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Michael Duryee-Browner 4/19/11

The Ideal of an Americanized Japan: Nitobe Inazō and Korekiyo Takahashi

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Abstract

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By Michael Duryee-Browner

Nitobe Inazō and Korekiyo Takahashi, who were both born at the dawn of the Meiji Era and died before World War II, represented the American ideal of Japan: westernized. This study is a question of the process of cultural exchange seen through the experiences of these two remarkable men. How did Nitobe Inazō and Korekiyo Takahashi, both consciously and unconsciously, choose to represent Japan to America? Why did they choose to do it the way they did? In what way were they the right men for the job and in what way were they simply perpetuating cultural misunderstanding? In a more general sense, how are foreign cultures interpreted? Who is responsible for the representation of a culture, and who in turn is responsible to analyze that portrayal?

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“We complain that we are not understood—or worse, that we are misunderstood…Far more profitable would it be for us to reflect how little we understand others, or how greatly we misunderstand them.”

-Nitobe Inazō, October 13, 1933.

Until the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853, Japan was governed by shoguns, policed by samurai, and secluded from the rest of the world. In just 50 years, the Tokugawa shogunate was replaced by the Meiji Emperor, the rifle had replaced the sword,[1] and railroads etched their way through the Japanese landscape. It was, and is still, perhaps the most impressively rapid and widespread adaptation exhibited by a country in history. The exposure of western thoughts, technologies, and styles to Japan also resulted in the exposure of Japanese life to the West. Japanese immigrated to the United States just as the Italians, Irish, and Chinese had before them: in search of work and opportunity. Within the borders of a country like the United States, one with a deep rooted history of a fear for the unfamiliar, this cultural adaptation traveled a rocky road. Historian Ronald Takaki detailed the path of the early Japanese immigrant in America as one of ethnic solidarity and enterprise.[2] This behavior only fueled anti-Japanese sentiments in the American political and social scene; the newcomers were painted as isolationists who had no interest in assimilating to western culture. Takaki's focus on Japanese immigrants (referred to collectively as the *Issei*) operating within the American domestic scene—an approach that has been popular with most scholars—was expanded upon by Eiichiro Azuma who called for a new, "inter-nationalist" approach to the era of Japanese immigration.[3] Instead of mere victims of racist America, Azuma painted the *Issei* as viable citizens of two distinct empires whose experience was dictated by the struggle to mediate the demands of both. The *Issei* experience is addressed in Chapter 1 and serves to establish the starting point for the main focus of this study.

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[1] In reality, for a second time. Starting in the early 1500s, Japan received and consequently advanced the quality of firearms to a significant extent throughout the century, but unification in 1618 brought an end to warfare and development of firearms fell by the wayside.

[2] Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1989), 180.

[3] Eiichiro Azuma, *Between Two Empires: Race, History and Transnationalism in Japanese America*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 6.

While Takaki and Azuma mainly discussed the general population of Japanese in America this study focuses on two men, Nitobe Inazō and Korekiyo Takahashi, who stood at the forefront of Japanese American cultural exchange. In Japan they were and still are highly revered. Nitobe represented Japan at the League of Nations and Takahashi served as both Finance and Prime Minister; both men at some point since their respective deaths have appeared on a Yen banknote. Nitobe has been the subject of much scholarly research, most of which centers on the cultural conundrums he found himself in when Japan became increasingly militarized in the first decades of the 20th century. This study focuses on two texts of Nitobe's: his acclaimed 1899 novel *Bushido: The Soul of Japan* which is discussed in Chapter 2, and a speech he gave to the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1929 entitled "Japan's Preparedness for International Co-operation" which is discussed in Chapter 3. The analysis centers on the language of these two texts and how they represent Nitobe's effort to portray Japan to a Western audience. Takahashi, on the other hand, besides a recent biography written by Dr. Richard Smethurst, has not received much attention from Western scholars outside of his fiscal policies. The study of Takahashi, then, is more specific and centers on three different periods of his life during which he interacted with the United States. Chapter 2 discusses Takahashi's inspection of the American patent system in 1885. Chapter 4 makes use of an excellent archive of newspaper articles, both online and from the author's personal collection, that describe Takahashi's second visit to the States in 1904 as well as his appointment as Prime Minister in 1921. All of these sources were written in English and intended for Western audiences.

The fact that these sources were all originally printed in English is crucial to this study's goal. Unlike the labor classes, who as Takaki and Azuma illustrated were subject to intense racism and powerful exterior forces, westernized intellectuals like Nitobe and Takahashi were

respected and listened to by their American counterparts and consequently awarded extraordinary autonomy within the United States and western social circles. While American politicians, intellectuals, and commoners readily cast aside the *Issei* population as unable to assimilate, they gave their full attention to Nitobe and Takahashi. Because of the respect they earned from American audiences, Nitobe and Takahashi earned a place in Japanese American relations in which their voice, their beliefs, and their behavior was extrapolated as a representation of Japan as a whole. This was not a position into which both men were unwittingly forced. Nitobe routinely labeled himself as Japan's "Bridge" to the West and Takahashi made several trips to and from the United States and Europe as a representative of the Meiji government. These men were intelligent, proud, and masters of the English language; in many ways the perfect type of person to take on the role of cultural ambassador. But as this study will show, these very characteristics served to undermine their efforts in the West, specifically America. Despite all of their talents that made them different from the *Issei*, Nitobe and Takahashi both fell victim to the same issues as their less popular brethren in that they were caught in the middle. Yet unlike the *Issei*, who were simply pushed aside, Nitobe and Takahashi represented the American ideal of Japan: westernized. This study then is a question of the process of cultural exchange seen through the experiences of two remarkable men. How did Nitobe Inazō and Korekiyo Takahashi, both consciously and unconsciously, choose to represent Japan to America? Why did they choose to do it the way they did? In what way were they the right men for the job and in what way were they simply perpetuating cultural misunderstanding? In a more general sense, how are foreign cultures interpreted? Who is responsible for the representation of a culture, and who in turn is responsible to analyze that portrayal?

Chapter One

The Issei Experience

Starting just before 1900, the Japanese government began to aggressively promote overseas emigration. Japanese immigrants to the United States were proud and hopeful; the Japanese government also expected great things from these pioneers. State-sponsored programs were set up in Japan and America to help westernize rural Japanese before their inevitable introduction to the American public: "the question of how to control the behavior of 'the poor,' in both a moral and material sense, was among the most important agendas of the Japanese immigrant community."[4] In this quote, "immigrant community" specifically refers to the elite *Issei*; members of this group were typically nationalistic colonialists, mercantilists, and students. The *Issei* elite commonly used the phrase *dekasegi* (loosely translated to "working away from home"), or *gumin* (ignorant masses), to refer to Japanese immigrants of the labor class. These upper- and upper-middle class individuals typically viewed their rural counterparts as damaging to the American opinion of Japanese immigration. *Issei* elite believed that their financial and political prospects in America were being directly impeded by the "ignorant" behavior of the less educated labor classes; these elites consequently reached out to the Japanese government for aid, and soon the Meiji government was spearheading formation of organizations such as the Japanese Association of America (JAA), which consisted of like-minded *Issei* elites who played a large role in attempting to prepare the immigrant community for life in America. These organizations allowed *Issei* elites to "govern" the less advantaged members of the *Issei* and hold them to extraordinarily high standards of behavior and etiquette so as not to jeopardize American

[4] Ibid., 35.

opinion of the Japanese empire as a whole.[5] Photographs show classrooms of Japanese immigrants taught by Japanese teachers in Western dress, instructing their "students" in American material culture as well as societal norms (not to cook "fetid" dishes and not to breast-feed in public, for example.)[6] The goal was to prove to Americans that Japan was a truly "modernized" country and that they deserved an equal place in the Western world. The fact that most immigrants were of rural origins and had no knowledge of American culture, much less how to use a fork, made these efforts largely superficial. This is further compounded by the fact that all the while, the *Issei* elites held the labor class of immigrants in such disdain. These efforts did not work, though they occupied a significant amount of time and effort on the behalf of the community of *Issei* elites. In 1924, the United States Congress passed the infamous Exclusion act which effectively barred Japanese immigrants from entering the United States; a principle sentiment of this campaign was the Japanese inability to assimilate to American culture. The fact that there may have existed two distinct classes of Japanese immigrants, as the *Issei* elite tried to show, did not register in the minds of the American populace.

America has an unfortunate history of anti-immigrant sentiments. Japanese immigrants began feeling the heat towards the end of the 1800s, a tide that only swelled in the first quarter of the 20th century. The *Issei* population in the mainland United States numbered only 2,039 in 1890,[7] but by 1910 their numbers had swelled to 72,157 according to the U.S. census.[8] Most immigrants found work on farms and some became quite successful owners themselves. White Americans in the western states, most notably California where the largest percentage of *Issei* lived, reacted unfavorably to what they believed was an encroachment upon their own financial

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[5] Ibid., 35-60.
[6] Ibid., 54-55.
[7] Ibid., 68.
[8] Brian Niiya, ed., *Encyclopedia of Japanese American History: An A-To-Z Reference from 1868 to the Present*, (New York: Facts on File, 2001), 4.

opportunities, exacerbated by a financial crisis known as the "Panic of 1907."[9] In 1913, California passed an Alien Land Law with the goal of excluding Japanese from owning farmland (similar laws were passed in both Oregon and Washington at later dates). Numerous loopholes made the legislation highly ineffective, so Californians revised the law in 1920 which had a significant impact on Japanese land ownership.[10] Anti-Japanese legislation came to a head in 1924, with the passage of the Exclusion Act; while it did not specifically mention the Japanese it worked "as clearly as if they had been specifically identified."[11] An article in the *San Francisco Chronicle* from January 4, 1920 summed up the American attitude in fairly blunt fashion: "[The Japanese] do not acquire our language, do not accept our social habits, do not read American literature, do not absorb American ideals. They remain Japanese subjects and their allegiance is not to America but to the Emperor of Japan."

As anti-Japanese attitudes flourished in the States, the *Issei* found themselves drifting farther and farther from Japan itself. Despite the rampant racism present in America, the Japanese government and *Issei* elites retained high expectations for the emigrant population and purposefully romanticized the *Issei* experience in order to garner support for the movement back home. A perfect example of this disparity lies in two distinct cartoons, one that appeared in an *Issei* newspaper and one that appeared in a magazine that appeared on the Japanese mainland. The first depicts a Japanese laborer in California, carrying a heavy satchel on which is written "exclusion" in Japanese. A tearful sun presides overhead who says in English, "Be patient and do your best, some day you will win." This is an example of the popular Japanese phrase *inin jicho* (prudence and perseverance) that was repeated in many *Issei* circles during the course of

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[9] Jules Becker, *The Course of Exclusion: San Francisco Newspaper Coverage of the Chinese and Japanese in the United States*, (New York: Mellen University Press, 1991), 116.
[10] Masao Suzuki, "Important or Impotent: Taking Another Look at the 1920 California Alien Land Law," in *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 64 No. 1, (Mar. 2004)
[11] Becker, 3.

exclusion.[12] The cartoon's optimism is muted, yet also quite out of place given the terrible lifestyle to which most of the poorer *Issei* were subjugated and the meager prospects that lay ahead. The cartoon from the Japanese magazine, however, is striking in its audacity; it portrays an *Issei* farmer who has tied two white Americans to a yoke. This cartoon "mirrored mainstream racial thinking in Japan," and was also a clear result of the "Issei Pioneer Thesis," a current in Japanese politics that strove to glorify the efforts of the *Issei* in America.[13] Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth than this brash cartoon. The disconnect between the *Issei* and the homeland from whence they came was clear. The *Issei* experience was dominated by a duality to which they were constantly subjugated. They were pushed and pulled between the cultural and global aspirations of two modern empires: "Although they constantly traversed, often blurred, and frequently disrupted the varied definitions of race, nation, and culture, Issei were able neither to act as free-floating cosmopolitans nor to enjoy a postmodern condition above and beyond the hegemonic structures of state control."[14]

Why is this discussion of the *Issei* experience important to this study? It is because there were Japanese citizens who did transgress these boundaries: for example, Japanese who enjoyed privileged lives, or early exposures to American culture, or a mastery of the English language. They were not *Issei* themselves as they did not immigrate to the United States. Their presence in America was temporary and typically at the behest of the Meiji government, or motivated by educational purposes. While they shared a common characteristic with *Issei* elites in being members of a wealthier and better educated class, their efforts were not as heavily invested in the behavior of the labor classes because they were not American citizens (or at least, they had not

[12] Azuma, 72.
[13] Ibid., 108.
[14] Ibid., 5.

taken up residence in America). This is an important distinction. While some *Issei* elites were well educated, aware of Western customs, and eager to assimilate, the fact that their presence in America was permanent caused them to be grouped with the labor class. They also spent much of their time trying to Westernize the poorer *Issei*, as well as fighting for equal rights on the political scene. The more transient individuals were the Japanese who were accepted by Americans and welcomed with open arms in to Western politics, intellectual circles, and even as members of family. To suggest that this hospitality was in part a product of the fact that they were guests—not neighbors—to Americans is not out of the question. Because the poor *Issei*, with their public breast-feeding and "fetid" dishes, were rejected by American society and the elite *Issei* were lumped in to the same category, the representation of the Japanese Empire as a modern and westernized entity fell in to the laps of these individuals who spent their lives traveling between the two empires. The focus of this study will be how they managed, and struggled, to maintain this precarious position in such a time in world history. Was their presence helpful to the American understanding of Japan? Were they accurately representing Japan? Or were they representing a select few Japanese? Or, perhaps even an idealized American view of Japan? Did they act as effective "bridges across the Pacific," or did they find themselves caught between two irreconcilable forces?

Chapter Two

Early encounters with the West

Nitobe Inazō and Korekiyo Takahashi were two of the privileged Japanese referenced at the end of Chapter 1. Both men share many characteristics as well as dissimilarities. Inazō was born September 1, 1862 in the the Morioka Prefecture of northern Honshu, the main island of the Japanese archipelago. Although his father died young, Nitobe's grandfather's economic success allowed him, his six siblings, and his mother a "rather high position both in rank and in worldly possessions…the more respectable of the middle class."[15] When Nitobe traveled to Tokyo to begin his education at the age of nine, he was carried there in a palanquin.[16] In Tokyo, Nitobe began to study English, where he excelled. This led to his acceptance in to the newly established Sapporo Agricultural College on the island of Hokkaido, a school founded by William S. Clark, who was one of the many *oyatoi gaikokujin* who came to Japan during this period.[17] At Sapporo, Nitobe was exposed to Christianity and by the time he graduated, he had converted. [18] Nitobe's relationship with Christianity continued when he made his first trip to the United States in 1884 to begin his graduate studies at Allegheny College in Pennsylvania. Unhappy with the education there, Nitobe transferred to Johns Hopkins University where he encountered Quakerism. Nitobe liked "the plain and simple clothing," and "he felt comfortable in the quiet atmosphere devoid of priest, sacraments, or rituals." In such an atmosphere, Nitobe believed, "were the only essentials

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[15] Nitobe Inazō, *Reminiscences of Childhood: in the early days of Modern Japan*, (Tokyo: Maruzen Co., 1934), 501.
[16] John F. Howes and George Oshiro, "Who Was Nitobe?" in *Nitobe Inazō: Japan's Bridge Across the Pacific*, ed. John F. Howes (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 7.
[17] These were foreign employees hired by the Meiji government with the goal of introducing Western technology and advancements to Japan in order to facilitate modernization.
[18] For a more in depth discussion of the Sapporo school and its graduates, including Nitobe's lifelong friend Uchimura Kanzo, see George Oshiro, "Nitobe Inazō and the Sapporo Band: Reflections on the Dawn of Protestantism in Early Meiji Japan," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, vol. 34 no. 1, 2007.

needed to mingle with the spiritual realm."[19] Through the Baltimore Meeting of Friends Nitobe would be introduced to his future wife, Mary Passmore Elkinton, whom he would marry in 1891 after finishing his doctorate in agricultural economics at Halle University in Germany. Nitobe's intellect was impressive; he wrote his dissertation in German, his third language.

Takahashi Korekiyo, on the other hand, grew up quite poor. Takahashi was born as Kawamura Wakiji on July 27, 1854 as the last of seven children. His father decided he could not support another child and four-day-old Wakiji was adopted by Takahashi Koretada, a member of the *ashigaru* class, one of the lowest members of samurai; many thought they "were not samurai at all."[20] At the age of six Takahashi was sent to study English in Yokohama and by the age of twelve he was quite proficient. Through a friend, Takahashi arranged to travel to San Francisco and before his departure he attempted to assemble a western looking outfit; it consisted, among other items, of a cotton vest and pants, a silk frock coat and a pair of used women's satin shoes.[21] The sea voyage took quite a toll on the outfit and he looked so strange upon arrival in the States "passersby occasionally hit the top of his hat to ridicule him."[22] Takahashi's arrangement in San Francisco was not ideal; the young boy was required to work for a family in return for room and board. Takahashi was not allowed to go to school and was stuck doing menial chores around the house throughout the day, which angered him so much that he simply stopped working. His host family proceeded to ask if he wanted to live in Oakland; Takahashi readily agreed and blindly signed a document presented to him by his American father. What the naïve Takahashi did not know was that he had just signed himself over for three years of indentured servitude. After a year of feuding with a Chinese stableboy and continued roguish behavior, the family moved and

[19] Oshiro, 103.
[20] Richard Smethurst, *From Foot Solider to Finance Minister: Takahashi Korekiyo, Japan's Keynes*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 10.
[21] Ibid., 21.
[22] Ibid., 24.

Takahashi luckily was able to return to Japan. When home, Takahashi taught at English-language schools in his home domain of Karatsu. While working at one of these schools, he met a Dutchman named Guido Verbeck, an *oyatoi gaikokujin* just like William S. Clark. Just as Nitobe had learned of Christianity through Clark, Takahashi learned of it through Verbeck and converted.

Nitobe and Takahashi clearly had quite exceptional experiences as Japanese youth in the early Meiji period. When compared with the *Issei* from the first chapter it is easy to see how these two bright-eyed young men greatly differed from the majority of the population that was emigrating to America (and even the rest of the Japanese population as a whole.) Nitobe was wealthy, attended a westernized high school, achieved a doctoral degree after studying in the United States and Germany, converted to Quakerism, and married an American woman all before 1900. Most of the *Issei* were poor, had no formal education, had hardly any idea what the United States or Germany even were, were certainly not Christian, and were consistently discriminated against by white Americans. One may cite Takahashi's modest upbringings as a point in common with the general *Issei* population, but he had achieved an advanced level of English by the age of 12. Before he turned 15 had already lived in the United States for over a year and had also converted to Christianity, all by the early 1870s.

Of all the differences between these two men and the rest of the Japanese in America, the essential difference was their mastery of the English language. For the Meiji government, these men achieved what the *Issei* elite could not: represent Japan in the international scene as a modernized country that should be taken seriously. Nitobe would later be appointed as Under Secretary to the League of Nations largely because of his fluency in English and French[23] and

[23] Thomas W. Burkman, "The Geneva Spirit," in *Nitobe Inazō: Japan's Bridge Across the Pacific*, ed. John F. Howes (Westview Press: Boulder, 1995), 186.

Takahashi's meteoric rise through the ranks of Meiji politics could not have been possible without his "command of English."[24] On the American side, it is easy to see why English-speaking Japanese were much more welcome than those who did not learn the language. Here we may quote Benedict Anderson from his seminal work on the rise of nationalism, *Imagined Communities*: "languages were, so to speak, the personal property of quite specific groups - their daily speakers- and moreover…these groups, imagined as communities, were entitled to their autonomous place in the fraternity of equals."[25] Men like Nitobe and Takahashi were granted access to this "fraternity" while a population like the *Issei* was kept out. Entrance in to this "fraternity" was of utmost importance to the Meiji government. Equally important to these two men, especially Nitobe, was getting their homeland invited to the "fraternity". In the following anecdotes we shall see how these efforts played out in the early lives of these two men.

During the second half of the 19th century the Meiji government worked furiously to adjust all forms of Japanese technology, ideology, and bureaucracy to the Western model; a man with a background like Korekiyo Takahashi was perfect to head such an exchange. Because of the rapid exchange of information, many European and American businessmen and inventors became wary that their products were being replicated in Japan without proper adherence to individual property rights. The Japanese did not have any established legal framework to deal with property rights and they viewed the creation of such as an opportunity to further legitimize Japan in the global community. Specifically, the government believed patent legislation could be used "as a lever to negotiate an end to the humiliating unequal treaties."[26] Because Takahashi had expressed earlier interest in individual property rights and he was fluent in English, he was

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[24] Smethurst, 36.

[25] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (Verso: New York, 2006), 84.

[26] Smethurst, 61. The "unequal treaties" were a series of legislations created in the second-half of the nineteenth century by Western powers that took advantage of Eastern nations such as Japan, Korea, and China.

asked to join the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry in 1881 with the goal of helping Japan write its first sets of trademark and patent laws.[27] In 1885, Takahashi left for the United States to get a first-hand look at the United States patent system. It was his second voyage to America and also the second time his dress was completely inappropriate upon arrival. The Japanese consul to New York, Takahashi Shinkichi, told him that his clothes were "Japanese-made and shameful to look at;"[28] the two consequently bought the younger Takahashi a whole new suit in proper American style. The journal *Scientific American* acknowledged the young Japanese national's visit with a short paragraph, in which is name his butchered as "Koerhiyo Takahaski."[29] While in New York Takahashi attended a performance showcasing Japanese "customs" for an American audience. He became quite upset at the portrayal of his homeland and in a later speech claimed it was "indecent and shamed us in front of foreigners."[30] The misrepresentation distressed him, but it was the fact that he felt demeaned in front of a foreign audience that truly bothered him. Despite these various cultural misunderstandings, Takahashi was received warmly by the employees of the U.S. patent office. During his stay Takahashi befriended a man named Schuyler Duryee who became his life-long acquaintance. The two were so close that Duryee asked Takahashi to be the godfather to his first son; the American newborn was consequently named Korekiyo Takahashi Duryee, though he went by the much simpler Kore. Though not married to an American like Nitobe, Takahashi thus also had family in the States. [31] Unlike the *Issei* of Chapter 1, Takahashi was readily welcomed into American society. Takahashi's

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[27] Ibid., 61.
[28] Ibid., 65.
[29] *Scientific American*, Vol. LIV, 1886.
[30] Smethurst, 65.
[31] I owe the openness of these two men a large debt. Schuyler Duryee is my great-great grandfather, Korekiyo Takahashi Duryee my great-grandfather. I now proudly hold the middle name "Kore" as a reminder of this incredible relationship.

relations with Schuyler Duryee are proof positive to his successful cultivation of his westernized character and his innate ability to act comfortably in an American setting.

There is one specific anecdote from this visit that shows perfectly how Korekiyo Takahashi chose to represent his homeland of Japan to a Western power like the United States. This moment comes from a discussion Takahashi had with a certain employee of the patent office, Dr. P.B. Pierce. As Takahashi's stay in Washington D.C. was coming to a close, Dr. Pierce acknowledged that since his Japanese visitor had asked so many questions during his visit, he wondered if he could pose one himself. Takahashi readily agreed and Dr. Pierce asked, "I would like to know why it is that the people of Japan desire to have a patent system." Takahashi's reply was nothing short of glowing:

> You know that it is only since Commodore Perry, in 1854, opened the ports of Japan to foreign commerce that the Japanese have been trying to become a great nation, like other nations of the earth, and we have looked about us to see what nations are the greatest, so that we could be like them; and we said "There is the United States, not much more than a hundred years old, and America was discovered by Columbus yet four hundred years ago;" and we said "What is it that makes the United States such a great nation?" and we investigated and we found that it was patents, and we will have patents.

In the face of such admiration, head satisfyingly swelled, Dr. Pierce's reply comes as no surprise: "Not in all history is there an instance of such unbiased testimony to the value and worth of the patent system as practiced in the United States."[32] Given our understanding of Takahashi and the country he was coming from, we know his testimony is far from "unbiased." One also must wonder where in Takahashi's answer Dr. Pierce found anything remotely specific to the actual "value and worth" of patent law in the United States, other than the fact that it was apparently what made the United States so great. Takahashi clearly struck the right note with his response.

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[32] Kenneth Dobyns, *The Patent Office Pony: A History of the Early Patent Office*, (Virginia: Sergeant Kirkland's Museum and Historical Society, Inc., 1994), 198-99.

This is an early example of Takahashi's conversational skill that would serve him well throughout his life, especially in his travels in the West. He was able to show genuine respect towards Dr. Pierce without being completely insincere; Takahashi was able to avoid the fact that the Japanese government was interested in the American patent system because they felt disrespected in the international community. Consequently, Dr. Pierce leaves the conversation with a positive view of Takahashi, and perhaps a more positive view of Japan as a whole.

In this brief trip to the United States we see excellent examples of Takahashi doing his best to represent Japan as a western, modern empire deserving of equal footing in international affairs. He was well-received by the Americans, as he was able to display his mastery of English and present himself in the proper American style. These of course are not the sole reasons he got along with his hosts so well, but they certainly helped his cause. The part of the visit that is most compelling, however, is the comparison between Takahashi's answer to Dr. Pierce and his ulterior motives in studying the American patent system. When we take Takahashi's reaction to the display of Japanese "customs" to an American audience in to account—in that he felt demeaned in front of foreigners—it becomes understandable that Takahashi did not want to reveal to men like Dr. Pierce that the Meiji government felt humiliated as a result of the unequal treaties. It is now common knowledge that Japanese culture places an extraordinarily large importance on maintaining honor and avoiding shame. In Nitobe Inazō's own work *Bushidō: The Soul of Japan* which will be discussed momentarily, he explains "the sense of shame seems…to be the earliest indication of the moral consciousness of our race."[33] Of course, Dr. Pierce did not know this, and consequently left his conversation with Takahashi with a generalized view of Japan as ardently pro-American and eager to emulate the United States in every possible way.

[33] Nitobe Inazō, *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*, 19th ed., (Tokyo: Teibi Publishing Co., 1913), 60.

There was no suggestion as to the vulnerability of the Japanese government or illusion to the distinct ways of Japanese culture. In 1885, many Americans like Dr. Pierce had little to no knowledge of Japanese culture (in the same way that the *Issei* knew nothing of theirs.) What Takahashi's language shows is that despite a westernized appearance and demeanor, he was still a product of century-old Japanese cultural norms. The fact that most Americans had no understanding of these customs only made matters more difficult.

Nitobe Inazō attempted to bridge this gap of cultural misunderstanding. After spending much of his young adulthood in America and Europe and after marrying Mary Elkinton in 1891, Nitobe returned to Japan to teach. Until his appointment to the League of Nations in 1920, Nitobe served as principal for the Ichikō, the preparatory school for the University of Tokyo, then as a professor at the University itself, before becoming the first president of the New Tokyo Women's Christian College. During this period Nitobe's most significant contact with the West was the publication of his book, *Bushidō: The Soul of Japan,* in 1899. Published during a time when Western interest in Japan was high and motivated by benevolence and not suspicion, mainly as a product of the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905,[34] *Bushidō* became an international best-seller. As Nitobe himself notes in the introduction to the 1905 edition and those that followed, the work had been translated in to a vast number of languages, from "Mahratti,…German,…Bohemian…Polish," and the list goes on. Nitobe also graciously notes the "exceedingly flattering news…that President Roosevelt has done it the undeserved honor by reading it and distributing several dozen copies among his friends."[35] *Bushidō* was also immensely popular in Japan as the book capitalized on the explosion of nationalism that

[34] A. Hamish Ion, "Japan Watchers: 1903-1931," in *Nitobe Inazō: Japan's Bridge Across the Pacific,* ed. John F. Howes, (Westview Press: Boulder, 1995), 79.
[35] Nitobe, x.

followed the victories in the Sino- and Russo-Japanese wars; "bushidō was suddenly everywhere."[36]

It must be noted that many critics have emerged since *Bushidō*'s first publication. As evidenced by his privileged youth, Western education and Christian faith, Nitobe was not the ideal man to be writing on the ancient moral code championed by the samurai of Tokugawa times. Besides the fact that Nitobe was relatively ignorant of Japanese history and the classical works of Japanese culture, most critics point to the fact that *Bushidō* made it seem as if there existed a universal code of behavior amongst all Japanese citizens that was divided in to clear categories that each citizen referred to as readily as a Christian would the Ten Commandments.[37] In spite of these criticisms, the general ideas of the book are considered accurate. The fact that many Japanese identified with the book is proof that most of Nitobe's interpretations rang true.

Whether or not *Bushidō* was a completely accurate portrayal of samurai ethics is not of utmost importance to this study; what is important is Nitobe's literary method. Nitobe's own introduction states that "The direct inception of this little book is due to the frequent queries put by my wife as to the reasons why such and such ideas and customs prevail in Japan."[38] The question of the intended audience of the book is put to bed a few pages later when he explains that he attempts to "illustrate whatever points I have made with parallel examples from European history and literature, believing that these will aid in bringing the subject nearer to the comprehension of foreign readers."[39] Nitobe makes good on this promise. For example, he relates the story of two samurai, Uesugi Kenshin and Takeda Shingen, who battled for fourteen long years. When the two men were at war, a rival prince denied the passage of salt in to

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[36] G. Cameron Hurst III, "Death, Honor, and Loyalty: The Bushido Ideal," in *Philosophy East and West* Vol. 40, No. 4 (October 1990): 513.
[37] Ibid., 512-514.
[38] Nitobe, v.
[39] Ibid., vii.

Shingen's region as a means to weaken him. When Kenshin learned of this plan, he wrote personally to Shingen decrying the act with the words, "I do not fight with salt, but with the sword." Nitobe compares this to the words of the Roman Camillus, who once proclaimed "We Romans do not fight with gold, but with iron." The story of Kenshin and Shingen continues until Shingen's death, over which his rival wept aloud at the loss of "the best of enemies." This, Nitobe points out, is reminiscent of the sorrow that overtook Antony and Octavius at the death of their long rival and friend, Brutus.[40]

Moments of comparison between Eastern and Western traditions and figures are rife in *Bushido*. Nitobe quotes the great Chinese philosopher Mencius, whom Nitobe credits with having a significant influence on Japanese spiritual thought: "the feeling of distress is the root of benevolence, therefore a benevolent man is ever mindful of those who are suffering and in distress." This, according to Nitobe, anticipated Adam Smith's ethical philosophy by fourteen hundred years.[41] Another example of Nitobe comparing Eastern and Western philosophies comes from an old samurai maxim: "It becometh not the fowler to slay the bird which takes refuge in his bosom." He believes this type of moral attitude helps explain why the Red Cross, a movement considered particularly Christian, found such great success in Japan. Nitobe goes on to explain that "for decades before we heard of the Geneva Convention, Bakin, our greatest novelist, had familiarized us with the medical treatment of a fallen foe."[42] The entire book is filled with such parallels and it certainly makes Nitobe's interpretation of bushidō easier to understand for the Western reader. Nitobe certainly cites aspects of Japanese culture that are distinct from Western culture, but he makes a habit of dismissing these as trivial (such as the

[40] Ibid., 31-32.
[41] Ibid., 39.
[42] Ibid., 42.

observation that Japanese are overly polite)[43] or claiming that they are not as prevalent as one might think (such as *seppuku.*)[44]

Bushidō: The Soul of Japan is essentially a study of compare and contrast, with the general theme being "we're not so different after all." Though published twenty years after Takahashi landed in America to study the patent system, it still fell within the timeframe of general Western enthusiasm for all things Japanese before anti-Japanese sentiments truly grabbed hold in the United States from 1907 onwards. Though a proud explanation of the moral framework upon which Japanese culture resides, the book was created specifically because Nitobe found himself unable to justify that very culture to his American wife. Nitobe believed that Western parallels were needed to make the content relatable to his Western audience and also clearly wanted to make a point that Western and Japanese culture shared many commonalities. While Takahashi was concerned with not revealing Japan's weakness, Nitobe was consumed by not revealing Japan's uniqueness. These behaviors were principally driven by the motivation to present Japan as a western, modernized country. Takahashi and Nitobe were intelligently playing up to their audience. One is motivated to question if these men, especially Nitobe given the popularity of *Bushidō*, missed a golden opportunity at such a point in history. True, *Bushidō's* popularity was most likely due to the extensive parallels Nitobe draws, yet the West was intrigued by Japan during the turn of the century in basically every facet: economically, culturally, spiritually, etc. Perhaps the concept of constantly presenting Japan in a Western context was the exact wrong way to approach the situation. Instead, a respectful and honest admittance that in certain ways Japan was exceptionally different from the West may have fostered a better mutual understanding between the two cultures. But as we shall see the

[43] Ibid., 47-48.
[44] Ibid., 119.

progression of the 20th century saw the paths of Japan and the West, America specifically, intertwine in a multitude of ways. As the two Pacific powers began to realize the inevitable fates of their two empires, the time for cultural interpretation was long gone. Instead, misconceptions and racial prejudices would dominate their relationship with men like Nitobe and Takahashi caught in the breach.

Chapter 3

Nitobe Inazō and the Institute of Pacific Relations

The Institute of Pacific Relations was founded in 1925 as a non-governmental organization with the goal of facilitating discussion on affairs in the Pacific.[45] As the increasingly nationalistic Japanese and American Empires extended their reach, joining the many European nations who had already established colonies throughout the region, competition among nations and ideas increased tenfold. Out of this atmosphere came the IPR with the intention of providing clear, reasoned, and apolitical conversation.[46] The opening page from the news bulletin heralding the inaugural session described the Institute as "a self-governing and self-directing body concerned with promoting the best relations between the Pacific peoples to avoid misunderstandings and conflicts and promote friendship and cooperation."[47] The IPR was originally a Christian organization. It first developed as an idea in 1919 from discussions held by the Young Men's Christian Association of Honolulu, which was searching for a means by which to spread Christian teachings to young men throughout the Pacific. Over the following years it separated completely from the YMCA and became an autonomous entity.[48] Still, the 1925 proceedings held in Honolulu carried a distinctly religious air. The 13-day program is outlined in the beginning of the minutes; each morning began with 15 minutes of "meditation."[49] The conference was initiated by a prayer led by the Japanese scholar Tasuku Harada in which he thanked God "that we meet in the Crossroads of the Pacific where the peoples of various

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[45] "A General Report of Institute Progress," in *News Bulletin (Institute of Pacific Relations)*, May 20, 1926: 1.
[46] Jon Thares Davidann, "Colossal Illusions: U.S.-Japanese relations in the Institute of Pacific Relations," in *Journal of World History*, vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring, 2001): 170.
[47] *Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session, June 30-July 14, 1925*(Honolulu: IPR, 1925), 7.
[48] Ibid., 7-11.
[49] Ibid., 28-34.

tongues, colors and creeds live together in peace and harmony."[50] Harada's claim that the many people of the Pacific lived "together in peace and harmony" is a fairly standard cliché that in fact was a belief held by many members of the IPR. In reality, European, American, and even Japanese imperialism was a strong source of hostility and distrust throughout the region in 1925.[51] Already present in the deepest roots of the IPR we see the potential for misrepresentation of certain cultures, especially those of Asian nations who had been subjected to colonial rule and whose populations were largely non-Christian.[52] While the delegates from the dominant colonial powers—chiefly the United States and Japan—would continue to dictate the majority of Institute proceedings, Christianity did take a backseat; by the time the next conference was held in 1927, the daily schedule did not include time set aside for morning meditation, nor did the conference begin with a prayer. Instead, other similarities besides being citizens of the major colonial powers—namely economical, political, and ideological beliefs—would tie the delegates together.

The list of national councils who participated in the IPR at some point in time is impressive: Australia, Britain, Canada, China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United States, France, the Netherlands, the USSR, the Dutch East Indies, Thailand, and India. In his Foreword to the minutes of the 1927 conference held again in Honolulu, General Secretary Merle Davis, an ex-missionary, proclaimed that "the liberal and conservative, idealist and materialist, labor leader and capitalist, internationalist and nationalist were present and stated their opinions."[53] Despite the apparent diversity in cultures and philosophies represented, the men (and few women) who made up these councils were in reality a relatively homogenous

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[50] Ibid., 41.
[51] Davidann, 160.
[52] For an account of Christianity in Meiji Japan, see Irwin Scheiner, *Christian Converts and Social Protest in Meiji Japan*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).
[53] J.B. Condliffe, ed., *Problems of the Pacific: Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu 1927,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), v.

group; the IPR has been widely referred to as a gentleman's club. In the early years of the organization, when tensions were low and optimism was high, the participants were probably more comfortable with each other than they would have been with members of varying social classes from their own countries.[54] While Davis' quote championed the variety of political and ideological beliefs represented at the 1927 conference, most of the delegates can be associated with the general theories of Wilsonian internationalism. They held faith in human nature, believed in solving problems using rational and scientific methods, and considered international organizations, such as the IPR and the League of Nations, the proper way to achieve their goals.[55] These attitudes were directly reflected in the general format of the IPR, in which questions and topics concerning affairs in the Pacific were posed for review and consequently answered through a series of round-table discussions. While Davis' claim for diversity of opinion is debatable, he makes an additional claim that was not only true but essential to the functioning of the IPR: "the Institute has no connection with any government. It is non-sectarian, non-controversial, and non-propagandist."[56] Davis and his colleagues were concerned with the straight facts, which clearly resonated with Japanese intellectuals in their search for an objective medium through which to represent their county.

Given the objective nature of the IPR and fact that the Institute was founded under the tenets of internationalism and advertised its goal as easing cross-cultural relations in the Pacific, it is easy to see why the Institute was so important to many Japanese looking for greater respect in the international community. Unlike the League of Nations, which was a principally European association in which Japan was originally a minor player, the IPR, with its positively unique

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[54] Sandra Wilson, "The Manchurian Crisis and Moderate Japanese Intellectuals: The Japan Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations," in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jul., 1992): 523.
[55] Tomoko Akami, *Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations in war and peace, 1919-45*, (Routledge: London, 2002), 2.
[56] Condliffe, vi.

Pacific focus,[57] provided a medium through which Japanese intellectuals could carry significant clout. Some of the original members of the Japanese council, or JCIPR, were Zumoto Motosada, the editor of the *Herald of Asia*, Aiko Hoshino, the president of the Tsuda Women's College, and Professor Abe Isoo, a Christian Socialist and political leader.[58] The Japanese who were either directly involved in the IPR or simply expressed their support for the organization resembled a "Who's Who" of the Japanese intellectual and business elite. Their participation was a testament to the seriousness with which the Japanese regarded the potential of the IPR.[59] This list is also proof to the liberal and elite nature of the IPR; no Japanese generals or admirals, or commoners, can be found among the long lists of delegates. The JCIPR was also decidedly, and predictably, pro-Western. Along with the League of Nations Association, the council was the major non-religious liberal or moderate organization in Japan throughout the 1920s and 30s.[60] These attitudes are further illuminated when we recall the fact that the Exclusion Act was put in to legislation in 1924; the JCIPR was formed the year after. Merle Davis expressed surprise at the optimistic attitudes of the members of the early JCIPR:

> I was impressed with the faith in the goodwill and justice of the United States to which many of the Japanese leaders still cling. America was the source of their idealism, and to her they still feel that they owe their training, their point of view and much of their culture. America had been for many years a 'Star of Hope' to these men.[61]

The Japanese were certainly dismayed at the enactment of the Exclusion Law; Nitobe himself proclaimed that he would not set foot in the States until the legislation was repealed. Still, Japanese intellectuals viewed the IPR as the perfect medium through which to showcase

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[57] Akami, 3.
[58] This is a small sample; the IPR's archives can be accessed to find lists of every member from every delegation for each conference.
[59] Davidann, 171.
[60] Wilson, 520.
[61] Both of these quotes appear in Akami, 69.

and properly explain their homeland to the United States. They also maintained an impressively positive attitude towards America. Shibusawa Eiichi, one of Meiji Japan's leading industrialists and member of the JCIPR, wrote to Davis in light of the events of 1924:

> We owe too much to America, we honour her and love her too much to strike back…The America that we know has not acted. It is another America, not the real America. We must be patient and give our friend time to reassert her best self and make right in her own time and her own way what seems to us to be an unjust and unreasonable act.[62]

Shibusawa references an America that "we know," but who, according to Shibusawa, belonged to this "real America"? The Americans with whom Shibusawa had interacted for most of his adult life were likely similar to the ones with which Nitobe and Takahashi were also familiar;[63] typically white, upper-middle class Anglo-Saxon Protestants who had some genuine interest in Japan or Japanese culture. As previously referenced, these characteristics fit the majority of the American council in the IPR. Shibusawa's attitude consequently offers an essential view into the behaviors of these men. Nitobe and Takahashi's eagerness to play up to their American audience takes on an even more intriguing role in this regard. It is certain that these two men and other westernized Japanese intellectuals yearned for acceptance from all American citizens (or at least a significant majority.) Yet the Americans who had the most profound effects on their lives—*oyatoi gaikokujin* like William S. Clark, compassionate friends like Schuyler Duryee, and internationalists like Merle Davis—were all of similar character. This certainly played a large role in their interpretations of American politics and ideologies. They were not completely ignorant to American prejudice, of course, as evidenced by their eagerness to join the IPR in the

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[62] Ibid., 69.

[63] Interestingly, as a young man Shibusawa prescribed to the political philosophy of *sonnō jōi* (revere the emperor, expel the barbarians); see Shibusawa Eiichi, *The Autobiography of Shibusawa Eichii: From Peasant to Entrepreneur*, trans. Teruko Craig, (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), Chapter 2. Shibusawa's political ideals changed after a tour of European countries when he realized the importance of industrialization and modern economics.

first place. But suggesting that the Exclusion Act was wrought by "another America" suggests a relative lack of knowledge of anti-immigrant sentiments in the United States. If the undercurrents of colonialism and Christianity in the IPR were a hint as to the potential cultural misgivings such an organization could proliferate, the nature of the Japanese delegation—upper-middle class, liberal, pro-Western—and the American delegation—upper-middle class, internationalist—can be considered serious red flags.

In 1929 Kyoto, Japan was scheduled to host the third meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations; coincidentally Sawayanagi Masatarō, who had headed the JCIPR at the first two meetings in Honolulu, was appointed to the House of Peers in the same year and consequently was not able to attend the conference. Naturally, the Japanese council turned to Nitobe, who had already logged seven valuable years of international experience while serving as an Under-Secretary General to the League of Nations from 1919-1926. As previously mentioned, the League failed to accomplish much for Japan; by the time of his resignation in 1926 even the staunch internationalist Nitobe found himself relatively disillusioned with the League's Euro-centric focus, though he remained a supporter of the organization as a whole.[64] The Institute provided a more regional focus which Nitobe embraced.[65] Apart from his time spent with the League, Nitobe was a clear choice to head the JCIPR based on his mastery of the English language, his scholarly background, and his self-proclaimed title of "bridge builder." Needless to say Nitobe, and the Japanese council as a whole, were highly motivated to make the 1929 conference a success. Members of the League of Nations, as well as hundreds of foreign media members, were present to witness the young yet inspiring Institute at work. All visiting delegates were given unrestricted travel on Japan National Railways (which appears to have been a breach

[64] Thomas W. Burkman, "The Geneva Spirit," in *Nitobe Inazō: Japan's Bridge Across the Pacific*, ed. John F. Howes (Westview Press: Boulder, 1995), 200.
[65] Ibid., 202.

of IPR rules against government support) and William Holland of the American council commented on the impressive organization and hospitality shown by the hosts.[66] Gratuities aside, Nitobe, on whose charisma and reputation the JCIPR depended, played an essential role.[67]

Nitobe, being the head of the council of the host nation, had the honor of giving the opening address in Kyoto. He began by referencing the modern Atlantic civilizations wrought from ancient Mediterranean cultures and waxed, "Now the Pacific lands are to be the stage where shall meet all the races and cultures of the world…We meet here not in the spirit of conflict…but with a will to understanding and peace. The old notions of nations as fighting units or commercial rivals, is being discarded."[68] Nitobe went on to describe the Institute's value in comparison to the League as an apolitical, voluntary organization focused on science and reason instead of a governmental body grounded in politics and law. As in similar fashion to *Bushido*, he tied in East and West parallels by referencing Wordsworth, Thomas Hill Green, and Confucius. He even concluded his address by comparing the physical surroundings of Kyoto with those of Geneva and claimed, "Thus does Japan provide the Conference with the geographical requisites for the peaceful discussion of international relations. May you make full and satisfying use of them." [69] The speech is classic Nitobe and no doubt exactly what the Japanese council, and the rest of those in attendance, wanted to hear. It served to establish the friendly tone that would accompany the Kyoto proceedings—even the Chinese delegation, upset at the possibilities of Japanese meddling in Manchuria left the conference pleased at the

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[66] George Oshiro, "The End: 1929-1933," in *Nitobe Inazō: Japan's Bridge Across the Pacific*, ed. John F. Howes (Westview Press: Boulder, 1995), 254-55.
[67] Wilson, 523.
[68] Nitobe Inazō, "Opening Address at Kyoto," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 2 No. 11, (November, 1929), 685.
[69] Ibid., 687.

generosity shown them.[70] These positive attitudes, however, may have been even more influenced by a second speech Nitobe made at Kyoto.

In a speech entitled "Japan's Preparedness for International Co-Operation" Nitobe set out to dispel all myths about Japan's anti-foreign history and portray her as an eager and respectful participant in international affairs. Nitobe cited the original constitution of Japan, the Charter of Five Articles of Oath, which was enforced in the first year of the Meiji era. Specifically he gave attention to the final two articles; the fourth called to "abolish old and harmful customs and follow the universal law of heaven and earth," and the fifth called "upon the nation to seek knowledge throughout the world."[71] Nitobe explained that through such beliefs, Japan came "to know its own shortcomings and those features in western civilization which were worthy of adoption…this mental discipline, this training of an international mind, is, in the long run, of more far-reaching consequence than this diplomatic success or that failure."[72] The argument, in sum, was that the internationalist spirit championed by the IPR itself was present in the very foundations of the modern Japanese state. Nitobe backed up this assertion with examples of Japanese international cooperation; he pointed out that Japan had not only been a participant in the League of Nations, but also in the Hague Conferences and the International Labor Organization, and had also expressed her support for the Permanent Court of International Justice.[73] Evidence was also provided from the domestic front. Perhaps in part a reference to the free rail passes given to visiting delegates, Nitobe insisted to foreign visitors that "the whole country is open for your inspection," and that "the police will not molest you, wherever you may wander." Nitobe spoke of the widespread publication of Japanese newspapers and how "you may

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[70] Oshiro, 255.
[71] Nitobe Inazō, "Japan's Preparedness for International Co-operation," in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 1, (Jan., 1930): 48.
[72] Ibid., 50-51.
[73] Ibid., 56.

still see the shabbiest coolie poring over them, for you will scarcely find a person in this country who cannot read and write,"[74] a valid claim as literacy rates in Japan witnessed a dramatic rise during the first decades of modernization.[75] Such a quote is a clear reflection of Nitobe's attempt to portray Japan as a modernized state and a blatant appeal to the intellectual backgrounds of the many IPR delegates in attendance.

The claims made by Nitobe in this speech are certainly true in many aspects. The rapid and widespread westernization of Japan during the Meiji period has already been discussed in this study as well as countless other scholarly works. It cannot be disputed that Japan was extraordinarily welcome to outside ideas and technologies. Nitobe's assertion that Japan had been an active participant in international discussions is also true; he even referenced her willingness to adopt a "spirit of concession" during such negotiations.[76] But nowhere in the entire speech does Nitobe speak of the rising nationalism found in many parts of Japan; most importantly, the Imperial Japanese Army. He instead presented the Charter Oath and the ideologies of Meiji Japan as founded principally in internationalism. There is no reference to *tennōsei* (emperor worship) or *kokutai* (national polity); he did mention the mid-nineteenth century movement of *sonnō jōi* ("revere the emperor, expel the barbarians"), but dismissed it as a propagandist tool used to garner support for the imperial system that was consequently abandoned once the Emperor seized control. Nitobe even interpreted the phrase as "Up with the Emperor! Down with *foreigners*!"[77] While the exact translation of the phrase *jōi* occurs in different forms, Nitobe's option was significantly less aggressive. Given the audience for his speech, it is clear why Nitobe made such a decision, as well as why he chose to stress the

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[74] Ibid., 47.
[75] Gluck, 12.
[76] Nitobe, "Japan's Preparedness for International Co-operation,"49.
[77] Ibid., 46. Emphasis added.

internationalization of the Japanese mind. But it is obvious that significant—and powerful—aspects that could be found in many modern Japanese minds were conveniently left out. Here we begin to see the unfortunate consequences of having a man like Nitobe representing an entire nation to an organization such as the IPR. As explained, he was not lying to his foreign peers. He was, however, presenting his home country in a particular way that emphasized certain aspects while omitting others. What is essential here is to highlight Nitobe's tendency to refer to Japan and the "Japanese mind" as a singular entity. He did not speak of the Japanese delegates to the IPR as a mere example of Japan's "potential" for international cooperation. He instead described the entire nation of Japan as "prepared" for international cooperation, a portrayal he based on the actions of a small group of liberal elites and the fact that commoners could be found reading the newspaper.

The rise of militarism in Japan was strong and swift during the first decades of the twentieth century, proving that the singular and international "Japanese mind" Nitobe championed to the Institute was just one of many that had gained influence in the island nation. This spirit, surprisingly, comes out, albeit breifly, in Nitobe's speech "On Japan's Preparedness for International Co-operation." Nitobe used this address to briefly address Japanese-Chinese relations which had become a pressing issue to the Institute and the international community as a whole. In this speech to the IPR, Nitobe admitted that "Japan has committed some grave errors in dealing with her neighbors" and even claimed that "the more advanced and liberal of our people entertain sincere sympathy for Young China's national aspirations. They wish her success. They would not interfere with her internal affairs."[78] This is the sole instance in the entire speech in which Nitobe chose to refer to a specific part of the Japanese population. No doubt the members

[78] Ibid., 51.

of the JCIPR would have placed themselves in this "advanced and liberal" group and claimed a similar attitude towards China. Nitobe seemingly anticipated that Japanese involvement in China, most notably Manchuria, did not have a bright future and wanted to distance men like himself from the future actions of more imperialistic and conservative Japanese. Nitobe's prescience was even more pronounced as he continued to speak of China and condemn them for certain actions, specifically their lack of "protection to the rights of foreigners." He expanded upon this thought by pronouncing that China did "not deserve to be treated in the same way…as those countries where [a foreigners'] life and property are safeguarded."[79] This exact sentiment became the rallying cry of Japanese imperialists in 1931 after the infamous Manchurian Incident; Japanese citizens and soldiers in Manchuria were claimed to be in danger at the hands of the Chinese army and in consequent need of protection. This attitude deserves specific attention. In a speech in which he presented the formation of a singular, internationalist "Japanese mind,"—and just after he referenced the sympathetic attitudes of the "the more advanced and liberal" Japanese—Nitobe himself showed signs of Japanese imperialism! But this singular instance is tucked away among pages and pages of internationalist rhetoric with which the rest of the IPR undoubtedly agreed. The audience was most likely so pleased with the majority of the speech that this slight deviation was either downplayed or simply forgotten altogether. Nitobe and Takahashi's representations of a westernized Japan resulted in a missed opportunity to portray the unique aspects of Japanese culture to the west. Here we see such a phenomenon from the opposite side. No one in the Institute seemed to notice the dismissive attitude the Japanese delegates held towards China; recall that even the Chinese delegation left Kyoto in good spirits. Instead, they were caught up in their own idealized vision of the Pacific as a place of "peace and

[79] Ibid., 52.

harmony"—as well as the ideal of Japan as an internationalist nation—and failed to notice the region's potential for political discord.

The Manchurian Incident changed the IPR for good. The Institute's non-governmental position was already in jeopardy by 1929 due to the popularity of the Kyoto Conference. The presence of international media and members from the League of Nations brought the Institute an unprecedented level of international recognition. In 1930 Merle Davis resigned his role as General Secretary citing in part the increased politicization of the organization.[80] The 1931 conference, held in Shanghai, came just one month after the Japanese army invaded Manchuria on September 19th. Despite the seething tensions between China and Japan the delegates from both countries came together and decided that cancelling the conference would be the exact opposite of what was necessary; thus Dr. Hu Shih of the Chinese delegation proudly stated in his opening remarks, "This *is* the Fourth Biennial Conference."[81] But the Institute had profoundly changed. While Nitobe and Davis' introductions to the 1927 and 1929 conferences emphasized the non-political nature of the IPR, the opening meeting in 1931 was punctuated by official greetings from the Presidents and Prime Ministers of China, Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines and the United States. This was almost entirely due to the intensifying conflict in Manchuria. Nine of the sixteen round-table discussions in 1931 concerned China,[82] as opposed to just three of eleven for the 1927 conference.[83] The Japanese delegation also supported Japan's military action in Manchuria. Nitobe's only address from the 1931 conference, entitled "Cultural Impacts—Old and New," called this "national difference" a

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[80] Takami, 136.
[81] Bruno Lasker, ed., *Problems of the Pacific: Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Shanghai 1931*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), v.
[82] Lasker, xi.
[83] Condliffe, xi.

"small thing."[84] The position of the JCIPR is striking; given their societal status and political philosophies they would have seemed one of the most likely groups of Japanese intellectuals to oppose the invasion. This pro-military stance is further shocking when this entire chapter is taken in to consideration. Japanese men like Nitobe joined and supported the IPR as a means with which to gain international recognition. They lauded its regionalist and non-governmental approach. In 1925 Tasuka Harada championed "the Crossroads of the Pacific where the peoples of various tongues, colors and creeds live together in peace and harmony." Four years later Nitobe would claim that under the auspices of the Institute "the old notions of nations as fighting units or commercial rivals, is being discarded." Yet in 1931 and the years to come, the JCIPR staunchly defended their own government's suspicious invasion of a fellow Pacific nation. They had joined the Institute to claim Japan's right to respect from the international community and at the same time were denying China that very right.

Nitobe was not a militarist. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria was impossible for him to reconcile as he was torn between his love for his country and his internationalist ideals. His political dualism during this period has been examined elsewhere in depth.[85] His speeches from 1929 can be used to point to a more subtle dualism that not only plagued Nitobe, but the rest of the IPR. The IPR was founded under Christian beliefs and brought upper-class, educated, and international individuals together to discuss the futures of their nations. Though the Institute's goal was admirable, it was founded on an ideal that simply did not exist outside of their own exclusive gentlemen's club. That ideal was simple: the Pacific was prepared for international cooperation. The Institute jumped to such a conclusion despite the fact that, just as Nitobe, they acknowledged their unique political and cultural beliefs when compared with that of their fellow

[84] Lasker, 478-9.

[85] See: Oshiro, George "Nitobe Inazō and Japanese Nationalism," in *Japanese Cultural Nationalism: At home and in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Roy Starrs (Kent, England: Global Oriental, 2004)

countrymen. They were all members of the "more advanced and liberal" population of their respective nations yet by only interacting with each other they came to misinterpret potential for reality. Nitobe, and the rest of the IPR, fell into their own trap. The potential for a Pacific of "peace and harmony" certainly did exist, as shown in the remarkably optimistic attitude and unprecedented desire for cultural exchange of this group of men and women. But the insular nature of such an elite community served to create a cycle of cultural misrepresentation that created an ideal of a Pacific that simply did not exist. This is not to suggest that a more integrated IPR could have prevented the Manchurian Incident, much less Pearl Harbor. This is also not suggesting that the members of the IPR were ignorant to the prevailing political trends of the time. Rather, in times of intercultural exchange and discourse, oftentimes the people most enthusiastic about the process represent a very small portion of the population they are representing. Their elite and liberal background leads to them to portray their culture in a specific way that not only caters to their beliefs but to the beliefs of their audience, and consequently true cultural understanding is never achieved.

Chapter 4

Korekiyo Takahashi in American media

Korekiyo Takahashi was the darling of many American publications throughout his career. To the many journalists who chose to document his story, Takahashi represented the ideal Japanese citizen: westernized. Within the context of the American media's treatment of Takahashi we can see similar patterns of idealization to those that developed in the gentlemanly confines of the Institute of Pacific Relations as discussed in the previous chapter. His character was intriguing enough to American journalists that several newspapers ran articles on him as early as 1904 when he traveled to the United States and Europe in search of war bonds to fund the Russo-Japanese war. Takahashi would resurface in American media in 1921 after his appointment as Prime Minister. Most other Japanese statesmen received little to no press during this period; a brief foray to the online database ProQuest returns few substantive results for any of the other Prime Ministers who held office during the Taishō Era (1912 to 1926). Only Katsura Tarō, elected in 1912, had his life story published in a December 13th edition of *The Living Age*. Unlike his contemporaries, Takahashi's political achievement received an impressive amount of press. In both sets of articles—those detailing his 1904 trip and those announcing his appointment as Prime Minister—Takahashi's westernized nature is expounded upon, typically focusing on his language, attire, and disposition. His life story is portrayed as the archetypal "rags to riches" tale so popular with American audiences. During the 1904 visit Takahashi again, at least initially, chose not to reveal the true nature of his visit to the States, just as he had 20 years prior when visiting the United States' patent office as described in Chapter 2. What makes the collection of articles from the early 1920s fascinating is the fact that Takahashi's political

agenda was extraordinarily liberal and essentially incompatible with the general current of Japanese politics at the time; nor did any American journalists mention the fact that Takahashi did not even want to be Prime Minister in the first place![86] These glowing appraisals of Japan's new Premier were being printed at the same time as anti-immigrant sentiments were coming to a head in the States and numerous newspapers were publishing anti-Japanese articles and editorials. These pieces offer a strong contrast to the glowing praise of Takahashi and his life story. While to Americans Takahashi represented the ideal of the westernized foreigner, Japanese immigrants to the States were attacked for their inability to assimilate to western culture. Despite these harsh attitudes, Takahashi as the consummate modern Japanese figure was too good of a story to pass up and American newspaper readers were presented with him as a representation of Japan's western future.

In 1904, Takahashi left Japan's shores—the first time since his inspection of the American patent system in 1884—again at the behest of the Japanese government with the goal of securing foreign capital to help fund Japan's army in their war with the Russian Empire. Takahashi's arrival in San Francisco was documented in December, 1904 in an article of unknown origin. In the article, "K. Takaasha" is quoted as saying, "I go to London on a matter of business for my banking institution. My mission is not for the Government; it is merely a private matter." In Chapter 2 we observed Takahashi presenting Japan's interest in the United States' patent system in a veiled manner in which he chose not to mention certain motivations for his visit. This 1904 quote from Takahashi, however, is a blatant lie. He had been directly approached by Count Inoue Kaoru, who at the time was the most senior member of the *genrō*—a group of retired elder Japanese statesmen who served as advisors to the emperor—to sell Japanese war

[86] Smethurst, 224.

bonds to Western investors.[87] Takahashi is also quoted in the article as saying that "in Japan one would scarcely know that war is going on." This suggests that Takahashi chose to lie about his trip in an effort to present Japan as fully in control of the situation. While in the field and on the seas Japan was the clear dominant force, the government had vastly underestimated the cost of the war. Outside funding was therefore vital to sustaining the Japanese effort. Luckily for the government, Takahashi was more than capable and brought in 800,566,000 yen worth of Japanese bonds from investors in the United States, England, France, and Germany; this accounted for an impressive 47% of the total cost of the war.[88] The calm demeanor displayed by Takahashi in the 1904 article most surely aided him in gaining confidence from Western investors. But Takahashi's modest description of his trip in 1904 lies in stark contrast to an article published in the *San Francisco Sunday Call* on January 28, 1906 as he was making his return voyage. In this article, entitled "The Man Through Whom Japan Financed Her War," Takahashi spoke freely about the vast sums of money he was able to procure for his nation; his face was described as beaming "with smiles" as he described the extra 75,000,000 yen raised to be put aside for Japanese veterans of the war. A "private matter," indeed. Takahashi's candidness in 1906 was a product of the self-assurance he had gained after such a successful trip. The support shown by Western investors was certainly seen as a vote of confidence in Japan as well as a huge step in Japan's quest for international recognition. Takahashi's overwhelming success in generating such funds also gained him significant trust from members of the Japanese government and would lead to his future appointments as Governor of the Bank of Japan in 1911 and Finance Minister in 1913.[89]

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[87] Ibid., 142.
[88] Ibid., 145.
[89] Ibid., 141.

Takahashi's excellent understanding of finance no doubt played a large role in his ability to garner such foreign support; however, his westernized persona may have played an even larger role, as evidenced by newspaper coverage of his visit. The article in the *Sunday Call* devoted significant time to portraying Takahashi's demeanor. He is described as "exceedingly courteous and dignified, yet one of the most approachable of men. It is a few such as he that have caused Japan to be referred to as the 'French nation of the East.'" While the article did not provide a direct quote, it seems as if Takahashi gave this particular reporter a similar account to the one detailed in Chapter 2 in reference to his interest in the United States' patent system:

> In his study of the conditions and causes of the marvelous development of the United States young Takahashi soon learned that one of the potent factors in that direction was the genius of the American and that a protection was afforded that genius for a limited period by the Government through its patent system.

The article goes on to describe Takahashi's relationship with Schuyler Duryee as an example of his amicability and ability to socialize with Americans. Overall, the article paints a pretty picture; in fact, the two page article is accentuated by a massive picture of Takahashi over which the title dances in what appears to be an imagining of a Japanese styled font of English. Takahashi's western tendencies are highlighted over and over again in the article and his love for the United States is played up demonstrably. It is shocking, then, to know that a newspaper from the same city published an article just one year prior in which Japanese immigrants were accused of being "the roots of crime and poverty…foreign spies…destroyers of the school system…a menace to American womanhood."[90] Clearly, Takahashi's knowledge of western culture and customs resulted in much better treatment from American media members than that given to the *Issei*. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the *Issei* were seemingly viewed as a completely different character with no hope of replicating Takahashi's penchant for assimilation. Despite the

[90] Becker, 107.

growing anti-Japanese attitudes of the early twentieth century United States, the American media's fascination with this westernized man from the east would only grow sixteen years later after his election as Prime Minister.

An article that ran in the *Boston Daily Globe* on November 27, 1921, just two weeks after Takahashi was named Prime Minister of Japan, attracted readers with the dramatic headline "Shanghai'd for Whaler's Crew, Now He is Premier." The article itself raises a few warning signs as to the journalist's credibility. The phrase "shanghai'd for whaler's crew" is a reference to how Takahashi arrived in the United States; the author claims that Takahashi was kidnapped, put aboard a whaling ship that sailed to Peru before finally arriving in San Francisco "where he was received as one who had risen from the dead." This is simply not true (Takahashi's journey to America is described briefly in Chapter 2.) The article also claimed that Takahashi journeyed to Peru later in life to start a gold mine, when in fact it was silver for which he was digging (the project failed.) Given these falsehoods, the reporter's claim that he was "one of the very few American newspapermen" to ever talk to Takahashi is therefore somewhat suspect. Inaccuracies aside, the *Globe* piece highlighted Takahashi's swashbuckling history and claimed "there is no other premier in the world who has had such a varied experience." It also discussed his portly figure and full beard, likening him to more of a "Portuguese or a Spaniard than a Japanese." Just as in the 1906 article, we again see Takahashi portrayed as more European than Japanese in nature. The *Globe* article also serves to establish what would be a popular refrain for American media members: Takahashi had essentially risen from nothing and was now the Prime Minister of Japan. The author's claim to be one of the select few reporter's to speak with Takahashi, along with the general embellishment found in the article, shows just how eager American media

members were to be in on the scoop. From Takahashi's westernized tendencies to his roller coaster ride in life, his was certainly a story that American audiences would read.

An article published in the *New York World* on January 22nd, 1922 did not bother with catchy slang like the *Globe*; it simply read "Japan's Premier Was at One Time American Slave." The piece was apparently written "by a Japanese student," though the student's name was not given. This explains the words devoted in the article to discuss the internal workings of the Japanese government in a clear attempt to educate American readers on the country's political situation. Takahashi's life was given equal attention and his dramatic rise to the top was credited to a life "as a student in the college of hard knocks." This colloquialism was used again under a small picture of Takahashi dressed in western clothing; the caption reads playfully, "He Took Some Hard Knocks in California." The phrase conjures up a feeling of endearment for the hardy Takahashi; it also seems an attempt by the editor of the newspaper, or perhaps even the Japanese student him or herself, to further Americanize this intriguing foreigner. By attributing a quote from the great American humorist George Ade to a Japanese statesman, the *New York World* fostered an inherent sense of familiarity in a man who hailed from a generally unfamiliar place. Takahashi took great care to present himself according to western standards. The American media consequently ate it up and further perpetuated his westernization. In fact, this particular piece was practically copied and pasted into the February 18th issue of *Literary Digest*. Of course, the editor made sure to add in some comments and assert that Takahashi's familiarity with American ways and language "proved the foundation of his fortunes." Such language only further advanced the portrayal of Takahashi as a symbol of western culture; not only was this Japanese man a true rags to riches story, but it was his western background that made the story possible.

The best example of the American media's embrace of Japan's portly new Prime Minister came from the January 1st, 1922 publication of the magazine *Current Opinion*. The piece did not just illustrate Takahashi as westernized; it described him as distinctly un-Japanese. At the head of the article was a photograph of Takahashi in full western military regalia, above which stood the title "Viscount Takahashi: Americanized Prime Minister of Japan." The author described Takahashi's "intimate" knowledge of America as being unparalleled by any "living Japanese statesman." Takahashi's birthplace of Morioka is discussed as a home to people "likened to our own New England stock" whose skin blushes intensely "when anyone hints that they are not white people." The new Prime Minister's "full laugh" was described as a "trait unusual in the Japanese." His "highly idiomatic English" was also praised. Takahashi's accomplishments in Japanese finance are then recounted, summed up with the claim that "there is not to be found in all Japan a single enterprise that remained insolvent after he had taken it in hand." While the article did not go on to predict the efficacy of Takahashi's Premiership, the message was clear. The writers of *Current Opinion* clearly viewed Takahashi as an excellent man to take on the job, largely, or perhaps entirely, due to the fact that he had so effortlessly assimilated himself into so many standards of western culture.

What makes this series of awed mini-biographies so compelling are the facts that non-elite Japanese immigrants were being attacked in American newspapers at the same time and that Takahashi's tenure in office was a virtual failure. The general attitude of Americans towards the growing Japanese-immigrant community can be summarized in this quote: "[The Japanese] do not acquire our language, do not accept our social habits, do not read American literature, do not absorb American ideals. They remain Japanese subjects and their allegiance is not to America but to the Emperor of Japan." Assimilation, or rather the lack thereof, was the rallying cry behind

the anti-immigration movement of the 1920s that led to the signing of the Exclusion Act by the United States Congress in 1924. California State Attorney General Ulysses S. Webb explained in 1922, "I am not asserting that they are inferior, but that they are different, and that is sufficient cause for our movement to check their increase among us."[91] This same attitude was reflected in a *San Francisco Examiner* article from November 16th which stated, "it is not that the people of the United States do not like the Japanese. On the contrary, they have a lively admiration for them. It is that the Japanese are not now, and never will be, assimilable in the country." Quite bizarre, then, that a man like Takahashi from the very same country as these immigrants was concurrently being praised in the American media for his impressive assimilation. Significantly more venomous beliefs were also held towards Japanese immigrants. California Senator James D. Phelan, one of the leaders of the anti-immigration movement, declared "the future of the white race" in danger as a direct result of the inability of Japanese immigrants to be "naturalized."[92] In the face of such comments, the articles championing Takahashi's Americanized style and beliefs seem even more surprising. In terms of Takahashi's political platform, the best way to articulate its widespread and radical nature, "the most progressive party platform in pre-World War II history," is to simply provide a list of the many reforms he proposed:

> Peaceful diplomacy, abrogation of Japan's unequal treaty rights in China, establishment of trade relations with the Soviet Union, major cuts in military spending, civilian control of the army and navy, devolution of certain central tax and spending authority to local governors, decentralization of education, universal suffrage, recognition of the right of workers to bargain collectively, and a graduated income tax.[93]

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[91] Becker, 174.
[92] Ibid., 176.
[93] Ibid., 215-16.

This extraordinarily liberal agenda effectively alienated many members of Takahashi's party by ignoring the needs of its power base and antagonizing its more nationalistic delegates. His party—the Rikken Seiyūkai, or Friends of Constitutional Government—succinctly split in two and Takahashi resigned his role as Prime Minister within nine months. Katō Tomosaburō, a career officer in the Japanese navy, replaced Takahashi; his appointment was barely recognized in the States.

Just as Nitobe Inazō and the Institute of Pacific Relations unwittingly clung to an idealized Pacific of cultural harmony and understanding, American media members latched on to an idealized view of Japanese statesmen. In Takahashi they had a character with whom American citizens could relate. His story could be classified as a realization of the fabled "American Dream" in which anyone can rise from the gutter, achieve vast wealth and accomplish great things. Other Prime Ministers of the same period received little to no attention despite being far more significant politically in Japan. In the same newspapers championing Takahashi, non-elite Japanese immigrants were considered utterly hopeless in terms of assimilation. But Takahashi was lauded by the American press for accomplishing that very feat. Both Nitobe and Takahashi missed an opportunity to properly display Japan to the West. These two men consciously portrayed Japan as a wide-eyed newcomer to the modernized world as they praised the United States for its successes and presented Japan as having many Western characteristics. When citizens of the United States were confronted with Japanese immigrants who did not fit these descriptions, they reacted harshly. The Americans who actually interacted with men like Nitobe and Takahashi during this time were thus convinced of Japan's great future and potential for "international co-operation." In a similar vein, American newspaper audiences were exposed to a hand-picked character at which to marvel; the Japanese state was certainly

safe in the hands of a westernized man such as Takahashi. This trend of cultural misrepresentation was not just happening at the elite level in organizations like the IPR, and was not solely caused by conscious efforts of men like Nitobe and Takahashi. Regular Americans were considerably close-minded to the types of Japanese with whom they were ready to identify; all Japanese immigrants were barred from entering the country in 1924! They were brushed aside by commoners, reporters, and politicians alike as incurably "different" without any hope for assimilation. The Japanese they did deem acceptable—westernized and English speaking—were consequently thrust further into the spotlight, only serving to further perpetuate stereotypes. This unfortunate cycle of cultural misrepresentation was therefore happening on all levels of society and Nitobe's admirable dream of connecting East to West collapsed in the process.

Conclusion

An American man named Varde McFarland, a family friend to Schuyler Duryee, wrote a letter addressed to Duryee's son and Takahashi's godson Korekiyo Duryee in 1917 in which he detailed a visit he had taken to Japan to visit Korekiyo Takahashi at his home in Asaka. In it he describes Takahashi as "every inch a gentleman" and admires his "beautiful home" and "private limousine." These elements of Takahashi's life in Japan leads Mr. McFarland to conclude: "His family are all very nice in every way and not at all like ordinary Japanese." Was Mr. McFarland stating that in his experience, "ordinary Japanese" were mean? Or, was he saying that they were not as wealthy as the Takahashi family? Or, was it simply that "ordinary Japanese" were not as courteous? This study suggests that it was a combination of all three. Mr. McFarland had the opportunity to travel to a foreign country and visit the home of one of its most important politicians, but his main takeaway was that the man and his family were "not at all" like the rest of the people he met or saw there. Here we see the paradox inherent in a figure like Korekiyo Takahashi, as well as Nitobe Inazō. They quickly gained the trust of their American friends through their linguistic skills, Western style, and intellectual achievements. These attributes, among the many others outlined in this study, allowed them to open the door to Japanese culture for these American individuals. But Americans never got the full picture. At times this was a result of Nitobe and Takahashi, who consciously and unconsciously, represented Japan in a distinctly western light, as with Nitobe's *Bushido* or Takahashi's "rags to riches" rise to the top of Japanese politics that played so well with American journalists. Or, it was a cause of these two men representing Japan in a way that chose to omit critical characteristics, as seen in Nitobe's speech to the Institute of Pacific Relations "On Japan's Preparedness in International Co-operation" and in Takahashi's visit to the United States' Patent Office. Either way, these

situations did little to help the vast cultural misunderstandings that existed between citizens of these two nations. Should men and women in the ilk of Nitobe Inazō and Korekiyo Takahashi then be forever barred from being involved in the process of cultural exchange? Of course not. As detailed, they are proud carriers of several characteristics that do not come easily to most people, whether through a lifetime of training—mastery of the English language—or through an innate skill—the ability to seamlessly adapt to new cultures. But they should never be mistaken for representatives of their culture as a whole, nor should any individual; culture itself is a sticky word that defies even the most logical attempt at explanation. To project an individual's character onto that of an entire country is an extreme misinterpretation of what cultural exchange and interpretation is all about. We can take the examples of Nitobe and Takahashi to serve as a guide for how we behave in today's ever globalizing world. Our unparalleled interconnectedness made possible by advancements in technology fosters an illusion of an interconnectedness of understanding. Just because we can talk to someone on the other side of the globe instantaneously does not mean that our thoughts, ideas, and beliefs are also transferred instantaneously. Cultural exchange must be guided at a steady pace, by a wide range of individuals, in a wide range of contexts.

This study is not complete by any means. For one, the author's inability to read Japanese has severely limited it in scope. Takahashi's own autobiography is not even included in the works cited; to date there is no English translation. While this study is about how Nitobe and Takahashi chose to represent Japan in the American sphere, material that describes the sentiments Japanese—liberal and conservative, past and present—held towards these men would be invaluable. Predictably there exists much more secondary literature on these two individuals in Japanese than in English; here too this study falls short. Other important sources did not find a

place in this study; for example, Nitobe's extensive *Editorial Jottings*, a collection of editorials he wrote for the English section of the *Osaka Mainichi* were not included, except for the quote that opens this essay. These brief columns were written in English but intended for a Japanese audience. To be able to compare and contrast the language of Nitobe's addresses to the IPR with these would have been an excellent addition. These articles were left out with the intention of keeping the study on the brief side, as well as in an attempt to keep the material balanced between both Nitobe and Takahashi. Finally, it must be addressed that Nitobe Inazō and Korekiyo Takahashi were not the only men responsible for representing Japan to the West. For example, statesman Kaneko Kentarō lived virtually at the same time; he studied at Harvard University and would later become good friends with Theodore Roosevelt, with whom he maintained a correspondence throughout his life.

Perhaps the most compelling offshoot of this study comes from a 1990 article written by Dr. Cameron Hurst of the University of Pennsylvania.[94] In it, Dr. Hurst describes Nitobe's *Bushido* and how it played a key role in forming the ideologies of certain militant groups in Japan. Dr. Hurst describes the famous tale of the Forty-seven Ronin and their quest for vengeance. At the end of the article, Hurst draws a parallel to this story with the February 26 Incident of 1926, when on a snow draped morning a group of idealistic young army officers assassinated several of the more liberal members of the Japanese government. One of these men was Korekiyo Takahashi. It is reported that one young man repeatedly shot Takahashi while shrieking "traitor!"; another slashed at Takahashi's body with a sword while crying "heavenly punishment!" What a bizarre end to the story it would be, in the context of this study, if these

[94] G. Cameron Hurst, "Death, Honor, and Loyalty: The Bushido Ideal," in *Philosophy East and West* Vol. 40, No. 4 (October 1990).

two young men were thinking of Nitobe's *Bushido* while assassinating one of Japan's, and America's, most beloved individuals.[95]

[95] Unfortunately, Dr. Hurst could not be reached for comment in concerns to this intriguing connection.

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