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March 16, 2016

Fighting for Peace: Factors Affecting the Durability of Peace after Civil War Termination

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An abstract of
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of Emory University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of
Bachelor of Arts with High Honors

Political Science

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Abstract

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Civil wars continue to be increasingly prevalent in the global environment. In contrast to their inter-state counterparts, civil conflicts are more numerous, brutal, and deadly. Exacerbating these effects is the problem that many civil wars reemerge after termination: the post-war peace does not last. This phenomenon begs the question: what factors promote a durable peace after civil war termination?

This study begins to explore that question, looking at various pre, mid, and post-war factors that affect the durability of peace after civil war termination. Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, this empirical study found that a country's economy is the most consistent factor that influences the durability of peace. More specifically, a strong economy correlates with a durable peace. This study also found that countries with pre-war political exclusion for populations and conflicts that fade both correlate with a less-durable peace, while conflicts that end in a total victory correlate with a more lasting peace. This research contributes to the vital discussion on how to handle civil war termination, promote peace, and prevent civil wars from reemerging.

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Table of Contents

Introduction	1
The Causes of Civil War	2
The Causes of Civil War: Ethnicity	3
The Causes of Civil War: Inequality	5
Characteristics of Conflict	6
Characteristics of Settlement	7
Post-Conflict Conditions	9
Research Design	13
Analysis Results	17
Table 1. Pre-War Factors	19
Table 2.1 Mid-War Factors: Deaths	20
Table 2.2 Mid-War Factors: Magnitude	20
Table 3.1 Post-War Termination Factors: Any Peace Agreement	21
Table 3.2 Post-War Termination Factors: Total Victory	21
Table 3.3 Post-War Termination Factors: Conflict Fades	21
Table 4.1 Post-War Peacekeeping Factors: Any Peacekeeping	22
Table 4.2 Post-War Peacekeeping Factors: Humanitarian Peacekeeping	22
Table 4.3 Post-War Peacekeeping Factors: Traditional Peacekeeping	23
Table 4.4 Post-War Peacekeeping Factors: Number of Peacekeepers	23
Table 4.5 Post-War Peacekeeping Factors: Number of Countries Involved in Mission.....	23
Introduction: Guatemala	23
Characteristics of Society: Guatemala.....	24
Characteristics of Conflict: Guatemala	27
Characteristics of Settlement and Post-Conflict Condition: Guatemala.....	31
Findings and Results	34
Guatemala	34
Quantitative and Qualitative Results	35
Conclusion	38
Bibliography	41

Introduction

Lasting an average of seven years, civil wars are some of the most violent and lengthy conflicts around the globe (Collier et al. 2004). Generally, civil wars are divided into two main types: ideological and ethnic. While ideological wars center more on a disagreement in type of governance, ethnic conflict is carried out by or in the name of ethnic groups (Fearon 2002). Despite this superficially simple division, civil conflicts are complex and particularly difficult to handle, resolve, and explain. As such, no one “silver bullet” explanation, or solution, exists for civil wars.

Reflecting this multi-faceted nature, the study of civil war identifies several factors that influence the likelihood of conflicts. Assuming that civil wars are a foreseeable feature of the current global system, creating a durable peace is the most valuable effort that can be made to mitigate war’s impact. This effort is especially important since half of all civil wars can be attributed to post-conflict relapses: peace is often fragile and difficult to maintain (Collier et al. 2008).

Taking into account the very nature of civil conflict and the importance of peace, this paper explores factors that may affect the durability of peace after civil war termination. More specifically, this paper will look at five sets of factors that may affect the durability of peace: pre-war ethnic relations and equality, degree and magnitude of violence during the war, the nature of war termination, post-war peacekeepers, and economic conditions and governance. While no measure will ever encapsulate every facet of conflict, these categories will help identify and organize extant research on conflicts while preempting this study’s research variables.

Using a two-prong strategy, this paper will first review current literature on the identified pre, mid, and post-war factors. Then, after presenting the hypotheses and research design, the

paper will continue with a quantitative analysis of civil wars around the globe (both ethnically and ideologically motivated) and further analyze with a specific case study of Guatemala. This paper will argue that a strong economy is overwhelmingly important in creating a durable peace. Additionally, exclusion from power before the conflict begins positively correlates with a less durable peace. Finally, conflicts terminating in a total victory positively correlate with durable peace while conflicts that fade away without definitive endings correlate with the reemergence of conflict. All other tested factors were found to be insignificant.

Civil wars are particularly vital to study because of their prevalence and severity. From 1816 to 1992, there have been 152 civil wars and 75 interstate wars. Even more shocking is the majority of civil conflicts occurred after World War II, with 80 civil wars and 24 interstate wars (Singer and Small 1994). These civil wars account for almost 12 million battle-related fatalities, with an unimaginable toll on the country's surviving population, its infrastructure, and its ability to rebuild (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000). While some civil conflicts are able to be resolved, half of all civil wars experience a breakdown of peace and reemerge (Collier et al. 2008). Creating a durable peace is a worthwhile venture, yet it is difficult. This study is important in contributing to literature on how to durably terminate civil wars, stop them from reemerging, and thus decrease the number of civil wars and the inherent death and destruction they bring.

The Causes of Civil War

A variety of pre-war factors affect and facilitate civil war onset, specifically ethnic relations, inequality and poverty (Hegre and Sambanis 2006).

The Causes of Civil War: Ethnicity

Scholars have devoted much effort to understanding why peace breaks down. Specifically, they have asked a number of questions: Are ethnic conflicts more likely to reignite? If so, why? While some find that ethnicity heterogeneous societies are not more likely to experience conflict, others outline theories using ethnicity to explain conflict onset in such societies (Fearon and Laitin 2001). Supporting the positive correlation between ethnic fractionalization and conflict divides the broad category of ethnic nationalism into three main positions: perennialists, modernists, and instrumentalists (Horowitz 1985; Blimes 2006; Rabushka and Shepsie 1972). These three positions describe various mechanisms in which ethnicity plays a role in conflict onset in ethnically heterogeneous societies.

Perennialist arguments center on the deeply ingrained, defining characteristics and practices of various ethnic groups. Perennialists contend that the inherent differences in ethnic groups' characteristics make conflict more likely (Horowitz 1985). These conflicts occur because ethnic groups' intense fear of the other cause them to perceive themselves to be engaged in what Horowitz describes as "zero-sum politics"; their passions and perceived differences leave little room standard politics, negotiations, or reciprocity. Thus, a combination of irrational fear of the other group, and the other group threatening their safety, leads to an inability to solve disputes and fears through civilized means and causes conflict.

Conversely, modernist theories focus more on the development of the state, arguing that the ascension of one ethnic group inherently blocks upward mobility of another (assimilation notwithstanding). In other words, the minority ethnic group may only achieve upward mobility by assimilating to the majority ethnic group's practices, creating motivations for separatist movements (Anderson 2006; Elbadawi 1999; Fearon and Laitin 2001; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2007). Finally, instrumentalists argue that the empirical, peaceful coexistence of many

ethnic groups points to the use of ethnicity as a tool a group uses to achieve an end, rather than the cause of conflict itself (Blimes 2006). Ethnicity creates ties within a group that help overcome the collective action problem, thus creating a unified group that is better able to successfully mobilize and create conflict.

Sensitivity-analysis of different measures of ethnic fractionalization helps to clarify the discrepancies in research on ethnic fractionalization's role in conflict onset (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Specifically, they look at different measures of ethnic fragmentation as they relate to civil war onset, including linguistic, racial, and religious components as well as ethnic fractionalization and heterogeneity. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) found that while one measure of ethnic dominance was not significantly associated with war onset, eight ethnic fractionalization variables are robustly and positively correlated with internal armed conflict. This correlation leaves the question of why ethnic factors have a high correlation with internal armed conflict, but not civil war.

Fearon and Laitin (2001) help ameliorate this puzzle. While their study finds no specific correlation between ethnic fractionalization and civil war, analysis suggests that political agendas that can both harness and encompass ethnic nationalism correlate with wars. More specifically, societies with low economic growth and that are also experiencing high rates of poverty create environments that are susceptible for insurgency recruitment, a recruitment strategy that could encompass using ethnic identities (Blimes 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2001). This positions ethnic fractionalization and nationalism as an indirect factor that favors the conditions for insurgency, which cause civil wars.

H₁: States with positive pre-war ethnic relations will also have a more durable peace.

The Causes of Civil War: Inequality

Inequality is another important societal characteristic in civil war onset. There are several measures of inequality that are pertinent to the study of civil war onset. Economic inequality is a favorite, yet many studies are plagued by data shortages on standard measures including gross domestic product (GDP), Gini indices (showing income distribution), and other factors in poor and conflict-prone countries where the data is arguable most important (like Africa and the Middle East) (Baten and Mumme 2013; Muller and Seligson 1987). Although only measuring political violence, not civil war, Muller and Seligson (1987) positively correlate income inequality with political violence. One explanation is that greater degrees of inequality create larger opportunities of advancement and gain for different ethnic groups during civil wars. These heightened opportunities only serve to prolong the conflict by raising the stakes of both winning and losing a conflict for the fighting actors (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Collier et al. 2004; Gurr 1968).

Other measures of inequality look at the differences in health of a population, or poverty levels. Baten and Mumme (2013) use male height as indicators of nutritional levels and health conditions of the society, showing an inverse correlation between low male height (poor nutrition and health) and high instances of civil war. Moreover, this study found that relative inequality, where large and significant differences in health quality existed, positively correlated with civil war. This alternative approach overcomes the data shortages of GDP and Gini indices. The study, similar to Muller and Seligson and instrumentalist ethnic approaches, looks at grievances and discontent (especially relative discontent compared to other better-off member of society), in living conditions as identified by nutrition and health conditions as facilitating conflict onset. Generally, ethnic ties make collective action easier while also providing natural cleavages within which a society can fracture under (Blimes 2006).

H₂: States experiencing high levels of political, economic, and social inequality before conflict's onset will be more likely to experience conflict recurrence.

Characteristics of Conflict

There are a number of pertinent characteristics of civil wars, including type of violence.

While pre-war factors are integral to any civil war analysis, looking at the violence within the conflict is also crucial. Kalyvas (2000) aims to address the research void on the dynamics of civil wars. This research stems from a general oversight and neglect of the difference between the terms conflict and violence. Put simply, violence is a *form* of conflict, deserving autonomy, not just a *degree* of conflict (Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Kalyvas 2000). Political actors may use violence to govern and achieve compliance (using violence as a means). Conversely, actors may use violence as a method of extermination (using violence as an end). In a civil war, the ultimate objective is either the, “re-establishment of a monopoly of legitimate violence or its replacement by a permanent local monopoly of legitimate violence” (Kalyvas 2000, 4).

Generally, political actors in civil wars show a trend from using indiscriminate, or arbitrary and large-in-scale, violence to selective, or limited and narrowly targeted, violence (Kalyvas 2000). This trend towards selective violence is logical: indiscriminate violence incentivizes civilians to join the discriminate actor. Indiscriminate violence, short of an extermination strategy, alienates the actor using the indiscriminate violence since civilians cannot modify their behaviors to avoid violence. However, wars may start with indiscriminate violence because of the difficulty in achieving selective violence, which requires asymmetrically distributed private information and population control (Kalyvas 2000).

Civilians choose allegiances based on factors beyond pre-existing ideological affiliation; violence can shape affiliation through its value as a political resource. More specifically,

violence can be used (by civilians, the insurgents, or the incumbent government) to obtain a specific behavior or outcome from those who it is targeted against, while it can also be used for extermination purposes (Kalyvas 2000).

The finding that intra-group conflict spurs violence may have negative implications for post-conflict relations, demonstrating that violence exists regardless of ethnic relations (Kalyvas 2000). Ethnic groups experiencing indiscriminate violence will be more likely to bond together, forming an internal ethnic bond and an external ethnic hatred of the party imposing the indiscriminate violence. This bonding is exacerbated if the imposing party can be identified as another opposing ethnic group (Kaufman 1996). Ethnic solidarity and thus identity cementation may hold true even when the actor they are fighting is not ethnically organized, since the group is still being targeted because of their ethnic identity and the internal process of solidarity would still occur.

Kaufman's (1996) articulation of this in-group formation is complimentary to the instrumentalist, or indirect, ethnic explanation of civil war onset, using ethnic groups and ties as a tool rather than a cause for insurgency. Additionally, this research may not be mutually exclusive with the intra-group denunciations (Kalyvas 2000); while intra-group dynamics may not always be positive, the group is still able to unify to form a collective hatred against another ethnic group.

H₃: States experiencing indiscriminate violence during conflict will be more likely to experience a less-durable peace.

Characteristics of Settlement

Civil wars end in a variety of ways, from a total victory of one actor to a negotiated peace settlement to an unofficial unspoken agreement when the fighting trickles to a halt. This study

will pay specific attention to the all three situations: a total victory, the presence of a treaty or settlement, and when the conflict fades.

Typically, conflicts phase into a treaty agreement following three main steps: negotiation, bargaining, and implementation (Fearon 1998, Walter 2002). The first phase encompasses the actors' decisions to initiate peace talks and the second phase, bargaining, determines whether the actors want to reach a peace settlement. The third, final, and most difficult phase is when the actors can choose to honor or defect from the agreed-upon settlement (Walter 2002). Some analysis indicates that the shadow of repeated iterations of future negotiations (the two actors continually working together post-war) makes the third stage easier to enforce, but delays the second bargaining stage because of the lasting impacts of the settlement (Fearon 1998).

The presence of a settlement is important in facilitating peace; however, third parties enforcement is essential for treaty guarantees and implementation (Walter 2002). The costs of war, rebels' goals, and outside pressure help bring the warring actors to the bargaining table, yet each side still has incentives to revert back to fighting. Without third-party guarantees, most of the political, military, and/or territorial guarantees in the treaty are just words. Demobilization is extremely risky because if one actor defects on the agreement the other actor would be vulnerable. Conversely, cohabitation creates a security dilemma for the negotiating groups, as each want to sufficiently protect themselves from the other, which inherently makes the non-arming actor feel more at risk and thus move to simultaneously rearm. These factors produce a high-risk environment for the re-initiation of civil war (Kaufman 1996; Walter 1997; Walter 2002).

Contrasting literature supports the process of war and argues in a quasi-Darwinian philosophy that if war runs its course, a victor will emerge and peace will be durable (Luttwak

1999; The Nation 1993; Toft 2010). In low-level wars, cease-fires and armistices, “systematically prevent the transformation of war into peace” because in the absence of war, no actor is motivated to negotiate a lasting settlement or reintegrate (Luttwak 1999, 37). Thus, both sides can only prepare for future war. This logic supports the finding that wars which terminate in a unilateral victory are less likely recur than those terminated in a negotiated settlement (Toft 2010).

The idea of a peace through war is important: from 1940 to 1990, 80 percent of civil wars were settled through processes of expulsion, extermination, or capitulation (of the losing side) (Walter 1997). Without credible guarantees enforced by third-party intervention, combatants prefer to defer to the decisive victory or loss of a battlefield. The evidence supports this claim, which inherently rejects arguments that dynamics such as power asymmetries, bargaining difficulties, opposing identities, or indivisible stakes make termination impossible. Specifically, 42 percent of civil wars from 1940 to 1990 experienced some degree of formal peace negotiation, and 94 percent of these instances drafted at least some form of a peace accord. Yet, only 20 percent succeeded in terminating conflict through settlements (Walter 1997). Thus, regardless of whether total victory is preferable, it may be the only option for civil wars not benefiting from third-party guarantors.

H₄: Conflicts ending in a power-sharing treaty will have a more durable peace.

Post-Conflict Conditions

Finally, there are several factors present after war termination that are integral to the study of civil war. Studying post-conflict conditions is especially pertinent since half of all civil wars can be attributed to post-conflict relapses and every civil war since 2003 has been a continuation of a past civil war (Collier 2008; Walter 2010). Specifically, this study will explore

economic condition, democracy, and the presence of third party peacekeepers. These factors help accurately portray the post-war environment, helping predict if a durable peace is possible.

The first factor is ethnic relations, which, as previously explained, is difficult to characterize. Two main parties of thought emerge on ethnic relations: partition and integration. These two opposing theories argue for either accepting the irreconcilable inter-ethnic differences and partitioning the groups to grant them local autonomy or striving for complete integration and centralized power sharing in order to overcome the inter-ethnic differences (Kaufman 1996; Kaufman 1998; Sambanis 2000).

These theories are both rational and logical, yet could not suggest more conflicting solutions. Partition theorists argue that separation reduces incentives and opportunities for further combat (the ethnic security dilemma), solves for the (arguably inevitable) dissolution of peace agreements in integrated societies, allows the newly homogenous states to grant their inhabitants (previously minorities) political power and access, and limits grievances by eliminating relative inequality between ethnic groups. Access to power is valued and important because of its ability to confirm a group's worth, while simultaneously ensuring the survival of the group and protection of minorities at risk (Horowitz 1985). Similarly, the newly "homogenous" states will only suffer from intra-ethnic social stratification, since partition removes other ethnics from the immediate social sphere.

Preempting accusations that partitions undermine democracy and promote illegitimacy, Kaufman (1998) found that while not all partition states are democratic, they are not less democratic than their predecessor states or neighbors. Furthermore, case study analysis suggests that partitions create equal, if not better, minority access when compared to how the state might have been without partition (Kaufman 1998).

Skeptical of the lack of quantitative data, Sambanis (2000) empirically tests the success of partition strategies to end civil wars. Ultimately, Sambanis' results support the partition theory, but struggle with issues of validity. Specifically, successor states not internationally recognized may have low levels of democracy and high levels of violence, but would not be included in the dataset of partition states. Interestingly, the tests do find robust evidence that partitions in non-ethnic conflicts create a more durable peace than those terminating ethnic conflicts. However, the evidence does not show that partitions are necessarily better at creating durable peace than integration solutions (Sambanis 2000).

The post-conflict economic condition also may play an integral factor in determining the durability of peace. Research shows inequality, especially relative inequality, precedes political violence (Baten and Mumme 2013; Muller and Seligson 1987). Civil wars play a unique role in hurting the economy. Wars destroy human, social, and physical capital; governments reallocate expenditures to the military; and private economic actors go abroad (Collier 2006). Lack of economic growth also increases the reemergence of violence by 14 percent, a figure that rises when other related factors such as ethnic dominance, low income, and resource dependence are taken into account (Collier 2006). Not only do these factors exacerbate relative inequality, they make economic recovery more difficult, which creates opportunities for violence.

Much like a strong economy, democracy is also important in creating a durable peace. However, before a democracy can be promoted, a basic state must exist in order to host that democracy (Diamond 2005). This requirement is somewhat difficult, since actors are more willing to agree to peace settlements that include power-sharing pacts, yet power sharing is difficult in the absence of a state (Walter 2002). Moreover, the respect for human rights and

equal access that democracy touts takes time to develop, a time where grievances could once again deteriorate into violence (Diamond 2005).

Finally, the role of third parties in providing credible security guarantees cannot be understated. Walter (2002) shows through qualitative and quantitative analysis that when deciding whether to sign a peace treaty, third-party security guarantees are the most important factor. These guarantees help post-war societies peacefully get through the high-risk five-year period after conflict termination where war is most likely to reemerge (Collier 2006; Walter 2002). Additionally, third-parties help create strong institutions that allow democracies to last; even if free and fair elections take place, the losing party might not let the winner assume power in the absence of strong institutional control for fear that the winner will overreach and severely oppress the loser. Put simply, elections do not solve commitment problems. Yet, with third-party guarantees and strong institutions, this fear is somewhat ameliorated and democracy can exist and promote peace (Stiansen 2013).

This paper will proceed to test the relationship between pre, mid, and post-war factors and the durability of peace. Using the discussed literature, the next section will outline a theoretical framework to support the proposed hypotheses and operationalize the independent and dependent variables and justify the selection of data for both variables. Next, the paper will present the data for the quantitative analysis and discuss observed trends found in the data. These trends will then be explored through a qualitative case study of Guatemala. Finally, conclusions from both the quantitative and qualitative studies will be discussed to fully summarize the findings of the research.

H₅: The presence of third-party peacekeepers will predict a durable peace.

Correspondingly, my null hypothesis predicts that the pre, mid, and post-war variables will have no effect on ethnic relations and a durable peace.

Research Design

These hypotheses will be tested through quantitative analysis and a qualitative case study. Statistical analysis allows general trends and patterns to emerge that would have been previously lost in the specificity of a case study. Similarly, the broad range and sheer number of cases used will improve the external validity of any conclusions the analysis reaches.

The quantitative analysis will make use of a survival analysis to determine whether a relationship exists between pre, mid, and post-civil war violence and the duration of post-war peace. This approach is most appropriate because of its ability to predict the influence of an independent variable on the failure or success of peace, which is the focus of this study.

Because of the different periods (pre, mid, and post-conflict), this paper will use year as the unit of analysis. Pre-war measures will be measured by the year immediately before conflict onset. Because of the dynamic nature and varying durations of wars, mid-war measures will be an average over the total civil war, rather than looking at individual years within the war. Similarly, post-war variables looking at the conflict termination will be dummy variables. Corresponding to the pre-war measures, post-war variables looking at the post-conflict condition will be the year immediately after conflict termination.

The dataset will include both ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars. The selection will exclude colonial wars of independence, due to the interesting yet fundamentally different nature of colonial civil wars that do not relate to the thrust of this study's inquiries.

This research aims to explore and test the effect of pre-war ethnic relations and equality; 3rd party involvement and type of violence during the war; war termination strategies; and post-

war ethnic relations, third party involvement, economic condition, and governance on the durability of peace. While many these concepts are difficult to quantify and test directly, this study will use a number of measureable dimensions of each concept in order to encompass it in a variable.

Specifically, there will five independent variables, which correspond to the hypotheses, to test the dependent variable, durability of peace. The independent variables are: pre-war ethnic relations, pre-war inequality, level of violence, post-conflict ethnic relations, and presence of third-party peacekeepers. The control variables are democracy and GDP. These variables were selected as literature has found them to be important factors on durable peace (Collier 2006; Diamond 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2001).

The variable “ethnic relations” will be measured through three main indicators: ethnic access to power, ethnic group size, and an ethnic group’s regional autonomy. Ethnic access to power will be categorized based on whether the group was completely excluded from power, meaning the group’s elite representatives held no political power, it was subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state, or the group excluded itself from political power; shared power with another group, meaning its representatives were either senior or junior partners in power-sharing arrangements and/or the government; or were the dominant political group, meaning it held monopoly power or was dominant in political power notwithstanding a few token, uninfluential, other members. These three indicators help determine how ethnic relations are playing out politically and socially. The indicators were chosen based on availability, with the acknowledgement that they do not encompass all factors involved in post-conflict ethnic relations.

The first dataset to operationalize the dependent variable is the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset. This dataset identifies 758 politically relevant ethnic groups from 157 countries, and analyzes at each group's access to state power from 1946 to 2010 (Wimmer 2009). More specifically, the dataset identifies the degree to which the ethnic group and/or their representatives held executive-level state power, with results ranging from total control of the government to overt political discrimination. This dataset is a more direct measure of how ethnic relations are playing out politically, since too much representation might indicate the ethnic group is seizing power while low representation might indicate oppression of the ethnic group. This dataset is limited in that it does not measure non-citizens, which could be pertinent in measuring ethnic groups experiencing discrimination.

The EPR dataset will also be used for the two other measures of ethnic groups: size and regional autonomy (Wimmer et al. 2009). Ethnic size is simply a best-estimate of the size of the ethnic group as a percent of the total population. Regional autonomy is coded as a dummy variable. EPR considers a group as autonomous if there is an active regional executive organ that operates below the state level and if the group members exert meaningful influence that is representative of the group's preferences in the regional subset.

GDP was measured using the GDP per capita (constant 2005 US\$) dataset from the World Bank. The dataset measures GDP divided by midyear population and data are in constant 2005 United States (U.S.) dollars (World Bank 2016).

Democracy scores were taken from the Unified Democracy Scores (UDS) dataset (Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2010). This dataset overcomes discrepancies in measurements and scores by synthesizing 10 extant scales to produce a cumulative score that reflects a quasi-consensus of subjective and objective democracy ratings. The dataset extends from 1946 to 2012

and encompasses, “virtually all countries in the world” (Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2010, 12). This analysis makes use of the median scores for democracy from the dataset.

Levels of violence will be measured through two main indicators: the number of deaths and the magnitude of violence. These two measures help distinguish between selective and indiscriminate violence, since lower incidents of deaths will indicate a more selective strategy while the opposite would indicate indiscriminate violence. These factors are chosen based on availability. Other factors during the civil war may indicate selective or indiscriminate violence; however, data constraints limit this analysis to the two.

Data for the number of deaths was taken from the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset. MEPV uses 324 episodes of armed conflict from 1946 to 2014 to categorize the conflict and give a “best estimate” number of deaths resulting from the conflict (Marshall 2015). The dataset tries to estimate the total number of deaths directly resulting from a civil war (both civilian and combatant), reflecting the median or mean often-disparate estimates (Marshall 2015).

The Uppsala Conflict Data Base Categorical Variables (UCDP 2009) dataset also reports war termination. This dataset will be used to identify three dummy variables that portray the end of the conflict. Specifically, the dummy variables taken from this dataset will be whether there was total victory or not, and whether there was any peace agreement or not, and whether the conflict simply faded without any formal agreement (Gleditsch et al. 2002). These three variables were perceived to be the simplest and most direct way to meaningfully measure civil war termination for this study.

Finally, the presence of third party peacekeepers will also be considered a dummy variable. The Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions Data Set, 1946-2014, dataset will be used to

extract data on peacekeeping (Mullenbach 2016). Because of the availability of data, there will be several measures on the presence and type of peacekeeping. First, the study will measure the effect of any peacekeeping presence. Next, the study will separate traditional, or observing, monitoring, and mediating, from humanitarian peacekeeping, measuring the effects of each on the durability of peace. Then, the study will measure the effect of size of the peacekeeping mission (how many peacekeepers were deployed) and the number of states involved in the mission. These measures should provide a comprehensive analysis on the effect of peacekeeping on the durability of peace.

Complementing the quantitative study, the qualitative case study will provide rich data and explanatory value. These contributions are simply not possible with quantitative data, which primarily only supports correlational relationships that are not fully explained. Guatemala is a particularly illustrative case study that will complement the statistical data. The longevity (36 years) of the war, the violent nature of the conflict, the third party involvement during and after the conflict, the distinctly ethnic nature of the violence, the negotiated peace settlement, and the ensuing difficulties in implementation of the settlement combine to make this case ideal for closer investigation and illustrative to the proposed hypotheses.

Analysis Results

My findings indicate that several pre, mid, and post-war factors are statistically significant in affecting the durability of peace after civil conflict termination. The following sections include the results from my survival analyses, specifically extrapolating on those found significant. The analysis' findings will be in order of the hypotheses.

The results are interpreted in the following way. Generally, if the hazard ratio is greater than one, the associated factor makes peace failure more likely, and correspondingly increases

the chances of the reemergence of civil war. Conversely, if the hazard ratio is less than one, the associated factor makes peace failure less likely, and correspondingly decreases the chances of the reemergence of civil war.

If the z-score is more than two, it is significant at the 95 percent level. If the absolute value of the probability of the z-score ($P > |z|$), which will be called the pz-score, is 0.05 or smaller, it is significant at the 95 percent level. If the pz-score is 0.10 or smaller, it is significant at the 90 percent level. If the pz-score is significant but the z-score is not, the results indicate an issue with the size of the sample.

Only one of the two control variables, GDP, was found to be significant throughout most of the analysis. Thus, the analysis indicates that democracy is statistically insignificant in promoting a durable peace after conflict termination, when compared with the other pre, mid, and post-war factors in each analysis.

The first and second hypotheses state that states experiencing negative ethnic relations and high levels of political, economic, and social inequality before the onset of civil war conflict will have a less durable peace. This hypothesis was tested in four main sections: type of governance, type of power sharing, GDP, and characteristics of the ethnic group. Generally, the results were only significant GDP and one type of power sharing, excluded, as shown in Table 1.

GDP, one of the analysis' control variable, was found to be statistically significant in the first regression. The z-score of 1.6 and strong pz-score indicates it is significant at a 95 percent level. The hazard ratio of 0.96784 also indicates directionality, showing that countries with greater wealth have a lower likelihood of conflict reemergence.

This section also tested factors that include power-sharing practices, which included if the groups were partners in power sharing or if a group was excluded. In power sharing agreements,

the analysis indicates that an asymmetrical, dominant power dynamic is the only power-sharing configuration that statistically affects the post-conflict durability of peace. In the presence of an unequal agreement where one group is dominant and the other is excluded, post-war peace is less stable. This finding is supported by a strong hazard ratio of 1.370174, a z-score of 1.69, and a z-score of 0.091, indicating significance at the 1/20 level, and close to a significance at the 1/10 level.

Table 1. Pre-War Factors

	Hazard Ratio	Z-Score	P> z
<i>Democracy</i>	0.96784	-0.25	0.792
<i>GDP</i>	0.9999195	-2.27	0.023
<i>Excluded</i>	1.370174	1.69	0.091
<i>Partner</i>	1.35537	1.50	0.134
<i>Dominant</i>	1.036458	0.10	0.920
<i>Ethnic Size</i>	1.223685	0.60	0.548
<i>Ethnic Regional Autonomy</i>	0.9207844	-0.41	0.682

The third hypothesis states that conflicts characterized by indiscriminate violence will also be plagued by conflict reemergence. This hypothesis measured violence through a count of deaths, and a general magnitude score, with higher death count and magnitude score showing a more indiscriminate approach. As shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, only GDP was found to be significant in affecting the durability of peace, rendering both findings statistically insignificant.

When compared to deaths, GDP was found to be significant. The low z-score and p-z-score, of -2.24 and 0.025, respectively, shows it is significant at a 95 percent level. Additionally, magnitude, the other measure of violence, produced an identical z-score and p-z-score, with a slightly weaker hazard ratio (0.9999211 versus 0.9999213). The findings of statistical

insignificance for both deaths and magnitude are complementary, indicating that no measure of violence is important in determining how long a peace will last after conflict.

Table 2.1 Mid-War Factors: Deaths

	Hazard Ratio	Z-Score	P> z
<i>Democracy</i>	0.9048651	-0.87	0.384
<i>GDP</i>	0.9999211	-2.24	0.025
<i>Deaths</i>	0.9999999	-0.23	0.818

Table 2.2 Mid-War Factors: Magnitude

	Hazard Ratio	Z-Score	P> z
<i>Democracy</i>	0.9101556	-0.82	0.412
<i>GDP</i>	0.9999213	-2.24	0.025
<i>Magnitude</i>	0.9816833	-0.43	0.671

The fourth hypothesis proposes that conflicts that end in a power-sharing treaty will also experience a more durable peace. This analysis looked at different aspects of conflict termination, which includes the presence of any agreement, a total victory, or if the conflict simply fades and no agreement is made. As shown in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, three factors were significant. GDP, a total victory, and if a conflict fades significantly affected the durability of peace.

Table 3.1 shows that the when compared with the presence of any agreement in terminating a conflict, GDP is still the only significant factor in creating a durable peace. This indicates that peace agreements are not statistically significant in creating a durable peace. Table 3.2 shows that the presence of a total victory is significant in promoting durable peace. Data analysis produced a strong hazard ratio of 0.6222945, indicating that if a conflict terminates in an

asymmetrical total victory, the ensuing peace will last longer than conflicts without a total victory. This finding is supported with a strong z-score of -2.76 and pz-score of 0.006.

Table 3.1 also indicates that while total victory is important, GDP is also statistically significant. While the pz-score of 0.050 barely makes it significant at the 95 percent level, it is significant nonetheless. However, comparatively, the presence of a total victory is more important than GDP in determining durability of peace.

Table 3.1 Post-War Termination Factors: Any Peace Agreement

	Hazard Ratio	Z-Score	P> z
<i>Democracy</i>	0.91377	-0.77	0.440
<i>GDP</i>	0.9999204	-2.25	0.024
<i>Any Agreement</i>	0.9440094	-0.31	0.755

Table 3.2 Post-War Termination Factors: Total Victory

	Hazard Ratio	Z-Score	P> z
<i>Democracy</i>	0.8459423	-1.42	0.155
<i>GDP</i>	0.9999339	-1.96	0.050
<i>Victory</i>	0.6222945	-2.76	0.006

Table 3.3 shows that conflicts that fade, rather than having a tangible and identifiable termination, have a significant and strong relationship with a weak post-conflict peace. The hazard ratio of 2.234059 strongly indicates that a conflict that fades is more likely to have a less-durable peace. The z-score and pz-score were also very strong, 5.45 and 0.000, respectively.

Table 3.3 Post-War Termination Factors: Conflict Fades

	Hazard Ratio	Z-Score	P> z
<i>Democracy</i>	0.9288247	-.064	0.522
<i>GDP</i>	0.9999167	-2.45	0.014

<i>Conflict Fades</i>	2.234059	5.45	0.000
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The fifth and final hypothesis articulates that third-party peacekeepers will create a more durable peace. The analysis used many dimensions to measure the presence of, type, and size of peacekeeping missions in post-civil conflict environments. All of these were found to be insignificant, as shown in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. Conversely, GDP remained the most important factor throughout each analysis. GDP also remained fairly constant. In the five analyses, the hazard ratio fluctuated between 0.9999214 and 0.9999215 (Table 4.5 showing an insignificant outlier of 0.9999211), the z-score fluctuated between -2.24 and -2.23 (Table 4.5 showing an insignificant outlier of -2.26), and the pz-score fluctuated between 0.025 and 0.026 (Table 4.5 showing an insignificant outlier of 0.024). The changes in Table 4.5 for GDP are not large enough to affect the results, as Table 4.5 still shows GDP as the most significant factor in affecting post-war peace.

Table 4.1 Post-War Peacekeeping Factors: Any Peacekeeping

	Hazard Ratio	Z-Score	P> z
<i>Democracy</i>	0.9074037	-0.84	0.402
<i>GDP</i>	0.9999214	-2.24	0.025
<i>Any Peacekeeping</i>	0.991836	-0.04	0.971

Table 4.2 Post-War Peacekeeping Factors: Humanitarian Peacekeeping

	Hazard Ratio	Z-Score	P> z
<i>Democracy</i>	0.9064428	-.086	0.392
<i>GDP</i>	0.9999215	-2.23	0.026
<i>Humanitarian Peacekeeping</i>	1.013016	0.05	0.963

Table 4.3 Post-War Peacekeeping Factors: Traditional Peacekeeping

	Hazard Ratio	Z-Score	P> z
<i>Democracy</i>	0.9086179	-0.83	0.408
<i>GDP</i>	0.9999214	-2.24	0.025
<i>Traditional Peacekeeping</i>	0.9626151	-0.11	0.913

Table 4.4 Post-War Peacekeeping Factors: Number of Peacekeepers

	Hazard Ratio	Z-Score	P> z
<i>Democracy</i>	0.9062304	-0.86	0.390
<i>GDP</i>	0.9999214	-2.23	0.025
<i>Number of Peacekeepers</i>	1.000001	0.14	0.892

Table 4.5 Post-War Peacekeeping Factors: Number of Countries Involved in Mission

	Hazard Ratio	Z-Score	P> z
<i>Democracy</i>	0.9170896	-0.76	0.449
<i>GDP</i>	0.9999211	-2.26	0.024
<i>Number of Countries Involved</i>	0.994682	-1.04	0.299

Introduction: Guatemala

The political game play of the United States and Guatemalan governments during the late 20th century directly translated into the Guatemalan Civil War from 1960 to 1996. While world powers were pursuing their interests in the political arena, there were very tangible and unforgettable consequences in Guatemala including the massacre of hundreds of thousands of people, especially the indigenous Mayan. Close analysis of this seemingly anomalous yet surprisingly representative case study will reveal unresolved social and economic inequality,

indiscriminate civil war violence, and a lack of proper termination agreements and enforcements prolonged the conflict. Although the 36-year civil war has not reemerged, the society has not rebuilt.

The international community had undeniable influence on the civil conflict. During the Cold War era, from 1947 to 1991, the U.S. fought to maintain hegemony against Soviet Russia, often resulting in the U.S. compromising its cornerstone democratic morals in a blind fight against communism. The two superpowers used various smaller and less developed countries around the world as battlegrounds for a series of proxy wars, and Guatemala fell victim to this undue influence.

In 1944, Guatemala experienced a shift towards communism when urban protests and an ensuing revolution led to the fall of President Jorge Ubico and with him, one of the most repressive dictatorships in the Americas. The ensuing decade saw unprecedented social and land reforms in Guatemala led by elected president Juan José Arévalo. Despite the importance of these reforms for the country, the U.S. focused on Arévalo's alleged association with communism and began covert and overt involvement in what evolved to be a 36-year civil war.

Characteristics of Society: Guatemala

Intermingled social, economic, and political inequalities are defining characteristics of Guatemala's 19th and 20th-century history. The social and economic relative inequality that translated into political inequality between the indigenous Indians (which were 60 percent of Guatemala's population and represented the country's rural poor) and the landed elite made land reform a crucial issue for Arévalo and Guatemala (Gellately 2003, 339). Dating back to 1873, Guatemalan President Justo Rufino Barrios enacted a series of land reforms aimed at promoting cultivation and coffee exports. Agrarian economics, as it related specifically to indigenous

poverty, moved to the forefront of governmental politics. This liberal change may have shifted, “the economic base of highland society [...] moving from regional trade to coffee production [yet] many of the players, or at least the families, remained the same” (Grandin 2000, 110). Barrios’ land reforms and the small subset of elite land owners that utilized the Indians as a labor force served to generate constant and reinforced familial power through legislated primitive capital accumulation (Grandin 2000, 111).

This finding is further supported by a comparison of the number of K’iche’ (indigenous) and Ladino (Hispanic) Farms. Between 1894 and 1901, the number of total farms decreased by more than 50 percent while the number of large farms (1000+ *cuerdas*) increased. 70 percent of arable land was concentrated in the hands of 2.2 percent of the landowners (Blum 1995, 73). No longer could indigenous people depend on a self-sustaining life style, yet privatization stopped them from successfully and profitably farming; the result was that privatization effectively kept them impoverished and disempowered while strengthening pre-existing social cleavages. Thus, Arévalo’s 1944 reforms sought to mitigate and reduce the relative inequality, aligning with the United Nations’ *Comisión Económica para América Latina* and looking to neighbors like Mexico for, “land and labor reform [policy ideas], which would restrain the power of the “feudal’ ” bourgeoisie, force investment in productive relations, and create an internal market for locally produced goods” (Grandin 2000, 200).

After analyzing other countries’ strategies, Guatemala developed a land reform program of its own. Specifically, President Jacobo Árbenz’s 1952 agrarian reform allowed individuals or peasant organizations to claim uncultivated land, showing a decisive attempt to shift power relations, economic advantage, and societal organization. While this reform helped, inequality persisted. The complex situation is perhaps best summarized in a 1963 brief from the U.S. State

Department, articulating that Guatemala is economically dependent on its export crops (coffee, bananas and cotton), socially divided by class and race, and any movement since 1944 towards socio-political development that would support a representative government, “has suffered alternate over-encouragement, artificial organization and restructuring in such rapid succession that the base for stable party organization today is still weak” (Department of State 1961-1963, Lot 67 D 396, 2).

Severe poverty and obstacles to social change, specifically due to, “cultural factors and authoritarian social traditions that have often discouraged personal initiative,” supported Guatemala’s social divisions (Segesvary 1984, 4). For example, in 1981, the top three percent of the country made more than \$12,000 while 65 percent of the nation’s population annually earned less than \$2,400. With most of the impoverished living in rural and hard-to-reach locations, access to the government and its resources, much less education and political advocacy, was scarce. As such, the Mayan and Ladino populations functioned by themselves in a submissive yet autonomous model.

This oxymoronic manner of existence can be explained by the tension between extreme poverty (creating dependence) and a lack of geographic proximity (creating autonomy). Thus, the population held a stake in the government, but were historically oppressed, kept at a minimum level of poverty, and lacked organization; the combination of these factors meant that the indigenous had not significantly challenged Guatemalan government in recent history (Jonas and McCaughan 1984, 109). In a blend of modernist and instrumentalist theories of conflict onset, the peasants were united in their dissatisfaction with the military regimes yet each had their own interests that may or may not have supported communist ideology. As Stanley and Holiday

articulate, “The revolutionary movement never became a Mayan movement, though many Mayan people supported the revolutionaries” (Stanley and Holiday 2002, 6-7).

Arévalo appointed Jacobo Árbenz as his minister of defense during his reformist presidency, and Árbenz later rose to win the presidency during 1951 elections. Árbenz’s rule was short-lived, since, “In March 1954, in a conference of the Organization of American States, the United States managed to pass a resolution against Guatemala for the hemispheric defense against ‘communist aggression’ ”(Moreno 1998, 27, translation mine). Indeed, the U.S., with intent to assassinate Árbenz and his communism, quickly gathered mercenaries, bribed the Guatemalan military (with funds provided by the Central Intelligence Agency), and invaded the country three months later on June 27, 1954” (Moreno 1998, 27).

The relatively rapid secession of presidents, combined with incomplete social, political, and economic reforms and foreign intervention set the stage for a complicated and multi-faceted civil war.

Characteristics of Conflict: Guatemala

For 36 years, Guatemala existed in a constant state of warfare. However, the actual intensity of violence was dependent upon those critical moments when the anticommunism and investment interests of the U.S. administration symbiotically aligned with the political and economic avarice of the Guatemalan regime to crush the Mayans. The Commission for Historical Clarification registered 42,275 victims; 23,671 were victims of arbitrary execution and 6,159 were victims of forced disappearances (Rothenberg 2012, 179). Other estimates place the total count significantly higher, yet the message is clear: the war was long, brutal, and bloody.

Analysis shows that 93 percent the human rights violations and acts of violence from 1962 to 1966 were committed by the Guatemalan State, with guerillas and other un-identified

groups taking responsibility for the other seven percent. This statistic is broken down even further, with the Army and other security forces committing more than 85 percent of the violations. This violence not only hurt the population, it also divided them into factions, turning neighbors into enemies and friends into foes, and inherently making reconciliation increasingly difficult (Sandoval 1998, 3).

The indigenous guerillas made a small but significant contribution to the violence, favoring a more selective strategy than their governmental counterparts. Fighting for their right to live without poverty and to be able to own arable land and practice their culture, the guerillas were composed of indigenous peoples (Rothenberg 2012, 125-6). Their presence, and refusal to continue to be repressed, triggered Guatemalan and U.S. governmental engagement and thus helped prolong the conflict. Additionally, hiding in the rural populations allowed the government to indiscriminately target the indigenous rural Mayan populations. Despite these factors, guerrillas were only responsible for three percent of the violence, leaving the rest for the U.S. and Guatemalan governments (Rothenberg 2012, 236). Arguably, the guerilla's selective violence strategy allowed them access to the goodwill of the rural population, supplying recruits and other necessary supplies.

During the war, violence demonstrated a purposive shift away from democratic practices. One particularly illuminating organization was the *Policía Nacional*, or National Police, of Guatemala, which was influenced by both the U.S. and Guatemala. Originally conceived in 1872 as the *Guardia Civil*, the group evolved until Presidential Decree 901 rebranded it to be the *Policía Nacional*, with the purposes of severing as, “an agent of justice, to cooperate in investigations and inquiries required by judges and courts” (Aguirre 2013, 2-3). The Constitution of 1956 allowed the Army to, “involve itself in the country's internal and public security”

(Aguirre 2013, 119). This shift inwards reveals a government willing to use military force, rather than social persuasion or democratic accountability, to keep the peace and control a society with local police and the National Army

Continued evidence is found in the statute in the 1954 Preventive Penal Law, the 1956 and 1965 Guatemalan Constitutions, and police documents. The 1954 Preventive Penal Law against communism allowed the government to have a legal basis in sanctioning political and social expression (Aguirre 2013, 26). The 1956 Constitution elucidates on an array of actions that could be taken against, “political opposition groups,” omitting the term “communist” to allow for a wider scope of discrimination and more subjectivity in classifying enemies of the state (Aguirre 2013, 7). The 1965 Constitution reveals blatant ideological discrepancies. While one section guarantees the freedom to form political parties with democratic regulations and principles, it simultaneously prohibits the formation of, “parties or entities that promote communist ideology, or [...] encourage actions or international links that threaten the sovereignty of the State or the bases of the democratic organization of Guatemala” (Rothenberg 2012, 7).

Further contradicting statements of democracy and freedom, police records evidence a highly subjective system. One estimate from 1978 rounds the number of actual arrests resulting from the anti-communist constitution to roughly twelve thousand, insisting that the prisoners needed to prove they were not communist (showing they were considered guilty and had to prove their innocence) and that they did not, “hold Marxist ideas during the [Arbénz] regime”(Grandin 2004, 68). The ideological discrepancies in the constitutions and actions of the police reveal a government void of democracy.

More specifically, the Guatemalan and U.S. governments' indiscriminate strategy can be seen in a number of different initiatives. Their violence first tore apart the structure of society, and then its people. For example, in 1980, the Guatemalan army systemically eliminated the Catholic Church and its advocacy groups such as *Acción Católica* (Catholic Action) because of supposed connections to guerrilla insurgency. The Catholic Church, an organization with the potential to counterbalance violence with religious morals and a grass-roots connection to the population, ceased involvement in government, and the army soon took over their churches and convents for military purposes. Formerly sacred places of worship were then used as, "centers for detention, torture, and execution, ensuring increased control over the population" (Rothenberg 2012, 57).

This indiscriminate violence correctly demonstrates Kalyvas' proposition that information asymmetries and a lack of control of a population breed indiscriminate violence. Since the government was trying to combat guerillas (which, by nature, try to disappear and hide amongst the population), the government felt validated in its indiscriminate use of terror. One story recounts how the head of the National Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff would arrive, "in communities and gathe[r] the people [...] he said, "The guerrillas are here and you are helping them." [...] he would choose a few people and have them shot in front of everyone, saying, "This is so that you don't keep supporting the guerilla, because even if you haven't started working with them yet, you certainly won't do so now" (Rothenberg 2012, 14). Another story articulates how the newly established Army Joint Operation Center (JOC) would torture individuals based on gathered intelligence. Workers at the JOC covered perceived enemies, "with a hood filled with glue, spooned out their eyes, cut out their tongues, hung them by their testicles" (Rothenberg 2012, 25).

Although violence permeated every level of society and tore apart structures like the Catholic Church, which were integral to societal and cultural structure, there was also a gendered aspect to the violence. One witness recounts how a group of soldiers surprised a woman and a girl during a military operation. “The captain ... ordered two soldiers to grab the young girl and he raped her ... He kneeled down, calmly removed his gear, lowered his pants and he said, “Hold that girl down, *muchá*” and he raped the poor woman...He raped the younger one too. Then, he let the rest of them rape her” (Rothenberg 2012, 57).

Characteristics of Settlement and Post-Conflict Condition: Guatemala

In December of 1996, the Guatemalan Government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) (the rebels) finished signing a series of peace agreements that began in 1987, designed to create a durable peace (Stanley and Holiday 2002). Fighting had virtually ceased, the guerillas fighters were weak, and civil conflict of the likes of the terminated civil war has not reemerged to date. The accords are widely considered a success because they successfully terminated the conflict; however, the accords have failed at democratizing the country.

The peace accords touted lofty goals: major political, institutional, social, and economic transformations and above all else, democratization. Despite these altruistic undertakings, the accords lacked any specific mechanisms or measures for implementation. The accords, “provided a national agenda for development and democratization, but were not constructed to resolve the fundamental problems that led to the war” (Holiday 2000, 78). Additionally, as Diamond (2005) explains, democracy needs a basic state to host it, and respect for human rights and equal access that democracy touts takes time to develop, a time where grievances could once again deteriorate

into violence (Diamond 2005). While these overarching problems existed, more specific failures can also be identified.

The most poignant and indicative issue with the process was a paradoxical lack of representation and power. The accords were mediated by the United Nations (U.N.), who facilitated frequent contact between the opposing URNG and the government led by the National Advancement Party (PAN) to help gain trust and facilitate a, “rapid and uneventful cantonment and demobilization process” (Stanley and Holiday 2002, 3). However, neither of these groups yielded majority representation in the country. Functionally defeated in 1983, the URNG had not disbanded but posed no legitimate threat to the survival of the state, and as such, yielded no political leverage. The PAN government, responsible for implementation from 1997 to 1999, won power by a slim margin and was consistently plagued by a myriad of social, economic, political, and international factors consistent with a society accustomed to military dictatorship (Stanley and Holiday 2002, 4, 9).

One major success of the accords was a successful demobilization and cease-fire. Demobilization finished in 1997 without incident and the cease-fire agreement was never violated. URNG militants have been successfully reintegrated into society, thus preventing a return to militarization, and have since achieved political representation. Undoubtedly, the approach of the planting season and decreased capacities of the URNG drove both sides to want to terminate the conflict quickly and efficiently. However, demobilization and cease-fire processes, which create a security dilemma that often persuade conflict reemergence, were successful as a result of the peace accords.

In addition to the peace accords, Guatemala was also granted a verification mission called MINUGUA. The mission began in 1994 as a human rights verification mission, which was

successful in deterring such abuses (Stanley and Holiday 2002). In 1997, the mission expanded, with less success, to verify all the accords. This larger mission was less successful for a number of reasons. The accords did not all have clear benchmarks to verify, as was present with the accords concerning human rights. Similarly, the population, which was already not well educated on MINUGUA, did not understand the expanded mission and only associated the group with human rights verification. While some of these barriers have been overcome, the verification mission was only partially successful in verifying accord implementation. Notable and important to this study, however, is the prevention of human rights abuses that the peacekeeping mission did achieve and thus, the potential for conflict reemergence.

Thus, while peace accords were signed and peacekeeping missions granted, actual implementation was difficult and continues to hinder progress in Guatemala. Deep seeded resentment to change was still rooted within the society. The low voter-turnout defeated a popular referendum on 50 constitutional reforms that were essential to the peace accords in 1999 is indicative of the weak political system that remains incapable of fully realizing the peace accords. The tax increase meant to fund social reform was delayed from 2000 to 2002 and the country's military budget was re-enlarged. Powerful anti-reform lobbies campaign against change and much of the rural (and urban) population does not understand the complicated agreements. The study shows that the mere presence of mutually agreed upon agreements does not necessitate the implementation of those agreements, or the societal shift necessary to prevent conflict reemergence.

Findings and Results

Guatemala

Although difficult to definitively draw causal connections between aspects of the Guatemalan Civil War and the durability of peace, it is possible to identify important factors of the war and speculate on its influence in the overall war and peace environment. While conflict has not reemerged in Guatemala, implementation of the accords has not been completely successful which could have been influenced by the same factors that would disrupt post-conflict peace.

The pre-war social, economic, and political inequalities persisted throughout the conflict substantively unchanged, thus hindering successful implementation of peace accords and democracy. These societal cleavages opened a space for mobilizing and sustaining rebellion. Relative inequality allowed guerillas to activate groups to fight, perhaps because they had nothing to lose. This is compatible with the findings of the quantitative analysis, especially the overwhelming support for the importance of GDP and pre-war political exclusion.

The extent of the inequalities could have exacerbated and engorged their influence in conflict onset and ultimately, post-war peace. Specifically, the economic inequalities left the Ladino peasants and indigenous Mayans disadvantaged, and the poor economy did not allow for major spending on social reform. The military-backed dictatorships left a country used to authoritarian control by the military and a small sect of landed elites, rather than democracy. Additionally, the landed elite that opposed guerilla power continued to influentially oppose measures to adopt the accords. This indicates the deeply seeded social divisions that were mitigated with political representation and integration yet not completely ameliorated. While the post-conflict peace was durable, these inequalities hindered accord implementation and democratization.

The indiscriminate violence during the Guatemalan Civil War also played a major role in the conflict and served to create an environment of mistrust and broken social ties. Because of the military's inextricable and powerful connection to the government, the distrust of the military translated to distrust of the government. Additionally, because of the military's distinct control of the government, transferring power to a civilian-controlled government (such as the PAN government) was difficult. Ensuing governments lacked experience, trust, and were plagued by corruption and efforts to return to a military model. The violence, and military that exacted the violence, destabilized the peace accords and continue to hinder the road to democracy.

Finally, the presence of an agreement and humanitarian peacekeepers had a positive, rather than negative, influence on peace. The accords, with help of U.N. mediation, helped negotiate a durable ceasefire and disarmament. MINUGUA also helped deter violence and human rights violations, thus propelling the society towards their democratic goals. While both of these efforts were undoubtedly plagued and not as successful as they were initially conceived to be, the successful and durable termination of a 36-year conflict is a significant accomplishment.

Quantitative and Qualitative Results

This study supported partially found support for H₁, H₂, and H₄ and little support for H₃, and H₅.

H₁ and H₂ articulated that ethnic divisions and political, economic, and social inequalities would make post-war peace less durable. The quantitative analysis found strong support for the influence of GDP on post war peace; specifically, a strong GDP correlates with a more durable peace while a weak GDP does the opposite. Additionally, this analysis showed that pre-war political exclusion correlates with a weaker post-war peace. Political exclusion might also be indicative of social exclusion, as a society that gives a certain group no political power may

extend this negative bias to other aspects of life. Using the same logic, economic inequality and political exclusion may also indicate ethnic divisions, providing support for H₁.

Guatemala's Civil War undoubtedly supported H₁ and H₂. The strong political, economic, and social divisions in the society were symptomatic of the deep-seeded ethnic divisions between the rural poor (Mayan and Ladino peasants) and the urban elite. Unresolved for 36 years, these factors contributed to an admittedly durable yet difficult peace. War has not reemerged in the country to-date, yet the country struggles to embrace democracy, social reforms, and other practices to develop a strong economy. These plague the country and arguably, make it more at-risk for a conflict to reemerge.

H₃ was not supported in the quantitative study, and possibly supported in the qualitative study. Violence experienced during civil wars did not statistically affect the durability of peace. However, Guatemala's case study revealed that the indiscriminate violence helped to further fracture the society and contributed to difficulties in negotiations of peace and rebuilding. For example, the rural poor intrinsically distrusted the elite and its government, which is partly why they rebelled in the first place. This distrust was further exacerbated during the conflict because of the gruesome and indiscriminate methods used by the government. However, just like the inequalities that were previously discussed, violence and ensuing distrust contributed to a shaky peace, but a durable peace nonetheless.

H₄ was partially supported by the quantitative and qualitative analysis. The quantitative analysis found that while the presence of any agreement did not positively correlate with a more durable peace, a total victory did, and a fading conflict correlated with a less durable peace. These results indicate that the lack of a definitive ending when a conflict fades creates a space for the conflict to restart. This could be more indicative about the quality and characteristics of

conflicts that fade rather than the lack of an end itself. For example, conflicts may fade because actors run low on supplies (soldiers, arms, and other supplies) yet the conflict has not been resolved. The fading could indicate the understanding that actors are temporarily de-escalating to be able to re-arm and prepare for a future fight.

This contrasts with a total victory, which indicates that one actor has lost the ability to fight and the other actor has achieved total power. A total victory is similar to a fading conflict in that both have not resolved the issues that began the war. However, it differentiates itself in that one side no longer has the ability to fight, and presumably will not regain that ability because the opposing actor has power and will not allow them to rebuild. Thus, while peace treaties may be ideologically ideal, a total victory is more practical in terminating conflict.

The case study of Guatemala shows some weak support for the merits of a peace treaty. The presence of the treaty allowed the sides to negotiate, improve human rights and political power sharing, and try to set guidelines for a more durable peace. However, research shows that many of the peace accords were not realized, which thus calls into question how important they were to creating a durable peace. Interestingly, the violence had virtually stopped in Guatemala by the time peace negotiations began. The question remains as to whether the peace might have been sustainable if fighting had simply faded and negotiations had not occurred. The quantitative analysis would indicate that it would not have been, because waning conflicts open the door to rearm, as the URNG would have needed to in order to continue fighting. Thus, the study shows that the peace treaty did not truly help contribute to the durable peace.

H₅ was not supported for the quantitative analysis and only partially supported for the qualitative study. These results may be more indicative of a selection issue of cases than the effectiveness of peacekeepers. The U.N. typically sends peacekeepers into the most difficult

conflicts that are most unstable after the conflict has terminated, making their mission more difficult than conflicts that have terminated and are likely to keep a durable peace.

In Guatemala, MINUGUA's presence on during its human rights verification did prevent some human rights violations. However, its expanded mission to enforce all accords was not successful, because of a lack of clear benchmarks and lack of understanding from the Guatemalan population. In Guatemala, it is doubtful that MINUGUA's successful presence in deterring human rights violations prevented the reemergence of conflict. However, it did help create a better peace for those Guatemalans, and thus can be considered marginally successful.

Conclusion

This study explored different factors that affect the durability of peace after civil war termination. This study used both quantitative and qualitative measures to examine the proposed factors and found four factors to be critical in creating a durable peace. GDP was overwhelmingly important in most of the analyses. Exclusion from power before the conflict begins positively correlates with a less durable peace. Conflicts terminating in a total victory positively correlate with durable peace while conflicts that fade away without definitive endings correlate with the reemergence of conflict. All other tested factors were found to be statistically insignificant.

The study has several implications for creating durable peace. Luckily, many pre and mid-war factors do not affect the durability of peace (except for pre-war political exclusion). This is good, because countries cannot retroactively control pre and mid-war factors once conflict has started. When terminating conflicts, peace agreements may not directly contribute to peace, but they may help conflicts from simply fading out without resolution. Thus, while this study did not find direct support for the benefits of peace agreements, it also did not show they

help contribute to future conflict, and thus they may still be important. Finally, the most important finding of this study is that strong economies promote peace. Rather than focusing on factors such as democracy, which is integral to many 21st century intervention strategies, actors must emphasize building (or rebuilding) strong infrastructure to support vibrant economies. While this is not easy, especially in a war torn country, this analysis shows that it is undoubtedly worthwhile in helping promote a durable peace.

This analysis suffered from several weaknesses. First is the availability and accuracy of data. Many countries do not have data for topics such as annual GDP. Additionally, this type of data becomes even more sporadic during conflict. Similarly, it is often difficult to estimate the number of deaths during civil wars, as counting is intrinsically difficult and actors may have political incentives to inaccurately report the number of deaths and disappearances. This issue affected the validity of the analysis, as fewer cases were used because of missing data and the data obtained may not have been accurate.

The other two weaknesses of the study deal with the incongruence in datasets and measuring difficult concepts. The study required many datasets to be merged so they could be compared and analyzed. However, different datasets coded conflicts differently. For example, one conflict might be seen as two conflicts in another dataset, or datasets might disagree on the start and end date of conflicts.

Additionally, the factors this study sought to analyze were often difficult to operationalize. For example, measures of social inequality and indiscriminate violence may be subjectively understood within a context, but are difficult to numerically represent. These two weaknesses affected the validity of the study as well, as they may have caused cases to be left out and for data to inaccurately represent the concept it is meant to measure.

Future studies must try to improve missing data and look at other war factors. Such factors might include the influence of third parties during a conflict, and what type of mid-war intervention they are providing. This variable could be further expanded to see how many third parties intervened, if the intervening actor(s) provided covert or overt support, and if they intervened on behalf of the rebels or incumbent. Additionally, studies might try to improve the research on the effectiveness of peacekeepers. This improvement could be accomplished by controlling for the difficulty of the conflict that peacekeepers are sent to, thus measuring their effectiveness rather than the fact that the peacekeeper's presence shows that the U.N. believes that country will struggle to maintain peace.

Regardless of what future studies find, this study enabled an interesting and revealing look at how various factors affect post-war peace. A strong economy and some equality are vitally important in helping to prevent conflict reemergence. The factors that were insignificant revealed where actors should (and should not) emphasize and spend their efforts when trying to avoid conflict reemergence. While the presence of civil conflict is an unchanging aspect of the status quo, this study helped narrow and focus efforts of actors seeking to create durable peace after conflict termination.

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