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Leslie Brody Date

On Behalf of Another: Exploring Social Value Orientation and Responses to Injustice

By

Leslie Brody
Doctoral Candidate

Department of Sociology

_____

Karen A. Hegtvedt
Advisor

_____

Cathryn Johnson
Committee Member

_____

Matthew Archibald
Committee Member

_____

Beth Reingold
Committee Member

Accepted:

_____

Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph.D.
Dean of the Graduate School

_____

Date

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By

Leslie Brody

B.A, Brandeis University, 2002

Advisor: Dr. Karen Hegtvedt, Ph.D.

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Abstract

On Behalf of Another: Exploring Social Value Orientation and Responses to Injustice
By Leslie Brody

This study examined the relationship between a person's "social value orientation" and involvement in activities aimed at reducing social injustice on behalf of others. Social value orientation is an individual level factor that impacts preference for certain outcomes. The literature on social value orientation suggests that, when faced with social dilemmas (i.e. situations where individuals must choose to pursue their own, immediate self-interests or to sacrifice for the good of a larger group), some people respond in a cooperative, or "pro-social" manner, while others respond individualistically or competitively in a "pro-self" manner. The goals of this project were twofold: to explore the social antecedents of social value orientation; and to examine whether social value orientation and other individuals level factors (i.e. demographics, childhood socialization, personal beliefs and values) influence the manner in which people respond to injustice that is observed but not personally experienced. In order to better understand what factors shape responses to injustice, this study drew from literature in the areas of psychology, social psychology, social movements, political activism, and Jewish studies.

Participants in this study were American Jewish adults, a population chosen because of the noted salience of social justice issues in Jewish communities. A survey research method was used to assess individual social value orientation and social antecedents. Participants were also asked to read and respond to vignettes describing two different, socially unjust scenarios. Regression was used to analyze data. Results of this study indicate that social value orientation and several other variables affect not only anticipated responses to injustice, but also the type of response preferred by observers of injustice. Factors that had the most influence over anticipated behavioral responses to injustice included social value orientation, education, income, valuing community involvement, and believing that a behavioral response would make a difference.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

According to Miller and Ratner (1996), "Theories as diverse as evolutionary biology, neo-classical economics, behaviorism, and psychoanalysis all assume that people actively and single-mindedly pursue their self-interest…" (p. 25). Such theories portray people as selfish and self-serving (Walster and Walster 1975). There is ample evidence, however, of individuals choosing to sacrifice time, energy, money, and, at times, even personal safety to act on behalf of others who have experienced injustice. Housed people work at homeless shelters, heterosexuals vote for gay rights, individuals who have never been abused send checks to domestic violence shelters. These actions prompt the question, "Why?" What motivates people to care about social injustice that does not impact them directly?

There may be non-material rewards for helping others such as feeling good about one's self, gaining friendships, or fulfilling religious or moral obligations. But while self-interest may be *a* motivation, it is not necessarily the only motivation. The purpose of this study is to examine factors that enhance the likelihood that individuals who are aware of social injustice will pursue a course of action intended to reduce it. Social justice, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, refers to the "fairness" of social institutions that structure society and facilitate or limit individuals' access to three primary resources: power, status, and money (Barry 1989). Rawls argues that social justice principles allow for society to distribute resources in a manner that prevents discrimination, protects human rights, and promotes social cooperation (see Rawls 1971).

The focus of this project is on what motivates perceivers of injustice to become active responders to injustice. Its primary goal is to elucidate when perceivers of

injustice – individuals to who are already aware of social injustice – will respond behaviorally to the situation, and what strategies they will use when they choose to do so. Moreover, this study considers factors that affect how people redress injustice that they have observed, but have not directly experienced. I draw from literature in the areas of social psychology, social movements, and, to a lesser extent, political participation in order to describe the range of responses that observers may have in response to others' injustices.

One key factor that may influence responses to injustice, by capturing beliefs that shape underlying motivations, is social value orientation. Within the psychology literature, social value orientation is defined as preference for specific outcome distributions (see Beggan et al. 1988; Eek and Garling 2006; Knight and Dubro 1984; Liebrand et al. 1986; McClintock and Allison 1989; McClintock and Liebrand 1988; Nauta, de Dreu, and van der Vaart 2002; Sattler and Kerr 1991; van Lange and Kuhlman 1994; van Vugt 1997; van Vugt, Van Lange, and Meertens 1996). More simply, it is a desire to divide resources a certain way, based on the weights one gives to his/her own and others' outcomes (McClintock and Allison 1989). Social value orientation is an individual level characteristic that remains fairly consistent and stable. It impacts cognition – the way that individuals perceive and interpret situations – as well as behavior.

There are three primary types of social value orientation: cooperative (or prosocial), individualistic (or proself), and competitive (also referred to as proself) (see Van Vugt 1997). Cooperative people try maximize joint outcomes for themselves and others. They prefer that all rewards to be equal, even if it means that they personally receive a smaller

reward than they might otherwise get (Eek and Garling 2006). Individualistic people endeavor to maximize their own rewards while ignoring others' rewards (McClintock and Allison 1989). They are invested in receiving the largest amount possible, regardless of what others get. Finally, competitive people try to maximize the difference between own and others' rewards (McClintock and Allison 1989). Competitive individuals are more invested in getting a larger reward than others rather than in maximizing their own personal rewards.

When faced with situations in which they must choose to pursue their own, immediate self-interest or sacrifice for the good of a larger group (i.e. a social dilemma), individuals either respond cooperatively, in a "prosocial" manner, or individualistically or competitively, in a "pro-self" manner. Prosocial people work to ensure overall well-being of the group, while proself people look out for their own interests.

Stouten, De Cremer, and Van Dijk (2005) argue, "social value orientation can play an important role in addressing how and why people respond to violations of equality" (p. 768). Because social value orientation impacts people's preferences for specific distributive outcomes (outcomes that maximize own rewards versus group rewards), it may also influence people's preferences for more general social outcomes. Whether faced with a social dilemma or social injustice, individuals often consider how various outcomes will affect them personally, and also how such outcomes will affect others. Indeed, Schroeder et al. (2003) maintain that justice processes for determining the fairness or unfairness of a situation are used in deciding how to respond to a social dilemma. Consequently, social value orientation may very well influence how people respond to others' experiences of social injustice.

Further support for this idea comes from research indicating that social value orientation influences helping behavior (McClintock and Allison 1989). McClintock and Allison (1989) found that cooperators are more likely than competitors to volunteer hours of their time when their assistance is requested. Presumably, attempts to redress injustice – which may be categorized as helping behaviors – would then also be shaped by social value orientation.

Justice responses are tangentially related to social dilemma responses. Yet, with few exceptions (see Eek and Garling 2006; Stouten et al. 2005; Van Vugt 1997), the social value orientation literature does not touch on justice-related issues. These few studies, however, illustrate the relevance of social value orientation to justice research. This study aims to augment previous research by focusing specifically on the connection between value orientation and reactions to injustice.

Most social value orientation research does not examine the impact of social factors on value orientation. With one major exception (see Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, and Joirman 1997), studies assume that people are disposed to be cooperative, individualistic, or competitive. The literature generally fails to address how an individual's background and past experiences may affect his or her social value orientation. Van Lange et al. (1997), however, emphasize that both childhood and adult socialization affect the development of a specific social value orientation. Furthermore, the political science and social movements literatures suggest that individual level factors may facilitate or restrict participation in certain pro-social activities, such as political activism and civic involvement. Consequently, individual level factors may also affect people's preferences for specific social outcomes—that is, their value orientation.

This study draws from literature in the areas of social psychology, social movements, and political science in order to establish what factors are likely to shape social value orientation and responses to social injustice. These include demographic factors such as sex, age, education level, employment status, and religiosity. Other social antecedents commonly discussed in studies on civic and political involvement include past experience with activism, participation in multiple volunteer activities, interest in current events, desire to stay informed on current events, and perceived efficacy of one's actions. Such factors provide motivation to become involved in social issues. As such, they are also likely to motivate responses to others' injustices. This subject is discussed in further depth in Chapter 4.

Figure 1 below describes the underlying theoretical model for this study. Previous studies have found that perceptions of injustice have an impact on responses to injustice (see Hegtvedt 2006). Consequently, this study will only briefly discuss the effect of perceptions on observers' reactions to injustice. Instead, it will focus on other portions of the model in Figure 1 by considering what factors influence social value orientation, and how social value orientation and other individual level factors impact behavioral responses to injustice. Do these factors have a direct impact on the strategies that people use to redress injustice? Do some factors have more of an impact than others? Do factors motivate use of different strategies?

Figure 1: Antecedents and Consequences of Social Value Orientation



This study attempts to answer these questions by using several approaches. First, I integrate the social value orientation and justice frameworks in order to provide a more complete picture of factors that affect when and how people respond to social injustices experienced by others. In doing so, I make a unique contribution to both literatures. Although previous studies have tested the relationship between social value orientation and responses to social dilemmas (i.e. Kramer, McClintock and Messick 1986; Knight and Dubro 1984; Liebrand 1984; Liebrand and Van Run 1985), few studies test the relationship between social value orientation and responses to social injustice. Furthermore, the data produced by this study will help clarify whether social value orientation impacts behavioral responses by observers who have no personal stake in the outcome. In other words, it will attempt to understand how prosocial and proself values drive behavior in situations where there is no material, personal reward for acting in either a prosocial or proself manner.

Second, I augment research on the development of value orientation by examining individual level factors that may shape preference for certain social outcomes. Little is known about why individuals develop different value orientations. Consequently, I

intend to contribute to the social value orientation literature by discovering its social antecedents.

Third, I examine the impact of social value orientation and other individual level factors in response to two different socially unjust scenarios. Much of the research on social value orientation relies on data collected in laboratory settings, using university students as subjects. This study, however, will be conducted outside the university setting. Participants, who came from 25 different states, were Jewish adults recruited through a snowball sample. By including only Jewish participants in this study, I also hope to contribute significantly to the Jewish studies literature. This study employs a social psychological perspective in order to augment research on Jewish responses to social injustice.

The point of this study was to gain a better understanding of what causes observers of injustice – people who are aware that an injustice has occurred – to use specific strategies in response to injustice. In order to achieve this goal I decided to focus my study on Jewish adults. Research indicates that social injustice is a particularly salient issue for members of the Jewish community. Studies on Jewish liberalism suggest that abuses of injustice are particularly abhorrent to Jews (Walzer 1995), and that Jews place strong value on collective responses to others' misfortune (Cohen and Liebman 1997). Jewish law demands that Jews pursue *tikkun olam* (repairing the world), *darchei shalom* (ways of peace), and *pikuach nefesh* (the saving of lives) (Vorspan and Saperstein 1998); thus, social justice, compassion, and caring for others are values that are relevant and important to Jews. This, paired with Jews' minority status and history of marginalization in the U.S. (Cohen and Liebman 1997), experience of persecution in Europe and the

devastation of the Holocaust (Levey 1996), and Jewish interest in maintaining individual rights and freedoms (Cohen and Leibman 1997) has heightened awareness of social injustice in the Jewish community.

Using a sample of Jewish adults allows for an exploration of what factors affect the type of behavioral response that people engage in when they do choose to redress injustice. There are many established, Jewish organizations dedicated to preserving civil rights, relieving human suffering, ensuring social justice, and creating social change. Such organizations include the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, Mazon, National Council of Jewish Women (NCJW), and Hadassah. Thus, members of the Jewish community have many opportunities to participate in activities intended to reduce social injustice. Levels and types of participation, however, vary from person to person. In this study, I examine whether individual level factors (gender, age, education level, income, marital status, religious observance patterns, etc.) predict the social value orientation of Jewish adults, and whether social value orientation and other individual level factors are related to people's desire to redress injustice in specific ways.

Two strategies are employed to test hypotheses in this study. First, a questionnaire is used to assess study participants' individual social value orientations. Second, participants read vignettes describing different, socially unjust scenarios and answered questions about their anticipated responses to the scenarios. The second strategy allows for assessment of whether an individual's social value orientation predicts behaviors consistent across different types of social injustice.

In Chapter 2 I review literature that speaks to the relationship between Judaism and social justice, in order to highlight the appropriateness of using a sample comprised of Jewish adults. Chapter 3 provides a conceptualization of social justice, a review of social psychological literature on the subject of justice for others, and a more in-depth discussion of the various behavioral responses used by individuals to redress injustice. Chapter 4 contains a description and discussion of the social value orientation framework. Chapter 5 reviews the research methodology for the survey component of this study, while Chapters 6 and 7 assess results and conclusions.

The purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of why some observers respond to injustice while others do not. Many individuals are aware of social injustice in their communities or in society at large, are concerned about it, but choose to do nothing in response. Their concern is not enough to motivate a behavioral response. Among those who do respond to injustice, some choose to actively redress the injustice through strategies such as attending a protest or writing a letter to a political representative, while others engage in strategies that are slightly more reflexive, such as staying informed about the situation or discussing it with others. Such actions may relieve feelings of distress or allow observers to gain a clearer understanding of the injustice, but will not necessarily change the outcome. Thus, among people who are aware of social injustice there are a number of potential responses: doing nothing (acknowledging the unfairness of the situation but refraining from a behavioral response), responding "reflexively" (using a strategy that relieves feelings of distress or increases understanding of the situation, but without the intention of changing the situation), or responding "actively"

(using a strategy that is intended to redress the injustice and change the outcome of the situation).

Beaton and Deveau (2005) argue that it is "critical to understand what drives members of an advantaged group to help less fortunate out-groups" (p. 1609). This research project is part of a body of research that attempts to illuminate the reasons why people engage in behaviors intended to reduce social injustice on behalf of others. It addresses the social psychological processes that motivate observers of others' injustices to take action and work to restore justice. In doing so, this study contributes to scholarly debate on how to create a socially just society. Understanding what motivates people to fight social injustice is an integral step down the path to social change.

CHAPTER 2: JEWISH RESPONSES TO SOCIAL INJUSTICE

The sample for this study is comprised of American Jewish adults over the age of 24. This particular population was chosen because of the salience of social justice issues in Jewish communities, which allows for exploration of whether individual characteristics affect the *type* of response that people have when they observe injustice. Members of the Jewish community have, and take, many opportunities to participate in activities intended to reduce social injustice. Levels and types of participation, however, vary from person to person. Consequently, utilizing a population of Jewish adults allows for close scrutiny of how individual level factors influence the *type* of response used by observers of injustice, while holding constant religious background. Below, I discuss the relevance of social justice issues to Judaism and to American Jews. My objective is to illustrate why Jewish individuals are likely to be aware of and concerned about social injustice.

Focusing on Jewish adults in this study allowed me to gain a better understanding of what causes perceivers of injustice to actively respond to the situation. While the Jewish community may be aware of and concerned about social injustice, not all individuals choose to redress it. And, when individuals do decide to act, they do so in a variety of ways. In choosing this particular population, my intention was to pinpoint which individual level factors motivate perceivers of injustice to become active responders, and what strategies injustice perceivers use to redress injustice on behalf of others.

Judaism and Liberalism

In this chapter, I discuss the connection between Judaism and liberalism and how it relates to the relevance of social justice issues in Jewish communities. Liberalism is not the focus of this study. But, research on Jewish liberalism provides insight as to why social injustice is so salient to Jews. This literature provides key explanations as to why Jewish American adults are likely to be concerned about social issues and motivated to redress injustice.

There is a significant amount of research on Jews and liberalism (see Cohen and Liebman 1997; Glaser 1997; Levey 1996). In measuring liberalism, Cohen and Liebman (1997) look at opinions regarding a number of social issues: church-state issues, political self-identification, civil liberties, permissive social and sexual codes, government spending and aid to the poor, support for African-Americans, and opposition to capital punishment. Other studies also tend to use the term liberalism to mean support for civil rights, minority group protection, Democratic voting patterns, and government assistance for disadvantaged populations (see Levey 1996). In discussing prominent patterns of Jewish liberalism, the literature does not always use the term "social justice". It does, however, provide insight as to why social justice is such an important issue in Jewish communities. For instance, in their study on Jewish liberalism, Cohen and Liebman (1997) found that "In the 1950's, vast majorities in a sample of suburban Jews claimed it was 'essential' or 'desirable' for a 'good Jew' to 'support all humanitarian causes,' help the 'underprivileged improve their lot,' and 'be a liberal on political and economic issues'" (p. 406). The extent to which people are liberal does, of course, vary. Some individuals and subgroups are more liberal than others (Levey 1996). Nevertheless, Jews

of all socio-economic classes are consistently found to be more liberal than non-Jewish, white counterparts.

Several arguments are used to explain why Jews tend to have liberal voting records and high rates of agreement with liberal statements in public opinion polls. One argument commonly used is that compassion, justice, and tolerance are values central to Judaism, and that these values generate liberal thinking (see Cohen and Liebman 1997; Glaser 1997; Levey 1996). Judaism includes hundreds of laws that demand ethical and moral behavior. Because of this, collective responses to others' misfortune are particularly important to Jews (Cohen and Liebman 1997). Furthermore, abuses of injustice are particularly salient amongst Jewish populations. Walzer (1995) argues:

> The Jewish commitment to justice is substantively connected to Jewish religious culture and to the experience of exile before as well as after emancipation. The connection goes all the way back to the first 'exile,' bondage in Egypt, and to the legal and moral code that came out of that experience…The prophetic books reaffirm the values of the Exodus story: indeed, no other body of literature is so likely to press people who take it seriously toward an identification with the poor and oppressed (p. 6).

In addition to justice, Judaism emphasizes the importance of pursing *tikkun olam* (repairing the world), *darchei shalom* (ways of peace), *pikuach nefesh* (the saving of lives), and *bikkur cholim* (visiting the sick) (Vorspan and Saperstein 1998). According to Vorspan and Saperstein (1998), "Jewish theology teaches us that when God created the universe, one small part of creation was intentionally left undone. That part was social justice!" (p. 8).

Justice, compassion, charity, and peace are so central to Judaism that that Jewish law directly commands Jews to pursue them. Perhaps because of this, Jews grapple, in

different ways, with a large range of social justice-related issues. In their book on social justice and moral choices, Vorspan and Saperstein (1998) list a number of complex issues that have elicited a Jewish response, including abortion, the death penalty, euthanasia, poverty, welfare, health care, environmental degradation, genocide, civil rights, discrimination, affirmative action, free speech, privacy rights, separation of church and state, and disparities in public education.

Glaser (1997) states very clearly that Judaism is not the only religion to emphasize compassion, ethics, and moral behavior. Thus, it is not these values alone that promote liberal thinking amongst Jews. Rather, it is these values paired with belief in laws mandating certain behaviors that influences Jewish patterns of liberalism. Glaser maintains, "The Jewish tradition is a particularly legalistic one…and if the teachings of the religion are important in shaping political attitudes, these rules are part of the religious package" (p. 447). In other words, laws and rules are central to Judaism. Understanding that religious beliefs shape political attitudes, it is likely that beliefs regarding laws within Judaism affect beliefs regarding laws in American society. Jewish values of compassion, ethics, and moral behavior are seen as binding rules in the Jewish community. The Jewish belief that these rules are obligatory impacts the way Jews think about laws that mandate ethical behavior in the U.S.

Some scholars maintain that Jews see liberalism as vital to a social environment in which individuals are able to question and revolt against authority figures, and work to maintain individual rights and freedoms (Cohen and Liebman 1997). Accordingly, Jews are seen as strongly supportive of civil liberties and laws that protect individual rights within the private sphere (Cohen and Liebman 1997).

American Jewish liberalism may be a continuation of historical political patterns. Cohen (1958), Howe (1976), and Spinrad (1990) all posit that Jews developed leftist values in Europe, and brought these values with them when they migrated to the U.S. Furthermore, leftist values may run in the family, as indicated by studies showing that Jews are more likely than other populations to report liberal parents (Cohen 1989; Rothman and Lichter 1982).

Patterns of Jewish liberalism may be in part the result of Jews' minority status in the U.S. (Cohen and Liebman 1997; Glaser 1997). Cohen and Liebman (1997) posit, "As a minority group with a historical memory of a collective struggle against discrimination, American Jews seek social acceptance in the larger society, freedom of religious practice, and the legitimacy to act on behalf of ethnic interests" (p. 409; see also Medding 1981). For instance, Glaser (1997) concludes that more than half of the whites involved in the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Summer were Jewish. In his study, Glaser found that, even after controlling for demographics and political orientation, Jews responded more favorably than other whites to Black progress. In addition, Jews are more likely than other non-Jewish whites to agree that the government is responsible for helping Blacks and other minorities, and more likely to support civil rights and policies intended to help Blacks (Glaser 1997).

A final explanation for Jewish liberalism is that it is a response to anti-Semitism and discrimination in Europe and the U.S., and to persecution during the Holocaust. Levey (1996) elaborates, "It is not that Jews are a minority or even a vulnerable minority, but of which conditions they share with other groups, that explains the intensity of their commitment to liberalism; it is their particular story of being a minority or marginalized

that counts" (p. 392). In other words, the Holocaust was such a devastating event that it substantially altered the ways that Jews see the world. Jews are more likely than other minorities to be liberal because they perceive liberals to be more invested in protecting rights and guaranteeing freedoms than conservatives (Levey 1996). By thinking, acting, or voting liberally, Jews attempt to protect themselves from further persecution.

Judaism and Social Justice

Although this study does not examine Jewish liberalism, literature on the subject provides an entre into a conversation regarding why social justice may be particularly salient to members of the Jewish community. Many of the explanations for Jews' liberal tendencies are useful in understanding Jewish concern with social justice. Jewish values (including compassion and commitment to justice), individualism, historical political involvement, minority status, and the Holocaust are all factors that are likely to make social justice an extremely salient issue for Jewish populations.

For instance, given the centrality to Judaism of values of compassion and collective response to others' misfortunes, it is likely that Jews may be particularly sensitive to others' experiences of injustice, and willing to respond collectively in order to create social change. As stated by Walzer (1995), Jews' historical experience with slavery and oppression may make them especially aware of others' unjust treatment. Likewise, desire to ensure individual rights and freedoms may cause this population to be hyper-attuned to threats to justice. Additionally, injustices experienced by minorities in the U.S. may be relevant and important to American Jews because of their own minority status in the country. Because of their own marginalization, Jews are mindful of others' marginalization. Attention to other minorities' unjust treatment may be prompted by

feelings of empathy stemming from past experiences with the same injustice or by fear that the injustice, in the future, may be experienced personally.

Furthermore, Jews have historically taken an active role in combating social injustice in the U.S. For example, the American Jewish committee was founded in 1906 to support Jewish life through the promotion of democracy and pluralism, as well as ending bigotry and human rights abuses.[1] The Anti-Defamation League was created in 1913 to end anti-Semitism and other forms of bigotry.[2] The American Jewish Congress first met in 1918 order to support Israel, fight anti-Semitism, and defend freedom of religion.[3] Mazon, an organization started in order to help relieve hunger, was founded in 1985.[4] A number of Jewish women's organizations also work to end social injustice and create social change. In 1892, a small group of women formed the National Council of Jewish Women (NCJW) in order to engage in social work in slums (Gittell and Shtob 1980). NCJW members provided immigrants with lodging, support networks, and help finding medical assistance and jobs. Today, the organization continues to promote social justice in the United States and internationally, with a focus on the needs and rights of women. Hadassah, an organization founded in 1912, promotes issues such as Zionism, health education, social action, and community service.[5] Jewish women were at the forefront of the creation of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (founded in 1915), as well as highly active in the feminist movement (Abrams 1994). According to Abrams (1994), "Jewish women in Europe and in the United States

[1] www.ajc.org
[2] www.adl.org
[3] www.ajcongress.org
[4] www.mazon.org
[5] www.hadassah.org

participated in and provided leadership for both suffrage and peace movements around World War I" (p. 195).

Like Glaser (1997) and Levey (1996), I emphasize that Jews are not distinct from other groups in having worked to reduce social injustice. Nor are they unique in placing value on compassion, caring, and individual freedom, existing as an ethnic minority in the U.S., or holding on to traditional beliefs after migrating to the U.S. Jews are not alone in their experiences of persecution and oppression. Many groups of people share one or more of these qualities, sets of beliefs, or experiences. Jews are distinct, however, in that, as a collective, they have historically been impacted by all of these factors. The context in which American Jews have lived shaped their perceptions of the world in a unique way, making it particularly likely that social justice issues will be highly salient within the Jewish community.

Because this study includes a specific population of participants, results may not be generalizeable to a larger population. The goal of this study is not to understand the effects of social value orientation in a heterogeneous population. Rather, it is to identify social antecedents of social value orientation and factors that facilitate or restrict behavioral responses by observers of injustice. This is an exploratory study that aims to investigate individuals' social psychological motivation for acting prosocially and/or redressing injustice in situations where there is no material benefit to doing so.
My hope is that that this study will provide a foundation for future research on the complex relationships between religious/ethic background, social value orientation, perceptions of injustice, and behavioral responses to injustice. Although there is a growing body of literature on "justice for others" in the area of social psychology, few

studies address how personal and religious beliefs affect observers' reactions. My intention is to augment the "justice for others" literature by incorporating such factors into this study.

CHAPTER 3: JUSTICE PROCESSES

In the previous chapter, I used the terms "justice" and "social justice" colloquially. Here, I provide a more formal definition. Justice is a "fundamental and indispensable organizing principle for any kind of human association" (Scherer 1992:p. 2). Yet, there is often a lack of consensus on what exactly constitutes justice. Scholars thus offer different rules of justice that may help to ensure fairness of distributions, procedures, and interactions. Individuals are likely to agree that justice has prevailed when there is congruence between an actual outcome, procedure, or interpersonal interaction and what they expected given a normative justice rule. But, when expectations are not met, or when they disagree with the normative justice rule invoked in a given situation, individuals are likely to perceive injustice (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995). Thus, justice is what appears fair in the "eye of the beholder" (Markovsky 1985; Walster, Walster, and Berscheid 1978).

As stated above, despite the subjectivity of justice perceptions, scholars agree that normative distribution, procedure, and interaction rules help to structure and organize society, and to promote perceptions of justice under certain circumstances. An understanding of these types of justice provides a basis for conceptualizing the general nature of social justice.

Types of Justice

Distributive Justice

According to Younts and Mueller (2001), distributive justice is "the fairness of outcomes or rewards that an individual or group receive" (p. 125). Adams (1965) argues that people see their outcomes as just when they are equitable – that is, when their

outcomes are proportional to their contributions. When assessing proportionality, individuals compare their inputs and outcomes to those of similar others.

Outcomes may be distributed equitably, as described by Adams (1965), but they can also be distributed equally, meaning that all individuals receive the same rewards regardless of their input. Alternatively, distributions may be based on individuals' level of need. According to allocation preference theory (Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry 1980), situational, relational, and cultural factors determine the distribution rule (equitable, equal, or need-based) that individuals consider the most fair. For example, Hegtvedt and Markovsky (1995) report that when there is no personal relationship between the allocator of rewards and the recipients of rewards, low performers perceive an equal distribution to be fair, whereas high performers deem an equitable distribution to be fair. In productivity-oriented task groups, individuals often claim an equitable distribution of rewards to be the most just; and in task groups where the goal is group solidarity or social welfare, group members prefer equal or need-based distributions, respectively (Leventhal et al. 1980). These findings illustrate that context affects distribution preference.

Procedural Justice

While distributive justice refers to the fairness of reward distributions, procedural justice refers to the fairness of the process leading up to reward distributions (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; Younts and Mueller 2001). Studies show that negative responses to distributive injustice will be tempered if the procedures used to arrive at the outcome are perceived to be fair (Brockner et al. 1997; Skarlicki et al. 1998). Procedures are perceived to be just when they are consistent, unbiased, ethical, and based on accurate information (Leventhal et al. 1980). Additionally, people affected by the procedures

must be able to contribute to the decision-making process, and there must be a means by which unfair decisions can be appealed. When procedures are fair, individuals are more willing to accept resulting decisions, to abide by group rules and laws, to continue to belong to a group, and to help their groups even when it involves some personal cost (Tyler, Degoey, and Smith 1996).

Tyler and Lind (1992) move beyond a focus on decision making rules to argue that procedural justice also includes three aspects of the treatment of individuals in groups: 1) trust, established through consideration of the views and needs of group members; 2) standing, the position of individuals within a group conveyed by respectful treatment; and 3) neutrality, meaning unbiased and honest treatment. Trust, standing, and neutrality indicate to group members that they are valued and respected.

Interactional Justice

The three components of treatment identified by Tyler and Lind (1992) also pertain to interactional justice, or "the fairness of interpersonal treatment" (Younts and Mueller 2001:p. 125). Bies and Moag (1986) argue that organizational procedures generate a process that ultimately decides how to allocate resources, but the way individuals interact during the process is distinct from the process itself. For instance, a company may be procedurally just without showing its employees politeness, respect, patience, understanding, etc. According to Bies and Moag (1986), in addition to fair procedures, individuals want fair interactions and communications with others. When people feel that they have been treated well by decision-makers, they are likely to

evaluate outcomes more favorably than when they feel that they have been treated unfairly.[6]

Social Justice

Although the social psychological justice literature primarily focuses on distributive, procedural, and interactional justice within groups, the notion of social justice may involve elements of all three, and more. Although there are some instances in which social justice is used interchangeably with distributive justice (see Barry 1989), the meaning of social justice transcends that of distributive justice. Social justice is distinct from other types of justice because it refers to the "fairness" of social institutions. It is justice that occurs in the social institutions that structure society, and facilitate or limit individuals' access to three primary resources: power, status, and money (Barry 1989).

Social institutions such as government systems, laws, education, health care, business enterprises, religions, and the like are responsible for distributing *and* restricting these three resources. According to Rawls (1971), "Principles of social justice…provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation" (p. 4). In other words, social justice principles ensure that the three primary resources are distributed in a non-discriminatory manner.

In addition to distributing resources fairly, socially just institutions protect human dignity and foster collective well-being by providing all individuals with the right to self-

[6] While some studies posit that interactional justice is simply a type of procedural justice, others argue that it is distinct from both procedural and distributive justice (Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, and Taylor 2000). Moorman (1991) suggests that procedural justice refers to whether or not an organization's decisions are fair, while interactional justice refers to whether or not a supervisor's decisions are fair.

protect, the right to own property, and rights to security, freedom from slavery, religious freedom, and equal treatment under the law (Rawls 1971). Rawls insists that any just society must protect these basic human rights.

Barry (1989) maintains that there are two primary approaches to answering the question, "What is social justice?" The first approach, which Barry refers to as the "justice as mutual advantage" approach, posits that social justice is what allows people to pursue their own self-interests. Justice is a type of constraint that individuals agree to because it fosters cooperation and greases social wheels, making it easier for individuals to get what they want. Thus, a just system is one which reduces conflict in order to ensure that individuals are able to continue to pursue their own interests. Justice is consequently mutually beneficial to all members of society.

The second approach maintains that individuals are invested in distributing resources and rewards in a way that is amenable to everyone. Justice principles allow members of a society to allocate limited assets in a way that is seen by others as reasonable and defensible. Barry (1989) elaborates, "a just state of affairs is one that people can accept not merely in the sense that they cannot reasonably expect to get more but in the stronger sense that they cannot reasonably claim more" (p. 8). A just society therefore ensures that resources are divided among its members in a manner that is perceived to be reasonable by all. Barry refers to this as the "justice as impartiality approach". Rawls (1971) suggests that impartial justice requires a "veil of ignorance", meaning that the individuals in charge of creating "fair terms of social cooperation" (Rawls 2005:p. 23) are ignorant of both their own and others' positions in the social hierarchy. In order to be truly just, lawmakers must not know the social positions of the

people they represent – that is, they must know nothing about the race, ethnicity, sex, etc., about the people for whom they are creating laws. Only by being ignorant of others' social positions can they be truly fair. The veil of ignorance prevents individuals from privileging certain groups over other, ensuring fair social conditions for all members of society.

In summary, social justice differs from other forms of justice because it specifically refers to the fairness of institutions that structure society. Social justice enforces a non-discriminatory and impartial distribution of resources (i.e. power, status, money) that is seen as reasonable, acceptable, and mutually beneficial by members of a society. It allows for the promotion of well-being of individuals and society as a whole, protection of human rights, and fostering of human dignity.

As in the case of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice, social justice perceptions arise from people's observations about the fairness of their actual outcomes or treatment, and the fairness of the normative justice rule employed. When social institutions fail to meet expectations, perceptions of injustice increase. And, because perceptions of injustice are so subjective, people's responses to social injustice are likely to differ depending on individual factors in a given situation.

Responses to the Personal Experience of Injustice

The social psychological justice literature primarily addresses injustice for the self – that is, how people respond they personally experience injustice. Early theorists paid particular attention to individual (and sometimes collective) reactions of victims of distributive injustice, and focused on the reactions of those who were directly impacted. The model used by these scholars, however, can be applied to understand the reactions of

observers to various types of injustice (Hegtvedt 2006). The next section discusses the early social psychology justice literature. Subsequent sections lay the groundwork for understanding how observers of injustice are likely to behave when they witness others' experiences of injustice. Throughout these sections, I elaborate on the relationship between perceptions of and responses to injustice – the relationship between the third and fourth boxes illustrated in Figure 1 (see Chapter 1). I argue that both individual level factors and perceptions of injustice may facilitate or restrict individuals' attempts to redress injustice on behalf of others. Social value orientation, the portion of the model not addressed here, will be discussed in the next chapter.

Perceptions of Injustice

As discussed above, perceptions of injustice are generally subjective, shaped by expectations stemming from normative rules about distributions, procedures, cognitions about the situation, and comparisons to past experiences, other people, and/or reference groups (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995). Justice standards are learned through socialization and arise from people's observations. Individuals perceive situations to be unfair when the rewards or treatment they receive are not what they expected or felt they deserved.

Assessment Processes and Responses to Injustice

The same basic assessment processes underlie perceptions of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. People evaluate their outcomes to assess whether or not they have been treated unfairly. Evaluations are subjective, and are based on expectations derived from normative justice rules, comparisons to similar others, and comparisons to past experience (see Greenstein 1996; Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995;

Moore 1991). They are also influenced by contextual and individual level factors. When expectations are not met, individuals make attributions about the situations in order to determine who is to blame (see Cohen 1982). Individuals perceive injustice when they believe that they are not personally at fault (see Cohen 1982).

Perceptions of injustice influence responses to injustice (Younts and Mueller 2001), including emotional responses. According to Adams (1965), individuals become distressed when they experience inequity. People want to believe that they "deserve" what they get, and feel uncomfortable when they do not believe that their outcomes were earned (i.e. their compensation is too small or too large, given their actions). Homans (1974) argues more specifically that people experience guilt when they believe that they have been unfairly overrewarded (when their outcomes are greater than their inputs), and anger and dissatisfaction when they believe that they have been underrewarded (when their inputs are greater than their outcomes).

When people are treated unfairly they are motivated to relieve accompanying distress by using cognitive or behavioral means to redress the injustice (Adams 1965). The more severely unfair the injustice is perceived to be, the more likely that the victim will respond to it (Markovsky 1985).

Cognitive Responses to Injustice

Cognitive responses to injustice include strategies that allow individuals to mitigate the perceived severity of injustice or ignore it altogether, in order to reduce distress. One example of such a strategy is cognitive distortion. In distributive situations, cognitive distortion refers to changing one's cognitions regarding one's own or another person's inputs or outcomes (Adams 1965). For instance, a person may

exaggerate his job skills and experience in order to justify securing a higher-paying job than his actual skills and experience might otherwise command. Or, in a contrast situation, an individual who is underpaid in a job may downplay her past job experience, thus mitigating the extent of the inequity and avoiding feelings of anger or distress that result from underreward.

Alternatively, if an individual is aware that a coworker receives more vacation days than other employees, he or she may attempt to distort the facts so that the extra vacation time seems more deserved. Again, this allows the individual to avoid feelings of anger or distress resulting from perceptions of personal underreward.

A person may also attempt to reduce perceptions of inequity by changing his or her social comparison reference group. People make assumptions about what they deserve based on the outcomes of similar others (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995; also see Berger et al. 1972). For instance, a high school teacher assesses what his or her salary should be by comparing it to that of teachers who are the same sex, have the same level of education, have spent the same number of years teaching, etc. In deciding what is just, people make "local" comparisons to similar others or "referential" comparisons to a normative standard (Cook and Hegtvedt 1983). If a person's outcome still seems unfair after making local or referential comparisons, he or she may choose to make a different social comparison that will make it appear more favorable. Changing social comparison groups allows the individual to change his/her perceptions of an outcome without changing the outcome itself.

Adams (1965) argues that, in choosing how to resolve inequities, individuals opt for strategies that maximize positive outcomes, minimize costs, and avoid cognitive

changes that threaten self-identity or self-esteem. People would rather change cognitions about others' inputs or outcomes than change cognitions about their own inputs and outcomes when possible.

Behavioral Responses to Injustice

In addition to cognitive responses, perceived injustices elicit a wide range of behavioral responses. For example, individuals who think they have been treated unfairly may leave the situation altogether (Adams 1965). Examples of this include quitting a job or finding an alternate exchange relationship.

A second example of a behavioral response is to manipulate one's own behavior to ensure that outcomes are "deserved". For instance, individuals who feel they are overpaid may work harder to show that they have earned their paycheck, and individuals who perceive themselves to be underpaid may decrease their efforts (see Cook and Hegtvedt 1983). By changing their behavior, individuals can ensure that they are rewarded "appropriately"—that their outcomes are commensurate with their inputs.

Different strategies are used to ensure that outcomes and inputs are commensurate. Lind et al. (1998) suggest that people who perceive procedural injustice in organizations may respond by lowering their performance level, stealing, disobeying the decisions of authorities, protesting, or suing their employers. In addition to these individual strategies, people also use collective strategies in response to unfair circumstances. Examples include coalescing with others to convince a decision-maker to change his/her mind (Hegtvedt et al. 2009), and participating in support group meetings, fundraising events, or demonstrations (Wiltfang and McAdam 1991).

While much of the literature discussed in this section focuses on how individuals respond when they are personally treated unfairly, it provides insight as to how people are likely to respond when they observe others' experiences of injustice. Observers, like victims of injustice, assess the severity of the perceived injustice; assign blame; and attempt to resolve the problem through cognitive and behavioral means. The justice-for-self literature informs the justice-for-others literature.

Perceptions of and Responses to Others' Experiences of Injustice

The majority of justice literature focuses on how people respond when they personally experience injustice. Far less attention is given to the subject of how people respond when they observe others experiencing injustice. Yet, "third party" perceptions of injustice are extremely important. Skarlicki and Kulik (2005) identify three primary reasons why this is true. First, for every one victim there may be many third parties. Everyone in a victim's social network is a possible third party. This means that while only one person is directly impacted by the injustice, any number of people may be indirectly affected. Injustice does not harm only its victim.

Second, third parties may influence victims' perceptions of and responses to their own unfair treatment. For instance, Barley (1991) found that individuals who thought they were the victim of bad luck were sometimes convinced by friends that they were actually the victim of a human rights violation. Goldman (1999) posits that family, friends, and coworkers influence whether or not layoff victims chose to file legal claims. These findings illustrate that third party perceptions of injustice are important because they can influence victims' perceptions of and responses to injustice.

Third, it may be within the power of third parties to influence the outcome of the situation. Third parties are often able to allocate resources, make decisions, or punish wrongdoers (Skarlicki and Kulik 2005). Consequently, they may have a hand in perpetuating or alleviating injustice. Third parties "define the scope of norms that regulate human behavior" (Skarlicki and Kulik 2005:p. 186; see also Bendor and Swistak 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004), deciding what is fair or unfair and what is an appropriate response to injustice.

The current study adds to the literature on of third-party (observer) responses to injustice by furthering the discussion on when and how people are likely to act on behalf of another who has experienced injustice. Below, I examine individual-level characteristics that are likely to affect observers' perceptions of and responses to others' injustices. These factors, coupled with motivational concerns and situational restrictions, provide a basis for understanding the conditions under which third parties attempt to redress social injustice.

Observers' Perceptions of Injustice

While similar in many ways, observers' sense of injustice also differs from that of victims of injustice. For instance, a number of studies indicate that third party reactions to injustice are similar, yet less intense, that victim reactions (see Lind et al. 1998; Sheppard, Lewicki, and Minton 1992; Tyler and Smith, 1998; Walster, Walster, and Berscheid 1978). Victims experience loss of some kind when treated unfairly, and are therefore likely to believe that an injustice has occurred and that they are not to blame for it (Skarlicki and Kulik 2005). Observers are not impacted in the same way. Furthermore, they do not always have first-hand information about what happened. Although some

third parties directly witness injustice, more often they hear about it second-hand from the victim, another third party, the media, etc. (Skarlicki and Kulik 2005). Regardless of the source of their knowledge, observers of injustice simply have less information about others' experiences than about their own. And, the amount of information that an observer has (or does not have) affects his or her perception of its unfairness (Lupfer et al. 2000).

Observer's perceptions color victims' perceptions. Social information processing theory (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978) explains that people are not isolated in their daily lives; they draw from their social situations when forming judgments. "People learn what their needs, values, and requirements should be in part from their interactions with others" (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978:p. 230). Individuals look to others to help them assess, interpret, and adapt to current situations, and to determine what is socially acceptable and what actions are appropriate. Consequently, third parties may have a great deal of influence over actors. In some cases, an actor may choose to adopt the opinions of others because of a desire to fit in or because others' attitudes help him/her figure out how to respond to a confusing social situation. Observers' judgments also cue actors as to what is important by emphasizing (and making salient) certain aspects of the social situation. Similarly, observers' perceptions of the severity of an injustice will affect the way that the victim interprets and makes sense of the situation.

Factors that Influence Observers' Perceptions

Like victims of injustice, observers' perceptions are shaped by the social context. There are a number of factors that influence the extent to which third parties perceive a situation to be unfair. First, justice judgments differ depending on whether they are made

by an individual or by a group of observers. Lind et al. (1998) maintain that when people rate injustice as a group, their ratings of unfairness are more extreme than if each group member had individually rated the unfairness. Second, observers are more likely to perceive a victim's treatment to be severely unfair when the distribution rule used is not their preferred rule, and they feel that a different rule would have benefited the victim (Skarlicki and Kulik 2005).

Third, observers' past experience with injustice influences how they react when they see others treated unfairly (Kray and Lind 2002). If individuals have experienced an injustice in the past that is similar to the one they witness, they may perceive the situation to be more severely unfair. In such a case, observers may feel that they have "insider" information about the injustice and can empathize with the victim.

Fourth, third parties do not like to see members of their social groups treated unfairly. Thus, shared social identity may influence observers' attributions of blame (Skarlicki and Kulik 2005). Identification with the victim can result from affect, sharing similar traits, or belonging to the same group (Brockner and Greenberg 1990). According to the group value model of procedural justice, people dislike having members of their social groups mistreated because exploitation of one group member may lower the status of the group as a whole (Lind and Tyler 1988). When people are treated fairly it indicates that they are valued and respected, while unfair treatment is a sign of disrespect. Consequently, when an individual's fellow group members experience injustice, he/she may perceive it as more severely unfair than when non-group members are treated unfairly (Skarlicki and Kulik 2005).

Additionally, because people make more positive assessments of individuals who are very similar (rather than very dissimilar) to them, observers are likely to evaluate victims with whom they identify positively (Burger and Rodman 1983). Hegtvedt et al. (1993) argue that individuals interpret behavior so that their personal social categories are viewed favorably, ensuring a positive social identity. Consequently, the victim's mistreatment is less likely to be viewed as "deserved" by observers who identify with the victim (Feather 1999). Brockner and Greenberg (1990) found that, when layoff survivors identified with layoff victims, they perceived layoffs to be more severely unfair than when they did not identify with the layoff victims.

Moreover, when observers identify with the victim, they may fear that they too are in danger of experiencing unfair circumstances. If similar others are treated unjustly, the injustice may, in time, affect them directly. Third parties are likely to perceive an injustice to be particularly severe when they expect it to affect them personally (Chaiken and Darley 1973; Thibaut and Walker 1975; Walster et al. 1978).

Individuals assess decision makers as well as victims when forming justice judgments, and observers' perceptions may be influenced by identification with the decision maker who caused the injustice. If an observer harbors positive feelings towards or identifies with the decision maker, he or she is likely to shift blame to someone else or some other entity (see Byrne 1971; Chaiken and Darley 1973; Dalbert and Yamauchi 1994). Nevertheless, identification with the guilty party does not preclude blaming him or her. Brockner et al. (1992) found that when layoff survivors identified with a company using unfair procedures they were more upset than when they did not identify with the company – most likely because layoff survivors felt betrayed by the company.

Fifth, although third parties are sensitive to the treatment (and behavior) of members of their social groups and those with whom they identify, they may be less sensitive to injustices suffered by outsiders. Staub (1989) maintains that individuals do not always perceive injustice suffered by members of groups outside their scope of justice. For instance, Americans may not pay close attention to violations of human rights or genocide in countries outside the U.S., because these countries fall outside their scope of justice. As Mikula and Wenzel (2000) argue, conflict resolution is easier when all parties involved share the same "value of justice and regard each other as belonging to a moral community within which moral values and rules of justice and fairness apply" (p. 133). Thus, perceptions of injustice are influenced by whether the observer exists within the same social context as the victim.

Belief in a Just World

In addition to the factors described above, observers' perceptions of the situation may be influenced by belief in a just world (see Aderman, Brehm, and Katz 1974; Gruman and Sloan 198; Lea and Hunsberger 1990; Lerner 1965; Lerner 1991). Individuals want to believe in a just world (Lerner 1965), where good things happen to good people and bad things happen to bad people. In order to maintain the belief that everyone receives his or her just deserts, people may be willing to ignore information, including others' reports of unfair treatment, which forces them to think otherwise. Ignoring an injustice or pretending that it never happened allows individuals to continue to believe in a just world. Thus, people may perceive another's unjust treatment to be unimportant or even deserved—and therefore, not truly unfair. This perception allows

their belief in a just world to remain unchallenged. By blaming the victim, observers reframe injustice as a punishment for past transgressions, and do away with it altogether.

Blaming the victim for having brought the injustice on him/herself is not an unusual response on the part of observers. In situations that appear unjust, third parties are more likely to fault the victim if the victim underperformed (Niehoff, Paul, and Bunch 1998) or if the victim did not immediately take advantage of resources that could have prevented the mishap (see Skarlicki and Kulik 2005).

This does not mean that the victim is always blamed, or that injustice is always ignored. The more harm to the victim, the more severely unfair third parties will perceive the situation to be (Folger and Cropoanzano 1998). If an injustice is particularly damaging to the victim, it is harder to ignore and will be assessed more harshly than if there appears to be little or no harm to the victim. And, when the transgressor is seen as having caused the suffering intentionally, the crime is viewed as more severely unfair than when the damage was inflicted unintentionally. Skarlicki and Kulik (2005) suggest this is because, when mistreatment of others was not intentional, it is unlikely to be repeated in the future; but when a transgressor purposefully hurts others, he or she is likely to repeat the offense. In such a case, the victim is less likely to be blamed, and, under certain conditions, observers are more likely to attempt to redress the injustice.

Observers' Responses to Injustice

Hegtvedt and Johnson (2000) maintain that the greater the perceived injustice, the more likely it is that victims will respond to the injustice. Similarly, I argue that as perceived severity of injustice increases, so does the likelihood that third party observers will attempt to redress the injustice. According to Skarlicki and Kulik (2005), an "intense

emotional sense of 'wrongness'" (p. 205) may occur in situations where third parties believe the victim was severely harmed and is not to blame. In order to alleviate distress caused by this intense sense of "wrongness", observers are likely to attempt to redress the injustice.

Montada (1998) argues that individuals are driven by the "justice motive". People are invested in enforcing justice principles because these principles allow for order in society and provide standards for how all people should be treated. Furthermore, individuals care about the overall welfare of members of their society. According to Van Lange and Messick (1996), "All other things being equal, individuals have a tendency to value collective outcomes…" (p. 100). Thus, responses to injustice may be motivated by a genuine desire to help others and increase the overall well being of society.

When individuals experience moral outrage in response to injustice, they are highly motivated to redress the injustice and punish the wrongdoer (Skarlicki and Kulik 2005). Thus, responses rely partially on the perceived severity of the injustice. Studies on helping behavior find that when a problem is not perceived to be particularly severe, individuals may see no need to redress it (Kramer et al. 1986).

Responses to injustice are also impacted by personal traits, perceptions of costs and benefits, participation in networks of people with common goals, and the ability to mobilize resources given situational constraints. As Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson (1980) point out, "some individuals will be more available for movement exploration and participation because of the possession of unscheduled or discretionary time and because of minimal countervailing risk or sanctions" (p. 793). Individuals' willingness and ability to respond to injustice relies on the resources that they have available to them and the

constraints in their lives. Individual level characteristics affect not only *whether* people respond to others' experiences of injustice, but also the *type of response* they have

The social psychology, social movements, and political science literatures provide insight into when and why people respond to injustice. Many of the studies within these areas do not directly speak to responses to social injustice. Yet, they illustrate the effect of individual level factors on activities such as political activism, civic engagement, and volunteerism—all of which can be viewed as responses to social injustice. The following sections discuss factors affecting when, why, and how individuals are likely to respond to pressing social issues, including social injustice.

Cost/Benefit Analysis

When making a decision about how to respond, observers of injustice may begin by assessing the costs and benefits associated with acting. Examples of costs include risk of personal harm or of expenditures of resources such as time, energy, money, or status. For instance, individuals may be unwilling to act on behalf of others because they fear they will be fired (see Gundlach et al. 2003; Miceli and Near 1984, 1985; Trevino 1992; Utne and Kidd 1980). Yet, there are also benefits to helping victims, such as restoring justice, ensuring the promise of future favors, gaining status, making friends, or feeling good. Schlozman (2002) suggests that some people "seek to do well while doing good" (p. 435), meaning that they help others in order to gain contacts, lengthen their resumes, or pursue a particular political agenda that ultimately benefits them personally. When the benefits outweigh the costs, third parties may choose to act; but when the costs outweigh the benefits, it is unlikely that they will choose to do so (Skarlicki and Kulik 2005).

Costs and benefits are not the same for all people, and this may affect the extent to which they are able or willing to respond to injustice. For instance, Putnam (1995) finds that civic engagement is correlated with age. Civic engagement encompasses responses to social injustice, as well as other forms of community involvement such as volunteering at a local soup kitchen, helping to clean up a public park, or fundraising for the PTA. Putnam's research shows that people born in the 1920's belong to almost twice as many civic associations as people born four decades later, in the 1960's. Their voting rates are almost double those of people born in more recent cohorts, and they read newspapers almost three times as often. Overall, "each generation who reached adulthood since the 1940's has been less engaged in community affairs than its immediate predecessor" (Putnam 1995;p. 675).

The costs and benefits of particular activities may also vary with age. While older individuals may be more inclined to be civically engaged, middle-aged individuals are more likely to be politically active than young adults or elderly individuals (Schlozman 2002). Examples of political action include voting, working on an election campaign, or attending a protest at a capitol building. The fact that middle-aged individuals are more likely to be involved than others in political activism may be because middle-aged individuals' social networks and resources allow them to engage more easily in political activism. But for both political activism and civic engagement, age appears to affect a) whether people respond to social issues, and b) the type of activity that they engage in when responding to social issues.

The costs of engaging in a response to injustice depend on individuals' personal commitments and responsibilities. In their study on sanctuary movement activism,

Wiltfang and McAdam (1991) suggest that biographical factors hinder or facilitate participation in activities that carry a high risk. Young people often have fewer responsibilities than older people, and consequently more time to volunteer; and people without jobs or with flexible jobs have greater opportunity to become involved in activist work. On the other hand, marriage restricts high risk activist involvement because individuals who are married must devote time and resources to their spouses and families. Parents with children living at home, in particular, have more responsibilities and less time and energy to share. At the same time, married men and women are more likely to be civically engaged, particularly if they have children (Putnam 1995). One likely explanation for this seeming contradiction is that civic engagement may be more "family friendly", as it encompasses activities such as joining the neighborhood watch, cleaning up a local park, or volunteering for the PTA. These are activities in which parents are likely to participate as a matter of course. Activist involvement, on the other hand, may require parents to go out of their way in order to participate – costing them extra time and energy. Thus, marital and parental status, like age, increase involvement in some activities but decrease it in others.

Past experiences also affect the likelihood of involvement in specific activities, perhaps because they are already established as rewarding. Wiltfang and McAdam (1991) found that individuals are more likely to become involved in high-risk activism when they have participated in other activist movements in the past. And, those who attend religious services frequently are also more likely to engage in high-risk activism. Wiltfang and McAdam's (1991) findings differ somewhat from findings in other collective action studies because of the nature of the movement they examined.

Sanctuary movement activism is higher risk than other forms of activism because it may involve illegal activity, and therefore carries different costs and benefits. Nevertheless, factors such as age and marital, parental, and employment status may facilitate or restrict involvement in a range of high and low cost activities.

Social Networks

One factor that that facilitates participation in *different types* of activities is a person's social network. Research suggests that social networks connect people to each other and facilitate participation in civic engagement, political activism, and social movements (see Putnam 1995; Schlozman 2002; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980). For example, individuals who voluntarily participate in activities outside politics gain access to social networks that connect them to others who are politically active (Scholzman 2002). When people participate in political activities, they build more civic skills and a greater understanding of the overall welfare of members of society (Schlozman 2002), which increases involvement.

Through social networks, requests for further involvement are made. These requests come from friends, family, neighbors, coworkers, fellow members of organizations, supervisors, religious leaders, and staff members of organizations. People they are more likely to become involved when their participation is requested by others by others in their social network at volunteer events, via mailings or phone calls, etc. (Scholzman 2002), especially if the request comes from someone they know. Individuals are more likely to join social movements when they are recruited by family, friends, and acquaintances – people who are already part of their social networks – than when they are recruited by strangers (Snow et al. 1980). And, individuals are more

likely to engage in political activities when they are part of a community or society that has a well-established history of involvement, because it makes it easier to join in collective efforts.

The extent of a person's social network results, in part, from one's personal characteristics and background. Individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to develop civic skills in the workplace and in organizations, are more likely to be asked to participate in political activities, and are more likely to be interested in and knowledgeable about politics (Schlozman 2002). Individuals with more education also tend to have greater financial resources, which allow them to become civically engaged (Putnam 1995).

Additionally, Putnam (1995) finds that individuals who are employed belong to more social groups than individuals who are unemployed. Again, individuals in the paid labor force may have more financial resources than others. But, as Putnam points out, middle income wage earners and the poor actually have slightly higher rates of civic engagement than affluent individuals (although, according to Schlozman [2002], they are also less politically active). A possible explanation is that paid workers have access to a greater diversity of social networks than people who do not work, making it easier for them to join groups

Gender is yet another factor that has an impact on social network membership. Women belong to fewer volunteer groups than men (Edwards, Edwards, and Watts 1984) and are less politically active (Schlozman 2002). They do, however, spend more time with those groups to which they belong, and more time engaging in informal social interaction than men (Robinson and Godbey 1995). So, while women may not belong to

as many groups as men, and while they are less inclined to engage in political activities, they still have many opportunities to expand their social networks and to develop relationships with the people in those networks.

Resource Availability and Situational Constraints

According to Klandermans (1997), perceiving social injustice is not always enough to motivate behavioral response. One has to believe that change is possible in order to attempt it. Beaton and Deveau (2005) "found that perceived resources bridged the gap between attitudinal and behavioral measures" (p. 1623). They maintain that respondents in their study were more willing to engage in collective action when they believed that the resources for mobilization were available to them. Similarly, Gamson (1961) suggests that coalition formation relies on distribution of resources and resource availability. People are more likely participate in political activities when they have the resources (i.e. wealth, skills, education, knowledge, organizational support) to do so, and when they are interested in politics and politically informed (i.e. they read the newspaper, stay aware of current events, research political candidates) (Schlozman 2002).

Individuals need to know that they have the tools required to make a difference. When observers believe that they have skills, information, expertise, or resources that allow them to effectively help the victim, they are more likely to act than when they feel helpless (see Notarius and Herrick 1988; Schwartz 1975; Walster et al. 1976; Wortman and Lehman 1985). When observers feel that they are powerless, do not think others will support them, or are prevented by some roadblock from rallying others, they may fail to do anything in response to others' unfair treatment because they believe that it will not make a difference (Skarlicki and Kulik 2005). Individuals often refrain from cooperative

behavior if they anticipate that others do not intend to act cooperatively (Kramer et al. 1986; Yamagishi and Sato 1986), if they feel helpless, or they believe that their goal is unattainable (Maki and McClintock 1983; Yamagishi and Sato 1986).

If the tools are not available to achieve a goal, attempts at social change are futile. People are more likely to be politically active if they think that their participation makes a difference (Schlozman 2002), and are more likely to engage in collective action in response to perceived injustice "once they have gathered the necessary resources to overcome any potential difficulties incurred" (Beaton and Deveau 2005, p. 1613; also see Klandermans 1997).

Summary

In summary, there are many factors that are likely to influence people's responses to social injustice. These include: personal characteristics such as age, sex, marital and parental status, employment status, education, and income; whether the benefits of responding outweigh the costs; whether one has a large and/or diverse social network; whether one feels that he or she has the resources that will enable him or her to alleviate the injustice; and whether one believes that others will pitch in. Social value orientation, an individual level factor that affects preferences for specific distributive outcomes, may also affect responses to injustice (as discussed in the next chapter).

Of course, not all factors motivate the same responses from third parties. Schlozman (2002) argues that specific factors may enhance certain types of political participation. For instance, an individual's strength of partisanship has a larger impact on voting than on involvement in community problem-solving. Income has more of an influence over whether individuals will donate to a campaign than over whether they will

join a protest. And, civic skills exert stronger effects on time-based political efforts – i.e., contacting a political leader as opposed to voting. Consequently, it is necessary to conceptualize the types of responses individuals may pursue.

Conceptualizing Dimensions of Responses to Social Injustice

When deciding if and how to respond to social injustice, individuals take into account the constraints in their lives, the resources available to them, and the (perceived) severity of the injustice. They also consider the strategies available to them, and the commitment each of these strategies will require on their part. Some strategies involve great commitment, meaning that they require a sacrifice of time, energy, money, and/or other resources in order to be successfully executed. Others require very little commitment and very little sacrifice.

The strategies that individuals employ in response to injustice are influenced by what they hope to achieve. For example, Hegtvedt et al. (2009) suggest that the following strategies may be used in response to a distributive or procedural injustice that occurs in a group setting: attempting to convince the decision-maker (who caused the injustice) to change his/her mind, coalescing with other group members to demand a change of outcomes, trying to persuade the decision-maker to make changes for the future so the injustice will not occur again, and discussing the situation with other group members.

The social movements literature addresses other types of strategies. For instance, Wiltfang and McAdam (1991) discuss concrete strategies that participants in the sanctuary movement employ in response to injustice experienced by illegal immigrants in the U.S. These include participating in support group meetings; transporting refugees out

of town; providing legal aid, education, and housing for refugees; donating clothing, money, and/or food to refugees; attending fundraising events; participating in a strike; participating in a civil rights, antiwar, or school demonstration; and involvement in local, state, and national electoral campaigns. While some of these activities are geared towards the goals of the sanctuary movement, they may also be used by individuals or groups to accomplish other social justice-oriented goals.

This study specifically examines the following strategies relevant to ensuring social justice: talking about the situation with friends, staying informed by reading a newspaper/watching the news/listening to the radio, voting, sending money to a social justice organization, volunteering for a social justice organization, writing a letter to a newspaper, writing a letter to a political representative, and attending a protest.

Voting, talking about the situation, and staying informed are conceptualized as "reflexive" strategies in this study because they involve minimal effort and are often done automatically. People are likely to engage in them whether or not a specific instance of injustice has been observed. Often the changes produced by these actions are not immediate, or intended to create lasting change. Reflexive strategies may help observers to feel better about the situation but will not necessarily reduce or eliminate the injustice. While voting has more potential to create change that talking about the situation or staying informed, it may be done with relatively little effort and sacrifice. Reflexive strategies involve few costs.

Volunteering, attending a protest, sending a letter to a political representative or newspaper, and donating money to an organization are conceptualized here as "active" strategies. These strategies are more "costly", and are intended to redress injustice. They

require personal sacrifice of time, energy, money, and – in some cases – even personally safety. Because of this, active strategies tend to be less reflexive and more "intentional". By committing resources in order to get their point across, individuals indicate that they are invested in remedying injustice and expect a response.

Summary

An observer's use of reflexive or active strategies presumes that the observer has noticed the suffering of a victim of injustice, and perceives the injustice to be severe enough to motivate a behavioral response. As in the case of the personal experience of injustice, the likelihood that an observer of injustice will attempt to redress it increases as perceptions of the severity of the injustice increase. Consequently, action presupposes that an injustice has been perceived, severity of the injustice has been assessed, and attributions of blame or innocence have been made. As stated earlier, the focus of this study is on understanding the reactions of individuals to whom social injustice is already a salient issue.

This chapter contained a description of factors that facilitate or restrict involvement in social issues. While research has addressed many factors that affect perceptions of and responses to injustice, it has overlooked one key individual level factor: social value orientation. In the next chapter, I will provide a more detailed discussion of social value orientation, indicating its importance as a factor that may significantly influence responses to others' experiences of social injustice, as well as discussion its social antecedents.

CHAPTER 4: SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION

The justice literature indicates that people are motivated to respond to injustice for two basic reasons: self interest and a genuine desire to enforce justice. Responses to injustice range from those that have few costs and require little commitment, to those that involve extremely high costs and require a great deal of commitment. A factor that is likely to influence the type of response in which an individual engages is social value orientation (SVO), which has been shown to affect responses to social dilemmas, and may also affect responses to social injustice. The social value orientation literature provides a foundation for building a better understanding of individuals' underlying motivation for responding to others' experiences of social injustices. Social value orientation is, more or less, a belief system about how resources should be divided. It causes people to work towards a distribution that they consider desirable, whether they are concerned only with their own outcome or with both their own and others' outcomes. Past research suggests that SVO helps to explain why some people are willing to make a personal sacrifice for the good of a group, and others are more interested in their own personal outcomes and less concerned about what happens to others (see Beggan et al. 1988; Eek and Garling 2006; Knight and Dubro 1984; Liebrand 1984; Liebrand et al. 1986; McClintock and Allison 1989; McClintock and Liebrand 1988; Nauta, de Dreu, and van der Vaart 2002; Sattler and Kerr 1991; van Lange and Kuhlman 1994; van Vugt, Van Lange, and Meertens 1996).

This chapter addresses two questions pertinent to this concept: What are the antecedents of social value orientation? And how does social value orientation affect perceptions of and responses to social injustice? Thus, the focus of this chapter is on the

portions of Figure 1 that relate to social value orientation – both its antecedents and its effect on perceptions of and responses to injustice.

Below, I begin by conceptualizing social value orientation, then review research examining how it affects outcome preferences. I also address the relevance of social value orientation to the justice literature. I conclude this chapter with hypotheses related to the antecedents and effects of social value orientation, as they relate to responses to social injustice.

Pepitone (1971) argues that "observations of real-life decision making with interdependent payoffs suggest that considerations of fairness and justice almost always enter into the pattern of choices" (p. 145). The social value orientation and justice literatures have much to contribute to each other. Combining the two will increase understanding of the underlying motivations and considerations that shape responses to social injustice.

Conceptualizing Social Value Orientation

Within the social psychological literature, social value orientation is defined as a social motivation (Liebrand 1984) and as a preference for a specific distribution of outcomes for both the self and others (see Beggan et al. 1988; Eek and Garling 2006; Knight and Dubro 1984; Liebrand et al. 1986; McClintock and Allison 1989; McClintock and Liebrand 1988; Nauta, de Dreu, and van der Vaart 2002; Sattler and Kerr 1991; van Lange and Kuhlman 1994; van Vugt, Van Lange, and Meertens 1996). Social value orientation is an individual level characteristic that remains fairly consistent and stable across time (Kuhlman, Camac, and Cunha 1986; McClintock and Allison 1986). It influences cognition by shaping the way that individuals perceive and interpret social

dilemmas, and it also impacts behavior. Because social value orientation affects the way that people perceive and respond to situations that involve collective welfare, it is likely to affect perceptions of and responses to social injustice.

The three primary types of social value orientation are cooperative (or prosocial), individualistic (or pro-self), and competitive (again, also referred to as pro-self) (see Van Lange et al. 1997). Cooperative/prosocial people try to maximize outcomes for themselves and others (Liebrand and McClintock 1988). It is important to them that rewards are divided equally among all people in a given context (Eek and Garling 2006), even if it means that they themselves do not maximize their own personal rewards. For instance, a cooperative individual would choose to divide $10 between himself and another person by taking $5 and giving $5 to the other person. He would not accept more money that the other person, even if he was allowed to do so.

Individualistic/proself people endeavor to maximize their own rewards while ignoring others' rewards (Liebrand and McClintock 1988). If asked to divide $10 between herself and another person, an individualistic person would most likely keep $9 and give the other person $1. She would do this in order to maximize her own rewards. An individualistic person would not object to an equal distribution of rewards as long as that distribution ensured her the largest possible gain. For instance, given the choice between dividing $10 equally between herself and another person or receiving $3 for the self and nothing for the other person, an individualistic person would choose the equal, distribution of $5 per person. In a situation where an individualistic person has been free-riding in a group (i.e., claiming membership without participating in the group), he/she might actually prefer an equal distribution. This would ensure him/her the largest

possible reward outcome for the smallest amount of work. Individualists are not concerned with others' profits – as long as others' profits do not detract from their own.

Competitive/proself people try to maximize the difference between their own and others' rewards (Liebrand and McClintock 1988). Given the choice of distributions of $10 (self) and $10 (other) OR $6 (self) and $2 (other), a competitive individual would choose the $6/$2 distribution. Unlike individualistic people, getting more than others has greater importance to competitive people than ensuring that their profits are as large as possible. A competitive individual would almost never choose an equal distribution of rewards, because such a distribution would prevent him or her from gaining more than others.

While most studies focus on these three types of value orientations, a few studies also include altruism as a value orientation (Liebrand 1984; Liebrand and Van Run 1985; Sattler and Kerr 1991). Altruistic individuals allot more of a reward to others than they do to themselves. Evidence is extremely mixed, however, regarding whether altruistic social value orientation actually exists (see Liebrand 1984; Liebrand and Van Run 1985; Maki and McClintock 1983; Sattler and Kerr 1991). Thus, it is excluded from this study.

One of the strengths of the social value orientation framework is that it establishes social interdependence as a foundational tenet. People are assumed to be interdependent with others; their behaviors may have an effect on other individuals, as well as society at large. A second strength of the framework is that it recognizes that people have different motivations in social dilemmas. For instance, individualists sometimes exhibit behavior similar to that of prosocials, although Van Vugt (1997) suggests that their underlying reasons for doing so may vary. A prosocial person cooperates because he or she is

concerned about others' welfare, while an individualistic person does so because of long term, personal benefit. Thus, social value orientation is both an outcome preference and a strategy for manipulating specific outcomes.

Experimental and Survey Research on Social Value Orientation

Most studies within this area assess social value orientation, then examine whether it affects an individual's behavior when he or she is faced with a social dilemma. Studies primarily use one of two tactics to examine the relationship between social value orientation and behavior: social dilemma tasks or surveys/interviews. Social dilemma tasks take place in a laboratory setting, whereas surveys and interviews assess how people react to actual social dilemmas that occur in everyday environments. In both experimental and survey studies, social value orientation is measured by examining participants' distribution preferences. Participants are given a series of possible outcome distributions (usually distributions of points or money), and are asked to choose which distribution is most desirable.

Measuring Social Value Orientation

Over time, methods for measuring social value orientation have changed. Early studies used social interaction measures (see Kagan and Knight 1981), which required the researchers to observe groups of two or more interacting individuals in situations where group members could act either cooperatively or competitively. Such measures, however, have been abandoned because researchers found it difficult to discern social value orientation from other social motivations (Knight and Dubro 1984). Also, research indicates that individuals sometimes "make a competitive choice in service of either a cooperative or competitive social value" (Knight and Dubro 1984:p. 99). Thus, in early

studies, it is unclear whether value orientation affects behavior at every stage of the dilemma game, or merely shapes preference for a certain outcome at the end of the game.

More recent studies have used measures that minimize the effect of group processes and strategizing, allowing for a more accurate analysis of social value orientation. Researchers ask study participants to make choices about their own and others' reward outcomes without ever interacting with the other person. Unlike earlier studies using the social interaction method, where participants' choices resulted from joint decisions with others regarding how to divide resources, these studies allow participants to make direct decisions regarding outcomes for themselves and others (Knight and Dubro 1984). Methods of classifying social value orientation include Decomposed Games (Kuhlman and Marshello 1975; Liebrand 1984; Messick and McClintock 1968; Pruitt 1970; Van Lange et al. 1997; Van Vugt et al. 1996), decision tasks (Knight and Dubro 1984), and rank correlations (see Liebrand and McClintock 1988).

Although the methods of classifying social value orientation in theses studies vary subtly, the same general techniques are used to assess social value orientation. Participants are presented with a series of outcomes, and asked to indicate which distribution they prefer. Distributions allow participants to maximize their own outcomes, joint outcomes with another party, or the difference between own and the other party's outcomes. For example, participants may be asked to indicate which of the following distributions is the most desirable: Option A) 480 points for self and 80 points for another, B) 540 points for self and 280 points for another, or C) 480 points for self and 480 points for another (Van Lange et al. 1997). In this example, A is a competitive

distribution, because it maximizes the differences between own and other outcomes; B is an individualistic distribution, because it maximizes personal outcome; and C is a cooperative distribution, because it maximizes joint/equal outcomes. Participants are described as cooperative, individualistic, or competitive if the majority of their distribution preferences indicate a desire to divide points/money in one of these three ways. For instance, studies classify participants as being of a certain social value orientation if six out of nine choices are consistent with one value orientation (see McClintock and Allison 1989; Platow et al. 1990; Van Lange et al. 1997; Van Vugt et al. 1996).

Social Value Orientation and Experimental Research on Social Dilemmas

Studies that utilize the experimental social dilemma task approach generally examine whether an individual's social value orientation is related to his or her behavior during a simulated social dilemma (see Kramer et al. 1986; Liebrand and van Run 1985; Sattler and Kerr 1991; Van Lange and Kuhlman 1994; Van Lange and Liebrand 1991). In these studies, researchers predict that social value orientation will affect the choices that people make in the simulated social dilemma. Two commonly used dilemma games are variations on the Prisoner's Dilemma (Elster 1989) and the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968). According to Liebrand et al. (1986), experimental games have the potential to mimic "decisional structure underlying real life dilemmas" (p. 6).

Typically in experimental games, participants are told that they have access to some type of resource (often money). The resource must be shared with another party—either a person or a group of people. Participants are required to decide how much of the resource to keep for themselves, and how much to leave for the other party. If

participants divide the resource equally with the other party, they will not maximize their potential earnings. But, they will act in a "fair" manner and may increase the likelihood that the other party will use an equal distribution when it is the other party's turn to allot resources. They may even increase the overall take-home for both parties. If participants keep most of the resource and give only a small amount to the other party, they will maximize their personal, immediate earnings. They also deny the other party equal access to the resource and risk retribution when it is the other party's turn to allot resources. Furthermore, they will deplete resources that could benefit all parties as a whole. Thus, participants are faced with a conflict. They must choose whether to maximize their own immediate earnings or to equalize the earnings of all parties involved.

Some studies, such as those by Kramer et al. (1986) and Liebrand and Van Run (1985) present the social dilemma to subjects in the form of environmental crisis requiring conservation efforts. This research finds that, in a simulated crisis, social value orientation affects willingness to conserve for the good of a larger group.

Research in this area measures social value orientation, and looks at whether cooperative, individualistic, or competitive *values* lead to certain *behavior* during interactions (indeed, individuals tend to act in accordance with their value orientations). Additionally, studies look both at whether social value orientation influences participants' evaluations of and responses to others during dilemma tasks. For example, Beggan, Messick, and Allison (1988), Sattler and Kerr (1991), and Van Lange and Kuhlman (1994) address the topic of "might over morality", arguing that cooperative

individuals and individualistic/competitive individuals place different value on the characteristics of morality and intelligence during dilemma games.

Beggan et al. (1988) find that prosocials and proselfs appraise cooperativeness and competitiveness differently. Prosocials evaluate the cooperative/competitive distinction in terms of good/bad dimensions, with cooperativeness being good and competitiveness being bad. Proselfs, on the other hand, see the distinction as a dynamic, strong/weak dimension. Cooperators are perceived by to be weak, while competitors are perceived to be strong. Because prosocials use the evaluative, good/bad dimension, they are more inclined towards egocentric bias - meaning, "They associate themselves with cooperative, good behaviors and associate others with competitive, bad behaviors" (Beggan et al. 1988; p. 608). Proselfs do not display this egocentric bias because they do not assess the cooperative/competitive dimension in terms of its morality.

Similarly, Sattler and Kerr (1991) hypothesize that moral considerations are central to cooperators' perceptions of and responses to social outcomes. Thus, when primed with information that emphasizes the virtue of cooperation – that is, information consistent with established beliefs – cooperators will be even more inclined to act cooperatively. Sattler and Kerr find support for this hypothesis, although they did not find any evidence of moral messages having an effect on individualists' behavior.

Van Lange and Kuhlman (1994) suggest that social value orientation influences the way that people process personality information about interdependent others. In their study, they propose that social value orientation has a moderating effect on "expected level of cooperation from partners perceived in terms of honesty and intelligence" (p. 137). The authors find that, when forming expectations about partners, prosocials place

greater weight on honesty information, while proselfs place greater weight to intelligence information.

McClintock and Liebrand (1988) examine the impact of task structure, others' task strategies, and social value orientation on choices in dilemma tasks. They argue that it is vital to look at how decision tasks are initially structured in terms of actors' interdependence. McClintock and Liebrand (1988) find that, in the absence of information indicating otherwise, cooperators assume that interdependent others will also cooperate (and share equally), and consequently base their task strategies on this assumption. Individualists, however do not share this bias. Additionally, the authors found that competitors are more likely than cooperators and individualists to exploit others who use a cooperative choice strategy. Competitors are also least sensitive to variations in others' task strategies. Individualists and cooperators were less likely than competitors to exploit others, and were more sensitive to others' strategy variations. In addition to their other results, McClintock and Liebrand (1988) found that others' task strategies had an effect on subjects' evaluations of them. A person who followed a tit-for tat strategy was perceived to be equally as fair and honest as a person following a cooperative strategy, but more intelligent and stronger than a person who was always cooperative.

Using a different type of approach, Stouten et al. (2005) hypothesize that prosocials and proselfs are likely to have different emotional responses to social dilemmas. Therefore, the authors look at behavioral and emotional reactions to a situation where there is a scarcity of public goods that must be shared by a group of people. In particular, they focus on what happens when all members of a group except

one use the equality rule within a dilemma game. Stouten et al. (2005) emphasize that both prosocials and proselfs may choose to use the equality rule, but for different reasons. Prosocials are motivated by genuine desire for equality, while proselfs are interested in increasing their own take-home. Because their behaviors are the same but their motivations are different, proselfs and prosocials are likely to have different responses to failure in a dilemma game.

After completing this experimental "public goods dilemma game", participants in this study were told that one person in their group violated the equality rule. They were asked to express how angry, irritated, disappointed, happy, elated, and/or relieved they felt regarding the game's outcome. Stouten et al. (2005) found that proselfs and prosocials both experienced negative emotions in response to group failure in the experimental game, but for different reasons. Prosocials were concerned with violations of the equality rule and unfairness, while proselfs were upset by personal loss of resources. Prosocials' positive emotions did not differ significantly whether their group succeeded or failed, but proselfs showed stronger positive emotions when their groups succeeded than when they failed. Again, this indicates that prosocials are most concerned with the fairness of a dilemma situation, while proselfs react more strongly to personal loss or gain.

Dilemma game research studies provide insight into the underlying motivations behind behavior in social dilemmas. They illustrate that an individual's value orientation will likely affect his or her perceptions and actions. A second set of studies augments this research by showing how the behaviors in which individuals engage outside the laboratory setting are also influenced by social value orientation.

Social Value Orientation and Survey Research in Social Dilemmas

Studies that employ the survey and/or interview method are somewhat different than studies that utilize the dilemma task approach, as they focus on social value orientation as a predictor for behavior in a social dilemmas that occur in everyday life (McClintock and Alison 1989; Nauta et al. 2002; Van Lange et al. 1997; Van Vugt 1997; Van Vugt et al. 1996). As such, they are more salient to this particular study. Studies that fall within this category look at people's value orientations and behaviors in different types of predicaments. For instance, how does social value orientation shape responses to conflict in the workplace? Environmental pollution and traffic concerns? Desire to volunteer in the community or donate to charity?

Nauta et al. (2002) examine the conditions under which, when faced with organizational conflict, individuals will express concern about their own problems versus their own problems *and* those of other departments in the organization. Nauta et al. found that individuals with a prosocial value orientation are more likely to show high concern for the goals of others departments. Furthermore, high concern for the goals of other departments, paired with high concern for personal goals increases the likelihood that people will use a problem-solving negotiation style when involved in interdepartmental negotiations. Nauta et al. (2002) argue that differences in social value orientation help to explain why some people are concerned about multiple goals (i.e. goals of their own and others' departments), while others focus only on goals that affect them more directly (i.e. only their own department's goals).

A number of studies ask whether social value orientation influences concern for the environment and preference for private (i.e. driving one's own car) versus public

transportation. These studies, however, provide contradictory evidence for the effect of social value orientation on environmental responses. Van Vugt, Van Lange, and Meertens (1996) test the hypothesis that prosocials exhibit more concern with environmental impact and less concern with travel flexibility than proselfs. They argue that social value orientation will influence commuter's preferences for driving in a car versus riding in public transportation. Their findings indicate that prosocials show greater preference than proselfs for commuting by public transportation, but that proselfs and prosocials were almost equally responsive to information explaining the efficiency of public transportation.

Not all research, however, supports these findings. Joireman, Van Lange, and Van Vugt (2004) look at whether social value orientation, concern for future consequences, and belief that commuting harms the environment impact preference for public transportation. Although they found that concern for future consequences and belief that commuting harms the environment both increased preference for public transportation, prosocials and proselfs did not significantly differ in their preferences. Previous research has produced similar findings with regard to the impact of social value orientation (Joireman et al. 1997; Van Lange et al. 1998).

In a related article, Van Vugt (1997) asks whether social value orientation predicts responses to privatization of public transportation. His study is one of the first to illustrate how "social value orientations are meaningfully related to the way people perceive and respond to structural solutions in social dilemmas" (p. 364), rather than to individual level, cognitive solutions. Van Vugt's research found that when individuals were aware that their personal outcomes would be low, both proselfs and prosocials

disproved of privatization. When personal outcomes were high, proselfs were more supportive of privatization. Findings also show that, when the costs of transitioning public transportation to private management were high, proselfs more strongly approved of privatization than prosocials. Van Vugt suggests that this may be because prosocials do not want to risk an expensive structural change that is not guaranteed to improve the situation. In this study, social value orientation affected responses to a social dilemma in a specific context in unexpected ways.

Tackling the subject from a different angle, Van Lange et al. (1997) examine whether social value orientation influences individuals' willingness to sacrifice in close, ongoing relationships. In this study, sacrifice represents a type of social dilemma: should one pursue one's self interests or forgo them for the good of the partner and the relationship? Contrary to their expectations, Van Lange et al. found that social value orientation had very little effect on willingness to sacrifice, and that what effect it did have was not in the predicted direction. While the authors expected prosocials to be more willing to sacrifice, individualists appeared more apt to do so in their study. Van Lange et al. suggest that sacrifice may actually be a strategy that people use to ensure long term happiness for themselves. Given its "personal pay-off", prosocials are not necessarily more likely to engage in it.

McClintock and Allison (1989) examine a topic tangentially related to willingness to sacrifice. They focus on whether social value orientation influences helping behavior. In their study, the authors assessed the social value orientations of students in an introductory social psychology course at a university. They then sent letters to students in the course, signed by the department chairperson, requesting that students to volunteer

subject hours. Students were asked to respond to the letter by indicating whether they were willing to volunteer, and how many hours they wanted to volunteer. Having already assessed the social value orientations of the students, McClintock and Allison analyzed whether social value orientation influenced the likelihood that a student would respond to the request for volunteers, and the number of hours the students were willing to volunteer. McClintock and Allison (1989) show that a cooperative/pro-social orientation increases the likelihood that an individual will engage in helping behavior. Cooperative students were not more likely to respond to the letter sent by the experimenters, but they were willing to donate more hours of their time than individualists and competitors. (Interestingly, McClintock and Allison also find that that a higher proportion of females than males could be classified as cooperative.) McClintock and Allison's study indicates, again, that social value orientation influences the choices that people make about their behavior in everyday life.

McClintock and Allison (1989) focus on social value orientation and volunteering, while Van Lange et al. (2007) examine its relationship with willingness to make a donation. They suggest that prosocials engage in more donation acts than proselfs, and that there is a connection between social value orientation and the types of organizations to which people are willing to give money. Participants in their study were asked to indicate whether they had participated in specific donations acts over the last year, and also whether they had donated to any organizations that fell under eight broad categories: third world organizations, charity organizations, health organizations, environmental organizations, church or related organizations, sports/recreation

organizations, organizations for the advancement of education and research, and organizations for the advancement of art and culture.

In support of their hypothesis, Van Lange et al. (2007) found that prosocials gave a greater number of donations than individualists or competitors. Prosocials were more likely than competitors and individualists to give certain types of donations. They more commonly donated used clothes in clothes containers, were registered contributors, and bought something in a third world shop or environment shop. They were not significantly more likely to give donations linked to religion, church, or street solicitors. But, prosocials had more donation goals that individualists and competitors. Van Lange et al. (2007) conclude that "Individual differences in social value orientation appear to be especially predictive of donations to organizations aimed at helping others who are strongly dependent on such help – people who are poor and people who are ill" (p. 380). The authors emphasize that their findings support the notion that social value orientation has predictive value outside the laboratory setting, in describing people's behaviors in their everyday life.

Gaps in the Social Value Orientation Literature

Despite the large range of topics covered by social value orientation studies, there are several gaps in the literature. First, while social value orientation studies examine the relationship between value orientation and responses to social dilemmas, far less attention is paid to the relationship between value orientation and responses to injustice. Studies do note that individuals value equality, equity, and fairness, and take these into account when making decisions in social dilemmas (see Eek and Garling 2006; Van Vugt 1997), and forming emotional responses (Stouten et al. 2005). Prosocials, in particular, are

likely to "react toward violations of equality by others out of fairness concerns because they consider equality as their important guideline in social decision-making" (Stouten et al. 2005:p. 769). Such findings suggest the relevance of justice to research on social value orientation, and the need for further research on the impact of social value orientation over behaviors intended to reduce injustice.

Second, for the most part, the literature does not address how people come to have social value orientation in the first place. The exception is a study by Van Lange et al. (1997), which examines factors that affect the development of social value orientation. Van Lange et al. argue that socialization throughout the lifespan is directly related to individuals' social value orientation development. Their study focuses on whether value orientation is affected by adult attachment styles (secure, anxious-ambivalent, or avoidant), number of siblings, age, education level, and sex. As described previously, some of these factors are also likely to affect responses to social injustice.

Third, while several studies look at "real-life" scenarios (McClintock and Allison 1989, Nauta et al. 2002, Van Lange et al. 1997, Van Vugt 1997, and Van Vugt et al. 1996), the majority of studies are restricted to the laboratory setting. While research describes the relationship between social value orientation and behavior in social dilemma tasks, or evaluations of others formed during dilemma tasks, it provides far less information about how social value orientation impacts behavior in everyday life. In order to help fill in this gap, the current study uses a sample of adults recruited from outside the university setting. Including adults in this study allows for an examination of whether people's responsibilities and commitments – marriage, children, employment, etc. – impact the type of response that they have as observers of social injustice. These

factors, as well as other (i.e. childhood socialization and various beliefs and values) are likely to affect social value orientation itself, as well as how it manifests itself when individuals witness social injustice.

Predicting the Antecedents of Social Value Orientation

Van Lange et al. (1997) hypothesize that early experiences with one's primary care giver affect relationship attitudes later in life. Children who have secure relationship with their childhood primary caregiver "may have learned to perceive interdependent situations and partners as safe and secure, readily behaving in a trusting manner, thereby increasing the possibility of developing cooperative patterns of interactions with interdependent others" (Van Lange et al. 1997:p. 735). Consequently, secure people develop prosocial value orientations. On the other hand, insecure individuals, who are distrusting in social interactions, are more likely to adopt a proself value orientation. In support of their hypotheses, these authors find that cooperative individuals show higher levels of secure attachment and lower levels of avoidant attachment than individualists and competitors. They conclude that secure/insecure attachment to childhood caretakers shapes adult interactions, and ultimately social value orientation.

A second hypothesis proposed by Van Lange et al. (1997) is that individuals with more siblings have more experience sharing with others, and thus develop prosocial behaviors. Contradictory evidence, however, indicates that group size negatively impacts cooperative behavior (see Liebrand 1984). As group size increases, cooperative behavior decreases (Van Lange et al. 1997). Individuals with many siblings may, therefore, be less inclined towards cooperation than individuals with fewer siblings. For this reason, Van Lange et al. looked at the number of siblings of individuals and individuals' place in the

birth order. Finally, they explored whether the sex of one's siblings made a difference in predicting cooperative, competitive, or individualistic value orientation. Their study found that cooperators had more siblings than individualists and competitors. Cooperators also had more older siblings than individualists, and more female siblings than individualists and competitors. Thus, having older siblings – and particularly sisters – in the household during childhood seems to have a significant impact on development of social value orientation.

Finally, Van Lange et al. (1997) posit that older individuals are more inclined towards prosocial behaviors both because society has become more individualistic than collectivist in recent decades, and because older individuals are more reliant on interactions with others for survival, and thus more inclined towards prosocial behaviors themselves. In their study, they analyzed connections between age, education level, sex, and social value orientation. They found that, as age increases, the percentage of prosocials increases and the percentages of competitors and individualists decreases. In addition, percentages of cooperators were greater among females than among males, while percentages of individualists were much lower among females than among males. The data, however, indicate no significant connection between education level and value orientation.

Van Lange et al. (1997) conclude that "differences in social value orientation are (a) partially rooted in different patterns of social interaction as experienced during the period from early childhood to young adulthood and (b) further shaped by different patterns of social interaction as experienced during early adulthood, middle adulthood,

and old age" (p. 742). Thus, Van Lange et al.'s study supports one of the primary arguments of this study.

Van Lange et al. (1997) also identify a primary weakness in their study, which is that it does not examine correlates of attachment differences, number of siblings, and age. They maintain that more research is needed to examine the impact of other factors, such as religion and socioeconomic status, which may impact social value orientation development. In looking at these factors, as well as many others, this study augments the work competed by Van Lange et al. (1997). In order to provide a more complex understanding of the social antecedents of value orientation, this study looks to various literatures (i.e. social psychology, sociology, political science) that describe individual level factors that are correlated with helping behavior, civic-mindedness, and political participation. Such factors are likely to provide insight into what shapes cooperative, competitive, or individualistic social value orientation.

Predictions: Social Antecedents of Social Value Orientation

There are various explanations as to why some individuals strive to increase group outcomes, while others are more concerned with their own outcomes. People's preferences for prosocial or proself outcomes are affected by both personal characteristics and previous experiences – i.e., who they are and how they were socialized. The following section contains a discussion of possible social antecedents of social value orientation. These antecedents fall into three basic categories: demographics (e.g. age, gender); childhood socialization (e.g. lessons learned from parents); and personal values, beliefs, and experiences (e.g. political orientation). In examining these factors, my goal is to fill in gaps in the literature by identifying the origins of value orientation.

Demographics

Age

Research suggests that age is extremely likely to influence social value orientation. Putnam (1995) argues that people born in the 1920's are far more likely than people born in subsequent decades to be civically engaged and involved in community affairs. He maintains that every new generation is less involved than the one before it. Given this, birth cohort may influence social value orientation. Older cohorts are likely to have more prosocial individuals than younger cohorts, because they grew up during an era where civic engagement was more common.

Additionally, Van Lange et al. (1997) indicate that as age increases, so does interdependence. In their study, they found that the percentage of cooperatives increases with age. Van Lange et al. (1997) suggest that, throughout the lifespan, individuals develop more and more interdependent relationships, then come to realize that helping and receiving help from others is extremely important. Similar to Putnam (1995), Van Lange et al. (1997) argue that society has become less collectivist and more independent over time. As a result, individuals born in earlier cohorts are more inclined towards prosocial behaviors than those born in later decades.

> *Hypothesis 1*: Age is positively related to a prosocial value orientation and negatively related to a proself value orientation.

Gender

A second factor likely to affect social value orientation is gender. From a very young age, children undergo gender typing: "the process by which children acquire not only a gender identity but also the motives, values, and behaviors considered appropriate

in their culture for members of their biological sex" (Shaffer 2005:p. 229). Girls are socialized to take on an "expressive role", which emphasizes cooperative behavior, kindness, nurturing, and sensitivity to others; and boys are socialized to take on an "instrumental role", which emphasizes dominant, independent, competitive, goal-oriented behaviors (Schaffer 2005). Additionally, parents are more likely to encourage interdependent behavior in their daughters than in their sons. For example, by the time they are 20-24 months, girls are rewarded for asking for help, following parents around, and playing with dolls. Boys in the same age group are reprimanded for engaging in these same behaviors (see Schaffer 2005).

Given that they are socialized differently during childhood, it is not surprising that males and females develop different attitudes regarding what is a "fair" distribution of outcomes. We see this reflected in the justice literature in studies on allocation of resources. Leventhal and Anderson (1970) conducted a study in which children were asked to do a task, then given prizes and told to distribute them between themselves and the other child who was assigned the same task. The authors found that boys divided the prizes evenly when they thought that the other child had done the same amount of work, and took far more than half when they thought they personally had done more work. Girls, however, distributed about the same amount to the other child and to themselves. Even when they did more work and it would have been to their advantage to take a greater share of the prizes, girls still preferred to share equally. There is some indication that this pattern continues into adulthood, as studies have illustrated that, under a variety of conditions, women give themselves a smaller reward allocation than men after completing a task (see Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995).

These studies support the notion that gender affects social value orientation, which is a type of outcome distribution preference. McClintock and Allison (1989) found a higher proportion of cooperative female than males in their study, and Van Lange et al. (1997) discovered that individuals who had older female siblings were more likely to be cooperative than individuals without female siblings. Van Lange et al. (1997) suggest that perhaps females are more likely than males to develop prosocial behaviors, and that they socialize family members to engage in similar behaviors.

Evidence for this supposition comes from political science research as well. Although women belong to fewer volunteer organizations than men (Edwards, Edwards, and Watts 1984), they spend more time with the groups to which they belong, and more time engaging in informal social interaction than men (Robinson and Godbey 1995). As a result, they have the opportunity to develop ties and commitment to others that men may not have. This, in turn, may foster a cooperative social value orientation in women. Because of both early childhood socialization and adult social interaction patterns, women are more likely to be prosocial, while men are more likely to be competitive or individualistic.

> *Hypothesis 2*: Females are more likely than males to have a prosocial value orientation.

Religious Service Attendance

In their 1991 study, Wiltfang and McAdam find that individuals who attend religious services frequently are more likely than others to engage in high-risk activism. One possible explanation for this finding is that individuals associate religious values with community involvement and helping others.

Consequently, individuals who attend services regularly may be particularly motivated to assist victims of injustice, even if there is a cost involved, and particularly hesitant to walk away from a person in need. In other words, they are concerned with both their own and others' outcomes. I posit that religious service attendance therefore increases the likelihood that an individual will be prosocially oriented.

> *Hypothesis 3*: Religious service attendance is positively related to prosocial value orientation.

Education, Employment, and Income

Putnam (1995) finds that individuals who are employed belong to more social groups than individuals who are unemployed, and he suggests that paid workers have more access to diverse social networks than people who do not work. Access to a variety of networks increases the number of opportunities that individuals have to participate in social groups and the number of invitations that they receive to participate in various social activities. By increasing social network size and opportunities to participate in different communities, and promoting social exchange and interdependent behaviors, employment may increase prosocial orientation.

> *Hypothesis 4*: Employed individuals are more likely than unemployed individuals to have a prosocial value orientation.

The consequences of education and income as they related to social value orientation are less straightforward. Middle income wage earners and the poor have slightly higher rates of civic engagement (Putnam 1995) but lower rates of political activism (Schlozman 2002) than wealthier individuals. Likewise, education increases the likelihood of some forms of community involvement, but decreases others.

Thus, the effect of income and education on community involvement gives little insight as to how income might affect value orientation. Although it is clear that income and education have an effect on community-oriented behaviors, it is less certain whether they have an effect on social value orientation. Consequently, income and education were examined in this study in an exploratory vein. No direct hypotheses are proposed on the effect of these factors on social value orientation. Nevertheless, because they have been shown to impact social behaviors, they are included in this study with the goal of discovering whether they also affect social values.

Childhood Socialization

Parental Values

A primary premise of this study is that socialization impacts the formation of values, and that early childhood experiences are likely to shape one's social value orientation (Van Lange et al. 1997). As Van Lange et al. (1997) suggest, childhood socialization affects the way that people view social interactions as adults. It also enforces certain beliefs, values, and behaviors in children (Shaffer 2005). Scholars who focus on learning theory have found that if parents consistently teach prosocial behaviors and praise their children for engaging in such behaviors, children come to associate prosocial behaviors with praise and positive feelings. Consequently, "acts of kindness become self-reinforcing" (Shaffer 2005:p. 307). Children continue to act prosocially because they are encouraged to feel good about engaging in prosocial behaviors.

Bandura (1989) argued that role models have an enormous impact on the development of prosocial values and behavior in children. When children are regularly exposed to others who act prosocially they are likely to internalize and engage in similar

behaviors. Eisenberg and Fabes (1998) found that when children observe kind acts they become more inclined to behave prosocially themselves, even when there are costs involved and no material benefits. Studies have also found that parents are able to socialize their children to be sympathetic by modeling empathic behavior and disciplining their children to understand when their behaviors have harmed others (see Shaffer 2005; also Barnett 1987; Hastings et al. 2000; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, and King 1979).

Parents who volunteer regularly, are civically involved, and talk to their children about helping others and/or being involved in their community are likely to instill prosocial values in their children. Parents who actively reinforce prosocial behaviors through their words and actions teach their children lasting lessons about the importance of helping behavior and concern for others.

> *Hypothesis 5*: Having parents who displayed concern for the welfare of others is positively related to prosocial value orientation.

Childhood Synagogue Attendance

As stated in earlier, Wiltfang and McAdam (1991) note that individuals who attend religious services frequently are more likely than others to engage in high-risk activism. This finding suggests that religious values and commitment to a religious institution may motivate individuals to become involved in their communities – to the extent that they are willing to do so even if there are personal costs involved. Additionally, participation in services indicates a desire to be active in a public, communal setting (rather than a private, non-communal setting). Together, these facts

suggest that individuals who attend religious services regularly may have an interest in maximizing group outcomes, rather than personal outcomes.

Parents who take their children to religious services regularly may, consequently, be teaching their children to be involved in and responsible to a larger community. Childhood religious socialization, like other types of socialization, has the potential to impact prosocial values and behaviors. Individuals who regularly attended services and participated in the Jewish community with their families during childhood may be more sensitive to the concerns of a larger community, and more invested in maximizing group outcomes.

> *Hypothesis 6*: Childhood religious service attendance is positively related to prosocial value orientation.
>
> *Hypothesis 7*: Having parents who valued social or religious involvement in their community is positively related to prosocial value orientation.

Personal Beliefs, Values, and Experiences

Liberal vs. Conservative Political Ideology

Through both childhood and adult socialization, individuals develop various values – including political ideology. Political ideology is a "set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved" (Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1991:p. 79). In other words, it is a set of beliefs about societal outcomes. Because political ideology is related to outcome preferences, it may also be related to social value orientation.

In the U.S., conservative ideologies emphasize individualistic solutions to social problems. Conservatives generally do not support "big government", and believe that the role of government is to help control "humanity's intrinsically base impulses" (Erikson et

al. 1991:p. 80), not to redress social injustice. Additionally, conservatives value competition and emphasize the importance of gaining success through individual action (Ball and Dagger 2002). Liberal ideologies, on the other hand, emphasize cooperative, government solutions to social problems. Liberals are more supportive of "big government", especially as a tool for helping disadvantaged members of society (Erikson et al. 1991). They believe that all people should have equal opportunity to succeed (Ball and Dagger 2002). Given this, I hypothesize that individuals who identify with liberal political ideology are more likely to have a prosocial value orientation, whereas individuals who have a conservative ideology are more likely to have a proself value orientation.

> *Hypothesis 8*: Liberal political beliefs are positively related to prosocial value orientation.
>
> *Hypothesis 9*: Conservative political beliefs are positively related to proself value orientation.

Belief in a Just World

Belief in a just world is another factor that may increase the likelihood that an individual will have a proself value orientation. According to Lerner (1980), "A Just World is one in which people 'get what they deserve'" (p. 11). When individuals observe outcomes that seem unfair, they may reason that the outcome was actually deserved. To believe otherwise is to question the assumption that good things happen to good people, and bad things happen to bad people.

Individuals who strongly believe in a just world are often more inclined to attribute blame to the "victim" of an injustice, rationalizing that the victim's situation must have been caused by past wrongful behavior. The inclination to

make personal (rather than situational) attributions indicates a desire to believe that people have power over their own outcomes – that outcomes are not random or decided by uncontrollable factors. Individuals who strongly believe that people have control over their outcomes and "get what they deserve" may also be more inclined to emphasize proself, rather than prosocial, values.

> *Hypothesis 10*: Belief in a just world is positively related to proself value orientation.

Predictions: Social Value Orientation and Responses to Injustice

While the previous section discussed factors that affect social value orientation, this section will address the effects of social various factors on behavioral responses to injustice. These factors fall into four categories: social value orientation; demographics; childhood socialization; and personal values, beliefs, and experiences.

One way that social value orientation may affect responses to injustice is by coloring people's perceptions regarding the severity of the injustice. Social value orientation represents a set of beliefs about distributions. As stated above, it refers to an allocation preference. Prosocial individuals are concerned about equal outcomes for self and others. Because of this, they may be especially sensitive to unjust situations, where outcomes are distributed unequally. Proself people, on the other hand, are likely to be concerned about others' outcomes only when they are personally affected. Given this, prosocials should perceive unjust situations to be more severely unfair than proselfs.

> *Hypothesis 11*: Prosocials will perceive an unjust situation to be more severely unfair than proself individuals.

Previous studies have established that perceptions of injustice impact responses to injustice (see Hegtvedt et al. 2009; Younts and Mueller 2001). As perceived severity of injustice increases, so does the likelihood that individuals will attempt to redress the injustice. Adams (1965) and Homans (1974) suggest that individuals become distressed when a situation is perceived to be unfair, and that they attempt to redress the injustice in order to relieve their distress. Accordingly, when injustices are particularly severe, individuals are more likely to recognize the need and urgency for redress.

> *Hypothesis 12*: Perceived severity of a social injustice is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.

Addressing the impact of perceptions of injustice on responses to injustice is important, because studies have shown that perceptions impact responses to injustice. Nevertheless, the primary focus of this study is not on perceptions of injustice. It is on what causes justice perceivers to become active justice responders – what motivates observers of injustice to actively respond to the situation. Thus, the rest of the hypotheses address the impact of social value orientation and other factors on behavioral responses to injustice.

Social value orientation may affect responses to injustice by moderating perceptions of injustice. But, it also likely has a direct effect. Prosocials, who are more concerned with equality than proselfs, may be more willing to use both low and active strategies to redress injustice and bring about equal outcomes. Proselfs, who are motivated primarily by self-interest, are less likely to exert effort on behalf of another – especially when there is no direct, personal benefit.

> *Hypothesis 13*: Prosocial value orientation is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.

Hypothesis 14: Proself value orientation is negatively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.

Predictions: Other Factors and Responses to Injustice

Chapter 3, "Justice Processes", provided a comprehensive discussion of how various individual level factors affect behavioral responses to injustice. The following section reviews these factors, explaining more specifically how they (alone and in conjunction with social value orientation) may influence observers' responses to injustice.

The factors addressed in this section do not all have the same amount of sway. While some are likely to motivate use of active strategies, others may simply prompt observers to respond in a modest way, using reflexive strategies. Demographics, childhood socialization, and personal values, beliefs, and experiences occasion different types of reactions.

As stated above, previous studies have confirmed that perceptions of injustice affect responses to injustice (e.g., Hegtvedt et al. 2009; Younts and Mueller 2001). This study begins with the premise that observers of injustice have witnessed an unjust situation and do in fact perceive it to be unfair. Given that the unfairness of a situation is already established, how will specific factors affect observers' responses to injustice? The following section attempts to answer this question. I hypothesize that while some factors are likely to motivate use of both reflexive and active strategies, other factors may have more of an impact on a single strategy (either reflexive or active, but not both).

Demographics

Gender

Research on whether men and women respond differently to observed injustice has produced mixed results (see Johnson et al. 2007). As stated earlier, girls and boys are socialized to display characteristics associated with their biological sex (Shaffer 2005). This early socialization, in addition to the socialization that individuals experience as adults, is likely to produce gendered behavior. Women are often stereotyped as being cooperative, and assumed to be more compassionate and empathetic than men. Marullo (1991) argues that women are generally perceived as having moral superiority over men and, because of their ability to give birth, are called upon to be "stewards" (Marullo 1991:p. 137) who see others safely through the life cycle. Taking advantage of this label, early female activists in the United States used Victorian notions of womanhood such as domesticity, purity, and sentimentality to explain their participation in social change organizations (Marullo 1991; Marchand 1972).

Meyer and Whittier (1994) maintain that women's organizations tend to emphasize the difference between personal problems and larger, structural injustices. Because of the focus on reducing social/structural inequalities, women's participation in social change and volunteer organizations has historically been geared towards making changes that would benefit a greater population – not just the women involved in the organizations. The fact that women had some personal experience with the injustices that they were trying to eliminate may actually have strengthened their feelings of empathy towards others by making it easier for them to put themselves in others' shoes – thus further increasing their concern for the fates of others.

While there is ample evidence of women taking on leadership roles both in women's and mixed-sex organizations, their participation has not necessarily been greater than that of men. It is, however, different is several respects. As stated earlier, women belong to fewer volunteer groups than men (Edwards, Edwards, and Watts 1984) and are less politically active than men (Schlozman 2002). But, women spend more time with the groups to which they belong, and more time engaging in informal social interaction than men (Robinson and Godbey 1995).

These findings indicate that, while women and men may be equally motivated to respond to injustices, they tend to use different strategies. Women are more likely than men to use informal interactions and engage in non-political behavior in response to injustice. In other words, they are more likely to use reflexive strategies such as staying informed about the situation and talking about it with others, which are informal, non-political strategies that can be used in response to perceived injustice.

> *Hypothesis 15*: Women are more likely than men to anticipate using reflexive strategies in response to injustice.

It does not necessarily follow that women are less likely than men to use active strategies. The active strategies addressed in this study are a mix of political and non-political, formal and informal tactics; thus, there is no clear rational for suggesting that men and women might differ in their use of active strategies.

Age

As stated previously, Putnam (1995) argues that people born in the 1920's and prior are far more likely than those born after the 1920's to be civically involved. Additionally, in Van Lange et al.'s (1997) study, the authors maintain that individuals

develop more interdependent relationships as they grow older, causing individuals to place more value on helping and cooperative behaviors. Because age motivates greater interdependence and interest in giving and receiving assistance, I hypothesize that, as age increases, so does the likelihood that an individual will engage in reflexive and active strategies in order to help others who have been treated unfairly.

> *Hypothesis 16*: Age is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.

Marital Status

According to Putnam (1995), married individuals are more likely than non-married individuals to be civically engaged. Having a spouse expands one's social network and increases the likelihood that one will be invited to participate in various community activities. Consequently, married men and women may receive more requests for help from others, and, in order to maintain their social network, may be inclined to respond in the affirmative whenever possible.

As stated earlier, the costs of engaging in a response to injustice depend on individuals' personal commitments and responsibilities. Wiltfang and McAdam (1991) found that marriage restricts high risk activist involvement, since people who are married devote free time and resources to their partners and families. Parents with children living at home, in particular, have more responsibilities and less time and energy to share. At the same time, married men and women are more likely to be civically engaged (Putnam 1995), perhaps because having a partner increases one's social network and, consequently, opportunities to be actively engaged in the community. These studies suggest that, although they may be unable to engage in active strategies because of their

family responsibilities, married people may be more inclined than others to engage in reflexive strategies in response to observed injustice.

> *Hypothesis 17*: Being married is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive strategies.

Parental Status

Parental status, like marital status, affects community involvement and helping behavior. Wiltfang and McAdam (1991) found that people with children living at home spend less time involved in the sanctuary movement than those who do not have children living at home, because they must devote time and resources to their families. Parents who have young children often participate in civic engagement activities (Putnam 1995), but may face limitations in terms of how much time, money, or energy they can spend responding to social injustice. Individuals who have older children or no children, on the other hand, often have more flexibility in terms of how they use these resources. These findings suggest that having children living at home may facilitate the use of strategies that are not costly, but impede the use of strategies that involve greater sacrifice. Thus, I expect that parents who have children living at home will be significantly less likely to use active strategies, but not significantly less likely to use reflexive strategies.

> *Hypothesis 18*: Having children living at home is negatively related to anticipated use of active strategies.

Current Synagogue Attendance

As stated above, there is some evidence that people who attend religious services frequently are more likely than others to engage in high-risk activism (Wiltfang and McAdam 1991). This suggests that individuals who regularly attend synagogue may be more inclined to work towards collective outcomes,

and more willing to commit themselves to redressing injustice – even when there are costs involved. Additionally, Gallup Polls (2008) found that people who identify as highly religious[7] are more likely to engage in helping behaviors such as giving to charity, volunteering for an organization, or helping a stranger (www.gallup.com).

> *Hypothesis 19*: Religious service attendance is positively related to anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.

Education, Employment, and Income

In some cases, education, employment, and income facilitate responses to injustice because they make it easier for individuals to be involved in their communities. Schlozman (2002) maintains that people with higher levels of education develop stronger civic skills in the workplace and in organizations, are more likely to receive requests for participation in political activities, and are more likely to be interested in and knowledgeable about politics. Individuals with more education also tend to have greater financial resources, which makes it easier for them to be civically engaged (Putnam 1995).

Employment, in addition to promoting civic skills, provides individuals with income that they would not otherwise have. Again, this makes it easier for people to participate in activities aimed at redressing injustice, particularly when participation requires a financial contribution. Education, employment, and income all increase the resources (i.e. civic skills, knowledge, social networks, money) that individuals have available to them. Such resources are likely to facilitate use of active strategies, which

[7] Gallup (2008) identifies individuals as "highly religious" if they indicate that "religion is important to their daily lives" and they "attended a religious service int eh week prior to being surveyed" (Pelham and Crabtree 2008, www.gallup.com).

tend to be more costly (because they demand a contribution of the resources described above). Education, employment, and income should have less of an impact on use of reflexive strategies, since they involve little or no cost and do not require a financial sacrifice.

> *Hypothesis 20*: Education, employment, and income are positively related to anticipated use of active strategies.

Childhood Socialization

Parental Values

As stated above, parents have the ability to socialize their children to adopt prosocial values and behaviors. Studies have found that by modeling certain behaviors, teaching their children lessons about empathy and helping, and disciplining children to understand how their actions help/hurt others, parents assist children in developing empathy and concern for the needs of others (Shaffer 2005).

How do prosocial values affect behavior? Some studies suggest that empathy causes children to reflect back on lessons that they learned during childhood – "Lessons such as the Golden Rule, the norm of social responsibility, or even the knowledge that other people approve of helping behavior" (Shaffer 2005:p. 314). These reflections cause people to assume personal responsibility for helping others, and to feel guilty when they do not act on behalf of a victim of misfortune (see Shaffer 2005; also Chapman et al. 1987; Williams and Bybee 1994). Individuals consider what their parents taught them, and it motivates them to behave in certain ways.

A study on Christians who faced grave danger to help Jews during the Holocaust found that the Christians had close ties to parents, and reported that their parents behaved

in a manner consistent with their moral and ethical beliefs (London 1970; Oliner and Oliner 1988). Similarly, U.S. civil rights activists who gave up their homes or jobs for the civil rights movement had parents who not only emphasized the importance of altruism, but also modeled such behavior by helping others. Activists who were less committed to the civil rights movement reported having parents who taught them about the importance of compassion but rarely demonstrated altruistic behavior (see Shaffer 2005; also Clary and Snyder 1991; Rosenhan 1970).

One explanation for why these activists were so strongly committed to their causes is that the values they internalized as children became part of their identities as adults. For instance, Grusec and Redler (1980) found that children who were told that they were nice or helpful were more likely than those in a control group to share their drawings and belongings with sick children. Studies have found that people who believe that concern for others is an important part of their identity tend to engage in more prosocial behaviors than people who do not think of themselves as compassionate, charitable, or helpful (see Shaffer 2005; also Clary and Snyder 1991; Eisenberg et al. 1999; Hart and Fegley 1995).

By reinforcing certain values and beliefs in their children, parents are able to socialize their children to a) think of themselves as willing and able to help others, and b) engage in prosocial behaviors as adults. As Shaffer (2005) argues, "warm and compassionate models who advocate prosocial behaviors and who practice what they preach are especially effective at eliciting prosocial responses from children" (p. 319). Consequently, individuals who had parents who taught them concern for others, helping

behavior, and a commitment to enforcing social justice are more likely than others to be highly motivated to assist victims of injustice.

> *Hypothesis 21*: Having parents who displayed concern for the welfare of others is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.

Childhood Synagogue Attendance

Childhood synagogue attendance may affect responses to injustice for several reasons. First, individuals who regularly attended religious services with their families during childhood had the opportunity to start building a community social network at a young age. If individuals maintain these networks as they get older, the community ties that they developed as children may continue to affect them as adults. Social networks increase the likelihood that individuals will be asked to participate in different community activities.

Second, individuals who regularly attended religious services with their families may have been socialized to value community involvement. This value, once internalized, could potentially motivate community-oriented behaviors later in life. Individuals who were taught the importance of interacting with others in the religious community may be concerned with maximizing group outcomes, including just outcomes. Thus, social networks and concern for others in one's community may motivate use of more active strategies.

> *Hypothesis 22*: Childhood religious service attendance is positively related to the anticipated use of active strategies.

Personal Beliefs, Values, and Experiences

Liberal vs. Conservative Political Beliefs

Political ideology affects how people think about themselves and others, and thus is also likely to impact responses to injustice. For instance, Williams (1984) found that conservatives were more likely than liberals to engage in victim derogation. When observers blame individuals for having brought misfortune on themselves, observers cease to think of the misfortune as injustice. As just world theory explains, injustice is framed as punishment for wrongful behavior. When this happens, observers will no longer see the need to help the "victim". Because liberals are less likely to engage in victim derogation than liberals, they are also more likely to perceive the situation as unfair, and to attempt to redress the injustice.

Additionally, Baradat (1984) notes that differences between liberals and conservatives may have implications for how individuals respond to injustice. Liberals tend to be dissatisfied with perceived flaws in society and confident that people can improve life through reason and action. They "are optimistic about our ability to improve ourselves and will experiment with a society's institutions to achieve that goal" (Baradat 1984:p. 33). Conservatives, on the other hand, are more cautious about making changes and more invested in maintaining the status quo. Although they may perceive society to be flawed, they are not confident that action will rectify the situation (Ball and Dagger 2002; Baradat 1984).

Furthermore, conservatives are less likely than liberals to believe that equality in society can and should be achieved. Baradat (1984) argues, "In the conservative's opinion the differences among people are so great in both quality and quantity as to make

any claim of human equality absurdly idealistic" (p. 37). Liberals, on the other hand, emphasize that individuals cannot be truly free unless they have equal opportunity to succeed (Ball and Dagger 2002). Thus, ensuring equal opportunity in society is and should be important. Given their respective political attitudes towards equality and social change, I propose the following:

> *Hypothesis 23*: Liberals are more likely than conservatives to anticipate using reflexive and active strategies in response to injustice.

Past Experiences of Injustice

When people feel that they share something in common with victims of injustice, they may be more inclined to attempt to redress the injustice. De Cremer and Van Vugt (1999) maintain that individuals who strongly identify with groups to which they belong may "invest more in public goods, and exercise greater restraint in resource dilemmas than low-identifying group members, both in laboratory and field dilemmas" (p. 872). In fact, they found that when faced with a social dilemma, proselfs and prosocials contributed equal amounts when they strongly identified with their group. Shared common experience (or at least identification) with the victim of an injustice appears to be a powerful motivator for cooperative behavior. Consequently, the likelihood that a person will attempt to redress an injustice may depend on whether or not he or she has experienced a similar injustice in the past.

> *Hypothesis 24*: Having experienced a similar injustice in the past is positively related to anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.

Empathy

Empathy, like past experience with an injustice, can make people more attuned to others' injustices, and more invested in redressing them (Shaffer 2005). As stated above,

empathy causes people to reflect back on past lessons about prosocial behavior. These reflections motivate individuals to help others by causing them to feel personally responsible for the outcome of the victim, and to feel guilty when they ignore another person who is suffering misfortune (Shaffer 2005; see also Chapman et al. 1987; Williams and Bybee 1994). Oswald (1996) argues that "understanding someone else's feelings (affective perspective taking), and, especially, actually experiencing feelings (empathy) may act as a motive to offer aid" (p. 615). Thus, individuals who are strongly empathetic are also likely to be highly motivated to redress social injustice.

> *Hypothesis 25*: Empathy is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.

Perceived Effectiveness and Expectations for Cooperation

The manner in which individuals respond to others' experiences of social injustice may also be influenced by whether or not they think that others will help them, and their goal is accomplishable. Individuals are less likely to take action when they feel defenseless, and more likely to take action when they feel that they have skills, resources, or support from others that will enable them to reach their goal (see Notarius and Herrick 1988; Schlozman 2002; Schwartz 1975; Walster et al. 1976; Wortman and Lehman 1985). When individuals feel helpless, do not think others will support them, or are prevented by some roadblock from rallying others, they may refrain from acting because they believe that it will not make a difference (see Kramer et al. 1986; Maki and McClintock 1983; Skarlicki and Kulik 2005; Yamagishi and Sato 1986). When people feel that they have the power to change a situation, they are more likely to attempt to do so.

> *Hypothesis 26*: Believing that one's actions will make a difference is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.

People are more likely to believe that their actions will make a difference under certain circumstances. Anticipated cooperation on the part of others makes individuals more willing to reciprocate by engaging in cooperative behavior. If people believe that others will be cooperative and supportive, it increases the likelihood that they will act on behalf of someone in need (Skarlicki and Kulik 2005). This is particularly true of cooperative individuals, who are more likely than others to "exhibit the same level of cooperation as they expect from others…" (Van Lange and Semin-Goosens 1998; see also De Cremer and van Vugt 1999), regardless of how they perceive the party who needs help. Prosocials are willing to help others if they feel that they have the support of the person that they are helping, and that their actions will make a difference.

> *Hypothesis 27*: Believing that others will cooperate in efforts to redress injustice is positively related to the use of reflexive and active strategies.

Community Involvement Values

The social movements literature indicates that participation in one community-oriented activity often leads to participation in other community-oriented activities. Individuals gain access to social networks through volunteer, civic, and political involvement, and these networks facilitate other types of public involvement (see Putnam 1995; Schlozman 2002; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980). For instance, Wiltfang and McAdam (1991) found that individuals are more likely to become involved in high-risk activism when they have participated in other activist movements in the past, and when they attend religious services frequently. Thus, I propose that the more highly

individuals value community involvement, the more likely they are to use reflexive and active strategies in response to perceived injustice.

> *Hypothesis 28*: The extent to which individuals value community involvement is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.

Belief in a Just World

As stated earlier, people are highly motivated to maintain belief in a just world. Such a belief allows individuals to make sense of the world, and rationalize that there is a reason for why bad things sometimes happen to good people. Consequently, individuals may be willing to ignore unjust situations that challenge their belief in a just world. Individuals who strongly believe in a just world may resort to victim derogation, which entails blaming the victim for having "caused" the injustice by engaging in wrongful behavior. When victim derogation occurs, it makes the injustice "disappear" and removes the need to use reflexive and active strategies. Thus:

> *Hypothesis 29*: Belief in a just world is negatively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.

CHAPTER 5: METHODS

Overview

Hypotheses in this study were tested using survey responses. The survey (Appendix A) was comprised of questions that fell into three distinct categories: demographic information; childhood socialization; and personal values, beliefs, and experiences. The survey also asked a series of questions to measure the social value orientation of participants. Additionally, participants were asked to read and respond to two vignettes describing socially unjust scenarios. The survey was electronically administered via the internet, and took about 20-25 minutes to complete.

Recruitment

As described earlier, participants in this study were American Jewish adults over the age of 24. Initial recruitment for this study was through rabbis from synagogues in the greater Atlanta area. In total, rabbis from 19 Reform, Conservative, Reconstructionist, and Orthodox synagogues were contacted. Of these synagogues, one agreed to make an announcement to the congregation during Shabbat services; one agreed to put flyers out for congregants to pick up; and four agreed to include a link to my study with their congregation's electronic newsletter/listserv.

This strategy did not produce enough participants, and it became necessary to broaden the method of recruitment. Consequently, an electronic link to the survey was sent out using listservs and individual email addresses. In addition to the four synagogues mentioned above, an organization for Jewish young adults living in Atlanta agreed to include electronic survey link on a constituent listserv. A snowball sample was used to recruit the remainder of the participants. Emails were sent to Jewish

acquaintances, family, and friends, with a request to forward an electronic link to the survey to any individuals eligible to participate (American Jewish adults, aged 24 or older). The majority of the individuals who were asked to distribute the online survey currently live in Washington State. Given that the survey dispersal began in the state of Georgia and continued through contacts in Washington, survey participants are predominantly from these two states. The unintended consequence of using two different recruitment strategies, however, was that the survey was distributed far more widely than initially anticipated. Individuals living in 25 states filled out the survey.

Qualtrics, the online survey software used to produce and distribute the survey, was made available through Emory University. Qualtrics allows users to create electronic questionnaires and to distribute them in a number of ways. For this study, an electronic link was created to the survey. The link was then posted on listservs and emailed to potential participants. The link allowed anyone who received it to access the survey online. Additionally, the link could be forwarded to others. The link was imbedded in a short message (posted on a listserv or written in the body of an email) that contained a brief description of the study and an invitation to participate. The message explained who was eligible to participate, and gave the PI's contact information so that individuals could request more information. Because participants received the link via the internet, they were able to complete the survey online, at their own convenience. The survey was left open for about two months, which gave them ample time and opportunity to complete the survey.

After receiving this message via listserv or email, participants clicked on the link, which opened an introductory page. This page contained an informed consent form, with

all required information required for the protection of human research subjects (see Appendix A). Participants were asked to read the informed consent form, and to give their consent by moving to the next page in the survey. Participants moved from page to page using arrows at the bottom of the screen. They were also able to go back through the survey to review or change answers if they chose. At the end of the survey, participants were thanked for their help. They were also asked to give contact information if interested in participating in a follow-up interview. The contact information was removed from other data prior to data analysis.

Qualtrics recorded all survey responses. These responses were then downloaded into STATA for statistical analysis. Data were labeled, organized, and analyzed in STATA. In compliance with regulations regarding human research protections, the data in both Qualtrics and STATA is password-protected, and can only be accessed by the PI.

Vignettes: Measuring Responses to Social Injustices

In this study, vignettes were used to assess how social value orientation, alone and in conjunction with other factors, affects anticipated responses to unfair situations. Two vignettes were included in the survey. The first described an unjust scenario related to the environment, and the second described an unjust scenario related to unequal access to healthcare. I chose to include two vignettes, rather than just one, in order to ascertain whether perceptions of and responses to injustice remain consistent across different social contexts. It was also my intention to create vignettes about situations that were severely unfair in order to ensure that study participants perceived them as such. This study began with the premise that social value orientation and other individual level factors would affect the responses of individuals who already perceived a situation to be unfair. Thus,

vignettes described situations that were clearly unjust. Finally, I tried to create vignettes where it was clear that the participant (i.e. the "observer") would not materially benefit in any way by responding to the situation. Although the participant might receive non-material rewards such as feeling good or fulfilling moral obligations, he/she would not be directly affected by the outcome of the situation. Thus, participants could choose reflexive or active strategies when faced with a situation where they had something to lose (i.e. time, energy, money) and very little to gain. Without the promise of a reward, how many would redress injustice on behalf of others?

The environmental injustice vignette was included in because several studies on social value orientation utilize environmental social dilemmas (Beggan, Messick, and Allison 1988; Joireman et al. 2004; Liebrand 1984; Van Vugt 1997; Van Vugt, Van Lange, and Meertens 1996). Additonally, Roch and Samuelson (1997) explain, "Uncertainty regarding the environment has been described as one of the defining features of life in organizations" (p. 222; see also Northcraft and Neal 1994). The following wording was used in the environmental injustice vignette:

> The city in which you live has a wonderful public transportation system. Buses run all over the city on a regular basis, so it is easy to catch one and get where you're going. You do not use the public transportation system very often because you work from home, but the few times you have used it you have found it convenient.
>
> The majority of the city's buses make a stop at Delancy Station. Delancy Station is centrally located, and most people who use the bus system have to travel through there during the day. It is a prime transfer spot. Buses constantly arrive to drop people off and pick them up.
>
> You do not live near Delancy Station, but last week you read a newspaper article about a serious problem experienced by people in the station's surrounding neighborhoods. The article said that buses stopping at Delancy Station tend to idle their engines while waiting for passengers,

> filling the air with gas fumes. As a result, there are extremely high levels of pollution in the local neighborhoods. In fact, pollution levels are so high that residents are beginning to get sick. Asthma rates in neighborhoods near Delancy Station are twice as high as the national average, and there is some evidence that the pollution may also be causing lung cancer among local residents.

The healthcare vignette was included because access to quality health care is an issue that has received much attention in the United States over the last couple of decades, and is a societal concern to which participants were likely to relate (Blendon et al. 2006). The vignette read:

> This morning on the news, you heard a story about a hospital several counties away from where you live. The news report stated that this hospital has been having serious problems. It is short-staffed and short on rooms, and thus has not been able to meet the needs of all its patients.
>
> Faced with too many patients, the hospital decided not to help anyone whose insurance does not cover the procedure that they need, regardless of what procedure it is. As of last week, patients without complete insurance coverage were turned away and forced to go to another hospital.
>
> As a result of this decision, two people were turned away from the hospital and died before they were able to get proper attention. Nevertheless, the hospital continues to stand by their decision to accept only patients whose insurance covers their procedures.

Participants answered questions pertaining to their perceptions of and anticipated responses to the injustices described in the vignettes. They were asked to indicate how severely unfair they perceive the situations to be on a nine point scale, with 1 indicating "very unfair" and 9 indicating "very fair". Initial analysis revealed that participants did indeed perceive the vignettes to be extremely unfair. The mean for the bus depot vignette was 2.38, and the mean for the hospital vignette was 2.31. Thus, this study achieved its goal of examining the responses of observers who already perceived a given situation to be unfair.

Participants were asked how likely they were to respond to the situation by engaging in any of the following behaviors: volunteering for a social justice organization, donating money to a social justice organization, attending a protest, writing a letter to a newspaper, writing a letter to a political representative, voting, staying informed by reading a newspaper paper/listening to radio/watching the news, talking about the situation with friends, or doing nothing. Participants answered on a scale of 1 (not at all likely) to 9 (extremely likely).

Reflexive and Active Strategies

As stated previously, the strategies described above were conceptualized as "reflexive" or "active". Reflexive responses included voting, staying informed about the situation, and talking about the situation with others. Active responses included volunteering, attending a protest, sending a letter to a political representative or newspaper, and donating money to an organization. Prior to creating these categories, I conducted a factor analysis on the items and found that they loaded on two factors.[8] I reasoned that the strategies that clustered together on the first factor involved few personal costs and would require little commitment on the part of an observer, while the variables that clustered on the second factor involved higher personal costs and called for a more active commitment to social change. Consequently, I created "reflexive" and "active" scales by adding and averaging each set of variables.[9] These scales were used in final analyses. Because participants were asked to respond to questions relevant to two

[8] "Staying informed" was uncorrelated with the other variables in the factor analysis for the hospital vignette, but loaded on the second factor with voting and discussing the situation with others for the bus vignette. I chose to include it in the low commitment category because it did load together in one scenario.
[9] I conducted preliminary regressions to compare the predictive power of individual items versus the low reflexive and active scales. The scales had more predictive power, and thus were used instead of the individual items.

different vignettes, four scales were included in this study: reflexive (α=0.739) and active (α= 0.8449) scales for the hospital scenario, and reflexive (α= 0.7608) and active (α= 0.8487) scales for the bus scenario.[10]

Survey Measures

Social Value Orientation

The social value orientation of participants was measured using a short-item list. A Decomposed Game procedure, as described by Liebrand (1984) shaped the list.[11] According to this procedure, participants are presented with different combinations of outcomes, expressed as a distribution of points. Participants choose between a distribution of points that would a) maximize their own outcomes, b) maximize joint outcomes, or c) maximize the difference between their own and the other's outcome. In this study, participants were initially described as cooperative, individualistic, or competitive if six out of nine of their answers reflected a desire to divide the money in one of these three specific ways. This method of measuring social value orientation has been used in a number of studies (see Liebrand 1984; Liebrand and Van Run 1985; Liebrand et al. 1986; Sattler and Kerr 1991; Van Lange and Kuhlman; Van Vugt 1997) and has been shown to have high internal validity (Van Run 1985; Van Vugt 1997). In addition, it does not appear to elicit socially desirable responses (Joireman et al. 2004; Van Vugt 1997).

Social value orientation distributions were similar to those found in past studies (see Van Lange et al. 1997; Van Lange et al. 2007). The vast majority of participants

[10] A summary of means and standard deviations for response strategies can be found in Appendix D, and reliability values for these scales can be found in Appendix E.

[11] Special thanks to Dr. Mark Van Vugt, Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Kent at Canterbury, for sharing the measure used in his study. The measure was replicated in this study.

(60%) were categorized as "cooperative" (n=143). The categories of "competitive" (5%, n=11) and "individualistic" (18%, n=43) were much smaller. One possible explanation for this finding comes from Iedema and Poppe (1994), who suggest that individuals who display cooperative behavior make stronger positive impressions on others than those who engage in individualistic or competitive behaviors. By exhibiting a prosocial orientation, individuals engage in a form of impression management. Similarly, Maki, Thorngate, and McClintock (1979) maintain that people perceive others who make competitive or individualistic decisions to be more selfish, bad, and unfriendly than others who make altruistic or cooperative decisions. Prosocials have been evaluated as more moral than proselfs (Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, and Suhre 1986) and as more just and fair (Liebrand et al. 1986). Thus, in order to ensure that others think well of them, people may work to develop a cooperative value orientation.

Given the disproportionate number of cooperative individuals, social value orientation was collapsed into two variables for the purposes of this study. Cooperative participants were labeled as "prosocial", and competitive and independent participants were labeled as "proself". This method of collapsing categories is commonly used in social value orientation research (see Joireman et al. 2004; Kramer et al. 1986; Van Lange and Liebrand 1991). Using the new social value orientations variables, 60% (n=143) of participants were prosocial, while 23% were proself (n=54). Seventeen percent of the participants (n=39) could not be categorized as proself or prosocial, according to the rules described above to establish social value orientation.[12]

[12] In order to further capture the extent to which participants held prosocial or proself values, a second set of measures was created. These measures were drawn from several studies: Earley's (1994), Erez and Earley (1987), and Eagly and Steffen's (1986). Analysis of these measures showed that they had weaker

The prosocial variable was coded as "0=other, 1=prosocial". For the prosocial variable, "other" included any participant who was proself or who could not be categorized as prosocial or proself according to the guidelines used to establish social value orientation in this study (see description above). The proself variable was coded as "0=other, 1=proself", where "other" included any participant who was either prosocial or neither proself nor prosocial.

Analysis in this study provided a comparison of prosocials versus non-prosocials and proselfs versus non-proselfs . (Non-prosocials were people who were proself or who could not be categorized; non-proselfs were people who were prosocial or who could not be categorized.)

Social Value Orientation Antecedents/Factors that Impact Responses to Injustice

To assess which factors affect both social value orientation and responses to injustice, a number of questions were asked to gain information about participants' personal characteristics and background experiences. As stated earlier, these variables were conceptualized as belonging in three categories: demographics; childhood socialization; and personal values, beliefs, and experiences.

There were too many variables in this study to include all in one regression model. Consequently, I used these categories to sort variables into models that focused on demographic characteristics (age, gender, adult synagogue attendance, education, employment, current income, parents' income during childhood); factors related to childhood socialization (cooperative family values, independent family values, parental community involvement during childhood, parental encouragement of community

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predictive power than the social value orientation measures. Consequently, these factors were not used in the final analysis for this paper. These measures can, however, be found in Appendix B.

involvement, childhood synagogue attendance); or factors related to values, beliefs, and experiences (political ideology, past experience of injustice, empathy, belief that actions will change an unjust situation, belief that others will try to help improve an unfair situation, and belief in a just world). Below is a description of these variables and how they were coded.

Demographics

Participants were asked to answer a number of questions about their background and personal characteristics. The following variables were included in final analysis: gender (0=male, 1=female), age (0=no age given, 1=24-34 years of age, 2=35-54 years of age, 3=55+ years of age)[13], marital status (1=single, 2=married, 3=divorced, 4=widowed), total number of children (1=none, 2=one to two, 3=three to four), number of children living at home (1=none, 2=one to three), current rate of synagogue attendance (1=never to three times/year, 2=four to six times/year, 3=one to two times/month, 4=more than two times/month), education (1=high school through college, some post-college, 3=graduate degree), employment status (1=full-time, 2=part-time, 3=unemployed), total household income (1=$70,000 or less, 2=$71,000-100,000, 3=$101,000-150,000, 4=$151+), parents' income during their childhood (1=$36,000 or less, 2=$37,000-70,000, 3=$71,000-$150,000, 3=$151+).

Childhood Socialization

Five variables were used to test the effect of childhood socialization on social value orientation and responses to injustice: family cooperative values, family independent values, parental community involvement, parental encouragement of

[13] Age was coded in continuous categories because certain ages were overrepresented. In the variable used in final analyses, each of the age categories includes at least 15% of the sample.

community involvement, and childhood synagogue attendance. Descriptions of these variables are given below.

Family Cooperative/Independent Values. The family cooperative/independent variables measured whether participants' parents had placed an emphasis on helping others or on refraining from interfering in the lives of others. The following questions were adapted from Perry's (1997) public service motivation (PSM) measure of prosocial family socialization. Participants responded to these questions using a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale.

1. My parents rarely donated money to charitable causes.
2. In my family, we always helped one another.
3. Concerning strangers experiencing distress, my parents generally thought it was more important "not to get involved."
4. My parents frequently discussed moral values with me (values like the "Golden Rule", etc.)
5. When I was growing up, my parents told me I should be willing to "lend a helping hand."

A factor analysis of these five items indicated that they clustered in two distinct categories. One set of items described "independent" actions (i.e. refraining from donating to charitable causes, not getting involved with others' problems), while the second set of items described "cooperative" actions (i.e. helping other family members, discussing moral values, being willing to lend a helping hand). Consequently, items 1 and 3 were combined into a scale that became the "family independent values" variable (α=0.4667), while items 2, 4, and 5 were combined in a scale that became the "family cooperative values" variable (α=0.7142).[14]

[14] In order to gain a more complete picture of how certain factors affected social value orientation and responses to injustice, a number of scales were created and used in this study. These scales were composites of various items from the questionnaire. To create the scales, factor analysis was conducted on

Parental Community Involvement. The parental community involvement variable was included as an indicator of the extent to which participants' parents modeled community-oriented, prosocial behavioral. The following questions were asked on the survey and used to create this variable. Participants answered on a 1 (not at all) to 9 (quite a lot) scale.

1. When you were growing up, to what extent were your parents involved in religious activities in the Jewish community?
2. When you were growing up, to what extent were your parents involved in social activities in the Jewish community?
3. When you were growing up, to what extent were your parents involved in community service activities in general?
4. When you were growing up, to what extent were your parents politically active?

Factor analysis revealed that items one through three loaded together on one factor, but item four (about political activism) was marginal. Consequently, the first three items were combined in a scale, which was used in final analyses (α=0.7941).

Parental Encouragement of Community Involvement. A set of questions was used to assess the extent to which participants' parents not only modeled certain behaviors, but also encouraged their child (the participant) to be active in the Jewish community and the community at large. These questions were used to measure the extent to which individuals' parents valued community involvement and spoke to their children about it. Participants were asked to answer the following question using a 1 (not important) to 9 (very important) scale:

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sets of items used to measure specific factors (i.e. ideologies, personal values, parental values). Variables that loaded on one factor were added together then averaged to create the scale. I then ran a set of regressions with the scales, and a second set of regressions with each of the individual items from the scales. Results indicated that the scales had more predictive power than the individual variables. Accordingly, the scales, rather than individual items, were used in the final analyses.

When you were growing up, to what extent did your parents encourage you to do the following?

1. Attend synagogue
2. Attend social events in the Jewish community
3. Do community service
4. Volunteer for organizations working to reduce injustice.
5. Give tzedakah
6. Try to relieve others' suffering
7. Be politically active

Six out of seven of these items loaded together on one of two factors. Consequently, two scales were created: the religious community participation scale, and the non-religious community participation scale. The religious community involvement scale was comprised of two items (attending synagogue, attending Jewish social activities), the other was comprised of four items (doing community service, volunteering for organizations, trying to relieve others' suffering, being politically active). Giving tzedakah was not correlated with either set of the other variables, perhaps because individuals may consider it to be compulsory (rather than voluntary) like the other activities.

Preliminary analysis indicated that the religious involvement scale had little impact on responses to injustice or social value orientation, but the non-religious community involvement scale had a great deal of predictive power. As there was no theoretical reason for including both scales in the study, only the non-religious community involvement scale was used in the final analysis (α=0.8382).

Childhood Synagogue Attendance. To measure the effect of childhood synagogue attendance on responses to injustice, participants were asked to indicate how often they attended synagogue as a child (0 to 3 times/year, 4 to 6 times/ year, 1 to 2 times/month, more than 2 times/month).

Personal Values, Beliefs, and Experiences

This survey collected information on the personal values, and beliefs, and experiences of study participants. The following variables were included in final analyses: political ideology; interest in current events; belief in the importance of community involvement; past experiences with injustice; empathy; belief that one's actions can change an unfair situation; belief that others will try and help to improve an unfair situation; and belief in a just world.

Political Ideology. Participants were asked to describe themselves as in terms of their political beliefs: 1=very liberal, 2=liberal, 3=moderate/middle of the road, 4=conservative, or 5=very conservative. The survey only allowed participants to choose one of these categories. In addition to directly testing political ideology, a measure was added in to examine participants' interest in current events. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that they are interested in current events on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale.

Adult Community Involvement Values. The questions used to measures the extent to which individuals' parents valued community involvement were also used to measure the extent to which participants themselves value community involvement. Participants were asked to respond to the following questions using a 1 (not at all important) to 9 (very important) scale.

As an adult, how important is it to you to do the following?

1. Attend synagogue
2. Attend social events in the Jewish community
3. Do community service
4. Volunteer for organizations working to reduce injustice.
5. Give tzedakah

6. Try to relieve others' suffering
7. Be politically active

To maintain consistency, two scales were created here as well: the religious community participation scale, and the non-religious community participation scale. As early analysis indicated that the religious involvement scale had little impact on responses to injustice or social value orientation (and there was no theoretical reason to include it), only the non-religious community involvement scale was used in the final analysis (α=0.8199).

Past Experience with Injustice. One hypothesis in this study maintains that past experience with social injustice is likely to affect how individuals respond to observed injustice. In order to test this hypothesis, participants were asked to indicate whether or not they had ever experienced an injustice similar to one of the injustices described in the vignettes. After reading the vignette describing the health-care related injustice, participants were asked, "In the past, has your health insurance ever made it difficult for you to get health care?" After reading the vignette describing the environment-related injustice, participants were asked: "Have you ever personally experienced a situation similar to this in the past?" Participants answered either "no" (0) or "yes" (1) to each of these questions.

Empathy. To test whether empathy affects responses to injustice, participants were asked to respond to indicate, on a 1 to 9 scale, the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the following statements, taken from Schieman, Scott, and Van Gundy's (2000) study.

1. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.
2. Other people's sorrows do not usually disturb me a great deal.
3. I am usually aware of the feelings of other people.
4. I feel that other people ought to take care of their problems themselves.
5. Many times I have felt so close to someone else's difficulties that they seemed as if they were my own.

Factor analysis showed that these items loaded together on two factors. Two scales were created. The "positive empathy" scale was comprised of two factors (usually aware of the feelings of other people, have felt so close to someone else's difficulties that they seemed personal), while the "negative empathy" scale was comprised of the remaining factors (I don't feel sorry for other people who have problems, other people's sorrows do not disturb me, other people should take care of their own problems). The two scales were closely correlated; consequently, only one could be used in the final analysis. Preliminary analysis revealed that the positive empathy scale had little predictive power, but the negative empathy scale did have such power. Thus, the negative empathy scale was used in the final analysis (α=0.7349).

Action and Social Change. In order to ascertain whether participants believed that their anticipated responses would make a difference, they were asked "How likely do you think it is that your actions will make a difference in getting the hospital to change its policy?" (for the hospital scenario), and "How likely do you think it is that your actions will make a difference in reducing pollution at Delancy Station?" (for the bus scenario). Participants answered both questions on a 1 (not at all likely) to 9 (extremely likely) scale.

Anticipation of Help from Others. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they anticipated help from other in redressing the injustices described in the

vignettes. After reading about the unjust situation at the hospital, participants were asked, "How likely do you think it is that other people will also try to get the hospital to change its policy?" After reading about the injustice at Delancy Station, participants were asked, "How likely do you think it is that other people will also try to reduce pollution at Delancy Station?" Participants answered both questions on a 1 (not at all likely) to 9 (extremely likely) scale.

Belief in a Just World. To measure the extent to which they believe that the world is just, participants were asked to respond, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale, to the following statements.

1. In life, people generally get what they deserve.
2. Free health care should be given to those who cannot afford it.
3. We live in a just world.
4. Suffering in life is rewarded in the afterlife.
5. Even people who suffer from severe misfortune can expect that, in the end, something good will happen to balance everything out.
6. People are responsible for their own life situations.

Factor analysis revealed that these items clung together on two factors. Three items loaded on the first factor: "In life, people generally get what they deserve"; "Free health care should be given to those who cannot afford it"; and "People are responsible for their own life situations". Two items loaded on the second factor: "Suffering in life is rewarded in the afterlife"; and "Even people who suffer from severe misfortune can expect that, in the end, something good will happen to balance everything out". A final item, "We live in a just world", did not load on either factor.

The items loaded on the first factor were conceptualized as attitudes about how people should live/society should function. These variables describe behaviors that are within human control – i.e. helping others, acting responsibly, accepting consequences.

The second factor was conceptualized as describing attitudes about things that are beyond human control – i.e. fate and the afterlife. The last variable simply describes the world as it is, without making a statement about expectations for human behavior or otherworldly rewards.

Two scales were created: one from the items that loaded on the first factor, and one from the items that loaded on the second factor. These scales were highly correlated, and thus could not be used together in regressions. I chose to use the first scale – which captured attitudes about how people should live/society should function – as it produced regressions with the clearest results (α=0.5248).

Data Analysis

The primary method used to examine data was regression analysis. Ordinary least square (OLS) regression was used to analyze the effect of social value orientation and other factors on anticipated use of strategies. Logistic regression was used to analyze the effect of social antecedent factors on social value orientation. Prior to conducting the OLS and logistic regressions, variables were closely examined in order to make certain that outliers did not distort results. To avoid problems caused by heteroscedasticity and to ensure a normal distribution, all of the continuous variables in this study with too few cases in a category (i.e. less than 15 percent of total cases) were reorded so that each new category was comprised of a minimum of 15 percent of the total responses. Past research indicates that such reordering creates greater accuracy of results (see Meyers, Gamst, and Guarino 2006).

CHAPTER 6: RESULTS

Characterizing the Respondents

The sample size for this study was 237.[15] Sixty-eight percent of study participants (n=158) were female, while 32 percent were male (n=74). All participants were over the age of 24.

Family Composition

Sixty-seven percent of participants reported that they were married (n=156), 22 percent were single (n=50), 7 percent were divorced (n=16), and 4 percent were widowed (n=10). Thirty-seven percent of participants did not have children (n=88), 47 percent had 1-2 children (n=111), and 16 percent had 3-4 children (n=37). Of this group, 22 percent had children living at home (n=52), and 78 percent did not have children living at home (n=184).

Socioeconomic Status

Forty-seven percent of participants had a graduate degree, 20 percent had received some post-college education, and 33 percent had a high school and/or college degree. Fewer than one percent had a high school degree or less. Of the participants, 60 percent (n=140) indicated that they are employed full time, 19 percent (n=45) are employed part-time, and 21 percent (n=48) are unemployed. Because such a large portion of the respondents were over the age of 55 (43 percent), it is possible that a large number of participants who indicated that they are unemployed are actually retired.

[15] The decision was made to include only U.S. citizens in the sample, in order to ensure that study participants shared common cultural understanding. Because only U.S. citizens were included in this study, it is likely that participants had similar expectations regarding just outcomes. Also, cases were also dropped if only a few of the questions on the survey were answered.

Roughly 29 percent of participants (n=64) listed their household income (from all sources, before taxes) as $70,000 or less. Twenty percent (n=44) indicated an income between $71,000 and $100,000, 21 percent (n=47) indicated income between $101,000 and $150,000, and 31 percent (n=69) indicated income over $151,000.

Religious Identity

Fifty percent of the participants identified themselves as Conservative (n=117), 33 percent were Reform (n=76), four percent were Reconstructionist (n=10), and three percent were Orthodox (n=7). Additionally, a number of people (10 percent, n=23) indicated that they did not identify with any of these categories. Thirty percent of participants (n=70) said that they attend synagogue three times a year or less, 27 percent (n=63) attend four to six times a year, 21 percent (n=48) attend one to two times a month, and 23 percent (n=53) attend more than two times per month.

The American Jewish Committee's 2008 Annual Survey of American Jewish Opinion found that 28 percent of Jews identify as Conservative, 30 percent are Reform, one percent are Reconstructionist, eight percent are Orthodox, and 31 percent identify as "just Jewish" (www.ajc.org). Thus, Conservative Jews were overrepresented in this study's sample and individuals who do not identify with a particular sect were slightly underrepresented. Percentages of people identifying with the other types of Judaism, however, were very close (within 5 percent) to those found by the AJC Annual survey.

Political Ideology

Fifteen percent of participants (n=35) identified themselves as very liberal, 41 percent (n=95) identified as liberal, 35 percent (n=82) identified as moderate, and 9

percent identified as conservative. Although participants were given the option of identifying themselves as "very conservative", none chose to do so.

The 1992-2001 Gallup Polls found that 33 percent of Jews identify as liberal, 40 percent identify as moderate, and 23 percent identify as conservative (Newport and Caroll 2002, www.gallup.com). The 2008 AJS Annual Survey of American Jewish Opinion found that 44 percent of Jews identify as extremely liberal, liberal, or slightly liberal; 30 percent identify as moderate, middle of the road; and 24 percent identify as slightly conservative, conservative, or extremely conservative (www.ajc.org). Thus, participants from this study were, on average, more liberal and less conservative than participants in the Gallup Poll and AJC Annual Survey, but the number of individuals who identified as "moderate" was roughly the same in all three studies.

Social Value Orientation

As stated earlier, 61 percent (n=143) of participants were prosocial, and 23 percent were proself (n=54). The remainder of the participants (n=39, 16 percent) could not be categorized as proself or prosocial according to the social value orientation guidelines used in this study (see previous chapter). The prosocial/proself distribution is similar to distributions found in previous studies (Van Lange et al. 1997; Van Lange et al. 2007).

Survey and Vignette Comprehension

In order to determine whether the survey was effective, the following questions were asked at the conclusion of the survey: "How easy or difficult was it for you to understand the two scenarios described in Sections 1 and 2?" (1=very difficult, 9=very easy); "How involved did you feel while imaging yourself as a witness to the scenarios?"

(1=not at all involved, 9=very involved); "Having taken the role of a witness to the scenarios described, how realistic do you think your responses to the questionnaire were?" (1=very unrealistic, 9=very realistic), and "How confident are you that your responses to the questionnaire reflect what you would be likely to perceive and how you would behave in such a situation?" (1=not at all confident, 9=very confident).

Participants indicated that the survey was very easy to understand (mean=8.26). They felt somewhat involved imaging themselves as a witness in the scenarios (mean=5.24), and thought that their responses were very realistic (mean=7.39). Most also felt confident that their answers accurately reflected how they would actually behave if actually faced with a similar injustice (mean=7.39).

Results

In the following section, I outline the results of data analysis conducted for this study, reporting findings in the following order: social value orientation antecedents; social value orientation and perceptions of injustice; the effect of perceptions of injustice on responses to injustice; and the effects of social value orientation and social antecedents on responses to injustice.[16]

Social Value Orientation Antecedents

The first set of hypotheses (1-10) proposed in the methods section addressed various factors that may influence social value orientation. Unexpectedly, little support was found for these hypotheses (see Table 1).

[16] A brief summary of results can be found in Appendix C.

Table 1. Logistical Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Analyses of Social Antecedents on Social Value Orientation[17]

	Prosocial SVO Antecedents			**Proself SVO Antecedents**		
	I	**II**	**III**	**IV**	**V**	**VI**
Demographics						
Age	-0.189 (0.214)	…	…	-0.029 (0.249)	…	…
Gender	0.035 (0.325)	…	…	-0.529 (0.367)	…	…
Adult Synagogue Attendance	-0.039 (0.131)	…	…	-0.110 (0.153)	…	…
Education	0.286 (0.167)	…	…	-0.448* (0.194)	…	…
Employment	-0.075 (0.194)	…	…	0.019 (0.232)	…	…
Adult Income	0.138 (0.131)	…	…	0.114 (0.157)	…	…
Parents' Income During Childhood	-0.376* (0.170)	…	…	0.439* (0.196)	…	…
Childhood Socialization						
Prosocial Values	…	0.216 (0.177)	…	…	-0.214 (0.200)	…
Proself Values	…	0.091 (0.185)	…	…	0.073 (0.208)	…
Parental Community Involvement During Childhood	…	-0.077 (0.192)	…	…	0.221 (0.217)	…
Parental Encouragement of Community Involvement	…	-0.083 (0.185)	…	…	0.130 (0.209)	…
Childhood Synagogue Attendance	…	0.074 (0.148)	…	…	0.014 (0.167)	…
Personal Values, Beliefs, and Experiences						
Political Ideology	…	…	-0.104 (0.168)	…	…	0.015 (0.188)
Belief in a Just World	…	…	-0.333 (0.221)	…	…	0.658** (0.254)
Psuedo R^2	0.035	0.007	0.010	0.066	0.011	0.029
Number of Cases	215	214	218	215	214	218

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p< .05; ** p<=.01; ***p<.001

[17]Different regression models were used to analyze the prosocial and proself variables (see Chapter 5 for a description of how the social value orientation variables were coded). Consequently, tables in this chapter display the results of prosocial and proself regression models in separate columns.

Most of the individual level factors tested here did not have a significant effect on social value orientation. Partial support, however, was found for Hypothesis 10. Belief in a just world did not have an impact on prosocial value orientation, but it was positively related to proself value orientation (0.658, $p<.01$). Strongly believing in a just world significantly increased the likelihood of having a proself orientation, and decreased the likelihood of having a prosocial value orientation (although not to a significant degree). This suggests that strong belief in a just world contributes to the development of a proself value orientation; but weak belief in a just world does not necessarily mean that an individual will develop a prosocial value orientation.

Additionally, there were two findings related to income and education. The income that participants' parents earned during their childhood had an effect on both prosocial and proself value orientation. Prosocial value orientation was negatively related to parental income (þ=-0.376, $p<=.05$), and proself value orientation was positively related to parental income (0.493, $p<.05$). Thus, social value orientation is related to wealth. As family wealth increases, so does the likelihood that a child will develop a proself value orientation; as it decreases, so does the likelihood that a child will develop a prosocial value orientation.

Education did not significantly affect prosocial value orientation, but its effect was in the predicted direction: As education increased, so did the likelihood of having a prosocial value orientation. Education also had a significant, negative effect on proself

value orientation (þ=-0.448, p<.05). As education level increases, the likelihood of having a proself value orientation decreases.[18]

Social Value Orientation and Perceptions of Injustice

Some support was found for Hypothesis 11, which states that prosocials will perceive an unjust situation to be more severely unfair than proself individuals. Prosocials and proselfs had similar perceptions of injustice. For the bus scenario, mean perceptions were 2.27 for prosocials and 2.62 for proselfs. For the hospital scenario, mean perceptions were 2.18 for prosocials and 2.35 for proselfs. Clearly, both prosocials and proselfs perceived the injustices described in the vignettes to be very unfair. A ttest revealed that the difference between prosocials' and proselfs' perceptions was not significant for the hospital scenario, but was significant for the bus scenario. The mean for prosocials was significantly smaller (p<.05), indicating that prosocials saw the bus scenario as significantly more unfair than proselfs. The same was not true for the hospital scenario.

The ttest just described examined the difference in between prosocials and proselfs' mean perceptions. Regression results, on the other hand, examined the difference between prosocials and "others" (i.e. proselfs and individuals who were neither proself nor prosocial), as well as the difference between proselfs and "others" (i.e. prosocials and individuals who were neither proself nor prosocial). Regression results indicate that prosocial value orientation significantly decreases perceptions of injustice: prosocials saw the hospital (þ=-0.376) and bus (þ=-0.328) scenarios as more severely unfair (p<.05) than "others" (see Table 2). Being proself did increase perceptions of

[18] Education, parents' income, and belief in a just world were the only three variables significantly correlated with social value orientation.

justice, but this increase was not significant. In this study there were far more prosocial participants than proselfs and individuals who could not be categorized, which may account for why the results were significant for prosocials but not for proselfs.

Table 2. Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Analyses of the Effect of Social Value Orientation on Perceptions of Justice

	Perceptions of Justice Based on SVO			
	Prosocial		**Proself**	
	I Hospital	**II Bus**	**III Hospital**	**IV Bus**
Social Value Orientation	-0.376* (0.177)	-0.328* (0.162)	0.059 (0.195)	0.332 (0.175)
R^2	0.021	0.020	0.000	0.017
Number of Cases	211	208	211	208

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001

Effect of Perceptions on Responses to Injustice

Hypothesis 12, "Perceived severity of a social injustice is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies," was supported (see Table 3).

Table 3. Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Analyses of the Effect of Perceptions of Injustice on Use of Reflexive or Active Strategies in Response to Observed Social Injustice

	Use of Strategies Based on Social Value Orientation and Other Factors			
	Reflexive Strategies		**Active Strategies**	
	I Hospital	**II Bus**	**III Hospital**	**IV Bus**
Fairness Perceptions	-0.151*** (0.038)	-0.261*** (0.043)	-0.273*** (0.038)	-0.136** (0.048)
R^2	0.071	0.153	0.201	0.039
Number of Cases	208	204	203	202

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p< .05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001

As perceived severity of injustice increases, so does anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.[19] This finding is consistent across all models, with one exception. Variables in the "personal beliefs, values, and experiences" category (see Table 4 below) reduce the significance of perceptions of injustice on anticipated responses to the bus

[19] Reflexive strategies are discussing the situation with others, staying informed about the situation, and voting. Active strategies are volunteering, attending a protest, sending a letter to a political representative or newspaper, and donating money to an organization.

scenario. This finding suggests that, depending on the nature of the injustice, perceptions may have less of an impact than other factors on anticipated responses.

Table 4. Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Analyses of the Effect of Perceptions of Injustice and Personal Values, Beliefs, and Experiences on Use of Reflexive or Active Strategies in Response to Observed Social Injustice

	Use of Strategies Based on Perceptions of Injustice and Personal Values, Beliefs, and Experiences			
	Reflexive Strategies		**Active Strategies**	
	I Hospital	**II Bus**	**III Hospital**	**IV Bus**
Perceptions of Injustice				
Fairness Perceptions	-0.088* (0.041)	-0.203*** (0.044)	-0.116** (0.038)	-0.030 (0.042)
Personal Values, Beliefs, and Experiences				
Political Ideology	-0.089 (0.057)	-0.137* (0.057)	-0.013 (0.053)	-0.021 (0.054)
Interest in Current Events	0.161** (0.053)	0.069 (0.054)	-0.001 (0.049)	-0.019 (0.052)
Past Experience with Injustice	0.281** (0.102)	0.223 (0.145)	-0.012 (0.094)	-0.009 (0.138)
Empathy	-0.123* (0.056)	-0.123* (0.054)	-0.080 (0.052)	-0.051 (0.052)
Belief that Action will Change the Unjust Situation	0.013 (0.050)	0.048 (0.034)	0.283*** (0.046)	0.310*** (0.033)
Belief that Others Will Try to Help Improve Unfair Situation	0.094 (0.064)	0.116** (0.044)	0.050 (0.059)	-0.067 (0.042)
Adult Belief in Community Involvement	0.078 (0.073)	0.134 (0.071)	0.195** (0.067)	0.289*** (0.068)
Belief in a Just World	0.047 (0.073)	-0.008 (0.072)	-0.010 (0.066)	0.006 (0.070)
R^2	0.259	0.3720	0.4349	0.490
Number of Cases	194	184	190	182

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p< .05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001

Effects of Social Value Orientation and Social Antecedents on Reponses to Injustice

Social Value Orientation

Hypotheses 13 and 14, which predicted the effect of social value orientation on use of reflexive and active strategies, were partially supported. Prosocial value orientation increases the likelihood that individuals anticipate use of reflexive strategies, but does not significantly affect active strategies (see Table 5). Proself value orientation

decreases the likelihood that individuals anticipate using reflexive strategies but, similarly, does not significantly affect active strategies. These findings are consistent across different models. They suggest that social value orientation has an impact on low cost responses to injustice, but that other factors matter more for higher cost responses to injustice.

Table 5. Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Analyses of the Effect of Social Value Orientation on Use of Reflexive or Active Strategies in Response to Observed Social Injustice

	Use of Strategies Based on Social Value Orientation							
	Prosocial SVO				**Proself SVO**			
	Reflexive Strategies		**Active Strategies**		**Reflexive Strategies**		**Active Strategies**	
	I Hospital	**II Bus**	**III Hospital**	**IV Bus**	**V Hospital**	**VI Bus**	**VII Hospital**	**VIII Bus**
SVO	0.368*** (0.099)	0.351*** (0.108)	0.131 (0.110	0.133 (0.114)	-0.351** (0.109)	-0.378*** (0.117)	-0.084 (0.120)	-0.144 (0.124)
R^2	0.062	0.049	0.007	0.007	0.047	0.049	0.002	0.007
# of Cases	211	206	206	204	211	206	206	204

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p< .05; ** p<.01; ***p<=.001

Demographics

Gender

Although Hypothesis 15 stated that women are more likely than men to anticipate using passive strategies, regression analysis produced mixed results regarding the effect of gender on responses to injustice. When perceptions of justice are excluded from the model, being female has a significant impact ($p<.05$) on anticipated use of reflexive strategies to the bus scenario, for both prosocials ($þ=0.270$) and proselfs ($þ=0.262$) (see Table 6).

Table 6. Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Analyses of Social Value Orientation and Demographics on Use of Reflexive or Active Strategies in Response to Observed Social Injustice

Use of Strategies Based on Social Value Orientation and Demographics								
	Prosocial SVO				**Proself SVO**			
	Reflexive Strategies		**Active Strategies**		**Reflexive Strategies**		**Active Strategies**	
	I Hospital	**II Bus**	**III Hospital**	**IV Bus**	**V Hospital**	**VI Bus**	**VII Hospital**	**VIII Bus**
SVO								
Prosocial/ Proself	0.283** (0.107)	0.326** (0.116)	0.075 (0.120)	0.216 (0.121)	-0.270* (0.119)	-0.343** (0.127)	0.072 (0.132)	-0.148 (0.133)
Demo-graphics								
Gender	0.186 (0.106)	0.270* (0.114)	-0.017 (0.119)	0.011 (0.121)	0.183 (0.107)	0.262* (0.114)	-0.012 (0.120)	0.012 (0.122)
Age	0.074 (0.082)	0.178* (0.089)	-0.097 (0.092)	0.087 (0.092)	0.068 (0.083)	0.178* (0.089)	-0.102 (0.092)	0.081 (0.093)
Marital Status	-0.050 (0.080)	-0.086 (0.086)	-0.038 (0.090)	-0.157 (0.089)	-0.072 (0.080)	-0.105 (0.086)	-0.040 (0.090)	-0.172 (0.090)
# of Kids Living at Home	0.140 (0.137)	0.110 (0.145)	-0.095 (0.154)	0.149 (0.154)	0.145 (0.138)	0.117 (0.145)	-0.086 (0.154)	0.155 (0.155)
Total # of Kids	-0.065 (0.102)	0.044 (0.110)	0.126 (0.114)	0.021 (0.114)	-0.044 (0.102)	0.057 (0.110)	0.131 (0.114)	0.037 (0.114)
Adult Synagogue Attendance	0.013 (0.045)	-0.010 (0.049)	0.037 (0.051)	0.103* (0.051)	0.007 (0.045)	-0.019 (0.049)	0.035 (0.050)	0.097 (0.051)
Education	0.111± (0.057)	0.135* (0.061)	0.191** (0.065)	0.110 (0.064)	0.105 (0.058)	0.125* (0.062)	0.203** (0.065)	0.108 (0.065)
Adult Income	-0.013 (0.046)	-0.073 (0.049)	-0.099 (0.052)	-0.201*** (0.051)	-0.005 (0.046)	-0.066 (0.049)	-0.100± (0.052)	-0.197*** (0.052)
Parents' Income	-0.071 (0.056)	0.042 (0.060)	-0.052 (0.063)	0.074 (0.063)	-0.071 (0.056)	0.044 (0.060)	-0.065 (0.063)	0.066 (0.063)
Employ-ment	-0.067 (0.065)	0.037 (0.069)	0.038 (0.073)	0.091 (0.074)	-0.070 (0.065)	0.028 (0.069)	0.035 (0.073)	0.086 (0.074)
R^2	0.112	0.141	0.076	0.142	0.103	0.139	0.076	0.132
# of Cases	194	189	189	187	194	189	189	187

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; ± p<.055, * p< .05; ** p<.01; ***p<.00

When perceptions of injustice are added in to the model, these effects disappear (see Table 7). Perceptions of justice appear to have more of an impact than gender on responses to injustice.[20]

[20] According to MacKinnon, Krull, and Lockwood (2000), three criteria can be used to establish a mediating relationship: the relationship between the independent and dependent variables is significant; the relationship between the independent and mediating variables is significant; and the mediator variable

Table 7. Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Analyses of the Effect of Perceptions of Injustice, Social Value Orientation, and Demographics on Use of Reflexive or Active Strategies in Response to Observed Social Injustice

	Use of Strategies Based on Perceptions of Injustice, Social Value Orientation, and Demographics							
	Prosocial SVO				**Proself SVO**			
	Reflexive Strategies		**Active Strategies**		**Reflexive Strategies**		**Active Strategies**	
	I Hospital	**II Bus**	**III Hospital**	**IV Bus**	**V Hospital**	**VI Bus**	**VII Hospital**	**VIII Bus**
Perceptions of Injustice								
Fairness Perceptions	-0.118** (0.040)	-0.218*** (0.046)	-0.262*** (0.042	-0.136** (0.050)	-0.131*** (0.040)	-0.221*** (0.046	-0.263*** (0.042)	-0.141** 0.050)
SVO								
Prosocial/ Proself	0.265* (0.106)	0.283* (0.110)	0.033 (0.110	0.188 (0.119)	-0.278* (0.116)	-0.313** (0.119)	0.038 (0.120)	-0.132 (0.131)
Demo-graphics								
Gender	0.195 (0.105)	0.190 (0.109)	0.006 (0.109)	-0.058 (0.121)	0.192 (0.105)	0.181 (0.109)	0.008 (0.109)	-0.059 (0.122)
Age	0.076 (0.083)	0.125 (0.084)	-0.083 (0.086)	0.053 (0.091)	0.067 (0.083)	0.125 (0.084)	-0.086 (0.086)	0.047 (0.092)
Marital Status	-0.037 (0.079)	-0.126 (0.082)	-0.029 (0.083)	-0.175* (0.088)	-0.060 (0.079)	-0.144 (0.081)	-0.029 (0.083)	-0.189* (0.088)
# of Kids Living at Home	0.202 (0.136)	0.184 (0.138)	0.019 (0.141)	0.185 (0.153)	0.211 (0.136)	0.191 (0.138)	0.024 (0.141)	0.193 (0.153)
Total # of Kids	-0.115 0.102)	0.013 (0.103)	0.008 (0.105)	0.003 (0.112)	-0.101 (0.102)	0.024 (0.103)	0.010 (0.105)	0.015 (0.113)
Adult Synagogue Attendance	0.010 (0.045)	0.002 (0.046)	0.043 (0.046)	0.110* (0.050)	0.007 (0.045)	-0.006 (0.046)	0.042 (0.046)	0.105* (0.051)
Education	0.076 (0.057)	0.104 (0.058)	0.114 (0.060)	0.099 (0.063)	0.064 (0.058)	0.092 (0.059)	0.119± (0.061)	0.096 (0.064)
Adult Income	0.010 (0.046)	-0.043 (0.047)	-0.060 (0.048)	-0.182*** (0.051)	0.021 (0.046)	-0.036 (0.047)	-0.060 (0.048)	-0.177*** (0.051)
Parents' Income	-0.067 (0.055)	0.011 (0.057)	-0.038 (0.058)	0.055 (0.062)	-0.066 (0.056)	0.014 (0.057)	-0.045 (0.058)	0.048 (0.062)
Employment	-0.066 (0.064)	0.056 (0.065)	0.042 (0.067)	0.107 (0.073)	-0.066 (0.064)	0.049 (0.065)	0.041 (0.067)	0.103 (0.073)
R^2	0.152	0.240	0.2411	0.179	0.149	0.242	0.2412	0.172
# of Cases	191	187	186	185	191	187	186	185

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; ± p< .055, * p< .05; ** p<.01; ***p<=.001

predicts (at a significant level) the outcome variable in a model with both the mediator and independent variables in it. A regression revealed that gender did not have a significant impact on perceptions of injustice in this study. Thus, perceptions of injustice do not mediate the relationship between gender and responses to injustice.

Age, Parental Status, Marital Status

No support was found for the Hypotheses 18 and 19, which address the effect of being a parent or being married on responses to injustice. But, the hypothesis that age increases anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies (Hypothesis 16) was partially supported. Age is positively related to anticipated use of reflexive strategies in response to the bus scenario (see Table 6). For both prosocials (β=0.178, $p<.05$) and proselfs (β=0.178, $p<.05$), as age increases, so does anticipated use of reflexive strategies in response to the environmental justice described in the bus scenario. These effects disappear when perceptions of injustice are added into the regression model (see Table 7). These results suggest that perceptions of injustice mediate the relationship between age and responses to injustice. One possible interpretation is that as individuals grow older, they gain more personal experience dealing with injustice and become more sensitive to it. When they witness injustice they perceive it to be severely unfair, and their anticipated use of certain strategies increases.

Religious Service Attendance

Partial support was found for the hypothesis that religious service attendance affects responses to injustice. A significant (β=0.103, $p<.05$) effect was found for religious service attendance (Hypothesis 19), but only for prosocials and the bus vignette (see Table 6). The more often prosocials attended religious services, the more likely they were to anticipate using active strategies in response the bus scenario. This suggests that religious service attendance impacts responses to certain types of injustices, but not others.

Employment, Education, and Income

Hypothesis 20, which stated that employment, education, and income are positively related to anticipated use of active strategies, was partially supported. Employment did not have a significant effect; education had a significant effect in the expected direction; and income had a significant effect, but not in the expected direction. In a model with only demographic variables (see Table 6), education has a positive, significant effect on use of reflexive strategies in response to the bus scenario and the use of active strategies in response to the hospital scenario, for both prosocials (reflexive/bus β=0.135, $p<.05$; active/hospital β=0.191, $p<.01$) and proselfs (reflexive/bus β=0.015, $p<.05$; active/hospital β=0.203, $p<.01$). Additionally, there was a marginal, positive effect on anticipated use of reflexive strategies in response to the hospital scenario (β=0.111, $p<.055$). Although education did not have a significant effect on all strategies, it did affect anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies in the predicted direction.

When perceptions of justice are added in to the model, however, these effects disappear and a marginal effect appears for proselfs' anticipated use of active strategies in response to the hospital scenario (see Table 7). A regression revealed that education has a significant impact on perceptions of justice (-.263, $p<.05$), suggesting that perceptions of justice are serving as a mediating variable between education and responses to injustice – suppressing the relationship in one case and making the relationship more significant in the other.[21]

[21] MacKinnon et al. (2002) posit that a mediating variable can have a "positive confounding" effect where it reduces the significance of the relationship between two variables or "negative confounding" effect where it increases the significance of the relationship between two variables.

Income, like education, affected responses to injustice. But, its influence was not in the predicted direction. Income has a significant, negative impact on anticipated use of active strategies in response to the bus scenario, for prosocials (-0.201, p<.001) and proselfs (-0.197, p<.001). It also had a marginal effect, for proselfs only, on anticipated use of active strategies in response to the hospital scenario (-0.100, p<.055) (see Table 6). When perceptions of justice are added in to the model the marginal effects disappear, but the other effects remain the same (see Table 7). The higher one's income, the less likely one is to anticipate using active strategies in response to the bus scenario. In this study, income did not facilitate responses to injustice.

Childhood Socialization

No support was found for the hypothesis about childhood religious service attendance (Hypothesis 22), but Hypothesis 21, regarding parental concern for the welfare of others, was partially supported. Parents' modeling behavior (i.e. actual involvement in the community) and conversations with their children about helping/not helping others did not have a significant effect. But, parental encouragement of childhood community involvement had a positive, significant effect on responses to the hospital and bus scenario in every regression model. Having parents who encouraged them to be involved in the community increased anticipated use of active strategies for both prosocials (hospital þ=0.128, p<.05; bus þ=0.178, p<.05) and proselfs (hospital þ=0.129, p<.05; þ=bus 0.178, p<.01) (see Table 8).

Table 8. Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Analyses of the Effect of Perceptions of Injustice, Social Value Orientation, and Childhood Socialization on Use of Reflexive or Active Strategies in Response to Observed Social Injustice

	Use of Strategies Based on Perceptions of Injustice, Social Value Orientation, and Childhood Socialization							
	Prosocials				**Proselfs**			
	Reflexive Strategies		**Active Strategies**		**Reflexive Strategies**		**Active Strategies**	
	I Hospital	**II Bus**	**III Hospital**	**IV Bus**	**V Hospital**	**VI Bus**	**VII Hospital**	**VIII Bus**
Perceptions of Injustice								
Fairness Perceptions	-0.124** (0.039)	-0.249*** (0.043)	-0.253*** (0.040)	-0.122* (0.049)	-0.139*** (0.039)	-0.250*** (0.043)	-0.255*** (0.039)	-0.121* (0.049)
SVO								
Prosocial/ Proself	0.379*** (0.101)	0.312** (0.102)	0.047 (0.103)	0.115 (0.117)	-0.378*** (0.110)	-0.309** (0.110)	-0.077 (0.110)	-0.146 (0.126)
Childhood Socialization								
Cooperative Values	0.044 (0.059)	0.098 (0.059)	-0.037 (0.060)	-0.044 (0.068)	0.051 (0.059)	0.106 (0.059)	-0.038 (0.060)	-0.043 (0.068)
Independent Values	-0.033 (0.060)	-0.080 (0.059)	-0.041 (0.062)	-0.043 (0.069)	-0.027 (0.060)	-0.079 (0.059)	-0.040 (0.062)	-0.043 (0.068)
Parental Community Involvement During Childhood	-0.051 (0.063)	-0.092 (0.063)	0.012 (0.065)	0.032 (0.072)	-0.047 (0.064)	-0.085 (0.064)	0.014 (0.065)	0.035 (0.072)
Parental Encourage-ment of Community Involvement	0.047 (0.062)	0.015 (0.062)	0.128* (0.063)	0.178* (0.071)	0.048 (0.062)	0.012 (0.062)	0.129* (0.063)	0.178** (0.071)
Childhood Synagogue Attendance	-0.048 (0.049)	0.036 (0.049)	-0.010 (0.050)	0.016 (0.056)	-0.039 (0.049)	0.040 (0.049)	-0.009 (0.049)	0.018 (0.056)
R^2	0.143	0.2413	0.219	0.1044	0.134	0.235	0.220	0.106
# of Cases	196	192	192	190	196	192	192	190

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<=.001

Personal Beliefs, Values, and Experiences

Political Ideology

The hypothesis that liberals are more likely than conservatives to anticipate using reflexive and active strategies (Hypothesis 23) was partially supported. Political ideology has a significant impact on anticipated use of reflexive strategies in response to the bus

scenario for prosocials (þ=-0.129, p<.05) and proselfs (þ=-0.133, p<.05) (see Table 9). The more liberal individuals perceived themselves to be, the more they anticipated using reflexive strategies in response to the bus scenario. But, as individuals became more conservative, they were less likely to anticipate using such strategies in response to the bus scenario. These results indicate that a liberal political ideology may increase anticipated use of reflexive strategies in response to certain types of injustice, but it does not necessarily have an impact on anticipated use of active strategies (see table on next page).

Table 9. Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Analyses of the Effect of Perceptions of Injustice, Social Value Orientation, and Personal Beliefs, Values, and Experiences on Use of Reflexive or Active Strategies in Response to Observed Social Injustice

	Use of Strategies Based on Perceptions of Injustice, Social Value Orientation, and Personal Beliefs, Values, and Experiences							
	Prosocials				**Proselfs**			
	Reflexive Strategies		**Active Strategies**		**Reflexive Strategies**		**Active Strategies**	
	I Hospital	**II Bus**	**III Hospital**	**IV Bus**	**V Hospital**	**VI Bus**	**VII Hospital**	**VIII Bus**
Perceptions of Injustice								
Fairness Perceptions	-0.073 (0.040)	-0.188*** (0.043)	-0.114** (0.038)	-0.025 (0.042)	-0.085* (0.040)	-0.185*** (0.043)	-0.115** (0.038)	-0.026 (0.042)
SVO								
Prosocial/ Proself	0.338*** (0.095)	0.316*** (0.096)	0.046 (0.090)	0.104 (0.094)	-0.336*** (0.103)	-0.327** (0.103)	-0.081 (0.097)	-0.093 (0.101)
Personal Beliefs, Values, and Experiences								
Political Ideology	-0.082 (0.056)	-0.129* (0.055)	-0.013 (0.053)	-0.018 (0.054)	-0.084 (0.056)	-0.133* (0.055)	-0.013 (0.053)	-0.020 (0.054)
Interest in Current Events	0.163** (0.052)	0.072 (0.053)	-0.001 (0.049)	-0.017 (0.052)	0.170*** (0.052)	0.082 (0.053)	0.001 (0.049)	-0.015 (0.052)
Past Experience with Injustice	0.248* (0.100)	0.195 (0.142)	-0.017 (0.095)	-0.020 (0.138)	0.237* (0.101)	0.198 (0.142)	-0.023 (0.095)	-0.016 (0.138)
Empathy	-0.098 (0.054)	-0.101 (0.053)	-0.076 (0.052)	-0.043 (0.052)	-0.095 (0.055)	-0.101 (0.053)	-0.073 (0.052)	-0.045 (0.052)
Belief that Action will Change the Unjust Situation	0.026 (0.049)	0.053 (0.033)	0.285*** (0.046)	0.313*** (0.033)	0.028 (0.049)	0.052 (0.033)	0.287*** (0.046)	0.311*** (0.033)
Belief that Others Will Try to Help Improve Unfair Situation	0.095 (0.062)	0.122** (0.043)	0.050 (0.059)	-0.065 (0.042)	0.088 (0.062)	0.126** (0.043)	0.049 (0.059)	-0.065 (0.042)
Adult Belief in Community Involvement	0.083 (0.071)	0.138* (0.069)	0.196** (0.067)	0.289*** (0.067)	0.088 (0.071)	0.134± (0.070)	0.198** (0.067)	0.290*** (0.068)
Belief in a Just World	0.075 (0.071)	0.008 (0.071)	-0.007 (0.067)	0.010 (0.070)	0.078 (0.072)	0.018 (0.071)	-0.003 (0.067)	0.013 (0.070)
R^2	0.307	0.409	0.436	0.493	0.300	0.406	0.437	0.492
# of Cases	194	184	190	182	194	184	190	182

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; ± p<=.055, * p< .05; ** p<.01; ***p<=.001

In addition to directly testing the hypothesis, I conducted analysis to ascertain whether interest in current events (rather than specific political beliefs) might affect

responses to injustice. Results indicate that strong interest in current events increases anticipated use of reflexive responses to injustice. With perceptions of justice included in the model, interest in current events has a significant effect on reflexive responses to the hospital scenario, for both prosocials (0.163, $p<.01$) and proselfs (0.170, $p<.001$). So, while political ideology and interest in current events both affect anticipated use of reflexive strategies, political ideology appears to have more predictive power for the bus scenario and interest in current events appears to have more predictive power for the hospital scenario.

When perceptions of fairness are removed from the model these results change slightly (see Table 10). The effect of interest in current events becomes significant for both of the scenarios, for prosocials (hospital $\beta=0.151$, $p<.01$; bus $\beta=0.118$, $p<.01$) and proselfs (hospital $\beta=0.132$, $p<.01$; bus $\beta=0.128$, $p<.01$). This change suggests that while interest in current events is important, fairness perceptions may be more so, depending on the nature of the injustice.[22]

[22] A regression of values, beliefs, and experiences on perceptions of justice revealed that interest in current events has a negative, significant effect on perceptions of justice, but only for the bus scenario (perceived fairness of the bus scenario decreases as interest incurrent events increases). While there was also a negative relationship between interest in current events and perceptions of justice for the hospital scenario, this relationship was not significant.

Table 10. Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Analyses of the Effect of Social Value Orientation and Personal Values, Beliefs, and Experiences on Use of Reflexive or Active Strategies in Response to Observed Social Injustice

	Use of Strategies Based on Social Value Orientation Personal Values, Beliefs, and Experiences							
	Prosocial SVO				**Proself SVO**			
	Reflexive Strategies		**Active Strategies**		**Reflexive Strategies**		**Active Strategies**	
	I Hospital	**II Bus**	**III Hospital**	**IV Bus**	**V Hospital**	**VI Bus**	**VII Hospital**	**VIII Bus**
SVO								
Prosocial/ Proself	0.347*** (0.095)	0.348*** (0.100)	0.063 (0.090)	0.104 (0.093)	-0.354*** (0.104)	-0.375*** (0.107)	-0.089 (0.098)	-0.096 (0.100)
Personal Values, Beliefs, and Experiences								
Political Ideology	-0.096 (0.055)	-0.146* (0.058)	-0.037 (0.053)	-0.023 (0.054)	-0.100 (0.056)	-0.150* (0.058)	-0.038 (0.053)	-0.025 (0.054)
Interest in Current Events	0.151** (0.052)	0.118* (0.054)	-0.008 (0.050)	-0.008 (0.051)	0.162** (0.052)	0.128* (0.054)	-0.005 (0.050)	-0.006 (0.051)
Past Experience with Injustice	0.211* (0.100)	0.228 (0.149)	-0.050 (0.096)	-0.011 (0.138)	0.198* (0.100)	0.229 (0.149)	-0.056 (0.096)	-0.008 (0.138)
Empathy	-0.111* (0.053)	-0.136* (0.055)	-0.091 (0.052)	-0.051 (0.051)	-0.110* (0.054)	-0.133* (0.055)	-0.089 (0.052)	-0.052 (0.051)
Belief that Action will Change the Unjust Situation	0.045 (0.048)	0.085* (0.034)	0.309*** (0.046)	0.318*** (0.032)	0.049 (0.049)	0.084* (0.034)	0.311*** (0.046)	0.316*** (0.032)
Belief that Others Will Try to Help Improve Unfair Situation	0.114 (0.061)	0.139** (0.045)	0.082 (0.059)	-0.064 (0.042)	0.111 (0.062)	0.143** (0.045)	0.081 (0.059)	-0.064 (0.042)
Adult Belief in Community Involvement	0.113 (0.071)	0.108 (0.071)	0.221*** (0.067)	0.280*** (0.066)	0.117 (0.071)	0.105 (0.071)	0.222*** (0.067)	0.281*** (0.066)
Belief in a Just World	0.084 (0.069)	0.033 (0.074)	-0.004 (0.066)	0.016 (0.069)	0.091 (0.070)	0.045 (0.074)	0.000 (0.066)	0.019 (0.070)
R^2	0.287	0.350	0.410	0.489	0.281	0.3507	0.4111	0.488
# of Cases	197	186	193	184	197	186	193	184

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p< =.05; ** p<=.01; ***p<=.001

Past Experience with Injustice

This hypothesis was partially supported. When participants had experienced an injustice in the past similar to the injustice described in the hospital vignette (Hypothesis 24), they anticipated using reflexive strategies in response to the hospital scenario. This is true both for prosocials (þ=0.248, p<05) and proselfs (þ=0.237, p<05) (see Table 9).

Empathy

Empathy (Hypothesis 25) also has an impact on reflexive strategy use (see Table 11). As empathy increases, so does anticipated use of reflexive strategies. This is true both for prosocials (prosocial/hospital -0.111, p<.05; prosocial/bus -0.136, p<.05) and proselfs (proself/hospital - þ=0.110, p<.05; proself/bus þ=-0.133, p<.05) (see Table 10).[23] But, when perceptions of injustice are added in to the model, the effects of empathy disappear. Further analysis indicated that stronger feelings of empathy lead participants to see the vignette scenarios as more severely unfair. Thus, perceptions of justice serve as a mediator between feelings of empathy and responses to injustice.[24]

Table 11. Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Analyses of the Effect of Empathy on Perceptions of Justice

	Effects of Empathy on Perceptions of Justice	
	I **Hospital**	**II** **Bus**
Empathy	0.351*** (0.093)	0.217** (0.084)
R^2	0.066	0.032
Number of Cases	206	203

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p< .05; ** p=.01; ***p<.001

[23] Note: Because the "negative empathy" scale was used, these findings are in the expected direction. As "negative empathy" decreases, anticipated use of low commitment strategies increases.

[24] Perceptions of justice meet all three of MacKinnon's criteria for establishing a mediating relationship.

Efficacy of Actions

Believing that one's actions will make a difference (Hypothesis 26) has an effect on both reflexive and active strategies (see Table 12). When individuals are convinced that their response will make a difference it increases their anticipated use of reflexive strategies for the bus scenario, and anticipated use of both types of strategies in the hospital and bus scenarios. This is true for prosocials (bus/reflexive þ=0.085, p<.05; hospital/active þ=0.309, p<.001; bus/active þ=0.318, p<.001) and proselfs (bus/reflexive þ=0.084, p<.05; hospital/active þ=0.311, p<.001; bus/active þ=0.316, p<.001) (see Table 10). When perceptions of injustice are added into the regression, the relationship between perceived efficacy of one's actions and anticipated responses to the bus scenario becomes non-significant. It remains significant, however, for active strategies in response to both the bus and hospital scenarios (see Table 9). It appears that perceptions of justice serve as a mediator here as well (see MacKinnon et al. 2000). A regression revealed that perceptions of injustice increased as people's belief that their actions would make a difference decreased. In other words, the less faith participants had in their ability to create change, the more unfair they perceived the bus and hospital scenarios to be.

Table 12. Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Analyses of the Effect of Belief in Change on Perceptions of Justice

	Effects of Belief in Change on Perceptions of Justice	
	I **Hospital**	**II** **Bus**
Belief that Action will Change the Unjust Situation	-0.332*** (0.079)	-0.186*** (0.050)
R^2	0.080	0.063
Number of Cases	208	205

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p< .05; ** p<=.01; ***p<.001

Assistance from Others

Believing that others will cooperate in efforts to redress injustice (Hypothesis 27) does make a difference, but only for use of reflexive strategies in response to the bus scenario. Even when perceptions of injustice are included in the model, both prosocials (þ=0.122, p<.01) and proselfs (þ=0.126, p<.01) are significantly more likely to anticipate using reflexive strategies in response to the bus scenario if they believe that others will try to help them (see Table 9).

Community Involvement Values

Hypothesis 28, which stated that believing that one's actions will make a difference is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies, was partially supported. The more strongly participants believed in the importance of community involvement, the more likely they were to anticipate using active strategies in response to both the hospital and bus scenarios. This is true for prosocials (hospital þ=0.221, p<.001; bus þ=0.280, p<.001) and proselfs (hospital þ=0.222, p<.001; bus þ=0.281, p<.001) (see Table 10).

When perceptions of justice are added in to the model, belief in community involvement increases anticipated use of reflexive strategies in response to the bus scenario. The variable's effect becomes significant for prosocials (0.138, p<.05) and marginally significant for proselfs (þ=0.134, p<.06) (see Table 9).[25]

[25] A regression model with adult belief in community involvement and perceptions of justice indicates that the more strongly participants believe in community involvement, the less fair they perceive the hospital scenario to be. But, because the relationship between belief in community involvement and perceptions of justice is not significant for the bus scenario, it's unlikely that perceptions are serving as a mediator in the model illustrated in Table 17.

Belief in a Just World

Hypothesis 29, which posits that belief in a just world decreases anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies, was not supported. No significant effects were found for belief in a just world, most likely because there was not enough variation within this sample. The implications of this finding, as well as the others in this study, are discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

In completing this project, my goal was to investigate factors that increase the likelihood that individuals will attempt to redress social injustice on behalf of others. I set out to create a study that would allow me to gain a better understanding of why and how individuals respond when they are aware of injustice but not personally affected by it. When there is no material reward for redressing social injustice, will individuals work to create a just outcome for others? How can we explain their motivation from a social psychological perspective? How do individual level factors, such as cognitions about the situation, demographics, religious beliefs, personal values, and early childhood socialization affect the strategies that people use to redress injustice? This study used a unique, micro-level perspective to answer these questions and to contribute to the growing body of literature on "justice for others".

The results of this study suggest that a number of different factors affect when and how people anticipate responding to injustice that does not put them at a personal disadvantage. Some of these results support findings from previous studies. Others augment the justice and social value orientation literatures by adding new (and some unexpected) insights into why people choose to engage in certain behaviors.

The underlying theoretical model for this study consisted of two parts (see Figure 1). The first focused on how individual level factors impact social value orientation. The second pertained to the direct effects of social value orientation on responses to others' experiences of injustice. In addition, the study examined how individual level factors might directly influence injustice responses. In this chapter I summarize the findings

relevant to each part of this model, offer explanations for unexpected results, and discuss the implications of the study for future research.

Figure 1[26]: Antecedents and Consequences of Social Value Orientation



While I did not discover a great deal of evidence to support the portion of the model that suggests individual level factors have an effect on social value orientation, this study did produce data to support the other parts of the model. Social value orientation, perceptions of injustice, and various individual level factors affect the likelihood that observers will respond to social injustice, and the types of strategies that observers use (i.e. reflexive or active) when they do respond.

Social Value Orientation

To begin with, it is important to note that the social value orientation measure replicated in this study produced results very similar to those of previous studies (in terms of categorization of study participants) (see Joireman et al. 2004; Kramer et al. 1986; Van Lange and Liebrand 1991). I was able to classify more than 80% of participants as either prosocial or proself. Of that 80%, there were more prosocial than proself individuals.

[26] From Chapter 1.

Thus, the method used to measure social value orientation in this study was successful in that it produced expected results in terms of classifying participants' value orientations.

Furthermore, the social value orientation measure was successful in that it had a more consistent effect on perceptions of and reactions to injustice than other measures of independent vs. interdependent behavior. Although two other measures of independent/interdependent behavior were included in this study for exploratory purposes, neither of them had the same significant effect as social value orientation.[27] Thus, although results related to social value orientation were somewhat unexpected in this study, the fact that value orientation had a consistent, significant effect on some responses to injustice indicates that it is worthy of further examination.

Social Antecedents of Social Value Orientation

Currently, the social value orientation literature focuses predominantly on how value orientation affects behavior in social dilemmas. Few studies have investigated what factors contribute to the development of a prosocial or proself value orientation. This study attempted to identify which variables, if any, are predictors of value orientation.

While most of the variables included in this study did not affect social value orientation, some relationships were found. The income that participants' parents earned during their childhood has a negative impact on prosocial value orientation. In other words, as parental income increased, the likelihood of being prosocial decreased. Appropriately, parental income had the opposite affect on proself value orientation. The more income one's parents had, the more likely he/she was to be proself.

[27] See footnote #11, pg. 95 in methods chapter.

Interestingly, parental income also had an impact on political ideology. At higher levels of parental income, participants were more likely to identify themselves as conservative and at lower levels they were more likely to identify themselves as liberal or very liberal. Although the effect of political orientation on social value orientation was not significant, results were in the predicted direction. Having a liberal ideology increased the likelihood of being prosocial, and having a conservative ideology increased the likelihood of being proself. It appears that an unidentified variable is influencing political ideology and social value orientation in the same way, by making individuals whose parents had lower incomes more likely to value equal opportunity and outcomes, and individuals whose parents had higher incomes more likely to value success through independent action and maximization of personal outcomes. More research is needed to determine exactly what mechanism is mediating the relationship between parental income and social value orientation.

Two other variables also impacted proself value orientation: education level and belief in a just world. Higher levels of education increased the likelihood of having a prosocial value orientation, but not to a significant degree. But, participants with higher levels of education were significantly less likely to be proself. These results suggest that education does indeed impact social value orientation. Although its effects were not uniformly significant in this study, findings indicate that as individuals gain more education, they are more likely to be prosocial – or, at the very least, less likely to be proself.

Like education level, belief in a just world only had a significant effect on proself value orientation. The more strongly people believe in a just world, the more likely they

are to be proself. As stated earlier, individuals who believe that people "get what they deserve" may be more inclined to make personal, rather than situation attributions. Such attributions assume that people have control over their own outcomes. This focus on individual control over personal outcomes appears to contribute to proself value orientation.

Although a strong belief in a just world predicted proself value orientation, weak belief in a just world did *not* predict prosocial value orientation. The relationship between belief in a just world and social value orientation was in the predicted direction, but not significant. One possible explanation is that lack of faith in a just world may prevent people from thinking and acting cooperatively, because they believe their efforts will not ensure fair outcomes in the long run. Results of this study suggest that people are less willing to use active strategies if they do not think that their actions will actually lead to change. Similarly, individuals may be less likely to develop a prosocial value orientation if they think that are not personally capable of making the world a fair place. Why fight the battle if you can't win the war?

Another possible explanation is that the results of this study were affected by the disproportionate number of participants who indicated that they do not believe that the world is fair. Participants in this study were asked to describe, on a 1-9 scale, the extent to which they believe in a just world. The mean response was 2.4 – an exceedingly low number. When asked to indicate on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale whether "we live in a just world", not a single participant chose 8 or 9 on the scale; and more than 80% of participants chose 1-4 on the scale. Thus, the majority of participants in this study strongly believed that the world is *not* just.

Although Rubin and Peplau maintain that individuals' just world belief vary widely, that was not the case in this study. Rubin and Peplau (1975) theorize that political conservatism increases belief in a just world, while direct experience with injustice and being part of a minority group lead to lack of belief in a just world. Because Jews tend towards political liberalism, are a religious/ethnic minority in the U.S., and have a history of experiencing persecution (including anti-Semitism in the U.S.), it is not surprising that participants in this study disagreed with the idea that we live in a just world. Participants' general lack of belief in a just world may have reduced the explanatory power of the variable. But, because the relationship was in the predicted direction, I suggest that it is deserving of further exploration in future research. A more diverse sample size would likely result in a wider range of answers to the "belief in a just world" question, and a stronger test of whether belief in a just world is a social antecedent of social value orientation.

The effects of the antecedents examine in this study – both expected and unexpected – suggest that, to some extent, early childhood socialization and personal values do indeed impact the social value orientations that people have as adults. Although the results from this study are certainly not conclusive, they do suggest that more investigation is needed to identify factors that help to shape prosocial versus proself value orientation.

How might future studies produce more decisive results? First, it is possible that there was not enough demographic variation among the participants to make this study's findings significant. Participants in this sample were not dramatically different from each other in terms of demographics, socialization, or beliefs and values. The effects of the

factors examined in this study might be greater with a larger and more diverse sample. Such a sample could also be used to help establish whether the findings from this study are consistent cross different populations.[28] The fact that the social value orientation measure was replicated in this study with results similar to those of previous studies (i.e. Van Lange et al. 1997; Van Lange et al. 2007) suggests that religion is probably not a major predictor of social value orientation. Consequently, future studies may benefit from focusing on other variables - such as income, education, and belief in a just world.

Second, I would strongly suggest use of qualitative as well as quantitative methods in future research. In this study, through the use of a questionnaire, I was able to ask general questions about participants' backgrounds, beliefs, and values. An interview format would allow for a more comprehensive and in-depth discussion of if and how socialization affects social value orientation. Interviews would also give participants more opportunity to elaborate on factors that affect their worldview and distributive preferences – factors that may have been overlooked in this study.

Third, work in this area may benefit by drawing from the sociological literature on altruism, as this literature discusses various factors that increase prosocial behaviors in children. Studies on altruism suggest that, by modeling certain behaviors and reinforcing values through rewards and punishments, parents can socialize their children to think of themselves as capable and willing to help others, and to engage in prosocial behaviors as they get older. Consequently, the altruism research may provide more insight into why children develop a particular value orientation. Use of qualitative methods would be

[28] For exploratory purposes, I conducted a factor analysis with social value orientation and the social antecedents examined in this study. Many of the social antecedents did load together with social value orientation on multiple factors, indicating a possible relationship between the variables. More research is needed to determine the exact nature of the relationship.

particularly helpful in exploring how participants' parents transmitted messages to them about altruistic and prosocial behavior. It would allow participants to reflect back on childhood experiences, their parents' values, and the lessons that their parents taught them about fairness.

Perceptions of Injustice

Perceptions of injustice were included in this study in order to determine whether social value orientation influences perceptions. Additionally, the justice literature suggests that perceptions of injustice may have an impact on responses to injustice. As expected, perceptions of injustice significantly affect anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies, in response to both vignettes. Thus, like previous research (see Hegtvedt et al. 2009; Younts and Mueller 2001), this study finds that perceptions of injustice affect anticipated behavioral responses.

In addition to having a direct impact, perceptions also mediated the relationship between some variables and anticipated responses to injustice. Perceptions did not mediate any of the childhood socialization variables, but they did mediate some demographic characteristics (i.e. education, age, and gender) and personal values, beliefs, and experiences (i.e. empathy, valuing community involvement, and believing that one's actions will make a difference). As these results indicate, perceptions of justice did not mediate all variables; but in a few cases they decreased or even increased the relationship between factors and responses to injustice.

Perceptions of Justice and Social Value Orientation

While it is still unclear what factors shape social value orientation – why some individuals are prosocial and others proself – one major finding of this study is that social

value orientation does indeed affect both perceptions of and reactions to injustice. Although various other measures of independent/interdependent orientaiton were included in this study, social value orientation was the only measure that consistently predicted cognitive and anticipated behavioral responses to the vignettes. Thus, results of this study indicate that social value orientation can be used to understand responses to social dilemmas, but also responses to social injustice. Furthermore, social value can be used to understand behavior in situations where observers of injustice receive no material benefit for acting on behalf of others.

Because the number of participants who could be classified as prosocial or proself was similar to that of previous studies (i.e. Van Lange et al. 1997; Van Lange et al. 2007), it is possible that results related to the effect of social value orientation on perceptions of and responses to injustice can be generalized to a larger population. There is no evidence to suggest that using a more diverse sample would cause the direction of the relationship between social value orientation and responses to injustice to change direction.

In general, prosocials and proselfs had very similar perceptions of justice. Both groups saw the health care and environmental vignettes as very unfair. Even though this was the case, prosocials and proselfs' perceptions of the environmental injustice were significantly different: prosocial perceived the situation to be more severely unfair.

So, although prosocials and proselfs generally prefer different distributions, in this study their perceptions of the injustice inherent in the two social issues described in the vignettes are not dissimilar. Proself individuals may have attempted to maximize their own rewards in the social value orientation survey measure, but they still saw the vignette

scenarios as unfair. This suggests that perceptual differences between prosocials and proselfs may depend on the nature of the injustice; and when differences do occur, they are relatively small. Having a proself orientation does not prevent individuals from perceiving social injustice. It does cause individuals to see the situation as slightly less unfair than they would if they had a prosocial orientation.

While prosocials and proself share similar perceptions of injustice, they have very different responses (as discussed in more detail in the next section). The implication here for the social value orientation literature is that prosocials and proselfs have similar ideas of what is socially just or unjust, but their perceptions motivate different behaviors. Prosocials are aware of injustice and want to redress it. Proselfs are aware of injustice but do not intend to redress it. Individuals who do not believe in a just world may be disinclined to help others because they believe their actions will not make a difference in the long run, or because they think that others are responsible for "solving their own problems". In terms of future research, it is useful to note that social value orientation can help explain nuances in people's perceptions of injustice. In the case of this study, however, it did not "cause" proself participants to ignore or dramatically downplay the severity of the injustices described in the vignettes. But, it did affect their anticipated behavioral responses.

This study produced results that augment both the social value orientation and justice literatures. One of its shortcomings, however, was the disproportionate number of prosocials and proselfs. Future studies could correct for this problem by treating social value as a continuous scale rather than a designation for individuals who have answered a certain number of questions in the same way. A continuous measure of social value

orientation would take into account how many times individuals choose cooperative, competitive, or individualistic distributions, and then place participants along a likert-like continuum, where 1=not at all prosocial, and 9=very prosocial; 1=not at all proself, 9=very proself; or 1=prosocial, 9=proself.

Responses to Injustice

As expected, and as discussed above, social value orientation affected anticipated responses to injustice. Being prosocial increased anticipated use of reflexive strategies and being proself decreased anticipated use of reflexive strategies, for both vignettes. Social value orientation influenced responses to injustice in the predicted directions, although only for the reflexive strategies. This finding partially supports the hypothesis regarding the effect of social value orientation on responses to social injustice, and has implications for both the social value orientation and justice literatures.

First, as previously stated, social value orientation does not only affect conduct in social dilemmas. It also influences responses to social injustice. This individual level factor is useful for predicting behavior in a variety of situations, and is one of the many reasons why observers choose (or do not choose) to help victims of injustice. While few social value orientation studies address issues of justice, future research would be justified in doing so.

Second, social value orientation affects the *type* of response that individuals have to others' experiences of injustice. In this study, it was only a useful predictor of reflexive strategies. When it came to active strategies, other variables (perceiving a situation to be severely unfair, believing that one's actions will change that situation, and/or placing a high value on community involvement) were better predictors. Social

value orientation influences involvement in activities that can be completed fairly easily (i.e. discussing the situation with others, staying informed about the situation, voting to change the situation). When it comes to activities that require more of a sacrifice, however, perceptions, beliefs, and values have a bigger impact on behavior.

Again, because participants were classified as prosocial or proself at rates similar to those in previous studies (i.e. Van Lange et al. 1997; Van Lange et al. 2007), the results of this study may be generalizeable to a larger population. I have no reason to believe that using a more heterogeneous sample would cause the direction of the relationship between social value orientation and reflexive/active strategy use to change.

Other Factors

Social value orientation had effects in the expected directions, but ultimately, factors in the "personal beliefs, values, and experiences" category were the best predictors of responses to injustice. When faced with injustice, observers redress injustice because they are driven by an interest in current events, feelings of empathy, belief that their action will make a difference, belief in the importance of community involvement, or previous experience dealing with injustice.

Use of Reflexive Versus Active Strategies

Results of this study indicate that the significance of certain factors depends on the nature of the social injustice (i.e. an environmental justice versus a health care-related injustice). Factors also varied in terms of how they affected anticipated use of reflexive or active strategies. My findings show that a number of factors significantly impact use of reflexive strategies (i.e. social value orientation, gender, age, political ideology, interest in current events, empathy, having experienced a similar injustice, believing that

others will help to redress the injustice). A few significantly impact use of both reflexive and active strategies (i.e. education, income, valuing community involvement, and believing that one's actions will make a difference). And, two factors significantly impact use of active strategies only (i.e. religious service attendance, having parents who displayed concern for the welfare of others). These results suggest that the inclusion of reflexive and active strategies in this study was justified. Individual level factors do not all induce the same behaviors. Some inspire responses that have relatively few costs while others motivate individuals to engage in activities that require a higher level of sacrifice.

Interestingly, the variables that increase anticipated use of active strategies mostly involve some type of social interaction between "self" and "other". Attending religious services requires an interaction between the self and a congregation; having parents who displayed concern for others requires interaction between the self, parents, and others; valuing community involvement requires the potential for interaction between self and a community; and believing that one's actions will make a difference requires potential for interaction between self and parties that have the decision-making power to create change. These variables were all stronger predictors of (anticipated) active behaviors than "non-interactional" variables such as age or sex.

Some of the other variables with significant predictive power were also "intrinsically interactional". For instance, the self cannot feel empathy without thinking about the "other". But, empathy influenced anticipated use of reflexive strategies and not use of active strategies. One direction for future research may be to consider why this

inconsistency exists. Why do certain factors motivate only use of low or active strategies?

Type of Social Injustice

One way to answer the question posed above would be to address how the nature of the social injustice affects responses to injustice. As stated in Chapter 5, two vignettes were included in this study in order to ascertain whether people's reactions to injustice are consistent in different situations. Do social value orientation and other variables have a comprehensive effect on responses to injustice, or does context matter?

Social value orientation impacted reactions consistently across the vignettes. It had a significant effect on anticipated use of reflexive strategies in response to both the health care and environmental injustice vignettes. In addition, a number of other variables (education, income, interest in current events, having parents who displayed concern for the welfare of others, valuing community involvement, believing that one's actions will make a difference) affected responses to both scenarios.

There were also some variables that affected responses to the bus scenario but not the hospital scenario: gender, age, political ideology, religious service attendance, and believing that others will cooperate in efforts to reduce injustice. Only one variable – having experienced a similar injustice in the past – had an impact on anticipated responses to the hospital scenario but not the bus scenario.

Overall, participants seemed much more motivated to respond to the bus scenario than to the hospital scenario. But, for the most part, they anticipated using reflexive strategies in response to the environmental injustice described in the bus vignette. While

participants were less likely to respond to the hospital scenario, when they chose to do so they usually anticipated using active strategies.

I offer two suggestions for why the vignettes elicited different reactions. The first is that participants thought that different types of injustices called for different response strategies. Individuals anticipated using the response strategy that they thought would be the most effective in a given situation. Either they thought that using the reflexive strategies was the best way to create change or they thought they could bring about change by using these low-cost strategies – so there was no need to engage in active strategies that might prove to be more costly (in terms of using up financial resources, time, energy, etc.).

A second interpretation is that participants were slightly more convinced that their actions would make a difference in the bus scenario. When participants were asked (on a scale where 1=not at all likely and 9=extremely likely) if their actions would make a difference, the mean response for the hospital scenario was 2.43 for the hospital scenario and 3.13 for the bus scenario. Participants may simply have seen combating the environmental injustice to be more achievable than taking on the health care system. Given how many opportunities there currently are to live a "green" lifestyle (i.e. availability of reusable grocery bags, energy efficient appliances, recycling services, hybrid cars), it seems reasonable that participants would see the environmental injustice as easier to "fix".

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to identify factors that enhance the likelihood that an individual will engage in activities intended to redress social injustice. By drawing

from literature in the areas of social psychology, psychology, social movements, political participation, and Jewish studies, I was able to gain a better understanding of why observers of injustice choose to respond to others' experiences of injustice in certain ways. Using an interdisciplinary perspective allowed me to fill in some of the gaps in these literatures, and to make a contribution to the growing body of research on "justice for others".

Throughout the course of my research, I established that social value orientation has a strong impact on certain types of behaviors. While past studies have determined that value orientation affects responses to injustice, this study confirmed that it also affects responses to social injustice. Social value orientation, however, is not the only factor that motivates individuals to redress injustice. Various demographic factors and childhood experiences affect anticipated use of low and active strategies in response to injustice. But, the strongest and most consistent predictors of behavior appear to be social value orientation, perceptions of justice, and factors that fall in the "beliefs, values, and experiences" category (i.e. political ideology, interest in current events, past experience with injustice, empathy, believing one's actions will make a difference, belief that others will help redress injustice, and belief in the importance of community involvement).

This project has laid the foundation for future research on social value orientation and justice. Although some antecedents of social value orientation were identified in this study, more research is needed to determine how socialization and past experiences affect the distributive preferences that individuals have as adults.

In addition to augmenting the social value orientation and justice literatures, this study made a contribution to the Jewish studies literature by looking at whether social value orientation and other individual level factors affect the anticipated responses of Jewish adults to observed social injustice. By using a social psychological framework, this research approached the subject of Jewish responses to injustice from a unique perspective. It identified a number of personal characteristics that affect how Jews (particularly those who are Conservative) respond to environmental and health-care related injustice. Whether or not these characteristics affect people of different Jewish sects or even different religions in the same way is a question that should certainly be addressed by future research.

Participants in this study shared common religious beliefs as well as a shared social history. Results of my study were almost certainly affected by the fact that participants did not vary widely in terms of a number of factors, including demographics and various values and beliefs (i.e. political ideology, belief in a just world). Future research might consider whether the patterns found in this study are the same or different from those of a larger and/or more diverse sample size; and, as stated above, whether individuals from various religious backgrounds differ in terms of distributive preferences and anticipated responses to social injustice.

Since the startling and disturbing murder of Kitty Genovese in 1964, sociologists have spent a great deal of time trying to understand why observers might refrain from helping the victim of an injustice. This project approached the subject of observer responses from an entirely different direction by asking what factors prompt individuals to *actively assist* victims of injustice. Throughout history, there have been many

examples of individuals and groups taking action to create social change, even when there was no direct, personal benefit to doing so. Like previous studies on justice for others (i.e. Brockner and Greenberg 1990; Brockner et al. 1992; Kray and Lind 2002; Lind et al. 1998), this research finds that there are indeed factors that increase the likelihood that observers will work for justice on behalf of another – whether that means staying informed about the situation, casting a vote, writing a letter, or attending a protest. People care about others' outcomes. German writer Jean Paul Richter suggested, "Do not wait for extraordinary circumstances to do good; try to use ordinary situations" (Douglas and Strumpf 1998). Results of this study suggest that many people are ready and willing to work for social justice and social change in response to ordinary situations – whether that means air pollution or inadequacies in the health care system. Individuals care about justice, for its own sake and for the sake of society as a whole.

APPENDIX A

Survey

Study No.: IRB00005750	**Emory University IRB** IRB use only	Document Approved On: 10/13/2007 Project Approval Expires On: **10/12/2008**

INFORMED CONSENT

Department of Sociology, Emory University

Title: Responses to Social Issues

Principle Investigator: Leslie Brody, Ph.D. Candidate

Advisor: Dr. Karen A. Hegtvedt, Professor

You are being invited to volunteer to participate in a study about perceptions of and responses to situations involving social issues. Jewish adults are being invited to participate. I hope to have about 600 participants in this study.

Participation in this study involves completion, at your convenience, of an online questionnaire. The questionnaire asks about your background, beliefs, experiences, and involvement in certain organizations. The questionnaire also includes two short stories. One describes a health care situation and the other pertains to transportation issues. After reading the stories, you will be asked a series of questions about your perceptions of the situation and how you believe you would be likely to respond. It should take approximately 20-25 minutes to complete the questionnaire. If possible, please complete the questionnaire in the next two weeks.

Participation in this study is completely voluntary, and you are free to decline to participate or to cease participation at any time. You may also skip questions; you do not have to answer any specific question in order to answer subsequent questions. I will assign each returned questionnaire an identification number.

All of your responses will be held confidentially. I will not have access to participants' email or IP addresses. My advisor and I are the only ones who will have access to the completed questionnaires and data files. Data analysis will be performed only on aggregated responses, and no names will be associated with this analysis. All

data will be stored on a password protected computer. Analyses will focus on aggregated patterns, not on individual responses.

The last question of the survey will ask if you are willing to participate at a later date in a follow-up interview. If you are willing to do so, you will be asked to give your name and contact information so that I may contact you in the future to set up a personal interview at a time and location convenient to you. The interview will last about one hour and will be tape recorded with your permission. You may, however, choose not to have the interview tape recorded. Your questionnaire responses will be separated from your contact information before the data are analyzed so they will be anonymous, just like the responses provided by those who decline to be interviewed.

There are no known risks to participation in this study. If any question makes you feel uncomfortable, you are free to skip it. There are also no direct benefits to you. Your responses will increase understanding about the ranges of responses that people have when faced with social issues. Information collected in the course of this study may be submitted for publication in sociology journals, or presented at conferences. Agencies and Emory Departments that make rules and policy about how research is done have a right to review study records. These include the Emory University Institutional Review Board.

If you have any questions about this study, please contact Leslie Brody (lbrody@emory.edu or 678-644-6678) or her advisor, Dr. Karen Hegtvedt (404-727-7517 or khegtv@emory.edu). If you have questions about your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact Dr. Coleen DiIorio, Chair of the Emory University Institutional Review Board, which oversees protection of human study participants. She can be reached at (404) 712-0720.

I appreciate your willingness to participate in this study. Please print this information for your records. Completion of the questionnaire indicates your consent to participate. Thank you very much!

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*Note: Arrows at the bottom of each page allow you to move forward and backward through this survey.

SOCIAL ISSUES STUDY

Thank you for your participation in this study!

Please begin by answering the questions below
Arrows at the bottom of each page allow you to move forward and backward through the survey.

SOCIAL ISSUES STUDY

Thank you for your participation in this study! Please begin by answering the questions below.

Arrows at the bottom of each page allow you to move forward and backward through the survey.

What is your religious affiliation?
* Orthodox
* Reform
* Conservative
* Reconstructionist
* Other:

In what state do you currently live?

What is your age?

Please indicate if you are:
*Male
*Female

What is your marital status?
* Single
* Married
* Divorced
* Widowed

Please indicate your highest level of education:
* High school
* Some college
* College
* Some post-college education
* Graduate degree

How often do you attend synagogue?
* Never
* 1 – 3 times a year
* 4 – 6 times a year
* 1 – 2 times a month
* More than 2 times a month

As a child, how often did you attend synagogue with your family/a member of your family?
* Never
* 1 – 3 times a year
* 4 – 6 times a year
* 1 – 2 times a month
* More than 2 times a month

How many of your friends are also Jewish?
* Very few
* Less than half
* About half
* More than half
* Almost all

In what country were you born?
* U.S.
* Other:

If you were born in the U.S., please indicate the region where you spent most of your time prior to age 18:
* Northwest
* West
* Southwest
* South
* Midwest
* Northeast
* Southeast

Where was your father born?
* U.S.
* Other:

Where was your mother born?
* U.S.
* Other:

Please indicate your employment status:
* Full-time
* Part-time
* Unemployed

What is your annual household income, from all sources, before taxes? (Okay to estimate)

* Under $36,000
* $37,000-70,000
* $71,000-100,000
* $101,000-150,000
* $151,000-200,000
* Over $200,000

What was the total household income in your family when you were growing up? (Okay to estimate)

* Under $36,000
* $37,000-70,000
* $71,000-100,000
* $101,000-150,000
* $151,000-200,000
* Over $200,000

Do you have children?

* No
* Yes

If you answered "Yes" to the previous question, please indicate how many children you have?

If you have children, how many are under the age of 18 and living at home?

How would you describe your political viewpoint?

* Very liberal
* Liberal
* Moderate, middle of the road
* Conservative
* Very conservative

With which political party do you identify?

* Democrat
* Republican
* Independent
* Other

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following:

Strongly Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Strongly Agree

- My parents rarely donated money to charitable causes.
- In my family, we always helped one another.

- Concerning strangers experiencing distress, my parents generally thought it was more important "not to get involved."
- My parents frequently discussed moral values with me (values like the "Golden Rule", etc.)
- When I was growing up, my parents told me I should be willing to "lend a helping hand."

How important is your Jewish identity to you?
Not at all Important 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Important

Please answer the questions below.
Not at All 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Quite a Lot

- When you were growing up, to what extent were your parents involved in religious activities in the Jewish community?
- When you were growing up, to what extent were your parents involved in social activities in the Jewish community?
- When you were growing up, to what extent were your parents involved in community service activities in general?
- When you were growing up, to what extent were your parents politically active?

When you were growing up, to what extent did your parents encourage you to do the following?
Not at All 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Quite a Lot

- Attend synagogue
- Attend social events in the Jewish community
- Do community service
- Volunteer for organizations working to reduce injustice.
- Give tzedakah
- Try to relieve others' suffering
- Be politically active

As an adult, how important is to you to do the following?
Not Important 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very Important

- Attend synagogue
- Attend social events in the Jewish community
- Do community service
- Volunteer for organizations working to reduce injustice
- Give tzedakah
- Try to relieve others' suffering
- Be politically active

Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following statements:
Strongly Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Strongly Agree

- Jews are a religious minority in the U.S.

- Jews are an ethnic minority in the U.S.
- As a Jew, I consider myself to be a member of a minority group.
- Historically, Jews have been marginalized in most of the countries in the world.

How close do you feel to God while:
Not at all Close 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very Close

- Being with a person you love?
- Gathering with the congregation during services?
- Helping individuals in need?
- Working for justice and peace?

This section focuses on beliefs that you may have.

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following:
Strongly Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Strongly Agree

- Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.
- Other people's sorrows do not usually disturb me a great deal.
- I am usually aware of the feelings of other people.
- I feel that other people ought to take care of their problems themselves.
- Many times I have felt so close to someone else's difficulties that they seemed as if they were my own.

To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements about current events?
Strongly Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Strongly Agree

- I am interested in current events.
- I watch the news regularly.
- I listen to news on the radio regularly.
- I read the newspaper regularly.
- I like to engage in debates about current events.
- I consider myself to be knowledgeable about current events.
- I consider myself to be knowledgeable about politics.

Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following statements about life:
Strongly Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Strongly Agree

- In life, people generally get what they deserve.
- Free health care should be given to those who cannot afford it.
- We live in a just world.
- Suffering in life is rewarded in the afterlife.
- Even people who suffer from severe misfortune can expect that, in the end, something good will happen to balance everything out.
- People are responsible for their own life situations.

Please indicate the extent to which you consider yourself to be the following:
Not at All 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very Much

- Kind
- Helpful
- Understanding
- Aware of others' feelings
- Able to devote self to others
- Dominant
- Independent
- Self-confident
- Direct
- Individualistic

Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following statements about people:
Strongly Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Strongly Agree

- People like to work in groups better than they like working by themselves.
- If a group is slowing me down it is better to leave it and work alone.
- To be superior, a person must stand alone.
- People do better work alone than in groups.
- Members of a group should accept group decisions even when they personally have a different opinion.
- Problem solving by groups gives better results than problem solving by individuals.
- One should live one's life independent of others as much as possible.
- Only those who depend on themselves get ahead in life.

Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following statements:
Strongly Disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Strongly Agree

- It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.
- Competition is the law of nature.
- When another person does better than I do, I get tense.
- Without competition, it is not possible to have a good society.
- Winning is everything.
- It is important that I do my job better than others.
- I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others.
- Some people emphasize winning; I'm not one of them.

This section asks you to perform a decision task.

Decision Task

Imagine that you have to distribute a large number of points between yourself and another person, whom we simply refer to as Other. You will never knowingly meet or communicate with this person, nor will he or she ever knowingly meet or communicate with you. In this decision task, both you and the other will be making choices by marking either the letter A, B, or C. Your own choice will produce points for yourself and the other person. Similarly, the other's choices will produce points for him/her and for you. Therefore, the total number of points you receive depends on his/her choices and your choices as well.

Example:
A: You get 500, Other gets 400
B: You get 500, Other gets 500
C: You get 550, Other gets 300

For each of the nine rows below, please click on A, B, or C depending on which division of points you prefer the most.

1	A: You get 480, Other gets 80	B: You get 540, Other gets 280	C: You get 480, Other gets 480
2	A: You get 560, Other gets 300	B: You get 500, Other gets 500	C: You get 500, Other gets 100
3	A: You get 520, Other gets 520	B: You get 520, Other gets 120	C: You get 580, Other gets 320
4	A: You get 500, Other gets 100	B: You get 560, Other gets 300	C: You get 490, Other gets 490
5	A: You get 560, Other gets 300	B: You get 500, Other gets 500	C: You get 490, Other gets 90
6	A: You get 500, Other gets 500	B: You get 500, Other gets 100	C: You get 570, Other gets 300
7	A: You get 510, Other gets 510	B: You get 560, Other gets 300	C: You get 510, Other gets 110
8	A: You get 550, Other gets 300	B: You get 500, Other gets 100	C: You get 500, Other gets 500
9	A: You get 480, Other gets 100	B: You get 490, Other gets 490	C: You get 540, Other gets 300

The following questions pertain to your community involvement.

Please check the boxes that best describe your involvement in the following Jewish community service-based organizations (you may choose more than one box for each organization):

- Not a member
- Not a member, have donated to the organization
- Member, have not attended a meeting/event in the last year
- Member, have attended a meeting/event in the last year
- Member, have helped to organize a meeting/event in the last year
- Member, have donated to the organization

Organizations:

- Anti-Defamation League
- American Jewish Congress
- American Jewish Committee
- Mazon
- Hadassah
- National Council of Jewish Women
- Your synagogue
- Please list any other organizations (Jewish or non-Jewish) to which you belong:

The following is a short scenario about a health care situation. Please read the scenario and respond to the questions that follow.

This morning on the news, you heard a story about a hospital several counties away from where you live. The news report stated that this hospital has been having serious problems. It is short-staffed and short on rooms, and thus has not been able to meet the needs of all its patients.

Faced with too many patients, the hospital decided not to help anyone whose insurance does not cover the procedure that they need, regardless of what procedure it is. As of last week, patients without complete insurance coverage were turned away and forced to go to another hospital.

As a result of this decision, two people were turned away from the hospital and died before they were able to get proper attention. Nevertheless, the hospital continues to stand by their decision to accept only patients whose insurance covers their procedures.

Please respond to the following questions regarding your perceptions of the scenario described above.

In your opinion, how unfair or fair is the hospital's policy?
Very Unfair 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very Fair

In response to the hospital's new policy, how likely are you to do the following?
Not at all Likely 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Likely

- Volunteer for an organization that is trying to get the hospital to change its policy.
- Send money to an organization that is trying to get the hospital to change its policy.
- Attend a protest organized to convince the hospital to change its policy.
- Write a letter to a political representative asking him/her to do something to get the hospital to change its policy.
- Stay informed about what is happening at the hospital by reading a newspaper paper, listening to radio, or watching the news.
- Write a letter to a newspaper expressing concern about the hospital's policy.
- Vote for a political leader who you believe will work to provide better healthcare for local residents.
- Talk about the situation with friends.
- Do nothing.

.

Please answer the questions below.
Not at all Likely 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Likely

- How likely do you think it is that your actions will make a difference in getting the hospital to change its policy?
- How likely do you think it is that your actions will make a difference to society in general?
- How likely do you think it is that other people will also try to get the hospital to change its policy?

In the past, has your health insurance ever made it difficult for you to get health care?
* No
* Yes

Do you have any personal experience working at or with a hospital?
* No
* Yes

The following is a short scenario about a transportation situation. Please read the scenario and respond to the questions that follow.

The city in which you live has a wonderful public transportation system. Buses run all over the city on a regular basis, so it is easy to catch one and get where you're going. You do not use the public transportation system very often because you work from home, but the few times you have used it you have found it convenient.

The majority of the city's buses make a stop at Delancy Station. Delancy Station is centrally located, and most people who use the bus system have to travel through there during the day. It is a prime transfer spot. Buses constantly arrive to drop people off and pick them up.

You do not live near Delancy Station, but last week you read a newspaper article about a serious problem experienced by people in the station's surrounding neighborhoods. The article said that buses stopping at Delancy Station tend to idle their engines while waiting for passengers, filling the air with gas fumes. As a result, there are extremely high levels of pollution in the local neighborhoods. In fact, pollution levels are so high that residents are beginning to get sick. Asthma rates in neighborhoods near Delancy Station are twice as high as the national average, and there is some evidence that the pollution may also be causing lung cancer among local residents.

Please respond to the following questions regarding your perceptions of the scenario described above.

In your opinion, how unfair or fair is the situation at Delancy Station?
Very Unfair 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very Fair

In response to the pollution problem at Delancy Station, how likely are you to do the following?

In response to the pollution problem at Delancy Station, how likely are you to do the following?
Not at all Likely 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Likely

- Volunteer for an organization that is working to reduce the pollution problem at Delancy Station.
- Send money to an organization that is working to reduce the pollution problem.
- Attend a protest to convince the government to take action and reduce the pollution problem.
- Write a letter to a political representative asking him/her to work to reduce the pollution problem.
- Stay informed about what is happening by reading a newspaper paper, listening to radio, or watching the news.
- Write a letter to a newspaper expressing concern about the pollution problem.
- Vote for a political leader who you believe will work to reduce the pollution at Delancy Station.
- Talk about the situation with friends.
- Do nothing.

Please answer the questions below.
Not at all Likely 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Likely

- How likely do you think it is that your actions will make a difference in reducing pollution at Delancy Station?

- How likely do you think it is that your actions will make a difference to society in general?
- How likely do you think it is that other people will also try to reduce pollution at Delancy Station?

Have you ever personally experienced a situation similar to this in the past?
* No
* Yes

How easy or difficult was it for you to understand the health care and transportation scenarios described previously?
Very Difficult 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very Easy

How involved did you feel while imaging yourself as a witness to the scenarios?
Not at All Involved 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very Involved

Having taken the role of a witness to the scenarios described, how realistic do you think your responses to the questionnaire were?
Very Unrealistic 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very Realistic

How confident are you that your responses to the questionnaire reflect what you would be likely to perceive and how you would behave in such a situation?
Not at All Confident 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Very Confident

Thank you for participating!

If you are willing to participate in a follow-up interview, please list your name, phone number, address, and email below. Your contact information will be separated from the rest of this survey before the data are analyzed, so the information that you provided in this survey will remain anonymous.

Again, thank you for your participation!

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APPENDIX B

Alternative Value Orientation Measures

Earley's (1994) and Erez and Earley's (1987) research on individualism and collectivism informed the questionnaire used in this study. A number of items from these two publications capture what might be considered prosocial or proself orientations. Items one through four are prosocial measures, and items five through seven are proself measures:

1. People like to work in groups better than they like working by themselves.
2. People do better work alone than in groups.
3. Members of a group should accept group decisions even when they personally have a different opinion.
4. Problem solving by groups gives better results than problem solving by individuals.
5. If a group is slowing me down it is better to leave it and work alone.
6. To be superior, a person must stand alone.
7. Only those who depend on themselves get ahead in life.

These items were included on the survey for this study. Participants answered on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale.

In another study on personal values, Triandis (1996) measures individualism and collectivism. In this study, the following questions, adapted from Trandis' vertical individualism measures, were used. Responses were on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale. The items below may be characterized as measuring the extent to which an individual has a proself orientation:

1. It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.
2. Competition is the law of nature.
3. When another person does better than I do, I get tense.
4. Without competition, it is not possible to have a good society.
5. Winning is everything.
6. It is important that I do my job better than others
7. I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others.

8. Some people emphasize winning; I'm not one of them.

Like Eagly and Steffen's (1986) study on communion and agentic characteristics, this study asked participants to indicate the extent to which they see themselves as being independent, dominant, self-confident, kind, helpful, understanding, aware of others' feelings, and able to devote self to others. Two additional characteristics were added to this list as well: direct and individualistic. Participants indicated whether or not these characteristics described them on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much).

APPENDIX C

Summary of Predictions and Findings

Predictions: Social Antecedents of Social Value Orientation

Hypothesis 1: Age is positively related to a prosocial value orientation and negatively related to a proself value orientation.	Unsupported
Hypothesis 2: Females are more likely than males to have a prosocial value orientation.	Unsupported
Hypothesis 3: Religious service attendance is positively related to prosocial value orientation.	Unsupported
Hypothesis 4: Employed individuals are more likely than unemployed individuals to have a prosocial value orientation.	Unsupported
Hypothesis 5: Having parents who displayed concern for the welfare of others is positively related to prosocial value orientation.	Unsupported
Hypothesis 6: Childhood religious service attendance is positively related to prosocial value orientation.	Unsupported
Hypothesis 7: Having parents who valued social or religious involvement in their community is positively related to prosocial value orientation.	Unsupported
Hypothesis 8: Liberal political beliefs are positively related to prosocial value orientation.	Unsupported
Hypothesis 9: Conservative political beliefs are positively related to proself value orientation	Unsupported
Hypothesis 10: Belief in a just world is positively related to proself value orientation	Partially supported: Belief in a just world is positively related to proself value orientation but not significantly related to prosocial value orientation. But, the relationship between belief in a just

	world and social value orientation was in the predicted direction.
Education and Parental Income	Prosocial value orientation was negatively related to parental income, and proself value orientation was positively related to parental income As education level increased, the likelihood of having a proself value orientation decreased.

Predictions: Social Value Orientation and Responses to Injustice

Hypothesis 11: Prosocials will perceive an unjust situation to be more severely unfair than proself individuals.	Partially supported: For hospital scenario, the difference between the mean perceptions and proselfs was not significant. It was, however, significant for the bus scenario. The mean for prosocials was significantly smaller. Thus the prosocials saw the bus scenario as significantly more unfair – but the same was not true for the hospital scenario. Regression results indicated that being prosocial significantly increased perceptions of injustice. Being proself did increase perceptions of justice, but this increase was not significant.
Hypothesis 12: Perceived severity of a social injustice is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.	Supported: As perceived severity of injustice increases, so does anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies. This finding is consistent across all models, with one exception. Variables in the "personal beliefs, values, and experiences" category reduce the significance of perceptions of injustice on anticipated responses to the bus scenario.
Hypothesis 13: Prosocial value orientation is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.	Partially supported: The effect is significant in the expected direction, but only for reflexive strategies.

Hypothesis 14: Proself value orientation is negatively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.	Partially supported: The effect is significant in the expected direction, but only for reflexive strategies.

Predictions: Other Factors and Responses to Injustice

Hypothesis 15: Women are more likely than men to anticipate using reflexive strategies in response to injustice.	Partially supported: When perceptions of justice are excluded from the model, being female has a significant impact on anticipated use of reflexive strategies to the bus scenario, for both prosocials) and proselfs. When perceptions of injustice are added in to the model, these effects disappear.
Hypothesis 16: Age is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.	Partially supported: Age is positively related to anticipated use of reflexive strategies in response to the bus scenario. For both prosocials and proselfs, as age increases, so does anticipated use of reflexive strategies in response to the bus scenario. These effects disappear when perceptions of injustice are added into the regression model (see Table 7), suggesting that perceptions of injustice mediate the relationship between age and responses to injustice.
Hypothesis 17: Being married is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive strategies.	Unsupported: At first glance, marital status appeared to be significant in some cases; but, further analysis indicated that results were the result of a skewed variable.
Hypothesis 18: Having children living at home is negatively related to anticipated use of active strategies.	Unsupported
Hypothesis 19: Religious service attendance is positively related to anticipated use of active strategies.	Partially supported: A significant effect was found for religious service attendance, but only for prosocials and the bus vignette. The more often prosocials attended

	religious services, the more likely they were to anticipate using active strategies in response the bus scenario.
Hypothesis 20: Employment, education, and income are positively related to anticipated use of active strategies.	Partially supported: Employment did not have a significant effect. In a model with only demographic variables, education has a positive, significant effect on use of reflexive strategies in response to the bus scenario and the use of active strategies in response to the hospital scenario, for both prosocials and proselfs. Additionally, there was a marginal, positive effect on anticipated use of reflexive strategies in response to the hospital scenario. In a model with perceptions of injustice and demographics, all of these effects disappear; but a marginal effect appears for proselfs' anticipated use of active strategies in response to the hospital scenario. Income is has a significant, negative impact on anticipated use of active strategies in response to the bus scenario, for prosocials and proselfs. It also had a marginal effect, for proselfs only, on anticipated use of active strategies in response to the hospital scenario. When perceptions of justice are added in to the model the marginal effects disappear, but the other effects remain the same.
Hypothesis 21: Having parents who displayed concern for the welfare of others is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.	Partially supported: Parents' modeling behavior and conversations with their children about helping/not helping others did not have a significant effect. But, parental encouragement of childhood community involvement had a positive, significant effect on responses to the hospital and bus

	scenario in every regression model. Having parents who encouraged them to be involved in the community increased anticipated use of high committment strategies for both prosocials and proselfs. A regression of perceptions of injustice and childhood socialization on strategy choice also produced one unexpected finding. The more strongly participants' agreed that their parents talked to them about cooperative values during their childhood, the more likely they were to anticipate using reflexive strategies in the bus scenario.
Hypothesis 22: Childhood religious service attendance is positively related to the anticipated use of active strategies.	Unsupported
Hypothesis 23: Liberals are more likely than conservatives to anticipate using reflexive and active strategies in response to injustice.	Partially supported: The more liberal individuals perceived themselves to be, the more likely they were to anticipate using reflexive strategies in response to the bus scenario.
Unexpected findings related to political orientation	With perceptions of justice included in the model, interest in current events has a significant effect on low commitment responses to the hospital scenario, for both prosocials and proselfs. So, while political ideology and interest in current events both affect anticipated use of reflexive strategies, political ideology appears to have more predictive power for the bus scenario; and interest in current events appears to have more predictive power for the hospital scenario. When perceptions of fairness are removed from the model, however,

	these results change slightly. For both prosocials and proselfs, interest in current events increased the anticipated use of reflexive strategies in response to injustice. This change suggests that while interest in current events is important, fairness perceptions may be more so – in certain contexts.
Hypothesis 24: Having experienced a similar injustice in the past is positively related to anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.	Partially supported: Having experienced a similar injustice in the past is positively related to anticipated use of reflexive strategies in response to the hospital scenario. This is true both for prosocials and proselfs.
Hypothesis 25: Empathy is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.	Partially supported: Empathy also has an impact on low commitment strategy use. As empathy increased, so did anticipated use of reflexive strategies. This was true both for prosocials. But, when perceptions of injustice are added in to the model, the effects of empathy disappear. Further analysis indicated that stronger feelings of empathy lead to increased severity of perceptions of injustice. Thus, perceptions of justice serve as a mediator between feelings of empathy and responses to injustice.
Hypothesis 26: Believing that one's actions will make a difference is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.	Partially supported: When individuals are convinced that their response will make a difference, it increases prosocials' and proselfs' anticipated use of reflexive strategies for the bus scenario and anticipated use of low active strategies in the hospital and bus scenarios. When perceptions of injustice are added in to the regression, the anticipated use of reflexive strategies in response to the bus scenario becomes non-significant. It remains significant for active strategies in response to both the bus and hospital scenarios. It appears that

	perceptions of justice serve as a mediator here as well.
Hypothesis 27: Believing that others will cooperate in efforts to redress injustice is positively related to the use of reflexive and active strategies.	Partially supported: Both prosocials and proselfs are significantly more likely to anticipate using reflexive strategies in response to the bus scenario if they believe that others will try to help them
Hypothesis 28: The extent to which individuals value community involvement is positively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.	Partially supported: In general, the more strongly individuals believe in community involvement, the more likely they are to anticipate using active strategies in response to both the hospital and bus scenarios. This is true for prosocials and proselfs. When perceptions of justice are added in to the model, belief in community involvement increases anticipated use of reflexive strategies in response to the bus scenario. These added effects only occur in the model with both perceptions of justice and social value orientation, so the changes are likely due to an interaction between the two variables
Hypothesis 29: Belief in a just world is negatively related to the anticipated use of reflexive and active strategies.	Unsupported, possibly because there was not enough variation within this sample.

APPENDIX D

Summary of Means and Standard Deviations for Response Strategies

Anticipated Responses to Hospital Vignette

	Mean	Standard Deviation
Reflexive Strategies		
Voting	2.20	0.77
Staying informed about the situation	2.08	0.79
Talking about the situation with others	2.85	1.13
Reflexive strategies scale	2.30	0.70
Active Strategies		
Volunteering	2.04	0.83
Attending a protest	1.82	0.79
Sending a letter to a political representative	2.1	0.84
Sending a letter to a newspaper	1.82	0.80
Donating money to an organization	2.54	1.12
Active strategies scale	2.04	0.75

Anticipated Responses to Bus Vignette

	Mean	Standard Deviation
Reflexive Strategies		
Voting	2.01	0.83
Staying informed about the situation	2.07	0.80
Talking about the situation with others	2.07	0.80
Reflexive strategies scale	2.01	0.74
Active Strategies		
Volunteering	1.89	0.79
Attending a protest	1.83	0.83
Sending a letter to a political representative	2.33	1.15
Sending a letter to a newspaper	1.90	0.80
Donating money to an organization	2.43	1.07
Active strategies scale	2.03	0.77

APPENDIX E

Reliability values for scales

SCALE	RELIABILITY
Hospital vignette reflexive scale	α=0.7396
Hospital vignette active scale	α=0.8449
Bus vignette reflexive scale	α=0.7608
Bus vignette active scale	α=0.8487
Family independent values scale	α=0.4667
Family cooperative values scale	α=0.7142
Parental community involvement scale	α=0.7941
Parental encourage of community involvement scale	α=0.8382
Adult community involvement scale	α=0.8199
Empathy scale	α=0.7349
Belief in a just world scale	α=0.5248

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