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THREE MODELS OF POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP IN PLATO

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An abstract of
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Abstract

THREE MODELS OF POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP IN PLATO

By Tony Leyh

This dissertation defends the thesis that Plato develops three distinct models of political friendship in *Alcibiades I* and *Cleitophon*, in *Republic*, and in *Laws* and that he uses a uniform explanatory strategy in all three models. All of these dialogues explain political friendship by looking at the psychological makeup required for citizens to be friends. I refer to this explanatory strategy as an appeal to the psychology of political friendship. The basic idea is that Plato eschews theorizing political friendship by looking at various objects (e.g. virtue, pleasure, or utility) that may motivate citizens to cultivate relationships with one another. Instead, the Platonic approach relies on the recognition that friends must in some way be psychologically similar. Citizen friends can be psychologically similar in an epistemic sense, i.e. by having the same knowledge or compatible but nonidentical beliefs. Yet, they can also be psychologically similar in an emotional sense, i.e. by having similar emotional responses and feelings of pleasure and pain regarding politically significant situations.

What distinguishes each model are the particular details of the psychologies. My first chapter argues for a Socratic model of political friendship as it appears in *Alcibiades I* and *Cleitophon*, in which citizens achieve friendship only when they attain shared knowledge of politics. Plato's *Republic* posits that political friendship obtains when some but not all citizens have knowledge while others have compatible beliefs about relevant political phenomena. Lastly, Plato's *Laws* develops a psychology that concentrates on emotional similarity and similar feelings of pleasure and pain (instead of epistemic similarity) to ground political friendship. The final chapter takes up the question of why exactly friendship matters for politics by a study of the relation between friendship and politics in the Platonic *Seventh Letter*.

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INTRODUCTION

In this dissertation, I argue that Plato develops three distinct models of political friendship in *Alcibiades I*[1] and *Cleitophon*, in *Republic*, and in *Laws* and that he uses a uniform explanatory strategy in the three models. All of these dialogues are unified in *how* they treat the topic because they explain political friendship by looking at the psychological makeup required for citizens to be friends. I refer to this explanatory strategy as an appeal to the psychology of political friendship. The basic idea is that instead of defining friendship by looking at various objects (e.g. virtue, pleasure, or utility) that may motivate citizens to cultivate relationships with one another, the Platonic approach relies on the recognition that friends must in some way be psychologically similar.[2] Sometimes this psychological similarity is explained in epistemic terms, when what citizen friends have in common is the same knowledge or compatible but nonidentical beliefs. Other times, the psychological similarity is explained in emotional terms, when citizen friends have similar emotional responses and feelings of pleasure and pain regarding politically significant situations.

[1] I am (hesitantly) unconvinced by arguments that attempt to show *Alcibiades I* is spurious. Critical debate about authenticity of this dialogue began in 19th century Germany with Schleiermacher considering it spurious. This was followed by Wilamowitz who deemed the *Alcibiades I* to be "sheepshit" (*Shafmist*) and Friedlander who, contra Wilamowitz, considered it to be authentic. More recently, Annas 1985 and Denyer 2001 each defend the dialogue as authentic. Joyal 2003 and Smith 2004 consider it spurious. Smith 2004's treatment is the most thorough and he offers good reasons to be resistant to arguments against authenticity based on ancient testimonia or stylometry. Smith's own position is that we should be extremely cautious in deeming *Alcibiades I* authentic because of how much the *Alcibiades I* conflicts with most of accepted Platonic doctrine. I think, however, that arguments from doctrine are often tenuous because the consensus about what in fact is accepted Platonic doctrine is controversial and nowhere near unanimous. And even when apparent texts seem to conflict, most of those conflicts can be resolved either by closer textual analysis or by paying more sympathy to the dramatic features of the dialogues. For instance, in *Protagoras* Socrates defends hedonism and in *Gorgias* Socrates argues against hedonism. We nevertheless consider both of these dialogues genuinely Platonic even though there is an elementary conflict in doctrine between the two. Instead, scholars try to articulate reasons why such a conflict exists, by appeal to dramatic context or to the other topics up for discussion in the dialogues. No one, as far as I know, reasons on the basis of this conflict that at least one of the dialogues must be spurious.

[2] See, e.g., *Laws* VIII.836e-837b. Of course, it is not an 'either-or' decision. It is possible, indeed probable, that Plato employs both approaches in the general treatment of friendship in the dialogues. My more precise claim is just that discussions of political friendship tend to proceed by psychological considerations.

By looking at the different ways in which Plato expresses the psychological similarity between citizens in various dialogues, I differentiate three models of the psychology of political friendship in the Platonic dialogues that Plato uses to fit different political proposals. First, in *Alcibiades I* and *Cleitophon*, we find what I call the 'Socratic model' of political friendship, in which citizens achieve friendship only when they attain shared knowledge of politics. In Plato's *Republic*, we find a second model, also based on an epistemic connection between citizens, where political friendship obtains when some but not all citizens have knowledge while others have compatible beliefs about relevant political phenomena. Lastly, Plato's *Laws* develops a psychology that concentrates on emotional similarity and similar feelings of pleasure and pain (instead of epistemic similarity) to ground political friendship.

The structure of this dissertation involves developing and evaluating each model of political friendship in a separate chapter. The final chapter takes up the question of why exactly friendship matters for politics by a study of the relation between friendship and politics in the Platonic *Seventh Letter*.

Methodology

Two aspects of my methodology deserve comment: (1) how I read the relationship between the political dialogues (e.g. *Republic* and *Laws*) and the friendship or love dialogues (e.g. *Lysis*, *Phaedrus*, and *Symposium*) and (2) how I understand a Platonic friendship generally and the psychology of friendship in particular.

(1) Choice of Dialogues

It may be a death knell to some readers that my dissertation—which purports to explain political friendship—does not contain thorough analyses of passage about love and friendship in *Lysis*, *Phaedrus*, or *Symposium*. In addition to the sheer amount of space such analyses would take up in this already lengthy dissertation, there are two main reasons for my exclusion of these passages. First, a

cadre of scholars has already attempted to unearth a theory of political love or political friendship from each of these dialogues.[3] Second, even putting aside the relative merits of each dialogue and each scholars' approach to that dialogue (which are surely substantial), there are problems that face those who opt for interpreting friendship in the political dialogues on the basis of friendship and love discussed elsewhere in Plato. The main difficulty is to establish that the dialogues being treated together are in fact compatible in how they talk about love or friendship (two notoriously capacious words in Greek). Can we be sure that *erôs* in *Symposium* is the same general concept as *erôs* in *Republic* V or *Laws* VIII? If so, whose *erôs* are we talking about in *Symposium*? The obviously political *erôs* of Phaedrus? The liminal but demanding *erôs* of Diotima? Can we be sure that *philia* in *Phaedrus* has enough similarity in meaning and use as political friendship in *Alcibiades I* or *Republic*? Answering these kinds of questions would be essential to a global and systematic investigation of political friendship in Plato. Now, I don't believe that such questions are unanswerable. To the contrary, it strikes me as fruitful avenue of inquiry. Rather, my point is that for those who want to investigate political friendship in this way, the beginning of this approach seems to have more peril than promise.

To avoid this second set of difficulties and make progress in a systematic study of political friendship in Plato, I interpret the dialogues as far as possible as concrete wholes, where the discussions of love and friendship are intertwined with the political system envisioned, the psychology developed, and the characters and drama of the dialogue. Although I think that there is much to learn from bringing dialogues in conversation, I worry that relying on *Lysis*, *Symposium*, or *Phaedrus* before achieving a clear sense of how political friendship works in the Socratic model, *Republic*, and *Laws* would have a distortive effect. The desire to make a thorny passage of *Cleitophon* or *Republic* conform to a pre-existing theory of friendship found elsewhere in Plato may be too great.

---

[3] Examples of classical approaches include the Vlastos 1973/1999 reading of *Lysis*, the Price 1989 reading of *Symposium*, and, more recently (and most convincingly I believe), the Sheffield 2011 reading of *Phaedrus*.

So, instead, I have tried to develop a general framework of political friendship in each of the three models by treating solely what the dialogues under discussion say about friendship and love. An upshot of this approach is that it leaves open for future research how well these models jive with the accounts of love and friendship found in *Lysis*, *Phaedrus*, and *Symposium*.

(2) A Preliminary Approach to Friendship

Throughout this discussion of Plato's approach to political friendship, I intend friendship to refer to an interpersonal relationship of reciprocal, other-regarding concern. The interpersonal element describes Plato's way of talking about political friendship as being a primarily human-to-human phenomenon. Political friendship, for Plato, never appears as a feeling that human beings have for inanimate or abstract objects. Certainly, individuals can have *philia* for such objects, but that use of *philia* is not dispositive for teasing out a Platonic approach to political friendship.

The reciprocity requirement of friendship usefully captures a common intuition: a friend who loves a non-friend has no friendship at all. Definitionally, friendship requires at least two individuals each of whom loves the other and each of whom is aware of that corresponding love. This definition allows us to exclude related but distinct relationships of unreciprocated love such as relationships of longing and erotic attachment as well as more opprobrious relationships of sycophancy and toadyism. The awareness element of reciprocity imposes a related restriction. Some ancient schools, like the Stoics, entertain seriously the view that psychological similarity can qualify as a friendship even when individuals who are psychologically similar do not know one another.[4] As far as I can discern, Plato's discussion of political friendship does not endorse such a view. Platonic political friends can pick out those among their community who knowingly reciprocate love and care for one another in a particular

[4] See Schofield 1999 and Vogt 2008 for further discussion.

way. No citizen of a Platonic political community would describe an unknown individual as a political friend.

Overview of Chapters

For the sake of guiding the reader, I here offer a summary of each chapter.

Chapter 1: Knowledgeable *Homonoia* as a Socratic Model of Political Friendship

This chapter argues that two Platonic dialogues, the *Alcibiades I* and *Cleitophon*, develop a distinct model of political friendship based on *homonoia* (generally, "unanimity" or "concord") that comes about only through shared knowledge. I call this model 'Socratic' because it fits well with Socrates' philosophical commitments. More specifically, each dialogue endorses the claim that political friendship as *homonoia* only exists when citizens share knowledge relevant to political life. (I use the term "knowledgeable *homonoia*" to refer to the requirement that *homonoia* only exists when citizens share knowledge.) I argue that knowledgeable *homonoia* is a viable and attractive idea of political friendship when adequately contextualized. A large part of this attractiveness, I contend, comes from the general attractiveness of Socratic philosophy. In justifying this claim, I show how the pairing of political friendship and knowledgeable *homonoia* coheres with and is entailed by many positions of the Platonic Socrates.

Chapter 2: Political Friendship in *Republic*

This chapter explores the psychology of political friendship in *Republic*. Various passages throughout *Republic* link justice and friendship together. Other passages intimate that all citizens of Kallipolis (the ideal city of *Republic*) are friends with each other. My argument is that the *Republic* grants insight into the psychological makeup of political friendship. Similar to the Socratic model, the *Republic* model still couches friendship in epistemic terms and describes it as a *homonoia*. In contrast to the Socratic model, however, the *Republic* model does away with the knowledge requirement for *homonoia* and political friendship. Instead, as I argue, political friendship and *homonoia* obtain when some citizens (i.e. the philosopher rulers) possess knowledge while other citizens have compatible but nonidentical beliefs.

In essence then, the *Republic* model relaxes the epistemic demands of friendship in comparison to the Socratic model.

CHAPTER 3: A SYMPHONY OF CITIZENS: POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP IN *LAWS*

This chapter presents a novel interpretation of political friendship in *Laws*. My thesis is that in *Laws* Plato has undertaken a radical departure from previous approaches to political friendship, both in his own writings and in antiquity generally. Instead of grounding political friendship on epistemic similarity, I argue that the *Laws* model of political friendship encourages citizens to achieve friendship predominantly on the basis of shared feelings of pleasure and pain. The core of my reading is what I call a nondeflationary pedagogical view of *Laws*, which holds that the Plato of *Laws* has revised his pedagogical theories to such an extent that citizens of Magnesia (the ideal city of *Laws*), while perhaps psychologically capable of achieving epistemic similarity to other citizens, are instead educated to consider one another as political friends by virtue of shared feelings about political life. To clarify the nondeflationary pedagogical approach, I contrast it with a nondeflationary psychological approach, which holds that the change in the psychology of political friendship in *Laws* is due to a change in the underlying general psychology of *Laws* (and not the pedagogy). I argue that the nondeflationary pedagogical approach offers the surest footing for explaining the radical change in the psychology of political friendship in *Laws*.

In addition, I buttress my thesis by arguing that a common reading that I label the 'deflationary' interpretation—i.e. the approach that holds that the *Laws* accords with either dramatic, doctrinal or cultural conventions in Plato or in antiquity generally such that the psychology political friendship in *Laws* is still predominately epistemic—has no dispositive support in the text of *Laws*. I suggest that neither the dramatic context of *Laws* nor the cultural milieu at the time Plato wrote *Laws* can sufficiently explain the psychology of political friendship. Similarly, I argue that doctrinal views in Plato about pleasure and pain, virtue, and education cannot fully decide the issue in favor of the

deflationary approaches over the nondeflationary ones. This dearth of textual and argumentative support for the deflationary view, coupled with the total absence of *homonoia* from the *Laws*, suggests that the psychology of political friendship in *Laws* is better explained on nondeflationary grounds.

I conclude this chapter by suggesting that the use of *sumphônia* in *Laws* tracks with my overarching thesis and effectively functions as a replacement for *homonoia*. I also discuss the philosophical promise of grounding political friendship on non-epistemic means.

CHAPTER 4: POLITICS AND FRIENDSHIP IN THE *SEVENTH LETTER*

In the final chapter, I offer an interpretation of the *Seventh Letter* that stresses the Platonic theme that friendship matters instrumentally and intrinsically for politics. My aim is to show that Plato's political advice to both the "companions and comrades of Dion" as well as to Dionysius II holds that friendship is necessary for and constitutive of successful political organization. Another aim is to show that the letter's analysis of friendship is compatible with the models of political friendship offered in the three previous chapters and with Plato's comments about love and friendship generally.

First, I analyze the scattered comments about friendship to unearth a working conception of friendship that distinguishes implicitly between "weak" and "strong" friendships. Second, I contextualize these comments about friendship by showing how they are consistent with Platonic political philosophy and Platonic philosophy of love and friendship. Third, I hold that the *Seventh Letter* provides lucid insight into why friendship matters for politics. Basically, the *Letter* shows that friendship is both useful for maintaining polities and necessary for coming to understand the ultimate goals at which polities should aim. I conclude by addressing two objections to friendship in the *Seventh Letter*, namely the practicability of such friendship and the tension between Plato's own conduct in the *Letter* and the advice he counsels.

CHAPTER 1: KNOWLEDGEABLE *HOMONOIA* AS A SOCRATIC MODEL OF POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP

INTRODUCTION

At both *Alcibiades I* 126b-127e and *Cleitophon* 409d-410a, Socrates and various interlocutors consider political friendship to involve a kind of *homonoia* (often translated as concord, unanimity, or agreement) based on shared knowledge between the citizens—or what I shall call 'knowledgeable *homonoia*.' In this chapter, I argue that the view that knowledgeable *homonoia* is a crucial element of political friendship is a serious one, that it is a viable and attractive idea of political friendship, and that it is so in a way that coheres with many positions characteristic of the Platonic Socrates.[5] For these reasons, I think it is fair to call it the 'Socratic model' of political friendship.

I develop my argument in four stages. First, I discuss the meaning and use of *homonoia* in key texts of classical Greece. I argue that we should not adopt the deflationary translation of *homonoia* as 'agreement' because in doing so we risk obscuring the clear political overtones of the term. Second, I argue that the view of political friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia* is presented in a generally positive light within *Cleitophon* and *Alcibiades I*. I show that the criticisms of political friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia* found in the dialogues are not to be taken as devastating, but instead are unpersuasive and surmountable. In the third and fourth sections, I respond to two general criticisms of this model of political friendship: (1) shared knowledge between citizens is an unattainable and thereby impracticable goal and (2) the claim that shared knowledge is tantamount to a kind of friendship obscures the most relevant features of friendship (e.g. shared experiences, intimacy, and emotional consonance). My conclusion is that the requirement of knowledgeable *homonoia* fits well

[5] My use of 'Socrates' and 'Socratic' refers to the character of the Platonic dialogues throughout unless otherwise noted. It should be mentioned that in the *Cleitophon*, it is not Socrates himself but an unnamed Socratic who suggests political friendship involves knowledgeable *homonoia*.

with the Socratic principles of virtue, knowledge, political authority, and methodology and that it is therefore not surprising that this description of political friendship is made in the context of Socratic discussions about politics.

1. What Is *Homonoia*? A Preliminary Look at *Homonoia* in Classical Greek Thought

Homonoia is primarily translated as either "agreement," "concord," or "unanimity," though there are other tenable translations (e.g. ones more faithful to the etymology of *homonoia* are "like-mindedness" and "sameness-of-mind"). Each of these translations captures something true about *homonoia*. "Agreement" is often a natural and reliable indicator of *homonoia*. "Concord" and "unanimity" connote the general getting-along (and the absence of faction [*stasis*]) among those who enjoy *homonoia*. "Like-mindedness" and "sameness-of-mind" bring out the epistemological bent of the term: what's going on in *homonoia* is the achievement of either identical or compatible epistemic states that allow concord and agreement to ensue. None of these translations, however, are fully adequate since each translation, while capturing something correct about *homonoia*, misses out on other important elements of the term found in the different translations.[6] In this section, I suggest that the use of *homonoia* as a political term is its primary use. One central consequence of this is that we should not render *homonoia* as "agreement," since such a translation lets in far too many phenomena that "*homonoia*" actually excludes. (This suggestion thereby anticipates one reason why the anonymous bystanders' objection to *homonoia* as political friendship in the *Cleitophon* constitutes an aberrant use.)

[6] Given that no single English word captures adequately the meaning of *homonoia* and any periphrastic I might think up would be too clunky (cf. Smith 2011's translation of *homonoia* as "a bond that could bring together otherwise unrelated or unallied groups"), I will leave it untranslated throughout so as to better preserve its multivalence. It should be noted, however, that the LSJ lexicon does not include "agreement" as a possible translation of *homonoia*; the three options it lists are "oneness of mind," "unanimity," and "concord." Liddell, Scott & Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon*, s.v. "ὁμόνοια."

Homonoia gains prominence in the fifth and fourth centuries among sophists (e.g. Antiphon and Thrasymachus), rhetoricians (e.g. Isocrates, Lysias and Demosthenes), historians (e.g. Thucydides and Xenophon) and philosophers (e.g. Plato and Aristotle). In each tradition, *homonoia* stands as a buzzword of sorts that connotes civic harmony; it conveys the recognition of a common purpose among a citizenry about what the *polis* should be doing or about who should be ruling and ruled.[7] Consider the following passages, one from each of the above traditions:

> (**T1**) Enough for us the time that has passed, and to be not at peace, but at war and in dangers until the present moment—for us who desire the day that has passed but fear the day that is coming—and to arrive not at *homonoia* but instead at hatred and troubles with one another.[8]
>
> *ἄλις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ παρελθὼν χρόνος καὶ ἀντὶ μὲν εἰρήνης ἐν πολέμῳ γενέσθαι καὶ διὰ κινδύνων εἰς τόνδε τὸν χρόνον, τὴν μὲν παρελθοῦσαν ἡμέραν ἀγαπῶσι, τὴν δ' ἐπιοῦσαν δεδιόσι, ἀντὶ δ' ὁμονοίας εἰς ἔχθραν καὶ ταραχὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀφικέσθαι.*
>
> Thrasymachus B1/D16

> (**T2**) We [Athenians] did not envy our allied cities when they grew, and we did not cause instability by promoting opposing forms of government so they might fight against one another and each try to curry our favor. On the contrary, we thought *homonoia* with the allies was for the common good, and so we managed all cities with the same laws, making policy for them as an ally and not as a despot, overseeing affairs as a whole, but allowing each city its own individual freedom.[9]

---

[7] See Keil 2017: 337-342 and Sinclair 1953: 60-62 for discussion of the origin of the term and its popularity in the fifth and fourth centuries. Also, see Mauro Bonazzi, "La concordia di Antifonte: cura di sé e degli altri fra democrazia e oligarchia" and Emidio Spinelli, "'Un commune sentire': amicizia e filosofia in Democrito" in Spinelli 2006 for discussion of *homonoia* and friendship in Antiphon and Democritus respectively.

[8] Laks and Most 2016, Most translation. I've left *homonoia* untranslated.

[9] Isocrates 2004, Papillon translation. Again, I've left *homonoia* untranslated, though Papillon here translates it as "unity." 'Unity' is an especially risky translation because it may imply that the similarity implicit within *homonoia* dissolves all

οὐ γὰρ ἐφθονοῦμεν ταῖς αὐξανομέναις αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ ταραχὰς ἐνεποιοῦμεν πολιτείας ἐναντίας παρακαθιστάντες, ἵν' ἀλλήλοις μὲν στασιάζοιεν, ἡμᾶς δ' ἀμφότεροι θεραπεύοιεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν συμμάχων ὁμόνοιαν κοινὴν ὠφέλειαν νομίζοντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις ἁπάσας τὰς πόλεις διῳκοῦμεν, συμμαχικῶς ἀλλ' οὐ δεσποτικῶς βουλευόμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅλων μὲν τῳν πραγμάτων ἐπιστατοῦντες, ἰδίᾳ δ' ἑκάστους ἐλευθέρους ἐῶντες εἶναι.

Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 104-105

(**T3**) And again, *homonoia* is deemed the greatest blessing for cities: their senates and their best men constantly exhort the citizens to be in *homonoia*, and everywhere in Greece there is a law that citizens shall promise under oath to be in *homonoia*, and everywhere they take this oath. The object of this, in my opinion, is not that citizens may vote for the same choirs, not that they may praise the same flute-players, not that they may select the same poets, not that they may like the same things, but that they may obey the laws. For those cities whose citizens abide by them prove strongest and enjoy the most happiness; but without *homonoia* no city can be made a good city, no house can be made a prosperous house.[10]

ἀλλά μὴν καὶ ὁμόνοιά γε μέγιστόν τε ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναι καὶ πλειστάκις ἐν αὐταῖς αἵ τε γερουσίαι καὶ οἱ ἄριστοι ἄνδρες παρακελεύονται τοῖς πολίταις ὁμονοεῖν, καὶ πανταχοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι νόμος κεῖται τοὺς πολίτας ὀμνύναι ὁμονοήσειν, καὶ πανταχοῦ ὀμνύουσι τὸν ὅρκον τοῦτον: οἶμαι δ' ἐγὼ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι οὐχ ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς χοροὺς κρίνωσιν οἱ πολῖται, οὐδ' ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς αὐλητὰς ἐπαινῶσιν, οὐδ' ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιητὰς αἱρῶνται, οὐδ' ἵνα τοῖς αὐτοῖς ᾄδωνται, ἀλλ' ἵνα τοῖς νόμοις πείθωνται τούτοις

difference and distinction between citizens or city-states. This kind of dissolution of all difference is not the appropriate unity of *homonoia*. See Tarn 1948: 400 for further discussion.

[10] Xenophon 1979-1986, Marchant translation with slight modification (including leaving *homonoia* untranslated).

γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐμμενόντων, αἱ πόλεις ἰσχυρόταταί τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέσταται γίγνονται: ἄνευ δὲ ὁμονοίας οὔτ' ἂν πόλις εὖ πολιτευθείη οὔτ' οἶκος καλῶς οἰκηθείη.

Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.4.16

(**T4**) For this reason, [*homonoia*] is not *homodoxia*, for the latter might occur even with people who do not know each other; nor do we say that people who have the same views on any and every subject enjoy *homonoia*, e.g. those who agree about the heavenly bodies (for *homonoia* about these is not a friendly relation). But we do say a city enjoys *homonoia* when people have the same opinion about what is to their interest, choose the same action, and do what they have resolved in common . . . *Homonoia* appears therefore to mean friendship between citizens, *which indeed is the ordinary use of the term*; for it refers to the interests and concerns of common life.[11]

διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία: τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπαρξειεν ἄν: οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταὐτὰ προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα . . . πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται: περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἥκοντα.

Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.6, 1167a22-b3, my emphasis

All of these passages, in addition to many more,[12] illustrate that *homonoia* is primarily a political term. Greek intellectuals of the fifth and fourth centuries deploy the term with near ubiquity in the context

[11] My translation based on text from Bywater 1920.

[12] Viz. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* 8.93, Lysias, *On the Confiscation of the Property of the Brother of Nicias* 17-18, *Defense Against the Charge of Subverting Democracy* 20-22, 27; Aristotle *Eudemian Ethics* VII.1241a15-35, *Magna Moralia* II.12, *Athenian Constitution* 40; Plato *Cleitophon* 409c-410a, *Alcibiades I* 126c-127d, *Statesman* 311a-b, *Republic* 351d, 432a; Demosthenes *On the Crown* 164-167, 246; Isocrates *Panathenaicus* 42, 258, *Nicocles* 41, *Phillipus* 16, 40, 141; Antiphon *Peri*

of discussing the relationships of citizens within the *polis*, or in the case of at least Isocrates, relationships between *poleis*.[13] Two points further support this claim. First, *homonoia* is often contrasted with either faction (*stasis*) or hatred (*exthra*) (e.g. **T1**). This contrast implies that *homonoia* describes relationships not only where faction and hatred are absent, but also where citizens or city-states comport themselves in a way that demonstrates care and concern for one another.

This care and concern lead to the second point: we also see *homonoia* frequently coupled with or identified as friendship (*philia*) in a political sense. In addition to Aristotle in *Nichomachean Ethics* IX.6, 1167a22-b3 (**T4**), *Magna Moralia* II.12, and elsewhere, Antiphon, Democritus, Demosthenes and Plato also pair *homonoia* with friendship.[14] This pairing seems natural because *homonoia* indicates friendly feelings between citizens or between city-states. This is not to say, however, that friendship and *homonoia* are fully interchangeable, since *homonoia* at least on the surface lacks the intimacy we associate with fuller senses of friendship.[15] At least in Plato, the reason why *homonoia* is frequently identified as friendship is because *homonoia* is the most relevant characteristic to political life. *Homonoia* ensures the longevity of the *polis* and thereby allows for the other characteristics of a fuller sense of friendship to bloom among citizens.

A central consequence of this survey of the use and meaning of *homonoia* is that "agreement" will not suffice as a translation since it lets in far too many cases that do not qualify as genuine

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Homonoias DK B65/D49, DK B62/D60, DK B64/D61; Democritus DK 68B 250, 255. In the Antiphon and Democritus citations, the D fragments refer to Laks-Most and the B fragments refer to Diels-Kranz.

[13] One reason Isocrates uses *homonoia* to describe the relationship between *poleis* is because of his ardent panhellenism, i.e. his belief that an alliance among Sparta, Athens, and the rest of Greece was the best way forward for the Greeks. Given this goal, it seems natural for Isocrates to deploy *homonoia* between *poleis* instead of between citizens in a single *polis* (which is by far its more common use).

[14] Viz. fn. 11.

[15] I will suggest in Section 3 that *homonoia* is an essential characteristic of political friendship, but it is not the sole one (and we thus should not reduce friendship to its epistemological grounding).

homonoia.[16] The thematical scope of *homonoia*, unlike 'agreement,' is limited predominantly to political matters.[17] Rarely, if at all, is *homonoia* used to denote a general sort of agreement. (The fifth and fourth century Greeks had other words for agreement generally, including the nouns *homodoxia* and *homologia* and the verbs *homologeô*, and *homognômoneô*.) We can for instance agree that mozzarella di bufala is superior to burrata, but one reason such an agreement would not count as *homonoia* is because, *ceteris paribus*, it does not pertain to political life.

Moreover, the epistemic demands of mere 'agreement' are far too lax for the Platonic conception of *homonoia*.[18] In *Cleitophon* and *Alcibiades I*, genuine *homonoia* only obtains when citizens possess shared knowledge (viz. **T5** and **T6**). In *Republic* and *Statesman*, genuine *homonoia* only obtains when at least some, but not all, citizens possess the relevant knowledge. These four dialogues thus exclude mere coincidence of opinion (*homodoxia*) as an instance of *homonoia*, though such a coincidence

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[16] *Pace* Denyer 2001 and Kamtekar 2004, each of whom translates *homonoia* as agreement. In his commentary on *Alcibiades I* 126c4, Denyer 2001: 202 claims that, "[t]he etymology of the word *ὁμόνοια* ('sameness of mind') allows it to stand for any sort of agreement." I think this is somewhat misleading. The etymology may allow this, but no extant Greek sources actually contain such a usage besides a bizarre exchange between Alcibiades and Socrates to be discussed later in this chapter. I will argue in Section 2 that Socrates is giving fishy arguments primarily to exhort Alcibiades to cultivate the self-knowledge and self-care necessary for political success. We should not view this exchange as one indicative of the general use and meaning of *homonoia*. Further, etymology is not interchangeable with meaning. We should be hesitant to ascribe this meaning to *homonoia* based solely on etymology, especially when the majority of extant sources appear to disconfirm such a meaning. Kamtekar 2004: 132-134 also translates, without argument, *homonoia* as agreement. One virtue among many of Kamtekar 2004, however, is that she clearly implies that *homonoia* is not agreement simply, but a certain kind of agreement restricted to a certain topic and restricted to a certain epistemology. The translation is nonetheless a potential source of confusion precisely because "agreement" normally does not have such restrictions.

[17] See especially **T3** and **T4**. The following excerpt from *Magna Moralia* II.12, 1212a14-21 is also illustrative of this point: "*Homonoia* borders close on friendship, if the kind of *homonoia* that you take is that which is strictly so called. For if one entertains the same notions as Empedocles and has the views about the elements as he, is he unanimous (*ὁμονοεῖ*) with Empedocles? Surely not! Since the same thing would have to hold in any like case. For to begin with, the sphere of *homonoia* is not matters of thought, but matters of action, and herein it is not in so far as they think the same, but in so far as in thinking the same they choose to do the same about what they think." (*ἡ δ' ὁμόνοιά ἐστιν μὲν σύνεγγυς τῇ φιλίᾳ, ἐὰν τὴν ὁμόνοιαν λάβῃς τὴν κυρίως λεγομένην. εἰ γάρ τις Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ ὁμοίως ὑπολαμβάνει καὶ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι ἅ κἀκείνῳ, ἆρά γε οὗτος Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ ὁμονοεῖ; ἢ οὔ; ἐπεὶ περί τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐχ ᾗ νοοῦσι ταὐτόν, ἀλλ' ᾗ ἅμα τῷ ταὐτὸν νοεῖν προαίρεσιν ἔχουσιν περὶ ἃ νοοῦσιν ἐπὶ ταὐτά.*)

[18] Kamtekar 2004: 133 is apt: "Plato's Socratic legacy prevents him from approving *ὁμόνοια*, understood as mere sameness of mind, irrespective of content and grounds."

often counts as agreement.[19] We can agree that real-estate magnates are unqualified to govern, but such agreement would not satisfy the requirements of Platonic *homonoia* until the grounds of our coincident beliefs are explored and plausible, compatible justifications for those beliefs are provided. In other words, the mere coincidence of belief is sufficient to constitute agreement but insufficient to constitute *homonoia*.[20]

2. *Homonoia* as Political Friendship in *Cleitophon* and *Alcibiades I*

With this linguistic history in mind, I turn now to defend the thesis that knowledgeable *homonoia* survives as a positive account of political friendship in *Cleitophon* and *Alcibiades I*. My first task will be to eliminate some preliminary obstacles to this interpretation, namely that in both dialogues the view seems to be quickly refuted and abandoned. On what grounds, then, do I infer that despite these refutations knowledgeable *homonoia* is taken to be the right account of political friendship? The first ground is that the logic and persuasiveness of these refutations is, upon close scrutiny, not very compelling. The second ground is that there are dramatic features of the dialogue—such as the specific interlocutors in *Cleitophon* and the previous discussions of politics earlier in *Alcibiades I*—that suggest the refutations are superficial.

The objections of knowledgeable *homonoia* that we find in the *Cleitophon* and *Alcibiades I* are not supposed to be taken as conclusive. In the two most common interpretations of the dialogue, the objection of the *Cleitophon* either challenges (1) the uniqueness of knowledgeable *homonoia* (which is identified with friendship) as the product of justice, because it is also considered the product of other crafts, or contends that (2) knowledgeable *homonoia* is a circular regress because justice itself is a kind

[19] See **T4** for further confirmation of this point.

[20] McKeen and Smith 2018: 147-149 also provide valuable discussion of why *homonoia* should not be translated as 'agreement,' especially in the passages of *Alcibiades I*.

of knowledge.[21] I suggest that both interpretations are misguided because they fail to see that the objection itself rests on a contentious and aberrant use of *homonoia*. As an alternative, I propose a reading that instead preserves the Socratic's initial answer of knowledgeable *homonoia* as a positive element of political friendship and reveals that the objections to the Socratic's views are uncharitable and borderline sophistic.

The *Alcibiades I* raises two further problems against knowledgeable *homonoia*, one about the meaning of *homonoia* and another about this model's internal consistency concerning plausible ideas of justice, *homonoia*, and friendship. My view is that in each of these problems Socrates is using specious arguments to exhort Alcibiades toward practices of self-knowledge and self-care. That is, the goal of offering bad arguments is to elicit a reaction and turn Alcibiades toward learning something. If these arguments are specious but protreptic, then there is nothing inherently problematic about the model of political friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia*. There is only something problematic in how Alcibiades defends, or rather fails to defend, the account of political friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia*.

2.1 An Objection to *Homonoia* as Friendship at *Cleitophon* 410a

The previous discussion of the meaning of *homonoia* segues nicely into addressing the objection to friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia* at *Cleitophon* 410a because the potency of this objection depends largely on what *homonoia* means. After reviewing the objection, I will argue that it is unpersuasive because it uses '*homonoia*' aberrantly, trying to expand its meaning to agreement in general when in fact *homonoia* carries no such meaning.

Let's first consider the following passage:

[21] These are the two most common approaches in scholarship, as discussed below in Section 2.1.1.

(**T5**) Finally, Socrates, one of your friends answered—and he really seemed quite clever in saying this—that the product unique to justice and not shared by any of the other skills is to produce friendship within the cities . . . real and true friendship is most precisely *homonoia*. When asked whether he considered this *homonoia* to be shared belief or knowledge, he rejected the former suggestion since he was forced to admit that many men's shared beliefs are harmful, whereas he had agreed that friendship is entirely good and is the product of justice; so he said that *homonoia* is the same, being knowledge, not belief.

Now by the time we reached this point in the argument, having really made no progress, the bystanders were able to take him to task and say that the argument had gone around in a circle back to where it began.

"Medicine too," they said, "is a sort of *homonoia*, as is every skill, and they all can say what they're *about*. But what you call 'justice' and '*homonoia*' has no idea what it's aiming at, and so it's not clear what its product could be." *Cleitophon* 409d-410a

Here an unnamed Socratic suggests that the unique product of justice is friendship in the cities. Friendship, this Socratic explains, is best understood as knowledgeable *homonoia*. A group of anonymous bystanders then responds with the following objection: Friendship as *homonoia* cannot be the unique product of justice because other arts (*technai*), including medicine, also involve *homonoia*.

2.1.1 Objections to *Cleitophon* 410a and a Response

The crux of deciding whether this objection refutes the Socratic's claim lies in deciding whether *homonoia* is the unique product of justice or whether it is true that medicine (or any other art) involves *homonoia*. If the latter is true, then the Socratic's claim is bunk. If not, then the premise of the objection, and thus the objection itself, is incorrect. I adopt the latter position: on my reading medicine and the other arts do not involve *homonoia*. Most scholars who have remarked on this passage, however, adopt

the former position: they take this objection to be a fatal refutation of the unnamed Socratic's proposal.[22]

In an alternative interpretation, Slings 1999 offers a different reason for why he thinks this refutation is persuasive. The problem is not that **T5** violates the uniqueness condition for the product of justice, but that it's a circular regress.[23] He formalizes the argument from **T5** as follows:

(1) Justice is knowledge and has a result.

(2) Its result is *ὁμόνοια*.

(3) *Ὁμόνοια* is shared knowledge.

(4) The result of justice as knowledge is knowledge.[24]

I consider the central problem with Slings' rendition of the argument to be the construal of (3). The Greek verb *εἶναι* ("to be") is notoriously flexible, leaving readers with an array of translation options.[25]

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[22] See Bruell 1999: 198-199, Marrin 2017: 310-312, Moore 2012: 265, Orwin 1982: 748-749, Roochnik 1984: 137, and Slings 1999: 175-177. Kremer 2000: 490-491 is a bit more reticent to label this exchange an explicit refutation, but nevertheless seems to think that the underlying idea of friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia* is somehow flawed. With the exception of Slings 1999, none of these authors examine the argument in great depth. Most just simply note that a refutation occurs, but not why the refutation according to them is sound and compelling.

[23] Bailly 2003: 157-158 follows Slings 1999's argument here for the most part. Bailly insightfully notes that the violation of the uniqueness condition and the circular regress are not necessarily mutually exclusive options. That is, it very well may be the case that the regress leads to a formulation of the product of justice that is so vague that it is also characteristic of other arts. Thus, the vagueness of the regression also fails to satisfy the uniqueness requirement. My position, I believe, is unaffected by however we construe this problem.

[24] Slings 1999: 175. To his credit, Slings seems to be rightly cautious about how he renders this argument. Viz. Slings 1999: 176 where he leaves open the possibility that *homonoia* can be construed otherwise: "[The circular regress] of the *Clitophon* does not invalidate [the underlying principle]: if it turns out that to define the result as *ὁμόνοια* creates a regress, it is proved at the most that we had wrongly defined *ὁμόνοια* (step 3), or the result of justice (step 2)."

[25] I should also note that this ambiguity also holds up to some extent in English. When I say that apples are fruits, laws are codes, and pugs are cuddlers, it is unclear from the statements alone whether I intend a relation of identity between subjects and predicates. I could just as well mean that each predicate highlights a necessary feature of what it means for that subject to be itself (but those features are certainly not the only necessary ones). Cf. LSJ, *Greek-English Lexicon*, s.v. "*εἶναι*."

McKeen and Smith 2018: 147, fn.12 discuss explicitly this flexibility of *εἶναι* in regard to *homonoia* and friendship in the context of *Alcibiades I*. There they offer a list of five possible interpretations of how *homonoia* and friendship relate. Also, Kahn 1966 and Kahn 1981 are helpful for this issue. Consider Kahn 1981: 105: "But I want to insist that the uses of *εἶναι* in Plato (as in Greek generally) are often *overdetermined*: several grammatical readings of a single occurrence are not only possible but sometimes required for the full understanding of the text." Finally, Brown 1994: 213-215 is also helpful on the predicative and identity senses of certain sentences with the copula in Plato.

When reading *Cleitophon* 409e4-5—*τὴν δὲ ὁμόνοιαν ἐρωτώμενος εἰ ὁμοδοξίαν εἶναι λέγοι ἢ ἐπιστήμην* ("when asked whether by *homonoia* [the unnamed Socratic] means it to be unity of opinion or knowledge")—Slings understands this question to be one of identity.[26] That is, Slings thinks the question concerns whether *homonoia* is identical to either *homodoxia* or *epistêmê*. Grammatically this interpretation is perfectly reasonable, but it's certainly not the only reasonable one. The problem of this interpretation is evident in Slings' argument: if we take *homonoia* to be identical to (shared) knowledge, then the argument succumbs to a circular and uninformative regress in large part because it permits Slings' inference of (4).

The flexibility of *εἶναι* though allows us to read the relation at issue also as an inclusion or predicative relation (and not identity one).[27] On my view the unnamed Socratic is being asked about what sort of epistemic state is included in *homonoia*: Does *homonoia* only obtain when there is shared knowledge or does unity of belief suffice? One upshot of my reading is that this interpretation makes the argument much more plausible because it avoids the regress in Slings 1999. Another upshot is that my reading seems more sympathetic to the use of *homonoia* in the fifth and fourth centuries (viz. Section 1), where it is never taken to be identical to some epistemic state. *Homonoia* roughly means political concord that arises on the basis of compatible epistemic states. The question being put to the unnamed Socratic seeks to clarify not whether *homonoia* is reducible to its epistemic features but rather what precisely are those epistemic features that are included in *homonoia*. Knowledgeable *homonoia* as the

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[26] Slings 1999: 254-255. I have modified the translation: where Slings translates *homonoia* as "concord," I leave it untranslated. Again, see note 24 for discussion of Slings' apparent awareness of this problem.

[27] The same general flexibility of *εἶναι* can also be seen in Meno's third definition of virtue at *Meno* 73d-e: "I at least think, Socrates, that justice is virtue" (*οἶμαι ἔγωγε ἡ γὰρ δικαισούνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετή ἐστιν*). Socrates' immediate response here seeks to clarify the ambiguity of this phrasing in a way that Cleitophon and the anonymous bystanders fail to do: "Virtue, Meno, or some virtue?" (*πότερον ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετή τις*;). Also, *Sophist* 259a4-b1 makes a similar point about the ambiguity in discussing how Difference both is being and not-being. See Leigh 2008: 116 for discussion of *Sophist*. See Charles 2006 for a brief but helpful discussion of *Meno* and for further references to this same kind of semantic flexibility in Plato.

product of justice is not circular because, even granting that justice is knowledge, this kind of friendship involves more than shared knowledge. It's rather that one important feature of this friendship, and a feature that makes it continuous with (and not regressive toward) justice is its grounding in shared knowledge.

One popular reason scholars find the bystanders' objection to be successful is because the alleged failure of the Socratic's answer shows that justice is not a *technê*.[28] Essentially, this reading of the passage claims that any answer to Cleitophon's question about the unique product of justice was doomed to failure because the activity of justice is not productive in the precise way that *technai* are productive. And it's wrongheaded of Cleitophon to ask (and the Socratic to answer) this sort of question. To address adequately the issue of justice as *technê* in *Cleitophon* would require wading into a longstanding and complex debate in Plato scholarship about whether the virtues are *technai*, and if so, to what extent they are—all of which seems tangential to my discussion here.[29] It should be sufficient for my purposes, however, to provide the following conditional response. If I'm right that this objection is, at bottom, unpersuasive and incorrect, then the conclusion that justice is not a *technê* (based solely on this alleged refutation) is unwarranted. My response nevertheless remains uncommitted about whether or in what sense justice is a *technê*. What I am committed to is that an argument different from one that rests on the bystanders' objection is needed to demonstrate this.

The final reason why most scholars consider the refutation persuasive, I imagine, is that they find "agreement" a satisfactory translation of *homonoia*. For if we read *homonoia* as "agreement" (and this is how both Gonzalez 1997 and Slings 1999: 319 translate it, though Slings translates it as "concord" elsewhere), the objection appears much more lucid. Surely medicine and all other arts involve some

[28] See, *inter alia*, Kremer 2000: 491, Orwin 1982: 749 ff., and Marrin 2017: 312-315 for various renditions of this view.

[29] I address the *technê* issue more directly in my discussion of the kind of knowledge at work in 'knowledgeable *homonoia*' in Section 3.1.2.

sort of knowledgeable agreement. Knowledgeable doctors agree about diagnoses, knowledgeable shipbuilders agree about shipbuilding, and so on. On this reading, practitioners of justice have no right to lay claim to knowledgeable agreement as the unique product they create. And good on the anonymous bystanders for pointing it out.

As I've argued in the previous section, however, we should not translate *homonoia* in such a deflationary manner. The Greek intellectual milieu in the fifth and fourth centuries treats *homonoia* as the friendship characteristic of a polity that arises from the citizens' epistemic parity. This milieu does not treat *homonoia* as agreement in general. What the Socratic most likely intends by *homonoia* is the term's primary signification as political concord among citizens.

When we read this passage with this understanding of *homonoia* in mind, the lethal bite of the objection suddenly becomes a soft nibble. For starters, as far as I'm aware, no medical literature from the fifth and fourth centuries deploys *homonoia* as a medical term in any sense.[30] And even if *homonoia* had some currency in the medical literature at this time, that would only show that there are two established senses of *homonoia*. It would not rule out that *homonoia* in its political valence is the unique product of justice. It would show at most that the uniqueness of *homonoia* to justice is not lexical. This lexical uniqueness of *homonoia* though does not seem to be what the unnamed Socratic was attempting to express anyways.

When we read **T5** with sensitivity to the meaning and use of *homonoia*, we should be skeptical towards the anonymous bystanders' contention that medicine and all other arts involve *homonoia*. Their objection is much like saying judges are not the only ones who issue verdicts, since teachers'

[30] Then only record of *homonoia* in medicine from the fifth and fourth centuries that I've found comes, surprisingly enough, from elsewhere in Plato. Erixymachus admits that he is speaking poetically when he claims that on account of Asclepius's tutelage physicians have learned how to bring about *homonoia* among the bodily elements (cf. *Symposium* 186e-187c). It would nonetheless be a pretty tenuous argument to suppose that medical practice in this time involves *homonoia*, with the primary evidence being one character's claim (a character with a penchant for hyperbole no less) in a Platonic dialogue. It is not until 2 A.D.—nearly six centuries later—that a medical author claims sincerely *homonoia* for the practice of medicine (viz. Galen, *Quod quibus catharticis medicamentis et quando purgare oporteat*, 2.25.3). I am indebted to Cindy Patterson for discussion of this point.

assignment of grades, film critics' evaluation of films, and gourmands' appraisal of restaurants are also verdicts. At best, this kind of objection rests on a misunderstanding of the linguistic context of 'verdict' which then causes the aberrant use of the term to topics where it is normally ill-fitting or excessively metaphorical. At worst, it is an eristic sophism that intentionally equivocates the meaning of a term so as to trip up one's interlocutor. Either way, it is unpersuasive.

The same holds for the objection in the *Cleitophon*.[31] The logic of the Socratic's claim that friendship is a kind of knowledgeable *homonoia* remains unaffected by the anonymous bystanders' objection, because, in a very real sense, their objection rests on false premises: it is simply not true that medicine and all other arts involve *homonoia*. The immediate consequence of this is that the uniqueness condition of justice has not been violated and there is thus no reason to consider the bystander's objection to be a decisive refutation.

2.2 Objections to Knowledgeable *Homonoia* as Political Friendship in *Alcibiades I*

The *Alcibiades I* raises two problems about knowledgeable *homonoia* as political friendship. The principal passage where these problems are evident is 126b8-127d8, which despite its length is worth quoting in full:

> (**T6.1**) [S]: Well then, what about a city? What is it that's present or absent when it's in a better condition and getting better management and treatment?
>
> [A]: The way I look at it, Socrates, mutual friendship will be present (*φιλία μὲν αὐτοῖς γίγνηται πρὸς ἀλλήλους*), and hatred and insurrection (*τὸ μισεῖν δὲ καὶ στασιάζειν*) will be absent.
>
> [S]: When you say 'friendship', do you mean *homonoia* or *dichonoia*?

[31] In fact, one consequence of my argument here is that it actually further supports the central point made by other readers of the *Cleitophon* (e.g. Marrin 2017, Moore 2012, and Roochnik 1984): Cleitophon's chastising of Socrates actually reveals Cleitophon's own lack of self-awareness and other shortcomings. His recounting of these anonymous bystanders' objection to Socrates without awareness of the objection's faults attests to Cleitophon's own insensitivity to argumentative rigor and sympathetic engagement with one's interlocutors.

[A]: *Homonoia.*

[S]: What skill (*τέχνην*) is it that makes cities agree (*ὁμονοοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις*) about numbers?

[A]: Arithmetic.

[S]: What about private citizens? Isn't it the same skill?

[A]: Yes.

[S]: And doesn't it also make each person agree with himself?

[A]: Yes.

[S]: And what skill is it that makes each of us agree (*ὁμονοεῖ*) with himself about whether a hand's-width is larger than an arm's-length? It's measuring, isn't it?

[A]: Of course.

[S]: Doesn't it make both cities and private citizens agree?

[A]: Yes.

[S]: And isn't it the same with weighing?

[A]: It is.

[S]: Well, this agreement you're talking about, what is it? What's it about? What skill provides it? Doesn't the same skill make both a city and a private citizen agree, both with themselves and with others? (*ἦν δὲ δὴ σὺ λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν, τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ τοῦ, καὶ τίς αὐτὴν τέχνη παρασκεύζει; καὶ ἆρα ἥπερ πόλει, αὐτὴ καὶ ἰδιώτῃ, αὐτῷ τε πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον;*)

[A]: That does seem quite likely.

[S]: What is it then? Don't give up. Try your best to tell me.

[A]: I suppose I mean the sort of friendship and *homonoia* you find when a mother and father agree with a son they love (*ὑὸν φιλῶν ὁμονοεῖ*), and when a brother agrees with his brother, and a woman agrees with her husband. *Alcibiades I*, 126b8-126e4

Once Alcibiades provides family relationships as examples of the kind of friendship he intends, Socrates proceeds with the following *reductio,* showing that Alcibiades' putative account of political friendship is inconsistent with his idea of justice:

> (**T6.2**) [S]: Well, Alcibiades, do you think that a husband is able to agree (*δύνασθαι ὁμονοεῖν*) with his wife about wool-working, when he doesn't understand it and she does (*τὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενον τῇ ἐπισταμένῃ*)?
>
> [A]: Of course not.
>
> [S]: Nor does he have any need to, because that's for a woman to know about.
>
> [A]: That's right.
>
> [S]: And is a woman able to agree (*δύναιτ᾽ ἄν ὁμονοεῖν*) with her husband about military tactics, without having learned about it?
>
> [A]: Of course not.
>
> [S]: I suppose you'd say that that's for a man to know about.
>
> [A]: I would.
>
> [S]: So, according to your argument, some subjects are women's subjects and some are men's subjects.
>
> [A]: Of course.
>
> [S]: So, in these areas at least, there's no *homonoia* between men and women. (*οὐκ ἄπα ἔν γε τούτοις ἐστὶν ὁμόνοια γυναιξὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας*)
>
> [A]: No.
>
> [S]: Nor is there any friendship, since friendship was *homonoia.* (*οὐδ᾽ ἄρα φιλία, εἴπερ ἡ φιλία ὁμόνοια ἦν*)
>
> [A]: Apparently not.

[S]: So when women do their own work they are not loved by men (*τὰ αὐτῶν πράττουσιν οὐ φιλοῦνται*).

[A]: It seems not.

[S]: Nor are men loved by women, insofar as they do theirs.

[A]: No.

[S]: So neither are cities well governed when the different groups each do their own work. (*οὐδ᾽ εὖ ἄρα ταύτῃ οἰκοῦνται αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι πράττωσιν*;)

[A]: But I think they *are*, Socrates.

[S]: What do you mean? In that case there's no friendship in cities, but we said friendship was present when cities are well governed, and not otherwise. (*πῶς λέγεις, φιλίας μὴ παρούσης, ἧς ἔφαμεν ἐγγιγνομένης εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι τὰς πόλεις, ἄλλως δ᾽ οὔ*;)

[A]: But I think it's when each person does his own work that mutual friendship results. (*ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ᾽ αὐτοῖς φιλία ἐγγίνεσθαι, ὅτι τὰ αὑτῶν ἑκάτεροι πράττουσιν*.)

[S]: You've just changed your mind. What do you mean now? Can there be friendship without *homonoia*? Can there be any *homonoia* when some know about the matter and others don't (*οἱ μὲν ἴσασι περὶ τούτων, οἱ δ᾽ οὔ*;)?

[A]: There can't possibly.

[S]: But when everyone does his own work, is everyone being just or unjust? (*δίκαια δὲ πράττουσιν ἢ αδικα, ὅταν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι πράττωσιν*;)

[A]: Just, of course.

[S]: So when the citizens do what is just in the city, there is no friendship between them. (*τὰ δίκαια οὖν πραττόντων ἐν πόλει τῶν πολιτῶν φιλία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται πρὸς ἀλλήλους*;)

[A]: Again, Socrates, I think there must be.

> [S]: Then what *do* you mean by this 'friendship' and '*homonoia*' that we must be wise and good advisers in if we're to be good men? I can't figure out what it is, or who's got it. According to your argument, it seems that sometimes certain people have it and sometimes they don't.
>
> [A]: Well Socrates, I swear by the gods that I don't even know what I mean. I think I must have been in an appalling state for a long time, without being aware of it.

Alc. I 126e5-127d8

In these passages, the first problem about political friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia* concerns Socrates and Alcibiades' bizarre use of *homonoia* throughout **T6.1**. They use *homonoia* as if it's tantamount to agreement, which challenges my interpretation in Section I that *homonoia* should not be understood as agreement. The second problem is one of consistency. Throughout **T6.1-2**, Socrates elicits Alcibiades' acceptance of three *prima facie* plausible ideas: (1) friendship is the barometer of just cities, (2) friendship involves knowledgeable *homonoia*, and (3) justice is when each does his or her own work. Ultimately, these three principles are shown to conflict because Socrates and Alcibiades' interpretations of (2) and (3) form an inconsistent set. I will argue that this problem arises from Socrates' excessively strict interpretation of (and Alcibiades' failure to defend adequately) (3). A more sympathetic and plausible interpretation of (2) and (3) makes the set consistent.

2.2.1 Socrates' Use of Suspicious Arguments and Its Justification

In both of these problems, I contend that Socrates is deploying suspicious arguments in an effort to exhort Alcibiades to recognize his ignorance, practice self-care, and cultivate self-knowledge. If this is correct, then we can see that Socrates would have good justification for misinterpreting key aspects of Alcibiades' thoughts. We can also see that if Alcibiades were better prepared, he might actually be able to defend the model of political friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia* that, with Socrates' help, he puts forth. The problems Socrates highlights in *Alcibiades I* are not problems inherent in the model

of political friendship, but they are rather problems concerning Alcibiades' ability to express and defend this model adequately.

Near the beginning of *Alcibiades I*, Socrates declares to an arrogant (*megalophrôn*) Alcibiades, who has haughtily shunned all of his suitors, that Alcibiades desires the renown and glory that comes from being an influential politician and political advisor (*Alc. I* 105a-b). Alcibiades and Socrates later accept that a competent politician must possess the relevant knowledge and understanding (*epistêmê*) to advise the *polis* soundly (*Alc. I*, 107c4-5, 108e5-109a5). Much of the rest of the dialogue portrays Socrates testing Alcibiades about whether he possesses the knowledge necessary to be a competent politician.

Socrates' methods for evaluating Alcibiades' competency are manifold, including standard Socratic *elenchos* (e.g. *Alc. I*, 106c3-108e4) and comparisons of Alcibiades' upbringing to those of rival Spartan and Persian leaders (*Alc. I*, 120e-124c).[32] Another method is subtler, but equally useful: the deployment of specious arguments with protreptic purposes. At first glance, this method may seem disingenuous and eristic. Why, we might ask, would Socrates use bad arguments in his investigation of whether Alcibiades knows what he claims to know? My aim in this section is to establish that Socrates has at least three good reasons for deploying specious arguments and to show that **T6.1** and **T6.2** are instances of such arguments.[33]

The first reason is because bad arguments successfully test, even if indirectly, Alcibiades' pretensions to knowledge. One power of possessing knowledge is the ability to recognize instances of

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[32] For stimulating discussion of the significance of this latter method and its effect on Alcibiades, see Foucault 2005: 33-38.

[33] I do not see a way of judging decisively whether Socrates is deploying specious arguments intentionally or unintentionally; my suspicion—and it is only a suspicion—is that it is the former. Ultimately though, I don't think that determining Socrates' intention bears too much on my argument here. It's fine for my purposes that the arguments are bad, and that Alcibiades fails to recognize why there are bad even though he claims to possess some kind of political knowledge.

non-knowledge in the relevant area. I can demonstrate my knowledge of chess not only by showing what moves improve my position, but also by showing what moves would blunder away my winning chances. If Alcibiades really does possess political knowledge, he should be able to recognize faulty arguments about the *polis*. The use of specious arguments thereby examines Alcibiades' alleged knowledge by seeing if he can diagnose instances of non-knowledge in the relevant subject matter.

The second reason for the permissibility of this method is that Socrates has already used other methods to test Alcibiades, and they have been to no avail. In the first half of the dialogue, Socrates' questioning reveals in at least two ways that Alcibiades appears not to have the knowledge he claims. First, Alcibiades has shown that he does not know the difference between justice and injustice, which he must know if he is to be a competent politician (*Alc. I*, 109a-118e). Second, Socrates' questioning shows that Alcibiades has not practiced the self-cultivation necessary for an Athenian leader to possess if he is to promote the welfare of the Athenians accurately and efficiently (*Alc. I*, 119a-124e). Either of these discussions ought to be enough to show that Alcibiades lacks the requisite knowledge to be a successful politician. Yet Alcibiades nevertheless remains committed to the belief that he is ready to begin his political career (*Alc. I*, 119b-c).

The third reason derives from Alcibiades' stubborn and dispiriting behavior in the dialogue. Alcibiades has shown that he is unwilling to listen to reasoned arguments, the consequences of which would prevent his political career from beginning. Socrates' gloss on this situation is that Alcibiades is ignorant of his ignorance. Even though he doesn't possess knowledge, Alcibiades still thinks he does (*Alc. I*, 118a). In this situation, a common Socratic tactic to encourage recognition of one's ignorance is to induce *aporia* in the interlocutor. And a typical way for Socrates to effect this is by using specious arguments that might bring otherwise plausible ideas to naught.[34] My position is that Socrates'

[34] It's no secret that many of Socrates' arguments throughout the Platonic dialogues are subpar, especially when excerpted from their context. One reason these arguments might be of some value though is due to how they respond to the behavior of given interlocutors. Meno's parroting of Gorgias in *Meno* may require Socrates to make a dubitable argument so that

fishy arguments have the necessary effect of getting Alcibiades to realize that he needs to change his way of life if he is to realize his promise. In classifying the arguments of **T6.1** and **T6.2** as specious, we will see that the possibility is left open that there is some sense to what Alcibiades' has put forth, but Alcibiades himself is not in a position to defend it adequately.

2.2.2 Socrates and Alcibiades' Perplexing Use of *Homonoia*

When Socrates poses the question in **T6.1** whether by friendship Alcibiades means *homonoia* or *dichonoia* (i.e. the opposite of *homonoia*, often translated as "discord" or "disagreement"), Alcibiades chooses the latter option (likely in part because of how en vogue *homonoia* was in the fourth century [viz. Section 1 of this chapter]). Socrates next offers very strange examples of *homonoia*, which Alcibiades nevertheless finds to be appropriate ones and then offers his own strange examples. Socrates, using *homonoeô*,[35] a verbal relative of *homonoia*, offers agreement about arithmetic, measuring, and weighing as instances of the kind of *homonoia* Alcibiades has in mind. This is odd for several reasons. First, already at *Alc. I* 111b-112e, Socrates and Alcibiades established that experts in a given profession will always agree about matters of their profession. And in that passage, Socrates' uses a much more common verb for agreement: *homologeô*. It thus seems unnecessary that Socrates has chosen to change from a more common and already-used word for agreement to one that is less common but obviously etymologically related to *homonoia*.[36]

Meno will begin to wake up and think for himself. Charmides' repeating of Critias' definition of *sôphrosynê* in *Charmides* may likewise force Socrates to see if Charmides really knows what he's talking about by slipping Charmides a bad argument. This list could go on and on.

[35] Unlike *homonoia*, the LSJ lists "to agree" as a possible translation of *homonoeô*. Like *homonoia*, however, *homonoeô*'s use in the fifth and fourth centuries is still primarily political. So, though *homonoeô* can signify agreement, its use here to signify not obviously political instances of agreement, especially given the context of Alcibiades' use of *homonoia*, still makes this passage rather strange.

[36] McKeen and Smith 2018: 144-149 hosts a for-the-most-part complementary discussion of the dangers of conflating *homonoia* and *homonoein* with *homologia* and *homologein* in *Alcibiades I*.

Second, none of the examples Socrates and Alcibiades provide reflect common uses of *homonoia*. Indeed, it appears to be precisely these cases of agreement that Xenophon in **T3** and Aristotle in **T4** seek to exclude from the ambit of *homonoia*. Some questions we should thus ask about **T6.1** are: Why does Socrates use *homonoeô* instead of *homologeô* to talk about the agreement between, e.g., the arithmeticians? Why does Socrates choose such odd examples to illustrate Alcibiades' claim that political friendship is *homonoia*? And why does Socrates use *homonoia* in a way that defies its meaning in the fifth and fourth centuries?

A single response can answer all of these questions: all of these oddities challenge Alcibiades' understanding. If Alcibiades really grasped why *homonoia* serves as an attractive element of political friendship, he should be able to recognize that Socrates' use of *homonoeô* is likely contentious, that the examples Socrates provides aren't really examples of the relevant phenomena, and that Socrates' general understanding of *homonoia* as political friendship confounds how the historians, orators, sophists, and philosophers of the fifth and fourth centuries treat *homonoia*. Alcibiades, of course, does none of this. In so doing, he demonstrates (in yet another way) his lack of understanding about politics. He also consigns knowledgeable *homonoia* as political friendship to a premature refutation that could have been avoided if Alcibiades were better prepared to defend the essential points of the account.

2.2.3 The Inconsistency of Socrates' Exclusivist Interpretation of Justice

The problem of Alcibiades' account is made even more explicit when Socrates shows Alcibiades that his ideas of justice, friendship, and knowledgeable *homonoia* are inconsistent.[37] Throughout **T6.1-2**, Alcibiades accepts three ideas:

(1) Friendship is the touchstone of political justice, i.e. the presence of friendship in the city signals that the city is governed justly. (*Alc. I*, 126b7-c2)

[37] This inconsistency has been noted by several scholars. See Denyer 2001: 199-206, Kamtekar 2004: 137-138, McKeen and Smith 2018: 147-148, and, among ancient commentators, Olympiodorus 2016: 190,1 – 191, 4.

(2) Political friendship involves shared, knowledgeable *homonoia*. (*Alc. I*, 126c2-127b1)

(3) Justice is when each does his or her own work. (*Alc. I*, 127c5-6)

The putative inconsistency arises when, per Socrates' example of husband and wife in **T6.2**, Alcibiades accepts what I call an 'exclusivist interpretation' of (3). The exclusivist interpretation maintains that when each person does his or her own work, 'one's own work' is understood in such a way that any work X has no overlapping domain of knowledge or understanding with any other work Y. A weaver only knows about weaving; a general knows only about generalship; and neither knows anything about the other's art. The exclusivist interpretation of (3) makes the set inconsistent because it makes shared knowledge between two people who each do their own work impossible. And, since shared knowledge is a requirement for *homonoia* in (2), and (2) is in some way an elaboration of (1), Alcibiades is forced to admit that even though he claims that friendship is the touchstone of justice, friendship is impossible when justice occurs.

2.2.4 Towards an Inclusivist Interpretation of Justice

This inconsistency can be easily resolved by either modifying (2) or (3). If Alcibiades drops the shared knowledge requirement of *homonoia* and replaces it with a less epistemically demanding account of *homonoia*, then the inconsistency with (3) may very well disappear. I will argue in Section 3, however, that there are compelling reasons not to resolve the inconsistency in this way and to offer instead an alternative interpretation of (3).

Indeed, it seems more plausible and philosophically charitable to change the exclusivist interpretation of (3) to an inclusivist one.[38] By 'inclusivist interpretation' I mean an understanding of

[38] Christopher Moore has suggested to me that another solution to this problem is to drop the general description of justice as doing one's own work altogether. The *Cleitophon*, for instance, treats justice only as a *technê* and does not rest on this kind of description. I think, however, that Alcibiades' description is a promising way to understand justice and that the best solution to this problem should aim to retain the initial plausibility of Alcibiades' account. I do agree, however, that dropping this description would in fact resolve the problem.

justice as "each doing one's own work" where one's own work, while still being a distinct activity, does not prohibit the possibility of overlapping domains of knowledge or understanding. The weaver still weaves and the general still conducts generalship, but it's possible that the weaver can know something about generalship and the general can know something about weaving. This inclusivist interpretation, as a more compelling understanding of justice, seems more charitable for two reasons.

First, Socrates' exclusivist interpretation of his division-of-labor definition of justice in *Alcibiades I* appears to be a specious tactic that aims at challenging Alcibiades to articulate his account more clearly. In other words, it is a specious tactic with a protreptic goal. In fact, Socrates has used this exclusivist interpretation elsewhere to similar effect.[39] If Alcibiades actually knew what he meant, he would see that Socrates' exclusivist interpretation is too stringent and should be replaced with a more robust, inclusivist one. When Alcibiades fails to do this and becomes perplexed, we see that the *aporia*-inducing function of Socrates' specious arguments has finally been achieved, for it is right at the end of **T6.1-2** that Alcibiades finally starts to appreciate the gravity of his ignorance (*Alc. I* 127d-e). He and Socrates then begin their discussion of how practices of self-care and self-knowledge may alleviate Alcibiades' ignorance and make him a competent political advisor.

Second, the inclusivist interpretation is more charitable because it is a more plausible understanding of justice. Above all, the inclusivist interpretation resolves the initial inconsistency between Alcibiades' initial three propositions. Since the inclusivist account permits shared knowledge

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[39] Several scholars have noticed that Socrates' use of this exclusivist interpretation to refute a definition of *sôphrosunê* at *Charmides* 161b3-5 is admittedly specious but also protreptic. See Brann 2011: 76-77, Gonzalez 1998: 45-47, and Roochnik 1996: 110. Brann 2011: 76-77 points out that Socrates appears to be trying to dissuade Charmides from relying on stock definitions that nix Charmides' personal commitment to philosophical discourse. Brann contends, however, that Charmides is doomed to misunderstand justice since "outside this psychological context [of the *Republic*] the formula 'doing one's own thing' is unintelligible." The formula's intelligibility, however, need not rely only on the psychology and political structure of the *Republic*. It's popularity throughout antiquity—where most thinkers obviously didn't rely on the psychological structure of the *Republic*—attests to this. So, while Brann is correct to point out that for Charmides this formula is indeed unintelligible, it's not because Charmides is unaware of the psychology of the *Republic*. It's rather because Charmides simply cannot reconcile the exclusivist interpretation of the definition with the actual phenomena of *sôphrosunê* as he sees it. And while one way of reconciliation is to utilize the psychology of *Republic*, a principal aim of this chapter is to show that other, distinct ways are also available. See Moore and Raymond 2019 for further discussion.

between different professions, the requirement of shared knowledge for *homonoia* no longer conflicts with the understanding of justice. Moreover, we find additional support in *Republic*, where an inclusivist interpretation is given to the definition of justice at *Republic* IV.433a7-8—a definition that is practically identical to the one in **T6.2** and remains substantively unchanged throughout the rest of the *Republic*.[40] At a minimum, we can see that the inclusivist interpretation in the *Republic* is compelling enough to anchor the rest of that discussion of justice. The substantive difference between the *Republic* and *Alcibiades I*, however, is that the inclusivist interpretation in the former dialogue does not require all citizens to have some kind of shared knowledge, whereas the latter dialogue does. Leaving aside this difference for the moment, it seems entirely plausibly on an intuitive level that a general can know something about weaving and a weaver can know something about generalship, though neither one need be versed in the intricacies of the respective activities.[41] What's obviously needed to fill out this interpretation is a clarification of the kind of knowledge involved and its content. I address this issue in Section 3 of this chapter.

All that's needed for my current argument though is to make, as I believe I have, two points about this inconsistency. First, Socrates' exclusivist interpretation of Alcibiades' idea of justice was aimed at inducing *aporia* in Alcibiades by challenging his alleged knowledge of justice. Second, an inclusivist interpretation of the passage—which allows shared knowledge between different kinds of work—avoids the inconsistency that arose in combination with Alcibiades' ideas of knowledgeable *homonoia*, friendship and the exclusivist interpretation of justice.

In this section, I've presented textual evidence that Socrates (or Socratics) and various interlocutors in both the *Cleitophon* and *Alcibiades I* consider knowledgeable *homonoia* to be a crucial

[40] I say that this interpretation is inclusivist because it allows for citizens to do their own works and to be friends with one another without requiring citizens to know about one another's craft.

[41] Olympiodorus 2016: 185, 5-10 in effect offers an inclusivist interpretation of this passage of the *Alcibiades I* as well.

element of political friendship. I've argued that each putative refutation of political friendship as involving knowledgeable *homonoia* is unpersuasive, either because the objections are rooted in contentious claims about the meaning and use of *homonoia* (see e.g. Sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.2) or the objections serve purposes other than a philosophical assessment of political friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia* (e.g. 2.2.3). Having addressed the objections in the texts, my aim in the next two sections is to argue for why understanding political friendship as necessarily involving knowledgeable *homonoia* is an attractive and fundamentally Socratic idea.

3. Why Knowledgeable *Homonoia* as Political Friendship?

T5 and **T6.1-2** make clear that the account of political friendship found in *Alcibiades I* and *Cleitophon* necessarily includes a kind of *homonoia* that is both shared and rooted in knowledge. Several scholars, however, have rejected this account of political friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia* because they find the knowledge requirement too demanding and exacting. They claim that it is unreasonable to demand a citizenry of moral experts, each of whom possesses expert knowledge about politics and virtue.[42] Against this argument, I argue that the knowledge requirement is perfectly reasonable in the framework of Socratic philosophy. Replacing knowledgeable *homonoia* with either a qualified sense of shared belief or with a model of epistemic deference, as some commentators suggest as alternatives proposed in *lieu* of knowledgeable *homonoia*, goes against the spirit of Socratic philosophy.[43]

The final point I make is that the achievement of this knowledge—whatever it may be and however it may be acquired—is ultimately peripheral to whether political friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia* is to be considered an attractive and 'Socratic' model. Instead, I think that the primary feature of this model (and one sufficient for accepting it) is its orientating function: the idea of political

[42] Kraut 1987: 233-243 presents an illuminating version of this view.

[43] See, e.g., McKeen and Smith 2018.

friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia* orients those who accept it away from eristic and sophistic debates about political life for the sake of attaining, e.g., fame and wealth and towards philosophical, cooperative, and friendly debates about what's true and just so that the *polis* can provide the grounds for citizens to achieve happiness.

3.1 An Unconvincing Argument Against Knowledgeable *Homonoia*

In his commentary on *Alcibiades I*, Denyer 2001 rejects outright the idea of *homonoia* as involving shared knowledge, claiming that "it is, in spite of [*Cleitophon*] 409e, unreasonable to demand expert understanding from all parties to a consensus as broad as ὁμόνοια has to be."[44] McKeen and Smith 2018 offer an even stronger comment on this issue in *Alcibiades I*: "Only few, if any, of those who are members of a given political community will possess political expertise. Any reasonable solution to the problem of faction, then, cannot rely on shared political expertise among all or most members of a given political community."[45] The two general observations that subtend these comments are that (1) experts in all crafts, including the political one, are rare and (2) that the kind of knowledge required for knowledgeable *homonoia* is expert knowledge. Since only experts have the relevant knowledge, then shared knowledge among an entire citizenry as the basis for *homonoia* is unreasonable and unachievable.

In rejecting knowledgeable *homonoia*, some commentators (such as Denyer 2001 and Kamtekar 2004) instead suggest that the best way to understand *homonoia* is as qualified shared-opinion (*homodoxia*) as discussed at *Rep.* 431d-e. Other commentators (such as McKeen and Smith 2018) entertain the idea that the proper epistemic attitude for most citizens may be one of "epistemic deference," in which those who do not know (and ostensibly recognize that they do not know) defer

[44] Denyer 2001: 202. Kamtekar 2004: 138-139 appears to adopt in passing a position apparently similar to Denyer's.

[45] McKeen and Smith 2018: 20-21. Also cf. 23: "Shared political knowledge seems to set the bar too high when it comes to agreement among the inhabitants of a political community."

to the expert who does possess the relevant knowledge.[46] Either way, however, it is clear that these commentators are unanimous in their conviction that *homonoia* rooted in knowledge is too strict and, therefore, an unreasonable requirement for political friendship.

The two assumptions that ground their rejection of knowledgeable *homonoia* have much textual support throughout the dialogues. For (1)—the claim that experts are rare—the following two passages are perhaps the strongest evidence:

> (**T7**) Tell me [Meletus]: does this also apply to horses do you think? That all men improve them and one individual corrupts them? Or is quite the contrary true, one individual is able to improve them, or very few, namely, the horse breeders, whereas the majority, if they have horses and use them, corrupt them? Is that not the case, Meletus, both with horses and all other animals? Of course it is, whether you and Anytus say so or not. *Apology* 25b1-7

> (**T8**) I believe that I'm one of a few Athenians—so as not to say I'm the only one, but the only one among our contemporaries—to take up the true political craft and practice the true politics. *Gorgias* 521d7-9

Support for (2)—the claim that the kind of knowledge required for knowledgeable *homonoia* is expert knowledge—is more diffuse but just as strong due to its frequency. We are, evidently, permitted to infer that the kind of knowledge involved in knowledgeable *homonoia* is craft-knowledge due to Socrates' frequent use of the "*technê* analogy," in which Socrates claims that the virtues, including

[46] McKeen and Smith 2018: 149-150. Although they ultimately reject this view, on p. 150 they develop the deference idea by stating: "[T]he novice would do well, in general, to exercise epistemic deference and assent to the referential identifications the expert employs with her terminology. In the absence of the relevant craft-knowledge, epistemic deference is the most responsible strategy for the novice to utilize."

justice, are analogous to various *technai*.[47] While of course appearing in both *Alcibiades I* and *Cleitophon*, this analogy is also a prominent feature of many of the other Socratic dialogues.[48]

I defend a different reading than McKeen and Smith 2018 (and presumably Denyer 2001) because I think both assumptions (1) and (2), despite the apparent textual evidence, are inadequate support for the rejection of knowledgeable *homonoia* as a kind of political friendship. When we see that these assumptions are unconvincing, we will then be in a position to see that the knowledge requirement for *homonoia*, while strange and demanding, is actually quite reasonable.

3.1.1 Why are Experts Rare?

T7 and **T8** undoubtedly imply that experts are rare. But what is needed to make the rejection of knowledgeable *homonoia* compelling is an argument that shows not merely that experts and their expert knowledge are rare, but that this rarity is a necessary feature of expertise. For knowledgeable *homonoia* will be untenable as a political friendship that exists among all citizens only if it is essential to the nature of expert knowledge that few possess it. The contexts of **T7** and **T8** not only do not support rarity as a necessary feature of expertise but actually undermine it. Further, insisting on rarity as a defining characteristic of expertise would be a bizarre and implausible position, especially for Socrates.

In **T7** part of Socrates' argumentative strategy is to point out the sheer improbability that he alone among the Athenians corrupts the youth. In fact, experts—those who provide benefit and avoid harm in whatever relevant domain—tend to be fewer than those who may unknowingly harm. So, if it is true that Socrates is alone among all the Athenians with respect to the harm-benefit divide, Socrates' point is that it is much more likely that he is the expert, i.e. the beneficial one and not the

[47] Irwin 1977:7 states, for instance, that "virtue simply is craft-knowledge."

[48] See, *inter alia*, *Charmides,* 165c-176d, *Euthydemus* 288e-292b, *Ion* 531b-532d, *Laches* 184e-185d, and *Rep.* I, 341e-343e. Two very helpful appendices of Socrates' use of the *technê* analogy can be found in Roochnik 1984: 307-310 and Roochnik 1998: 253-265.

harmful one. Socrates nowhere claims here that expertise necessarily involves few practitioners. Indeed, Socrates is on trial in part for the popularity of his elenctic method, which evaluates expertise and, ideally, encourage interlocutors to pursue expert knowledge themselves. That is, Socrates is on trial precisely because his method and whatever knowledge involved therein does not apply to the rare and chosen few *per se*. To the ho-hum Athenian like Meletus, Socrates' practice is dangerous precisely because it undermines the concept of expertise reserved for the elite few (whether that few be the elders, the best speakers, the nobly-born, etc.). Socrates' implicit conception of expertise and expert knowledge reveal that such expertise is not necessarily rare; anyone who cultivates the appropriate skills and habits in principle can attain such expertise.

Just before **T8**, Socrates has argued to Callicles that authentic politics should not aim at the gratification of people's indiscriminate pleasures but at improving their souls. In **T8**, Socrates laments the fact that politicians tend to not consider the improvement of citizens' souls to be of paramount importance for what they do. Again, nowhere does Socrates make the claim that political expertise is necessarily a rarity among citizens. And, like the *Apology*, if Socrates' position in *Gorgias* were to be generalized, there would be an abundance, not a dearth, of such expert knowledge and thus of experts.

On philosophical grounds, it would be extremely odd if Socrates were to claim that expertise is necessarily and essentially limited to the few.[49] For that would commit Socrates to the apparently absurd belief that expert knowledge was either some kind of zero-sum resource, where your possession of knowledge could preclude my possessing it, or that expertise is definitionally and dialectically linked to non-expertise. The first disjunct is absurd because knowledge is obviously not a

[49] This claim is consistent, however, with a sociological description that experts are rare (in part because such sociological descriptions do not make claims about the necessity and essence of expertise). But the fact that they are rare, at least under Socratic methodology, has nothing to do per se with the nature of expertise itself nor with human intellectual capabilities. The rarity of expertise may, for instance, be due to a subpar educational system or to prominent but misguided cultural values. This view of the rarity of expertise stands in stark contrast to, e.g., *Republic*, where there is a much more definitive account of human nature and sorting by individuals' natures into positions for which they are best capable.

finite resource. If anything, one's having knowledge encourages others to gain that knowledge. This idea, in fact, undergirds the claim that knowledgeable *homonoia* is a *shared* phenomenon. One feature of possessing knowledge is the ability to engender it in others under the right circumstances. A knower can defend her true beliefs and diagnose errors or inaccuracies in rival beliefs with a reliable consistency. Thus, experts cannot be rare on the grounds that the knowledge inherent in their expertise is somehow limited or finite.

The second disjunct is likewise absurd. We might think that expertise is only meaningful by contrast with non-experts. That is, we might think that expertise is definitionally or dialectically related to non-expertise. In some instances, this kind of dialectical relation obtains; but it is predominantly (or maybe only) in those relationships that involve a finite or zero-sum object. Fame, for instance, would be insignificant if everyone were famous because part of what it means to be famous is to be distinct and noticeable in a way that most people are not. Conceptually, fame demands that others not be famous. As we just saw, however, knowledge for at least Socrates is not this kind of object. Experts are not experts because there are non-experts from whom they can be distinguished. Experts are experts because they have a systematic understanding of some domain, whether that be shipbuilding or politics. In principle, this kind of systematic understanding could be achievable by all and still be worthy of the title 'expert.'

3.1.2 What Kind of Knowledge in Knowledgeable *Homonoia*?

In the last section, I granted for the sake of argument the assumption that Socrates intends the knowledge characteristic of knowledgeable *homonoia* to be the kind of robust knowledge that experts have. I now challenge that assumption. I believe that the nature of the knowledge characteristic of this model of political friendship is underdetermined between various senses of knowledge.[50] I argue for

[50] Fine 2005: 60 concisely refers to what I've called 'robust knowledge" as "a specialized, systematic, synoptic grasp of a given domain." By contrast, I understand ordinary knowledge to entail something like a coherent set of true, justified beliefs but without the synoptic view or systematicity found in robust knowledge. The reference to Fine 2005 and the

this underdetermination by mainly showing that Socrates' use of the *technê* analogy is ambiguous as to what are the truly analogous features between virtue and *technê*. In other words, virtue and *technê* may not be analogous because they both involve the same kind of knowledge, but rather because, e.g., they each may have significant cultural or pedagogical purchase. In showing this underdetermination, I will also argue that (2)—that the kind of knowledge at work in knowledgeable *homonoia* is expert knowledge—does not compel (as some scholars suppose it to) the wholesale rejection of knowledgeable *homonoia* as a crucial element of political friendship.

The main support for (2) relies on the pervasive use of the *technê* analogy throughout *Cleitophon* and *Alcibiades I* (as well as in many other Socratic dialogues). The analogy of *technê* to justice in *Alcibiades I* is explicitly present in **T6.1-2**. (Even though it's implicit in **T5**, Cleitophon also mentions it explicitly at *Cleitophon* 409a7-10.) One reading of this analogy is that the kind of knowledge involved in *technê* (which is robust and often called craft-knowledge) is identical to the kind of knowledge involved in virtue. Given this reading, it is a short step to conclude that therefore political friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia* must likewise involve craft-knowledge and be robust.

Technê is a kind of expertise or skill that involves robust knowledge about a given subject matter. Expert shipbuilders, for instance, know how to build a ship, can demonstrate and account for this knowledge (Socrates often seeks a definition as evidence of this), and under the right conditions can teach others to build ships. This is broadly what it means to have craft-knowledge about ship-building. Setting aside for the moment the accuracy of Cleitophon's reporting and general

terminology of robust and ordinary knowledges I initially found in Benson 2015: 12-14 and fn. 42. The general distinction between two kinds of knowledge has taken on a dizzying amount of descriptions in Plato scholarship. One finds, for instance, distinctions between weak and strong knowledge, divine and human knowledge, craft and lay knowledge, definitional and non-definitional knowledge, knowing that (propositional knowledge) and knowing-how, infallibilist and fallibilist knowledge, higher level and lower level knowledge, and so on. Brickhouse and Smith 2000: 99-23, Benson 2000: 167-188, and Benson 2015: 11-13 each provide helpful and at times contrasting guides about the vast scholarship and terminological differences going on here.

understanding, which has been seriously doubted,[51] we can admit that Cleitophon has not utterly distorted Socrates' normal practices, for Socrates consistently places virtue in analogy with *technê*. It thus seems *prima facie* plausible that justice, for Socrates, might involve a knowledge similar, if not identical, to craft-knowledge. To assess this plausibility, however, we have to ask a crucial question: When Socrates puts the virtues in analogy with the *technai*, does he necessarily mean that the knowledge characteristic of virtue is analogous to the knowledge characteristic of *technê*?

Some think the answer to this question is an emphatic yes. For instance, Irwin 1977: 7 clearly states: "virtue simply is craft-knowledge." Others, including Roochnik 1996 and Gonzalez 2000a, answer with an equally emphatic no. On their readings, the primary if not exclusive function of the *technê* analogy is not to show in what ways virtue and *technê* may be similar, but rather even if somewhat paradoxically to emphasize the utter disanalogy between virtue knowledge and craft-knowledge. In between these two positions are a bevy of more moderate answers that claim virtue and *technê* share some relevant features that make the analogy edifying, but that we should neither ascribe a relation of complete identity nor non-identity to virtue and *technê*.[52]

Kamtekar 2006 has argued that Socrates has good dialogical, historical, and sociological reasons to use *technê* in his discussions of politics; the popular orators and sophists, like Gorgias and Protagoras, all claimed educational powers by virtue of having a political *technê*. Socrates, Kamtekar argues, adopts this *technê* language to transform discussions of political legitimacy away from questions of nobility, ancestry, and wealth and towards questions of competency and understanding. One important effect of Kamtekar's argument is that that we can see that Socrates has reasons totally

[51] Most thoroughly by Moore 2012.

[52] I cannot provide an exhaustive account of any of these three positions. For a diverse collection of moderate positions, see Nussbaum 1986, Nehamas 1998, and Kamtekar 2006.

independent of what his idea of moral knowledge may be that would warrant his frequent use of the *technê* analogy.

What follows from this debate, I think, are thus two crucial points about responding to this objection of political friendship. First, even if we were to grant that Socrates and his interlocutors do recommend a citizenry of moral experts who are like experts in *technai*, what exactly it means to have an expertise in *technê* remains slippery. When Socrates' asks Alcibiades about what *technê* and knowledge he possesses that qualifies him to govern other Athenian citizens (*Alc. I*, 125e, cf. 107c-d, 108b-c), we cannot infer from Socrates' asking and Alcibiades' answering that the knowledge required to govern over others is identical to the knowledge found in other *technê* (in part because it's not clear that the knowledge characteristic of other *technê* is uniform or precise). Likewise, when Cleitophon claims justice is a *technê*, we are right to hear the Socratic overtones, but we should approach with caution. Cleitophon might be putting it too crudely when he demands from Socrates on the basis of the *technê* analogy to receive the knowledge of justice because it's an open and very real possibility that both Socrates does not know it and that this kind of knowledge is not one that can be transmitted so easily.

Second, it is unclear whether Socrates seriously intends a society of moral experts. This is so mainly because it is unclear whether his use of the *technê* analogy intends a serious relationship of identity between craft-knowledge and virtue knowledge, or an instructive but insincere relationship to emphasize the disanalogy between craft-knowledge and virtue-knowledge, or a more deflationary relationship in which *technê* and virtue share some but not all relevant characteristics. So, the claim that this model of political friendship is unsustainable because a citizenry of moral experts is impossible rests on a presumption that the expertise and knowledge Socrates and his interlocutors recommend is identical to the expertise and knowledge of the *technai*. And also, as I argued in the previous section, nothing Socrates says in these dialogues commits him to the view that a citizenry of moral experts (if desired) would be impossible.

If we think that Socrates' use of the *technê* analogy does not imply that the epistemological features of *technê* and virtue are analogous, ordinary knowledge becomes another possibility of the kind of knowledge characteristic of knowledgeable *homonoia*. Perhaps Socrates means that only the political advisor or politician should have some kind of expert knowledge about politics, while what's required for other citizens is a less demanding sense of knowledge. Whereas the politician's knowledge is synoptic and systematic, the average citizen's knowledge may include something like true, justified beliefs about politics but need not include the systematic and synoptic features. At bottom though the entire citizenry, including politicians and non-politicians, would enjoy shared knowledge in so far as they would share true and similarly justified beliefs about political life and human happiness.

Olympiodorus implicitly endorses the strategy of ordinary knowledge among most citizens. In his commentary on the *Alcibiades I*, he makes the following remark about how to resolve the inconsistency of Alcibiades' position (viz. **T6.2** and discussion in Section 2.2.4):

> (**T11**) And it's clear that [husband and wife] are not in agreement with respect to their *immediate* goal inasmuch one happens to understand horsemanship, the other wool-spinning, whereas they are in agreement with respect to their more *final* goal, for the husband goes to war to protect his wife . . . and she weaves wool to protect the man, so that he may not be destroyed by the onslaught of the climate.[53]

Olympiodorus' solution, like my proposed solution, is inclusivist because it resolves this inconsistency not by denying the epistemic requirements of *homonoia* but by modifying the interpretation of justice as 'each doing one's own work.' Olympiodorus' solution is distinctive because it in effect recommends a strategy of cultivating among the citizenry a shared, ordinary knowledge (i.e. a non-expert knowledge). Olympiodorus does not speak of citizenry of political virtuosos. His claim that husband

[53] Griffin Translation from Olympiodorus 2016: 184, 5-10 (pp. 111-112). Translator's Emphasis.

and wife do not enjoy *homonoia* about their "immediate goal" entails the point that expert knowledge is not necessary for knowledgeable *homonoia* as political friendship. He instead describes a model in which it suffices for one to know how another's work contributes to a shared, "more *final* goal," but does not have the systematicity of synoptic view characteristics of expert, robust knowledge

The textual support that allows Olympiodorus' apparent reading of knowledge in two different ways—i.e. as expert knowledge at some points and something like ordinary knowledge as others—is at best contentious. It is nonetheless philosophically plausible that the kind of knowledge necessary for *homonoia* need not be expert knowledge. And it also has the benefit of resolving the putative inconsistency of the *Alcibiades* while nonetheless maintaining the three distinct claims that gave rise to the initial inconsistency. If we follow Olympiodorus' lead, then ordinary knowledge among the citizenry can suffice as an account of the knowledge required for knowledgeable *homonoia*.

To recap: some scholars hold that the kind of knowledge at work in knowledgeable *homonoia* must be expert knowledge.[54] They hold this primarily on the basis of the fact that the analogy of virtue (including justice, and thus, by implication, political friendship which is produced by justice) to *technê* is intended to emphasize virtue's analogous requirement of expert knowledge. But this inference is too quick. The *technê* analogy can support a variety of explanations in addition to expert knowledge being analogous between virtue and *technê*. Alternative explanations include that Socrates is actually trying to show how virtue and *technê* are crucially different or that Socrates is using *technê* as a rhetorical foothold (due to the cultural prominence of *technê* in Athens) to anchor his interest in discussing virtue.[55] That the textual and scholarly evidence cannot identify one explanation as preferable over the others means that how to interpret the *technê* analogy is underdetermined. As long as this

[54] A classic treatment, as mentioned above, is Irwin 1977.

[55] Roochnik 1996 and Gonzalez 2000a argue for the former explanation. Kamtekar 2006 argues for the latter explanation.

underdetermination exists, then to reject knowledgeable *homonoia* on the grounds of the knowledge being expert knowledge cannot suffice as a compelling rejection.

3.2 Socratic Knowledgeable *Homonoia*: A Reasonable Account

I have considered several objections that try to establish that the requirement of knowledgeable *homonoia* for political friendship is unreasonable or unachievable. By contrast, I believe it to be a reasonable model of political friendship. It is not enough for my argument, however, to merely show that the objections which label the model unreasonable are themselves unpersuasive. In addition, I need to show why knowledgeable *homonoia* should be included in this model of political friendship. To this aim, I argue in this section that knowledgeable *homonoia* accords with the general character of Socratic philosophy. In showing this accord, I will hold that political friendship as involving knowledgeable *homonoia* is a natural outgrowth of generally Socratic principles.

The first argument is fairly straightforward. Socrates' conversations often imply that he believes there is such a thing as political knowledge, a knowledge of how best to organize the *polis*, of who should rule and be ruled, and of how to persuade and interact with fellow Athenian citizens (e.g. *Euthy.* 291c-291d; *Gorg.* 521d-e; *Ap.* 29d-e). If this kind of knowledge exists, why should it not be the ideal basis of how citizens engage in politics and thus also the ideal basis for their political friendship? Cleitophon's description of Socrates' mission in *Cleitophon* and Socrates's self-description of his mission in *Apology* characterize Socrates as overtly concerned with encouraging fellow citizens to care about and acquire virtue. If virtue essentially includes knowledge, then Socrates' mission entails that he is concerned with engendering some kind of knowledge among citizens. In this way, Socrates and his interlocutors' description of political friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia* is perfectly reasonable because it is already entailed by larger Socratic methodological and philosophical commitments.

Second, we should note that the earlier objections may intend this model of political friendship as unreasonable not in the sense that this model is without logical reasons but in the sense that it is

impracticable and paradoxical. Knowledgeable *homonoia* as political friendship is an unreasonable goal precisely because every citizen cannot attain knowledge and such a goal flies in the face of common sense. I have already argued that at least conceptually the kind of knowledge involved here might indeed be attainable by all. But, even despite this fact, the alleged impracticability does not affect this model of political friendship any more than it would affect other characteristically Socratic positions that defy practicability. The so-called 'Socratic paradoxes'—that *akrasia* is impossible because no one does wrong willingly or that all virtues are a unity or that knowledge is necessary and sufficient for virtue—are paradoxes not in the logical sense of involving a contradiction but in the sense of being *para doxa*, against common opinion and belief. Though this model may in a very general sense be unreasonable, that knowledgeable *homonoia* as a requirement of political friendship is similarly paradoxical does not count against it as it being unreasonable in a Socratic framework. If anything, this paradoxicality evinces its Socratic status, given how often Socratic positions appear unreasonable to common sense.

These points also address why I resist the approach of many scholars who undermine the uniqueness of *Cleitophon* and *Alcibiades I* by considering the accounts of political friendship in those dialogues as preludes to political friendship in the *Republic*.[56] One way, but not the only way, to conceive of political friendship is through Kallipolis of *Republic*. The epistemic standards of political friendship in *Republic* are heavily relaxed compared to those of *Alcibiades I* and *Cleitophon*. In Kallipolis, not all citizens are knowers, which means that knowledgeable *homonoia* cannot be the grounds of political friendship in *Republic*. Making this point does not show however that the *Alcibiades I* and *Cleitophon* accounts of political friendship are misguided on the basis of their requirement of knowledgeable *homonoia* for all citizens. Instead, knowledgeable *homonoia* provides an alternative account of political

[56] Including Denyer 2001, Kamtekar 2004, and McKeen and Smith 2018. For my treatment of political friendship in *Republic,* see Chapter 2.

friendship that merits being taken seriously on its own. The primary reasons this is so are because (1) the textual objections in the dialogues do not actually affect the viability of knowledgeable *homonoia* as a component of friendship—as I've argued, they can be explained instead as, e.g., pedagogical or rhetorical strategies—and, more importantly, (2) the proposal that political friendship require shared knowledge is fundamentally Socratic.

3.3 The Orientating Function of Knowledgeable *Homonoia*

In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, I have argued that the knowledge requirement of *homonoia* has content (even though it's underdetermined) and conceptual plausibility. I now want to put aside this discussion and instead argue that the most attractive feature of knowledgeable *homonoia* does not lie in its achievability *per se* but in what I call its 'orientating function.' We can value knowledgeable *homonoia* as an element of political friendship for reasons other than the state of affairs its attainment may bring about. One source of such value can be seen from how the shared endorsement of knowledgeable *homonoia* as an element of political friendship reorients conversations about politics and happiness away from factious sophism and towards cooperative, friendly discussion.

An unfortunately enduring feature of political conversation is the use of effective yet inane rhetorical tricks that aim at mere persuasion. The reasons behind such tricks are manifold; greed, unbridled competitiveness, egotism no doubt play their parts here. In Socrates' time, the sophists and eristic debaters were the primary emblems of this style of political conversation. In Plato's *Euthydemus*, for instance, the brotherly pair of former-wrestlers-turned-debaters, Euthydemus and Dionysodoros, exemplify what Socrates' describes as an ability "to battle in arguments and always to refute what is being said, regardless of whether it be true or false" (*Euthyd.* 272b1-2). Their disregard for the truth and sole regard for winning the 'battle of argument' indicates that their conversations about politics will not aim at revealing the truths about what best political organization and political policies conduce to human happiness, but rather at the more superficial goal of giving their positions the mere

appearance of correctness, and their opponents' incorrectness. Euthydemus and Dionysodoros are by no means outliers. Although verbal pankration may be a flavor of sophism unique to them, their deprioritizing of speaking truthfully in favor of speaking successfully or fancily or just confidently finds allies of varying strength in several more fifth- and fourth-century Greek intellectuals.

Adopting a conception of political friendship that includes knowledgeable *homonoia* would reorient such discussions away from verbal competition and towards a cooperative and sincere engagement about politics and happiness. In *Alcibiades* I and *Cleitophon*, the knowledge of knowledgeable *homonoia* must be shared. This model of friendship requires that each citizen-friend possesses the requisite knowledge. The attempt to achieve this kind of friendship thus entails that to whatever extent citizens care about acquiring this knowledge for the sake of friendship they must also care about their fellow citizens likewise acquiring it, since the lack of knowledge parity would stifle the friendship. That is, the emphasis of this model of friendship shifts from a sophistic appearance of knowledge to the actual and verifiable attainment of it, since the mere appearance of knowledge obviously cannot serve as a reliable basis for actual knowledge.

But what exactly is involved in the shift to caring about the epistemic state of fellow citizens and in attempting to achieve this model of friendship? One part of it surely includes something akin to the Socratic *elenchos*, in which citizens can challenge and examine their knowledge claims.[57] Yet the Socratic *elenchos* can often devolve into unfriendly acrimony. One need only think of Callicles' bitter withdrawal from discussion in *Gorgias* or the acerbity of Thrasymachus in *Republic* I. The central problem of this kind of acrimony is that it can transform otherwise helpful conversations into naught, thus preventing the sincere search for and possible acquisition of knowledge.

[57] For an overview of the method, see Benson 2015. For two helpful comments on this aspect of the *elenchos*, see Vasiliou 2008: 158-159 and Nightingale 2010: 8-13.

This devolution should not dismay us since it is not a necessary feature of the *elenchos*. If anything, this kind of acrimony is more of a reflection on certain interlocutors' self-identifications: they get so upset with Socrates in part because they identify themselves or their livelihoods to an excessive extent with their reputation as a knower, or adroit speaker, or proponent of some position. When any of these sources of identity are elenctically undermined, there arises a radical change in one's self-understanding. This radical change, if it brings about the conditions necessary for proper inquiry and conversation, is ultimately a boon. It just might take some time for those who are refuted to perceive the refutation as a boon. (Recall that by *Republic* VI.498d Thrasymachus and Socrates consider one another friends.) We should also note that for every Thrasymachus or Callicles, there exists a Nicias, Theaetetus, or Lysis who conduct themselves admirably in the *elenchos*. When each of them is shown to lack knowledge, they do not ridicule Socrates but rather band together with him to consider the issue further for the sake of coming to understand better. This cooperative search for knowledge appears to be the best orientation for attaining knowledgeable *homonoia*.

We also get a clearer picture of what a cooperative search for knowledge looks like at *Meno* 75c8-d4, when Socrates contrasts two types of interlocutors—*eristikoi* and *philoi*—in an edifying way:

> (**T12**) If my questioner was one of those clever and disputatious (*ἐριστικῶν*) debaters, I would say to him: 'I have given my answer; if it is wrong, it is your job to refute it.' Then, if they are friends, as you and I are, and want to discuss with each other, they must answer in a manner more mild and suitable for discussion. By this I mean that the answers must not only be true, but in terms admittedly known to the questioner (*ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαλεκτικώτερον μὴ μόνον τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἐκείνων ὧν ἂν προσομολογῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτώμενος*).[58]

[58] For a comparable discussion, see *Theaetetus* 168a-b.

There are three important features in Socrates' description of friendly conversation. First, friendly conversation is milder (*πραότερόν*) and more suitable for discussion (*διαλεκτικώτερον*). Thus, eliminated outright from such conversation are several motivations ostensibly unrelated to knowledge-seeking, since, e.g., acerbity and antagonism are not too mild and not suitable for discussion.

Second, Socrates expands on what it means for answers to be "more suitable for discussion." As is standard for Socratic discussions, answers in friendly conversation must be truthful or at least genuinely aim at expressing the truth.[59] These truthful answers also, however, must be expressed in terms with which the interlocutor is familiar. I cannot overstate the importance of this feature because it is crucial to how shared knowledge-seeking must take place. This passage maintains, correctly, that those who claim knowledge have no right to seek refuge in esoteric and unfamiliar terminology when defending whatever they claim to know. For one, it's obvious that such terminology is a non-starter for meaningful dialogue. If I teach my introductory logic students about the truth semantics of a conditional by solely using terms such as 'antecedent,' 'consequent,' and 'necessary and sufficient conditions' without explanation, they will stare at me with jaw-dropping blankness and incomprehension. Even if what I say to them is truthful, the truth remains inaccessible to them because it is clothed in unfamiliar and inaccessible terms.

Granted the adroit interlocutor should seek clarification if she is unaware, the larger point of Socrates' comments is that part of what it means to discuss as friends is to not confound one's interlocutor with fancy jargon. In fact, when we do so, we are in a sense behaving unfriendly. When I spew unexplained technical jargon at my logic students, I effectively fail to treat them as fellow

[59] Socrates obviously does not mean that any friendly conversation must reveal the truth, as if all friendly interlocutors, when discussing, possess the truth. Rather, this comment is best taken as an instance of what Vlastos calls the "say-what-you-mean" requirement of Socratic *elenchos*. Interlocutors must speak the truth in the sense that they really believe what they are saying. They needn't speak the truth absolutely, but only according to what they earnestly believe. Cf. Vlastos 1982.

interlocutors with whom I am trying to share some logic knowledge. The corollary to this feature is that we should exhibit concern about our fellow interlocutors' epistemic states. Part of discussing for the sake of shared knowledge in terms admittedly known to the interlocutor includes assessing, by whatever means appropriate, an interlocutor's familiarity with a given topic—i.e. with the foundational assumptions and requisite vocabulary necessary for substantive discussion—and to then proceed on the basis of that assessment.

The final feature focuses on what Socrates excludes from his account, namely an insistence on a vaguely defined, faux civility. Neither Socrates' immediate point in the *Meno* nor his general behavior throughout the Platonic dialogues support the view that Socrates might be suggesting that *carte blanche* tone-policing is required for friendly discussion. Being friendly need not involve being polite. As we have been exploring, the goal of shared knowledge requires interlocutors who are earnest in their pursuit of knowledge and earnest in sharing that knowledge with others. If an interlocutor fails on either one of these fronts, the most appropriate reaction, indeed the genuinely friendly one, can be to express one's discontent at this kind of failure. It is wholly reasonable and at times even necessary to chide an interlocutor when they have failed to live up to the requirements of philosophical conversation. We often see Socrates behaving this way. Consider how Socrates castigates Alcibiades, after the latter has repeatedly failed to acknowledge the inconsistencies in his belief:

> (**T13**) Dammit, Alcibiades, what a sorry state you're in! I hesitate to call it by its name, but still, since we're alone, it must be said. You are wedded to stupidity, my good fellow, stupidity in the highest degree—our discussion and your own words convict you of it.
>
> *Alcibiades I* 118b-c[60]

[60] Also cf. Socrates' blunt criticism of Hippocrates at the beginning of *Protagoras* as well as Plato's own comments in *Seventh Letter* (discussed extensively in Chapter 4).

This passage should be taken as consistent with the account of friendly discussion in the *Meno* passage. We speak frankly, even if disapprovingly, with our friends because at bottom we seek to improve their lives and their epistemic standing. If their lives are something we do care about, often times the appropriate expression of that care can be disapproval and disappointment because we see the danger in their actions. This kind of approach exemplifies one way in which interlocutors, when adopting knowledgeable *homonoia* as a model of political friendship, may exhibit the care and concern for fellow citizen's epistemic states characteristic of seeking to attain knowledgeable *homonoia*.

The main point, however, is that this approach contains within itself a momentous shift in how citizens would comport themselves. When pursuing a model of political friendship that involves knowledgeable *homonoia*, citizens would act in ways that eliminate the motives for cheap sophisms, because those motives inhibit the pursuit of shared knowledge. This facet alone requires us to take this model of political friendship seriously, even if a citizenry-wide achievement of shared knowledge is unattained.

4. KNOWLEDGEABLE *HOMONOIA* AND POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP

Why should we consider knowledgeable *homonoia* a tenable element of political friendship? And what is the exact contribution of *homonoia* to political friendship? In this final section, I answer these questions by making four points. First, I show that *homonoia* is a central element but identical with friendship. Second, I offer reasons why Socrates and his interlocutors focus on knowledgeable *homonoia* as a central characteristic of friendship, instead of other characteristics. Third, I argue that knowledgeable *homonoia* makes room for disagreement as an element of friendship. Finally, I conclude by suggesting how knowledgeable *homonoia* entails reciprocated, other-regarding concern characteristic of friendship.

4.1 KNOWLEDGEABLE *HOMONOIA* AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF FRIENDSHIP

Although I believe that knowledgeable *homonoia* is a crucial element in the Socratic model of political friendship presented in *Cleitophon* and *Alcibiades I*, I do not think that knowledgeable *homonoia* and political friendship are wholly interchangeable. In Section 2.1.1, I pointed out that the Greek in the *Cleitophon* passage is ambiguous, leaving underdetermined whether the proposal that knowledgeable *homonoia* is political friendship means that (a) political friendship is identical to *homonoia* or (b) political friendship includes *homonoia*. I suggested there that (b) is the more reasonable interpretation philosophically, because it avoids the regress posited by Slings 1999. I here wish to further strengthen my suggestion of (b) by showing how it also allows for a better account of political friendship.

When we understand knowledgeable *homonoia* as identical to political friendship, we are left with a quite bizarre account of friendship. Gone apparently are the reciprocity, benevolence, and shared experience normally thought to be necessary elements of friendship. Instead, the *homonoia* that arises from shared knowledge somehow by virtue of the shared knowledge alone becomes tantamount to a kind of friendship.[61] The onus, on this reading, would be to explain why such a relationship is indeed a friendship and why the normal traits of friendship are either subsumed in the *homonoia* relation or no longer necessary for political friendship.

We may also recall Aristotle's argument against *homodoxia* as a political friendship to suggest that shared knowledge likewise is, by itself, inadequate as an account of political friendship: "*Homonoia* also seems to be a friendly relation. For this reason it is not *homodoxia*; for that might occur even with people who do now know each other" (*EN* IX.6, 1167a21-23). We can reformulate this objection by arguing that the same thing may hold for shared knowledge. It's possible for two people to attain

[61] The Stoics do in fact articulate a kind of friendship that approximates this. But the Stoic account relies on an ethics, ontology, and epistemology that cannot be based on Socratic texts alone. Given the heavy Stoic assumptions needed to make the identity view plausible, I think it's an improper view to attribute to Plato or to the Platonic Socrates. See Schofield 1999 and Vogt 2008 for further discussion of how the identity view accords with Stoicism.

knowledge of the same thing without knowing one another. And if these two people do not know each other, they obviously cannot be considered friends. Thus, even though shared knowledge is a part of political friendship, there has to be more to it than just this kind of *homonoia* for it to be an authentic form of friendship.

My view, however, avoids these murky waters by arguing against the identity relation of *homonoia* and political friendship. To permit the other important characteristics of friendship, even in its political sense, to emerge I interpret knowledgeable *homonoia* to be one characteristic among many others of political friendship. In so doing, my view allows for several other important characteristics of friendship—e.g. reciprocity, goodwill, etc.—to be included under the description of political friendship. This is an attractive reading because it allows the notion of political friendship as knowledgeable *homonoia* to still retain characteristics that would allow us to understand this citizen relationship as an authentic friendship. What's left for me to explain, however, is why there is such an undeniable emphasis on *homonoia* in the passages of political friendship that I have been exploring. Even if the grammar of the passage and the charitable philosophical interpretation of it allow for an inclusive reading, it is nonetheless odd that *homonoia* is focused on so extensively while the other possible characteristics are barely mentioned.

4.2 Explaining the Emphasis on Knowledgeable *Homonoia*

There are two points that, when taken together, explain why Socrates and his interlocutors focus their attention on *homonoia*. First, *homonoia* is the most relevant characteristic for the political dimension of political friendship because the achievement of *homonoia* ensures that citizen relationships—and the political institutions upon which those relationships rest—have the stability and longevity necessary for cultivating the other elements of political friendship. Second, the tumultuous history of constitutions and city-states in classical Greece warrants the preponderance of attention given to the features, like *homonoia*, that forestall revolution and ensure the stability of the city-state.

Homonoia in classical Greece is often contrasted with faction (*stasis*) and hatred (*exthra*) (viz. **T1** and **T2**) because the achievement of the like-mindedness characteristic of *homonoia* prevents both faction and hatred from arising. If we can achieve the kind of concord implicit within *homonoia*, then the citizenry and the city itself are safe from any internal sources of faction that could corrode the bonds with one another or with the city itself. The longevity of the city and of the citizen relationships that depend on the city is of primary importance because longevity is necessary for any meaningful attempt for a city to achieve justice and for citizens to achieve the political friendship characteristic of justice. Justice and friendship do not bloom in an instant. They come about only after extensive and persistent effort. Any political organization that changes every week cannot be considered a just one. Similarly, any political organization that changes every week cannot allow for citizens to form friendships. When Greek intellectuals of fifth and fourth century harp on *homonoia* as a focal characteristic of friendship, they are rightly highlighting that with *homonoia* comes longevity and stability which are necessary for any meaningful sense of justice and any meaningful forms of friendships to develop within a *polis*. The longevity and stability, in turn, can allow for other characteristics of political friendship mentioned above to emerge.

Even if we accept abstractly the propositions that (a) *homonoia* entails longevity and stability and that (b) longevity and stability are necessary for veridical friendships, we still need to make plausible why this model chooses to emphasize *these* necessary traits instead of other necessary traits of friendship, like reciprocity and goodwill. The main reason is historical. Greece in general and Athens in particular was a site of tumultuous violence and frequent revolution. In Plato's approximate lifetime, Athens endured the toll of the Peloponnesian war, including Alcibiades' disastrous Sicilian Expedition, several oligarchic takeovers of Athenian democracy between 411 and 405 BCE, the brief but vicious reign of the Thirty Tyrants in 404 BCE, and the Corinthian War from 395 - 387 BCE. The stability of any form of political organization could hardly be taken for granted. Indeed, attention to the historical

details of the lives of fifth and fourth century intellectuals, including Plato and also Isocrates, Thucydides, Xenophon, and even Aristotle, partially explains why *homonoia*, and the stability and longevity inherent in it, was mentioned so frequently and debated so intensely. To accomplish any vision of justice espoused by these authors first required that a *polis* with a reliable enough stability could come into existence. And *homonoia* among citizens signaled the possibility of just such a *polis*.

4.3 *Homonoia*, Disagreement and Friendship

One important criticism of this account of political friendship is that it appears to severely undervalue the role of disagreement in friendship and in politics. Often a genuine friend is not one with whom we agree but one who challenges our practices and values because this very challenge may express an earnest and well-founded care for our wellbeing that is characteristic of friendship. We can also make the same point through the alternate route: if friends always agree with us, then how are we to differentiate friends from sycophants and toadies, those who placate us for reasons other than other-regarding concern?

J.S. Mill's *On Liberty* contains perhaps the most lucid defense of the value of disagreement in politics. There are two passages in particular that merit attention for my discussion:

> (**T14**) But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.[62]

Here Mill identifies a twofold value of disagreement. First, disagreement is useful because it ideally corrects the beliefs of those who are wrong. Second, the defense of true beliefs against false ones is

[62] Mill 2011: 37.

valuable because it makes our perceptions of those true beliefs more vivid and lasting. The second passage articulates more clearly the value of disagreement from false beliefs:

> (**T15**) However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that however true it may be, if it is not full, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.

Here again Mill emphasizes the value of disagreement, even if the disagreement arises from false beliefs by some people. The Millian argument is a strong one. Mill is surely correct about the distinction between dead dogma and living truth. In modern terms, we can parse this distinction in terms of the adequacy of justification. Living truths are those that we have good reasons to believe in, understand those reasons, and can express and defend those reasons to others. Dead dogmas, by contrast, can be true beliefs without justification: if we cannot see why true beliefs are indeed true then they no longer bear on how we live; we may be ready to discard them at the first moment of discomfort or inconvenience. Part of the energy for discussion and debate comes from how truth and our pursuit of truth can motivate us to defend our accounts and, when necessary, amend them.

This line of argument becomes even more potent if we translate *homonoia* as agreement, as is often done in Plato scholarship.[63] Under this translation of *homonoia*, it appears that political friendship aims at agreement simply, and, in so doing, eliminates any role for constructive disagreement between friends or within a polity. I have already argued in Section 1, however, that agreement is not a suitable translation of *homonoia* on philological and philosophical grounds. The fact that this translation appears to make this objection about disagreement more potent just serves as further evidence that it is a translation we should avoid.

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[63] See Section I for further discussion and arguments against this translation.

Aside from translation issues, the Millian objections warrant further comment. On my view, knowledgeable *homonoia* does result in agreement, but, importantly, the goal of *homonoia* is not agreement *per se*. It's a truism that when shared knowledge is achieved, the knowers by virtue of having knowledge of the same thing, will agree on what they are discussing. In other words, agreement is an effect of shared knowledge. This, however, is significantly different than focusing on agreement as the ultimate goal of political friendship. To reduce *homonoia* to agreement risks mistaking an effect of *homonoia* for *homonoia* itself. When we achieve shared knowledge, we will agree with one another. Obviously though, the fact that we agree with each other does not mean that we have shared knowledge.

Also, my construal of knowledgeable *homonoia* has left plenty of room for disagreement en route to achieving such friendship. My discussion in Section 3.3 of the orientating function of knowledgeable *homonoia* explicitly claimed that disagreement should occur in a Socratic framework because the only way we come to achieve knowledge is by replacing our inadequate beliefs with more adequate ones through elenctic examination. The Socratic account of the value of disagreement—which perhaps differs from the Millian one on this point—requires that valuable disagreement must be earnest and sincere. The Millian model may still value false beliefs rooted in eristics and unbridled competitiveness because the ensuing disagreements still vitalize the living truths for those who have them while the eristics remain impervious to persuasion.

The Socratic framework is more selective. Socrates sees that eristic debate and disagreement can have pernicious effects on the education of bystanders and the audience. Those who debate eristically risk conveying the wrong sort of message about why we dialogue and argue with one another. For Socrates, proper disagreement is restricted between those who hold genuinely conflicting positions and who want to determine the cause of the disagreement so as to understand their positions better. Eristics, by contrast, seek disagreement and debate for ulterior motives, including the desire

for fame, wealth, or just sheer competitiveness. When these motives take hold, disagreement no longer aims at uncovering truth and knowledge between interlocutors, but risks distorting conversations such that the uncovering of truth and knowledge becomes impossible.

In this way, then, the Socratic model makes room for disagreement. And the kind of disagreement at work here is the one friends—those who care non-instrumentally about the wellbeing of one another—utilize in their conversations.[64] Ideally, friends argue with one another for the sake of getting the other friends to realize that their beliefs or actions are detrimental to their wellbeing. When friends disagree in this way, they improve their own and their friends' epistemic states in a way characteristic of knowledgeable *homonoia*. That is, their disagreement has the orientating effect of turning themselves to pursue shared knowledge and thus fully achieve their friendship.

4.4 Knowledgeable *Homonoia* and Reciprocated, Other-Regarding Concern

A fundamental aspect of any form of friendship involves reciprocated other-regarding concern. Friends are friends because they care about one other and that care is reciprocated. Due to this care, friends do friendly things like provide advice and come to one another's aid, especially in difficult times. The sources of other-regarding concern can be manifold. But the Socratic model of political friendship shows us how shared knowledge can sustain other-regarding concern between citizens. In my discussion of the knowledge requirement of *homonoia* in Section 3.1, I suggested that a minimal and plausible version of this content of knowledge is that citizens come to know how one another's activities contribute to the common, political good.

Returning to the example in *Alcibiades*, one strategy of the expert politician is to encourage wool-workers to see how generalship can provide the good of safety to the city and to encourage generals to see how wool-working provides clothing necessary for our health by protecting us from

[64] For a recent article in legal philosophy that makes use of this topic, see Baude and Doerfler 2018. For distinct views on the moral constraints on friendship and disagreement, see Stroud 2006 and Koltonski 2016.

the elements. The shared knowledge implied here is one of knowing how various activities contribute to political life and why political life is something worth contributing to. Essentially, the politician is responsible for encouraging citizens to see why political life is necessary for their own happiness. When they can see this and also see how various activities contribute to the maintenance of political life, they will be able to claim a shared knowledge with other citizens about how various activities are important and worthwhile for the common good.

In this way, the shared knowledge requirement can ground reciprocated, other-regarding concern. We will see, based on our knowledge that politics is necessary for our own happiness, that we care about fellow citizens and their activities insofar as they contribute to politics and thus to a necessary condition for our own happiness. The concern is other-regarding insofar as we see that fellow citizens need to be in a position where they can contribute to political life (and also not interfere in others' activities as a result of ignorance) and we thus care about the citizens for their own sake, i.e. so that they can fulfill their requisite political functions.[65] When all citizens do this, as the ideal of *shared* knowledge implies, then the other-regarding concern will be reciprocated. So, in this way, the knowledge requirement of *homonoia* on this model achieves other seminal features of friendship generally and political friendship in particular.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that knowledgeable *homonoia* is a Socratic account of political friendship. I have done so by showing that the criticisms of knowledgeable *homonoia* in *Alcibiades I* and *Cleitophon* are unpersuasive. In expanding on this point, I have argued that knowledgeable *homonoia* is actually a

[65] I don't think there is any conflict between saying (a) that it is a form of other-regarding concern when we care about citizens qua people who contribute to political life and to say (b) that we care about political life because we recognize it is necessary for our own happiness. A conflict only arises if we construe self-concern and self-interest (implicit in (b)) as mutually exclusive with other-regarding concern. But I see no reason why we should construe it as mutually exclusive. I can care for others insofar as they contribute to my happiness, and this can still be an authentic form of other-regarding concern.

rather plausible requirement for a Socratic account of political friendship, given Socratic commitments about virtue, knowledge, political authority, and methodology. I have further argued that knowledgeable *homonoia* makes room for other important characteristics of friendship—including reciprocity, goodwill, shared experience, and constructive disagreement—but that the focal emphasis on knowledgeable *homonoia* is plausible because of its stabilizing function within the *polis*. I have also suggested that the knowledgeable *homonoia* requirement can accommodate important aspects of friendship, including disagreement between friends and reciprocated other-regarding concern.

CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP IN *REPUBLIC*

INTRODUCTION

Plato's *Republic* presents an interesting model of the psychology of political friendship, different from what I have called the Socratic model. In this chapter, I argue that friendship exists among all citizens of Kallipolis (the ideal city of *Republic*) by design, and that *Republic* offers much insight into what is required psychologically and educationally for citizens of Kallipolis to achieve and enjoy this friendship. Like the Socratic model, the '*Republic* model' still uses epistemic terms to define friendship and connects friendship with a kind of *homonoia*. Unlike the Socratic model, however, the *Republic* model abandons the requirement that *all* citizens possess knowledge to achieve political friendship. Instead, political friendship and *homonoia* obtain when some citizens (i.e. the philosopher rulers) possess knowledge while other citizens have compatible but nonidentical beliefs. In essence then, the *Republic* model relaxes the epistemic demands of friendship in comparison to the Socratic model.

My argument proceeds in four sections. First, I motivate the important role friendship plays in *Republic* by considering three *prima facie* items of evidence for friendship in Kallipolis: (1) descriptions of the affective relationships among the philosopher rulers, (2) the Noble Lie as presented in the myth of metals, and (3) and a passage from *Rep.* V that describes how citizens relate to one another. Second, I argue that the discussion of care (*κῆδος*), friendship (*φίλια*), and believing (*ἡγέομαι*) throughout *Rep.* III.412c-d serves as a general framework for understanding friendship in Kallipolis. I argue that political friendship requires each friend to hold two beliefs, a belief in shared utility and a belief in biconditional happiness.[66] Section 3 shows how the particular education of each class provides

[66] The names for these beliefs are borrowed, with modification, from Reeve 2006: 166-167.

compatible but distinct grounds to hold the beliefs required for friendship. In showing that each class holds the requisite beliefs, I conclude that there are grounds to infer that all citizens enjoy friendship. The fourth section shows how the treatment of *homonoia* throughout *Republic* confirms the epistemic dimension of political friendship in the dialogue. I pay special attention to how the use of *homonoia* conforms with the general usage of the term in antiquity and argue that other words that Socrates and company use to describe the city's unity and concord (e.g. *συμφωνία*, *ἁρμονία*, and *συνᾶδον*) should be read as amenable to the epistemic overtones of *homonoia* given the context of *Republic*.[67] Finally, I conclude the chapter with brief remarks on the value of this model of political friendship and how it contrasts with the Socratic one.

1. Seeing Friendship in *Republic*

Offhand, it may not appear that friendship plays any role, let alone a significant one, in the positive account of justice in Plato's *Republic*. My aim in this section is to counter this appearance. I will do so by highlighting several passages that explicitly and implicitly suggest that friendship—understood either as friendly relations between psychic parts, between political classes, or both—plays a nontrivial role in the design of Kallipolis.

1.1 Justice and Friendship

The central inquiry of Plato's *Republic* concerns the nature of justice. In *Republic* I, we see that several definitions of justice connect it to friendship. Socrates' rebuttal of Cephalus' idea that justice is paying one's debts makes use of an example that focuses on the best way to treat one's friends (*Rep.* I.331c-d). Polemarchus' first definition claims that justice is helping friends and harming enemies (*τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς*) (I.332d6-7). Socrates' examination of Polemarchus' definition also includes an extensive discussion about what constitutes a friend, where we learn that

[67] For my understanding of the relationship between *homonoia* and friendship in Plato and in classical antiquity generally, see Chapter 1, section 1.

minimally a friend must both appear and actually be useful (*χρηστόν*) (I.334c-335a). Later, Socrates, in conversation with Thrasymachus, makes a stark contrast between injustice and justice in terms of their effects on how citizens relate to one another, which is cast in terms of hatred and friendship:

> (**T1**) Doubtless, Thrasymachus, that injustice at any rate produces faction, hatred, and war among one another, while justice brings *homonoia* and friendship. *Rep.* I.351d3-5[68]
>
> *στάσεις γάρ που, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἥ γε ἀδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρέχει, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν.*

Nevertheless, when we arrive at the ultimate definition of justice (understood either psychically or politically) at *Rep* IV.433a-b as doing one's own work and not meddling with others, it may seem that friendship and *homonoia* have dropped off since neither concept is included in the above definition.[69] This, however, would be a hasty inference. Even if friendship and *homonoia* are not explicit in the definition, they are at work in several other passages of *Republic*. Further consideration of these passages, especially in light of the educational system and political structure of Kallipolis, can make good on Socrates' claim in **T1** that friendship and *homonoia* accompany justice.

1.2 Friendship among Philosopher Rulers in Kallipolis

Several explicit passages in *Republic* hold that the philosopher rulers of Kallipolis will enjoy friendship with each other.[70] At the beginning of *Republic* III, Socrates, while explaining the appropriate kinds of educational poetry, clearly claims that members of the guardian class will be friends with one another:

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[68] All translations are from Grube and Reeve in Plato 1997. I have occasionally made modifications. The Greek text is based on Burnet's *Platonis Opera.*

[69] It is worth noting that when Socrates expands upon the psychic variant of justice at *Rep.* IV.443d-e, he reintroduces the intimate connection between friendship and justice: "One who is [psychically] just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each other. He regulates well what is really his own and rules himself. He puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself" (*μὴ ἐάσαντα τἀλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὑτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα.*)

[70] For further discussion of friendship within the guardian class, see Kraut 1973a, El Murr 2012, Caluori 2013, and El Murr 2017.

(**T2**) Such then, I said, are the kinds of stories that I think future guardians should and should not hear about the gods from childhood on, if they are to honor the gods and their parents and not take their friendship with one another lightly. *Rep.* III.386a1-4

τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ θεούς, ἦν δ᾽ἐγώ, τοιαῦτ᾽ἄττα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀκουστέον τε καὶ οὐκ ἀκουστέον εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων τοῖς θεούς τε τιμήσουσιν καὶ γονέας την τε ἀλλήλων φιλίαν μὴ περὶ σμικροῦ ποιησομένοις.

Later, at *Republic* V, we find more textual support that the guardians reciprocate friendship when Socrates and Glaucon agree that philosopher guardians will interact with each other in a generally friendly manner:

(**T3**) [S] What about your guardians? Could any of them consider a co-guardian as an outsider or address him as such?

[G] There's no way he could for when he meets any one of them, he'll hold that he's meeting a brother or a sister, a father or a mother, a son or a daughter, or some ancestor or descendant of theirs.

[S] You put that very well. But tell me this: Will your laws require them simply to use these kinship names or also to do all the things that go along with the names? Must they show to their "fathers" the respect, solicitude, and obedience we show to our parents by law? . . .

[G] The former. It would be absurd if they only mouthed kinship names without doing the things that go along with them. *Rep.* V.463c3-e1[71]

[71] I have added the speaker brackets for the sake of clarity. I should also note that the guardian classes in Plato changes meaning throughout *Republic*. Until *Rep.* III.414b, the guardian class refers to actually two distinct classes, the auxiliaries and the philosopher guardians. After III.414b, 'guardian' refers solely to the philosopher rulers, who are guardians in the "most precise sense." Throughout this chapter, I will use 'guardian,' 'philosopher guardian,' and 'philosopher ruler' interchangeably. I will use 'auxiliary' to refer to the class of citizens that are responsible for the policing and soldiering duties. I will use 'guardian classes' to refer to the collective of auxiliaries and philosopher rulers.

> Τί δὲ οἱ παρὰ σοί φύλακες; ἔσθ' ὅστις αὐτῶν ἔχοι ἄν τῶν συμφυλάκων νομίσαι τινὰ ἢ προσειπεῖν ὡς ἀλλότριον;
>
> οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. παντὶ γὰρ ᾧ ἄν ἐντυγχάνῃ, ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῇ ἢ ὡς πατρὶ ἢ ὡς μητρὶ ἢ υἱεῖ ἢ θυγατρὶ ἢ τούτων ἐγκόνοις ἢ προγόνοις νομιεῖ ἐντυγχάνειν.
>
> κάλλιστα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τόδε εἰπέ: πότερον αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα μόνον οἰκεῖα νομοθετήσεις, ἢ καὶ τὰς πράξεις πάσας κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα πράττειν, περί τε τοὺς πατέρας, ὅσα νόμος περὶ πατέρας αἰδοῦς τε πέρι καὶ κηδεμονίας καὶ τοῦ ὑπήκοον δεῖν εἶναι τῶν γονέων . . .
>
> αὗται, ἔφη: γελοῖον γὰρ ἄν εἴη εἰ ἄνευ ἔργων οἰκεῖα ὀνόματα διὰ τῶν στομάτων μόνον φθέγγοιντο.

What is less explicit though is whether nonguardian citizens of Kallipolis (i.e. auxiliaries and producers) also enjoy friendship both in their own classes and with other classes. The determination of this is significant in part because it may attenuate the cogency of Socrates' claim in **T1** that justice brings about friendship. On the one hand, if justice results in friendship only for a few citizens (e.g. the philosopher rulers), then such justice seems congenial to a Thrasymachean interpretation that justice is indeed another's good and not necessarily good for all just people (assuming friendship is a good) (*Rep.* 1.343c-343a).

If, on the other hand, justice produces friendship for all members of the just society, then not only does this account seem less susceptible to a Thrasymachean reinterpretation, but it also seems to support Socrates' other claims that justice is always good for its possessor and that the aim of a just polity is to not make any one person or group happy, but the entire polity happy (cf. IV.420d-421c; VII.519e-520a). My view is that the rest of *Republic* can explain Socrates' claim in **T1** in a way that does not render it susceptible to a Thrasymachean gloss. The first step to defending this position, to which I will now turn, is to show that there are textual and philosophical grounds to infer that friendship exists among more than just the philosopher rulers.

1.3 Friendship among All Citizens of Kallipolis?

When Socrates describes the devolution of the ideal city into a timocracy in *Republic* VIII, he makes a perhaps surprising comment about how the citizens will change the way they treat one another as they transition to timocratic rule:

> (**T4**) Once civil war breaks out, both the iron and bronze types pull the constitution towards money-making and the acquisition of land, houses, gold, and silver, while both the gold and silver types—not being poor, but by nature rich or rich in their souls—lead the constitution towards virtue and the old order. And thus striving and struggling with one another, they compromise on a middle way: They distribute the land and houses as private property, *enslave and hold as serfs and servants those whom they previously guarded as free friends and providers of upkeep*, and occupy themselves with war and with guarding against those whom they've enslaved.
>
> *Rep.* VIII.547b-c, my emphasis[72]

στάσεως, ἣν δ'ἐγώ, γενομένης εἰλκέτην ἄρα ἑκατέρω τὼ γένει, τὸ μὲν σιδηροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν ἐπὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ γῆς κτῆσιν καὶ οἰκίας χρυσίου τε καὶ ἀργύρου, τὼ δ'αὖ, τὸ χρυσοῦν τε καὶ αργυροῦν, ἅτε οὐ πενομένω ἀλλά φύσει ὄντε πλουσίω, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετην καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν ἠγέτην: βιαζομένων δὲ καὶ ἀντιτεινόντων ἀλλήλοις, εἰς μέσον ὡμολόγησαν γῆν μὲν καὶ οἰκιας κατανειμαμένους ἰδιώσασθαι, τοὺς δὲ πρὶν φυλαττομένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὡς ἐλευθέρους φίλους τε καὶ τροφέας, δουλωσάμενοι τότε περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας ἔχοντες, αὐτοὶ πολέμου τε καὶ φυλακῆς αὐτῶν ἀπιμελεῖσθαι.

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[72] A similar passage about friendship in Kallipolis can be found in *Rep.* IX.590d (cf. also IX.588e-589a): "It isn't to harm the slave that we say he must be ruled, which is what Thrasymachus thought to be true of all subjects, but because it is better for everyone to be ruled by divine reason, preferably within himself and his own, otherwise imposed from without, *so that as far as possible all will be alike and friends,* governed by the same thing" (my emphasis). (*οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δούλου οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ θρασύμαχος ᾤετο τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄμεινον ὂν παντὶ ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὑτῷ, εἰ δὲ μη, ἔξωθεν ἐφεστῶτος, ἵνα εἰς δύναμιν πάντες ὅμοιοι ὦμεν καὶ φίλοι, τῷ αὐτῷ κυβερνώμενοι.*)

This passage is important for several reasons. First, it couches the rise of faction in language that recalls two earlier passages—which I will discuss shortly—that bear on the education and comportment of citizens in Kallipolis. The use of iron, bronze, silver, and gold types to describe those at faction clearly hearkens back to the Noble Lie—the statewide myth disseminated to all young citizens of Kallipolis. And the description of the currently enslaved people who are serfs and servants as formerly being providers of upkeep (*tropheas*) recalls a passage that details how guardians and nonguardians view one another's contributions to the city.

But the main reason this passage is important is because it clearly shows that all citizens of Kallipolis—before the constitution devolved into more imperfect forms—were friends with one another. If the citizens of Kallipolis are somehow friends with one another and the ideal city is structured so as to promote this friendship, then we should be able to discern the causes (e.g. psychological, educational, or ideological) of such friendship.

1.3.1 Noble Lie

Perhaps surprisingly, one of the sources of political friendship is the Noble Lie. The myth of metals is introduced in *Republic* III as a noble falsehood (*gennaion pseudos*) that will persuade the entire city (*Rep.* III.414c). The myth instructs citizens that they are all born from earth—their mother (*Rep.* III.414e1-2)—and that they consider one another siblings (*Rep.* III.415a2). We also learn that all citizens instantiate one of four possible types of natures, characterized by four types of metal: gold, silver, iron or bronze. Every citizen is best suited for a specific task relative to their nature: gold and silver citizens will become either philosopher rulers or auxiliaries, while iron and bronze citizens will comprise craftsmen, farmers, and the rest of the non-guardians (I refer to this collective as producers) (*Rep.* III.415a-d).

One reason the myth plays a central role in Kallipolis is because it encourages citizens to enact justice. If justice is doing one's own work and not meddling in another's work, then those citizens

who subscribe to the myth of metals are furnished with explanations that allow them to understand why they should do a certain task and why other citizens are better suited for other tasks.[73]

What's especially fascinating about the myth is that it encourages citizens to enact justice partially on the basis of encouraging them to view one another as friends (*philoi*). Recall that '*philia*' has a much broader semantic range than 'friendship' may capture.[74] A central example of a *philia* relationship in classical antiquity is that of family members.[75] Consider a famous passage from Sophocles' *Antigone*, where Antigone expresses to Creon her unwavering commitment to her brother as *philia*:

Creon:	Are you not ashamed to think alone?
Antigone:	It is no shame to serve blood relatives (*ὁμοσπλάγχνους*).
Creon:	Was not he who died on the other side your brother (*ὅμαιμος*)?
Antigone:	Full brother, on both sides, my parents' child.
	(*ὅμαιμος ἐκ μιᾶς τε καὶ ταὐτοῦ πατρός*).
Creon:	Your act of grace, in his regard, is crime.
Antigone:	The corpse below would never say it was.
Creon:	When you honor him and the criminal just alike?
Antigone:	It was a brother (*ἀδελφὸς*), not a slave, who died.
Creon:	Died to destroy this land the other guarded.
Antigone:	Death yearns for equal law for all the dead.
Creon:	Not that the good and bad draw equal shares.
Antigone:	Who knows but this is holiness below?
Creon:	Never is the enemy, even in death, a friend
	(*οὔτοι που' οὐχθρός, οὐδ' ὅταν θάνῃ, φίλος*).
Antigone:	I cannot share in hatred, but in love
	(*οὔτοι συνέχθειν, ἀλλὰ συμφιλεῖν ἔφυν*).[76] (511-522)

[73] See Wilberding 2012: 130-132 for further discussion.

[74] Konstan 1997: 9, Belfiore 2000: 3-15 and 19-20, and, with specific reference to political friendship, Sheffield 2017: 98-99. Also, Konstan 1997: 55-56 argues that many uses of *philein* and *philia* correspond more than scholars have previously admitted to contemporary ideas about friendship.

[75] Blundell 1989: 39-41.

[76] Sophocles 2013. Greek text from Sophocles 1990. See further commentary on the prominence of *philia* in this passage and for the prominence of *philia* in Sophocles' *Antigone*, see, respectively, Blundell 1989: 106-115 and Belfiore 2000: 142-144.

Likewise, at *Eudemian Ethics* VII.1242a19-22, Aristotle notes that associates in one's family (among other kinds of associates) qualify as friends.[77] Since family relationships are a subset of the larger set of *philia*-relationships, then to the extent that they myth encourages citizens to consider one another as family members, so too does it encourage citizens to consider one another as *philoi*.

Through the myth, each citizen can be persuaded to do his or her own work because they can (a) conceptualize how they each have different abilities which render them better suited for different tasks and (b) are likely not to meddle with another's work mainly because they view other citizens as friends. Notice that it is only the conjunction of (a) and (b) that actually brings to fruition both elements of the *Rep.* IV.433a-b definition of justice doing one's own work *and* not meddling in others. Notice also that the myth essentially depends on citizens viewing each other as friends. If citizens were to be told only the 'metals' part of the myth—the part that explains how the kind of metal in their soul makes them eligible for certain offices and ineligible for others—then there is no guarantee that the myth would achieve its function of encouraging citizens to "care for the city and each other" (*têsˆ poleôs te kai allêlôn kêdesthai*) (*Rep.* III.415d).[78] It is highly unlikely that citizens would exhibit care for one another solely on the basis of seeing that they are made of different metals. Rather, the part of the myth that completes this task is the part that informs the citizens that they are *philoi*, for it is both a near truism that one should care for one's friends and there exists another passage to be discussed shortly which directly connects the activity of caring to that of *philia*.[79]

Yet before we address that passage, there is one central obstacle to my interpretation of the myth of metals that I should address. According to some scholars, it is not clear that the producer

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[77] See also Schofield 1998: 40-42.

[78] For further discussion of the purpose of the myth, see Schofield 2006: 284-292.

[79] For the relationship of caring to love and friendship, see Frankfurt 2004: 10-32. For the other passage, see **T8** and ensuing discussion below.

class has heard the myth. If true, this would be problematic because it would mean that the kind of educational work which I attribute to the myth would be partial at best. The onus would be on me to either explain why producers would regard fellow citizens as friends on account of some different feature of Kallipolis or to drop the claim entirely.[80]

There is voluminous debate about the extent of the education of the producer class in Kallipolis. The relevant positions in the debate consists of those who claim that the producer class does not receive the primary musical and gymnastic education in *Republic* II-III[81] and those who claim that the producer class does receive this education or at least part of it.[82] What is mainly at issue for our purpose is whether the myth of metals counts as a part of the primary education or, more precisely, whether the producers are exposed to the myth of metals. My position is that there is good reason to suppose the producers have heard the myth and that we can thus suppose that the producer class and the rest of the citizens of Kallipolis are familiar with its content.

This debate has become somewhat intractable because Plato is vague about the education of the producers and there seems to be textual evidence for both sides of the debate. Hourani, for instance, makes the excessively strong (and unduly psychologizing) claim that: "It would seem to [Plato] a waste of effort to educate *everyone* towards Guardianship" and "In the *Republic* everyone is to

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[80] A second obstacle may be that the myth of metals cannot be the ultimate grounding of friendship among all classes because at least some classes (e.g. the philosopher guardians) clearly do not believe the literal content of the myth but recognize it as a noble *lie*. The task here, then, is to explain how and on what grounds those who do not subscribe to the myth can claim friendship with other citizens. I grant that the myth is not the ultimate grounding. My only aim in this regard will be to show that the other groundings (e.g. the true beliefs of the auxiliaries or the knowledge of the philosopher guardians) are compatible with and complementary to the underlying justifications offered in the myth of metals.

[81] See Hourani 1949 for the strongest and most concise version of this view. See also Reeve 2006: 186-189 and, in a somewhat qualified way, Kamtekar 2004: 158-159.

[82] More recently, see Jeon 2014: 188 fn.11. Wilberding 2012 holds that primary education involves educating the appetites, but it's unclear if he also thinks this means that appetitive people (e.g. producers) are educated or if only the appetites of the guardian classes are educated. See also Cornford 1941: 62 and 151. Since this position is compatible with but also more committal than mine, I will not spend much time addressing the fine points of it. Suffice it to say that a minimum source of education is the myth of metals and if, as these scholars claim, the producer class receives more of an education than the myth, then that only strengthens their education and my interpretation.

perform the function for which he is most fitted by nature; the natural corollary of this is that everyone is to be trained to perform that function and *for no other purpose*."[83] Hourani's two main pieces of evidence to justify this claim are that (1) Plato never mentions explicitly the education of the producer class and (2) the only time Plato is explicit about the education of the producer class (at. *Rep.* V.546d), the education described is craft education.[84] The problem with (1), put simply, is that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Likewise with (2). The fact that the only explicit mention of producer education is with respect to their craft-education does not necessitate that craft-education is the only education they receive.

The main problem here can also be seen in the putative corollary mentioned in the second quotation above from Hourani's article. While Hourani is undoubtedly correct that in Kallipolis everyone is to perform the function for which they are most fit by nature, this way of formulating it is slightly crude and misses out on what's really going on in Kallipolis. The goal of *Republic* is not just to ensure that everyone performs their characteristic functions, but rather that they do so with compatible motivations and do so in a way that maximizes their collective happiness (*Rep.* IV.420d-421c; VII.519e-520a).[85] With this being the case, we should actually expect on philosophical and interpretive grounds—in addition to the textual ones just mentioned—that Kallipolis is structured in a way that provides all classes with at least some guidance about the correct motivations and happiness.

In section 3.4, I will examine more thoroughly how the Noble Lie is a source for such correct motivations. But, for now, support that the producers actually learn the Noble Lie can be inferred from the following two remarks of Socrates that preface the exposition of the myth:

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[83] Hourani 1949: 59. My emphasis in each quotation.

[84] Reeve 2006: 186-189 gives a more thorough account of the textual problems in attributing primary education to the producers.

[85] For further discussion, see Reeve 2006: 153-159 and, for criticism of Reeve and a different account, see Kamtekar 2004: 145-148 and 151-155. Also valuable is Vasiliou 2008: 233 as well as fns. 40 and 41.

(**T5**) How, then, could we devise one of those useful falsehoods we were talking about a while ago, one noble falsehood that would, in the best case, persuade even the rulers, but if that's not possible, then the others in the city? *Rep.* III.414b8-c2

τίς ἄν οὖν ἡμῖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μηχανὴ γένοιτο τῶν ψευδῶν τῶν ἐν δέοντι γιγνομένων, ὧν δὴ νῦν ἐλέγομεν, γενναῖόν τι ἕν ψεθδομένους πεῖσαι μάλιστα μὲν καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ δὲ μη, τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν;

(**T6**) I'll tell it, then, though I don't know where I'll get the audacity or even what words I'll use. I'll first try to persuade the rulers and the soldiers and then the others in the city.

Rep. III.414d1-3

λέγω δὴ—καίτοι οὐκ οἶδα ὁποίᾳ τόλμῃ ἤ ποίος λόγοις χρώμενος ἐρῶ—καὶ ἐπιχειρήσω πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας πείθειν καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν

The phrase "the others in the city" (*τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν*) in **T5** and **T6** seem most plausibly to refer to the auxiliaries and the producers in the former passage and the producers in the latter. Indeed, the implicit contrast in either passage is difficult to construe as referring some politically relevant group other than the producer class. For what other part of the population of Kallipolis could be intended in such phrasing? And, in addition to this interpretative point, Kamtekar 2004: 159 makes a helpful note on this issue: "There is no reason to suppose that producers would be prevented from hearing these stories [e.g. the myth of metals], for how could they harm them?" Even if we put aside the textual issue about whether producers learn the myth—an issue which is at worst ambiguous, but on my view obliquely inclusive of the producers according to **T5** and **T6**—we can see that there are good philosophical grounds to read the myth as including the producers. First, it will not harm them, since the operative ethical and political beliefs in the myth are compatible with justice and justice never harms its possessor (viz. *Rep.* I.335e). The second point, and a more important one for my argument,

is that the myth of metals' use of friendship language as the proper relationship among citizens actually provides important motivations for all classes—including the producers—to enact justice.[86]

1.3.2 Naming Preservers, Auxiliaries, and Providers of Upkeep and Wages

The second passage referenced in **T2**'s declaration of friendship among all citizens is one in *Rep.* V that focuses on how the unity of Kallipolis is exemplified in the names citizens give to one another. This passage is important in part because it demonstrates, in contrast to other cities, the cooperative and mutually appreciative attitude that all citizens have toward one another's contributions in the ideal city:

> (**T7**) It's time now to return to our own city, to look there for the features we've agreed on [i.e. the absence of faction, the presence of unity, and the sharing of pleasures of pain], and to determine whether it or some other city possesses them to the greatest degree.
>
> Then that's what we must do.
>
> What about those other cities? Aren't there rulers and people in them, as well as in ours?
>
> There are.
>
> Besides fellow citizens, what do the people call the rulers in those other cities?
>
> In many they call them despots, but in democracies they are called just this—rulers.
>
> What about the people in our city? Besides fellow citizens, what do they call their rulers?
>
> Preservers and auxiliaries. (*σωτῆράς τε καὶ ἐπικούρος*)
>
> And what do they in turn call the people?
>
> Providers of upkeep and wages. (*μισθοδόταις τε καὶ τροφέας*)
>
> What do the rulers call the people in other cities?
>
> Slaves.

[86] For discussion of the myth of metals being addressed to all citizens, see Vasiliou 2008: 235, Wilberding 2012: 131, and Prauscello 2014: 46-47.

And what do the rulers call each other?

Co-rulers.

And ours?

Co-guardians. *Rep.* V.462e3-463b8

τί οὖν; ἔστι μέν που καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἄρχοντές τε καὶ δῆμος, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ;

ἔστι.

πολίτας μὲν δὴ πάντες οὗτοι ἀλλήλους προσεροῦσι;

πῶς δ' οὔ;

ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί ὁ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις δῆμος τοὺς ἄρχοντας προσαγορεύει;

Ε*ἐν μὲν ταῖς πολλαῖς δεσπότας, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατουμέναις αὐτὸ τοῦνομα τοῦτο, ἄρχοντας.*

Τ*ί δ' ὁ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ δῆμος; πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί τοὺς ἄρχοντάς φησιν εἶναι;*

σωτῆράς τε καὶ ἐπικούρος, ἔφη.

τί δ' οὗτοι τὸν δῆμον;

μισθοδότας τε καὶ τροφέας.

οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἄρχοντες τοὺς δήμους;

δούλους, *ἔφη.*

τί δ' οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀλλήλους;

συνάρχοντας, ἔφη.

τί δ' οἱ ἡμέτεροι;

συμφύλακας.

The passage is immediately followed by **T3**, which importantly claims that the positive names the citizens use are not just superficial talk, but actually accompanied by correspondingly positive actions. In other words, referring to one another as "preservers" (*sôtêras*), "auxiliaries" (*epikourous*), and

"providers of upkeep and wages" (*misthodotas te kai tropheas*), is not merely lip service citizens pay to one another; it is supposed to be genuinely reflective of how they view each other.[87] In contrast to other cities, where rulers view subjects as "slaves" (*doulous*) and subjects view rulers as "despots" (*despotas*) or "rulers" (*arxontas*), the citizens of Kallipolis, as displayed in the words they use, view one another in terms of the contributions they make to the shared life of the *polis*. Guardians are valuable because they manage the well-being of the *polis* according to principles of justice; auxiliaries are valuable because they are allies to the guardians, mainly by defending the city from threats internal and external; and producers generally are valuable because they equip the city with its requisite needs, including food, medicine, and similar tasks.[88]

Also noteworthy is that we can see here that citizens, if they are to use these names sincerely, must somehow possess the cognitive resources to recognize the utility and importance of the other activities in the city while also not mistakenly believing themselves best suited for those activities. There thus needs to be an adequate educational system in place that can provide citizens of varying levels of ability with compatible justifications for these conceptualizations. But, to anticipate a forthcoming argument, what's especially important for the discussion in the next section is that citizens view one another in this way on the basis of *beliefs* they have about the worthwhileness of their own contributions and those of fellow citizens to the polis.

Another important feature of this passage is that it lends support to the idea that friendship exists among all the citizens. The nomenclature in **T7**, with its implicit praise and commendation of fellow citizens and their activities, implies that each citizen demonstrates some friendly disposition

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[87] See Kamtekar 2004: 158-159 and Reeve 2006: 204-205 for concordant discussions of this passage.

[88] See Vasiliou 2008: 232-247 for a discussion of the varied tasks of the producer class. See Prauscello 2014: 54-55 for further discussion, especially of the cultural and historical context of some of the approbative terminology the citizens of Kallipolis use.

toward other citizens.[89] Further evidence of this also comes from re-reading **T4** in light of this passage. In **T4**, Socrates makes explicit that the use of *tropheas* by the guardians and auxiliaries (before the devolution into timocracy) toward the producers implied a friendship among all classes: "They enslave and hold as serfs and servants those whom they previously guarded as free friends and providers of upkeep" (*τοὺς δὲ πρὶν φυλαττομένους ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὡς ἐλευθέρους φίλους τε καὶ τροφέας, δουλωσάμενοι τότε περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας ἔχοντες*). If part of what grounds the guardians and auxiliaries' friendships towards the producers is how they acknowledged and valued their contribution to the city, then it seems plausible that the producers likewise viewed the auxiliaries and guardians as friends for a similar reason. In this way, this passage seems to provide testimony that a feature of Kallipolis is that all citizens are friends with one another.

2. Two Beliefs and a Framework of Political Friendship

I suggested in Section 1.3.1 that one politically and ethically significant feature of the myth of metals is that it educates citizens to treat one another, broadly, as friends (insofar as familial relationships instantiate *philia* relationships). I also suggested that the terminology citizens deploy to refer to one another supports the claim that citizens are friends in Kallipolis. One claim I made in that section is that friendship can count as an important motivation with respect to encouraging citizens to enact justice. In the next two sections, I want to explain why friendship functions in this way by exploring how Plato connects the psychology of friendship with care and beliefs about happiness. Specifically, citizens are taught to adopt two beliefs—a belief in shared utility and a belief in biconditional happiness—that provide them a conceptual means and a motivation to treat one another as friends.

In *Rep.* III, we learn that one goal of the myth of metals it to encourage citizens "to care for the city and each other" (*tês poleôs te kai allêlôn kêdesthai*). This claim is preceded by an illuminating and

[89] Prauscello 2014: 52 – 56 also connects this passage with friendship throughout Kallipolis.

general analysis of care (*kêdesthai*) and love (*philein*) in the midst of Socrates and Glaucon discussing the qualities necessary for ruling. I take the following passage as foundational to an analysis of the psychology of friendship in *Republic*:

> (**T8**) [A]s the rulers must be the best of the guardians, mustn't they be the ones who are best at guarding the city?
>
> Yes.
>
> Then, in the first place, mustn't they be knowledgeable and capable, and mustn't they care for the city?
>
> That's right.
>
> Now, one cares most for what one loves.
>
> Necessarily.
>
> And someone loves something most of all when he believes that the same things are advantageous to it as to himself and believes that if it does well, he'll do well and that if it does badly, then he'll do badly too.
>
> That's right. *Rep.* III.412c8-d1[90]
>
> *νῦν δ', ἐπειδὴ φυλάκων αὐτοὺς ἀρίστους δεῖ εἶναι, ἆρ' οὐ φυλακικωτάτους πόλεως;*
>
> *ναί.*
>
> *οὐκοῦν, φρονίμους τε εἰς τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν καὶ δυνατοὺς καὶ ἔτι κηδεμόνας τῆς πόλεως;*
>
> *ἔστι ταῦτα.*
>
> *κήδοιτο δε γ' ἄν τις μάλιστα τούτου ὅ τυγχάνοι φιλῶν.*
>
> *ἀνάγκη.*

[90] Prauscello 2014: 47 apparently takes **T8** to be mainly retrospective, i.e. serving as a "skillful declination" of care and philia for the myth of metals. But nothing in context demands this and, in fact, the immediate context actually goes against a solely retrospective reading. For instance, when the guardians are described *phronimous*, it implies that they probably no longer believe the Noble Lie.

καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γ᾽ ἄν μάλιστα φιλοῖ, ᾧ συμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὅταν μάλιστα ἐκείνου μὲν εὖ πράττοντος οἴοιτο συμβαίνειν καὶ ἑαυτῷ εὖ πράττειν, μὴ δε, τοὐναντίον.

οὕτως, ἔφη.

Plausibly enough, Socrates and Glaucon determine that one quality necessary for a ruler is that the ruler should care about that over which she rules. In delimiting what it means to care about something, Socrates suggests that a surefire way to elicit care is through considering the object of care worthy of *philia*. In delimiting this in turn, Socrates parses *philein* in epistemic terms—as evidenced by his correlative use of "*ἡγοῖτο*." Generally, according to **T8**, one loves (or has *philia* for) any X when one holds two beliefs about X:

(1) Belief in Shared Utility: the same things confer advantage to both X and to oneself.

(2) Belief in Biconditional Happiness: a state of affairs in which one's faring well is necessarily and sufficiently bound with another person's (or another thing's) faring well.[91]

Suppose that I love Max. According to this framework, I must hold two beliefs about Max to sincerely love him. First, I must believe in shared utility between us. For instance, maybe I believe that Max and I receive advantages in playing chess together; the advantage for each of us perhaps consists of the intellectual pleasure of strategizing and calculating various lines of moves that lead to checkmate. Or perhaps this is only the advantage Max receives and I believe the advantage for me is in the pleasure of spending time with Max, and chess-playing is one way to attain that pleasure (a distinct pleasure to be sure, but an advantage none the less). The point is that I hold a belief in shared utility as long as I recognize that the thing common to Max and me (e.g. playing chess) confers advantages to both of

[91] The terminology, with some modification, of 'biconditional happiness' is borrowed from Reeve 2006: 166-167. I will use 'faring well' and 'happiness' or 'happy' interchangeably. Singpurwalla 2006b: 278 also alludes to this biconditional feature: "Socrates seems to be suggesting then, that the happiness of an individual citizen cannot be achieved independently of his fulfilling his role in making the community of he is a part happy, or in other words, in making his fellow citizens happy."

us. Notice that the advantage does not have to be identical between Max and myself. It is entirely plausible—and in the context of *Republic* likely necessary—that the same object, activity, or entity can be a source of multiple advantages—some feature of which may appeal to some people and other features which may appeal to different people.

The second belief necessary to my loving Max is my belief in biconditional happiness. I believe that my happiness is biconditionally bound to Max's happiness when I believe both that (1) if Max fares well, so to do I fare well and (2) if Max does not fare well, neither do I. In *Republic* terms, this means that good rulers do not just care about and love the city (and the citizens who compose the city), but that they do so on in part on the basis of holding the belief that their own happiness is biconditionally bound to the happiness of the rest of the city. If Max likewise holds a belief in shared utility and a belief in biconditional happiness about me—that is if Max also loves me—then it seems plausible on the basis of that reciprocity for us to claim *philia.*[92]

The connection of care with friendship has a substantial philosophical pedigree in Plato and elsewhere. Plato's *Phaedrus*, for instance, thematizes the relationship between care and *philia.*[93] More recently, Harry Frankfurt has argued that love (which in Frankfurt's sense includes friendship), at bottom, is best described as a special kind of caring about something. It is only when we care about people in a certain way that we can be said to love them.[94] Although the psychological underpinning of Frankfurt's account of love differs drastically from the Platonic one, **T8** shares the general insight

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[92] Kraut 1973a: 337 reads this passage as showing that citizens' extended interests include the welfare of the city broadly, even if it may not be in their immediate interests. This seems to be a reasonable way of explaining in moral psychological terms the kind of ethical framework at work here and thus seems compatible with my point. Kraut also has solid reasons to reject reading this passage as somehow implying that it is possible for the interests of the philosopher guardians to actually come apart from and possibly conflict with the interests of the city.

[93] This argument has been made persuasively by Sheffield 2011. See also Sheffield 2017: 95-98 for more illuminating discussion.

[94] Frankfurt 2004: 11-16.

with Frankfurt that we can satisfactorily understand love and friendship by reference to caring. Where the *Republic* model of care and friendship departs from the Frankfurtian one is in its analysis of love as a necessarily cognitive activity, as an activity that depends on our epistemic attitudes.[95]

An additional reason **T8** is important is because it does not require us to perform the thorny hermeneutical task of appealing to other dialogues, such as Plato's *Lysis, Symposium*, or *Phaedrus*, to understand broadly the nature of friendship in *Republic*.[96] Instead, sufficient analysis of **T8** offers on its own a solid account of at least the minimal conditions of friendship. It seems plausible to insist that friends are somehow alike and share in one another's lives and activities. What **T8** suggests is that an important sense in which friends become similar is by holding compatible if not identical beliefs in matters relevant to their friendship. So, in political friendship the relevant beliefs pertain to issues of justice, community, and happiness—all premier political topics in Plato.[97] Obviously, **T8** is not a discursive presentation of friendship; it may leave out other relevant criteria for friendship—emotional dispositions, certain other activities or behaviors characteristic of friendship, etc.—but it does nonetheless provide a solid and plausible psychological basis upon which to understand how citizens in a political community may achieve friendship.[98]

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[95] Frankfurt argues against an intellectualist model of love, instead explicitly opting for a volitional one. See Frankfurt 2004: 43-57.

[96] Many scholars are quick to assume that there is not a substantial account of friendship in the *Republic*. Both Vlastos and Reeve, for instance, import a utility model of friendship from the *Lysis*. While, no doubt, this account of love as I've developed does involve beliefs in shared utility, I see no reason to engage in the unnecessarily messy task of assuming that the same kind of utility is at work in *Lysis* and *Republic*, especially because the rest of the *Republic* seems to give substantial grounding to the minimal sense of utility in (1). See Vlastos 1973/1999: 145 and Reeve 2006: 166-167. Kraut 1973a and Price 1989 turn to *Symposium* to interpret some of these passages in *Republic* about love and friendship. Sheffield 2011 takes the *Phaedrus* as offering a tripartite and general theory of friendship. I think the inquiry into whether Plato's views on love and friendship throughout the more explicitly love- and friendship-themed dialogues (e.g. *Lysis, Phaedrus*, *Symposium*) is consistent and coherent with how he treats love and friendship in the political dialogues (e.g. *Republic, Laws, Statesman*) is important and fruitful. But I do not think it is necessary for unearthing at least a proto-account of friendship and love in the political dialogues, including *Republic*.

[97] For a for-the-most-part complementary and general discussion, see Sheffield 2017: 98-100.

[98] For defense and further discussion of non-exhaustive accounts of friendship for political purposes, see Chapter 1, Section 4.1 and Chapter 4.

3. Extending the Framework to All Citizens

One aspect worth emphasizing in this account of friendship is that nothing in the passage restricts this analysis of *philia* solely to the guardian class. As **T8** claims, guardians are distinguished by the conjunction of three characteristics; guardians are knowledgeable (*phronimous*), capable (*dunatous*), and they care for the city (*kêdemonas tês poleôs*). While the conjunction of these three is unique to the guardians, it is quite clear that an aim of *Republic* is to encourage all citizens, not just the philosopher guardians, to care about the city (cf. *Rep.* III.415c-d). Moreover, only the guardians' beliefs in shared utility and biconditional happiness will be grounded in the philosophical knowledge of the Forms. This does not mean, however, that such knowledge is the only grounding. As long as nonphilosophical citizens can support their beliefs in shared utility and biconditional happiness on distinct but compatible grounds, then we can understand them to love the city and the citizens as equally sincerely (even though perhaps not as equally truthfully) as the philosopher guardians.

Indeed, these two fundamental beliefs of citizen-wide friendship seem to be operative in the description of Kallipolis as a unified community that shares in pleasure and pain. In a well-known passage from *Rep.* V, Socrates and Glaucon discuss the unity of the city:

> (**T9**) Is there any greater evil we can mention for a city than that which tears it apart and makes it many instead of one? Or any greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?—There isn't.
>
> And when, as far as possible, all the citizens rejoice and are pained by the same successes and failures, doesn't this sharing of pleasures and pains bind the city together?—It most certainly does.
>
> But when some suffer greatly, while others rejoice greatly, at the same things happening to the city or its people, doesn't this privatization of pleasures and pains dissolve the city?—Of course.

> And isn't this what happens whenever such words as "mine" and "not mine" are used in unison? And similarly with "someone else's"?—Precisely.
>
> Then, is this the best-governed city, the one in which most people say "mine" and "not mine" about the same things in the same way?—It is indeed . . .
>
> Then, whenever anything good or bad happens to a single one of its citizens, [the best-governed city] above all others will say that the affected part is its own and will share in the pleasure or pain as a whole. *Rep.* V.462a8-e1

ἔχομεν οὖν τι μεῖζον κακὸν πόλει ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὅ ἄν αὐτὴν διασπᾷ καὶ ποιῇ πολλὰς ἀντὶ μιᾶς; ἢ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ὅ ἄν συνδῇ τε καὶ ποιῇ μίαν; — οὐκ ἔχομεν.

Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης κοινωνία συνδεῖ, ὅταν ὅτι μάλιστα πάντες οἱ πολῖται τῶν αὐτῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων παραπλησίως χαίρωσι καὶ λυπῶνται; — παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ἡ δε γε τῶν τοιούτων ἰδίωσις διαλύει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν περιαλγεῖς, οἱ δὲ περιχαρεῖς γίγνωνται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς παθήμασι τῆς πόλεώς τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει; — τι δ' οὔ;

ἆρ' οὖν ἐκ τοῦδε τὸ τοιόνδε γίγνεται, ὅταν μὴ ἅμα φθέγγωνται ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰ τοιάδε ῥήματα, το τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν; καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου κατὰ ταὐτά; — κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ἐν ᾗτινι δὴ πόλει πλεῖστοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ τοῦτο λέγουσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμὸν, αὕτη ἄριστα διοικεῖται; — πολύ γε . . .

ἑνὸς δὴ οἶμαι πάσχοντος τῶν πολιτῶν ὁτιοῦν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἡ τοιαύτη πόλις μάλιστά τε φήσει ἑαυτῆς εἶναι τὸ πάσχον, καὶ ἢ συνησθήσεται ἅπασα ἢ συλλυπήσεται.

I consider this passage to be a nearly complete application of friendship among the citizens according to the framework developed above. The emphasis on sharing of pleasures and pains seems to be an (admittedly weak, but soon-to-be strengthened!) form of a belief in biconditional happiness. Part of what it means to share in pleasures and pains is that one thinks that what pleases another also pleases

oneself and likewise with pains. Insofar as pleasure is a component of the happy life—i.e. that the happy person lives pleasurably (viz. *Rep.* IX. 583a)—we can read the community of pleasures and pains as an instance of the belief in biconditional happiness. Moreover, we can also read the community of pleasures and pains as instantiating belief in shared utility.[99] This is so because pleasure seems to be a paradigmatic example of an advantage or a benefit. It is axiomatic that pleasure, when properly construed, is advantageous, though certainly not all pleasures are equal; the educational program of *Republic*, for instance, is keen to promote only the appropriate kinds of pleasures.[100] Further, the discussion of the kinds of pleasure and of how the philosopher is most experienced and knowledgeable about the different kinds of pleasure at *Rep.* IX.580d-583a seems to ensure that the pleasures and pains the ideal community feels are not deleterious pleasures, but only those that are conducive to faring well.

3.1 The Sources of Friendship Beliefs for the Classes of Kallipolis

So far, I have suggested that it is plausible to locate some inklings of civic friendship in the Noble Lie and in the passage on the nomenclature citizens use to refer to one another. In an effort to make good on that suggestion, I have also argued for the possibility that, despite the immediate context, the framework of care and friendship in **T8** can be extended from the philosophers of *Republic* to the nonphilosophers. To strengthen this argument, I now want to show that each class of Kallipolis—the philosopher guardians, the auxiliaries, and the producers—have ample educational resources at their disposal to form compatible and complementary beliefs in shared utility and in biconditional happiness. I will treat each class in turn.

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[99] Kraut 1973a: 336.

[100] See comments on the education of appetitive desires in *Rep.* 431c5 and the difference between necessary and unnecessary desires at *Rep.* 558d-559c.

3.2 KNOWLEDGE AND FRIENDSHIP FOR PHILOSOPHER GUARDIANS

The unique epistemic position of the philosopher guardians consists in their possession of knowledge and wisdom. They attain this knowledge through their primary education in music and gymnastics coupled with the special education they receive as detailed in *Rep.* VI-VII, which includes mathematics and dialectic and culminates in knowledge of the Forms. For political and ethical purposes, the philosophers' knowledge enables them to deliberate well about what particular actions and practices are just and virtuous, since through knowledge of the Good, philosophers also know Justice and Beauty and virtue (*Rep.* 443d-e; 484d-485a; 505e-508a).[101] Philosophers are also concerned about justice and virtue generally because they recognize virtue as intrinsically choiceworthy and as constitutive of the goodness and happiness that everyone desires (cf. *Rep.* VI.505c-e).[102]

To say that philosophers are concerned with justice, however, is not enough to explain precisely the motivations for why philosophers are committed to holding the two beliefs—shared utility and biconditional happiness—necessary for their friendship with the other citizens. Indeed, such an explanation may appear more difficult when we recall a set of passages, which has puzzled scholars for generations,[103] that entail both that philosophers are the most apt to rule and at the same time appear unwilling and unmotivated to engage in ruling (*Rep.* VII.519e-520d; 521b-c, and 540a). Philosophers, we learn, prefer to spend their time in philosophy (519c). The problem is that it seems the philosophers should by virtue of their knowledge wish to enact political justice and, at the same time and also by virtue of their knowledge (and the splendor of philosophy), are unmotivated to perform the obligations required for establishing and maintaining political justice. If this holds, then

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[101] Also cf. 517d and 520c for comments on the practical excellence of philosophers compared to nonphilosophers.

[102] On the intrinsic value and benefit of justice, see Singpurwalla 2006b.

[103] For various solutions to this puzzle, see Cooper 1999: 138-149**,** Irwin 1995, Kraut 1999, and Brown 2004.

it is difficult to count philosophers as friends of other citizens because it is mysterious how one can ascribe to philosophers a belief in shared utility with the other classes and a belief in biconditional happiness with them, both of which are required for friendship. If the philosopher guardians really saw justice as advantageous (and connected their activity of ruling with justice) and if they really believed that their happiness was bound to their fellow citizens also faring well, why would they be unmotivated to pursue ruling justly?

In general, I find this line of reasoning unpersuasive. Granting for the sake of argument that there is a genuine conflict in the philosopher's motivations,[104] the conflict is not one of being motivated to philosophize versus being unmotivated to rule. Rather, philosophers are *comparatively* less motivated to rule than to philosophize. This comparative dimension is perfectly compatible with the philosopher guardians nonetheless being motivated to rule; it is just that their preferences and interests entail they are even more motivated to philosophize. While there thus may need to be some institutional strictures or legislation in place (e.g. 540a-c) to ensure that not all philosophers are always philosophizing, it is still plausible to say that they can be motivated to rule. If they are motivated to rule then, there must be something genuinely good and virtuous about ruling (since definitionally philosophers are motivated by knowledge they must know why ruling is good for the city).

The reasons that Socrates gives for why philosopher guardians should rule roughly consists of reasons for philosopher guardians to believe in shared utility and in biconditional happiness with the other citizens of Kallipolis. Consider part of Socrates' fictional address to the guardians at *Rep.* VII.510a-c where he explains why they must rule:

> (**T10**) When people like you come to be in other cities, they're justified in not sharing in the city's labors, for they've grown there spontaneously, against the will of the constitution. And

[104] In general, I think Brown 2004's arguments against 'filling the gap' approaches are persuasive and correct. Nonetheless, I think my point still stands, even if we maintain that there is a genuine motivational conflict here.

what grows of its own accord and owes no debt for its upbringing has justice on its side when it isn't keen to pay anyone for that upbringing. But we've made you kings in our city and leaders of the swarm, as it were, both for yourselves and for the rest of the city.

[O]*ἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι τοιοῦτοι γιγνόμενοι εἰκότως οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἐν αὐταις πόνων, αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείας, δίκην δ'ἔχει το γε αὐτοφυὲς μηδενὶ τροφὴν ὀφεῖλον μηδ' ἐκτίνειν τῳ προθυμεῖσθαι τὰ τροφεῖα. ὑμας δ'ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν τε αὐτοῖς τῇ τε ἄλλῃ πόλει ὥσπερ ἐν σμήνσειν ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας ἐγεννήσαμεν.*

And also consider Socrates' description of the conclusion of the guardians' education:

(**T11**) Then, at the age of fifty, those who've survived the tests and have been successful both in practical matters and in the sciences must be led to the goal and compelled to lift up the radiant light of their souls to what itself provides light for everything. And once they've seen the good itself, they must each in turn put the city, its citizens, and themselves in order, using it as their model. Each of them will spend most of his time with philosophy, but when his turn comes, he must labor in politics and rule for the city's sake, not as if he were doing something fine, but rather as something that has to be done. *Rep.* VII.540a-b

γενομένων δὲ πεντηκοντουτῶν, τούς διασωθέντας καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας πάντα πάντῃ ἐν ἔργοις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαις πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἀκτέον, καὶ ἀναγκαστέον ἀνακλίναντας τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον, καὶ ἰδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, παραδείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνῳ, καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κοσμεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ἐν μέρει ἑκάστους, τὸ μὲν πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοντας, ὅταν δὲ τὸ μέρος ἥκῃ, πρὸς πολιτικοῖς ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας καὶ ἀρχοντας ἑκάστους τῆς πόλεως ἕνεκα, οὐχ ὡς καλόν τι ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πράττοντας.

Socrates' general claim in these passages is that the guardians have received a substantial benefit from the city: they've received an upbringing and education that has allowed them to appreciate the beauty

of reason and share in the happiest life. Implicit within this benefit is that the guardians should recognize and hold a belief in the shared utility of ruling Kallipolis. This implicit point has actually been made explicit earlier: at IV.442c Socrates says that philosophers—whose rational part rules in their souls—have "knowledge of what is beneficial for each part and for the whole [soul]," (*ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὑτῷ τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἑκάστῳ τε καὶ ὅλῳ*) which per the city-soul analogy also implies they have knowledge of what is beneficial for each class and the whole city. The same education and society in which they were raised benefits not only themselves, but also all other citizens (*Rep.* VII.519e). This means that the knowledgeable guardians are also aware that there is a shared utility to all citizens in the upkeep of Kallipolis.[105] Since the guardians realize that they are the only ones capable of ruling well, we can infer that part of their motivation for so doing is to preserve the harmony and unity of the city, qualities which allowed the guardians themselves to become and continue to be who they are.

In a related way, **T10** and **T11** also support ascribing a belief of biconditional happiness to the philosopher guardians. The guardians recognize that they should rule in part because they recognize that their happiness is both necessarily and sufficiently tied to the happiness of the rest of the citizens. The way the happiness of the guardians is necessarily bound to the rest of the city is straightforward. When Socrates and Glaucon found the initial city, they formulate a principle of specialization, which holds that each citizen should only do the thing that they are best at (*Rep.* II.370b-d). The necessity of this principle comes from recognition that no individual is entirely self-sustaining; political communities, Kallipolis included, form out of shared need and interdependence (*Rep.* II.369b-d).

This principle applies to the philosopher guardians. Their rigorous and demanding education—and the subsequent opportunity that affords them to enjoy the highest form of

[105] See Reeve 2006 and Kamtekar 2004 for two different interpretations for how all classes are benefitted in Kallipolis. Nevertheless, both interpretations rightly hold that the benefits of life in Kallipolis are substantially different for each class. See my earlier discussion of shared utility to show why different benefits in the same activity still counts as a genuine instance in shared utility.

happiness—depends on the work of fellow citizens who guard the city, grow food, and supply other goods so that those with philosophical potential can finish their fifty-year education.[106] Hence the necessity of fellow citizens—and their happiness which is connected to their own work[107]—for the philosopher's happiness.

That the producers' and auxiliaries' happiness is also sufficient for (and therefore biconditionally bound to) the philosophers' happiness may seem at first sight to be an odd claim. Part of this oddity is due to the fact that the happiness of the other two classes appears miles away from the happiness of the philosophers. Philosophers, we are told, are happiest when they are contemplating the Forms (*Rep.* VI.500b-d); the happiness of the other citizens of Kallipolis—who do not have a reflective grasp of the Forms—consists only in approximations of the philosopher's happiest life, including experiencing the pleasures particular to a given citizen's nature and in the degree of virtue attainable by that citizen.[108] So how exactly might the happiness of the other two classes suffice for the philosopher's happiness?

One approach is to argue that the division between contemplating the forms and ruling the city is a superficial one. Richard Kraut has argued, largely on the basis of **T10** and **T11**, that when the philosophers rule the city, they are in effect engaged in an applied study of the forms.[109] As Socrates claims: "And once [the philosophers guardians] have seen the good itself, they must each in turn put the city, its citizens, and themselves in order, using it [i.e. the good itself or the Form of the Good] as

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[106] I obviously have to argue that these activities for the auxiliary and producers class count as a form, albeit a weaker one, of happiness. I will do that in Section 3.3 for the auxiliaries and Section 3.4 for the producers.

[107] We can understand the relationship between happiness and one's own work at various levels of connectedness. Kraut 1973b: 219-220, Vlastos 1978:179 and Nettleship 1958: 136-137 hold that the happiness of nonphilosophers is to be identified with them doing their own work. Kamtekar 2001 more sensibly, in my opinion, holds that the happiness of nonphilosophers is connected to but not reducible to doing their own work.

[108] For the happiness and virtue of nonphilosophers in Kallipolis, see Reeve 2006, Kamtekar 2004, Kamtekar 2001: 210-217 and Kamtekar 1998: 322-324. See also *Republic* I.352d-354a.

[109] Kraut 1999: 235-255.

their model" (*Rep.* VII.540b; cf. *Rep.*VI.500d-501a). Interpreting the activity of ruling in this way, the happiness of the nonphilosophers is sufficient for the happiness of the philosophers because the only activity that culminates in the happiness of nonphilosophers—ruling Kallipolis well—is none other than activity that philosophers at their happiest are engaged in. In other words, the nonphilosophers' happiness is sufficient for the philosopher's because they are co-extensional.

Another way we can reach the same conclusion is by adopting Kraut's general insight without requiring the more disputed claim that ruling the city is an applied study of the Forms. For as long as we recognize that the maximal happiness of the nonphilosophers can only come about in a city ruled with wisdom and that the only way to achieve such wisdom is through engaging in the study of the Forms (the happiest philosophical activity), then the happiness of nonphilosophers serves as incontrovertible evidence of the happiness of philosophers. Put differently: the happiness of the nonphilosophers is sufficient for the happiness of the philosophers not because it has a causal bearing on the philosopher's happiness, but because its presence is an unmistakable indicator of the philosopher's own happiness in Kallipolis.

In this section, I have explored the claim in **T8** that the philosopher guardians have *philia* for the city (and thus the citizens that compose it) by showing how their education provides them with the knowledge necessary for holding the two beliefs required for *philia* in Kallipolis, a belief in shared utility and a belief in biconditional happiness. My aim in the next two sections is to show that the educations of the auxiliary class and the producer class also support holding these two beliefs, albeit on different grounds relative to their different educations.

3.3 Stable, True Belief and Friendship for the Auxiliaries

The immediate context of **T8** pertains to the philosopher guardians and thereby implies that the two-belief framework of *philia* is rooted only in the philosophical knowledge accessible only to the guardians. There is no reason, however, why this context should restrict the operative idea about

friendship and belief from arising solely through knowledge. I argue instead that we can (and should) uncouple two characteristics of the guardians—(1) that they are knowledgeable (*phronimous*) and (2) that they love the city and its citizens. (1) clearly applies to the philosopher guardians only. Yet (2) applies to all members of the city, including the auxiliaries and the producers, but they hold the required beliefs on the basis of epistemic grounds other than knowledge. My aim in this section is to show how the education of the auxiliaries and the institutional structure of their lives support ascribing to them as well the two requisite beliefs for friendship.[110]

The auxiliaries receive, in addition to the Noble Lie, the musical and gymnastic education detailed throughout *Republic* II-III.[111] A central feature of this education includes hearing and imitating a carefully curated set of stories, poems, and songs that depict genuinely virtuous actions and persons (including the philosopher rulers) *as virtuous*, and genuinely vicious ones *as vicious* (cf. *Rep.* II.377b-378b). Two central aims of this education are to instill in those who receive it the ability to distinguish what is fine from what is shameful as well as the ability to recognize instances of virtue and vice (*Rep.* III.401e-402a; III.402c-d).[112]

Implicit in the ability to distinguish between the fine and shameful and in the ability to recognize instances of virtue and vice is that the auxiliaries are acquiring and acting on beliefs about these subjects (cf. *Rep.* II.377b). Another effect of this education, the attainment of political courage

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[110] My argument in this section and the following one is principally indebted to Kamtekar 1998, Kamtekar 2004, Brown 2004, and Vasiliou 2008. My central contribution to their discussions is to show that their general arguments support a claim that none of them made, namely that nonphilosophers have good epistemic reasons to consider themselves friends with the rest of the citizens of Kallipolis.

[111] Jenkins 2015: 850-855 also argues that this primary education includes at least some mathematical education. My interpretation is unaffected by the persuasiveness of Jenkins' argument since my arguments rely only on the musical and gymnastic dimension of the guardian classes education. That said, Jenkins' insight nonetheless strengthens the fact that the primary education of *Republic* is focused on instilling correct beliefs and educating appetites for the purpose of making citizens more receptive to those correct beliefs. For a similar line of argument, see also Thaler 2015.

[112] For further discussion, see Gill 1985 and Singpurwalla 2006a.

by the auxiliaries, makes this point even clearer. Consider this exchange between Socrates and Glaucon at *Rep.* IV.429e-430c:

> (**T12**) [S] Then, you should understand that, as far as we could, we were doing something similar [to dying wool] when we selected our soldiers and educated them in music and physical training. What we were contriving was nothing other than this: That because they had the proper nature and upbringing, they would absorb the laws in the finest possible way, just like a dye, so that their belief about what they should fear and all the rest would become so fast that even such extremely effective detergents as pleasure, pain, fear, and desire wouldn't wash it out—and pleasure is much more potent than any powder, washing soda, or soap. This power to preserve through everything the correct and law-inculcated belief about what is to be feared and what isn't is what I call courage, unless, of course, you say otherwise.
>
> [G] I have nothing different to say, for I assume that you don't consider the correct belief about these same things, which you find in animals and slaves, and which is not the result of education, to be inculcated by law, and that you don't call it courage but something else.
>
> [S] That's absolutely true.
>
> [G] Then I accept your account of courage.
>
> [S] Accept it instead as my account of *civic* courage, and you will be right.
>
> Τοιοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑπόλαβε κατὰ δύναμιν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς, ὅτε ἐξελεγόμεθα τοὺς στρατιώτας καὶ ἐπαιδεύομεν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ. μηδὲν οἷον ἄλλο μηχανᾶσθαι ἢ ὅπως ἡμῖν ὅτι κάλλιστα τοὺς νόμους πεισθέντες δέξοιντο ὥσπερ βαφήν, ἵνα δεθσοποιὸς αὐτῶν ἡ δόξα γίγνοιτο καὶ περὶ δεινῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ την τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπιτηδείαν ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ μὴ αὐτῶν ἐκπλύναι τὴν βαφὴν τὰ ῥύμματα ταῦτα, δεινὰ ὄντα ἐκκλύζειν, ἥ τε ἡδονή, παντὸς χαλεστραίου δεινοτέρα οὖσα τοῦτο δρᾶν καὶ κονίας, λύπη τε καὶ φόβος καὶ ἐπιθυμία, παντὸς ἄλλου ῥύμματος. τὴν δὴ

τοιαύτην δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν διὰ παντὸς δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν τε πέρι καὶ μὴ ἀνδρείαν ἔγωγε καλῶ καὶ τίθεμαι, εἰ μη τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

ἀλλ΄ οὐδέν, ἦ δ'ὅς, λέγω. δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τοὐτων ἄνευ παιδείας γεγονυῖαν, την τε θεριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη, οὔτε πάνυ νόμιμον ἡγεῖσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν.

ἀληθέστατα, ἦν δ'ἐγώ, λἐγεις.

ἀποδέχομαι τοίνυν τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

Καὶ *γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν δ'ἐγώ, πολιτικήν γε, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέξῃ.*

Here, Socrates makes explicit several important effects of the auxiliaries' education. First, they acquire beliefs about virtue. Socrates claims specifically about courage that they hold beliefs about what is and is not to be feared. (Although courage is discussed here, Socrates also implies they also hold beliefs about moderation, frankness, and high-mindedness at III.402c.) Second, these acquired beliefs are stable and reliable.[113] Socrates says that as a result of their education auxiliaries are able to maintain their beliefs even in the presence of "extremely effective detergents," including pleasure, pain, and desire. Third, these beliefs are true. Aside from explicitly labeling their beliefs correct, the fact that their beliefs are "law-inculcated" countenances their truth. The philosopher rulers, who legislate and rule on the basis of knowledge, would only establish laws that promote true beliefs for the auxiliaries.[114]

[113] See Wilburn 2015: 14-16 for further discussion of the stability of these beliefs. See Kamtekar 2017: 169-171 for discussion of how the spirited part of the soul and the reasoning part are both necessary for courage.

[114] This claim might seem to undermine the philosopher ruler's dissemination of falsehoods, including the Noble Lie. But recall the distinction at *Rep.* II.382b-d between a true falsehood (*τό ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος*)—which is an ignorance in the soul about the things that are and which all hate most of all (*μίσοῦσι μάλιστα*)—and a verbal falsehood (*τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος*)—which, while not literally true, approximates the truth and can be a "useful drug" (*φάρμακον χρήσιμον*) for helping one's friends and for early education. The rulers' dissemination of falsehoods are verbal ones, which at bottom encourage citizens to adopt an operative true belief even if, to speak in modern terms, they hold that true belief on the basis of a faulty or inexact justification.

Fourth, and finally, the conjunction of these beliefs and the education that cultivated them warrant attributing to the auxiliaries political courage specifically and political virtue generally.[115]

The immediate questions for our purpose are how these features of the auxiliaries' education support the contention that they hold beliefs in shared utility and in biconditional happiness. My view is that the auxiliaries' belief in shared utility largely comes as a consequence of their ability to reliably detect good things as fine and honorable. Since justice is a good and the philosopher rulers know this, the auxiliaries are expected to believe justice is honorable because their stable and true beliefs about the honorable track the philosopher's knowledge of it and because auxiliaries are deferential toward the philosopher rulers.[116] Further, since the auxiliaries, in whose souls the spirited part rules, are honor-lovers, it follows that they should also be motivated to enact justice by virtue of seeing justice as honorable (cf. *Rep.* IX.581b-c).[117] Since goods are by definition beneficial (and these goods are not susceptible to misuse because they are regulated by the philosopher rulers), it follows that auxiliaries operate on the basis of a belief in the shared benefit of justice in part because they recognize this as

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[115] See *Rep.* VI.500d for discussion of philosopher rulers as makers of 'demotic virtue' and Kamtekar 2004: 141-142 for how this demotic virtue applies to the citizens of Kallipolis and is not a mere, illusory appearance of virtue. See Bobonich 2002: 41-58 and 79 for a contrasting and critical view of demotic virtue. In support of Bobonich, see also *Phaedo* 69b and 82a-b. Also, see Kamtekar 1998 for how these true beliefs count as "imperfect" virtue and how imperfect virtue allows auxiliaires to still value virtue for its own sake. Finally, for further discussion of non-philosophical virtue in *Phaedo* and *Republic*, see Vasiliou 2012.

[116] Twice in *Rep.* III, Socrates comments that an effect of primary education is that the two guardian classes will be receptive to reason, even before they develop (if they ever do) the capacity of reason. At III.401 Socrates talks about education leading the youth "unwittingly, from childhood on, to resemblance, friendship, and harmony with the beauty of reason" (*εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων λανθάνῃ εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα*). Then, at III.401e-402a, Socrates states: "[An educated soul] will rightly object to what is shameful, hating it while he's still young and unable to grasp the reason, but, having been educated in this way, he will welcome the reason when it comes and recognize it easily because of its kinship with himself" (*τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ'ἄν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὤν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ' ἄν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφείς*). This latter passage's mention of 'welcoming the reason when it comes' should be interpreted in two ways, as both the reason internal to his soul if the soul's own rational capacity develops and as the external reason of the philosopher-rulers if the capacity doesn't develop. See *Rep.* IX.590c-d for the rule of external reason.

[117] For largely complementary analyses of the psychology and motivations of the auxiliaries, see Kamtekar 1998: 323-334 and Brown 2004: 284.

the philosopher rulers' view (though auxiliaries couldn't explain *why* the philosophers' hold this view) and in part because they recognize it as a genuine source of honor.

Now, we must inquire about how the auxiliaries hold beliefs in the necessity and sufficiency of the city's happiness for their own happiness. Before this, however, I want to acknowledge a related issue so that I may bracket it for the ensuing discussion (and for the parallel discussion of the producer class). The related issue is whether nonphilosophers in Kallipolis are in fact happy. To answer this question satisfactorily requires investigation into the relation of virtue to happiness, into the degrees and kinds of virtue (if any), and into the degrees and kinds of happiness (if any). Each of these investigations and the larger issue they depend on has received substantial scholarly treatment and has resulted in two basic camps: (1) the pessimists who think that nonphilosophers are not happy and who tend to think that civic virtue is sham virtue and (2) the optimists who tend to think the nonphilosophers are approximately happy and approximately virtuous.[118] While I tend to side with the optimists, nothing in my argument actually hinges on whether this side is correct. This is so because what I am especially interested in are the beliefs that nonphilosophers hold about their happiness, not whether those beliefs actually track their happiness, nor whether they result in some degree of actual virtue and actual happiness.[119] Another reason I can bracket this discussion is largely due to the phenomenology of friendship. It is entirely plausible, and perhaps even commonplace, for the beliefs that ground friendships to be erroneous or misguided without undermining the sincerity of the

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[118] For pessimists, see Irwin 1995 and Bobonich 2002: 411. For optimists, see Reeve 2006: 153-159, Brown 2004, Kamtekar 2004, and Vasiliou 2008. For a general and thorough overview of some of the relevant issues, see Devereux 2005.

[119] Granted that if these beliefs the nonphilosophers hold are way off the mark (and thus the pessimists are correct), something pernicious or at least self-undermining may seem afoot in *Republic*. For the question then arises, Why claim Kallipolis seeks to maximize the happiness of the entire city when two-thirds of the citizens hold beliefs that actually inhibit or discourage their own happiness? Either Plato's *Republic* is, à la Karl Popper, an elaborate propaganda machine, or Plato committed a rather elementary and obvious blunder in the aim of the ideal city. See Lear 1992 for discussion of related issues as it pertains to the relationship between *psyche* and *polis* in *Republic*.

friendship itself.[120] If it were otherwise, we would risk endorsing the stringent and absurd view that only friendships that rest on irrefutable beliefs can count as legitimate friendships.[121]

Nonetheless, to make the argument that the auxiliaries subscribe to the belief in biconditional happiness, I should say a word about what their happiness likely consists in (again, though, bracketing the question of whether this is an authentic form of happiness). The happiness of the auxiliaries likely consists of two things: their political virtue and achieving honor. The reason these two things are relevant can be seen from analyzing the auxiliaries' political virtue in **T12** in light of Socrates' other comments about the relationship between virtue and happiness. In *Rep.* I, Socrates makes the following three claims that connect virtue to happiness: (1) virtue entails excellence of function (e.g. virtuous eyes see well), (2) the virtue of the soul is to live well, and (3) to live well is to enjoy happiness (*Rep.* I.353b-354a). In supplementing this account in *Rep.* IV, Socrates claims that virtue is the health of the soul, meaning each soul part doing its characteristic function in harmony with one another (*Rep.* IV.444d-e). Stitching these two passages together, we can surmise that the happiness for auxiliaries involves them having a maximally well-ordered soul and executing their characteristic function of guarding the city from internal and external threats in an honorable fashion.[122]

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[120] The discussion of *erôs* and beauty in Plato's *Symposium* is illustrative. There, Diotima says that love is the desire for beauty. What we desire is thus indicative of what we view as beautiful. Now, as we ascend in our education of *erôs*, we will at some point recognize things we once loved as beautiful to no longer be so, or to be much less beautiful than previously thought. It doesn't follow from this, however, that we never in fact loved those things. That would be post-hoc rationalizing. Rather, we have learned more about beauty and, as a result of that learning, no longer see those things as beautiful, but at the time that we did find those things beautiful, we sincerely loved them. See *Symposium*, 200a-201d. Aristotle's framework of friendship in *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII and IX also presents solid evidence for this point. While perhaps the most perfect friendships include virtue and knowledge, other sorts of meaningful friendships can exist even when both friends lack knowledge and virtue.

[121] My first chapter claims that the Socratic model of political friendship resembles this view. But that model makes sense only given characteristically Socratic views about knowledge, psychology, and communicability that, if left out, would render the model quite absurd.

[122] Since their soul is controlled by their spirited part, the way it becomes well-ordered psychologically is by having the philosopher's reason rule it externally (*Rep.* IX.590d). For an excellent account of how this works, see Kamtekar 1998. See also descriptions of the musical and gymnastic education that aims to make the guardian classes souls' lead "them unwittingly, from childhood on, to resemblance, friendship, and harmony with the beauty of reason" (*Rep.* III.401c-d) and the description of spiritedness at *Rep.* II.374e-375d.

The auxiliaries believe that their happiness is necessary for the city's wellbeing for reasons similar to the philosophers', namely the principle of specialization. If the auxiliaries are not vigilant in guarding the city from threats, they jeopardize the possibility of the philosophers' ruling well and the producers' furnishing the necessary social goods. And if the city cannot act justly it cannot be happy, since happiness requires justice (*Rep.* I.352e-354a).[123] Although there is no unambiguous textual evidence that the auxiliaries are exposed to the plain formulation of the principle of specialization, there is no reason to suppose they wouldn't be. After all, they are instructed about and receive explanations of a myriad of other significant principles, like the abolition of the family and the prohibition on private property among the guardian classes (*Rep.* IV.423e-424a). Further, they are at least exposed to the mythical rendition of the principle in the Noble Lie, which couches different citizens' specializations in terms of metals in their soul. Aside from the potential difference in the content of the belief, the key psychological difference between the auxiliaries and the philosophers in their beliefs about this necessity is that the auxiliaries lack the knowledge necessary to guarantee for themselves that those reasons are undeniably good ones. Instead, their education, overseen by knowledgeable philosophers, has instilled stable and accurate beliefs about this necessity and this effectively allows the auxiliaries to take the philosophers' reasons as their own guide.

Now for the belief in the sufficiency of the auxiliaries' happiness for the city's happiness. For textual reasons, it is more expedient for me to argue for the contrapositive of the auxiliaries' belief in this sufficiency. That is, I shall argue that the auxiliaries have reasons to believe that if the city is not happy, then the auxiliaries are not happy (instead of arguing for the claim that if the auxiliaries are happy, then the city is happy). But since they are logically equivalent, in showing one I will have in effect shown the other. My argument thus is to claim that the auxiliaries, if left to their own devices

[123] Cf. Devereux 2005: 273-275.

and without the guidance and cultural institutions of the city, will act in ways counterproductive to their happiness.

A city can be unhappy in many ways. In Kallipolis, one could locate the source of unhappiness in the absence or misbehavior of any three classes. If, however, I can identify at least one instance in which the unhappy city leads to unhappy auxiliaries, then that will warrant my point. So, suppose that the auxiliaries were to be deprived of the philosophers' rule (a central element of the city's justice) and thus their wisdom. Also gone then would be the proper management of the musical and gymnastic education that the philosophers oversee. As a result, the auxiliaries would likely no longer have true beliefs about what is honorable. Since, definitionally, they are ruled by their spirited part and are thus honor-lovers, they will pursue honor at all costs, unconstrained by considerations of whether the putatively honorable action is also a good one. Consider what Socrates and Glaucon agree to concerning spirited people who are without philosophy at *Rep.* II.375b-c:

> (**T13**) But if they have [spirited] natures, Glaucon, won't they be savage to each other and to the rest of the citizens?
>
> By god, it will be hard for them to be anything else.
>
> Yet surely they must be gentle to their own companions and harsh to the enemy. If they aren't, they won't wait around for others to destroy the city but will do it themselves first.
>
> *πῶς οὖν, ἦν δ'ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὐκ ἄγριοι ἀλλήλοις τε ἔσονται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ὄντες τοιοῦτοι τὰς φύσεις;*
>
> *μὰ Δία, ἦ δ΄ ὅς, οὐ ῥᾳδιως.*
>
> *ἀλλα μέντοι δεῖ γε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πρᾴους αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους χαλεπούς. εἰ δὲ μη, οὐ περιμενοῦσιν ἄλλους σφᾶς διολέσαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ φθήσονται αὐτὸ δράσαντες.*

The rather unsubtle suggestion here is that the auxiliaries, in acting on their characteristic desires for victory and honor, may betray and irreparably harm either fellow auxiliaries or citizens if their pursuit of honor isn't constrained by goodness. Either because of this harm or for other, related reasons, the auxiliaries in their mistaken pursuit of honor *simpliciter* (instead of only those instances of honor that conform to goodness) will not only not preserve the city but actively destroy it. And if they destroy the city, which I've already argued is necessary for their happiness, then they will have ruined their own chances at happiness as well.

Before we declare victory in showing the sufficiency belief, we should also countenance the case where auxiliaries do acquire true beliefs independent of Kallipolis and see whether those true beliefs might entail their happiness. One reason we should do so is because Socrates admits of the possibility of individuals arising outside of Kallipolis who "consult with philosophy in a way that's worthy of her" (*Rep.* VI.496a).[124] If philosophers can, with enough luck and divine help, arise outside of Kallipolis, perhaps so too can spirited people with true belief. But even if we grant this, these newfangled auxiliaries face a different but equally fatal obstacle for their happiness: their beliefs aren't stable. One essential aspect of the primary education was to dye the souls of the auxiliaries with true beliefs that would remain despite the presence of "extremely effective detergents" (*Rep.* IV.429e-430a). Without such a rigorous and tailored education, even spirited people with true beliefs are liable to abandon them under the right temptations of fear, or pleasure, or pain.

In fact, Plato's description of the timocrat in *Rep.* VIII addresses this exact case. The timocratic soul, who embraces his "victory-loving and spirited part and becomes a proud and honor-loving man," ultimately is faced with a dilemma (*Rep.* VIII.550b). His dilemma arises as soon as the societal standards of honor change; he must choose whether to pursue the honor that comes from virtue or

[124] See Brown 2004: 288-290 for further discussion.

the honor that comes from wealth. All careful readers of *Republic* know that instead of sticking to his true-beliefs about honor that he acquired from his father, the timocrat indulges in the timocracy's new standard of wealth-based honor and thereby brings about the rise of oligarchy (*Rep.* VIII.550c-e). This case illustrates vividly that even if a spirited person somehow acquires true beliefs, those beliefs are unreliable and fickle. Whenever the spirited person pursues honor independent of or contrary to virtue, she sacrifices her opportunity for happiness.

We have thus seen that in the two relevant cases of a spirited person who lacks some of the essential elements of Kallipolis—(1) the spirited person who has false beliefs about honor and (2) the spirited person who has true beliefs about honor—cannot be happy. (1) fails because false beliefs about honor do not lead to happiness. (2) fails because those true beliefs lack stability and ultimately collapse into the problem of (1). In seeing this, we can now assert with confidence that if the city is not happy, then the auxiliaries are not happy. In asserting this, we can also thereby lay claim to the fact that the auxiliaries have grounds to believe, on the basis of their education, that their happiness is sufficiently tied to the happiness of the city.

In this section, I have argued that there are grounds to ascribe to the auxiliaries the two beliefs required for friendship in Kallipolis (a belief in shared utility and a belief in biconditional happiness). I have done so by arguing that the musical and gymnastic education of the auxiliaries provides them with true and stable beliefs about matters relevant to their friendships with other citizens. We can also supplement this point by drawing attention to some passages that explicitly claim the auxiliaries enjoy friendship with other citizens and passages that describe institutional resources focused on maintaining friendship. Obviously, **T2**, **T3**, **T4**, and **T7** all imply that the auxiliaries enjoy friendship with at least some members of Kallipolis.

Further, at *Rep.* II.376b, Socrates claims that one aspect of guarding the city is for the auxiliaries to distinguish between their friends and their enemies. Finally, when Socrates introduces the abolition

of the family and proscription of private property among the auxiliaries and philosopher rulers at *Rep.* IV.424a and then is asked about it again at *Rep.* V.450c, these policies are justified in terms of friendship, by invoking the proverb "friends share everything in common" (*κοινὰ τὰ φίλων*). In terms of their functionality for auxiliaries, these policies most likely maintain friendships by eliminating the possibility of interfamilial competitions and the pursuit of wealth-based honor. That is, these policies supplement the beliefs required for auxiliaries' friendships by forestalling the very possibility of introducing potentially discordant sources of honor in their lives. It is for all of these reasons that we can claim with confidence that the auxiliaries hold friendships with other citizens of Kallipolis.

I now turn to a discussion of on what grounds the producers view other citizens as friends.

3.4 True Belief and Friendship for the Producers

Much like the previous two sections, my strategy here is to present a brief synopsis of the producers' education. I will then argue that this education permits the producer class to hold beliefs in shared utility and biconditional happiness with the rest of the citizens of Kallipolis. In brief, my view is that the producers' friendship beliefs derive from the conjunction of three aspects of their education: the Noble Lie, craft education, and the general arguments about what the philosopher is that can convince them that philosophers should rule.[125]

To recap briefly, the Noble Lie, embodied in the myth of metals, is a story disseminated to all citizens of Kallipolis. For those citizens who do not progress to musical and gymnastic education, this

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[125] It may seem odd to attribute to the appetites and appetitive people the capacity for belief. But *Republic* IV.442c-d, IX.571d**,** X.602a-603a and X.605c each seem to attribute beliefs to all soul parts. It also seems required by virtue of the repeated description of moderation—either psychologically or politically—as a kind of *homodoxia* about who should rule and be ruled. If the appetites and appetitive people are incapable of belief, why would they repeatedly be described as engaged in *homodoxia* and *homonoia*? Cf. **T15**-**T17** and accompanying discussion below. Surely, the kind of belief at issue here is a relatively weak form, certainly dissimilar in important ways from the ability to reason, which is the province of the rational part of the soul. In discussing this issue, Wilberding 2012: 132 is illuminating: "It is important to distinguish between two varieties of cognition: conceptualization and reasoning. In light of Plato's repeated characterizations of the appetitive part as *alogiston*, it seems difficult to maintain that it has the capacity to reason. Yet it seems trivially true that the appetitive part is in some sense capable of conceptualization." For those who hold that the appetitive part is capable of belief, see Lorenz 2006: 72-73 and Wilberding 2012: 133-134. Wilberding 2012: fns. 20 and 21 clarifies what's at stake between his understanding of appetitive belief and Lorenz's, but choosing a side on this issue is immaterial to and outside the scope of my argument. It suffices that they both agree appetites and appetitive people are capable of belief.

myth will be an important source of beliefs about their roles in the city and their fellow citizens' roles. The myth instructs that all citizens are born of Mother Earth and that all fellow citizens are siblings (*Rep.* III.414e-4145a). The listeners to this myth also learn that different citizens are better suited for certain offices than others, and the reason for this is on account of the metal in their souls. Gold souls are philosopher rulers; silver souls are the auxiliaries; and iron or bronze souls are the producers.

In addition to the Noble Lie, there are two other important elements of the producers' education. First, they receive craft training (cf. *Rep.* V.456d10). Since the producers comprise farmers, cobblers, doctors, engineers, and other non-guarding and non-ruling occupations, they require training in the techniques and procedures of their specific disciplines.

Second, it is likely that the producers are also able to receive, if needed, further persuasive explanations from the philosopher rulers about what the philosopher is.[126] The significance of this second aspect of their education is that, if for whatever reason—incredulity, curiosity, or simplemindedness—the producers still desire to appreciate how the philosopher ruler will rule, the philosopher rulers are able to adequately explain to them, gently and without envy (*ἄφθονόν τε καὶ πρᾷον ὄντα*), the nature of the philosopher and how that nature makes them capable rulers who look out for the welfare of their subjects and the city.

On my view, the Noble Lie, craft education, and the possibility of further explanation of the nature of the philosopher constitute adequate grounds to see that producers hold beliefs in shared utility and in biconditional happiness. The Noble Lie does the load-bearing work here. In terms of shared-utility, we see that parents of iron- or bronze-souled children encourage without pity their children to join the craftspeople, despite whatever immediate affection they may have for the child; we also see iron- and bronze-souled parents send with honor (*τιμὴν*) any gold- and silver-souled

[126] See *Rep.* V.499d-500a, and discussion of this passage with respect to producers in Kamtekar 2004: 160, fn. 50 and Vasiliou 2008: 236-240.

children they have to the guardian class (*Rep.* III.415c). The most plausible explanation of this phenomenon (even if these citizens don't conceptualize it in this way precisely) is that such citizens see it is in the interests of their children's happiness to do what is proper to their natures. And insofar as it is in the children's interests, we can infer it is also in the parents' interests insofar as children are in some sense extensions of their own parents.[127]

In terms of biconditional happiness, the producers hold that their happiness is necessary for the happiness of the city for largely the same reasons as the other classes: the principle of specialization.[128] The only significant difference between the producers' reasons and the other classes' is that this principle is explained to the producers in terms of soul metals, not as a general principle. But the underlying and operative belief is identical: one should do what one is best suited to do (and nothing else) so that we all can live well.

The belief in the sufficiency of their happiness for the city's happiness is, however, not similar to the other classes' beliefs. The producers, I submit, view their happiness as sufficient for the city's happiness for reasons similar to why they believe in shared utility. Given that they are persuaded by the myth, they believe every citizen to be a family member. Part of what this means, as scholars have noted, is that producers are encouraged to view their interests as extensions of other citizens' interests, and vice versa.[129] So when the collection of citizens who make up the city are happy, the producers

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[127] The (at least partial) identification of children (or family members generally) as extension of their parents is commonsensical and commonplace, both in antiquity and in contemporary discussions of love and friendship. See, for instance, *Laws* IV.721c-d on marriage and immortality and *Symposium* 206c-207a on *erôs* as the desire for immortality where one form of immortality—i.e. of extending one's own life—is through having children, with enlightening but divergent commentary by Sheffield 2006: 84-86, Obdrzalek 2010, and Sheffield 2012: 126-127. For modern discussion, see Harry Frankfurt's comments on Bernard William's thought experiment and famous quip of having "one thought too many" at Frankfurt 2004: 34-37. Fromm 2006: 36-49 is also lucid on this issue.

[128] For a lucid but critical overview of this principle as applied to the producer class, see Meyer 2005.

[129] Kraut 1973a: 335-338.

too are happy for no other reason than the producers view those citizens' happiness as part and parcel of their own happiness by virtue of being *philoi* and extensions of themselves.

Under the perspective of the producers, the same holds for how other citizens presumably view them. When a certain artisan is happy, that artisan likely thinks that her extensive family is also happy by virtue of them identifying with her *as family members and philoi*. So, the sufficiency holds as a matter of proximate identity because the producers identify themselves with their family members.[130]

Interpreted in this light, the Noble Lie functions as a source of the beliefs essential to experiencing *philia* with the other citizens. The most obvious way it does so is by convincing producers that their fellow citizens are *philoi*.[131] But how the myth actually demonstrates that they are indeed *philoi*, I've argued, runs parallel to producers seeing their lives in terms of shared utility and biconditional happiness with other citizens.

One important objection to the view I have presented here is that I seem to have neglected the other relevant psychological feature of the producers, namely that they are appetitive and money-loving (*Rep.* IX.580e). The worry here is that producers do not enjoy happiness unless they satisfy their characteristic appetites in a way concordant with the functioning of Kallipolis. And we thus cannot consider our discussion of their belief in biconditional happiness complete without considering this aspect of their psychology.

In consideration of this objection, I have two points. First, it is true that in Kallipolis producers receive money and thus to some extent satisfy that appetitive desire. But, like the auxiliaries' desire for honor, this appetitive desire is only indulged to the extent that its satisfaction coheres with the wellbeing of Kallipolis as a whole, the determination of which comes from the philosopher rulers'

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[130] Aristotle in his discussion of self-love makes a similar hermeneutic move. See *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.4, IX.8, and Θ 12, 1126b27-29. Also see Frankfurt 2004: 79-100 for another helpful discussion of self-love. See Irwin 1990: 93-94 for further defense and discussion of this point in Aristotle.

[131] See Prauscello 2014: 46 for complementary discussion.

wisdom and judgment (e.g. *Rep.* IV.431c-d). Second, Plato in *Republic* does have resources to educate the appetites in a way that motivates the producers properly.[132] At *Rep.* VI.485d-e, we gain insight into the nature of appetitive desire:

> (**T14**) Now, we surely know that, when someone's desires incline strongly for one thing, they are thereby weakened for others, just like a stream that has been partly diverted into another channel.
>
> *ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτῳ γε εἰς ἕν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν, ἴσμεν που ὅτι τἆλλα τούτῳ ἀσθενέστεραι, ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκεῖσε ἀπωχετευμένον.*

Eric Brown calls this Plato's "hydraulic principle of psychology," and he draws two important lessons from this principle that bear on educating appetites: "First, do not feed [appetitive desires]. Second, divert attention from them."[133] This rationale we can see is at work in the producers' education. The first lesson is in effect by virtue of the philosopher ruler's restricting in a reasonable fashion whatever money the producers receive. The second lesson is in effect, as Brown notes, through the producers' craft education. To the extent that they devote themselves to performing their craft well, then to the same extent are their unnecessary appetitive desires weakened per **T14**.[134]

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[132] See Schofield 2006: 272-273 and 286.

[133] Brown 2004: 285. See Brown 2012: 68-71 for further discussion of the hydraulic principle. See also Wilberding 2012: 135-137 for thorough and complementary discussion.

[134] Recently, Jeon 2014 has argued (1) that the producers are not appetitive and (2) that the producers receive musical and gymnastic education. This view, if correct, would undermine the account I have just presented. I nevertheless have serious misgivings about both (1) and (2). Jeon rightly notes that Socrates' insistence on the unity of the city requires the producers to be motivated in the right way. I think, however, that the author locates the motivation in the wrong place. Given Socrates' insistence, Jeon says (1) follows from (2) and (2) follows for the sake of consistency, despite the lack of textual evidence. It should be noted that Jeon provides no argument for (2) other than that it seems necessary for the unity of the city. But, my account, if correct, explains how producers are motivated properly in a way that still allows them to be appetitive and without needing the a-textual claim that producers receive musical and gymnastic education. I show that these motivations derive, with assistance from insights Kraut 1973a and Brown 2004, from the myth of metals alone, about which there is evidence the producers have learned. Jeon's argument also relies heavily on the analogy of honor-lovers and money-lovers in Kallipolis with the timocratic and oligarchic souls in *Rep.* IX. But this analogy, as Kamtekar 1998: 319-310 and Vasiliou 2008: 233-234 have shown, is inexact, because the former souls have grown up in Kallipolis but the timocrat and oligarch of *Rep.* IX have not. So that seems to me to also be shaky ground for Jeon's argument.

We can now see that the producers have grounds to hold beliefs in shared utility and beliefs in biconditional happiness. The origin of these beliefs lies largely in the myth of metal. These beliefs also receive motivational reinforcement and further coherence from the producers' craft education and the possibility of further instruction from philosopher rulers.

The main psychological differences in the producers' beliefs are that they hold them on shaky justificatory grounds and that they are likely not as stable as the auxiliaries' beliefs. Since the source of stability for the auxiliaries' beliefs came from their extensive musical and gymnastic education and there are no solid reasons to believe the producers received such extensive education, it's probable that the producers' beliefs, outside of Kallipolis, will waver when confronting harmful temptations.[135]

Nonetheless, the producers do still hold true beliefs (and are motivated accordingly) about life in Kallipolis and about their fellow citizens. It is important we remember, first, that the Noble Lie is not envisioned to be what Socrates calls a "true falsehood" (*τό ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος*), but rather a "verbal falsehood" (*τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος*).[136] An aspect of verbal falsehoods is that on one level they are obviously false, but that is on a superficial level. On a more fundamental level, verbal falsehoods embody ethical and political truths, truths that those who subscribe to verbal falsehoods believe. In the case of the producers, the superficial falsehood is the claim about their origin from Mother Earth and the metallic content of their souls. But on a deeper level, the latent truths are that humans have different capabilities, that they should perform the offices in which they are most capable, they should perform them in a way that treats other citizens with friendship and care, and it

[135] This is not to ignore the inculturation the producers benefit from simply by living and being raised in Kallipolis, per Vasiliou 2008: 234. It's only to say that that inculturation does not act as an unfading dye for the producers' soul that remains steadfast in the face of extremely effective detergents, so to speak.

[136] *Rep.* II.382b-d. See also footnote 35.

is in this performance that the relative happiness of individuals and the absolute happiness of a political community lies.

3.5 Conclusion

In this section, I have argued that each class of Kallipolis holds beliefs in shared utility and in biconditional happiness. I have also argued that each class holds these beliefs on psychologically distinct but compatible grounds. The philosopher rulers' beliefs are grounded in knowledge; the auxiliaries' beliefs are both stable and true as a result of their education; and the producers' beliefs are true but not as stable. If this argument is successful, then we are granted the inference that all citizens of Kallipolis are friends since they satisfy the epistemic requirements—albeit in different ways—for friendship as explained in Section 3. Another inference that we are granted is that, given each class actually holds these beliefs, the citizens' relationship can be characterized as reciprocal and cognizant of the reciprocity, both features we would expect from any meaningful form of friendship, political or otherwise.[137] Citizens in Kallipolis carry out their duties and live out their lives among friends and acknowledge one another *as friends*. One insight of the *Republic* account of political friendship is to show that these activities are possible on the basis of similar but nonidentical epistemic and psychological grounds.

4. *Homonoia* and Friendship

So far, I have argued for friendship among citizens by showing how they meet the requirements for *philia* outlined in **T8**. Another, complementary strategy at my disposal is to present how Kallipolis

[137] Prauscello 2014: 55 also notes the reciprocity among and throughout the classes. It is important to distinguish the sense of awareness that citizens have. Citizens are aware and cognizant of the fact the other citizens are friends and engage in reciprocal friendly acts in Kallipolis. They are likely unaware, except for the philosopher-rulers, of the other classes' exact reasons for viewing one another as friends. But being unaware of this fact doesn't mean they are unaware of the general fact that they are friends. See Sheffield 2011 and 2019 for further discussion of relevant features of friendship generally and political friendship specifically.

encourages *homonoia*, a term intimately connected with political friendship.[138] My ultimate claim in this final section is that Plato's discussion of *homonoia* and moderation further support the model of political friendship I have developed thus far.

A prominent feature of Kallipolis is its unity and concord (e.g. *Rep.* V.462a-b). Socrates unfortunately is not consistent with his terms for expressing this concord. He variously refers to this concord as *συμφωνία*, *ἁρμονια*, *συνᾷδον*, and of course *ὁμόνοια*. It is reasonable to assume given the earlier analysis of education in Kallipolis that Socrates thinks political concord depends on psychological similarity.[139] Despite Socrates' terminological laxity, it is also reasonable to assume that the key part of psychological similarity in *Republic* concerns citizens' epistemic attitudes and beliefs, especially in light of my argument in Section 3.[140] So even though *συμφωνία*, *ἁρμονια*, and *συνᾷδον*, do not carry as strong epistemic overtones as *homonoia*, it seems that in the context of *Republic* they often refer to the same kind of concord.

As I have argued in Chapter 1, *homonoia* dovetails with political friendship because it conveys either the recognition of common purpose among a citizenry or conveys consensus about who should rule and be ruled.[141] If my argument has so far been successful, we can already recognize that these

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[138] See Section 1 of Chapter for extensive discussion of *homonoia* and friendship by intellectuals contemporaneous with Plato. See also *Cleitophon* 410a-d, *Alcibiades* 126a-127d, and *Statesman* 311b for further associations of friendship with *homonoia*.

[139] McKeen and Smith 2018: 143-146.

[140] McKeen and Smith 2018: 144-146 criticize Kamtekar 2004, among others, for translating *homonoia* as 'agreement' because they think this translation misses out on the truly important dimension of (Platonic) *homonoia*: the requirement of psychological similarity. While this criticism may be more trenchant for other scholars, I think the disagreement between Kamtekar 2004 and McKeen and Smith 2018 is more terminological than substantive. Kamtekar 2004: 133 clearly argues against interpreting *homonoia* as just any kind of agreement: "Plato's Socratic legacy prevents him from approving *ὁμόνοια*, understood as mere sameness of mind, irrespective of content and grounds." What Kamtekar means by "content and grounds" seems to me to have much overlap with what McKeen and Smith mean by psychological similarity, unless McKeen and Smith think beliefs and epistemic attitudes are not a part of Platonic psychology. But *Republic* IV.442d, IX.571d, X.602a-603a and X.605c each seem to attribute beliefs to all soul parts, which would make it seem peculiarly unPlatonic to deny that epistemic attitudes cannot count as psychological similarity.

[141] See Keil 2017 and Sinclair 1953 for further discussion. Also worth consulting are the two separate definitions of ὁμόνοια in the pseudo-Platonic *Definitions* at 413b and 413e. Kamtekar 2004 has excellent discussion of the latter sense of *homonoia* in *Republic*.

senses of *homonoia*, irrespective of the term's appearance in the text, are at work in Kallipolis. For it is a feature of friendship in Kallipolis that citizens recognize a shared, common purpose vis-à-vis their beliefs in shared utility and biconditional happiness. For instance, each class holds that its own happiness is necessary and sufficient for others' happiness. (The pursuit of happiness surely counts as a common purpose among the citizens.) Likewise, all citizens believe in the principle of specialization, either unadorned or in mythical garb. Part of what that belief functionally entails is that citizens agree about who should and should not rule, because they all have, thanks to their educations, epistemic resources to understand what they and others are best at in the city.

Aside from these *sotto voce* operations of *homonoia*, Socrates uses '*homonoia*'—or instructively similar words—several times. First, recall our first quoted passage from *Rep.* I:

> (**T1**) Doubtless, Thrasymachus, that injustice at any rate produces faction, hatred, and war among one another, while justice brings *homonoia* and friendship. *Rep.* I.351d3-5
>
> *στάσεις γάρ που, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἥ γε ἀδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρέχει, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν.*

Consider also some of Socrates' comments about moderation (*σωφροσύνη*):

> (**T15**) [Moderation] spreads throughout the whole. It makes the weakest, the strongest, and those in between—whether in regard to reason, physical strength, numbers, wealth, or anything else—all sing the same song together. And this *homonoia,* this concord between the naturally worse and the naturally better as to which of the two is to rule both in the city and in each one, is rightly called moderation. *Rep.* IV.432a-b
>
> *ἀλλὰ δι' ὅλης ἀτεχνῶς τέταται διὰ πασῶν παρεχομένη συνᾴδοντας τούς τε ἀσθενεστάτους ταὐτον καὶ τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους καὶ τοὺς μέσους, εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσει, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἰσχύι, εἰ δε, καὶ πλήθει ἢ χρήμασιν ἢ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν τοιούτων: ὥστε*

ὀρθότατ᾽ ἄν φαῖμεν ταύτην τὴν ὁμόνοιαν σωφροσύνην εἶναι, χείρονός τε καὶ ἀμείνος κατὰ φύσιν συμφωνίαν ὁπότερον δεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ.

(**T16**) And surely, I said, if we had to decide which of the four [virtues] will make the city good by its presence, it would be a hard decision. Is it the agreement in belief (*ὁμοδοξία*) between the rulers and ruled? *Rep.* IV.433c[142]

ἀλλα μέντοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰ δέοι γε κρῖναι τί τὴν πόλιν ἡμῖν τούτων μάλιστα ἀγαθὴν ἀπεργάσεται ἐγγενόμενον, δύσκριτον ἄν εἴη πότερον ἡ ὁμοδοξία τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ ἀρχομένων;

(**T17**) And isn't [an educated person] moderate because of the friendship and harmony among these same parts, namely, when the rulers and ruled believe in common that the rational part should rule and don't engage in civil war against it? *Rep.* IV.442c-d[143]

σώφρονα οὐ τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν τούτων, ὅταν το τε ἄρχον καὶ τὼ ἀρχομένω τὸ λογιστικὸν ὁμοδοξῶσι δεῖν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ στασιάζωσιν αὐτῷ;

As already noted, Socrates' remark in **T1** invokes a commonplace and popular of conjunction of *homonoia* and friendship.[144] Socrates' discussion of moderation in **T15**-**17** expands upon this remark. In **T15**, Socrates explains that part of the *homonoia* that accompanies political justice consists of the citizens being in concord about who should rule and be ruled, or, more broadly, about what work each citizen should do in the city.[145] *Homonoia*, being closely associated with friendship, seems an

[142] The context of this passage makes it clear that this question refers to moderation.

[143] Also cf. IV.441e-442a where Socrates claims that education makes the soul concordant (*sumphôna*). See Kamtekar 2004: 153 for additional commentary.

[144] See Section 1 of Chapter 1.

[145] See Reeve 2006: 240-242 for discussion of how moderation, *homonoia*, and the principle of specialization relate.

appropriate term here in part because this description alludes to some of the sources of friendships (e.g. the principle of specialization) for the citizens. It is also appropriate because the sources of these friendships are processed in the souls of citizens as various beliefs, thereby making *homonoia* (literally, 'like-mindedness' or 'sameness-of-mind') an apt term given its pronounced epistemic flavor.

I claimed at the beginning of this chapter that *Republic* had resources to make good on Socrates' claim in **T1** that *homonoia* and friendship accompany justice. In some sense, we have already seen how that is the case regarding friendship. In the pursuit of political justice, citizens have access to nontrivial and true beliefs that allow them to consider themselves friends with other citizens. Insofar as friendship and *homonoia* are synonymous or at least have a large overlap in meaning, evidence of friendship accompanying justice should count as evidence of *homonoia* accompanying justice as well. But Socrates also says in **T15** that moderation is a kind of *homonoia* (cf. *Rep.* III.389d). Therefore, when Socrates claims at *Rep.* IV.433b that justice preserves moderation (along with the other virtues), we can understand this preservation as also implying the coexistence of justice and *homonoia*.[146]

In **T16** and **T17**, Socrates, perhaps contrary to expectations, does not describe these cases of moderation, one political and one psychic, as *homonoia*. Instead he elects to describe moderation as involving '*homodoxia*.'[147] I find this substitution illustrative of the underlying psychology of *homonoia* and political friendship generally. *Homodoxia*—literally 'sameness-of-belief'—parses the epistemology of *homonoia*. The kind of unanimity and concord in *homonoia* occurs because all citizens (or, psychically, all soul parts) have compatible beliefs (*doxai*) about the relevant issues. Since *doxa* is the common epistemic feature among all three classes, it is thus fitting to articulate their *homonoia* as a kind of *homodoxia*.

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[146] Cf. Kamtekar 2004: 149.

[147] For further discussion of the soul's inner-workings regarding *homodoxia*, see Lorenz 2006: 72-73 and 109-110 and Wilberding 2012: 135-140.

Importantly, however, *doxa* is the common epistemic feature among all three classes but it is not the common epistemic grounding for all three classes. This fact shows why the charges of *Cleitophon* 409d-410a and Aristotle's comments on political friendship and *homonoia* at *EN*. IX.6, 1167a21-23, each of which objects to *homodoxia* as political friendship, are inapplicable to the *Republic* model.[148] The *Cleitophon* objection holds that *homodoxia* cannot be the grounding of political friendship because people's many shared beliefs are harmful (*πολλαὶ καὶ βλαβεραὶ γίγνεσθαι ὁμοδοξίαι ἀνθρώπων*). Aristotle's objection runs at *EN* IX.6, 1167a21-23 as follows:

> (**T18**) *Homonoia* also seems to be a friendly relation. For this reason it is not *homodoxia*; for that might occur even with people who do now know each other.
>
> *φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται. διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία: τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν ἄν.*

The *Cleitophon* objection rests on a general truth, namely at least some instances of shared belief are harmful. But this general truth does not apply to Kallipolis because part of the justificatory grounding of *homonoia* as *homodoxia* is the knowledge of the philosopher rulers. While the auxiliaries and producers may hold shared beliefs with imperfect justifications, that the philosopher rulers hold their beliefs on the basis of knowledge of the Forms guarantees that the shared beliefs between all three classes will not be harmful. Put another way, although *homodoxia* exists in *Republic*, the way Socrates outlines the ideal education program ensures that this *homodoxia* is influenced by and consonant with ethical (and non-harmful) knowledge.

The same rationale parries Aristotle's objection: *homonoia* as *homodoxia* in Kallipolis is not *homodoxia* simply, but *homodoxia* governed in a foundational way by knowledge. The other objection in

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[148] Scholars often take Plato's *Republic* to be the target of Aristotle's comments. If I'm right, however, that's an uncharitable attribution to make because it would impute to Aristotle a bizarre reading of political friendship in *Republic*. My guess, for reasons explained mainly in Leyh (forthcoming), is that Aristotle's comments on *homodoxia* are best taken as a reference to Isocrates. For a discussion of *homonoia* in Aristotle, see Lockwood 2020.

T18 is that it is possible to have shared beliefs without knowing one another and thus *homodoxia* cannot be an instance of political friendship (presumably because friends should at least be familiar with each other). Again, while this is a general truth, it is inapplicable to the *Republic* model of political friendship precisely because all the citizens know each other quite well and quite intimately.

Conclusion

The use of *homodoxia* as a stand-in for *homonoia* also highlights what is noteworthy in this model of political friendship. Certainly this model shares with the Socratic one the idea that political friendship and its underlying psychological features are best understood epistemically and in relation to *homonoia*. But, instead of restricting authentic *homonoia* to only knowers (as in the Socratic model), we find in Plato's *Republic* a thorough and lucid exploration of how to obtain meaningful and reliable friendships in a polity while not excluding non-knowers from enjoying friendship.

This element is surely something laudatory about the *Republic* model. It is empirically true that only a rare few, if any, will obtain anything resembling Platonic knowledge as described in *Republic*. It is also phenomenologically accurate that most sincere and genuine friendships occur on the basis of something other than knowledge. The *Republic* model's ability to accommodate both of these truths—and the extensive accompanying exploration of what a version of political friendship that can accommodate these truths looks like—has been the focus of this chapter. And, if my argument has been persuasive in the slightest, it is a sign that we should take into deeper consideration the philosophical contribution Plato's *Republic* makes to the study of friendship in general and its political variant in particular.

CHAPTER 3: A SYMPHONY OF CITIZENS: POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP IN *LAWS*

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I explore the psychology of political friendship in Plato's *Laws* and show that there are significant differences with the two other models (i.e. the Socratic model and *Republic* model). I argue that the absence of *homonoia* in *Laws* is indicative of a shift in the underlying psychology of political friendship. Concretely, I argue that the '*Laws* model' of political friendship eschews grounding friendship on epistemic similarity and instead requires citizens to achieve friendship on the basis of shared feelings of pleasure and pain.

In Section 1, I present a brief history of *homonoia* and suggest that the absence of *homonoia* in *Laws*, given this history, should raise our eyebrows. Then, I introduce in Section 2 the varieties of 'deflationary solutions' for explaining this mysterious absence. They are deflationary because they solve the mystery by explaining away the absence of *homonoia*. In Section 3, I introduce the varieties of nondeflationary solutions which solve the mystery by arguing that some philosophical aspect of *Laws* (e.g. the psychology, ethics, politics, or pedagogy) makes the absence of *homonoia* intelligible without dismissing its absence as illusorily mysterious. In Section 4, I offer my own nondeflationary solution, according to which the *Laws* pedagogical system has shifted its focus from creating social harmony based on epistemic compatibility towards a harmony based predominantly on shared feelings of pleasure and pain. In the final section, I argue that this shift in focus explains the use of *sumphônia* as a philosophically and lexically appropriate substitute for the absent *homonoia*.

For this chapter, I focus on two philosophical strands in both the deflationary and nondeflationary solutions: psychology and pedagogy. My reason for concentrating on these two is because Plato tends to explore political friendship (and *homonoia*) by appeal to both its psychological requirements and to the complementary pedagogical resources that encourage proper psychological

development. Thus, if we are to solve the mystery of *homonoia* and political friendship, we should focus on the relevant dimensions of psychology and pedagogy in *Laws*.

1. The Mystery of *Homonoia* in Plato's *Laws*

Political friendship as *homonoia* can be found with near ubiquity among the Greek intellectuals of the fifth and fourth centuries, including in Plato.[149] We see historians, sophists, orators, and philosophers use the term with the same general denotation. Isocrates frequently speaks of the benefits of *homonoia* and almost certainly considers it to consist of shared opinion.[150] Aristotle outright rejects shared opinion and instead defines *homonoia* as the confluence of thought and desire about political ends.[151] So too does Plato throughout many dialogues identify political friendship as a kind of *homonoia*. In *Alcibiades I* and *Cleitophon*, political friendship is identified as *homonoia* and occurs only when there is shared knowledge among the citizenry (cf. *Alc. I*, 126a-127e and *Cleit.* 409a-410e). In *Statesman* and *Republic*, the standard of *homonoia* is relaxed to allow genuine political friendship to obtain when some but not all citizens are knowers and others have something like true belief (cf. *Statesman* 311a-c, and *Rep.* IV.432a).

Plato's extensive involvement with the established *homonoia* tradition of political friendship makes it quite surprising that *Laws*, by far his longest and most assiduous political work, does not contain even one use of *homonoia*.[152] Given the traditional pairing of *homonoia* and *philia*, our surprise

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[149] See Chapter 1, Section 1 for a more extensive textual and philological survey of the *homonoia* tradition. See Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 for two different models of political friendship as *homonoia* in Plato. See also El Murr 2014a: 4.

[150] See Isocrates, *Panathenaicus* 225-226, *Panegyricus* 3 and *Antidosis* 77. Although Isocrates never clearly enters into the debate about the epistemological grounding of *homonoia*, his general denunciation of knowledge claims in politics, philosophy, and rhetoric coupled with his praise of *doxa* in *Against the Sophists* and *Antidosis* allow us to infer that he cannot mean by *homonoia* much more than shared opinion (*homodoxia*), For further information on my views about Isocrates' epistemology, see Leyh (forthcoming).

[151] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.6, 1167a20-25.

[152] There is one instance of *homonoeô* at *Laws* VI.759b. But this passage occurs in a relatively abstruse comment about what positions to appoint for the upkeep of temples and in what manner they are to be appointed. There are two reasons this does not count as an instance of connecting *homonoia* and *philia*. First, the semantic range of *homonoeô* is much wider than *homonoia*'s range. So we cannot infer that the Athenian Stranger's use of *homonoeô* implies *homonoia*. On this issue, see Chapter

should heighten when we recall that friendship among the citizens is still a central goal of Magnesia's political organization:

> (**T1**) Whenever we say that it's necessary [for the legislator] to look towards sound-mindedness, or prudence, or friendship, it's necessary for us to keep in mind that each topic is not different but the same. *Laws* III.693c3-5
>
> *ἀλλὰ ἀναλογίζεσθαι χρή, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν φῶμεν δεῖν βλέπειν, ἢ πρὸς φρόνησιν ἢ φιλίαν, ὡς ἔσθ' οὗτος ὁ σκοπός οὐχ ἕτερος ἀλλ' ὁ αὐτος.*[153]
>
> (**T2**) We said that it is necessary for the legislator to legislate while aiming at three things, so that the city framed according to these laws will be both free and a friend to itself and will also possess intelligence. *Laws* III.701d5-7
>
> *ἐλέξαμεν ὡς τὸν νομοθέτην δεῖ τριῶν στοχαζόμενον νομοθετεῖν, ὅπως ἡ νομοθετουμένη πόλις ἐλευθέρα τε ἔσται καὶ φίλη ἑαυτῇ καὶ νοῦν ἕξει.*
>
> (**T3**) Our proposal of laws was looking towards allowing our citizens to be the happiest ones and particularly to enjoy being friends with one another. *Laws* V.743c
>
> *ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ τῶν νόμων ὑπόθεσις ἐνταῦθα ἔβλεπεν, ὅπως ὡς εὐδαιμονέστατοι ἔσονται καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις φίλοι.*[154]

1, Section 2.2.2 for further discussion. The second reason is because this passage in no way hints about being a programmatic comment about friendship for all Magnesians. It is an isolated comment about the most efficient manner to organize priests and priestesses as temple caretakers. Given the Athenian Stranger's broad comments about political friendship elsewhere, it would be quite unlikely and surprising to find the important psychological dimension of political friendship buried in this passage alone and also in a use of *homoneô* instead of *homonoia*.

[153] All Greek text is based on Burnet's *Platonis Opera*. Translations of *Laws* I and II are from Meyer 2015 with slight modification. Translations of all other Plato text is from Cooper 1998 with more significant modification. I have also benefitted from consulting the translation of Griffith 2016.

[154] There are several other references to friendship in Magnesia. See *Laws* VI.756e-757b with discussion by Schofield 2013: 286-288; *Laws* V. 738d-e for friendship in the civic festivals; *Laws*. 6.771d-e with Sheffield 2020: 350 and Prauscello 2014: 131 fn.76; for friendship and symposiastic practices: see *Laws* 1.640b7-8, 640d with Sheffield 2016: 16**.** For a discussion of *philia* and *eros*, see Laws *VIII* with Sheffield 2020. For discussion of the eradication of faction in Magnesia, see Cohen 1993: 309-311.

The mystery here concerns why Plato fails to include *homonoia* in his discussion of political life, especially of political friendship, in Magnesia.[155] The mystery raises the following pressing question: If friendship remains a goal of political organization in Magnesia, then what reasons, if any, are there to not characterize it as a kind of *homonoia*? Answering this question requires us to confront two general interpretative strategies designed for solving the mystery.

2. A Deflationary Solution to the Mystery

One solution to the mystery is to argue that Plato in *Laws* has not changed his conventional understanding of political friendship as involving *homonoia* in an essential way. I refer to this solution as deflationary because it solves the mystery by explaining it away, rather than preserving it. The task for this theory is to explain how the *Laws*' discussions of political friendship (and the other philosophically relevant topics) are consistent with the features of *homonoia*. In its simplest terms, this theory holds that the absence of a word does not signal the absence of an idea. While there may be a lexical oddity in how *Laws* describes political friendship, there need not be a corresponding change in how *Laws* actually conceptualizes political friendship.

There are a variety of ways to argue for this general solution because one can attempt to solve the absence of *homonoia* by appeal to a variety of sources. Two common routes are appealing to either the dramatic situation of the *Laws* or to the doctrinal elements of Plato's philosophy (including Platonic psychology and pedagogy) to argue that *homonoia* still plays its typical role regarding political friendship.

2.1 An Appeal to the Dramatic Context

Let's take the dramatic route for a moment. Here one could use the dramatic context of *Laws* to argue that *homonoia* is an inapt choice because of the term's largely Athenian legacy. Thus, *homonoia*'s absence

[155] Sheffield 2020: 359 also recognizes this mystery.

is not because Plato has changed his views, but because the dramatic situation of *Laws* prevents clear expression of those views. For instance, one may argue that unlike the *Republic* and Socratic models of political friendship as *homonoia*, the *Laws* concerns a discussion between a Spartan, a Cretan, and an Athenian about founding a fictional polity on the countryside of Crete. On this view, the absence of *homonoia* can be explained by the fact that it might be a value foreign to a Cretan and a Spartan. Here, the Athenian legacy of *homonoia*, not the underlying psychology or pedagogy of the term, explains its absence in a conversation with a Spartan and a Cretan.

This dramatic appeal as an explanation of the absence of *homonoia* is insufficient for two reasons. The first reason is historical and contextual. Even if one grants for the sake of argument that *homonoia* has a predominantly Athenian legacy (and I'm not even sure this should be granted), it does not follow that an ostensibly Athenian value could not be promulgated and popularized elsewhere. Clear evidence of this fact comes from Isocrates' *Panegyricus* 103-104, where he advocates for *homonoia* between Sparta, Athens, and the rest of Greece. That Isocrates was able to appeal to *homonoia* as a goal worth endorsing among all of the Greek city-states attests that even if *homonoia* was most popular in Athens, it certainly remained an intelligible and possibly attractive value to other parts of Greece.

The second reason is textual. The Athenian frequently criticizes Spartan and Cretan customs as inadequate to Athenian ones. For instance, throughout *Laws* I.633d–638c, the Athenian with little trepidation claims both that the Cretan model of virtue as victory over oneself is subpar and that the Spartan conception of *sôphrosunê* is demonstrably false. The Athenian then recommends concepts that align with Athenian practices and customs—e.g. symposia as a proper venue for achieving full *sôphrosunê* (*Laws* I.636-649). These passages signal that if the Athenian had wanted to endorse *homonoia* as a model for political friendship, the dramatic context and characters of *Laws* would not have prevented him from doing so.

2.2 An Appeal to Platonic Doctrine

Arguments from doctrine are thornier. This version of the solution still relies on the main point that the absence of a word does not guarantee the absence of its influence on the text. Yet, instead of relying primarily on the dramatic features of the text, this solution holds that either the underlying psychology or pedagogy (or both) of political friendship in *Laws* remains consistent and continuous in the relevant senses with the other dialogues that discuss political friendship as *homonoia*. Thus, if *Laws* is consistent in these senses regarding political friendship, it's probable that *homonoia* exists in practice in Magnesia and there's no need to make a mountain out of a molehill due to a lexical peculiarity.

The majority of scholars who have written about political friendship and *homonoia* in *Laws* embrace these doctrinal solutions. Bobonich 2002 with admirably careful wording alludes multiple times to the concord and friendship of *Laws* being characterized in terms of *homonoia*.[156] Schofield 2013 also frequently teases the connection between *homonoia* and friendship but never acknowledges that this connection given *homonoia*'s absence in *Laws* might be ill-fitting.[157] Prauscello 2014: 23 adopts a similar position, claiming:

> [I]n both the *Republic* and the *Laws* a significant part of the rhetoric of citizenship to be internalized and performed in Plato's utopias hinges on a sustained ideological promotion of mutual concord (*homonoia*) and 'love/friendship' (*philia*) between all its members.

El Murr 2018: 238 also adopts the same strategy, positing:

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[156] See, *inter alia*, Bobonich 2002: 92, 118, 416. Bobonich 2002 never explicitly attributes concord as *homonoia* to the *Laws*, but the above passages, where Bobonich always implies that the *Laws* and *Statesman* agree about fundamental issue of political philosophy and then discusses *homonoia* in the *Statesman* as fundamental to a political community, invite the inference that Bobonich thinks *homonoia* is operative in *Laws*.

[157] See Schofield 2013: 283-284, 290-292, 294, and 297.

> Dans les trois grands dialogues politiques que sont la *République*, le *Politique* et les *Lois*, la *philia* joue un role preponderant. Comme d'autres avant er après lui, Plato met en evidence que la *philia* et l'*homonoia*, l'amitié et la concorde civile, vont de pair, et que l'amitié est un élément indispensable à l'harmonie interne de la cite.

All four scholars assume at varying levels of straightforwardness that *homonoia* has a nontrivial role to play concerning friendship in *Laws*.

What evidence do they offer? While they cannot appeal to the text of *Laws* since the term makes no appearance, they are not without resources. Schofield 2013 chooses to appeal not to Platonic doctrine, but to that of Aristotle and general intellectual discourses of the fifth and fourth centuries (e.g. an oracle Lycurgus received from the Delphic oracle).[158] The main reasons Schofield adopts this approach are because the composition of *Laws* and Aristotle's time at the Academy overlap and there are admittedly many similarities between Aristotle's *Politics* and Plato's *Laws*.[159] So, irrespective of whatever other Platonic dialogues contain, Schofield's version of this solution allows us to infer *homonoia* in *Laws* primarily on the basis of parallel discourses and approaches by Plato's contemporaries.

Scholars can also appeal to Platonic texts that appear in harmony with the political philosophy of *Laws*. For Bobonich 2012 (and possibly Prauscello 2014 and El Murr 2018) those texts include this passage from *Statesman* 311b-c about the statesman's art of weaving:

> (**T4**) Then let us say that this marks the completion of the fabric which is the product of

[158] Schofield 2013: 283, 288, 291and 294. Schofield makes the following ambiguous claim about *Laws*, with reference to the message of the Delphic oracle received by Lycurgus: "But in the Athenian's version [of the triad of values for proper legislation seen in **T2**], friendship and wisdom take the place of concord [Schofield's translation of *homonoia*] and, more importantly, courage or manliness." It's not clear here if Schofield means that friendship replaces *homonoia* in the sense that friendship as a distinct value replaces concord completely or if friendship replaces concord in the sense that it elaborates on the values of *homonoia* important for *Laws,* but those values are nonetheless contiguous and compatible. From context, the latter formulation seems a more plausible formulation of Schofield's view.

[159] See Schofield 2010 for further discussion.

> the art of statesmanship: the weaving together, with regular intertwining, of the dispositions of brave and moderate people—when the expertise belonging to the king brings their life together in *homonoia* and friendship and makes it common between them.
>
> Τοῦτο δὴ τέλος ὑφάσματος εὐθυπλοκίᾳ συμπλακὲν γίγνεσθαι φῶμεν πολιτικῆς πράξεως τὸ τῶν ἀνδρείων καὶ σωφρόνων ἀνθρώπων ἦθος, ὁπόταν ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ φιλίᾳ κοινὸν συναγαγοῦσα αὐτῶν τὸν βίον ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη.

While neither Prauscello 2014 nor El Murr 2018 explain why they view *Statesman* and *Laws* as simpatico, Bobonich 2002: 417 argues that the dialogues share common pedagogical and political grounds:

> Each citizen is required to be virtuous and the boundaries of the political community are constituted by the capacity for and dedication to virtue. Moreover, this very conception of the city and of citizenship is part of the citizens' self-conception: they are educated to see themselves as craftsmen of virtue.[160]

The political common ground then is that both *Statesman* and *Laws* define the political community in terms of a collection of citizens, all of whom should be willing and able to acquire full virtue. (Bobonich 2002 rightly contrasts this view of the political community with that of *Republic*.) The pedagogical common ground, according to Bobonich, can be seen in *Statesman* 309c, where the task of the statesman is to correctly educate citizens by encouraging them to adopt in their souls: "that opinion about what is fine, just and good, and the opposites of these, which is really true and is guaranteed" (*τὴν τῶν πέρι καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἐναντίων ὄντως οὖσαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ*

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[160] Prauscello and El Murr cite these passages in *Statesman* as support, so presumably they hold reasons similar to Bobonich's. In addition to 415-417, see Bobonich 2002: 117-118 where he comments on p.118 again on education in the *Statesman* (with understood applicability to *Laws*): "It is only by giving citizens the same true ethical opinions about the fine, just, and the good—and excluding those not capable of sharing in them—that genuine concord (*homonoia*) and friendship (*philia*) can be achieved in the city. Although Plato is not fully explicit about this, such opinions seem to consist in grasping—albeit in a way that amounts to less than knowledge—the reasons behind the law, that is, grasping why they are fine, just, and good."

βεβαιώσεως). Bobonich 2012: 416-417 sees this similar educational task at work primarily in three *Laws* passages that describe the citizen's education as an education in virtue:

> (**T5**) No [citizen] shall be numbered among those who engage in technical arts, nor any servant of a [citizen]. For a citizen possesses a sufficient art, and one that needs long practice and many studies, in the keeping and conserving of the public system of the city, a task that demands his full attention. *Laws* VIII.846d
>
> *πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιχώριος μηδεὶς ἔστω τῶν περὶ τὰ δημιουργικὰ τεχνήματα διαπονούντων, μηδὲ οἰκέτης ἀνδρὸς ἐπιχωρίου. τέχνην γὰρ ἱκανήν, πολλῆς ἀσκήσεως ἅμα καὶ μαθημάτων πολλῶν δεομένην, κέκτηται πολίτης ἀνὴρ τὸν κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως κόσμον σῴζων καὶ κτώμενος, οὐκ ἐν παρέργῳ δεόμενον ἐπιτηδεύειν.*
>
> (**T6**) This law [i.e. a law against practicing multiple *technai* simultaneously] they shall guard against, and they shall punish the resident [citizen] with reproaches and dishonors, if he turns aside to any art other than the pursuit of virtue. *Laws* VIII.846d-847a
>
> Τοῦτον δὴ *τὸν νόμον ἀστυνόμοι διαπονούμενοι σῳζόντων, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἐπιχώριον, ἐὰν εἴς τινα τέχνην ἀποκλίνῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελειαν, κολαζόντων ὀνείδεσί τε καὶ ἀτιμίαις*
>
> (**T7**) That life we speak of—which most truly deserves the name 'life'—is doubly (rather far more than doubly) lacking in leisure, seeing that it is occupied with the care of the virtue of the body and the soul. For there ought to be no other secondary task to hinder the work of supplying the body with its proper exercise and nourishment or the soul with teachings and habits. Every night and day are not sufficient for the man who is doing this to win from them their fruit in full and ample measure. *Laws* VII.807c-d
>
> *διπλασίας τε καὶ ἔτι πολλῷ πλέονος ἀσχολίας ἐστὶν γέμων ὁ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος πάντως καὶ ψυχῆς εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν βίος εἰρημένος ὀρθότατα. πάρεργον γὰρ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων διακώλυμα γίγνεσθαι τῶν τῷ σώματι προσηκόντων εἰς ἀπόδσιν*

πόνων καὶ τροπφῆς, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ψυχῇ μαθημάτων τε καὶ εθῶν, πᾶσα δὲ νύξ τε καὶ ἡμέρα σχεδὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἱκανὴ τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ πράττοντι τὸ τέλεόν τε καὶ ἱκανὸν αὐτῶν ἐκλαμβάνειν.

The general argument here is that because the *Statesman* and *Laws* are both concerned with promoting virtue in all citizens and that the *Statesman* describes a consequence of this education in **T4** to be *homonoia* and friendship among the citizens, we should assume that the education of citizens in *Laws* also results in *homonoia* and friendship. More putative evidence of this is the insistence that *Laws* aims at friendship among its citizens, as seen in **T1**-**T3**.

Given that Plato closely associates psychology and pedagogy, scholars who adopt the doctrinally-focused deflationary solution can rely on either the psychology or pedagogy of *Laws*. For those who rely on psychology, the educational evidence found in *Statesman* matters not because of education *per se*, but because it reveals similarities to psychologies elsewhere in Plato. Those who rely on pedagogy, by contrast, can remain agnostic about any psychological similarities or dissimilarities and say that the educational continuities are sufficient for seeing *homonoia* at work in *Laws*. These approaches can also be combined so that one finds *homonoia* at work in *Laws* by virtue of both the psychological and pedagogical continuities of *Laws* with other dialogues.

3. A Nondeflationary Solution to the Mystery

As an alternative solution, one can argue that the disappearance of *homonoia* in Plato's *Laws*, if not necessarily purposeful, is nonetheless significant and indicative of a revision on Plato's behalf about either the nature of political friendship, of how it best comes about, or both. At its heart, a nondeflationary solution contends that, on the basis of some change (or changes) in Plato's view, *homonoia* is absent in *Laws* because the term is unsuitable for describing political friendship.[161] (This

[161] Sheffield 2020: 359-360 has argued for a generally nondeflationary solution: "Ὁμόνοια clearly does not capture quite what Plato has in mind [in *Laws*] . . .[S]o we get *philia* in place of ὁμόνοια. What explains this substitution? There is more built into *philia* [in *Laws*], as we have seen." My argument in this chapter aims to largely bolster this argument. On my view, however, the relevant contrast is not between *philia* and *homonoia*, but rather between *homonoia* and *sumphônia*, both of which can serve to signal the psychological aspects of *philia* in its political valence.

type of solution is nondeflationary because it solves the mystery of *homonoia*'s absence while affirming the legitimacy of the mystery itself.) The task for this kind of interpretation is to identify the relevant changes in the philosophy of *Laws* and to explain how those changes make *homonoia* an inadequate description of political friendship. The two strongest versions of this argument find their basis in *Laws*' discontinuity with either (1) psychologies elsewhere in Plato or with (2) pedagogies elsewhere in Plato.

Before discussing the varieties of nondeflationary solutions, I want to raise some suspicion about the competing deflationary solutions, which are under-supported by the text of *Laws*. The following point is worth reiterating because of its importance: although *homonoia* is central to the two models of political friendship we have already explored, *Laws* contains zero mentions of *homonoia*. If Plato really thought *homonoia* was appropriate to political life (and especially political friendship) while he was composing *Laws*, we would expect the Athenian Stranger to use the term to describe the relevant phenomena at least once. This holds even more so because of the centrality of *homonoia* in other dialogues that discuss political friendship.[162] It thus strikes me as implausible (and unfalsifiable) to suppose that the omission of *homonoia* was somehow a casual lapse in judgment on Plato's part.

But this general reason against deflationary solutions can be supported by more specific reasons against each type of deflationary solution. The doctrinal appeal in Schofield 2013 rests on a rather slippery slope.[163] For whatever commonalities exist between Aristotle's political philosophy and that of *Laws*, there exists just as many profound differences between the two.[164] Similarly, other cultural discussions about *homonoia* cannot do much load-bearing work about the meaning of specific proposals and themes of *Laws*. This so in part because Plato is notorious for rarely inheriting without scrutiny such cultural discussions and in part because Plato often adopts the cultural language of his time to

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[162] See *Alcibiades* 126-137, *Cleitophon* 409-410, *Statesman* 309-310, and *Republic* IV.432 as discussed in chapters 1 and 2.

[163] Because I think it is a slippery slope, I do not discuss in the next section nondeflationary arguments that rest on similar doctrinal appeals to Platonic contemporaries.

[164] Aristotle himself offers a contrast of his own political philosophy with that of *Laws* in *Politics* 2.6.

modify the underlying assumptions that govern that language so as to accord with his other philosophical commitments. The cultural practices of symposium and pederasty in *Symposium* and *Laws* as well as the description of Spartan *sôphrosunê* in *Laws* I (among many others) countenance this claim. Thus, it seems that the same reasons that this brand of doctrinal appeal deploys to support ascribing *homonoia* to *Laws* can be used just as forcibly to support not ascribing it.

Regarding the approach of Bobonich, Prauscello and El-Murr, we should realize that the applicability of the *Statesman* passages (e.g. **T4**) to the *Laws* passages (**T5**-**T7**) on citizens being educated in virtue depends fundamentally on two analogies holding: (1) that virtue in *Statesman* is analogous to virtue in *Laws* and (2) education in *Statesman* is analogous to education in *Laws*. It is not clear however that (1) or (2) hold. In Section 3.1.2 and Section 3.2.1, I challenge the adequacy of each of these analogies for doing the kind of argumentative work necessary for the deflationary view.

While none of these above comments count as a decisive refutation, they are nonetheless general reasons to doubt those deflationary solutions. After explaining two types of nondeflationary solutions, I will argue that the primary evidence that the deflationary solutions rely on in *Laws* is undecisive at best. I will argue that *Laws*' passages on the psychology of virtue, the psychology of pleasure and pain, and the general educational program—all of which matter for political friendship—are actually better interpreted as fostering friendship by primarily non-epistemic means. These revisions of the relevant issues in *Laws* best explains the absence of *homonoia* and it does so in a nondeflationary way.

3.1 A Nondeflationary Psychological Solution

According to this interpretative line, the fact that *homonoia* does not appear in descriptions of political friendship in *Laws* is mainly due to changes in Plato's views of psychology. The two most relevant features for political friendship are the psychology of pleasure (and pain) and the psychology of virtue. This is so because these are central features of education in Magnesia and of the psychological lives

of Magnesians. For instance, in **T5**-**T7** the Athenian claims that Magnesians are being educated for the sake of virtue, and, as *Laws* II.653b-c (to be discussed in more depth in Section 3.1.2) tells us, virtue requires harmony between our pleasures and pains and reason.

My thesis in this section is that a nondeflationary psychological solution—relying either on changes in the psychology of pleasure (and pain) or on the psychology of virtue—is promising, although there is not abundant textual evidence to support it. Concretely, I argue for two specific claims: (1) that pleasure and pain in *Laws* involves noncognitive and nonconceptual content, all of which receives significant attention throughout *Laws* and (2) there exists a form of virtue (albeit a weak form) that is focused not on the cognitive features of virtue but on feeling the appropriate sensations of pleasure and pain at the right time. For these reasons, I conclude that appeal to this psychology, while offering some support for the nondeflationary approach, is not strong enough to rule out the deflationary approaches to *homonoia* that rely on the cognitive and conceptual aspects of psychology in *Laws*.

3.1.1 The Psychology of Pleasure and Pain in *Laws*

Pleasure and pain figure prominently in *Laws*. Throughout *Laws* II.653-670, feeling pleasure and pain is repeatedly heralded as an indispensable instrument for correct education. And in the great prelude at *Laws* V.732-734, the Athenian Stranger delivers an elaborate defense of the most beautiful life (*τὸν κάλλιστον βίον*) on the grounds that such a life "excels in providing what we all seek: a predominance of pleasure over pain throughout our lives" (*κρατεῖ καὶ τούτῳ ὅ ζητοῦμεν, τῷ χαίρειν πλείω, ἐλάττω δὲ λυπεῖσθαι παρὰ τὸν βίον ἅπαντα*) (*Laws* V.733a).[165] Given this importance, parsing the

[165] The strikingly praiseworthy collection of comments about pleasure in *Laws* has led to debate about whether Plato adopts hedonism. For those who think so, see Carone 2003 and especially Mouracade 2005. For those who argue against inferring a strict hedonism in *Laws,* see Annas 1999, Annas 2010 and especially Warren 2013 who considers in great detail the *Laws* V.732-734 argument about the role of pleasure in the most beautiful life. Meyer 2012: 354-360 also argues against psychological hedonism in the *Laws* but does so on the basis of an interpretation of *Laws* I.644.

nature of pleasure and pain effectively functions as a battleground between deflationary and nondeflationary approaches to political friendship (granting, for the sake of argument, that shared feelings of pleasure and pain can be sufficient for friendship). If pleasure can be shown to be somehow predominantly cognitive and conceptual, then deflationary solutions can argue that the shared feelings of pleasure and pain can be the locus of *homonoia* because at bottom what it means to share such feelings is to conceptualize the relevant phenomena in a compatible, if not identical, way. And this similar conceptualization is in effect *homonoia*. By contrast, if nondeflationary solutions can show that pleasure and pain are in an important way predominantly noncognitive or nonconceptual, then they can argue that no subterranean *homonoia* is to be found in the feelings of pleasure and pain among Magnesians.

Definitively deciding this issue in favor either solution is a Sisyphean task. There is no substantive discussion of the components of pleasure in *Laws*.[166] And whatever evidence there is for one side, it is either scant or undermined elsewhere in *Laws*. I offer here some examples of passages that might incline us towards one theory or another to conclude that there is no sufficient evidence to make a decision based solely on psychological doctrine.

Advocates of deflationary solutions may point to *Laws* II.657c-d where pleasure is tied to belief and conclude therefore that pleasure is belief-oriented and conceptual.[167] But that passage cannot support such a strong conclusion. At most, it supports the inference that pleasure can accompany beliefs. But it doesn't follow from *that* claim that the experience of pleasure itself somehow involves beliefs or conceptualization. Nor does it follow that this passage commits us to the view that one only

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[166] Meyer 2015: 128 *et passim* characterizes the fundamental ambiguity with slightly different but to my mind entirely consistent terminology.

[167] Gosling and Taylor 1982: 171-174 entertain a similar interpretation. Schöpsdau 1994: 228-230 holds on the basis of *Laws* I.644c-d that pleasure and expectation (*elpis*) are difficult to distinguish and, since *elpis* is described as a future-oriented belief, it seems that pleasure is on this view is also closely associated with belief. I, however, disagree with this analysis of *Laws* I.644c-d as will be made clear shortly.

experiences pleasure as a result of having beliefs.[168] There may be other sorts of activities that are also pleasurable irrespective of the beliefs latent in those activities (one here may think of the pleasure of choral dancing in *Laws*).

Similarly, advocates of nondeflationary solutions may claim that the following comment about pleasure carries the day for their approach:

> (**T8**) [Each soul] possess in itself two witless and opposing advisors, which we call pleasure and pain. *Laws* I.644c7-8[169]
>
> *δύο δὲ κεκτημένον ἐν αὑτῷ συμβούλω ἐναντίω τε καὶ ἄφρονε, ὥ προσαγορεύομεν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην*

This passage supports understanding pleasure and pain non-conceptually because they are described as *ἄφρονε*. Context further supports this reading because immediately after this passage the Athenian enumerates another psychic item:

> (**T9**) In addition to [pleasure and pain], the soul has opinions about the future, whose common name is 'anticipation' and whose particular names are 'fear', the anticipation before pain, and 'daring', the anticipation before the opposite. *Laws* I.644c9-d1
>
> *πρὸς δὲ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν αὖ δόξας μελλόντων, οἷν κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δέ, φόβος μὲν ἡ πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἡ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου*

If pleasure implied beliefs, then why would the Athenian feel the need to add beliefs about the future to his account of soul in addition to pleasure and pain? Less rhetorically, if pleasure had a strong

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[168] Meyer 2012: 363-364, I think, accords with this point. Her claim is that there are certain pleasures ("anticipatory pleasures") that are intimately connected with beliefs about the future. But she also makes room for the possibility of non-anticipatory pleasures; in fact, this kind of distinction must be implicit in her claim on p.364 about the different motive forces between pleasure and pain, on the one hand, and anticipations of pleasure and pain on the other.

[169] The Greek poses this as a question that receives an immediate affirmation from Clinias. For facility, I have modified the syntax from an interrogative to a declarative.

conceptual component, it would seem unnecessary to add beliefs about the future as an extra psychic item since pleasure and pain, and their putative conceptual element, could account for such beliefs.

Yet, unfortunately for fans of the nondeflationary approach, this line of interpretation is likewise unsustainable. There may be reasons that pleasure and pain do not encompass future-oriented beliefs, but those reasons need not imply the impossibility of any beliefs whatsoever at work in feeling pleasure or pain. Further, this discussion of the soul occurs in the midst of a larger discussion about self-victory and some may argue that the psychology on offer here should not be expanded beyond this context.[170] So whatever non-conceptual interpretation we develop here ought not count as commentary about the psychology of pleasure and pain generally in *Laws*.[171]

Appeal to other dialogues that substantively discuss pleasure and pain do not resolve this issue either. The *Timaeus* and *Philebus* each discuss more directly the nature of pleasure, wherein we find a general understanding that pleasure is a complex perception involving both nonconceptual and conceptual elements.[172] At *Timaeus* 77b5-c3, we find a description of pleasure that seems rather tough to harmonize with a deflationary reading:

> [The appetitive part of the soul] is totally devoid of belief and calculation and reason, but does share in perception, pleasant and painful, together with desires. *Tim.* 77b4-6[173]

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[170] This point about the context-specific psychology is made by Wilburn 2013: 67.

[171] Meyer 2015: 128, Bobonich 2002: 354, Barney 1992: 287-292, Frede 1987: 3-8, and Silverman 1991 hold that pleasure has two senses: a specific sense in which pleasure is a perception and a larger, general sense in which pleasure is an appearance—understood to be a mixture of belief and perception—and thus has conceptual content.

[172] Another aspect of the study of pleasure in Plato has been whether Plato consistently maintains a restorative theory of pleasure throughout the dialogues or if he transitions from a restorative theory to a steady-state theory of pleasure. Discussion of this issue, while important, seems at best orthogonal to my argument. For further analysis, see Gosling and Taylor 1982 and Frede 2010.

[173] I am not concerned with how soul partitioning in *Timaeus*—and thus the discussion of the 'appetitive part' in this passage—tracks with the psychological part(s) of *Laws* because I don't believe this debate matters for my argument. For those who suggest that the psychology of *Laws*, despite its unitary appearance, can handle tripartition, see Wilburn 2015 and Meyer 2012. For an elaborate defense of the unitary psychology of *Laws*, see Bobonich 2002: 258-288. It should be noted that a lot of the debate hangs on what one means by a "psychic part." For Bobonich, a part must be agent-like. Meyer 2012: 351-2 fn. 4 notes that her account of the psychology does not rest on a similar construal.

> ᾧ δόξης μὲν λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ μέτεστιν τὸ μηδέν, αἰσθήσεως δὲ ἡδείας καὶ ἀλγεινῆς μετὰ ἐπιθυμιῶν

Here pleasure is described as a kind of perception. This passage also bluntly demarcates a line between perception and typical forms of conceptualization. Indeed, this bluntness has given rise to at least two general (and incompatible) theories of perception (including pleasurable and painful perceptions) in Plato. The imagistic theory holds that this passage should be taken at face value and we are thus to understand perception as a kind of non-conceptual imaging.[174] On this theory, pleasure—which is obviously a kind of perception—is thus to be understood non-conceptually.

By contrast, cognitivist theories hold that an adequate explanation of pleasure must incorporate in a significant way conceptualization and cognition in pleasurable and painful perceptions. The strongest argument for this position has been made by pointing out the explanatory and hermeneutic weaknesses of the imagistic theory.[175] But it is also buttressed by several passages in *Philebus*, most notably the distinction between true and false pleasures which distinguish between pleasures on cognitive grounds and thus imply that pleasures are cognitive.[176]

In sum, the psychology of pleasure, especially of whether and to what extent it is cognitive or noncognitive, remains lamentably imprecise in *Laws*, and in other Platonic dialogues that discuss pleasure extensively. So even though the description of pleasure and pain as ἄφρονε in *Laws* and the complementary description of pleasure at *Timaeus* 77b-c seem to imply that pleasure is nonconceptual and thus supports a nondeflationary argument about the absence of *homonoia*, there is not enough supporting evidence (or uncontroversial evidence) to adequately support the argument.

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[174] Lorenz 2006 is perhaps the most thorough expositor of this view.

[175] This view has been most thoroughly defended by Bobonich 2002: 354-374. For discussion of the weaknesses of the imagistic theory—both as a reading of Plato and as a general theory of perception and pleasure—see Bobonich 2010.

[176] See Frede 1985 and Frede 2010 for further discussion.

3.1.2 The Psychology of Virtue in *Laws*

A second locus of debate about the disappearance of *homonoia* in *Laws* concerns the psychology of virtue. Given that all citizens of *Laws* are said to be virtuous (or aiming toward virtue), examining the psychology of virtue can provide insight into the citizens' general psychological dispositions since they all aim for virtue. If all forms of virtue in *Laws* are fundamentally conceptual, then that fact would support a deflationary argument about *homonoia*. If, by contrast, virtue (or at least a form of virtue) is primarily nonconceptual, then that fact would provide strong grounds for a nondeflationary argument about *homonoia*. My goal in this section is to argue for the latter point, by claiming that at least one form of virtue is primarily nonconceptual (even though the highest and most perfect forms of virtue involve conceptualization). My claim, if persuasive, shows that the psychology of virtue can support nondeflationary arguments about *homonoia*.

The most relevant textual evidence for understanding virtue in *Laws* comes from the following passage:

> (**T10**) I mean that when we are children, the first sensations we experience are pleasure and pain, and it is in our pleasures and pains that virtue and vice first develop in our souls. By the time we are old, we are lucky if we have also developed wisdom and stable true opinions, for these goods and all that they involve complete a person, but it is the virtue that first develops in children that I mean by education. If pleasure and liking and pain and hatred develop correctly in our souls when we are not yet able to grasp the account, and when we do grasp the account they agree with it because they have been correctly trained by appropriate habits, this agreement is virtue in its entirety. *Laws* II.653a5-b6[177]

[177] See Sheffield 2020: 338 for further discussion of this passage and the role *eros* plays here.

> *λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους εὐτυχὲς ὅτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο: τέλεος δ᾽ οὖν ἔστ᾽ ἄνθρωπος ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐν τούτοις πάντα κεκτημένος ἀγαθά. παιδείαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετήν: ἡδονὴ δὴ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἄν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ ὀρθῶς εἰσίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν, αὕτη ᾽σθ᾽ ἡ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετή.*

Several commentators on this passage have recognized that virtue in *Laws* differs significantly from how virtue is described elsewhere in Plato. Richard Kraut has described virtue in Magnesia as more "ordinary" and "fragile" insofar as virtue does not require the secure underpinnings of philosophical reason.[178] Christopher Bobonich has likewise noted differences in Magnesian virtue, suggesting that the cognitive and propositional content given to pleasure affects how the emotions relate to a virtuous disposition.[179] Susan Suavé Meyer has described the *Laws* model of virtue as the "agreement model," since virtue consists in the agreement (*sumphônia*) between pleasures and pains on the one hand and reasoned judgments on the other.[180] I want to further these scholars' general consensus about the

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[178] See Kraut 2010: 63-68.

[179] Bobonich 2002: 360-365. Bobonich's claim that pleasure has cognitive content admits of at least two interpretations. One is that we feel pleasure on the basis of a cognitive activity such that all pleasures, at bottom, are really positive cognitive evaluations of whatever object or situation. A second is that the experience of pleasure can always be described in terms of the beliefs and propositional attitudes of the agent, even if on a phenomenological level the agent is not aware of those beliefs and attitudes as she feels pleasure. I think the second is the more accurate account of pleasure in the *Laws* and that the former interpretation is overly rational. Meyer 2012: 360-366 presents an account of anticipatory pleasures and pains that seems in agreement with my view in *Laws*. Meyer argues that there can be intentional objects of our anticipations that are themselves pleasurable or painful but there can also be intentional objects of our anticipations that are neither pleasurable nor painful but the act of anticipating them is itself pleasurable or painful. For further discussion of how this issue bears on my argument, see the previous section.

[180] Meyer 2015: 162-163. I will choose not to refer to virtue as rooted in an "agreement model" because I think "agreement" is too epistemologically loaded and my central claim in this section is that there is a form of virtue that is not based on a Magnesian's epistemic attitudes. I also do not think "agreement" is the best translation of *sumphônia* in this case; "harmony" or "consonance" strikes me as more apt. Annas 2010 also has a helpful discussion about the role of the preludes in *Laws* with respect to encouraging virtue among the citizenry. Carone 2002: 336-337 also has a lucid discussion of how individual virtues interrelate in *Laws*.

particularity of Magnesian virtue by arguing that **T10** is a grounding text for understanding not only perfect virtue, but also imperfect virtue and by what criterion imperfect virtue differs from perfect virtue in *Laws*.

In all its forms, virtue requires harmony (*sumphônia*). This virtuous harmony exists between *logos* and feelings of pleasure and pain. Traditional accounts of virtue in Plato construe this harmony to be achieved primarily through an agent's epistemic capacities (*logos*, broadly construed). That is, once a Magnesian can exercise her *logos* in a way that directs corresponding pleasures and pains appropriately, then she can be said to have attained the *sumphônia* characteristic of virtue. While I do not want to dispute that this kind of psychic harmony is indeed virtue, I do want to argue, based on **T10**, that this is not the only form of harmony and of virtue in *Laws*.

Another kind of virtue is one that arises on the basis of feeling pleasure and pain correctly, irrespective of one's epistemic attitude concerning those feelings or the situation that gives rise to such feelings. In **T10**, the Athenian claims that this is the sort of virtue that predominates in children; it consists of feeling pleasure and pain in our souls "before we are yet to able understand the reason why."[181] This psychic state counts as a virtuous one because it ensures that young Magnesians will have the correct dispositions and act as the fully virtuous person would act (i.e. the one with her own, fully developed *logos*). That is, they act in a way that accords with rational principles, but they do not act on the basis of those rational principles. Rather, they act correctly on the basis of the appropriate feelings of pleasure and pain.

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[181] I discuss how the correlated psychic state of "before understanding the reason why" relates to, but is nonetheless distinct from, a similar passage in *Republic* III in Section 3.2.2. I should also note that I take the last line of **T10** to refer to a perfected or completed state of virtue, not to the only form of virtue. This seems plausible because the Athenian claims a few lines earlier that children have a kind of virtue without being able to grasp the account. If we take the last line to refer to the only form of virtue, the Athenian would contradict himself in the span of a few lines. My view avoids the contradiction and makes sense of both how children can be said to have a kind of virtue and of how, exactly, the form of virtue that comes when we are able to grasp the relevant account is *σύμπασα ἀρετή*.

Yet, there is an immediate problem facing this account. If virtue is the harmony of *logos* and feelings of pleasure and pain and the young Magnesians, according to the Athenian in **T10**, are psychologically unable to grasp such a *logos*, in what way can they be understood to enjoy the necessary harmony with *logos* such that they are virtuous? The key to answering this problem, I think, lies in how the Athenian characterizes laws in the famous puppet passage (and elsewhere). There, the Athenian claims:

> (**T11**) This is the sacred and golden guidance of calculation, also called the city's common law.
>
> *Laws* I.645a1-3[182]
>
> *δ' εἶναι τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴν χρυσῆν καὶ ἱεράν, τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν νόμον ἐπικαλουμένην.*

The Athenian thus holds that public law in Magnesia is a political expression of the *logismos*. Recognizing this fact allows us to overcome the above problem because whenever young Magnesians feel pleasure and pain (e.g. during the tragedy festivals) and those feelings accord with the dictates of the law, then we can see that they are actually enacting a harmony (*sumphônia*) between *logos* and feelings of pleasure and pain. The particularity of this type of harmony for them, however, is that the *logos* is externalized vis-à-vis the expression of public law. And this externalization owes to the fact, as **T10** states, that younger Magnesians lack a fully developed *logismos*, which only comes later in their lives. By contrast, older Magnesians—who have a more developed and mature *logismos*—enact the harmony internally, between their soul's *logismos* and their feelings of pleasure and pain.

The *Laws*, then, offers a model of a predominantly nonconceptual form of virtue. This virtue consists of feeling pleasure and pain appropriately in a way that harmonizes with law. This constitutes

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[182] This gist of this remark is also repeated at *Laws* VIII.835e: "Reason, which is embodied in law as far as it can be, tells us to avoid indulging the passions that have ruined so many people" (*τίνα δή ποτε τρόπον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει ἀφέξονται τῶν πολλοὺς δὴ πολλὰ ἐπιθυμιῶν εἰς ἔσχατα βαλλουσῶν, ὧν ἄν ὁ λόγος προστάττῃ ἀπέχεσθαι, νόμος ἐπιχειρῶν γίγνεσθαι*). For further discussion see Moss 2014: 199. I do think Moss 2014 interprets virtue too narrowly according to my arguments. Moss 2014: 199 claims, for instance, that virtue "involves more than simply doing what the *logos* or *nomos* prescribes," but I think this fact is only true of full virtue, but not of its weaker and more imperfect forms.

the harmony required of virtue because the law is the public expression of *logos*. This public expression allows citizens—predominantly younger Magnesians—whose rational faculties are not fully developed to achieve a form of virtue (cf. *Laws* II.672c). This form of virtue is certainly a weak one. The weakness is in part because the younger citizens must always defer to what the law holds and, if the law is silent on some morally precarious situation, then these citizens may falter. Nonetheless, this weak form of virtue is supplemented in Magnesia by the frequent guidance of older, more rational citizens and by an elaborate educational system that focuses significantly on ensuring that young Magnesians feel pleasure and pain correctly and eventually appreciate the reasons why certain cases are truly pleasurable and painful.[183]

The most relevant inference from this analysis for my general argument is as follows. Deflationary solutions cannot rely on the fact that all citizens are said to either aim at virtue or be virtuous as evidence that *homonoia* is at work in the background of Magnesia because there are forms of virtue that are nonconceptual.[184] Thus, we cannot assume the psychology of virtue provides any determination of the psychological disputes about *homonoia*, because the psychology of virtue is broad enough to accommodate both nonconceptual and conceptual forms of virtue.

Nevertheless, I do not think it is feasible to rest a nondeflationary argument about *homonoia* solely on the psychology of virtue because it is nonetheless quite clear that the Athenian expects the more perfect and stable forms of virtue to involve Magnesian's rational capacities, even if those capacities are less than properly philosophical like in *Republic*. Instead, I think the strongest nondeflationary position, to which I will now turn, holds that the educational program of *Laws* focuses

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[183] See also Sheffield 2020: 353: "Citizens have acquired the values required for the desired treatment of others not, or not solely, through learning abstract principles of 'beauty', 'equality', and 'justice', but by training in their affective responses."

[184] As discussed earlier, see Bobonich 2002: 417 (as well as Prauscello 2014 and El Murr 2018) who hold that virtue in *Laws* is analogous to virtue in *Statesman*.

not on cultivating epistemic parity among the citizens, but rather on shared feelings of pleasure and pain. This focus provides us solid reasons to see why *homonoia* would be an inapt description of friendship in Magnesia.

3.2. A Nondeflationary Pedagogical Solution

Our second, nondeflationary approach attends to Plato's new views concerning pedagogy in *Laws*. According to this solution, the aim and structure of Magnesia's educational system directs attention predominantly towards citizen's abilities to feel pleasure and pain as well as to enact the correct kinds of emotional responses to whatever ethically charged situation, while in other dialogues the pedagogical models often focus on the citizen's abilities to hold compatible or identical beliefs. This attention to shared feelings of pleasures and pains is a novel contribution of Platonic educational theory and, as I argue, it offers a solid explanation of why *homonoia*, especially as it appears in *Republic*, is rightfully absent from *Laws*.

My argument in this section is twofold. First, I show that attention to the programmatic comments about education throughout *Laws* as well as several specific educational practices reveal that Magnesians' early education is predominantly, though not exclusively, a sentimental one, i.e. one that focuses on feelings of pleasure and pain. I further suggest how this shared sentimental education unifies citizens of various ages and intellectual capabilities. Second, I explain how the emphasis differs from the educational theory of *Republic* such that *homonoia* coheres well with *Republic* but not with *Laws*. To conclude, I clarify how this newfound emphasis on the emotions supports the general nondeflationary position.

3.2.1 The Sentimental Education of Magnesians

The overt goal of Magnesian education—discussed most substantively in *Laws* II and VIII—is to encourage citizens to feel pain and pleasure at, respectively, genuinely pleasurable and painful situations. Consider, for instance, the following passages:

(**T12**) But the part of virtue that consists in having properly nurtured pleasures and pains, so that we hate what we should hate and love what we should love from beginning to end, if you separated this off in your account and called it education, you would be exactly right on my view.

Laws II.653b-c

Τὸ δὲ *περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν ὀρθῶς ἄν προσαγορεύοις.*

(**T13**) Everybody feels pleasure and pain at the same things, so that they all praise and blame with complete unanimity.

Laws V.739d2-4

ἐπαινεῖν τ᾽ αὖ καὶ ψέγειν καθ᾽ ἕν ὅτι μάλιστα σύμπαντας. ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίροντας καὶ λυπουμένους

Each of these passages holds rather straightforwardly that citizens will be educated toward and united by shared feelings of pleasure and pain. And in both instances pleasure and pain are never explicitly valued for their conceptual content. On my view, the insight behind Magnesian education is that citizens enact a meaningful form of reciprocated, other-regarding concern solely by virtue of all of them hating what they ought to hate and loving what they ought to love.

The real novelty of pedagogy in *Laws* lies in the recognition that most citizens can form reliable responses of pleasure and pain without holding explicit beliefs about what's pleasurable and painful. Instead, Magnesian education devotes the majority of its attention to the emotional and sentimental development of its citizens. And, in so doing, citizens may come later in life to appreciate the rational basis of what's pleasurable and painful but such a basis need not and in fact does not ground their affective regard for one another.

To get a further sense of this sentimental education at work, it will be helpful to examine some of the pedagogical practices of Magnesia.[185] Famously, there are three hundred sixty-five educational festivals each year (cf. *Laws* VIII.828b). An essential feature of these festivals is the performance of tragedies and comedies, which require the vast majority of Magnesians to dance, sing, and perform music together (*Laws* II.653e-654a). The Athenian explains the excellent performance of music and dance mainly by appeal to the feelings evoked when one sings and dances. That is, we sing and dance well when we correctly feel pleasure and pain at the situations depicted in our performance.

Indeed, this feeling of pleasure and pain is specifically contrasted with a competing idea of excellence in music and dance. The Athenian assures his interlocutors that it is insufficient to excel at dance and music if we have only an "intellectual grasp of good things" (*τὸ διανοηθὲν εἶναι καλὸν*, *Laws*. II.654c) precisely because this intellectual grasp does not guarantee that the one who understands will be motivated enough to actually experience joy and hatred in his performances.

This comment is enlightening because it shows that the real focus of Magnesian festivals—a rather large portion of Magnesian education—does not focus on instilling correct beliefs, but rather on instilling the correct feelings of pleasure and pain.[186] The rationale which warrants this focus is that the pleasures and pains we experience formatively shape our character and that this shaping necessarily occurs before we develop the more specialized faculties of evaluation and discrimination of pleasures and pains (*Laws* II.656b; cf. II.667c-d).

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[185] For more general discussion of education in Magnesia, see Morrow 1960: 297-389, Patterson 2013, and von Heyking 2016: 148-155.

[186] It's certainly possible that correct beliefs may come about later as a result of generating these correct feelings, but that effect is clearly not the main aim or emphasis of Magnesian education. This possibility transforms into plausibility when we also consider the Athenian's claim that reason is a capacity that's developed over time and not immediately present. A consequence of this aspect of human psychology is that education must focus on nonrational motivations broadly, which are contiguous with feelings of pleasure and pain construed broadly (cf. *Laws* II.672c). I discuss this point more directly in the contrast with musical education in *Republic* in Section 3.2.2.

This insight is further strengthened when the Athenian argues that the proper criterion to evaluate artistic performance is the pleasure it engenders in the performers and in the audience alike (*Laws* II.658c). Of course, not all pleasures are equal and only a discriminating judge who has high moral standards can decide which pleasures are compatible with the goals of Magnesian education.[187] But it would be a mistake to assume that this capacity for discriminating between pleasures is required for all Magnesians. Rather, the Athenian nicely parses this issue in the discussion of how correct pleasures affect the souls of those who only recognize those pleasures as pleasant (but not yet as correct):

> (**T14**) [E]ducation is the drawing and guidance of children towards the correct account that is articulated by the law and accepted as correct by the worthiest and eldest citizens on the basis of their experience. The soul of a child must not become trained to feel pleasure or pain that opposes the law, or opposes those who accept the law. Rather, the child's soul must follow the law and be pleased and pained at the same things as the elderly. Bringing about this 'concord' (*sumphônian*), as we call it, is the very serious purpose of the things that we call 'songs', which are really charms for our souls. Children's souls, you see, can't abide seriousness, so we perform these charms in the playful guise of songs. *Laws* II.659d-e
>
> *παιδεία μέν ἐσθ' ἡ παίδων ὁλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγὴ πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρημένον, καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεστάτοις καὶ πρεσβυτάτοις δι' ἐμπειρίαν συνδεδογμένον ὡς ὄντως ὀρθός ἐστιν: ἵν' οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παιδὸς μὴ ἐναντία χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐθίζηται τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου πεπεισμένοις, ἀλλὰ συνέπηται χαίρουσά τε καὶ λυπουμένη τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις οἵσπερ ὁ γέρων, τούτων ἕνεκα, ἃς ᾠδὰς καλοῦμεν, ὄντως μὲν ἐπῳδαὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὗται νῦν γεγονέναι, πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἥν λέγομεν συμφωνίαν ἐσπουδασμέναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδὴν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχάς, παιδιαί τε καὶ ᾠδαὶ καλεῖσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι*

[187] See Warren 2013, Annas 1999, Carone 2003, and White 2001 for further discussion of pleasure generally and of the qualitative differences among pleasures.

This fascinating passage shows that even if pleasures are distinguished correctly only when one understands the relevant moral issues, these pleasures can nonetheless be felt by all, including those who lack such an understanding. As such, these feelings of pleasure and pain are the common ground among all citizens. What distinguishes them is that various citizens may feel pleasure and pain at some situation on different grounds. Older Magnesians may enjoy pleasure at the imitation of a morally salutary situation because they recognize it *as morally salutary*. Younger Magnesians may also feel pleasure at this situation, but it would not be for the same reasons as older Magnesians. Rather, their pleasure is likely a natural response to the perception of order, rhythm and harmony that characterizes such morally salutary situations (*Laws* II.653e). Only later in life, if at all, will the understanding of how and why some situation is pleasant come to them. And when or if this comes, it's possible, perhaps even necessary, that the quality of their pleasures change, but what's essential for establishing common bonds among Magnesians—i.e. that they feel pleasure and pain in unison—never changes.

The emphasis on children's feeling of pleasure and pain throughout *Laws* is warranted by the fact that their souls, as mentioned in **T14**, are not able to reason about the relevant situations yet. A consequence of this is that much discussion of the sentimental education of Magnesians appears to be directed only at children. But closer attention to other educational practices shows that older Magnesians are also in need of the constant reinforcement and fine-tuning of their pleasures and pains. The clearest example of this fact comes in the Athenian's endorsement of symposium as an educational practice, especially for the citizens between thirty and sixty years of age.

In *Laws* I, the Athenian elicits Clinias and Megillus' agreement that wine-drinking is an important test of one's virtue, especially of *sôphrosunê* (*Laws* I.648d-649a). The importance of wine-drinking comes from realizing that in a state of drunkenness one's "pleasure and pains, angry feelings and passions" (*σφοδροτέρας τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ θυμοὺς καὶ ἔρωτας ἡ τῶν οἴνων πόσις ἐπιτείνει*) are intensified while one's "perceptions, memories, opinions and cognitions . . . entirely

abandon" oneself (*τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ μνήμας καὶ δόξας καὶ φρονήσεις . . . πάμπαν ἀπολείπει ταῦτα αὐτόν*, *Laws* I.645d-e). But if drunkenness induces such a state of intensified pleasures and pains, we should ask what this state reveals about virtue.

To put it in somewhat Aristotelian terms, the answer is that this test distinguishes virtue from mere continence. If virtue, as described in **T10**, is a harmony between one's rational faculties and one's feelings of pleasure and pain, the fully virtuous agent should have both their rational faculties *and* feelings of pleasure and pain aligned rightly. One can determine if one's feelings are aligned correctly by inducing a state in which one's rational faculties (e.g. memory, beliefs, judgments, and cognitions) are absent. Since the drunken person feels pleasure and pain at an intensified level, their wine-induced behaviors are highly revelatory of an essential part of the harmony characteristic of virtue, namely their feelings of pleasure and pain. It is through sympotic wine-drinking then that Magnesians can distinguish between, on the one hand, someone who has an intellectual grasp of what is good but lacks the emotional and hedonic disposition towards it (e.g. the person described at *Laws* II.654c) and, on the other hand, the virtuous individual who has both the intellectual grasp of and appropriate emotional disposition toward the good.

Since symposia as educational practices are only relevant for citizens with fairly developed rational faculties (since it tests one's pleasures and pains in the desertion of one's rational faculties), it makes sense that the chorus of Dionysus, which essentially functions as a large symposium, is reserved for citizens between the ages of thirty and sixty. But, aside from this psychological fact, the way the Athenian describes how wine-drinking and sympotic practices affect the older Magnesian citizens sheds further light on the sentimental education of all citizens. For instance, the Athenian mentions two times that drinking rejuvenates older souls and makes them more educable:

> (**T15**) A person approaching his forties, however, when invoking the gods at the end of a communal dinner, will call upon Dionysus in particular, inviting him to that rite and recreation for

the elders which he gave to humans as a remedy for the crabbedness of old age. It makes us grow young again and forget our ill temper as our souls' hardened character softens, like iron that becomes pliable when placed in the fire. *Laws* II.666b2-c3

τετταράκοντα δε ἐπιβαίνοντα ἐτῶν, ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις εὐωχηθέντα, καλεῖν τούς τε ἄλλους θεοὺς καὶ δὴ καὶ Διόνυσον παρακαλεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τελετὴν ἅμα καὶ παιδιάν, ἥν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ γήρως αὐστηρότητος ἐδωρήσατο τὸν οἶνον φάρμακον, ὥστε ἀνηβᾶν ἡμᾶς, καὶ δυσθυμίας λήθῃ γίγνεσθαι μαλακώτερον ἐκ σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, καθάπερ εἰς πῦρ σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα γιγνόμενον, καὶ οὕτως εὐπλαστότερον εἶναι

(**T16**) Anyone who participates [in the chorus of Dionysus] loosens up and becomes merry. Bursting with unchecked speech and unwilling to listen to his neighbors, he thinks he is fit to rule both himself and the rest of the company.

Didn't we say that when this happens the souls of the drinkers are like iron in the fire? They become softer and more youthful, receptive to the influence of a skillful educator who can shape them anew, just as when they were young. *Laws* II.671b3-c2[188]

πᾶς δέ γε αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ κουφότερος αἴρεται καὶ γέγηθέν τε καὶ παρρησίας ἐμπίμπλαται καὶ ἀνηκουστίας ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τῶν πέλας, ἄρχων δ' ἱκανὸς ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γεγονέναι.

οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν, ὅταν γίγνηται ταῦτα, καθάπερ τινὰ σίδηρον τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πινόντων διαπύρους γιγνομένας μαλθακωτέρας γίγνεσθαι καὶ νεωτέρας, ὥστε εὐαγώγους συμβαίνειν τῷ δυναμένῳ τε καὶ ἐπισταμένῳ παιδεύειν τε καὶ πλάττειν, καθάπερ ὅτ' ἦσαν νέαι;

What these passages tell us is that, aside from testing one's virtue, symposia also contribute substantially to the education of older Magnesians. The metaphor of welding is telling in this regard.

[188] I have excluded Clinias' affirmation for ease of reading and because it does not affect my point.

The originally rigid, ironlike aspects of the soul (cf. *Laws* I.644d-645a) become malleable through drunkenness. And in this malleable state, the Athenian suggests that the older Athenians are more susceptible to refining their emotional disposition, primarily through praising noble behaviors of drunken citizens and shaming ignoble ones.

Magnesian pedagogy does not restrict this sentimental education only to the choral festivals and the symposia. Rather, the idea that feelings of pleasure and pain can be the primary locus of moral education pervades life in Magnesia. Physical education, including dancing, is pleasant by virtue of enacting in movement orderly harmony and rhythm, to which human beings are innately sensitive and able to enjoy (*Laws* II.653e-654a). When Magnesians dance well, they are pleased in the performance and spectacle of dancing (and singing) because the rhythm and harmony is inherently pleasurable. Again, it seems both possible and required (given descriptions of child psychology in *Laws*) that younger Magnesians take pleasure in dance without being aware of *why* dancing is in fact pleasurable.[189] Likewise, the Athenian's requirements that pregnant women should go for walks, that children yet unable to walk should be carried by nurses to temples or the countryside, and that mothers should rock their newborn children to sleep are all justified by appeal to how these movements prepare embryos and infants to take pleasure in orderly movement and how they discourage fearful dispositions in children (*Laws* VII.789d-790e).[190]

The most essential takeaway at this point is that we have a reason to see why *homonoia* (and its epistemic and conceptual connotations) is absent from *Laws*: citizens simply are not unified and

[189] Kamtekar 2010 has an excellent analysis of the psychological value of physical education in *Laws* that, I believe, coheres with my points.

[190] A further consideration would be the musical and emotional dimensions of the preludes, which the Athenian stranger describes as instruments of persuasion and as musically charming. It is possible, then, that at least some preludes can appeal to the pleasures and pains of not-yet-fully-rational Magnesians and thereby fortify their feelings of pleasure and pain and also their bonds with fellow citizens. For discussions of preludes along these lines, see Annas 2010, Annas 2017, and Wilburn 2013. For a dissenting view, see Bobonich 1991.

harmonious through holding compatible beliefs or, more literally, being 'like-minded.' They are instead unified by common feelings of pleasure and pain and, crucially, these feelings arise independently of whatever beliefs and judgments Magnesians may hold. Since *homonoia* would be an infelicitous description of this kind of unity and harmony, its absence may seem less mysterious and indeed justified.

3.2.2 A Contrast with Education in *Republic*

A way of bolstering my defense of the nondeflationary pedagogical solution is by contrasting the *Republic* and *Laws* educational systems. On their surfaces, they possess many undeniable similarities. For instance, both systems make use of musical and gymnastic education for the sake of educating the emotions, especially in children. Further, the kind of musical and gymnastic practices are similarly restricted to only those that are morally salutary. Finally, there are even near verbatim descriptions of the psychological states of citizens who undergo this education. Compare the following two passages:

(**T17**) If pleasure and liking and pain and hatred develop correctly in our souls when we are not yet able to grasp the account, and when we do grasp the account they agree with it because they have been correctly trained by appropriate habits, this agreement is virtue in its entirety.

Laws II.653b3-b6

ἡδονὴ δὴ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἄν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ ὀρθῶς εἰσίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν, αὕτη ᾽σθ᾽ ἡ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετή.

(**T18**) And since [the one properly educated in music and poetry] has the right tastes, he'll praise fine things, be pleased by them, receive them into his soul, and, being nurtured by them, become fine and good. He'll rightly object to what is shameful, hating it while he's still young and unable

to grasp the account, but, having been educated in this way, he will welcome the reason when it comes and recognize it easily because of its kinship with himself.

Rep. III.401e4-402a4

καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαίρων καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ᾽ ἄν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλός τε κἀγαθός, τὰ δ᾽ αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ᾽ ἄν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὤν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ᾽ ἄν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι᾽ οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφείς.

Here we see that education in both *Republic* and *Laws* aims at encouraging citizens to like good things and hate bad things, and that a mark of successful education is when this liking and hating occurs while citizens are still "unable to grasp the account" of why something is pleasant or unpleasant.

Despite all of these similarities, however, I believe that the educational strategies for encouraging this pre-fully-developed-rationality liking and disliking are crucially distinct. Put simply, the *Republic* strategy educates not-fully-rational citizens to hold beliefs that are compatible with a fully reasoned, philosophical account; the *Laws* strategy educates not-fully-rational citizens by directly encouraging them to take pleasure and pain in the appropriate situations without worrying about whatever beliefs these citizens may hold.

To illustrate this claim, I should say a word about how I interpret the educational system of Kallipolis to be fully belief-oriented. Before this, however, it is worth noting that I do not intend to say that the not-fully-rational citizens (e.g. children) in Magnesia are psychologically incapable of undergoing a *Republic*-style education. Rather, the *Laws* educational system simply adopts a different tact for educating these citizens. In other words, the relevant revision between *Republic* and *Laws* here is pedagogical, not necessarily psychological.

As discussed in Chapter 2, education in *Republic* involves instructing citizens to hold compatible beliefs which differ in terms of their veracity and completeness. The education of the

nonphilosophical citizens (i.e. the producers and auxiliaries) is primarily aimed at inculcating the relevant beliefs. For instance, the producers are exposed to the Noble Lie, the effect of which is to convince producers to hold beliefs in shared utility and biconditional happiness with their fellow citizens.[191]

Likewise, the musical and gymnastic education that the auxiliaries receive primarily aims to establish and fortify beliefs they hold about virtue and vice, honor and dishonor. Repeatedly throughout *Rep.* II and III the educational value of poetry and music is couched in terms of the beliefs they impart to the audience. For example, in his criticism of Homer and Hesiod, Socrates claims that the falsity of their poetry harms the young because "the young cannot distinguish what is allegorical from what is not, and the beliefs they acquire at that age are hard to expunge and usually remain unchanged. That may be the reason why it is most important that the first stories they hear should be well told and dispose them to virtue" (*ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅτι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μη, ἀλλ᾽ ἅ ἄν τηλικοῦτος ὢν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις δυσέκνιπτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι: ὧν δὴ ἴσως ἕνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον ἅ πρῶτα ἀκούουσιν ὅτι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν*, *Rep.* II.378d-e). Socrates again appeals to the harmful beliefs citizens acquire when he endorses censoring those who depict the children of god engaging in various evils: "[T]hese tales are harmful to those who hear them, for every man will be ready to excuse his own evil conduct if he believes these things are done" (*πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττουσίν τε καὶ ἔπραττον καὶ*, *Rep* III.391e).[192]

Socrates also determines the other appropriate elements of a musical education—the musical modes and meters—by reference to whether they encourage one to adopt correct and useful beliefs.

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[191] For further discussion, see Chapter 2, Section 3.4.

[192] Also, cf. III.387b and 390a.

His line of reasoning on this issue is as follows. First, Socrates claims that the content of songs do not substantively differ from the content of stories and literature (398d-e). Then Socrates explicitly holds that the "mode and rhythm must fit the words." (*την γε ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ τῷ λόγῳ*, *Rep.* III.398d). This approach leads Socrates to exclude the Lydian modes as well as the instruments apt for that mode of music (e.g. the Lydian pipe or "any many-stringed instrument") and to admit the Dorian and Phrygian modes. Given that Socrates' principle is that musical modes and instruments must accord to the content of the music (which is functionally no different than the content of literary stories), the clear inference is that musical education in *Republic* is belief-oriented: all elements of music are to be accepted or rejected on the basis of whether they are able to help to cultivate and reinforce appropriate beliefs in their hearers, beliefs which are contained in the content of the stories and songs.[193]

A similar rationale cannot be said to apply to Magnesia in any substantive way. First and perhaps most obvious, there is no substantive characterization of the unity and the harmony of the city in terms of shared beliefs or shared conceptualizations about the relevant social and political issues of their shared lives. Second, the similar pedagogical practices (e.g. musical training and gymnastics) between Kallipolis and Magnesia are justified by widely different arguments. Whereas Kallipolis, as just discussed, accepts or rejects educational practices on the basis of whether those practices promote adopting the correct beliefs, Magnesia accepts or rejects these practices on the basis of whether they promote liking the correct pleasures and disliking the correct pains (cf. *Laws* II.659d-e).[194]

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[193] Further evidence of the belief-oriented nature of education can be seen when Socrates famously likens musical and physical education to dying wool. He says that this education allows the auxiliaires to "absorb the laws in the finest possible way, just like a dye, so that their belief about what they should fear and all the rest would become so fast that even such extremely effective detergents as pleasure, pain, fear, and desire wouldn't wash it out—and pleasure is much more potent than any powder, washing soda, or soap" (*Rep.* IV.430a1-b1). See Chapter 2, Section 3.3 for further discussion of this passage.

[194] It is important to note that doctrinal deflationary arguments cannot respond that pleasure is, at bottom, conceptual because, as argued in Section 3.1.1, pleasures in *Laws* are not necessarily conceptual. And even if they were, pleasures are also complex, including both conceptual and nonconceptual elements. This complexity makes it difficult to ascertain which

Third and finally, it is important to note that the specific educational practices that complement or undergird the musical and gymnastic education in Kallipolis are notably absent in *Laws*. The most significant one for our purposes is the Noble Lie. In Kallipolis, the Noble Lie was a crucial feature of civic life because it was the first exposure of the entire citizenry to the two beliefs required for friendship and harmony among the citizenry (belief in shared utility and in biconditional happiness). In Magnesia, there is nothing comparable to the Noble Lie in the sense that Magnesian educators do not deploy falsehoods of any sort to convince citizens to subscribe to policies or ideals that they otherwise may reject (justifiably or not).

Admittedly, at *Laws* II.663d-664b, the Athenian entertains the idea of promulgating a persuasive falsehood, but that discussion remains hypothetical and is actually in service of establishing two related points— (1) that good lawgivers are persuasive and (2) that the Magnesian choral ensembles (not enchanting lies) are the most promising practice to persuade citizens to enact an enduring unanimity together.[195] Indeed, the very fact that the Athenian acknowledges the utility and effectiveness of promulgating a statewide falsehood, but instead chooses to persuade citizens through choral festivals and performances crystallizes the distinction between Kallipolis and Magnesia: Kallipolis persuades citizens to foster harmony by convincing them to hold compatible beliefs about civic life, but Magnesia persuades citizens to foster harmony by exposing them to relevant pleasures and pains and encouraging them to feel pleasure or pain in the right ways through praise and blame, not through compatible beliefs.

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element of pleasure is being targeted in childhood education. But, the numerous comments throughout *Laws* that what's truly important in childhood education is that they feel pleasure and pain at the correct situations, regardless of their beliefs about those situations, seems to make any appeal to pleasure's conceptual dimension unpersuasive and shaky. For further discussion, see Mouracade 2015: 74-79.

[195] von Heyking 2016: 141 is thus wrong to claim that a noble lie is operative in Magnesia. This passage he refers to only entertains the utility of a noble lie, but Magnesia clearly eschews employing a noble lie in favor of choral and musical education. For further discussion, see also Warren 2013: 326.

Recognizing this distinction also allows us to see why another similarity between *Republic* and *Laws* is merely apparent. Consider the following passage:

> (**T19**) [A]nd as far as possible, everyone is altogether unified in what they praise and blame, according to what the take pleasure and pain in. *Laws* V.739c8-d3
>
> *ἐπαινεῖν τ᾽ αὖ καὶ ψέγειν καθ᾽ ἕν ὅτι μάλιστα σύμπαντας ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίροντας καὶ λυπουμένους.*
>
> (**T20**) And to the greatest extent, will our citizens hold in common the same thing, which they will call 'mine.' And as a result of this commonality they will also have a community of pleasure and pain. *Rep.* V.464a4-6
>
> *Οὐκοῦν μάλιστα τοῦ αὐτοῦ κοινωνήσουσιν ἡμιν οἱ πολῖται, ὅ δὴ ἐμὸν ὀνομάσουσιν; τούτου δὲ κοινωνοῦντες οὕτω δὴ λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς μάλιστα κοινωνίαν ἕξουσιν;*

The similarity between these two is that both communities take pleasure and pain at the same objects, and this sharing in pleasure in pain is in each case a result of the education each cohort of citizens receives. But the important distinction in assessing the deflationary-nondeflationary debate in *Laws* lies in the complexity of pleasure. If we admit that pleasure has both conceptual and nonconceptual dimensions, then an educator who seeks to shape citizens hedonic responses has two basic strategies that correspond to each dimension of pleasure.

First, one can seek to educate citizens according to the conceptual dimension of pleasure. This is the strategy of *Republic*. Here the educational emphasis is on instilling the appropriate beliefs in citizens. And, because of these beliefs, citizens will deem whatever situation as either pleasant or painful *on the basis of their compatible yet distinct beliefs*. On this rationale, if I believe sincerely and ardently that my happiness is connected to the prospering of my community, I will find that any situation which I believe to benefit my community a pleasurable one and any situation that harms it to be a painful one.

The second strategy, exemplified in *Laws*, is to educate citizens through the nonconceptual dimension of pleasure. As the Athenian claims in *Laws*, there is something innately pleasurable in the witnessing and performance of order, harmony and rhythm; and citizens are capable of partaking in these kinds of pleasure even if they are unable to recognize the conceptual apparatus that makes these pleasures pleasurable. Accordingly, people take pleasure in situations that exemplify order, harmony, or rhythm (e.g. in choral performances) even if they lack the beliefs that these situations are pleasurable because of what they exemplify.

Both strategies strike me as phenomenologically plausible with respect to pleasure and to education. It's reasonable to imagine that some cases of pleasure involve finding an activity pleasurable because it accords with beliefs we have about goodness, happiness, or pleasure itself. It's also reasonable to imagine that not every pleasure is necessarily the result of some beliefs we have. This fact is epitomized in children. The infant who bobs her head and smiles to music is taking pleasure in the underlying rhythm and melody of song, even if the infant lacks the conceptual apparatus to explain or to recognize why or how what she is feeling is a sincere pleasure. If we accept this fact about pleasure and we accept the characteristically Platonic assumption that pleasures and pains (however they come about) inform the development of our character, then the educational plausibility also follows.[196] For in whatever way a society can encourage its citizens to feel pleasures and pains, then so too can it educate its citizens to regard those pleasures as salutary and those pains as harmful.

4. Revisiting Political Friendship and *Sumphônia* in Magnesia

Plato's use of *sumphônia* in *Laws* supports the thesis that there is a change in the nature of political friendship. In what follows I argue that *sumphônia* does a lot of the load-bearing work that we would have expected *homonoia* to have done if it were present in *Laws*. The general replacement of *homonoia*

[196] See, *inter alia*, *Laws* I.636e and *Laws* II.656a-c.

with *sumphônia* further strengthens the idea of an underlying change in the psychology of political friendship because the connotations of *sumphônia*, unlike *homonoia*, are not essentially epistemic or cognitive. I conclude this chapter by suggesting that this change is a practical and philosophically promising grounding of political friendship.

4.1 The Semantic Stakes of *Sumphônia* versus *Homonoia*

Both *sumphônia* and *homonoia* signify "unity" or "concord" and each term is often used in a political sense. Indeed, in *Republic*, the two terms seem to be almost interchangeable:

> (**T21**) Moderation spreads throughout the whole. It makes the weakest, the strongest, and those in between—whether in regard to reason, physical strength, numbers, wealth or anything else—all sing the same song together. And this unanimity (*ὁμόνοιαν*), this agreement (*συμφωνίαν*) between the naturally worse and the naturally better as to which of the two is to rule both in the city and in each one, is rightly called moderation. *Rep.* IV. 432[197]
>
> *ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ὅλης ἀτεχνῶς τέταται διὰ πασῶν παρεχομένη συνᾴδοντας τούς τε ἀσθενεστάτους ταὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους καὶ τοὺς μέσους, εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσει, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἰσχύι, εἰ δε, καὶ πλήθει ἢ χρήμασιν ἢ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν τοιούτων: ὥστε ὀρθότατ᾽ ἄν φαῖμεν ταύτην τὴν ὁμόνοιαν σωφροσύνην εἶναι, χείρονός τε καὶ ἀμείνονος κατὰ φύσιν συμφωνίαν ὁπότερον δεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ.*

But unlike in *Republic* (and elsewhere in Plato), *sumphônia* in *Laws* is the only term regularly used to describe both the general concord among the citizens and the psychic concord within them. We saw in **T10** for instance both that virtue is the *sumphônia* of *logos* (either one's own or represented through legislation) with feelings of pleasure in pain and that children who accrue the first form of virtue are

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[197] *Sumphônia* seems especially licensed here given the musical metaphor used in this passage. *Sumphônia*, as the obvious etymon of the English 'symphony', rings true in that the Greek term also has a significant musical connotation. I think it is the musical metaphor that establishes the interchangeability between *homonoia* and *sumphônia*, not any general semantics about the terms themselves. For further discussion of the musical flavor and general meaning of *sumphônia*, see Meyer 2015: 135.

said to be in harmony (*sumphônêsôsi*). Another appearance of *sumphônia,* used again as a description of the general concord between citizens, occurs at *Laws* III.689d-690a. In this passage, *sumphônia* is invoked as a precondition to attaining sound judgment (*φρόνησις*). The Athenian even goes so far as to say that "the greatest and most beautiful type of *sumphônia* would be most rightly called the greatest wisdom" (*ἡ καλλίστη καὶ μεγίστη τῶν συμφωνιῶν μεγίστη δικαιόστατ᾽ ἄν λέγοιτο σοφία*) because such *sumphônia* is what allows political life—and the concomitant pursuit of virtue and happiness—to remain stable and functional.

What is especially telling about the use of *sumphônia*, given my previous arguments above, is that while it does signify 'unity' or 'concord,' it is a term that is free from the historical and semantic baggage that *homonoia* bears. Whereas an entire tradition of an ancient Greek political thought—one in which Plato himself actively participated in—uses *homonoia* to denote the sort of concord that arises on the basis of epistemic parity (and the etymology of *homonoia* supports this usage), the use of *sumphônia* in the *Laws* is unencumbered by such traditions and etymology.

Rather, *sumphônia* appears to be the term most apt to describe the kind of political friendship and concord I've argued for above, namely a concord that arises on the basis of shared feelings of pleasure and pain.[198] *Sumphônia* operates as political friendship because it illustrates the citizens' getting along with and demonstrating non-instrumental concerns for other citizens.[199] *Sumphônia* as the operative principle serves as the motivational and agential impetus for all Magnesians to act friendly towards one another. For instance, the strategy behind the choral festivals is that, through their

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[198] von Heyking 2016: 134-135 also notices the connection between *sumphônia* and friendship in *Laws*. But he interprets the *sumphônia* broadly, as one that exists between the rational rule of Nous and nonrational elements of Magnesia. This interpretation seems to me to obfuscate the interesting psychological changes in political friendship because it conflates the external perspective that readers are privy to with the internal, partial perspective of life as a Magnesian citizen. Only the reader's perspective sees clearly and confidently that Magnesia is rationally structured by Nous; some citizens (but not all) are unaware of this fact.

[199]See Bobonich 2002: 424-432 for a discussion of how this kind of other-regarding concern plays out in light of the complex social structures of Magnesia.

exposure to comparable musical performances, the citizens of Magnesia—both the younger ones with their underdeveloped rational capacities and the older ones who are intellectually and emotionally more developed—will forge a common bond. This bond arises from their shared emotional responses to what's either painful, pleasurable, or some combination of these two in the musical performances (even though the younger and older citizens likely find such performances pleasurable or painful for different reasons).[200] This shared emotional catalogue issues in concord because citizens come to form preferences about what's praiseworthy and blameworthy based in large part on how something evokes feelings of pleasure or pain. Since all citizens have, so to speak, perused the same emotional catalogue, they are likely to approve and to disapprove similar things. These similarities among citizens are the seeds of civic friendship and of concord because they both forestall the possibility of factious rivalry and discord from arising among the citizens and foster other-regarding concerns for their fellow citizens.

In sum, as a result of this novel pedagogy, Magnesians enjoy political friendship not because they hold compatible beliefs about political life, but because they share feelings of pleasure and pain about relevant political and social phenomena. One way to track this revision is by noticing the absence of *homonoia* in *Laws* and how *sumphônia* seems to replace *homonoia* as the relevant description of political concord and friendship.

5. The Philosophical Promise of Political Friendship and *Sumphônia*

So far, I have argued that on textual and philosophical grounds there is ample evidence that a shift in the psychology of political friendship in *Laws* has occurred. I now want to argue that this shift is a

[200] On the relationship of emotions with pleasure and pain, see *Laws* I.644c-648a along with discussions by Frede 2010: 113-115, Meyer 2012, and Meyer 2015: 173-177.

good one by claiming that political friendship rooted in shared feelings of pleasure and pain is both a phenomenologically cogent and philosophically plausible account of how friendship arises.[201]

When we reflect on how friendships come about, intuitively more seems to be required than epistemological alignment. Granted that the *homonoia* tradition of political friendship may not neglect other aspects of friendship, its emphasis on like-mindedness nevertheless risks either obscuring those aspects or relegating them to ancilla. Political friendship in the *Laws* offers a wholesome corrective to this oversight. Often what's initially required of friendship is a vulnerability and a corresponding emotional openness (as opposed to agreement in beliefs) and, then hopefully later, an emotional harmony (i.e. a *sumphônia*). Even on a political register, we make friends in part by expressing how situations and experiences affect us, by claiming how some political action pains us or pleases us. The *Laws* account of political friendship pays due respect to how this sort of emotional consonance serves as a pillar upon which friendships can both originate and be sustained.

The *Laws*' account also offers a philosophically compelling account of the psychology of friendship. The *homonoia* tradition takes this psychology to be primarily epistemological, i.e. to consist essentially of parity of beliefs or shared knowledge. Some recent trends in epistemology, however, show that there are other relevant factors to include besides one's formulation of belief or knowledge claims (I have in mind here notions of 'situated knowledges' as well as both feminist and Marxist theories of standpoint epistemology).[202] In a sense, the *Laws* account of political friendship as I've

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[201] For further discussion of the practicality of Magnesian friendship, especially with respect to the discussion of *philia* in *Laws* III, see Murgier 2018.

[202] Haraway 1988: 590, for instance, seems to capture something at least partially true about life in Magnesia as well: "We seek those ruled by partial sight and limited voice—not partiality for its own sake but, rather, for the sake of the connections and unexpected openings situated knowledges make possible. Situated knowledge are about communities, not about isolated individuals. The only way to find a larger vision is to be somewhere in particular." Most Magnesians, even though growing up in the same community and under the same laws, hold only partial views of, for example, the tragedies and choral festivals they attend. A central reason for the various partialities is due to their widely different ages which correspond to different educational levels and psychological capacities. Yet, each Magnesian bears an emotional response (i.e. a painful or pleasurable response) to what he or she experiences. Each of these emotional experiences is understood to be valid and legitimate, irrespective of the underlying beliefs that ground these responses or of the clarity and precision with which these emotions are expressed. This kind of epistemological position may not be entirely new in

presented it anticipates some but surely not all of these insights.[203] The emphasis on emotional aptitude and maturity—especially in contrast to the *Republic*'s emphasis on shared belief among citizens, where different citizens will hold the same belief with different justifications—as a tenable (and primarily non-rational) expression of one's understanding seems complementary to certain movements within standpoint epistemology. This emphasis also functions as a claim that what's crucial to political friendship is not *per se* citizens' abilities to formulate coherent and compatible propositions about justice and politics. Rather, the truly innovative approach of the *Laws* redirects our attention, and rightly so, to the possibility of emotional harmony and consonance—in general, a symphony with fellow citizens—as a viable foundation for concord and political friendship.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that Plato's *Laws* implements a new psychology of political friendship, which best explains the absence of *homonoia* in *Laws*. I have done so by defending the theory that the pedagogy of *Laws* focuses on cultivating different psychological components requisite for friendship. I have also suggested that a solution based on psychological changes in *Laws* is a plausible and complementary approach, but there are serious objections that it must first overcome. My argument has opposed the dominant approaches to political friendship and *homonoia* in *Laws*, which I've described as deflationary. The analyses of virtue, of pleasure and pain, of the drama, and of the general philosophy of *Laws* have

antiquity (though *Laws* is the first to link it to political friendship explicitly). It has been persuasively argued that Elsa Morante's *La Serata a Colono*, a rewriting of Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* and found in her 1968 *Il mondo salvato dai ragazzini*, portrays Antigone in such a way that Antigone's knowledge and understanding challenges non-emotional, excessively rational accounts of knowledge. In addition to Morante, see the lucid analysis of Di Rosa 2018: 29 who argues in Morante's rendition that "behind Antigone's apparent idiocy lies a form of knowledge that is able to grasp truths about reality which primarily rationalistic forms of knowledge are unable to comprehend."

[203] The main difference, I think, is that Plato would be hesitant to label such standpoints as "knowledge." I think Plato still remains largely an intellectualist about virtue (though this is attenuated in the *Laws* in that the weaker forms of virtue need not be intellectual) and a rationalist about knowledge. But what Plato of *Laws* shares in common with standpoint theorists is that they all recognize the legitimacy and validity of primarily nonrational and emotional attitudes. Magnesians who feel pleasure and pain in an appropriate way can be understood to be virtuous, irrespective of their cognitive attitudes and conceptual abilities.

shown that the grounds on which these deflationary approaches rest are shaky at best. These analyses have also been in service of outlining more clearly what this new psychology of political friendship entails: we are political friends, according to the *Laws* model, when we feel pleasure and pain in unison at the relevant social and political phenomena. Lastly, I have remarked that this revision is interesting on account of its novelty within Platonic philosophy specifically and antiquity generally as well as on account of its phenomenological cogency and philosophical promise.

At this point, I have argued for three distinct models of political friendship. The Socratic model and *Republic* model develop accounts of political friendship that rely on nurturing citizen's epistemological capabilities. Evidence of this reliance is visible from the fact that both models associate political friendship with *homonoia*. In the Socratic model, political friendship includes shared knowledge between all citizens as a necessary and central feature. In the *Republic* model, political friendship is relaxed; veridical friendship exists when some citizens (the philosopher rulers) have knowledge while others (the auxiliaries and producers) have only true beliefs. The third model of political friendship represents Plato's adventurous departure from the *homonoia* heavy approach. In *Laws*, the absence of *homonoia* and the routine usage of *sumphônia* instead signals this departure. Instead of depending on epistemological compatibility to anchor citizens' friendships, the educational system of Magnesia shows a practical way to ground political friendships among citizens on the basis of shared feelings of pleasure and pain. All of these models make use of the psychology of political friendship as an explanatory strategy but each parses the particular psychological requirements differently. In my final chapter, I highlight a theme common to all of these models: the important roles that friendship can and should play in Platonic politics.

Chapter 4: Friendship and Politics in the *Seventh Letter*

INTRODUCTION

There is much talk of friendship (*φιλία*) and its various cognates in the *Seventh Letter*.[204] The letter is addressed to the companions and comrades (*οἰκείοις τε καὶ ἑταίροις*) of Dion. Plato and Dion counsel Dionysius II to cultivate virtue-based friendships (332d). A distinction between two forms of friendship is given at 333e. The so-called philosophical digression is prefaced with a test aimed to determine whether Dionysius II has the proper *philia* for *sophia* (340b-341a). And finally, there are several friendships depicted in the drama of the letter, including those of Plato and Dion, Plato and Archytas, Plato and Archedemus, as well as Dionysius II and several of the Tarentines.[205] In this chapter, I explore these different uses of friendship and explain the way in which for Plato friendship is essential to political success.

Scholars have paid relatively scant attention to the philosophical and political import of friendship in the *Seventh Letter*, preferring instead to debate either the letter's authenticity or the digression.[206] Some commentators, however, have noted *en passant* that friendship has some prominence in the *Seventh Letter*.[207] Yet, as far as I am aware, however, no Anglophone study exists (aside from my 2019 article) that focuses on the extensive role of friendship in the *Seventh Letter*. Among these commentators, Lewis 2000a and 2000b give the most extensive treatment of friendship.

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[204] A shorter version of this chapter has been published as "Friendship and Politics in the *Seventh Letter*," 201-214 in Ralkowski and Reid 2019. See Leyh 2019 for further bibliographic information.

[205] For discussion of the last three relationships, see Lloyd 1990, who is especially critical of the philosophical aptitude of Archytas as presented in the letter.

[206] I am undecided about whether the letter is authentic. If it is authentic, then that's great for my project. If it is apocryphal, then I still hold there is value in the letter: even if it's not Plato's word, we can learn about how friendship and politics intertwine from a generally and undoubtedly Platonic perspective. For further discussion of the letter's authenticity, see Burnyeat and Frede 2015. For criticism of their arguments from doctrine against authenticity, see Hull 2019 who holds the *Seventh Letter* is compatible with the political structure of Magnesia in *Laws*.

[207] See Morrow (1962): 228 n.31; De Blois (1979): 268-276; Lewis (2000a): 28-31 and Lewis (2000b): 241-243.

However, he focuses mainly on the rhetorical dimension of the letter—i.e. that the letter is addressed to the 'friends and followers of Dion.' Unfortunately, this focus leads Lewis to gloss over the explicit advice offered to Dionysius II as insubstantial outside of the context of the letter's addressees. One goal of this essay is to show that this is not necessarily the case and that the *Seventh Letter* actually encourages larger reflections on the general relationship between friendship, philosophy, and politics in Platonic thought.

So contrary to this general scholarly tendency, I argue that friendship plays a crucial role in the letter. This is clear first in the political advice offered to Dionysius II, and also indirectly, in the dramatic entanglements of Plato's friendships (especially to Dion and the Tarentines). The descriptions of Plato's friendships, in fact, help to explore in greater depth the complexities and challenges of putting his political advice to Dionysius II into practice.

My argument proceeds in several steps. First, I show that the analysis of two forms of friendship at 333e provides us with a relevant framework of friendship for politics. Second, I argue that this framework is consistent with Plato's comments on friendship and politics throughout other dialogues. Third, I argue that Plato advises Dionysius II to cultivate friendships because, on the one hand, such friendships ensure the longevity of his rule, and on the other, they enable him to recognize the goods at which the Syracusan polity ought to aim. Fourth, I offer a reading of the drama of the *Seventh Letter*, where I suggest that Plato's various friendships involve him in political activities that he otherwise should have avoided. At first sight, these friendships create a tension between how Plato himself behaved in Syracuse and how he advises Dionysius II. I conclude, however, that this tension is resolvable. Plato's behavior intimates that any political principles and advice ought to be flexible enough to accord with the nuances of any specific political situation.

1. Towards an Understanding of Friendship

Although *φιλία* or closely related terms (e.g. *οἰκεῖος*, *ἑταῖρος*, *ἀδελφός*, *σύμφωνος*, and *συγγεγονότος*) appear several times, no formal definition of what proper friendship consists of is ever given throughout the letter.[208] In one sense, this is unsurprising: a substantive meditation on friendship might seem inapposite in a letter proposing to counsel Dion's companions about the pressing politics of Syracuse. We can, however, unearth a working understanding of what authentic friendship entails by consideration of some dramatic moments in the letter. More specifically, the following passages present a working distinction between two general kinds of friendship, which I'll call 'weak friendships' and 'strong friendships.'

Generally, I understand friendship in all of its forms to involve at minimum a kind of reciprocated, other-regarding concern for the friend's welfare.[209] Other-regarding concern need not be taken to exclude possible self-interested or even selfish motives for friendship. When a sycophant befriends a ruler, the sycophant cares about the ruler's actions insofar as the ruler must act in a way to preserve his or her ability to confer benefits and luxuries upon the sycophant. As such, the sycophant demonstrates to some extent a concern for the ruler *qua* ruler, even though the origin of this concern likely comes from the sycophant's crude self-interest. If the ruler loses power and is thus no longer able to provide benefits, the sycophant's friendship with the ruler will likely dissolve. This dissolution does not mean that the sycophant and ruler were not friends; it only means that the kind of friendship they enjoyed was weak.

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[208] An alternative route here would be to attempt to include considerations of friendship found elsewhere in Plato (e.g. in *Lysis*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, and some of the more overtly political dialogues like *Republic*, *Gorgias*, and *Laws*) to understand friendship in the *Seventh Letter*. I think this method risks distorting some of the more interesting dramatic moments of the letter by forcing those moments to fit into a procrustean mold developed by reliance on elsewhere in Plato. And ultimately, such a method is unnecessary because a functional, though perhaps imprecise, understanding of friendship can be excavated from the letter (as I hope to show in this section).

[209] See section 3 for how this idea about friendship is consonant with many of Plato's dialogues.

In the *Seventh* Letter, the origin and strength of this other-regarding concern are the most prominent factors in classifying any friendship as either weak or strong. 'Weak friendship' is the most common type and is described by Plato as a "facile comradeship" (*τῆς περιτρεχούσης ἑταιρίας*) and a "vulgar friendship" (*βαναύσου φιλότητος*) (333e1; 334b4).[210] This relationship often arises from shared customs, rituals, and other kinds of initiation (333e). It is a 'weak' friendship in the sense that whatever other-regarding concern that exists among friends is likely to evaporate at the first sight of difficulty or temptation. In other words, weak friendship is weak because the other-regarding concern characteristic of that friendship is less likely to endure amidst hardships.

One clear example of weak friendship is Dion's friendship to two unnamed Athenians. During his exile from Syracuse, Dion befriended two Athenians, who by virtue of their friendship aided and accompanied Dion in returning to Syracuse (333e-334a). Upon Dion's return, however, these Athenians immediately wavered in their opinion of Dion and eventually sided with the Syracusans who accused Dion of treachery and plotting tyranny. The fact that these unnamed Athenians abandoned Dion upon their arrival shows that, even if at one point they possessed some kind of concern for Dion (we have no reason to believe anything to the contrary), their concern for Dion and Dion's goals quickly dissolved once they realized that association with an alleged conniving tyrant and malfeasant may put their own livelihoods in jeopardy.

Plato offers his relationship with Dion as a case of what I call a 'strong friendship.' Plato says that their friendship arose from a "common liberal education" (*ἐλευθέρας παιδείας κοινωνίαν*) and was a more stable and reliable kind of friendship (334b-c). Earlier in the letter, Plato also tells us that he detected in Dion an unprecedented aptitude and zeal for learning. Presumably, then, Plato and Dion's shared love of philosophy at least in part comprises the 'common liberal education' that serves

[210] All translations of Plato are from Plato (1997) with some modification. Greek text for Plato's *Letters* is based on Moore-Blunt (1985). Greek text for Plato's other writings is based on Burnet (1900-1907). I have also benefited from consulting Radding's translation in Ralkowski and Reid 2019.

as the basis of their friendship. In contrast to weak friendship, Plato suggests that the strength of his bond to Dion (aside from exculpating Athens from the embarrassment of the Athenians who betrayed Dion) ensured that Plato would go to extraordinary lengths to help his friend, including enduring several long travels to and from Sicily and placing himself directly under the purview of a volatile and impetuous tyrant.[211]

The principal aspect of this kind of friendship that contrasts with 'weak friendship' is its durability. Plato easily could have declined Dion's initial offer or refused to return to Syracuse upon experiencing the behavior of Dionysius II. Instead, Plato, out of his friendship to Dion (and his passion for philosophy), chose to return to Syracuse and remained steadfast in his support of Dion, despite the calumnies spreading throughout Syracuse about Dion.

The distinction between weak and strong friendships allows us to see that the most relevant characteristic of friendship for politics is friendship's durability. One reason strong friendships are more valuable is because they preserve the stability of the polis. One strategy to cultivate strong friendships is to engender a shared love of philosophy between friends because a genuine, cooperative philosophical relationship tends to remain unperturbed by capricious desires that often frustrate weaker friendships.

2. Friendship and Politics in the *Seventh Letter* and Elsewhere in Plato

I have so far resisted the temptation to import Platonic themes—either themes about love and friendship from dialogues like *Lysis*, *Symposium,* and *Phaedrus* or themes about politics from dialogues like *Alcibiades I*, *Cleitophon*, *Republic*, *Statesman*, and *Laws*. My main reasons for doing so is to let, as far as possible, the *Seventh Letter* speak for itself and to not prejudice what the letter actually says.

[211] Heather Reid has helpfully called my attention to the friendship of Damon and Phintias as recounted in Iamblichus' *Vita Pythagorae* XXXIII. Their friendship, especially in contrast with the overt jealousy of Dionysius displayed there as well, strikes me as another example of the endurance and longevity of strong friendship.

Nevertheless, if I want to claim that the account in *Seventh Letter* is Platonic in spirit if not in letter, I should at least explain how I view the *Seventh Letter*'s message as consistent with some of the Platonic dialogues mentioned above.

Plato's views on friendship—to the extent they can be discerned at all—are diffuse throughout his corpus. His most explicit treatments of friendship are in *Lysis*—which is aporetic—and *Phaedrus*. Plato, of course, also speaks frequently about friendship in political contexts in, for example, *Republic* and *Laws*. I have argued already, however, that those political contexts should not be criticized for lacking full-blooded descriptions of friendship.[212] What's important in political treatments of friendship, for Plato, is identifying the necessary conditions for citizens to enjoy friendship with one another. Since Plato, like much of the tradition of antiquity, is interested in the psychology of friendship, these necessary conditions tend to be psychological ones—e.g. friendship consists of shared, necessary epistemic or emotional attitudes and proper motivations. The *Seventh Letter*, aside from recommending Dionysius II to pursue an education in philosophy and to transform his soul (cf. 343e-344a), remains silent about the psychological conditions necessary for friendship. Instead, the letter focuses more on the relevant effects—i.e. stability and durability—of the practice of friendship (viz. §2). So, on my view, there is no conflict in the accounts of friendship in the political dialogues and the *Seventh Letter* because they approach the study of friendship from distinct but complementary avenues.

In the more explicitly, friendship-oriented Platonic dialogues we also see Plato's interest in the underlying psychological motivations behind friendship. (I will only focus on one such friendship-oriented dialogue, because an exhaustive account would be lengthy and unnecessary.) In *Phaedrus*, Lysias and Socrates both speak frequently of friendship as a benefit of proper association with (in

[212] See Chapter 1, Section 4.1-4.2 and Chapter 2, Section 2.

Lysias' odd case) nonlovers or (in Socrates' case) lovers (*Phd.* 233d, 253c). The nature of friendship throughout *Phaedrus* is explained in terms of the underlying motivations. Following Sheffield 2011: 258-262, there is a threefold account of friendships in *Phaedrus*: friendships of pleasure, friendships of honor or "exchanges of pledges," and friendships based on the recognition of good character. Two important elements of how these friendships are prioritized is in terms of their stability and their other-regarding concern.[213] Obviously, this is the same element in friendship that I've argued in the previous section that the *Seventh Letter* stresses. But like the comparison to the more political dialogues, the letter lacks the more robust psychology underpinning friendship that *Phaedrus* contains.[214] But, this lack also allows us to see that there is nothing *prima facie* incongruous between friendship in *Seventh Letter* and friendship in the more explicitly friendship-oriented dialogues.

The final point I want to make about the *Seventh Letter*'s consistency with other Platonic texts concerns political philosophy. There is an unfortunate and mistaken assumption in much scholarship that Plato's aim in Syracuse was to instill the philosopher rulers of *Republic*.[215] This assumption lacks textual support and is based on uncharitable readings of both *Republic* and *Seventh Letter*. The positive political doctrines Plato espouses in *Seventh Letter* are general enough that there is no reason they

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[213] Cf. Sheffield 2011: 258-261 who argues, rightly, that pleasure friendships are on average the most short-lived and philosophical friendships are the most durable. For allusions to other-regarding concern in all friendships, see *Phaedrus* 255e-b, 256e-257a, and *Laws* VIII.837a-d. See also Sheffield 2011: 259-262 and Sheffield 2020: 344-346.

[214] I am reticent to agree with Sheffield 2011: 261's claim that in only philosophical friendships is there "the motivational structure that provides a unified and consistent framework for enduring concern over time. Compare the fleeting nature of physical pleasure (232e6), which issues in an untrustworthy partnership (241a) where the lover, once sated, gains control of himself and is 'compelled to default' (241b4) on his side of the exchange. Or the honour-lovers who fluctuate between concern for the good of the other and treating him as an object of sexual attention." It's unclear to me whether Sheffield thinks that (a) only philosophical friendship have enduring concern *and* that this concern is long-lasting or (b) that all types of friendships involve enduring, other-regarding concern but they differ only on the basis of their relative endurance or lack thereof. My suspicion is that Sheffield comes closer to (a). And, if so, I think this misses out on the fact that, even if motivated by pleasure or honor, friends can still exhibit authentic, other-regarding concern precisely on the basis of these motivations. And recognizing this would still leave unaffected Sheffield's ranking of the three types of friendship because what's truly necessary for that ranking is that, *ceteris paribus*, pleasure and honor are not constitutive features of who our friends are in a way that the 'sharing of thought' (256b) characteristic of philosophical friendships may be.

[215] Most recently, Sieben 2019: 239-241 subscribes to this view with little justification. See also Frede in Burnyeat and Frede 2015: 48, 51 and 75.

should be supposed to imply necessarily the *Republic*'s picture of political life (cf. 328b-c, 331c-d, 334c).[216] For instance, Plato's comments about uniting philosophy and politics at 328b-c cannot count as dispositive evidence that Plato wished to enact Kallipolis without begging the question about what is meant by both philosophy and politics. Further, the philosopher rulers only make sense in the context of the highly structured and intricate city of Kallipolis, complete with educated producers and auxiliaries, the proscription of private property, and the abolition of the family among the guardian classes. None of these other necessary details are mentioned in the letter.[217]

But even if we allow that the *Seventh Letter* is not the attempt to bring about Kallipolis, we can still recognize general consonance between Platonic political philosophy and the *Letter*.[218] The *Letter* emphasizes the importance of the rule of laws (334c), the analogy between the virtues of a city and a soul (326a), the consonance of philosophy and politics (335d), all of which are themes in *Republic*, *Laws*, and elsewhere. Further, as the proceeding sections will show, the *Letter*'s thoughts about the role of friendship in politics strikes notes concordant with the views of *Republic*, *Laws*, and *Statesman* on this matter. So, in sum, I think the *Seventh Letter* can be read as consistent with Platonic discussions of friendship—both by itself and as a political phenomenon—and politics. I will now turn to a more in-depth discussion of how and why friendship matters for politics according to the *Seventh Letter*.

3. The Political Import of Friendship

The operative distinction in *Seventh Letter* between weak and strong friendships gains more weight as we consider the actual advice that Plato and Dion offer to Dionysius II (in **T1**-**T3** below). Plato's

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[216] Gonzalez 2019: 267-276 and Isnardi Parenti 2002 are both extremely edifying about this issue.

[217] See also Foucault 2008: 251-253 and Isnardi Parenti 2002: 220-222 for further arguments against supposing Plato wished to bring Kallipolis to Syracuse. Finally, Hull 2019's argument that *Seventh Letter* is doctrinally consistent (at least partially) with *Laws* also seems to count as evidence against Plato's putative wish to enact Kallipolis, since the political projects of *Laws* and *Republic* are notoriously distinct. If the *Seventh Letter* is capacious enough to accommodate both projects, then it should not be interpreted to be concerned with just one.

[218] See Lewis 2000b for a more thorough investigation of this topic.

point is that friendship is crucial for political success. Not just any kind of friendship, however, suffices for doing the job of politics well. Although weak friendships are able to provide a certain level of stability (especially in comparison to a ruler with zero friendships), only strong friendships make a true difference in the long-term stability and health of political relations. That is, as we will see at the end of this section, even though there are alternative methods of providing stability, only strong friendships are able to nurture the right kind of philosophical dispositions that conduce to the good life in the polis.

Being a tyrant, Dionysius II is in a particularly vulnerable position: he's liable to be swarmed by sycophants and toadies who, instead of looking out for what's best for him and his goals, will placate his baser desires and distract him from ruling well.[219] Whoever wishes to reform a political society, including a Syracusan tyranny, ought to observe the import of this distinction among types of friendship because a ruler's cultivation of one type in lieu of another may make the difference between a polity that aims at its citizens' welfare and one that aims at satisfying the indiscriminate and whimsical desires of its leader.

Indeed, throughout **T1**-**T3** Plato suggests that whether Dionysius II develops meaningful friendships both with himself and with others is of decisive importance. First, he indicates that fostering these kinds of strong friendships is instrumental to maintaining political stability and avoiding political turmoil (cf. 332e-333a):[220]

> **(T1)** I would advise you all [the comrades of Dion] then in this way, as Dion and I advised Dionysius. First, we advised that he live each day so as to habituate himself to be as empowered as possible and so as to acquire both trustworthy friends and companions. In acting this way,

[219] In fact, *Republic* 567a-568a and 575e-576a as well as *Gorgias* 510b-e present arguments that the tyrant can never cultivate genuine, trustworthy friendships in large part because of this precise vulnerability.

[220] De Blois (1979): 276 and Lewis (2000a): 29 each recognize this instrumental line of thought.

he would avoid the very things his father suffered: when he captured many great cities in Sicily that had been pillaged by barbarians, he was not able to resettle the cities with loyal governments because he lacked trustworthy companions. 331d5-332a1

Κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐγὼ ὑμῖν τ᾽ ἂν ξυμβουλεύοιμι, ξυνεβούλευον δὲ καὶ Διονυσίῳ μετὰ Δίωνος, ζῇν μέντοι τὸ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν πρῶτον, ὅπως ἐγκρατὴς αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἔσεσθαι μέλλοι καὶ πιστοὺς φίλους τε καὶ ἑταίρους κτήσεσθαι, ὅπως μὴ πάθοι ἅπερ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ὃς παραλαβὼν Σικελίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας πόλεις ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐκπεπορθημένας, οὐχ οἵός τ᾽ ἦν κατοικίσας πολιτείας ἐν ἑκάσταις καταστήσασθαι πιστὰς ἑταίρων ἀνδρῶν.

The case of Dionysius I, Dionysius II's father and predecessor, illustrates the instrumental reason. No matter how deft and powerful a ruler, the lack of faithful companions in whom you can confide and entrust the management of your empire always portends political turmoil. A similar claim is made in the following lines:

(T2) Even though Dionysius I brought together all of Sicily into one city (knowing he could trust no one), he barely kept it all together. For he was poor in trustworthy friends, whose presence or absence is the greater sign of one's virtue or vice. 332c3-6

Διονύσιος δὲ εἰς μίαν πόλιν ἀθροίσας πᾶσαν Σικελίαν ὑπὸ σοφίας πιστεύων οὐδενὶ μόγις ἐσώθη· πένης γὰρ ἦν ἀνδρῶν φίλων καὶ πιστῶν, οὗ μεῖζον σημεῖον εἰς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδέν, τοῦ ἔρημον ἢ μὴ τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι.

So, if Dionysius II fails to find reliable companions, then his time as a ruler will be short-lived simply because the logistics of ruling exceeds the capabilities of any one person. Consider one more passage:

(T3) Dion and I thus advised the following things to Dionysius II, since on account of his father it happened that he was both uneducated and not used to appropriate relationships. First of all, we instructed him to desire to acquire from among his relatives and peers other

> friends and companions in virtue, but especially to become a friend to himself, since in this regard he was amazingly in need. 332c8-d6
>
> *Ἃ δὴ καὶ Διονυσίῳ ξυνεβουλεύομεν ἐγὼ καὶ Δίων ἐπειδὴ τὰ παρὰ πατρὸς αὐτῷ ξυνεβεβήκει οὕτως ἀνομιλήτῳ μὲν παιδείας, ἀνομιλήτῳ δὲ συνουσιῶν τῶν προσηκουσῶν γεγονέναι, πρῶτον ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὁρμήσαντα φίλους ἄλλους αὑτῷ τῶν οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ ἡλικιωτῶν καὶ συμφώνους πρὸς ἀρετὴν κτήσασθαι, μάλιστα δ' αὐτὸν αὑτῷ, τούτου γὰρ αὐτὸν θαυμαστῶς ἐνδεᾶ γεγονέναι*

T3 emphasizes that Dionysius II must cultivate not just any kind of friendship, but he must find "companions in virtue" (*συμφώνους πρὸς ἀρετὴν*). The friendships appropriate to Dionysius II, while politically useful, are fundamentally philosophical (insofar as the pursuit of virtue requires a philosophical disposition). Why, we might wonder, is a philosophical friendship necessary for a ruler? It certainly cannot be because only philosophical friends are loyal ones. Cruelty, bribery, fear and other nearly innumerable methods can equally generate a reliable enough loyalty independent of friendship. Machiavelli expounds and evaluates this method in *Il Principe:*

> **(T4)** From this, a dispute arises about whether it is better [for a prince] to be loved than feared or vice versa. The proper response is that one would want to be the one and the other; but because it is difficult to hold them together, it is much more reliable to be feared than loved.[221]
>
> (*Il Principe* XVII)
>
> *Nasce da questo una disputa, s'elli è meglio essere amato che temuto o econverso. Respondesi che si vorrebbe essere l'uno e l'altro; ma perché elli è difficile accozzarli insieme, è molto piú sicuro essere temuto che amato.*

An effective prince, Machiavelli notes, has a variety of stratagems at his disposal, only one of which is the cultivation of loving relationships (including friendships) with other citizens. The main concern about friendship for Machiavelli is that being a beloved ruler carries with it a litany of other potential

[221] All translations of the Italian are mine and are from Machiavelli (2006).

problems, since friendships can quickly dissipate and we are more prone to betray those we love than those we fear, presumably because we expect loved ones to forgive us eventually (cf. *Il Principe* XVII). As such, Machiavelli appears reticent to endorse friendship as even a tenable means of fostering political constancy and loyalty, let alone as a primary one which the *Seventh Letter* in effect does.

The main reason this Machiavellian line is inapplicable to the *Seventh Letter* is due to what Plato tells us repeatedly though somewhat obliquely throughout the text: philosophical friendships are essential because they are a necessary and constitutive feature of realizing the ruler's ultimate aim, the promotion of the citizens' welfare and happiness (viz. 326a-b; 327c-d; 332d-e; 335d-e and 351c-d).[222] The (enthymematic) argument for why philosophy is necessary to achieve this task runs roughly along the following lines:[223]

(1) To govern a polity well, one must promote the citizenry's happiness.

(2) To promote the citizenry's happiness, one must understand what's good for the citizenry generally.

(3) To understand what's good for the citizenry, one must understand what a human being is and what's conducive to human flourishing.

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[222] Machiavelli develops this very contrast with the aims of ancient politics in both *Il Principe* and *I Discorsi*. In Chapter XV of the former work, Machiavelli clearly condemns the aims of ancient political organizations—both theoretical and actual ones—as ineffectual and useless. In an obvious and seditious reference to Plato, Machiavelli tells us that rulers should not focus on making citizens happy: "And many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen nor known to exist actually; since how one lives is so distant from how one should live that he who leaves alone what one does for what one should do, learns his ruin rather than his preservation. For someone who wants to always make declarations of goodness contrives his demise among so many that are not good" (perché elli è tanto discosto da come si vive a come si doverrebbe vivere, che colui che lascia quello che si fa per quello che si doverrebbe fare, impara più tosto la ruina che la preservazione sua: perché uno uomo che voglia fare in tutte le parte professione di buono, conviene rovini infra tanti che non sono buoni) (*Il Principe* XV).

[223] I think this argument is to some extent actually recurrent throughout Plato's explicitly political works. *Gorgias*, *Statesman*, *Republic*, and *Laws* each parse premise(s) of this argument differently which thereby leads to different understandings of how politics should work and what happiness may consist in. At bottom though is a general consensus that politics should encourage human flourishing and competent rulers should have some awareness of what constitutes such flourishing. But a more in-depth discussion of this seems to me too far afield of my principal topic here.

(4) The attempt to know what a human being is and what encourages its flourishing is an essentially philosophical endeavor.

(5) Thus, to be a good ruler one must in some sense be a philosopher.

This argument thus developed only shows, however, that Dionysius II ought to practice philosophy ardently and seriously. It does not yet show how friendship enters into it. My view is that friendship is essential because it is necessary for practicing philosophy properly. In the *Seventh Letter*, Plato describes philosophy as fundamentally interpersonal and dialogic. Concretely, philosophy requires dialogue and discussion with others interested in philosophical topics who can encourage, challenge and develop our beliefs and insights. We find this thought captured in the perhaps most famous line of the letter:

> (**T5**) For this [philosophical] knowledge cannot be put into words like other sciences; but after *long-continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the subject*, suddenly, like light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born in the soul and straightaway nourishes itself.[224]
>
> (341c-d, my emphasis; cf. 330a-b)
>
> *ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶν ὡς ἄλλα μαθήματα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας γιγνομένης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ συζῆν ἐξαίφνης, οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδήσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἤδη τρέφει*

There are two lessons we can draw from this. First, philosophy cannot be an isolationist endeavor. When Plato and Dion recommend Dionysius II to practice philosophy, they intend for him to express his beliefs seriously, be receptive to criticism of those ideas from adroit interlocutors, and attempt to live his life according to those beliefs forged through philosophy. (They thus obviously do not mean

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[224] This is the Morrow translation, which might be an overtranslation but is nonetheless illustrative of the point I am making. The relevant Greek here—*ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας γιγνομένης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ συζῆν*—is ambiguous. It's not certain whether there are many associations with *τὸ πρᾶγμα* itself or many associations *with others* about *τὸ πρᾶγμα*. I think the latter makes more sense according to the general context of the letter. For further discussion, see Hyland 2008: 104.

Dionysius II needs to go traipsing about the Sicilian countryside entertaining solely by himself whatever abstract, inchoate thoughts strike his fancy.) The recommendation to Dionysius II to practice philosophy is necessarily a recommendation to work cooperatively with others in thinking carefully and critically about what's real, true, and good. It is only when he does the latter can he come to recognize the best and proper way to rule the Syracusan polity.

The second lesson is that philosophy, when practiced well, nurtures a kind of friendship with one's interlocutors. Anyone engaged in the sincere practice of philosophy—especially when philosophy is understood as inherently dialogic and interpersonal—develops care for his or her interlocutors. This care arises in part from the recognition that the quality of our interlocutors bears directly on the quality of our practice of philosophy. When intelligent, focused, and concerned people discuss some philosophical topic with us, we see that their insights actually contribute to the refinement and enhancement of our own thoughts. We likewise hopefully provide helpful insights to those interlocutors. The repeated attempts to improve what we and our interlocutors think (and how to live according to those thoughts) contain the seeds for strong friendships—i.e. for relationships rooted in reciprocated and enduring other-regarding concern—to blossom.

A converse of this second lesson is likewise noteworthy (and is exemplified also at *Meno* 75c-d).[225] Whoever engages in philosophy for ulterior motives—e.g. to make a grandiose display of one's erudition, to attempt to garner a reputation for being really smart, or simply to engage in a bit of verbal combat—*de facto* treats his or her interlocutors in a way that inhibits the more authentic loving of wisdom. Such a person treats these interlocutors not as equal partners who are necessary for philosophizing well, but as instruments through which to attain whatever ulterior goal that philosophy may bring about (e.g. honor or fame).

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[225] See Chapter 1, Section 3.3. for discussion of the *Meno* passage.

This kind of behavior stifles philosophy because it stifles a necessary element of practicing philosophy well: earnest and fruitful dialogue with others. Friends engage in discussion not simply to refute one another, but to discuss earnestly and in a way that both participants in the conversation can come to assess and evaluate whatever topic or argument is being put forth. Whatever partial or total refutation ensues from friendly discussion is never the ultimate aim, but rather a necessary and educative step in the attempt to practice philosophy well. The *Seventh Letter*'s emphasis on the joint pursuit of the subject between teacher and pupil seems to allude to this dimension of friendly discussion as well.

Has Dionysius II understood these lessons? Despite his apparent intellectual abilities (cf. 328a; 338b-c; 339b-e), he conspicuously fails to take up the advice of Plato and Dion to cultivate the appropriate friendships. This failure becomes manifest in at least two ways. First, Dionysius II fails to philosophize well; he fails to enact, in other words, a proper *philia* for *sophia*. Upon hearing of Dionysius II's renewed desire for philosophy, Plato devises a test to determine if Dionysius II's desire is genuine (340b).[226] Plato explains to Dionysius II the great labor and toil inherent in practicing philosophy well. If Dionysius II acknowledges such labor and proceeds to exert himself continuously in philosophic studies, then his soul is a genuinely philosophical one and he is a "true lover of wisdom" (ὄντως φιλόσοφος) (340c2). Dionysius II, however, recoils upon hearing the rigor of the philosophical life and claims to already understand philosophy sufficiently well (341a-b). Dionysius II's posture shows that his love of wisdom is rooted in something other than the desire to acquire wisdom and rule well. This is further borne out by the tyrant's odd behavior of publishing and disseminating his discussions with Plato as solely his own thoughts (341b; 344e-345d); Plato speculatively attributes this

[226] For further discussion, see Forcignanò 2019.

behavior to Dionysius II's shameful love of honor (*φιλοτιμίας αἰσχρᾶς*) or desire for fame (*ἀγαπῶν δόξαν*) (344e3-345a1; cf. 338d-e).

The second way this failure can be seen is from how Dionysius comports himself with his peers and colleagues, especially Dion and Plato. Dionysius II displays overt jealousy that Plato and Dion were better friends than he and Plato (330b; 349e). He consistently reneges on promises made to Dion and Plato as well as to Theodotes (345c-d; 347d-e; 348c-349a). In short, Dionysius II shows throughout the letter a dangerous combination of impetuousness and crude self-interest that prevents him from fostering even a semblance of amicable relationships, even with those who actively attempt to befriend him.

A central consequence of Dionysius II's disreputable behavior in philosophy is that whatever relationships ensue, they cannot be the strong friendships that are both characteristic of sincere philosophy and utterly helpful for politics. If they become friendships at all, they will be more like the weak friendships where whatever other-regarding concerns friends exhibit will be concern for likely accidental and ephemeral features of one another.[227] By contrast, those who engage in philosophy (while heeding Plato's advice to recognize that reliable and competent interlocutors are necessary to philosophizing well) will form strong, enduring friendships. The principal reason why this is the case is because to whatever extent the interlocutors are indeed competent and reliable is due to how they like-mindedly view philosophy as necessary to living their lives well and as a cooperative activity. In

[227] If Dionysius II actually manages to befriend someone as he spouts off his pseudo-philosophical doctrine, this friendship likely arises due to the friend's (unwarranted and naïve) concern that he may acquire some knowledge from Dionysius II and Dionysius II's concern that this new friend will continue to heap praise and adulation on his ramblings. Yet as soon as this friend realizes that no knowledge is to be had here and stops praising Dionysius II, the friendship will fizzle out. This fizzling is due to the fact the other-regarding concerns characteristic of this friendship were fleeting. The friend's concern arose from mistakenly thinking Dionysius II was knowledgeable; once he realizes the mistake, there will no longer be any such concern. Dionysius II's concern arose from the soon-to-be-extinct praise-heaping quality of the friend. When at least one of these other-regarding concerns vanishes, so too does the friendship.

other words, the competency of competent interlocutors informs their character; it is not an ephemeral feature that may disappear at a whim.

I should now address an objection about the feasibility of political friendship in *Seventh Letter*. Marren 2019 argues against the practicability of political friendship on the basis of historical context. First, Marren establishes a general principle: "We cannot take all of the prescriptive passages in the *Letter* univocally when we observe that history contradicts ideas and advice that its author issues."[228] This principle is somewhat ambiguous. She might mean that historical sensitivity can help contextualize the significance of the *Seventh Letter*. This interpretation would make her principle, I think, persuasive and valuable. But she might also mean that historical context determines the meaning of a text. This strikes me as uncharitable and a generally erroneous hermeneutic principle, especially for Platonic texts, which so often riff on traditional topics in novel ways. Later in her essay, it's clear that Marren intends the latter meaning of the principle.

Marren's error is most evident when she applies this historical principle to political friendship in *Seventh Letter*: "If we do not take the historical context into consideration and assume that the author means for us to follow this advice about political friendship, we end up with tyranny" (99). What's the evidence for this claim? Well, Euphemus *nearly seventy years earlier* in Thucydides' *History* claimed that friendships can be a tool to "cripple our enemies" and solidify power for tyrants.[229] This, of course, raises at least two important questions. Is seventy years earlier sufficient proximity to make the historical principle applicable to the *Letter*? Marren is silent on this issue but seems to take its applicability for granted. Second, and more importantly, do we have any reason to assume Euphemus' understanding of political friendship accords with the *Seventh Letter*'s understanding or the generally

[228] Marren 2019: 97-98.

[229] Ibid: 98.

Platonic understanding? Marren 2019 adduces no evidence to answer this question affirmatively, most likely because none exists. To put it simply: we should not accept without argument that Euphemus' understanding of political friendship applies to the *Letter* when there is no *prima facie* reason to believe those understandings are compatible and so much of the *Letter* actively contravenes Euphemus' position.

As my previous chapters and this current one show, Plato's thoughts about political friendship are fundamental to his political philosophy. At *Republic* 331d-332b, 375b, 576a and *Laws* 695d (and elsewhere), Plato argues that friendships are integral to a just and well-run city. Instead of addressing this as evidence against her view, Marren 2019: 99 fn.23 punts on it by simply saying, again without argument, that this collection of references actually counts as further evidence in support of her view that political friendship implies the possibility of tyranny.[230] On this issue, historical context could show how Plato (along with Aristotle too) innovatively reworks political friendship to elevate it above mere cronyism.[231] Instead, Marren opts to use debatably relevant historical evidence and a distortive interpretative principle to force political friendship in *Seventh Letter* into a mold of cronyism at the cost of letting a more sympathetic and accurate view of political friendship emerge.

All of this is to say that Plato's repeated advice to Dionysius II is an essential element of his general instructions about how to be a good ruler. Since Dionysius II purports to aim at governing well, Plato's point is that it is only through such friendships that Dionysius II can maintain the stability of his empire and come to realize the proper way to confer sincere happiness upon the Syracusans. Dionysius II's failure to realize this political order is, in turn, attributable to his misapprehension of

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[230] One wonders, for instance, how Marren can accommodate her view in light of the exchange between Socrates and Polemarchus in *Rep*. I, where, in response to Polemarchus' idea that justice is helping friends and haring enemies, Socrates (a) doesn't deny the relevance of friendship and (b) holds that justice, by its very nature, never harms.

[231] *Laws* 1.626c-626e is also instructive here. We see the Athenian reworking commonplace ideas about virtue and justice so that they actually accord with bringing about peace and friendship. See Schofield 2013: 285 for further discussion of this issue and see Schofield 2013 generally for several instances of Plato's familiarity of traditional ideas and his constant refashioning of them in *Laws*.

philia—understood both as an orientation toward other people as well toward wisdom. His choice to cultivate weak and facile friendships with flatterers (e.g. 333b7-c1) attenuates his rule both by creating excessive tumult in Syracuse and by preventing him from coming to see the goals at which the political art should aim. Friendship, as I have attempted to explain in this section, is a legitimate and powerful political principle.

4. Resolving an Apparent Tension between Plato's Advice and Behavior

We would go too far in our interpretation of the *Seventh Letter*, however, if we infer from the above analysis that friendship is a panacea for all political malaise. Indeed, there is discord between Plato's explicit advice and how he himself behaves in the letter, and this discord is due to Plato's own *philia*-commitments. As a conclusion, I suggest that, instead of undermining the relevancy of Plato's advice about friendship, this tension actually amplifies his advice because it shows both that one's political principles, including especially one's *philia*-commitment, ought to be informed by the nuances of any specific political situation.

The tension, in brief, is as follows. Plato endorses the principle that one should discontinue advising those who refuse to listen, especially if offering advice is likely to be fruitless or if it puts one in immediate harm (330d-331e). The main justification behind this advice is that it maintains one's sense of self-respect (ἀνδρεία) (330d). Plato's numerous visits to Syracuse to aid Dionysius II apparently violate this principle, since Dionysius II manifestly fails to adopt the advice on Plato's first visit, frequently manipulates Plato and Dion, and endangers the welfare of Plato and his various companions (especially Dion, Archytas, and Archedemus).[232] Per Plato's own advice here, he should

[232] I thus disagree with the interpretation of this passage found in Trabattoni (2016): 268-271. There, Trabattoni suggests that Plato does not violate the advice because he only offers *logoi* and performs no *erga*. Plato's actions certainly include *logoi*, but the very fact that he makes the voyage to return to Syracuse must be construed unequivocally as an *ergon* that endangers Plato's livelihood (of which Plato must have been well aware, given his previous interactions with Dionysius II). If Plato were to have abided strictly by his own advice, he would never have returned to Syracuse at all.

not have returned to Syracuse. This advice notwithstanding, Plato obviously does return to Syracuse. There thus arises a tension between Plato's advice to cultivate and nurture friendships and to discontinue advising those who refuse to listen. This tension raises the question of what motivated Plato to return to Syracuse and to thereby violate the principle.[233]

Surely, he returns not because he is optimistic about Dionysius II's philosophical potential and willingness to accept Plato's instruction (338b-e, 347e), nor because he is unaware of the potential harm inherent in his return (345d-e; 346e-347a). Rather, the clear motivation that spurs Plato to return is the set of his various *philia*-commitments, including his commitment to philosophy (328b-c; 339e-340a) as well as his friendship with Dion, Archytas, and Archedemus (339a-c). Indeed, Plato's following comment about the impetus for his third visit to Sicily captures the motivational primacy of his friendships nicely:

> (**T6**) Now when the summons [by Dionysius II] had taken on this character, with my friends in Sicily and Italy pulling me and those at Athens almost pushing me away with their urging, the same consideration occurred to me as before, that I ought not to betray my friends and followers in Tarentum. (339d6-e3)
>
> *αὐτης δὴ τοιαύτης γενομένης ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ τῆς μεταπέμψεως, τῶν μὲν ἐκ* Σικελίας *τε καὶ* Ἰταλίας *ἑλκόντων, τῶν δὲ* Ἀθήνηθεν *ἀτεχνῶς μετὰ δεήσεως οἷον ἐξωθούντων με, καὶ πάλιν ὁ λόγος ἦκεν ὁ αὐτός, τὸ μὴ δεῖν προδοῦναι* Δίωνα *μηδὲ τοὺς ἐν* Τάραντι *ξένους τε καὶ ἑταίρους.*

[233] One objection here might be that I've confused the chronology of events. This objector would argue that Plato's principle is formulated in light of his experiences at Syracuse, not before or cotemporaneous with those events. Thus, Plato's behavior does not conflict with his principles, because those principles derive at least in part from reflection on his behavior and the events that transpired with Dionysius II. Even if this chronology holds up (and it very well might), I don't think this objection addresses the heart of my point. My main point is that, conceptually, Plato's advice risks conflicting with his behavior in Syracuse; Plato's failure to address the conflict (whether merely potential or actual) suffices for me to show that there is a tension in the letter, and, as long as this tension remains, my point will stand.

Plato's repeated comments about the pronounced role his friendships take in his deliberations about whether to return to Syracuse (coupled with the absence of other motivations) attest that he violated the above principle primarily due to his own friendships.

One reading of this violation may suggest that we ought to cast doubt about the feasibility of Plato's advice in general, particularly the advice to cultivate friendships. If Plato himself cannot act consistently with his own advice, why should we expect anyone else to? This reading, however, construes Plato's advice too rigidly, supposing that no justified exceptions to principles can ever exist.

On my reading, this tension augments and elucidates the appropriate manner to take up Plato's advice. This tension contains two insights about the advice offered elsewhere in the letter. First, political principles ought to be flexible enough to accommodate the demands of any political situation. If Plato were friendless and thereby devoid of any commitments to Dion and the Tarentines, then he could have refused Dionysius II's final summons in good conscience and remained faithful to all of his principles. The context of this ultimate Syracusan voyage shows that such a refusal is however unavailable to Plato. Primary among Plato's concern—and consonant with his suggestions about nurturing strong friendships—is the welfare and wellbeing of his friends, which is threatened especially if Plato refuses to return to Sicily.

In the choice between two principles that conflict, Plato's behavior teaches careful readers that during such genuine conflicts, we cannot do otherwise than stand up for our friendships and those whom we view as integral to living well and living philosophically. This decision does not need to be taken as one that undermines the coherency and consistency of Plato's catalogue of advice *per se*. Rather, Plato's decision to aid his friends (and abandon, even if momentarily, his principle to discontinue counseling) exemplifies the judiciousness and care one ought to display in any similarly murky and intricate political situation.

The second and related point is that Plato's conduct towards his friends illustrates that strong, philosophical friendships often demand of us more than just pursuing philosophy together. Such friendships are vital ingredients in the recipe for practicing philosophy well, and we thus should exhibit concern for friends in their entirety. When their lives and livelihoods are threatened, the onus is on us to take their difficulties, at least to some extent, as our own. The constellation of Plato's many suggestions about friendship and his own conduct as a friend to several figures in the *Seventh Letter* work together to illustrate that in the inevitable tribulations our philosophical friends face, it's incumbent on us to come to their aid not as solely as wisdom-seekers but as friends.[234]

[234] I'd like to thank Heather Reid, Mark Ralkowski, Marta Jimenez, Kevin Corrigan, and participants in the 2018 Fonte Aretusa Seminar on Plato at Syracuse for helpful suggestions and instructive comments on earlier versions of this chapter. I am also grateful to Frisbee Sheffield for generous comments as well as probing questions. This essay benefitted greatly from their collective insight and encouragement.

CONCLUSION

I began the introduction by expressing my conviction that Platonic writings have something meaningful to say about political friendship. A central goal of my dissertation was to lend credence to this conviction by illustrating the explanatory power of Plato's psychological approach to political friendship.

Some of the explanatory power derives from the plausible assumptions about friendship on which this approach rests. First is the assumption that friends must, in some sense, be psychologically similar. We saw in discussion of *Cleitophon* and *Alcibiades I* that a strong form of psychological similarity is psychological identity, but nevertheless this identity requirement still has the attendant value of orienting citizens to care about shared values. And that care can be expressed through disagreement, so long as it is disagreement that arises on the basis of sincere and honest motives. The second assumption is that the psychological elements required for friendship are educable. Examination of the various educational programs of these models—whether implicit (as in the Socratic model) or explicit (as in *Republic* and *Laws*)—provides for the possibility that all of these elements can be refined to varying degrees and this refinement can allow citizens to achieve friendship.

The iterability of this approach further demonstrates its power. Each model distinguishes itself by virtue of which psychological element or elements it relies on in describing political friendship. The Socratic model's requirement of knowledge, the *Republic* model's reliance on some citizens' knowledge and others' compatible beliefs, and the *Laws* model's innovative use of emotional and nonrational psychic elements, when taken together, testify to the capaciousness of this approach.

Further evidence of this approach's iterability is that several contemporary authors employ a similar psychological approach to political friendship. Martha Nussbaum, for instance, has recognized love as an emotion and has argued for a vision of political love that avoids "coercive homogeneity"

among the polity and instead coexists with and reinforces the critical freedoms necessary for contemporary liberal societies.[235] Danielle Allen, while drawing largely on Aristotle, nonetheless develops an account of political friendship that is amenable to the psychological approach that I have argued for in Plato. She argues that political friendship is able to transform any rivalrous conceptions of self-interest into equitable ones. And the particular attractiveness of this transformation is that it springs forth from citizens voluntarily, instead of via external coercion as legal standards might require.[236]

Martin Luther King, Jr. makes a very explicit connection of political love and friendship to psychology. In "Loving Your Enemies," King claims that political love is essential for a proper political community and is signaled by psychological unity. Correspondingly, the activity of loving your enemies—which King considers laudatory—demands an understanding of the disunified psychologies of one's enemies.[237] Moreover, King also defines love in psychological terms, often describing it as a "redemptive goodwill."[238]

In an obvious sense, Plato is far away from contemporary political societies. This remoteness seems to discredit any insights that Plato might offer to substantive discussions of political friendship in modern, liberal societies. Coupled with this fact is that political friendship—as a practical ideal—might seem equally out of place. The term 'political friendship' may conjure up quaint, idyllic notions that cannot accommodate a robust and healthfully antagonistic public discourse. But as my dissertation argues, and as the contemporary scholars above corroborate, a Platonic approach to

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[235] Nussbaum 2013: 378-80.

[236] Allen 2006: 127-139. Allen's approach parallels bell hook's idea of how justice interweaves with living by a "love ethic," and by avoiding a "greed ethic." See generally, hooks 2001: 85-126.

[237] King 2010: 48.

[238] See ibid: 46 and King 2003: 46.

political friendship should have a natural appeal to anyone interested in politics and friendship (understood as a species of political love).

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