Distribution Agreement

In presenting this thesis or dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree from Emory University, I hereby grant to Emory University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive, make accessible, and display my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known, including display on the world wide web. I understand that I may select some access restrictions as part of the online submission of this thesis or dissertation. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis or dissertation. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

Signature:

_____ _____

Date

Buying Womens Rights:
The Role of Conflict and International Actors in Gender Reform

By

Laura Huber
Doctor of Philosophy

Political Science

Dan Reiter, Ph.D.
Advisor

David Davis, Ph.D.
Committee Member

Danielle Jung, Ph.D.
Committee Member

Accepted:

Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph.D.
Dean of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies

Date

Buying Women's Rights:
The Role of Conflict and International Actors in Gender Reform

By

Laura Huber
Master of Arts, Emory University, 2017
Bachelor of Arts, University of Dayton 2014

Advisor: Dan Reiter, Ph.D.

An abstract of
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Political Science
2019

Abstract

Buying Women's Rights:
The Role of Conflict and International Actors in Gender Reform

By Laura Huber

Conflict's disruptive and destructive nature can both harm women's rights and challenge traditional gender norms to promote greater equality. This dissertation explores how international actors during and after conflict can promote gender reform by offering material incentives to states in exchange for improving women's rights domestically. This dissertation proposes that conflict increases the influence of international actors to promote gender reform. Gender reforms are costly and therefore require both political support and the necessary resources to successfully adopt and implement them. As a result of the securitization of women's rights, international actors have an incentive to promote the adoption of gender reforms and to offer material incentives to offset the associated costs of gender reform for the government. However, a state's level of sensitivity to material incentives for gender reform may differ. Conflict states may be particularly sensitive given their dependence upon international actors for resources and domestic shifts in gender norms during conflict that may create a unique short-term opportunity for gender reform. Therefore, conflict-affected states with high levels of international intervention and pressure should be especially likely to adopt women's rights reforms compared both to non-conflict states and to conflict states that have low levels of international intervention. This dissertation explores the interactive impact of conflict and international influence on gender reform at four levels of analysis: legal reform, women's political equality, individual beliefs, and gendered security sector reform. Using two unique data sets on the adoption of women's rights laws cross-nationally and the adoption of gendered security sector reform between 1988 and 2016, combined with data on women's political participation and individual surveys in Uganda, this dissertation supports the proposition that international actors have a moderating effect on women's rights after conflict. The overall results imply that international actors play a key, and at times necessary, role in promoting gender equality after conflict, but they have differential impacts depending on the type of gender reform examined.

Buying Women's Rights:
The Role of Conflict and International Actors in Gender Reform

By

Laura Huber
Master of Arts, Emory University, 2017
Bachelor of Arts, University of Dayton 2014

Dan Reiter, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Political Science
2019

Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of many people. First, and foremost, I thank my committee, Dan Reiter, Danielle Jung, and David Davis for their support and encouragement throughout the process of writing my dissertation and my time in graduate school. Their consultations, feedback, and assistance proved invaluable.

Second, I am thankful to a number of people who read drafts of parts of this dissertation and provided helpful feedback, including Sabrina Karim, Kyle Beardsley, Isemene Gizeles, Dara Cohen, Rob Nagel, and many others.

Third, I am particularly thankful to two of my academic mentors. First, I am indebted to Natalie Hudson who first introduced me to research on Women, Peace, and Security and who has continuously supported and encouraged me. Second, Sabrina Karim has been an invaluable mentor for the past five years and I am indebted to her for her support, advice, and encouragement.

I am also thankful for the support and encouragement I have received from all of the faculty, staff, and graduate students of the Emory University Department of Political Science, including, Eric Reinhardt, Beth Reingold, Debbie Allen, Kathy Malanoski, and Denise Brubaker.

I am further indebted to my friends who have always been there for me with support, laughter, and help, including Anna Gunderson, Dani Villa, Kirsten Widner, Maggie MacDonald, Abbey Heller, Nancy Arrington, Mariah Cressy, Nick Jackson, Bianca Noronha, Kelly Fearon, and Stephanie Ryan. I am also thankful for my family, including John and Courtney Huber-MacNealy, Megan Huber, and Joe Krasinskas. For the past five years, each of them has been a truly valued source of support.

Finally, this dissertation is dedicated to my life-long mentors: my parents, Steve Huber and Kitty Huber. Without their constant love, support, and generosity, this journey would not have been possible.

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1

Introduction

> "We have made partners of the women in this war...Shall we admit them only to a partnership of suffering and sacrifice and toil and not to a partnership of privilege and right?" —Woodrow Wilson, 1918[1]

After WWI, suffragists throughout the United States mobilized to demand voting rights for women. One poignant rallying call for the suffragists was that women's vital contribution to the war effort was left unpaid and unacknowledged. Instead, women were being encouraged to leave their newfound economic, political, and social independence to return to more traditional roles as mothers, wives, and homemakers. In his 1918 speech to Congress quoted above, President Woodrow Wilson evoked a debt that the country owed to women, arguing that in exchange for their suffering, sacrifice, and contribution during the war, they should be granted increased rights and liberties. Although it would take another year for women to gain the right to vote in the U.S., this process exemplifies how women can use their experiences during

[1] Woodrow Wilson, An Address to the Senate 30 Sept., 1918

conflict to demand increased rights and equality. Women's suffrage after World War I, constitutional amendments to recognize women's equal rights after the Ugandan Bush War, unprecedented female legislative representation after the Rwandan genocide, and the election of the first African female president after the Liberian civil war demonstrate that conflict can, at times, provide a unique opportunity for women to gain increased power, rights, and influence.

However, conflict can also be detrimental to women's rights. Although men are far more likely to die as a direct result of conflict – with some studies estimating that up to 80% of *direct* deaths in conflict consist of men – women disproportionately suffer from the indirect negative effects of conflict. For example, within the past thirty years, civilian casualties, many of whom are women or children, have increased dramatically, reaching a peak of almost 90% of casualties in wars during the 1990s (UNICEF). Additionally, children and women make up an estimated 80% of displaced populations (UNICEF). Moreover, women and girls are at risk of sexual and gender-based violence during conflicts, which may lead to several other negative consequences, including trauma, health problems, social stigma and ostracization, domestic violence, mental health issues, and higher rates of suicide (McKay 1998). Further, women often face indirect harms from weapons during conflict. For example, in Africa, almost 80% of agricultural work is performed by women, which increases their risk of being injured by a landmine (Ashford and Huet-Vaughn 1997). Moreover, crumbling or inaccessible infrastructure during conflict may have especially harmful effects for women, especially pregnant women or new mothers (McKay 1998). Although women normally have longer life expectancies than men, conflict decreases

this gender gap, indicating that conflict directly or indirectly leads to more female deaths or younger female deaths compared to men (Plümper and Neumayer 2006). Thus, many scholars and practitioners have concluded that conflict disproportionately harms women more than men.

Civil war can be a highly destructive force that harms livelihoods, destroys families, topples leaders, and upends communities. However, from that disruption can come new opportunities to reorder society and increase the rights of marginalized groups. As one of the most universally marginalized groups, women are both especially vulnerable to the harmful effects of conflict and also able to mobilize during and after conflict to increase their position in society. How does conflict affect women's economic, political, and social rights? Why does conflict have disparate effects on women's rights in different contexts? This dissertation explores the effect of conflict on women's rights at the legal, societal, individual, and policy level. Specifically, it explores how international actors influence how conflict affects women's rights.

1.1 Conflict and Women's Rights

Conflict's impact on women has long been studied by scholars and policymakers. From graphic descriptions of women suffering as victims when ancient cities were sacked to long-standing fascinations with female "Amazon" fighters, women have played a central, although often marginalized, part in war throughout history. However, the precise way in which conflict impacts women's rights remains unclear. Partially as a result of a lack of clear, consistent data on women's experiences in war, scholars

continue to contest how conflict impacts women (Gardam 1997). Throughout this dissertation, gender equality and women's rights will be referred to relatively interchangeably. While women's rights alone are not synonymous with gender equality, which refers to equality beyond social dichotomies between men and women, women's rights are an indicator of gender equality and thus, this dissertation refers to them as the best observable measure of gender equality.

Two predominant theories predict contrasting outcomes for women during and after conflict. The first, more traditional perspective argues that conflict and gender inequality are mutually reinforcing and that conflict universally harms women's rights (Enloe 1989, 2000, Goldstein 2003). According to this theory, conflict relies upon traditionally male values, such as courage, physical strength, aggression, and a lack of emotion, which become encouraged within society to sustain war efforts (Goldstein 2003). As societies become increasingly militarized during conflict, feminine values and roles are devalued and as a result, women are increasingly marginalized (Enloe 1989, 2000). Thus, these theories argue that women's rights and gender equality should decrease after conflict.

However, a new wave of scholarship within the past five years increasingly argues that under certain circumstances, conflict can create opportunities for women to increase their rights and participate more actively in politics, economics, and social activities (Tripp 2015, Webster, Torres and Beardsley N.d.). These theories generally argue that conflict alters traditional gender norms as women participate in more "male" roles during conflict, increases women's political participation and mobilization, highlights women's insecurity in the post-conflict period, and calls greater

international attention to women's rights in the country (Ahikire, Madanda and Ampaire 2012, Berry 2015, Carpenter 2005, Hoduck 2016, Huber and Karim 2018, Karim 2016, Thomas and Adams 2010, Tripp 2015, Webster, Torres and Beardsley N.d., Wood 2008). Thus, women's experiences, roles, and increased decision-making power during conflict increase their desire for gender equality which causes them to mobilize into women's rights movements, seek political office, and become more politically engaged (Tripp 2015). These theories argue that by disrupting entrenched community, political, and societal hierarchies, conflict can create a unique opportunity for women to obtain previously inaccessible rights.

Therefore, the current literature on conflict and women's rights faces a puzzle: why does conflict sometimes harm women's rights, while other times women gain unprecedented levels of power and influence after conflict? This dissertation will argue that international actors can help offset the negative impacts of conflict on women's rights by offering material incentives to encourage, support, and facilitate reforms that allow women to transform relatively short-term opportunities to gain increased power during conflict into longer-term societal, legal, and individual changes in gender equality. However, before discussing the specific influence of international actors on women's rights, the next section will discuss how international actors influence domestic policymaking more generally.

1.2 International Actors and Diffusion

International actors often play a key role in state-building after conflict and in policy diffusion cross-nationally. International policy diffusion influences domestic policy-making as states adopt policies that align with international norms and practices. This international pressure in favor of certain policies often challenges and overcomes centuries of local tradition and culture. For example, although slavery had been practiced for centuries, it went from a universal practice to being formally prohibited in all but a few states in less than one hundred years largely due to the campaigning and active coercion of Great Britain (Quirk 2006). Similarly, women's suffrage, which was virtually unheard of before 1880, was assumed to be an essential component of the modern state by 1980. As with slavery, while the initial campaign for women's suffrage depended on mass domestic mobilization, after 1930, women's suffrage was more commonly adopted as a result of international pressure with little to no domestic mobilization (Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997). Finally, since the mid-1990s, laws against female genital mutilation (FGM) have increased exponentially, largely due to the advocacy of international organizations.[2]

Despite the eventual widespread acceptance of many of these laws and norms, compliance rates varied greatly across countries. For example, although Denmark first abolished the importation of slaves into its West Indies colony in 1803, followed shortly by Britain in 1807, the practice remained widespread and the last country to abolish slavery, Mauritania, maintained its legality until 1981. Similarly, FGM

[2]Although only three states adopted laws against FGM before 1990, thirty have adopted similar laws today.

remains widely practiced today. Only 18 African states and 12 industrialized states have enacted laws criminalizing FGM and even in those countries, implementation and enforcement are often weak. While these tensions may be found with a number of policies, this dissertation focuses on gender reform as one reform that is increasing in prominence internationally, but that also continues to face domestic resistance.

In October 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) to the applause of women's rights advocates, security experts, and Member State Representatives (Anderlini 2007). This landmark resolution, which promotes women's right to participate in security and peace processes, sparked an outpouring of research on the relationship between gender equality and security (Anderlini 2007, Cohn 2004, Huber and Karim 2018, Olsson and Gizelis 2013, Tryggestad 2013, UNDP 2010, Willet 2010). With UNSCR 1325, women's rights became a matter of national and international security and sprung to the front of the international agenda as states and international organizations adopted domestic and foreign policies to promote gender equality. For example, under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States declared women's rights abroad to be a main priority (Hudson and Leidl 2015*a*). The so-called "Hillary Doctrine" states,

> "The protection and empowerment of women and girls is key to the foreign policy and security of the United States...women are critical to solving virtually every challenge we face as individual nations and as a community of nations...the status of the world's women is not simply an

issue of morality - it is a matter of national security."[3]

In other words, states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are now concerned with improving the status of women globally. This led international actors to increasingly pressure domestic policymakers to adopt gender reforms using a variety of tactics, including normative appeals, direct assistance, the promise of future benefits, and threats of punishment for noncompliance (Bush 2011, Hafner-Burton 2008, Krook 2009, Montoya 2013, Paxton, Green and Hughes 2008, True 2016).

However, despite international pressure and growing domestic advocacy movements, a great degree of variation exists among states in the number and character of their reforms (Bush 2011, Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, Hafner-Burton 2008, Huber and Karim 2018, Krook 2009, Montoya 2013, Paxton, Green and Hughes 2008, True 2016). For example, as of 2016, only 40% of countries had comprehensive, adequate legal frameworks against domestic violence. Similarly, only 79 states have adopted National Action Plans for the implementation of UNSCR 1325.[4] Moreover, around 50% of states have adopted some form of political gender quota to promote women's participation in the legislature. However, even within political quotas, the quality and scope of these quotas vary. For example, while some countries mandate up to 50% female participation in elections, others quota systems are formed of voluntary party quotas or target a relatively small amount of female participation, around 10% (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2006).

[3]State Department's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, 2010

[4]According to the PeaceWomen Website, which trackes UNSCR 1325 implementation globally.

Further, in addition to differing legal frameworks on women's rights, gender equality varies greatly cross-nationally. For example, globally, women comprise only 24% of legislators.[5] Parity in legislative representation has only been reached in three states, Rwanda, Cuba, and Bolivia, while women make up less than 10% of representatives in 12 states.[6] Further, according to the World Bank, women's labor force participation hovers at less than 50%, ranging between 15% (Algeria) and 86% (Rwanda). Finally, although the average girls' secondary school enrollment ratio is relatively high, around 70%, in low income countries it averages 38%, reaching as low as 14% in the Central African Republic.[7]

While legal reforms are important steps towards gender equality, they are not the only way that women's rights may improve. Even in the absence of a formal legal framework supporting women's rights, women may begin to incrementally improve their social, economic, and political status. Further, individual government agencies, such as security sector institutions, often adopt regulations and enforcement that directly influence women's experiences and interactions with the government. For example, if there is a law that criminalizes the practice of FGM, but it is not successfully implemented, then that law will have little to no effect on women's lives and rights. Similarly, in the absence of a formal law against FGM, if the government internally decides to punish FGM as a form of violence against women or as a health violation under other legal codes, they can significantly affect the practice. Previous studies on conflict and women's rights predominantly examine the effects of conflict

[5]Data on women's parliamentary representation comes from the Interpaliamentary Union data set.

[6]In 2019, Yemen had the lowest rate of female participation with less than 1% of female legislators.

[7]Statistics from 2017 according to the World Bank.

on women's rights indicators, such as their participation in the the legislature. Few studies have systematically compared how conflict affects the adoption of multiple laws and policies on women's rights. Moreover, women's and men's individual beliefs on gender equality form the foundation of societal, legal, and political changes in women's rights.

Gender reform is not a linear process. It is often affected by setbacks, major victories, and institutional and social inertia. Therefore, it is vital to explore the impact of conflict and international actors at various levels as their effect may not be ubiquitous across all types of gender reform. To the author's knowledge, this is the first study to examine how conflict affects women's rights at four levels of analysis: at the legal level through the adoption of women's rights laws, at the societal level exploring how conflict influences women's aggregate political equality, at the individual level examining personal attitudes towards women's rights, and at the policy level through the adoption of gendered security sector reforms.

While international organizations urge the adoption of gender reforms, such as legislative gender quotas, campaigns against domestic violence and rape, national action plans for gender equality, and the creation of governmental women's rights offices, little is known about the systematic diffusion of these policies. Given the increasing prevalence of these policies, it is imperative to analyze their diffusion across states.

This project seeks to answer two main questions. First, what role do international third party actors play in promoting the adoption of gender reforms domestically? Scholars have long considered how international and domestic dynamics interact to

affect domestic policymaking (Chaudoin, Milner and Pang 2015, Gourevitch 1978, Jervis 1997, Oatley and Danzman 2011, Pevehouse 2005, Waltz 1979). This project extends theories of the moderating effect of international factors on domestic policymaking by proposing that domestic context, specifically civil conflict, primes and increases the influence of international actors. More specifically, this project asks which states are the most likely to adopt or improve women's rights and what motivates this change? While the progress of individual states, institutions, or regions to promote gender equality has been increasingly documented, little is understood about gender reform cross-nationally (Basini 2013, Carey 2001, Charlesworth and Wood 2010, Dandeker and Segal 1996, Farr 2011, Hewitt 2016, Irvine 2013, McWilliams and Kilmurray 2015, Olsson 2001, Pupavac 2005, Wright 2016).

Specifically, this project examines how international third parties promote gender reform by offering material incentives, including foreign aid disbursements and trade relationships, in exchange for gender reform. While some third parties may adopt and internalize the WPS agenda due to normative beliefs, they may pressure other states to adopt similar policies through both normative and material pressure. While all states are susceptible to material incentives, states which have experienced intrastate conflict are especially dependent upon international aid and investment due to conflict-related destruction and decreased economic activity.

1.3 Conflict: Opening Doors for International Actors

Gender reform incur costs on a state and therefore, given limited resources, states must prioritize gender reforms sufficiently to warrant committing their resources to it (Huber and Karim 2018). First, gender reforms require resources to be drafted, adopted, and implemented. Additionally, they may carry normative, cultural, social, and political costs. First, states may reject gender reforms if they conflict with the society's cultural or social norms. In these states, leaders and politicians may bear large costs for adopting gender reforms in the form of criticism, lost support, and possible loss of office. Second, politicians may be reluctant to adopt gender reforms if they threaten their political power. In other words, if politicians and leaders came to power in a gender inequitable state, they may fear that gender reforms and increased women's rights, may challenge their political power. In other words, they may fear that gender reforms may negatively alter the stability of their office, either by actively empowering women or by provoking backlash and criticism. For example, Lazarev (2018) found that male politicians actively resisted women's rights reforms after the Chechen civil conflict in order to retain the support of male voters who supported traditional gender norms.

Therefore, the adoption of gender reforms may trigger costs in terms of resources, social and cultural authority, and political competitiveness. As a result, to adopt gender reforms two conditions must be present. First, states must have the physical resources to plan, adopt, and implement gender reforms. Second, state leaders must

have the political will to adopt them.

Conflict can dramatically alter the availability of resources and the degree of political will for gender reforms. Conflict may increase domestic political will by shifting gender norms, increasing insecurity for women, and damaging international reputation. However, these shifts alone may not be enough to sufficiently motivate states to undertake gender reform as they do not offset the necessary resource costs. Additionally, conflict may also decrease political will for gender reform if it leads to a culture that supports militarized masculinity. Therefore, international actors then play a key role in motivating gender reform because they offer both the political will and resources necessary to offset the costs.

International actors have demonstrated increasing willingness to offer material incentives and support to states to advance women's rights and gender equality. For example, several foreign aid distributors, such as USAID, now have separate funding sources for aid projects devoted to women's rights. Similarly, the UN has called for gender to be integrated into all of its programming, especially its peacekeeping operations. Therefore, international influence in a country, in the form of UN programming, international aid and trade, IGO partnerships, and transnational women's rights organizations, may promote gender reform as they often offer material incentives or support in exchange for compliance with the growing women's rights norm. While international actors may promote women's rights reform globally, conflict states tend to be especially dependent upon the international community and therefore, are more sensitive to international material incentives and thus, more likely to comply.

To explore the impact of conflict and international actors on women's rights,

this dissertation explores changes in gender equality at the micro- and macro-levels. Specifically, this analysis examines the effect of civil conflict on women's rights. Civil conflict is particularly likely to create the conditions under which international actors can successfully promote women's rights. Since civil conflict by definition occurs between the government and non-state actors within the state, it is more likely to disrupt social and political hierarchies within society than an interstate conflict that may or may not occur within a state's borders. While women's rights may change after interstate war, such as occurred after World War I and World War II, this likely only occurs with large interstate wars that require the mass mobilization of both men and women into the military or industrial sectors to support the war effort.

In contrast, even low-level civil conflicts can radically disrupt gender relations and create openings for international actors. Civil conflict threatens the perceived legitimacy of a government and thus, a government facing internal strife may be more likely to concede to the pressure and demands of international actors in order to regain their legitimacy (McLeod 2011). Further, civil conflict may cause severe economic damage. Civil conflict may not only lead to damage to a state's infrastructure, but political instability and violence often causes the flight of economic investment out of the country and decreased economic activity within the country (Fielding 2004, Singh 2013). Therefore, civil conflict creates both the necessary cultural, social, and political disruption and the increased dependence on international actors necessary to create opportunities for women's rights to improve after conflict.

International actors can incentivize and support improvements in women's rights at several levels, each of which is tested in this dissertation. First, international

actors may pressure the government to adopt women's rights laws, such as political gender quotas, laws criminalizing violence against women, and the legalization of sexual and reproductive rights. Legal rights are often a key indicator of gender equality as they provide women with a legal basis to assert their rights. Second, women's rights may change "on the ground" in which women begin to participate more in social, economic, and political activities. Even in countries with similar legal frameworks, women's enjoyment of those rights may vary greatly. For example, while legally women are allowed to vote, run as candidates, and be elected to the legislature in all countries globally, women's legislative representation varies widely between 1% and 56%.[8] Therefore, it is important to examine aggregate societal indicators of gender equality in addition to the legal framework. Further, individual government agencies and institutions may adopt their own gender reform policies. Therefore, this dissertation examines one set of institutions that has been the focus of international efforts to promote gender reform: the security sector. Finally, laws and policies are unlikely to have an impact if individual attitudes and behavior remain unchanged. This is especially important when considering women's rights given that men and women may have different opinions regarding gender equality. Therefore, to understand how conflict affects women's rights, there needs to be an understanding of how exposure to conflict impacts both men's and women's individual attitudes towards gender equality.

This dissertation demonstrates that international actors, at times, play an important role promoting women's rights after conflict. While previous literature has

[8]According to the InterParliamentary Union's statistics on women's legislative representation.

disagreed on the role of international actors after conflict, the theory and results presented in this dissertation highlight that in the absence of international actors, conflict has mixed results on women's rights and often directly harms women's rights. In contrast, when international actors are present, women are more likely to gain increased political power nationally, individually hold more gender equitable views, and are more likely to participate in the security sector. With international third-party involvement during and after conflict, women are more able to effectively and successfully translate short-term increases in their agency during conflict into sustainable increases in gender equality. Thus, international actors act as a "door prop" and can ensure that the momentary opportunity opened during conflict is not immediately closed by the contrasting influence of militarized masculinity and a reversion to the status quo after conflict, but that women are given the necessary support and resources to expand their rights and participation. However, their impact differs across different types of gender reform, emphasizing that gender reform is a complex, multidimensional process.

1.4 Contribution

This dissertation makes five contributions, three theoretically and two empirically. First, this dissertation adds important clarification to the Women, Peace, and Security literature and to the larger literature on policy and reform diffusion by highlighting the key role of international actors. To date, the Women, Peace, and Security literature has remained relatively unclear on how women's rights change after conflict and

if they do change, the predominant factors motivating this change. As previous scholarship has primarily relied on single-country case studies or cross-national studies that explore only one facet of women's rights after conflict, contradictory theories and findings have been proposed (Krook 2009). This dissertation offers a new theoretical framework that complements the current predominant theories and helps ameliorate the contradictory findings between them. By emphasizing the key role of international actors in promoting women's rights after conflict, this dissertation explores a key, long-standing puzzle within Women, Peace, and Security literature.

Second, although this dissertation specifically focuses on women's rights after conflict, the theoretical framework can be applied to various other forms of rights reforms and state behavior. International actors prioritize other reforms including reforms that support democratic behavior, good governance, transparent and accountable security sectors, ethnic and minority rights, and many more. The theory proposed in this dissertation argues that international actors can strategically leverage their increased material influence in conflict-affected states to promote these reforms.

Third, this dissertation undertakes the most comprehensive analysis of the multiple levels of women's rights to date. In comparing how conflict and international actors influence women's rights at the individual, societal, policy, and legal level, the results demonstrate that women's rights are differentially impacted at different levels. Scholarship on women's rights reform has largely assumed ubiquitous effects on all types of women's rights reforms. However, gender reform is not linear and different types of gender reform may be impacted by conflict and international actors in specific ways. This dissertation highlights the need to consider how the factors that

influence rights reforms, both for gender equality specifically and for other types of desired reforms, may act as separate, but related phenomenon that may be influenced by different factors.

Fourth, this dissertation introduces two new data sets on women's rights policies cross-nationally. One of the main obstacles to the systematic study of gender equality is a lack of consistent data. This dissertation overcomes this problem, enabling the analysis of previously unstudied women's rights developments, by introducing two novel data sets. First, it gathered and tests the most comprehensive set of women's rights laws cross-nationally currently available. While there has been some data collection on individual laws, such as political gender quotas or abortion laws, and on the regional adoption of laws, such as violence against women legal frameworks in the European Union, no study has yet examined how laws regarding different aspects of women's rights compare with one another. Second, this dissertation introduces a new cross-national dataset on gendered security sector reform for all states between 1988 and 2016. Expanding on data initially collected on conflict-affected states between 1988 and 2012, this new dataset includes security sector reform in non-conflict states, a crucially understudied phenomenon, and incorporates data on multiple forms of gendered security sector reforms, allowing unique comparisons on a reform that is increasingly adopted, but whose effects are relatively unknown (Karim, Wagstaff and Huber n.d.).

Fifth, by using localized data on both violent events and women's rights, this dissertation partially overcomes an additional obstacle to quantitatively studying the intersection of conflict and gender: endogeneity. The direct and indirect connections

between gender equality and decreased violence have been robustly demonstrated in both quantitative and qualitative studies (Caprioli 2000, 2003, 2005, Caprioli and Boyer 2001, Dumas 2010, Findley and Young 2015, Hudson and Den Boer 2002, Hudson et al. 2013, Melander 2005*a*,*b*). Since it is theorized that gender equality both decreases the likelihood and intensity of conflict and that it is then affected by conflict, it is difficult to establish the direction of causality when examining how conflict and international intervention impact women's rights. By using localized data on villages and neighborhoods in Uganda and demonstrating that there is no consistent evidence that exposure to conflict at the micro-level is related to local levels of gender equality, this study partially overcomes these endogeneity problems, allowing for a clearer identification of the causal impacts of conflict on gender equality. Additionally, the cross-national analysis of women's political equality in Chapter 4 uses Difference-in-Differences regression analysis to further identify the causal impact of conflict and international actors. However, even the correlational analyses presented throughout the dissertation identify important, and previously unproven, associations between conflict, international actors, and gender reform.

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the importance of examining the role of international third-party actors in promoting women's rights after conflict. Current literature has demonstrated a strong and consistent relationship between conflict and women's rights, however, a reliance on individual case studies and a lack of data has

resulted in confusing and contradictory results in how conflict impacts women's rights in the short- and long-term. International actors may partially explain the different outcomes for women during and after conflict. Specifically, international actors can leverage material incentives in conflict-affected states to increase the political will and resources necessary to successfully adopt and implement women's rights. The rest of this theoretical framework will be developed and tested both nationally and sub-nationally throughout the dissertation.

Chapter 2 outlines the current state of the literature which examines the impact of conflict on women's rights. First, it will discuss the development of the Women, Peace, and Security norm, which identified women's rights as a vital component of security and increased international commitment to promoting women's rights abroad, especially within conflict-affected countries. Second, it will detail the two predominant literatures on how conflict affects women's rights. The "Militarized Masculinity" theory argues that conflict and gender inequality are mutually reinforcing and as a result, conflict should decrease women's rights and reinforce traditional gender norms. In contrast, the "Opportunity Structures" theory argues that conflict disrupts entrenched gendered hierarchies within society as women engage more in the conflict and politics, become community leaders, and mobilize politically. Finally, the chapter will explore how international actors influence domestic policymaking and further explores why international actors engage in gender reform abroad.

Chapter 3 develops the theoretical expectation of how international actors and conflict create opportunities for improvements in women's rights. First, it highlights the costs of gender reform that prevent certain states from adopting gender reform.

Second it discusses how international actors may use financial incentives to support and pressure for gender reform in all states. Third, it proposes that conflict-affected states are especially sensitive to international material incentives for gender reform given their pre-existing level of political will due to the disruption of gender roles during conflict and their increased dependence upon international actors for support and resources. Therefore, it predicts that while international exposure increases the likelihood of gender reform, this effect will be especially strong in conflict-affected societies.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 test the empirical implications of the overarching theory at different levels of gender reform adoption and implementation. Gender reform is often not a linear process, but instead diffusion and improvements occur at different paces for different types of gender reform. Therefore, to understand the multidimensional and dynamic relationship between conflict, international actors, and gender reform, the reform process must be examined at different levels of analysis. These three chapters explore gender reform through the adoption of legal reform, the implementation of gender reforms with regards to political inclusion and participation, individual, micro-level changes in men's and women's behaviors, and the adoption of gender policies in the security sector. Each of these levels of analysis has different actors that perform gender reform, who have different motivations for adopting gender reform, and have varying levels of exposure and strategic reactions to conflict and international actors.

First, Chapter 4 explores how the experience of international conflict and international pressure influences the adoption of several different women's rights laws, in-

cluding laws against marital rape, sexual harassment, and intimate partner violence, the establishment of political gender quotas, and the creation of national machinery to support women's rights. Moreover, it also tests how conflict and international influence affect indicators of women's political rights, including women's parliamentary representation, political participation and political power. In this way, Chapter 4 highlights gaps between the adoption of gender reform and its implementation on the ground.

Chapter 5 examines how exposure to conflict and international aid at the subnational level influence individual attitudes towards women's rights and gender equality in Uganda. Individual beliefs and behavior form the basis of gender reform and directly influence the success of formal gender policies. However, individuals have deeply entrenched, personal connections to gender relations and therefore, they may react differently to exposure to conflict and international actors than government actors who may be able to more carefully weigh the costs and benefits of gender reform. Particularly, this chapter explores how conflict and aid may have heterogeneous effects on men's and women's attitudes because men's and women's experiences during conflict differ radically and international aid programs may not as strongly influence men's attitudes towards gender equality. Uganda presents a particularly important case to test the theory given its extensive history of conflict, including conflicts that had highly gendered components, such as female combatants and sexual violence, and the large amount of international attention and intervention during and after the conflict. By matching geo-located data on violent events in Uganda and international aid project disbursements with individual surveys responses, this analysis enables a

fine-grained examination of how conflict and aid impact men and women differently. Additionally, it demonstrates that at the local level, gender equality does not appear to increase the likelihood that conflict occurs in the first place, partially decreasing the endogeneity problems that plague previous studies of gender and conflict. Finally, this chapter explores how changes in individual attitudes towards gender equality are translated into tangible power shifts by exploring women's electoral success in sub-county elections in Uganda.

Chapter 6 furthers the analysis by exploring how conflict can specifically impact one type of gender reform, gendered security sector reform. UNSCR 1325 specifically calls for increased participation of women in security roles as a direct way to prevent conflict recurrence and outbreak. Therefore, much of the international pressure for gender reform has been focused on gendered security sector reform. Given that gendered security sector reform has been linked with increased legitimacy and decreased violence, and women's chronic under-representation in security roles, gendered security sector reform can play a vital role in promoting women's rights and security. Additionally, gender reform in the security sector is often directly linked with strategic outcomes for the government, including increased security and legitimacy. Using a unique data set on gendered security sector reform, this chapter demonstrates that while conflict and post-conflict states are more likely to adopt gendered security sector reform compared to non-conflict states, international intervention influences the character of the reforms adopted.

Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings. It also underscores the limitations of the dissertation and highlights future research.

Chapter 2

Conflict, Gender, and International Actors: An Overview of Current Literature

While women's rights have been increasingly promoted since the early 20th century, a notable shift occurred at the turn of the 21st century when women's rights began to be emphasized as crucial for international peace and security (Anderlini 2007, Hudson 2009, Jansson and Eduards 2016). While previously, women's rights were considered to be an important social and moral concern, they were rendered a secondary, deprioritized status compared to other concerns, such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, or intrastate conflict (Anderlini 2007). Beginning with the Beijing Platform for Action (1995) and culminating with UNSCR 1325 (2000), women's rights moved from an issue of "human security" and development to an international security concern

(Anderlini 2007, Hudson 2009, Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011, Tryggestad 2013).

This rhetorical, moral, and policy shift in favor of women's rights dramatically increased the international community's attention to gender equality. The United Nations has referred to gender equality as "not only a fundamental human right, but a necessary foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world" and incorporated gender equality into its sustainable development goals.[1] Similarly, the US Women, Peace and Security Act (2017) argues that "the United States should be a global leader in promoting the participation of women in conflict prevention, management, and resolution and post-conflict relief and recovery efforts; ...[this] is critical to country and regional stability," reiterating the relatively new global commitment to increase women's rights and participation in decision-making specifically as a tool to prevent, control, and end conflict. The increased attention on women and particularly women's roles and experiences in conflict has resulted in an explosion of literature exploring how conflict affects women and how women and gender equality affect conflict.

However, despite developments in scholarship on women, peace, and security, it remains unclear exactly how conflict and gender equality are linked. In fact, the two predominant strains of literature, the "Militarized Masculinity" literature and the "Opportunity Structures" literature predict that conflict should have opposite impacts on women's rights. Further, the role of international actors in promoting women's rights after conflict is unclear. This chapter will explore the current state

[1]For more information on UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls, see https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/

of the literature on the diffusion of women's rights globally, the impact of conflict on women's rights, and the influence of international actors in domestic policymaking.

2.1 Women, Peace, and Security - A Rising International Norm

While there are many norms and policies that international actors seek to promote domestically, this dissertation particularly examines the diffusion of gender reforms due to their increasing salience domestically and internationally. However, these patterns of diffusion and implementation are highly relevant to other types of policy diffusion, such as human rights reforms, environmental policies, and children's rights policies. In general, these patterns are likely to be observed with policies that are favored and promoted by the international community, are relatively new and increasing in salience, and challenge behavior practiced within a broad range of states. In this way, gender reforms represent a particularly strong case as their recent securitiziation has propelled women's rights to a previously unparalleled prioritization on the international agenda, but also face strong resistance as they challenge and seek to transform fundamental societal relations that are often strongly connected with and based in cultural, societal, and political structures. Additionally, the potential transformative effect of gender reform is particularly great given the ubiquitous presence of gender inequality in every state.[2]

[2]While the degree of gender inequality varies greatly between states, in general every state demonstrates some level of gender inequality. The few exceptions would be small, localized, and usually isolated matriarchal and relatively more gender equitable subcultures, but these are rarities.

Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) advocates argue that women's rights are integral to peace and security for a number of reasons. Most prominently, gender relations and gender roles can be constructed, politicized, and mobilized to support war, militarism, and violence (Enloe 1989, 2000, 2007, Goldstein 2003, Sjoberg and Via 2010). In this view, traditional gender norms,[3] which cast men as protectors and women as innocents, lead to a mutually reinforcing relationship between patriarchal gender roles and conflict (Goldstein 2003). For example, the connection between gender roles and war mobilization can be seen through early socialization activities of boys where they are taught to hide or deny emotions, to roughhouse, to develop strong bonds with other boys, and to be assertive, all of which are activities and characteristics looked for and developed in soldiers — aggression, courage, and cohesion (Goldstein 2003). Similarly, Enloe (1989) examines how women's lives are militarized through gender norms to support U.S. military endeavors and hegemony. Further, other scholars identify gender inequality as a form of structural inequality, which promotes violence at the personal, local, national, and international level (Caprioli 2005, Caprioli and Boyer 2001, Hudson et al. 2013, Melander 2005*a*,*b*). Moreover, one strain of WPS scholarship adopts an evolutionary biology approach and examines how patriarchal societies promote competition among men for access to reproductive opportunities which leads to inter- and intra-state conflict (Hudson and Den Boer 2002, Hudson et al. 2013, Thayer and Hudson 2010). For example, Thayer and Hudson (2010) argue that highly patriarchal and hierarchical societies increase the attractiveness of

[3]Here and throughout this dissertation "traditional gender norms" refers to highly patriarchal gender norms in which women are afforded very few rights.

terrorism for poor, less eligible men who cannot compete with more powerful men for wives. Similarly, Berko and Erez (2007) argue that unmarried, widowed, or childless women may be more likely to turn to terrorism in traditional societies if they feel they failed to attain gendered expectations.

Finally, other WPS scholars directly connect women's rights with increased security through increased productivity, democratization, and representation. This instrumentalist view of women's rights argues that through promoting women's participation in economics and politics, the society can leverage the productivity and differing skills of women to become more developed, prosperous, democratic, and stable. For example, Hudson et al. (2013) demonstrate a correlation between women's security and economic prosperity and democratization. Further, scholars of descriptive representation have argued that women's representation in politics improves legislation regarding "women's issues," makes foreign policy less aggressive, and increases spending in health, education, and development (Bhavani 2009, Koch and Fulton 2011, Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017).

The direct and indirect connections between gender equality and decreased violence have been robustly demonstrated in both quantitative and qualitative studies (Caprioli 2000, 2003, 2005, Caprioli and Boyer 2001, Dumas 2010, Findley and Young 2015, Hudson and Den Boer 2002, Hudson et al. 2013, Melander 2005*a*,*b*). However, while the WPS agenda has largely been accepted as valid by the international community, little is understood regarding how gender equality can be promoted through policy changes. Various policies and reforms promoting women's rights and gender equality have been adopted by international organizations, state governments, and

local organizations. While numerous labels have been applied to specific types of reforms that promote gender equality,[4] this dissertation uses the broad label of "gender reforms." Gender reforms are policies, programs, or reforms that promote women's rights, including social, political, and economic rights, and greater gender equality. In other words, these are changes that promote equal rights for women and men and remove sex- and gender-based discrimination.[5] Additionally, gender reform also refers to improvements in gender equality and women's rights more generally, even in the absence of formal laws and policies.

One of the most common gender reforms internationally is the adoption of political gender quotas that establish a threshold of women's participation in politics (Caul 2001, Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2006, Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, Hughes 2011, Krook 2006, 2009, Piatti-Crocker 2011, Scwindt-Bayer 2009). Over 130 countries have adopted a legislative gender quota (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). Political quotas may increase both women's descriptive representation, or women's physical representation within the legislature, and can increase women's substantive representation, or the adoption of further policies favorable towards women (Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo 2012, Htun, Lacalle and Micozzi 2013). However, the effectiveness of quotas is often mitigated by cultural and institutional factors. For example, Finnemore and Sikkink (2012) find that substantive representation only occurs when widespread cultural support for women's rights and for the political quota exist.

[4]For example, see Arat (2015), Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015), Lombardo (2005), Walby (2005) for a discussion of the terms "gender mainstreaming" and "gender balancing."

[5]It should be noted that this definition excludes policies framed as "women's rights" policies, but that seek to reinforce traditional gender inequalities. These can include policies that claim to protect "women's right" to bear children, but in fact promote traditional norms that restrict women to the role of caregiver.

Other gender reforms include the establishment of gender offices in the government, the adoption of laws against rape, particularly marital rape, and domestic violence, and the adoption of National Action Plans for gender equality or for UNSCR 1325. The security sector is commonly targeted for gender reform due to UNSCR 1325's emphasis on women's participation in security, as will be explored more in Chapter 6. For example, as of 2012, about 40% of countries had a publicly declared gender quota or target for the security sector.[6] Other examples of gender reforms in security sector reform (SRR) include the recruitment of women, the appointment of women into decision-making roles, the establishment of sexual harassment and gender equality policies, the creation of gender equality offices or units, the building of facilities and equipment for women, the establishment of special gendered units, and the hosting of gender sensitization training. There is some empirical evidence that gendered SSR increases operational effectiveness, empowers women, increases the perceived legitimacy of security forces and enhances communication with the population (Bridges and Horsfall 2009, Cordell 2010, Holliday 2012, Karamé 2001, Karim 2016, Kember 2007). Finally, Krause, Krause and Bränfors (2018) demonstrates that women's participation in peace processes increases the duration of the peace. However, other scholars critique gendered security sector reforms, arguing that they have little to no effect on security effectiveness (Basini and Ryan 2016, Dharmapuri 2011, Jennings 2011).

Additionally, women's rights cross-nationally also varies greatly, as can be seen in Figure 2.1, which plots the fertility rate of all non-OECD countries in 1988, 2000,

[6]Based on a random sample of 88 states.

and 2016.[7] Fertility rates are a commonly used indicator of gender equality as they demonstrate the strength of traditional gender norms that women should bear and raise children. Although fertility rates generally have decreased throughout the years, the rate of change differs greatly across countries and some countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, continue to have relatively high fertility rates of around 5 to 6 children born to each woman on average. Similarly, women's political participation ranges greatly cross-nationally. While a small number of countries have reached or are near reaching gender parity in their legislative branch, the average rate of women's legislative participation is low at 24% and ranges between 1% to over 50%.[8]

2.1.1 Diffusion of Gender Reforms

Despite the increased interest in gender reforms, relatively little is understood about why states adopt these reforms. Additionally, while many states have welcomed the adoption of gender reforms, others have rejected these reforms and some have even adopted explicitly anti-gender equality policies. What explains variation in these reforms across states? Several models are invoked to explain the diffusion of gender reforms. While these frameworks share common themes, they differ in their proposed causal pathways and the primary actors. Importantly, no single framework explains gender reform diffusion across all states (Krook 2009).

Some scholars emphasize that states adopt gender reforms in an effort to appear modernized and to gain greater favor with the international community. Bush (2011)

[7]OECD countries excluded. Data on fertility rates comes from the World Bank.
[8]Data according to the InterParliamentary Union statistics on women's legislative participation.



Figure 2.1: Cross-National Fertility Rates, 1988–2016

explains how political gender quotas are closely tied to conceptions of modernization, democracy, and industrialization. Similarly, Montoya (2013) traces how states seeking to enter the EU faced pressure to adopt laws targeting violence against women to demonstrate their level of "civilization." In the same vein, McLeod (2011) argues that Serbia adopted several women's rights policies to demonstrate its legitimacy and modernity. Therefore, as women's rights policies become increasingly tied to norms of good governance, states may adopt them for reputation concerns.

Other scholars point to the role of NGOs in the diffusion of gender reforms. For example, many scholars credit non-state WPS advocates with developing the discursive framework of women's rights as vital to security that led to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 (Anderlini 2007, Hudson 2009). Similarly, Htun and Weldon (2012) argue that feminist mobilization both domestically and transnationally is critical for the adoption of policies combating violence against women. Further, Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015) demonstrate that the growth of the international feminist movement increased the adoption of legislative gender quotas. Finally, Irvine (2013) proposes a reverse boomerang model in which domestic women's organizations pressure IGOs to comply with women's rights and then pressure their government to adopt women's rights policies.

Finally, several models focus on domestic sources of norm diffusion (Cortell and Davis 2000, McBride and Mazur 2011). Democracy is often linked with the adoption of gender reforms since democracies are more susceptible to learning and internal and external pressure. For example, True (2016) and Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015) find that democracy promotes the adoption of NAPs for UNSCR 1325 and political

gender quotas, respectively. Similarly, women's participation in politics also may increase the adoption of gender reforms due to substantive representation of female constituents (Bratton and Haynie 1999, Celis and Childs 2012, Koch and Fulton 2011, Pitkin 1967). For example, there is evidence that women's participation in the legislature and in other positions of political power promotes the adoption of pro-women policies (Bashevkin 2014, Hughes, Krook and Paxton 2015, Iyer et al. 2012, True 2016).[9] Finally, as explored below, conflict and post-conflict states are especially prone to adopt gender reforms (Acharya 2004, Basini and Ryan 2016, Hughes, Krook and Paxton 2015, Krook 2006, True and Mintrom 2001).

Despite the wealth of proposed mechanisms underlying the adoption of gender reforms, little is systematically understood about how international and domestic actors independently and interdependently influence the process. As discussed by Krook (2009), there are several possible paths to gender reform and there is no single necessary or sufficient condition to explain diffusion. However, the literature's general reliance on case studies has led to some contradictory conclusions. For example, Porter (2002) claims that international pressure is necessary for gender mainstreaming policy diffusion in the EU, whereas, Htun and Weldon (2012) argue that domestic women's movements and national gender machineries form the basic building blocks of gender reform. Montoya (2013) highlights how both domestic women's movements and international pressure are vital to the adoption of policies combating violence against women. Further, True and Mintrom (2001) examine the adoption of gender machineries in national governments and find that transnational networks of non-

[9]However, the direct link between women's representation and gender reform is unclear.

state actors are the primary forces driving the diffusion of gender reform. Similarly, Murdie and Peksen (2015) found that women's rights organizations play a key role in promoting women's rights compliance when they engage in naming and shaming tactics. Finally, Bush (2011) and Huber and Karim (2018) examine how UN peacekeeping missions promote the adoption of political gender quotas and security sector gender balancing policies, respectively. In other words, domestic and international factors have both been proposed as the primary diffusion pathway.

Two studies represent important progress towards understanding systematic patterns of diffusion. True (2016) examines the adoption of NAPs for UNSCR 1325 and Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015) investigate the diffusion of political gender quotas. Both studies test the effects of several mechanisms of diffusion, including international pressure, transnational advocacy, democracy, women's political representation, and conflict. However, these studies include several shortcomings. First, both focus on the adoption of one type of policy, which obscures points of comparison and results in contradictory findings. For example, while True (2016) finds that conflict does not influence NAP adoption, Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015) find it has a large, positive relationship with quota adoption. Second, both studies do not consider the interactive effects which may occur between international and domestic diffusion pathways. That said, Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015) present a major advancement by considering how transnational and domestic women's movements interact and surprisingly find a negative interaction, underscoring the need for more investigation. Third, these studies remain agnostic about when certain diffusion pathways are more likely to promote the adoption of gender reforms. For example, why in some cases does it appear that

international actors are more important for norm diffusion, while other studies seem to demonstrate that domestic actors are primary? Many studies recognize that some diffusion mechanisms are likely more influential in some contexts than others, but do not empirically test how certain structural and institutional attributes may condition which diffusion pathway will be primary.

In many ways, the diffusion of gender reforms shows similarities with the diffusion of other reforms, such as the abolition of slavery, female suffrage, human rights reforms, the prohibition of FGM, and even democratization. For example, many of these policies were adopted relatively rapidly,[10] first in response to persistent campaigning by individual states and advocacy organizations and then in response to overwhelming international pressure that led to adoption regardless of domestic demand (Cloward 2016, Quirk 2006, Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997). As a result, those states which adopted the reforms in the second phase often experienced high levels of noncompliance and demonstrated weak will to enforce the policy (Cloward 2016, Quirk 2006). However, these reform diffusion patterns carry a number of important considerations. First, in many of them, especially slavery with Great Britain, one state rose to act as the enforcer of the reform to ensure that other states adopted the policy and complied with it, often at extremely high costs (Quirk 2006). Second, these diffusion patterns are largely divided into temporal phases: the first phase of domestic mobilization and the second phase of international pressure. However, the gender reform diffusion process has shown a combination of both these facets

[10]While there is great variation in the diffusion time frame of these reforms, it is rapid compared to the length of time that existing practices which the reform sought to change existed prior.

simultaneously. Further, the patterns of gender reform has demonstrated significant resistance to international pressure among some states and not others.

2.2 The Impact of Conflict on Gender Equality

While violent conflict often results in widespread economic, social, and political damage, it can also trigger societal and political transformation. Wars can create new states and societies, promote economic growth, secure political rights for a previously marginalized group, and prompt cultural change. While women's rights often occupy a precarious position in conflict and post-conflict societies, conflict can also challenge traditional gender roles and allow the international community to promote gender reforms. In fact, gender equality and gender reforms have a powerful impact on the onset, character, and termination of conflict. For example, gender equality may act as a form of societal inequality that may spur conflict through increased grievance, similar to Collier and Hoeffler (2004)'s argument that economic inequality may lead to civil war. Similarly, according to WPS theory, gender inequality may influence interpersonal interactions and increase aggression and belligerence, which could alter bargaining strategies — increasing the acceptable costs of war and compounding information and commitment problems, thereby shortening the bargaining range. For example, psychologists have often found that men are generally more risk-acceptant than women in a range of activities, including sexual behavior, drug and alcohol consumption, driving, financial decision-making, gambling, physical activity, intellectual tasks, informed guessing, and hypothetical choices (Byrnes, Miller

and Schafer 1999). While the reasons for these gendered differences in risk-taking are unclear, scholars have argued that they may occur as a result of a combination of evolutionary-psychological pressure for men to engage in risky behavior to obtain reproductive success and societal norms that associate risk-taking with masculinity and restrict women's access to risky behavior (Byrnes, Miller and Schafer 1999, Eckel and Grossman 2002, Wilson and Daly 1985). Additionally, Wilson and Daly (1985) suggest that when the stakes are high, the competition involves large gains in power, and there will be a wide spread of rewards and punishment between the winner and loser, such as may occur during war, the incentive to take risks increases, especially among men. This may indicate that in patriarchal societies, which value masculine traits, such as risk-taking, and where men are more likely to be in power, leaders are more willing to take the "gamble" of conflict rather than accept a bargain (Fearon 1995). In this way, gender reforms may help prevent conflicts if they result in greater women's participation in foreign policy decision-making and if they alter societal values to de-emphasize traits such as aggression and risk-taking.

Further, once war has begun, states with lower levels of women's rights often experience longer and more intense civil wars with greater levels of civilian victimization and human rights violations (Melander 2005*b*). Finally, gender reforms may help quicken the termination of conflict and facilitate the establishment of long-term peace. First, gendered socialization may lead women to more easily overcome commitment and information problems and negotiate a settlement between belligerents. For example, women tend to be recognized as better crisis negotiators because they focus on creating a mutually satisfactory agreement, whereas men tend to focus on

achieving their goals (Babock and Laschever 2003, Barron 2003, Boyer et al. 2009). Similarly, peace agreements negotiated by women tend to last longer than those negotiated solely by men (Krause, Krause and Bränfors 2018, Stone 2014). This may occur because women's participation increases the range of issues addressed in the peace agreement, leading to a more robust and comprehensive agreement.[11] In this way, gender reforms can help prevent conflict, reduce its intensity, and promote successful peace negotiations.[12] Additionally, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, by leveraging material incentives to promote gender reform, international actors may be able to help promote stable societies or prevent or end conflict without having to militarily intervene. However, while the gendered nature of conflict is increasingly recognized, there is great disagreement on how conflict will affect women's rights.

This dissertation expands on the scholarship on the diffusion of women's rights reforms by presenting a theory of how violent conflict conditions which types of diffusion pathways will be the most prominent leading to gender reform. Particularly, conflict moderates and amplifies the influence of international actors. While this dissertation does not claim that there is one single explanation for gender reform, it seeks to identify diffusion patterns, specifically by examining how international actors leverage material incentives to promote the adoption of gender reform and how country context moderates the relative influence of domestic and international actors.

Exploring the influence of international actors helps explain a puzzle within the

[11] Although the author is not aware of any empirical studies which demonstrate this relationship, the claim that women consider a wider range of issues when negotiating peace is widely accepted and promoted by WPS advocates and the international community.

[12] It is important to note that one implication of this is that states which have experienced conflict may have lower levels of women's rights and gender equality. This possible selection bias will be accounted for in the research designs.

literature on conflict and women's rights. Currently, there are two predominant sets of theories on how conflict affects women's rights that predict opposite effects. One set of theories, henceforth referred to as the "Militarized Masculinity" theory argues that conflict leads to cultural shifts that encourage hypermasculinity, emphasize traditional gender roles, and harm gender equality. This theory has largely dominated literature on conflict and women's rights for the past twenty years. However, in the last five years, a new strain of literature has proposed that conflict can increase women's rights. This literature, referred to in the remainder of this dissertation as the "Opportunity Structures" theory claims that conflict can create unique opportunities for women to expand their rights and political power. Each of these theories are discussed in more detail below. As will be explored in Chapter 3, international actors may play a key role in determining whether conflict leads to the "Militarized Masculinity" or "Opportunity Structures" outcome for women.

2.2.1 Conflict and "Militarized Masculinitiy"

Conflict has long been viewed as a man's domain – boys play with GI Joe action figures and pretend to be soldiers, men often have mandatory military service or registration, young male social clubs teach survival skills useful in military settings, and the vast majority of soldiers across the world are male (Enloe 1989, Goldstein 2003).[13] Further, young men comprise the majority of direct deaths resulting from

[13]Although it is impossible to know the exact proportion of female soldiers globally due to lack of data, in countries for which data is available only 6% of soldiers are female, which is likely higher than the global average (Karim, Wagstaff and Huber n.d.). Additionally female soldiers often do not serve in combat positions, instead serving in more traditionally service-oriented or feminine roles, such as medical personnel, support roles, and clerical roles.

conflict with some studies finding that young men comprise more than 80% of direct conflict casualties.[14] The social, economic, and physical costs of conflict often create cultures of so-called "militarized masculinity" in which ideal male attributes become hypermasculine, violent, and militant (Enloe 2000, Whitworth 2004).

States and societies in conflict often rely on and reinforce traditional gender roles and cultivate hypermasculinity to sustain the war effort (Goldstein 2003). During conflict, traditionally male values, such as courage, physical strength, aggression, and a lack of emotions, are emphasized as these are considered to be necessary traits of a good soldier.[15] While all men in the society may be exposed to these norms of hypermasculinity, men directly exposed to conflict or men who participated in armed groups experience the strongest effect. Military training, drills, and group cohesion building activities often rely on highly masculinized concepts. For example, Cohen and Nordås (2014) and Cohen (2013) find that rebel groups engage in gang rape of civilian women in order to build unit cohesion. However, the range of activities may span between sexualized hazing activities short of rape to using feminine adjectives and names for male cadets to humiliate them (Khalili 2011, Krosnell and Svedbert

[14]It is important to note that studies often find that men suffer higher rates of mortality from direct conflict, whereas women tend to have higher mortality rates in the post-conflict period. This occurs largely because men are more likely to participate directly in the fighting or be targeted for violence because they are seen as potential future fighters. In contrast, higher female mortality rates occur in the longer-term after conflict due to decreased vaccinations, increased disease spread, higher risk pregnancies, and a lack of maternal health care (Ghobarah, Huth and Russett 2003, Li and Wen 2005, Murray et al. 2002). For example, Plümper and Neumayer (2006) find that women's life expectancy decreases more than men's life expectancy after war, leading them to conclude that conflict has greater negative effects on women than men when the entire conflict and life cycle is considered.

[15]It should be noted that contemporary scholars debate whether these are in fact necessary traits for a soldier. Given the changing nature of militaries over the centuries to rely more on sophisticated and technological weapons rather than brute strength, many of these characteristics have become less important over time (Masters 2005). However, most contemporary military forces continue to emphasize these values.

N.d.). In fact, sexualized violence often becomes central to military organizations and militarized masculinity (Morris 1996, Zurbriggen 2010). However, civilian men may also be impacted as media campaigns, government policy, and cultural norms tend to shift to favor traditional gender norms during and after conflict (Enloe 1989, Goldstein 2003, Zurbriggen 2010). Thus, in a militarized culture, men are more likely to hold deeply masculinized views and a strict adherence to a hypermasculinized concept of manhood.

In this patriarchal mindset, men may feel particularly threatened by post-conflict changes in gender roles. Historically, after conflict women have been forced out of public roles that they entered during the fighting to return to traditionally feminine roles. For example, during both World War I and World War II women became more politically and economically engaged. In WWII, women's labor force participation increased from 27% to 37% between 1940 and 1944, representing an 89% increase in women serving in clerical positions, a 112% increase in factory positions, and a greater than 400% increase in durables manufacturing, a position which paid twice as much as traditional women's jobs (Schweitzer 1980). However, after the war, women lost many of these gains. While women's work force participation rate remained slightly elevated above the 1940 level, it shrank significantly and women were largely forced back into traditionally feminine jobs. For example, factories and manufacturers that closed or restructured after the war, reopened to only allow male employees (Schweitzer 1980). The trend of women entering the labor force and politics during war and then being forced back into domestic roles after war has been repeated in conflicts across the globe (Schweitzer 1980). Men fueled by the patriarchal values strengthened

by militarized masculinity may actively resist women's increased participation and gender equality. Thus, many men's main goal after conflict may be to re-instate traditional gender roles rather than continue to challenge them and help women gain legal rights and recognition. For example, Kelly et al. (2018) find that domestic violence often increases after conflict and argues that this may occur because men struggle with and resist changing gender roles after conflict, among other reasons. Similarly, Lazarev (2018) demonstrates that the Chechen government undermined efforts to sustain female empowerment that occurred during the war in order to gain the support of male voters who sought to regain their control over their families and women.

Therefore, the "Militarized Masculinity" scholarship argues conflict should increase hypermasculinity and militarization within society, which encourages traditional gender norms. Thus, these theories argue that women's rights and gender equality should decrease after conflict.

2.2.2 Conflict and "Opportunity Structures"

However, a new wave of scholarship increasingly argues that conflict can create opportunities for women to increase their rights and participate more actively in politics, economics, and social activities in the correct context and circumstances. These theories generally argue that conflict alters traditional gender norms as women participate in more "male" roles during conflict, increases women's political participation and mobilization, highlights women's insecurity in the post-conflict period, and calls

greater international attention to women's rights in the country (Ahikire, Madanda and Ampaire 2012, Berry 2015, Carpenter 2005, Hoduck 2016, Huber and Karim 2018, Karim 2016, Thomas and Adams 2010, Tripp 2015, Webster, Torres and Beardsley N.d., Wood 2008). Thus, women's experiences, roles, and increased decision-making power during conflict increase their desire for gender equality which causes them to mobilize into women's rights movements, seek political office, and become more politically engaged. Specifically, the opportunity structures literature has broadly pointed to four causal mechanisms that may lead to increased women's rights after conflict. These causal mechanisms are highly interrelated and often mutually reinforcing, however, as will be explored in later chapters, they often rely on assumptions regarding the ability of women to translate short term preferences for gender equality into sustainable, structural change in political and social hierarchies.

First, the experience of conflict may challenge traditional gender roles to promote women's participation in the public sphere. Gender roles are most directly challenged by women's participation in the conflict as combatants, which highlights their agency to act as political and military agents (Sjoberg 2007, 2018). For example, Karim (2016) found that after the Liberian civil war, Liberians were more comfortable around and evaluated the competency of Liberian female police officers higher than foreign female peacekeepers because they had witnessed Liberian female fighters' competency during the war. However, short of direct participation in combat, women's experiences during and after conflict may also challenge traditional gender roles in less dramatic ways. For example, during conflict when able-bodied men may be absent, injured, or killed, women often have to fill traditionally male roles, such as economic laborers,

mediators of interpersonal conflicts, and community leaders (Carpenter 2005). For example, women in Northern Uganda increased their economic activity during war to fill the role of missing men (Ahikire, Madanda and Ampaire 2012). Similarly, in Sierra Leone, many women entered an informal, shadow economy, some of which included selling supplies, food, and necessities to combatants or combat-stricken communities (Hoduck 2016).

Additionally, women may fill the political positions of men who are either absent or may be ineligible or unwilling to enter political office. After conflicts, women may gain unprecedented political representation in high-ranking offices, such as women's unmatched representation in the legislature of Rwanda or the election of the first African female president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, in Liberia after their respective conflicts. Further, women may mobilize as part of a peace movement. For example, in Liberia, women launched a nonviolent peace campaign, which demanded an end to the civil war and called for more women's participation in peacemaking. Similar women's movements for peace or justice have arisen in other conflicts.[16] Women may be able to leverage these mobilization efforts and their status as the new "leaders" of their families and communities to gain political office. For example, Berry (2015) argues that the genocide and civil war in Rwanda created political mobilization opportunities for women that legitimized them as political actors and led to more women running for (and being elected to) political office. Further, women may gain legitimacy as political leaders from the fact that they may not have directly

[16]For example, similar movements include the Woman's Peace Party in the USA during World War I, Mothers Against Silence in Israel during Israel's war with Lebanon, Women in Black in Israel starting during the Intifada, and the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina after the Dirty War.

participated in fighting, do not support war,[17] or were not "responsible" for the war originally (Thomas and Adams 2010). Therefore, during and after conflict, there may be increased mobilization of women into traditionally male roles and women may gain increased influence over their homes, their communities, and the country. Women's increased leadership and expanded roles during conflict then alters gender norms and expectations by demonstrating women's successful experience in the public sphere. As a result, women may be able to campaign for increased rights after conflict by utilizing their experience and mobilization networks developed during the conflict. Additionally, the public, having witnessed women's increased agency during conflict, may be more accepting of women in leadership and gender equality more broadly.

Second, although conflict may challenge gender roles to empower women in some aspects of life, it also creates an environment that is particularly insecure for women as they may be displaced from their homes, disconnected from their communities, and economically and physically vulnerable (Bennoune 2007). This insecurity is most predominantly expressed through increased threat of SGBV due to rape by combatants or peacekeepers, spousal frustration, or women's vulnerability to predatory behavior in refugee communities or temporary homes (Cohen and Nordås 2014, Karim 2017*a*, Karim and Beardsley 2016, Manjoo and McRaith 2011, Nordås and Rustad 2013). Therefore, the government may feel obligated to address women's unique insecurity through gender reforms. For example, Nagel (2019) argues that sexual violence in conflict is viewed as a direct threat to a government's masculinity and power to a greater

[17]Female political leaders often play up traditional stereotypes that women are less aggressive and hawkish than men to support their candidacy after war (Thomas and Adams 2010)

degree than other types of political violence, and can induce the government to negotiate to protect its patriarchal image. While women's heightened security needs alone may not be sufficient to cause gender reform (as they may be symptomatic of entrenched patriarchy), it may act as a rallying point around which advocates organize to lobby the government for gender reform.

Third, during and after conflict, the population may distrust the government, especially if it is accused of abusing civilians. The government may undertake gender reforms in the hope of leveraging gendered stereotypes that women are less corrupt, violent, and militant to decrease its perceived hypermasculinity and distance itself from its behavior during the conflict (Bush 2011, Karim 2016, McLeod 2011).

Finally, these theories often point to the role of international actors in encouraging women's rights. During and after conflict, new actors may gain access to and influence over state policymaking. Conflict may weaken a state's internal policymaking abilities by damaging its infrastructure, limiting the state budget available for non-war programming, and increasing political frustration and dysfunction. Political and economic damage may lead states to turn to and rely upon foreign donors to maintain or rebuild their government, economy, and infrastructure. Therefore, states, IGOs, and NGOs may intervene to end the conflict, prevent conflict resurgence, and assist in rebuilding efforts, and thereby gain influence over the reforms adopted. However, as discussed above, it is unclear exactly what role international actors play or how influential their efforts are in promoting women's rights after conflict. For example, Tripp (2015) argues that international actors had relatively little role promoting women's rights after the Ugandan Bush War. In contrast, Bush (2011) and Huber and Karim

(2018) find that international actors significantly increase the adoption of political gender quotas and gendered security sector reform, respectively. Therefore, the exact role of international actors to promote gender equality after conflict remains to be thoroughly explored.

In summary, the opportunity structures literature argues that women's rights can change after conflict because conflict upsets traditional gender roles and power hierarchies. This can occur both through a positive influence of women gaining increased power and leadership during conflict either as combatants or community, political, and economic leaders to fill gaps left by men who have died, been injured, or fled during the conflict, as well as through negative influences, such as increased levels of violence against women. These experiences lead to shifting gender norms that prime women and the public to be more accepting of gender reform. Additionally, the government that may be willing to adopt gender reform to increase its legitimacy after conflict. As will be explored more below and in Chapter 3, international actors can then play a key role in offering the material incentives and normative pressure necessary for the increased political and public will for gender reforms to be translated into tangible outcomes for women's rights.

Therefore, the current literature on the effect of conflict on women's rights faces a puzzle: why does conflict sometimes harm women's rights, while other times women gain unprecedented levels of power and influence after conflict? The following chapter will argue that international actors can help offset the negative impacts of conflict on women's rights predicted by the militarized masculinity theory by offering material incentives to encourage, support, and facilitate reforms that allow women to trans-

form relatively short term opportunities to gain increased power during conflict into longer-term societal, legal, and individual changes in gender equality as expected by the opportunity structures theory. However, before discussing the influence of international actors on women's rights, in particular, the final section in this chapter will discuss how international actors influence domestic policymaking more generally.

2.3 International Third Parties and Domestic Policymaking

While the state has long been considered the basic unit of international relations, scholars question the relative importance of domestic and systemic, international factors in world politics. Some scholars argue that domestic factors, including regime type and economic endowments, dominate policymaking, while others assign primacy to international factors, such as the balance of power (Boix 1998, Jervis 1997, Waltz 1979). As globalization has increased, most scholars acknowledge that domestic and international forces interact to influence international relations and domestic policymaking, yet the extent of this interaction and the relative influence of domestic and systemic factors remains highly debated (Boix 1998, Cerny 1995, Chaudoin, Milner and Pang 2015, Frieden and Rogowski 1996, Garrett 1998, Garrett and Lange 1996, Gourevitch 1978, Kitschelt and Stephens 1999, Mosley 2000, 2003, Oatley and Danzman 2011).

At one extreme, the international system plays no role in domestic policymak-

ing, which is determined solely by the state and its characteristics. In other words, these models argue that a state's internal characteristics predict what policies will be adopted and international actors and context have no influence on domestic policymaking (Chaudoin, Milner and Pang 2015). However, in the increasingly globalized world, such theories are less common. Nonetheless, several theories, often labeled as the "second image" of international relations, continue to emphasize the primacy of domestic factors relative to international factors (Waltz 1979). For example, the democratic peace theory argues that regime type influences state bellicosity, which results in less conflict between democracies (Oneal and Russett 2001).

In contrast, some scholars argue that the international system has an exogenous, direct effect on domestic policymaking that is independent of domestic characteristics. For example, literature on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) often examines investment as an exogenous shock to the domestic system that influences policymaking (Andrews 1994, Broz 1999, Frieden 1991, Li and Resnick 2003). These "Second-Image Reversed" theories claim that international factors, such as the balance of power, policy development of neighboring states, and increased economic interdependence, directly and indirectly influence domestic policymaking (Gourevitch 1978). For example, geographic spillover may cause states to adopt the policies or experiences of their neighboring states, such as democracy, conflict, and trade policy (Gleditsch and Ward 2006, Simmons and Elkins 2004). Additionally, IGOs and NGOs promote the adoption of certain policies domestically. For example, UN Member States bind themselves to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions and often

cooperate with UN initiatives.[18]

There are a number of ways in which international actors can influence domestic policymaking. First, states may adopt policies supported by international actors as a result of social pressure to conform with international trends to retain a legitimate reputation. For example, the "world polity" model argues that countries are culturally-constructed and exist within a world society that promotes modernization, which creates pressures for diffusion of "modern" policies (Strang and Meyer 1993). Therefore, states comply with norms to appear 'modern' and increase their international reputation (Bush 2011). Social pressure has promoted the adoption of a number of liberal policies, including democracy, human rights reforms, women's rights reforms, and labor reforms (Bush 2011, Goodman and Pegram 2012). For example, Montoya (2013) examines how IGOs, such as the European Union (EU), invoke rhetoric connecting certain desired policies with European culture, industrialization, and stablity.

Similarly, states may adopt policies as a result of learning. In other words, states may observe the beneficial results of their peers' policies and hope to share in the benefits by adopting similar policies (Balla 2001, Berry and Berry 1999, Mintrom 1997, Shipan and Volden 2008). This effect is especially strong among geographically proximate and culturally similar countries due to improved communication and enhanced generalizability (Balla 2001, Berry and Berry 1999, Mintrom 1997, Shipan

[18]However, it should be noted that the relationship between compliance with international organizations and domestic behavior is highly debated. While some argue that international organizations have little direct influence on domestic policy decisions due to the selection effect, others argue that international organizations can continue to influence state behavior by leveraging state concerns of legitimacy, access to international resources, decision-making, and power, and fear of reprisal (Stein 2005).

and Volden 2008). Additionally, international organizations may function as "teachers of norms" or "transmission belts" by disseminating information about growing international norms (Finnemore 1993, Greenhill 2010*b*, Nye and Keohane 1989). For example, the boomerang model argues that transnational advocacy networks (TANs) facilitate information exchange between domestic and international actors to facilitate norm diffusion by applying internal and external pressure on states (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Montoya 2013, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999, True and Mintrom 2001).

Finally, international actors may promote the adoption of certain policies domestically through coercion. In particular, the international actor may motivate the state to adopt certain policies by offering a benefit or threatening a punishment for lack of compliance. Coercion can take various forms, including direct punishment for noncompliance, such as sanctions, indirect punishment, such as the promise of less cooperation, the removal of future benefits, and the promise of rewards for good behavior. For example, many IGOs outline standards of behaviors for their members and threaten expulsion or sanctions in the event of violations. Pevehouse (2005) outlines international coercive strategies as "carrots and sticks," which represent the combined offers of rewards and punishments to induce compliance. While Pevehouse (2005) examines how IGOs use coercion to promote democratization, carrots and sticks are used to promote a broad range of domestic policies. Specifically, coercion can tie material rewards to the adoption of certain types of policies favored by the international community.

Recently, scholars are moving beyond theories that examine only the direct, exogenous influence of domestic *or* international factors to examine how domestic and

international characteristics interact to determine policy outcomes. For example, Chaudoin, Milner and Pang (2015) identify a set of theories which argue that international factors have a moderating role on domestic variables, altering when certain domestic characteristics will result in a particular outcome. They point to theories which examine how trade openness influences domestic labor preferences, which in turn affects democratization (Ahlquist and Wibbels 2012). Additionally, interdependent models may consider how domestic factors influence the international actor's priorities. For example, the policy priorities of IGOs are often affected by the domestic concerns of member states, which then leads to greater pressure for those policies across all member states. Similar models consider the spatial and temporal dependence of policy outcomes among states. Further, Hyde (2011, N.d.) develops an interdependent model of norm diffusion, arguing that states seeking greater benefits from the international community will adopt certain policies, such as election monitoring, to signal that they are a "good" state. However, once enough "good" states adopt the policies, "bad" states are tempted to also adopt similar policies to share in the benefits. This creates a problem for international actors attempting to reward states for good behavior as they are no longer able to distinguish between "good" states that adopt the policy with the intent of internalizing the norm and the "bad" states who adopt it with no intention of following through, but hope that their continued bad behavior will be obscured. In general, many of these theories consider the deeply complex relationship between international and domestic factors, which moderates domestic policymaking.

Most states are affected in some way by international factors to adopt policies

favored by the international community. However, there is no consensus on the relative role of normative convergence, in which domestic actors internalize the norm versus international coercion, in which the state adopts the policy to avoid punishment or reap the benefits of compliance with little to no normative acceptance. The relative roles of normative beliefs and coercion are complex as different actors may adopt policies for different reasons. For example, the bandwagoning model argues that norms gain precedence on the international stage as a result of NGO campaigning and the adoption of the norm by a few important states (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). While these original norm-accepting states adopted the norm due to the states' (or IGOs') inherent belief in its justness, as more states adopt the norm, the motivations for adoption become less clear (Hyde 2011, N.d.). Importantly, bandwagoning occurs once enough states have adopted the new norm to exceed the "tipping point" at which point states comply regardless of domestic pressure or normative beliefs.[19] Therefore, there exists great heterogeneity among states regarding the role of domestic and international factors and the influence of normative persuasion and coercion on domestic policymaking. Importantly, as will be discussed in the next chapter, conflict can uniquely increase a state's dependence on international actors, making them more sensitive to international pressure for gender reform.

[19]The tipping point is commonly considered to be when one third of states have adopted the norm. However, the tipping point may be reached earlier if powerful states adopt the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998)

2.4 Conclusion

Gender equality and conflict are intricately linked, however, the exact ways in which conflict impacts gender equality in the short- and long-term are not adequately understood. Scholars disagree on how conflict affects women's rights. While some argue that conflict harms women's rights, others point to unprecedented gains in women's political leadership after conflicts in Liberia, Uganda, Rwanda, and many others as evidence that women's rights can increase after conflict. However, little is understand regarding when conflict will improve and when it will harm women's rights.

Since the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2000, women's rights and gender equality have been prioritized by the international community as a key strategy to prevent, control, and terminate conflict and to promote peace and security. Thus, an important shift has occurred in the past twenty years in how the international community perceived gender equality. While previously gender equality was a normative and liberal goal, it was often sidelined in the international agenda in favor of more pressing security and development issues. Thus, women in conflict-affected states were largely left unsupported and at the mercy of cultures of militarized masculinity that harmed their rights and equality. However, since the dawn of the WPS agenda, international actors have increasingly prioritized women's rights after conflict and now actively encourage, support, and facilitate gender reforms after conflict. As will be explored in the next chapter, international involvement in conflict-affected states may be a necessary factor to allow women to translate short-term changes in gender roles during conflict into long-term sustainable improvements in gender equality.

Chapter 3

Buying Women's Rights: International Actors and Women's Rights After Conflict

In the past 20 years, international third party actors have increasingly encouraged and pressured domestic policymakers to adopt gender reforms using a variety of tactics, including normative appeals, direct assistance, the promise of future benefits, and the threat of punishment for noncompliance (Bush 2011, Hafner-Burton 2008, Krook 2009, Montoya 2013, Paxton, Green and Hughes 2008, True 2016). However, despite this international pressure, a great degree of variation exists among states in the number and character of their reforms (Bush 2011, Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, Hafner-Burton 2008, Huber and Karim 2018, Krook 2009, Montoya 2013, Paxton, Green and Hughes 2008, True 2016). While the progress of individual states,

institutions, or regions to promote gender equality has been increasingly documented, little is understood about gendered policy adoption cross-nationally.[1] This chapter develops a theory on the diffusion of women's rights cross-nationally by examining how civil conflict primes and increases the influence of international actors. Particularly, this chapter examines how international actors promote gender reform by offering material incentives in exchange for improvements in women's rights.

As reviewed in Chapter 2, the two predominant literatures on gender and conflict predict different outcomes for women's rights. While the opportunity structures literature proposes that conflict may have beneficial impacts on women by challenging traditional gender roles and increasing women's political mobilization, the militarized masculinity literature expects that conflict should encourage hypermasculinity and decrease gender equality. What explains the different expectations of these two literatures and the empirical patterns that appear to support both outcomes of conflict on women's rights in different contexts?

Both theories acknowledge that international actors may play a role in contributing to or mediating the effects of conflict on gender equality, but often understate the influence of these actors as secondary to cultural and societal pressures of gender norms or to domestic actors (Tripp 2015, Webster, Torres and Beardsley N.d.). The theory presented here argues that international actors mediate the most likely diffusion pathway for women's rights. In particular, by offseting the costs of gender

[1]For a survey of literature examining the adoption of gender reform, see Basini (2013), Carey (2001), Charlesworth and Wood (2010), Dandeker and Segal (1996), Farr (2011), Hewitt (2016), Irvine (2013), McWilliams and Kilmurray (2015), Olsson (2001), Pupavac (2005), Wright (2016)) Further, the connection between the adoption of women's rights policies and their outcomes and impacts on gender equality is not always clear.

reform through material incentives, international actors promote the adoption of gender reform. Further, in conflict states in particular, international actors can leverage material incentives to help prevent a regression back to the gendered status quo and facilitate longer-term improvements in women's rights.

3.1 A Heavy Burden: The Costs of Gender Reform

Gender reforms incur costs on a state and therefore, given limited resources, states must prioritize gender reforms sufficiently to warrant committing their resources to it. These costs manifest in a number of ways. First, and most directly, gender reforms require resources to be drafted, adopted, and implemented. For example, to adopt and implement a law on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), experts must be consulted, time must be spent drafting and passing the law, and resources must be spent to inform police, justice officials, and citizens, to investigate possible infractions and to persecute perpetrators. Therefore, gender reforms require the commitment of time, funds, and personnel.

Additionally, gender reforms may carry normative, cultural, social, and political costs that may lead certain states to reject their adoption. First, states may reject gender reforms if they conflict with the society's cultural or social norms. This is most likely to occur in societies which hold deeply patriarchal values that are embedded in their social institutions. In particular, various religious beliefs restrict women's roles

and rights. Specifically, some versions of Islam hold conservative views of gender and sex, which lead them to resist "liberal" gender reforms that are viewed as corrupt or foreign (Mayer 1991). For example, while debates over the definition of domestic violence are common across various cultures and religions, conservative interpretations of Islam confront a contradiction between religious texts that appear to condone domestic violence and international norms against domestic violence. In particular, Pakistan has seen a strong debate on this topic as the powerful Council on Islamic Ideology submitted a proposal that would allow husbands to legally "lightly beat their wives," claiming that it was sanctioned by Koranic teachings and Sharia Law (Craig 2006). Similarly, countries with large populations of Catholics and Evangelical Protestants have also seen debates around women's rights, particularly regarding access to birth control and abortions. Similar culture-based resistance to women's rights is commonly confronted with topics such as female genital mutilation (FGM), child marriage, and polygany where individuals argue that these elements are central to their culture and therefore, cannot be altered or outlawed without undermining tradition.

Therefore, in states where gender reforms contradict popular (or even minority) cultural, religious, or social institutions and beliefs, leaders and politicians may bear large costs for adopting gender reforms and face criticism, lost support, possible loss of office, and social unrest, which in extremes can lead to violence. For example, after a political gender quota was implemented in the Indian state of Nagaland in February 2017, riots and protests occurred, leading to property destruction, the deployment of hundreds of troops, and two deaths (Feliz 2017). As a result, some societies and

leaders may view gender reforms as violating and undermining their culture, religion, or identity, increasing their willingness to resist international and domestic pressure in favor of these reforms.

Finally, politicians may be reluctant to adopt gender reforms if they threaten their political power. In other words, if politicians and leaders came to power in a gender inequitable state (and probably retain power largely due to the support of men), they may fear that gender reforms, and the resultant increased women's rights, may decrease their support and increase the pool of potential challengers for political power. This threat is seen most prominently with political gender quotas in which male politicians face an influx in the number of candidates challenging them or may find themselves ineligible for offices and seats reserved for women. Male politicians may perceive gender quotas to be a "negative sum" game in which they receive a worse outcome from adopting this gender reform (Krook 2016).[2] Therefore, they may fear that adopting gender reforms may negatively alter the stability of their office, either by actively empowering women or by provoking backlash and criticism.

Therefore, gender reforms may trigger great costs for states, communities and their leaders in terms of resources, social and cultural authority, and political competitiveness. As a result, to adopt and implement gender reforms two conditions must be present. First, states must have the physical resources to draft, adopt, and implement gender reforms. Second, state leaders must have the political will to adopt them. This will can conform with the views of the majority population who support

[2]However, it is important to note that not all male politicians reject gender quotas and that gender quotas, at times, have worsened gender inequalities (Krook 2016). This underscores important questions of when and under what conditions there will be resistance and/or counter-intuitive outcomes, as discussed in this dissertation.

gender reform or may contrast the views of the population. In the latter case most prominently, although it may also occur in the former, leaders must be prepared for the consequences of adopting these reforms, including popular backlash, criticism, increased political competition, and potentially the loss of power. Further, in order for the gender reform to be successful, the population must have some degree of political will to support it. The sources of resources and political will can be internal or external and can be developed over time or may experience sudden shifts.

3.2 Sharing the Costs: International Influences on Gender Reform

International actors can promote gender reform by altering the costs associated with their adoption and implementation. International influence commonly is expressed through the use of carrots, or the promise of future rewards, and sticks, or the threat of punishment for noncompliance, to convince policymakers that it is in their strategic interest to comply with international norms (Hafner-Burton 2008, Lake 2016, Pevehouse 2005, Poast and Urpelainen 2018). Similar to a "second image reversed" approach (Pevehouse 2005), international actors may incentivize states to adopt gender reforms. In particular, international actors can offset the costs by offering assistance with the adoption and implementation, promising increased financial cooperation as a result of compliance, or threatening to remove financial support if gender reform is not enacted.

While international influence on the diffusion of gender reform is manifested in several ways, including direct participation in policymaking, agenda-setting power through financial relationships, and peer pressure, international actors gain the greatest influence by offering material incentives to states in exchange for adopting desired policies. Third parties can offer various forms of material incentives. On one hand, they may promise direct "payments" to the state in return for gender reforms. For example, several foreign aid distributors, including the U.S., Sweden, and the IMF, offer economic aid to countries that propose to commit it to women's rights programs. Further, states may receive more indirect material incentives, such as the promise of greater economic cooperation and investment in the future. For example, Hashimoto (Forthcoming) argues that state leaders join the ICC to tie the hands of potential rivals by invoking fears of future prosecution, which would decrease investment and trade. Similarly, as gender equality become an increasingly salient topic, states, their public, IGOs, NGOs, and businesses may withhold investment from states accused of violating women's rights and increase investment in states that make progress in promoting gender equality. For example, clothing factories in Guatemala and Mexico have been increasingly criticized by consumers and NGOs for discriminatory practices against women, including forced pregnancy tests, birth control, and sexual harassment.[3] In other words, third parties may offer both the promise of increased

[3]A long history exists of third party actors invoking poor women's rights as justification for punitive action. For example, scholars argue that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were partly justified among the American and Western public by rhetoric which emphasized women's suffering under the previous regimes. High ranking U.S. officials publicized meetings with women's rights officials from both countries and the State Department published reports documenting women's rights abuses occurring under Saddam Hussein's and the Taliban's regimes. (Al-Ali and Pratt 2010, Jabbra 2006, Wylie 2003)

investment, aid, and cooperation in the future in exchange for the adoption of gender reform and the threat of withdrawing those material benefits if the state does not comply.

Further, international third parties may also offer the necessary resources, assistance, and expertise to adopt and implement gender reform policies, negating the costs that would otherwise be borne by the state. This removes the immediate costs that states must pay to adopt the policy. Therefore, third parties can promote gender reform through offering direct and indirect material incentives ranging from immediate assistance in policy adoption to the promise of medium and long-term benefits in the form of greater investment, aid, and cooperation.

However, it is important to note that offering material incentives and promising to "link" those material incentives with behavior may not be sufficient to change state behavior. For example, several scholars point to commitment issues that decrease the likelihood that international actors will fairly reward and punish state behavior (Bearce and Tirone 2010, Curtice and Reinhardt N.d., Stone 2011, von Borzyskowski and Vabulas N.d.). This commitment problem is heightened when the initial material investment made in exchange for compliance provides the giving state with economic or security benefits that decreases its willingness to later punish the receiving state. This dynamic has been found with foreign aid disbursements to states believed to be too-big-to-fail according to the donor's security and economic interests and with trade agreements that benefit powerful economic actors (Bearce and Tirone 2010, Curtice and Reinhardt N.d.). Therefore, material incentives with embedded conditionality may have limited long-term, practical effects as once the initial investment

has been made, the receiving state may believe that it can violate the conditions of the agreement with impunity.

Additionally, material incentives may lead to disingenuous policy adoption as states may adopt gender reform to reap the potential international benefits with little or no intent to implement the policy. For example, Hyde (2011, N.d.) argues that if international actors offer material benefits to states that exhibit "good" behavior, then states may begin to adopt policies to signal to the international community that the state deserves benefits. However, as "good" states continue to be rewarded by adopting these policies, "bad" states will increasingly take the gamble that if they adopt the policy, they will receive the coveted rewards without changing their behavior. For example, Vreeland (2008) argues that multi-party dictatorships that commit torture are more likely to ratify the Convention Against Torture, despite their increased use of torture compared to one-party dictatorships, to appease the demands of internal and external interest groups. In other words, the policy diffuses without necessarily causing changed behavior and without the international community having to directly advocate for the policy. In the context of this theory, this would indicate that all states are beginning to adopt gender reforms regardless of their "type," namely whether or not they support women's rights, limiting the strength of the signal observed by the adoption of these policies.

These two sets of scholarship have several important implications for the theory developed here. First, they recognize that material incentives can and do persuade states to adopt, at least nominally, certain policies or sign agreements with conditionality clauses surrounding state behavior that is favored by the international

community (or the donor state). Second, it points to the potential limits of material incentives over the long-term by calling into question whether linkage can actually change state behavior or whether it leads to empty promises and window-dressing and under what conditions the latter outcome arises.

Third, it is important to note that while gender equality has tended to increase over the past several decades, it is not yet ubiquitous across states. In fact, contrary to the expectations of the final stage of Hyde (N.d.)'s theory where all states adopt the policy regardless of whether they support the norm, many states continue to resist gender reform. For example, several countries have recently adopted or considered policies that would restrict gender equality, such as Russia's reduction of domestic violence penalties, Pakistan's consideration of a law condoning wife beating, and several countries' renewal of conservative debates on reproductive rights, including in the United States (Craig 2006, Kim 2017, Sifferlin 2017). Similarly, other states continue to have laws that discriminate against women, despite the protest of local and international women's rights advocates. This includes laws that restrict women's clothing in Sudan, allow for marital rape in India, the Bahamas, Lebanon, and Singapore, restrict women's movement and job choice in Afghanistan, Yemen, Cameroon, Saudi Arabia and Guinea, and limit women's inheritance in Tunisia. In other words, while gender reforms have become more widespread in the past several decades, they are not yet considered standard practice and still retain their power to signal a state's commitment, albeit imperfectly, to gender equality to international and domestic actors. Further, this underscores that some states appear to resist the material incentives for gender reform offered by international actors.

Further, international actors may support gender reform even in the absence of official state policies or legal reform. For example, international actors may offer direct support to women's rights movements within the country to assist their activism and mobilization. Similarly, international aid programs often directly work with local women to increase their economic, political, and social rights. Therefore, international actors may bypass the state and legal reform to directly implement women's rights reforms. Importantly, through this support, international actors offer material support to local women and to women's movements that decreases the financial and social burden that would otherwise be paid directly by the women and their allies.

Therefore, international third party actors promote the adoption of gender reform by offering material incentives to decrease the costs of gender reform paid by the government, by women's rights movements, and women themslves. As a result, states that have a high level of international intervention and influence should face greater pressure and incentives to adopt gender reform compared to states with less international presence.

3.3 Conflict: Opening Doors for Gender Reform

While international actors may incentivize the adoption of gender reform in all states, conflict states are primed to be particularly sensitive to this material pressure as a result of their increased financial dependence upon international support. Therefore, international actors may play a vital and perhaps necessary role in promoting women's rights after conflict. While the instability of conflict may provide some opportunities

for women to challenge traditional gender roles, demonstrate their agency as leaders, and mobilize politically, there is often overwhelming pressure to revert back to the status quo after conflict. Additionally, as will be explored more in Chapter 5, it is not clear whether conflict has homogeneous effects on all members of the population. In other words, while some women may find that conflict affords them unique opportunities to assert their power, other women may suffer tremendously under militarized masculinity. This section will propose that international actors play a key role in offsetting the harmful effects of militarized masculinity and supporting women's short-term increases in political, economic, and social leadership by offering material incentives to offset the costs of gender reform. In other words, international pressure counteracts the potential negative effects of conflict on gender equality and helps to ensure that the disruption of conflict is used to create new opportunities for women and to prevent backsliding after conflict ends. In particular, given the high costs of conflict and the increased concerns for legitimacy in conflict-affected states, international material incentives should be even more influential in conflict and post-conflict states compared to non-conflict states.

Conflict is very draining on resources as a state must siphon funds into its fighting capacity and infrastructure repair, which may limit the resources available for other sectors or gender reforms. Moreover, after conflict, resources must be devoted to the rebuilding process as the country struggles to implement DDR, repair infrastructure, resume regular social service provision, and reform and rebuild the government and security sector. For example, Stewart and Fitzgerald (2001) describe the negative consequences that conflict has on economic growth, exports, consumption, public and

private investment, and development. Further, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) roughly calculate that the cost of armed conflict in a low-income country averages about 64.2 billion U.S. dollars. For example, after Liberia's civil war, the country suffered from a damaged infrastructure and decimated economy, which led it to become highly dependent upon foreign aid. Bacon (2015) reports that donor flows to Liberia ranged between 356 and 556 million dollars (USD) between 2009 and 2012, which represented up to 771% of government spending and 39% of Liberia's GDP. Further, in 2013, Liberia had the highest global ratio of FDI to GDP. In contrast, while non-conflict states experience similar resource limitations and also face trade-offs regarding how to spend their limited resources, since they have not experienced a violent shock,[4] they may be able to consider a broader range of reforms on which to spend resources rather than immediate rebuilding or security concerns.

Therefore, conflict and post-conflict states may have more severe resource limitations, which may lead them to be highly dependent upon international donors, trade partners, and organizations to augment their resources. Similarly, conflict-affected states are eager to rebuild to prevent further conflict and instability. Therefore, conflict and post-conflict states are highly susceptible to the material incentives of international actors who may offer reconstruction assistance, foreign aid, or investment in exchange for gender reforms due to their immediate needs to stabilize and rebuild and their medium- and long-term need for economic growth and stability. Further, while international actors promote gender reform cross-nationally, special attention

[4]However, states may experience other types of shocks to their environment, infrastructure, and capabilities, such as natural disasters, that may have a similar effect. Future studies should explore other political, economic, and social disruptions that may create a similar increased sensitivity to international material incentives.

is paid to conflict and post-conflict states since UNSCR 1325 outlines them as most urgently needing gender reform.

However, while conflict may provide an opportunity for gender reform, it is not sufficient to ensure greater gender equality. In many ways, conflict is directly damaging to gender equality as argued by the militarized masculinity theory (Enloe 1989, 2000, Goldstein 2003, Hudson et al. 2013). The theory presented here does not necessarily contradict this perspective. Instead, it expands upon original scholarship that critiques the reinforcing nature of patriarchy and conflict by considering the developments in the WPS norm in the past twenty to thirty years, which challenge traditional ideas regarding conflict and gender. Specifically, while previously the WPS norm was underdeveloped and had little support, since UNSCR 1325, it is now an increasingly important norm. In other words, many international and domestic actors now understand that conflict and gender inequality are linked and therefore, specifically target conflict countries for women's rights campaigns, as encouraged by UNSCR 1325. Further, beyond the increased messages and pressure received during and after conflict due to the relatively new appreciation of the links between conflict and patriarchy, conflict states are economically, politically, and socially vulnerable and unable to resist these pressures, even if they wished. Therefore, new developments in the international WPS norm increased the international community's interest and investment in reducing gender inequality in conflict affected countries. However, it should be noted that conflict is not sufficient to increase the likelihood of gender reform. In fact, if international intervention and pressure does not occur to advocate for these reforms, then the more traditional view of conflict as further embedding patriarchy

is likely to occur.

In other words, the presence of international actors and their material incentives may partially explain why some conflicts worsen women's rights, while gender equality increases after other conflicts. Recalling the causal mechanisms proposed by the opportunity structures literature in Chapter 2, it becomes clear that in the absence of international actors, many of these mechanisms would be ineffective. First, the opportunity structures theory heavily relies on an assumption that women will be able to assert their newly expanded leadership skills during and after conflict. In other words, it assumes that women who acted as combatants, political leaders, or economic contributors during conflict will be able to continue to do so, or even expand their participation, after conflict. However, there are several reasons that women may be barred from increasing their leadership. First, after conflict there is often social pressure to revert to the previous gendered status quo (Goldstein 2003, Lazarev 2018, Schweitzer 1980). For example, after the mass mobilization of women into the military-industrial complex during World War I and World War II, women were highly encouraged, and at times forced, to return to traditionally feminine roles after the end of both conflicts. For example, the "baby boom" in the United States started after World War II as women left factories, hospitals, and peace movements to return to more traditional roles as mothers, homemakers, and wives. Therefore, in the absence of a consolidated national and international support network, women may not be able to translate short-term gains in rights into longer, more sustainable reforms.

Reversion to traditional gender power hierarchies is especially likely to occur if men do not also change their beliefs regarding gender norms and women's rights. In

the vast majority of societies, men are the gatekeepers of power and thus, men control when gender reform does or does not occur. This is particularly concerning given that the opportunity structures theory partially relies on an implicit assumption that men are absent during conflict. It is often precisely because men are missing in some capacity, either because they are fighting in the conflict, were injured, imprisoned, or incapacitated in some other way, or left the community, that women are able to increase their roles as political leaders, the heads of households, economic laborers, community leaders, and activists. If men are absent during the conflict, it is unclear why they would similarly update their beliefs about women's rights once they return home given that they did not personally witness women's increased agency and leadership during conflict.[5]

In other words, the opportunity structures theory often assumes homogeneous effects among men and women on their support for gender equality after conflict, but, as will be explored further in Chapter 5, there is reason to doubt that men would update their beliefs. On one hand, men in conflict societies are likely exposed to militarized masculinity either directly or indirectly and as a result, they are more likely to decrease their support of gender equality (Goldstein 2003). On the other hand, gender norms are incredibly resilient and although conflict may temporarily disrupt traditional gender roles, men – who hold greater power under traditional gender roles – are likely to want to return to those traditional roles. For example, Kelly et al. (2018) find that conflict increases the level of intimate partner violence as men

[5]This mechanism is more likely to hold true for male combatants who interacted with female combatants during the conflict. However, given the relative rarity of female combatants and the subordinate role that women commonly play within insurgent groups, this mechanism would likely affect a small minority of men (Thomas and Bond 2015*a*)

attempt to reassert control over their female partners. Similarly, after several conflicts, coalitions of men specifically advocated for a return to "traditional values," and the corresponding decreased levels of gender equality (Lazarev 2018). Therefore, in order for widespread gender reform to occur after conflict, men must also be incentivized to favor gender equality, which cannot be assumed to occur after all conflicts.

Second, the opportunity structures theory assumes that the government both is willing and able to adopt and implement gender reforms. Regarding the level of government will, this either assumes that politicians themselves support gender reform or that the government is responsive to public pressure in favor of it. The opportunity structures theory would argue that the government should have increased political will to adopt gender reform. While this may be called into question for the same reasons outlined in the previous two paragraphs, even if we assume that this is true, political will alone is not enough to ensure the adoption and implementation of gender reforms. As argued above, gender reform is costly. Conflict and post-conflict states often suffer from resource constraints due to the high level of resources needed to address security concerns and post-conflict reconstruction and the harmful effects that conflict has on the economy, which can further limit the pool of resources available. As a result, having the political will to adopt gender reform alone is not sufficient. The government must also have the necessary resources; resources that can come from international actors.

Therefore, by considering the role of international actors, this theory addresses the gaps and assumptions within both the militarized masculinity and opportunity structures theories. Militarized masculinity is a relative constant in conflict. Even leftist

insurgent groups commonly rely on traditional gender roles during and after conflict (Dietrich Ortega 2012). Therefore, it is highly likely that both men and women are exposed to some degree of militarized masculinity during conflict. However, this may be partially offset by women's experiences during conflict that challenge traditional gender roles and lead women to desire greater gender equality. Additionally, the government's desire for legitimacy and for financial support from international actors prime it to be highly sensitive to international material pressure. As a result, while conflict-affected states may have some nascent political will to adopt gender reform, without the necessary resources to overcome the costs of gender reform and to prevent men's (and traditional women's) resistance to reform, conflict is unlikely to result in gender reform. International actors then play a key, and at times necessary, role in promoting gender reform by offering the material incentives and pressure to offset the costs of gender reform, to support women's efforts to gain increased rights, and to pressure men and politicians to adopt these reforms.

Thus, the experience of conflict primes the state for gender reform by altering the domestic context and increasing the state's dependence on foreign aid, investment, and assistance. International actors then offer material incentives, both in the form of direct benefits, such as increased aid, cooperation, and investment, and the resources needed to draft, adopt, and implement the reform. Particularly, conflict affects a state's resource limitations, sensitivity to material inducements, and domestic pressure for gender reform — which may make a state more willing to adopt gender reform. Although non-conflict states may also be impacted by international factors, conflict and post-conflict states are especially likely to adopt gender reform

when international influence increases. Moreover, given the contrasting influences of militarized masculinity and shifting gender norms during conflict on gender equality, international actors may ensure that short-term changes in women's leadership and desire for increased equality during and after conflict is accompanied by the necessary resources to offset the costs of longer-term gender reform. While this theory focuses specifically on the dynamics of conflict and international actors, its causal mechanisms could be robust to any shock to a state that results in an increased dependence on international support and increased international pressure, such as a major natural disaster, economic crisis, health epidemic, or regime transition. Further, it is most likely to occur when the shock also results in challenges to traditional gender norms that can further prime the domestic context to have increased political will for gender reform, which when combined with international material incentives, can prompt gender reform. Moreover, it is important to note that international actors are one possible factor that may influence the diffusion of gender reform and other factors, such as domestic women's rights movements, also influence women's rights in non-conflict and conflict-affected countries.

3.4 Pathways to Women's Rights: Legal, Regulatory, or Behavioral Change

Conflict may empower women at multiple levels: through formal legal changes, changes in state regulations short of legal changes, or informal behavior change on

the ground by individual citizens. Increasingly, studies have shown women's political participation increases after conflict (Bush 2011, Hughes and Tripp 2015, Tripp 2015, Webster, Torres and Beardsley N.d.). This increased participation could occur through legal changes that promote women's political rights, such as legislative quotas, electoral laws, or constitutional amendments. Further, it could also be the result of other types of government campaigns short of the adoption of laws, such as informational campaigns to encourage female voter registration. Finally, it could occur through individual women choosing to be more politically active even in the absence of legal guarantees or encouragements.

It is important to consider each level of reform separately because the process of women's rights reform is not linear and different types of women's rights may change at different speeds. For example, Karim and Hill. (N.d.) find relatively low levels of correlation between women's aggregate level of security, inclusion, and equality. Similarly, gender reform at different levels, from the individual to legal to societal, may occur at different times and be affected by different domestic and international factors as a result of the different relevant actors and the motivations behind each type and level of gender reform. Additionally, as will be touched on in Chapter 4, the adoption of gender reform does not always indicate sufficient implementation of gender reform and vice versa. Therefore, a wide range of gender reform must be considered to fully capture the dynamic relationships between conflict, international actors, and women's rights.

There are several reasons to believe that conflict primarily creates opportunities for women to gain rights through informal channels rather than through the adoption

of formal laws. For example, women may join the government in larger numbers after conflict and therefore, the government does not feel the need to adopt gender reform. Additionally, the government may simply lack the capacity to adopt large gender reform laws. Further, policymakers may be aware that international actors support the adoption of these policies and due to concerns of neo-imperialism may actively reject adopting similar policies. Thus, while these policymakers may advocate for gender reform, they may not adopt the policies favored by international actors explicitly.

However, at the same time, post-conflict states may be eager to adopt formal women's rights policies if they believe that it is a relatively simple way to gain increased legitimacy in the eyes of the international community and the domestic public. For example, after the genocide and civil war in Rwanda, the legislature adopted a legislative quota, partially to mend the government's reputation with the international community and appear democratic and progressive. Additionally, women in the post-conflict context may mobilize to demand the adoption of legislative changes regarding women's rights. For example, Tripp (2015) argues that after the civil war in Uganda in the 1980's, women's movements mobilized to demand that the government amend the constitution to guarantee equal rights between men and women.

Therefore, improvements in women's rights in post-conflict states may occur either through the adoption of laws regarding women's rights, the adoption of government-supported policies that promote women's rights on the ground, or through changes in women's individual behavior. This study will consider these as distinct, but complementary pathways to women's rights.

3.5 Conclusion

In the past twenty years, women's rights have been increasingly connected to conflict as scholars and international actors have recognized that women and gender equality play an important role in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. However, women's rights in post-conflict states vary widely as some states significantly improve women's rights, while others backslide into entrenched systems of patriarchy and gender inequality. This theory argues that in response to the rising WPS norm, international third party actors seek to encourage states to adopt women's rights reforms through material incentives. While this pressure is applied to all states, conflict and post-conflict states have greater sensitivity of material incentives and altered willpower to adopt these reforms as a result of the conflict, amplifying the impact of these incentives. In other words, while international actors promote the adoption of gender reform in all states, their effect is amplified in conflict and post-conflict states given their increased dependence on international support.

Moreover, given the contrasting positive and negative influences of conflict on women's rights, international actors may play a vital role in offsetting the negative impacts of conflict on gender reform to ensure that short-term gains in women's rights are translated into sustainable changes in the society's gender norms. The following chapters test this theory and its implications cross-nationally across all states since 1988 and sub-nationally in Uganda by exploring the adoption of women's rights laws, improvements in women's rights on the ground, individual changes, and the adoption of gendered security sector reforms. This dissertation not only clarifies the pathway

through which women's rights may improve after conflict and thus contributes to the WPS literature, but it also explores the ways in which international actors influence domestic policymaking and statebuilding after conflict more generally.

Chapter 4

Cross-National Effects of Conflict on Women's Rights

4.1 Introduction

This chapter turns to the cross-national analysis of the impact of international actors and civil conflict on gender reform, including formal legal reform and societal gender equality. This goal of this chapter is to test theoretical expectations proposed in Chapter 3, namely that third party actors should incentivize gender reform, an effect that should be particularly strong in post-conflict states. In other words, this chapter expects that cross-nationally, conflict-affected states that have high levels of international involvement in their domestic policymaking and economy should be more likely to adopt and implement gender reform compared to non-conflict states and conflict-affected states that have little international intervention.

4.2 Conflict, International Influences, and Gender Reform

Chapter 3 proposes that international actors promote gender reform through offering material incentives to offset the costs of adoption and implementation. While there are various factors that affect the diffusion of gender reform, international actors may gain increased influence by leveraging material incentives. At one extreme, international third parties mandate or direct the reforms adopted. This participation may take the form of agenda-setting, advising, and assistance in formulating policies. For example, UN peacekeeping missions often undertake agenda-setting and direct participation in policymaking to advocate for liberal reforms. Bush (2011) argues that peacekeeping missions increase the likelihood of political gender quota adoption in developing countries as the country hopes to leverage the resources and influence of the peacekeeping mission to demonstrate its level of democratization and modernity. Similarly, peacekeeping missions influence the adoption of security sector gender reforms in post-conflict states (Huber and Karim 2018). Finally, several studies trace how peacekeeping missions support a number of gender reforms in post-conflict nations by providing critical resources and international support for women's rights initiatives (Bacon 2015, Karim and Beardsley 2016, McLeod 2011, Olsson 2001).

However, short of a UN peacekeeping mission, international influence can be exerted through the presence of UN personnel, technical advisers and experts, and funding. While various IGOs have adopted and promoted the WPS agenda, including NATO, EU, AU, and ASEAN, the UN remains at the forefront of the women's

rights agenda as the first major organization to recognize women's rights as a security concern and for its continued prioritization of gender equality. Therefore, the UN is the most likely international actor to specifically advocate for women's rights while also offering the necessary material assistance and incentives to offset the costs of gender reform.

Specifically, the UN may promote gender reforms by providing expertise regarding gender issues and policy development, disseminating information regarding the benefits of gender equality, training government officials, assisting in implementation, monitoring and evaluating the progress of gender reforms, and providing funds and other resources to support adoption and implementation. For example, Basini and Ryan (2016) argue that states adopted UN sanctioned language and policy recommendations to decrease the costs of independently developing a NAP for UNSCR 1325. Similarly, UN Women, the UN agency charged with promoting gender equality, had a budget of 690 million dollars in 2014 and 880 million dollars in 2016 to support gender reforms internationally (UN Women 2016).[1] In addition, other UN agencies, such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Children Fund also support gender reform programs. Given the UN's high prioritization of gender reforms, its commitment to mainstreaming gender through all of its operations, and its recent history offering assistance and support to governments specifically to adopt gender reform, it represents the type of international actor most likely to directly promote gender reform. Therefore, as UN presence within a state increases, the state

[1]This represents a significant increase from the budget of its predecessor, the United Nations Development Fund for Women, in 1982 of 4 million dollars (UNIFEM 2008).

may be more likely to adopt gender reforms due to increased international pressure and resources.

International Hypothesis 1: *As UN presence increases in a state, the state becomes more likely to adopt gender reforms.*

Additionally, international actors may also retain agenda-setting power through financial relationships. One possible channel for international actors to influence a country's policymaking is through foreign aid. Donor countries and institutions often use foreign aid as a carrot (or stick) to persuade the recipient country to adopt certain reforms, including gender reforms (Bush 2011, Hughes, Krook and Paxton 2015). For example, the U.S. foreign aid agency, USAID, has grants earmarked for women's rights initiatives. Similarly, the Swedish International Development Cooperation prioritizes the promotion of gender equality when making decisions about foreign aid disbursements.

Therefore, as a state receives greater amounts of foreign aid as a proportion of its total gross domestic product (GDP), it will become more dependent upon donor states and more sensitive to international pressure for gender reforms. While not all foreign aid donors prioritize gender equality, the top ten largest donors all have promoted gender equality abroad.[2] However, this effect is likely to be magnified when the donor is associated with liberalism and women's rights. For example, states which have adopted NAPs for UNSCR 1325 have sent a clear signal to their own citizens and the international community that they intend to comply with the UN's prioritization of gender reform. Further, nine out of ten of the top foreign aid donors have adopted

[2]The main exception to this is the United Arab Emirates.

NAPs for UNSCR 1325.

International actors are more likely to give aid to or trade with states that are similar to them (Maoz 2012, Zhou 2011). Therefore, gender equitable states may be more likely to form financial relationships with other equitable states. Additionally, once a financial relationship has been established, the less equitable state may learn or begin to emulate its donor, and therefore, it may adopt gender reforms even in the absence of direct material incentivization. Therefore, it is not necessary that the donor explicitly calls for gender reform among the aid recipient for gender reform to diffuse to the recipient. However, material incentives may have the unique effect of being able to prompt gender reform even amongst a state with low levels of gender equality or which is not similar to a gender equitable donor state. While a state may believe that it can learn the benefits of gender reform from a culturally proximate neighbor, it may be successfully encouraged to adopt a gender reform through material incentives from even non-proximate donors.

Therefore, donors with high levels of gender equality and which have previously adopted gender reforms are likely to encourage recipient states to adopt gender reforms.

International Hypothesis 2a: *As a state's dependence on foreign aid increases, the state becomes more likely to adopt gender reforms.*

International Hypothesis 2b: *Conditional upon a state's foreign aid donors adopting gender reforms, as a state's dependence on foreign aid increases, the state becomes more likely to adopt gender reforms.*

Similarly, international actors may leverage trade relationships to pressure states

to adopt gender reforms. For example, several states and trade institutions have begun to use the promise of trade and the threat of trade disruption to encourage human rights compliance. For example, the United States' African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) offered trade agreements to sub-Saharan African states with the condition that the state improve labor rights (Hafner-Burton 2005). While the effectiveness of AGOA and similar trade agreements with human rights conditionality is debated,[3] the use of human rights performance as a condition of a trade agreement demonstrates that third party actors do leverage trade to promote certain domestic behaviors. Similarly, investors and trading partners may perceive gender equality as an indicator of social capital and skills (Blanton and Blanton 2007, Blomström, Kokko and Mucchielli 2003, Kucera 2002). In other words, investors may perceive that low levels of women's rights are correlated with lowered productivity, economic activity, and human capital (Coleman 2010). Therefore, as trade forms a greater proportion of a state's total GDP, the state's increased dependence upon the continued cooperation of its trade partners will heighten its sensitivity to international pressure for gender reforms. Further, as with the previous hypotheses, it is possible that the relationship between trade and gender reform adoption is dependent upon the trade partner's own gender equality record. In other words, a state that has a poor record of women's rights may be less likely to promote gender reform in its trade partners than a state that promotes gender equality in its own policymaking.

International Hypothesis 3a: *As a state's dependence on trade increases, the state becomes more likely to adopt gender reforms.*

[3]See Curtice and Reinhardt (N.d.)

International Hypothesis 3b: *Conditional upon a state's trading partner adopting gender reform, as a state's dependence on that trade partner increases, the state becomes more likely to adopt gender reforms.*

Further, several IGOs have adopted the WPS framework and prioritized women's rights and can leverage the material benefits of membership to pressure for similar gender reforms in member states. Specifically, IGOs may connect compliance on gender reform with several material benefits that result from membership, participation, and cooperation in the IGO. For example, Pevehouse (2005) argues that the EU offered material incentives in the form of sticks and carrots to promote democratization among member states. Moreover, Poast and Urpelainen (2018) finds that international organizations play a key role in providing transitional democracies the public goods and expertise necessary to consolidate democracy. Similarly, Montoya (2013) examines how current and potential EU member states adopted laws addressing violence against women in response to demands by the EU (Polack and Hafner-Burton 2000). Additionally, NATO promotes gender reform in the security sector as vital to the success and effectiveness of both national militaries and the NATO alliance and therefore, encourages and requires its member states to adopt gender reforms that promote women's participation in security. NATO then uses a variety of mechanisms to publicize, celebrate, and reward those member states that have adopted gender reforms and shame and punish states that have not complied.

Therefore, membership in IGOs increases international coercive pressure by linking the benefits of membership with gender reform. Additionally, as above, it is likely that IGOs will be especially likely to pressure for gender reforms and be willing to tie

continued benefits with compliance on women's rights policies as the members which make up the IGO become more committed to women's rights. For example, Greenhill (2010*a*) finds that as the average human rights compliance of all the members of an IGO increases, each individual state member is more likely to also increase their own human rights. In a similar way, if the members of an IGO on average have complied with gender reform, then any individual member state is more likely to adopt gender reform to demonstrate their commitment to the shared values of the IGO's member states.

International Hypothesis 4a: *As a state become more interconnected with intergovernmental organizations, the state becomes more likely to adopt gender reforms.*

International Hypothesis 4b: *As the average level of previous gender reforms adopted by member states of an IGO increases, each individual member state becomes more likely to adopt gender reforms.*

Finally, many scholars argue that non-state actors play a vital role in promoting the adoption of gender reforms cross-nationally (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Paxton, Green and Hughes 2008, True and Mintrom 2001). Since 1970, women's international NGOs (WINGOs) have expanded exponentially in both number and membership to produce dense networks (Berkovitch and Berqôvîč 1999, Hughes, Krook and Paxton 2015). WINGOs are vital to uncovering violations of women's rights, garnering domestic support, and calling international attention to gender equality in certain countries. Importantly, unlike domestic women's movements, which are subject to similar resource constraints as the government and may possess limited power in relation to the government, WINGOs have independent resources and support (Hughes,

Krook and Paxton 2015). Further, it is important to note that while WINGOs and domestic women's movements may work cooperatively to support domestic gender reform, they should remain conceptually independent. This distinction is especially important in light of recent scholarship that international and domestic women's movements can be at odds with one another, leading to tensions and reduced policy impact. For example, Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015) find that the growth of the international women's movement and domestic women's organizations negatively interact to slightly decrease the likelihood of political gender quota adoption. They argue that this likely occurs because international and domestic women's movements may disagree over policy priorities. Similarly, they suggest that the combined presence of both international and domestic women's rights advocates may provoke resistance from male elites who feel that their power is threatened. Finally, WINGOs may pursue different policies and may employ different tactics than domestic women's movements due to differing levels of power, available resources, and funding opportunities.

International Hypothesis 5: *As the presence of international women's rights organizations in a state increases, the state becomes more likely to adopt gender reform.*

While all states face resource constraints that may make them likely to respond to international material incentives, states that are currently experiencing conflict or have recently experienced conflict are especially likely to be sensitive to resource limitations and therefore are more likely to adopt gender reforms in response to material incentives. Therefore, conflict and post-conflict states are often highly dependent

upon international donors, trade partners, and organizations to augment their resources. As a result, conflict and post-conflict states are highly susceptible to the material incentives of international actors who may offer reconstruction assistance, foreign aid, or investment in exchange for the adoption of gender reforms due to their immediate needs to stabilize and rebuild and their medium- and long-term need for economic growth and stability. Further, while international actors promote gender reform cross-nationally, special attention is paid to conflict and post-conflict states since UNSCR 1325 outlines them as most urgently needing gender reform.

Conflict Hypothesis: *Conflict and post-conflict states should be more likely to adopt gender reforms conditional upon the presence of international factors than non-conflict states.*

4.3 Research Design

To test the theoretical expectations above, a unique cross-national data set on the adoption of gender reform between 1988 and 2016 was created.[4] This data set includes information on the year of adoption of several gender equality reforms. These include the creation of gender machinery within the government whose responsibility it is to promote women's rights and gender equality domestically, the criminalization of several forms of violence against women, and the adoption of a legislative gender

[4]Robustness checks also expand the time frame to 1970.

quota.[5] The coding rules of these variables can be found in the Appendix.[6]

For each reform, a separate data set was created which contains country-year observations from 1988 until the year in which the reform was adopted at which point the country drops out of the data set. While some of these laws can be reformed, repealed, or adopted multiple times, the primary analysis only considers the initial adoption of the policy. There are several reasons for this. First, when a policy is initially adopted, the state may bear several costs unique to the first adoption, such as the resources needed to draft and campaign for the policy and initial cultural backlash. It is reasonable to believe that once a policy has been adopted for the first time, the process through which it is adopted again and the costs which must be paid are significantly altered. Second, while it is possible for these laws to be repealed, it is extremely unlikely and is a rare occurrence in the data. Finally, the data set was limited to countries which are not members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as OECD states generally have higher levels of gender equality, earlier adoption of gender reforms, and a lower incidence of conflict.

[5]Additional reforms in the data set, but whose results are not presented here, include the legalizing of abortion and the conditions under which an abortion is legal, the outlawing of child marriage, the adoption of a National Action Plan to promote gender equality (including NAPs for UNSCR 1325), and reforms to outlaw economic discrimination against women.

[6]Data on the adoption of these laws was gathered from a number of sources. Primary sources include IGOs, such as the UN (especially UNICEF, UN Women, and the UN Population Fund), the WHO, and NATO, NGOs, such as Girls Not Brides and Stop Violence Against Women, news reports and think tanks (including the Pew Research Center and the Center for Democratic Control of the Armed forces), and scholarly data sets, including the Quota Adoption and Reform over Time (QAROT) data set from Hughes et al. (2017) and the Women in Parliament data set by Paxton, Green and Hughes (2008).

4.3.1 Dependent Variables

Several dependent variables are examined in this analysis.[7] All of the dependent variables reflect legal, programmatic, or organizational changes made by a national government or its institutions to promote either women's rights or gender reform. First, three types of violence against women laws are examined, including laws that explicitly criminalize intimate partner violence (IPV), the criminalization of marital rape, and laws against sexual harassment either in the workplace or more generally.[8] Next, *Government Machinery* examines the creation of government offices that may promote women's rights[9] and *Government Ministry* captures the creation of a ministry-level government body created that is devoted to women's rights. Next, the analysis considers the creation of a legislative gender quota, or a legally mandated minimum level of representation for women within the legislative branch (Hughes et al. 2017).[10] Figure 4.1 plots the decade of adoption of *Gender Machinery*, *Intimate Partner Violence*, *Sexual Harassment*, and *Political Quota*. The remaining maps can be found in the Appendix. As can be seen states vary greatly in the timing of their adoption across gender reform types.

Since the data represent an unbalanced panel containing discrete country-years[11] and the theory focuses on time until a reform is adopted, event history analysis is

[7] Summary statistics for all variables used in this analysis can be found in the Appendix.

[8] These variables only considered laws that explicitly criminalized these forms of violence rather than laws which are either silent on the legality of violence against women or imply illegality under another statute.

[9] This can include offices and departments that operate within another ministry (even if that ministry is not primarily tasked with women's rights).

[10] This variable excludes voluntary party quotas.

[11] Since the adoption of laws and policies by legislatures or through other government processes is often recorded yearly, the data is organized into years rather than more continuous time units.

Figure 4.1: Map: Decade Of Adoption of Dependent Variables



the most appropriate form of modeling (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). While there are several models which can be used, the primary analysis presented here uses discrete event logistic regression. Logistic regression was chosen rather than Cox Proportional Hazard models due to important time trends that alter the effects of the independent variables over time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).[12] In other words, since the promotion of women's rights and the adoption of these reforms vary over the decades, we should expect that the effects of the variables will also vary, which violates the assumptions of the Cox Proportional Hazard model. In contrast, with logistic regression, time trends can be explicitly modeled to avoid biasing the results. The time dependency of each model depends on the dependent variable tested

[12]However, Cox Proportional Hazard Models are used as a robustness check and the results remain consistent.

and as a result, time trends are modeled as linear, cubic, or quadratic depending on the dependent variable.[13]

4.3.2 Independent Variables

Several sets of independent variables are used in this analysis. The first set of independent variables measure international influence within the state-year. The first, *World Bank Aid* is the log-transformed one-year lagged amount of World Bank Aid that the country received. Ideally, there would be a variable to measure the degree of UN peacekeeping influence in the country. However, as UN peacekeeping missions are predominantly in conflict-affected countries, there is not a consistent measure of peacekeeping in non-conflict states. Thus, World Bank Aid is used as a proxy of UN presence. As the World Bank is a UN administered body, its aid can be considered an extension of UN influence. International Hypothesis 1 expects a positive relationship between World Bank Aid and gender reform and this effect should be magnified in conflict-affected states.

Further, to examine International Hypotheses 2a and 2b, *Aid Context* was included in the models as a robustness check. *Aid Context* accounts for the average fertility rate of a state's foreign aid donors. Data on bilateral foreign comes from the the Aid Data project and includes multiple types of aid, including Official Development Assistance (ODA) and security assistance aid. Fertility rates are one indicator of a state's level of gender equality as it demonstrates the strength of traditional norms of women as child bearers/caretakers and proxies for a woman's participation in the

[13]Plots of the time trends within the dependent variables can be found in the Appendix.

public sphere. In other words, as the fertility rate increases, gender equality generally decreases. Therefore, the theory expects there to be an inverse relationship between the average fertility rate of a state's donors and the time until a gender reform is adopted. Due to a strong correlation between *Export Context* and *Aid Context*, the two variables cannot be included in the same model without inducing bias into the model. However, the results do not significantly change with the use of *Aid Context* in the place of *Export Context* as can be seen in Appendix Tables 8.24 and 8.25.[14]

Export Context accounts for the average fertility rate of a state's trade partners. Data on exports comes from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics Database. According to the "California Effect," importing countries may be able to leverage trade relationships to transmit their higher standards to exporting states with lower standards (Vogel 1997). Several studies have demonstrated that states which have greater export ties to states with higher levels of human rights are more likely to in turn increase their internal respect for human rights (Cao, Greenhill and Prakash 2013, Greenhill, Mosley and Prakash 2009). International Hypotheses 3a and 3b expect there to be an inverse relationship between the state's dependence on exports and the average fertility rate of a state's donors and gender reform adoption.

Next, to account for the pressure that IGOs can exert on states, *IGO Context* records the average level of gender equality among the member states of IGOs to which the state is a member in the year, weighted by the centrality of each member state. This variable was calculated in a similar fashion to Greenhill (2016). First, for each IGO to which a state is member, the average fertility rate of the IGO's member-

[14] *Export Context* was used in the main models due to the higher reliability of the data.

states is calculated. This is then weighted by the number of states which belong to the IGO to account for the relative direct connections between IGO members.[15] Next, the average fertility rate of states across *all* IGOs to which a state is a member in the year is calculated. An additional variable to consider a state's context is the average fertility rate of a state's culturally proximate neighbors, including states with a shared geography, language, religion, and colonial history. While this variable is not included in the primary analysis due to multicollinearity concerns, it is included as a robustness check and the results remain consistent. International Hypotheses 4a and 4b expect that as *IGO Context* increases, indicating that a state's connection with IGO partners that have high levels of fertility (and thus, lower levels gender equality) increases, the likelihood of gender reform adoption should decrease.

Further, to account for the ability of WINGOs to pressure a state to adopt gender reforms, a count of the number of WINGOs in the state in the year was included. This measure was created using data from Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015) and Cole (2012) which varies between 0 and 114.[16] International Hypothesis 5 expects that as the number of WINGOs present in a state increases, the likelihood of gender reform adoption also increases.

To account for a domestic source of pressure for gender reform, women's political

[15]Specifically, IGOs which have many members are weighted less than IGOs which have fewer members since as the number of members decrease, the more direct the connection between members in the IGO become. For a description of the weighting scheme, see Greenhill (2016).

[16]While the Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015) is gathered from 1970 to 2013, it is gathered in five year intervals. Therefore, interpolation was used to fill in the missing years and extrapolation was used to update the data through 2016. Additionally, if data was missing for certain country-years from the Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015), it was supplemented with the Cole (2012) data. While this is not ideal as the two data sets use slightly different methods to count the number of WINGOs, they are highly correlated and therefore, are capturing the same relative number of WINGOs.

leadership, the proportion of the legislature that is female as recorded by Paxton, Green and Hughes (2008) and the World Bank (2016) is included.[17] Proponents of substantive representation argue that female legislators promote pro-women policies and therefore, as women's representation in the legislature increases, states should be more likely to adopt gender reforms (Bashevkin 2014, Hughes, Krook and Paxton 2015, Iyer et al. 2012, True 2016).

The final independent variable indicates the conflict status of the state. This variable is a categorical variable in which a state is coded as 0 if it is not experiencing a civil conflict and has not experienced a civil conflict within the past five to ten years, 1 if the state is experiencing an active civil conflict, and 2 if a state has experienced a civil conflict within the past five years (if the conflict caused less than 1,000 battle deaths) or ten years (if the conflict caused 1,000 or more battle deaths), but is not currently fighting an active conflict.[18] Conflict was defined according to the UCDP/PRIO data set as more than 25 battle deaths occurring between the government forces and a non-state actor within the territory of the state in the state-year.[19] Military coups were excluded from the analysis.[20] These variables are lagged by one year. In the full data set, around 19.5% of observations are active conflict state-years and 11.1% are post-conflict years.[21]

[17] An additional operationalization of women's political leadership used as a robustness check is whether the state has a female head of state.

[18] If a state is within the ten year period after one conflict when it begins a new conflict or fighting is renewed, it returns to being coded as an active conflict state.

[19] Alternative measures of post-conflict, namely post-conflict as ending five years after a conflict ends or as a permanent state, are in the robustness checks.

[20] However, the results remain consistent when military coups are included.

[21] Controls for various characteristics of the conflict, including intensity, termination, the use of female combatants by the insurgent group, and the occurrence of conflict-related sexual violence, are included in the appendix.

All of the independent variables are lagged by one year to account for endogeneity. As previous scholarship has shown, gender reform and gender equality can affect the likelihood of a state experiencing conflict and the level of international intervention (Caprioli 2005, Caprioli and Boyer 2001, Karim and Beardsley 2017, Melander 2005*a*,*b*, Tripp and Kang 2008, Webster, Torres and Beardsley N.d.). Therefore, to better establish how conflict and international actors influence gender reform and not the other way around, the independent variables are lagged by one year. To account for the conditional nature between a state's conflict status and the international influences on the successful adoption of reform, as expected by the Conflict Hypothesis, in every model, the state's conflict status is factored to create two dummy variables for whether the state is experiencing an active conflict or is a post-conflict state (with non-conflict states as the excluded category) and this factored indicator is then interacted with each of the independent variables. The Conflict Hypothesis expects that international actors should have a stronger effect in conflict and post-conflict states compared with non-conflict states.

4.3.3 Control Variables

Several control variables are included to account for other factors that may influence the adoption of gender reform, the occurrence of conflict, and the level of international intervention. All controls are lagged by one year. First, a state's level of democratization and its respect for political rights and civil liberties may influence its likelihood of experiencing conflict, the state's exposure to international actors, and its likelihood

of gender reform. A state's respect for other forms of civil rights and liberties may be a strong indication of whether they are similarly likely to respect women's rights. Additionally, states with a stronger respect of rights and liberties are also likely to be more integrated into the (democratic) international community, and therefore, are more likely to respond positively to international pressure to adopt gender reforms (Oneal and Russett 2001). Additionally, a strong respect for political and civil rights and liberties also decreases a state's likelihood of experiencing conflict (Cingranelli et al. 2019). To measure a state's level of democratization and its respect of political rights and civil liberties, *Freedom House* measures civil liberties and political rights within a country. Freedom House creates two seven-level categorical measures of a state's political rights and civil liberties, not including women's rights, which are averaged for this analysis. A coding of 1 indicates a state that has high respect of civil and political rights, whereas a coding of 7 indicates a less free society.

Moreover, wealthier states are more capable of adopting gender reforms due to increased budgetary resources. Further, wealthy states often experience increased gender equality and decreased conflict propensity (Hudson et al. 2013). Additionally, international material incentives may be less effective in wealthy states that are not as dependent upon foreign support. *GDP per capita* measures the state's gross domestic product per capita. *GDP per capita* is gathered from the World Bank and lagged by one year and log transformed.

Additionally, to account for the existing level of gender equality within a state, which affects the likelihood of gender reform, the probability that the state experiences a conflict, and the state's integration into the international community, the average

fertility rate in the state-year is included as a control (Caprioli 2005, Caprioli and Boyer 2001, Maoz 2012, Melander 2005*b*). With regards to international influence, it is particularly important to examine a state's own level of gender equality since states often form international relationships with culturally similar states, which may obscure the impact of the gender equality of the international partner if not considered (Maoz 2012, Zhou 2011). Similarly, gender equitable states are less likely to experience conflict overall (Caprioli 2005, Caprioli and Boyer 2001, Maoz 2012, Melander 2005*b*). While there are multiple indicators of gender equality, for this analysis, fertility rates are the most accurate and reliable indicator as they have been consistently tracked for many decades, unlike other measures of women's rights.[22] Fertility rates are gathered from the World Bank and lagged by one year.

Finally, other controls were included as robustness checks, but are not shown in the results below, including the state's dependence on oil reserves and several features of the state's conflict, including whether there were female combatants, the extent of conflict-related sexual violence, the conflict's intensity, the deployment and length of a UN peacekeeping mission, and the outcome, including whether the winner was a rebel or government, and whether there was a gendered peace agreement.

[22]However, alternative measures of gender equality are considered and the results are consistent.

4.4 Results

4.4.1 Legal Gender Reform

While several patterns appear in the results, each gender reform is affected by different factors. Each table presented below tests a different gender reform and contains three models: the first model includes full independent and control variables, but does not include interaction terms; the second model interacts both active conflict status and post-conflict status with each of the independent variables; and the third model only interacts post-conflict status with the independent variables.[23] Table 4.1 examines the adoption of laws criminalizing intimate partner violence, Table 4.2 examines laws against sexual harassment, Table 4.3 examines the criminalization of marital rape, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 examine the creation of a national gender ministry and machinery, respectively, and Table 4.6 examines the adoption of a political gender quota.

While there is some support for the hypotheses that international influence increases the likelihood of the adoption of several women's rights reforms in non-conflict states, there is not significant, consistent evidence that international influence has a significantly different effect in active conflict or post-conflict states compared with non-conflict states.

With regards to the criminalization of intimate partner violence, the results indicate that non-conflict states whose trading partners have relatively low fertility rates and who have higher levels of women's participation in the legislature are significantly

[23] Active states were recorded as "non-post-conflict" for these tests.

Table 4.1: Discrete Event History Model: Intimate Partner Violence Reform

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Laws		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−0.15 (0.36)	−0.53 (3.55)	
Post Conflict	0.29 (0.33)	−6.19 (4.17)	−5.17 (3.85)
World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Export Context	−0.84** (0.34)	−1.28*** (0.47)	−0.72* (0.38)
IGO Context	−0.47 (0.42)	−0.57 (0.49)	−0.77* (0.43)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.06*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Freedom House	−0.29*** (0.09)	−0.30*** (0.10)	−0.31*** (0.10)
GDP Per Capita	0.11 (0.14)	0.12 (0.15)	0.14 (0.14)
Fertility	−0.36*** (0.13)	−0.43*** (0.13)	−0.36*** (0.13)
Muslim Majority	0.003 (0.35)	−0.03 (0.36)	0.02 (0.36)
Years to Adopt	0.16 (0.22)	0.18 (0.23)	0.16 (0.22)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.003 (0.01)	−0.004 (0.01)	−0.003 (0.01)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid		−0.02 (0.04)	
Active Conflict:Export Context		1.56** (0.67)	
Active Conflict:IGO Context		−1.48* (0.80)	
Active Conflict:WINGOs		0.003 (0.02)	
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent		0.08* (0.04)	
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid		0.02 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Post Conflict:Export Context		−0.01 (0.76)	−0.65 (0.70)
Post Conflict:IGO Context		1.55* (0.92)	1.85** (0.88)
Post Conflict:WINGOs		−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent		0.07** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Constant	−0.52 (2.57)	1.58 (2.93)	0.18 (2.64)
Observations	2,829	2,829	2,829
Log Likelihood	−301.01	−292.14	−297.67
Akaike Inf. Crit.	632.02	634.28	633.33
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.2: Discrete Event History Model: Sexual Harassment

	Dependent variable:		
	Sexual Harassment Laws		
	(4)	(5)	(6)
Active Conflict	0.50 (0.35)	−5.07 (4.10)	
Post Conflict	−0.53 (0.43)	8.98 (7.76)	9.20 (7.59)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.003 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Export Context	−1.91*** (0.45)	−2.03*** (0.49)	−1.97*** (0.45)
IGO Context	−0.33 (0.44)	−0.36 (0.52)	−0.10 (0.45)
WINGOs	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.03* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Freedom House	−0.25** (0.10)	−0.23** (0.10)	−0.24** (0.10)
GDP Per Capita	−0.05 (0.16)	−0.07 (0.16)	−0.09 (0.16)
Fertility	−0.13 (0.14)	−0.21 (0.15)	−0.13 (0.14)
Muslim Majority	−0.38 (0.36)	−0.50 (0.39)	−0.41 (0.37)
Years to Adopt	−0.01 (0.19)	0.03 (0.20)	0.03 (0.20)
Years to Adopt^2	0.003 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.0001 (0.0001)	−0.0000 (0.0001)	−0.0000 (0.0001)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid		−0.04 (0.04)	
Active Conflict:Export Context		0.68 (0.85)	
Active Conflict:IGO Context		0.41 (0.78)	
Active Conflict:WINGOs		0.04** (0.02)	
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent		0.08* (0.05)	
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid		−0.02 (0.07)	−0.01 (0.07)
Post Conflict:Export Context		−1.24 (1.84)	−1.25 (1.83)
Post Conflict:IGO Context		−2.29* (1.32)	−2.28* (1.28)
Post Conflict:WINGOs		0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent		0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)
Constant	4.69* (2.53)	5.51** (2.79)	4.19* (2.51)
Observations	2,988	2,988	2,988
Log Likelihood	−295.95	−288.96	−293.88
Akaike Inf. Crit.	621.90	627.92	625.77

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.3: Discrete Event History Model: Marital Rape

	Dependent variable:		
	Martial Rape Laws		
	(7)	(8)	(9)
Active Conflict	1.05* (0.57)	−3.60 (5.62)	
Post Conflict	0.36 (0.65)	−5.06 (6.89)	−3.09 (6.37)
World Bank Aid	0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Export Context	0.49 (0.55)	0.07 (0.67)	0.20 (0.58)
IGO Context	−0.41 (0.68)	−0.63 (0.82)	−0.22 (0.69)
WINGOs	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.05** (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)
Freedom House	−0.15 (0.14)	−0.11 (0.15)	−0.09 (0.14)
GDP Per Capita	0.10 (0.24)	0.15 (0.24)	0.05 (0.24)
Fertility	−0.51** (0.21)	−0.51** (0.22)	−0.45** (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−2.29** (1.08)	−2.34** (1.10)	−2.24** (1.07)
Years to Adopt	−0.18 (0.25)	−0.17 (0.26)	−0.16 (0.26)
Years to Adopt^2	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.0001 (0.0001)	−0.0001 (0.0001)	−0.0001 (0.0001)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid		−0.05 (0.06)	
Active Conflict:Export Context		0.63 (0.92)	
Active Conflict:IGO Context		0.65 (1.33)	
Active Conflict:WINGOs		0.01 (0.02)	
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent		0.03 (0.06)	
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid		−0.09 (0.08)	−0.07 (0.07)
Post Conflict:Export Context		1.50 (1.34)	1.34 (1.29)
Post Conflict:IGO Context		0.23 (1.70)	−0.25 (1.63)
Post Conflict:WINGOs		0.01 (0.05)	0.001 (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent		0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)
Constant	−4.06 (3.82)	−2.49 (4.39)	−3.66 (3.86)
Observations	3,564	3,564	3,564
Log Likelihood	−147.37	−145.36	−147.78
Akaike Inf. Crit.	324.75	340.73	333.56

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.4: Discrete Event History Model: Gender Ministry

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry		
	(10)	(11)	(12)
Active Conflict	0.50 (0.39)	3.29 (4.17)	
Post Conflict	−0.004 (0.58)	1.08 (9.02)	−0.27 (9.02)
World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.02)	−0.005 (0.03)	0.003 (0.02)
Export Context	0.46 (0.61)	0.45 (0.68)	0.38 (0.64)
IGO Context	−1.07** (0.50)	−0.67 (0.57)	−0.90* (0.51)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Freedom House	0.11 (0.12)	0.11 (0.12)	0.14 (0.12)
GDP Per Capita	−0.37 (0.23)	−0.39* (0.23)	−0.39* (0.23)
Fertility	0.20 (0.18)	0.17 (0.18)	0.21 (0.18)
Muslim Majority	0.42 (0.45)	0.30 (0.47)	0.34 (0.46)
Years to Adopt	−0.17 (0.23)	−0.20 (0.23)	−0.15 (0.23)
Years to Adopt^2	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.0002 (0.0001)	−0.0002 (0.0001)	−0.0002 (0.0001)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid		0.03 (0.05)	
Active Conflict:Export Context		−0.12 (0.88)	
Active Conflict:IGO Context		−0.74 (1.04)	
Active Conflict:WINGOs		−0.02 (0.02)	
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent		0.03 (0.07)	
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid		0.35 (0.53)	0.35 (0.54)
Post Conflict:Export Context		1.38 (1.36)	1.41 (1.34)
Post Conflict:IGO Context		−2.55 (1.66)	−2.28 (1.64)
Post Conflict:WINGOs		−0.17* (0.10)	−0.16 (0.10)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent		−0.04 (0.10)	−0.05 (0.10)
Constant	−2.18 (3.60)	−2.95 (3.90)	−2.55 (3.70)
Observations	2,763	2,763	2,763
Log Likelihood	−192.90	−187.61	−189.45
Akaike Inf. Crit.	415.79	425.21	416.91

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.5: Discrete Event History Model: Gender Machinery

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Machinery		
	(13)	(14)	(15)
Active Conflict	0.19 (0.32)	−3.63 (3.75)	
Post Conflict	0.10 (0.35)	−0.53 (4.33)	−0.28 (4.27)
World Bank Aid	0.04** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
Export Context	−1.05*** (0.39)	−0.78* (0.42)	−0.87** (0.40)
IGO Context	−0.52 (0.38)	−0.69 (0.42)	−0.60 (0.39)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.0005 (0.02)
Freedom House	−0.29*** (0.09)	−0.32*** (0.10)	−0.30*** (0.09)
GDP Per Capita	0.03 (0.15)	0.02 (0.16)	0.02 (0.16)
Fertility	0.10 (0.13)	0.08 (0.13)	0.09 (0.13)
Muslim Majority	−0.09 (0.33)	−0.15 (0.36)	−0.06 (0.34)
Years to Adopt	1.52*** (0.51)	1.42*** (0.51)	1.43*** (0.51)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.15*** (0.04)	−0.14*** (0.04)	−0.14*** (0.04)
Years to Adopt^3	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)
Years to Adopt^4	−0.0001*** (0.0000)	−0.0001*** (0.0000)	−0.0001*** (0.0000)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid		0.01 (0.04)	
Active Conflict:Export Context		−0.66 (0.68)	
Active Conflict:IGO Context		1.35 (0.91)	
Active Conflict:WINGOs		0.01 (0.02)	
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent		0.14** (0.07)	
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid		0.12 (0.13)	0.11 (0.13)
Post Conflict:Export Context		−1.26 (0.83)	−1.19 (0.82)
Post Conflict:IGO Context		0.70 (0.96)	0.57 (0.93)
Post Conflict:WINGOs		0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent		−0.01 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.06)
Constant	−1.56 (2.57)	−1.19 (2.75)	−1.45 (2.63)
Observations	1,513	1,513	1,513
Log Likelihood	−279.33	−274.11	−276.90
Akaike Inf. Crit.	590.66	600.23	593.80

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.6: Discrete Event History Model: Political Gender Quota

	Dependent variable:		
	Political Gender Quota		
	(16)	(17)	(18)
Active Conflict	−0.06 (0.41)	−1.17 (3.86)	
Post Conflict	−0.15 (0.44)	18.25** (7.81)	18.33** (7.72)
World Bank Aid	0.05** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.06*** (0.02)
Export Context	−0.80* (0.42)	−1.28** (0.52)	−0.79* (0.43)
IGO Context	−0.70 (0.48)	−0.21 (0.56)	−0.46 (0.49)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.004 (0.02)
Freedom House	−0.005 (0.10)	0.02 (0.11)	−0.02 (0.10)
GDP Per Capita	−0.10 (0.18)	−0.08 (0.19)	−0.08 (0.18)
Fertility	−0.26* (0.16)	−0.29* (0.16)	−0.26 (0.16)
Muslim Majority	0.36 (0.36)	0.36 (0.37)	0.46 (0.37)
Years to Adopt	0.16 (0.23)	0.14 (0.23)	0.16 (0.23)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid		−0.02 (0.05)	
Active Conflict:Export Context		1.15 (0.77)	
Active Conflict:IGO Context		−0.62 (0.85)	
Active Conflict:WINGOs		−0.03 (0.02)	
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent		0.10* (0.05)	
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid		−0.10* (0.05)	−0.09* (0.05)
Post Conflict:Export Context		−1.51 (1.64)	−2.08 (1.63)
Post Conflict:IGO Context		−3.01** (1.21)	−2.59** (1.16)
Post Conflict:WINGOs		−0.04 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent		−0.15 (0.10)	−0.17* (0.10)
Constant	0.43 (2.77)	−0.16 (3.08)	−0.81 (2.84)
Observations	3,280	3,280	3,280
Log Likelihood	−258.12	−247.24	−252.23
Akaike Inf. Crit.	546.23	544.49	542.47

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

more likely to adopt laws that criminalize intimate partner violence. Women's legislative representation and gender equitable trading partners also increased the likelihood of adoption in active conflict states, but not post-conflict states. In contrast to expectations, as the average fertility rate of a country's IGO partners increases, post-conflict countries are less likely to adopt intimate partner violence laws. The same pattern holds with the adoption of laws against sexual harassment with women's legislative representation and trade relationships increasing the likelihood of law adoption in both non-conflict and active conflict states. However, in contrast to intimate partner violence laws, IGO memberships have the expected relationship with post-conflict states. Additionally, the presence of WINGOs in non-conflict states also increases the likelihood of the adoption of sexual harassment laws.

No significant, consistent patterns appear with the criminalization of marital rape or with the creation of a gender ministry. This may occur with the creation of gender ministries due to the relatively rare nature of a state having a ministry devoted to gender. However, with the creation of more general gender machinery, both World Bank Aid and Export Context have significant relationships with the creation of machinery in the expected direction. Among conflict-affected states, the only significant relationship is in active conflict states with the women's legislative representation, which has a positive relationship with the creation of gender machinery.

A similar pattern is found with the creation of gender machinery also exists with the adoption of a political gender quota. For non-conflict states, World Bank Aid and more equitable trade partners both significantly increase the likelihood of the adoption of a political gender quota. Again, women's legislative representation is

weakly, positively associated with the adoption of a quota in active conflict states. Equitable trade partners appear to also increase the likelihood of adoption in post-conflict states. Interestingly, the constituent term for post-conflict is significant and positive, indicating that in the absence of international actors, post-conflict states are significantly more likely to adopt political gender quotas, in contrast to the theoretical expectations.

Table 4.7: Results Summary: International Influence in Non-Conflict States

	Dependent variable:						
	Expectation	IPV	Sexual Harassment	Martial Rape	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
World Bank Aid	+	+	-	+	+	**-**	**+**
Export Context	-	**-**	**-**	+	**-**	**-**	-
IGO Context	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
WINGOs	+	+	**+**	-	+	+	+

Note: Based on Model 3 in Each Table.
Note: Symbols in bold indicate a statistically significant relationship.

Table 4.8: Results Summary: International Influence in Post-Conflict States

	Dependent variable:						
	Expectation	IPV	Sexual Harassment	Martial Rape	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
World Bank Aid	+	+	-	-	+	+	**-**
Export Context	-	-	-	+	+	-	-
IGO Context	-	**+**	**-**	-	-	+	**-**
WINGOs	+	-	+	+	-	+	-

Note: Based on Model 3 in Each Table.
Note: Symbols in bold indicate a statistically significant relationship.

Overall, as can be seen in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 that summarize the results across all the dependent variables, relatively few consistent patterns emerge from the results. The most consistent relationship is between *Export Context* and the adoption

of various gender reforms among non-conflict states. In other words, it appears that states which export to other states which have higher levels of women's rights, or low fertility rates, are more likely to adopt gender reforms. Additionally, the presence of WINGOs in non-conflict states is positively, although inconsistently, associated with the adoption of several gender reforms. For two of the gender reforms, *Political Gender Quotas* and *Gender Machinery*, *World Bank Aid* had a positive, significant association with adoption in non-conflict states. Among the remaining independent variables the relationships appear to be more tenuous and inconsistent. Therefore, while there is some limited support for International Hypotheses 1, 3b, and 5, this support is not consistent across all gender reform types. With regards to legal reform, there is no support for the Conflict Hypothesis, or that conflict states with international actors present should be more likely to adopt gender reforms compared to non-conflict states with international actors or conflict states without international actors.

4.4.2 Women's Rights Reform "On the Gound"

What do these results imply for women's rights after conflict? One possible explanation is that while conflict may empower women, this does not happen through formal changes in the law. Increasingly, studies have shown women's political participation increases after conflict (Bush 2011, Tripp and Kang 2008, Tripp 2015, Webster, Torres and Beardsley N.d.). The findings above that demonstrate a lack of relationship between conflict and the adoption of gender reforms is therefore rather surprising. How-

ever, as discussed in Chapter 3, gender reform is complex and non-linear. Therefore, conflict and international actors may have different impacts on other manifestations of gender reform and gender equality. One explanation for the contrasting findings is that if conflict does provide opportunities for women to gain rights, that process is happening "on the ground" informally rather than in the government through the adoption of formal laws. For example, maybe women are participating in politics in larger numbers after conflict and therefore, the government does not feel the need to adopt gender reform. Additionally, the government may simply lack the capacity to adopt large gender reform laws. Similarly, there is some anecdotal evidence that women in post-conflict societies form informal support groups to address gender based violence without government intervention and therefore, maybe there is less pressure for formal gender based violence laws if women are "taking care of it" on their own.[24] Further, policymakers may be aware that international actors support the adoption of these policies and due to concerns of neo-imperialism may actively reject adopting similar policies. Thus, while these policymakers may advocate for gender reform, they may not adopt the policies favored by international actors explicitly. One way to probe this alternative theory is to examine whether international and domestic factors affect indicators of women's rights "on the ground."

In other words, there are often gaps between the adoption of women's rights reforms and their implementation. For example, Tables 8.6 to Tables 8.11 demonstrate that having a women's rights law in place does not consistently correlate with

[24]For example, in 2013 interviews in Liberia conducted by the author, respondents discussed how women in villages would form support groups. If a woman in the village reported that she was the victim of domestic violence, the group would mobilize and help the woman file a police complaint, keep the woman safe from her abuser, and would, if necessary, confront the abuser themselves.

improved women's rights outcomes, such as women's fertility rates, labor force participation and political empowerment. Instead, while some women's rights laws are associated with positive outcomes for women's rights, the relationship is inconsistent and often depends on the type of law examined and the specific indicator of women's rights. At times, the adoption of women's rights laws even results in decreased women's rights outcomes. It is important to note that these models only demonstrate a correlation. The adoption of women's rights laws is not exogenous and therefore, the adoption of the law initially may be impacted by women's existing levels of women's rights in the country, making it difficult to find the causal effect of law adoption. Additionally, given the lack of data on the implementation of specific women's rights laws cross-nationally – for example, there is no consistent cross-national, longitudinal data on rates of intimate partner violence, marital rape, or sexual harassment – these models do not test the direct implementation of the laws. Despite these challenges, these models demonstrate illustrative evidence that there is an important distinction between adoption, implementation, and outcomes for women's rights. In other words, the adoption of reforms does not always correlate with improved women's rights on the ground. Therefore, to understand the diffusion of gender reform, it is not enough to only look at the adoption of policies, but also at whether gender reform is being implemented sufficiently, even in the absence of a formal law.

To do this, models were run which examine the influence of the primary international actors, specifically the UN, Export relationships, and IGO memberships on several indicators of women's rights across non-conflict and conflict states. Using

Ordinary Least Squares regression with country-year fixed effects, which replicate Difference-in-Differences models, I examined whether the interactive relationship between post-conflict states and international actors proposed above appears when examining several indicators of women's rights, rather than the adoption of women's rights reforms. These include the percent of the legislature that is female and two indices of gender equality from the Varieties of Democracy project: the *Political Empowerment Index* which examines whether women have access to all chambers of the legislature and participate in civil society and the *Gendered Power Distribution* which is a five level ordinal variable examining the distribution of power between men and women ranging from men having a near monopoly on political power to equal distributions of power between men and women.[25] While largely the same independent variables are used, to account for both the influence of international and domestic women's rights organizations, an indicator from the Varieties of Democracy project which examines women's participation in civil society organizations (CSOs) and CSOs' prioritization of women's rights, replaces the previous *WINGOs* variable.[26]

The results presented in Table 4.9 present some evidence that women's rights do generally increase in post-conflict states, conditional upon the presence of international actors. Model 19 tests the relationship between international actors, conflict status, and women's legislative representation. As can be seen, female representation increases in conflict affected states when the country receives World Bank Aid, has increasingly gender equitable trading partners, and has strong women's civil society

[25]The use of OLS with non-continuous dependent variables is acceptable given that the sample size is sufficiently large.

[26]The results do not change significantly if the original WINGOs variable is included.

Table 4.9: OLS Results: Conflict and Gender Equality

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(19)	(20)	(21)
Conflict	3.79* (2.30)	0.05** (0.02)	0.40*** (0.15)
World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.02)	0.0003* (0.0002)	−0.0005 (0.001)
Export Context	−10.78*** (2.62)	0.11*** (0.03)	−0.55*** (0.17)
IGO Context	2.90*** (0.98)	−0.04*** (0.01)	0.12* (0.06)
Female CSOs	1.08*** (0.29)		0.30*** (0.02)
Freedom House	0.50*** (0.11)	−0.02*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP per Capita	−0.51* (0.26)	−0.02*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.27 (1.07)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.10* (0.06)
Legislative Gender Quota	4.50*** (0.31)		
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.07*** (0.02)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.002 (0.001)
Conflict:Export Context	−1.69*** (0.44)	−0.02*** (0.005)	0.03 (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	−0.11 (0.55)	0.004 (0.01)	−0.14*** (0.04)
Conflict:Female CSOs	1.02*** (0.33)		0.06*** (0.02)
Constant	64.11*** (11.45)	0.50*** (0.12)	2.81*** (0.76)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	3,446	3,537	3,702
R^2	0.75	0.92	0.89
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.92	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.69 (df = 3266)	0.05 (df = 3359)	0.32 (df = 3522)
F Statistic	54.66*** (df = 179; 3266)	231.19*** (df = 177; 3359)	161.30*** (df = 179; 3522)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

participation, as can be seen in Figure 4.2, which plots the relationships between World Bank Aid, conflict-status, and women's legislative representation. It should be noted that in non-conflict states, international actors also often appear to have positive impacts on gender equality, however the relative effect of these actors is larger in post-conflict states.

Model 20 shows a similar pattern. Once again, the presence of international actors generally increases women's political empowerment. While Model 19 demonstrated that more women participate in the legislature, this model further supports the finding that women's political participation increases even outside of the legislature to include other chambers of government and women's civil society participation. While in non-conflict states, receiving World Bank aid and with more equitable IGO member-states increase women's political empowerment, gender equitable trade partners have a negative relationship with women's political empowerment. Therefore, there is somewhat mixed evidence for how international actors influence non-conflict states. This may occur because women's participation in other chambers of government or in civil society is relatively less observable and less prioritized by international actors compared with women's legislative participation. The positive effect of international actors on political empowerment, especially World Bank Aid, is magnified in conflict-affected states. Moreover gender equitable trade partners exert a positive influence on political empowerment in conflict states in contrast to non-conflict states. In other words, trade partners appear to specifically promote women's political empowerment in all chambers of government and political activity in post-conflict states compared to non-conflict states.

Model 21 examines the gendered power index and once again demonstrates that while certain international and domestic actors often have a positive influence in non-conflict states, this influence is magnified in conflict-affected states. While the two previous models tested women's physical presence within the government, Model 9 examines their level of power within these institutions, distinguishing between simple physical presence and the power to affect political outcomes. Among non-conflict states, World Bank Aid, IGO memberships, and gendered civil society organizations all increase women's power within political decision-making. This effect is further magnified for IGO memberships and women's civil society organizations in post-conflict states. While World Bank Aid does not reach significance in this model, it is positive, in expectation with the theory.

Overall, these exploratory models provide initial evidence that international actors do have some success at promoting women's rights, especially in post-conflict states, but their effect may be limited at changing individual behavior rather than convincing governments to adopt formal women's rights laws or policies. This provides support for the Conflict Hypothesis, indicating that post-conflict states with international actors present are significantly more likely to improve women's political rights compared to both non-conflict states and post-conflict states without international actors present.

Generally, all results shown here are robust to alternative model specifications. The adoption model results remain consistent when Cox Proportional Hazard Models

Figure 4.2: Predicted Probabilities: Conflict, World Bank Aid, and Female Legislative Representation



are used,[27] with the inclusion of year fixed effects, and the use of time polynomials.[28] Additionally, the results are robust when the country's aid dependence and donor equality is included,[29] the state's colonial history, culturally proximate neighborhood effects, controls regarding the nature of the conflict, the state's respect for physical integrity rights, government ideology, the number of UN staff deployed in the country,[30] and alternative measures of gender equality.[31]

4.5 Conclusion

Women's rights have been increasingly connected to conflict as scholars and international actors have recognized that women and gender equality play an important role in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. As a result, international

[27]While the results are also generally robust with the use of Weibull models, as can be seen in the Appendix, the data does not sufficiently fit the Weibull distribution, which violates the assumption of the model and induces bias (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). While the data does approximate a Weibull distribution for early adopters of gender reform, the data has a large number of outliers that have late adoptions, which are outside of the predicted Weibull distribution. Additionally, the Weibull model includes an assumption that the process by which time-varying covariates vary is exogenous. This assumption cannot be accepted given that there is likely a large degree of endogeneity between a state's adoption of gender reforms, experience with conflict, and international influence. Cox Proportional Hazard Models relax these assumptions. Once the covariates included in the model are accounted for, duration dependency can be best thought of as a nuisance and therefore, the functional form of duration dependency is best left unspecified. This is attractive since the baseline hazard is not of central interest to this study, rather the main point of interest is the impact of the covariates on the hazard rate, and therefore, Cox Proportional Hazard Models provide greater flexibility that do not require assumptions to be made regarding duration dependency (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Kaplan Meier Non-Parametric Survival Curves can also be found in the Appendix.

[28]It should be noted that the results for the law adoption models with the Cox Proportional Hazard models are sightly more significant than with the Logistic Regression models. However, as explained above, due to the time dependency between the independent variables and the adoption of gender reform laws, Cox Proportional Hazard Models may induce bias into the results.

[29]Aid dependency falls just below significance with women's legislative representation (Model 7), but retains its sign.

[30]The results for women's Political Empowerment and the Gender Power Index change slightly with UN Staff, but this may be because UN Staff is likely to be highly correlated with other the independent variables of interest.

[31]While some of the results of individual independent variables for some dependent variables may change slightly with the various robustness checks, the overall trend remains consistent.

third party actors seek to encourage states to adopt women's rights reforms through material incentives. Conflict and post-conflict states have greater sensitivity to material incentives and greater will power to adopt these reforms as a result of the conflict, amplifying the impact of these incentives.

This chapter demonstrates while that conflict and post-conflict states are not necessarily more likely to adopt various women's rights laws in response to the increased presence of international actors, these actors do appear to significantly increase women's rights on the ground in post-conflict countries relatively more than in non-conflict countries. This may indicate that international third party actors are not capable of or willing to pressure other governments for women's rights reform, but that active participation of international actors in aid programming, civil society organizations, and trade relationships may lead to the diffusion of norms and behaviors that improve women's rights informally. It also highlights a gap between legal adoption of gender reform and the implementation of those reforms.

Gender reforms are unlikely to be successful if they do not sufficiently shift individual attitudes and behavior. Similarly, without individual changes in beliefs regarding women's rights, states are unlikely to adopt gender reform in the first place. Therefore, patterns of micro-level changes in individual beliefs on gender reform are likely to be replicated at the macro-level and vice versa. To further test the possible causal mechanisms between international actors, exposure to conflict, and women's behavior, this dissertation will next explore sub-national variation in women's rights in Uganda to examine whether women living in districts that were more exposed to conflict *and* received international aid are more likely to present improved indicators

of women's rights than women living in other districts. Additionally, while international actors in general may not influence the adoption of gender reform, future work will examine whether some international or domestic conditions may be necessary for gender reform, such as women's inclusion in peace negotiations. Finally, not all international actors may be equally likely to prioritize gender reform or to pressure states to adopt gender policies. Therefore, future work should examine which international actors have made commitments to women's rights and power relations among different international actors.

Chapter 5

One Step Forward, One Step Back: The Micro-level Impacts of Conflict and Aid on Men's and Women's Attitudes in Uganda

The end of Uganda's civil war in 1986 ushered in a wave of reforms to increase women's rights. Women became more politically engaged, joined parliament in unprecedented numbers, advocated for women's rights laws, and successfully campaigned for a gender quota in local and national political offices. Along with Rwanda, scholars point to Uganda as an example of the positive impact that conflict can have on women's political participation (Tripp 2015). The previous chapter found that conflict and international actors have the strongest impact on increasing women's rights "on the

ground." In other words, their influence occurs primarily through changing individual behavior rather than through formal legal changes. Why are improvements in women's rights limited to behavioral change and not translated into formal legal changes to women's rights and gender norms? While exposure to conflict and international aid may alter gender norms and behavior among some individuals, the impact may vary greatly depending on the degree of exposure and individual characteristics. This chapter explores sub-national and individual variation in women's rights after conflict by examining how micro-level exposure to conflict and to international aid heterogeneously impact men and women.

Conflict may impact women and men differently given their different roles in conflict, types of security threats and vulnerability, and support networks. Men, as potential recruits and more at risk of directly participating in the fighting, are likely to be more exposed to hypermasculine and militant attitudes. While women may also be exposed to the trend towards traditional gender norms, this may be offset in conflict areas where women in local communities must actively mobilize and participate in political decision-making, economic activities, and social organizing to counter the threat of conflict and the disruption in daily life (Tripp 2015). Additionally, the impact of conflict may be mediated by the presence of international actors who strategically use the disruption of conflict to support and cultivate new progressive attitudes. As a result, conflict exposure may heterogeneously impact men and women, encouraging men to become less gender equitable and women to be more supportive of women's rights.

However, conflict alone may not be enough to improve attitudes towards gender

rights even among women. Importantly, after conflict, pressure to re-establish the pre-war status quo with respect to gender relations increases. As society begins to return to "normal" after conflict and families are reunited, men who fled, joined the fighting, or participated in peace movements often seek to re-establish the previous power hierarchy, including gender norms (Kelly et al. 2018, Lazarev 2018). Thus, after conflict, women's rights face challenges and a pressure to return to pre-war levels or in fact may decrease to reflect the increased militarization and hypermasculinity cultivated during the war. International actors can mitigate the backsliding on women's rights after conflict. International aid programs may intentionally or unintentionally increase women's rights for two reasons. First, a small but increasing portion of international aid programs specifically focus on women's rights and gender equality. However, these programs often focus almost entirely on women and lack comprehensive components to address gender norms and behaviors among men. Second, as discussed above, conflict primes many women to question traditional gender norms and desire increased rights. International aid programs tend to focus on promoting development, creating conflict resolution programs and cultivating liberal, progressive values, all of which favor women's rights. Thus, international aid programs may provide an opening for women to build upon and cultivate the ideals of gender equality that they began to develop during the war.

Therefore, conflict may impact men and women differently depending both on their level of exposure to conflict that alters and primes changing gender norms and their interaction with international aid programs that promote progressive values that can provide an opening for women to express their new values more freely. As a result,

women exposed to both conflict and international aid may hold relatively more equitable values than women exposed to either factor alone or to neither. Additionally, men exposed to both conflict and aid are unlikely to significantly alter their views on gender equality as a result of the dual impact of increased hypermasculinity during conflict and the absence of targeted international aid for male gender norms. Exploring the micro-level and individual impacts of conflict may illuminate why improved gender equality "on the ground" is not translated into formal legal change: if men largely hold political power, they are unlikely to adopt women's rights laws if male policymakers and their male constituents do not have the political will to support gender equality.

Uganda presents an intriguing case to examine the subnational effects of conflict for several reasons. First, while the Ugandan government adopted several national women's rights reforms after the 1986 civil war ended, implementation of these reforms varies. For example, elections for village women's councils halted in 2001, only restarting in 2017.[1] Additionally, women's power and influence in these councils has been questioned as women representatives often do not meaningfully participate in decision-making (Johnson, Kabuchu and Kayonga 2003). Second, Uganda experienced several intrastate conflicts that varied local-level exposure to violence across the country and within districts. Uganda has been plagued by conflict and insecurity for much of its independent history, beginning with a military coup in 1971 and the Ugandan Bush War of 1981-1986 and continuing since with 14 insurgencies, primarily

[1]Carol Kasujja, "Women urged to participate in Local Council elections" *New Vision* https://www.newvision.co.ug/new$_v$*ision*/*news*/1464423/*road* − *map* − *women* − *councils* − *polls*

in the Northern region, displacing more than 1.4 million people, killing hundreds of thousands, and crippling the economy in some areas.[2] These short- and long-term impacts led to shifting gender roles (Tripp 2015).

Additionally, this conflict and its gendered dimensions captured relatively large amounts of international attention. Much of this international attention focused on the plight of civilians as the primary insurgent group, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) became increasingly brutal over time, routinely kidnapping, murdering, and mutilating civilians. As a result, international actors increased their presence in Uganda, especially in areas exposed to conflict. Finally, although gender relations at the macro-level may influence a state's propensity to conflict which raises endogeneity concerns in cross-national studies, at the micro-level in Uganda, gender relations in one neighborhood or village are unlikely to influence its exposure to violence. Instead, micro-level exposure to conflict is more likely to be driven by the strategic calculations of the warring parties, decreasing concerns for endogeneity.

Using Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data, a nationally representative sample of men and women in Uganda, this analysis compares the influence of conflict and international aid at the micro-level on individual responses to several proxies for gender equality and women's rights. The results demonstrate that while exposure to conflict in the absence of international actors worsens women's attitudes and behavior towards gender equality, dual exposure to both conflict and international actors increases the likelihood that women will hold more equitable beliefs and increase their political engagement and household decision-making compared to women not exposed

[2]For more on the impacts of Uganda's conflicts, see IDMC (2011).

to both of these factors. Women exposed to both conflict and international aid are significantly less likely to approve of wife beating and are more likely to consume media on a weekly basis than women exposed to conflict alone. Further, while generally conflict overall decreases women's control over finances, exposure to international aid partially ameliorates this effect. These two sets of results indicate that while conflict alone is harmful to women's rights, international exposure can ameliorate these negative impacts. Men, on the other hand, do not significantly alter their attitudes or behavior in response to conflict and international actor exposure.

Thus, the results confirm the findings in the previous chapter: conflict's positive impact on women's rights may be conditional upon the presence of international actors. However, it further deepens the analysis by considering how conflict may impact men and women differently. The findings also indicate that international aid can, but not always, overcome conflict's negative impacts on some indicators of women's rights. This further clarifies the findings in Chapter 4. If only women become more gender equitable after conflict, but men do not, it is unlikely that national legal changes will occur as men tend to control policymaking. Instead, women may begin to individually engage in increased political, economic, and social activity rather than attempt to change legal frameworks regarding women's rights.

5.1 Heterogeneous Impacts of Conflict on Men and Women

Chapter 3 argues that international actors should encourage the adoption and implementation of gender reform. Additionally, it claims that conflict primes societies to be more sensitive to these material incentives offered by third party actors. However, the ability to adopt and enact gender reform depends upon individuals in decision-making roles, who are usually men, similarly viewing gender reforms as a useful reform. Additionally, to be successful, gender reforms cannot simply exist on paper, but must influence individuals' behavior and attitudes. Therefore, to understand the process through which gender reforms are adopted and implemented, it is important to consider how conflict and international influence affects individuals at the micro-level Without corresponding changes in individual behavior, gender reform is unlikely to be successful. Additionally, while Chapter 3 largely considers the aggregate effects of conflict on society and on political leaders, conflict and international pressure may have different effects on men and women. This is particularly important in interpreting the macro-level results since it is individual men and women who make decisions about whether they will support or resist gender reform.

Chapter 2 discussed two competing theories of how conflict affects gender equality: the "Militarized Masculinity" theory and the "Opportunity Structures" theory. However, these theories do not distinguish between the expected effect of conflict on men and women and how their experiences after conflict may differ. This section will first explore the expected effect of conflict on women developed by the militarized

masculinity and opportunity structures theories.

First, militarized masculinity theory argues that society in general should become less gender equitable after conflict as the increased militarization of society encourages traditional gender roles and hypermasculinity. However, the main force of the masculinizing and militarizing cultural norms during after conflict should predominately fall onto men as the individuals most likely to participate in conflict and security as soldiers. Thus, as a result of their experiences during conflict, cultural shifts that often encourage men to value traditional gender norms, and post-conflict pressure to re-establish power hierarchies, after conflict men are less likely to hold favorable attitudes towards gender equality than men not exposed to conflict.

Additionally, Lindsey (2018) argues that conflict reinforces the patriarchal norm of protective masculinity which can cause the community to turn a blind eye to domestic violence as a lesser evil than punishing a man that could later act as a community protector in case of future conflict. While Lindsey (2018) also argues that the protective masculinity norm increases community desire to punish outsiders who rape female community members, this trend is not necessarily an indication of women's empowerment as the desire to punish rape comes from a concern for community wellness rather than for women's rights.[3] Therefore, Lindsey (2018) has demonstrated that conflict exposure can significantly alter men's attitudes towards some types of violence against women, while hinting that different types of violence may affect men and women differently, but without exploring extensively why these differences may

[3]Additionally, the condemnation of "stranger rape" over domestic violence often reinforces norms that women are the objects and property of their fathers, husbands, brothers and other male relatives. Thus, it is likely that this desire to punish may be rooted in men's desire to protect their "property," rather than out of concern for women's rights.

arise. This project builds and expands upon this logic of the heterogeneous effects of conflict exposure by providing a theory as to how exposure to both conflict *and* international actors may explain differences between men and women's attitudes towards violence against women and other forms of gender equality.[4] Therefore, the current literature supporting the militarized masculinity theory of conflict would expect that men should become less supportive of gender equality after being exposed to conflict.[5]

Militarized Masculinity Male Expectation: *Men exposed to conflict should be less favorable towards gender equality than men not exposed to conflict.*

Further, the "militarized masculinity" literature also expects conflict to have similar effects on women by supporting traditional gender norms. Just as the militarized masculinity culture encourages men to support war efforts as good fighters, it also often defines women's "proper" roles within traditional conceptions of femininity. For example, during conflict, women are often depicted in repetitive tropes as the "concerned, but proud mother," the "doting and devoted wife," and the "brave yet caring nurse," all roles in which the woman's primary purpose is to support the men's war effort (Enloe 2000, Goldstein 2003). Additionally, even when women participate more directly in the conflict, either in supportive roles like

[4]Lindsey (2018) largely does not explore international influence, which the theory advanced in this dissertation would argue aggregates possibly conflicting effects of conflict, possibly explaining some of her contrasting results with regards to how certain types of violence against women should be punished.

[5]When discussing the theoretical expectations of the militarized masculinity and opportunity structures theories, their findings and hypotheses will be referred to as "expectations." This is to distinguish between the claims that are already made in existing literature from the unique hypotheses proposed in this dissertation.

the famous "Rosie the Riveter" icon of World War II or as combatants, they are often presented and discussed in distinctly feminine ways compared to their male colleagues (Enloe 2000, Sjoberg 2007, Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). For example, female soldiers are often portrayed as innocent, less aggressive, and more peaceful than male soldiers. This is further exemplified by several countries that require female police and military officers to wear heels, make-up, and skirts as their uniform, which not only aims to differentiate female from male soldiers, but also reduces female soldiers to female bodies and sexualized objects rather than competent soldiers and security agents (Enloe 2000). Thus, the "militarized masculinity" theory of gender and conflict also expects that women exposed to conflict will hold less favorable attitudes towards gender equality than women not exposed to conflict.

Militarized Masculinity Female Expectation: *Women exposed to conflict should be less favorable towards gender equality than women not exposed to conflict.*

In contrast, the opportunity structure theory argues that conflict can create opportunities for women to increase their rights and participate more actively in politics, economics, and social activities in the correct context and circumstances. These theories generally argue that conflict alters traditional gender norms as women participate in more "male" roles during conflict, increases women's political participation and mobilization, highlights women's insecurity in the post-conflict period, and calls greater international attention to women's rights in the country (Ahikire, Madanda and Ampaire 2012, Berry 2015, Carpenter 2005, Hoduck 2016,

Huber and Karim 2018, Karim 2016, Thomas and Adams 2010, Tripp 2015, Webster, Torres and Beardsley N.d., Wood 2008). Thus, women's experiences, roles, and increased decision-making power during conflict increase their desire for gender equality which causes them to mobilize into women's rights movements, seek political office, and become more politically engaged.

***Opportunity Structures Female Expectation**: Women exposed to conflict should be more favorable towards gender equality than women not exposed to conflict.*

However, the "opportunity structures" literature does not often focus on the impact of conflict on men's attitudes towards gender equality. As outlined in Chapter 2, there are four causal mechanisms that may lead conflict to improve women's women's rights. First and foremost, these theories argue that women's increased experiences with leadership, economic participation, political mobilization and activism, and household control challenge traditional gender norms. As a result, these theories assume that there will be more public support for gender reform. Largely, these theories also assume that men undergo a similar change in their gendered beliefs. For example, male soldiers who voice support for increased female integration in the military often specifically reference that their experience with female soldiers demonstrated women's competence and effectiveness in combat situations.[6] If a conflict does fundamentally reorder a society's gender relations, it is possible that men

[6]For example, in his Op-Ed, Fenlason (2016) cites his work with female soldiers during combat as "proving" their effectiveness to him, which now inspires him to call for increased gender integration.

in general may also increase their support of gender equality.

However, men may not update their beliefs regarding gender roles in the same way as women during and after conflict. In particular, the opportunity structures literature often relies on an implicit or explicit assumption that men are absent during conflict. For example, in Uganda and Sierra Leone, women increased their economic participation specifically because men were no longer able to work in these jobs due to the conflict (Ahikire, Madanda and Ampaire 2012, Hoduck 2016). Similarly, Schweitzer (1980) traces how women's mobilization into war-related industries during WWII was quickly reversed after the war ended as men that had previously been deployed with the army flooded back to the factories and displaced the female workers. Therefore, if women obtain leadership and public roles during conflict because men are absent, it is not clear why men should update their beliefs about women's rights if they did not personally witness it. Instead, historically, men have returned from the conflict or from refuge abroad and expected a return to the gendered status quo (Kelly et al. 2018). Gender norms are incredibly resilient and although conflict may temporarily disrupt traditional gender roles, men – who hold greater power under traditional gender roles – are likely to want to return to those traditional roles. This tension is further exacerbated in conflicts embedded in militarized masculinity where men may not significantly improve their beliefs regarding women's rights and may also expressly decrease their support of gender equality (Lazarev 2018).

Second, these theories assume that increased attention to women's vulnerability during conflict will increase support for gender equality. However, once again, a tension arises between men's presumed absence during conflict and the likelihood that

they would be aware of and concerned with women's insecurity during conflict. Further, given that men are commonly the perpetrators of these crimes against women, including increased levels of intimate partner violence and sexual violence, this mechanism could have the opposite effect by normalizing violence against women among men (Kelly et al. 2018).

The third mechanism of the opportunity structures theory – concern for legitimacy – is more pertinent to the government rather than individual men. While individual men may be concerned about their legitimacy in the community, unless there is a community norm that links the legitimacy of individual men with support for gender equality, this is unlikely to be a primary concern for men. This is once again further complicated by the possible dual, contrasting pressure of militarized masculinity during conflict which would link male legitimacy with traditional gender norms rather than with gender equality.

Thus, there is a disconnect between the basic assumptions of the opportunity structures theory and their expectation for men. In general, these theories largely assume that men should adopt similar pro-gender equality attitudes as women after conflict. However, a closer look at the assumptions built into the causal mechanisms of this theory highlight that men are unlikely to be directly exposed to women's increased agency and leadership during conflict and therefore, they are unlikely to significantly update their beliefs regarding gender equality unless a massive, society-wide shift in gender norms has occurred, which is exceedingly rare. Additionally, the opportunity structures theory often implicitly recognizes that militarized masculinity continues to occur during conflict. Therefore, in addition to the positive signals on

women's rights following women's increased leadership during conflict, men are also exposed to negative signals supporting traditional gender norms.

Thus, while the opportunity structures literature often assumes that men should improve their support for gender equality, the causal mechanisms underlying these theories are more likely to affect women and instead, men may not be as directly affected. Additionally, men are exposed to the counteracting influence of militarized masculinity and therefore, a more realistic expectation from the opportunity structures theory is that either men may be slightly more supportive of gender equality if there is a large realignment of gender norms or are not affected at all.

***Opportunity Structures Male Expectation**: Men exposed to conflict should be slightly more or equally favorable towards gender equality than men not exposed to conflict.*

The previous chapter demonstrated that international actors encourage improvements in women's rights as measured through women's political representation and power, but do not significantly increase the likelihood of the adoption of formal legal changes or policies by the government. This finding deepens previous theories on the "opportunity theory" of conflict that argue that conflict can improve women's rights. However, these theories largely argue that conflict and international actors should impact *both* grassroots changes and and legal changes in women's rights. The previous chapter clarifies these theories by finding that women's rights improve primarily through changes in individual behavior and attitudes rather than through

government policies. There are several reasons that international influence may be channeled primarily through changes on the ground in women's rights. First, post-conflict governments often face a large number of legal demands from parties to the conflict in addition to potentially suffering from decreased policymaking capacity. Thus, they may simply lack the capacity to adopt large gender reform laws. However, these same governments may be willing to undertake less costly initiatives to improve women's rights short of formal legal changes. Additionally, they may be willing to allow international actors to implement these programs themselves as this significantly decreases the direct costs to the state. Moreover, international actors may prefer to directly implement women's rights programs rather than work through government policy if they fear corruption, a lack of sustained political will, and an inability to successfully implement the policy by the government. Further, women's rights may change due to other types of post-conflict international aid programs. For example, an international aid project aimed at education may have downstream effects improving women's rights as more girls attend school.

Further, legally guaranteed rights and legal changes in favor of women's rights most likely occur when those in power – usually men – share gender equitable values. This includes elite men and policymakers that must have the political will and support to draft and adopt the laws and non-elite men who often control power, finances, and resources within the home that would allow women to mobilize for women's rights and who act as key constituent supporters of politicians. However, conflict and international aid may impact men and women differently. Importantly, if men and state officials who hold the power to change formal policies regarding women's

rights oppose growing women's empowerment after conflict, they may block women's rights policy reform. For example, Lazarev (2018) argues that after the conflict in Chechnya, women sought greater rights and legal recognition, but policymakers who instead favored neo-traditional, patriarchal policies blocked their efforts. However, scholarship exploring the impacts of conflict on women's rights often overlooks the role of men within this process. While disruptions in traditional gender roles in conflict may lead women to undertake roles and behaviors traditionally reserved for men that may increase their desire for women's rights as described in Chapter 3, conflict may also reaffirm traditional gender roles for men. The presence of international actors and aid may predict which outcome of conflict on women's rights applies at the micro-level in various conflict contexts.

5.1.1 The Mediating Impact of International Actors

While both the militarized masculinity and opportunity structures theories acknowledge that international actors may play a role in contributing to or mediating the effects of conflict on gender equality, they also often understate the influence of these actors as secondary to either the cultural and societal pressures of gender norms or to domestic actors (Tripp 2015). Additionally, previous studies suffer from aggregation bias as they examine the impact of conflict on society overall and do not examine how conflict may affect men and women differently, often implicitly assuming homogeneous effects among men and women. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, international actors play a key role in offsetting the costs incurred by domestic actors attempting to

promote gender equality and thus, when there is political will within the community in favor of women's rights, international actors may provide the required resources necessary to transform that will into tangible improvements in women's rights. However, with regards to individual beliefs and behaviors, international actors may have different impacts on men's and women's attitudes towards gender equality.

International actors in post-conflict societies may impact men and women differently in a number of ways. First, some international aid programs target women's rights specifically, offering a range of resources such as micro-financing, job training and professionalization, health programs, domestic violence awareness, and other programs promoting women's empowerment. For example, Beath, Christia and Enikolopov (2013) found that aid programs that prioritized gender equality and female participation in Afghanistan increased women's social, political, and economic participation and mobility. Further, by promoting more general development and democratization, international aid programs may indirectly support gender equality as gender equality has been correlated with development.

However, while exposure to international aid may improve women's attitudes towards gender equality, men may not connect international aid exposure to women's empowerment. For example, many international aid programs do not directly seek to change men's attitudes towards gender equality. For example, when women's empowerment programs only target women and do not simultaneously target men, domestic violence increases as men perceive household power as a zero sum game and thus, their female partner's empowerment threatens their own power (Schuler et al. 2018). Similarly, scholars have warned that the influx of international aid and attention to

sexual violence against women in conflict led to unintended negative consequences, especially for male victims of sexual violence who often feel isolated and abandoned by the international community (Autesserre 2012, Baaz and Stern 2008). Thus, men may be relatively less exposed to international aid programs that directly promote gender equality. At worst, this may lead men to react negatively and violently towards ideals of gender equality if they perceive it as a threat to their own power status within the community and at best, men may experience some spillover effects of treated women, but the effect will likely be smaller in magnitude.

Thus, while women exposed to conflict may experience slight increases in their attitudes towards women's rights due to their increased participation in traditionally male roles, this may be tempered by the dual impact of conflict on emphasizing militarized masculinity and traditional gender roles. However, women exposed to both conflict and the commonly pro-women's rights influence of international aid may be able to more permanently translate their new roles into internalized gender equitable views and behavior.

***Hypothesis 1a**: Women exposed to conflict, but not international aid should not hold significantly more gender equitable views than women not exposed to conflict.*

***Hypothesis 1b**: Women exposed to conflict and international aid should hold more gender equitable views than women not exposed to conflict.*

In contrast, men exposed only to conflict may become less favorable towards women's rights due to the pressures of militarized masculinity. This effect may

be partially resisted by the presence of international actors. For example, Falb et al. (2014) found that while the threats to traditional gender norms and economic stressors of the conflict in Côte D'Ivoire threatened men's sense of masculinity, and thus risked igniting a backlash effect against women's rights, international aid programs that specifically targeted men for gender equality programming altered the male participants' behavior, resulting in slight increases in gender equality. However, this type of intervention is rare and the lack of programming targeted at men's views of women's rights combined with men's perceptions of zero sum gains from international programming may cause men's attitudes towards women's rights to at worst worsen and at best stay unchanged.

***Hypothesis 2a**: Men exposed to conflict, but not international aid should hold less gender equitable views than men not exposed to conflict.*

***Hypothesis 2b**: Men exposed to conflict and international aid should not hold significantly altered gender equitable views than men not exposed to conflict.*

The expectations of the "Miltiarized Masculinity," "Opportunity Structures," and the theory proposed here for men's and women's attitudes towards women's rights are summarized in Table 5.1. The "Militarized Masculinity" theory expects that exposure to conflict should decrease both men's and women's support of gender equality, although we may expect men's support of gender equality to decrease relatively more given that they are the primary recipients of the anti-gender equality cultural messaging at the heart of militarized masculinity. The "Opportunity Structures" theory

Table 5.1: Theoretical Expectations

	Support of Gender Equality			
	Militarized Masculinity	Opportunity Structures	**Without Aid**	**With Aid**
Men	↓	—	↓	—-
Women	↓	↑	—	↑

in contrast argues that support for gender equitable attitudes should increase among women exposed to conflict. While this theory does not often directly discuss how conflict exposure would affect men, men are unlikely to significantly alter their views given that the motivation behind the opportunity structures theory is that it is due to men's absence that women gain increased power during conflict and thus, men would not be exposed to women's agency during conflict. The final two columns demonstrate how considering the mediating effect of international actors alters the expectations of how conflict impacts support for gender equality. Without international aid, men who are exposed to conflict should hold relatively less favorable attitudes compared to men not exposed to conflict because they are more likely to be affected by militarized masculinity. Women exposed to conflict and not aid, on the other hand, are unlikely to significantly alter their beliefs. In contrast, when international aid is present, women exposed to conflict may be more likely to hold more permanently increased attitudes in support of gender equality because international actors are able to offset the negative effects of conflict and provide women with the necessary support to resist militarized masculinity or a reversion back to the status quo after conflict.

5.2 Gender and International Actors in Uganda's Civil Wars

> "No one should think that what is happening today is a mere change of guard: it is a fundamental change in the politics of our country."[7]

Uganda suffered decades of civil war, internal strife, and humanitarian crises. Since its independence in 1971, Uganda experienced more than 14 insurgencies, ranging from relatively small-scale conflicts to full civil war. A list of major insurgencies can be found in Table 5.2.[8] However, out of that civil war came unprecedented advances in women's rights. Tripp (2015) argues that Uganda was the first African country where women's post-conflict advances became evident due to social, cultural, and economic changes during the conflict. As highlighted by the quote from Musevnei's 1986 inauguration speech above, scholars and women's rights activists have argued that the end of Uganda's Bush War ushered in a wave of political, social, and economic changes that fundamentally improved women's rights and political participation in Ugandan politics. Importantly, Uganda's conflicts represent important gendered dimensions, including sexual violence committed by warring parties, rebel forces that promoted women's rights, and women's political mobilization into peace movements (Tripp 2015). Additionally, Uganda's conflicts, especially later conflicts with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) during the 2000s, gained large amounts of international attention at a time when the WPS agenda was just beginning to gain

[7] President Yoweri Museveni, 1986 inauguration speech.
[8] Much of this information comes from Lindemann (2011)

traction and international actors began to prioritize women's rights in earnest.

However, women's empowerment in Uganda has not been consistent, varying both over time and sub-nationally, and is far from complete. For example, domestic violence remains common as almost 50% of women experience domestic violence and more than 20% experience sexual violence. Moreover, beliefs regarding when wife beating is justified varies sub-nationally between 26% of women in Kigezi to 72% in Bukedi. Thus, Uganda represents a particularly useful case to test the theory posited in this dissertation as it includes both violent conflict with gendered components and large amounts of international aid that both varied in their geographic coverage within country.

Table 5.2: Major Insurgencies in Post-Independence Uganda

Conflict Name	Years	Major Insurgent(s)
Rwenzururu Uprising	1962–1982	Rwenzururur Movement
Mengo Crisis	1966	Mutesa II Loyalists
1972 Invasion	1972	Front For National Salvation (FRONASA)
Ugandan Bush War	1981–1986	National Resistance Army (NRA)
Acholi Rebellion, UPDA	1986–1988	Ugandan People's Democratic Army
Holy Spirit Movement	1986–1987	Holy Sprirt Movement (HSM)
LRA Insurgency	1987– Present	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
Uganda People's Army	1987–1992	Uganda People's Army (UPA)
West Nile Insurgency	1994–1997	West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)
		Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II)
ADF Insurgency	1996–2007	Allied Democratic Front (ADF)

One of the most important wars in Uganda's history was the Ugandan Bush War, also known as the Luwero War, the Ugandan Civil War or the Resistance War, fought between the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) and the National Resistance Army (NRA) from 1981 to 1986. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, the leader

of the NRA, began the war in protest of the rigging of the 1980s elections by then president Milton Obote. Between 100,000 and 800,000 people died across Uganda, although many were concentrated within the "Luwero Triangle" north of Kampala. The UNLA was accused of various human rights abuses, including one-sided violence against civilians. In 1986, the NRA captured the capital, Kampala, ending the war and Museveni became president in 1986, a position he still holds today.

The Ugandan Bush War had several important gendered dimensions. First, women fighters played a relatively important role in the NRA. While the number of female fighters was relatively small, around 100, they had a disproportionately large impact on the movement (Tripp 2015). Women took over various command positions and the NRA included a dedicated women's wing. For example, Brigadier General Proscovia Nalweyiso, a woman, rose to the highest ranks of the NRA and later the Ugandan Army. Similarly, many former female NRA fighters later joined the newly formed Museveni government, including the Minister of Gender, Labour and Social Development. Moreover, three NRA women participated in the (ultimately unsuccessful) peace talks, a major development at a time when women rarely joined peace negotiations (Tripp 2015). Second, while sexual violence was not documented during the Ugandan Bush War, women's increased vulnerability led many to engage in sex in exchange for protection, which has been connected to Uganda's high rate of HIV/AIDS infection.[9] Finally, the NRA, both as a rebel group and a political party, held relatively favorable views towards women's rights, setting up village women's

[9]For example, see the UNICEF Memo "Sexual violence as a weapon of war" *UNICEF* https://www.unicef.org/sowc96pk/sexviol.htm

councils and later advocating for and setting quotas for women's participation on local, sub-national, and national political bodies (Kasfir 2005).

Tripp (2015) traces how the gendered dynamics of the Bush War increased political participation by women in post-war Uganda and led to the formalization of the women's rights legal framework. First, she argues that the war had profound repercussions on gender relations and identities as women began to desire greater rights. Women's participation in traditionally male roles during conflict as well as their own victimization in the conflict led them to perceive themselves as more capable and independent. Second, although women's movements and organizations in Uganda had previously been suppressed, after the war, they experienced a resurgence, which led to an active women's movement that pressured the government to adopt women's rights reforms. Further, women actively participated in several peace movements.

While the Bush War ended officially in 1986, splinter wars and insurgencies continue until today. The most prominent of these is the insurgency in Northern Uganda waged by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony. Sparked by concerns of marginalization by the government and perceptions of discrimination against Northern Ugandans, who are largely members of the Acholi tribe, the LRA insurgency has since displaced more than 1.8 million people and has devastated the Northern region's economy (IDMC 2011). The LRA became increasingly notorious in the early and mid-2000s in response to several LRA-sponsored attacks against civilians, including IDP camps and the abduction of child soldiers. In 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced arrest warrants for top LRA commanders, including Kony, for a number of war crimes, including civilian mutilation, forced abductions, and sex-

ual violence.[10] After failed peace talks in 2007, the LRA continued to launch attacks in Uganda and surrounding countries, becoming less organized over time, choosing to prey more on civilians rather than engage with government forces (Gersony 1997).

The LRA also presents several gendered dynamics. The LRA abducted both women and men to serve within their ranks (Pham, Vinck and Stover 2008). However, once abducted, men and women within the LRA held gendered roles – women and girls served as wives, servants, child care attendants, cooks, and porters while men served as soldiers. Women were also forced into sexual slavery (Annan et al. 2009, Baines 2014). Abducted women were given as "wives" to higher level officers, while lower-level male LRA members were not allowed to marry or engage in sexual relations with the women (Annan et al. 2011). If abducted girls were younger than twelve years old, referred to as *Ting Ting* within the LRA, their "husband"/owner was required to wait until she was 12 to have sex with her (Annan et al. 2009). Women within these forced marriages experienced high levels of sexual and physical violence, with 93.5% of women in LRA forced marriages reporting abuse, compared to 6.9% of abducted LRA women not in forced marriages and 1.7% of non-abducted LRA women (Annan et al. 2009). However, a small number of women defined as being undesirable wives – those unable to bear children – received combat training and became soldiers. 69% of abducted women reported serving in a supportive role, while 16% reported participating in a combat role (Annan et al. 2009). Some women eventually gained leadership roles, with 4% of a sample of female LRA members reporting that they

[10]For case information, see the following ICC Case Information Sheet for "The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti" https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/kony/Documents/KonyEtAlEng.pdf

could give orders to other fighters (Annan et al. 2009).

The LRA had several other unique gendered practices that largely revolved around preventing attrition and re-enforcing strict gender roles, such as specific protocols surrounding widows and death penalties for adultery (Baines 2014). It is important to note that the level of sexual violence committed by the LRA against non-abducted civilian women was surprisingly low given the levels of non-sexual violence committed against civilians. For much of its existence, the LRA strictly forbade rape of civilian women or newly abducted women (only "husbands" were allowed to have sex with abducted women).[11] Annan et al. (2009) and Baines (2014) argue that the LRA leadership used strict control over gendered and sexual relationships to create social cohesion and maintain control over their soldiers. Maintaining cohesion was especially important in the LRA due to its reliance upon abductions and forced recruitment (Baines 2014). However, as the command structure and hierarchy began to deteriorate in the late 2000s, LRA soldiers began to engage in more widespread rape. Finally, the LRA originally began as an evolution of "the Holy Spirit Movement" led by a woman, Alice Lakwena, before Kony took control (Behrend 2000).

Moreover, Uganda received large amounts of attention from the international community in the wake of its civil conflicts. The humanitarian crisis ignited by the LRA insurgency in the North, combined with several other simultaneous insurgencies and districts plagued by unrest led to millions of Ugandans being displaced from their homes, many civilian deaths and disfigurements, and a widespread famine. By 2003,

[11]It is important to note that sex occurring within these forced marriages still constituted rape according to international standards.

the UN stated that the crisis in northern Uganda had grown to be "one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world."[12] In response, several UN agencies and other international actors committed to increase their presence in northern Uganda to help provide humanitarian assistance. Additionally, the LRA insurgency's continued use of violence against and abduction of civilians resulted in international condemnation, which culminated in 2005 when the ICC put out an arrest warrant for several high-ranking LRA commanders.[13] Further as the LRA began to launch attacks into the surrounding countries, more countries coordinated and supported military maneuvers against the LRA.

Uganda's conflicts coincided with changes in international norms regarding women's rights. Beginning with the 1985 UN Conference on Women and continuing with the 1995 Beijing Conference and the 2000 adoption of UNSCR 1325 and its subsequent resolutions expanding the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, the international community increasingly supported women's rights in post-conflict countries. For example, several donors specifically pledged aid to women's rights movements in Uganda to help them continue their efforts.[14] Uganda continues to receive over 2 billion U.S. dollars in aid each year from intergovernmental organizations, such as the European Union, and individual states.[15] However, it is important to note that many of these international aid projects were complementing initiatives already begun by local women's rights movements in Uganda (Tripp 2015).

[12] As quoted in this UN press release from the head of the UN Humanitarian Affairs Office Jan Egeland. https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/afr750.doc.htm

[13] See the ICC's warrant against Kony here https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/kony

[14] As recorded in the AidData Uganda data set.

[15] As recorded in the AidData Uganda data set.

Thus, Uganda presents a most-likely case to study the impact of conflict and international aid on women's rights sub-nationally. Uganda not only experienced multiple conflicts that varied greatly in degree across the country, but these conflicts demonstrated deeply gendered characteristics. Moreover, Uganda received large amounts of international aid, including aid targeted specifically at women's rights projects. Finally, Uganda has a well-developed localized women's rights movement that is further supported by the international community.

5.3 Research Design

Sub-national data was primarily gathered from the Demographic Health Survey (DHS), an international survey sponsored by USAID, distributed and run by national statistic agencies, such as the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics.[16] The DHS collects nationally representative samples of the population and asks public health related questions on issues including medical care, maternal and reproductive health, children's health, and diet. Additionally, some waves of the DHS survey asked a subset of female respondents about domestic violence and women's empowerment.

Uganda held waves of DHS surveys in 2000, 2006, 2011, and 2016. In total, over 53,000 women and men participated in the DHS survey. Women represent over 41,000 of the respondents. The DHS survey stratifies survey locations by region and by rural or urban areas. Survey clusters represent small geographical locations: neighborhoods

[16]The survey would have been distributed, run, and published by the Ugandan government. This decreases concerns that respondents would have altered their responses specifically to cater to the United States government's desires.

in cities and villages in rural areas. Within these clusters, households are randomly chosen to be surveyed and within those households random men and women were selected to participate. The sample was limited to individuals who were not visitors to the village and who had lived within the village for at least five years at the time of the survey. Figure 5.3.1 plots the locations of survey locations. Summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis can be found in Table 5.3.

5.3.1 Dependent Variables

Three primary dependent variables from DHS are used. First, "Justification of Wife Beating" is a dichotomous variable recording if the respondent believed that a husband was justified in beating his wife if she burned food, goes out without her husband's permission, argues with her husband, or neglects her children. 54% of male and female respondents believe wife beating is justified under at least one of these conditions. Importantly, this variable records attitudes towards when wife beating is justified, not whether the respondent has experienced wife beating.

Table 5.3: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Wife Beating Justified	51,085	0.544	0.498	0	1
Media Consumption	53,009	0.693	0.461	0	1
Financial Control	10,969	0.425	0.494	0	1
Total Events, logged	53,034	0.112	0.498	0.000	4.654
Total Aid, logged	53,034	5.188	7.446	0.000	22.931
Age	53,034	28.318	9.693	15	54
Rural	53,034	1.755	0.430	1	2
Education Level	53,033	1.218	0.755	0	3
Catholic	52,556	0.376	0.484	0	1
Married	42,884	0.617	0.486	0	1
Electricity	41,289	0.211	0.408	0	1



Figure 5.1: DHS Cluster Locations, 2000-2016

Second, *Media Consumption* records whether the respondent consumes newspaper, radio, or television at least once a week. This variable weakly proxies for a respondent's level of political knowledge and engagement. Unfortunately, since the DHS is primarily a health and demographic survey, it does not directly ask questions about political engagement. However, media consumption proxies for one's level of political knowledge. For example, Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre and Shehata (2013) and Chaffee, Ward and Tipton (1970) both find that one's level of political interest is a strong indicator of media consumption. Around 70% of the entire sample consumes media once a week. Media consumption is more common among men as 80% of men consume media once a week compared with 66% of women.

The final dependent variable is only asked of female respondents and thus, men are dropped from the analysis. *Financial Decision-making* is a dichotomous indicator of whether the respondent reports that they make decisions regarding spending their male partner's earnings jointly with their partner. Financial control within families is both an expression of and a further cause of gendered power dynamics between male and female intimate partners. Decision-making participation has been endorsed as a measure of relationship equality (Bartley, Blanton and Gilliard 2005, Gray-Little and Burks 1983, Malhotra and Mather 1997, Rosenbluth, Steil and Whitcomb 1998). Historically and still today in most societies, men are viewed as the "breadwinners" indicating that their income plays a fundamental role in providing for the basic needs of their families, whereas women's income is often viewed as less important and supplementary (Bartley, Blanton and Gilliard 2005, Zelizer 1989, 1997). Thus, even when women enter the workforce and generate income, their financial control continues to

be dictated by social norms regarding gender roles. Vogler (1998) demonstrated that men and women with more egalitarian gender values are more likely to jointly make decisions regarding household finances and that household financial decision-making patterns were more likely to be determined by ideological and cultural views rather than relative size of the male or female partner's economic contribution to the household. Thus, financial household decision-making reflects, replicates, and reinforces gendered power hierarchies and inequality in the larger society (Kenney 2006).

This variable specifically examines *joint* decision-making between partners rather than whether the female respondent was the sole decision-maker for two reasons. First, if a woman is the sole decision-maker regarding her partner's income, this may indicate a distant, missing, or disinterested partner, rather than a partner that consults with and supports his wife. Second, joint decision-making indicates a level of equality and respect within a relationship that would not be captured by either the wife or the husband making financial decisions alone. For example, in low income households where money management is viewed more as a burden and source of shame rather than a source of power, women tend to handle finances alone, whereas men tend to take control over household finance once income increases (Vogler 1998). Importantly, household financial decision-making based on separate spending spheres for men and women – in which men alone make financial decisions with or without providing an "allowance" to his female partner or in which women make financial decisions alone – are associated with greater household inequality as they tend to strictly segregate spending responsibilities and protect men's personal spending money while limiting opportunities for discussion and debate between male and female partners

regarding household priorities, needs, and grievances (Pahl 1980, 1983, Shove 1993, Vogler 1998, Vogler, Lyonette and Wiggins 2008). Thus, when financial decisions are made by only the male or female partner, this further illustrates unequal patterns of burden- and benefit-sharing.[17]

This variable is only available in this study for female respondents. Also, due to coding complications in the original DHS data, only responses from 2016 are included. Additionally, only married women or women in long-term relationships are included in this sub-sample. About 42% of female respondents reported that they made decisions regarding their husbands earnings jointly with him. It is important to note that this variable records a woman's *perception* of her financial decision-making role in relation to her husband. Similar questions regarding other types of financial decision-making asked of both men and women demonstrate that men may perceive financial power-sharing differently than women. Thus, this does not necessarily record whether financial decisions are made jointly in reality. Instead, it measures women's perception of her control over financial decision-making and therefore, her relative economic power in the household.

As Hypotheses 2a and 2b predict that men will not significantly change their attitudes or behaviors after conflict, they may not significantly alter their actual control over decision-making or may not purposefully begin to share power after conflict. In contrast, women may begin to believe that they should assert more control over household finances. When looking at the DHS data regarding financial

[17]However, the results remain the same when considering women who make decisions regarding their partner's earnings alone or jointly with their partner to account for female-headed households.

decision-making between men and women, men consistently underestimate women's contribution to financial decision-making compared to women's perspectives. It is unclear if this indicates that men are underestimating women's actual decision-making power or if women are projecting their hopes for increased financial control. However, this variable captures women's perception of their participation in financial decision-making, which may indicate women's aspirations for increasing decision-making power in addition to small (perhaps unnoticed by their male partners) actions they make take to actually increase their financial control.

Similarly, all of the dependent variables reflect either personal attitudes about perceived women's rights or individual behaviors that are unlikely to be directly influenced by one's partner. Since conflict and international aid may have different impacts on men and women, this study must be careful to examine dependent variables that can reflect the independent influence of these factors on men and also on women. For example, domestic violence is also an important measure of gender equality. However, the occurrence of domestic violence experienced by women may conflate conflict's impact on women and men, obscuring the differing impacts. While conflict may make women more equitable, it may make men resent women's newly embraced empowerment, which can increase domestic violence (Kelly et al. 2018, Schuler et al. 2018). Further, women's increased awareness of their rights may make it more likely that they recognize and report domestic violence when it occurs. Therefore, this study is limited to dependent variables that measure the impact of conflict on women's and men's attitudes and behaviors independently.

5.3.2 Independent Variables

Two primary independent variables are examined: violent events and international aid. *Total Violence* is a count of the number of violent events that occurred within 20 kilometers of a DHS cluster, the distance an average person can walk within one day. The primary measure of *Total Violence* used in the analysis only counts violence which occurred *in the past five years* as more recent violence is likely to have a stronger impact on one's behavior than violence in the distant past.[18] Alternative measures include a count of deaths and a count of civilian deaths only, both of which do not change the results. To further account for remaining concerns of endogeneity, violent events that occurred in the same year of the survey are not included in the count. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, violent events occurred throughout the country, but violence was more common in the North (where the LRA insurgency was centered) and the West.

Violent events are relatively rare. Between 1989 to 2016, each cluster experienced an average of about 2 events and within the five years before each survey wave, clusters experience an average of 0.7 events. As can be seen in Figures 3 and 4, more than 90% of clusters did not experience violence in the past five years of each survey. When violence did occur, it ranged between 1 or 2 events (about 44% of clusters that experienced violence had two or less events) to 104 events. Given the large amount of skew in the data, *Total Events* is log transformed.

[18]The results are somewhat sensitive to the yearly range of violent event and aid exposure. While the signs remain consistent, *Justification of Wife Beating* falls below significance for violent events beyond 6 years, *Media Consumption* falls below significance when only examining violent events in the past two or three years, as well as 7 and 10 years, and *Joint Financial Decisionmaking* lost significance beyond 7 years.



Figure 5.2: Violent Event Locations, 1989-2016

The second independent variable, *International Aid*, is the amount of aid received within 20 kilometers of a DHS cluster, as recorded by the AidData Project. The AidData project geo-locates aid given by states and IGOs, such as the World Bank, IMF, or European Union between 1988 and 2016.[19] Giving aid is one of the primary ways in which international actors can encourage women's rights and influence society and leverage material incentives more generally in a post-conflict society. While some of these projects focus specifically on women's rights, such as the Anti-Trafficking of Women and Children "Safe Return" aid project in Karamoja district pledged by Norway in 2011 and 2012, the Mainstreaming Women's Rights in Health and Community Responses to Violence Against Women in Kapchwora and Bukwo Districts

[19]Not included are aid donated by NGOs, churches, or individuals.



Figure 5.3: Total Violent Events, 5 Years



Figure 5.4: Number of Events in Violent Districts

committed by the European Union, or Austria's "Securing Women's Socioeconomic and Political Rights in Post-conflict Northern Uganda" aid project, the majority are devoted to more general causes, such as education, health, and government support. In the aid project-year sample in Uganda for this time range, 100 projects specifically had words related to women, gender, girls, or sexual and reproductive health in their name and 194 projects were categorized in issue areas that are often considered to be "women's issues," including health, education, and poverty. Unfortunately, it is not possible to distinguish whether there was further gender programming in these aid projects beyond their name and main categorization. For example, a project on government capacity building or budget support could have a gender component that would not be obvious from its name or main categorization. However, even aid projects not specifically devoted to women's rights may indirectly improve women's rights. This may occur through exposure to Western liberalism and ideas regarding women's rights, improved social status and health of communities which over time in-

creases women's rights, or international actors encouraging communities that receive aid (even aid not specific to women's rights) to improve women's rights. Thus, all types of aid are included in this analysis, even if they are not explicitly focused on women's rights.[20]

Although aid is often committed to large areas, such as an entire district or region of Uganda, this analysis only records international aid within a cluster if the aid project's primary disbursement location was within 20 kilometers. This is to account for the fact that many aid projects focus the majority of their funds in one location, often the largest city, town, or village in the area, due to logistical difficulties in reaching isolated communities. Thus, this analysis uses a relatively conservative measure of aid. On average, a cluster received about 8 million dollars in aid over the time period, but aid received between 1989 and 2016 ranges between $0 direct disbursements in the cluster's radius to more than one billion U.S. dollars. Generally, cities receive more aid and the Northern region also received large amounts of aid in the wake of the destruction caused by the LRA. *Total Aid* is log transformed.

One of the primary concerns in cross-national analyses of the impact of conflict on women's rights is the endogenous relationship between conflict and gender equality. Multiple studies demonstrate that less gender equitable countries are more likely to engage in both inter- and intra-state conflict.[21] Examining micro-level patterns of

[20]Further, because of the difficulties establishing which aid projects did include gendered components, it cannot be tested whether gendered aid has a different effect compared with non-gendered aid. This is unfortunate given the theory's emphasis on aid's impacts directly on women which would be strongest for aid that incorporates a gender component. An additional point of study in the future should disentangle the possible heterogeneous effects of gendered and non-gendered aid.

[21]See Caprioli (2003, 2005), Caprioli and Boyer (2001), Hudson and Den Boer (2002), Hudson et al. (2013), Hudson and Leidl (2015*a*,*b*), Melander (2005*a*,*b*)

violence and women's rights helps overcome this problem. While Uganda's relatively low level of gender equality on average may have made the country more susceptible to conflict, at the localized level, exposure to direct fighting close to an individual's home is not directly correlated with local gender equality. In other words, at a highly disaggregated level, such as the neighborhood or village level used in this analysis, local gender equality does not influence whether fighting occurs nearby. Instead, fighting location is driven primarily by strategic and logistic concerns.

As can be seen in Table 5.4, there is no correlation between a location's level of gender equality, as measured by the percentage of girls married under the age of 17 and whether individuals in that location were surveyed, experienced previous conflict, or had previously received aid. While consistent data on women's rights at the local level across Uganda is difficult to obtain, gender inequality is a major driver of child marriage and child marriage has been shown to have harmful effects on gender equality, including increasing the likelihood that the girl bride experiences domestic violence, has a high-risk pregnancy, and receives less education (Raj 2010). Child marriage prevalence at the sub-county level – the most local level for which accurate data on this indicator can be gathered and matched with the DHS survey data and other controls – does not influence whether the DHS survey was issued in that sub-county, decreasing concerns of a biased sample.[22]

Importantly, child marriage prevalence is also not correlated at the sub-county level with the prevalence of conflict in the sub-county or with the amount of in-

[22]The data is gathered from 2014 when there were 1,382 sub-counties in Uganda. These are relatively small administrative units. More than 81% have a population of less than 50,000 people.

ternational aid disbursed (Table 5.4, Models 2 and 3). This decreases concerns of endogeneity or that sub-counties with higher levels of gender equality may be less likely to experience conflict or aid. As described above, at the local level, conflict occurrence and aid disbursements are likely driven primarily by logistic and strategic factors, rather than the social and behavioral connection between gender equality and aggressive behavior that can at the country-level increase propensity to conflict. It is important to note that there is a correlation between the occurrence of violent events in a sub-county and the amount of international aid disbursed in that area.[23] This is to be expected and is in line with the theory outlined in this dissertation as international actors often specifically seek to influence and rebuild in areas more heavily affected by conflict. In other words, local areas experiencing more conflict are often in greater need of international aid. Additionally, international actors may particularly target these areas for aid in the hopes of influencing statebuilding in the post-conflict environment (Lake 2016). This is similar to the mechanism described in the theory – international actors target conflict areas for aid in order to help rebuild, stabilize the area, and prevent spillover and humanitarian crises, but also may hope to gain more direct influence over statebuilding in the aftermath of conflict by leveraging their material incentives. However, this pre-existing correlation between the two main independent variables constrains this analysis' ability to make causal claims. However, given the lack of a correlation between the dual "treatments" of conflict and aid and the main dependent variable of gender equality, these results still illuminate important dynamics of the impact of these two correlated phenomena on

[23]These results are consistent when examined at the cluster-level rather than the sub-county level.

gender dynamics at the local level.

5.3.3 Control Variables

Several controls account for individual and household characteristics that may influence individual attitudes towards women's equality and exposure to conflict and aid. Controls come from the DHS survey. First, a respondents' age may influence both attitudes towards women's rights and the reaction to violence. In particular, younger people tend to have more favorable views towards women's rights and may react to violence and threat differently than older individuals. Moreover, younger respondents may be more open to changing their beliefs regarding gender norms compared to older respondents who are often more conservative and less amenable to changing their beliefs on gender relations. Therefore, *Age* records the respondent's age.

Similarly, there is often a noticeable urban-rural divide regarding women's rights as individuals living in cities tend to hold more egalitarian views that those living in rural areas. Moreover, people living in cities were more likely to be exposed to international aid given the prevalence of aid distributions in cities due to the greater ease of aid project implementation in cities compared to rural communities. Moreover, people living in cities may be more likely to be the targets of violence. Thus, *Rural* is a dichotomous variable recording whether the individual lives in a rural area. 43% of respondents live in a rural area, measured by distance to the closest neighbor.

Next, a respondents' level of education is also likely to influence their prior beliefs regarding gender equality and their reaction to aid and conflict exposure. Generally,

Table 5.4: Survey Balance and Treatment

	Dependent variable:		
	Sub-county Surveyed	Number of Conflict Event	International Aid
	(1)	(2)	(3)
International Aid (logged)	0.003	0.02***	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Number of Conflict Events (logged)	0.01		0.35***
	(0.04)		(0.11)
% Child Marriage	0.12	−0.03	−0.20
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.24)
Percent Literate	−0.29**	−0.08	0.14
	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.37)
Employment	0.001	0.0002	−0.01
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Percent with Electricity	0.25	1.46***	0.83
	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.53)
Population	0.00003***	−0.000009*	0.00004***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Population Sex Ratio	−0.003	−0.0004	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	1.03***	−0.09	0.38
	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.56)
Observations	1,091	1,091	1,091
R^2	0.07	0.16	0.05
Adjusted R^2	0.06	0.15	0.04
Residual Std. Error	0.45 (df = 1079)	0.34 (df = 1080)	1.29 (df = 1080)
F Statistic	7.58*** (df = 11; 1079)	19.86*** (df = 10; 1080)	5.58*** (df = 10; 1080)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

higher levels of education are associated with more favorable attitudes towards gender equality. Moreover, educated individuals may be more amenable to updating their beliefs after exposure to international aid due to the correlation between development, education, and support for liberal values. *Education Level* records the highest level of school a respondent completed. As a categorical variable, *Education Level* splits schooling into no education (0), primary (1), secondary (2), and more than secondary (3). 13% of the sample had no education, 58% completed primary school, 22% completed secondary school, and 7% had post-secondary education.

Moreover, beliefs regarding gender relations are often highly intertwined with religious beliefs, especially among conservative religions, such as Catholicism and Islam which tend to support more traditional gender relations. Uganda is a majority Christian country, about 40% of citizens are Catholic, 31% are Anglican, and 13% are Muslim.[24] Catholics tend to have conservative views regarding women's rights, especially in comparison to Anglicans. *Catholic* records whether a respondent was Catholic or if they were a member of another religion.

Further, an individual's marital status likely influences both their own gendered beliefs and their response to exposure to violence and aid. First, married individuals are likely to have more conservative attitudes towards gender relations compared to single people and married women are often more likely to follow the beliefs of their husband (which usually aligns with other social cleavages, such as race, religion, and partisanship) compared to other women's movements (Baldez 2003). Moreover, given traditional stereotypes that men should protect women during conflict, married

[24]Other specifications of this variable include dummies for Christian or Muslim.

women and men may respond differently to perceived threats after exposure to violence to align with norms of protective masculinity (Lindsey 2018). Finally, exposure to international aid, especially aid that encourages gender equality, may create tension within married couples (Kelly et al. 2018). *Married* is a dichotomous indicator of the respondent's marital status. Respondents were considered "married" if they were legally married or had lived with the same partner for multiple years. 62% of respondents are married.

Wealth also influences individual beliefs on gender equality with wealthier individuals often holding more progressive and liberal views on gender equality. Moreover, wealthier individuals may be more able to access the benefits of international aid programs and may enjoy higher levels of security compared the less wealthy individuals. Unfortunately, the DHS survey did not ask about respondent's wealth or income until 2014. Thus, as a proxy for wealth, a dummy variable for whether the respondent's home had electricity is included. Only 20% of respondents had electricity. Unfortunately, this question was not asked of male respondents and thus is not included in the male models. However, robustness checks with other proxies for wealth included do not significantly alter the results.

Finally, to account for geographic and time patterns within Uganda that influence both whether violence occurs in clusters and whether the cluster received financial aid and changing attitudes towards women's rights over time, fixed effects are included for both region and survey wave. It should be noted that a control for ethnic group, primarily the Acholi group as a primary group that experienced insurgency, was not included as the "Northern" region fixed effect largely proxies for this control. For

example, 99% of Northern Uganda's residents belong to the Acholi ethnic group.

Five models are presented below. Table 5.5 presents the model results for women and Table 5.6 includes the results for men. All models are logistic regression models. All models are stratified by region and urban/rural (as determined by the DHS survey strata), include survey weights, and cluster standard errors by DHS cluster-year and household.

5.4 Results

The results support the theory that women exposed *both* to conflict and international aid hold more gender equitable attitudes and are more politically engaged than women exposed to conflict alone. Further, men do not appear to significantly alter their attitudes and behavior in clusters that were exposed to both conflict and aid.

As can be seen in Table 5.5, while conflict alone generally has a negative impact on women's rights at the local level, international aid can help offset these negative impacts. With both media consumption and a woman's joint financial control over her husband or partner's earnings, as the number of conflict events increases in areas without aid, women are significantly less likely to consume media or make joint decisions with their husbands. Additionally, although not a significant difference, the number of conflict events also has a positive sign on the likelihood that a woman reports that wife beating is justified. *International Aid* in non-conflict areas does not appear to have any impact on attitudes and behaviors towards women's rights. Importantly, in areas that experienced both conflict *and* received international aid,

women are significantly less likely to justify wife beating, are more likely to consume media, and are more likely to report that they make decisions jointly with their partner regarding how to spend their husband's earnings compared to women in conflict areas without aid.

In areas with no international aid, conflict increases the likelihood that a woman reports wife beating is justified from 61% to 92%. However, in areas with large amounts of international aid, conflict slightly decreases approval of wife beating, decreasing the likelihood of approval from 56% to 43%. In other words, women exposed to the most conflict have significantly different attitudes toward wife beating conditional upon the presence of international actors. Women living in conflict areas not exposed to international aid are almost 90% more likely to believe wife beating is justified than women in conflict areas with international aid projects. This supports the theory that international influence may be a necessary condition for conflict to have any positive impact on women's rights. Similarly, while women's media consumption decreases significantly from 62% to 13% in conflict areas with no international aid, it increases from 64% to 82% in conflict neighborhoods with aid, representing a stunning 600% increase in the likelihood of weekly media consumption.

Finally, while conflict negatively impacts women's financial decision-making overall regardless of the amount of international aid within the area, aid appears to help offset this negative effect. The likelihood that a woman in an area with no aid jointly controls her husband's finances decreases from 41% to 6% as conflict events increase, a decrease of 35 percentage points and an 85% decrease in probability that male and female intimate partners jointly participate in decision-making, while women exposed

to international aid and conflict experience only an 16% percentage point decrease from 44% to 28%, only a 36% decrease in probability of joint decision-making. In other words, the negative impact of conflict on women's household financial decision-making which aligns with militarized masculinity theories that gender equality is worsened after conflict, is half as severe in areas exposed to international aid, which gives some slight support to the opportunity structures theory. In other words, although international aid may not be able to overcome the negative impacts of conflict to successfully achieve women's empowerment across all spheres of life, it may be able to mitigate the negative effects of conflict and militarized masculinity on women's rights. These findings echo the findings of Beath, Christia and Enikolopov (2013) who found that aid projects in Afghanistan that promoted gender equality increased women's participation in political, social, and economic activities, but had relatively less impact on financial decision-making.[25]

Thus, with some forms of gender equality, conflict exposure still negatively impacts women's perspectives of their rights even in the presence of international actors. In these cases, instead of improving women's rights in conflict areas compared to non-conflict areas, international aid in conflict-exposed clusters largely worked to offset some (but not all) of the negative impacts of conflict on women. This finding aligns more with scholarship that finds that conflict does have an overall negative effect on

[25]It is important to note that the authors of that study found that the aid program had no significant effect on decision making, which contradicts the finding presented here that aid did offset the negative impacts of conflict on decision-making. This may occur because the authors' argue that financial decision making in Afghanistan was often considered to be a family activity and thus it was largely expected that women would participate in financial decisions. This is not the case in Uganda where only half of the female respondents reported participating in decisions regarding major household decisions, visits to family and friends, and healthcare.

Table 5.5: Logistic Regression Results: Women's Responses

	Dependent variable:		
	Wife Beating Justified	Media Consumption	Joint Decision-making
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Number of Conflict Events	0.200	-0.378^{**}	-0.665^{***}
	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.047)
International Aid	-0.001	-0.0005	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Age	-0.021^{***}	0.002	-0.006^{**}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Rural	0.216^{***}	-0.344^{***}	0.159^{*}
	(0.058)	(0.072)	(0.086)
Education Level	-0.364^{***}	0.603^{***}	0.224^{***}
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.042)
Catholic	0.079^{**}	0.027	-0.094^{*}
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.050)
Married	0.021	0.229^{***}	
	(0.034)	(0.035)	
Electricity	-0.406^{***}	0.810^{***}	0.101
	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.065)
Conflict Events:International Aid	-0.020^{**}	0.026^{**}	0.027^{***}
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.003)
Constant	1.751^{***}	0.317^{**}	-1.198^{***}
	(0.138)	(0.156)	(0.205)
Region Controls	X	X	X
Survey Wave Controls	X	X	
Observations	31,810	32,933	10,862
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 5.5: Predicted Probabilities: Conflict, Aid, and Women's Attitudes and Behavior







women. However, it does contribute to the theory that conflict can open "opportunity structures" for women by demonstrating that while conflict is negative overall for women's rights, under some conditions, international aid can mitigate its impact. However, with other indicators of women's rights, such as media consumption and attitudes towards wife beating, international aid, combined with conflict, entirely negated the negative impact of conflict. This effect becomes even more pronounced when compared to the decrease in women's rights experienced by women living in conflict areas that did not receive international aid. It is important to note that while conflict's impact on women's attitudes towards wife beating and media consumption is in the expected directions, the substantive effect is somewhat fuzzy. For example, Figure 5.5 shows that with regards to Wife Beating and Media Consumption, the

slope of the line for women exposed to international aid is positive, but the confidence intervals are large. In other words, these results illustrate a new dimension to the "opportunity structures" theory. In addition to international actor presence as being a necessary condition to offset the negative impacts of militarized masculinity, the results indicate that even in the presence of these actors, women barely *improve* their attitudes towards gender equality. Instead, they are largely offsetting the negative effects of conflict or slightly, but not significantly, improving their attitudes. Thus, the opportunity structures literature must be careful to not overstate the beneficial impact on women and instead, examine the conditions under which conflict may have different impacts on women and the resistance of societal norms even after conflict and even for women's own internal beliefs.

When we examine the conditional impacts of conflict exposure and international aid on men's attitudes towards women, we see that conflict and aid do not jointly significantly alter men's attitudes or behavior.[26] Men in areas exposed to conflict and aid do not have significantly different attitudes or behavior regarding wife-beating and media consumption, as can be seen in Figure 5.6. For example, although there is a slight positive increase in the likelihood that both men exposed to aid and men not exposed to aid report that wife beating is justified, raising it from slightly below a 50% probability to a slightly more than 50% probability among men not exposed to aid and from a 43% probability to a 47% probability among men not exposed to conflict, the change is not statistically significant. Further, it is important to note that conflict and international aid do not alter men's media consumption, which decreases

[26]Note that *financial control* was not included as this question was not asked to male respondents.

concerns that the findings for women's increased media consumption may simply reflect a more engaged community overall. As Figure 5.6 shows, although there is a slight positive slope to men's media consumption as exposure to conflict increases for both men exposed to aid and those not exposed to aid, this effect is not statistically significant. Therefore, conflict and international aid appear to have a unique impact on women that is not observed in men. While these results are largely suggestive as men were asked less questions related to women's rights, this may suggest that international aid and conflict do not alter men's attitudes towards gender equality.

Generally, these findings demonstrate that while conflict overall can have a negative influence on women's attitudes and behaviors on gender equality, international aid can mitigate this negative influence. Men, on the other hand, do not appear to significantly alter their behavior or attitudes on wife beating or their amount of media consumption in conflict-exposed clusters that received international aid.

These results help explain the empirical and theoretical tensions between the "militarized masculinity" literature and the "opportunity structures" literature. First, the findings underscore that conflict negatively impacts women's rights, supporting the "militarized masculinity" findings. In other words, conflict often led to a significant decrease in gender equitable behavior and values among women. However, as suggested by the "opportunity structures" literature, the interactive effect between conflict exposure and international aid demonstrates that under some circumstances, women's rights can be promoted to some extent in post-conflict areas. However, even with international aid exposure, women exposed to conflict only slightly change their beliefs towards wife beating and their frequency of media consumption. Thus,

Table 5.6: Logistic Regression Results: Men's Responses

	Dependent variable:	
	Wife Beating Justified	Media Consumption
	(4)	(5)
Number of Conflict Events	-0.59^{**}	0.06
	(0.23)	(0.35)
International Aid	0.001	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	-0.02^{***}	-0.0001
	(0.003)	(0.004)
Rural	0.34^{***}	-0.53^{***}
	(0.09)	(0.12)
Education Level	-0.48^{***}	0.80^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Catholic	0.09	-0.13^{*}
	(0.06)	(0.07)
Married	-0.25^{***}	0.18^{**}
	(0.07)	(0.08)
Conflict Events:International Aid	0.004	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	1.18^{***}	1.54^{***}
	(0.21)	(0.25)
Region Controls	X	X
Survey Wave Controls	X	X
Observations	9,312	9,631

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Figure 5.6: Predicted Probabilities: Conflict, Aid, and Men's Attitudes and Behavior

these results suggest that while the opportunity structures theory may be correct to challenge the prevailing logic that conflict is always harmful to women and gender equality, the positive effects of conflict on gender equality should not be overstated. Further, the results highlight that conflict may amplify the influence of international actors. While international aid did not significantly influence women's rights in clusters that were not exposed to violent events, there was a positive impact on women's rights in conflict areas. Thus, conflict may prime a society to be more responsive to international pressure for women's rights. As an important clarification to the "opportunities structures" literature, which often argues that international actors are one possible, but not always necessary cause of post-conflict improvements of women's rights, these findings underscore that international actors are a necessary condition to increase women's rights after conflict and that without international actors, individual women's rights will often decrease.

5.4.1 Robustness Checks

These results are robust to several alternative operationalizations of the dependent variable and specifications of the model. The results are consistent when other operationalizations of the dependent variable are used, such as the count of number of circumstances under which wife beating is justified and each circumstance of wife beating considered individually,[27] and the control of a husband's finances both jointly and solely by women, and joint control of a woman's own earnings. While models

[27]It should be noted that when wife beating in response to women going out without permission, refusing sex, or arguing are considered individually, the model falls just below significance, but retains its negative sign.

testing the individual types of media in isolation — television, radio, and media — were not significant, the sign remains consistent and the results fall just below significance. The results are also robust to alternative specifications of the model, including using OLS and GLM regression.

Additionally, the results remain consistent when alternative definitions of conflict exposure are used, including a count of the number of overall deaths, a count of the number of civilian deaths, and extending the radius to 50 kilometers. These robustness checks hold for both men and women. Moreover, the results are robust to the inclusion of controls for population density of the cluster, proximity to the border, and the intensity of lights at night in the cluster to proxy for urbanization, development, and wealth.

It is important to note that the scope of the theory and results are limited to actions and beliefs that women and men can do or hold in isolation from their partner. In other words, this study does not consider actions that men and women may do together, such as experiencing domestic violence and fertility experiences. This is precisely because the theory argues that conflict and aid should impact men and women in opposite ways. In other words, if women are becoming more equitable and men are either not changing their behavior or are becoming more patriarchal, joint behavior may not change. This is affirmed by tests of several other outcomes on women's behavior that is dependent upon men, including experiencing domestic violence at the hands of a woman's male partner and the number of children that a woman and man have. For example, while previous studies have found that conflict generally increases domestic violence experienced by women, this robustness check

finds that when the interaction between conflict and international actors are considered, the results become negative, but not significant. Thus, this is more evidence that the ability of women to leverage the opportunities that conflict and aid open for them is compromised by men's lack of parallel changes regarding women's rights.

5.5 Mobilizing Women: Conflict, Aid, and Local Elections

So far, this analysis has demonstrated that women who were exposed to more violence and aid at the micro-level in Uganda hold attitudes that are more favorable towards women's rights and gender equality than women not exposed to these dual influences. However, shifts in individual attitudes may not lead to broader empowerment for women in society as a whole if women cannot obtain political power. Therefore, this final section will explore whether conflict and aid exposure influence women's political participation and electoral competitiveness. If individual women hold more gender equitable beliefs and have more political knowledge, as indicated by their increased consumption of media, then they should be more engaged in local politics. The results will present illustrative evidence that while conflict decreases the likelihood that women will win elections overall, international aid disbursements in sub-counties that experienced violent events increase the probability that a female candidate will win elections at the sub-county level.

To explore the effects of conflict and aid on election outcomes, data was gathered

on the candidates of sub-county level elections in the 2016 elections from the Ugandan Electoral Commissions website. Uganda has several levels of political office: national, district, sub-county, and village. Sub-county positions include chairpersons, directly elected councillors and specially elected councillors representing women, youth, and the elderly. There are councillors specifically reserved for women in which only women are permitted to run, however, women are also allowed to run for non-quota positions, such as directly elected councillors, councillors representing youth, and councillors representing the elderly. Slightly over one third of positions are reserved for women. In total, information was able to be gathered on 20,188 candidates for sub-county positions in 1,403 sub-counties.

The dependent variables measure several components of women's participation and electoral success in sub-county elections. First, *Female Candidates* is a count of the number of female candidates running in the sub-county. Second, *Female Winners* is a count of the number of winners of elections for sub-county positions that were female. Finally, *Percent Female Winners* measures the percentage of total elected candidates that were female. These three dependent variables will explore both whether women are more likely to enter races as candidates and whether they are more likely to successfully win those races.

The independent variables remain the same as they were in the previous analysis. *Total Events* is a count of the number of violent events that occurred in the sub-county according to the GED data set and *Total Aid* is the amount of multilateral and bilateral aid distributed in the sub-county. Additionally, several control variables were added for other factors that may influence women's participation in elections.

First, *Working Percent* is the proportion of the population that currently is employed, which proxies for the level of economic stability and prosperity in the sub-county. Second, *Electricity Percent* is the proportion of households that have electricity in their homes. In Uganda, electric power is relatively rare; around 27% of the population has electricity according to the World Bank. At the sub-county level, electricity proxies for the level of development, urbanization, and wealth in the sub-county. In other words, sub-counties with more electricity may be more developed and thus, may have increased female participation in elections. Further, *Total Population* and *Population Sex Ratio* measure the number of individuals living within the sub-county and the sex ratio of the population to account for the availability of individuals who could run as candidates and voters. Data for all of these controls comes from the The National Population and Housing Census held in Uganda in 2014. Moreover, controls for the region, North, East, and West (with Central excluded) are included to account for similarities among sub-counties based on their climate, histories, and ethnic make-up no otherwise captured by the controls.

In addition, several other controls for the current and previous political status of the sub-county are included. First, *Female Position* is a dichotomous indicator of the percentage of candidates in the sub-county that were running for a female-specific position, such as "Women's Directly Elected Councillor." Obviously, one should expect that female-specific positions should have an increased number of female candidates and a winning female candidate. Next, *Female Candidates* and *Total Candidates* are counts of the number of female candidates and total candidates running the sub-

county, respectively.[28] Further, *NRM Representative* indicates the number of previous winning candidates in the previous 2011 election that were members of the National Resistance Party, the party of incumbent President Museveni. Further, *Divided District* measures the extent to which the district in which the sub-county is situated is divided between political parties. One may expect that candidate selection and voting patterns differ in "safe" districts in which one party dominates than in more competitive districts. Finally, *Female MPs* is the percentage of members of parliament from the sub-county's district that are female (based on the 2011 election) to account for the sub-county's previous willingness to elect female candidates.

To facilitate interpretation and allow for the inclusion of fixed effects, all three models presented below use OLS regression. The results can be seen in Table 5.7. As can be seen, while conflict and aid do not have significant effects on the number of women who run as candidates in sub-county elections (Model 6), they do significantly increase the probability that those female candidates who do run, will win the election (Models 6 and 7). Model 6 demonstrates that although sub-counties that experience conflict, but not aid have less female winners of sub-county elections, sub-counties that experienced both conflict and received international aid have significantly more female winners. Whereas sub-counties that experienced conflict, but did not receive international aid elect an average of 2.18 women, this increases to 2.36 women on average in sub-counties exposed to both international aid and conflict. While this is a relatively moderate increase in overall size, the average number of women elected

[28] *Female Candidates* is not included on the right hand side in Model 1, which examines the effects of conflict and aid on the number of female candidates running in the election.

Table 5.7: Sub-county Election Outcomes OLS Results

	Dependent variable:		
	Female Candidates	Female Winners	Percent Female Winners
	(6)	(7)	(8)
Total Events	−0.0001	−0.001***	−0.0000
	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0000)
Total Aid	−0.001	0.002	−0.0005
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0003)
Working Percent	−0.0003	−0.005**	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0003)
Electricity Percent	0.26***	−0.91***	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.17)	(0.02)
Total Population	0.0000	−0.0000***	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Population Sex Ratio	0.0003	−0.001	0.0000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0003)
Female Position	0.98***	0.16***	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.01)
Female Candidates		0.20***	0.05***
		(0.06)	(0.01)
Total Candidates	0.02***	−0.003	−0.02***
	(0.004)	(0.01)	(0.001)
NRM Representative	−0.001	0.02***	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Divided District	−0.001	−0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.0004)
Female MPS	−0.0002	0.02**	−0.0005
	(0.003)	(0.01)	(0.001)
Eastern	0.02	−0.29***	0.03***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.01)
Northern	0.01	−0.14**	0.02**
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.01)
Western	0.004	−0.01	−0.002
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.01)
Total Events*Total Aid	0.00001	0.00004**	0.00001**
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Constant	−0.12	1.97***	0.39***
	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.03)
Observations	1,341	1,341	1,341
R^2	0.97	0.51	0.38
Adjusted R^2	0.97	0.50	0.37
Residual Std. Error	0.30 (df = 1325)	0.61 (df = 1324)	0.08 (df = 1324)
F Statistic	2,835.68*** (df = 15; 1325)	85.29*** (df = 16; 1324)	50.16*** (df = 16; 1324)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

in a sub-county is 3.7 and therefore, this represents a 5% increase in the number of women elected. Similarly, Model 7 demonstrates sub-counties that have been exposed to high levels of both aid and conflict elect a greater percentage of female-to-male candidates. Substantively, the number of women elected increases about 1.5 percentage points from 40.5% of elected officials to 42% in sub-counties that receive aid as conflict events increase. Once again, this is a relatively small substantive effect. However, women's legislative representation is extremely slow changing. For example, in the past 5 years, women's legislative representation globally has only increased 1.45 percentage points and has only increased 5.3 percentage points within the last 10 years. Therefore, even a moderate change of 1.5 percentage points is a relatively large change when compared to women's representation within Uganda and worldwide. The results remain robust when a control is included for the number of female voters in the 2016 elections in each sub-county.

5.6 Conclusion

Uganda experienced decades of insurgencies that deeply impacted gender equality. From the Ugandan Bush War of the 1980s to the current LRA insurgencies, Ugandan rebel and state fighters have used gender dynamics, female fighters, and sexual violence both strategically and non-strategically. Additionally, civilian women have been displaced and suffered famines, economic recessions, and disrupted family lives, which altered gender roles. Finally, women also mobilized politically and socially within Uganda to form peace movements and advocate for greater political partic-

ipation. The adoption of several women's rights laws and the election of women to parliament in unusually large numbers, largely inspired the "opportunity structures" theory of post-war women's rights. However, gender equality still is lacking in Uganda, especially among average or marginalized men and women. Thus, the argument that women's rights worsen after conflict is not nullified by the Ugandan example and in fact, there is evidence that women's rights suffered in the destruction and famine in Northern Uganda.

This chapter builds upon the findings of the previous chapter and previous work on the intersection between conflict and women's rights by examining how sub-national variation in individual exposure to violent events and international aid affects women's rights. Additionally, it is the first work within the quantitative "opportunity structures" literature to consider how conflict's impact on men and women differs and how this may partially explain the tensions between the opportunity structure and militarized masculinity literatures. By examining how micro-level exposure to violent events and international aid projects influences individual behaviors and attitudes surrounding women's rights and political engagement, such as when wife beating is justified, media consumption, and financial control, this analysis clarifies how international actors gain greater influence in areas affected by conflict. The results demonstrate that conflict led to a significant decrease in gender equitable behavior and values across Uganda. However, international aid can mitigate the negative influence of conflict on women to improve gender equitable values held by women. Further, the results demonstrate that men do not experience parallel increases in women' rights attitudes.

While not examined here, future analyses may examine how conflict has other

heterogeneous impacts based on demographic characteristics. For example, Beath, Christia and Enikolopov (2013) found that age, wealth, and ethnicity may impact the effects of aid on women's rights. In particular, women who are already privileged may be most likely to find conflict to be empowering compared to marginalized women. However, elite women may also resist widespread social and cultural change if they perceive changing societal conditions to be a threat to their elevated status.

The different impacts of conflict and aid on men and women may explain why conflict does not translate into the adoption of women's rights laws despite improving women rights "on the ground." If men, who often hold political power, do not alter their views on gender equality after conflict in response to international presence, even if women do become more equitable, it is unlikely that men will choose to altruistically adopt women's rights laws.

Chapter 6

Sisters in Arms: Gendered Security Sector Reform

The two previous chapters have demonstrated a connection between conflict, international pressure, and women's rights at the individual level. They have demonstrated that although conflict can harm women's rights and gender equality at times, international actors can help promote women's rights when they have a large degree of influence in a post-conflict state. This chapter extends the theoretical and empirical analysis proposed in the previous two chapters by exploring how conflict alters a state's political willingness and ability specifically to adopt one particular type of gender reform: security sector gender reforms.

While there are many types of gender reform, the security sector represents an unusually important institution for gender reform given its potential impact on societal norms and behavior, the state's reliance on it for safety and protection from internal and external threats, and the inherent danger the security sector itself can pose to the

civilian government. Additionally, the security sector is of particular interest both theoretically and for policy as a test of the relationship between conflict, international actors, and women's rights. On one hand, the effects of militarized masculinity that decrease gender equality should be the strongest within the security sector as the epicenter of the hypermasculine norms developed in preparation for, during, and after conflict to ensure an ample supply of willing soldiers (Goldstein 2003, Whitworth 2005). On the other hand, since 2000 and the adoption of UNSCR 1325, which explicitly called for increased women's participation in security, international actors have increasingly focused on gendered security sector reform in conflict-affected states as a tactic to prevent conflict recurrence (Hudson 2009). Further, increased mobilization needs during conflict may give women a unique opportunity to enter the security sector. Given that the security sector is often viewed as a source for social experimentation where new policies and norms can be tested before being implemented more broadly in society and that the provision of security as a public service is often viewed as a prerequisite to full citizenship and the rights that accompany it, gender reform in the security sector is an important source of social change.

Gendered security sector reform incurs costs both in terms of the resources needed to implement the reforms and in the form of social and institutional backlash which may occur if the masculine culture associated with security and by extension broader gender norms are threatened. However, it also has many benefits that satisfy the desires of both the government and the security sector, including increased effectiveness, national security, legitimacy, and accountability. Thus, gendered security sector reform will be adopted when the benefits to the security sector outweigh the costs.

Conflict may offer two conditions under which the benefits of gendered security sector reform outweigh the costs. First, during and after conflict there may be increased mobilization of the population into the security sector. During conflict, manpower demands are high as the size of the security sector swells to meet the wartime demand. After conflict, although the security sector may shrink somewhat, high levels of personnel recruitment and a desire to rebuild the legitimacy of the security sector may also increase mobilization demands of specifically new recruits. Thus, conflict-affected states may have increased personnel needs in the security sector, leading to an increased likelihood of adopting gendered security sector reform to attract and adapt to the increased recruitment of women.

Second, as argued in Chapter 3, conflict often increases a state's dependence upon the international community for aid, support, and resources. Since the international community has prioritized gendered security sector reform since 2000, international actors commonly offer resources, funding, and expertise that offset the logistical costs of gendered security sector reform. Additionally, international actors may provide political cover to prevent social backlash on security institutions and the government for gendered security sector reform. Therefore, due to increased personnel needs, conflict-affected states should be more likely to adopt gendered security sector reform and this effect should be magnified in states with a high degree of dependence on international actors.

Using a unique data set on security sector gender reform between 1988 and 2016 in all non-OECD countries, the results demonstrate that conflict and post-conflict states are significantly more likely to adopt gender balancing and gender mainstreaming re-

forms in the security sector than non-conflict states. Additionally, within conflict states, those that were exposed to international influence in the form of UN multidimensional peacekeeping, World Bank aid, and pressure from culturally similar states were significantly more likely to adopt gendered security sector reform. However, there is variation in the results depending on the type of reform examined. Gender balancing reforms – or those that seek to increase women's physical representation in the police and military relative to men – were less likely to be influenced by international pressure than gender mainstreaming reforms – or those that seek to increase the gender equality of the police or military. This may indicate that gender balancing reforms are primarily driven by personnel needs and not by international pressure in favor of gender equality. In contrast, gender mainstreaming reforms, such as sexual harassment policies within the police and military, the creation of a gender advisor, or domestic violence training for police, are influenced by international actors. Therefore, these findings provide further support for the conclusion of the two previous chapters: although the dual impact of international actors and conflict can improve women's rights to some extent, the scope of these changes is limited by other logistic, strategic, or normative concerns.

6.1 Gender Reform in the Security Sector

Although women have long participated in security, security sectors remain highly masculinized, both in the composition of security personnel and the values held by the institution (Sjoberg 2007). Security is often portrayed as a masculine duty - men

are supposed to protect their families and communities, while women are portrayed as the benefactors of security based on gendered stereotypes that women are weak, innocent, or nonviolent (Sjoberg 2018). In this study, security sector institutions consist of organizations that have the authority to use force to protect individuals and the state, such as the armed forces, police forces, federal agents, border and immigration agents, and intelligence services. The "security sector" refers to the state's security apparatus, including the civil and military personnel that work in these institutions (Jacob 2009, Meharg 2010).

Highly masculinized security sectors have been increasingly criticized. Scholars connect militarized masculinity with increased interstate and intrastate violence (Enloe 1989, 2000, Goldstein 2003, Higate and Henry 2004, 2009, Karim and Beardsley 2017, Sjoberg and Via 2010). In other words, masculinzed and patriarchal security sectors may be more likely to engage in aggressive and violent behavior (Whitworth 2005). Further, masculinized security institutions may be more likely to commit human rights abuses, such as sexual violence (Cohen and Nordås 2014, Karim and Beardsley 2013, 2016, Nordås and Rustad 2013). Finally, women may conceptualize security differently than men and have differing security needs (Tickner 1988, 1992, 2005). As a result, security sectors that are predominantly male may provide non-comprehensive security due a limited perspective of and experience with security.

While there are many types of security sector gender reforms, this study categorizes them into two main types. Gender mainstreaming reforms in the security sector seek to promote gender equality by increasing women's representation, decision-making power, and influence. In other words, gender mainstreaming seeks to break

down the masculinized values, hierarchies, and composition of security sectors to create a new institutional culture in which both male and female values, perspectives, bodies, and voices are valued equally.[1] Examples of gender mainstreaming efforts in security sector reform include the recruitment of women, the appointment of women into decision-making roles, the establishment of sexual harassment and gender equality policies, the creation of gender equality offices or units, the building of facilities and equipment for women, the establishment of special units to address gendered security issues, such as sexual and gender based violence (SGBV), the hosting of gender sensitization training, and the creation of a National Action Plan (NAP) to implement UNSCR 1325.

One specific type of gender mainstreaming reform is gender balancing which specifically seeks to increase women's physical representation within a security institution relative to men's representation. Gender balancing reforms are the most common type of gender reform undertaken by states and include actions such as recruitment drives that specifically target women, gender quotas that establish a minimum number or proportion of women that must be in the institution, the creation of gendered units or offices, such as SGBV units or all-female units, the removal of bans of women from certain positions, the promotion of women to high-ranking offices, and the creation of a NAP for 1325. As will be noticed, these reforms are also considered to be gender mainstreaming reforms. Gender balancing is one component of gender mainstreaming, but is not sufficient to complete gender mainstreaming because women's

[1]Gender mainstreaming, according to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), is "The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels" (A/52/3/Rev.1 1997).

presence alone within a security institution does not guarantee increased gender equality (Karim and Beardsley 2017).[2] Therefore, gender balancing must take place with other reforms to change the institutional culture in addition to the composition of security personnel.

Largely, calls for gender reform in the security sector argue that gender reform improves the effectiveness of the security sector and promotes national security (Egnell 2014). These claims argue that gender mainstreaming brings a broader range of experiences, skills, and perspectives to the security sector, which improves its ability to provide security and respond to potential threats. For example, female officers can perform gender sensitive duties, such as female body searches, house searches, and working with female prisoners, suspects, or victims. Moreover, gender reforms may increase the sector's perceived legitimacy as women are perceived to be less corrupt, less threatening, and more empathetic than men (Baaz and Utas 2012, Dollar, Fisman and Gatti 2001, Hendricks 2012, Karim 2017*b*, Karim and Beardsley 2013, Rabe-Hemp and Schuck 2007). Also, gendered security sector reform may improve responses to sexual violence through increased female representation, the creation of SGBV units, and the prioritization of domestic violence as a serious security concern (Anderlini 2007, Dharmapuri 2011). Finally, gender reform promotes women's right to participate in security and encourages women's empowerment (Olsson and Gizelis 2013, 2015).[3]

[2]In other words, a gender balancing reform is an example of gender mainstreaming, but not all gender mainstreaming reforms are specifically gender balancing as some gender mainstreaming reforms, such as the development of sexual harassment policies or the development of training sessions on sexual violence, seek to alter gendered relations within the institution, but do not directly attempt to increase women's representation.

[3]Please note that this dissertation does not necessarily argue that women's integration into the

There is some empirical evidence supporting the auspicious claims of gender mainstreaming advocates. For example, Cordell (2010) and Kember (2007) argue that the presence of an all-female peacekeeping unit in Liberia inspired local women to join the police force, engaged the local community more effectively, and contributed to an anecdotal decrease in local crime. Further, Karim (2017*b*) finds that gender balancing increases the perceived legitimacy of the security sector among the population. Karamé (2001) and Bridges and Horsfall (2009) find that female peacekeepers and soldiers are better able to relate to local female populations. Similarly, Female Engagement Teams (FETs) with the U.S. army have been credited with decreasing local hostility towards U.S. forces and increasing operational effectiveness (Holliday 2012). Moreover, female peacekeepers may decrease the incidence of rape and prostitution among UN peacekeepers (Dharmapuri 2011).

However, gender mainstreaming is also critiqued. Security institutions often have deeply entrenched and purposefully cultivated masculinized cultures and norms. Therefore, some scholars doubt the effectiveness of gender mainstreaming reforms. For example, Dharmapuri (2011) argues that small token gestures of gender reform are unlikely to have any effect on the institution's larger gendered behavior because women recruited into the security sector are likely to adapt to the masculinized culture. In this perspective, Jennings (2011) found that female peacekeepers are no more likely to report their colleagues' inappropriate behavior than male peacekeepers. Further, Karim and Beardsley (2017) found that despite the UN's rhetorical commitment

security sector contributes to women's rights in other sectors. Many feminists argue that women's integration into security does little benefit to women since it only includes them into another patriarchal hierarchy (Anderlini 2007, Dharmapuri 2011, Sjoberg 2007).



Figure 6.1: Number of Gender Balancing Reforms Adopted Between 1988 and 2016

to gendered security sector reform, a culture of patriarchal protection exits and female peacekeepers are often deployed to safer missions. However, despite a lack of consistent, empirical evidence of the positive effects of gendered security sector reforms as of yet, international actors continue to promote their adoption, especially in post-conflict states.

Since 2001, gender reform in security institutions has been declared as a main priority by several IGOs, such as the UN, NATO, the AU, the EU, and the OECD. However, a wide range of compliance with this emerging norm exists (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2. Please note that countries in white are not in the data set). For example, women's representation in police forces ranges from 1% to 54% and their participation in the military ranges from 0.5% to 26%.[4] Further, only 79 states have adopted NAPs for UNSCR 1325. Finally, only 40% of states have publicly recorded security sector gender recruitment targets or quotas to increase women's representation. Therefore, the question remains as to why do states adopt gender mainstreaming and gender balancing reforms in the security sector and why are some states more likely to adopt these reforms than others?

6.2 Conflict and Gendered Security Sector Reform

Conflict and international aid may promote women's increased participation in, protection by, and support in a number of agencies and departments. While the "opportunity structures" literature has focused on women's political, economic, and social

[4]Data based on 2016 figures from the author's data.



Figure 6.2: Number of Gender Mainstreaming Reforms Adopted Between 1988 and 2016

rights, conflict may have a particularly strong influence on women's participation in security. This section extends the theory presented in the previous chapters to focus gendered security sector reform as a type of women's rights reform that is most directly tied to the WPS agenda and thus, is a particularly strong and important test of the theory.

On one hand, the effects of militarized masculinity that lead to worsened gender equality should be the strongest within the security sector as the epicenter of the hypermasculine norms developed during conflict (Goldstein 2003). Additionally, conflict often worsens public perceptions of the security sector, especially as security sectors are the most common perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence during the conflict (Cohen 2013, Cohen and Nordås 2014). On the other hand, since 2000 and the adoption of UNSCR 1325, which explicitly called for increased women's participation in security, international actors have emphasized gendered security sector reform in conflict-affected states as a tactic to prevent conflict recurrence.

6.2.1 International Pressure for Gendered Security Sector Reform

Between 2015 and 2018, the United States spent $160 million in Afghanistan alone to support women's participation in the police and military (Jones 2018). Further, in June 2018, the US launched a $120 million project to create a "Women's Police Town" to house 300 Afghan national policewomen and their families. Similar aid targeted at gendered security sector reform in Afghanistan has been disbursed by NATO, the

UN, Japan, and Oxfam, among others. While no consistent, reliable statistics exist on the amount of international money spent to increase women's participation in police and military forces in Afghanistan over the past decade, these two examples demonstrate that international actors are offering material support to bolster women's participation in the security sector.

Why would international actors incentivize and support women's participation in foreign police and military forces? Beyond moral or liberal arguments in favor of gender equality, international actors often invoke claims that women's participation in police and military forces is a matter of national and international security. The font of international concern for women's rights after conflict, UNSCR 1325, focused specifically on women's right to participate in peace and security roles and processes. While the language of UNSCR 1325 is broad and encourages women's participation "at all decision-making levels" that may influence conflict resolution and peace, which may include civil society, economic actors, and politicians, members of the security sector are overwhelmingly responsible for conflict, security, and peace. Thus, the UN and many Member States have focused their implementation efforts of UNSCR 1325 on expanding women's representation in, protection by, and access to security sector institutions. For example, National Action Plans (NAPs) on Women, Peace, and Security, which are national-level policies or laws focused on implementing UNSCR 1325, often exclusively focus on women's participation in police, military, and peacekeeping roles. For example, the US Women, Peace, and Security Act adopted in October of 2017 explicitly recognizes that promoting women's participation in conflict, security, and peace processes is in the best interests of U.S. security:

> "This bill expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) the United States should be a global leader in promoting the participation of women in conflict prevention, management, and resolution and post-conflict relief and recovery efforts; ...[this] is critical to country and regional stability."

As explained above, there are a number of reasons why women's participation in security roles may prevent conflict recurrence and contribute to peace. For example, female police are often recruited specifically to search, interrogate, and detain female terrorists. In societies that have traditional gender norms or gender segregation, female police and military officers may increase cooperation with and information gathering from female community members.[5] However, even in countries with less stringent gender norms, female participation in the police and military may improve civilian and community relations, increase efficiency and effectiveness, and increase the legitimacy of security forces (Wood N.d.).

By evoking security rhetoric to support gendered security sector reform, UNSCR 1325 and its subsequent resolutions pushed gender and security toward the top of the international agenda (Hudson 2009). While feminist scholars have critiqued the instrumental and often essentialist logic underpinning the securitization of women's rights, it has proven to be a very effective tactic to increase international pressure for gender reform in the security sector, especially in post-conflict states which are seen as the greatest threat to national, regional, and international security. For example, Huber and Karim (2018) find that peacekeeping missions increase the likelihood that

[5]For example, Female Engagement Teams (FETs) were deployed with US and NATO forces in Afghanistan as it was believed that female community members in Afghanistan would prefer to or only ccooperate with female soldiers.

a post-conflict state will adopt a security sector gender balancing reform.[6] This international influence likely increases as more resources are brought to the country, which can be used to implement state-desired gendered security sector programs or pressure an unwilling government to adopt these programs. Therefore, although international actors may promote women's rights more broadly in post-conflict countries, gendered security sector reforms present both a normative and security concern for international actors, giving them increased incentive to promote gendered security sector reforms in conflict-affected states.

6.2.2 Domestic Pressure for Gendered Security Sector Reform

Furthermore, in addition to international pressure, conflict may also lead to gendered changes in the security sector as a result of increased mobilization of the population into the security sector and its related institutions. The most prominent mobilization needs are calls for direct participation in the security sector. As mobilization demands begin to outstrip the availability of willing or able men, the government may feel pressured to turn to women to bolster security personnel (Goldstein 2003). For example, after the U.S. army became a volunteer force, the U.S. increasingly turned to female recruits during conflicts, such as the Gulf War (1991) or Iraq War (2003) (Aponte et al. 2011). Similarly, during the Korean War, the U.S. Defense Department established the Defense Advisory Committee of Women in the Services to target women

[6] Huber and Karim (2018) examine the effect of UN peacekeeping missions on the adoption of security sector gender balancing reforms in *post-conflict* states. This study expands on that research by examining security sector gender balancing *and* mainstreaming in conflict *and* non-conflict states.

for recruitment (Bellafaire 2006). Further, Thomas and Bond (2015*b*) examine how competition for recruits between insurgent organizations and mobilization needs in Eritrea led to the recruitment of women, despite some ideological reluctance. In addition to mobilization directly into the military, there may also be mobilization needs for war-related activities, such as weapons-making and medical care. For example, during World War II, women were famously employed in war-related industries to support the war effort as more men were pulled away from industries to fight in the conflict (Goldstein 2003). Therefore, as a conflict rages, especially long or intense conflicts, mobilization needs increase, heightening the probability that the security sector will turn to women to fill its ranks. This effect is likely to be particularly strong during active conflict, although it may also be present after conflict, especially if men who previously participated in the security sector either do not wish to continue after the conflict or may be barred from participating in it again.[7]

Further, the experience of conflict may also challenge traditional gender roles that bar or dissuade women from joining the security sector. Gender roles are most directly challenged by women's participating in the conflict as combatants. Women's direct participation in violent conflict shatters ideals of feminine innocence, weakness, and nonviolence and demonstrates women's agency in security roles (Karim and Beardsley 2016, Sjoberg 2007). Therefore, female combatants' experiences may break down stereotypical gender norms that women are not suitable for the security sector.[8]

[7]For example, if a military is accused of committing atrocities during conflict, many security sector reform programs prevent military members from joining a newly constructed military.

[8]For example, Karim (2017*b*) found that after the Liberian civil war, Liberians were more comfortable around and evaluated the competency of Liberian female police officers higher than foreign female peacekeepers potentially because they had directly witnessed Liberian women's strength and abilities as security agents during the conflict.

Moreover, although conflict may challenge gender roles to empower women in some aspects of life, it also creates an environment that is particularly insecure for women. This insecurity is most predominantly expressed through increased threat of SGBV (Cohen and Nordås 2014, Karim 2017*a*, Karim and Beardsley 2016, Manjoo and McRaith 2011, Nordås and Rustad 2013). The security sector may feel obligated to address women's unique insecurity by undertaking gender reforms. Finally, during and after conflict, the population may distrust the security sector for its participation in the conflict, especially if it is accused of abusing civilians. The security sector may undertake gender reforms in the hope of leveraging gendered stereotypes that women are less corrupt, less violent, and less militant to decrease its perceived hypermasculinity and distance itself from previous behavior (Karim 2017*b*).

6.2.3 The Strategic Adoption of Gendered Security Sector Reform

While the proposed benefits of gendered security sector reform are numerous and there may be high internal and external demand, the process of adopting and implementing gendered security sector reform is costly and multidimensional, requiring the approval and cooperation of a number of civilian and security actors who may disagree on the inherent value and costs of the reform. At its most general, the goal of security sector reform is to increase national security. However, security sector reform also often seeks to promote a security sector that is accountable to the civilian government and population, transparent, bound by rule of law, inclusive, sensitive to the differing

needs of members of the population, effective, and efficient.[9] In other words, the goal of security sector reform is to maximize national security at the lowest direct cost to the government, while also increasing the legitimacy of the government's monopoly over the use of force and ensuring continued loyalty of the security sector to the government. The security sector also wishes to maximize its effectiveness, while increasing its perceived legitimacy, influence, and supply of resources (Feaver 2009).

However, the extent to which gendered security sector reforms will support these goals may be disputed. As described above, advocates argue that gendered security sector reform has certain benefits, including increasing the supply of potential recruits to fulfill mobilization needs, increasing the perceived legitimacy of the security forces, increasing the inclusively of the security forces, increasing the skill set and experiences of security officers, and increasing civilian cooperation. Thus, gendered security sector reform can contribute to the main goals of security sector reform and interests of both the government and the security sector agencies: increased effectiveness, improved national security and increased legitimacy.

However, gendered security sector reforms also incur high costs, including some costs that are higher than experienced with traditional non-gendered security sector reforms. These reforms may include the logistical costs of altering existing training and policies and having to invest greater resources in gender sensitive or gender integrated programming, such as building female barracks, bathrooms, uniforms, or training facilities. Additionally, there may be social resistance to gendered security

[9]For example, see OSCE (2016). However, it should be noted that some countries may undertake security sector reforms simply to increase the power of the security sector or the government, rather than to make the security sector more legitimate, transparent, and accountable.

sector reform, which can lead to decreased public support and cooperation. Finally, some individuals argue that gendered security sector reform, and often specifically the integration of women into security roles, decreases the effectiveness of security forces (Zeigler and Gunderson 2005). These arguments most commonly claim that female security agents may disrupt unit cohesion and may be less physically capable of performing in security roles.

While there are many factors and circumstances that may affect the benefits and costs of gendered security sector reforms, two predominant influences are mobilization needs during conflict and international intervention and pressure. First, as described above, when mobilization needs increase, especially when they increase rapidly, this may dramatically increase the benefits of gendered security sector reform. When manpower demands increase, the government and security sector may suddenly face a dwindling set of potential recruits. Thus, they often face a trade-off between turning to recruit less qualified or less committed men or expanding their recruiting efforts to women who may be highly qualified, but previously excluded. During times of massive mobilization, such as during the World Wars, countries may both increase their recruitment of men, such as instituting a compulsory universal draft of men, and recruiting more women. Therefore, when there is high mobilization into the security sector, either due to security threats, such as a looming or current war, or due to a large restructuring process of the security sector, the benefit of gendered security sector reform – enabling mass recruitment of women into the security sector to fill the necessary recruitment gaps – may supersede the costs associated with the resources required to recruit, train, house, and retain female officers.

Particularly during conflict, the security sector expands rapidly, often outstripping the supply of available men, causing the government to turn to women. In contrast, after conflict, the size of the security sector may decrease, reducing the need to turn to women to fill these posts.[10] Therefore, while gender balancing should overall be more likely to occur in both conflict and post-conflict states, it should be especially likely to occur in active conflict states.[11] However, even in post-conflict states, the ranks of the security sector may quickly and dramatically decrease as individuals are demobilized and the security sector may hope to distance itself from its participation in the conflict by recruiting a new and reformed force, which may lead to gender balancing efforts. Thus, states that are experiencing or have recently experienced conflict should be more likely to adopt gendered security sector reforms to fulfill increased or changing mobilization needs. While this mobilization effect is likely the strongest with gender balancing reforms, it should also affect gender mainstreaming reforms to ensure that women can be recruited, retained, and successful within the security sector.

Hypothesis 1: *Conflict affected states should be more likely to adopt security sector gender balancing reforms than non-conflict affected states.*

Hypothesis 2: *Conflict affected states should be more likely to adopt security sector gender mainstreaming reforms than non-conflict affected states.*

[10] This may only occur if the government is willing to retain the same troops it used during conflict.

[11] The patterns of gender balancing during conflict illustrate that the adoption of gender balancing reforms does not necessarily signify that the security sector is becoming more gender equitable. This chapter remains relatively agnostic about the implications of which causal pathway leads to policy adoption. In other words, it is possible that in conflict states, gender reforms in the security sector may be undertaken with little to no intention of undermining the current patriarchal culture (and in fact, may reinforce this culture) and instead are simply responses to mobilization needs.

Further, if mobilization drives the adoption of gendered security sector reform, states should be more likely to adopt them after high intensity conflicts where there were more than 1,000 battle deaths compared to low intensity conflicts with between 25 and 999 battle deaths. In other words, if gendered security sector reform occurs partially in response to the need to fill the ranks of the security sector, the security sector either must be growing in size rapidly or when there are high casualty rates, both of which are more likely during high intensity conflicts.

Hypothesis 1b: *States experiencing high intensity conflicts should be more likely to adopt security sector gender balancing reforms.*

Hypothesis 2b: *States experiencing high intensity conflicts should be more likely to adopt security sector gender balancing reforms.*

Second, conflict-affected states with high levels of international involvement should be especially likely to adopt gendered security sector reforms as they have both internal pressure and mobilization needs and the international material incentives to adopt them given the prioritization of these reforms by the international community. As discussed, gendered security sector reforms incur costs on the state and the individual security institution in the form of resources that must be devoted to implementing the reforms and in terms of concerns of potential backlash. Security is commonly viewed as a highly masculine activity and thus, gendered security sector reform may be viewed not only as inappropriate socially for encouraging women to engage in a non-feminine activity, but may also be viewed by some as antithetical to the effective operation of a strong, capable, and cohesive security force. For example, Zeigler and Gunderson (2005) describe how arguments against women's integration into the

military have evolved from originally focusing on the inappropriateness of women's participation in security as a violation of gender roles to women's perceived inadequacy as soldiers to the current focus on the disruption of "unit cohesion." Thus, the government and security sector must be prepared to endure costs in the form of backlash that may include decreased support for politicians that favor gendered security sector reform, decreased male interest in joining the security institution, hazing and discrimination against women in security roles, and at an extreme, disobedience and mutiny from individuals within the security institution that resist gender reform.

International actors can offset both of these costs, while further emphasizing the benefits of gendered security sector reform. With regards to the latter, international actors may share information about the benefits of gendered security sector reform with the government and security sector and may also share best techniques to facilitate these reforms.[12] Therefore, the benefits of gendered security sector reform as a method to improve national security, the effectiveness of the security sector, and its legitimacy may become more clear. Further, international actors may offset the costs of gendered security sector reform. First, they may offer to assist with the direct costs of drafting and implementing the reform. For example, in 2007, the United Nations developed, sponsored, and facilitated the creation of a specialized education program for female police officers in Liberia that helped dramatically boost female representation in the Liberian National Police to almost 20% from 2% in the span of around five years (Karim 2017*b*). Similarly, in 2017 the Canadian government announced that it

[12]For example, several international agencies, such as the UN, NATO, and the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) have released guides with "best practices" and advice to undertake gendered security sector reform.

was creating a fund specifically to support gendered security sector reforms in other countries with the goal of increasing the number of female peacekeepers. Further, the presence of international actors may offer political cover to the government and the security sector to shift responsibility for the reforms to the international actors in the hopes of decreasing some of the backlash directly faced by the institution (Huber and Karim 2018).

Therefore, although the mobilization demands and domestic sources of pressure for gendered security sector should make conflict affected states more likely to adopt them, this effect will be magnified in states where there is a high level of international influence and increased dependence upon international partners to support the government and the security sector because these actors can offset the high costs of gendered security sector reform, while also highlighting the benefits of them.

Hypothesis 3: *As dependence upon international actors increases, conflict affected states should be more likely to adopt security sector gender balancing reforms than conflict affected states without international influence.*

Hypothesis 4: *As dependence upon international actors increases, conflict affected states should be more likely to adopt security sector gender mainstreaming reforms than conflict affected states without international influence.*

6.3 Research Design

To test these hypotheses, this analysis uses a unique cross-national data set on security sector gender reform in non-OECD states between 1988 and 2016.[13]

6.3.1 Dependent and Independent Variables

The main dependent variables are *Gender Balance* and *Gender Mainstream*. *Gender Balance* is a dichotomous indicator of whether a gender balancing reform was adopted by the security sector in the state-year. Gender balancing reforms were defined as the adoption of a recruitment target or quota for female personnel, the hosting of a female-focused recruitment campaign, the creation of an office or unit with gendered implications, the removal of barriers to women's participation in certain security roles, the promotion of women to a high-ranking security position for the first time, the establishment of associations for female security personnel, and the creation of a National Action Plan (NAP) for UNSCR 1325.[14]

This indicator varies from year to year, recording a positive instance of gender balancing only if a gender balancing reform was adopted *in that year*. In other words, a state may adopt a gender balancing reform in one year, but not the next year. This distinguishes the adoption of these reforms from the simple existence of them. States may adopt a gender balancing reform that will be implemented for many years.

[13]OECD countries were excluded as these countries often have a relatively higher level of gender equality within their security forces.

[14]Reforms were largely recorded based on newspaper articles or country gender mainstreaming guides or performance reviews, such as those country reports published by the UN or NGOs. This variable expands on the same variable in the Karim, Wagstaff and Huber (n.d.) data set, extending it to non-conflict countries, standardizing the yearly range, and altering some coding rules.

However, the adoption of the gender balancing reform would only be recorded in the year it was adopted, rather than its tenure of existence.[15] The use of a dichotomous indicator allows for an examination of whether the experience of conflict has *any* effect on security sector gender reform, rather than the magnitude of the effect.[16] Gender balancing reforms were relatively rare in the sample, occurring in 16.1% of state-years.

The second dependent variable, *Gender Mainstream* is also a dichotomous variable indicating that the state adopted a gender mainstreaming policy in the security sector in the year. A positive instance of gender mainstreaming was defined as any government led or approved reform or program to increase gender equality within the security sector, increase security forces' awareness of, sensitization to, and response to gendered issues, or create a welcoming environment for all genders in the security sector either as personnel or as recipients of security.[17] All reforms included within the *Gender Balance* variable are also included within this variable, in addition to other reforms, such as gender sensitization trainings, SGBV training, sexual harassment policies or gender equality policies, the building of female facilities or equipment, and policies, procedures, or manuals for gendered crimes or violence, such as SGBV, human trafficking, and domestic violence.[18] *Gender Mainstream* also varies from

[15]This coding not only allows for an examination specifically of adoption patterns, but also is more reliable since it is difficult to determine how long most gender policies are in place.

[16]However, an alternative measure of the dependent variable as a count of the number of reforms adopted is used with a negative binomial regression in the appendix to analyze the magnitude of the effect. Further, pending the collection of further data, future studies should examine the overall gender reformed status of the security sector.

[17]This coding excludes programs supported entirely by NGOs without the government's direct support and collaboration. This was done to ensure that the variable only recorded programs that were directly supported by the government, rather than programs that are done independently from or without the active involvement of the government.

[18]The correlation between *Gender Balance* and *Gender Mainstream* is 0.85. The high correlation

state-year and is coded as 1 on the state-year in which a policy is first adopted. As to be expected, *Gender Mainstream* is slightly more common than *Gender Balance* with 21.2% of state-years observing the adoption of a gender mainstreaming reform.[19]

To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, two main sets of independent variables to operationalize conflict. The first is a dichotomous indicator of whether the state-year is "conflict affected." *Conflict Affected* is coded as 1 if the state-year was either experiencing active civil conflict or had experienced active conflict within the last five years (for low intensity conflict) or ten years (for high intensity conflicts).[20] Conflict is defined according to the UCDP/PRIO data set on intrastate conflict as 25 battle deaths in the state-year.[21] This analysis is limited to intrastate conflict since the mechanisms underlying the motivation for conflict affected states to adopt security sector gender reforms are likely to be the strongest in civil conflicts.

Finally, it is important to note that conflict is not randomly assigned across states and certain states are more likely to experience conflict than others. Therefore, common techniques to establish a causal relationship, such as random assignment, experimental manipulation, matching, or difference-in-differences analysis are not feasible options due to issues with data availability, a lack of theoretical justification for the appropriate matching covariates with regards to security sector reform, and con-

is expected given that gender balancing reforms are part of gender mainstreaming reforms and because it is likely that states that adopt gender balancing reforms are also more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms.

[19]It should be noted that instances of gender mainstreaming are likely to be underreported compared to gender balancing. However, there does not appear to be any systematic differences across countries in the degree of underreporting.

[20]Alternative codings of this variable conceptualize post-conflict as five years after the conflict ends or as a permanent state after conflict. These are used as robustness checks.

[21]Alternative codings of this variable with a threshold of 1,000 battle deaths is found in the appendix.

cerns of endogenous relationships between conflict, international intervention, and gendered security sector reform. To address this possible bias, several controls are added to the models to account for alternative mechanisms that may influence both whether conflict occurs and whether gendered security sector reform is adopted, each of which is described in detail below. Moreover, despite the inability to make causal claims, this analysis' ability to identify correlations between gendered security sector reform and conflict represents a major improvement in the empirical study of gender reform in the security sector. As the first study to cross-nationally examine the adoption of gender reform, this analysis demonstrates a robust relationship between a state's conflict status, their level of international intervention, and the adoption of gender reform.[22] While previous qualitative studies have examined the adoption of gendered security sector reform in a relatively small sub-set of studies, cross-national patterns have largely been obscured. Moreover, any induced bias from the potentially endogenous relationship between gender reform and conflict is likely to decrease the reported relationship since patriarchal states and security sectors are more likely to experience conflict and are also more likely to resist the adoption of gender reforms (Caprioli 2000, 2003, 2005, Caprioli and Boyer 2001, Cole 2012, Goldstein 2003, Hudson and Den Boer 2002, Hudson et al. 2013, Melander 2005*a*,*b*). To address concerns of endogeneity, this variable is lagged by one year. About 34% of the state-years are conflict-affected.

[22]To the author's knowledge, only one previous study has quantitatively studied gendered security sector reform. Huber and Karim (2018) examine the adoption of gender balancing reforms in conflict states. The data used in this analysis expands upon this earlier version of the data set to include non-conflict states. This allows this analysis not only to expand the cross-national coverage, but also to compare patterns of adoption across conflict and non-conflict states.

Secondly, *Active Conflict* and *Post-Conflict*, are dummy variables indicating whether the state is experiencing an active conflict with more than 25 battle deaths or not and whether the state has experienced a conflict with more than 25 battle deaths within the last 10 years but is not currently experiencing conflict.[23] These variables are also lagged by one year. Around 19.2% of observations are active conflict state-years and 19.6% are post-conflict years.

Moreover, to test Hypotheses 1b and 2 b, conflict is further subdivided by intensity. According to the UCDP/Prio Data, conflict is defined as high intensity if there were more than 1,000 battle deaths in the state-year and low-intensity if there were between 25 and 999. Post-conflict years are coded according to the highest intensity recorded five years before the end of the conflict.

To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, the data was subset to conflict states in the past five to ten years, five years for lower intensity conflicts and ten years for higher intensity conflicts. The full data set could not be interacted with the international actor variables of interest because the main variable, UN peacekeeping, cannot be present in non-conflict states, and thus there is no comparison category for the interaction term. However, subsetting the data largely replicates the same conditions as interactions. To capture the influence of international actors in conflict-states, several proxies for international presence or pressure are used. First, *Multidimensional Mission* is a dichotomous variable indicating whether there was a UN multidimensional peacekeeping mission deployed to the state in the country-year. Multidimensional

[23] Alternative measures of post-conflict, namely post-conflict as ending five years after a conflict ends or as a permanent state, are included in the robustness checks. Although not included in the main models, controls for various characteristics of the conflict, including the conflict termination and the presence of female combatants are included in the appendix.

peacekeeping missions have more expansive mandates than traditional or observational peacekeeping missions that often include assisting the host state with security sector reform. Additionally, given that it was a UN Security Council Resolution that established the importance of women's participation in security, UN multidimensional peacekeeping missions often explicitly recognize gender in their mandates. Data on peacekeeping missions is gathered from the IPI Peacekeeping Database. 11.3% of conflict-affected-state years had a peacekeeping mission deployed to a post-conflict state.

Second, as in Chapter 4, *Export Context* records the average weighted fertility rate of the state's exporting partners. Export relationships have been shown to have a strong influence over a state's respect for human rights as countries leverage trade relationships to transmit standards to their trade partner (Cao, Greenhill and Prakash 2013, Greenhill 2010*a*, Vogel 1997). Data on exports comes from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics Database. As before, there should be an inverse relationship between the average fertility rate of a state's donors and gender reform adoption. The average Export partner's fertility rate for conflict affected states is around 4.5.[24]

Third, to capture aid dependence, *World Bank Aid* is the lagged and log transformed amount of aid that a country received from the World Bank in the previous year. The World Bank is the primary aid distributor of the UN and thus, likely shares the UN's preference for security sector gender reform. Additionally, World Bank Aid is a broader reflection of the country's need for and dependence on other forms of

[24]This is a relatively high fertility rate compared to the world average in this time period which varied between 3.3 in 1988 and 2.4 in 2016. However, this likely occurs because more stable, prosperous trade partners, that would also be expected to have lower fertility rates, often decrease trade with unstable states, which increases the average fertility rates of a state's remaining trade partners.

foreign aid, such as other sources of multilateral aid and bilateral aid.

Finally, *Cultural Similarity* is the average weighted measure of the fertility rates of a state's culturally proximate states. Security sector reform is a learned process that often occurs through trial and error and information sharing between states as governments learn which reform investments are the most useful, efficient, and effective. Cultural proximity, such as shared language, shared geography, shared colonial history, and shared religion, increase the ease at which information is shared and allows leaders to make more accurate deductions about how successful a reform will be in their context. In other words, the military in Ghana may view a successful security sector in reform in Liberia as a stronger signal that the same reform would be successful in Ghana than if that same reform were adopted and successful in the United States because the military, political, economic, and cultural contexts of those two countries are very different. As with *Export Context*, we should expect *Cultural Similarity* to have a negative correlation with the adoption of gendered security sector reform.

All independent variables are lagged by one year to account for endogeneity.

6.3.2 Control Variables

A number of control variables are included. First, a state's previous international and domestic commitment to women's rights in international law may influence how sensitive they are to international pressure for further gender reforms. Additionally, states that are more integrated into the international community, especially to the

international community that supports women's rights may be more likely to experience both international pressure for security sector gender reform and be less likely to experience conflict (Cingranelli et al. 2019). Therefore, a control is included for the number of years since the state ratified the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as recorded by the UN Treaty Collection Database.[25] CEDAW is the main international treaty on women's right to equal opportunities. Although CEDAW does not have a enforcement mechanism, which has led to relatively unequal compliance, it signifies a state's willingness to identify women's rights as an international norm (Cole 2012). Further, *CEDAW Years* also weakly proxies for the presence of women's rights organizations, which may lobby for security sector gender reform (Simmons 2009).[26]

Next, to account for gender equality within the state, which may indicate the need or pressure for security sector gender reform and has also been shown to affect whether conflict occurs (Caprioli 2000, 2003, 2005, Caprioli and Boyer 2001, Hudson and Den Boer 2002, Hudson et al. 2013, Melander 2005*a*,*b*), *Fertility* is the one-year lagged measure of fertility rates during the country-year as recorded by the World Bank.[27] This variable reflects previous studies, which have used lagged measures of

[25]The number of years since CEDAW was ratified is used instead of a dichotomous indicator of whether CEDAW was ratified at all to gain greater information about the degree of commitment to and compliance with CEDAW by proxying for the degree of CEDAW's internalization within the state.

[26]The results are robust to the inclusion of a control for transnational women's rights organizational presence in the country.

[27]While fertility rates reflect one of many possible indicators of gender equality, it is the best measure for this analysis as other common indicators, such as labor force participation ratios and secondary school ratios may be endogenous to security sector gender mainstreaming since the security sector makes up the labor force and secondary school graduation is often a requirement to join the security sector. As a robustness check, several alternative measures for gender equality are used, including female-to-male secondary school ratios, female legislative representation, and labor force ratios.

fertility rates to proxy for gender equality (Caprioli 2003, 2005, Caprioli and Boyer 2001). The average fertility rate is 3.8.

Further, while gender mainstreaming and gender balancing in security sector reform have been taking place for decades, the passing of UNSCR 1325 represented the first time that gender reform in the security sector was declared to be an international and national obligation. As a result, gender mainstreaming and gender balancing in security sector reform in conflict states should be especially likely after the passing of UNSCR 1325 in 2000. Additionally, international actors should have increased their pressure in favor of the adoption of gender reform after UNSCR 1325. Therefore, *UNSCR 1325* is a dummy variable indicating whether the state-year is after the passing of UNSCR 1325 in 2000.[28] Slightly more than half of the observations, 57%, take place after 2000.

Regime type may also influence a state's likelihood of adopting gender reforms, the degree of sensitivity to international pressure, and risk of experiencing conflict. For example, democracies are likely more willing to adopt security sector gender reforms to conform with international norms and are also more likely to be gender equitable (Bjarnegård and Melander 2011). Moreover, strongly democratic states are less likely to experience internal conflict compared to both transitional democracies and authoritarian states (Hegre 2001). *Democracy* is the one year lagged Polity II score from the Polity IV data set (Marshall et al. 2015). *Democracy* ranges from -10 to 10, with 10 representing a strong democracy. The sample average is 2.2, indicating

[28] 2000 is not included in the dummy variable because UNSCR 1325 was adopted in October, meaning that most states would not have had time to incorporate gender mainstreaming policies in their security sectors by the end of the year.

the average regime is in a transitional, weak democracy.[29]

Moreover, wealthier states are more capable of adopting gender mainstreaming reforms due to increased budgetary resources. Further, wealthy states may also experience increased gender equality, since the two are correlated. Finally, wealthier states are also less prone to conflict due to their increased capabilities and public good provisions that can prevent violent challenges to state power (Fearon 2005, Fearon and Laitin 2003). *GDP per capita* is a measure of the state's gross domestic product per capita. *GDP per capita* is gathered from the World Bank and lagged by one year.

Additionally, Majority Muslims countries have been shown to be reluctant to adopt gender reform (Cole 2012). Moreover, given that international networks often center around cultural homophily, it is likely that Muslim majority states have closer international ties to other Muslim states, which may decrease the likelihood that international actors in Muslim majority countries will encourage the adoption of gendered security sector reform (Maoz 2012, Zhou 2011). *Muslim Majority* is an indicator of whether more than 50% of the state's population was Muslim, according to the World Religion's data set.[30] Slightly more than one third of the sample represents a Muslim majority state.

To account for autocorrelation, *Time Gender Balance* and *Time Gender Mainstream* are count measures of the years since the previous gender balancing or mainstreaming reform was adopted, respectively. Gender mainstreaming and balancing

[29] A state is a democracy when it has a Polity II score of 6 or higher (Marshall et al. 2015).

[30] The World Religion's data set only includes data on the percentage of Muslims within a country in five year intervals. The coding recorded at each interval was continued for the next four years until the next interval. Since this is a dichotomous interval and the percent of the population which practices Islam is unlikely to change rapidly within a four year period, this coding is likely to be accurate.

reforms are likely to be highly interrelated across years. The cubic polynomial approach by Carter and Signorino (2010) captures the hazard rate, including those estimated by parametric duration models, of the state adoption of a new gender reform.[31]

Further, in the conflict state subset, controls for several characteristics of the conflict were included. First, sexual violence during conflict my increase domestic and international attention on the need for gendered security sector reform to prevent such violence from occur again. Similarly, security forces that commit sexual violence may be more likely to engage in violent behavior that may provoke conflict (Whitworth 2005). Therefore a control for for the average level of conflict-related sexual violence which occurred during the conflict from the SVAC data set is included (Cohen and Nordås 2014, Nordås and Rustad 2013). This ordinal variable measures sexual violence committed by parties to the conflict as non-existent, limited, widespread, or massive/systematic. Non-conflict countries were coded as having non-existent conflict related sexual violence.

Moreover, the conflict's intensity may increase the likelihood that gendered security sector reforms will be undertaken after the conflict given increases in mobilization needs during high intensity conflict. Additionally, international actors are more likely to intervene during high intensity conflicts. *Intensity* was measured as low if there were between 25 and 1,000 battle deaths in the state-year and high if there were more than 1,000 battle deaths. Data on conflict intensity comes from the UCDP/Prio

[31] Additional robustness checks includes the use of these variables as time variable dummies and the use of a generalized estimation equation (GEE) without time variables. The results remain consistent across these different specifications for autocorrelation across time.

intrastate conflict data set.

Finally, in addition to the main controls described above, an additional set of models is run on a random subset of the data using the following two controls to account for other security sector reform processes that may be occurring simultaneously with gendered security sector reform and for the level of women's previous integration into the security sector. Results will be shown for the logistic regression models with and without these variables.

First, one possible confounding process is that gendered security sector reforms may be occurring alongside general, non-gendered security sector reforms. While conflict and post-conflict states may be more likely to adopt gendered security sector reform programs, it is also possible that these states are simply more open to all types of security sector reform and that general security sector reform promotes the adoption of gendered policies. This may obscure the unique influence that conflict and international actors have specifically on gender reform by ignoring that these two factors also likely encourage more general security sector reform. *Non-Gender SSR* is a dummy variable indicating whether any large-scale non-gendereded security reforms have been adopted in the state-year. Non-gender security sector reform was defined as the establishment of a national or institutional plan for security sector reform, the creation or dissolution of a security institution or office, the institution of an oversight committee, or the creation of funding programs to improve the security sector. This control variable begins to examine whether gendered security reforms are adopted independently from general, non-gendered security sector reform or if they are adopted in conjunction with it. Due to data limitations, this variable is only

available for a random sample of 2,473 state-years in the data set.[32]

Table 6.1: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Gender Balance	4,579	0.161	0.368	0	1
Gender Mainstream	4,573	0.212	0.409	0	1
Conflict Affected	3,795	0.342	0.474	0	1
Post-Conflict	3,795	0.140	0.347	0	1
Active conflict	3,795	0.202	0.402	0	1
Multidimensional Mission	1,296	0.113	0.316	0	1
Export Context	1,279	4.464	1.848	1.157	8.713
World Bank Aid	1,296	11.723	9.248	0.000	22.930
Cultural Similarity Context	1,273	4.067	0.695	1.856	6.331
Intensity	3,775	0.395	0.629	0	2
CEDAW Years	3,815	13.424	9.656	0	36
Fertility	3,757	3.800	1.785	1.085	8.713
Post 1325	3,816	0.557	0.497	0	1
Polity 2	3,712	1.160	6.612	−10	10
GDP per Capita	3,573	7.338	1.324	4.546	11.391
Muslim Majority	3,816	0.307	0.461	0	1
Conflict Intensity	1,276	1.168	0.517	0	2
Conflict Sexual Violence	1,035	0.430	0.734	0	3
Time Since Adoption (GB)	4,815	6.462	6.785	0	110
Time Since Adoption (GM)	4,815	5.698	6.567	0	110
Non-Gendered SSR	2,473	0.414	0.493	0	1
Women in Security Years	2,295	19.631	17.739	0	90

Additionally, gender reforms may be dependent upon the existing level of gender equality within the security sector. In other words, countries that have more equitable security sectors may not have to adopt as many gendered security sector reforms compared to countries with less equitable security sectors, confusing the results. This may be particularly concerning if countries that have less equitable security sectors are more likely to enter conflict (Enloe 1989, 2000, Goldstein 2003, Higate and Henry 2004, 2009, Whitworth 2005). While qualitative empirical evidence does not demonstrate a strong correlation between the adoption of gender reform and the relative equality of the security sector – for example, Norway and Sweden which have rela-

[32]This data was coded according to the Karim, Wagstaff and Huber (n.d.) Security Sector Reform data set and supplemented with information from the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces.

tively equitable security sectors compared to other countries in the world, have high rates of adoption of gendered security sector reform – this remains a serious concern. Thus, to proxy for women's previous level of integration into the police and military, a count of the number of years since women first entered the police or military as officers is included as a control.[33] Although women's presence alone in an institution does not perfectly proxy for their level of equality or power in that institution, as women gain more experience in the security sector, their presence often becomes more legitimized, they may gain more power and influence, and they may increase their capacity to mobilize to demand reform. Women's year of integration in the security sector ranges widely in the sample with an average of almost 20 years since integration and a maximum of 90 years.

As the two dependent variables are dichotomous, logistic regression with state-clustered standard errors is used. As mentioned above, the inclusion of cubic polynomial time variables captures the hazard rate within the logistic regression model. Alternative models that use OLS regression and those that restructure the dependent variable as a count of the number of reforms adopted remain robust to the results presented below.

[33]It is often quite difficult to identify the first year a woman entered the police or military in a security-focused role, rather than in administrative support roles. Thus, this variable measures either the police or military years if one is available. If dates of entry for both the police and the military are found, the earliest date of entry is used.

6.4 Results and Discussion

The results demonstrate that conflict and post-conflict states are significantly more likely to adopt gendered security sector reforms and indicate that international presence in conflict states increases the likelihood of adoption, as expected by the theory.

Tables 6.2 and 6.3 present the logistic regression results examining the influence of experiencing active or recent conflict on the adoption of gendered security sector reform on the full sample of country-years between 1988 and 2016. The results demonstrate that "conflict affected" states are significantly more likely to adopt gendered security sector reforms. The positive, statistically significant relationship holds for both the adoption of gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms, supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2. Models 1 and 2 examine the adoption of gender balancing reforms and demonstrate that conflict affected states are significantly more likely to adopt gender balancing reforms compared to non-conflict states, even when accounting for a non-gendered security sector reform and previous levels of gendered integration into the military (Model 2). While non-conflict-affected states have a 36.6% likelihood of adopting a gender balancing reform, conflict-affected states have a 46% likelihood. Further, Models 3 and 4 examine the adoption of gender mainstreaming reforms. As with Gender Balancing, Model 3 tests the baseline model, whereas Model 4 is tested on a subset of states to for which there are data on the history of women's integration into the police and military and non-gendered security sector reform. Conflict affected states are significantly more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms in both models, although the effect size is slightly smaller in



Figure 6.3: Predicted Probabilities: Conflict Status and Gender Mainstreaming Reform Adoption

Model 4. As can be seen in Figure 6.3, while non-conflict-affected states have a 50% probability of adopting a gender mainstreaming reform, the likelihood increases to 65% in conflict-affected states.

Table 6.3 splits "conflict affected" into its two respective components: active conflict states and post-conflict states. Once again, for each type of reform, gender balancing and gender mainstreaming, two models are shown. The first tests the baseline model with controls for CEDAW ratification, UNSCR 1325, fertility rates, regime type, GDP per capita, and Muslim Majority. The second model includes controls for women's inclusion into the security sector for the first time and for non-gendered security sector reform. As can be seen, both active conflict states and

Table 6.2: Logistic Regression Results: Gendered Security Sector Reform Between Conflict and Non-Conflict States

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balance		Gender Mainstream	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.42^{***}	0.31^{**}	0.41^{***}	0.38^{**}
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Post 1325	0.67^{***}	0.50^{**}	0.82^{***}	0.67^{***}
	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.20)
CEDAW Years	0.01^{*}	0.02^{*}	0.02^{**}	0.03^{**}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Fertility	-0.08	-0.13	-0.08^{*}	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Polity 2	0.03^{**}	0.01	0.04^{***}	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita	0.01	-0.04	0.02	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.11)
Muslim Majority	-0.003	-0.12	0.01	-0.25
	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.22)
Time Since Adoption	-0.15^{***}	-0.14^{***}	-0.25^{***}	-0.28^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Time Since Adoption^2	0.01^{***}	0.01^{*}	0.02^{***}	0.02^{*}
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time Since Adoption^3	-0.0000^{*}	-0.0000	-0.0003^{**}	-0.001
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0004)
Non-Gendered SSR		0.17		0.04
		(0.17)		(0.14)
Women in Security Years		-0.004		-0.01
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Constant	-1.86^{**}	-1.06	-1.69^{***}	-1.56
	(0.73)	(1.11)	(0.61)	(1.03)
Observations	3,479	1,355	3,476	1,354
R^2	0.11	0.09	0.18	0.15
χ^2	234.36^{***} (df = 10)	80.27^{***} (df = 12)	435.05^{***} (df = 10)	141.36^{***} (df = 12)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

post-conflict states are significantly more likely to adopt both gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms relative to non-conflict states. Model 5 demonstrates that both active and post-conflict states are more likely to adopt gendered balancing reforms compared to non-conflict states, however the effect size is relatively larger in active conflict states. While non-conflict states have a 36% probability of adopting gender balancing reforms, active conflict states have a 47.8% likelihood of adopting gender balancing reforms and post-conflict states have a 45% likelihood. The results are somewhat tempered in Model 6, which may occur due to the smaller sample size, but still find a significant, positive association between active conflict states and the adoption of gender balancing reforms. However, post-conflict remains positive, but falls below significance. This may indicate that in post-conflict states, gender balancing reforms are occurring alongside non-gendered security sector reform or may be partially dependent upon women's pre-existing levels of integration into the police and military.

Models 7 and 8 demonstrate that both active and post-conflict states are significantly more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms in the security sector. Active conflict and post-conflict states have a 43.4% and 43.2% likelihood of adopting gender mainstreaming reforms respectively compared to non-conflict states that have a 33% probability. The results remain robust to the inclusion of controls for non-gendered security sector reform and women's integration. This may suggest that in contrast to gender balancing reforms, more comprehensive and gender equality-focused gender mainstreaming reforms are relatively unique compared to other types of security sector reform and security sector gender norms in post-conflict states.

Table 6.3: Logistic Regression Results: Gendered Security Sector Reform Between Conflict and Non-Conflict States, Conflict Factored

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balance		Gender Mainstream	
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Active Conflict	0.48***	0.36*	0.42***	0.39**
	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Post Conflict	0.33**	0.24	0.41***	0.36**
	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Post 1325	0.68***	0.49**	0.82***	0.67***
	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.20)
CEDAW Years	0.01*	0.02*	0.02**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Fertility	−0.08	−0.13	−0.08*	−0.07
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Polity 2	0.03**	0.01	0.04***	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita	0.01	−0.05	0.02	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.11)
Muslim Majority	0.003	−0.11	0.01	−0.25
	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.22)
Time Since Adoption	−0.15***	−0.14***	−0.25***	−0.28***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Time Since Adoption^2	0.01***	0.01*	0.02***	0.02*
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time Since Adoption^3	−0.0000*	−0.0000	−0.0003**	−0.001
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0004)
Non-Gendered SSR		0.15		0.03
		(0.18)		(0.15)
Women in Security Years		−0.004		−0.01
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Constant	−1.85**	−1.03	−1.69***	−1.55
	(0.73)	(1.11)	(0.61)	(1.03)
Observations	3,479	1,355	3,476	1,354
R^2	0.11	0.09	0.18	0.15
χ^2	235.28*** (df = 11)	80.56*** (df = 13)	435.06*** (df = 11)	141.38*** (df = 13)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Further, Table 6.4 finds some limited support for Hypotheses 1b and 2b, or that high-intensity conflicts should increase the likelihood of gendered security sector reform more than low-intensity conflicts. While high-intensity conflicts are consistently positively associated with the adoption of both gender balancing reforms and gender mainstreaming reforms, low intensity conflicts have a strong, positive correlation with gender balancing reforms and only a weak correlation with gender mainstreaming reforms. As with the previous tables, two models are run for each type of gendered security sector reform, one with baseline controls and one with the two sub-set controls for the gendered and non-gendered state of security sector reform in the state.

Models 9 and 10 generally find a significant, positive relationship between both high intensity and low intensity conflicts and the adoption of gender balancing reforms. Compared to non-conflict states that have a 38% likelihood of adopting gender balancing reforms, low intensity conflicts and high intensity conflicts have a 46% and 60% chance of adopting gender balancing reforms respectively. In other words, states that have experienced major conflicts are almost twice as likely to adopt gender balancing reforms compared to non-conflict states and are 30% more likely to adopt them compared to states experiencing minor conflicts. However, it is important to note that when other security sector reforms are considered in Model 10, low intensity conflicts lose significance. This provides partial support for Hypothesis 1b by demonstrating that high intensity conflicts have a more robust association with the adoption of gender balancing reforms than low intensity conflicts. This supplies further support to the theory that gendered security sector reforms are in part driven by increased mobilization needs.

A similar pattern emerges when examining the adoption of gender mainstreaming reforms. While Model 11 demonstrates that both high and low intensity conflicts are more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms compared to non-conflict states, low intensity conflicts drop to a 10% significance level in Model 12 when full control are included, once against demonstrating that the relationship between low intensity conflicts and gender mainstreaming reform adoption is not as robust as the that of high intensity conflicts. While non-conflict states have a 33% probability of adopting gender mainstreaming reforms, states with low- and high-intensity conflicts have a 42% and 50.5% likelihood of adopting them.

Additionally, across all the models, after the adoption of UNSCR 1325, both conflict affected and non-conflict affected states became more likely to adopt gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms. This provides partial evidence that after gendered security sector reform became prioritized on the international agenda, countries were responsive to the shift in international demand. Similarly, there is a weak, significant, positive relationship between the number of years since a state signed CEDAW and the adoption of gendered security sector reform. This indicates that as states increase their commitment to international reforms dedicated to women's rights, they are more likely to comply with international pressure to adopt gendered security sector reform. Additionally, since countries that have signed CEDAW tend to have more well-established and mobilized women's movements, this may indicate greater internal domestic pressure for gendered security sector reform. As expected, more democratic states are more likely to adopt gender balancing reforms and gender mainstreaming reforms. This relationship falls below significance though in the full

model with controls for non-gendered security sector reform and women's integration into the military. This likely occurs because non-gendered security sector reform may be a proxy for democratization efforts within countries. Surprisingly, although in line with some qualitative evidence, there is no relationship between a country's level of gender equality, both more generally in society as measured by fertility rates or within the security sector, and the adoption of gendered security sector reform. This supports qualitative and anecdotal evidence that countries that adopt gendred security ssector reform are not only being driven by concerns for gender equality, but may be responding to personnel needs or to international pressure and thus, societal gender equality is not always significantly correlated with the adoption of these reforms. Additionally, because the security sector is highly masculinized, even in countries with relatively high levels of gender equality, ample opportunities for gender reform remain and thus, it is unlikely that there is currently an upper limit preventing more equitable states from adopting gender reform.

Overall, it appears that conflict affected states, both active and post-conflict, are more likely to adopt gendered security sector reforms compared to non-conflict states, even when we account for the higher likelihood of nongendered security sector reforms in conflict affected states. What drives the increased adoption of gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms in conflict affected states? To explore the influence of international actors in conflict states on the adoption of gendered security sector reform, Table 6.5 presents the results of a logistic regression model examining the effects of international presence on gendered security sector reforms in conflict affected states.

Table 6.4: Logistic Regression Results: Gendered Security Sector Reform Between Conflict and Non-Conflict States, Intensity Factored

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing		Gender Mainstreaming	
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Low Intensity	0.31***	0.19	0.37***	0.28*
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.14)
High Intensity	0.88***	0.74***	0.71***	0.63***
	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.24)
Post 1325	0.60***	0.46**	0.80***	0.64***
	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.18)
CEDAW Years	0.02**	0.02*	0.02**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Fertility	−0.07	−0.13	−0.07	−0.07
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Polity 2	0.03*	0.01	0.04***	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
GDP per Capita	0.01	−0.04	0.01	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.12)
Muslim Majority	0.03	−0.05	0.02	−0.19
	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.14)	(0.22)
Time Since Adoption	−0.15***	−0.14***	−0.23***	−0.28***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Time Since Adoption^2	−0.0000***	−0.0000*	0.01**	0.02**
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time Since Adoption^3	−0.0000***	−0.0000*	−0.0002	−0.001
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0002)	(0.0004)
Non-Gendered SSR		0.18		0.05
		(0.17)		(0.15)
Women's Security Years		−0.004		−0.01
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Constant	−1.90**	−1.08	−1.65***	−1.48
	(0.76)	(1.20)	(0.61)	(1.08)
Observations	3,404	1,360	3,401	1,359
R^2	0.11	0.10	0.18	0.15
χ^2	222.19*** (df = 11)	85.40*** (df = 13)	403.76*** (df = 11)	141.41*** (df = 13)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

International presence in conflict affected countries often has a significant, positive correlation with the adoption of gender mainstreaming reforms (Models 15 and 16) in support of Hypothesis 4. However, the relationship with gender balancing is less apparent. In both Models 13 and 14, with the exception of cultural proximity, other forms of international influence, including UN peacekeeping, trade ties, and World Bank aid, do not have a significant relationship with the adoption of gender balancing reforms. Thus, there is not much support for Hypothesis 3.

In contrast, international influence has a strong, positive, significant relationship with the adoption of gender mainstreaming reforms. In both Models 15 and 16, the presence of UN multidimensional peacekeeping mission and lower fertility rates among a state's culturally proximate neighbors significantly increase the likelihood of the adoption of gender mainstreaming reforms. The presence of a multidimensional peacekeeping mission increases the probability of the adoption of a gender mainstreaming reform by around 40% from a 50% probability to a 70% likelihood.[34] The substantive effect is even more dramatic with a state's cultural proximity. As a state's culturally proximate neighbors' fertility rates increase from the maximum of 6.3 (indicating low levels of gender equality) to the minimum of 1.8, its likelihood of adopting gender mainstreaming reforms increases from 17% to 83.6%.[35] Further, in Model 16, which includes the full set of controls, including non-gendered security sector reform and women's historical inclusion in the police and military, the relationship grows even stronger between peacekeeping missions and cultural proximity

[34]According to the results of Model 15.
[35]According to the results of Model 15.

and the adoption of gender mainstreaming reforms. Additionally, in Model 16, states that receive World Bank Aid also are significantly more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms. However, there is no significant relationship between export ties and the adoption of gender mainstreaming reforms in either model. This is in line with findings by Curtice and Reinhardt (N.d.) that trade relationships often fail to significantly motivate changes in human rights.

Interestingly, as can be seen in the Appendix, international presence only influences the adoption of gendered security sector reform in low intensity conflicts. This may indicate that in high-intensity conflicts, gendered security sector reform is primarily driven by mobilization needs, regardless of international pressure. While this does not mean that international actors do not advocate for and incentivize the adoption of gendered security sector reform in high-intensity conflict states, these states are already inclined to adopt them to fulfill personnel needs. In contrast, in low-intensity conflicts, there is not as a great of a mobilization need for gendered security sector reforms. Therefore, these states need to be incentivized to adopt gendered security sector reform, which may explain the increased influence of international actors in these states.

The differing results between the adoption of gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms is interesting and demonstrates that international actors may have limited influence in altering the behavior of conflict states in some contexts. Gender balancing reforms are primarily driven by personnel needs, rather than concerns for gender equality. Therefore, these results indicate that international actors have relatively little influence in impacting the decisions of conflict states regarding the

Table 6.5: Logistic Regression Results: Gendered Security Sector Reform International Influence in Conflict States

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balance		Gender Mainstream	
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Multidimensional Mission	1.23**	0.82	1.33***	1.28***
	(0.53)	(0.79)	(0.38)	(0.50)
Export Context	−0.01	−0.02	−0.002	0.05
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.12)
World Bank Aid	0.02	0.02	0.02*	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Cultural Similarity Context	−0.73***	−0.92***	−0.67***	−0.89***
	(0.24)	(0.33)	(0.18)	(0.28)
Post 1325	0.27	0.10	0.41	0.25
	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.37)	(0.37)
CEDAW Years	−0.03	−0.04	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Polity 2	0.04	−0.02	0.05	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
GDP per Capita	0.13	0.25	0.07	0.30*
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.17)
Muslim Majority	−0.69	−0.83*	−0.57	−0.53
	(0.44)	(0.47)	(0.36)	(0.39)
Time Since Adoption	−0.13	−0.004	−0.17*	−0.22**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Time Since Adoption^2	0.01	−0.003		0.01*
0.02*				
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.005)	(0.01)
Time Since Adoption^3	−0.0000	0.0000	−0.0001*	−0.0001*
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)
Conflict Intensity	0.53**	0.59**	0.33	0.41
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.22)	(0.26)
Conflict Sexual Violence	−0.03	−0.04	−0.11	−0.09
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Non-Gendered SSR		0.45		0.33
		(0.36)		(0.36)
Women in Security Years		0.01		0.004
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Constant	0.25	−0.09	0.58	−0.46
	(1.14)	(0.99)	(0.97)	(1.07)
Observations	509	341	508	341
R^2	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.20
χ^2	52.69*** (df = 14)	40.17*** (df = 16)	64.57*** (df = 14)	49.93*** (df = 16)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

composition and recruitment of men and women into the security sector. However, if we recall that conflict affected states are more likely to adopt gender balancing reforms than non-conflict states, this may indicate that the increased balancing of security forces in conflict states is occurring due to logistical mobilization needs rather than in response to international pressure to conform with the Women, Peace, and Security agenda.

In contrast, gender mainstreaming specifically attempts to increase the level of gender equality and gender sensitivity in the security sector. Gender equality is often not viewed as a priority for security forces during conflict. Unlike gender balancing which may be seen as self-evidently necessary given manpower shortages during and after conflict, gender mainstreaming may need to be incentivized by international actors. In other words, to many conflict states, gender mainstreaming may incur costs on the security sector, such as implementation costs of adopting new policies, designing new trainings on gender, creating new equipment for women, or holding current soldiers or police accountable for sexual harassment or assault, whose benefits are not always immediately obvious in the highly militarized and masculine culture of conflict-affected security sectors. Thus, international actors play a key role in incentivizing the adoption of these reforms by applying pressure and by offering to offset the costs of these reforms. For example, the UN often sponsors, hosts, and facilitates trainings on domestic violence prevention and investigation for police forces, which decreases the government's financial burden of adopting gender mainstreaming. Thus, similar to the findings of the two previous empirical chapters, these results demonstrate that international actors play a key role in promoting gender reform

after conflict. However, their influence is limited in scope to only influence reforms that are often seen as secondary concerns.

6.4.1 Robustness Checks

The results generally remain robust to the different operationalizations of conflict. The results for all models shown remain robust when the post-conflict period is defined according to conflict termination type and when conflicts that occurred due to coups are removed. While the results of the full sample models fall below significance when interstate conflicts with at least 25 battle deaths is used, the conflict subsample results remain the same. This may indicate that for interstate conflicts, the presence of international actors is necessary to lead to gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reform adoption.

Additionally, an alternative measure of gender mainstreaming which excludes reforms that primarily recruit more women produced consistent results.[36] Further the models are robust to GDP instead of GDP per capita, alternative measures for gender equality,[37] majority Catholic or Christian controls, communist controls, regional controls, and an individual empowerment index (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014), although *World Bank Aid* loses significance at times. Additionally, the results remain robust without state clustered standard errors and when a Negative Binomial Model is used to examine the number of reforms adopted. The results are also robust to the inclusion of a categorical measure of the number of UN staff in the country instead

[36]This meant that recruitment campaigns, female promotion, and recruitment gender quotas were excluded.

[37]Such as women's legislative representation and labor force ratios.

of the dichotomous measure of UN multidimensional peacekeeping missions and in fact, it becomes significant in the gender balancing models and *Export Context* gains significance in these models.

Finally, there may still be some concern of an endogenous relationship between security sector gender reform and the occurrence of conflict. (Cohen and Nordås 2014, Enloe 1989, 2000, Goldstein 2003, Higate and Henry 2004, 2009, Karim and Beardsley 2013, 2016, 2017, Nordås and Rustad 2013, Sjoberg and Via 2010, Whitworth 2005). While the lagged independent variables address this endogeneity to some extent, an additional proxy for the theoretical mechanisms that is more exogenous to the dependent variable is used as a robustness check – natural disasters. While natural disasters do not necessarily cause conflict, they are associated with decreased state capacity and create social and political upheaval (Berrebi and Ostwald 2011, 2016). Further, a natural disaster would prompt several of the theoretical mechanisms underlying the relationship between conflict and gendered security sector reform, including increased insecurity for women as women tend to be the worst affected by disasters,[38] altered gender roles as disaster may disrupt established daily life and women may have to take a more active role in re-establishing and rebuilding homes, businesses, and communities, increased international attention and pressure as countries, NGOs, and IGOs send aid, and increased mobilization into security institutions if the military and police are deployed to assist after the disaster. However, natural disasters are unlikely to be highly correlated or endogenous to gendered security sector reform. Therefore, an

[38]The international community has increasingly recognized that natural disasters often have more harmful consequences for women than men. For more information, see the summary of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in 2005 http://www.unisdr.org/2005/wcdr/wcdr-index.htm

additional set of models are run on a random subset of the data with a dichotomous indicator for whether a natural disaster has occurred within the state-year as the independent variable. Data on natural disasters comes from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT).[39] The results remain robust.

6.5 Conclusion

The security sector is a key, recognizable component of government power. While previous studies have primarily focused on how conflict affects women's political participation and empowerment and the two previous chapters explored how conflict affects legal changes, women's rights indicators, and individual attitudes towards gender equality, it is unclear how exactly women's increased agency and rights found in the previous chapter translates into the longer term improvements in gender equality indicators found in the first empirical chapter given the corresponding finding that women's rights laws do not change after conflict. If the state is not adopting women's rights laws officially, how are women's rights changing on the ground? One possible explanation is that even in the absence of formal women's rights laws, smaller reforms and policies may actively work to improve women's rights after conflict.

In the wake of the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the international community rallied to increase women's representation and equality in security roles and conflict decision-making. Although women had been slowly integrating into the police and military forces beginning in the early 20th century, after 2000, there has been a rapid

[39]The occurrence of a natural disaster is defined as any one or more of a geophysical, meterological, hydrological, or climatological disaster in the state-year.

increase in the adoption of gendered security sector reforms in response to the adoption of UNSCR 1325. While the UN and its Member States committed to improving women's rights more generally since the adoption of CEDAW in 1970, UNSCR 1325 was the first time that women's rights were securitized. However, the focus on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 has been specifically on the security sector. Additionally, although all UN Member States are legally required to implement UNSCR 1325 in their own countries, the main focus of implementation has been on countries which are currently experiencing or have recently experienced conflict. Since gendered security sector reform has been proposed as a tool to prevent conflict recurrence and spillover, it has become a major security concern and priority. Therefore, gender security sector reform should be a "most likely" case of international actors offering material incentives in exchange for the adoption of women's rights reforms after conflict, this is an important test of how conflict and international influence interact to influence gender equality.

Using a unique data set on the adoption of gendered security sector reform in all non-OECD states between 1988 and 2016, this analysis demonstrates that conflict affected states, both states currently experiencing conflict and states that have recently experienced conflict, are significantly more likely to adopt gendered security sector reform. Moreover, conflict-affected states that are susceptible to international pressure, such as countries hosting UN multidimensional peacekeeping missions, those that receive World Bank aid, and those who are culturally similar to gender equitable countries, are significantly more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms compared to conflict states that do not have these international influences present.

However, these indicators of international pressure do not significantly increase the likelihood of the adoption of gender balancing reforms in the police or military. This further complements and supports the findings of the two previous empirical chapters: international actors in conflict-affected environments often can increase gender equality. However, the scope of this reform is limited by other factors. In this case, gender balancing reforms, which are primarily the result of manpower shortages during and after conflict, are not influenced by international actors. This may occur because these types of reforms are driven primarily by logistical demands and thus, are seen as self-evidently necessary by conflict-affected security sectors regardless of international presence. In contrast, gender mainstreaming reforms are often viewed as a secondary concern by security sectors compared to gender balancing reforms. In other words, security sector institutions are more likely to understand the need to integrate more women into the military when they are facing security concerns that increase the need to mobilize the population than they are to perceive the need to adopt a sexual harassment policy in times of a crisis. Therefore, the often highly masculinized and militarized security sectors of conflict-affected states are unlikely to be willing to spend the necessary resources to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms. However, international actors are more likely to prioritize these types of reforms, given the popularity of the UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace, and Security agenda and may offer material incentives and support to conflict-affected states to adopt gendered security sector reforms as a conflict containment strategy. Thus, international actors play a key role in increasing the political will and resources to incentivize the adoption of gender mainstreaming reforms in particular.

In the past five years, scholars have increasingly argued that the disruption of normal political and social hierarchies during conflict can create opportunities for women to gain increased political power. However, these findings provide further support for the conclusion of the two previous chapters: although the dual impact of international actors and conflict can improve women's rights to some extent, the scope of these changes is limited by other logistic, strategic, or normative concerns.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

7.1 Summary and Implications

This dissertation sought to explore a question that has long puzzled Women, Peace, and Security scholars: how does conflict affect women's rights and what role do international actors play in this process? The analysis demonstrates that international actors play a key, and at times necessary, role promoting women's rights by offsetting the costs that would otherwise be born by the state or by women themselves to adopt, implement, and support gender equality. Conflict in many ways is damaging to women's rights, however, international actors can offset these negative impacts. However, the scope of international actors' impact is limited to certain types of gender reform.

This dissertation expands on two predominant theories on conflict and women's rights. While conflict can encourage hypermasculinity and traditional gender roles as the society becomes more militarized in reaction to participation in conflict, it can

also create opportunities for women. When normal familial, social, and political ties and hierarchies are disrupted during and after conflict, women may enter into new roles as community leaders, the heads of families, economic laborers, and political activists (Tripp 2015). Having demonstrated their agency during conflict and entered the public sphere in greater numbers, women may be able to successfully mobilize to demand women's rights. However, women's temporary empowerment during conflict does not always translate into long-term improvements in women's rights and gender equality. In fact, the government and men may resist changes in women's rights, sometimes violently (Kelly et al. 2018, Lazarev 2018). Thus, after conflict, women may need support to take advantage of the unique shifts of power and momentary weaknesses in the traditional gendered power hierarchy. Gender reforms are costly and therefore require both political support for them, but also the necessary amount of resources to successfully adopt and implement them.

While scholars often mention that international intervention and influence plays some role in promoting women's rights after conflict, it is unclear exactly what effect they have and its relative importance (Tripp 2015). However, international third-party actors have an incentive to promote women's rights after conflict *and* have the financial leverage to encourage and facilitate gender reform. First, international actors may have normative reasons to promote women's rights, believing that women's rights are important, liberal, progressive values. Additionally, international actors have increasingly linked women's rights to security concerns (Hudson 2009). Beginning with the Beijing Platform for Action in 1999 and continuing with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and its subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace,

and Security, the UN and its Member States have acknowledged that women's unique experiences, concerns, and networks are key to preventing and terminating conflict. Thus, although international actors have long promoted women's rights in developing countries and in post-conflict countries, after 2000, women's rights gained additional traction on the international agenda as a major security concern.

Therefore, international actors have incentives to promote women's rights abroad. While there are a number of ways that international actors can do this, they often leverage material incentives to influence domestic policymaking. International actors often gain influence of policymaking when they are maintain financial relationships with a state. By offering material incentives, international actors can decrease the costs of gender reform that would otherwise be paid by the state or by individual women.

However, a state's level of sensitivity to material incentives for gender reform may differ. Conflict states may be particularly sensitive for two reasons. First, as a result of conflict's destructive effect on the economy, conflict-affected states are often highly dependent upon international actors for support and resources. This is complemented by international intervention offering political cover for leaders and institutions to adopt gender reform while decreasing the likelihood of direct backlash against individuals who support gender reform. Second, as argued by the "opportunity structures" literature, conflict may create opportunities for women to expand their leadership and economic power, increasing the level of political will for gender reform (Tripp 2015). Therefore, conflict-affected states with high levels of international intervention and pressure should be especially likely to adopt women's rights

reforms compared both to non-conflict states and to conflict states that have low levels of international intervention.

The theoretical expectations proposed in this dissertation were tested both cross-nationally and subnationally on gender reform legally, socially, politically, individually, and in the security sector. Since gender reform is often a non-linear process that requires behavioral and structural change by a large number of different actors who may hold disparate beliefs, priorities, and motivations, it is imperative to examine gender reform at different levels of analysis.

In Chapter 4, the theory was tested cross-nationally on both the adoption of laws regarding women's rights, such as laws criminalizing various forms of violence against women, creating national gender machinery, and adopting a political gender quota, and on indicators of gender equality. This was the first study to compare the effects of conflict on legal reform and aggregate indicators of women's rights reforms. Previous quantitative studies on the impact of conflict on women's rights almost exclusively examine women's rights indicators and not laws or only focus on one law (Bush 2011, Huber and Karim 2018, Hughes, Krook and Paxton 2015, True 2016, True and Mintrom 2001). Importantly, and somewhat surprisingly, the results demonstrate that conflict and international actors may have different impacts on different types of women's rights reforms. While conflict and international actors had relatively inconsistent relationships with the adoption of all types of women's rights laws, post-conflict states with high levels of international intervention do appear to be significantly more likely to have increased women's political power and political legislative representation compared to both post-conflict states with lower levels of

international intervention and with non-conflict states. These findings highlight that international actors may have disparate effects on women's rights, depending on the type of change they seek to create. Why don't international actors significantly influence the adoption of laws in post-conflict states? This may occur due to decreased lawmaking ability or increased corruption in post-conflict states that cause international actors to prefer to support women's rights "on the ground" than to encourage the adoption of laws that may or may not be able to be adopted or implemented in a post-conflict state.

To further probe how conflict changes women's rights and why it does not lead to legal shifts in women's rights, Chapter 5 explored the heterogeneous effects of conflict and international aid exposure on women's and men's attitudes towards gender equality and political engagement in Uganda. To date, much of the literature and theory surrounding women's rights after conflict tends to focus on how societal attitudes are affected in aggregate or simply how women are affected. However, men are the traditional gatekeepers of power, especially political power, and may be affected by conflict and aid differently than women. Thus, it is imperative to examine the effects of conflict on men and women in isolation. Men receive the brunt of the militarized masculinity signaling during conflict and are not often directly or indirectly influenced to favor women's rights by international actors after conflict. Women instead often gain increased power and influence during conflict and may receive both direct and indirect benefits from aid, such as aid programs that directly target women's empowerment and programs that more broadly improve public health, education, and development which are highly correlated with gender equality. Thus, the dual im-

pact of conflict and aid should cause women to significantly improve their attitudes towards women's rights, but should have a relatively null effect on men.

Uganda is a useful case to test this theory given its long history of conflict that has been both widespread and also clustered in various regions, the gendered dynamics of its conflict that included female fighters, rebel groups that promoted women's rights, and sexual violence, and the great amount of international attention and aid that was paid to its conflicts, especially in the early- and mid- 2000s when the Women, Peace, and Security agenda was taking root. The results demonstrate that although conflict is generally harmful to women's and men's attitudes towards women's rights, women who were exposed to aid were significantly more likely to hold more gendered equitable views and behaviors compared to women who were only exposed to conflict and not aid. Men, on the other hand, did not significantly alter their views when exposed to both aid and conflict.

Further, this chapter explores whether these micro-level changes in attitudes and behavior translates into tangible power for women by examining female participation and success in sub-county elections in Uganda. The results again demonstrate that while exposure to conflict decreases the likelihood that female candidates are elected, this negative effect is partially ameliorated in sub-counties with high levels of international aid. Complementing the findings in Chapter 4, these findings demonstrate that even at the individual and sub-national level, conflict and international actors can significantly influence women's rights. However, it further clarifies the process through which this occurs by demonstrating that conflict has disparate effects on men and women. This may explain why women's increased individual support for

women's rights and societal changes in women's political power are not translated into the adoption of laws since men overwhelmingly control policymaking in most countries.

These results emphasize that for individual women, conflict is often harmful – it increases the acceptability of wife beating, decreases media consumption, decreases financial decision-making, and decreases the likelihood of women winning sub-county elections. However, international actors can offset these negative effects partially or completely. These findings may help explain the persistent, contrasting evidence that has been found previously in support of both the "militarized masculinity" and "opportunity structures" theories: in the absence of international intervention, militarized masculinity predominates and gender equality likely decreases after conflict, but when international actors are present, they can challenge militarized masculinity and instead support women's attempts to translate their short-term gains in power during conflict into more sustainable changes to individual beliefs on women's rights and increased political power.

Finally, Chapter 6 explores an additional administrative and societal level at which gender reform can be made: the security sector. UNSCR 1325 emphasized the important role that women play in constraining, preventing, and ending conflict and thus, the majority of international pressure for women's rights, especially in conflict-affected countries, has been on gendered security sector reform. Additionally, increased mobilization requirements during and after conflict may also increase the likelihood that security sector reforms are adopted. Using a unique data set on gendered security sector reforms adopted in the police and military in all states between 1988 and 2016,

this study is the first to quantitatively examine gendered security sector reform.

The results demonstrate that in general, conflict and post-conflict states are significantly more likely to adopt two types of gendered security sector reform, gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms. Moreover, post-conflict states with high levels of international intervention are significantly more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms compared to post-conflict states without international intervention. In contrast, international intervention does not appear to impact the adoption of gender balancing reforms in post-conflict states. This indicates that the adoption of balancing reforms in post-conflict states is predominantly driven by logistical personnel needs and thus, is less likely to be influenced by international pressure that calls for more gender equitable security sectors because the state will likely need to adopt gendered security sector reform irrespective of international influence. This once again emphasizes that while international actors can play an important role in promoting women's rights after conflict, their effect is often limited by the capabilities, interests, and norms of the post-conflict state.

These results emphasize that the relationship between conflict and women's rights is far more complex than previously considered and that international actors play a vital role. Rather than being one additional, but not necessary factor that promotes women's rights after conflict, this dissertation demonstrates that international actors play a key, and at times necessary, role. Additionally, the results illustrate the need to more carefully consider how different forms of gender reform may be differentially impacted by conflict and international intervention. Previous literature largely discussed legal reform, societal behavior, individual attitudes, and policy as interchangeable,

assuming that if conflict improved one of these facets, the others would similarly follow suit. However, this dissertation demonstrates that some forms of gender reform, in particular legal reform, are less likely to change in response conflict or international intervention.

Similarly, the results are demonstrate the need to more carefully examine the micro-level effects of conflict on women's rights. Currently, most studies in this subfield examine cross-national, regional, or sub-national case studies. However, these studies do not consider how conflict may have different impacts on individuals, including between men and women and within men and within women. Men and women are not homogeneous groups and their experiences during and after the conflict may vary greatly which alter the impact of conflict on women's rights. While this study specifically examines how international aid may alter how conflict affects men's and women's attitudes after conflict, other factors may influence this relationship that should be examined in future work, such as ethnicity, roles and experiences during the conflict, and poverty or elite status. Therefore, this dissertation not only clarifies the theory on how women's rights change after conflict and what role international third-party actors play in this process, but it also demonstrate the need for WPS scholarship to more critically consider heterogeneities in the intersection between conflict and gender equality at different levels, in different contexts, and for different individuals.

7.2 Limitations and Future Work

While this study presents important improvements on previous theoretical frameworks and analytical investigations on the impact of conflict on women's rights, there are several limitations. First and foremost, while this study clarifies the causal direction of the relationship between conflict and women's rights and emphasizes important conditionalities between conflict and international intervention, it does not claim that international actors are more important or more necessary than domestic actors. In fact, it is highly likely that international actors depend on partnerships with local women's rights movements and gender equality allies. In other words, international actors offer material support to encourage women's rights, but if there are no domestic actors willing to take and effectively use that support, there would still be no observable changes in women's rights. Therefore, future work will more carefully examine the relative roles of international and domestic actors and will explore how partnerships are made between these two actors. In other words, while this dissertation appears to indicate that international actors play a very important, if not necessary, role in promoting women's rights after conflict, this dissertation cannot show and does not claim that international actors are always sufficient for gender reform.

Future work must more carefully test the causal mechanism. This dissertation presents improvements on previous research designs to test the causal mechanism more clearly. For example, Chapter 5 demonstrates that at the local level in Uganda, levels of gender equality in the sub-county do not predict whether that sub-county

experienced violence, partially ameliorating the endogeneity problem that commonly plagues studies on gender and conflict. However, while this allows for a slightly better identification of the effect of both conflict and aid on gender equality, exposure to conflict and aid remain highly correlated, which makes it difficult to causally parse out the effects of the two experiences. Similarly, while the use of a Difference-in-Difference model in Chapter 4 partially allows for causal identification of the effect of conflict and aid across years within countries on indicators of gender equality, since this is cross-national data, the concern of endogeneity that less equitable states are more likely to experience conflict in the first place may still remain. Therefore, future studies should develop unique designs that allow the examination of exposure to both conflict and aid as if random.

Similarly, future research should explore more directly the connections between reform adoption, implementation, and outcomes for women's rights. While this dissertation primarily examines the adoption of women's rights reform, the second set of results in Chapter 4 indicates that there is likely a disconnect between reform adoption and implementation. Therefore, future work expanding on this dissertation should examine whether reforms are successfully implemented and what factors affect implementation. In particular, future versions of the Gendered Security Sector Reform Data Set will include variables exploring not only the adoption, but also the implementation of gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms to help explore the reform process more closely.

Additionally, this dissertation currently explores the influence of international actors largely in aggregate. In other words, while it proposes that certain interna-

tional actors, such as the UN or more gender equitable trading partners, should be more concerned about women's rights than others, it does not parse out how different forms of international intervention and individual actors may have different effects on women's rights. Therefore, future work will examine how specific types of international intervention, such as aid specifically directed towards women's rights, transnational partnerships with local women's rights movements versus direct international aid or program implementation, and aid from different international actors may influence women's rights.

Further, while this study demonstrates that international actors promote gender reform, it does not directly examine the character or quality of that reform. For example, there is some anecdotal and empirical evidence that internationally-driven reforms may be different in character and in success rates compared to locally-driven reforms (Basini and Ryan 2016). Are internationally-driven and internationally-supportive programs equally successful in promoting women's rights. For example, Chapter 6 found that international actors can promote the adoption of gendered security sector reforms. Do the character of these reforms or their implementation differ from reforms that are adopted in the relative absence of international pressure? Are these reforms perceived to be more or less legitimate by the local population? On one hand, internationally-driven reforms may be viewed as less legitimate and less sustainable than local reforms, but on the other hand, sustained international support may help successfully implement a reform or program that would otherwise have little internal support, limiting its impact.

Moreover, while this study specifically studies gender reform, the theory that con-

flict can increase a state's sensitivity to international material incentives, thereby increasing the likelihood that it will adopt internationally-favored reforms is not specific to gender reform. Therefore, future work should explore how international actors may use their unique influence in conflict-affected states to support the adoption of other types of reform. For example, since the mid-1990s, the international community has increasingly argued that good governance and human security are necessary to promote development and security. Therefore, post-conflict states are likely to receive pressure to adopt various reforms, such as (non-gendered) security sector reform, electoral reform, government transparency reforms, human rights reforms, and many others.

Increasing gender equality is not only an important human rights issue, but is also vital for sustainable development and security. However, relatively little is known about the diffusion of gender reform cross-nationally and sub-nationally. Scholars have long disagreed on the impact of conflict on women's rights and currently, the literature proposes several contradicting theories and findings. This not only creates theoretical puzzles, but it also complicates policy design and intervention, especially in post-conflict countries where it is unclear how women's rights can best be supported. Hopefully this dissertation, its unique theory regarding the conditionality of conflict's impact on women's rights based on international actors and its unique empirical approach to testing the theory, provide a theoretical and empirical foundation to continue this important research agenda.

Chapter 8

Appendix

8.1 Chapter 4

Gender Reform Dataset Variable Definitions and Sources

Gender Machinery: This variable indicates whether there exists within the government a body responsible for promoting women's rights within the countries and gender mainstreaming government policy. This can include offices and departments housed within a larger ministry, such as the Ministry of Health or Labor, or a special committee attached to the executive. An alternative coding of this variable only includes high level offices and when there is a specialized gender ministry, rather than gender falling under the scope of another ministry. Sources include the UN National Mechanisms document.

Legislative Gender Quota: This dichotomous variable indicates that country has adopted a gender quota as part of its constitution or secondary law. This variable

only includes mandated legislative quotas or reserved seats and excludes party quotas. This variable comes from Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2017) and was updated from 2015 to 2016.

Intimate Partner Violence: This variable indicates whether the state has adopted a law against intimate partner violence and domestic violence. The definition used to identify an adequate law against intimate partner violence comes from the UN as a law which "includes a range of sexually, psychologically and physically coercive acts used against adult and adolescent women by a current or former intimate partner, without her consent" (UN General Assembly 2006, 37). The data refer to instances where domestic, family or intimate partner violence is specifically criminalized or where provisions for protection orders are in place (UN Women 2012). Primary sources include the UN Women Handbook for National Action Plans on Violence Against Women (2012) and Violence Against Women Dataset (2013), the Social Institutions and Gender Index, and Stop Violence Against Women. The UN Violence Against Women Dataset was used as the primary source and if contradictory information was found from other sources, this was specifically noted within the data.

Child Marriage: This variable indicates whether the minimum of age for marriage is eighteen for both men and women. Alternative codings distinguish whether there is any minimum age for marriage, but it falls below eighteen and and minimum age of eighteen. Additionally, while the primary coding used in this analysis does not consider whether there are allowed exceptions to the minimum age law (for exmple, in many countries while the minimum age of marriage may be eighteen, individuals can be married younger if they have parental permission or the permission of the courts),

alternative codings take this into account. Primary sources include Pew Research Center, Girls Not Brides, the Right to Education Project, and Equality Now.

Marital Rape: This variable indicates whether there is a law that specifically criminalized marital rape. Marital rape, also called spousal rape, is non-consensual sex where the perpetrator is the victim's spouse. Although general rape laws (except where exemption of a spouse is explicitly stated) do not preclude a spouse from being prosecuted, the data refer to instances where the law explicitly criminalizes marital rape, without qualifications, for exmple by providing that sexual assault provisions apply irrespective of the nature of the relationship between the perpetrator and complainant; or stating that no marriage or other relationship shall constitute a defence to a charge of sexual assault under the legislation(UN DESA-DAW 2009a, 26). In other instances, a marital (or equivalent) relationship may be explicitly cited in the law as an aggravating factor. Explicit criminalization of marital rape is recommended as best practice by, among others, the Council of Europe (Council of Europe 2009c). To be coded as one, the state had to have a law that explicitly criminalizes marital rape or specified that spouses aren't exempt from general laws against rape (in other words, having a general law on rape without an explicit statement that the law applies to spouses or a court decision that ensures this, does not count as successful adoption). Primary sources include the UN handbook for National Action Plans on Violence Against Women.

Sexual Harassment: This variable is defined as any law that prohibits sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is defined as "Unwelcome sexually determined behaviour, in both horizontal and vertical relationships, including in employment

(including the informal employment sector), education, receipt of goods and services, sporting activities, and property transactions" (UN DESA-DAW 2009a, 28). The law may be specific to the economic sector or general. The country must have in place laws that prohibit sexual harassment under civil or criminal law. Primary sources include the UN handbook for National Action Plans on Violence Against Women, the Social Institutions and Gender Index, and Stop Violence Against Women.

Liberal Abortion Law: This variable identifies whether the state has legalized abortion beyond when abortion is needed to save the mother. This includes abortion in cases of rape or incest, preservation of the womans health (physical and mental), feotal impairment, socioeconomic grounds, and without restriction. Primary sources include UN country reports from the UN Population Fund, the Pew Research Center, and Harvard's Abortion Law Archive.

Table 8.1: Year of Law Adoption: Afghanistan – Djibouti

Country	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Intimate Partner Violence	Child Marriage	Marital Rape	Sexual Harassment	LGBTQ	Child Marriage Strict	Abortion	Political Quota
Afghanistan	2001	2001	2009	2009	2009	2016	NA	2009	NA	2004
Albania	NA	2006	2006	1991	NA	2008	1995	NA	1991	2008
Algeria	2003	2003	2015	2005	NA	2004	NA	2005	1987	2012
Angola	1991	1991	2011	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2005
Argentina	NA	1992	1994	1987	2009	2009	1987	NA	1987	1991
Armenia	NA	2000	NA	2013	NA	2013	2003	NA	1987	1999
Azerbaijan	NA	1998	2010	2011	NA	NA	2000	2011	1987	NA
Bahrain	NA	2001	NA	NA	NA	1987	1987	NA	1987	1987
Bangladesh	1987	1987	2010	1987	NA	2000	NA	1987	NA	1990
Belarus	NA	2000	2009	1987	NA	NA	1994	NA	1987	NA
Benin	1999	1999	1987	2004	2012	2006	NA	NA	2003	NA
Bhutan	NA	2004	2013	1994	2004	2007	NA	1994	-999	NA
Bolivia	NA	1992	1995	NA	2013	NA	1987	NA	1987	1997
Bosnia–Herz	NA	2003	2003	1987	NA	2010	1998	NA	1987	1998
Botswana	NA	1987	2008	2001	NA	2001	NA	2001	1987	NA
Brazil	2003	1987	2004	1987	-999	1990	1987	NA	1987	1997
Bulgaria	NA	NA	2005	1987	NA	2005	1987	NA	1987	NA
Burkina Faso	1997	1997	NA	NA	NA	2004	1987	NA	1987	2009
Burundi	2000	2000	2009	1993	2009	2009	NA	NA	1987	2005
Cambodia	1993	1993	2005	1987	NA	2009	-999	NA	1997	NA
Cameroon	1987	1987	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1987	NA
Cape Verde	NA	1994	2004	1999	-999	2007	2004	1999	1987	2010
CAR	NA	1987	2006	1998	NA	2010	-999	-999	NA	NA
Chad	2003	2003	2002	2015	NA	NA	1987	2015	2002	NA
Chile	-999	1991	1994	-999	1999	2005	1999	-999	-999	-999
China	NA	1990	2001	1987	NA	2007	1997	1987	1987	2007
Colombia	NA	2001	1996	1987	1996	2006	1987	NA	2006	2011
Comoros	-999	1995	-999	1987	2014	-999	NA	NA	1987	NA
Congo	-999	-999	NA	1987	NA	-999	1987	-999	NA	2007
Costa Rica	NA	1998	1996	1987	2007	1995	1987	NA	1987	1996
Croatia	994	2004	2000	1987	1997	2003	1987	NA	1987	2008
Cuba	NA	NA	1987	1987	1987	1997	1987	NA	1987	NA
Cyprus	NA	1994	1994	-999	1993	2006	1998	NA	1987	NA
Czech Republic	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
Djibouti	1999	1999	NA	2002	NA	NA	1987	NA	NA	2002

Table 8.2: Year of Law Adoption: Dominican Republic–Kuwait

Country	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Intimate Partner Violence	Child Marriage	Marital Rape	Sexual Harassment	LGBTQ	Child Marriage Strict	Abortion	Political Quota
Dominican Rep	2010	1987	1997	1987	1997	1997	1987	NA	-999	1997
DRC	1987	1987	NA	2009	NA	2006	1987	2009	NA	2011
East Timor	NA	2007	2009	2001	2009	2002	2001	2001	-999	2005
Ecuador	NA	1997	1995	1987	NA	1998	1997	NA	1987	1997
Egypt	NA	2002	1987	2008	NA	2014	-999	2008	NA	2009
El Salvador	NA	1996	1996	1987	NA	2003	1987	NA	1987	2013
Equatorial Guinea	1987	1987	NA	NA	NA	-999	1987	NA	1991	NA
Eritrea	NA	NA	NA	1987	NA	NA	NA	NA	1987	1994
Estonia	NA	1996	-999	NA	NA	2004	1990	NA	1990	NA
Ethiopia	1995	1995	2005	1987	NA	-999	NA	1987	1987	NA
Fiji	1998	1998	2010	NA	NA	1999	2010	NA	1987	NA
Gabon	2002	1987	NA	NA	NA	NA	1987	NA	NA	NA
Gambia	1996	1987	2013	NA	NA	2010	NA	NA	1987	NA
Georgia	NA	2004	2006	1987	NA	NA	2000	NA	1987	NA
Germany	1987	1987	1987	1987	NA	NA	1987	NA	1987	NA
Ghana	2001	2001	2007	-999	NA	NA	NA	-999	1987	NA
Guatemala	NA	2000	1996	2015	NA	NA	1987	NA	NA	NA
Guinea	1994	1994	NA	1987	NA	NA	NA	NA	1987	2009
Guinea-Bissau	-999	-999	2013	NA	NA	NA	1993	NA	NA	NA
Guyana	NA	1987	1997	NA	2010	1997	NA	NA	1987	2000
Haiti	1994	1994	NA	1987	NA	NA	1987	NA	NA	2012
Honduras	NA	1999	1997	1987	2011	1999	1987	NA	NA	2000
Hungary	NA	1994	NA	1987	NA	NA	1987	NA	1987	NA
India	2007	1987	2005	1987	NA	1993	NA	1987	1987	NA
Indonesia	1987	1987	2004	NA	NA	NA	-999	NA	2010	2003
Iran	NA	1987	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Iraq	2004	2004	NA	1987	NA	1987	1987	NA	NA	2004
Israel	NA	1998	1991	NA	1987	1998	1987	NA	1987	NA
Ivory Coast	1987	1987	NA	1987	NA	1998	1987	NA	NA	NA
Jamaica	NA	1987	1996	1987	1991	NA	NA	NA	1987	NA
Jordan	NA	1987	2008	2001	NA	NA	1987	NA	1987	2003
Kazakhstan	NA	1998	2009	1987	NA	NA	1998	NA	1987	NA
Kenya	2008	1987	2015	2009	NA	2003	NA	NA	1987	1997
Kosovo	NA	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	NA	2007	NA
Kuwait	NA	1997	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1987	NA

Table 8.3: Year of Law Adoption: Kyrgyzstan–Poland

Country	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Intimate Partner Violence	Child Marriage	Marital Rape	Sexual Harassment	LGBTQ	Child Marriage Strict	Abortion	Political Quota
Kyrgyzstan	NA	1996	2003	1990	NA	NA	1998	NA	1990	2007
Laos	2003	2003	2004	-999	NA	NA	-999	NA	NA	NA
Lativa	NA	2000	-999	1987	NA	2004	1992	NA	1991	NA
Lebanon	NA	1996	2014	NA	2016	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Lesotho	2000	1998	NA	1987	NA	1992	2010	NA	NA	2011
Liberia	2001	2001	NA	1987	NA	NA	NA	2011	1987	2005
Libya	NA	1992	NA	1987	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2012
Lithuania	NA	1996	2011	-999	NA	1998	1993	NA	1987	NA
Macedonia	NA	1997	2004	1987	1998	2010	1996	NA	1987	2002
Madagascar	-999	-999	2000	2007	NA	2000	1987	NA	NA	NA
Malawi	1987	1987	2006	1987	NA	2013	NA	NA	NA	NA
Malaysia	2001	2001	1994	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1989	NA
Mali	1997	1997	NA	1987	NA	NA	1987	NA	2002	NA
Mauritania	-999	1992	NA	2001	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2006
Mauritius	1987	1987	1997	1987	NA	2008	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mexico	NA	NA	1987	NA	NA	1990	1987	NA	1987	NA
Moldova	NA	1999	2008	-999	2008	2006	1995	NA	1987	NA
Mongolia	NA	2002	1999	1987	NA	2011	1987	1987	1987	2011
Montenegro	NA	2006	2006	2006	2006	2007	2006	NA	2006	2011
Morocco	-999	-999	-999	2004	NA	2003	NA	NA	1987	2002
Mozambique	1995	1995	2009	2004	NA	-999	2014	NA	1987	NA
Myanmar	NA	1996	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Namibia	2000	1990	2005	1990	2000	1990	NA	NA	1990	NA
Nepal	1995	1995	2009	1987	2006	2015	2008	1987	1987	1990
Nicaragua	NA	1987	1996	1987	2011	1996	2008	NA	-999	2012
Niger	1987	1987	NA	NA	NA	2003	-999	NA	2006	2002
Nigeria	1989	1989	NA	2003	NA	2015	NA	NA	1987	NA
North Korea	NA	2001	2010	1987	-999	NA	-999	1987	1987	1998
Oman	NA	NA	NA	1987	NA	NA	NA	1987	NA	NA
Pakistan	2004	2000	NA	NA	NA	2010	NA	NA	1990	2002
Panama	1997	1987	1995	1987	NA	1995	2008	2015	1987	1997
Papau New Guin	NA	1987	2013	NA	NA	-999	NA	NA	NA	NA
Paraguay	1992	1992	1997	1987	NA	1995	1987	NA	NA	1996
Peru	1996	1996	1993	1987	-999	-999	1987	NA	1987	1997
Philippines	NA	1987	2004	1987	1997	1995	1987	NA	NA	1989
Poland	NA	1987	NA	1987	1987	NA	1987	NA	1987	NA

Table 8.4: Year of Law Adoption, Qatar–Zimbabwe

Country	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Intimate Partner Violence	Child Marriage	Marital Rape	Sexual Harassment	LGBTQ	Child Marriage Strict	Abortion	Political Quota
Qatar	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2004	NA	NA	1987	NA
Romania	NA	1995	2000	2011	2000	2002	1996	NA		
Russia	NA	1993	NA	1987	NA	1987	1993	NA	1987	NA
Rwanda	1994	1994	2008	1987	2008	2008	1987	NA	1987	2003
Saudi Arabia	NA	NA	2013	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1989	2011
Senegal	1996	1996	1999	NA	NA	1999	NA	NA	NA	2007
Serbia	NA	2004	2005	1990	2006	2005	1994	NA	1987	2004
Sierra Leone	1996	1993	2007	2007	NA	2012	NA	NA	1987	NA
Singapore	NA	2002	1995	1987	NA	NA	NA	NA	1987	NA
Slovakia	NA	NA	NA	1992	NA	NA	1992	NA	1992	NA
Slovenia	NA	2002	1995	1991	1991	2003	1991	NA	1991	2006
Somalia	1991	1991	NA	1987	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2001
South Africa	NA	1997	1998	1987	1993	1998	1998	NA	1987	NA
South Korea	NA	NA	NA	1987	NA	1995	1987	NA	1987	1995
South Sudan	2011	2011	NA	NA	-999	NA	NA	NA	NA	2011
Sri Lanka	1987	1987	2005	1995	NA	1998	NA	NA	NA	NA
Sudan	-999	-999	NA	NA	NA	2015	NA	NA	1991	1998
Suriname	NA	1997	2009	1987	2009	NA	1987	NA	NA	NA
Swaziland	NA	1994	NA	1987	NA	NA	NA	NA	2005	2005
Syria	NA	2003	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Tajikistan	NA	1987	2013	2010	NA	NA	1998	NA	1987	NA
Tanzania	1987	1987	NA	NA	NA	2004	NA	NA	1987	1987
Thailand	NA	1999	2007	1987	2007	1998	1987	NA	1987	NA
Togo	1987	1987	NA	2007	NA	-999	NA	NA	2007	2013
Trinidad Tobago	1987	1987	1999	1987	2000	NA	NA	NA	1987	NA
Tunisia	1993	1992	1993	2007	NA	2004	NA	NA	1987	2011
Turkmenistan	NA	-999	NA	2012	NA	NA	NA	2012	1987	NA
Uganda	1995	1995	2009	1987	NA	2006	NA	NA	1987	1987
Ukraine	NA	1996	2001	2012	NA	2007	1987	NA	1987	NA
UAE	NA	NA	NA	1987	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Uruguay	NA	1987	1995	1987	NA	2009	1987	NA	1987	2009
Uzbekistan	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1987	2004
Venezuela	2009	1993	1998	1987	1999	1998	1987	NA	NA	1997
Vietnam	NA	2008	2007	1987	2008	2013	1987	1987	1987	2015
Yemen	NA	1996	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Zambia	2012	1987	2011	1987	NA	2011	NA	NA	1987	NA
Zimbabwe	2004	2004	2007	2016	2001	2002	NA	NA	1987	2013



Figure 8.1: Decade of Adoption: Gender Ministry and Machinery



Figure 8.2: Decade of Adoption: Marital Rape



Figure 8.3: Decade of Adoption: Child Marriage and Abortion Laws



Figure 8.4: Kaplan Meier Survival Curves, VAW Laws



Figure 8.5: Kaplan Meier Survival Curves, Other Laws



Figure 8.6: Survival Curves by Conflict Status, VAW Laws







Figure 8.7: Survival Curves by Conflict Status, Other Laws



Figure 8.8: Weibull Density Plot, VAW Laws



Figure 8.9: Weibull Density Plot, Other Laws



Figure 8.10: Weibull Model Fit, VAW Laws



Figure 8.11: Weibull Model Fit, Other Laws



Figure 8.12: Map: Global Fertility Rates, 1988–2015

Table 8.5: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Intimate Partner Violence Law	5,660	0.237	0.425	0	1
Sexual Harassment Law	5,542	0.217	0.412	0	1
Marital Rape Law	5,691	0.097	0.296	0	1
Gender Ministry	5,589	0.232	0.422	0	1
Gender Machinery	5,610	0.518	0.500	0	1
Legislative Gender Quota	5,843	0.158	0.365	0	1
Conflict Status	5,825	0.420	0.684	0	2
Security Council Neighbors	5,662	0.681	0.466	0	1
Export Context	5,846	3.707	0.789	1.923	5.393
IGO Context	5,669	3.760	0.516	2.048	5.067
WINGOs	5,329	25.104	20.961	0	114
% Female Legislature	5,024	10.629	9.202	0.000	63.800
Freedom House	5,464	4.547	1.734	1.000	7.000
GDP per Capita	5,230	7.043	1.357	3.948	11.391
Fertility	5,839	4.410	1.938	1.085	8.713







Figure 8.13: Hazard Rates, VAW Laws



Figure 8.14: Hazard Rates, Other Laws

Table 8.6: Women's Rights Law Adoption and Women's Rights Outcomes Correlation: Female Legislature Percent

	Dependent variable:					
	Female Legislature Percent					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intimate Partner Violence Law	1.23*** (0.32)					
Sexual Harassment Law		0.13 (0.33)				
Martial Rape Law			3.33*** (0.43)			
Gender Machinery				1.15*** (0.33)		
Gender Ministry1					1.03** (0.40)	
Political Gender Quota						4.26*** (0.33)
Conflict	−0.27 (0.34)	−0.46 (0.34)	−0.27 (0.33)	−0.22 (0.33)	−0.60* (0.34)	−0.50 (0.32)
Women's CSO	2.05*** (0.32)	2.33*** (0.31)	2.05*** (0.31)	2.32*** (0.32)	2.44*** (0.32)	1.65*** (0.29)
Muslim Majority	−0.25 (1.13)	−0.32 (1.12)	−0.01 (1.12)	−0.64 (1.11)	−0.40 (1.11)	−0.27 (1.10)
Freedom House	0.24* (0.13)	0.37*** (0.14)	0.24* (0.13)	0.22* (0.13)	0.26* (0.13)	0.50*** (0.12)
GDP Per Capita	−1.35*** (0.31)	−1.23*** (0.34)	−1.19*** (0.30)	−0.99*** (0.30)	−0.93*** (0.30)	−1.04*** (0.29)
Oil Rents per GDP	−0.05** (0.02)	−0.05* (0.03)	−0.04* (0.02)	−0.06** (0.02)	−0.06** (0.02)	−0.05** (0.02)
Constant	36.53*** (2.81)	35.46*** (3.06)	33.28*** (2.77)	34.82*** (2.79)	33.78*** (2.79)	34.30*** (2.63)
Country Fixed Effects						
Year Fixed Effects						
Observations	3,007	2,926	3,021	2,961	2,958	3,150
R^2	0.75	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.75	0.75
Residual Std. Error	4.87 (df = 2841)	4.81 (df = 2759)	4.81 (df = 2853)	4.80 (df = 2795)	4.80 (df = 2792)	4.76 (df = 2980)
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.7: Women's Rights Law Adoption and Women's Rights Outcomes Correlation: Political Empowerment Index

	Dependent variable:					
	Political Empowerment Index					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intimate Partner Violence Law	0.002 (0.003)					
Sexual Harassment Law		-0.01^{***} (0.003)				
Martial Rape Law			0.01^{**} (0.004)			
Gender Ministry1				0.01^{***} (0.003)		
Gender Machinery					0.01^{***} (0.003)	
Political Gender Quota						0.03^{***} (0.003)
Conflict	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.0000 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Women's CSO	0.08^{***} (0.003)	0.08^{***} (0.003)	0.08^{***} (0.003)	0.08^{***} (0.003)	0.08^{***} (0.003)	0.08^{***} (0.002)
Muslim Majority	0.01 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Freedom House	-0.01^{***} (0.001)	-0.01^{***} (0.001)	-0.01^{***} (0.001)	-0.01^{***} (0.001)	-0.01^{***} (0.001)	-0.01^{***} (0.001)
GDP Per Capita	-0.01^{***} (0.002)	-0.01^{***} (0.003)	-0.01^{***} (0.002)	-0.01^{***} (0.002)	-0.01^{***} (0.002)	-0.01^{***} (0.002)
Oil Rents per GDP	-0.0004^{**} (0.0002)	-0.0003 (0.0002)	-0.0003^{*} (0.0002)	-0.0005^{**} (0.0002)	-0.0004^{**} (0.0002)	-0.0003^{*} (0.0002)
Constant	0.63^{***} (0.02)	0.65^{***} (0.03)	0.62^{***} (0.02)	0.62^{***} (0.02)	0.64^{***} (0.02)	0.63^{***} (0.02)
Country Fixed Effects						
Year Fixed Effects						
Observations	3,064	2,980	3,081	3,015	3,016	3,213
R^2	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95
Adjusted R^2	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95
Residual Std. Error	0.04 (df = 2897)	0.04 (df = 2812)	0.04 (df = 2912)	0.04 (df = 2848)	0.04 (df = 2849)	0.04 (df = 3042)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.8: Women's Rights Law Adoption and Women's Rights Outcomes Correlation: Gendered Power Index

	Dependent variable:					
	Gendered Power Index					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intimate Partner Violence Law	0.04* (0.02)					
Sexual Harassment Law		0.02 (0.02)				
Martial Rape Law			0.15*** (0.03)			
Gender Ministry1				−0.07*** (0.02)		
Gender Machinery					−0.02 (0.02)	
Political Gender Quota						0.15*** (0.02)
Conflict	0.09*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
Women's CSO	0.24*** (0.02)	0.28*** (0.02)	0.27*** (0.02)	0.25*** (0.02)	0.25*** (0.02)	0.27*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	−0.07 (0.05)	−0.07 (0.06)	−0.05 (0.05)	−0.06 (0.05)	−0.07 (0.05)	−0.07 (0.05)
Freedom House	−0.05*** (0.01)	−0.04*** (0.01)	−0.04*** (0.01)	−0.05*** (0.01)	−0.05*** (0.01)	−0.03*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.04** (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.004 (0.02)
Oil Rents per GDP	−0.001 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)	−0.0002 (0.001)	−0.0005 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)
Constant	1.19*** (0.16)	1.27*** (0.18)	1.02*** (0.16)	1.25*** (0.16)	1.23*** (0.16)	1.02*** (0.16)
Country Fixed Effects						
Year Fixed Effects						
Observations	3,182	3,098	3,203	3,131	3,136	3,346
R^2	0.91	0.90	0.91	0.91	0.90	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90
Residual Std. Error	0.29 (df = 3015)	0.30 (df = 2930)	0.29 (df = 3034)	0.29 (df = 2964)	0.29 (df = 2969)	0.30 (df = 3175)
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.9: Women's Rights Law Adoption and Women's Rights Outcomes Correlation: Fertility Rates

	Dependent variable:					
	Fertility					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intimate Partner Violence Law	0.08*** (0.02)					
Sexual Harassment Law		0.17*** (0.02)				
Martial Rape Law			0.02 (0.03)			
Gender Ministry1				−0.11*** (0.03)		
Gender Machinery					−0.01 (0.02)	
Political Gender Quota						0.03 (0.02)
Conflict	0.07*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Women's CSO	−0.06*** (0.02)	−0.04** (0.02)	−0.06*** (0.02)	−0.05*** (0.02)	−0.06*** (0.02)	−0.05*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.21*** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.06)	0.19*** (0.06)	0.19*** (0.06)
Freedom House	−0.03*** (0.01)	−0.02** (0.01)	−0.04*** (0.01)	−0.03*** (0.01)	−0.03*** (0.01)	−0.03*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	0.14*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)
Oil Rents per GDP	0.01*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)
Constant	1.66*** (0.18)	1.26*** (0.20)	1.62*** (0.18)	1.71*** (0.18)	1.64*** (0.18)	1.64*** (0.18)
Country Fixed Effects						
Year Fixed Effects						
Observations	3,182	3,098	3,203	3,131	3,136	3,346
R^2	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.96
Adjusted R^2	0.96	0.97	0.97	0.96	0.96	0.96
Residual Std. Error	0.33 (df = 3015)	0.32 (df = 2930)	0.32 (df = 3034)	0.33 (df = 2964)	0.33 (df = 2969)	0.34 (df = 3175)
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.10: Women's Rights Law Adoption and Women's Rights Outcomes Correlation: Women's CSO Participation

	Dependent variable:					
	Women's CSO Participation					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intimate Partner Violence Law	0.02 (0.02)					
Sexual Harassment Law		0.01 (0.02)				
Martial Rape Law			0.09*** (0.03)			
Gender Ministry1				0.04* (0.02)		
Gender Machinery					−0.02 (0.02)	
Political Gender Quota						0.13*** (0.02)
Conflict	0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.09 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)	0.09 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.12** (0.06)
Freedom House	−0.07*** (0.01)	−0.07*** (0.01)	−0.07*** (0.01)	−0.07*** (0.01)	−0.07*** (0.01)	−0.07*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.09*** (0.02)	−0.09*** (0.02)	−0.09*** (0.02)	−0.08*** (0.02)	−0.08*** (0.02)	−0.09*** (0.02)
Oil Rents per GDP	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.002 (0.001)	−0.002 (0.001)	−0.002* (0.001)	−0.002 (0.001)
Constant	1.96*** (0.16)	2.03*** (0.17)	1.92*** (0.16)	1.97*** (0.16)	1.90*** (0.16)	2.03*** (0.15)
Country Fixed Effects						
Year Fixed Effects						
Observations	3,182	3,098	3,203	3,131	3,136	3,346
R^2	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.89
Adjusted R^2	0.90	0.89	0.89	0.90	0.90	0.89
Residual Std. Error	0.29 (df = 3016)	0.29 (df = 2931)	0.29 (df = 3035)	0.29 (df = 2965)	0.29 (df = 2970)	0.30 (df = 3176)
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.11: Women's Rights Law Adoption and Women's Rights Outcomes Correlation: Female Labor Force Participation

	Dependent variable:					
	Female Labor Force Participation Rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intimate Partner Violence Law	−0.22 (0.19)					
Sexual Harassment Law		−0.11 (0.19)				
Martial Rape Law			1.61*** (0.26)			
Gender Ministry1				0.21 (0.24)		
Gender Machinery					−0.12 (0.20)	
Political Gender Quota						0.17 (0.20)
Conflict	−0.36* (0.20)	−0.51** (0.20)	−0.32* (0.19)	−0.32 (0.20)	−0.35* (0.20)	−0.34* (0.19)
Women's CSO	−0.76*** (0.19)	−0.74*** (0.18)	−0.82*** (0.18)	−0.85*** (0.20)	−0.80*** (0.20)	−0.80*** (0.19)
Muslim Majority	−3.81*** (0.57)	−3.46*** (0.54)	−3.43*** (0.55)	−3.88*** (0.57)	−3.83*** (0.57)	−3.74*** (0.56)
Freedom House	0.42*** (0.08)	0.54*** (0.08)	0.47*** (0.08)	0.43*** (0.08)	0.43*** (0.08)	0.42*** (0.08)
GDP Per Capita	−0.42** (0.18)	−0.67*** (0.19)	−0.43** (0.18)	−0.42** (0.19)	−0.42** (0.18)	−0.45** (0.18)
Oil Rents per GDP	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Constant	36.74*** (1.69)	37.85*** (1.77)	35.15*** (1.63)	36.59*** (1.72)	36.49*** (1.71)	36.96*** (1.66)
Country Fixed Effects						
Year Fixed Effects						
Observations	3,081	3,001	3,101	3,034	3,038	3,146
R^2	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.97	0.97	0.97
Adjusted R^2	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97
Residual Std. Error	2.95 (df = 2916)	2.82 (df = 2835)	2.85 (df = 2934)	2.96 (df = 2869)	2.96 (df = 2873)	2.91 (df = 2978)
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.12: Robustness Check: UN Security Council Neighbor, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.87 (3.75)	−5.08 (4.30)	−1.37 (6.06)
Post Conflict	−0.74 (4.56)	11.46 (8.00)	−11.25 (10.93)
UN Security Council Neighbor	−0.96 (1.90)	−1.65 (1.88)	−5.82* (3.41)
Export Context	1.13 (0.75)	−2.14** (0.84)	1.86 (1.26)
IGO Context	−0.20 (0.49)	−0.27 (0.55)	−0.25 (0.84)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.02 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.30*** (0.10)	−0.21** (0.10)	−0.16 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.09 (0.13)	0.03 (0.15)	0.07 (0.23)
Fertility	−0.32** (0.13)	−0.14 (0.14)	−0.33 (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−0.29 (0.36)	−0.63 (0.40)	−2.62** (1.10)
Years to Adopt	0.31 (0.23)	−0.11 (0.24)	0.12 (0.32)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.004 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0001 (0.0003)	−0.0002 (0.0004)	−0.0002 (0.0005)
Active Conflict:UN Security Council Neighbor	−8.40 (5.94)	2.34 (5.03)	−139.77 (9,170.22)
Post Conflict:UN Security Council Neighbor	7.47* (4.02)	−12.13 (8.46)	5.62 (6.96)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.14 (0.76)	0.53 (0.89)	0.12 (1.07)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.84** (0.94)	−1.75 (2.02)	1.72 (1.69)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.54** (0.76)	0.46 (0.78)	0.49 (1.30)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.52* (0.92)	−2.60** (1.28)	1.32 (2.16)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.003 (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)	0.003 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	−0.005 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.05 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.04 (0.07)
Constant	−7.32* (3.77)	5.92 (3.94)	−9.83 (6.23)
Observations	2,011	2,115	2,663
Log Likelihood	−300.15	−286.09	−141.43
Akaike Inf. Crit.	650.31	622.17	332.85

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.13: Robustness Check: UN Security Council Neighbor, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	0.53 (4.34)	−4.88 (3.80)	−5.47 (4.14)
Post Conflict	4.26 (7.49)	1.11 (4.50)	18.20** (8.28)
UN Security Council Neighbor	2.17 (2.27)	−0.24 (1.75)	−0.06 (2.12)
Export Context	2.84* (1.53)	0.75 (0.81)	−0.80 (0.85)
IGO Context	−0.77 (0.65)	−0.86* (0.45)	−0.08 (0.60)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.06 (0.12)	−0.33*** (0.10)	−0.05 (0.11)
GDP Per Capita	−0.47** (0.22)	−0.18 (0.14)	−0.26 (0.17)
Fertility	0.28 (0.18)	0.06 (0.12)	−0.27* (0.16)
Muslim Majority	0.24 (0.49)	−0.29 (0.37)	0.23 (0.38)
Years to Adopt	−0.30 (0.27)	−1.45*** (0.34)	0.07 (0.28)
Years to Adopt^2	0.05** (0.02)	0.23*** (0.06)	−0.0003 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	−0.0000 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002** (0.0001)	
Active Conflict:UN Security Council Neighbor	−6.07 (5.22)	0.81 (4.11)	1.58 (4.64)
Post Conflict:UN Security Council Neighbor	14.46 (11.62)	6.08 (5.55)	−1.66 (6.42)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.05 (0.95)	−1.11 (0.89)	1.72* (0.89)
Post Conflict:Export Context	2.14 (2.07)	−1.26 (0.91)	−1.93 (1.77)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.12 (0.90)	1.98** (0.85)	−0.03 (0.83)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−2.89 (2.15)	0.73 (0.99)	−3.03** (1.27)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.14 (0.11)	0.03 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.06 (0.09)	−0.02 (0.06)	−0.13 (0.10)
Constant	−10.60 (6.72)	3.27 (3.36)	1.00 (4.22)
Observations	1,973	825	2,392
Log Likelihood	−174.09	−242.14	−249.60
Akaike Inf. Crit.	398.18	536.28	549.19

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.14: Robustness Check: UN Staff, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.08 (5.92)	1.58 (6.74)	0.39 (14.90)
Post Conflict	−0.76 (7.43)	2.38 (9.63)	−551.56 (128,456.90)
UN Staff	−0.04 (0.28)	0.07 (0.27)	0.74* (0.44)
Export Context	1.88 (1.25)	0.12 (1.12)	3.66** (1.85)
IGO Context	−0.19 (0.63)	0.09 (0.63)	0.10 (1.24)
WINGOs	0.0005 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.04* (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.34*** (0.13)	−0.34*** (0.12)	−0.43* (0.23)
GDP Per Capita	−0.17 (0.17)	−0.20 (0.18)	−0.45 (0.36)
Fertility	−0.54*** (0.17)	−0.19 (0.17)	−0.65* (0.35)
Muslim Majority	−0.51 (0.42)	−0.50 (0.44)	−2.24* (1.28)
Years to Adopt	−0.92 (0.87)	−0.99* (0.51)	−1.90 (1.27)
Years to Adopt^2	0.07 (0.05)	0.06* (0.03)	0.12* (0.08)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001* (0.001)	−0.002* (0.001)
Active Conflict:UN Staff	0.81 (0.49)	0.11 (0.57)	0.48 (1.22)
Post Conflict:UN Staff	−0.79 (0.58)	0.23 (0.69)	33.80 (3,233.18)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.13 (1.64)	−0.04 (1.86)	−1.23 (4.02)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−0.84 (1.78)	0.63 (2.68)	19.22 (32,866.08)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.65** (0.83)	−0.85 (0.92)	0.71 (1.77)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.02 (1.14)	−2.23* (1.24)	98.74 (12,644.36)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.002 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.04)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	−1.64 (387.97)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.09)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	3.85 (306.65)
Constant	−1.26 (6.97)	4.47 (4.71)	−1.20 (11.28)
Observations	1,116	1,198	1,707
Log Likelihood	−193.60	−220.60	−84.32
Akaike Inf. Crit.	437.19	491.19	218.65

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.15: Robustness Check: UN Staff, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.06 (12.93)	16.15 (17.63)	−14.36* (8.36)
Post Conflict	2,227.77 (221,925.90)	17.79 (14.01)	8.20 (10.49)
UN Staff	−0.33 (0.48)	0.82 (0.54)	−0.32 (0.38)
Export Context	5.85* (3.35)	0.37 (2.04)	−2.60* (1.34)
IGO Context	−0.58 (1.18)	0.11 (1.24)	−0.34 (0.79)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.03)	0.03** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.09 (0.20)	−0.56** (0.24)	0.10 (0.14)
GDP Per Capita	−0.42 (0.40)	−0.30 (0.34)	−0.50** (0.23)
Fertility	0.56* (0.30)	0.14 (0.29)	−0.47** (0.22)
Muslim Majority	0.07 (1.11)	−0.41 (0.88)	0.72 (0.45)
Years to Adopt	1.95 (2.83)	−6.65 (8.48)	−0.63 (0.59)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.07 (0.16)	0.56 (0.99)	0.04 (0.04)
Years to Adopt^3	0.001 (0.003)	−0.02 (0.05)	−0.001 (0.001)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0001 (0.001)	
Active Conflict:UN Staff	0.09 (1.04)	−3.66* (1.99)	0.13 (0.62)
Post Conflict:UN Staff	23.64 (15,182.81)	−0.80 (1.11)	0.73 (0.67)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.13 (3.37)	−1.78 (4.72)	5.69*** (2.16)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−364.40 (37,210.92)	−3.51 (3.31)	1.47 (2.71)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−0.43 (1.85)	−1.66 (2.81)	−0.62 (1.06)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−282.21 (28,564.48)	−1.54 (2.64)	−3.04** (1.31)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.06)	−0.04 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.87 (1,477.60)	0.05 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.04)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.15 (0.17)	−0.11 (0.19)	0.11 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−44.70 (6,650.86)	−0.25 (0.19)	−0.15 (0.10)
Constant	−34.97 (22.19)	26.10 (26.74)	11.77** (5.45)
Observations	1,167	271	1,435
Log Likelihood	−78.83	−72.75	−164.09
Akaike Inf. Crit.	207.66	197.50	378.18
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.16: Robustness Check: UN Aid, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.43 (4.37)	−2.38 (5.02)	−1.38 (8.72)
Post Conflict	2.83 (5.53)	14.74 (9.63)	−16.61 (18.63)
UN Aid	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Export Context	0.33 (0.88)	−1.22 (0.92)	2.81* (1.48)
IGO Context	0.14 (0.53)	0.09 (0.62)	0.06 (0.98)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.003 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.29*** (0.11)	−0.25** (0.11)	−0.11 (0.17)
GDP Per Capita	0.19 (0.16)	−0.13 (0.20)	−0.10 (0.30)
Fertility	−0.29** (0.14)	−0.19 (0.17)	−0.46* (0.25)
Muslim Majority	−0.28 (0.36)	−0.77* (0.44)	−2.50** (1.12)
Years to Adopt	0.28 (0.29)	−0.10 (0.29)	0.89 (0.55)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.04)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0001 (0.0004)	−0.0003 (0.0005)	0.001 (0.001)
Active Conflict:UN Aid	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Post Conflict:UN Aid	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.46 (0.91)	0.63 (1.09)	0.13 (1.59)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−2.32* (1.34)	−0.75 (2.02)	2.53 (2.65)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.83** (0.86)	−0.38 (0.90)	0.20 (1.53)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.02 (0.95)	−4.45** (2.05)	2.43 (3.59)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.002 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	−0.10 (0.10)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.02 (0.07)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.12 (0.10)
Constant	−6.39 (4.34)	2.42 (4.94)	−16.70** (8.39)
Observations	1,661	1,735	2,221
Log Likelihood	−260.22	−246.49	−121.01
Akaike Inf. Crit.	570.45	542.98	292.03

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.17: Robustness Check: UN Aid, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−1.39 (4.81)	−6.27 (5.14)	−9.97** (5.08)
Post Conflict	2.03 (7.76)	1.06 (4.82)	21.28** (10.10)
UN Aid	0.00** (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Export Context	3.21* (1.75)	0.12 (0.91)	−1.20 (0.86)
IGO Context	−0.79 (0.67)	−0.71 (0.49)	−0.34 (0.65)
WINGOs	0.0005 (0.01)	−0.003 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.06 (0.13)	−0.27** (0.11)	−0.05 (0.11)
GDP Per Capita	−0.47* (0.28)	−0.16 (0.20)	−0.12 (0.20)
Fertility	0.30 (0.19)	0.01 (0.14)	−0.26 (0.17)
Muslim Majority	0.30 (0.49)	−0.38 (0.39)	0.31 (0.39)
Years to Adopt	−0.33 (0.30)	−1.52*** (0.41)	−0.04 (0.30)
Years to Adopt^2	0.06** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.08)	0.002 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01** (0.01)	−0.0000 (0.0005)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002* (0.0001)	
Active Conflict:UN Aid	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Post Conflict:UN Aid	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.28 (1.00)	−0.88 (1.02)	2.38** (0.97)
Post Conflict:Export Context	2.26 (1.88)	−0.57 (0.90)	−2.91 (2.30)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.35 (0.94)	1.99* (1.06)	0.48 (0.89)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−2.29 (1.82)	0.07 (1.04)	−3.08** (1.36)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.001 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.11 (0.09)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.01 (0.07)	0.19** (0.09)	0.16*** (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.04 (0.09)	0.01 (0.06)	−0.16 (0.10)
Constant	−11.80 (7.80)	5.50 (3.83)	3.05 (4.56)
Observations	1,526	563	1,925
Log Likelihood	−153.44	−199.53	−223.22
Akaike Inf. Crit.	356.88	451.05	496.44

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.18: Robustness Check: Cultural Similarity, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−0.57 (2.90)	−3.87 (3.42)	3.22 (4.06)
Post Conflict	7.10* (3.78)	0.29 (4.94)	−3.77 (6.41)
World Bank Aid	0.004 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)
Export Context	0.88 (0.77)	−0.75 (0.99)	2.16 (1.33)
Cultural Context	−0.02 (0.32)	−0.10 (0.34)	0.15 (0.47)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.29*** (0.09)	−0.25*** (0.09)	−0.20 (0.14)
GDP Per Capita	0.13 (0.14)	−0.07 (0.16)	0.18 (0.24)
Fertility	−0.25** (0.10)	−0.13 (0.12)	−0.28 (0.17)
Muslim Majority	−0.35 (0.36)	−0.70* (0.40)	−1.73** (0.82)
Years to Adopt	0.27 (0.22)	0.12 (0.26)	0.24 (0.31)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.01)	0.0002 (0.02)	−0.004 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0000 (0.0003)	−0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0000 (0.0004)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.001 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.10* (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.04 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.06)	−0.08 (0.08)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.18 (0.98)	−1.01 (1.36)	1.54 (1.40)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−0.44 (1.19)	−2.38 (2.21)	1.96 (2.09)
Active Conflict:Cultural Context	−0.12 (0.72)	1.53 (0.96)	−1.53* (0.89)
Post Conflict:Cultural Context	−1.72* (1.01)	1.28 (0.97)	−0.44 (1.42)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.003 (0.01)	0.03** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.004 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.001 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.02 (0.06)
Constant	−7.63** (3.55)	−0.16 (3.82)	−14.75*** (5.69)
Observations	2,053	2,150	2,757
Log Likelihood	−307.21	−290.63	−148.60
Akaike Inf. Crit.	664.41	631.26	347.20

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.19: Robustness Check: Cultural Similarity, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	1.27 (3.60)	−1.42 (3.37)	−6.13* (3.34)
Post Conflict	−7.92 (8.40)	−2.07 (5.12)	4.52 (4.72)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)
Export Context	2.57 (1.65)	0.24 (0.85)	−0.001 (0.92)
Cultural Context	0.67 (0.48)	0.55* (0.32)	−0.58* (0.33)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.03)	−0.06* (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.02 (0.12)	−0.38*** (0.10)	−0.05 (0.10)
GDP Per Capita	−0.43* (0.23)	−0.13 (0.16)	−0.06 (0.19)
Fertility	0.30* (0.16)	0.03 (0.11)	−0.06 (0.13)
Muslim Majority	−0.48 (0.49)	−1.18*** (0.42)	0.26 (0.40)
Years to Adopt	−0.23 (0.27)	−1.48*** (0.34)	0.10 (0.27)
Years to Adopt^2	0.05** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.001 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	−0.0001 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002** (0.0001)	
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.26 (0.31)	0.20 (0.21)	−0.09* (0.05)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.91 (1.41)	−2.17* (1.19)	1.60 (1.17)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.02 (2.94)	−1.67 (1.33)	−3.77* (2.23)
Active Conflict:Cultural Context	0.52 (0.96)	1.61** (0.76)	0.33 (0.76)
Post Conflict:Cultural Context	1.58 (1.64)	0.83 (0.79)	2.37* (1.25)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.05 (0.05)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.06)	0.15** (0.07)	0.11** (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.06 (0.11)	0.04 (0.06)	−0.05 (0.08)
Constant	−15.39** (6.66)	−0.72 (3.22)	−3.26 (4.02)
Observations	2,020	829	2,452
Log Likelihood	−175.07	−236.83	−243.44
Akaike Inf. Crit.	400.15	525.66	536.89
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.20: Robustness Check: Female Labor Force Participation, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	3.84 (4.20)	−2.53 (4.95)	−0.05 (7.80)
Post Conflict	−1.31 (4.91)	9.91 (8.03)	−12.42 (11.72)
World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)
Export Context	0.56 (0.81)	−1.81** (0.91)	2.78* (1.46)
IGO Context	0.48 (0.43)	0.21 (0.47)	0.89 (0.74)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	−0.02 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.42*** (0.10)	−0.28*** (0.10)	−0.23 (0.16)
GDP Per Capita	0.32** (0.14)	−0.09 (0.16)	0.08 (0.27)
Female Labor Rate	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)
Muslim Majority	−0.86** (0.42)	−1.00** (0.46)	−3.89*** (1.40)
Years to Adopt	0.85** (0.35)	0.15 (0.35)	0.73 (0.56)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.05** (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.04)
Years to Adopt^3	0.001* (0.0005)	−0.0000 (0.0005)	0.0004 (0.001)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.07)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.04 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.07)	−0.09 (0.08)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.56 (0.95)	0.43 (1.11)	−0.10 (1.59)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.55 (1.04)	−1.61 (2.01)	2.62 (1.83)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.51** (0.77)	−0.13 (0.83)	0.29 (1.39)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.50 (0.95)	−2.26* (1.30)	1.30 (2.08)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.0001 (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.04* (0.03)	−0.01 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.07)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.06* (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.07)
Constant	−12.22*** (4.19)	3.14 (4.30)	−20.42*** (6.96)
Observations	1,803	1,899	2,450
Log Likelihood	−285.82	−271.39	−135.20
Akaike Inf. Crit.	621.64	592.78	320.40
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.21: Robustness Check: Female Labor Force Participation, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	3.51 (6.51)	9.47 (7.33)	−2.79 (5.17)
Post Conflict	−3.86 (10.60)	−1.25 (5.84)	17.96** (8.55)
World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)
Export Context	1.98 (1.69)	0.37 (0.92)	−1.29 (0.89)
IGO Context	−0.66 (0.73)	−0.46 (0.53)	−0.11 (0.52)
WINGOs	0.02 (0.01)	−0.003 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	−0.01 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.02)
Freedom House	0.09 (0.16)	−0.31** (0.13)	0.03 (0.11)
GDP Per Capita	−0.59** (0.24)	−0.05 (0.17)	0.13 (0.18)
Female Labor Rate	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.02* (0.01)
Muslim Majority	0.50 (0.62)	−0.21 (0.47)	−0.28 (0.46)
Years to Adopt	0.79 (0.61)	3.99* (2.12)	0.70 (0.46)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.56* (0.30)	−0.04 (0.03)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0003 (0.001)	0.03* (0.02)	0.001 (0.001)
Years to Adopt^4		−0.001* (0.0004)	
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.004 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.05)	−0.04 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.18 (0.26)	0.14 (0.15)	−0.09* (0.06)
Active Conflict:Export Context	1.36 (1.43)	−1.34 (1.39)	1.47 (1.11)
Post Conflict:Export Context	2.78 (2.47)	−0.94 (1.14)	−1.65 (1.88)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−2.03 (1.35)	−1.40 (1.39)	−0.34 (0.92)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−2.01 (1.82)	0.39 (1.02)	−2.77** (1.19)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	−0.04** (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.08 (0.08)	0.04 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)	0.12** (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.03 (0.09)	0.001 (0.06)	−0.16 (0.11)
Constant	−10.50 (7.55)	−11.25* (6.38)	−4.18 (4.71)
Observations	1,780	659	2,177
Log Likelihood	−140.13	−181.82	−228.43
Akaike Inf. Crit.	330.27	415.65	506.85
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.22: Robustness Check: Year Fixed Effects, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.97 (3.85)	−4.22 (4.28)	−3.99 (6.92)
Post Conflict	0.23 (4.77)	11.68 (8.12)	−8.92 (10.79)
World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.02)	−0.002 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Export Context	1.46* (0.85)	−0.95 (1.04)	1.94 (1.38)
IGO Context	−0.14 (0.50)	−0.18 (0.58)	−0.23 (0.87)
WINGOs	0.004 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.32*** (0.10)	−0.25** (0.11)	−0.16 (0.16)
GDP Per Capita	0.12 (0.15)	−0.08 (0.18)	0.13 (0.26)
Fertility	−0.30** (0.14)	−0.11 (0.16)	−0.42* (0.23)
Muslim Majority	−0.41 (0.37)	−0.62 (0.41)	−2.70** (1.14)
Years to Adopt	1.40 (0.90)	0.37 (0.63)	0.50 (1.53)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.08 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.05)	−0.03 (0.12)
Years to Adopt^3	0.002 (0.001)	0.0005 (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.06 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.06 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.09)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.09 (0.87)	0.51 (0.92)	0.71 (1.25)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.82* (1.03)	−1.72 (1.96)	2.22 (1.92)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.57** (0.75)	0.42 (0.80)	0.78 (1.34)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.09 (0.94)	−2.59* (1.36)	0.52 (2.18)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.005 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.02 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.07)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.07)
Constant	−8.64** (4.31)	1.48 (5.19)	−10.66 (7.15)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	2,025	2,115	2,677
Log Likelihood	−281.52	−267.90	−128.21
Akaike Inf. Crit.	667.03	639.80	360.43

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.23: Robustness Check: Year Fixed Effects, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−0.23 (4.24)	−3.36 (4.15)	−4.65 (4.15)
Post Conflict	−2.79 (10.38)	−2.90 (6.15)	20.64** (9.08)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)
Export Context	2.63 (1.71)	0.88 (0.91)	−0.52 (0.98)
IGO Context	−0.58 (0.65)	−0.61 (0.48)	0.07 (0.63)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.002 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.03 (0.13)	−0.34*** (0.11)	−0.04 (0.12)
GDP Per Capita	−0.47* (0.25)	−0.10 (0.17)	−0.05 (0.20)
Fertility	0.25 (0.20)	0.17 (0.14)	−0.13 (0.17)
Muslim Majority	0.22 (0.54)	−0.61 (0.43)	0.23 (0.39)
Years to Adopt	3.21 (4.65)	7.87* (4.03)	2.73** (1.32)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.14 (0.29)	−1.11** (0.55)	−0.20** (0.09)
Years to Adopt^3	0.002 (0.01)	0.06** (0.03)	0.004** (0.002)
Years to Adopt^4		−0.001** (0.001)	
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.04 (0.05)	0.004 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.28 (0.35)	0.27 (0.22)	−0.10* (0.06)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.14 (1.06)	−1.54 (1.02)	1.69* (0.93)
Post Conflict:Export Context	1.90 (1.99)	−1.15 (1.01)	−2.30 (2.00)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.03 (0.92)	2.00** (0.95)	−0.09 (0.84)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−1.78 (1.86)	0.37 (1.03)	−3.06** (1.28)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03** (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.12 (0.09)	0.03 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.07)	0.17** (0.08)	0.12** (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.04 (0.09)	0.005 (0.06)	−0.14 (0.11)
Constant	−12.21 (8.92)	−7.03 (5.14)	−5.24 (5.16)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	1,987	826	2,406
Log Likelihood	−156.59	−214.81	−219.32
Akaike Inf. Crit.	417.17	535.62	542.63
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.24: Robustness Check: Aid Dependency Context, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	1.42 (5.02)	−6.01 (3.98)	−5.98 (5.00)
Post Conflict	−0.84 (11.43)	−7.04 (6.42)	18.32*** (7.08)
World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Aid Context	2.94 (2.69)	0.34 (0.57)	−0.37 (0.90)
IGO Context	−0.62 (0.63)	−0.76* (0.45)	−0.30 (0.61)
WINGOs	0.02** (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.11 (0.12)	−0.29*** (0.10)	−0.08 (0.11)
GDP Per Capita	−0.39 (0.25)	−0.02 (0.16)	−0.03 (0.19)
Fertility	0.28 (0.18)	0.09 (0.12)	−0.24 (0.16)
Muslim Majority	0.29 (0.48)	−0.43 (0.38)	0.35 (0.38)
Years to Adopt	−0.41 (0.30)	−1.71*** (0.38)	0.32 (0.32)
Years to Adopt^2	0.06*** (0.02)	0.27*** (0.07)	−0.02 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.01)	0.001 (0.001)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0003** (0.0001)	
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.26 (0.42)	0.22 (0.17)	−0.06 (0.06)
Active Conflict:Aid Context	−0.61 (1.21)	−0.49 (0.73)	1.76 (1.21)
Post Conflict:Aid Context	1.90 (2.29)	0.07 (1.29)	−2.07 (1.63)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.25 (0.89)	1.60** (0.78)	0.33 (0.83)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−2.24 (1.71)	0.74 (0.96)	−2.83** (1.19)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.11 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.06)	0.13** (0.06)	0.13** (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.03 (0.10)	0.01 (0.06)	−0.10 (0.09)
Constant	−10.64 (10.12)	3.28 (3.26)	−3.20 (4.91)
Observations	1,789	771	2,212
Log Likelihood	−175.93	−238.09	−236.07
Akaike Inf. Crit.	401.85	528.17	522.13
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.25: Robustness Check: Aid Dependency Context, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	7.67* (4.56)	−6.23 (4.84)	0.22 (7.30)
Post Conflict	−2.63 (5.20)	10.84 (10.60)	8.52 (12.94)
World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.05 (0.04)
Aid Context	−0.98* (0.50)	0.29 (0.77)	−1.17 (0.79)
IGO Context	−0.16 (0.50)	−0.11 (0.56)	−0.06 (0.99)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.04** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.33*** (0.10)	−0.23** (0.10)	−0.19 (0.16)
GDP Per Capita	0.14 (0.15)	−0.09 (0.17)	0.28 (0.26)
Fertility	−0.27** (0.12)	−0.21 (0.15)	−0.22 (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−0.40 (0.37)	−0.67 (0.42)	−17.27 (942.07)
Years to Adopt	0.22 (0.26)	0.15 (0.27)	0.18 (0.36)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0003 (0.0005)	−0.0001 (0.0005)	0.001 (0.001)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.06 (0.06)	−0.05 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.08)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.06 (0.07)	0.13 (0.20)	−0.02 (0.11)
Active Conflict:Aid Context	−1.29 (1.18)	1.51 (1.19)	−0.91 (1.40)
Post Conflict:Aid Context	−1.16 (1.20)	−0.59 (2.38)	−2.26 (2.39)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.44* (0.83)	0.19 (0.81)	1.03 (1.49)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.27 (0.98)	−4.01** (1.88)	−0.67 (2.64)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.0000 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.0001 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.001 (0.06)
Constant	−0.10 (3.47)	−3.38 (4.45)	−2.57 (6.22)
Observations	1,904	1,981	2,437
Log Likelihood	−279.05	−272.30	−130.38
Akaike Inf. Crit.	608.10	594.60	310.75

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.26: Robustness Check: Colonial History, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.09 (3.70)	−5.04 (4.20)	−2.21 (5.91)
Post Conflict	−0.40 (4.62)	10.78 (7.94)	−10.02 (11.32)
World Bank Aid	0.003 (0.02)	−0.001 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Export Context	1.34* (0.79)	−2.52*** (0.92)	2.42* (1.38)
IGO Context	−0.20 (0.51)	−0.14 (0.55)	−0.09 (0.87)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.30*** (0.10)	−0.27** (0.11)	−0.19 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.10 (0.14)	0.03 (0.17)	0.17 (0.25)
Fertility	−0.32** (0.13)	−0.19 (0.15)	−0.26 (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−0.30 (0.37)	−0.69* (0.40)	−2.71** (1.12)
Years to Adopt	0.35 (0.24)	−0.18 (0.24)	0.23 (0.34)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.0001 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0002 (0.0003)	−0.0003 (0.0004)	−0.0001 (0.001)
British Colony	−0.27 (0.31)	0.13 (0.34)	−0.22 (0.51)
French Colony	−0.19 (0.41)	1.20*** (0.44)	−0.18 (0.75)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.06 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.06 (0.08)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.17 (0.81)	0.58 (0.91)	0.22 (1.10)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.65* (0.98)	−1.78 (1.95)	1.88 (1.75)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.43* (0.75)	0.54 (0.77)	0.76 (1.29)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.19 (0.92)	−2.34* (1.28)	1.09 (2.19)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.005 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.09* (0.05)	−0.01 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.05 (0.03)	0.06* (0.04)	0.04 (0.07)
Constant	−8.28** (3.86)	7.03* (4.25)	−14.46** (6.93)
Observations	2,025	2,115	2,677
Log Likelihood	−302.94	−283.49	−144.41
Akaike Inf. Crit.	659.88	620.99	342.82

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.27: Robustness Check: Colonial History, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	0.004 (4.31)	−5.00 (3.90)	−5.20 (4.19)
Post Conflict	−2.44 (9.93)	−4.82 (5.72)	21.35** (8.80)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Export Context	2.72* (1.63)	0.28 (0.92)	−0.11 (0.93)
IGO Context	−0.60 (0.65)	−0.82* (0.46)	0.48 (0.67)
WINGOs	0.02 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.06 (0.13)	−0.35*** (0.10)	−0.07 (0.11)
GDP Per Capita	−0.46* (0.24)	−0.03 (0.17)	−0.15 (0.19)
Fertility	0.28 (0.18)	0.07 (0.13)	−0.04 (0.17)
Muslim Majority	0.12 (0.49)	−0.56 (0.38)	0.32 (0.41)
Years to Adopt	−0.39 (0.28)	−1.58*** (0.35)	0.31 (0.30)
Years to Adopt^2	0.06*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.06)	−0.01 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	0.0003 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002** (0.0001)	
British Colony	−0.29 (0.45)	0.40 (0.37)	−1.61*** (0.48)
French Colony	0.44 (0.51)	0.49 (0.44)	−1.03** (0.46)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.26 (0.38)	0.23 (0.19)	−0.08 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.08 (0.97)	−0.86 (0.91)	1.70* (0.91)
Post Conflict:Export Context	1.64 (1.82)	−0.70 (0.89)	−2.29 (1.91)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.18 (0.90)	1.75** (0.87)	0.03 (0.86)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−1.73 (1.71)	0.82 (0.96)	−3.29*** (1.25)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.10 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.04)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.06)	0.15** (0.07)	0.09* (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.02 (0.09)	0.02 (0.06)	−0.15 (0.10)
Constant	−10.38 (6.98)	3.79 (3.72)	−6.61 (4.76)
Observations	1,987	826	2,406
Log Likelihood	−174.34	−237.69	−236.82
Akaike Inf. Crit.	402.69	531.37	527.64

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.28: Robustness Check: Conflict With Coups Included, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.55 (3.70)	−5.58 (4.26)	−2.42 (5.90)
Post Conflict	2.25 (4.25)	3.13 (5.73)	−11.14 (11.02)
World Bank Aid	0.004 (0.02)	−0.005 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Export Context	1.31* (0.77)	−1.81** (0.84)	2.21* (1.26)
IGO Context	−0.18 (0.49)	−0.29 (0.55)	−0.16 (0.86)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.29*** (0.10)	−0.21** (0.10)	−0.19 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.11 (0.14)	−0.05 (0.17)	0.17 (0.25)
Fertility	−0.35*** (0.13)	−0.17 (0.15)	−0.28 (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−0.33 (0.36)	−0.59 (0.39)	−2.72** (1.11)
Years to Adopt	0.33 (0.24)	−0.11 (0.24)	0.21 (0.33)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.0002 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0002 (0.0003)	−0.0003 (0.0004)	−0.0001 (0.001)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.06 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)	−0.07 (0.08)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.13 (0.81)	0.79 (0.91)	0.24 (1.10)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.67* (0.91)	0.35 (1.23)	1.83 (1.72)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.52** (0.75)	0.46 (0.78)	0.78 (1.27)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	0.58 (0.84)	−1.78 (1.11)	1.42 (2.11)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.003 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.07)
Constant	−8.33** (3.82)	5.32 (4.09)	−13.37** (6.55)
Observations	2,025	2,115	2,677
Log Likelihood	−303.81	−288.44	−144.44
Akaike Inf. Crit.	657.61	626.88	338.88
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.29: Robustness Check: Conflict With Coups Included, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−0.46 (4.34)	−5.20 (3.90)	−6.63 (4.25)
Post Conflict	3.36 (5.45)	−1.91 (4.35)	12.40* (6.50)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.03)
Export Context	2.89* (1.56)	0.36 (0.84)	−1.20 (0.84)
IGO Context	−0.78 (0.69)	−0.67 (0.46)	−0.17 (0.61)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.06 (0.13)	−0.34*** (0.10)	−0.002 (0.11)
GDP Per Capita	−0.40* (0.24)	−0.02 (0.16)	−0.02 (0.19)
Fertility	0.27 (0.18)	0.13 (0.12)	−0.21 (0.16)
Muslim Majority	0.09 (0.48)	−0.58 (0.39)	0.22 (0.38)
Years to Adopt	−0.37 (0.27)	−1.56*** (0.35)	0.10 (0.29)
Years to Adopt^2	0.06*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.06)	−0.01 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	0.0002 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002** (0.0001)	
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)	−0.08 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.02 (0.98)	−0.82 (0.89)	2.01** (0.89)
Post Conflict:Export Context	1.01 (1.14)	−0.08 (0.79)	−0.39 (1.41)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.31 (0.93)	1.80** (0.85)	0.11 (0.85)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−1.42 (1.14)	0.42 (0.88)	−2.55** (1.12)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.06)	0.13** (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.07 (0.07)	−0.03 (0.05)	−0.12 (0.09)
Constant	−11.00 (7.02)	2.48 (3.52)	−0.49 (4.35)
Observations	1,987	826	2,406
Log Likelihood	−175.48	−239.08	−245.71
Akaike Inf. Crit.	400.96	530.16	541.41

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.30: Robustness Check: 1,000 Battle Deaths Only, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.55 (3.70)	−10.81 (10.80)	509.97 (63,516.34)
Post Conflict	2.25 (4.25)	−7.01 (4.44)	−3.48 (6.95)
World Bank Aid	0.004 (0.02)	−0.005 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
Export Context	1.31* (0.77)	−1.70** (0.83)	2.50** (1.24)
IGO Context	−0.18 (0.49)	−0.74 (0.56)	0.30 (0.78)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.02 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.29*** (0.10)	−0.19* (0.10)	−0.22 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.11 (0.14)	0.06 (0.17)	0.02 (0.24)
Fertility	−0.35*** (0.13)	−0.14 (0.15)	−0.30 (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−0.33 (0.36)	−0.47 (0.39)	−2.57** (1.09)
Years to Adopt	0.33 (0.24)	−0.19 (0.25)	0.16 (0.33)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.005 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0002 (0.0003)	−0.0004 (0.0004)	−0.0002 (0.001)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.10 (0.09)	5.32 (3,015.78)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.06)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.13 (0.81)	−0.32 (2.37)	138.34 (18,850.61)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.67* (0.91)	1.05 (0.98)	−0.35 (1.36)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.52** (0.75)	2.67 (2.02)	−376.58 (27,906.22)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	0.58 (0.84)	0.79 (0.82)	1.41 (1.58)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.06* (0.03)	3.88 (428.28)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.003 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.001 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.06 (0.09)	−4.11 (595.61)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)
Constant	−8.33** (3.82)	5.58 (4.08)	−14.32** (6.22)
Observations	2,025	2,115	2,677
Log Likelihood	−303.81	−287.31	−141.13
Akaike Inf. Crit.	657.61	624.62	332.27

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.31: Robustness Checks: 1,000 Battle Deaths Only, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	836.85 (71,614.44)	5,201.43 (476,961.00)	4.24 (9.92)
Post Conflict	−4.94 (5.60)	−11.31** (5.28)	2.67 (5.31)
World Bank Aid	−0.002 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Export Context	3.12** (1.55)	0.14 (0.78)	−0.71 (0.79)
IGO Context	−1.23** (0.58)	−0.71* (0.42)	−0.28 (0.55)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.03)	−0.05* (0.03)	−0.03 (0.02)
Freedom House	0.08 (0.12)	−0.24** (0.10)	−0.02 (0.11)
GDP Per Capita	−0.46* (0.24)	−0.05 (0.16)	−0.09 (0.19)
Fertility	0.22 (0.17)	0.05 (0.12)	−0.26 (0.16)
Muslim Majority	0.27 (0.49)	−0.40 (0.36)	0.23 (0.38)
Years to Adopt	−0.46* (0.27)	−1.61*** (0.34)	−0.03 (0.27)
Years to Adopt^2	0.07*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.003 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	−0.0000 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002** (0.0001)	
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	1.21 (252.46)	37.62 (5,920.86)	−0.10 (0.09)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.08 (0.07)	0.10 (0.07)	−0.08 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−42.50 (3,231.33)	−632.32 (51,586.84)	1.41 (1.71)
Post Conflict:Export Context	0.65 (1.03)	0.14 (0.94)	1.72 (1.10)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−204.98 (15,550.59)	−993.72 (60,788.74)	−2.18 (2.46)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	0.67 (1.08)	2.22* (1.16)	−2.13 (1.42)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.65 (176.56)	−5.09 (231.97)	0.002 (0.03)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.004 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.02)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	−2.98 (1,377.59)	−27.71 (2,119.62)	0.02 (0.19)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.02 (0.07)	0.13** (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)
Constant	−9.08 (6.68)	3.71 (3.20)	−0.32 (4.10)
Observations	1,987	826	2,406
Log Likelihood	−170.28	−232.39	−250.20
Akaike Inf. Crit.	390.56	516.79	550.40

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.32: Robustness Check: Falls Below 25 Battle Deaths Removed as Post-Conflict, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.80 (3.64)	−5.41 (4.24)	−2.22 (5.96)
Post Conflict	6.07 (4.78)	3.46 (5.89)	−6.52 (13.66)
World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Export Context	1.09 (0.77)	−1.78** (0.85)	2.39* (1.29)
IGO Context	−0.03 (0.49)	−0.29 (0.55)	−0.26 (0.88)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.03* (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.04*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Freedom House	−0.26*** (0.09)	−0.22** (0.10)	−0.22 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.12 (0.14)	−0.05 (0.17)	0.17 (0.25)
Fertility	−0.34*** (0.13)	−0.16 (0.15)	−0.30 (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−0.26 (0.35)	−0.62 (0.39)	−2.62** (1.11)
Years to Adopt	0.29 (0.23)	−0.11 (0.24)	0.27 (0.34)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.004 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0001 (0.0003)	−0.0003 (0.0004)	−0.0000 (0.001)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.07 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.05)	0.004 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.09)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.29 (0.79)	0.73 (0.91)	0.19 (1.11)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.63* (0.97)	0.26 (1.22)	1.96 (2.27)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.68** (0.74)	0.50 (0.78)	0.83 (1.27)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−0.43 (0.98)	−1.68 (1.19)	0.35 (2.64)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.05 (0.06)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.06)	−0.26 (0.24)
Constant	−8.34** (3.76)	5.14 (4.13)	−13.78** (6.71)
Observations	2,025	2,115	2,677
Log Likelihood	−305.42	−289.25	−142.61
Akaike Inf. Crit.	660.84	628.50	335.21

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.33: Robustness Check: Falls Below 25 Battle Deaths Removed as Post-Conflict, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−0.21 (4.33)	−4.87 (3.88)	−6.36 (4.21)
Post Conflict	4.03 (5.28)	−1.67 (4.33)	12.28* (6.51)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.03)
Export Context	2.98* (1.55)	0.39 (0.85)	−1.08 (0.85)
IGO Context	−0.83 (0.69)	−0.59 (0.46)	−0.18 (0.61)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.005 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.06 (0.13)	−0.34*** (0.10)	−0.01 (0.11)
GDP Per Capita	−0.40 (0.24)	−0.05 (0.16)	−0.01 (0.19)
Fertility	0.26 (0.18)	0.12 (0.12)	−0.20 (0.16)
Muslim Majority	0.12 (0.48)	−0.51 (0.38)	0.15 (0.38)
Years to Adopt	−0.38 (0.27)	−1.57*** (0.35)	0.11 (0.29)
Years to Adopt^2	0.06*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.06)	−0.01 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	0.0002 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002** (0.0001)	
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)	−0.07 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.10 (0.98)	−0.77 (0.89)	1.94** (0.90)
Post Conflict:Export Context	0.62 (1.12)	−0.10 (0.78)	−0.47 (1.40)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.33 (0.93)	1.67** (0.85)	0.12 (0.84)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−1.19 (1.15)	0.37 (0.88)	−2.39** (1.12)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.02 (0.08)	0.001 (0.06)	−0.12 (0.10)
Constant	−11.07 (6.96)	2.25 (3.51)	−1.01 (4.37)
Observations	1,987	826	2,406
Log Likelihood	−175.21	−239.36	−246.41
Akaike Inf. Crit.	400.43	530.72	542.83
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.34: Robustness Check: Post-Conflict as 10 Years, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.68 (3.79)	−6.61 (4.37)	−2.01 (6.10)
Post Conflict	2.75 (3.67)	−1.84 (4.54)	−2.29 (6.41)
World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Export Context	0.99 (0.77)	−1.88** (0.86)	1.97 (1.27)
IGO Context	−0.06 (0.52)	−0.53 (0.58)	0.14 (0.90)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.03* (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.04* (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.27*** (0.10)	−0.19* (0.10)	−0.21 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.14 (0.15)	−0.04 (0.17)	0.16 (0.26)
Fertility	−0.33*** (0.13)	−0.18 (0.15)	−0.27 (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−0.30 (0.35)	−0.58 (0.40)	−2.88*** (1.10)
Years to Adopt	0.29 (0.24)	−0.14 (0.24)	0.19 (0.33)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.002 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0001 (0.0003)	−0.0003 (0.0004)	−0.0001 (0.001)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.06 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	−0.002 (0.07)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.27 (0.81)	0.86 (0.92)	0.34 (1.12)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.15 (0.80)	0.54 (0.99)	1.36 (1.26)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.63** (0.77)	0.65 (0.81)	0.55 (1.31)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	0.22 (0.74)	−0.52 (0.83)	−1.13 (1.39)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.07* (0.04)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.08* (0.05)	−0.01 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.05)
Constant	−7.98** (3.86)	6.42 (4.20)	−13.32** (6.69)
Observations	2,025	2,115	2,677
Log Likelihood	−305.73	−288.96	−143.08
Akaike Inf. Crit.	661.47	627.91	336.17
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.35: Robustness Check: Post-Conflict as 10 Years, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	0.84 (4.53)	−3.83 (3.98)	−5.35 (4.31)
Post Conflict	5.37 (4.79)	4.27 (3.39)	12.41** (5.63)
World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.03)
Export Context	3.28** (1.62)	0.43 (0.85)	−0.79 (0.85)
IGO Context	−0.53 (0.71)	−0.38 (0.48)	−0.16 (0.62)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.04 (0.13)	−0.33*** (0.10)	−0.01 (0.11)
GDP Per Capita	−0.39 (0.24)	−0.04 (0.17)	−0.04 (0.19)
Fertility	0.29 (0.18)	0.12 (0.12)	−0.23 (0.16)
Muslim Majority	0.04 (0.47)	−0.55 (0.38)	0.22 (0.38)
Years to Adopt	−0.36 (0.27)	−1.54*** (0.35)	0.10 (0.29)
Years to Adopt^2	0.06*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.06)	−0.01 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	0.0001 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002** (0.0001)	
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.07 (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)	−0.04 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.19 (1.01)	−0.86 (0.90)	1.75* (0.91)
Post Conflict:Export Context	0.03 (0.98)	−0.59 (0.72)	−0.95 (1.19)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.10 (0.96)	1.50* (0.86)	−0.002 (0.86)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−1.41 (0.98)	−0.78 (0.73)	−2.16** (0.94)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.003 (0.02)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.06)	0.13** (0.06)	0.11** (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.03 (0.06)	−0.06 (0.05)	−0.19** (0.09)
Constant	−13.37* (7.26)	1.13 (3.57)	−1.69 (4.43)
Observations	1,987	826	2,406
Log Likelihood	−175.60	−239.25	−246.10
Akaike Inf. Crit.	401.20	530.50	542.19

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.36: Robustness Check: Female Head of State, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.31 (3.68)	−5.62 (4.34)	−2.12 (5.96)
Post Conflict	−0.70 (4.63)	9.58 (7.82)	−10.16 (11.28)
World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.02)	−0.001 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Export Context	1.10 (0.78)	−1.88** (0.85)	2.18* (1.27)
IGO Context	−0.27 (0.49)	−0.22 (0.55)	−0.13 (0.86)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.29*** (0.10)	−0.23** (0.10)	−0.19 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.14 (0.15)	−0.05 (0.17)	0.17 (0.25)
Fertility	−0.33** (0.13)	−0.16 (0.15)	−0.28 (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−0.32 (0.36)	−0.54 (0.39)	−2.72** (1.11)
Years to Adopt	0.31 (0.24)	−0.09 (0.24)	0.20 (0.34)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0002 (0.0003)	−0.0002 (0.0004)	−0.0001 (0.001)
Female Head of State	0.24 (0.33)	−0.18 (0.33)	−0.04 (0.48)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.06 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.06 (0.08)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.17 (0.80)	0.85 (0.92)	0.26 (1.10)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.62* (0.98)	−1.34 (1.88)	1.79 (1.71)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.47* (0.75)	0.45 (0.78)	0.71 (1.28)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.29 (0.92)	−2.30* (1.30)	1.25 (2.16)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.005 (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.001 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.07)
Constant	−7.48** (3.79)	5.21 (4.04)	−13.42** (6.56)
Observations	2,025	2,115	2,677
Log Likelihood	−303.06	−287.25	−144.51
Akaike Inf. Crit.	658.13	626.50	341.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.37: Robustness Check: Female Head of State, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	0.09 (4.52)	−5.32 (3.84)	−5.90 (4.17)
Post Conflict	−0.32 (10.11)	−5.17 (5.69)	18.45** (8.09)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.03)
Export Context	2.84* (1.53)	0.70 (0.85)	−1.09 (0.84)
IGO Context	−0.78 (0.64)	−0.74 (0.45)	−0.15 (0.61)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.04 (0.13)	−0.36*** (0.11)	−0.01 (0.11)
GDP Per Capita	−0.51** (0.25)	−0.06 (0.16)	−0.01 (0.19)
Fertility	0.25 (0.18)	0.11 (0.12)	−0.19 (0.16)
Muslim Majority	0.17 (0.48)	−0.56 (0.38)	0.27 (0.39)
Years to Adopt	−0.37 (0.27)	−1.55*** (0.35)	0.11 (0.28)
Years to Adopt^2	0.06*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.06)	−0.01 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	0.0002 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002** (0.0001)	
Female Head of State	−0.69 (0.55)	−0.43 (0.40)	0.20 (0.38)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.24 (0.35)	0.23 (0.19)	−0.10* (0.05)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.19 (0.95)	−1.04 (0.90)	1.86** (0.89)
Post Conflict:Export Context	1.58 (1.83)	−0.75 (0.89)	−1.69 (1.77)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.28 (0.90)	2.05** (0.85)	0.07 (0.84)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−2.07 (1.73)	0.95 (0.97)	−2.90** (1.20)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.11 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.05 (0.09)	−0.002 (0.06)	−0.15 (0.10)
Constant	−9.68 (6.77)	1.99 (3.47)	−1.14 (4.37)
Observations	1,987	826	2,406
Log Likelihood	−174.39	−238.01	−243.95
Akaike Inf. Crit.	400.77	530.01	539.91

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.38: Robustness Check: Female Combatants Control, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	5.27 (3.89)	−3.61 (4.43)	−3.90 (6.72)
Post Conflict	0.05 (5.14)	11.92 (7.98)	−17.05 (18.20)
World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.02)	−0.004 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Export Context	1.40* (0.80)	−1.70* (0.88)	2.62* (1.37)
IGO Context	−0.29 (0.50)	−0.20 (0.57)	−0.25 (0.89)
WINGOs	0.004 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.03* (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.28*** (0.10)	−0.21** (0.10)	−0.20 (0.16)
GDP Per Capita	0.06 (0.15)	−0.10 (0.17)	0.11 (0.26)
Fertility	−0.37*** (0.13)	−0.20 (0.15)	−0.36 (0.22)
Muslim Majority	−0.25 (0.37)	−0.64 (0.42)	−3.06*** (1.18)
Years to Adopt	0.30 (0.24)	−0.23 (0.25)	0.26 (0.35)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.0004 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0001 (0.0004)	−0.001 (0.0004)	−0.0001 (0.001)
Female Fighters	0.05 (0.21)	−0.20 (0.21)	−0.10 (0.36)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.07 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.10 (0.10)	−0.04 (0.07)	−0.15 (0.12)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.05 (0.86)	0.80 (0.96)	0.63 (1.25)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.31 (1.15)	−1.81 (2.12)	5.35 (3.88)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.57** (0.75)	0.08 (0.84)	0.88 (1.34)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	0.58 (1.00)	−2.42* (1.29)	−0.60 (3.84)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06 (0.06)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.07)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.09 (0.11)
Constant	−7.77** (3.92)	5.32 (4.22)	−14.09** (7.07)
Observations	1,854	1,942	2,474
Log Likelihood	−283.39	−270.57	−136.19
Akaike Inf. Crit.	618.78	593.14	324.38
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.39: Robustness Check: Female Fighters Control, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	1.05 (4.43)	−4.54 (4.17)	−6.49 (4.39)
Post Conflict	−5.71 (11.12)	−2.40 (7.77)	18.52** (8.04)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.03)
Export Context	3.95** (1.82)	0.92 (0.89)	−1.14 (0.85)
IGO Context	−0.85 (0.70)	−0.72 (0.49)	−0.17 (0.61)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.01 (0.14)	−0.38*** (0.11)	−0.01 (0.12)
GDP Per Capita	−0.53** (0.26)	−0.12 (0.17)	−0.07 (0.19)
Fertility	0.26 (0.20)	0.03 (0.14)	−0.24 (0.17)
Muslim Majority	0.45 (0.53)	−0.57 (0.45)	0.21 (0.38)
Years to Adopt	−0.34 (0.31)	−1.61*** (0.37)	0.06 (0.29)
Years to Adopt^2	0.07*** (0.02)	0.26*** (0.07)	−0.003 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	0.0001 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002** (0.0001)	
Female Fighters	−0.05 (0.29)	−0.13 (0.26)	−0.10 (0.21)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.30 (0.37)	0.28 (0.29)	−0.11* (0.06)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.37 (0.99)	−1.11 (0.95)	2.03** (0.96)
Post Conflict:Export Context	1.60 (2.13)	−1.64 (1.21)	−1.93 (1.77)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.31 (0.94)	1.93** (0.94)	0.11 (0.86)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−0.31 (1.74)	0.69 (1.13)	−2.52** (1.14)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.16 (0.11)	0.02 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.04)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.07)	0.20** (0.08)	0.14** (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.01 (0.10)	0.06 (0.06)	−0.14 (0.11)
Constant	−14.00* (7.81)	1.96 (3.67)	−0.08 (4.44)
Observations	1,875	750	2,236
Log Likelihood	−155.92	−207.84	−235.89
Akaike Inf. Crit.	363.85	469.68	523.78

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.40: Robustness Check: Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Control, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.06 (4.06)	−4.23 (5.50)	0.79 (7.07)
Post Conflict	−0.09 (5.03)	11.12 (8.06)	−12.53 (11.84)
World Bank Aid	0.004 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Export Context	1.30* (0.79)	−1.67* (0.88)	2.85** (1.26)
IGO Context	−0.22 (0.49)	0.02 (0.57)	−0.28 (0.86)
WINGOs	0.005 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.28*** (0.10)	−0.26** (0.11)	−0.16 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.09 (0.15)	−0.11 (0.17)	0.003 (0.25)
Fertility	−0.34*** (0.13)	−0.16 (0.15)	−0.36* (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−0.42 (0.38)	−0.66 (0.43)	−2.65** (1.17)
Years to Adopt	0.29 (0.25)	−0.02 (0.27)	0.42 (0.38)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.03)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0001 (0.0004)	−0.0002 (0.0004)	0.0003 (0.001)
Sexual Violence	−0.29 (0.36)	−0.18 (0.41)	−0.65 (0.80)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.05)	−0.03 (0.07)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.10 (0.10)	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.08)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.05 (0.83)	1.10 (1.25)	−1.04 (1.28)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.52 (1.02)	−1.64 (1.93)	1.32 (1.77)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.28 (0.88)	−0.46 (1.04)	0.80 (1.58)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	0.76 (1.00)	−2.47* (1.32)	2.05 (2.38)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.002 (0.02)	0.05** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.02)	0.04* (0.03)	0.05 (0.06)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.06)	0.03 (0.07)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.07)
Constant	−7.90** (3.85)	3.88 (4.29)	−14.71** (6.59)
Observations	1,914	2,011	2,496
Log Likelihood	−290.85	−266.99	−137.39
Akaike Inf. Crit.	633.70	585.98	326.79

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.41: Robustness Check: Conflicted-Related Sexual Violence Control, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	12.44** (5.96)	10.06 (6.93)	−1.15 (5.34)
Post Conflict	−1.15 (9.79)	−3.72 (5.70)	20.55** (9.14)
World Bank Aid	−0.005 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.09*** (0.03)
Export Context	2.73* (1.53)	0.86 (0.87)	−0.90 (0.88)
IGO Context	−0.57 (0.66)	−0.82* (0.48)	−0.31 (0.64)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.09 (0.13)	−0.37*** (0.11)	0.01 (0.12)
GDP Per Capita	−0.30 (0.25)	−0.03 (0.17)	−0.01 (0.19)
Fertility	0.37* (0.20)	0.07 (0.13)	−0.28 (0.18)
Muslim Majority	0.05 (0.53)	−0.40 (0.39)	0.29 (0.40)
Years to Adopt	−0.13 (0.31)	−1.34*** (0.38)	0.54 (0.39)
Years to Adopt^2	0.04 (0.02)	0.21*** (0.07)	−0.04 (0.03)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.001* (0.001)	−0.01** (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002* (0.0001)	
Sexual Violence	0.54 (0.35)	0.70* (0.38)	0.39 (0.34)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.03 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.20 (0.32)	0.19 (0.16)	−0.15** (0.06)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−1.33 (1.26)	−2.20* (1.22)	1.09 (1.07)
Post Conflict:Export Context	1.57 (2.25)	−1.24 (1.03)	−2.05 (2.00)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−2.05 (1.46)	−0.96 (1.45)	−0.71 (1.10)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−1.71 (1.73)	1.14 (1.05)	−2.92** (1.32)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.005 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.10 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.05 (0.04)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.03 (0.08)	0.06 (0.09)	0.15** (0.07)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.03 (0.09)	0.01 (0.06)	−0.14 (0.12)
Constant	−12.77* (6.83)	1.25 (3.59)	−2.87 (4.81)
Observations	1,914	796	2,290
Log Likelihood	−158.16	−218.93	−223.05
Akaike Inf. Crit.	368.32	491.85	498.09
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.42: Robustness Check: UN Multidimensional Mission, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.41 (3.74)	−5.18 (4.27)	−2.81 (5.92)
Post Conflict	−0.03 (4.73)	9.23 (7.72)	−12.03 (11.22)
World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.02)	−0.002 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Export Context	1.25 (0.77)	−1.83** (0.85)	2.20* (1.28)
IGO Context	−0.26 (0.49)	−0.26 (0.55)	−0.11 (0.86)
WINGOs	0.005 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.29*** (0.10)	−0.22** (0.10)	−0.19 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.10 (0.14)	−0.04 (0.17)	0.18 (0.25)
Fertility	−0.34*** (0.13)	−0.16 (0.15)	−0.28 (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−0.35 (0.36)	−0.53 (0.40)	−2.78** (1.14)
Years to Adopt	0.33 (0.24)	−0.09 (0.24)	0.21 (0.34)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.0002 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0002 (0.0003)	−0.0002 (0.0004)	−0.0001 (0.001)
Multidimensional Mission	−0.30 (0.64)	−0.11 (0.70)	0.96 (1.20)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.07 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.08)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.14 (0.81)	0.73 (0.91)	0.37 (1.12)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.74* (0.98)	−1.30 (1.86)	2.02 (1.73)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.46* (0.75)	0.43 (0.78)	0.75 (1.26)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.19 (0.92)	−2.22* (1.29)	1.49 (2.13)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.003 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.07)
Constant	−7.74** (3.79)	5.11 (4.05)	−13.67** (6.58)
Observations	2,025	2,115	2,677
Log Likelihood	−303.20	−287.38	−144.24
Akaike Inf. Crit.	658.41	626.76	340.47

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.43: Robustness Check: UN Multidimensional Mission, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−0.12 (4.35)	−5.13 (3.85)	−6.54 (4.16)
Post Conflict	−2.76 (10.04)	−4.84 (5.51)	18.00** (8.36)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.03)
Export Context	2.85* (1.55)	0.76 (0.85)	−1.24 (0.84)
IGO Context	−0.83 (0.64)	−0.82* (0.45)	−0.07 (0.61)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.06 (0.12)	−0.33*** (0.10)	−0.03 (0.12)
GDP Per Capita	−0.44* (0.24)	−0.05 (0.16)	−0.002 (0.19)
Fertility	0.26 (0.18)	0.11 (0.12)	−0.18 (0.16)
Muslim Majority	0.26 (0.48)	−0.50 (0.38)	0.32 (0.39)
Years to Adopt	−0.37 (0.27)	−1.53*** (0.35)	0.13 (0.29)
Years to Adopt^2	0.06*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.06)	−0.01 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	0.0002 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002** (0.0001)	
Multidimensional Mission	0.69 (1.25)	0.52 (0.78)	0.91 (0.67)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.27 (0.39)	0.21 (0.17)	−0.09* (0.06)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.09 (0.96)	−1.04 (0.90)	1.96** (0.89)
Post Conflict:Export Context	1.96 (1.85)	−0.72 (0.90)	−1.65 (1.82)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.24 (0.91)	1.98** (0.86)	0.12 (0.84)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−1.94 (1.70)	0.92 (0.98)	−2.80** (1.23)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.11 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.05 (0.04)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.04 (0.09)	0.003 (0.06)	−0.15 (0.10)
Constant	−10.19 (6.73)	1.85 (3.49)	−1.05 (4.34)
Observations	1,987	826	2,406
Log Likelihood	−175.12	−238.39	−243.27
Akaike Inf. Crit.	402.24	530.79	538.54

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.44: Robustness Check: UN Peacekeeping Mission Years, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.44 (3.72)	−5.19 (4.27)	−1.56 (6.02)
Post Conflict	0.54 (4.82)	8.90 (7.73)	−8.48 (11.91)
World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.02)	−0.002 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Export Context	1.28* (0.77)	−1.84** (0.85)	2.18* (1.26)
IGO Context	−0.25 (0.48)	−0.25 (0.55)	−0.14 (0.86)
WINGOs	0.005 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.29*** (0.10)	−0.22** (0.10)	−0.18 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.10 (0.14)	−0.03 (0.17)	0.17 (0.25)
Fertility	−0.35*** (0.13)	−0.16 (0.15)	−0.28 (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−0.37 (0.36)	−0.53 (0.40)	−2.65** (1.09)
Years to Adopt	0.33 (0.24)	−0.10 (0.24)	0.20 (0.33)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0002 (0.0003)	−0.0003 (0.0004)	−0.0001 (0.001)
Multidimensional Mission Years	−0.09 (0.12)	0.04 (0.10)	−11.49 (711.58)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.06 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.06 (0.08)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.12 (0.81)	0.79 (0.91)	0.17 (1.10)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.77* (0.98)	−1.27 (1.88)	1.62 (1.75)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.44* (0.75)	0.37 (0.79)	0.68 (1.30)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.08 (0.93)	−2.20* (1.29)	0.99 (2.23)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.004 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.07)
Constant	−7.82** (3.80)	5.04 (4.05)	−13.38** (6.50)
Observations	2,025	2,115	2,677
Log Likelihood	−302.95	−287.30	−144.06
Akaike Inf. Crit.	657.90	626.61	340.13

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.45: Robustness Check: UN Peacekeeping Mission Years, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	0.16 (4.37)	−5.16 (3.85)	−6.24 (4.16)
Post Conflict	−1.14 (10.05)	−4.60 (5.60)	18.56** (8.72)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.03)
Export Context	2.90* (1.55)	0.74 (0.85)	−1.25 (0.84)
IGO Context	−0.84 (0.64)	−0.83* (0.45)	−0.05 (0.61)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.06 (0.12)	−0.33*** (0.10)	−0.04 (0.12)
GDP Per Capita	−0.46* (0.24)	−0.05 (0.16)	−0.01 (0.19)
Fertility	0.26 (0.18)	0.11 (0.12)	−0.18 (0.16)
Muslim Majority	0.23 (0.48)	−0.52 (0.38)	0.32 (0.39)
Years to Adopt	−0.36 (0.27)	−1.53*** (0.34)	0.11 (0.29)
Years to Adopt^2	0.06*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.06)	−0.01 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	0.0001 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002** (0.0001)	
Multidimensional Mission Years	−0.06 (0.63)	0.04 (0.20)	0.18* (0.11)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.25 (0.37)	0.22 (0.18)	−0.08 (0.06)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.15 (0.95)	−1.05 (0.90)	1.93** (0.89)
Post Conflict:Export Context	1.70 (1.83)	−0.76 (0.90)	−1.74 (1.90)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.22 (0.91)	1.99** (0.86)	0.09 (0.84)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−2.02 (1.70)	0.86 (0.98)	−2.86** (1.25)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.11 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.06 (0.04)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.04 (0.09)	0.004 (0.06)	−0.15 (0.10)
Constant	−10.13 (6.73)	1.92 (3.48)	−0.89 (4.32)
Observations	1,987	826	2,406
Log Likelihood	−175.25	−238.58	−242.88
Akaike Inf. Crit.	402.51	531.17	537.77

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.46: Robustness Check: Government Victory Control, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.33 (3.72)	−5.51 (4.26)	−2.46 (5.89)
Post Conflict	−0.37 (4.66)	9.05 (7.65)	−10.05 (11.13)
World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)
Export Context	1.26 (0.77)	−1.97** (0.85)	2.02 (1.27)
IGO Context	−0.26 (0.49)	−0.29 (0.55)	−0.13 (0.86)
WINGOs	0.004 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	−0.02 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.29*** (0.10)	−0.20* (0.10)	−0.16 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.12 (0.14)	−0.03 (0.17)	0.17 (0.25)
Fertility	−0.35*** (0.13)	−0.13 (0.15)	−0.25 (0.20)
Muslim Majority	−0.34 (0.36)	−0.52 (0.39)	−2.67** (1.11)
Years to Adopt	0.34 (0.24)	−0.11 (0.24)	0.18 (0.33)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0002 (0.0003)	−0.0002 (0.0004)	−0.0001 (0.001)
Government Victory	0.22 (0.34)	−0.67 (0.41)	−0.98 (0.77)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.07 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.08)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.16 (0.80)	0.78 (0.91)	0.30 (1.10)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.70* (0.98)	−1.34 (1.87)	1.77 (1.73)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.46* (0.75)	0.50 (0.78)	0.79 (1.27)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.23 (0.92)	−2.13* (1.28)	1.32 (2.18)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	−0.001 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.07)
Constant	−7.96** (3.83)	5.36 (4.06)	−13.01** (6.51)
Observations	2,025	2,115	2,677
Log Likelihood	−303.12	−285.92	−143.52
Akaike Inf. Crit.	658.24	623.84	339.03
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.47: Robustness Check: Government Victory, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	0.06 (4.38)	−5.20 (3.86)	−5.87 (4.19)
Post Conflict	−1.15 (9.91)	−4.53 (5.57)	18.66** (8.14)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.03)
Export Context	2.96* (1.56)	0.75 (0.85)	−1.12 (0.84)
IGO Context	−0.86 (0.65)	−0.84* (0.45)	−0.12 (0.61)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.05 (0.13)	−0.33*** (0.10)	−0.02 (0.12)
GDP Per Capita	−0.46* (0.24)	−0.06 (0.16)	−0.03 (0.19)
Fertility	0.25 (0.18)	0.10 (0.12)	−0.20 (0.16)
Muslim Majority	0.23 (0.48)	−0.51 (0.38)	0.24 (0.38)
Years to Adopt	−0.36 (0.27)	−1.53*** (0.35)	0.11 (0.28)
Years to Adopt^2	0.06*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.06)	−0.01 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	0.0001 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002** (0.0001)	
Government Victory	0.31 (0.46)	0.15 (0.37)	0.06 (0.39)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.26 (0.37)	0.22 (0.18)	−0.10* (0.05)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.12 (0.95)	−1.02 (0.90)	1.91** (0.89)
Post Conflict:Export Context	1.63 (1.82)	−0.73 (0.90)	−1.67 (1.77)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.22 (0.91)	1.98** (0.86)	0.02 (0.84)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−2.00 (1.71)	0.80 (0.98)	−2.97** (1.21)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.10 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.04 (0.09)	0.004 (0.06)	−0.15 (0.10)
Constant	−10.21 (6.77)	2.01 (3.49)	−0.93 (4.34)
Observations	1,987	826	2,406
Log Likelihood	−175.05	−238.51	−244.08
Akaike Inf. Crit.	402.10	531.03	540.16

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.48: Robustness Check: Rebel Victory Control, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.32 (3.67)	−5.32 (4.28)	−0.80 (5.86)
Post Conflict	−0.22 (4.67)	9.02 (7.74)	−8.78 (11.76)
World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.02)	−0.003 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Export Context	1.15 (0.77)	−1.77** (0.86)	1.96 (1.26)
IGO Context	−0.18 (0.50)	−0.31 (0.56)	0.07 (0.87)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.28*** (0.10)	−0.22** (0.10)	−0.19 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.12 (0.14)	−0.04 (0.17)	0.19 (0.25)
Fertility	−0.32** (0.13)	−0.17 (0.15)	−0.21 (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−0.36 (0.36)	−0.53 (0.40)	−2.71** (1.10)
Years to Adopt	0.32 (0.24)	−0.09 (0.24)	0.15 (0.34)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.004 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0002 (0.0003)	−0.0002 (0.0004)	−0.0002 (0.001)
Rebel Victory	0.48 (0.54)	−0.27 (0.56)	1.28* (0.71)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.06 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.08)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.18 (0.79)	0.75 (0.91)	0.01 (1.09)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.76* (0.96)	−1.26 (1.88)	1.00 (1.76)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.47** (0.75)	0.45 (0.78)	0.59 (1.27)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.26 (0.92)	−2.20* (1.29)	1.59 (2.22)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.003 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.003 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	−0.03 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.07)
Constant	−7.90** (3.79)	5.10 (4.06)	−13.62** (6.53)
Observations	2,025	2,115	2,677
Log Likelihood	−302.96	−287.28	−143.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	657.91	626.56	338.29
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.49: Robustness Check: Rebel Victory Control, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	0.57 (4.34)	−3.91 (3.84)	−5.96 (4.21)
Post Conflict	−0.03 (9.58)	−2.73 (5.48)	18.56** (8.13)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.03)
Export Context	2.89* (1.55)	0.66 (0.85)	−1.10 (0.84)
IGO Context	−0.76 (0.63)	−0.65 (0.45)	−0.14 (0.61)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.07 (0.13)	−0.34*** (0.10)	−0.01 (0.11)
GDP Per Capita	−0.44* (0.24)	−0.02 (0.16)	−0.03 (0.19)
Fertility	0.27 (0.18)	0.12 (0.12)	−0.20 (0.16)
Muslim Majority	0.23 (0.48)	−0.62 (0.39)	0.25 (0.38)
Years to Adopt	−0.38 (0.27)	−1.68*** (0.35)	0.11 (0.28)
Years to Adopt^2	0.06*** (0.02)	0.26*** (0.06)	−0.01 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	0.0001 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002*** (0.0001)	
Rebel Victory	0.73 (0.68)	1.32** (0.57)	−0.11 (0.64)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.23 (0.34)	0.19 (0.16)	−0.10* (0.05)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.20 (0.95)	−1.10 (0.90)	1.91** (0.89)
Post Conflict:Export Context	1.57 (1.80)	−1.02 (0.91)	−1.68 (1.77)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.16 (0.90)	1.78** (0.86)	0.04 (0.84)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−2.13 (1.71)	0.69 (0.97)	−2.94** (1.20)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.11 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.04 (0.09)	−0.001 (0.06)	−0.15 (0.10)
Constant	−10.54 (6.81)	1.46 (3.53)	−0.92 (4.34)
Observations	1,987	826	2,406
Log Likelihood	−174.76	−236.25	−244.07
Akaike Inf. Crit.	401.52	526.51	540.15

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.50: Robustness Check: Gendered Peace Agreement Control, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	4.17 (3.71)	−5.38 (4.27)	−1.91 (5.94)
Post Conflict	−0.40 (4.68)	9.18 (7.80)	−12.43 (11.09)
World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.02)	−0.002 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Export Context	1.23 (0.77)	−1.71** (0.85)	2.75** (1.32)
IGO Context	−0.31 (0.49)	−0.29 (0.55)	−0.11 (0.87)
WINGOs	0.004 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.03* (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.28*** (0.10)	−0.22** (0.10)	−0.20 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.13 (0.14)	−0.04 (0.17)	0.24 (0.25)
Fertility	−0.35*** (0.13)	−0.18 (0.15)	−0.29 (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−0.29 (0.36)	−0.49 (0.40)	−2.71** (1.12)
Years to Adopt	0.32 (0.24)	−0.09 (0.25)	0.30 (0.35)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.004 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0002 (0.0003)	−0.0002 (0.0004)	−0.0001 (0.001)
Gendered Peace Agreement	0.21 (0.37)	0.42 (0.39)	1.18** (0.56)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.07 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.06 (0.08)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.17 (0.80)	0.80 (0.91)	0.14 (1.11)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.70* (0.99)	−1.35 (1.90)	1.95 (1.69)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.45* (0.75)	0.40 (0.78)	0.74 (1.28)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.26 (0.93)	−2.22* (1.31)	1.65 (2.20)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.002 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.07)
Constant	−7.68** (3.80)	4.80 (4.08)	−16.43** (6.88)
Observations	2,024	2,114	2,676
Log Likelihood	−303.15	−286.84	−142.52
Akaike Inf. Crit.	658.31	625.68	337.05

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.51: Robustness Check: Gendered Peace Agreement Control, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	0.09 (4.36)	−4.64 (3.89)	−5.86 (4.18)
Post Conflict	−0.71 (9.72)	−1.70 (5.88)	18.72** (8.18)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.03)
Export Context	2.64* (1.56)	0.69 (0.84)	−1.07 (0.86)
IGO Context	−0.75 (0.64)	−0.79* (0.45)	−0.14 (0.61)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.04 (0.13)	−0.34*** (0.10)	−0.01 (0.11)
GDP Per Capita	−0.47* (0.24)	−0.03 (0.16)	−0.03 (0.19)
Fertility	0.30* (0.18)	0.13 (0.12)	−0.21 (0.16)
Muslim Majority	0.18 (0.48)	−0.67* (0.40)	0.26 (0.39)
Years to Adopt	−0.38 (0.27)	−1.60*** (0.35)	0.11 (0.29)
Years to Adopt^2	0.06*** (0.02)	0.25*** (0.06)	−0.01 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	0.0001 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002*** (0.0001)	
Gendered Peace Agreement	−0.84 (0.68)	−0.84 (0.61)	0.09 (0.42)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.24 (0.36)	0.21 (0.16)	−0.10* (0.05)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.13 (0.95)	−1.19 (0.89)	1.89** (0.89)
Post Conflict:Export Context	1.93 (1.88)	−1.15 (0.93)	−1.72 (1.79)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.21 (0.91)	1.98** (0.86)	0.03 (0.84)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−2.25 (1.75)	0.52 (1.02)	−2.95** (1.20)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.12 (0.09)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.05 (0.09)	0.01 (0.06)	−0.15 (0.10)
Constant	−9.38 (6.78)	1.98 (3.46)	−1.02 (4.37)
Observations	1,986	825	2,405
Log Likelihood	−174.32	−236.86	−244.06
Akaike Inf. Crit.	400.65	527.72	540.12

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.52: Robustness Check: UN Voting Similarity General, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	3.01 (3.99)	−2.01 (4.68)	−0.09 (7.46)
Post Conflict	−1.75 (4.93)	8.12 (8.48)	−18.84 (20.10)
World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.06* (0.04)
Export Context	1.20 (0.84)	−1.63* (0.87)	2.64* (1.39)
IGO Context	−0.12 (0.52)	−0.26 (0.57)	−0.29 (0.92)
WINGOs	0.003 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.34*** (0.11)	−0.21** (0.11)	−0.30* (0.17)
GDP Per Capita	0.18 (0.15)	−0.10 (0.17)	0.05 (0.27)
Fertility	−0.27* (0.15)	−0.21 (0.16)	−0.46* (0.25)
Muslim Majority	−0.41 (0.37)	−0.68 (0.42)	−2.65** (1.13)
Years to Adopt	0.90*** (0.33)	−0.08 (0.28)	0.74 (0.51)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.05** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.03)
Years to Adopt^3	0.001* (0.0004)	−0.0002 (0.0004)	0.001 (0.001)
UN Voting Similarity	0.19 (0.26)	0.09 (0.25)	−0.47 (0.41)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.08)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.07)	0.08 (0.25)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.60 (0.91)	0.11 (1.03)	−0.22 (1.45)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.53 (1.03)	−1.62 (2.16)	2.09 (2.72)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.38* (0.76)	−0.03 (0.82)	0.40 (1.43)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.48 (0.97)	−1.98 (1.29)	2.94 (3.72)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.004 (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.0004 (0.02)	0.05** (0.03)	−0.10 (0.09)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.03 (0.07)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.06* (0.03)	0.07* (0.04)	0.13 (0.10)
Constant	−11.36** (4.57)	5.04 (4.35)	−15.22* (7.92)
Observations	1,870	1,968	2,522
Log Likelihood	−282.85	−274.05	−129.05
Akaike Inf. Crit.	617.69	600.09	310.10

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.53: Robustness Check: UN voting Similarity General, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	1.26 (7.25)	3.96 (8.06)	−0.78 (4.76)
Post Conflict	−5.94 (11.81)	0.10 (6.64)	14.99* (8.29)
World Bank Aid	−0.004 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)
Export Context	0.54 (1.86)	0.30 (0.99)	−1.13 (0.87)
IGO Context	−0.32 (0.82)	−0.50 (0.62)	−0.32 (0.65)
WINGOs	0.02 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.003 (0.03)	−0.06 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.01 (0.16)	−0.27* (0.14)	0.01 (0.12)
GDP Per Capita	−0.13 (0.29)	−0.12 (0.20)	0.005 (0.19)
Fertility	0.49** (0.24)	−0.03 (0.19)	−0.28 (0.18)
Muslim Majority	−0.04 (0.60)	−0.41 (0.46)	0.12 (0.40)
Years to Adopt	0.96* (0.57)	4.59** (1.92)	0.40 (0.37)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.64** (0.28)	−0.03 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.001 (0.001)	0.04** (0.02)	0.001 (0.001)
Years to Adopt^4		−0.001** (0.0004)	
UN Voting Similarity	−0.82 (0.52)	0.03 (0.31)	−0.21 (0.29)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.07)	−0.02 (0.06)	−0.04 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.21 (0.35)	0.20 (0.22)	−0.11** (0.06)
Active Conflict:Export Context	1.21 (1.59)	−0.60 (1.47)	1.31 (1.01)
Post Conflict:Export Context	2.39 (2.62)	−1.16 (1.22)	−1.17 (1.77)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.43 (1.43)	−0.72 (1.47)	−0.74 (0.93)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−1.13 (1.81)	−0.30 (1.11)	−2.41** (1.22)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.002 (0.03)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.09 (0.07)	0.04 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.08)	0.12 (0.09)	0.11* (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.02 (0.10)	0.03 (0.06)	−0.10 (0.11)
Constant	−12.01 (8.71)	−11.20* (6.26)	−1.45 (4.96)
Observations	1,855	725	2,250
Log Likelihood	−133.11	−177.00	−232.05
Akaike Inf. Crit.	318.22	408.00	516.09
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.54: Robustness Check: UN Voting Similarity to Nordic States, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	2.19 (4.28)	−3.65 (4.67)	−0.37 (7.53)
Post Conflict	−1.91 (4.96)	11.58 (10.54)	−19.02 (20.79)
World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.06 (0.03)
Export Context	1.11 (0.84)	−1.43 (0.88)	2.68* (1.40)
IGO Context	−0.16 (0.52)	−0.06 (0.58)	−0.29 (0.92)
WINGOs	0.001 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.34*** (0.11)	−0.23** (0.11)	−0.27 (0.17)
GDP Per Capita	0.17 (0.15)	−0.12 (0.18)	0.04 (0.27)
Fertility	−0.29** (0.15)	−0.15 (0.16)	−0.44* (0.25)
Muslim Majority	−0.50 (0.38)	−0.68 (0.41)	−2.59** (1.13)
Years to Adopt	0.90** (0.36)	−0.13 (0.30)	0.91 (0.55)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.05* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.05 (0.04)
Years to Adopt^3	0.001* (0.001)	−0.0004 (0.0005)	0.001 (0.001)
UN Voting Similarity Nordic	−0.14 (0.27)	−0.20 (0.28)	0.32 (0.41)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.08)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.03 (0.06)	0.12 (0.20)	0.08 (0.24)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.73 (0.94)	0.81 (1.04)	−0.15 (1.48)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.52 (1.04)	−0.60 (2.11)	2.16 (2.80)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.38* (0.81)	−0.24 (0.88)	0.44 (1.42)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.52 (0.98)	−4.22** (1.99)	2.91 (3.83)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.002 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.004 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	−0.09 (0.09)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.07)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.06* (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.13 (0.11)
Constant	−10.44** (4.54)	4.01 (4.36)	−16.31** (7.86)
Observations	1,861	1,951	2,463
Log Likelihood	−274.01	−268.28	−128.10
Akaike Inf. Crit.	600.02	588.57	308.20

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.55: Robustness Check: UN Voting Similarity to Nordic States, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	2.75 (7.04)	7.25 (8.06)	−1.31 (4.82)
Post Conflict	−3.96 (11.68)	−1.57 (5.79)	15.36* (8.45)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)
Export Context	0.89 (1.87)	0.23 (0.98)	−0.98 (0.88)
IGO Context	−0.17 (0.80)	−0.25 (0.59)	−0.49 (0.67)
WINGOs	0.02 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.04 (0.16)	−0.28** (0.14)	0.03 (0.12)
GDP Per Capita	−0.23 (0.29)	−0.08 (0.20)	0.03 (0.19)
Fertility	0.49** (0.23)	0.10 (0.18)	−0.27 (0.18)
Muslim Majority	−0.11 (0.60)	−0.50 (0.44)	0.23 (0.40)
Years to Adopt	1.16* (0.62)	4.48** (1.90)	0.49 (0.41)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.06 (0.04)	−0.62** (0.28)	−0.03 (0.03)
Years to Adopt^3	0.001 (0.001)	0.04** (0.02)	0.001 (0.001)
Years to Adopt^4		−0.001** (0.0004)	
UN Voting Similarity Nordic	0.56 (0.50)	−0.13 (0.33)	0.02 (0.30)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.07)	−0.03 (0.06)	−0.04 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.16 (0.27)	0.15 (0.14)	−0.11** (0.06)
Active Conflict:Export Context	1.13 (1.52)	−1.12 (1.44)	1.29 (1.02)
Post Conflict:Export Context	2.93 (2.68)	−0.92 (1.16)	−1.31 (1.78)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.72 (1.40)	−1.07 (1.47)	−0.55 (0.92)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−2.09 (1.80)	0.39 (1.02)	−2.39* (1.28)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.002 (0.03)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.08 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.08)	0.11 (0.09)	0.11** (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.004 (0.09)	0.01 (0.06)	−0.10 (0.11)
Constant	−14.66* (8.72)	−12.33** (6.23)	−2.05 (5.02)
Observations	1,823	724	2,221
Log Likelihood	−134.13	−180.59	−226.73
Akaike Inf. Crit.	320.25	415.19	505.46

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.56: Robustness Check: Oil Rents Per GDP, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	2.94 (3.67)	−5.41 (4.27)	−2.46 (6.05)
Post Conflict	−0.89 (4.63)	8.31 (7.67)	−10.06 (11.21)
World Bank Aid	0.004 (0.02)	−0.002 (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)
Export Context	1.28* (0.77)	−1.81** (0.84)	2.31* (1.28)
IGO Context	−0.33 (0.49)	−0.34 (0.55)	−0.33 (0.88)
WINGOs	−0.0001 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.03* (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.19* (0.10)	−0.16 (0.11)	−0.13 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.40** (0.17)	0.08 (0.18)	0.37 (0.28)
Fertility	−0.24* (0.14)	−0.12 (0.15)	−0.19 (0.21)
Muslim Majority	−0.37 (0.35)	−0.48 (0.39)	−2.45** (1.09)
Years to Adopt	0.33 (0.24)	−0.12 (0.24)	0.22 (0.34)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0001 (0.0003)	−0.0003 (0.0004)	−0.0001 (0.001)
Oil Rents Per GDP	−0.05*** (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.07 (0.05)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.003 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.07 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.07)	−0.09 (0.08)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.23 (0.79)	0.74 (0.90)	0.21 (1.11)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−1.70* (0.99)	−1.18 (1.88)	1.95 (1.68)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.15 (0.76)	0.48 (0.77)	0.88 (1.29)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.39 (0.92)	−2.10* (1.28)	1.27 (2.13)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.005 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.001 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.07)
Constant	−10.29*** (3.88)	4.27 (4.05)	−14.99** (6.62)
Observations	1,976	2,072	2,628
Log Likelihood	−297.43	−285.24	−142.47
Akaike Inf. Crit.	646.86	622.47	336.93

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.57: Robustness Check: Oil Rents Per GDP, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−0.64 (4.39)	−5.14 (3.86)	−5.41 (4.21)
Post Conflict	−1.73 (10.03)	−4.22 (5.77)	18.83** (8.19)
World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.08*** (0.03)
Export Context	3.08** (1.56)	0.75 (0.85)	−1.15 (0.84)
IGO Context	−0.91 (0.64)	−0.80* (0.46)	−0.01 (0.62)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.09 (0.13)	−0.33*** (0.10)	−0.04 (0.12)
GDP Per Capita	−0.43 (0.27)	−0.05 (0.18)	−0.03 (0.21)
Fertility	0.27 (0.18)	0.12 (0.13)	−0.19 (0.17)
Muslim Majority	0.18 (0.48)	−0.50 (0.39)	0.30 (0.38)
Years to Adopt	−0.34 (0.27)	−1.56*** (0.35)	0.13 (0.29)
Years to Adopt^2	0.06*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.06)	−0.01 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.004)	0.0002 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0002** (0.0001)	
Oil Rents Per GDP	−0.004 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.001 (0.02)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.26 (0.40)	0.20 (0.19)	−0.11* (0.06)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.11 (0.95)	−1.10 (0.90)	1.91** (0.89)
Post Conflict:Export Context	1.69 (1.80)	−0.77 (0.89)	−1.62 (1.79)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.35 (0.91)	2.02** (0.87)	−0.04 (0.84)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−1.92 (1.71)	0.86 (0.97)	−3.00** (1.20)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03* (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.11 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.04 (0.09)	0.002 (0.06)	−0.15 (0.10)
Constant	−10.79 (6.83)	1.87 (3.58)	−1.37 (4.45)
Observations	1,935	806	2,369
Log Likelihood	−173.65	−234.68	−238.91
Akaike Inf. Crit.	399.29	523.36	529.82

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.58: Robustness Check: Physical Integrity Rights Control, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	5.22 (4.32)	−6.36 (4.73)	−1.01 (6.26)
Post Conflict	−3.32 (5.08)	7.03 (12.19)	−8.44 (12.79)
World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.02)	0.004 (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)
Export Context	0.75 (0.86)	−1.18 (0.98)	1.27 (1.19)
IGO Context	−0.53 (0.55)	−0.10 (0.59)	−0.15 (1.00)
WINGOs	0.001 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.05** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.08*** (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.30** (0.12)	−0.37*** (0.13)	−0.19 (0.17)
GDP Per Capita	0.31* (0.16)	0.13 (0.18)	0.47* (0.27)
Fertility	−0.27** (0.13)	−0.05 (0.16)	−0.28 (0.22)
Muslim Majority	−0.35 (0.41)	−0.54 (0.43)	−17.47 (995.53)
Years to Adopt	0.12 (0.25)	0.19 (0.34)	0.11 (0.29)
Years to Adopt^2	0.005 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.03)	0.001 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.0003 (0.0004)	0.0000 (0.001)	−0.0001 (0.0004)
Physical Integrity	−0.08 (0.10)	−0.21** (0.10)	−0.18 (0.15)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.09 (0.07)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05 (0.09)	0.21 (0.39)	−0.09 (0.10)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.36 (0.91)	1.00 (1.02)	−0.50 (1.12)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−0.97 (0.95)	0.17 (2.01)	1.04 (1.92)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.19 (0.86)	0.48 (0.87)	1.09 (1.44)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.44 (1.01)	−4.03* (2.13)	1.57 (2.56)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.005 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.07)
Constant	−5.87 (4.24)	1.03 (4.84)	−10.87 (6.62)
Observations	1,795	1,874	2,255
Log Likelihood	−263.40	−254.09	−120.79
Akaike Inf. Crit.	578.81	560.17	293.59

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.59: Robustness Check: Physical Integrity Rights Control, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	0.50 (4.44)	−4.53 (3.91)	−6.01 (4.55)
Post Conflict	−2,166.50 (114,568.50)	−6.40 (7.33)	21.42** (9.19)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.09*** (0.03)
Export Context	2.44 (1.58)	0.91 (0.89)	−0.49 (1.04)
IGO Context	−0.94 (0.66)	−0.74 (0.46)	−0.15 (0.68)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.06* (0.03)
Freedom House	0.08 (0.14)	−0.32*** (0.11)	−0.11 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	−0.41 (0.25)	−0.08 (0.17)	0.15 (0.22)
Fertility	0.22 (0.18)	0.09 (0.13)	−0.11 (0.18)
Muslim Majority	0.29 (0.52)	−0.62 (0.40)	0.30 (0.42)
Years to Adopt	−0.50* (0.29)	−1.41*** (0.29)	0.12 (0.28)
Years to Adopt^2	0.07*** (0.03)	0.21*** (0.04)	−0.001 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.002*** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.0000 (0.0004)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0001*** (0.0000)	
Physical Integrity	−0.05 (0.11)	0.01 (0.08)	−0.05 (0.11)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	162.14 (8,225.41)	0.41 (0.31)	−0.16** (0.07)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.29 (0.96)	−1.04 (0.88)	1.64* (0.97)
Post Conflict:Export Context	108.99 (6,567.25)	−0.80 (0.93)	−2.49 (1.90)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.26 (0.92)	1.85** (0.86)	0.10 (0.89)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−381.13 (19,023.63)	0.23 (1.08)	−3.08* (1.60)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−8.97 (479.35)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.04)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.003 (0.06)	0.13** (0.06)	0.18*** (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−3.63 (263.82)	0.04 (0.06)	−0.05 (0.11)
Constant	−7.61 (6.80)	0.94 (3.66)	−4.29 (5.32)
Observations	1,691	751	2,079
Log Likelihood	−158.54	−225.70	−203.33
Akaike Inf. Crit.	369.07	505.40	458.66

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.60: Robustness Check: Government Ideology, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	0.96 (6.91)	−4.74 (7.23)	−12.63 (14.51)
Post Conflict	−12.09 (10.22)	30.68 (23.28)	−4.08 (14.55)
World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)
Export Context	−0.06 (1.23)	−1.29 (1.35)	1.37 (1.54)
IGO Context	−0.90 (0.95)	0.90 (0.99)	−0.18 (1.54)
WINGOs	0.002 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	−0.06*** (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.04 (0.03)	−0.004 (0.03)	0.11*** (0.04)
Freedom House	0.01 (0.16)	−0.29 (0.19)	0.07 (0.23)
GDP Per Capita	0.68** (0.27)	0.21 (0.31)	1.73*** (0.52)
Fertility	−0.24 (0.19)	−0.07 (0.23)	−0.35 (0.34)
Muslim Majority	−0.94 (0.69)	−0.29 (0.68)	−18.63 (1,454.70)
Years to Adopt	−0.04 (0.36)	0.85** (0.37)	0.67 (0.48)
Years to Adopt^2	0.02 (0.03)	−0.05*** (0.02)	−0.04 (0.04)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.001 (0.001)	0.001*** (0.0003)	0.001 (0.001)
Left Executive	−0.25 (0.61)	0.89 (0.70)	0.20 (0.83)
Right Executive	−0.10 (0.64)	−0.22 (0.78)	−0.86 (0.84)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.06 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	−0.12 (0.10)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.22 (0.31)	−0.19 (0.26)	0.06 (0.13)
Active Conflict:Export Context	3.42* (1.84)	0.62 (1.50)	3.65 (2.78)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−0.30 (1.61)	−5.48 (4.59)	1.54 (2.79)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−4.72* (2.41)	−0.04 (1.44)	0.03 (2.54)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	2.20 (1.55)	−6.00 (4.67)	0.21 (2.68)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.08* (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.11* (0.06)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.02 (0.02)	0.11 (0.08)	0.07 (0.06)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.06 (0.10)	0.05 (0.09)	−0.15 (0.14)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.05 (0.05)	0.21 (0.18)	−0.51* (0.30)
Constant	−5.16 (5.25)	−7.39 (6.90)	−23.88*** (8.29)
Observations	869	961	1,130
Log Likelihood	−149.17	−131.72	−76.13
Akaike Inf. Crit.	352.34	317.44	206.26

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.61: Robustness Check: Government Ideology, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	6.94 (8.27)	−6.89 (6.69)	2.05 (8.75)
Post Conflict	−1,429.38 (140,635.70)	−4.64 (8.35)	20.18 (19.09)
World Bank Aid	0.03 (0.05)	−0.001 (0.03)	0.10** (0.04)
Export Context	3.54** (1.77)	1.11 (1.07)	0.12 (1.29)
IGO Context	−0.54 (1.09)	−0.59 (0.73)	−1.44 (1.23)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	−0.07 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)
Freedom House	−0.02 (0.21)	−0.55*** (0.18)	0.10 (0.19)
GDP Per Capita	−0.69 (0.43)	−0.45 (0.29)	0.54* (0.33)
Fertility	−0.07 (0.26)	−0.03 (0.19)	−0.21 (0.27)
Muslim Majority	0.62 (0.73)	0.11 (0.52)	0.13 (0.67)
Years to Adopt	−0.08 (0.41)	−0.84 (0.54)	0.20 (0.35)
Years to Adopt^2	0.04 (0.04)	0.12 (0.10)	−0.003 (0.02)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.005 (0.01)	−0.0000 (0.0003)
Years to Adopt^4		0.0000 (0.0002)	
Left Executive	0.12 (0.87)	−0.60 (0.65)	−0.24 (0.75)
Right Executive	−0.61 (0.97)	−0.28 (0.61)	−0.41 (0.78)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.07 (0.08)	0.003 (0.06)	−0.04 (0.08)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	89.70 (8,244.03)	0.24 (0.32)	−0.18* (0.11)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−1.13 (1.55)	−0.93 (1.41)	0.08 (1.46)
Post Conflict:Export Context	29.76 (8,877.09)	−0.68 (1.56)	−5.55 (4.63)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−0.21 (1.55)	1.91 (1.45)	−0.13 (1.65)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−122.49 (14,524.75)	0.15 (1.34)	−0.32 (3.04)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.03)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−1.37 (590.21)	0.04 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.10)	0.14 (0.10)	0.06 (0.12)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−1.94 (446.79)	0.08 (0.08)	0.10 (0.16)
Constant	−11.19 (7.78)	2.98 (4.40)	−6.57 (7.76)
Observations	1,023	421	1,182
Log Likelihood	−78.29	−127.36	−111.29
Akaike Inf. Crit.	210.57	310.72	276.58

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.62: Robustness Check: 1970–2016 Sample, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence	Sexual Harassment	Marital Rape
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−0.53 (3.55)	−5.07 (4.10)	−3.60 (5.62)
Post Conflict	−6.19 (4.17)	8.98 (7.76)	−5.06 (6.89)
World Bank Aid	0.01 (0.02)	−0.003 (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)
Export Context	−1.28*** (0.47)	−2.03*** (0.49)	0.07 (0.67)
IGO Context	−0.57 (0.49)	−0.36 (0.52)	−0.63 (0.82)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.02 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.30*** (0.10)	−0.23** (0.10)	−0.11 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	0.12 (0.15)	−0.07 (0.16)	0.15 (0.24)
Fertility	−0.43*** (0.13)	−0.21 (0.15)	−0.51** (0.22)
Muslim Majority	−0.03 (0.36)	−0.50 (0.39)	−2.34** (1.10)
Years to Adopt	0.18 (0.23)	0.03 (0.20)	−0.17 (0.26)
Years to Adopt^2	−0.004 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Years to Adopt^3	0.0000 (0.0001)	−0.0000 (0.0001)	−0.0001 (0.0001)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.07)	−0.09 (0.08)
Active Conflict:Export Context	1.56** (0.67)	0.68 (0.85)	0.63 (0.92)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−0.01 (0.76)	−1.24 (1.84)	1.50 (1.34)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.48* (0.80)	0.41 (0.78)	0.65 (1.33)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	1.55* (0.92)	−2.29* (1.32)	0.23 (1.70)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.003 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.08* (0.04)	0.08* (0.05)	0.03 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.07** (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.06)
Constant	1.58 (2.93)	5.51** (2.79)	−2.49 (4.39)
Observations	2,829	2,988	3,564
Log Likelihood	−292.14	−288.96	−145.36
Akaike Inf. Crit.	634.28	627.92	340.73
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.63: Robustness Check: 1970–2016 Sample, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry	Gender Machinery	Political Quota
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	3.29 (4.17)	−3.63 (3.75)	−1.17 (3.86)
Post Conflict	1.08 (9.02)	−0.53 (4.33)	18.25** (7.81)
World Bank Aid	−0.005 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.03)
Export Context	0.45 (0.68)	−0.78* (0.42)	−1.28** (0.52)
IGO Context	−0.67 (0.57)	−0.69 (0.42)	−0.21 (0.56)
WINGOs	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.01 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Freedom House	0.11 (0.12)	−0.32*** (0.10)	0.02 (0.11)
GDP Per Capita	−0.39* (0.23)	0.02 (0.16)	−0.08 (0.19)
Fertility	0.17 (0.18)	0.08 (0.13)	−0.29* (0.16)
Muslim Majority	0.30 (0.47)	−0.15 (0.36)	0.36 (0.37)
Years to Adopt	−0.20 (0.23)	1.42*** (0.51)	0.14 (0.23)
Years to Adopt^2	0.01 (0.01)	−0.14*** (0.04)	−0.01 (0.01)
Years to Adopt^3	−0.0002 (0.0001)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.0001 (0.0001)
Years to Adopt^4		−0.0001*** (0.0000)	
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.35 (0.53)	0.12 (0.13)	−0.10* (0.05)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.12 (0.88)	−0.66 (0.68)	1.15 (0.77)
Post Conflict:Export Context	1.38 (1.36)	−1.26 (0.83)	−1.51 (1.64)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−0.74 (1.04)	1.35 (0.91)	−0.62 (0.85)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−2.55 (1.66)	0.70 (0.96)	−3.01** (1.21)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.17* (0.10)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.07)	0.14** (0.07)	0.10* (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.04 (0.10)	−0.01 (0.06)	−0.15 (0.10)
Constant	−2.95 (3.90)	−1.19 (2.75)	−0.16 (3.08)
Observations	2,763	1,513	3,280
Log Likelihood	−187.61	−274.11	−247.24
Akaike Inf. Crit.	425.21	600.23	544.49

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.64: Robustness Check: Cox Proportional Hazard Model, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence Years to Adopt	Sexual Harassment Years to Adopt	Marital Rape Years to Adopt
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	7.45* (3.85)	−4.56 (3.83)	−1.49 (5.95)
Post Conflict	4.33 (4.79)	7.90* (6.24)	−9.72* (13.46)
World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)
Export Context	6.53*** (0.81)	5.41*** (0.82)	7.62*** (1.35)
IGO Context	−0.51 (0.43)	−0.42 (0.51)	−0.06 (0.81)
WINGOs	−0.02*** (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.05** (0.02)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)	0.06 (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.37*** (0.10)	−0.31*** (0.10)	−0.29 (0.15)
GDP Per Capita	−0.05 (0.14)	−0.43** (0.16)	−0.02 (0.24)
Fertility	−0.51*** (0.13)	−0.39*** (0.14)	−0.35 (0.20)
Muslim Majority	−0.61 (0.34)	−0.78* (0.40)	−2.80** (1.10)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	−0.001 (0.04)	−0.09*** (0.04)	−0.08 (0.06)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.11** (0.06)	−0.01 (0.06)	−0.05 (0.08)
Active Conflict:Export Context	−0.43 (1.03)	1.40 (0.89)	0.83 (1.21)
Post Conflict:Export Context	−2.85*** (1.21)	−0.75 (1.60)	1.71 (2.08)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	−1.77** (0.68)	−0.23 (0.69)	0.16 (1.22)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	0.94 (0.75)	−2.50*** (1.19)	1.16 (2.38)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.05** (0.03)	−0.002 (0.05)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	−0.02 (0.06)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.08)
Observations	2,025	2,115	2,677
R^2	0.10	0.07	0.04
Max. Possible R^2	0.42	0.38	0.15
Log Likelihood	−436.87	−419.66	−156.40
Wald Test (df = 21)	215.98***	133.28***	125.23***
LR Test (df = 21)	213.30***	160.23***	116.47***
Score (Logrank) Test (df = 21)	245.43***	160.70***	116.19***
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.65: Robustness Check: Cox Proportional Hazard Model, Other Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Ministry Years to Adopt	Gender Machinery Years to Adopt	Political Quota Years to Adopt
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−0.66 (3.86)	−2.75 (3.15)	−5.04 (4.00)
Post Conflict	1.25 (8.22)	4.99 (4.57)	19.30** (9.07)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)
Export Context	11.98*** (1.64)	6.35*** (0.71)	4.66*** (0.94)
IGO Context	−0.72 (0.64)	−0.63 (0.39)	−0.41 (0.56)
WINGOs	−0.03** (0.01)	−0.05*** (0.01)	−0.003 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.03 (0.03)	−0.06** (0.03)	−0.05* (0.03)
Freedom House	−0.05 (0.12)	−0.41*** (0.09)	−0.11 (0.11)
GDP Per Capita	−0.59** (0.25)	−0.37** (0.15)	−0.35* (0.20)
Fertility	0.40* (0.19)	0.01 (0.12)	−0.45** (0.17)
Muslim Majority	−0.16 (0.50)	−1.01** (0.37)	0.33 (0.38)
Active Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.05)
Post Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.23 (0.32)	0.21** (0.13)	−0.06 (0.06)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.14 (0.91)	−1.45* (0.84)	2.33** (0.99)
Post Conflict:Export Context	0.26 (1.27)	−3.09*** (0.91)	−2.49 (2.36)
Active Conflict:IGO Context	0.30 (0.86)	2.01** (0.74)	−0.32 (0.78)
Post Conflict:IGO Context	−1.17 (1.51)	0.48 (0.80)	−2.50*** (1.02)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	−0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.04** (0.02)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	−0.09** (0.07)	0.03 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)
Active Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.004 (0.07)	0.13** (0.05)	0.12*** (0.05)
Post Conflict:Legislature Percent	−0.06 (0.08)	−0.001 (0.05)	−0.13 (0.10)
Observations	1,987	826	2,406
R^2	0.11	0.27	0.05
Max. Possible R^2	0.27	0.74	0.27
Log Likelihood	−201.52	−418.78	−316.30
Wald Test (df = 21)	218.75***	247.83***	114.44***
LR Test (df = 21)	226.25***	261.11***	119.69***
Score (Logrank) Test (df = 21)	205.13***	201.20***	105.72***
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.66: Robustness Check: exct Likelihood Discrete Cox Proportional Hazard Model Results, UN Staff, VAW Laws

	Dependent variable:		
	Domestic Violence Law	Sexual Harassment Law	Marital Rape Law
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−4.93*** (1.82)	8.80 (7.62)	1.36 (2.61)
Post Conflict	0.98 (1.41)	−1.50 (2.69)	−12.24 (7.73)
UN Staff	−0.01** (0.004)	−0.0002 (0.001)	−0.0002 (0.002)
Export Context	−0.03*** (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)
Aid Context	0.02 (0.05)	−0.002 (0.05)	−0.14 (0.12)
WINGOs	−0.003 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)
Female Legislature	0.04 (0.03)	−0.005 (0.03)	0.13*** (0.04)
CEDAW Years	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.14*** (0.03)	−0.10** (0.05)
Polity 2	0.11*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.07 (0.06)
GDP	0.21 (0.18)	−0.22 (0.26)	−0.37 (0.51)
Population	-0.004 (0.37)	0.30 (0.25)	−0.60 (0.51)
Muslim Majority	−1.82*** (0.48)	−0.92** (0.42)	
Active Conflict:UN Staff	0.01* (0.004)	0.005 (0.01)	0.002 (0.002)
Post Conflict:UN Staff	0.003 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.003)	−0.01 (0.01)
Active Conflict:Export Context	0.05*** (0.02)	−0.06 (0.11)	−0.07 (0.07)
Post Conflict:Export Context	0.003 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.04)	0.10* (0.06)
Active Conflict:Aid Context	0.01 (0.06)	−0.93 (0.86)	0.20 (0.13)
Post Conflict:Aid Context	−0.12* (0.08)	0.02 (0.06)	0.18 (0.12)
Active Conflict:WINGOs	0.04 (0.03)	−0.13 (0.14)	0.04 (0.04)
Post Conflict:WINGOs	0.03 (0.03)	0.06 (0.05)	0.18 (0.13)
Active Conflict:% Female Legislature	−0.04 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.18)	−0.17* (0.09)
Post Conflict:% Female Legislature	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.05)	0.10 (0.12)
Observations	819	871	1,223
R^2	0.10	0.06	0.03
Max. Possible R^2	0.41	0.42	0.16
Log Likelihood	−174.64	−213.70	−84.68
Wald Test	62.73*** (df = 21)	38.60** (df = 22)	29.53 (df = 21)
LR Test	83.76*** (df = 21)	50.98*** (df = 22)	40.97*** (df = 21)
Score (Logrank) Test	60.64*** (df = 21)	43.57*** (df = 22)	35.59** (df = 21)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Muslim Majority removed for marital rape model due to singularity

Table 8.67: Robustness Check: UN Security Council Neighbor, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	3.08 (2.66)	0.03 (0.02)	0.29* (0.16)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.02)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.001)
UN Security Council Neighbor	0.42 (1.36)	0.02 (0.01)	0.12 (0.09)
Export Context	−8.93*** (2.76)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.51*** (0.18)
IGO Context	1.98* (1.04)	−0.04*** (0.01)	0.06 (0.07)
Women's CSOs	1.14*** (0.32)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.27*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.07 (1.12)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.07 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.12*** (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.49*** (0.12)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.73** (0.28)	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.01 (0.02)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.06** (0.02)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.001)
Conflict:UN Security Council Neighbor	0.79 (2.55)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.20 (0.16)
Conflict:Export Context	−1.84*** (0.51)	−0.02*** (0.004)	0.06** (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	0.09 (0.60)	0.002 (0.01)	−0.13*** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	1.21*** (0.35)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.04** (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	60.90*** (11.52)	0.75*** (0.10)	2.93*** (0.73)
Observations	3,190	3,267	3,397
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.95	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.68 (df = 3011)	0.04 (df = 3089)	0.30 (df = 3219)
F Statistic	52.33*** (df = 178; 3011)	347.20*** (df = 177; 3089)	162.44*** (df = 177; 3219)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.68: Robustness Check: UN Staff, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	17.91*** (5.09)	0.06 (0.04)	−0.39 (0.28)
World Bank Aid		0.0002* (0.0001)	0.001 (0.001)
UN Staff	−1.88*** (0.30)	−0.005** (0.002)	−0.003 (0.02)
Export Context	4.65 (3.89)	0.03 (0.03)	−0.11 (0.21)
IGO Context	2.82** (1.25)	−0.05*** (0.01)	0.002 (0.07)
Women's CSOs	1.90*** (0.49)	0.06*** (0.004)	0.16*** (0.03)
Muslim Majority	1.80 (1.45)	−0.02** (0.01)	−0.04 (0.07)
Political Gender Quota	4.60*** (0.40)		
Freedom House	−0.26 (0.20)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.06*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−1.66*** (0.42)	−0.01** (0.003)	−0.01 (0.02)
Conflict:World Bank Aid		0.001** (0.0002)	−0.001 (0.001)
Conflict:UN Staff	1.61*** (0.37)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.04* (0.02)
Conflict:Export Context	−4.51*** (1.21)	−0.02** (0.01)	0.15** (0.07)
Conflict:IGO Context	−1.76** (0.79)	−0.0004 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	−0.41 (0.46)	0.002 (0.003)	0.01 (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	20.81 (13.34)	0.74*** (0.10)	1.96*** (0.73)
Observations	2,130	2,160	2,222
R^2	0.83	0.97	0.94
Adjusted R^2	0.81	0.97	0.93
Residual Std. Error	4.17 (df = 1969)	0.03 (df = 1997)	0.23 (df = 2059)
F Statistic	58.74*** (df = 160; 1969)	389.69*** (df = 162; 1997)	186.63*** (df = 162; 2059)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.69: Robustness Check: UN Aid, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	2.73 (2.85)	0.04 (0.02)	0.34* (0.18)
UN Aid	−0.01 (0.02)	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.002* (0.001)
Export Context	−9.79*** (2.74)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.55*** (0.17)
IGO Context	2.24** (1.04)	−0.04*** (0.01)	0.07 (0.06)
Women's CSOs	1.21*** (0.32)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.28*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.06 (1.12)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.07 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.20*** (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.45*** (0.12)	−0.02*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.65** (0.28)	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.005 (0.02)
Conflict:UN Aid	0.03 (0.03)	0.0002 (0.0002)	−0.001 (0.002)
Conflict:Export Context	−1.51*** (0.57)	−0.02*** (0.005)	0.05 (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	0.09 (0.59)	0.0005 (0.01)	−0.13*** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	1.10*** (0.35)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.04* (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	63.07*** (11.49)	0.76*** (0.10)	3.04*** (0.73)
Observations	3,204	3,284	3,417
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.95	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.68 (df = 3027)	0.04 (df = 3107)	0.30 (df = 3240)
F Statistic	53.31*** (df = 176; 3027)	345.38*** (df = 176; 3107)	164.34*** (df = 176; 3240)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.70: Robustness Check: Cultural Similarity, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	4.71*** (1.69)	0.03** (0.01)	−0.14 (0.10)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.02)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.001 (0.001)
Export Context	−8.09*** (2.66)	0.003 (0.02)	−0.53*** (0.17)
Cultural Context	4.76*** (0.95)	−0.002 (0.01)	0.16*** (0.06)
Women's CSOs	1.04*** (0.32)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.26*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.48 (1.12)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.05 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.20*** (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.51*** (0.12)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.84*** (0.28)	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.02 (0.02)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.03 (0.02)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.001)
Conflict:Export Context	−3.82*** (0.82)	−0.02*** (0.01)	0.04 (0.05)
Conflict:Cultural Context	1.37** (0.54)	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.03)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	1.65*** (0.36)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.06*** (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	43.64*** (10.96)	0.64*** (0.09)	2.57*** (0.70)
Observations	3,296	3,371	3,502
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.89
Adjusted R^2	0.75	0.95	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.75 (df = 3120)	0.04 (df = 3196)	0.31 (df = 3327)
F Statistic	56.41*** (df = 175; 3120)	342.65*** (df = 174; 3196)	162.06*** (df = 174; 3327)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.71: Robustness Check: Aid Dependency, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	−2.06 (2.75)	0.01 (0.02)	0.24 (0.17)
World Bank Aid	−0.005 (0.02)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0003 (0.001)
Aid Context	−0.31 (0.42)	0.01* (0.004)	−0.09*** (0.03)
IGO Context	0.01 (1.16)	−0.04*** (0.01)	−0.03 (0.07)
Women's CSOs	1.25*** (0.33)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.29*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	−0.68 (1.09)	0.005 (0.01)	−0.13** (0.05)
Political Gender Quota	3.77*** (0.34)		
Freedom House	0.38*** (0.12)	−0.02*** (0.001)	−0.05*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.71** (0.29)	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.01 (0.02)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.08*** (0.03)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.002)
Conflict:Aid Context	−0.79 (0.54)	−0.02*** (0.005)	0.07** (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	0.44 (0.60)	0.003 (0.01)	−0.12*** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	1.36*** (0.35)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.03 (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	32.37*** (5.56)	0.81*** (0.05)	1.53*** (0.34)
Observations	2,884	2,955	3,085
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.91
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.95	0.90
Residual Std. Error	4.46 (df = 2709)	0.04 (df = 2780)	0.29 (df = 2910)
F Statistic	48.09*** (df = 174; 2709)	326.74*** (df = 174; 2780)	163.47*** (df = 174; 2910)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.72: Robustness Check: Colonial History, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	3.25 (2.64)	0.03 (0.02)	0.26 (0.16)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.02)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.001)
Export Context	−9.08*** (2.75)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.55*** (0.17)
IGO Context	2.24** (1.04)	−0.04*** (0.01)	0.07 (0.06)
Women's CSOs	1.17*** (0.32)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.28*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.08 (1.11)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.07 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.16*** (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.45*** (0.12)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.65** (0.28)	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.01 (0.02)
British Colony	−2.85 (2.25)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.10 (0.15)
French Colony	4.66** (2.16)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.19 (0.14)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.06** (0.02)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.001)
Conflict:Export Context	−2.00*** (0.50)	−0.02*** (0.004)	0.06** (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	0.26 (0.60)	0.003 (0.01)	−0.12*** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	1.18*** (0.35)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.04* (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	58.75*** (11.73)	0.78*** (0.10)	3.29*** (0.75)
Observations	3,204	3,284	3,417
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.95	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.67 (df = 3025)	0.04 (df = 3105)	0.30 (df = 3238)
F Statistic	52.90*** (df = 178; 3025)	345.14*** (df = 178; 3105)	162.51*** (df = 178; 3238)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.73: Robustness Check: Conflicts with Coups Included, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	2.66 (2.56)	0.03 (0.02)	0.22 (0.16)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.02)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0003 (0.001)
Export Context	−9.90*** (2.76)	0.004 (0.02)	−0.53*** (0.18)
IGO Context	2.07** (1.04)	−0.04*** (0.01)	0.05 (0.07)
Women's CSOs	1.33*** (0.32)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.28*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	−0.05 (1.12)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.07 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.15*** (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.46*** (0.12)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05** (0.02)	0.0005** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.001)
Conflict:Export Context	−1.46*** (0.50)	−0.02*** (0.004)	0.03 (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	0.12 (0.58)	0.002 (0.005)	−0.09** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	0.74** (0.33)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.03 (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	63.62*** (11.53)	0.77*** (0.10)	3.00*** (0.73)
Observations	3,204	3,284	3,417
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.95	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.69 (df = 3027)	0.04 (df = 3107)	0.30 (df = 3240)
F Statistic	53.03*** (df = 176; 3027)	345.53*** (df = 176; 3107)	163.17*** (df = 176; 3240)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.74: Robustness Check: 1,000 Battle Death Conflicts Only, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	-9.01^{***} (3.24)	0.05^{*} (0.03)	0.68^{***} (0.20)
World Bank Aid	-0.03^{**} (0.01)	0.0004^{***} (0.0001)	0.0003 (0.001)
Export Context	-9.03^{***} (2.71)	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.53^{***} (0.17)
IGO Context	1.63 (1.00)	-0.04^{***} (0.01)	0.07 (0.06)
Women's CSOs	0.89^{***} (0.31)	0.08^{***} (0.003)	0.27^{***} (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.84 (1.10)	0.01^{*} (0.01)	-0.08 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.08^{***} (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.48^{***} (0.12)	-0.01^{***} (0.001)	-0.04^{***} (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	-0.76^{***} (0.28)	-0.01^{***} (0.002)	-0.01 (0.02)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.18^{***} (0.03)	0.001^{***} (0.0002)	0.001 (0.002)
Conflict:Export Context	-3.14^{***} (0.61)	-0.03^{***} (0.01)	0.05 (0.04)
Conflict:IGO Context	3.70^{***} (0.77)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.23^{***} (0.05)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	2.18^{***} (0.40)	0.02^{***} (0.003)	0.08^{***} (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	63.18^{***} (11.27)	0.79^{***} (0.10)	2.95^{***} (0.73)
Observations	3,204	3,284	3,417
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.75	0.95	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.60 (df = 3027)	0.04 (df = 3107)	0.30 (df = 3240)
F Statistic	55.59^{***} (df = 176; 3027)	350.51^{***} (df = 176; 3107)	165.40^{***} (df = 176; 3240)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.75: Robustness Check: Conflict Falls Below 25 Deaths Removed, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	−3.56 (2.54)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.18 (0.16)
World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.02)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	−0.001 (0.001)
Export Context	−10.68*** (2.73)	−0.0005 (0.02)	−0.52*** (0.17)
IGO Context	1.40 (1.03)	−0.04*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.06)
Women's CSOs	1.59*** (0.31)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.30*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	−0.14 (1.11)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.06 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.02*** (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.53*** (0.12)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.70** (0.28)	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.01 (0.02)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.09*** (0.02)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.004*** (0.001)
Conflict:Export Context	−0.89* (0.51)	−0.02*** (0.004)	0.05 (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	1.00* (0.56)	0.01*** (0.005)	−0.004 (0.03)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	0.18 (0.33)	0.01* (0.003)	−0.02 (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	69.19*** (11.43)	0.81*** (0.10)	3.11*** (0.73)
Observations	3,204	3,284	3,417
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.95	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.66 (df = 3027)	0.04 (df = 3107)	0.30 (df = 3240)
F Statistic	53.73*** (df = 176; 3027)	343.16*** (df = 176; 3107)	163.33*** (df = 176; 3240)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.76: Robustness Check: Post-Conflict as Ten Years, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	1.96 (2.56)	0.01 (0.02)	0.28* (0.16)
World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.02)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.001)
Export Context	−9.80*** (2.76)	0.004 (0.02)	−0.56*** (0.18)
IGO Context	2.19** (1.06)	−0.04*** (0.01)	0.06 (0.07)
Women's CSOs	1.30*** (0.34)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.30*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	−0.16 (1.12)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.06 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.15*** (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.44*** (0.12)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.60** (0.28)	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.01 (0.02)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.07*** (0.02)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.001)
Conflict:Export Context	−1.02** (0.48)	−0.01*** (0.004)	0.04 (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	−0.09 (0.57)	0.005 (0.005)	−0.13*** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	0.66** (0.32)	0.01*** (0.003)	−0.004 (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	62.93*** (11.56)	0.77*** (0.10)	3.09*** (0.73)
Observations	3,204	3,284	3,417
R^2	0.75	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.95	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.69 (df = 3027)	0.04 (df = 3107)	0.30 (df = 3240)
F Statistic	52.99*** (df = 176; 3027)	342.63*** (df = 176; 3107)	163.56*** (df = 176; 3240)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.77: Robustness Check: Female Head of State, Women's Rights Outcome

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	3.04 (2.64)	0.03 (0.02)	0.21 (0.16)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.02)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.001)
Export Context	−9.44*** (2.76)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.42** (0.17)
IGO Context	2.14** (1.04)	−0.04*** (0.01)	0.04 (0.06)
Women's CSOs	1.21*** (0.32)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.26*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.07 (1.12)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.05 (0.05)
Political Gender Quota	4.16*** (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.46*** (0.12)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.03*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.65** (0.28)	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.01 (0.02)
Female Head of State	−0.07 (0.47)	−0.002 (0.004)	0.24*** (0.03)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.06** (0.02)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.001)
Conflict:Export Context	−1.94*** (0.50)	−0.02*** (0.004)	0.07** (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	0.27 (0.60)	0.003 (0.01)	−0.12*** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	1.14*** (0.35)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.04** (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	61.97*** (11.53)	0.76*** (0.10)	2.59*** (0.72)
Observations	3,204	3,284	3,417
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.95	0.90
Residual Std. Error	4.67 (df = 3026)	0.04 (df = 3106)	0.30 (df = 3239)
F Statistic	53.10*** (df = 177; 3026)	346.99*** (df = 177; 3106)	166.97*** (df = 177; 3239)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.78: Robustness Check: Female Fighters, Women's Rights Outcome

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	1.21 (2.84)	0.03 (0.02)	0.33* (0.18)
World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.02)	0.0003** (0.0001)	−0.0000 (0.001)
Export Context	−8.76*** (2.84)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.55*** (0.18)
IGO Context	3.62*** (1.09)	−0.02** (0.01)	0.13* (0.07)
Women's CSOs	1.39*** (0.34)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.28*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.22 (1.25)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.11*** (0.33)		
Freedom House	0.57*** (0.13)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.72** (0.30)	−0.01*** (0.002)	0.01 (0.02)
Female Fighters	−0.10 (0.32)	0.005* (0.003)	0.06*** (0.02)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05* (0.03)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.002 (0.002)
Conflict:Export Context	−2.18*** (0.56)	−0.03*** (0.005)	0.04 (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	1.10* (0.65)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.14*** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	1.48*** (0.40)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.05** (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	52.96*** (11.89)	0.66*** (0.10)	2.70*** (0.76)
Observations	2,985	3,057	3,176
R^2	0.77	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.75	0.95	0.90
Residual Std. Error	4.65 (df = 2807)	0.04 (df = 2879)	0.30 (df = 2998)
F Statistic	51.82*** (df = 177; 2807)	335.75*** (df = 177; 2879)	155.92*** (df = 177; 2998)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.79: Robustness Check: Female Combatants, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	0.92 (2.84)	0.03 (0.02)	0.34* (0.18)
World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.02)	0.0003** (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.001)
Export Context	−8.96*** (2.84)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.55*** (0.18)
IGO Context	3.59*** (1.08)	−0.02** (0.01)	0.12* (0.07)
Women's CSOs	1.40*** (0.34)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.28*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.14 (1.25)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.10*** (0.33)		
Freedom House	0.55*** (0.13)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.70** (0.30)	−0.01*** (0.002)	0.01 (0.02)
Female Combatants	1.19** (0.58)	0.002 (0.005)	0.03 (0.03)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.05** (0.03)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.002 (0.002)
Conflict:Export Context	−2.13*** (0.56)	−0.03*** (0.005)	0.03 (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	1.02 (0.65)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.13*** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	1.53*** (0.40)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.05** (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	53.85*** (11.89)	0.66*** (0.10)	2.71*** (0.76)
Observations	2,985	3,057	3,176
R^2	0.77	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.75	0.95	0.90
Residual Std. Error	4.65 (df = 2807)	0.04 (df = 2879)	0.30 (df = 2998)
F Statistic	51.91*** (df = 177; 2807)	335.30*** (df = 177; 2879)	155.44*** (df = 177; 2998)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.80: Robustness Check: Conflict Related Sexual Violence, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	1.27 (2.88)	0.03 (0.02)	0.47*** (0.18)
World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.02)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	−0.0001 (0.001)
Export Context	−13.71*** (2.76)	−0.03 (0.02)	−0.95*** (0.18)
IGO Context	3.00*** (1.03)	−0.03*** (0.01)	0.12* (0.07)
Women's CSOs	1.14*** (0.32)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.30*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.17 (1.08)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	3.76*** (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.47*** (0.12)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.33 (0.29)	−0.01*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.02)
Sexual Violence	−0.48* (0.27)	−0.005* (0.002)	−0.03* (0.02)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.08*** (0.03)	0.001** (0.0002)	−0.0004 (0.002)
Conflict:Export Context	−1.67*** (0.57)	−0.03*** (0.005)	−0.02 (0.04)
Conflict:IGO Context	0.52 (0.67)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.10** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	0.83** (0.36)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.03 (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	73.04*** (11.45)	0.89*** (0.10)	4.38*** (0.73)
Observations	3,001	3,075	3,196
R^2	0.76	0.96	0.91
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.95	0.90
Residual Std. Error	4.49 (df = 2825)	0.04 (df = 2899)	0.29 (df = 3019)
F Statistic	50.93*** (df = 175; 2825)	352.14*** (df = 175; 2899)	166.55*** (df = 176; 3019)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.81: Robustness Check, UN Multidimensional Mission, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	4.15 (2.70)	0.01 (0.02)	0.18 (0.17)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.02)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.001)
Export Context	−9.15*** (2.75)	0.003 (0.02)	−0.56*** (0.17)
IGO Context	2.01* (1.04)	−0.03*** (0.01)	0.08 (0.06)
Women's CSOs	1.20*** (0.32)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.27*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.03 (1.11)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.07 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.17*** (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.48*** (0.12)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.71** (0.28)	−0.01*** (0.002)	0.0001 (0.02)
UN Multidimensional Mission	−1.32** (0.65)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.04)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.06** (0.02)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.001)
Conflict:Export Context	−2.05*** (0.51)	−0.02*** (0.004)	0.07** (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	0.09 (0.60)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.11*** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	1.13*** (0.35)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.04* (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	61.61*** (11.49)	0.76*** (0.10)	2.98*** (0.73)
Observations	3,204	3,284	3,417
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.95	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.67 (df = 3026)	0.04 (df = 3106)	0.30 (df = 3239)
F Statistic	53.20*** (df = 177; 3026)	348.30*** (df = 177; 3106)	163.62*** (df = 177; 3239)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.82: Robustness Check: UN Mission Length, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	4.42* (2.66)	0.02 (0.02)	0.23 (0.16)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.02)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	−0.0000 (0.001)
Export Context	−8.95*** (2.75)	0.004 (0.02)	−0.55*** (0.17)
IGO Context	1.84* (1.04)	−0.03*** (0.01)	0.08 (0.07)
Women's CSOs	1.23*** (0.32)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.28*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.01 (1.11)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.07 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.21*** (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.46*** (0.12)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.73*** (0.28)	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.003 (0.02)
Multidimensional Mission Years	−0.36*** (0.10)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.01** (0.01)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.06** (0.02)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.001)
Conflict:Export Context	−2.11*** (0.50)	−0.02*** (0.004)	0.07** (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	0.08 (0.60)	0.004 (0.01)	−0.12*** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	1.16*** (0.35)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.04* (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	61.73*** (11.47)	0.76*** (0.10)	2.96*** (0.73)
Observations	3,204	3,284	3,417
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.95	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.66 (df = 3026)	0.04 (df = 3106)	0.30 (df = 3239)
F Statistic	53.43*** (df = 177; 3026)	348.53*** (df = 177; 3106)	163.50*** (df = 177; 3239)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.83: Robustness Check: Goverment Victory Control, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	3.08 (2.64)	0.03 (0.02)	0.27 (0.16)
World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.02)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0003 (0.001)
Export Context	−9.14*** (2.75)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.56*** (0.17)
IGO Context	2.10** (1.03)	−0.04*** (0.01)	0.07 (0.06)
Women's CSOs	1.21*** (0.32)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.28*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.14 (1.11)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.08 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.15*** (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.47*** (0.12)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.64** (0.28)	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.01 (0.02)
Government Victory	1.12* (0.58)	0.02*** (0.005)	−0.07** (0.03)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.06** (0.02)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.001)
Conflict:Export Context	−1.93*** (0.50)	−0.02*** (0.004)	0.06* (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	0.24 (0.60)	0.003 (0.01)	−0.12*** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	1.17*** (0.35)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.04* (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	60.80*** (11.51)	0.74*** (0.10)	3.06*** (0.73)
Observations	3,204	3,284	3,417
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.95	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.67 (df = 3026)	0.04 (df = 3106)	0.30 (df = 3239)
F Statistic	53.19*** (df = 177; 3026)	348.50*** (df = 177; 3106)	163.48*** (df = 177; 3239)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.84: Robustness Check: Rebel Victory Control, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	2.64 (2.65)	0.03 (0.02)	0.27 (0.16)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.02)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.001)
Export Context	−9.66*** (2.75)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.54*** (0.17)
IGO Context	2.15** (1.03)	−0.04*** (0.01)	0.07 (0.06)
Women's CSOs	1.25*** (0.32)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.28*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.11 (1.11)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.07 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.15*** (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.46*** (0.12)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.63** (0.28)	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.01 (0.02)
Rebel Victory	−2.12** (1.00)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.04 (0.06)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.06** (0.02)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.001)
Conflict:Export Context	−1.82*** (0.51)	−0.02*** (0.004)	0.06* (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	0.27 (0.60)	0.003 (0.01)	−0.13*** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	1.13*** (0.35)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.04* (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	62.55*** (11.50)	0.76*** (0.10)	2.98*** (0.73)
Observations	3,204	3,284	3,417
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.95	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.67 (df = 3026)	0.04 (df = 3106)	0.30 (df = 3239)
F Statistic	53.21*** (df = 177; 3026)	347.21*** (df = 177; 3106)	163.25*** (df = 177; 3239)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.85: Robustness Check: Gendered Peace Agreement Control, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	2.89 (2.64)	0.03 (0.02)	0.28* (0.16)
World Bank Aid	−0.01 (0.02)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0002 (0.001)
Export Context	−9.47*** (2.75)	0.005 (0.02)	−0.55*** (0.17)
IGO Context	2.08** (1.03)	−0.04*** (0.01)	0.07 (0.06)
Women's CSOs	1.18*** (0.32)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.28*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.09 (1.11)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.07 (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	4.17*** (0.32)		
Freedom House	0.46*** (0.12)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.60** (0.28)	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.01 (0.02)
Gendered Peace Agreement	0.72* (0.38)	0.01*** (0.003)	−0.004 (0.02)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.06** (0.02)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001 (0.001)
Conflict:Export Context	−1.88*** (0.50)	−0.02*** (0.004)	0.06* (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	0.26 (0.60)	0.003 (0.01)	−0.13*** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	1.13*** (0.35)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.04** (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	62.11*** (11.49)	0.77*** (0.10)	3.03*** (0.73)
Observations	3,203	3,282	3,415
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.95	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.67 (df = 3025)	0.04 (df = 3104)	0.30 (df = 3237)
F Statistic	53.20*** (df = 177; 3025)	350.15*** (df = 177; 3104)	163.89*** (df = 177; 3237)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.86: Robustness Check: Physical Integrity Rights, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	−0.92 (2.78)	0.04 (0.02)	0.44** (0.17)
World Bank Aid	−0.001 (0.02)	0.0003** (0.0001)	−0.001 (0.001)
Export Context	−13.26*** (3.65)	−0.01 (0.03)	−0.94*** (0.23)
IGO Context	2.98** (1.39)	−0.02 (0.01)	0.18** (0.09)
Women's CSOs	1.32*** (0.35)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.32*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	−0.83 (1.11)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.10* (0.06)
Political Gender Quota	3.27*** (0.36)		
Freedom House	0.63*** (0.13)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.02*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.50 (0.34)	−0.01*** (0.003)	−0.02 (0.02)
Physical Integrity	0.17** (0.07)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.03*** (0.005)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.08*** (0.03)	0.0004* (0.0003)	−0.0001 (0.002)
Conflict:Export Context	−0.55 (0.55)	−0.02*** (0.005)	0.09** (0.03)
Conflict:IGO Context	−0.0004 (0.64)	−0.0003 (0.01)	−0.19*** (0.04)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	1.42*** (0.36)	0.03*** (0.003)	0.03 (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	69.48*** (15.39)	0.73*** (0.13)	3.99*** (0.98)
Observations	2,600	2,663	2,766
R^2	0.75	0.96	0.92
Adjusted R^2	0.73	0.95	0.91
Residual Std. Error	4.35 (df = 2428)	0.04 (df = 2492)	0.28 (df = 2595)
F Statistic	42.15*** (df = 171; 2428)	323.34*** (df = 170; 2492)	165.35*** (df = 170; 2595)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.87: Robustness Check: Government Ideology, Women's Rights Outcomes

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict	8.24* (4.50)	0.05 (0.04)	0.69** (0.29)
World Bank Aid	0.002 (0.02)	0.0002 (0.0002)	−0.003* (0.002)
Export Context	−18.43*** (5.06)	0.11** (0.04)	0.21 (0.33)
IGO Context	2.99* (1.71)	−0.03** (0.01)	0.35*** (0.11)
Women's CSOs	1.13** (0.48)	0.08*** (0.004)	0.30*** (0.03)
Muslim Majority	−1.55 (1.43)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.14* (0.08)
Political Gender Quota	1.49*** (0.50)		
Freedom House	1.06*** (0.18)	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.03*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.74 (0.50)	−0.02*** (0.004)	0.03 (0.03)
Left Executive	0.18 (0.65)	0.01 (0.01)	0.05 (0.04)
Right Executive	−1.27* (0.68)	−0.01* (0.01)	−0.12*** (0.04)
Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.02 (0.04)	0.001** (0.0004)	0.01** (0.003)
Conflict:Export Context	−1.74** (0.80)	−0.04*** (0.01)	0.06 (0.05)
Conflict:IGO Context	−1.54 (1.05)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.27*** (0.07)
Conflict:Women's CSOs	2.30*** (0.56)	0.04*** (0.005)	−0.04 (0.04)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Constant	89.16*** (21.39)	0.34* (0.18)	−1.54 (1.41)
Observations	1,480	1,527	1,540
R^2	0.76	0.95	0.90
Adjusted R^2	0.73	0.94	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.40 (df = 1346)	0.04 (df = 1394)	0.29 (df = 1406)
F Statistic	31.84*** (df = 133; 1346)	195.60*** (df = 132; 1394)	98.10*** (df = 133; 1406)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

8.2 Chapter 5

Table 8.88: Robustness Check: Wife Beat Count Variable and Dichotomous OLS

	Dependent variable:	
	Wife Beating Count	Wife Beating Dichotomous
	(1)	(2)
Conflict Events	0.153^{*}	0.034
	(0.093)	(0.025)
Total Aid	0.0002	−0.0002
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Age	-0.011^{***}	-0.005^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Rural	0.194^{***}	0.050^{***}
	(0.033)	(0.013)
Education Level	-0.238^{***}	-0.082^{***}
	(0.014)	(0.005)
Catholic	0.031	0.018^{**}
	(0.020)	(0.008)
Married	−0.001	0.004
	(0.019)	(0.008)
Electricity	-0.191^{***}	-0.097^{***}
	(0.029)	(0.012)
Conflict Events:Total Aid	-0.012^{**}	-0.004^{**}
	(0.006)	(0.001)
Constant	1.878^{***}	0.887^{***}
	(0.077)	(0.030)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X
Observations	31,810	31,810
Log Likelihood	−55,294.470	−24,327.730
Akaike Inf. Crit.	110,618.900	48,685.460
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.89: Robustness Check: Wife Beating Justification For Each Type (1)

	Dependent variable:		
	Wife Beat Go Out	Wife Beat Neglect Children	Wife Beat Argue
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict Events	0.026	0.027	0.073*
	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.044)
Total Aid	0.001	0.0001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.003***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)
Rural	0.057***	0.042***	0.043***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Education Level	−0.066***	−0.065***	−0.062***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Catholic	0.013*	0.021***	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Married	0.015**	0.006	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Electricity	−0.071***	−0.065***	−0.056***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Conflict Events:Total Aid	−0.003	−0.004**	−0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Constant	0.648***	0.774***	0.395***
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	32,642	32,678	32,504
Log Likelihood	−24,417.090	−25,128.240	−22,116.650
Akaike Inf. Crit.	48,864.190	50,286.470	44,263.310

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.90: Robustness Check: Wife Beating Justification For Each Type (2)

	Dependent variable:	
	Wife Beat Burn Food	Wife Beat Refuse Sex
	(1)	(2)
Conflict Events	0.071^{***}	0.016
	(0.026)	(0.028)
Total Aid	0.0001	-0.0002
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.003^{***}	-0.001^{**}
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Rural	0.039^{***}	0.056^{***}
	(0.009)	(0.008)
Education Level	-0.050^{***}	-0.061^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Catholic	0.006	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Married	-0.021^{***}	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Electricity	-0.022^{***}	-0.029^{***}
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Conflict Events:Total Aid	-0.005^{***}	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.269^{***}	0.215^{***}
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X
Observations	32,637	32,103
Log Likelihood	$-16{,}201.700$	$-18{,}943.550$
Akaike Inf. Crit.	32,433.400	37,917.100
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 8.91: Robustness Check: Media Consumption Count Variable and Dichotomous OLS

	Dependent variable:	
	Media Count	Media Dichotomous (OLS)
	(1)	(2)
Conflict Events	-0.08^{***}	-0.08^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Total Aid	-0.001	-0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	0.001^{*}	0.0001
	(0.0005)	(0.0003)
Rural	-0.23^{***}	-0.05^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.01)
Education Level	0.30^{***}	0.11^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.005)
Catholic	0.02^{**}	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Married	-0.02	0.04^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Electricity	0.48^{***}	0.13^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Conflict Events:Total Aid	0.004	0.01^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.002)
Constant	1.01^{***}	0.55^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X
Observations	32,908	32,933
Log Likelihood	$-37{,}025.75$	$-22{,}993.12$
Akaike Inf. Crit.	74,081.49	46,016.25
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.92: Robustness Check: Alternate Financial Control Dependent Variables

	Dependent variable:	
	Sole Control of Women's Finances	Sole and Joint Control Husband's Finances
	(1)	(2)
Conflict Events	-0.655^{**}	-0.575^{***}
	(0.284)	(0.199)
Total Aid	-0.004	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.004)
Age	-0.004	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Rural	0.463^{***}	0.143^{*}
	(0.108)	(0.077)
Education Level	0.110^{**}	0.208^{***}
	(0.047)	(0.039)
Catholic	-0.117^{*}	-0.091^{*}
	(0.066)	(0.050)
Electricity	0.075	0.115^{*}
	(0.086)	(0.063)
Conflict Events:Total Aid	0.043^{***}	0.022^{**}
	(0.014)	(0.010)
Constant	-1.888^{***}	-0.856^{***}
	(0.255)	(0.188)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X
Observations	6,813	10,862
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.93: Robustness Check: Media Consumption for Each Type

	Dependent variable:		
	Newspaper	Television	Radio
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict Events	−0.13	−0.39***	−0.29
	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.30)
Total Aid	0.001	0.002	−0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.003)	(0.01)
Age	−0.001	0.003**	−0.01***
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Rural	−0.47***	−0.05	−1.03***
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Education Level	1.31***	0.50***	0.59***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Catholic	0.13**	0.02	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Married	−0.57***	0.22***	−0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Electricity	0.40***	0.18***	2.29***
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Conflict Events:Total Aid	0.003	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Constant	−1.89***	−0.26*	−1.03***
	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.17)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	32,925	32,930	32,939

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.94: Robustness Check: Alternative Dependent Variables with 50 Kilometer Radius on Wife Beating

	Dependent variable:		
	Wife Beating Justified		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Total Events, 50 Km	0.306***		
	(0.101)		
Total Deaths, 50 Km		0.306***	
		(0.101)	
Total Civilian Deaths, 50 Km			0.306***
			(0.101)
Total Aid	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	−0.021***	−0.021***	−0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Rural	0.217***	0.217***	0.217***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Education Level	−0.365***	−0.365***	−0.365***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Catholic	0.080**	0.080**	0.080**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Married	0.022	0.022	0.022
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Electricity	−0.406***	−0.406***	−0.406***
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Events:Total Aid	−0.023***	−0.023***	−0.023***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Constant	1.740***	1.740***	1.740***
	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.138)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	x	x
Observations	31,810	31,810	31,810
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.95: Robustness Check: Alternative Dependent Variables with 50 Kilometer Radius on Media Consumption

	Dependent variable:		
	Media Consumption		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Total Events, 50 Km	−0.168***		
	(0.065)		
Total Deaths, 50 Km		−0.168***	
		(0.065)	
Total Civilian Deaths, 50 Km			−0.087
			(0.084)
Total Aid	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Rural	−0.348***	−0.348***	−0.351***
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Education Level	0.603***	0.603***	0.604***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Catholic	0.025	0.025	0.030
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Married	0.230***	0.230***	0.230***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Electricity	0.812***	0.812***	0.807***
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Events:Total Aid	0.010*	0.010*	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Deaths:Total Aid	0.010*	0.010*	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Civilian Deaths:Total Aid	0.010*	0.010*	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Constant	0.329**	0.329**	0.316**
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.156)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	32,933	32,933	32,933
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.96: Robustness check: Domestic Violence and Desired Number of Children

	Dependent variable:	
	Domestic Violence	Ideal Number of Children
	(1)	(2)
Conflict Events	−0.001	0.140
	(0.039)	(0.103)
Total Aid	0.0002	0.0004
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Age	0.006***	0.032***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Rural	0.040**	0.279***
	(0.020)	(0.039)
Education Level	−0.061***	−0.295***
	(0.009)	(0.017)
Catholic	0.044***	−0.110***
	(0.015)	(0.021)
Married		0.288***
		(0.021)
Electricity	−0.064***	−0.169***
	(0.019)	(0.030)
Pregnant		−0.160***
		(0.028)
Conflict Events:Total Aid	−0.0002	−0.005
	(0.002)	(0.006)
Constant	0.160***	3.360***
	(0.051)	(0.093)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X
Observations	7,633	23,682
Log Likelihood	−6,126.525	−39,478.050
Akaike Inf. Crit.	12,279.050	78,986.100
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.97: Robustness Check: Population Density Control

	Dependent variable:	
	Wife Beating Justified	Media Consumption
	(1)	(2)
Conflict Events	0.334*	−0.438***
	(0.172)	(0.168)
Total Aid	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age	−0.018***	0.0004
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Rural	0.213**	−0.679***
	(0.105)	(0.130)
Education Level	−0.232***	0.737***
	(0.040)	(0.044)
Catholic	−0.090*	0.073
	(0.053)	(0.061)
Married	0.043	0.213***
	(0.054)	(0.062)
Electricity	−0.522***	1.257***
	(0.087)	(0.148)
Population Density	−0.00001	−0.00005*
	(0.00001)	(0.00003)
Conflict Events:Total Aid	−0.024**	0.028**
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Constant	1.564***	0.920***
	(0.225)	(0.264)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X
Observations	13,431	14,203
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.98: Robustness Check: Nightlight Brightness

	Dependent variable:	
	Wife Beating Justified	Media Consumption
	(1)	(2)
Conflict Events	0.332^{*}	-0.440^{***}
	(0.172)	(0.168)
Total Aid	-0.002	-0.0002
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age	-0.018^{***}	0.0003
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Rural	0.214^{**}	-0.648^{***}
	(0.101)	(0.122)
Education Level	-0.234^{***}	0.733^{***}
	(0.040)	(0.044)
Catholic	-0.090^{*}	0.074
	(0.053)	(0.061)
Married	0.046	0.214^{***}
	(0.054)	(0.062)
Electricity	-0.510^{***}	1.235^{***}
	(0.087)	(0.146)
Nightlight Brightness	-0.010	-0.046^{*}
	(0.013)	(0.027)
Conflict Events:Total Aid	-0.023^{**}	0.029^{**}
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Constant	1.570^{***}	0.864^{***}
	(0.217)	(0.250)
Region Fixed Effects	x	x
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X
Observations	13,455	14,227

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.99: Robustness Check: Proximity to Border

	Dependent variable:	
	Wife Beating Justified	Media Consumption
	(1)	(2)
Conflict Events	0.378**	−0.491***
	(0.182)	(0.171)
Total Aid	0.001	−0.002
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Age	−0.018***	−0.0001
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Rural	0.232**	−0.522***
	(0.094)	(0.119)
Education Level	−0.224***	0.725***
	(0.039)	(0.043)
Catholic	−0.093*	0.066
	(0.053)	(0.059)
Married	0.034	0.229***
	(0.054)	(0.062)
Electricity	−0.498***	1.128***
	(0.085)	(0.147)
Proximity to Border	−0.00000***	0.00000***
	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Conflict Events:Total Aid	−0.027**	0.032***
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X
Constant	1.746***	0.230
	(0.217)	(0.253)
Observations	13,587	14,360
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.100: Robustness Check: Men's Responses, Wife Beating Justification Count and OLS

	Dependent variable:	
	Wife Beating Count	Wife Beating Dichotomous
	(1)	(2)
Conflict Events	-0.126^{*}	-0.059^{**}
	(0.069)	(0.024)
Total Aid	-0.001	0.0001
	(0.003)	(0.001)
Age	-0.009^{***}	-0.004^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Rural	0.225^{***}	0.073^{***}
	(0.043)	(0.019)
Education Level	-0.261^{***}	-0.104^{***}
	(0.020)	(0.009)
Catholic	0.018	0.020
	(0.032)	(0.013)
Married	-0.165^{***}	-0.056^{***}
	(0.037)	(0.015)
Conflict Events:Total Aid	0.0004	0.0005
	(0.005)	(0.002)
Constant	1.652^{***}	0.770^{***}
	(0.103)	(0.044)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X
Observations	9,312	9,312
Log Likelihood	$-15{,}213.580$	$-6{,}919.763$
Akaike Inf. Crit.	30,457.150	13,869.530
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.101: Robustness Check: Men's Responses on Justification for Each Type (1)

	Dependent variable:		
	Wife Beat Go Out	Wife Beat Neglect Children	Wife Beat Argue
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict Events	-0.102^{**}	-0.131^{***}	-0.020
	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.055)
Total Aid	0.001	-0.001	0.0005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.003^{***}	-0.004^{***}	-0.002^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Rural	0.060^{***}	0.067^{***}	0.044^{***}
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Education Level	-0.088^{***}	-0.084^{***}	-0.070^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Catholic	0.005	0.011	0.002
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Married	-0.028^{*}	-0.048^{***}	-0.029^{**}
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Conflict Events:Total Aid	-0.0003	-0.00003	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.596^{***}	0.680^{***}	0.426^{***}
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X	X
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.038)
Observations	9,515	9,547	9,469
Log Likelihood	$-6{,}498.114$	$-6{,}867.206$	$-6{,}311.270$
Akaike Inf. Crit.	13,026.230	13,764.410	12,652.540
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.102: Robustness Check: Men's Responses on Justification of Each Type (2)

	Dependent variable:	
	Wife Beat Burn Food	Wife Beat Refuse Sex
	(1)	(2)
Conflict Events	-0.065^{*}	0.028
	(0.039)	(0.046)
Total Aid	-0.0003	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	-0.002^{***}	-0.001
	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
Rural	0.050^{***}	0.047^{***}
	(0.009)	(0.012)
Education Level	-0.035^{***}	-0.058^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.005)
Catholic	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.009)
Married	-0.036^{***}	-0.049^{***}
	(0.009)	(0.011)
Conflict Events:Total Aid	0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	0.207^{***}	0.223^{***}
	(0.022)	(0.027)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X
Observations	9,541	9,439
Log Likelihood	$-2,827.693$	$-4,300.563$
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,685.386	8,631.125
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 8.103: Robustness Check: Men's Responses, Media consumption Types

	Dependent variable:		
	Newspaper	Television	Radio
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conflict Events	0.101	-0.168^{***}	-0.575^{***}
	(0.076)	(0.065)	(0.199)
Total Aid	-0.001	0.0001	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Age	-0.021^{***}	0.002	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Rural	0.219^{***}	-0.348^{***}	0.143^{*}
	(0.058)	(0.072)	(0.077)
Education Level	-0.364^{***}	0.603^{***}	0.208^{***}
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.039)
Catholic	0.081^{**}	0.025	-0.091^{*}
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.050)
Married	0.021	0.230^{***}	
	(0.034)	(0.035)	
Electricity	-0.408^{***}	0.812^{***}	0.115^{*}
	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.063)
Conflict Events:Total Aid	-0.009	0.010^{*}	0.022^{**}
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Constant	1.742^{***}	0.329^{**}	-0.856^{***}
	(0.138)	(0.157)	(0.188)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	x	x
Observations	31,810	32,933	10,862
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.104: Robustness Check: Women's Alternate Years and Justification of Wife Beating (1)

	Dependent variable:		
	Justification of Wife Beating		
	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years
Total Events	0.22^{***} (0.08)	0.16^{*} (0.08)	0.16^{**} (0.08)
Total Aid	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)
Age	-0.02^{***} (0.002)	-0.02^{***} (0.002)	-0.02^{***} (0.002)
Rural	0.34^{***} (0.06)	0.34^{***} (0.06)	0.34^{***} (0.06)
Education	-0.40^{***} (0.02)	-0.40^{***} (0.02)	-0.40^{***} (0.02)
Catholic	0.09^{***} (0.03)	0.09^{***} (0.03)	0.09^{***} (0.03)
Married	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Electricity	-0.03^{**} (0.01)	-0.03^{**} (0.01)	-0.03^{**} (0.01)
Total Events:Total Aid	-0.01^{**} (0.01)	-0.01^{*} (0.01)	-0.01^{*} (0.01)
Constant	1.46^{***} (0.13)	1.46^{***} (0.13)	1.47^{***} (0.13)
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	32,968	32,968	32,968

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.105: Robustness Check: Women's Alternate Years and Justification of Wife Beating (2)

	Dependent variable:		
	Justification of Wife Beating		
	6 Years	7 Years	10 Years
Total Events	−0.02 (0.07)	−0.07 (0.05)	−0.07 (0.05)
Total Aid	−0.0001 (0.003)	0.0000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Age	−0.02*** (0.002)	−0.02*** (0.002)	−0.02*** (0.002)
Rural	0.34*** (0.06)	0.34*** (0.06)	0.34*** (0.06)
Education	−0.40*** (0.02)	−0.40*** (0.02)	−0.40*** (0.02)
Catholic	0.09** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)
Married	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Electricity	−0.03** (0.01)	−0.03** (0.01)	−0.03** (0.01)
Total Events:Total Aid	−0.004 (0.01)	−0.003 (0.004)	−0.002 (0.003)
Constant	1.50*** (0.13)	1.51*** (0.13)	1.50*** (0.13)
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	32,968	32,968	32,968

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.106: Robustness Check: Women's Alternate Years and Media Consumption (1)

	Dependent variable:		
	Media Consumption		
	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years
Total Events	−0.15** (0.06)	−0.18*** (0.07)	−0.17** (0.07)
Total Aid	−0.003 (0.004)	−0.002 (0.004)	−0.002 (0.004)
Age	0.003* (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)
Rural	−0.55*** (0.07)	−0.55*** (0.07)	−0.54*** (0.07)
Education	0.67*** (0.03)	0.67*** (0.03)	0.67*** (0.03)
Catholic	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Married	0.24*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.03)
Electricity	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Total Events:Total Aid	0.01 (0.005)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01** (0.005)
Constant	0.75*** (0.15)	0.75*** (0.15)	0.74*** (0.15)
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	34,142	34,142	34,142
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.107: Robustness Check: Women's Alternate Years and Media Consumption (2)

	Dependent variable:		
	Media Consumption		
	6 Years	7 Years	10 Years
Total Events	−0.10* (0.05)	−0.03 (0.05)	−0.05 (0.05)
Total Aid	−0.001 (0.003)	−0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Age	0.003* (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)
Rural	−0.54*** (0.07)	−0.55*** (0.07)	−0.56*** (0.07)
Education	0.67*** (0.03)	0.67*** (0.03)	0.67*** (0.03)
Catholic	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Married	0.24*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.03)
Electricity	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Total Events:Total Aid	0.01* (0.005)	0.01 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)
Constant	0.72*** (0.15)	0.72*** (0.15)	0.74*** (0.15)
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	34,142	34,142	34,142
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.108: Robustness Check: Women's Alternate Years and Joint Financial Decisionmaking

	Dependent variable:		
	Joint Financial Decisionmaking		
	6 Years	7 Years	10 Years
Total Events	−0.91** (0.42)	0.04 (0.12)	0.10 (0.08)
Total Aid	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
Age	−0.01** (0.003)	−0.01** (0.003)	−0.01** (0.003)
Rural	0.15* (0.08)	0.15* (0.08)	0.15* (0.08)
Education	0.25*** (0.04)	0.25*** (0.04)	0.25*** (0.04)
Catholic	−0.10** (0.05)	−0.10** (0.05)	−0.11** (0.05)
Total Events:Total Aid	0.04* (0.02)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Constant	−1.14*** (0.19)	−1.14*** (0.19)	−1.15*** (0.19)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	11,164	11,164	11,164
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.109: Robustness Check: Men's Alternate Years and Justification of Wife Beating (1)

	Dependent variable:		
	Justification of Wife Beating		
	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years
Total Events	−0.17*** (0.06)	−0.13** (0.06)	−0.15** (0.06)
Total Aid	−0.002 (0.01)	−0.0003 (0.01)	0.0005 (0.01)
Age	−0.02*** (0.003)	−0.02*** (0.003)	−0.02*** (0.003)
Rural	0.36*** (0.09)	0.36*** (0.09)	0.36*** (0.09)
Education	−0.48*** (0.04)	−0.48*** (0.04)	−0.48*** (0.04)
Catholic	0.08 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
Married	−0.25*** (0.07)	−0.25*** (0.07)	−0.25*** (0.07)
Total Events:Total Aid	0.005 (0.01)	0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)
Constant	1.18*** (0.20)	1.17*** (0.20)	1.18*** (0.20)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	9,611	9,611	9,611
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.110: Robustness Check: Men's Alternate Years and Justification of Wife Beating (2)

	Dependent variable:		
	Justification of Wife Beating		
	6 Years	7 Years	10 Years
Total Events	−0.14** (0.07)	−0.14** (0.06)	−0.14** (0.06)
Total Aid	0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	−0.001 (0.01)
Age	−0.02*** (0.003)	−0.02*** (0.003)	−0.02*** (0.003)
Rural	0.35*** (0.09)	0.35*** (0.09)	0.37*** (0.09)
Education	−0.48*** (0.04)	−0.48*** (0.04)	−0.48*** (0.04)
Catholic	0.08 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)
Married	−0.25*** (0.07)	−0.25*** (0.07)	−0.25*** (0.07)
Total Events:Total Aid	0.0002 (0.005)	−0.0001 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
Constant	1.19*** (0.20)	1.19*** (0.20)	1.15*** (0.20)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	9,611	9,611	9,611
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.111: Robustness Check: Men's Alternate Years and Media Consumption (1)

	Dependent variable:		
	Media Consumption		
	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years
Total Events	0.01 (0.10)	0.004 (0.09)	0.004 (0.10)
Total Aid	0.003 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age	−0.0004 (0.004)	−0.0003 (0.004)	−0.0003 (0.004)
Rural	−0.48*** (0.12)	−0.50*** (0.11)	−0.51*** (0.11)
Education	0.80*** (0.05)	0.80*** (0.05)	0.80*** (0.05)
Catholic	−0.12* (0.07)	−0.13* (0.07)	−0.13* (0.07)
Married	0.20** (0.08)	0.20** (0.08)	0.20** (0.08)
Total Events:Total Aid	−0.003 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)
Constant	1.47*** (0.25)	1.51*** (0.25)	1.51*** (0.25)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	9,942	9,942	9,942
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.112: Robustness Check: Men's Alternate Years and Media Consumption (2)

	Dependent variable:		
	Media Consumption		
	6 Years	7 Years	10 Years
Total Events	−0.02 (0.10)	0.002 (0.10)	−0.03 (0.09)
Total Aid	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age	−0.0004 (0.004)	−0.0004 (0.004)	−0.001 (0.004)
Rural	−0.51*** (0.11)	−0.51*** (0.11)	−0.51*** (0.11)
Education	0.80*** (0.05)	0.80*** (0.05)	0.80*** (0.05)
Catholic	−0.13* (0.07)	−0.13* (0.07)	−0.12* (0.07)
Married	0.20** (0.08)	0.20** (0.08)	0.20** (0.08)
Total Events:Total Aid	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)
Constant	1.52*** (0.25)	1.52*** (0.25)	1.50*** (0.25)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Wave Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	9,942	9,942	9,942
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.113: Robustness Check: Individual Election Results

	Dependent variable:	
	Female Candidates	Percent Votes Won
	(1)	(2)
Total Aid	0.01***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Total Events	0.005***	−0.0000
	(0.002)	(0.0004)
Total Candidates	−0.56***	−0.14***
	(0.01)	(0.001)
Percent Employed	−0.005***	0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.0002)
Percent with Electricity	1.83***	0.14***
	(0.08)	(0.02)
Total Population	0.0000***	0.0000***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Population Sex Ratio	−0.0003	0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.0003)
NRM Representatives	−0.05	0.03***
	(0.04)	(0.01)
Divided Districts	0.12***	0.001
	(0.02)	(0.005)
Female Position	0.62***	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Previous Female PM	0.32***	0.003
	(0.05)	(0.01)
Female Candidate		−0.01
		(0.02)
Total Aid:Total Events	−0.0000	−0.0000
	(0.0001)	(0.0000)
Total Aid:Female Candidate		−0.003***
		(0.001)
Female Candidate:Total Events		−0.002**
		(0.001)
Total Aid:Female Candidate:Total Events		0.0002**
		(0.0001)
Constant	3.01***	0.79***
	(0.14)	(0.03)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X
Observations	17,863	16,548
R^2	0.45	0.51
Adjusted R^2	0.45	0.51
Residual Std. Error	1.19 (df = 17847)	0.25 (df = 16528)
F Statistic	986.81*** (df = 15; 17847)	919.96*** (df = 19; 16528)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.114: Robustness Check: Subcounty Elections, Female Voters Control

	Dependent variable:		
	Female Candidates	Female Winners	Percent Female Winner
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female Candidates Number		-0.12^{***}	0.03^{***}
		(0.01)	(0.001)
Total Candidates	0.03^{***}	-0.04^{***}	-0.01^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0002)
Total Events	-0.0001^{***}	-0.0005^{***}	-0.0000^{***}
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)
Total Aid	0.0001	-0.001^{***}	0.0003^{***}
	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.0001)
Working Percent	0.0003	-0.01^{***}	-0.001^{***}
	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.0001)
Electricity Percent	0.03	-0.68^{***}	0.02^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.01)
Total Population	0.0000^{***}	-0.0000^{***}	-0.0000^{***}
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.00)
Sex Ratio	0.001^{***}	0.0005	0.0002^{***}
	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.0001)
Female Position	1.00^{***}	0.45^{***}	0.005^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.01)	(0.001)
NRM Representative	-0.002^{***}	0.02^{***}	0.001^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0001)
Divided District	-0.004^{***}	-0.003^{***}	0.0003^{***}
	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.0001)
Previous Female PM	-0.01^{***}	0.02^{***}	0.001^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0002)
Percent Female Voters	-0.06^{**}	0.16^{***}	0.02^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.005)
Total Events:Total Aid	0.0000	0.0001^{***}	0.00004^{***}
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Constant	-0.36^{***}	2.35^{***}	0.31^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.01)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Observations	21,143	21,143	21,143
R^2	0.98	0.57	0.57
Adjusted R^2	0.98	0.57	0.57
Residual Std. Error	0.30 (df = 21126)	0.61 (df = 21125)	0.06 (df = 21125)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

8.3 Chapter 6

Table 8.115: GSSR in Conflict States, High and Low Intensity Conflicts

	High Intensity Conflicts		*Low Intensity Conflicts*	
	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
Multidimensional Mission	0.80	0.80	0.64*	0.99***
	(1.11)	(1.19)	(0.35)	(0.31)
Export Context	3.12*	2.78*	0.76	0.90
	(1.64)	(1.63)	(0.58)	(0.58)
World Bank Aid	−0.04	−0.03	0.01	0.02*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Cultural Context	−3.27***	−3.24***	−0.37	−0.49*
	(0.96)	(0.93)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Active Conflict	0.89	0.56	0.07	−0.01
	(0.61)	(0.55)	(0.30)	(0.24)
Post 1325	1.11	0.62	0.68	0.99***
	(0.80)	(0.67)	(0.42)	(0.34)
CEDAW	−0.03	−0.03	0.02	0.03*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Polity 2	0.20***	0.19***	0.03	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.02)
GDP Per Capita	−0.57	−0.35	0.03	0.05
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Muslim Majority	1.86**	1.64**	0.11	0.21
	(0.88)	(0.81)	(0.36)	(0.28)
Time Since Balancing	−0.81**		−0.12	
	(0.36)		(0.13)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.17***		−0.001	
	(0.06)		(0.02)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.01***		0.0003	
	(0.003)		(0.001)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.76**		−0.17
		(0.34)		(0.11)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.14**		0.01
		(0.07)		(0.01)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.01**		0.0000
		(0.003)		(0.0005)
Sexual Violence	0.19	0.27	−0.03	−0.10
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Constant	4.33	4.54	−3.54**	−3.68**
	(5.46)	(5.71)	(1.51)	(1.58)
Observations	170	170	662	661
R^2	0.39	0.37	0.11	0.19
χ^2 (df = 14)	48.28***	46.75***	43.18***	86.53***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.116: Robustness Check: Below 25 Battle Death Termination Removed

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.44*** (0.11)	0.44*** (0.10)		
Active Conflict			0.45*** (0.13)	0.39*** (0.13)
Post Conflict			0.30* (0.18)	0.28* (0.15)
Post 1325	0.59*** (0.17)	0.80*** (0.15)	0.60*** (0.17)	0.80*** (0.15)
CEDAW	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Fertility	−0.08 (0.06)	−0.08* (0.05)	−0.08 (0.06)	−0.08* (0.05)
Polity 2	0.03* (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	0.004 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.07)	−0.01 (0.06)
Muslim Majority	0.02 (0.16)	0.02 (0.14)	0.04 (0.16)	0.05 (0.14)
Time Since Balancing	−0.16*** (0.03)		−0.16*** (0.03)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01*** (0.002)		0.01*** (0.002)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0000*** (0.0000)		−0.0000*** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.23*** (0.05)		−0.23*** (0.05)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.01)		0.01** (0.01)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0002 (0.0002)		−0.0002 (0.0002)
Constant	−1.83** (0.76)	−1.63*** (0.62)	−1.70** (0.77)	−1.47** (0.63)
Observations	3,405	3,402	3,405	3,402
R^2	0.11	0.18	0.11	0.17
χ^2	213.92*** (df = 10)	400.95*** (df = 10)	210.85*** (df = 11)	394.14*** (df = 11)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.117: Robustness Check: Below 25 Battle Death Termination Removed, Conflict Sub-Sample

	Dependent variable:	
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)
Multidimensional Mission	0.69* (0.36)	0.87*** (0.28)
Export Context	1.03** (0.44)	0.93* (0.48)
World Bank Aid		0.01 (0.01)
Cultural Context	−0.65*** (0.22)	−0.71*** (0.23)
Active Conflict	0.24 (0.23)	0.09 (0.20)
Post 1325	0.68** (0.32)	0.83*** (0.27)
CEDAW	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Polity 2	0.04* (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)
GDP Per Capita	−0.06 (0.10)	−0.003 (0.09)
Muslim Majority	0.15 (0.28)	0.20 (0.27)
Time Since Balancing	−0.17** (0.07)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01** (0.004)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0001** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.18*** (0.06)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.004)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0001** (0.0000)
Sexual Violence	0.004 (0.16)	−0.05 (0.15)
Constant	−2.46** (1.13)	−2.18* (1.29)
Observations	907	906
R^2	0.13	0.18
χ^2	69.87*** (df = 13)	111.09*** (df = 14)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.118: Robustness Check: Coups Removed as Conflict

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.46^{***} (0.11)	0.45^{***} (0.10)		
Active Conflict			0.49^{***} (0.13)	0.45^{***} (0.13)
Post Conflict			0.41^{***} (0.16)	0.47^{***} (0.13)
Post 1325	0.59^{***} (0.17)	0.79^{***} (0.15)	0.59^{***} (0.16)	0.79^{***} (0.15)
CEDAW	0.02^{*} (0.01)	0.02^{**} (0.01)	0.02^{*} (0.01)	0.02^{**} (0.01)
Fertility	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.08^{*} (0.05)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.08^{*} (0.05)
Polity 2	0.03^{*} (0.01)	0.04^{***} (0.01)	0.03^{*} (0.01)	0.04^{***} (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)	0.004 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)
Muslim Majority	0.01 (0.16)	0.02 (0.14)	0.01 (0.16)	0.01 (0.14)
Time Since Balancing	-0.15^{***} (0.03)		-0.15^{***} (0.03)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01^{***} (0.002)		0.01^{***} (0.002)	
Time Since Balancing^3	-0.0000^{***} (0.0000)		-0.0000^{***} (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		-0.23^{***} (0.05)		-0.23^{***} (0.05)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01^{**} (0.01)		0.01^{**} (0.01)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		-0.0002 (0.0002)		-0.0002 (0.0002)
Constant	-1.83^{**} (0.76)	-1.64^{***} (0.62)	-1.82^{**} (0.75)	-1.64^{***} (0.62)
Observations	3,405	3,402	3,405	3,402
R^2	0.11	0.18	0.11	0.18
χ^2	214.72^{***} (df = 10)	401.77^{***} (df = 10)	214.91^{***} (df = 11)	401.80^{***} (df = 11)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.119: Robustness Check: Coups Removed as Conflict, Conflict Sub-Sample

	Dependent variable:	
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)
Multidimensional Mission	0.69* (0.36)	0.87*** (0.28)
Export Context	1.03** (0.44)	0.93* (0.48)
World Bank Aid		0.01 (0.01)
Cultural Context	−0.65*** (0.22)	−0.71*** (0.23)
Active Conflict	0.24 (0.23)	0.09 (0.20)
Post 1325	0.68** (0.32)	0.83*** (0.27)
CEDAW	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Polity 2	0.04* (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)
GDP Per Capita	−0.06 (0.10)	−0.003 (0.09)
Muslim Majority	0.15 (0.28)	0.20 (0.27)
Time Since Balancing	−0.17** (0.07)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01** (0.004)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0001** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.18*** (0.06)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.004)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0001** (0.0000)
Sexual Violence	0.004 (0.16)	−0.05 (0.15)
Constant	−2.46** (1.13)	−2.18* (1.29)
Observations	907	906
R^2	0.13	0.18
χ^2	69.87*** (df = 13)	111.09*** (df = 14)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.120: Robustness Check: Interstate Conflict

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.09 (0.26)	0.08 (0.23)		
Active Conflict			0.42 (0.31)	0.05 (0.32)
Post Conflict			0.001 (0.29)	0.09 (0.25)
Post 1325	0.60*** (0.17)	0.79*** (0.16)	0.60*** (0.18)	0.79*** (0.16)
CEDAW	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Fertility	−0.07 (0.06)	−0.08* (0.05)	−0.07 (0.06)	−0.08* (0.05)
Polity 2	0.03* (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.04 (0.07)	−0.04 (0.06)	−0.04 (0.07)	−0.04 (0.06)
Muslim Majority	0.07 (0.16)	0.07 (0.14)	0.07 (0.16)	0.07 (0.14)
Time Since Balancing	−0.16*** (0.03)		−0.16*** (0.03)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01*** (0.002)		0.01*** (0.002)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0000*** (0.0000)		−0.0000*** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.24*** (0.05)		−0.24*** (0.05)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.01)		0.01** (0.01)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0003 (0.0002)		−0.0003 (0.0002)
Constant	−1.36* (0.74)	−1.16* (0.59)	−1.38* (0.74)	−1.15* (0.59)
Observations	3,405	3,402	3,405	3,402
R^2	0.10	0.17	0.10	0.17
χ^2	197.95*** (df = 10)	382.64*** (df = 10)	198.88*** (df = 11)	382.64*** (df = 11)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.121: Robustness Check: Interstate Conflict, Conflict Sub-Sample

	Dependent variable:	
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)
Multidimensional Mission	−7.98*** (1.33)	−8.31*** (1.22)
Export Context	0.91 (0.70)	1.16* (0.70)
World Bank Aid		0.04 (0.04)
Cultural Context	−0.78*** (0.25)	−0.78*** (0.29)
Active Conflict	0.25 (0.49)	0.37 (0.42)
Post 1325	1.33 (0.93)	1.76** (0.82)
CEDAW	0.01 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)
Polity 2	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
GDP Per Capita	−0.33 (0.30)	0.03 (0.28)
Muslim Majority	0.11 (0.29)	0.19 (0.29)
Time Since Balancing	−0.33 (0.28)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.05 (0.06)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.003 (0.003)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.41 (0.33)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.09 (0.08)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.01 (0.01)
Constant	0.35 (3.97)	−3.60 (3.77)
Observations	306	306
R^2	0.26	0.29
χ^2	45.36*** (df = 12)	54.44*** (df = 13)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.122: Robustness Check: Post-Conflict as 10 Years For All Conflict

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.38*** (0.11)	0.39*** (0.10)		
Active Conflict			0.47*** (0.13)	0.45*** (0.13)
Post Conflict			0.28* (0.15)	0.34*** (0.12)
Post 1325	0.60*** (0.17)	0.80*** (0.15)	0.60*** (0.17)	0.80*** (0.15)
CEDAW	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Fertility	−0.07 (0.06)	−0.08* (0.05)	−0.08 (0.06)	−0.08* (0.05)
Polity 2	0.03* (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	0.004 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)	0.001 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)
Muslim Majority	0.01 (0.15)	0.01 (0.14)	0.02 (0.15)	0.01 (0.14)
Time Since Balancing	−0.16*** (0.03)		−0.15*** (0.03)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01*** (0.002)		0.01*** (0.002)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0000*** (0.0000)		−0.0000*** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.23*** (0.05)		−0.23*** (0.05)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.01)		0.01** (0.01)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0002 (0.0002)		−0.0002 (0.0002)
Constant	−1.82** (0.75)	−1.65*** (0.61)	−1.80** (0.74)	−1.64*** (0.61)
Observations	3,405	3,402	3,405	3,402
R^2	0.10	0.17	0.11	0.17
χ^2	209.72*** (df = 10)	397.56*** (df = 10)	211.41*** (df = 11)	398.12*** (df = 11)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.123: Robustness Check: Post-Conflict as 10 Years For All Conflict, Conflict Sub-Sample

	Dependent variable:	
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)
Multidimensional Mission	0.22 (0.29)	0.30 (0.24)
Export Context	0.76* (0.41)	0.66 (0.43)
World Bank Aid		0.01 (0.01)
Cultural Context	−0.67*** (0.22)	−0.62*** (0.22)
Active Conflict	0.21 (0.18)	0.10 (0.15)
Post 1325	0.59** (0.28)	0.78*** (0.25)
CEDAW	0.02* (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Polity 2	0.03* (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
GDP Per Capita	−0.15 (0.10)	−0.09 (0.08)
Muslim Majority	0.27 (0.24)	0.23 (0.21)
Time Since Balancing	−0.19*** (0.05)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01*** (0.003)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0001*** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.19*** (0.05)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01*** (0.003)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0001*** (0.0000)
Constant	−0.89 (1.10)	−1.05 (1.12)
Observations	1,321	1,320
R^2	0.14	0.20
χ^2	113.74*** (df = 12)	181.97*** (df = 13)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.124: Robustness Check: GDP Control

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.32*** (0.12)	0.36*** (0.11)		
Active Conflict			0.29* (0.15)	0.31** (0.14)
Post Conflict			0.36** (0.16)	0.42*** (0.14)
Post 1325	0.63*** (0.16)	0.83*** (0.15)	0.63*** (0.16)	0.83*** (0.15)
CEDAW	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Fertility	0.02 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.03)
Polity 2	0.03*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
GDP	0.16*** (0.04)	0.10*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.11*** (0.04)
Muslim Majority	−0.07 (0.16)	−0.03 (0.15)	−0.08 (0.16)	−0.04 (0.14)
Time Since Balancing	−0.13*** (0.03)		−0.13*** (0.03)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.005*** (0.002)		0.005*** (0.002)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0000*** (0.0000)		−0.0000*** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.22*** (0.05)		−0.22*** (0.05)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.01)		0.01** (0.01)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0003 (0.0002)		−0.0003 (0.0002)
Constant	−5.74*** (0.98)	−4.07*** (0.87)	−5.80*** (1.01)	−4.18*** (0.89)
Observations	3,408	3,405	3,408	3,405
R^2	0.12	0.18	0.12	0.18
χ^2	237.07*** (df = 10)	413.11*** (df = 10)	237.23*** (df = 11)	413.60*** (df = 11)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.125: Robustness Check: GDP Control, Conflict Sub-Sample

	Dependent variable:	
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)
Multidimensional Mission	0.34 (0.28)	0.38* (0.23)
Export Context	0.64 (0.46)	0.55 (0.48)
World Bank Aid		0.01 (0.01)
Cultural Context	−0.54** (0.23)	−0.53** (0.23)
Active Conflict	0.18 (0.19)	0.07 (0.15)
Post 1325	0.59** (0.30)	0.78*** (0.27)
CEDAW	0.02 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)
Polity 2	0.03 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
GDP	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
Muslim Majority	0.20 (0.25)	0.17 (0.23)
Time Since Balancing	−0.18*** (0.05)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01*** (0.003)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0001*** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.18*** (0.05)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01*** (0.003)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0001*** (0.0000)
Constant	−2.46 (1.61)	−2.20 (1.53)
Observations	1,321	1,320
R^2	0.13	0.20
χ^2	110.39*** (df = 12)	180.68*** (df = 13)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.126: Robustness Check: Women's Legislative Representation Control

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.40*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.10)		
Active Conflict			0.45*** (0.13)	0.42*** (0.13)
Post Conflict			0.33** (0.15)	0.40*** (0.13)
Post 1325	0.63*** (0.17)	0.81*** (0.16)	0.63*** (0.17)	0.81*** (0.16)
CEDAW	0.02** (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)
Legislature Percent	−0.003 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.002 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Polity 2	0.03** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	0.07 (0.05)	0.08* (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.07* (0.04)
Muslim Majority	−0.01 (0.16)	0.04 (0.15)	−0.001 (0.16)	0.05 (0.15)
Time Since Balancing	−0.14*** (0.03)		−0.14*** (0.03)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01*** (0.002)		0.01*** (0.002)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0000*** (0.0000)		−0.0000*** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.22*** (0.05)		−0.22*** (0.05)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.01)		0.01** (0.01)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0003 (0.0002)		−0.0003 (0.0002)
Constant	−2.57*** (0.40)	−2.48*** (0.36)	−2.56*** (0.40)	−2.48*** (0.36)
Observations	3,212	3,209	3,212	3,209
R^2	0.10	0.17	0.10	0.17
χ^2	191.33*** (df = 10)	370.28*** (df = 10)	191.85*** (df = 11)	370.31*** (df = 11)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.127: Robustness Check: Female Labor Force Participation Control

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.40^{***} (0.11)	0.41^{***} (0.10)		
Active Conflict			0.46^{***} (0.14)	0.43^{***} (0.13)
Post Conflict			0.31^{**} (0.15)	0.39^{***} (0.13)
Post 1325	0.50^{***} (0.16)	0.69^{***} (0.15)	0.50^{***} (0.16)	0.69^{***} (0.15)
CEDAW	0.02^{**} (0.01)	0.02^{**} (0.01)	0.02^{**} (0.01)	0.02^{**} (0.01)
Female Labor Rate	-0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)
Polity 2	0.02^{*} (0.01)	0.04^{***} (0.01)	0.02^{*} (0.01)	0.04^{***} (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	0.04 (0.05)	0.07 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.07 (0.04)
Muslim Majority	-0.03 (0.17)	0.03 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.17)	0.04 (0.15)
Time Since Balancing	-0.17^{***} (0.03)		-0.17^{***} (0.03)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01^{***} (0.002)		0.01^{***} (0.002)	
Time Since Balancing^3	-0.0000^{***} (0.0000)		-0.0000^{***} (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		-0.23^{***} (0.05)		-0.23^{***} (0.05)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01^{**} (0.01)		0.01^{**} (0.01)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		-0.0002 (0.0002)		-0.0002 (0.0002)
Constant	-2.10^{***} (0.60)	-2.22^{***} (0.48)	-2.12^{***} (0.60)	-2.23^{***} (0.48)
Observations	3,084	3,081	3,084	3,081
R^2	0.10	0.16	0.10	0.16
χ^2	185.43^{***} (df = 10)	342.99^{***} (df = 10)	186.23^{***} (df = 11)	343.05^{***} (df = 11)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.128: Robustness Check: Catholic Majority Control

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.44*** (0.11)	0.43*** (0.10)		
Active Conflict			0.48*** (0.13)	0.43*** (0.13)
Post Conflict			0.38** (0.15)	0.43*** (0.13)
Post 1325	0.58*** (0.17)	0.79*** (0.15)	0.58*** (0.17)	0.79*** (0.15)
CEDAW	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Fertility	−0.07 (0.06)	−0.08* (0.05)	−0.08 (0.06)	−0.08* (0.05)
Polity 2	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	0.01 (0.07)	0.004 (0.06)	0.004 (0.07)	0.004 (0.06)
Muslim Majority	0.01 (0.16)	0.04 (0.14)	0.02 (0.16)	0.04 (0.14)
Time Since Balancing	−0.16*** (0.03)		−0.16*** (0.03)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01*** (0.002)		0.01*** (0.002)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0000*** (0.0000)		−0.0000*** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.23*** (0.05)		−0.23*** (0.05)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.01)		0.01** (0.01)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0002 (0.0002)		−0.0002 (0.0002)
Catholic Majority	−0.04 (0.17)	0.02 (0.16)	−0.04 (0.17)	0.02 (0.16)
Constant	−1.83** (0.76)	−1.59** (0.62)	−1.82** (0.76)	−1.59** (0.62)
Observations	3,397	3,394	3,397	3,394
R^2	0.11	0.18	0.11	0.18
χ^2	213.66*** (df = 11)	399.49*** (df = 11)	214.02*** (df = 12)	399.49*** (df = 12)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.129: Robustness Check: Catholic Majority Control, Conflict Sub-Sample

	Dependent variable:	
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)
Multidimensional Mission	0.67* (0.38)	0.84*** (0.29)
Export Context	1.00** (0.43)	0.88* (0.45)
World Bank Aid		0.01 (0.01)
Cultural Context	−0.65*** (0.22)	−0.71*** (0.22)
Active Conflict	0.24 (0.23)	0.11 (0.20)
Post 1325	0.70** (0.31)	0.86*** (0.27)
CEDAW	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Polity 2	0.04* (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)
GDP Per Capita	−0.07 (0.10)	−0.01 (0.09)
Muslim Majority	0.19 (0.28)	0.28 (0.27)
Time Since Balancing	−0.17** (0.07)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01** (0.004)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0001** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.18*** (0.06)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.004)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0001** (0.0000)
Sexual Violence	−0.001 (0.16)	−0.06 (0.15)
Catholic Majority	0.14 (0.24)	0.24 (0.21)
Constant	−2.36** (1.17)	−1.96 (1.26)
Observations	907	906
R^2	0.13	0.18
χ^2	70.19*** (df = 14)	112.15*** (df = 15)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.130: Robustness Check: Christian Majority Control

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.43*** (0.11)	0.44*** (0.10)		
Active Conflict			0.47*** (0.13)	0.45*** (0.13)
Post Conflict			0.38** (0.15)	0.44*** (0.13)
Post 1325	0.59*** (0.17)	0.80*** (0.15)	0.59*** (0.17)	0.80*** (0.15)
CEDAW	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Fertility	−0.07 (0.06)	−0.08* (0.05)	−0.07 (0.06)	−0.08* (0.05)
Polity 2	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)
Muslim Majority	−0.04 (0.20)	0.04 (0.17)	−0.03 (0.20)	0.04 (0.17)
Time Since Balancing	−0.16*** (0.03)		−0.16*** (0.03)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01*** (0.002)		0.01*** (0.002)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0000*** (0.0000)		−0.0000*** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.23*** (0.05)		−0.23*** (0.05)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.01)		0.01** (0.01)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0002 (0.0002)		−0.0002 (0.0002)
christian_maj	−0.09 (0.16)	0.02 (0.16)	−0.09 (0.16)	0.02 (0.16)
Constant	−1.81** (0.74)	−1.62*** (0.62)	−1.80** (0.74)	−1.62*** (0.62)
Observations	3,401	3,398	3,401	3,398
R^2	0.11	0.18	0.11	0.18
χ^2	213.80*** (df = 11)	399.98*** (df = 11)	214.13*** (df = 12)	399.99*** (df = 12)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.131: Robustness Check: Christian Majority Control, Conflict Sub-Sample

	Dependent variable:	
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)
Multidimensional Mission	0.69* (0.36)	0.86*** (0.28)
Export Context	1.03** (0.44)	0.92** (0.46)
World Bank Aid		0.01 (0.01)
Cultural Context	−0.65*** (0.22)	−0.72*** (0.22)
Active Conflict	0.24 (0.23)	0.12 (0.20)
Post 1325	0.67** (0.32)	0.85*** (0.27)
CEDAW	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Polity 2	0.04* (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)
GDP Per Capita	−0.06 (0.10)	−0.01 (0.09)
Muslim Majority	0.14 (0.32)	0.33 (0.32)
Time Since Balancing	−0.17** (0.07)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01** (0.004)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0001** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.19*** (0.06)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.004)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0001** (0.0000)
Sexual Violence	0.004 (0.16)	−0.05 (0.15)
christian_maj	−0.01 (0.23)	0.20 (0.23)
Constant	−2.46** (1.13)	−2.17* (1.27)
Observations	907	906
R^2	0.13	0.18
χ^2	69.87*** (df = 14)	111.75*** (df = 15)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.132: Robustness Check: Communist Control

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.45*** (0.10)	0.44*** (0.10)		
Active Conflict			0.50*** (0.13)	0.45*** (0.12)
Post Conflict			0.39** (0.15)	0.44*** (0.13)
Post 1325	0.60*** (0.16)	0.80*** (0.15)	0.61*** (0.16)	0.80*** (0.15)
CEDAW	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Fertility	−0.07 (0.05)	−0.08* (0.04)	−0.07 (0.05)	−0.08* (0.04)
Polity 2	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)
Muslim Majority	0.03 (0.16)	0.03 (0.14)	0.04 (0.16)	0.03 (0.14)
Time Since Balancing	−0.15*** (0.03)		−0.15*** (0.03)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01*** (0.002)		0.01*** (0.002)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0000*** (0.0000)		−0.0000*** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.23*** (0.05)		−0.23*** (0.05)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.01)		0.01** (0.01)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0002 (0.0002)		−0.0002 (0.0002)
Communist	0.22 (0.52)	0.07 (0.50)	0.22 (0.52)	0.07 (0.50)
Constant	−1.92*** (0.69)	−1.66*** (0.56)	−1.91*** (0.69)	−1.66*** (0.56)
Observations	3,401	3,399	3,401	3,399
R^2	0.11	0.18	0.11	0.18
χ^2	214.23*** (df = 11)	400.39*** (df = 11)	214.68*** (df = 12)	400.39*** (df = 12)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.133: Robustness Check: Communist Control, Conflict Sub-Sample

	Dependent variable:	
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)
Multidimensional Mission	0.68* (0.36)	0.87*** (0.28)
Export Context	1.02** (0.44)	0.93* (0.48)
World Bank Aid		0.01 (0.01)
Cultural Context	−0.64*** (0.22)	−0.71*** (0.23)
Active Conflict	0.24 (0.23)	0.09 (0.20)
Post 1325	0.67** (0.31)	0.83*** (0.27)
CEDAW	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Polity 2	0.04* (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)
GDP Per Capita	−0.06 (0.10)	−0.003 (0.09)
Muslim Majority	0.14 (0.29)	0.19 (0.27)
Time Since Balancing	−0.17** (0.07)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01** (0.004)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0001** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.18*** (0.06)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.004)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0001** (0.0000)
Sexual Violence	0.003 (0.16)	−0.05 (0.15)
Communist	−0.24 (0.93)	−0.28 (0.86)
Constant	−2.44** (1.11)	−2.20* (1.30)
Observations	906	906
R^2	0.13	0.18
χ^2	69.76*** (df = 14)	111.16*** (df = 15)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.134: Robustness Check: Regional Controls

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.42*** (0.11)	0.43*** (0.11)		
Active Conflict			0.43*** (0.13)	0.41*** (0.13)
Post Conflict			0.42*** (0.15)	0.45*** (0.13)
Post 1325	0.58*** (0.17)	0.77*** (0.15)	0.58*** (0.17)	0.77*** (0.15)
CEDAW	0.01* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Fertility	−0.12 (0.08)	−0.09 (0.07)	−0.12 (0.08)	−0.09 (0.07)
Polity 2	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	0.01 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)
Muslim Majority	−0.08 (0.18)	0.04 (0.16)	−0.08 (0.18)	0.03 (0.16)
Time Since Balancing	−0.15*** (0.03)		−0.15*** (0.03)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01*** (0.002)		0.01*** (0.002)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0000*** (0.0000)		−0.0000*** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.23*** (0.05)		−0.23*** (0.05)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.01)		0.01** (0.01)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0002 (0.0002)		−0.0002 (0.0002)
Constant	−2.22*** (0.81)	−1.99*** (0.71)	−2.22*** (0.81)	−2.00*** (0.71)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Observations	3,405	3,402	3,405	3,402
R^2	0.11	0.18	0.11	0.18
χ^2	230.62*** (df = 15)	406.68*** (df = 15)	230.62*** (df = 16)	406.72*** (df = 16)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.135: Robustness Check: Regional Controls, Conflict Sub-Sample

	Dependent variable:	
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)
Multidimensional Mission	0.64* (0.36)	0.84*** (0.29)
Export Context	0.80* (0.47)	0.67 (0.45)
World Bank Aid		0.02 (0.01)
Cultural Context	−0.67*** (0.25)	−0.67*** (0.24)
Active Conflict	0.21 (0.23)	0.09 (0.20)
Post 1325	0.57* (0.31)	0.83*** (0.28)
CEDAW	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Polity 2	0.05* (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)
GDP Per Capita	−0.04 (0.10)	0.03 (0.12)
Muslim Majority	0.07 (0.31)	0.20 (0.29)
Time Since Balancing	−0.16** (0.07)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01* (0.005)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0001* (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.18*** (0.07)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.004)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0001** (0.0000)
Sexual Violence	0.01 (0.16)	−0.06 (0.15)
Constant	−2.29** (1.11)	−2.10* (1.26)
Region Fixed Effects	X	X
Observations	907	906
R^2	0.13	0.19
χ^2	73.24*** (df = 17)	113.60*** (df = 18)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.136: Robustness Check: Clustered Standard Errors Removed

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.44*** (0.11)	0.44*** (0.10)		
Active Conflict			0.49*** (0.13)	0.44*** (0.12)
Post Conflict			0.38*** (0.15)	0.44*** (0.14)
Post 1325	0.59*** (0.15)	0.80*** (0.14)	0.59*** (0.15)	0.80*** (0.14)
CEDAW	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Fertility	−0.08* (0.04)	−0.08** (0.04)	−0.08* (0.04)	−0.08** (0.04)
Polity 2	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	0.004 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.002 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Muslim Majority	0.02 (0.13)	0.02 (0.12)	0.02 (0.13)	0.02 (0.12)
Time Since Balancing	−0.16*** (0.03)		−0.15*** (0.03)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01*** (0.002)		0.01*** (0.002)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0000** (0.0000)		−0.0000* (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.23*** (0.05)		−0.23*** (0.05)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.01)		0.01** (0.01)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0002 (0.0002)		−0.0002 (0.0002)
Constant	−1.83*** (0.54)	−1.63*** (0.50)	−1.82*** (0.54)	−1.63*** (0.50)
Observations	3,405	3,402	3,405	3,402
R^2	0.11	0.18	0.11	0.18
χ^2	213.92*** (df = 10)	400.95*** (df = 10)	214.32*** (df = 11)	400.95*** (df = 11)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.137: Robustness Check: Clustered Standard Errors Removed, Conflict Sub-Sample

	Dependent variable:	
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)
Multidimensional Mission	0.69** (0.32)	0.87*** (0.30)
Export Context	1.03** (0.47)	0.93** (0.43)
World Bank Aid		0.01 (0.01)
Cultural Context	−0.65*** (0.25)	−0.71*** (0.24)
Active Conflict	0.24 (0.22)	0.09 (0.20)
Post 1325	0.68** (0.32)	0.83*** (0.29)
CEDAW	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Polity 2	0.04** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
GDP Per Capita	−0.06 (0.09)	−0.003 (0.09)
Muslim Majority	0.15 (0.27)	0.20 (0.25)
Time Since Balancing	−0.17*** (0.06)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01** (0.004)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0001* (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.18*** (0.06)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01** (0.004)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0001* (0.0000)
Sexual Violence	0.004 (0.14)	−0.05 (0.14)
Constant	−2.46 (1.65)	−2.18 (1.53)
Observations	907	906
R^2	0.13	0.18
χ^2	69.87*** (df = 13)	111.09*** (df = 14)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.138: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression, Cumulative Number of Reforms

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing Count	Gender Mainstreaming Count	Gender Balancing Count	Gender Mainstreaming Count
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.24*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)		
Active Conflict			0.26*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)
Post-Conflict			0.21*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)
Post 1325	0.98*** (0.05)	1.00*** (0.05)	0.98*** (0.05)	1.00*** (0.05)
CEDAW	0.04*** (0.002)	0.04*** (0.002)	0.04*** (0.002)	0.04*** (0.002)
Fertility	−0.07*** (0.01)	−0.05*** (0.01)	−0.07*** (0.01)	−0.05*** (0.01)
Polity 2	0.02*** (0.003)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.02*** (0.003)
GDP Per Capita	0.07*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Muslim Majority	−0.06 (0.04)	−0.07* (0.04)	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.07* (0.04)
Time Since Balancing	−0.12*** (0.01)		−0.12*** (0.01)	
Time Since Balancing^2	−0.002** (0.001)		−0.002** (0.001)	
Time Since Balancing^3	0.0000*** (0.0000)		0.0000*** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.15*** (0.01)		−0.15*** (0.01)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		−0.001 (0.001)		−0.001 (0.001)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		0.0000*** (0.0000)		0.0000*** (0.0000)
Constant	−0.52*** (0.18)	−0.57*** (0.17)	−0.51*** (0.18)	−0.57*** (0.17)
Observations	3,405	3,405	3,405	3,405
Log Likelihood	−4,721.69	−5,247.68	−4,721.24	−5,247.64
θ	5.32*** (0.47)	4.43*** (0.31)	5.32*** (0.47)	4.43*** (0.31)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	9,465.38	10,517.36	9,466.49	10,519.28
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.139: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression, Cummulative Number of Reforms, Conflict Sub-Sample

	Dependent variable:	
	Gender Balancing Count	Gender Mainstreaming Count
Multidimensional Mission	0.12 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)
Export Context	0.50*** (0.14)	0.37*** (0.13)
Cultural Context	−0.59*** (0.06)	−0.66*** (0.07)
Active Conflict	0.10 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)
Post 1325	0.78*** (0.10)	0.72*** (0.10)
CEDAW	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Polity 2	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Muslim Majority	0.04 (0.08)	0.24*** (0.08)
Time Since Balancing	−0.14*** (0.02)	−0.13*** (0.02)
Time Since Balancing^2	0.0002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)
Time Since Balancing^3	0.0000 (0.0000)	−0.0000 (0.0000)
Sexual Violence	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.09* (0.05)
Constant	0.58 (0.50)	1.18** (0.49)
Observations	907	907
Log Likelihood	−1,095.81	−1,233.39
θ	35.19 (26.77)	11.78*** (3.18)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,219.62	2,494.78
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.140: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression, Number Adopted Per Year

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balancing Count	Gender Mainstreaming Count	Gender Balancing Count	Gender Mainstreaming Count
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conflict Affected	0.27*** (0.09)	0.24*** (0.08)		
Active Conflict			0.28** (0.11)	0.19* (0.10)
Post-Conflict			0.25** (0.13)	0.30*** (0.11)
Post 1325	0.53*** (0.13)	0.64*** (0.12)	0.53*** (0.13)	0.64*** (0.12)
CEDAW	0.02** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
Fertility	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.03)
Polity 2	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
GDP Per Capita	−0.001 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.001 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)
Muslim Majority	0.10 (0.11)	0.08 (0.10)	0.10 (0.11)	0.08 (0.10)
Time Since Balancing	−0.16*** (0.02)		−0.16*** (0.02)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01*** (0.001)		0.01*** (0.001)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0000** (0.0000)		−0.0000** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.16*** (0.02)		−0.16*** (0.02)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01*** (0.001)		0.01*** (0.001)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0000** (0.0000)		−0.0000** (0.0000)
Constant	−1.80*** (0.47)	−1.82*** (0.42)	−1.79*** (0.47)	−1.84*** (0.42)
Observations	3,405	3,405	3,405	3,405
Log Likelihood	−1,629.11	−2,001.62	−1,629.09	−2,001.29
θ	1.74*** (0.49)	1.56*** (0.29)	1.74*** (0.49)	1.57*** (0.29)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,280.23	4,025.24	3,282.18	4,026.58

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.141: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression, Number Adopted Per Year, Conflict Sub-Sample

	Dependent variable:	
	Gender Balancing Count	Gender Mainstreaming Count
Multidimensional Mission	0.53** (0.25)	0.38* (0.22)
Export Context	0.64 (0.40)	0.33 (0.35)
Cultural Context	−0.39** (0.20)	−0.37** (0.17)
Active Conflict	0.22 (0.19)	−0.01 (0.16)
Post 1325	0.66** (0.27)	0.60** (0.24)
CEDAW	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Polity 2	0.04** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
GDP Per Capita	−0.09 (0.08)	−0.04 (0.07)
Muslim Majority	0.12 (0.22)	0.31 (0.19)
Time Since Balancing	−0.14*** (0.05)	−0.13*** (0.05)
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01** (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0001 (0.0000)	−0.0000 (0.0000)
Sexual Violence	−0.04 (0.12)	−0.01 (0.11)
Constant	−2.14 (1.41)	−1.18 (1.24)
Observations	907	907
Log Likelihood	−410.75	−491.17
θ	1,583.77 (13,776.03)	8.44 (12.06)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	849.51	1,010.33
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.142: Robustness Check: UN Staff Presence

	Dependent variable:	
	Gender Balancing	Gender Mainstreaming
	(1)	(2)
UN Presence	0.26** (0.11)	0.14 (0.11)
Export Context	0.95** (0.45)	0.83* (0.50)
World Bank Aid		0.01 (0.01)
Cultural Context	−0.59*** (0.20)	−0.64*** (0.22)
Active Conflict	0.16 (0.23)	−0.02 (0.20)
Post 1325	0.63** (0.29)	0.78*** (0.26)
CEDAW	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
Polity 2	0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
GDP Per Capita	0.002 (0.11)	−0.01 (0.09)
Muslim Majority	0.18 (0.27)	0.20 (0.27)
Time Since Balancing	−0.22*** (0.07)	
Time Since Balancing^2	0.01*** (0.004)	
Time Since Balancing^3	−0.0001*** (0.0000)	
Time Since Mainstreaming		−0.25*** (0.06)
Time Since Mainstreaming^2		0.01*** (0.004)
Time Since Mainstreaming^3		−0.0001*** (0.0000)
Sexual Violence	−0.01 (0.16)	−0.03 (0.15)
Constant	−3.06** (1.38)	−2.05 (1.45)
Observations	812	811
R^2	0.13	0.17
χ^2	66.36*** (df = 13)	96.76*** (df = 14)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8.143: Robustness Check: Natural Disasters and Gendered Security Sector Reform

	Dependent variable:			
	Gender Balance	Gender Mainstream	Gender Balance	Gender Mainstream
	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Natural Disasters	0.40** (0.19)	0.36** (0.18)	0.51** (0.23)	0.64*** (0.23)
CEDAW Years	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Nongender SSR	0.24 (0.17)	0.18 (0.14)	0.24 (0.17)	0.18 (0.14)
Fertility	0.02 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.04)
UNSCR 1325	0.51** (0.25)	0.89*** (0.21)	0.69** (0.32)	1.31*** (0.32)
Democracy	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
Democratic Transition	0.28 (0.45)	0.28 (0.42)	0.29 (0.45)	0.30 (0.42)
GDPPC Growth	0.0002 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	−0.0002 (0.01)	−0.0001 (0.01)
Muslim Majority	−0.16 (0.22)	−0.18 (0.19)	−0.16 (0.22)	−0.19 (0.19)
Time Gender Balance	−0.25** (0.11)		−0.25** (0.11)	
Time Gender Balance^2	0.02 (0.02)		0.02 (0.02)	
Time Gender Balance^3	−0.0004 (0.001)		−0.0004 (0.001)	
Time Gender Mainstream		−0.20* (0.11)		−0.19* (0.11)
Time Gender Mainstream^2		0.01 (0.02)		0.01 (0.02)
Time Gender Mainstream^3		−0.0003 (0.001)		−0.0003 (0.001)
Natural Disaster∗UNSCR 1325			−0.22 (0.31)	−0.52* (0.32)
Constant	−2.40*** (0.42)	−2.01*** (0.39)	−2.48*** (0.44)	−2.23*** (0.41)
Observations	1,557	1,557	1,557	1,557
R^2	0.13	0.16	0.13	0.16
χ^2	110.65*** (df = 12)	148.72*** (df = 12)	110.99*** (df = 13)	150.91*** (df = 13)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Conducted on a random subsample of states. State Clustered Standard Errors

Bibliography

A/52/3/Rev.1. 1997. "Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997.". **URL:** *http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/52/plenary/a52-3.htm*

Acharya, Amitav. 2004. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." *International Organization* pp. 239–275.

Ahikire, Josephin, Aramanzan Madanda and Christine Ampaire. 2012. "Post-war economic opportunities in northern Uganda Implications for women's empowerment and political participation.".

Ahlquist, John S. and Erik Wibbels. 2012. "Riding the Wave: World Trade and Factor-Based Models of Democratization." *American Journal of Political Science* 56:447–464.

Al-Ali, Nadje and Nicola Pratt. 2010. *What kind of liberation?: Women and the occupation of Iraq*. Univ of California Press.

Anderlini, Sanam. 2007. *Women Building Peace: What They Do, Why It Matters*. Lynne Rienne.

Andrews, David M. 1994. "Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 38:193–218.

Annan, Jeannie, Christopher Blattman, Dyan Mazurana and Khristopher Carlson. 2011. "Civil war, reintegration, and gender in Northern Uganda." *Journal of conflict resolution* 55(6):877–908.

Annan, Jeannie, Christopher Blattman, Dyan Mazurana, Khristopher Carlson et al. 2009. "Women and Girls at War: 'Wives', Mothers and Fighters in the Lord's Resistance Army." *Unpublished manuscript. Retrieved September* 28:2009.

Aponte, Maribel, Syreeta Cherry, George Fitzelle, Kelly Ann Holder, Baboyma Kaginiwa, Sidra Montgomery, Angus St. Hilaire and Eddie Thomas. 2011. "America's Women Veterans: Military Service History and VA Benefit Utilization Statistics." *Department of Veterans Affairs* .

Arat, Zehra Kabasakal. 2015. "Feminisms, Women's Rights, and the UN: Would Achieving Gender Equality Empower Women?" *American Political Science Review* 109(04):674–689.

Ashford, Mary-Wynne and Yolanda Huet-Vaughn. 1997. "The impact of war on women." *War and public health* pp. 186–197.

Autesserre, Séverine. 2012. "Dangerous tales: Dominant narratives on the Congo and their unintended consequences." *African Affairs* 111(443):202–222.

Baaz, Maria Eriksson and Maria Stern. 2008. "Making sense of violence: voices of soldiers in the Congo (DRC)." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 46(1):57–86.

Baaz, ME and M Utas. 2012. "Beyond 'Gender and Stir'." pp. 5–10.

Babock, L. and S. Laschever. 2003. *Women don't ask*. Princeton University Press.

Bacon, Laura. 2015. "Liberia's Gender-Sensitive Police Reform: Improving Representation and Responsiveness in a Post-Conflict Setting." *International Peacekeeping* .

Baines, Erin. 2014. "Forced marriage as a political project: Sexual rules and relations in the Lord's Resistance Army." *Journal of Peace Research* 51(3):405–417.

Baldez, Lisa. 2003. "Women's movements and democratic transition in Chile, Brazil, East Germany, and Poland." *Comparative Politics* pp. 253–272.

Balla, Steven J. 2001. "Interstate Professional Associations and the Diffusion of Policy Innovations." *American Politics Research* 29.

Barron, L.A. 2003. "Gender differences in negotiators' beliefs." *Human Relations* 56:635–662.

Bartley, Sharon J, Priscilla W Blanton and Jennifer L Gilliard. 2005. "Husbands and wives in dual-earner marriages: Decision-making, gender role attitudes, division of household labor, and equity." *Marriage & Family Review* 37(4):69–94.

Bashevkin, Sylvia. 2014. "Numerical and policy representation on the international stage: Women foreign policy leaders in Western industrialised systems." *International Political Science Review* 35(4):409–429.

Basini, Helen and Caitlin Ryan. 2016. "National Action Plans as an Obstacle to Meaningful Local Ownership of UNSCR 1325 in Liberia and Sierra Leone." *International Political Science Review* 37(3):390–403.

Basini, Helen S. A. 2013. "Gender Mainstreaming Unraveled: The Case of DDRR in Liberia." *International Interactions* 39:535–557.

Bearce, David H. and Daniel C. Tirone. 2010. "Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor Governments." *Journal of Politics* 72:837–851.

Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia and Ruben Enikolopov. 2013. "Empowering women through development aid: Evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan." *American Political Science Review* 107(3):540–557.

Behrend, Heike. 2000. *Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits: war in northern Uganda, 1985–97*. Ohio University Press.

Bellafaire, Judith Lawrence. 2006. "Public Service Role Models: The First Women of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services." *Armed Forces & Society* 32:424–436.

Bennoune, Karima. 2007. "Do We Need New International Law to Protect Women in Armed Conflict." *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 363:363–387.

Berko, Anat and Edna Erez. 2007. "Gender, Palestinian Women, and Terrorism: Women's Liberation or Oppression?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30:493–529.

Berkovitch, Nitza and Niā Berqôvîč. 1999. *From motherhood to citizenship: Women's rights and international organizations*. JHU Press.

Berry, Frances S. and William D. Berry. 1999. "State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations." *American Political Science Review* pp. 395–416.

Berry, Marie E. 2015. "From Violence to Mobilization: Women, War, and Threat in Rwanda." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 20:135–156.

Bhavani, Rikhil S. 2009. "Do Electoral Quotas Work After They Are Withdrawn?" *American Political Science Review* 103.

Bjarnegård, Elin and Erik Melander. 2011. "Disentangling Gender, Peace and Democratization: The Negative Effects of Militarized Masculinity." *Journal of Gender Studies* 20(2):139–154.

Blanton, Shannon Lindsey and Robert G Blanton. 2007. "What attracts foreign investors? An examination of human rights and foreign direct investment." *The Journal of Politics* 69(1):143–155.

Blomström, Magnus, Ari Kokko and Jean-Louis Mucchielli. 2003. The economics of foreign direct investment incentives. In *Foreign direct investment in the real and financial sector of industrial countries*. Springer pp. 37–60.

Boix, Carles. 1998. *Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the World Economy*. Cambridge University Press.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M and Bradford S Jones. 2004. *Event history modeling: A guide for social scientists*. Cambridge University Press.

Boyer, M.A., B. Urlacher, N.F. Hudson, A. Niv-Solomon, M.J. Butler Janik, Brown L.L, S.W. and A. Ioannou. 2009. "Gender and Negotiation: Some Experimental Findings from an International Negotiation Simulation." *International Studies Quarterly* 53:23–47.

Bratton, Kathleen A. and Kerry L. Haynie. 1999. "Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race." *The Journal of Politics* 61(03):658–679.

Bridges, Donna and Debbie Horsfall. 2009. "Increasing Operational Effectiveness in UN Peacekeeping Toward a Gender-Balanced Force." *Armed Forces & Society* 36:120–130.

Broz, J. Lawrence. 1999. "Origins of the Federal Reserve System: International Incentives and the Domestic Free-rider Problem." *International Organization* 53:39–70.

Bush, Sarah Sunn. 2011. "International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures." *International Organization* 65(1):103–137.

Byrnes, James P, David C Miller and William D Schafer. 1999. "Gender differences in risk taking: A meta-analysis." *Psychological bulletin* 125(3):367.

Cao, Xun, Brian Greenhill and Aseem Prakash. 2013. "Where is the tipping point? Bilateral trade and the diffusion of human rights." *British Journal of Political Science* 43(1):133–156.

Caprioli, Mary. 2000. "Gendered Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 37(1):51–68.

Caprioli, Mary. 2003. "Gender Equality and State Aggression: The Impact of Domestic Gender Equality on State First Use of Force." *International Interactions* 29(3):195–214.

Caprioli, Mary. 2005. "Primed for violence: The role of gender inequality in predicting internal conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 49(2):161–178.

Caprioli, Mary and Mark A Boyer. 2001. "Gender, Violence, and International Crisis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(4):503–518.

Carey, Henry F. 2001. "Women and peace and security: The politics of implementing gender sensitivity norms in peacekeeping." *International Peacekeeping* 8:49–68.

Carpenter, Charli R. 2005. "Women, children and other vulnerable groups: gender, strategic frames and the protection of civilians as a transnational issue." *International Studies Quarterly* 49(2):295–334.

Caul, Miki. 2001. "Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas." *Journal of Politics* pp. 1214–1229.

Celis, Karen and Sarah Childs. 2012. "The Substantive Representation of Women: What to Do with Conservative Claims?" *Political Studies* 60(01):213–225.

Cerny, Philip G. 1995. "Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action." *International Organization* 49:595–625.

Chaffee, Steven H, L Scott Ward and Leonard P Tipton. 1970. "Mass communication and political socialization." *Journalism Quarterly* 47(4):647–666.

Charlesworth, Hilary and Mary Wood. 2010. "'Mainstreaming Gender' in International Peace and Security: The Case of East Timor." *Yale Journal of International Law* .

Chaudoin, Stephen, Helen V. Milner and Xun Pang. 2015. "International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical Models in International Relations." *International Organization* 69:275–309.

Cingranelli, David, Skip Mark, Mark Gibney, Peter Haschke, Reed Wood and Daniel Arnon. 2019. "Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict." *Social Sciences* 8(2):41.

Cloward, Karisa. 2016. *When Norms Collide: Local Responses to Activism against Female Genital Mutilation and Early Marriage*. Oxford University Press.

Cohen, Dara Kay. 2013. "Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (19802009)." *American Political Science Review* 107(3):461–477.

Cohen, Dara Kay and Ragnhild Nordås. 2014. "Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Introducing the SVAC Dataset, 1989–2009." *Journal of Peace Research* 51(3):418–428.

Cohn, Carol. 2004. "Feminist peacemaking." *The Women's Review of Books* 21:8–9.

Cole, Wade M. 2012. "Government Respect for Gendered Rights: The Effect of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on Women's Rights Outcomes, 19812004." *International Studies Quarterly* 57(2):233–249.

Coleman, Isobel. 2010. "The global glass ceiling: Why empowering women is good for business." *Foreign Aff.* 89:13.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* pp. 563–595.

Cordell, Kristen. 2010. "Gender-Related Best Practices in Peacekeeping Operations in Liberia: 2003-2009." *Report commissioned for the Office of the Gender Advisor, United Nations Mission in Liberia* .

Cortell, Andrew P and James W Jr Davis. 2000. "Understanding the domestic impact of international norms: A research agenda." *International Studies Review* 2(1):65–87.

Craig, Tom. 2006. "Pakistani husbands can lightly beat their wives, Islamic council says." *The Washington Post* .
URL: *https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/05/26/pakistani-husbands-can-lightly-beat-their-wives-islamic-council-says/?utm$_t$erm = .7eed222b7bbe*

Curtice, Travis B. and Eric Reinhardt. N.d. "The Limits of Linkage: The Political Economy of Human Rights Trade Sanctions." *Working Paper* .

Dahlerup, Drude and Lenita Freidenvall. 2006. "Quotas as a Fast Track to Equal Representation for Women." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* pp. 26–48.

Dandeker, Christopher and Mady Wechsler Segal. 1996. "Gender Integration in Armed Forces: Recent Policy Developments in the United Kingdom." *Armed Forces & Society* 23.

Dharmapuri, Sahana. 2011. "Just Add Women and Stir?" *Parameters* pp. 56–66.

Dietrich Ortega, Luisa Maria. 2012. "Looking beyond violent militarized masculinities: guerrilla gender regimes in Latin America." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 14(4):489–507.

Dollar, D, R Fisman and R Gatti. 2001. "Are Women Really the 'fairer' Sex? Corruption and Women in the Government." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 46:423–429.

Dumas, Jennifer. 2010. "Gender Inequality and Terrorism: An Analysis of the Effects of Socioeconomic Gender Inequality on Terrorism." *University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations* .

Eckel, Catherine C and Philip J Grossman. 2002. "Sex differences and statistical stereotyping in attitudes toward financial risk." *Evolution and human behavior* 23(4):281–295.

Egnell, R. 2014. *Gender Effectiveness, and Organizational Change. The Swedish Model*. Palgrave MacMillan.

Enloe, Cynthia. 1989. *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*. Pandora Press London.

Enloe, Cynthia. 2000. *Maneuvers: The international Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*. University of California Press.

Enloe, Cynthia. 2007. *Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link*. Rowan & Littlefield.

Falb, KL, J Annan, E King, J Hopkins, D Kpebo and J Gupta. 2014. "Gender norms, poverty and armed conflict in Côte DIvoire: engaging men in women's social and economic empowerment programming." *Health education research* 29(6):1015–1027.

Farr, Vanessa. 2011. "UNSCR 1325 and Women's Peace Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territory." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 14:539–556.

Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49:379–414.

Fearon, James D. 2005. "Primary commodity exports and civil war." *Journal of conflict Resolution* 49(4):483–507.

Fearon, James D and David D Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war." *American political science review* 97(1):75–90.

Feaver, Peter D. 2009. *Armed servants: Agency, oversight, and civil-military relations*. Harvard University Press.

Feliz, Solomon. 2017. "Tribes in India Demand an End to Local Gender Quotas, Sparking Deadly Riots." *Time Magazine* .
URL: *http://time.com/4659204/nagaland-india-gender-quota/*

Fenlason, Jeff. 2016. "An Infantry Master Sgt On Why Leaders Need To Embrace Gender Integration." *Task and Purpose* .
URL: *https://taskandpurpose.com/military-better-women-combat-jobs-says-infantry-master-sgt*

Fielding, David. 2004. "How does violent conflict affect investment location decisions? Evidence from Israel during the Intifada." *Journal of Peace Research* 41(4):465–484.

Findley, Michael G. and Joseph K. Young. 2015. "Terrorism, Spoiling, and the Resolution of Civil Wars." *The Journal of Politics* 77.

Finnemore, Martha. 1993. "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms." *International Organization* pp. 565–597.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* pp. 887–917.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 2012. *The Impact of Gender Quotas*. Oxford University Press.

Franceschet, Susan and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2008. "Gender Quotas and Women's Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina." *Politics & Gender* 4.

Frieden, Jeffry A. 1991. "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance." *International Organization* 45:425–451.

Frieden, Jeffry A. and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. *The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview*. Cambridge University Press.

Gardam, Judith. 1997. "Women and the law of armed conflict: why the silence?" *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* 46(1):55–80.

Garrett, Geoffey. 1998. *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy*. Cambridge University Press.

Garrett, Geoffrey and Peter Lange. 1996. *Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change*. Cambridge University Press.

Gersony, Robert. 1997. *The Anguish of Northern Uganda: Result of a Field-based Assessment of the Civil Conflicts in Northern Uganda*.

Ghobarah, Hazem Adam, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett. 2003. "Civil wars kill and maim people – long after the shooting stops." *American Political Science Review* 97(2):189–202.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede and Michael D. Ward. 2006. "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization." *International Organization* 60:911–933.

Goldstein, Joshua S. 2003. *War and Gender*. Springer.

Goodman, Ryan and Thomas Pegram, eds. 2012. *Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights Institutions*. Cambridge University Press.

Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. "The Second Image Reversed: the International Sources of Domestic Politics." *International Organization* 32:881–912.

Gray-Little, Bernadette and Nancy Burks. 1983. "Power and satisfaction in marriage: A review and critique." *Psychological Bulletin* 93(3):513.

Greenhill, Brian. 2010*a*. "The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms." *International Studies Quarterly* 54:127–145.

Greenhill, Brian. 2010*b*. *Norm Transmission in Networks of Intergovermental Organizations*. Dissertation: University of Washington.

Greenhill, Brian. 2016. *Transmitting rights: International organizations and the diffusion of human rights practices*. Oxford University Press.

Greenhill, Brian, Layna Mosley and Aseem Prakash. 2009. "Trade-based diffusion of labor rights: A panel study, 1986–2002." *American Political Science Review* 103(4):669–690.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression." *International Organization* 59(3):593–629.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2008. "Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem." *International Organization* 62(4):689–716.

Hashimoto, Barry. Forthcoming. "Why do autocrats accept the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction? Theory and evidence." *International Organization* .

Hegre, Håvard. 2001. "Toward a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816–1992." *American political science review* 95(1):33–48.

Hendricks, Cheryl. 2012. "Research on Gender and SSR in Africa." pp. 11–17.

Hewitt, Sarah. 2016. "Gender, peace and security In the Australian Defence Force: Sarah Hewitt in conversation with Captain Jennifer Wittwer, CSM, RAN." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* .

Higate, Paul and Marsha Henry. 2004. "Engendering (In) security in Peace support Operations." *Security Dialogue* 35(4):481–498.

Higate, Paul and Marsha Henry. 2009. *Insecure spaces: peacekeeping, power and performance in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia*. Zed Books London.

Hoduck, Ann. 2016. "Protecting Spaces for Women's Economic Participation in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States." *Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security Occassional Paper Series* .

Holliday, Janet R. 2012. "Female Engagement Teams: The Need to Standardize Training and Employment." *Military Review* .

Htun, Mala and S Laurel Weldon. 2012. "The civic origins of progressive policy change: Combating violence against women in global perspective, 1975–2005." *American Political Science Review* 106(3):548–569.

Huber, Laura and Sabrina Karim. 2018. "The Internationalization of SSR Gender Balancing in Post-Conflict States." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* .

Hudson, Natalie Florea. 2009. *Gender, Human Security and the UN: Security Language as a Political Framework for Women*. London: Routledge Press.

Hudson, Valerie M and Andrea Den Boer. 2002. "A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace: Security and Sex Ratios in Asia's Largest States." *International Security* 26(4):5–38.

Hudson, Valerie M, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli and Chad F. Emmett. 2013. *Sex and World Peace*. Columbia University Press.

Hudson, Valerie M. and Patricia Leidl. 2015*a*. *The Hillary Doctrine: Sex and American Foreign Policy*. Columbia University Press.

Hudson, Valerie M and Patricia Leidl. 2015*b*. *The Hillary Doctrine: Sex and American Foreign Policy*. Columbia University Press.

Hughes, Melanie M. 2011. "Intersectionality, Quotas, and Minority Women's Political Representation Worldwide." *American Political Science Review* pp. 604–620.

Hughes, Melanie M and Aili Mari Tripp. 2015. "Civil war and trajectories of change in women's political representation in Africa, 1985–2010." *Social forces* 93(4):1513–1540.

Hughes, Melanie M., Mona Lena Krook and Pamela Paxton. 2015. "Transnational Women's Activism and the Global Diffusion of Gender Quotas." *International Studies Quarterly* pp. 357–372.

Hughes, Melanie M, Pamela Paxton, Amanda Clayton and Pär Zetterberg. 2017. "Quota adoption and reform over time (QAROT), 1947-2015.".

Hyde, Susan D. 2011. "Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion." *American Journal of Political Science* 55:356–369.

Hyde, Susan D. N.d. "The Problem of Insincere Compliance in International Relations: Norms, Policy Diffusion, and International Expectations." *Working Paper* .

IDMC. 2011. "Unprepared for peace: Education in northern Uganda in displacement and beyond.".

Irvine, Jill A. 2013. "Leveraging Change." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 15:20–38.

Iyer, Lakshmi, Anandi Mani, Prachi Mishra and Petia Topalova. 2012. "The power of political voice: women's political representation and crime in India." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 4(4):165–93.

Jabbra, Nancy W. 2006. "Women, words and war: explaining 9/11 and justifying US military action in Afghanistan and Iraq." *Journal of international women's studies* 8(1):236–255.

Jacob, Margarete. 2009. Engendering Security Sector Reform: Sierra Leone and Liberia Compared. In *Engendering Security Sector Reform: A Workshop Report*. pp. 48–75.

Jansson, Maria and Maud Eduards. 2016. "The Politics of gender in the UN Security Council Resolutions on women, peace and security." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 18:590–604.

Jennings, Kathleen. 2011. "Women's participation in UN peacekeeping operations: agents of change or stranded symbols?" *NOREF Report* .

Jervis, Robert. 1997. *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*. Princeton University Press.

Johnson, Deb, Hope Kabuchu and Santa Vusiya Kayonga. 2003. "Women in Ugandan local government: the impact of affirmative action." *Gender & Development* 11(3):8–18.

Jones, Sophia. 2018. "The Many Dangers of Being an Afghan Woman in Uniform." *The New York Times* .
URL: *https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/magazine/afghanistan-women-security-forces.html*

Karamé, Kari H. 2001. "Military women in peace operations: Experiences of the Norwegian battalion in UNIFIL 1978-98." *International Peacekeeping* 8:85–96.

Karim, Sabrina. 2016. "Evaluating the Changing of the Guards: Survey Evidence from Liberia on Security Sector Female Ratio Balancing Reforms." *Working Paper, Emory University* .

Karim, Sabrina. 2017*a*. *Gender and Women in Military Affairs: A Comparative Study*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Karim, Sabrina. 2017*b*. "Restoring confidence in post-conflict security sectors: Survey evidence from Liberia on female ratio balancing reforms." *British Journal of Political Science* pp. 1–23.

Karim, Sabrina, Andrew Wagstaff and Laura Huber. n.d. "Internal Security Forces Dataset.".

Karim, Sabrina and Daniel Hill. N.d. "The Study of Gender and Women in Cross-National Political Science Research: Rethinking Concepts and Measurement." *Working Paper* .

Karim, Sabrina and Kyle Beardsley. 2013. "Female Peacekeepers and Gender Balancing: Token Gestures or Informed Policymaking?" *International Interactions* 39(4):461–488.

Karim, Sabrina and Kyle Beardsley. 2016. "Explaining sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions The role of female peacekeepers and gender equality in contributing countries." *Journal of Peace Research* 53(1):100–115.

Karim, Sabrina and Kyle Beardsley. 2017. *Equal Opportunity Peacekeeping*. Oxford University Press.

Kasfir, Nelson. 2005. "Guerrillas and civilian participation: the National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981–86." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43(2):271–296.

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders*. Cornell University Press.

Kelly, Jocelyn TD, Elizabeth Colantuoni, Courtland Robinson and Michele R Decker. 2018. "From the battlefield to the bedroom: a multilevel analysis of the links between political conflict and intimate partner violence in Liberia." *BMJ global health* 3(2):e000668.

Kember, Olivia. 2007. "Impact of the Indian Formed Police Unit in the United Nations Mission in Liberia." *Master Thesis* .

Kenney, Catherine T. 2006. "The power of the purse: Allocative systems and inequality in couple households." *Gender & Society* 20(3):354–381.

Khalili, Laleh. 2011. "Gendered practices of counterinsurgency." *Review of International Studies* 37:1472–1491.

Kim, Lucian. 2017. "Russia President Signs Law to Decriminalize Domestic Violence." *National Public Radio* .
URL: *https://www.npr.org/2017/02/16/515642501/russian-president-signs-law-to-decriminalize-domestic-violence*

Kitschelt, Herbert, Peter Lange Gary Marks and John Stephens. 1999. *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*. Cambridge University Press.

Koch, Michael T. and Sarah A. Fulton. 2011. "In the Defense of Women: Gender, Office Holding, and National Security Policy in Established Democracies." *The Journal of Politics* 73(01):1–16.

Krause, Jana, Werner Krause and Piia Bränfors. 2018. "Women's Participation in peace negotiations and the durability of peace." *International interactions* 44(6):985–1016.

Krook, Mona Lena. 2006. "Reforming Representation: The Diffusion of Candidate Gender Quotas Worldwide." *Politics & Gender* pp. 303–327.

Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Krook, Mona Lena. 2016. "Contesting gender quotas: dynamics of resistance." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 4:268–283.

Krosnell, Annica and Erika Svedbert, eds. N.d. *Making Gender, Making War: Violence, Military and Peacekeeping Practices*. Routledge.

Kucera, David. 2002. "Core labour standards and foreign direct investment." *International Labour Review* 141(1-2):31–69.

Lake, David A. 2016. *The Statebuilder's Dilemma: Legitimacy, Loyalty, and the Limits of External Intervention*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lazarev, Egor. 2018. Laws in Conflict: Legacies of War and Legal Pluralism in Chechnya PhD thesis Columbia University.

Li, Quan and Adam Resnick. 2003. "Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inows to Developing Countries." *International Organization* 57:175–211.

Li, Quan and Ming Wen. 2005. "The immediate and lingering effects of armed conflict on adult mortality: a time-series cross-national analysis." *Journal of Peace Research* 42(4):471–492.

Lindemann, Stefan. 2011. "Just another change of guard? Broad-based politics and civil war in Museveni's Uganda." *African Affairs* 110(440):387–416.

Lindsey, Summer. 2018. "Conflict, Protection, and Punishment: Repercussions of Violence in eastern DR Congo." *Working Paper* .

Lombardo, Emanuela. 2005. "Integrating or Setting the Agenda? Gender Mainstreaming in the European Constitution Making Process." *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society* 12:412–432.

Malhotra, Anju and Mark Mather. 1997. Do schooling and work empower women in developing countries? Gender and domestic decisions in Sri Lanka. In *Sociological forum*. Vol. 12 Springer pp. 599–630.

Manjoo, Rashida and Calleigh McRaith. 2011. "Gender-Based Violence and Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Areas." *Cornell International Law Journal* 44:11–31.

Maoz, Zeev. 2012. "Preferential attachment, homophily, and the structure of international networks, 1816–2003." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29(3):341–369.

Marshall, Gurr Monty G., Ted Robert and Ketih Jaggers. 2015. "Polity IV Project Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015 Dataset Users' Manual.".

Masters, Cristina. 2005. "Bodies of Technology: Cyborg Soldiers and Militarized Masculinities." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 7:112–132.

Mayer, Ann Elizabeth. 1991. *Islam and human rights: tradition and politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

McBride, Dorothy and Amy Mazur. 2011. "Gender Machineries Worldwide." *World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development* .

McKay, Susan. 1998. "The effects of armed conflict on girls and women." *Peace and Conflict* 4(4):381–392.

McLeod, Laura. 2011. "Configurations of Post-Conflict: Impacts of Representations of Conflict and Post-Conflict upon the (Political) Translations of Gender Security within UNSCR 1325." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 13:594–611.

McWilliams, Monica and Avila Kilmurray. 2015. "From the global to the local: Grounding UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security in post conflict policy making." *Women's Studies International Forum* 51:128–135.

Meharg, Sarah Jane. 2010. *Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building*. Vol. 17 Strategic Studies Institute.

Melander, Erik. 2005*a*. "Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 49(4):695–714.

Melander, Erik. 2005*b*. "Political Gender Equality and State Human Rights Abuse." *Journal of Peace Research* 42(2):149–166.

Mintrom, Michael. 1997. "Policy entrepreneurs and the diffusion of innovation." *American Journal of Political Science* 41:738–770.

Montoya, Celeste. 2013. *From global to grassroots: the European Union, Transnational Advocacy, and Combating Violence against Women*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Morris, Madeline. 1996. "By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture." *Duke Law Journal* 45:651–781.

Mosley, Layna. 2000. "Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States." *International Organization* 54:737–773.

Mosley, Layna. 2003. *Global Capital and National Governments*. Cambridge University Press.

Murdie, Amanda and Dursun Peksen. 2015. "Women's rights INGO shaming and the government respect for women's rights." *The Review of International Organizations* 10(1):1–22.

Murray, Christopher JL, Gary King, Alan D Lopez, Niels Tomijima and Etienne G Krug. 2002. "Armed conflict as a public health problem." *British Medical Journal* 324(7333):346–349.

Nagel, Robert Ulrich. 2019. "Talking to the Shameless?: Sexual Violence and Mediation in Intrastate Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* .

Nordås, Ragnhild and Siri CA Rustad. 2013. "Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers: Understanding variation." *International Interactions* 39(4):511–534.

Nye, Joseph S. and Robert O. Keohane. 1989. *Power & Interdependence*. Pearson Scott Foresman.

Oatley, Thomas, W. Kindred Wineco Andrew Pennock and Sarah Bauerle Danzman. 2011. "The Political Economy of Global Finance: A Network Model." *Perspectives on Politics* 11:133–153.

Olsson, Louise. 2001. "Gender mainstreaming in practice: The United Nations transitional assistance group in Namibia." *International Peacekeeping* 8:97–110.

Olsson, Louise and Theorora-Ismene Gizelis. 2013. "An Introduction to UNSCR 1325." *International Interactions* 39:425–434.

Olsson, Louise and Theorora-Ismene Gizelis. 2015. *Gender, Peace and Security: Implementing UNSCR 1325*. Routledge.

Oneal, John R and Bruce Russett. 2001. *Triangulating peace: Democracy, interdependence, and international organizations*. Norton New York.

OSCE. 2016. "Security Sector Governance and Reform: Guidelines for OSCE Staff.". **URL:** *https://www.osce.org/secretariat/231176*

Pahl, Jan. 1980. "Patterns of money management within marriage." *Journal of Social Policy* 9(3):313–335.

Pahl, Jan. 1983. "The allocation of money and the structuring of inequality within marriage." *The Sociological Review* 31(2):237–262.

Paxton, Pamela, Jennifer Green and Melanie Hughes. 2008. "Women in Parliament, 1945-2003: Cross-National Dataset.". ICPSR24340-v1.

Pevehouse, Jon C. 2005. *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization*. Cambridge University Press.

Pham, Phuong N, Patrick Vinck and Eric Stover. 2008. "The Lord's Resistance Army and forced conscription in northern Uganda." *Hum. Rts. Q.* 30:404.

Piatti-Crocker, Adriana. 2011. *Diffusion of Gender Quotas in Latin America and Beyond*. Peter Lang.

Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. University of California Press.

Plümper, T. and E. Neumayer. 2006. "The Unequal Burden of War: The Effect of Armed Conflict on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy." *International Organization* 60:723–754.

Poast, Paul and Johannes Urpelainen. 2018. *Organizing democracy: how international organizations assist new democracies*. University of Chicago Press.

Polack, Mark A. and Emilie Hafner-Burton. 2000. "Mainstreaming gender in the European Union." *Journal of European Public Policy* 7:432–456.

Pratt, Nicola and Sophie Richter-Devroe. 2011. "Critically Examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 13:489–503.

Pupavac, Vanessa. 2005. "Empowering women? An assessment of international gender policies in Bosnia." *International Peacekeeping* 12:391–405.

Quirk, Joel. 2006. "The Anti-Slavery Project: Linking the Historical and the Contemporary." *Human Rights Quarterly* 28.

Rabe-Hemp, CE and AM Schuck. 2007. "Violence Against Police Officers Are Female Officers at Greater Risk?" *Police Quarterly* 10:411–428.

Raj, Anita. 2010. "When the mother is a child: the impact of child marriage on the health and human rights of girls.".

Ramirez, Francisco, Yasemin Soysal and Susanne Shanahan. 1997. "The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship: Cross-national Acquisition of Women's Suffrage Rights, 1890 to 1990." *American Sociological Review* 62.

Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. *The Power of Human Rights*. Cambridge University Press.

Rosenbluth, Susan C, Janice M Steil and Juliet H Whitcomb. 1998. "Marital equality: What does it mean?" *Journal of Family Issues* 19(3):227–244.

Schuler, Sidney Ruth, Rachel Lenzi, Shamsul Huda Badal and Sohela Nazneen. 2018. "Men's perspectives on women's empowerment and intimate partner violence in rural Bangladesh." *Culture, health & sexuality* 20(1):113–127.

Schweitzer, Mary M. 1980. "World War II and Female Labor Force Participation Rates." *The Journal of Economic History* 40:89–95.

Scwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2009. "Making Quotas Work." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* pp. 5–28.

Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah and Reed Wood. 2017. "Governing Well after War: How Improving Female Representation Prolongs Post-conflict Peace." *Journal of Politics* .

Shipan, Charles R. and Craig Volden. 2008. "The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion." *American Journal of Political Science* 52:840–857.

Shove, Elizabeth. 1993. Accounting for power: formal financial systems and domestic power. In *Inequalities in Employment, Inequalities in Home Life, Conference Proceedings for the 20th Cambridge Stratification Seminar, University of Cambridge*. pp. 9–10.

Sifferlin, Alexandra. 2017. "How These States Are Fighting to Protect Reproductive Rights." *Time Magazine* .
URL: *http://time.com/4663777/states-protect-reproductive-rights/*

Simmons, BA. 2009. *Mobilizing Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Simmons, Beth A. and Zachary Elkins. 2004. "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diusion in the International Political Economy." *The American Political Science Review* 98:171–189.

Singh, Prakarsh. 2013. "Impact of terrorism on investment decisions of farmers: Evidence from the Punjab insurgency." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57(1):143–168.

Sjoberg, Laura. 2007. "Agency, Militarized Femininity and Enemy Others." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 9:82–101.

Sjoberg, Laura. 2018. "Jihadi Brides and Female Volunteers: Reading the Islamic State's War to See Gender in Conflict Dynamics." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* .

Sjoberg, Laura and Caron E Gentry. 2007. *Mothers, monsters, whores: women's violence in global politics*. Zed Books.

Sjoberg, Laura and Sandra Via. 2010. *Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives*. ABC-CLIO.

Stein, Jana Von. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *American Political Science Review* 99.

Stone, Laurel Anne. 2014. "Women Transforming Conflict: A Quantitative Analysis of Female Peacemaking." *Working Paper* .

Stone, Randall W., ed. 2011. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and Global Economy*. Cambridge University Press.

Strang and JW. Meyer. 1993. "Institutional conditions for diffusion." *Theory and Society* 22.

Strömbäck, Jesper, Monika Djerf-Pierre and Adam Shehata. 2013. "The dynamics of political interest and news media consumption: A longitudinal perspective." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 25(4):414–435.

Thayer, Bradley A. and Valerie M. Hudson. 2010. "Sex and the Shaheed: Insights from the Life Sciences on Islamic Suicide Terrorism." *International Security* 34:37–62.

Thomas, Gwynn and Melinda Adams. 2010. "Breaking the Final Glass Ceiling: The Influence of Gender in the Elections of Ellen Johnson – Sirleaf and Michelle Bachelet." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 31:105–131.

Thomas, Jakana L. and Kanisha D. Bond. 2015*a*. "Women's Participation in Violent Political Organizations." *American Political Science Review* 109:488–506.

Thomas, Jakana L. and Kanisha D. Bond. 2015*b*. "Women's Participation in Violent Political Organizations." *American Political Science Review* 109:488–506.

Tickner, J. Ann. 1988. "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation." *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 17:429–440.

Tickner, J Ann. 1992. *Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving global security*. Columbia University Press.

Tickner, J. Ann. 2005. "Gendering a Discipline: Some Feminist Methodological Contributions to International Relations." *Signs* 30:2173–2188.

Tripp, Aili M. and Alice Kang. 2008. "The Global Impact of Quotas." *Comparative Political Studies* pp. 338–361.

Tripp, Aili Mari. 2015. *Women and power in post-conflict Africa*. Cambridge University Press.

True, Jacqui. 2016. "Explaining the global diffusion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda." *International Political Science Review* 37.

True, Jacqui and Michael Mintrom. 2001. "Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming." *International Studies Quarterly* 45:27–57.

Tryggestad, Torunn L. 2013. "Trick or Treat? The UN and Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security." *Global Governance* 15:539–557.

UNDP. 2010. "Ten-Year Impact Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security n Peacekeeping.".

Vogel, David. 1997. "Trading up and governing across: transnational governance and environmental protection." *Journal of European public policy* 4(4):556–571.

Vogler, Carolyn. 1998. "Money in the household: some underlying issues of power." *The Sociological Review* 46(4):687–713.

Vogler, Carolyn, Clare Lyonette and Richard D Wiggins. 2008. "Money, power and spending decisions in intimate relationships 1." *The sociological review* 56(1):117–143.

von Borzyskowski, Inken and Felicity Vabulas. N.d. "The Punishment Phase: IGO Suspensions to Sanction Political Backsliding." *Working Paper* .

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. "Political institutions and human rights: Why dictatorships enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture." *International Organization* 62(1):65–101.

Walby, Sylvia. 2005. "Introduction: Comparative gender mainstreaming in a global era." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 7:453–470.

Waltz, Kenneth Neal. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. CAddison-Wesley.

Webster, Kaitlyn, Priscilla Torres and Kyle Beardsley. N.d. "Social Hierarchies in the Crucible of War." *Working Paper* .

Whitworth, Sandra. 2004. *Men, militarism, and UN peacekeeping: a gendered analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Whitworth, Sandra. 2005. *Critical Security Studies in World Politics*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Willet, S. 2010. "Introduction: Security Council Resolution 1325: assessing the impact on women, peace and security." *International Peacekeeping* 17:142–158.

Wilson, Margo and Martin Daly. 1985. "Competitiveness, risk taking, and violence: The young male syndrome." *Ethology and sociobiology* 6(1):59–73.

Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2008. "The social processes of civil war: The wartime transformation of social networks." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11:539–561.

Wright, Katherine AM. 2016. "NATO's adoption of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security: Making the agenda a reality." *International Political Science Review* 37:350–361.

Wylie, Gillian. 2003. "Women's Rights and Righteous War' An Argument for Women's Autonomy in Afghanistan." *Feminist Theory* 4(2):217–223.

Zeigler, Sara L and Gregory G Gunderson. 2005. *Moving beyond GI Jane: Women and the US military*. University Press of America.

Zelizer, Viviana A. 1989. "The social meaning of money: "special monies"." *American journal of sociology* 95(2):342–377.

Zelizer, Viviana A Rotman. 1997. *The social meaning of money*. Princeton University Press.

Zhou, Min. 2011. "Intensification of geo-cultural homophily in global trade: Evidence from the gravity model." *Social Science Research* 40(1):193–209.

Zurbriggen, Eileen L. 2010. "Rape, war, and the socialization of masculinity: Why our refusal to give up war ensures that rape cannot be eradicated." *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 34(4):538–549.