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Confronting the System v. Maneuvering from Within: A Comparative Analysis of Anti-Harassment Activists’ Strategies in Egypt and Jordan

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a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences
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Abstract

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By Emilia Truluck

Street harassment is a growing problem in many Middle Eastern countries between Egypt and the Levant. Although there is a significant amount of feminist organizing against street harassment that is occurring in these countries, there is very little research on the activism strategies employed by Arab feminist activists. This study attempts to address the lack of research on Arab feminist activism in order to illuminate the ways that women create and select strategies to survive and improve their quality of life in different patriarchal structures around the world. In order to address this gap in the literature, I interviewed 14 representatives of organizations attempting to combat street harassment in Egypt and Jordan. I selected Egypt and Jordan as countries of focus for this study because they represent two ends of a spectrum of activism against street harassment in the Middle East: Egypt has been the site of multiple studies on the issue, and is the home of multiple organizations combatting street harassment, while Jordan is a country with very few statistics on harassment and even fewer overt anti-harassment initiatives. Using the data from the 14 interviews, as well as information that I had gathered about the history and structure of feminist civil society in both Jordan and Egypt, I created a theory of nested patriarchal structures, in which the woman was protected and restricted by disciplinary apparatuses of the family, the neighborhood, and the state, to explain why activism against street harassment in Egypt looked so different from activism in Jordan. I concluded that, because the nested patriarchal structure remains strong in Jordan, Jordanian women find it more useful to maneuver within the patriarchal system for protection from street harassment. Meanwhile, the patriarchal structure in Egypt began to collapse with the 2011 uprising, causing women to lose any protection that they once gained from the state’s disciplinary apparatus while simultaneously opening a space for them to directly combat harassment. I aim for this analysis of these two different modes of activism to be useful for transnational feminists who seek to learn more about ongoing feminist activism in the Middle East.
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Introduction

In the past few decades, the oppression and mistreatment of women by men in Egypt and the Levant has become a strategic interest of a range of otherwise unaffiliated constituencies, from the administration of George W. Bush to the leadership of the Feminist Majority Foundation. Many of these constituencies have created their own narratives of Arab women’s victimhood in order to justify controversial policies and interventions in the region. One of the most recent foci of those in the West who are superficially concerned with the situation of Arab women has been the increasingly visible street harassment of women in the region, particularly of women in Egypt. Although street harassment in the region is a serious problem that is still under-researched, particularly in Jordan, too many Western politicians and feminists have created a discourse around the existence of this phenomenon that has been used solely to bolster their own stereotypes of aggressive Arab men and victimized Arab women. In an effort to combat these stereotypes, while remaining sensitive to the concerns of Arab women existing in different types of patriarchal societies, I have, in this study, attempted to provide a more complex portrait of the situation of women in Egypt and the Levant (hereafter referred to as the region). To accomplish this goal, I have focused this study on the narratives of Arab men and women combatting street harassment through feminist civil society in Egypt and Jordan.

UNHCR, CARE, and Human Rights Watch have all published studies on the prevalence of street harassment in Egypt and the Levant, and activists around the region have begun to mobilize to combat the issue. Egypt, in particular, has been the site of multiple studies on street harassment and Egyptians have developed a myriad of anti-harassment grassroots initiatives and registered NGOs that have inspired activism elsewhere in the region (e.g., in Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories). In contrast, Jordan remains a country where the problem of
Harassment is, according to some of the country’s most prominent feminists, under-researched and unaddressed.\(^1\) Egypt and Jordan therefore represent opposite poles on the spectrum of anti-harassment activism in the region, despite their cultural similarities, geographic proximity, the presence of government-sponsored female empowerment programs in both countries and comparatively high rates of young male unemployment (a factor that has often been linked to increased street harassment).\(^2\)

By focusing on feminist activism against street harassment in Egypt and Jordan, I am responding to feminist theorists who have called for further research on the strategies used by women to survive and improve their quality of life in different patriarchal structures around the world.\(^3\) I am also attempting to address the imbalance between the attention paid to the oppression of women in the Egypt and the Levant and the inattention paid to Arab women’s feminist organizing.\(^4\) Although a number of studies have been conducted on feminist movements in Egypt and the non-Arab countries of the region, very few studies have been conducted on feminist organizing in Jordan, so this comparative study of Egyptian and Jordanian feminist organizing against street harassment aims to fill this gap in the literature.\(^5\)

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Importantly, I have chosen to focus my study on secular activist groups that focus on male-to-female harassment. A number of studies have been conducted on various contemporary and historical Islamic feminist organizations, but there seems to be a gap in the literature about Middle Eastern women’s secular organizing. This gap is problematic, as it not only neglects an entire field of activism in the Middle East, but also reinforces the idea that secular modes of activism are limited to Western feminists. As for my decision to limit the study to analyzing activism against male-to-female harassment, I am unaware of any organizations that are attempting to combat other non-heteronormative forms of harassment. Not until one of the people I interviewed began discussing male-to-male harassment did I realize that activism around this issue was even being considered in Egypt and Jordan. Studying religious activism against harassment, or activism against non-heteronormative forms of harassment, would therefore be important for future projects, but is beyond the scope of this study.

The primary data for this investigation are the 14 interviews that I conducted via Skype with anti-harassment activists in both Egypt and Jordan. Believing that the words and experiences of these activists are the most important and original parts of the study, I have arranged the sections of my thesis so that the activists’ voices are emphasized. As I will illustrate in my analysis of these interviews, both Egyptian and Jordanian women are working to prevent the street harassment of women, but are being forced to do so amid differing trends of internationalization and NGO-ization and within two different types of patriarchal structure. In

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Egypt, women are having to confront a collapsing patriarchal apparatus in which the implicit disciplinary power of the paternal state has, as a result of the societal chaos catalyzed by the 2011 uprising, been replaced with a regime of explicit violence towards women. In contrast, women in Jordan have to work within a strong patriarchal system infused with disciplinary power that has, for the most part, maintained its ability to both restrict women’s freedom of movement and simultaneously protect women from street harassment. Therefore, as I will illustrate, anti-harassment activists in Egypt are catalyzed to mobilize in Egypt because of the spaces left by the collapsing patriarchal disciplinary apparatus, while in Jordan, anti-harassment activists are forced to strategically maneuver within a paternalist disciplinary apparatus to accomplish their goals of making streets safer for women.  

Chapter 1: Literature Review

Feminist organizing, as we understand the notion today, began in the Middle East in the late nineteenth century, as many Middle Eastern countries were confronting colonialism and the decay of Ottoman rule. Much of the region’s secular feminist discourse arose from this period’s modernization and nation-building efforts, and its rise coincided with two resulting phenomena: the spread of information technology (i.e., the arrival of the printing press) and the spread of literacy among women (of middle and upper classes). Importantly, Western feminists did not import secular Middle Eastern feminism, and “Middle Eastern feminisms generated a critique of western ‘imperial feminism/s’ as they brought the insights and activist modes of their own secular/national feminisms to the table of (Western-dominated) international feminism during the

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7 Much of my discourse on disciplinary power and the disciplinary apparatus was inspired by Michel Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
twentieth century.” Naturally, feminists in the Middle East were in conversation with feminists elsewhere, but Middle Eastern feminism was not an imported imperial project. However, the history of colonial co-optation of the rhetoric of women’s rights in the Middle East and around the colonized world made secular Middle Eastern feminism vulnerable to critique from Islamists and nationalists from its beginning. In the words of Uma Narayan,

Many Third-World feminists confront the attitude that our criticisms of our cultures are merely one more incarnation of a colonized consciousness, the view of ‘privileged native women in whiteface,’ seeking to attack their ‘non-Western culture’ on the basis of ‘western’ values.

Secular Middle Eastern feminism and feminist activism is both original and legitimate. Middle Eastern feminist activists have long been, and remain, vital contributors to Middle Eastern civil society. Just as Narayan argues that she learned of the oppressive nature of marriage “not from books but from Indian women in general” prior to her “explicit acquisition of a feminist politics,” many Egyptian and Jordanian feminists working against street harassment are responding to problems that they have labeled and experienced within their own societies, problems that were not introduced to them by Western feminists or liberal philosophers. At the same time, I will not focus my analysis of the problem of sexual harassment in the Middle East on particular patriarchal facets of “Arab culture,” as I hope to avoid reinforcing the asymmetrical way that non-Western cultures are frequently labeled as oppressive, static, monolithic entities by somehow non-cultured Western researchers. In other words, conscious of Narayan’s critique of researchers who suggest Indian women experience “death by culture,” I will attempt to avoid

9 Ibid., 12.
10 Ibid., 13.
13 Ibid., 9.
suggesting that Middle Eastern women are somehow harassed by culture.\textsuperscript{14} Aware of my positionality as a white female citizen of the U.S., and the ways that my own country has used rhetoric about Middle Eastern women for political gain, I will attempt to craft this research in a way that does not reify problematic cultural categories.

Defining Civil Society

During the time of the Greek city-state, Socrates and Plato emphasized the importance of public argument to balance “civility” and the “good life,” originating the earliest Western concept of a civil society.\textsuperscript{15} Later, Aristotle would coin the term \textit{koinonia politiké}, to refer to an independent and self-sufficient association of free, equal, and like-minded persons united by a common set of norms and values. Though interpreted as a state apparatus by many today, Aristotle would have seen \textit{koinonia politiké} as a concept closer to our concept of civil society.\textsuperscript{16}

David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith were some of the first philosophers to refer to civil society “clearly as a network of human relationships separate from the State.”\textsuperscript{17} Prior to this, the Aristotelian logic of civil society and the structure of society at-large as a work of nature was not challenged until the seventeenth century, when Thomas Hobbes and John Locke “argued that societies are formed as the result of a social contract between human beings.”\textsuperscript{18} Furthermore, they argued that in “civil society” the “impartial state maintained peace in a community of people acting in a civic manner.”\textsuperscript{19} The existence of the state, therefore, created a condition where it became rational for people to act in a “civil manner” and cooperate

\footnotesize
textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 86.  
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 62.  
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 61.  
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
rather than fight.\textsuperscript{20} Hobbes’ and Locke’s philosophies had a major influence on the way that Hume, Ferguson, and Smith would theorize civil society, as all three would still focus on the somehow connected nature of civil society and the state.\textsuperscript{21}

Hegel was the first to argue that a separation between civil society and the state was the primary feature that set modern society apart from medieval society, and he conceptualized it as a “system of needs” in which individuals would reconcile private needs and desires with social demands and expectations.\textsuperscript{22} In his theory, the personal and economic needs of individuals cause them to develop interdependent relationships that occupy a space between the family and the state, and these relationships are the basis for civil society. However, these relationships were not automatically peaceful, and therefore a vital civil society could not exist without the guidance of the state.\textsuperscript{23} Many other theorists used Hegel’s idea of civil society as a basis for their own concepts, including, on the right, the idea that civil society had the potential to have a greater effect on the democracy than its laws and the physical environment, and on the left, the Marxist idea that civil society was so rife with class antagonism that it only served the interests of the bourgeois.\textsuperscript{24} By the end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Western theorists would add three crucial facets to the definition of civil society: namely, its role in the formation of values and action-orienting norms; its composition of both formal and informal networks, initiatives, and social movements;

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 63.
\textsuperscript{22} Georg W.F. Hegel, \textit{Elements of the Philosophy of Right} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1820).
\textsuperscript{23} Laine, “Debating Civil Society,” 63.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 64.
and, thanks to Habermas, its location in the “public sphere,” where the public came together to create a common discourse free of coercion.25

The concept of civil society was further developed in the 1980s as a result of the fall of the Berlin Wall and associated events. In some views, it became more of a “positive” concept, a location for progressive change, rather than a dying victim of the state.26 Civil society was now seen as a playground for democracy and development, and a “global civil society” focused on these two issues was born.27 For marginalized groups, particularly women, civil society became an “alternative channel through which they [could] obtain political influence.”28 Nonetheless, in the eyes of some feminist political theorists, including Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser, and Anne Phillips, civil society is still risky for women, as it has traditionally operated in a way that excludes them, faces fewer regulations (which could lead to impunity for sex discrimination), and allows for an easier dissolution of the welfare state (the state could shift the responsibility for provision of services to NGOs, leading to feminized poverty).29 Additionally, the concept of civil society relies on a “flawed distinction between the public and the private which engender segregation and denigrates the status of women.”30 One of the aims of this study will be to

28 Eto, “Autonomous Women’s Organizations, Civil Society and Democracy,” 2.
determine whether civil society in Egypt and Jordan, as it handles street harassment, has a positive or negative effect for women in each country.

Many theorists argue that Western-centered concepts of civil society must be altered in order to apply to the Middle East. For example, Diane Singerman, influenced by Gramsci and feminist theory, argues that one cannot develop an accurate understanding of civil society in Egypt until the family and other informal networks are recognized as civil society actors on par with formal political institutions.31 Singerman points out that a range of movements opposed to colonialism, imperialism, Westernization, and American hegemony have placed the family at the center of their oppositional strategies, causing Middle Eastern women (as mothers and daughters) to become, in the words of Parvin Paidar, the “bastions of Muslim identity and preservers of cultural authenticity.”32 Nonetheless, many of the secular political and civil society associations in the Middle East “still maintain a fundamental political blind spot by denying the family as a site of power and a space in which politics occur.”33 This kind of blind spot is particularly problematic for groups that attempt to advance feminist causes, such as the organizations that are the focus of this study, as it may prevent them from fully addressing root causes of sexual harassment (causes which are embedded in traditional, family-enforced notions of women’s place in public spaces).

In order to address the concerns of feminists who believe civil society is not a concept that would work for women, political scientist Mikiko Eto reframes civil society based on Iris Young’s definition of civil society as a collection of private, civic, and associative activities

32 Ibid., 8.
33 Ibid., 9.
Young suggests that an activity-based understanding of civil society would allow for the boundaries to blur between civic, private, and political associations, thereby allowing for the seamless incorporation of boundary-crossing activism. Eto takes the theory one step further by uniting families and state institutions with Young’s previously defined associational activities, essentially creating five elements of potential civil society activity. Eto’s theory therefore allows for the existence of activities that straddle the public and private spheres, making it perfect for an analysis of feminist civil society.

Because of the influence that fathers, husbands, and brothers have on the participation of women in the public sphere, I cannot rely on a Hegelian idea of civil society for an analysis of women’s activism against street harassment. Family structures determine how harassment affects women in the public space (for example, when men in a family prohibit a woman from working or attending school to avoid her being harassed), as well as whether women will join anti-harassment organizations, so they must be included in our definition. Additionally, as I will show later, many of the functions that are performed by non-state independent civil society actors in Egypt are performed by quasi-governmental agencies in Jordan, so it would be too limiting to define civil society as purely the in-between space dividing government and the family. Because it allows for the integration of many different types of civic, private, political, familiar, and state activities into the concept of civil society, Eto’s definition of civil society provides the basis for my own definition. For the purpose of this study, civil society will be defined as a spectrum of the formal and informal networks, ranging from quasi-governmental NGO’s to family structures.

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34 Eto, “Reframing Civil Society from Gender Perspectives,” 109.
35 Ibid., 110.
36 Ibid., 114.
37 Ibid., 109.
which are focused on regulating, advocating, and acting with and for particular populations within a state.

Women’s Movements in Civil Society

According to critical theorists of civil society, social movements are the most important players in civil societies, because social movements confront the state directly and attract the government to their causes with direct demonstrations and campaigns.\textsuperscript{38} Social movements are often defined as sustained, organized, voluntary challenges to an established authority.\textsuperscript{39} Additionally, they often feature “conflictual relations with opponents,” linkages of “dense informal networks,” and “a distinct collective identity.”\textsuperscript{40} By balancing “disruption and confrontation” with “cooperation and consensus building,” social movements strive “to make lasting, large-scale, and significant changes in the texture of society.”\textsuperscript{41} Critically, they must exist outside politics, in the hands of ordinary people with a variety of social backgrounds, in order to avoid being co-opted by government authorities.\textsuperscript{42}

Women’s movements can be considered a subtype of social movement.\textsuperscript{43} Within women’s movements, women’s organizations may perform an array of different functions, simultaneously transforming women’s private concerns in to public issues, giving women a space to gather and share knowledge, and providing women with channels of communication

\textsuperscript{38} Eto, “Autonomous Women’s Organizations, Civil Society and Democracy,” 10.
\textsuperscript{43} Eto, “Autonomous Women’s Organizations, Civil Society and Democracy,” 15.
with the government. Additionally, women’s movements “act out of personal concerns stemming from the consciousness and experiences of individual women.” For the purpose of this study, women’s movements will be defined as inclusive of feminist men.

In the Middle East, women’s movements are having a “feminizing” effect on the public sphere because of the increasing number of women who are political actors. By their presence, these women are “challenging the patriarchal underpinnings of state and society and the monopoly of the state and of men over the public sphere.” Additionally, they are democratizing the public sphere, disrupting the masculine privilege and primordial associations that have previously reigned in the public domain. Women’s movements therefore not only push for progressive reform, but are, of themselves, a reforming presence in the public sphere. To see the extent to which women’s movements are responsible for governmental reforms, one needs to look no further than Htun’s and Weldon’s longitudinal study of women’s movements around the world.

Htun’s and Weldon’s study of social movements and policies addressing violence against women in 70 countries over four decades has shown that the “autonomous mobilization of feminists in domestic and transnational contexts—not leftist parties, women in government, or national wealth—is the critical factor accounting for policy change.” According to their analysis, the effects of independent feminist civil society mobilization are “more

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44 Eto, “Autonomous Women’s Organizations, Civil Society and Democracy,” 18.
45 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
important…than women’s descriptive representation inside the legislature or the impact of political parties.”

Strong, autonomous feminist movements are “both substantively and statistically significant as a predictor of government action to redress violence against women…” and “the strongest movements are associated with at least one additional area of action in every case while controlling for a wide variety of variables.” Furthermore, Htun and Weldon illustrate that the impact of global norms and legislation on domestic policy making “is conditional on the presence of feminist movements in domestic contexts,” proving the importance of a thriving feminist civil society even for the implementation of existing policies on violence against women. This study, inspired by Htun and Weldon’s conclusion, seeks to determine the specific ways that feminist civil society creates a safer public space for women in Egypt and Jordan.

Street Harassment as a Priority of Middle Eastern Women’s Movements

As Nadje Al-Ali explains, “most of the goals and priorities of Middle Eastern women’s movements are related to modernization and development discourse,” although in recent years, “a small number of women activists have started to put on the agenda previously taboo issues, such as women’s reproductive rights and violence against women.” In order to understand how previously taboo topics are making their way onto the feminist agendas of Middle Eastern women’s movements, I am examining current activism against street harassment in Egypt and Jordan. For both of these countries, UN reports have been written about gender-based violence including street harassment as a type of violence, but only one, Egypt, has a women’s movement

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50 Ibid., 564.
51 Ibid., 560.
52 Ibid., 548.
that is focused on combatting it. By examining the way that civil society functions in both Egypt
and Jordan, and the priorities of the broader women’s movements in both countries, I hope to
determine why Egypt has managed to make the topic of street harassment less taboo while
Jordan has not.

I decided to focus on the phenomenon of street harassment, as opposed to other forms of
violence against women, because of its effect on women’s access to the public sphere—the space
conceived of by Habermas as the location of civil society. Though my own definition of civil
society does not restrict it solely to the space between state and family (instead including both
quasi-governmental organizations and family structures), it is important to examine women’s
access to civil society’s traditional realm. Because street harassment prevents women from
accessing and feeling safe in public space in both Egypt and Jordan\(^{54}\), an analysis of feminist
activism against street harassment will not only provide a map of the feminist civil society in
both countries, but will also illustrate the importance of access to the public sphere for feminist
civil society in the Middle East.

Street harassment was first defined in the U.S. during the 1980s, and the discourse around
street harassment was heavily affected by the fight to get workplace sexual harassment
criminalized. Catharine MacKinnon, a feminist legal scholar, spearheaded this fight while
theorizing it as a product of the heteronormative patriarchy.\(^{55}\) As a result, the original definitions
of street harassment were created in a framework in which males were always perpetrators and

\(^{54}\) For Egypt, see UN Women’s Study on Ways and Methods to Eliminate Sexual Harassment in
Egypt and Nadia Ilahi’s “Gendered Contestations: An Analysis of Harassment in Cairo and its
Implications for Women’s Access to Public Spaces.” For Jordan, see the King Hussein
Foundation Information and Research Center’s Homebound Girls in Jordan report and Mary
Kawar’s “Transitions and Boundaries: Research into the Impact of Paid Work on Young
Women’s Lives in Jordan.”

\(^{55}\) Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination
females were always victims. In addition, street harassment was defined as an act that was always perpetrated by strangers in public domains. One of the most cited theorists about street harassment, Carol Gardner, argues that women are “open persons” in the street, and that part of their role as women is to be open for public commentary and judgment. Men in the public sphere, for Gardner, are afforded a certain amount of “civil inattention,” whereas women in the public sphere exist solely as receptors for men’s comments and judgments. Later theorists would disagree with Gardner on the reasons for harassment, arguing that harassment occurred because society did not believe that women belonged in the public sphere or because men felt disempowered, even emasculated, by women’s progress outside the home. Building on this idea, theorists like Cynthia Bowman argue that women in the public sphere are acting out of role, and that harassment is meant to limit their mobility in the public sphere, essentially accomplishing “an informal ghettoization of women…to the private sphere of hearth and home.” Some even argue that street harassment is a form of “sexual terrorism” used to remind women and girls that “they are at risk and vulnerable to male aggression just because they are female.” One of the goals of this study will be to determine whether any of these theories are applicable to Egypt and Jordan, and, if so, which ones are endorsed by women’s organizations combatting street harassment in each country.

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59 Bowman, “Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 520.
Although many feminists today have started to critique concrete definitions of harassment by arguing that “it is up to the victim to label the behavior harassment,” for the purpose of clarity, I will be using a specific definition of harassment throughout this study.\(^61\)

This definition of sexual harassment was created by HarassMap, a major anti-harassment organization in Egypt, and is used by many anti-harassment organizations in the country. HarassMap’s definition is as follows:

Sexual harassment is any form of **unwanted** words and/or actions of a sexual nature that violate a person’s body, privacy, or feelings and make that person feel uncomfortable, threatened, insecure, scared, disrespected, startled, insulted, intimidated, abused, offended, or objectified.\(^62\)

HarassMap also states that sexual harassment can include ogling, facial expressions, catcalls, comments, stalking/following, sexual invitations, unwanted attention, sexual photos, online overtures, unwanted phone calls, unwanted touching, indecent exposure, threats, and mob sexual harassment.\(^63\)

**Chapter 2: Methodology**

Feminist theories of cross-cultural research inspired the methodology of this study, as I was conscious of the importance of cultural specificity, intensive study, possible commonalities across cultures, and the need for critical evaluation of study materials\(^64\) prior to beginning my research. In fact, my knowledge of these theories was one of the primary reasons that I decided

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\(^{63}\) Notably, HarassMap’s definition is for sexual harassment, not just street harassment. However, street harassment is a form of sexual harassment recognized by HarassMap, so the definition still functions properly with concern to street harassment.

to focus on women’s activism and movements against harassment rather than women’s experiences of harassment. I believed that by focusing more on activism, I would not fall as easily into the Western researcher’s trap of objectifying Middle Eastern women as eternal victims and Middle Eastern men as sexual deviants, but would instead illuminate the ways that women in Egypt and Jordan are making their voices heard.

I used both primary and second data sources for this study. Information from social media profiles of anti-harassment initiatives in Egypt and Jordan and semi-structured interviews with their representatives comprise the primary data. In order to determine who to interview and which organizations to analyze, I used a technique of “theoretical sampling.” I tried to speak to people from as broad a diversity of organizations as possible (large and small, registered and unregistered, government affiliated and independent) so that I could have exposure to the greatest number of categories and a strong foundation for creating theory. The secondary source data, on civil society in Egypt and Jordan, is comprised of reports found from independent online searches as well as reports suggested by professors and interviewees.

As has been recognized by other scholars in the field, researching the two countries simultaneously poses the unique problem of having to synthesize a vast amount of scholarly work on Egypt while struggling to find a fraction of the information about Jordan. As a result, in order to find appropriate activists to interview in Jordan, I relied primarily on recommendations from contacts I had established in Amman during my study abroad program in Spring 2015, and to find appropriate activists to interview in Egypt, I was able to use news articles about harassment in Egypt and Facebook searches of Egyptian groups combatting

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harassment. For both countries, I also sought further connections from established interviewees. As for secondary source data, such as the information about the general civil society climate in Egypt and Jordan, I relied on Internet and library catalogue searches of relevant terms, as well as recommendations from interviewees. Emory University’s Institutional Review Board approved the methodology of this study prior to data collection.

Conducting the Interviews

According to feminist writer Hilary Graham, “the use of semi-structured interviews has become the principal means by which feminists have sought to achieve the active involvement of their respondents in the construction of data about their lives.”67 Semi-structured and unstructured interviews have become favorites of feminist researchers because they allow free interaction between the researcher and interviewee, provide opportunities for clarification and discussion, and allow people to describe their ideas, thoughts, and memories in their own words rather than in those of the researcher. Semi-structured interviews also allow the researcher to explore people’s views of reality by introducing new questions as the interview proceeds, and to use the interviewee’s answers to then generate theory. Even if the interview does not go as planned, variations resulting from the limited structure, will often provide valuable reflections of reality.68

For this project, I conducted a single semi-structured interview, lasting between 30 minutes and an hour, with 16 individuals involved in women’s rights activism in Egypt and Jordan. Due to the disparity between the number of relevant actors in Jordan and Egypt, seven of the interviewees were from Jordan and nine were from Egypt. Fourteen of the interviewees were acting as representatives of particular women’s rights organizations, and two of them were

68 Ibid., 19.
independent activists. Importantly, only 14 of the interviews are represented in this study, as I decided two of them (one from Egypt and one from Jordan) did not add relevant information to the topic.

Each interviewee was asked similar open-ended questions about the reasons they chose to get involved in activism against street harassment, obstacles their organizations faced, and the impact that they believed their organizations were having in Egyptian or Jordanian society. The remainder of the questions in each interview were not standardized, but were tailored to the individuals with whom I was speaking. In order to tailor the interviews to the interviewees, I created profiles of each organization before interviewing the organizations’ representatives, which enabled me to ask targeted questions about each organization’s specific campaigns and the personal experiences of each representative.

Each interview was conducted via Skype between January and March, 2016, at a location and time chosen by the individual interviewee. Each interviewee, in the course of scheduling the interview, was sent a copy of an information sheet that contained information about the purpose of the study and their rights as a participant. At the beginning of each interview, I would review important points from the information sheet and ask if the interviewee would allow me to create an audio recording of the interview. After obtaining permission from each interviewee, I recorded the interviews with Audible software so that I could review them later and focus on being an engaged interviewer, rather than a preoccupied note taker, during the conversation.

Analyzing the Interviews

Due to the relatively small number of interviews I conducted, the data in this project was analyzed completely qualitatively in order to create “grounded theory”. Qualitative analysis entails a “nonmathematical process of interpretation” undertaken for the purpose of “discovering
concepts and relationships in raw data and then organizing these into a theoretical explanatory scheme.\textsuperscript{69} The theoretical explanatory scheme created is referred to as “grounded theory,” which is unique in that the researcher creating grounded theory does not begin the project with a preconceived theory in mind, but rather allows a theory to “emerge from the data.”\textsuperscript{70} This theory is often “a set of well-developed categories…that are systematically inter-related through statements of relationship.”\textsuperscript{71}

After conducting and transcribing all of my interviews, I used a process of “open coding” to mine the interview data for concepts that were either similar in nature or related in meaning.\textsuperscript{72} The result of “open coding” was the determination of particular categories of phenomena, which were then further analyzed through processes of axial and selective coding. Axial coding allowed me to theorize relationships between categories of phenomena and their subcategories (answering the questions when, what, where, how), and to therefore draw comparisons between particular categories of phenomena.\textsuperscript{73} Ultimately, the practice of axial coding allowed me to create hypotheses about the nature of relationships between the various facets of anti-harassment activism that I then used to create an easily comparable narrative for each activist. I utilized these narratives to create a theory about the reason for the difference between activism against street harassment in Egypt and Jordan.

**Chapter 3: Introduction to Feminist Civil Society in Egypt and Jordan**

Before exploring the work of anti-harassment activists in Egypt and Jordan, it is necessary to understand the social and political context in which these groups work. All of these

\textsuperscript{69} Strauss and Corbin, *Basics of Qualitative Research*, 11.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{72} For definitions of open coding, axial coding, and selective coding see Strauss and Corbin’s *Basics of Qualitative Research*, 102-103.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 126-130.
groups that I researched are part of the feminist civil society in each country, and many of them function as NGOs. Although there is informal grassroots organizing also happening in each country, I was unable to find many people doing this kind of work because they are not people who are known internationally. As a result, I have focused on registered and un-registered organizations that have (or had) fairly regular activities and some reputation beyond their respective countries. This chapter will explain the obstacles that these groups must overcome in order to act in the public realm and avoid persecution by the government. By understanding the social and political context of anti-harassment organizing, the reader will be better prepared to analyze why some organizations, especially in Egypt, choose to directly confront the state apparatus while others, particularly in Jordan, choose to work within the state apparatus.

Civil Society Regulation in Egypt and Jordan

During the 1990’s, the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Egypt and the Levant began to increase, “resurrect[ing] old nationalist suspicions about the role of international actors in undermining national unity.”\(^74\) In Egypt, Law No. 23 was used to restrict the operation of NGOs by “requiring them not accept foreign funding, collect donations, or fundraise without prior permission from the Ministry of Social Affairs.”\(^75\) After international criticism of the draconian legislation, the Egyptian government appointed Mervat al-Tellaway, a well-respected former ambassador, as Minister of Social Affairs and charged her with drafting a new NGO law. The new law prohibited the formation of NGOs that “threaten national unity,”


“violate public order or morality,” or “practice any political or trade union activity.” The limitations on NGOs, according to Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “rendered Egypt’s non-governmental organizations as mere extensions of the governmental bureaucracy, but without pay,” and led to only 40% of Egypt’s NGOs being “active and effective.” Nonetheless, Egyptians in the 1990s still managed to have a functioning civil society in some respects, as it was estimated that there were seven informal associations for each formally registered NGO.

In 2002, Law 84 was passed to provide the government with grounds for prohibiting the establishment of any association that had a political purpose, and for preventing any association’s activities, its access to foreign funding, and its membership in international networks. Individuals who continued working in unregistered groups would be subject to prison terms for engaging in “unauthorized activities,” though this part of the law was only enforced when it was politically expedient to do so. This type of unfair selective application of the law was symbolic of a larger form of government corruption that lead to the 2011 uprising.

After the uprising began in 2011, the legal restrictions on civil society in Egypt were augmented by acts of blatant governmental intimidation. The Egyptian government and military became more and more fearful that it was losing control over the restive populace, and it began to perceive all types of activists, including human and women’s rights activists, as threats.

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78 Ibrahim, “Egyptian Law 32,” 9, 36.
June 2013, 43 individuals from five foreign-based NGOs were convicted for their participation in NGOs that were “operating without necessary approvals” and receiving funds from abroad illegally.\textsuperscript{81} That same year, the government prevented two prominent human rights organizations from accessing foreign funding, nearly causing both organizations to collapse.\textsuperscript{82} Then, in November 2013, the Egyptian government passed Law 107, a law that required demonstrations and gatherings of more than 10 people in public spaces to obtain permission from the Interior Ministry three days in advance of the gathering (people who did not abide by this law risked being forcibly disbanded, arrested, or harassed).\textsuperscript{83} This law was widely seen as a threat to Egyptian civil society, as it strongly limited the Egyptian people’s freedom of association.\textsuperscript{84} As a result of the government’s tactics,

The [civil society] sector’s financial viability weakened as NGOs faced significant challenges to receiving foreign funds, advocacy declined as citizens became less willing to engage in public demonstrations; service delivery deteriorated when the government froze the bank accounts of NGOs that provided critical services; and public image was affected as the government’s actions negatively colored the public’s view of the sector.\textsuperscript{85}

Despite these obstacles, the Ministry of Social Solidarity (with whom every Egyptian NGO must register) reported that the number of NGOs rose from 37,500 in 2012 to 43,500 in 2013.\textsuperscript{86}

In Jordan, although civil society actors have not been subject to such blatant intimidation, civil society organizations continue to face prohibitive legal restrictions on advocacy and

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\textsuperscript{82} U.S. Agency for International Development, “2013 CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa,” 11.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 10.
\end{flushright}
lobbying, suffer from weak management structures, and have a heavy dependence on foreign donors.\textsuperscript{87} The primary law governing civil society organizations, Societies Law No. 51 of 2008, requires civil society organizations to register with the Ministry of Social Development in order to operate, prohibits the achievement of “political or religious goals” as the primary focus of such groups, and places civil society organizations under relevant government ministries for supervision.\textsuperscript{88} To avoid falling under the supervision of the General Federation of Jordanian Women, which supervises all women’s civil society organizations, some organizations, like the Jordanian Women’s Union (JWU), registered under the Ministry of Interior as “popular bodies” instead of under the Ministry of Social Development.\textsuperscript{89} Other feminist civil society organizations, such as the Sisterhood is Global Institute/Jordan (SIGI) register as not-for-profit companies with the Ministry of Trade and Industry in order to avoid regulation by the Ministry of Social Development. Royal non-governmental organizations (RINGOS) do not have to worry about regulation from the Ministry of Social Development, as they are registered under separate laws “based on royal decrees and parliamentary endorsement.” As a result, RINGOs have fewer restrictions on permissible activities, may receive more funding from public and private sources, and may receive government funding that is unavailable to other NGOs.\textsuperscript{90}

There are few obstacles in the registration process for civil society organizations in Jordan, but there are still some organizations, such as an initiative that would assess the performance of parliamentary representatives, that have been denied registration.\textsuperscript{91} The primary obstacles to the work of civil society organizations in Jordan come after registration: for

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 26.  
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{89} Al-Atiyat, “Harvests of the Golden Decades,”142.  
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
example, non-profits must endure long procedures to obtain permission from the prime minister for all funding, and, until recently, all civil society organizations had to provide notification to the Administrative Governor 48 hours before organizing a public assembly.\textsuperscript{92} Additionally, all civil society organizations must provide lists of employees, volunteers, and staff wages in their annual reports.\textsuperscript{93} RINGOs and other sectors are not subject to these types of rules.\textsuperscript{94} Beyond direct government interference, civil society organizations also often face a lack of funding because of very limited opportunities for local funding and a dependence on international donors, and their advocacy efforts are often undermined by competition.\textsuperscript{95} Because of their dependence on foreign donors, civil society organizations are also often forced to “follow the money,” shifting their own priorities to fit those of the potential donor. As an added burden, negative media coverage, particularly by public media outlets, has led the Jordanian public to be suspicious of civil society organizations that receive foreign funding.\textsuperscript{96} The government, however, supports civil society as long as it is aligned with governmental objectives, and many international NGOs are allowed to operate freely in the country.\textsuperscript{97} Possibly as a result of this support, the number of registered civil society organizations in Jordan increased from 3,329 in 2012 to more than 3,800 in 2013.\textsuperscript{98}

Although Egypt and Jordan are quite different in terms of their government structures and roles for civil society, “movements in one country tend to emulate successful movements in

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.; Freedom House, \textit{Freedom in the World 2015}.  
\textsuperscript{93} U.S. Agency for International Development, “2013 CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa,” 27.  
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 28, 29.  
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 31.  
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.; Freedom House, \textit{Freedom in the World 2015}.  
neighboring countries…even when there are important differences in the history and character of regimes in the region.” As a result, even though Jordan may have far fewer organizations targeting street harassment at the current point in time, it can be expected that activism around street harassment will only grow as Egypt’s anti-harassment movement becomes more successful. In this study, I will analyze the successes and failures of women’s activism against street harassment in Jordan and determine whether the lessons from Egypt can be adapted to the Jordanian context.

History of Feminist Civil Society in Egypt and Jordan

This section will focus on the organizations, actions, and social movements in Egypt and Jordan that have feminist aims. To avoid confusion, I will be using the commonly accepted English definition of feminism to determine which organizations, actions, and social movements are relevant for this study. This definition states that feminism is “the advocacy of women’s rights on the grounds of political, social, and economic equality to men.” Notably, Arabic does not have a universally accepted equivalent of the word “feminism,” and this has been one of the reasons that opponents of women’s equality in the Arab world have argued that feminism is a Western import. As a result of the term’s ambiguity in Arabic and the way it has been employed by Middle Eastern opponents of feminism, some women’s rights activists in the

101 Niswi, the root of the closest Arabic term to “feminism,” nisa’iya, has been listed in English-Arabic dictionaries as a synonym for “female” and “feminine” (unthawi), giving the term nisa’iya an ambiguous meaning of both feminism and femininity. For a deeper discussion of the language of feminism in Arabic, see Pernille Arenfeldt’s and Nawar Al-Hassan Golley’s “Arab Women’s Movements: Developments, Priorities, and Challenges,” in Mapping Arab Women’s Movements, ed. Pernille Arenfeldt and Nawar Al-Hassan Golley (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 10-11.
Middle East, including the ones interviewed for this study, “may not necessarily call themselves feminists although they may have feminist beliefs.” Though I will be using the term feminist civil society to describe the organizations and movements that fight for women’s equality in the Middle East, the reader should remain aware that this is an imperfect term in that it has no Arabic equivalent. Nonetheless, careful consideration has been given to ensure that the aforementioned English definition of feminism is deployed properly throughout this study.

The history of Egypt’s feminist civil society can be traced back to the colonial resistance of the early 20th century, when Egyptian women took an active role in nationalist activities. Just as Egyptian women today are idealized as potential models of modesty and piety in conservative Islamist discourse, in the early 20th century, they were symbols of both secular nationalist and Islamic modernity projects. For example, in 1919, the female relatives of exiled members of the anti-British Wafd Party “were encouraged to take up the national burden” while the men were out of the country, so they led campaigns demanding the boycott of British goods. One of these women, Huda Shaarawi, founded the Egyptian Feminist Union in 1923, an organization that framed the franchise of women as a nationalist long-term development goal. About 13 years later, one of the Feminist Union’s members, Zaynab Al-Ghazzali, broke away from the

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102 Ibid., 11.
secular organization to form her own Islamic alternative, the Muslim Women’s Association.\textsuperscript{106} Al-Ghazzali declined to merge this organization with the already existing Muslim Brotherhood, as she did not wish for it to become an auxiliary organization, but it became associated with the Muslim Brotherhood when she began helping the families of Muslim Brotherhood members who were imprisoned after the Brotherhood was banned in 1945.\textsuperscript{107} These two organizations, which were often in conflict, represented the two types of modernizing efforts targeting women: one focused on emulating the concerns of international (Western) feminists, and one used liberal Islamic reform as a basis for change.\textsuperscript{108} These two types of discourse around women’s rights would lead many Egyptian feminists to begin articulating their programs in the discourse of both Islam and nationalism.\textsuperscript{109}

Unlike Syria and Lebanon, which also became home to feminist organizations during their years of independence, Egypt maintained an active feminist civil society even after the nationalist fervor of the 1920s, and feminists continued to push for women’s suffrage and political rights until they were granted in 1956.\textsuperscript{110} Notably, women’s suffrage and women’s greater civic involvement were concerns primarily of the upper and middle classes, as “poor women had long been ‘in the public,’ working to keep their families afloat, and had little time to spare over concern for these issues.”\textsuperscript{111} However, before the middle and upper class feminist movement could become more inclusive, it was squelched by the rise to power of Gamal Abd al-Nasser in 1956. Under Nasser’s socialist, nationalist reign, a policy of state feminism was

\textsuperscript{106} Talhami, \textit{Historical Dictionary of Women in the Middle East and North Africa}, 1\textsuperscript{st} ed., s.v. “Zaynab Al-Ghazzali.”
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Hatem, “In the Shadow of the State,” 47.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} Hatem, “In the Shadow of the State,” 24.
\textsuperscript{111} Lewis, “Convergences and Divergences: Egyptian Women’s Activisms,” 47.
created to promote women to positions of public political leadership, and non-state-initiated feminist organizations were outlawed.\textsuperscript{112}

Feminist civil society experienced a lull until the 1970s, when the second wave of feminism began gaining momentum with the controversial Nawal El Saadawi at its fore.\textsuperscript{113} During the 1980s, Egypt became the home of the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association and the New Woman Research Center, and in 1985, a coalition of feminists was created under the title of the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Woman and the Family.\textsuperscript{114} Independent feminist organizations continued to operate, with restrictions, through the 1990s, and in the early 2000s, activism against sexual harassment began.\textsuperscript{115}

Since its ratification of CEDAW in 1981, the Egyptian state has tried to co-opt the “gender agenda” in order to buttress its reputation on the international stage. For example, in 2000, President Mubarak issued a decree establishing the National Council for Women (NCW). This organization was created to propose public policy related to the empowerment of women and to integrate women into Egypt’s national development goals.\textsuperscript{116} However, many Egyptians, including participants in grassroots women’s rights campaigns, saw the NCW as simply another way for the Egyptian state to seek favor from the West without implementing any real changes for women.\textsuperscript{117} A tension quickly developed between grassroots organizations and the NCW, but

\begin{footnotes}
\item[112] Ibid., 51.
\item[113] Ibid., 60.
\item[114] Ibid., 61.
\item[115] Ibid., 61.
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Egyptian feminist were not deterred from their work, and continue to struggle for genuine equality.

The emergence of feminist civil society in Jordan occurred quite a bit later than in Egypt, with the “first phase” beginning in the 1940s.\textsuperscript{118} During this phase, women’s activists were largely wives and daughters of politicians and other prominent political figures. The first women’s organization in the country, the Women’s Solidarity Association, established in 1945, was led by Queen Misbah (wife of King Abdullah I, the first king of Jordan) and Princess Zain ElSharaf (Queen Misbah’s daughter-in-law, wife of Prince Talal), and was comprised of Amman-based women close to the royalty.\textsuperscript{119} It was occupied with charity-oriented programs and training women to become better mothers and housewives (not unlike many of the early Egyptian women’s organizations).\textsuperscript{120} The Association, along with the similarly guided Women’s Union Society, which was established in 1947 by Princess ElSharaf, dissolved in 1949 due to personal conflicts between members.\textsuperscript{121}

The second phase of the Jordanian women’s movement was inspired by the “revolutionary” activity of the Palestinian women’s movement.\textsuperscript{122} It began with the establishment of the Arab Women’s Union (AWU) in 1954, which had a mission of establishing “equal rights and responsibilities, liberating Palestine, and full Arab unity.”\textsuperscript{123} From its start, the Arab Women’s Union was connected to the Jordanian Nationalist Movement, which posed a major threat to the monarchy because of its support for the reunification of Jordan and Palestine.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 136.
\textsuperscript{122} Dababneh, “The Jordanian Women’s Movement,” 96.
and its opposition to the monarchy’s Western ties. Nonetheless, the organization was allowed to exist for a few years, and its focus centered on gaining women’s suffrage. In response to this campaign, the government granted partial suffrage in 1955 to women who had a primary school education, but the activists, unsatisfied that illiterate women were still excluded, continued to push for full suffrage.\textsuperscript{124} However, the fight for suffrage had to move underground when, in 1957, an attempted military coup caused the monarchy to impose martial law.\textsuperscript{125} Though women continued working together in underground societies after 1957, feminist civil society was not allowed to re-enter the public sphere until the removal of martial law in 1967.\textsuperscript{126}

The lifting of martial law in 1967 and the granting of full suffrage to women in 1974 symbolized the birth of the third phase of women’s activism in Jordan. During this period, a parallel structure of women’s organizations was created, as the leftist feminists who had associated themselves with the PLO formed the Women’s Union in Jordan (a reincarnation of the AWU) and the Jordanian government began supporting women’s rights to bolster its reputation in the international community.\textsuperscript{127} The new goals of the union focused on “full rights” for women, representing Jordan, raising women’s educational and socioeconomic levels, and unifying women’s activism.\textsuperscript{128} Although the goals no longer seemed to focus on the liberation of Palestine, many of the Union’s activists remained preoccupied with the issue and the Union still ran many activities in support of the Palestinian cause.\textsuperscript{129} The government, threatened by the Women’s Union’s political nature, shut down the Union again in 1981, saying that they had

\textsuperscript{124} Al-Atiyat, “Harvests of the Golden Decades,” 137.
\textsuperscript{126} Al-Atiyat, “Harvests of the Golden Decades,” 137.
\textsuperscript{127} Dababneh, “The Jordanian Women’s Movement,” 103
\textsuperscript{128} Al-Atiyat, “Harvests of the Golden Decades,” 137.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
“deviated from their original platform.”130 Dissatisfied, the Union took the case to the Court of Cassation and won, so it was allowed to remain active under the new name of the Jordanian Women’s Union.131

The Jordanian state further increased its involvement with the women’s movement with the appointment of the first female minister of social development, Iman Mofti, in 1979.132 Mofti attempted to bring more government control over the women’s movement, and was responsible for creating the General Federation of Jordanian Women (GFJW) to coordinate the work of and to represent Jordanian women’s organizations.133 Although the JWU refused to be collapsed under the GFJW, the JWU was still eclipsed by it. Members of the JWU perceived the creation of the GFJW as the first step of the Jordanian government in co-opting the feminist movement.134 These two organizations, and their competitive relationship, came to symbolize Jordan’s brand of state feminism and its independent women’s organizations.135

The 1990s saw a major increase in the number of women’s organizations in Jordan (from a few in the 1980s to more than 39 in the late 1990s).136 In 1993, Jordan ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which had a major effect on the feminist priorities of the country throughout the decade. During this period, feminist activists began obtaining gender quotas in government bodies, advocating for legal changes on personal status laws, and combatting honor crimes.137

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130 Ibid.
131 Ibid., 139.
133 Ibid.
135 Ibid., 105.
137 Ibid., 134.
also began receiving more foreign funding and “royal feminism” started to emerge.\(^{138}\) The new dependence on foreign funding meant that the priorities of women’s organizations in Jordan were now guided by international donors, and were often geared towards women’s political participation and the implementation of CEDAW.\(^ {139}\) Similarly, from 1995 onward, Princess Basma Bint Talal and Queen Rania would become more and more involved in women’s rights issues, which would affect much of the women’s movement’s programming.\(^ {140}\)

Similar to Egypt, Jordan’s women’s movement was affected by increasing internationalization and state feminism. In 1992, the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) was established as an organization that could act as the liaison between the government and women’s NGOs, and in 1996, the JNCW became officially recognized by the Jordanian government as a semi-governmental body that would represent Jordan at all levels when women’s issues were being addressed.\(^ {141}\) The JNCW was also mandated with ensuring that national legislation did not discriminate against women, and was recognized as the national policy-making body of all women’s issues.\(^ {142}\) Perhaps because of the strong involvement of the government in JNCW’s mandate, some women activists in the 1990s began to feel that it was a state conspiracy aimed at controlling their work and being the sole representative of Jordanian women.\(^ {143}\) However, the JNCW eventually became more respected by including all relevant voices in the preparation process for CEDAW shadow reports.\(^ {144}\)

\(^{138}\) Ibid., 140.  
\(^{139}\) Ibid., 144.  
\(^{140}\) Ibid., 150.  
\(^{141}\) Ibid., 147.  
\(^{142}\) Ibid.  
\(^{143}\) Ibid.  
\(^{144}\) Ibid., 148.
During the early 2000s, the women’s movement in Jordan became focused on honor crimes, amending the personal status laws, creating quotas for women in government, and publishing CEDAW in the *Official Gazette* (making it legally binding). In addition, various women’s organizations came together to create a shadow report to send to the CEDAW committee, claiming that the official report drafted by the JNCW was too pro-government.

Although women’s issues in Egypt and Jordan were addressed in two different ways in the mid-20th century, Merve Hatem claims that they were both examples of postcolonial Arab states utilizing their power over women’s political citizenship rights “to serve their national and international concerns.” When feminist civil society was not present, “the state was able to ignore women,” and when it was, the state was able to “co-opt them,” reinforcing the status of women as dependent citizens. Similarly, when women’s work in the public sphere was perceived as useful (i.e., during the struggles for independence), it was encouraged and allowed, but when it was perceived as dangerous (i.e., after independence), it was either banned or co-opted.

**Contemporary Trends in Feminist Civil Society in Egypt and Jordan**

According to a recent study of Arab women’s movements, there are three contemporary trends occurring across Middle East civil society: internationalization, “NGO-ization,” and an expansion of Islamic discourse on gender equality. Additionally, the women’s movements of the past century and today have been dominated by “representatives of the educated middle and upper classes of urban centers” who have focused their agendas on their own class-specific goals.

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145 Ibid., 156, 161.
146 Ibid., 162.
147 Hatem, “In the Shadow of the State,” 26.
148 Ibid., 27.
concerns. This study will address whether the ongoing secular movements against street harassment in Egypt and Jordan are experiencing the trends of internationalization and NGO-ization. Since street harassment is a phenomenon that is directly experienced by women of all classes, but particularly the lower ones, I will also attempt to determine whether movements against street harassment are seen as elitist, like other Arab feminists’ concerns. The only trend I will not be addressing is the expansion of Islamic discourse on gender equality, as my study is limited to the work of secular organizations.

Feminism in the Middle East has been internationalized for decades, as both formal and informal transnational feminist networks in the Middle East existed in the 1920s and 1930s. However, a wider form of transnational feminist networks arose with the United Nations’ Decade for Women (1976-1985). With the Arab countries’ ratifications of CEDAW during the 1980s and 1990s and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of 1995, feminists in the Arab world gained access to new, internationally recognized instruments for bringing women’s empowerment to their countries’ agendas. Because the trend of internationalization is said to be both historical and continuing, I have asked the interviewees for this study about their collaboration with women’s movements in other Middle Eastern countries as well as their relationships with broader international networks.

One of the consequences of the internationalization of Arab women’s movements has been their simultaneous NGO-ization in Egypt and the Levant. NGO-ization is a term used by social movement activists and academics to refer to the “institutionalization, professionalization,

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150 Ibid., 20.
151 Ibid.
depoliticization and demobilization” of social movements. Many argue that NGO-ization has a negative effect on social movements because it diverts energy and resources away from organizing the public and toward internal bureaucracy. They believe that NGO-ization turns civil society organizations into “hierarchical, centralized and corporate entities that focus on their own survival rather than trying to mobilize society.” For example, successful NGOs must have directors who are able to garner funds from the international community, and often this type of person is not the same type of person who would be able to communicate effectively with the local constituency that the NGO is claiming to serve. Additionally, because NGOs are project-based and rely on grants, they are often limited to small staffs, strict timelines, and competition with other similar NGOs for funds. Movements, on the other hand, are based in large numbers of people with common goals and lead to more sustainable, democratic change. Scholar Islah Jad argues that Arab women’s NGOs may be successful in advocating for women on an international stage, providing direct services for particular groups, and disseminating information, but broader popular movements are needed to create more sustainable, locally-driven social change.

The literature on Egypt and Jordan shows that the women’s movements in these two countries are not immune to regional trends. For example, Leslie Lewis, through ethnographic study, illustrates that many Egyptian women involved in “feminist” activities are reluctant to call themselves feminists, particularly if the women are religious. Though Egyptian feminists have

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153 Ibid., 7.
156 Ibid., 186.
157 Ibid., 187.
been active since the early 20th century, increased internationalization of feminism and more conservative interpretations of Islam have meant that some contemporary Egyptian women’s movements are eager to use the language of Islam to justify women’s rights and hesitant to use the label of feminism to describe their work. However, both secular and Islamic Egyptian feminists alternate between secular and religious rhetorical strategies depending on their audiences. Similarly, in Jordan, feminist activists are caught in a sensitive position between tribal leaders and Islamists who argue that women’s movements are imports from the morally corrupt West and international efforts focused on reforming the Middle East that put women at the top of their agendas. As a result, the feminist discourse of Jordan has shifted from the “daring” focus on universal frameworks and human rights of the 1990s to a near obsession with reassuring people that women’s rights are in “conformity with Islam and Arab norms and traditions.” In order to placate tribal leaders and Islamists, who have become louder in recent years, Jordanian feminist activists now eschew the “feminist” label and the idea of women’s “liberation,” instead focusing their discourse on “advancement” and “empowerment.” In both Egypt and Jordan, feminist activists must walk a fine line between the international feminist community, which holds the purse strings, and increasingly conservative Islamists, who control social approval. Perhaps as a result of walking a fine line between these communities, and the government, the movements in both countries are heavily NGO-ized (allowing them to receive foreign funding and be less politically charged). As a result, the movement against street harassment in each country will therefore be primarily represented by NGOs in this study.

159 Ibid., 55.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid. 166.
The Problem of Street Harassment in Egypt and Jordan

Egypt

The presence of women in the public sphere in Egypt is nothing new, and has in fact become “fairly normalized over the past century,” but the streets remain gendered male and are the site of increasing sexual harassment.163 Since the uprising in 2011, there has been a veritable explosion of discourse on the topic of sexual harassment and assault in Egyptian protest spaces, but street harassment in Egypt continues unabated.164 According to an oft-cited 2013 study conducted by UN Women in Egypt, 99.3% of women in Egypt have experienced some form of sexual harassment, most of which happens on the street or on public transportation.165 Furthermore, street harassment in Egypt has been a recognized problem since at least 2008, when the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights carried out one of the country’s first study on the topic, illustrating that 83% of Egyptian women and 98% of foreign women in Egypt had been harassed.166 Since that study was published, a number of researchers have theorized about the potential reasons behind the harassment and journalists have become interested in how it is being addressed. I will introduce some of these arguments before I begin describing the Egyptian

163 Lewis, “Convergences and Divergences: Egyptian Women’s Activisms;,” 57.
165 UN Women, Study on Ways and Methods to Eliminate Sexual Harassment in Egypt, 6-7.
organizations that work against street harassment, as many of the people I interviewed from the anti-harassment organizations referenced them.

One of the reasons given for the widespread problem of street harassment in Egypt, particularly in Cairo, is that public spaces are coded as masculine, and that women must perform a “model femininity” if they enter the streets.\textsuperscript{167} Women who are visibly racialized (i.e., who are not light-skinned Arabs) are subject to more harassment because they disrupt patriarchal ideas of what the feminine should be, while women who are visibly classed (i.e., who cannot avoid the streets in a private car) are subject to harassment because they are more often disrupting male-coded spaces. Sexual harassment becomes a tool of men to maintain control in a changing society.\textsuperscript{168} Notably, this theory, like many of the other theories discussed in this study, assumes that the dynamic of harassment is a heterosexual one, always perpetrated by men against women. Primarily familiar with these types of heteronormative theories prior to beginning this study, I conducted my research with a focus on harassment perpetrated by males toward females. However, as will be mentioned later, another phenomenon that was named as a problem by activists in both Egypt and Jordan was male to male harassment. As a result, this type of heteronormative theory must be expanded beyond the male/female dichotomy in order to accurately describe the reasons for street harassment in Egypt.

Another theory, propagated by Fatima Peoples, attempts to explain street harassment in Egypt in a similarly heteronormative manner, but further contextualizes the issue with an economic analysis. Perhaps as a result of the increased contextualization, Peoples’ theory has become one of the most cited reasons for the increase in street harassment in Egypt. Peoples’ argues that the increase is occurring because of high unemployment rates and an ensuing

\textsuperscript{167} Ilahi, “Gendered Contestations,” 56.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 66.
weakened patriarchal system.\textsuperscript{169} Peoples argues that the downtrodden economy makes it difficult for men to own a home or have financial stability prior to marriage, and the patriarchal standard that the man will be the economic provider in any marriage therefore prevents many men from being eligible to marry.\textsuperscript{170} As a result, these men are emasculated and take to the streets to reaffirm their fragile masculinities.\textsuperscript{171} Multiple interviewees referenced this theory implicitly, sometimes agreeing that the lack of economic opportunities in Egypt was a cause of harassment, and sometimes stating that such an argument was simply an excuse for harassers.

Straying from the theories attempting to analyze why street harassment occurs in Egypt, theorist Paul Amar developed an argument about street harassment that described it as a “nodal controversy for addressing (and deflecting) issues of labor mobility, police brutality, class conflict, youth alienation and social disintegration in an increasingly polarized polity.”\textsuperscript{172} He argues that UN campaigns used essentialist gender politics and respectability politics to address harassment, basically making harassment into a timeless problem of Arab masculinity.\textsuperscript{173} El Nadeem was one of the few organizations in Egypt to address the problem of sexual harassment outside of this framework by defining it as a “particular perversion practiced by the repressive security state.”\textsuperscript{174} According to Amar, most other NGOs, in addition to the state apparatus, used campaigns against sexual harassment to further demonize and delegitimize the working poor (many of the campaigns often targeted the working poor as the harassers).\textsuperscript{175} In fact, he argues, as soon as the state began to realize that NGOs were not addressing the role of the police and

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\textsuperscript{169} Peoples, “Street Harassment in Cairo: A Symptom of Disintegrating Social Structures.”
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 313.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., 315.
security state in the generation of sexualized violence, the government began to “enthusiastically” embrace the anti-harassment campaigns. He argues that anti-harassment campaigns were appropriated by the security state and NGO establishment “as justification for extending police brutality, mass arrests, social cleansing of the city and the necessity of the emergency decree.”

Prior to conducting interviews, I found this argument to be quite compelling, so I was sure to ask each organization what they thought about the laws against street harassment and whether they thought there was a potential for those laws to be used to target particular types of people. Interestingly, none of the organizations quite fit into Amar’s framework, and El-Nadeem itself found the argument to be not completely accurate.

Jordan

Unlike in Egypt, there is a tremendous lack of data on street harassment and activism against street harassment in Jordan. There have been no nationwide studies of the type that UN Women conducted in Egypt, and there have hardly been any formal localized studies either. The studies that have mentioned the problem of street harassment have either been informal and hyper-local, or have mentioned street harassment only briefly, as part of a larger context of social issues. Many activists that I spoke to cited the lack of research on street harassment in Jordan as one of the main reasons that there is so little activism against it. The lack of activism has meant that there is also a lack of research on activism against street harassment in Jordan (particularly compared to the research on the same topic in Egypt), so this study, by comparing Egypt and Jordan, will attempt to fill this research gap. Before delving into the interviews with anti-harassment activists, though, I will present in this section some of the studies based in Jordan that have either informally or partially examined street harassment.

\[176\] Ibid., 319.
\[177\] Ibid.
The first studies that analyzed street harassment in Jordan as a form of gender-based violence seem to have been published by international NGOs and UN agencies that were concerned with Jordan’s Syrian refugee population. For example, as part of an assessment of gender-based violence towards refugees living in Jordanian host communities, a 2012 UN Women report showed that many Syrian refugee women were did not feel safe going to the market alone because they would be singled out for harassment there. The same report also showed that many Syrian parents did not feel comfortable sending their female children to school in Jordan due to harassment they might experience from Jordanian men. Similarly, women often did not feel comfortable interacting with aid providers because of harassment they had experienced from aid providers in the past. Another report, published by CARE in 2014, showed that the situation for Syrian women in Jordan had not improved, as they were still being harassed in public based on sexualized stereotypes about Syrian women. Because of these types of reports, researchers began to wonder whether Jordanian women were also being subjected to street harassment, and combatting harassment became a self-set priority for the JNCW in 2015.

The rest of Jordanian civil society (e.g., grassroots organizations and ordinary citizens) began talking about street harassment around the same time as the international NGOs, but for different reasons. By 2012, a number of blog posts had already been written about Jordanian

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179 Ibid., 35.
180 Ibid., 41.
women’s personal experiences of harassment, and one short-lived YouTube campaign had been created to raise awareness of the issue, but public discourse about harassment in Jordan did not really begin to proliferate until an infamous event at the University of Jordan. That year, Dr. Rula Quawas, a professor and dean at the University of Jordan, allowed her students to do a project on the topic of harassment on campus. After the video project was published on YouTube, the president of the university blamed Quawas for trying to diminish the university’s reputation, and Dr. Quawas was removed from her post as dean. Her removal sparked an international outcry and caused more journalists and organizations to begin to pay attention to the topic of harassment in Jordan, so most of the studies analyzed below are at least indirectly related to the courage of Quawas and her students.

An independent Jordanian researcher conducted one of the primary studies on the topic of street harassment in February 2014. Unlike the studies by the international organizations mentioned above, this was a study that focused solely on Jordanian women’s experiences of street harassment, not on Syrian women’s general experiences in Jordan. According to this study, which was written in Arabic and not online (making it impossible to review its methodology), 53% of Jordanian women had experienced sexual harassment, the most common form of which is verbal. Based on my own experience interviewing women about harassment in Jordan, I

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find this number to be quite low, and evidence of confusion about the definition of harassment as well as evidence of a strong taboo on the issue.\footnote{Emilia Truluck, "Understanding Street Harassment in Jordan: A Comparative Analysis of Syrian Refugees’ and Jordanian Citizens’ Experiences of Street Harassment in Jordanian Host Communities," \textit{Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection} (2015), Paper 2056, \url{http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2056}.}

The idea that there is a taboo around harassment was explored in an article published later that year, by an American journalist, Elizabeth Wilson, which was devoted specifically to analyzing street harassment in Jordan.\footnote{Whitman, “As Jordanian Women Leave the Home, Sexual Harassment Reaches Unprecedented Levels.”} For this article, Wilson interviewed a number of Jordanian women about their experiences of street harassment, and concluded that, although street harassment was a problem worldwide, it was a new problem in Jordan because women had only recently started entering the workforce and occupying public space. Wilson said that, based on her interviews, the problem had reached new levels of social acceptability in the past few years, and the mentality of society was still to blame the victim. She compared the silence around harassment in Jordan in 2014 to the silence from 2009 and before around harassment in Egypt.

The taboo around discussing harassment in Jordan only recently started to break further. In the summer of 2014, an episode of mass sexual harassment in the northern city of Irbid was captured on YouTube.\footnote{"عملية تحرش جماعي بفتياتين ادت الى اندلاع مشاجرة عنيفة في مدينة أريد，“YouTube video, 5:03, posted by Anjel Barooa, July 14, 2014, \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8wUTnG8ONCE}.} Soon after the video went viral, the Jordanian government announced that it would be taking steps to revise the legal framework governing “acts which contradict the customs and morals of Jordanian society.”\footnote{Ebtihal Mahadeen, “Beyond modesty: fighting sexual harassment in Jordan,” \textit{Al-Araby}, December 21, 2014, \url{https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/e1036955-a010-47d3-8a7e-e82341cf9413}.} Presumably, harassment would be included as one of these acts, a classification that a number of feminists and organizations, including the JNCW,
have critiqued.\textsuperscript{190} According to them, the definition of harassment should be grounded in ideas of gender inequality, not nebulous ideas of modesty and morals. Defining harassment with the rhetoric of modesty and morals would make it too easy for the government and society to blame the phenomenon of harassment on the harassed.

After the 2014 episode, a few different local studies on harassment were published. One, based on a poll of 200 randomly selected female students from six Jordanian universities, showed that 67\% of the female students had been exposed to one or more episodes of sexual harassment, and 30\% of the students had been harassed and threatened with failing a class if they told anyone.\textsuperscript{191} An article written about the study results stated that at least one female professor had tried to help victimized students lodge formal complaints about the harassment, but that the university’s administration had refused to hear them.\textsuperscript{192} Another study, conducted informally by 4Youth Magazine, focused on the reasons why voters believed that harassment happened rather than on the prevalence of harassment. That study found that 53.55\% of voters believed that lack of awareness throughout the early stages of education was the main cause of harassment, and 20\% believed that customs and traditions were the cause of harassment.\textsuperscript{193}

Analyzing the Activism

Informed by theories of social movements and civil society, as well as the literature on activism against street harassment in Egypt and Jordan, I analyzed nine different facets of each organization that I selected. First, I analyzed how they defined the problem of harassment: where they believed it occurred, who they believed it occurred to, what they believed the harassment

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
was, why they believed it happened, its historical context, and how they came to recognize it as a problem. Next, I analyzed the rhetoric of each organization’s representative about the taboo of street harassment: whether the taboo continued to exist and if it had adapted over time, as well as how it affected the activities of the organization. Third, I analyzed the inclusivity of each group by determining whether they used culturally sensitive rhetoric, whether they included men, or whether they dealt with harassment in a non-heteronormative framework. I then analyzed the methods of each organization. Next, I analyzed the NGO-ization of each organization: whether there was a hierarchy, a reliance on grants, a project-based mode of activism, the presence of qualified staff, or a method of monitoring and evaluation. Fifth, I analyzed each group’s internationalization by determining whether they received international funding, used an internationally recognized definition of street harassment, gained publicity from the international press, or utilized statistics and information from international bodies. Then I analyzed the groups’ various sources of funding and their registration status with the government. Finally, I analyzed the relationships between the different organizations, as well as the ways that they either confronted the government or avoided government persecution. This method of analysis enabled me to create a theory to explain the differences in the anti-harassment movements and patriarchal structures in Egypt and Jordan.

**Chapter 4: Activism Against Street Harassment in Egypt**

This chapter is comprised of the data that I gathered and analysis that I conducted based on interviews with representatives of eight Egyptian women’s rights organizations and anti-harassment initiatives. Four of these organizations (EIPR, HarassMap, El Nadeem, and Nazra) were founded prior to the uprising of 2011, three of the organizations (Basma, Binat Masr Khat Ahmar, and Ded Taharosh) were founded during the uprising, and one of the organizations
(Igmadi) was founded after the uprising. Two of the organizations (Basma and Nazra) are registered as NGOs, two of the organizations are registered as private companies (EIPR and Igmadi), two are not registered (Binat Masr Khat Ahmar and Ded Taharosh), one of the organizations (HarassMap) is currently seeking registration as an NGO, and one is registered as a clinic (El Nadeem). These interviews illustrate how the Egyptian organizations are working together to form a movement against street harassment in a country where the formerly implicit disciplinary patriarchal structure is collapsing and perpetrating frequent, direct violence against them.

HarassMap

HarassMap, the largest and first Egyptian independent initiative devoted solely to combatting street harassment, was created in 2005 by four women: three Egyptians and one American. The co-founders of HarassMap believed that, rather than waiting for the government to act on the issue, or for the existing laws about sexual harassment to be enforced, they would have to do grassroots advocacy in order to address society’s acceptance of sexual harassment. In order to delve deeper into the work of HarassMap, I explored its very professional bilingual website and conducted an interview of Noora Flinkman, a Swedish woman who joined HarassMap in 2012 after conducting research in Egypt for her Master’s thesis. She currently serves as HarassMap’s director of marketing and communications, and she spoke to me as a professional representative of the organization.

One of HarassMap’s most important contributions to anti-harassment activism in Egypt has been its extensive definition of harassment. As Flinkman told me, there is a lot of confusion around the topic of harassment in Egypt. She explained,

We have a problem of knowledge in general when it comes to sexual harassment. Some people will call rape “harassment” instead of calling it rape, for example. In the same way, people call harassment “flirting” [even] when it’s harassment, not flirting. Of course, flirting is something completely different. But there’s a lot of misunderstanding with the terminology…people use terminology like “flirting” a lot to belittle the problem somehow. It’s often like, “Well, this is just what boys do, boys will be boys,” just like everywhere.195

Aware of the misunderstanding of harassment as a word and as a concept, the members of HarassMap created a comprehensive definition of sexual harassment (available on their website and mentioned earlier in this study) by researching the ways that Egyptians and the international community talked about harassment, and then added to those definitions by including examples from their own experiences. Notably, the definition changes as the types of harassment faced by Egyptian women change (e.g., phone calls were added when they became a more frequent method of harassment). Because HarassMap is focused on combatting all forms of harassment, a goal that is reflected in their definition, it can be frustrating for them when researchers focus solely on the sexual assaults and violent harassment that accompanied the uprising. Though Flinkman herself recognizes a link between the uprising and harassment, she laments that there is so much more about the topic of sexual harassment in Egypt that still has yet to be studied. For her, sexual harassment is one of the top challenges faced by women in Egypt today, as it affects their mobility, safety, and security, and is not just a byproduct of the uprising.

Prior to the uprising, street harassment existed, but there was a much greater taboo around it. Flinkman herself remembers that when she first came to Egypt, she saw harassment and experienced it herself, but that “everyone just pretended like they didn’t see anything.”196 Similarly, when she first started working at HarassMap, there were hardly any studies on sexual

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196 Ibid.
harassment in Egypt. She says that when HarassMap first launched, “[sexual harassment] was a huge problem, but no one was talking about it and no one wanted to talk about it so there was no media attention, there was no public debate, nothing.” Instead, most Egyptians, including those in university administrations, would argue that sexual harassment did not occur in Egypt, or that it was a foreign problem. The Egyptian uprising brought a proliferation of discourse around harassment, causing more people today to acknowledge the presence of sexual harassment in Egypt (however, it has not helped with the confusion around whose fault the harassment is or why it happens). According to Flinkman, this proliferation of discourse has made many people assume that harassment in Egypt is now more rampant than it was before. However, she says that confirming such an assumption would be difficult because of the lack of research and discourse on harassment prior to the uprising.

Importantly, Flinkman sees the problem of harassment as related to flaws in the Egyptian legal system. For example, Flinkman notes how there is currently a law against sexual harassment that is relatively thorough in its definition of the act of harassment, but is not being implemented. She states,

> From what we understand from our work, it seems as if a lot of people who were supposed to be implementing the law don’t even know about it. In general, there’s this perception in society that sexual harassment is not a crime. So, if you don’t think that sexual harassment is a crime, you’re very unlikely to be taking it seriously when someone comes into the police station to report it. There are a lot of problems with this, because there are perceptions that women deserve it, she provoked someone to do whatever he did, etc. So there’s this blaming, this idea that the one who should be punished is the women or the girl rather than the harasser, usually. This is the problem… When this mentality is there, the law is less likely to be implemented and implemented well.

As she points out, the problem with harassment in Egypt is not limited to the act of harassment itself, but is related to a broader misunderstanding of what harassment is (i.e., no recognition that

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197 Ibid.  
198 Ibid.
harassment is a crime), a mindset that those who are harassed provoked their harasser, and an ultimate lack of implementation of the law against harassment. This understanding of the problem as something broader than the act itself, something embedded in the social norms of modern Egyptian public spaces, affects the methods that HarassMap uses to combat street harassment.

HarassMap’s primary method of combatting street harassment is through its mapping initiative. Launched in December 2010, the Map is a crowdsourced visual representation of the reports of harassment that people have filed with HarassMap via SMS, phone, or the online form.199 The Map is used to support “an offline community mobilization effort to break stereotypes, stop making excuses for perpetrators, and to convince people to speak out and act against harassment.”200 The crowd-sourced information from the Map is used to support the organization’s annual reports about the status of harassment in Egypt, which is in turn used to create communications campaigns on both traditional and social media that aim to dispel myths about sexual harassment.

In addition to running the Map, HarassMap trains hundreds of volunteers from around Egypt to speak to shopkeepers, taxi drivers, and university administrators about creating “harassment-free zones.”201 During her interview, Flinkman explained how the campaign to create “harassment-free zones” had evolved from an initiative with a small group of volunteers to a project with formal corporate partners:

Previously we just had groups of volunteers that would go in the streets and try to talk to people…to convince them to make their little area a zero tolerance zone, for example. This became a bit more institutionalized when we started to create partnerships with shop owners, restaurant owners, cafe owners, and even just people who sell stuff in the streets.

199 “How and Why We Began,” HarassMap.
200 Ibid.
201 “What We Do,” HarassMap.
We tried also with taxi drivers and microbus drivers to have a more formalized partnership where they actually sign something and they take some training and they have some commitments that they’re supposed to follow when it comes to continuing to stand up against sexual harassment when they see it happening, etc… We’ve been piloting this for a while to see how it works and this last year, in 2015, we started to work with bigger companies. So our first partnership was with Uber, the taxi company, maybe you know it? We basically partnered with them to train their staff who then are giving a training on sexual harassment to all their drivers. So all the drivers have to take this. It’s a very short training, but still, a training on sexual harassment, [about] what it is, [what the] laws [are] and what the company’s policy is against it, etc. Also as part of the partnership the drivers have to sign a pledge saying that they will stand up against sexual harassment if they see it happening etc. So this is the first partnership and it was launched in September or October last year. But we hope to continue with this in 2016, of course. But it’s not easy, actually. Because when you deal with companies, they’re businesses and maybe their biggest interest is to do business, so it’s difficult. Even with smaller businesses, like with cafes, etc. to find time for them to take some time off to receive the training, and then for them to prioritize this throughout, it’s difficult. You have to find the people who are already with you… who are already supporting the cause. Then they will take time to do all of this work.\textsuperscript{202}

As she makes clear, the initiative began as something hyper-local, dependent upon volunteers, and evolved into something that could be used to do corporate training for international companies with branches in Egypt.

Currently, Flinkman believes the greatest resistance to the harassment-free zones initiative comes from Egyptian universities. Although HarassMap is training university students to raise awareness about street harassment on their campuses, many of the university administrators do not want to admit that their university is a site of sexual harassment of students. Cairo University is currently the only university that has agreed to transgress the taboo against harassment by implementing an anti-sexual harassment policy (one that was created by HarassMap) and to create a committee for overseeing harassment cases. Flinkman is hopeful that Cairo University’s actions will help change the environment around sexual harassment at other Egyptian universities.

\textsuperscript{202} Noora Flinkman, interview by author, January 27, 2016.
In order to educate Egyptians who are not already spending the majority of their time in public spaces or at universities, HarassMap has implemented at least one TV and radio campaign about street harassment. This campaign, which ran right before Ramadan last year, focused on creating negative associations with harassment and positive associations with taking action against harassment. After the campaign was over, HarassMap hosted an online survey to determine whether people who had seen or heard the campaign on TV or radio had changed their opinion of street harassment, whether it had convinced them that street harassment was a crime, or whether it had made them decide to intervene in cases of street harassment in the future. More than 600 people responded to the survey and the “huge majority” said that they believed harassment was a crime and that they would intervene, which suggests that HarassMap’s multi-pronged approach to street harassment is effective.\(^{203}\) Another reason that this type of education campaign might have been so effective is that HarassMap does not label itself as a feminist organization or a women’s rights organization, but as an initiative that is working on harassment. According to Flinkman, by avoiding the label of “feminist,” HarassMap avoids causing further confusion (by having to explain what feminism is) and is able to reach out more effectively to broad swaths of the population.\(^{204}\)

Ultimately, HarassMap is an example of an anti-harassment initiative that has become both NGO-ized and internationalized but has still maintained its effectiveness. Although it began as a group of volunteers working together on anti-harassment campaigns after their regular jobs, on the weekends and in the evenings, it became more formalized and hired its first staff members in 2012. Two of the staff members were not Egyptian, including one co-founder and my interviewee, but this seems to have had little effect on the organization (the two non-Egyptian

\(^{203}\) Ibid.  
\(^{204}\) Ibid.
staff members are careful not to participate in any of the activities in the streets in order to avoid de-legitimizing the organization). Also in 2012, HarassMap became “incubated” (i.e., hosted) under the NGO Nahdat El Mahrous, meaning that it became able to apply for funding and hire staff without independently registering with the government (at that point, they did not feel established enough to seek registration on their own). After becoming eligible for funding, HarassMap quickly became project-based and grant reliant. Its first funds, from a Canadian research agency, were earmarked for a particular 2-year research project about using crowdsourcing as a method for doing research on street harassment. HarassMap also began to realize the importance of monitoring and evaluation. They would review their projects and then use the review to make their programming more effective. According to Flinkman, this process of NGO-ization did not change the core of HarassMap’s work, but simply gave them a firmer foundation. Though they may have an NGO-ized focus on specific projects, they have not lost sight of their ultimate goal of making public spaces safer for women, nor have they become internationalized to the point of losing control over their contextually-specific concerns. Because NGO-ization has had a positive effect on HarassMap, they are currently seeking official registration as an independent (not incubated) organization.

Regardless of pending registration, NGO-ization, or internationalization, HarassMap has become a trademark of the anti-harassment movement in Egypt and has become an organization with which almost every other organization I studied has collaborated. HarassMap lists a number of partners on their website, including the Goethe Institute, which allows them to host events at their premises, Ded Taharosh which partners with them to create Community Mobilization activities, Efdah Motaharosh which shares reports and collaborates on campaigns with them, and

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205 Ibid.
} Additionally, Flinkman says that HarassMap has good relations with other groups working on sexual harassment and that they have partnered with many of them for trainings and workshops. The one exception to this rule is the NCW, as Flinkman says “It’s not very impactful or effective to work with them from what we’ve seen so far.” She continues,

It’s really important for us that what we do has an impact, and [that] it’s a practical impact, not just a lot of talking. I think this makes us very different from the National Council for Women because they’re a lot about talking and not so much about action or impact on the ground. It’s very problematic because they’re also related to the Ministry of Interior, etc. So it makes it difficult…now I saw actually that they’ve completely reformed the Council and I don’t know who’s in it or how it works now--this was just recently--but so far there have also been individuals within the Council with very problematic views on violence against women [about] whose fault it is and whose fault it’s not, etc. So we’ve never seen it as important to work with them.\footnote{Noora Flinkman, interview by author, January 27, 2016.}

In contrast to their avoidance of the NCW, HarassMap is eager to work with groups who provide support and other services to harassed women, or groups that target potential harassers, as they fill needs and provide services that HarassMap cannot.

El Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture

Though not a solely harassment-focused organization, El Nadeem is the oldest organization I researched, having started in 1993, and it is also the most confrontational toward the government. During its first year of existence, it restricted itself to providing direct psychological services to victims of torture (which they define as any form of violence perpetrated by the state) and providing legal and medical reports of its services when
necessary. Later, it began publishing reports about torture in Egypt, and it also expanded its focus to include violence against women. In 2000, it published a shadow report on CEDAW’s implementation. In order to create a profile of El Nadeem, I read a number of reports to which El Nadeem had contributed and interviewed Farah Shash, a self-defined feminist and a psychologist who joined the organization in 2012. Although Shash is currently only working for El Nadeem part-time, providing consultancy work, she has performed a variety of roles at El Nadeem, including providing psychological services to female survivors of violence, conducting research, and collaborating with El Nadeem’s lawyers on policy drafts.

Before further analysis of the work that El Nadeem does as it relates to harassment, it is important to note that El Nadeem considers sexual harassment to be a form of violence against women. Extending that logic, because it is a form of violence, when sexual harassment is perpetrated by the state, El Nadeem considers it a form of torture. For example, El Nadeem considers much of the harassment that occurred in Tahrir Square during the uprising to be torture, as much of it was perpetrated by the Ministry of Interior and security forces, and the state had a responsibility to stop the violence. However, when it comes to violence against women, El Nadeem does not limit itself to torture, but also helps survivors of violence perpetrated by other Egyptian civilians. One type of violence that El Nadeem addresses in its activities is harassment, which El Nadeem defines as any non-consensual act that has a sexual meaning. Unlike other people I interviewed, who gave a heteronormative definition until pressed further, Shash further elaborated on El Nadeem’s definition by saying that it didn’t matter which gender perpetrated harassment or which gender experienced harassment, but that it was “consent and acceptance”

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209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
that mattered for an act to be considered sexual harassment.\textsuperscript{211} When I asked what she thought of scholar Paul Amar’s placement of the responsibility for harassment in Egypt solely at the feet of the state, she said,

\begin{quote}
I do agree that violence against women is a political thing, it’s a political issue, and I do believe that we need to state it [harassment] as a political issue to actually get political will to able to make any kind of difference. But you can’t deny the social aspect that comes with it [harassment], the conservatism and patriarchy and so many other things that are involved.\textsuperscript{212}
\end{quote}

Based on these statements from Shash, it is evident that El Nadeem does not limit its definition of harassment to state-perpetrated activities, nor does it assume the event is heteronormative (with a man as the harasser of a woman). Instead, El Nadeem sees harassment as a sexual act that is committed without the consent of both parties, as something that must be combatted by the state, and as something that has been created, at least partially, by the social mores of Egypt. This definition of the problem makes El Nadeem closer to the other anti-harassment organizations than it might first seem.

The one part of El Nadeem’s understanding of harassment as a problem that makes it different from other anti-harassment organizations, at least publicly, is the way that it recognizes how the state not only fails to prosecute sexual harassment, but also how the state previously perpetrated sexual harassment. When questioned about why she believed the rate of street harassment was higher in Egypt than in other countries, she answered,

\begin{quote}
It’s so many factors…I think when things [harassment] started, they were, number one, not criminalized by the state and they were actually practices that were used by the state…[harassment] is a practice that the state used and it’s not criminalized! And victim blaming is unbelievable. So the main message that was used was, “Ok, it’s her problem, not the perpetrator.” They [Egyptians] blame it on the economy, they blame it on education, they blame it on everything, but this is what has been happening for years, and it takes a lot of effort to actually change the final message that should be used, [which] should be to change the culture of victim-blaming in general. Also, [there have been] political and social
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{211} Farah Shash, interviewed by author, January 23, 2016.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid.
changes. I mean, Egypt has been becoming extremely conservative since the end of the 70s and throughout the 80s and that could be for several, several reasons, [like] political changes or economic changes and millions of people going to Saudi Arabia and getting affected by Wahhabi kind of thought and coming back with that. And I think it’s very oppressive to women. And so many other political and social changes that I think can also affect them [such as] lack of gender mainstreaming in Egyptian education. [There is] horrible, horrible education and gender segregation within the Egyptian curriculum… [there are] so many factors [that contribute to street harassment in Egypt].  

Shash locates the problem of street harassment very clearly in a broader political and social trend of conservatism in Egypt, but she is hesitant to say that it is linked only to a poor economy or education system. She suggests that street harassment is a manifestation of increased Islamic conservatism in Egypt and claims that same conservatism caused Egyptians to blame the victims of harassment instead of the harassers. Though she mentions the use of harassment by the government, she does not suggest that it is wrong to ask the government now to enforce laws against harassment, illustrating that, as the government changes, so does El Nadeem’s expectations of it.

Although El Nadeem is focused on providing direct services to survivors of sexual violence and torture, it conducted some of the first research on street harassment in Egypt in 2007. At that time, El Nadeem found that 64% of women in Egypt had been harassed. When asked how that number could have changed so drastically from 2007 and 2013, when UN Women found that 99.3% of Egyptian women had experienced harassment, Shash stated that, in 2007, “people didn’t really know what harassment was.” However, now, she says

The term [taharosh/harassment] itself is… used more than we used to use it and there’s no negativity or taboo attached to it so everybody talks about sexual harassment and that’s fine. So I guess maybe that [an increase in harassment] could be the case. I can’t really claim that harassment has increased or decreased or whatever, and until this day I can’t

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213 Ibid.
really claim this. So what I know is that awareness has increased and the way that we use the term now is very different from before.\textsuperscript{216}

In other words, Shash believes that the taboo around discussing harassment in the public sphere in Egypt has decreased, causing more women to admit to being harassed (she states later that it is still taboo to talk about sexual violence in the private sphere). Similar to Flinkman from HarassMap, Shash says that this decrease in taboo makes it difficult to determine whether harassment has actually increased in the past few decades. Shash herself was affected by the taboo, as she first said she became aware of harassment as a problem in Egypt in 2009, when the media started talking about it. However, upon further questioning, she revealed that she was harassed all the time when leaving high school in 2003 and 2004. She had coded her own memories to accord with when harassment started becoming a publicly recognized problem in Egypt, which suggests that many other women have probably done the same. Therefore, even though some studies on harassment existed prior to the uprising, because of the taboo and lack of awareness about street harassment at the time, they did not reveal the extent of the problem.

Though the taboo around harassment has broken since the founding of El Nadeem, the work of El Nadeem has changed very little. There are two departments in El Nadeem: one that focuses on providing services to survivors of torture, and one that is focused on women survivors of violence. Although the organization is focused on providing psychological rehabilitation to both types of survivors, Shash herself represents the diversity of work that the organization does. A psychologist, Shash also does research, analysis, and advocacy for the organization, and she works with the lawyers who are contracted out by the organization to create policy bills and drafts of laws. Although El Nadeem began in 1993 solely as a provider of psychological services to torture survivors, its leadership realized that psychological support was “not enough to

\textsuperscript{216} Ibid.
actually rehabilitate the survivor” so it started adding legal support, advocacy, and documentation services.\textsuperscript{217} The legal support services in particular became very important to harassment survivors; however, in 2015, increased pressure from the state forced El Nadeem to shut down its legal department.

Importantly, El Nadeem was originally established as a nonprofit company in 1993, but it had to end that part of its activities in 2015 and shift its activity to being solely a clinic. As a result, El Nadeem is currently registered as a clinic. El Nadeem has not sought registration as an NGO because, in the words of Shash,

\begin{quote}
We can’t be working against the Ministry of Interior and its practices and get an approval from the Ministry of Interior for everything that we do. And state security [we can’t work with] as well. So, no, this is one huge issue that we can’t really deal with. The other thing is that the main thing we do is provide psychological support. So we chose to stick to those kinds of activities and focus on them. I think the alternative would be [to] shut down because they wouldn’t give us registration anyway.\textsuperscript{218}
\end{quote}

Notably, El Nadeem reduced its services in order to maintain some form of registration with the government, suggesting how important registration is in the current political climate and how difficult it is to get registered as an NGO.

Even though it is obvious that El Nadeem has been careful with its registration status in order to avoid persecution by the state, on the day of the interview in mid-January, Shash confided that the situation in Egypt was “nothing very good right now” for El Nadeem.\textsuperscript{219} Then, on February 17, 2016, about one month after the interview, “two police officers from the Azbakeyya District authority and one city employee ordered the employees of the Nadeem Center to leave the center’s premises.”\textsuperscript{220} El Nadeem was served an “administrative closure

\textsuperscript{217} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{220} “Egypt: Threat of imminent closure of the El Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation for Victims of Violence and Torture,” World Organization Against Torture, last modified February
order” from the Ministry of Health and the Azbakeyya district authority for “breaching license [registration] conditions.” On February 24, the Ministry of Health claimed that El Nadeem had committed two legal violations by changing its name and the nature of its activity, but the center’s director argued that the government was “fabricating facts.” The center had been registered as a clinic since 2003, but according to the Ministry of Health, had changed the nature of its activity from a medical to a rights center, a change that violated the registration laws. El Nadeem is currently refusing to shut down, having contracted a lawyer, and the threat of closure has not stopped it from publishing its February 2016 report on Ministry of Interior violations against Egyptian citizens and prisoners.

Keeping in mind the current situation being faced by El Nadeem, one begins to understand more deeply how the NGO-ization of feminist civil society in the Arab world is undermining some of the more radical Arab feminist organizations. By forcing organizations like El Nadeem to register as NGOs, while simultaneously preventing organizations as radical as El Nadeem from obtaining the proper registration, the Egyptian government attempts to maintain control over the Egyptian feminist movement. At this point, El Nadeem is neither an NGO according to its registration records, nor an NGO in its lack of monitoring and evaluation (mentioned in the interview). In fact, the only two ways that El Nadeem resembles other NGOs in Egypt is the fact

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221 Ibid.


223 Ibid.

that it has a small highly qualified staff that does the bulk of the organization’s work and that it relies on funding from international organizations that are not affiliated with international governments.\textsuperscript{225}

Similar to other organizations, including HarassMap, El Nadeem does not officially collaborate with the NCW, because, according to Shash, the NCW’s positions have been “very, very bad” in the past, and because the NCW was silent during the violence perpetrated against women in 2013 and 2014.\textsuperscript{226} She says that the members of the NCW do not believe that violence by the state is a type of violence against women, which makes it difficult for El Nadeem to work with them. However, she added, if the NCW needed informal consultancy, El Nadeem would do it. This tentative willingness to collaborate with the NCW makes El Nadeem surprisingly a bit more willing to collaborate with them than other anti-harassment organizations.

Although the government may continue to try to persecute El Nadeem, it will undoubtedly remain an integral part of Egyptian feminist civil society. In the words of Shash, one of El Nadeem’s biggest assets is its “very strong link with the other feminist organizations” in Egypt.\textsuperscript{227} She says that they all work like they’re one big organization, filling in each other’s gaps and “building on each other’s work in a very good way.” Contrary to political scientist Paul Amar’s argument that El-Nadeem’s effort to expose state-sponsored violence toward female protestors was undermined by the work of internationalized anti-harassment NGOs, Shash believes that all of the feminist organizations in Egypt realize that violence against women is a political issue and that the state must take greater responsibility for it.\textsuperscript{228} However, not every organization is focused on confronting the government—instead, the organizations have “divided

\textsuperscript{225} Farah Shash, interviewed by author, January 23, 2016.
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.
Like Flinkman from HarassMap, Shash believes that the fight against street harassment in Egypt would not be nearly as strong without the variety of organizations currently combatting the issue.

**Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights**

Established in 2002, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) works to strengthen basic rights and freedoms in Egypt “through research, advocacy and support litigation in the fields of civil liberties, economic and social rights, and criminal justice.” Similarly to El Nadeem, the (EIPR), was founded before HarassMap, is quite confrontational, and focuses on a variety of human rights issues. Like El Nadeem, the EIPR is most known for its role in speaking out against government-perpetrated harassment. One of the most famous instances of EIPR’s work against harassment occurred after the anti-Mubarak protests on May 25, 2005. The EIPR blogged that a group of thugs hired by the Ministry of Interior were responsible for sexually assaulting female journalists and protestors, and on May 18, 2006, the EIPR filed a complaint against the government with the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights. In 2013, the Commission reached a verdict that the government was responsible for the assaults, and called for reparations to be paid to the victims, but the verdict is yet to be heeded by the government. Nonetheless, the verdict is hailed as one of the EIPR’s many achievements. In order to delve deeper into the work of the EIPR, I interviewed Dalia Abdel Hamid, a pharmacist who joined the EIPR in 2010 to fulfill her lifelong dream of working for a human rights

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232 Ibid.
organization. She currently serves as the gender and women’s rights officer at the EIPR, so she coordinates all of their work around issues of gender and sexuality.

The EIPR has had a focus on gender and sexuality issues ever since its founding, but for a while, the programs were not named as such.\(^{233}\) The EIPR began to specifically address sexual harassment and assault as human rights violations in 2005 and later during the uprising. Similar to El Nadeem, the EIPR’s definition of sexual harassment covers a multitude of nonverbal and verbal gestures of a sexual nature that are not consensual. According to Abdel Hamid, the phenomenon of sexual harassment is a result of a “general sexism in the public space.”\(^{234}\) This “general sexism” is responsible for a number of different types of discrimination faced by women in Egypt. Abdel Hamid gave an example of one manifestation of this sexism:

> [For example, people] trying to impose a specific attire on women in specific places. Whether its a ban on the face veil, or banning specific women who are veiled from entering specific spaces, all these restrictions on attire reflect how the society is thinking about women as bearers of identity and how both the state and society want women to be dressed in a certain way to market a specific image about, you know, this society or the state.\(^{235}\)

Because the EIPR perceives sexual harassment as something that is inseparable from other issues of gender inequality in Egyptian society, they have not limited themselves to combatting only harassment. Instead, they have taken a more “holistic approach,” to their work, addressing a broader swath of human and personal rights.\(^{236}\)

Like the representatives of other anti-harassment organizations, Abdel Hamid mentioned the past taboo around discussing sexual harassment and the related “normalization” and “social

\(^{233}\) Dalia Abdel Hamid, interviewed by author, January 21, 2016.
\(^{234}\) Ibid.
\(^{235}\) Ibid.
\(^{236}\) Ibid.
decriminalization” of sexual violence that led to people not condemning the perpetrators.\textsuperscript{237} These facets of the problem led Abdel Hamid to claim that sexual harassment in Egypt really was worse than in other countries, a claim that other activists were hesitant to make. However, she was also quick to admit that there had been very little comparative research done on the problem of sexual harassment in Egypt as compared to the problem in any other country, so it was difficult for her to say why the magnitude of the problem in Egypt was so great.

Interestingly, all of her statements about the normalization of harassment in Egypt, and its severity as a problem, were made in the past tense, which she herself pointed out. She believes that the taboo around sexual harassment began to break about five years ago, thanks to sustained activism against harassment, and she uses the new article in the law about sexual harassment to support her argument. She describes the way that the new article about sexual harassment is being utilized because of the breaking of the taboo,

Now, specifically the sexual harassment article, not the rest of the sexual violence articles, but at least [the sexual harassment article] is good enough. It is considerably implemented, not because of the political will of the state as much as because [of] the strong will of the women and young girls in this country. Now more girls are encouraged to submit online testimonies, to go on TV and talk about it [harassment], …and to go to the police stations and … report. And [organizations] even pressure the police person to be more responsive to the survivors, to be more attendant to them, and to accept them more. In the beginning there was not a friendly reception from the police to the survivors of violence. But because of the ongoing activism and because of the “naming and shaming” … and the social media--[like] when survivors used to photograph harassers and perpetrators, to publish their car numbers, to go and publish their testimony if they went to a police station [and had a bad experience at the police station]--all this made a paradigm shift in how the police and the society and the state in general is addressing the problem of sexual violence.\textsuperscript{238}

Interestingly, she believes that the new law against harassment is being implemented because women themselves are now more empowered. As I will show, other organizations do not believe that the environment around sexual harassment in Egypt has progressed quite this much.

\textsuperscript{237} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{238} Ibid.
The majority of the EIPR’s activism on sexual harassment seems to have taken place during and immediately after the uprising. Abdel Hamid describes the evolution of the EIPR’s work on the topic:

Before the revolution we used to do research and policy briefs, and part of this was on gender-based violence, including sexual violence. After the revolution [began], in 2012, we co-founded Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment, which used to intervene directly in the mass sexual assaults that were happening in Tahrir Square. After that, and after 2013 specifically, we participated in the workshops and meetings for legal reform regarding sexual violence crimes, and now we are back to work[ing] on policy levels. So, we had a commentary on the national strategy about combatting violence against women, and now we are trying to have some campaigns encouraging women to report sexual violence crimes. As I told you, we have a comprehensive approach towards gender and sexuality, so the latest campaign we had was about comprehensive sexuality education, including, you know, the importance of educating people about how to step up for themselves, specifically in issues related to domestic violence and other crimes of sexual violence, not only related to sexual harassment.\footnote{Ibid.}

Unlike El Nadeem and HarassMap, the EIPR is not focused on providing services to victims of sexual harassment, but has instead included advocacy against sexual harassment in its larger campaigns against sexual violence. When a need arose in 2012 for more interventionist tactics, the EIPR co-founded Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment and then returned to addressing sexual harassment through policy creation and modification. In their policy work, they were often directly confrontational of the government, a role that would not be expected based on their NGO-ization.

The EIPR is partly NGO-ized and internationalized in the sense that it has a small staff of qualified individuals, receives funds from international organizations, and participates in international conferences and advocacy. Certain jobs at the EIPR, such as the reproductive and sexual health researcher positions, even require a medical background (Abdel Hamid has a pharmacy degree). However, the EIPR is not NGO-ized or internationalized in every respect; in fact, Abdel Hamid made it quite clear that the EIPR does not do work on a project basis (like
most NGOs) but instead takes a more holistic, social change focused approach to its work. Similarly, Abdel Hamid stated that they have shifted their advocacy farther away from international issues since 2011 and have re-focused themselves on the national context. Finally, the EIPR is registered as a consultation company, not an NGO, as the laws around NGOs are “very draconian” and “allow a lot of intervention in [their] work.”

Since the EIPR participated in an interview with me, they, like El Nadeem, have come under closer scrutiny by the government for “illegally receiving foreign funding”. In February, the founder of EIPR, Hossam Bahgat, was told that he was banned from leaving Egypt, and in March, his assets were frozen by a court order, pending investigation. Heba Morayef, the EIPR’s associate director, has told Reuters that she expects the assets freeze to extend to the group as a whole, possible forcing the EIPR office to close. Morayef has said that the Egyptian security agencies see human rights organizations as part of a “global conspiracy to sow chaos,” which has caused them to crack down recently on human rights organizations, particularly those with members who were active in the uprisings of 2011. This example, along with the former example of El Nadeem, proves that NGO-ization is not nearly as much of a threat to Egyptian anti-harassment initiatives as the government itself is. The EIPR, in order to avoid the government regulation of NGOs, registered itself as a company, but the government has not

240 Ibid.
allowed the organization’s registration status to protect it from the ongoing crackdown on human
rights organizations. In the current political climate of Egypt, no independent rights-based
organization is safe.

As would be expected by an organization part of such a contentious relationship with the
government, the EIPR is wary about working with the NCW. Although Abdel Hamid did not
state that the EIPR never works with the NCW, she did say that they work with the NCW “from
a distance.” 244 She claimed that the NCW was the most important body working on gender
issues, and that the NCW has included representatives from the EIPR in discussions about how
the NCW’s national strategy to combat violence against women could be improved. However,
she also said it was impossible for the EIPR to attend all of the meetings because they are under-
staffed and argued that they would “rather keep a distance” that would allow them (the EIPR) to
criticize the NCW. 245 Ultimately, for the EIPR it is important to be in conversation with the
NCW even if the EIPR is not fully supportive of the NCW’s agenda.

The EIPR, like HarassMap and El Nadeem, is also in continuous contact with the other
feminist organizations in Egypt. However, Abdel Hamid has also been openly critical of at least
one of the newer anti-harassment initiatives, Elbesi Fustanik (Put on your dress), because of its
equation of dresses with femininity and its fascination with a mythically free time of the
1960s. 246 I asked Abdel Hamid whether she thought the romanticization of the 1960s was a
problem perpetuated by many of the other anti-harassment initiatives, and to my surprise, she
said no, that “many of [the anti-harassment campaigns] are feminist and gender sensitive…and

244 Dalia Abdel Hamid, interviewed by author, January 21, 2016.
245 Ibid.
246 Hala Ali, “Egyptian women urged to ‘put on your dress’,” Al-Monitor, September 18, 2015,
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/egypt-put-on-your-dress-campaign-sexual-
harassment.html.
She connected the romanitization of the 1960s with a certain type of pseudo-feminism that was not necessarily popular amongst anti-harassment organizations in Egypt. Her statements showed that anti-harassment organizations and initiatives in Egypt are quite diverse, and not always in helpful ways, but that there are ultimately enough anti-harassment organizations with similar philosophies that effective partnerships can be made.

Nazra for Feminist Studies

Nazra was the last organization I could find with an anti-harassment campaign that was established prior to the uprising. Founded in 2007, Nazra is a group that aims to build the Egyptian feminist movement, as its members believe that “feminism and gender are political and social issues affecting freedom and development in all societies.” In order to achieve their goals, Nazra does research, develops relevant Arabic terminologies, supports women human rights defenders, supports women in politics, litigates for local/regional/international gender cases, advocates integration of gender issues into the political and social contexts, networks with movements and stakeholders to build a strong feminist movement, and uses art to raise awareness of feminist issues. To find out more about Nazra’s general functioning as an organization, as well as about its campaigns against harassment, I interviewed Mahy Hassan. A self-defined feminist, Hassan joined Nazra in 2013 as a facilitator at Nazra’s feminist school and now serves as the campaigns coordinator of the Women Human Rights Defenders program.

Hassan referred to HarassMap’s definition of sexual harassment when asked for Nazra’s definition, and explained that there continues to be a confusion about the definition of harassment in Egypt. Like the representatives of other organization, Hassan stated that many

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249 Mahy Hassan, interviewed by author, January 18, 2016.
people confuse flirting and harassment, and that they will use the word for flirting particularly when they are trying to undermine the harm of the harassment that occurred. Like Abdel Hamid from the EIPR, Hassan also argued that the rate of harassment was higher in Egypt than in other countries, and like Flinkman from HarassMap, she labeled harassment as one of the top problems being faced by women in Egypt. Explaining her belief that harassment is one of the major problems for Egyptian women, Hassan says

I can’t walk three streets without having three fights, at least [laughing]. [You can’t walk without] someone throwing a word or looking at you or staring at you…of course you feel insecure in the street wherever you go. You have to take some precautions or you have to be from a certain class to avoid that [because] you either to have a car, your own car, or you can afford taking a cab. But [you can’t just take] any cab…because also taxi drivers, they harass women. But Uber for instance [is safe]. This makes it harder for women from different classes to avoid sexual harassment.\textsuperscript{250}

Notably Hassan was the first activist I spoke to who included a class analysis in her description of the problem of harassment. She was adamant that women with lower socio-economic status confronted harassment more regularly than other women, suggesting that, in order for the problem of harassment to truly be addressed, activists would have to fight for a change to the environment of the public sphere, rather than for the creation of services that might allow women to avoid the public sphere. This belief in broad social change is undoubtedly one of the reasons that the Nazra does not focus on providing services but instead focuses on popular education and lobbying campaigns.

In defining the reasons for harassment, Hassan listed the culture of Egypt, the impunity toward harassers, and the overpopulation and poverty in Egypt as potential reasons for its high rate of harassment. But ultimately, she said that the reason “is the patriarchal way of thinking and

\textsuperscript{250} Ibid.
the power dynamics and how people can get away from these crimes.” She described what she meant by people getting away with the crimes when she gave an account of how laws are not being properly applied.

The system is not working. When women and girls go to a police station and file a report against a perpetrator, they [the police] will offer an alternative punishment. They [the police] will say “Ok, we will slap him on the face and you can let him go” or “He’s a poor old guy” or “He’s a poor young boy.” They will always find an excuse. So the system is not working. [The solution to this problem is created] not only by making the punishment higher, like instead of 3 years imprisonment it should be 10 years...It is about the law actually [being] applied. [Because the law isn’t applied] you find few people that actually get punished even by the law that exists from 2014. Nazra’s belief that a major part of the problem of sexual harassment is a lack of enforcement of the existing laws has a significant impact on its particular campaigns.

Much of the work of Nazra around harassment is focused on advocating for the Egyptian government to take action against the sexual violence crimes that have been reoccurring over the past five years. In order to advocate more effectively for this type of change, Nazra tries to increase women’s political participation and educate women so that they can “push the agenda of sexual violence” within their political parties. One of the ways that Nazra has conducted these educational campaigns, at least in previous years, has been through the curriculum at a feminist school that they founded. When the school was active in 2013 and 2014, it had about 25 students (8 of whom were male) each year, and applicants were selected based on their current activism on feminist issues. In 2015 and 2016, after the feminist school was discontinued due to political and security reasons, Nazra shifted its focus to coordinating public campaigns against street harassment and conducting university seminars about sexual violence and bodily integrity. One can easily see that Nazra’s methods are connected to its belief that the law is being under-

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251 Ibid.
252 Ibid.
253 Ibid.
utilized, as they are focused on raising public consciousness about harassment rather than changing the laws on harassment. In Nazra’s eyes, sexual harassment is a societal issue that can only be addressed through education and consciousness-raising.

Unlike HarassMap, El Nadeem, and the EIPR, Nazra is registered with the government as an NGO, making it the most NGO-ized organization profiled so far. According to Hassan, Nazra began in 2005, and gained its status as an NGO in 2007. When asked why Nazra decided to register as an NGO, Hassan answered

Because charity was not working. We wanted to make more of a systemized movement and a group to conduct different programs and workshops that we needed funds for. We [also] wanted to do more work on the political level as well, not only on sexual violence or not only on sexuality, for example, so to be able to do that I guess you have to be an NGO.254

Hassan’s description of why Nazra chose to get registered reflects the fact that such a step was necessary in order to gain funding. Like other anti-harassment organizations, Nazra relies on funding from international non-governmental donors, and registering as an NGO gave them more legal access to these types of funding streams.

Alarmingly, even though it has attempted to follow all of the bureaucratic rules regarding Egyptian NGOs, Nazra has become the latest human rights organization targeted by the government. The week of March 24, three employees and the director of the organization were summoned for questioning by the prosecution in the aforementioned case charging Nazra and EIPR with “illegally receiving foreign funding.”255 The case was opened five years ago, and symbolizes an escalation in the crackdown on Egyptian human rights organization. According to the founder of Nazra, the latest events are part of a campaign of the government to slander them and other rights-based organizations as spies.256 The fact that Nazra is the latest group to be

254 Ibid.
255 Noueihe and Aboulenein, “Human rights on trial in Egypt.”
256 Ibid.
targeted, even though it is one of the few women’s rights organizations in Egypt registered as an NGO, shows that NGO-ization offers no protection from the state.

As might be suggested by their reliance on international funds, Nazra is also quite internationalized, even more than other comparable organizations in Egypt. One of Nazra’s first activities that Hassan told me about was its participation in the 16 Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence, a UN Women campaign, and when I asked about Nazra’s coordination with organizations in other countries, Hassan was very forthcoming:

We have collaborated with CREA [Creating Resources for Empowerment in Action], the Indian organization. We [also] made a regional feminist school, which was called the Feminist Institute in the MENA [Middle East/North Africa] region, where people from Egypt and from the region were participating. Also, on the level of the Women Human Rights Defenders program, we engaged with different groups and coalitions like the Women Human Rights Defenders coalition of the MENA region and [the] international coalition. We also [participate in] the ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council] state in the UN, so we also attend CSW [the UN Commission on the Status of Women] and [participate in] the UPRs [Universal Periodic Reviews], things like that. So, we take the advocacy internationally, regionally, [and] locally.\(^{257}\)

Although all Egyptian anti-harassment organizations examined so far have been at least slightly internationalized, none have participated in transnational feminist advocacy as much as Nazra has. Nonetheless, Nazra’s involvement in the international community makes it no less able to collaborate with other Egyptian feminist organizations on nationally specific campaigns.

One of the few organizations with which Nazra does not collaborate is the NCW. Hassan explains why,

It [the NCW] is not a non-governmental organization. And, there is conflict of interest, of course, when it comes to the National Council for Women, because they are the ones who are writing the national strategy for combatting violence against women, for example. How are we going to be working with them while we are advocating for and trying to push to put certain things in the strategy, [and trying to determine] how to combat it, [and to determine] what are the right terminologies to use?\(^{258}\)

\(^{257}\) Mahy Hassan, interviewed by author, January 18, 2016.

\(^{258}\) Ibid.
Although Nazra is similar to most other anti-harassment initiatives in its avoidance of the NCW, it appears to be stricter in limiting its contact with the organization. As mentioned above, the EIPR has similar reasons for avoiding the NCW, but has participated in workshops to improve the national strategy rather than tried to combat it. In other words, EIPR has tried to affect the government’s women’s rights agenda from the inside, while Nazra has focused on changing it from the outside.

Nazra’s relationship with the NCW is not at all indicative of its relationship with other Egyptian feminist organizations, as Nazra seems to have a positive relationship with almost every other anti-harassment organization. Nazra has collaborated with other Egyptian feminist organizations on multiple campaigns, suggesting that collaboration is an important strategy for them. Their collaborative efforts were particularly frequent during and immediately following the uprising, as Nazra was able to provide resources to newer, more informal interventionist initiatives. For example, during the uprising, Nazra provided resources such as meeting space, organizational tools, and workshops to smaller anti-harassment initiatives Operation Anti-Sexual Assault, Basma, Tahrir Bodyguard, and the EIPR, and these organizations were able to address mob sexual assaults and harassment in protest spaces in more direct ways. In a similar way, Nazra has provided resources and conducted educational workshops for smaller feminist organizations elsewhere in Egypt. However, Nazra is not simply a resource for other organizations—in some campaigns, Nazra is an equal partner. For example, in 2012, Nazra collaborated with HarassMap and Basma on an initiative called “Fix it in your mind,” which was focused on raising awareness of the definition of harassment. Similarly, on a policy level, Nazra formed a “feminist coalition” with the Women in Memory Forum, the New Woman Foundation, and other Egyptian feminist organizations, but because of the worsening political situation since
2015, the collaboration has ended. Currently, Nazra stills works with other organizations on collective research, but Hassan told me that Nazra must be more careful about the extent of its collaboration with other feminist organizations.

Binat Masr Khat Ahmar

Founded in June 2012, Binat Masr Khat Ahmar (The Girls of Egypt are a Red Line) was one of the first anti-harassment groups created specifically out of the political atmosphere of the uprising. The group was short-lived, ending its activities in July 2013 in response to anti-protest laws, but it is a great example of the kind of anti-harassment initiative that existed as a result of the revolution. In order to explore Binat Masr Khat Ahmar’s work further, I interviewed Dina Farid. Farid is the initiative’s founder, but has currently put her work with the initiative on hold while she studies for her Master’s degree, works, and takes care of her small children.

Farid founded Binat in response to the election of Mohamad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. Describing its founding, she says,

I feared that with the arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood to power that a lot of women’s rights would be in jeopardy. It was a very impulsive, fear-based start. I basically just started off with a Facebook page that day, and it picked up quite fast. It wasn’t meant at the beginning to be a sexual harassment movement as much as it was meant to be [a movement] for women’s rights in general, [a movement] to protect what there is of women’s rights, and to try to get some more of the rights. Then it [Binat Masr Khat Ahmar] evolved into the anti-harassment movement. We found [harassment] to be something that was very hard-pressing at the time. With all the violence in the street, violence that was happening to women in the protests, and in large gatherings…we thought [harassment] is a very pressing issue and we should focus on it...

Like other anti-harassment initiatives in Egypt, the group started with a focus on general women’s issues, but it soon narrowed to combatting sexual harassment in the public sphere. Also similar to other anti-harassment initiatives, Farid links an increased Islamic conservatism (symbolized here by the Muslim Brotherhood) with decreased safety for women in the public

259 Ibid.
sphere. Later in the interview, Farid refers back to an incident of sexual harassment in the 90s that was nationally publicized and created an outcry in order to illustrate how the situation for women had worsened as Islamic conservatism had increased. She also refers to the period of the 1960s as a time which was better for women, further connecting the rise in Islamic conservatism and harassment.

Farid does not limit her argument to blaming Islamic conservatism for the rise in harassment. Another connection that she makes with the increase in harassment is the downturn of the economy and the related decrease in the quality of education in Egypt. She argues,

The increase in violence in general [happens]…when things become scarce, and they are scarce here in this country, they are very scarce, there is scarcity, [so] people start to go into survival mode. [They think] “I will survive: it’s either me, or you.” That [mindset] increases the violence in general. When there is a soft spot in the violent area, such as a child or a woman or whatever, I guess it gets affected…more obviously. Another thing is that socially, socially, the men are expected to be the breadwinner, and they’re expected to make money, raise a family, get the apartment to get married, have a good job, have a good car, pay for dowry, get the ring, and all of that and there’s no jobs, goddamit! How are you going to…An average salary here is like, what, 1000 pounds, and the average apartment is 5000 pounds--it doesn’t add up!!! So I think that the…man, he’s not getting his self worth from anywhere. He has a boss that kicks him around because he knows he needs the money…he knows if he goes into a prison he’s not going to get his rights from authorities …Society expects him unfairly, unrealistically, to have all these things, and the country’s not providing it! So he’s very, very oppressed too. But who is weaker? The woman! Who can he take it out on? The woman! You know? And it’s not that he’s not responsible, it’s just that all these things need to be taken into consideration. It’s all these things put together. I mean he has no power, he has no money--we’re talking about the big majority of the people in Egypt--they’re not getting their self-esteem, they’re not self-actualizing, they’re hardly getting their basic needs met of water and sex and food and shelter and so they’re very angry! There is no law, you know, and then you’ve got these religious people telling you the woman’s weaker. [So you think] “Yay!!! Finally, I’ve got someone weaker than I am! Let’s kick the shit out of them!”

Farid spends more time telling me about the downturn of the economy and its relation to sexual harassment than she does telling me about any other reason for harassment. She believes that scarcity in Egypt has led to a disempowerment of men, who are traditionally supposed to be the

261 Ibid.
breadwinners, and this disempowerment has led them to seek power over women. One of the ways they do this is by being violent toward women. Farid was the first person I interviewed who mentioned an explanation of harassment so similar to Fatima Peoples’ (mentioned in the Literature Review), and was one of the only people who spent a sustained amount of time trying to explain the reason for the rise in harassment. As a result of Farid’s attempt to understand the reason behind harassment, Binat’s methods of combatting harassment were quite different from other initiatives in Egypt.

Like other organizations founded during the uprising, Binat’s primary method of combatting harassment was by engaging with people in public spaces and by patrolling public spaces during Eid (a major holiday when much harassment happens in Egypt) and during protests. Differently from these other groups, Binat’s main objective was to “stop harassment before it happens” rather than catching a harasser and having a big media campaign.\footnote{Ibid.} Nonetheless, if Binat volunteer groups saw a mob assault or harassment happening, they were trained to intervene, even using violence if necessary, and to extract the victim. The group would then try to convince the girl to report the harassment to the police, but she often would not, so the group’s work would end there. Although it was often disappointing on some level for women to not report their harassers to the police, Farid admits that imprisoning the harasser would probably end up making him more violent. Many people, upon hearing Farid’s analysis of the cycle of violence, would claim that Binat was siding with the harasser, and Binat’s goal of preventing harassment rather than punishing the harasser made it controversial among the other anti-harassment initiatives.

The controversial nature of Binat’s approach did not stop it from collaborating with other
anti-harassment initiatives or with the government. In fact, Binat held its first event at Eid with Basma (a similar organization founded at almost exactly the same time) and HarassMap, and it began collaborating with Awlad Al Balad (The Boys of Cairo, another anti-harassment initiative) soon after. Additionally, in Tahrir Square, during protests, Binat would work with Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment, Tahrir Bodyguard, and Shoft Taharosh (I Saw Harassment) to extract women who were being assaulted or harassed. Because of its involvement in these activities, Binat was, ironically, invited by Morsi’s government to provide input on the revision of the law on violence against women, and were later invited by the NCW to provide additional feedback. Binat’s collaboration with other organizations and its involvement in giving feedback to the government made it quite similar to other anti-harassment initiatives at the time, even if its ideology and focus on rehabilitation of the harasser was quite different.

Binat was also quite organizationally similar to other anti-harassment initiatives that arose during the uprising. Like other initiatives (all of which died out), Binat never registered as an NGO and, as a result, relied on personal donations for funds. Binat was not internationalized, there was never a professional staff of the initiative and it was not project-based. Instead, it was local (Cairo-focused), comprised of volunteers, and focused on longer-term ideas of social change, which included a criminal justice system based on rehabilitation rather than punishment. Although the literature might suggest that its lack of NGO-ization made it a more authentic initiative, it also made it impossible to sustain, so the initiative is currently defunct.

Basma

Basma (Imprint) was founded in July 2012, one month after Binat Masr Khat Ahmar. Basma is one of the only groups that was founded during the uprising to have survived. Other organizations, such as Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment, Tahrir Bodyguard, and Binat Masr
Khat Ahmar (The Girls of Egypt are a Red Line), died when the uprising ended, but Basma continues to operate today. To determine why Basma has managed to survive this long, I interviewed Nihal Zaghloul. Zaghloul is the founder of Basma and serves as its fundraising officer, managing its funds and ensuring that it has enough resources for the staff’s professional development.

Basma was founded with the purpose of “tackling sexual violence in general” as well as issues such as street children, illiteracy, and unemployment. Like organizations such as El Nadeem and the EIPR, Basma was not founded with the idea that it would be focused on street harassment. In fact, Zaghloul found organizations like HarassMap, which focused solely on harassment, to be quite limiting. However, all of Basma’s campaigns ended up focusing on harassment, which it defined as any act by someone in a public or private space that was unwanted by the other person.

Similar to other organizations that were founded prior to the uprising or at the beginning of the uprising, Basma struggled to break the taboo around street harassment. Many people would confuse harassment and flirting, and they would question why Basma was obsessed with such a seemingly insignificant problem. Zaghloul, however, was convinced that harassment was a political issue, a symbol of women’s disenfranchisement in the public and social spheres, and therefore was very important to address.

In order to address harassment, Basma included men as volunteers and even targeted them in volunteer recruitment. Zaghloul described why she believed it was so important to include men in the movement:

Men are essentially half of the society and…63% of men, according to the latest UN Women study, have admitted to doing sexual harassment, [to] sexually harassing women in

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263 Nihal Zaghloul, interviewed by author, January 17, 2016.
public spaces. So it is vital that [men] are part of the change. We cannot ask women to always stand up and file reports if nobody will help her on the streets. Whether we like it or not, the majority of people in public spaces are men...It is vital that change comes from both sides, not just from one side.264

In its emphasis on men’s role in combatting harassment, Basma was similar to other anti-harassment initiatives formed during the uprising (including Binat Masr Khat Ahmar).

Basma’s inclusivity as an organization did not stop with men. Basma is known for having volunteers with a wide variety of political opinions, and in order to handle this, they have written “rules of engagement” for employees and volunteers to use with each other.265 These rules focus on avoiding sensitive topics or, alternately, discussing them in an open-minded way. In discussing the inclusiveness of the group, Zaghloul gave me an example of how it dealt with LGBT members:

There’s [been] a couple of times [when] there were a couple of guys who were not accepting of other people’s identities or part of [other people’s] identity and sexual orientation and the [guys] asked them to leave. But, the rest of our members voted that we will not discriminate against anyone, not for anything, and they asked those two men to leave...we do not discriminate, we do not differentiate between people based on their gender or sexual orientation or race or religion or political views.266

The way that inclusivity has been incorporated into the organization’s policy has likely made Basma stronger as an organization.

Although Basma’s patrols of public space in Egypt were similar to organizations like Binat, its other activities were more varied. This variation is probably what has allowed it to survive past the uprising. For example, now Basma collaborates with HarassMap to encourage universities to create anti-harassment policies, and Basma has placed comics in Metro stations to raise awareness of harassment. Additionally, Basma hosts workshops for student groups in order to teach them how to campaign against sexual harassment in their own communities. All of these

264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
projects allowed Basma to remain relevant even after the uprising ended.

Another factor that likely contributed to Basma’s lasting success was its NGO-ization. Basma registered with the government in 2014 in order to avoid being arrested for working illegally. Zaghloul says that before they were registered as such, they were more disorganized, completely volunteer-based, and were limited in the amount of funding they could receive. Now, though, they are registered with the Ministry of Social Solidarity, so they have a clear hierarchy, internal policies, multiple sources of funding (including international donors like UN Women), a qualified paid staff, and a system for monitoring and evaluation. However, being registered is not without its bureaucratic burdens:

It can take up to a year for the Ministry of Social Solidarity to approve my funding. Before [registration] I didn’t have to get the approval, but now I do and so that slows down my pace. Say you have a project and I apply in 2015 and the project is a year. It’s quite possible that I will not be able to do it.267

So, although NGO-ization has been positive for Basma in the sense that it has caused the organization to become more organized and sustainable, registering with the government has also made Basma more limited by the state’s bureaucracy. Although registration opened up more funding opportunities, the bureaucratic regulations make these opportunities difficult to reach, meaning that registration with the government might not make sense for most organizations of this size.

Basma was one of the few anti-harassment initiatives to register as an NGO or to seek approval from the Interior Ministry before patrolling in public spaces. However, the organization, like others, still does not collaborate with the NCW. Zaghloul, describing the reason for this, says that Basma “works mostly on the street” and the NCW “works mostly in

267 Ibid.
offices." So, Basma sometimes seeks information or training manuals from the NCW, but never really works with the NCW on events. In contrast, Basma regularly works with other non-governmental anti-harassment initiatives, including HarassMap, Nazra, and the EIPR. Zaghloul calls this coordination “quite important,” as she says:

> We do different things at different places. We don’t all do the same thing. This is where it helps us to cover more ground. Literally. [Other organizations] also [help] with knowledge and experience. And, honestly, when we are several organizations it’s harder for the government to stop us than if we are all in one place [where] if we stop then everything else stops.\(^{269}\)

The different groups can share resources with one another, fill in each others’ gaps in services, and help each other avoid government persecution, all of which ensures that the anti-harassment movement continues.

**Ded Taharosh**

Like Bint Masr Khat Ahmar and Basma, Ded Taharosh (Against Harassment) is an anti-harassment initiative that was founded during the uprising, in the summer of 2012. Although Ded Taharosh, like Basma, has managed to survive beyond the uprising, they have not NGO-ized. To learn more about how Ded Taharosh was able to sustain itself for such a long period of time without becoming NGO-ized, I spoke to Ayman Nagy. Nagy used to be the marketing manager of a band and a general human rights activist, but after participating in an action with Basma and HarassMap, he founded and began directing Ded Taharosh in his spare time.

According to Nagy, sexual harassment is the main issue facing women in Egypt, and it became an increasingly dire problem during the uprising. Because of his belief, Ded Taharosh began with three main goals: first, it wanted to end the social acceptability of sexual harassment in Egypt; second, it wanted to create a law against sexual harassment in Egypt; and third, it

\(^{268}\) Ibid.  
\(^{269}\) Ibid.
wanted to raise awareness of harassment through workshops. Before doing any of this, Ded Taharosh had to create a definition of street harassment, which according to Nagy, was any violation of the private space of a person, from visual, to verbal, to inappropriate touching. Sexual harassment could be perpetrated against men, and Nagy had heard of many cases of male-to-male harassment, but because he believed the harassment was overwhelmingly directed toward women, the organization focused on male-to-female harassment. Like the representatives of other organizations, Nagy said that the word for flirting was often used to refer to taharosh, so Ded Taharosh had to struggle to make people understand the seriousness of the problem.

The methods that Ded Taharosh use to combat harassment have been heavily influenced by Nagy’s awareness of the different ways that people understand harassment. For example, one of Ded Taharosh’s activities is conducting educational workshops about harassment, but to ensure that they reach as broad an audience as possible, they adjust the workshop depending upon the area of the Egypt that they are in. There are three different kinds of workshops: public awareness workshops, which focus on bringing sexual harassment into discourse; harasser workshops, which focus on getting harassers to end their problem behaviors; and general acceptance workshops, which focus on getting people to accept one another regardless of their differences. According to Nagy, people in Cairo and people in the south of Egypt (in more rural areas) have completely different understandings and familiarity with the terms around harassment, so Ded Taharosh adjusts the content of the workshop depending upon where it will be held.

The activities of Ded Taharosh have also been influenced by Nagy’s own understand of harassment. For example, the organization’s first event was during Eid, when a team of volunteers worked to raise awareness of harassment and intervene where harassment was happening. The same team that intervened at the first event continued to intervene in protests and
Eid celebrations throughout the uprising, as these were spaces where Nagy believed harassment was greatest and where he did not see the police intervening to stop it from happening.

Unlike other anti-harassment organizations such as Basma, which had a similar beginning in the uprising, Ded Taharosh has not NGO-ized but has internationalized. For example, the organization does not have a hierarchy or a paid staff, but it does now have branches in Tunisia and Lebanon thanks to interested people in both of these countries. Although volunteers must interview to be a part of Ded Taharosh, they are not selected based on previous experience or qualifications, but based on passion for the cause. According to Nagy,

We select people that are going to participate in the Movement, not based on their political background...just based on their passion for the cause and what they want to do. [It doesn’t] matter how educated they are or how experienced [they are] with nonprofits. We just take them based on passion and we invest in them as much as we can.  

Additionally, Ded Taharosh does not rely on grant money. The organization is funded by the volunteers, and has a policy of not taking funds from outside organizations. Nagy has been quite intentional in avoiding NGO-ization by not taking funds or having employees, as he does not want Ded Taharosh to develop the problems of other NGOs in Egypt. In his words,

I personally work with a lot of organizations in Egypt and...I see how money affects the passion for the cause itself. So the passion turns, with time, into a job, and sometimes to a boring job where you just need to meet your target or just go to the events because you’re required to go to the events. We [Ded Taharosh] just do the events when we feel like we will make a change or be impactful.  

To Nagy, becoming NGO-ized would threaten the vitality of Ded Taharosh, but becoming internationalized has not. As a part of avoiding NGO-ization, Ded Taharosh has decided not to become registered with the government, as they do not want to be controlled by anyone.

Unexpectedly, so far, their failure to register with the government has not caused them any problems. In fact, ministries have still invited the group to give lectures and workshops at

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271 Ibid.
conferences, and Ded Taharosh has attended many meetings with the NCW. However, like all the other anti-harassment organizations, Ded Taharosh admits to having conflicting views with the NCW and is reluctant to collaborate with it. Nonetheless, Ded Taharosh has better relations with the government than many other organizations with anti-harassment campaigns, including El Nadeem and the EIPR. Considering that Ded Taharosh is able to collaborate with the government while un-registered, while El Nadeem is being threatened by government while registered, one can assume that formal registration matters less to the government than the nature of the activities that the organization is carrying out. Ded Taharosh is probably not perceived as a threat to the government because it is solely focusing on street harassment, primarily harassment perpetrated by Egyptian civilians, whereas El Nadeem is likely seen as a threat because it has a larger mission of holding the government accountable for its human rights violations.

In terms of collaboration with other organizations, Ded Taharosh is similar to most anti-harassment initiatives in that it partners at various times with almost everyone. Nagy says they have great relationships with every organization that works on women’s rights in Egypt, particularly HarassMap and Basma. Ded Taharosh co-sponsored their first event with Basma and currently works with HarassMap on anti-harassment campaigns around Egypt. When I asked whether he thought there were too many anti-harassment initiatives in Egypt to be effective, Nagy further described the importance of collaboration to me,

Even if we disagree with some of them on certain issues, it’s important to have the buzz around the issue itself. Everyone talks about it. Everyone tries to resolve [it]. And we all get together at some point, and we just focus on one thing, and [then] we focus on the other one. We meet with each other every now and then, as organizations against sexual harassment and for women’s rights in Egypt, and we try to have an agenda for everyone. [We try] to divide the tasks between us. [For example], if I have a university project--because everyone now has a university project, Basma has a university project, HarassMap has a university project--we try to distribute it between us so we can actually do a good
As he states, the plethora of anti-harassment initiatives in Egypt could be a problem, but they are not because the organizations coordinate with one another to fill in one another’s gaps. It’s through these types of statements that one comes to realize that social movements against harassment in Egypt do not exclude NGOs, but instead include them as part of a larger network combatting the same social ill.

Igmadi

Igmadi, founded in 2012, is yet another anti-harassment initiative that was created in response to the mass harassment and assault perpetrated during the uprising. Igmadi, like Basma and Ded Taharosh, survived past the uprising, but its methods of combatting sexual harassment center around self-defense training, rather than general awareness raising or intervention in protest spaces. In this study, Igmadi will serve as an example of anti-harassment initiatives that combat harassment by focusing on empowering the potentially harassed, rather than educating bystanders or potential harassers. It will also serve as an example of an initiative that was founded on an international model (the Wen-Do women’s self defense model). To understand Igmadi, its mission, and its place in Egypt’s anti-harassment movement, I interviewed Schirin Salem, a German-Egyptian WenDo trainer and one of the initiative’s co-founders.

Igmadi was founded in 2012, when Schirin and her business partner Emeline, a Zumba instructor, decided that they could offer something valuable to the burgeoning “movement” against sexual harassment. WenDo is a self defense program for women and girls which focuses on self-confidence, and Zumba is a fitness program based in dance, so the two women decided to begin hosting events that used both WenDo and Zumba to empower women to fight

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272 Ibid.
273 Schirin Salem, interviewed by author, February 1, 2016.
harassment. According to Salem, one of the reasons that harassment occurs is because women do not realize that it is not the right of the harasser to harass, so it is important to Igmadi to incorporate the empowering rhetoric and activities into every event they have. However, Salem also believes that men must be taught that women should be treated like human beings, as empowering women is only “50% of the solution,” but Igmadi does not address this specific issue. So, Salem’s beliefs about the reasons that harassment has become such a rampant problem in Egypt only affects Igmadi’s programming to a limited extent—more important for her are the skills that she and Emeline bring to the table.

Unlike other Egyptian anti-harassment initiatives that I researched, Igmadi is currently registered as a service providing company. I asked Salem why they had not registered as an NGO and she responded,

> I mean we were trying to establish an NGO but a lot of NGOs recommended not to do this because it’s such a hassle. I don’t think it would have [brought] any advantage [to register] because NGOs cannot get any foreign funding…like they have these huge procedures which are just really annoying… it’s much easier for the donors to work with us if we are a company.\(^{274}\)

Salem believed that becoming an NGO would threaten Igmadi’s viability, as she believed it would make locating funding more difficult. This belief was in direct contradiction to many of the NGO representatives I interviewed, as they often cited registering primarily to gain access to funds that they believed they did not have access to while unregistered. So, it seems that for any organization, it would be more beneficial to register as a company, as this would decrease the regulation of funding, but some organizations have to register as NGOs because they cannot pass as a company. This trend sheds significant light into the complications of registration in Egypt.

Perhaps in connection with not being registered as an NGO, Igmadi has avoided NGO-ization to a certain extent. There is no real hierarchy in the organization, as it is small and run

\(^{274}\) Ibid.
together by Schirin and Emeline, and there is no real staff. However, Igmadi does have a process of monitoring and evaluation (conducting surveys and interviews after each event) and is dependent on grants from organizations like UN Women and the GIZ (German International Cooperation). Neither Schirin nor Emeline works for the organization full-time, but instead remain private contractors for fitness classes, running Igmadi on the side. In some sense, being registered as a company has given Igmadi the freedom to exist with very little fear of regulation, but it has not necessarily made the organization more sustainable. Comparing Igmadi to other organizations, which are both registered and un-registered, it becomes clear that registration does not necessarily correlate with sustainability.

Another facet of anti-harassment initiatives that does not correlate with registration status is the amount of collaboration that the initiative engages in. For example, Igmadi’s registration status as a company does not preclude it from working with other organizations that are either registered as NGOs or are completely unregistered. In each of its events, Igmadi seeks collaboration with other anti-harassment initiatives, and often allows other initiatives to pull volunteers from their crowd. Particular organizations that Igmadi has allowed in its events are HarassMap, Heya Masr, Safe Kids, El Nadeem, and Amal. Igmadi sees these organizations as vital, as they are able to perform functions that Igmadi does not—for example, Igmadi always has HarassMap define harassment, as it is more qualified to do so. Like every other anti-harassment initiative, Igmadi has never directly collaborated with the NCW, but unlike the other initiatives, it is open to doing so.

Summary

The interviews of the representatives from Egyptian organizations show that, in Egypt, people combatting harassment define the causes of rampant harassment in entirely different
ways, use a variety of different methods to combat the problem, and have diverse types of relationships with the government. The organizations that were founded prior to the uprising, except HarassMap, tended to have a broader focus on women’s and human rights, rather than street harassment, and were usually more critical of the government. The organizations that were founded during the uprising, aptly reflecting the concerns of these few years, were far more focused on sexual harassment and assault of women in protest spaces, and initially mobilized as citizen police patrols. Igmadi, the only organization I researched that was founded after the uprising, also focused on harassment, but did so in a way focused on empowering women through self-defense classes rather than protecting them with patrols. Some of the organizations, like Binat Masr Khat Ahmar and Ded Taharosh, avoided the government at all costs by remaining un-registered, while other organizations, like El Nadeem and EIPR, registered, but not as NGOs, in order to avoid being restricted by Egypt’s draconian NGO laws. Similarly, some of the organizations were not as selective about their financiers (so that their initiatives would remain sustainable), while others insisted that financing come from individuals (so that their initiatives would remain independent). Nonetheless, despite their differences, every organization representative with whom I spoke had a myriad of examples of how their organization had collaborated with at least two of the other organizations I had interviewed. Every group recognized the importance of collaborating with others, as every group saw themselves as a small part of a broader movement against harassment. Regardless of their status as NGOs or informal organizations, the organizations worked to fill each other’s gaps and have ultimately developed a real social movement against street harassment. Although the Egyptian state still attempts to undermine the most confrontational organizations, its direct persecution of these organizations has only reinforced society’s distrust of the government. Therefore, very few
Egyptians are convinced that the state is providing any kind of protection to its citizens, particularly female citizens. As a result, the disciplinary power apparatus of the Egyptian state is collapsing, providing both a vacuum where a paternalist/disciplinary protection of women used to exist, as well as an opportunity for grassroots activism against the continued problem of street harassment.

Chapter 5: Activism Against Street Harassment in Jordan

Feminist civil society has developed in a much different way in Jordan than in Egypt. Unsurprisingly, the activism against street harassment in Jordan does not have the same history as activism against street harassment in Egypt. In Jordan, there is no equivalent to HarassMap or Ded Taharosh, instead, there are semi-governmental organizations, royal NGOs, and private companies that work on multiple women’s rights projects at the same time, some of which are focused on researching and combating street harassment. Additionally, in Jordan, one of the most important actors in the struggle against street harassment has been an individual, rather than a group or organization. This individual, Dr. Rula Quawas, approved a student group’s project on harassment, and the project provoked a passionate national discourse on the problem. However, the discourse was overwhelmingly negative, and blamed Quawas for drawing attention to such indecent behavior. Influenced by this discourse, almost all of the organizations that I interviewed in Jordan are working on projects that will educate the public about the problem of harassment. The one that has no education initiatives, SheCab, is instead focused on providing a service that would allow women to avoid street harassment on public transportation. None of the organizations are very confrontational, as their actions are limited the very strong disciplinary apparatus of Jordan’s patriarchal system.
Dr. Rula Quawas

In order to understand the environment faced by anti-harassment activists in Jordan, one must know the story of Dr. Rula Quawas, a professor and former dean at the University of Jordan. As mentioned earlier, she is at least indirectly responsible for opening up a discourse on street harassment in Jordan, and she paid dearly in her professional life for doing so. This section will be devoted to her story and her work combatting harassment in Jordan, and is compiled from an interview I conducted with her as well as an interview with one of her former students.

Quawas’ story begins with the fact that every year, she teaches a course on feminist theory (the only one of its kind at a university in Jordan). In the course, the students read novels, short fiction, and other texts, and at the end, the students are required to do a project. For the project, they are required to venture outside the classroom and interact with people other than their classmates. In the fall of 2011, four of her students approached her to ask if they could create a video about sexual harassment on campus, and she approved it. Quawas claims that, at the time, she did not even ask “Why sexual harassment?”275 The students explained to her that they would be asking women on campus about what types of comments they heard while walking around campus, and that they needed help to learn how to make a video. So, Quawas found some people who could teach them video technology, and the students came in twice on the weekends to prepare for the project. After the expressions were collected, the students again sought approval from Quawas (before putting them in the video) and she made them remove all of the most explicit phrases. When the video was finally made, it only featured about 20 phrases, all of which had been approved by Quawas.

275 Rula Quawas, interviewed by author, February 26, 2016.
After the video was published on YouTube, a controversy about its content began boiling all over Jordan. According to a former student of Quawas, “it was everywhere, from Facebook statuses to local news websites.” The reactions toward the video were “extremely polarized,” and it “bother[ed] people who denied the fact that sexual harassment exists on campus… [and] provoked people who found the mere introduction of such a taboo topic as catastrophic.” People became angrier at the female students who had dared to raise the issue of harassment than at the perpetrators of harassment themselves. However, it was not until the following year, in September, 2012, that the controversy deepened.

In early fall 2012, after discourse around the video had grown louder and louder in Jordan, Quawas received a phone call from the president of the university who, shortly into it, began shouting “You’re slandering the university, how dare you!” After responding to him that he had no right to treat her like that, she hung up and sent him a written explanation that the video was a class project. Within two days, on September 2, she learned from a newspaper article that she had been removed from her position as Dean of the Faculty of Foreign Languages at the University of Jordan.

Soon after her removal, the international community began to mobilize on Quawas’ behalf, a movement that was spearheaded by the Middle East Studies Association. A separate movement began in Jordan, when a group of her former students created the “Supporting Rula Quawas and Academic Freedom” website. According to one of the founders of the website, Quawas’ removal from her post was even more disturbing than the preceding controversy over

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277 Ibid.
278 Rula Quawas, interviewed by author, February 26, 2016.
The student argues that the university began to silence not only Quawas but also her supporters, and that it started to propagate lies in order to justify its decision. Even the newspapers in Jordan, she said, refused to publish the comments of Quawas’ supporters. Other professors on campus, including a professor of Shari’a law, organized a public protest against Quawas on the University of Jordan’s campus, and called for “action” to be taken against her. The university took no action against this professor’s intimidating behavior and, instead, accused Quawas of “delusional heroism.” Quawas, meanwhile, for the past six months had been experiencing finger-pointing and harassment as she walked through campus, and fearing being attacked, she hired security to wait by her car for when she left the university in the evenings. Eventually, Quawas left for the U.S. as a Fulbright Scholar, but is now back at the University of Jordan, employed not as a dean, but as a professor.

Quawas’ story is important because of the way it illustrates the way that Jordanian society disciplines those who break taboos around sexual harassment. It is also necessary to review because it is one of the major reasons that more and more Jordanian organizations have started talking about sexual harassment in recent years. Although Quawas is involved in a myriad of Jordanian feminist organizations, including the JNCW, the JWU, and the King Hussein Information and Research Center, her primary involvement in the anti-harassment movement in Jordan has been through her role as a professor, as someone who encourages women to speak about the problems they face. She is an example of the way that social movements in Jordan are not comprised solely of activist groups, NGOs, or protestors, but are, rather, comprised of multiple types of actors.

279 Lavallee-Belanger, “Supporting Rula Quawas and Academic Freedom.”
280 Ibid.
281 Ibid.
282 Rula Quawas, interviewed by author, February 26, 2016.
SheCab

SheCab is one of the only organizations in Jordan that is solely devoted to a project that relates to street harassment. Most other initiatives are carried out under the umbrella of a larger organization, but SheCab is independent. The only other initiative with this type of singular focus and independence is SheFighter, a women’s self-defense initiative, but I was unable to get an interview with anyone from SheFighter. So, the interview with Rahmeh Abushweimeh from SheCab will serve to elucidate how street harassment in Jordan is being addressed through private entrepreneurial initiatives. Abushweimeh, a proud Muslim feminist, is the founder and communications strategist for SheCab.

Abushweimeh and three other young women founded SheCab when they were participating in a 5-week U.S. State Department-sponsored program for women leaders held at St. Mary’s College in June 2014. While in the U.S., Abushweimeh and her colleagues were inspired by a female taxi driver to begin thinking about what the presence of female taxi drivers could do for women in Jordan. She described the way that transportation in Jordan currently limits women’s mobility:

We already have a huge problem in the transportation sector because families and the women themselves are always concerned when it comes to taking public transportation because most of the harassment takes place in public transportation… It’s one of the main reasons why a lot of Jordanian women, although they are well-educated, they are unemployed because of the transportation. Here in Jordan, cars are not very affordable for everyone, and if there is a car, the man tends to use the car more because his job is considered more important than hers.  

Abushweimeh and her colleagues believed that a taxi service with female drivers could solve some of these problems, as it would allow women to feel more “safe and secure” when taking cabs and would therefore empower them to travel wherever, whenever they needed.

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283 Rahmeh Abushweimeh, interviewed by author, January 22, 2016.
When Abushweimeh and her colleagues returned to Jordan, they began contacting taxi companies with their idea: They would train and qualify female drivers, and the taxi companies would just have to hire them. However, none of the companies were open to the idea:

People said that there will be no way for them to hire to female drivers because [women] cannot drive. [They believe] women are not qualified to fill this position. It needs a man to be in the street the whole time, not a woman.  

As a result of the resistance they faced from established taxi companies, they decided to transform their idea from a training initiative into a social entrepreneurship of their own. By solely employing female drivers, their company would serve three purposes: it would show that women were just as capable as men of driving a taxi, thereby normalizing the presence of female taxi drivers; it would provide job opportunities for women in a country with a high unemployment rate; and it would give women around Amman the option to travel without fear of harassment from a taxi driver. In order to make the idea more palatable to conservative elements in the community, and to ensure the safety of the drivers, SheCab would begin by only offering its services to women; however, eventually, Abushweimeh hopes to open the service to anyone who wants to use it.

Obviously, the way that Abushweimeh defines harassment has a large effect on the tactics that she is using to address it. Her definition, though inclusive of verbal and physical aspects of harassment, is quite heteronormative. Although she admitted, when directly asked, that she had known of at least one man being harassed, she argued that harassment happens much more to women. Her heteronormative view of harassment, in which the male is the harasser and the woman is the harassed, has easily lent itself to the creation of an anti-harassment initiative based on sex segregation. Similarly, her belief that harassment in Jordan is greatest on

\[^{284}\text{Ibid.}\]
public transportation and in taxis is what caused her to found a company that focuses specifically on transportation. She states,

I think that the probability of getting harassed in public transportation is higher than in the street, because there are so many different people in the bus, for example, and you never know who you are sitting next to. But when it comes to the street, some people tend to have these ideas that “I cannot just harass her because this might be her neighborhood, and her dad or her brother could come out anytime, and I’ll get in real trouble.” But when she’s alone in the taxi, or alone in the bus…the harasser would feel that he’s safe to harass her, that she is out of her comfort zone and that she is in his comfort zone. So the likelihood of harassment, in my opinion, would occur more in public transportation because they believe that she’s alone there [and] she has no one else to protect her.285

Abushweimeh believes that streets are at least nominally safer for women, as a male harasser can never be sure that a male relative of the woman on the street is not around. She recognizes the way that women can be both threatened and protected in the Jordanian patriarchy, and she uses this understanding to create an initiative that operates within the patriarchy to combat harassment.

Importantly, although SheCab functions with the patriarchy in order to survive, Abushweimeh does not necessarily believe in the legitimacy of the way that the patriarchy operates in Jordan. For example, she complains that in Jordan, victims of harassment are often blamed for the harassment. She calls out the way that the patriarchy creates this type of atmosphere by discussing the ways that laws against harassment are not properly utilized in Jordan:

The laws are there, but it’s not about the laws, it’s about women not using their rights to sue a male driver or any guy on the street who harassed her. Here in Jordan they point the accusations, the fingers, towards women whenever harassment occurs. It’s always about what she’s wearing or what she’s doing or her behavior or her laughter or her voice, if she has a loud voice… so it’s always the women’s responsibility, that she provoked men to harass her. This is why women feel that there is no point, that if she went to sue the man who harassed her, that people are going to blame her, that people are going to start making assumptions that there must be a reason why he did this, must be something that she was wearing. Although here in Jordan a lot of women wear hijab, still people keep

285 Ibid.
blaming them for what they were wearing. Even if she was wearing hijab, people would still say that it is her fault, that she was not dressed right, that she was wearing a lot of makeup, that she was laughing loud, that she gave him a reason to do this to her. But people are becoming more and more educated about that, that the woman is the victim, not the man, and it’s his responsibility not to harass her, whatever she’s wearing. This culture [of blaming the perpetrator] is not very popular yet here. Not so many people are familiar with it. Yes, there are laws that give the woman the right to sue the man or just to file a report, if a man harassed her, but women unfortunately do not use this right.  

Interestingly, though Abushweimeh recognizes that there needs to be a culture change in order for harassment to end, she has focused her energy on creating an initiative that might provide a harassment-free space without changing the patriarchal culture.

Nonetheless, even though SheCab is working somewhat within the Jordanian patriarchy, Abushweimeh and her team have faced a backlash for attempting to break taboos in Jordan. Whereas Quawas ended up penetrating only the taboo on harassment, SheCab has attempted to break both the taboo on harassment and the taboo on female taxi drivers. Notably, women of the wealthier classes in Jordan, who have access to cars, drive themselves and others around Jordan quite often, but the notion that women could be taxi drivers is still considered unnatural. As a result, SheCab has been the target of many vitriolic Facebook comments and messages, with some conservative men saying that the project is akin to “prostitution,” “a devious idea from the enemies of God and religion,” and the result of the U.S. “brainwashing Muslims under the guise of freedom.”  

Making SheCab a service exclusively for women has therefore functioned not only as a way to work within the conservative norms of Jordanian society, but also as a way to keep the female drivers safe from retribution for breaking the taboo.

In addition to backlash for attempting to break the taboo around discussing sexual harassment in Jordan, SheCab has also faced backlash because of their sources of funding. When

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286 Ibid.
SheCab won the competition for best social entrepreneurship idea at the program at St. Mary’s, the university raised $1,000 as seed grant for them to begin training female drivers. With those funds, SheCab was able to train three drivers. Then, SheCab applied for an Alumni Engagement grant from the U.S. State Department, and won $20,000 to take the initiative off the ground. Because the funding was from the U.S. government, rumors immediately started flying, claiming that SheCab was part of a conspiracy for the U.S. to take control of the country. Then, when the USAID gender program Takamol highlighted SheCab on its website in the summer of 2015, some people in Jordan connected it to the recent announcement of the legalization of marriage equality in the U.S. saying, according to Abushweimeh, “This is a plan for the U.S. Embassy, first they want to do this, and then, you know, gay marriage, and then what else??” To combat these ideas, Abushweimeh responded in both an English and an Arabic language paper, explaining to people that the ideas were from Jordanians even if the funding was from the U.S. In the response, she announced,

People tell me that I have been brainwashed by the Americans after we participated in the programme [at St. Mary’s]. But I tell them I have brainwashed the Americans back, changing their perception on Islam and women through our discussions.288

As illustrated by this quote, Abushweimeh is in an almost constant battle to justify the SheCab initiative to the more conservative elements of Jordanian society, and she is doing so by reinforcing her own Jordanian Muslim identity. Just as she has chosen to work within the patriarchy to implement her idea, she has also chosen to highlight her own cultural identity in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the project.

Unlike other organizations examined in both Egypt and Jordan, SheCab is not NGO-ized (because it is a private company), but it is internationalized. Although SheCab does not have any connections to similar companies in other parts of the world (including PinkTaxi in Egypt),

288 Ibid.
SheCab is internationalized in the sense that it was founded from an international conference and is reliant on foreign funds. Additionally, the only organization that it has partnered with so far has been USAID Takamol (for a venue for a launch event)—Abushweimeh has not reached out to any other more local Jordanian feminist organizations for resources or support. SheCab’s relative insularity is therefore quite illustrative of how fractured Jordanian feminist civil society is compared to Egyptian feminist civil society.

TechTribes

Like SheCab, TechTribes is a private company, not an NGO. Unlike SheCab, TechTribes has a variety of projects focused on information and communications technology for development. According to its professional-quality website, TechTribes works to “support and develop the capacity of active citizens and CSOs to partner and work together to better achieve a cause-driven and organizational mission.” They provide their partners with training and mentoring, technical assistance with technological tools, and sometimes, small grants. TechTribes also has a few of its own initiatives, one of which is Harkashat, an anti-harassment campaign. Although this initiative is not the sole focus of TechTribes, the organization’s founder, Khaled Hijab, is very passionate about the topic of harassment, and he was eager to discuss his plans for Harkashat with me.

Hijab first became aware of the problem of harassment in Jordan after someone he was close to experienced harassment in an academic setting. He decided to take action on the problem after seeing the video of mob harassment in Irbid that was taken in the summer of 2014. Although he believes, through what he hears in the media, that the phenomenon of harassment is worse in Egypt, he is distressed about how bad harassment is in Jordan, and how no one seems to

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be addressing it. He founded the Harkashat initiative based on a belief that there is a lack of understanding in Jordan about what harassment is, and that youth should be mobilized to change existing laws on harassment. Its name, usually translated as “acts of teasing that have sexual connotations,” was selected to show people that harassment can include a wide spectrum of acts, from physical to verbal.²⁹⁰ He was given the idea for the initiative by a group of youth who he met through a U.S. State Department-funded social action program—they wanted to create a project to combat harassment in some way, but they were unable to find any research on the topic. Although there have been a number of studies recently on gender-based violence in Jordan, Hijab claims that harassment is not understood as a form of gender-based violence, even by many official feminist organizations in Jordan, so these studies were not helpful to the youth group. In order to address the problem of a lack of research, Hijab attempted to partner with certain research centers in Jordan, including the King Hussein Foundation Information and Research Center, but no one was willing to give them the funds to carry out the project. Others were not willing to include male-to-male harassment as one of the forms of harassment they would recognize, which Hijab found unacceptable. The lack of research on the topic, the lack of funds for the topic, and the lack of understanding about the topic led Hijab to create Harkashat as an initiative of his information and communications technology company, TechTribes.

Although Hijab believes that strengthening the law against street harassment would be beneficial, he claims that the real problem is Jordanians’ own understanding of themselves and their sexuality—he argues that behavior must be changed in order for harassment to stop, and that behavior cannot be changed solely by a law. Hijab’s understanding of the problem of

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harassment as related to behavior and culture has led him to design a multi-faceted approach to addressing harassment with Harkashat. First, in order to address the lack of research on the subject of harassment, Hijab created the online map. Unlike HarassMap, Harkashat’s map can provide the viewer with instant statistics, so it can be used to monitor and notice any changes in trends of sexual harassment. Hijab hopes that eventually the map can be given to the government, which has been complaining about lack of evidence of the problem, so that the government can invest more resources in combatting harassment. Second, in order to address the lack of awareness about harassment, Hijab hopes to use the map to create education campaigns and public awareness announcements to place on public transportation. He also hopes to begin hosting activities on harassment in university campuses, but as will be discussed later, has been running into obstacles with this initiative so far. Third, in order to address the lack of services currently offered to harassment victims, particularly those who are male, he also plans for Harkashat to run a hotline and other services for victims. In order to accomplish his goals, he has created a 5-year strategic plan for Harkashat that he hopes will lead to behavior change in Jordan.

Similar to SheCab, TechTribes is not an NGO, and the founder developed his idea for the Harkashat initiative while participating in a U.S. State Department-sponsored grant for social action. However, Hijab quickly decided that he did not want the Harkashat initiative to be solely reliant on foreign funds, so he embedded it in his company TechTribes. By making Harkashat just one of the initiatives of his company (some of which receive a profit), he was able to ensure that Harkashat could be funded continuously from its start. Everyone in the organization agrees that, for the sake of the initiative’s legitimacy, it is important for Harkashat not to be funded by a foreign government, so they rely on a combination of donations and internal funds to continue
the program. The consulting arm of the organization, which seeks to provide services to other nonprofits, ensures that there is always a back-up fund in case grants are not available. As a result of its multiple sources of funding, TechTribes is registered under the Ministry of Industry and Trade as a nonprofit, rather than with the Ministry of Social Development, which, according to Hijab, makes getting program approvals from the government easier.

Unlike SheCab, TechTribes has tried to form partnerships with multiple Jordanian feminist organizations. They began by reaching out to the Sisterhood is Global Institute (SIGI), research organizations (like the King Hussein Foundation Information and Research Center), and universities. Of these, the only one that was helpful was SIGI, as one of SIGI’s employees delivered a law-related education session to the members of Harkashat and offered SIGI’s legal services to Harkashat pro bono. The Information and Research Center was initially also willing to help, but they lost funding for a harassment-focused project and were asking Harkashat to pay for the research (a request that was not possible for Harkashat to fulfill). On the other hand, the universities refused from the start to collaborate, as university administrators were uncomfortable with harassment being spoken about on campus. These administrators would tell him that he could not host events on campus unless he changed the topic to something more broad, like gender-based violence. I asked him why he thought such a taboo existed around discussing harassment on university campuses, and he responded with two reasons:

Recently, it’s because…a professor at the University of Jordan, Rula, was fired because her students decided to do the project [on harassment] at the university. So…other professors at other universities, not only Jordan University, always fear that this is going to happen to them. Second, I think our universities recently have been priding themselves for providing a safe environment for students. So, bringing up the term or even the issue at a university, on a university campus, might mean one of two things: the first is you’re implying that the university, [has a problem on it’s own campus]…The second, and this is something that we [heard], at Mu’tah University in the south, last year, [when] the Dean of the Faculty of Student Affairs said, “I really highly appreciate what you’re doing, but there will be a problem if I rent the auditorium and one of the students stands up and says ‘I have been
harassed by my professor at this university.’ It would look bad on the record. That would get us in trouble at the university. So, we’re not telling you that we don’t know that there is a problem--we do know that--but we just don’t want to highlight it.” So everyone’s just trying to play it safe, I would say.291

His analysis of the taboo on discussing harassment at universities is likely applicable to the taboo that exists in broader Jordanian society as well. At least for male-to-female harassment, many members of society seem to recognize that it happens, but are hesitant to break the taboo around it for fear of the problem of harassment being worse than expected.

Hijab’s problems with finding collaborative partners has only increased when he has mentioned male-to-male harassment, an issue that he believes is quite pressing. He described the taboo that currently surrounds male-to-male harassment:

Jordan has an issue with male to male harassment, something that we don’t talk about, but it’s there. Male students in schools and universities acknowledge the fact that they’ve been harassed, some of them…But it’s something that I don’t think Jordan is ready to talk about. So, because of the lack of research and because us as an organization said we have a mandate to be gender sensitive and not to generalize, why are we, or why should we label this as a women’s movement and a women’s campaign? You know? We don’t have numbers. And numbers might prove that male to male harassment is the phenomenon. But until we prove otherwise, we’re not going to label the campaign.292

To Hijab, addressing the issue of male-to-male harassment was at least as pressing as addressing the issue of male-to-female harassment. Hijab was the only person with whom I spoke who spent more than a few seconds recognizing that male-to-male harassment exists, and he was certainly the only person to question the narrative that harassment is primarily a women’s issue. Both of these ideas, that male-to-male harassment exists and that harassment is not necessarily solely a women’s issue, threaten the heteronormative roles of masculinity and femininity that the Jordanian patriarchy has created.

292 Ibid.
Because Hijab’s ideas of harassment threaten the Jordanian patriarchy, they are seen as threatening to Jordan’s semi-governmental feminist organization, the JNCW. Hijab told me of his attempts to broach the subject of male-to-male harassment with the JNCW:

This year, we did go to the National Commission for Women and… they laughed at us! [chuckles] They said, “Great, what you’re doing, but male to male harassment is not something that we as the National Commission can talk about because it’s not within our mandate.” And I respect that about them, but what I did not understand is the mocking part, you know? I fully respect you adopting or working on women’s issues, but if you’re … labeling your work as gender inclusive and gender sensitive then, you know, you cannot eliminate, or you cannot forget about, the fact that you as an organization, and most of the women’s organizations in the country, have nothing to do with gender… Their understanding of gender and gender sensitivity and inclusiveness is a minimum. They understand gender as women, women, and girls. So I respected their [the JNCW’s] input but then we asked to meet with the people who run their Hotline. And my question then was very straightforward. I said, “If I, as a male, call you, call the hotline, and want to report an incident—like I just got raped—would you help me?” Their answer was very clear: “No, we cannot.” And that I found funny, because [they’re] claiming to have a service. And that by itself became very alarming. We started looking at the services …to realize that these are women and girls only services. Women and girls only hotlines. And part of what we’re doing nowadays, actually, is to try to start a real hotline, a hotline that caters to all, a hotline where you can call in with no bias, no gender discrimination…because it’s dumb, it’s just dumb293.

In Hijab’s opinion, male-to-male harassment in Jordan is a huge problem that is not being addressed, and he blames part of the taboo on feminist organizations like the JNCW that refuse to even recognize that male-to-male harassment exists.

Since Dr. Quawas is also involved with the JNCW, I asked her about this kind of attitude in the organization, and she admitted that, yes, the JNCW probably did react this way, because addressing male-to-male harassment would mean recognizing that non-heteronormative relationships exist in Jordan. Discussing LGBT relationships and the LGBT community is even more taboo in Jordan than discussing male-to-female harassment, so it would be risky for the JNCW to take male-to-male harassment on as an issue of concern. Additionally, the JNCW is

293 Ibid.
quasi-governmental, meaning that it is funded by the government, and according to Dr. Quawas, “the voice of the government [e.g., regular statements from politicians] is against the LGBT community.”\(^\text{294}\) Hijab, however, is not sympathetic to the JNCW’s position, and has decided to continue to focus Harkashat on all forms of harassment, no matter who it collaborates with. It has yet to be seen whether Hijab will be further marginalized by other women’s rights activists because of his more inclusive stance.

**Leaders of Tomorrow**

Leaders of Tomorrow is an organization that, similar to TechTribes, runs a number of initiatives, only one of which is focused on street harassment. According to its professional-quality website, Leaders of Tomorrow is a youth-led organization that aims to “create a wave of constructive reform across Jordan and the rest of the Middle East by utilizing a series of standalone initiatives, each structured to induce change in separate aspects of social and political culture.”\(^\text{295}\) These initiatives can be considered tools for addressing certain topics in Jordan, one of which is currently harassment. In order to understand how Leaders of Tomorrow incorporated a campaign against harassment into their existing initiatives, I interviewed Chris Lash, managing director, and Almudaffar Shobaki, project officer. Lash is one of many American NGO workers in Jordan, but the only American on the Leaders of Tomorrow team, and Shobaki is his Jordanian colleague.

Like Hijab, Shobaki was hesitant to define harassment, instead preferring to refer to the “international definition” and the opinion of Jordanian feminists like Asma Khader (a lawyer and human rights activist who has directed the Sisterhood is Global Institute/Jordan, the JWU, and

\(^{294}\) Rula Quawas, interviewed by author, February 26, 2016.

the JNCW).\footnote{296} However, like the other Jordanians that I interviewed, he was quick to point out that one of the primary issues in Jordan is that Jordanians “do not really know what to consider harassment and what not to consider as harassment.”\footnote{297} Similarly, Lash said that “a lot of people who are harassers…feel that as long as if they’re not touching someone, they can get away with whatever.”\footnote{298} This lack of knowledge of what comprises harassment can make it difficult to do campaigns against harassment or conduct research on harassment, as there is no common vocabulary. As a result, Western tourists tend to speak about the harassment in Jordan more than Jordanians do, as they often have more exposure to the concept of harassment. Because of this discourse by foreigners, Shobaki believes that it affects the reputation of Jordan both internally and abroad.

Additionally, both Shobaki and Lash believe that part of the problem of harassment in Jordan is the lack of research on the topic. Although Shobaki believes it is an increasing phenomenon, he says that statistics are very difficult to trust because they are always coming from informal studies. Shobaki says that, although you might find verbal harassment on the streets and in the workplace, it is hard to know how severe of a problem it is because of the taboo and the lack of resources. Lash agrees, but says that the taboo is potentially being broken as more and more women enter the workforce, feeling for the first time that they can speak out against it. When I asked why the taboo against discussing harassment in Jordan seemed to be greater than the taboo on discussing harassment in other Middle Eastern countries, Shobaki said that it related to the general taboo on physical relationships between girls and guys outside of marriage—this taboo created a shame around girls who experienced harassment, a feeling which further

\footnote{296} Chris Lash and Almudaffar Shobaki, interviewed by author, February 23, 2016
\footnote{297} Ibid.
\footnote{298} Ibid.
reinforced the taboo. Similarly, both Shobaki and Lash agreed that there remains an even larger taboo on discussing male-to-male harassment (neither would have mentioned it if I had not brought it up). Lash, like Dr. Quawas, said that the taboo was related to a more general taboo around non-heterosexual interactions

Shobaki and Lash’s belief that awareness is a primary part of the problem with harassment in Jordan caused them to implement awareness-raising activities through the pre-existing Diwanieh and Fadfed initiatives of Leaders of Tomorrow. As background, the Diwanieh initiative was founded with the goal of bringing “debate of taboo issues to the streets” so that the public could join in discussions with decision makers about “contentious sociopolitical issues.”299 It encourages Jordanian youth to organize crucial debates in high-capacity public arenas, where panelists are opinion leaders, local experts, and/or government representatives and the audience can participate by presenting points of view during the event. Fadfed serves a similar purpose of enabling “free public expression among the Jordanian public regarding sensitive issues.”300 For Fadfed projects, youth place large sheets of blank paper in public places and give colored pens (coded for age and gender) to members of the public so that they can write their thoughts on the different focus topics. Once the event is finished, the Leaders of Tomorrow team compiles the data into reports that they can then relay to government officials and other members of the community, allowing the public to easily and anonymously convey their opinions to political leaders.

At the time of the interview, Leaders of Tomorrow was planning a Diwanieh public debate about harassment that would feature Jordanian feminist Asma Khader, creating

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infographics on harassment for a public awareness campaign, and kicking off a Facebook page for people to share their experiences of harassment anonymously. They were also organizing a “Vox Pop” video where members of the public would give their opinions on harassment, coordinating a walk with the “Fast Walking Group” where the walkers would wear special ribbons symbolizing their opposition to harassment, and finishing a video of celebrities saying one sentence each about harassment.\(^3\) Earlier in the month, they had organized a 4-day capacity-building training for the youth who were going to be organizing the Diwanieh and Fadfed programs on harassment. For the first two days of this workshop, they trained the youth on debate skills (prior to the main debate on harassment, the youth would be staging their own), the next day they trained them on storytelling and sharing their stories through cartoons, and the final day they trained them on social media advocacy against harassment. Notably, all of these program facets were tailored to raise awareness about harassment, not necessarily to provide services to victims of harassment, which makes Leaders of Tomorrow’s methods different from those of SheCab and TechTribes.

Another aspect of Leaders of Tomorrow that makes it different from SheCab and TechTribes is its NGO-ization. Not only is its work project-based and its staff in a hierarchy, but it is also registered as an NGO with the Ministry of Political Development. It registered in 2010 after being started informally as a youth collective in 2007. According to Lash and Shobaki, it is fairly easy to register as an NGO in Jordan, but sometimes the Ministry will interfere with the NGO’s activities if it perceives a threat to national security. However, with the current project on sexual harassment, they have not faced a negative reaction from the government.

\(^3\) To see the videos and more information about the events, visit the anti-harassment campaign’s Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/wba3dein/?fref=nf.
Leaders of Tomorrow is also NGO-ized in that it relies on grants to keep its projects running. Whereas SheCab will eventually have its own revenue to keep running, and TechTribes is set up so that Harkashat can be independently funded, Leaders of Tomorrow relies on grants for every project. As a result, Leaders of Tomorrow must partially tailor its initiatives to the needs of grant-makers. For example, the board members and founder of Leaders of Tomorrow, Sami Hourani, have been wanting to address street harassment for some time, but they had to wait until an appropriate grant came along before they could implement such an initiative. The current project is taking place thanks to a grant call focused on human rights, so in order to win the grant, the organization had to frame the issue of harassment as a human rights issue.

Although much of the grant money for Leaders of Tomorrow comes from international sources, including USAID and the UN, and at least one of the staff members (Lash) is American, they do not believe that they are perceived as being internationalized. Lash states that they do not bend their project goals to meet the desires of funders, so he believes they are seen as being fairly independent. Their independence, like that of the SheCab and TechTribes, extends to their collaboration with other organizations, which is to say, like the other organizations, they do not collaborate much with others working on similar issues. Although for this campaign they are collaborating with Asma Khader, the Fast Walking group, a famous Jordanian cartoonist, and a local theater, they are not collaborating with any other organizations running anti-harassment campaigns or with any of the official feminist organizations in Jordan. According to Lash, the organizations such as the JNCW and the JWU are “higher-up” and deal with more national issues, whereas Leaders of Tomorrow enjoys working with other community organizations. Interestingly, though, none of the community organizations they are working with also target
harassment (like SheCab or TechTribes) meaning that their collaboration seems to be primarily based on services needs rather than solidarity.

King Hussein Foundation Information and Research Center

Though not currently working on any anti-harassment projects, the IRC is an important organization to consider when mapping the anti-harassment movement in Jordan, as it is an example of a royal NGO (a particular type of royally-endorsed NGO not to be found in Egypt) and the type of organization that could provide the research that is so desperately needed by anti-harassment initiatives in order to improve their effectiveness. One of its goals is to connect grassroots, community-based organizations to the national and international stages. To do so, the IRC partners with these organizations to collect information about certain topics in society, and in return, the IRC helps them build their capacity as organizations. The IRC uses that research to suggest policies at the national and international agendas. It seems that if the IRC chose to focus on harassment as one of its research priorities, then the lack of data on the issue could be resolved. To learn more about the IRC, I interviewed Dr. Aida Essaid, its executive director.

The IRC was founded as the National Task Force for Children in 1996, right after Jordan signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child. At the time, it was the only center doing research on children’s issues in Jordan. By the early 2000s, it had begun to incorporate women’s/gender issues into its research agenda, and it currently runs an online portal, the Haqqi information zone, to store all of the gender research that has been conducted in the country. Notably, there is no study strictly on harassment located in the portal (a few studies address the issue indirectly). Dr. Essaid is not sure why this lack exists, as she says that everyone, at least in the NGO community, sees harassment as a problem, even as a type of gender-based violence. However, she admits that Jordanians might say there are too many other (i.e., more important)
issues to deal with, because some Jordanians do not consider gender issues a priority for creating a more democratic, developed society. Nonetheless, she believes the harassment is now being talked about more because, in her opinion, it is happening more.

Unlike the other Jordanian organizations that I researched, the IRC, because of its status as a royal NGO, has very few bureaucratic limitations on its activities, so it could be relatively easy for them to work on a project targeting harassment. One of the reasons that it can remain independent, even of the royal family, is because of its institutionalization. Essaid says that Queen Noor currently acts as the Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the King Hussein Foundation, and they set the areas of focus, the themes, and the goals for the Foundation as a whole, but that the Executive Director of the Foundation (who is not a member of the royal family) ensures that the mission gets executed by the teams of each affiliated organization (of which the IRC is one). This NGO-ization not only allows for independence from the royal family, but also sustainability—because the IRC is not connected with one particular member of the royal family, it is able to be sustained across multiple generations.

The IRC’s ability to apply for funding, until recently, has also had very few limitations. As an NGO established by royal decree, it is not registered with a Ministry (like other NGOs are), and in the past, the IRC did not need to seek any kind of approval for receiving money from foreign sources. Last year, though, thanks to changes in national security, new policies were created on foreign funding of organizations. These policies have made it so that if the IRC wanted to apply for a grant from a foreign source, they would need to get approval from the Ministry of Social Development before they could accept the money. Nonetheless, Essaid said these new regulations were much harder on smaller community-based organizations than they
were on the IRC, as these organizations did not have the same connections in the government to follow up on their applications.

Unfortunately, it seems as though the IRC will be unable to focus on harassment as a project until it becomes a priority for one of its partner community organizations or until it receives a grant that allows it to make it a research priority. Essaid says that one of the reasons civil society seems to be so weak in Jordan (in that there are hardly any social movements) is that Jordanians have grown too dependent on the state to provide for them (unlike in Egypt, where the state has historically been weaker). Until civil society strengthens, it is unlikely that there will be a movement of any sort against harassment, and until such a movement starts, it seems unlikely that harassment will become a priority for the IRC.

Takamol

Takamol is a USAID initiative that focuses on “mainstreaming gender through policy reform at the national and community levels.” Like TechTribes, the IRC, and Leaders of Tomorrow, it is currently coordinating multiple projects, only one of which relates to harassment. Nonetheless, Takamol, is one of the most active feminist organizations in Jordan, so is important to examine to get a sense of where the Jordanian feminist movement’s priorities are located. To compile this profile about Takamol, I interviewed Ayman Halaseh, the organization’s senior component leader for advocacy and policy.

Halaseh, like every other NGO representative I interviewed, believes that lack of research on the phenomenon and confusion around the definition of harassment are two of the major facets of the problem of harassment in Jordan. Although he says harassment is not acceptable in Jordan, and that the 2012 UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women recommended

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that Jordanian organizations begin working on projects to combat the phenomenon, he admits that addressing harassment is not a priority of many Jordanian feminist organizations. Instead, many feminist organizations are working on getting Article 308 (which allows a rapist to avoid prosecution by marrying the woman he raped) removed from the penal code. Takamol, on the other hand, is not limiting itself to addressing Article 308, and is currently creating a plan to begin working on addressing the way that the Jordanian labor code and penal code addresses harassment. He says that Takamol’s analysis has shown that the law does not cover all forms of sexual harassment, including employee-to-employee harassment or non-physical harassment (both in the workplace and on the street), so Takamol is lobbying for a more comprehensive definition of sexual harassment in the law. Interestingly, the reason that addressing street harassment has become one of the priorities for Takamol is not just because it is a women’s rights issue, but because it is potentially one of the barriers that prevents a woman from working in the private sector. Jordan has one of the lowest labor force participation rates for women in the Middle East, a major problem for the country’s productivity, so framing the problem of harassment as a labor issue is a way of making it seem more pressing (and less taboo) to a wider variety of people.

On the topic of the taboo around discussing harassment, Halaseh says that in some ways, it still exists, but in other ways, it started to break in 2012. Halaseh claims that he has known harassment in Jordan existed as a problem since the 1990s, when he was working with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Jordan, and he would hear from unaccompanied Syrian women in Jordan that they experienced harassment in the country. He assumed at the time that Jordanian women probably had similar experiences, but did not report them. Halaseh says that in certain cases, the girl who is harassed in the street “might hesitate to present a complaint,” due to
cultural norms and traditions, and that she might fear for her reputation if she reports to the police.\textsuperscript{303} However, Halaseh says that the taboo on public discourse about harassment began to break in 2012, after the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women visited Jordan and recommended that it “properly address sexual harassment within a well-defined legal framework.”\textsuperscript{304} The year 2012 was also the year that the firestorm around Dr. Quawas began, which Halaseh said was another major reason why the public taboo on the issue began to break.

Like many of the other Jordanian organizations working at least partially on harassment, Takamol is reliant on international funding. However, it is different from those organizations in that it is a USAID initiative, and is therefore extremely closely associated with the U.S. In fact, when USAID announced the Takamol project, IREX, the D.C.-based International Research and Exchange Board, won the bid, Therefore, Takamol is now subject to monitoring and evaluation by both USAID and IREX. USAID also determines the topics on which Takamol will work each year, and then the all-Jordanian team on the ground creates projects within the topic frameworks. This year, USAID requested that Takamol focus on women’s economic empowerment in Jordan, which is one of the reasons that Takamol is framing its anti-harassment initiative as a labor-related project.

Although one might imagine that Takamol’s close association with the U.S. would make its work difficult in Jordan, or would call its legitimacy into question, Halaseh says that its association with the U.S is mitigated by the fact that all of the people working with it in Jordan are Jordanian. Although the JWU, which has a policy of not working with projects funded by USAID, refuses to collaborate with Takamol, Halaseh says that there have been some NGOs that previously were unwilling to work with USAID which are now willing to work with Takamol. It

\textsuperscript{303} Ayman Halaseh, interviewed by author, March 7, 2016.
\textsuperscript{304} Ibid.
is these types of collaborations that Halaseh believes makes the organization even more legitimate in the eyes of the Jordanian public.

According to Halaseh, Takamol’s most important strategic partner is the JNCW. He says that the JNCW is a semi-governmental body that is responsible for representing the interests of Jordanian women to the CEDAW committee. Among other things, Takamol has helped the JNCW build its capacity so that it can receive more funding in the future, and has helped it report on its international obligations. Concerning harassment, specifically, Takamol is working with a grassroots organization called Anhre, a human rights organization which is attempting to raise awareness of the problem of harassment in Jordan and which is preparing research on the Jordanian legal framework around sexual harassment. Halaseh hopes that a group like Anhre will come up with the official definition for harassment in Jordan, as he does not want Takamol to be responsible for solving the definition confusion. Ultimately, Takamol’s abilities to combat harassment are limited, as it works more to build capacity of other organizations than to organize independent campaigns or services, but its support could make the difference between a smaller anti-harassment initiative in Jordan succeeding or failing.

Summary

These interviews have illustrated how street harassment is not a priority of many feminist organizations in Jordan. The few organizations with anti-harassment projects tend to focus on two types of actions: first, breaking the taboo around discussing the issue of harassment, and second, providing services to women who are harassed. Additionally, these organizations did not collaborate with one another like similar organizations did in Egypt—instead, they only worked with other organizations when they needed particular resources. Due to the strength of the disciplinary apparatus of the paternal patriarchal structure in Jordan, many activists were not as
confrontational as their peers in Egypt, but instead found it useful to strategically maneuver within the patriarchal system in order to ensure that it functioned in a way that was most beneficial to the women inhabiting it.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

As the interviews illustrated, the activism against street harassment in Egypt and Jordan is vastly different. Though the people combatting harassment in Egypt and Jordan have fairly similar definitions of harassment, the ways that they choose to combat the problem could not be more diverse. Even within each country, the different anti-harassment organizations and campaigns participate in different types of activism, possess different attitudes and beliefs about their surrounding cultural and legal systems, and collaborate with other anti-harassment groups in varying capacities. The diversity of groups within each country makes it difficult to compare the activism against harassment between the two countries. Nonetheless, an analysis of the interviews with the organizations’ representatives illustrates that there are three facets of anti-harassment activism that differ between organizations in Egypt and organizations in Jordan. These differing facets are the anti-harassment initiatives’ attitudes toward the state, their methods of choice for combatting harassment, and their collaboration with other similar organizations in-country. This chapter will include a brief overview of these differences as well as my own theoretical framework for understanding their existence.

Organizations working on anti-harassment campaigns in Egypt have a visibly greater distrust of the state and its legal apparatus than those operating in Jordan. Some Egyptian organization representatives, such as Noora Flinkman from HarassMap and Mahy Hassan from Nazra, expressed their distrust in the state by explaining what they perceived as the corruption of the police. These activists lamented the fact that when women reported harassment to the police,
the police would often blame the women for their experiences rather than help them file a legal claim. They drew attention to the fact that, although laws might exist against harassment, the police do not always execute these laws. As a result, these activists did not trust the state apparatus to solve the problem of harassment.

Other Egyptian organizations, fueled by their distrust of the state apparatus, took a more confrontational stance in their activism. These organizations, including El Nadeem, which published a shadow report on CEDAW blaming the state for perpetrating harassment, and the EIPR, which filed a case against the Egyptian government in the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, blamed the Egyptian government for normalizing sexual harassment. Going one step further than HarassMap and Nazra, El Nadeem and the EIPR have attempted to hold the government directly responsible for the violent environment surrounding women in Egypt today. To these organizations, mistrust in the government was not only due to the government’s ignorance of the problem of sexual harassment, but was a result of its direct involvement in creating the problem.

The differing ways that organizations in Egypt viewed the state were also reflected in the different reasons that organization representatives gave for the lack of collaboration between their organization and the NCW (the state-sponsored feminist organization). Every organization representative I interviewed, except from Basma and Igmadi, stated that they did not collaborate with the NCW because of a disagreement with them on the problem of violence against women. None of the organizations collaborated with the NCW on a regular basis. To many of them, the NCW ignored sexual harassment when it was perpetrated by the state, and this created a conflict of interest. The NCW, like the police, became a symbol of the untrustworthy state, so it was avoided.
In Jordan, organizations tended to be much less confrontational toward the government, and their representatives tended to place more trust in the laws. For example, Rahmeh Abushweimeh, founder of SheCab, and Khaled Hijab, founder of TechTribes, lamented that people did not take advantage of their legal protections against harassment. Their complaints suggested that the problem of harassment had less to do with the state’s legal apparatus and more to do with the culture that women were living in. Similarly, Takamol’s activism on harassment focused on improving the law that applies to harassment, suggesting that if the legal apparatus was stronger, then the problem of harassment could be more effectively combatted.

Also in Jordan, organizations working against harassment were much less polarized when it came to working with the JNCW (the semi-governmental body officially tasked with Jordan’s women’s rights agenda). Most of the organizations that did not work with the JNCW believed their work was simply focused on different priorities than the JNCW. For example, Chris Lash from Leaders of Tomorrow said that they did not work with the JNCW because their campaign was more grassroots, not focused on legal issues. Meanwhile, Takamol, the organization working on a legal amendment, counted the JNCW as its most important partner. The decision about whether or not to work with the JNCW was based much more on practical needs rather than on ideology. Even Khaled Hijab from TechTribes, the only person who expressed being disappointed with the JNCW (for not recognizing the problem of male-to-male harassment), initially reached out to JNCW to collaborate before deciding that it was more important for TechTribes to work independently to fill a gap in the JNCW’s services. For all of these organizations, the JNCW symbolized a part of the state apparatus that, although not always relevant to their work, was at least working toward similar goals.
Importantly, the relationship of trust between the state and these organizations did not exist on a one-way path. In Egypt, the organizations that distrusted the government were the same organizations that have been singled out for government persecution this year. These organizations—El Nadeem, the EIPR, and Nazra—were, in addition to HarassMap, the only organizations I interviewed that were founded before the uprising, and they were organizations that had been active in attempting to hold the government responsible for abuses against its citizens (including sexual harassment) for years. The organizations that were not perceived as threatening by the government, namely those that were founded during and after the revolution with the idea of directly intervening in acts of harassment and raising awareness of the problem amongst the Egyptian populace, were left alone. In Jordan, all of the organization representatives I interviewed expressed trust in at least one part of the state apparatus (usually the legal system), so the Jordanian government has not felt threatened by them and has not targeted them. In fact, the government has made it fairly easy for most of them to register, and has allowed them to seek foreign funding. Though Jordanian society has not been as accepting (particularly with regard to the more confrontational work of Dr. Rula Quawas), this seems not to have affected most of the Jordanian organizations’ relationship to the state apparatus.

The different relationships between the state and the anti-harassment initiatives in Egypt and Jordan, in addition to the different political climates and different levels of taboo around harassment in each country, have affected the types of actions that initiatives in each country deem most effective and appropriate. In Egypt, where organizations were less likely to trust any part of the state apparatus, most of the organizations could be classified as taking one of two types of actions: some, like Binat Masr Khat Ahmar, focused their activities on creating public spaces that were safe for women, and others, like the EIPR, Nazra, and Igmadi, worked on
educating the public about the issue of harassment and women’s rights in public spaces. Other
organizations, like HarassMap, Basma, and Ded Taharosh, coordinated both types of activities.
The representatives of these organizations all believed that, due to the international attention
brought to Egypt by the uprising, there were enough statistics to prove that harassment existed in
the country, so, for the most part, these organizations did not focus themselves on conducting
research about the phenomenon. More important to these organizations than adding to the
growing body of statistics was protecting women in public spaces when the police refused to do
so, and convincing the Egyptian public that it was everyone’s responsibility to make streets safer
for women. These organizations took it upon themselves to fill a gap that the state had left open,
so they chose not to focus on re-directing power to the state as much as on empowering the
Egyptian public with knowledge and safety.

In Jordan, representatives of anti-harassment initiatives and women’s rights organizations
were more concerned with the taboo around discussing harassment than with the government’s
handling of it. Most of them were quick to blame social norms and culture, rather than the
government, for the problem of harassment. As a result, their activities were divided between
providing educational workshops for the public, conducting research on the problem of sexual
harassment, and providing culturally sensitive services that might help women avoid harassment.
For example, Leaders of Tomorrow was very focused on getting the public to talk about and
define harassment, the Information and Research Center was attempting to collect data on the
effects of harassment, and SheCab was intent upon providing a service that might allow women
to avoid spaces where harassment was most prevalent. Meanwhile, TechTribes was involved in
implementing all three types of actions. Although one could argue that these Jordanian
organizations were filling gaps in the state apparatus as much as the Egyptian organizations
were, the Jordanian organizations seem to have perceived themselves as instead supplementing
the state. As a result, the Jordanian organizations were not focused on creating radical political
changes, but instead on convincing Jordanian society to adjust its norms so that public spaces
would be safe for women.

Because Jordanian anti-harassment organizations saw themselves as supplemental, rather
than as parts of a larger movement, they collaborated with one another and other unrelated
organizations on an as-needed basis. For example, TechTribes, prior to beginning the Harkashat
initiative, reached out to the Sisterhood is Global Institute to learn about the issue of harassment,
and contacted the Information and Research Center to be a research partner on a grant
application. These collaborations and collaboration attempts were not efforts to create a broader
network of anti-harassment organizations, but were instead practical ways for TechTribes’ to
support its own initiatives. Collaboration in Jordan is not necessarily done as an expression of
solidarity from one group to another, but is used as a tool by each organization to support its own
activities.

Collaborations between organizations in Egypt are quite different. All of the organization
representatives told me that it was very important to have multiple initiatives and organizations
combating harassment in Egypt, as they each filled in one another’s gaps to create a more
cohesive social movement against harassment. For example, HarassMap and Ded Taharosh
worked together to create more effective community mobilization activities; Nazra provided
resources such as meeting space and trainings to Basma and EIPR; Binat Masr Khat Ahmar
coordinated with HarassMap and Basma to reach broader audiences with their anti-harassment
advocacy campaigns; and Igmadi allowed other anti-harassment organizations to recruit
volunteers at their events. The representatives of these organizations saw collaboration with one
another as a vital tool for achieving their goals, as it allowed the organizations to cover more
ground and create a bigger buzz around the issue of harassment. Related to their distrust of the
government, some of the representatives also suggested that working together ensured that the
government would have more difficulty squelching their activism—if one organization was
stopped, it would not stop the movement.

As the interviews illustrate, the differences between anti-harassment activism in Egypt
and Jordan cannot be thoroughly explained by theories of internationalization or NGO-ization. In
both countries, the international community has been heavily involved in funding the anti-
harassment organizations, and in both countries, the anti-harassment scene has become
dominated by the presence of NGOs. Unlike the literature might suggest, most of the
interviewees believed that NGO-ization allowed their organizations to become more sustainable,
and those who worked in transnational feminist networks found their participation in these
networks to be extremely useful.

The vast differences between activism against street harassment in Egypt and Jordan can
be explained by the differences in patriarchy’s structure and function in the two states. In both
countries, the patriarchal system relies on strictly defined forms of heterosexual masculinity and
femininity with men defined as protectors/aggressors and women defined as the
protected/victims. As a result, the taboo around harassment is stronger in both countries when
concerning non-heteronormative harassment (i.e., male-to-male harassment, female-to-male or
female-to-female harassment). Additionally, in both states, patriarchy exists on the level of the
nuclear family as well as on the level of the government, but in Jordan, the patriarchy has, until
very recently, successfully protected women from street harassment and prevented them from
mobilizing. In Egypt, the patriarchy has been the source of aggressive attacks on women’s
sexuality and bodily autonomy in public spaces. As a result, Jordan is not home to a movement against street harassment (even though recently more organizations have become interested in the issue), while Egypt is. A descriptive analysis of patriarchy’s structure in Egypt and Jordan will further illuminate the reasons that street harassment, and therefore activism against street harassment, shows up so differently in the two locations.

The patriarchy in Jordan can be represented as a nested system of paternal/disciplinary control over women (see Appendix A for figure). The men in a woman’s nuclear family (i.e. her father and brothers and/or husband) form the first layer of patriarchal control over her. Before a woman is married, her father and brothers are supposed to act as her protectors from other men, and when a woman marries, her husband is added to this cohort. Fathers, brothers, and husbands actualize their duties in different ways, but many of them do so in a way that limits the mobility of the woman in question. For example, as IRC reports showed, they might discourage their daughters, sisters, or wives from leaving the home if they believe the women will be harassed, or, as Rahmeh Abushweimeh (the founder of SheCab) said, the male family members might prohibit the women from taking public transportation or taxis. Both of these examples are ways that men believe they are protecting women from public sexual harassment, yet they are also both ways that men inhibit women’s employment and education opportunities by confining them to the space of the home.

Surrounding the nuclear family, with its primary locus of control over women, is the second layer of patriarchal control over an individual woman: her extended family, tribe, and/or neighborhood. Similar to the men of the nuclear family, the men of a woman’s extended family or tribe (who in urban areas might also be many of the men in her neighborhood) are concerned with her protection, particularly the protection of her honor (as symbolized by her virginity).
However, unlike the men of the nuclear family, who can only control and protect women within the home, the men of the tribe or neighborhood expand the area in which women can be monitored or disciplined by male family members for breaking social norms. Nonetheless, this expanded layer of patriarchal control can also have a protective function, ensuring that women are safe from street harassment in a larger area beyond the home. As Abushweimeh said, the probability of getting harassed in Jordan is likely greater on buses or in taxis than on the streets, as women walking on the streets could be walking in their neighborhood, within view of their male family members. Clearly, a man harassing a woman would not want to be caught by her male family members who are tasked with protecting her. As a result, the second layer of patriarchal control, when it works effectively, serves both to expand the area of control over women while also expanding the area in which she is protected from street harassment.

The final layer of patriarchal control over individual women in Jordan is the paternal state, symbolized by the father figure of King Abdullah. Although this layer is farther removed from the daily life of most individual women, it is a macro-level representation of the disciplinary paternalism embodied by the other two layers, and it is responsible for ensuring that the two layers of patriarchal control encompassed by it are both preserved and regulated. Regulation of the two lower levels of patriarchal control is important, as it ensures that they will continue to function even in an ever-changing world. Although such regulation is not always easy, the paternal state has succeeded until now, creating a disciplinary, yet protective, “security fence” around Jordanian women. This “security fence” has succeeded for a long time in both protecting and confining many Jordanian women, preventing many of them from seeing the need to mobilize around issues like street harassment, reinforcing the taboo around discussing street
harassment, and pre-empting the creation of a social movement against street harassment like the one that exists in Egypt.

In Egypt, the patriarchal ideal looks similar to the patriarchal ideal in Jordan—after all, they are both Arab countries with strong Islamist constituencies and similar heteronormative ideas about gender roles. However, the outer layer of the nested system of Egyptian patriarchy has been fractured ever since the Egyptian government started using sexual violence against women participating in anti-Mubarak protests in 2005 (See Appendix B for figure). Though the timeline of the violent demise of the nested patriarchal system could potentially begin with a point as far back as the overthrow of Egypt’s last king, Farouk I, in 1952, most of the people I interviewed pointed toward the 2011 uprising as the turning point for sexual harassment and assault in Egypt, so this analysis will locate the most damaging blow to the nested patriarchal system in the mob sexual assaults of 2011.

In 2011, the security apparatus’ acts of sexual assault toward female protestors broke the outer layer, the paternal state layer, of the patriarchy in Egypt. Rather than enforcing an implicit form of paternalist discipline against its citizens, as it had in the past, the state became a predator focused on maintaining order via sexual discipline. The same patriarchal structure that protected women in Jordan became an imminent physical threat to women in Egypt. However, the danger posed to women by the fractured state would not have been as imminent if the collapsing state did not fall on and break the next patriarchal layer, that is, the layer of the neighborhood. It was the collapse of the layer of the neighborhood that led to the increase in street harassment beyond the protest setting.

Ever since President Mubarak implemented structural readjustment policies in the 1990’s, the Egyptian economy had been suffering. The economic downturn led to massive
unemployment, which was one of the major reasons for the 2011 uprising. In addition, the economic downturn caused the patriarchal layers of the neighborhood and the nuclear family to fracture. As Peoples’ has argued, the combination of high unemployment and increasing state violence towards protestors led to a masculinity crisis for many Egyptian men. Many men became unable to marry due to their economic instability, which had a major effect on their ability to perform masculinity in the way that had been outlined for them by the Egyptian patriarchal system. This masculinity crisis led many men to attempt to regain their masculinity by perpetrating acts of sexual violence, including street harassment, against unknown women in public spaces. Neighborhoods were no longer safe for women, as some of the men who had formerly performed their masculinity by being protectors were now economically emasculated by the state. This emasculation, an effect of the collapse of the paternal state, led to the collapse of the disciplinary patriarchal layer of the neighborhood, which had performed actions that both monitored and protect women, onto the layer of the nuclear family.

The collapse of both of these outer layers onto the layer of the nuclear family caused many women to be threatened by street harassment in public spaces. Even those women who were able to find a husband could no longer rely on protection from their husband or father because of the increasing danger on the street. The patriarchal protection of the nuclear family was not enough to protect women in public spaces, so women were forced to confront the collapsing patriarchal structure. No longer able to rely on the government or their families or neighborhoods for protection, Egyptian women were forced to break the taboo and organize against sexual violence and, specifically, sexual harassment. As a result, they created a multitude of organizations that provided services, conducted awareness campaigns, and lobbied for legal reform, and they ensured that the organizations worked together to accomplish comprehensive
change. The patriarchal system was no longer functioning in a way that even nominally protected women, so they had to take responsibility for every facet of their own protection. Amidst the chaos of the uprising, Egyptian women created a social movement against harassment that, for the most part, has lasted until today.

Ultimately, Egyptian anti-harassment organizations have been more confrontational toward the state and more collaborative with each other compared because the Egyptian state has failed to offer the protection promised by its disciplinary paternalistic patriarchal structure. The anti-harassment activists in Egypt no longer feel as though they can gain any protection from the fractured Egyptian patriarchy, so they are no longer attempting to work within its rules. The Egyptian patriarchy has, in every way, failed women, leaving them with no option but to seek safety and justice beyond the patriarchal framework. In contrast, the layers of the Jordanian patriarchy are currently intact, so the Jordanian patriarchy is still able to fulfill its promise of providing protection to women. As a result of the intact structure, many Jordanian women find it unnecessary to participate in feminist activism against street harassment, while the few that do choose to combat harassment in a direct way (e.g., Rula Quawas) find themselves extremely limited, even threatened, for transgressing the patriarchal norms. In order to most effectively address harassment, Jordanian women must maneuver within the strong patriarchal system, leveraging its disciplinary capacity in strategic ways.

In this study, I was able to create a theory about the reasons for the different characteristics of anti-harassment activism in Egypt and Jordan, but my research was limited by time and travel constraints. In order to test this theory, there are a number of avenues that could be pursued in future research. First, one could analyze the etymology of the linguistic construct of taharosh (harassment) and nesawiya (feminism) in order to determine how these issues were
conceptualized by Arabs prior to the modern proliferation of internationalized feminist discourse. To develop a more comprehensive understanding of how the Jordanian and Egyptian patriarchal systems work today, one could also analyze the taboo around male-to-male harassment in each country. This kind of analysis would illustrate exactly how non-heteronormative forms of harassment are threats to the patriarchal structures of each country. Finally, in order to develop a better overall understanding of feminist civil society in both countries, there must be further analysis of whether theories of NGO-ization can effectively apply in contexts where NGOs are part of, not separate from, ongoing social movements.

It is my hope that transnational feminists can use my theory on the differences between Egyptian and Jordanian modes of anti-harassment activism to be better allies of women in the Middle East. Armed with the knowledge that Jordanian women have to maneuver within a disciplinary, yet paternally protective, patriarchal structure, while Egyptian women are forced to confront a dangerously collapsing patriarchal structure, transnational feminists will hopefully be less likely to stereotype Middle Eastern women in a non-existent binary of victim and activist. In both countries, women are experiencing the harms of street harassment, but due to the different cultural and political contexts, symbolized in this paper by the different patriarchal structures, they must choose for themselves the most effective forms of survival and resistance. It is the duty of Western feminists to support these activists, whether they are maneuvering within a patriarchal structure or confronting a collapsing patriarchal structure head-on. As the increasing crack-downs on Egyptian feminist organizations has shown, Middle Eastern feminists are being forced to confront many different obstacles. It would be a disservice to them and to Western feminist activists to ignore these Middle Eastern feminists’ agency, strength, and technique. I urge other feminist theorists to return to the field’s roots as activism-based scholarship, and to
continue the work of creating grounded theory that can be useful and sensitive to all women, no matter what patriarchal structure surrounds them.
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Print Sources


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Appendix A:

Jordan
The Ideal Protective/Disciplinary Patriarchal System
Appendix B:

Egypt
The Fractured Patriarchal State

[Diagram showing layers of society with labels: Paternal state, Extended family/tribe/neighborhood, Nuclear Family, Woman. Arrows indicate layers collapseing.]

Paternal state collapsing

Neighborhood layer collapsing

Nuclear family layer collapsing

The woman is unable to collapse into anything, so she must confront the collapse to survive