other words, a metaphysics of presence reduces the soundscape to *present* sounds, ultimately losing the broader field of interactions in the process.

To deepen the logic of presence and absence in soundscapes, let us turn to Derrida's critique of Husserl in *Voice and Phenomenon* (2011). There, Derrida suggests that Husserl's logic-based philosophy of language maintains a metaphysics of presence. Specifically, Derrida argues that the self-presence of solitary mental life that Husserl opposes to re-presentation is not actually primordial intuition. Rather, Derrida claims that solitary mental life depends on (and is derived from) repetition. As we will see, the same holds for so-called solitary sonic life.

In *Logical Investigations*, for example, Husserl distinguishes between "indication" and "expression." Whereas indication merely "points" towards the reality of something else (e.g., smoke indicating a fire), expressions *mean* something. In other words, they comprise a phenomenal unity with that being expressed. Turning to communication between subjects, Husserl argues: "all expressions in communicative speech function as indications. They serve the hearer as signs of the 'thoughts' of the speaker, i.e., of his sense-giving inner experiences, as well as of the other inner experiences which are part of his communicating function" (2001b, 189). In other words, expressions in communicative speech function as indications that intimate experiences to the hearer; the hearer does not gain conceptual knowledge from this intimation, but rather "*intuitively* takes the speaker to be a person who is expressing this or that … *perceives* him as such" (2001b, 189; emphasis in original). From this, we may understand Husserl as gesturing towards our inability to intuitively grasp the mental phenomena of another person as we would our own; in hearing an expression communicated by a speaker, we do not experience said expression

in the way the speaker themselves does. Instead, we perceive the speaker as *manifesting* that experience, as *intimating* this or that to us. Husserl makes clear, however, that this hermeneutic gap is not necessarily an issue, as "mutual understanding demands a certain correlation among the mental acts mutually unfolded in intimation and in the receipt of such intimation, but not at all their exact resemblance" (2001b, 190). In line with his critiques of psychologism, then, Husserl suggests that mutual understanding does not require us to understand the experiences of others per se, but the experiences of others *as given* through intuition.

If expressions in communicable speech function solely as indications (because we have only an "outer" percept of them, not an "inner" one), where do expressions come into play? Later in *Logical Investigations,* Husserl goes on to argue that we can only reach "pure" expression (as phenomenal unities) in solitary mental life. He asserts:

> So far we have considered expressions as used in communication, which last depends essentially on the fact that they operate indicatively. But expressions also play a great part in uncommunicated, interior mental life … in a monologue words can perform no function of indicating the existence of mental acts, since such indication would there be quite purposeless. For the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment. (2001b, 190-191)

In suggesting that words do not function indicatively during internal monologuing, Husserl is arguing that expressions (in their true form as phenomenal unities) occur only during this time, for they are "themselves experienced by us at that very moment." Because of this, Kane notes: "Husserl's analysis of the meaning of speech does not require an actual sounding voice or external listener … Husserl's interest is not in the sonorous speaking voice but in the voice phenomenologically taken, speech in its transcendental flesh" (2014, 189). In other words, "listening" to meaning becomes a soundless experience for Husserl, as it does not ultimately require any sort of physical sounding.

It is here, however, that Derrida locates a fatal flaw in Husserl's thinking. Beginning with Husserl's preliminary distinction between indications and expressions, Derrida points out that despite Husserl's commitment to a "pure" expression, there is no expression without speech and, as Husserl suggests, not everything in speech is expressive, so the totality of speech is already caught up in an "indicative web" (Derrida 2011, 26). To Husserl's assertion that we do not communicate indicatively in solitary mental life, Derrida suggests that Husserl applies his fundamental distinction between reality and representation to language. However, Derrida argues that to effectively use language: "from the start I must operate (in) a structure of repetition whose element can only be representative" (Derrida 2011, 42). In other words, language as/in sign is necessarily a repetition, for a sign cannot be a singular event but must be repeatable and recognizable. From this, Derrida then suggests that if all of speech is representative, then the difference between effective speech and representative speech (and the difference between reality and representation) becomes suspect.

Additionally, the idea of self-presence as a sort of primordial intuition starts to crumble, for there is no primordial "origin" or "source point" that isn't already a re-presentation. To make this point, Derrida turns to Husserl's own writings on internal time consciousness. As Boos explains: "Husserl's account of temporality is of interest to Derrida because it appears to introduce non-presence into the constitution of the present and thus sows the seeds of deconstruction in the West's privileging of the present as the moment of truth and being" (2008, 7). In describing lived temporality, Husserl maintains his threefold structure of retention (primary memory), lived experience, and protention. While direct experience is the "now-point" or the direct impression of perception, Husserl notes that it is always taken together with retention and protention. In describing what is given in one perception, he thus includes "that which is not now spatially present

but which does exist; [and] that which is simultaneous with what is perceived, although not perceived itself" (Husserl 1991, 182). Derrida therefore suggests that Husserl acknowledges the existence of non-presence in the present, for retentions are no longer present. Returning to the melody example discussed in chapter four, a melody thus becomes "the unity of the present and nonpresent" (Boos 2008, 8). And while Husserl later tries to maintain a distinction between retentions (as primary memory) and memories (as secondary memory), "Derrida argues that there must be a continuity between retention and secondary memory such that it is impossible to claim that there is a *radical discontinuity* or a *radical difference* between retention and re-presentation" (Lawlor 2011, xxi; emphasis in original). In the very act of listening to oneself speak, then, signs can be (and are) operable, for the self-presence that expression requires is always already contaminated by non-presence.

Schafer likewise rejects philosophy's attempts to establish a "radical discontinuity" between sound and silence. He seeks to develop a "recovery of *positive* silence" (1977, 258; emphasis added). Like Derrida, he stresses the importance of repetition and iterability in and for the soundscape. In the conclusion of *Voices of Tyranny*, for example, he writes:

> The visual society is always amazed at the aural retentiveness of people who have not yet passed through the visual phase … Repetition. Repetition is the memory medium for sound. Repetition is the means by which sounds are retained and explained. Repetition is the means by which the history of the world is affirmed … Repetition makes the listener participate in the statement not by comprehending it but by knowing it. (1993, 167)

While Schafer never cites Derrida in his works (indeed, his citational practices are unruly at best), his emphasis on repetition as the "medium of sound" resonates with Derrida's development of différance. For example, in writing that repetition "is the means by which history is affirmed," I take Schafer to be making the point that history is experienced –and is experienced as *meaningful*– through processes of non-presence, repetition, and deferral.

What's more, Schafer questions Western philosophy's alignment of sound with presence and *being*. He muses: "The negative character of silence has made it the most potentialized feature of Western art, where nothingness constitutes the eternal threat to being" (1977, 257). He continues: "Man likes to make sounds to remind himself that he is not alone. From this point of view total silence is the rejection of the human personality. Man fears the absence of sound as he fears the absence of life" (1977, 256) To be clear, Schafer himself does not believe that silence is "nothingness" or the "absence of life." Rather, he highlights these assumptions to reject the metaphysics of presence operative in Western philosophy and its creation of sound/silence, presence/absence dichotomies. For Schafer, sound and silence are not oppositional terms. Rather, he describes silence as a *relative* term, a term that is always already soundful. Schafer's writings on silence are inspired by John Cage, particularly his book *Silence: Lectures and Writings* (1973). To better explain Schafer's position on silence, then, I will begin with a brief exegesis of Cage's work and its phenomenological undertones. I will then explain how these commitments appear in Schafer's work, and how they ultimately demonstrate a lack of a "radical discontinuity" between sound and silence.

1.2 *Schafer, Cage, and a Phenomenology of Silence*

In "Forerunners of Modern Music," Cage argues that sounds have four primary characteristics: pitch, timbre, loudness, and duration (1973, 63). Silence, on the other hand, has only duration. Cage is careful to note that this does not make silence the "opposite" of sound, however. Referencing his experience in an anechoic chamber at Harvard University,[79] he suggests that the

[79] In his oft-repeated tale about entering an anechoic chamber at Harvard University, Cage recalls that he "heard two sounds, one high and one low. When I described them to the engineer in charge, he informed me that the high one was my nervous system in operation, and the low one my blood in circulation" (1973, 8). In hearing these sounds, Cage notes that the possibility of absolute silence came into doubt; even within a space specifically designed to be as

difference between sound and silence "is not objective (sound-silence) but rather subjective (sounds only), those intended and those others (so-called silence) not intended" (Cage 1973, 13-14). Silence thus involves the absence of *intentional* sound rather than the absence of sound.

While Cage's use of "intentional" here can be taken in a literal sense (i.e., to sound deliberately or to make sounds on purpose), I argue that his emphasis on the intentional nature of sound also gestures toward the fundamental structures of consciousness as articulated by Husserl. Returning to chapter one, consciousness is primarily characterized as being *intentional*. For example, in *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* Husserl argues that "every act in the specific sense has the fundamental character of being a consciousness of something, an 'intentional lived experience'" (Husserl 2001a, 19). In other words, "intentionality" describes how we are always conscious *of* something, how consciousness is always directed or oriented in specific ways. Approaching Cage through a phenomenological lens, "sound" may be re-defined as the sonic phenomena we find ourselves oriented towards, or the sonic phenomena we take as the "objects" of our perception. Such a reading largely coincides with Cage's own interpretation of sounds. In describing non-experimental music, Cage claims that "[composing] remains a question of making a thing upon the boundaries, structure, and expression of which attention is focused" (1973, 13). In other words, the structures and boundaries of canonical Western music function less to constitute music as such than to orient listeners' attention, therefore highlighting the role played by intentionality in acts of listening.

In "making a thing upon the boundaries" to which attention is focused, music operates by orienting listeners to specific sounds and situations. But what of silence? As previously discussed,

quiet as possible, Cage was still able to hear the sounds of his own body. The experience thus proved to be a formative one for Cage, leading him to proclaim that "until I die there will be sounds. And they will continue following my death" (1973, 8).

Cage holds that silence is not the absence of sound, but the absence of *intentional* sound. In a philosophical context, such an assertion requires further elaboration: if silence encapsulates "all of the sounds we don't intend" (Zwerin 1970, 166), how are we to understand those sounds that escape intentional awareness? Like Cage, phenomenologists have long questioned how silence troubles popular (mis)conceptions about perception, presence, and absence. For example, in *Listening and Voice: Phenomenologies of Sound* (2007) Ihde proposes that "the electronic communications revolution has made us aware that once silent realms are in fact realms of noise and sound" (4). Speaking specifically about the soundfulness of the ocean and the stars, Ihde echoes Cage in suggesting that "experientially, I cannot escape sound" (2007, 109). Turning instead to sound's spatiality, he characterizes silence as "a *dimension* of the horizon," or as a periphery against which focal sounds can appear (2007, 109; emphasis in original). As a horizonal "dimension," silence thus situates sound just as "the horizon situates the field which in turn situates the thing" (2007, 106). In this framework, silence is not the opposite of sound. Rather, silence is a *relative* absence that surrounds and is inextricably co-present with it. Like the horizon, then, silence's "absence" is ultimately what makes sound's "presence" possible.

As a dimension of the sonic horizon that is necessarily coexistent with sound, silence thus plays a crucial role in aural perception. But if silence itself is always soundful, how might silence dis- or re-orient listeners' intentional experience? Describing the rise of electronic media, Ihde muses that "in listening to music, particularly reproduced music, there is the experience of the *intrusion* of unwanted sound. The hiss, hum, and static that may occur distracts, and one 'gestures toward' the silence that allows music its 'purer' presence" (2007, 111). In hearing the hiss or hum of the record, Ihde suggests that listeners turn *away* from unintentional sound (i.e., silence) toward an idealized, "pure" musical presence. Cage, however, adopts a different approach in dealing with

this "intrusion." Defending his unwavering confidence in sound's future, Cage explains "this fearlessness only follows if, at the parting of the ways, where it is realized that sounds occur whether intended or not, *one turns in the direction of those he does not intend*" (1973, 8; emphasis added). Rather than strive for a "purer presence" in music, Cage encourages listeners to turn *toward* the unintended, or to reorient themselves to the sounds that intrude and disrupt. As he notes in his 1958 lecture "Composition as Process": "the world teems with [unintentional sounds], and is, in fact, at no point free of them" (1973, 23). In asking listeners to turn toward sonic phenomena "called silence only because they do not form part of a musical intention" (1973, 22-23), Cage challenges listeners to attend to those sounds that escape the automaticity of intentional awareness. Only then does he suggest that we may grasp the music of the world that exists beyond the confines of tonal structures and compositional boundaries.

Such a turn is particularly evident in Cage's famed composition, *4'33".* Completed in 1952, *4'33"* features four minutes and thirty-three seconds of silence,[80] often framed by the movements of a conductor or performer to indicate its start and completion (e.g., the opening and closing of a piano, the pause of a conductor's outstretched hand, etc.) The score was made for any instrument or any combination of instruments and comprises three parts that are variously timed. There are no notes indicated in the score; rather, the only instruction is for performers to remain silent (or *tacet*). The "material" of the piece, therefore, is composed of nothing but silence, which is to say nothing but the unintentional sounds that arise throughout its performance. With its indeterminate boundaries, *4'33"* thus "opens onto that which surrounds it" (Barrett 2013, 8). For example, in a recording of William Marx's performance of *4'33"* at the McCallum Theatre in Palm Desert, California, one can hear the muffled coughs and sniffles of the audience, the faint

[80] The duration of the composition is not absolute, as Cage himself allowed for different interpretations of *4'33"* to last for different amounts of time.

footsteps of someone leaving or returning to their seat, and even the sounds of Marx wetting his lips between the piece's three movements. The piece's porosity thus has a profound intentional effect: rather than orient a listener towards the intentional sounds produced by a performer, *4'33"* *reorients* listeners' attention to all those sounds that would typically escape intentional awareness. The piece not only transforms the role of the performer, then, but also the role of the audience member. As Jonathan D. Katz explains:

> Silent music inaugurated a process of reading that moved the listener, potentially, from unselfconscious complicitly with dominant forms of expression (in which the expressive was passively registered as inherent in the music) toward a degree of self-consciousness about one's role as a listener or a maker of meaning. Thus, silence paradoxically contributed to the destructuring of music's discursive norms. (1999, 243-244)

In shifting listeners' awareness to unintended sound, silent music thus disrupts the automaticity of musical perception. Perhaps like Husserl's epochē, *4'33*" exposes how acts of listening are shaped by processes of "unselfconscious complicity," and subsequently tasks listeners with momentarily suspending them. In its refusal to intentionally sound, *4'33"* thus alerts us to those sounds which are so often overheard, thereby gesturing toward other possible ways of listening in and to the world.

Returning to our focus on Schafer and the soundscape, I argue that Schafer likewise approaches silence as a sort of soundful horizon, or as a zone of unintended sounds. In *The Soundscape*, for example, he directly references Cage's experience in the anechoic chamber, concluding that silence "can only be considered as approximate, never absolute" (1977, 256). Referencing the title of Cage's book, *Silence: Lectures and Writings*, Schafer likewise suggests that the use of silence "must be qualified or assumed to be ironical" (Schafer 1977, 256). Indeed, part of Schafer's project to recover "positive silence" stems from a desire to hear those sounds that are often overheard within the soundscape. For example, he argues that "we need to regain

quietude in order that fewer sounds can intrude on it with pristine brilliance… If we have a hope of improving the acoustic design of the world, it will be realizable only after the recovery of silence" (1977, 259). Like Cage, then, Schafer interprets silence as a practice of attunement, one that disrupts the automaticity of perception and alerts us to the "pristine brilliance" of various overheard sounds. In this way, Schafer (like Cage in *4'33"*) approaches silence as a sort of *activity*, one that requires silencing certain sounds so that others can be heard.

So, too, does Schafer describe silence as a sort of *horizon*. Like Ihde, he describes silence as the "beautiful backdrop over which our actions are sketched and without which they would be incomprehensible, indeed could not even exist" (1977, 258). Like the phenomenological horizon, Schafer argues that silence is ultimately what makes auditory perception possible, and is constantly co-present with the sounds we attend to. Returning to the three features of the soundscape (keynote sounds, signals, and soundmarks), our experience of being-in-sonic-worlds is only possible through the horizonal co-presence of silence. Without it, life would be a cacophony of competing sounds, and the aural "ground" of the soundscape would cease to exist.

2. *The Politics of Silence: Schafer, Cage, and the Politics of "Nothingness"*

While Cage and Schafer are helpful in rethinking soundscapes of silence as relative phenomena and/or as practices of reorienting attunement, their analyses only take us so far. Specifically, I suggest that Cage and Schafer do not consider the histories of resonant environments enough, nor how certain sounds are made inaudible through social and historical processes and how we might make such processes manifest. To explain this point further, I will begin with a brief exegesis of Cage's response to some political interpretations of his work. I will then discuss Schafer's history of noise abatement laws and his political interpretation of acoustic "phobias" and nuisances. While Schafer does acknowledge how the materiality of a soundscape influences its (re)sounding, I

conclude by noting that Schafer does not consider the sociopolitical *arrival* of this materiality, or how these materials are the products of historical processes.

To begin, Cage was notoriously hostile to overtly sexual or political interpretations of his work. Following Julius Eastman's "paraphrasing" of *4'33"* in 1962, for example, Cage "responded by banging violently on a piano in the room and scolding performers who had more generally, in his view, interpreted his indeterminate instructions as an invitation to do 'any goddamned thing' they wanted" (Barrett 2013, 7). Similarly, responding to Charlotte Moorman's performance of *21'1.499*" which included "various references to tampons, orgasms, condoms, and Planned Parenthood" (Barrett 2013, 6), Cage accused Moorman "[of] having 'murdered' his composition" (Barrett 2013, 6). In each of these instances, Cage rejected what he perceived to be misappropriations of his work, despite having previously stated that "I don't think of [*4'33"*] as 'my piece'" (1988, 12). As with his critiques of American jazz, Cage viewed these interpretations as having allowed the political –and therefore, the intentional and the expressive– to seep back into music. Here, I take Cage to be following the ontological turn in sound studies, insofar as he assumes an ontological/materialist approach to silence that attempts to get at the "material-affective processes that lie 'beneath representation and signification'" (Sterne 2015, 2). In other words, Cage approaches silence as a practice of negation or effacement to make the inaudible audible or to make everyday sounds strange. He does not, however, question how social and historical processes shape this in/audibility, or how this process of negation can be used toward political ends.

Some responses to Cage therefore suggest that he fails to provide us with a rigorous notion of the *social*. For example, Douglas Kahn writes that "one of the central effects of Cage's battery

of silencing techniques was a silencing of the social" (1997, 580).[81] In other words, in silencing intended sounds to bring out the unintended, Kahn argues that Cage also silences social and political discourse. While some scholars nonetheless interpret this silencing as a quasi-anarchistic evasion of oppositional politics (Barrett 2013; Katz 1999; Stricklin 2006), others (Kahn 1997; Rainer 1981) maintain that Cage's work irrevocably fails "to admit a requisite sociality by which a politics and poetics of sound could be elaborated within artistic practice or daily life" (Kahn 1997, 557).[82] Against these sorts of readings, I suggest that the issue isn't that Cage fails to "admit

[81] While Cage may not have envisioned *4'33"* as being a political piece, I argue that both its early development and its recent redeployments by contemporary artists gesture toward its enduring sociopolitical potential. In his later work, Cage is often described as being markedly anti-social; in "45' For a Speaker" (1954), he muses that "a composer uses the sounds to express an idea …a sound is a sound. To realize this: one has to put a stop to studying music" (1973, 176, 185). In his early writings, however, Cage specifically questioned how silence might allow us to better connect with others. For example, in his 1927 Southern California Oratorical Contest speech "Other People Think," Cage suggests that "[O]ne of the greatest blessings that the United States could receive in the near future would be to have her industries halted, her business discontinued, her people speechless … then we should be capable of answering the question, 'what ought we to do?' for we should be hushed and silent, and we should have the opportunity to learn what other people think" (Cage 2012, 48). Here, Cage explores how silence might allow us to attune ourselves to the sounds of others, or to hear those thoughts typically drowned out by the sounds of industry, media, and speech. A similar argument arises in his later lecture, "A Composer's Confessions," delivered at Vassar College in 1948. There, Cage notes his desire to compose a wholly silent piece that would last three or four and a half minutes long and would be sold to Muzak companies under the title *Silent Prayer*. In both lectures, Cage approaches silence as a site of potential social transformation; as Kahn summarizes: "in 'Other People Think' Cage only implied that the social transformation would come about through individual transformation of consciousness, whereas in 'A Composer's Confessions' social transformation would come about only through personal acts by legions of solitary individuals" (1997, 570). While scholars like Yvonne Rainer rightfully critique Cage for "the goofy [political] naiveté" of both speeches (1981, 67), they nonetheless demonstrate that Cage was, at one point, interested in the complex intersections between silence and society.

[82] While Cage later abandoned his interest in the social in favor of a form of listening as detached engagement (Katz 1999, 235), musicians and artists continue to question how his work may be productively taken up in activist contexts. Questioning what forms of politics might arise from a (mis)appropriation of Cage, Rainer muses: "What is John Cage's gift to some of us who make art? This: the relaying of conceptual precedents for methods of nonhierarchical, indeterminate organization which can be used with a critical intelligence, that is, selectively and productively, not however, so we may awaken to this excellent life; on the contrary, so we may the more readily awaken to the ways in which we have been led to believe that this life is so excellent, just, and right" (1981, 67-68). Referencing Cage's claim that indeterminacy alerts us "to the very life we're living which is excellent once one gets one's mind and one's desires out of its way" (Cage 1970, 51), Rainer instead suggests that Cagean operations may be used to critically examine (and ultimately, disrupt) the discursive norms that shape our lives. Here, I take Rainer to be making a critically phenomenological point. Just as Rainer challenges artists to take up Cagean indeterminacy in order to "more readily awaken to the ways in which we have been lead to believe that this life is so excellent, just, and right," so too does critical phenomenology task us with suspending "commonsense accounts of reality in order to map and describe the structures that make these accounts possible, to analyze the way they function, and to open up new possibilities for reimagining and reclaiming the commons" (Guenther 2020, 15).

a requisite sociality," but a certain *kind* of sociality. Specifically, Cage does not go far enough to engage with a politics of in/audibility in considering the resonance of silence.

Like Cage, Schafer also fails to consider the politics of in/audibility in his account of silence. This is not to say that Schafer does not engage with political discourse in discussing silence. Recounting the evolution of noise abatement laws, for example, he notes:

> [S]treet music was a continual subject of controversy. Intellectuals were irritated by it. Serious musicians were outraged… but resistance moved to the middle class as well, as soon as it contemplated an elevation of lifestyle. After art music moved indoors, street music became an object of increasing scorn… The study of noise legislation is interesting, not because anything is ever really accomplished by it, rather because it provides us with a concrete register of acoustic phobias and nuisances. (1977, 65-76)[83]

In suggesting that the history of noise legislation provides us with a "register of acoustic phobias," Schafer gestures toward the politicization of noise and quiet throughout nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. For middle class Europeans during this time, quiet time and spaces became markers of wealth and status.[84] To riff on Michael Birenbaum Quintero, the history of noise abatement laws thus followed a quasi-biopolitical dictum, "to make silent and let sound" (2019,

[83] Here, we might also think about chapter three and the death of keening as a funerary practice in Ireland. As discussed there, part of keening's demise was due to the rise of a new, middle-class identity and Catholic notions of propriety.

[84] Such a reading coincides with other literature on the history of noise abatement within sound studies. For example, in "The Soundproof Study," Jonathan Picker details how "beginning at midcentury [in 1800s London], middle-class domesticity waged a battle to impose the quiet tenor of interior middle-class domesticity upon the rowdy terrain outside… this position drew upon language of the hunt to demonstrate among other things the persistence or territorial concerns, of metaphors of invasion and containment, in the gathering of opposition to street music" (2012, 142, 149).

144).[85][86] Schafer's history of noise abatement efforts directly highlights this politics of quietude, and how experiences of quietude (particularly in cities) were socially and politically contingent.

So, too, does Schafer acknowledge how built environments necessarily shape the soundscape. In *Voices of Tyranny*, for example, he writes: "the soundscape of every society is conditioned by the predominant materials from which it is constructed" (Schafer 1993, 69). Perhaps like Ahmed's work on orientations, then, Schafer does not approach soundscapes as being simply "given." Rather, he attends to the materials that help constitute the soundscape, as well as the histories of those very materials. He concludes: "Materials change, sounds change, social customs change" (1993, 69).

While Schafer thus acknowledges the politics of silence and resonance in other parts of his work, he does not carry this discussion into his recovery of *positive* silence. Like Cage, Schafer attunes to silence to get "behind" or "beyond" overpopulated soundscapes and to achieve contentment and fulfillment (Schafer 1977, 146). What's more, Schafer suggests that it is in silence that we listen at our best: "When there is no sound, hearing is most alert. Silence is indeed news for those possessing clairaudience" (1997, 259). Cultivating soundscapes of silence will thus help us achieve "clairaudience," a play on "clairvoyance" that describes "clear" or "exceptional"

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[85] In "Loudness, Excess, Power: A Political Limnology of a Global City of the South," for example, Michael Birenbaum Quintero explores the "sonic sequestering" of port and city in Buenaventura, Colombia. Focusing on a luxury hotel built between the port complex and the city's downtown, he describes how soundproof, double-paned glass is used to seal off the sounds of the city, creating a "quiet" subjectivity enforced through the lines of private property. Through a Foucauldian lens, Birenbaum Quintero demonstrates how this sequestering: "has a direct corollary in the bio-power dictum of 'make live and let die,' in which to make live is to construct an inviolably individuated sound environment, and to let die is homologous with being left exposed to the contaminating sounds of the world. In other words, *to make silent and let sound*" (2019, 144; emphasis in original). By revealing the sonic dimensions of bio-power, Birenbaum Quintero thus demonstrates how "rational, liberal, state-centered" approaches to sound studies cannot grasp all the ways in which sonic power exceeds agonistic political frameworks and troubles agent-centered sonic discourse (2019, 137).

[86] Interestingly, one might also read Cage as operating in this way. Such a reading coincides with quasi-Foucauldian readings of Cage and readings of Cage's work as being anarchistic in a Foucauldian sense.

hearing (1977, 272). Such a claim risks overhearing the ways in which silence may also be constrained and conscripted through sociopolitical discourses.

2.2 *The Politics of Nothingness: Critical Interventions*

If Schafer and Cage both fail to move from a practice of negation to the politics of in/audibility in their accounts of silence, how might we develop a robustly sociopolitical account of silence? Specifically, how might we make audible the social and political valences of silent soundscapes? Here, I suggest we turn to more recent works in aesthetics, Black studies, and critical phenomenology for answers. In *Blackpentacostal Breath*, for example, Crawley investigates practices of *breath* as otherwise modes of (re)sounding social organization. Like Schafer and Cage, Crawley approaches silence as a relative term. He explains: "Silence is a certain mode of inattention to some objects while, no doubt, privileging others, a silence is never all encompassing" (2017, 244). Here, Crawley's account aptly gestures toward the phenomenological aspects of silence, insofar as it is shaped by modes of sensuous attention and attunement. So, too, does Crawley locate a sort of radical potentiality in silence. Riffing on James Baldwin, he muses: "if silence is never absolute, then that which is there is a standing forth, a set of capacities" (2017, 243). Like Schafer and Cage, then, Crawley appears to develop a sort of positive account of silence, defining silence not as an absence per se but as a practice of attunement or (re)orientation.

Unlike Schafer, however, Crawley's account of silence is distinctly *political*. Silence, for Crawley, is not a felicitous state to which we should return. Rather, Crawley hears silence as "the antithesis of the ceaseless pulse of vibration … the regulation of thought from vibrational otherwise possibilities" (2017, 245). In describing the modes of intentional awareness that help to structure silence, Crawley maintains that "silence, of course, is not the lack of sound, it is noise directed in a certain way, with certain modes of socially acceptable behavior and comportment"

(2017, 244). He clarifies further: "What silence indexes… is a certain quality of seeming noiselessness, but this quality is effectuated by context" (2017, 44). Unlike Schafer and Cage, then, Crawley demonstrates how attunements to silence are necessarily political ones, insofar as silence is a social and political construct borne of Enlightenment thought that differentially stratified sonic space. In other words, silence and quietude (as organizations of sound) come to structure what "properly" constitutes ground, figure, and nothingness, effectively silencing otherwise ways of being-in-sonic-worlds.

While Crawley approaches silence as a legacy of Enlightenment's focus on containment and enclosure, Martina Ferrari locates a radical (and, more importantly, decolonial) thread in silence's history. In her article "Questions of Silence: On the Emancipatory Limits of Voice and the Coloniality of Silence," Martina Ferrari explores the colonial logics that reify voice as liberatory and silence as oppressive. Speaking specifically about the #MeToo movement, Ferrari argues that the neoliberal impetus to "speak up" "is not nuanced enough to prevent its own deployment as an instrument of oppression rather than liberation" (2019, 2). Like Crawley, then, Ferrari questions how silence is deployed to stratify sonic space. Such a deployment is not accidental; rather, Ferrari outlines how the coloniality of voice relies on a racialized metaphysics of presence that reifies "… a Parmenidean ontology of being and nonbeing, presence and absence, light and darkness, whereby speech and voice are the mark of purity, presence, transparency, and the fullness of being, whereas its other, silence, is the mark of impurity, absence, and lack of being" (2019, 9). Here, Ferrari's refusal of modernity's dichotomies echoes Cage's refusal of a sound/silence divide, insofar as Cage likewise rejected any attempt to reduce silence to an oppositional term. Unlike Cage, however, Ferrari aptly highlights how these oppositions are the

epistemic and ontological norms of modernity and coloniality, such that a rejection of the political through silent music is not actually possible.

In response to the coloniality of the voice, Ferrari offers her notion of *deep silence* as a decolonial form of negotiation and meaning-making that resists the flattening of silence into oppression. Recalling the experiences of Frantz Fanon and Gloria Anzaldúa, she writes: "dwelling in these experiences of displacement from the language and the world of the colonizer not only reveals the fictitious nature of the logic regulating the exclusion; it can also be a fertile 'ground' for the rereading and rewriting of reality, for the dis-placement of usual meanings and expectations" (2019, 15). In other words, through the rich accounts provided by decolonial thinkers, Ferrari suggests that the presumed "absence" of silence serves as a fecund lacuna whereby new meanings and expectations can be articulated. Here, we might note an important potential connection between Ferrari and Cage. Whereas Cage approaches silence as an opportunity to hear new sounds or to make everyday sounds strange, Ferrari expands on this sort of estrangement effect and questions how silence can be used to create new counter-intentions or to estrange normative (and particularly, oppressive) ways of hearing.

In both Crawley's and Ferrari's accounts, then, silence figures as not only as a practice of effacement, but also as a practice of interruption and counter-insurgence. By destabilizing popular alignments of silence with absence, both Crawley and Ferrari gesture toward the ethical and political weight of presumed "nothingness" and dispense with any belief in a primordial, presocial realm of silence. Returning to our focus on Schafer, however, a question remains: how are we to account for silent *soundscapes*, apart from a focus on silent subjects? While Ferrari's account aims to destabilize a Parmenidean construction of the sounding subject, her article nevertheless focuses on the sounds and silences of (re)sounding human bodies. Crawley's text also focuses on the

aesthetics of possibility present in choreosonic practices. This is not to say that there is anything wrong with such a focus; indeed, as Born argues: "There is nothing inherently wrong with an approach to the analysis of sound that focuses exclusively on either the sound object or the listening subject" (2019, 202). Returning to Lucier's composition, however, how might we account for the ethical resonance of a room, or the silence of place-spaces themselves? And, more specifically, how might these silences be full of histories, meanings, and expectations that we risk overhearing in focusing only on human sound?

In response to these questions, Born offers a fruitful framework upon which we can build. In her chapter, "On Nonhuman Sound– Sound as Relation," Born offers a relational account of sound as an assemblage of human, nonhuman, and affective mediations. By "nonhuman sounds," Born is specifically interested in the "kinds of sounds that do not originate in human intentional acts or in humanly directed technological mediations" (2019, 187). In turning to nonhuman sound, Born's aim is twofold: first, to refute the anthropocentrism of many theories in sound studies, and second, to describe how humans come to be *subjectified by* nonhuman soundings. While listening to a rainstorm, for example, she writes: "I am ineluctably situated in relation to [the rain sounds], subjectified by them, albeit with a certain freedom of reverie, of enjoying a range of potential affective responses" (2019, 186). In writing that she maintains "a freedom of reverie" in listening to the rain, Born does not wholly give way to new materialism. Rather, her account assumes a Deleuzoguattarian tenor, recognizing our sensuous capacities without overdetermining them.[87]

Perhaps most striking in this chapter is Born's description of her experience attuning to (or with) the nonhuman sounds surrounding her mother's death. She recounts: "I am sitting with my

[87] Here, Born's citation of Alva Noë helpfully clarifies her position. As Noë writes in *Action in Perception*: "qualities are available in experience as possibilities, as potentialities, but not as complete givens. Experience is a dynamic process of navigating the pathways of these possibilities" (2006, 178).

mother; she is at home in her bed two days before her recent death, late evening… I have become increasingly attuned to the dull, buzzing 'note' emitted by the smart hospital bed on which she lies. There is no escape from this mechanical hum" (2019, 199-200). In her inability to escape the nonhuman drone of the smart hospital bed, Born begins to hum *with* the bed, harmonizing and vibrating along with it. Such an attunement proved incredibly powerful for Born; she explains "the experience of being able still to be in sonic and sensory attunement with [my mother], affectively and touching and merged via the call-and-response of my keening hums and sighs, and hers in turn, was precious" (2019, 201). In attuning to and harmonizing with the nonhuman "background sound" of palliative care technology, Born was able to attend to a resonance otherwise overheard in everyday perception. This resonance allowed Born to access a frequency through which she could attune to her mother, creating new possibilities for engagement and care. In the space of her profound grief, therefore, Born discovered a soundful presence in her mother's absence, and was able to reconnect with her mother through it.

Already, important parallels arise between Born's relational analysis and Schafer's account of silence.[88] In talking about nonhuman sound, Born writes: "generally, nonhuman sound is not a focus of human attention. To become aware of it requires an attunement, a shift, from perceptual background to foreground" (2019, 188). So, too, does Schafer's work suggest that attuning to silence requires a perceptual shift, insofar as silence is soundful and encompasses all those sounds we typically overhear within the soundscape. So, too, does Born's focus on nonhuman sounds resonate with Ihde's discussion of (soundful) silence in the development of technology. Recall that for Ihde, in listening to electronic music, "there is the experience of the *intrusion* of unwanted sound. The hiss, hum, and static that may occur distracts, and one 'gestures toward' the silence

[88] This is not to overlook Born's direct critique of Schafer. For more, see chapter one, section 2.1, "The Subject Critique."

that allows music its 'purer' presence" (2007, 111; emphasis in original). In other words, Ihde highlights how intentionality is, in a sense, oriented toward an ideal (rather than actual) silence, insofar as silence is filled with "unwanted sounds" like the crackle and hiss of static. Unlike Ihde (and perhaps more like Cage and Schafer), however, Born's work asks that we turn toward these "unwanted sounds," and that we question how these nonhuman sound(ing)s shape our experiences of being-in-sonic-worlds.

Absent in Born's relational account, however, is a robust consideration of the politics or historicity of nonhuman sound. At the end of the chapter, Born writes:

> [T]he approach that I want to advocate suggests the possibility of troubling the bifurcation of nature– notably, the separation of scientific description from an appreciation of the affective and aesthetic qualities even of nonhuman sound as it enters into historical relations that endow it with such qualities. (2019, 202)

While Born thus directly recognizes the inescapable relationality between nonhuman sound and historical context, she does not spend much time in the chapter exploring these connections. In describing her attunement to the hum of the smart hospital bed, for example, Born does not consider the social and historical dimensions of the bed's humming, e.g., the histories of technological advancement that led to the development of such technology. To be clear, this is not meant as a critique of Born's work, nor to suggest that this is a critical omission. Rather, I argue that this absence functions as an important point for future inquiry. Returning to Ferrari, Crawley, and Kirkegaard, I am interested in the political dimensions of silent soundscapes, or how we might use practices of silence to attune to the social and ethical valences of resonant environments.

3. *I am Sitting in A[n Emergency] Room: Soundscapes of Silence*

Let's return to the opening vignette of this chapter. How might we reconceptualize the soundscape of an intensive care unit through an engagement with Schafer, Born, Ferrari, *and* Crawley? In

many ways, my personal experiences resonate strongly with Born's. Many of my final experiences with my father were mediated by nonhuman sounds: the beeps and clicks of life support machines, the sounds of staff pagers, etc. What's more, in the absence of his voice, my father and I often sought mutual attunement through other sorts of sounds, particularly the sounds coming from the small television mounted by his bed. Following Schafer, then, the "silent" soundscape of my father's room was always already full of sounds, sounds that reoriented our experiences of togetherness and shared resonance.

Thinking about Kirkegaard's *Four Rooms*, however, how was this resonance shaped by social and historical processes? In other words, rather than move (pace Lucier) from "personal, human, and domestic speech to pure anonymous sound" (Cox 2009, 24-250), how can we conceptualize the "anonymous sound" of the intensive care unit as being socially and historically contingent? And, riffing on Schafer, how do the very materials of this soundscape (i.e., the materiality of the West Haven VA hospital) shape its resounding?

In "Orientations Matter," Ahmed discusses the philosopher's table and our orientations towards it. She explains that "the philosopher is orientated toward the writing table, as the object on which writing happens, which means keeping other things and rooms relegated to the background" (2010, 237). The background is not incidental to the table's existence; rather, "the background would be understood as that which must take place in order for something to arrive" (Ahmed 2010, 239). Here, we might think of Schafer's discussion of silence once more. Just as Ahmed argues that the background is necessary for an "object" to arrive, so, too, does Schafer characterize silence as a necessary "taking place" for sound to arrive. In other words, for something to resound, other things must be made (relatively) inaudible. This difference in intensity is ultimately what allows a soundscape to differentiate.

In discussing the arrival of the table, however, Ahmed also questions its materiality and history. She clarifies: "we can also think of the background as having a temporal dimension" (2010, 240). Turning to the philosophy of Karl Marx, she suggests that in attending to the background, phenomenology must also attend to its conditions of emergence in both an historical and material sense. In other words, how do backgrounds (or in a sonic sense, silences) emerge through histories of arrival and production? Returning to the writing table, Ahmed muses: "Marxism allows us to rethink the object as not only in history but as an effect of historical processes… If we were simply to 'look at' the object we face, then we would be erasing the 'signs' of history. We would apprehend the object as simply there, as given in its sensuous certainty, rather than as 'having got here,' an arrival which is how objects are binding and how they assume a social form" (2010, 240-241).

In the context of the table, then, it is not enough to perceive the table as simply given, as an object suspended from history. Rather, Ahmed demonstrates how attending to the table as a phenomenal object requires that we question how it was made (i.e., what materials is it made of? How was it constructed?) as well as how it arrived (i.e., how did the table come to be? Come to be *here*?) Returning to Schafer, I suggest that such an emphasis likewise applies to the materiality of the soundscape. Recall that in *Voices of Tyranny*, Schafer argues that "the soundscape of every society is conditioned by the predominant materials from which it is constructed" (Schafer 1993, 69). Reading Schafer and Ahmed together, then, I question how this "predominance" is itself an effect of social and historical processes. Attending to the materiality and history of soundscapes requires that we ask how these soundscapes came to arrive, how they were created, and how this creation can be heard as an effect of historical processes of in/audibility and generations of activity.

Following Ahmed, I argue that a critical rereading of soundscapes of silence challenges us to attend to silences as effects of historical processes. Following Kirkegaard, I suggest that the vibratory resonance of silent soundscapes is neither asocial nor ahistorical; rather, such resonance is "haunted" by the histories of these soundscapes and the (re)sonant bodies that inhabited them. This is not to suggest that soundscapes of silence are overdetermined by their materiality or their histories of arrival; rather, I mean to emphasize that soundscapes, like the philosopher's table, contain temporal backgrounds, backgrounds effectuated by history. Therefore, attending to soundscapes of silence not only requires a reorientation of perceptual habit (Schafer) and attention to nonhuman soundings (Born), but also requires that we attend to the histories that frame these soundscapes (Ahmed), and the latent politics resonant within them (Crawley).

Let us return to my opening vignette: how might we speak to the materiality and historical arrival of the VA medical center as a sort of soundscape? What's more, how did this materiality and history affect its very resonance, particularly the resonance of my father's room in the intensive care unit? If an attention to the background requires that we attend to soundscapes' "having got there," how did the West Haven VA come to be, and how did my father come to be there, as well? The Veterans Health Administration originated during the Civil War, offering care to volunteer military forces (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 2015). In 1865, the program expanded with President Abraham Lincoln's authorization of medical asylums "to provide medical and convalescent care for discharged members of the Union Army and Navy volunteer forces" (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 2015). The VA medical center in West Haven, Connecticut, was built in 1919, and originally served as a tuberculosis hospital (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 2015). In 1948, the U.S. government purchased the property and began construction to create a

hospital campus specifically for veterans. The campus reopened on September 13, 1953, providing care for area service members.

Approaching the beginning of the 21st century, the aging population of area veterans created new demands on care and long-term resources. As Robert A. Hamilton explains, the changing population created a demand "for long-term nursing care, rather than the acute-care programs that have given the West Haven Veterans Administration a national reputation" (1992). Beyond its aging population, however, the history of V.A. hospitals was also shaped by clientele in another manner. For many veterans, the V.A. serves as their only means for accessing medical care. As Hamilton notes: "Because the V.A. hospital guarantees care to veterans, regardless of their ability to pay, its caseload includes many people with drug and alcohol problems as well as destitute people who have put off preventive care" (1992).

Like the veterans that Hamilton describes, my father's arrival at the V.A. was borne of necessity; having been unemployed for four years and without private insurance, the V.A. was the only form of medical care he could access. His presence (and simultaneously, his vocalic absence) in the West Haven intensive care unit echoed the facility's long history of care effectuated by class, addiction, and other systems of inequality. Given these historical and personal histories, then, it is impossible to describe the resonance of these rooms as being pre-personal or anonymous. Rather, the very construction of the hospital was borne of need, a need inevitably shaped by the (un)ethical practices of the military industrial complex and its afterlives. Like Kirkegaard's *Four Rooms*, the walls of the West Haven V.A. 's intensive care unit are inflected with the social histories that necessitated their construction and are likewise "haunted by the human beings that once inhabited them" (Cox 2009, 25). Through a critical rereading of the soundscape, I thus conclude that the silence of these rooms is deeply *soundful*, in a literal, historical, and ethical sense. And to riff on

Crawley, attending to these silences makes audible "how that which is deemed nothing has material [and ultimately, political] vibratory force" (2017, 203).

4. *Concluding Thoughts*

Throughout this chapter, I have explored the politics of silence and its sociohistorical arrival as a sort of soundful background or horizon. Whereas Schafer sought to recover an account of *positive* silence within the soundscape, this chapter develops a social and political account of silence within the soundscape. Riffing on Crawley, Ferrari, and Born, I have explored the presumed nothingness of silence as a fecund site of social and political interruption and obligation. Just as Schafer maintains that the materiality of the soundscape necessarily shapes its (re)sounding, so, too, do I suggest that the histories of this materiality likewise shape soundscapes' resonance. Such an intervention can have important consequences for the ethics of silence and political investigations into material resonance more broadly.

Conclusion

Throughout this dissertation, I have sought to demonstrate the fecundity of my (re)interpretation of the soundscape as a philosophical and political concept. I argued that the soundscape provides us with novel insights into subjectivity and space/place and captures the juridical and non-juridical machinations of power. Surveying the popular literature on sound, I interrogated the sound studies vs. auditory cultural studies divide, ultimately arguing that both traditions offer rival third-person accounts of sonic experience. Responding to these accounts, I offered a third possible path, one that centers the importance of first- and second-personal accounts of sound while also recognizing the dynamic generativity and affordances of sounds themselves.

In developing my critical reinterpretation of the soundscape, however, I do not mean to suggest that sound is somehow more "real" or "just" than other sensory modalities, nor do I interpret it as containing a metaphysical valence that exceeds (or perhaps, transcends) meaning and discursivity. Indeed, to do so would be to engage in the sonotropism that Scherzinger warns against, or simply to reverse the audiovisual litany that Sterne outlines. As Sterne explains: "Rather than inverting the audiovisual litany, why not redescribe sound? … We do not need to assume that sound draws us into the world while vision separates us from it … [i]f history exists *within* the senses as well as *between* them, then we need not begin a history of sound with an assertion of the transhistorical dimensions of sound" (2003, 18; emphasis in original). Like Sterne, then, my rereading of the soundscape offers a politics of (sonic) perception that is attentive to and dependent on the contingent social and historical structures through which we perceive.

In chapter seven of *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari stress the importance of art in rescuing sensation from the trappings of phenomenological sensings. They suggest that art operates as a "bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects" (1994, 164).

They continue: “the aim of art is to wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject, to wrest the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another: to extract a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations” (1994, 164). While much of the chapter discusses sensations in terms of paintings, they also discuss *music*, focusing specifically on the percepts and affects of harmonies, dissonances, and breaks.

Critical of the philosophical (or more specifically, phenomenological) notion of the “subject,” Deleuze and Guattari ask what art might teach us about lived experience. They muse:

> Can sensation be assimilated to an original opinion, to *Urdoxa* as the world’s foundation or immutable basis? Phenomenology finds sensation in perceptual and affective ‘a priori materials’ that transcend the perceptions and affections of the lived … as we have seen, phenomenology must become the phenomenology of art because the immanence of the lived to a transcendental subject must be expressed in transcendent functions that not only determine experience in general but traverse the lived itself here and now, and are embodied in it by constituting living sensations. (1994, 178)

In arguing that phenomenology must become the phenomenology of art, Deleuze and Guattari gesture toward a radical seed at the heart of phenomenology, a seed they believe was lost with Husserl’s turn toward *Urdoxa*. Put briefly, while phenomenology appears to do away with *doxa* vis. the bracketing of the natural attitude, Deleuze and Guattari hold that Husserl nevertheless maintains an *urdoxa*, or a commitment to univocal meaning that harmonizes self and world and presupposes a primordial framework of good sense (Reynolds and Roffe 2006, 230). As Reynolds and Roffe explain: “for Deleuze, phenomenology is powerless to break with this *urdoxa* of the union between good sense and common sense” (2006, 232). In calling for phenomenology to become the phenomenology of art, then, Deleuze and Guattari outline a path through which phenomenology might break free of its commitment to *urdoxa* and recognize good/common sense as being produced rather than originary.

Much of chapter seven of *What is Philosophy?* is aimed at Merleau-Ponty in both overt and covert tones. For example, Deleuze and Guattari describe Merleau-Ponty's "Fleshism" as the "final avatar of phenomenology" (1994, 178). For Reynolds and Roffe, however, these thinkers share much more in common than originally thought. In *The Visible and the Invisible*, for example, Merleau-Ponty attempts to do away with "high-altitude thinking that detaches us from the truth of our situation" (Lefort 1968, xxviii). Like Deleuze and Guattari, then, Merleau-Ponty's later phenomenology rejects the transcendental ego as well as "surveys proceeding from some transcendent position above, ignorant of the questioner's involvement and co-implication in that which is being questioned" (Reynolds and Roffe 2006, 230). This leads Merleau-Ponty to inquire into the relationship between philosophy and *non-philosophy*. He concludes:

> My whole first part [is] to be conceived in a very direct, contemporary manner, like the *Krisis* of Husserl: show our non-philosophy, then seek its origin in a historical *Selbstbesinnung* and in a *Selbstbesinnung* on our culture which is science … Yet philosophy is not immediately non-philosophy– It rejects from non-philosophy what is positivism in it, militant non-philosophy– which would reduce history to the visible, would deprive it precisely of its depth under the pretext of adhering to it better. (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 183, 266)

In highlighting the dynamism of philosophy and non-philosophy, Merleau-Ponty offers us a phenomenology that is radically immanent without giving way to empiricism. In this way, Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty need not be understood as entirely oppositional thinkers; rather, their works coexist in a "plurality of planes" that grapple with the same questions of immanence, sense, and history (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 68).

Riffing on both Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, I argue that my reinterpretation of the soundscape likewise provides us with a survey of sonic experience that does not proceed "from above" or through eidetic structures. Rather, it arises through the immanent involvement and co-implication of (re)sounding bodies that affect and are affected by sounds. In other words, my

rereading of the concept does not reduce the soundscape to a "product" of subjective experience. Rather, by working within and between phenomenology and poststructuralism, my account explores both the perception *and* percepts of various soundscapes.

Responding to Deleuze and Guattari's charge that phenomenology must become the phenomenology of art, can we interpret soundscapes as kinds of artworks? For Schafer, the soundscape is certainly a work of art- though not in the manner that Deleuze and Guattari might imagine. Throughout his writings, Schafer repeatedly describes the soundscape as a sort of composition, one that warrants our utmost attention. In his introduction to *The Soundscape*, for example, he questions: "is the soundscape of the world an indeterminate composition over which we have no control, or are we its composers and performers, responsible for giving it form and beauty?" (1977, 5). In the next line, he answers this question in the affirmative, arguing that he will use the rest of the text to "treat the world as a macrocosmic musical composition" (1977, 5). Indeed, much of Schafer's writings about the soundscape are prescriptive, advising his readers on how to better maintain and alter their sonic surroundings.

Thus far, I have intentionally avoided describing the soundscape as an artwork or composition, for it risks mischaracterizing the soundscape as the intentional product or creation of a (re)sounding subject. Bringing Deleuze and Guattari's work to bear on Schafer's, however, might we interpret the soundscape as a work of "art" insofar as it is a bloc of sensations that surpasses or exceeds listeners, but nevertheless affects (and is affected) by them? In other words, can the soundscape implicate (re)sounding subjects without necessarily relying on them?

Responding to these questions, I argue that such a reading is supported by my reinterpretation of the soundscape offered throughout this dissertation. For example, such a reading aligns with my reinterpretation of the soundscape as a place-space that relocalizes phenomena even

as it is relocalized by them (chapter one). It is also supported by my rereading of Husserl's *Emfindnisse* together with Deleuze's *Logic of Sense* to address both orientations within the soundscape as well as the immanent generativity of sounds themselves (chapter three). Finally, it is supported by my rejection of the conceptualist vs. non-conceptualist divide in the hearing vs. listening debate (chapter four).

In sum, this project has two primary aims. The first concerns my critical reinterpretation of the soundscape and its location relative to existing views within the sound studies literature. Here, I identify two primary "camps." The first approach (called "sound studies" proper) examines sonic experience through an ontological lens, separating the materiality or being of sound from social, political, and historical analyses. In contrast, the second approach (called "auditory cultural studies") emphasizes the historicity of sound over and against lived sonic experience. In other words, against sound studies' attempts to ontologize sound and voice, these theorists focus on the ways in which sound is always already cultural.

Responding to these two views, my work offers a third possible approach that addresses *both* first- and second-personal accounts of sonic experience and their social, political, and historical variances. Riffing on the works of Canadian composer R. Murray Schafer, I demonstrate how a retooled notion of the "soundscape" proves philosophically and politically fruitful, insofar as it is a *place* (or *topos*) and requires a notion of sonic agency that involves responses to norms, which can entail unwitting subjection, self-conscious conformity, resistance, and transformation.

The second aim of this project involved exploring the resonances and dissonances between the various traditions I work with and through. As my title suggests, I am particularly interested in how sound studies and the philosophy of sound allow us to productively work within the breaks

of phenomenology and poststructuralism. Through engaging with these traditions, we are also able to understand the soundscape as a plane of perceptions *and* percepts, of affects *and* affections without giving way to the "bad dialectics" present in other accounts (i.e., sound studies versus auditory cultural studies, phenomenology versus poststructuralism, presence versus absence, etc.) In other words, by destabilizing the presumed dichotomy between sound studies and auditory cultural studies, I also have sought to destabilize some of the presumed dichotomies between poststructuralism and phenomenology, gesturing instead towards their various resonances and planes of consistency (Reynolds and Roffe 2006, 228). In this way, I see this project as fostering a sort of reciprocal exchange, insofar as sound studies helps us retune our approaches to phenomenology and poststructuralism, and phenomenology and poststructuralism help us better understand sonic phenomena and our experiences of being-in-sonic-worlds. At the heart of this project, then, is a concern with describing and unsettling relations and operations of power and sense *through* sound. Just as Deleuze and Derrida identify a sort of anarchic seed in Husserlian phenomenology, so, too, does this project locate a deeply fruitful and anarchic seed within soundscape studies.

Towards the end of *Voices of Tyranny*, Schafer argues that "the soundscape is a plenum" (1993, 116). His choice of language is interesting here; while he rarely cites other thinkers directly,[89] he regularly references psychoanalysis.[90] What does it mean to describe the soundscape as a *plenum*, and what does this mean for our experiences of being-in-sonic-worlds? *In Fear of*

[89] It is clear that Schafer was incredibly well-read, and he engages with a wide range of interlocutors. However, Schafer often does not cite specific figures when engaging in these conversations. For example, while he uses the language of phenomenology a few times throughout his works, he never actually cites phenomenology, nor does he reference a single phenomenologist. Interestingly, one of the philosophers he cites the most is Aristotle, particularly Aristotle's work on hearing, sound, and voice in *De Anima*.

[90] In *The Soundscape*, for example, he writes: "Simultaneously with Webern's discovery of the value of silence in music, his compatriot Freud discovered its value for psychoanalysis. 'The analyst is not afraid of silence. As Saussure remarked, the unconnected monologue of the patient on the one side and the almost absolute silence of the psychiatrist on the other was never made a methodological principle before Freud'" (1977, 257).

Breakdown: Politics and Psychoanalysis, Noëlle McAfee builds on Winnicottian psychoanalysis to develop a *plenum* model of early childhood development. In early life, McAfee argues that we experience a state of plenum, or a state wherein self, other, and world are wholly undifferentiated (2019, 42-43). How, then, might we think of the soundscape as a sort of plenum? Clearly, Schafer does not mean to use the term in a strictly psychoanalytic sense. But in thinking about this undifferentiated quality that McAfee highlights, I contend that the soundscape operates as a sort of "plenum" insofar as it does not seek recourse to a transcendental field or subject. Rather, the soundscape highlights the immanence of sound without confusing it with an immanence that is wholly apprehended by a (re)sounding subject. My critical rereading of Schafer's work therefore makes evident the complexity and novelty of his concept, such that it encompasses both concrete "acts" of listening and sounding, as well as the plenum of generative sounds that make those very acts possible and, ultimately, exceed them.

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