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The Place of Place in Liturgical Theology

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The Place of Place in Liturgical Theology

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An abstract of
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate Division of Religion,
Person, Community and Religious Life
2018

Abstract

The Place of Place in Liturgical Theology
By Matthew Lawrence Pierce

This thesis draws upon "place theory" to develop a new method for analyzing liturgical spaces while attending to the challenges of appropriating non-theological resources for theological purposes. To illustrate both the challenges of such appropriations as well as the potential gains, the new analytic method is developed in conversation with liturgical theology, which itself evinces reticence of drawing upon non-theological sources, especially the human sciences.

The first chapter locates the project within the traditional foci of liturgical studies, then introduces the major tasks of liturgical theology. The second chapter examines recent theological reflection on "place," identifying the similarities with liturgical theology as well as important patterns—especially the use of spatial metaphors and pairings—within the arguments of theological reflection on place. The third chapter examines these patterns through the lens of phenomenology and neuroscience, suggesting that the shape of discourse on place has its origins in the particularities of human anatomy and physiology. These patterns indicate not only aspects of human emplacement, but also tools for place-making, thus allowing us to employ them as an analytic method for studying the creation and sustaining of places. The final chapter turns this new method upon early Methodist love feasts, which often did not meet in traditional "liturgical spaces."

The resulting method for analyzing liturgical space extends the analytic reach of liturgical studies by enabling the analysis of *ad hoc,* impermanent places and the identification of some of the specific communal and individual goods entailed in the maintenance of ritual boundaries. Further, the method identifies a link between the maintenance of such boundaries and opportunities for greater freedom and openness within the group. Finally, this method sheds new light on the relationship between discourse about place and practices of place-making.

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Acknowledgments

The completion of this dissertation comes with a range of debts to those who helped inspire my interest in place, those who have helped in the production of the work itself, and those whose care and support made my time at Emory a pleasure.

My interest in place began at the feet of James R. McGraw, who encouraged me to attend carefully to the land and to ecosystems. An undergraduate course on religious landscapes taught by Jim Sanders connected religious practice to the physical landscape for the first time. Some years later, Willie James Jennings wove together culture, pneumatology, and geography in a way that remains a touchstone for my thinking. Gary Laderman guided me through the scholarly landscape of religion and place. Marla Nelson played a host of instrumental roles during my time at the University of New Orleans and thereafter, not least of which has been holding me to the highest scholarly standards.

Those who have supported my work at Emory University are legion. Lisa Hoelle, Layla Karst, and Kristyn Sessions made managing *Practical Matters* one of the most productive and joyous endeavors of the past several years. The Emory Center for Digital Scholarship helped make the two ends meet and provided a home away from home. Special thanks are due to Rob O'Reilly and Michael Page for hiring me way back in 2011 and to Chase Lovellette and Wayne Morse for keeping me on. The Initiative in Religious Practices and Practical Theology and the General Board of Higher Education and Ministry of The United Methodist Church provided financial support for the final years of my dissertation research and writing.

The professional support I have received over the past few years has left me indebted in ways I cannot easily repay. L. Edward Phillips nurtured my love of liturgy at Duke, facilitated my move to Emory, and remains an example of pastoral care as a scholar. Ted Smith has provided sage counsel and modeled excellence in teaching. As dissertation committee member, officiant at our wedding, occasional employer, and household friend, Bobbi Patterson has been a constant and constantly positive presence over the past eight years. Gary Cornell and Phil Schroeder have provided opportunities and mentorship that continue to bear fruit in my professional life.

A small handful of folks have given the love and support every dissertation writer requires. John and Lauren Boyles, Jina and Johann Choi, Chris and Jenelle Holmes, and Devin and Jory White are some of the loveliest people and best models for the Christian life I know. John Boyles is owed special thanks for having to listen to me prattle on about place/space/liberals/conservatives/Hauerwas/church bulletins/Jesus for countless miles around the track at Emory. Pegah Moghaddam has helped keep me whole.

My patient wife Elizabeth has suffered through countless morning discussions of French social theory (now forbidden before 6:00 AM) and my consternation at being unable to articulate what I could intuit. She has read, and heard read aloud, passage after passage of this text, doing so with patience and charity. Her companionship has been the best part of the past few years.

Finally, I need to thank my mother. From her I learned to wrestle deeply with moral questions and to strive constantly toward a more fulsome embodiment of the Gospel. For what it's worth, Momma, dissertations are much longer and much bigger deals than honors theses.

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WALKING THROUGH RECENT PLACES

"I believe…in the resurrection of the body…"
—The Apostles' Creed

"My mother often told me to be unselfish, but I have become suspicious of the advice. No, I do it for my own selfish reasons. If I did not talk to the theater owner or the ticket seller, I should be lost, cut loose metaphysically speaking. I should be seeing one copy of a film which might be shown anywhere and at any time. There is a danger of slipping clean out of space and time. It is possible to become a ghost and not know whether one is in downtown Loews in Denver or suburban Bijou in Jacksonville. So it was with me."
—Walker Percy, *The Moviegoer*

In the latter half of the twentieth century, the human relationship to the physical environment emerged as a focus across the humanities. The "turn to place" occurred not only in fields that traditionally did not have the physical environment as their central concern—English and philosophy, for example—but also within fields where "place" has always been the central focus. The 1970s witnessed the rise of "human geography," a subdiscipline within geography that attended particularly to the human relationship to the physical environment. The emphasis upon the human *experience* of the physical environment stood in clear contrast to the central concern of geography up to that time, chorology, which focused upon the delineation of regions.

This multi-disciplinary "turn to place" had several causes. Phenomenologists such as Martin Heidegger in the first half of the twentieth century had attended both to human experience and the interaction between humans and the objects and fixtures in their surroundings. Yi-Fu Tuan, one of the first (and perhaps the best known) human geographers drew upon this phenomenological tradition when he began to explore the human relationship to the physical environment in *Space and Place: The Perspective of*

Experience.[1] A second impetus for the "turn to place" flows through the work of Henri Lefebvre (*The Production of Space*) to Michel Foucault and Michel de Certeau, whose concern about the role of the physical environment in producing and maintaining power clearly evince the influence of dialecticism.[2] Changes in the patterns of human habitation and transportation in the latter half of the twentieth century radically altered the ways many experience the physical environment. Thus, Edward Relph (*Place and Placelessness*) and Marc Augé (*Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity*) sought to delineate the negative impacts of these impacts on communities and upon individuals.[3]

Phenomenology, forms of dialecticism, and transformations in socio-geographic practices shaped Christian theological reflection as well. Mark Wynn (*Faith and Place: An Essay in Embodied Religious Epistemology*) employs a phenomenology of place as a means of exploring the nature of God.[4] Remnants of dialectical thought arise in discussions about inclusion/exclusion (as in Philip Sheldrake's *Spaces for the Sacred: Place, Memory, and Identity*).[5] Concerns about changes in socio-geographic practices have inspired Christian theological reflection on place, particularly around the ecological impacts of human development (Lynn White's "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis" and Geoffrey Lilburne's *A Sense of Place: A Christian Theology of the Land*) and

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[1] Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977).

[2] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991); Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage, 1995); Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

[3] Edward Relph, *Place and Placelessness* (London: Pion, 1976); Marc Augé, *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity* (New York: Verso, 1995).

[4] Mark R Wynn, *Faith and Place: An Essay in Embodied Religious Epistemology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[5] Philip Sheldrake, *Spaces for the Sacred: Place, Memory, and Identity* (London: SCM, 2001).

both urbanization (Walter Brueggemann's *The Land: Place as Gift, Promise and Challenge in Biblical Faith*) and suburbanization (*The Noise of Solemn Assemblies: Christian Commitment and Establishment in America* by Peter Berger, for example).[6]

Within the theological curriculum, reflection on the physical environment has traditionally fallen to liturgical scholars and their analyses of liturgical architecture and rites of consecration. It is therefore surprising that liturgical scholars have largely overlooked the insights of "place theorists" in other disciplines, including Christian theology.

This essay has three central tasks. The first of those tasks is the development of a new methodology for analyzing the human relationship to the physical environment in the liturgy. Thus, the thesis begins with a test case—a Methodist Episcopal love feast held in 1804. As an outdoor event, this love feast cannot be analyzed using the traditional methodologies of liturgical scholars: architectural semiotics and exegesis of rites of consecration. An analytic framework able to offer insight onto this event would therefore extend the analytic reach of liturgical scholars generally.

The second and third tasks arise from challenges that arise in appropriating "place theory" for the purposes of liturgical studies: accommodating positive valuations of the material Creation and making visible the tacit and unseen.

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[6] Lynn White, "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis," *Science* 155 (#3767) (10 March 1967): 1203-1207; Geoffrey R. Lilburne, *A Sense of Place: A Christian Theology of the Land* (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1989); Walter Brueggemann, *The Land: Place as Gift, Promise and Challenge in Biblical Faith*, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 2002); Peter. L. Berger, *The Noise of Solemn Assemblies: Christian Commitment and Establishment in America* (New York: Doubleday, 1961).

Material Matters

Within Anglophone Christian theology, theological reflection on place has had a cumulative character, with the most recent theology of place—*Where Mortals Dwell: A Christian View of Place for Today* by Craig Bartholomew—engaging all previous authors in this "tradition."[7] Viewing that tradition through the lens of *Where Mortals Dwell* reveals an important trend: underlying every account of the human experience of the physical environment is an anthropology, a sociology, and an eschatology. Beneath and undergirding these, moreover, is an understanding, often implicit, of the role of the material Creation in human life, in the sustenance of Christian communities, and in the hereafter. Indeed, because Bartholomew has as his central task elucidating a theology of place, *Where Mortals Dwell* has as a central component arguing for a *positive* theological valuation of the material Creation, including human bodies, the built environment, and a materialist eschaton. This re-valuation of material Creation is perhaps most clearly seen in Bartholomew's quotation of Paul Santmire.

> Is the final aim of God, in his governance of all things, to bring into being at the very end a glorified kingdom of spirits alone who, thus united with God, may contemplate him in perfect bliss, while as a precondition of their ecstasy all the other creatures of nature must be left by God to fall away into eternal oblivion? Or is the final aim of God, in his governance of all things, to communicate his life to another in a way that calls forth at the very end new heavens and a new earth in which righteousness dwells, a transfigured cosmos where peace is universally established between all creatures at last, in the midst of which is situated a glorious city of resurrected saints who dwell in justice, blessed with all the resplendent fullness of the earth, and who continually call upon all creatures to join with them in their joyful praise of the one who is all in all? [8]

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[7] Craig Bartholomew, *Where Mortals Dwell: A Christian View of Place for Today* (Grand Rapids, MI : Baker, 2011).
   [8] Paul Santmire, *Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian Theology* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1985), 217-8 quoted in Bartholomew, *Where Mortals Dwell*, 7.

The two images of the eschaton described by Santmire contrasts two accounts of the eschaton: one that offers a positive valuation of material Creation, the other an account of Creation in which materiality ultimately has no ultimate place.

The phenomenologist Drew Leder argues that Western philosophy has a long tradition of onto-valuational dualism.[9] Within this framework, the cosmos is regarded as divided between two distinct and unequally valuable parts. More a sensibility than a coherent theory, onto-valuational dualism regards one half of the pairing as ontologically less valuable than and therefore subordinate to the other half. Thus "mind" is superior to and rules over "matter." Thus "man" is superior to and rules over "nature." Thus the material portions of Creation ultimately "fall away into eternal oblivion." Thus the "rational" is superior to the "affective." Thus, theology is superior to and rules over the [material action of] the liturgy.

Theologies of place have grappled with this theological and cultural bequest as they have attempted to articulate a positive role for the physical environment in the spiritual lives of individuals, the sustenance of communities, and in the eschaton. In doing so, they have often (though not universally) employed spatial pairings (such as "place and space") to highlight the difference between reading the physical environment through the lens of onto-valuational dualism, which tends to denigrate material Creation, versus through the lens of a theology which positively values the material Creation.

Asserting a positive role for the material Creation comes into conflict with broadly held sensibilities about the nature of Creation generally. Oscar Cullman notes the fervent, angry responses he received in arguing the centrality of a bodily resurrection

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[9] Drew Leder, *The Absent Body* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

within the early Christian kerygma.[10] Likewise, Joel Green notes that despite a near consensus among contemporary scholars that bodily resurrection was a central component of early Christian belief, popular eschatology remains staunchly antimaterialist.[11]

What would it look like for liturgical scholars to appropriate a more positive valuation of the material Creation? After all, the traditional tools for analyzing liturgical space—architectural hermeneutics and exegesis of rites of consecration—attend primarily to the non-material aspects of the physical environment—the "meanings" set in stone and the "words" that set a place apart. One answer to the question lies within the central tasks of liturgical theology, a subdiscipline of liturgical studies.

Liturgical theology and theological reflection on place emerged at approximately the same time. Beginning in the 1960s, liturgical theology sought ostensibly to articulate the relationship between the Church's liturgy and the faith it proclaimed, between *lex orandi* and *lex credendi*. Upon closer inspection, however, liturgical theologians have applied that contrastive pairing to different referents: to institutional structures of the church, modes of engagement, different accounts of faith, etc. In each circumstance, *lex orandi* and *lex credendi* played a similar role to the use of spatial pairings in theologies of place: one denoted some aspect of the Christian life as read through (or influenced by) onto-valuational dualism, the other viewed the same aspect through the lens of a positive material valuation. Thus liturgical theologians used *lex orandi*, *lex credendi* to articulate

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[10] Oscar Cullman, *Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? The Witness of the New Testament* (New York: Macmillan, 1958), 2ff.

[11] Joel Green, *Body, Soul, and the Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker), 5ff.

the relationship of "faith" to "worship" within a context of shifting valuations of the material Creation.

This shift, however, has not gone unnoticed. Liturgical theologians like Michael Aune read much of liturgical theology as being "too anthropological" and therefore insufficiently "theological" (i.e., insufficiently "about God").[12] In the context of shifting valuations of materiality, one can read such comments as evidence that altering the valuation of the material Creation within soteriology generally requires recasting the relationship between divine action and human response. Indeed, even those liturgical theologians like Martha Moore-Keish who offer the most positive valuation of materiality continue to evince a certain reticence about doing so.

In order to highlight the gains of a more positive valuation of the material Creation as well as the ways that valuation requires re-evaluating the relationship between divine action and human response, this essay develops a new method for analyzing liturgical space in conversation with liturgical theology. This engagement enables a more clear-eyed appropriation of recent reflection on place, understanding both the benefits and the consequences. Doing so has the added benefit of illuminating a dynamic that has shaped liturgical theology from its outset: the re-valuation of materiality. Liturgical theologians are thereby better able to understand the tensions within their own field, especially when accused of (or feeling) "too anthropological."

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[12] Michael Aune, "Liturgy and Theology: Rethinking the Relationship," *Worship* 81, no.1 (2007): 46-68.

Hidden in Plain Sight

A Methodist Episcopal love feast in 1804 could occur outdoors, with participants positioning themselves so as to create an *ad hoc* place. This test case thus pushes to the fore the role of human embodiment in the experience and making of places, liturgical and otherwise.

"Turning to the body" no less than "turning to place" poses distinct challenges. In her essay, "Embodied Knowledge, Embodied Theology," Bonnie Miller-McLemore notes that a number of scholars have "turned to the body" as a means of countering body/soul dualism.[13] Often, however, these scholars import that very dualism as a methodological assumption into their analysis, such as when they treat bodies as "texts" read by others. Miller-McLemore thus highlights a challenge of talking about human embodiment: one can intend to discuss humans in non-dualist terms while unwittingly importing dualist presuppositions.

Why does this occur? At least two answers present themselves. First, scholars simply may not have been appropriately rigorous in the development of their methodologies. Because onto-valuational dualism is as much a sensibility as a theory, dualist presuppositions can "sneak" in simply because a scholar has been habituated to dualist thought. Second (and implicit in the first), human embodiment may lend itself to such errors.

If we begin with the presupposition that humans are not fully transparent to themselves, a gap opens between self-reflection ("what we think we think") and lived experience. Drew Leder notes that much of what humans experience does not rise to the

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[13] Bonnie Miller-McLemore, "Embodied Knowing, Embodied Theology: What Happened to the Body?" *Pastoral Psychology* 62, no. 5 (2013): 743-58.

level of conscious reflection.[14] For example, humans do not think about the sensation of their extremities—the ambient "feeling" of toes, for example—until something interrupts that ambient, background sensation. Stubbing a toe draws significant attention to it; so does, however, the toe going numb, the loss of ambient feeling. Under normal circumstances then, much of what one "experiences" simply fades into a kind of ambient Gestalt. An untoward event, however, calls acute attention to certain portions of the human body. Insofar as the particularities of embodiment shape the human relationship to the physical environment, then the "hiddenness" of the body and the overrepresentation of the untoward become clues to understanding both emplacement and place-making.

Developing the "hiddenness" of the body as a methodological presupposition has at least two aspects. First, self-reflection does not capture the totality of embodied experience. Second, one should anticipate an overrepresentation of untoward events (like stubbing a toe), because untoward events have greater salience. Taken together, these suggest the need for a methodology that can identify aspects of embodiment (and therefore emplacement) that remain "hidden in plain sight."

The second chapter suggests one such approach to this task. Examining recent reflection on place—theological and otherwise—reveals a number of spatial metaphors and pairings that consistently arise: Place Is a Container, Place Is an Intersection, space and place, space and time, as well as center and periphery. These metaphors and pairings occur repeatedly and not only as explicit topics of reflection (as when comparing the logical entailments of Place Is a Container to those of Place Is an Intersection), but also as underlying, implicit structures of arguments.

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[14] Leder, *The Absent Body,* 4ff.

In the third chapter, these metaphors and pairings are taken as signaling different aspects of human embodiment/emplacement, each of them having their origin in the particularities of human anatomy and physiology. In turn, these aspects of embodiment are used by humans to construct and sustain places. Thus, the metaphors and pairings identified in the second chapter are woven together first as aspects of embodiment/emplacement, then as part of the technology of place-making. As defined in that chapter, technologies of place seek to extend basic human capacities in both temporary and durable ways.

Together in One Place

The final chapter turns a) the aspects of place and b) place-making as a technology into an analytic lens through which to examine early Methodist Episcopal love feasts. In doing so, the love feast is revealed to employ a range of spatial dynamics, some of which work at cross purposes with one another. In contrast to the approach of many contemporary accounts of place which would focus upon a single facet of emplacement and place-making, viewing the love feast through the lens of multiple aspects highlights how analyzing the event through a single aspect would overlook the co-presence of several aspects, some of which might we working at cross purposes with one another.

The chapter then returns to the question of the relationship between divine action and human response. The account of place and place-making offered in the essay extends consideration of the links between human embodiment, epistemology, and formation

sufficiently far so as to require revising the relationship between what God accomplishes in the liturgy and what humans are thereby empowered to do and to become.

In the end, the challenges posed a) by identifying and addressing the bequest of onto-valuational dualism as well as b) the "hiddenness of the body" yield a research question that could serve as overall question of this essay: what would it mean to develop a new method for analyzing liturgical spaces that took human embodiment seriously?

CHAPTER 1
THE PLACE OF PLACE IN LITURGICAL STUDIES

> At our Quarterly-Meeting for this Circuit [Baltimore County], the Love-Feast was held in a field; the women were within, and the men formed circles all round them. They all partook of bread and water, and spake freely of the great things God had done for their souls.
>
> I am, affectionately your's, as formerly,
>
> Francis Asbury.
>
> > —"Extract of a Letter from Mr. Francis Asbury, to Mr. Zachary Myles [Baltimore, August 16, 1804]"[1]

A letter between bishop Francis Asbury and Zachary Myles provides a glimpse of the state of Methodism in the first years of the nineteenth century. In the letter, Asbury notes the numeric growth of the movement—20,000 added in the previous year—as well as some anticipated events, including an 800-mile sojourn from Baltimore to Broadwell, Kentucky for a conference. The communique ends not with a final paean to the numerical growth of Methodism or the geographical expansion of the young "American Empire," but with the description of a generally less notable event: a love feast at a quarterly meeting.

Adopted from the Moravians in the mid-1700s, the quarterly meeting began as an administrative gathering to oversee the business of early Methodist circuits.[2] What began as a single-day event soon became a two-, three-, sometimes four-day affair in which the administration of the circuit remained a stable but increasingly marginal part. Various liturgical activities filled the quarterly meeting, drawing Methodists and non-Methodists

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[1] *Methodist Magazine*, (Jan 1805): 47.

[2] The following account of early Methodist love feasts draws primarily upon the work of Lester Ruth, especially *A Little Heaven Below: Worship at Early Methodist Quarterly Meetings* (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 2000).

alike.

For early Methodists, the liturgical actions of the quarterly meeting fell into two categories: "societal" gatherings in which only Methodists could participate and "congregational" activities in which Methodists and others could equally share. Events such as preaching and exhortation took place before "mixed crowds" of Methodists and non-Methodists. Anyone at any stage of their spiritual journey could participate in these events. To such mixed crowds no shutters were closed nor doors barred. By contrast, "societal" worship took place only among Methodists. The love feast, for example, required a private setting. A combination of shared bread and water with testimonials, the love feast provided a venue for Methodists—clergy and laity, male and female, slave and free—to give voice to the graciousness of God in their lives and to bask in the warm fellowship of other Methodists. Such was the rapture of these gatherings, argues Lester Ruth, that early Methodists often described them in eschatological terms: the love feast was "a little heaven below."[3]

The importance of privacy for societal gatherings was marked, leading not only to a preference for meeting indoors but also to the use of doormen who guarded entrance into the love feast. At times an indoor space—a barn, a church, a home—of sufficient size could not be found to hold all the Methodists who had gathered. On one such occasion, Methodists made their own private space, the women and others speaking gathered at the center, the men forming concentric circles around them. "They all partook of bread and water, and spake freely of the great things God had done for their souls."

Such an impromptu act of place-making likely left little physical evidence after

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[3] William Watters, *A Short Account of the Christian Experience, and Minstereal Labours, of William Watters* (Alexandria, VA: S. Snowden, 1806), 75-6, quoted in Ruth, *A Little Heaven Below,* 22.

the love feast had ended. Perhaps the grass and dirt there showed signs of having been stood and sat upon. Perhaps some bit of trash remained, dropped by a participant. Apart from Asbury's letter, the chief remnant of that love feast lies not upon the soil of Baltimore County, but upon the souls of those who gathered together before God and with one another.

Turning to Place

Over the past fifty years "place" has emerged as an analytical lens within a number of scholarly fields. In the 1970s, Yi-Fu Tuan and Edward Relph expanded the scope of geography by giving greater focus to the *human experience* of the physical environment.[4] As described by Tuan, geography to this point had ceased its investigations at rooftops: the analysis of landforms, regions, and the physical environment may have included the mapping of buildings ("rooftops"), but did not consider the experience of the building by those *in* the building.[5] Tuan and others pushed geography to consider the human experience of the physical environment. Within comparative religion, the publication of Mircea Eliade's *The Sacred and the Profane* ignited reflection upon the nature of religious spaces that spread across disciplinary lines.[6] Jeanne Kilde Halgren argues that religious studies alone now contains four

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[4] Yi-Fu Tuan, *Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and Values* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1974); Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977); Edward Relph, *Place and Placelessness* (London: Pion, 1976).

[5] Yi-Fu Tuan, "Cultural Geography: Glances Backward and Forward," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 94, no. 4 (2004): 729-33.

[6] Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion* (New York: Brace and World, 1959).

distinguishable approaches to religious places.[7] Philosophy too has given renewed

attention to place, mostly notably in two works of the phenomenologist Edward Casey,

Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World and *The*

Fate of Place: A Philosophical History.[8] Place has been foregrounded in fields ranging

from psychology to sociology to history and beyond.[9]

With a single major exception, liturgical studies has been slow to appropriate

insights gained from this "turn to place" or to make a similar turn of its own. The

reticence of liturgical scholars to examine the worship from the perspective of place is

striking for at least three reasons.

First, liturgical studies *in general* has been the primary area within the Christian

theological curriculum for reflection upon place, doing so chiefly as analysis of

consecratory rites, the hermeneutics of Christian architecture, and the ritual uses of

space.[10] Ignazio M. Calabuig, for example, examines the development of church

consecrations using a combination of ritual texts, hymns, and historical accounts.[11]

Liturgy and Architecture by Louis Bouyer and *Liturgy and Architecture from the Early*

Church to the Middle Ages by Allan Doig represent but two of the scores of books on the

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[7] Jeanne Halgren Kilde, "Approaching Religious Space: An Overview of Theories, Methods, and Challenges in Religious Studies," *Religion and Theology* 20 (2013): 183-201.

[8] Edward S. Casey, *Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Edward S. Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

[9] For an early look at the emergence of "place" in multiple fields, see J. Nicholas Entrikin, "Place and Region," *Progress in Human Geography* 18, no. 2 (June 1994): 227-233.

[10] For the purposes of this thesis, I employ Schattauer's definition of liturgical studies as encompassing three disciplinary areas: liturgical history, liturgical theology, and the "study of liturgy as ritual and symbolic event." See Thomas H. Schattauer, "Liturgical Studies: Disciplines, Perspectives, Teaching," *International Journal of Practical Theology* 11, iss. 1 (June 2007): 106-37.

[11] Ignazio M. Calabuig, "Church Consecrations," in *Handbook for Liturgical Studies,* V. 5., ed. Anscar Chupungco (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2000).

origins, uses, and meaning of Christian liturgical architecture.[12] Within ritual studies,

Victor Turner has provided significant insight into the role of the physical environment as

both metaphor for certain ritual states (e.g., liminality) and as a means of *creating* that

state.[13] Ronald Grimes has both reflected on the performance of rituals in non-ritual

settings in *Rites out of Place* and has offered a ritual perspective on "sacred space."[14]

Because "public worship" and "liturgy" almost always denote a *gathering* of the faithful

(both living and departed), liturgical studies has become the area within the theological

curriculum for the study of place almost by default.

Second, the absence of renewed reflection on place within liturgical studies stands

in contrast to the recent and growing body of reflection on place that has developed

among systematic theologians, biblical scholars, and scholars of Christian spirituality.

The writings of Harvey Cox (*The Secular City*, 1965), F.W. Dillistone (*Traditional

Symbols and the Contemporary World*, 1968), Thomas Torrance (*Space, Time, and

Incarnation*, 1969), and Lynn White, Jr. ("The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,"

1967) ignited contemporary theological reflection on the physical environment, yielding

several works, including some written within the past few years.[15] One recent study—

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[12] Louis Bouyer, *Liturgy and Architecture* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967) and Allan Doig, *Liturgy and Architecture from the Early Church to the Middle Ages* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008). Others in this vein include Colin Cunningham, *Stones of Witness: Church Architecture and Function* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1999); Peter Hammond, *Liturgy and Architecture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); and Richard Kieckhefer, *Theology in Stone: Church Architecture from Byzantium to Berkeley* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[13] Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969). See in particular 94-130.

[14] Ronald Grimes, "Jonathan Z. Smith's Theory of Ritual Space," *Religion* 29 (1999): 261-73; Ronald Grimes, *Rites Out of Place: Ritual, Media, and the Arts* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

[15] Harvey Cox, *The Secular City: Urbanization and Secularization in Theological Perspective* (New York: Macmillan, 1965); F. W. Dillistone, *Traditional Symbols and the Contemporary World* (London: Epworth, 1973); Lynn White, "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis," *Science* 155 (#3767) (10 March 1967): 1203-1207.

Places of Redemption by Mary McClintock Fulkerson—even examines worship as a practice of place-making.[16]

Finally, the relative absence of explicit reflection on "place" within liturgical studies stands in contrast to the renewed attention given to the liturgical setting following the second Vatican Council. That "Mother Church earnestly desires that all the faithful should be led to that fully conscious, and active participation in liturgical celebrations" suggested to many the need to change the architectural setting of worship to accommodate greater lay participation.[17] Practically, this often entailed a shift toward curvilinear seating within the nave, reduced distance between the congregation and both the pulpit and altar, more prominent baptismal fonts, and an aesthetic which gave prominence to a few symbols by reducing the overall architectural detailing within the worship space.[18] These recommendations, in whole or in part, are found in the writings of some of the more prominent liturgical scholars of the late 20th century: Louis Bouyer, James White, Susan White, and Gordon Lathrop among them.[19]

To be clear, liturgical scholars have attended to various aspects of the physical environment, particularly the symbolism of liturgical spaces, the rites used to consecrate liturgical spaces, and the nature of sacred space generally. Kimberly Bracken Long as

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[16] Mary McClintock Fulkerson, *Places of Redemption: Theology for a Worldly Church* (New York: Oxford University Press), 2007.

[17] *Sancrosanctum Concilium,* II.14.

[18] Though himself not a Roman Catholic, the architect Edward provides one of the clearest articulations this new architectural emphasis. See Edward Sövik, *Architecture for Worship* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1973). For a traditionalist Roman Catholic critique of this aesthetic and its advocates, see Michael S. Rose, *The Renovation Manipulation: The Church Counter-Renovation Handbook* (Milford, OH: Hope of Saint Monica, 2001).

[19] Louis Bouyer, *Liturgy and Architecture* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967); James F. White and Susan F. White, *Church Architecture* (Akron, OH: OSL Publications, 1998); Gordon Lathrop, *Holy Things: A Liturgical Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993); Gordon Lathrop, *Holy People: A Liturgical Ecclesiology* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999); Gordon Lathrop, *Holy Ground: A Liturgical Cosmology* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003).

well as James and Susan White have even reflected on how worship leaders should inhabit and move within liturgical spaces.[20] We might ask, then, if these scholars are not talking about "place" using a different vocabulary. Practically, reflection on "place" has three characteristics. First, scholars draw upon and contribute to discussions of the human relationship to the physical environment *in general.* With the notable exception of Gordon Lathrop, liturgical scholars have neither drawn upon recent reflection on place nor participated in that discussion. One signal of a desire to engage in those discussions would in fact be using specific vocabulary, especially "place." Irrespective of how scholars define the word in their analyses, reflection on the physical environment *qua* "place" often signals participation in this larger discussion. [21] Finally, much of the reflection on the liturgical environment remains focused upon the symbolic content of liturgical space, especially what can be seen and heard. "Place" typically denotes a concern beyond the eye and the ear to attend to the broader human experience of the physical environment. Kimberly Bracken Long makes a significant move in this direction, but *The Worshiping Body* primarily engages discussions around "the body" and "embodiment," not "place."[22]

Among liturgical theologians, Lathrop alone has employed "place" as an analytical lens. In his three-book reflection on liturgical theology, ecclesiology, and

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[20] James F. White and Susan F. White, *Church Architecture;* Kimberly Bracken Long, *The Worshiping Body: The Art of Leading Worship* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2009).

[21] As discussed in the next chapter, Anglophone theological reflection on "place" has had a largely cumulative character, with each generation of scholars engaging earlier writers on the topic and specifically foregrounding "place" as a topic (often by putting it in the title of the work). Broadly speaking, the Francophone tradition differs from the Anglophone tradition here. If American, Australian, and British thinkers have signaled their engagement with one another through the language of "place," French authors (Bachelard, de Certeau, and LeFebvre, for example) have more frequently focused on *espace.*

[22] As will become clearer in subsequent chapters, understanding place and emplacement *especially* in the liturgical context requires a fulsome account of the body and embodiment. Long's *The Worshiping Body* is a significant contribution in that it calls attention to bodily comportment in the liturgy, but this is not in service of understanding the human relationship to the physical environment generally.

cosmology—*Holy Things*, *Holy People*, and *Holy Ground*—Lathrop makes frequent reference to the role of place and the consequences of location. Prompted to reflect upon place by only a few sources, Lathrop connects the gathering of the worship community [in a particular place] to the role places in general play in providing an existential anchor and a point of orientation. Moreover, Lathrop notes that the particular location of a worshiping community has a range of ecclesiological, ecological, and missiological ramifications. The breadth of these ramifications suggests the need for a more fulsome account of the role of place in Christian worship, one which draws place into the foreground.

The Problem with "Place"

Developing an account of place for use within liturgical theology appears deceptively straightforward, however. Recent reflection on the human relationship to the physical environment has frequently employed non-rarefied terminology, most notably "place" and "space." Use of such common words can hide substantive differences in the ontologies, anthropologies, and sociologies presupposed by theorists of place.

Human geographers Robert Sack and Nigel Thrift both discuss "place" and the physical environment, but their underlying ontologies and anthropologies could hardly be more different.[23] Sack's work presupposes an anthropology which sharply distinguishes between the mind and the body. His ethics of place-making employs Kant's Categorical Imperative in a manner that excludes consideration of habituation and affect. Moreover, Sack develops his account of place-making alongside an ontology which clearly

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[23] Robert David Sack, *Homo Geographicus: A Framework for Action, Awareness, and Moral Concern* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Robert David Sack, *Geography as a Tool for Developing the Mind: A Theory of Place-Making* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2010). On Thrift, see Nigel J. Thrift, *Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

distinguishes humans from their physical environments. Contrast this to the Nigel Thrift, whose anthropology not only downplays the distinction between mind and body, but whose ethics *emphasizes* the role of the affections and habituation. Concerned with Modern ontologies which too clearly distinguish humans from their physical environments, Thrift regards humans as intimately and inextricably connected to their physical surroundings.

Both Sack and Thrift discuss "place" and "geography," but their underlying ontologies and anthropologies differ radically. Failing to recognize such substantive differences risks not only the appropriation of mutually exclusive ontologies and anthropologies, but of unwittingly importing an ontology or an anthropology at odds with our own theological commitments. The same holds true for the sociologies presupposed by theories of place.

With his *The Production of Space*, Henri Lefebvre advanced a thesis that would become central to contemporary reflection on place: place-making combines the manipulation of the physical environment and the social-construction of meaning as a method of deploying power.[24] Space "serves as a tool of thought and of action; that in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power; yet that, as such, it escapes in part from those who would make use of it."[25] This single quote advances three key themes that will run throughout *Production.* Place-making ("the production of space") can be used as a technology that shapes and enhances human thought and action. Place-making always generates unintended consequences for those who employ it. Finally, place-making is a means of

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[24] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991).

[25] Ibid., 26

control, domination, and power. This last theme will come to eclipse the others in much

of the subsequent reflection on place that employs Lefebvre. The treatment of place in

both *The Practices of Everyday Life* by Michel de Certeau and *Sacred Power, Sacred*

Space by Jeanne Halgren Kilde illustrate this propensity to cast place-making in agonistic

terms.[26]

Like the diverse ontologies and anthropologies which underlie Sack and Thrift,

the agonist sociology of Lefebvre suggests the need for judicious consideration of the

sociologies which underlie the theories of place we appropriate for theological purposes.

Discussions of "place" are deceptively straightforward in another way as well. If

place is indeed a tool, as both Sack and Lefebvre claim, then it shares with other tools a

diminishing need for attentiveness given greater familiarity and use.[27] This disappearance

of tools from conscious attention is paralleled by their re-emergence when the tool ceases

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[26] *The Practice of Everyday Life* assumes an agonistic context for the analysis of the activities that constitute "everyday life." With regard to place, that analysis hinges upon the relationship one has to *le lieu propre*, "a proper place/one's own place." A position (metaphorical or literal) to which one can lay claim or otherwise defend as one's own, "a proper place" determines how one relates to combatants within this assumedly agonistic context. Those with a proper place—land they own, for example, or a title ascribed to them—can engage in "combat" in much the same way that occupants of a fortress relate to guerrilla fighters who might assail it. The very possession of a proper place shapes the methods by which the occupant can engage in combat. Conversely, those without a proper place play the role of the guerillas assaulting a fortified position. Their mobility and consequent inability to capitalize on small victories shape the ways they fight. Those with *un lieu propre* employ strategies, those without, tactics.
The popularity of analyses which employ de Certeau's tactics may lie in the comparative simplicity of *Practices* in contrast to other writings of de Certeau (where *le lieu propre* also appears). More likely, tactics (the methods of the underdog) lend themselves to analyses of place and practice where the author wishes to examine means of "getting over" on those whose supposed access to *le lieu propre* implies the possession of power which is, by default, agonistic and associated with domination and control.
One sees a similar tendency within *Sacred Power, Sacred Place*. Ostensibly a critical read of liturgical spaces as a lens upon the relationship between God, clergy, and laity, *Sacred Power* consistently reduces spatial differentiation between clergy and laity (raised *bemas* for leading worship, for example) to differences in interpersonal power and, in turn, to access to the divine. The advent of the raised platform for worship leaders as in Dura Europas becomes a sign of the growing institutionalization and hierarchization of the Christian church. In turn, this will shape who has a claim on access to the divine. Lay access to the divine and "exclusion" of one party by another are central concerns of *Sacred Power*, suggesting that Kilde assumes an agonistic context, power being manifest chiefly in situations of inequality and in ways that cannot redound to the benefit both parties. See Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Jeanne Haldren Kilde, *Sacred Power, Sacred Space: An Introduction to Christian Architecture and Worship* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[27] Drew Leder, *The Absent Body* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990): 30ff.

to function normally.[28] As such, discussions of place are prone to overemphasize those features of place made salient because of dysfunction, change, or other alteration in function.[29]

The Place of Departure

This thesis develops an account of place for use within liturgical studies that addresses two challenges to the appropriation of "place" theory: the diverse ontologies, anthropologies, and sociologies found within "place theory" and the bias toward the broken, dysfunctional, and untoward within discussions of place.

In order to highlight the challenge posed by the often implicit anthropologies, ontologies, and sociologies of place theorists, this thesis proceeds in conversation not with architectural hermeneutics or exegesis of consecratory rites, but with liturgical theologians and with a carefully chosen case study.

As discussed below, liturgical theology has as one of its central tasks re-evaluating the relationship between divine action and human response given recent shifts in anthropology and a revaluation of the material Creation. Though not identified as one of the central tasks of the field, liturgical theologians have consistently wrestled with how to relate *lex orandi* to *lex credendi* given new perspectives on human nature and materiality. Developing a new method for analyzing the role of the physical environment in conversation with liturgical theology makes explicit the challenges posed by new anthropologies and ontologies while also noting the potential gains of that new method.

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[28] Ibid., 68-99.

[29] As discussed in the second and third chapters, the body of theological reflection on place that has emerged in the past fifty years has evinced this overemphasis.

The Methodist love-feast which began this chapter will serve as the central case study of place and place-making in this thesis. Because it happened outdoors and in a field, the love feast leaves no artifact behind for hermeneutical analysis. Given its transitory nature, a discussion of sacred versus profane space could not focus on the particular geography of a building or landscape. Thus, these traditional approaches to analyzing place within liturgical studies would have little material with which to work. As such, using the love feast as a case study allows the displays further possible gains from a new method for analyzing the role of the physical environment in the liturgy.

The love feast also provides a means of examining the complexities of power in place making. The very exclusivity of love feasts may at first glance appear inimical to the formation of an "inclusive" community. As discussed again in the final chapter, though, that very exclusivity may provide the power necessary to overcome, however briefly, the barriers of class, race, and gender.

The Chief Tasks of Liturgical Theology

This essay develops a new method for analyzing liturgical space in conversation with liturgical theology in order to highlight both the potential gains this new method while also highlighting the challenge posed by the often implicit ontologies, anthropologies, and sociologies of place theorists.

To understand how the engagement with liturgical theology accomplishes this requires, first, identifying both the explicit and implicit tasks of liturgical theology as it has taken shape over the past sixty years. From its inception in the 1950s to the present, liturgical theology has focused on three tasks. Foremost among those tasks, liturgical theology has sought to articulate the relationship between the worship of the Church and

the practice and content of formal theology. That task emerged, I argue, as a result of grappling with new, largely implicit anthropologies which called into question the primacy of human thought and formal theology in the life of individual Christians and Christian communities. Within Western churches, the Modern emphasis on rationality had yielded a view of formal theology as the chief authority and moral guide for the Christian life. In such a view, Christian worship *enacted* the beliefs stated in the creeds and articulated in doctrine.

Liturgical theology questioned this derivative depiction of the Christian cult. Asserting a more central role for liturgical practice, however, created two dilemmas for liturgical theology. First, asserting a greater role for Christian worship raises concerns about the respective role of God's action and human response. The new anthropologies used to explore worship suggested the power of ritual, symbols, and other human technologies to shape individuals and communities. In turn, this has suggested to some that God plays a diminished role in Christian worship. The second task of liturgical theology arises from this dilemma: articulating the respective role of God and humans in Christian worship. The third dilemma arises from the second. Liturgical theologians not only asserted the formative power of Christian worship, they also acknowledged the role of humans in shaping worship objectively and subjectively. Christian worship shapes Christians and Christians shape worship. Articulating that relationship has emerged as the third task of liturgical theology.

At its emergence in the 1950s, liturgical theology took phrase *ut legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi* ["being that the law of supplication establishes the law of belief"] as a touchstone for relating worship ("*lex supplicandi*") to formal theology ("*lex credendi*"). An examination of the original context of the phrase "ut legem…" suggests

that articulating the relationship of *lex orandi* to *lex credendi* cannot meaningfully be sundered from the twin tasks of relating divine action to human response and worshipers to worship.

If liturgical theology consisted of the single task of relating *lex orandi* to *lex credendi*, the appropriation of contemporary reflection on place would be a more straightforward task. However, place theory employs anthropologies similar to the ones that gave rise to liturgical theology. The use of place theory, therefore, holds both exegetical potential for liturgical theology while also raising similar questions about how to relate human response to divine action and worshipers to worship.

Prosper of Aquitaine

Written by Prosper of Aquitaine (c. 390-c. 455), the phrase *ut legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi* appears in the *Indiculus,* an attack on semi-Pelagianism which asserted the necessary and prior role of divine grace in the human response to God. To illustrate this necessary and prior role, Prosper points to prayers of the Good Friday Mass, specifically the request that God make possible the moral and spiritual transformation of those not quite in good standing with the Church: unbelievers, idol worshipers, and so forth.

> Besides the inviolable sanctions of the most blessed and apostolic see, with which the most pious fathers, having cast down the pride of the pestilential novel teaching, taught us to ascribe to the grace of Christ the origins of good will, the growth of commendable efforts, and perseverance in them to the end, let us also consider the sacraments of priestly prayers that, having been handed down by the apostles, are uniformly practiced throughout the whole world and in every Catholic church, so that the law of prayer establishes the law of belief [*ut legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi*]. For when the bishops of the holy peoples observe the mandates committed to them by office in the presence of divine mercy, they plead the cause of the human race, and while the whole Church sighs deeply with them, they entreat and pray that faith may be given to unbelievers,

that idol worshipers may be freed from the errors of their impiety, that the light of truth may appear to the Jews, the veil over their heart having been removed, that heretics may regain their senses by perception of the Catholic faith, that schismatics may receive the spirit of revived charity, that the remedies of penance may be granted to the lapsed, and finally that the court of heavenly mercy may be opened to catechumens when they are led to the sacraments of regeneration. The effect of these very things demonstrates that they are not asked from the Lord either vainly or in a perfunctory manner: seeing that God deigns to draw many out of every kind of error, whom delivered from the power of darkness he might transfer into the kingdom of the Son of his charity [Col 1:13], and from vessels of wrath he might make vessels of mercy [Rom 9:22]. This is so much thought to be entirely divine work, that to the God accomplishing these things thanksgiving and praise are always rendered for the illumination or the correction of such people.[30]

That the Church entreats God and prays "that faith may be given to unbelievers," for example, suggests that unbelievers lack the ability to turn to God *of their own power*. The same holds true for all others not in good standing with the Church. Contra the semi-Pelagians, divine grace empowers all human response to God.

Liturgical theology has its origins in articulating the relationship of the Church's *lex orandi* (or *supplicandi*) to its *lex credendi*, a task which liturgical theologians readily identify as the central purpose of the field. That task in fact has two parts—assigning referents to *lex orandi* and *lex credendi*, then articulating the relationship between these two referents. To date, the debates about the meaning of *lex orandi* and *lex credendi* in the *Indiculus* have failed to yield a consensus as to their referents within liturgical theology. In the absence of an agreement upon the precise meaning of either *lex orandi/supplicandi* or *lex credendi*, liturgical theologians have employed the terms in various ways, with the former pointing toward the liturgy broadly, the latter, again, toward theology broadly. Though their specific referents have varied, the contrastive

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[30]. Translation from Daniel G. Van Slyke, "*Lex Orandi, Lex Credendi:* Liturgy as Locus Theologicus in the Fifth Century?," *Josephinium Journal of Theology* 11, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2004): 130-151.

structure of *lex orandi*, *lex credendi* continues to be widely accepted within the guild of liturgical theology.

If liturgical theology took Prosper's dictum broadly as its *raison d'etre*, the larger theological context of the *Indiculus* has proven less important. The assertion of the need for divine grace to enable any human response to God parallels the second task of liturgical theology: articulating the relationship between divine action and human response in the Christian liturgy. Though rarely foregrounded as a central task of the field, liturgical theologies typically include an account of the respective roles of God and humans in worship. Indeed, liturgical theologians at times evince a defensiveness around this topic that seems to presuppose a zero-sum game. As articulated by Kevin Irwin, "There is a delicate balance in liturgy: divine initiative and human response, the action of God and the sanctification of humanity. How one achieves this is part and parcel of liturgy as an art and a craft…But even then it is not about what we achieve but what God works among us and through us… We trip this delicate balance at our peril…"[31] Irwin's warning is instructive and explains the hesitation shown by some theologians when appropriating the human sciences to examine Christian worship.

In his defense of an Augustinian reading of the human need for divine grace, Prosper points to the *law* of supplication, "handed down by the apostles" and "uniformly practiced throughout the whole world and in every Catholic church." Even if an intentional mischaracterization, the assertion of the apostolic origins of the *lex orandi* along with its universality suggests the existence of an authoritative rule of prayer binding for Christians everywhere. From Schmemann onward, liturgical theology has

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[31] Kevin Irwin, "A Spirited Community Encounters Christ: Liturgical and Sacramental Theology and Practice," *Catholic Theology Facing the Future: Historical Perspectives*, ed. Dermot A. Lane (New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2003), 119-20. Cited in Michael Auné, "Liturgy and Theology: Rethinking the Relationship," *Worship* 81, no. 1 (March, 2007): 46-68.

challenged such a straightforward reading of the relationship of worshipers to the words and actions of Christian worship. Like the relationship between divine action and human response, liturgical theologians have rarely treated the articulation of the relationship between worshipers and worship practices as a central task of the field. This has not, however, impeded lengthy reflections on the ability of worship to shape worshipers, the nature of worship as the "actualization of the church," or the need for "critical reflection" upon and reform of worship. Though perhaps not "uniformly practiced throughout the whole world" of liturgical theology, determining the relationship between worshipers and worship practices stands among the central tasks of the field.

In the next section, we examine three liturgical theologians—Alexander Schmemann, Kevin Irwin, and Martha Moore-Keish—comparing a) their different readings of *lex orandi*, *lex credendi* as well as their accounts of the relationship b) between divine action and human response and c) between worship and worshipers.[32]

Alexander Schmemann

In his *Introduction to Liturgical Theology*, Alexander Schmemann offers one of the earliest and most influential arguments for liturgical theology as a distinct field within the "system of theological disciplines."[33] Acknowledging the role of dogmatic theology as "the discipline which unites the conclusions [of other theological fields] and brings them together into a balanced whole," Schmemann asserts that dogmatic theology ought to treat the liturgy as a *theological locus* in a similar manner to that of Scripture. The field

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[32] The liturgical theologians chosen for comparison—Alexander Schmemann, Kevin Irwin, and Martha Moore-Keish span a fifty-year period, beginning with the advent of liturgical theology as a distinct field. Moreover, each represents a distinct theological tradition.

[33] Alexander Schmemann, *Introduction to Liturgical Theology* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1986), 18.

of biblical theology interprets the Bible, another theological locus, discerning its meaning

for dogmatic theology. Liturgical theology would serve a similar task, interpreting the

meaning of the liturgy for dogmatic theology. In Schmemann's rendering, *lex credendi*

specifically denotes dogmatic theology, a specific discipline within the larger "system of

theological disciplines." *Lex credendi*, then, denotes not only a body of knowledge, but

an activity that takes place within a particular institutional context. The equation of

dogmatic theology with *lex credendi* presupposes not just disciplinary divisions, but the

larger institutional framework and *ethos* of the Western university. By contrast, *lex*

orandi denotes the objective content of worship—the words, actions, and structures of the

liturgy—but also a different institutional context and an accompanying *ethos*, a "whole

spirit."[34] The difference in institutional setting and *ethos* requires a distinct field—

liturgical theology—which interprets the meaning of the liturgy for dogmatic theology.

What Schmemann discerns as the primary meaning of the liturgy is the

ecclesiastical and eschatological vision of Christian worship from its inception to the

early fourth century. Found particularly in the juxtaposition of the Eucharist with the

weekly gathering of Christians, the meaning of worship lies primarily in what the liturgy

accomplishes.

> His Kingdom has entered into the world, becoming the new life in the Spirit given by Him as life within Himself. This messianic Kingdom or life in the aeon is "actualized"—becomes real—in the assembly of the Church, in the ekklesia, when believers come together to have communion in the Lord's body. The Eucharist is therefore the manifestation of the Church as the new aeon; it is participation in the Kingdom as the parousia, as the presence of the Resurrected and Resurrecting Lord. It is not the "repetition" of His advent or coming into the world, but the lifting up of the Church into His parousia, the Church's participation in His heavenly glory.[35]

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[34] Schmemann, *Introduction*, 23.

[35] Ibid., 72

The meaning of the liturgy lies not in some past event remembered or re-enacted. Instead, meaning lies in what worship does in the present. The liturgy "actualizes," "realizes," "establishes the reality" of the Church as the in-breaking of the eschatologically hoped-for Kingdom into the present.[36]

Over time, this original ecclesiological and eschatological meaning became obscured. Countering Orthodox theologians "usually inclined to 'absolutize' the history of worship, to consider the whole of it as divinely established and Providential," Schmemann argues that the original meaning of the liturgy has become obscured by additions to and reinterpretations of the liturgy from the fourth century onward.[37]

Central to Schmemann's understanding of the meaning of the liturgy is the Ordo, the sequence of prescribed actions and words in the liturgy. "Meaning" arises from the liturgy not from the verbal content of the liturgy alone, but from the joining of actions and words in a particular sequence.

For the most part, the Ordo may change only slightly over the course of several hundred years. However, suggests Schemann, the relative stability of the liturgy over time masks the instability of the ways Christians experience and understand the objective content of worship.

> Above all it is important for the historian of worship to know that the "liturgical piety" of an epoch can in various ways fail to correspond to the liturgy or cult of which this piety is nevertheless the psychological perception or experience. This means that piety can accept the cult in a "key" other than that in which it was conceived and expressed as text, ceremony or "rite." Liturgical piety has the strange power of "transposing" texts or ceremonies, of attaching a meaning to them which is not their plain or original meaning. This is not a question of not understanding their meaning, or of inadequate perception. It is a question here of a definite coloring of the religious consciousness which sets up between worship

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[36] Ibid. On "actualizes," 72, "establishes the reality," 107-8; "realized," 193.

[37] Ibid., 92. On the continuity of the original meaning of the liturgy *within the liturgy* into the present, see Schmemann, *Introduction,* 219.

as it actually is and its inner acceptance, like a unique prism refracting reality, and compelling the believer to experience it in a given key.[38]

Liturgical piety does not simply denote the subjective experience of individual worshipers, the "inner acceptance" of the liturgy. Liturgical piety stands between "worship as it actually is" and that "inner acceptance." Akin to *Zeitgeist* and *Weltanschauung*, liturgical piety points towards the perspectives and sensibilities shared within a community. These perspectives and sensibilities are taken for granted, all but compelling "the believer to experience [worship] in a given key." Schmemann's description of paganism provides an apt example of the nature of liturgical piety: "...paganism, which the Church had been fighting with all her strength, was not so much a doctrine as it was a cosmic feeling in the deepest organic way with the whole fabric of the social, political and economic life of the times."[39]

The impact of liturgical piety on the liturgy itself is multiple. As suggested above, the liturgical piety of a community serves as a prism upon the liturgy, a way of viewing the objective content of worship. Liturgical piety also leads to reinterpretation of individual elements of the liturgy and the whole liturgy itself. One contemporary form of liturgical piety, suggests Schmemann, yields explanations of "the Divine Liturgy as the depiction of the life of Christ."[40] The transformations of Christian worship in the fourth century and after arose primarily through shifts in liturgical piety away from a view of the Church as "actualized" in the Eucharist. These early shifts in liturgical piety not only led to the reinterpretation of extant words, actions, and structures within the liturgy, but also to the addition of new elements that comported with the liturgical piety of the age. In

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[38] Ibid., 98

[39] Ibid., 112.

[40] Ibid., 31.

time, the addition of new elements would yield a complexity that largely obscured the original ecclesiological and eschatological meaning of the liturgy.

Introduction to Liturgical Theology gave shape to the nascent field of liturgical theology, suggesting its role as interpreter of the meaning of worship for dogmatic theology, "to make the liturgical experience of the Church again one of the life-giving sources of the knowledge of God."[41] Schmemann dedicates roughly half the treatise to arguing for the need for liturgical theology, outlining its methodology, and uncovering the meaning of the liturgy. The entire second half of the book focuses on liturgical piety and the ways that shifts in perceptions and sensibilities transformed Christian worship over four centuries. Put in terms of chief tasks of liturgical theology, Schmemann dedicates half of the *Introduction* to the relationship of *lex orandi* to *lex credendi*, turning in the second half to offering an account of the relationship between worship and worshipers via consideration of the role of liturgical piety.

Of the three tasks of liturgical theology, the relationship between God's action and human response receives the least attention within the *Introduction*. This occurs in part, though, because Schmemann offers an alternate narrative to traditional Orthodox readings of liturgical history. In contrast to those who would regard the evolution of the liturgy as providential, Schmemann argues that that humans have had a significant role in shaping their liturgical response to God, and this to mixed effect. "It is time to realize that both the history of the Church herself as well as the history of her worship contain elements of tragedy—declines as well as revivals, the human element as well as the divine."[42]

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[41] Ibid., 23.

[42] Ibid., 92.

The role of God in the liturgy stands out most clearly in discussions of worship as "actualizing" the Church as the Church. Explaining the transformation of Jewish liturgical forms into a new Christian register, Schmemann argues that...

> ...this [Jewish] cult was subjected to an eschatological transposition, since within the Church as the Body of Christ the wholly-other was realized as something given, fulfilled, communicated to people, something already belonging to them. Not a mediation between the sacred and the profane, but the fact of the accomplished consecration of the people by the Holy Spirit, their transformation into "sons of God"—herein lies the newness of the content and significance of the cult. It received its purest expression it the Eucharist—in a cultic act whose significance was not the renewal of mediation but the actualization of the identification of the Church with the Body of Christ and of the fact that she belonged to the Aeon of the Kingdom.[43]

One could parse "the accomplished consecration of the people by the Holy Spirit" and "their transformation into the "sons of God'" in a few ways. In any case, Schmemann clearly identifies Christian worship, particularly the Eucharist, as either flowing out of or re-actualizing both that consecration and that transformation. Elsewhere, Schmemann argues that the purpose of worship "is to express, form, or realize the Church—to be the source of that grace which always makes the Church the Church, the people of God, the Body of Christ, 'a chosen race and royal priesthood'" (1 Peter 2:9).[44]

The "actualization" of the Church depends, at least in part, upon the understandings that worshipers bring to the liturgy. Schmemann never makes this quite explicit, but his concern to reveal the meaning of worship not only for the sake of dogmatic theology but also for the sake of worshipers seems quite clear. Alternative meanings of the liturgy lead worshipers to seek certain forms of spiritual satisfaction from the liturgy, quenching any desire for a true understanding of the ecclesiological and eschatological nature of worship.

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[43] Ibid., 103.

[44] Ibid., 29.

> Thus, people love to explain the Divine Liturgy as the depiction of the life of Christ. But who explains it as the expression of the life of the Church, as the action by which she is eternally realized? Whoever sees that in this action she is not depicting the life of Christ before the congregation, but is manifesting, creating and fulfilling herself as the body of Christ. The believer loves the ceremonies, symbols, the whole atmosphere of the church building, this familiar and precious nourishment for his soul, but this love does not long for understanding, because the purpose of the cult is thought of precisely as the bestowal of a spiritual experience, spiritual food.[45]

The possibility that such "liturgicalness" impedes a full understanding of the liturgy suggests that the "actualization" of the Church within worship remains somehow contingent upon the openness of worshipers *to* that actualization.[46] Schmemann makes clear that this original meaning of the liturgy remains embedded within contemporary Orthodox practice. Nonetheless, the failure of the contemporary Church to recognize liturgy as its actualization has further consequences. "Having ceased to be the expression of the Church, worship has also ceased to be the expression of the Church in relation to the world."[47]

In the *Introduction to Liturgical Theology* we see one of the first substantive reflections on methodology for the nascent field focusing upon three tasks: explaining how to relate the worship of the Church (*lex orandi*) to dogmatic theology (*lex credendi*), describing the ways that worship transforms worshipers ("actualization") and worshipers transform worship, and articulating an understanding of the liturgy that enables contemporary Christians better to participate in the work of God in and through the Eucharist. Other liturgical theologians may assign different referents to *lex orandi* and *lex credendi*, offer alternate views for the relationship between divine action and human response, and argue for a different relationship between the words, actions, and structures

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[45] Ibid., 31.

[46] "Understanding" here in the sense of a transformed liturgical piety.

[47] Ibid., 31.

of worship and the worshipers themselves. Nonetheless, these three tasks remain central
to the work of liturgical theology.

Kevin Irwin

In the nearly thirty years after the translation of *Introduction* into English,
liturgical scholars had continued to wrestle with the relationship of *lex orandi* to *lex
credendi*, divine empowerment to human response, and worshipers to the words, actions,
and structures of the liturgy. The Roman Catholic liturgical theologian Kevin Irwin wrote
Context and Text: Method in Liturgical Theology (1994) within a markedly different
context from that of Schmemann's *Introduction to Liturgical Theology* (1962, 1966).[48]
The call for inculturation by the Second Vatican Council made explicit the need for a
critical function for liturgical theologians in the adaptation of the liturgy, thus calling for
the Church to reshape the liturgy. Whereas the Eastern Orthodox Schmemann seems
hesitant to critique the liturgy of his own community, Irwin faced a situation that *called*
for a methodology of critique and renewal. Moreover, *Context and Text* benefits from a
generation of reflection on Schmemann and on liturgical theology.

Context and Text proposes a methodology for liturgical theology not wholly
dissimilar to Schmemann's *Introduction*. Like Schmemann, Irwin emphasizes the need to
expand the interpretive lens of liturgical theology to include not only liturgical texts, but
also an array of other contextual information, including the liturgical arts of music,
architecture, pictorial art and artifacts. Again, like Schmemann, Irwin understands
liturgical theology as the task of discerning the meaning of the Church's worship. The

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[48] Kevin Irwin, *Context and Text: Method in Liturgical Theology* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1994).

methodologies of Schmemann and Irwin do differ however. The call for (as well as the fact of) liturgical inculturation—the incorporation of "local culture" into the Mass—requires Irwin to propose a methodology that provides a means of assessing the fit between inculturated liturgies and the intent of the published rites of the Church.

The matter of "fit" implies a three-fold task: discerning the meaning a) of inherited liturgies, b) of the current published rites, and c) of the rites as enacted in each locale, what Irwin calls liturgical events. Liturgical theology examines these contemporary liturgical events in light of both the historical evolution of a given liturgical rite and the present forms of the rites. Together, these three components—the history of the rite, the present form of the rite, and the liturgical event—constitute the "text" liturgical theologians interpret: the whole historical and contemporary context *is* the text used in analysis, not just the published rites. Worshipers themselves are part of the current context. Participation in the liturgy transforms worshipers, changing them and, in turn, creating an ever-new context to be interpreted as a text. "Hence the usefulness of the phrase 'text shapes context' in the sense that the theology of liturgy (text) necessarily shapes the theology and spirituality of those who participate in the liturgy (context)."[49] "Context is text" *and* "text shapes context."[50]

Irwin describes the purpose of *doing* liturgical theology in a manner akin to that found in *Introduction*. Liturgical theology addresses "how to articulate the theology of what occurs in the act of liturgy, how to appropriate liturgy as a source for systematic theology, how to use the liturgy as a basis for articulating moral and spiritual

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[49] Irwin, *Context and Text*, 56.

[50] Thus, Irwin has already pointed toward two different aspects of the relationship of worship to worshipers: the liturgy transforms the theology and spirituality of worshipers even as they shape the context within which they interpret its "words, symbols, and gestures."

theology...[and] how to develop a new and more adequate approach to sacramental theology."[51] The worship of the Church (*lex orandi*) can be interpreted, and it can inform systematic theology (*lex credendi*) as well as other areas within the theological curriculum (also *lex credendi*?). The ability of liturgy to inform moral and spiritual theology also suggests that worship plays a role in shaping the moral and spiritual life of worshipers.

In reviewing the dossier of "liturgical theology" from Prosper of Aquitaine into the present, Irwin makes two moves characteristic of many liturgical theologians from the 1970s onward—1) emphasizing the qualitative differences between worship and "doing theology" and 2) asserting the primacy of worship for the life of the Christian. Schmemann had explicitly connected liturgy to dogmatic theology via liturgical theology: one scholarly, theological discipline (liturgical theology) informs another (dogmatic theology) in a manner akin to the role of another, well-known discipline (biblical theology). Worship clearly occurs in a different institutional context than either liturgical theology or dogmatics, and Schmemann hints at the qualitative differences between the "doing" of theology and the "doing" of worship.[52] The *lex orandi* needed an interpreter for the *lex credendi* in part because worship is a different sort of activity, one that did not readily translate into dogmatic theology. By the mid-1990s, though, liturgical scholars had begun forcefully to use *lex ordandi*, *lex credendi* to assert the qualitative difference between "doing" worship and "doing" theology. Consider this description of Prosper of Aquitaine's *Indiculus* in *Text and Context*:

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[51] Ibid., x.

[52] "What is needed is not so much the intellectual apprehension of worship as its apprehension through experience and prayer." Schmemann, *Introduction,* 23.

> Hence Prosper's dictum *ut legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi* in its original setting means that the liturgy manifests the Church's faith. The statement's reference to the apostolicity of liturgy means that liturgy is a theological source to the degree that it is founded on Scripture and is the expression of a praying Church.[53]

The emphasis here lies on the role of liturgy as a theological source and the apostolic and biblical foundation of the liturgy that qualifies it as a theological source. The paragraph continues, turning attention to the particular character of worship.

> Prosper's reference to liturgical texts also implies an appreciation that such texts are poetic, symbolic, and more fully existential than rational in composition and style. Thus a proper interpretation of Prosper's valuable adage about the Church at prayer is based on what occurs in the liturgical event of Good Friday and it respects the particular genre of liturgical prayer.[54]

The texts of the liturgy are a particular "genre," one "poetic, symbolic, and more fully existential than rational in composition and style." The event (the "doing" of worship) must, therefore, be interpreted in light of these particular characteristics of the liturgical genre. Irwin here is not simply asserting the need to take the genre of liturgical events seriously. He is trafficking in a contrast between *worship* and *theology* that has become so deeply rooted in liturgical theology that he does not need to name his point of contrast. Worshipping differs substantively from theologizing.

Throughout *Context and Text*, Irwin describes the liturgy via a contrast between two modes of engaging the world, one embodied in liturgy, the other regarded as characteristic of 20th-century systematic theology. Worship engages the imagination, employs multivalent symbols, and is characterized by the use of poetry, metaphor, and imagery. Worship is *not* didactic, reductive, objectifying, monovalent, or chiefly ratiocinative. Consider this reflection on the role of symbols in the liturgy:

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[53] Ibid., 6

[54] Ibid., 6.

> Thus what is central here is the use of symbols and symbolic engagement in worship, as opposed to *objectification of symbols or their reduction to being signs* since (customarily today) both objectification and signs convey one meaning and have a one-to-one correspondence with what they signify. Symbols and symbolic gestures, on the other hand, by their nature are polyvalent and have many meanings.[55]

In setting up this opposition, Irwin has contrasted worship with the characteristics of Modern rationalism. Concerned that the liturgy has frequently become too didactic and shaped by an anthropology that over-values rationality and objectivity, Irwin contrasts the imaginative, diverse, and polyvalent nature of worship to the reductive, objectifying, didactic tendencies of systematic theology. Indeed, worship might even save theology from itself. As Irwin notes, the "liturgy restrains theology from becoming an 'a-theological religious science' since it is the 'ritual action by which we live and enact faith in the triune God' which enactment of faith grounds all theology."[56]

Liturgical theologians like Irwin not only sought to articulate the difference between Christian worship and "doing" theology, they asserted the primacy of worship over against theology as an activity *and* as an articulated set of beliefs. In some theological quarters, worship had come to be regarded as the lesser activity, "the existential expression of theological dictums."[57] Irwin and others countered this view of the relationship of *lex orandi* to *lex credendi* by asserting that worship engaged humans more fully than theology traditionally conceived. "Since the liturgy is the Church's self-expression through a complex, ritual act of words and symbols, the liturgical expression of faith is more immediate and direct than an intellectual expression or justification of

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[55] Ibid., 143. Emphasis added. See also 177, 199.

[56] Ibid., 268, citing Catherine Mowry LaCugna, "Can Liturgy Ever Again be a Source for Theology?" *Studia Liturgica* 19 (1989): 1-16.

[57] David W. Fagerberg, *What is Liturgical Theology? A Study in Methodology.* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1992), 75.

faith in theological argument or dogmatic pronouncement."[58] Distinguishing between the

liturgy as *theologia prima* and theological reflection as *theologia secunda*, Irwin (and

others) asserted the causal primacy of liturgy over theology.[59]

Before proceeding, we do well to note the different ways that Schmemann and

Irwin use *lex orandi* and *lex credendi*. The former employed the pairing to point to the

relationship between worship and systematic theological reflection, particularly within

the Western university context. Irwin uses *lex orandi* and *lex credendi* in a similar way, at

least in part, but the repeated emphasis upon the experiential differences between

worshiping and theologizing (*theologia prima* and *theologia secunda*) foregrounds the

qualitative differences in these activities. In both cases "worship" and "theology" are the

referents, but Schmemann and Irwin emphasize different aspects of each word while

maintaining the contrast implied by *lex orandi, lex credendi*.

With regard to the relationship between the action of God and human response,

Irwin regards the liturgy as the experience of the paschal mystery of Christ by the power

of the Holy Spirit. "The one source for the Church's sustenance is the paschal mystery of

Christ actualized through the action of the Spirit in the liturgical proclamation of the

Scriptures and the Sacramentalization of this announcement in sacraments."[60] Irwin

recognizes the problem created by the historical, temporally-removed nature of the

Advent, Crucifixion, and Resurrection of Christ. These events were immediately

experienced by some (i.e., they were present to these events). Those in the present,

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[58] Gerard Lukken, "The Unique Expression of Faith in the Liturgy," in *Liturgical Expression of Faith*, Concilium 82, eds. H. Schmidt and D. Power (New York: Herder and Herder, 1973), 16. Cited in Irwin, 45.

[59] For a critique of this bifurcation of liturgy and theology, see Paul Bradshaw, "Difficulties in Doing Liturgical Theology,'" *Pacifica* 11 (1998): 181-94.

[60] Irwin, *Text and Context,* 107. See also 180.

however, experience these events not as though present, but through other means—words, gestures, and symbols. The Holy Spirit, argues Irwin, vivifies those means, making Christ present (if differently so) to contemporary worshipers as he was to the first Christians. The Holy Spirit works in and through words, gestures, and symbols that are both theologically and anthropologically "apt." Theologically apt because they faithfully point toward God, anthropologically apt because God has chosen means of communication that befit our nature.[61]

The liturgy empowered by the Holy Spirit can transform worshipers as well. Irwin adds *theologia tertia* to the contrast between *theologia prima* and *secunda*.

> ...*theologia tertia*, which underscores the essential relatedness of liturgy to living the Christian life. In our understanding tertiary theology derives from both the primary theological act of liturgy and its derivative reflection in secondary theology. It concerns the spirituality and moral life dimension of liturgy in terms of living the spiritual life in congruence with the mystery of God and the gospel values experienced and celebrated in liturgy.[62]

Notably, both liturgy (as *theologia prima*) and theological reflection (*as theologia secunda*) provide tools for "living the Christian life," including the transformation of worshipers' perception of reality. Irwin makes it clear, however, that such transformation depends in part upon the openness of worshipers to the presence of God and to the transformation of their lives. "This means that our understanding of the task and method of liturgical theology requires a commitment to the God revealed and experienced through the liturgy, a responsiveness to how God is revealed and active in liturgy and a deepening conversion to gospel living as disclosed and experienced in the liturgy."[63] The

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[61] Ibid., 315. The work of the Spirit and the aptness of these means notwithstanding, the creaturely nature of human beings means that any liturgy is inherently provisional (277) and that, in turn, all reform of rites should not aim for "the perfect liturgy," but the "least imperfect" worship.

[62] Ibid., 46.

[63] Ibid., 274.

liturgy provides a "privileged means" of speaking to and encountering God, one whose

fulness and intent rely at least in part upon human responsiveness to the work and

presence of God.[64] What is true of hearing the Word read and proclaimed is true for the

entirety of the liturgy:

> Attentive listening to the Word in the liturgical assembly can be an effective experience of repeated transfiguration of the Church. Such moments of transfiguration are also moments of transformation whereby God graces the Church directly and endows it with his life-giving Spirit so that the body of Christ can appropriate more fully the life of grace and live its life consonant with that grace.[65]

The transformation of Christians—individually and collectively—toward a life

more "consonant with that grace" changes the liturgical context of that community. As

noted above, Irwin regards the theological and cultural context of a worship event as part

of the "text" liturgical theologians must read in order to discern the liturgical theology of

that community. This is the second relation Irwin cites between worship and worshipers.

Worship provides a privileged means of encountering God and being transformed into the

grace conveyed; transformed worshipers, in turn, encounter the polyvalent words,

symbols, and gestures of the liturgy differently, giving rise to differently inflected "local"

theologies.

Martha Moore-Keish

In *Do This in Remembrance of Me*, Martha Moore-Keish undertakes the kind of

local theological analysis called for in *Context and Text*. Through an examination of a

congregation's *lex orandi*, Moore-Keish seeks to shed new light upon the relationship of

ritual activity (*lex orandi*) to Christian faith (*lex credendi*). Here, *lex credendi* does not

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[64] On the language of "privileged means," see 275, 303, 316.

[65] Ibid., 115.

refer chiefly to dogmatic theology and its particular location within the Western

theological curriculum. Instead, *lex credendi* concerns the meaning of the word "faith"

and how it relates to the worship life of the Church.

    Do This examines the relationship between understandings of "faith" within the

Reformed tradition and ritual forms of the Eucharist. Moore-Keish identifies two

different strands of thought on the nature of Christian faith. One, associated with John

Calvin and John Williamson Nevin, regards faith as a divine gift, "the attitude of

receptivity, given by the Holy Spirit, which allows the Word and sacrament to join the

person to Christ."[66] Such a view of faith regards the Word and sacraments as means by

which Christ himself is present through the person of the Holy Spirit. Christ chose to be

present to the worshiping community through words and material signs. Thus, worship

provides a privileged means of encountering Christ. Faith is the God-given receptivity

and openness to that presence. Associated with Charles Hodge and Francis Turrentin, the

other account of Christian faith regarded faith as assent to doctrinal propositions. This

view of faith regarded worship as the acting out of these doctrinal propositions, as not

only secondary but comparatively unimportant compared to "faith." This latter view of

faith, argues Moore-Keish, has had a profound influence upon the Reformed tradition

over the past two centuries.

> Too often we in the Reformed tradition have focused on doctrinal formulations, such as the one in the Westminster Catechism, as the starting points of eucharistic theology. We have regarded the eucharist as the enacting of carefully formed doctrines about Christ and church: here at the table we understand that Christ is really—but not corporeally—present and that in partaking of the bread and wine we are reminded of the meal Jesus shared with his disciples on the night when he was betrayed. We come to the table with these doctrines, and because we understand them properly, we can rightly partake of the sacrament.[67]

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[66] Martha L. Moore-Keish, *Do This in Remembrance of Me: A Ritual Approach to Reformed Eucharistic Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008), 36.

[67] Ibid., 10.

Faith as assent to propositions took on a ritual form within many congregations: withholding communion from children until an age sufficient that they could understand the doctrinal propositions and give their assent. Moreover, the manner of celebrating the Eucharist enabled reflection on those doctrinal propositions.

According to Moore-Keish, the understanding of faith as assent to propositions, widespread though it be, poses two significant challenges. Regarding worship as enacting propositions leaves no room for assessing the formative power of the liturgy itself. "Faith" informs worship, but worship never forms faith. Secondly, the priority of propositions to worship risks "an idolatry of reason," a "dangerous exaltation of reason over liturgical practice" in which "the effectiveness of the eucharist is made dependent on our human understanding of it."[68] Through an examination of a congregation's ritual practice, its *lex orandi*, Moore-Keish demonstrates the formative power of Christian worship while asserting an account faith as a God-given receptiveness.

The congregation in Decatur, Georgia discussed in *Do This* evinced not one but two local eucharistic theologies. Though part of a single congregation and participating in the same worship services, Moore-Keish identified two different groups within the church, identifiable primarily by their preferred method of communing. The first group preferred a mode of reception that "centers on the corporate sharing of the elements": leaving one's pew, walking toward the front of the sanctuary, and receiving bread and wine from the hands of clergy and lay helpers. Those who preferred this method found certain emphases within the Eucharistic liturgy newly salient. When the congregation received bread and wine at the front of the sanctuary,

[68] Ibid., 11.

people in the front rows were able to see the faces of those behind them as they came down the aisle. They smile in pleasure at one another. The liturgical phrases about the congregation as the "one body of Christ" and the table as a "joyful feast" assumed new meaning, because the congregation behaved more like one connected body, and there was a palpable joy in the gathering…All the participants are inescapably aware of the gathered community in a way that is not as evident during [reception of bread and wine from trays passed down the pews].[69]

Roughly half of the congregation preferred this method of communing "precisely because [it] generates more of a sense of community than sitting in the pew."[70] This first group valued the communal feel and recognized that a particular ritual form (proceeding forward to receive communion) made possible the greater emphasis upon the "one body of Christ."

In contrast to the communal emphasis of the first group, the second group regarded the "Lord's Supper as individual devotion." These individuals preferred receiving bread and wine in the pews from trays passed down the pews, regarded the words of institution as the heart of the Eucharistic liturgy, equated "meaning" with "thoughtful reflection," and preferred quiet, unobtrusive music rather than communal hymns during the distribution of the elements.[71] Many within this group had grown up in churches that withheld communion from children until the age of discernment—a ritual practice, says Moore-Keish, which emphasizes individual reflection and remembering.

The most striking finding of *Do This* lies in the disjunction between interpretation and practice. Notice that the first group *recognized* that a particular ritual form (receiving communion by going forward) drew out and emphasized Eucharistic themes. "Doing" communion in a particular way foregrounded particular "meanings." The latter group,

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[69] Ibid., 127-8.

[70] Ibid., 128.

[71] Ibid., 125-32.

however, consistently distinguished between "doing" and "meaning." Meaning for them entailed individually recollecting the Last Supper and death of Jesus, an imaginative exercise abetted by the form of the ritual they grew up with and now preferred: minimal movement, minimal interpersonal interaction, non-distracting music. Yet this latter group failed to recognize how this ritual form shaped and perpetuated their ability to engage in the act of recollection. The ritual had shaped them and continued to shape them in a way that they did not recognize and probably would not affirm on a rational level.

Through the examination of a local *lex orandi*, Moore-Keish reveals a deep gap between practice and interpretation within at least this particular congregation. Indeed, the theme of hiddenness runs throughout the book. As a researcher, Moore-Keish came to recognize that that a "substantial part of what the ritual action does is to form participants' affections and relationships, a facet of the ritual doing that cannot be seen by a detached observer."[72] In congregant interviews, themes prominent within the Eucharistic liturgy rarely rose to consciousness, especially among those who had grown up in congregations that ritually connected confirmation (at the age of discernment) to Communion.[73] The same held true of christological, eschatological, pneumatological themes within the Eucharist: notwithstanding their prominence in the liturgy, these themes had not become "part of the conscious eucharistic theology of the congregation."[74] Put differently, themes "in plain view" within the Eucharistic prayer had either been ignored or missed by the majority of congregants. Of course, the most prominent hiddenness arises in the disjunction between interpretation and practice by half

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[72] Ibid., 110.

[73] Ibid., 112. Similarly, congregants asked about eschatological themes in the Eucharistic prayers never mentioned any of the three references to the second coming of Christ within the prayer itself.

[74] Ibid., 120.

of the congregation. "The ironic twist suggested by the present study is that this hermeneutical approach to sacraments depends on a particular set of practices for its existence."[75] Examining the link between practice and interpretation within a congregation highlighted the various epistemological gaps faced by congregants and researcher alike.

Too, by looking closely at a single congregation, Moore-Keish demonstrates the challenge of maintaining the balance between divine action and human response. "As Don Saliers puts it, liturgy is (or may be) 'both anthropological rite and divine self-manifestation.'" Liturgy is holy encounter, but it is also a profoundly human activity.[76] Acknowledging that rituals generally have the power to transform human affections and perceptions places Moore-Keish seemingly at risk of displacing the work of God in sanctifying Christians. This becomes particularly clear within her discussion of performance theory and ritual studies. Drawing upon the ritual scholar Catherine Bell illumines the "profoundly human" side of Eucharistic activity, yet Bell regards ritual as *only* anthropological rite. Moore-Keish regards the reduction of Christian ritual solely to anthropological act as overlooking the role of divine presence and empowerment in the Eucharist.

> Bell can help Reformed theologians revise their estimation of eucharist as a secondary enactment of prior doctrine, focusing on the power of the eucharistic ritual to establish union of participants with God. Bell would say that the ritual itself unites the participants with "god"; Reformed theologians argue that the Holy Spirit acts in and through the ritual to unite worshipers with Christ. These are two different discourses, but they share a focus on the eucharist as an event in which the faithful are really united with God.[77]

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[75] Ibid., 137.

[76] Ibid., 62.

[77] Ibid., 151.

The seam between divine action and human response appears elsewhere in *Do This,* as when Moore-Keish makes certain to avoid collapsing the work of the Holy Spirit into the dynamics of ritual performance.[78] The distinction between "faith" as assent to propositions and "faith" as an attitude of receptivity given by God serves throughout the book as a means of avoiding such a collapse: because receptivity to the presence and work of God is itself a gift, no purely anthropological account (i.e., ritual studies, performance theory) could account for the formative power of the liturgy. In Moore-Keish's account, formation by the liturgy requires a certain receptivity on the part of worshipers, but that receptivity is itself a gift from God.

Do This employs *lex orandi*, *lex credendi* as a lens upon two different understandings of "faith" within the Reformed tradition. Faith as intellectual assent (*lex credendi*) regards worship (*lex orandi*) as acting out the [intellectual] content of faith. Faith in such a view is static and always prior to worship. With faith as receptivity, however, the relationship between liturgy and theology shifts. Faith opens worshipers to the on-going work of God in the liturgy, but liturgy can also transform worshipers, deepening their faith. In identifying the faith as intellectual assent with "idolatry of reason," Moore-Keish displays how closely *lex orandi*, *lex credendi* lies to the question of identifying the respective role of God's action in the liturgy and humanity's response therein. Noting the link between ritual formation (*lex orandi*) and understanding of the Eucharist (*lex credendi*) binds the relationship of worship to worshipers with *lex orandi*, *lex credendi* and the relationship of God's action to human response. Through examination of worship in a local congregation, Moore-Keish has shown the three tasks of liturgical theology to be inextricably bound up with one another.

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[78] Ibid., 146.

More than *Lex Orandi, Lex Credendi*

Roughly five decades separate the English publication of *Introduction to Liturgical Theology* and *Do This in Remembrance of Me*, with *Context and Text* falling toward the latter part of those fifty years. From the time of its first articulation in *Introduction* through the present, liturgical theology has wrestled with the relationship between the *lex orandi* and the *lex credendi* of the Church. As the work of Alexander Schmemann, Kevin Irwin, and Martha Moore-Keish demonstrate, examining that relationship has remained the defining task of the field. Notably, though, none of these three authors assigns the same referent to *lex orandi* and *lex credendi*. In each circumstance, the three authors point broadly toward "worship" and "theology," but each also emphasizes markedly different aspects of worship and theology. The instability of referents for *lex orandi* and *lex credendi* contrasts with the relative stability of the contrastive coupling of two distinct though related phenomena. Schmemann emphasizes the different institutional location and ethos of liturgy and theology, Irwin focuses on the qualitative difference between worshiping and theologizing, and Moore-Keish questions the unidirectional influence of "faith" upon worship. To be sure, each of these scholars uses the *lex orandi, lex credendi* distinction to wrestle with topics characteristic of their own traditions: the Orthodox Schmemann wrestling with the relationship of the Church to (Western) universities, the Roman Catholic Irwin with the relationship between the Latin prototype of the liturgy and its various instantiations, and the Reformed Moore-Keish grappling with the relationship of doctrine to faith. That despite their different ecclesial backgrounds they evince the same pattern of using *lex orandi*, *lex credendi* as a kind of wedge against Modern presuppositions gives our argument here greater pique.

Surely part of the power of *lex orandi*, *lex credendi* lies in its pithiness, the ease with which liturgical scholars and others interested in the liturgy can use the pairing to assert a renewed place for liturgy in the life of the Church. Perhaps as important is its ability to highlight contrasts. Indeed, the contrastive nature of *lex orandi, lex credendi* has made it an apt tool for grappling not simply with the relationship of worship to theology, but also with the decline of Modern epistemologies and anthropologies. Consider the cluster of associations made by Schmemann, Irwin, and Moore-Keish with *lex orandi* and *lex credendi.* Associations with the *lex orandi* include "the existential," poetry, prose, polyvalence, affect, and mystery. By contrast, *lex credendi* is associated with didacticism, ratiocination, intellect, the university, monovalence, codification, and comprehension. Liturgical theology arises precisely at the time when the depiction of human beings as primarily "thinking things" came into question along with the theological and ecclesial structures that had grown up around that assumption. In such a circumstance, *lex credendi* becomes a proxy term for those various theological and ecclesial structures.

Putting "Place" alongside Liturgical Theology

Developing a new method for analyzing liturgical space using recent reflection on "place" would not normally seem to require such a fulsome engagement with liturgical theology. There are two important reasons for doing so in this case.

First, engaging liturgical theology helps highlight the specific gains of a new method for analyzing liturgical space. While this new method *might* contribute new insights into the hermeneutics of architectural symbolism and the exegesis of liturgical rites, I would argue that the major contributions of this method lie elsewhere, specifically the relationships between a) what worshipers *say* in (and about) worship and what they

do in worship, b) how worshipers make decisions about how to shape the liturgy and how those decisions in turn shape worshipers, and c) examining the human response to divine action. These are, I have argued, central tasks of liturgical theology. Developing a new method for analyzing liturgical space through an engagement with liturgical theology helps highlight the contributions of the new method for analyzing liturgical space to liturgical studies generally.

Second, engaging liturgical theology helps illumine one of the central challenges of appropriating the insights of "place theory." All three of the chief tasks of liturgical theology—articulating the relationship between *lex orandi* and *lex credendi*, between divine action and human response, and between worshipers and the objective content of worship—have at their heart *at least an implicit anthropology*, an understanding of what the human being is. How do the ratiocinative and discursive practices of humans (*lex credendi*) relate to other human practices (*lex orandi*)? How are humans shaped by divine action and how are they empowered to respond? How have humans shaped the objective content of the liturgy and how, in turn, are they formed by participating in that liturgy? How one understands the human being strongly influences, if not determines, how one answers these questions. I have argued here that liturgical theology arose amidst a shift within the larger intellectual milieu, a shift that called into question previous assumptions about the human as chiefly (and ideally) a ratiocinative creature and, therefore, about the role of the university, formal theology, and "thinking" rather than "doing" those assumptions entailed. "Place theory," including theological reflection on "place," has arisen amidst the same shifts within the larger intellectual milieu. Indeed, reflection on place pushes the human experience and shaping of the physical environment into the

foreground. How one understands human nature, therefore, strongly influences the account of the relationship between humans and their physical environments.

Within liturgical theology, the changing understandings of the human being have often resulted in a tension about the relationship between divine action and human response. Because that relationship has largely, if implicitly, been assumed to be zero-sum, then any alteration in the underlying (and again, often implicit) anthropology has two outcomes. First, because divine action and human response are keyed to one another, shifts in anthropology require a complementary shift in divine empowerment. If one believes, for example, that the human soul is what animates human bodies and that God empowers people primarily by transforming the soul, then any alteration in the relationship of the soul to the "whole" human being will require an adjustment in how God empowers and transforms people.[79] The second outcome is tied to the first. Because the relationship of divine action to human response is assumed to be zero-sum, *any* alteration of the human side of the equation not only requires an adjustment in the divine side, but it will have the appearance of God "losing ground." To return to the words of Kevin Irwin, "There is a delicate balance in liturgy: divine initiative and human response, the action of God and the sanctification of humanity…We trip this delicate balance at our peril…"[80]

Developing a new method of analyzing liturgical space in conversation with liturgical theology makes apparent the gains of drawing upon theories of place, particularly the identification of the specific communal and individual goods entailed in

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[79] If one shifts *away from* an account as distinct from the body to an account of the soul as an epiphenomenon, this changes the logic of divine empowerment ["through the soul"] and calls for a new account that comports with the soul as epiphenomenon rather than as the "spiritual" component of the human being.

[80] Kevin Irwin, "A Spirited Community," 119-20.

the maintenance of ritual boundaries. At the same time, because place theory places so

much emphasis upon *the human* side of the equation, using it to develop a new method

for analyzing liturgical spaces will require a new account of divine action to human

response.

CHAPTER 2
THE PLACE OF PLACE IN THEOLOGY

This chapter serves as a bridge between a) the discussion of the origin and

primary tasks of liturgical theology and b) the construction of a theory of place-making.

Liturgical theology and recent theological reflection on place both emerged within

an intellectual milieu that challenged earlier assumptions about human nature—

particularly the depiction of humans as primarily "thinking" creatures—and about the

role of the material Creation in human life, the sustenance of Christian communities, and

in the eschaton. The chapter begins by highlighting some of the major shifts within the

larger intellectual milieu in which both liturgical theology and theologies of place

emerged.

On the far side of the bridge is an account of place and place-making that enables

a more robust understanding of the relationship of humans to the physical environment,

including the shape of discourse about the physical environment. Along with the use of

contrastive pairings—space and place, space and time, center and periphery—two spatial

metaphors occur regularly in discussions of the physical environment: Place Is a

Container and Place Is an Intersection. In some circumstances, authors select a spatial

pairing or metaphor as a rhetorical device, as when Paul Tillich uses "space and time" to

critique non-universal religions. Elsewhere, authors debate the more appropriate

metaphor for place given the logical implications of each. Thomas Torrance, for example,

contrasts the theological and sacramental implications of applying to God the metaphor

Place Is a Container rather than Place Is an Intersection. Finally, certain metaphors

dominate the logic of an argument without receiving explicit mention. Philip Sheldrake

does not set out to contrast "place and space" or elaborate the logical inferences of Place Is an Intersection. Nonetheless, his entire argument presupposes the ability of places to act like containers. The presence of these metaphors and pairings as both explicit topics and implicit structures suggests that they are more than merely turns of phrase. Indeed, as argued in the next chapter, these pairings and metaphors may well have their origin in the particularities of human anatomy and physiology. By way of adumbration, because humans have the kinds of bodies they have, they think and speak about embodiment and emplacement in ways shaped by their anatomy and physiology.

The Turn to Place in Philosophy

Liturgical theology and theologies of place share a similar intellectual milieu. Both arose during a transition from anthropologies and ontologies bequeathed by Modernity to anthropologies and ontologies which attended more (and more positively) to the role of the materiality. Edward Casey has offered the most thorough account of this transition within the study of the human relationship to the physical environment. His account about the philosophy of space sheds light on the shifts in anthropology and ontology which underlie the emergence both liturgical theology and theologies of place.

As described by Edward Casey, Modern philosophy evinced particular habits of thought which yielded not only the emphasis given to abstract space over concrete places, but also to the particular character of space within these accounts. First, "the subordination of all discrete phenomena to mind" stands among the primary emphases of philosophical modernity.[1] This reduction to mind typically entails a de-materializing of

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[1] Edward Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 203.

topics—stripping them of their concreteness and particularity, leaving behind an idea or concept. Thus, with space and place, Modern philosophy followed the Christian thinker Philoponus (i.e., John the Grammarian, c. 490-570) in regarding space as "pure dimensionality void of all corporeality."[2] Space in such an understanding denotes a void, a vacuum which exists independently of the particular locations (i.e., places) within it. The "subordination of all discrete phenomena to mind" frequently comes with a Manichean emphasis of the non-material over the material. Within the pairing of space and place, the former—more abstract and more general—comes logically and ontologically prior to the concrete particularity of individual places.

The reduction to mind within Modern philosophy paired with the presupposition of the logical coherence of the universe. In order to craft a logically coherent account of spatiality, Modern philosophy often focused upon a single aspect, then using "space" and "place" as contrasting but mutually coherent terms to depict that aspect.[3] Modern philosophical reflection on space as well as contemporary theological reflection on place regularly employ this and other contrastive pairings.

A commitment to the logical coherence of the universe paired with a focus on a single aspect of space often result in an overlooked remainder. Both Modern philosophy and contemporary theology exhibit the tendency to craft logically coherent accounts of spatiality by employing definitions of space and place that exclude key aspects of spatiality in order to maintain logical coherence. Casey describes this as a common habit of Modern philosophy: "As a direct consequence of the imperfect fit between the garb of

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[2] Ibid., 197.

[3] "Space and time" is another such pairing of experientially complementary terms used to highlight contrasts within a single aspect of emplacement.

scientific-theoretical ideas and the life-world, there is a considerable unredeemed remainder of unmathematized and even unmathematizable material that does not attain representation in the symbols of mathematics or the formulas of physics…"[4] As an example, Newtonian "absolute space" exists "without relation to anything external" and "remains always similar and immoveable."[5] Though ontologically robust, space in such a rendering simply becomes a synonym for "area." "Place," in turn, becomes a specific part within that area. Taken together, "space and place" in this usage simply denote different aspects of physical location.

Analogous treatment of a painting shows how such an analysis leaves an "unredeemed remainder of unmathematized and even unmathematizable material." A painter cannot paint upon thin air: she requires the (previously existing) canvas upon which to apply paint. The canvas does not need the paint to exist, but the paint does need a space upon which to be applied. Every stroke of paint and every detail of the painting can be described as existing within a particular part of space and taking up a discrete surface area. Asked to explain a painting, one could note the nature of the canvas (space), then offer a highly accurate depiction of the location and area of every stroke of paint (place). Describing a painting in this manner—El Greco's "Adoration of the Shepherds," for example—would be highly accurate while largely missing the point. There is simply more going on in "Adoration" than a discussion of the canvas and a spatial account of the paint strokes. The "unredeemed remainder" in this instance is the very *raison d'etre* of the painting itself.

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[4] Ibid., 221.

[5] Isaac Newton, *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, Book 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934), 6.

No theoretical account of spatiality can remove considerations of location, of things in particular places within a larger space. Nonetheless, a fulsome account of spatiality will include more than space and the particular "places" within it, more than canvas and the position and length of brush strokes.

Casey does not suggest that any single, Modern philosophical account of spatiality came to hold sway over philosophical and popular conceptions of space and place. Instead, Modern philosophy bequeathed rarefied perspectives on space and place borne out of particular habits of thought, described above as "the subordination of all discrete phenomena to mind" and the presupposition of the logical coherence of the universe (in Kevin Irwin's terms, monovalence rather than polyvalence). As described by David Harvey, "The Enlightenment project…took it as axiomatic that there was only one possible answer to any question. From this it followed that the world could be controlled and rationally ordered if we could only picture and represent it rightly."[6]

The impact of this bequest to contemporary thought and practice has taken multiple forms. Certainly, the priority given to space over against place shaped theoretical *discourse*. John Inge goes further, however, suggesting that humans overlook their "emplacedness"—the fact that we are creatures with material bodies locatable in a particular place—precisely because the theoretical discourse inherited from Modern philosophy has suppressed "place."[7] Yet the suppression of "place" in discourse within Modern philosophy may have amplified other tendencies to downplay the particular, concrete, and material, as Inge himself claims in noting the perennial influence of

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[6] David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (New York: Blackwell, 1989), 27.

[7] John Inge, *A Christian Theology of Place* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 14.

Neoplatonism upon Western thought.[8] (Put aptly by Oliver O'Donovan, "… we should

notice the tendency in Platonism to speak of the spirit or intellect, divine or human, as

transcending spatial definition because it transcends materiality."[9]) This transcendence of

materiality notwithstanding, the very same habits of thought which emphasized the

abstractness of space also shaped scientific inquiry and various aspects of modern life,

many less theoretical than philosophy, including architecture and medicine.[10] All of this

suggests that the spatial bequest of Modern philosophy took many forms and cannot

easily be identified as simply the cause of the contemporary "crisis of place."

Within philosophy, the twentieth century witnessed a shift away from the

"crushing monolith of space" toward reflection upon place, emplacement, and place-

making. As narrated by Casey, the turn to place within contemporary thought has

altogether shifted the direction of spatial inquiry. Instead of beginning an investigation of

spatiality generally by elaborating the nature of abstract space, twentieth-century

reflection on spatiality begins with the human experience of the physical environment.

This shift has had three important outcomes for subsequent reflection on the nature of

place.

If the Modern depiction of space rested upon a larger emphasis upon the

universal, the mental, and the absolute, the shift toward place rests upon an emphasis on

the particular, the material, and the contingent. Contemporary shifts in anthropology, for

example, have emphasized the embodied, material nature of human beings.

"…[I]nterpreting the human subject as a distinctively *bodily* subject and not as a mental

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[8] Ibid., 5.

[9] Oliver O'Donovan, "The Loss of a Sense of Place," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 55, no. 1 (March 1989): 42.

[10] Casey, *The Fate of Place,* 334.

or intuitive subject" raises questions about the bodily basis for our abstract reflection upon spatiality while also expanding the scope of inquiry beyond the symbolic contents of the physical environment."[11] Casey suggests that even the abstract models of space proposed by Philoponus have a bodily basis. In the work of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the human body is depicted as the source for our abstract depictions of spatiality.[12] An expanded epistemology which incorporated pre-reflective experience (as in Husserl's "life-world") provided a place for considering aspects of the human experience previously overlooked by an emphasis upon the symbolic and "the mental."[13]

Again, in contrast to the emphasis on uniform space, twentieth century philosophical reflection on spatiality has emphasized not only the materiality of place, but also the possibility of diverse places at different scales. Thus, Bachelard in *Poetics of Space* explores the home as a whole and in its several parts ("Drawers, Chests and Wardrobes" receive their own chapter).[14] Foucault focuses upon the relationship between power, knowledge, and spatial arrangements in different settings, including asylums (*The History of Madness*), prisons (*Discipline and Punish*), and homes (*History of Sexuality, Volume 1*).[15] Places as small as a human hand (Knott) to the whole of the Earth (Wynn) have been explored.[16]

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[11] Casey, *The Fate of Place,* 206.

[12] See ibid., 218ff.

[13] See ibid., 217, 221-3.

[14] Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994 [1958]). On "drawers, chests, and wardrobes," see 74-89.

[15] Michel Foucault, *The History of Madness* (New York: Routledge, 2009 [1961]); *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage, 1995 [1977]); *History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction* (New York: Vintage, 1990 [1976]).

[16] Kim Knott, *The Location of Religion: A Spatial Analysis* (Oakville, CT: Equinox, 2005); Mark R. Wynn, *Faith and Place: An Essay in Embodied Religious Epistemology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

The diversity of "places" examined within twentieth-century thought has at least two interpretations. Per Casey, "This suggests that there is no singular, much less ideal, Place behind so many different (or at least differential) masks. To this extent, the recent history of place may seem all the more hidden, since there is no official story to be told, only a series of significant incidents to be recounted."[17] Alternatively, if "place" can denote everything from human bodies to prisons to the earth conceived as a whole, then either "place" can denote nearly anything conceivably "habitable"—the position taken by Casey—or it lacks precision sufficient to avoid easy abuse.

The third outcome of the "turn to place" within Western thought arises from the manner in which the discussion is framed. Modern philosophy foregrounded "space," often relegating "place" to the rank of secondary consideration. Contemporary *theological* reflection on spatiality has frequently employed the pairing "space and place" while reversing the polarity. *Place* now bears the positive valence.[18] Combined with the denotative range of "place," this reversed valence opens the possibility for "space" to denote undesirable aspects of the physical environment or ways of relating to the physical environment. If Modern philosophy showed itself prone to craft abstract models of space in order to achieve coherence, contemporary theological reflection on place has shown itself prone to commit a similar fallacy, emphasizing particular aspects of the human experience of the physical world in order to contrast ways of inhabiting and making places.

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[17] Casey, *The Fate of Place,* 286.

[18] Compare the use and valences of "place and space" in Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

The Vocabulary of Place

Liturgical theologians and theologians of place not only share the context of shifts within the larger intellectual milieu, they exhibit other similarities as well. Whereas liturgical theology employed the pairing *lex orandi, lex credendi* to highlight contrasts, theologians of place (like many others) have employed spatial pairings, particularly "space and place," "space and time," and "center and periphery." In much the same way that the denotations of *lex orandi* and *lex credendi* shift while the contrastive structure between them remains, use of spatial pairings evinces its own denotative slipperiness. Paul Tillich, for example, uses the pairing "space and time" to denote both "fundamental aspects" of human experience (being in time, being emplaced) but also as metonymies for different religious experiences. As with the contrast *lex orandi*, *lex credendi*, the power of such pairings lies in the very fact of their denotative range coupled to their ability to contrast two related phenomenon.

The spatial pairings are not the only rhetorical tools used in theological reflection on place. Theologians of place explored the utility of spatial metaphors as frames for their analysis. Thomas F. Torrance, for example, reflects on the logical consequences for theology (particular the relationship of God to Creation) of two different spatial metaphors, Place Is a Container and Place Is an Intersection.[19] Elsewhere, Oliver O'Donovan and others will debate the aptness of spatial metaphors, often suggesting one in preference to others.

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[19] As discussed below, Thomas Torrance specifically uses the language of "space as the seat of relations," a way of focusing upon the fact that human relations with God happen in an emplaced manner that requires a place, a time of interacting with God. The way subsequent scholars work with this language "of seat of relations" closely parallels the language of others who, like Oliver O'Donovan, reflect at length on the happenstance nature of human *encounters* with one another (vis-à-vis the "Parable of the Good Samaritan" (Luke 10:25-37)).

An important feature of both the spatial pairings and the spatial metaphors is their occurrence both as both explicit topics for discussion (e.g., "Place Is a Container" is preferable to "Place Is an Intersection") as well as for implicit structures. In his discussion of the human relationship to the physical environment, Philip Sheldrake does not explicitly adopt a single spatial metaphor as the frame for his discussion. Nonetheless, his entire analysis of place presupposes the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, interiority and exteriority that are implied by the metaphor Place Is a Container.

The remainder of this section presents the core argument of several theologians of place, noting in the course of their arguments the various ways that the spatial pairings and metaphors occur both explicitly and implicitly. Additionally, this section highlights the ways that using a single pairing or metaphor to frame a discussion can skew the discussion of place and yield an "unredeemed remainder."

Place is a Container versus Place Is an Intersection

The oldest strand of theological reflection upon spatiality examines space as a creature, as an aspect of Creation. Typically paired with time, these reflections might more properly be said to be theologies of space rather than of place. Here, cosmology and ontology stand in the foreground. In *Space, Time and Incarnation,* Torrance offers an account of the relationship of God to space and time in light of both the Creation and the Incarnation.[20] Two questions drive Torrance's reflection. First, if God has created *ex nihilo* and stands outside of space and time, how does one account for divine action

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[20] Thomas F. Torrance, *Space, Time and Incarnation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

within the Creation? Second, how does the Incarnation—the entrance of God into Creation *par excellence*—alter the relationship of God to Creation spatially and temporally? As Torrance himself notes, both questions draw attention to the use of spatial metaphors with reference to God.[21]

Torrance suggests that the inadequacy of contemporary theological responses to these questions is the result of the continued use of medieval metaphors of space, metaphors which envisioned space primarily as a container or receptacle. Having its origins in ancient Greek thought, the container metaphor of space exercises "conceptual control over whatever is conceived by means of it."[22] The container metaphor implies that every vessel has an interior and an exterior, an inside and an outside. Cosmic space conceived as a container, therefore, calls for a "somewhere" exterior to space itself. The container metaphor may also entail the influence of the container upon the contained. Just as water poured into a vessel takes the shape of the vessel itself, so space as a container suggests that divine entrance into spatiality in some wise "shapes" God. The dominance of the container metaphor may be seen in sacramental theologies which regard Eucharistic elements as transportable containers of divine grace, though these have often entailed complex explanations to sunder the "shaping power" of the elements from the

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[21] If God created *ex nihilo*, then neither space nor time preceded the Creation, but came into being alongside the stars, the earth, and all its inhabitants. God is not, therefore, conditioned by temporality or spatiality. God does not, in other words, exist "in time" or "beyond space" except metaphorically. Indeed, God cannot be said to exist *before* Creation, for this implies the presence of time *before* the creation of time itself. God cannot be said to exist *outside* of Creation, for this implies the existence of a space exterior to the Creation itself. Such a depiction of the relation of space, time, and God prompts questions about how God relates to what God has created *if* that relationship cannot be accounted for in simple spatial or temporal terms. The Incarnation and the presence of Christ in the Eucharist give these questions further pique.

[22] Torrance, *Space, Time and Incarnation*, 26.

presence of Christ they carried.[23] Torrance goes so far as to suggest that behind the

Lutheran and Calvinist disagreements regarding the nature of the sacraments lies their

different spatial metaphors and the resulting differences in the ways Christ can be present

in bread and wine.[24]

Patristic theology offered an alternative to the container view of space, one that

regarded "space as the seat of relations or the place of meeting and activity in the

interaction between God and the world" (i.e., Place Is an Intersection).[25] Such a view

does not avoid spatial or topological language, but avoiding the metaphor of space *as*

container shifts attention away from questions of containment and exclusion and toward

locations where God has chosen to be known. "Thus while the Incarnation does not mean

that God is limited by space and time, it asserts the reality of space and time for God in

the actuality of His relations with us, and at the same time binds us to space and time in

all our relations with Him."[26]

Space, Time, and Incarnation exemplifies traditional theological reflection upon

"space" in its dual cosmological and ontological focus, in its pairing of "space" and

"time," and in its abstract, "top down" treatment of space. Notably, Torrance uses neither

"space" nor "place" as a pejorative term: space denotes everything that has extension,

place indicates particular spatial and temporal locations within Creation (as when Jesus

Christ becomes "the place of meeting and activity in the interaction between God and the

world"). Second, Torrance has paired space and time as *complementary* terms whose

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[23] Ibid*.,* 27.

[24] Ibid., 31ff.

[25] Ibid., 13.

[26] Ibid., 67.

definitions *require* one another. With F. W. Dillistone and other later theologians, reflection on "place and space" will evince a similar complementarity, but with one key difference. The denotation of the word "space" reverses, shifting from "solidity, extension, and stability" to "fluidity, change, and instability."

Space *or* Time

The complementarity of the terms used in the discussion of spatiality has important rhetorical ramifications when "time and space" or "place and space" become part of a polemic. As discussed in the next chapter, the complementarity of "space" and "time" as cosmological terms results from their inextricability in lived experience. When the two terms become part of a polemic, however, the complementarity extends to their valence: if *time* or its attributes is positively viewed, then *space* or its attributes becomes negatively viewed, and vice versa. The complementarity of the two terms at the ontological or experiential level then vanishes, having been replaced by the complementarity of valence.

This rhetorical sleight of hand appears in the treatment of space and time in *Theologies of Culture*. Like Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich reflects upon the ramifications of the link between geographic particularity and religion.[27] Following Immanuel Kant (and like Torrance), Tillich describes time and space as the two irreducible categories of existence.

> Time and space are the powers of universal existence including human existence, human body and mind. Time and space belong together: We can measure time only by space and space only in time. Motion, the universal character of life,

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[27] See Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (London: Nisbet, 1945), 105-7.

needs time and space. Mind, which seems to be bound to time, needs only embodiment in order to come to existence, and consequently needs space.[28]

This complementarity emerges not only in day to day experience, but in physics as well, where "time" becomes the "fourth dimension of space."[29] Tillich goes further however, giving voice to a tradition within Christian thought that regards space and time as antithetical. "But while time and space are bound to each other in such an inescapable way, they stand in a tension with each other which may be considered as the most fundamental tension of existence."[30] That tension manifests in nothing less than the difference between the God of Abraham, who offers a future different from the past, and the gods of the pagans, trapped in cycles of violence and injustice.

For Tillich, because "time" denotes *linear change*, space acquires *cyclical* change as a denotation.

> Time without direction is time under the full control of space. Therefore, it is the first victory of time that the process of life goes from birth to death, that growth and decay create a direction which cannot be reversed. The aged cannot become young again in the realm of life. Nevertheless, the predominance of space remains. The life-process cannot be reversed, but it can be repeated. Each individual repeats the law of birth and death, of growth and decay. The direction of time is deprived of its power by the circular motion of continuous repetition. The circle, this most expressive symbol of the predominance of space, is not overcome in the realm of life.[31]

Here, "time" and "space" both indicate *temporal* patterns, one linear, one cyclical. Yet because "space" typically denotes solidity and stability, Tillich can contrast "time" as a linear temporality to "space" as a cyclical—and therefore more *stable*—temporality. Tillich has thus traded on the complementarity of both terms in order to forge a

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[28] Paul Tillich, *Theology of Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 30.

[29] Ibid., 31.

[30] Ibid., 30.

[31] Ibid., 31.

dichotomy that captures a contrast he wishes to make. After linking the God of Abraham

and of Jesus to time, to prophecy, and justice, space becomes synonymous with injustice.

> This leads to the ultimate point in the struggle between time and space. Prophetic monotheism is the monotheism of justice. The gods of space necessarily destroy justice. The unlimited claim of every spatial god unavoidably clashes with the unlimited claim of any other spatial god. The will to power of the one group cannot give justice to another group. This holds true of the powerful groups within a nation and of the nations themselves. Polytheism, the religion of space, is necessarily unjust. The unlimited claim of any god of space destroys the universalism implied in the idea of justice. This and this alone is the meaning of prophetic monotheism.[32]

The difference between time and space represents nothing less than the difference

between God and paganism, justice and injustice, progress and stasis. "Space" here has

little to do with spatiality, the physical environment, or emplacement. Instead, "space"

serves as a metonymy for religions bound to a particular geographic extent (in contrast to

"universal religions").

We do well to note how the metonymic use of "space" creates an elision, an

illusion that gives the appearance of speaking *about* spatiality while in fact discussing

something else. By employing the traditional "time and space" pairing while maintaining

their complementarity, *Theology of Culture* masks a discussion of an existential

orientation under terms typically reserved for cosmological and ontological reflection.[33]

A similar pattern marks much of the discussion of "place" and "space" in the 20th and 21st

centuries. When coupled to a normative vision for geographic cum social practice,

theologies (and theories) of place often employ a dichotomy (e.g., "place" versus

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[32] Ibid., 38.

[33] Though perhaps pushing the distinction between space and time to a new limit, Tillich nonetheless remains within a long tradition of interpretation of worshipping God "neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem," but in spirit and in truth." (John 4:21-4). Reading the Johannine passage as indicating the a-spatiality of Christian worship and ecclesial identity creates a vacuum—the New Jerusalem *in a future time* replaces Jerusalem or any other "space" in the present.

"space") that emphasizes particular facets of the human encounter with the physical environment. These dichotomies, however, reduce place to a single aspect of place, excluding other aspects and dynamics of the relationship of humans to their physical environments. Perhaps most importantly, transforming "place and space" (or "time and space") into mutually exclusive terms hides the fact that in lived experience they are mutually constitutive.[34]

Harvey Cox will appropriate the contrast between space and time in a manner similar to Paul Tillich. More importantly, *The Secular City* serves as the counter-point to much of the later reflection on "place and space." The image of personal autonomy and geographic mobility described by Cox—humanity freed from the constraints of tradition and small communities—stands in stark contrast to those who advocate a return to such "places." In a sense, Cox provides an account of the very kind of "space" against which later theologians like Walter Brueggemann and Craig Bartholomew will rail. Additionally though, *The Secular City* evinces a keen awareness of the link between the built environment and patterns of sociality, what we might call socio-geographic practices.

Against those who decry urbanization and the rise of secularism in the West, *The Secular City* mounts a biblical defense of secularization, naming cities as its native soil. "Secularization…is the legitimate consequence of the impact of biblical faith on history."[35] Cox describes secularism as the disenchantment of nature, the desacralization

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[34] This is a central argument of the third chapter, that the paired opposites used to describe place have their origin in lived experience. In the case of "space and place," their internal structure has its basis in the fact that humans have to negotiate between objects *in place* and the open *spaces* between them.

[35] Harvey Cox, *The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective* (New York: Macmillan, 1969), 17.

of politics, and the deconsecration of values. Secularism strips nature, politics, and values of extra mundane referents. In contrast to earlier human epochs, modern humanity need not reverence nature because of some inherent connection to divinity. Instead, nature becomes simply a realm of human action to be handled responsibly. The same goes for politics and values. Cox argues that disenchantment, desacralization, and deconsecration have their initial impetus in Scripture, namely in the Creation, the Exodus, and the Sinai Covenant. Each of these "pivotal" events released humanity from a form of bondage: thrall to the natural world, subservience to "divinely instituted" governments, and bigotry regarding local traditions.[36]

Having defended secularization as the outworking of biblical faith, *The Secular City* examines life in contemporary cities. In contrast to "village life," where local traditions and *Gemeinschaftlich* relations abound, the city frees individuals from these constraints, replacing them within a setting where anonymity and mobility are the norm. Indeed, Cox *prizes* the freedom gained from thinner interpersonal commitments and less-enduring ties to particular locations because they enable humans to reach their full maturity and exercise the greatest level of personal, individual responsibility. Thick interpersonal relationships and local traditions may enable right action, but they do so by limiting the choices individuals have.[37] Without those thick relationships and local tradition—and with greater anonymity and mobility—humans have a greater range of options from which to choose.

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[36] Cox clearly intends "the Creation" to denote the theological implications of the Creation story, particularly over against its antitype, Babylonian creation myths.

[37] "[Anonymity] serves for large numbers of people as the possibility of freedom in contrast to the bondage of the law and convention." Cox, *The Secular City,* 40.

For Cox, the good of anonymity and mobility lies precisely in their enabling

"responsible," "mature" action. Either can become a means of avoiding moral

responsibility. "Endless movement from place to place can betray the same kind of

unwillingness to take responsibility for decisions which can be seen in switching

wives."[38] Neither these two key facets of urbanism—anonymity and mobility—nor the

three facets of secularism—disenchantment of nature, the desacralization of politics, and

the deconsecration of values—imply moral latitude or laxity. Cox notes, for example, that

"some modern writers have pointed out…that modern man's attitude toward

disenchanted nature has sometimes shown elements of vindictiveness."[39] By contrast,

"The mature secular man neither reverences nor ravages nature. His task is to tend it and

make use of it, to assume the responsibility assigned to The Man, Adam."[40]

In his account of both secularism and urbanism, Cox champions the loosened ties

of modern individuals from others, from nature, and from tradition. In this *The Secular*

City provides an apt point of comparison to those who will advocate for *Gemeinschaftlich*

relations between people and to the land. Perhaps fatefully, Cox couples his analysis of

secularism and urbanism to a view of "time and space" like the one espoused by Tillich:

the God of Israel and of Jesus Christ is the God of time and not of place. "[YHWH] was a

god of history, not of nature."[41] By contrast, "The Baalim of Canaan were the proprietors

of certain activities or more frequently of particular towns and places. They were

immobile gods."[42] Indeed, the God of Israel stalwartly refuses "to be a hearth god of

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[38] Ibid., 58.

[39] Ibid., 23.

[40] Ibid., 23.

[41] Ibid., 57.

[42] Ibid., 55.

some home-sweet-home."[43] Cox thus not only champions contemporary freedom from the constraints of tradition and nature, he places "religions of nature and land" in antagonism to "responsible," "mature" faith in Jesus Christ.

Place *and* Space

The writing of D. F. Dillistone foreshadowed a change in theological reflection on spatiality by framing the discussion in terms of an opposition between place and space. Indeed, even before Tuan's *Space and Place* (1977) and Relph's *Place and Placelessness* (1976), Dillistone cast the theological conversation about place in terms of a dichotomy.[44]

Grasping the full import of Dillistone and his use of "space and place" requires understanding not only his terminology but also his rationale and methodology. *Traditional Symbols* addresses a change in contemporary Western culture: the declining importance of "traditional and time-honored symbols generally and of any symbolism not connected to current technology in particular."[45] "Because we have dethroned symbolism," argues Dillistone, "we are now left, momentarily, with but a single symbol of almost universal validity, that of the machine."[46]

Dillistone frames his discussion of symbolism by examining four basic "categories or co-ordinates" of human existence: the topographical, the chronological, the corporeal, and the psycho-linguistic. Because "every man is related first to a particular

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[43] Cox, 56.

[44] F. W. Dillistone, *Traditional Symbols and the Contemporary World* (London: Epworth, 1973); Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977); Edward Relph, *Place and Placelessness* (London: Pion, 1976).

[45] Dillistone, *Traditional Symbols,* 3.

[46] Ibid., 3.

place," consideration of the nature of that emplacement stands with time, action, and communication as a basic category of existence. The corporeal denotes physical activities like the "ritual activity" of the Eucharist; the psycho-linguistic captures the verbal acts of communication between persons and with themselves.

From the outset, Dillistone frames his discussion of "the topographical" aspect of human existence in terms of "place" and "space."[47] The pairing actually has two sets of denotations, only one of which Dillistone makes explicit.[48] Like "time and space" in earlier theological reflection, "place" and "space" entail one another.

The first set of denotations for "place and space" complement one another. Here, "space" denotes spatiality in general, much as it did in the "time and space" pairing in Torrance. "Place" simply means specific locations within space. Places are thus particular and concrete, space (typically singular) is general and abstract. "[The architect] constructs models of space, contracting the immensities, but at the same time stretching up towards the transcendencies. Similarly he designs models appropriate to a particular place, honouring the past, but at the same time stretching out towards the future."[49]

Though in this first pairing space denotes spatiality generally, conceptions of space do differ. One reason for the decline of traditional symbols of space and place is the expanded understandings of space yielded by "the invention of the telescope, the sail and the mariner's compass…"[50] This expanded understanding strained those symbols which had previously given coherence to the human understanding of space.

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[47] Ibid., 85.

[48] To be clear, they are "sets of denotations" because each definition of "place" requires (or at least implies) a contrasting state of affairs identified as "space."

[49] Ibid., 85.

[50] Ibid., 91.

> ...man was now to become aware of an indefinitely expansive empty space in which vast numbers of material bodies journeyed on tracks which man could observe and represent in graphical form but which did not lend themselves to expression within any kind of symbolic building.[51]

This expanded understanding of space not only made certain symbols more tenuous, suggests Dillistone, it also proved existentially destabilizing. "Again, man's sense of place was bound to be transformed in the light of his new discoveries."[52]

With "space" denoting area generally, "place" indicates particular locations within that space. Dillistone notes that places differ not only in their relationship to one another (i.e., per their location), but also in their features. The peculiarity of places, their distinctness from one another, has existential import. "…in such an open environment one all-important concern was the defining of significant places."[53] Humans, Dillistone suggests, *need* particular locations to which they can attach meaning and import. "Places," therefore, are bearers, containers of meaning.

This first, complementary use of "place and space" can become an antagonistic pairing, as when one emphasizes the particularity of certain locations over against the whole of Creation. Such a possible antagonism becomes evident within the discussion of the medieval West, which Dillistone depicts as beholding the whole of Creation and each of its parts as a coherent symbolic web, all of it pointing toward God. Within this setting, the presence of churches and the celebration of the Eucharist did not primarily hallow particular *places* so much as beatify Creation generally.[54] This contrast between *valuing* particularity over generality occurs again within the discussion of Christians having

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[51] Ibid., 91.

[52] Ibid., 91.

[53] Ibid., 85.

[54] Ibid., 90.

buildings for the sole purpose of worship and gathering. Notably, space and place

actually retain their complementarity even when used dichotomously, only the *valuation*

of place (or space) shifts.

The second set of denotations for "place and space" retains their *semantic*

complementarity (each word still implies the other) but shifts from a mutually

constitutive relationship to one of mutual exclusion. Having described particular

locations within space as places, Dillistone moves on to discuss the *experience* of these

particular locations.

> In contrast to the sense of a place I have set the feeling of space. Psychologically
> it seems natural that when man is free to roam and wander as he will the balance
> of his emotions will be preserved by attachment to some cherished and relatively
> settled place. On the other hand, when he at length puts down roots and
> establishes an ordered community life within a particular area, something of the
> longing for the open spaces and for the freedom of his spirit is likely to revive.
> The benefits of civilization are such that few can resist their attraction. Yet the
> feeling for space cannot easily be quenched.[55]

The "sense of place" includes "attachment to some cherished and relatively settled

place," rootedness, and ordered sociality in a particular location; the "feeling of space"

contains freedom "to roam and wander" along with a longing for open spaces and

freedom. A subtle shift in meaning arises in this paragraph, hinted at by the way "place"

and "space" are qualified. "In contrast to the *sense* of place I have set the *feeling* of

space…" Dillistone has moved, albeit subtly, away from discussing spatiality and the

physical environment. Instead, "place" and "space" become metonyms for a cluster of

experiences as much social as geographical. The "freedom" of space is not simply about

physical movement; it is contrasted to geographical and *social* "rootedness" and to living

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[55] Ibid., 87.

within the confines of "an ordered community life." "Place and space" are no longer simply spatial concepts. They have become socio-geographical terms.

How Dillistone has transformed "place and space" into a socio-geographic pairing deserves careful attention. Though Dillistone does signal this shift by using the phrases "*feeling* of space" and "*sense* of place," one could easily enough overlook the change in meaning because he has retained the denotative complementarity of "place" and "space." The use of "place" and "space" in the English language retains a striking complementarity no matter how abstractly the pairing gets used. "Place" always points to stability in some form (of location, of content, of belonging). "Space," by contrast, always points to openness, the "gaps" between and around locations, absence of content, lack of constraint. Thus, for every occurrence of "place" in Dillistone and subsequent theological reflections on spatiality, one could ask, "What stable features or aspects does 'place' point to?" Likewise, for every occurrence of "space," one could ask, "What unstable or open features does 'space' point to?"

Take for example the passage quoted above. The "sense of place" includes the following stable features: rootedness, establishment in a particular location, and order (presumably denoting stable expectations and practices within a community). "Feeling of space" points to openness and freedom, and not just of the spatial or geographical sort. The same holds true for the complementary use of "place and space" within Dillistone, where "place" denotes fixed, stable locations and "space" the open area surrounding and between them.[56]

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[56] As discussed in the next chapter, the complementarity of "place and space" *at least* mirrors the constant, unconscious distinction humans make between stable objects "in place" (floors, desks, trees, etc.) and the spaces between them. The very fact of having a mobile body requires negotiation upon and among stable features in the spaces they create.

Virtually without exception, "place and space" function in this way, a fact that both benefits and bedevils discussions of place. The benefit lies in the ability of "place and space" to highlight the contrast between stability and openness in a range of circumstances. The bedevilment arises when that stability/openness contrast decreasingly has to do with spatiality and geography. As used by Dillistone, the "feeling of space" and the "sense of place" are less about the physical world than the *experience* of a combination of geographic *cum* social factors.

Brueggemann and later writers will eliminate the words "feeling" and "sense" as qualifiers, using simply "place" and "space." That move, that elision will place the discussion of place on unsteady ground. "The feeling of place" and the "sense of space" tilt "place" and "space" toward mutual exclusion: one experiences a particular social and geographic location as *either* a place of belonging and stability or as confining and stifling, as either open and free or insecure and dangerous. The words "place" and "space" still imply one another, but they no longer mutually constitute one another the way "time and space" did. One then can become either an advocate of place or of space.

Traditional Symbols has two sets of paired denotations for "place and space." One employs "place" to denote fixed locations within a larger, encompassing area. The other contrasts the experience of rootedness in a particular location (and the social and geographic constraints that entails) with the geographic, interpersonal, and existential freedom of life outside such a location. The difference between these paired denotations calls attention to the range of meaning that these two words can have within a single text.

Place *or* Space

In the preface to the second edition of *The Land: Place as Gift, Promise, and Challenge*, Brueggemann makes explicit the theological currents which inform both Tillich and Cox with respect to "time and space." The biblical theological movement had accented "God's Mighty Deeds in History," emphasizing the cumulative interactions of God in human history over and against the regressive, place-based religions of the Canaanites and the *Baalim*. Biblical theology had employed two key dichotomies— "history and nature" and "time and space"—always associating the religion of Israel and of Jesus Christ with the former term in each pairing.[57] By contrast, Brueggemann came to believe that "the Old Testament, in its theological articulation, was not all about deeds, but was concerned with *place*, specific real estate that was invested with powerful *promises* and with strategic arrangements or presence in that place."[58] In contrast to a two-fold relationship between God and the people Israel, the relationship always had a third member, the land.

Like Cox, Brueggemann couples his exegesis of the Old Testament to reflection on contemporary practice. In contrast to Cox, *The Land* stands in opposition to the forms of sociality and relationship to land lauded in *The Secular City*. Along with the desire to undermine the "space and time" framework of biblical theology, *The Land* seeks to address…

> …the failure of an urban promise…That promise concerned humans persons who could lead detached, unrooted lives of endless choice and no commitment. It was glamorized around the virtues of mobility and anonymity that seemed so full of promise for freedom and self-actualization.[59]

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[57] Walter Brueggemann, *The Land: Place as Gift, Promise and Challenge in Biblical Faith*, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 2002), xi.

[58] Ibid., xi.

[59] Ibid., 4.

That promise aimed to address contemporary meaninglessness and *ennui.* Its failure could

not have been avoided because it arose from a misdiagnosis. "[I]t is *rootlessness* and not

meaninglessness that characterize the current crisis. There are no meanings apart from

roots."[60] Brueggemann uses the "sense of place" versus "feeling of space" dichotomy

found in Dillistone to highlight the contrast between *The Land* and *The Secular City.*

> A sense of place is to be sharply distinguished from a sense of space as has been
> stressed by some scholars. "Space" means an arena of freedom, without coercion
> or accountability, free of pressures and void of authority. Space may be imaged as
> weekend, holiday, avocation, and is characterized by a kind of neutrality or
> emptiness waiting to be fulfilled by our choosing.[61]

By contrast,

> "place" is a very different matter. Place is a space that has historical meanings,
> where some things have happened that are now remembered and that provide
> continuity and identity across generations. Place is space in which important
> words have been spoken that have established identity, defined vocation, and
> envisioned destiny. Place is space in which vows have been exchanged,
> promises have been made, and demands have been issued. Place is indeed a
> protest against the unpromising pursuit of space. It is a declaration
> that our humanness cannot be found in escape, detachment, absence
> of commitment, and undefined freedom.[62]

In crafting a vocabulary with which to contrast *The Land* to *The Secular City*,

Brueggemann transforms the "place and space" dichotomy into a means of contrasting

two models for inhabiting particular locations and interacting with that particular locale.[63]

Above we noted that in the pairing of "place and space," "space" denoted fluidity,

change, and instability while "place" indicated solidity and stability. Notice how

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[60] Ibid., 4.

[61] Ibid.*,* 4.

[62] Ibid.

[63] The use of the "place and space" dichotomy occurs infrequently in *The Land* but with sufficient
consistency to suggest a clear pattern. For example, "The Land for which Israel yearns and which it
remembers is never unclaimed space but is always a place with YHWH…" (5). See also 27-8, 50, 55, 49-
50, 74, 118, 135, 141, 143-4, 155, 201, 207, 208.

Brueggemann has shifted the referents from geographical/spatial fluidity and stability to *social* fluidity and *social* stability. "'Space' means an arena of freedom" while "Place is space" in which vows, promises, and demands—acts which ostensibly reduce freedom by binding us to certain courses of action—have been made.

The shift from "space and place" as primarily spatial terms to being socio-geographic terms has both benefits and consequences. Positively, Brueggemann has underscored the interrelationship between the patterns of human inhabitation and human sociality: some patterns of inhabitation lend themselves to certain social patterns while making others difficult if not impossible. In this, Brueggemann concurs with Cox. Both recognize the role of the physical environment in giving shape to human interactions. Negatively, Brueggemann has created a trope which obscures other aspects of the physical environment.

This obscuring becomes clear when we ask if the locations that Brueggemann describes as "spaces"—the modern city, vacation spots, the workshops and kitchens of our avocations—are not actually places. Are we somehow not *in place* if we are not in a location with the kind of social and geographic imbrication that Brueggemann connects to "place"? If to be "in place" or in "a place" does not require the enduring, stable relationships prescribed by Brueggemann, then his "place and space" dichotomy places us at risk of mistaking a description of certain *kinds* of relationships in a particular place for a description of the relationship of humans to the physical environment itself.

This elision can occur for two reasons. First, employing a spatial vocabulary— "space and place"—masks the substitution of a rarefied definition for a broader and more comprehensive depiction of the nature of place. Second, Brueggemann maintains the

complementarity of "space" and "place," using each word with its standard denotations (openness and freedom for the former, solidity and stability for the latter) while substituting spatial referents for social ones.

Brueggemann is not alone in the use of such a dichotomy. One of the earliest and most influential texts within humanist geography, Edward Relph's *Place and Placelessness*, employed a series of dichotomies (including "place versus placelessness") to highlight transformations in socio-geographic behavior in the post-war era. Some of the early passages in *Space and Place* suggest that another humanist geographer, Yi-Fu Tuan, employs "space and place" in a manner that similarly focuses upon conscious experiences of the physical environment. "Place is security, space is freedom," for example.[64] Marc Augé discusses the emergence of locations made for transit and minimal personal connection, "non-places," in contrast to "places."[65] In an analysis of human practice with relationship to power, de Certeau employs the "place and space" dichotomy to contrast modes of spatial appropriation.[66] Like Brueggemann, each of these studies highlights the role of the physical environment in shaping or sustaining patterns of sociality. Like Brueggemann, each of these studies emphasizes the human *experience* of the physical environment to the extent that the actual materiality of the physical environment becomes all but moot. Augé's "non-places," to take but one example, are physical locations *designed* to have certain characteristics. His analysis focuses upon the

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[64] Tuan, *Space and Place,* 3. However, the book proceeds to examine space, place, and "place and space" from multiple perspectives that do not employ "space and place" chiefly as an experience of the physical environment.

[65] Marc Augé, *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity* (New York: Verso, 1995).

[66] De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life,* 16ff..

experience of such places *not the ability of the physical environment to enable such experiences.*

Place Is [*Not*] a Container, Center and Periphery

In *Spaces for the Sacred*, Philip Sheldrake reflects upon the role of place in human life and in the human encounter with God.[67] Noting the many forces that have eroded sense of place since World War II, Sheldrake asserts the importance for place for sustaining human communities, anchoring a sense of identity, providing robust relationships, and encountering God.

> First, "home" stands for the fact that we persistently need a location where we can pass through the stages of life and become the person we are potentially. Second, we need a place where we can belong to a community. Third, we need a place that offers a fruitful relationship with the natural elements, with plants and animals and with the rhythms of the seasons. Finally, we need a place that offers access to the sacred (however we understand that term)—perhaps, crucially, relates us to life itself as sacred.[68]

The very need for rootedness in place, however, introduces both paradox and tension into the Christian life.

The paradox arises because humans encounter "the universal through the particular, the transcendent through the contingent, the spiritual through the material, the ultimate through the historical."[69] The need for place and the fact of "creature-liness" means that humans always and only encounter God in, with, and through other creatures (i.e, Place Is an Intersection). The tension occurs for two reasons. First, though humans encounter God in particular circumstances and in particular locations, divine action and presence transcend both place and time. "…in Christian terms, a theology of place must

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[67] Philip Sheldrake, *Spaces for the Sacred: Place, Memory, and Identity* (London: SCM, 2001).

[68] Ibid., 10.

[69] Ibid., 71. For references to the paradox of universality and particularity, see also 23-9, 30, 33, 46, 64, 67, 86, 115, 117.

maintain a balance between God's revelation in the particular and a sense that God's place ultimately escapes the boundaries of the localized."[70] The second reason for the tension lies in human nature. Without naming it as such, Sheldrake repeatedly refers to the human proclivity to seek stability by setting boundaries around themselves and around their communities (i.e, Place Is a Container). For at least the past several hundred years, Western Christians have cultivated patterns of spirituality that divided interiority from exteriority, thus making faith a private, sequestered matter.[71] Similarly, whole communities—Christian and otherwise—can cultivate a collective life of sanctity by closing itself off from others. Such communities may even strive to practice reconciliation and cultivate holiness, but the very fact of their sequestration falls short of what God desires for humanity.

> Insofar as the catholicity of God is mediated through Jesus Christ, it is important to note in reference to the New Testament that an important feature of Jesus' practice was to push people, not least those closest to him, away from familiar places into locations they found disturbing.[72]

The Christian, sacramental manner of manifesting the universal in the particular entails foregoing enclosure and stability for porous boundaries and the acknowledgement that the fullness of salvation cannot be attained on this side of Jordan.

Foregoing enclosure opens Christian communities to the possibility of creating truly "Catholic place," which can never be simply an arrival point but always implies a further departure, from center to periphery.[73] When celebrated faithfully, the Eucharist itself can become the quintessential Catholic place. "To celebrate the Eucharist also

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[70] Ibid., 30.

[71] Ibid., 194. See also 72.

[72] Ibid., 69.

[73] Ibid., 70.

commits people even more radically, to cross the boundaries of fear, of prejudice and injustice in a prophetic embracing of other people, without exception, in whom we are challenged to discover the Real Presence of an incarnate God…"[74]

Sheldrake brings to the fore two important facets of theological reflection on place. First, a metaphor for place can structure the argument of a book without the author's calling attention to the fact. Sheldrake makes repeated if implicit use of the metaphor "Place Is a Container." The language of boundaries, liminality, interiority, and exteriority all presuppose a view of place as acting like a container. Yet Sheldrake seems unaware of the predominance of this metaphor—he does not mention it in his initial discussion of space versus place which presumably frames the book. [75] Second, discussions of place often employ spatialized language that does not chiefly denote features of the physical environment. Sheldrake depicts a catholic place as one with porous *boundaries*, a people moving ever *outward* in an attempt to counteract the human tendency toward *enclosure* and *stability*. Sometimes the spatial language is literal, as when contrasting the geographic stability of monastic communities to the mobility of Jesuits. In other circumstances, the spatial language serves as a potent means of highlighting contrasts in psychological phenomena. The ease with which Sheldrake slides between spatial and non-spatial topics *without changing vocabulary* suggests a need for caution in discussions of place and spatiality.

Space becomes Place where Place Is an Intersection

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[74] Ibid., 79.

[75] Ibid., 6ff.

Oliver O'Donovan strives to offer a Christian theological account which acknowledges the universal scope of the Kingdom of God while providing a means of rooting Christians ethically and existentially. Using the contrast of "place" and "space," O'Donovan proposes a vision of place that emphasizes the intersection of paths. "Human existence evokes place out of space by a distinctive social pattern of mobility and rootedness that characterizes our species. Place is woven by the intertwining of human paths within a space that is shared."[76] Space becomes place when physical environments provide opportunities for encounter both "on the road" and at home. On the one hand, by emphasizing the possibility of encounter in both settings O'Donovan avoids the easy answer to contemporary existential homelessness: a return to some imagined time when settled people had fulsome, contented lives. On the other hand, O'Donovan places *encounter* (Place Is an Intersection) rather than residence (Place is a Container) at the center of both "place" and a related concept, "neighbor."

While providing a minimum moral standard, universal moral obligation "may amount to not much more than universal indifference, for the universal claim of every human being upon every other is, after all, more of a critical principle than a substantial one, and to love everybody in the world equally is to love nobody very much."[77] Recognizing this, O'Donovan suggests that proximity and contingency provide an *ad hoc* but nonetheless necessary means of enacting universal moral obligation. The "Parable of the Good Samaritan" illustrates the virtue of recognizing the import of chance encounter.

> There is a nearness of contingency, a chancing upon, a nearness of pure place, unqualified by any relation or connection but simply a matter of finding yourself

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[76] Ibid., 306.

[77] Ibid., 316.

> next to somebody; and it is that which the parable holds up to us as the context for the neighbor's claim.[78]

Interpreting the actions of the Samaritan as an enactment of moral universalism, O'Donovan regards such enactments as the very stuff of place-making. "The Parable of the Good Samaritan"

> takes place on a road, the primary symbol of our capacity to weave place out of space by creating a non-place through which we pass on our way from place to place…But the mercy of the Samaritan restored that point on the road to the dignity of a real place, a place of meeting..."[79]

"Space" becomes most definitively "place" when one recognizes oneself "next to somebody," able concretely to fulfill one's universal moral obligation. In such moments, the *ad hoc*, the contingent become "instances of the universal."[80]

Center and Periphery, Place allows the Intersection of Symbols

To date, Gordon Lathrop has offered the most extensive reflection upon the role of place vis-à-vis Christian worship. Though ostensibly offering a liturgical theology, ecclesiology, and cosmology, the *Holy Things*, *Holy People*, *Holy Ground* trilogy repeatedly reflects upon the impact that place can and should have on the liturgy.[81] In contrast to several recent reflections on place, Lathrop does not begin with a definition of "place" and then proceed to analyze worship from the standpoint of that definition. His reflections on place occur within a discussion of a practice, yielding an account of place that as a multifaceted phenomenon, denoting everything from geographic location to

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[78] Ibid., 316.

[79] Ibid., 317.

[80] Ibid., 318.

[81] Gordon Lathrop, *Holy Ground: A Liturgical Cosmology* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2003); *Holy People: A Liturgical Ecclesiology* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1999); *Holy Things: A Liturgical Theology* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1993).

embeddedness in a particular cultural system to the human need to feel grounded. This variety of meanings takes place within a framework that embraces juxtaposition and apparent contradiction. Indeed, Lathrop argues that Christian worship itself "makes meaning" by juxtaposing the "things" of the liturgy—bath, meal, word, leader, assembly—in a manner that always points beyond themselves and to Jesus Christ, who stands at the center of the liturgy. Thus, the liturgy keeps central the intersection of the core symbols of the Church.

The *Holy Things/People/Ground* trilogy responds to a criticism of Christianity made by Susanne Langer. In *Philosophy in a New Key,* Langer argues that human thought and meaning-making takes place primarily through the use of *symbols.*[82] The use of symbols differentiates humans from other animals, who do not evince the ability to generate words or material objects that stand in place of something else (e.g., words, emotions, material objects, etc.) Humans, moreover, cannot function together without the use of symbols. According to Langer, transformations in the social and economic structures during the 19th and 20th centuries created a need for a *new* symbolism, in part because Christianity had failed to produce a symbolic order sufficient to address the complexities of modern life.

In the trilogy Lathrop addresses this criticism by clarifying the way in which Christian worship can make meaning through the use of symbols. Recognizing the truth of Langer's critique, Lathrop must also offer an account of *why* Christian worship has often failed as a symbol system for the modern world. The first task requires identifying

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[82] Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art* (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1942). Lathrop mentions *Philosophy in a New Key* in *Holy Things*, 3-4 and 205; *Holy Ground*, 4 and 51. Lathrop also notes the influence of Langer on his work in "Ordo and Coyote: Further Reflections on Order, Disorder and Meaning in Christian Worship," *Worship* 80, no. 3 (May, 2006): 194-212.

the core symbols of the Christian liturgy and determining how they relate to one another. The latter task entails clarifying the ways in which churches have failed appropriately to employ the symbols.

Lathrop draws the core symbols of the liturgy— water (baptism), Word (the synaxis), along with bread and wine (the Eucharist)— and the manner of relating them to one another primarily from *Introduction to Liturgical Theology* by Alexander Schmemann.[83] Both the *sequencing* of these elements *within* the liturgy (Word before bread and wine, Baptism before table) and the daily, weekly, and yearly cycles are received as the *core structure* of the liturgy. To these Lathrop will add two more core symbols, those implied by the liturgy itself: people gathered to worship ("the assembly") and the person who leads that liturgical assembly, "the leader."[84] The core symbols brought together within the temporal framework of the core structure constitute the *ordo*, the basic framework for Christian worship.

The liturgy does not simply string together these symbols in order to evoke their multiple referents in sequence. Instead, the liturgy places them next to one another in *juxtaposition*. Without removing or dismissing all their resonances, the combination of these core symbols points beyond the particular referents of individual symbols and toward a central referent.

> These assertions...they help us to see why the actions of "the core" are the core: because they have to do with Jesus Christ. They are the core because in them we are enabled to encounter the full

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[83] For references within the trilogy to Schmemann, see *Holy Things,* x, 47-51; *Holy People*, 19. Lathrop himself describes *Holy Tthings* as arising from "a years-long reflection on the ecumenical significance of the meaning of the ordo of the liturgy as it was elucidated in the seminal work of the American Russian orthodox theologian, Alexander Schmemann" Lathrop, *Holy Things*, x.

[84] Though not identified outright within *Introduction to Liturgical Theology*, Schmemann argues that the "distinction between 'corporate' and 'private' worship is a contradiction of the basic and ancient concept of Christian worship as the public act of the Church…" Ibid., 23-4.

reality of who Jesus is and what he does, and so we are brought to stand before God in the power of the Spirit as one body in Christ.[85]

No single symbol, no particular word suffices to speak of God. Lathrop notes that the Trinity itself models the need for "more than one thing" set next to another in order to speak the truth of God.[86] One encounters other such pairings in doublets used in eschatology, Christology, and elsewhere.

> The various paradoxical pairs that have been so necessary to Christians in order to speak faithfully of God—human and divine, letter and spirit, now and not yet, hidden and revealed, immanent and transcendent—correspond, in conceptual language, to the ways the liturgy presents the faith.[87]

The use of a single symbol puts its users at risk of absolutizing that symbol. Without elaborating the psychology behind his concern for the "absolutized" symbol, Lathrop evinces a consistent concern about symbols that stand alone, without juxtaposition. A symbol "unjuxtaposed" or "unbroken" by another too often fails to point beyond itself, pointing instead to the community that uses it.

> These are beloved, holy things. When they are absolutized, they can also be used for religious pride and achievement, for what Ignatius calls "sabbatizing," while the God that they thereby proclaim is only a mirror of ourselves.[88]

These "mirrors of ourselves" frequently place others at risk. A worshipping assembly, even one with the symbols set forth in clear juxtaposition to one another, may come to value their relationship to one another so much that they absolutize *their* assembly (itself a symbol) and create boundaries against those outside. Indeed, a symbol used without juxtaposition may lead to a cosmology which does not recognize its own limitations and consequently to assuming the prerogative of destroying others.[89]

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[85] Lathrop, *Holy People*, 109.

[86] Lathrop, *Holy Things*, 69.

[87] Ibid, 80.

[88] Ibid, 81.

[89] Lathrop, *Holy Ground*, 92.

The trilogy does not directly address reasons why the Church has failed to provide a symbolic system adequate to modern life, though three reasons appear constantly throughout the text. First, the Church has failed to identify its core symbols and place them within a core structure (center and periphery). Second, the Church has repeatedly allowed its ritual activities, its symbols, and its words to absolutize, to calcify and therefore to fail to point beyond themselves to Christ. Third, the Church has obscured the core symbols, burying them beneath other ritual actions, other symbols, too many words. "A primary task of local leadership is thus to further that reform by making the central matters large, clear, unobstructed, noble in simplicity, engaging in presentation, powerfully involved with life and death."[90] Various other components of the liturgy, even those of broad use, can obscure the primary symbols and their relationship to one another. Lathrop repeatedly recommends that the core symbols be set forth "clearly" and "in strength."[91] "It now becomes clear that Christian worship has a responsibility to let these things always be and be seen to be at the center of our gathering."[92]

The language of center and periphery and Place Is an Intersection undergirds Lathrop's understanding of symbol and liturgy. In order for (figuratively) core symbols to be seen as such, they must (literally) be made central to the worship of a community. So that no single symbol calcifies a community, the symbols must intersect with one another both figuratively and literally—their mutual presence and import made central to the community. Importantly, the interplay between figurative and literal occurrences of

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[90] Lathrop, *Holy People*, 90.

[91] On "clearly" and "with clarity," see Lathrop, *Holy Things*, 100, 132; Lathrop, *Holy People*, 112, 132; Lathrop, *Holy Ground*, 62, 112, 143. For "in strength," see Lathrop, *Holy Things,* 116; Lathrop, *Holy Ground,* 112.

[92] Lathrop, *Holy People*, 114.

center and periphery and Place Is an Intersection arises apart from Lathrop's more explicit reflection on the role of place in the liturgy.

The Vocabulary of Place

Theological reflection on place has made use of a two of spatial metaphors—Place Is a Container and Place Is an Intersection—as well as three contrastive pairings—time and space, place and space, center and periphery. In some cases, theologians have chosen a specific metaphor or pairing as a frame for their discussion. Paul Tillich and Walter Brueggemann employ spatial pairings as frames for their discussion, for example. Both Tillich and Brueggemann, however, put on display a distinct challenge of framing a discussion in terms of a single metaphor or pairing: one can easily slide between different denotations of a pairing, masking that shift by maintaining the contrastive structure within the pairing. The same holds true for spatial metaphors: one can slide from concrete discussions of the physical environment to other, non-spatial topics while maintaining the inferential structure of the metaphor. This suggests, then, that another approach to discussing place—and to developing a methodology for analyzing liturgical spaces—is desirable.

Nevertheless, the metaphors and pairings should not be jettisoned. Their ubiquity as explicit topics and as implicit structures suggests that they are more than merely spatial "turns of phrase," that these metaphors and pairings have their origin in something more fundamental about human emplacement. Indeed, as argued in the next chapter, these metaphors of place have their origin in the particularities of human anatomy and physiology.

Materiality Affirmed in Word and Method

Liturgical scholars cannot, however, simply "turn to the body" as a means of developing a new method for analyzing place. As Bonnie Miller McLemore has noted, many have "turned to the body" as a means of overturning dualist anthropologies, but did so in a manner that presupposes the very dualism the author seeks to overcome.[93] At the same time, the greater attention paid to materiality within liturgical theology has often resulted in a concomitant concern about the relationship between (non-material) divine action and (material) human response. Consequently, a "turn to the (material) body" will require addressing that concern.

Theologians like Mary McClintock Fulkerson and Mark Wynn provide important keys to a way forward by discussing emplacement and embodiment not in the abstract, but through phenomenology (Wynn) and bodily practices (Fulkerson). Their accounts of place display both the challenges of the "turn to the body" as a method of discussing place while also providing a way to understand the ubiquity of spatial metaphors and pairings as both explicit topics and implicit structures.

God and Place

In *Faith and Place*, Wynn undertakes three tasks.[94] First, he seeks to explain the relationship between divine omnipresence and religious practices in particular places. Second, Wynn explores knowledge of God by analogy to knowledge of place. The third

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[93] Bonnie Miller-McLemore, "Embodied Knowing, Embodied The- ology: What Happened to the Body?" *Pastoral Psychology* 62, no. 5 (2013): 743-58.

[94] Mark R. Wynn, *Faith and Place: An Essay in Embodied Religious Epistemology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

task explores how the physical environment can form and sustain the knowledge of an omnipresent God.

Divine omnipresence implies that God's relationship to space is undifferentiated.[95] If God is everywhere, then God is equally present in all locations. Yet belief in divine omnipresence frequently goes hand in hand with the use of religious sites for the purposes of personal devotion, pilgrimage, and worship.[96] To account for this "differentiated religious significance of place," Wynn suggests comparing the knowledge of God to the knowledge of place.

Knowledge of place provides an apt analogue to knowledge of God because of its similarity in *kind.* Knowledge of God, "in the theologically or religiously interesting sense, involves a commitment of the person in their affective-practical-cognitive integrity…"[97] "Religiously interesting" knowledge shapes perception and behavior even when not readily communicable in verbal terms. Similarly, knowledge of place may indeed resist verbal articulation while nonetheless eliciting affective, perceptual, and practical responses. Wynn contrasts knowledge of place (and of God) to forms of knowledge variously described as "objective," "scientific or purely observational," and "non-embodied intellect."[98]

The experience of slipping on ice offers a telling example of embodied knowledge of the "religiously interesting" kind. Having once slipped on ice, "ice will now assume a

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[95] Ibid., 1.

[96] Ibid., 2.

[97] Ibid., 9.

[98] The contrast appears frequently within the text. See ibid., 25, 33, 39, 41, 101, 102, 113, 123, 134, 164, 175, 201, 206, 207, 223.

new salience in the person's awareness of the world."[99] The fear of slipping on ice

consequently alters both perception and behavior. Ice now becomes a feature of the

landscape that stands out in the perceptual field. When encountered, ice calls forth shifts

in mobility and bodily posture (decreased speed, for example, and a lowered center of

gravity). Such knowledge, argues Wynn, may defy verbal explication while nonetheless

shaping the life and behavior of the individual. In a similar fashion, knowledge of God

includes affective states (e.g., fear, wonder, gratitude) that alter perception and elicit

changed patterns of behavior.

Wynn offers three ways in which "the knowledge of God will have, in certain

fundamental respects, the same character as knowledge of place."[100] First, divine supra-

individuality is analogous to placial supra-individuality. Many places exhibit a kind of

supra-individuality, an overall texture that surpasses the sum of their parts. Though a

human might catalog the smells, sights, sounds, climate, and other features of a particular

location, the place cannot be reduced to a catalog of its features. Place, in a sense,

"subsumes its parts" and surpasses any reckoning of them."[101] Analogously, Creation

contains many witnesses to the divine nature, though this does not mean that God can be

accounted for by a full cataloging of those witnesses. Instead, God surpasses any

accounting of those parts even while those parts continue to witness to divine nature.[102]

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[99] Ibid., 31.

[100] Ibid., 15.

[101] Ibid., 53.

[102] Wynn points out that the analogy fails when comparing the relationship of places to their separate features to God and the multiple components of Creation. Places cannot subsist apart from the various features/components; God, however, not only subsists apart from the Creation but in fact sustains all of Creation in its existence. Thus, Wynn suggests that the divine supra-individuality is comparable to the *genius mundi* of a place, which presumably can survive even a destruction of the place itself. Wynn, *Faith and Place,* 62-7.

Second, places exercise a narratively mediated agency. Historic events yield narratives about a specific location that subsequently inform behavior within and perception of that place. A battle may yield commemoration in word and deed, the land being removed from productive use, marked with plaques and statues, and traversed by visitors in a manner that bespeaks a sense of reverence. In combination with its narrative, such a place elicits and makes intelligible certain actions, attitudes, and perceptions. Moreover, the place *cum* narrative marks some behaviors as "appropriate, others as not."[103] In an analogous fashion, "various divinely authorized stories establish a context in the light of which we can determine which kinds of human activity are appropriate or context-congruent. In the latter case, these stories concern not so much some localized place, as the cosmos as a whole…"[104] Divine interaction with humanity along with the revealed *telos* of God for Creation yields a narrative about the world and its purposes that makes intelligible certain actions, attitudes, and perceptions while marking some behaviors as appropriate, others as not. "…[The] world as a whole is a place and the significance of this place is relative to its role as the setting for God's creative, reconciling, and redemptive work…"[105]

Third, both place and God provide a foundation for the narrative coherence of human life. In contrast to those who idealize rootlessness as the means to the "genuine freedom…of unconstrained choice," Wynn suggests that true freedom lies in narrative coherence, the ability to offer an account of one's life."[106] When one tells stories about

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[103] Ibid., 76.

[104] Ibid., 76.

[105] Ibid., 82.

[106] Ibid., 93.

one's life, the settings of those stories are not incidental to the narrative, are not simply backdrops to the events. As discussed above, these contexts frequently make actions and perceptions intelligible.[107] Wynn argues that knowledge of God provides an analogous context. For those who believe (in a religiously interesting sense) in the creating, reconciling, and redeeming work of God, "the sense of [one's] life story, and therefore specifying who [one is], will depend ultimately upon reference to God."[108]

Religious sites such as those visited on pilgrimage provide a means of forming and sustaining a knowledge of God as described above, one that engages humans in their affective-practical-cognitive integrity. Two key aspects of place make religious sites apt for such formation and sustenance. First, places at human scales (versus, say, the whole cosmos) can serve as microcosms for the whole. Treated as a smaller version of the Creation at large, a religious site can enable an individual to orient herself to the Creation and its Creator in a manner that employs more than imagination or ratiocination. Citing Bourdieu, Wynn notes that small scale actions can cultivate patterns of perception and behavior that form and mirror a whole worldview.[109] Secondly, the physical environment can serve as a "storehouse" of memory, enabling someone to re-experience a past event or encounter in a way that memory alone (in a different location) would not.[110] As microcosm and storehouse, sacred sites have the ability to train and sustain a knowledge of God of the "religiously interesting" variety.

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[107] Shared assumptions between speakers about what normally transpires in a particular context often masks how the context informs the story. Different contexts for the same action radically alter the sense of a narrative. Consider two stories about buying a popsicle from a pushcart, one set on the streets of New York, one set on a sand dune in the Sahara…

[108] Ibid., 89.

[109] Ibid., 129.

[110] Ibid., 86, 97.

A key strength of *Faith and Place* is the emphasis placed upon both the role of the human body in epistemology and the role of the physical environment in contributing both to a "sense of place" and to shaping human perception and behavior. In contrast to Sheldrake, Wynn has moved beyond place as chiefly a narrative construction to a view of place that accounts for the role of the material world in a way that does not reduce to social construction. Similarly, Wynn offers a religious epistemology that extends beyond ratiocination to include tacit, more bodily focused knowledge.

Places of Redemption

Among the theological reflections on place discussed here, only *Places of Redemption* stands outside the body of theological reflection on place that began with Cox, Dillistone, and Brueggemann.[111] The cumulative nature of that body of reflection can be seen most clearly in *Where Mortals Dwell*, which engages all of the theological loci and practical concerns of its forebears. By contrast, Fulkerson does not engage previous theological reflection on place, but rather turns to various "place theorists" to understand her experience in a multi-ethnic United Methodist congregation that had "made space" for persons with severe disabilities.

Located in northeast Durham, NC, Good Samaritan UMC (a pseudonym) shifted from an all-white, largely working-class congregation to become a "place of redemption" that included African-Americans as well as residents of a nearby home for persons with disabilities. Rather than focusing solely upon the shifts in theological and biblical interpretation that accompanied this transition, Fulkerson seeks to present Good

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[111] Mary McClintock Fulkerson, *Places of Redemption: Theology for a Worldly Church* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Samaritan as a "faith community…that is bodied and visceral as well as biblically shaped and doctrinally traditioned."[112] This entails attending not only to the words spoken and read, but also to patterns of [less verbal] behavior that characterize this community. This move to include reflection upon non-verbal behavior represents a "distinct move in relation to the theological task," a shift away from a view of theology as chiefly expressed in words alone.[113] Within this ethnographic study, this turn to the non-verbal also has a more personal foundation. Finding herself face to face with African-Americans and persons with severe disabilities, the white, normate-bodied Fulkerson finds herself responding aversively to the presence of persons unlike herself. "My feeling of strangeness in response to the unaccustomed 'blackness' of the place and the presence of people with disabilities at that first visit suggests that my conscious commitments to inclusiveness were not completely correlated with my habituated sense of the normal."[114] The gap between her own commitments and her embodied responses to others prompts the increased attentiveness to non-verbal behaviors in *Places of Redemption.*

To depict Good Samaritan as a place that has "unity and an enduring character," Fulkerson draws upon a variety of place theorists. Place, she notes, combines the physical environment and the meanings associated with it. Good Samaritan…

> …has the unity of a place. As such it is not constituted simply by its building, the renovated garage with the Methodist flame and cross, or by its distance from the tall-steepled, brick Baptist church down the road from it. But neither is this place simply a bunch of ideas in its members' heads. As a 'territory of meaning' it will be the buildings, the land, *and* the forms of meaning produced by its participants.[115]

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[112] Ibid.*,* 8.

[113] Ibid., 9.

[114] Ibid., 15.

[115] Ibid., 30.

Additionally, though, the "identify of place, its duration through time, is defined by ongoing *practices*."[116] For congregations, such practices typically denote weekly gatherings for worship, times of fellowship, and Bible study. Such practices as these do provide continuity over time while also being evaluable against the defining events of the faith community, "the faith of Israel and the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ."[117] Some patterns of behavior (like aversive responses and obliviousness to the presence of others) may not rise to the level of conscious awareness, making them less detectable (and therefore harder to amend) in light of the defining events of the faith community. The practices that constitute Good Samaritan, therefore, include not only those wittingly undertaken and verbally explicable, but also those patterns of perception and bodily response that occur unconsciously.

Attending to both the intentional and the habitual practices of Good Samaritan allows Fulkerson to offer a more robust normative evaluation of the congregation. Expanding evaluative concern beyond the spoken words mean that…

> …competence in communicating gospel cannot be evaluated simply by attention to the verbal message. "Jesus loves everyone," for example, will not be a successful communication of welcome in a situation characterized by inherited, racialized visceral reactions without attention to the bodily messages that will inevitably accompany it.[118]

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[116] Ibid., 32.

[117] Ibid., 37.

[118] Ibid., 49.

The body, after all, can "produce messages at odds with good intentions."[119] Incorporative (bodily) and inscriptive (verbal) practices constitute the place of Good Samaritan while also calling for normative evaluation.[120]

Places of Redemption considers four clusters of practices ranging from weekly worship and bible studies to cleaning of the church building itself. The central concern of *Places*, however, lies in articulating the disjunction between inscriptive and incorporative practices at Good Samaritan, between the spoken desire to include non-whites and those with non-normate bodies and the individual and collective practices which unwittingly exclude these groups or minimize their participation. Mainline Protestants have coupled propriety and piety, argues Fulkerson, yielding worship which requires bodily and verbal comportment beyond the scope of persons with certain physical and cognitive disabilities.[121] Good Samaritans and members of other congregations have also inherited bodily practices of obliviousness and dominance that belie the gospel generally and the good intentions of Good Samaritan UMC in particular.

Through the lens of place, Fulkerson pushes theological reflection and concern past its traditional concern with inscriptive, verbal practices, yielding an attentiveness to the affections and the body comparable to Wynn's knowledge of God of the "religiously interesting sense." In pushing the boundary of traditional theological reflection, *Places* makes a significant contribution to understanding the challenges that face congregations striving for inclusivity.

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[119] Ibid., 49. Many of these untoward bodily messages were the result of habituation within larger "places." Fulkerson uses the term "residual" to indicate any bodily habituated that arises within these larger contexts. See Fulkerson, *Places of Redemption,* 57-70, 76, 81, 82, 83, etc.

[120] Ibid., 85.

[121] Ibid., 85.

With regard to place, however, Fulkerson makes two instructive errors. First, though defining place as a combination of 1) physical environment, 2) meanings associated with that environment, and 3) the practices that take place within a particular location, the physical environment of Good Samaritan largely disappears as a factor in the life of the congregation. Imbricated in a host of places ranging from the world (and its global economy) to a multi-racial neighborhood, the location of Good Samaritan chiefly matters because of the residual patterns of bodily and verbal practice that "overlap" the congregation. Thus, even the physical location of the congregation chiefly matters because of human activity.

Second, though repeatedly emphasizing the contested nature of place and practices of place, Fulkerson treats post-modern *place theory* as a unified discourse rather than a discourse with its own contests and disagreements. At worst, this raises concerns about the selective appropriation of theorists to advance a particular theological perspective. At best, the "unified discourse" created from the selection of place theorists represents a partial account of place applicable chiefly to the particular circumstance which it was chosen to explain. Put differently, an *ad hoc* assemblage of place theorists does well in developing a tool for analyzing a given community or location, but perhaps ought not be taken to be an account of place or place-making in general.

Places Where Mortals Dwell

The last theological treatment of place considered here, Bartholomew's *Where Mortals Dwell*, displays the cumulative character of the theological discussion of place that began with Dillistone and Brueggemann. The earliest treatments of place focused

narrowly on certain aspects of the human encounter with the physical environment—the role of the Promised Land in the covenantal life of Israel, for example. Bartholomew, by contrast, offers a systematic theology of place, one beginning with the accounts of Genesis and ending in practices of place-making that reflect Christian eschatological hopes.

Ostensibly focused on place, *Where Mortals Dwell* takes on the larger task of defending the goodness of the material portions of Creation, especially the human body and the physical environment.[122] Asserting the goodness of the material Creation requires overcoming the frequently anti-materialist bent of Christian theology. Used as an epigraph to the discussion of place in the Bible, the following quotation from Santmire captures two visions of the material creation from an eschatological perspective.

> Is the final aim of God, in his governance of all things, to bring into being at the very end a glorified kingdom of spirits alone who, thus united with God, may contemplate him in perfect bliss, while as a precondition of their ecstasy all the other creatures of nature must be left by God to fall away into eternal oblivion? Or is the final aim of God, in his governance of all things, to communicate his life to another in a way that calls forth at the very end new heavens and a new earth in which righteousness dwells, a transfigured cosmos where peace is universally established between all creatures at last, in the midst of which is situated a glorious city of resurrected saints who dwell in justice, blessed with all the resplendent fullness of the earth, and who continually call upon all creatures to join with them in their joyful praise of the one who is all in all?[123]

These two eschatological visions differ chiefly in their regard to their opinion of the material components of Creation: the former envisions salvation as the departure of human souls from all materiality, the latter salvation as the transfiguration of the whole cosmos—material and non-material alike. In proposing a theology of place which regards

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[122] Non-material components of creation would include, for example, time and spiritual beings (e.g., thrones, principalities, etc.).

[123] Bartholomew, *Where Mortal Dwell,* citing Paul Santmire, *Travail of Nature*, 217-8.

the material Creation as a good, Bartholomew also seeks to avoid wholly materialist as well as pantheist accounts of Creation.[124] Understanding the role of place in Christian theology requires not collapsing all reality into the material, not conflating the material and the spiritual, and not setting the "spiritual"/non-material over against the material Creation.

Bartholomew posits three doctrines as the foundation of a Christian theology of place: the Creation, the Incarnation, and a materialist eschaton. Each of these doctrines can be read as either underscoring the goodness of the material Creation or relativizing it. As noted by Brueggemann (and exemplified by Tillich), Old Testament scholarship had contrasted "nature" to "history" and "space" to "time," identifying the faith of Israel with the latter in each pairing. Contrasting the faith of Israel to "nature" and "space" pits that faith against materiality (i.e., the materiality of the natural world and, as discussed above, "space"). In contrast to the "nature and history" dichotomy, Bartholomew asserts that the accounts of Creation in Genesis regard the material Creation as good.

Similarly, the Incarnation can be read in a manner that either underscores or undermines the goodness of the material Creation.[125] "...[I]t is commonly assumed that with the new era instituted by Jesus the importance of land and thus place recedes into insignificance. Jesus is rightly seen by many to fulfill the great Old Testament places of land, temple, and Jerusalem, but the inference is then drawn (or not) that place no longer really matters."[126] Bartholomew acknowledges that the advent of Christ transforms the relationship of God to humanity and to place in interrelated ways. First, the Incarnation

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[124] Ibid., 16-7.

[125] Ibid., 90-117.

[126] Ibid., 90.

opens the possibility that all humanity—not just the people Israel—may enter covenant with God. One need not, therefore, enter into covenant *through* entrance into a particular ethnicity. Second, the liturgical locus of those in covenant with God shifts from the temple in Jerusalem (a fixed location) to the person of Jesus Christ (a non-fixed location). Both of these transform the role of place for those in covenant with God by enabling all people—anywhere—to worship God in any location—anywhere.

Especially when coupled with an anti-materialist eschatology, both of these "anywheres" suggest a thoroughly relativized role of the physical world for Christians, a sensibility captured in the phrase "place doesn't matter." When coupled to an eschatology that affirms the goodness (if imperfection) of materiality, the openness of covenant to all people and liturgy to all places requires the challenging work of instantiating the Kingdom of God in every particular location where Christians work, worship, and dwell. The challenge for Christians lies in not allowing the universal claims of Christianity to obfuscate the need for specific instantiation. If once Israel served as a witness to other nations, now every *ekklesia* "is to be a sign of the kingdom [of God] in its particular place…"[127]

Concomitant with the need to instantiate the universal in particular circumstances, Bartholomew suggests practices of place-making to cultivate a renewed appreciation for the particularities of place. These practices draw attention to places at scales ranging from household gardens to cities to the whole planet.[128] The practices themselves, however, are small-scale activities that provide opportunities for attending to the particularities of a place. Churches can call to mind the ecological impacts of proposed church buildings, for

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[127] Ibid., 129.

[128] Ibid., 27, 49,

example.[129] Bartholomew repeatedly emphasizes that *how* one undertakes the practices of place-making is as important as *that* one undertakes them. In contrast to the speed and inattentiveness characteristic of "our dromocratic" societies, practices of place-making emphasize "attentiveness, familiarity, silence, slowness, stability, repetition, particularity, hope, respect, love."[130] Gardening thus serves as a place-making practice *par excellence* because of the small scale attentiveness and patience it requires.[131] For places at scales well above the human body such as the cosmos, [bodily] practices such as liturgies can provide a means of anchoring and orienting participants.[132]

The comprehensiveness of *Where Mortals Dwell* highlights how a focus upon place requires not only a discussion of typical theological loci—theological anthropology, ecclesiology, eschatology, and the doctrines of Creation, Incarnation, and Redemption—but their re-valuation. Indeed, Bartholomew's treatment of place suggests that each of these loci may have both anti-materialist and pro-materialist versions. A Gnostic Incarnation might, for example, not transform the material Creation by the entrance of God into Creation so much as indicate a willingness for God to send emissaries into materiality to rescue souls through the imparting of (decidedly non-material) wisdom.

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[129] Ibid., 265.

[130] Ibid., 320. On "dromocratic societies," see 4, 274. Cf. Wynn, *Faith and Place,* 27, 186, 246.

[131] Ibid., 268ff.

[132] Ibid., 75 and 236.

Looking Back on Place

Theological reflection on place in the past fifty years has illumined both potential gains of a new method for analyzing the physical environment of liturgy while also highlighting some of the ways such a method might misfire.

Like liturgical theology, theological reflection on place has occurred within the context of broad shifts away from Modern philosophical conceptions of space and its cognate within Christian theology, anti-materialism. The shift toward a more positive valuation of the material world becomes clearest in the writings of Fulkerson and Bartholomew. In *Places of Redemption*, Fulkerson expands the horizon of theological inquiry beyond the stated beliefs of a community to attend to the their embodied, material practices. Bartholomew calls into question the pervasive anti-materialist interpretation of the Gospel. So it is that theologians of place have helped expand both the repertoire of analytic methods and provided a theological discourse which supports that expanded repertoire.

Theologians of place have often employed pairings and metaphors as framing devices for their arguments. Torrance fretted the theological implications of Place is a Container, suggesting instead Place Is an Intersection ("place is the seat of relations"). Tillich favored "time and space" whereas Dillistone and Brueggemann preferred "place and space." Sheldrake implicitly structures his argument around the presupposition that places act very much like containers. Explicitly and implicitly, these pairings occur throughout recent theological reflection on place.

These pairings and metaphors have proven problematic in use, however. Because spatial, metaphorical language can be used across contexts, one can have the appearance

of discussing place (or, with Tillich, time and space) and yet have largely moved beyond discussions of spatiality. One can even discursively reject a metaphor of place while finding that dynamic unavoidable. This disconnection is comparable to what Moore-Keish found in *Do This In Remembrance of Me*: individuals trained to overlook the role of the body and practice in the maintenance of their spirituality can a) deny any positive role for the body and practice while b) engaging in bodily practices that reaffirm that denial.

What prompts theological reflection on place matters because a prompt can bias the direction of the resulting discussion. In some circumstances, changes in socio-graphic practices have drawn attention to previously taken for granted aspects of the social and physical environment, prompting reflection on the nature of place generally. In those circumstances, the most salient aspects of "place"—the parts that have changed—come to be read as the totality of "place." Brueggemann uses the "place and space" distinction to identify what is lost when moving into *The Secular City*. His concern with interpersonal relationships as constitutive of "place" is not unimportant, but it does make his understanding of "place" a poor as a synonym for "the human relationship to the physical environment." Sheldrake's reflection on place appears prompted by a concern with the insularity of some Christian communities, an insularity encapsulated in the metaphor Place is a Container. His concern to reject these practices and their supposedly sustaining metaphor leads him to overlook the dynamics of containment evident in his entire discussion.

Beginning an analysis of the physical environment a) by addressing an untoward change in the physical environment or b) by selecting a single pairing or metaphor risks

importing an avoidable bias at the outset. In the course of its deliberations, the body of

theological reflection on place has illumined a different way forward. Rather than

addressing a particular concern or selecting a single problem or metaphor, identify the

pairings/metaphors that consistently arise both explicitly and implicitly within

discussions of place. In this chapter we identified five pairings/metaphors: space and

place, space and time, center and periphery, Place is a Container, Place Is an Intersection.

Concomitant with the drive in theologies of place to articulate a positive role for

human embodiment and materiality generally, the next chapter explores how the

particularities of human anatomy and physiology shape the way humans both experience

and discuss the physical environment, especially their use of spatial pairings and

metaphors.

CHAPTER 3
PLACE-MAKING AS TECHNOLOGY

In retrospect, three patterns can be discerned among the corpus of theological

reflection on place that has emerged over the past half century. First, theological

discussions of place have employed a limited vocabulary of spatial pairings and

metaphors. As early as *Space, Time and Incarnation* (1969), concern about the logical

inferences of "Place Is a Container" led Thomas Torrance to argue for an alternative

spatial metaphor, "Place Is an Intersection." More subtly, theologians of place have

employed the logic of these metaphors without making them as explicit. Oliver

O'Donovan argues for a contemporary reading of the "Parable of the Good Samaritan"

that regards as neighbors those whom we encounter by happenstance (Place Is an

Intersection). Philip Sheldrake lauds the outward movement of the Jesuits, particularly in

contrast to the stability of Benedictine monks (Place Is a Container).

Elsewhere theologians draw upon another form of metaphorized language: paired

opposites. Perhaps because of the influence of F.W. Dillistone on subsequent discussions

of place, theologies of place early on evinced a tendency to used paired contrasts to

illuminate dynamics of the human experience of the physical environment.[1] To be sure, a

similar tendency emerged among human geographers, including two of its earliest

theorists, Edward Relph (*Place and Placelessness*, 1976) and Yi-Fu Tuan (*Space and

Place: The Perspective of Experience*, 1977) as well as among cultural theorists, most

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[1] In *Space, Time and Incarnation*, *Thomas* Torrance had used both "space" and "place," but not in the complementary fashion that F.W. Dillistone had in *Traditional Symbols and the Contemporary World* (1968). Dillistone would exercise a lasting influence on the field through his appropriation by Brueggemann in *The Land.* See Thomas F. Torrance, *Time and Incarnation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969; F.W. Dillistone, *Traditional Symbols and the Contemporary World* (London: Epworth, 1973)..

notably Michel de Certeau.[2] Within theology and without, the use of the dichotomous

pairing— "place *versus* space," among others—remains an important if not ubiquitous

tendency.

The second pattern discernible within theologies of place is the role of untoward

changes in prompting reflection. Post-war urbanization had prompted concern among

contemporary theologians. *The Secular City* rebuts those concerns while championing the

moral maturity required to live in "the secular city." The link between people, geography,

and religion championed by the Nazis prompted Tillich's reflections on religions of

"time" versus religions of "space." Again and again, the initial impetus for theological

reflection on place was some concern, something having gone amiss in the relationship

between humans and their physical environment. While a concern about "Blut and

Boden" (i.e., "Blood and Soil") lies at the extreme of such concerns, theologians of place

have frequently been prompted to reflection by what they regard as untoward changes in

socio-geographic practices, patterns of movement and dwelling within a particular

community.

Finally, whether asserting the role of the Creation as the "seat of relations" (i.e.,

"Place Is an Intersection) between humans and God (Torrance) or the "sacramentality" of

particular places (Sheldrake), theologies of place have been marked by the need not only

to call attention to the material Creation, but indeed to defend its very goodness. Perhaps

nowhere is this more clearly visible than Bartholomew's quotation of Paul Santmire.

> Is the final aim of God, in his governance of all things, to bring into being at the
> very end a glorified kingdom of spirits along who, thus united with God, may

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[2] Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 77ff. Like Anglophone theologians of place, de Certeau has employed paired-opposites—space and place—in order to highlight a single dynamic of the physical environment: the different possibilities available to those with *un propre lieu* from those without.

> contemplate him in perfect bliss, while as a precondition of their ecstasy all the other creatures of nature must be left by God to fall away into eternal oblivion? Or is the final aim of God, in his governance of all things, to communicate his life to another in a way that calls forth at the very end new heavens and a new earth in which righteousness dwells, a transfigured cosmos where peace is universally established between all creatures at last, in the midst of which is situated a glorious city of resurrected saints who dwell in justice, blessed with all the resplendent fullness of the earth, and who continually call upon all creatures to join with them in their joyful praise of the one who is all in all?[3]

If philosophers and theologians of place have been wont to blame the "abstract space" of Modern philosophy for contemporary inattention to the material world, these two eschatological visions point toward a deeper *theological* matter afoot: the widespread anti-materialism of Western Christianity, particularly Protestantism.

This chapter articulates a theory of place and place-making that combines three important gains of previous reflection on place. Rather than selecting a specific spatial metaphor or pairing as a framework for the conversation, we begin with the premise that those metaphors and pairings have their origin not in abstract reflection on the physical environment, but in the specifics of human anatomy and physiology. The kinds of bodies that humans have shapes their patterns of thought and discourse *about* emplacement. Rather than attempting to analyze the discursive sources of the contemporary "problems of place," we ask why dysfunction plays such an outsize role in prompting reflection on place. Finally, rather than "turning to place" by "turning to the body," we focus on both the experience of embodiment and the practice of place-making. In these three ways, this theory of place and place-making aims to draw upon the very best insights of recent reflection on place while avoiding some of its more serious shortcomings. In turn, that

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[3] H. Paul Santmire, *Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian Theology* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1985), 217-8. Cited in Bartholomew, *Where Mortals Dwell,* 7.

theory of place and place-making aims to provide a foundation for analyzing liturgical events like the open-air love feast with which this thesis began.

The chapter begins by turning to the experience of human embodiment. Human anatomy and physiology shapes the way we interact with and move within the physical environment. Our bodies shape our experience of the physical world and inflect the way we conceive of and talk about it. Seeing "place" through the human body avoids the temptation to reduce the physical environment to a single facet (e.g., "place is meaningful space") by identifying various aspects of what it means to have bodies like ours that navigate among and shape other material creatures. The chapter then turns from identifying these various aspects to considering them as the basic tools of making places, both liturgical and otherwise.

The Disappearing Body

In *The Absent Body*, Drew Leder explores the human experience of embodiment and how that experience shapes our anthropological assumptions.[4] Leder begins with two complementary dynamics: "disappearance" and "dys-appearance."

Many of the functions performed by our bodies require little conscious awareness or deliberative attention. Our sense organs do not require conscious awareness of the organs themselves in order for perception to occur. We do not need to see our eyes in order to see, nor do we need to hear our ears in order to hear. Indeed, Leder suggests that as a general principle "insofar as I perceive through an organ, it necessarily recedes from

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[4] Drew Leder, *The Absent Body* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

the perceptual field it discloses."[5] Too, under normal circumstances humans can move about without needing consciously to coordinate the various muscles required to walk or to move a wheelchair forward.[6] Not only do we *not* have to give conscious attention to the mechanics of our movement, doing so might actually *impair* our locomotive capabilities.[7] Leder notes that "'The relationship between my decision and my body are, in movement, magic ones.' I tend to forget this magical quality precisely because it is a taken for granted base from which my actions spring."[8] Third, habituation over time reduces our need to concentrate attention on novel or difficult tasks. The acquisition of new skills often requires giving minute attention to bodily mechanics, as when runners in training consciously alter their stride or posture. In time, repeated, conscious efforts at running with a particular stride habituates the body to that stride, eliminating the need for conscious attention to form. The use of novel tools evinces a similar dynamic. Learning to use simple tools like hammers often requires significant focus at first. Repeated use of a tool, however, diminishes the focus required, making use of the tool as unconscious as movement of the body generally.[9] Many of our vital functions—respiration, circulation, digestion, and the like—require no conscious effort on our part to function normally. In all of these ways, argues Leder, the well-functioning human body *disappears* from our conscious awareness, allowing us to shift our focus elsewhere. As described by Leder,

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[5] Ibid., 14.

[6] An obvious contrast would be having to re-learn as adults activities that physical injury or illness have attenuated.

[7] Ibid., 20.

[8] Ibid., 20.

[9] Ibid., 31.

"For me to engage in any activity there are a countless number of other actions I must cease, skills and motor schemas I leave unused, corporeal regions I render quiescent."[10]

In contrast to bodily disappearance, dysfunction, injury, and disease make the body reappear, what Leder calls "dys-appearance." Take for example a hiker in the forest. Under normal circumstances, a hiker can attend to the sights, sounds, smells, the whole feeling of being out of doors and amid trees. Her attention might focus upon the path in front of her or turn to workaday concerns. A wrong step that twists the ankle immediately restructures this experience. A portion of the body which had previously not called for conscious attention becomes the focus of awareness: pain makes the ankle dys-appear. The ability to attend to other aspects of the surrounding environment recedes—the greater the amount of pain in the ankle, the more the sights, sounds, and smells of the forest pale. When the hiker returns to walking, the pain of each step inserts a new desire and a new *telos*: to be free of the pain. The dys-appearance of the body through pain 1) *draws attention to* the body in general and the site of the pain in particular and 2) *away from* other aspects of our surroundings, 3) makes opaque the formerly invisible functioning of a body part, and 4) *supplants* other desires and purposes with the desire to be free from pain and return to "normal" functioning.

Other circumstances may also make the body dys-appear. Whether causing pain or altering our ability to function normally, disease makes the body dys-appear through loss or inhibition of normal functioning. The acquisition of new skills such as learning scales on the piano, working clay, or driving nails calls attention to the mismatch between what we desire to do (play the scales, shape the clay, drive the nail) and what we likely

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[10] Ibid., 26.

accomplish (making mistakes on the keyboard, misshaping the clay, bending the nail), at least at first. The gap between our intention and the outcome—between "mind" and "body," it may seem—becomes even more piquant if we have already heard or seen someone perform the task with seeming effortlessness.

Disappearance and dys-appearance are complementary parts of a single dynamic, "where the rising of one is necessarily linked to the other's decline."[11] Leder argues that the dynamic of disappearance/dys-appearance has a particular interpretive trajectory, or "vector." Because bodily dysfunction (injury, disease, etc.) a) draws negative attention to an otherwise "disappeared" body while b) interfering with elective *teloi*, humans may come to regard the body negatively, as something other than the self. In this way, says Leder, human embodiment *itself* suggests a dualist structure of exterior body and interior "self."

Enduring dys-appearance not only shifts our teleological focus, but may even suggest that the body is somehow "apart from" the self. Consider the contrast between health and illness as described by Leder:

> Both exhibit an element of alienation from the body. In the case of health, the body is alien by virtue of its disappearance, as attention is primarily directed toward the world. With the onset of illness this gives way to dys-appearance. The body is no longer alien-as-forgotten, but precisely as-remembered, a sharp and searing presence threatening the self.[12]

Under normal circumstances, then, the body comes to attention most clearly in the midst of dys-appearance, suggesting not only the body as something other than "the self," but as somehow in antipathy to the "self." "It is precisely because the normal and healthy

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[11] Ibid., 55.

[12] Ibid., 91.

body largely disappears that direct experience of the body is skewed toward times of dysfunction."[13]

Contemporary reflections on Modern anthropology have often assumed that Cartesian-style dualism has its roots in *discourses* that distinguish between the mind/soul and the body, associating the former with the "self" while deprecating the latter. By contrast, Leder suggests that the abiding power of Cartesian dualism rests on the match between dualist anthropologies and our lived experience, particularly the dynamic of disappearance/dys-appearance. "Any historical metaphysics that exhibits an enduring power and persuasiveness must, I would argue, have a meaningful phenomenological core. That is, it must describe and provide an interpretation for a range of significant human experiences."[14] The dynamic of disappearance/dys-appearance itself suggests a dualistic reading the self. That "body-soul dualism" is not culturally universal suggests that disappearance/dys-appearance does not determine the shape of anthropological discourse. Leder's claim here is subtler—that the dynamic of disappearance/dys-appearance makes some interpretations of "the self" more plausible than others, that it has a particular vector.

The plausibility of a two-part self has been coupled within Western culture to a larger narrative which the experience of the body itself continually reinforces. Cartesian-style dualism does not simply distinguish between two parts of the self. Like Platonic body/soul dualism before it, Cartesian dualism regards the mind as *ontologically* different from the body. Because the mind/soul is made of "better stuff" and is identified with the "true self," the mind/soul is *superior to* the body. Rather than a dualism of two equal

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[13] Ibid., 86.

[14] Ibid., 107.

parts, one has a human comprised of a) two b) ontologically different and c) differently

valuable parts, what Leder dubs "onto-valuational dualism."

That onto-valuational dualism applies not only to the different *parts* of the human

being. The *functions* of the mind/soul are ontologically different in kind and of greater

esteem than the functions associated with the body. From here, it is not difficult so see

how such a distinction could be applied to all reality, distinguishing in turn that which

belongs to the higher ontological order (including the mind/soul) as well as that which

belongs to the lower ontological order of the body and the material. One could, for

example, distinguish between the higher order activity of theological reflection, an

activity of the mind/soul, from the lower order activity of enacting ("with the body") the

content of that theological reflection in worship. Similarly, one could distinguish between

the abstract conceptualization of the physical environment "space" from the particular

traits of specific material "places."

Looking Back through the Disappearing Body

Leder's account of bodily disappearance/dys-appearance offers insight into the

shape of recent theological discourse on place as well as on the emergence of the field of

liturgical theology.

As noted above, untoward changes in socio-geographic practice have often

prompted theological reflection on place. Suburbanization, for example, creates a change

a theologian regards as untoward, yielding a reflection on place generally that includes a

stated desire to return to a previous state of affairs (or something comparable). The role

of untoward changes in socio-geographic practice and the impulse to return to some

previous (or new) normalcy suggests an analogous relationship between *embodied* disappearance/dys-appearance and *emplaced* disappearance/dys-appearance. In both circumstances, proper functioning allows the body/place to disappear. The introduction of some form of dysfunction calls attention to a *particular aspect* of the physical environment along with a desire to return to a "pain free" state.

If the analogy holds, there are two important consequences. First, reflection on place will skew toward the dysfunctional because the "broken" aspects of place have dys-appeared (and thus risen to conscious awareness) while other, normally functioning elements remain hidden in plain sight. The resulting analysis of place (and prescriptions for "fixing it") will over*emphasize* the dysfunctioning aspects of the physical environment while over*looking* the ones functioning normally.

Theologians of place have at times fallen prey to the trap of overemphasizing the dysfunctional. Prompted by what he perceives as a widespread sense of moral disorientation (because of the very freedom celebrated in *The Secular City*, no less), Walter Brueggemann employs the "Place Is a Container" metaphor to highlight the importance of stable relationships and mutual obligations. Whereas space "means an arena of freedom, without coercion or accountability, free of pressures and void of authority" and "may be imaged as weekend, holiday, avocation, and is characterized by a kind of neutrality or emptiness waiting to be fulfilled by our choosing," place is

> a space that has historical meanings, where some things have happened that are now remembered and that provide continuity and identity across generations. Place is space in which important words have been spoken that have established identity, defined vocation, and envisioned destiny. Place is space in which vows have been exchanged, promises have been made, and demands have been issued. Place is indeed a protest against the unpromising pursuit of space. [15]

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[15] Brueggemann, *The Land*, 4.

In short, the physical environment is a container either full of meaning and obligation ("place") or empty of meaning and obligation ("space"). Notwithstanding the rhetorical power of this contrast, Brueggemann implicitly reduces the physical environment to interpersonal and existential concerns. The physical environment largely disappears in this figure-ground move. Having spotted some aspect of socio-geographic practice that has gone amiss, Brueggemann has foregrounded that problem and defined the role of the physical environment *in terms of* that problem. As a consequence, the mundane, normally-functioning aspects of the physical environment are overlooked. To be fair, Brueggemann was not attempting a systematic theology of place. Nonetheless, to the extent that the human interaction with the physical environment exhibits a dynamic similar to bodily disappearance/dys-appearance, then discussions about place are prone to focus chiefly on the dysfunctional while overlooking the functional.

There are other consequences of the dynamic of disappearance/dys-appearance. Failing to recognize that disappearance is a characteristic of *proper* functioning, theologians of place have assumed that recent, problematic changes in socio-geographic practice have arisen because of inattention to place, a consequence of over-emphasizing "abstract space." Given this diagnosis, the prescription calls for either a new, "place-attentive" philosophy or a theology that affirms the goodness of material Creation. To the extent that the analogy of body to place holds, the solution in such circumstances is not necessarily imbuing the physical landscape with meaning or a more positive valuation of the material Creation, but simply addressing whatever dysfunction has occurred and returning place to its state of functioning disappearance. Indeed, as I suggest below,

disappearance/dys-appearance is one of the chief dynamics of place, and thus one of the primary tools of place-making.

Excursus: Onto-valuational dualism, *lex orandi*, *lex credendi*, place and space

Leder's account of bodily dynamics also provides a suggestive lens through which to examine the shape of liturgical theology and theologies of place. As noted above, the dynamic of disappearance/dys-appearance makes plausible a dualistic anthropology in which humans are comprised of an inner part and an outer part, a mind/soul and a body. Leder notes, however, that Western body/soul dualism has not regarded the human as simply comprised of two different parts. Typically, those parts are regarded as ontologically different, with one of them superior to the other. This *onto-valuational dualism* regards the body and soul not simply as distinct, but made of different "stuff."

That ontological divide—and thus the difference in valuation—extends beyond the body and mind/soul. Because of their origins, the respective actions of the body and the mind/soul can also be mapped onto this matrix. Thus, the activities associated with the mind/soul—thought, ratiocination, theological reflection—can be placed in opposition to the "lower" activities associated with the body—feeling (as opposed to "thought"), intuition (as opposed to "ratiocination"), and worshipping (as opposed to theological reflection). Within this onto-valuational framework, a similar distinction can be made between the will and habit, the exercise of reason and the (reason-less) repetition of a learned behavior.

That dividing line between mind/soul and body has often been extrapolated beyond the human being and onto reality itself, now divisible between the "immaterial" and the "material," the "spiritual" and the "worldly." In its strongest theological forms, onto-valuational dualism promotes an utter disparagement of material Creation.[16] Salvation in such accounts ultimately has little to do with the body besides escaping it. Baptism may be regarded as an expression of one's personal resolve (the action of the soul), the (material) waters denied any effect upon the baptized. Bread and wine in communion are (material) reminders whose efficacy lie in their ability to evoke certain interior states. Upon death the soul is "set free" from the body to go be in the presence of a God in a thoroughly immaterial heaven. Indeed, the continued influence of this onto-valuational dualism may be seen in contemporary Euro-American theologies of the afterlife. Joel Green argues that by the late 20th century, biblical scholars and Church historians had moved toward consensus that the resurrection of the body was a central facet of early Christian belief and proclamation. By contrast, popular contemporary Christian accounts of the afterlife remain starkly anti-materialist in their assertion of a wholly spiritual hereafter involving only an immortal soul.[17]

To be clear, onto-valuational dualism is not exclusively, perhaps not even primarily, a theoretical lens. The deprecation of the material can shape a range of theological *loci*, including eschatology, sacramental theology, soteriology, and anthropology. While onto-valuational dualism may take a formal, theoretical form, more

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[16] Notably, within theology this ontological divide does not typically fall between the created and the uncreated, but between the material and spiritual. Bodies and our souls may both be creatures, but one is material, the other spiritual.

[17] Joel Green, *Body, Soul, and the Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker), 5ff.

commonly it occurs as a sensibility, a *tendency* to read the world in unequal pairings, a *tendency* to deprecate the material. The assertion that onto-valuational dualism is perhaps more wisely regarded as a sensibility rather than just a theoretical lens aims to highlight two dynamics within Western thought and perception.

Though presumably not employed by Prosper of Aquitaine as ontologically distinct and unequal categories, in the hands of contemporary liturgical theologians *lex orandi/supplicandi* and *lex credendi* become tools for distinguishing different activities and characteristics that consistently fall along onto-valuational lines: dogmatic theology versus Christian liturgy (Schmemann); Christian faith versus ritual activity (Moore-Keish); the reductive, objectifying, didactic tendencies of systematic theology versus the imaginative, diverse, and polyvalent nature of worship (Irwin). In each instance, liturgical theologians have sought to articulate the value of the "material" over the presumed preeminence of the immaterial, the cognitive, the ratiocinative. In each instance, liturgical theologians have countered theological onto-valuational dualism not by denying the dualism itself, but by reversing the polarities. The existence of the larger ontological framework thereby remains intact, perhaps because it has been hidden.

The same holds true for theologies of place. The preference within Modern philosophy for the abstract and the ratiocinative yielded an account of the physical environment that emphasized the abstract and reductive ("space") over the concrete and particular ("place"). In response, theologians of place have often sought to assert the importance of "place" over "space," simply reversing the polarity of the dualism. Both liturgical theologians and theologians of place have sought to address the emphases of Modern philosophy—with its onto-valuational dualism—chiefly in terms of that dualism.

Moreover, identifying onto-valuational dualism as a sensibility allows us better to understand rituals where "bodily disappearance" enables participants to overlook the contribution of material conditions to the ritual itself and, in turn, interpreting the ritual as "more" spiritual than other ritual forms in which bodily "disappearance" is less possible. As discussed in the first chapter, the congregation researched for *Do This in Remembrance of Me* employed two methods of communing. One required participants to go forward to receive the elements from a server. Those who preferred this method noted how going forward to commune, receiving from the hand of another, and then being able to see other church members upon returning to their seat drew out communal themes in the Eucharistic. The activity of moving coupled with seeing and being seen by others made the ritual action itself "appear." The other form of communing, by contrast, allowed communicants to remain in their seats and receive bread and wine from trays passed down the pews. This form of communing minimizes both physical movement as well as opportunities to be seen by other congregants. In turn, this allows the ritual actions to "disappear." Those who preferred this method of communing equated the "meaning" of the Eucharist with "thoughtful reflection" and imaginative recollection of the Last Supper and Crucifixion. In contrast to the group who preferred going forward to commune, this latter group did *not* recognize how the material conditions of the ritual abetted their thoughtful reflection by making their bodies, their physical actions, and the people around them "disappear."

It may very well have been important for these Reformed congregants *not* to notice the contribution of material conditions to their "thoughtful reflection" and interior, "spiritual" state. Onto-valuational dualism presupposes a zero-sum game in which to be

"more spiritual" requires there to be less of the "bodily." Within such a matrix, recognizing how material conditions abet an interior state might diminish the perceived spiritual content of the ritual itself. In turn, this may help us interpret the concern that liturgical theology is insufficiently "theological." A given author can obviously dedicate more or less space to reflecting on the respective contributions of God and humans within Christian worship. At the same time, any attention given to anthropology within liturgical theology might imply a diminished role for the divine in worship.

Thus onto-valuational dualism as a sensibility helps us better understand the shape of liturgical theology and theologies of place. Both have shown themselves prone to employ paired terms ("space and place," *lex orandi, lex credendi*," "time and space") to contrast different characteristics, phenomena, or objects. Consistently those contrasts line up along opposite sides of the ontological divide of onto-valuational dualism even as the explicit references assigned to the term varies with the author. Schmemann, Irwin, and Moore-Keish all assign different meanings to *lex orandi* and *lex credendi*; all three, however, assign to *lex orandi* the institutions, characteristics, or actions typically associated with the "material" half of onto-valuational dualism, and vice versa. Within theologies of place, the same pattern emerges *even when spatial terms cease to have spatial denotations*.

Spatial Metaphors We Live By

Beginning our account of place with the human body uncovered an important though frequently overlooked aspect of embodiment and of being emplaced: when functioning normally, our bodies (and the environments we inhabit) may "disappear"

from our conscious awareness. When combined with the phenomenon of its dys-appearance amid dysfunction, this disappearance may reinforce a dualistic reading not only of ourselves, but also of the world we inhabit. Perhaps more pointedly, the dynamic of disappearance/dys-appearance makes it more likely that our discourse about the body (and the physical environment) is dominated, if not defined by, the parts made salient by dysfunction. This is analogous to developing an account of human physiology based solely upon pathology.

Our bodies shape our experience of and discourse about the physical environment in another way as well: by creating vectors, likely paths of interpretation, that yield a discrete number of spatial metaphors through which we reason and discuss place.

The use of paired opposites occurs throughout contemporary reflection on place—space and place, space and time, center and periphery, inside and outside—alongside a limited number of spatial metaphors—"Place Is a Container" and "Place Is an Intersection," among others. Some authors prefer certain pairings over others, developing their arguments in terms of "space and time" (Tillich) rather than "place and space" (Brueggemann).[18] Elsewhere, metaphors of place are understood as metaphorical and therefore exchangeable. Bruce Morrill notes the recent transition of spatial metaphors within Roman Catholic sacramental theology, with Edward Schillebeeckx advocating a view of the sacraments as a places of encounter with God (Place Is an Intersection) rather than the Thomistic view of the sacraments as containers.[19]

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[18] The same dynamic occurs within systematic theology as well. In Theories of Culture, Kathryn Tanner advocates replacing the "inside/outside" language of post-liberal theologians with the image of certain facets of Church life being held at the center (center and periphery). See Kathryn Tanner, *Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology* (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1997).

[19] Bruce T. Morrill, "Initial Consideration: Theory and Practice of the Body in Liturgy Today" in *Bodies of Worship: Explorations in Theory and Practice*, Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999), 1.

The varied use of paired opposites and spatial metaphors might suggest the wholly "constructed" nature of our experience of and discourse about place. As interchangeable conceptual tools, the pairs and metaphors may be taken up or laid aside depending upon personal preference or rhetorical needs. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, however, have argued that such paired opposites and metaphors are not purely constructs, but have their origin in concrete, day-to-day interaction with the physical environment.

Lakoff and Johnson have sought to articulate an account of the human being in contradistinction to the dualist anthropology of René Descartes, the "view that reason is transcendental, universal, disembodied, and literal."[20] In one of its most recent formulations, this dualist epistemology (and its underlying anthropology) likened the human mind to a computer, with "thought" being a program run by the computer. In this metaphor, because any computer could run the software, the link between the particularities of the hardware and the way the software ran was thought to be minimal.

> A consequence of the metaphor was that the hardware—or rather "wetware"—was seen as determining nothing at all about the nature of the program. That is, the peculiarities of the body and brain contributed nothing to the nature of human concepts and reason. This was philosophy without flesh. There was no body in this conception of mind.[21]

The dualism between hardware and software finds a parallel in discussions of "perception" and "conception." "While perception has always been accepted as bodily in nature, just as movement is, conception—the formation and use of concepts—has

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[20] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 76.

[21] *Ibid*.

traditionally been seen as purely mental and wholly separate from and independent of our abilities to perceive and move."[22]

In contrast to this "disembodied" epistemology, Lakoff and Johnson argue that our "software" is radically shaped by our "hardware," our conceptions by the very bodies through which we perceive the world. Lakoff and Johnson posit a model of human cognition that connects our sensorimotor system to our conscious, rational thought via a "vast and intricately structured" unconscious.[23] Within this unconscious lie "all our automatic cognitive operations" and "all our implicit knowledge,"[24] both of which are shaped by the body's encounter with the world.

The primary evidence of this bodily basis for human thought lies in the human dependence upon metaphors for thinking and communicating. As in their earlier work *Metaphors We Live By*, Lakoff and Johnson deny a correspondence theory of truth, one which asserts that humans are able to obtain an understanding of reality ["in their heads"] that corresponds with some objective truth out in the world.[25] By contrast, they suggest that human conceptualization of the world is mediated *by* the kinds of bodies we have— what we see is shaped by *how* we see. But because well-functioning bodies (and sensory organs, and the gestalt of our sensory organs) are prone to disappear from conscious reflection, the formative role of anatomy and physiology is prone not to rise to conscious awareness.

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[22] Ibid., 37.

[23] Ibid., 13.

[24] Ibid., 13.

[25] Ibid., 95; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

One can detect the formative role of anatomy and physiology in the *way* we think,

argue Lakoff and Johnson. Human thought and speech is largely metaphorical, thus

linking together two ostensibly unlike things in consistent patterns. Take for example the

metaphor Affection Is Warmth. The link between affection and temperature arise in a

number of different phrases—"I'm *warming up* to her," "He's *cold* hearted," and "I

received a *cool* reception," among others. The link between interpersonal interaction and

physical warmth begins, say Lakoff and Johnson, in infancy: when a parent responds to

the cries of an infant, that response combines the physical warmth of the caregiver with

soothing, sustenance, etc. The regular coupling of caregiving and physical warmth yields

a stout if unconscious association of interpersonal affection and care with physical

temperature. Lawrence Williams and John Bargh have even suggested that the

association of affection with warmth explains why persons holding warm objects (e.g.,

cups of hot coffee) are more likely to evaluate an imaginary person as warm and friendly

than did their counterparts holding cold cups of coffee![26] In Lakoff and Johnson's words,

> We have a system of primary metaphors simply because we have the bodies and
> brains we have and because we live in the world we live in, where... intimacy
> does tend to correlate significantly with proximity, affection with warmth, and
> achieving purposes with reaching destinations.[27]

Our language is full of such metaphors—Affection Is Warmth, of course, but also

Intimacy Is Proximity and Purposes Are Journeys, among others—and many of these

metaphors are found throughout the world.[28]

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[26] Lawrence E. Williams and John A. Bargh, "Experiencing physical warmth influences interpersonal warmth," *Science* 322 (October 2008): 606-7.

[27] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By,* 59.

[28] Ibid.*,* 57.

Our conceptions of time are also shaped by metaphors that have their root in our lived experience. Notwithstanding that time is "as basic a concept as we have," English and many other languages do not conceptualize time on its own terms. Instead, time is primarily conceptualized ("metaphorized") as something else. One such metaphorization is Time Is Motion, which appears in phrases like "Everything crept to a halt," "Time flies by," "The days slipped by…" In the discussion of the Affection Is Warmth metaphor, the bridge between affection and warmth is their regular coincidence: those physically affectionate with us are physically proximate, and therefore "warm." The same holds true with Time Is Motion. The passage of time, argues Lakoff and Johnson, is experientially linked *with the motion of objects* or *of ourselves* as observers.

> ...time is metaphorically conceptualized in terms of motion. There is an area in the visual system of our brains dedicated to the detection of motion. There is no such area for the detection of global time. That means that motion is directly perceived and is available for use as source domain by our metaphor systems.

Both the salience of objects/observer in motion and our own cognitive hardware influence the way we conceptualize and talk about time.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Tillich begins his discussion of time and space using a similar contrast.

> Time and space belong together: We can measure time only by space and space only in time. Motion, the universal character of life, needs time and space. Mind, which seems to be bound to time, needs only embodiment in order to come to existence, and consequently it needs space.[29]

The description of the relationship between time and space offered by Tillich bypasses an aspect of our embodied experience that underlies the metaphorization of time in terms of movement. We do not simply see objects in motion or experience ourselves as in motion,

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[29] Paul Tillich, *Theology of Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 30.

but we see objects in motion within a larger field of objects that are "not moving." Much like the figure/ground relationship beneath the dynamic of disappearance/dys-appearance, the metaphorization of time in terms of movement requires the contrast between an object (ourselves or something within our sensory field) moving in relationship to other, often non-moving objects. The paired-opposite "time and space" captures the two-fold components of this dynamic, the contrast between perceived movement against a larger field of stability.

Tillich moves from talking about time and space as aspects of our material existence to using "time and space" as a metaphor for contrasting prophetic religions that change (and thus exhibit "movement") to those whose repetition and rootedness in place makes them stable. In doing so, he maintains the relationship of contrast between "time" and "space," what Lakoff and Johnson call "the inferential structure." The subtle shift from using "time and space" to talk about the experience of time and space to using it as a way of classifying religions is made possible because Tillich maintains that relationship.

Beneath the contrast between Modern "space" and "meaningful place" lies a similar figure/ground relationship, one which also arises from the nature of our embodiment and consequent experience of the physical environment. Concerned about changes in socio-geographic practices (dys-function) in the late twentieth century, philosophers and theologians of place often blamed the influence of Modern philosophy upon our conceptions of (and consequent treatment of) the physical environment. Modern philosophy had foregrounded space, conceived as abstract and empty. The Cartesian grid serves as the paradigm of Modern "spatial thinking"—spatiality generally was conceived

as a void empty save for those fixed places within it. In turn, addressing contemporary

dys-functional socio-geographic practices requires a new account of the physical

environment, one which is "full of meaning." Brueggemann's account of place in *The

Land* serves as the paradigm for this exchange of emphasis from "empty space" to

"fulsome place":

> Place is a space that has historical meanings, where some things have happened
> that are now remembered and that provide continuity and identity across
> generations. Place is space in which important words have been spoken that have
> established identity, defined vocation, and envisioned destiny. Place is space in
> which vows have been exchanged, promises have been made, and demands have
> been issued.[30]

Upon examination, there are two metaphorizations implied in both the Modern reduction

to space and the contemporary counter-emphasis upon place. The first of these is the

relationship between fixity and stability, freedom and movement. As described by

Dillistone,

> In contrast to the sense of a place I have set the feeling of space. Psychologically
> it seems natural that when man is *free* to roam and *wander* as he will the balance
> of his emotions will be preserved by *attachment* to some cherished and relatively
> *settled* place. On the other hand, when he at length puts down *roots* and
> *establishes* an ordered community life within a particular area, something of the
> longing for the *open* spaces and for the *freedom* of his spirit is likely to revive.
> The benefits of civilization are such that few can resist their attraction. Yet the
> feeling for space cannot easily be quenched.[31]

Note the contrast between space ("free...open...freedom") and place

("attachment...settled… roots... establishes"). Space and place here are used spatially

("free to roam" and "open spaces") as well as metaphorically ("puts down roots and

establishes and ordered community life"). Both the literal, spatial use and the

metaphorical use share the contrast between freedom and movement, fixity and stability.

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[30] Brueggemann, *The Land,* 4.

[31] Dillistone, *Traditional Symbols,* 87. Emphasis added.

That contrast arises from the human experience of being solid objects capable of movement and locomotion. The movement of limbs along with every form of locomotion from one place to another requires constant negotiation between fixed objects (walls, pylons, trees, etc.) and within the open spaces they create. Things that are "in place" (including other humans, whether moving or not) have "space" between them through which we navigate. This is true whether we raise our hands or stand up, move our wheelchairs forward or walk backward. In both its figurative and literal forms, the implied pairing of "place and space" takes the inferential structure Space Is Openness/Place Is Stability. Thus, the sentence "I need more space" may denote a desire for more physical space within which to move or fewer social constraints that inhibit literal or figurative "movement." To put a book "in its place" denotes putting the book in an established—and therefore implicitly stable—location with respect to other objects; putting another human "in their place" denotes returning a person to an established location with respect to other persons (and perhaps also objects). Even the Cartesian grid exemplifies the contrast between openness ("abstract, empty space") and stability (fixed locations, i.e., "places").

The second metaphorization draws upon the experience of containment. We constantly negotiate physical spaces that have the ability to hold within or constrain smaller objects. Much of the time such containment is useful and benign—pockets hold keys, trunks carry luggage, bottles contain liquid, etc. We not only encounter naturally occurring containers (e.g., water held in the hollow of a rock) but we manufacture containers both big and small. Buildings and other physical locations are among the larger literal containers we create—buildings contain conditioned air, for example, and

keep out unwanted humans and other animals. Lakoff and Johnson suggest that our implicit, unconscious understanding of physical containment provides the architecture for categorization generally, as when we "place" certain creatures *into* particular *phyla* and *genera*.[32]

Contemporary reflection on place has frequently employed the metaphor Place Is a Container of meaning, affect, or purpose. Eager to counter abstract understandings of place as containers and locations, Relph argues that "place" combines both physical conditions with the meanings and activities we bring to it.

> Places are fusions of human and natural order and are the significant centers of our immediate experiences of the world. They are defined less by unique locations, landscape, communities than by the focusing of experiences and intentions onto particular settings. Places are not abstractions or concepts, but are directly experienced phenomena of the lived-world and hence are full with meanings, with real objects, and with ongoing activities.[33]

The experience of "placelessness," by contrast, "describes both an environment without significant places and the underlying attitude which does not acknowledge significance in places."[34] In Relph's accounting, a key difference between the experiences of "place" and "placelessness" lies then in whether one experiences a location as full of—or devoid of—meaning, i.e., "Place Is a Container" of meaning. Indeed, places as containers of meaning emerges as one of the regular tropes of recent theological reflection on the physical environment, especially among those concerned with Modern philosophy's emphasis upon abstract, *empty* space.

Not all treatments of place as a container are congenial, however. The liturgical theologian Gordon Lathrop repeatedly emphasizes the need for the core symbols of the

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[32] Lakoff and Johnson, *The Embodied Mind,* 20.

[33] Edward Relph, *Place and Placelessness* (Pion: London, 1976), 141.

[34] Ibid, 143.

liturgy "to point elsewhere," *outside* of the liturgy and *outside* of the assembly that has gathered to celebrate it. Word added to bread always points elsewhere, toward "the absent and the poor," "toward suffering humanity *outside* of the assembly's circle."[35] Absent the juxtaposition of symbols that point to the absent, the poor, and others *outside* the assembly, the figurative boundary [of the container] between those inside and those outside may harden. Because places are containers that can exclude, the assembly need always ensure the presence of a "gracious open door."[36]

Through the "place/space" and "Place Is a Container" metaphors, the link between the sensorimotor system and abstract reflections on place becomes clearer. Largely unconscious movement between stable objects and the open spaces between them provides a foundation for contrasting stable expectations (promises, covenants, ordered community life) and the open spaces outside of them (the longing for the *open* spaces and the freedom of spirit). Likewise, a tacit understanding of containment enables the metaphorization of place as a container of meaning. In the metaphor "Time Is Movement," time and space stood in a figure ground relationship to one another. Within that metaphor, one could focus upon movement and change or stability and permanence. Both, however, were always implied within the inferential structure of the metaphor. The same holds true for the place/space pairing. One can focus upon either stability and fixity or openness and freedom. In either case, however, each implies the presence of (and contrast to) the other. This explains why philosophers and theologians of place can subtly

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[35] Gordon Lathrop, *Holy Things*: *A Liturgical Theology* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1993), 149, 163.

[36] Ibid., 119.

use "place and space" for non-spatial referents—so long as one maintains the inferential structure between stability and openness, the metaphor rings true.

Two other spatial metaphors occur within contemporary reflection on place: center/periphery and intersection/meeting point. Center/periphery metaphors have at least two phenomenological bases: human vision and human cognitive awareness. Human sight can focus in only one direction at a time. Within that visual field, the center is the most acute, the most focused, while the entire periphery remains unfocused, fuzzy.[37] Perhaps more potently, the dynamic of disappearance/dys-appearance provides another phenomenological grounding for center/periphery. Well-functioning portions of the body typically disappear from our focused, conscious awareness. At the same time, these same portions of the body contribute to a larger gestalt comprised of both focused consciousness and a largely unconscious ambient awareness. A limb might come to conscious awareness by *going numb*, a *decrease* in the ambient "data" it normally supplies. Until this or some other form of dysfunction makes the body dys-appear, the limb remains at the periphery of our awareness, much like the edges of our visual field.

The dominance of visuality within Lathrop's *Holy* trilogy yields a concomitant emphasis upon center and periphery, focus and edge. Lathrop repeatedly recommends that the core symbols be set forth "clearly" and "in strength."[38] "It now becomes clear that Christian worship has a responsibility to let these things always be and be seen to be at the center of our gathering."[39] Notably, in this one sentence Lathrop uses the

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[37] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 35; *Metaphors We Live By*, 31.

[38] On "clearly" and "with clarity," see Lathrop, *Holy Things*, 100, 132; Lathrop, *Holy People*, 112, 132; Lathrop, *Holy Things*, 62, 112, 143. For "in strength," see Lathrop, *Holy Things*, 116; Lathrop, *Holy Ground,* 112.

[39] Lathrop, *Holy People,* 114.

center/periphery metaphor both literally and figuratively. The core symbols should *literally* be placed and enacted so as to be visually and aurally central so that the core symbols can "be seen" (and heard) to be figuratively central to the life of the worshipping community.

The metaphor "Place Is an Intersection" combines an array of visual and other bodily experiences. Visually "intersections" occur everywhere planes or lines collide. Lakoff and Johnson have argued that metaphors of adjacency and contact stand among the standard battery of spatial metaphors that occur regularly across languages.[40] Human mobility also yields happenstance encounters and collisions whenever two trajectories intersect.

The metaphor of intersection/meeting point most frequently occurs as an alternative to containment metaphors. Torrance, for example, argues that theologians needed to substitute the spatial metaphor of intersection for that of containment when describing the relationship of God to Creation. Creation construed *as a container* with God *outside* that container had the result of raising problematic questions when the metaphor was logically extended. Instead, Torrance argues for the abandonment of the container metaphor, emphasizing instead the language of meeting point and intersection. Lilburne follows Torrance, suggesting that the Incarnation "reconstitutes place as a concept for human living and self-understanding" precisely because particular places are the loci of God's encounter with humanity." By defining the locus of God's encounter with humanity, not in a generalized view of universal space but in a particular place, the

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[40] Lakoff and Johnson, *The Embodied Mind*, 35

Incarnation reconstitutes place as a concept for human living and self-understanding."[41]

O'Donovan suggests a similar substitution of metaphors: the loss of elective particularity

(of a particular people *contained* in a particular place) yields a universality of concern for

places and people that is in practice difficult to sustain. Thus, O'Donovan argues that the

loss of a particular place requires a willingness to embrace the moral requirements

created by happenstance.

> There is a nearness of contingency, a chancing upon, a nearness of pure place,
> unqualified by any relation or connection but simply a matter of finding yourself
> next to somebody; and it is that which the parable [of the Good Samaritan] holds
> up to us as the context for the neighbor's claim.[42]

Theological reflection on place over the past fifty years has turned time and again

to a limited number of paired opposites—space and place, space and time, center and

periphery—along with two spatial metaphors, "Place Is a Container" and "Place Is an

Intersection." Lakoff and Johnson have argued that the structure of human

conceptualizing and speech arises out of embodied experience, thus a phenomenological

basis may be identified for each of the paired-opposites and the spatial metaphors.[43]

Following Lakoff and Johnson, our understanding of place arises out of our embodied

encounter with the world around us, our emplacedness.

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[41] Geoffrey R. Lilburne, *A Sense of Place: A Christian Theology of the Land* (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1989), 109.

[42] Oliver O'Donovan, "The Loss of a Sense of Place," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 55, no. 1 (March 1989): 136.

[43] Lakoff and Johnson do identify metaphors that have their origin outside of the body. Western culture in particular metaphorizes time as a commodity ("time is money"), a metaphor that lacks a basis in human anatomy/physiology. The origin of the metaphor lies in the ability of a culture to "reify" a particular metaphor—to structure language, behavior, and institutions in a manner that repeatedly reinforces a given metaphor. In such a circumstance, the metaphor would could have its origin "outside" of the body with subsequent generations having their experience make "time is money" more plausible. Perhaps more pointedly, some metaphors have no bodily basis hard to reify at a human scale. Plate tectonics, cited by Johnson, is one such metahpor. See Mark Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 193. The existence of metaphors with a non-bodily origin and supra-human scale is perhaps the greatest weakness in Lakoff and Johnson's argument.

We can also reverse the logic of Lakoff and Johnson. If spatial metaphors arise from our embodied experience, then any given spatial metaphor reveals a facet of the human encounter with the physical environment. Our ability to employ the paired opposites "place and space" non-literally and to deploy that same inferential structure in non-spatial contexts suggests an underlying, homologously structured experience. We "think" and can make inferences in terms of the metaphorization "place and space" because embodied movement requires distinguishing, even if unconsciously, between fixed objects in place and the open spaces between them. The same, of course, can be said for other paired-opposites and spatial metaphors: each reveals a distinct aspect of our encounter with the physical environment, our emplacedness.

We may be tempted to view both the use of paired opposites and spatial metaphors as verbal constructs to be chosen or discarded depending upon the rhetorical thrust of an argument or our programmatic ends. This assumption, however, requires sundering the relationships between a particular metaphor and embodied experience. As Lakoff and Johnson suggest, we do employ metaphors from across domains constantly, discussing social dynamics in terms of spatial metaphors, for example, or interpersonal affect in terms of temperature. Nonetheless, certain metaphors—and the paired-opposites and spatial metaphors are among these—have their origin and foundation in our embodied experience. We may use them to discuss non-spatial dynamics, may apply them in non-spatial domains. At their root, however, lies a shared, embodied experience of the physical environment.

With this in mind, two mistakes in argumentation and analysis can be avoided. On the one hand, acknowledging the bodily root of the paired-opposites and spatial

metaphors avoids the trap of assuming that all metaphoric speech represents a form of "untruth" to reveal some other "truth." Indeed, in their discussion of metaphors and liturgy, Andrea Bieler and Louise Schottroff argue that the power of metaphors lies in the very fact of their inaccuracy.

> ...a metaphor is a figure of speech more fully true, a simile one only partially appropriates. Metaphors express something that is literally not true: the liturgical assembly is not a body, nor is God a rock or a father. Yet metaphors express something that is on a different level true. They stimulate our imagination...metaphors expand human imagination by layering, in human thought and communication, what is with what it is not.[44]

Metaphoric speech within its own domain—spatial metaphors used to talk about the physical environment—differ from the use of spatial metaphors applied to non-spatial topics. Rather than being a literally untrue juxtaposition that reveals some other "truth," spatial metaphors reveal something of the truth of emplacement with a human body.

On the other hand, acknowledging the bodily basis for the paired opposites and spatial metaphors suggests that the experience of the physical environment cannot be reduced to any single pairing or metaphor. Recent theological reflection on place has been marked by the assertion of one metaphorization over another—"place" versus "space," "space" versus "time," "Place Is a Container" versus "place is a meeting point." In doing so, some scholars have often made the same mistake with regard to place that others have made with regard to time.

> ...you...wind up doing one of the things that philosophers have typically done: choosing some aspect of the concept that you want to focus on and claiming that that one aspect really is time, either time as a flow, or time as a continuous unbounded line, or time as a linear sequence of points, or time as a single spatial-like dimension in a mathematical theory of physics.[45]

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[44] Andrea Bieler and Luise Schottroff, *The Eucharist: Bodies, Bread, & Resurrection* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2007), 136.

[45] Lakoff and Johnson, *The Embodied Mind,* 169.

Taking the dynamics of disappearance/dys-appearance as a methodological assumption, certain aspects of the physical environment (like the experience of time) may rise to our conscious awareness while other aspects "disappear." Mindfulness of the possibility of disappearance of well-functioning (but still nonetheless functioning) aspects of the physical environment reminds us of the need to attend to both the disappeared aspect of place as well as those that presently dys-appear.

The bodily basis of the paired-opposites and spatial metaphors requires a maximalist approach to understanding the human experience of the physical environment. Rather than debating whether place is "a container" or "an intersection," one asks instead:

- How does this particular space make use of the dynamics of containment? What is literally and figurative held inside? What is literally or figuratively kept outside? What constitutes the boundary between inside and outside?

    ...as well as...

- What meetings and intersections occur in this particular place? How does the physical arrangement of this site facilitate intersections? Prevent intersections?

A similar list of questions can be generated for each of the paired opposites:

- What aspects of this place are stable, in place? What aspects of this place are open and allow for movement?
- How does movement express or capture the passage of time in this location? How does stability create a ground of stability against which that movement passes?
- What is central within this space? What people, objects, or actions are made focal? What people, objects, or actions are peripheral in this space? How do peripheral/background elements enable other elements to stand out in focus?

Such a maximalist approach does not require that every discussion of place—liturgical or otherwise—address all of these questions. Indeed, one often has to focus upon one aspect

of place over and against another as figure to ground. A maximalist approach does, however, militate against any attempt to *reduce* place to a single aspect.

With this maximalist approach to place in mind, two characteristics of prior reflection on liturgical spaces deserve reconsideration. First, discussions of sacred space traditionally focused on the symbolic content of the architecture, thus attending primarily to what a particular space made *central* and stable.[46] More recent treatments concerned with questions of power and inclusion have focused on the ability of the physical environment to contain and exclude. In both cases, the discussion of place has focused upon a single aspect.

Second, Lathrop's discussion of place remains remarkable for its ability to hold together and relate different aspects of the physical environment. By avoiding any attempt to define place, Lathrop frees himself to focus on various aspects as each becomes relevant to the core symbols and structure of the liturgy. The repeated call to allow the central symbols to "stand forth clearly" and "in strength" relies upon the ability of places to focus our attention on certain persons, objects, and actions. At the same time, the gathering of a liturgical assembly with*in* a particular place can tempt that assembly to harden the literal and figurative barriers between themselves and those *out*side the assembly. By juxtaposing the central symbols with the assembly itself, Lathrop aims to mitigate one dynamic of place (inclusion and exclusion, an aspect of Place Is a Container) by using another (symbols kept central).

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[46] Bruggink and Droppers provide a poignant example of this emphasis upon the symbolic content of architecture: "If the gospel of Christ is worthy of accurate verbal proclamation week by week, it is also worthy of faithful architectural proclamation, where its message speaks year after year." Donald J. Bruggink and Carl H. Droppers, *Christ and Architecture: Building Presbyterian/Reformed Churches* (Grand Rapids, MI : Eerdmans, 1965).

Insofar as the metaphorical structure of human thought and speech arises from the nature of embodiment, the paired-opposites and spatial metaphors used by theologians of place suggest what it means for creatures with bodies like ours to be emplaced—conceiving of time (at least in part) through the contrast of objects in motion against a static field; negotiating between objects in place and the spaces between them, etc. These aspects of emplacement combine with another from the beginning of this chapter—disappearance/dys-appearance. This latter aspect suggests the need to develop an analytical approach to the physical environment generally that bears in mind that the salience of some aspects does not constitute the totality of place, that indeed we may overlook those aspects of the physical environment that function best and have therefore disappeared.[47]

Place-Making as a Technology

Human anatomy and physiology shape the way humans inhabit and navigate the physical environment. In turn, the patterns of perception and navigation shape human cognition and speech.[48] A combination of phenomenological reflection (Leder) and analysis of spatial metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson) within theologies of place revealed some of these key aspects of human embodiment and emplacement: disappearance/dys-

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[47] To this point, I have spoken of different "aspects" and "dynamics" of place, using the two terms more or less interchangeably. "Aspects" highlights the diverse, complementary components of being emplaced with bodies like ours while "dynamics" emphasizes the role of time, movement, and change in our understanding of the physical environment. Lakoff and Johnson, who cite Leder, make the claim that conscious thought recruits portions of the human brain primarily associated with "the body" and its movement. The shared cognitive resources result in the metaphorical structure of thought and speech. "Dynamics" seeks to eliminate any version of onto-valuational dualism, including traditional/popular theological anthropologies. As discussed in the final chapter, Joel Green argues for the abandonment of onto-valuational dualism and the antagonism of "body" and "soul," suggesting instead an anthropology in which the soul denotes an aspect of the human being. See Green, *Body, Soul, and the Human Life* , *5ff.*

[48] Leder and Lakoff and Johnson offer different accounts of how this shaping occurs. As noted above, Leder employs the language of "vectors," by which he means interpretive possibilities. Some experiences, he argues, simply lend themselves to some interpretations and not others.

appearance, things in place and the spaces between them, focus and periphery, containment, movement and stability, and so forth.[49]

Humans not only inhabit and navigate their physical environments, of course: they shape and maintain them as well. Thus, the several dynamics of emplacement not only reveal something of the human *experience* of place, they also suggest the various tools available to humans as they shape their physical environments. The remainder of this chapter turns from place and the dynamics of embodiment and emplacement to the technology of place-making.[50]

Popular discussions of technology often focus on new electronic and computer gadgetry. The same largely holds true for discussions of technology within worship settings, where technology denotes electronically-powered equipment, especially musical instruments and communications media like projectors, television screens, and holograms. Within worship and without, these electronic and computation technologies may disrupt familiar patterns of behavior. Put differently, the introduction of these technologies creates dysfunction, making these new technologies dys-appear while an array of other technologies continues to function normally. As with the dys-appearance of the body, discussions of technology skew toward the introduction of tools, techniques,

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[49] In *Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception*, Yi-Fu Tuan explores how the particularities of the human sensorium creates a perceptual world. This chapter has a similar aim using different aspects of perception. Rather than focusing chiefly upon the "five senses" and their perceptive abilities of a world "out there," focusing on proprioception (an "internal sense") provided a means of examining how other human facilities shape our perception of the physical world. See Yi-Fu Tuan, *Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and Values* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1974)*,* 6ff.

[50] In *Christian Worship and Technological Change*, Susan J. White offers an account of technology that is similarly expansive as to the one offered here. She argues that "not only [will] nearly every person who will participate in an act of Christian worship next Sunday morning [will also be caught up in the experience of technologized living during the rest of the week, but also...technology and the liturgy have been involved in mutual interchange in every period of human history." Susan White, *Christian Worship and Technological Change* (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1994), 121-2.

and social arrangements that discernibly alter familiar patterns of behavior, including worship.[51]

Technologies often extend human capacities beyond the innate capabilities of a single human, with human manufactured artifacts providing the most obvious examples. Hammers direct a significant amount of force to a small surface area in a manner neither hand nor foot nor forehead could safely accomplish. Clothing extends the body's ability to maintain temperature, creates another layer of protection beyond the skin, and provides a durable communications medium to others and to the self. Calculators allow humans to engage in mathematical calculations of greater complexity and with greater speed than they could ever perform on their own.

As noted above, however, the use of a tool often requires learning how to employ it. With repeated, intentional use initial clumsiness with a hammer can become the deft handling of a tool. The initial concentration required in wielding the hammer gives way to what Leder calls "incorporation," "to bring within a body."[52]

> The problematic nature of these novel gestures tends to provoke explicit body awareness...Yet the successful acquisition of a new ability coincides with a phenomenological effacement of all this. The thematization [conscious awareness] of rules, of examples, of my own embodiment, falls away once I truly know how to swim.[53]

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[51] A poignant example may be found in a 1929 Emory BDiv thesis, "The Church Bulletin." Earl Burton Emmerich wrote to scores of congregations across the United States requesting copies of their bulletins. These now broadly available tools, he argues, provide a range of particular benefits to the congregation and guests. Often left in hotel rooms, the bulletins could help visitors to the area help locate a worship service they could attend while in in town. The image of the church on the front of the bulletin helped them identify the very building itself. These and other benefits of the bulletin commended their use in every congregation. Emmerich had to defend the introduction of an artifact into worship that today many assume as an essential component of worship. After habitual use, the novelty and disruptive nature of bulletins has disappeared.

[52] Leder, 31.

[53] Leder, 31

This suggests, then, that a constitutive part of technology is the learned ability to make use of a tool, "for the incorporation of a tool always involves the concurrent mastery of the skill whereby it is employed. The blind man incorporates not only the stick but a new sensorimotor schema."[54] Others may participate in abetting that incorporation, employing various pedagogies to assist others in the use of a novel tool. Manual lessons like scales on a piano, practicing handwriting, and the repetitive striking of the same key in typing lessons provide salient examples of learning to use a tool with the pedagogical assistance of another.

The example of learning how to use a single tool—hammer or piano, calculator or typewriter—illustrates how a single technology can extend the native capacities of an individual. The example, however, has two important limitations that require a more expanded definition of technology.

The first limitation becomes apparent when we remove the tool itself. What if technology meant not only *artifacts* that extend native human capacities, but anything that extends native human capacities with or without a particular tool. Native human skill at swimming may be debatable, but techniques for moving through the water more efficiently and more quickly can be discerned, learned, and taught. Taking away a particular artifact reveals that techniques themselves may be understood as extending human capacities. Here again, certain examples prove the most obvious. The training of athletes does not simply focus upon acquiring speed or power, but upon particular forms, strides, *techniques*. Techniques without tools exist elsewhere, of course. Various ascetic practices—fasting, for example, or learned patterns of breathing—can alter body

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[54] Leder, 179.

chemistry, shaping how the practitioner thinks and feels, inducing certain states of consciousness.[55] Use of mnemonic devices like memory palaces extend native capabilities to remember. Similarly, social arrangements can extend individual human capacities without tools as an intermediary. Simply lifting a heavy object with the help of another extends the capabilities of an individual. Notably, such an activity often requires learned patterns of coordination—knowing precisely *when* to lift, for example. Rudimentary divisions of labor extend individual capacities by off-loading required (or elective) tasks onto others, thus freeing individuals to focus on other responsibilities.

A baseball team provides an example of how all three technologies—tools, techniques, and "togetherness"—combine to extend the capacities of a single individual. The task of those playing defense is to a) to pass a ball in front of three consecutive hitters. In the event the hitter hits a fair ball, the defense has a new task, b) preventing her from touching four consecutive plates either by catching her hit in the air or getting her otherwise "out." To accomplish this goal, the defense combines a number of artifacts (gloves, uniforms, cleats), techniques (learned ability to throw and catch the ball), and practiced patterns of social coordination (throwing the ball from one person to the next).

Expanding the definition of technology to include techniques and "togetherness" in turn yields an expanded understanding of place-making. The most obvious components of place-making may well be alterations to the physical environment: walls and roofs and windows and so forth. As Mary McClintock Fulkerson has aptly pointed out in *Places of Redemption*, however, place-making often also includes shared practices and

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[55] While I have here chosen to use "tool" in a rarefied manner for the sake of clarity, it would normally not seem unnatural to describe fasting, rhythmic breathing, or other spiritual practices as "tools." This suggests an acknowledgment that their use is a change in regular patterns of behavior that has some particular *telos.*

techniques.[56] Of particular import for present purposes, an outdoor gathering like the love feast becomes visible as an act of place-making despite the lack of durable changes to the physical environment (walls, roofs, etc.). The love feast also becomes visible as a technology, as an extension or enhancement of individual participants.

The example of single tool as an extension of the self has another shortcoming as well. The typical thought experiment that accompanies the single tool takes the form, "What human capacity does this particular tool extend or enhance?" The hammer admits of a ready answer to such an inquiry, but nails do not. What human capacity does a nail extend? The ability to hold together two pieces of wood? Again, an adze clearly enables the application of force in a manner the human body alone cannot, but what of the wood beam created using the adze?

The recent shift toward defining technology in terms of human enhancement avoided the difficulties associated with some earlier, more anthropocentric definitions. "Technology" defined in opposition to "nature" implicitly pitted humans against other creatures. Other animals may build dams, nests, and colonies, but they did so as a matter of nature, through instinct. Humans alone learned and adapted, humans alone crafted tools. The paired opposites "technology versus nature" paralleled the division between soul and body within onto-valuational dualism. Humans differed from other animals as souls to bodies, so did their tools (technology). If replacing "technology versus nature" for "technology extends native human capacities" has the benefit of avoiding anthropocentrism, it has the consequence of overlooking a constitutive component of

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[56] Of central concern in *Places of Redemption* are the aversive responses of whites to non-whites. McClintock-Fulkerson herself acknowledges that she herself has learned--and therefore must unlearn--this pattern of behavior. Eliminating these aversive responses requires, *inter alia*, identifying the behavior in oneself, acknowledging the undesirability of the behavior, etc. Thus, aversive response calls for the employment of *techniques* to alter oneself.

technologies like place-making: creating both temporary and durable change to the physical environment, change that is not "natural."

Focusing on creating temporary and durable change provides a means of contrasting technology to nature without implicitly importing onto-valuational dualism. The material world consists of a network of causal chains, with one event—the movement of billiard balls, the falling of rain, the splitting of atoms—causing other effects, creating "networks, webs, and chains of material causes and effects through space."[57] Humans, like other animals, alter these causal chains, sometimes durably, sometimes temporarily. Beavers make dams that alter the flow of water of creeks and rivers. Ants dig tunnels and clear paths to move en masse.

At its most rudimentary level, human placemaking interrupts and alters causal chains. Roofs interrupt the "natural" flow of light and the "natural" falling of precipitation and foliage. Walls simultaneously keep out the "natural" elements, weather and animals alike. The laying of pavement creates a durable surface that impedes erosion and holds plant life at bay. Though contemporary life in the Western world has created layer upon layer of intricately woven causal chains (the Internet, power grids, and so forth), these additional layers rest upon, not replace, the rudimentary aspects of place: interrupting and altering causal chains. If distinguishing between human actions that alter causal chains and other animal actions that do so were necessary, one could point out that humans have to learn how to dig dams and make roads; beavers and ants do not.

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[57] Robert D. Sack, *Geography as a Tool for Developing the Mind* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2010.), 54.

An account of place-making as a technology that extends native human capacities by creating both durable and temporary effects has two important implications for the study of places, sacred and otherwise.

First, insofar as durable and temporary effects are part of place-making, then part of an analysis of place and place-making seeks to uncover what kinds of effects are created by the act of place-making. Of course, the focus within studies of liturgical architecture has been upon the durable structures created for worship—church and chapels, narthexes and naves. Viewing place-making as a technology expands the scope of changes under investigation. Beyond enduring or temporary changes to the material landscape, the changes to individuals and social arrangements also come into view. As a technology, place-making need not be a process through which one creates artifacts. As a technology, place-making may also be viewed as technique or particular form of social arrangement.

Perhaps more importantly, taking account of the creation of temporary and durable effects enables an expanded understanding of the dynamics of containment so central to the making of place. The chief concern of many contemporary theologians with the metaphor Place Is a Container lies in its social impacts: thinking of place (or the church) as a container, it is assumed, yields behavior that, like a container, keeps certain things, or people, outside. Hence the language of an "open" [Communion] table. Hence Lathrop suggests the need for the liturgical symbols to "break" place, lest the community forget to include those without. Hence Kathryn Tanner assails the exclusionary tendencies of post-liberal theology, suggesting instead the image that the Church be understood by what it keeps central (rather than what it keeps out).

Focusing on temporary and durable *material* effects allows a more expansive understanding of the dynamics of containment. The qualms with Place (or Church) Is a Container focus entirely upon exclusion of some perceived other. But the dynamics of containment are multiple. Like smaller containers, buildings and rooms keep certain things in. An exterior wall not only interrupts movement of sunlight, wind, and debris; that wall may also create a container to interrupt or bracket "natural" dynamics within. The air-conditioned building requires not only the introduction of an HVAC system, but also walls, roofing, and apertures with sufficient insulation to prevent the "natural" dissipation of cold air. The interior surfaces of a sanctuary can absorb and magnify the sound of voices and instruments by their ability to "contain" sound. Sometimes, place making alters causal chains not primarily to exclude, but to amplify, intensify, or hold together.

At the same time, the dynamics of place as a container and place/space work together. Dillistone primarily associated place with fixity and stability with*in* a community, thus he blended the two dynamics and implicitly connected openness to being "outside" (not with*in*) a place. As a result, he conflates the two dynamics, with stability and interiority being conflated, the same with openness and exteriority. Those who, like Dillistone, conflate openness with exteriority fail to recognize how the dynamics of containment create openness and freedom *within* a container. By interrupting "natural" causal chains, walls and roofs and floors create spaces of openness that are free *from* sunlight, wind, noise, and so forth. That empty urban sanctuaries can serve as places of quiet respite relies precisely upon the fact that the buildings dampen exterior sound. In much the same way the bodily stillness of congregants in *Do This in Remembrance*

creates a particular kind of interior space, so too the physical environment can create space, freedom, and openness *within.*

Durable Effects of Another Sort

The most durable impacts of the technology of place-making are frequently the buildings and other transformations of the physical environment. Humans do, however, make places to elicit less durable effects, including emotional excitation and moral transformation. The sociologist Randall Collins offers an account of ritual that makes apparent how ritual activities like the liturgy shape the physical environment of participants to establish durable bonds between participants, elicit "collective effervescence," and imbue symbols with emotional power. Further, Collins shows how materiality in the form of human embodiment pervades such rituals, indeed, making them possible at all. "Ritual is essentially a bodily process. Human bodies moving into the same place starts off the ritual process."[58] Prior to the maintenance of boundaries, subjective or otherwise, rituals begin by bringing individuals together, i.e., Place Is an Intersection.

Seeking to fuse the ritual insights of Emile Durkheim with the micro-sociology of Erving Goffman, Collins offers an account of ritual that includes the physiological and material processes behind a) the creation of symbols, b) the forging of group solidarity, and c) the transformation of emotional excitation within rituals (i.e., Durkheim's collective effervescence) into durable moral dispositions. Rituals in this account have four basic "ingredients."

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[58] Randall Collins, *Interaction Ritual Chains* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 53.

First, two or more people must be gathered together in sufficient proximity for the bodies of those gathered to attune to one another. This attunement includes an array of ways that individuals interact, conscious and unconsciously, with one another. Humans within proximity to one another engage in ongoing "'tacit monitoring,' to make sure nothing abnormal or threatening is in the offing…"[59] When humans move from unfocused interaction to focused interaction, their bodies begin to interact with one another in subtle ways. Persons engrossed in conversation with one another (i.e., in focused interaction) exhibit a number of unconscious synchronizations. These synchronizations range from the timing of bodily gestures and vocal inflection to the matching of certain brainwaves and the nearly inaudible drone-like hum humans in conversation emit.[60] This bodily synchronization is possible because "humans as animals have evolved with nervous systems that pay attention to each other…"[61] But in order for bodies to attune to one another, they must be within *range* of one another. Hence the first component of Collins' ritual is gathering together in physical proximity.

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[59] Ibid., 23. As described by Erving Goffman, such tacit monitoring of *others* resembles the tacit monitoring of our bodies in the midst of "disappearance." See Erving Goffman, *Behavior in Public Places: Notes on the Social Organization of Gatherings* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

[60] Collins, *Interaction Ritual Chains,* 75-9, 137-9. On the synchronization of bodily movements, see William S. Condon and W.D. Ogston, "Speech and Body Motion Synchrony of the Speaker-Hearer" in *Perception of Language,* ed. D. D. Horton and J. J. Jenkins (Columbus, OH: Merrill, 1971); Adam Kendon, "Movement Coordination in Social Interaction," *Acta Psychologica* 32 (1970): 1-25; J. N. Capella, "Mutual Influence in Expressive Behavior: Adult-Adult and Infant-Adult Dyadic Interaction," *Psychological Bulletin* 89 (1981): 101-32; William S. Condon and Louis W. Sander, "Neonate Movement of Synchrony Demonstrated between Movements of the Neonate and Adult Speech," *Child Development* 45, no 2 (1974): 456-62; William S. Condon and Louis W. Sander, "Neonate Movement is Synchronized with Adult Speech: Interactional Participation and Language Acquisition," *Science* 183 (1974): 99-101. On the synchronization of subliminal sound waves, see Stanford Gregory, Stephen Webster, and Gang Huang, "Voice Pitch and Amplitude Convergence as a Metric of Quality in Dyadic Interviews," *Language and Communication*, 13 (1993): 195-217.

[61] Collins, *Interaction Ritual Chains,* 53.

The second ingredient of these rituals is boundaries to outsiders that provide ritual participants a clear sense of who is and is not participating.[62] Some of this boundary setting is practical: individuals within range of bodily attunement who do not participate in the ritual can become "wet blankets," inhibiting the bodily and emotional attunement of other participants.[63] Such individuals can simply be distracting because unwilling to synchronize their actions, undercutting focused attention. Less salutary is the link between ritual action, the formation of solidarity, and defensiveness about the ritual community and its symbols.[64]

Third, people "focus their attention upon a common object or activity, and by communicating their focus to each other become mutually aware of each other's focus of attention."[65] The focus of attention may be a "religious" symbol in the traditional sense—a statue of a saint or deity, for example. Collins argues, however, that nearly any object, activity, or topic can become the object of mutual focus, and thus serve as a symbol of the community (his later chapters treat sex, cigarette smoking, and the modern symbol of "the individual").

Finally, ritual participants share a common mood or emotion, what Collins calls "emotional entrainment." Participants must be open to participation in the ritual, willing to allow the movements and the energy of the community to shape their actions and focus. This openness, in turn, abets the feedback loop of bodily attunement and anticipation of others' movements, speech, and emotions.

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[62] Ibid., 47.

[63] Ibid., 282.

[64] Ibid., 109.

[65] Ibid., 48.

A successful ritual combines these four ingredients—physical proximity and coordination, clear boundaries, shared focus, and increasingly shared mood or emotion—yielding within participants a sense of euphoria and empowerment.[66] That "collective effervescence," quite palpable during the ritual itself, translates into an enduring (though by no means permanent) disposition, one marked by concern for the ritual community, value of the ritual's symbols, and a sense of efficacy and moral focus. As summarized by Collins, rituals...

> ...that combine a high degree of mutual focus of attention, that is, a high degree of intersubjectivity, together with a high degree of emotional entrainment—through bodily synchronization, mutual stimulation/arousal of participants' nervous systems—result in feelings of membership that are attached to cognitive symbols; and result also in the emotional energy of individual participants, giving them feelings of confidence, enthusiasm, and desire for action in what they consider a morally proper path.[67]

The energy built up from participation in ritual gets stored in both the ritual symbols and in the individuals who participate. The symbols retain a durable (but again, not permanent) ability to evoke the feelings of the ritual. Participants remain charged with the emotional energy created during the ritual, acting like "batteries" that require regular charging by repeated participation in rituals. Indeed, humans are the links between rituals, what Collins calls "interaction ritual chains." "In a strong sense, the individual is the interaction ritual chain. The individual is the precipitate of past interaction situations and an ingredient of each new situation."[68]

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[66] Collins notes that rituals do fail to create the kind of mutual focus and emotional entrainment required to create a sense of collective euphoria and solidarity. Language about "empty rituals," for example, suggests that at least the commentator failed to participate in the ritual. See Ibid., 51-3.

[67] Ibid., 42.

[68] Ibid., 5.

Collins' account of rituals provides an apt example of a place-making activity where multiple spatial dynamics are simultaneously at play. If we begin by looking for the dynamics we identified in the previous chapter—space and place (openness and stability), space and time (temporal stability and change), center and periphery, containment, and encounter—rituals employ several of these simultaneously. Because effective rituals require physical proximity to other participants, rituals begin by drawing people together (Place Is an Intersection) and keeping them there (Place Is a Container) long enough to enact the ritual. Mutual entrainment requires not only physical proximity, however, but a shared focus upon group symbols (center and periphery). Moreover, mutual entrainment requires ritual settings that exclude non-participants whose inactivity could damped the excitation of the ritual itself (containment). When combined, these various spatial dynamics enable a mutual entrainment that creates a durable (if impermanent) emotional charge that energizes participants and binds them together. Effective rituals, then, are a technology that employs facets of the physical environment (including the presence of other participants) to create both temporary and durable effects.

Understanding Emplacement through the Body

This chapter began its exploration of place and place-making by focusing upon the human body. The particularities of human anatomy and physiology not only shape how humans experience the physical environment, the body also shapes how humans think and speak about the physical environment. With this in mind, the paired opposites and spatial metaphors found throughout recent theological reflection on place are seen

not simply as rhetorical choices, but evidence of a discrete number of spatial dynamics of human embodiment: stability and openness, center and periphery, containment, and intersections. Those dynamics, in turn, become the tools that humans use to construct places. As a human technology, place-making uses the dynamics of place to create both temporary and durable effects, both physical and social. The micro-sociology of Randall Collins provides a further lens to help us identify durable social effects within acts of place-making.

The final chapter turns to the love feast with which this thesis began. Through the lens of place-making as a technology, dynamics of place appear within that simple gathering that a focus on liturgical symbolism and consecration rites would overlook.

CHAPTER 4
THE LOVE FEAST AS PLACE, THE LITURGY AS PLACE-MAKING

The previous chapter outlined a new approach to analyzing the human interaction

with the physical environment. The first portion of the chapter focused on how the human

body shapes our experience of the physical environment and our discourse about the

physical environment. Following the phenomenological analysis of Drew Leder, the

human body exhibits the dynamic of disappearance and dys-appearance. Well-

functioning aspects of our bodies often do not rise to the level of conscious awareness

(what Leder calls "thematization") until something dysfunctions. That dysfunction, in

turn, makes the body "dys-appear," drawing attention to the site of the dysfunction and

attenuating our ability to attend to other goals and aims. In turn, argues Leder, the

dynamic of disappearance and dys-appearance shapes our discourse about the body. The

hiddenness of the body amidst proper functioning combines with the dys-appearance of

the body amid dysfunction to yield an interpretive trajectory that regards the body as

negative, as something other than the self, especially when dysfunction (injury, illness, or

general wear) interferes with our goals and aims.

Insofar as interactions with the physical environment are comparable to the nature

of embodiment, the experience of place will also exhibit the dynamic of

disappearance/dys-appearance. Indeed, as the review of recent philosophical and

theological reflection on place has shown, dysfunction in some aspect of the human

relation to the physical environment often serves as the initial impetus for the discussion.

The resulting discourse about place has therefore skewed toward thinking of place in

terms of dysfunctional aspects, a move akin to understanding human anatomy primarily

through pathology. This suggests, in turn, the need for an analytical tool that can identify a range of aspects present in place and used in place-making.

Developing that tool began by examining the common metaphors and pairings used to describe the human experience with the physical environment. Pairings such as "space and time" and "place and space" occur frequently throughout recent philosophical and theological reflection on the physical environment. Similarly, certain metaphors occur frequently throughout these writings, including Place Is a Container and Place Is an Intersection, among others. Continuing the emphasis upon human embodiment as a lens upon our experience of and discourse about the physical environment, the previous chapter argues that the pairings and spatial metaphors used to discuss place have their origin in the nature of our embodiment. Mark Johnson and George Lakoff have argued that the metaphorical structure of human thought arises from the particularities of human anatomy and physiology. For example, the conflation of emotional proximity with physical warmth in speech arises because of the regular concurrence of both when caregivers hold babies against their bodies. A consideration of each of the pairings and metaphors used in recent discussions of place suggests that both pairings and metaphors have their origin in the nature of our embodiment. In turn, this suggests that no single pairing or metaphor can capture the breadth of the human experience of the physical environment. Instead, a robust analysis of place requires an awareness of the presence of multiple, concurrent dynamics.

The final section of the chapter began with the observation that humans not only experience and discuss the physical environment, they shape and maintain their environments as well. Human geographer Robert Sack outlines a theory of place-making

that focuses first upon the material conditions that underlie the making of place. Developing a theory of place-making from the ground up, Sack argues that the alteration of causal chains underlies all acts of place-making. Attending to the alteration of causal chains brings into view complementary dynamics of place-making that often escape detection when scholars focus upon dysfunctions of space. For example, the conflation of Place Is a Container with the dynamic of place and space yields the false conclusion that to be "contained" is to be "constrained," to lack freedom of movement. Attending to the alteration of causal chains, however, indicates that the fixity of external boundaries (containment) can create spaces of freedom *for* particular tasks. Sack notes that scientific laboratories make experimentation possible precisely by excluding a range of activities and creating a distinct physical environment. Exclusion under such circumstances becomes a freedom *from* in order to create a particular freedom *for…*

This concluding chapter returns to the event that opened this thesis—a Methodist Episcopal love feast held in Baltimore in 1804. Absent the elements traditionally discussed in analyses of liturgical spaces, the love feast focuses upon a practice of place-making that serves as a test case for the new framework for analyzing place developed in the last chapter. At the same time, this analysis of the love feast provides an alternative reading of the role of "power" in Christian communities while bringing to the fore two concerns of liturgical theology: 1) the relationship between divine action and human response and 2) the role of Christian liturgy in moral and spiritual formation.

The chapter begins by placing the love feast within the context of Wesleyan ecclesiology and the liturgical praxis of early Methodism. The chapter then examines the love feast through the lens of the methodology developed in the preceding chapter, place-

making as a technology. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the theoretical gains and challenges posed by the new model for analyzing place.

Love Feast in its Methodist Context

Until 1784, Methodism in the English colonies existed as a reform movement within the Anglican Church. Though the writings of John Wesley clearly attest to the on-going presence of those who called for separation from the Anglican Church (within England as elsewhere), the political separation of thirteen English colonies from Great Britain in 1783 prompted the formation of a distinct ecclesial body.

The formation of the Methodist Episcopal Church at the Christmas Conference of 1784 provides an important marker within Methodist historiography. The shift from movement within the Anglican Church to a "church" in its own right suggests that American Methodists had rejected the ecclesiological vision of John Wesley. The change in ecclesial status notwithstanding, American Methodists continued to employ liturgical practices and categories that mirrored the praxis and ecclesiology of John Wesley, even if in altered form.

For Wesley, the Anglican Church provided both access to the means of grace established by Christ (the "instituted means of grace") and objective theological standards that provided a shared doctrinal basis for early Methodists.[1] Relying on the Church of England to provide the sacraments and doctrinal standards freed early

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[1] David Lowes Watson, "The Origins and Significance of the Early Methodist Class Meeting" (PhD diss., Duke University, 1978), 171-2. Part of the call for separation from the Anglican Church *before* independence had been because Methodists had insufficient access to Anglican parishes where they could commune regularly. Too, John Wesley had commended the "Articles of Religion" of the Church of England (largely without redaction) to the Methodists of the United States.

Methodism to focus upon moral and spiritual transformation. In the words of David

Lowes Watson,

> It was much more [Wesley's] concern to pursue the theology and practice of
> discipleship, and what he perceived in the history of English Dissent was that
> discipline proved in the final analysis to be an elective concept of the faith. He
> also perceived that the larger ecclesia provided the inclusive order and structure
> without which a disciplined ecclesiola could now be free for the distinctive
> function of developing Christian discipleship.[2]

Wesley's focus upon Christian discipleship took the form of a variety of small gatherings.

These groups provided a means of mutual exhortation and encouragement as well as

examination. Though the purposes and structure of these small gatherings changed even

within Wesley's lifetime, the bands, societies, and classes all shared the cultivation of a

spiritual ethos through regular meetings that included some combination of mutual

sharing and accountability.

Wesley drew upon the Pietist tradition of *ecclesiola in ecclesia* to explain the

relationship of Methodism to the Church of England as a whole. Often paraphrased as

"little church in the big Church," *ecclesiola in ecclesia* provided a means of relating the

particularist, private gatherings to the larger life of a generalist and public Church.

The love feast emerged as part of the development of those private gatherings.

Methodist use of the love feast derived from a ritual employed by the Moravians, a

sharing of bread and water (sometimes coffee). At first exclusive to members of bands,

the love feast came to combine the ritual sharing of bread and water with mutual

exhortation, encouragement, and self-examination. In time, Wesley would promote the

love feast among all the Methodist gatherings, not just the highly selective bands. In

doing so, Wesley gave *ecclesiola in ecclesia* a concrete, ritual form: gathering with the

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[2] Ibid., 171-2. See also 158-9.

larger ecclesia meant participation with non-Methodist Christians in the liturgical life of the Church of England, gathering as *ecclesiola* meant joining exclusively Methodist gatherings for the private ritual of the love feast. Participating in both gave ritual form to *ecclesiola in ecclesia.*

After the formation of the Methodist Episcopal Church as an ecclesial body distinct from the Church of England, however, the ability of Methodists to continue this ritual embodiment of *ecclesiola in ecclesia* shifted. Methodists in the United States could no longer continue the dual participation in a public, Church of England liturgy while also regularly coming together in Methodist-only gatherings. When clergy were absent, Methodists gathered weekly for exclusively Methodist society meetings; where clergy were present, Methodists gathered for some combination of closed society meeting and public worship.[3]

The ritual embodiment of *ecclesiola in ecclesia* re-emerged in the dual public and private gatherings at the quarterly conference. Though originally a gathering of local Methodist clergy to conduct the business of a circuit, by 1784 the quarterly meeting had become a multi-day liturgical event that gathered hundreds, sometimes thousands of Methodists from the surrounding area. Quarterly conferences included a range of ritual activities—public preaching and exhortation, hymn singing, the Eucharist, love feasts, as well as various pastoral rites, as the occasion made necessary.[4]

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[3] The majority of Methodists in the New World would have had no regular access to an Anglican parish where they could participate in a public liturgy (alongside their own Methodist societal gatherings). It is therefore all the more striking that American Methodism would recreate the ritual form of *ecclesiola in ecclesia* within the setting of the quarterly conference.

[4] Lester Ruth, *A Little Heaven Below: Worship at Early Methodist Quarterly Meetings* (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 2000), 41ff, 97. The difference between preaching and exhorting lie both in the status of the speaker and the content of the message. Generally speaking, clergy alone could interpret a passage of Scripture for the gathered community. Sermons were therefore the prerogative of the clergy.

As the quarterly conference grew from business meeting to regional gathering, Methodists planned their conferences on weekends, thus enabling a broader range of participants to attend. Slaves, for example, would have been more likely to be given liberty to travel on a Sunday than any other day of the week. "In addition to a greater attendance of slaves, others noted that Sunday attracted more wealthy people, who seemingly were too disinterested to attend on other days, and more poor people, 'especially those of our own society,' who could not spare the time or procure horses otherwise."[5] Moving the quarterly conference to weekends yielded a more or less standard format for the gathering, with the business meeting, preaching, and exhortation taking much of the time on Saturday and love feasts, Communion, and more preaching and exhortation on Sundays.[6] Though the order of the ritual elements varied somewhat, the location of the love feast on Sunday morning was nearly standard.

The ritual embodiment of *ecclesiola in ecclesia* at quarterly conferences appears most clearly in the contrasting behavior and vocabulary surrounding the love feast and Communion. Love feasts were almost entirely exclusive to those participating in Methodist society meetings *prior* to a particular quarterly conference. Exceptions could be made for persons whose character could be vouched for by love feast participants, but on the whole the gatherings were private, ideally held indoors. Absent an appropriate building, Methodists might cancel their love feasts or, as in the love feast described by Asbury, create a private space using their own bodies. At times, Communion would be incorporated into the private gathering following a love feast.

Notwithstanding their frequent use of Scriptural references, lay exhorters did not seek primarily to interpret Scripture.

[5] Ibid., 33.

[6] Ibid., 24, 104.

The vocabulary Methodists employed to distinguish the love feast from other liturgical elements parallels Methodist praxis. Methodists described gatherings exclusive to Methodists as "societal" (i.e., those regularly participating in a Methodist *society*).[7] Other elements such as preaching, exhortation, and the various pastoral rites were not exclusive to Methodists and could thus be celebrated within "the congregation," the designation for all those who had gathered at a quarterly conference. Early Methodists continued using a distinction found in the British *Large Minutes*, distinguishing between "private" elements exclusive to Methodists (i.e., the love feast) and "public" elements within the congregation.[8] The use of familial language like "brother" and "sister" only among fellow Methodists further marked the boundary between them and those within the larger "congregation."[9]

Notwithstanding the seriousness with which early Methodists enforced the privacy of love feasts—including occasionally physically removing persons from these private gatherings—the "societal" meetings of early Methodists were open to all, theologically speaking.[10] The Methodist societies in America employed a distinction made by Wesley with regard to class meetings in England. Rather than admitting only those who had experienced justifying faith, Wesley opened the class meetings to all those who sought to "flee the wrath to come." This included everyone, from those seeking a sense of conviction for their sinfulness through those who had experienced sanctifying grace in their lives. One did not therefore have to be "saved" to participate in these class

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[7] Ibid., 34-5, 42.

[8] Ibid., 34-5.

[9] Russell E. Richey, *Early American Methodism* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), 6.

[10] On "liturgical bouncers," see Ruth, *A Little Heaven Below,* 53.

meetings, only willing to participate in the life of the class meeting. Too, Wesley's Arminianism supposed that all persons received grace sufficient unto salvation. Thus, the Methodist class meetings—and later, the "societal" gatherings of American Methodists—were understood to be open to all those who responded to the grace freely given them.

The Baltimore love feast recalled by Asbury was likely one part of a quarterly conference, and therefore part of a larger event that had gathered Methodists and non-Methodists alike. As with many love feasts at quarterly meetings, those encircled Methodists almost certainly had a larger audience, onlookers excluded from participation.

The Ins and Outs of an *Ad Hoc* Place

The previous chapter noted the dominance of a discrete list of metaphors and metaphorical pairings within recent theological reflection on place. Understood as the various *aspects* of place, these metaphors also witnessed to the tools of making and sustaining places: fixity and openness (place and space), movement and stability (space and time), center and periphery, containment and exclusion (Place Is a Container), and encounter (Place Is an Intersection). In any given act of place-making, any or all of these dynamics may well be at play, perhaps even working at seeming cross purposes.

Perhaps most obviously, the love feast employs the dynamic behind the metaphor Place Is a Container. Holing themselves up inside buildings, guarding doors, forcibly removing those deemed not to belong: all of these place-making activities serve to create a hard boundary between those within and those without. A singular focus upon the dynamics of containment would only capture the apparent exclusivity of the love feast. The enforcement of that boundary, however, also makes possible the dynamic of

place/space. By employing both durable and temporary boundaries, Methodists created a space, an area that created a freedom *for* particular activities and the creation of a peculiar form of community.

The weekend format of the quarterly meeting enabled the gathering of a diverse crowd—Methodists and non-Methodists, rich and poor, slave and free. In the public, congregational portions of weekend, Methodists often followed the cultural norms regarding the segregation of seating and activities by race and sex.[11] The "private" gatherings of the love feast, however, provided a setting within which the norms of race, age, and sex were subverted.

As noted above, the love feast consisted of two primary components: personal testimonials and the sharing of water and bread. The testimonials held a certain practical primacy over the food ritual. If a love feast had had only "cold" testimonials, then Methodists often adjudged that no love feast had occurred at all.[12] According to Lester Ruth, the testimonials of the love feast had a more or less standardized content.

> Most were probably variations on a common theme: how that individual had gone through the various stages of salvation. As such, testimonies would have shared many of the same details and had the same basic order. That commonality was itself part of the benefit and purpose of testimonies. In this way, individual after individual reaffirmed the common understanding of salvation and demonstrated that the grace of God was indeed experienced among people like themselves.[13]

The personal rehearsal of the various stages of salvation provided a number of benefits to those listening. On the one hand, it served as a reiteration of the *via salutis* as understood by early Methodists. This was particularly important given that love feasts included

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[11] The same holds true for many of the weekly gatherings of Methodists, which often had separate class meetings depending upon sex, marital status, and race.

[12] Ibid., 107.

[13] Ibid., 109-10.

persons at different stages of spiritual experience: hearing the rehearsal of others'

journeys provided a framework for interpreting one's own experience and served to

encourage others to continue to "remain on the path toward conversion or sanctification

or both."[14] Notwithstanding its stereotyped elements, testimonies at the love feast

required a personal accounting of one's own experience often too intimate for public

airing. By providing a safe venue within which to offer personal testimony, the enclosure

of the love feast made possible greater openness and intimacy among participants.

Early Methodists understood that the enforced privacy of their "societal"

gatherings provided a distinct opportunity for a range of persons to offer their testimony.

"As the bishops noted in 1798, including unawakened persons could 'cramp, if not

entirely destroy that *liberty of speech*' in love feasts. A particular concern was preserving

the liberty of women members since some non-Methodists opposed women speaking in

the church."[15] Moreover, the love feast did not rely on clerical leadership, a fact

remarkable among a people who differentiated publicly those authorized to exegete

Scripture (elders and bishops) and those who could only exhort (exhorters). The private

setting of the love feast thus permitted a form of participation, if not a kind of leadership,

by those who elsewhere would have been silenced.

The privacy of the love feast created spaces not only for a variety of individuals, it

also helped to foster sense of fellowship so intense it strained the descriptive vocabulary

of its participants. "Simply put, Methodists believed that the quality of fellowship that

they frequently experienced in their restricted rituals was nothing less than a foretaste of

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[14] Ibid., 111. Indeed, Methodists had an entire vocabulary for the experiential mileposts along the *via salutis*. See Ibid., 36ff.

[15] Ibid., 116. Citing *The Doctrines and Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church in America, with Explanatory Notes* (Philadelphia, 1798), 73.

the quality of life in heaven itself. "[16] The use of eschatological language to describe their sense of fellowship at love feasts speaks to the affective intensity and sense of bonding among participants. Methodists understood the quality of fellowship *and* its composition as a foretaste of the eschaton. As such, the experience of that fellowship provided a witness to participants both of God's gracious action in the present and the promise of an eschatological joy yet to come.

The quality of the fellowship was noticed not only by participants in the love feast. Those excluded from participation also witnessed this fellowship, responding with a combination of attraction and revulsion. On the one hand, the love feast reviled onlookers by virtue of its exclusivity and its inclusivity. New England love feasts in particular were subject to violent interruption by a populace none too keen on religious exclusion.[17] Methodism also brought together as equals persons of low estate, including slaves and lower status whites. At the same time, the quality of the fellowship and the earnestness of those within the love feast attracted those excluded, convincing them to "to grieve over their own status as being separated from God and the people of God."[18]

Russell Richey has argued that the quarterly conference, especially the love feast, was the gospel of Methodism put on full display.

> There in the midst of the world—frequently outdoors or in public space so as to accommodate the crowds—community occurred, responded to the 'worde' of the fraternity, and was ordered by elder or superintendent. In quarterly meeting, Methodism most fully displayed its wares and was, in that sense, most fully the church.[19]

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[16] Ruth, *A Little Heaven Below*, 104.

[17] Ibid., 115.

[18] Ibid., 116.

[19] Richey, *Early American Methodism,* 12.

That embodiment and foretaste of the eschaton required early Methodists to have a space in which all could gather and participate—lay and clergy, slave and free, male and female—a space created by physical boundaries and put wholly on display.

Felt but Unseen Dimensions of an *Ad Hoc* Place

Having laid out both the structure and context of the love feast, we can now view it through the analytical lens developed in the previous chapter. Begin by identifying the various spatial dynamics co-present in the liturgical activity. Then determine both the likely durable and temporary effects upon participants and upon the physical environment generally. Finally, compare those effects with the stated objectives and perceptions of participants.

The formation of concentric circles in the middle of a field highlights the length to which early Methodists would go to create a *literal* and *figurative* space within which women and slaves could participate with white males, both lay and clergy. The willingness to enforce physical boundaries around their community provided the conditions for greater intimacy and openness. If nothing else, the love feast highlights the role of boundary-setting (Place Is a Container) in creating spaces of freedom and openness through maintaining boundaries.

One might describe this first account of place-making as the use of material conditions (gathering inside buildings, gathering in concentric circles) to create a subjective space in which the key role of materiality lies in the establishment of boundaries. The role of "the material" may chiefly be seen to be the establishment and maintenance of a physical boundary. Collins' account of ritual discussed in the previous

chapter provides a lens on the role of human embodiment and place-making in events like the love feast. With Collins in mind, four more dynamics of place emerge: Place Is an Intersection, focus and periphery, space and time, and Place Is a Container.

Physical proximity enables the mutually reinforcing dynamics of mutual attunement and emotional entrainment. Several facets of the love feast drew participants into sufficient physical proximity to allow for mutual attunement and emotional entrainment. Given the centrality of personal testimonies to the love feast, participants would have been arranged in such a manner so as to be able to hear one unamplified voice, thus drawing participants closer together. Meeting in buildings not designed for public gatherings (such as barns) or out in the open would have made proximity to the speaker—and thus to other participants—all the more important.

The matter of shared focus suggests the need for certain architectural forms. Shared focus means setting forth the community's symbols "clearly and in strength," to echo Lathrop. This may be as simple as attending to the possibilities for arranging participants so they are able a) to focus their attention, b) detect the focus other others, and c) synchronize their physical movements. Collins notes, moreover, that "sacred spaces" close out outside distractions. Too, setting aside specific buildings for ritual activities may enable those places to become charged as a kind of secondary symbol. A space reserved exclusively for a certain ritual activity not only reduces "interference" from non-ritual stimuli, it may also become "charged" with the emotional energy of the ritual itself. Inversely, ritual activities that consistently meet in *ad hoc* locations potentially remove the building as a possible symbol, though enabling a greater focus on other symbols within the rituals.

Absent a consistent gathering place, the love feast downplayed focus upon a particular physical setting, enabling other ritual foci to stand out. Given the account of the love feast offered above, two important foci emerge: the theological narrative of the *via salutis* (the path from being awakened to one's sinfulness through to Christian perfection) and the community itself. The largely stereotyped testimonies were the *sine qua non* of the love feast. More to the point, *cold* testimonies—those unable to excite or sustain an acceptable level of emotional energy—fell short of the ideal. In addition to the testimonies, the gathered community itself was charged as a symbol. The solidarity of the community was a frequent focus of conscious reflection among early Methodists, who regarded the quality of fellowship as a foretaste of the Kingdom fully come.[20]

The lack of a building may have further contributed not only to the focus upon the gathered community, but upon the very temporariness of that community. As Lester Ruth has noted, "now" was an important word both in its evangelical urgency and as an ecclesiological descriptor.

> There was great emphasis in early Methodist theology on the importance of the present time. "Now" was the favorite adverb of time. This "now," as represented in Methodist worship, contained both in a sense of great opportunity and of great urgency. Because faith was portrayed as the premier precondition for experiencing saving grace, a speaker at a Methodist public meeting could emphasize both the present opportunity for experiencing grace ("all people can respond, if they have faith!") and the present urgency to do so ("all people must respond; have faith!").[21]

At the same time, Methodists wrote of the pain they felt in having to leave one another after a love feast. Such was the rapture of their gathering that they not only described it in

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[20] The willingness to dismiss the validity of "cold testimonies" provides a safeguard against testimonies as a symbol generally. Protecting the validity of the testimony as a symbol benefits from being able to disqualify testimonies which fail to elicit sufficient mutual attunement and emotional entrainment.

[21] Ibid., 55.

eschatological and other-worldly terms, they envisioned the hereafter with reference to the love feast. "Their worship experience specifically caused them to envision heaven as a place where they would never have to part with their Methodist brothers and sisters again."[22]

A durable meeting location would have provided an object of stability that could have stood in the stead of the community, a specific artifact whose very stability might have offered some comfort to these Methodists. Absent such a building, the very temporariness of their gathering—the "now" of their community—would have stood out in greater contrast. Put in terms of spatial dynamics, the stability of a building could have provided the contrast of a "space" versus the movement, the temporality of the community ("time"). The absence of a stable *space* amplifies the very transience ("time") of the gathering.

Finally, Collins indicates two ways in which exclusion from participation in any given love feast abetted the mutual attunement and emotional entrainment of participants. The firm boundaries around the community created a real "other" against whom Methodists could define themselves. Methodists at times did succumb to the temptation to contrast themselves to the "bad" or the "wicked" who did not participate in their gatherings.[23] At the same time, the testimonies each offered would have recounted their own former status (as having once been "bad" or "wicked") and ascribed to God credit for making their transformation possible.

Because the prerequisites for participation in a love feast were at least theoretically open to everyone, only a particular love feast would have been foreclosed to

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[22] Ibid., 152.

[23] Ibid., 118.

non-Methodists. Subsequent love feasts would be open to them should they chose to participate in Methodist societal gatherings henceforth. In light of Collins' account of ritual, the practical outcome of this would be the potential exclusion of those who a) had not already committed to the symbols of the community (the *via salutis* as recounted in testimonies and the community itself), b) had not begun to practice participating in the offering of testimonies, and c) might therefore interfere with the ability of the community to become mutually attuned and emotionally entrained. Participants in the love feast had already gained experience in components of the ritual itself at early societal gatherings. That familiarity provided training in the object of mutual focus ("what should we be doing and attend to here?") and increased the possibility of participating in a manner that allowed mutual attunement and emotional entrainment.

Viewing the love feast as an act of place-making makes visible how these gatherings employed a range of spatial dynamics: space and place, focus and periphery, encounter (Place Is an Intersection), and containment (Place Is a Container). Combined, these dynamics fostered two important facets of early Methodist life: the radically egalitarian gatherings of the love feast and the energy to pursue a spirituality that was both robust and often counter-cultural.

Having employed a methodology that identifies a range of spatial dynamics at play, no single dynamic of the love feast emerges as *the* fact of place. This becomes important in light of contemporary concerns about belonging to a particular community (both geographic and social) and exclusion of outgroups. Those focused on the former may find an affinity with Place Is a Container, full of meaning and shared history. On the other side, the very exclusivity of such communities remains a persistent concern within

the academy and the Church. Beginning with a single metaphor of place would allow either side to defend their view of what is proper to place. Alternatively, beginning by identifying a range of potentially co-temporal dynamics shows how any given act of place-making simultaneously employs multiple spatial dynamics, some of which may be working in opposite directions. Hence the love feast is particularly apropos here—though temporary, these liturgical events would enforce strict physical and interpersonal boundaries in order to create a radically egalitarian space.

"Whither grace?"

The love feasts of early American Methodists strain the traditional approaches to discussing the physical environment within liturgical studies. The love feast required no dedicated space and, therefore, required neither consecratory rites nor left architectural remains to be analyzed. Similarly, early participants in the love feast ascribed holiness and sacrality to the gathered *community*, not to the physical setting itself. To the extent that the love feast created a sacred space, it was a sacred space that was temporally fleeting and dependent upon both the presence of the gathered community and having a "successful" love feast. The inability of traditional analytic methods to parse the spatial aspects of the love feast suggested the need for a new approach to studying place and place-making within liturgical studies.

Recent philosophical and theological reflection on place provides a range of resources upon which to draw for developing that new approach. As discussed in the second chapter, describing this corpus generically as "place theory" masks the significant amount of diversity within that corpus. More importantly, describing recent reflection on

place as "place theory" lends itself to incautious, *ad hoc* appropriations of its insights. Like liturgical theology, recent theological reflection on place in particular has challenged the anthropology and ontology of Modernity. Like the use of the pairing *lex orandi* and *lex credendi* within liturgical theology, the use of paired opposites within reflection on place has provided a means of contrasting Modern understandings of the physical environment (as abstract *space*, for example) to an account that did not give primacy to the ratiocinative and the abstract. Notwithstanding its internal diversity, recent reflection on place is no mere tool kit upon which liturgical theologians can draw *ad hoc*. The insights of recent reflection on place frequently come with anthropological and ontological commitments.

Thus prior to the appropriation of the insights of recent reflection on place, liturgical scholars must unearth the underlying anthropological and ontological assumptions of those reflections. By putting theologies of place in conversation with liturgical theology, one of the key challenges for appropriating place theory becomes apparent. Insofar as liturgical theory has wrestled with the theological ramifications of employing new anthropologies and ontologies, one can reasonably expect that use of a method that employs similar anthropologies and ontologies would raise similar questions about the relationship between divine action and human response. As suggested in the first chapter, liturgical theologians have frequently operated on an implicit assumption that the relationship between divine action and human response is zero sum. To offer an account that expands the explanatory role of materiality and human bodiliness appears to "take ground" from God and diminish the explanatory role of divine action. Developing a new method of analyzing place requires an awareness, then, of both a) the

anthropological and ontological presuppositions of any given theory of place as well as b) the concerns the new method may well arouse about the relationship of divine action to human response.

Theories of place are not, however, without their own internal challenges. The second chapter reviewed recent theological reflection on place, noting four problematic tendencies. First, reflections on place frequently employed a single pair of opposites or a single spatial metaphor—place and space, space and time, and so forth—as a heuristic device through which to examine the relationship of humans to the physical environment. Second, use of these paired opposites often shifts between descriptions of the physical environment and non-literal uses, frequently descriptions of social phenomena. The seamlessness of that shift often obscured the movement from a) discussing the *physical* environment in spatial terms to b) discussion of the *social* environment in spatial terms. Finally, the discussion of place often had as its initial impetus some concern about changes in social and geographic arrangement. In turn, this initial concern often skewed the consequent discussion of the physical environment toward the resolution of that problem. As such, "place" became more or less synonymous with the facet of the physical environment that had drawn the author's attention at the outset.

The third chapter took a different approach to developing a new method for analyzing place within liturgical theology. Beginning with the presupposition that one cannot understand the human experience of and discourse about place apart from the nature of human embodiment itself, the third chapter presents a phenomenological foundation for an account of place and place-making. Examining our experience of and discourse about place through the lens of embodiment provided suggestive explanations

for trends within recent reflection on place, particularly the prevalence of certain paired opposites and spatial metaphors.

The phenomenological approach served an important theological purpose as well. As noted in the introduction, Bonnie Miller-McLemore argues that discussions of the body that attempt to overcome Cartesian dualism frequently discuss the body in dualistic terms, as when the body is treated as a construction [in the mind] or as the object of observation [by others]. By rooting their understanding of the human in the particularities of human anatomy and physiology, Leder, Johnson, and Lakoff provide one approach to understanding our experience of and discourse about place that foregrounds the human body and materiality without reducing either to the implicit dualism of social construction (i.e., what a thing *is* is what we have come to *think* it is).

Zero Sum

That early Methodists described the love feast as a prudential means of grace denotes early Methodists' awareness that the love feast was chiefly valuable as a means toward specific outcomes. Wesley described those channels of grace "enjoined in the teaching and example of Jesus Christ in the gospels" as "instituted" means of grace, incumbent upon all Christians. Thus, Wesley would distinguish the Eucharist, prayer, and other instituted means from those practices that had been found to help individuals and communities "grow in grace." These "prudential" means of grace were understood as elective and, as with the love feast, a means of shaping the life of a particular Christian community, one "little church" within "the big Church."

Liturgical theology has assumed two zero-sum dynamics within the liturgy. As discussed throughout this thesis, the most prominent of zero-sum assumption pits divine action against human response. Another zero-sum context emerges when liturgical theologians and others assume, like Henri Lefebvre, that power is essentially agonistic and, therefore, zero-sum.

Describing the love feast and other activities as prudential means of grace indicates Wesley's insight that these means were contingent, apt vehicles toward certain spiritual and formative ends. In Wesley's thinking, those vehicles provided channels of grace, God's presence *and* power to transform individuals. The current account might add that such activities also drew upon a means of collective transformation present when individuals gather, mutually focus, and engage in mutual attunement and emotional entrainment. We might think of this also (and simultaneously) as the harnessing of a kind of interpersonal *power*, dynamics which abet solidarity and personal transformation. In contrast to the presumption of power as chiefly agonistic, Methodist societies—contingent and ostensibly open to all comers—make evident the possibility that power can be shared, garnered, used for mutual benefit. No doubt early Methodists were embedded within a larger context in which race and gender were caught in agonistic dynamics. Nonetheless, Collins highlights the possibility that rituals like the love feast might indeed employ power in non-agonistic ways, indeed in ways that seek to build up rather than tear down or replace.

Examining the dynamics of place in the Methodist love feast provided an opportunity to examine the spatial dynamics of a Christian liturgy with all of the typical spatial accoutrement stripped away. Sans building and consecratory rite, the spatial

dynamics of place—which is to say the material, embodied, emplaced dynamics—come most clearly into view. No one dynamic of place could describe the love feast. Reduction to place or space, place as a seat of relations versus place as a container, or space versus time would yield, at a minimum, an incomplete picture of how the physical environment fosters and abets the gathered community. A fulsome account of the physical environment begins by identifying the range of possible dynamics involved in the making and maintaining of places. Though an outdoor gathering, the love feast may at first appear to have occurred simply in some available space (and not really a particular place), examining the love feast through the lens of spatial dynamics shows that multiple dynamics of place and place-making are simultaneously at place in that "space."

Calling attention to these spatial dynamics, however, brings us face-to-face with one of the abiding concerns of liturgical theology: the relationship between divine action and human response. Early Methodists understood grace as the presence and power of the Holy Spirit working within them. Any time one experienced the power of God—felt the calming of assurance of justification, freedom from sin, and so forth—one was encountering nothing less than the power of God working within. Early Methodists described worship settings in which "the Spirit moved" as "a work of the Lord." Moreover, they attributed the moral transformation in their lives to God's handiwork.

Attending to the material aspects of place-making means taking seriously human embodiment, not first as a construct and as an object to be read by others, but as the condition for our interaction with the rest of the material world. At the same time, it means taking seriously the possibility that some of what we have previously attributed to divine action may well have a material basis in the human body. Given the zero-sum

context that liturgical theology often presupposes, acknowledging the ability of our nervous systems to respond to one another and to engage in mutual excitation has the appearance of ascribing to humans and the material world what once would have been ascribed to the Holy Spirit. In a zero-sum context, God has "lost" ground.

To this there are two important responses to liturgical theology. First, rather than viewing the relationship of divine action to human response as a zero-sum game, that relationship may simply be more dynamic and less discernible to humans than was presupposed by Christian theology shaped by the assumptions of Modernity. Liturgical theology arose within the context of new anthropologies challenging earlier presumptions about the relationship between "theology" and "worship." With little exaggeration one could argue that liturgical theology sought to articulate the role for worship in the Christian life once the belief that human beings are primarily "thinking things" had come into doubt. With that doubt also came a questioning of the nature of faith primarily as cognitive assent to certain premises about God. Though liturgical theologians have sought to articulate the role of worship in the Christian life in contrast to the anthropological assumptions of Modernity, they have largely left unchallenged the Modern presupposition that the distinction between divine action and human response was a) a zero-sum game b) with clear and discernable boundaries.

Expanding our understanding of the material and anthropological inputs to worship and creaturely formation requires us to reformulate our understanding and teaching about the respective role of God and humanity in the liturgy. Without desiring either to be glib or trite, that lack of clarity coupled with a belief that God is active

despite the unclarity may indeed be a more robust form of faith for a people who see as in a mirror dimly.

If I may add here a biographical note, I myself have found my understanding—in the religiously interesting sense—challenged by those scientific and anthropological advances which "explain away" experiences and phenomena previously attributed to God. As described by Leder, onto-valuational dualism is a sort of liturgical piety, a perceptive framework that worshipers bring with them into the liturgy, "a cosmic feeling in the deepest organic way…[24] Offering a rejigged account of the relationship of worshipers to God and to other worshipers has at times left me with a palpable sense of loss, of a need to find a new footing. I say this to say that I take most seriously those concerned about liturgical theology being "insufficiently theological" because "too anthropological."

Discourse and Practice

The dynamic of bodily disappearance/dys-appearance requires a more nuanced approach to the relationship of thought to action, discourse to practice. Leder's dynamic of bodily disappearance/dys-appearance, the bodily foundations of metaphorical thought, and Collins' interaction ritual chains all employ an anthropology which presumes that humans are not wholly transparent to themselves. Our bodies engage in an on-going monitoring of ambient conditions that frequently does not rise to the level of conscious reflection; we think and speak in metaphors shaped by embodied experience; we feel the effects of synchrony with other persons without knowing that our bodies work like

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[24] To be clear, this description is offered of paganism as a one set of "cosmic feelings" that have carried by worshipers into the liturgy.

interpersonal antennae. In each case, there are more dynamics at play in our interaction with the world and with one another than rises to our conscious awareness. More importantly, given the dynamics of disappearance/dys-appearance, what rises to the level of conscious awareness may in fact be only a small portion of our experience, which actively occludes everything else that continues to function normally.

Identifying these "disappeared" dynamics calls for a theory of the body, and, by extension, of place, that begins by identifying the array of dynamics likely at play. Overlooking these often-hidden dynamics confounds the move from prescription to description. An account of place-making focused upon a single dynamic (e.g., space and place, space and time, etc.) can identify how that dynamic manifests in a particular situation. Other dynamics might influence, inflect, or alter these initial assessments. Analyzing the love feast only through the lens of Place Is a Container may well focus upon how early Methodists enforced the boundaries between the included and the excluded (along with the fact of exclusion itself). Adding consideration of place and space, of stability and openness, illumines another dynamic: by enforcing strong physical and social boundaries, early Methodists created a space, an openness for women and slaves to witness to their experience of God in a way not possible elsewhere.

The movement from description to prescription becomes particularly piquant given the abiding concern of liturgical theology for the formation of worshipers. From Schmemann onward, liturgical theologians have sought to articulate an account of worship that was not simply an expression of faith (i.e., a set of stated beliefs), but in fact the crucible within which that faith took shape and within which Christian virtues might

be molded. Most recently, that concern for liturgy as moral formation has centered on the question of inclusion.

To be sure, the love feasts of early Methodism represent both radical inclusion and an ultimate failure. At a time when those who preached equality in the southern states risked physical and social harm, the love feasts provided a space set apart within which there was neither "slave nor free." As Lester Ruth has noted, these love feasts were reviled both for their willingness to exclude others and for the fact they appeared to level the ground between men and women, whites and blacks. The love feasts also proved failures, of course. White Methodists and black Methodists would largely part ways after the death of Francis Asbury in 1816. That separation was the result, at least in part, from equality and mutual affection in the love feast to remain sequestered there.

However fleeting and imperfect, the radical inclusion of the love feasts was predicated upon a willingness explicitly and obviously to exclude those who had not already begun to participate in Methodist ritual life. The interplay of inclusion and exclusion in the love feast may shed light on contemporary concerns about inclusion. Are there, in fact, implicit or hidden exclusions that make possible "diverse" and "inclusive" communities and, if so, do these exclusions belie discourses that affirm "inclusivity" and "radical hospitality?" More pointedly, I would suggest that failing to identify the subtle forms of exclusion which make "diverse" and "inclusive" spaces possible hides the often-subtle interpersonal violence which makes spaces safe for some but not others.

The nature of our embodiment—and thus of emplacement—may mean that some dynamics of place are always at play. The dynamics of inclusion, exclusion, boundary-marking, and liminality—all manifestations of the dynamic of containment—may be

more obvious at certain times than others, but the dynamics of containment are almost certainly *always* at play. Though our analyses of worshipping communities and liturgical spaces may champion inclusion of whatever variety, the creation of spaces for inclusion—whether figurative or literal—unavoidably may require boundary-marking and exclusion even when the latter do not rise to the level of conscious awareness. The question may well be not whether or not a community or a building or a liturgy excludes others, but the degree to which they are able to identify their acts of place-making and willing to admit their witting and unwitting practices of exclusion.

CONCLUSION
REMEMBERING TO FORGET

"When the shadow of the sash appeared on the curtains it was between seven and eight o' clock and then I was in time again, hearing the watch. It was Grandfather's and when Father gave it to me he said I give you the mausoleum of all hope and desire; it's rather excruciatingly apt that you will use it to gain the reducto absurdum of all human experience which can fit your individual needs no better than it fitted his or his father's. I give it to you not that you may remember time, but that you might forget it now and then for a moment and not spend all your breath trying to conquer it. Because no battle is ever won he said. They are not even fought. The field only reveals to man his own folly and despair, and victory is an illusion of philosophers and fools."

—William Faulkner, *The Sound and the Fury*

From Embodiment to Emplacement

The first chapter of this thesis introduced both the case study—the Methodist love feast from 1804—as well as the three main tasks of liturgical theology. The selection of the test case and liturgical theology aims to highlight the specific contributions of the new method for analyzing liturgical space. The love feast, especially one held out of doors, does not readily submit to the traditional methods of analyzing liturgical spaces: architectural hermeneutics and exegesis of the rites of consecration. The primary insights from this new method would, therefore, lie in understanding the relationship of words and texts to practice, divine action to human response, and worshipers to the objective content of the liturgy. These, I have argued, are the central tasks of liturgical theology.

The second chapter began by outlining some of the shifts in the larger intellectual milieu that formed early liturgical theology and theologies of place. Laying liturgical theology and theologies of place side-by-side illumined important aspects of that shared intellectual milieu: both liturgical theology and theologies of place emerged amidst a

questioning of Modern valuations of the human being and of materiality in general. Next, I examined recent theological reflection on place, looking for patterns in both the explicit argumentation and implicit structures. Doing so revealed a number of spatial pairings and metaphors that arose repeatedly: space and place, space and time, center and periphery, Place Is an Intersection, and Place Is a Container. Rather than argue for a preference of one metaphor or pairing over another as "the" definition of place, I argue that the frequency of these pairings and metaphors signal intrinsic characteristics of emplacement. These metaphors and pairings occur regularly in discussion of place precisely because they arise from a fundamental experience of embodiment and emplacement.

The next chapter turned to the phenomenology of Drew Leder and the cognitive linguistics of Mark Johnson and George Lakoff to provide a framework for understanding the *shape* of discourse about place. Leder illumines two important dynamics of embodiment and emplacement. First, the body exhibits a dynamic he describes as disappearance/dys-appearance. When functioning normally, the body calls little attention to itself. Injury or change in function, however, call significant attention to the injured or malfunctioning part. (One might have little reason to focus attention on one's shin until hitting one's shin on something hard, for example.) The dynamic of disappearance/dys-appearance helps explain why so much of recent theological reflection on place has begun by identifying a concern about contemporary socio-geographic practice: untoward changes in the social and geographic landscape create acute, focused attention on *specific aspects* of the physical environment. This, in turn, leads to an overrepresentation of certain concerns about "place" and a skewing of attention within theologies of place

toward the "broken" aspects of place rather than on the human relationship to the physical environment as a whole.

The work on conceptual metaphors by Lakoff and Johnson connected the language of place—especially spatial metaphors and pairings—to human anatomy and physiology. These spatial pairings and metaphors have their origin in the particularities of human embodiment: being creatures constantly navigating the open *spaces* between objects *in place*, contrasting the passing of time to the stability of things in space, and so forth. Lakoff and Johnson further helped explain the shape of recent reflection on place by highlighting the ability of metaphors (and pairings) to move between concrete discussions of embodiment and emplacement to other areas. Because these metaphors retain their inferential structure when they move between domains (place *always* denotes stability when paired with space, for example), scholars like Tillich can slide more or less seamlessly from using "time and space" to discuss time and space to contrasting Israelite and Canaanite religion.

Combined, Leder, Johnson, and Lakoff provide important insights into the nature of place. First, they helped explain the *shape* of discourse about place: the recurrence of spatial metaphors and pairings, the outsize influence of untoward events, and the reason why discussions using spatial language can end up not talking about the physical environment very much at all. Second, Leder, Johnson, and Lakoff link the *shape* of discourse about place to human embodiment, and thus to emplacement. Spatial pairings and metaphors no longer appear simply as rhetorical options, but clues to the dynamics of embodiment and emplacement.

The human geographer Robert Sack argues for place-making as human tool. Combining the spatial pairings and metaphors with his account of technology creates a bridge from the experience of emplacement generally to the act of place-making. Understood as a human technology, place-making employs the dynamics of place beneath the pairings and metaphors (stability and openness, movement and stability, center and periphery, etc.) to extend basic human capacities in both temporary and durable ways. The micro-sociology of Randall Collins provides a concrete example of how to think about the dynamics of place in a ritual as creating both durable and temporary effects. Further, Collins helps extend the analytic range to include not simply effects upon the non-human physical landscape (buildings, terraforming, etc.), but alterations in human beings as well.

Translated into a method for analyzing liturgical space, place-making as a technology has two key steps. First, one begins by trying to identify all of the spatial dynamics revealed by the pairings and metaphors: stability and openness, movement and stability, center and periphery, containment, intersection, as well as disappearance/dys-appearance. What architectural, social, and practical boundaries are present in the love feast? How does, for example, the formation of boundaries around a community (containment, Place Is a Container) keep out non-participants, competing symbols, or various distractions? How do those boundaries (containment) help create a literal or figurative space within (place and space)? Hence the spatial metaphors and pairings serve as a checklist for examining a place or an act of place-making. Second, identify the durable and temporary effects that these dynamics create, whether wittingly or not. As with Collins, bringing individuals together (Place Is an Intersection) with firm boundaries

(Place Is a Container) around a central symbol (center and periphery) enables participants to become emotionally charged along with their central symbol. In contrast to earlier analytic methods of place-making that would have focused primarily on buildings and similarly permanent changes to the physical landscape, this method aims to capture *ad hoc* places and the less visible (and less durable) effects they have.

The final chapter turned this lens upon the Methodist love feast with which this thesis began. One of the several liturgical elements of quarterly meetings, the love feast employs several aspects of place-making, even when held out of doors. Methodists gathered in tightly guarded circles (Place Is a Container) created spaces in which slave and free, male and female could openly share about their experience of faith (space and place). Love feasts typically required a rehearsal of one's spiritual journey as refracted through Methodist soteriology. Thus, the narrative of the community, repeated and rehearsed regularly, became a central symbol of their time together (center and periphery). At the same time, these meetings frequently took place in barns and homes and other settings not typically used for worship. In the absence of a building that could become a stable symbol of the community, the symbolic value of the community itself—including its transience—became central to these gatherings (stability and motion). The love feast represents an ideal example of a successful ritual as defined by Randall Collins: the community gathered, defended boundaries, and left having been mutually entrained and with a durable (but impermanent) sense of *esprit d'corps* and elation.

Gaining Ground

Analyses of liturgical space traditionally take one of two forms: architectural hermeneutics and exegesis of the rites of consecration. Both of these presuppose a fixed location and permanent structures. Architectural hermeneutics, after all, focuses upon the *built* environment. While rites of consecration *could* be used to set apart an area temporarily for the liturgy, typically these rites are used to hallow buildings and the interior spaces they create.

The analytic model developed here extends the reach of these traditional methods in two ways. Most obviously, the new method makes it possible to analyze *ad hoc* places: gatherings and events that employ the tools of place-making but which leave few physical markers upon the landscape. The love feast proved apt in showing how this can occur. Several of the men involved in the Baltimore love feast created concentric circles in order to create both firm boundaries against those without and an open space for those within. Such impermanent gatherings clearly "make place" despite leaving few markers upon the physical landscape. The method proposed enables such *ad hoc* places to be identified as such, thus making them susceptible to analysis.

Second, the traditional methods for analyzing liturgical space focus almost exclusively on the visual and audial aspects of liturgical spaces: the *meanings* of the architectural massing and the symbols on the walls, the *meanings* of the words spoken in consecration.[1] The method proposed here pushes beyond the visual and the audial to take into account more of the human sensorium. The micro-sociology of Randall Collins

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[1] The present thesis did not provide the space to offer an analysis of the human sensorium. By way of adumbration, the traditional methods of analyzing liturgical space—especially their focus on meaning and their emphasis upon sight and sound—give every indication of working safely on the "spiritual"/"intellectual" side of onto-valuational dualism. The present model *had* to move past these in order not to commit the error of sneaking body/soul dualism implicitly.

expands the analytic repertoire beyond sight and sound to include such phenomena as mutual entrainment and physiological arousal in general.

It bears asking whether a nearly identical analysis of the love feast could not have been performed using Randall Collins' account of ritual alone? Indeed, Collins' model *alone* could identify a number of the relevant dynamics at play in the love feast, doing so almost certainly in less spatialized language. However, there are two key contributions made by his incorporation in to the present model.

Collins' analysis would have overlooked the *absence* of a permanent liturgical space as a constitutive component of the love feast. By identifying *in advance* the dynamic of space and time, stability and movement, the new method identified the absence of a permanent liturgical space as a contributor to the power of the group *as a symbol*. In reverse, part of the power of [built] liturgical spaces may now be seen to be becoming symbols connected to the emotional energy of the liturgies they contain.

More importantly, however, Collins' microsociology is not scalable as an analysis of the physical environment. Collins here works like a "plug-in": a supplement, an amplification to the overall analytic method. The contributions of a microsociology are focused upon face-to-face encounters. The model presented here, however, can be pushed beyond the face-to-face encounters of rituals (indoors and out) to analyze neighborhoods, towns, and so forth. In those circumstances, other scholars and others analytic methods will be more aptly used as "plug-ins."

One of the key hopes of this model when deployed upon multiple scales simultaneously—the worship of a congregation *and* the neighborhood within that congregation worships—will be a better, more clear-eyed understanding of *how these*

different scales relate to one another. Helping congregations recognize the connections between the place-making of their worship and the place-making of their neighborhoods may help congregations better proclaim and embody the Gospel within their communities.

Bonnie Miller-McLemore's essay "Embodied Knowing, Embodied Theology: What Happened to the Body?" proved crucial in identifying the problem of terminological slipperiness when talking about bodies (and of places) and also of identifying a way forward.[2] In her essay, she notes that scholars seeking to counter Cartesian body/soul dualism through a foregrounding of "the body" frequently (and unwittingly) employ dualist methodologies in their analyses. One could, indeed, be talking about "the body" and yet somehow skirt reflection on anatomy and physiology, the experience of pain and pleasure, the fact of being a spatially (and temporally) finite creature. Miller-McClemore not only highlighted a potential challenge of talking about place—one could, like Tillich, be talking about "time and space" but not talking about time and space—she also suggested a way forward: look to human anatomy, physiology, and the *experience* of embodiment. In addition, therefore, to selecting the love feast as a test case for this new method of analyzing sacred space, this thesis sought to explore place and place-making through human anatomy, physiology, and the experience of embodiment and, by extension, of emplacement.

This new method aims not only to help analyze liturgical space, but to set important boundaries on how we discuss the human experience of the physical environment. Thomas Torrance debates the relative merits of applying to God one spatial

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[2] Bonnie Miller-McLemore, "Embodied Knowing, Embodied The- ology: What Happened to the Body?" *Pastoral Psychology* 62, no. 5 (2013): 743-58.

metaphor over another based upon the logical consequences of each. It is one thing to debate the aptness of spatial metaphors with regard to God. It is quite another to do so when offering descriptive assessments of the physical environment or making normative claims about how to shape places. The methodology developed here suggests that multiple spatial dynamics are at play in every act of place-making. Therefore, no single metaphor or contrastive pairing provides a definitive lens upon a place or an act of place-making. This is not to suggest that these pairings and metaphors lose any of their rhetorical power. A clear-sighted assessment of the human relationship to the physical environment, however, will require a willingness to admit the co-presence of multiple spatial dynamics at play simultaneously.

Those dynamics, moreover, may work in apparently conflicting directions. The contemporary conflation of openness and freedom ("space" in "space and place") with the absence of boundaries (Place Is a Container) may make it difficult to see or acknowledge how boundaries can create spaces of openness and freedom. Being able to identify the interrelationship of containment to openness and freedom provides two important insights onto contemporary liturgical and other communities. On the one hand, understanding that link allows us to identify some of the specific goods entailed in the maintenance of communal and ritual boundaries—doing so creates a distinct interpersonal dynamic within such boundaries that may not be otherwise obtainable. On the other hand, understanding this link may help us identify the subtle boundaries that surround groups and activities that enable greater freedom and openness.[3] By identifying in advance a range of possible spatial dynamics at play, this methodology seeks to bring

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[3] I am here thinking in particular of those communities whose discourse champions inclusion, but whose discursive practices are strongly policed and require constant learning by members.

greater analytic clarity to situations in which those dynamics may be subtle or working well enough to "disappear."

This methodology offers further insight into the relationship between discourse and practice. Craig Bartholomew has argued that the contemporary crisis of place is the result of having overemphasized abstract space over concrete, particular places. One could read Bartholomew as arguing that if you "get the wording right," right perception and action will follow. Bartholomew would not be alone in this sentiment—the debates about the most appropriate metaphor for place often come bundled with a similar assumption about the primacy of language over perception and action. The ability of the body (and of well-functioning place) to disappear suggests that discourse about emplacement and the perception of place (and work of place-making) are less firmly connected than Bartholomew suggests.

Many places are *made* to disappear from our conscious awareness. Indeed, this is a concern raised by Marc Augé, Edward Relph, and Robert Sack.[4] The contemporary ability to shape the physical and sensory landscape enables architects and engineers to create places that barely impinge upon human consciousness. The method developed here would regard such places not as mal-functioning but as in fact performing their intended purpose. Distaste for such places and the wider phenomenon of creating "placeless" spaces does not negate the fact that disappearance itself is both a dynamic of place and a tool of place-making. If one disagrees with the making of "placeless" spaces or the spread of relatively uniform architectural communities (such as residential subdivisions),

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[4] Marc Augé, *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity* (New York: Verso, 1995); Edward Relph, *Place and Placelessness* (London: Pion, 1976); and Robert D. Sack, *Homo Geographicus: A Framework for Action, Awareness, and Moral Concern* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

the solution is not a new vocabulary, but participation in the decision-making processes that decide upon future purposes, then decide how to the employ the various spatial dynamics to bring about the desired durable and temporary effects.. The deliberation about desired effects and the best use of spatial dynamics toward that end are perhaps the most important roles of discourse as it relates to practice: not the shaping of perception, but in the forming of plans to shape places toward particular outcomes, some of them durable, some of them temporary.

Next Steps

Having argued that place-making is a human technology, a more fulsome account of place-making will require an equally robust account of technology. An early task in this effort will focus upon qualitative differences in technologies. To the extent that we are willing to identify both the hammer and the corporation as technologies, we have to be able to parse the qualitative differences between manual technologies (such as hammers) and technologies of complex social arrangements (like corporations). Perhaps more importantly for present purposes, insofar as we are willing to identify both the love feast and the maintenance and defense of nations as technologies of place-making, then a new model will need to be developed with distinguishes between those scales of place-making in which all [living] participants are present to one another (the love feast) and those where place is developed and maintained across broad geographic areas rather than in physically proximate settings. The model proposed here for analyzing the role of the physical environment in the liturgy employs a micro-sociology and presupposes worshipers in physical proximity to one another. Doing so will enable a richer account of

place if indeed the place-making required for face-to-face rituals (Collins'

microsociology) differs qualitatively from the place-making required to create and

maintain places such as cities and nations. Indeed, such a multi-scalar account of place-

making may serve as a means of speaking to different kinds of discipleship, one attuned

to face-to-face encounters, another when dealing with technologies at a larger scale, what

we might call "the powers and principalities."

Before We Depart

Two things bear note at the very end. The first is that the goal of this analysis is

not to discipline the day-to-day speech of liturgical scholars, or even to call attention to

the dynamics constantly at play. The solution to the contemporary "crisis of place" will

not be a better vocabulary during the day, but better practices guided by more thorough

planning at the outset. Put differently, the purpose is not to be constantly remembering

place and thinking of it analytically, but to be intentional in its building and shaping so

that, later, we can forget it now and then and not spend all our breath trying to "get it

right." This side of Jordan, I am unclear that our place-making can be perfected. With a

nod to Kevin Irwin, perhaps the goal should be to work toward the most apt places and

the least inadequate practices of place-making.

As hinted at in the epigraph to the introduction, one of the underlying

presuppositions to this thesis is the resurrection of the body as a central to the Christian

kerygma. It is my hope that the account of embodiment and emplacement offered here

provides contemporary Christians an account of the body, worship, and Christian practice

that comports with a theological vision that regards the whole human being as worthy of

being raised up on the last day.

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